Immanuel Ness
Zak Cope

Editors

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism

Second Edition

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and Anti-Imperialism

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With 36 Figures and 33 Tables

Editors
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Preface

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism presents prominent themes, epochal events, theoretical explanations, and historical accounts of imperialism from the beginnings of modernity and the capitalist world system in the sixteenth century to the present day. Important scientific and scholarly interpretations of imperialism have in the last 20 years reshaped the way intellectuals analyze and map human history. The present work takes these innovations a step further, offering a body of comparative research that both challenges and enhances our understanding of the world we live in.

Starting from a shared commitment to internationalism and social justice, we have taken care to include entries that elucidate the historical and contemporary centrality of imperialism to all aspects of society. In doing so, we have attempted to present imperialism from a range of perspectives. As such, we do not agree with all of the interpretations or conclusions reached by all of the authors whose work appears herein. Indeed, we differ profoundly with some of the assertions made, the most questionable of which tend to reflect typical ideological prejudices of imperialist society. Nonetheless, we believe that a glaring inattention to the transfiguring effects of imperialism on the political structures, economic institutions, cultures, and psychologies of both imperialist and oppressed nations can be found across the political spectrum. We consider this oversight a major obstacle to the understanding and progressive transformation of society and hope that this encyclopedia contributes to its overcoming.

While post-colonial studies have from the 1970s onward described the perseverance of forms of cultural domination, clearly an important marker of imperialist influence, critical geopolitical and economic analysis is absent in much of the research. At the same time, whereas formal imperialism has largely been abandoned (though not completely, as the examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine show), free-market globalization has stimulated a new era of neo-colonial imperialism, reinforcing divisions in wealth within nations and across borders. Given a renewed popular and academic interest in the subject, attendant to its increasingly obvious real-world import, a comprehensive collection on imperialism is an invaluable resource to scholars and students of the humanities and the social sciences. Yet, whereas imperialism is an indispensable element of contemporary political analysis and scholarly investigation, a primary academic reference work on the subject has up to now been sorely lacking. As well as its academic relevance, imperialism is of profound concern to anyone interested in international history, politics,

sociology, and economics. The *Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism* was conceived and designed to fill this gap for scholars and students across academic disciplines and beyond the confines of the university.

In its broadest definition, imperialism is the military, political, legal, and/or economic control of one people's territory by another so that the subject territory is made to relinquish resources, labor, and produce for little or no compensation. Almost all societies have been subject to various forms of imperialism at one time or another, transforming their established political order and socioeconomic activities, prohibiting old customs and imposing new ones, dislocating inhabitants from their communities, and, in some instances, settling and occupying territories afresh. In the process, imperialism has imposed national, racial, ethnic, and class domination on disparate populations. This work examines how imperialism has impacted societies in the Third World, (i.e., the former colonies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean) as well as how it has shaped social relations and popular perceptions in the First-World countries of Europe, North America, and Japan. It describes imperialism's shifting mechanisms of international wealth transfer and reveals how super-profits derived from superexploitation, accumulation by dispossession, and debt usury (none of which can treated in isolation from the others) have come to form the very taproot of the global profit system.

"Imperialism" is a term that is politically charged. For some, it signifies the glory of empire, the march of progress, and the triumph of civilization. In recent years, there has been a dramatic surge in pro-imperial discourse, epitomized in Britain by the work of scholars and commentators such as Niall Ferguson, Robert Kaplan, Andrew Roberts, William Dalrymple, Daniel Kruger, Keith Windschuttle, and Dennis Prager. In the 1990s, US political scientist Samuel Huntington famously decried the inherent barbarism of all non-Western cultures in his *The Clash of Civilizations* and found an eager mainstream audience in the context of the so-called War on Terror and the discourse of "humanitarian interventionism." Meanwhile, the state and corporate media monopolies dominating public discourse around the world present phenomena associated with ongoing imperialist machinations and processes in a consistently and universally benign light, except where a rival might be held culpable.

This volume does not attempt any exhaustive account of the human toll of imperialism, which would require dozens of thick volumes to cover the spectrum in any detail. It is important to state, however, that the development and maintenance of industrial capitalism was made possible, inter alia, by the plunder of Indian gold and silver from the Americas; by the wholesale theft of Indian land by force of arms and the resultant 50–100 million deaths from war, overwork, overcrowding, economic ruin, starvation, malnourishment, and related diseases; by the slave trade (1500–1869), which resulted in the deaths of perhaps 20 million Africans; by the loss of up to 100 million Africans from their homeland and hundreds of years of agonizing toil, wanton mistreatment, and early death for them; by the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland between 1649 and 1650 that resulted in approximately 618,000 deaths as well as the colonial exploitation that led to the Great Famine of 1845–52 resulting in

1 million deaths and 1 million emigrants; by Britain's plunder of India that resulted in about 29 million deaths from famine between 1877 and 1902; by Belgium's colonization of the Congo, which, between 1880 and 1920, resulted in at least 10 million deaths through starvation and slaughter; by Japan's colonial wars leading to perhaps 30 million deaths; by the killing of half-a-million Iraqi children under 5 years of age who died between 1991 and 1998 from sanctions imposed by the USA and UK; and by investors' ongoing dispossession of the land of the world's poorest peoples, which results in needless hunger, preventable disease, and curable disease leading to the unnecessary deaths of 100 million children every decade.

Added to these figures must be those deaths occurred during the First World War (37 million) and Second World War (at least 50 million), wars instigated by imperialist rivals as a means of each securing preferential trade agreements, tariff barriers, trade routes, protected markets for investments and manufactures, and sources of raw materials. Leaving aside excess deaths caused by economic dependence on foreign monopolies, we may also consider imperialism as responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of people in interventions by the major imperialist powers (the USA, especially) all over the Third World since 1945.

In light of the above, we believe that it is impossible to properly understand imperialism without reference to the struggle against it. Anti-imperialism took shape in the West with mass opposition and national liberation struggle leading to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian Empires following the First World War. Its appeal grew considerably with the impact of the Russian and Chinese revolutions and the subsequent erosion of the British and French empires in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the English-speaking metropoles, the struggles of Black Americans and Irish, as well as the struggles of the Palestinians in the 1960s and 1970s, popularized anti-imperialist resistance still further. With the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the imposition of neoliberal regimes everywhere, the struggle between East and West has shifted primarily to that between North and South, exposing the abject divisions of income and opportunity within the world system. We present here a range of biographies and movement studies that exemplify the rich and ongoing tradition of national liberation theories and practices.

By highlighting the centrality of imperialism to present and historical social realities, this encyclopedia provides a multifaceted corrective to the myopic (inter)nationalism espoused in the global North by both the political right and its ostensible foes on the left. Undoubtedly, the class interests of the labor aristocracy have been reflected in the analyses and propaganda of the European and North American left for which imperialism is too often understood either as a historical or cultural throwback or as benefiting only (some) capitalists or a narrow upper stratum of workers in specific sectors of the economy. Under capitalism, however, the privileges of the metropolitan workforce relative to the proletariat proper (exploited, value-creating wage-earners) are afforded only by imperialism and can, therefore, only be maintained or extended by the same means. Ultimately, this ensures that the pursuit of short-term economic advancement by what is thus constituted as a mass labor

aristocracy must entail open or tacit compromise with capital. Those within the upper echelons of the global working class who aim to determine their destiny free of capitalist diktat must advocate the abolition of global wage scaling, the sine qua non of imperialism, even in the certain knowledge that this will mean a lengthy and considerable reduction in their compatriots' purchasing power.

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism provides a comprehensive examination and overview of its subject, covering many of the most significant social, cultural, political, and economic aspects of the imperialist project. Entries chronicle the ways in which imperialist domination has unfolded, tracing its roots, goals, tactics, influence, and outcomes over time and space. We have not, unfortunately, been able to include all of the biographies that we would have liked to (e.g., of such anti-imperialists as Jose Maria Sison, Bhagat Singh, George Habash, Hassan Nasrallah, Gerry Adams, Michael Collins, Sitting Bull, Robert Mugabe, Daniel Ortega, Muammar Gadaffi, Rajani Palme Dutt, Lin Biao, Enver Hoxha, Abimael Guzmán, Charu Majumdar, and Subhas Chandra Bose, among others), or entries on all subjects relating to imperialism. We encourage readers to use this resource as a spur for further investigation. Nonetheless, we are confident that *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism* is the most comprehensive scholarly examination of the subject to date.

We hope you enjoy reading it as much as we enjoyed editing it.

New York, USA   Immanuel Ness
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A

1970s

1983 Invasion

2011 War

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Abd-el-Krim al-Khattabi (1882–1963)

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Abd al-Karim al-Chattabi; Abdu l-Karīm al-Ḫaṭṭābī; Mohammed Abd al-Karim; Moulay Muḥend; Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi

Introduction

Mohammed Abd-el-Krim Al-Khattabi became an icon throughout the world for initiating extensively organized resistance initially against the Spanish and then the French imperial powers in the Rif region of northern Morocco during the years 1921–1926, the first country founded after a successful war of decolonization. Unlike most uprisings, achieving independence was not the trigger for his struggle: Abd-el-Krim did not turn resistance fighter against imperialism defined as a means of achieving greater economic progress but rather against exploitation and injustice. Abd-el-Krim was a Rifi, an ethnic group within the region's larger Berber community, with Tamazight being the native language of the Rifis. Until then, neither of the two powers had ever encountered a firmly united opponent that was astonishingly well organized both politically and militarily. His ability to manage to unify numerous independent tribal leaders or a fragmented society, marked by adherence to different paths (*tareeqah*) of Sufism (Islamic spiritual sciences) if not blood feuds, for the purpose of setting up a sizeable army, is what makes Abd-el-Krim so unique and the ensuing success of the Rifis unprecedented. His leadership skills, family background, him being a charismatic speaker and

judge on Islamic jurisprudence, and farsighted dedication for economic progress were certainly determining factors to attain allegiance. Another factor that makes Abd-el-Krim unparalleled is his successful implementation of socioeconomic reforms based upon *Sharia*, the Islamic law, and its execution through increased numbers of judges and courts (El-Asrouti 2007, p. 103). He forbade the traditional self-administered justice by appointing a Muslim judge (*qadi*) – accompanied by two legal officials (*'udul*) – for each clan. Until then, the Rifis adhered to common law (*urf*), which in most instances was contradicting – in particular concerning the rights of women – the Quranic law (El-Asrouti 2007, p. 99). In line with his policy to improve the role of women, his wife endeavored to open a girls' school (Pennell 1987, p. 113). In an interview with a journalist of the *Chicago Tribune*, Abd-el-Krim called upon experts ao to help in establishing a school system in the Rif (Sasse 2006, p. 311). He had also plans to establish a university combining traditional and modern sciences (Pennell 1986, p. 149).

Abd-el-Krim surprised most of European and American visitors who met him: Contrary to expectations he was relatively small, slightly plump, and calm. He was always dressed in traditional clothes and wore a turban, and his office was in a rather small clay building. He is described as being down-to-earth, intelligent, energetic, and a man of practical thinking. Western journalists interviewing him invariably express their amazement about his sharp mind and his knowledge about the international political affairs. As a devout Muslim, Abd-el-Krim was driven by the fundamental tenet of Islam. He publicly protested against claims of the French media that he intends to conquer Fes and become sultan of Morocco or become a khalif. He assured that his aim was to defend independency of the Rif and to achieve its recognition by other nations (Bode 1926, p. 18). Abd-el-Krim also emphasized repeatedly that the Riffian tribesmen, who supported him against the Spanish, were driven by fear of losing tribal independence and religious custom and not by nationalism (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 11). Thus, when he raised the issue of

freedom, most tribes were on his side (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 11).

Abd-el-Krim was driven by an unshakeable will to fight for a cause: Despite the overwhelming imbalance of power stages against him, there is no question that Abd-el-Krim had any doubts of winning the war against the united armies of Spanish and French colonial powers equipped with the latest war technology. Despite the dead-end situation of his army vis-à-vis a powerful European army, he still believed strongly that he would have triumphed had his policies been carried out and the *Sharia* been imposed correctly (Pennell 1986, p. 231). In a propaganda speech given, he said "…if you join us, we will be as one. We will defeat the Christians with your help or without it…" (Pennell 1986, p. 83). Abd-el-Krim's life and his military achievements are briefly summarized in the following.

Abd-el-Krim's Biography

Abd-el-Krim grew up in Spanish Morocco, a situation that had been long endorsed by the Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz and the members of his family whose lifestyle, let alone their political or financial leadership skills, left much to be desired. It was a relatively war-torn environment, the causes of which ranged from claims to the throne in Morocco to blood feuds between families or tribes. For this reason, Abd-el-Krim mentions in his memoirs that he was used to war and to the smell of gun powder since early childhood (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 41). Abd-el-Krim's family, briefly referred to as Khattabis here, was from the clan *Ait Hattab* in the Rif, with the most numerous and powerful tribe *Ait Waryiġel* under its auspices. Research to date failed to link the line of ancestry of Khattabis to *Ait Waryiġel*, but there seems to be unanimity among researchers that the Khattabis settled and ruled in the region of the *Ait Waryiġel* clan, for more than, as put by Abd-el-Krim (1927, p. 39) a 1000 years. Abd-el-Krim claims in his memoires that his ancestry originated from the Arabian peninsula and that they had a *sharifian* lineage, i.e., descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

Abd-el-Krim's father was a *qadi* and governor, as was his grandfather and his mother was the daughter of a *qadi* (Bode 1926, p. 18). Thus his family enjoyed a good reputation and was influential throughout the region (Abd-el-Krim 1927, pp. 10–11). Abd-el-Krim and his brother, Si M'hammed (1893–1967) – who would later play a significant role in Abd-el-Krim's successes – pursued Islamic studies from a very young age, their first teachers being their father and their uncle (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 39). At the very beginnings of the twentieth century, at the age of 20, Abd-el-Krim moved to Fes and studied for 2 years at the *madrasas* Al-Attarin and Saffarin in order to fulfill the entry requirements for the renowned University of al-Qarawiyin in Fes, which includes – apart from Arabic language and grammar – memorization of the Quran in full as well as few other texts on Islamic jurisprudence. At the University of al-Qarawiyyin, Abd-el-Krim (then aged 22) begun to advance his Quranic studies. Si M'hammed, in turn, became a qualified mining engineer in Spain (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 10).

Between 1906/1907 and 1913, Abd-el-Krim taught at a school set up by the Spanish while simultaneously writing columns for the Arabic supplement of the Spanish daily newspaper *Telegrama del Rif* up until 1915. In 1909 and still during the process of his postgraduate studies of Islamic and Spanish law to become an Islamic judge – which he accomplished with an excellent qualification in 1912 at the age of 30 – Abd-el-Krim worked as a Spanish translator and advisor for the *Oficina de Asuntos Indigenas*, Department of Native Affairs, which was set up for greater citizen oversight and, as Abd-el-Krim would later discover, to submit the population. He translated for diverse mining companies, which inevitably informed him about economic exploitation plans of the colonizers. In 1910 Abd-el-Krim was appointed by the same department as *qadi* for the Melilla region and in 1914 as supreme judge. As a judge, Abd-el-Krim's work had mainly to do with the organization of the protectorate, such as the legal aspects of rights and title deeds to the iron deposits of Beni Tuzin, which bordered on his own tribal area.

Initially, thus both father and son were loyal to the Spanish. For this loyalty the Khattabis are taunted by researchers in the field: Fleming (1991), e.g., notes that "Abd-el-Krim and his father also helped organize a Spanish faction in their home kabyle. For this act, the elder Abd-el-Krim was awarded the Cross of Military Merit and an annual pension of fifty pesetas, while the younger was named qadi al qudat, or chief Islamic judge of the Melillan region" (p. 61). Abd-el-Krim justified this loyalty with the belief that the Spanish would bring economic progress and that without any foreign involvement this would not be possible. In fact, among several other economic deficiencies in the region, a major hindrance to development was poor infrastructure. Due to its geographical location and surrounding mountain ranges, the region was relatively isolated from the rest of the country. Hence, the Rif was relatively poor vis-à-vis the rest of the country, a phenomenon known as "Mezzogiorno effect." Terhorst (1925), a German diplomat and eyewitness of those times, describes the Rif region as follows: "2,000 meter high, gloomy, coarse and steep mountain chain extends along the North African Mediterranean coast between Melilla and Ceuta. The veil of the unexplored stretches mysteriously over this stage-like mountain world. The Rif is still a mystery, has still something dark, unknown to the European. Two Englishmen tried to move deeper into the mountains; but no one ever heard anything from them. Apparently a Frenchmen has managed to cross the Rif in 1600" (p. 154). Yet another reason for their loyalty to the Spanish was the idea of using the Spanish as a shield against the French colonial powers. The Khattabis were ardent opponents of any French involvement in the region. The sultan had signed the Act of the Conference of Algeciras on 7 April 1906, which had entitled also the French to establish a protectorate over Morocco. Since 1912 France maintained a troop of around 75,000 men in Morocco. These were divided into two groups, one into east and the other into west, and each was under the command of a division general. Two-thirds of the regular army consisted of African nationals including Moroccan (Bode 1926, p. 19). Later during the resistance, a

significant number of indigenous legionnaires both from the Spanish and French protectorate armies would change sides: In July 1921, for instance, nearly 5,000 were recorded to have deserted (Sasse 2006, p. 100).

The loyalty of the Khattabis changed in 1914 when the Spanish gradually began to advance into *Beni Urriaguel*. Abd-el-Krim and his family began to experience unfair practices inflicted on the locals directly. The French, who had gained control over the heartland of Morocco, were equally not in an amicable relationship with the local population. The Spanish authorities began to cut the incomes of the tribal leaders, including the father of Abd-el-Krim, and instead were paying bribes to tribesmen whom they expected to help in their efforts to expand into the Central Rif more readily. Abd-el-Krim started taking action by criticizing such corrupt practices as well as colonialism as a driver for economic progress, first through his job as journalist (Ayache 1981, p. 182). In 1915, when questioned by his employer, Abd-el-Krim told that both he and his father were supporters of the Young Turks and were working for the revolt of Islam against the Allies, particularly the French. Moreover, he candidly stated that any Spanish interference in these schemes would prove to be a fatal error (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 44; Ayache 1981, p. 217). For saying this, Abd-el-Krim was imprisoned on 6 September 1915, by the Spanish for almost 1 year. On 23 December 1915, Abd-el-Krim attempted to escape with a rope far too short at the other end but failed after breaking his leg, which would leave him slightly limping for the rest of his life. He was eventually released in return for his father's support for the landing of the Spanish at the Bay of Al Hoceima (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 46).

The uneasy relationship finally came to an end in 1918 when the Spanish continued to subjugate more tribes. Dissent among the population was exacerbated by a bad harvest, which was further complicating the already prevalent poor economic conditions (Pennell 1986, p. 65). Abd-el-Krim's father began to initiate an organized resistance (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 41 and 55). In order to strengthen unity among the tribes and to put an end to blood feuds, monetary fines charged for murder (*haqq*) – which had been abolished by the Spanish – were reintroduced and extended to apply to collaborators as well. The Rifis felt the reward of unity when they foiled a major attack led by General Manuel Fernández Silvestre (1871 Cuba – 1921 Annual, Rif) from the sea. Nevertheless, the general still managed to enter by using a different route later on. Confronted by the imminent threat of Spanish invasion, Abd-el-Krim's father started a campaign but died unexpectedly in August 1919. There were speculations that his father's death was due to a poison administered by the Spanish (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 57). With his death, the troop (*harakah*) disintegrated so that the Spanish could proceed with their plans for invasion without any resistance up until the beginning of 1921. Along these developments Abd-el-Krim, together with his brother, continued the campaign to form an inter-tribal alliance. Abd-el-Krim realized that Islamic concept of unity was the main peacemaking element which could help the Riffians find supratribal consciousness and identity (Pennell 1986, p. 238). He maintained a tolerant disposition toward tribal leaders with different ideologies and would endorse the legitimacy of their statuses among their respective tribes as long as they agreed to accept him as a leader. Soon, the brothers' endeavors bore fruit. Abd-el-Krim, being a charismatic leader and an impressive preacher, recorded more success than his father or any other Berber rebel leaders ever managed to achieve: In April 1921, at the age of 39, Abd-el-Krim was elected by 50 *Sheikhs* as their military leader. Political as well as religious decisions equally fell within the scope of Abd-el-Krim's duty. An oath of allegiance, consisting of one page, was designed according to a traditional homage document. It expressed that the signatories are committed to him with their hearts and tongues, that they compliantly obey him with their heads and rush to him with their feet, and that they will not be disobedient to him, and that they will not stray from the joint path of the community. The document ends with the sentence: "We pay

homage to you, we recognize you as the Head, and entrust you to guide us with justice, kindness and truthfulness and to judge between us justly" (El-Asrouti 2007, p. 79). In the oath Abd-el-Krim is addressed as khalif although Abd-el-Krim repeatedly denied that he aspired the status of the khalif.

Soon after his election, Abd-el-Krim managed to unite the various independent and quarrelsome tribes in the Rif to the point where he could field an army of some 65,000 men (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 94; Hart 1976, p. 388). Abd-el-Krim's efforts of unification also involved cooperation with other rebel leaders. One of the most troublesome for the imperialist powers was El Raisuli (1871–1925). Immediately before Abd-el-Krim's revolt, Raisuli had for some years led an ardent resistance against the colonial powers in the Jibala region (western zone of the Rif occupied by Spain). Raisuli's war tactics entailed piracy, in particular maritime. Raisuli refused Abd- el-Krim's invitation to join him. He was captured in 1925 and imprisoned (Furneaux 1967, p. 133). Eventually he died in captivity as a prisoner of Abd-el-Krim in 1925.

Despite the lack of support from other rebel leaders, Abd-el-Krim recorded two victories on a single day and proved that the oath was well-deserved: In a surprise attack on 2 June 1921 launched on Dhar Ubarran, about 600 Spanish soldiers were killed. Similarly, General Silvestre's troops ended with a defeat in Sidi Idris (Pennell 1986, p. 81). These victories encouraged more and more men to join Abd-el-Krim's troops. The success of the Rifis in the ensuing Battle of Annual on July 17, which lasted for 5 days, was unprecedented in the history of any battle of this kind. One of the participating soldiers, Chaaib Si-Mohand N'aali, reports in a documentary: "Abd-el-Krim was our leader. We encircled the Spanish troops. They resisted. But they were afraid and exhausted. We wiped them out." There are significant discrepancies in the literature concerning the number of troops on both sides: The estimated numbers for the Spanish troops range between 25,000 and 30,000 (Hart 1976, p. 374) and for the Rifis 3000 (El-Asrouti 2007; p. 61, 92, 95). Woolman (1968, p. 149) considers

in addition to the regular also the local army and estimates the total number of the Rifi Army to have been around 80,000. The Spanish death toll is estimated to have been between 8,000 and 10,000 (Sasse 2006, p. 40; El-Asrouti 2007, p. 61). Other historians set the death toll higher, at up to between 13,000 and 19,000 fatalities including captives (Hart 1976, p. 374). Out of panic and fear, not least induced by General Silvestre's decision to retreat the very next day, many Spanish soldiers fled the battlefield. The general eventually lost his life in this battle. Large amounts of war booty had fallen into the hands of Rifis. About 700 Spanish solders were captured, which were kept for a ransom. Abd-el-Krim warned from the start to impose death sentences upon those who abused or tortured prisoners of war or mutilated dead bodies (Pennell 1986, p. 81). In his memoires Abd-el-Krim states that the death toll of his enemies would have reached hardly conceivable dimensions had he not done this (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 72). For the Rifis the defeat of their opponents was an "absolute miracle" – as Krim's brother had called it: Abd-el-Krim ordered that *Quranic* verses be recited and prayers of thanks performed for the attained and the upcoming victory over the Spanish (Pennell 1986, p. 168). The colonial forces, in turn, dubbed the clash as "the Disaster of Annual." The reconquest of the areas lost in the past continued, and the Rif Republic was proclaimed on 1 February 1923. The humiliating failure of the Spanish military contributed to the instability of the Spanish government, and on 13 September 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870–1930) assumed absolute powers as a dictator following a coup d'état.

Bode, a German author, summarizes his impressions in his book on Abd-el-Krim published in 1926 on how the Muslim world felt about the Rif resistance, namely, that not Mustafa Kemal Paşa but Abd-el-Krim became the champion of Islam (Bode 1926, p. 55). Abd-el-Krim received innumerable financial supporters and collaborators – including Turks and Germans – for his cause. Large amounts of monies were collected in Madras, Delhi, Kalkutta, Syria, and

Lebanon to help "Muslims in Morocco" (Bode 1926, p. 24, p. 55). Abd-el-Krim sent letters – through journalists or envoys – to heads of states across the world asking for acceptance of his newly founded country. Abd-el-Krim also had plans to abandon the Spanish currency and introduce own currency, namely, "Riffan," for the Rif instead. Through one of his European collaborateurs, namely, Captain Charles A. P. Gardiner, an English arms smuggler and speculator, the notes were printed in England on the 10 October 1923, but these were disposed off into the sea after Abd-el-Krim refused to pay the excessive price Gardiner was asking (Sasse 2006, p. 178 and 304).

In July 1924, the Spanish experienced another crushing defeat in Chaouen. As in 1921, this was also a surprise attack where the Spanish had to give up one post after another. Concerning the death toll on both sides during this clash, there are significant disparities in the literature, too. The Spanish, according to one source, lost about 10,000 soldiers (Pennell 1986, p. 176).

But the tide began to turn. Since the beginning of 1924, the Rifis were observing problems initiated now by the French colonial powers: The Ouergha Valley, one of the most fertile regions of the Rif, was an important source of supply for agricultural produce to Rifis, and it began to be of interest to the French, too. Under the excuse of rearrangement of plot boundaries, the French began to build blockhouses and military posts around the valley. Food was already short due to embargos, and Abd-el-Krim forbade food exports and threatened any infringement with hard penalties. There was another reason for food shortage, notably contaminated soil: the Spanish had resorted to using the acutely poisonous chemical warfare agent S-Lost (Yperite) or mustard gas by aerochemical method for the first time in history starting in 1921 and on a large scale in 1924 in the Rif (Kunz and Müller 1990, p. 175). The poison was sourced from Germany and produced in Spain under the supervision of the German chemist Hugo G. A. Stoltzenberg (1883–1974). No one was spared from this atrocity: Not only were the guerilla fighters their target but also villages and water resources. The Ouergha Valley was largely spared from this contamination.

Under pressure from his people to take action, Abd-el-Krim decided to attack the French. With this decision, as he later admitted, he made the greatest strategic mistake since he took up the leadership of the resistance: He had not foreseen that the two competing imperial powers would eventually unite their manpower and resources against the Rifi resistance. Initially the French, as the Spanish had earlier, were recording significant losses. Out of desperation and the fear of losing even Fes, the French General Lyautey (1854–1934) saw no other solution than a joint operation with the Spanish to defeat the Rifis. Now the Spanish with 200,000 and the French with 160,000 men supported with the latest war technology were confronting the Rifi troops, consisting of about 60,000–80,000 men (Sasse 2006, p. 51). Pröbster (1925) makes the following statement concerning the number of troops on each side: "On the 9th July 1925 the French decided to increase the number of their troops to 150,000. The Spanish army consisted of about 100,000 Soldiers. In contrast, the number of the Rifis were at most 40,000–50,000. The aim of the Franco-Spanish army consisting of a quarter million men was to destroy the Rif republic founded by Abd-el-Krim" (p. 154). With regard to the number of Rifi troops, Pröbster (1925) adds: "Marshal Pétain estimates this figure to be between 30,000 and 40,000" (p. 158). The number of dead and missing French soldiers between April 1925 and May 1926 was 2,162 (Sasse 2006, p. 56). The territories lost were gradually reconquered, and on 26 May 1926, *Mulay Muhend*, the lion of the Rif, as Abd-el-Krim is remembered by the Rifis, was forced to surrender to the French forces. After being imprisoned for 2 months in Fes, Abd-el-Krim was exiled on the 28 August 1926 together with his two wives and children, his brother, his uncle, and their families – altogether 30 people (Malbert 2016) – to the French island La Réunion, located in the east of

Madagascar. The family lived at several accommodations including Chateau Morange – an impressive colonial castle – and then Castel Fleuri. The Réunionese felt proud having Emir Abd-el-Krim's arrival, and soon the Riffians made friendship – despite initial reservations of the authorities – with some members of the Indo-Muslim community of about 1,500 Gujaratis from India (Malbert 2016). Abd-el-Krim remained discrete, would meet only few families, and had good relationship with the governor. The authorities would appoint Ismail Dindar, a tailor, to cater for the families' traditional clothing and *halal* food requirements (Malbert 2016). Dindar eventually became Abd-el-Krim's best friend. One year before leaving Réunion (in 1946), Abd-el-Krim befriended Raymond Vergès, the leader of the Réunion Communist Party (Malbert 2016). He used to spend his time teaching Arabic and Quran, which he knew by heart, to the children in the family and the children of Dindar, and from 1937 onward – as by then surveillance of the family was reduced – also discovering the island and hunting. The family would grow sugar cane, mango, litchi, and guava in their garden and geranium on a large plot of land they had acquired. The family was granted a pension and would complement their income by selling geranium oil in their shop in Saint-Denis (Malbert 2016). In an interview conducted in 2013 Abd-el-Krim's daughter Meryem el-Khattabi (1939–2017) noted that her father used to say to his children that the island was a kind of "Kindergarten managed by the French."

In 1947 a decision was made to relocate Abd-el-Krim and his family of about 41 (some sources state 52) people to Southern France. The Greek ship "SS Katoomba" was hired for this purpose. However, during the transfer, Abd-el-Krim and his family managed to escape in Egypt. Abd-el-Krim's escape was planned and orchestrated by his admirers: On 23 May 1947, Mohamed Ali Eltaher, the president of the Palestinian Committee in Egypt, received a telegram from Abdo Hussein Eladhal, briefly informing that the ship with Abd-el-Krim on board had left the harbor of Aden

on the 23 May. On 27 May, Eltaher informed King Farouk (1920–1965) of Egypt, via a telegram, about Abd-el-Krim's arrival at the Suez Canal and asked for his support in freeing him, as the ship once in Egyptian waters would lose authority from France. On 30 May at Suez harbor, Abd-el-Krim was visited in the night by Eltaher accompanied by few other men from the Arab Maghreb Bureau and the king's representatives to discuss the escape plan and the king's proposal of an asylum in Egypt. Abd-el-Krim showed no reservations but said that he would also consult the matter with his family and come up with a final decision once in Port Said after the ship had passed the Suez Canal. In Port Said, Abd-el-Krim endorsed his acceptance and left the ship with his family pretending to visit the city.

Abd-el-Krim lived henceforth in Cairo. In January, 1948, he announced the formation of the National Liberation Committee of North Africans – supporting the liberation of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia – and presided over it until his death in 1963. His daughter Meryem el-Khattabi stated in an interview in 2013 that Abd-el-Krim would send fighters on a mission (*Fidayins*) for the armed struggle. As during his struggle in the Rif, he was counting on support from Germany to arm Algerian rebels. Abd-el-Krim's influence seems to have gone beyond the Maghreb countries, as there are claims that, for instance, Ho Chi Minh and Abd-el-Krim had cooperated during the war in Vietnam against the imperial powers: Minh asked Abd-el-Krim for support upon which the latter persuaded the Maghreb soldiers fighting in Indochina on the side of the French to change fronts (Sneevliet 1942, footnote 2). Similarly, when consulted as to which course of action to take upon the imminent creation of Israel, Abd-el-Krim replied: "Don't worry, do nothing. We cannot win that war for two reasons: We will either be defeated by the little Jewish state, and we will become a laughing-stock across the world; or we will win, and we will have the whole world against us. So what to do? Let the Jews colonize the Palestinians. We will be dealing with a classic colonial

situation, and the Palestinians will liberate themselves, as Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians will one day liberate themselves" (Barrada and Sitbon 2004, p. 98). There is also evidence that Che had met Abd-el-Krim twice in 1959 in the Moroccan embassy in Cairo (Er 2015). In 1958, 2 years after Morocco became independent, the King of Morocco, Mohammed V, declared Abd-el-Krim as a national hero, ordered the release of all his confiscated properties in Ajdir, and invited him during a personal visit in Cairo in 1960 to return to the Rif. Abd-el-Krim refused this invitation, stating that the country had not become fully independent (Woolman 1968, pp. 227–229).

Publications on Abd-el-Krim and His Struggle

Abd-el-Krim's resistance made headlines throughout the world right from the beginning. The continual media coverage on the Rif War is certainly associated with the impact of the amazement with which the world had followed the relative success of the Rifis against the technologically far better equipped imperial powers. It should therefore come as no surprise that his failure and capture was covered in newspapers under praiseworthy and eulogistic headings such as "Like Prometheus Chained to a Rock," (San Francisco Chronicle, 24 October 1926). Abd-el-Krim's biography – based upon a relatively short interview – was published very soon after his capture. A French journalist had a rare chance to conduct an interview with him as soon as he was captured and published it in the form of a biography in 1927. The interview was conducted in French, and as Abd-el-Krim could not speak French, his brother acted as translator. Given the worldwide reputation of Abd-el-Krim, the rather short book was circulated widely. Its German translation came out in the very same year. The Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong is said to have held a copy of it and that he expressed his admiration for Abd-el-Krim's leadership by telling a Palestinian delegation of Fatah in 1971 the following: "You have come to me to hear me speaking about a people's liberations war, but in your

own recent history you have Abd-el-Krim. He is of one the most important inspiration sources, of which I have learned what the people's liberations war exactly is" (Sneevliet 1942, footnote 2). However, given the continuous media coverage of the Rif War and interviews conducted by the American journalist Mowrer (in October 1924) – published in *Chicago Daily News* from November 1924 to early January 1925 – and Vincent Sheean (in 1925) with his 1926 book *An American Among the Riffi*, the biography did not contain much more information.

Books of history tend to avoid mentioning wars that went against their interests: Although Abd-el-Krim and the Rif War made continuous headlines during the 1920s, it is largely ignored in the historical literature. Abd-el- Krim's resistance had led to the loss of thousands of lives, and his ideology was based upon Islamic ideals. Headings of more recent scholarly literature on the Rif War involve phrases such as "a forgotten war" or referring to Abd-el-Krim "the unknown or forgotten leader." His struggle and his motives were also falsified in his home country until recently: Moroccan schoolbooks briefly mention about Abd-el-Krim by underlining that he had fought against the colonizers for the Moroccan throne.

In contrast to scholarly literature, it is an unprecedented phenomenon that Krim's resistance continues to be used generation after generation as a setting for novels and films across nations (Er and Rich 2015). Initiated in Hollywood, since its beginning, the Rif War is continuously being portrayed across nations in the fiction genre, where it is generally used as danger setting for adventurers. Now as then, these publications do not purport to provide a realistic recount or enact realistic scenes on the Rif War but to associate it with extreme brutality and promiscuous behavior purportedly justified by Islamic teachings, a system of explanation much rooted in orientalism (Er and Rich 2015). These novels and films present their own thematic settings while giving a false image of Abe-el-Krim, namely, as a lover of Western women. No evidence exists that Abd-el-Krim was promiscuous or had any relationship with Western women. According to the norms and traditions of the time, Abd-el-Krim had two wives called

Thaimunt and Fatima; both women were sisters of his close confidants and ministers Si Mohammed Boujibar and Si Mohammed Mohammedine Hitmi (Woolman 1968, p. 207; Sasse 2006, p. 44). From these marriages Abd-el-Krim had 11 children, 6 of which were born in Réunion. With regard to brutality with which the Rifis allegedly had conducted the revolt, there is sufficient evidence by the imperial powers on propaganda to perpetrate massacre on the Rifis (Er and Rich 2015), if the use of mustard gas for the first time in the history of mankind is not sufficient proof thereof.

The Military Techniques

The military techniques and tactics applied by the Rifis during the clashes earned the greatest admiration of not only the opponent soldiers but also the high-rank officers. In the context of the El Mers campaign on 24 June 1923 in which the French forces had 200 casualties, Windrow (2010), for instance, remarks: "Prince Aage [a French captain of royal descent] saw them coming in from his left front; he took professional pleasure in the skill with which they alternated between mounted movements and skirmishing on foot with carbines" (p. 482). In order to get thorough understandings of the diaries of the operations, remnants of the battles including ruins of buildings such as forts, trenches, or hills never ceased to be subject to scrutiny by military experts and historians since the end of the Rif War (Windrow 2010, p. 525). Scholarly studies on Abd-el-Krim and the Rif War frequently characterize Abd-el-Krim as co-inventor of modern guerilla tactics. Abd-el-Krim adhered to Islamic teachings on self-glorification and megalomania, when he was asked to comment on his successes: To the question of Paul Scott Mowrer (1887–1971), a foreign correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*, in 1924, as to who actually planned the Annual victory Abd-el-Krim responded "God planned it but I was present."

Worldwide research on the Rif War is unanimous that the war tactics of the Rifis were emulated during other rebellions such as the Druze War of Syria with France (1925–1927), the

Algerian War of Independence with France (1954–1962), and the Vietnam War with the United States (1946–1954) (Sasse 2006, p. 96). Twentieth-century anti-colonial revolutionary leaders – such as the Vietnamese leaders Hô Chi Minh (1890–1969) and Võ Nguyên Giáp (1911–2013) and the Yugoslav leader Tito (1892–1980) – are specifically mentioned as being influenced by the military tactics of Abd-el-Krim (Seymour 2008, p. 62; Sneevliet 1942, footnote 2). There is evidence that in particular Che Guevara (1928–1967) – who is considered as the most successful anti-imperialist guerilla leader to date – employed the tactics and methods, which were devised by the Rifis (Er 2015). The link between Abd-el-Krim and Che comes through, the Spanish Republican veteran of the Moroccan colonial campaign, Alberto Bayo (born in 1892 in Cuba – died in 1967 in Cuba), the much respected guerilla trainer of Che. Bayo had joined the Spanish army in 1916 and had become a pilot in the Air Force. His first assignments in Morocco are recorded to have started in 1919. Eventually, Bayo joined the elite corps *Legion Española* (the Spanish Foreign Legion), which was specifically founded to combat the rebels in Morocco. As a pilot Bayo had also dropped chemical war agents into the Rif. It was also during one of his missions in the Rif sometime between September 1924 and 1925, when he was seriously wounded and even lost one eye (Dosal 2010, p. 49). Bayo, already 64, had fought for 11 years against the Rifi rebels – the only guerrilla war he fought against – and had participated in the subsequent Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), when he was approached by Castro in 1956 for the purpose of training his soldiers in Mexico for the Granma expedition against the Batista regime (Dosal 2010, p. 49). The Castro brothers as well as Che Guevara took part in the training sessions. Generally, most of the successes of the rebels against the Batista forces are claimed to have been due to Bayo's tactical teachings.

With regard to the source of Bayo's expertise on guerilla tactics, Abel and Fisch (2011) comment that through North African guerillas Bayo had discovered methods of fighting that occupied him for the rest of his life, and as a theoretician of these, he had attained popularity all over the

world. The extent of Bayo's admiration for the tactics of the Rifis is put by Hansen (1960) as follows: "Castro succeeded in persuading Colonel Alberto Bayo to give a select group of cadres theoretical and practical training in guerrilla warfare. Bayo was well-known in Latin America as an expert in this field, having served in the Spanish forces that fought Abd El Krim in Morocco. The colonel became an admirer of the Moroccan guerrilla fighters and made a study of their tactics, which he sought, unsuccessfully, to place at the disposal of the Republican government of Spain in the civil war against Franco."

Similarly, Fidel Castro (1926–2016), yet another role model for Che, mentions in his biography (Castro and Ramonet 2008, p. 162, 168; Balfour 2002) that *he read about the Battle of Annual, one of the most successful attacks against the Spanish initiated by Abd-el-Krim in 1921.* Castro and Ramonet (2008) further says: "Later, in the twenties, Franco took part in a colonial war, in Morocco, in which the army had massive casualties. There was one battle, at Annual, in which Spain lost over 3,000 men. I've read the whole history of that war" (p. 496). Castro makes a few statements regarding the teachings of Bayo with reference to the Rif War. In his autobiography Castro comments that, "Bayo taught us how to set up a guerilla to break a defence the way Moroccans of Abd-el-krim faced with the Spanish." Castro and Ramonet (2008) further says: "Bayo never went beyond teaching what a guerrilla fighter should do to break through a perimeter when he's surrounded, on the basis of his experience of the times Abd el-Krim's Moroccans, in the war in the Rif, broke through the Spanish lines that encircled them" (p. 174). Research demonstrates in fact that there are a number of tactical similarities between the tactical teachings of Bayo as well as the operational methods used by Che during his battles in Cuba and the methods applied by the Rifis under Abd-el-Krim's leadership (Er 2015).

Abd-el-Krim's Strategic Innovations

There was no shortage of trained men in the Rif. A description of the Riffians' personality and

prowess is provided in Terhorst: "They are big and tough people, who can easily overcome any pains and labour. They are good riders and shooters, as it is the pride of any Rifi to own a gun. In order to possess a gun a Rifi works hard from a very young age and saves up to acquire one. The death of an enemy makes little difference if it is for getting a gun for it" (Terhorst, p. 173). Researchers on the Rif War unanimously agree that the contentious spirit of the Rifis – not least triggered by the idea of *jihad* and martyrdom – was one of the main determinants of their success. Another factor that gave the Rifis a competitive edge was their ability to cope with the demands of the guerrilla life in a challenging environment. The Rifi warriors were used to the difficulties associated with living in the Atlas Mountains, had a good knowledge of the topology of the Rif, and were extraordinarily acclimatized to both the excessive heat and the cold rainy seasons (Pechkoff 1926, p. 141, 211, 228). For this reason, Abd-el-Krim himself once made the supercilious statement that one Rifi would beat any ten Frenchmen (Woolman 1968, p. 184). Abd-el-Krim also appointed a general for each region (Sasse 2006, p. 96). Being vital for the success of their resistance, Krim's best warriors never fought jointly against the enemy. Each used to take leadership responsibilities for subgroups of warriors during a military operation and was under direct control of Abd-el-Krim (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 94; Hart 1976, p. 388).

During the battles and ambush attacks, the Rifis are also known to have used mountains, cliffs, and bushes in an astonishing way, for their own advantage. Some of the war tactics and methods that were specific for the Rifis include the following: caves dug in the slopes (Windrow 2010, pp. 523–524); extensive use of granite ramparts, rocks, and boulder-strewn summits in the hills as concealment/cover from which to target the enemy; the use of smokeless-powder rifles that made it impossible to locate its user; and hiding cannons in caves and using these exclusively at night, which made their discovery impossible (Woolman 1968, p. 108; Windrow 2010, p. 555). Most operations were conducted in the night. Apart from these, few other guerilla

tactics are still mentioned in the literature as having been typical for the Rifis. These fall into three different categories of defense techniques, namely, siege war, attack on armored cars, and bayonet-versus-knife fighting.

The siege war techniques used by the Rifi soldiers are the most enthusiastically and vividly described methods that can be found in the literature on the Rif War. Woolman (1968) refers to one such siege tactics as follows: "Mhamed Abd el Krim's strategy and tactics were simple but effective. The Rifians were to surround each small enemy outpost and attempt to take it by sneak attack. If this failed, they were to wait for the garrison to run short of water or bullets, then kill the besieged men as they made a break for freedom. These tactics worked to perfection in eastern Spanish Morocco during the Annual rout" (p. 156). Abd-el-Krim himself sees as the reason for the success in Dhar Ubarran and Sidi Idris on 2 June 1921 the division of the Spanish troops into blockhouses which were encircled by the Rifi armies in a surprise attack (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 67).

Another innovative siege warfare technique applied by the Rifis was the so-called double ring of trenches dug around posts or camps, which they used to beat back resupply attempts or to prevent access by rescue parties (Windrow 2010, p. 532). Only a few incidents are known where foreign legionnaires succeeded to get through the camps (Windrow 2010, p. 533). In the rare case where legionnaires managed to break through the first one, they would be held back by the second ring. On 3 May 1925, General Colombat was unable to break through the Berber trenches encircling Bibane, despite 6 h of fighting (Windrow 2010, p. 511).

Kunz and Müller (1990) mention the Rifi tactics of attacking armored vehicles, which they claim was also successfully practiced later on by other infantrymen from across the world. By referring to Woolman (1968), the authors describe the method: "While some men controlled the tank's crew through rifle shots into the vision slits, the others used to creep up onto the vehicle to throw grenades (produced by local craftsmen) into the hatch"(p. 58). Woolman's (1968) version

is as follows: "The Spanish opened fire as soon as the enemy appeared, but although the guns brought down some of the Rifian attackers, others dropped to the ground and waited until the cars lumbered closer. Jumping up, the Rifians surrounded each car, fired their rifles through the ports, and set fire to the gasoline tanks, thus completely destroying the armored car" (p. 104). Windrow (2010, p. 498) states that the Rifis would lay flat to avoid being seen by the crew. The first of such attacks known to have taken place was on 18 March 1922 against the Spanish tank company equipped with 12 French Renault FT-17s. In a joint operation with the legion infantry, their task was to drive the tribe Beni Said from the towns of Tugunz and Ambar (Scurr 1985). The legion suffered 86 casualties during this counter-attack by the rebels.

A further tactical approach that was identified as being unique to the Rifis relates to the use of bayonet-versus-knife fighting. Windrow (2010) describes this method as follows: "it was whichever side showed the most aggression that had the essential advantage. On the receiving end of a determined bayonet-charge the Berbers, like any other fighting men, would themselves 'float', and this tactic – if exactly timed, and carried out with real resolve – was successfully employed often enough for veteran officers to regard it as a panacea against any threat within 100 yards" (p. 471).

In additions to these, further guerilla tactics and methods are mentioned in the literature, which had caught the attention of witnesses of the clashes. One frequently described tactics relate to demoralization of the enemy by repeating the *strike and run tactic* until the enemy is demoralized and takes a static and defensive posture. Windrow (2010) describes the battle of the highly organized French company III/3rd REI on 6 May 1922 with the Rifis: "Any halt other than to deliver a rapid fusillade encouraged the Berbers to concentrate their own fire, pinning the platoon down and creating a static target towards which the tribesmen were instinctively drawn" (p. 470). During this clash, the French had 99 casualties (40% of their strength which included 17 killed, 64 wounded, and 18 missing). Rifis managed to apply this tactic even at a larger scale. During the

winter of 1923–1924, for instance, more than a quarter of the foreign army was tied down in static positions without any plans to regain the initiative (Windrow 2010, p. 498). Woolman (1968) cites the description of a Spanish legionnaire on how the Rifis used to defend themselves: "Abd el Krim's characteristic fighting tactics are to withdraw or retreat while the enemy advances, but at the first halt of the latter, to start sniping, at which the Moroccans are experts. And it is very difficult to shoot them down as they never collect in large groups, but in isolated bevies which are continually on the move; whereas the French and Spanish troops, moving in concentrated masses, are easy targets" (p. 184).

Yet another method relates to the method of preventing relief columns from joining one another (Woolman 1968, p. 90, 104, 136). At the end of July 1924, to mention one example, the Oued Laou outpost line near Tetouan was isolated by Krim's forces, and any relief attempt was fiercely attacked (Windrow 2010, p. 498). "It took 8th Company no less than three hours to get within 50 yards of the base of the rocks by alternate fire and rushes, but they were then pinned down, and two messengers sent back to appeal for artillery support were both shot as they ran" (Windrow 2010, p. 541).

The Rifis also used the presence of two imperial powers in their fighting arena to their advantage: After an operation into the French protectorate, Abd-el-Krim could always switch to his base in the Spanish territory. French were not authorized to follow him there as they wanted to avoid clashes with the Spaniards. At times Abd-el-Krim's success against the French was also due to misleading information he was disseminating: As opposed to his true intention, he would announce that his main target would be the north, i.e., the Spaniards.

The tactic of systematically targeting the vanguard during an ambush was yet another prime tactic of the Rifis. Windrow (2010) writes: "The Berbers did not give junior leaders the luxury of much time to think, and the man with the coloured képi and Sam Browne belt was a priority target" (p. 470). Referring to the clashes during July 1925, Windrow (2010) writes: "The bereaved II/1st Foreign, south of Ouezzane, had been led by Captain Derain, doubling up in command of the battalion and his own 5th Company due to the heavy officer casualties" (p. 543).

Windrow (2010) gives description in the context of clashes on the hills: "The moment of first occupying a summit was among the most dangerous, since the Berbers often counter-attacked immediately before the soldiers could organize a perimeter or set up machine guns. . . . As the first platoons reached a crest . . . tribesmen who had dropped a little way down the reverse slope might fire into their faces and launch an uphill rush at extraordinary speed" (p. 483). Windrow further notes, "A few tribesmen noted for their ambush skills had been watching and remembering every detail for several days; the best shots with the best rifles occupied a height from which they could see far along the back-trail or even the fort gates, while those with old muskets hid themselves among the rocks and trees a few yards from the track. However antique their weapons, the first blast at point-blank range could always drop one or two légionnaires in their tracks" (p. 491). The diaries of former legionnaires often mention fear of going outside an outpost or fort, let alone being sent to the front line. For this reason, the front line was also used as a punitive measure for those who broke the rules or committed offenses in the army. Given the great danger looming outside outposts and forts, foreign legionnaires would only go out if it was an absolute necessity, such as in case of water shortage after the area was checked and guarded by spahis, as described by Windrow (2010): "If there were any Spahis with the main garrison they rode out first and occupied high points, but in all cases the machine guns in the watchtowers were cocked, riflemen manned the walls, and look-outs scanned the surrounding terrain with binoculars while the water parties led the mules to the river or well. Such corvées were preceded by an advance guard which went beyond the watering point to picket any overlooking crest" (p. 491). However: "The routes and timetables of both corvées and supply parties inevitably became predictable, and by the tenth time an NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] had carried out this duty without incident it was equally inevitable that he tended to relax his vigilance . . .. This

was the moment at which the Berbers would strike" (Windrow 2010, p. 491). Routs triggered by fear were frequently observed during the Rif War. Windrow (2010) gives a description: "On 3 September, near Souk de Ait Bazza, a series of fierce attacks on a Moroccan Skirmisher battalion 'produit un léger flottement'; this elegantly phrased panic ('a light floating . . . ') was quelled by charges that cost two companies of I/2nd REI another 33 men killed" (p. 484). Referring to the incident of Annual, Windrow (2010) notes: "The withdrawal on 22 June [1921] soon degenerated into a rout, and many men were ambushed and cut down. Silvestre and his staff all died; the body of the native affairs officer Colonel Morales was handed back later" (p. 464). Concerning the persistency with which the Rifis defended their posts using aforementioned tactics, Woolman (1968) says: "The forces at Melilla now numbered 36,000; led by Generals Sanjurjo and Calvalcanti, the Spanish slowly pushed their way to Nador, which they retook on August 13. Under intermittent attack from snipers, the Spanish struggled slowly onward; it took them almost two months to advance the few miles between Nador and Zeluan" (p. 103).

Conduct of Operations

Abd-el-Krim's aim was to create the nucleus of an army modeled to some degree on Western standards. Abd-el-Krim's regular troops (about 10,000 men) consisting of infantry and artillery wore military uniforms (Bode 1926, p. 22; Furneaux 1967, p. 117). The traditional tribal dress was retained in most cases, but the soldiers wore different colors of turbans to denote their rank (Windrow 2010, p. 497).

Despite their tactical innovations and fighting expertise, the Rifis were heavily reliant upon weapons from the Western world. Krim was actually very keen to get whatever modern technology he could and even planned to start a small air force in the Rif (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 103). An agreement for the purchase of four military planes was made with a French company, but only one could be smuggled into the Rif from Algeria in December 1923 (Sasse 2006, p. 196). By the end

of the war, Spanish troops confiscated 53 boxes containing a dismantled machine made in France (Sasse 2006, p. 203). Between 1926 and 1930, no fewer than 124,269 rifles, 232 machine guns, 128 artillery pieces with 4549 grenades, and 7 mortars were collected from the Riffians by the Spanish (Woolman 1968, p. 213; Sasse 2006, p. 203). Abd-el-Krim also knew the risks associated with a total dependence on arms imports and initiated the production of explosives: As the local Jewish population was primarily engaged in metalwork, Abd-el-Krim commissioned them to produce hand grenades using Spanish sardine cans and unexploded ordnance (Abd-el-Krim 1927, p. 95; Coon 1931, p. 65). At the end of the war, the Spanish confiscated 1,480 such handmade explosives (Sasse 2006, p. 132 and p. 203). Empty cartridge cases were refilled; new ones were manufactured in a production unit employing 60 workers (Sasse 2006, p. 192).

The Rifis were heavily reliant upon know-how from outside the borders of their own country, particularly with regard to technology-intensive weapons systems. Some of the guns, tanks, and even aircraft which were shot down needed repair. No Riffian was trained for this purpose, and European deserters as well as volunteers had to be employed for this task (Sasse 2006, p. 130, 133, 199). Desertions were not least encouraged by Abd-el-Krim's communist supporters orchestrated from the Soviet Union, pacifists, and social democrats. Their efforts incorporated propaganda through flyers and speakers inducing several French soldiers to join Abd-el-Krim's forces. The number of European deserters between 1921 and 1926 was estimated to have been at least 150, and the majority of these were Germans (Sasse 2006, p. 105). Increasing number of German deserters was recorded especially in 1924 due to Abd-el-Krim's plans to attack the French-occupied Morocco. Among the deserters, Abd-el-Krim was especially keen on those who were able to impart their technical skills on the usage of the arms confiscated during the Battle of Annual and Monte Arruit. The most prominent trainers are known by name (see Sasse 2006, pp. 100–101).

Abd-el-Krim, like his father, stood also for modernization. He saw that building a road

network would be a major advantage militarily as it would facilitate the transportation of confiscated heavy artillery (Sasse 2006, p. 125). In 1921 the road between Ajdir and Ait Kamara was built under the supervision of Si M'hammed, while in July 1922, about 60 Germans, mostly deserters from the French Foreign Legion, took over the supervision and management of further roads (Sasse 2006, p. 126).

Espionage service and intelligence support from the populace and the Rifi guerilla fighters also played a significant role for the success of the Rif resistance. Abd-el-Krim's scouts would inform him about every negligence in the guard duty and security service of the enemy so that an advantage could be taken instantly. Thus, setting up a telephone network was one of Abd-el-Krim's priorities (Sasse 2006, p. 122). The task of setting up a telephone system was accomplished Rifis who had gained experience from the Algerian telephone services as well as deserting Europeans (Sasse 2006, pp. 117–119, 122–123). Abd-el-Krim was connected with all sections of his front by cable reel telephone. The maintenance and operation of about 77 telephone stations – mostly located in the conquered Spanish block-houses – were also done by deserters and local youngsters trained for the purpose (Sasse 2006, p. 119 and 123). In 1925 Abd-el-Krim availed of about 30 radio transmitters and receivers and 4 telegraph stations, which kept him informed about the latest military reports of the French and Spanish (Sasse 2006, p. 121 and 124). Even the cavalry availed of wireless and impact resistant "saddle apparatus" (Sasse 2006, p. 121). Chain of command and transmission was set up excellently: Behind the front there was a row of headquarters which were connected with the reserves by telephone and light cars.

Conclusion

Abd-el-Krim repeatedly pleaded for peace and end of the war and asked for negotiations, but his requests remained unanswered. In this regard Krim said that the Spanish intended to annihilate the Rifis and pointed to the futility of the accusation that the Rifis were defending their freedom and religion only (Abd-el-Krim 1927). The refusal of his demands for self-determination in accordance with international law only prolonged the war, led to more deaths, and caused immense costs and massive political turmoil – a development that was to have a decisive influence on the later history of Spain, France, and ultimately Europe: Given the hardships and difficulties of fighting in the Rif, the Rif provided the perfect venue for advancing military and political ambitions for few unscrupulous officers. One such officer was the Spaniard Francisco Franco (1892–1975), who had joined the Moroccan colonial troops in 1913. When 23 he became a captain in 1916 and then the youngest major in the Spanish army after receiving a medal for bravery in 1917 for surviving a severe injury in 1916. Franco was second-in-command for the Spanish Foreign Legion which had experienced a crushing defeat in 1921 at Annual, and in 1923 he had become a commander of the legion. As colonel – supported by French troops invading from the south – he led troops ashore at Al Hoceima in 1925, marking the beginnings of the end of the Rif War. He was then promoted to the rank of brigadier general in 1926. The Rif War could be suppressed entirely in 1934, but it had left severe marks upon the Spanish political climate. The calamities of the ensuing Spanish Civil War in 1934 ending with Franco's victory in 1939 and the World War II were worse than what the Rifis had ever experienced. Abd-el-Krim's (1927) concluding remarks in his memoires that the war was imposed upon the Rifis and that not only the Rifis have been defeated but that the imperial powers had lost the war too, as the successes of the Rifis had given them pride, hope, and self-confidence that could not be annihilated by any defeat, seems to have been a prelude for Franco's dictatorship and the consequences this had upon France and later history.

Cross-References

▶ Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism
▶ Ben Bella, Ahmed (1918–2012)
▶ Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)
▶ Cinema and Anti-imperialist Resistance

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Abdou Diouf

Abdu l-Karīm al-Ḥaṭṭābī

▶ Abd-el-Krim al-Khattabi (1882–1963)

Abolition

▶ British Slavery and Australian Colonization
▶ Louverture, Toussaint (c.1743–1803)

Aborigines

▶ Australia's Colonisation and Racial Policies

Accumulation by Dispossession

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Accumulation of Capital

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

Achebe, Chinua (1930–2013)

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Definition

Chinua Achebe, born Albert Chinualumogu Achebe in Ogidi in eastern Nigeria on 16 November 1930, was a writer, novelist, poet, and critic.

Chinua Achebe, born Albert Chinualumogu Achebe in Ogidi in eastern Nigeria on 16 November 1930, was a writer, novelist, poet, and critic. Achebe's father Isaiah Okafo Achebe was baptised by the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society and took on missionary teaching. His mother Janet Iloegbunam Achebe belonged to the blacksmith community of Umuike village in Awka. Achebe excelled at school and won a scholarship for higher studies. He graduated in English Literature in 1953 from the University College in Ibadan.

After a short span of teaching at the Merchants of Light School at Oba, Achebe joined the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation in 1954. He was subsequently elevated to the position of director of external broadcasting in 1961, attained 'the Voice of Nigeria' position, and served the corporation until the 1966 Igbos massacre in western and northern Nigeria. During the Nigeria–Biafra war (1967–70), Achebe served the Biafran diplomatic service and undertook extensive trips abroad to speak on behalf of the Biafran cause. At the end of the war in 1970, he joined the University of Nigeria at Nsukka and then held a number of teaching positions at universities in the US and Canada.

Achebe was the recipient of many honorary degrees from universities in the US, Canada, England, Scotland, and Nigeria. He was awarded the Order of the Federal Republic, the Nigerian National Merit Award, the Commonwealth Poetry Prize (1974), the Lotus Award for Afro-Asian Writers (1975), the Campion Medal (1996), the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade (2002), the Man Booker International Prize (2007), and the Dorothy and Lillian Gish Prize (2010). He was a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, London (1981) and an Honorary Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Letters (1983) and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2002). In 1998 he was appointed as the prestigious McMillan Stewart Lecturer at Harvard University.

Achebe was the author of five novels: *Things Fall Apart* (1958), *No Longer at Ease* (1960), *Arrow of God* (1964), *A Man of the People* (1966), and *Anthills of the Savannah* (1987). This compendium of work maps the transition of Nigeria from colonial to neo-colonial rule. Achebe's radical departure from

the colonialist historical narratives made crucial differences in representing Nigerian society and character. In *Reading Chinua Achebe*: *Language and Ideology in* Fiction (1991), Simon Gikandi aptly says:

> there is in all of Achebe's novels a fundamental link between the idea of the nation, the concept of a national culture, and the quest for an African narrative. Fanon's famous dictum that the liberation of the nation is 'that material keystone which makes the building of a culture possible' finds its parallel in Achebe's desire to liberate the African mind from the colonial complex and the 'crisis of the soul' which it triggers in the colonized. (Gikandi 1991, p. 7)

Regarded by many as the father of the modern African novel, Achebe was induced to write his novels as counter-narratives to Eurocentric discourses, which denigrated Africa. He pointed out how European mythology had constructed Africa, and worked to provide a counter-discourse that took part in the reconstruction of the African self. Achebe imagined a pre-independence national community with shared history as both progressive and useful for writing. In 'The Novelist as Teacher', he wrote:

> Here then is an adequate revolution for me to espouse – to help my society regain belief in itself and put away the complexes of the years of denigration and self-abasement …. For no thinking African can escape the pain of the wound in our soul …. I would be quite satisfied if my novels (especially the ones I set in the past) did no more than teach my readers that their past – with all its imperfections – was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God's behalf delivered them. (Achebe 1975, pp. 71–72)

Achebe's resentment at the European representations of Africans in literature incited him to write his maiden and classic novel *Things Fall Apart* (1958). Written during the same period in which Frantz Fanon was formulating his ideas, the novel delineates a critical study of the Igbo village, Umuofia. In the story, the protagonist Okonkwo lives during the colonisation of Nigeria, struggles with the legacy of his father, a shiftless debtor, as well as grapples with the complications which arise with the visit of white missionaries to his village of Umuofia. Okonkwo, the tragic but flawed protagonist, resists the onslaught of

colonial culture. Achebe was keen to remind his readers that European colonialism is not entirely responsible for all the turmoil in Umuofia. Wole Soyinka described the novel as 'the first novel in English which spoke from the interior of an African character, rather than portraying him as exotic, as the white man would see him' (Jaggi 2000, pp. 6–7). The novel explores the cultural conflict and encounters between Christian doctrine and Igbo traditions, and resists the racist images of Africa as depicted in such literary works as Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* and Joyce Cary's *Mister Johnson*. In an interview with Lewis Nkosi in *African Writers Talking,* Achebe spoke vociferously against the racial portrayal of Nigerian character by Cary in Mister Johnson. Achebe declared that:

> one of the things that set me thinking was Joyce Cary's novel, set in Nigeria, *Mister Johnson,* which was praised so much, and it was clear to me that it was a most superficial picture of – not only of the country – but even of the Nigerian character, and so I thought if this was famous, then perhaps someone ought to try and look at it from the inside. (quoted in Pieterse and Duerden 1972, p. 4)

As an anti-colonial novel, *Things Fall Apart* narrates the story of a society which has been irretrievably changed by the colonial power and culture. The scene in which Okonkwo's son Nwoye is alienated by the sacrifice of his foster brother is reminiscent of the biblical story of Abraham's willingness to obey his god's command to slay his son. Through these allusions, Achebe's novel engages with the Eurocentric representations of Africans as barbaric, marginal, and lacking coherence or speech. There are scenes in which the narrator promotes one perspective and simultaneously develops the negative side of that point of view. This double perspective surfaces in the language that Achebe adapts in the novel. For instance, there is a brilliant description of the missionary Mr. Smith's attitude: 'He saw things as black and white. And black was evil. He saw the world as a battlefield in which the children of light were locked in mortal conflict with the sons of darkness' (Achebe 1994/1958, p. 164).

Achebe's second novel *No Longer at Ease* explores the dilemma faced by young Nigerians in

contemporary Nigeria. Obi, the protagonist, is the grandson of Oknonkwo, the main character of *Things Fall Apart*. After attaining university education in England, Obi comes back to the newly independent Nigeria with the hope that he will rise by becoming an important part of the leadership. However, he is trapped between divergently pulling forces of tradition and modernity. This dilemma becomes apparent when he falls in love with a girl of the despised *osu* caste and faces stiff resistance from his orthodox family.

Arrow of God, published in 1964, narrates the interaction of Igbo tradition with European Christianity. Ezeulu, the chief priest of Ulu, is taken aback by the British intervention in the region and encourages his son to learn the secret behind the power of the foreigners. The message conveyed through Umuaro's political conflict with Okperi, the cultural conflict with the white man, and the religious conflict with the Church is that one should abide by the laws of the society that one belongs to. In the novel, the coloniser despises the culture of the colonised. Mr. Winterbottom summons Ezeulu, and when the latter fails to comply, he is detained in prison. The novel reaches its climax when the quest for power transforms into the quest for revenge.

A Man of the People (1966) is an acerbic satire on an un-named, African, post-colonial state. The protagonist Odili Samalau is seduced by the power and rhetoric of the corrupt minister of culture named Nanga. This seduction appears as a central motif for Nigerian politics, as various groups of voters in the region are symbolised by Nanga's loyal wife Elsie, his city mistress, and Edna, the young rural girl he is tempted to make his second wife. Finally, Odili courts and gets Edna, but at a substantial cost. One crucial problem that Achebe focuses upon in the novel is the search of a language that can be an authentic and appropriate mode of expression. Throughout the novel, Odili narrates the story and gives clichéd justifications for his shifting political allegiance; by doing so, he simultaneously enables the reader to discern his own unreliability as a narrator. The novel ends with a military coup, which prefigured an actual coup in Nigeria a few months after the publication of the novel,

triggering the bloody massacre of Igbos in northern Nigeria.

Achebe's fifth novel *Anthills of the Savannah* (1987) has a strong resemblance to the contemporary socio-political setup of Nigeria. There are reflections of *The Trouble with Nigeria* in the novel. This is a polyvocal text in which there are multiple narrators. The novel is about a coup in the fictional West African nation of Kangan, where Sam, a Sandhurst-trained military officer, has become president. His friends Ikem Osodi and Chris Oriko die while opposing the savage abuse of power. A military coup annihilates everything and eliminates Sam and Beatrice Okoh, an Honours graduate, a senior official in the ministry of finance, and girlfriend of Chris. As the narrator of this complex novel, she becomes a leader as well as representative of a group of women who envision an optimistic future for Nigeria.

In 1983, upon the death of Mallan Aminu Kano, Achebe became deputy national president of the People's Redemption Party and wrote a booklet *The Trouble with Nigeria* in which he gave his analysis of the failure of Nigeria leadership (Achebe 2010). As the director of Heinemann Educational Books in Nigeria, Achebe promoted many African authors by encouraging them to write creatively. In 1984 he founded *Uwa ndi Igbo*, a significant bilingual magazine for Igbo studies.

Edward Said argues that if non-European peoples are to be represented with justice it must be in a narrative in which they may themselves be the agents. Then they will appear as the creators of their own universe. Achebe, in his writings, draws heavily upon the Igbo oral tradition. By interspersing folk tales in his narrative, Achebe illuminates the community values in the form and content of his storytelling. For instance, in *Things Fall Apart* he dwells upon the interdependency of masculine and feminine by bringing the tale of earth and sky into the fabric of the novel. Similarly, the singing of folk songs and ceremonial dancing in Things *Fall Apart* are the sum total of the oral Igbo tradition. Achebe sprinkles proverbs throughout the narrative and with this technique he throws light upon the rural Igbo tradition.

Achebe's writings constitute interpretative spaces and critique of the post-colonial aesthetic. His works evince his ability to reverse the status of colonial language as a tool of colonial ideology to the language as a medium of new forms of expression. Achebe's choice of writing in the English language was due to his desire to write back to the empire. By altering the idiom, usage, and syntax of the English language, he transforms the language into African style. In 2007, when Chinua Achebe became the second writer to be awarded the international Man Booker Prize, the distinguished novelist Nadine Gordimer commented that he had attained 'what one of his characters brilliantly defines as the writer's purpose: "a new found utterance" for the capture of life's complexity. This fiction is an original synthesis of the psychological novel, the Joycean stream of consciousness, the post-modern breaking of sequence. He is a joy and an illumination to read' (Jaggi 2000, p. 7) On Achebe's 70th birthday in 2000, Wole Soyinka said: 'Achebe never hesitates to lay blame for the woes of the African continent squarely where it belongs' (quoted in Nare 2005, p. 149).

Bruce King in his Introduction to Nigerian *Literature* sums up Achebe's achievement as a Nigerian writer in the following words:

> It could be argued that the real tradition of Nigerian literature begins with Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* (1958). It begins a tradition not only because its influence can be detected on Nigerian novelists, such as T.M. Aluco, but also because it was the first solid achievement upon which others could build. Achebe was the first Nigerian writer to successfully transmute the conventions of the novel, a European art form, into African literature. His craftsmanship can be seen in the way he creates a totally Nigerian structure for his fiction. (King 1972, p. 3).

King rightly said that Achebe had a sense of irony and was especially excellent at satire. He compared Achebe to the nineteenth-century English novelists, such as George Eliot and Thomas Hardy, in presenting a detached and tragic universe in which exceptional individuals are crushed by the larger cultural forces. Fondly called the 'grandfather of Nigerian literature', Achebe died after a short illness on 21 March 2013 in Boston. At his death, *The New York Times* described him in his obituary as 'one of Africa's most widely read novelists and one of the continent's towering men of letters'.

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Adivasis and Resistance to Imperialism

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> "We should not . . . be too frightened by the word 'archaic.'"
> "Marx–Zasulich Correspondence: Letters and Drafts," February–March 1881, Karl Marx in Teodor Shanin (1983, p. 107)

> "*. . . imperialism is a way of life of capitalism. Therefore, the elimination of imperialism requires the overthrow of capitalism.*"
> Harry Magdoff (1978, p. 261)

Synonyms

Colonialism; Expansionism; Indigenous peoples; Insurgency; Neo-colonialism; Struggle; Tribal peasants

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Bernard D'Mello has retired.

Definition

From the colonial age to the present, Adivasi peasants in India have been resisting the ongoing brutal, planned, and discontinuous processes of commoditization of land, commercialization of forests, and proletarianization of labor, by resort to insurgency. The Kol insurrection of 1831–1832, the Santal hool (rebellion) of 1855, and the Birsaite ulgulan (great tumult) of 1899–1900, against the Sarkar–sahukar–zamindar (colonial government–moneylender–landlord) trinity in the colonial age; and the Naxalite/Maoist–Adivasi insurgency against the Indian state–big business combine, which has been directing the twenty-first century land grabs in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh State, in independent India, are emblematic of such resistance to imperialism. The latter, understood as a process by which ruling and dominant, collaborating classes and the state team up to advance their activities, their interests, and their power in the so-called noncapitalist areas of the nation and beyond.

Introduction

Considered the "indigenous peoples" of India, this not without sharp controversy, Adivasis – specific "tribes," for instance, Gond, Kol, Koya, Munda, and Santal in the central-eastern region of India – have been at the forefront of peasant insurgency against "imperialism," both in colonial and independent India. In this chapter, I present the big picture on such insurgency, drawing on the Kol insurrection of 1831–1832, the Santal *hool* (rebellion) of 1855, and the Birsaite *ulgulan* (great tumult/uprising) of 1899–1900, the latter a Munda rebellion named after its leader Birsa Munda. I then cover the ongoing Gondi Adivasi–Maoist insurgency in the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh in independent India, resisting twenty-first century land grabs over there. I thereby seek to throw light on Adivasi resistance to "imperialism" in the colonial age and in the present, covering Adivasi peasant-insurgent politics and collective action over the long haul, albeit

in the contemporary period, led by a Maoist intelligentsia largely coming from the Indian middle class. This is an analysis of imperialism and the resistance to it in two different phases. There is thus a need to theorize imperialism and anti-imperialism as processes and apply that theory in the two different contexts.

The Adivasis have been resisting imperialism ever since the colonial state extended its control over land and forests, and labor relations by bringing in place "modern" administrative, legal, market, and repressive structures. The colonial and independent Indian states used such structures to modulate the discontinuous processes of commoditization and commercialization of land and forests, respectively, and the intermittent process of proletarianization of labor; all three underway over historical time, brutal planned undertakings, and still ongoing. In this massive endeavor, in the nineteenth century, the colonial government, the *Sarkar*, forged a symbiotic relationship with the *sahukar* (the merchant-moneylender) and the *zamindar* (landlord), constituting an exploitative and oppressive trinity that was the root cause of the Adivasi peasant rebellions. So also, in the Adivasi–Maoist resistance to the twenty-first century land grabs in the Bastar region, part of the ongoing process of commodification of land over historical time. But here the Adivasi–Maoists have been resisting an Indian state–big business combine that has been extending its activities, interests, and its power in these "noncapitalist areas."

Just like the Adivasi peasant insurgent of the colonial period grasped the nexus of the officials of the Sarkar (then the colonial authorities) with Indian exploiters, so also the Adivasi peasant insurgent of the twenty-first century understands the bond between the ruling politicians and officials of the Indian state and big business, whether Indian or multinational, in finance, production, and commerce. In both cases, then and now, the Adivasi peasant insurgent knew/knows that the business deals and settlements of the latter are dependent and contingent on the power of the former. The Adivasi peasant insurgent had/has a gut understanding of the mutuality of their activities, interests, and power.

Before I get any further, I need to clearly state the following: (a) There were a whole series of Adivasi *and* non-Adivasi insurgent-peasant struggles in the nineteenth century (Gough 1974); Adivasi peasants constituted only around one-tenth of the peasant population. (b) The overall national movement for independence in the twentieth century was multi-ethnic and multicultural; "tribal" persons, constituting around 8% of the Indian population, could only be a small part of that movement. (c) My characterization of the Adivasi peasant insurgencies of the nineteenth century and the ongoing Adivasi–Maoist insurgency as anti-imperialist resistance does not, in any way, imply that the peasant insurgents had/have a conscious leadership with an anti-imperialist strategy and program formulated in advance, and based on a theory of imperialism and anti-imperialism, or even that the leadership thought/think of imperialism the way I am now going to do, trying, as I am, to decipher the real meaning of their heroic resistance of the past and the present. All I can say is that the insurgent-Adivasi peasants had/have a gut understanding of the nature of the beast they were/have been confronting and why they needed to confront it.

Let me then come to the layout of this chapter. What immediately follows is a theoretical section dealing with imperialism as a process inherent in the development of capitalist underdevelopment. This is followed by a section on what being "tribal," or Adivasi had/has meant for such people who have been the victims of the process of development of capitalist underdevelopment in colonial and in independent India. I then go to the three Adivasi peasant insurgencies, the Kol, the Santal, and Birsaite rebellions, focusing on what led to insurgency; the Adivasi insurgent's consciousness as a class; the Adivasi peasants' view of themselves as rebels; the forms of struggle; the nature of solidarity of the oppressed; and the essentially local character of the revolts. This is followed by an account of the ongoing Adivasi–Maoist insurgency against the Indian state–big business combine's land grab in the Bastar region. Characterizing these insurgencies as anti-imperialist resistance certainly calls for a clarification of what I mean by imperialism, to which I now turn.

Imperialism: Theory and History, Inspired by Rosa Luxemburg's

For my purpose over here, I think that the theory, despite its incongruencies, and the historical material in Rosa Luxemburg's *The Accumulation of Capital* (1951/1913), subtitled "A Contribution to the Economic Explanation of Imperialism" (this did not appear in the title of the English translation), is particularly pertinent. This is because the book focuses on the relations between the capitalist and the "noncapitalist areas" of the world and has the intention of explaining imperialism for the entire period of capitalist expansion. Moreover, despite its theoretical inconsistencies, Luxemburg's intuition about *effective* demand – demand, at a profitable price, for the volume of goods and services that can be produced with existing capacity – being capitalism's most fundamental macroeconomic problem, proved to be correct. This insight came to be validated analytically by J M Keynes and Michal Kalecki, independently of each other, in the 1930s. As Kalecki, in his 1939 *Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations*, has written, "the necessity of covering the 'gap of saving' by home investment or exports was outlined by her [Rosa Luxemburg] perhaps more clearly than anywhere else before the publication of Mr Keynes's *General Theory*" (Kowalik 2014/1971, p. 4).

Luxemburg rooted her *theory* of imperialism completely in the problem of *effective* demand, what in Marxist terminology is called the "realization" problem. The markets provided by workers and capitalists in a closed economy prove to be insufficient to support investment over the long term because the surplus produced cannot be realized. To fulfill capitalism's growth imperative, therefore, business enterprise and the state have to team up to capture external (noncapitalist) areas and markets and engage in armaments production and militarism, and this quest for external markets and resort to

militarism leads to imperialism (Magdoff 1978, pp. 263–269; Kowalik 2014). Aware that fixed definitions squeeze the lifeblood out of history, nevertheless, to help her readers, Luxemburg defined imperialism as "the political expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open for the non-capitalist environment" (1951, p. 446), within and beyond a capitalist country's borders, through militarism and war.

Of course, theory is necessarily abstract; it singles out for analysis the most important factor (s) that drive the process of change. But there are many other forces making for change, and so, in order to grasp the whole matter, one must go intelligently back and forth from theory to reality and vice versa (Magdoff 1968, pp. 18–19). Luxemburg's historical material also stresses the search for alternative sources of raw materials, fresh investment opportunities, and new sources of labor. The historical material and the analytical framework can be a guide to understanding the "development of (capitalist) underdevelopment" – the development of a country that entered the capitalist world-system, a global system of exploiting and exploited nations, as a colony/semi-colony. The progress of countries that had been through the processes of the *primary* accumulation of capital and industrial revolution much earlier was at all stages of their development the most important cause of the retrogression of those countries/regions they had turned into colonies/semi-colonies (Baran 1957; Sweezy 1967; Frank 1966).

For instance, upon India being subjugated and turned into a colony, its economy entered the world-capitalist economy. The brutal, discontinuous processes of commodification of land, commercialization of forests, and proletarianization of labor in India's colonial economy (within the world-capitalist economy) then followed over historical time (for an overall perspective on these processes, see Wallerstein 1976). Private property in land came with the coalescence of landlord and bourgeois. Such property in land in India was, at first, a cross-breed of landed property (with debt-induced bonded labor attached to it) and bourgeois property, and contingent upon the payment

of land revenue to the colonial state, and thus constituted "capital" as a combination of "estate" and class forms. There was even serial multiple leasing of land, with a number of intermediaries getting a share of the surplus. The actual tillers, the real peasants, tenants-at-will, could be evicted at the whim of their lessors. Exploitation was based on extra-economic coercion and from being compelled by lack of ownership of land to offer one's capacity to labor for a fraction of the value-added of the agricultural commodities produced. Societal arrangements reflected a blend of the manifold gradations of social rank, as in the oppressive social institution of caste, and class antagonisms. And the power exercised by the landlord and the moneylender stemmed from an organic unity of polity and economy (as in tributary social formations) in the countryside, this despite a formal functional separation of economic, political, and legal roles (as in a bourgeois system).

Such exploitative land and labor relations were forms of employment of labor and of dividing up land as capital in relation to the profitability they were expected to yield on the market, giving the colonial economy its worth in world trade by it providing a market and a source of raw materials for modern industry in the colonial power's home country. What came in place was a combination of free and "unfree" labor, the latter as a potential wage-labor reserve, and of quasi-commodified and commodified land, the former kept in reserve, with both these reserves retained in anticipation of significant changes in the international division of labor, or enhanced demand, that would require the relocation of certain lines of business or the expansion of capacity in the underdeveloped countries. Part of the "unfree" labor and quasi-commodified land would then come to be released from these labor and land reserves (as explained in Wallerstein 1976). A much higher rate of exploitation in the periphery and lower costs of land and minerals, with the adoption of the same technology, would lead to a higher rate of profit there, and the surplus would be shared among the owners of the companies and professional elites, and the respective states/governments, both at the center and the periphery. This has been the modus

operandi that has for long constituted the core of the world-capitalist system's exploitative institutional structure.

In the recent phase of significant changes in the international division of labor, India has been witnessing the expansion of its steel and aluminum industries, and with much of the mineral deposits of iron ore and bauxite in the Adivasi areas of central and eastern India, integrated steel plant and bauxite–alumina–aluminum complexes need to be located there. So, the land grabs and the Adivasi insurgent resistance to them in this region. Such resistance also stems from the fact that as far as the Adivasi peasantry is concerned, capitalism has been relatively unsuccessful in imparting its ideology, culture, and values to it.

When it comes to the acquisition of agricultural lands by the government for, and on behalf of, big business, from the non-Adivasi peasantry, this usually boils down to a question of the "price" at which it will be willing to settle the matter. But, in the case of the Adivasi peasantry, an offer of a favorable price far from resolves the matter, for there is a notion of *joint* holding of land, rivers, pasture, and forests as their community habitat, with a socio-religious responsibility to their ancestors, protective-guardian deities, and nature spirits to preserve and sustain it. So much so that the penetration of the Indian state, Indian big business, and the multinational corporations into the Adivasi areas of central and eastern India and their bid to usurp the *jal, jangal,* and *zameen* (water, forests, and land) of the Adivasis, thereby assaulting their *izzat* (sense of dignity), have been militantly resisted, even to the extent of resort to insurgency in places where the Maoists have been politically active in their communities.

Here the process of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2007, p. 159) has turned exceedingly violent and catastrophic, what with the escalation of militarism and war by the Indian state leading to cultural and economic ruin of these communities. Yet the Adivasi peasants have persisted. As Luxemburg wrote, albeit with respect to what the colonial powers did in the "noncapitalist areas" of their colonies, and her passionate account, in parts (Luxemburg 1951, pp. 365, 376, and 452), might well apply to what

has been happening in the undeclared civil war that the Indian state has unleashed against its own people in central and eastern India:

> . . .primitive conditions allow of a greater drive and of far more ruthless measures than could be tolerated under purely capitalist social conditions. . . . The unbridled greed, the acquisitive instinct of accumulation . . . is incapable of seeing far enough to recognise the value of . . . an older civilisation. . . . Force, fraud, oppression, looting . . . [is] openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests for power the stern laws of the economic process.

Under capitalism, the underlying basis of the dispossession of people from their lands is what potentially brings the highest rate of return from the private profitable use of those lands. Such dispossession usually takes place by the application of the law *and* the use of the threat or the actual use of force. These are the means by which land is "liberated" from the obstructions to its most private profitable use. One of these obstructions is "customary rights," which are put an end to because they interfere with the capitalist process. Property rights are made "private" and "exclusive" (Magdoff 2013, pp. 1–3).

In India, the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894 was the culmination of a series of colonial laws from 1824 onwards. The year 1863 marked the first incorporation of the provision for the colonial government's use of the legal doctrine of "eminent domain" to acquire land on behalf of the private sector, ostensibly for the "public purpose," the latter, itself quite all encompassing. The colonial period, with its "development" projects, land settlements, Forest Acts of 1865, 1878, and 1927, de-proto-industrialization, forced commercialization of agriculture, and the setting up of plantations and mines, spawned a vast segment of displaced persons by the time India became independent in 1947. This immiserated segment of the Indian people became a huge contingent of marginalized people in the wake of further displacement as a result of the development projects of the postindependence period (Bharati and Rao 1999, pp. 1374–1375).

The Government of India, in the erstwhile Planning Commission's *Twelfth Five-Year Plan*

(2012–17), admits that the number of people displaced following development projects since 1951 was 60 million persons by the year 2011, and only a third of these are "estimated to have been resettled in a planned manner. . . . Around 40 per cent of those displaced . . . [were] Adivasis [who make up only 8% of the Indian population] . . . Given that 90 per cent of our coal, more than 50 per cent of most minerals and most prospective dam sites are in Adivasi regions, there is likely to be continuing tension over issues of land acquisition in these areas" (Planning Commission 2013, para 6.33, p. 196). From the beginning of the new millennium, with the entry of big business into energy, mining, telecommunications, civil aviation, infrastructure (ports, highways, etc.), banking and high finance, a segment of Indian big business, with close political links in the upper echelons of the government, has emerged as a "financial aristocracy." The latter has enhanced its net worth by pocketing the already available wealth, public, community, and private, by means of the government's application of the law in their favor *and* the threat or actual use of force to dispossess people.

With neo-liberal policy and ideology in command, the exploitation of natural resources – water, electricity, coal, bauxite, iron ore, etc., for industries such as steel and aluminum – has been "managed" by giant mining companies supported by their home states, if they are multinational corporations, and the Indian state, and a network of financial institutions, national and international, all of which have been driving the process of accumulation by dispossession. The Indian government and the State governments that administer its "internal colonies," the Adivasi areas, have been striving to ensure cheap labor-power, low-cost, low royalty rate, high-profit minerals, water, electricity, coal, and huge capital gains in the exercise of options, along with a predatory public administration, paramilitary, and armed police to overwhelm the Adivasis in these regions.

It was Immanuel Wallerstein who did much to disseminate a crucial insight of Fernand Braudel of the Annales School of historiography that it has not been capitalism per se that has transformed "noncapitalist regions" but significant entry of capitalist big business that has brought this about, for big business comes with all the necessary political support to accomplish the mission (Wallerstein 1986). One can think about this in the light of the inroads of the East India Company in the Indian subcontinent, backed by the British state, and the transformation of India from a tributary social formation in decline to capitalist underdevelopment over a hundred years after 1757. Much later, Indian big business and the multinationals in our day and age, in a close nexus with the Indian state, have directed and steered the process of development of capitalist underdevelopment to make India an "emerging economy." With political support from the Indian state, Indian big business and the multinationals have driven the land grabs that threaten further dispossession and displacement of Adivasis from their habitats in central and eastern India. Structurally bred on "rent" (monopoly profit) – the antithesis of what the classical economists regarded as profit – constantly seeking monopoly positions, and accumulating vast amounts of capital derived from "rent," big business, able to get the necessary political support from the Indian state, has sought to transform many a "noncapitalist area" over the last three decades.

At the heart of the economic process – and discovery of what Luxemburg (1951, p. 452) calls the "stern laws of the economic process" – in the contemporary period is high finance. Wealth fundamentally originates in the exploitation of labor and the appropriation of nature in the process of production, but goes through all kinds of markets to become commodities, money, stocks and bonds, and other financial instruments, and back into money, commodities, and so on, with the hindmost appropriated by the financial aristocracy and other sections of big business. In this Age of Financial Capital, a relatively independent financial complex sits on top of the world's *real* economy and its national units and significantly influences the structure and behavior of those real economies and the corporations therein. The latter are driven more and more to mobilizing their cash reserves for financial speculation and entrepreneurship [Sweezy 1994].

In the specific setting of accumulation by dispossession in the so-called "noncapitalist areas" – areas not yet under the influence of big business enterprise that has all the necessary political support to transform them – the creation of huge capital-gains opportunities begins with the state virtually driving peasants, including those dwelling in and cultivating patches of forest land, out of their habitats. The state then under-prices its sales of the grabbed lands and other natural resources to big business enterprises, the very resources they covet for their manufacturing, industrial, mining, electricity generation and transmission, real estate, or infrastructural projects. For mining, the state hands over lucrative leases for a pittance – that is, the extractive rents of the increasingly scarce minerals are appropriated by mining capital that pays mere symbolic royalties to the *rentier* state. Having gained ownership over scarce natural-resource assets, the market valuation of which turns out to be a multiple of the under-valued prices at which they were bought, massive capital-gains opportunities are almost guaranteed, and the political brokers who fix the original deals get their cut (D'Mello 2018, p. 200).

The capital-gains opportunities come not merely from the bonanza of getting the natural resources dirt cheap. There is also an element of pure speculation, for instance, betting on expectations of such bonanzas in the future, which spurs further inflation of their underlying finan-cial-asset values. Indeed, the whole dynamic of accumulation by dispossession in the "non-capitalist areas" that promises cheap natural-resource hoards on the asset side of big-business balance sheets seems to be at the root of the unbridled greed and the political violence esca-lating into a war of the state against one's own people where the victims uncompromisingly resist their dispossession by resort to peasant insurgency. The prospect of big cuts for the likely political brokers leads to big money-backed elec-toral contests for political power. Accompanying the unbridled greed and the political violence of the counterinsurgency are, besides fraud and looting, the incapacity to recognize the value of older, nature-revering cultures, and the abuse of tribal habitats and ecosystems (D'Mello 2018, pp. 200–201).

Given the leading role of high finance in the world-capitalist system from the 1990s onwards, at the economic core of the new imperialism in the first two decades of the twenty-first century is "globalized monopoly-finance capital" (Foster 2015). The land grabs *steered* by the Indian state–big business combine in the Adivasi areas of central and eastern India, the expropriations of Adivasi habitats there, are driven, as I have argued earlier, by the financialization of the accumulation-by-dispossession process that serves the interests of globalized monopoly-finance capital. The Indian state–big business combine is subordinate to globalized US monop-oly-finance capital and the US Treasury, which has foisted neo-liberal financial-sector policies on the Indian economy.

At the core of this excursion into certain aspects of the theory and history of modern impe-rialism are the activities, interests, and powers of corporations and states (also see Sweezy 1978). From the foregoing, it seems clear that imperial-ism is a process by which big business and the state team[ed] up to expand their activities, their interests, and their power beyond the borders of the nation and in the nation's so-called "non-capitalist areas." Rosa Luxemburg hit the nail on the head when she showed that imperialism, which was barbaric in the colonies, was in the very nature of capitalism, the way of life of capitalism. Capitalism has been Janus-faced – life largely subject to the rules of civilization at the center; life under inhuman conditions in the periphery with the state disregarding those rules that stemmed from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

Of course, as the reader would have noticed, I have all along put the description "noncapitalist areas" in double-inverted commas and even, at times, called them "so-called." From this it should be evident that I do not consider capitalism as only an economic system where practically all labor-power and land are available as commodities and all production leads to the generation and appro-priation of surplus value, and this view of mine is contrary to what Luxemburg was arguing in

her *The Accumulation of Capital*. However, Luxemburg chose to examine a pristine pure capitalism precisely in order to show that its very existence is predicated upon its imperialist behavior. Quoting from the end of Marx's chapter 31, "The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist," in *Capital, Volume I*, with reference to the original accumulation of capital, that "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt," she writes that this "characterizes not only the birth of capital but also its progress in the world at every step, . . ." (Luxemburg 1951/1913, p. 453). I agree. After India was subjugated and turned into a colony, forcibly made to enter the world-capitalist economy, the discontinuous processes of commodification of land, commercialization of forests, and proletarianization of labor, brutal planned processes have been underway over historical time right up to the present. Let me then get to the community – the Adivasis – worst affected by those processes over the last two hundred years.

Being Adivasi: Theory, History, and Roots

Adivasi is a twentieth-century term by which a large section of the "tribal" people of India generally refer to themselves. The various Adivasis – specific "tribes," for instance, Gond, Kol, Munda, and Santal in the central-eastern region of India – are distinct communities of people, with their own dialects, customs, culture, and rules which structure how they act towards and in regard to each other. What distinguishes them from mainstream Indian society, whether Bengali, Bihari, Odiya, or Telugu, is internal social relations based much more on perceived kinship bonds, frequent cooperation to achieve common goals stemming from a collectivist tradition, and maintenance of a certain distance from the state and mainstream society because there is a historical memory of such contact – with state officials, traders, usurers, and contractors – as having brought oppression, exploitation and degradation (Hardiman 2015, pp. 3–4; Shah 2010, pp. 9–35; Xaxa 1999).

Are the Adivasis really India's "indigenous people"? The eminent archaeologist and historian, Shereen Ratnagar, whose work has focused on the Indus Valley Civilization, writes that "to claim that the Aryan immigration of the second millennium BC was a watershed that divided indigenes from colonizers is fraught with problems. . . . There has not been uninterrupted settlement in the same villages since prehistoric times in any part of the country. Instead we have archaeological evidence for abandonment of not only villages but entire regions; there would have been migrations, and colonization of new lands through the ages. Second, claims that forest-dwellers are indigenous to their area disregard the fact that ethnic identities change over periods of time, and often imply that forest-dwellers have not changed since the stone ages—and that may be more pejorative than the nomenclature 'tribes'" (Ratnagar 2003, pp. 19–20).

I have been putting the word "tribe" in double-inverted commas because for some, and for Indian officialdom, as in "Scheduled Tribe," it implies "primitiveness" and "backwardness." Tribes, of course, predate class society, characterized as they are by the social relation of kinship, socially recognized and culturally formed, and *joint* ownership of the natural resources from which they made a living. Associated with ancestors and jointly held, all the members of the tribe had rights to a share of the land as part of that natural resource base, and the group exercised its sovereignty over it.

As regards actual tribal society, as Ratnagar puts it: "For prehistorians, tribal society represents a stage of social evolution that took shape in the neo-lithic 'revolution'—the transition when, any time after about 9000–8000 BC, in various phases and places in West and South Asia, diverse groups took to cultivating crops and taming and breeding animals, thereby ceasing to rely exclusively on hunting, gathering, foraging and fishing for their food. ... ... In pre- and proto-historic India, there were dozens of such societies. Common to them are small villages, simple material culture, a limited range of tool types, mostly one-room huts, a few crafts like the production of pottery and clay figurines,

and diverse food-procurement strategies" (Ratnagar 2003, pp. 22, 23).

In later periods, following the social evolution of class societies, tribes coexisted with such societies, whether petty-commodity, tribute-paying social formations in India's precolonial period, or later in the colonial period with the development of capitalist underdevelopment. But they were no longer tribes in the original sense of the term, more so in the nineteenth century, when colonial ethnographers, steeped in a racist anthropology, characterized them as "primitive tribes." From the precolonial period, the upper-caste elite characterized forest dwellers – *pulkasas* in the *Laws of Manu* – as "the lowest of men" (Hardiman 2015, p. 3). So, it comes as no surprise that the upper-caste elite readily appropriated nineteenth-century colonial anthropology's characterization of caste status and tribe in a racist idiom.

Colonial empire building, territorial expansion, and domination of the weaker princely states, unlike in precapitalist times, no longer left the economic basis of the conquered or the dominated territories intact. The economic base of these territories, including the forests, was transformed and adapted to serve the imperatives of the accumulation of capital in Britain. The relative political autonomy that the various Adivasi communities had was now the nostalgic stuff of their precolonial past. The forests were at first demarcated but disregarded because they were areas that did not bring in the revenue that accrued to the (East India) Company-state from agriculture. But later, when their commercial value was recognized, and in the face of the huge demand for durable timber from the British Royal Navy and the railways, they were sought to be "enclosed" and managed by a forest department (created in 1864) of the colonial government as part of the process of commercializing them.

With the coming of the forest acts of 1865, 1878, and 1927 on the statute, "transgression," especially in the "reserved forests" but also in the "protected forests," even if this was merely to collect some fuel wood, or to graze cattle, or collect minor forest produce, was dealt with severely. Not only were the forests subjected to

Enclosure, even "wastelands" meant for grazing were sought to be "reclaimed," so much so that the precolonial fluid extension of occupations related to forests, grazing, and cultivation of fields was disrupted with the colonial demarcation of the three. The so-called "forest people" were forced to remain in their defined domain (terrain) and occupation, and militant political assertion of hitherto shared customary rights over all three, forests, grazing, and cultivation of fields, was deemed to be "criminal." Cultivation of lands in areas demarcated as forests was also deemed illegal. The "customary rights" of the Adivasi peasants were disregarded. The commodification of wood and other forest products attracted more sahukars (mahajans), merchants, and contractors into the forested and hilly areas.

Earlier, the Company-state's extension of the land tenure system to the peripheries of these areas that were cultivated by the Adivasis and the settling in of moneylenders and traders from the plains pushed many of the former into debts they couldn't repay. This led to dispossession of their lands (the collateral security for the loans), and desperate forced-migration as "coolies"/indentured laborers, through a recruitment system akin to that of slavery, to plantations in far-off Mauritius or British Guiana (in the Caribbean) and, later, from central India in the mid-nineteenth century, to the tea gardens in Assam and Darjeeling (Ghosh 1999; Dasgupta 1981).

After suppressing the insurgencies, the colonial administration instituted reform in the form of protectionary measures. For instance, following the Kol rebellion of 1831–1832, the Wilkinson rule that provided for a degree of self-governance by tribal village councils. After the Santal *hul* of 1855–56, the Santal Parganas Settlement Regulation Act of 1872, which legally blocked the transfer of lands to nontribal persons in the Santal Parganas. The Scheduled Districts Act of 1874 too. And subsequent to the 1899–1900 Birsaite (Munda) *ulgulan*, the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act of 1908 (Shah 2010, pp. 14–15, 18). Certainly, these were gains that had been won for Adivasis by their peasant-insurgent comrades. But unlettered in the official language of the courts, and anyway, with power still in the hands of the

Sarkar–sahukar–zamindar trinity, these gains were never secure.

By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the "tribes" in central and eastern India no longer occupied coherent areas. Their languages were in the process of being lost. The economic structure, the material culture, and the social practices in the areas they inhabited were significantly permeated by those of class–caste society within which the Adivasis found themselves. The surpluses they generated were appropriated by mercantile capital. With the commodification of land, and hence individual ownership and tenancy, the social fabric of kinship had been torn apart. Moreover, many tribal peasants, heavily indebted to moneylenders and landlords, had lost their lands and were forced into bonded or indentured labor. Large-scale displacement, in the colonial period itself, to make way for the railways, plantations, army and paramilitary cantonments, and coal mining and stone quarrying, had fragmented many a tribal community. Importantly, class formation had proceeded further within the Adivasi communities as they faced the pressures of class society more deeply under capitalist underdevelopment.

Over time, bitten by the capitalist bug, some of the Adivasi village, tehsil and district headmen turned into large landowners, imperiling community rights. Adherence to the norm of individual rights being subsumed within community control began abating. Some of the large landowners even appropriated the *gairmazurwa khas* (the non-revenue paying wastelands) for themselves (Roy Burman 2009). Their progeny are the Adivasis who have forgotten their own history of resistance to capitalism's way of life or do not want to be reminded of it. They have been assimilated into the socio-economic system on that system's terms. Co-optation has, to an extent, corrupted the Adivasi peasantry's social fabric of cooperation, community, and solidarity, or what remains of it. Adivasi ethnicity must thus be seen in an historical context, and Adivasi culture must be tied to historical tradition (Devalle 1992).

Overall, the Adivasis transformation process over the longue durée – if one were to use that expression from the French Annales School of historiography – has been towards a peasantry (Devalle 1981), albeit without complete obliteration of the attributes that characterize a tribe. The latter is evident in the social recognition of kinship; "kinsmen" helping one another with labor and instruments of cultivation on one another's plots of land on the basis of reciprocity, not exchange; individual rights still considered to be embedded in community rights; an exceptional degree of self-sufficiency of Adivasi peasant households; a better-off Adivasi peasant household generally not exploiting the labor or the goodwill of its poorer kinsmen; and greater relative gender equality. The peasant attributes of rural Adivasis have been/are evident, as I will show when I discuss the core aspects of the insurgencies, in their very definition of themselves, in alliance with other tribes and oppressed castes, and in opposition to the *Sarkar–sahukar–zamindar* trinity then, and the Indian state–big business combine now, defending their rights to the lands they had/have been inhabiting and tilling for generations. The class alliance, though it did/does not constitute the principal element of rebel solidarity, was/is of all exploited Adivasis and oppressed castes, and hence it transcended/transcends Adivasi affiliation. In other words, there has been no "isolated tribalism" in such resistance. Let me then get to the three most-significant Adivasi insurgencies in nineteenth-century India.

The Kol, Santal, and Birsaite (Munda) Insurgencies

The Kol Rebellion of 1831–32, the Santal Hul of 1855–1856, and the Birsaite (Munda) ulgulan of 1899–1900 – "the most massive and powerful of all such uprisings … bordered on peasant wars" (Guha 1983, p. 159). They were part of Indian peasant resistance to their oppression and exploitation in colonial India that took on the attributes of insurgency. In analyzing the three rebellions as Adivasi peasant resistance taking on the attributes of insurgency, I draw on Ranajit Guha's classic, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (1983) that has done much to throw light on peasant-insurgent

politics and collective action in India during the period 1783–1900, from the Rangpur *dhing* in 1783 to the Birsaite *ulgulan* in 1899–1900.

I must, however, state upfront the main point of difference I have with Guha. Underlying his analysis is the implicit view that in India in the colonial period, to maintain its rule, British imperialism had allied with Indian *feudalism*, and it was this which accounted for the prevailing state of backwardness and determined the *semi-feudal* character of the exploitation, oppression, and domination of the peasantry. I stress the fact that India came into the world capitalist system as a colony of Britain much after the latter had been through the process of original accumulation of capital and as the industrial revolution was underway in Britain. Under the sway of the policies of its oppressor and suppressor, Britain, which tailored those colonial policies – in the nineteenth century, mainly centered on the commoditization of land and forests, the commercialization of agriculture, and "deindustrialization" – to advance the accumulation of capital in Britain, India experienced capitalist underdevelopment, not "semi-feudal" backwardness.

Instead of chronological descriptions of the Kol, Santal, and Birsaite insurgencies, I will – viewing insurgency and counterinsurgency together, with the latter inevitably accompanying the former – comment on what led to insurgency; the Adivasi insurgent's consciousness as a class; the Adivasi peasants' view of themselves as rebels; the forms of struggle; the nature of solidarity of the oppressed; and the essentially local character of the revolts. In covering all these aspects, I draw mainly, but not uncritically, from Guha (1983), for his is a historiography not undermined or prejudiced by the "facts" and the views of the counterinsurgency about the insurgency.

All the three insurgencies, the Kol, the Santal, and the Birsaite, were war-like campaigns spread over several districts. The Kol insurrection of 1831–1832 over a greater part of the Chotanagpur region and Palamau, with the Larka Kols of Singbhum crossing over to assist the rebels. The Santal hul of 1855–56, with a rapid thrust and phenomenal spread over Damin-i-Koh and Birbhum and from there over a wide area up to

Bhagalpur. The Birsaite ulgulan of 1899–1900, with an abrupt beginning and a rapid advance over the Chotanagpur region.

The Kol insurrection took almost complete possession of the Chotanagpur region in a matter of four weeks. As the main leader of the insurrection, Bindrai explained, the rebellion was against "those who have deprived us of both honour & homes. … They have taken away from us our trees, fishes, lands and jagirs [land grants]" (Guha 1983, pp. 283, 287). It was even officially acknowledged that the "massive alienation of tribal lands to outsiders in the years preceding the insurrection" (Guha 1983, p. 287), with the Company-state desperate to increase its revenue through commoditization of the land, was the main cause of the "jacquerie," as the British called it. So one might say that the combined effect of the colonial government and its Indian collaborators who had come into the region following its ceding to the Company-state had led to the expropriation of the homeland of the Adivasi people, which led them to revolt.

The Santal hul was preceded in 1854 by gangs of hungry and famished "social dacoits" seeking justice in open acts of defiance, robbing food. Upon being dealt with by the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as criminals, even as the exacting merchant-moneylenders were favored by the police and the courts, the Santals were appalled by the double standards, and this was one of the main reasons that provoked the hul (Guha 1983, pp. 95–101). The Adivasi peasants felt that their own social–moral code, according to which the government had an obligation to provide for a subsistence minimum, was an overriding right of the starving food-robbers. They viewed themselves as rebels, but the police's "insistence on dealing with them as criminals is what triggered off the insurrection" (Guha 1983, p. 99). Moreover, it was the Santals that had earlier cleared forest land and brought it under the plough, but with the Company-state's commoditization of land and its alienation to zamindars and mahajans (sahukars), and the Sarkar intervening favorably on their behalf, the Adivasi peasantry made no difference between the Sarkar and the *diku* (the outsider–exploiter). The historic paravānā (warrant) – declaration of intent to wage war – issued by Sido and Kanhu,

leaders of the Santal hul, was a proclamation of Santal belligerence addressed to both the colonial government and its Indian collaborators, the native exploiters of the Adivasi peasantry (Guha 1983, pp. 283–284).

Among what caused the Birsaite ulgulan, as expressed by the Mundas, was the loss of their *khunt-katti* rights – claimed by Adivasi descendants over lands reclaimed from the forests at the time when their villages were founded. This was after their repeated appeals to the Sarkar and the missionaries brought no redress. Great hopes were kindled when Birsa, in the form of a prophetic savior, came on the scene. As the ritual chant of the Mundas when the hour struck for the ulgulan, translated by Kumar Suresh Singh in his 1966 classic, *The Dust Storm and the Hanging Mist: A Study of Birsa Munda and His Movement in Chhotanagpur, 1874–1901*, went: "... We shall not leave the zamindars, moneylenders and shopkeepers [alone] / They occupied our land / We shall not give up our *khunt-katti* rights /... / O Birsa, our land is afloat / Our country drifts away ... / The big enemy, the sahebs donning the hat / Seized our land" (Guha 1983, p. 288). Thus, recovery of the lost homeland of the Mundas was the main aim of the ulgulan, a homeland gone in the imperialist process of commodification of land and enclosure of their forests, from which they were banned or restricted.

In all the three rebellions, the Adivasi insurgents had what might be called an incipient form of class consciousness, for they made clear distinctions between the section of the non-Adivasi population that was their enemy, landlords, and mahajans (merchant–moneylenders), and the rest who came from the oppressed castes and classes. The Kols singled out the landlords and moneylenders among the *suds*, non-Adivasi outsiders, and when the Company-state came to the defense of these class enemies, a war-like campaign developed against the Company-state (Guha 1983, p. 26). In the hul, in many villages, the Santals burnt down the houses of the *mahajans* but spared those of the oppressed peasants. The Birsaite ulgulan, even as it was launched to liberate the Munda homeland from

British rule, clearly expressed its hatred for banias (traders) and mahajans (moneylenders) as exploiters (Guha 1983, pp. 22–23, 26). What had emerged in these three insurgencies was an incipient form of class consciousness – no longer reconciling themselves to their lowly conditions, the Adivasi peasants implicitly defined themselves as a class opposed to the zamindar, the sahukar, and the sarkari officials.

The three Adivasi insurgencies were, in their very nature, political resistance against imperialism. There was an *openness* in their affirmation of intent, with practically no attempt to conceal the violence by pretending to conform to law and order. The insurrections were *public* and *collective* political acts, with parleys and assemblies to establish their legitimacy, and forms of mass mobilization, and with explicit warnings in advance by the Kols and the Santals. Just as the Adivasis engaged in collective labor in the harvesting of their crops, so too did they decide to engage in collective violence against their oppressors (Guha 1983, p. 126). They were *destructive*, no doubt, what with all the wrecking, arson, and looting. In all this destruction, what stood out was "demolition of the symbols of enemy authority" and settling accounts with the Sarkar, the sahukar, and the zamindar. The insurgencies were near *class wars*, expressing the will of the oppressed and the exploited classes.

Nevertheless, killing was *not* the principal modality of the insurgents, although the few informers that surfaced and the few traitors that came to light were assassinated. Retributive killing, as in tenant murdering his landlord, or debtor his usurer, or untouchable his caste-Hindu tormentor, was minimal – although the degree of exploitation and oppression knew no bounds. Of course, as between insurgency and counterinsurgency, it was a very unequal confrontation, with largely axes, knives, and bows and arrows, but with a gut understanding of what it takes to fight as the underdog in an asymmetric war, all this on the side of the insurgency, and guns and sabres, and cavalries, and trained soldiers and officers of the British colonial army on the side of the counterinsurgency. Moreover, the counterinsurgency, expressing the will of the Sarkar and

committed to protecting the *sahukar* and the *zamindar*, invariably "made of killing a principal modality" (Guha 1983, p. 161). A village united in resistance was condemned as a "dacoit village" and marked out for destruction. Mass solidarity and fervor fostered by the rebellion was diagnosed as "contagion," as in the spread of a virus. The ones inspired by the ethics of the insurgent political project were labeled "fanatics." Defiance of criminal law as in the IPC, or unlawful application of it, was labeled "lawlessness," and insurgents bent on "turning the world upside down" were deemed to be "criminals" (Guha 1983, pp. 16–17).

As regards solidarity, in all the three insurrections, there were inter-tribal alliances of armed collaboration with most of the other tribal peasantry in the rebel areas, and so there was an Adivasi identity of the peasantry involved in them. The counterinsurgency tactic of inter-tribal divide and rule failed. In the Santal hul, the nontribal *Gwalas* (shephards), the *Lohars* (blacksmiths), and the *Doms* (Untouchables, the most persecuted in the caste hierarchy) came on the side of the insurgency. In the Kol and Munda insurrections, the Adivasi insurgents "were careful systematically to spare from violence many of the poorer classes of the non-tribal population with whom they had customary economic and social transactions in the rural communities where they lived as neighbours" (Guha 1983, p. 176). This might seem that class solidarity had cut across ethnic divisions among the rural poor, as fearful British officials at the time of the Kol rebellion seemed to think, but, in reality, class consciousness did not make up the principal component of rebel solidarity (Guha 1983, pp. 176–177).

One of the direct results of the colonialist creation of a highly centralized state in the Indian subcontinent, linking urban mercantile and credit capital with the businesses of the landlords and the moneylenders in the countryside, was the strengthening of the landlord's and the moneylender's authority when they got the backing of the sarkar. The coexistence of the *kacheri* in the district headquarters – the official buildings housing the court, the treasury, the police station,

and the jail – and the *havelis* (mansions) of the big merchants, indigenous bankers, and absentee landlords made it easier to put in place the legal cover necessary for the usurious and rack-renting transactions. Of course, I must add, following the Charter Act of 1813, which abolished the East India Company's monopoly over India's foreign trade, the triumph of the Industrial Revolution leading to the swamping of the Indian domestic market with British factory-made goods; the turning of India into a primary producer for the British industrial system; the more successful zamindars took to trade and commerce in collaboration with British concerns as junior partners. The peasants really hated and regarded with fear the *kacheri* and the *haveli*, the two main visible symbols of authority. The combination of the landlord's and the moneylender's authority with that of the Sarkar, the blending of the mores of landlordism and usury with the ruling culture of imperialism, complicity and legal cover that safeguarded the interests of the Sarkar and the landlords and moneylenders, all of this provided peasant insurgency with the objective conditions of its emergence and propensity to spread (for a similar view, but one that holds that colonialism allied with Indian "semi-feudalism," see Guha 1983, p. 226).

Peasant insurgency as the principal antithesis of imperialism took place alongside the growth and consolidation of the "colonial empire with its centralised bureaucracy, army, legal system, institutions to purvey a western-style education, its railways, roads and postal communication, and above all, the emergence of an all-India market economy" (Guha 1983, p. 297) in the nineteenth century with mercantile capital in India as an appendage to industrial capital in Britain. Certainly, the more the colonial state apparatus and infrastructure and the mercantile capitalist economy on an all-India scale grew and got consolidated, the more the peasant revolts – imbued as they were with "peasant localism," confined within local boundaries, and preoccupied with local considerations – got undermined. The "domain of rebellion" remained a small subset of the "domain of the nation" (Guha 1983, p. 331), and hence, more vulnerable to defeat. The domains of the three insurgencies were as large as

the areas the main tribe involved inhabited, what it called its homeland, and wherein there had been a massive alienation of Adivasi lands. "(C)oresidential solidarity and primordial loyalty" severely restrained the spread of such resistance against colonialism (Guha 1983, p. 331).

"Yet all such limitations notwithstanding," as Ranajit Guha asks, "where else except in this fragmented insurgent consciousness is one to situate the beginnings of those militant mass [anti-imperialist, I might add] movements which surged across the subcontinent in 1919, 1942 and 1946? . . . (N)ot to recognize in ... [the tribal and non-tribal] peasant insurgencies—limited as they were by 'the habit of thinking and acting on a small scale'—]the elements of what made the broader and more generalized struggles of the Indian people possible in the twentieth century would be to foreshorten history. . . . Many of the mass movements of the twentieth century[—the Rowlatt Satyagraha, Quit India, Tebhaga, Telangana, and, I might add, the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency—]bear at least some of . . . [the] hallmarks [of the nineteenth-century peasant-insurgent's consciousness]" (Guha 1983, pp. 331–332).

Adivasi–Maoist Resistance to the Land Grab in Bastar

This brings me to Adivasi resistance to imperialism in the present period. The development of capitalist underdevelopment makes for the element of continuity in the chequered careers of colonial and independent India. No wonder that from 1967 onwards, two decades after independence in 1947, Naxalite–Maoist peasant insurgency took shape in different local areas, especially Adivasi inhabited ones, in the States of West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh (Telangana), Bihar (Jharkhand), Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh), Maharashtra, and Odisha, and has been resisting capitalist underdevelopment ever since (D'Mello 2018: Chaps. 1, 4, and 7). But even as mainstream nationalist and social-democratic left politics came into its own on a subcontinental basis in the twentieth century, this peasant

insurgency has remained localized, in severely underdeveloped areas in certain regions. It has failed to spread far and wide over the vast countryside of the Indian subcontinent.

At the heart of the conflict has been the alienation of land, the taking away of the means whereby a peasant lives, either in the course of class differentiation of the peasantry or in the underdevelopment that has accompanied industrialization and urbanization. The last two decades of the twentieth century and the first two of the twenty-first century have witnessed breakneck relocation of "old" industries out of the developed capitalist countries and into mainly the so-called emerging economies, especially China, but also India. Capitalist underdevelopment, as a process, has its roots in imperialism, which has been a way of life of capitalism as a world-system, constantly developing in a combined but uneven way. As the center has been relocating the "old" industries to the semi-periphery, it has been taking on "new," science-based, high-tech ones.

Space does not permit me to cover the long-running Naxalite/Maoist peasant insurgency in which Adivasis have always had a big hand. The processes of commodification/commercialization of land, forests, and other natural resources have yet to exhaust their historical potential. In their unfolding during the colonial period, they have invariably been brutal and violent. What I now do is look at one more phase of these ongoing processes, this in southern Chhattisgarh – what was once the dependent princely state of Bastar that acceded to India in 1948 – that has led to what could well have been one of the biggest and most brutal land-grabs for private corporations in independent India, as also militant Adivasi–Maoist resistance to it. But, of course, Adivasi peasants have not been the only victims of dispossession of their lands. There have been many resistance movements against acquisition of land, especially when the state has sought to grab lands for and on behalf of private corporations (Shrivastava and Kothari 2012, pp. 193–230).

In the first decade of the new millennium, the dynamic of accumulation by dispossession brought on a corporate land grab in some of the districts in the Bastar region. Tata Steel was

planning to set up a five million tons per annum steel plant in the district of Bastar. Essar Steel was lining up to build a 3.2 million tons per annum steel plant in the district of Dantewada. Tata Steel allegedly tried to rig *gram-sabha* (village assembly) consent in the Lohandiguda block of the district of Bastar, while Essar Steel reportedly tried to do the same in the Dhurli block of Dantewada district (Bharadwaj 2009; Navlakha 2012, pp. 26–39).

In 2003–2004, the then Union Home Minister, the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party's L. K. Advani assured "support" to so-called "people's resistance groups" to undermine the support the Maoists had in the Adivasi village communities and wean away the villagers from the Maoists (UMHA 2004, p. 44). In the financial year 2004–2005, grants were disbursed to "Nagarik Suraksha Samitis" (citizen defense outfits) under the budgetary heading "security-related expenditure" and to the state police for honorariums to be disbursed to "Special Police Officers" (SPOs) (UMHA 2005, pp. 47–48) – irregular recruits from the local population who are given basic arms training and made to perform certain functions in the counterinsurgency, for example, as informers.

The central government and its provincial counterpart in Chhattisgarh were thus able to create the wherewithal for the launch of a state-backed, armed private vigilante force to cut off the villagers from the Maoists. This force, called Salwa Judum (meaning "purification hunt," in Gondi), was launched in June 2005. It assisted the armed police forces in the counterinsurgency's attempt to create "strategic hamlets" – separation of the local population from the Maoist guerrillas by putting the former in small segregated settlements, thereby depriving the "fish" (the guerrillas) of the proverbial "sea" (the local population) in which they must swim in order to survive. Indeed, Essar Steel and Tata Steel reportedly began to contract with Salwa Judum for "protection and 'ground-clearing' services." A "land and power grab," with Salwa Judum "leaders' function(ing) as local warlords," was "masquerading as a local uprising" (Miklian 2009, pp. 442, 456; Navlakha 2012, pp. 116–120). "Warlords" to "landlords" – the "local warlords,"

under "contract" from the two big steel companies, were overnight turning into "landlords" to rake in the moolah!

In Dantewada, Bastar, and Bijapur districts, in the corporate land grab, entire villages were evacuated, and villagers forcibly herded into camps, that is, strategic hamlets, from which those who escaped were branded Maoists and hunted down. According to a 2009 draft report authored by Sub-Group IV of the Committee on State Agrarian Relations and Unfinished Task of Land Reforms, set up by the Ministry of Rural Development, New Delhi, Salwa Judum was "supported with the fire power and organization of the central forces." This report was quickly withdrawn from the ministry's website for it drew attention to, in its own words, "the biggest grab of tribal land after Columbus" in the making, initially "scripted by Tata Steel and Essar Steel who want seven villages or thereabouts each to mine the richest lode of iron ore available in India."

In Dantewada and Bijapur districts, backed by the security forces, between June 2005 and 2009, Salwa Judum razed 644 villages, hounded the inhabitants into roadside police camps ("strategic hamlets"!), and forced many more to escape in order to save life and limb. Around 350,000 Adivasis were displaced – 47,000 were forcibly herded into roadside camps, 40,000 fled across the state border into Andhra Pradesh, and 263,000 sought shelters in the forests. Perhaps this was the largest and most brutal displacement so far in independent India in the state's bid to grab lands for and on behalf of private corporations (D'Mello 2018, pp. 191–92).

Such brutality as part of the process of accumulation by dispossession of Adivasis from their habitats was unleashed to put cheap natural-resource hoards on the asset side of big-business balance sheets and thereby create huge capital gains opportunities. As I have explained earlier, this has been at the root of the unbridled greed and political violence. The diabolical Operation Dispossession escalated into a war of the Indian state against its own people, for the Adivasi victims, under Maoist leadership, ultimately got together to uncompromisingly resist their dispossession. Big money-backed electoral contests

for political power; fraud and looting; incapacity to recognize the value of older, nature-revering cultures; the abuse of Adivasi habitats and ecosystems. All these happenings remind me of what Rosa Luxemburg (1951/1913) passionately wrote, and I quoted from some of those passages earlier, about what colonial capitalism had done in the "noncapitalist areas" of the world.

The Salwa Judum operation, militarily backed by the security forces, had a devastating impact on the Gondi Adivasi peasants. From June 2005, for about 8 months, the Adivasi–Maoist People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), including its militias at the village-level, could not prevent the killings of hundreds of ordinary Adivasi peasants, the razing of hundreds of villages, the forcible herding of people into camps, and the sexual atrocities against women. Vast stretches of cultivable land lay fallow; collection of minor forest produce was totally disrupted; people did not have access to the weekly *haats* (local markets); the schools had been turned into police camps. A complete trampling upon the rights of people and a total rupture of the social-cultural fabric of life were a stark reminder of rule under an occupation army (HRW 2008; PUDR–PUCL 2006; Independent Citizens' Initiative 2006).

It was only after eight months that the Maoists raised a Bhumkal militia – named after an historic Adivasi uprising, the Bhumkal rebellion, in Bastar in 1910 – which then led the resistance at the local level and protected the people who gradually resumed agricultural cultivation and collection of minor forest produce. On July 16, 2006, the PLGA attacked a Salwa Judum– SPO-organized, security forces-protected, Errabore camp in Dantewada and freed the detainees. On March 15, 2007, the PLGA attacked a police camp that had been set up in a girls' school in Ranibodli (in Bijapur police district) and killed 68 policemen, a significant proportion of them SPOs, and looted weapons. Of course, they ensured that all the schoolgirls in the hostel were safe. It is significant that after most of such attacks the Party appealed to the SPOs – who were locally recruited Adivasi youth – to quit their jobs and seek the people's pardon (D'Mello 2018, pp. 235–236).

But the Salwa Judum–SPO operation went on. On January 8, 2009, in the village of Singaram (Dantewada district), the Salwa Judum–SPOs displayed a level of savagery, indeed, barbarity, that was shocking. They took their hostages to a canal and butchered them, taking turns in raping the women before slaughtering them (D'Mello 2018, p. 236). Under the Union Home Ministry, a joint command to coordinate the counterinsurgency operations of the central security forces with the police forces of the seven Maoist-insurgency-affected states – Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Maharashtra, and West Bengal – was already in place. In September 2009, the Union Home Ministry directed this joint command to intensify the counterinsurgency with the launch of Operation Green Hunt (OGH). The Indian state forces have since been "hunting" Adivasis! Significantly, Dantewada, the epicenter of what the Indian state calls "left-wing extremism," was where OGH began, in the Kishtaram-Gollapalli area.

The Maoists responded with a major "tactical counter-offensive campaign." On April 6, 2010, PLGA guerrillas the size of a small battalion ambushed troops of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), including members of COBRA (the CRPF's Commando Battalion for Resolute Action), between Tadimetla and Mukaram villages in Dantewada district. They killed 76 of the state troops in this ambush. In the statement issued after the attack, in a section entitled "why this counterattack was carried out?" the Communist Party of India (Maoist) mentions, among other things, the barbaric acts of the state forces, the Singaram incident (the atrocity mentioned above), in particular (D'Mello 2018, pp. 236–237).

The Adivasi–Maoist guerrilla army, much more accomplished in the art of guerrilla warfare, and with the Adivasi population its eyes and ears over the vast terrain, could not be subdued by the technologically better-equipped state forces. In January 2013, the Union Home Ministry directed the joint command to step up OGH. Not able to get at the PLGA guerrillas, the state forces began targeting the civilian support base of the Maoists more than before to show a larger

number of Maoists killed. Most of the dead have, however, been noncombatant civilians. Villages deemed to be supportive of the Maoists have been targeted with unilateral and indiscriminate firing on villagers, for instance, in Sarkeguda, Kothaguda, and Rajpenta (in Bijapur district in southern Chhattisgarh) on June 28, 2012, when nineteen noncombatant Adivasis were gunned down, even when there was no exchange of fire. The security forces reckoned that noncombatant Adivasis who supported the Maoists deserved to be killed, for the state intelligence had identified the "Maoist villages" (D'Mello 2018, p. 237).

On July 5, 2011, in a public interest litigation, "Nandini Sundar & Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh," the Supreme Court declared the practice of the state of arming local Adivasi youth as Special Police Officers and of funding the recruitment of vigilante groups like Salwa Judum to fight the Maoists, unconstitutional. But, ignoring this Supreme Court order, the State of Chhattisgarh did nothing to disband this state-backed, armed private vigilante force. The Maoists were left with little choice but to deal with the supreme "warlord" of the Salwa Judum, Mahendra Karma. An opportunity came their way when an armed convoy of provincial Congress Party leaders accompanied by Mahendra Karma were passing through the Darba Ghati valley in the Sukma area, 345 kms south of the state capital of Raipur, on May 25, 2013. In a daring operation, Adivasi–Maoist guerrillas ambushed the convoy, leaving the state's security and intelligence apparatus shocked. The Z-plus armed security personnel – entitlements of the "lords" of India's political establishment – were no match for the guerrillas. Mahendra Karma, founder of the Salwa Judum, was among the dead (Navlakha and D'Mello 2013).

The Indian state's war against its own people in southern Chhattisgarh goes on. The counterinsurgency operations have gone high-tech with "fortified" police stations and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), deployed to "remote sense" the locations (and relocations) of the "left-wing extremist" Adivasi guerrillas. The government has reportedly deployed around 120,000 armed personnel, commandos, paramilitary, and police,

including "India Reserve" battalions, in the Dandakaranya region, the larger Adivasi inhabited terrain – of which Bastar is a part – in the guerrilla war. It cannot stomach the fact that Tata Steel was forced to give up its plans to locate a five million ton per annum steel plant in Bastar in the face of concerted militant resistance of the Adivasi people there. More generally, the militant resistance of the Adivasi–Maoists since 1967 has also forced the reluctant and resistant capitalist power to institute the following protective laws: (a) the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) that grants self-governance through *Gram Sabhas* (village assemblies) for people living in the Scheduled Areas; and (b) the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (the Forest Rights Act) that grants Adivasi and other forest dwellers individual and/or community tenures to forest land. But, with power remaining in the hands of the Indian state–big business combine, these laws have so far proved to be of little worth to the Adivasi peasantry.

Conclusion

Adivasi resistance to imperialism over the last two hundred years, as I have shown, has basically stemmed from the expropriation of what the Adivasi peasantry has considered its lands and forests, indeed, its homelands. This expropriation has been the consequence of the discontinuous processes of commoditization and commercialization of land and forests, respectively, and the intermittent process of proletarianization of labor, all three over historical time, as brutal planned undertakings, and still ongoing. The launch of the three processes followed the incorporation of India into the world-capitalist system as a colony of Britain, and they have yet to exhaust their historical potential. They have brought about forms of exploitative and oppressive land and labor relations that have persisted as long as they have met the profitability criterion and have proved to be amenable to adjustment with the changing international division of labor.

Clearly, the most brutal, indeed, barbaric forms of violence have been unleashed on Adivasis, in colonial and independent India, whenever they have taken recourse to peasant insurgency to resist the imperialism that has, through the above-mentioned planned processes, been expropriating their lands and forests, indeed, their very homelands, and mercilessly exploiting them. These insurgencies, of the past and the present, have invariably been open, public, collective, and violent in their modality, and in solidarity with the non-Adivasi oppressed, but local, confined to contiguous Adivasi areas. The domain of the insurgencies has always fallen far short of the domain of the nation. This has been their principal weakness, in effect, confining such resistance to imperialism and its local collaborators to the local level, never approaching the domain of the nation.

Expressing the will of the *Sarkar*, whether the colonial or the Indian, and committed to protecting the *sahukar* and the *zamindar*, and big business, the counterinsurgency, as I have shown, had/has invariably made killing its principal course of action. A village united in resistance was/is marked out for destruction. There was just a mere expression of "mild regret" from the government of India following "the indiscriminate slaughter of Munda women at [the village] Sail Rakab" in the course of the Birsaite ulgulan (Singh 1966, pp. 114–115 in Guha 1983, p. 161). And, in our times, in the ongoing civil war in Bastar, the killings of hundreds of ordinary Adivasi peasants, the razing of hundreds of villages, the forcible herding of people into camps (strategic hamlets), and the sexual atrocities against women.

The Indian state forces have violated practically all the limiting conditions for the deployment of violent means, specified in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II of 1977 relating to non-international armed conflict. The Indian state is *not* even a signatory of the two 1977 Protocols. Its forces have indulged with impunity in massacre, torture, rape, terror, killings of noncombatants and of guerrillas wounded, surrendered or rendered helpless in combat, with not even an utterance of "mild regret" on the part of the government of India. The most brutal forms of violence were unleashed by the colonial state in the Adivasi areas and on the Adivasis, and in independent India, the Indian state has, in this respect, followed in the footsteps of its colonial counterpart.

What might explain the cruelty, the destruction, the annihilation, the extremism with no compromise, the crimes against humanity, the expropriation akin to capitalism's original accumulation, the barbarism of capitalist imperialism unleashed against the Adivasis over the last two hundred years, behind the door of apparent civilization? For long, over historical time, Adivasis have been at the receiving end of the dominant Indian upper-caste attitude of antagonistic subjugation and associated exploitative and discriminatory behavior towards them. Given the dominant Indian awareness of imputed physical differences vis-à-vis Adivasis, buttressed by colonial anthropology in the nineteenth century, I would characterize such oppressive social relations as racial. But one must also keep in mind that the oppression of the Adivasis cannot be viewed in isolation from their exploitation, as poor peasants and landless laborers, and in, what used to be, slave-like labor conditions in the plantations. Adivasi oppression has been rooted in their alienation from what used to be their homelands, because of expropriation.

Fighting for the birth of a humane world, insurgent Adivasis have been averse to capitalist ideology, culture, and values. "Reciprocity should be the norm, not exchange. Prices and profit cannot settle the question of the ecological value of our lands, our forests, our rivers, indeed, our homelands. Our historical memory is of having always been the victims of unequal exchange when it came to be being forced to engage in commerce with the exploitative *diku*." I remember these words from conversations I had with two different Adivasi-Maoist intellectuals, the first, some time in the latter half of the 1970s, and, the second, some time in the first-half of the 1990s. I could find the means to express a message from these conversations of nature's ecological value only much later, a troubling thought, articulated in

Paul Burkett's *Marx and Nature* (1999). Simply put across, nature requires long cycles of evolution, development, and regeneration, whereas capitalism is governed by the imperative of short-term profits.

The persistence of the Adivasi legacy of communitarian traditions, the egalitarian consciousness, the consciousness of collective interests, and plebeian democracy, survivals from preclass society, suggest that, even in the face of all the odds stacked against it, the Adivasi peasantry has refused to give up these ways of life. Their long history of resistance to the imperialism inherent in capitalism; their fight against their dispossession and displacement, and the seizure of their lands to turn them into private property on a massive scale; their opposition to the capitalist-imperialist system's relentless drive to accumulate by extracting and privately appropriating nature's bounty; their resistance to all of this over the last two-hundred years has made for their survival and resilience. Frankly, Adivasi–Maoist resistance today has shaped my account of the real meaning of their resistance in the past, and I hope that over time, the domain of resistance to imperialism becomes a larger and larger subset of the domain of this whole wide world.

Maoism was shaped by China's vernacular revolutionary traditions, and, in India, it is being shaped, among other things, by Adivasi-peasant historical memory of their peasant insurgencies and what the Adivasi–Maoist guerrillas have been bringing to it. Already there is a kind of reciprocal recognition of this. Documenting the real meaning of the Adivasi resistance to imperialism in the past *and* the present is important, but more significant will be what might happen to the resistance over time.

Cross-References

▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

▶ Naxalite Movement: An Anti-imperialist Perspective

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Advanced Capitalism

▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism

Africa

▶ Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism
▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism
▶ Liberia, the Struggle for Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty, and Democracy
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▶ Enslaved African Labour: Violent Racial Capitalism

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▶ Magubane, Bernard Makhosezwe (1930–2013)

African National Congress

▶ Magubane, Bernard Makhosezwe (1930–2013)

African Nationalism

African Slave Trade

African-Americans

AFRICOM

AFRICOM, NATO and the 2011 War on Libya

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Synonyms

2011 War; AFRICOM; Imperialism; Libya; Muammar Gaddafi; NATO; Neoliberalism

Definition

This essay argues that there is little to sustain a credible, logical justification for the 2011 war on Libya as being about human rights, and describes how this perspective suffers from a severe deficiency of empirical substantiation. Conversely, while oil was not insignificant, it was neither the sole concern nor the single determinant of the US-led war. In narrow terms, the imposition of a no-fly zone would serve as a gateway for military action designed to secure regime change, an objective pursued by the US since 1969. In broad terms, what was at stake in Libya was the strategic repositioning of the US in Africa, guided by economic interests and pursued through its new unified combatant command (AFRICOM), in developing a militarised neoliberal relationship with African states.

One of the more successful results of US information operations and public diplomacy during the March–October 2011 war on Libya was to create a debate about the purposes of the war, and to even 'define down' war itself so that it was officially classed instead as a kinetic humanitarian action: not war, but rather 'protecting the Libyan people, averting a humanitarian crisis, and setting up a no-fly zone' (Rhodes 2011). Thus, on one side is an assertion that the military campaign, first led by the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) on 19 March 2011, invoking the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 17 March, and then led by NATO until the official cessation of its combat role on 31 October, was to be understood primarily as a humanitarian effort legitimised by the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine. At stake, in the latter perspective, were the lives of civilians, and a 'popular uprising' for democracy, pitted against the 'brutal dictatorship' of Muammar Gaddafi. On another side was strong scepticism that primarily emphasised that this was instead another war about oil. On closer examination, there is little to sustain a credible, logical justification for the war on Libya as being about human rights, and the position suffers from a severe deficiency of empirical substantiation. On the other hand, while oil was not insignificant, it was neither the sole concern nor the single determinant of the US-led war. In narrow terms, the imposition of a no-fly zone would serve as a gateway for military action designed to secure regime change, an objective pursued by the US since 1969. In broad terms, what was at stake was

the strategic repositioning of the US in Africa, guided by economic interests and pursued through its new unified combatant command (AFRICOM), in developing a militarised neoliberal relationship with African states.

Libya: America's Problem in Africa

On 1 September 1969, then Captain Muammar Gaddafi along with other junior officers overthrew King Idris in a bloodless coup. Soon after that it became clear to the US that Libya would embark on a radical Pan-Arab nationalist course. Gaddafi became chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and commander-in-chief of the Libyan armed forces from September 1969, and then prime minister and minister of defence from January 1970 to 1972. During that time, and only weeks after Gaddafi first came to power, members of the administration of President Richard Nixon met to discuss options for dealing with Libya. In November 1969, high-level meetings occurred between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and various Pentagon and CIA officials to discuss the possibility of landing forces at the US's Wheelus Air Base in Libya as part of an armed takeover of the country, as well as covert actions to engineer a coup; other options included sanctions, freezing assets, reducing bilateral ties, or simple acquiescence (BACM 2011, pp. 79–119). This was largely in response to the RCC's announcement in 1969 that it would promptly expel the US from Wheelus, and the British from El-Adem airbase as well, with the expulsions executed in 1970. Also in 1970, Libya began to drastically revise the price agreements for its oil exports, and threatened nationalisation (Thornton 2001, p. 69). From then onwards, the US would develop an increasingly acrimonious relationship with Libya and with Muammar Gaddafi personally.

Tensions between the US and Libya escalated into outright conflict during the 1980s, under the US presidency of Ronald Reagan. Two of the immediate pretexts for US military actions against Libya in that period were the issue of freedom on navigation in the Gulf of Sidra (claimed by Libya

as territorial waters, which the US contested), and alleged Libyan support for terrorist acts against US targets. Thus, on 19 August 1981, US jets shot down two Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sidra. The US claimed its planes had been attacked first. During 24–25 March 1986, US forces fired missiles on Libyan targets, again claiming that they had been attacked first. On 16 April 1986, President Reagan ordered US air and naval forces to bomb various installations in Libya, among them Muammar Gaddafi's own residence, killing one of his daughters. On 4 January 1989, two US Navy F-14 s shot down two Libyan jets, 70 miles north of Libya, because of alleged hostile intentions demonstrated by the Libyans.

In addition to these overt instances of direct military conflict, the Reagan Administration worked on various plans for covert actions designed to overthrow Gaddafi, with the support of neighbouring countries and employing Libyan dissident groups armed and trained by the US. As early as 1981, the US planned for a coup to take place in Libya, with the provision of Egyptian military aid to Libyan rebels. In fact, it was within a mere 2 months of taking office that Reagan had the CIA draft a plan by the then deputy director for operations, Max Hugel, which examined various proposals for covert action, ranging from disinformation and propaganda, to sabotaging Libyan oil installations, and organising military and financial support for Libyan dissident groups in Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, and in the US itself. US media also produced dozens of articles and opeds encouraging the campaign against Gaddafi; and Tunisian and Saudi officials confirmed privately that they were 'told by officials of the Reagan administration that Qaddafi would be eliminated by the end of 1981' (Wright 1981–82, pp. 15–16). Among the strategies that were used was the CIA's creation of real and illusionary events with the goal of making Gaddafi believe 'that there is a high degree of internal opposition to him in Libya' (Woodward 1987, p. 481). Published accounts have documented the CIA's and the National Security Council's 'obsession' with Libya during Reagan's term, designing a set of escalating acts up to and including a proposed Egyptian invasion of Libya (Perdue 1989, p. 54; Woodward 1987,

pp. 181–186, 409–410, 419–420). In an approach that served as a preview of US objectives over 20 years later, the Reagan Administration sought to isolate Libya from the rest of Africa, and tried to pressure the Organisation of African Unity to censure Libya, refuse to hold meetings in Libya, and cancel the planned Libyan presidency of the OAU in 1981, with especially intense pressure on the Liberian government to persuade it to cut ties with Libya and expel its embassy. The various US pressure tactics used to sway African leaders included military and economic aid, naval port calls, and the employment of military advisers (Wright 1981–82, p. 14). All of these capabilities would be later combined and focused on Africa with the institution of AFRICOM, and Libya would it be its first military target.

Tensions with the US under President George W. Bush were dramatically reduced by Libya. In 2003, Libya decided to take responsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and to pay compensation to the families of the victims, in return for the lifting of sanctions. In 2004, after Libya announced it would cease development of chemical and nuclear weapons, President Bush withdrew a ban on travel to Libya and authorised US oil companies with pre-sanctions holdings in Libya to negotiate their return to the country. The US also partially lifted sanctions, and approved US companies buying oil or investing in Libya. Most US sanctions were lifted by the end of 2004 after President Bush signed Executive Order 12543 (Klare and Volman 2006, p. 614).

Yet, mutual suspicion, friction, and new tensions developed soon after Barack Obama assumed the presidency in 2009. That year also marked a milestone in Libya's decade-long effort to gain a position of respected leadership and influence across Africa: 2009 marked the 40th anniversary of the officers' revolt against King Idris; the 10th anniversary of the Sirte Declaration that founded the new African Union (AU); the election of Gaddafi as AU Chairman; Libya taking up a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and Ali Treiki, Libya's top diplomat on Africa, becoming the Secretary General of the UN General Assembly. Libya under Gaddafi was

taking an increasingly important leadership role in Africa and, dissatisfied with the paltry results of rapprochement with the US, was simultaneously blocking US opportunities for investment and economic opportunities in Libya itself as well as impeding greater US penetration into Africa by subverting US plans with what might be called 'dinar diplomacy'. Libya invested billions of dollars in industrial development across the continent, financed the creation of an African satellite communications network, and provided massive financial contributions towards the African Development Bank and the African Monetary Fund, which would specifically challenge the hegemony of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Gaddafi was passionate about using Libyan oil money to help African allies industrialise and add value to their export commodities, helping even staunch US allies in Africa in achieving a measure of food self-sufficiency. The combined effect was to increasingly move the continent away from its role in the global economy as a supplier of cheap raw materials, which was a legacy of colonialism. All of this happened as the US had developed a new strategic view of Africa and aggressively began to expand military ties and business opportunities.

An eventual 'target of opportunity' presented itself with the outbreak of street protests in Libya in February 2011, the exposure of serious fissures within the government itself, and the manifestation of strong internal divisions around Libya's orientation towards Africa, which in previous years had already witnessed deadly mass riots against African migrant workers in the country. Ostensibly, the street protests began in Benghazi on 15 February after a human rights lawyer had been arrested. By 17 February, the protests escalated dramatically. Violent confrontations with security forces ensued: police stations were torched and army barracks were raided. African migrants and black Libyans were targeted once again by opposition protesters and rebels. Soon, whole towns were taken by anti-government forces. On 21 February the defected Libyan deputy permanent representative to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, declared that 'genocide' was underway as the Libyan government was allegedly bringing

in groups of African mercenaries via the nation's airports. In addition, prominent Arab and then Western media outlets began to assert that Libya was using jets and helicopters against unarmed protesters. On this basis, from 21 February, the first calls were made for the imposition of a no-fly zone to halt flights into Libya and disable the Libyan air force.

The Aims of the 2011 War

Overtly, the stated aims of the US-led intervention revolved around protecting civilians, saving lives, and averting a greater humanitarian crisis. Thus, Obama declared on 28 March 2011, in terms that echoed Reagan's speeches: 'If we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world' (Obama 2011b). In a joint letter, Obama with UK prime minister David Cameron and French president Nicolas Sarkozy asserted: 'By responding immediately, our countries halted the advance of Gaddafi's forces. The bloodbath that he had promised to inflict on the citizens of the besieged city of Benghazi has been prevented. Tens of thousands of lives have been protected' (Obama et al. 2011). US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates reiterated that, 'this administration's approach has been guided by a core set of principles . . . opposing violence, standing for universal values, and speaking out on the need for political change and reform' (Gates 2011).

However, two distinct sets of considerations require alternative explanations to be advanced instead. One has to do with the fact that the official explanation continually meandered and changed shape during the course of the war, morphing into varied and repeated justifications for regime change, along with extensive evidence showing that the assassination of Colonel Gaddafi himself was a persistent objective, and proclamations about the 'democratization' of Libya as a goal, all of which at one point or another had previously been sworn against as objectives of the intervention (see Forte 2012a, pp. 121–130; Hague 2011;

Obama 2011b). The then US secretary of state encapsulated this alternative narrative when rejoicing to a US news reporter 'We came, we saw, he died!' following the murder of Gaddafi on 20 October 2011. That the narrative was clearly unsettled is something which requires that we do not take the opening justifications at face value.

Another set of considerations has to do with the alleged humanitarian goals of the intervention: saving lives, protecting civilians, averting a 'massacre' in Benghazi. There are several reasons, with ample evidence to support each, that render these goals as questionable in the context of US and European actions leading up to and during the course of the conflict. For example, well prior to any alleged threat by Gaddafi against Benghazi, and as early as a few days after the first street protests began in mid-February 2011, there were already groups of CIA agents on the ground to 'gather intelligence for military airstrikes and to contact and vet the beleaguered rebels', joined by more agents later. President Obama had 'signed a secret finding authorizing the CIA to provide arms and other support to Libyan rebels' even before the international press had begun to speak of an organised, armed rebellion (Mazetti and Schmitt 2011). Also in that period, USAID deployed a team to Libya, as announced by early March (DipNote 2011; Lee 2011). 'In the early days of the Libyan revolution', as Hillary Clinton recounted, Christopher Stevens, then the Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy, was dispatched to Benghazi to work with the insurgents (Clinton 2012). Thus, before any serious diplomatic initiatives could be organised, before the development of a multinational coalition, prior to establishing the facts of any humanitarian crisis on the ground, and even before a local insurgency could gain strength on its own, the US was already leading the way to intervention designed to secure the overthrow of the Libyan government.

There are many more reasons for questioning the official justifications for military intervention. By all accounts, Libyan government forces had quickly routed insurgents, retaking a number of key towns by late March 2011; foreign military intervention had the immediate effect of slowing the government's advance and started to equalise

the military fortunes of the insurgents who were now backed by the most powerful combined air forces of the world. In effect, the conflict between Libyan forces was thus prolonged for several more months, with more cities destroyed in the process, most notably Sirte, which was a bastion of government support. Thus, with many more inevitably killed than 'saved' as a result of the prolonged war, one of the key justifications for intervention was invalidated. US-led forces prolonged the war by also arbitrarily extending their mission in Libya: on 28 March 2011, President Obama had already declared, 'In just one month, the United States has worked with our international partners to mobilise a broad coalition, secure an international mandate to protect civilians, stop an advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a no-fly zone with our allies and partners . . . we've accomplished these objectives . . .. I want to be clear: the United States of America has done what we said we would do' (Obama 2011b). Nonetheless, the war was continued for seven more months and only ended for NATO once Colonel Gaddafi had been murdered and Libya's government had been overthrown. Indeed, as a precondition for ending the war, Obama himself stipulated that government forces should withdraw even from the cities where a majority of residents stood with the government, with the list of cities expanding as the war progressed (see Obama 2011a). In other words, the US continually exceeded a military mandate that it had already exceeded, while allowing no solutions except a military one.

In addition, rather than protecting civilians, US and/or other NATO forces targeted civilian infrastructure (water, power, roads, government buildings, and select residential areas), and in a number of documented instances they deliberately targeted civilians themselves (government workers, public broadcasters, and civilian rescuers). Among the more notable, recorded and verified cases occurred on 15 September 2011 in Sirte, when 47 civilian rescuers were targeted as part of the 'double-tapping' practice for conducting drone strikes (where first a military target is struck, then all adult, able-bodied men who arrive on the scene thereafter to rescue

victims are attacked; see FFM 2012, pp. 44–45). Western human rights organisations also confirmed cases where apartment blocks in Sirte were targeted by NATO bombardments: one case occurred on 16 September 2011 when several airstrikes targeted a large apartment building in Sirte containing roughly 90 apartments and 'at least two residents were killed', while NATO did not even list an apartment building as one of its targets, opting instead to produce the following list: 'Key Hits 16 SEPTEMBER: In the vicinity of Sirte: 5 Command and Control Nodes, 3 Radar Systems, 4 Armed Vehicles, 8 Air Missile Systems' (see AI 2012, pp. 13–14; HRW 2012, pp. 50–53; NATO 2011a). On 25 September 2011, just before dawn, NATO carried out an airstrike against the home of Salem Diyab in Sirte, killing four children and three women. The apparent target was Mosbah Ahmed Diyab, a brigadier-general, who in fact 'lived in another area of the city' (AI 2012, p. 15; HRW 2012, pp. 47–50). Once again, NATO described this civilian residence as a 'command and control' facility and deliberately obfuscated the fact that it was deliberately targeting civilian structures: 'Key Hits 25 SEPTEMBER: In the vicinity of Sirte: 1 command and control node 2 ammunition/vehicle storage facility, 1 radar facility, 1 multiple rocket launcher, 1 military support vehicle, 1 artillery piece, 1 ammunition storage facility' (NATO 2011b). In yet another case documented and verified by both Human Rights Watch and the UN's own Commission of International Inquiry on Libya, on 8 August 2011 in the town of Majer, NATO planes bombed a farming compound, in and around which there was no evidence of any military activity. It was struck a second time when civilian rescuers arrived. NATO bombs killed a total of 34 civilians and injured 38 in that attack (HRW 2012, pp. 27–32; UN 2012, p. 16).

Instead of protecting civilians, we have evidence of the contrary practice. In some notable cases, NATO forces ignored African refugees adrift at sea, even as they passed NATO vessels that were enforcing a strict naval blockade and had the sea off Libya's coast under close surveillance. In fact, on NATO's watch, at least 1,500 refugees fleeing Libya died at sea during the war.

They were mostly Africans from south of the Sahara, and they died in many multiples of the death toll suffered by Benghazi residents during the initial protests there that had captivated media attention in the West. Even the Italian government, a party to the NATO campaign, publicly complained that international humanitarian law had been violated when NATO vessels ignored distress calls and passed by boats adrift at sea without aiding them. One might also note that when NATO repeatedly stated it was protecting civilians, this in practice usually meant it was protecting armed civilians opposed to the government, against other armed civilians who supported it.

Thus, if the practice of military intervention belied the proclaimed humanitarian objectives, and the narratives that justified the intervention shifted and then contradicted the original stated aims, then an alternative explanation becomes necessary as the official ones simply fail to convince, as they inadequately account for enough facts in an accurate, logical, and credible manner. Moreover, there is the critical question concerning historical context. Why now? For decades, US leaders and mainstream media in the global North had cast Colonel Gaddafi as a villainous, brutal dictator, long accused of torture and assassinations at home, and seen as key perpetrator of international terrorism. Yet from 2003–10, there had been an official rapprochement. So what was it about 2011 that seemingly caused the US to suddenly discover 'human rights abuses' as a justification for military intervention? Indeed, 2011 offered a further twist to this issue: just a little over a month before the first calls for foreign military intervention, the UN Human Rights Council received and discussed a report on human rights in Libya, and of the 46 delegations that commented on the report a majority 'noted with appreciation the country's commitment to upholding human rights on the ground', and further commended 'the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the preparation and presentation of its national report, noting the broad consultation process with stakeholders in the preparation phase' (UN 2011, p. 3). Was 2011 different then because of the local uprisings? There had been multiple armed uprisings, coup attempts, and assassination plots throughout Gaddafi's 42 years at the helm, and yet none of those had been used to justify a concerted military campaign to overthrow the government, nor were they read as a sign of government illegitimacy. Nor were the human rights credentials of the rebels pristine and unquestionable for that matter, as many African migrant workers and black Libyan civilians were targeted for rape, robbery, and murder on the basis of the colour of their skin and their perceived allegiance to Gaddafi, while pro-government protesters in Benghazi were also killed (Cockburn 2011). Human rights, therefore, explain very little. Also, why was there such intervention in Libya, and yet the opposite in Yemen and Bahrain? Arguing that 'just because the US cannot intervene everywhere, does not mean it should not intervene in Libya' still does not answer why Libya was targeted. Of course, 2011 did offer a new political context that created openings for intervention, particularly around what was much vaunted in the global North as the 'Arab Spring' and 'calls' from elite quarters for the US to 'do something' to aid in ushering a new, democratic Arab world. While that political conjuncture was not insignificant, the only real change that had transpired within the last decade was a new US strategic shift towards Africa, with the creation of a unified military command just 3 years before 2011, that being the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) which would in fact take the lead in the opening weeks of the military campaign. Since we have very little of what was made public from official quarters that is reliable and can help us answer 'why Libya in 2011', we have to look at long-term, and short-term historical contexts beyond Libya alone, and understand broader and deeper US political and economic objectives. We thus require answers that take into account multiple factors and varied determinants, and that connect them logically. In this effort, what US officials said to each other privately (as revealed in the several hundred diplomatic cables from the US Embassy in Tripoli that were published by WikiLeaks) becomes especially useful, particularly in light of US strategic and economic concerns.

AFRICOM, Oil, and Leadership

A broad outline of the array of US objectives that could and in some respects would be fulfilled by pursuing the path of aggression against Libya in 2011 can be discerned in terms of the immediate strategic geopolitical gains to be had from the opportunities presented by the Libyan crisis, as well as benefits for longer-term political and economic interests both in Africa and the Middle East, if not more globally.

There were at least nine areas where the US could maximise gains to be had by overthrowing the Libyan Jamahiriya Government, presented here in no particular rank of importance. The first would potentially involve increased access for US corporations to contracts funded by massive Libyan expenditures on infrastructure development (and then reconstruction), from which US corporations had frequently been locked out when Gaddafi was in power (USET 2008, 2009c, d). Second and closely related to the first, the US would thereby also expand its hold on key geostrategic locations and control over access to lucrative petroleum resources much sought after by China and others. Third and stemming from the first two, the US and its allies would potentially be able to ward off any increased acquisition of Libyan oil and construction contracts by Chinese and Russian firms. Fourth, the overthrow of the Jamahiriya could ensure that a friendly regime was in place that was not influenced by ideas of 'resource nationalism' (USET 2007). Fifth, the US could increase the presence of AFRICOM in African affairs, in an attempt to effectively substitute for the African Union and to entirely displace the Libyan-led Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), whose membership encompassed nearly half of Africa and rivalled the US's Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (USET 2009e). Sixth, by intervening for declared 'humanitarian' reasons in support of something cast as a 'popular uprising' for 'democracy', the US could bolster its claims to being serious about freedom, democracy, and human rights, and present itself – unlike the image created by the Iraq war – as being on the side of Arabs and Africans. Seventh, a successful

intervention could work to ensure a politically stable North Africa, guided by the belief that democratic states are the best defence against radical extremism. Eighth, by drafting other nations (in NATO and the Arab League) to undertake the work of defending and advancing US political and economic interests, the US could efficiently achieve dominance at a minimised political and economic cost. Ninth, a successful intervention could help to spread the neo-liberal model of governance and development by removing a major impediment. Joseph Biden, who would later become vice president, recounted: 'I told Qaddafi there are certain basic rules to playing in the global economy ... no one will invest in your country without transparency or without stability. To deliver the promise to your people is going to require significant change ...' (Timmerman 2004, p. 19). Taken together, these present a far more convincing picture of US objectives, than that presented in the humanitarian narrative analysed earlier, especially because they fit a historical pattern of US–Libyan relations and global context of neo-liberal intervention.

In leading the war in its opening phases, AFRICOM's role as part of a US strategic shift towards Africa deserves further elaboration, especially as AFRICOM bridges and combines the political, economic, and military goals of the US in Africa. AFRICOM came about as a result of what was at least a decade-long process of rationalising, strategising, and organising (AFRICOM 2011, p. vi). From 1990–2000, the US intervened militarily in Africa more than 20 times (Catoire 2000, p. 102). There was increased discussion among military planners of the deficiencies in taking a reactive, piecemeal approach, focused only on contingencies, when 'shaping the environment' could reduce the need for 'expensive and uncertain military interventions' (110, 111). To shape the environment, the military would require a single, unified command devoted exclusively to Africa, rather than have US-African affairs parcelled out to various commands with responsibilities primarily in the Pacific, Asia, and Europe. A US military force was definitely needed, it was argued, in light of France's announcement in 1997 that it would

reduce its military forces on the African continent by 40%, creating a perceived vacuum (105–106). While the purpose of a command would be to 'enhance access and influence while communicating regularly with senior foreign civil and military leaders on a variety of issues', it would do so by 'building better security relations' with African nations, 'endeavoring to build trust and "habits of cooperation" that permit quick agreement and common action to resolve regional conflict'; this would be particularly necessary at time when 'US resources are limited' (102).

Military strategists also recognised that Africa had 'tremendous mineral wealth, huge hydro-electrical power reserves, and significant under-developed ocean resources', with the 'better part of the world's diamonds, gold, and chromium', added to the fact that 'copper, bauxite, phosphate, uranium, tin, iron ore, cobalt, and titanium are also mined in significant quantities', and 'some 20 percent of America's oil' was being imported from Africa, while Africa itself was seen as a potentially large, new market for US commodities (104). The US military itself is totally dependent on an imported supply of cobalt, among other strategic minerals that belong to the US's stockpile programme, the loss of which would constitute, as was understood already in the 1950s, 'a grave military setback' (Magdoff 2003, pp. 55–56).

Adding to the Pentagon's work, a high-level body was appointed by President George W. Bush in February 2001 (the National Energy Policy Development Group, NEPDG), which was chaired by Vice President Dick Cheney. The NEPDG's final document is known as the 'Cheney report'. The Cheney report focused on Africa as a strategically valuable supply of oil as it could be relied upon in the event of major crises and disruptions in the Middle East and elsewhere; moreover, African oil was deemed to be of high value given its low sulphur content and its relative ease of access (NEPDG 2001: sec. 8, p. 11). In order to expand US access on the continent, the Cheney report argued that African nations, under US guidance, would have to 'enhance the stability and security of trade and investment

environments' (NEPDG 2001: sec. 8, p. 19). Building on the Cheney report, and mindful of the concerns voiced by military strategists before that, oil industry lobbyists were joined by a select group of members of Congress and military officers in producing a White Paper submitted to the US Congress and the Bush Administration in 2002. The group called itself the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG 2002). AOPIG tightly linked military and economic goals, emphasising African oil as a vital interest to the US. AOPIG called for 'a new and vigorous focus on U.S.-military cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, to include design of a sub-unified command structure which could produce significant dividends in the protection of U.S. investments' (2002, p. 6), and reproduced elements of the prior two reports. Like Catoire (2000, p. 107), AOPIG also singled out Libya as an adversary state and a 'threat possibility' that exposed US personnel and assets to 'heightened dangers and diminished opportunities' (2002, p. 15).

In 2004, an advisory panel of Africa experts, authorised by Congress to propose new policy initiatives, identified five factors that had shaped increased US interest in Africa over the past decade: 'oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and HIV/AIDS'. They indicated that these factors had led to a 'conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa' (Kansteiner and Morrison 2004: vi, 2). This strategic view, they argued, required that the US should 'significantly increase' its 'presence on the ground' (4). As with previous reports, this one also combined military with economic goals, the former to preserve and reinforce the latter. Noting that Africa had proven reserves of more than 60 billion barrels of oil – with Libya, as the panel would have known, having the highest proven oil reserves on the continent (39.1 billion barrels) (Frynas and Paulo 2007, p. 240, 241) – the panel noted that Africa had already become the fourth-largest source of US oil imports, and with a slew of major US oil corporations active on the continent accounting for more than 100,000 energy-based jobs in the US, these actors had 'a stake in the promotion of a stable investment climate' (Goldwyn and Ebel 2004, p. 6, 11, 12).

Like Catoire (2000), the panel also recognised that 'the leverage the United States can muster, in coalition with others, is not overwhelming and will diminish by the end of the decade' (Goldwyn and Ebel 2004, p. 7). 'Stability and development' could only be achieved if African political leaders pursued 'a modernising vision' (9). The US could exercise leverage via its military and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF; in addition, by 'engaging' the continent on 'common principles for the promotion of transparency, development, and respect for human rights, the more effective U.-S. leadership will be' (10). As with the prior policy papers, this panel also called for the Department of Defense to create a unified command focused on Africa (Morrison and Lyman 2004, pp. 115–116); AFRICOM was created on 1 October 2007, and became functional 1 year later. This panel also singled out Libya in 'fomenting arms trafficking and instability in Africa, and it proposed an initiative that would implicitly counter the work of Libya's World Islamic Call Society in its proposal for 'a major continent-wide Muslim outreach initiative on a dramatically large scale' (Morrison and Lyman 2004, pp. 115–116, 105). Other panellists also cited Libya's 'adventurism' and 'destabilisation' activities in Africa, pointing out that it funded rebel movements in West Africa, a key strategic location of oil (Herbst and Lyman 2004, p. 119 133).

'Africa doesn't need strong men, it needs strong institutions', US President Barack Obama declared in Ghana in 2009, a sentiment that would be echoed in the policy to establish transparency, good governance, economic growth, and democratic institutions as envisioned by the US in the 2012 US *Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa* (White House 2012, p. 2). The National Security Strategies of 2002, 2006, and 2010 had all highlighted what was perceived as the growing strategic value of Africa (Ploch 2011, p. 14). In the preface to the 2012 document, Barack Obama wrote: 'the United States will not stand idly by when actors threaten legitimately elected governments or manipulate the fairness and integrity of democratic processes' (White House 2012: i). The 'democratisation' of Africa thus became a US national security concern. Added to the US strategic agenda was humanitarian intervention: 'We have been the world's leader in responding to humanitarian crises' (1). As a US military article had constructed this issue, Africa is 'a world leader in humanitarian crises, failed states, and deadly conflict' with more UN 'peacekeeping missions than any other continent' (Garrett et al. 2010, p. 17). Africa was the problem, and the US was the source of solutions. This was felt urgently by some as Africa loomed larger: 'by 2050, there may be two Africans for every European' (16).

Not far removed from the political imperatives for US leadership as constructed in the National Strategy, economic concerns and moulding African institutions to suit transnational capitalist penetration – shaping the environment – weighed heavily. Barack Obama adverted, 'Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular. Africa's economies are among the fastest growing in the world, with technological change sweeping across the continent and offering tremendous opportunities in banking, medicine, politics, and business' (White House 2012: i). Identified as important to US prosperity, Africa would need 'to remove constraints to trade and investment' and open itself to global markets, and promote 'sound economic governance' (i, ii). As a result of such a transformation, President Obama vowed to 'encourage American companies to seize trade and investment opportunities in Africa . . . while helping to create jobs here in America' (ii). However, there would be further obstacles to remove from the path of US expansion: 'Transnational security challenges pose threats to regional stability, economic growth, and U.S. interests' (1). As Vice Admiral Robert Moeller declared in 2008, AFRICOM was about preserving 'the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market' (Glazebrook 2012).

Both AFRICOM and the TSCTP were vigorously opposed by Libya under Muammar Gaddafi's leadership, as both the US ambassador to Libya and the head of AFRICOM, Gen Ward,

were both aware (see USET 2009a, b). There was also opposition from the Northern African Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), led by Libya (Campbell 2008, p. 21). It also seemed that most of the African continent rejected AFRICOM as well, just as Nelson Mandela, a key ally of Gaddafi, had previously rejected President Bill Clinton's plans for a US-led Africa Crisis Response force. Thus, in October 2007, members of the Pan-African Parliament, the African Union's legislature, voted in favour of a motion to 'prevail upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of America's Government's request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent' (quoted in Ploch 2011, p. 25). The defence and security ministers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) stated 'that sister countries of the region should not agree to host Africom and in particular, armed forces, since this would have a negative effect. That recommendation was presented to the Heads of States and this is a SADC position'; the 25-member body then backed the position and, 'flatly refuses the installation of any military command or any foreign armed presence of whatever country on any part of Africa, whatever the reasons and justifications' (quoted in Campbell 2008, p. 21). The Arab Maghreb Union 'also voiced strong opposition to the placement of US bases anywhere on the continent' (ibid.). Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued the following statement: 'ECOWAS has stated resolutely its opposition to American bases in the region. At the forefront of this effort stands Nigeria, whose leadership unequivocally denounced the possibility of American troops being based in West Africa' (quoted in Campbell 2008, p. 22). In summary, it can be safely concluded that in every single respect of what the US identified as the strategic value of Africa, Gaddafi's leadership stood opposed, which itself might not have been significant except for the fact that Libya had both the financial leverage and political clout to exercise a significant competing presence in Africa that raised walls against US expansion.

Interventionist Methodology

The intervention to overthrow the Libyan government relied upon an array of methods, some borrowed from previous US plans from the late 1960s and 1980s. One of these involved arming anti-government insurgents, and bombing the way ahead of them, while targeting personnel and institutions of the Libyan state. At every single point, peace talks between the opposition and the government were halted or undermined by the US, and diplomatic action by the African Union was equally thwarted and side-lined both by the US and the UN. After unsuccessfully seeking legitimacy in the form of an endorsement from the AU, the US later decided that it was totally dispensable, and claimed authority for its intervention in Libya thanks to a vote in the Arab League, where less than half of its members voted in support of foreign military intervention. The government of Libya was barred from representing itself at the UN in an unprecedented and almost certainly illegal silencing by the body, while the US government refused to issue visas to representatives of the standing government in Tripoli. At the UN, largely unknown 'human rights' NGOs held full sway in propagating unqualified and unsubstantiated exaggerations and fabrication of numbers of protesters killed by the government, while never mentioning atrocities committed by the opposition. In at least one case, one of the Libyan human rights groups speaking at the UN Human Rights Council had not disclosed its overlapping membership with the anti-government National Transitional Council. The general approach at the UN was to take everything stated by the opposition at face value, while refusing to hear the Libyan government. Put simply, virtually nothing was done to avert war, and everything was done to accelerate it. In this respect, the creation of an ambience of 'emergency' became a significant part of the interventionist methodology as it could be used to rush to war, stifle debate, and predetermine who would have the authority and legitimacy to speak.

Within relatively short order, it became apparent that humanitarian concerns served as a thin veil for the pursuit other goals. Even in the

statements by leading US officials, there was little effort to conceal this fact once the bombing was underway. Nearly 2 weeks after the US fired the cruise missiles that opened the campaign, then Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained in a congressional hearing how and when the US chose to intervene: 'it became apparent that the time and conditions were right for international military action', not because all diplomatic options had been exhausted, and not with reference to a humanitarian crisis, but due to the statements of support for intervention from the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and once 'our European allies expressed a willingness to commit real military resources' (Gates 2011).

The US led overall military operations in Libya, from the official opening of AFRICOM's Operation Odyssey Dawn on 19 March 2011 until the official end on 31 October 2011. By the end of the campaign, NATO had completed a total of 9,634 strike sorties against Libyan targets, out of a total of 26,156 sorties overall as part of what it called Operation Unified Protector (NATO 2011c, p. 2). Of the 28 member states of NATO, only eight actually took part in combat sorties, which was reduced to six by the end of August 2011. The primary participants in combat were the US, France, Italy, the UK, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, and Norway. The US provided the majority of refuelling, resupply, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, and fired nearly all of the 214 cruise missiles apart from seven (Bomb Data 2014). The US also deployed the majority of drones. In terms of 'boots on the ground' – which the Libyan insurgents proclaimed they did not want, but welcomed nonetheless – there were US CIA agents and untold number of 'private contractors' of various nationalities (Mazetti and Schmitt 2011); there were also British MI6, SBS, SAS, and SFSG troops, in total numbering as many as 350 and deployed from as early as the time of the first street protests at the end of February 2011 (Mirror 2011; Williams and Shipman 2011; Winnett and Watt 2011); hundreds of troops from Qatar fought on the front lines in nearly every region (Black 2011); also, Jordan had troops on the ground (Barry 2011), and, according to the governments of Sudan and post-Gaddafi

Libya, Sudan's military also participated actively in combat and in arming the insurgents. What confuses matters, aside from NATO and US secrecy, is the extent to which non-US air missions were in fact non-US—as Barack Obama himself revealed: 'In fact, American pilots even flew French fighter jets off a French aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. Allies don't get any closer than that' (Obama 2011c).

Sirte, as Gaddafi's hometown, a major stronghold of popular support for the government, and the birthplace of the African Union in 1999, was to be the war's most devastated city, coming under particularly intense NATO bombing. Sirte was targeted from the very opening of NATO's bombing campaign, lasting until the end. Indeed, out of the total number of days spent bombing by NATO, Sirte was targeted for 42% of those days. As the final offensive against the city began in August 2011, NATO flew more than 130 air strikes at the end of the month. In just 3 days after the insurgents first tried entering Sirte on 15 September 2011, NATO bombed 39 targets in the small city. In a period of 3 weeks in September, NATO struck 296 targets here, even before the final month of bombings. The most conservative assessments found that 70% of the city had been destroyed in fighting on the ground and by NATO bombardment. The total number of civilians killed in Sirte, or in all of Libya during the war, is still not known and no credible investigation has been undertaken, either by the UN, or NATO, or by the transitional governments that followed; if anything, there has been a deliberate effort not to unearth these facts by those with the authority and resources to do so, and successive Libyan administrations, indebted to NATO, have explicitly rejected any calls for an investigation.

That one of the immediate goals of the military intervention was regime change is an inescapable conclusion derived from substantial evidence that Muammar Gaddafi was personally targeted in a series of bomb and missile strikes (Forte 2012a, p. 122–129). Moreover, in addition to US drones targeting Gaddafi's convoy as it fled Sirte on 20 October 2011, one of the prominent opposition leaders, Mahmoud Jibril, later revealed that a foreign agent (likely French) was the one who

actually executed Gaddafi (Forte 2012a, p. 129). Regime change is a violation of international law, as it is a violation of US law to assassinate a foreign head of state. However, in invoking the mandates of the UN, specifically UN Security Council Resolution 1970 and even more so 1973, the US and its NATO partners persisted in presenting every action as legal and authorised. Article 4 of UNSCR 1973 specifically mandates member states 'to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians' (UNSCR 2011, p. 3). The political and military leadership of NATO would thus present every single action as consistent with that broad and open language, resorting to semantic games in portraying wherever Gaddafi was located as being in and of itself a 'threat to civilians'. Even as Gaddafi fled, and was struck by missiles fired by US drones, he was still represented by NATO as 'endangering civilians'.

From a perspective concerned with human rights, protecting civilians, and defending civil liberties, it is interesting to note that in January 2011, France under President Nicolas Sarkozy offered the Tunisian government of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali security support, and dispatched riot-control equipment to put down anti-government protests in Tunisia, right down to the final days of Ben Ali's rule; additionally, the GCC had itself sent troops to quash protests in Bahrain in March 2011, the same month that the bombing of Libya began; also in March 2011, in the face of massive anti-government protests in Yemen demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the US continued to offer its political support and military co-operation. If taking the humanitarian claims at face value, it is difficult to understand what it was about Libya in particular that presented such a crisis of conscience and a moral imperative to intervene on the side of government opponents, even in the same month that the US and its allies were doing the opposite in Bahrain and Yemen. However, pretending that there was a unique and urgent moral demand in the case of Libya certainly aided in 'shaping the environment' so as to create an ambience of emergency, and to create that effect public communication became essential in deploying numerous ideational counter-

measures to offset questions, criticisms, and potential delays.

Complex Ideational Counter-Measures

Symbolism, myth, morality, and emotion were called upon by supporters of the war with the desire to produce an ambience of 'emergency' around the events of February–March 2011, serving a variety of purposes (while complicating or adding to classical theories of imperialism which tend to downplay such factors). Here we are dealing not just with hegemonic norms, but also potentially more intimate belief-systems, learned cultural values, and emergent structures of feeling that seemingly impel 'humanitarian intervention'. In the rapid lead up to the US-led war in Libya, symbolism, myth, morality, and emotion were used as countermeasures by: (a) dampening or arresting any international mass movement against the impending war; (b) altering the terms of debate by channelling attention to issues of morality; (c) dividing potential leftist opposition by turning the left in the global North into mutually hostile camps divided along anti-imperialist versus pro-democracy lines (and thus achieving the construction of a choice between alleged freedom under imperial dominance versus local authoritarian autonomy); (d) placing obstacles in the path of the articulation and audibility of anti-imperialist critiques from the global South; (e) creating an international chorus of voices, predominantly in the global North, predominantly in the mass and 'social' media, demanding immediate action which was reduced to specifically military action. The alleged 'consequences of inaction' were culturally constructed and socially distributed, with the hope of both spreading accountability and acquiring legitimacy, while also depoliticising the intervention by turning it into a purely moral choice and a question of witnessing, solidarity, and conscience. 'Not another war in a Muslim country' was a fear felt in the Obama Administration, and voiced by then Defense Secretary Robert Gates, haunted by the spectre of the recent war of occupation in Iraq. While no significantly new weapons technologies

were tested in the war in Libya, some of the newer ideational and communicative technologies of the last 20 years were reworked and deployed.

With reference to symbolic constructions, the long-standing US demonisation of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was particularly compelling for many members of the mass audience, especially in the US itself, and the Obama Administration sought to capitalise on that. Over the course of three decades, US government officials spoke in terms that suggested they favoured the overthrow and death of Gaddafi. Successive US presidents thus demonised Gaddafi in ways that suggested he was evil, or subhuman. President Richard Nixon said Gaddafi was 'more than just a desert rat' but also 'an international outlaw', and urged an international response to Gaddafi; then, President Gerald Ford said Gaddafi was a 'bully' and a 'cancer'; after President Jimmy Carter spoke of Gaddafi as 'subhuman'; more than all, President Ronald Reagan responded to a question about whether he would 'not be sorry to see Qaddafi fall' by stating 'diplomacy would have me not answer that question'; Reagan's secretary of state, General Alexander Haig, referred to Gaddafi as 'a cancer that has to be removed', while Vice President George H.W. Bush described Gaddafi as an 'egomaniac who would trigger World War III to make headlines' (Wright 1981–82, p. 16). One should also recall Reagan's famous statement about Gaddafi: 'this mad dog of the Middle East [who] has a goal of a world revolution, Moslem fundamentalist revolution' (Reagan 1986a: n.p.). To this Reagan added about Gaddafi, 'I find he's not only a barbarian but he's flaky' and 'I think he's more than a bad smell' (quoted in Bowman 2011: n.p.). Reagan also asserted in a televised address to Americans that Gaddafi 'engaged in acts of international terror, acts that put him outside the company of civilized men' (Reagan 1986b). Gaddafi thus stood for the barbaric, the uncivilised, the animal, the disease that stood against international order. For longer than Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi had been symbolised in mainstream narratives as a demonic presence, with little in the way of dissenting or critical voices being heard. The fact of the hegemony of this narrative, over an extended period and with the weight of presidential and mainstream media authority, could help to inculcate a popular belief in Gaddafi as a singularly malevolent, dangerous, and unstable creature. It would take little effort for this narrative to be reanimated in 2011, with the desire to secure popular support for regime change.

In terms of myth, numerous fabrications of atrocity and methods of committing atrocity were conjured up by proponents of intervention in ways that spoke to deeply ingrained beliefs around race and sex, and the violence of non-Western others. Some of these unproven allegations simply recapitulated the narrative of Gaddafi as a perpetrator of egregious and lurid crimes, in a manner that sexualised Orientalist discourse. This was especially the case with the charge that Gaddafi had ordered systematic mass rape against Libyans during 2011, a charge made by both the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the US ambassador to the UN. The additional charge was that troops, ordered to rape, where fuelled by Viagra. If sex performed an internalising function of graphically vivifying the nature of Gaddafi's domestic 'tyranny', race performed an externalising function that forged a convergence between anti-black racism in Libya and US desires to remove Libya as a leader in Africa. Here we are dealing with the myth of African mercenaries being flown in to massacre protesters, and even to indiscriminately terrorise ordinary Libyans with rape and murder. While not a single African 'mercenary' was ever produced to substantiate such claims, nor any evidence recorded in the many photographs and videos of protests and fighting in the streets, there was instead ample evidence documented by international human rights organisations and the media of black Libyans and African migrant workers being indiscriminately assaulted, abducted, tortured, and often murdered by the Libyan insurgents. Thus, the African mercenary myth was useful for cementing the intended rupture between 'the new Libya' post-Gaddafi and Pan-Africanism, thereby realigning Libya with Europe and the 'modern world', which some in the Libyan opposition explicitly craved. The myth also became a useful cover for mass murder along

racial lines. Indeed, Amnesty International itself found that 'some Libyan rebels seem to regard the war against Gadhafi as tantamount to a battle against black people' (Ghosh 2011). Other myths produced by Western and Arab media, as well as Libyan activists at home and anti-government exiles, involved stories proven to be false that concerned alleged atrocities by the Libyan government. These included stories of: Libyan jets, helicopter gunships, and anti-aircraft artillery being used against unarmed protesters; mass defections from government ranks; peaceful protests; and, of course, of a threatened 'genocide' against Benghazi (see Forte 2012a: ch. 5, b). Taken individually or together, these myths could be useful in producing an international perception of emergency by heightening fear, rooted in prior beliefs of the monstrosity of non-Western regimes and the sexual violence of black people.

Morality played a paramount role in compelling and justifying foreign military intervention (as counter-intuitive as this statement might seem at this point). In particular, a series of *moral dualisms* acted as the central justificatory principles. One such moral dualism could be characterised as follows: 'If we do not act, we should be held responsible for the actions of others. When we do act, we should never be held responsible for our own actions'. A second moral dualism involves selecting certain lives as being better, more important, and thus worthy of being saved than others – thus, while an alleged massacre to come in Benghazi could not be tolerated by Western leaders and key opinion shapers, the actual devastation of Sirte did not occasion any outcry. A third moral dualism comes into play with the selectivity in practice of what in theory claims to be a universal and non-discriminatory defence of human rights: intervention is only justified in some parts of the world, but not in others, regardless of the presence or scope of human rights violations. A fourth moral dualism came into play with the shifting labelling practices employed by US officials and the dominant media: while the US labelled armed civilians in Afghanistan as either 'terrorists' and/or 'insurgents', in Libya they became 'revolutionaries'

and their deaths in battle were counted among 'civilian' deaths. Hence, 'protecting civilians' in NATO's public parlance became a practice of spearheading the Libyan insurgency by attacking government troops and armed civilians who supported the government. However, the broader role of moralising discourse was to depoliticise military intervention, to arrest opposing discourses, and to remove the motivations for intervention from question.

Emotions which, when given voice, supported and demanded intervention, were themselves moulded and motivated by the skilled use of language, within the context of what media commentators dubbed the 'Arab Spring'. Vicariously experienced through messages from activists on the street posted to social media, a certain fervour acquired momentum that hailed all protesters in any streets in North Africa and the Middle East as agents of a new progressive order of freedom, democracy, and human rights. The Iraq War was seemingly forgotten as some Westerners now saw themselves as part of an alliance with Arabs against local tyranny (while preserving US dominance). What remained to shape these emotions into a direction that favoured military intervention in Libya (and potentially in Syria) was the deployment of stock narrative tropes that themselves evoked emotional responses. Thus, the 'international community' of 'civilised' nations 'not standing idly by' as assaults on protesters stained 'the conscience of the world' meant intervening on 'the right side of history' to 'save lives' and 'protect civilians' with 'surgical strikes' that respected 'human rights'. Intervention thus became not a geopolitical act, but something akin to therapy, or a mode of health-care provision. That Libya was made to stand out as the special subject of direct intervention, and be accepted as such by some, owes a great deal to the prior demonisation of Gaddafi, moral dualisms, and the powerful pull of racial and sexual myths. An anti-imperialist stance could thus be made to look as dark, sinister, and seemingly a part of 'the problem'. Emotional responses, however, were highly dependent on attention spans, and as Libya began to fall into ever deeper chaos

as a result of the intervention, and violence continued steadily past 2011, the emotional outcry diminished considerably. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that such emotions resonated outside of social media, revealing dominant opinion formations in social media spheres not to reflect mass opinion on the whole.

Libya may thus also offer a case study of how the regimentation of emotion can inform new theorising about imperialism. However, considerable caution is necessary. On one side, it is largely true that social and corporate media resonated with calls for a no-fly zone to be imposed, from late February to early March 2011. As an example, the online activist organisation Avaaz (2011) collected more than 800,000 signatures petitioning the UN to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Meanwhile, it did not clarify to signatories that the UN had no power of its own to implement this, and that such action would involve direct military intervention to destroy Libyan airfields and air defences, as Defense Secretary Gates had to explain emphatically (HAC 2011). Indeed, Avaaz's campaign director obfuscated this latter fact, saying the petition was not a call for military intervention (Hilary 2011). Major human rights organisations in the global North, along with numerous newspaper editorials, made similar calls. On the other side, it is largely not the case that these views were representative of a plurality or majority of citizens, and there is little evidence that they succeeded in persuading the public to back such calls for intervention. A series of opinion polls conducted in the US showed large majorities were against the idea that the US had a responsibility, moral or otherwise, to intervene in the Libyan civil conflict, and even while significant majorities reaffirmed their dislike for Gaddafi and even supported his removal, they were against US military intervention aimed at regime change. The national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, conducted from 10–13 March 2011, during a critical period of especially heightened dissemination of most of the elements discussed above, found that: 63% rejected the idea that the US had a responsibility to intervene, lower than was even the case for the

wars in Kosovo and Bosnia; only 16% favoured bombing Libyan air defences, an essential part of imposing a no-fly zone; 69% of US respondents rejected providing arms to Libyan opposition groups; and 82% were against sending US troops. Even so, among those favouring military intervention, moral arguments tended to win over arguments for regime change (Pew 2011, pp. 1–2). A number of polls by other organisations, also conducted in March 2011, tended to produce results very similar to those reported by the Pew Research Center (see e.g., ABC 2011; Polling Report 2011), with some reporting that fewer than 10% of Americans supported US military intervention to remove Gaddafi (Angus Reid 2011). As something of an exception, a CNN poll found greater support for establishing a no-fly zone and sending arms to the insurgents, with 76% reporting an unfavourable opinion of Gaddafi; yet even here, 62% were opposed to military intervention for the purpose of regime change (CNN 2011, pp. 2–3). By June 2011, what limited US public support existed for the Libyan War had declined further (Condon 2011). In addition, most elected representatives in the US Congress consistently voted to deny support for the war. As one example, on 24 June 2011, the US House of Representatives voted 295–123 against a resolution authorising the limited use of force in support of the NATO mission in Libya (AP 2011).

Protecting Libya: Imperial Humanitarianism

The culmination of all of these factors was the intent to continue fortifying a system of globalised *humanitarian abduction,* ultimately rooted in the civilisational projects of nineteenth-century British and American colonisation. This system involves claims to be better at administering the world, and being entitled to administer it, according to either divine, moral, political, economic, or technological endowments. Humanitarian interventionism thus points to a way of administering the world that goes beyond brute force alone, and harkens back to the older

philosophical premises of settler colonialism. Part of this claim to administrative enlightenment involves the idea of protection, which assumes that some exist in a natural state as hapless and incapable victims who require the aid of powerful outsiders. It also assumes that natives are ruled either by brutish or irresponsible chiefs and parents, and thus redemption necessitates external correction. The construction of 'humanitarian emergency' as if it were a simple fact, one that occurs naturally or due to innate deficiencies in a given (usually non-Western) sociopolitical system, tends not only to reinforce notions of pathological primitiveness, but goes further by creating the 'need' for a custodial relationship between the tutors from the global North and their racially differentiated wards. It is not surprising, then, that the 'responsibility-to-protect' doctrine – articulated by key proponents such as Gareth Evans, Lloyd Axworthy, and Michael Ignatieff – should arise from settler states such as Australia, Canada, and the US, with long histories of missions, residential schools, and 'Indian schools', along with the office of 'Protector of the Aborigines' in British colonies. Aboriginals were to be saved from themselves, rescued from their own inborn defects and savage habits while their lands and political self-determination would be surrendered to their rescuers.

Humanitarian interventionism is premised on an understanding that the sovereignty of others should not matter when others prove themselves incapable of proper self-rule, as implied by the construction and application of international programmes of good governance, transparency, accountability, and aid to civil society via non-governmental organisations in order to 'save failed states' (see Helman and Ratner 1992–93 vs Gordon 1997). This updated version of the civilising mission is found in new reprises of the white man's/woman's burden in saving others from barbarity, what some call the 'white savior syndrome' (Cammarota 2011). This syndrome usually involves creating decontextualised ahistorical binaries (using mythological principles of demonisation and sanctification): bad guys and good guys, dictators and civil society, extremists and moderates, black and white, them and us.

To the extent that contemporary notions of protection reflect a prior history of settler colonisation and extant philosophies of liberal humanitarianism, we should expect to see an updating of the processes of abduction beyond the straightforward acts of seizure of the past, when indigenous children were forcibly removed from their parents and relocated to white-run schools. Abduction in the contemporary sense can involve, in broad terms, the assumption of responsibility for/over others, thus appropriating control of their social formation; it can also involve varied forms of removal, from the adoption of children to international scholarships and other forms of retraining; it can involve destabilisation, regime change, and forms of military destruction, so that intervention today may beget intervention tomorrow; abduction may also involve the capture of local leaders and placing them on trial in international tribunals or local courts under foreign occupation; and it can involve various ways of creating the suffering of others and then pleading the need to come to their rescue.

Cross-References

▶ Gaddafi, Muammar (1942–2011)

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Aggression on Non-western Cultures

A

Agrarian Labor and Peasantry in the Global South

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The food crisis, which erupted in 2007–2008 and resulted in catastrophic effects on the peoples of numerous countries of the South, especially Africa, as well as popular rebellions, represent two of the many dimensions of the crisis of the capitalist world system. Other very worrying aspects include socioeconomic, political, ideological, energy, or climatic ones. The food and agricultural dimensions of the current systemic crisis reveal the global failure and deep dysfunctions that characterize the agricultural "model" imposed worldwide by financial capital and transnational agribusiness corporations since the beginning of the neoliberal era in the late 1970s, along with the implementation of the structural adjustment plans (SAPs) in the Global South and austerity policies in the North. For more than three and a half decades, the peasantries of the world have been suffering an intensification of attacks by capital on their land, natural resources, and means of production. These attacks have also been eroding national sovereignty and the role of the state; destroying individuals, families, and

communities; devastating the environment; and threatening the survival of huge numbers of human beings across the world.

The dysfunctions affecting the agricultural sectors can be perceived by identifying a series of striking paradoxes. As a matter of fact, approximately three billion people on the planet today continue to suffer from hunger (one-third) or malnutrition (two-thirds), although agricultural productions are greatly exceeding food needs, with an effective overproduction of at least 150%. Furthermore, a huge majority of these people are themselves peasants or living in rural areas: three-quarters of those suffering from undernourishment are rural. Meanwhile, the expansion of the areas for cultivation worldwide is accompanied by a significant decline in peasant populations compared to the populations in the urban areas, which absorb the massive and persistent rural exodus, mainly into growing miserable slums. Moreover, an increasing proportion of land is cultivated by transnational corporations, which do not direct their agricultural production toward food consumption, but rather toward energy or industrial outlets (e.g., agro-fuels). In most countries of the South that are excluded from the benefits of capitalist globalization, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia, a relative dynamism of agricultural exports derived from rental commercial crops coexists with increasing imports of basic products to meet food needs. Clearly, and urgently, things must change.

This chapter is an attempt to make sense of how these urgent global problems are manifested in the Global South and the North, and while there are common traits in how global capital goes after profit, the receptions on the ground differ. Hence, it is important for struggles in different parts of the world – affected differently but also sharing related features – to develop a concerted understanding of the problems and prioritize strategies that take heed of the differences and share common visions for the future.

Theoretical and Historical Framework

To begin with, a theoretical and historical framework is needed. Samir Amin proposed a series of analytical elements to answer major questions about the appropriate kind of agriculture (capitalist, socialist, or peasant) to guarantee the objective of food sovereignty; the agricultural productions to be prioritized to reach a development model able to conciliate the improvement in food supply and the preservation of the environment; and the reflection on the resolution of the agrarian question.

He analyzed family agriculture and the differences between North and Global South. In the North (North America, Western Europe), a modern and highly productive family agriculture dominates, supplies these countries' food demands, and produces exportable surpluses. However, while integrated into the capitalist system, this agriculture does not share a characteristic of capitalism: its labor organization generally requires a reduced and polyvalent workforce. Within the capitalist logic, a significant part of the income generated by farmers – even land owners – is controlled and collected by segments of high capital, implying that their remuneration does not correspond to their productivity. Thus, family agriculture can be assimilated to the status of a subcontractor or an artisan working in a putting-out system, and squeezed between supermarkets, agribusiness, and banking.

In the Global South where peasant families constitute almost half of humanity, the types of agricultural systems vary, with wide differences in productivity among them (from mechanized latifundium to micro parcels, with lands for self-consumption or cash crop exports, etc.). But, taken as a whole, these Southern agricultures – often peasant ones – suffer from a (growing) productivity gap as compared to the North. Most family agricultures of the South are under-equipped, noncompetitive, and destined for subsistence food, which explains the poverty of the rural world or the inefficiency to supply food to cities. But the Southern peasant agriculture is also largely integrated into the local and dominant global capitalist system and their profits are consequently siphoned by dominant capital.

Here, the key question is whether agriculture in the South could be modernized by capitalism. Amin says no, and criticizes the notion of "food

security" according to which the Global South should rely on a specialization in cash crop products for export to cover food deficits. It results in disaster, as the recent food crisis has shown. What is necessary is food sovereignty, and a sine qua non is access to land for all peasants, to be considered a goal toward which most struggles in rural areas are oriented.

Amin differentiates the types of land tenure systems in the South, depending on the ownership status. The first system is land tenure based on private ownership. Since the "enclosures" process in early capitalism in Western Europe, this is seen as the "modern" form of landownership by the "liberal" ideology's rhetoric and management rationale by making land a "merchandise" exchangeable at market price. Opposing this idea, Amin asserts that it is unsustainable to draw from the construction of Northern modernity rules for the advancement of the peoples of the global South. To change land into private property, the present reactivation of the "enclosures" process involves dispossession of peasants, as in the colonial times. Other forms of regulating the right to use land are conceivable and can produce similar results, avoiding the foreseeable destruction by capitalism.

Land tenure not based on private ownership is the second system, which takes heterogeneous forms and where access to land is regulated by rules derived from institutions involving individuals, communities, and the state. Among these are "customary" rules that traditionally guarantee access to land to all families – but it does not mean equal rights. These rights of use by communities are limited by the state and only exist today in deteriorated forms, attacked by capitalist expansion. Frequently, European colonial powers left surviving customary practices to retain their domination. The same phenomenon is occurring today under imperialist pressures. Popular revolutions in Asia or Africa sometimes challenged this legacy. China and Vietnam (or Cuba in Latin America) constitute unique examples of the success of a land system based on the rights of all peasants within the village. This constitutes equal access to and use of land, with the state as the sole owner and equal land distribution among usufructuary families. Amin examines the evolution of this system based on the suppression of private landownership, up to now, and its ability to resist the attacks it is suffering.

Elsewhere, agrarian reforms implemented by nonrevolutionary hegemonic blocks generally only dispossessed large landowners to the benefit of middle (or even rich) peasants, ignoring the interests of the poor. New waves of agrarian reforms are needed today to meet the legitimate demands of the poorest and landless peasants in India, South East Asia, Kenya, South Africa, the Arab countries, and many parts of Latin America. This is true even for other Southern regions where capitalist private ownership rights have not yet penetrated deeply (or formally), such as in intertropical Africa.

This could be done through an expansion of the definition of public property to include land, along with a democratization of the state and the minimization of inequalities. However, the success of these agrarian reforms always remains uncertain because such redistributions maintain tenure systems led by the principle of ownership and even reinforce the adherence to private property. In the dominant discourse, serving the interests of capital and its agribusiness model, a "modern reform" of the land tenure system means privatization, which is the exact opposite of what the challenges of building of democratic and alternative agricultural projects based on prosperous peasant family economies really require. Therefore, the only obstacle to the fast trend of commodification and private appropriation of landownership is the resistance and organization of its victims: the peasants (Amin 2005).

Latin America

João Pedro Stedile examined the forms and tendencies of capital penetration in the agricultural sector in Latin America, and studies the current challenges imposed on peasant movements of this continent and their programs, in particular La Via Campesina. He begins by analyzing the mechanisms through which capital accumulated outside of agriculture has taken control of this sector and

concentrated it worldwide in the current phase of financialized capitalism (Stedile 2007).

He elaborates how, due to the current crisis, large Northern corporations fled to peripheral countries to save their volatile capital by investing in fixed assets, such as land, minerals, raw materials, water, biodiversity territories, or tropical agriculture, and by taking over renewable energy sources, particularly productions for agro-fuels. This generated speculative operations in the futures markets and a rise in the prices of agricultural goods traded in the global stock exchange markets, without any correlation to production costs and the actual value of the socially needed labor time.

Stedile then analyzes the consequences of the imposition of corporate private ownership of natural resources on the life and organization of the peasants, with people and states losing sovereignty over food and productive processes. The destructive "model" of capital for agriculture – agribusiness, or "agriculture without people" – brings deep and insuperable contradictions.

With this aim, Stedile defends what could be the main elements of a peasant program that promotes workers' control, anti-capitalist agricultures, food sovereignty, and environmental protection in the countries of the South. This alternative platform includes: prioritizing policies of food sovereignty and healthy foods; preventing the concentration of private land and nature ownership; diversifying agriculture; increasing labor and land productivity and adopting machines that respect the environment; reorganizing agricultural industries into small and medium scale, controlled by workers and peasants; controlling food production by domestic social forces and prohibiting foreign capital from owning land; stopping deforestation; preserving and disseminating native improved seeds and preventing the spread of genetically modified seeds; ensuring access to water as the right to a common good for every citizen and developing infrastructure in rural communities; implementing a popular energy sovereignty and reviewing current models of transportation; ensuring the rights of indigenous communities; promoting socially oriented public policies for agriculture; universalizing social welfare for the entire population; generalizing educational programs in rural areas and enhancing local cultural habits; changing the international free-trade agreements that function to the detriment of the peoples; and encouraging social relations based on human values built over millennia, such as solidarity and equality – which are the very values of socialism.

Stedile presents some organizational and political challenges for peasant movements, at the local and global levels, in order to face the current disadvantageous balance of power, where global capital is on the offensive to control nature and agricultural goods. Such an analysis results from the experienced realities in Latin America, and from the resistances of these peasant movements against capitalist destructions. And last, he suggests addressing the interests of transnational capital and its control mechanisms by: building a popular, alternative development model of agricultural production managed by the peasants and workers; by transforming the struggle for land into that for territory; developing a technological matrix based on agroecology, free schools in the countryside, training programs at all levels and alternative means of mass communication; and creating opportunities for mass social struggles and building alliances against the class enemies gathering all sectors living in rural areas as well as city workers, nationally and internationally.

Africa

With a specific focus on Southern Africa, Sam Moyo studied the peasantries who have suffered attacks under colonialism, post-independence, and neoliberal capitalism. He goes on to outline the perspectives of rebuilding them on the reaffirmation of the inalienability of land rights and collective food sovereignty. His starting point is the desperate situation of most African peasants, who are facing a crisis of social reproduction, food insecurity and insufficient incomes from farming, and their survival strategies despite the state's withdrawal. Regardless of the diversity of African agricultures, their persistent and generalized failure to increase productivity and supplies as well as to

resolve agrarian questions of enhancing the social reproduction of the majority of the peasantries – conceived as elements of democratization and national development – is clear and dramatic.

Centuries of systemic land alienation and exploitation of peasantries' labor, through unequal integration into the capitalist world system during colonial and post-independence periods, resulted in the underdevelopment of the agrarian systems. SAPs exacerbated extroversion, extraction of surplus value, land concentration, food imports, and aid dependency. Recently, a new assault led by foreign land-grabbing actors dispossessed the peasantry of its lands and natural resources and intensified its labor exploitation. Such accumulation processes undermine the social value of peasant production based on self-employed family labor and self-consumption as well as its ability to adopt technologies and crops to expand low energy-intensive production for its social reproduction. These evolutions, which are driven by financialized capital and agri-business at the expense of marginalized peasantries, fuel local conflicts and accentuate the polarization of agrarian accumulation (Moyo and Yeros 2005).

Moyo presents an overview of the long-run history of the destruction of African food production systems by analyzing the trajectory of primitive accumulation and disarticulation of these agrarian societies. He describes the various phases, forms, and trends of land alienation, dispossession, and incorporation of the peasantries, from colonialism, post-independence developmentalism, to neoliberalism and its re-institutionalized primitive accumulation. He touches upon the current crisis involving land grabbing and "contracted farmers." Then, he explains the underdevelopment of the agrarian productive forces, using examples from countries of the mal-integrated Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the qualitative changes in the agrarian surplus extraction and its externalization through the unequal world and subregional trade regimes under neoliberalism. Here, the recent global food price and agrarian crisis, especially in the SADC region, as well as South African capital's hegemony are studied. Moyo assesses the social consequences of such processes on the collapse of

basic food consumption and the increase in food-related poverty – except in a few "secure" enclaves – and on the more recent "alternative" strategies within the neoliberal context and the "push" to universalize the commodification of land.

The real alternative is one that supports priorities given to food sovereignty and a sustainable use of resources by autonomous small producers, in which democracy is inclusive and solidly founded on social progress. This requires a range of public policy decisions of restructuring these food systems, including the choices of the basic commodities to be produced in order to satisfy social needs, a redistribution of the means of food production (land, inputs, and water), substantial infrastructural investments, and enhancing the peasantries' human resources. This task will also include regional integrations. A reorientation of the SADC region's agricultural policies toward more collective strategies to defend food sovereignty and land rights is needed, in order to reverse the present free-trade and market-based approach of this regionalization.

China

Erebus Wong and Jade Tsui Sit, following Wen Tiejun's theses, attempted to rethink the problematics of "rural China" in the development of the country in order to argue for rural regeneration as an alternative to a destructive "modernization." The latter is often reduced to industrialization and the empowering of the state, pursued through several phases from the middle of the nineteenth century to the revolutionary period. It seems to be relevant to reconsider the intellectual heritage of the rural reconstruction movement – active during the 1920 and 1930s but much neglected today – in post-developmental China, where the rural sector has been historically exploited.

To understand the present situation of China's peasantry – the majority of its population – it is necessary to examine the mechanisms involved beyond the collectivization-liberalization dichotomy. Land is a key issue for China, which has to nourish 19% of the world's population with 8% of the world's arable land. In spite of agricultural

output, only 13% of its total land area can be cultivated. The explanation is to be found in the fact that land is collectively owned by village communities and distributed within peasant households, who use it mainly for food production to maintain self-sufficiency. Wong and Sit propose a historical overview of China's modernization to capture the essence of its trajectory in the last 60 years. After 1949, the new regime underwent a period of Soviet-style industrialization, installing an asymmetric dual system unfavorable to the peasantry. However, despite the industrialization strategy, the peasantry has benefited from the radical land reforms.

Nowadays, many peasants are suffering from exploitation and injustice, but a few residual socialist practices subsist, including the legacy of land reforms. In the mid-1980s, the promotion of export-oriented growth generated flows of migrant workers from the rural areas to cities – mostly comprised of surplus labor force from rural households that owned a small plot, without land expropriation. The rural sector took up the cost of social reproduction of labor and served as a buffer to absorb social risks in urban areas caused by current pro-capital reforms. It also revealed its stabilizing capacity by regulating the labor market and reabsorbing unemployed migrant workers in cities during cyclic crises (Wen 2001).

However, mainstream intellectuals support the neoliberal ideology to advocate land commodification. Under the pressures of construction projects led by fiscally constrained local governments and real estate speculators, land expropriation accelerated in the 1990s. About 40–50 million peasants lost their land; the landless appeared in the 2000s, especially after the 2003 law modifying collective arable land legislation and excluding a new generation from land allocation through redistribution. Wong and Sit explain the dangers associated with such evolutions, which weaken the mechanisms of risk management through internalization in rural community, in a time when 200 million peasant migrant workers are living in cities and evolving into the working class. This is why, inspired by Wen Tiejun's analysis of the agrarian and rural problem of China, they defend collective landownership in rural

areas as the most precious legacy of the 1949 revolution.

China's take-off is largely based on the exploitation of its rural sector. Today, the export-oriented model has become such a path dependency and internal disequilibriums are so deep that China has to make great efforts to switch its trajectory of development to invest into rural society, to guarantee social progress, and to preserve the environment. Solutions for an alternative path could be to reactivate and revalorize the status of the peasantry, to rediscover the pioneering ideas of the rural reconstruction movements, and to support the experiments of rural regeneration currently developed in the country, as renewed and powerful insights, both popular and ecological, to overcome the destructive aspects of contemporary global capitalism.

India

Utsa Patnaik exposed the political-economic context of the peasant struggles for livelihood security and land in India. She begins by recalling that peasantry and rural workers of the global South are under historically unprecedented pressures today by attacks by capital, especially on the means of securing livelihood, and among them land, in order to control the use of lands for its own purposes, and divert agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes. Such a movement looks similar to that of primitive accumulation in Western Europe of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, but today, the Southern peasantry has nowhere to migrate, except to the slums of the megalopolis. Peasants are now turning from passive resistance to active contestation of global capital domination, transforming them from objects to subjects of history.

She examines the agrarian distress, suicides, and unemployment in India and states that inequalities have increased considerably from the 1990s under neoliberal policies and that the living condition of the masses of the laboring poor today is globally worse – except where positive interventions have taken place to stabilize livelihood. In rural India, this situation results from

attempts to take over peasant lands and resources by domestic and foreign corporations, supported by the state. In parallel, unemployment is partly due to the inability to translate higher economic growth without income redistribution into job creation, while purchasing power has been eroded by inflation prices of basic needs for ordinary people, forgotten by the ruling classes' strategy of submission to financial capital.

The author points out that the main trend observed in the Indian economy – which has two-thirds of its workforce occupied in agriculture – is that the relative share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in the gross domestic product, especially for crops like food grains, has declined, while that of industry has stagnated, but of services has increased. In a context of trade openness, fiscal contraction, price-stabilization system dismantling, and land acquisition for SEZs, the state has launched an attack on small farmers, in the name of "development" but in fact for the benefit of a small minority of real estate speculators, thus creating an agrarian crisis intensifying into the struggle for land.

As a consequence, small producers have been exposed to the ups and downs of prices, forced to be indebted to money lenders and banks, have lost lands against unpaid debts or even committed suicide. With the implementation of the neoliberal agenda, land ownership concentration is happening at an all-India level and livelihood insecurity is spreading. Therefore, farming is becoming unviable. The author analyzes the ongoing resistances of farmers to land acquisition or to change in land use (setting up extractives). She describes the repression suffered by peasant rebellions, and also the victories won when the state governments have had to withdraw their projects or concede compensations.

Patnaik recalls the economic characteristics of land, which is not produced by human labor, and the implications of its pricing, different from that of agricultural commodities (prices are anchored to amounts of labor used for producing them). Based on market capitalization of incomes, the price of land – in a capitalist system – can vary considerably, depending on its use and the associated yield. Here lies the root of the discontent of farmers, constrained (and cheated) by the state governments to sell their lands at low prices, that is, with compensations far below the profits earned by private investors or speculators, who parcel them for lucrative purposes. One adverse effect, among others, is that the total cropped area becomes stagnant and the growth in output slows down, leading to inflation in food prices and a contraction of demand. The author finally asserts that to think – like the corporates in collusion with the state do in India – that peasants can be treated as dupes is a mistake because they are now aware of their rights and are strongly resisting their exploitation (Patnaik 2011).

Oceania

Rémy Herrera and Poeura Tetoe studied Oceania, specifically Papua New Guinea. They tried to elucidate the "*Papua Niugini* Paradox," that is, the striking coexistence of an alleged "archaic" (i.e., not based on private property) system of landownership – as in most Oceanian insular countries – and the vivacity of the peasants' resistance against neoliberal capitalism, such as the penetration of FDIs in mining, hydrocarbons and natural resources, including forestry and water. Access to land is a real issue in this country where a majority of the population is still involved in subsistence crops for self-consumption, "customary" rules persist on more than 90% of the soil territory, and the use of land is the source of acute conflicts between transnational corporations, the state and the society.

Herrera and Tetoe examine the people's attachment to land. European colonization integrated the indigenous people into global capitalism, transforming most of them into small farmers and making them dependent on colonial plantation companies. Despite this tendency, a feature characterizing this peasant society today is the persistence of traditional institutions to defend collective landownership. The authors analyze this connection to land, customary practices and management, and collective ownership of land in a context where land is always the object of desire of private interests and under pressure to be

registered and privatized. They also explain the ambivalence in the position of the state, which faces pressures from foreign investors and international donors, to the point that the dominance of traditional collective forms of social organization within the unusual structure of land tenure has not prevented increased exports of minerals, hydrocarbons, and agribusiness products. The protective role of the state over customary land use has only been effective where private interests are not involved and no natural resources have been discovered. Elsewhere, the state has been taking over land to sell the exploitation of all resources. The access to natural resources and their exploitation by foreign firms are being carried out with the support of the state, which articulates this process of land appropriation with the previous ancestral structures of collective landownership, without introducing "free" land markets.

Even though the logic of "ideology of landownership" is gaining ground and many peasants have been receptive to financial compensations, the social structures instead of collapsing have adapted to it. Despite pressures toward individualization of landownership, Papua New Guinean authorities have not succeeded in challenging customary collective landownership. The reason is to be found in the popular resistance by the peasant society against privatization of land, the imposition of modern register for lands, and their management by capitalist laws.

Herrera and Tetoe trace the history of the registration of customary land and the establishment of cadastral systems from the Australian colonial administration to the recent "land reform" component of the SAPs, that has been jointly imposed by the Papua New Guinean state and foreign donors. They affirm the legitimacy of popular mobilizations gathering large sections of civil society (and even of the military) against privatization of customary land as common patrimony and of their revendication for social progress, in one of the countries with the lowest social indicators in the world.

What is defended is the legitimacy of the principle of collective landowning and free access to the peasant community land; what is demonstrated is the possibility of other rules for land use; what is recommended is to maintain the existence of noncapitalist peasant farming. Constraints obliterate the struggles of a people longing to master their collective destiny. The government has little room for maneuver. But an alternative to neoliberalism is required, along with the emergence of a class alliance around the peasantry, to draw a modern development strategy that benefits the people (Herrera and Lau 2015).

Facing the Domination of Financial Capital

All these authors, whichever region they consider, emphasize the general failure of capitalism to solve the agrarian and agricultural issues. The deterioration of the situation of peasant agricultures following the exacerbation of the food dimension of the current systemic crisis of capitalism has confirmed once again the structural inability of such a system to resolve the internal contradictions it has generated since its very origins, not only at the local, national, and regional levels but also worldwide.

Even in the richest countries of the North, where productivity boosted by technological progress is very high and food provision is available for a large majority of the population, the problems experienced by most family agricultures to keep their smallholding farms, maintain their productive activities and work in satisfactory conditions, the problems faced by consumers to master both the variety and the quality of their food as well as the problems encountered by every citizen to conserve natural resources and protect the environment, are exceeding the bounds of the bearable.

The team of European Coordination of La Via Campesina examined the difficulties of European agriculture, which is diverse in its productions and structures, as well as the farmer struggles in this continent. Most of these farmers receive incomes lower than the minimum wages of other professional categories and live under the pressure of repeated sectorial crises due to neoliberal policies and the risk of elimination of their small- or medium-sized farms. While agricultural work is

poorly recognized and the environment is threatened, subsidies intended to compensate prices that are often below production costs primarily benefit a minority of large producers and agribusinesses and impose dumping on the Southern countries. The confrontation is not between North and South but between two visions of agriculture: agricultural liberalization versus food sovereignty. The authors demonstrate that a Europe without farmers would not be proof of its development. Things will change only if European farmers and citizens act together, in solidarity with Southern peasant movements, to draw societies out from their submission to transnational firms.

The European Coordination of La Via Campesina explains the common problems encountered by farmers, in spite of their diversities, who are dealing with industrialization and globalization: productivism, disappearance of small farmers, attacks on peasant agriculture by agribusiness, indebtedness, outsourcing of agricultural production, monoculture plantations, dissemination of GMOs, pollution, etc. In the face of such destructions and the inertia of professional organizations defending the interests of dominant economic powers, European farmers have started to resist. The authors describe the evolutions of these struggles, culminating in the emergence of a European farmer movement, connected with civil society and international movements, to propose alternatives, from local-national to globalized struggles: against the concentration of lands by agribusiness, the introduction of GMOs, the appropriation of seeds by seed industrial firms, or neoliberal agricultural policies and rules of international trade promoted by the WTO.

La Via Campesina's European authors analyze the alternatives opened by the global crisis of the dominant system. According to them, the tasks of the European farmers should be to make food sovereignty (conceived as a right and a duty) the framework of agricultural policies and to build a large alliance of European citizens – producers and consumers – to achieve this goal; to promote a new farming model generating employment, a well-nourished population and respect for the environment; to work toward global food governance; and to participate in international

mobilizations for the defense of nature, climate, and biodiversity under attack by WTO free-trade agreements. Grassroots initiatives to relocate food production have multiplied today in the continent.

Finally, the European Coordination of La Via Campesina team concludes that another European common agricultural and food policy is possible, which presupposes deep changes in priorities. The latter should strive to maintain and develop a sustainable and social peasant agriculture, feeding the people, preserving health and the environment, and keeping rural landscapes alive; guarantee peasants decent living conditions thanks to stable and sufficient incomes and recognition and attractiveness of their profession; relocate food when possible; and allocate public supports in priority to productions effectively beneficial for employment and the environment.

In the Global South, where average levels of productivity and mechanization in agriculture are often weaker, the difficulties are more worrying. Today, nearly half the Southern countries have lost the capacity to produce and supply what their people demand and need to eat. Post-independence Africa was self-sufficient for its food provisioning at the beginning of the 1960s but is today a net food importer continent. Even as we highlight it here, around three billion undernourished persons – mostly poor peasants or landless – are suffering from hunger, while masses of rural families who have lost their lands do not anymore have access to land and means of food production. In most peripheral societies pauperization is spreading, and the living conditions in rural areas – as well as in huge urban slums congested with the rural exodus – are dramatic, that is, simply inhuman and unacceptable.

Clearly identified by all the authors, the common enemy of the people – wherever they may be living (or just surviving), working, and resisting, in the South or in the North – is financial capital, which pushes people deeper and deeper into indebtedness and subjects them to super-exploitation. Despite the numerous, multidimensional, and complex contradictions of the world system, it is precisely high financial capital, in crisis, that has launched a modern *conquista*, characterized by repeated assaults on all public

goods and common heritage of humanity, through a commodification of life including land and the environment, and an attack on livelihood, along with an overexploitation of labor – peasants and workers taken as a whole.

As finance capitalism becomes more barbaric and destructive than ever, the structural problem for the survival of late capitalism is downward pressure on the profit rates. Financialization as an answer creates only a debt-driven economy and the only thing that this system will offer, until it is in its death agony, is the worsening exploitation of labor and life. The peasantries of the Global South will continue to be dispossessed from their land and means of livelihood. The contradictions of the capitalist global system have now become so deep and so unsolvable that the system brinks on collapse. To be able to relaunch a cycle of expansion at the center of the world system, the current systemic crisis must destroy gigantic amounts of fictitious capital and transfer the costs to the global South – to the majority of the world's population – as well as to the environment.

The present situation does not resemble the beginning of the end of the crisis, but rather the beginning of a long-run process of implosion and collapse of the present phase of financialized capitalism. For humanity to get out of this impasse, radical change is the only hope. This forces us to reconsider the alternatives of social transformation which must be beyond capitalism.

The difficulties are significantly complicated by the choices made by most of the states in the Global South – especially in the so-called "emerging" countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa – in favor of (one of the many varieties of) capitalism. Beyond their recent success in terms of high GDP growth rates and despite their differentiated contents and implications, such pro-capitalist development strategies are illusory and unsustainable.

Converging Peasant Struggles Today

Hence, for the great majority of the people in the Global South as well as in the North, the struggle against deteriorating conditions is at the same time the struggle against processes of the globalization of capitalistic relations spearheaded by financial capital, that is, against capitalism itself. Among the programmatic demands are: agriculture should be withdrawn from the WTO; agro-fuels should be banned; and control of technology, pricing, and market by transnational agribusiness firms should be rejected. Demands put to the state to defend national food sovereignty are legitimate and necessary. But it has to be reckoned that in the era of the hegemony of financial capital, the role of the state is, more often than not, compromised. Global capital has bonded interest blocs across local, national, and international levels. Thus, exerting public pressure for critical policies against the aggression and manipulation of transnational agribusiness is a necessary strategic move for mobilization. While it needs to be stressed that a state's reason of existence is to protect the society, failing which it might as well not be, the people and the movements need to at the same time actualize all potentials for reduction of their dependency on capital, debt, and the market. This is all the more necessary for peasant and family agriculture. The guiding principle is community's control over and management of land and water as commons, which must not be allowed to be privatized or commodified. Agrarian reform to redistribute land to the tiller is high on the agenda in most countries in South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The struggle is not just for "land," but also for "territory," which involves cultural, social, economic reorganization of communal relations to produce and live in a cooperative or collective manner. This necessitates that the "commons" are not objects for control or appropriation still operating in the capitalist logic but focal nodes supporting a different relationship of the community members among themselves and in relation to nature.

Food sovereignty remains at the core of the struggle. To attain food sovereignty, a mode of production other than the capitalist mode of production has to be practiced. This even calls into question national boundaries, for sustainable food production, distribution, and consumption is based on bioregions and watershed systems,

rather than the political borders of modern nation-states. What is also called into question is the mode of consumption and circulation with its destructive impacts on nature and value systems of communities that have acquired the wisdom through the centuries to live in sustainable ways. One important insight is the practice of sharing beyond monetary measures that reduce social relations to calculations of gain and loss. The people's struggles and demands show that in relating to each other, what needs to be envisioned includes modes other than those of capitalistic relations. They also demonstrate the importance of the ecological dimension by recognizing that the current capitalist crisis is at the same time a profound ecological crisis brought about by the extractive industries that exhaust the earth's resources and contaminate water, land, and air; the industrializations that contribute to global warming and climate change; or the capitalistic systems of food production and supply dependent on petrol as fuel.

Strategies to reduce dependence on or control by finance capitalism are to be devised, ranging from establishing the state's control over financial capital to the protection of food and livelihood items from price speculation and market manipulation. For the social movements, the paramount task is to defend food sovereignty at the national and local levels. Local self-organization at the grassroots level to place food sovereignty and environmental security as priority and to fend off attempts at manipulation by financial capital requires direct actions innovative in their intellectual and affective dimensions for going beyond the dead end of capitalism. In this connection, we see more and more debates in the social movements on the defense of the commons, re-ruralization, rebuilding of rural and urban communities that practice values different from capitalistic ones – values of reciprocity and communality.

A reimagination of the ways in which human societies produce and consume is the only way out of the catastrophic crisis that humanity is in. Without food sovereignty, i.e., autonomous communal self-management in the production, distribution, and consumption of food, no

sustainable, diversified economy or political autonomy will be built. Without reversing the logic of the maximization of profit and the concentration of private ownership, especially that of land and the means of production, no state policy and leadership will be consistent or effective. Without radically questioning the hyper-concentration of power in the hands of high finance, no genuinely substantive democracy, with social progress and participation of the people at all levels and in all the processes of decision-making concerning their collective future, will be possible.

Thus, a key question in front of us is that of subjectivity and agency, i.e., the question of the production of subjectivities by the struggling people themselves in going beyond contradictions that inform their struggles. How can we envisage the classes and masses for this social transformation or revolution? What can be the role of family farmers, small peasants, and farm workers? We know that many progressive movements and leftist thinkers have historically had ideological difficulties to understand the peasantries and political difficulties to build class alliances with them. Yesterday as today, peasant and family agricultures are sometimes stereotyped as being underproductive, inefficient, backward, and condemned to disappear in the very movement toward "development." "Modernization" is too often conceived as (and reduced to) industrialization, and more recently as extending services, that is, as being antagonistic to maintaining small or medium-sized family agricultures oriented toward self-sufficiency and local demand.

Consequently, and unfortunately, the anti-capitalist nature of family agricultures is unheeded; hence, its potential ability for structural changes and transformation of the societies and economies we are living in is underestimated. In social movements or worker organizations, many leftist theoreticians still feel that peasants are "residuals" of the past, defending corporatist or sectorial interests, and they are not seen as fighting for common objectives convergent with those of other workers and citizens. For this to change, it is necessary to take a radical critique of modernization, where urbanization and industrialization

have been presented as progress and development, the violence and plunder of imperialism and colonialism have been concealed or understated, and racism brought in to justify the pillage. Alongside this progress, privileging an anthropocentric exploitation of nature, what used to be the commons are seized from the users, especially food producers in rural and indigenous communities.

In this predatory onslaught on the commons, production, rather than for the reproduction and enhancing of lives, is put into motion for the accumulation of more and more money – capital that seeks to command labor power and take control over every aspect of social life through mechanisms of privatization. Thus, the processes of globalization of capitalistic relations can be seen in a way as the spread of cancerous cells traversing the entirety of social life. Exploitation takes place by subsuming every form of labor into the valorization machine that produces values through the domination of fantasies and desires with an overflowing supply of monetary garb, the symbol of wealth and well-being that is in fact the instrument of the exploitation of life.

Hence, the struggle to recover the commons is to assert the right to autonomous life and self-management for the majority across the wide global spectrum. In the face of the difficult task of offsetting the almost irreversible damages to the very existence of the earth as habitat for humans and other species under global warming, climate change and human-induced catastrophes like the nuclear crisis, farmers, as much as workers or other social sectors, are the protagonists and actors for change. It is a question of alliance of struggles on all fronts, building interdependent and mutual support as well as learning from one another that enhance our capacities for autonomous life and self-management.

Access to land and other resources necessary for the reproduction of life, as commons, is a legitimate right for all peasants, workers, and common people. If food sovereignty is to safeguard modes of autonomous collective self-management, it is necessary to accept the continuation of family agricultures in the foreseeable future in the twenty-first century. If agrarian and

agricultural questions are to be solved, it will be obligatory to liberate ourselves from the destructive logics that currently drive capitalism under high finance domination. If the present rules of the imperialist domination of international trade are to be modified, we, peasants, workers, and people of the North and the South, must unite and together face our common enemies – financial capital and its local allies – in order to recreate viable visions, rebuild alternative strategies, and participate in the long arduous road to communism.

This chapter is dedicated to the problems faced by the Southern (and Northern) family agricultures in the current neoliberal era of financial capital domination worldwide, and to the revival of peasant struggles for their social emancipation and legitimate right of access to land and food. Obviously, such struggles also concern all categories of workers and the people as a whole because what is at stake is the challenge to reach food sovereignty and to build our societies, at the local, national, and global levels, on the principles of social justice, equality, and real democracy.

Cross-References

▶ Africa
▶ Agriculture
▶ China
▶ Global South
▶ India
▶ Latin America

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Agrarian Rebellion

▶ Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts Against British Imperialism

Agriculture

▶ Food and Imperialism: Food Regimes, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America

Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism

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Synonyms

Commodity dependence; Dispossession; Food import dependence; Market integration; Peasants; Plantations; Structural Adjustment

Definition

World agriculture is marked by extreme imbalances that are among the most durable economic legacies of European imperialism. Many of the world's poorest countries in the tropics are net food importers despite having large shares of their labor force engaged in agriculture and large amounts of their best arable land devoted to agro-export commodities. This commodity dependence has deep roots in waves of dispossession, the establishment of plantations, and the subjugation of peasantries to increasing competitive pressures at the same time as they were progressively marginalized in landscapes. On the other hand, many of the world's wealthiest countries, including Europe and other temperate regions with heavy European settlement, supply a large share of all agricultural exports despite having extremely small shares of their labor force engaged in agriculture. The rise of the world's temperate breadbaskets is also steeped in the violence of imperialism, and the sweeping enclosure of vast and rich agricultural frontiers by European settler farmers at the expense of indigenous peoples, which brought immense productivity gains that were later amplified by input-intensive industrialization. Appreciating the roots of these imbalances helps cut through the myths of comparative advantage that shroud global market integration and center agriculture and food in struggles to build more equitable and sustainable societies.

Introduction

Despite the immense bounty of world agriculture, about one in nine people on earth are chronically hungry or malnourished, and many more face micronutrient deficiencies. Hunger and food insecurity are overwhelmingly concentrated in tropical and subtropical regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, which are together home to about two-fifths of humanity. Another glaring feature of global hunger and food insecurity is that they are disproportionately concentrated in rural areas, among small-scale farmers, farmworkers, and landless people. These patterns are bound up with a stark contradiction: the world's poorest countries tend to have the highest shares of their labor force engaged in agriculture and yet import more agricultural products than they export, as can be seen clearly in the group of low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs) identified by the FAO (see: http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/lifdc/en/).

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One of the most significant commonalities between LIFDCs is that they depend on a narrow set of agricultural or other primary commodities for a large share of their total exports, and the earnings of these commodities have fallen over the long-term relative to the more diverse imports these countries rely on (UNCTAD 2017). Crops like sugar, cotton, coffee, tea, palm oil, cocoa, bananas, and tobacco typically occupy large shares of the best arable land across the tropics, as well as dominating the marketing infrastructure and capital invested in agriculture. Meanwhile, a small number of industrially produced cereals, oilseeds, and livestock species have become increasingly crucial to global food security, while a small number of exceptionally large transnational corporations dominate flows of seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, and animal pharmaceuticals on the input side and food processing, distribution, and retail on the output side (IPES 2017). Industrial surpluses and corporate concentration increasingly bear on earnings of small farmers everywhere, who typically receive little to no state support with respect to things like extension, inputs, and credit.

It is important to appreciate the historical foundations of these contemporary imbalances, in part to help dispel celebratory accounts of global market integration and the premise that comparative advantage is a natural or inevitable arbiter of production. This chapter sets out to explain key aspects of how European imperialism ruptured and reconfigured agricultural production and food consumption, establishing durable structural problems that took on some new elements beyond independence and were exacerbated by neoliberal economic policies.

Localized Metabolisms: Friction and Diversity in Agrarian History

The development and diffusion of agriculture revolutionized the socio-ecological metabolism of our species, or the dynamics of how people relate to each other, their habitats, and other animals. The rise of farming and herding around 10,000 years ago involved qualitatively and quantitatively larger transformations of the earth than occurred with societies based on hunting, fishing,

and gathering (although small human groups did drive some very significant ecological changes prior to agriculture, manipulating some ecosystems through fire and hunting many large mammalian species to extinction in the course of migrating around the earth). It also involved fundamentally different interspecies relations, as animals selected for particular physical traits and behaviors became increasingly dependent upon human interventions over time. The practices of farming and animal husbandry and the ensuing food surpluses, along with associated granaries and markets, had a pivotal part in the rise of class and gender differentiation, cities, and civilizations.

Ancient granaries and markets for cereals, seeds, spices, and livestock indicate that there was some degree of trade from the early origins of agriculture, and techniques, crops, and domesticated animals gradually dispersed over long distances, transforming the nature of farming and herding. Nevertheless, a *heavy friction of distance* prevailed over the great majority of agrarian history, even within large and complex societies, in the sense that most farm outputs and inputs could only circulate within a relatively small radius from season to season. In the first instance, it was hard to ship bulky items very far over space when movement depended upon animal labor and (to a lesser extent) wind-powered boats along coasts and rivers. Perishability magnified these barriers, with drying and salting techniques used largely for in situ storage rather than trade. A clear reflection of this friction of distance appears in the fact that the first truly long-distance trade network premised on cultivated goods involved spices, dried and ground plants that could hold value at vastly smaller volumes than things like dried cereals or animal flesh.

For millennia, farmers had to save some of the seeds from each harvest to replant the next season, which did not begin to change in a big way until the development of hybridization in the twentieth century, accelerating further with genetic modification. As discussed later, the capacity to mine, manufacture, and ship fertilizers over long distances did not take off until the nineteenth century, which meant that farming societies had to develop

localized ways of reducing erosion and sustaining nutrients and soil organisms. This included practices such as cultivating nitrogen-fixing crops (prior to knowing what nitrogen was); digging crop residues into the soil; planting specific crops for soil cover; and having small populations of livestock graze on crop stubble or fallowed land and return condensed nutrients to land. Similarly, before the advent of modern pesticides in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, efforts to contain undesirable species depended on localized ecological knowledge and complimentary associations of species, such as fostering habitat for certain insects to control others that threaten crops.

The essential point here is that the interconnected practices of growing and preparing foods were, for most of agrarian history, deeply embedded in bioregions, augmented occasionally by introductions of new plants and animals. Thus, we can read aspects of the long history of agriculture as a sort of collective genius: myriad innovations in response to varying biophysical conditions, each occurring somewhere on a spectrum from deliberate experimentation to serendipity (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). The multiplicity of both ecological endowments and human innovations together contributed to the great diversity of cuisines that is an important aspect of the earth's cultural diversity, and some agrarian civilizations successfully maintained the biophysical conditions of production over millennia – most fundamentally, healthy soils (Montgomery 2007).

However, the long history of agriculture should not be romanticized in either social or ecological terms. As indicated, the emergence or diffusion of farming tended to generate sharp new social hierarchies, with the history of peasantries characterized by exploitation on two fundamental levels. First, a small minority ruling class tended to dominate the surplus production, with peasant households compelled to turn over a share of their harvest by some combination of laws, customs, taxes, and force, as well as sometimes being conscribed for labor or military service (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). Second, patriarchal decision-making prevailed widely within peasant households, kin groups, and communities (Wolf 1966). The net result is that peasant societies were often marked by high infant mortality, low life expectancy, recurrent risks of disease epidemics, and chronic conditions of undernutrition, with women and girls generally the worst off. Further, many agrarian civilizations failed to maintain the biophysical conditions of production, with soil degradation a recurring factor in the decline of civilizations, from Mesopotamia, to Rome, to the great city states of the Mayan world (Montgomery 2007).

The Great Rupture: The Onset of European Imperialism and the Rise of Global Agricultural Commodities

The ability to secure and store surplus grains was a key element of political power in the rise of large and complex societies, as managing periods of shortage had an important part in social control and legitimizing ruling classes. Yet, until recently, even the largest empires could not conquer the heavy friction of distance associated with farming and food, meaning that their socio-ecological metabolism tended to remain highly localized, whether relations and exchanges are conceived at the scale of agricultural landscapes, villages, or capital cities. This localizing imperative held even in contexts where political power stretched over large areas, with the Roman Empire the first partial exception, as it came to rely heavily on trans-Mediterranean flows of grain from North Africa. But this exception only proves the rule, as Rome's reliance on long-distance grain imports was fleeting, simultaneously reflecting its political and military might and its cracking agrarian foundations (Montgomery 2007).

It was not until the onset of European conquests in the late fifteenth century that the localized character of farming and food began to be broken apart, sometimes slowly, sometimes suddenly. One especially dramatic rupture occurred in the insular Caribbean where the violence of the Spanish conquistadors and the devastating diseases they carried annihilated the Tainos and the Carib peoples within just a few generations. Across the Americas, similar combinations of

military superiority, apocalyptic disease vectors, forced or coerced labour, and undernourishment weakened or destroyed many cultures and helped Europeans rapidly appropriate immense amounts of the best arable lands. The appropriation of indigenous land was also aided by the introduction of new crops and livestock animals, including cattle, pigs, horses, donkeys, sheep, goats, and chickens. Livestock were especially transformative. Whereas domesticated animals had previously had a minimal role in the farming systems of the Americas, these new species exploded in population and geographic distribution, sometimes in deliberate ways (i.e., on farms and ranches) and sometimes (having gone feral) racing ahead of the frontiers of European conquest and permanent settlement (Crosby 1972, 1986).

Radical transformations of agriculture in the Americas contributed to the expansion of European imperialism in three basic ways. First, tropical agricultural commodities provided immense sources of profit and accumulation and helped unleash a wave of technological innovation in Europe, especially England. Second, agriculture and ranching provided a key foundation for the extraction of mineral wealth, especially in central Mexico, the Andean region, and southeastern Brazil. Third, the opening of new farming frontiers provided a means to absorb some of Europe's "surplus" population, created as peasants were squeezed off the land by the changing dynamics of surplus extraction amid the long transition from feudalism to capitalism.

Two crops alone, sugar and cotton, made the colonies of the Caribbean basin, east coast of South America (stretching from Brazil to the Guianas), and southern United States among the most lucrative of all European imperial possessions into the eighteenth century. Booming demand for these crops together with the decimation of indigenous populations and the failure of a yeoman model of migrant farmers initially created a vexing problem of labor that was resolved with the rise of the transatlantic slave trade and the development of the plantation system (Mintz 1985; Beckford 1972). Sugar and cotton plantations had a momentous role in the making of the

modern world system, at once stoking demand for slaves that carried roughly 10 million Africans across the Atlantic (with many more dying in transport) and providing key inputs for the mills of the early Industrial Revolution (Beckert 2014; Mintz 1985). The devotion to profit-seeking cultivation was so complete on the insular Caribbean that it became the first region of the modern world where food security was systematically wedded to long-distance flows of food, as imports like wheat and salted cod were needed to supplement the provisioning grounds of slaves on the margins of the plantation landscape.

For the Spanish Empire in the Americas, minerals like silver and gold were the primary source of profits from the conquests of the early sixteenth century up to the waves of independence in the early nineteenth century, while mineral extraction became increasingly important to the Portuguese in Brazil from the late seventeenth century onwards. The mining enterprise was enabled by a dualistic agricultural system of very large-scale *haciendas* and, in the Spanish realm, small-scale indigenous farms in those regions where indigenous populations rebounded after their initial devastation. Haciendas were essentially ranches with some grain cultivation, which quickly sprawled over extensive areas of natural grasslands as well as the former agricultural heartlands of the Aztec and Incan Empires and other densely settled indigenous populations. As Wolf (1982) encapsulates it, "an agriculture of clean-tilled fields and open pasture replaced a horticulture based on the meticulous cultivation, drainage, and terracing of small plots," and it had an important role providing the mining economy with food and other key resources (e.g., leather, tallow), including animal labor for haulage. From modern-day Mexico to Chile, the surviving and eventually rebounding indigenous populations were confined to more marginal lands, often at higher elevations, where they mostly lived in small farm communities. Although these communities had some degree of autonomy meeting their subsistence needs, they also faced economic and extra-economic pressures to provide the food, supplies, and especially labor needed for mining (Wolf 1982; Galeano 1973).

In the American colonies with the heaviest European migration – the northern and western United States, Canada, and Argentina – the agricultural systems that emerged had strong resemblances to those of Europe along with some distinctive socio-ecological characteristics. On one hand, European colonists, many of them floundering or recently displaced peasants, largely sought to replicate the grain and livestock mixed farming systems they were familiar with, while also integrating some "New World" crops like maize and potatoes. On the other hand, colonists faced different economic circumstances, gaining access to much larger amounts of land than was typical in Europe, at relatively little cost. Initial settler payments to the Crown did help to pay for the administration and military defense of the colonies, but the vastly greater (indeed immeasurable) cost of this "cheap" land was borne by indigenous peoples, as sweeping enclosures tore at the fabric of societies and cultures that had no previous conception of private property. Although early European pioneers in the eastern United States and Canada had a degree of subsistence orientation, the new archetype of family farming that emerged quickly became oriented toward commodity production (i.e., selling in markets) without the commodification of labor (i.e., relying mostly on unpaid family labor rather than waged labor) (Friedmann 1978). The market orientation of family farms was augmented by the large land sizes and rich soils underneath converted forests and grasslands, both of which contributed to unprecedented per farmer surpluses. This cheap land would later become a major source of cheap food for European empires (especially the British) as they industrialized.

The dynamics of European imperialism in Africa and Asia ruptured the socio-ecological metabolism of agriculture in very different ways than the Americas. Like the Americas, Africa and Asia contained a wide array of societal trajectories prior to the arrival of Europeans, from large empires with sizable cities and agricultural surpluses to nomadic groups living at low densities with limited technology. Unlike the Americas, however, neither African nor Asian lands were conquered swiftly, in part because disease vectors did not ravage the populations. In Africa especially, the dynamics of disease transmission served to inhibit rather than facilitate European settlement for centuries.

From the early fifteenth to the late nineteenth century, the landed European presence across much of Africa was largely confined to a series of slave-trading forts. The one exception was in southern Africa, where the dispossession of land began earlier with the establishment of the Dutch Cape Colony in the late seventeenth century. Yet this limited spatial footprint belies the transformative impacts of the slave trade over the course of four-and-a-half centuries, as the tentacles of slave raiding reached far across the continent, wreaking violence, heightening ethnic conflicts, and causing incalculable demographic losses and cultural trauma as millions of young working age people were seized from their communities. This profoundly altered the trajectories of farming and herding and innovation more generally, long before the onset of direct rule following the Scramble for Africa in 1884–1885 (Rodney 1982). However, it was not until the ensuing period of direct colonial rule that the intensely localized metabolism of African agriculture began to dramatically change.

In Asia, the long-standing European mercantile ambitions (spurred in part by the historic movement of spices) were unleashed by improvements in seafaring, led by the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French, and initially focused on the Indian subcontinent and Indonesian archipelago. Similar to Africa, the landed presence of Europeans was for centuries largely confined to coastal settlements and dominated by joint-stock companies, though without the same ferocity or demographic impact as the slave-dominated trade in Africa. Another difference was that the shift from trading relations to direct European rule also came earlier in Asia, with the Dutch East India Company governing parts of the Indonesian archipelago and the British East India Company governing parts of the Indian subcontinent. These companies significantly increased the scale of commodity production, including cotton, sugar, tea, and spices, prior to the widening and deepening of European imperial control in the nineteenth

century. The British East India Company not only began to alter the course of agricultural development but also its handicrafts, deliberately undercutting the previously thriving textile production in the Indian subcontinent. Its goal in this, which had an enduring legacy, was to ensure cheap exports of raw cotton to British mills along with a large export market for manufactured British textiles.

Industrialization, Imperial Expansion, and the Intensification of Agricultural Commodity Flows

By the eighteenth century, tropical agricultural commodities from parts of the Americas and Asia were moving on a global scale in significant volumes. As indicated, sugar and cotton plantations had central part in the early Industrial Revolution, and combinations of sugar plus coffee, tea, or cocoa became a basic expectation for working people far beyond the tropics, as well as a means to help mask nutrient-poor diets (Mintz 1985). However, in general flows of food continued to be limited by the heavy friction of distance into the nineteenth century. It might have been lucrative to ship crops like sugar, cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, and spices on wooden ships with wind and sail, but shipping core food staples was less viable due to lower margins per unit, risks to food (and thereby national) security, and political pressures from domestic farmers.

These barriers began to break down with the accelerating industrialization and urbanization in Europe in the nineteenth century, foremost in Britain. In the middle of the nineteenth century, captains of British industry successfully lobbied to liberalize the importation of grains against the opposition of Britain's landed elite. This reflected the key role of cheap food in sustaining cheap labor (i.e., containing wage pressures) and thereby enhancing the competitiveness of British manufactures in world markets (Moore 2015). The decisive shift was the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 that opened British markets to imported grains. The economic motives of industrial capital were enhanced by the political value of cheap

food in moderating social discontent in burgeoning cities, as Britain went from having a large majority of its population living in rural areas at the beginning of the nineteenth century to having a large majority in urban areas by the end of it. The economic and political pressures to encourage cheap food imports into Britain subsequently unfolded in other parts of Europe undergoing rapid industrialization and converged with technological revolutions that made them much more accessible, namely, the proliferation of railroads, rise of steamships, and development of transoceanic telegraph cables. Together, coal-fired combustion engines and steel reduced the friction of distance for bulky agricultural commodities, starting with wheat from the bountiful agricultural frontiers of the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia. Europe's "breadbasket" became truly globalized (Cronon 1991).

As discussed in the previous section, farming in these regions was significantly market oriented from early on, with the typically large scale of farms and rich soils – especially as the great grasslands were enclosed, parcelled, and plowed up – leading to much greater labor productivity and lower unit costs than in Europe. The fact that European migrant farmers in these regions could produce more and cheaper grains than the farmers who remained in Europe contributed to a reinforcing pressure. Further migration from Europe was spurred as farmers there struggled to survive against this rising competition. This competitive pressure was augmented by the increasing industrialization of agriculture in the late nineteenth century, as tractors and combines helped extensive grain farmers overcome the limited supply of labor and grow even bigger in scale. Advantages in scale and labor productivity also held with livestock production, and once refrigeration units were developed, these new breadbasket regions also began exporting surplus meat and dairy products (Cronon 1991).

While the new breadbasket regions had some decided competitive advantages as the world market in grains was developing, the spread of extensive monocultures was a radical biophysical experiment, and soils that had never previously been tilled were not as limitless as they seemed at

first to European colonists. This began to come into focus in the nineteenth century with advancing scientific knowledge about the role of key nutrients in plant productivity (most of all nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium) and the dynamics of soil degradation. The rise of modern soil science informed the pursuit of new sources of external fertilization that was needed not only for tired European soils but also as productivity declined in some of the earlier settler frontiers like the eastern United States (Montgomery 2007; Worster 1990). This gave rise to an unlikely resource: nutrient-rich guano, accumulated excrement from seabirds and bats that was found in great volumes on some ocean islands. The first major site of guano extraction and exports occurred off the Pacific coasts of Chile and Peru, and this boom sparked the United States to seize a series of small, remote islands, an episode Clark and Foster (2009) call "guano imperialism." Though this lucrative resource was quickly depleted, it had an important role in establishing global flows of fertilizers, which were needed to respond to the accelerating problems of soil degradation associated with the industrialization of agriculture. The manufacture and movement of fertilizers began to unfold on a much greater scale in the twentieth century with the development of phosphorous and potash mining and processing and the revolutionary Haber-Bosch process for turning atmospheric nitrogen – and vast amounts of fossil energy – into synthetic nitrogen fertilizer (Smil 2001).

Along with a globalizing breadbasket, the rapid industrialization of Europe also catalyzed the race to directly colonize large areas of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as imperial powers determined to secure greater flows of cheap agricultural commodities and other raw materials. Although some export-oriented production was already engrained in parts of the Indonesian archipelago and Indian subcontinent through joint-stock companies, the establishment of the Dutch East Indies and British India reflected the desire to intensify it. Imperial powers also saw abundant possibilities for tropical commodity production in vast regions like Africa and French Indo-China, where export-

oriented agriculture was virtually starting from scratch. In addition, while most of Latin America gained its independence in the early nineteenth century, the region continued to be heavily influenced by these same imperial designs, entering a sort of neocolonial position in the world system. Britain quickly moved into the power vacuum left by Spain and Portugal and dominated trade and investment in various agricultural and resource sectors across the region before giving way to ascendant US economic and political influence as the nineteenth century wore on (Galeano 1973).

Efforts to expand export commodity production in new African and Asian colonies were complicated by the fact that European migration tended to be very small relative to the native populations. A common response was to "divide and rule"; that is, to exacerbate inequalities along class and ethnic lines and cultivate allegiance from existing or newly positioned elites. This translated to a few distinct approaches to transforming agriculture. The first approach was to advance new plantations based on wage labor by forcibly dispossessing local inhabitants or enclosing common lands. This entailed a twofold subsidy to European investors and local elites, both in the acquisition of plantation land and the creation of a pool of cheap labor, as workers were compelled not only by lost livelihoods in some instances but also by the compulsion to pay new "head" or "hut" taxes used to finance colonial administrations and militias. The second approach was to graft export production onto already existing property regimes. This was accomplished partly through market forces, as landholding elites and upwardly mobile peasants became more commercialized in response to new prospects for accumulation and partly through the pressure of taxation, with subsidence-oriented peasants forced to generate earnings to meet new obligations (Davis 2001; Watts 1983). Prospects for upward mobility were profoundly gendered, as any efforts to promote access to new crops, technologies, and markets and foster private land ownership tended to privilege male household heads (FAO 1995). The third, less widespread approach to transforming agriculture was to

promote extensive grain farming and livestock ranching. Although this model was generally not well suited for the moist tropics, conditions were viable in a few places, most notably the Punjab region of the Indian subcontinent, where it was propelled by Punjabi farmers, and parts of southern and eastern Africa, where enclosures of grasslands made way for extremely large white settler properties.

The rapid expansion of agro-export commodities across the tropics was wildly destabilizing for many societies, especially for the poorest among them. The heightened focus on selling and buying food widely undermined customary social protections for coping with periods of scarcity, including both institutions (e.g., community-managed food storage systems) and perceptions about collective entitlements and responsibilities. Meanwhile colonial administrations paid little heed to social safety nets, with the basic result that food security became more wedded to market successes or failures (Davis 2001; Watts 1983). Moreover, the pressure to produce commodities uprooted practices tailored to local biophysical conditions and experiences with climatic variability, such as the use of specific crop varieties and intercropping patterns to manage long dry seasons or spells of intensive rainfall. The destabilization of small farming cultures was also affected by demands for labor in mineral-rich regions that drew some of the male population into seasonal or long-term migration patterns, heightening both the farming and household responsibilities of women.

These social and ecological vulnerabilities came together with devastating effect in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when millions of impoverished people starved to death in a series of famines that stretched across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Mike Davis (2001) has evocatively called these famines the "Late Victorian Holocausts" to mark them as a direct outcome of British imperialism. In making this case, Davis acknowledges that weather extremes associated with El Niño and La Niña Southern Oscillations contributed to widespread crop failures, while stressing that cyclically adverse conditions used to bring hardship rather than catastrophe. However, the extent of famine is only comprehensible

by taking the preceding agrarian change into account, along with the merciless imperial responses. British authorities consistently denied the magnitude of the crises and the part played by imperial policies, while blaming local people for their suffering, providing scant and slow relief, and using harsh disciplinary measures to quell dissent (the capacity for which was already depleted by the emaciated conditions of populations). A striking example of the brutality of imperial rule is that large volumes of wheat exports continued flowing out of British India amidst widespread starvation (Davis 2001). This response can be seen to represent an early instance of "disaster capitalism" (Klein 2007), whereby the ruling authority seizes upon a crisis as a strategic opportunity to amplify the political economic transformations in motion, insisting the root problem is not the trajectory of change but that it has not advanced far enough.

These catastrophes severely weakened large areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and helped solidify their place as externally dominated commodity producers in the context of an expanding world economy, whether these ruts were centuries in the making or very recent. Davis (2001) signals this in the subtitle to *Late Victorian Holocausts*, which highlights the role of the famines in the 'Making of the Third World.' Two characteristic features of this commodity dependence made it especially problematic. First, for most individual colonies, the lion's share of export earnings came from a small number of crops or minerals, while their economies came to rely on a much wider range of imported products, especially as the twentieth century wore on (e.g., consumer goods, farm implements, pharmaceuticals, electronics, automobiles, military equipment). Second, value-added segments of commodity chains were generally located within the imperial power. In a few instances, local processing capacities were deliberately undercut, as in the famous case of cotton and textiles in India alluded to earlier. More often they were stunted from the start, from sugar in the Caribbean to cocoa in West Africa. This contributed to overwhelming imbalances in technological dynamism, which were further affected by the

dominance of imperial planners and engineers in constructing the key infrastructure of the export economy like rail and road networks, irrigation projects, and electricity grids.

As far-reaching as the conditions of economic dependence were, the colonies of Africa and Asia did not import much food prior to the great waves of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. But here too, the proverbial seeds of dependence had been sown.

The Colonial Inheritance: Agricultural Imbalances Old and New

Much as in Latin America in the nineteenth century, independence did little to alter the subordinate position of the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia in the world economy. Exports continued to pivot around a small range of primary commodities, foreign corporations continued to dominate the value and decision-making in commodity chains, and agro-exports continued to be a key source of foreign exchange needed to sustain import patterns. These dependent relations were typically associated with the outsized political power of plantation owners, successful commercially oriented farmers, and large-scale merchants. However, commodity dependence was also connected to deep social tensions, given the strong association between agro-export production and land inequalities and the fact that populations were still overwhelmingly rural and agrarian.

Struggles for land redistribution were a pivotal part of some anticolonial liberation movements, helping rally small peasants and landless workers (Wolf 1969), and were embedded in the politics of decolonization everywhere to varying degrees following independence. While these politics were always rooted in specific histories, they were also influenced by comparative perspectives and geopolitical pressures. Land inequality played a significant part in revolutionary struggles in Mexico, Russia, and China in the first half of the twentieth century, and aggressive appropriations of private property were a central pillar of postcolonial development strategies for countries within Soviet

and Chinese spheres of influence. Although the social transformations and conflicts associated with building new forms of collectivist agriculture did not involve democratic processes or meet the aspirations of most peasants, fears of the volatility of the rural poor in the context of the Cold War helped incline the United States and the West to support variations of land reform. This support was especially notable in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the wake of the Second World War, reflecting the strength of communist forces in East Asia. There it was hoped that a substantial class of medium-sized, commercially oriented farmers could provide a bulwark against more radical social pressures in the countryside and the perceived "communist threat" to business interests in the region.

Approaches to land reform in the 1950s and 1960s were also influenced by Keynesian ideas about development policy and planning, or what is often referred to as the era of the "developmental state." Developmental states were seen to have a number of essential roles including: managing markets and investment; investing in infrastructure, public services, and state-run enterprises; and pursuing a degree of redistribution (Leys 1996). For agriculture specifically, developmental states retained flexibility to use tariffs and quotas to protect domestic markets (though they often didn't) and generally supported domestic marketing agencies, extension services, seed banks, research facilities, and subsidized credit. Many also attempted to transfer some publicly and privately held land to the rural poor. Mainstream development thinking openly acknowledged the social and economic benefits of land reform, including its potential to improve food access, employment, income distribution, and demand for goods and services in rural areas, in turn providing improved footing for economic diversification and generally reducing tensions (Borras 2008; Weis 2007).

Yet despite this case and the evident success of land reforms in East Asia, in general the United States worked to resist or dilute struggles over land reform across the rest of its sphere of influence (Weis 2007). This opposition was rooted in both the direct threat they posed to US corporate

interests in some instances, especially in parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, and ideological hostility to left-wing social movements and political parties demanding sweeping land reforms. Where the United States did sanction land reforms in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress, they were framed with the similar hope to broaden the base of commercial farmers as in East Asia. However, the scale paled in comparison, in the context of a region with the world's most severe land inequalities, as the United States was unwilling to confront the vested power of landholding elites who formed a key base of support for right-wing military regimes and staunch Cold War allies.

Regardless of the nature of land reform pursued between the 1950s and 1970s, reforms tended to replicate the colonial focus on male household heads, in many cases overriding customary rights of women within households and communities (FAO 1995). Land reforms also unfolded amidst an embrace of industrialization and urbanization that cut across the ideological spectrum, with agriculture expected to decline in relative economic terms (i.e., as a share of both GDP and employment). The pursuit of industrial and urban growth in developing countries converged with booming agricultural surpluses across much of the temperate world, led by the United States, which suddenly made food imports cheap and abundant (Friedmann 1990, 2004). In the first instance, the profusion of cheap food resulted from the combination of continuing mechanization, the development of high-yielding hybrid seeds, and dramatic increases in fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation, which dramatically increased labor productivity. Fast-declining numbers of farmers in industrialized countries could each feed fast-rising numbers of non-farmers.

Surging labor productivity was, however, only part of the story of cheapness; it was also amplified by both explicit and implicit subsidies. The explicit subsidization involved a combination of Keynesian-era support programs together with rising food aid and export-directed payments, which allowed exports to sell in foreign markets below the prices that held in domestic markets.

The period of aggressive surplus dumping (including both aid and subsidized exports sold below the prices in domestic markets) stemmed from both the fear that domestic gluts would devastate farm earnings and the opportunism of rapidly growing and consolidating food processing corporations, big farmer lobbies, and states, that recognized the long-term benefits cultivating new outlets could have, paving the way for rising commercial exports over time (For the United States, aid and subsidized trade was also a powerful lever of geopolitical power, flowing disproportionately toward Cold War allies) (Cochrane 2003; Friedmann 1990, 2004). The implicit subsidization relates to the resource intensity and wide-ranging environmental costs associated with industrial agriculture, including soil degradation, water pollution and overdraft, persistent toxicity, biodiversity loss, and greenhouse gas emissions. Because these costs are partly or wholly unaccounted, or externalized, they can be understood to brace the competitiveness of industrial foods (Weis 2010, 2013).

For governments in newly independent countries it mattered little why food was cheap. Aid and subsidized food imports were generally welcomed as a way to support development transitions by containing wage costs and social pressures, which were complicated immensely by the rapid population growth that was occurring. The resulting surge in cheap grains flowing from rich to poor countries was most dramatic in sub-Saharan Africa, which went from being a negligible food importer at the cusp of the independence era to having food security heavily wedded to imports in the space of just a few decades (Friedmann 1990; Andrea and Beckman 1985). While food imports were expected to help facilitate industrial and urban development, diversification proved elusive for the world's poorest countries. Instead, there was an unprecedented phenomenon of urbanization *without* industrialization, marked by rising urban squalor (Davis 2006).

Widespread failures to diversify meant that many agro-exports established under colonial rule continued to have central roles generating foreign exchange and enabling import patterns.

Amid the global economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, the danger of these continuing ruts was somewhat obscured by relatively strong commodity prices. However, as rates of global economic growth slowed, tropical agricultural commodities began a long-term decline in relation to the much wider range of imports these countries had come to depend upon (Robbins 2003). In addition to flagging global growth, declining terms of trade were also affected by a range of other factors including: the structural overproduction of tropical commodities; the failure to establish strong supply management initiatives like OPEC among major tropical agro-exports (or the decline of fledgling efforts, like the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement in 1983); the substitutability of some products from the temperate world (e.g., high fructose corn syrup and artificial sweeteners for sugar; a range of fibers for cotton); the wage gains achieved by organized labor in the Keynesian era (which tended to increase the cost of manufactured goods); and the rising energy prices after the 1972–1973 oil price shock.

In sum, at the same time as food import dependence was taking root in many poor countries, their stubborn dependence on a narrow range of agro-exports was poised to become more problematic.

Deepening Dependence: Neoliberalism and Agriculture

A wildly regressive spiral emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Declining terms of trade facing many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia produced persistent balance of payments deficits, which led to heavy government borrowing and sharply rising debt. By the early 1980s, with payments deficits persisting and interest rates rising, many governments struggled to meet their obligations to creditors. This is often referred to as the "Third World Debt Crisis," which was essentially a crisis of state solvency that threatened global financial markets, as billions of dollars of loans were poised to evaporate, erupting in 1982 with two very large

debtors, Brazil and Mexico, teetering on the brink of defaults). The IMF and World Bank emerged as the key crisis managers and, in turn, the dominant architects of development policy and planning across most of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. The first step of financial crisis management was to provide loans to states to ensure that debts were repaid. The second step, dismantling the developmental state and institutionalizing neoliberalism, was compelled through the conditions on these loans. Together, loan conditionalities added up to a policy prescription known as structural adjustment that included demands for: increasing liberalization trade and investment; the deregulation of prices and wages; cutbacks in government expenditures; currency devaluation; the privatization of state enterprises and services; and the promotion of exports based on comparative advantage.

Structural adjustment was guided by the ideological assumption that development policy and planning should prioritize aggregate growth rather than equity (with the latter seen to impede the former) and that growth was best ensured by entrenching the competitive discipline of global market forces. Global market integration was expected to optimize the efficiency of production everywhere and, accordingly, the availability of the lowest priced or highest quality goods. For states, this meant that the overarching development objective should be to enhance export production rather than pursue diversification or redistribution. One implication was that the rising food imports flowing into the world's poorest countries were not in themselves a concern so long as export growth could be achieved elsewhere. The extension of this logic was that agriculture should be further oriented toward areas of comparative advantage, that is, on those commodities that can be produced more cheaply than elsewhere, to maximize foreign exchange and the ability to import foods produced more cheaply elsewhere (Weis 2007).

The focus on export growth together with the retrenchment of the state swept away concerns for redistributive land reform. In the neoliberal

vision, the only viable redistribution of land should occur through "non-confrontational" buying and selling which, unsurprisingly, did not tend to produce progressive outcomes (Borras 2008). This approach was known as *land market reform* because the goal was to make land markets more transparent and accessible, improving knowledge and reducing taxes and the costs of land transactions. However, as Borras (2008) demonstrates with a wide range of cases, the shift from state-led redistributive reforms to land market reform generally failed to encourage transfers of land from rich to poor, at worst producing regressive outcomes and at best benefitting a middle-strata of commercialized farmers. This shift was a key precursor to the surge in corporate land deals (or "land grabbing") in the 2000s, as finance capital, sovereign wealth funds, and transnational corporations increased acquisitions of large tracts of land, most dramatically in sub-Saharan Africa (White et al. 2012). Along with land reform, adjustment also ravaged other supports for domestically oriented production once pursued by developmental states with respect to marketing, extension, research, seeds, and credit. The lynchpin of this development model, export growth, had two main paths. The first was to improve the output and efficiency of "traditional" agro-exports (i.e., those established under imperial rule), with increasing mechanization envisioned as one key path to improving labor productivity and reducing costs. The second was to build markets for new or "non-traditional" agro-exports, such as tropical fruits (e.g., mangoes), "off-season" fruits and vegetables (i.e., in relation to industrialized countries), cut flowers, and intensive livestock and aquaculture (Weis 2007).

Encouragement to grow traditional agro-exports paid no regard to the problem of structural overproduction, which had been a key aspect of declining terms of trade. Not only did this dynamic not disappear, but it got much worse with long-standing producers and some new entrants simultaneously encouraged to grow more. The result was what Robbins (2003) called the "tropical commodities disaster": further declines in relative prices in world markets, which were most damaging for those countries with the greatest reliance on a narrow range of

traditional agro-exports and highly advantageous to the transnational corporations dominating the value within commodity chains (Robbins 2003). While there were some notable successes establishing non-traditional agro-export growth, in general these were concentrated in comparatively wealthier developing countries (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Thailand, South Africa) and with benefits concentrated among foreign and domestic corporations involved in trade as well as narrow segments of the agrarian populations, especially landed elites and sometimes medium-scale commercial farmers.

The neoliberal approach to agricultural development was further entrenched with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The WTO set in place new rules that strengthened investor rights, limited the flexibility of governments to intervene in markets in the future, and extended US-styled patent protections on intellectual property, which was heavily pushed by leading seed and input corporations to help lock in the annual purchase of proprietary seeds. Strong intellectual property regimes are an important part of ongoing efforts to displace seed saving and selecting practices, that began with the development of high-yielding hybrid seeds and have been increasingly focused on the extension of genetically modified seeds since the 1990s (Kloppenburg 2004). This marked a major shift in the scale at which the growing power of corporations could be exerted, posing new challenges for movements of small farmers, landless workers, and indigenous peoples around the world. Efforts to organize beyond national and subnational scales grew into transnational agrarian movements, most notably Vía Campesina, with rural alliances allied by shared opposition to the WTO and the corporate power it was seen to represent. This unity-in-negation was reflected in an early rallying cry of Vía Campesina to get the "WTO Out of Agriculture" and in the strong oppositional presence it mounted at WTO Ministerials from Seattle in 1999 onward. However, social movements cannot draw vitality only from opposition powerful ideologies like neoliberalism and institutions like the WTO; they also need inspiring counternarratives, and for transnational

agrarian movements, these have increasingly come to hinge around demands for food sovereignty (Edelman and Borras 2016; Edelman et al. 2014).

Food sovereignty is premised on the basic demand that agriculture and food systems should be subject to local and democratic controls as far as possible, along with the belief that the small farming wisdoms and cultures that have endured and adapted over the past 500 years are not relics of the past but the agents of a more equitable and sustainable future. Rather than simply a job that can be displaced in qualitative or quantitative terms, farming is regarded as something with the capacity to sustain far more dignified livelihoods than any other sector, while food is seen to possess social and cultural meanings and values that transcend the commodity form. Vía Campesina has also increasingly stressed agro ecological arguments for small farming in its conception of food sovereignty, as well as the centrality of gender equality from household relations to governance Climate change is at the forefront of the agroecological case for small farming (Altieri and Toledo 2011). Part of this involves drawing attention to the major role industrial agriculture plays in climate change and how this is bound to make the regressive dynamics world agriculture much worse, affecting conditions of production most immediately and negatively in the semiarid tropics and tropical coastal regions. The flipside is a case that biodiverse small farms have the potential to help "cool the earth" and to increase prospects for climate change adaptation (Vía Campesina 2009). Still, there is a danger of largely replacing unity-in-negation with unity-through-ambiguity, and critics stress that prevailing conceptions of food sovereignty give too little attention to things like rural class differentiation (both past and present), the role of markets (and the nature of market intervention envisioned), and the question of what institutional form should rightful sovereignty take (Bernstein 2014). Nevertheless, if advocates of food sovereignty are willing to work through difficult ideological terrain it seems poised to have a prominent role enlivening anti-systemic struggles into the future (Borras 2019; Edelman and Borras 2016).

Conclusions

For millennia, the socio-ecological relations between agriculture and food have been a fulcrum of cultural diversity. As capitalism has advanced unevenly across the world since the fifteenth century, commodity relations have increasingly swept aside the biophysical basis of farming – including localized ecological knowledge, managed diversity, and regionally rooted cuisines – over large areas of the world's agricultural land. Agriculture is ever more governed by amoral compulsions of comparative advantage and profitability and the biophysical illogic of rising distance (of both inputs and outputs), narrowing diversity, and externalized costs. Food is ever more a de-spatialized commodity, with access increasingly governed by money. The apex of this is large-scale monocultures producing for global markets, worked by immense machines or wage laborers. Competition from these monocultures is reverberating in increasingly precarious small farm livelihoods the world over, with rural poverty driving levels of migration that are entirely disconnected from prospects of achieving stable work, which is producing a new scale and form of urban marginality (Davis 2006).

In short, the dynamics of contemporary agriculture and food systems are central part of global inequality and the deterioration of ecological conditions, not only for agricultural production but for all life. By better understanding their long imperial roots, and how key imbalances have gotten worse not better beyond independence and especially under neoliberalism, it can help to inform struggles to build a more equitable and sustainable world.

Cross-References

- ▶ Agriculture, Underdevelopment, and Imperialism
- ▶ Food and Imperialism
- ▶ Food and Imperialism: Food Regimes, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony
- ▶ Food and Imperialism: The Corporate Regime and Global Peasant Resistance
- ▶ Food and the International Division of Labour
- ▶ Food, Imperialism, and the World System

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Agriculture, Underdevelopment, and Imperialism

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Definition

A view has gained currency of late that 'imperialism', in the sense of a 'world system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced countries"' (Lenin 1977, p. 637), is no longer a useful category in the era of globalisation. The notion of imperialism, it is argued, has necessarily a 'spatial' dimension, captured for instance in Lenin's reference to 'a handful of advanced countries' in the above remark; but, with 'economic superpowers' now emerging from within the ranks of the Third World, that spatial dichotomy has ceased to be relevant, which makes the concept of imperialism itself irrelevant.

On the one hand the monopoly capitalists in the emerging Third-World countries have been integrated into international finance capital; and on the other hand the oppression and dispossession of the non-monopoly segments of the population, not just the workers, is not confined to Third-World peasants and craftsmen, but extends also to vast sections of the population in the advanced countries, who are pushed into penury for instance by financial crises. Hence the tendency is towards a homogenisation of the two

segments of the globe, the advanced and the backward countries, which undermines the meaningfulness of the concept of imperialism.

Introduction

The purpose of the present essay is to critique this view and establish the abiding relevance of the concept of imperialism. It argues that capitalism simply cannot exist as an isolated self-contained system; that it can do so only within a pre-capitalist setting, by exercising domination over its pre-capitalist surroundings (which no longer therefore retain their original pristine form); that this domination necessarily has a 'spatial' dimension, in the sense that whether or not capitalism in the metropolis also dominates its own internal pre-capitalist or small producers, it cannot do without dominating such producers located in a particular 'outlying' geographical region; and that no difference is made to this phenomenon of domination, and hence to the phenomenon of imperialism, by the fact that capitalism and capitalists (including monopoly capitalists integrated with international finance capital) emerge powerfully within this region too.

I

Modern industrial capitalism in Western Europe was associated from the very beginning with the processing of raw materials that were not produced, and indeed were not *producible,* in Western Europe itself. Cotton, whose processing into cloth pioneered the industrial revolution, was not producible in Britain, the pioneer industrial capitalist country. It had to be imported from the tropical and sub-tropical colonies. Likewise a variety of consumer goods, from fresh fruits to tea and coffee, which entered into the daily budgets of the bulk of the population in the capitalist metropolis, were simply not producible in the metropolis itself and had to be imported from distant tropical and subtropical lands, where again their cultivation had to be either introduced or augmented for meeting metropolitan needs.

Indeed the economic historian Phyllis Deane (1980) sees the industrial revolution as following from, and being conditional upon, the development of a certain pattern of world-wide trade. This pattern however was *imposed* upon the rest of the world, especially upon the tropical and subtropical lands, characterised by pre-capitalist production, by the emerging metropolitan capitalism itself.

Dependence of Metropolitan Capitalism

This dependence of metropolitan capitalism upon the pre-capitalist producers of the tropical and subtropical lands for supplying it with a range of raw materials and consumer goods has not changed to this day; indeed it cannot change, given the fact that these goods are simply not producible in the temperate regions where metropolitan capitalism is predominantly located.

This fact, however, is so thoroughly obscured by the extreme smallness of the weight of such primary commodities in the total gross value of output in the advanced capitalist countries that it is scarcely ever taken into account, even by radical authors. But this smallness is a result of the specific *valuation* process. Such valuation itself in other words expresses a relationship of domination. It expresses the domination characterising the metropolis's relationship with the 'outlying regions': with its pre-capitalist and small producers, and also with its low-paid plantation workers, who produce the primary commodities needed in the metropolis. It is ironic that this fact of domination, which underlies the low value of these commodities, is sought to be denied on the basis of such low value itself (I emphasis the social basis of this valuation process in Patnaik 1997).

To borrow Harry Magdoff's argument (2000), one cannot make steel without using iron ore, no matter how much is paid for the latter. If iron ore is obtained *gratis* by snatching it from regions where it was earlier used, and hence its value has zero weight in the gross value of steel produced, then this fact, far from expressing the absence of domination, expresses rather the extreme severity of it. Relative value comparisons therefore are irrelevant to the argument about the absolute necessity of a whole range of products of the 'outlying regions' for metropolitan capitalism.

As accumulation occurs, the need for such products increases, for any given output-mix in metropolitan capitalism; and as the output-mix in the latter changes owing to product innovation, newer goods from the 'outlying regions' begin to be demanded (which also happens because of process innovation). *Metropolitan capitalism must not only have these goods supplied from the 'outlying regions', but have them supplied at prices that do not increase at a rate which can threaten the value of money in metropolitan capitalism.* It is not enough in other words that the 'outlying regions' should just be opened up for trade and made to supply these goods to the metropolis, which *per se* is just a once-for-all process. It has to be continuously ensured that their supply price does not rise to threaten the value of money, since any such threat can have a seriously destabilising effect upon the capitalist system, which is quintessentially a money-using system. (The threat to the value of money in the metropolis posed by increasing supply price of primary commodities is independent incidentally of the weight of their value in the gross value of metropolitan output.)

Primary Commodities, Land, and Investment

The fear of such an increase in the supply price of primary commodities (and hence in their terms of trade vis-à-vis manufactured goods) haunted David Ricardo, who saw the accumulation process under capitalism grinding to a halt, and the arrival of a 'stationary state', as a consequence of it. What Ricardo had failed to appreciate, however (because, being a believer in Say's Law, he never saw money as a form in which wealth could be held under capitalism), is that long before the arrival of the stationary state, money as a form of holding wealth would have been subverted by the rising supply price of primary commodities, disrupting the functioning of the capitalist system. (I use the term 'money' throughout this essay to refer only to currency and bank deposits irrespective of whether 'money' in this sense has a commodity link.)

The danger of such disruption was recognised by John Maynard Keynes, who even paid an oblique tribute to Lenin while doing so. In his opus *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Keynes wrote (1919, p. 112): 'Lenin is said to have declared that the surest way of destroying the Capitalist System is to debauch the currency... Lenin was certainly right.'

And yet, in addition to the money prices of primary commodities produced in tropical and subtropical regions rising to 'debauch' the currencies of metropolitan capitalist countries, even the terms of trade between manufacturing and primary commodities have not moved secularly in favour of the latter as visualised by Ricardo. Indeed, on the contrary, barring war years, when in any case the capitalist state intervenes so heavily in the functioning of markets and in wealth-holders' choice of assets that the danger of a spontaneous subversion of the money-form loses all relevance, *the secular movement of the terms of trade between primary commodities and manufacturing has been against the former.*

This is not because the *output* of these commodities has increased in keeping with the requirements of the capitalist metropolis, *and done so at decreasing unit costs*, or at the very least non-increasing unit costs, for given money wages (or unit money incomes of producers). In other words, the decline in terms of trade for tropical primary commodities is not because Ricardo's prognostication of a limited land mass constraining the output increase of agricultural products has been proved wrong. On the contrary, not only has the tropical land mass that can sustain such production remained fixed in size, but land-augmenting technological progress and land-augmenting investment, like in irrigation (which makes multiple cropping possible), has been quite conspicuous by its absence under the regime of metropolitan domination. In the entire history of the British Empire, for instance, there was hardly any significant investment in irrigation undertaken in any part of the empire, other than in the Canal Colonies of the Punjab (Bagchi 1982).

This is hardly surprising. Such land-augmenting investment and technological progress necessarily require a substantial spending effort by the state; but prior to the Keynesian revolution in economics the very *idea* of the state moving away from the tenets of 'sound finance' (i.e. of balancing the budget), let alone playing a proactive role in undertaking investment, was considered anathema. Even after Keynes had advanced the argument in the midst of the Great Depression that government expenditure financed by borrowing was not to be shunned, it took several years, indeed until after the Second World War, before significant public investment became acceptable as practical policy in the metropolis itself; in the colonies of course such acceptability had to await decolonisation.

The question therefore arises: since the size of the tropical land mass, on which alone can several of the commodities required by metropolitan capitalism be produced, is given, and since land-augmenting investment and technological progress in the tropics were conspicuous by their absence during the entire period before decolonisation, how was the rising requirement of metropolitan capitalism for such commodities met, even as the terms of trade moved adversely for them?

The simple answer to this question is that even though the output of tropical primary commodities as a whole did not increase, *there was a compression of their use within the regions where they are produced, to make more of them available to the metropolis.* The mechanism of such compression was, to borrow Utsa Patnaik's argument (1999, p. 354), an 'income deflation'. Income deflation, imposed on these 'outlying regions', made available to the metropolis the commodities that it needed. This happened either directly, through a shift of such commodities from local absorption to meeting the needs of the metropolis, or indirectly, through a shift of land use from crops whose absorption declined because of income deflation to those which the metropolis needed.

What is true of commodities produced on the tropical land mass, which has a more or less fixed size, is also true more generally of exhaustible resources. They too will be generally subject to increasing supply price (for given money wages). This poses a threat to the value of money in the

metropolis as accumulation increases the demand for such commodities. One way of warding off this threat, even as accumulation proceeds, is to impose an income deflation in the 'outlying regions' so that more of such commodities become available for metropolitan needs by squeezing their absorption outside the metropolis. Income deflation imposed on the 'outlying regions' in short is one of the means of ensuring that the value of money remains intact in the face of capital accumulation. *The imposition of such income deflation is a major characteristic of imperialism.*

Colonial Extraction from Pre-capitalist Economies

The two chief means through which income deflation was imposed in the colonial period were the system of colonial taxation, which led to a 'drain of surplus' from the colony to the metropolis, and the displacement of local crafts through competition from metropolitan capitalist products, which was called 'de-industrialisation' in Indian nationalist writings. How these two mechanisms worked can be clarified through a simple example.

Consider a pre-capitalist economy, where 100 peasants produce 200 units of food, of which they consume 100 and give the rest to the overlord as revenue. The overlord in turn supplies this to 100 artisans, who give in exchange 100 units of artisan products. The overlord, we assume for simplicity, consumes no food, and the peasants and artisans, who have identical value productivity, consume only food. Now, suppose the capitalist sector encroaches upon this economy, removes the overlord, imposes taxes worth 100 upon the peasants, and takes the proceeds for its own use.

For accounting purposes it can show its imports of 100 as being balanced by an export of 'administrative services' to the pre-capitalist sector, that is, as payment for ruling the latter; and this would also figure as an expenditure item in the government budget in the pre-capitalist economy. Both the government budget and the trade account will then actually *appear to be balanced*, while in fact the capitalist sector is appropriating the surplus from the pre-capitalist sector. The

consequence will be the displacement of the artisans, who would now be unemployed, and the use of the 100 food, which they were consuming earlier, by the capitalist sector. The latter in this way has got its requirement of food (or other raw materials for the production of which the land earlier devoted to food production can now be used), without there being additional output in the pre-capitalist sector, and hence any scope for the phenomenon of 'increasing supply price' to manifest itself and threaten the role of money.

The second mechanism, 'de-industrialisation', operates as follows. In the above example, even if there are no taxes, that is, the overlords are not replaced and continue to obtain the same income as they were doing before, but are induced to consume imported goods from the capitalist sector in lieu of domestic artisan products, even then while trade will be actually balanced, with 100 of food being exported against 100 of imported manufactured goods from the capitalist sector, domestic employment (of artisans) will have fallen by 100, and so will domestic output by 100. In other words, even with balanced trade (i.e. no appropriation of surplus from the pre-capitalist sector by the capitalist sector), the pre-capitalist sector's industrial sector will have shrunk by 100 (whence the term 'de-industrialisation'). This will have entailed an income deflation in the pre-capitalist sector, and the export of primary commodities to the capitalist sector (in this example food, but in actual fact all sorts of products which the tropical land mass devoted to food production can otherwise produce). The two forms of income deflation we have discussed so far are additive in their effects.

II

A hallmark of income deflation is that even as it restricts demand in the 'outlying regions' for the commodities produced there, it *ipso facto* also restricts their production, not just of the commodities it does not require (in the above example, artisan products) but even of commodities it does take away (in the above example, food). Land-augmenting investment and technological

progress, the scope for which is, as we have seen, in any case limited in the regime of 'sound finance', even becomes unnecessary, as the capitalist metropolis can meet its requirements of such commodities through income deflation. And since such income deflation squeezes the peasantry and petty producers in the Third World (the squeeze on the petty producers in turn increasing the demand for land for leasing in, and hence the magnitude of land rents, to the detriment of the peasants), whatever incentive there may have been for such producers for raising output is snuffed out. The result is absolute impoverishment of the Third-World population, uneven development between the two segments of the world economy, and stagnation or even decline of output in the Third World, all of which were visible during the colonial period.

The Third-World states that came up after decolonisation not only broke with this pattern of income deflation, but even undertook land-augmenting investment and technological progress, and a number of measures supporting the peasants and petty producers, in their respective economies, all of which broke with the stagnation in their traditional sectors. While this meant that the requirements of metropolitan capitalism could be met through a rise in the output of these commodities, which did not even necessarily entail increasing supply price (at given money wages) because of the land-augmenting investment and technological progress being undertaken by the post-colonial Third-World states, the absence of income deflation *left open the scope for a rise in commodity prices and hence an undermining of the value of money in the metropolis*. This is exactly what happened at the beginning of the 1970s when world commodity prices rose sharply.

This increase is often interpreted incorrectly. The interpretation goes as follows: the persistent US current account deficit, on account *inter alia* of its maintaining a string of military bases all around the globe, meant, under the Bretton Woods system where the US dollar was ordained to be 'as good as gold', that other countries were forced to hold on to the dollars pouring out of the US. This outpouring became a torrent during the Vietnam War, and France under President De Gaulle became unwilling to hold dollars any more. It demanded gold instead, which forced the suspension of the dollar–gold link and the subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods system. This collapse created panic among speculators who, suddenly denied a secure monetary form of holding wealth, moved to commodities, causing the worldwide commodity price explosion. This interpretation in short sees the price explosion only as a temporary panic reaction.

A more plausible explanation however is as follows. In the context of the *generally* high levels of aggregate demand maintained through state intervention in metropolitan capitalist economies, including above all through high US military spending, escalating expenditure on the Vietnam War gave rise to a state of excess demand, especially for primary commodities; since the scope for imposing income deflation on the 'outlying regions' did not exist as in colonial times, this pushed up their prices, which the speculative factors underscored by the first interpretation further aggravated. The commodity price explosion in short was the inevitable denouement that capitalism, enfeebled by decolonisation which robbed it of its traditional weapon of income deflation against Third-World producers, faced in the post-war period. Post-war capitalism, though it kept up its level of aggregate demand through Keynesian demand management, did not have any means of keeping down raw material prices in the face of growing demands for such raw materials arising from accumulation, and hence warding off threats to the value of money. This fact was exposed in the early 1970s.

France's move to gold instead of US dollars then becomes explicable not as an act of intransigence on the part of President de Gaulle but simply as an expression of the 'debauching of the currency' that Keynes had talked about. And the weakness of the Bretton Woods system, in comparison with the Gold Standard, is then seen to consist in the fact that the latter was based on a colonial system which made possible the imposition of income deflation on the 'outlying regions', while the former was crippled by the fact of decolonisation, and hence a loosening of the bonds of imperialism.

The experience of the early 1970s incidentally clarifies an important point. Strictly speaking, wealth-holders would shift from holding money to holding commodities as wealth-form only when the expected price appreciation of commodities exceeds the sum of the carrying cost and the risk-premium on commodities. (The risk arises because nobody can be certain about the degree of price appreciation, and because commodities are illiquid compared with money.) But a general belief among wealth-holders which has persisted for millennia is that the price of gold will never fall permanently compared with commodity prices, while currencies can be permanently devalued in terms of commodities. And *gold itself has a relatively small carrying cost.* Hence if wealth-holders expect a permanent rise in the money price of commodities (as they would in conditions of increasing supply price, with given money wages), then they will shift from money to *gold.* And an increase in the money price of gold because of such a shift would further strengthen expectations about a rise in commodity prices in general.

It follows that if there are some people who are either cavalier about risk-taking or have absolutely certain expectations that commodity prices are going to appreciate, then they will trigger an inflation whose very persistence will make others less scared of the risk of holding commodities or gold, and hence more willing to desert money as a wealth-form. Since such people will generally exist, one can say that metropolitan capitalist economies are always haunted by the fear of a 'debauchment' of currency; and the larger the edifice of money-denoted financial assets they have built up, the greater this fear is (which is why 'inflation-targeting' becomes an obsession in the current era of financialisation).

Money and the US Dollar

The undermining of the value of money which arises from developments in commodity markets expresses itself as a shift from money to gold. The fact that historically there have been very few episodes of currencies being destabilised because people actually hold vast amounts of commodities

is therefore not surprising. First of all, any shift to commodities is countered by appropriate income deflation so that inflation and any associated shift to commodities are not *actually* allowed to persist. Secondly, the shift to commodities expresses itself as a shift to gold. Episodes of shifting from currencies to gold are plentiful, and the early 1970 provide one example; a good deal of Marx's writing on money is in fact concerned with such shifts.

The 'debauchment' of the US dollar, the leading currency of the capitalist world, in the early 1970s gave rise to a drive to re-establish an international regime akin to what prevailed in colonial times, which would re-open the scope for income deflation, and this brought forth the regime of globalisation under which we live today. *Globalisation in other words represents a rolling back of the post-colonial situation where the peasants and petty producers of the 'outlying regions' obtained some reprieve from income deflation.*

To say this is not to suggest some 'conspiracy theory'. Capitalism being a spontaneous system as opposed to a planned one, the ushering in of globalisation, and with it of an income-deflationary regime, was not some calculated measure. It arose through the functioning of the system itself: the inflationary episode of the early 1970s gave rise to a recession during which commodity prices, other than that of oil (which increased because of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), came down. But the recession contributed to the process of globalisation of finance (and the coming into being of an entity that has, appropriately, been called 'international finance capital'), which was under way in any case during the period of Keynesian demand management. International finance capital is the key entity behind the contemporary phenomenon of globalisation (Patnaik 2010).

It follows from this that the view that imperialism as a phenomenon persisted only before globalisation came into being, and has lost its relevance under globalisation, is the very opposite of the truth. In fact postwar decolonisation meant some loosening of imperialism, and the contemporary globalisation has actually strengthened its hold.

III

How little this fact is understood can be illustrated with reference to an argument advanced by no less distinguished an economist than Paul Krugman. Krugman, who is a regular columnist of *The New York Times*, had argued in his column of 21 April 2008 that the state of excess demand in the markets of primary commodities in the early 1970s was overcome through supply adjustment, such as new oil-strikes in the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, and the entry of new land into cultivation. This however is not correct.

The resource crisis of 1972–75 was hardly overcome through supply adjustment. In the case of the most vital primary commodity, namely food grains, it was overcome not through any appreciable stepping up of supplies, but through a severe compression of demand, and the latter happened through a fresh round of income deflation imposed over much of the world. *The regime of 'globalisation' inter alia was a means of enforcing such an income deflation.*

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the total world cereal output in the triennium 1979–81 was around 1573 million tonnes for a population (for the middle year of the triennium, 1980) of 4435 million. For the triennium 1999–2001 the cereal output increased to around 2084 million tonnes for a population (for the middle year of the triennium, 2000) of 6071 million. This represents a decline in world per capita cereal output from 355 kg in 1980 to 343 kg in 2000 (FAO 2015). Given the fact that during this period per capita income in the world increased significantly, and given the fact that the income elasticity of demand for cereals (*consumed both directly and indirectly via processed food and animal feed*) is markedly positive (even if less than one), a stagnant or declining per capita cereal output should have spelled massive shortages, leading to a severe inflation in cereal prices. Such an inflation, since it would have occurred in a situation where the money wage rates in the manufacturing sectors around the world, to which manufactured goods' prices are linked, were not increasing *pari passu* with cereal

prices, would have meant a shift in the terms of trade between cereals and manufactured goods in favour of the former.

Third World, Globalisation, and Finance Capitalism

But this did not happen. On the contrary, cereal prices fell in relation to manufactured goods prices by as much as 46% over these two decades (Chakraborty 2011)! This suggests that the decline in per capita cereal output, in a situation of rising world per capita income, did not generate any specific inflationary pressures on cereal prices. The reason for this was the income deflation imposed over much of the world. It is this, rather than any supply increase, as Krugman (2008) suggests, that explains the absence of any specific trend-inflationary pressures in cereal prices (i.e. ignoring fluctuations) until recently. And this income deflation was imposed over much of the Third World via the phenomenon of globalisation.

There are at least three processes through which income deflation occurs over much of the Third World in the era of globalisation (Patnaik 2008). The first is the relative reduction in the scale of government expenditure. Because economies caught in the vortex of globalised finance can be easily destabilised through sudden flights of finance capital, retaining the 'confidence of the investors' becomes a matter of paramount importance for every economy, for which their respective states have to show absolute respect to the caprices of globalised finance.

Finance capital in all its incarnations has always been opposed to an interventionist state (except when the interventionism is exclusively in its own favour). An essential element of this opposition has been its preference for 'sound finance' (i.e. for states always balancing their budgets, or at the most having a small pre-specified fiscal deficit as a proportion of the gross domestic product, or GDP). The argument advanced in favour of this preference has always been vacuous, and was pilloried by Professor Joan Robinson of Cambridge as the 'humbug of finance' (Robinson 1962). The preference nonetheless has always

been there, and has become binding in the era of globalised finance, when states willy-nilly are forced to enact 'fiscal responsibility' legislation that limits the size of the fiscal deficit in relation to GDP. At the same time, this move towards 'sound finance' is accompanied by a reduction in the tax–GDP ratio, owing to tariff reduction and to steps taken by states competing against one another to entice multinational capital to set up production plants in their respective countries.

The net result of both these measures is a restriction on the size of government expenditure, especially welfare expenditure, transfer payments to the poor, public investment expenditure, and development expenditure in rural areas. Since these items of expenditure put purchasing power in the hands of the people, especially in rural areas, the impact of their curtailment, exaggerated by the multiplier effects which are also to a significant extent felt in the local (rural) economy, is to curtail employment and impose an income deflation on the rural working population.

The second process is the destruction of domestic productive activities under the impact of global competition, from which they cannot be protected as they used to be in the *dirigiste* period, because of trade liberalisation, which is an essential component of the neo-liberal policies accompanying globalisation. The extent of such destruction is magnified to the extent that the country becomes a favourite destination for finance, and the inflow of speculative capital pushes up the exchange rate.

Even when there is no upward movement of the exchange rate and not even any destruction of domestic activity through the inflow of imports, the desire on the part of the getting-rich-quick elite for metropolitan goods and lifestyles, which are necessarily less employment-intensive than the locally available traditional goods catering to traditional lifestyles, results in the domestic production of the former at the expense of the latter, and hence to a process of internal 'de-industrialisation' which entails a net-unemployment-engendering structural change. This too acts as a measure of income deflation.

The third process through which income deflation is effected is a secular shift in income distribution against the *producers of primary commodities* because of the increasing hold of a few giant corporations in the *marketing* of those commodities. This has the effect of curtailing the consumption demand of the lower-rung petty producers owing to the income shift towards the higher-rung marketing multinational corporations. Globalisation thus unleashes income deflation, which curbs excess demand pressures and keeps commodity prices in check, and hence the value of money intact, exactly as happened in the colonial period.

IV

The preservation of the value of money in the metropolis however requires something more in addition to income deflation in the 'outlying regions' which ensures the availability of supplies to the former without an increase in supply price of commodities at given money wages (or money incomes of producers) in the latter. *This additional requirement is that the money wage itself should not go up in the 'outlying regions'.* In other words, apart from reduced absorption of commodities in the 'outlying regions' it also requires that the wage-unit in the latter should remain stable. And this is ensured by the existence there of substantial labour reserves.

The Reserve Army in the Periphery
The fact that capitalism requires a reserve army of labour was emphasised by Marx. This is both to keep the level of real wages restricted for any given level of productivity, so that the rate of surplus value remains positive at all times, and also to instil work-discipline among the workers by threatening them with the 'sack'. The role that custom backed by force plays under feudalism in enforcing work-discipline is played under capitalism by the threat of dismissal and hence unemployment. And this threat remains real precisely because unemployment remains a real phenomenon.

But in addition to the reasons mentioned by Marx there is a further overriding need for labour reserves, which arises from the system's need to have a group of 'price-takers' who supply it with essential inputs but who cannot enforce money wage claims (or money income claims) even to

maintain their *ex ante* income share. There is in other words the need for labour reserves for maintaining the value of money itself, and these labour reserves have to be quite substantial, so substantial that the workers located in their midst cannot even maintain their real wages in the face of a rise in prices, let alone push for an autonomous rise in their money wages (this argument is discussed at greater length in Patnaik 1997). The maintenance of such labour reserves has typically been in the 'outlying regions', where they surround petty producers producing for the metropolis (who therefore are forced to act as 'price-takers') and have been created and preserved by metropolitan capital.

The domination by metropolitan capital of its surroundings where petty producers are located and are drawn into producing for the capitalist metropolis, and where a substantial reserve army is maintained and income deflation is imposed to preserve the value of money and the entire edifice of finance erected upon it, is thus essential for its very existence. To what extent this domination, which is the essence of imperialism, is adequate to serve its requirements in the present era is a separate problem; indeed it is possible to argue alongside Rosa Luxemburg (though for reasons different from those that she cited) that with the development of capitalism it becomes increasingly difficult for such domination to act successfully as a stabilising factor for the system (Luxemburg 1963), but that is not the same as saying that the system ceases to have any need for such domination. Imperialism is as necessary today as it ever was; indeed, if anything, it is even more necessary today than ever before, because the edifice of finance that capitalism has today is far larger than anything it has ever had. Once this fact is accepted, then profound implications follow from it for the nature, strategy, and tactics of the revolutionary struggle that has to be engaged in for transcending this system.

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Ahmed Ben Bella

▶ Ben Bella, Ahmed (1918–2012)

Aimé Césaire

▶ Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)

Alexis Tsipras

▶ Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

Algeria

▶ Ben Bella, Ahmed (1918–2012)

Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism

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Synonyms

French colonialism; Imperialism; North Africa; Revolution

Definition/Description

The Algerian resistance to French colonialism began decades before one of the most significant revolutions in the twentieth century. The Algerian revolution is an archetype of the anti-colonial revolution in the post-Second World War era and embodied an example for independence struggles throughout the Third World.

Introduction

The year 2014 marks the commemoration of the 52nd Anniversary of the national political independence of Algeria and the 60th birthday of the Algerian revolution that started in November 1954. The Algerian people resisted French colonial oppression for decades before leading one of the greatest and most important revolutions in the twentieth century against the NATO-supported second colonial power in the world.

Any discussion around decolonisation and anti-imperialism cannot ignore the importance of Algeria and how its revolution was so inspiring to many oppressed people all over the world.

However, nowadays, Algeria is neither the revolutionary of 1954–62 nor the anti-imperialist of the 1960s and 1970s.

Algeria has been run by a dictatorship since its independence in 1962 and despite undeniable achievements on many fronts, the Algerian people, after regaining their national sovereignty from the French colonialists, have not yet achieved popular sovereignty that will fulfil the emancipatory vision of the Algerian revolution.

This essay will attempt to outline Algeria's trajectory from an assertive anti-imperialist stance to a position of submission and complicity with imperialism.

The Colonial Era and the Revolutionary Struggle

For in a very concrete way, Europe has stuffed herself inordinately with the gold and raw materials of the colonial countries: Latin America, China and Africa. From all these continents, under whose eyes Europe today raises up her tower of opulence, there has flowed out for centuries towards that same Europe diamonds and oil, silk and cotton, wood and exotic products. Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. The wealth which smothers her is that which was stolen from the under-developed peoples.

Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding (Fanon 1961: 81).

No revolution resembles another. This is because all of them are rooted in a specific national or regional history, are led by particular social and generational forces, and happen at a given moment in the development of the country. However, they present a common point, without which they wouldn't be called revolutions: the seizing of state power. Despite all the elements that might point to continuity, it is this rupture that marks a revolutionary change: the arrival of a new bloc of classes to the direction of the state or the transition from a colonial dependence to a national independence, even if the latter can be formal only.

The Algerian independence struggle against the French colonialists was one of the most inspiring anti-imperialist revolutions in the twentieth century. It was part of the decolonisation wave that had started after the Second World War in India, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and many countries in Africa. It inscribed itself in the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the era of the 'awakening of the South', a South that has been subjected for decades (in some cases more than a century) to imperialist and capitalist domination under several forms from protectorates to proper colonies as was the case with Algeria.

Retrospectively, French colonisation of Algeria was unique as it was the first Arabic-speaking country to be annexed by the West and the first country in Africa to be subjugated by a Western empire; way before the Berlin Conference in 1884, when different European empires (British, French, German, Belgian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese . . .) met to carve up the continent between themselves.

Algeria was invaded in June 1830 and the immediate pretext was revenge for an incident in 1827 when the then reigning Dey of Algiers, Khodja Hussein, angry at the French refusal to repay loans from the Napoleonic wars, attacked the French consul with a fly whisk, shouting: 'You are a wicked, faithless, idol-worshipping rascal'. But the real motivations were mainly political and economic. Politically, the invasion of Algeria was intended to distract attention from the domestic problems of the Bourbons and the unpopularity of Charles X's regime by the pursuit of *la gloire* abroad. Economically, Algeria was seen as a country of enormous untapped potential; and French traders wanted to expand outwards from the trading posts they had already established on the Algerian coast (Evans and Phillips 2007: 2).

The French army would spend the next 50 years suppressing an insurgency; 15 of them would be spent fighting the brilliant, fierce, and dedicated resistance-leader Abd-El-Kader. The 25-year-old holy man (*marabout*) was dubbed the Algerian Cromwell by the writer Alexis de Tocqueville and the extent of his success can be measured by the Treaty of Tafna in 1837, whereby he was recognised as the sovereign over two-thirds of Algeria. The war of conquest was relentlessly resumed 2 years later under the command of the ruthless Marshal Bugeaud who adopted a scorched-earth policy, causing barbarian atrocities that ranged from population displacement, to land expropriations and massacres including by asphyxiation with fire of more than 500 men, women, and children from the Ouled Riah tribe who had taken refuge in caves. In the face of a stronger and better equipped army, Abd El-Kader eventually surrendered in December 1847 (Fisk 2005: 637).

Along with Marshal Bugeaud's 'pacification', colonisation was actively encouraged. In a renowned statement before the National Assembly in 1840, Bugeaud said; 'Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there one must locate colons, without concerning oneself to whom those lands belong'. By 1841, the number of such colons already totalled 37,374, in comparison with approximately 3 million *indigènes* (Horne 2006: 30). By 1926, the number of settlers had reached some 833,000, 15% of the population, reaching just under 1 million by 1954.

French rule in Algeria lasted for 132 years, as opposed to 75 years in Tunisia and 44 years in Morocco, a depth and duration of colonial experience unique within Africa and the Arab world. It was in 1881 that Algeria was administered for the first time as an integral part of France. With the extension of civilian rule, the second-class status of the Muslim population became the foundation stone of French Algeria, and Muslims' exclusion was reflected at all levels of political representation. Anti-Muslim discrimination was also built into the electoral system and the inferior status of Muslims was inscribed into the law with the introduction of the loathsome Code de l'Indigénat in 1881 (McDougall 2006: 89–90). This was a uniquely repressive set of rules that closely controlled the Muslim population and imposed harsh penalties for a multitude of infractions, including vague crimes such as being rude to a colonial official or making disrespectful remarks about the Third Republic (Evans and Phillips 2007: 33).

Frantz Fanon in his powerful book *The Wretched of the Earth*, a canonical essay about the anti-colonialist and Third-Worldist struggle,

describes thoroughly the mechanisms of violence put in place by colonialism to subjugate the oppressed people. He wrote: 'Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence …. The violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm of the destruction of native social forms and broken up without reserve the systems of reference of the economy, the customs of dress and external life, that same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native …' (Fanon 1961: 31, 48).

According to him, the colonial world is a Manichean one, which goes to its logical conclusion and '*dehumanizes the native, or to speak plainly it turns him into an animal*'. Sartre does not disagree. In his essay 'Colonialism is a System', written in 1956 (2 years after the start of the Algerian revolution), he wrote: 'The conquest was achieved by violence. Over-exploitation and oppression required the maintaining of violence including the presence of the army. … Colonialism denies human rights to men whom it subdued by violence, whom it maintains by force in misery and ignorance, therefore, as Marx would have said, in a state of "sub-humanity". In the facts themselves, in institutions, in the nature of exchange and production, racism is inscribed' (Sartre 1964).

Colonialism Denied Algeria Its Own History, Nationalism Reinvented It

> National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon. (Fanon 1961: 27)

After the French succeeded in violently suppressing the rebellions, the last of which was in 1871 in Kabylia, it took over half a century for the Algerian resistance movement to surge again and to morph into a proper Algerian nationalism. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish three strands of Algerian nationalism, each identified with a particular leader. There was the religious movement embodied by the Association of the Ulema of Sheikh Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis; the revolutionaries following Messali Hadj; and finally the liberals led by Ferhat Abbas. (For more detail on the Associations of the Ulema and the liberals led by Ferhat Abbas, see McDougall 2006.)

Messali Hadj is considered to be the founding father of Algerian nationalism and the first one to call explicitly for total independence (for all three Maghreb nations), part of the programme of the political grouping he founded in 1926 in France called the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), which under his leadership had become the most radical of all nationalist organisations.

In February 1927, in Brussels and during the Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he was charged to present the ENA's programme. It was the first time that an orator on an international rostrum demanded independence for the Algerian colony and the Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates: 'The independence of one of the three countries will only succeed if the liberation movement of that country is sustained by the other two' (Ikdam, October 1927, cited in Kaddache 2003).

Originally linked to the French Communist Party (PCF), the grouping set out to organise the North African proletariat base, and unlike other organisations had social demands such as the redistribution of land among the *fellahs* (peasants) and confiscation of all property acquired by the French government or colons. Messali fell out with the French communists because they relegated the Algerian anticolonial struggle to the background of the international fight against fascism. The PCF went a step further in 1939 when it introduced the concept of Algeria as a 'nation in formation'. This concept, which argued that Algeria was not yet a fully fledged nation, was perceived as an apology for colonialism by Messali and his followers. The ENA was dissolved, and then reconstituted by Messali in 1937 as the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), this time concentrating its activities on

Algeria alone. During the Second World War, the PPA operated as a clandestine organisation and after the war, it assumed another name: Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD).

'Victory in Europe Day' and Massacres in Algeria (8 May 1945)

> It was at Setif that my sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment, my nationalism took definite form. (Kateb Yacine, Algerian writer and poet, quoted in Horne 2006: 27)

While across Europe there were fervent celebrations to mark the Nazi capitulation, and while France was rejoicing at the deliverance from a 5-year occupation, Muslim Algerians were massacred by the thousands because they dared to demonstrate for something they had been denied for more than a century. In that Victory in Europe Day, they marched in Setif in favour of Algerian independence and they deployed banners bearing slogans such as: 'For the Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and Independent Algeria!' They also brandished for the first time a flag that would later become that of the FLN liberation movement.

The French colonial authorities repressed the march in blood, and an insurrection ensued leading to the murder of 103 Europeans and the slaughter of tens of thousands (some estimates go up to 45,000) of Muslims in Setif, Guelma, and Kherrata by French gendarmerie, troops, and vengeful European settlers.

These massacres had significant repercussions for the Algerian nationalist movement and for the young generation of militants. The Algerian war had already started and the preparation for an armed struggle imposed itself. Most historians agree that these massacres of 1945 marked every Algerian Muslim alive at the time and every one of the Algerian nationalists who was prominent in

the FLN traces his revolutionary determination back to May 1945.

Ben Bella, a future leader of the FLN and head of state, a much-decorated sergeant of the 7th Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs, a unit that had distinguished itself in battle in Europe, wrote: 'The horrors of the Constantine area in May 1945 succeeded in persuading me of the only path; Algeria for the Algerian'. Also convinced was Mohammed Boudiaf, another revolutionary FLN leader and also future head of state, who rejected electoral politics, rejected assimilation, and saw violence and direct action as the only way forward (Evans and Phillips 2007: 52).

In effect, these tragic events represented the first volley of the struggle for independence.

The War of Independence (1954–62)

> Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it. (Frantz Fanon)

Breaking with Messali's classical scheme of progressive raising of Algerians' consciousness, some young militants formed a small autonomous nucleus, issued from l'Organisation Spéciale (OS, a clandestine structure of the MTLD that was charged to prepare for a future armed struggle) and pressed for the concrete preparation of an armed insurrection. The idea was announced through the formation of the Comité révolutionnaire pour l'unité et l'action (CRUA) by Hocine Aït Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mostefa Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M'hidi, Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider, and Belkacem Krim. The insurgency erupted on 1 November 1954, and to mark a rupture with the past, a new name was given to the CRUA: Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) (Ruscio 2012).

The Algerian struggle for independence cannot be divorced from the then international context of decolonisation and the first wave of the awakening of the global South: the formation of the Arab

League committed to Arab unity in 1945, Indian independence from Britain in 1947, the success of the Chinese Maoist revolution in 1949, and the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955 that united 29 non-aligned countries from Africa and Asia challenged colonialism and neo-colonialism in a setting of Cold War tensions.

The FLN leaders were under no illusion about the scale of the task confronting them and their confidence was bolstered by France's humiliating defeat in Indochina in May 1954. The great victory of the Vietnamese people at Dien Bien Phu, as Fanon described it, was no longer, strictly speaking a Vietnamese victory. 'Since July 1954, the question which the colonised peoples have asked themselves has been "What must be done to bring about another Dien Bien Phu? How can we manage it?"' (Fanon 1961: 55).

The importance and impact of Dien Bien Phu on the psyche of colonised people can hardly be overstated. Benyoucef Ben Khedda, president of the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA), recalled: 'On 7th May 1954, the army of Ho Chi Minh inflicts on the French expeditionary corps the humiliating disaster of Dien Bien Phu. This French defeat acted as a powerful catalyst on all those who have been thinking that an insurrection in the short term is by now the only remedy, the only possible strategy . . .. Direct action took precedence over all other considerations and had become the priority of priorities' (Ben Khedda 1989).

In 1962, the nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas wrote: 'Dien Bien Phu was not only a military victory. This battle remains a symbol. It is the Valmy of the colonized people. It is the affirmation of the Asian and African man vis-à-vis the man of Europe. It is the confirmation of human rights at a universal scale. In Dien Bien Phu, France has lost the sole legitimation of its presence: the right of the powerful' (Abbas 1962).

What followed the declaration of war on 1 November 1954 in Algeria was one of the longest and bloodiest wars of decolonisation, with merciless atrocities committed by both sides (for a history of the war see Horne 2006; Stora 1994). The FLN leadership had a realistic appreciation of the military balance of power, which was in favour of the fourth largest army in the world. Their strategy was inspired by the Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh's dictum 'For every nine of us killed we will kill one – in the end you will leave'. The FLN wanted to create a climate of violence and insecurity that would be ultimately intolerable for the French, internationalise the conflict, and bring Algeria to the attention of the world (Evans and Phillips 2007: 56). Following this logic, it was the decision of Abane Ramdane and Larbi Ben M'hidi to take the guerrilla warfare to the urban areas, and specifically to launch the battle of Algiers in September 1956. There is no better way to fully appreciate this key and dramatic moment of sacrifice in the Algerian revolution than the classic realist film of Gillo Pontecorvo: *The Battle of Algiers*, released in 1966. There is a dramatic moment when Colonel Mathieu, a thin disguise for the real-life General Massu, leads the captured FLN leader Larbi Ben M'Hidi into a press conference at which a journalist questions the morality of hiding bombs in women's shopping baskets. 'Don't you think it is a bit cowardly to use women's baskets and handbags to carry explosive devices that kill so many people?' the reporter asks. Ben M'hidi replies: 'And doesn't it seem to you even more cowardly to drop napalm bombs on defenceless villages, so that there are a thousand times more innocent victims? Give us your bombers, and you can have our baskets' (Fisk 2005: 640).

Eventually, the urban insurgency was crushed mercilessly using torture on a systematic scale to extract information, including fitting electrodes to genitals (Alleg 1958). By October 1957, the FLN networks had been dismantled in Algiers after the blowing up of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe in his hiding place in the Kasbah. Despite losing militarily, the FLN scored a diplomatic victory as France was isolated internationally because of the scandalous methods of repression that had been used.

Official estimates claim that in fact 1.5 million Algerians were killed in the 8-year war that ended in 1962, a war that has become the foundation of modern Algerian politics.

Support for Revolution, Delinking from the Imperialist-Capitalist Global Order

In 1962, the Algerian people not only celebrated their newly found sovereignty but also expressed their dreams and aspirations for a different, more just and egalitarian society. Proud of its victory and animated with a revolutionary fervour, Algeria wanted to build a new socialist order, to halt underdevelopment, put in place an agrarian reform, and achieve mass education.

For a big part of what was already called the Third World, especially those countries that were still under the grip of colonial domination, Algeria opened the way, represented a model and a hope. Its capital Algiers was the Mecca of all revolutionaries all over the world, from Vietnam to southern Africa, who desired to bring down the imperialist and colonial order. Algeria was the first country in Africa to regain its independence by force of arms. In 1964, the charter of Algiers declared that: 'The development of socialism in Algeria is linked to the struggles of other people in the world … The resort to armed struggle might prove decisive to regain national sovereignty. For every revolutionary movement, support to this struggle is sacred and is not subject to any bargaining' (quoted in Deffarge and Troeller 2012: 20). Hence, Algeria's decisions to give asylum and financial support for many movements all over the world that were fighting for independence, against racism, colonialism, and imperialism.

In the Arab world, the new regime established ties with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and rode the wave that chased the French and the British after their pitiful adventure in the Suez in 1956, a wave that imposed independence for Tunisia and Morocco, a wave that overthrew the monarchy in Iraq in 1958 and in Northern Yemen in 1962. Palestinians also initiated the first actions to put back their country on the political map, from which it has been removed (Gresh 2012: 6).

In the first year of independence, with an incredible spontaneity and voluntarism, Algerian workers took over operations of modern farms and units in industrial settings abandoned by the Europeans fleeing to France and engaged in an amazing grass-root experience of self-management and socialism from below (Gauthier 2012: 12).

For 15 years from 1962–78, Algeria was fully engaged in a delinking experience to break away from imperialist domination. Hence, its role as one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that was aspiring for a new world order and seeking economic independence. The Algiers Charter of the 77 in 1967 was a significant step in shifting the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism from the political sphere to the economic one. It strongly denounced the intolerable logic of an unjust global system where the continuous enrichment of the already privileged countries was obtained through the growing impoverishment of the proletariat nations, which were seen on the one hand as a market for the dominant Western economies, and on the other, as a reservoir of cheap labour and natural resources. Che Guevara also argued in this direction in a speech delivered in Algiers in February 1965. In this he demanded that countries claiming to be socialist should eliminate 'their tacit complicity with the exploiter countries, with the West' in their relationships of unequal exchange with people fighting imperialism (Guevara 1970: 574).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian nation state had a clear and ambitious programme of ideas and the will and ability to realise them. A significant and inspiring industrialisation project was pursued. Nationalisations to recover the resources of the country were initiated and culminated in February 1971 when the oil industry was nationalised, the first successful nationalisation of oil ever to be carried out in the Arab-Islamic world (Roberts 2003: 13).

Inspired by Fanon, the regime under Ben-Bella in 1963 nationalised lands belonging to foreigners; and, under Boumediene, an agrarian revolution was initiated in 1971 to eliminate the agrarian bourgeoisie and to support the peasants, who had been the principal victims of the war operations.

Dictatorial and military, the regime of Colonel Houari Boumediene did not represent a right-

wing military dictatorship (like that of Augusto Pinochet's in Chile) that served the interests of an oligarchy linked to imperialism. Boumediene's economic policies were accompanied by progressive social achievements such as democratisation of education, the access of huge segments of the popular masses to health services, guarantees for employment and social upward mobility. In the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria alongside Egypt occupied a prominent and leading position during the first wave of the 'awakening of the South' in the era of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement. By 1980, they were the most industrialised states in Africa, aside from South Africa, with a solid experience in industrial management and technological expertise. This autonomous project served a majority of the population and thus achieved a form of social consensus; indeed, denying its significant accomplishments would be nihilistic. However, this attempt of delinking from the imperialist and capitalist global order had its own limitations and internal contradictions (Amin 1990). These included the continuing food dependence, reliance on oil revenues, the infiltration of foreign capital in the economy, and, more importantly, the dictatorial character of the regime, which concentrated powers in the hands of one person, Houari Boumediene.

The political rule of Boumediene suppressed the democratic practice, depoliticised the masses, and reduced them to passive spectators instead of encouraging them to actively participate in public life. Moreover, this project was piloted by a national bourgeoisie in the Fanonian sense of the word, which led to popular discontent in the form of open criticisms during the debates around the National Charter of 1976 and through strikes in the public sector in 1976 and 1977, contesting the development of inequalities, repression, and lack of freedoms. The crux of the matter was how to remedy these serious shortcomings, and how to overcome the contradictions in order to take the nascent development project to the second phase of consolidation, and achieve genuine economic independence. However, after the death of Boumediene in 1978, these considerations were unfortunately not on the agenda of the Algeria's ruling elite in the 1980s and 1990s.

From Resistance to Submission to Imperialism

Algeria, an Immense Bazaar: The Politics and Economic Consequences of *infitah*

With the global neo-liberal wave gaining momentum in the 1980s, sweeping away the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc, eventually spreading to the whole world from Argentina to Poland and not sparing China on the way, and with the plummeting of oil revenues, the Algerian national development project was abandoned by the Chadli clique. It was dismantled as a process of deindustrialisation was carried out to give way to neo-liberal policies and the submission to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its structural adjustment programmes (1992–93, 1994–99). This had heavy consequences on the population: job losses (more than 500,000 in a few years), decrease of purchasing power, cuts to public spending, increasing precariousness of salaried workers, opening-up of foreign trade, and the privatisation of public companies. Algeria paid around $90 billion in debt service between 1990 and 2004, and paid its debt several times, in fact, seven times. This does not constitute a necessary imperative, but a choice of a regime that abdicated to Western hegemony (Belalloufi 2012).

The dignitaries of the new neo-liberal religion declared that everything was for sale and opened the way for privatisations. This allowed an explosion of import activity, which pronounced a death sentence on the productive economy. Rachid Tlemçani notes that by 1997, 7,100 companies (5,500 private) controlled the non-hydrocarbon foreign trade, the majority of which were specialised in import activities resulting in the transformation of the Algerian market into an immense bazaar for foreign goods with its reservoir of corruption (Tlemçani 1999: 118).

Under President Bouteflika, from 1999, this neo-liberal logic of undermining national production while promoting an import-import economy (imports increased from $9.3 billion in 2000 to $27.6 billion in 2007 and $54.85 billion by 2013) was pushed even further, aiming for a complete integration into the global economy. This is

evidenced by the dismantling of all custom barriers, the progress in WTO membership negotiations, the adherence to the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), and the signature of an association agreement with the European Union in 2002.

It is in the name of the sacrosanct principles of the neo-liberal dogma that industrial investment halted for 30 years. It is because of their profiteering disciples that industrial figures mutated into traders-importers. It is also in their name that the share of industry in GDP went down from 26% in 1985 to about 5% in 2009 (Belalloufi 2012: 25). The successive governments made all the necessary arrangements for the foreign investors to rush into Algeria and confirmed their mission of offering the lion's share of the revenues to multinational companies. As a matter of fact, they have hastened to rescue the crisis-ridden European car industry by importing 200,000 cars a year, perpetuating the logic of an economy based on import, trade, sheer consumption, and shunning local production and industry (Hamouchene 2013b).

The *infitah* (economic liberalisation) of the last three decades ended up assigning the country to the status of a dependant of the imperialist-capitalist system and an exporter of energy within the neo-colonial framework of the international division of labour. Instead of re-industrialising, building a productive economy far from the bazaar import-import activities, and investing in Algerian youths who still risk their lives to reach the northern shores of the Mediterranean in order to escape the despair of marginalisation and relegation as Hittistes (literally, those with their backs to the walls referring to the unemployed who ceased to be stakeholders in post-colonial Algeria), the Algerian authorities confirmed their surrender to foreign capitals and multinationals by the Renault fiasco (Charef 2012) and destructive shale gas exploitation (Slate Afrique 2013), placed its considerable foreign reserves (around $200 billion dollars) in foreign bonds, mainly American, and also offered financial support to the IMF ($5 billion dollars), a neo-colonial tool of plunder that crippled the country's economy in the 1990s.

Algeria's Foreign Policy: Complicity with Imperialism

In the last 2 years, several articles and analyses have attempted to decrypt Algeria's ambiguous position towards Western imperialist interventions in Libya and Mali. In contrast to its assertive and resolute diplomacy of the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian regime confused many people as it was not easy to tell whether it supported or opposed these recent wars.

On the one hand, those who were reductionist failed to analyse the situation objectively and resorted to the easy explanation that Algeria is being pragmatic and that the seeming contradictions in its decisions and actions are only a reflection of its realist approach. However, those who adhere to a binary view of the world, divided into an imperialist North and an anti-imperialist South, had a Pavlovian attitude which advanced the idea that Algeria is under immense pressure and is being targeted for its resource nationalism and resistance to Western hegemony (Glazebrook 2013).

Will these claims stand the test of scrutiny? Is the Algerian position towards these imperialist interventions justified? Why has Algeria failed to play a more proactive role in solving the crises in Mali and Libya, given that it is a regional military and economic power that should have been at the forefront in these conflicts? This is even more important as Algeria was very concerned about its security and warned against the risks of destabilisation and spill-overs in the whole region if the conflicts escalated after Western intervention. Finally, is Algeria really resisting Western hegemony and challenging imperialist domination?

Tacit Complicity with NATO's Intervention in Libya

The Algerian regime was generally hostile to the uprisings that took place next to its borders, and adopted its so-called 'neutralist' position in relation to the momentous events in nearby countries. How could it be otherwise for an authoritarian regime whose survival was threatened by the risk of the revolutionary wave reaching its shores? Several high-ranking officials declared that Algeria had its 'Arab Spring' in 1988, insisted on

maintaining the 'false' stability of the country, and used the card of the 1990s traumatising civil war to dissuade the population from going down the same path as the Egyptians and Tunisians.

The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), irritated by the 'neutralist' position of the Algerian authorities and their refusal to recognise it as an interlocutor, claimed – without any documentary evidence – that Algeria gave support to the Gaddafi Regime and provided him with mercenaries to curb the revolution. The NTC also reacted angrily to Algeria's decision to grant members of the Gaddafi family asylum and considered this an act of enmity (Guardian 2011). The Algerian ambassador to the UN told the BBC that Algeria was simply respecting the 'holy rule of hospitality' and was accepting the family on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, some sources have reported that the government had promised to hand over Muammar Gaddafi should he try to follow his family into Algeria.

A closer look at the seemingly ambiguous position of the Algerian regime will reveal that the latter was trying to adapt to a fast-changing situation in the region and was mainly preoccupied about its survival and stability. Algeria voted against a resolution endorsing a no-fly-zone adopted by the empty-shell Arab League, and declared that it was up to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to decide on such a matter, which it did by passing resolution 1973 allowing for a NATO intervention in Libya.

Algeria *did not* oppose the intervention and did not even question its imperialist motives, and only resorted to vague criticism of the Western powers' implementation and interpretation of UNSC resolution 1973. Algeria's hostility towards the intervention can be explained by its fear of what it would mean for the border zone and by what has become a spiritless and perfunctory opposition to foreign meddling in other countries' internal affairs.

Collusion in the French Intervention in Mali

While Algeria was actively pushing for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in northern Mali and was a mediator in negotiations between the Malian authorities and the National Movement

for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamists of Ansar Al-dine, France was not too keen on this approach from the start and ended up intervening unilaterally in January 2013. The Algerian regime surprisingly declared its respect for the French decision to intervene because Mali had requested help from 'friendly' powers!

Since when has the ex-colonial master been a 'friendly' power that cares about the livelihood of Malians? Since when has France, with its neo-colonial tools (Françafrique, Francophonie . . .), cared about the fate of Africans?

Two explanations can be put forward to understand the Algerian reaction: (a) the Algerian regime naively believes that the Western powers have suddenly become altruistic, abandoning their imperialist mission of dominating and controlling the world according to their narrow interests; or (b) the regime simply abdicated to Western hegemony and is willing to co-operate.

A few days after the French intervention in Mali, the Algerian people had to suffer the humiliation of being informed by the French foreign minister that their authorities had 'unconditionally' opened Algerian airspace to French planes, and he demanded that Algiers close its southern borders. Who said that neo-colonial attitudes are anachronistic (Hamouchene 2013a)?

Some journalists also reported that a US drone was allowed to monitor the hostage stand-off in the BP plant in In Amenas, in south-eastern Algeria; and more recently, it came to light that the Algerian authorities were giving precious support to the French operations in Mali by discreetly providing much-needed quantities of fuel to the French military. This in fact amounts to collusion with the French neo-colonial expedition (Le Point.fr 2013).

Algeria and the Military Threat on Syria: Words Are not Enough

Algeria was among the 18 countries (from a total of 22) which voted in November 2011 for Syria's suspension from the Arab League and for implementing sanctions over its failure to end the government crackdown on protests. It is a staggering majority-decision coming from countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and

Algeria, which possess dazzling records on democracy and human rights.

In a move perceived as a withdrawal from the process of searching for a political settlement for the Syrian crisis, the Qatar and Saudi Arabia–led Arab League made the decision, on March 2013, to offer the Syrian National Council (SNC) Syria's place in the Arab League. Algeria and Iraq voted against the motion, arguing that such a decision contradicts the Arab League Charter on the inadmissibility of any actions aimed at regime change in the Arab states.

The summit's final document says that, 'each member state of the Arab League has the right to supply defensive means as it so wishes – including military defence – to support the resistance of the Syrian people and the Free Syrian Army (the armed wing of the Syrian opposition)'. With such a statement, one only wonders if the Arab League has not become a sycophant to the Western powers (France, Britain, and the US) and a legitimising tool for their agendas in the region.

On 1 September 2013, the Arab League urged international action against the Syrian government to deter what it called the 'ugly crime' of using chemical weapons. It was a major step towards supporting Western military strikes but fell short of the explicit endorsement that the US and some Gulf allies had hoped for. Echoing its position in the Libyan crisis, Algeria, alongside Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Tunisia expressed its opposition to a foreign military intervention in Syria outside of the 'international law', a concept it knows very well to be a euphemism for the rule of the powerful. Fortunately, this time, Russia and China are not on the side of the Western powers.

It is inconceivable to deem such a stance anti-imperialist or reconcile it with an outright collusion in the French intervention in Mali. Such behaviour is utterly inconsistent with a coherent anti-imperialist line and it can hardly be qualified as resistance to Western hegemony. Algeria has adopted a very low-profile diplomacy in the Libyan conflict, and toward the Arab League and Turkey's reactions to the Syrian crisis; a position that no longer captures its heavyweight and daring diplomacy of the 1960s and 1970s, and which exemplifies the erosion of any semblance of an anti-imperialist line once attached to the FLN Regime. However, this behaviour is not contradictory with the Algerian regime's narrow survival policy, even if it means going by the dictates and decisions of the powerful and manoeuvring within this framework of Western and US domination over the world.

If Algeria really wanted to play an active role in the momentous changes happening in the region (including firmly opposing the intentions of the Gulf monarchies and Turkey in Syria) and to be a relevant actor in managing the multiple crises in its immediate neighbourhood, it would need to change itself first.

Resistance to Imperialism: A Definition

Let's put the Libyan and the Malian examples aside, and assume that these are isolated cases or that they could constitute exceptions to Algerian foreign policy; and let's examine together whether Algeria can qualify as anti-imperialist in other respects. To do that, we need to have some objective criteria to make a judgement.

Samir Amin – an Egyptian economist, social theorist, and leading radical thinker – identified five privileges of the contemporary imperialist centres that must be challenged to call into question the logic of imperialist domination (Dembélé 2011: 45):

- domination over technologies with the over-protection of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
- exclusive access to the natural resources of the planet
- control of the integrated and globalised monetary and financial system
- control of means of communication and information
- control of weapons of mass destruction.

We can already see that certain states are challenging or resisting one or more of these monopolies in a more or less important fashion: China, India, and Brazil in the field of technological development; South Africa, Brazil, and China in access to natural

resources; China, Iran, and Venezuela in accessing the globalised capital markets and managing their own financial systems; Qatar, Venezuela, and China in the domain of communications and information; and Iran, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Brazil in the field of weapons of mass destruction.

However, challenging one or more of these monopolies does not necessarily constitute an anti-imperialist position. For instance, Qatar, India, and Pakistan are close allies of Western powers and qualifying them based on these criteria as anti-imperialist states would be an aberration. China is particularly interesting, as many observers have argued that it could be an aspirant and potential rival imperialist (Klare 2012). 'Rebellious' regimes such as Iran have a double nature. On the one hand, they are part of the global capitalist/imperialist system because they are keeping their own people under its domination as well as applying to them neo-liberal potions. On the other hand, these regimes resist and refuse to align entirely with the big powers. Resistance to these exclusive controls is therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition to become an anti-imperialist state and represents a start on the road towards a fully coherent and principled anti-imperialist position. An anti-imperialist stance should be inscribed in a well-thought-out vision that not only attempts to contest these five monopolies, but also strongly opposes imperialist interventions and meddling in other states' affairs. This stance should also challenge the profoundly unjust political and neo-liberal economic order, and fully support the emancipation struggles for people all over the world. Surely, there will be some contradictions along the way, but these need to be addressed within an appropriate framework in which the principal aim is to bring an end to imperialist domination.

Algeria is Submissive to Imperialism

Is Algeria challenging the imperialist monopolies mentioned above? Is it trying to break away from global imperialist domination? A simple look at the facts on the ground will reveal that this is not the case.

Long gone are the days when the capital Algiers was seen as the Mecca of revolutionaries all over the world. Times have passed when Algeria was audacious and undeterred in its foreign policy, when: (a) it supported anti-colonialist struggles all over the world; (b) the question of Palestine and Western Sahara were at the top of its foreign-policy priorities; (c) it significantly supported (in financial and military terms) the Palestinian cause in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973; (d) it broke its diplomatic relations with the US in 1967; (e) it played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement and hosted its 1973 summit in Algiers, which strongly denounced the structural inequality in the global system benefiting already-privileged countries at the expense of the other ones in the global South. Long gone is the era when Algeria engaged in a delinking experience to break away from imperialist-capitalist domination. It sadly renounced the pursuit of an autonomous national development that involved a certain degree of economic and political confrontation with imperialism.

Alas, recovering the national sovereignty from French colonialists was not accompanied by recovering the popular sovereignty through building a strong civil society and actively involving the masses in public life in a democratic way. These are absolutely necessary conditions in sustaining the resistance to Western domination. The new pathology of power (to borrow Eqbal Ahmad's words), observed in the authoritarian and coercive practices of the nationalist bourgeoisie (Said 1994: 269), the demobilisation and depoliticisation of the rural and urban masses, was at the heart of the subsequent dismantling of the national development project and replacing it with an anti-national one. In his chapter on 'the pitfalls of nationalist consciousness' in the *Wretched of the Earth,* Fanon foresaw this turn of events. He strongly argued that unless national consciousness at its moment of success was somehow changed into a political and social consciousness, the future would not hold liberation but an extension of imperialism with its divisions and hierarchies (Fanon 1961).

Algeria nowadays, and especially after 9/11, closely co-operates with NATO, an organisation that not only supported the French military against the Algerian people in the War of Independence (1954–62), but recently invaded Afghanistan and intervened in Libya. The regime also collaborates with the American and British armies that invaded Iraq and equally with the French army that intervened recently in Ivory Coast to impose a presidential candidate and in Mali to supposedly fight Islamist fundamentalists. The secretive and authoritarian regime – dubbed by Algerians 'Le Pouvoir' – participates alongside the CIA, FBI, MI6 and DGSE in the 'Global War on Terror', which constitutes another alibi for imperialist interventions (in fact and according to the report "Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition" by the Open Society Justice Initiative released on February 2013, Algeria is complicit in the human rights abuses associated with the illegal CIA secret detention and extraordinary rendition programme, as it permitted use of its airspace and airports for these operations). And not content with all of this, it plays the role of a guardian to fortress Europe by protecting it from poor African immigrants who are escaping the misery caused by the European powers in the first place (Morice and Rodier 2010). Algeria also joined the Union for the Mediterranean alongside a criminal and colonialist state like Israel and now has a 'moderate' position towards the Palestinian question. Likewise with the Western Sahara situation, Algeria is now backing the outrageous principle of a solution accepted by both parties. Since when do the dominated need to wait for the dominant to accept the terms of their liberation? There was also a rapprochement with the world organisation of the Francophonie, one of the principal instruments of French political domination in the world. This bleak picture of a reactionary and shameful foreign policy is truly disgraceful to the memory of the historical revolutionary FLN.

Having said that, Algeria has not yet become a simple valet to imperialism like the petro-monarchies of the Gulf, the Egypt of Hosni Mubarak or the Jordanian monarchy, but it has renounced the logic of resistance. It embraced another logic, that of abdication, submission, and collusion, which will only worsen. The Algerian regime does not contest the profoundly unjust international order and seeks instead to adapt to it. It is far from the courageous and conscious resistance of certain Latin American countries like Chavez's Venezuela and Morales's Bolivia.

Anti-imperialism and the Democratic Struggle

The Comprador Bourgeoisie

The analysis above suggests that an antinational, sterile, and unproductive bourgeoisie is getting the upper hand in running the state affairs and hegemony in directing its economic choices, albeit with some resistance from a quasi-non-existent national bourgeoisie (e.g. amendment of the unashamedly anti-national hydrocarbon Khelil Law in 2006, after Hugo Chavez lobbied against it). It is enough to look at the unproductive nature of the Algerian economy, with the preponderance of import-import trade activity and de-industrialisation to realise that this bourgeoisie has a character, which is essentially rentier, commercial, and speculative. It is only interested in exporting its own profits abroad, hoarding them in tax havens, or investing them in non-productive sectors/assets such as restaurants, hotels, and properties. (On how this bourgeoisie is striving to sell off the economy in the most anti-national manner, see Belalloufi 2012.)

This comprador bourgeoisie does not produce but consumes what it imports and seriously undermines vital public services such as health and education, which are deteriorating year after year. The Mafia-like oligarchy is neo-liberal by religion and has no regard for the future of the country and its population. It is parasitic and rapacious as it preys on the economy and maintains an endemic corruption (responsible for a series of major corruption scandals that touched important sectors of the economy, including the most strategic of them all: the energy sector). It is entirely subordinated to the international system of economic, political and military domination, and therefore, represents the true agent of imperialism and is its useful accessory.

No to imperialist meddling, no to the status quo
This largely comprador regime is the biggest threat to the sovereignty of the nation and must surely be overthrown. However, it is necessary to make sure that this fall occurs within a national context and won't lead to the instauration of another regime submissive to imperialism. This is an extremely challenging task for the democratic opposition and necessitates an adequate understanding of imperialism and its workings to avoid becoming an instrument of destabilisation for the country in favour of imperialism. However, an absolute vigilance towards imperialist designs must not lead to accepting or defending the status quo and the fake stability, namely supporting a regime that is denying its own people the right of self-determination. This caution must not lead to renouncing the struggle for democracy and the hegemony of the oppressed masses.

We must not be blinded by a narrow and simplistic anti-imperialist stance that is based on a Manichean view of the world: an imperialist North and an anti-imperialist global South. This view ignores the realities on the ground where people are suffocated by corrupt and authoritarian regimes, most of which are clients of the Western powers. It also dilutes with its distasteful lack of nuance the importance of building strong democratic states and comforts certain parasitic comprador classes that posture as superpatriots. Unfortunately, this view is reinforced by what has been happening to the inspiring 'Arab Spring', especially its hijacking by the Western intervention in Libya and the proxy war in Syria.

It is therefore of paramount importance to realise that authoritarianism and corruption are the twins of any neo-colonial enterprise, and are objective allies of imperialism (reactionary political Islam being another example). Non-democratic regimes (like those of Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi, Bashar Al Assad, and Bouteflika) can be managed more or less easily by the imperialist centres and are weakened and threatened by a system that dispenses with popular legitimacy to seek the Western powers' approval instead. As long as these regimes are vassals to the imperial powers, they can repress and oppress their people at will, and when they are no longer useful they are abandoned and replaced (Saddam, Moubarak, Ben Ali, Gaddafi, Ali Saleh ...). This refusal of democracy is hence very perilous for the sovereignty of the nation and its territorial integrity.

Moreover, these 'patriotic' dictatorships serve perfectly the imperial designs of redrawing a greater Middle East within a strategy of weakening nation states. Along with Western military supremacy and massive propaganda, our dictators are key elements in this plot. They repress their own people, participate in proxy wars for the empire (Iraq against Iran) and can be used at the end as a justification for a direct intervention/occupation. The Iraqi scenario is not something of the past; it has been replicated rather efficiently in Libya and is currently underway in Syria, albeit taking a different approach. It can potentially be extended to other countries including Algeria to fully eradicate any unwillingness to be dominated. It doesn't happen only to others, so how can we avoid re-colonisation, the direct management of our energy resources, the control of our territory, as well as the subordination of the country to interests that are not ours?

There is no better quotation to respond to this question, to emphasise the extreme danger of dictatorial systems to national security and to underscore the necessity of a national cohesion based on citizenship and freedom than what the late Abdelhamid Mehri, an intellectual of the Algerian revolution, said about Algeria in the aftermath of the historic events in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011: 'If you don't want to be changed by the others, you have to change yourself. Democracy is not only an ethical necessity; it is equally a national security imperative. Therefore, dictatorship and authoritarianism are real existential threats and objective allies to imperialism'. More than 50 years after its independence, Algeria has to reconnect with its revolutionary past by instigating a democratic revolution to end tyranny and injustice, as well as dismantling the comprador state and installing an audacious antiimperialist regime that will truly liberate the people and also strive to build an equitable multi-polar world order. This can be done through transcending national constraints and establishing strong

alliances worldwide, in particular South–South in order to rise, emerge, and achieve freedom from imperialist domination.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism
▶ French Indochinese War, 1945–1954
▶ Middle East: Socialism and Anti-imperialism
▶ Settler Colonialism
▶ Socialism, Nationalism, and Imperialism in the Arab Countries

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Ali Shariati (1933–1977)

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Ali Shariati Mazīnānī was an Iranian sociologist, philosopher, and revolutionary. Blending left-wing Western philosophy with Shi'a Islam, creating a form of Islamic socialism, he is often cited as one of the most influential Iranian intellectuals in the twentieth century and the "ideological father" of the Iranian revolution of 1979 (Jackson 2006, p. 221). Being among the "seminal figures in the prehistory of the Islamic Revolution," his writings and lectures focused primarily on the progressive and/or revolutionary nature of Islam, especially Shi'a Islam, and how it can address the fundamental problems of the contemporary world, including Western imperialism (Algar 2001, p. 87). Shariati called for a rejuvenation of Iran through a radical yet modern embrace of its Shi'a roots in an attempt to liberate it from foreign domination as well as the Pahlavi monarchy. Although his core ideas were marginalized after the successful removal of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah and the institution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, his revolutionary form of Shi'a Islam continued to influence other Third World anti-imperialist theorists, well beyond his early death in 1977. Furthermore, although Shariati died before the overthrow of the Shah, his life and work did the most to prepare Iranian youth for the Islamic revolution to come (Keddie 1981, p. 215).

According to the historian Nikki R. Keddie, Shariati became influential at a time when (1) Iran was modernizing, including the development of a higher education system that incorporated a high degree of subjects and disciplines thought to be "Western," and (2) due to the educational divide, many new social groups were forming, and such groups were confronted by "new cultural problems – accelerated urbanization, Westernization, industrialization, spectacular speculation and corruption" (Keddie 1981, p. 222). Additionally, Iran was falling for what the Iranian philosopher, Jalal Al-i Ahmad, dubbed *ġharbzadegī*, translated as "Westoxification," "Euromania," or "Occidentosis." In other words, Iranian society was suffering from a massive infatuation with all things Western, so much so that native culture was abandoned as being "backward" or even "primitive" (Ahmad 1984; Byrd 2011, pp. 88–92). These radical shifts in society were also compounded by the dominating influence of the British Empire and its Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had established itself in Iran soon after the discovery of oil in 1908. In the absence of the British withdrawal from the Middle East post World War II, the United States would become Iran's "protectorate." In order to secure the maximum benefit of Iran's natural resources, especially its oil wealth, the United States worked closely with the Shah of Iran to maintain stability in the country, which included selling the monarch tens of millions of dollars' worth of weapons, which were mainly used for internal repression of opposition groups (Byrd 2011, pp. 12–13). Coupled with the Shah's "White Revolution," a series of modernizing reforms that overwhelmingly benefitted the wealthy and the Shah's family, Iranian society grew wrestles and was prepared for a messiah-like figure to deliver it from its travails. If not the return of the Shi'a Twelfth Imam from his "major occultation" (*al-ġaybat al-Kubra*), that earthly messiah-like figure would either come from a modern background or a traditional one, but he would inevitably have to be rooted in Shi'a Islam. The two men that filled that emancipatory role more so than anyone else were Sayyid Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini (Ayatollah Khomeini), the revolutionary Shi'a cleric, and Ali Shariati, the Shi'a intellectual dedicated to the renovation, modernization, and radicalization of Islam (Byrd 2011; Byrd and Miri 2017).

Biography

Ali Shariati was born in Mazīnān, a village near the desert in Khorâsân, into a long-standing clerical family. His father, Muhammad-Taqī Shariati Mazīnānī, studied theology at the holy city of Mashhad between 1927 and 1928, but did not finish. Although he was a scholar of Qurʾānic interpretation (*Tafsīr*), he followed a different, yet still religious, course of life; he became a teacher in the national education system and founded the Centre for the Propagation of Islamic Truths (*Kanun-i Nashr-i Haqa'iq-i Islami*), wherein he attempted to highlight the progressive aspects of Islam, demonstrating how they were compatible with modernity. According to his biographer, Rahnema (2008), Ali Shariati's father believed that "educated youth who would constitute the responsible citizenry of the future had to be exposed to an Islamic teaching compatible with the requirements of modern times" (p. 208). In doing so, he rejected the Western-oriented secularism that was growing in Iran as well as the petrified worldview of the Shi'a *'Ulamā'* (clerics). Although he saw certain aspects that were truthful, Mohammad-Taqī rejected the anti-religious Marxism that was prevalent among the intellectuals, especially those within the Tudeh Party (Iran's Communist Party). This reconciliation between secular leftist thought emanating from the Western philosophical tradition, and traditional Shi'a Islam, would have a lasting effect on Muhammad-Taqī's son Ali, who was continuously educated by his father throughout his childhood, as he was an active member of his father's center and fully participated in their activities. It was Ali's philosophical amalgamation of these two intellectual trends that would later make him the most important Iranian intellectual during the revolutionary period of the 1970s.

Although he was shy and a bit reclusive as an adolescent, preferring to study at home in his father's library, his intellectual capacity was never in question, as he showed interest in subject matters well beyond the traditional educational curriculum of Iran. His genius for such probing questions was augmented in the late 1940s when he began to read philosophical works, some of which were Western and anti-religious, such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Franz Kafka. According to Rahnema (2008), his study of heterodox works caused a severe crisis of faith, wherein "the thought of existence without God was so awesome, lonely and alien that life itself became a bleak and futile exercise" (p. 212). In the face of philosophical antinomies, he even contemplated suicide. It was only through his contemplation of Mawlānā Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī's *Masnavi* that he was pulled from the pit of despair.

In 1950, having finished the ninth grade, Shariati entered the Teacher Training College in Mashhad, graduating just 2 years later, and began teaching at a nearby high school. The existential angst that plagued him with the study of philosophy was put to rest. According to Rahnema (2008), it was Shariati's discovery of Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī (d. 652 CE), a companion to the Prophet Muhammad, which eased his anxiety about life, as it gave him an "epistemological medium [for] recognizing and defining the idea life and society" (p. 212). Often thought of as the first "Islamic socialist," Abū Dharr was an early convert to Islam in Mecca. He is remembered for his strict adherence to Islamic piety, his fierce loyalty to the Prophet Muhammad, and his defense of 'Ali claim to succeed the prophet. After the prophet's death in 632 CE, he stood in opposition to Mu'āwiya, who later established the Umayyad dynasty of caliphs. Shariati's study of Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī was followed by the writing of two important books, *Tarikh-i Takamol-i Falsafe* (A History of the Development of Philosophy), which is commonly known as *Maktab-i Vaseteh-i Islam* (The Median School of Islam) and *Abu Zar-i Ghifari: Khoda Parast-i Sosiyalist* (Abū Dharr: The God-Worshipping Socialist). Both of these books attempted to augment Islam above other prevalent philosophical and political-economic ideologies while simultaneously interpreting their core ideas through an Islamic lens. In fact, the later book *Abu Zar-i Ghifari* explains succinctly the reconciliation of Islamic theology and socialist core of Islam that he was attempting to resurrect (Dabashi 2011, p. 53). He was especially concerned with the Islamic/Western encounter, arguing that Western colonialism

weakened Islamic identity to the point that it could hardly resist Westernization. However, such Westernization had allies within Iran. By reflexively favoring all things Western, Iranian intellectuals did an enormous amount of damage to Iran's sense of self. It was the intellectuals' dependence on Western thought that drained Iran from creating its own modern identity from its own Islamic resources. This dependence on the West for its intellectual substance had to be remedied if Iran was ever to be truly independent.

Although he was critical of the West, Marxism, and other Western ideologies, these two books are an expression of Shariati's lifelong attempt to rejuvenate Islam in dialogue with Western thought. Additionally, by maintaining the importance of Islam within the context of Western modernity, globalization, and Western hegemony, his work filled a "spiritual vacuum" left by the secular Iranian intellectuals, one that was also distinct from the traditional Shi'a orthodoxy (Jackson 2006, p. 222). Because of this, his work spoke to both modernists and the religious.

Shariati's study of Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī was especially important to his life. His book was based on the radical Egyptian novelist Abu'l Hamid Jaudat al-Sahhar's Arabic text on the same subject, which the teenage Shariati had translated into Persian (Algar 2001, p. 88). In it, Shariati depicts Abū Dharr as a model for the real Muslim, one whose submission to God impels the believer to struggle against all forms of oppression, exploitation, and denigration. Rahnema writes that in Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Shariati "creates a hero, a model and a symbol, who defied wealth, power and even religious authority to save the 'authentic' Islam of the poor, the oppressed and the socially conscious. One man against the mighty ruler of the Islamic empire" (2008, p. 213). Following the thought of Abū Dharr, Shariati believed that the success of the early Muslim empire caused the abandonment of the initial prophetic spirit of Islam. Islam became *affirmative*, in that it became worldly and invested in the status quo and in doing so relinquished its inherent *negativity*: its critique of the unjust world

as it is. The division between affirmation and negation within religion would later become the dominant theme in his work *Religion* vs. *Religion.*

For Abū Dharr, the Islam of the Prophet Muhammad was constitutionally critical. Based in the central notion of *tawḥīd* (the "oneness of God"), Islam relentlessly called for justice in an unjust world; it demanded equality in an unequal society; it attempted to eradicate racism and tribalism; and it struggled against all forms of vice and corruption in governance. This was not the Islam of the Muslim ruling classes, who had become complacent in their opulent palaces since the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE). For Shariati, Abū Dharr followed in the footprints of the Prophet Muhammad, not as a prophet but as a revolutionary attempting to overthrow all conditions that debased humanity. As such, Abū Dharr was Islam's first "socialist" reformer – whose critique was forever the thorn in the side of the ruling class. Thus, in Abū Dharr, Shariati found a "universal revolutionary archetype" that he could personally follow (Dabashi 2011, p. 53). Abū Dharr was a socially committed Muslim who embodied all the progressive values of "authentic" Islam: "equality, fraternity, justice, and liberation" (Rahnema 2008, p. 213). Echoing the lessons his father taught him, Shariati's study of Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī convinced him that those progressive social values that he was initially attracted to in his studies of Western Leftist philosophy were in fact constitutional values, principles, and ideals of the Islam of the prophet. These revolutionary concepts were not made in the West and imported into Iran as the secular Marxist intellectuals tended to argue but were rather central tenets of the Islamic tradition that had been buried under the weight of Shi'a conservatism, clerical quietism, and the compromise of Islam with the monarchy, capitalism, and imperialism. The task of the responsible Muslim intellectual, Shariati thought, was to resurrect and reload these prophetic ideals in an attempt to revive the religion of the Prophet Muhammad and continue the struggle against all forms of oppression. Thus, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī remained Shariati's personal model for revolutionary praxis for the rest of his

life, and he continued to interpret Islam through the lenses of al-Ghifārī's radical critique of injustice. According to Rahnema, Shariati felt so close to the exemplar of Abū Dharr that he may have even believed himself to be some kind of "reincarnation" of him (2008, p. 214). Later, conservative clerics used Shariati's attachment to Abū Dharr as a source of ridicule, arguing that Abū Dharr was a "common thief" who only embraced Islam so he could share in the booty of conquest (Rahnema 2008, p. 214). Nevertheless, Abū Dharr remains today highly regarded, especially among the Shi'a.

The Mossadeq Years

While at the Teacher's Training College in Mashhad, he was a member of the God-Worshipping Socialists (*khudaparastan-i susialist*), a group of young men who espoused a modern Islamic nationalism that attempted to combine Islam with socialism and anti-imperialism. Outside of the classroom, Shariati's time in college was informative; it brought him into close contact with individuals from the lower classes, with whom he began to fully understand the real pain of poverty that was on the rise in Iran at the time. He also continued his routine of unconventional study, reading the works of both Islamic reformers, such as Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, as well as other Western thinkers. The ideas of the God-Worshipping Socialists were distributed through Shariati's writings in the Mashhad daily newspaper, *Khorasan*, which called for the rejection and removal of capitalism and Iranian feudalism while rooting their critiques in teachings of Prophet Muhammad and 'Ali ibn Abū Ṭālib – the first "legitimate" successor to Muhammad according to the Shi'a. The God-Worshipping Socialists' demands for a more just society contributed to the growing unrest with the Shah's regime, which had become increasingly rigid with its own population and deferential to British oil interests.

In 1951, the Shah appointed the Iranian Nationalist Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq as Prime Minister of the *Majlis* (Parliament) in an attempt to appease the growing unrest. Shariati supported Mossadeq's reforms, which included the 1952 *Land Reform Act* and which redistributed a portion of the land from the landlords to the tenets; factory owners were forced to pay employee benefits, including unemployment, and peasants were liberated from forced labor. The most controversial reform of Mossadeq was his nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, wherein Britain lost its control of the extraction, production, and distribution of Iranian oil. Considering the oil stolen, Britain removed all its oil workers, enforced a blockade of Iranian oil exports, and pressured the United National Security Council to intervene on its behalf. With these and other measures fully implemented, Iranian oil production came to a halt, thus depriving Mossadeq of the funds he needed to continue his domestic reforms.

Having grown tired of Mossadeq's nationalism and his move toward socialism, which drew him further into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, the British and the Americans hatched a plan to overthrow Mossadeq in a coup d'état. This was orchestrated by the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his younger brother, Allen Dulles, who was then the director of the CIA. "Operation Ajax," the plot to remove Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, was approved of by President Eisenhower and directed in Tehran by Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of US President Theodore Roosevelt. Conspiring with anti-Mossadeq elements of the government, conservative clerics, and the Shah, who had left Iran for the safety of Rome, Prime Minister Mossadeq was removed from office on August 19, 1953. On August 22, the Shah returned from his temporary exile and resumed power; this time he was massively supported by Britain and the United States, who in return received the near-exclusive rights to develop Iran's oil. While numerous individuals in Mossadeq's government were tortured and executed, the former Prime Minister's life was spared; he lived under house arrest in Ahmadabad until his death in 1967.

Shariati's support for Mossadeq's nationalism and socialism never waned, and his removal from

power weighed heavily on him. Earlier in 1953, he had become a member of the Mossadeq's National Front and fully supported the socialist reforms that had been implemented. The coup d'état cemented in Shariati's mind the evils of the "trinity": the United States, the Pahlavi monarchy, and the conservative clerics, the latter of the two having sacrificed Islam for their own personal gain (Rahnema 2008, p. 216). Due to this interjection of imperial power and its alliance with reactionary religion, revolutionary Marxism, which condemned both imperialism and religion, continued to rise among the politicized youth. Being a part of this resistance movement, Shariati "coined and popularized" the catchphrase in Persian, *Zar-o Zoor-o Tazvir*, the "evil trinity" of "wealth, coercion and deceit" (Rahnema 2008, p. 216). This short phrase encapsulated the growing critique of the entrenched power of capitalism (wealth), the Shah, the ruling class, the imperialists (coercion), and the conservative Shi'a clerics that legitimated the unjust and tyrannical conditions (deceit) (Jackson 2006, p. 223).

As Shariati continued his engagement in political actions opposing the "evil trinity," mostly through demonstrations and writing for newspapers, he also continued his formal studies. In 1954, he passed his examination and received his diploma in literature. Soon after, he entered the University of Mashhad where he continued to study Arabic and French as well as Western thought, laying down the foundations for his progressive, modernist, and revolutionary interpretation of Islam, one that was more applicable to the turbulent events that had happened in the years prior (Abrahamian 1988, p. 291). As a member of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), he, as well as his father, was continually harassed by the Shah's government, and both were briefly arrested and imprisoned in 1957. In July of 1958, he married Pouran-i Shariat Razavi and in 1960 received his bachelor's degree in Persian literature. Seeing promise in this young scholar, Shariati was awarded a scholarship to study abroad at the Sorbonne in Paris. This began, in the words of Hamid Algar (2001), the "second formative period" in Shariati's life (p. 88).

The Paris Years (1960–1964)

Upon arrival in France, the provincial young scholar quickly suffered culture shock. Paris in the early 1960s both repelled him and fascinated him. Socially, he was appalled by the level of libertine decadence, with its sexual licentiousness, alcoholism, gambling, and devious nightlife. The secular society of Paris was a free and open society, one that was detached from any traditional moral systems closely associated with Abrahamic religions. For Shariati, conspicuous consumption and the relentless pursuit of pleasure attempted to fill the void where religion once stood, but it was a poor substitute. In his view, it made Parisians amoral, shallow, and hedonistic. Additionally, according to Rahnema (2008), Shariati saw Europe as a "pitiless iron monster," prepared to "swallow everyone despite their different cultures and identities" (p. 218). He witnessed how the great democratic amalgamation of cultures in cosmopolitan Paris led to the death of traditional beliefs and moral systems, creating a new kind of man that was neither Western nor of Eastern; he was a one-dimensional creature of Western capitalist modernity. On the other hand, Shariati found his time in Paris enlightening. He was drawn to the various world-class educational institutions, the scholars that animated them, and the dissident academic climate that filled the air in the local coffee houses. Shariati would later write how indebted he was to his French professors for his academic enlightenment. Although he was already well-read for a young Iranian, these mainly Christian or atheist scholars challenged him to think beyond the confines of his intellectual provincialism. While remaining committed to his Shi'a convictions, Shariati began to see ever more clearly the universality of truth; if a claim was true in a Western philosophical framework, it then must also have validity within an Islamic framework, especially as it pertained to the conditions and nature of humanity. His discovery of truth both in Western thought and Shi'a Islam reinforced the education he received from his father and his work as a God-Worshipping Socialist and pro-Mossadeq activist.

While studying sociology and literature in Paris, Shariati came under the spell of a variety of social thinkers, whom he later called "idols," including the famed French Islamologist, Louis Massignon, who Shariati believed taught him the skills of inner critique or the ability to remain devoted to his Islamic faith while simultaneously being critical of it. The Christian mystic Massignon, according to Rahnema, served as Shariati's "Western substitute" for the poet and mystic Mawlānā Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī, who was central to his spiritual formation back in Iran. Indeed, he likened his meeting to Massignon to Rūmī's meeting of his spiritual master, Shams-i-Tabrīzī, the wandering dervish that sparked Rumi's spiritual genius. Without the influence of the Catholic Massignon, Shariati believed he would have remained trapped in his "impoverished spirit, mediocre mind and stale vision" (Rahnema 2000, p. 121). From 1960 to 1962, Shariati served as Massignon's research assistant and developed a near-religious adoration of the senior scholar. According to Shariati's biographer, Ali Rahnema, the budding Iranian scholar's presence rekindled Massignon's Catholic faith, and Massignon's mystical and gnostic influence on Shariati allow him to overcome his own religious doubts (Rahnema 2000, pp. 122–123). Furthermore, Massignon's belief that all adherents to the Abrahamic religions were bonded in a fraternal unity greatly affected Shariati's views on Judaism and Christianity. Indeed, under the influence of Massignon, Shariati became religiously ecumenical. He believed that the prophet Abraham was the central axis point of the three faiths. Shariati even gave Abraham's iconoclasm a new meaning: following his example, especially when Abraham destroyed his father's idols, Shariati believed it was the role of the three Abrahamic faiths to destroy the idols of the modern world – the domination of the ruling class, social injustice, and economic inequality. The influence of Massignon, the Orientalist Catholic and spiritual guru of Shariati, can be seen throughout Shariati's later works.

After Massignon, Shariati became engrossed in the thought of George Gurvitch, a sociology professor at the Sorbonne who Shariati discovered was a Jewish-Russian émigré who fled Stalin's Soviet Union. A staunch supporter of Algerian independence, Shariati found in Gurvitch another model for being a professional intellectual and a social justice activist. Being captivated by Gurvitch's thought, in a defiant letter home to his father, Shariati even remarked that the Jewish ex-communist Gurvitch embodied the essence of Shi'ism more closely than Iran's senior clerics, who never sacrificed anything for their beliefs (Rahnema 2000, p. 123). Thus, the Jewish scholar who fought for social justice embodied the qualities of *tawḥīd* (radical monotheism), while the reactionary and "quietest" Shi'a clerics legitimized the rule of the polytheist (*shirk*) Pahlavi monarchy, thus betraying the essence of Islam. Shariati benefited greatly from Gurvitch's expansive knowledge of Marxism. It was in his time with Gurvitch that he began to understand Marx's philosophy from within, and in doing so, was able to critique Marx's deficiencies as well as appropriate those aspects of Marxism that ringed true. Many of Gurvitch's critiques of Marx, especially his materialist definition of class, would later end up in Shariati's public lectures, some of which were published by the Shah as a way of undermining Shariati's appeal to left-wing Iranian students (Algar in Shariati 1980, pp. 13–14). Nevertheless, it was during Shariati's time with Gurvitch that he studied Marxism and was able to rescue certain elements of dialectical materialism that remained a fundamental part of his sociology of religion.

When one reads Shariati, one is often struck by the creative ways he interprets both Western and Islamic terms. Words that were once seen as the domain of conservative religion and politics are reinvented, reloaded with new symbolic meaning, and redeployed in the struggle against oppression and imperialism. Although he was always philosophically eclectic, this practice of salvaging and transforming stale concepts came from Shariati's brief engagement with the French Islamologist Jacques Berque, and his *degrée de signification* method, wherein the essential meaning of a word is identified, liberated from its formalism and

traditionalism, and radically reignited. Rahnema (2000) explained this phenomenon in this way: "words could thus be transformed from passive means for idle chatter and tools of stupefaction into instruments for socio-political change. Berque had ignited something in Shariati. He took each commonly used term in the vocabulary of every Muslim and reinterpreted it until gentle lullabies became electric currents" (p. 126). Shariati became an expert in using Western philosophy to reclaim the original radical impulse of the Islamic lexicon; it was as if traditional Islamic verbiage became impregnated with a new revolutionary spirit. Many of his reclaimed words and phrases would end up linguistically defining the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. Much of his radicalized vocabulary was appropriated and furthered by the religious leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, who, although he never publically admitted it, knew he owed much of his revolutionary rhetoric to Ali Shariati. For example, it was Shariati who transformed the otherwise somber Shi'a holiday of "Āshūrā," which marks the assassination of Imam Hossein ibn "Alī in Karbalā," Iraq, into a revolutionary slogan, propelling the masses to follow Hossein's revolutionary example and rebel against unjust authority: "Every day is 'Āshūrā', every land is Karbalā'."

While in Paris, Shariati participated and worked closely with many Algerian Independence groups and their leaders in exile and contributed numerous articles to their French language publications. In the course of these involvements, he became an avid reader of Frantz Fanon, the Martinique revolutionary psychiatrist and author of the 1952 book *Les Damnés de la terre* (*The Wretched of the Earth*), which was a major influence throughout the Third World liberation movement. Fanon's work, especially his earlier book *Peau noire, masques blancs* (*Black Skin, White Masks*), gave Shariati a framework for understanding the psychological alienation brought about by Western imperialism and how such alienation contributes to the domination of the West over the rest (Algar 2001, p. 89). Despite the fact that Fanon was thoroughly secular, his works pressed upon Shariati the need for colonized peoples to reject their blind mimicry of the

West, embrace their own cultural resources, and create a new revolutionary identity out of the old that is both appropriate for modernity and capable of resisting the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of the colonizing nations. This task, Fanon insisted, and Shariati agreed, may include revolutionary violence (Fanon 1963, pp. 35–106). Most importantly, Shariati's engagement with the work of Fanon instilled in him the imperative for international solidarity that the colonized nations of the world, despite their cultural, religious, and linguistic differences, had to ban together in one anti-imperialist front. Along with three other Algerian sympathizers, Shariati began to translate Fanon's *Les Damnés de la terre* into Persian as *Mostazafin-i Zamin*. It was later published entirely under his name. Although Shariati invited Fanon to write a preface for his Persian translation of Fanon's 1959 book *L'An V de la Révolution Algérienne* (*Five Years of the Algerian War*), later published in English as *A Dying Colonialism*, such a preface never happened. However, there were three letters exchanged between the two men, wherein they discuss what is expected of an "authentic intellectual" and the role of religion in the struggle to emancipate the colonized Third World (Rahnema 2000, p. 127; Fanon 2018, pp. 667–669). After lamenting the divisiveness sectarianism brings into the global struggle against Western imperialism, Fanon writes to Shariati, "although my path diverges from, and is even opposed to, yours, I am persuaded that both paths will ultimately join up toward that destination where humanity lives well" (Fanon 2018, p. 669). Despite their disagreements of the nature of religion and its potential to contribute to revolutionary change, both men agreed upon the ultimate destiny: the destruction of imperialism and the creation of nation-states free from foreign domination.

While finding a home in the intellectual milieu of Paris' left-wing philosophers, sociologists, and exiled revolutionaries, Shariati absorbed the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, which filled the air of the early 1960s Paris. Sartre's attempts to reconcile Marxism with existentialism greatly impressed Shariati, as it demonstrated the fruitfulness of philosophical cross-pollination, as well as

the usefulness of Marx's class analysis. Sartre's philosophy, which argued that man is "condemned to be free," challenged Shariati to live an authentic life, taking full control of his destiny and full responsibility for its subsequent consequences. While he elevated Sartre's existentialism to the level of importance with socialism and Islam, he did not agree with the assumed foundations of Sartre's philosophy: materialism and atheism (Rahnema 2000, p. 127). Rather, Shariati insisted that man needed a moral and ethical guide, one that pronounced realistic absolutes. The relativism that animated Sartre's merely formal ethics would not lead to man's individual emancipation, but rather it would further his enslavement to his own desires. God, for Shariati, must ultimately determine what is right and wrong, not the "common sense" (*bon sens*) of individuals, as Sartre believed (Rahnema 2000, pp. 127–128). Nevertheless, according to the Iranian scholar Hamid Dabashi, it was through Shariati's combination of Frantz Fanon's anti-colonialism and his own interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism that he "championed the ideal of an autonomous and independent person fully in charge of history," and in doing so, became a real threat to both the "Pahlavi monarchy and the Shi'i clerical establishment" (Dabashi 2011, p. 269). Furthermore, the ongoing translation of the revolutionary ideas he acquired in Paris into Islamic concepts made him all the more a threat to the monarchical and clerical establishment, for he represented an alternative *Islamic* authority, one that reclaimed the charismatic and prophetic spark of primordial Islam, before it was routinized and institutionalized by the clerics. As such, his form of Islamic intellectualism avoided the pitfalls of the "assimilated intellectual," who knew all the latest philosophies of the West but couldn't relate to their own native culture nor the Iranian masses, and it avoided the reactionary quietism of the traditional Shi'i *'Ulamā'*. In addition to his own theoretical work, he had become convinced of the need for a revolutionary vanguard in Iran (Rahnema 2008, p. 224). Based on Régis Debray and Che Guevara's *Foco Theory*, which was born out of the guerilla experience of the Cuban Revolution on 1959, such a small cadre of highly trained revolutionaries and intellectuals would initiate and lead the nation in

revolt against the corrupt regime. Understanding the threat that Shariati's call for revolution posed, the monarchy waited patiently for the prodigal son to return home.

The Revolutionary Scholar Returns Home (1964–1977)

In 1964, with his Ph.D. (in literature) in hand, Shariati was immediately arrested and imprisoned upon entering Iran for his subversive activities in France. After being detained in Azerbaijan, he was later transferred to Qezel Qal'eh prison near Tehran, in which he spent 1.5 months. For Hamid Algar (2001), Shariati was not a "dangerous opponent" of the Shah's regime for the normal reasons, but rather the monarch took notice of him "because of the role of leadership that he had exerted" and because of the "intellectual dimension" of his radical thought. Such thought, Algar states, "transcended the normal agitation and concentration on demonstrations and shouting of slogans that was current among the Iranian opposition abroad" (2001, p. 90).

Upon release, Shariati moved his family back to Mashhad in search of a university appointment (Rahnema 2008, p. 225). The first 3 years back Iran were disappointing to him; he could only find employment teaching in a variety of high schools. While he continued to develop his revolutionary form of Shi'i Islam, he found that the audiences he had access to outside of a university setting were ill equipped to understand his analyses. Being away from Paris, the center of revolutionary intellectualism, was depressing, and he missed the stimulation of being in the center of it all. He kept himself busy translating Louis Massignon's book on Salmān al-Fārsī (Solomon the Persian), who was a compassion of Prophet Muhammad, and wrote his literary biography, *Kavīr* (*The Desert*), which spelled out his personal mission to liberate all the *wretched* of his country (Rahnema 2008, p. 227).

In 1967, Shariati was offered a position in the sociology department at the University of Mashhad (Algar 2001, p. 90). In an atmosphere of mediocrity, his genius for synthesizing both

Islamic and Western ideas was on full display. His lectures were well attended, as the students were attracted to his knowledge of the West and the fact that he didn't disparage Iranian culture and Islam as so many other Western educated intellectuals did. In fact, he made it clear that his form of sociology wasn't "value-free," but rather was rooted in Islam and emancipatory thought, and was committed to reforming Iranian society (Algar 2001, p. 91). This was a formative period of Shariati's thought, as it gave him access to students who were both yearning for political change and concerned with the loss of authentic Iranian culture. Shariati stressed to his student the need for political-economic change in Iran, as well the need to return to Islam and a God-centered way of life. He argued that the young revolutionaries committed to undermining the status quo could not do so from a foreign perspective, but rather must root themselves in their own traditional Shi'i resources, as it would be through those religious resources that progress in society would occur. In other words, the "foreignness" of a Western, especially Marxian, analysis would limit an understanding of such an analysis to the intellectual class. However, to make the same analysis through Islamic terms would deliver the message to the entire Iranian population. What was needed was an "Islamization" of the analysis, and for that the students needed to return to their own culture. In this process, the quietism, conservativism, and reactionary nature of the Shi'i clerics would have to be challenged and eventually purged so that the revolutionary nature of Islam could be rescued and restored.

In pursuit of his consciousness raising goals, Shariati published one of his most important books in 1969: *Eslamshenasi* (*Islamology*). Based on his lectures at the University of Mashhad, in book Shariati first takes aim at the "assimilated intellectuals," charging them with being incapable of thought independent of their Western models, thus abandoning their Islamic, Iranian, and Shi'i roots. Based in his reading of authoritative sources of Shi'i Islam, the Qur'an, Sunnah (example) of Prophet Muhammad, the teachings of the Shi'i Imams, as well as the example of the first "four rightly guided Caliphs" (*al-Khulafā'u*

ar-Rāshidūn), Shariati argued that *Eslamshenasi* served a tripartite purpose: (1) it argued for an modern Islam that paradoxically returned to its egalitarian and democratic roots; (2) it identified the barriers to reclaiming the original revolutionary spirit of Islam, including monarchy and the *'Ulamā'*, and (3) it forwarded the idea that it was an obligation of all true believers to struggle against the ills of modernity in the name of Islam's radical anti-idolatry monotheism (*Tawḥīd*) (Rahnema 2008, pp. 229–230). Furthermore, Shariati distinguished between two forms of Islam; the first is affirmative in nature, in that it is institutionalized and invested in the status quo; the second is negative in nature: it displays a dynamism that is critical of the status quo, which corresponds with the original emancipatory and liberational geist of Muhammad's religion. According to Rahnema, this recharging of Islam with its original negativity created many enemies for Shariati among the conservative Shi'i clerics (Rahnema 2008, p. 233). He cites Shaykh Muhammad-Ali Ansari as writing, "We warn the Royal government of Iran, the Iranian people and the Iranian clergy that during the past 1,000 years, the history of Islam and Shi'ite Islam has never encountered a more dangerous, dreadful and bolder enemy than Ali Shariati" (Rahnema 2008, p. 233). Islam, for Shariati, had to be wrenched away from its conservative caretakers, who used it for the purpose of social statics. He believed that it must be returned to the people in order for it to once again be a source of social dynamics and radical change. Creating a cleavage between the conservative clerical establishment and Shi'i Islam was one of Shariati's main goals, and with the publication of *Eslamshenasi*, those clerics began to take notice of that growing cleavage.

In June of 1971, Shariati was released from his position at the University of Mashhad, and was sent to Tehran, the capital of Iran. Once there, he became a fixture at the Hosseiniyeh Ershād, a nontraditionalist religious institute that was established by the Iranian politician Nasser Minachi, and dedicated to actively changing Iran's state of affairs (Algar 2001, p. 91). Shariati believed that the Hosseiniyeh Ershād could become the spiritual center for his kind of

modernist Islam. He frequently gave lectures there on a variety of topics, most of which were infused with the ideas he wrote about in *Eslamshenasi*. This was an especially formative time in Shariati's life, as his condemnation of the Shah and the clerical establishment was juxtaposed to the height of the Shah's arrogant rule. While the masses were grumbling, struggling under the weight of increased poverty, Westernization, the repression of the Shah's secret police (SAVAK), as well as the disastrous effects of the Shah's pro-Western reforms he dubbed the "White Revolution" (*Enqelāb-i Sefīd*), the Shah was being praised on the international stage for his management of Iran – the "island of stability" as the US President Jimmy Carter called it in 1977 (M.R.P. Shah 1967). Furthermore, the Shah never wasted a chance to praise the pre-Islamic Persian Empire, reminding his people that he and his regime were the inheritors of that glorious past. Iran, which had been a thoroughly Shi'i country for hundreds of years, saw little use for the legacy of the Persian Empire outside of a historical appreciation. Thus, as the Shah became more and more distant from the religious life and culture of the Iranian people, powerful forces were on the move, including Ali Shariati and his appeal to younger, disaffected, yet politically active Iranians, as well as the growing influence of the radical cleric Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been expelled from Iran in 1964 by the Shah because of his critiques of the Pahlavi regime. It was at the Hosseiniyah Ershād that many of Shariati's most important lectures were transcribed and published in book form or disseminated by mimeograph, similar to Ayatollah Khomeini's speeches made during his exile from Iran (Keddie 1981, p. 216).

Shariati's tendency for binary thinking, which according to Hamid Algar is a by-product of his study of Marxism, appeared once again in his November, 1971, speech, "The Responsibility of being a Shi'a," wherein he distinguished between the "'Alawī Shi'a," who were the true followers of Imam 'Ali ibn Abū Ṭālib, and the "Safavid Shi'a," those who institutionalized Islam and made it into an ideology for the ruling class and an opium religion for the masses. In Shariati's time, those who followed the Shah, whom he believed to be a

modern incarnation of Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiya (647–683 CE), the murderer of Hossein ibn 'Ali (the prophet's grandson and third Shi'a Caliph), were the Safavid Shi'a *par excellence.* They had abandoned the true Islam of the poor, the broken, and the oppressed, for the Islam of the wealthy, the powerful, and the rulers (Rahnema 2008, p. 236; Algar 2001, p. 89; Keddie 1981, pp. 217–218). Although he had already rejected Che Guevara's *Foco Theory* of guerilla warfare as unsuitable for Iran, Shariati began to openly call for the removal of the Shah through a mass revolt of the people. Armed struggle, in the manner of 'Ali ibn Abū Ṭālib and Hossein ibn 'Ali, was the responsibility of every true believer, not just a small intellectual cadre, Shariati claimed. Martyrdom in the cause of justice was not to be rejected, but to be embraced, just as it was for the central figures in Shi'a Islam, who became the models for revolutionary Islamic praxis in Shariati's reading. Because of his open hostility toward the Shah's regime, the open calls for its removal, and the frequent street battles that Shariati's followers were involved in, the Hosseiniyah Ershād was forcibly closed down in 1972 (or 1973 depending on the source). Additionally, some of the highest ranking clerics wrote books attacking Shariati's "misleading and deceiving" interpretations of Islam (Rahnema 2008, p. 237). With the urging of these and many other senior clerics, Shariati's works were confiscated and banned, although they continued to circulate both in Iran and abroad (Jackson 2006, p. 224; Keddie 1981, p. 223). His life being continually threatened, Shariati attempted to evade SAVAK by going into self-imposed hiding. However, after the arrests of his family members, including his father, were used as leverage against him, he eventually surrendered in September of 1973. He was imprisoned for 18 months in Komiteh prison, spending most of that time in solitary confinement.

Refusing to publically recant his anti-Shah, anticleric, and anti-imperialist positions, the Shah's regime resurrected one of Shariati's old lectures (1967) entitled *Ensan*, *Eslam*, *va Maqrebzamin* (*Man*, *Islam*, *and Western Schools of Thought*), in which Shariati condemned Marxism and other revolutionary

political philosophies as being incompatible with Islam and published it in the newspaper *Keyhan*, giving the impression that Shariati had rejected his radical thought while in prison (Rahnema 2008, p. 239). Although he did criticize Marxism for reducing mankind to a mere units of production, Shariati never rejected all aspects of Marxism, nor did he change his mind about the Shah while imprisoned. He remained steadfast in his demand for the overthrow of the Peacock Throne. Additionally, he did not view Marxism as a being an ideological threat to Islam, rather it was a secular competitor, since both were inherently anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-capitalist. It was *limited* due to its lack of what he thought were humanistic values, as well as its dogmatic anti-religious stance, but in its class analysis, Marxism was at its core truthful (Jackson 2006, p. 224).

From when he was released in March of 1975, to when he fled Iran in May 1977, Shariati lived a life of isolation. While the revolt against the Shah was increasingly growing, so too was the stature of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was still influencing much of the Shah's opposition from his exile in Najaf, Iraq, and in doing so becoming the unofficial leader of the coming revolution. Through his students and associates in Iran, Khomeini, who had also criticized the apolitical stance of clerical "quietism," had come into contact with Shariati's work, which later proved to be quite influential on the senior Ayatollah. Meanwhile, Shariati's influence was still growing despite the fact that he was effectively barred from participating actively in the protests and demonstrations. Nevertheless, his writings at the time reflected his isolation, as he became more introspective, examining both love and mysticism as aspects within the sociopolitical realm (Rahnema 2008, p. 241). During this time, he laid down his definitive philosophy of religion, which condemned capitalism and the bourgeois values that it exports around the world, as well as the imperial powers that impose such social arrangements of less powerful nations. In opposition to the liberal world order, he argued for a just society, an ideal society, which is defined by a form of Islamic socialism predicated on a true and devout devotion to God (Rahnema 2008, p. 242).

Exile and Death (1977)

Without the permission from the Shah's government, on May 16, 1977, Shariati fled Iran for the safety of London. Alerted of his absence, the SAVAK arrested his wife Pouran and their 6-year-old daughter Mona but allowed their two older daughters, Soosan and Sara, to fly to London unaccompanied. Shariati, wracked by fear of what the SAVAK would do to his wife and children, retrieved his two daughters at Heathrow, but could not spend much time with them: his body was found dead the next morning, June 19, 1977 (Keddie 1981, p. 216). While the official cause of death was determined to be the result of a heart attack, many believe that Shariati's mysterious and sudden death came at the hands of SAVAK, which had a long reach outside of Iran. Although the Shah denied it, very few of Shariati's closest associates believed that this committed enemy of imperialism, at the age of 43, wasn't murdered upon the order of the Shah. Because he died a believing Muslim within a just struggle against tyranny, he was bestowed the title "martyr" (*shahīd*) by the Iranian people (Algar 2001, p. 93). Nevertheless, Shariati's body was not returned home to Iran but rather was flown to Damascus, where he was buried within the compound of Sayyīdah Zaynab Mosque, close to the tomb of Zaynab, the daughter of 'Ali and the Prophet Muhammad's granddaughter. The shrine/mosque complex is the center of Shi'a religious studies in Syria and is a pilgrimage site for Shi'i and Iranian pilgrims. Although he was removed from being an active agent in the fall of the Shah and the ousting of the United States in Iran, his works, especially the revolutionary spirit that he infused into traditional Islamic vocabulary, continued on until the overthrow of the Shah in January of 1979 (Jackson 2006, p. 226). According to Nikki R. Keddie, after the death of Shariati, his books were "sold everywhere, by the hundreds of thousands," not only in the capital of Tehran but also in the holy city of Qum, as well as Mashhad, where he spent much of his life (Keddie 1981, p. 223). Even in the small provincial villages that didn't have bookstores, one could find copies of Shariati's books, as he had grown into a

"mythical figure of militant Islam," martyred for the liberation of his people (Keddie 1981, p. 223).

Major Themes of Ali Shariati's Anti-Imperialist Sociology of Religion

When one reads Shariati, one has to bear in mind that he is dedicated to two revolutions: the first is the rebirth of Shi'a Islam as a transformative force within the modern world. Second, he is dedicated to the overthrow of the Shah and removal of the imperial power of the United States in Iran's affairs. Academically, Ali Shariati is best known as a sociologist of religion. Although he was not trained in any of Iran's prestigious seminaries, some scholars, including John Esposito, believe that Shariati is best understood as an Islamic liberation theologian (Shariati 1986, p. xi). Drawing from many different sources, his theoretical analyses of various religious phenomena were eclectic, and for that he was often criticized by traditional Shi'i authorities for his use outside sources, including Sunni jurisprudence and Western philosophy. Although his work was expansive, there are a few distinct themes that run throughout Shariati's work that are key to understanding his overall sociology of religion and how it pertains to his involvement in Iran's revolution.

In a series of lectures entitled *Religion* versus *Religion* (*Mazhab 'Alyhi Mazhab*), Shariati demonstrates the dialectical nature of the historical religions. Similar to Marx's claim about class struggle, Shariati argues that all of history is a history of religious warfare, wherein one form of religion opposes another, and in a Hegelian sense, one determinately negates (*aufhaben*) the other. In order to illustrate this claim, Shariati reminds us that the Arabic word "*kāfir*," which is generally translated as "atheist" or "non-believer," came into the Islamic lexicon in seventh-century Arabia, when there was no such thing as a non-religious society or individual; all individuals believed in some form of divinity, as atheism is a modern phenomenon. Thus, the struggle between the believers and the *kāfirūn* (disbelievers) is not between religious voices and atheists, but rather between religious voices and other religious

voices; it is between the religion of *tawḥīd* (radical monotheism) against the religion of *shirk*, the Arabic term for polytheism, or what Shariati says is the "enslavement of humanity in bondage to the idols," whatever those idols may be within a given time and place (Shariati 2003, p. 30). On the face of it, it would seem that his tendency for binary thinking has pitted one religion against another. On closer look, Shariati's view is more sectarian and interreligious. He argues the following:

> Two basic religions have existed in history, two groups, two fronts. One front has been oppressive, an enemy of progress, truth, justice, the freedom of people, development and civilization. This front which has been to legitimate greed and deviated instincts and to establish its domination over the people and to abase others was itself a religion, not disbelief or non-religion. And the other front was that of the rightful religion and it was revealed to destroy the opposite front. (Shariati 2003, p. 61)

Shariati maintains that these "two basic religions" are essentially two basic forms that can be found *within* the same religion. One form is *affirmative*, in that it invests itself into the status quo; it is worldly; it rejects revolution; it is "priestly" in that it's authority is routinized; it justifies and helps maintain the social structure as it is: it is the religion of the ruling class. In the hands of the masses, such an affirmative religion is what Marx says religion is: opium (Byrd 2018, pp. 118–120; Shariati 2003, p. 35). In their opiated condition, Shariati states that "people surrender to their abjectness, difficulties, wretchedness and ignorance, surrender to the static situation which they are obliged to have, surrender to the disgraceful fate which they and their ancestors were obliged to have and still have – an inner, ideological surrender" (Shariati 2003, p. 35). In light of this form of ruling-class religion, Shariati argues for a different kind of Islam, one with an active social conscience. In his *Eslamshenasi*, he states that

> It is not enough to say we must return to Islam. We must specify which Islam: that of Abu Zarr [Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī] or that of Marwan the Ruler. Both are called Islamic, but there is a huge difference between them. One is the Islam of the caliphate, of the palace, and of the rulers. The other is the Islam of the people, of the exploited, and of the poor. Moreover, it is not good enough to say that one should be "concerned" about the poor. The corrupt

caliphs said the same. True Islam is more than "concerned." It instructs the believer to fight for justice, equality, and elimination of poverty. (Shariati in Abrahamian 1988, p. 295)

The influence of Marx's class analysis is apparent in much of Shariati's work, although he was critical of the "vulgar Marxism" pushed by the Soviet Union and adopted by many anti-religion Iranian intellectuals.

Against the affirmative polytheistic form of religion is prophetic religion, which is inherently *negative*, as it is *contra mundum* (against the world as it is); it seeks revolutionary change; it maintains the recalcitrant spirit of the prophets; it is critical of the prevailing social structure, and it opposes all forms of opiate religion. For Shariati, the role of the true believer, who follows the oneness of God (*tawḥīd*), is to unveil the polytheism that hides behind the hijab of monotheism (Shariati 2003, p. 55). He writes, [the believer] "must be able to distinguish the religion of multitheism under the deceitful mask of monotheism and remove this covering of hypocrisy – whatever form it has taken – throughout the world" (Shariati 2003, p. 57). Therefore, Shariati believes that religion must be self-critical, willing to look within itself in order to purify itself of all reactionary, oppressive, and idolatrous pollutants, which he saw in the "quietest" clerics of Iran, who were unwilling to join their fellow Iranians in their struggle against the idolatrous Shah (Abrahamian 1988, pp. 295–296). For Shariati, the only way to be faithful to the emancipatory religion of Prophet Muhammad was to struggle against the modern idolatry created by reactionary clerics, capitalism, monarchy, and imperialism, which made false idols out of status, money, privilege, and power.

Debate continues as to how Shariati ultimately related to Western philosophy, especially Marxism, with some scholars, such as Hamid Algar, believing that Shariati studied Marxism ultimately to undermine it from within, whereas other scholars, such as Ervand Abrahamian, believing that Shariati "synthesiz[ed] modern socialism with traditional Shi'ism" (Abrahamian 1988, p. 289). Ali Gheissari argues that when Shariati invoked the term "Islam," he meant "Shi'ism combined with an eclectic synthesis of non-Muslim and non-Iranian ideas" (Gheissari 1998, p. 97). Despite the varying

opinions, an objective reading of Shariati's work cannot fail to see the large degree of influence that Marxism, neo-Marxism, and other forms of radical left-wing thought had on his understanding of Islam and his analyses of Iran and Western imperialism. The vocabulary of Karl Marx, Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, and Jean-Paul Sartre is ever-present in Shariati's books and speeches, although obscured by an Islamic veil. Although he deployed their concepts, he did not simply accept Western thought uncritically, but consciously discarded what he thought was untrue or was not applicable to Iran, while preserving what was truthful and applicable through a process of Islamization. According to Hamid Dabashi, Shariati "internalize[ed] and digest[ed] the revolutionary projects" of rival ideologies and in the process "Islamize[d] them" (Dabashi 2011, p. 273). In this sense, Shariati allowed the categories of Western emancipatory thought to enliven, enrich, and resurrect what he determined was the original revolutionary spirit of Islam, especially Shi'a Islam, which had gone dormant under the domination of the apolitical clerics, corrupt Islamic empires, and Western modernity. According to Dabashi, Shariati's creative engagement with "wider emancipatory movements" rescued Shi'ism from its "sectarian cul de sac," thus giving new life to old ideas (Dabashi 2011, p. 300). It is interesting to note that Western philosophy, especially political philosophy, has since its inception determinately negated religion, wherein certain religious ideas would be translated into secular political ideas. For example, the idea of Christian charity (*caritas*) became the basis for the welfare state, and the belief that all humans are created in the "image of God" (*Imago Dei*) became the basis of universal human rights. In the case of Shariati, the determinate negation went in the other direction: secular philosophy was translated into religion, which was more appropriate for the still-religious country of Iran in the 1970s.

Shariati's attempt to revivify (*tajdīd*) Shi'a Islam distinguishes him from other Third World revolutionaries, who followed more closely Marx's arguments about religion being a barrier to political emancipation. For example, Shariati disagreed with Frantz Fanon's position that in order for a people to emancipate themselves

from their colonial masters, they must abandon their religious identity, as such identity is inherently reactionary and divisive. Shariati argued that oppressed peoples must rediscover and return to their cultural roots, their cultural identities, and their inherited religions, as such authentic resources would be the basis of resistance to Western cultural, political, and economic hegemony (Abrahamian 1988, p. 291). Psychologically, they must define who they are, and regain their "sense of belonging" (*ta'assob*), or they will be defined by the West (Gheissari 1998, pp. 99–100). If they have no independent sense of self, and their identity is fractured or ill-defined, they have no capacity to resist how the West will define them according to their self-interests. Shariati was especially concerned that the Iranian intelligentsia (*rushanfekran*) return to their cultural roots, as it was the role of the intellectuals to guide the masses to their emancipation (Abrahamian 1988, p. 292; Byrd 2018). They're uncritical "assimilation" to Western standards was a precondition for a successful Western takeover of the Third World.

While Shariati's work did influence numerous Iranian intellectuals, the most important person it influenced was Ayatollah Khomeini, the radical Shi'a cleric who would eventually come to lead the Iranian revolution from his exile. While he did not discount the role that the Shi'a clerics *could* have in the Iranian revolution, he did not expect that one would become its unquestioned leader. As can be witnessed in his fiery speeches, Khomeini learned a lot from the nonclerical "liberation theologian," who was just as critical of the quietism of the clergy as Khomeini was. Not only did Khomeini resists his fellow clerics' demand that Shariati be condemned on the account that he distorted the Shi'a tradition, according to Abrahamian, Khomeini himself began to adopt the class-consciousness-infused language that Shariati had Islamized (Abrahamian 1993, p. 47; Moin 1999). Abrahamian writes that under the influence of Shariati, Khomeini

> depicted society as formed of two antagonistic classes (*tabaqat*): the oppressed (*mostazafin*) and the oppressors (*mostakberin*). In the past, Khomeini had rarely used the term mostazafin, and when he had, it had been in the Koranic sense of "the meek,"

"the humble," and "the weak." He now used it to mean the angry "oppressed masses," a meaning it had acquired in the early 1960s when Shariati and his disciples translated Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* as *Mostazafin-e Zamin* (Abrahamian 1993, p. 47).

The clear parallels to Marx's ruling class and the proletariat are evident in this and many more of Khomeini's public announcements. A class analysis, as opposed to a sectarian analysis, saturated Khomeini's anti-Shah lectures and speeches, in which he used the precise terms that Shariati devised. However, Khomeini brought clerical authority to the language and analysis, whereas Shariati forwarded a nonclerical "reformist" type of prophetic authority. With Khomeini, Shariati's "eclectic synthesis" of Western philosophy and Shi'ism penetrated and radicalized many traditional clerics, who were willing to following Khomeini's lead against the Shah where they resisted following the layman Shariati, who, by virtue of his religious critique, trespassed upon their territory (Byrd 2011, pp. 98–102).

Conclusion

Although Ali Shariati is not well-known in the west, as his reputation was eclipsed by the revolutionary Shi'a cleric Ayatollah Khomeini, he was nevertheless one of the most influential intellectuals of the twentieth century. His thoughts and ideas, which were born both in the *dār al-Islam* (abode of Islam) and the west, animated one of the twentieth century's most impactful revolutions. However, the form of Islamic radicalism he forwarded was, like his reputation, eclipsed by the theocratic regime that followed the 1979 Revolution. His "Islamic socialism" gave expression to those who wanted to create an Islam that was both modern and committed to maintaining the radical truths of Islam. Today, his form of Islamic radicalism has unfortunately been overshadowed by the violent extremism of terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), who share very little of Ali Shariati's commitment to the Islamic values of peace (*salaam*) and justice (*'adl*). Unlike these

terrorist groups, Shariati represents a future-oriented remembrance of the primordial Islam, with the practical intent to rejuvenate (*tajdīd*) the original progressivity of the Islamic tradition, especially its commitment to the poor, the oppressed, and the discarded. Thus, Shariati's gaze at the past was always in service to the future. By fusing the concept of *tawḥīd* and social justice, which included his uncompromising opposition to imperialism, he embodied the original *contra mundum* spirit of Prophet Muhammad and his mission to overturn the injustices of his time and place. Ultimately, while Shariati may not be the figure whose image adorns the walls of Iran, his influence on a generation of revolutionary Iranians cannot be diminished nor forgotten.

Cross-References

▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
▶ Middle East: Socialism and Anti-imperialism
▶ Nationalisation
▶ Orientalism
▶ Pan-Arabism and Iran

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Amilcar Cabral

▶ Imperialism, Uneven Development, and Revolution: The Example of Amilcar Cabral

Amiri Baraka

▶ Baraka, Amiri (1934–2014)

Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa

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> The first Mandela was Jesus Christ. The Second was Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela. The third Nelson Mandela are the poor people of the world. (S'bu Zikode, a leader of Abahlali baseMjondolo, the South African shack dwellers movement, quoted in Gibson 2006, p. 12)

Synonyms

African nationalism; Emancipation; Imperialism; National democratic revolution; National liberation; Racial capitalism; Settler colonialism; White supremacy

Definition

"Anti-Apartheid, Anti-Capitalism, and Anti-Imperialism: Liberation in South Africa?"

The entry analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of three movement strategies to achieve liberation in South Africa. The core of anti-apartheid strategy was to unite forces to overcome the racist white domination of the Nationalist Party regime in power since 1948. The anti-capitalist strategy stressed the connection between apartheid's political and social discrimination with an underpinning capitalist exploitation, promoting independent working class organization and socialist objectives. The anti-imperialist strategy emphasized that apartheid was built on the foundation of African labor's super-exploitation that had been established by Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century, and that liberation has to overcome the continuing alliance between white capital and imperialism. Employing the political vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism, these competing strategies are articulated as distinct interpretations of the national democratic revolution in South Africa. These strategies have abiding consequences for diagnosing the process of transition and post-apartheid structural dynamics.

Introduction

On 16 August 2012, heavily armed South African police ambushed and hunted down striking mine workers. They killed 34 miners, wounded another 78, and then arrested a further 177 strikers, incredibly charging them with murder. The miners worked at Marikana platinum mine owned by British company Lonmin and were on strike for a living wage (Alexander et al. 2012). A tough hand had been called for by Cyril Ramaphosa, once a leader of the miners' union, but now a multi-millionaire and a Lonmin shareholder. The Marikana Massacre was a turning point, demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that the ANC government sides with big business against the workers.

Little over a year later, on 5 December 2013, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, the personification of dignified resistance to apartheid, and his country's first democratically elected president, died aged 94 years. The world's media recalled Mandela's role in leading the ANC liberation struggle, his

27 years in prison, and dwelt at length on the generosity of his spirit in the reconciliation with his former oppressors. Honoring a great man whom they had spent decades fighting was not simple hypocrisy; the international bourgeoisie let out a detectable collective sigh of relief that matters had not turned out worse.

To bracket the Marikana Massacre with Mandela's passing captures the deep ambiguities of contemporary South Africa, where apartheid has gone, but capitalism seems as entrenched as ever. What had the liberation struggled achieved? Where did it go wrong? What still needs to be done? Those who see Mandela as untouchable locate the problem as a post-Mandela degeneration in presidents Mbeki and Zuma. Others see the deal that Mandela struck as the source of the problem, delivering an end to apartheid but on terms that guaranteed private ownership of the means of production. In the early 1990s, the ANC leaders certainly felt faced with a stark choice between a pragmatic peace and revolutionary war. Was the ANC's strategy wrong, or was it just as far as it could get given the balance of forces?

This essay takes the long view on these questions, outlining a series of critical debates concerning the relations between apartheid, capitalism, and imperialism. We focus on the connections between theoretical perspectives and movement strategies, with special reference to the nexus between British imperialism and capitalism in South Africa. Our lens excludes as it magnifies; we do not cover vital related topics including especially the struggle experiences of the African masses, South Africa's occupation of Namibia, and wars against the Frontline States, the impact of the divestment movement led by African Americans, and the role of the US and international finance in apartheid's end game, all of which are needed for a rounded picture.

The theoretical perspectives considered are successively anti-imperialist, anti-apartheid, and anti-capitalist. The essay argues that a new synthesis of these perspectives is possible and necessary. The nub of the debate is the dominant, orthodox, communist strategy of transition summed up in the term "national democratic revolution." We will see "national democratic revolution" had two distinct versions rooted, ultimately, in distinct class interests, and that the concept needs to be rescued from the pro-bourgeois, orthodox communist version. The essay concludes that South Africa today is a particular case of neocolonial capitalism generating particular forms of resistance that involve fighting racism and imperialism on class terms.

South Africa and Theories of Imperialism

The conquest and domination of African peoples in Southern Africa feature in the classical Marxist theories of imperialism. Beyond the direct reportage and commentary by Hobson (1900, 1988/1902), the Marxists Hilferding (1981/1910), Luxemburg (2003/1913), and Lenin (1916a, b) all sought to build this history into a wider theoretical explanation. Between them, these authors address economic, social, and political aspects of the relation between Britain and South Africa. In general, this literature treats the relation as an archetype of modern world imperialism. Moving from the abstract to the concrete, in this section we will ask what did these theorists of imperialism from Middle and Eastern Europe learn from South Africa?

Starting with the most strictly economic approach, Hilferding concentrates on the reorganization of capital's corporate forms. He was involved in a simultaneous exposition and critique, a sustained dialogue between the categories of Marx's *Capital* and capitalism as it had evolved a generation later. Hilferding sets up a dialogue with *Capital*, especially volume 3, Part 5 on the division of profits, which he seeks to extend. Although he does not entirely lose sight of production, Hilferding leaves the labor process in the background. In the foreground are changes in the forms of capital as value-in-circulation, the creation of capital markets, the socialization of capital, futures markets, joint stock corporations, the stock exchange, and credit as capital that are still recognizable and of enormous significance today.

Hilferding fastens onto the significance of what Marx termed "fictitious capital," defined as a

property claim on future income (Hilferding 1981/1910, p. 597). He highlights that shares in joint stock companies are a form of fictitious capital, a capitalized claim on the future profits of the company, and so the turnover of these shares "is not a turnover of capital, but a sale and purchase of titles to income" and that "aside from the yield their price depends upon the rate of interest at which they are capitalized"; it is therefore "misleading to regard the price of a share as an aliquot part of industrial capital" (111). When shares are issued and sold for money, "one part of this money constitutes the promoter's profit … and drops out of circulation in this cycle. The other part is converted into productive capital and enters the cycle of industrial capital" (113). Hilferding's step forward is to identify the inversion of form, how the socialization of industrial capital is mediated through finance, and that this actually further disguises the source of profits. This is relevant because companies offering shares in South African gold mines were being launched on the London stock market, thousands of miles away from the site of production, and gave *both* the London banks and financiers like Cecil Rhodes enormous windfall "promoter profits."

Hilferding claimed that his study of "dividends as a distinct economic category" took the analysis of the corporation "considerably beyond" Marx's "brilliant sketch of the role of credit in capitalist production" (114–115). This opened the question that Lenin would make explicit: the character of changes in capitalism beyond those analyzed by Marx. Marx had already perceived in the capitalist joint stock company "a necessary point of transition towards the transformation of capital back into the property of the producers, though no longer as the private property of individual producers, but rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social property" (Marx 1981/1895, p. 568). For Marx, the socialization of capital showed the real possibility of a mode of production controlled by the associated producers, that is, socialism. Without directly refuting Marx's optimism, Hilferding's analysis registered that the joint stock company had actually become the vehicle for imperialist surplus profit. The potential for socialist transition that Marx foresaw in the form of socialized capital had turned in a reactionary direction. Hilferding highlighted the export of industrial capital in the production of raw materials, pointing out that price fluctuations and hence profit variability lead to a strong tendency to the formation of cartels in this sector. Capital investment in these new territories, he argued, "turns towards branches of production which can be sure of sales on the world market."

> Capitalist development in South Africa … is quite independent of the capacity of the South African market, since the principal branch of production, the working of the gold mines, has a practically unlimited market for its product, and depends only upon the natural conditions for increasing the exploitation of the gold mines and the availability of an adequate work force. (Hilferding 1981/1910, p. 317)

Hilferding did not delve into the racial colonial processes involved in procuring "an adequate work force," but he did mark a change in the role of certain colonies within capitalism as a whole, from commodity consumers to producers of surplus value.

Rosa Luxemburg gave a stirring critique of the racism and violence of colonial capitalism. Her *The Accumulation of Capital* has a chapter on capitalism's struggle against the peasant economy and takes South Africa as the major example. Luxemburg charted the dispossession of the original African peoples by the Boer farmers and then their ousting by the British mining interests. The history is excellent, but there is an issue with her theory. At its most general form, Luxemburg stated:

> Imperialism is the political expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of the non-capitalist environment. (2003/1913, p. 426)

While Luxemburg's framing is sensitive to the battles of first nations at the frontiers of expanding capitalism, it is incomplete as a theory of their incorporation as oppressed nations within the capitalist mode of production. She sees the mode of production of the conquered society as persisting in a subordinated relationship to the conquerors,

rather than a new synthesis of extended capitalist social relations that also changes the conqueror's mode of production (for elaboration of this idea, see Higginbottom 2011). A form of Luxemburg's argument has been influential in Wolpe's articulation of modes of production approach (see below).

Whereas Luxemburg's theory of imperialism emphasized that capitalism inherently requires sources of value from societies external to it, Lenin's theory is of a capitalism that has been *transformed in its expansion*. As did Luxemburg, Lenin ascribed great significance to the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, which he placed with the US war with Spain in 1898 as a historical turning point of global significance. In *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916a), Lenin argued that these two wars marked a new stage in which a handful of imperial powers fought each other in order to gain colonial possessions and that these wars served to *re*divide the world between them. Lenin acknowledged that he had learnt much from the "social reformer" Hobson's 1902 work based primarily on South Africa, describing it as "a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of imperialism." He saw those features most pronounced in Britain as a "rentier society" enjoying "superprofits," and the domination of finance that had sprung from the spectacular profits extracted from South Africa, India, the West Indies, and other colonies.

Most distinctive in Lenin's theory of imperialism is that it has a political side (imperialism as generalized and intensified national oppression) and an economic side (imperialism as monopoly capitalism, the domination of finance) which he did not have time to integrate with Marx's critical political economy. In contrast to Hilferding's detailed extension of the categories of volume 3 and Luxemburg's robust critique of volume 2, Lenin's "popular outline" on imperialism (1916a) does not reference back to *Capital*. He was more concerned to present the totality of contradictions, to connect the military conflict in Europe with the economics of imperialism. In this regard there is a greater theoretical leap with Lenin than with his contemporaries, and because not all the conceptual mediations were filled in, perhaps a leap of faith *by Lenin* that he had applied

Marx's spirit of revolutionary dialectics to the new reality (Anderson 1995).

What Lenin did achieve was the filling out of his concept of modern imperialism as a new stage of capitalism to encompass a fresh look at social class relations. He was especially concerned to chart the social roots of "opportunism" in Europe, the tendency to reconciliation with the ruling class even as it engaged in imperialist oppression and war. In the rich countries, the working class had become more differentiated, with an upper stratum merging with the petit bourgeoisie that was socially corrupted and bound to the benefits of imperialism, a "labor aristocracy" that for material as well as ideological reasons backed its own state in the war. Although imperialism had created a split in the working class, resistance had at the same time created the possibility for unity of workers in oppressor and oppressed nations on the political basis of support for national self-determination. In the poor countries, specifically the colonized nations, national liberation movements were agents of rebellion and revolution that the poorer strata of workers in the rich countries should unite with as allies against their own imperialist state and its labor aristocratic defenders (Lenin 1916b).

Another aspect of Lenin's analysis of imperialism was the class relations within the oppressed nation and the social basis of their distinct political objectives. This aspect was quite undeveloped in Lenin's initial analysis, which was challenged by Indian M.N. Roy in debates at the second congress of the Communist International. Together they developed a position that recognized the distinct experiences and role of the working class in the oppressed nation (Lenin 1920; Roy 1922).

The recognition that capitalism had created structural divisions and splits within the working class internationally resonated strongly in South Africa, from where, quoting a contemporary observer Mr. Bryce, Hobson reported an "absolute social cleavage between blacks and whites":

> The artisans who today come from Europe adopt the habits of the country in a few weeks or months . . . the Cornish or Australian miner directs the excavation of the seam and fixes the fuse which explodes the dynamite, but the work with the pick axe is done by the Kaffir. (Hobson 1900, pp. 293–294)

Half a century later, and this "absolute social cleavage between blacks and whites" would be pushed yet further.

Debating the Struggle Against Apartheid

The apartheid system was introduced in 1948 and lasted until South Africa's first nonracial elections in 1994. Apartheid was intense racism across all spheres of life, justified as a program of "separate development" for racially identified groups.

After the Second World War, the increasingly urbanized African workforce was employed in manufacturing (men), services and domestic labor (women), as well as on the mines and farms. The entire African population was denied citizenship of South Africa; instead, Africans were designated citizens of ten remote, impoverished, ethnicized Bantustan homeland states to where around four million would be forcibly removed as "surplus people." Black Africans constituted over 70% of the population but could hold only 13% of the land. The barrage included racial classification of "Indians" and "Coloureds" as well. Apartheid's segregation laws meant that all political and economic power was reserved for "Whites," only 15% of the population (IDAF 1983; Mamdani 1996; Platzky and Walker 1985).

The racist assault called forth a defiant response from the oppressed majority. The ANC Youth League played a leading part in a Defiance Campaign that built up over the 1950s, the era that gave birth to the *Freedom Charter* whose story is told in Nelson Mandela's autobiography and rightly celebrated in most accounts (Mandela 1994). The Charter remains for many the foundational anti-apartheid document. "The People Shall Govern! . . . All National Groups Shall have Equal Rights!" it declared. Moreover, its economic demands centred on sharing the country's wealth: "the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks, and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole . . . and all the land redivided amongst those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger" (ANC 1955). The ANC formed a multi-racial coalition around

the Charter, including the Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the (unmarked white) Congress of Democrats, the trade unions, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and so on, designated "the Congress Alliance."

Less well known, but of lasting significance, is the emergence of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) at this time. The "Africanist" PAC was against white supremacy; it had split from the "Charterist" ANC on several related grounds including disagreement with the excessive influence of white communists in its leadership. The PAC pointed out that different national groups were not the same; Africans were the absolute majority and that to put the exploiting, European white minority on the same footing as Africans as a national group was to reproduce white privilege within the Congress Alliance in the name of equality. The PAC identified their commonality with other African liberation struggles and emphasized the land question, in which regard the PAC saw South Africa as a case of settler colonialism. See especially the PAC's leader Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe's inaugural speech for a clear explanation of these themes (Sobukwe 1959). In practice, the PAC showed a stronger commitment to mass initiative but weaker organizational infrastructure than the ANC working with the Communist Party. For example, the 1960 protest at Sharpeville against the pass laws, brutally shot down by the police, was in fact called by the PAC. As both liberation organizations turned to guerrilla armed struggle in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre they were both banned, their activists hunted down, killed, tortured, and imprisoned. The racist regime even passed a special law allowing it to imprison Sobukwe, as well as Mandela and ANC comrades (Lodge 1983; Pogrund 1990).

The SACP Version of the National Democratic Revolution

So it was in the immediate context of the Communist Party's rivalry with Pan-Africanism that its version of the national democratic revolution crystallized in the early 1960s. The SACP's forerunner, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) founded in 1921, had originally been oriented to the white workers and supported their

strike in 1922, infamously behind the racist slogan "Workers of the world, unite and fight for a white South Africa!" The party then shifted attention to the black majority of workers, although the Executive Committee of the Communist International still found it necessary to admonish its South African comrades: "the CP cannot confine itself to the general slogan of 'Let there be no whites and no blacks.' The CP must stand the revolutionary importance of the national and agrarian questions." It urged the party to invite black workers "without delay into much more active leadership" (ECCI 1928).

In stating its political strategy 30 years later, the Soviet-inclined "Marxist-Leninist" SACP still found the use of Lenin's thought to be ideologically central, and so we turn now to that legacy. In his *Two Tactics* booklet written in 1905, Lenin (1905) had analyzed that there needed to be two revolutions in Russia: first, a democratic revolution to sweep away the Tsarist feudal dictatorship and bring in a democratic republic; then a socialist revolution to get rid of capitalism. Lenin argued an energetic interventionist tactic in the first, democratic revolution, so that it be pushed to its fullest limit, toward a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," and that this would be against the bourgeoisie whose instincts were to compromise, to do a deal with the Tsar and the landlord class. In this way the ground would be prepared for passing on to the socialist revolution. The actual course of the revolution confirmed Lenin's general orientation, albeit in a way that was unexpected due to the realignments of the First World War which saw the Russian bourgeoisie turn ever more decisively against the mass of workers and peasants.

The struggle for independence was of course a long-standing issue for oppressed peoples in countries occupied by European colonialism that was posed afresh by the national movements in the twentieth century. The idea of the national democratic revolution was widely debated in the early years of the Communist International including, as we have indicated, with reference to strategy in South Africa. It was from these antecedents that the SACP constructed its own version of the national democratic revolution. In 1962, the SACP adopted the thesis of "colonialism of a special type" arguing that the:

> "The combination of the worst features both of imperialism and of colonialism with a single national frontier," maintained in the interests of all whites, but particularly the monopolies which "are the real power." In this "white colonialist system" the task of the Communist Party "is to lead the fight for the national liberation of the non-white people, and for the victory of the democratic revolution." (Davies et al. 1984, p. 291)

From this perspective, the party gave its "unqualified support" to the *Freedom Charter*, arguing that, although not itself "a programme for socialism," nonetheless:

> Its aims will answer the pressing and immediate needs of the people and lay the indispensable basis for the advance of our country along non-capitalist lines to a socialist and communist future. (SACP 1962)

This ambiguous formulation was to leave many questions open as to how the democratic revolution would connect "along non-capitalist lines" to a socialist future.

Several crucial points were overlooked in the SACP's rendering of Lenin. First, the whole point of *Two Tactics* was that the working class should ally with the peasantry to together play the leading role in the democratic revolution against feudalism; Lenin warned that the Russian bourgeoisie would vacillate and seek to make a deal short of full democracy. Second, while the political goal of the democratic revolution was to gain a republic, as that afforded the best grounds for working-class organization to flourish, its social purpose must be to destroy private ownership in the land. Learning from the experience of peasant revolts against the landlord class, Lenin (1907) went on to emphasize that the land should be nationalized to complete the democratic revolution. As circumstances changed again in the First World War, he added "nationalisation of the land is not only the 'last word' of the bourgeois revolution, but also a *step towards socialism*" (Lenin 1917). Third, while Lenin retained an analytical distinction

between the democratic revolution and socialist revolution, their relationship changed in practice. As the class struggle changed reality, Lenin changed his conceptualization. In his later understanding, he presented them more and more as phases in one continuous, complex revolutionary process. This applies to the actuality of the Russian revolution itself as well as to anti-colonial struggles; throughout, there was a sense of revolutionary dialectics on how the two could be connected to the best advantage of the working class.

How then would the national democratic revolution to get rid of apartheid be prosecuted to the best advantage of the African working class? The SACP's "colonialism of a special type" has drawn one line of criticism from Trotskyism on the grounds that it justified armed struggle and turned away from the specific mission of the working class (Callinicos 1988, pp. 61–72). For Hirson, the SACP's "two-stage theory" of revolution "became the hallmark of Stalinism in South Africa" (1992, p. 48). The Trotskyists' critique of "two stages" (actually two revolutions in the SACP interpretation) and their preferred "permanent revolution" thesis based on (Trotsky 1906) suffers from two problems, both of which were forms of abstraction. First, it was abstract politically: there was an urgent need for a democratic national liberation movement uniting forces to end racist apartheid, including by violent armed struggle as required. Second, the critique was theoretically schematic: it harked back historically but was disconnected from an actualized political economy of current realities. The left critique of the "Stalinist" SACP needed to be grounded in the concrete debate about apartheid's connection with capitalism and imperialism, which was about to surface.

SACP theorist Brian Bunting's book *The Rise of the South African Reich* clarified the direction the party had taken: it sought liberalism as an ally. Bunting identified two wings of Afrikaner political leadership in response to the British state-building strategy that forged the Union of South Africa in 1910. The orientation of "Milnerism"

was the offer of an alliance between the predominantly British mining magnates and Afrikaner settler farmers as the dominant class. Generals Smuts and Botha were for conciliation with the British, whereas Hertzog was for a separate path for Afrikaners (Bunting 1964, pp. 22–23). Bunting emphasized that Hertzog's Nationalist Party supported Hitler in the 1930s. If the point was not sufficiently clear, his book was published with swastikas on its cover. The Afrikaner "Nats" stood for *wit baaskap* in the 1948 election. Bunting translates *baaskap* literally as "mastership": Charles Feinstein (2005, p. 161) translates *wit baaskap* more meaningfully as "white domination." The Nationalists gained 70 out of the 150 seats and, as the biggest single party, formed the government that implemented a series of measures to stop all forms of integration and to enforce racial exclusion of the black majority, bringing in *apartheid*, otherwise known as "separate development." Bunting portrayed these as "South Africa's Nuremberg Laws." He framed apartheid as a *policy* that was the product of Afrikaner nationalism's convergence with Nazi ideology. This in turn implied a "popular front" opposition strategy that involved uniting with all possible forces, in particular with British liberal democratic capitalism, against the greater evil. This view of apartheid was widely shared internationally at the time and in that sense is not exceptional. The significance was that Bunting was an SACP guiding light, yet his analysis suppressed entirely the legacy of Marxist theorizing South Africa in its relation with capitalism and imperialism.

In many respects, the strengths and weaknesses of the final outcome of the anti-apartheid struggle were already present in Bunting's decidedly pro-liberal capitalist and pro-British "Marxist" analysis. The persistence of this line of thought, despite its obvious one-sidedness, can only be because it corresponds to certain class interests.

Apartheid as a Stage of Racial Capitalism

In the 1970s there was a flourishing of Marxist scholarship, mostly written in exile, influenced by

ideas of the "New Left" and motivated by the liberation of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism and the recovery of struggles inside South Africa, most especially after the Soweto Uprising in 1976.

The South Africa Connection by First, Steele, and Gurney on Western investment in apartheid is a classic that deserves to be republished. After the Sharpeville Massacre there was a brief dip, and then foreign investment surged. Two-thirds of the investment came from Britain, such that "it is hard to imagine how some sectors, like banking … would keep going without British backing" (First et al. 1973, p. 9). The explanation for the investment surge was simple: the spectacular returns to investors "is exactly what apartheid is all about" (15). First et al. recognized specifically Afrikaner prejudices, but they argued, the difficulty with this description of apartheid:

> As the result of a clash between two aggressive nationalisms – African and Afrikaner – does not explain, for one thing, why and how apartheid grew so naturally and effortlessly out of the state policies pursued, not in the *Boer* Republics but in the *British* ones, when South Africa was a colony run from Whitehall. (16)

Although they do not critique him directly, First et al. were challenging Bunting's analysis. The emphasis in this new approach was on apartheid *as the latest stage of capitalism* in South Africa, as well as a set of ethnic/nationalist policies. The starting point of the revisionist school of analysis was the relation between class and race in the formation of a modern, industrial "racial capitalism." Harold Wolpe (1972) and Martin Legassick (1974) were founding contributors to this new school, both of whom focused on the system of migrant African labor for the gold fields from 1890 onward. Frederick Johnstone (1976) and Bernard Magubane (1979) wrestled with theorizing the role of British imperialism as colonial capitalism. What is distinctive here is the concentration on the establishment of the corporate mining system as the foundation of modern South Africa, historically *prior* to apartheid as such.

The new analyses engendered a debate with liberalism, which is reviewed in (Alexander 2003). Could big business become a force against apartheid? Could, as the liberals claimed, foreign investment be portrayed as at all beneficial for the African working class?

The general point that the new Marxists argued is that, contrary to the liberal claim that capitalist growth "would in the long run undermine the racial structure of apartheid," it was actually accompanied by "ever-increasing repression" (Legassick and Innes 1977, p. 437). Liberal author Merle Lipton's response argued that, in absolute and relative terms, the condition of African labor was improving. "If important groups of capitalists are increasingly tending not to support apartheid, then this makes possible the option of cooperation with them" (Lipton 1979, p. 75). Consequentially, for Lipton, a "constructive engagement" with big business to end apartheid was viable.

Apart from the empirical grounds of the dispute, and the political consequences, of which more later, there was a theoretical Achilles heel in the Marxist response to the liberals. Although approaching the issue in historical materialist terms, most of the new Marxists balked at a concept of greater exploitation which was required to anchor their argument, and would connect racial capitalism with imperialism theoretically.

Debate over the Rate of Exploitation

The critique of Wolpe by Michael Williams (1975) is infrequently cited but worth close attention. Williams applied Marx's theory of commodity money to stress the particularity of gold production in South Africa. Wolpe and Williams made a serious attempt to use the concepts of Marx's *Capital* in their analysis of the specific social relations constituting South African capitalism. Wolpe highlighted the reproduction of migrant labor power in pre-capitalist societies with low money costs, allowing mining capital to pay low wages to African workers. South Africa emerged as a social formation in which the capitalist mode of production draws value from pre-capitalist modes. Echoing Luxemburg, Wolpe interpreted this relation of exploitation relying on reproduction outside capitalism as the continuation of Marx's "primitive accumulation."

Williams's intent was to critique both Wolpe and the more standard SACP thesis. He fastened

on the particularities of value production by African labor in the gold fields. Williams replaced Wolpe's outer contradiction with pre-capitalist modes as the source of extra surplus value with an inner contradiction peculiar to the capitalist production of gold as the money commodity. Gold mining capitalists had a privileged position that allowed them to draw surplus profits: "the gold mining industry is in a unique position to reap the benefits of exploitation directly in accordance with the quantity of immediate labour it employs" (Williams 1975: 23). This draws on Marx's theory of absolute rent and needed further development using the theory of differential rent, but which nonetheless was a big step forward. For a discussion of Williams and Wolpe which argues that the "articulation of modes of production" is better theorized as a rearticulation of the capitalist mode of production itself, in which race is internalized as part of the capital-labor relation, see (Higginbottom 2011). In place of the notion of colonialism of a special type to explain South Africa's exceptionalism, Williams argued in effect for a fuller concept of capitalism of a special type. With the idea of "archaic surplus value," he came close to the categorical breakthrough achieved by Marini in Latin America, with the concept of the super-exploitation of labor.

In a paper published by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, Good and Williams (1976) reached a high point from which to take the theoretical debate forward. Their purpose was to convince British workers that their solidarity would serve a common interest. What was innovative in their argument was the application of Marx's explanation of the declining rate of profit to the problem, in relatively popular form. They opened their discussion in similar vein to Legassick (1976, p. 437), who argued that although African workers were paid significantly less than workers in Britain, British workers were nonetheless in a technical sense actually more exploited because they were more productive and hence received relatively less for their labor. This is more than a view, but rather a deeply and widely held ontological assumption of Trotskyism and north-centric Marxism in general. In line with this thinking, Good and Williams offered a worked example to demonstrate the difference in value relations between an "advanced country" (such as Britain) and a "neocolony" (such as South Africa). In their example, productive technique and hence the ratio of capital invested to labor is much higher in the advanced country, thus:

> Let 4:1 be the capital–labour ratio in the advanced capitalist country and 1:4 in the neo-colony; and let 100 per cent be the rate of exploitation in the former and 50 per cent in the latter. (Good and Williams 1976, p. 8)

The analysis was bounded by these two assumptions; but were they correct?

On the first assumption, Good and Williams's data showed that in 1970, the gross fixed capital formation per manufacturing worker in South Africa was just marginally below that in the UK. But investment in South Africa was increasing faster, so, by 1973, fixed capital per worker was slightly *higher* in South Africa than in the UK. Insofar as gross fixed capital formation per worker is a reasonable proxy for the mechanization that led to greater productivity, what Marx termed the technical composition of capital (1976/1867, p. 762), the UK and South Africa manufacturing averages were roughly equivalent. A Land Rover production line in Pretoria was in fact technically quite similar to one in Solihull, and the workers were similarly productive.

The second assumption of the illustrative example concerned the rate of exploitation, yet this was precisely what had to be investigated rather than assumed. Marx explained that within the capitalist mode of production, the rate of exploitation of labor is the same as the ratio of surplus value to variable capital, which he called the rate of surplus value. The rate of exploitation of the workers is the surplus value they produce (s) divided by variable capital (v) exchanged in wages to purchase their labor power (1976/1867: ch. 11). The ratios of 100% rate of exploitation in the advanced country and 50% in the neocolony are similar to the ones given by Marx, in a questionable example comparing a European country "where the rate of surplus value might be 100%" and "in an Asian country it might be 25%" (Marx 1981/1895, p. 249), which he did not justify empirically, and which bears no relation to the

international production relations of contemporary capitalism, but which has been clung onto as a crutch by subsequent north-centric Marxists. Good and Williams assembled data that showed there could not possibly be a lower rate of exploitation in South Africa than in the UK, because on the basis of a similar technical composition, investors were able to make a significantly higher rate of profit. "We can only conclude that the relatively high rate of profit in South Africa is more a function of the high rate of exploitation than of low capital–labour ratios" (Good and Williams 1976, p. 10). The investigation obliged Good and Williams to move beyond their initial assumptions and conclude that the rate of exploitation in South Africa was indeed higher. When we add here that white labor was remunerated on average nine times more than African workers (Martin 2013, p. 26) and that by this time there were few white workers, rather white *supervisors*, this higher average rate of exploitation was entirely due to the *drastically lower wages paid to the African workers for the same value produced*.

We have arrived at a vital point for the political economy of apartheid, capitalism, and imperialism: the rate of exploitation considered quantitatively to demonstrate the material "cleavage between black and white." To illustrate, gold mining in South Africa publishes industry figures. This allows us to estimate the degree of exploitation of African gold-mine workers over decades. Selecting the same year that Good and Williams studied (i.e., 1970), the ore milled per worker was 193 metric tons; the average working revenue was R11.24, the working costs R7.34, and the working profit R3.90 per ton. In 1971, the average annual African wage was R209, at 1970 prices. Assuming the 1970 annual wage was also R209, the average wage cost was R209/193, that is, R1.08, per ton (Feinstein 2005, p. 170; Lipton 1986, p. 410). Assuming that working profit is realized surplus value, and wage cost stands for variable capital, on these figures the gold mining industry average rate of exploitation of African labor was R3.90/1.08 (s/v), or 361%, *nearly four times higher* than the 100% rate typically cited by Marx. Rather than, as Marx often observed, workers toiling half the working day for themselves and half for the capitalist, the African workers' wages were the equivalent of less than a quarter of their labor time, with nearly four-fifths of their time going to the capitalist.

The above analysis corresponds with solidarity initiatives that some trade unionists in the UK, such as the British Leyland workers, were taking against their own bosses (Luckhardt and Wall 1980, pp. 481–483). On theoretical terrain, it fills the gap left by Hilferding, who viewed the international class relation from its European end, where the benefit to finance was apparent. The promoter's profit made in the launch of new mining companies and income from shares as fictitious capital had, eventually, to come from somewhere. What underpinned the new generation of joint stock companies and other forms of finance capital was at the other end of the relation, fundamentally the system of cheap labor, or super-exploitation of African workers, as the source of the expected surplus profits (in this case nearly identical to the "superprofits" in Lenin's terminology).

The History of Imperialism and Racial Capitalism

The relation of imperialist super-exploitation is the axis around which racial capitalism in South Africa was built, and which buoyed up the monetary system of British colonialism, extending its life. Within two decades of the initial production on the Rand in the early 1890s, the gold industry employed a quarter of a million African workers at any time, with several times more than that number rotating through the migrant system. The British prosecuted the Second Boer War to wrest control of the Rand from the Afrikaner farmers, who themselves had dispossessed the Africans two generations before. Victorious Lord Milne inaugurated a regime tailored to the needs of mining capital: land laws, the color bar, and pass controls (Callinicos 1981). The African National Congress came together in 1912, just 2 years after the birth of the South Africa Union, to protest "the repression of all blacks in every conceivable form" (Meli 1988, p. 34).

Around two-thirds of the mine labor force came from outside the borders of the Union

(Wilson 1972). In their first two decades, the Johannesburg mining houses were mostly financed from London, with some capital from Germany and France. Milne's project was foundational, shaping the contours of the state as a functioning apparatus of racial repression, and it situated South Africa's location in international political-economic relations. African labor was pulled in from neighboring colonies, while profits flowed out to London. London moreover consolidated its control over the world's biggest source of gold. Gold bullion boosted the value of pound sterling and the City of London as a financial center, and with that extended Britain's imperial privilege (Ally 1994). Once they had secured the Union, the British pursued rapprochement with the Afrikaners to secure internal political stability through white supremacy, in exchange for a share in the spoils. This power shift is seen as one of the "systemic periods" in South African history that would transition again into apartheid in 1948 (Terreblanche 2002).

A distinctly South African mining monopoly capital emerged when Ernest Oppenheimer formed the Anglo American Corporation in 1917. Using capital investments mostly from the USA, Oppenheimer set about bringing the diamond and gold industries under the sway of centralized holding companies. The story is well told in Lanning (1979) and the dedicated book-length study by Innes (1984). These authors point out that underlying Oppenheimer's financial wizardry was an inherent tendency toward monopoly characteristic of gold production. As identified by Williams (1975), insofar as gold is the money commodity, the universal equivalent exchangeable with every other form of abstract human labor, capitalist gold producers have an unlimited demand for their product. Any increase in productivity, reducing production costs and expanding volume, increases profits without undercutting the "price" of other gold-producing capitals. This gave rise to a unique attenuation of competition in certain aspects. The gold mining capitalists of the early Rand were united in their determination to keep labor costs down through industry-wide "maximum wage agreements," and they had a mutual interest in sharing knowledge on production techniques and output data. Corporate organization passed quickly from hundreds of individual joint stock companies to just six financial groups that switched capital around a portfolio of gold mines according to their performance (Innes 1984, p. 55). Monopoly over the diamond industry started at the sales end, a cartel limiting sales to keep the price up. Oppenheimer's innovation was to build on these tendencies and take them to another level. He centralized existing mining corporations into a single conglomerate that rapidly rose to preeminence in South Africa and beyond that into sub-Saharan Africa.

On its internal projection, Anglo-American opened up mine production in the Orange Free State after the Second World War, requiring increased investment in plant and machinery to cope with the mines' extreme depth. The company concentrated its portfolio on the more profitable mines and emerged as a "dove" within the Chamber of Mines, lobbying for an increase in black wages that would reduce its reliance on foreign labor, which it was in the best position to afford. Anglo's intention was *not* to get rid of the color bar but to *reposition* it. The corporation's reforming pressure was within narrow limits defined by self-interest and in any case could only ameliorate the growing gulf between white and black as captured in their earnings ratio, which had risen from 12 times in 1946 to over 20 times in 1969 (Lanning 1979, p. 156).

The external projection of the Oppenheimer Empire is documented by Lanning and Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah argues that imperialism entered a new stage of neocolonialism after the Second World War. He sees the essence of neocolonialism being that although the subordinate state "is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside" (Nkrumah 2002/1965 ix). Outside direction was targeted at the profitable extraction of Africa's mineral resources. In this regard, Nkrumah showed South Africa in a double relation with the rest of Africa. On the one hand, "the whole of the economy is geared to the interests of the foreign capital that dominates it" (12), and, on the other hand, white South Africa's

mining giant had spread neocolonial tentacles of its own across Africa. Oppenheimer's De Beers diamond group drew profits from Sierra Leone, the Congo, Tanganyika, Angola, and South West Africa (today Namibia); and Anglo-American subsidiaries mined in Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and Zambia.

Neocolonialism and Black Consciousness

What is striking in Nkrumah's account is the leading role of mining corporations alongside finance as the principal vehicles of Africa's continuing neocolonial domination. In his analysis, the main contradiction is between externally based capital and internally based democracy. This view is deepened by class analysis of neocolonialism that confronts the voluntary alignment by an aspiring African middle class, choosing to align itself with the interests of the corporations and imperialism. Fanon (2000/1963) and Cabral (1966) analyzed the class aspect of neocolonialism in its subjective and objective dimensions. They warned against and fought against the neocolonial alliance as an outcome of the liberation struggle (Saul 2012).

Fanon's mode of thought had its correlate in racist South Africa, Black Consciousness. Writing under the pseudonym "Frank Talk," Steve Biko urged his fellow blacks to realize that "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed" (2002/1978, p. 68). The government banned Biko in 1973 and made it illegal to quote his words, and yet his thought contributed to a new generation of struggle, the workers revolt in the early 1970s, and most especially the school students' rejection of Afrikaans as the language of their education that animated the Soweto Uprising. Biko was assassinated in 1977, and the next year his comrades formed the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO).

Under the pseudonym "No Sizwe," Neville Alexander wrote *One Azania, One Nation* to dissect the Nationalist Party apartheid ideology in the construction of groupings of people through the prism of "race," with the Bantustans as the lynchpin. Alexander brought a fresh perspective into the debate. He argued that understandings of race held by different currents "tend to become tied to

the related question of which class should lead the national liberation movement" (Alexander 1979, p. 98). He identified three conceptions of national liberation in South Africa. The first, which had been advocated in the ECCI 1928 memo, was for an independent native republic. The second conception was "the democratisation of the polity within the existing capitalist framework . . . that the black people should be *integrated* in the existing system by being given formal political equality" (285–286), as advocated by the SACP/ANC alliance (whether this is a fair characterization of the *Freedom Charter* is part of the debate). Alexander advocated a third conception: the unity of the non-Europeans to overcome the white bourgeois class strategy of division and fragmentation in which "the nation . . . consists of all the people who are prepared to throw off the yoke of capitalist exploitation and racist oppression" (290). "Azania" was the term adopted to relay the idea of one nation of all the oppressed.

Black Consciousness drew in some measure from the transition that took place among African Americans from civil rights to radical nationalism. These debates over how to defeat racism arose in different contexts, yet began to overlap.

Debating Solidarity Strategy

Another aspect of the debates internal to the movements, that indeed throws light on them, was the parallel external debate on international solidarity strategy.

As we have seen, First et al. (1973) had pointed out the vital importance of the South African connection for sustaining the imperialist character of British capitalism, with 10% of its direct investments and 13% of its foreign profits worldwide (1973, p. 334). To the economic we should add military collaboration, on which Labour Governments in the 1940s, 1960s, and 1970s had an appalling record, especially with regard to purchasing uranium from South Africa and illegally occupied Namibia (Brockway 1975; Moorsom 1982). Far from banning the nuclear bomb, the British Labour Party had connived with apartheid to make it. This raised again Lenin's analysis of

the labor aristocracy, a privileged layer expressed through the official labor movement that would block effective moves to undermine the very relation from which it drew its privilege (Yaffe 1976).

The debate over solidarity strategy has been resurrected in two recent publications. Fieldhouse (2005) offers a history of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) as a pressure group. Thörn (2006) conceives of "anti-apartheid" as a social movement, a successful campaign that he presents as a model for transnational action. Both works downplay the degree of British involvement with apartheid, that is, they express the AAM's standpoint in the debates of the time, drawing at least one sharp review (Brickley 2005). There is an ongoing research project that investigates the views and actions of participants in what became known as the militant wing of anti-apartheid and which offered a distinct strategy, the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group (Brown and Yaffe 2014, 2017). It is timely to review the debate, not least for any lessons that may be drawn for future international solidarity campaigns.

Even by its own terms of maximizing unity against apartheid, the AAM made a strategic error. In practice, its mobilization against British collaboration with apartheid was constrained to what was acceptable to the official trade unions and Labour Party in Britain, and since Labour had in government itself collaborated fully with apartheid, the extent of AAM action was generally no more than formal lobbying. In fact, most purposeful initiatives to break the routine of collaboration came from *outside* the official AAM, the clearest indicator being the Stop the Seventy Tour (Hain 1971, pp. 120–125).

The question of unity needs to be considered dialectically in relation to the struggle. The right point of unity in the struggle cannot be defined in the abstract, but in the concrete (Cabral 1989). It was the masses in South Africa, in Namibia, their liberation movements, and the Frontline States who were fighting apartheid directly, and their struggle was the primary motor for the entire movement. The solidarity movement was a support base that could only fight apartheid indirectly, a secondary but nonetheless important role, and to

do that effectively, it had to have its own clear strategy. In its close cooperation with the SACP and the ANC, the official AAM strategy confused roles, whereas there was a need to distinguish between them. If the solidarity movement had a single issue to concentrate on, it was to *isolate* apartheid, to weaken it from without, and that meant fighting collaboration between its own establishment and the apartheid regime, to work for sanctions. To do otherwise would be to renege on its specific responsibility. The greater the collaboration, as in the case of imperialist countries such as Britain and the USA, the more this was so. In fighting British collaboration with apartheid, solidarity forces in Britain were providing the most effective contribution they could to fighting apartheid (Brickley et al. 1985).

A further problem became ever more evident. The mobilizing activity of the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group came across a second constraint that given its position as a solidarity campaign was at first difficult to accept and later even harder to comment on publicly. Despite their anti-imperialist rhetoric, the SACP and ANC were in practice opposed to an anti-imperialist campaign that risked alienating their allies in the Labour Party and other sectors of the British establishment. They were closely tied to the AAM; its orientation was theirs too. Once this was realized, the sectarianism of the ANC toward solidarity with other currents arising in South Africa, its tendency to put itself forward as the sole representative, to discourage direct trade-union solidarity links, and to court only social-democratic support all fell into a new light.

In the meantime the struggle had taken a leap forward. The racist regime was confronting manifold political and economic challenges that led it to instigate a phoney reform program of controlled internal changes (Price 1991). The combination of co-option and repression failed to stem the upsurge in popular protest. The United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed in 1983 to oppose a stooge "tricameral parliament", a national organization with an international audience. The UDF was the above-ground internal correlate of the ANC, linking it to the mass upsurge on the program of anti-apartheid unity.

Murray (1987) relates the widespread eruptions of popular revolt, "stay away" strikes, civic protests, and the broadening of political struggle in the mid-1980s. Every time the regime turned the screw, the resistance grew. The Vaal Uprising in 1984 was an explosion of working-class rebellion. Even the State of Emergency in 1985 could not halt the protest spreading nationwide. To his lasting credit, Mandela steadfastly refused to countenance any deal short of one person one vote, even at the expense of staying in prison. Toward the end of the decade the regime was reaching an impasse, every move it made was thwarted by the preparedness for insurrection, not by the increasingly concerned ANC/UDF leadership but from grassroots forces, whether UDF aligned or not. It was doubtful they could be held back, raising the possibility of an internal people's war to match the wars going on immediately outside South Africa's borders.

Ten years of Kissinger's policy of "constructive engagement" had failed to rescue Pretoria; cracks were appearing in the alliance of international forces protecting the regime. The State of Emergency had the unintended consequence of unsettling international lenders, who from the credit crisis of 1985 began to look for an exit strategy (Ovenden and Cole 1989: ch. 4). Sanctions had really begun to bite (Commonwealth Committee 1989; Orkin 1989). South Africa's "total strategy" security doctrine meant saturation terror in Namibia and took an awful and devastating toll on the adjoining populations of Mozambique, Angola, and the other frontline states (Hanlon 1986). At the close of several months of fighting, at the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, in early 1988, Cuban-piloted planes and tanks helped Angola's MPLA Government defeat the invading South African forces. After having inflicted tens of thousands of African casualties, hundreds of white South Africans were now also being killed. Not only had South Africa's invasion of Angola been repulsed, its ability to maintain the occupation of Namibia without further morale-sapping losses was doubtful. Forced back on its external front, and facing internal insurrection, the racist minority regime's capacity to sustain total warfare had been tested to breaking point. The apartheid

state could no longer guarantee capital accumulation and racial domination; *the question of reform or revolution had truly arrived*. On the side of white supremacy, P.W. Botha's resignation in 1989 cleared the way for new president F.W. de Klerk to address the previously unthinkable: steps toward a negotiated non-racial settlement (Price 1991, p. 11).

Beyond Apartheid: Managed Transition

By the mid-1980s, the racist regime had entered into a prolonged "organic crisis" (Saul 1986). As reflected in publications such as *Work in Progress*, *Transformation*, *South Africa Labour Bulletin*, and *South African Review*, the debate on the opposition side had returned with fresh immediacy to the question of political power and what would happen beyond apartheid.

Two Class Interpretations of the National Democratic Revolution

Under the pressure of an intensifying class struggle, two distinct and, in class terms, opposing interpretations of the national democratic revolution emerged. What the different interpretations of Lenin's "two tactics" meant for the South African revolution was about to become clear.

The general history of workers' organizations and trade unions in South Africa is told up to 1950 from the SACP perspective by Simons and Simons (1983). Luckhardt and Wall (1980) provide a comprehensive history of the pro-ANC South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) until the end of the 1970s. At this time there was a resurgence of trade unionism inside South Africa, especially in the Eastern Cape, and with it came a new debate between "workerists" and ANC "populists." Eddie Webster's study of workers' arduous conditions in metal foundries linked changes in the labor process to the radical form of trade unionism that these workers created, based on the role of the shop steward. Webster saw the rise of the shop stewards' movement as "a challenge from below" (1985, p. 231) and "the birth of working class politics" (261). Webster worked with the FOSATU federation formed in

1979, the "workerist" tendency that emphasized rank-and-file trade unionism. Steven Friedman (1987) covered the black trade unions as a journalist, telling the story of the Durban strikes in 1973 and the debate inside the movement about whether to register with the state after the Wiehahn reforms, which FOSATU did, but the SACTU/ANC-aligned unions refused seeing registration as tacit collaboration. The SACTU/ANC "populist" tradition came forward into a new generation of general unions linked with community-based struggle organizations. Leaders like Moses Mayekiso emerged who embodied both strands.

COSATU was formed in 1985 from the convergence of unions led by the "workerist" and "populist" tendencies and the 180,000 strong National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) that broke away from another federation, CUSA. The independent union movement had swollen from just 10,000 members in 1976 to COSATU's 600,000 members (Naidoo 1986), with 250,000 more in other federations. The first years of COSATU bore great promise of possibilities for united worker resistance, and within its first 8 months, the federation led the two biggest strikes in South Africa's history. It was mobilizing against the immediate challenge of the regime's restrictive Labour Bill and in a wider sense to bring apartheid to an end. General secretary, Jay Naidoo, made the point that COSATU was engaged in the general democratic struggle, *both* as an independent organization of the working class *and* an essential component of the democratic forces:

> It is clear that in the specific conditions of our country it is inconceivable that political emancipation can be separated from economic emancipation. (Goddard 1986, p. 10)

COSATU's inaugural congress was a high point, calling for disinvestment and resolving to support all sections of the oppressed:

> To call for a national strike should the apartheid regime carry out its threat to repatriate any migrant workers . . .
>
> ... under capitalist conditions of exploitation unemployment is a reality facing every worker at all times. To establish a national unemployed workers' union as a full affiliate . . .

> ... women workers experience both exploitation as workers and oppression as women and that black women are further discriminated against on the basis of race . . .(ibid.)

In terms of strategy, Naidoo asserted:

> We are not fighting for freedom which sees the bulk of workers continuing to suffer as they do today. We therefore see it as our duty to promote working-class politics. A politics where workers' interests are paramount in the struggle. (cited in Goddard 1986, p. 10)

This was a militant reformulation of the national democratic revolution strategy in terms "*where workers' interests are paramount*" (emphasis added). Meanwhile some distance away, in London in fact, SACP leader Joe Slovo was likewise reformulating the concept of national democratic revolution, but moving it in the opposite direction, onto pro-capitalist terms:

> For some while after apartheid falls there will undoubtedly be a mixed economy, implying a role for levels of non-monopoly private enterprise represented not only by the small racially oppressed black business sector but also by managers and business people of goodwill who have or are prepared to shed racism. (cited in Reed 1986, p. 10)

This latter formulation was an olive branch to the multinationals. As David Reed pointed out, Slovo was deliberately imprecise, "his failure to specify that the land and monopoly industry will be expropriated" tailored to assure "disparate forces" ranging from Anglo-American to the British Labour Party that private enterprise would be safe (Reed 1986, p. 10). This was a retreat from the 1962 program, whose "non-capitalist lines" had become capitalist lines and a long step away indeed from Lenin's "nationalisation of the land is not only the 'last word' of the bourgeois revolution, but also a *step towards socialism*," which in the South African context could only translate into nationalization of the mines and mineral resources. Slovo, then, reformulated the national democratic revolution, into terms *where the interests of big capital would remain paramount*.

Still, the message was coded. Wolpe's insistence upon contingency in the concept of national democratic revolution (1988, p. 32) was an adroit supporting move to Slovo; any realistic strategy

needed to take into account the unknowns of political struggle. Those more schooled in Marxism might recall that Lenin himself updated his view on how the analytically separable democratic revolution and the socialist revolution were connected in practice. Yet, for all the sophisticated pseudo-theoretical argumentation (Slovo 1988), the SACP's revived version of the "national democratic revolution" proved to be so elastic that it meant all things and none. It took some time for the realization to emerge that the SACP's version of "contingency" in the national democratic revolution meant something altogether different to Lenin's; in fact, it was not contingent at all but its opposite, an enforced separation between ending apartheid and bringing down capitalism. In practice, it was used to cover up not only the ANC's historic compromise but whatever venal opportunism was attendant upon it (Bond 2000; McKinley 1997).

Regulation Theory, Orthodoxy, and Alternatives in the Moment of Transition

Meanwhile, as the endgame of apartheid approached, a particular school of political economy arose temporarily like a fashion. At the end of the 1980s, a group of scholars working with the union federation COSATU developed an analysis of organic crisis in South Africa based on the "regulation" approach from France. They were to pave the way and give a radical economics gloss to the political turnaround that was about to take place. The approach theorizes changes to capital accumulation in any given capitalist society using the interrelated concepts of regime of accumulation, mode of exploitation, and regulation. In this view, regulation is broadly "the way in which the determinant structure of a society is reproduced" (Aglietta 1980, p. 13). Applying this to South Africa, Stephen Gelb argued that the postwar accumulation model crystallized by apartheid was best conceived as a "racial Fordism." Henry Ford had not only pioneered mass production but linked this to a society of mass consumption in the USA: his workers should earn enough to own one of the cars they produced. Gelb saw a similar accumulation model combining mass production and consumption in

South Africa, with the crucial qualification that it was racially structured: wages were limited, and consumption was limited, only *white* workers were paid enough to afford a car. Racial Fordism was necessary to cement the support of the white population and possible so long as it could be built on the continuing success of mining. South Africa has chosen an accumulation strategy that "made possible the importation of the capital equipment necessary to expand manufacturing" (Gelb 1991, p. 15).

Contingency is built into the regulation mode of analysis, too, as it seeks to explain why one strategy is adopted rather than another. In Gelb's analysis the "racial Fordism" strategy relied on the dollar price of gold and other mineral exports to pay for the imports. There was a competition for investment between mining and manufacturing. Their growing demand for skilled but cheap labor led capitalist organizations to press for the color bar to float, to allow some African workers into occupations previously reserved for whites and into more settled urban living. These changes were resisted by the political regime, putting "racial Fordism" into crisis. In this regard, Gelb noted without irony the convergence of his analysis with the calls for reform by Harry Oppenheimer, inheritor of the Anglo-American Corporation (19–20).

Gelb argued the need for an alternative economic strategy in which the "developmental state" was the central actor that would lead social restructuring to the benefit of the working class. The agency of the state was "an essential counterweight to the inevitable reluctance of extremely powerful private economic agents, especially the conglomerates, to bring about a fundamental shift in economic development" (31). The strategy the regulationists proposed was a series of industrial-sector plans requiring the cooperation of business and labor under the direction of government. Redirecting finance to invest in state priorities would be a particular challenge given South Africa's "highly concentrated corporate structure, which dominates the provision of external finance to industrial firms" (31). Behind the apparent pragmatism of the approach was a huge dose of utopianism: wishful thinking that the

conglomerates would accept an arrangement in which their profitability would be subordinated to a social justice agenda through state-directed plans for each industry. Bond (2000) and many others point out that in practice the opposite happened: big business controlled the economic policies of the postapartheid state.

There are weaknesses at the heart of the regulation theory that correspond to its exponents' technocratic tendency. The theory, Gelb argued, "focuses above all on the process of exploitation in class societies; that is, the appropriation by one class of the surplus produced by another. The various processes through which this surplus is expanded or contracted, comprise the major driving force in the accumulation process" (Gelb 1991, p. 9). This claim is not substantiated. On the contrary, regulation theorist Aglietta doubts the essentiality of surplus value as a concept (1980, p. 15) and rejects the concept of imperialism "as an ambiguous notion" (29). In Gelb's book, none of the sector chapters actually look at the issue of surplus value and exploitation. What emerged from the regulation school's apparent sophistication was actually a watered-down version of Marxism. It recognized class struggle, but without relating it to workers' production of surplus value and its conversion into capital, that is with the general law of capital accumulation; it recognized monopoly capital is a social power and yet hung back from its conversion into social property, as we have seen Marx had anticipated.

There was a second attempt to promote a reform-led strategy, the Macroeconomic Research Group "think tank" team that produced the MERG Report in 1993. The principal authors of this report came from the SACP and the British Communist Party, and were heavily influenced by the latter's "Left Alternative Strategy" (Sender 2014; Fine 1983). The MERG Report was critical of orthodox economic policy and advocated a leading role for state, with a special role for public sector investment leading a mixed economy in a progressive direction (MERG 1993, pp. 7–8). The proposed framework opposed privatization and advocated a moderate expansion of public expenditure to foster job creation, yet it also relied on a high rate of investment from the existing

corporate sector and on attracting further foreign investment (1993, pp. 9–10). The report promised that private investors would "reap handsome rewards" if they cooperated with the state in addressing inequalities and inefficiencies (1993, p. 11). The MERG's optimistic projection of public sector and private sector growth through partnership *avoided* the political crunch issue of nationalization linked to popular political power. But even this "realistic" and "affordable" center-left policy was rejected by the ANC leadership, who had set themselves on a more orthodox path (Habib and Padayachee 2000).

At the vital moment, these theoreticians bestowed a left patina to the SACP/ANC's historic compromise with capital. But what about the third party in the triple alliance: the trade unions? Despite being positioned as advisers to COSATU, the crucial political factor that the regulationists ignored, and despite its connections with COSATU the MERG downplayed, was the revolutionary potential of the working class mass movement, the only actor capable of breaking the power of the banks and conglomerates to enforce their nationalization. The mass movement was in both frameworks reduced to a mere lobbyist within the alliance, rather than striking out as an independent political actor. Both groups of economists advocated a "developmental state" to counterweigh big capital. This set the regulationists in particular on a trajectory; the trade-union researchers became ANC government advisers and then reluctant co-authors of the neoliberal program.

From Regulation to Reconciliation

The commitment of the political executive is pivotal in the power play between state and capital. By 1991, the ANC had already sufficiently indicated its accommodation with big business to bring into serious doubt its intention of implementing the regulationists' or MERG advised alternative strategy. While the tensions within the triple alliance would take several years to eventually play out, the ANC leadership was already courting big business. On 4 July 1990, Nelson Mandela addressed British businessmen on the "critical need" for rapid growth

that "cannot happen without large inflows of foreign capital" (cited in Padaychee 1991, p. 108). The transition was going to be managed top-down. As Marais puts it:

> The ANC's historical privileging of the political over the economic invited a settlement that would allow for significant restructuring of the political sphere, and broad continuity in the economic sphere. (2011, p. 70)

The lynchpin of the continuity was the arrangement made with a core group of multinationals led by Anglo-American, as detailed by Terreblanche (2002) and Marais (2011). Their analysis has been further validated by the publication of the inside story of British diplomacy, penned by Thatcher's ambassador to South Africa who testifies to the enormous effort that was put in to ensure that Mandela accepted continuity of ownership of big business (Renwick 2015). The die was fully cast in 1993 when, as part of the power-sharing interim government, the ANC applied secretly for an IMF loan, with the standard conditions attached (Martin 2013, p. 163). The outcome was a reconciliation with white-owned capital and imperialism that pushed socialism firmly off the agenda (Bond 2013, pp. 575–576).

South Africa After Apartheid

Democratic rule was welcomed, but class divisions have polarized. The unemployment rate actually increased from 28% in 1995 to 42% in 2003 and by 2013 stood at 34% (Di Paola and Pons-Vignon 2013); (Kingdon and Knight 2009). Fifty-five percent of 23-year-olds are not in education, employment, or training (Lolwana 2014). Sixty-five percent of African women are unemployed (Ntlebi 2011). Income distribution is still highly racialized, "in 2005/06, whites accounted for 9.2% of the population but netted 45% of total household income" (Marais 2011, p. 209). The African population suffers one of the worst levels of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis in the world (264). Migrant mine workers still suffer silicosis and other crippling diseases on an industrial scale (McCulloch 2013). Johannesburg is threatened by rising acid mine water, Soweto is still rimmed

by poisonous tailings dumps, and communities in the Mpumalanga coalfield are engulfed by a cocktail of pollutants. According to environmental activist Matthews Hlabane, "the soil is burning and full of salt, the water is contaminated, the air is dangerous," cited in (Munnik 2008, p. 52).

Black economic empowerment (BEE) has meant business opportunities for some, but it is no more than a minority who have prospered, "the real beneficiaries of the democratic breakthrough have been the various fractions of the black middle classes, which have seen rapid growth" (von Holdt 2013, p. 593). South Africa after apartheid has not been a utopian experience for the working-class majority of the black majority. The decision of the ANC to embrace the neoliberal model has layered a new set of ills over the apartheid legacies of debt, disease, violence, exclusion, poverty, and environmental disaster. Good entry points into the critical literature that grasp the real content of the transition are Brickley (2012), Marais (2011), Satgar (2012), Terreblanche (2002), and von Holdt (2013).

A critical perspective from within liberal democracy is exemplified by Andrew Feinstein (2009) and R.W. Johnson (2010), who are scandalized by defense minister Joe Modise's corrupt arms deal with a British Aerospace consortium. Their justified exposure of the ANC in power is, however, shorn of any critique of its neoliberalism. In similar fashion, Plaut and Holden (2012) ask "Who rules South Africa?", and answer narrowly and only in terms of political parties rather than the socioeconomic structures of class (and race) power. Liberals do not like the ANC's corruption, advancing to degeneracy under Mbeki and Zuma, but they nonetheless back its economic program. Liberal historian Leonard Thompson's *History of South Africa* identifies that once reconciliation was achieved, the Mandela government had two major goals: "to create growth and to improve the quality of life for the majority of citizens," but, he asserts, "if both goals were pursued simultaneously from the beginning of the new regime, they would not be compatible" (2001, p. 278). That is, within the liberal paradigm, a challenge to private property relations is even now off the agenda; what is needed to

deepen democracy is first and foremost more cap-italist economic growth providing the base for a future redistribution of wealth. Recognizing growth first, redistribution later was the ANC's "crash course in reality." But we have been here before; this is trickle down, the mantra of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism After Apartheid

The South African state is not a "developmental state," as it is not pursuing any substantive strat-egy of state-led industrialization and redistribu-tion. After apartheid, the ANC aligned South Africa with the post-Washington consensus ver-sion of neoliberalism. The state interventions that take place are to facilitate market efficiencies, capital investment, and accumulation. The eco-nomic structural roots are to be traced back to the late 1980s and the outward movement of finance capital that continued through the 1990s into the postapartheid era. Through a series of programs, the ideology of the ANC as the ruling party has indigenized and given "an African voice to neoliberalism" (Satgar 2012, p. 43). With the goal of competitiveness in global markets, ANC governments have sought to impose trade liberal-ization, with tight monetary and fiscal policies, but in so doing, they have dismantled a relative degree of self-sufficiency. It was in this latter respect that the peculiarities of apartheid's politi-cal economy were most strongly present. The legacy included a comprehensive array of para-statal energy corporations across the steel, coal, electricity, and hydrocarbon sectors, as well as arms manufacture and transport infrastructure that in the ANC's initial Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) would continue as the crucial hub to endogenous development. The approach was quickly undermined by the adoption in 1996 of the misnamed Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) framework.

State programs have provided 14 million peo-ple with social grants and have built a million houses, an example of "post-Washington" poverty alleviation measures; nonetheless, "underpinning this reality is a state incapable of stemming the tide towards deepening inequality" (2012, p. 54).

Many in social movements targeted by the ANC machine might go further to argue that the state is not only incapable but decidedly unwilling.

Postapartheid into Globalization: Global Apartheid

Fine and Rustomjee make an important analysis of South Africa's economy, arguing that the "min-erals energy complex" (MEC) remains at its cen-ter and furthermore plays "a determining role throughout the rest of the economy" (1996, p. 5). "Complex" suggests interconnection, and these authors delineate the inputs and outputs that were constructed over decades around three prin-cipal actors: the mining corporations; formerly state, now privatized, state energy corporations; and, at its hub, finance. The complex gives the economy unusual characteristics. Coal is largely exported or turned into gas or electricity, rather than consumed in homes. The South African economy is "uniquely electricity intensive," with 40% of electrical energy used "in mining and mineral processing" (8). These authors recognize the continuing central importance of Anglo-American and its association with "South Africa's highly developed financial institutions," and point out that in this system of accumulation, finance is the epicenter of the complex (91–92). Drawing on Davies (1979) and O'Meara (1983), Fine and Rustomjee (1996) analyze the process, whereby Afrikaner capital emerged in the inter-war period to compete and converge with English capital. They trace the inputs and outputs to the mining and energy complex, note the growth of uranium and platinum mining, and review debates on industrial policy. Critical responses by Bell and Farrell (1997) and Nattrass and Seekings (2011, p. 549) argue that the MEC interpretation overstates the weight of the minerals energy complex by including all related manufacturing and under-states the extent of diversification of manufactur-ing sectors.

The restructuring of mining capital and other conglomerates throughout the transition is a vital topic. Cross-sector shifting of investments com-plicates the picture. In the late 1980s, a lot of foreign corporations, especially US ones, divested from South Africa. Sanctions penned the mining

corporations into their domestic capital markets, so they bought into the businesses previously owned by foreign capital, for example, the automotive industry, as analyzed in (Barnes 2013). From its inception in the 1920s, the auto industry's production combined imported kits with increasing local content. The1980s saw "South African mining houses and pension funds acquiring the assets of the departing MNCs" (249), a consequence of the pressure of sanctions. By 1993, mining capital dominated vehicle production. The sole exception was Volkswagen, which stayed throughout. The other multinationals returned in the 1990s to form joint ventures with local capital, and then further buyouts such that since 2008 all the seven major vehicle manufacturers have been 100% owned by global brand multinationals.

In correlation with these movements has been the "offshoring" of big mining capital's headquarters as soon as it was able to do so after 1994. Fine and Rustomjee highlight the "extent of capital flight" (1996, p. 11, 177) that was at first illegal but has since been officially allowed. The phenomena are investigated in a series of studies that probe:

> A particular combination of short-term capital inflows (accompanied by rising consumer debt largely spent on luxury items) *and* a massive long-term outflow of capital as major 'domestic' corporations have chosen offshore listing and to internationalize their operations while concentrating within South Africa on core profitable MEC sectors. (Ashman et al. 2010, p. 178)

Capital flight averaged over 9% of GDP from 1994 to 2000, rising to 12% between 2001 and 2007. Major corporations "such as Anglo American, De Beers, Old Mutual, South African Breweries, Liberty, Sasol and Billiton" have relisted on the London Stock Exchange (Ashman et al. 2011, p. 13). The moves are a combination of push and pull factors. Moving out corporate HQs means that dividend payments escape South Africa's exchange controls and removes the corporations from any risk of nationalization. Moving to London provides security, a better access to credit, and an enhanced platform for global operations. These corporations that were the principal economic beneficiaries of more than a century of racial capitalism have internationalized their operations through London and repositioned themselves as global players.

Ashman and Fine (2013) link the offshoring process with the restructuring of the financial sector in South Africa itself, which by 2010 was dominated by just four conglomerates: Standard Bank, ABSA, First Rand, and Nedbank, which between them control 84% of the market. Two of these "Big Four" have a London connection. UK-based Barclays Bank bought a controlling share in ABSA in 2005; and Nedbank is controlled by Old Mutual, the insurance conglomerate that moved to London and is "placed thirtieth of the world's most powerful corporations" (165).

As well as capital flight, relocating the site of capital ownership, there is the distinct question of capital flows into and out of the country. South Africa was "the single largest investor in FDI projects in Africa outside of South Africa itself in 2012" (Ernst and Young 2013, p. 5). South Africa is also the destination for more FDI projects than any other African country (31). The top five source countries for FDI projects in Africa from 2007 to 2012 were the USA, UK, France, India, and South Africa. China is ninth on the list. The UK had three times more projects. Of the top ten global mining corporations with direct investments in Africa, three (arguably four) are UK-based, and three are South Africa-based (Fig 2014). Each of the UK-based global mining corporations has significant connections with South Africa.

We started this essay with Hilferding, to whom Ashman et al. (2010, p. 175) wrongly ascribe the idea that industrial and banking capital fuse to form finance capital. As we have seen, his argument is rather that they are "intimately related" through credit and capital markets, and the form of the linkage is fictitious capital. More generally, there is yet to be a positive connection between theories of imperialism and the particular form of neoliberalism and capital restructuring in contemporary South Africa.

William Martin (2013) takes a world-systems approach to framing South Africa within international racial hierarchies of core and periphery

countries. Like Fine and Rustomjee, he gives special emphasis to the industrialization that took place in the inter-war period. He looks closely at the policies of the Nationalist and Labor Pact Government from 1924 with case studies of railways, banking, and tariffs. The government built a fully national railway system, whose extension and tariffs were geared to the needs of white farmers and white labor rather than the mining magnates. South Africa created its own reserve bank so that monetary policies, specifically decisions to go on and off the gold standard, were not so directly tied to British imperial interest. Similarly, South Africa sought a customs union with its neighbors, on terms that would favor its interests. The state steel corporation ISCOR was constructed in the 1930s to locally supply mines, rail, and incipient manufacturing industries. Martin argues that with these changes South Africa managed to industrialize and emerge as a "semi-peripheral" state, a relation that has seen major continuity into the postapartheid period as South Africa continues to export manufactures and capital to its sub-Saharan neighbors. Bond reads this unequal relation as "aspirant sub-imperialism" (2008, p. 25), whereas Southall and Melber take a more benign view of the internationalisation of South African capital as "primarily a case of market forces at work" (2009, p162).

Social Movement Struggles and Politics

This essay cannot do justice to the depth and diversity of social struggle movements in post-apartheid neoliberal South Africa. It is nonetheless essential to appreciate the creative mainspring, the energy of the working class in resistance. *Challenging Hegemony* collects excellent essays on social movements in peri-urban Johannesburg, the National Land Committee of rural farm dwellers, and the Treatment Action Campaign's patient-led fight for state support and treatment of HIV/AIDS (Gibson 2006).

Ashwin Desai's *We are the Poors* relays the eruption of community-based class struggles. Community movements have sprung up among the poor in Chatsworth near Durban and other townships nationwide, fighting against the effects of neoliberalism on their lives. The trigger issues

are the state's callous determination to drive through market solutions to problems of service provision. Metropolitan councils insist on "cost recovery," rent debt collection, and disconnection for nonpayment for water and electricity services. With ever more workers unemployed or at best casually employed, they simply cannot pay. The impoverished find ways to reconnect their homes, to resist evictions, and to stand up to ANC local councillors and the police. Drawing on past struggle experiences, but also overcoming old divisions, people in the new movements are taking collective action for their very survival, putting themselves onto the frontline with innovative direct-action tactics. Starting from their immediate need to stop cutoffs and evictions, communities united around the Durban Social Forum, "New Apartheid: Rich and Poor." Durban in 2001 was "the first time a mass of people had mobilized against the ANC government" (2002, p. 138).

The ANC's neoliberal program continues to evoke counter-movements. In the Western Cape, Mandela Park is another community that found itself under armed assault by the state, its leaders either imprisoned or on the run, for resisting mass evictions from privately built housing. The evictions were consequent on the ANC's adoption of a Structural Adjustment Programme in 1996. The company manufacturing the prepaid water meters is Conlog Holdings, the same corporation that Modise took directorship of as reward for the British Aerospace fighter deal (Pithouse and Desai 2004).

Social movements face considerable problems in finding a way to consolidate an ongoing political project. Trevor Ngwane was an ANC councillor in Johannesburg who refused to implement party policy to privatize domestic services. He was thrown out of the ANC and then stood against them on an anti-privatization platform. The Anti-Privatisation Forum was formed in 2000 to unite struggles by grassroots campaigns fighting the electricity cutoffs and the privatization of workers' jobs at Wits University (Ngwane 2003; Buhlungu 2004). It was from independent social struggles like these that Ngwane and other socialists began to advocate the formation of an

independent workers party; see Bond et al. (2012). Against this perspective, Buntu Siwisa (2010) recognizes the breakdown of social citizenship exemplified by the APF but disputes that "intellectuals-cum-activists" have a mandate from the urban poor for forming an electoral alternative to the ANC. Another explanation for the difficulty that social movements have is that they are subject to dirty tricks and repression by the ANC at the local level (Zikode 2013). The rural poor, farmworkers, went on strike in 2012 (Jara 2013). The persistence of these social struggles from below is a constant reminder that, despite the difficulties, there is a possibility of a party emerging to the left of the ANC. Several populist pretenders have thrown their hats into the electoral ring, but the more difficult challenge remains of constructing an inclusive and nonhierarchical social and political national movement.

The recovery of the mass movement is ongoing. In the communities, despite ANC-directed state violence against it, the shack dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo continues to resist and "walk the talk" of advocating socialism from below (Zikode 2013).

Barchiesi (2011) emphasizes the precarious and insecure conditions of the working poor. He encountered "disorientation, apprehension and disillusionment" (xvii) of municipal workers in Johannesburg and industrial workers in the East Rand. On the demoralization and decline of collective solidarity in the NUM, see Beresford (2012). There are developments in trade unions across many sectors breaking from the ANC alliance (Amandla! 2013). There is a fight to recover the independence of COSATU from the ANC/SACP; as a result, the now biggest affiliate, the metal workers union, has declared the need for a united front and a new workers party (NUMSA 2013).

In party-political terms, the biggest turnaround has been the emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) under the leadership of Julius Malema, former president of the ANC Youth League. The ANC expelled Malema in February 2012 for fomenting divisions and tarnishing the party's reputation. The criminal charges against him for money laundering and corruption may have been politically motivated; they may be true; either way, Malema's radical discourse has resonated with a growing audience among those disillusioned with 20 years of ANC rule. The political issue that got Malema into trouble with the ANC hierarchy was pushing for nationalization of the mines and the land. Malema visited the striking Marikana miners 2 days after the Massacre, the first national political figure to do so. He condemned the shootings, attacking the mine's British owners and Cyril Ramaphosa, "the ANC in government eat with the British" (City Press 2012). Malema returned in October 2013 as the EFF launched itself at a mass rally in Marikana with the slogan "Economic Freedom in our Lifetime" (Mvoko 2013). The EFF has combined the left wing of the ANC with the Africanist and Black Consciousness traditions, both in its imagery and radical program (Fogel 2013), and has mounted enough of an electoral challenge to the ANC to take over 6% of the votes, gaining 25 seats and a platform of opposition in the National Assembly (EFF 2014; Sowetan 2014).

Some Conclusions

This essay has looked over a long trajectory of anti-imperialist, anti-apartheid, and anti-capitalist Marxist theories concerning South Africa. I have argued that the anti-apartheid struggle was legitimately conceived as a mass democratic revolution against racism, but I have sought to return working class content to the notion of national democratic revolution, and rescue it from the formulaic, reformist compromise and ultimately pro-capitalist interpretation of the SACP. African nationalism is not inherently reformist; it takes revolutionary directions that can be bolstered by a strategy of unity of the oppressed against all exploitation. The motor of the revolution has been the resistance of the black masses that emerged in the form of the ANC's Congress Alliance and Pan Africanism, reappeared as Black

Consciousness, and finally erupted as multifaceted working-class insurrection of sufficient threat to force regime change. The national democratic revolution in South Africa was an alliance of classes as well as races. The impetus of the revolutionary movement was harnessed and channeled by privileged class interests leading the ANC alliance in its crucial phase.

In the fight against apartheid, the ANC had the most successful strategy in that it concentrated on unity in the struggle against apartheid. The strength of being "anti-apartheid" was, however, turned into its opposite: a source of weakness. In abstracting apartheid from its connections with capitalism and imperialism, the ANC has become a vector for the exploitative system. The SACP and ANC's strategy was a bourgeois class project. Black empowerment was for a select few millionaires. The "us" in the slogan "South Africa belongs to us!" is not the African masses but a black bourgeoisie that seeks to own and control the postapartheid democracy as its property.

In the South African context, nationalization of the mining conglomerates and their transformation into social property would be the last word of the democratic revolution and the first word of the socialist revolution, a measure that great energy was spent to ensure did not happen. This is the connection with socialism, which remains an unavoidable fight against capitalism and imperialism.

Politically, one chapter has ended, and new terms of struggle based on a split from the ANC alliance are being addressed. Questions of how the movement is built, from within or outside the trade unions, from above or below, whether there will be participatory workers' control over social struggles, and the form of political representation of the oppressed are all in contention.

The mission of critical political economy should be to reinforce the efforts of the masses, not to offer up alternative economic policies for the consideration of the bourgeoisie. The system of accumulation of capital wrests on the conversion of surplus value into capital and must therefore encompass the mode of exploitation of the working class and how this is reproduced systemically. I have argued that the mode of exploitation of the racially oppressed before and during apartheid was a form of super-exploitation. Marikana demonstrates the continuation of super-exploitation in postapartheid class relations as well. The classical Marxist theories of imperialism that owed so much to material relating South Africa and Britain need to be refreshed in the light of this experience.

Most of the writers cited in this survey, including the present author, are white males and academics, many based in the global North. Allow then a penultimate comment on the diluting effects on theory that is mediated through layers of social privilege. Critical political economy can only make a step forward if it embraces theories and perspectives that originate in working-class experiences in the global South. So informed, it can help illuminate the fundamental continuities of racially oppressive class exploitation and investigate super-exploitation in South Africa today. Yet the outright rejection of dependency theory by still influential authors (Callinicos 1994; Fine and Harris 1979; Legassick 1976) is holding back the revolutionary contribution of Marxism. To avoid recognition of the greater exploitation of workers in the global South is as incorrect theoretically as it is unedifying morally; above all, it is misleading politically as to the principal agency of revolutionary change that will come from the oppressed. I have argued that a generation ago, such evasion of super-exploitation missed the essence of apartheid in South Africa; today it misses the essence of global apartheid.

Cabral's and Fanon's thesis has been realized in the negative in South Africa. The paradox of postapartheid has been that so long as the masses trusted the ANC, any substantive alternative strategy would be politically inoperable. The Marikana Massacre changed that. Although the ideological spell has been broken, the deal that the ANC and its allies struck means that the legacies of racial capitalism are still being reproduced. The profits that flow into South African corporations from across Africa, and

simultaneously flow out from its workers to the global centers of financial power, indicate that postapartheid has descended into a particular set of neocolonial relations of collaboration, a *neocolonialism of a special type*.

Azania is still on the way. The full potential of the African masses is yet to be realized, but they are once again finding the way forward.

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Anti-capitalism

▶ Peru, Underdevelopment, and Anti-imperialism

Anti-colonial

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Anti-colonial Conferences

▶ League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

Anti-colonial Movement

▶ League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

Anti-colonialism

▶ Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts Against British Imperialism
▶ Senghor, Lamine (1889–1927)

Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)

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Synonyms

Anti-Imperialism; Antiwar Movements; Imperialism; Socialism

Definition

The 1960s was crucially marked by anti-colonialism, as the states that gained their independence during that decade were twice as numerous as those of the previous two decades combined. This essay aims at addressing the different aspects of anti-colonialism in the 1960s and 1970s, both in the way it was expressed in the former colonies and in relation to the impact it had within imperialist countries. This impact was visible in the formation of antiwar and anti-imperialist movements, as well as movements inspired by anti-colonial struggles.

Introduction

In 1971, Ariel Hoffman and Armand Matterlard published *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist*

Ideology in the Disney Comic in Chile during the short period of Salvador Allende's presidency. Soon after Pinochet's coup d'état, the book was banned and the remaining copies were destroyed. In just a decade, this title had been published in 15 different countries and translated into 16 different languages. This example is emblematic of the depth of the struggle between the imperialist camp and the (former) colonies and dependent countries that went beyond politics and economics to include the cultural field. In basic Marxist terms, it can be argued that during the 1960s and 1970s, imperialism was heavily criticised not only at the level of the economic base, but also at the level of the superstructure.

This essay aims at addressing the different aspects of anti-colonialism in the 1960s and 1970s, both in the way it was expressed in the former colonies and in relation to the impact it had within imperialist countries. This impact was visible in the formation of antiwar and anti-imperialist movements, as well as movements inspired by anti-colonial struggles (e.g. The Black Panther Party for Self-Defence in the US, or ETA in Spain). Before proceeding to the analysis, we will need to outline the evolution that the Second World War brought about in the world capitalist system with respect to the end of colonialism in its original form and its transformation into neo-colonialism. An enlightening periodisation of decolonisation is provided in Betts (2004) and Rothermund (2006), both of whom provide glossaries of terms or historical events that can help the reader conceptualise the issues dealt with in this essay.

The post-Second World War period was undoubtedly marked by national liberation movements in the former colonies of Western imperialist countries. Decolonisation was initiated in the 1940s with the formation of six independent states, followed by ten more in the 1950s. But it was the decade of the 1960s that was crucially marked by anti-colonialism, since the states that gained their independence during that decade were twice as numerous as those of the previous two decades combined (Betts 2004: 112–113). The need to study imperialism and anti-colonialism when investigating the aforementioned period has been stressed by historians and

other social scientists who have studied this era. As Frederic Jameson emphasises in his milestone article on the 1960s:

> It does not seem particularly controversial to mark the beginnings what would come to be called the 60s in the third world with the great movement of decolonization in British and French Africa. It can be argued that the most characteristic expressions of a properly first world 60s are all later than this, whether they are understood in countercultural terms – drugs and rock – or in the political terms of a student new left and a mass antiwar movement. Indeed, politically, a first world 60s owed much to third-worldism in terms of politicocultural models, as in a symbolic Maoism, and, moreover, found its mission in resistance to wars aimed precisely at stemming the new revolutionary forces in the third world. . . . The one significant exception to all this is in many ways the most important first world political movement of all – the new black politics and the civil rights movement, which must be dated, not from the Supreme Court decision of 1954, but rather from the first sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, in February of 1960. Yet it might be argued that this was also a movement of decolonization, and in any case the constant exchange and mutual influences between the American black movements and the various African and Caribbean ones are continuous and incalculable throughout this period. (1984: 180)

In this context, adopting the notion of the 'Long Sixties' – as elaborated by Arthur Marwick (2012) – can help conceptualise the period, whose beginnings may be said to coincide with the emergence of decolonisation struggles of the mid-1950s, as in Algeria or the Second Indochina War (Vietnam War), and their influence on the youth and radical movements in the rest of the world.

Post-Second World War Imperialism and Colonialism

The Second World War brought about momentous changes in the global balance of forces, with the US now being the leading imperialist country, the Axis-related imperialisms not only having been defeated, but also subjugated to (mainly US) imperialism. The East, from the Balkans to China a few years later, was now largely red. And the former colonies had initiated a process of decolonisation through a variety of means, from pleas to the United Nations to armed

struggle. The impact of these changes on imperialist countries was felt on three levels:

- The first level concerned the changes that decolonisation brought to each imperialist country's position on the geopolitical chessboard, since the loss of former colonies entailed not only economic losses but also loss of the political and military control of geographical regions.
- The second level concerned changes to the equilibrium between the West and the East, understood in terms of the two mutually exclusive worlds of capitalism and that of socialism.
- The third level reflected the contradictions within imperialist countries that were intensified by the emergence of anti-war and anti-colonial/anti-imperialist movements, and, in some cases, movements of various minorities with demands ranging from equality to separatism or autonomy. These movements were to a great extent inspired by the anti-colonial struggles in the so-called 'Third World' (on the lack of concrete conceptualisation of this term, see Tomlinson 2003: 307–321). The most distinctive case was that of the Vietnam War and the impact it had on a global scale on the rise of the anti-war movement and the radicalisation of youth movements.

Each imperialist country had to face the new reality and develop its own strategy and tactics towards this decolonisation process. There were a variety of different approaches on the part of each imperialist country towards each former colony's demand for independence. There were cases in which independence was granted without the necessity for armed struggle. Nevertheless, in every case, the former colonial forces focused on safeguarding their interests, either by denying independence or by imposing – or attempting to impose – their successors, drawn from the local ruling classes. The end of formal empires did not bring the end of colonialism *ex facto* (Hobsbawm 1995: 199–222). What it actually did was to transform the nineteenth and early twentieth- century

imperial–colonial nexus into the post-Second World War imperialism–neo-colonialism nexus. In this latter nexus, independence would be nominally granted to the former colonies while, in reality, imperialism aimed at retaining control and perpetuating its regime of domination and exploitation (on the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism, see Rothermund 2006: 258–274). The global geopolitical realignment was also determined by the fact that, apart from the US in the West and the Soviet Union in the East, all the other major players on the international chessboard had been either defeated or weakened during the Second World War.

Workers and Oppressed Peoples and Nations of the World, Unite!

The above exhortation was used by the Communist Party of China in its document 'A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement' http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm (03 June 2013). This document, published in 1963, captures the momentum of the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggles of the period I am dealing with. Important anti-colonial struggles exploded in formerly French colonies such as Algeria and Indochina, and Dutch colonies such as Indonesia. Despite these significant anti-colonial and national liberation struggles that took place in the vast majority of the so-called 'Third World', the milestone of the era was the struggle in Vietnam. As a consequence of this view of Truth, Gandhi was always ready to amend his ideas and change his mind about actions already undertaken and underway. This has been criticised by many, even in his own times, as being inconsistent or opportunistic. This is not only due to the fact that the Vietnamese anti-colonial struggle lasted for almost three decades – having been initially formed in order to fight against French rule in the 1940s and 1950s, later struggling against US imperialism until the defeat of the latter in the mid-1970s – but mainly because

this defeat was inflicted upon the main force within the Western camp, the US. The Vietnam War led to a global solidarity movement, and had an impact on the formation or radicalisation of many social movements – especially youth movements – as well as on the emergence of anti-US, anti-imperialist sentiment throughout the world.

Anti-colonialism cannot be viewed or treated *en bloc*. Different political and social forces led anti-colonial struggles and the overall decolonisation process in each country. On the one hand, there were conservative or progressive bourgeoisies that sought an independent state – i.e. political independence – through which they could gain a bigger share of the wealth and power than was possible during the colonial period. On the other hand, there existed radical and revolutionary forces whose aims were not limited to merely gaining political independence, but included transforming their societies as well. Questions regarding what was to be done the day after independence were not restricted to the geographical framework of the former colony, and led to the development of ideologies such as Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism or the use of the term 'Third World' as a global framework within which individual anti-colonial struggles were part. The ideologies of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism were developed, echoing voices in the anti-colonial camp that articulated how national liberation and social emancipation of the formerly colonial world could only be achieved through a project of unifying the newly liberated areas, rather than through upholding singular paths for each one taken separately. One of the most distinctive representatives of this approach, Kwame Nkrumah, a leader of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa and the first president of Ghana, wrote:

> Three alternatives are open to African states; first, to unite and to save our continent; secondly, to continue in disunity and to disintegrate; or thirdly, to sell out and capitulate before the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism. As each year passes, our failure to unite strengthens our enemies and delays the fulfillment of the aspirations of our people. (Nkrumah 1973: 125)

It emblematic of this trend that Nkrumah, who found himself in exile in the mid-1960s after his rule had been overthrown in a coup (Birmingham 1995: 22), created a publishing house named 'Panaf Books', specialising in Pan-Africanism and other related issues. (See http://www.panafbooks.com/History.html, (04 June 2013).

The anti-colonial struggle not only involved the imperialists and the anti-colonial forces. The situation was often complicated by the position of the two main forces in the communist camp, China and the Soviet Union. The communist camp faced a split in the early 1960s that affected the struggles in the former colonies. The communist forces that played a significant role in the anti-colonial struggle aligned themselves either with China or the Soviet Union. There have been cases, especially in the 1970s, where the anticolonial camp within a country splintered into two or more different sides, often leading to civil war (e.g. Angola; see Rothermund 2006: 231–238).

In order to analyse the anti-colonial struggles of the period, either in a single case or in general terms, the following factors ought to be taken into consideration:

- The sociopolitical and economic forces that formed and led the anti-colonial struggle
- The colonial forces and their potential for forging alliances and for transformation according to shifting circumstances (e.g. the transition from the French to the US in Vietnam)
- The position of the Soviet Union and China towards the anti-colonial struggle as a local focus of a wider ideological and political conflict, which must be assessed both in terms of diplomacy (statements, speeches in international fora and organisations) and in terms of material support (supplying arms and ammunition, military training).

In the Belly of the Beast: Struggles within Imperialist Countries

'[T]he revolutionary movement has never been so powerful in the world, now that the Third World

movements for liberation and economic independence have been joined to the anti-capitalist struggle in the imperialist centres.' This quotation, by Etienne Balibar (1977: 194) addresses the significance of the relation between, on the one hand, the anticolonial struggles and, on the other hand, struggles within the imperialist countries. The interpenetration of the two struggles cannot be stressed enough. The interaction of the two struggles – of those in the 'Third World' and those in imperialist and capitalist countries – should not be perceived as equal. The struggles in the 'Third World' were, as we will see later, inspirational – mainly for the youth and the oppressed minorities – in the so-called 'First' and 'Second' Worlds; but there is no evidence, or at least evidence of an equal impact, of inspiration also flowing in the opposite direction.

The impact of anti-colonial movements on the imperialist and other capitalist countries, or on non-colonial countries, is visible in two different categories that have historically interacted with each other. The first was the development of anti-war and anti-imperialist movements in imperialist countries. These emerged as a direct result of expressions of solidarity with anti-colonial struggles. The second was the development of both theoretical positions and movements that were either inspired, guided, or otherwise affected by anti-colonial struggles.

As far as the former category is concerned, Vietnam should be considered the anti-colonial struggle that played the most significant role in creating a global anti-war movement. Vietnam was the womb from which emerged what we now refer to as the 'Long Sixties'. Although the seeds had already been there since the period of the Algerian War and the Cuban Revolution, among others (Kalter 2013: 24). As Christoph Kalter states:

> [T]his war was perceived by contemporary 68ers as being part of a larger Third World problematic shaped by the confrontation of 'imperialism' and 'anti-imperialism'. (2013: 24)

Kalter underlines the fact that the notion of 'Third World' was also crucial for many of the protesters of the 1960s since:

> [t]he concept allowed for a radical critique of existing systems of power and representations while permitting them at the same time to elaborate equally radical alternatives. The Third World stimulated the transnational mobilization of protest movements. It had profound effects on worldviews and self-images of intellectuals and activists. (ibid.)

Regardless of the national particularities and dimensions of each movement, activists of the 1960s and the 1970s regarded themselves as part of a global movement with the anti-colonial struggles at the vanguard. 'The storm of the people's revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America requires every political force in the world to take a stand. This mighty revolutionary storm makes the imperialists and colonialists tremble and the revolutionary people of the world rejoice' (Communist Party of China 1963). It is no coincidence that this was a high tide for separatist movements in imperialist countries, including movements of the Basques in Spain, then Corsicans in France, and Francophones in Quebec. Anticolonial struggles also constituted the ideological and political basis for groups like the German 'Red Army Faction' (Moncourt and Smith 2009). Furthermore, the fact that race issues were placed at the top of the agenda in countries like the US, culminating in the formation of political organisations focusing on people of specific race/ethnicity such as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defence (see Seale 1991) or the Young Lords (Enck-Wanzer 2010) cannot be fully comprehended outside of the context of anti-colonialism. An incident that highlights this relationship is featured in the documentary *Eldridge Cleaver: Black Panther* (1970), directed by William Klein. The documentary was filmed in Algiers where, in addition to Cuba and France, Eldridge Cleaver had found refuge while in exile. William Klein met Cleaver at the Pan-African Cultural Festival in 1969, where Cleaver had been officially invited by the Algerian government to participate along with his African-American Information Centre.

One should not forget the impact of revolutionary figures like Ho Chi Minh and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara 'on the youth all over the world. Their names became slogans chanted

during demonstrations and their figures were printed in posters hung on the walls in university dormitories and political hangouts. Che's quote urging the creation of 'two, three, many Vietnams' (Guevara 1998/1967) became an inspiration and a motivation for activists in both the West and the East.

Fighting with Cameras and Typewriters

The anti-colonial struggle not only had an influence in terms of revolutionary practice, but also in terms of political and ideological theory per se and in terms of art and literature. In this connection, we must note the effect of anti-colonialism on the 'most valuable means of mass agitation', namely cinema (J.V. Stalin, 'Thirteenth Congress of the R.C.P. (B.)', http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/TPC24.html [5 June 2013]). More broadly, we must discuss the impact of anti-colonial struggles on Western intellectuals.

The aforementioned William Klein (IMDb n.d.) is just one example of many artists who aligned themselves with the anti-colonial forces through their work. Klein's films, such as *Far from Vietnam* (1967; co-directed with Chris Marker, Agnès Varda, and Jean-Luc Godard), *Mr. Freedom* (1969) and Festival *Panafricain d'Alger* (1969), are directly related to the anti-colonial struggles of the 1960s. Another example is the Dutch filmmaker Joris Ivens (Europese Stichting n.d.), who had been influenced by anti-colonial struggles as early as the 1940s, when he filmed *Indonesia Calling*! (1946). He also made films about Cuba, China, Laos, and Vietnam during the 'Long Sixties': *Six Hundred Million with You* (1958), *Pueblo Armado* (1961), *Carnet de Viaje* (1961), *Far from Vietnam* (1967), *The 17th Parallel* (1968), *The People and their* Guns (1970), *Meeting with President Ho Chi Minh* (1970), *How Yukong Moved Mountains* (1976). And of course, one must mention one of the most influential films of this period, Gillo Pontecorvo's *The Battle of Algiers* (1966), a film that 'painted one of the most vivid pictures of Western colonialism and Third World resistance ever put on film' (Elbaum 2006: 23). The trend of political films during the 1960s and 1970s focusing on the anti-colonial struggles of the Third World (Wayne 2001) was so strong and pervasive that it acquired the term 'Third Cinema':

> The original ideas of Third Cinema, as with all such political and aesthetic movements, were a product of both the social and historical conditions of the time, particularly those prevailing in the 'Third World.' Poverty, government corruption, fraud 'democracies,' economic and cultural neo-imperialisms, and brutal oppression affected many Third World countries. These conditions required an appropriate response, and radical revolutionary movements rapidly sprang up to contest reactionary politics and to champion those whom Frantz Fanon called 'the wretched of the earth.' Third Cinema was in many ways an effort to extend the radical politics of the time into the realm of artistic and cultural production. (Gabriel n.d.)

In addition to the arts, like cinema, which were at once inspired by, and provided inspiration to, the struggles and activists worldwide, we must note a sharp transformation in academic thought in its relationship to anti-colonialism. For example, the formation of academic disciplines such as Colonial/Post-colonial Studies and Black Studies in American Universities (now usually known as African-American Studies) has been a direct result of anti-colonial struggles. One impact these struggles and movements had on the student mobilisations, especially in the US, was that the student movement took on as one of its central tasks dissemination of the history of the oppressed. In addition, students connected the anti-colonial struggle to the struggle for their own future – that is, to their demands for an education better suited to their needs. This led to the emergence of intellectuals from the heart of these movements, like Amiri Baraka, or the rise in popularity of intellectuals like C.L.R. James or Edward W. Said who, despite having been born in the colonies, had been active mainly in imperialist centres.

Another direct impact was the orientation that Economic Development studies took during that era, especially in the growing popularity of the dependency theory, some of the best-known proponents of which have been Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel, Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, and

Paul Sweezy. One of the most popular periodicals of this school of thought has been *Monthly Review,* first published in 1949. Dependency theory first appeared before the 1960s but reached its peak during the 1960s and 1970s, precisely due to the high tide of anti-colonialism.

However, anti-colonialism not only influenced fields of studies and research as a whole, but also impacted intellectuals on an individual level. One typical case is that of Jean-Paul Sartre, whose contribution on this topic has often been neglected (Paige 2010: 227–228; Wolin 2010). Sartre took a highly active anti-colonial stand, and joined his thought to that of thinkers like Frantz Fanon, one of the best-known and most influential anti-colonial writers, for whose infamous *The Wretched of the Earth* Sartre wrote a preface (Fanon 1963). Other thinkers published works on a variety of academic fields such as history and political science, like the now conservative David Horowitz (then part of the New Left), who produced important literature such as *From Yalta to Vietnam* (1969), and Herbert Marcuse, who *published An Essay on Liberation* (1969) and *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (1972).

Conclusion

During the 1960s and 1970s, the only certain thing was that everything was uncertain. Revolution was in the air, and the Absaloms of the world, who believed that their societies were mired in boredom and indifference, were proven wrong. One of the reasons that not only boredom was absent, but in reality there was a constant movement and upheaval, was the existence of anti-colonialism, the theory and practice of which affected not only the (former) colonies and colonial powers, but the whole world. The globe was a theatre of war and revolution. For almost two decades, every social and cultural practice, from music and film to books and reading habits, was transformed in the light of anti-colonial struggles. That period led to the emergence of intellectuals from below, with political activists becoming researchers for the needs of the struggle.

There is a very popular anecdote in Greece which tells how, during the 1970s in the Greek universities, one of the key questions that troubled the student movement was whether China had sent rice to Pinochet's Chile. Radicals worldwide were troubled during the period under consideration by similar questions on issues concerning countries far away, with which they had no actual relation, apart from being part of an imaginary global revolutionary process. Yet, what is the legacy of the anti-colonial movement of the 1960s and 1970s? A very popular phrase in contemporary social movements is 'think globally, act locally'. The essence of the 1960s and 1970s is that a national liberation or an anti-colonial victory was regarded as one's own by people who acted on a local or national level, but at the same time had a strong belief that their struggle was essentially helping the Vietcong, for example, move one step forward towards seizing power.

This spirit of being part of a transnational project helped intellectuals and artists to overcome the limits of national cultures and perceptions and try to place their works in a wider context. (see Klimke and Scharloth 2008). And along with the war(s), a hope for a better future was brought home. 'Bring the war home' was a popular slogan of the anti-war movements during the Vietnam War (http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/08/09/bring_the_war_home.php [04 June 2013]). A lot seemed to be changing during the 'Long Sixties'. As shown in this essay, this period, as well as the issues involved in it, should be elaborated in a critical manner, without an attempt to either idealise or demonise what took place.

Cross-References

▶ Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism
▶ Cinema and Anti-imperialist Resistance
▶ Cold War Imperialism and Anti-imperialist Protests at the End of the Cold War
▶ Guerrilla Warfare and Imperialism

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Anti-imperialism

Anti-imperialism in Greece and Turkey Regarding Cyprus (1950s and 1960s)

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Synonyms

Anti-Imperialism; Cyprus; Greece; NATO; Turkey

Definition/Description

The Greek and Turkish in the membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has inhibited anti-colonial resistance in Cyprus to American, British, and Western European foreign domination. As a result of the foreign presence in Cyprus, while the country is nominally independent, it remains subordinate to the military, political and economic influence of the United States and foreign powers. The country exhibits the characteristics of a semi-colony rather than an independent state and remains economically backward in Europe.

Introduction

Since the Second World War, the US has managed to become an informal empire (Pantich and Gindin 2012), with 'Washington able to set the parameters within which the other capitals [have] determined their course of action' (Lundestad 2003, p. 64). Together with the advance of imperialist rule, however, resistance to it also advanced (Said 1994, p. xxiv). In Greece and Turkey, resistance to imperialism rested upon one basic premise: the asymmetric alignment with the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had turned Greece and Turkey into a US dependency, even a semi-colony. Although colonial status was not actually imposed in either country (Bozarslan 2008, pp. 423–427), genuine democracy was deemed to have become impossible and economic underdevelopment inevitable.

The left presented imperialist powers as foreign conquerors who were maintaining their countries in a state of virtual occupation (EDA 1961a; TİP 1963). Greece and Turkey had been transformed into the colonial, or semi-colonial, subjects of imperialist powers, chiefly the US, which exploited these nations by using their geographical, military, strategic, and economic positions. In other words, it was believed that Greece and Turkey were among those countries of the periphery that supplied imperialist powers with an important market and sources of raw materials and soldiers for imperialist wars, as in the Korean War (1950–53). Thus, both countries could neither form nor execute an independent national policy as imperialist powers were oppressing, denationalising, and colonising them.

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate in what way anti-imperialism was used in the case of Cyprus; an issue with national meaning for both countries. Indeed, Cyprus presents 'an episode of contention' for two (Greek and Turkish) conflicting nationalisms. As anti-imperialism

was one of the leftist 'weapons', our analysis will limit itself to the leftist parties: the United Democratic Left (EDA) in Greece, and the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP) in Turkey. Instead of trying to define what anti-imperialism is, we will try and place anti-imperialist rhetoric and actions in the domain of practical politics. In other words: 'socialism becomes what socialists do' (Sassoon 2001, p. 50).

Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA, 1951–67)

After the arrival of a British colonial presence in Cyprus in 1878, Greek irredentist nationalism, under the guise of *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece), gradually became a massive movement. The Hellenic ethnic character of Cypriot society, the role of the Church, and the political programme of *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), aimed at encompassing all ethnic Greek-inhabiting areas in a Greek state, provided the foundational elements and legitimacy for this process (Anagnostopoulou 2004a, pp. 198–228), in which Britain was instrumental because it 'not only created the space for the introduction of Hellenism, it planted its seeds' (Varnava 2012, p. 33). Encapsulated particularly in the concept of *Megali Idea,* irredentism soon developed into a sort of political and cultural orthodoxy, 'the only ideology', of the Greek state (Stefanidis 2007, p. 17). After the Second World War, and especially after the Greek Civil War (1946–49), irredentism came to be expressed by the right and was associated with patriotism and anticommunism, excluding the left from the 'patriotic scene' of the country, especially, since the consequences of the Civil War were attributed *en bloc* to those of that political persuasion. *Ethnikofrosyni* (national-mindedness/loyalty to the nation), the updated ideological orthodoxy of pre-war Greece, emerged as an anti-communist platform; it was institutionalised in the security apparatus of the Greek state, and it served as 'a measure of loyalty to national integrity and the "prevailing social order"' (30).

Against this background, the Greek left, represented legally in Parliament by the EDA,

had constantly to prove its patriotism in order to be incorporated anew into Greek society. This was managed, painstakingly and not always successfully, through the national issue of Cyprus, the *Hellenicity* of which, as the EDA also claimed, was 'beyond argument'. As a matter of fact, 'nobody dared to question the Greekness of Megalonisos [Great Island] and the inalienable right of her people to unite with the national whole' (CQGP 1997: vol. 1, 40); a transition that, according to the left, would be achieved through self-determination; a stage that, because of the island's population being 80% Greek, would eventually lead to *enosis*. Self-determination however, could not be exercised because of Greece's dependency upon US imperialism (EDA 1961a, pp. 13–14), the primary goal of which was to 'preserve the state of vassalage' (EDA 1961b, pp. 8–9). Imperialism for EDA, in all of its aspects (economic, military, political), held the country captive, and made it unable to exercise an independent foreign policy that would set Cyprus free from British colonial administration and the imperialist designs in general. The party argued that the country's national independence was being removed, as demonstrated by US objections to Greece bringing the issue to the United Nations, or the lack of any direct or indirect reference there to Cyprus's self-determination (EDA 1955).

Both the left and the right held that Anglo-Saxon imperialism provided extensive assistance and support to Turkey; a belief that gained additional credence in Greek political circles after the events of September 1955 (19), when the Turkish government organised a pogrom against the Greek population of Istanbul in response to the anti-colonial events in Cyprus a few months before. These events signified for the left the grave need for all agreements that had been made with the Great Powers and Turkey to be terminated immediately (ASKI, EDA Archive, Box 478), because they 'turned the situation in Cyprus to a critical state, [. . .] which could lead to genocide' (CQGP: vol. 1, 267). The common politics and tactics of Turkey and Great Britain in Cyprus, and those of the US through NATO, were presented by the EDA as those of a 'common

imperialist camp' which acted on the basis of a common agenda: the perpetuation of the imperialist system through Cyprus. The increasing US interference in the domestic affairs of the country marked also the dynamic presence of Greek youth, which in large part supported the EDA and its belief that 'the restoration of its [the people's] dominant rights and *enosis* with Motherland Greece' (*Avgi*, 20 April 1955), would also mean the liberation of the country and Hellenism from its *par excellence* enemies the Americans and NATO; the 'New Perses' (the Titan god of destruction) that aimed at subjugating the people (*Avgi*, 6 December: 1958).

Following the bi-communal bloody events of December 1963, the Cyprus crisis reemerged along with the vehemence of anti-imperialism/anti-Americanism, in which 'the American imperialists and the Greek reactionaries organize in common a big conspiracy to close the issue of Cyprus, and overthrow democracy in Greece' (*Avgi*, 23 September 1964). The US stance on the Greek positions, as well as the Johnson Letter, with which the Turkish invasion of the island to stop the atrocities was stopped by the US, and the Fulbright Mission that followed, were all perceived as a grand conspiracy targeting Greece and the people of Cyprus (*Avgi*, 5–8 May 1964); see also the centrist newspaper *Ta Nea*, 8 and 11 April 1964); a conspiracy that aimed at turning Cyprus into a NATO base (CQGP: vol. 3, 281) to control and fulfil the imperialist countries' military designs in the region (CQGP, vol. 3: 200). The imperialist goal of transforming Cyprus into a NATO military base was a living proof that the Greek government wished to close the issue of Cyprus, while its propaganda tried to persuade the Greek people that only the US could 'give her [Cyprus] to us [the Greeks]', as happened with the London-Zürich Agreements of 1959. The government failed, however, to see that the interest of the Atlantic community came 'above any national interest' (CQGP: vol. 2, 262). As the party emphasised, the US always aimed at including Cyprus under the authority of the 'imperialist and colonialist NATO', a fact that was revealed every time by the speedy US acceptance of any plan the British proposed (EDA 1959, pp. 4–12).

For the EDA, the issue of Cyprus never stopped being an anti-colonial issue that could be solved through the united antiimperialist struggle; a consistent stance of the anti-Western, anti-NATO, and generally anti-imperialist climate of the period. The anti-imperialist, anti-Western agenda of the EDA was not always expressed through an open support of the Soviet Union's positions, mainly out of fear of the party being targeted for communistic actions, but there was a constant support of the Non-Aligned and Third-World countries and of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist climate as this was taking shape during the Cold War. Indeed, the EDA was very often referring to the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America and the Third World as comprising those forces whose support Greece should seek in relation to the Cyprus question (Odysseos 1964, p. 49). By hitting Cyprus, the imperialists 'wish to numb the morale of the liberation movements. They want to establish an offensive military base facing the "worrying" voices of the Afro-Asian shores' (Odysseos 1965, pp. 79–89). The imperialist conspiracy, one of the party supporters wrote, also managed to drag the Greek government in, because 'the Greek government never realized that, behind the official declarations, *enosis* through the establishment of an independent Cypriot state and ensuring self-determination means a national and fortified solution' (Diamantopoulos 1964, p. 3). This fortified solution was no other than the position of 'Independence–Self-determination–*Enosis*' (*Avgi*, 9 February 1967); the position that was shared also by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

Türkiye işçi Partisi (TİP, Workers' Party of Turkey, 1961–71)

For Turkey, the Cold War realities and her alliance with the West was a realisation of her vision of belonging to the West, as this was envisioned and dictated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his circle. Within the Cold War and following the NATO needs and 'directives', the Kemalist state adopted anti-communism and transmuted it into one of the main state ideology elements, appropriating at the

same time those Cold War elements that it deemed necessary to secure both national unity and the Western orientation of and identification with the nation. The result was a nationalist, anti-communist Kemalist right, adapted to the Cold War conditions, fighting the 'enemy' that came to be defined as 'the communist internal enemy that threatens the unity of the Turkish nation and as the external national enemy that threatens the security of the Turkish nation' (Anagnostopoulou 2004b, p. 180). The identification of communism with national threat, a common characteristic of Cold War, in the Turkish context meant 'nationalisation' of Islam, the Turkish pre-Cold War enemy, and putting it to the service of the nation.

The re-signification of Islam helped Turkey to *Turkify* the Ottoman past, or, at least, some aspects of it. In the case of Cyprus, being a former Ottoman territory, this meant that those elements deemed necessary were also attributed to Cyprus. It was expressed through an irredentism, in which the Turkish Cypriots were part of the Turkish nation. The Turkish Cypriots became, from that time onwards, part of the Turkish nation, who were threatened both by communism and by the national 'imperialist' enemy: the Greeks (182). The Greek threat of the early twentieth century, during the Turkish National Liberation period (1919–22), was developed and adapted in the Cold War context. In this, the Greek irredentist agenda of enosis worked as a catalyst to prove that the Greek threat was still evident and imminent, and helped to elevate the Cyprus Question as *milli dava* (national issue). Finally, by providing a national content and dimension to Cyprus, Turkey managed also not to distance herself from the Kemalist principle of *Misak-i Milli* (National Pact), another significant element for the Turkish left during the 1960s.

The Turkish left during the 1960s, represented in the National Assembly by the TİP, was characterized by two distinct characteristics: anti-imperialism and Kemalism, the former gaining its legitimacy and impetus through the latter. The anti-imperialism of the Turkish left came to be identified with an independent Turkish foreign policy, having as its main point of reference the

Cyprus question (Christofis 2015). As the party chairman Mehmet Ali Aybar argued, 'beneath the Cyprus question lie the interests of imperialism', and, therefore, Turkey 'is not able to pursue an independent foreign policy' (Aybar 1968, p. 322). Independent foreign policy, however, meant equal distance both from the Soviet Union and the US (97). Following the example of the Third World and Latin America (Ünsal 2003, pp. 247–252), the TİP associated, anti-imperialism among other things with nationalism, the latter being 'the ideological expression of our [Turkish] people against the foreign yoke, against imperialism and capitalism. [Nationalism] is resolutely attached to the idea of independence' (Aybar 1963, p. 9).

The TİP's significance lies in the fact that it managed to become one of the main anti-imperialist voices in Turkish politics. The main argumentation of the party was based on criticising the bilateral agreements and friendly relations of the Demirel Government with the US, which was responsible for the '35 million m^2 of Turkish land [that] are under American occupation' (Aybar 1965, p. 176). Not only the Demirel Government and the Justice Party, but all Turkish governments, the *comprador* bourgeoisie as the party referred to them, were severely criticised for betraying Turkey's national interests since Mustafa Kemal's death.

The Cyprus question demonstrated, according to the TİP that Turkey was in a *déjà vu* situation, and that the crisis in the island after 1963, caused by Makarios's attempt to amend the Constitution, proved to Turkish people that their country was confronting the same imperialist powers that she had fought during the Turkish National Liberation Struggle. In other words, Turkey was confronting anew the Anglo-Saxon imperialism and the ambition of the Greek bourgeoisie to fulfil the imperialism of the *Megali Idea* (Boran 1965). The party referred to the dependency on foreign capital that the country had fallen into as the trap of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. This dependency, and the true nature of Turkish–US relations, became apparent with the Johnson Letter, and at the same time forced the Turkish government to acknowledge how far it had been drawn away from Kemalist

principles (IISG, *Kemal Sülker Papers*, folder 558).

This feeling, that Greece had become the channel of imperialism, was verified and empowered by the Acheson Plan a few months later. The Plan was of US invention, promoting the *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece by vesting part of Cyprus to Turkey. The Turkish government should not accept the Acheson Plan, the party claimed, because it signified another imperialist intervention. It was enosis in 'disguise' and acceptance of it would mean approval of a solution contrary to the national interest, by giving the false impression of a country orbiting around Anglo-Saxon imperialism (Boran 1965).

The TİP's reaction to the US president's Johnson Letter (which deterred a possible Turkish military landing on Cyprus) and the Acheson Plan was to call for a common antiimperialist front of 'all the socialists and Atatürkists to unite their power for an independent foreign policy' (IISG, *Kemal Sülker Papers*, folder 551). Similarly, during the general congress held in the city of Malatya in 1966, it was decided that Turkey's primary agenda was to reach full independence by turning back to the foreign policy of Atatürk's Turkey during the National Liberation Struggle (TİP 1966). The national liberation war was portrayed by the TİP as the historical basis of its understanding of national independence. In the party's narration of that period, those years were depicted as ones of national awakening for the people living within the borders of the national pact. Aybar stated that 'forty-four years after the completion of the first one, we must begin a second National Liberation Struggle [. . .]. We are determined in the struggle until such time as the last American soldier has left our country' (IISG, *Kemal Sülker Papers,* box 610, folder 1). Atatürk's nationalism was the battle-standard against Western imperialism (Doğan 2010, p. 160).

Not a single government, TİP argued, 'had not realized, and did not want to realize, that Great Britain and the US, in relation with the Cyprus question, would be on the side of the Rum and the Greeks [Yunan]', because their interests are best served that way (IISG, *Kemal Sülker Papers,* box

610, folder 1). The British bases in Cyprus, and the support of *enosis* with Greece in order to make Cyprus a NATO member, were of prime importance to British and US interests: so what the Turkish governments called 'alliance' and 'friendship' was not a policy to be trusted by the people. With the Johnson Letter, the people realised this, and so participated in an anti-imperialist struggle in which, a party report notes, 'the Cyprus Question is the most tangible, the most scrutable and sensitive issue of the anti-imperialist struggle and the Second National Liberation movement for the masses and the public opinion' (IISG, box 558). 'The Cyprus Question is the point of reference', the party report continues, 'and of highest importance for the anti-imperialist struggle', but the government seemed unable to realise this and to oppose the US. Therefore, the Cyprus question presented a lost cause for the party, especially, since the undisputed right of the Turkish people to 'define its own fate' was taken away by imperialism and its domestic collaborator. Since Cyprus could not return to its rightful owner (i.e. Turkey), and the 'double enosis – partition' would be stopped by the Greek and Anglo-Saxon imperialists, then the best solution for Turkey and other smaller states, including the Third-World countries, would be a demilitarised, federated Cyprus. This became one of the fundamental positions of the TİP throughout the 1960s (Boran 1967, p. 79).

Conclusion

Since the end of the Second World War, the left had to operate in societies where nationalism was well entrenched and disseminated by powerful ideological state apparatuses (Althusser 2001), while Marxism was usually considered a non-patriotic foreign-driven ideology. Nationalism, in the distinct forms of Ethnikofrosyni and Kemalism, was the effective means by which the state was identified with society, and provided at the same time the fitting basis on which to construct the image of a homogenised will. The image of the national unity and the quest of the national interests proved to be substantially effective for

parties that sought legitimisation. In the attempt to present the left also as patriotic, and gain credentials and popularity by presenting itself as the vanguard of the whole nation, it came to adopt similar, if not identical, ideological tools to those of the dominant ideologies, filtered of course, through a leftist discourse, most notably, anti-imperialism and anticolonialism. During that process, the concept of nation's primacy became basic also to the actions of the anti-imperialist movement. While, on the one hand, anti-imperialism becomes the means for the left to mobilise the people, the mobilisation took place in the name of nationalism, and not in the name of anti-imperialism, or internationalism. In other words, socialism was subordinated to national ends, placing the anti-imperialist values of socialism at the service of the particularistic irredentist values of nationalism.

Thus, although always dominated by a consistent anti-imperialism/colonialism, the left aimed to fulfil the interests of the respective national centres. Furthermore, the goal of the left was not to acquire national independence for Cyprus that would lead to an independent nation state. Rather, in the Greek case, national independence would be a transitory stage to enosis; while, in the Turkish case, it meant that national independence was the necessary solution since Taksim (partition), or accession to Turkey, had been strongly opposed by Greece and the Great Powers. In other words, it seems that the left also got trapped in the anachronistic irredentism of the Motherlands; *enosis*, as demonstrated by the Greek and Greek Cypriot elite, was presented as the only national solution for the Greek Cypriot community. As a national solution, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community adopted a federated, demilitarised Cyprus only because the other choices did not present a feasible alternative and would eventually have led, according to the party, to serious problems.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Cold War
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Political Economy of the European Periphery
▶ Turkish Left and Anti-imperialism in the 1970s
▶ US Militarism and US Hegemonic Power

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Anti-Iranian Sentiment

▶ Pan-Arabism and Iran

Anti-nuclear Movement

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Anti-racism

▶ Pan-Africanism

Anti-slavery

▶ British Slavery and Australian Colonization

Antiwar Movements

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)

Arab Nationalism

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)
▶ Pan-Arabism and Iran

Arab Socialism

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Definition

Championed by prominent figures like Baath movement leader Michel Aflaq, Arab socialism was a dominant, almost hegemonic ideology of the Arab World throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition to the Baath Party movement, Arab socialism also influenced Nasser's Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Palestine, and Lebanon. Even though it identified itself with the term socialism, there were vast differences between Western Marxism and Arab socialism in their interpretations of reality, one glaring example being Arab acceptance of the importance of spirituality and the role of religion in societal culture. Other differences included Arab socialists' relatively benign treatment of private property, the bourgeois class and its role in exploitation of labour, their emphasis on the revolutionary role of the whole Arab nation rather than just the working

class, and finally their tendency to equate non-Arab socialism with Soviet practice. Hence, stemming from these philosophical differences, one may argue that Arab socialism, rather than being a movement of genuine resistance against prevailing conditions by the working class in the Arab world, was instead a pragmatic choice by Arab military/civilian bureaucratic elites in modernising their respective nations in the wake of their struggle for independence against Western imperialism. This then, leads us to an exploration of the historical causes that gave rise to what we call the modern state and its associated ideologies in the Middle East.

History of Modern Middle Eastern Societies

The most important determinant regarding Middle Eastern societies in their pre- and post-colonial history has been the structure of the state and how other prominent social forces position themselves and act against it. Although some Western writers have tended to view Ottoman and Middle Eastern precapitalist formations as identical to European feudalism, Ottoman-style land administration and the general organisation of agricultural production differed from that of the European model. First of all, the existence of huge tracts of state-owned land and communal properties in the Middle East played a primary role in preventing the emergence of a European-style feudal aristocracy within the empire. Second, peasants had more freedom in deciding which crops to cultivate: their main responsibility was tax paying and care of military men the state assigned to their land. In Ottoman lands, the state strictly controlled the use of its properties, since the entire edifice of government depended on the nexus between expansion of arable lands through conquest and their distribution among prominent military men (Quataert 1994). However, these military men largely acted as representatives of the sultan (a kind of a tax collector), rather than as the fully fledged landlords of medieval Europe. Another significant sign of the sultan's control over relationships in rural areas was the

appointment of *kadis* (religious judges) to supervise law and order, a system wholly dissimilar to the unbounded power of European feudal landlords in judicial matters within their territories. One should add that central control over land administration was not entirely homogeneous throughout the Empire: in some parts of the Middle East (such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq), privately owned land happened to be more widespread, leading to more pressure by landlords on peasants in the organisation of production (Gibb and Bowen 1957).

When European development began to surpass Ottoman technology and push the Empire from Central Europe in the late sixteenth century, military conquests which had formed the backbone of the perennial land administration system under Turkish rule came to a halt. The loss of a crucial source of revenue from conquests meant sultans faced the prospect of increasing taxes and other revenues from within their existing borders. The *iltizam* (tax farming) system was implemented to fulfil the urgent need for an intensive accumulation model to replace obsolete territorial expansion. This system envisioned a spur in revenues through delegating tax collection to regional *ayan*s (landlords). After bidding for a region's tax collection rights, the *ayan* tended to restrict the peasants' freedom in organisation of production (Pamuk 1994). This development was concurrent with the erosion of confidence in the justice system of the Empire. Although ayans gradually became a source of regional power, their pattern of behaviour did not echo that of the European bourgeoisie: their fortunes generally fluctuated according to the political climate at the centre. Rather than being interested in overseas excursions and capital accumulation through investment, or in the formation of a political alternative, Middle Eastern *ayan*s opted simply to increase the burdens on their peasant tenants and to buy political titles (symbols of power) from the Ottoman centre. The power of *ayan*s varied greatly according to the specificities of certain regions. While land distribution in Anatolia was relatively fairer than in Arab regions, issues of irrigation, transportation, and proximity to markets determined the state–*ayan* power

relationship. In this context, one may say that Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq witnessed a more unequal distribution of land and a more burdened peasantry, with the result that the first peasant rebellions against agrarian conditions erupted in these regions (Beinin 2001). From Anatolia to other parts of the Middle East, peasant rebellions opposed existing land distribution, arbitrary taxes and worsening regional living standards, but they were far removed from establishing any coherent political and economic alternative to the prevailing *İltizam* system. At the same time, the existence of these rebellions conflicts with Eurocentric Orientalist accounts depicting the regions' history as largely stagnant.

By the late eighteenth century, major European companies had begun to penetrate the Middle East and the Napoleonic wars and British industrial revolution had facilitated military and trade expeditions to the region. The region's rulers, mainly Ottomans, usually opted to collaborate with foreign merchants through benign trade deals with Europeans. The 1838 Baltalimani trade agreement, and ensuing capitulations given to foreigners by the Ottoman sultan in İstanbul and Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt, not only put local merchants and guilds at a disadvantage (since these deals meant that local traders paid more taxes than importers), but also accepted free-trade rules which greatly advanced the position of British and French manufacturing as opposed to Ottoman economic development needs (İnalcik and Quataert 1994). For example, in Egypt all manufacturing capacity was diverted to cotton-related businesses, which limited these regional economies to a single crop and indirectly made them dependent on British textile demands. These capitulations mainly stemmed from the Turkish Empire's lagging behind Europe in economic and technological developments, especially since the Empire's ill-fated second expedition to Vienna in 1688. Moreover, in the lands of the Middle East, industrialisation could not follow the same pattern of development as Europe. While European merchant and traders gradually freed themselves from the yoke of feudal aristocracy and initiated a town-based autonomous economy, the Ottoman manufacturing and trade system, dependent as it

was on strictly controlled small-scale guilds and large land owners, resisted competition and delayed the emergence of the wage–labour relation in terms of a capitalist economy. According to Charles Isawi, these guilds, small property owners, and their production and competitive capacities were hugely diminished in the wake of European penetration into regional markets. Even early signs of factory-level production and efforts at industrialisation came from Christian minorities in the Empire, who had connections with foreign merchants and were thus protected by capitulation agreements (İssawi 1980). Furthermore, the nature of the relationship of dominance in the Middle East – landlord–peasant, guild master–worker – meant production was less efficient and more locally focused, which in turn narrowed the dynamism and scale of the markets. State-led industrialisation attempts, especially in the weapons industry, also adhered to the same methods, and were beleaguered by official corruption and inefficiencies that failed to create a healthy working class that could be counted on as a source of demand.

In retrospective analysis, from 1838 to 1918, the Ottomans and Egyptian elite opted to create an economic growth that led to ever increasing indebtedness and capitulations to Europe, and in which local landlords and bureaucrats were the bridgeheads linking the Middle Eastern economy to the developing world markets. The foundation of Duyun-i-Umumiye and official surrendering of the Empire's finances to European control serve to summarise the hopelessness of the situation. Efforts at unionisation by the urban working class in the late nineteenth century were also precluded by ethnic and religious divisions, since most of these efforts were led by minority workers such as Jews, Greeks, or Armenians, and as we have mentioned above, peasant rebellions questioning existing power relationships and worsening living standards never came close to formulating a real political alternative that could be a source of social change. From 1918 to the end of the 1950s, what one saw in the Arab world was a relatively quickening economic development. This came about as a result of the Great Depression, which had the fortunate effect of leaving

Middle Eastern societies to their own local means, since the great powers such as the British and French had to struggle with their own domestic problems. However, the semicolonial Western-supported monarchies of the Arab world at this time failed to diminish either rural or urban economic inequality, or to address the problem of independence. Moreover, their mostly urban-based development of industry and service sectors also brought with it a young generation of intellectuals and rural migration to the cities, both of which would help form the base of future populist regimes (Beinin 2001). Since the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French and British had taken over mandate of areas stretching from Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and parts of the Arabian peninsula, in addition to their direct rule over Algeria and Egypt. The Arab revolt of 1936 greatly influenced the psyche of the region's inhabitants, as Arabs witnessed the brutal colonial suppressions of nationalist movements from Palestine to Algeria. Under those historical conditions, Arab radical socialists like Michel Aflaq, seeing no hope of real independence under Western-supported monarchies, decided to organise and rebel against the region's comprador powers.

Era of Change: Populist Regimes and Socialism

The mainly populist regimes of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt, Arab Socialist and Baath Party regimes in Syria and Iraq, and the Algerian FLN all came to power through military coups, a fact that made the backbone of these regimes radical military and civilian bureaucrats rather than a wide cross-section of the popular classes. However, that does not mean that these regimes lacked ideological hegemony over wide sections of their populations. The ruling parties espoused the idea of Arab socialism to embrace the lower classes, but an inquiry into working-class influence on the political process reveals that only upper-income, highly skilled and unionised sections of the class were influential in decision-making circles (excluding poorer sections). In terms of their reformist and 'revolutionary

nature', these authoritarian regimes opted for the highly protectionist state-led import substitution model, and large-scale agrarian reform that aimed to redistribute lands from the wealthier classes to the peasantry. Through these two policies, the ruling elite gradually built up a paternalistic relationship with both the countryside and the urban working class; a development which, in the words of Joel Beinin, empowered and disempowered the popular classes at the same time (Beinin 2001).

In order to understand the ideological framework of Arab socialism, one has to grasp the meaning of Arab nationalism, since it forms the kernel from which other associated ideologies like Baath emerged. Militaryled governments in the Middle East after the Second World War, seeing their movement as a response to Arab humiliation by Ottomans and then Western powers, defined their eventual goal as unification of the Arab nation. Centuries-long colonial ties and struggles determined the very essence of these regimes as anti-Western, a stand which unequivocally paved the way for adaption of the socialist development idea, in opposition to a post-war Western world strictly identified with capitalism. The last nail in the coffin of western credibility among Arabs was the uncritical support Western governments provided to the state of Israel and the division of historic Palestine. The predicament of Palestinians against a pro-Western force in the heart of the Middle East not only damaged the psyche of the region's population, but also entirely undermined the position of pro-Western forces in these countries. In the words of two main ideologues of Arab nationalism, Michel Aflaq and Gamal Abdul Nasser, their cause was different from ordinary nationalism, and aimed to unite the spirit of the Arab nation, since they saw perennial subordination to colonial powers and internal divisions as the main causes of underdevelopment and backwardness (Sluglett 1992). In this grand conceptualisation of Arab identity, cultural components of that identity – such as Islam, Arab belief in social justice and so forth – were attributed uncritical positive qualities. Thus, the military coups of patriotic officers and the Baath Party were undertaken to overcome this apparent

contradiction between Arab spirituality and material conditions on the ground in the Middle East.

After situating Arab socialist regimes in an economic and political framework, one may begin to dissect the glaring differences between Arab and Marxist socialism in terms of ideological and ontological subjects.

Theoretically, the main divergence between Arab socialists and what they consider Western Marxism is how the former understood the issue of exploitation. The movement's leaders, like Aflaq and Egyptian intellectual Muhammad Haykal, identified exploitative practices with the decades-long Arab experience of Western colonialism and its collaborators in monarchies (Haykal 1968). Rather than trying to find a social foundation for the term, these authors had an arbitrary manner of diagnosing what constituted exploitation. Unlike Marx's argument that it is the appropriation of surplus value during the production process, Arab socialists tended to see it as a form of contemptuous human behaviour, especially apparent in some upper-class greed for disproportionate wealth and the desire to display this wealth. Thus, logically, they stressed that if an individual truly subsumes the essence of Arab nationalism and works for national unity, that individual will not resort to exploitative practices. Hence, Arab socialism attributed the basis of exploitation to human volition. In fact, this idealist thinking pattern was not surprising, since it justified Arab military and civilian bureaucracies' own position towards various social classes, as it theoretically facilitated the separation of loyal capitalists from exploiters. Also, this political understanding helped them control trade-union and communist organisation activities, since any proceeding from Marx's original conceptualisation inevitably brought forth the question of the proportion of working-class involvement in the Arab socialist project. As a further step, and in light of the explanation above regarding the nature of exploitation, writers like Haykal and Aflaq refuted the Marxist notion of class struggle. According to them, the Marxist class struggle is too extreme in its conception and in its consequences of annulling human freedom and individualism for the sake of society's well-being (Aflaq 1968). On this point, these authors, rather than engaging with Marx's original writings on the subject, tended to divert their criticism to the practices of existent socialism in the Soviet Union. Like their counterparts in Baath, Mohhamad Haykal and Clovis Maqsud tried to abstract the USSR experience both from the historical and social conditions that influenced Soviet reality and from the intra-Marxist disputes pertaining to the nature of bureaucratisation and Stalinism. As a concomitant fact, one may stress the following: if the foundation of the class struggle is not the production process itself, then objectively determining the egalitarian distribution of society's wealth in Arab socialism is controversial. Since the nature of trade-union activities were also evaluated on the basis of their primary loyalty to Arab national unity, Arab socialism further disempowered civil society, while criticising communism as an ideology that kills individual spirit (Maqsud 1968). Furthermore, emphasis on the free individual (accepted as an achievement of Western capitalism) by these writers ignored the historical struggles of Western working classes to gradually win their democratic rights against the powers that be. In the Arab socialist understanding, an Arab worker was already a free individual, as their government saved them from the yoke of tyranny and imperialism. In addition to all of the above, Arab socialist regimes tried to balance the USSR and the Western blocs in their quest for development aid, as a result of which the aforementioned authors were at pains to emphasise the differences between their socialism and what they called the crude materialism of the Soviet Union.

One significant issue that we can point out in terms of the variance of Arab socialists from Western Marxism was the role of religion in everyday life and politics in their countries. Unlike Karl Marx's argument depicting religion largely as the opium of the masses, in the Middle East, socialist writers crafted a revolutionary role for religion, especially Islam. For example, in his writings on co-operative socialism, Ramadan Lawand argued that Marxism's insistence on materialism turned it into a thought pattern that lacked spirituality (Lawand 1968). Former

Al-azhar preacher Mahmud Shaltut, in his quest to reconcile Islam and socialist ideas, wrote that issues like social solidarity and the fight against behavioural excesses (i.e. luxurious consumption) were also part of Islam's indispensible agenda. As a corollary to this, Shaltut pointed out the programmatic similarities between Islam and Arab socialists (Shaltut 1968). In a further demonstration of these opinions, Michel Aflaq tried to save Arab socialism's secular leanings by referring to the erroneous application of genuine Islam in the Arab world, which in itself justified a renewal of religion through the socialist governments, this time by implementation of the correct and progressive nature of Islam. Hence, Aflaq professed the essence of Arab identity to be Islamic, and since their cause was a call for betterment of Arab society, their religion could not be anything but revolutionary (Aflaq 1968). All these attempts to integrate religion into Arab nationalist and socialist paradigms, albeit without a strong philosophical foundation, were the results of Arab socialists' search for quick legitimacy among the population, since otherwise the narrow social base of the ruling elite would be too transparent. Also, in the Arab experience, a history that did not witness any secular struggle against religious institutions or any call for social justice and equality inevitably anchored its ethical reference to Islam, since the reversal of that would mean tacit acceptance of the Marxist critique of the social roots of religion.

In a short summary of these historical and ideological discussions, one may argue that Arab socialism and its immediate predecessor Arab nationalism were historically specific ideologues of Arab ruling elites, which were used by them to overcome problems of modernisation and underdevelopment (Karpat 1968). The heavy presence of bureaucratic authoritarianism, coupled with passive acceptance by trade unions and the Arab left of the status quo under Nasser or Baath Party rule, greatly disempowered the working class and prevented the emergence of a reliable opposition. This partially forced silence of the left was another reason – the biggest factor being the humiliating defeat of Arab armies by Israel in 1967 – that facilitated the transition from Arab socialism to neo-liberal forms of rule, beginning with Anwar Sadat's rule in Egypt. In terms of their economic and social development goals, Arab socialist and nationalist regimes were more successful than their neo-liberal counterparts, which acted to integrate the region's economies into the global economy under IMF tutelage (Kadri 2012). However, in the final analysis, Arab socialism was insufficient in constructing a viable alternative either to Western capitalism or Soviet socialism. As mentioned earlier, Arab intellectuals and statesmen lacked an ontological analysis of the system in their own time, which reminds us of Marx's premise that any socialist ideology should be a ruthless critique of existing order.

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Arabs

▶ Women's Rights and Western Imperialism in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Arafat, Yasser (Abu Ammar) and the Palestine Liberation Organization

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Definition

Yasser Arafat, (Abu Ammar), affectionately known as El Khityar (the old man) lived from 1929–2004. He was at the heart of the Palestinian struggle and the uncontested leader of the revolution for four decades. The struggle of the PLO, under Arafat's leadership, had a huge global impact, particularly on the global South.

Arafat, Yasser (Abu Ammar) (1929–2004) and the Palestine Liberation Organisation

Yasser Arafat, (Abu Ammar), affectionately known as El Khityar (the old man) lived from 1929–2004. He was at the heart of the Palestinian struggle and the uncontested leader of the revolution for four decades. The days following his death showed the man's immense popularity in Palestine and the world. Arafat was the embodiment of his people's cause; an iconic freedom fighter who actively led his people in their struggle to liberate their homeland. He was a major force in uniting his people under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and was devoted to the cause. He spent time with the fighters in the bases, the families in the refugee camps, the activists, and the militants. He lived as they did. His people saw him as the only member of the PLO leadership who was truly one of them. Moreover, the struggle of the PLO, under Arafat's leadership, had a huge global impact, particularly on the global South.

On January 1958, Yasser Arafat and nine other Palestinian activists set up the first cells of the Fatah movement in Kuwait, advocating armed struggle to liberate Palestine. On 17 March 1964, the first Palestinian delegation, comprising Yasser Arafat and Khalil Al-Wazir, arrived in China to confer with premier Chou-En-Lai in order to forge a relationship which would be vital to the future of the Palestinian struggle.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) recognised the Palestinian people as a nation in 1964 and the PLO as their only legitimate representative. More importantly, China's leadership refused to recognise the authority of Israel over Palestine. The PRC identified with the Palestinian guerrillas and provided them with military aid and training. The leadership in China recognised a common dynamic in the Palestinian struggle against capitalism and imperialism, and in their confrontation against US imperialism as represented by its advanced base 'Israel'. Consequently, on 1 January 1965, Al-Asifa ('The Storm'), the newly formed military-wing of Fatah, initiated its guerrilla raids against Israel with an unsuccessful bombing of the national water carrier (which transfers water from the Sea of Galilee in the North to the highly populated Centre and arid South).

In the wake of the June 1967 War, Israel, assisted by the US, devastated the air forces of Egypt and Syria in large-scale, surprise, pre-emptive attacks. Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, the West Bank,

and the Golan Heights. Arab masses were devastated by this second catastrophic defeat inflicted on them by Israel (also referred to as the 'Zionist entity' by Palestinians). On 24 December 1967, Ahmad Shuqayri resigned as chairman of the PLO and made way for the 'Fedayeen' organisations (Palestinian armed organisations). On 21 March 21 1968, the Israeli army attacked the 'Fedayeen' base at Karameh, Jordan. Despite heavy losses, the Palestinian fighters managed to counter the Israeli forces and destroy many of their attack tanks, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy troops and pushing them back to the west bank across the River Jordan.

Vietnamisation of the Palestine Struggle

Arafat, along with George Habash (leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP) were able to present the Arab nation with the victory at Karameh as the first victory against Israel since the earlier defeat. The official Arab armies were discredited. Arabs were yearning for a victory over the 'undefeatable' Israeli Army. Karameh represented a paradigm shift in the Palestinian armed groups. Arab men and women flocked to join the ranks of the Palestinian resistance in their thousands.

Arafat's Fatah movement interpreted this momentum as a mandate from the Palestinian resistance (Al-Muqawama Al-Filistiniyya) to assume leadership of the by now discredited PLO and its ineffective military wing the PLA (Palestine Liberation Army) in order to radicalise them and make them relevant to a new phase in the armed struggle. At the 5th Palestine National Council (PNC) session, held in Cairo, Arafat succeeded in fulfilling that mandate. The leadership of the resistance groups dominated the PLO's newly elected executive committee and Fatah leader Yasser Arafat was elected chairman of the Executive Committee.

Chairman Arafat started in earnest the task of transforming the PLO into an effective dynamic organisation capable of representing Palestine and of bringing the plight of its refugees, and the injustices inflicted on the Palestinian people

under occupation, to the attention of the international community. The 'Vietnamisation' of the Palestinian struggle began as the Palestinian resistance groups, within a remodelled PLO, advocated the amalgamation of the Viet Cong's 'people's war' model for insurgency and Algerian FLN guerrilla warfare tactics for the liberation of Palestine from Zionist occupation.

Toward a Secular Democratic State

In July 1968, Arafat succeed in garnering the support of all the factions of the Palestinian resistance movement to amend the Palestine National Council's Charter, with a majority vote to stop the Arab regimes meddling in the PLO's affairs. They summarised the PLO's strategy and goals in the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a secular, democratic state for Arabs and Jews in its liberated land. In November 1969, in Cairo, Arafat publicly secured the vital backing of Egypt's revolutionary leader Nasser. Meanwhile, the radical new PLO leadership was receiving huge public support from the Arab masses and Arab revolutionary governments such as the FLN Government in Algeria, and the leftist Arab Socialist Ba'athest Governments in Syria and Iraq.

This concerted support was translated into military aid and training, financial aid and large numbers of volunteers joining the Palestinian resistance movement, thus beefing up the ranks across the spectrum of Arab resistance that included nationalists and socialists, as well as emergent Marxist-Leninist organisations such as the PFLP. The PFLP had a profound unifying impact on liberation movements worldwide. Its leader, George Habash, identified imperialism, led by the US, as humanity's main enemy and characterised Israel as its advanced military base in Palestine.

Arafat Invents a Revolutionary Theory

PFLP ideology identified the Palestinians as victims of capitalism and, with other PLO factions

and socialists within Fatah, represented the Palestinian struggle as a fight against imperialism. Following the success of the FLN in Algeria, the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in China, and of the Viet Cong, the Palestinian model became the people's war. Many Palestinian fighters adopted the revolutionary ideologies of anti-imperialist Pan Arabism, Arab socialism, Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, or Maoists' Marxist-Leninism. Arafat, however, wanted to widen the scope of Arab involvement in the revolution, unhindered by ideologies. He asserted: 'We have just launched a non-ideological revolution; together we are going to invent a theory for it'.

This bold reasoning found great support among some cadres of the resistance movement, who perceived it as a way to preserve the local character and culture of the Palestinian struggle between the late 1960s and the 1980s. Arafat transformed the Palestinian national struggle into a diverse hub for an international campaign against imperialism. The PLO supported and influenced the anti-imperialist struggles of resistance movements globally, and for national liberation movements across the globe, Arafat became the de facto leader of the international liberation movement.

Black September

British colonial power created Jordan (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) essentially as a buffer state; a security belt to protect the future entity of 'Israel' from Arab attacks from its eastern border. The region's imperialist sponsors (the British and the US) were therefore not impressed with local developments after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (June 1967), which was under Jordanian control. Global news of the Fedayeen victory over Israel at Karameh was disturbing for the Western powers. The US accelerated and redoubled its efforts in rebuilding, equipping, and retraining the Jordanian army, which was ordered to provoke Palestinian fighters, to ambush their units and to eject them from Jordan. This created a previously unheard of Jordanian nationalism. Bedouin tribes in Jordan

were manipulated into conflict with the PLO, under the regime's slogan 'Jordan for the Jordanians', and to resolve the regime's elite's 'contradiction of a state and a revolution', in which 'a revolution cannot coexist on the same territory within the kingdom'.

Following the PFLP's hijacking of three airliners (6 September 1970), the Jordanian Army attacked the Palestinian guerrillas throughout Jordan (16 September 1970), marking the beginning of a bloody confrontation between the highly trained, Western-supplied Jordanian Army and the paramilitary Palestinian groups. Jordan inflicted heavy defeat on the PLO groups, pushing them out of Jordan. The Palestinians headed north through Syria and on to Beirut.

In November 1974, Palestine witnessed the political implications of 1970's 'Black September', through Arafat's historical 'gun and the olive branch' speech to the UN General Assembly. The speech, in which Arafat made a peace offer from the PLO, appeared to be the unspoken recognition of the State of Israel. The PLO was given a UN observer status, as part of its new upgrade to the international status, with the codicil that the PLO must recognise the UN charter and its resolutions. Israel was recognised by a UN resolution. This was a high political price, demanding recognition of Israel's occupation of 72% of Palestine, especially for the Palestine refugees, scattered in refugee camps or around the world as stateless people.

The Israeli 1982 War on the PLO

After 1974, Israel aimed to weaken the PLO further and to impose new political realities with a series of incursions and invasions of Lebanon. On 6 June 1982, Israel took on the task of eliminating the PLO (after receiving the green light from US secretary of state Alexander Haig) by deploying its land, air, and naval resources until Beirut was besieged. Haig anticipated that 'the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) should smash the PLO's military capability, send its political leadership running for whatever safety they could find, and in the process destroy whatever of

Hafez Assad's Syrian military got in the way. This would, he thought, gut Soviet influence in the Middle East' (Boykin 2002).

Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon did not succeed in destroying the PLO forces as planned, in spite of the political and logistical support Israel received. The Palestinian fighters fiercely fought the advanced Israeli army for 88 days, but to save Beirut and its residents from threat of total annihilation, the PLO accepted a US deal, brokered by Ronald Reagan's special presidential envoy Philip Habib. The PLO leadership agreed to leave Lebanon, and the Palestinian guerrillas departed, with their weapons. This was not an ignominious retreat. The PLO had held their own against the 'undefeatable' army for 88 days and left Lebanon with their guns.

Arafat's analysis of the 1982 war on Lebanon revealed a steep decline in the official Arab system, and a widening of imperialist influences (if not yet a total domination of the region) that emerged during the war through the active involvements of the US, Britain, and France. On the other hand, the USSR was exposed as a fragile, declining superpower. This analysis led many within the PLO leadership to see a clearer picture of a waning Soviet Union ceding its spheres of influence in the region to Western powers. Furthermore, a political shift was emerging within the PLO, with huge implications for its position and political agenda.

The PLO's departure from Lebanon exposed Arafat and weakened the leadership. Having lost his last foothold in a bordering Arab state, Arafat understood that the only course open to him was political action. Immediately after leaving Beirut, he did the unthinkable; he stopped in Egypt to restore his relationship with the US's main man Husni Mubarak. Needing political support, Arafat and the PLO leadership were subjected to political designs of the wealthy and reactionary Arab regimes. Their interference influenced Arafat's decisions and PLO policy, which transformed to facilitate the Western-backed Arab regimes' proposals for a peaceful solution.

This political compromise caused conflict in Arafat's Fatah, and the PLO at large, leading to the gradual weakening of the PLO and the reduction of Arafat's influence over his people. Losing his grip over the PLO, he also lost his stature as de facto leader of the Arab liberation movement and his overall standing within the global liberation movement began to diminish as a result.

Arafat in the Intifada

The eruption, on 9 December 1987, of the Intifada (a large-scale popular uprising), was the explosion of Palestinian frustration at living under repressive Israeli military occupation and it grabbed international headlines.

The Intifada shifted the centre of gravity of Palestinian political initiative from the PLO leadership outside Occupied Palestine, to Occupied Palestine. The revolutionaries in Occupied Palestine began to form popular committees, consisting of local leadership drawn from the grass roots and including resistance factions, trade unionists, and students. The Intifada's activities were planned and co-ordinated largely by the new radical young leadership and represented a new generation of freedom fighters.

This deeply worried Arafat and his aides. The Intifada revealed the extent to which they were losing touch with their grass roots. Arafat rapidly designated his second in command Abu Jihad to co-ordinate with the active resistance factions to find a way to rein in those committees not part of the PLO factions. The PLO's main armed factions (Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP – comprising the United National Leadership of the Uprising) commanded strong popular credibility and respect in Occupied Palestine. Using the umbrella of the UNLU (joined by the Communist Palestinian People's Party), the PLO successfully regained direct control over the Intifada.

People's committees channelled all necessary logistics and support to sustain the Intifada, and maintain Palestinian morale. Arafat drew international attention to the plight of the Palestinians, effectively engaging the financial support of wealthy Arab regimes in rebuilding destroyed homes and in supplying medical resources.

During the First Intifada, over 1,000 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces, including 237 children under the age of 17. Many tens of thousands more were injured. According to an estimate by the Swedish branch of Save the Children, as many as 29,900 children required medical treatment for injuries caused by beatings from Israeli soldiers during the first 2 years of the Intifada alone (Btselem n.d.). Approximately 120,000 Palestinians were imprisoned by Israel during the First Intifada.

The UNLU deployed effective civil disobedience and non-violent resistance tactics, which were inherited from the first phase of the 1936–39 'Arab revolt in Palestine' against the British. This first phase was directed primarily by the urban and elitist Higher Arab Committee (HAC) and was focused mainly on strikes and other forms of political protest (Norris 2008). The popular resistance employed rock throwing against the occupation soldiers. The Israeli reaction was ruthless. Defence minister Yitzhak Rabin implemented the infamous 'broken bones' policy (Hass 2005), ordering his soldiers to break the limbs of any Palestinian caught hurling rocks at the occupation forces. The Israeli soldiers used brutal force to repress the unarmed Palestinian youth of the Intifada. This broad-based resistance drew unprecedented international attention to the situation facing Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Arrival of Muslim Brotherhood

Arafat sensed the ground shifting beneath the PLO. In 1987, Hamas was founded in Gaza, formed from the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. During the 1980s, the Israeli occupying authorities viewed Hamas as a counterbalance or alternative to the Marxists and the secular nationalists of the PLO. They implicitly supported its emergence, hoping that it would sow seeds of future feudalism among non-ideologically homogeneous armed Palestinian factions. Divide and conquer was a lesson learned from British imperialism, as in 1928 during the British occupation of Egypt. On this

occasion, the British encouraged the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, rightly perceiving that its ideological existence would clash with the Egyptian nationalist movement.

Arafat Calls for an Independent Palestine

The convening 19th Palestine National Council (PNC), from 12–15 November 1988, endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 242, linking it to the 'national right' of the Palestinian people. The PNC affirmed the PLO's determination to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the principles of international law, including all related UN resolutions and the resolutions of Arab summits; on 15 November, Arafat presented the delegates with The Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine. A few weeks later in Geneva (13 December), Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, reaffirming the PLO's rejection of all kinds of terrorism, and inviting Israel to talk peace.

The Madrid Conference (30 October 1991) was co-sponsored by the Soviet Union and the US. It was an early attempt by the international community to initiate a peace process through negotiations involving Israel, the Arab countries (including Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan), and the Palestinians. The PLO went to Madrid based on the principle of Land for Peace. Soon Arafat was encouraged by some of his aides to open a secret negotiating channel with Israel.

Subsequent justifications centred on the defeat of Arafat's major Arab supporter, Iraq, at the hands of the US-led Western coalition, and the vanishing of their international sponsor, the USSR, what led to the emergence of the US as the only world superpower.

There is another perspective, however, which is that, rather than supporting the delegation at Madrid, Arafat opened secret negotiating channels in Norway, fearing that the UNLU (along with their new partners in the Intifada, Hamas) would be diplomatically strengthened by the Madrid concessions. These secret negotiations

led Israel and the PLO to sign the Declaration of Principles, giving the Palestinians partial control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On 1 July 1994, a triumphant Arafat returned to Palestine for the first time in 26 years. On 5 July 1994, he formed the Palestinian National Authority, tasked to run Palestinian affairs in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. And in December 1994, Arafat won the Nobel Peace Prize (along with Rabin and Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres), Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian National Authority in the first Palestinian elections on 20 January 1996.

The Road to al-Aqsa Intifadas

Arafat made a promise to the PLO Central Council, before the convening of the Camp David II summit: 'We are going to fight a harsh battle, which my comrades and I will fight in your name, and we shall not concede our rights. ... neither Arafat nor any other leader can concede our rights in Jerusalem, and the rights of the refugees that have been guaranteed by international legitimacy' (Arafat 2000).

The second Palestinian Intifada was, in many ways, similar to the second phase of the 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine, which violently targeted the British occupation forces. The British used collective punishment measures combined with brutal force against the Palestinians.

In 1999, Arafat agreed with DFLP leader Nayef Hawatmeh to aim for a united national position at the Israeli-PA final status talks. A month later, he welcomed Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP's second-in-command) returning to Palestine after 32 years in exile. In July 2000, US president Bill Clinton convened Camp David II, with Arafat and Israeli PM Ehud Barak aiming to reach a final peace deal. But Arafat rejected the Israeli proposals on Jerusalem, stating that 'The Arab leader who would surrender Jerusalem is not born yet' (quoted in Jamal 2006). Arafat described the talks to me, among others, saying 'I felt I was held against my will or being kidnapped by Bill Clinton at some stage' (ibid.). After 9 days, The White House declared the summit a failure.

On 28 September 2000, 2 months after the failure of the Camp David talks, Ariel Sharon, then leader of the Opposition, stormed the holy Haram al-Sharif and al-Aqsa compound in the company of 2,000 Israeli soldiers. Palestinians exploded in anger over Sharon's incursion, not forgetting that, at Camp David, Israel had (for the first time with US backing) explicitly claimed sovereignty over the sacred compound. The insult prompted Arafat to tell the Palestinian leadership, 'The Battle for Jerusalem, which began at Camp David, has just been transported here' (ibid.). Arafat predicted that the battle would be long and stated that Sharon's visit had been intended to provoke a military clash. Soon, Sharon arose to power and the military clash began.

Arafat never gave up his guerrilla persona, frequently emphasising his readiness to resume armed struggle if needed. Now had to be that point, in defence of Palestinian national rights and Jerusalem. While Sharon continued to escalate his military action against the Palestinians, Arafat continued to deny Israeli demands. And Israeli public relations (with the help of mainstream Western media), portrayed the ferocious Israeli attacks on the Palestinians as self-defence.

Israel was deploying F-15s and F-16s, helicopter gunships, navy gunships, tanks and heavy artillery in its assaults on Palestinian infrastructure and people, besieging most Palestinian towns and villages, and targeting refugee camps and homes. Palestinian paramilitary groups, in return, targeted any Israeli installation within reach, civil or military. Arafat merely restated his commitment to the peace process and called for the resumption of negotiations where they had left off at Camp David and Taba. Sharon labelled all Palestinian forms of struggle for liberation terrorist attacks, and began an international campaign to de-legitimatise the Palestinian national struggle.

Arafat spent the last 3 years of his life a prisoner in Ramalla, from December 2001 until he was allowed to leave for medical treatment in Paris, only days before his death. He remained confined to his headquarters at 'the Muqata', which was subjected to daily shelling by the besieging Israeli Army. Arafat believed that his treatment was a punishment for his refusal to

betray his people at Camp David. He always pointed to the complicit silence of the international community, and the absence of any feasible demand to lift the Israeli siege or for the cessation of Israeli shelling of his headquarters. Arafat said: 'I know that the siege will be long and that I am paying the price for my refusal to surrender to American and Israeli demands at Camp David' (ibid.).

Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) or – El Khityar – was the embodiment of his people's cause, the iconic freedom fighter who actively led his people in their struggle to liberate their homeland. He helped protect his people's lives, culture, and identity from the blades of the Zionist's neo-colonial eraser, and he was a major force in uniting his people under the PLO. Under Arafat's leadership, the Palestinian people displayed immense pride in being Arab Palestinians. And he was the Arab leader who reminded imperialism that Jerusalem was not for sale.

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Armed Struggle

► Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)

Asianism

► Pan-Asianism

Assassination

► Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

Assimilation

► Imperialism and Settler Colonialism: Xenophobia and Racism in North America

Aswan High Dam

► Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Asylum

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Athleticism

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Australia

► Australia's Colonisation and Racial Policies
► British Slavery and Australian Colonization
► Labour and Decolonisation, Anti-imperialist Struggles (Australia/South-East Asia)
► Nuclear Imperialism

Australia's Colonisation and Racial Policies

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Synonyms

Aborigines; Australia; Colonialism; Imperialism; Indigenous struggles; Racism

Definition

From the earliest contact, Britain's view of Australia was underpinned by economic motives: extension of the Empire through possession, possibilities of trade and investment, as well as the protection of property, reduction of overcrowding in jails, and the relief of poverty at home. But more insidious than these explicit economic motivations was the way in which economic progress was understood in relation to different races or human types. The known peoples of the world were ranked within a hierarchy of civilisation, with the British race and its advanced industrial economy at the apex and the Aborigines said to lack precisely those attributes and capacities which explained Britain's economic success. From this perspective, they were always a problem to be managed in one way or another by government authorities. From an indigenous perspective, Australia remains a colonising power, and Aboriginal people remain, on the whole, dispossessed. This chapter charts the history of that dispossession, but highlights the ways in which, despite this sorry story, the history of Australia's colonisation has also been one of Aboriginal resistance and tactical use of the colonisers, their laws, culture, and institutions; and one of humanitarian feeling and support for Aborigines, even if some of that support was offered from within a Western frame of reference.

Introduction: the Colonisation of the Australian Aborigines

The violent transition to the capitalist system over the centuries preceding 1778, the date of the first British convict ship to arrive on Australian shores, produced new criminalities to protect property and create the dependence on monetary exchange required for the widespread creation of a wage labour force. Extreme poverty amongst those dispossessed by the enclosures of land maintained a steady rate of crime and hence a steady flow of criminals sentenced to transportation. Given the loss of the North American colonies in 1776, and a disastrous attempt to set up convict settlements in West Africa, the British government sought new possibilities of colonization for both the transportation of criminals and for the emigration of its impoverished working classes. Captain James Cook's 'discovery' of Australia's eastern coast in 1770 provided the opportunity to set up penal/settler colonies in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), followed by Western Australia and Port Philip Bay (Victoria). South Australia became a colony in 1834, and in 1863 the area of the Northern Territory was included within its boundary, to be ceded to the federal government in 1911. Queensland was declared a British colony in 1859. Granted self-government from the 1850s, the several distinct areas of settlement remained colonies of the British Crown until they united as states of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901.

Cook had been issued secret instructions by the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty to search for the continent that was thought to exist to the west of New Zealand. Such a discovery, the instructions suggested, 'may tend greatly to the advancement of the Trade and Navigation' of the British Crown (Lord Commissioners 1768). Upon discovery of the continent, Cook was, with the consent of the natives, to 'take Possession of Convenient Situations in the Country in the Name of the King of Great Britain', unless the land was uninhabited, in which case Cook was to 'take Possession for his Majesty . . . as first discoverers and possessors' (ibid,). Cook observed

indigenous natives, the Aborigines, but believed them too few in number and too primitive in development to be able to lay claim to ownership of the land, and hence he did so for the British Crown. Thus, from the earliest contact, Britain's view of Australia was underpinned by economic motives: extension of the Empire through possession, possibilities of trade and investment, as well as the protection of property, reduction of overcrowding in jails, and the relief of poverty at home. But more insidious than these explicit economic motivations was the way in which economic progress was understood in relation to different races or human types. Civilisation itself was an economic achievement consisting of a division of labour within production and within the family, property, and individual property ownership, and a political system which managed the protection of property and freedom of exchange (see e.g. the writings of Australia's first chair of Political Economy Edward Hearn 1863, 1883). The known peoples of the world were ranked within a hierarchy of civilisation, with the British race and its advanced industrial economy at the apex. Early descriptions of the Australian Aborigines focused on their simple and primitive lives, including their tribal and communal existence, nomadic tendencies, lack of cultivation or herding, and the absence of mechanisms of governance. The Aborigines lacked, therefore, precisely those attributes and capacities which explained Britain's economic success. From this perspective, they were always a problem to be managed in one way or another by government authorities.

Thus, while broadly similar (see McGrath 1995), the colonies', and later the states', administration of the Aborigines reflected a host of ninetheeth and twentieth-century discourses around civilisation, racial difference, and economic progress, all of which were underpinned by Western understandings of the civilised economic subject. Although in recent decades Aborigines have won some land rights and some semblance of self-governance, there remains within policy a strong element of this colonial problematic of the fit between Aboriginal people and the Western economic subject, evidenced

most obviously in the management of the economic lives of the Aborigines of the Northern Territory under the so-called Intervention of 2007 and the Stronger Futures legislation of 2012 (see Harris 2012; Vivian 2010). From an indigenous perspective, Australia remains a colonising power, and Aboriginal people remain, on the whole, dispossessed (see, Cooke et al. 2007). This chapter charts the history of that dispossession, but it should be noted that despite this sorry story, the history of Australia's colonisation has also been one of Aboriginal resistance and tactical use of the colonisers, their laws, culture, and institutions; and one of humanitarian feeling and support for Aborigines, even if some of that support was offered from within a Western frame of reference.

Governance of the Indigenous: Dispossession

The Aborigines' failure to develop the land in ways consistent with Western ideas of economic progress provided the British government with an economic justification for its assertion of ownership over Australian territory. Despite this dispossession, however, from white settlement until the colonies were granted self-government from the 1850s, interactions between the settlers and Aborigines were, according to British policy, to be guided by respect and fairness. Governors of the colonies were instructed:

> To endeavour by every means in his power to open an intercourse with the natives, and conciliate their good-will, requiring all to live in amity and kindness with them; and if any of our subjects should wantonly destroy them or give them any unnecessary interruption in the exercise of their several occupations, it is our will and pleasure that you do cause such offenders to be brought to punishment, according to the degree of the offence. (Colonial Office quoted in Reece 1974, p. 104)

In reality, the British government had little interest in the Aboriginal people until after the Reform Bill of 1832, which brought to office men of humanitarian sympathies (Foxcroft 1941, p. 22). And because all land had been decreed the property of the British Crown, Aborigines had no

formal rights to remain within their traditional areas in the face of the expanding settlement as freed convicts were joined by British immigrants in demanding land grants. Frontier violence was rife, practised by both settlers and Aborigines (see Reynolds 1987). Such was the neglect of the orders of the Colonial Office that when the 1838 massacre of 28 Aborigines at Myall Creek led to the hanging of seven white men, following an initial trial in which they were found not guilty, the public was outraged (see Reece 1974, Chap. 4). Settlers felt entitled to protect their property since the government refused to do so:

> The lives of these men – the lives of all who have been slain in contests between the blacks and the whites, might not have been sacrificed, but for the successive Governments of this Colony, who have hitherto refused protection to the settlers, by means of an effective armed force; and by this refusal given rise, in all probability, to a war of extermination (Sydney Morning Herald 1838).

Thereafter 'it became almost impossible to prosecute whites for the murder of Aborigines' (Reece 1974, p. 191).

The first decades of Australia's colonisation saw the dispossession of the Aborigines around the coastal settlements as wool became the source of wealth both in Australia and Britain. The ability of the colonial governments to sell or lease land to graziers maintained the colonies' financial independence of the mother country, and cheap land lowered the cost of resources to Britain's expanding industries. Thus, despite official policy, both the colonial and British governments were committed to developing the pastoral industry, and encouraged, by omission or commission, the extension of the frontier further and further inland (Christie 1979; Dunn 1984). Cattle replaced sheep as the frontier extended into northern and inland regions, and frontier violence persisted well into the twentieth century (see Reynolds 1987).

The early decades of Australia's colonisation were also, however, characterised by efforts to civilise the Aborigines. Most reports of these experiments were negative, leading the constitutional scholar, politician, and founder of the system of primary education in New South Wales William Wentworth to argue that:

> The aborigines of this country occupy the lowest place in the gradatory scale of the human species. They have neither houses nor clothing: they are entirely unacquainted with the arts of agriculture; and even the arms, which the several tribes have, to protect themselves from the aggressions of their neighbours, and the hunting and fishing implements, with which they administer to their support, are of the rudest contrivance and workmanship. Thirty years intercourse with Europeans has not effected the slightest change in their habits; and even those, who have most intermixed with the colonists, have never been prevailed upon to practise one of the arts of civilized life (1820, pp. 27–28; see also Woolmington 1988).

Nevertheless, with the tide turning in Britain in favour of the self-government of the colonies, and with the strength of humanitarian feeling toward the natives of the British Empire following the abolition of British slavery (see Aborigines Protection Society 1837), the period in which the dispossession of the Aborigines dominated was followed by one of protection within the context of pastoral labour shortages, a widespread belief that the Aborigines were doomed to a natural extinction, and a commitment within legislation to instil some form of work ethic within, in particular, the younger generations of Aborigines, a policy position which would continue until the 1960s.

Governance of the Indigenous: Becoming Workers

Shortages of labour in settler colonies was a major concern of Edward Wakefield's system of colonisation. The problem with the British colonies in the New World, he argued, was that land was so plentiful that new settlers could become landholders without the need to become wage workers. A labour force could be ensured only if the price of land was high enough to force newly arrived settlers into the labour market. After saving for some time, workers would buy land from the government, and the government would use these funds to pay the fares of new emigrants. Wakefield's vision of the successful settler colony was a re-creation of the factors which had led to British economic growth: 'the greatest division

of labour; the greatest production; the utmost excess of production over consumption; the greatest accumulation of wealth – in other words, the utmost prosperity of the colony – the greatest progress of colonisation' (Wakefield 1829, p. 21).

Wakefield's policies were adopted to various degrees by the British and Australian authorities, and systematic emigration from the United Kingdom to Australia began in 1831 (see Goodwin 1966, Chap. 3). Consistent with the demands of the emerging economies, most likely to receive free passage were agricultural workers and their families, and single women in domestic service (see Haines 1994). Aboriginal labour was also a solution to the shortages of workers, as well as the expense of white workers, particularly in the expanding pastoral lands throughout the continent. Although frontier violence remained significant in these areas, Aborigines began to be seen more as potential workers, albeit a reserve army of labour to whom no long-term commitments needed to be made, than threats to property. Several factors bolstered this view. In eastern Australia the supply of labour fell from the 1830s as the assignment of convicts to remote settlers waned and finally ended with the 1840 ban on transportation to Australia's eastern coast. From the early 1850s, agricultural and pastoral workers were lost to the newly discovered goldfields. And Aborigines were superb bushmen, highly valued for their tracking skills, and Aboriginal women could be trained as domestics. They were willing to settle on the station as a means of maintaining connection to their ancestral lands, and were extremely cheap compared to white labour, frequently working merely for scant rations for themselves and their tribe until equal wages were legislated in the 1960s. By the early 1870s the employment of Aboriginal labour was widespread in the northern pastoral industry and by 1892 Aborigines made up the majority of station workers in the Northern Territory (May 1983, Chap. 3; Reid 1990, p. 174).

In coastal regions, government reserves joined missionaries in trying to instill a sedentary lifestyle in order to civilise and Christianise the Aborigines. Rations kept Aborigines tied to these areas – it was not until formal 'Aboriginal Protection' legislation was introduced that many Aborigines were required to maintain residence on these properties. From 1850, the government of Victoria, for example, began to 'vigorously' form stations and missions 'and every attempt was made to civilise the tribal derelicts and half castes' (Foxcroft 1941, p. 101). A new attitude around rations had emerged: 'Food and clothing was not to be issued gratuitously except in case of extreme emergency' (102). As *The Empire* declared in 1854, 'The sacred law – "If any man will not work, neither should he eat" – is at the very foundation of political economy' (quoted in Goodwin 1966, p. 356). Children were also to be instilled with the work ethic. Although there were a variety of views on the efficacy of the formal education of Aboriginal children, rations were used to encourage school attendance (see Fletcher 1989; Christie 1979, p. 125).

While Aboriginal children (who by this time were frequently partially white) were being schooled, 'full-blood' Aborigines were increasingly thought of as destined for extinction. A mid-century reformulation of the notion of race cast Australian Aborigines as biologically incapable of modernisation (Anderson and Perrin 2008; McGregor 1997). This belief in the natural disappearance of the Aboriginal race persisted, despite evidence to the contrary, and it comforted white Australians to think that this was simply a 'natural law' of evolution: 'reserves have been made and aids to soothe the sufferings of a dying race. . . . Their disappearance is a natural necessity' (Collier 1911, pp. 129–130).

Governance of the Indigenous: Consolidation of the White Breadwinning Male

The federation of Australia entrenched an imaginary nation of racial homogeneity. The Constitution excluded Aborigines from Australian population statistics, and the federal Immigration Restriction Act (1901), also known as the White

Australia policy, articulated this vision of Australia as a civilised outpost of the Empire by excluding non-white immigrants. The indentured Melanesian workers upon whom the Queensland sugar industry relied were deported (see Moore 1988). As John Watson, the leader of the Australian Labour Party, argued, the new nation 'reserved the right to say who shall be citizens. We ask that they shall be on a moral and physical level with ourselves, and that they shall be such as we can fraternise with and welcome as brother citizens of what we hope will some day be a great nation' (Commonwealth of Australia 1901, p. 5177). Clearly, this vision excluded the Aborigines.

In this vision, Australia's development relied not simply on white people, but on white families. The economically productive family was one in which men worked and women kept house and looked after children (Hewitson 2013). In 1904, the federal government was alarmed at the falling birth-rate of white women, with a Royal Commission finding that the waning birth-rate undermined 'the value of the family as the basis of national life; … the character of the people; … their social, moral, and economic progress; … their national aims and aspirations; … their capacity to survive in the rivalry of nations' (1904, p. 53).

A host of related policies centralised the well-being of the white male breadwinner and his family as the basis of Australia's economic progress. Immigration policy kept out productive Asian workers unused to Australian standards of living: 'It is not the bad qualities, but the good qualities of these alien races that make them so dangerous to us. It is their inexhaustible energy, their power of applying themselves to new tasks, their endurance and low standard of living that make them such competitors', argued Alfred Deakin, the Commonwealth's first Attorney General (Parliamentary Debates 1901). Tariff policy provided protection to those businesses which paid 'fair and reasonable' wages (New Protection 1907–8). Wages policy formally defined 'fair and reasonable' wages in 1907, when a manufacturer of harvesters applied for tariff protection. The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration found that unskilled white male workers would thereafter receive a wage sufficient to support 'the normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised community' (Higgins 1907, p. 3). The average employee was a white man supporting a family of five. To encourage population growth, the Maternity Allowance Act of 1912 granted £5 to every new white mother. Assisted immigration targeted families and breadwinner family formation: 'Men for the land, women for the home, employment guaranteed, good wages, plenty of opportunity', claimed an Australian Government (1928) poster encouraging British emigration.

Aborigines, on the other hand, were subjected to more and more regulation and supervision under the state Aboriginal Protection Acts (see Rowse 2005a, pp. 244–245). These Acts established that Aboriginal wages, which were in the region of 20% of the white male wages established in the Harvester decision and less for Aboriginal women, would be paid directly to the Aboriginal Protector who would dispense funds as he saw fit. The Acts also controlled where Aborigines lived and whether and where they could travel. In keeping with the biological perspective on race which had become dominant in the second half of the nineteenth century, these Acts formalised systems of child removal which would keep young Aborigines from being incorporated into Aboriginal culture (see Commonwealth of Australia 1997). Another widely held and comfortable assumption on the part of many white Australians was that Aboriginal mothers did not miss their 'half-caste' children. As one Aboriginal Protector remarked in 1906:

> The half-caste is intellectually above the aborigine, and it is the duty of the State that they be given a chance to lead a better life than their mothers. I would not hesitate for one moment to separate any half-caste from its aboriginal mother, no matter how frantic her momentary grief might be at the time. They soon forget their offspring. (Isdell 1906, quoted in Commonwealth of Australia 1997, Chap. 7)

Aboriginal families, then, were decimated, while white families were encouraged, supported, and centralised within Australia's vision of its national development.

A

Governance of the Indigenous: Becoming the Productive Economic Citizen

In 1937, the state Chief Protectors of Aborigines met for the first time to co-ordinate their administration of the Aborigines. A resolution as to the 'Destiny of the Race' was passed, wherein:

> That this Conference believes that the destiny of the natives of aboriginal origin, but not of the full blood, lies in their ultimate absorption by the people of the Commonwealth, and it therefore recommends that all efforts be directed to that end. (Commonwealth of Australia 1937)

This policy of assimilation was further defined at a subsequent meeting of the states to include all Aborigines:

> The policy of assimilation means that in the view of all Australian governments that all aborigines and part-aborigines are expected eventually to attain the same manner of living as other Australians and to live as members of a single Australian community, enjoying the same rights and privileges, accepting the same responsibilities, observing the same customs and influences by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalties as other Australians. (Commonwealth of Australia 1961; see also Rowse 2005b).

In keeping with these intentions, Commonwealth government welfare benefits (such as old-age and widows' pensions and payments to mothers) were extended to Aborigines over the post-Second World War period, though payments were usually made directly to state governments or managers of reserves and missions rather than to Aborigines themselves. Unlike white women, though, Aboriginal women eligible for government payments were subjected to intense surveillance by State Protectors and by the agents of the Commonwealth welfare system. Aboriginal women were visited by inspectors from Aboriginal welfare boards, and taught, through required attendance at clinics and the viewing of government-produced films, how to act like white Australian housewives. In the film *Why Clean?,* for example, Aboriginal mothers are shown appropriate standards of hygiene. *A House in Town* educated Aborigines about suburban nuclear family life (see Moore 1984). State governments introduced ways in which Aborigines could be exempted from the operation of the Aboriginal Protection Acts. This entitled Aborigines to freedom of movement and to white wages. These rewards again came at the cost of adopting the institutions of white Australian culture to the exclusion of Aboriginal culture. The Western Australian Government (1944), for example, required applicants to have lived as a 'civilised' person and to have dissolved all relationships with Aborigines except for immediate family members for the two years before application for exemption. Thus, the adoption by Aborigines of Western marriage and nuclear family life, proper motherhood, and breadwinning status were essential components of the policy of assimilation into Western notions of productive economic citizenship, though missionaries and government reserves had long tried to impose this family form on Aborigines as part of their civilising and Christianising project (Attwood 2000; Perkins 1936, p. 196).

Conclusion

Throughout white Australia's history of interaction with Aborigines there have run themes of exploitation as well as compassion, fear, and ignorance as well as deep caring and appreciation, but these humanitarian impulses, and Aborigines' own agencies, were dominated by those which have sought the dispossession and disappearance of Aborigines. Aboriginal policy making reflected colonial and twentieth-century Australia's visions of economic development and nation building, themselves premised in significant ways upon a Western imaginary of the productive economic agent. Although in recent decades Aborigines have won numerous battles for land rights and self-governance, many Aborigines, if not most, remain economically marginal and dispossessed. In short, for Aborigines, Australia remains a colonising power.

Cross-References

▶ British Slavery and Australian Colonization
▶ Settler Colonialism

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Authoritarianism

▶ Women's Rights and Western Imperialism in Iraq: Past Meets Present

B

Baath Regime

Baathism

Baghdad Pact

Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade

Bandung Conference

Banking

Baraka, Amiri (1934–2014)

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Synonyms

Amiri Baraka; Biography; Black nationalism; Cultural nationalism; White racism

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of US actor, teacher, theater director and producer, author, black liberation activist, and poet Amiri Baraka (1934–2014).

> I tried to defend myself. 'Look, why jump on me? I understand what you're saying. I'm in complete agreement with you. I'm a poet. . . . what can I do? I write, that's all. I'm not even interested in politics.'
>
> She jumped on me with both feet, as did a group of Mexican poets in Habana. She called me a 'cowardly bourgeois individualist'. The poets, or at least one young wild eyed Mexican poet, Jaime Shelly,

almost left me in tears, stomping his foot on the floor, screaming: 'You want to cultivate your soul? In that ugliness you live in, you want to cultivate your soul? Well we've got millions of starving people to feed, and that moves me enough to make poems out of.' (Jones/Baraka, 'Cuba Libre', in *Home: Social Essays*, 2009: 57)

Amiri Baraka, formerly Everett LeRoi Jones, was born in Cuba, July 1960. It was in the heat of a 14-h train journey, as it rolled through the fervour of the people's revolution, that Baraka came into being. Prior to a phone call he had received early that year, Baraka had been Leroi Jones, the poet. When Richard Gibson, an organiser with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, rang to offer him a place on a trip to post-revolutionary Cuba, with 12 other black writers from the US, he had been fully ensconced in the role of the poet. Answering the phone drunk, in a Greenwich Village apartment, he was most likely surrounded by the likes of Diane di Prima, Allen Ginsberg, and Joel Oppenheimer, the set he had assembled around his publishing ventures *Floating Bear* and *Yugen.* Even when he arrived at Idlewild Airport to join the delegation to Cuba, Baraka was still very much Leroi Jones, the beat poet, outwardly disinterested, but inwardly sizing up career opportunities, disappointed that the 'name' writers who were supposed to be in the travelling party (James Baldwin and Langston Hughes) had cancelled. Dismissing many of the others on the trip (aside from Robert Williams) as 1920s and 1930s 'kinds of Negroes' (Jones and Baraka 2009: 25), Jones was embodying the milieu he had set his sights on since dishonourable discharge from the Air Force: a certain mode of New York intellectuality.

In the essay 'Cuba Libre', Baraka gives an account of a series of increasingly intense conjunctural moments, which arose from the material contradictions between the ideal persona he had been trying to realise in the Village, and the material reality of the Castroled revolution erupting all around him. These moments led him to fundamentally question the nature of the promising literary career he had begun to carve out for himself. Although the Bantuisation of his name did not take place until 1967, it was in Cuba that the shift from Jones to Baraka began.

Most assessments of Baraka's career tend to focus on the regularity of his ideological, social, artistic, one could even say racial, transformations. Researchers ascribe the arrivals at bohemia, Black Cultural nationalism, and Third-World Marxism, to the sheer force of his individual will (Harris in Baraka 1990). In fact, these transitions were indicative of Baraka's position at the intersection of various race and class lines. This unstable position allowed him to respond to the key social, political, and cultural questions of the moments in which he operated. The close scrutiny given to his shifting perspectives often leads to a fetishisation of the nature of those changes, and the way Baraka committed himself zealously to a modernist pursuit of the new. What is not given as much attention is that which remained constant for Baraka over the range and type of his actions. Those consistent features of Baraka's career were put in place during that brief but almost overstimulating trip to Cuba.

The combination of dysentery, dehydration, and elation Baraka experienced hiking up in the searing heat of the Sierra Maestra to hear a two-hour Castro speech left two things engraved on his psyche. First, the undeniable potency of what he was encountering in Cuba meant he could never return to the status of 'just' being a poet:

the wild impression one gets from the country, is that it is being run by a group of young radical intellectuals, and the young men of Latin America are *radical.* Whether Marxist or not, it is a social radicalism that they want. No one speaks of compromise. The idea never occurred to them. (Jones and Baraka 2009: 52)

It was in Cuba that he came to the realisation it was possible for a poem, and a poet, to function as part of a revolutionary consciousness, to be utilised in the service of a mass intellectuality. The relative sanctuary afforded to the North American and European artist was the model Baraka had been seeking ever since he left the Air Force in 1957. Although he had, to some extent, found it, this model began to fall to pieces in free Cuba.

Secondly, the other gilded cage Baraka lived within, his American-ness, began to disintegrate in the Caribbean. Although he had access to a Du

Boisian second sight, and could therefore comprehend the absurdity and limitation of the claims his country made for self-evident freedoms, Baraka still only understood his blackness in relation to the US. It took leaving the country, if only for a short time, to attune his senses to the series of anticolonial revolutionary movements beyond those borders:

> The young intellectual living in the United States inhabits an ugly void. He cannot use what is around him, neither can he revolt against it. Revolt against whom? Revolution in this country of 'due process of law' would be literally impossible …… That thin crust of a lie we cannot detect in our own thinking. That rotting of the mind which had enabled us to think about Hiroshima as if someone else had done it, or to believe vaguely that the 'counterrevolution' in Guatemala was an 'internal affair.' (Jones and Baraka 2009: 54)

In Cuba, the US became an entity which stretched far beyond Washington State, Maine and Texas, and he shared his blackness with insurgents in Southern and Latin America, Africa and Asia:

> We are *old* people. Even the vitality of our art is like bright flowers growing up through a rotting carcass.
>   But the Cubans and the other *new* peoples (in Asia, Africa, South America) don't need us, and we had better stay out of their way. (Jones and Baraka 2009: 78)

When conducting an overview of Baraka's career, it is vital a researcher acknowledges the antagonisms that occupied his actions and work. It is accurate to say that at various moments of his career, it was possible to label Baraka a chauvinist, misogynist, homophobe, anti-Semite, and egotist (Watts 2001). In many ways Baraka is toxic, but that does not mean he should be set aside. To do so would represent an act of grave irresponsibility, because all the inexcusable violence he sent out into the world, via his pen and voice, was inseparable from the deep commitment to transform himself into a revolutionary propaganda machine, one that saw no distinction between art and politics, and pointed its ammunition at the heart of US capital. This drive was first implanted in June 1960. For Baraka, after Cuba, the work became as serious as his life.

The commitment to producing art in the service of liberation, and framing the task of making revolution as one that had to imagine itself beyond the borders of the US, can be traced throughout his career after 1960. These were the two consistent lines running throughout his range of ideological shifts, and he adapted them to suit each 'problem space' out of which he was operating (Scott 2004: 4).

Baraka's new orientation revealed itself soon after his return from Cuba. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961 had a deep resonance with young black Americans, who were increasingly aligning themselves with liberation movements in the Third World. Lumumba, a charismatic and bold figure, offered a new model for black leadership in the US. Therefore, the suspected influence of the US government in the Congolese leader's murder, combined with the United Nations' refusal to intervene, became a source of rage. On 15 February 1961, a group of black men and women, wearing black armbands and veils, burst onto the floor of the UN Security Council meeting, leading to violence. Outside there were larger protests organised, this time drawing equally blunt repressive responses from the New York Police Department. The chant that went up from the crowds was 'Congo Yes! Yankee No!', an echo of the slogan which could be heard on the streets of Havana: 'Cuba Si! Yanqui No!' (Woodard 1999). It is no surprise to learn that Baraka was in the mix on the day:

> Patrice Lumumba was assassinated by the C.I.A to stop the newly freed Congolese people from nationalising Union Miniere and other Rockefeller properties. I found myself marching outside the U.N. in demonstrations, while others, mostly blacks, took off their shoes and threw them down in the gallery as the gallery guards were called in to toss the demonstrating blacks out. Sisters were bashing the guards in the head with their shoes and throwing shoes down in the gallery. Ralph Bunche said he was ashamed and scandalised by such niggerism, while we were scandalised and ashamed of his negro-ass tom antics. (Jones and Baraka 1984: 181)

The second assassination which served as a foundation for both the emerging Black Nationalist movement and Baraka's own political horizon was that of Malcolm X, on 21 February 1965. The murder of another towering Black leader

(this time home-grown), who was forging a black politics which was decidedly militant and internationalist in outlook, was monumental for Baraka. It prompted him to leave Greenwich Village, shed the bohemian poet persona, and relocate uptown. In Harlem, Baraka went about the task of rethinking the role of black art as a determining factor in a mass black revolutionary movement.

His immediate response was to establish the Black Arts Repertory Theater School (BARTS) in 1965. The working experiment gathered musicians from the nascent black avant-garde, playwrights, poets, and cultural commentators. Their role was to both practise and teach, in order to develop black art which directly communicated to, and participated in, the struggles of the black community around the school. Although the project fell apart violently within the space of a year, BARTS became the touchstone for a flourishing nationwide Black Arts movement. Similar organisations quickly began to establish themselves in black locales across several US cities (Smethurst 2005). Baraka soon learnt the lessons from the failures of BARTS, returning to Newark to set up the 'Spirit House', this time along more focused organisational lines.

Ideologically, during this period, Baraka put together a response to the question of black nationhood which adapted the forms of Third-World liberation represented by Castro and Lumumba. It was Malcolm X, though, who was the mimetic and strategic model for much of Baraka's early nationalist thought, due to the way X had been able to reposition black people in the US as a colonised population. The problem for the radicals who took up X's legacy was the question of land. The anticolonial national liberation movements were built upon claims over stolen territory. Such an organisational lever was never truly on the table for black Americans (Dawson 2002).

Baraka's skill in the early flourishing of his nationalism was to improvise a politics of nationhood which did not require an attachment to a singular piece of territory. He was able to open up the forceful sentiment of anti-colonialism and make it applicable to the black nationalist movement in the US. The ideological focus shifted,

under his influence, to collective consciousness and the geographical multiplicity of blackness in the US. Baraka pointed out that there were concentrated pockets of black populations locked within almost every major urban centre in America. With the right kind of organisational structures and strategic planning, these areas could be taken over and controlled by black people and become the basis for a mass black power base. But for such a plan to work as a national project, it needed to be contained within a collective consciousness which could bypass the fact that all of these black locales were relatively isolated within the physical terrain of the US:

> Black Power is the Power first to be Black. It is better, in America, to be white. So we leave America, or we never go there. It could be twelve miles from New York City (or two miles) and it could be the black nation you found yourself in. That's where your self was, all the time. (Jones and Baraka 1968: 122)

Baraka was recasting a territorial issue into a metaphysical one. The concentrated pockets of blackness may have been locked within major US cities, but psychically they existed beyond the US. Harlem and Watts were separated geographically, but they were unified by blackness. Consciousness was deployed to bridge the strategic gaps in the nation. The concept of territory was reorganised by Baraka so that the black nation was not a coherently singular site, yet it remained unified by its blackness: a one that was not a one. The thrust of Third-World liberation and the historical specificity of slavery in the US came together through Baraka's politics of national consciousness, which sought to refigure black as a country (Jones and Baraka 2009).

At the turn of the decade there were a series of subtle changes in Baraka's politics. He took up a more formalised Pan-Africanism, and along with it shifted towards organised electoral politics. As a result, his framing of the nation question changed. All of these factors came together at the Congress of African Peoples, held in September 1970 at Atlanta, Georgia. The congress was designed to bring together a variety of black interest groups, ranging from radical community organisers to those within the Democratic Party structure, in

order a assemble a coherent national black political agenda.

Whilst there were still significant strains of his earlier politics at work during this moment (such as an internationalist focus on developing a 'World African Party', and calls for a psychic, rather than physical, separation from America), it is the issue of land that fundamentally altered. Baraka made calls for the annexation of much of the former Confederate South, the eventual aim being a black plebiscite over secession from the US. Such a call was justified because of the degree to which black labour had been exploited in order to build the southern economy, and the region contained the largest concentration of black people over a wide geographical area. Baraka spent much of the 1970 congress pushing the line: 'If there is enough of you standing on it, you ought to claim it' (Baraka 1990: 101).

The hope for a 'World African Party' flourishing in the US soon began to fall apart, as did Baraka's investment in the politics it espoused. This was largely due to the actions of the professional black political class, whose members would, at best, only ever pay lip service to any revolutionary aims. It was in 1974 that, ideologically at least, Baraka found his way back to Cuba, formally announcing his adherence to 'Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung thought' (Baraka 1990: 257). Whilst the move amplified the already operating internationalism that had been with him since 1960, what is noteworthy about this period is that despite Baraka's fervour for scientific Marxism, his aesthetic commitments never wavered. The demands he made upon himself as a poet, after returning from Havana, never ceased. There was never a distinction drawn between his commitment to socialist revolution and black art. This was made evident in the 1979 poem 'AM/TRAK'. It is customary to couch Baraka's work in jazz, and especially John Coltrane, through the prism of his black cultural nationalism. Baraka's furious examination of questions of blackness sits more comfortably with a set of ideas associated with the racial nature of Coltrane's artistry. With 'AM/TRAK', Baraka retells the giant of modern music's narrative, but turns the open secret of Coltrane's music into one

that was produced by, and offers an escape route from, the morass of exploitative capital:

> From the endless sessions
>   money lord hovers oer us
>   capitalism beats our ass
>   dope & juice wont change it
>   Trane, blow, oh scream,
>   yeh, anyway.
> . . . .
>   And yet last night I played *Meditations*
>   & it told me what to do
>   Live you crazy mother
>   fucker!
>   Live!
>   & organize
>   yr shit
>   as rightly
>   burning!
> (Baraka 1990: 270, 272)

To open this essay with the statement that Baraka was born in Cuba in 1960 was, of course, intended to provoke. But such a claim is built on the idea that familial and political genealogies are never quite one and the same thing. This sentiment applies to no one more appropriately than Amiri Baraka. Despite, or perhaps even because of, the zeal and brutality of his myriad ideological transformations, which have always left him exposed to scrutiny by more rigid ideologues, two questions appear to have consistently driven his public life, ever since that 14-h train journey to the Sierra Maestra: What does a revolutionary poem do, and how does a poet go about making that kind of revolution?

Cross-References

▶ Settler-Colonialism and the New Afrikan Liberation Struggle

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Barbados

▶ Braithwaite, Chris (1885–1944)

Basing and Forward Force Projection

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Battle of Afghanistan

▶ Global War and the Battle for Afghanistan

Bedouins

▶ Settler Colonialism: Regional Development and the Dispossession of the Negev Bedouin

Belt&Road Initiative

▶ Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy

Ben Bella, Ahmed (1918–2012)

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Synonyms

Ahmed Ben Bella; Algeria; Biography; Nationalism; Socialism

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of Algerian politician, soldier, revolutionary, and first President of Algeria Ahmed Ben Bella (1918–1912).

From 1830 to 1962 Algeria was a French colony. The French occupation was marked by a long period of bloody conquest, and a mixture of disease and violence caused the indigenous population of Algiers to decline by a third between 1830 and 1872. Arab Algerians were discriminated against and were denied basic rights while hundreds of thousands of Europeans emigrated to Algeria. Under French colonialism two societies evolved in Algeria, a Muslim society based on a traditional economy and a European society which was heavily dependent on French capital and markets but also relied on Muslim labour. The two societies had relations of extreme inequality. French authorities had introduced capitalist property relations in landholding in the late nineteenth century, and European settlers expropriated many hectares of land from native holders; by 1936 40% of the land owned by indigenous people had been taken over. By 1960 the Muslim population had expanded from three million to about nine million. While some new farmland had been made available, Muslim farmers had been pushed into largely marginal areas, and with the French enforcement of property rights, farmers were unable to move freely, a situation which led to land exhaustion

and diminished grazing. Native agriculture was heavily dependent on wheat, and it was difficult for farmers to break into the cultivation of more profitable crops such as cotton or wine grapes. As the Muslim population grew it became impossible for peasants to grow enough food to support the population. Destitution forced people to move into the cities, and there were famines throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Vast slums, referred to as 'bidonvilles', circled the larger cities, with those surrounding Algiers containing 150,000 people.

By 1954 there were about a million European settlers in Algeria, the vast majority of them living in cities. Three-quarters of Europeans worked in the liberal professions, trade, transport, and administration or as skilled workers and could be regarded as middle class. Their average income in 1960 was about the same as in metropolitan France. The Native Code denied the vast majority of Muslims basic civil rights and French citizenship. Muslims could in theory opt to live under the French Civil Code and be granted citizenship rights, but this could mean severing ties with their own community and was in practice discouraged by the French authorities. The provision of education was highly unequal: as late as 1957 all European children were receiving an education but over 80% of Muslim children had no schooling.

Settler politics in Algeria developed in a deeply authoritarian direction. Direct action, through civic organisations or ad hoc groups, was preferred to party politics or representative democracy. Authoritarian French leaders such as Pétain were popular. Before and after the Second World War the French governments made some attempts to improve conditions for the native population, but any attempt to change the dominant role of the European settlers over Muslims was fiercely resisted.

Ahmed Ben Bella was born in Marnia, a small market town on the Algerian–Moroccan border, one of five sons of a farming family. There is some uncertainty about his date of birth: it has been suggested that his father changed the date originally given, 25 December 1918, to indicate that Ahmed was born in 1916 so that he could leave school early and work on the family farm. According to Robert Merle's transcribed biography (1967) Ben Bella grew up on a relatively poor farm of 70 acres with poor soil and no water supply, the family's main income coming from a small business that his father owned. His four brothers all died young: the oldest brother received wounds in the First World War of which he later died, the second died of disease at Marnia, the third went to work in France and disappeared in the evacuation of 1940, and the fourth was called up by the French army in 1939, but contracted tuberculosis and died in the same year. Bella also lost his father in that year.

Ahmed spent his early childhood in an environment where Arabs, Jews, and a small number of French mixed amicably. After receiving the certificate for completing primary school Ahmed attended a middle school nearby in Tlemcen, a town bigger than the village of his childhood. Here he first experienced the racism and harassment suffered by Muslim students. At one point he was threatened with expulsion after he talked back to a teacher who had insulted Islam. During this time Ahmed became active in sports, especially football, which was then one of the few activities where status depended on talent and performance rather than ethnicity. Despite this the sport was still segregated, with the Algerian team playing against the French settlers' team only once a year. At school Ahmed also became involved in Algerian nationalist politics. At 15 he joined the Union Nationaliste des Musulmans Nord-Africains, a nationalist organisation which appealed to Algerian youths in the Arab-speaking madrasa schools during the 1930s. In 1937 it became the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA).

In 1934 Ahmed sat the *brevet* examination required for entry into secondary school in the French education system, but did not pass. Rather than strain the finances of the family friend with whom he was staying, he elected to return to the family farm in Marnia, where he helped with farm work, worked for an insurance company, and continued with sport. He also enlisted for military training; in 1937 he was called up for service in the French army and was posted to the 141st Alpine infantry regiment at Marseilles. This

regiment included both French and Algerian conscripts, but its officers were all from metropolitan France. Ben Bella recalled being treated fairly; he took the non-commissioned officers' examination and passed with high marks, becoming a sergeant. Service in the French army may appear incongruous for someone attracted to Algerian nationalist politics, but Ben Bella stated that he felt military training was important and he was opposed to fascism.

Ben Bella was due to be released from the army in 1939, but this was deferred with the outbreak of the Second World War and he was posted to an anti-aircraft battery near Marseilles. He experienced the German Stuka bombing of that city in 1940; the men under his command, mostly young soldiers, abandoned their stations when the bombing began. Ben Bella then recruited a group of Corsican reservists, who were more reliable. He was awarded the Croix de Guerre for heroism in the attack. After his demobilisation in 1940 Ben Bella was invited to remain in Marseilles as a professional footballer. Although he was tempted he turned the offer down, concerned about worsening conditions in Algeria.

The defeat of France in 1940 brought appalling poverty to Algeria. The country experienced inflation, shortages of consumer goods, starvation, and typhus epidemics; Ben Bella's close friend and mentor Abdelkrim Baraka died of typhus, and in Marnia Ben Bella found one brother desperately ill and his father and another brother dead. He spent much of the early 1940s rebuilding the family farm, which had been abandoned. He also started a local football team. He resisted the anti-semitism of the French Vichy regime and gave protection to a Jewish player.

In 1943 Ben Bella was recalled to the French army and was posted to the 6th Algerian regiment at Tlemcen. Here he witnessed racial segregation and discrimination and became active in a campaign against segregation. He was next transferred to the 5th Moroccan infantry regiment, which was made up of Moroccan professional soldiers and commanded by a Corsican. After a discussion with a commander Ben Bella agreed to discontinue agitation in order to continue the struggle against fascism. Despatched to Italy, Ben Bella's regiment fought at Naples in December 1943, relieving an American unit near Montano, and participated in the liberation of Rome, encountering members of the Italian resistance. It then fought the Germans at Siena. After this battle the unit was relieved and sent into the reserve in order to take part in the invasion of France. Ben Bella was sent to train recruits.

The Setif Uprising was a turning point in Ben Bella's life. On 8 May 1945, as Nazi Germany was officially surrendering, an anticolonial march in Setif, a city 200 miles east of Algiers, turned violent and several dozen French settlers were killed. In retaliation European vigilantes and French troops killed between five and ten thousand civilians. This event had a traumatic and electrifying effect on Algerian troops returning home, and Ben Bella, shocked by the fierce repression at Setif, turned down an offer to stay in the French army on the grounds of needing to care for his mother and sisters.

At this time the Algerian electoral system was rigged in favour of the French community. One million Europeans elected two-thirds of the municipal councillors, who made up the *Premier Collège,* while ten million native Algerians elected the remaining one-third to the *Second Collège.* Upon returning to Algeria Ben Bella joined the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), created in 1946 to replace the outlawed PPA and, like the previous organisation, promoting the full independence of Algeria. Ben Bella put his name on a list of candidates for the municipal council of Marnia and won a seat. At this time much of Algeria, including the area surrounding Marnia, was ravaged by typhus and starvation. The French socialist mayor of Marnia, Gerbaud, put Ben Bella in charge of food supplies and rationing, where he did exemplary work. In a political standoff with the *Premier Collège,* Ben Bella and other members of the *Second Collège,* in protest against being denied any meaningful authority, resigned en masse; Ben Bella was regarded as one of the ringleaders.

Ben Bella found, in a situation that appeared to have been set up by the local authorities that a

family of squatters had taken his family farm and house. The local *gendarmes* refused to help. Attempting to repossess his house, he wounded a squatter and was forced to flee, initially to Algiers, where he went underground in 1947.

In 1948 the MTLD lost all its seats, and in 1950 it was suppressed by the police. Losing public support, it split into various factions which pitted the more radical leadership against moderates favouring electoralism. During this crisis in the organisation, Ben Bella became leader of the Organisation Spéciale (OS), a semi-secret internal faction which was created to bypass what was regarded as the opportunism of the moderates. It was sharply opposed by other elements of the MTLD.

In 1949 Ben Bella was part of a group which planned a robbery of the post office in Oran. His involvement in this was discovered in the following year, and he was arrested in Algiers. Ben Bella and other members of the OS sought to turn their trial into a debate on French rule in Algeria, but this was opposed by the MTLD. He was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment at Blida. The MTLD sought to distance itself from the bank robbery, and it abolished the OS immediately after Ben Bella's arrest. Plans for escape by Ben Bella and his OS colleagues were sabotaged by the MTLD, but they managed to escape in 1952, using a file that had been hidden in a loaf of bread. Ben Bella went first to Tunisia, then secretly to Paris and in 1953 Egypt.

Egypt at this time was in the early stages of its nationalist revolution under Gamel Abdul Nasser. The Egyptian leaders had proposed a united north African liberation movement, which they would finance and presumably control. The OS leadership in Egypt turned this down, but Ben Bella nevertheless regarded himself as a Nasserist and an Arab nationalist; Egyptian support was important throughout the Algerian struggle. On meeting Nasser and other Egyptian leaders, Ben Bella felt sorrow at his inability to communicate in his Algerian dialect, at one point bursting into tears.

The FLN (National Liberation Front) was formed from mergers of the OS and several smaller groups at meetings in France, Algeria, and Switzerland and became officially known as the FLN on 10 October 1954. Ben Bella emerged as one of the leadership group of nine and continued to be based in Cairo until 1956 (Horne 1977, p. 79). Partly in reaction to a speech by the French premier Mendes France, who, while recognising the French withdrawal from Indo-China, declared Algeria to be an 'irrevocable' part of France, it was agreed that a campaign of militant action would begin on 1 November. An FLN radio broadcast from Cairo called for the 'restoration of the Algerian state sovereign, democratic, and social, under the framework of Islam' (quoted in Horne 1977, pp. 94–95). The FLN began attacks on military and civilian targets throughout Algeria on what became known as the 'Toussaint Rouge', or 'Red All Saints' Day', in November 1954. The November attacks are regarded as the beginning of the Algerian Revolution, or Algerian War of Independence. The purpose of the attacks was to rally the Algerian people with a show of resistance by a militant minority, further a polarisation within the Algerian nationalist movement, and provoke the government into finally dissolving the opportunistic MTLD. The latter goal was successfully achieved, with the French arresting the leadership of the organisation. At this time the FLN received some aid from Morocco, but the additional aid that it hoped for did not materialise. Later, aid from other Arab countries, especially Egypt, was important in the struggle.

By 1955, when the FLN moved into urban areas, it was apparent to the French that they faced a serious insurgency. A dramatic escalation in the war occurred with the Philippeville massacre in August of that year, in which the FLN and supporters killed 123 people, 71 of them French, including elderly women and babies. Before this time FLN's policy had been to attack only military and government targets, but the local commander of the Constantine region believed that an escalation was required. The French army and colonists carried out extensive massacres in retaliation, with, according to some accounts, 12,000 civilians being killed by the army, police, and settlers. The events at Philippeville also led to a hardening of attitude within the government and increased repression.

By 1956 the FLN was divided into two sections: the leadership operating in Algeria, known as the 'Intérieur', and the leadership in Tunisia and Morocco, known as the 'Extérieur'; Ben Bella was prominent in the latter group. In August and September of that year rifts appeared and the two groups began operating separately.

In 1956 Ben Bella was targeted in two assassination attempts. The first one was foiled when he refused to accept a package delivered to his Cairo hotel by a taxi driver; as the taxi drove away a bomb exploded, killing the driver. Later that year a gunman entered his hotel room in Tripoli, Libya. In a brief struggle Ben Bella was wounded before the gunman escaped, to be killed later by guards at the Libyan border.

In 1955 and 1956 the FLN took part in indirect peace negotiations with the French government of Guy Mollet. In September 1956 a provisional peace agreement, arranged through intermediaries, appears to have been arrived at. To ratify the agreement before it could be made public Ben Bella and leaders of the Extérieur were to fly from Rabat to Tunis on a safe-conduct pass. In what became known as the 'airplane coup', Ben Bella's DC3 was ordered by the French army to land in Algiers. The passengers were arrested and they were then held for the duration of the war.

In Algiers Ben Bella and the other Extérieur leaders were harshly interrogated by French officers. From there Ben Bella and his comrades were transferred to the Sante prison in France, where they remained for two and a half years; Ben Bella remembered this as the worst part of the six-year imprisonment. In 1959 De Gaulle had the prisoners transferred to the Isle of Aix, where conditions were much better. Ben Bella and his colleagues went on several hunger strikes for the right to be treated as political prisoners. During his imprisonment there was increasing agitation by French extremists against the prisoners. In May 1958 an apparent attempt by a rightist group to seize the prisoners was pushed back, and at one point Ben Bella and his colleagues had to be guarded by 200 mobile police. The leadership of the Extérieur group at large had formed the Provisional Government of

the Republic of Algeria (GPRA) to co-ordinate international relations. While this was meant to be a temporary organisation Ben Bella became alarmed by reports of it evolving into a bureaucratic mandarinate, ignoring the needs of the civilian refugees and the Intérieur fighters. Ben Bella mentioned that he was worried about a 'facile and corrupt regime' taking power after independence (Merle 1967, p. 119).

In 1961 serious peace talks began, and in March 1962 the Évian Accords were signed by France and the GPRA at the French town of Évian-les-Bains. They granted sovereignty and self determination to Algeria but made stipulations protecting French interests, including access to Algerian oil and protection for the European French community. Ben Bella initially opposed the Évian Accords because he felt they were too stringent, but he signed them after modifications were made, and an agreement was reached for the GPRA to summon a congress immediately after the ceasefire in order to decide the direction of the Algerian government.

On Ben Bella's release from prison in 1962, De Gaulle wanted him to be flown to Rabat and delivered to King Hassan of Morocco, but having previously had a bad experience with the French in relation to a flight to Morocco, Ben Bella insisted on being flown to Switzerland. From there he went to Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, where he was received as a hero. Rifts in the Algerian independence movement widened, however. Ben Bella felt that the Algerian Revolution was backsliding in a neo-colonialist direction caused by a lack of ideological direction. He sought to remedy this and to give a clear direction to independence. Meetings between the Intérieur and Extérieur factions were held in Tripoli, and a socialist programme for Algeria was agreed on, although Ben Bella felt that the apparent agreements were based more on cynicism. Shortly thereafter an opposing 'Bureau Politique' broke away from the GPRA. The rift approached outright war. At one point the GPRA attempted to have Ben Bella arrested in Tunis and began arresting his supporters in Algeria.

A period of chaos threatened. Remnants of the French Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (or Organisation Armée Secrète, OAS) remained strong in the Oran district, and it was feared that the OAS would attempt to set up a separate state. In addition *harkis* forces, native Algerians recruited by the French, were still in existence, and there was the possibility of them intervening in an open FLN split. Throughout Algeria local *willaya* forces, who often fought the French with little outside help, refused to cede their control over regions. The armed wing of the FLN, the Army of National Liberation (ALN), was divided into guerrilla units, which fought the French in Algeria and struggled for control of the expatriate community in France, and a component, based primarily in Morocco and Tunisia and with ties to the Berber communities, which more resembled a conventional army. The latter, led by Colonel Hourari Boumediene, saw less combat than the guerrilla units in Algeria.

With the aid of Colonel Boumediene's forces Ben Bella was able to outmanoeuvre the GPRA and prevent what appeared to be a looming civil war. In July 1962 the ceasefire agreement with France was ratified in a popular referendum and the country became independent. Ben Bella entered Algeria though his home town of Marnia, marking a triumphal return. In 1963 he was elected premier of Algeria unopposed.

Upon independence Algeria faced huge problems. The educational system was in disarray, as the OAS had destroyed schools and burned the Algiers University library. Thousands of teachers had left their posts. The French army still occupied parts of the country while the emigration of most of the French population in 1962 had led to an economic collapse. Two million Algerians, a fifth of the population, were unemployed, and the cities were filled with starving people from the countryside. In this situation reorganising the agricultural sector was felt to be a priority. Agricultural policy was centralised and aid was promised from the socialist bloc. Some success was achieved, with an outstanding harvest in 1963.

In the conditions prevailing in a developing country like Algeria it was felt that a single party would best unify the various elements of society. Ben Bella outlawed the Communist Party, although he maintained respect for communist militants. He put much effort into reviving and developing the educational sector. The University of Algeria was reopened, and Ben Bella was proud of the fact that Algeria dedicated a quarter of its budget to education. In February 1963 the *Petits Cireurs* or 'Small Shiners' operation was begun, a massive programme to aid, educate, and organise the large orphan and destitute child population of the country.

After independence European interests still controlled much of the economy. Much agricultural land was still owned by big French or Algerian landowners, but in March 1963 most of these estates were nationalised when the ANL, now called the National Popular Army, simply marched on the big estates and gave land to peasant families. Many businesses in the cities were bought out cheaply by native Algerians, and it was feared that an exploitive Algerian business class would emerge in place of the French. Ben Bella, who was influenced by the Trotskyist economist Ernest Mandel, initiated a system of worker selfmanagement known as *autogestion* which was even stipulated in the Algerian constitution.

The results of the land reform and *autogestion* programmes were chaotic. Unrest and resentment against what were seen as Ben Bella's autocratic style grew. In May 1964 a bomb exploded in front of his official residence in Algiers. Unrest grew in the Kybilya region, and there was a revolt by the Sahara regional army. On 19 June 1965, Ben Bella was deposed in a coup led by his former ally Colonel Boumedienne. He was held for 8 months in an underground prison and then taken to a villa outside Algiers, where he was held under house arrest for 14 years. In 1971 he married Zohra Sellami, an Algerian journalist. The couple adopted two children.

Boumediene died in 1978 and restrictions on Ben Bella were eased in July 1979. In 1980 Ben Bella was allowed to leave Algeria for Switzerland, where he lived in Lausanne for

10 years. Returning to Algeria in 1990, he re-entered politics and led the Movement for Democracy in Algeria, a moderate Islamist party that he had founded in exile in 1984 in the first round of Algeria's abortive 1991 elections. This party was banned in 1997. Ben Bella participated in negotiations to end the bitter Algerian civil war which had begun in 1991. At this time he advocated greater democracy in Algeria.

Ben Bella opposed the US war against Iraq of 2003 and was elected president of the International Campaign Against Aggression on Iraq. He was present when the 'Arab Spring' protests began in Algeria and the Arab world. He remained critical of the US's role in world affairs and of global capitalism. Although a lifelong religious Muslim he was critical of radical Islamists, believing that they misinterpreted Islam. Ben Bella died at his family home on 11 April 2012. The exact cause of death is unknown but is believed to have been respiratory illness.

In the 1970s and 1980s Algeria experienced an economic decline after a drop in the price of oil, which impacted on the working class and poor. After a military-backed government shut down an election in 1992 which the Islamic Salvation Front was expected to win, an action supported by France and NATO, a bitter civil war broke out in which over 200,000 people were killed. In 1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president, amid allegations of electoral fraud. According to Louisa Hanoune, the 2014 presidential candidate of the Algerian Workers' Party, the implementation of an International Monetary Fund structural adjustment plan led to the closing of hundreds of state-run companies and the loss of thousands of jobs, and the Association Agreement with the European Union has devastated agriculture and industry, as such programmes have done elsewhere in the developing world (*Socialist Organizer* 2014).

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▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)

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Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane

▶ Magubane, Bernard Makhosezwe (1930–2013)

Bikini Atoll

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Biko, Steve (1946–1977)

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Definition

Steve Biko was born on 18 December 1946 in King William's Town, South Africa. A prodigiously talented thinker and speaker, his life is a symbol of the sacrifices made when national liberation movements are confronted by the forces of history that seek to repress and subjugate them.

They had to kill him to prolong the life of apartheid.
(Nelson Mandela quoted in Somerville 2002*)*

It is both sad and timely to reflect that many of the leaders on whose vision and bravery anti-colonial movements are built do not live to see the fulfilment of their struggle. Stephen Bantu Biko is one of those leaders. A prodigiously talented thinker and speaker, his life is a symbol of the sacrifices made when national liberation movements are confronted by the forces of history that seek to repress and subjugate them. But if his life is a symbol for sacrifice, then so too is it a symbol for the liberatory maxim articulated by Burkina Faso's late revolutionary president Thomas Sankara: 'While revolutionaries as individuals can be murdered, you cannot kill ideas' (Kasuka 2013: 294–295).

Steve Biko was born on 18 December 1946 in King William's Town, South Africa. King William's Town is situated in the Eastern Cape, which is home to the greater proportion of one of the country's largest population groups, the Xhosa people. Biko was a Xhosa, a status that he shared with fellow antiapartheid icons Nelson Mandela, a Xhosa chief, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whose father was Xhosa.

Yet his heritage also positions him in a more complex anti-colonial trajectory. The Eastern Cape was the ground on which were fought the Frontier Wars, a century-long period of battles between the Xhosa people and colonial settlers that began in 1779. It comprised nine separate wars, varying in brutality, and interspersed with oases of calm. Ultimately, the wars, which came at great cost to the indigenous population, culminated in the annexation of Xhosa lands and entrenchment of British colonial rule. Nonetheless, the anti-colonial tradition of the Xhosa people was firmly fixed both in the history of resistance in the Eastern Cape and in the psyche of the resistance movement that the Eastern Cape would go on to produce; including Biko, who has been described as a 'Xhosa prophet', albeit problematically, given that this is both an essentialist and messianic description (Mangcu 2014: 11). Xolela Mangcu, whose indepth biography of Biko provides a brilliant conspectus of his politics

and proliferates the process of correcting his relative absence from the public consciousness, tackles this problematisation: 'Steve Biko was as much a product of South Africa's multi-ethnic political heritage as he was a child of the Xhosa people of the Eastern Cape' (ibid.).

Biko lost his father at a young age and was raised by his mother, who worked as a domestic servant employed by white families in the town in which he and his three siblings grew up. It is difficult to envisage that the racist servitude to which his mother would have been subjected did not influence the political ideology of the young Steve Biko during his early years.

In 1963 he joined Lovedale Institution where his older brother was also studying. After his brother was arrested and jailed for one year on suspicion of belonging to the military arm of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a black nationalist political party, the police questioned Biko. Arrests such as this, Biko would go on to say, led to 'some kind of political emasculation of the black population', with the result being that blacks were discouraged from articulating their political and economic aspirations (Biko 1987: 143). Unshackling blacks from this mental and oral incarceration was an integral part of Biko's pioneering Black Consciousness ideology.

Following police questioning, Biko was not arrested but did find himself expelled from his school. His expulsion meant having to temporarily give up his studies, which he resumed when he joined a Roman Catholic boarding school. Close friendships with a nun and priest here paved the foundations for his later ideas on Black Theology.

After graduating from his boarding school, Biko won a scholarship to study medicine, which he pursued at the University of Natal, where he first became involved with student politics. It was also where the conclusions Biko had initially drawn from his brother's arrest were to become manifest.

Opposition from blacks to their treatment by the government at the time was diminishing, Biko felt, and their participation in the struggle was becoming increasingly marginalised by white-dominated organisations like the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). The

cosmetic make-up of these organisations was unlikely to change given the significantly higher number of white students who were able to attend university in apartheid South Africa. Thus, these ostensibly multi-racial organisations paradoxically reproduced the racial inequalities in South African society and led Biko to notice a recurring pattern: 'Whites were in fact the main participants in our oppression and at the same time the main participants in the opposition to that oppression' (ibid.). Biko's disavowal of multi-racial organisations like NUSAS stemmed, then, from the recognition that such bodies represented not the interests of the black minority amongst their membership but the liberal white majority. They were representative of the existing structural forms of race-privilege in such organisations, and the ordering of dissent in ways that were, in reality, ambivalent to the consciousness project Biko was trying to create. For blacks to advance their political struggle, they must first seize control of it.

Accordingly, in 1968, the golden year for political and social movements across the world, Biko led the founding of the South African Students' Organization (SASO). A structure had been put in place that would restore to blacks the inalienable right to commandeer their own fight against apartheid. SASO can be seen as the first formalisation of the Black Consciousness Movement in that it exalted the virtues of black solidarity and placed pride in blackness at the heart of the political spectrum. No longer did black students have to rely on white spokespersons to articulate their suffering, nor did they have to accept the structural stifling of their demands for equality. Blacks began to associate much more readily with each other, setting them on course for the psychological emancipation with which Black Consciousness is synonymous.

Here Biko engages with the sentiment of the Pan-Africanist pioneer of the 'Back to Africa' movement Marcus Garvey, whose hope was that blacks would 'emancipate ourselves from mental slavery because while others might free the body, none but ourselves can free the mind' – a political ideal popularised by Bob Marley's iconic *Redemption Song* (Garvey 1990: 791). In order

for blacks to free their bodies for themselves, Black Consciousness demonstrates, they must *first* free their minds.

It would be wrong, if fathomable, to assume that Biko advocated total segregation. On the contrary, he recognised that the success of South Africa's anti-colonial movements would depend to a large extent on their ability to ultimately transcend ethnic boundaries. However, all movements are shaped by the conditions in which they are created and the political challenges they address. SASO's politics of distancing itself from existing establishment liberal white organisations was a necessary response to a climate in which blacks were made to feel inferior and whites, thus, correspondingly superior. Much more reflective of SASO's race politics and the Black Consciousness Movement as a whole was its welcoming right from the start of coloured and Indian activists, overcoming existing barriers in the process. As Biko's long-time friends Malusi and Thoko Mpumlwana state, 'Black Consciousness sought to unite the "non-whites" into a socio-political block recognized as "blacks"' (Biko 1987: xxvi). In this way the Black Consciousness Movement helped not only to organise but to *define* 'black' as a broad coalition of the non-white oppressed, recognising it was not just Africans who suffered from unjust material conditions. The Black Consciousness Movement's broader black solidarity also distinguished it from some of the narrower elements of both the PAC and the African National Congress (ANC).

As SASO expanded, its following diversified to incorporate a wider representation of blacks beyond the relatively educated university demographic. This drive was boosted by a practical outlook and applied language that focused on the needs of ordinary Africans, avoiding the trap of an aloof discourse disconnected from society at large that similar organizations had fallen victim to. This trajectory culminated in the creation by black communities in 1972 of the Black People's Convention (BPC), which expressly excluded whites, and took Black Consciousness as its central philosophy. Black Consciousness extolled the virtues of blackness, including all aspects of its history and culture. In order to be able to do this,

the Black Consciousness Movement argued, the black community had to rid itself of the palimpsestic remains of centuries of oppression, enslavement, and subjugation; such a process of psychological liberation could only be undertaken by black communities themselves. This is what distinguished the Black Consciousness Movement from the more compromising approach of Nelson Mandela, for example, who placed greater hope in multi-racial struggle.

The reach of Black Consciousness extended further still when Biko joined the Black Community Programmes (BCPs), which focused on the social and economic empowerment and independence of black communities. The BCPs established health centres, disseminated literature, supported the families of political prisoners, and built schools and crèches – all of which sought to improve the material welfare of blacks while increasing their self-reliance. This was in part driven by a belief that individual mental liberation could not be satisfactorily reached *prior* to changing circumstances.

Biko's Black Consciousness Movement represented the convergence of these three aforementioned organisations: SASO was the radical student body that was instrumental in setting political direction; the BPC was the wider body in society that brought people together; and the BCPs were the self-help welfare arm. It was a holistic approach that reflected Biko's understanding of society and the need for systemic change if emancipation were to be achieved. In an interview with a European journalist on his vision for an egalitarian society, Biko outlined the BPC's road to meaningful change as 'reorganizing the whole economic pattern and economic policies', including the redistribution of wealth (Biko 1987: 149). Moreover, he had a prescient warning for his fellow activists: 'If we have a mere change of face of those in governing positions what is likely to happen is that black people will continue to be poor, and you will see a few blacks filtering through into the so-called bourgeoisie' (ibid.).

The effectiveness of Black Consciousness caused the apartheid establishment to be unnerved, and they instigated a crackdown on its members in the first half of the 1970s. Leaders of the movement were arrested, while Biko was initially confined to his hometown before being banned from further work with the BPC in the mid-1970s. By that point, however, he had spread the influence of Black Consciousness far and wide across South Africa. The increasing militancy of black communities, linked to this dispersion, found its sharpest expression in the Soweto Uprising of 1976. The principal spark for the protests was the Afrikaans Medium Decree of 1974, which made compulsory the use of Afrikaans as a medium for teaching in schools. The rebellion to this was a reflection of the increasing consciousness and determination of the young followers of the Black Consciousness Movement to assert their own history and identity.

Biko's death came after a period of heightened harassment by the state. However, he remained defiant throughout and refused to cease his political organising, knowing that the movement for liberation was gathering pace. He was arrested and detained under the Terrorism Act in 1976 and again the following year. On 18 August 1977, while travelling with a comrade, he was stopped at a roadblock. The police did not recognise Biko, while his friend, Peter Jones, refused to reveal his identity – despite the dangers he knew this entailed. Sensing the danger his friend was putting himself into, it was Biko who came forward and revealed himself to the officers. They promptly took Biko and Jones away to separate stations. Jones's bravery came at a cost of repeated beatings and torture; Biko's came at a greater cost. At the police station he was stripped naked and badly beaten, resulting in a brain haemorrhage on 6 September. Despite his rapidly deteriorating condition, he was kept in prison for days, before being driven – shackled and naked – to a prison hospital hundreds of kilometres away. He died in a prison cell in Pretoria on 12 September 1977. The apartheid government tried to suppress news of what had really happened to Biko – a brutal assassination at the hands of the state – but his murder resonated around the world and galvanised the fight for freedom.

Those who die fighting for freedom are never truly murdered, only martyred. That is not to romanticise their deaths but to exalt their lives,

as it returns us to the maxim with which we began: states can kill individuals but not the effects of their ideas on the lives of others. The Black Consciousness that Biko represented lived on to the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa – an anti-colonial and anti-racist victory for which Stephen Bantu Biko will forever be remembered.

Biko's hope to bring together the BPC, ANC and PAC is evident in the collection of his writings *I Write What I Like.* He believed that a united front would create the most formidable challenge to apartheid. Mandela has suggested that it was in the run-up to a meeting with the then-leader of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, to progress this hope that Biko was killed. The prospect of that triumvirate forming a coalition against apartheid alarmed the apartheid government. It is that sentiment which lay behind Mandela's assertion in the epigraph to this chapter: in order for apartheid to live, Biko had to die. As an individual, his magnitude equalled that of the armoured apartheid nation he confronted; and so his murder equalled the creation of a martyr, his physical destruction, a stride towards the political destruction of the very state that carried it out.

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Bioaccumulation

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Biography

Black Liberation

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Black Nationalism

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Black Panthers

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Definition

Since arriving on American shores, struggle has characterised much of African and African-American people's experience globally and in the US. Blacks' struggle against political subjection and domination has characterised much of their social relations with the capitalist world economy, has been ongoing, and has taken

multiple forms. It has been black resistance to racism and oppression which has been the major form of protest to the domination of black peoples since the sixteenth century. It is in this context that we must situate the resistance and struggle of the Black Power Movement (BPM) over time more generally and the Black Panther Party (BPP) more specifically.

Introduction

Since arriving on American shores, struggle has characterised much of African and African-American people's experience globally and in the US. Blacks' struggle against political subjection and domination has characterised much of their social relations with the capitalist world economy, has been ongoing, and has taken multiple forms. It has been black resistance to racism and oppression which has been the major form of protest to the domination of black peoples since the sixteenth century. It is in this context that we must situate the resistance and struggle of the Black Power Movement (BPM) over time more generally and the Black Panther Party (BPP) more specifically.

The BPM is arguably one of the most important forms of modern resistance in African-American history. It can be traced back to the slaves, the African Blood Brotherhood of the 1910s (who fed from the Communist Party USA [CPUSA]), the 1920s with Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association, and through the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s with the National Negro Congress, A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington movement, as well as the Nation of Islam and the ideologies of Malcolm X (Austin 2006, pp. 2–9; Haywood 1978; Kelley 1990). This long and enduring history set the stage on which the BPP would emerge.

The BPP was one of many organisations that was created and continued under the umbrella of the modern phase of the BPM during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. It earned its place in history because of its militancy and the revolutionary stance its members took at the tail end of

the Civil Rights Movement. They grabbed the attention of those around them because of the resurrection of a more militant and vigilant stance against discrimination as well as their emphasis on mobilising the masses. It was this stance that led to the BPP's greatest success.

Although much has been written in recent years about the BPP, its organisation, programmes, and activities, very little has been written about the structural conditions which contributed to its ideologies and militant stances. A thorough examination of the Party's ideology in response to these structural conditions over time has yet to be undertaken. In examining the Party and its many actions and activities, central questions are: What was the ideology of the BPP? Where did it come from? Did the ideologies of the BPP change over time, and if so, how and why did they change? Who influenced this ideology? And did changes in ideology change the perceptions and activities of the Party over time?

The thesis of this essay is that the BPP's ideology was grounded in a critique of the dominant perspectives on black equality. Over the course of the BPP's existence, however, this critique and the substance grounding it would go through continuous ideological transformations as a result of larger structural conditions that led to changes in the posture of Party members. There was thus a continuous evolution of perspectives on the part of Party members based on their continuous struggles to make sense of the world. Over the course of the Party's existence, it came to be guided by a number of ideologies that continuously built on and corrected deficiencies in the dominant and more widely accepted ideologies of Black Power and Black Nationalism. Conflicts within the group about what the Party was fighting for shaped each of these ideologies that were promoted at different points in time. At each stage, these ideologies served as guides for the Party's changing activities. Ranging from Black Nationalism to Revolutionary Nationalism to Revolutionary Internationalism to Revolutionary Inter-communalism, each of these ideologies represented different phases in the Party's history and evolution and each brought changes to Party

activities and activism. For instance, early on, the Party took on a version of Black Nationalism because of relationships to the Black Power Movement and agreement with its critiques about the Civil Rights Movement. This ideology influenced the Party's early belief that the struggle was predominantly an African-American one to reclaim the manhood of African-American males. At the height of the Party, in response to the repression and many conflicts and contradictions arising out of these conditions, new coalitions were formed. The Party then took on the ideology that the struggle was one against capitalism and that the fight waged had to be one of African and African-American revolution. Later the Party would again augment this ideology based on new interpretations of old influences and relationships with international organisations. It would take on the belief that the struggle was for all oppressed peoples, and that efforts should be geared toward achieving the selfdetermination of destiny and life goals absent among many if not all oppressed populations within the US and abroad.

In this essay, I will examine the changes in the ideology of the Party between 1967 and 1971 through an analysis of the BPP's major media and vocal outlet, the organisations newspaper *The Black Panther*. I will particularly focus on the published poetry, speeches, and essays of Party members gathered from the Binghamton University library archive. I will utilise this in conjunction with other methods of acquiring data including biographies and other forms. The hope of this essay is to add to the larger dialogue on the BPP and particularly discussions of Party dynamics and their many functions in order to promote the continuance of its important legacy.

Black Power, Black Nationalism and the BPP (1966–67)

Michael West and many others argue that the rise of modern black resistance began with the global mechanisms of the quadripartite revolutions (global abolitionism, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution) (West 2005, p. 87). This is because this period led to Blacks being freed from slavery and being educated by whites. For West, one major consequence of this education was the internalisation of western values and principles on the parts of African elites and intellectuals which, although not inevitable, led to an integrationist black consciousness and ultimately an integrationist Black protest that was foundational to movements such as the US Civil Rights Movement (West 2005, pp. 89–91). Importantly, capitalism (and in many cases scientific socialism), industrialisation, secularisation, and urbanisation for the African-descent patterned after the Western world was for many intellectuals the way of rising above darkness and getting equality. It was a means to move beyond the conditions that set blacks up for servitude. However, for Michael West and many others it was clear that a large population did not benefit from the strategy of these intellectuals (102). For West, those who benefited least from the quadripartite schema, the end of slavery, decolonisation, and desegregation began to believe that this posturing was limited, and they contested its worth. This opened up spaces for critique centred on the Black Power ideology (102). In noting the lack of ability for integration in some cases and the limitations of integration in others, the non-intellectual masses played a crucial role in this critique.

Black Nationalism, as I argue, was the first form of Pan-Africanism and also dated back to slavery. It began even before integrationist approaches and was the more revolutionary stance of the slave tradition that began in Africa and the Americas with maroons and slave revolts and with field slaves or the non-elite. The integrationist project and approach, however, aligned more thoroughly with dominant white perceptions about civilising blacks, and Black Nationalism in slave form was subsequently hidden and obscured. However, Black Nationalism, in clear opposition to the dominant approach of striving for integration, was always the integrationists' strongest critique. It emphasised self-sufficiency, race pride, and black separatism as opposed to integration and the Westernisation of Africans and Africa (Encyclopedia Britannica 2014;

Stanford Encyclopedia 2014). This critique later gained ground because of the lack of changes in the structural conditions of black people in their negotiations for uplift following the integrationist approach. It is only in this context that we may understand the modern phase of the BPM.

The modern phase of the BPM of the 1960s and 1970s began as the result of the disillusionment of many African-Americans with the outcome of the dominant approaches to subjugation such as Intellectual Pan-Africanism, Négritude and the Civil Rights Movement. Positioning itself against middle-class movements that emphasised the 'talented tenth's' uplift, the BPM found its roots in the maroon communities and revolutionary fervour of slave revolts as well as in organisations and movements such as the African Blood Brotherhood of the 1910s, the CPUSA, the Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association, and the ideologies of Malcolm X. It became a force and mobiliser for the empowerment of African-Americans in its own right and with its own dynamic historicity (Austin 2006, pp. 2–9; Haywood 1978; Kelley 1990; Umoja 2006, p. 225). It was within this tradition that the BPP emerged and became an important fixture within the African-American community, successfully changing the focus from an isolated African-American struggle against racism in the US to capitalism and imperialism everywhere.

Amidst the turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, the BPP was formed and proved to be a substantial force within the modern phase of the Black Power Movement. Arriving on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement, the BPP was first established in 1966 by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale as a nuanced response to the many injustices still plaguing the African-American community. A large part of what made the Party so appealing was its reaching-out to the most downtrodden or the lumpenproletariat, the militant stance the Party was taking at the tail end of the Civil Rights Movement, and its revolutionary activities and actions that came at a time when the pull of non-violence was wearing thin. It was because of these major premises and actions that within the course of a few years (between 1966 and 1971) the BPP became one of the most successful organisations

within the BPM, succeeding in transforming the struggle for many African-Americans as well as many others both nationally and internationally.

The world that the BPP knew and understood in its earliest years was heavily influenced by the ideologies and organisation of both the historical and modern phase of the Black Power Movement. From its earliest inception, the BPP identified with and worked with organisations in the Black Power Movement and identified itself as a Black Nationalist organisation. Some of the major influences on the Movement were also influences of the BPP. For instance, both considered themselves to be the 'heirs of Malcolm X' and took up his ideas about the way the struggles for equality should be approached, including his ideas about the position of whites in the movement (Jeffries 2006, p. 7). The Party followed the example of many such Black Power Movement organisations by not admitting whites and shunning co-operation with white organisations (ibid.).

Others who contributed to their ideas about liberation and revolution were Robert F. Williams with *Negroes With Guns* and Frantz Fanon with *The Wretched of the Earth* (ibid.). Also, early on, expanding upon and incorporating protection groups of the 1950s and 1960s, the Party defined the struggle as one for racial solidarity and liberation, and geared its activism toward bettering the African-American community. The Party thus sought in its very beginnings to actualise this form of Black Nationalism, particularly by putting an end to the brutality inflicted on many African-Americans within the community, which, for them, was aiding in black liberation (Austin 2006, p. 7; Calloway 1977, p. 58; Courtright 1974, pp. 249–267; Umoja 2001, pp. 3–19). In its early years, the Party's emphasis on revolution and liberation centred on the liberation of African-American males from the dominance of the 'White man'.

For instance, Huey P. Newton in the early years of the Party took from Eldridge Cleaver when he spoke of the struggles of the Black community as struggles between the African-American male and the white male, the slave and the slave master, stating that:

The historical relationship between black and white here in America has been the relationship between the slave and the master; the master being the mind and the slave the body. The slave would carry out the orders that the mind demanded of him to carry out. By doing this the master took the manhood of the slave because he stripped him of a mind. He stripped black people of their mind. In the process the slave-master stripped himself of a body . . .. This caused the slave master to become envious of the slave because he pictured the slave as being more of a man . . . in order to reinforce his sexual desire, to confirm, to assert his manhood he would go into the slave quarters and have sexual relations with the black woman (the self-reliant amazon) . . .. The slave was constantly seeking unity within himself; a mind and a body. He always wanted to be able to decide . . .. (Cleaver in Matthews 1998, p. 280).

Many Party members also espoused similar beliefs. For instance, the April 1967 issue of *The Black Panther* published the article 'Why Was Denzil Dowell Killed?' in which the struggles are outlined as a need for protection against the American white power structure and against police brutality in the community. This particularly highlighted the need for African-American males to begin organising, become aware, and fight for Black power. The author wrote that:

Let us organize to defend ourselves . . .. We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality . . .. These brothers have become aware of something that the white racists have been trying to keep secret from Black people all the time: that a citizen has the right to protect himself . . .. Black people must realize the time is short and growing shorter by the day . . .. Black people want and need the power to stop the white racist power structure from grinding the life out of the Black Race through the daily operation of this system which is designed to exploit and oppress Black people . . .. The Black Panther Party For Self-Defense really has something going. These brothers are the cream of Black Manhood . . . Black Men!!! It is your duty to your women and children, to your mothers and sisters, to investigate the program of the Party. There is no other way. (quoted in Foner 1995, pp. 9–12)

Many of the subsequent activities of the Party at this time appear to have grown out of these ideologies and understandings. This seemed to be the Party's way of carrying out action based on these ideologies. For instance, members were

quite specific in the case of African-Americans in the Bay Area. At their foundation, they developed a ten-point programme entitled 'What We Want, What We Believe' based on what they saw as the needs of and injustices perpetrated against the African-American community. Their aims included freedom, full employment, an end to the robbery of the black community, decent housing, education, exemption from military service for black men, an end to police brutality, freedom for all black men in prisons and jails, black people to be tried by a jury of their own peers, and land, bread, housing, clothing, justice and peace (Austin 2006, p. 353; Foner 1995, pp. 2–4; Holder 1990, p. 28; Jones 1998, pp. 473–475; Major 1971, pp. 291–293; Newton 1980, pp. 119–122). Upon its foundation, the Party took on the title of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. Its first task was the orchestration of armed patrols of the police and community as well as beginning to advocate for armed struggle (Austin 2006, p. 7; Calloway 1977, p. 58; Courtright 1974, pp. 249–267; Rodriguez 2008, pp. 119–141; Seale 1970, p. 37; Smith 1999, p. 31; Umoja 2001, pp. 3–19).

In addition to the armed patrols that were set up, many of the activities that the Party engaged in during this time were also quite specific to the mobilisation of African-Americans in general and particularly the African-American community in the Bay Area. The Party worked within the African-American community to have stop lights installed at dangerous intersections and to have community review boards set up (Fletcher et al. 1993, p. 223).

Throughout 1966 and 1967, the Party was strongly committed to the traditions and ideology of the BPM which was specific to blacks in the US. However, these ideas as well as many of the other ideas of the Party would change. The Party would eventually see these organisations' ideologies as limited interpretations of the struggles of African-Americans as their ideology began to move more steadily and heavily to a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist viewpoint. This occurred in tandem with the Party beginning to establish coalitions with other organisations, including aligning with the Peace and Freedom Party

(221–223). It would thus be forced to expand its truths, ideologies, assumptions, and actions. These alliances would come to have an enormous impact on the Party's understandings throughout 1968 and 1969. At the start of 1968 and continuing in 1969, its ideologies began to change rapidly, along with which changes came shifts in Party perceptions, activism, and activities.

Black Nationalism, Revolutionary Nationalism, and the BPP (1968–69)

Throughout 1968 and 1969, the Party was faced with many contradictions in relation to the ideology of the larger BPM. For the Party, many in the BPM just did not sufficiently answer these contradictions with their actions (Hayes and Kiene 1998, p. 164). Beginning in 1968, the Party began to take great issue with black and cultural nationalists' arguments for black-only struggles, with the emphasis on the black male struggle and with black and cultural nationalists' ultimate goals for a 'Black nation'. The BPP argued that this form of thought was limited and problematic in its goals and struggles, particularly in regard to its analysis of race and class as separate struggles (164). This came as a result of its desire and need for alliances. It then began to draw links between many struggles going on throughout the nation and the world which led it to conclude that the black/cultural nationalist ideology was not wholly sufficient to deal with the power structures and processes of oppression that plagued the African-American community. The BPP believed that there were better truths out there to explain things. Because of the many conflicts with the ideologies of black and cultural nationalism which resulted in conflict between the Panthers and other Black Nationalist groups surrounding these issues and turf, the BPP came to define black and cultural nationalism as a reactionary and chauvinistic and part of the problem within the US (ibid.). Though the Party in essence retained some of the central premises that had guided them in their early years (for instance, continuing to stress ideas of black liberation and the need to resolve the problems of

the American power structure), it also began to emphasise the importance of coalitions and that the goal of the struggles in the US should be for socialism. No longer able to look to Black Nationalist organisations, the BPP began to depend more heavily on Marxist-Leninist theory as well as that of Che Guevara and Mao Zedong, and looked to different revolutions around the world for guidance (164–165). The Party began to emphasise these new sources as its ideological examples of what should be done about the struggles.

The liberation struggles and revolutions that had been taking place around the world became a prime example for the ideology of the BPP at this time. The principles of Karl Marx, Lenin, Che Guevara, and Mao Zedong thus began to be actualised in the Party in greater and more explicit ways (Abu-Jamal 2004, p. 105; Hayes and Kiene 1998, p. 164). The Cuban revolution and its subsequent enactment of socialism, as well as Vietnam, became the dominant influences on the Party during this time, as did the liberation struggles/revolutions in Africa, driven by the writings of Franz Fanon with the case of Algeria and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah (Hayes and Kiene 1998, p. 164; Abu-Jamal 2004, p. 105). These became the BPP's point of departure. With these struggles as its example, it reconfigured how it saw the struggle.

A reassessment of the situation of African-Americans in light of these new sources led to the development of the idea of revolutionary nationalism during this time. The Party began to define class as an important feature of the struggle, capitalism as the source of the problem, and socialism as its ultimate goal (Hayes and Kiene 1998, p. 164). Taking from Huey Newton, the BPP began to see race struggles as a part of larger struggles against imperialism and capitalism, and the African-American situation as similar to that of others who had been colonised (165). At this time, the Party began to define African-American struggles as colonisation struggles, and argued that they were synonymous with struggles for decolonisation (ibid.). It began to stress that African-Americans were among the many who had been colonised with the expansion

of Western Europe and the US, and that this created a relationship with other forces internationally. All represented a fight against colonisation and the evils of capitalism, imperialism, and racism (Hayes and Kiene 1998, pp. 164–165). The Party began to stress that struggles of African-Americans required international intervention, drawing connections between the US police and military force and other international colonial forces. This began to be reflected to a greater extent in Panther writings.

Within the writings of BPP members, there were increasingly notions of revolution and liberation suggesting that the only way to achieve the wants of the community was via revolution. They now more directly called for guerrilla warfare. They described police in the US as a fascist military organisation that served with the national guard to subordinate African-Americans and subversives. For instance, an article in *The Black Panther* compared the struggles of African-Americans to those in Vietnam and also emphasised the belief that genocide was upon the nation and revolution:

> Just as the Vietnamese people refuse to be controlled by the capitalist racist American government, and are fighting to retain control of their own country, black people in America are fighting to have control of their communities in their hands. With a potential mass of fifty million blacks moving together to control their communities across the nation, the first assault by the political leadership of the racists is to destroy the leadership of the black struggle in order to be able to move against the masses without organized resistance …. The advent of fascism in the US is most clearly visible n the suppression of the black liberation struggle …, The police departments nationwide are preparing for armed struggle with the black community and are being directed and coordinated nationally with the US Army and the underground vigilante racist groups for massive onslaught against black people. But the billy clubs and mass arrests and guns are no longer just for black people: the white peace movement and the student power struggle is also beginning to get a taste of police violence …. The day when the state and its police power ceases to protect the community but in turn attacks the people of the community has arrived in this country. This is the first stage of building the police state …. The next step is genocide. The black community faces two alternatives: total liberation or total extinction. (Cleaver 1968, p. 8)

In 1969, the Party continued to believe that immediate revolution was needed and would occur. For instance, Huey Newton appeared to believe that revolution would be sparked because of the nature of the system and that dealing with corrupt political officials was a top priority. Huey Newton, in a message to the Party for the celebration of his birthday (published in *The Black Panther* in February), described the Party's efforts in mobilising the community as a revolutionary force, and emphasised the belief that the revolution would be sparked by some significant event. He foresaw it being brought about in the way the Mao Zedong laid it out. He believed the people would finally turn on the corrupt politicians and the nation's political means and create new systems in similar ways to what was going on in Vietnam (Newton 1969).

This new ideology clearly influenced and changed many BPP members' perceptions of the struggle. For instance, much of Party writing suggests that members redefined their notions of the problems of African-Americans as struggles centred on the enemy as the capitalist and imperialist power structure. They redefined the solutions to these problems as socialism.

Eldridge Cleaver also goes about discussing the struggle as one against capitalism and colonisation, outlining the nature of the struggle and how revolution could and would be successful in America. In an interview he stated that:

> … we don't look upon this situation as being something confined to the geographical boundaries of the United States or the North American continent. We see this as a world-wide contest, and in this world-wide contest, you are in very much the minority, and we are the majority. So you don't have 20 million black people to deal with, you have 700 million Chinese, 300 million Africans and un-numbered billions and millions and millions, and millions, and millions of mad black, red, yellow people to deal with. And you know that. (Cleaver 1968, p. 6, 14)

This new ideology also guided many of the subsequent BPP actions at the time. In addition to many of its chapters opening nationwide, the Party began to operate some of its earliest survival programmes developed to 'help people survive until their consciousness' was raised to the

necessity and importance of revolution (Abron 1998, pp. 178–179; Holder 1990, p. 78). These survival programmes served as a means of demonstrating to the people a new world (of socialism) through the means of creating community-controlled institutions, but they also developed revolutionaries for the struggle through maximising safety, nourishment, and health care (Abron 1998, pp. 178–179; Holder 1990, p. 78). No longer centred on the 'Black Man's' struggle, coalitions became central to BPP organising. It began forming coalitions with Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and Asian-Americans such as those with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and Students for a Democratic Society as well as those with African-American, Puerto Rican, and white street gangs in Chicago (Holder 1990, pp. 124–130). The BPP also began to branch out internationally. For instance, in June 1968, Eldridge Cleaver took the case of African-Americans to the United Nations, while Bobby Seale attended the World Peace conference in Montreal, Canada in December 1968 (Fletcher et al. 1993, p. 228; Major 1971, p. 297). In addition to this, the Party began giving widespread support to both national and international organisations such as the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (ibid.). The BPP at this time also developed and fostered important ties with the Black Liberation Army, an underground group of revolutionaries who aimed at disrupting the American/capitalist system (Umoja 2006, pp. 224–225). Within the Party there also developed a secret society of revolutionaries (an underground wing) for guerrilla-type warfare, through its affiliation with the Black Liberation Army. This emphasised military training, particularly with the arrival in the Party of Geronimo Pratt and his training of many chapters (Umoja 2006, pp. 227–228). These changes also culminated with the BPP removing the 'Self-Defense' from its name, a move reflecting its growing and changing connections with other struggles of the world (Matthews 1998, p. 277). These important changes also prompted massive repressive efforts on the part of the US authorities.

Because of the Party's message and their appeal during this time, the BPP became the target for mass repression on the part of US government agencies. Throughout these years, it continued to be the prime target for government and local law enforcement officials who followed J. Edgar Hoover. Local law enforcement on a national level as well as the FBI and CIA worked to infiltrate the Party, and in doing so killed many of its members, arrested many more, and caused inter-group strife among the different organisations like the BPP and the US organisation, a competing nationalist group, as well as between the Panthers and the Black Stone Rangers and within the Party itself (Ngozi-Brown 1997, pp. 157–170). The political repression of the BPP, orchestrated and carried out by organisations like the CIA and the FBI under COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Programme) in conjunction with local law enforcement, heightened in 1969 and escalated throughout 1970. Such actions were instrumental in changing the organisation and mobilisation of the Party. For instance, in 1969, the BPP went through massive reorganisation and conducted a purge of members (the first of many expulsions that followed) to remove suspected law enforcement moles as well as to cleanse the organisation of any who were seen as non-productive while at the same time closing off membership for three months (Le-Blanc-Ernest 1998, p. 310; Smith 1999, p. 48). These events led to the positioning of many women in the roles once overwhelmingly held by men. Women, because of repression, also increasingly began being seen in a different light as their roles changed, with them becoming central to the functioning and leadership of the Party. As a result, women began taking on more of the leadership and rank-and-file roles, as well as running by far the majority of Party programmes. By all accounts, women became the structure and backbone of the Party. Men and women began working side by side, and in so doing created a gender-neutral setting that was new to the BPM. This was reflected at a national level. The repression of these years influenced greatly the Party's ideology, particularly in regard to women and their role in the struggle.

As a result of the many changes in the ideology of the BPP between 1968 and 1969, Party perceptions and activism went through important and notable transformations that made much of its organisation between 1970 and 1971 possible and were the preconditions for organising at this time. With its beginning very much in the reactionary nationalism the Party would later come to shun, the BPP transformed between 1968 and 1969 from an organisation specifically for the African-American lumpenproletariat to an organisation which also embraced the lumpenproletariat of other cultures and the oppressed proletariat of the world. These processes contributed greatly to the Party's further growth and expansion in becoming both a national and international organisation during this time and to the particular shifts in its ideology between 1970 and 1971.

Revolutionary Internationalism and Inter-communalism, and Survival Pending Revolution (1970–71)

The period between 1970 and 1971 was critical for the BPP, marking its zenith and the start of its decline. Although the Party continued until 1982, when its last programme, the liberation school, closed its doors, the year 1971 marked its end as a revolutionary organisation. During this time, the Party's ideology would again shift based on its need to again reconcile its position with new understandings of the world. Repression had an immense influence on the ideology and truths of the BPP, with many members beginning to again branch out, this time internationally through forced exile abroad to escape the authorities. The many changes in the Party's ideological views influenced shifts in how members perceived their role in the struggle and their activities and mobilisation.

As a result of repression, many members were forced underground and fled the US. This however facilitated deeper connections with struggles being carried out around the world. For instance, Eldridge Cleaver went into exile and travelled the world forming coalitions in Cuba and with Al Fatah before settling in Algeria (Abu-Jamal 2004, pp. 106–107). Others who fled were Party captain Bill Brent, who went to Cuba; field marshal Don Cox, Sekou Odinga, Larry Mack Michael Tabor, and Connie Matthews who all ended up in Algiers where the Party formed its international wing (ibid.). Black Panther organisations also began in Britain, Bermuda, Israel, Australia, India, and Canada (Umoja 2001, pp. 3–4).

Influenced more heavily than ever by Marxist-Leninists, and a certain utopianism of Marx and Mao Zedong, Huey Newton articulated a new ideology upon release from prison in 1970: Revolutionary Internationalism. This, he believed drew heavily from Revolutionary nationalism and particularly its coalitions, but emphasised new things (Hayes and Kiene 1998, p. 169). This ideology centred on the belief that the US was more of an empire of nations that dominated the world rather than a nation in itself, and saw the US as an international enemy (Hayes and Kiene 1998, p. 169). He believed that the only way to combat this enemy was through international efforts and strategies and through the unity of all oppressed peoples (ibid.). Shortly after this change, another was made. That same year, at the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention, the ideology shifted again, this time to one of Inter-communalism (170). This ideology extended upon internationalism, only breaking down the idea of nationhood and nation states and emphasising that rather than international coalitions, territories were a part of a world community brought about by the imperialism and oppression of the US (ibid.). These changes were directly reflected in the perceptions of the Party in its paper.

Within the writings of many members, much of this ideology was perpetuated and heightened. This was exemplified in the belief that the role and objective of the BPP was to enlighten the people and aid in their awakening to the truth about the American system and about capitalism and capitalist, imperialist organisations of societies. The Party refined the definition of themselves and emphasised their role as a revolutionary political programme. This, for them, meant they were an armed political programme focused on survival until there was a world revolution. They emphasised their role in serving the people

and survival while educating them and showing them a better way until universal revolution occurred. For them, this universal revolution required struggle in all places to destroy the oppression for all. While the Party still advocated a preparedness to die for what they believed in, they ultimately came to believe that in order to change the structure their mission had to be change people within the US and worldwide before revolution could occur. Throughout 1970 and 1971, much of the Party's writings reflected this great shift.

For instance, Huey Newton in 1971 suggested that the revolution would eventually come and that what was important was focusing on survival. He also describes the importance of the community in bringing about revolution (Newton 1971). The Party, furthermore, begins to describe its role as dedicated to the survival of the people until the universal revolution. Many members followed these beliefs and traditions wholeheartedly. For example,, in an article entitled 'Survival Pending Revolution', an anonymous author emphasises the importance of the survival programmes to the survival of the masses and the need to focus on them until the revolution comes about (Anonymous 1971). It was with these ideologies as the Party's foundation that the Party went about conducting its actions.

Between the years 1970 and 1971 the Black Panthers continued to go through dramatic changes organisationally as a result of the war waged against them by the FBI, but also because of their changes in ideology (Calloway 1977, p. 69; Holder 1990, p. 288; Newton 1980, p. 55). The most important change that occurred was the Party dropping the ten-point programme because they felt it no longer represented the needs of the community (Anonymous 1971). Other big changes came with a shift in the BPP platform, with the Party gradually moving from a paramilitary, revolutionary organisation to more of a political programme centred on serving the community. Because of these changes in ideology, many of the actions of the Party members changed. They began emphasising the survival programmes during this time, expanding them to include the liberation school, multiple free breakfast programmes, welfare rights advocacy,

and youth activities as well as the free clothing programme and free health clinics (Abron 1998, pp. 177–188).

Throughout 1970 and 1971, critical changes in the ideology of the Party and its organisation brought about important changes in activism as well as mission that, along with repressive measures, directly influenced the BPP's decline as a revolutionary organisation and served as the precondition for Huey Newton officially putting down the gun in 1972. All of these changes over the brief six-year existence of the Party as a revolutionary organisation were a part of the growth and expansion of the BPP and why it was so successful during its short run. It is this legacy that must be remembered.

Conclusion

The struggles against capitalism have been multiple and various as have the repressive measures to maintain them. The struggles of African-Americans within the US are just one example. The BPM was one of the most important movements for African-Americans within the US, and was the culmination of all struggles that had taken place up until that point. Despite great gains on the part of these movements, much remained to be done. It was within this tradition and this continuation of repression that the BPP emerged and became important. In its short existence, it attempted and succeeded to a certain extent in changing the very fabric of American society at the same time as it too continually changed.

As has been shown, over the course of the Party's existence it was guided by a number of ideologies that served to build on and correct conflicts within others. As a result of many occurrences and influences, Party members and particularly Party leadership were forced to re-think many of its major organising premises as well as strategies and tactics for attaining success in its efforts to adapt the Party to a changing environment in order to remain useful within the community. Ranging from Black Nationalism to Revolutionary Inter-communalism, the Party was continuously adapting to the environment around it and expanding upon its thought to fit into

growing and enhanced consciousness and understandings. As the BPP's ideologies changed, so did its perceptions and activities, which added to the success and widespread appeal of the Party over time. Connecting the struggles of African-Americans to the struggles throughout the world, though not new, placed the Party on a higher plateau than many others in the BPM and caused wider rifts between them. While the Party began as an organisation seeking to liberate the African-American community through the reclaiming of the masculinity of African-American men (and initially organised in a way that gave precedence to African-American males), it ultimately took on a more politically relevant stance that represented the way in which the world that they lived in was organised. For this, the BPP should be recognised as an innovator of its time that trod territory little explored before and whose legacy continues to this day.

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Black September

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Blues

▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

Bolivarian Revolution

▶ Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolutionary Anti-imperialism, and Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

Braithwaite, Chris (1885–1944)

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Synonyms

Barbados; Colonialism; Communism; Maritime history; Pan-Africanism; United Kingdom; United States

Anticolonialist Agitator and Socialist Seafarer

The Barbadian agitator and organiser Chris Braithwaite, better known under his adopted pseudonym 'Chris Jones', was one of the leading black political radicals in 1930s Britain and, as a founding member and chair of the Colonial Seamen's Association (CSA), perhaps the critical lynchpin of an anti-colonial maritime network in and around the imperial metropolis of inter-war London. His talents as an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist activist came to the fore during the 1930s when he was briefly in and around the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), and then in militant Pan-Africanist organisations such as the International African Friends of Ethiopia (IAFE) and the International African Service Bureau (IASB) led by the outstanding black Trinidadian socialists George Padmore and C.L.R. James.

Born in the materially impoverished British Caribbean colony of Barbados, Braithwaite encountered 'the problem of the colour line' early in life, having found work as a seaman in the British merchant navy when still a teenager. Braithwaite's self-education and awakening consciousness of race took place while he 'sailed the seven seas'. As he later put it in a speech in 1941, while for 'forty years he has been a rolling stone in every part of the world . . . he had yet to find a spot where under white domination elementary freedom is granted to the subject races' (*New Leader*, 23 August 1941, quoted in Høgsbjerg 2014: 62). After a few years' break from the sea, spent on land in Chicago in the US, Braithwaite returned to serve with the British merchant navy during the First World War, when the recruitment of colonial seamen reached its height to fill the places left by recruitment of native seamen into the Royal Navy. After the war, Braithwaite moved to the 'black metropolis' of New York and found work for a period in a bar.

Many black Caribbean mariners settled in America, and some became leading politically radical militants in the American working-class movement, such as Ferdinand Smith, the

Jamaican-born co-founder of the National Maritime Union, and the equally remarkable figure of Hugh Mulzac, born on Union Island in the Grenadines, who after travelling to New York from Barbados worked for a period as a ship captain on Marcus Garvey's Black Star Line. However, Braithwaite himself now undertook the 'voyage in' to imperial Britain, where he settled down in 1920s London working for the employers' Shipping Federation. Braithwaite's work, based in London's Docklands, home to many black seamen, was a highly responsible job, one usually reserved for whites only. As a Shipping Federation agent in 'the Pool', part of the River Thames where many ships came to dock, Braithwaite was charged with finding and supplying colonial seamen, engineers, stokers, and others, often at a few hours' notice. However, and quite remarkably given the relatively privileged job he had acquired, he was soon politically radicalised and immersed himself in the British working-class movement, becoming an activist in what became the National Union of Seamen (NUS) (see Padmore 1944).

In Britain, Braithwaite challenged the exploitative and oppressive experience of colonial seamen in the inter-war period, which saw state racism and the threat of deportation as well as a more informal racism which the shipowners encouraged and in which the NUS openly colluded. The NUS's collaboration with employers and state meant that black seamen required identification cards and had to join the union – despite its racism – in order to have any chance of employment (for more on this institutional racism see Tabili 1994). Braithwaite personally seems to have been better positioned to survive the dangers resulting from widespread racist state practices in shipping, including the threat of deportation under targeting of 'aliens', through his job and his relationship with and marriage to Edna Slack, a white woman originally from Derbyshire. The couple took up residence in Stepney, in the East End of London and in close proximity to the West India docks, and would ultimately have six children.

In 1930, Chris Braithwaite would join the newly launched Seamen's Minority Movement (SMM), a rank-and-file grouping of militant seamen organised by the CPGB to lead a fightback against an attempt by shipowners to make seamen pay for perhaps the greatest economic crisis in the history of capitalism. Adopting a pseudonym, 'Chris Jones', to avoid victimisation by his employer, Braithwaite found that his experience as an NUS militant and the nature of his work made him an extremely important recruit for the SMM, and he was soon elected onto its central committee. Indeed as early as April 1930 'Chris Jones' was chairing the second meeting of the SMM 'Committee of Coloured Seamen', and by 1931 he had joined the CPGB itself (for discussion of Braithwaite's activism in this period see Sherwood 1996). As early as 1930, according to Stephen Howe, Braithwaite was regarded by one undercover police officer as 'the CP's most valuable contact among colonial seamen' (see the 'Secret Report on Communist Party Activities in Great Britain among Colonials' submitted to the Colonial Office by Superintendent E. Parket on 22 April 1930, quoted in Howe 1993: 186). As well as organising the distribution of such 'seditious' publications as the Negro *Worker,* he played an important role in launching the Negro Welfare Association (NWA) alongside his comrade and compatriot Arnold Ward and rallying solidarity with the Scottsboro Boys (see Adi 2009). By 1933, through his association with the NWA and his tireless campaigning, Braithwaite had also struck up a remarkable friendship with the radical Nancy Cunard, great-granddaughter of Sir Samuel Cunard, the founder of the famous shipping fleet, which refused to allow black seamen anywhere near the decks of its passenger liners until the 1950s. Cunard was then editing her monumental 800-page fusion of Pan-Africanism and communism, *Negro: An Anthology*, for publication in London. They would both serve together for a period on the NWA committee, and there is a famous picture taken of Braithwaite on a May Day demonstration in London in 1933 – just one of several photographs of 'Comrade Chris Jones' published in the *Negro Worker*, now edited by the Trinidadian revolutionary George Padmore – and reprinted in Cunard's Negro: *An Anthology* (1934: 567).

However, the great 'zig zag' from ultra-left to right which characterised the Stalinised Communist International as it shifted from the catastrophist perspectives of 'class against class' to an attempt to build a deeply respectable 'Popular Front' against fascism and war, in the hope of enabling a diplomatic alliance of Britain, France and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, was to spell the end for organisations like the SMM and would ultimately end the involvement in international communism of many black radical activists like Chris Braithwaite. In 1933, as anti-imperialist agitation against the 'democracies' of Britain and France was increasingly sidelined, Braithwaite followed George Padmore's lead and resigned in protest from the Communist Party, though he remained supportive of organisations such as the NWA (see Høgsbjerg 2014: 43–44).

However, despite his relative political isolation, in July 1935 'Chris Jones' would emerge as the foremost tribune of black and Asian seamen opposing the new British Shipping Subsidy Act, which threatened the very presence of black colonial seamen on British ships (see Tabili 1994: 78, 82). Braithwaite took the initiative, with support from the League Against Imperialism and the NWA, to form a new organisation, the CSA. Impressively, from the very start the CSA embraced not only black colonial seamen, but also other Asian seamen, such as the Indian 'Lascars'. As the Indian communist seamen's organiser and future secretary of the group, Surat Alley, recalled, the CSA 'started at the time when Italian Fascism threat[ened to] attack Abyssinia [Ethiopia]. The Association was the expression of the discontent existing among the colonial seamen and its aim was to redress their grievances' (Sherwood 2004: 443).

Chris Braithwaite threw himself into building solidarity with the people of Ethiopia in the face of Mussolini's war plans. By August 1935, George Padmore had arrived in London from France, and was soon helping his friend and compatriot C.L.R. James organise what became the International African Friends of Ethiopia (IAFE). Braithwaite was a leading activist in this new Pan-African organisation, speaking out alongside the likes of Amy Ashwood Garvey, the Jamaican

Pan-Africanist and first wife of Marcus Garvey, and the Kenyan nationalist Jomo Kenyatta of the Kikiyu Central Association. Braithwaite was involved in mobilising his networks of colonial seamen to organise direct action to undermine the economy and trade of Italy and possibly even smuggle weapons to Ethiopia through the maritime industry (Quest 2009: 122).

Late November 1936 saw the first annual conference of the CSA in London. Braithwaite, who was elected chair, 'stressed the need of organisation as the one salvation of the colonial peoples'. The range of support for the organisation was unprecedented and historic, given the ethnic divisions and hierarchical racial stratifications of British shipping encompassing not only black seamen but also Indians, Arabs, and Chinese seamen – testament in part to the respect for Braithwaite's tireless work and dedication (Tabili 1994: 159). The CSA demanded removal of the 'disabilities' imposed on colonial seamen by 1935 Shipping Subsidy Act, which gave preference to white seamen, and also demanded that 'the seamen of the British Empire be given full democratic rights – the right to trade union organisation, freedom of speech and assembly'. This was a great advance on the 1920s, when there had been no solidarity articulated between the various colonial seamen, and there had been no demands particular to their conditions. Initially the CSA concentrated its efforts on the effects of the Shipping Subsidy Act, and by late 1937 the stringency of the application of the provisions of the Act were slackened, so some success could be recorded (Sherwood 2004: 443).

One CSA activist from early 1937 onwards, the West Indian Ras Makonnen, born George Thomas Nathaniel Griffith in British Guiana, has perhaps left historians the most vivid description of the work of the CSA. Makonnen described it as 'a welfare and propaganda grouping', and recalled that since 'we did not want a separate black union' for colonial seamen, part of the CSA's work involved trying to persuade west African seamen resident in Britain to join the NUS, despite all its appalling failings. He remembers that 'Chris's role . . . was to act as a mouthpiece if there was any injustice that needed taking up . . . he was

looked on as a leader in the same way as some of the outstanding Irish dock leaders in New York' (Makonnen 1973: x, 129).

What might be called Braithwaite's 'class struggle Pan-Africanism' found expression and flourished not simply in his leadership of the multi-ethnic CSA but in his key role as organising secretary for the new 'International African Service Bureau for the Defence of Africans and People of African Descent' (IASB), formed in May 1937. In solidarity with the heroic arc of labour revolts which swept the colonial British Caribbean – including his native Barbados – during the late 1930s, Braithwaite again repeatedly took to the podium of Trafalgar Square alongside the likes of James and Padmore. Ever since the turn to the 'Popular Front', Braithwaite, together with James and Padmore, also used to go to CPGB meetings to heckle and expose the communists' 'pretensions at being revolutionists' by raising awkward questions about British imperialism. As James remembered, they would speak about the struggles of French and British colonial subjects who now had been forgotten as Britain and France were declared grand 'peace-loving democracies' and bulwarks against fascism. 'While I would ask a question, and Padmore might say a word or two, it was Chris Jones who made a hell of a row.' 'Chris would get himself into a temper and explode and make a revolution at the back of the hall . . . at the shortest notice, he could generate indignation at the crimes of imperialism and the betrayals of Stalinism as to shock into awed silence hundreds of British people in the audience' (Høgsbjerg 2014: 54).

Critically, the IASB attempted to help ideologically arm, build solidarity with, and develop networks with the colonial liberation struggles across the African diaspora. Braithwaite wrote a monthly column for the IASB journal, *International African Opinion,* entitled 'Seamen's Notes', and organised the distribution of this illegal 'seditious' publication into colonial Africa through his network of radical seamen. The contacts Braithwaite and others made in turn fed information and reports back to the IASB in London (for more on this see Quest 2009: 121–122). Despite the poverty and hardships of Blitz-hit London, Braithwaite kept up his political work for African emancipation throughout the Second World War until his sudden death from pneumonia on 9 September 1944, just over a year before the historic Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester.

In 1925, the long-serving president of the NUS, Joseph Havelock Wilson, had declared, 'I have always believed that British seamen have done more to discover and establish the British Empire, and to develop it. It will be the task of the same men of the sea to keep it' (Tabili 1994: 81). From the moment Chris Braithwaite arrived in Britain in the aftermath of the First World War until his death he refused such a 'task'. He instead fought against almost impossible odds and in the face of the most bitter racism for black and white unity and an alternative, anti-imperialist, and socialist vision for seamen both in Britain and internationally, based on struggle from below. As well as forming the CSA, he worked alongside the likes of Amy Ashwood Garvey, C.L.R. James, and George Padmore to form and build militant and political Pan-Africanist organisations such as the IAFE and the IASB. As the historian Winston James notes, the 1930s represented 'one of the most crucial decades in the history of black Britain' as it witnessed 'the birth and emergence of a number of new black organisations and a level of black activism that was unprecedented' (James 2004: 363, 365–366).

From the mid-1930s, Chris Braithwaite, like George Padmore, had worked closely with the socialist Independent Labour Party (ILP), and both developed close links with ILP-supporting intellectuals around it, such as the writers Reginald Reynolds and Ethel Mannin. Both Reynolds (1956) and Mannin (1947) paid fine tributes to Braithwaite's oratory and activism after his passing. Padmore must have felt particularly moved by the passing of this older, dedicated militant, who must have in many ways represented his very ideal of a black 'organic intellectual' of the international working-class movement, and his obituary of his friend and comrade serves in many ways as a worthy tribute:

> His death is a great loss to the cause of the colonial peoples as well as International Socialism, the finest ideals and traditions of which he upheld to the very

end . . . He never spared himself in rendering aid to the cause of the oppressed. Many were the working-class battles and campaigns in which he gave his best . . . his memory will long remain as a symbol of the hopes and aspirations of his race. (Padmore 1944)

Cross-References

▶ League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

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Brazil

▶ Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International

Brexit and the End of Empire

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Synonyms

Empire education; European union; Race brexit

Definition

This chapter examines the ending of the British Empire and its imperial myths. It discusses who voted to leave the European Union (the Brexit vote) and why. It discusses the importance of the education system which misinformed and mis-educated generations of young people, and it comments on the nostalgia many people feel for a "white" country comfortably ruling an empire.

Introduction

Imperial nostalgia is not only a feeling but a catalyst. It takes social discontent and transforms it into a dangerous form of political tribalism. (Shafak 2018)

The sun is finally setting on the British Empire. Although an Honours system still awards recipients The Most Excellent Orders of the British Empire, the pomp and the circumstances which characterized the empire have slowly disappeared. Britain is also leaving the European Union, after a 40 year membership. The vote to leave the EU in June 2016 quickly described as Brexit, pushed what was still a United Kingdom, into an uncertain future, two of its four countries, Scotland and Northern Ireland, seriously considering independence from England and Wales. Despite Boris Johnson when Foreign Secretary publishing his "vision of a bold and thriving Britain after Brexit" (Johnson 2017), the signs are that with no empire and fewer ties with the rest of the European continent, the imperial sunset does not look rosy. An election in December 2019, won by the Conservative Party with the slogan "Get Brexit done," was greeted in the Daily Express newspaper with a whole page headline "The British Lion Roars for Boris and Brexit" (Hal 2019) and a leaving date in January 2020 was promised. But there can be no certainty what a postimperial post-Brexit Britain will look like, or even if "Britain" will stay a United Kingdom, and no agreement as to who will be considered citizens. One certainty is that although other European countries were shedding their (smaller) empires following the Second World War, the British government and public found it hard to come to terms with colonial countries gaining their independence, often through vicious conflict. They also found it difficult to accept the invited arrival of former colonial people to work in the country. Nostalgia for lost imperial glories is not confined to Britain but forms the background for nationalistic beliefs in reclaiming sovereignty, and economic control, and it encourages the populist and racist appeal of right wing individuals, parties, and fascist groups.

This chapter offers a brief history of imperial myths and the effect of myth and mis-information on the Brexit decision. It discusses who voted for the Brexit decision and why and notes the long "goodbye" as countries left the empire, Britain became poorer as a result, and vast increases in inequality and poverty followed, with immigration taking most of the blame rather than policies which favored the rich. It especially discusses the dismal failure of the education system which both helped to produce an increasingly corrupt elite, often descended from those who created the empire, and mis-educated generations of children about empire. It points out that for over a 100 years schools and higher education institutions misinformed or lied to the majority of young people about the realities and cruelties visited on imperial "subjects." The chapter illustrates that the British (especially the English) have a dangerous misconception of their national identity, fed by promises that great trade deals with the world will somehow make Britain "Great" again, but with fewer migrants or "foreigners," apart from rich investors and property owners. Migrants and refugees from global conflicts often created by former imperial wars have been made scapegoats, with race and migrant hatreds intensifying after the Brexit vote. It concludes that despite the promises of the Conservative government at the end of 2019 to limit the ravages of austerity, cut migration, and create a workable relationship with the European Union, without the land, loot, and labor that an empire brought, the future for a majority of the population seems uncertain.

The Imperial Mindset

Despite a very large literature on the British Empire and its creation and decline, most white British people, including the supposedly well educated, know little about the empire their grandparents were born into, which gradually after the Second World War turned into a Commonwealth of some 53 countries. Thirty-one of these countries had fewer than three million people, with 14 being tax havens. For 3 years after June 2016 when 17.4 million people voted to leave the EU, with 16.3 wanting to remain, the question of a border with Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland became a crucial issue, as the Republic was part of the European Union. Few people knew that the English colonized the whole of Ireland in 1169 (Wales in 1536), and it was not until 1707 that the Act of Union joined England and

Scotland. It was only in 1922 that a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland came into existence. Many of the "traditions" of these countries, as in the rest of the British Empire, were invented by imperial rulers imposing their culture and beliefs, although in 1715 an attempt by the government to ban the Scottish kilt on the grounds that it was not acceptable to "respectable" people as when men bent down or it was a windy day the kilt was "indecent" was defeated (Trevor-Roper 1983). Historians of internal colonialism have documented the expansion of an English state as it attempted to anglicize the three other countries, especially through the colonial plantation policy in Ireland (Canny 2001). England has always benefited from the economic and political dependence of the Celtic countries (Hechter 1975) and it is not surprising that antagonisms between the countries still persist. The histories of subjugated states have always been marginalized or misrepresented in national history stories. Former Education Secretary Michael Gove told the Conservative party conference in October 2010 that "Children are growing up ignorant of one of the most inspiring stories I know- the history of the United Kingdom." But that would be his version of the national story and did not include the miseries inflicted on the Irish population, or the millions of unnecessary deaths in Indian famines (Tomlinson 2019, p. 54).

While the start of the British Empire is still debatable, the actual takeover of land is usually claimed to be the island of Bermuda, following a shipwreck there in 1609. The island is now a tax haven for wealthy individuals and multinational companies. Through conquests and exploitation Britain emerged as a major sea power and trading nation. The East India Company, forerunner of the imperial conquest of India, was, as historian William Dalrymple noted, a corporation with an army, taking over Bengal and other states from the Mughal Emperors and sending out Robert Clive, an "unstable sociopath" to run the company, loot the country, and enrich himself (Dalrymple 2015). The famines in India which killed tens of millions, and the famines in Ireland in the 1840s, were largely unknown to several generations as school ignored or mis-informed

young people, who knew that even in famines Clive was insisting people pay taxes, erecting gibbets in streets to encourage this. Clive is generally still celebrated in history texts as a hero, just as Cecil Rhodes, famously enriching himself in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) is celebrated. A billionaire by the age of 22 controlling 90% of the world's output of diamonds and believing that the Anglo-Saxons were "the finest race in the world" (Tomlinson 2019, p. 40). Rhodes has even survived student demands that his statue be removed from outside Oriel College in Oxford. A close friend of Rhodes, the poet and writer Rudyard Kipling, was one of many who encapsulated the British views of their colonized peoples. Although even in his life time much of Kipling's work was regarded as imperialist propaganda, his poem "Take up the White Man's Burden" was taught in schools around the country. It actually demonstrated how deluded the British were over empire, as far from being a burden, the labor of the colonized gave the British unjustified goods and privileges.

By the mid-nineteenth century Britain was an industrial nation and described itself as the "workshop of the world." Much of this industrial revolution depended on slave and indentured labor overseas. While imperialists originally believed in free trade to sell British products around the world, by the early twentieth century governments were introducing notions of "imperial preference" which imposed taxes on good from outside the empire. In 1926, an Empire Marketing Board was set up which produced some 72 reports extolling imperial trade. These included recipes for "housewives" made from foodstuffs imported from the empire. The restricted diets of the colonized as even their food was plundered were never an issue to the colonists. In the early twentieth century, attempts were made to boost patriotism through Empire Days, when school children were given free mugs and chocolate, and there was an Empire Exhibition in Wembley in 1926. Imperial propaganda as well as food nourished enthusiasm for empire, although ignorance persisted. In 1948 a survey found that fewer than 50% of people could name one colony, although a majority of the English persisted in regarding the vanishing

empire as a "good thing." An imperial mindset has been a long time dying, as an editorial in the *New York Times* pointed out in 2017, "Britain is undergoing an identity crisis ... the nineteenth century myth of Britain as the workshop of the world,... with an empire on which the sun never sets, confronted a post WW2 reality when a lot of these tales stopped being true... Britain no longer has an agreed upon national narrative" (Erlanger 2017).

Imperial Identity

Ignorance of the territories of the Empire continued into the twentieth century, people being confused in 1982 when the Argentineans invaded the Falkland Islands which many thought were Scottish islands. They were actually the Malvinas Islands, taken by force by the British in 1833. A naval officer David Tinker wrote that "the navy felt that we were British and they (the Argentineans) were wogs, and that made all the difference" (Tinker 1982, p. 178). The common assumption that the empire and imperial beliefs all happened long ago is mistaken. Beliefs in white racial superiority present from the early conquests and underpinned by the eugenic thinking of the Victorian era has hardened into a current imperial identity based on (English) assumptions of genetic, cultural, linguistic, and nationalistic superiority. As Aminul Hoque has noted, the rhetoric of colonizer versus the colonized, powerful versus the powerless, civilized versus the uncivilized, modern versus backward has shaped race, class, and gender relations between white people and those from the "dark continents" of Africa and Asia (Hoque 2015). Hostility to European and other "foreigners", although white, was evident in the 1905 Aliens Act, the first Act to control immigration and intended to keep Jews and Eastern European people out of the country. Despite some 17 immigration control Acts passed over the twentieth and early twenty-first century, the campaign to leave the EU used the successful slogan "Take Back Control" suggesting that there was no control over immigration to Britain. European, Irish, and colonial immigrants have over the

years been regarded as suspect entrants and unworthy of acceptance as equal citizens, with refugees and asylum seekers even less welcome. A British (largely English) identity was created by defining who was not British.

An imperial mindset never died and continued to shape views of a British national identity. National Servicemen, drafted into fighting colonial wars 1946–1962, and now the grandfathers and fathers of today, were among many who regretted the ending of the British Empire and retained the notions of imperial superiority their overseas trips encouraged. As one officer explained, "We all thought the empire was a marvellous thing and a force for good throughout the world. When Britain chose to give her empire away we were saddened. The colonial people had all the blessings of colonial rule and look how casually they dismissed them" (Shindler 2012, p. 92). The giving away included conflict and killings in a number of colonies – Malaysia and Kenya in particular. Reparations are currently being paid to Kenyans tortured during the 1960 conflicts for independence.

The man who is still regarded as a significant figure in supporting notions of a sovereign state, unencumbered by immigrants and foreigners, is Enoch Powell, first elected a Member of Parliament in 1950 after 19 attempts at selection. Powell's nationalism and anti-immigrant stance articulated a romantic view of a white nation "united in its island home" (Powell 2012). In a speech in 1987 reflecting on his 37 years as a member of parliament Powell recalled how he found it incredible that the Indian Raj was no longer in British control and the "remainder of the empire which Britain had taken into the second world war" was gone, especially after the loss of the Suez Canal in 1956 (Powell 1987). He also commented in this speech that "anyone would have been dismissed as raving mad who in 1950 told the people of Britain that by the end of the century a third of London's population would be Negro or Asiatic." In a hagiography celebrating Powell's life the Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith, returned again as a Conservative MP in December 2019 to Parliament, praised Powell's "fight to ensure the British people did not lose power to

supra-national institutions" meaning the European Union (Duncan Smith 2012, xxii).

Brexit and the European Union

A Bill to join the European Economic Community was presented to Parliament in 1972 and the UK voted in a referendum to join the EEC in February 1975. Margaret Thatcher signed a Single Market Act in 1986 and in 1992 Conservative Prime Minister John Major signed the country into a European Union. Labor Prime Minister Gordon Brown signed a further Treaty in Lisbon in 2009. This ratified an EU remit which extended to foreign, security, and defense policy, citizenship, a single market, agriculture, fisheries, free movement, border checks, asylum and immigration, civil, criminal and police issues, justice, tax, economic, and monetary policy, employment and social policy, public health, consumer protection, industry, the environment, energy including nuclear, commercial, and financial provision and other issues (Geddes 2013).

The UK by 2019 had become deeply embedded in European institutions and organizations, benefiting on many levels, not least subsidies for agriculture and trade. The Lisbon Treaty also included Article 50 which allowed for any EU country to withdraw from the Union. Although Britain was engaged in all these areas, ignorance about the EU and what being in a European Union meant was widespread. A small group of mainly rich, influential right-wing men were deeply opposed to remaining in the EU, especially with workers' rights policies, and lobbied over the years to take Britain out (Dorling and Tomlinson 2019). In 2015 Prime Minister David William Donald Cameron, attempting to placate these men, called for another referendum, in which a "Vote Leave" campaign, with the slogan "Take Back Control," was won by Leavers with 51.7% of the electorate who voted choosing leave and 48.3% voting to remain in the EU. Some 28% of those eligible to vote did not bother, and overall only 37.5% of the adult population voted for Brexit. Scotland and Northern Ireland had majority votes to remain in the EU. A week before the

referendum, in June 2016, a young member of Parliament Jo Cox was murdered outside her constituency rooms by a man who shouted "Britain first and death to traitors" as he killed her. Hate crime increased after the referendum with a 58% rise in reported hate crime the week after the vote.

Three and a half years of hostile debates and antagonisms from all sides followed the referendum, especially over the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a country in the EU. The issue was supposedly settled in December 2019, when a Conservative government with a majority was elected using the slogan "Get Brexit Done." Prime Minister Alexander Boris de Feiffel Johnson brought in a Bill declaring that the country would leave the EU on 31 January 2020, making it illegal to extend negotiations to leave the Union after December 2020. He also declared that the language of leave and remain and even Brexit should no longer be used. This proved be difficult as a majority of the electorate actually demonstrated in the December 2019 General Election that candidates for Remain voting political parties (Liberal, Labour, Green, Northern Irish Parties, and others) received 16.5 million Parliamentary votes, whereas those candidates supporting Leave voting parties received only 14.8 million.

Leaving the EU

Many reasons for voters returning a majority for "Leave" in the 2016 referendum were put forward. A major view was that many people, especially in the north of England and coastal towns, had suffered from a rise in inequality and the decimation of public services since a program of austerity was forced on them by a Conservative government after 2010. The irony of northern people supposedly voting for an elite who had caused austerity was noted in some of the media. In early 2019 even the right-wing newspaper *The Telegraph* reported that income inequality in the UK was still growing with the poorest facing cuts in social security benefits. The richest fifth of households saw their incomes rise with low rates of taxation, while the poorest households lived on

£36 per day (Dorling 2019, xv). Food banks and homelessness became commonplace in Britain – one of the most wealthy countries in the world. However, the blame for this was largely directed away from the rich and the governing party. Instead the blame for austerity and inequalities fell on immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers and a barely articulated resentment that lives had become worse since the empire disappeared. The 1950s are often quoted as a time when Britain was a happier "white" country (Kynaston 2007). The anti-immigrant speeches of Enoch Powell MP in the late 1960s and his romantic views of a sovereignty continued to resonate. The romanticism did not extend to colonial immigrants encouraged by himself when a Minister of Health and by other politicians, to come to work in Britain. His sneering at "negroes and picaninnies" was echoed by current Prime Minister Johnson who when a journalist described black children as "picaninnies" with "watermelon smiles" (Nagesh 2016). As Foreign Secretary, Johnson also demonstrated a remarkable lack of sensitivity, attempting to quote a racist poem by Rudyard Kipling in front of a Buddhist shrine in Myanmar. The poem included the line "blooming idol made of mud" (Dorling and Tomlinson 2019, p. 118) and infamously described Muslim women wearing the burka as resembling letter-boxes.

Brexit, Nostalgia, and the Middle Classes

The northern working classes were in reality unfairly blamed as being the majority who voted to leave the EU. As subsequent analysis showed, a majority of those who voted Leave were in southern areas of England and were from the middle classes. Combining much of the information from a variety of polls, notable Lord Ashcroft Polls, Sky data, the Electoral Commission and other analysis, analysis of who actually voted to leave or remain demonstrated that while 28% of the electorate did not vote in the referendum, older white people were the major leavers and were living predominantly in southern counties of England. Some 59% of all who voted Leave were middle class (as indicated by being in census

categories A, B, and C). The proportion of leavers in the lowest social class categories, D and E, were just 24%. Middle class Leavers were crucial to the vote in 2016.

While many who voted Leave were influenced by the long term anti-immigrant rhetoric, it was older middle class voters who were more likely to remember empire and be nostalgic for a British identity which was both white and imperialistic. As writer Elaine Shafak, quoted at the beginning of this chapter has pointed out nostalgia is not just a feeling, it can combine regrets for a past, however mythological, with anger and anxiety about the current situation, even though for some that may be relatively privileged. There has been little analysis or explanation as to why so many people, who might be regarded as comfortably off, voted as they did. Immigration and the lies told about immigrants taking up work, benefits, housing, hospital treatment, and schools to the detriment of the "native" British resonated in all social classes. In the 10 weeks up to voting in June 2016 over 14,000 newspaper and magazine articles mentioned immigration, all overwhelmingly negative. Migrants were blamed for many of Britain's economic and social problems. Anecdotes and comments made by middle-class voters suggest that even those with houses and pensions from secure past jobs were worried about the future for their children and grandchildren and were able to overlook the benefits migrants' work brought, especially in health, social care, transport, and education services. It was the middle classes, voting Conservative after 2010 who saw money spent on the health services fall and their social care deteriorate, despite the work of young educated European migrants in hospitals and care work, yet they still complained about immigration.

Fewer middle-class women than men voted to leave, which might suggest that it is middle-class men who continue to feel more entitled to comfortable lives for themselves and their descendents. But even those who are ignorant or misinformed about the realities of empire cling to the visceral feeling beyond mere nostalgia that somehow they have been wronged. The secure life, the assumed superiority by race, color,

culture, and geography, the lack of control of global events, where even pensions can be threatened by multinational businesses and global organizations, the deteriorating public services which older middle as well as working class people were subject to, were implicated in Leave votes. But there was still a sense of an entitlement to greatness, hence the persistence of the label "Great Britain." The attempts by right wing populists during the referendum to conjure up fantasies of a return to an Empire 2.00 resonated with many people, although a later attempt to create a Brexit Party dedicated to the mythologies of empire and led by Nigel Farage, a public school educated politician who failed seven times to be elected to parliament, failed to become a parliamentary party.

Education and Empire

The education system at all levels in Britain, especially England has failed dismally over a 150 years to alleviate ignorance and xenophobia in young people. It has instead contributed to the misinformation and lies about an empire which subjugated millions of people around the world, and inculcated notions of superiority, especially to those who were described as "black and brown inferiors'" (Lloyd 1984, p. 180). Schools and text books have been largely places of myth-making and evasions with the truth. Until the 1960s, maps of the world on classroom walls still had large sections colored pink, because the countries "belonged to us." A curriculum tacitly supporting the merits of empire and silent on exploitation and cruelty was the norm. The 1880s through to the 1930s was a period when after vast areas of Asia and Africa had been taken over, the empire was at its height, and this period coincided with a social class based expansion of mass education in England.

The social class hierarchy was supported by Social Darwinist and eugenicist notions of the intellectual inferiority of lower social classes and also of the people colonized overseas, which have persisted into the twenty-first century. Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, helped popularize these theories through his writings on *Hereditary Genius* (Galton 1869). Passion for the classification of supposed "race" along biological lines developed around the same time that eugenic theories were spreading. A white Caucasian "race" was supposedly superior to the Mongoloid and Negroid race. The stereotypes of the defective, ignorant, and idle working classes in England were similar to stereotypes of the lazy and stupid native overseas and the struggle to deliver education to the working classes over the nineteenth century placed their schooling firmly in the lower layers of the social class pyramid. But what was actually taught in elementary state schools was always influenced by the "public" (private nonstate) schools attended by upper class children. Robert Roberts, describing his childhood upbringing in a Salford slum and elementary schooling, wrote that "school was a gaunt and blackened building, made exciting by learning that there were five oceans and five continents, most of which seemed to belong to us" (Roberts 1971, p. 140). The upper classes really believed this.

Public School Influence

The social and political values of the upper classes filtered down into the elementary and developing secondary schools of the twentieth century. Imperial values permeated education and the curriculum. As Robert Verkaik pointed out in his book *Posh Boys: How the English Public Schools run Britain* "Public schools helped to write British history. They have been cheerleaders for empire and controlled the narratives of empire" (Verkaik 2018, p. 45). Even in 1985, Keith Joseph leaving office as Secretary of State for Education could reiterate a mythological view of British narratives and values.

> British history and cultural traditions are or will become part of the cultural heritage of all who live in this country... schools should be responsible for trying to transmit British culture, enriched as it has been by so many traditions. (Joseph 1986, p. 8)

The problem with this was that many of the traditions and values were and are highly

questionable in terms of democracy and justice, with imperial contacts taking the form of military conquest, appropriation of land and wealth, slavery, forced labor, and denial of human rights. Headteachers and religious leaders well into the twentieth century remained convinced of the duty of public school educated boys to run the empire. As one wrote in *The Contempory Review* in 1899 "The energies of the British race have given them their empire... and British rule of every race has brought within its sphere the incalculable benefits of just law, free trade and considerate government" (Lawson-Walton 1899). The Head of Shrewsbury school believed that God had entrusted England with creating a Christian empire held together by military means and set up a Cadet Corps in his school so that "boys with brains and character would be available for the preservation of English dominions" (Mangan and Mackenzie 1986, p. 119). The Head of Harrow school, attended by Winston Churchill in the early 1890s, was another enthusiastic proponent of empire and wrote in a paper for the Royal Colonial Institute in 1895 that the "the boys of today are the statesmen and administrators of the future, in their hands is the future of the British Empire" (Mangan and Mackenzie 1986, p. 121). In 1955 Prime Minister Churchill suggested the slogan "keep Britain White" for the general election campaign of that year. The Head of Loretto school in Edinburgh claimed that God's purpose for the British was to guide world history and a major task of public schools was to create neo-imperial warriors. This was a role enthusiastically embraced at Fettes, another Scottish public school, whose school magazines excelled in "strident jingoism" (Mangan and Mackenzie 1986, p. 123), confident that "Britain ruled the waves." This school was attended from 1966 to 1971 by Anthony Charles Lynton Blair, later the New Labour leader and British Prime Minister, who led the country into seven wars during his tenure.

Although the public schools had been largely set up to educate poor scholars, this is ideal rapidly disappeared and it was upper and upper middle class boys, and later a smaller number of girls, who were privately educated in them. Many of the schools were funded by money from imperial

looting and a slave trade. The Dollar Academy in Scotland, attended by Fraser Nelson, the current editor in 2019 of the right-wing magazine *The Spectator* was founded in 1818 by John McNabb, a sea captain whose fortune came from transporting slaves to the West Indies. Prime Minister David Cameron, instigator of the EU referendum, had five Ministers (and himself) educated at Eton, regarded as the top public school. There was a majority of privately educated men in his Cabinet who had gone on to Oxford University, an institution notorious for the riotous behavior of young men usually excused on the grounds of "high spirits." Theresa May, who followed him as Prime Minister, had attended a state grammar school before going on to study geography at Oxford, in a Department setup in 1899 by Professor Halford Mackinder, a keen imperialist who had developed a series of Empire lectures for teachers. May promised to examine the inequalities created by private schools, but never managed this. Alexander Boris de Feiffel Johnson, becoming Prime Minister in July 2019, included in his first Cabinet 60% privately schooled men, with four old Etonians.

Schooling for the Masses

The values and curricula from public schools filtered down from the later 1800s into the now obligatory elementary schooling for the working classes and an expansion of secondary schools for the middle classes. Even public school boys, set to govern colonies, needed help from grammar schools boys who could calculate in rupees the profit to be made from building railways in India. There was also a need to justify colonial wars and imperial expansion beyond Social Darwinist ideas of racial superiority, although the working classes and the Irish were frequently referred to as inferior "races." Charles Kingsley, author of the well-known children's book *The Water Babies* and later a chaplain to Queen Victoria, commented that even though the Irish looked like "human chimpanzees" at least they were white (Kingsley 1863). Justification for imperial conquests and domination over colonized people was

reproduced in Victorian and Edwardian text books and juvenile literature, much of it reproduced into the 1970s. The Geographical Society proposed a study of empire in 1896 and geography, history, English, and religious study became vehicles for imperial propaganda, although working class children, confined to a diet of basic literacy, numeracy, and manual training, did not get the full benefit of this until after 1945. The magazine National Geographic eventually managed to apologize to readers for endlessly presenting bare-breasted "native women" in its photographs with Europeans fully clothed.

A popular text originally published in 1902 *Men of Renown* (although it included three women, all Queens) was recommended by the Board of Education in 1902 as suitable for higher elementary classes. In this and other texts, "the natives" who fought to resist imperial rule were presented as possessing evil ill-feeing towards their benevolent rulers (Finnemore 1902). Geography Professor A. J. Herbertson, a prolific writer of text books, wrote a series of commercial geography books in which the necessity of "natives" doing manual labor supervised by Europeans produced sound economic benefits for Britain. References to people toiling for the empire persisted even after India had gained independence in 1947, and there was seldom any reference to the many Indian troops who had fought in the world wars for the empire. An Empire Youth Annual published in 1948 extolled what became the "Groundnuts Scheme" – a government scheme funded by Unilever to grow peanuts in East and West Africa. An article described how "native women" threshed the plants and "native dockers" carried the bags on their heads. It told its readers – the grandparents of today – that "the scheme will raise the standards of life of the natives in these possessions and keep valuable money within the Empire" (Fawcett 1948). The scheme was actually a total failure, but textbooks into the 1970s presented Europeans as opening up Africa for the good of Africans rather than looting the countries to provide the raw materials which kept Western countries wealthy and "developed."

From the 1880s, an expansion of popular publishing came at the same time as the development of mass education and wider imperial adventures, and these have persisted over the years. Rudyard Kipling produced works that have been influential over the years in film and musicals, (*The Jungle Book, The Lion King)* and as noted, his poetry continued to be popular, especially extolling public school boys to oversee the "sullen peoples" of empire (Kipling 1949). Much of the literature for juveniles came replete with militarism and patriotism in which violence became legitimized as the right of a superior race. Both public school boys and slum boys shared the same values in which fighting, racism, and sexism figured large. Tarzan (actually English Lord Greystoke) was a white man forever fighting black men in jungles and rescuing white women. He remained popular in books (written by Chicago born Edgar Rice Burroughs) and on film, a new Tarzan film being released as late as 2016. After the Second World War youth literature demonizing German Nazis added to the xenophobia against foreigners, with Russian spies and Islamic terrorists added to both adult and youth literature to feed distrust of all those not considered to be truly British (Le Carre 2019).

Education for Ignorance

During the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first education for ignorance about a decaying empire no longer available to provide loot and labor overseas persisted. Even post-war Prime Minister Clement Attlee, venerated for creating a welfare state, was still describing his excitement and youthful imperialism over large portions of the world map being colored pink, declared in the Chichele lecture he gave in Oxford in 1960 that "We believed in our great imperial vision" (Attlee 1961). But an alternative story was hard to uncover. Much of the documentation of colonial administration and its cruelties were deliberately destroyed as colonies achieved independence, and much remains in files and archives that are difficult to access. Ian Cobain has described *Operation Legacy,* a project designed to remove files relating to darker deeds of the empire, and attempts to conceal information

not only about overseas decolonization, but also the history of the 30 year long "Troubles" in Northern Ireland (Cobain 2016).

Into the twenty-first century, education policy in England has been dominated by unprecedented levels of testing and assessment of children from preschool to university, demand for accountability of schools and teachers in a marketized competitive ethos and with no clear idea as to how a traditional curriculum could develop into an education for a democratic multicultural society. Governments have used a rhetoric of inclusion and diversity to disguise increased social and economic segregation and exclusion and to defend a curriculum that has remained largely nationalistic. Teachers, themselves unschooled in understanding empire, have found it difficult to teach about an imperial past or the relationship with the European Union. Citizenship education compulsory from 2002 came nowhere near facing the realities of being either white or not-white in a disunited Kingdom. Nor could teachers combat any hostile and mythological reporting about the activities of the EU, which as a journalist in the 1990s Boris Johnson indulged in. The Blair government's early claims to respect for diversity gave way to promises to be tough on immigration and asylum seekers, a revival of antisemitism, fears of Islam, and blaming black youth for violence. There was no information, as wars in the Middle East were undertaken, that there had been decades of imperial domination. There had been little teaching about the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 whereby the British and French governments agreed to carve up Iraq, Syria, and the Lebanon? Who learned that the problems of Palestine and the future Israel were due to a British colonial presence? Who remembered that Michael Gove, a journalist about to be elected to Parliament, wrote a book in 2005 which likened parts of the religion of Islam to fascist and communist ideologies and when Education Secretary in 2010 reinstated a traditional subject-centered curriculum which "should not become a vehicle for imposing passing political fads on our children" (DfE 2010). The fads included race and racism, multiculturalism, immigration, and gender issues. Gove's advisor on the history curriculum was

Niall Ferguson, a believer in the "Greatness" of the British Empire (Ferguson 2004).

In 2013 an even more tightly controlled curriculum was presented. All schools were required to teach "Fundamental British Values." These were defined as democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect for different faiths, although when Carol Vincent asked people to describe British values, the people gave top billing to the Queen, tea, fish, and chips and queuing (Vincent 2019). Research into the views of those who had studied the Gove curriculum suggested that ignorance and xenophobia still prevailed, and that the vote to leave the EU had increased levels of race hatreds of all kinds. In 2018 a group of students at Nottingham University were filmed chanting racist abuse outside a black female student's door, "We hate the blacks" and "sign the Brexit papers" (Tomlinson 2019, p. 221). In 2016 the Director of the South Asian Centre at the London School of economics noted that:

> Students arrive at university completely ignorant about empire, that vital part of history. When we talk of Syria they have no notion of Britain's role in the Middle East... they have no clue about the history of immigration, they don't understand why people of other ethnicities came to Britain... they haven't learned about it in school. (Mohsin 2016)

Universities have begun to present critiques of empire. Postcolonial studies, increasingly researched and taught by black and minority academics, are developing, and literature presented by juveniles, fiction writers, and other well-known people are published. Nikesh Shukla noted that the people writing in his edited book are not just writing about race, they are writing about the systemic racism that runs through the country today and "race is everything we do, because the universal experience is white" (Shukla 2016 editorial). Similarly award winning hip hop musician Akala has written on *Race and Class in the Ruins of Empire* (Akala 2019) and journalist Afua Hirsch has described her experiences as a mixed race girl descended from Jewish and African immigrants in Britain, where the failure to turn what should be a rich asset of multiculturalism into an identity crisis of epic proportions for the whole population (Hirsch

2018). Other historians have focused on the largely untold stories of the writers, politicians, and activists who opposed the development of the British Empire, the treatment of the colonized, and anticolonial resistance in Britain and abroad (Gopal 2019).

Post-Brexit Britain, Fantasy or Reality

In 2017 *The Times* newspaper reported that the then Trade Secretary Liam Fox was suggesting a resurgence of trade with the remaining empire – the Commonwealth countries – that would lead to an Empire 2.00. Supporters of Brexit have consistently claimed that when the country leaves the EU, there is scope for great trade with the rest of the world under World Trade Organisation rules. Although a Department for Exiting the European Union was set up and progressed some way in trade discussions, it quickly became apparent that this was something of a fantasy as the deals politicians continued to boast about would take years to finalize. The only other country to leave the EU, Greenland, took 7 years to complete any trade negotiations. As Britain is no longer the "workshop of the world" and manufacturing had shrunk to less than 10% of the economy, the question as to what the country would be able to depend on to trade and provide employment became crucial. The main possibilities appeared to be the arms trade, in particular providing killing weapons for Middle East buyers, banking, although the reputation of British banking had become tarnished after the 2008 collapse, tourism, where the Royal Family and its castles and characters continue to draw in tourists, especially from the rising middle classes of China and Japan, and perhaps spying. Although even here the spy agencies seemed to spend more time on the activities of Labour party members, ban the bomb and environmental activists and trade unions than on foreign dangers.

The rise in hate attacks and demonization of foreigners and immigrants affected the country in ways not planned for. In 2017 there was a 90% drop in applications from nurses from European countries to work in Britain and a 60% rise in nurses and midwives leaving the country.

Bursaries for nurses, midwives, paramedics, and other crucial health services were discontinued in 2016. Infant mortality rose in 215 and 2016, as did death rates. At the other end of the scale all but one of the top 12 people in the Sunday Times Rich List in 2017 were immigrants, and in 2018 it was reported that wealthy Chinese had been given 146 out of the 355 "investor visa" given to rich overseas people to invest in Britain. It was also reported that the rich were having trouble getting servants as the pound slumped and even as the new Conservative government with a majority in Parliament refused to make public a report on Russian influence on the EU referendum at the end of 2019, Prime Minister Johnson on attended a "caviar-fuelled victory party in London" hosted by former KGB agent Alexander Lebedev, now owner of the London Evening Standard newspaper (Harding and Sabbagh 2019). On the same day, despite having promised in the election manifesto to keep jobs in the country, the government approved the sale of UK defense firm Cobham to an American private equity company for £4 billion.

By 2020 in failing to come to terms with the end of empire, and voting to leave the European Union, Britain has become a state far removed from the post Second World War beliefs in liberal democracy, with more co-operation and a promise that all should have decent housing, health care, social security, and education. The arrival of people from former colonies and their reception, despite the labor and lives they have given to the country, remains a disgrace. Under poor political leadership, the country has gradually become more competitive, greedy, xenophobic, and racist, with a misplaced nostalgia that seeks scapegoats for social and economic problems and tolerates high levels of inequality. But if leaving the European Union makes the country poorer, overall people may cease to tolerate high levels of inequality and work to become more equal. The white British may even come to realize that they live in a multiracial and multicultural country which is not going to change, except for the better. If that happens then the country will not be "Great," but it might be a decent normal society that people could be proud to live in.

Cross-References

▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ Empire and Imperialism in Education Since 1945: Secondary School History Textbooks

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Britain

British Colonialism

British Empire

British Left and Imperialism: The Fainthearted Internationalists

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Synonyms

Britain; Imperialism; Internationalism; Labour Party; Marxism; Socialists; V.I. Lenin.

Definition/Description

British and European socialists have historically advocated socialism at home while advocating militarism and imperialism abroad. The British left typically supported imperialism and war to advance nationalism as opposed to internationalism.

There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism and that is – working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in *one's own* country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy and material aid) *this struggle*, this, *and only this*, line in *every* country without exception. (Lenin 1965, p. 80)

Lenin was moved to offer this adamantine definition of internationalism during the First World War when millions of workers and peasants from Britain, Germany, Turkey, India, and China and many other nations and states were slaughtering each other at the behest of their imperialist rulers. For Lenin, colonialism was but one aspect of imperialism or monopoly capitalism (Lenin 1952). He therefore had had no hesitation in denouncing the European war which erupted in 1914 as an imperialist war. But for most European socialists imperialism was taken to be a synonym for colonialism. It was fairly easy then for those socialists who supported the war to rationalise it as (in the German case) a war against Russian autocracy or (in the British case) a defence of Belgium against 'Prussian militarism'.

But even when the colonial objectives of the various powers became crystal-clear – when, for instance, the war spilled over into Africa or when the Bolsheviks revealed the Anglo-French plot to take over the Middle Eastern possessions of the Ottomans – very few European socialists desisted from supporting the war. As it is war which provides the most searching test of internationalism and which most clearly reveals fundamental attitudes to imperialism, this essay on the British left and imperialism (using this concept in the Leninist sense) will focus on the two imperialist world wars of the twentieth century and their aftermath. It will concentrate on the two most important parties of the British left, the Labour Party and the Communist Party (CP).

It is not particularly surprising, given that until relatively recently Britain was in possession of a huge empire, that the British left tended to see only the colonial aspect of British imperialism. Moreover, the most influential theorist of imperialism among the British left was the liberal J.A. Hobson, who saw colonialism as the essence

of imperialism. But concentration on colonialism can easily lead to ignoring one of the most important internal aspects of imperialism – the use of social reform to bolster working-class support for the capitalist order. In Britain in 1914 working-class support for war was solid, but later a price – post-war reform – began to be demanded for support.

The imperialist powers could not have attempted to wage imperialist war without the support of the working class. To many on the left the influence of a 'labour aristocracy' benefiting from imperialism could be the only explanation for such support. Lenin was a pioneer of this trend (Lenin 1965). But is the influence of a labour aristocracy sufficient to explain the existence and persistence of such social-patriotism? (Communists tended to use the terms 'social-chauvinism' and 'social-patriotism' interchangeably. But it is inappropriate to use the same term for the simple patriotism of most working-class people and the conscious priority given by many on the left to the national interest over their internationalist responsibilities. Here, the term 'social patriotism' is used for the former tendency, 'social-chauvinism' for the latter.)

A school of Marxist scholars argues that the explanation for working-class support for imperialism is not merely the influence of a 'labour aristocracy'. It is argued that in the imperialist countries all working-class people – even the poorest – benefit to some degree from imperialism (Amin 1977; Lotta 1984; Nabudere 1977). This materialist explanation for the strength of social patriotism in the imperialist countries is convincing. In Britain, for instance, the growth of imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was accompanied by, to name but two reforms, an expansion of the franchise to a majority of working men and the introduction of old-age pensions.

Needless to say, especially given that they tended to come from the intelligentsia and the better-off sections of the working class, the leaders and members of the parties of the British left were not immune to bourgeois influence. Indeed they used their influence among the working class to subvert internationalism. The largest

party of the British left, the Labour Party, has throughout its history taken a consistently pro-imperialist stance.

The party was not a Marxist party. It was founded by the trade unions, which were anxious for representation in parliament to secure legislation favourable to trade unionists on such matters as the right to strike. Another major influence on Labour was the Fabian Society, whose members argued for social reform in the national interest. George Bernard Shaw argued that 'a Fabian is necessarily an Imperialist', while Sydney Webb declared his support for the Liberal imperialist Lord Rosebery on the grounds that he was the most likely among the Liberal leadership to create a '"virile" collectivist, imperialist opposition party' (Porter 1968, p. 111), before deciding that Labour would be the best vehicle for social reform.

Though affiliated to the Second International, Labour took little part in its agonised debates regarding the circumstances in which it might be possible to support a national war. Though a substantial minority argued that a war of national defence could be supported, majority opinion was that a general European war would be an unjust war (Braunthal 1966). The parties of the International were committed to organising general strikes to oppose such a war. British socialists were still discussing the general strike option when the race to war began in late July 1914. The majority capitulated to war-fever. Labour's leader, Ramsay MacDonald, resigned in order to lead a pacifist opposition to the war and was replaced by the pro-war Arthur Henderson.

Labour's stance on the war was twofold. On the one hand it gave it full support. On the other hand it attempted to defend working-class interests on such matters as the rights of trade unionists and food shortages and demanded post-war reform as the reward for working-class support for the war. Its War Committee issued a series of reports demanding reform on such matters as housing, education, and welfare. In 1915 Labour joined the government and quickly demonstrated its imperialist credentials. Labour eventually took over the Ministry of Labour, becoming responsible for ensuring that the working class

co-operated in the production of war materials. The party was in government in 1917, when British troops entered Jerusalem to initiate the Anglo-French takeover of the Ottoman Empire. Locally, many Labour people served on tribunals, which, after the introduction of conscription in 1916, decided on who could and who could not be exempt from military service and were thus party to the continuing carnage.

The other main parties of the British left in 1914 were the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and two Marxist parties, the British Socialist Party (BSP) and the much smaller Socialist Labour Party (SLP). Led by MacDonald, the ILP maintained an ineffective pacifist opposition to the war. It might be expected that the Marxist and thus nominally internationalist BSP would oppose the war, but it too declared its support for war. An internationalist minority was outraged when at the start of the war a manifesto called on the membership to participate in army recruiting campaigns. As many as 15 out of 18 London branches called for the manifesto to be withdrawn. In Glasgow, John Maclean argued that 'Our first business is to hate the British capitalist system. . . It is mere cant to talk of German militarism when Britain has led the world in the navy business' (Crick 1984, p. 268). The SLP, particularly active in Scotland and the north of England, also resolutely opposed the war. Though large anti-war demonstrations were held in London and other places, the anti-war minority proved unable to mobilise significant numbers of workers against war.

Though few workers came to oppose the war in principle, considerable working-class discontent arose over such matters as conscription, food shortages, and inflation (prices outstripped wages throughout the war; by 1918 average real wages of cotton workers were only 75% of pre-war levels: Jones 1987, p. 37). A sense that working-class people were bearing an unfair share of the burden of war emerged. In Scotland, the BSP and SLP led vigorous battles against rent increases and in defence of working conditions. By 1917, after nearly three years of war, unrest was becoming widespread. In Lancashire, weavers were angered by increased prices,

arguing that 'profitmongers' had exploited food shortages while 'some six million men have been giving their blood on the battlefields' (Amalgamated Weavers Association 1917). In 1917 and 1918 large-scale strikes erupted in many industries. In Lancashire, for instance, there was a mass strike of engineering workers and a general strike in the cotton trade. The Russian Revolution of 1917 prompted ruling-class apprehension that the British working class too would revolt.

Not coincidentally, the government began to respond to demands for reform. Its Reconstruction Committee, established in 1917 in response to working-class discontent, promised reform. Much of this was delivered. An Education Act, for instance, raised the school leaving age to 14 and abolished halftime education (until the passing of the Act children aged 11 and 12 were allowed to work half-time and go to school half-time). But the most important reform was the huge expansion of the electorate in 1918, which gave the parliamentary vote to virtually all men of 21 and over and to householder women of 30 and over; previously only around 30% of working-class people had been able to vote in parliamentary elections (further legislation in 1928 gave the vote to women on the same basis as men). This Act, which massively expanded Labour's potential electoral base, was instrumental in transforming the fortunes of the party: it went from third-party status to becoming the principal party of social imperialism.

It was never likely that Labour could have won in the jingoistic and pro-government ideological climate in which the general election of December 1918 was held (shortly beforehand Germany had sued for peace). But from 1919 there were several years of acute class conflict and rising working-class class consciousness, of which the Labour Party was the principal beneficiary. In the municipal elections of 1919 – the first held under the expanded householder franchise (under which the voting age for women was 21, not 30) – Labour made impressive advances in many industrial towns and cities. These advances were probably due to Labour's vigorous demands for housing reform. Housing had become a crucial electoral

issue by 1919. The British prime minister Lloyd George's famous 'Homes Fit for Heroes' speech was the result of grasping the electoral potential of promoting improved working-class housing. The king too advocated a much more interventionist approach to housing. At Buckingham Palace he had told representatives of local authorities that 'it is not too much to say that an adequate solution of the housing question is the foundation of all social progress' (Burnett 1978, p. 215).

Britain's failure to eradicate slum housing – though local authorities did build more than a million good houses for working-class people between the wars (Malpass 2005, p. 40) – gave rise to the myth, widely held among labour movement activists, that wartime promises of social reform had been broken. In fact, significant reforms were enacted between the two world wars. One of the most important was a series of Unemployment Insurance Acts passed between 1920 and 1922, which provided for unemployment benefit for all industrial manual workers and lower-paid white-collar workers. Meagre and increasingly under attack as unemployment relief was in the inter-war period, such relief should be contrasted with the almost total absence of poor relief in India and the rest of the empire (a point made by Gandhi during his famous visit to Lancashire in 1931), as should the expansion of the electorate in Britain with the increasingly repressive regime in India.

Such matters were regarded as reprehensible by those European socialists who took any notice of them. But even they usually regarded the colonial question as a peripheral matter. Socialists believed that it was in the advanced capitalist countries that the decisive revolutionary battles were to be fought, after which the colonies would be given their freedom. The annual conferences of the ILP, 'while maintaining a certain interest in such issues as conscription and war, made virtually no effort to discuss the colonies' (Porter 1968, pp. 96–97). Moreover, what interest there was in colonial matters tended to be tinged with paternalism. Hobson, socialists' mentor on imperialism, opposed enfranchising black Africans on the grounds that they were 'still steeped in the darkness of savagery' (Young 1989,

pp. 53–54). At the 1904 Amsterdam congress of the International, a resolution on India from British delegates, while opposing the existing form of colonial rule in India, nevertheless affirmed that the International recognised 'the right of the inhabitants of civilised countries to settle in lands where the population is at a lower stage of development' (Braunthal 1966, pp. 311–312).

At Easter 1916 the revolutionary wing of Irish nationalism staged an armed revolt and issued a proclamation of independence (at that time the whole of Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, but effectively a colony) and thus presented a test of the British left's internationalism. Few on the British left were prepared to support the revolt. It was hardly to be expected that official Labour would support a colonial revolt at the height of the war with Germany. Sylvia Pankhurst's Workers' Socialist Federation (WSF), one of the organisations which were to found the CP a few years later, was the only organisation of the British left to give unqualified support to the rebellion in Ireland. Far more typical was the response of the ILP, which announced that 'In no degree do we approve of the *Sinn Fein* rebellion. We do not approve of armed rebellion at all, any more than any other form of militarism or war' (Beresford-Ellis 1985, p. 232). The BSP, by then in the hands of the internationalists, was equivocal. It had nothing to say for several weeks and then disdainfully remarked that 'In every demand made by the Sinn Fein movement there is the spirit of nationalism. . . to rise, as the men in Dublin rose. . . was foolish', but it could 'understand this effort of the Irish people to throw off the alien yoke' (The Call, 9 July 1916). It was not until after the formation of the CP that British Marxists began to take seriously such national movements as that in Ireland.

In post-war opposition, the Labour Party criticised the British Government's savagery in the Anglo-Irish War of 1919–21 and its bloody suppression of the independence movements in India: but in office its record was little better, despite affirming during the general election of 1918 its support for 'freedom for Ireland and India' and pledging to 'extend to all subject peoples the right of self-determination' (Labour Party

1918, p. 3). J.H. Thomas, the colonial secretary in the first Labour Government of 1924, famously remarked on taking office that he was there 'to see that there is no mucking about with the British Empire' (Ward 1998, p. 185). Labour took office not long after Britain had conceded a measure of independence to Egypt after a revolt which had begun in 1919 (though never a formal British colony, Egypt, nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, had been under British control since 1882). Naively, the leaders of the Egyptian independence movement assumed that a Labour government would be sympathetic to their demand for full independence. They were disappointed. Moreover, an upsurge in the independence movement was ruthlessly suppressed.

As for India, Labour had the opportunity during its second term of office in 1929–31 to make some progress towards independence, but showed its Euro-centric paternalism by refusing to accept Nehru's draft constitution for an independent India (Porter 1984, p. 297). While it is true that Labour could not command a parliamentary majority for Indian independence, it did possess executive authority over India and in 1930–31 presided over the savage repression of an upsurge in the Indian independence movement. Thousands were injured and hundreds killed, including the leaders of an uprising in Sholapur, who were hanged (Ahmed 1987, p. 261).

Such was Labour's response to the postwar upsurge in national liberation movements. What of the CP? Founded in 1920, mainly by the BSP and a minority of the SLP, the party inherited much from the Second International, including its half-hearted commitment to supporting colonial independence. Only months prior to the party's founding congress, British troops had killed 379 and wounded around 1200 people at a peaceful pro-independence gathering at Amritsar. Yet the congress did not find it necessary to discuss the colonial question. But home truths regarding the party's indifference to the colonial question heard at the second congress of the Communist International (Comintern) led to a greater theoretical appreciation of the importance of the national and colonial question. The influence of Comintern theses – which asserted that the national revolutionary movement in the colonies was an integral part of the world revolutionary movement against imperialism and must be fully supported by the communist movement (Hessel 1980, pp. 68–76) – could from then on be clearly discerned.

A long article in the party's journal *The Communist* referred to 'the belief in some quarters [clearly in the CP itself] that the national idea is being overemphasised'. It was right to reject 'Rule Britannia and all that rubbish [but there is] a vast difference between the nationalism of a dominant nation and that of an oppressed nationality' (*The Communist, 7* October 1920). Nevertheless, there was considerable tardiness into translating this theoretical appreciation into practice. In 1921 the party leadership set up several committees to direct the party's practical activities (*The Communist Review,* October 1921), but a colonial committee was not established until 1924. In 1922, in its report to the party's annual conference, the leadership had nothing to say on imperial matters, nor did any branch submit a resolution on such matter (CP 1922).

One problem, of course, for any party wishing to support movements against British imperialism is that most British workers would have regarded such a stance as treachery, a point made by a British delegate to the first congress of the Comintern. This may well explain why the CP seems to have devoted more energy to lending assistance to the movement in India than to trying to raise support for that movement in Britain. Certainly, these had been the priorities of those attending the first meeting of the party's Colonial Committee (CP Colonial Committee 1924). While the party's publications did begin to cover the colonies more frequently and supported national movements within them, they made only spasmodic attempts – one such was 'Down with Empire' demonstrations on Empire Day (an annual event aimed at raising popular enthusiasm for the empire) in 1930 – to build practical support for anti-colonial struggles among British workers.

Even so, some credit should be given to the internationalist sentiments which led quite a few of its members to travel to India to help the Indian party. Two of these members, Ben Bradley and

Philip Spratt, were among those arrested in 1929 and charged with conspiracy. Bradley and Spratt were eventually sentenced to long prison terms, but were released after an international outcry. Relations between the British and Indian parties at this time were difficult. The manifesto of the first congress of the Comintern had shown the lingering influence of the paternalism of the Second International when it declared 'colonial slaves of Africa and Asia: the hour of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will also be the hour of your liberation!' (Riddell 1987, pp. 227–228). Thus, the CP insisted in 1925 that it should exercise leadership over the Indian party (Overstreet and Windmiller 1969, p. 75). It was no doubt this attitude which led Indian communists to complain of the 'Empire Consciousness', 'bossing', and 'big brotherly' attitude of the British party towards its Indian counterpart (Gupta 1997, p. 78). It seems very likely that British communists took to India with their internationalism a side-order of paternalism.

Even such lukewarm commitment to internationalism began to fade away as a new international crisis developed in the 1930s. The Wall Street Crash of 1929, the resultant international depression, and the victory of fascism in Germany in 1933 were all the product of the fundamental contradictions of imperialism, which had led to, but had not been resolved by, the imperialist war of 1914–18. A second imperialist world war began to seem probable. The Labour Party and, increasingly, the CP both viewed the threat of war through Euro-centric spectacles. Both parties saw the looming war as an antifascist war and, in the case of the CP, as a war in defence of the USSR. Its essentially imperialist content was increasingly hidden by a fog of anti-fascist rhetoric.

Only the tiny Trotskyist sects argued that war was the inevitable result of the contradictions of capitalism and saw in the looming war the possibility of revolutionary advances. Labour and (eventually) the CP both argued that diplomacy and resolute action against the axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan could prevent war. The CP and (to a lesser extent) the Labour Party were keen too that Britain, France, and the US should ally with the USSR. A strong pacifist

element in Labour led it to oppose rearmament at first, but this opposition was dropped as the threat to British from German imperialism became clearer. The CP too initially opposed rearmament, arguing that only a left-wing People's Government could be trusted not to use arms for imperialist purposes. But the threat of Germany led the CP to begin to support the government's war preparations, eventually ending its opposition to conscription.

When diplomacy inevitably failed, both parties declared their support for the British war effort (the ILP took refuge in pacifism). Labour's support for war is perfectly explicable; in office it had shown that its internationalism was only skindeep and that it was an imperialist party. But how could the CP, born out of the revolutionary left's opposition to the first imperialist war, support the second imperialist war? The conventional answer is Soviet diplomacy (the USSR had sought to build anti-German alliances with Britain, France, and the US). There is much truth to this, but a more fundamental factor is that the Comintern and the CP had not made a clean break with the Euro-centrism and social chauvinism of the Second International. In 1935 the Comintern held its seventh congress, which was marked by a breach with the revolutionary internationalist outlook adopted at its first two congresses. The congress adopted a new Euro-centric strategy in which the general revolutionary interest was subordinated to the defence of socialism in the USSR. Central to this strategy was the defence of democracy (in practice, the defence of the national interest) in France and Britain.

Until 1935 the CP had been insistent that it would never support its 'own' government in war because, it argued, any war in which an imperialist Britain participated would be an imperialist war. But at the seventh congress it was claimed that the bourgeoisie of those imperialist countries threatened by fascism could no longer be trusted to defend the nation. The policy of the dominant section of the British imperialists towards the expansionist axis states was to appease them, to make concessions in the hope that war could be avoided, perhaps to turn Germany and Japan against the USSR, and, if war did come, to have

had time to prepare for it. This was a policy of national survival, not national betrayal; but many, from Winston Churchill to Harry Pollitt, the leader of the CP, saw it as such. At the seventh congress, the leaders of the European parties argued that the communists must take up the role of defenders of the nation. Pollitt took up this theme with alacrity: Communists, he argued:

> must prove that we love our country so well that our lives are dedicated to removing all the black spots on its name, to removing poverty, unemployment and the bloody oppression of colonial peoples. We must show that the working class alone is the true custodian of the honour and rights of the British people. (Pollitt 1935)

This outlook chimed with the sentiments of many others on the British left, including influential elements of the Labour Party. In the mid-1930s fascism seemed to many a serious threat in Europe, where the Nazi triumph in Germany had encouraged the European far right. In France in 1934 monarchists and fascists had united in an attempt to overthrow the republic. In Britain the British Union of Fascists was attacking Jews in London's East End.

Probably the most influential of the left-wing bodies fighting for left unity was the Socialist League, the rump of the ILP. In 1932 its members had elected to remain in the Labour Party after the ILP majority split from Labour. Many of the most influential members of the Labour left were active in it, including G.D.H. Cole, Stafford Cripps, Aneurin Bevan, and Harold Laski. Inspired by the victories of popular fronts of all antifascist parties in Spain and France, the league hoped to build a popular front in Britain. In the autumn of 1936, prompted by the fascist revolt against the Spanish republic, unity negotiations began between the CP, the Socialist League, and the ILP.

Euro-centric indifference to the struggles of the colonial peoples surfaced at the first of the negotiating meetings. Pollitt asked the representatives of the Socialist League why all reference to the colonies, including a demand for independence for India, had been dropped from their draft of the proposed joint manifesto. Bevan replied that the labour movement paid too much attention to international matters and that another member of

the Socialist League was opposed to Indian independence because it would cause difficulties for India. Pollitt did not press the matter (CP Political Bureau 1936). As a result of these negotiations, a unity campaign with a popular front programme, not including colonial freedom, was launched in January 1937 but lasted only until Labour disaffiliated the Socialist League in the spring.

There was some success in forging unity between the CP and elements of the ILP. Attempts to build anti-fascist unity between the two organisations had started shortly after the Nazi victory in Germany, and 40,000 people took part in an antifascist rally in March 1933. But the main spur to unity came from an Italian threat to the British Empire. In the autumn of 1935 Italy invaded Abyssinia (today Ethiopia). This constituted a clear threat to British interests in the Middle and Far East, in particular the passage to India through the Suez Canal. In response, the CP unsuccessfully demanded that the British Government join with other states in the League of Nations to institute sanctions against Italy. The ILP opposed this policy, prompting a substantial number of its members to leave for the CP.

The CP was still adamant that only a left-wing People's Government could be trusted to defend Britain against fascism, but as the threat of war loomed ever closer, CP discourse increasingly stressed German aggression rather than the international economy in which Britain was the principal imperialist exploiter. Pollitt remarked, shortly after the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, that 'one of the important differences between 1936 and 1914 is this, that in 1914 you could not say which is the aggressor. In 1936 it stands out for all to see' (CP Central Committee 1936).

The implication was clear. But before the CP could urge the working class to assume the responsibility of defending the nation there was an apparently insuperable ideological and political obstacle to overcome. Had not Marx and Lenin argued that the working class had no country? Of course, it could be argued that now the working class did have a country, the USSR. But even so, how could working-class support for the war effort of an imperialist country be justified?

Shortly after the Munich agreement of 1938, which the British and French imperialists hoped would help to turn Nazi Germany against the USSR, the Comintern tackled this issue: Once, it was argued, the idea that 'the proletarian has no country was a profound and bitter conviction'. But things had changed. Through the class struggle the working class had 'gradually won a place in the nation for themselves' and 'began to revise its relationship with the nation... the working class and the Communist Party are [now] the only consistent defenders of national independence' (Communist International 1938, p. 24).

A year later Britain and France declared war on Germany after Germany invaded Poland. The Labour Party had no hesitation in giving its full support to the war. Labour ministers were appointed to the War Cabinet in the spring of 1940, as the 'phoney war' ended with the German invasion of Norway, France, and the Low Countries. The party was not deflected from its support for the British war effort even when the imperialist nature of the war became very clear indeed as the initial European war which had broken out in 1939 spilled over into North Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East.

But what of the CP? Early in 1939, when war seemed inevitable, a pamphlet issued in Pollitt's name, *Will it Be War?*, suggested that if war came British Communists would not be found wanting:

> Our country and our people will never fall victims to fascism. The people of Britain will fight if necessary better than any other people in the world. They stand now unafraid in a land led by capitulators... people who are afraid to stand on their own feet, people who will whine about the 'horrors of war', blind to the fact that a real policy of defence means the only sure shield for preventing war. And if it fails, the people of Britain will fight as never before.

It would be cynical not to see here an emotional commitment to fighting fascism. The CP's stance on the war was complex and ambiguous. It had no doubt that Britain should be defended, but other factors – distrust of what it regarded as a pro-fascist government, a desire to defend the USSR, and even simple patriotism, as opposed to social chauvinism – were at play. Immediately after the outbreak of war it therefore called for a 'war on two fronts' – against Germany certainly, but also against the 'enemies of democracy' in Britain (*Daily Worker*, 2 September 1939).

But shortly afterwards the Comintern intervened to declare that the war was an imperialist war and could not be supported. Most CP members fell into line. Neither the Comintern nor the CP had suddenly rediscovered Leninism: their opposition to the war was the result of British and French refusal to ally with the USSR against Germany. The CP was therefore well placed to resume its support for war once the Soviet–German pact of mutual convenience, concluded shortly before the outbreak of war, was ended by the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941. But by then the ambiguity and complexity present in 1939 had dissolved into a determination to support the British war effort and defend the USSR, fuelled no doubt by Britain's desperate situation in the war and the disastrous defeats of the Red Army. There were no more calls for a 'war on two fronts'.

Working-class support for another war with Germany was firm, though not enthusiastic. There was no repeat of even the limited anti-war protests of 1914, but neither was there a repeat of the enthusiastic scenes which had then greeted the outbreak of war (though they were much exaggerated by propagandists and historians). Labour movement support was however given with some misgivings. Continuing deprivation in the industrial districts, where there was still much poverty, poor housing, and unemployment, had led to the belief that the sacrifices of 1914–18 had not been adequately rewarded, that promises of reform had been broken to grow deep roots (though, as we have seen, there had been significant reform).

In Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancashire, a leading trade unionist doubtless spoke for many when asserting that working-class people would not be '"led up the garden path" after this war like they were after the last'. Trade unionists were 'watching the workers' interests at the same as they were backing the country 100 per cent' (*Ashton Reporter*, 9 February 1940). The implicit assumption here, of course, is that the problem is not that the working class had supported an

imperialist war, but that they had been inadequately rewarded for doing so. But Labour movement doubts were assuaged after promises of reform emerged in the wake of the British defeats in Norway and France in 1940. Once in the Cabinet, Labour ministers dominated domestic politics and mainly determined the shape of post-war politics. Anti-fascism and complacent talk of a 'people's war' cloaked labour's social-imperialist collaboration with capital.

Assumptions that there would be substantial post-war reform accelerated after the British victory over German and Italian forces at El Alamein in North Africa in late 1942. Not coincidentally, the Beveridge Report, which urged an end to the five 'giant evils' of squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease, was published shortly afterwards. This report and the other two principal wartime foundations of the post-war welfare state, the 1944 White Paper on Employment, which promised full employment, and the 1944 Education Act, which provided for post-war free secondary education for all and the further raising of the school leaving age, were all broadly welcomed by the labour movement.

Chimerical hope of colonial reform emerged in the course of the war, notably after the adoption in 1941 by Britain and the US of the Atlantic Charter, which promised post-war self-determination for all. But the Labour Party's support for war was not at all diminished when Churchill made it clear that he did not regard the promise of self-determination as applicable to the British Empire. Nominally, Labour was in favour of post-war self-determination: but its record in post-war office suggests that Labour's fundamental attitude was revealed when one of its most senior leaders, Herbert Morrison, remarked that the notion of self-government for many of the colonies was 'ignorant, dangerous nonsense... it would be like giving a child of ten a latch-key, a bank account and a shotgun' (Louis 1977, p. 33).

Labour's stance on India revealed in practice Labour's social chauvinism. Nominally committed to Indian independence, Labour ministers were as adamantly opposed as the Conservatives to granting wartime independence, leading to the abject failure of the 'Cripps Mission' in 1942.

Stafford Cripps (known to leaders of the Congress Party of India as 'Stifford Crapps') flew to India in 1942 with an offer of independence after the war. The Congress Party of India was unimpressed and launched the 'Quit India' movement, a campaign of civil disobedience intended to force the British to grant independence. The campaign was savagely repressed. Congress leaders, who had earlier been released from prison as a concession to the independence movement, were sent back to gaol.

The precondition for domestic and colonial reform was of course a defeat of the Axis powers and a defence and, where necessary, reconquest of British bases, colonies, and spheres of interest in the Mediterranean, North Africa, Middle East, and Far East. But it became clear in 1944–45, as the war turned decisively in the allies' favour, that promises of self-determination for the colonial peoples were false. British rule was forcibly reimposed in such places as Burma and Malaya. In late 1944 Britain also militarily intervened in Greece, long a British dependency, to prevent communist-led partisans from taking power. There were protests from left-wing Labour people over these matters, but they continued to give overall support to the war.

The CP's overriding concern was the defeat of fascism (in which category, with some dialectical ingenuity, it included Britain's principal Far Eastern rival, Japan) and the defence of the USSR. It was therefore reluctant to fully support anti-colonial campaigns. While it supported demands for wartime reform for India, including some measure of selfgovernment, it tried to use its influence with Congress to persuade it not to resort to civil disobedience when these demands were not met. In the final stages of the war British colonial reconquests in the Far East were given a warm welcome, if usually accompanied by platitudinous remarks that desires for colonial freedom should be respected. The CP maintained this ambivalent stance – for instance criticising the use of British troops to restore Dutch rule in Indonesia – until the eruption of the Cold War in 1947 necessitated a more militant position.

Labour won a landslide victory in the general election of 1945. Labour's programme was a

settlement of the imperial bargain struck between labour and capital in 1939–40. Making full employment the primary objective of economic policy and establishing a comprehensive system of social insurance and free health care greatly improved conditions for working-class people, thereby bolstering British imperialism's social base. The Conservative Party quibbled about some aspects of Labour's programme, but raised no fundamental objection.

Internationally, Labour was the main agent of British imperialism's attempts to restore the pre-war imperial order. Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary in the 1945–51 Labour Government, was quite unapologetic about this, telling the House of Commons in 1946 that he was 'not prepared to sacrifice the British Empire... I know that if the British Empire fell... it would mean that the standard of life of our constituents would fall considerably' (Ramdin 1987, p. 132). Indeed it would: Malayan rubber, for instance, sold for dollars, played a crucial role in financing post-war reconstruction at home (Cain and Hopkins 1993). Not long after Bevin's remarks, Britain began a war against a communist-led national liberation war against British rule in Malaya. Labour's apologists usually refer to the granting of independence to India in 1947 to affirm the party's internationalist credentials. But in truth, there was little alternative. Unrest in India made attempts to prolong British rule unfeasible. Moreover, pressure from the US to grant independence could not be resisted, given Britain's increasing dependence on US finance and arms.

Overall, this is a sorry tale. The co-operation of the labour movement with British capital in the two world wars meant that British imperialism felt relatively secure at home while it pursued imperialist objectives abroad. Moreover, the reforms enacted after both wars bolstered imperialism's domestic social base and made it even less likely that British labour would seriously threaten the rule of capital. There always have been and still are British people who have opposed British imperialism – Sylvia Pankhurst, for instance, was a consistent opponent of British rule in India and Ireland – but these have tended to be on its margins or not even on the left. Its mainstream

organisations, especially when faced with the test of war, have either, like the Labour Party, unquestioningly supported imperialism or, like the CP, ultimately capitulated to it.

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British Museum, Imperialism and Empire

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Museums have a long history rooted in colonialism and imperialism, but none come close to the lasting legacy of the British Museum. Since its opening 260 years ago, the British Museum has welcomed more than 350 million visitors who stroll through its endless galleries and gaze at thousands of objects from faraway places. Many of these objects were acquired, or rather appropriated, from the British colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which has become a point of contention in recent decades. With repatriation requests from former colonies growing exponentially, it is imperative to look back at the

relationship between the British Museum and the British Empire as well as how the museum came to be a "universal museum." The museum was built on imperialistic ideals and became a symbolic representation of overseas British wars and expeditions, and grew out of a developing interest in personal collections and world fairs. As the British Empire expanded throughout the nineteenth century, people living in Britain began to view objects in the British Museum from the perspective of difference - the difference between their own culture and that of the colonies they conquered - which led to an overall sense of cultural superiority. The colonies, as well as their objects, contributed to the creation of a national British identity in this way. This feeling of superiority over "less civilized" cultures as embodied in the British Museum has continued to the present day. By refusing former colonies' requests to repatriate objects, the British Museum upholds Britain's "superior" status in relation to the former colonies, and the British Empire therefore survives through the displays and exhibits at the museum. Hence, the British Museum is an imperialist institution that continues to use its vast collections from the former colonies to sustain a British national identity, preserve its power over its former colonies, and maintain the legacy of the British Empire.

The Evolution of British Interest in Cultural Objects

Founded in 1753, the British Museum became one of the first national, public, and secular museums in the world, in which neither church nor monarch owned the institution (Duthie 2011). The museum would not have started without the donation of collections from Sir Hans Sloane, an Irish physician and avid collector. Sloane began collecting in 1687 during his voyage to Jamaica, where he served as a physician to the governor of the colony. He returned to Britain with 800 plant and animal specimens, which would become the foundation of his encyclopedias on natural history. Upon his return, he built up his collection by absorbing the collections of his colleagues as

well as buying items from travelers and explorers throughout the British Empire. He eventually obtained 32,000 coins and medals, 50,000 books and manuscripts, 334 volumes of dried plants, and thousands more miscellaneous "natural and artificial rarities" (The British Museum Story n.d.). Sloane wrote in his will that his collection would be left with King George II in exchange for 20,000 pounds for his son and on the condition that the government would create a museum to house his collection (Sloane 1753). The trustees of the newly created British Museum chose to buy and convert the sixteenth-century Montagu House into a museum for Sloane's objects. Thus, Sloane's collection of assorted items became the foundation for what would become the British Museum, and so began its imperial legacy.

Today, the British Museum is the most visited museum in the United Kingdom, but this was not always the case. The museum opened its doors in 1759, 6 years after its founding. During the early years, people who wished to visit the museum had to apply for tickets, and the visiting hours were extremely limited. Entry was initially restricted to the wealthy or to those who had donated personal connections to the trustees and curators. At this time, the collection consisted mostly of the library, which filled the ground floor rooms of the Montagu House, and the natural history specimens from Sloane's collection, which covered most of the second storey. Other early exhibits included classical antiquities such as Egyptian mummies as well as Greek and Roman antiquities. By the 1830s, the daily operating hours of the museum were expanded, making the museum more open and accessible to the general public (The British Museum Story n.d.).

Although the early British Museum had already possessed a large collection of natural history and some cultural artifacts, the British public was predominantly disinterested in objects from the colonies in the eighteenth century. This was due in part to the exclusivity of the British Museum, as well as the fact that objects of natural history, such as plant and animal specimens, outnumbered cultural objects at the time. In addition, before cinema, photography, and illustrated newspapers, Londoners led "culturally insulated

lives" their curiosity confined to their own area of the world (Breckenridge 1989). However, a number of factors led to the museum's growth during the height of the British Empire in the nineteenth century and the eventual growth of public interest in cultural objects. These factors included a series of victorious overseas wars throughout the eighteenth century, late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century voyages of exploration, the increase in personal collections and wonder cabinets, and the advent of world fairs.

The eighteenth century is largely defined by the abundant wars and conflicts between powerful European countries and their respective colonies. Just as these wars shaped the course of history, they also greatly impacted the pride of the British people. The fourth Mysore war fought in 1799 between the British East India Company and the Kingdom of Mysore is merely one example of a war which shaped British perceptions of the colonies and themselves. The Siege of Seringapatam was the final battle of this war; the British killed Tipu Sultan and reinstated the Wodeyar dynasty. This victory was one of the most important ones on the Indian subcontinent because it provided a symbol of hope and brought confidence to the British people (Breckenridge 1989). In 1800, painter Robert Ker Porter created a panoramic scene of this battle. The painting was so realistic and powerful that viewers became overwhelmed with emotions, feeling as though they were at the scene of the battle themselves. This panorama turned the British population's attention to India; as Londoners gazed upon the 200-foot-long canvas, they became more convinced of the British Empire's superiority of their culture over Mysore, India as a whole, as well as the other British colonies. This feeling grew stronger as the British Empire continued to be victorious in countless wars throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to John M. MacKenzie, this imperial outlook led to an influx of patriotism and nationhood that soon defined the British Empire (MacKenzie 2019).

With the growth of national pride came Enlightenment voyages of scientific discovery in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Such voyages, led by those such as Captain James Cook, Lieutenant Edward Belcher, and Sir Joseph Banks, produced the first real collections of ethnographic artifacts for study in England. During his first voyage from 1768 to 1771 in the Pacific, Cook collected numerous ethnographic objects that survive in the collections of the British Museum and other British institutions. The British Museum began displaying Cook's objects in 1778, which began to fascinate visitors who had never seen these faraway lands. Belcher led an Arctic expedition from 1825 to 1827, where he collected Alaskan Eskimo artifacts and donated many to the British Museum while keeping the majority for his own personal collection. Joseph Banks, president of the Royal Society from 1778 to 1819 and an avid patron of the natural sciences, advocated for the central role of scientific discovery in achieving Britain's imperial aspirations. Areas prioritized for exploration and scientific discovery also happened to be of economic importance to the British Empire as well as areas of competitor interest (Owen 2006). These explorer vessels soon became symbols of Britain's maritime power that stretched across the globe. As a result of these expeditions, the British Museum's colonial collections grew immensely into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By 1800, the museum began to outgrow the Montagu House due to the overwhelming number of visitors flocking to see the colonial objects on display.

Many British explorers also returned home with incredible amounts of artifacts to display in their homes for their own personal collections. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, objects were often displayed in a trophy paradigm. By displaying objects in this fashion, collectors, many of whom were colonial officials, politicians, or explorers, felt a sense of authority and superiority over the indigenous people whose objects they housed (Wintle 2008). These collections were often called "wonder cabinets," in which artifacts were disorganized and eclectically displayed, with their value derived more from its decontextualized uniqueness than its meaning. Following the success of the Seringapatam panorama, the British East India Company created an

"Oriental Repository," which housed cultural objects brought back to the metropole from the colonies. Here, Londoners gazed at Tipu's regalia, and it soon became one of the most popular exhibits at the time (Breckenridge 1989). In addition, the Londoners who came to see these "wonder cabinets" traveled vicariously through these collections rather than visiting the colonies themselves, which gave them a biased and exotic view of the colony whose artifacts were on display. For example, Sir Richard Temple, British politician and administrator in India, had his own personal collection that included bows, arrows, and spears. These artifacts were used for pig hunting and fishing in India, but he described them as deadly weapons and "arms of savages," reflecting the British imperial project: the civilizing mission (Wintle 2008). Nonetheless, people who came to see Temple's collection as well as other cabinets of curiosities felt an overwhelming sense of wonder, mystery, intrigue, and allure. This sense of wonder people felt while viewing these collections led to the ultimate success of personal collections as well as the fairs and museums that followed.

Similar to personal collections, world fairs were large events which also reduced cultures to their objects through selective representation (Breckenridge 1989). These fairs were a result of advances in transportation, photography, advertising, and the overall growth of capitalism. The most famous world fair was the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851, held in London. This event was the first of its kind; millions of visitors attended this fair during the 5 months it was open. As a result, an era of "exhibition mania" commenced not only in Britain, but around the world. More than 30 colonies and countries were represented here by their raw materials, manufactures, and paraphernalia at the fair. India was the most well-represented colony at the exhibition, placed in the center of the court with more floor space than every other country present. The India transept began at the main entrance of the fair and led to the Queen's retiring room, offering the Queen a "continuous gaze on objects of what were to become her distant and cultural others" (Breckenridge 1989). India's section at the fair included native village scenes, which included street vendors and dancing women who were brought to London specifically for entertainment purposes. Visitors gawked and gazed with curiosity and amusement at such a drastically different culture than their "civilized" European lifestyle. The Crystal Palace Exhibition was imperative to the changing of British attitudes toward colonial artifacts, especially ones from India; millions of British citizens attended this fair and marveled at the colonies' objects in contrast to their own "sophisticated" culture.

The Growth of a British National Identity

Because of the many wars and expeditions which resulted in personal collections, world fairs, and the objects brought back to the metropole, the British public's initial disinterest in cultural objects from the colonies suddenly evolved into massive interest. As a result, British visitors began to view ethnographic objects from the perspective of cultural difference. The sense of national pride and patriotism from expeditions and exhibitions gave rise to feelings of cultural superiority over the "other." For example, the most notable sections of the Crystal Palace Exhibition were India and the United States, which stood in stark contrast to one another. India's artifacts and display included royal regalia, elephant trappings, weapons, and textiles. The United States' exhibit, on the other hand, contained inventions, machinery, and mass produced consumer products. The disparity between these two displays illustrates how the British compared cultures based on their objects (Breckenridge 1989). Following the Crystal Palace Exhibition, the British Museum in the nineteenth century became a powerful symbol of empire with representations of various cultures that were displayed in a deeply imperialistic fashion. As Janet Owen (2006) claims,

> "The British Museum incorporated ethnographic material brought back from exploration into displays that organized material geographically into regions across the world. The public who visited these galleries were more interested in the exoticism

of difference represented by these artifacts and how they defined their own European identity through contrast rather than any interest in a deeper understanding to the cultures that created them."

As a direct consequence of war, exploration, and colonialism, these displays ultimately led the British public to consider their culture "superior" to non-Western cultures.

When it was first established, the British Museum was mainly a home for objects of natural history, such as Sloane's plant and animal specimens. However, due to the aforementioned wars and expeditions resulting in personal collections and world fairs, the British Museum shifted from a largely natural history museum to an ethnographic and cultural one. This shift encapsulates one of the most important features of colonial museums (MacKenzie 2010). The British Museum's collections reflected the interests of the Empire: both were involved in constructing a hierarchical view of the world (with European civilizations at the top), and both were primarily interested in the economic gain the colonies gave Britain. In fact, the museum did not collect British and medieval European objects until 1851, nearly a century after the museum's founding. By primarily collecting artifacts from its colonies, the British Museum was a key colonial institution that contributed to establishing Britain's hegemony over its overseas colonies. Just as the British Empire's expansion into Asia and Africa were key to creating a sense of national pride back in the metropole in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, so the colonial objects housed in the British Museum were essential in promoting a sense of cultural superiority and national prestige that would never have been achieved had the museum been restricted to only displaying British artifacts (Clunas 1998).

The British Museum as an Imperialist Institution

The British Museum thus became an "imperial archive" and was the "most spectacular repository of the material culture of empire" (Duthie 2011). Until the 1930s, exhibitions in the British Museum were described as "encyclopedias of knowledge about empire" (MacKenzie 2010). Artifacts from India, Nigeria, Greece, Egypt, China, and many more colonies and countries of economic interest were looted from their homeland and displayed in the British Museum during the height of the British Empire. The act of possessing these objects from the "peripheries" and moving them to the "center" symbolically depicted London as the heart of the empire (Barringer 1998). In this way, the British Museum became a "world museum" and still classifies itself as such.

One example of such an object relocated to the metropole is the Rosetta Stone. It was one of the earliest and most famous artifacts from a colony acquired to the British Museum. The stone is inscribed with Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, demotic scripts, and Ancient Greek which depict a royal decree from 196 BC during the Ptolemaic dynasty. It was discovered in 1799 by French soldiers occupying Egypt, who were soon defeated by the British. Under the Treaty of Alexandria in 1801, the French ceded the Stone and the British transferred it to the British Museum, where it has been almost continuously displayed since 1802. By 1803, the Greek text on the Stone was translated, thus becoming a crucial key to translating and understanding Egyptian hieroglyphs (Edwardes and Milner 2003). The Rosetta Stone is now the most visited single object in the British Museum. In addition, merchandise such as postcards and shirts with the text of the Rosetta Stone have been sold in the museum gift shop and are incredibly popular.

Although Greece was never an official British colony, with the exception of the Ionian Islands from 1815 to 1862, the British Empire was especially interested in Greece for economic, naval, and even cultural purposes. The looting of the Parthenon Marbles provides a perfect example of opportunism and imperialism in Greece. Thomas Bruce, the seventh earl of Elgin, traveled to Greece to bring back drawings and antiques to Britain. Instead, between 1801 and 1812, he forcefully removed numerous Parthenon sculptures and took them to London, where these items are now housed at the British Museum

(Duthie 2011). These sculptures have been on display since 1817 and have become one of the most popular exhibits at the museum.

In 1897, the British led a punitive expedition in Benin, which is now in modern-day Nigeria. This mission was carried out 2 months after Lieutenant James Phillips, and eight other British officers were ambushed and killed while approaching Benin City. As retaliation, nearly 1,000 bronze art pieces were seized by force from the royal palace of the Kingdom of Benin, and 200 of those went straight to the British Museum's collection. The remaining bronzes were intended to be sold in order to provide compensation for the families of the British officers (Jones 2003). This type of expedition was typical of the British Empire, resulting in the plundering of art and the looting of cultural items. Interestingly, some Europeans believed these bronze plaques and figures to be so beautiful that they could not have been created by Africans, but instead claimed that these pieces of art were created by Portuguese sailors who had traveled through Benin (Duthie 2011). Nonetheless, the looting of Benin bronzes and their display in the British Museum made African art visible to Europeans, resulting in a sense of "surprise and mystification" toward the artifacts (Jones 2003).

The British victory of the Opium War (1839–1842) resulted in a change of British perceptions of Chinese culture. This victory, as seen with other British wars, established a sense of cultural and economic superiority over the Chinese. However, Chinese art was praised, described as interesting, splendid, and magnificent. Thus, China was both the "land of the uncivilized" and a country which produced admirable and exotic goods (Pagani 1998). In 1907, Sir Aurel Stein removed an entire library of ancient Chinese documents and artwork from the Dunhuang Caves. He persuaded a monk to sell this library for only 220 pounds. Stein returned to England with 24 wagonloads of papers, art, and ancient objects, including a copy of the *Diamond Sutra*, the world's earliest known printed book (Duthie 2011). In the British Museum, Chinese art and documents were included in the Department of Prints and Drawings, curated alongside European objects (Clunas 1998).

As the British Empire gradually waned in the twentieth century, these "souvenirs" from the colonies began to play an even greater role in the British national image of themselves, resulting in a feeling of nostalgia for the declining empire (Clunas 1998). At the same time, former colonies were beginning to request repatriation of cultural objects in the British Museum. The issue of repatriation has been prevalent since the early twentieth century, but demands for repatriation of cultural items have increased exponentially since then, especially in more recent decades. Due to legislation, the British Museum has refused to return artifacts on more than a few occasions. The British Museum Act of 1963 prohibits the museum from selling or disposing of any valuable objects; the trustees can only dispose of or sell objects that are duplicates or that are made of paper and created after 1850 (British Museum Act 1963). Although this Act could be amended or overturned, the British Museum has used it as a justification to refuse repatriation requests and will not return artifacts for "moral reasons."

There are many reasons why former colonies are requesting these items to be returned to them, despite the legislation that prohibits it. Since gaining its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832, the Greek government has been tirelessly working to restore their stolen art. In the case of the Elgin Marbles, the Greek government argues that the marbles are important pieces of heritage that represent the "Greek soul" and should be fully returned to their mother country. The British Museum may display such artifacts for their beauty and uniqueness, but "the colonized have been deprived of objects that are central to their historical narratives of identity" (Duthie 2011). The Parthenon Marbles were originally created as a single piece of artwork. Unfortunately, because fragments of the marbles are scattered around the world, it is now decontextualized and cannot be appreciated in its intended form. In addition, new museums are being created in these countries, such as the Acropolis Museum in Greece, that are prepared to house their own cultural objects with modern technology to protect their exhibits. However, the

British Museum has made no progress towards fulfilling this Greek demand. In fact, one of the marbles was loaned to Russia's State Hermitage Museum to celebrate its 250th anniversary in 2015. Much to the displeasure of the Greek government, the marbles have not touched Greek soil since they departed in 1812.

Egypt followed in the footsteps of Greece and has been requesting the return of the Rosetta Stone, as well as other Egyptian artifacts, since 2003. Dr. Zahi Hawass, director of the Supreme Council of Antiquities in Cairo, hoped that the British Museum would return the Stone with little hesitation. However, this was not the case. He states: "If the British want to be remembered, if they want to restore their reputation, they should volunteer to return the Rosetta Stone because it is the icon of our Egyptian identity" (Edwardes and Milner 2003). Hawass discussed the possibility of a 3-month loan of the Rosetta Stone to the Cairo Museum. This would be a short-term solution that Hawass hoped would lead to the eventual repatriation of the Stone. In return, the Cairo Museum was prepared to give the British Museum a replica, but the British Museum has not accepted this offer to date. Some museum officials say that Egyptians only became interested in the Rosetta Stone after its significance was revealed by the British. This perpetuates the imperialistic notion that the colonies do not care about their own cultural objects as much as the British do.

Nigeria, too, has been longing for the return of the bronzes since its independence from Britain in 1960. However, the British Museum has resisted the permanent return of the bronzes due to the legislation that bans it from permanently disposing of their collections. However, the British Museum lent 35 of its 200 Benin Bronzes to the museum at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1960s. In fact, this was the first loan of any artifacts from the British Museum outside of England (Canaday 1965). The British Museum was willing and eager to loan these items to the United States but was wary about repatriating, or even loaning, the bronzes to their country of origin. As of 2018, Nigeria has been open to accepting a loan of the artifacts rather than full

repatriation as a compromise with the British Museum, and current efforts are being made, albeit slowly, to work out a loan agreement.

Chinese academics since the 1930s have publicly condemned Stein for the looting of the Dunhuang Caves objects. Fu Sinian, director of the Academia Sinica in Nanjing and influential Chinese scholar, believed that Western sinologists who acknowledge the work and contributions of Chinese scholars are worthy of praise. However, Stein had no interest in sharing his findings with these scholars and instead gave the antiquities to the British Museum (Jacobs 2010). Today, these documents and artworks have not been repatriated; however, the International Dunhuang Project (IDP) was created in 1994 with the intent to digitize and catalog these objects on the Internet so that a wider audience can learn about and research these items.

Scholars, historians, and museum professionals have long debated about whether or not these cases are examples of looting or legal acquisition. Excerpts from explorers' journals suggest that there was a two-way exchange, at least from their perspective, between themselves and the native people. A journal entry from Belcher's expedition to Alaska states:

> On meeting with the Eskimo, after the first salutation is over an exchange of goods invariable ensues, if the party have anything to sell, which is almost always the case; and we were no sooner seated in the tent than the old lady produced several bags, from which she drew forth various skins, ornamental parts of the dress of her tribe, and small ivory dolls, allowing us to purchase whatever we liked.

In return, the British explorers bartered with necklaces, brooches, and cutlery (Owen 2006). These consensual exchanges of goods did occur, but are often overlooked. However, there are many more examples, such as the Benin bronzes, where artifacts and cultural objects were undeniably appropriated without the consent of the native people. Even still, the British Museum continues to justify the taking of the Parthenon Marbles. On the British Museum website, there is a page dedicated to the Parthenon Marbles, its history, and the controversies surrounding repatriation efforts. The website states:

> Lord Elgin, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, acting with the full knowledge and permission of the Ottoman authorities, removed about half of the remaining sculptures from the fallen ruins and from the building itself. Lord Elgin was passionate about ancient Greek art and transported the sculptures to Britain. Their arrival in London was to make a profound impression upon western ideas of art and taste. It promoted the high regard that the European Enlightenment already had for ancient Greek civilization. (The Parthenon Sculptures n.d.)

This paragraph from the British Museum website exemplifies their imperialistic view that is still prevalent in the twenty-first century. The use of strong, compelling words such as "passionate," "profound," and "high regard" by the authors seem to be used in order to persuade the audience that the taking of the Parthenon Marbles was justified not only at the time they were looted, but also in the present day. The British Museum, under the British Museum Act of 1963, cannot repatriate colonial objects for "moral obligations," even if they were looted without the colony's consent.

Whether or not cultural objects were looted is debatable, but the Elgin Marbles, Rosetta Stone, Benin Bronzes, and the Dunhuang Caves artifacts remain prominent examples of how the British Museum has maintained their imperial power over "weaker" countries by refusing to return their highly prized cultural objects. Repatriation of these artifacts is important for building up the self-esteem and sense of nationalism of the former colony. Repatriation efforts also give former colonies a voice on the world stage, empower them to stand up to their former colonizer, and demand the return of their own cultural objects. These cultural objects are also central to a country's historical narrative of identity.

Despite these repatriation efforts by governments of former colonies, the British Museum has refused or ignored the majority of these requests and believe that the museum's collections should remain intact. There is a major paradox concerning this institution's collections: the museum no longer accepts objects to its collections unless they were legally acquired, yet the museum insists that the objects taken and

looted during the era of the British Empire are "now part of the museum and, more broadly, the cultural heritage of the nation" (Duthie 2011). Neil McGregor, director of the British Museum from 2002 to 2015, claims that the institution is a "universal museum" and that it has evolved from being an "imperial war chest" to a "global resource," therefore still indirectly laying claim to the objects acquired under the British Empire (Duthie 2011). Because the British Museum sees itself as a resource of knowledge, McGregor argues that cultural objects should remain in London because it is a widely visited city and will be seen by a large number of people from around the world. In addition, many believe that if the British Museum were to repatriate its colonial objects, their museum would be nearly emptied. This belief perpetuates the assumption that the source nations of the antiquities are incapable of housing and maintaining their own objects and that they need an institution such as the British Museum to preserve the culture's history and heritage, which is a common imperialist view that has not changed. This is especially true of the Dunhuang Caves documents and the Elgin Marbles. For example, a newspaper article entitled "Concerning the Ethics of Loot" from 1904 states:

> For the possession of [the Elgin Marbles] by the British Museum has proved the most efficacious means of preservation of some of the grandest masterpieces of the plastic art of ancient Athens, the sculptures which were left in their place at the Parthenon at the time of the conveyance to England having been subjected since then to the most lamentable injuries and deterioration through lack of proper care and wanton destructiveness. (Concerning the Ethics of Loot 1904)

In the 1930s, many British people acknowledged Stein's efforts to keep the Chinese antiquities in perfect condition during the journey from the Dunhuang Caves to the British Museum. If not for Stein, these people believed that the antiquities would have been lost forever at the hands of "stupid local peasants, who in their ignorance would have burned the manuscripts and idols in order to cure a disease" (Jacobs 2010). Still today, there are advocates who claim that the British

Museum is the rightful home of cultural artifacts belonging to other nations because they believe that they are the only ones capable of taking care of the items. Although this may have been true at the time the artifacts were taken, it does not pertain to the present-day. In short, the British Museum's claims to ancient artifacts and its reluctance and refusal for repatriation further reinforce its past imperial policies and characteristics.

Since the days of the British Empire, the British Museum has improved in some ways. Objects are labeled more accurately and are displayed in a less random and more orderly fashion. In addition, in a postcolonial context, it is considered inappropriate and culturally insensitive for museum curators to treat the material objects of other cultures as "exotica." The British Museum has improved in this regard, treating objects with more respect and equality than in previous years. Despite these improvements, the British Museum still carries on the imperial legacy from the days of Empire. For example, in 2017 the official Twitter account of the British Museum had an "Ask a Curator" session in which the public could ask them any questions about the museum and its exhibits. One question concerned the labeling of exhibits and making information available, to which the museum replied: "We aim to be understandable by 16-year-olds. Sometimes Asian names can be confusing – so we have to be careful about using too many" (Belam 2017). The British Museum, and ethnographic museums as a whole, needs to "redefine their priorities in response to an ever more globalizing and multicultural world" by being transparent about the colonial history of exhibits with museum visitors, and by understanding that context is extremely important in reflecting the meaning of an object, and that the way in which an object is displayed has the capability to alter the audience's interpretation of that object (Harris and O'Hanlon 2013).

Museums, especially one that has existed for as long as the British Museum, are not only sites for accessing history but are also historical sites of significance in themselves. Displays and objects in the nineteenth-century British Museum, which remain to this day, have been deeply imperialistic and are key to understanding the British Empire as a whole. The transition from being part of a powerful empire to a post-imperial institution has been challenging for the British Museum. By holding onto antiquities and cultural items from Britain's former colonies and claiming to be a "universal museum," the British Museum has further perpetuated the issue of imperialism in the museum setting. Cultural objects from the colonial era that remain in the British Museum metaphorically depict the British as maintaining control over their now former colonies. In this way, the British Museum continues to hold onto the days of the British Empire. Until the British Museum repatriates artifacts that remain in their possession, or at the very least acknowledges their deeply rooted imperialist history in a more sympathetic way, the sun will never truly set on the British Empire.

Cross-References

▶ Brexit and the End of Empire
▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
▶ Empire and Imperialism in Education Since 1945: Secondary School History Textbooks
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism

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British Raj

British Slavery and Australian Colonization

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Synonyms

Abolition; Anti-slavery; Australia; Britain; Class; Colonization; Convicts; Imperialism; Labor; Race; Rights; Slavery; Transportation

Definition

This entry explores the intersecting histories of British slavery and the anti-slavery movement and the colonization of Australia. Focusing on the crucial period between the American Revolution and the French and Caribbean revolutions (1776–1793), I review the ways that debates about slavery, penal discipline, and transportation map changing ideas about race, labor, and rights. This history reveals the role of the anti-slavery movement within imperialism and its imbrication with the apparatus of colonial government. The celebration of British abolition of Caribbean slavery has tended to obscure the impact of slavery on the development of a global labor system in two related ways: First, the prominence of transatlantic slavery has masked the long-term, global story of the role of coercive labor in imperial expansion, including its racial dimensions. Second, it has obscured the ways in which, for the British, race and class were articulated social categories that constituted competing objects of reform. British convicts, overwhelmingly working class, were seen by many as white slaves, and their status remained the focus of tension throughout the operation of transportation. In this way transportation was shaped by slavery but also subsequently determined key aspects of global post-emancipation labor flows. Conversely, as one of

the most powerful humanitarian social campaigns ever seen in the Anglophone world, the anti-slavery movement became a fertile source of affective imagery, language, and stories that could be applied to a range of causes in the colonies. Slavery and its abolition shaped desires for freedom and justice and were invoked to contest the oppression of convicts, Aboriginal people, indentured laborers, and women, to the end of the nineteenth century and beyond.

Introduction

On the 13 May 1787, the 11 ships now known as the "First Fleet" sailed from Portsmouth with their cargo of convicts, effectively initiating the British colonization of Australia. In the same month, the organized anti-slavery movement began, with the establishment by Granville Sharp and other evangelical Christians of *A Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade*. This correspondence was no coincidence but reveals the profound imbrication of the seemingly distinct histories of the anti-slavery movement and Australian colonization. In the months before the First Fleet departed, the first governor of New South Wales, Captain Arthur Phillip, presented his ideas regarding the colony's management. He pictured a future colonial society in which convicts would both remain apart from civil society and, at the same time, retain their freedom, writing that:

> As I would not wish convicts to lay the foundations of an empire, I think they should ever remain separated from the garrison, and other settlers that may come from Europe, and not be allowed to mix with them, even after the 7 or 14 years for which they are transported may be expired. The laws of this country will, of course, be introduced in [New] South Wales, and there is one that I would wish to take place from the moment his Majesty's forces take possession of the country: That there can be no slavery in a free land, and consequently no slaves. ("Phillip's Views" 1787)

Phillip's assertion may at first sight appear odd, given that at the time Britain was the world's leading slave-trading nation and was not to abolish the trade for another 20 years (1807). The practice of slavery itself was not to be outlawed across the British Empire until 1833, 45 years after the colonization of New South Wales. So what did Phillip mean by the "laws of this country," and what did he know of slavery? Phillip probably shared the general view that the condition of slavery did not exist under English law, promulgated following the landmark Somerset case of 1771–2. Often considered to mark the unofficial beginning of the abolition movement, Chief Justice Lord Mansfield held that chattel slavery had no basis in common law in England and Wales and had never been positively established by legislation (Temperley 1972; Wise 2006; Paley 2002). But as a junior naval officer, Phillip had observed slavery at first hand while on a tour of duty to the Caribbean between 1760 and 1762. He had also served in the Portuguese navy, fighting in Brazil against Spain in the Third Colónia War. At this time, Brazil was both a depository for *degredados*, or convicts, and was permeated by slavery at all levels (Blackburn 1988; McIntyre 1984, pp. 98–101; Frost 1987). In his brief comments, Phillip expressed a somewhat ambivalent view of white convicts as morally undeserving and yet also as British subjects with rights. During the tumultuous 1780s, a decade of change sandwiched between the American Revolution and the French and Caribbean revolutions, debates about slavery, penal discipline, and transportation intersected in important ways, revealing shifting ideas about race, punishment, and rights.

Imperialism and Unfree Labor

Increasingly, scholars have emphasized the ubiquity, longevity, and global reach of the diverse forms of unfree labor "flows" that were key to European expansion overseas, emphasizing the relationship between diverse forms of coerced labor migration, including African and Asian enslavement and indenture. Several historians point out that the Atlantic slave trade, operating from the mid-fifteenth century until the end of the nineteenth century, was only the most visible and

well-known of these flows (e.g., Allen 2014; Anderson 2016; Anderson and Maxwell-Stewart 2013; Engerman 1986; Nicholas and Shergold 1988). The British had first entered the Atlantic slave trade during the sixteenth century but from the early seventeenth century enlisted naval and military resources to protect the trade from rivals and the threat of revolt, becoming the world's leading slave traders (Blackburn 1988). Its most intense phase constituted the "triangular trade," which involved European ships taking goods to Africa to buy slaves and then transporting enslaved Africans to the plantation societies of the Americas (the Caribbean, the American South, and Iberian America), before returning to Europe with slave-grown products such as sugar, tobacco, and cotton. In consequence, the numbers of Africans imported to the Americas was staggering: by the time the British ended their own slave trade in 1807, they had shipped 3.25 million Africans across the Atlantic (Burnard 2012; Walvin 2001; Beckles 1991).

Alongside slavery, two long-standing labor systems had supported British imperialism: the indentured servant system, in which migrants agreed to work without wages for a number of years in exchange for passage, and the transportation of criminals to North America (Maxwell-Stewart 2007, 2010, 2015; Grubb 2000). Until the late eighteenth century, plantations both in the Caribbean and in Virginia (which was considered part of the West Indies until well into the eighteenth century) fuelled demand for both African slaves and British convicts, although they were worked separately from the early eighteenth century onward (Butler 1896; Ekirch 1990). Nonetheless, over the second half of the eighteenth century, white convicts in the American colonies were increasingly treated like slaves and legally and practically disqualified from membership in civil society (Burnard 2015). Following the loss of her American colonies in 1778, Britain was forced to find alternative destinations for her criminals and for imperial investment. During this decade, as Britain searched for solutions to her perceived problems of overcrowding, poverty, and crime, the status of black people throughout the empire, and the question of penal discipline were especially challenging (Atkinson 2016, pp. 58–59). Reformers rethought the status

of slaves and convicts, especially after the 7 Years' War, as the empire expanded to include various categories of subjects (Brown 2006; Burnard 2015).

By the end of 1775, gaols were overflowing, and Home Office secretary William Eden decided to place felons on hulks moored in the Thames. A series of inquiries addressing the problems of transportation and prisoner accommodation resulted in the continuation of the hulk system and proposals for transportation, despite those who advocated categorization, behavioral monitoring, and reform. From 1784 legislation specified that the transportation contractor was granted a "property and interest in the service of the offender," referring to a 1717 precedent applied to American destinations (*Journal of the House of Commons* 1782–1784, p. 844; Brooks 2016, p. 167). Imprisonment with hard labor was first introduced into English law with the Criminal Law Act 1776 (6 Geo III c 43), also known as the "Hulks Act"; however many were concerned about its inhumanity and the infringement of prisoners' rights (Atkinson 1994, pp. 94–98; Bolton 1980; Gray 2016). By adding bondage to exile, convicts began to look more like slaves – a category increasingly coming under attack.

Many transportation schemes were proposed, and a number of experiments, especially in Africa, were progressively ruled out between 1775 and 1786 (Gillen 1982; Christopher 2010; Christopher and Maxwell-Stewart 2015). In August 1783 James Matra, who had sailed with Cook on the Endeavour, submitted plans to the Home Office for uses for New Holland. The House of Commons committee set up in April 1785 under Lord Beauchamp inquired into the operation of transportation act and sought a destination for settlement which would eventually be of some benefit to Britain. It heard a range of proposals, from figures such as Matra, Wilberforce, botanist Joseph Banks, and naturalist Henry Smeathman, who had visited Sierra Leone and proposed it as a site for African redemption. In 1786 hysteria about the convict problem increased and in August Sydney finally announced the Botany Bay decision (Clark 1999; Frost 2012; *Historical records of New South Wales* 1892, pp. 14–16).

Almost simultaneously, another colonizing experiment was made, as Smeathman's proposal of Sierra Leone was seized upon by anti-slavery campaigner Granville Sharp and the *Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor* in 1786–1787. Sharp's particular concern was to resettle some of the "Black Poor of London," comprising black loyalist refugees from the American Revolution. He persuaded the Treasury to finance the ships and embarking settlers and named the settlement the "Province of Freedom"; founded on free black labor, anti-slavery campaigners also believed that the project would refute proslavery arguments and sited in the midst of the slave-trading region might ultimately transform it. Braidwood argues that the government supported the Sierra Leone venture, not to rid itself of an unwanted population of African descent but because the Black Poor were regarded as British subjects with a legitimate claim on the state (Braidwood 1994). About 400 blacks and 60 whites reached Sierra Leone in May 1787, just as the First Fleet left for Botany Bay (Christopher 2010; Coleman 2005; Land and Schocket 2008).

A third British settlement was sponsored at this time: located in the Bay of Honduras in Central America, now Belize, 2214 displaced settlers from the Mosquito Shore in Spanish territory joined a small existing community of timber-getters in 1786. They were superintended by Lt. Colonel Edward Despard, who was instructed to allocate land to the new arrivals and who initially attempted to assign "40 yards of River course for each and every persons of all colours, free or Slaves, Male or female, of which a family consisted" (Bolland and Shoman 1975, p. 21). But the local families ignored him, and Sydney also admonished Despard, responding that "people of Colour, or Free Negroes . . . [are not] considered upon an equal footing with People of a different Complexion" (Atkinson 2016, p. 63). As Land and Schockert (2008) argue, the many schemes advanced at this time implied "various significantly different destinies for the settlers." Debates about these various schemes, and especially Sierra Leone and Botany Bay, map the contested and changing contemporary category of race and its relationship to British subjecthood.

Race

In their review of the long-term, global flow of forced labor that formed the background to convict transportation, Emma Christopher and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart note a growing association between race and "unfreedom" at this time, expressed in concerns to maintain racial labor hierarchies (2013, p. 80). The East India Company, for example, refused to accept Irish and English convict labor at the same time that it began to send Indian convicts to tropical sites such as Sumatra and Penang (Yang 2003; Allen 2009). These policies demonstrate the ways in which contemporary ideas about "race" linked to skin color conceived specific "constitutions" to be acclimatized to climatic zone (Christopher 2007, 2008, 2010; Coleman 2005, pp. 57–58.). Many historians have argued that late eighteenth-century concepts of human difference referred not to "scientific sets of physical characteristics" but rather that "savages" in the early modern period, whether African or Irish, were "seen as more culturally than racially different from Europeans." Skin color was "just one signifier that could be trumped by culture" (Wilson 2003, p. 11; Wheeler 2000).

However, historians of science also identify a shift during the 1770s toward the emergence of recognizably modern ideas of race as fixed inherent differences (Stepan 1982). One prominent response to the Somerset case, for example, was Edward Long's influential 1774 *The History of Jamaica. Or, General Survey of the Antient and Modern State of that Island*, in which he made the polygenist argument that "negro" and "white" constituted distinct species (Bohls 1999; Hall 2002; Long 1774; Meijer 1999, p. 60; Swaminathan 2003). Some scholars have argued that polygenism remained a controversial minority viewpoint in British racial thought into the 1860s (Kidd 2006, p. 85; Stepan 1982, p. 3). However it is clear that by the 1770s identities such as Englishness – while defined through government, institutions, and language – nonetheless included recognizably racialized assumptions (Wilson 2003). During this decade implementing the global labor schemes required for imperial expansion was increasingly structured by ideas about race, labor, and rights.

Race and Class

Sometimes downplayed in accounts of British abolition is the classed nature of the movement, and the way that for the British, race and class were articulated social categories that constituted competing objects of reform. Yet this tension is apparent as early as Long's 1774 *History of Jamaica*, which compared the happy situation of West Indian slaves with the wretched state of white British laborers and indentured apprentices (Long 1774, p. 571). This comparison marked the inception of what historian of slavery David Brion Davis termed "the contest between the two systems of oppression" (2014, p. 307). Davis argued that British abolitionism had the dual character of both promoting broader moral progress and providing "moral capital" for the ruling classes but at the same time supporting the status quo by "unintentionally diverting attention from domestic issues like 'wage slavery'." (Davis 2014, p. 311). Fuelled by a familial "sort of fascinated antagonism," Britain and the United States perceived each other as "negative reference" groups (Cunliffe 1979, pp. 37–38). This led to the seeming paradox that abolitionist Britain maintained a highly unequal aristocratic monarchy that employed wage slavery for industrialization – while the world's leading democracy obstinately defended slavery (McDaniel 2013). After 1833, the success of the abolitionists made them a model for other causes, and the tension between concern *either* for slaves *or* for convicts was largely overcome; in addition, alliances were embodied, for example, in the work of Joseph Sturge and the Chartists (Fladeland 1984). However, the association of "levelling" ideals with abolition was very damaging to the cause, particularly after 1793 when the Jacobins provided a terrifying example of what social reform might lead to. Specifically, the increasing opprobrium attached to slavery meant that the treatment of white British convicts during the late eighteenth century was defined in relation to African slavery, even as many aspects of the system endured. The slave-like status of white convicts, overwhelmingly working class, remained a central problem throughout the system's operation.

Already in the late 1770s, perceptions of transportation as a form of slavery drove opposition to the system's renewal. Reformer Jeremy Bentham saw felons this way, responding to the Hulks Act by advocating the construction of "hard-labor houses" instead and proposing that in order to "inculcate the justice, to augment the terror, and to spread the notoriety of this plan of punishment," a sign should be erected above the doors of penitentiaries, reading "Violence and knavery/Are the roads to slavery" (Bentham 1778, p. 32). During the 1780s, as the various African experiments were made, including the disastrous Sierra Leone venture of 1786–1787, and transportation to Botany Bay began, convictism and slavery intersected in complex ways (Christopher 2007, 2010). Transportation provided the proslavery lobby with much ammunition as they sought to emphasize the similarities between slavery and British worker oppression – while abolitionists insisted on the distinction between what Thomas Clarkson (1786, pp. 56, 49) termed the "voluntary slaves" of Botany Bay and the legitimate victims of African slavery. In May 1789 the anti-slavery cause aroused great public attention as Wilberforce gave his first speech attacking the trade and describing the terrible middle passage – 2 months before the notorious Second Fleet, or "death fleet," sailed for Botany Bay. In April 1792 Wilberforce made a famous speech before calling for a vote on his proposed bill, in which he told the story of Captain Kimber's brutal treatment of a 15-year-old African girl on the slave ship *Recovery:* she was suspended by the ankle and whipped and subsequently died from her injuries. Following tremendous public scandal, Kimber was prosecuted in what was a landmark case for the anti-slavery movement: for the first time, the treatment of slaves was framed as "murder" (Cobbett 1806–1820; Pollock 1977; Swaminathan 2010, 490, 495–96). The case was tried over 3 days in June 1792, in the same Admiralty session at the Old Bailey in which Captain Donald Trail and his chief officer were prosecuted for their treatment of convicts and crew aboard the "death fleet."

Considering these two important trials together reveals the shared status of convicts and slaves at this time, as well as its contestation at a key moment in imperial history. Following the safe passage of

the well-funded and carefully monitored First Fleet in 1788, the second fleet was seen as an opportunity to cut costs. Leading slave-trading firm, Calvert, Camden and King was contracted for the voyage, and the six ships that sailed in July 1789 arrived with only 75% of her passengers living, while around 40% more were to die within 6 months of reaching Australia (Flynn 1993). As one observer of the diseased and dying passengers exclaimed, "the slave trade is merciful compared to what I have seen in this fleet" (Hill 1790, p. 2; Christopher 2007). Trail's trial for the murder of an 'unknown convict' revealed many shocking features of the convicts' treatment that were reminiscent of the Atlantic 'middle passage'. Witnesses described the harshly restrictive slave shackles that allowed little movement, extreme physical violence, the reeking stench and screams in the night, and starvation (Christopher 2007, pp. 116–120; King V Trail and Elrington 1792).

Both trials were attended by powerful supporters of the West Indian interest: naval hero Horatio Nelson, the Duke of Clarence, Admiral Barrington, and Lord Sheffield – who actively interfered to cause the acquittal of all the defendants (Wilberforce and Wilberforce 1838, p. 357; Sugden 2011, p. 400). At this time there were very strong links between British sea power, national security, and colonial affairs and especially between the Royal Navy and the valuable West Indies plantations. As the possibility of war loomed in 1792, many were concerned to support these interests in the face of French naval power (Petley 2016). Clarence's maiden speech in the house of Lords just 4 weeks earlier had rejected Wilberforce's Abolition Bill, and he had suggested that "the proponents of the abolition are either fanatics or hypocrites, and in one of those classes I rank Mr. Wilberforce" (*The Parliamentary Register* 1792, pp. 1349–1350). Clarence's close friend and mentor Nelson shared these views, and later, as debate reached a climax in 1807, the proslavery lobby was to publish a letter Nelson had written to a sugar planter promising to protect their interests, while he still had a "tongue to launch in my voice against the damnable and cursed doctrine of Wilberforce and his hypocritical allies" (Laughton 1902, pp. 438–

439; Knight 2005, pp. 26–27, 43–117). Both Kimber and Trail had been employed by Calvert, Camden and King (Sturgess and Cozens 2013), but Trail had also served in the navy, under Nelson, who was there to provide a character reference. Barrington and Sheffield were also outspoken proslavery advocates (e.g., Holroyd 1790). During the trial, Clarence had tried to influence the result by "gestures" and "improper conduct" – and his party also dined with the judges (Sugden 2011). As Wilberforce's sons later told, the case was lost "through the shameful remissness of the Crown lawyers, and the indecent behaviour of a high personage [Clarence, then King William IV of England] who from the bench identified himself with the prisoner's cause" (Wilberforce and Wilberforce 1838, p. 357). In both cases, Justices Sir James Marriott and Sir William Henry Ashurst, both strong opponents of reform, dismissed the prosecution as malicious, and in a shocking reversal, the accusers were instead prosecuted for perjury.

In one sense, both trials argued for recognition of the passengers' humanity, whether slave or convict, in prosecuting their treatment. Despite this setback for reform, the Kimber trial has been argued to mark the inception of using newspaper culture to publicize debate, arouse public feeling, and bring the case to trial in the first place (Swaminathan 2010; Carey 2005) – also applicable to the Trail case. Many officials and members of the public were outraged by the treatment of the convicts, and a long and substantial parliamentary paper was printed in March 1792 providing reports on conditions on board the convict vessels, including letters from senior government officials (*Accounts and Papers relating to Convicts* 1792). Surely for many, the 1792 report, with its appalling description of shipboard conditions, evoked the terrible "middle passage" Wilberforce and his supporters had publicized to great effect just as the death fleet set sail.

Ending Slavery, 1807–1833

In 1793 the war with revolutionary France began, which hindered all reformist causes, including

abolition, as official attention focused on trade and colonial interests (Swaminathan 2009, p. 198). After the ratification of the French Constitution of 1793, marking the onset of the Jacobin phase of the French revolution, the abolitionist cause became divided, as many of the elite saw a connection between abolition and radical republicanism. This "new racism" fuelled arguments for the slave trade, and so for the anti-slavery leaders, it was essential to maintain a sharp distinction between the evils of the colonial slave world and the ostensibly free social institutions that had been imperiled both by French tyranny and English "Jacobins" (Davis 2014, pp. 307–308, 311–312; Lambert 2005; Oldfield 1995). Wilberforce, an ardent anti-Jacobin, acknowledged that their friendliness toward abolition "operates to the injury of our cause" (Blackburn 1988, pp. 146–147). Contemporaries accused him of hypocrisy in his concern for slaves, yet commitment to Britain's deeply unequal social order: opponents such as William Cobbett accused Wilberforce, "[n]ever have you done one single act, in favour of the labourers of this country; but many and many an act have you done against them" (Cobbett 1823, pp. 516–517). However, despite Cobbett's accusations, Wilberforce and other members of the anti-slavery movement were in fact very concerned for convicts and for religious life in the new colonies. As his biographer James Stephens later wrote, "While others were regarding the Australian continent only as a vast receptacle for convicts, [Mr Wilberforce's] Parliamentary influence was used for laying the foundations of the Church which now [1849] occupies every inhabited district of New South Wales" (1849, p. 511).

Finally, as Britain mastered France, and as the effect of events in the Caribbean such as the St. Domingue revolution of 1804 were felt, new pragmatic abolitionist arguments were made for making slave society a productive and loyal workforce of citizens. Following parliamentary debate, the Foreign Slave Trade Bill passed, forbidding British ships to engage in the slave trade after 1 January 1808.

The movement to finally abolish slavery itself across the Empire gathered pace after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. In January 1823 the anti-slavery movement was revitalized when William Wilberforce, Henry Brougham, and other veteran abolitionists established the "Society for Mitigating and Gradually Abolishing the State of Slavery throughout the British Dominions." During the 1820s the British anti-slavery movement legitimated the precepts of free-market capitalism, emphasizing the distinction between slave and "free" labor first popularized by Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (Turley 1991). Anti-slavery campaigners argued that free labor would expand markets, by allowing the worker to become a consumer – while wage labor would motivate productivity (e.g., Davis 1999; Drescher 2002, p. 54). However in place of the harsh physical constraints of slavery, many advocated the economic, legal, and moral disciplining of workers. As Eric Williams first claimed, and as recent analysis has affirmed, the slave colonies' economic value to the empire diminished during the 1820s, and only protection ensured the viability of West Indian sugar (Williams 1944; Draper 2009; Blackburn 1988, pp. 433–435). Abolition was not due solely to the moral persuasion of the humanitarians, but was eventually achieved when ending slavery became economically and politically advantageous.

In the decade leading up to the triumph of abolition in 1833, the colonies began to offer an alternative for the investment of capital, goods, and people, as instantiated by the life-journeys of figures moving from the plantations of the West Indies to Australia. As British policy-makers and investors pondered how to colonize, the question of a colonial labor force became pressing. The now-ascendant anti-slavery movement insisted upon the distinction between "black" slavery and free "white" labor. Debates about the establishment of the Swan River Colony on the west coast of Australia in 1829 map the ways in which "free labor" emerged as a central principle in debates about both emancipation and colonization. While Swan River was the first free Australian colony, links to slavery are particularly visible in the form of arguments against free labor and the advocacy of racial, as well as class, labor hierarchies. The failure of *laissez-faire* at Swan River made it an example of how *not* to colonize, helping Edward Gibbon Wakefield to argue for the "concentration" – that

is, disciplining – of white labor in his formulation of systematic colonization. Concurrent with the making of the English working class, Swan River was formative in the making of a colonial working class, entrenching the principle of regulated but free white labor as constitutive of the settler colony (Lydon forthcoming).

Conversely, in the older penal colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, in spite of Governor Phillip's early proclamation, by the 1820s, the transportation system was being criticized for its likeness to the slave trade.

In August 1833 British Parliament abolished slavery in the British Caribbean, Mauritius, and the Cape when it passed the "Act for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Colonies, for promoting the industry of manumitted slaves, and for compensating the persons hitherto entitled to the services of such slaves." In place of slavery the negotiated settlement established a system of apprenticeship and granted £20 million in compensation, to be paid by British taxpayers to the former slave-owners (Draper 2009). Arguments against transportation also strengthened, and the new reformist Whig government immediately lowered the rate of convict transportation to New South Wales. In 1838, the scandalous Molesworth report declared that "[t]ransportation is much more than exile; it is slavery as well." For critics, opposition to transportation – and especially corporal punishment, and particularly flogging – focused on anxieties about the legitimacy of the wider British imperial project. In 1840 the system was halted altogether in favor of the Probation System in Van Diemen's Land (Hirst 1983; Maxwell-Stewart 2010; Meyering 2010). Nonetheless, slavery continued to be central to domestic and imperial histories until at least the mid-nineteenth century (Hall et al. 2014).

Slavery in the Colonies During the Nineteenth Century

"Slavery" was frequently invoked in the settler colony of Australia, seemingly so distant from the Atlantic slave trade and its canonical forms of subjection and exploitation. The British anti-

slavery campaign accumulated tremendous cultural, moral, and affective power and was subsequently adopted for many different social causes throughout the nineteenth century. Following abolition, the movement's leaders sought to redirect popular interest toward the empire's Indigenous peoples, as exemplified by the 1835–1836 "Select Committee on Aborigines" inquiry (Aborigines Select Committee) chaired by abolitionist parliamentarian Thomas Fowell Buxton. The Aborigines Select Committee applied the language of anti-slavery to British settlers and attempted to define principles that would uphold the rights of Indigenous people across the empire (Elbourne 2003). The Aborigines Select Committee represented a high point of humanitarian influence and laid the foundations for the establishment of the Aborigines Protection Society. Yet during the 1830s white settlers in the Australian colonies sought to consolidate their possession of Aboriginal land, prompting tension between colonists and Aboriginal people, and between settlers and British humanitarian interests. Humanitarians deploying anti-slavery rhetoric arguments collided with the realities of the frontier in 1830s New South Wales, and those caricaturing Aboriginal people as inhuman savages. However, focusing blame upon the convict perpetrators also allowed upper-class humanitarians to displace responsibility from the system of colonization itself (Lydon 2018).

Historians have often overlooked popular humanitarian politics during the later nineteenth century, assuming that abolitionist zeal had died out by the end of the American Civil War. However while the older anti-slavery organizations may have declined, they were replaced with newer forms of anti-slavery, sometimes termed an anti-slavery "pluralism," that were particularly evident in literature and culture (Huzzey 2012). Abolitionist arguments became more diffuse over the second half of the nineteenth century but continued to be drawn upon by a range of social reformers. In Australia, a diverse range of relations between colonists and Indigenous peoples were characterized as slavery, including forced indenture, trafficking, and prostitution. As the frontier moved north, attempts to control violence and the ill-treatment of Indigenous people

evoked anti-slavery arguments in Queensland and northwestern Western Australia (e.g., Lydon 2014; Paisley 2014). Like other forms of humanitarian politics, anti-slavery ideals were profoundly imbricated with the apparatus of colonial government, challenging simple oppositions between moral and political, philanthropic, and colonial interests. Conversely, abolitionist and imperial ideologies could be mutually sustaining among the British public and were drawn upon to argue for the expansion of empire. Such analogies reveal how metropolitan ideas about humanity, freedom, and ultimately human rights have been tested against colonial experience, while domestic Australian interests were adjudicated by imperial humanitarianism, in a dialogue that was global in scope.

By the 1890s Britain witnessed the largest revival of anti-slavery protest since the early nineteenth century, focused on condemning the coercive systems of labor taxation and indentured servitude of the so-called new slaveries of European imperialism in Africa. Britain's identity and imperial reputation were at stake in these debates, as safeguarding free labor assumed central importance as a marker of progressive colonial rule that distanced Britain from an earlier era of slavery. The late nineteenth century was a pivotal period in British anti-slavery protest, bridging the gap between the Victorian era of abolition and the rise of human rights protest under international government (Grant 2005). Regarding Australia, however, accusations of slavery prompted an embarrassed silence, as granting responsible government and federation entailed bargaining away Indigenous people's rights.

Conclusion

Many important studies of the British anti-slavery movement and its aftermath have focused on European domestic reform (e.g., Drescher 2009). Critics such as Saidiya Hartman, however, have argued for including the colonial dimensions of this global story (Hartmann 2010). On one level, the prominence of the Atlantic slave trade can be linked to the success of the anti-slavery movement and its continuing celebration in collective

memory. However, as historians have recently shown, unfree labor "flows" enabled European expansion and comprised diverse forms of coerced labor migration (e.g., Allen 2014; Anderson and Maxwell-Stewart 2013; Anderson 2016). This focus on the category of labor is an important shift in analysis that transcends national and Anglocentric interests. Situating Australia in the context of international anti-slavery networks reveals the importance of colonial experience within the global history of anti-slavery and in shaping post-emancipation racialized labor regimes within a global history of unfree labor.

However it is also important to acknowledge that such distinctions emerged and have remained powerful due to the centrality of racial taxonomies in Western thought and culture and their relationship to definitions of rights. In addition, adding the category of white convict to the broad opposition between British concern for blacks but not for white workers (by contrast with US concern for democracy but adherence to slavery) extends and destabilizes this binary framework. Convicts and their slave-like but contested status reflected a deeply classed British world view. Finally, by including colonial experience, we are reminded of the near-total abnegation of Indigenous rights. Celebration of abolition in the Caribbean has acted to obscure British complicity in invasion and dispossession of Australian Aboriginal people. The inception of Australian transportation and the emergence of the anti-slavery movement at the same time was not a coincidence, but rather expresses the growing concern for the treatment of labor and the rights of British subjects as the empire expanded. Tensions around the status and treatment of white felons were perhaps most visible through the lens of arguments regarding African slaves, but the many shared features of both systems of forced labor generated enduring ideas about race, labor, and rights.

Cross-References

▶ Australia's Colonisation and Racial Policies
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism
▶ Louverture, Toussaint (c.1743–1803)

► Racism and Imperialism
► Settler Colonialism
► Settler Imperialism and Indigenous Peoples in Australia
► Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

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British Socialism

▶ British Socialist Theories of Imperialism in the Interwar Period

British Socialist Theories of Imperialism in the Interwar Period

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Synonyms

British socialism; Harold Laski; Henry Brailsford; Imperialism; Interwar period; Leonard Woolf

Definitions

There are key concepts used in this chapter. Socialism is understood as a broad intellectual tradition that includes other theoretical approaches such as Fabianism and Marxism. However, while the first two are generally pro-democratic and nonviolent, the latter supports revolution and it may compromise democratic values in order to achieve or maintain socialism. While the beginnings of socialism can be traced back to the 1820s with the writings of Robert Owen, Saint-Simon, and Charles Fourier,

Marxism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century with the contributions of Karl Marx and Engels. Fabianism, which favored a gradual achievement of socialism through democratic means, started in the late nineteenth century with the writings of Bernard Shaw, Herbert Wells, Sidney Webb, among others (Fabian Society 2019).

New imperialism is a period in history during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when the industrialized powers of the time, such as Britain, France, Germany, and even the United States, expanded their dominions into Africa and/or Asia. Finally, the chapter embraces Anthony Brewer's (1990: 20) meaning of the term "classical Marxist theory of imperialism," which includes the writings of Hilferding, Luxemburg, Bukharin, and Lenin.

Introduction

As this encyclopedia demonstrates, imperialism has been one of the major themes in world history. Yet, one particular period of importance of this phenomenon is the so-called new imperialism, usually dated from the 1870s until the First World War. This was an epoch when the industrialized powers of the time, such as Britain, France, Germany, and even the United States, expanded their dominions into Africa and/or Asia. Moreover, This was an international episode in which many renowned Marxian writers contributed intellectually during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Rudolf Hilferding (1981 [1910]), Rosa Luxemburg (1913 [1951]), Karl Kautsky (1914), Nikolai Bukharin (2003 [1917]), and Vladimir Lenin (1975 [1917]) are notorious examples.

The analyses of the above thinkers have been taken into consideration by many surveys of imperialism, books, doctoral theses, and articles (see, for instance, Callinicos 2009: 23–66; Marshall 2014: 317–333). However, beyond them and John Hobson's work, which has also been widely acknowledged as a result of its profound influence on Marxian theorizations, there have been only few studies aiming to recover the contributions of thinkers of the early twentieth-century writing

about the so-called new imperialism (for an exception, see Etherington 1984). In fact, it is commonly asserted that after Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), there were no important Marxist-based contributions on the topic in consideration until the 1940s or 1950s. For instance, Anthony Brewer's seminal *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (1990) explores Hobson, Luxemburg, Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin's work and then jumps until the 1950s to consider Paul Baran's *Political Economy of Growth* (1957). The reason: "the period between the wars produced no notable innovations in the Marxist theory of imperialism" (Brewer 1990: 136. For two other examples disregarding the contributions on the theme during the interwar period, see Noonan 2010: 14–90; Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009: 9–33).

Is it really the case that there were no meaningful Marxist-related theorizations on imperialism from 1917 until the late 1940s? Contra this position, this chapter shows that there was an important cohort of British intellectuals that, around the interwar period, embraced key Marxist tenets to theorize about imperial affairs. Through the cases of Henry Noel Brailsford, Leonard Woolf, and Harold Laski, this writing illustrates the closeness of a loose British tradition to Marxist analyses of imperialism. Nevertheless, the chapter also shows that the British theorizations in consideration were original in their proposed solution to imperialism. In this sense, it is claimed that they represent an alternative to "classical Marxist approaches" on the theme. To sustain the main argument of this manuscript, the chapter studies the three British thinkers previously mentioned by considering their political thought, their main insights on imperialism, and their proposed solutions to it.

Henry Noel Brailsford

Political Thought

Henry Brailsford's political thought moved increasingly to the left as his career advanced. He (1873–1958) was born in Yorkshire and raised in Scotland. He studied classics and philosophy at

Glasgow University obtaining a Masters of Arts degree in 1894 with first class honors and winning the Thomas Logan award for being the most prominent arts graduate of his generation. In 1944, he was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Laws by Glasgow University as a result of his distinguished career (Leventhal 1985: 20–21, 284). One of the earliest indications of Brailsford's move toward the left is evidenced by his involvement with Fabianism. While doing his studies, he was one of the founders of the Fabian Society at Glasgow University in the early 1890s. He nonetheless left the association in 1899 as a result of its lack of determined criticism against British imperialism, particularly in South Africa (Blaazer 1992: 10). Brailsford became a member of the Liberal Party during the 1890s. Nevertheless, by the early 1900s, he had commenced a more serious reading of Marx; and by 1907 he left the Liberal Party and joined the leftist Independent Labour Party (ILP), which was affiliated to the Labour Party (LP). This year, in a letter to Robert Ensor, Brailsford asserted: "I have always been a Socialist- I used to be a Fabian. The ILP does not exactly draw me like a magnet. Still I believe in its possibilities..." (quoted in Leventhal 1985: 95).

The ILP opened important opportunities for Brailsford. He became, for example, a member of the Advisory Committee on International Questions of the LP, which housed other important intellectuals of the time writing about imperialism, such as John Hobson and of course Harold Laski and Leonard Woolf (Sylvest 2004: 412). In addition to this, in 1922 he became an editor of the ILP's the *New Leader*. Under his leadership, the weekly newspaper was clearly leftist. At that time, Otto Bauer, one of the intellectual fathers of Austro-Marxism, considered the *New Leader* to be "the best Socialist publication in the world" (Leventhal 1974: 91).

Although Brailsford strongly rejected violent means (see, for instance, Brailsford 1921), he was sympathetic to the communist revolution in Russia. He was a member of the 1917 Club and also the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom, which were groups congenial to the communist movement. In 1904 he helped Lenin, Trotsky, and other Russian revolutionaries to get false passports and fare tickets to travel secretly to Russia, which, as a result of this, Brailsford was found guilty in court and had to pay a fine (Blaazer 1992: 82; Brailsford 1940: 206). After the Russian Revolution took place in 1917, Brailsford asserted: The earth "has become a more habitable planet since the Russian autocracy has been destroyed" (Leventhal 1973: 88).

Thus, Brailsford's affinities toward socialism are clear. In fact, he (1936: 257) considered Marx to be "a great and seminal teacher." Moreover, he and other contemporary intellectuals considered that he was a socialist. For example, in a chapter of *Fabian Colonial Essays* (1944), he affirmed: "Socialists... we should also be the pioneers in showing how the... colonial peoples can be integrated..." (Brailsford 1944: 21). In addition, in a letter sent to the socialist Fabian Herbert Wells, Brailsford said to him: "I'm more of a Marxist than you are..." (Leventhal 1974: 99). Brailsford's contemporaries also regarded him within the socialist tradition. For instance, Michael Foot, who was member of Parliament, named him "the greatest Socialist journalist of the century" (Ashworth 2007: 40).

Insights on Imperialism and Their Closeness to Marxism

Not only was Brailsford's political thought closely related to socialism and to some extent to Marxism but also his theory of imperialism. His view on the primacy of economics to understand world affairs, his anti-capitalism, and his instrumentalist view of the state were key components of his understandings of imperial affairs.

Brailsford's views of imperialism in particular and the world in general were mediated by the Marxist position that argued for the supremacy of economics over other factors, such as politics and culture. For example, when explaining the reasons of the First World War, Brailsford considered that neither armaments nor power was the main cause of that military conflict. During the interwar period, he (1925: 49) argued: "It is true that when the Great War broke out, questions of nationality played their part in it. But its actual origin lay in... the economic motive...."

In *The War of Steel and Gold* (1918), probably Brailsford's magnum opus, he explained that the causes of imperial conquests were to be found in issues related to economics. The accumulation of capital, for instance, was key to make sense of imperialism. Capitalists of developed countries produced more than their domestic consumers could buy. As a result, they were impelled to conquest foreign markets (Brailsford 1918: 86). Additionally, "another powerful economic factor upon the growth of Imperialism... [was] the pressure of the armament firms." Given their interest in selling weapons, Brailsford (1918: 88) claimed that they might drive states into war.

Thus, Brailsford embraced the Marxian economic deterministic view of the world. In fact, he acknowledged that. In a lecture delivered in 1947, Brailsford asserted that he had adopted his view of imperialism from Marx and Engel's tenet that privileges economics to understand how the world operates. In addition, he disapproved John Hobson for believing this was an inadequate approach (Brailsford 1952: 6, 26).

Another way in which Marxism was key for Brailsford's theory of imperialism was in its anti-capitalism. Like Marxism, Brailsford thought that capitalism was unfair and produced severe inequalities and exploited workers:

> Always, by the injustice and folly of its distribution of the product of industry, it creates for itself a haunting anxiety... It has taken in profits what ought to have gone in wages, and the result is that the home market, which is, in the main, composed of the wage-earning masses of the population, is unable, by reason of their poverty, to absorb the goods which its perfected machines pour out. (Brailsford 1925: 50)

Moreover, Brailsford opposed capitalism because he believed it was closely related to war and imperialism. According to him, the capitalist system was responsible for imperial conquests because they benefited the privileged classes economically. He explicitly joined other socialists, such as Karl Kautsky, to criticize Norman Angell's belief that there would be no more military conflicts between the great powers. Brailsford thought this was not the case, because imperial states, impelled by their respective capitalist class to acquire foreign markets for their products, were

destined to fight for those limited spaces (Brailsford 1918: 163–166).

One more way in which both Marxist and Brailsford's insights were closely related was in their understanding of the state. According to Marx and Engels (1848), the state is merely "...a device for administering the common affairs of the whole bourgeois class." Similarly, Brailsford (1938: 39) perceived the state as "...an apparatus of force that serves at home and abroad the economic interests of an owing and ruling minority." Brailsford often proved this idea with examples of small privileged groups benefited by military imperial interventions of the British state (see, for instance, Brailsford 1925: 46, 1918: 54).

Remedies to Imperialism

As a result of Brailsford's committed anti-imperialist standpoint, he provided solutions to capitalist imperialism. One of his remedies was influenced by Marxism, but also differentiated his international theory from other Marxian popular approaches of the early twentieth century. Like orthodox Marxists, Brailsford believed that the capitalist system was composed of two antagonistic classes. To finish with the exploitative organization of society, it was necessary to replace the system with a utopian classless socialism. In Brailsford's (1925: 36) words:

> The main purpose of Socialism must be the conquest for the whole community of economic power... we are engaged in the most formidable class-struggle which history has ever witnessed. It is a struggle for economic power between the many who do productive work and the few who exercise the authority which ownership convers. It cannot end until this usurping class has been disposed by the transference of the capital to the community. The struggle cannot be avoided, but victory, will mean, not merely the triumph of one class over another, but the abolition of class itself.

Where Brailsford differed significantly from orthodox Marxists was in the means to reach a socialist society. As already mentioned, Brailsford was critical of the violent means used by Russia. Instead of revolution, he thought that it was possible to achieve the utopia through democracy. Accordingly, Brailsford (1936: 261)

believed that "...to advance to socialism by constitutional means involves us in the use of democracy as our instrument." This was of course a position embraced by other socialists of the time, such as Kautsky (1918: 88). Nevertheless, it is in this that Brailsford's approach differs significantly from the writings of the Marxist classical theories of imperialism, such as Bukharin, Luxemburg, and Lenin.

The other solution provided by Brailsford to solve imperialism was related to the establishment of a collective security mechanism. In 1917, he wrote a book that shaped his future reputation: *A League of Nations*. Among other things, Brailsford (1917: 289, 302) proposed that the international organization to be created after the Great War should have a "Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague," a "Permanent Executive" formed by the great powers, and a "Council of Conciliation for all nonjusticiable disputes" between states. The key for Brailsford was that the League should have to enforce sanctions to ensure that the issues of war and imperialism would be solved (Brailsford 1917: v, 292–3, 299–301). As a result, after the creation of the League of Nations, Brailsford became disappointed of how the organization was designed. According to him, the institution was framed to tackle international issues on a purely political foundation. However, with that framework, Brailsford considered that "the economic motives for imperial expansion would remain as potent as they were in 1914." The League therefore needed to address the economic impulses of imperial actions. It would need, for example, to make sure that all great powers would have access to unlimited imports of raw materials (Brailsford 1925: 122–123, 126).

Leonard Sidney Woolf

Political Thought
Leonard Woolf (1880–1869) was another intellectual writer about imperialism during the interwar period and whose political thought was considerably socialist. He was born in London and studied at Cambridge University. After his graduation, he joined the British Colonial Civil Service and was sent to modern-day Sri Lanka. There, Woolf observed the abuses of the British Empire, became an anti-imperialist, and returned to Britain in 1912. In 1913, he became a Fabian and joined the socialist Fabian Society, where he published his influential *International Government* (Woolf, 1916), which proposed a mechanism of international collective security and was influential in the creation of the League of Nations. Two years later, his main political association became the LP. There, he was appointed Secretary of the Advisory Committee on International Questions (1918–1945) and also of the Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions (1924–1945). It was under the auspices of the LP that Woolf wrote his second most influential book, *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (1920b). In addition to his previous associations, he was one of the founders of the 1917 Club, the same group that embraced Brailsford (Wilson 2003: xii, xiii).

Woolf's leftist associations informed his thought significantly. He was in fact notably interested in Marxist ideas. This is reflected in several book reviews he elaborated. He, for example, reviewed *To the Finland Station* (1940) written by Edmund Wilson, which explores the ideas of several Marxists, including Trotsky, Engels, and Marx (Woolf 1941: 234). One more example is his written assessment of Martin Buber's *Paths in Utopia* (1949). This book provides an examination of important socialists, among which are Marx, Engels, and Lenin (Woolf 1949: 624).

Beyond his interest in Marxism, Woolf and others have labelled his political thinking as socialist. For example, Noel Annan, who has written considerably about Woolf, typifies the English as "a socialist, an anti-imperialist, and a supporter of the League of Nations" (Annan 1990). Similarly, Elleke Boehmer (2000: 25) describes Woolf as an "anti-imperial socialist economist and internationalist." Woolf, in fact, characterized himself as socialist. In *Socialism and Cooperation*, for instance, he (1921: 4) asserts: "The author of this book is a socialist...." Elsewhere, he even described his thought as "Marxian socialist" (Woolf 1940: 152). However, it is important to stress that he considered to be a Marxist only to a

limited extent. In *Barbarians at the Gate*, he (1939: 123–124) explains that he regarded himself a "Marxian Socialist – but only up to a point." The reason was that he was against being dogmatic about any set of beliefs, as many communists of his time were. In addition to this, Woolf, as the two following sections show, differed from orthodox Marxists in other important aspects.

Insights on Imperialism and Their Closeness to Marxism

While there are some deviations, there are substantial similarities between Woolf's insights on imperialism and Marxist analyses. First, like orthodox Marxism, Woolf believed in the significance of economics to understand world affairs. In *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, for instance, he (1920a: 7) argued: "It is clear that. . . the national economic interests are the primary concern of the State, and the whole machinery of government and Government Offices. . . [are] mainly directed to the promotion of the commercial interests of the nation." In 1920, he also wrote *Economic Imperialism*. The main argument of the book is that the primary causes of imperialism are economic. According to the author, imperial conquests were impelled by the desire to obtain new markets, to acquire raw materials, and, more generally, to gain monetary profits (Woolf 1920b: 26–29).

Nevertheless, Woolf often criticized "communists" of his time for blindly ignoring noneconomic aspects, such as political and ideational factors (Woolf 1928: 23, 1939: 194). In spite of this, Woolf considered that his approach was close to classical Marxism. For him, Marx and Engel's original method included the interaction between ideas and economics, which was something that Woolf applied to his analyses (Woolf 1939: 194, 220–221).

Another key element that was part of Woolf's theory of imperialism was his critique of capitalism. Like Marxists, Woolf regarded this system as exploitative. According to him (1921: 11), the "capitalist, in the pursuit of his own profits. . . exploit[s] the worker and consumer." Clearly in tune with Marxism, Woolf conceived capitalism as a system of competition and struggle between two main classes. In his own words, in a capitalist structure "every individual or class is compelled to take part in a ceaseless struggle against other individuals or classes for the ownership or control of the means of production or the commodities produced" (Woolf 1921: 19). Moreover, in the international level, the privileged classes used imperialism to acquire markets and raw materials from the undeveloped regions (Woolf 1920c: 5). This is of course parallel to the claim of classical Marxism which holds "the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe" (Marx and Engels 1848: 6).

As already seen in the section on Brailsford, in order to seek economic profits around the world, Marxists assert that capitalists utilize the machinery of the state. This is a tenet also embraced by Woolf. In *Imperialism and Civilization*, for instance, he (1928: 11, 61) asserted that the state ". . .was invoked by the capitalist to aid him in developing or exploiting the other continents." In the case of European empires, the state had been used to conquest African and Asian territories in order to give concessions to its own privileged classes and to protect them from capitalists of other empires who also wanted to pursuit profits in subjugated economies.

While Woolf was a firm critic of the capitalist system, his criticism to individual capitalists was often nuanced. This standpoint was in fact taken from Marx, who famously stated (1867):

> I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense *couleur de rose* (i.e., seen through rose-tinted glasses). But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests.

Similarly, but applied to the international level, Woolf stressed (1920a: 321):

> The capitalist imperialist is only a human being who has yielded to the tyranny of his own desires and of the social and economic system in which he blindly believes. The social and economic system allows him to regard personal profit-making as in itself a legitimate motive for either personal or political action.

Remedies to Imperialism

Woolf, like many intellectuals who had experienced the Great War and were specialized in

world affairs, supported the creation of an international organization to combat international anarchy (i.e., the absence of a supreme authority above states) and other major related problems of the time, such as war and imperialism. His *International Government* (1916) was, in fact, influential in how the League of Nations was framed (Wilson 2003: 54–55). For example, Woolf's proposal of a world collective security mechanism included (1) a "Council of all the constituent states" which was a legislative body (called the Assembly when the League was eventually created), (2) a "Council of the eight Great Powers" to solve issues related to the more powerful states of the time (named the "Council" when the League was created), (3) an "International Secretariat" in charge of the official communication of the organization (baptized as the "Secretariat" during the League's life), and (4) an International High Court to settle legal disputes between states (later known as the "Permanent Court of International Justice" in the created League, which even though it was not one of its main organs, it was an important part of its system) (Woolf 1916: 379–95; Pedersen 2015: 5–7).

While Woolf often defended the League as a possible solution to imperialism (Woolf 1928: 132), he also provided another remedy to this international malady. Since he considered that imperialism was the result of the capitalist system, he consequently believed that socialism could solve imperial maladies (Woolf 1921: 17). After the creation of the League, he argued that it would work ineffectively as a result of its capitalist composition. In his own words (Woolf 1920b: 105):

> The League, as it exists to-day…is simply being used to obscure the fact that France and Britain are obtaining large accessions of territory for economic exploitation in Africa and Asia. This is not surprising. The States which are members of the League are capitalist States, organised on a basis of capitalistic imperialism.

Thus, besides internationalism, socialism was a key component in Woolf's international theory to solve the issue of imperialism. Nevertheless, his socialist society should not be achieved through orthodox Marxist methods. Like Brailsford, Woolf often opposed radical violent means. Instead, influenced by Fabianism, he favored a gradual transition to socialism. Accordingly, Woolf (1921: 111) reasoned with other socialists: "…we shall not attempt, perhaps, by a cataclysmic revolution, to break up the whole framework of our existing society." Instead, he (1940: 89) considered that socialism should be advanced gradually through democracy. Therefore, Woolf's most ideal remedy to solve imperialism included the ingredients of collective security and a democratic socialist society. This is why in the middle of the Second World War he warned: "If the international government which our society demands is not established on a democratic and socialist basis by free national communities, it may be established in the form of slave empires by dictators" (Woolf 1940: 231).

Harold Joseph Laski

Political Thought

Of the three thinkers considered in this chapter, it is Harold Laski who was most strongly influenced by Marxist ideas. Yet, his conversion to a type of non-radical Marxism was gradual. He (1893–1950) was born in Manchester, England, and raised in a Jewish family. Before starting his studies at Oxford University, in 1911 he married Frida Kerry, a fervent feminist socialist (Lamb 2004: 5). During his studies, he had two major theoretical influences. His main mentors were the liberal Ernest Barker and the Fabian Herbert Fisher (Hoover 2003: 25). It was also the time when Laski admired F.W. Maitland's liberal pluralism and G.D.H. Cole's guild socialism (Lamb 2004: 5–6). In addition to the above, Laski was part of the Fabian Society at Oxford University (Laski 1944:164).

Since Laski's graduation in 1914 until the mid-1920s, his political thought was predominantly guided by liberal pluralist notions. After that, he was more influenced by socialist and Marxist ideas. Laski explicates this in *A Grammar of Politics*, which was first published in 1925. There, he explains that during the Great War, he was a pluralist who was critical of the concept of sovereignty. At that time, he conceived the state as one among many institutions in society. Consequently, during those years Laski believed that

the state did not have the right to claim the monopoly of violence within a determined territory (Laski 1938: x–xi). While during the mid-1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, Laski still valued his previous point of view, he now reasoned:

> The weakness, as I now see it, of pluralism is clear enough. It did not sufficiently realise the nature of the state as an expression of class-relations... [my] pluralist attitude to the state and law was a stage on the road to an acceptance of the Marxian attitude to them. (Laski 1938: xi–xii)

The gradualist Fabian socialism that considerably influenced Woolf also informed Laski's thought during the late 1920s. In fact, he was an executive member of the Fabian Society from 1921 to 1936 (Cole 1961: 198). In 1925, he wrote a booklet called *Socialism and Freedom*, where he supports this ideology, but he strongly criticized any authoritarian deviations. Nevertheless, by 1927 he still questioned Karl Marx's legacy. That year he wrote a letter to his friend Oliver Wendell Holmes: "I dislike Marx intensely" (DeWolfe 1953: 998). Thus, during the late 1920s, while Laski supported Fabian socialism, he rejected Marxism. This changed during the next decade.

During the 1930s and 1940s, Laski's political thought became closer to classical Marxism. In 1932, he joined the Socialist League, a faction of the LP that wanted to move the party more toward the left. Moreover, in 1939 he wrote an article called "Why I am a Marxist" in which he regarded himself as both a socialist and a Marxist (Laski 1939: 76). Nevertheless, he often detached himself from radical Marxists of his time. In a public meeting, a communist once asked Laski if he was really a Marxist, to which he answered: "Yes, my friend, we are both Marxists, you, in your way, I in Marx's" (Mathur 1988: 458). Thus, during the last two decades of his life, Laski identified his theoretical perspective with Marx but rejected the views of contemporary communists. Yet, while Laski's main theoretical influence during the 1930s and 1940s was Marxism, he kept close ties with Fabianism. In fact, he held the chair of the Fabian Society from 1946 to 1948 (Fabian Society 2019).

Insights on Imperialism and Their Closeness to Marxism

Laski's insights on imperialism were significantly informed by Marxist understandings, especially during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1933, for example, he wrote "The Economic Foundations of Peace" as one of the chapters of Woolf's edited *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War*. In it, he claimed that the main causes of imperialism and war were economic. For Laski (1933: 507), "No one now denies that the British occupation of Egypt was undertaken in order to secure the investments of British bondholders; and that the South African War was simply a sordid struggle for the domination of its gold-mines." Thus, like Marxism, Laski (1935b: 122) considered: "the economic factor, then, is the bedrock upon which the social superstructure is built."

Despite Laski acknowledged the significance of economics to explain imperial factors, he took a similar approach than Woolf's in that he also rejected the idea of disregarding other factors. In fact, Laski conceded that his theoretical standpoint was Marxian. According to him (1935b: 158):

> That there is an interweaving reciprocity between all the different factors of any culture-pattern was emphasised by Marx and Engels at every stage of their analysis. The claim of historical materialism is simply that the economic factor defines, in Engels's phrase, the 'fundamental necessity' within the framework of which all other ideas will be selected as significant.

Since Laski's insights on imperialism were mediated by Marxism, he was very critical of the capitalist system. First, he considered that capitalist imperialism enlarged inequalities. According to Laski (1932: 98), "the essence of a capitalist society is its division into a small number of rich men and a great mass of poor men." Capitalist imperialism perpetrated this because it benefited only the small class of investors who were causing imperialist adventures because they were interested in obtaining new markers for their products (Laski 1933: 524). Second, Laski reasoned that capitalism produced imperialism and that the latter generated war (Laski 1933: 505). Thus, capitalism

was an undesirable system because as long as it survived war would not be eradicated. In fact, he believed that war was an indispensable element of capitalism (Laski 1935b: 229). Third, Laski was critical of the capitalist system because he believed it had connections with fascist regimes. He thought that fascism prospered because of the support of industrialists who were afraid that socialism would replace capitalism. For him, fascism was a counterrevolution used to prevent the rise of socialism (Laski 1935a: 41). It is important to mention that Laski acknowledged (1937: 88) the Marxian inspiration of his ideas about the relationship between capitalist imperialism and fascism.

In addition to the above, Laski embraced the Marxist view of the state. As already seen, until the early 1920s, he had understood the state through pluralist eyes. Since the late 1920s, however, his view of this institution was filtered by Marxist lenses. Like Marxism, Laski (1938, x–xi) believed that "the State is the instrument of that class in society which owns the instruments of production." He (1935a: 27) considered this was dangerous for world peace because different imperialist states would be competing for the exploitation of the undeveloped world. He was of course conscious that he was borrowing his understandings of the state from Marxism (see, for instance, Laski 1944: 71).

Remedies to Imperialism

Of the three intellectuals analyzed, Laski was the most cautious with respect to his support of the League of Nations. He conceded that "despite its weakness and its setbacks, it is difficult to doubt both the value of the League and the necessity for an organisation of this kind." Yet, he was conscious that this institution needed to be reformed (Laski 1931: 100–101, 1933: 512). Like Brailsford and Woolf, Laski considered that the central problem of the League was that it was composed of capitalist states that had an interest in imperial practices. The main problem of the organization was that it was not "transforming the inherent nature of economic imperialism"

because of its capitalist membership. Therefore, Laski's solution to imperialism required that states would adopt socialism. Because a socialist state would distribute wealth more efficiently in the domestic level, there will be no more incentives to conquest new markets abroad through imperial activities given that the workers would have the economic capacity of buying the products offered by capitalists (Laski 1933: 523–524, 543). This is why Laski (1935b: 258) believed "socialism and economic imperialism are incompatible."

How did Laski propose socialism should be reached? In the early 1920s, he was clearly against revolutionary means. In 1923, for example, he criticized Marx, Lenin, and communists for believing that socialism could only be attained through violence. Nonetheless, he also clarified: "What is here in dispute is not the end the Russian Revolution seeks to serve... The question is whether the overthrow of institutions by violent means is every likely to serve its intended purpose" (Laski 1923: 46–48).

During his socialist years, Laski became less critical of Marx's writings on revolution. While he formally denied to support insurgencies, he became more conscious about the difficulty of establishing a socialist society through gradualist means. In *Democracy in Crisis*, for example, Laski argued (1935a: 255) that the likelihood of socialist revolutions was favored by the unsecure international circumstances of his time, where the workers' standard of life was precarious. The other alternative, capitalists supporting the socialist cause, would be frankly implausible (Laski 1935a: 233). Because of this, he claimed that a socialist insurgency was almost inevitable. However, despite Laski advanced the socialist cause and believed that a revolution was unescapable, he did not favor violent means. Instead, he believed that revolution, like war, caused dead and suffering. While unrealistic, he considered that the democratic path toward socialism was ideal (Laski 1935a: 105, 266). In fact, during the 1940s he urged British capitalists to agree on a "revolution by consent," where they would willingly favor a nonviolent movement toward the socialization of

the means of production (Laski 1946: 16). Thus, Laski's utopian society "must not only be socialist, but also democratic" (Laski 1949: 14).

Conclusion

Although it has been frequently neglected by mainstream surveys on theories about imperialism, there was an influential British socialist cohort of intellectuals writing about this topic during the interwar period and the 1940s. This chapter has employed Brailsford, Woolf, and Laski as examples of this group of theorists. Other thinkers, such as G.D.H. Cole and G.B. Shaw, might as well fit adequately within this loose tradition. Further research, however, would be needed to rescue their contributions on imperial affairs.

The cohort of theorists covered in this chapter recognized a direct influence from Marx and Engels. Specifically, within their contributions on imperialism, they acknowledged the primacy of economics over other factors, they were strong critics of the classist exploitative nature of capitalism, and they embraced an instrumentalist view of the state. Moreover, they believed that socialism was a key remedy to eradicate imperialism. They were, nonetheless, less comfortable with Leninist understandings because they considered them economic determinist and because they favored systematic violence for the sake of socialism. The intellectuals analyzed here, on the other hand, opposed violent means and supported a democratic type of socialism. Because of all these reasons, the British socialist approach covered in this chapter provides an alternative to the Marxist classical theories of imperialism.

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B

British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia

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Synonyms

British colonialism; Imperialism; Indian Independence; Pakistan; Partition; South Asia

Definition

The 'short' half-century from 1905 to 1947 in South Asia was framed by two partitions that say much about the contours of imperialism and anti-imperialism during this final phase of British rule in the Indian subcontinent. With the decision to partition the colonial province of Bengal along its east–west (and Hindu–Muslim) axis in 1905, mass agitation in India was given its most visible platform since the so-called 'sepoy' mutiny or Indian rebellion of 1857. By once more dividing a Bengal that nationalist fervour had successfully reunited by 1911, while splitting the Punjab in two as well, the end of British imperialism in the subcontinent in 1947 brought not only independence but also the carnage and tragedy that yielded the two new states of India and Pakistan.

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Swaraj, the Partition of Bengal, and the Growth of All-India Party Nationalism

While the origin of official party nationalism in India dates to the middle of the 1880s, the English-educated 'middle classes' who launched the organisations that became the Indian National Congress (INC) were reformist more than anti-imperialist in bent. The demands articulated by the most visible among these early nationalists thus focused on increased opportunities for participation in the Government of India. These included calls for easing access to posts in the Indian Civil Service and for increased representation within the ranks of the limited institutions of quasi-parliamentary government that the Raj first established after the rebellion of 1857 and until the Indian Councils Act of 1861.

While the INC can scarcely be described as heading a mass-based people's movement in its early years, events like the so-called Ilbert bill controversy of the 1880s did mean that even the politics of reformism harboured the seeds of more significant oppositional tendencies. Already prior to the INC's formation, moreover, figures like the Parsi intellectual Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917), the renowned forefather of party nationalism in India and a member of the UK parliament from 1892 to 1895, had begun to voice key points of a nationalist indictment of the economic effects of imperial rule. By the time selections from Naoroji's speeches and writings were prominently collected in his *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* in 1901, he was joined in this effort by figures like the Maharashtrian nationalist and Bombay Supreme Court Judge Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842–1901) and, especially, the Bengali intellectual and Indian Civil Service member Romesh Chunder Dutt (1848–1909). Together such figures articulated ideas about the drain of wealth from India to Britain, the de-industrialization of the subcontinent's economy through the stifling of handicraft production and

the attendant consequence of de-urbanization, and the beginnings of a thesis about distorted agricultural commercialization. The latter, in particular, highlighted the Raj's privileging of the production of export commodities and their movement by rail to coastal cities over grains for domestic consumption, the creation of a robust internal market, and the prevention of the spate of famines that haunted the Indian countryside throughout the late nineteenth century (Habib 1985; Roy 2000).

By the 1890s Congress nationalism was showing new and more vigorously agitational tendencies as well as signs of the tensions around religious communitarianism that would continue to complicate the politics of anti-imperialism in India throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The early 1890s marked the high point of the popular movement for cow protection that had been gaining momentum across much of north-west India for some two decades, especially with the support of the Gujarati religious luminary Swami Dayananda Saraswati (1824–83) and his orthodox Hindu reformist organization the Arya Samaj. This was a budding sore point between increasingly mobilised members of the Hindu community and segments of Indian Muslim society – for whom the cow could be a more ready option than the goat for performing the rite of sacrificial slaughter associated with certain festival days in the Islamic calendar – and rioting around the issue broke out in 1893 in various parts of north India. Clearly symbolising growing inter-religious tension, such turbulence was also indicative of a new phase in the expression of nationalist discontent with the colonial government, whose registration scheme for licensing cow slaughter was taken both as an unfulfilled prohibition of the practice by the protection movement's advocates and as express sanction for it by Indian Muslims.

One of the more prominent exponents of the majoritarian brand of nationalism that emerged from this mix of anti-imperialist agitation and communitarian strife was the Maharashtrian social reformer, lawyer, and early Congress 'extremist' Balwantrao Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), who along with Lala Lajpat Rai (1865–1928) in the Punjab and Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932) made up the famous triumvirate of 'Lal, Bal, and Pal', usually portrayed as moving the Congress away from its reformist origins and towards a more militant stance. Especially with partition of Bengal in 1905 by the notoriously high-handed Viceroy George Nathanial Curzon (in office 1899–1905), a more extremist 'hot faction' emerged within the Congress. This so-called *garam dal* faction was counterpoised against the more moderate *naram dal* or 'soft' faction headed by figures like Tilak's rival, the Congress leader Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866–1915), a fellow Maharashtrian from the Ratnagiri district who was 10 years his junior.

While the 'moderate'–'extremist' split certainly speaks to the terms on which majoritarian party nationalism negotiated its own evolving temperament, as contemporary historians observe, it does a disservice to the diversity of elements that underpinned the first truly mass and geographically expansive episode of anti-imperialist nationalist agitation that developed around the call for *swadeshi* ('self-sufficiency') in Bengal from 1905 to 1908 or 1911. Along with the old moderates who favoured constitutional methods while being 'deeply offended at Curzon's aggressive measures' (Bose and Jalal 2004, p. 95) in Bengal, such as Gokhale and the forefather of Bengali nationalism Surendranath Banerji (1848–1925), the historian Sumit Sarkar distinguishes three other orientations. While the 'extremist' politics favoured by Lal, Bal, and Pal, as well as figures like the Calcutta-born poet and yogi Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950), clearly did leave room for tactical violence if necessary, more generally such figures called for passive resistance through the boycott of British goods and institutions. At the same time, already prior to 1905 other more diffuse strands – such as those emanating from the Nobel laureate, the famous Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore – had been calling for Indians to ready themselves for a more confrontational stance against the Raj through a process of self-strengthening (*atmashakti*). Finally, at the most militant end of the spectrum were individuals, both male and female, who used tactics of revolutionary terror, including bombings and political assassinations (Bose and Jalal 2004, p. 96; Sarkar 1988).

While the highpoint of *swadeshi* agitation had passed by 1908, in the previous 3 years notable achievements had been made, with cotton imports declining by up to a quarter in the first year of boycott and a concerted effort to avoid other imported consumer goods as well as major institutions of the colonial state such as courts and educational facilities. At the same time, events in Bengal provided a rallying point for anti-imperial nationalist sentiment to deepen in other parts of the subcontinent as well. They also provided a basis for Congress to increase its visibility and press its claim to the status of ostensible spoke for the nationalist cause outside Bengal, primarily in parts of Madras, the Punjab, and Bombay. As the historian Burton Stein notes, for example, in the south of India the *swadeshi* movement and the larger moderate–extremist split within Congress that it precipitated by 1907 was used by different elements of Madras's Brahmin community to jockey for leadership over the regional Congress. While the Mylapore Brahmins of Tamil Nadu had dominated Congress activity in Madras until 1905, their upstart northern Telugu-speaking Brahmin adversaries opted to side with the more radical stance of figures like Tilak and Aurobindo. Supporting the singing of the banned Bengali anthem 'Bande Mataram' ('Hail Mother India') and pledging to unite the Madras and Calcutta division of the Congress, it was this same faction of Telugu-speaking Brahmins who would form the Andhra Mahasabha in 1910. A half-century later, the same body would succeed in its call for a separate Telugu-speaking province to be carved out from the old colonial province of Madras (Stein 2010, pp. 282–283).

In the Punjab *swadeshi* activism in Bengal ended up resonating with unrest or discontent that had its own independent cause. The main point of anger in this crucial wheat-growing bread-basket of the subcontinent was the colonial state's decision to raise rates for canal waters. Some 30 years after irrigation in the province started to be transformed through large-scale canal construction – which, along with the railways, ended up being one of the only forms of heavy capital investment that the late colonial state would sponsor – the years 1906–07 saw the outbreak of significant peasant unrest in the Punjab. At the same time, the province was another site that proved only too well equipped for anti-imperialist social unrest to blend into inter-communitarian tension, owing to its mixed population of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Therefore, so too were the Arya Samaj's efforts at consolidating support among the lower middle-class Punjabi Hindus just past their third decade (Fox 1985).

By the end of the first decade of the new century, much of the more militant leadership that had assembled around *swadeshi* – including Lajpat Rai and Tilak – would see their campaigning result in imprisonment or exile. By this time, moreover, the spirit of boycott had already been largely broken – in no small part because of the opportunistic decision of Bombay's textile industrialists to ramp up prices and profits amid diminished competition, which sapped the Bengali peasant's ability to persist in support of the boycott. Nonetheless, by 1911 they also saw victory, as the new viceroy Hardinge (who replaced Curzon's own successor, the Earl of Minto, in 1910) opted to annul the partition decision. In the process, the colonial state's about-turn also served to discredit the class of landed Muslim interests in East Bengal who had been the only group to support partition, thus further opening the way for the All India Muslim League, which it played a significant role in founding in 1906, to be seized by a new style of leaser by the time of the First World War.

The First World War, the Shifting Economics of Colonial Rule, and Political Leftism

It is telling that among the myriad effects of the First World War on the context of early twentieth-century imperialism and antiimperialism in India the movement of some one million Indian troops to foreign theatres of operation rarely ranks high on the list. While well over 60,000 would perish in foreign battlefields, those who returned proved greatly transformed by the traumas of battle as well as by what was, for most, their first sight of

Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Though it is difficult to quantify the effect that such exposure had on the views of those who returned to a home society ruled by Britain, the numbers underlying other aspects of the war's impact are less difficult to capture. Used widely to protect Britain's broader imperial interests in Asia and Africa throughout the late nineteenth century, on the eve of the war the British Indian Army was already among the largest volunteer forces in the world, if not the largest. In the 4 years after 1914 its ranks had swelled enormously, totalling some 1.2 million by 1918 with some 350,000 absorbed just from the Punjab (Bose and Jalal 2004, p. 102; Bose 2006, p. 125). Not surprisingly, such a vast increase in manpower together with the need to support the wider military endeavour that Britain was fighting entailed a large-scale expansion of India's war-related production, as well as of prices and the money supply.

This combination produced decidedly polarising effects at the different ends of the class spectrum. With the free coinage of silver rupees suspended since the early 1890s, Indian currency policy was controlled by the Secretary of State for India sitting in London, on the basis of a so-called gold exchange standard. With both a gold reserve and a paper currency reserve at his disposal, the Secretary of State's policy throughout the 1890s was to stabilise the exchange rate of the rupee at 1 shilling 4 pence. If the general tendency towards deflationary policy became too much of a bottleneck, as was becoming the case during the first decade of the twentieth century as economic activity expanded, the mints could be selectively reopened to coin more silver rupees. With the enormous expansion in the price of silver during the war, however, the relationship between the nominal and intrinsic values of the rupee suddenly reversed. Whereas for the previous 20 years actual value was well below nominal value, when the opposite became the case after 1914 there was no choice but to allow the rupee to appreciate. The latter effect was exacerbated by the growing demand for silver fostered by the ramping up of wartime production, which necessitated increased coinage given what was then a still limited paper currency. The supply of silver rupees thus

expanded from 1.8 billion to 2.9 billion during the war years (Rothermund 1993, pp. 72–73).

With the colonial state also resorting to an outright printing of money that was secured by accumulating credits on India's behalf in the Bank of England, in the 5 years from 1914 to 1919 circulating paper notes jumped from Rs. 660 million to Rs. 1530 million (Bose and Jalal 2004, p. 103). Given its multiple sources, war-induced inflation would persist for a significant period after 1919, a fact that helped expand the windfall profits that the war had brought to India's ascending capitalists. Among the emergent industrial bourgeoisie who benefited most were west India's textile mill owners, concentrated in Bombay and Ahmedabad, with the jute mill owners of East Bengal also seeing significant gains after a decline in orders at the very start of the war (though British jute magnates were dominant in the province); coal-mining capital also fared well. While these were among the few sectors that had already managed to establish themselves under imperial rule, the war marked a coming-out party for cement and, especially, steel, with the famous conglomerate of the Tatas capitalising on the de facto protection that the war brought with it (Rothermund 1993, pp. 67–69; Sarkar 1988, p. 171).

Further complicating these tendencies was the Government of India's unchastened revenue demand, a virtual necessity in light of its priority of reorienting Indian society and economy towards serving Britain's war-related needs. While the hated Indian land tax – which had been the principal mechanism for effecting the drain of wealth ever since the late 1700s – had by the 1880s already started to decline in importance in relation to other means of surplus appropriation, it remained a significant burden all the same. Given the increasing reliance on other sources of government demand during the war years – especially through the income tax and customs duties – it was India's great mass of agriculturalists as well as its much smaller, though significant, band of urban workers who were hardest hit.

As prices of industrial goods and imported manufactures increased precipitously, the war had the opposite effect on the prices of agricultural

commodities destined for export. This made for a particularly perilous circumstance for the Indian peasant, whose livelihood had been definitively fastened to the world market ever since the reversal of the long price depression that had characterised the East India Company's rule in the years from 1820 to 1850. While the blow to the agrarian export economy produced a grave decline in earnings for the wealthier peasantry, as Sarkar notes, the agricultural poor and the landless were confronted with an even more dire situation; the fact that the price of the coarse food grains on which such groups relied for subsistence was increasing faster than the price of more expensive crops like rice and wheat became a particular source of distress. For urban workers as well, the high price of food grains meant that the wartime industrial boom amounted to little in the face of the erosion of their real wages. Overall, therefore, 'the war meant misery and falling living standards for the majority of the Indian people' (Sarkar 1988, p. 171).

As a harbinger of great economic dislocation, the war also portended the extreme volatility of social forces that would underpin Gandhianism during the 1920s and the attendant process by which Gandhi himself would transform Congress into the head of a true mass movement. Already before the 1920s, however, both mainstream party nationalism and other anti-imperialist forces experienced other crucial developments that bear mentioning. From 1915 to 1918, for example, the famous poet and Hyderabadborn Bengali activist Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) travelled the breadth of the subcontinent talking about nationalist themes and the empowerment of women. Well before sitting in jail alongside the men who dominated Congress nationalism in the 1930s, she had helped to launch the Women's Indian Association in 1917 to call for female suffrage and the right to hold what limited legislative offices existed for Indians within the colonial government.

In these same years, other new varieties of radicalism, internationalism, and leftism were accumulating as well. It was in the years after 1918 that trade unionism became truly substantial, paving the way for significant strikes, especially in Bombay in the mid- to late 1920s. It was also in

1920 – at the October meeting of the Second Congress of the Communist International in Tashkent – that the Communist Party of India is often said to have been started. (The main wing of the party, however, records its birth as dating from a conference for Indian communists held in Kanpur, the largest city in contemporary Uttar Pradesh, in 1925.) The spirit of internationalism inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution absorbed a broad range of Indian figures who had already become convinced of the need to solicit foreign assistance – including that from Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany – during the war. They included the eminent socialist (and eventual exponent of a self-made philosophy of 'radical humanism') M.N. Roy. Well before the Bengali revolutionary had appeared at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Roy's initial involvement in what the British feared would become a vast Indo-German conspiracy had brought him to Japan, Korea, China, the US, and then Mexico, where he proved instrumental in starting that country's Communist Party as well.

Roy's tireless intellectual production, together with his relentless and penetrating criticism of the mainstream of Indian nationalism, including Gandhi's 'counterrevolutionary leadership' in calling an end to the first campaign of civil disobedience in the early 1920s, is indicative of the great diversity in Indian anti-imperialism that is typically obscured by the focus on better known-figures and organised party activity (Roy 1926, p. 47). In this respect, the origins of Gandhi's role as anti-imperialist tactician in his struggles on behalf of the Indian community of South Africa (though, as is worth noting, not in any significant way the black one) should not be regarded as unique. Already prior to war and outside a path of intrigue as extensive as that which Roy would travel, for example, an institution like the Ghadar Party had been set up among Punjabi emigrants in North America. With the goal of supporting India's liberation, assorted Ghadarites had made their way back to the Punjab on the outbreak of war in order to organise revolutionary activities by 1915, persisting in their oppositional activity for the next 30 years until independence was finally won. In a very different example, it was in this

same period that in Malabar the beginnings of the modern state of Kerala's communist tradition began congealing with the emerging, if often symbolically conflicted, low-caste empowerment politics of temple entry (Menon 2007).

Gandhianism, Islamic Universalism, and the Development of a Mass Basis for Politics in the 1920s

Before the 1920s, there was ample reason to believe that the relative quiescence that characterised the beleaguered Congress movement during the first years of the war had come to an end. With leaders like Tilak back from imprisonment or exile (the latter having been jailed in Mandalay), by 1916 Congress had reached its historic Lucknow Pact with the Muslim League. While the pact would continue in the spirit of moderate reformism in its demands on the British, it was more notable for what it suggested about efforts to forge an all-India anti-imperialist politics capable of bringing together the subcontinent's extremely heterogeneous Muslim community during these years.

As would remain the case well into the 1940s, and much more than the Congress at the same point, the Muslim League was a party in search of a base. What it did have was a new generation of leadership, with the Karachi-born and English-trained barrister and INC member Muhammed Ali Jinnah (1846–1948) having joined the League in 1912 after being elected as the Muslim representative to the Imperial Legislative Council in 1909. Tellingly, Jinnah's political career thus began in the wake of the so-called Morley–Minto reforms legislated through the Indian Councils Act of 1909. While portrayed by Congress leaders as a stalling tactic in lieu of real self-government, the Morley–Minto reforms increased the number of Indian representatives to the district, municipal, provincial, and central legislative bodies, while expanding their selection through elections rather than appointment. Partly in response to the 'middle-class' reformist Muslim leadership, Morley–Minto also inaugurated a system of reserved seats (at a proportion tending to exceed population

levels) for Muslim representatives as well as separate electorates for those seats that were to be restricted to Muslim voters. Jinnah himself initially opposed such a system, given its tendency to ghettoise Muslim politics. After he separated himself from any official role in Congress by 1916, however, his ascent within the command structure of the League by championing Hindu–Muslim unity through the Lucknow Pact would be premised on persuading the Congress to accept separate Muslim representation and elections.

While it is true that by this time separate electorates and seats reserved on a 'communal' basis were becoming a nonnegotiable issue for the Muslim elite, the politics of imperial divide and rule was not confined to Muslims alone. This would be made most dramatically evident in the rift between Gandhi and the great leader of India's Dalit community Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) over the 'communal award' of 1932, through which the British proposed to mandate a separate electorate for untouchables as well. Yet it had been cemented well before with the Government of India Act of 1919, which reaffirmed electoral 'communalisation' by providing for reserved seats not only for Muslims but for various other groups as well, including Sikhs, non-Brahmins, and landowners. The other crucial feature of the 1919 Act was to formalise the so-called Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 2 years earlier. Setting the pattern for imperial strategy for the next quarter century, the 1919 Act thus sought to appease the increasingly vociferous demands articulated by the nationalist mainstream for home rule by offering a system of dyarchy or dual government. By expanding the franchise and devolving a variety of non-essential powers of government to the provinces, where Indian politicians would be dominant, the offer of dyarchy proved effective in splitting the mainstream of party nationalism after 1917 once more.

It was against this backdrop that Mohandes Karamchand Gandhi (1868–1949) would step into the void of official leadership, with his charisma, invocation of traditional Hindu imagery, and unique blend of cultural traditionalism, agrarian anti-materialism, and tactical ingenuity accelerating Congress into his orbit. The symbolism to

which Gandhi appealed allowed a much-needed expansion of populism within the mainstream of the nationalist movement. As Thomas and Barbara Metcalf observe, for example, Gandhi's appeal to the imagery of *khadi* (hand-spun or hand-woven cloth) and *charkha* (the spinning wheel) 'opened new opportunities for India's women'. This took place by shifting the emphasis of the most audible stream within nationalist discourse from the notion of woman as guardian of an inner 'spiritual' order to woman as a lead sponsor in actively *creating* the nation by her own hand (Metcalf and Metcalf 2006, p. 185).

Born to a Gujarati *bania* family, educated as a lawyer, and having made his way to South Africa by 1893, Gandhi would remain keenly aware of the goings-on in India, with his earliest well-known tract, *Hind Swaraj*, appearing in 1908. By 1915 Gandhi had returned from Natal, initially remaining distant from Congress nationalism and dipping his toes into the waters of several local agitations instead. From 1917 to 1918 he thus involved himself in Gujarat in an episode of agrarian protest over the colonial state's land revenue demand, followed by a second experiment in the industrial centre of Ahmedabad where he helped to conciliate a labour dispute in the city's textile mills. His third major campaign during these years found him in the eastern province of Bengal, where he lent his support to peasants against the European indigo planters who supervised the forced regime of production to which they were subject.

By 1919, with mainstream party nationalism able to win no more than dyarchy, with the hated wartime emergency powers for detention and trial without jury (inaugurated by the so-called Rowlatt Acts) retained, and with seething discontent among the urban and agrarian poor, Gandhi saw fit to expand his strategy for agitation far and wide. After he set up his own organisation Satyagraha Sabha, drawing on the existing infrastructure of home rule leagues and allying with the leaders of 'Pan-Islamist' (or, perhaps less derisively, 'Islamic universalist') sentiment, the Muslim brothers Mohamed and Shaukat Ali, the protests of 1919 were the most significant in India since the 1857 rebellion. They also marked the inauguration of a new method of hartals or work stoppages which were designed to unfold in co-ordinated fashion with urban marches and other forms of direct action. Alarming to the British, the new emphasis on such tactics elicited a resort to martial law in various areas; the most notorious consequence of this took place in the Punjabi city of Amritsar, where on 13 April 1919 the commanding general Reginald Dyer ordered his troops to open fire on peaceable protesters gathered at the Jalianwalla Bagh, killing 379 and injuring more than 1200 (Bose and Jalal 2004, pp. 111–112; Metcalf and Metcalf 2006, p. 168).

Now more vocally calling for the old strategy of 'passive resistance' to be supplemented by a confluence between *ahimsa* (nonviolence) and his new philosophy of 'questing for truth' through *satyagraha,* Gandhi ascended rapidly over the next few years. Both on its surface and at a much deeper level for the great many, especially in the north Indian belt from Gujarat to the Uttar Pradesh, where so many revered the Mahatma (or 'the great soul'), it was a *Gandhian* nationalism that became the idiom for confronting British imperialism en masse. Fresh from capturing leadership, Gandhi continued his alliance with Muslim political leaders attempting to spearhead a mass movement among Indian Muslims to express concern over the fate of the Ottoman Empire's claim to the Islamic caliphate, the survival of which was feared to be in jeopardy after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Allying with these 'pro-*khilafat*' Muslims, Gandhi once again expanded his tactic of organised mass agitation through what became the truly all-India 'non-cooperation movement' of 1920–22. As Sarkar notes, even in a relatively isolated province like Assam, non-cooperation would attain a strength that no later episode of nationalist anti-imperialism would again rival (Sarkar 1988, p. 217). Likewise, so was the 'Malabar Rebellion' of 1921 a chapter in noncooperation. (It was also, more immediately, a chapter in pro-*khilafat* agitation among a Mappila community of Muslim tenants in south-west India who had been invoking Islamic imagery in protest against their largely Nair and Nambudiri landlords since the mid-nineteenth century.)

Again taking British imperialism by storm, the ferocity of non-cooperation was scarcely contained. Gandhi's decision to muster the immensity of his reputation to call for its end in February of 1922 – not, as suggested earlier in the quotation from M.N. Roy (1926), without criticism – followed from peasant unrest in the Uttar Pradesh district of Gorakhpur, which resulted in the burning of a police station in the town of Chauri Chaura and the deaths of 22 officers trapped inside. As the incident at Chauri Chaura suggests only too well, mass agitation may have found crucial inspiration in Gandhian nationalism but was never exhausted by it. Throughout the 1920s, as significant episodes of *satya-graha* continued, there was also a dramatic upsurge in labour and peasant unrest, both through highly visible organised action and on a more spontaneous basis. The textile mills of Bombay played host to their first widespread strike in September of 1925, with some 250,000 millhands participating and communist trade unionists playing a significant role in its organization. This was only a prelude, however, to the much bigger industrial action that would be conducted among Bombay's millhands 3 years later in 1928, with worker participation roughly doubling (Chandravarkar 1981). Likewise, during these same years the subcontinent witnessed a dramatic expansion in the membership of the new *kisan sabhas* ('peasant associations'). Marching largely to the beat of its own drummer, such peasant (and also 'tribal') resistance was more often than not feared as a source of potentially uncontainable unrest in the countryside, by British colonialists as well as mainstream party nationalists. With the growth of such subaltern movements, the demands and ideologies of those at their forefront also proved varied and nimble. Calls for abolition of *zamindari* landlordship, threats of rent and revenue strikes against government and private landed interests alike, and agitation against the government's attempts to increase its tax demand – as in the Krishna–Godavari river delta in 1927 – would become an important feature of these years and a sign of things to come (Sarkar 1988, pp. 241–242).

At the same time, it was not just Gandhi who displayed a knack for charismatic leadership coupled with tactical ingenuity. By 1927 Ambedkar had emerged as the crucial figure giving voice to the demands for caste equality (and abolition), especially among his own community of Mahar untouchables in Maharashtra. As his visibility increased, he would also become unsparing in criticising Gandhi's paternalistic and ineffectual approach to India's Dalits, which focused on conciliation rather than confrontation by calling on upper castes to treat untouchability as an unwanted accretion rather than a fundamental feature of Brahmanical domination. In Tamil Nadu, these same years witnessed Erode Venkata Ramaswami (1879–1973), known to his followers under the title of Periyar, break with Congress after supporting non-cooperation in the south of India to launch his anti-Brahmanical 'self-respect' movement.

The Political and Economic Contexts of the 1930s

In terms of the high politics of British rule in India during the period from the late 1920s to the end of the 1930s and before the Second World War, there occurred a continuation of already established patterns of imperial retrenchment. In the face of ever more vociferous demands for autonomy and, by December 1929, *purna swaraj* ('complete self-rule'), London persisted in offering only vague possibilities of constitutional reform by increasing the franchise, expanding legislatures, and devolving non-essential powers to the provinces. True sovereignty through control over the political centre and key issues like defence and finance remained off-limits. To an observer in the 1930s it would hardly go without saying that the days of British imperialism in the subcontinent were numbered.

The historic *purna swaraj* declaration itself was meant as a direct response to the parliamentary 'Simon' Commission of 1928 and its tepid recommendations along the above lines in the wake of the extreme anti-imperialist tumult of the 1920s. Gandhianism had dealt the final blow to Congress's old moderates long ago, and by 1930 it was a younger, more left-leaning, and

still almost entirely male leadership that was taking over the party, which had now become the premier font of majoritarian nationalist politics in India. This included figures like Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), both of whom would play ever more important roles in the years to come. After the failure of the Simon Commission, it was with Gandhi's historic 'salt march' in March 1930 that the next great wave of all-India anti-imperialist agitation would be unleashed. This took shape through the civil disobedience campaigns of the early 1930s. While the salt tax was deemed an obscure target to inaugurate this new phase of struggle, the symbolic richness of the choice was made manifest as Indians of all stripes supported the Mahatma's procession to the coastal city of Dandi. The insistence of a figure like Naidu on participating alongside the largely male group that Gandhi had assembled portended what would also become of the thousands of largely rural women (along with some urban-based elite women) who would consciously break the law, openly selling and buying salt in countless market towns. It was the subcontinent's women, above all, in other words, who would vindicate Gandhi's tactic.

While civil disobedience would be renewed several times over the next 4 years, amid large-scale arrest and repression, the first phase of the campaign reached a limit in March 1931. At this point Gandhi once more found himself with cold feet when faced with the possibility of uncontained peasant radicalism and the possibility of revolutionary violence. (It was during this period that the young Punjabi revolutionary and Marxist Bhagat Singh (1907–31), along with his fellow revolutionaries Sukhdev Thapar (1907–31) and Shivaram Rajguri (1908–31), would be tried for the last time and convicted in the famous Lahore Conspiracy case that resulted in their execution.) Ongoing calls in the agrarian context to suspend the payment of rent, for example, fell foul of Gandhi's general preference for 'national unity' over arousing excessive inter-class and inter-caste discord by too freely sanctioning a national liberation movement focused on the inequities of Indian society rather than just the goal of independence. By March 1931 Gandhi would enter into his much-reviled pact with Viceroy Irwin in advance of the second of the three Round Table Conferences that would take place on constitutional reform in London and as part of which he would call to end the first phase of the civil disobedience campaign. Unfortunately, Gandhi banked on obtaining more than would be in the offing at the second conference, which took place at the end of 1931. He would miss the third conference at the end of 1932 altogether, although from his jail in Pune his vow to fast to the death in the name of opposing the fractionalization of Hindu unity did succeed in persuading Ambedkar to sign the so-called Poona Pact. (It was by the terms of the latter that Ambedkar withdrew his support for Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's communal award, which would have created separate electorates for India's untouchables. In exchange, Ambedkar won Gandhi's support for an increased number of seats for the 'depressed classes' instead.)

While the first inkling that Britain might one day leave India would emerge with the Government of India Act of 1935, that piece of legislation was roundly condemned by anti-imperialist forces across the political spectrum. Although it would do away with the system of dyarchy and bring all government offices under the control of elected Indian officials, the Act's arrangements for power at the federal centre were deemed too little, too late. Among the condemnations were those that came from Jinnah, now the leader of the Muslim League, who used the Act's deficient though explicit proposals for the future structure of a federal centre as an occasion to return to politics after the League had been largely sidelined from the mid-1920s. (The 'Pan-Islamist' politics of the Gandhi-allied *khilafat* movement proved to be little to Jinnah's staunchly secularist liking.)

Despite their outrage at the 1935 Act, mainstream party nationalists opted not to boycott the proposed elections for provincial ministries in 1937, with Congress's sweeping success proving nearly unqualified and the Muslim League's dismal performance a sign of how little support Jinnah still had as the 'sole spokesman' for India's Muslims. Winning a total of only 4 percent of the Muslim vote, as the historian Ayesha Jalal has

been most important in demonstrating, Jinnah's League was caught in the basic contradiction that would bedevil any brand of all-India Muslim politics for the next 10 years. With the two most populous Muslim states of the Punjab and Bengal dominated by elites and politicians whose interests favoured maximal provincial autonomy, there was scarcely any convergence with the interests of elites and politicians in the Muslim minority provinces, whose fate would be tied to the prospect for power over the federal centre. According to this view, there was no straight line from the demands of the Muslim League to a demand for secession in order to form an Islamic homeland (Jalal 1985). Of course, outside the realm of high politics the notion of a Muslim state in north-west India, consisting of what would become the provinces of the eventual West (though not East) Pakistan, had initially been articulated in 1930 by the famous poet Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and again in 1933 by Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge. As such, it was also gaining popular momentum within the broader context of mounting anti-imperial agitation in the years that followed.

Setting the larger context for the high and popular politics of India anti-imperialism during these years was the shock of the Depression, which was heard around the world and reverberated across the decade. From the standpoint of a colonial economy like that of India, still dealing with the dislocation produced by the First World War, the Depression initially manifested itself through the sudden collapse of a wheat price that had become acclimatised to a general increase in agrarian prices following the First World War. While internal supply and demand conditions in India remained the same, the release of American wheat stores took their toll on world market prices. A similar fate (though for very different reasons) was met by the price of rice.

Yet it was not simply cash crop production that was hit by the Depression. With British imperialism's dominant mode of surplus extraction having already shifted since the 1870s and 1880s to appropriation via credit rather than tax-based mechanisms, by 1929 the Indian peasant had grown deeply dependent on borrowing.

Therefore, even if the path of credit terminated in the person of the reviled moneylender, it clearly commenced in the esteemed high streets of London. The larger collapse in liquidity was thus anathema to the subsistence agriculturalist as well, given the reliance of the peasant on usurious loans to service revenue, rent, and debt payments. All of these burdens thus increased when prices for agricultural commodities plummeted, given that both government and landed and moneyed power-holders refused to lower their respective demands.

It can be no surprise that Gandhi's decision to call off civil disobedience before the Second Round Table Conference took place just as discontent was spreading from the subcontinent's wheat-producing areas to its eastern and southern rice-growing regions (Rothermund 1993, pp. 98–99). With the colonial state's refusal to accept the nationalist demand for a prohibition on the export of gold, it is equally unsurprising that from 1931 to 1936 some Rs. 3 billion worth of gold left India. The product of distress sales by a desperate peasantry selling off ornaments, trinkets, and, in effect, the last reserves of what little wealth they had, the outflow was the direct consequence of the marked appreciation of gold and the inability of anyone but the Secretary of State in London to control India's monetary policy. Once it became more lucrative for the moneylender to demand the surrender of objects made of precious metal rather than whatever nominal debt he was owed, there was little choice for the peasant but to comply. In the process the enormous disinvestment from the Indian countryside that took place maintained Britain's allimportant imperial interest and self-image as creditor, including that to an India with which it had long run a trade deficit but upon whose exports the imperial centre's traditional surplus with the rest of the world was based (Rothermund 1993, p. 102).

Finally, in urban areas the Depression produced a more varied set of effects. While unemployment and low wages were common in many important sectors, such as jute and cotton textiles, for industrialists in others the limited tariff protections that were allowed in these years proved significant. Sugar, pig iron, and cement are three

notable examples. Ultimately, however, 'the 1930s were good times for urban consumption' though much less so for 'urban investment', with the Rs. 155 million worth of alcohol imported in this time, rivalling the total invested in machinery for cotton textile production (Bose and Jalal 2004, p. 122).

War, Partition, and the End of British Imperialism

To continue with the focus on economic context, the last years of the British imperial enterprise in the subcontinent once again produced a whiplash effect wrought, in major part, by the consequences of international geopolitics for world capitalism. Viceroy Linlithgow's unilateral declaration of India's entry into the war alongside Britain on 3 September 1939 inaugurated a new phase of anti-imperialist outrage among party nationalists, though much less within the Communist Party of India. (The latter's anti-fascist stance in support of the Allied war and its eventual opposition to the last great Gandhian episode of civil disobedience that took place through 1942s Quit India movement would largely sap the goodwill it had been building up since the high point of communist–socialist unity after 1936.)

While the effects of the Second World War were not wholly different from those of the First, they were also much more dramatic. Initially at least the war brought with it increasing prices that reversed the pattern of the Depression years, with the full employment of existing industrial resources, another windfall in the profits of India's capitalist class, and significant difficulties for the agrarian and urban poor. With little new capital investment, even though wages and profits should have increased purchasing power for ordinary consumption, the prioritisation of export for provisioning Britain's war effort ended up seriously compounding what Rothermund calls the regime of 'forced saving' to which India was being subjected (1993, p. 115). With goods from the subcontinent bought by the British government on credit, in the longer term the vast sterling balances that India was accumulating in London would

fundamentally alter its foundational role as debtor to Britain's creditor. Although the heart of the economic relationship on which British imperialism had come to be premised would thus be inverted, in the immediate term such balances could not be touched. Moreover, the enormous increase in the Indian money supply on which such expansion was based made for a grave inflation shock. While in the 10 years from 1929 to 1939 the money supply increased from Rs. 3.4 to 4 billion in coins (and dropped from Rs. 2.6 billion to 1.6 billion in paper notes), by 1945 it had reached Rs. 22 billion. Overall, during the war the printing presses thus produced the equivalent of Rs. 11 billion in sterling balances in the Bank of England and another Rs. 5 billion in other credits. Herein was to be found not only the inversion by which the war would result in a national debt of Rs. 9.5 billion and credits totalling approximately Rs. 16 billion but also one source of the extreme duress that the rural poor, labour, and the urban salaried would face. With a dramatic decline in what the economist Amartya Sen calls 'exchange entitlements', it was the millions in rural Bengal who would suffer the worst of this duress, with the catastrophic famine of 1943–44 taking some 3.5 to 3.8 million lives (Bose and Jalal 2004, p. 129; Rothermund 1993, p. 116; Sen 1999).

While by the end of the war the fate of British imperialism was in many ways sealed, the 1940s would witness questions of independence that were increasingly consumed by questions about the structure of the proposed federal centre. The renewed rift within Congress after 1937, which pitted an increasingly pronounced left wing led by Subhas Chandra Bose against the organization's more conservative right wing and what was, by then, Gandhi's often stifling moderation, was only temporarily repaired by the shared outrage over the declaration of war on India's behalf. The reinvigorated spirit of unity that resulted did lead the rejection of Sir Stafford Cripps's Mission to India in March 1942, the gestures of which towards self-government proved insufficient for party nationalists in the Congress. However, this unity could not conceal the lasting difficulties that were to result from the crisis that Congress had experienced in its conference of early 1939 at

Tripuri, a village in the then Central Provinces, where Gandhi up-ended Bose's attempts to win re-election as president. Despite the latter's electoral victory, Gandhi had used his great personal stature to persuade both Congress's right and left, Nehru included, to make it effectively impossible for Bose to lead. Combined with the general failure of the Congress left to resist the anti-labour and anti-*kisan* policies of its party ministries in the provinces, the atmosphere was such that Bose was left with little choice but to withdraw his candidacy. Opting in June 1939 to form a new 'Forward Bloc' within Congress – with communist support – he would be altogether ousted from the INC by the end of 1939 (Sarkar 1988, pp. 373–374).

In this sequence of events are to be found the origins of Bose's later efforts to launch the last great internationalist chapter in Indian anti-imperialism with his Azad Hind Fauj ('Indian National Army', INA), with its widespread participation of women and its famous female 'Rani of Jhansi' regiment as well as its tilt towards the Axis powers. Escaping from India in 1943 and making his way towards Japan, Bose sought to recruit a religiously and ethno-linguistically diverse range of Indian expatriates and surrendered soldiers from the British Indian Army in East and South-East Asia. These he planned to use to lead a march back to Delhi in order to strike at a Britain embroiled in the Allied war. While the INA would be halted in 1944, and Bose himself would die in a plane crash in 1945, the British decision in that same year to try three INA officers – one Hindu, one Muslim, and one Sikh – would incite the last great episode of mass people's protest during the anti-imperialist struggle.

In the story of Bose's exile from Congress, there can also be found evidence of the conflicting nature of the forces that comprised Indian anti-imperialism at nearly every level. While the politics of Hindu–Muslim strife had hardly begun in the 1940s (or even in the twentieth century), whatever clear momentum towards partition that had developed in these years was not ultimately determinative of the choice of partition. Instead, the rush of events that followed the end of the war derived principally from the inability of mainstream party nationalists to come to consensus over what the federal structure of the post-colonial state should look like. Amid the squabbling, recrimination, and back and forth, almost nothing was certain with respect to how 'nations' and 'states' in the subcontinent were to be aligned once the British were finally to leave.

With the Simla conference of June 1945 bringing together Gandhi, the Congress, and Jinnah, with the 1945–46 elections in which Jinnah's Muslim League had finally won any semblance of right to call itself an All-India Party for the subcontinent's Muslims, and with the so-called Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, exactly what the Pakistan demand was supposed to mean remained largely up in the air. From the standpoint of Jinnah's brand of Muslim League anti-imperialism, the idea of binding together the Muslim-majority areas of the north-west and Bengal in the north-east was meant largely as a means for creating a loose confederal structure.

In this latter vision – as the Cabinet Mission of 1946 found the British largely endorsing – the 'Pakistan' entity, complete with its large Hindu and Sikh minority communities, was to function as a counterbalance to a 'Hindustan' entity that would have its own large community of Muslim minorities. Therefore, that Jinnah's endgame should have eventually come apart may not have been an entirely obvious outcome, even if it was, perhaps, naive to imagine that Congress's leadership – now securely in the hands of figures like Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950) – would ever prefer a weakened centre over a non-partitioned Bengal and Punjab. That the ultimate fruit of antiimperialism in India was to be both independence and the enormous human tragedy of partition, however, cannot be doubted. With an effective population exchange across religious lines of some 12 million persons and widespread, gruesome, and semi-organised communitarian slaughter, Britain's sudden insistence on quitting India as fast as it could in 1947 would pave the way to a new era of American neo-imperialism, complete with its Cold War battles against the Soviet Union. The latter itself being no stranger to neoimperialism in Asia, it would be a very different constellation of global forces that would have to be met by the states that the

struggle against British imperialism in the subcontinent gave rise to, India, Pakistan, and eventually Bangladesh as well.

Cross-References

▶ Decolonization in South Asia
▶ Imperial Tastes and Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century India
▶ India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism
▶ Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts against British imperialism
▶ Labour and Decolonisation, Anti-imperialist Struggles (Australia/South-East Asia)
▶ Pan-Asianism
▶ Women's Movements, Indian Anti-colonial Struggle

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C

Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973)

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Definition

Amílcar Lopes Cabral was an African intellectual
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pendence movement of Guinea Bissau and Cape
Verde islands.

Amílcar Lopes Cabral was an African intellec-
tual revolutionary trained in Portuguese Marxism,
who made a significant contribution to the inde-
pendence movement of Guinea Bissau and Cape
Verde islands. In his monumental *Post-
colonialism: An Historical Introduction*, Robert
J.C. Young says: 'From the perspective of African
Socialism … the greatest figure of those who
were forced to resort to violence in order to
achieve liberation was from neither a Franco-
phone nor an Anglophone, but a Lusophone cul-
ture: Amilcar Cabral' (2003: 283). Born in Bafat,
Guinea Bissau on 12 September 1924, Cabral
attained his elementary education in Infante Don
Henrique primary school in the town of Mindelo,
Cape Verde. His father, Juvenal Cabral, was a
mulatto from the Cape Verde islands. The people
of Cape Verde archipelago, unlike those of Guinea

Bissau, were mulattos whom the Portuguese
assimilated with their hegemonic cultural
practices.

Growing up under Portuguese colonialism,
Cabral experienced at first hand the oppression
of the common masses of Cape Verde. The colo-
nial regime of Portugal's fascist dictator Antonio
de Oliveira Salazar created a virtual hell for the
working classes of Cape Verde. This was the time
when the seeds of revolution started germinating
in young Cabral. He assumed the name Labrac,
and began his political activities of resistance
during his school days. Cabral graduated from
the University of Lisbon in 1950 as a colonial
Agronomy engineer. During university days, he
founded revolutionary student movements and
proposed active resistance to the ruling dictator-
ship of Portugal. In Lisbon he met several African
students from Mozambique and Angola and incul-
cated the ideas of Third-World nationalism in
them. Among these students were: Agostinho
Neto and Mario de Andrade, two of the future
founders of the Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), a guerrilla organisation which
from 1956 onwards would fight for independence
from Portugal; Vasco Cabral, who was later to join
the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of
Guinea and Cape Verde) and become the eco-
nomic minster of Guinea-Bissau; Eduardo
Mondlane, later leader of the Front for the Liber-
ation and Independence of Mozambique. These
students established the Centre for African Stud-
ies (CAS) at the home of Alda Espirito Santo, a

rich man from Sao Tome. CAS was a loose colloquium of students who conducted weekly seminars on African history and politics. These young Africans often meditated over the fact that while many colonial powers were anticipating the disintegration of their empires, the Portuguese were consolidating their hold over their African empire. By 1951, CAS came under the scanner of the Portuguese authorities. Fearing persecution at the hands of Portuguese security forces, Cabral and his associates disbanded the colloquium.

After the completion of his degree, Cabral returned to Africa in 1952 and became an iconic figure for the movements which sought liberation of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Cabral joined the colonial Provincial Department of Agricultural and Forestry Services of Portuguese Guinea, and travelled extensively across the country. The pathetic condition of Guineans living under colonial rule kindled revolutionary thoughts in the mind of young Cabral. While serving the Agricultural and Forestry Service in Guinea-Bissau, he came into intimate contact with the local masses. He went to villages far and wide and made peaceful efforts to make the people aware of their exploitation at the hands of the coloniser. However, this incited the Portuguese administration of Guinea-Bissau, and Cabral was forced to leave his job. He went to Angola, joined the Movimento Popular Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA), and with the help of revolutionaries like Antonio Agostinho Neto, made this movement instrumental in the revolutionary practices within the country. Cabral's political concerns provoked the colonial administrators, and he was exiled to Portugal. He was given permission to visit his mother annually. It was the phase of an epistemological shift in the theory and praxis of young Cabral. He abandoned the peaceful path of liberation and looked upon armed struggle as the only hope for independence. On 19 September 1956, on one of two subsequent visits to Guinea, Cabral founded the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC). He led the guerrilla movement of PAIGC against the colonial Portuguese

government in Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde. The goal of this conflict was to capture territory from the Portuguese. With the help of Kwame Nkrumah, Cabral set up training camps in Ghana and, besides training his lieutenants in guerrilla warfare, trained them in effective communication skills that would enable them to muster the support of Guinean tribal chiefs for PAIGC.

In 1960, Cabral attended the Second Conference of African Peoples in Tunis, and the same year during a visit to Canakry he established the party headquarters of PAIGC at the Guinean capital. For co-ordinating liberation struggle against the Portuguese empire in Africa, Cabral facilitated the formation of the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), a joint front comprising PAIGC, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Angola's MPLA. Cabral actively started inculcating the revolutionary ideology in the minds of his followers, so that a violent struggle might be launched in the near future to liberate Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde archipelago from the Portuguese clutches. He established training camps in the Republic of Guinea and in Senegal, both of which had recently got freedom from France. The first PAIGC-led offensive against the Portuguese began in March 1962, and severely hit Praia, the capital of Cape Verde. However, PAIGC cadres were logistically inferior to the Portuguese military and this forced the PAIGC leadership to avoid a direct armed struggle on the Cape Verde Islands. Cabral suggested guerrilla warfare and on 23 January 1963 PAIGC forces clandestinely attacked the Portuguese formations at Trite fortress in the southern part of Guinea-Bissau. Cabral, as the secretary-general of PAIGC, was the guiding spirit behind the armed liberation struggle against the atrocious Portuguese colonial regime, and trounced vastly superior Portuguese forces supported by NATO, the US, Spain, and South Africa.

Cabral emphasised the role of culture in resisting the repressive forces of Portuguese colonialism and asserted that the psychological and social reconstruction of the colonised was the foundational premise for the armed struggle against the coloniser. Cabral believed that the national fight for liberation

enabled the marginal human beings, who were dehumanised by colonialism, to recover their personalities as Africans. This regional assertion was more than a mere local issue and in a broader perspective it was a challenge to Eurocentric theories. The PAIGC was a revolutionary movement firmly grounded in the social reality of Guinea. It was revolutionary precisely because its guiding framework was drawn from the indigenous circumstances. Cultural assertion and psychological reconstruction, for Cabral, were the processes integral to the cause and effect of the struggle for national liberation. Robert Young succinctly sums up the anti-imperialist oeuvre of Cabral in these words:

> His work stands out for the ways in which he extends his analyses from the practicalities of the creation of resistance movements, to the military strategies involved, to the vanguard role of the party in the formation of anti-colonial unity, to the forms by which cultural identity and dignity – [as] essential components of the liberatory process – can be asserted. (285)

At the First Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, held in Havana in January 1966, Cabral delivered his lecture under the title of 'The Weapon of Theory' (1966). Rejecting the universalised model of the Bolshevik Revolution, Cabral emphasised that national and social liberation was the outcome of 'local and national elaboration ... essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of each people' (Cabral 1969: 74–75). Cabral had first-hand knowledge of the situation in Guinea-Bissau, which he had gained during broad agricultural research for the Forestry Department. This was the period when he assembled detailed information about the cultural and material life of various ethnic groups and their interpersonal relations within Guinea-Bissau, and a deep understanding of the ground realities faced by the peasantry, especially the land-tilling women. Cabral was deeply conscious of promoting an ideological apparatus for the liberation movements, oriented towards the dialectics of 'foundations and objectives of national liberation in relation to the social structure' (Cabral 1969: 75). Robert Young judiciously says in this context: 'It was to be Cabral himself who would formulate the fullest realization of a workable African socialism' (2003: 246).

Political liberation, for Cabral, was incomplete if it didn't accompany a severe setback to the 'imperialist domination on the social structure and historical processes of our peoples' (Cabral 1969: 81). His emphasis on culture as an essential tool of resistance to the foreign domination inspired future revolutionaries throughout the world.

Cabral accentuated the necessity of giving due consideration to the internal stratification of the colonised nations, where each class had different interests in relation to the metropole. This was because Cabral could envisage the tentacles of neo-colonialism looming large on the continent. The influence of Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro is clearly visible in these words of Cabral: 'the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism' (83). Cabral's 'Weapon of Theory' is not just aimed at ending the colonial rule, but takes the end of foreign domination as the ultimate target. An independent nation, according to him, can either become a victim of neocolonialism, or take a turn towards socialism. Cabral redefined the goal of revolution in his two-pronged agenda of defeating the colonial power and bringing a violent social revolution, which could be realised by giving equal emphasis to the material as well as social and cultural aspects of revolution. He differentiated liberation from independence and argued for the pursuit of liberation from neo-colonialism: 'the neo-colonial situation (in which the working classes and their allies struggle simultaneously against the imperialist bourgeoisie and the native ruling class) is not resolved by a nationalist solution; it demands the destruction of the capitalist structure implanted in the national territory by imperialism, and correctly postulates a socialist solution' (86). Complete liberation, according to Cabral, could only be achieved if national revolution cultivated the ground for a social revolution.

Cabral was of the firm belief that the petty bourgeoisie benefited from colonialism but were never completely incorporated into the colonial system, and because of this ambivalent position only a small fragment of this class was revolutionary. Trapped in the conflict between colonial culture and the colonised culture, the petty bourgeoisie had no

coherent interest in carrying out the revolution. Cabral was conscious of this weakness:

> In fact history has shown that whatever the role – sometimes important – played by the individuals coming from the *petite bourgeoisie* in the process of a revolution, this class has never possessed political control. And it could never possess it, since political control (the state) is based on the economic capacity of ruling class, and in the conditions of colonial and neocolonial society this capacity is retained by two entities: imperialist capital and the native working class. (Chabal 1983: 176)

About the role of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie in the liberation struggle, Cabral echoed the words of Lenin by concluding that the ruling classes never voluntarily give up their power: 'the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong' (Cabral 1969: 89). He asserted that the fundamental step in the liberatory praxis of a nation was the recognition of the link between the colonised elites and the coloniser at the level of culture and acculturation. The hegemonic culture of the colonisers suppressed the ability of the colonised elites to construct an identity free from colonial determination.

Cabral felt that their people were at a specific historical stage, which was characterised by the backward conditions of their economy. He believed that the anti-colonial struggle was not only aimed at liberating the colonised people from the sufferings and miserable conditions of their lives, but also aimed at restoring the right of Africans to write and narrate their own history, which had been denied to them by the colonialists. In *Revolution in Guinea,* Cabral aptly says:

> The colonialists usually say that it was they who brought us into history: today we show that this is not so. They made us leave history, our history, to follow them, right at the back, to follow the progress of their history. Today, in taking up arms to liberate ourselves, in following the example of other peoples who have taken up arms to liberate themselves, we want to return to our history, on our own feet, by our own means and through our own sacrifices. (63)

Laying stress on the education and indoctrination of his comrades, Cabral urged: 'Oblige every responsible and educated member of our Party to work daily for the improvement of their cultural formation' (71). He equally emphasised the need to educate women, who could play a vital role in the liberation struggle. According to Cabral, the germ of the liberation struggle was encapsulated in the endurance and revival of culture, defined as 'simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history' (Cabral 1974: 41–43). He claimed that people could reclaim their own history only through the optimum realisation of their own culture, which he considered an indispensable tool for the masses to confront the foreign domination. Cabral believed that liberation meant personal and active commitment. Basil Davidson aptly says in this context:

> Liberation . . . had to mean an active and personal commitment to a process – perhaps above all, in Cabral's concept, a cultural process – for the advancement of which a mere sympathy or 'support' could never be enough. With whatever shortcomings, this commitment which Cabral asked of those who followed him was the central project of his discourse, the measure of his originality. (1989: 136)

Re-contextualising the Marxist discourse that history began with class struggle, Cabral argued that the driving force of history was dependent on the mode of production instead of on class struggle. The emphasis on the cultural-historical dimension of the liberation struggle forms the crux of his philosophical oeuvre. In contrast to the Marxist presumption that history began with class struggle and hence the peoples of Asia, Africa, and America were living beyond history before colonialism, Cabral appropriated the Althusserian model and developed a new inclusive historical model within a continued Marxist framework.

Cabral's undogmatic left-oriented analyses of the ground realities of the colony has affinities with the Gramscian model of combining theoretical ingenuity and local knowledge with emphasis on culture in the nationalist struggle for emancipation. Throughout the period of the liberation struggle in South Africa, Cabral epitomised the hope of African people for recovery and restoration. The war of liberation led by Cabral in the Portuguese colonies of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau ended with the declaration of their independence by the Portuguese government in October 1974.

Unfortunately, Cabral did not live to see independence, as he fell victim to a coup in 1973. He was assassinated by a corrupt former PAIGC comrade Kani Inocencio, on behalf of an opposing group that aimed at taking over the leadership of PAIGC. In death, Cabral was honoured at home and abroad. In 1973, the World Peace Council declared the annual Amílcar Cabral Award would be conferred on the individuals and groups who had shown exemplary courage in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Cape Verde's international airport was renamed The Amílcar Cabral International Airport. In 1979, a soccer tournament for the West African countries was renamed the Amílcar Cabral Cup. However, the best tribute echoes in a common saying in Guinea-Bissau *'Cabral ka muri'* (Cabral is not dead), which invokes the spirit of struggle and sacrifice that Cabral resurrected.

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Capital Export

Capital Exports

Capital Flows

Capitalism

Capitalism and the First World War

Capitalist Globalization

Capitalist Imperialism

Carbon Markets

Caribbean

Caribbean Imperialism

Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)

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Synonyms

Cuban Revolution; Latin America; Cold War; Socialism; Soviet Union; United States; Armed Struggle

Definition

Fidel Castro (1926–2016) is often seen as the "apostle" of anti-imperialism in Latin America. Due to his unrelenting spat with the United States, the leader of the Cuban Revolution appears as the most charismatic figure from the Latin American left. His legendary struggle in the Sierra Maestra, his unbending position with regard to "American imperialism," and his apparent independence from Havana's closest ally – the Soviet Union – have made Castro a beacon of resistance and independence in Latin America and beyond.

After meeting Fidel Castro in the *Sierra Maestra* in February 1957, 2 years prior to his revolutionary triumph, the American journalist Herbert Matthews sketched a revealing portrait of the insurgent leader: Castro was not a Marxist, and his political agenda, although "vague and couched in generalities," amounted to a radical and democratic "new deal" for Cuba. It was, concluded Matthews, an "anti-Communist" program (Matthews 1957). Later, in the 1960s, when Castro's authority was solidly enshrined in a full-fledged revolutionary Cuba, the historian Theodore Draper coined the term "Castroism" to describe a rather undefinable ideology that, for tactical reasons, changed in order to justify past inconsistencies (Draper 1965, 49). Indeed, it is difficult to place Castro's political commitments within one coherent and unchanged category. Castro's leadership before and after Fulgencio Batista's fall in January 1959 was marked by instability as well as pragmatic adaptation: he embraced socialism more than 2 years after his successful insurrection; Castro's relationship with the Soviet Union (USSR) was frequently tainted by tensions, and a conscious effort was made to differentiate the Cuban Revolution from the Soviet experience; the initial nationalist discourse seemed to dilute in the 1960s and 1970s, when the Cuban authorities fostered internationalism with Third World countries, including far-reaching intervention in Africa.

Nevertheless, one term pervades most of Castro's political itinerary: anti-imperialism (adopted as a rejection of American hegemony in the hemisphere). It could be argued that Castro's most dramatic cause was the relentless fight against US imperialism and its hostile policy toward the island, which he pursued until his final days despite his declining health.

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was born in 1927 in a country located fewer than 100 miles from the US coastline. This "geographic fatality" was far from being irrelevant for Cuba's history, since US proximity resulted in American domination of the island. US troops played a crucial role in the outcome of the Cuban War of Independence (1895–1898), securing a key position in Cuba's affairs for US officials until the revolution that ousted Batista in 1959. The American ambassador in Havana was often depicted as the real power in the shadows, holding a position enshrined by the 1901 Platt Amendment and that stipulated several conditions entrenching Washington's dominance of the Caribbean country. These included the right

to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence and a government adequate for the protection of individual liberties. Despite the amendment eventually being dropped in the 1930s, the USA maintained a strong grip on the Cuban political system, as well as retaining the contentious military base in Guantánamo. Not surprisingly, in order to characterize Cuba's submissive position with regard to the USA, post-revolutionary historians have labelled the Republican era (1902–1959) as a "neocolony," a "pseudo-republican" phase.

However, in Birán – a small agricultural hamlet and birthplace of Fidel Castro – the controversial nature of USA–Cuba relations did not considerably affect the daily rhythm of life. Amidst the calmness of a small village situated in the *Oriente* province nearly 500 miles from the capital, Havana, nothing indicated Castro's future meteoric rise into world politics. Fidel's father, Don Ángel Castro, was a Spanish migrant who successfully secured financial stability by growing sugarcane. His mother, Lina Ruz, second wife of Don Ángel, was a fervent Christian with a modest educational background (Vayssière 2011, 47), and her wealth would later be expropriated by her own sons as a result of the implementation of the 1959 agrarian reform. In spite of Fidel's young rebellious character, little in his childhood and adolescence suggested the radical turn his life would eventually take.

The anti-American leanings that shaped the Cuban Revolution were not yet shared by a young Fidel Castro, who, in 1940, addressed a letter to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to express his admiration in the wake of his most recent, and final, reelection (Skierka 2004, 5). Castro's Jesuit education had a strong and lengthy influence on him. Even during the *Sierra Maestra* campaign (1957–1959), it was still possible to see Castro wearing a scapular around his neck. He would later acknowledge to the Brazilian priest Frei Betto that the "Jesuits clearly influenced me with their strict organization, their discipline and their values. They [...] influenced my sense of justice" (Skierka 2004, 19–20).

Castro's younger brother, Raúl (born 1931), who became the first Minister of Defense under revolutionary rule, also studied with the Jesuits, but he drew different conclusions. Raúl Castro's childhood differed from the evolution experienced by Fidel. Less independent and more attached to his family, he evinced a controversial and complex behavior. In preparatory school, where he nourished growing hostility toward religion, his performance was modest and in contrast to the outspoken personality of Fidel. In Havana, Raúl was soon approached by members of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the Cuban equivalent of the pro-Soviet Communist parties. Assuming an active political commitment, he benefited from the opportunity to travel to Europe and took part in the Youth International Festival held in Vienna in February 1953, before moving on to Czechoslovakia and Rumania, describing the latter as "a paradise" (Merle 1965, 120). This is not to imply that Fidel Castro's insurrectional movement was a Communist-oriented organization from its inception. On the contrary, apart from Raúl, few combatants of the action that gave birth to the 26th of July Movement ("M-26-7"), the Moncada Barracks attack, had any notion of socialist ideas. Fidel Castro himself was not a Communist.

In 1942, Castro took the train to Havana, where he was enrolled in a prestigious Jesuit school. He excelled as an athlete and was introduced by his teachers to the work of the "Apostle of Cuban Independence," José Martí (Vayssière 2011, 72), who held the crown among the revolutionary chain of heroes. Castro's interest in politics accelerated in 1945, when he began studying law at the University of Havana. This is probably the least known period of Castro's life. Some observers have suggested that he was involved in the widespread culture of gang violence (*gangsterismo*) that permeated student activism under the presidencies of Ramón Grau San Martín (1944–1948) and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948–1952). What seems undeniable is that those university years fed Castro's anti-imperialistic inclinations. He unsuccessfully attempted to become president of the University Students Federation (FEU), and he became enmeshed in two "initiatory experiences." The first was an aborted expedition designed to overthrow the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo

in June 1947. The second was the tragic event traditionally known as *Bogotazo*. Castro landed in Colombia as a Cuban representative for a Latin American student congress, which was conceived to be held in parallel with an Inter-American Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Skierka 2004, 27). This international encounter represented an unhidden defiance of the US position in the hemisphere. During his stay in Colombia, Castro managed to meet the popular leader of the Liberal Party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, before the latter was dramatically assassinated. The future "Comandante" witnessed firsthand the massive violence that destroyed Bogotá, provoked thousands of deaths, and triggered the infamous period known as *La Violencia* (1948–1958).

The end of the 1940s was indeed a pivotal time in Castro's life: he became affiliated with the Orthodox Party (from which he organized the clandestine and armed faction that would later conduct the Moncada attack), married the bourgeois student Mirta Díaz-Balart, and visited the country that would haunt Castro forever, the USA. But Castro had not yet clearly defined his ideological identity. His friend Alfredo Guevara tried to convince him to join the PSP, but quickly realized that Fidel was a "free electron" (Vayssière 2011, 88). As Castro acknowledged during his trip to Chile in 1971, at that time, "I had a few thoughts in my head [. . .] I had indoctrinated myself. [. . .] But, was I a Communist? I was not. [. . .] I was involved in the vortex of political crisis in Cuba [. . .] and I started to fight" (Castro 1972, 277). Castro's main contemporary political inspiration was the Orthodox Party's Eduardo Chibás, whose speeches against corruption exerted a strong influence on him (de la Cova 2007, 28). Thus far, Castro's political skills had already heralded a promising career in the electoral arena. However, Batista's coup d'état in March 1952 led to a general reassessment of the necessary political strategies. Institutional attempts to transform the country no longer appeared to be an adequate tactic, and the appeal of an insurrectional stance to overthrow Batista swiftly gained ground.

Fidel Castro was certainly not the first militant to engage in armed struggle. The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Women's Civic Front, Triple A, *Acción Libertadora*, and large sections of the FEU were all movements that adopted an insurrectional position prior to the Moncada events (Mencía 2013, 192–303). Among this plethora of revolutionary organizations and growing rejection of Batista's authoritarian shift, Fidel Castro began gathering together young members of the Orthodox Party, eventually amassing between 1,500 and 2,000 potential combatants. The aim of his group, initially called *El Movimiento*, was to facilitate military training in order to start carrying out armed actions against the dictatorial government. After months of preparation, they were finally ready to attempt a first blow: the Moncada Barracks attack – the "Cuban Bastille" – a failed assault that, according to Cuba's revolutionary "vulgate," has become the "birth of the Revolution" (de la Cova 2007).

In order to discredit Castro's insurgency, the Batista regime linked the "moncadistas" to the PSP – a false theory that was nonetheless sustained by the coincidental fact that the head of the Cuban communists, Blas Roca, was in Santiago in July 1953 celebrating his birthday with other party members. Accused of complicity with Castro, the Communists faced soaring repression, with their party banned and their official newspaper, *Hoy*, closed down (Cushion 2016, 36). The PSP was not the only organization affected by Batista's authoritarian rule.

More than 60 combatants were killed after the attack, and Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl, and most of the assailants were jailed. However, paradoxically, the government's counterattack offered Castro an extraordinary opportunity to gain wider public visibility. Put on trial in September 1953, Castro opted to take up his own defense and delivered his legendary speech "History will absolve me." Castro's defense was memorable in more than one respect, and it provided the first public and coherent political outline of the M-26-7, unveiling Castro's strong reformist leanings and ideological proclivities. In addition, the manifesto was widely disseminated during Castro's months in prison, giving voice and popularity to the movement that became known as the M-26-7. Interestingly, "History will absolve me" does not refer to the Cold War's ideological clash

but instead highlights the local roots of the anti-Batista struggle: "the intellectual author of this revolution is José Martí, the apostle of our independence," stated Castro. He also stressed the need to restore the 1940 Constitution, sketched the main contours of an agrarian reform, decisively attacked corruption, and outlined a wave of nationalization. It was indubitably a far-reaching and liberal agenda, but it did not bear the anti-imperialist stance that would later characterize Castro's discourse. The only mention of Cuba's geographical surroundings was rather reassuring: the island's future policy in the Americas would be one of "close solidarity with the democratic people of the continent" (Gott 2004, 50). Nothing was hinted at with regard to the Soviet Union and the Socialist sphere of power.

Batista decreed an amnesty, granting Castro and many other political opponents their release. Fidel's years in prison had been a highly formative phase, allowing him to become acquainted with the works of Marx and Lenin. This is not to say that Castro had become a socialist, but he certainly gained a more sophisticated political understanding that would encourage him to perceive his revolution within a broader international framework. In an article published by the magazine *Bohemia*, Castro was pictured reading a report on the overthrow of the leftist Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz (de la Cova 2007, 240). Released in May 1955 and utterly convinced that there was no electoral resolution to the crisis, Castro and his brother Raúl fled to Mexico, where they would articulate their movement and prepare an armed insurrection aimed at ousting Batista. Castro's departure did not imply a complete transfer of the revolutionary movement from Havana to Mexico City, as sectors of the M-26-7 were still active on the island and had established growing international connections, including in the USA. Moreover, other organizations were also vigorously fighting in Cuba with the purpose of dismantling the Batista regime. The Revolutionary Directorate (DR), headed by José Antonio Echeverría, who met Castro in Mexico City in August 1956, assumed a determined insurrectional stance (Mencía 2007, 190), as well as the

Authentic Organization and the PSP, but the latter without immediately adopting armed struggle as its fundamental strategic line.

It was in Mexico that Castro met the Argentinian traveler of the Americas Ernesto Guevara, who had recently witnessed the consequences of the US-funded coup against Árbenz in Guatemala and nurtured a Marxist political thinking (Reid-Henry 2009). In December 1956, together with *Che* Guevara and 80 fellow combatants, Castro embarked on the yacht *Granma* in order to initiate the next phase of the struggle on Cuban territory. They landed in the *Oriente* province, but the initial plan, aimed at triggering a wide popular outburst by coinciding with an uprising in Santiago, failed. Castro and his crew stepped onto the island later than expected, which allowed the government to launch a fierce counterattack, killing and capturing several revolutionaries. The Castro brothers managed to escape, finding shelter in the *Sierra Maestra*, where they quickly established contact with an outlaw rural leader, Crescendo Pérez (Wickham-Crowley 1992, 141). The cooperation between the M-26-7 and the peasants was indeed a key feature of the Cuban Revolution, which has not been sufficiently emphasized.

Under these circumstances, Castro's guerrilla movement rapidly gained traction across the *Oriente* province, allowing the M-26-7 to split its rebel army into multiple revolutionary columns, including Column 8 Ciro Redondo led by *Che* Guevara, Second Front Frank País led by Raúl Castro, and Column 3 led by Juan Almeida. As a result of this insurrectional expansion, the M-26-7 created a large *territorio libre* (free territory), within which the *barbudos* ("bearded men") provided the local population with essential social benefits such as hospitals and schools (Useem 1977, 104). As stated in a document sent to his brother Fidel in April 1958, Raúl Castro was particularly successful in rallying the local population and organizing the "free territory," thereby benefiting from the support of the peasants, who were "willing to help to infinity" (Castro 1961, 218).

The M-26-7's growing popular legitimation has to be viewed as a critical component that

boosted Castro's position within the insurrectional movement. Early in 1958, the PSP validated the "armed path" promoted by the M-26-7 (Cushion 2016, 162–163), and in April 1958, as a result of a failed strike conducted by the *Llano(the M-26-7's urban underground)*, the core of the movement was transferred to the *Sierra* (Sweig 2002, 151). Castro became the indisputable leader of the Cuban Revolution.

Batista's 1958 military offensive aimed at dislodging the rebels from the mountains did not succeed, further consolidating the position of Castro's troops. Guevara headed to Las Villas, where he was welcomed by Faure Chomón, leader of the DR, and together they planned a final assault. Doomed by an irreversible revolutionary surge, alienation of the Cuban elites, and Washington's reluctance to back his regime, Batista eventually fled the island on January 1, 1959, paving the way for Castro's spectacular entry into Havana a week later.

Castro enjoyed an impressive popular support, but initially he only kept his position as head of the rebel army. Manuel Urrutia – a lawyer who had previously defended the insurgents and vindicated their armed struggle – was nominated, with Castro's green light, as first president of the revolutionary government. He was not a radical, and he wished to maintain a cordial relationship with the USA. The first cabinet reflected the new government's ideological moderation. No Communist members held a ministerial position, and the anti-imperialist discourse was expressly silenced to avoid unnecessary strains with the White House. Having replaced José Miró Cardona as prime minister on February 13, 1959, Fidel Castro led a goodwill mission to the USA in April. While giving a speech in Princeton, he evinced a moderate stance and attributed the success of the revolution to the fact that the insurgents "had not preached class war" (Gott 2004, 166). He also remarked: "We are against all kind of dictatorship. [...] That is why we are against Communism" (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 9). In spite of Castro's restraint, President Dwight Eisenhower made sure to be absent during the Cuban's visit to Washington, instead opting to play golf. Castro was outraged. Some observers have pointed to Eisenhower's snub as a crucial factor establishing an irreversible distance between Havana and Washington (Castro 2009, 220).

However, as announced in "History will absolve me," the Cuban Revolution soon adopted a reformist and social inclination. A new institution was created to organize large-scale land redistribution: the National Institute of Land Reform (INRA), led by Castro since 1959. As the Cuban Revolution slipped into political radicalization, the cabinet's influence was undermined, while INRA became the "genesis of the *real* Cuban Revolution" (Anderson 2000, 386). The final blow to the moderate sectors of the government came in July 1959, when Castro appeared on television and threatened to resign "in view of the difficulties issuing from the Presidency," which, due to Castro's overwhelming popularly, forced Urrutia to step down (Brown 2017, 32). This political crisis heralded further radicalization and allowed a number of PSP members to secure more prominent positions.

Although in 1959 the Cuban Revolution went rather unnoticed in the USSR (Karol 1970, 190), Castro's mounting tensions with the USA drew attention from Moscow, eventually prompting Nikita Khrushchev to send an envoy to the island. The chosen emissary was the prominent politician Anastas Mikoyan, who returned to Moscow with an optimistic prospect of the revolution (Khrouchtchev 1971, 464). Cuban–Soviet economic connections were quickly reinforced, raising concern in the White House. American companies (e.g., Shell, Texaco, Standard Oil) refused to refine Soviet oil, and in retaliation, the Cubans confiscated US assets in June 1960. A few months earlier, a tragic event had already cemented the irreversible rift between Washington and Havana. In March 1960, a Belgian arms shipment arrived in Havana on board *La Coubre*, a French freighter. The ship suddenly exploded, killing more than 100 people and destroying its valuable cargo. For Fidel Castro – as he stated in a speech at the funeral of some of the victims – there was no doubt that the explosion was a "premeditated attempt to deprive" the island of weapons, and he pointed to Washington as responsible for the sabotage. The blast served as

an appropriate justification to push the revolution forward and adopt an increasingly hostile stance toward the USA (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 40–42).

Castro's unmistakable anti-American posture adopted in 1960 was coupled with a belligerent international stance and a resolute willingness to operate a rapprochement with the Socialist world. The First Declaration of Havana (September 1960) formalized Castro's leftist turn and delineated the island's controversial foreign policy. He spelt out his agenda by first stressing that "the People of Cuba strongly condemn the imperialism of North America for its gross and criminal domination," before delivering a call to "fight for a liberated Latin America." The right model to attain the expected liberation was, in Castro's view, "to take up the arms of liberty" (Gott 2004, 184–185). Needless to say, the Americans were outraged with the *Comandante*'s message. They struck back in November 1960 with an embargo on US exports to Cuba. In April 1961, a CIA-trained force of Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs in an attempt to invade the country, but Castro's successful military operation delivered a major strategic defeat to the USA, boosting his authority and international prestige.

However, as the revolutionaries embraced a more defined and radicalized ideological character, the institutionalization of the political structure became indispensable. The variety of revolutionary organizations was therefore replaced by a more centralist structure. The establishment of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) in July 1961 responded to the need of unifying the leadership by merging Castro's M-26-7, the DR, and the PSP. But the growing ascendency of the Communists and the marginalization of several former M-26-7 and DR members provoked rising grievances, which eventually forced Castro to speak out and condemn what he qualified as "sectarianism." As a result, the first secretary of the ORI – the orthodox Marxist Aníbal Escalante – and his followers were ousted (Blight and Brenner 2002, 90), while the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, who was suspected of conspiring with the former PSP leader, was replaced by a well-known sympathizer of Castro's revolution: Aleksandr Alekseyev.

In spite of Alekseyev's goodwill, the advent of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 further deteriorated the alliance with the Soviets. When the Americans detected the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba and quarantined the island, Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy engaged in negotiations to solve a crisis that threatened to escalate into nuclear war. The Soviets agreed to remove the weapons, but Khrushchev did not consult the Cubans first. Castro was furious, and Cuba's fidelity to the USSR waned for nearly a decade: "The October Crisis influenced Soviet–Cuban relations for years," he acknowledged in a 1987 interview with an Italian journalist (Minà 1987, 111).

In this strained and delicate scenario, the island's ideological definition seemed unclear. Although Fidel Castro had firmly proclaimed the socialist character of his revolution in April 1961, and later claimed to be a "Marxist–Leninist" (December 1961), Cuba resisted outright "Sovietization." The Missile Crisis intensified Castro's independence and defiant stance, but he knew that Cuba needed to normalize relations with the Soviets, the only foreign partner able to support and defend the Caribbean island. With that goal in mind, Castro travelled to Moscow in April 1963 and again a few months later in January 1964. However, despite the spectacular staging of both trips, these gestures of goodwill exerted a short-term effect.

The tension between Havana and Moscow was shaped by the unrelenting debate over the appropriate path for a revolution. While the USSR and its Communist allies in Latin America favored "peaceful coexistence" and an institutional road to Socialism, Cuba defined a belligerent revolutionary theory based on armed struggle. The Cubans started to train Latin American guerrillas in its territory and contended that Castro's insurrectional scheme (known as *foquismo*) was applicable across the hemisphere (Spencer 2008, 98–104). As relations with the Soviets deteriorated, Cuba's stern anti-imperialist discourse tended to emphasize the disparity between Third World countries and the superpowers, rather than the Cold War's East–West scheme. Che Guevara

was the most vocal critic of "Soviet imperialism." In 1965, the Argentinian gave a controversial speech in Algeria, in which he accused the Socialist countries of being "accomplices of imperialist exploitation" and urged them to "put an end to their tacit complicity with the exploiting countries of the West" (Reid-Henry 2009, 304). Fidel Castro shared Guevara's views, but he was aware of the damaging effect that this rhetoric might have on his fragile partnership with the East. While the defiant tone with regard to the USSR persisted, Cuba's solidarity with Third World states and revolutionary movements increased. In Havana, Castro hosted the Tricontinental Conference (January 1966), an international meeting gathering representatives from Asia, Africa, and Latin America sharing a "common anti-imperialist stance" (Castro 1966). The meeting offered proof that Cuba had opted for favoring connections with Third World revolutionaries instead of pro-Soviet Communist parties (Lévesque 1988, 141–146). Beyond the affiliation to the Socialist ideology oriented by Moscow, what truly justified the convergence between revolutionaries across the globe was a shared combat against "imperialism." Castro made this clear in his closing speech: "What the peoples have most in common to unite the people of three continents [. . .] is the struggle against imperialism." He later attributed all worldwide contemporary injustices to the perverse effect of US domination: "the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism, the struggle against racism and, in short, all the phenomena which are the contemporary expression we call imperialism, whose center, axis, and principal support [is] Yankee imperialism" (Castro 1966). Beyond the concept of Communism, it is apparent that during the second half of the 1960s, the Cuban ideological pillar shaping its international policy was, first and foremost, anti-imperialism.

Castro was explicitly spelling out his reservations with regard to the Soviet model, considered too mellow and incapable of frontally defying "bourgeois" countries. He also criticized Moscow's ambition to propound a unified scheme

to reach socialism and constantly highlighted Latin America's distinctiveness, such as when he singled out "the abuse of the [Soviet] manuals of Marxist-Leninism," which, in light of contemporaneous global developments, had "become outdated and anachronistic" (Fagen 1969, 136–137).

Many indications reflected Cuba's uneasiness concerning the Soviet approach based on promoting a Socialist economic system rather than emphasizing anti-imperialist struggles: while visiting the island in June 1967, Alexei Kosygin was conspicuously scorned by Cuban authorities; the first conference of the Latin American Organization of Solidarity (OLAS), held in Havana in 1967, was closed with a speech in which Fidel Castro defined guerrilla warfare as the "fundamental route" for revolution, and hinted at criticism regarding the Soviets' "financial and technical aid [. . .] to countries [such as Eduardo Frei's Chile and Raúl Leoni's Venezuela] that are accomplices in the imperialist blockade against Cuba" (Castro 1967); in January 1968, allegations denouncing a plot designed by Cuban "conspirators" in connection with staff members of the Soviet Embassy in Havana led to the "micro-faction affairs" (Blight and Brenner 2002, 134).

This strained situation soon became unsustainable. Moscow was no longer willing to support such an unreliable international partner, threatening to curtail its aid to Cuba. In addition, the armed path promoted by Castro suffered a major blow in 1967 with the death of Guevara in Bolivia, and new "revolutionary" governments (such as that of Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru and Omar Torrijos in Panama since 1968) showcased unexpected routes to progressive transformation, mollifying the island's belligerent posture. In this renewed context, Castro became aware of the need to resolve issues with the USSR, and he thus departed from his previous radicalism. He first announced the revolution's new approach in August 1968, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, when he expressed his support for the Soviet action. Contrary to his former emphasis on the clash between "small" and "big" countries, this time, Castro stood up in defense of the "entire socialist community,"

justifying the military intervention in Prague by the fact that the Eastern country was "heading toward a counterrevolutionary situation, toward capitalism and into the arms of imperialism" (Castro 1968).

Cuba entered an era of increasingly cordial ties with the USSR. Henceforth, in most of his speeches, the Cuban leader made sure to stress Moscow's generosity and even encouraged his allies, such as the Chilean President and socialist activist Salvador Allende (1970–1973), to tighten links with the Kremlin. Anti-imperialism was now a mental scheme directed exclusively at the Americans, while US allies were usually deemed "puppets" of the superpower. When Augusto Pinochet's coup d'état ousted Allende in 1973, Castro viewed it as nothing more than work of the "hand of imperialism," which was "behind the Chilean events" (Castro 1973). Allende's fall was a painful setback for the Cubans. The Chilean left-wing coalition, Popular Unity, facilitated Cuba's reintegration within the Latin American scene. Santiago resumed diplomatic ties with Havana immediately after Allende's electoral victory (November 1970), and Castro made a controversial 3-week *tournée* of the South-American country at the end of 1971. It was the first time that the Cuban leader was officially hosted by a Latin American head of state since 1959, which helped to dismantle the island's isolation in the hemisphere. Allende's overthrow was seen in Cuba as a signal demonstrating that, in Latin America, the necessary conditions for a revolution had not yet been attained. Therefore, Havana redirected its "international duty" to Africa, where Castro found fertile ground for social and radical transformation (Harmer 2013, 85). "Our homeland is not just Cuba," stated Castro, "our homeland is also humanity" (Skierka 2004, 209). Hundreds of thousands of Cubans landed on the African continent to provide military and medical assistance, which led to renewed tensions with the Carter administration (1977–1981). Cuban intervention was particularly striking in Angola, where Castro sent 36,000 soldiers between November 1975 and April 1976, eventually achieving an unusual

success that "prevented the establishment of a government beholden to the apartheid regime" (Gleijeses 2008, 126).

Havana's intervention in Africa became one of the few signs of independence with regard to the USSR. The Cuban 1970s constituted a period of increasingly friendly relations with Moscow, which also entailed the adoption of a harsher domestic policy. In a 1971 speech, Fidel Castro announced what Ambrosio Fornet has coined the *Quinquenio Gris*, a new era in which any expression of dissidence would be severely repressed, particularly in the cultural field: "Our evaluation is political. [. . .] Aesthetic values cannot exist when there is hunger, where there is injustice. [. . .] For a bourgeoisie, anything can have aesthetical value – anything that entertains him, that amuses him, that helps him to linger in his laziness and boredom as an unproductive bum and parasite. But we cannot evaluate a worker, a revolutionary, a communist, in such a way" (Castro 2001). The *Quinquenio Gris* was accompanied by a Soviet-oriented political and economic institutionalization: Cuba entered the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1972; in 1975, the Cuban Communist Party held its first National Congress since its foundation in 1965, with Fidel Castro nominated as first secretary; a year later, the first revolutionary Constitution – which assumed its affiliation to "Marxism–Leninism" – was approved.

In 1979, a significant year, Cuba hosted the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, during which Castro's speeches highlighting the disparity between rich and poor countries were enthusiastically welcomed by world leaders. This could have been wrongly perceived as an effort to distance the island from Moscow, but Castro's refusal to speak out against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979 proved the opposite. That same year, the Sandinista Revolution successfully seized power, reviving hopes of a revolutionary outbreak in Latin America. Havana's links to the Nicaraguan government – as well as the "Cuban-Sandinista support structure [. . .] elsewhere in Central America" (especially to the insurgency in El Salvador) –

created new strains with the "imperialist enemy" and ultimately led to a series of US-backed covert actions against the Sandinistas (Hager and Snyder 2015, 28).

Under Jimmy Carter's rule, however, détente had seemed plausible. An agreement of mutual recognition was signed in 1977, but any prospect of reconciliation was destroyed by Cuba's presence in Africa and by the "Mariel affairs." The latter was a rare moment of popular discontent. In April 1980, more than a thousand Cubans occupied the Peruvian Embassy, which became a protest site for and against Castro's government. To diffuse the situation, the authorities allowed those who Castro had called *escoria* to leave the country from the port of Mariel, resulting in an exodus of 124,779 Cubans, including a significant number of criminals purposely released from prison by the authorities (Kapcia 2009, 41).

Prospects regarding Cuba–USA relations further deteriorated in 1981, when Ronald Reagan was elected president. The landing of 9000 US soldiers on the Caribbean island of Grenada (October 1981), where Castro had sent 800 Cubans – 24 of whom were killed – led the "líder máximo" to compare the Reagan administration with Nazi Germany (Quirk 1993, 822). While clashes with the White House continued to escalate, the 1980s were years of intimate ties with the Eastern world. Due to the growing access to Soviet equipment, canned food, cars, magazines, and many other products, large portions of Cuban society remember this decade with "nostalgia" (Puñales-Alpízar 2012).

However, with Mikhail Gorbachev and the advent of his reformist international agenda, the "Cuban–Soviet friendship" was put in serious jeopardy. Havana remained overwhelmingly dependent on the USSR and its sphere of influence. More than 86% of Cuban foreign trade was established with a CMEA adherent (Skierka 2004, 252). In the USSR, the willingness to continue helping Havana started to wane. The politburo decided to unveil the official figures regarding Soviet foreign assistance. In 1986, many USSR citizens realized with consternation that Cuba's

annual cost amounted to 25 billion rubles (only exceeded by the expenses concerning Vietnam, which represented 40 billion rubles per year) (Zubok 2007, 299).

Fidel Castro was one of the few world leaders who anticipated the outcome of Gorbachev's perestroika (Pavlov 1994, 111), and consequently, he launched a broad national program to counter the effects of Soviet reformism. The "Rectification of errors and negative tendencies" campaign unfolded in an opposite direction to what happened in the East. It was designed to further strengthen the Socialist character of the Cuban Revolution and reject capitalist openings (Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 37) while also silencing numerous activists within the Communist Youth who openly sought to emulate Gorbachev (Kapcia 2009, 41).

With Soviet–Cuban relations deteriorating and worries of a freezing of USSR aid to Havana, Castro began to spell out his concern. In August 1989, the official newspaper *Granma* announced a ban on the distribution of *Sputnik* and *Novedades de Moscú*, two of the most popular Soviet magazines distributed on the island. Castro's apprehensions soared after Soviet participation in a 1990 meeting with leaders of the Cuban diaspora in Miami, which pushed the Cubans to condemn a gesture "that played into the hands of the enemies" (Pavlov 1994, 161). Unable to hide the now inevitable rupture with the Kremlin, Castro did not hesitate to criticize Moscow's renunciation. He distinguished between "two types of communists: good [the Cubans] and bad ones [the Soviets] [...] Those who do not submit to imperialism [...] they call inflexible. Long live inflexibility" (Skierka 2004, 247). By accusing the USSR of excessive complicity with "imperialism," Castro was preparing his own people to face the worst crisis that the Cuban Revolution has ever experienced: the so-called "Special Period in Time of Peace."

Indeed, with the demise of the USSR and an extremely hostile international landscape, living conditions in Cuba soon crumbled. Bicycles substituted cars, constant blackouts interrupted

everyday life at home and at work, the water supply was erratic, and the Cubans started to lose weight (Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 41). Economic reforms soon followed, and Castro was forced to open the country to tourism and, by doing so, to an uncontrollable flow of foreign influences. The end of the Cold War also led to a major ideological reassessment of the revolution. References to the Soviet model disappeared, while Castro repeatedly acknowledged "our mistake of deification of the USSR." To find the authentic foundations of the Cuban Revolution, the official discourse increasingly referred to the 1st years of post-Batista Cuba, resulting in a growing vindication of those who embodied the real roots of the revolution: José Martí and Che Guevara. Castro wanted to "re-Cubanize" his revolution (Miller 2003, 150), which led to a 1992 constitutional amendment.

By 1996, the Cuban economy began to recover as a consequence of subsequent waves of reforms. In spite of Castro's concerns regarding the psychological impact of a potential influx of foreign visitors, tourism eventually displaced sugar as the principal source of wealth (Jatar-Hausmann 1999, 83). The situation was still unstable when a favorable event offered the Cubans an unexpected opportunity to remerge within the Latin American scene: the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998. The US embargo was reinforced throughout the 1990s, increasing the international isolation of the Castro administration, but the Cuban–Venezuelan alliance under Chávez, soon followed by the Latin American "Pink Tide" – a hemispheric leftist turn allowing rapid institutional integration for Cuba – gave "oxygen to Cuba." A commercial accord was signed in 2000, in which Caracas agreed to provide Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil a day in exchange for money, goods, and services (Jones 2008, 288). As a result, Cuban doctors, physical education teachers, agricultural experts, military advisers, and intelligence operatives flocked to Venezuela, engaging in a decisive cooperation between two countries that saw themselves as "revolutionary" and "anti-imperialist" partners.

Growing ideological convergence with sympathetic Latin American governments (Lula Da Silva in Brazil, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, among others) allowed Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez to launch an ambitious regional project designed to buttress hemispheric connections while simultaneously undermining US preeminence on the continent. The Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America (ALBA) was founded in 2004 with the mission of achieving economic integration while purposely excluding the White House. First planned in discussions between Venezuelan and Cuban representatives, ALBA was conceived as an alternative of the US-promoted Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (ALCA). ALBA's first declaration signed by Castro and Chávez in Havana claimed a Bolivarian "Latin Americanist vision" in opposition to "the other America, the expansionist one with imperialist appetite" (Gott 2011, 315). Emboldened by the "commodity boom," Chávez sponsored a series of initiatives meant to outweigh the US influence – the new regional currency *SUCRE*, the Bank of the South, and the television network Telesur – all of which were initiatives that Castro had been dreaming of for years. The battle against "imperialism" in the Americas, thanks to Chávez's vital commitment and financial backing, was seriously threatening the US position in the region.

But Castro could not lead this "golden age" for the Latin American Left, as, due to health issues, he was forced to temporarily delegate his presidential duties in 2006. Unable to recover from an intestinal disease, the *Comandante* finally decided to retire, passing the torch to the long-standing "number two" of the revolution, his brother Raúl Castro. Significant opportunities were enacted under the new leadership, leading to striking economic reforms, the removal of members of Fidel Castro's inner circle, and a steady normalization of Cuba–USA relations (at least until Donald Trump took office). Although Raúl Castro repeatedly claimed to be taking his brother's advice into account, it clearly appeared that the new

administration was following its own path. Fidel Castro's interaction with the Cuban people was limited to his *Reflexiones* in *Granma*, in which he continued to evince his inexhaustible obsession with American imperialism. Throughout the last 10 years of his life, it became increasingly rare to see Castro in public events. The international press was always eager to speculate about Castro's medical condition. The old revolutionary was often caught wearing an Adidas tracksuit while hosting a foreign head of the state – usually an "anti-imperialist" dignitary, such as Evo Morales, Nicolás Maduro, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Castro's "reflections" covered various topics ranging from environmental issues, world politics, agricultural innovations, and nuclear weapons. "Imperialism" always remained at the core of his preoccupations, as in his 2012 press article entitled "World Peace Hanging by a Thread," in which he accused Washington and "its contradictory and absurd imperial policy" of plunging the globe into chaos (Castro 2012). Regarding US authorities, Castro remained unrelenting until his final days. When, in March 2016, Barack Obama became the first American president to visit Cuba in 88 years, thereby crowning the Havana–Washington "thaw," Castro wrote: "We don't need any gifts from the empire," before recounting "nearly 60 years of ruthless blockade" (DeYoung 2016).

Weak and with a trembling voice, Castro gave a last party address in April 2016. He appeared in public once again to celebrate his 90th birthday along with his brother Raúl and the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. On the night of November 25, 2016, President Raúl Castro suddenly appeared on television to give a brief speech and announce the death of the "Commander in Chief of the Cuban Revolution." Drinking alcohol and live concerts were forbidden during a 10-day mourning period, and a funeral procession from Havana to Santiago was organized, tracing, in reverse, Castro's triumphal march to the capital after Batista's fall in January 1959.

Fidel Castro's image proliferated in the following months, while his definition of revolution – originally a speech made in 2000 – was widely displayed in public buildings: "Revolution means to have a sense of history [...], it is achieving emancipation by ourselves and through our own efforts; it is challenging powerful dominant forces from within [...]; it is a profound conviction that there is no power in the world that can crush the power of truth and ideas" (Castro 2000). Sure enough, while the US administration under Donald Trump is imposing new restrictions affecting the Cuban economy, Castro's anti-imperialist legacy remains unlikely to disappear.

Cross-References

▶ Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa

▶ Arab Socialism

▶ Ben Bella, Ahmed (1918–2012)

▶ Cold War

▶ Cold War and Latin America

▶ Cuba: A Historical Context to Anti-imperialism, Nineteenth Century to the Present

▶ Grenadian Socialist Anti-colonialism and US Imperialism

▶ Guerrilla Warfare and Imperialism

▶ Guevara, Ernesto 'Che' (1928–1967)

▶ Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)

▶ Martí, José (1853–1895)

▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism

▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism

▶ Nationalisation

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▶ U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

▶ United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity

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Censorship

▸ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Center-Periphery

▸ Structural Violence and Imperialism

Central America

▸ Nicaragua and Contemporary American Imperialism
▸ U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

Central Asia

▸ Global War and the Battle for Afghanistan

Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)

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Synonyms

Aimé Césaire; Biography; Colonialism; Négritude; Postcolonialism

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of French poet, author, politician, and philosopher Aimé Césaire (1913–2008).

Born on 26 June 1913 into a modest family of Basse-Pointe, Martinique (then, a French colony), Aimé Césaire was a brilliant student at the Lycée Schoelcher, Fort de France. Leaving for Paris with a scholarship to attend the prestigious Lycée Louis le Grand in Paris, he met the future poet and Senegalese president Léopold Sédar Senghor who became his closest friend. In Paris, Césaire discovered that he was a 'Negro' (he confessed later that until he left Martinique in 1931 he did not know what it meant to be black) and African. In 1934 Césaire founded with Senghor and Léon Gontran Damas the journal *L'Étudiant Noir* (Black student) and developed the concept of 'Negritude', embracing blackness and African-ness to counter a legacy of colonial self-hatred. In June 1935, Césaire entered the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he studied American black writers, especially the poets of the Harlem Renaissance. He passed the *agrégation des lettres*, the national competitive examination that leads to a career in teaching. In 1937 he married Suzanne Rossi.

In 1939, the first version of *Cahier d'un retours au pays natal* (Notebook of a return to the native land) appeared in the journal *Volonté's*. The poem was considerably revised before the definitive version in 1956.

As the Second World War began, Césaire and his wife returned to Martinique to take up teaching positions at Lycée Schoelcher. The colonial governor, Admiral Robert, was a staunch partisan of Vichy, and Césaire became increasingly critical of his regime. In 1941 he and Suzanne founded the journal *Tropiques* (Tropics). Césaire travelled to Haiti in 1944, which at the time was still the only independent black republic in the Americas, and he came back with, on the one hand, an admiration for the Haitian Revolution and the people and culture of Haiti, and on the other hand, a contempt for the Haitian elite which had betrayed the revolution.

Upon his return, he gave lectures on Haiti and was asked to run on the French Communist Party ticket for mayor of Fort-de-France and for the new French National Assembly. He won by a landslide in the election of 27 May 1945. Césaire would remain mayor of Fort-de-France for nearly 56 years, until 2001, and serve as a deputy in France's National Assembly until 1956 and again from 1958 until 1993.

Césaire was appointed in 1945 to defend in the National Assembly the proposal to abolish the colonial status of the four French colonies which had all experienced slavery: Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, and Réunion. In his report, he drew up a severe indictment of their situation after 300 years of French colonisation. The four colonies became French departments on 19 March 1946.

Meanwhile, he continued to write, and published a collection of poetry, *Les Armes miraculeuses* (Miraculous arms, 1946) and *Soleil cou-coupé* (Sun cut throat 1948). In 1947, Césaire was with Alioune Diop a confounder of *Présence africaine* (African presence), which evolved in the 1960s into a publishing house of the same name.

In 1956, Césaire participated in the First Congress of Negro Writers and Artists in Paris, broke with the French Communist Party, and turned to theatre. In 1958, at the First Congress of the Martinican Progressive Party, which he had created, he called for federalism.

While he performed his duties as an elected deputy and mayor, he continued to write. In 1959, he was at the Second Congress of Negro Writers

and Artists in Rome. He wrote two more collections of poetry on Africa and the slave experience: *Ferrements* (Iron chains, 1960) and *Cadastre* (1961; translated, 1973).

In 1993, he retired from national political life but remained mayor of Fort de France until 2001. He died on 17 April 2008.

Colonial Racism and Emancipation

As a student in Paris in the 1930s, Césaire had discovered that he was *'Nègre'* (Negro). He rejected the French programme of assimilation, writing in 1939 that, 'The Black youth wants to act and to create. It wants to have its own poets, its own authors who will tell its sorrows and hopes. The Black youth wants to contribute to universalism, to the humanization of humanity' (*Nègreries*, cited in Ngal 1975: 75). But to reach that goal, blacks had to remain true to themselves. *'Negro I am, Negro I will remain',* he declared as late as 2004. Being black and Antillean 'is not about difference; it is not about degree of difference. It is about alterity and singularity'.

During his long political career, Césaire remained a staunch enemy of European colonialism and anti-black racism. In his plays, in his poems, in his essays, in his speeches and in his interventions in the National Assembly, he never ceased to indict colonialism for its violence and brutality, its destructive power and its contempt for non-European civilisations and cultures. He denounced colonial repression and supported anti-colonial insurrections and wars. As a member of the French Communist Party, he participated in peace congresses in the Soviet Union where he travelled widely. As a contemporary of the 1947 insurrection in Madagascar and of its savage repression by French colonial troops, of the war in Indochina (1946–54), of the 1955 repression in Cameroon, of the crushing of revolts in Berlin (1953) and Budapest (1956), of the Cuban Revolution (1959), of the US war against Vietnam (1955–75) and of revolts in the French Antilles, Césaire demonstrated a constant interest in the worldwide struggle of peoples for emancipation.

To Césaire, the National Assembly was an agonistic space in which to deploy his attacks on a French republican government that was betraying its promises and violating human rights in its empire. He pointed to the deep shadow that colonial slavery, colonialism, and racism had cast over republican principles. He was sharp and direct in his interventions, pointing out French racism among its political representatives. In March 1946, as he was condemning the government's policies of repression against the communists who had demonstrated against the colonial war in Indochina, he was insulted by Conservatives. He declared that the manoeuvres to shut him down were 'manifestations of a racism unworthy of the Assembly'. In 1947, he loudly protested against the arrest and condemnation of Malagasy deputies. In 1949, he warned the minister of the interior: 'In colonial countries, it is almost always the perception of injustice which determines the awakening of the colonized peoples'. During an exchange in 1950, he answered a colleague who had asked 'What would you be without France?' with the words 'A man from whom you would not have tried to take away his freedom'; and to, 'You should be very happy that we taught you to read!' he said, 'If I have learned to read, it is thank to the sacrifice of thousands and thousands of Martinicans who wanted their sons to be educated so that they would be able to defend them one day' (Toumson and Henry-Valmore 1993: 112).

He often spoke against the inequalities between France and the Antilles, discussed the problem of Antillean identity and non-development of their economy, criticised a public education that ignored their social and cultural context, and mentioned the persistent question of their administrative status. In the 1960s, he called the French government's encouragement of migration by thousands of young Antilleans to France a 'genocide by substitution'. As late as 1980, 34 years after his speech against the colonial status of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana, and Reunion, Césaire continued to protest against recurrent colonial privileges and to argue that France willingly maintained its overseas departments in a state of non-development and showed a continuous denial of their cultural identity. (The summaries of his interventions at the French National Assembly can be found at [http://goo.gl/xTeqU0].)

His criticism of colonialism was rooted in his own experience of inequalities, injustice, and racism in Martinique, and of the cultural mediocrity of colonial society. Overseas societies in their movement towards equality would come up sooner or later, he argued, against French politics of abstract universalism and denial of cultural identities; and they would have to decide the course of their own emancipation.

The Native Land, Slavery and Colonialism

Césaire's poems, theatre, speeches, and essays all dealt with the experience of being black and colonised and of going through the difficult process of emancipation. In his texts, he explored what it meant to free oneself from a legacy of hatred, contempt, and barbarism in the name of the 'civilising mission'. He had observed how colonised people, 'those whom they inoculated with degeneracy' (Césaire 2001: 38), could become complacent about poverty, colonialism, and self-loathing. Decolonisation was thus first and foremost a process of getting rid of self-hatred produced by racism, of recovering dignity and pride in one's own past and of affirming the worth of all cultures and civilisations. But emancipation was full of obstacles and pitfalls, and in his plays he wrote about the tragedy of being in power, about the impatience the leader felt with the people, about the betrayals and the solitude of the leader.

'My mouth shall be the mouth of those calamities that have no mouth/my voice the freedom of those who break down/in the prison holes of despair', Césaire wrote in *Cahier d'un retours au pays natal.* He spoke for 'those without whom the earth would not be the earth', writing the history of the vanquished, of those made

anonymous by colonial and post-colonial national narratives. Colonial slavery, the matrix of colonial and imperialist policies, had transformed Africans into 'Negroes', human beings with no memory, no pride, and no self-respect. Negroes had to recover the glorious past of their ancestors and remind themselves that even in the slave ship they had remained 'standing and free'.

Colonial slavery had created the inhuman condition; post-slavery colonialism had expanded the system to the whole world. Césaire, however, wanted to be preserved 'from all hatred'. His goal was a new humanism, which he developed again in *Discourse on Colonialism*. Césaire made a connection between Nazism and European colonialism. The corollary of colonial despotism was Nazi warmongering. With colonialism, 'a poison has been distilled into the veins of Europe and, slowly, but surely, the continent proceeds toward savagery' (Césaire 2000: 36; originally published as *Discours sur le colonialisme* by Présence Africaine, 1955). Yet, what Europeans could not forgive Hitler was not the 'crime against man' but the 'crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man' (ibid.).

Discourse on Colonialism was written in the midst of the Cold War when Césaire was still a member of the French Communist Party. He had written positively about Soviet society and had dedicated poems to French communists and to Soviet leaders. US imperialism was a threat to peace, and towards the end of *Discourse*, Césaire warned that it would surpass the barbarism of Western Europe which had nonetheless historically 'reached an incredible level' (2000: 47). 'The barbarism of the United States' would bring 'The modern barbarian. The American hour. Violence, excess, waste, mercantilism, bluff, conformism, stupidity, vulgarity, disorder' (76). 'This Empire' (the US) would be much more destructive than European colonialism. 'American domination – the only domination from which one never recovers. I mean from which one never recovers unscarred' (77).

The bourgeois class and the bourgeois nation state were the enemies of a new humanism and

Césaire named in his conclusion the proletarian revolution as curing universal wrongs. Yet, he never forgot how deep colonial racism had contaminated European thought. His strategy was to put side-by-side quotes by infamous racist writers and by famous and revered humanist writers, all Western, to show how much both had been seduced by racial thinking. The European working class itself had more than often given its consent to the colonial racialised order. Césaire called again for a new humanism that would go beyond racism, the desire to dominate in the name of 'civilisation' that would not seek to erase differences but rather to recognise cultural differences.

In 1956, Césaire resigned from the French Communist Party. In his letter to the general secretary Maurice Thorez with whom he has had good relations, he made reference to the revelations concerning Stalin's crimes in Khrushchev's famous 'Secret Speech'. He wrote that 'The dead, the tortured, the executed' were 'the kind of ghosts that one can ward off with a mechanical phrase'. The French Communists, however, had not been up to the task and had 'shown reluctance to enter into the path of de-Stalinization'. His 'position as a man of color' had allowed him to observe the problems of the Communists and of the European left: 'their inveterate assimilationism; their unconscious chauvinism; their fairly simplistic faith, which they share with bourgeois Europeans, in the omnilateral superiority of the West'. He hoped for an 'African communism' and for 'a universal enriched by all that is particular, a universal enriched by every particular: the deepening and coexistence of all particulars (*un universel riche de tout le particulier, riche de tous les particuliers, approfondissement et coexistence de tous les particuliers)*. European theories of emancipation lacked the capacity to understand the problems faced by black and Asian peoples. The struggle against imperialism was economic, political *and* cultural.

In his plays as well as in his book on Toussaint Louverture, Césaire raised questions about the

difficulties of being in power in a post-colonial situation. He had witnessed the betrayal of the Haitian elite, he foresaw the control that colonial forces would exercise over the fate of the newly independent state, and he observed the fascination of post-colonial leaders for the practices of their white oppressors, and the rise of dictators and their reigns of terror.

Independence

Césaire never fought for Martinique's independence, explaining his position by his respect for the people's will which had chosen to be integrated into the French Republic. Often asked how he could reconcile the scathing tone of his writings with his political position, he answered that he accepted that hiatus and that, in his political life, he had to take into account the general context. His politics at home were driven by his wish to get rid of the legacies of racism and that poor people should get better education, better health, and better opportunities.

Though he testified at the 1962 trial of a young Martinican accused of having written 'Martinique to the Martinicans!' on the walls of the island, he thought that they were taking unnecessary risks; true, the 1946 law had failed to establish equality but 'independence will mean chaos and poverty'. One should not underestimate the hold that successive French governments have put on overseas societies. Repressive policies coexisted with greater dependency on France. At the time of Césaire's death in 2008, Martinique was still deeply dependent on France. An ageing society, it has a middle class of civil servants receiving higher salaries than they would in France (a remnant of the colonial past), from where all appointed posts and political leaders come, 40 per cent of its population is without a high-school diploma, 22 per cent live under the poverty level and more than 37 per cent are unemployed. For €367 million worth of exports there are €2.76 billion worth of imports from France.

Repeatedly tested about the 1946 integration, he explained that national consciousness had not still emerged in the French Antilles. It was understandable, he argued, that Antilleans had first sought to have their citizenship fully recognised and that, sooner or later, they would discover that their naïve belief in equality had been thwarted. In his preface to Daniel Guérin *Les Antilles décolonisées* (Decolonized Antilles, 1956), in which the author criticised the consequences of the 1946 law, Césaire argued that it had paradoxically awakened a sentiment of national consciousness. One had to acknowledge obstacles, he argued, among them the psychological dimension of the legacy of the slave trade and slavery. Before Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, Césaire understood that the colonised's psychological emancipation was fundamental in the process of decolonisation. He shared with other post Second World War writers of the European colonies an interest in the psychology of the colonised and the coloniser, both entangled in a murderous embrace.

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Chile, Globalization, and Imperialism

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Introduction: Imperialism, Free Trade, and Latin America

One of the characteristics of modern capitalism is its global scale. This has implied that capital accumulation positions the different political units in the international system in an economic hierarchy where some units control the main productive and military forces, while others are constituted as dependent economies and specialized in areas of less dynamism and technological content. That international division of labor has resulted in a growing inequality in the distribution of income and power among nations and among the classes within each nation (Hickel 2017).

That dynamic does not function spontaneously. On the contrary, the accumulation and circulation of capital on a global scale require a set of institutions and rules that ensure its operation. These rules focus both on building markets where they did not exist before (what Harvey (2005) defined as "accumulation by dispossession") and on securing preservation of market relations, via the protection of the profit appropriation of foreign investments, the assurance of the commodities flows, the protection of private property over natural resources, and the maintenance of labor discipline.

How are these rules imposed? One of the key roles of the States where the productive forces are concentrated in the international order is to maintain this global hierarchy, and their actions are imperialist when their goal is to impose

those norms to the peripheries, either through formal (military invasions) or informal means (negotiations with local elites, trade agreements, etc.) (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). Thus, although in the capitalist dynamic the global economy and the interstate system of sovereign nations are formally separated, the first dimension depends on the imperialist interventions in the second one to ensure the institutional matrix of its operation (Wood 2003).

Thus, capitalist imperialism traditionally refers to the set of actions of the states from core economies aimed at building, securing, and perpetuating the rules of the global capitalist market in the peripheries either through formal or informal actions. The success of these measures at a global scale generates what is conventionally identified as "globalization." This dynamic was identified already in 1841 by Friedrich List, when he characterized the hegemonic power of the time, England, as the protector of the international free trade regime and the key actor that restricted peripheral countries the policy space to erect protectionist measures in order to consolidate their own industrialization process (List 1841; Chang 2002).

But imperialism not only is a unilateral phenomenon (going from the imperialist core to a passive periphery) but also implies the active participation of the capitalist classes from the peripheries. In particular, the exporting class, whose sources of capital accumulation are the areas in which the periphery has comparative advantages (the latter being less a neutral outcome of the international market and more an active imposition of the empire on the colonies), are active in promoting internally the agenda of the imperialist core (free trade and policy space restrictions).

How were these actions deployed in the Latin American periphery during the contemporary period?

The financial crisis of the 1980s marked a break in the political-economic trajectory of Latin America. The regional growth of the 1970s was largely sustained by increasing indebtedness derived from a sudden increase in liquidity in the financial system from the developed world. That cycle of indebtedness had an end with the

financial panic during the Mexican moratorium of 1982, which ended with a cut in the financial flows and a region tied to a massive debt with international banks (mainly from the USA) equivalent to 400% of exports (see Bértola and Ocampo 2012).

The debt was not only a problem of the debtor but also of the issuer. One of the possibilities of the region was to default, which would extend the crisis to the US economy. In this context, the USA together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) offered financial assistance and active collaboration to the region to renegotiate the debt in exchange for a series of structural reforms that unleashed the capitalist market economy from the series of regulations, policies, and restrictions that the region implemented since the postwar period (focused on consolidating a process of industrialization together with income and wealth redistribution). This US-IMF-WB agenda implied, as is well-known, fiscal austerity, privatizations, and the radical trade opening that laid the foundations for neoliberalism in the region (Stallings 1992).

In this way, US-IMF-WB imperialist actions forced the periphery (under the threat of making the region a pariah in the international financial system) to establish the minimal institutional bases for free trade (Peet 2009). These reforms (latter named as the "Washington Consensus") reinserted the region into the global capitalist market and repositioned it as a supplier of raw materials and low-skilled labor-intensive goods for the core regions.

A second moment of the US imperialism came during the 1990s, and it focused on the multilateral and bilateral fields. In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established after almost a decade of negotiations and pressures from the USA and Europe to modify trade rules and impose new stricter measures on intellectual property rights (IPRs) and increase protection of investors' property rights (Chang 2008; Wade 2003). In parallel, since the late 1990s, the USA began its strategy of "competitive liberalization" to, through a series of regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with the elites from peripheral countries, strengthen free trade rules

beyond the WTO norms, especially in the area of financial deregulation, more stringent IPRs, and new protections of foreign investments (Gallagher 2008). In this way, the informal mechanism of imperialism consolidated a vast network of institutional arrangements that ensured the circulation of capital on trade, investment, financial, and property protection areas in the peripheries.

The results of this imperial free trade agenda in Latin America were deep: intense regional deindustrialization, stagnated growth, and strong financial instabilities during the 1990s and mid-2000s (Torres 2019). The region could only temporarily recover economically with the exogenous shock of the commodity boom (an outcome of both financial speculation on commodities from the core financial institutions and the rise in demand from China). However, this recovery deepened the tendencies of deindustrialization and reprimarization of the region's export basket and has strengthened the trade dependence with China (Gallagher 2016). Is China becoming today a new imperial actor that disputes US hegemony over the region, in the same way as the latter did with the UK since the end of the nineteenth century?

In these international dynamics of building an imperial free trade framework in Latin America, Chile has been considered by the liberal academy as an example of the economic success of this strategy for the peripheries (Kuczynski and Williamson 2003). Indeed, Chile is nowadays the most economically open country, with the largest number of free trade agreements and with the highest GDP per capita in the region. Is Chile a case that represents the positive outcome of the imperialist strategy?

Trying to answer that question and understand the nature of the imperialist relations in Chile is the objective of this chapter. As will be shown in the next sections, in the Chilean case, it is possible to detect all the imperialist actions that have been presented so far: the constant US imperialist pressures to impose a free trade agenda in the peripheries, the emergence of China and its impact on the peripheries' productive matrix, and how these dynamics set strong limits on the policy space that countries need in order to pursue their own

autonomous industrial policies. In the last section, a summary of the argument will be presented, and certain general ideas for a national program that challenges the imperialist structure and addresses the objective of autonomous development will be considered.

Chile: The Forerunner of Globalization

Chile began its transition to neoliberalism in the mid-1970s, around a decade before the imperialist imposition on the region through the structural reforms during the debt crisis. However, that does not imply that US imperialism has not played a key role in the country, on the contrary.

The intensification of the class struggle during the socialist government of Allende ended with the Pinochet military coup in 1973 that repressed the leftist political forces. During Allende's government, the USA actively financed opponents and economically blocked the socialist government, especially after the nationalization of the copper industry in the hands of US companies (Kornbluh 2013; Shiraz 2011; Petras and Morley 1975).

In turn, those who imposed the pro-free trade agenda during the military dictatorship were a group of economists trained at the University of Chicago, where the neoliberal vision of economics and politics was taught and promoted. This academic training project was actively promoted by the US government, and its objective was, in a kind of "cultural imperialism," to influence regional economic policies. As Juan Gabriel Valdés pointed out, these academic training programs at the University of Chicago were "a striking example of an organized transfer of ideology from the United States to a country within its direct sphere of influence... the education of these Chileans derived from a specific project designed in the 1950s to influence the development of the Chilean economic thinking" (quoted in Klein 2007, p. 62).)

In this way, through financing the destabilization of Allende's government and via the preparation of technical cadres for Pinochet's reforms, the USA was a key player in actively promoting the new Chilean economic order (Kornbluh 2013). This new order was characterized by two dynamics: a cycle of accumulation by dispossession and a strengthening of free trade rules.

The first involved the consolidation of large financial conglomerates in the economy and the expansion of capitalist accumulation to the area of social services. The wave of privatization of public companies permitted the financial capital to take a leading role in the economy. In 1969, financial conglomerates controlled 41 companies, while in 1978 it jumped to 278, particularly in the financial and natural resource areas (Fernández 2004). Although Allende had successfully eliminated the landholding and redistributed the property to the peasants, the dictatorship cut all subsidies and protective measures to that sector, initiating a massive transfer of ownership from smallholding to nascent capitalist conglomerates and thus initiating the capitalist accumulation of agriculture (agro-capitalists went from controlling 36% of total agricultural land in 1973 to 53.2% in 1979) (Kay 2002). In the area of social services, the dictatorship dismantled the former Chilean Welfare State and commodified the pension, educational, and health system, resulting in a massive expansion of the areas for capitalist accumulation.

The second dynamic involved the complete integration of Chile into the global capitalist economy. The tariffs dropped down to 10% at the end of the 1970s, the property rights of foreign investors were highly protected, the financial system was liberalized, and the capital account was opened. Chile, in this way, became the first economy to adopt what in the 1980s and 1990s would be the US imperialist agenda for the periphery: the construction of a market society where material reproduction and the pattern of productive specialization of the economy would be determined exclusively by the imperatives of capitalist accumulation (Ahumada and Solimano 2019).

However, this project quickly entered a crisis. The radical trade and financial liberalization, together with the cuts in subsidies and protections to the national industry and the wage repression, generated a sharp fall in both consumption and internal investment, which led to high unemployment and increasing deindustrialization

throughout the 1970s. This situation only managed to sustain itself temporarily through a cycle of indebtedness derived from the growing liquidity in the financial system. Financial capital, in this way, sustained a repressed productive order based on an unsustainable credit flow (what is nowadays defined as the "financialization" of the economy) (Ahumada 2019).

The regional crisis of 1982 destroyed the Chilean model. The sudden cut in the financial flows particularly impacted an economy with fragile productive bases such as Chile. The crisis completely destabilized the dictatorship and rearticulated the political opposition.

In the middle of this internal process, Pinochet accepted the IMF and WB credits in exchange for new measures that were required such as a radical export turn of the economy in order to ensure the debt payment. That was in line with the project of the nascent exporting capitalist class that had consolidated during the 1970s. The forestry, fishing, and agricultural areas had initiated a modernization of their productive bases that, during the trade opening, permitted a radical export expansion. The export capitalists offered Pinochet a package of pro-export policies in the areas in which the country had displayed comparatives advantages (on how this economic modernization had its origin in an active entrepreneurial role of the state in the 1960; see Lebdioui 2019).

This export capitalist class demanded the dictatorship of the implementation of package of policies such as a strong exchange devaluation, subsidies to nontraditional exports, and protection of traditional agriculture (Silva 1996). Those measures were implemented in order to restore economic growth, ensure the political support of agricultural sectors to the dictatorship, and lay the foundations for an economic dynamism around the nascent areas of economic competitiveness.

At the end of the 1980s, Chile had, on the one hand, consolidated an export-led growth around natural resources, with a growing power of the exporter capitalists in the economic order, and, on the other hand, the opposition had succeeded in the plebiscite, opening the doors to a new democratic period at the beginning of the 1990s. It will be during this period when Chile definitively consolidated its insertion into the capitalist globalization and where the USA deployed a new imperial strategy to consolidate its economic hegemony.

Chile in the Orbit of the US Free Trade Imperialism

As noted in the introduction, at the beginning of the 1990s, the US imperialism (via structural reforms) had already made Latin America dismantle the social-developmental institutional framework that it had installed during the second half of the twentieth century and established the fundamental bases for free trade (the so-called globalization). With that order already established, the USA moved to a multilateral consolidation strategy via the nascent WTO and the attempt to establish regional free trade agreements (this section is based on Ahumada 2018, 2019).

In that context, Chile joined the nascent "globalization" under the leadership of an extractive-technocratic power block: the extractive sector (forestry, fishing, mining, fruit) was the source of Chile's export dynamism and a nascent liberal technocracy anchored in the Ministries of Finance and Economy, which would become in the 1990s in key political actors in establishing the main state policies (Silva 2010). This power block, in order to expand the export dynamism, implemented three key measures in the early 1990s: tariff reduction (to reduce the price of inputs), establishment of capital controls (to discourage speculative financial capitals and privilege entry of productive FDI), and the beginning of a series of free trade agreements to ensure the exporters' elimination of non-protectionist regulations for their commodities in foreign markets.

Within this insertion strategy, Chile joined the nascent WTO, begun a wave of trade agreements with regional countries, and tried to become a member of the new NAFTA. Both the WTO and the idea of extending NAFTA to other countries in the region were keys for the US imperialist strategy of securing a framework that would make permanent pro-free market rules in trade, foreign

investment, and patent areas. For Chile, becoming a member of the WTO gave the power bloc a legitimacy in the international sphere that it needed. In turn, the invitation to join NAFTA allowed exporters to have better terms of access in these markets than their competitors. In this sense, the interests of the Chilean power bloc were in line with the US imperialist strategy.

Already during the negotiation of Chile's entry into NAFTA, the USA required Chile to substantially modify its investment rules, financial regulations, and IPRs. In effect, the USA demanded Chile to eliminate capital controls, eliminate export subsidies, and increase the protection of patents. While Chile failed to make the changes because the US Congress did not approve Chile's membership in the end, these demands will reappear again when Chile's power bloc subsequently attempted to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA).

Chile's entry into the WTO reproduced the same principle that the USA sought to impose on the regional agenda. In fact, under pressure from the WTO, Chile modified its IPRs (expanding the duration of patents from 15 to 20 years), deepened foreign investment safeguards, and virtually eliminated export promotion measures that it had imposed since the 1980s. That affected exporters but not so much as to refuse to be part of that agreement.

The Chilean strategy of securing foreign markets for its exports (through bilateral trade agreements and becoming a member of the WTO) supported their competitiveness and produced an important economic expansion. In fact, during the 1990s, the country grew by around 6% per year, and manufacture exports jumped from around 4.5% of the total exports at the beginning of the 1990s to 10% at the end of the decade (Data from World Development Indicators). Chile had gone from a growth anchored in an unsustainable indebtedness during the 1970s to the one anchored in export extractivism during the 1990s. As will be seen in section "The Stagnation of Chile's Periphery and Its Social Contradictions" although this new type of growth allowed Chile to overcome the crisis and gave it a decade of economic dynamism, it undermined key economic pillars necessary for long-term sustainable development.

This dynamism, however, was interrupted by the Asian crisis of 1998 and its impact throughout the region. The crisis generated a half-decade of regional economic stagnation and the end of the Chilean boom (Bértola and Ocampo 2012; Ffrench-Davis 2018). Not only did the Asian crisis undermine the Chilean boom, but the exporting classes themselves began to modify their strategy at the end of the decade: from an export diversification around natural resources (strongly supported and subsidized by the state since the 1960s until the mid-1990s) to favor its regional expansion maintaining the same productive structure. That is, it was decided to "export" the business structure to other countries without redirecting investments toward deepening the diversification process. In other words, after diversifying their exports via state support and new markets, the capitalist exporters stick around these sectors abandoning the strategy to continue the diversification process.

The stagnation of the Chilean model, both in its growth and diversification, generated a series of doubts in the political sphere regarding the efficacy of the trade and development strategy policy that the country had taken. A more heterodox alternative (suggested by a series of economists from the government) was to integrate Chile into the Mercosur in order to establish a unitary regional voice in the international system and privilege the regional market for exports with higher-technological content. However, this strategy, which had gained support in the political system in the early 2000s, was abandoned when, on the one hand, the export sector demanded a more intense agenda of free trade, particularly toward signing free trade agreements with megamarkets (e.g., USA, EU, and China), and the financial sector demanded to deepen the capital market liberalization and, on the other hand, the USA offered Chile to begin the negotiation of an FTA immediately.

The USA saw in the strengthening of Mercosur a threat to its regional hegemony. Chile's potential entry into the Mercosur was a threat to its intention to strengthen its regional free trade rules. The

offer of a FTA to Chile was, thus seen, a short-term tactical movement to stop the growth of Mercosur. But it was also part of a more long-term strategic action.

Why did the USA have such an interest in Chile, a country that represented less than 1% of its exports? The interest was geostrategic. The strategy of "competitive liberalization" (i.e., consolidating free trade rules through a series of bilateral free trade agreements that would impose rules in the various economic areas even more stringent than in the WTO) required signing agreements with small countries that had a position of trade dependence with the USA and that would be willing to yield some regulatory framework for better access to the US market (Feinberg 2003). Chile was useful to the USA because the internal financial and export elites were willing to accept its demands in order to have better market access to Chile's main export economy (in the early 2000s, the USA represented about 25% of its total exports) and because, if the agreement was reached under the terms demanded by the USA, it would serve as the basis for future free trade agreements with other countries in the region (as was later with the FTA with Peru, Colombia, and CAFTA).

The Chile-US FTA (signed in 2003) implied that the Chilean extractive capitalist class would gain better access to the US market for its commodities (e.g., elimination of protectionist tariffs, make the tariff privileges given under the GSP mechanism permanent), but in return the government accepted US pressures to eliminate capital controls and strengthen IPRs. The agreement between the extractive capitalist class and the USA marked a milestone in Chilean trade policy: Chile abandoned its intention to collaborate in forming a more united region and turned to a strategy of market opening with the developed world yielding to US pressures.

From then on, Chile deepened its insertion in the world market through a wave of new FTAs (China, South Korea, Japan, P4, Vietnam, etc.) in order to position the extractive class as a global competitor. Such competitive positioning, however, not only did not prevent but also deepen the stagnation in export diversification, anchoring Chile into a typically extractive and peripheral economy. For example, in the trade relations with the USA, copper still accounts for around 30% of Chile's total exports, processed fish around 15%, low-processing forest products 10%, and fruits 20% (Data taken from the Observatory of Economic Complexity for the year 2017).

However, since the mid-2000s, a new key player in Chile's economic relations emerged. China has quickly become the main trading partner for the extractive class, displacing even the USA and substantially modifying the Chile's trade structure. The following section will briefly discuss the Chile-China relations in the context of the emerging power of China vis-à-vis the USA and Latin America.

The Dragon in the Room: China Coming to Chile

As transnational capitalism developed since the 1950s, the economic hegemony of the USA weakened in the mid-1970s with the emergence of other competitors on the global scene: Japan and the Southeast Asian tigers, which sustained since the 1960s' average growth rates of 6.5–7.0% per year. However, it has been China who has become nowadays the greatest threat to the USA in the dispute over global economic hegemony. Indeed, since 1980, China has sustained annual average growth rates of almost 10% during four decades, thus becoming the fastest-growing economy during the current phase of globalization and the second largest economy in terms of GDP, after the USA.

In complete opposition to the imperialist free trade agenda of the USA, China since the 1980s (and for that matter, Japan and South Korea before) has implemented a series of industrial, financial, and trade policies that have focused on protecting and promoting a quick export-led industrialization. In fact, the entrepreneurial role of state-owned enterprises, the political use of the exchange rate as a measure to increase its export

competitiveness, the national content requirements to foreign FDI, and the active support (through subsidies, long-term credits, and R&D financing) to "national champions" in high-tech industries (such as telecommunications) are part of a general strategy of economic integration that is in complete opposition to the agenda imposed by the USA to Latin America since the 1980s (Burlamaqui 2015).

In the context of the last 20 years, characterized by the intensity of technical progress and the emergence of new competitors, such as China, India, and Asia Pacific in general, the world economy (and Latin America) has undergone strong changes in its patterns of competitiveness, particularly with the emergence of global value chains. In this way, the new productive pole of Asia, but fundamentally the Chinese dynamism, has reconfigured the core-periphery relations, challenging the current hegemony of the USA and the West (Rosales 2009).

Indeed, after a series of successive cyclical crises that occurred between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, starting in 2003, Latin America, but especially South America, was favored by the upward cycle of commodity prices exported by the region. The key factor in this price boom (which would bring the highest growth rates to the region since before the debt crisis of the 1980s, through an export expansion and a substantial improvement in the terms of trade) was the expansion of China's demand for commodities such as oil, soybeans, and copper, among other (Jenkins 2011). These regional goods were largely intermediate inputs that China required for its accelerated pace of growth and structural change (Perrotti 2015).

This boom generated a short-term "virtuous" core-periphery scheme for the region so far as its terms of trade improved in its favor, allowing left government to increase social expending, resulting in an important period of poverty reduction. In this context, various Latin American countries led by governments of different political signs made a deep trade and financial cooperation bet with China, thus gaining more autonomy

from US-IMF-WB complex, partially reconfiguring the core-periphery geopolitical relationship. However, this favorable price cycle came to an end in 2014, and the final balance for the region was a deep deindustrialization and reprimarization of its economies (Mavroeidi and Ahumada 2017).

The case of Chile is key for understanding these trends, since the expansion of the copper demand by China in its process of structural change made Chile a nation highly benefited from the price boom. The relations between Chile and China began 50 years ago, when in December 1970, after being elected as president of Chile Salvador Allende, it became the first country in South America to recognize the Chinese mainland government.

During the Pinochet dictatorship, these relationships were characterized by their pragmatism and based on the principle of noninterference, mainly in geopolitical terms. With the end of the Chilean dictatorship and the beginning of the democratic governments since the 1990s, these relations intensified and expanded toward economic exchange. During the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000), these relationships were further deepened by the signature of three agreements, the Agreement on Stimulation and Mutual Protection of Investment (1994), the Maritime Transport Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Fisheries (1995), and in 1996 the Space Cooperation Agreement to which the Cooperation Agreement in Agriculture, Livestock and Science and Technology was added. Also, during the period, and as a way to confirm these strong relations, Chile was also the first Latin American country to support China's entry into the WTO that materialized in 2001. (A detailed description of the evolution of Chile-China relations can be found in Lee and Hongying (2011).)

In 2006, in the context of the commodity boom, China and Chile signed an FTA. Even though most of Chile's exports were copper, China was also becoming an important market for the extractive class as a whole. As forestry, fruits, fish, and wine sectors expanded their

exports to the Asian giant, the extractive class demanded the government to consolidate better market access to China, which resulted in the signature of the FTA.

This FTA, then, came as a way to institutionalize the bilateral trade expansion that began since the end of the 1990s. In fact, in the beginning in the 2010s, about 25% of Chile's total exports went to China and that bilateral trade was of the order of about 20 billion dollars. By the middle of this decade, China had already become Chile's first trading partner, and Chile is nowadays the most trade-dependent country to China in the region. In fact, if in 1999 Chile's trade with China represented less than 2% of its GDP, by the end of the 2010s, it represented around 15% (the   biggest share in the region) (Data from UNCTADstat).

Despite these significant export flows, and beyond various agreements and cooperation treaties that have been concluded between both countries since the signing of the FTA, especially in various areas of technology transfer and adaptation, trade patterns have not exceeded a classical core-periphery logic: China exports to Chile mainly medium- and high-tech goods, while Chile exports to China mainly non-processed copper. Chile's exports to China are, at the end of the 2010s, around 50% primary commodities, and the rest is natural resources with low levels of processing (Ibid.).

In other words, since the FTA, Chile has not taken advantage of these relations to diversify its productive structure and export basket with China; on the contrary, it has deepened the reprimarization of its exports. One reasons that this trade relation has not been able to spark a process of productive transformation lies in China's specific strategy toward foreign natural resources and energy supplies. As Rocha and Bielschowsky (2018) have analyzed, China has different strategies depending on the type of foreign economic sector and product it needs. In contrast to oil imports (where Chinese's strategy has been to offer credits to countries in exchange for secure future oil supply, as in Ecuador or Venezuela), in the case of copper, of which 66%

comes from Chile, the main strategy has been to secure the supply through transnational operations (buying the commodity to foreign or national firms through market exchange).

In summary, the situation of contemporary Chile is one of two different types of dependencies, functioning at the same time but in a tense complementarity. First, Chile is still part of the US imperialist geopolitical area of influence: the formal ties with the US agenda have led Chile to apply trade, financial, IPR, and FDI regimes that overprotect the interest of the financial rentiers (through the elimination of the capital controls mechanisms), techno-rentiers (through the enforcement of IPRs), and extractive rentiers (through the deregulation and prohibition of pro-development policies toward FDI, most of which go to extractive areas) and legally restrict the space for the state to implement pro-development policies (Ahumada 2019). These regimes, as indicated above, have been actively promoted by the USA through multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements and by the national exporter class, which interests lie in the increase competitiveness of the extractive exports (Rodrik 2018).

Second, Chile's trade dependence to China has reinforced a typical nineteenth-century core-periphery trade relation: non-processed natural resources in exchange for high-tech goods. While this has considerably increased the demand for the commodities in which Chile has comparative advantages, it has also put pressure for deepening the deindustrialization of the internal economy, the reprimarization of the export basket together with the intensification of a dynamic of "extractive land-grabbing" to feed this increasing demand.

Both dynamics (US pro-rentier rules adopted by Chile and trade dependence with China) lock Chile into a peripheral kind of economic growth *without* the necessary policy space for the state to implement active policies to redirect resources toward sectors beyond the extractive ones and with more technological content. As the next section will show, this challenges the economic, social, and political sustainability of Chile's order.

The Stagnation of Chile's Periphery and Its Social Contradictions

The decade of the 2010s has shown clear signs of the exhaustion of the Chilean extractivist strategy of insertion into the world economy. This pattern, an outcome of the national export class interests and the US imperialist geopolitical strategy to the region, has produced four key economic structural limitations: (i) an export basket highly dependent on extractivist sectors, (ii) a poorly diversified productive structure with low technological complexity that does not allow greater productivity gains to increase long-term growth, (iii) a loss of policy space to strengthen an autonomous industrial sector (as explained in the previous sections), and (iv) exacerbation of the structural productive heterogeneity and its consequent effect on inequality and job insecurity.

The previous tendencies help to explain the contemporary growth stagnation of the Chilean economy. Its annual average growth between 2008 and 2018 has been 3.1%, and a rate significantly lower than 7.4% reached between 1990 and 1998, when neoliberalism promised greater benefits and progress to the region in general and Chile in particular. The boom in prices of raw materials, such as copper, failed to replicate the growth rates experienced during the first years of the 1990s: between 2004 and 2007, the Chilean economy grew 5.7% and between 2008 and 2013 just 3.8%. (For a detailed analysis of the data, see Ffrench-Davis (2018).)

The direct causes behind the stagnation are (i) the end of the commodity price boom boosted by China (2013) and (ii) the global geopolitical context given by various tensions such as the "trade war" of China-USA (2018–2019). However, deeper causes are the stop of transnational companies to invest in mining (at the beginning of 2019, several investment projects were frozen), a cycle of diminishing returns in natural resource sectors (forest plantations, fishery catches, aquaculture production of salmon and trout, and manufactures based on natural resources in general). To this must be added lower domestic productive investment in infrastructure areas and advances in technological innovation in broad terms (see Díaz and Ffrench-Davis 2019).

The upward price commodity cycle, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, generated a reprimarization of the national economy but also the increasing dominance of the service sector. Indeed, the value added of primary activities (including large copper mining) in 2010 represented 11% of the total GDP, while in 2018 it reached 15.7%. Also, the value added of the tertiary sector, strongly dominated by financial services and retail, went from representing 58% in 2003 to 65% in 2018. The sector that lost weight during the upward cycle was the manufacturing, moving from a 23% to 19%. The premature deindustrialization that the Chilean manufacturing industry suffered from 1973 with the shock policies implemented by the dictatorship, accentuated by the debt crisis in the 1980s, and "normalized" during the 1990s and 2000s is now deepening again since the 2010s (Torres 2020).

In relation to exports, the reprimarization and deindustrialization are even more evident. In 2005, the primary sector represented a 42% of the total exports, while in 2018 it rose to 44%. This rise has been at the expense of natural resource-based manufacture exports that have felt from 49% to 44% during that period. Also, before and after the upward price cycle, exports of high-, medium-, and low-technology manufactures – historically marginal – fall from 10% to 7%. This reality is far from the ones of economies that have always been considered a feasible pattern of development for the Chilean case: South Korea and Finland. In the case of South Korea, exports of high-, medium-, and low-technology goods represent nowadays more than 60%, and its exports based on natural resources are around 20%. In Finland, meanwhile, exports of goods with high technological content are close to 55%, and those of manufactures based on natural resources 40%, leaving natural resources with a share of total exports below 5%.

A particular feature of Latin American underdevelopment described by Pinto (1970) is the so-called structural or productive

heterogeneity, according to which, in the peripheral countries, there are very high labor productivity gaps between sectors and firms (which is also expressed in high wages and profit gaps). One key outcome of this phenomenon is the persistent situations of income inequality. In the current context of globalization, and as a consequence of the pattern of international insertion adopted by Chile since the 1990s, structural heterogeneity has tended to intensify, among companies differentiated by size, productive sector, between national or transnational property and geographical location. Strong productive gaps coexist between large companies (whether they belong to national economic groups or multinational conglomerates) and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The wage differentials play in favor of those workers employed in large national or foreign companies, preferably exporters in detriment of workers in SMEs, where the majority of the labor force is employed (see Infante and Sunkel 2009).

The economic area that most clearly reflects this income inequality, as a consequence of the productive heterogeneity, in the historical and also more recent context is the labor market. In Chile, a high degree of precariousness and labor flexibility has been maintained along with the deepening of the external insertion. With this, low effective unionization rates have become a persistent characteristic of Chile's labor market. For example, while in 1973 a 33.7% of the labor force was unionized, in 2013 it was just the 14.2% (Durán and Kremerman 2015).

The impact of the structural heterogeneity, as well as labor flexibility and prevailing labor practices, has been the maintenance of a very unequal income distribution both at class and individual levels. In relation to the class income distribution, between 1950 and 2013, the share of wage in the total product has fallen from 43% to 34%, well below countries with higher union density such as Argentina and Brazil (46% and 44%, respectively) and the OECD average, where this participation has remained stable at around 65%. Regarding personal income distribution, Chile still shows very high inequalities, with a Gini index close to 50%. Recent literature on top income shares also reveals that the richest 1% of the population accumulates 16% of the total income. Based on these data, it is possible to conclude that Chile is one of the most unequal countries in Latin America and in the OECD during the period 1964–2015 (Flores et al. 2019).

Conclusions: Toward an Autonomous Development Path

Imperialism represents the set of political actions that the capitalist core countries perform on the peripheries to ensure the circulation and accumulation of capital at a global scale. For this purpose, core countries seek both to ensure the institutional order of free trade (protection of the property rights and the right of commodity flows within and between countries) and expand capitalist accumulation toward new non-commodified areas (accumulation by dispossession).

In the case of Chile, these actions by the USA have varied. Initially, imperialism expressed in a very direct way: from financing the overthrow of the Allende government to investing on the training of technicians who would impose a free trade agenda in Chile during the dictatorship. However, in the early 1990s, imperialist actions turned to more informal tactics. This shift toward informal imperialism led many academics to consider that imperialism as a phenomenon had disappeared from the Chilean reality. However, this was mainly because they were unable to identify the new imperial tactics and their goals.

Indeed, the 1990s were characterized by Chile's insertion into the WTO (which led the country to eliminate export promotion policies and strengthen its patents' regime) and then, in early 2000s, to negotiate the FTA with the USA (which it undermined the project of a united South America at the international level and eliminated the possibility of implementing capital controls for Chile).

This project was led by a Chilean extractive export class that emerged in the mid-1980s and that constitutes the key pillar of Chilean insertion into the global economy. Indeed, much of the interests in adhering to the US geopolitical strategy in the region (wave of FTAs) was actively promoted by this class. In this way, US imperialism was articulated with internal sectors in

promoting a Chile's neoliberal pattern of economic insertion.

This insertion, which has made Chile dependent on an export structure anchored in natural resources, has received a demand shock with China's industrial growth and demand for new raw materials. In fact, China has now become Chile's main trading partner, with the cost of consolidating a type of exchange that has not been seen since the nineteenth century: exporting raw materials in exchange for consumer goods with high technological content.

However, this type of insertion is displaying a series of economic, social, and political contradictions. Chile has lost its former economic dynamism while the productivity of the economy has stagnated since 20 years ago. An important cause of this is the overdependence of Chile's growth regime on the exploitation of natural resources, which has entered a phase of profound decreasing returns. In turn, the structural productive heterogeneity has produced a deep inequality and job insecurity, which has generated a social outbreak at the end of 2019 that has dismantled the political stability of the national order.

In parallel, the environmental unsustainability that the extractive pattern has generated has deployed a new wave of revolts in different regions of the country. In this sense, the pattern of insertion is nowadays in a period of deep stagnation and questioning. What kind of solutions are possible to build that could permit a type of development sustained in a non-extractive and autonomous growth of national productive capacities?

The option for a non-extractive development implies a series of green industrial policies that could allow the building of new knowledge-intensive sectors beyond natural resource areas and that could allow to diversify exports beyond the extractive exploitation done by the exporter capitalist class (as the case of Finland's economic boom through export diversification in the 1970s has shown). Also, it is necessary a new financial regime that can redirect capital to sectors with greater productive potential and protect the economy from the international financial instabilities (as did the national banks in Germany, Japan, and South Korea during their economic takeoffs). Finally, it is necessary to make the patent regime more flexible, encouraging free use and reducing the power of patent monopolies (as China and South Korea have done in their respective takeoffs).

These measures demand a new social pacts and a new active role of the state in controlling key economic dynamics and imposing new pro-development (and not pro-rent accumulation) rules to foreign and national capitalist's investments.

This pro-development agenda is a complex possibility in the current context of dependence and subordination to the hegemonic powers of global capitalism. In this sense, the Chilean development challenge is a political one, both in the national and international dimensions. The great challenge that lies ahead is how to build a pattern of insertion in order to increase the space for developmental policies (which implies reformulating the multilateral and bilateral agreements promoted by the USA) and implementing measures that reduce the power of capital over local aggregate investment, thus undermining its sovereignty over that sphere. That challenge is probably the deepest that lies ahead and is the one that will only be resolved in the field of politics.

Cross-References

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ Industrialisation and Imperialism
▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity

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China

China and Neocolonialism

China: Anti-imperialism from the Manchu Empire to the People's Republic

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; China; Communism; Imperialism; Nationalism

Definition

This essay explores China's struggles against imperialism from the eighteenth century to the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

Renowned American historian Charles Beard in 1947 warned that a US policy of military interventionism in defence of economic interests would lead to 'perpetual war for perpetual peace', a phrase that would be used over and over again by critics of US foreign policy, from the historian William Appleman Williams to the playwright and man of letters Gore Vidal. Imperialism would lead to this in China and much of the world.

There are three major organisational systems which have been used by imperialist powers in modern history. The first and best known is colonialism – the establishment of formal colonies; for example, the British in India and later Chinese Hong Kong, the French in Indochina, the Japanese in Korea and later Chinese Taiwan, and the US in the Philippines, all before the First World War. The second, establishing 'protectorates' or 'satellites', is characterised by indirect control: establishing military bases and economic control through direct investment or marginal taxation on investments, one-sided trade agreements, with military intervention when its power is threatened. The third and broadest is sphere of influence, characterised by multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements granting the imperialist nation special privileges compared to its international rivals.

Until the rise of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century, imperialists sought to establish colonies to which they could export raw materials. These colonies would purchase finished goods from metropolitan centres, and expand protected markets at the expense of rivals, leading to wars in which colonies were often used as pawns.

In the later eighteenth century, these wars led to the first successful anti-colonial revolution in history: the American Revolution against the British Empire. Within two generations, this was followed by South and Central American anti-colonial revolutions against the Spanish and Portuguese Empires as Europe and Britain were embroiled in wars against first the French Revolution and then Napoleon.

While these wars and revolutions swept Europe and the Western Hemisphere, an industrial revolution developed, firstly in Britain. Despite the loss of its American colonies, Britain would use its new economic power to establish the largest empire in human history, inaugurating a world system which would come to be termed 'imperialism' by the end of the nineteenth century.

Imperialism and the Chinese Empire

China, with its landlord-scholar bureaucrat power structure and its rationalist Confucian ideology, existed for millennia in large part because it absorbed conquerors and prevented internal capitalists and others who might threaten its Empire. It had engaged in trade (silks, porcelain, tea) with European powers, restricting their access to China. It had expanded over much of East Asia for centuries by a policy of assimilating groups to Chinese Confucian culture (a process known as 'Sinification'), defining itself as the 'Middle Kingdom', the centre of civilisation, seeking to limit contact with all outsiders. But the landlord class, its mandarin state machine ruling through Confucian ideology, could not withstand the assault of British-led industrial capitalism, which in the name of 'civilisation and progress', 'free markets', and 'the rule of law' sold opium that destroyed the bodies and minds of millions of Chinese people, seized Chinese territories, and established unequal treaties between China and the imperialist powers.

The powerful East India Company, which controlled all of India as a corporate fiefdom, found itself by the late eighteenth century losing to Chinese tea in the international tea trade on the world market. Furthermore, the Chinese state sold tea only for silver, leading to a major British deficit in the balance of payments for trade. The British government and East India Company responded by exporting large quantities of Indian opium to China. The opium trade expanded in 1834 when Britain, committed to a policy of 'free trade,' ended the East India Company opium monopoly and opened up the trade to 'entrepreneurs', including Americans who sold Turkish opium in China.

'Free-market' competition worked to lower opium prices and increase sales in China, where local merchants and corrupt officials profited from the trade, which was centred in Canton, through which all Chinese trade went. When a Chinese official, Lin Lexu, governor of Canton, banned the trade, an international crisis followed in which, in the name of 'free trade' and bringing China under 'international law,' Britain launched the First Opium War (1839–42). The British won, seizing Canton and Shanghai and compelling the Chinese court to sign the Treaty of Nanking (1842), a model for later imperialist incursions into China. First, Hong Kong was ceded to Britain (as a gateway to China). Five new ports (including Shanghai) were also opened to foreign commercial interests, who were given both residency rights and 'extraterritoriality,' meaning that they were not subject to Chinese law but to the laws of their respective nations.

As a final humiliation, China was compelled to pay an indemnity to the opium sellers for the lost opium confiscated and destroyed during the war. France and the US then demanded similar concessions, as China found itself in the midst of a civil war, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–68), which would cost more lives than any conflict in history until the First World War. Although the Taiping Rebels adopted a hybrid version of Christianity to advance a revolutionary populist programme (their leader, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, claimed that he was the younger brother of Jesus come to establish a 'heavenly kingdom' of economic and social equality in China), Britain, France, and the US supported the Manchu dynasty while treating the civil war as a further opportunity to force new concessions.

Britain demanded the opening of all ports and exemption from all tariffs against British imports, joining with France, the US, and tsarist Russia to launch the Second Opium War in 1858. Over the next 2 years, China suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of British and French naval and land forces, culminating in the destruction of the emperor's Summer Palace in Beijing and widespread looting of Chinese treasures by civilian and military forces. China again was compelled to pay large indemnities to foreign governments and business interests, and to open itself up entirely to foreign business travellers and missionaries. Also, a British subject, Sir Robert Hart, was brought in to serve as the inspectorgeneral of China's Imperial Maritime Custom Service, collecting tariff payments for the Manchus, 'modernising' the port system, and serving essentially as a representative of all the imperialist powers over the 'China market'.

Imperialist powers now demanded more of everything (raw materials, markets; most of all, cheap indigenous labour). They also had devastating new weapons. In Asia and Africa, traditional ruling groups found themselves caught between foreigners whom they did not want and masses of people whom they feared to mobilise. China was much larger but no different. Its leaders sought policies of 'self-strengthening' to produce or purchase modern weapons with which to retain the existing system. But they could no more do that than keep opium out of the country. They were fighting a world system, which they never understood.

The treaties which followed the Second Opium War included provisions for the export of Chinese indentured labour throughout the world, labour which, for example, was crucial in the construction of the western tier of the US transcontinental railroad after the US Civil War. A Chinese diaspora was created. In the aftermath of the Taiping Rebels' defeat, the commanders of the Manchu armies began to become regional warlords, further undermining the central government.

Finally, Japan, itself a target of imperialism, saw a section of its nobility launch the 'Meiji Restoration' in the 1860s. This was a revolution against the feudal system which, over a generation, suppressed both Samurai and peasant rebellions and established a government committed to the rapid development of industrial capitalism at home and an aggressive imperialist foreign policy abroad, seeking to join the imperialist powers. China by the 1890s had become and would remain the centre of Japanese imperialism's attempt to develop an Asia-Pacific Empire.

And the incursions multiplied. France colonised Indochina against feeble Chinese opposition in the 1880s. Semi-feudal tsarist Russia threatened Chinese Manchuria. Reformist elements began to develop inside China and in the growing Chinese diaspora. For example, Sun Yat-sen, a resident of the Independent Kingdom of Hawaii and a Christian convert, returned to China and involved himself in a failed plot to overthrow the dynasty in 1895. Japan declared war on China and won a decisive victory over it, seizing Chinese Taiwan as a colony and acting for

the first time in its history to extend its influence on the Asian mainland, an unwelcome member of the imperialist 'club' whom the German Kaiser called the 'Gelbe Gefahr' (Yellow Peril).

After Kang Yu Wei, a Mandarin reformer, failed to advance moderate reforms in 1898, dividing the imperial court, all the imperialist powers began to actively carve up China into regions for themselves: a 'race for concessions', as it was called. These events prompted the US to seize the Philippines in the 'Spanish American War' of 1898, abandoning its anti-colonial traditions. In US thinking, the Port of Manila was a stepping stone to the 'China Market', a myth that energised all the imperialist powers, who found it convenient to believe that a capital-poor China could purchase huge quantities of their goods.

Secret societies had long played a role in China, both as a centre of popular resistance to the Manchus and as a tool for various factions. In 1899, secret societies touched off anti-foreign uprisings directed against Christian missionaries and all foreigners. The Manchus first sought to use this movement to improve their position against the imperialist powers, but were pushed by the rebels to declare a half-hearted war, laying siege to the foreign legations district of Beijing which they could easily have overrun. After that, the imperialist powers launched a multinational naval and land-based military intervention (the largest of its kind ever until the First World War), to crush the rebellion.

The European and US press were filled with accounts of the atrocities of the 'Boxer' rebels (their use of martial arts suggested the name 'Boxer Rebellion'). The looting in Beijing and other cities, and the rape and murder of Chinese bystanders, received limited recognition, although there were accounts of these events for which the imperialist powers generally blamed each other. In the aftermath of the Rebellion, the Manchu Government, saddled with a huge indemnity, lost all influence as its regional commanders increased their power and the imperialists fought over its territories.

Russia and Japan then fought a war over Manchuria and Korea, resulting in a de facto Japanese victory in 1905. The US, committed to

an 'open door in China', was in negotiations with the Japanese even before the Russo-Japanese War had officially ended. In the Taft-Katsura Agreement, it accepted Japanese control of Korea in exchange for Japan's acceptance of US colonial control of the Philippines. Access to the Chinese trade and investment stood behind the US 'open-door' policy, which did not extend to either Korea or the Philippines.

Britain, still seeking to control the most valuable region inside China (the Yangtze Valley), negotiated an alliance with Japan against Russia directly and Germany and the US indirectly, both of whom, as Britain's major industrial rivals, were pursuing noncolonial imperialist policies. Imperial China found itself an onlooker to these developments: deteriorating into something like a national slum; cities filled with impoverished masses; foreigners living in luxurious protected enclaves; and a class of Chinese compradors, merchant middlemen growing rich through their connections with the imperialist powers. In the countryside, bandits and warlords made the hard life of poor peasants and landless labourers even more miserable than before.

Imperialist Powers and the First Chinese Revolution

The Confucian Mandarin state had for centuries connected status and political power with formal learning, producing a great respect for formal education. As this system decayed rapidly, a large number of students and scholars who had studied to obtain positions found that these posts no longer existed. Western ideas ranging from Social Darwinism to Marxism began to reach Chinese students and intellectuals via Europeans and Americans in China, the Chinese diaspora, and groups in Japan interested in bringing 'modern civilisation' to China.

Sun Yat-sen, in exile in Japan, had organised the Kuomintang (KMT): a political party which called for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of a Chinese republic. In 1911, uprisings among workers, peasants, and students with the support of urban merchants brought down the Manchu state, and Sun and the KMT moved forward in an attempt to channel the revolutionary movement into the creation of a republic. Although Sun clearly represented the sort of China which the imperialist powers had spoken of since the First Opium War, they gave him no support.

Instead, an International Banking Consortium representing these powers gave their support to a Manchu general and de facto warlord, Yuan Shih-k'ai, who had failed to use his army to support the Manchus and now turned on the revolutionaries. Yuan would give the imperialist powers the economic concessions they wanted, even though he had no real popular support and rapidly began to act as a military dictator. Frank J. Goodnow, the president of Johns Hopkins University and the former president of the American Political Science Association, served as his most important foreign political adviser, drafting the two constitutions that Yuan sought to inflict on the Chinese people. His response to US critics was that the Chinese were not 'mature enough' for political democracy. But Yuan's attempts to consolidate his power largely collapsed in face of opposition from the popular masses, peasants, and workers, and a nascent, urban, Chinese, national, capitalist class. After a failed and ludicrous attempt to make himself emperor, Yuan died in 1916, and China was in effect governed by the remnants of the imperial Mandarin civil service while cliques of warlords, former henchman of Yuan, fought with each other for power, backed by the various imperialist powers as the First World War raged elsewhere.

In China itself there were important new developments. Intellectuals organised journals which became the centre of a 'new culture' movement. This condemned Confucianism's emphasis upon social harmony through obedience to familial elders and a scholar Mandarin class as the major barrier to progress. There spread an eclectic interest in the political and social philosophies that were being imported into China along with the goods of the imperialist powers. Like many Chinese students and intellectuals, Chen Tu-shiu (a leading figure in this new movement) and Li Ta-chou (chief librarian at the University of

Peking) turned to Marxism with the coming of the Soviet Revolution, attracted by its call for an antiimperialist world revolutionary movement.

The Soviet Revolution and Germany's defeat eliminated two of the imperialist powers jockeying for power in China. But the victorious Britain, France, US, and Japan remained. During the war, Japan had made '21 demands' on China, demands which would have transformed it into a Japanese protectorate/satellite and left Manchuria subject to Japanese colonial settlement. The US vigorously opposed this and negotiated in 1917 the Lansing Ishi Treaty. By its provisions, Japan pulled back from direct action to enforce its demands but conceded nothing, while the US restated its commitment to an 'open door' in a unified China. When the Versailles Conference 'transferred' German economic concessions in northern China to Japan, protest demonstrations by students, workers, and national capitalists spread throughout urban areas from 4 May 1919 onwards. These demonstrations ignited a much higher level of organised resistance. Sun Yat-sen, once more in China, found himself organising military forces to fight warlords, and established a KMT-led military government at Guangzhou (1921), dedicating himself to a united China.

The Comintern, committed to fighting imperialism and organising both Communist parties and anti-imperialist movements in the colonial regions of the world, worked with Chen, Mao, and other pioneers of Chinese Marxism to establish a Communist Party of China (CCP) in 1921. At the same time, Chinese students in Europe (many on exploitative 'work-study programmes') organised a student section of the Chinese Communist Party abroad. Chou En-lai and his younger protégé Deng Xiaoping were drawn from the ranks of these students, and later became major figures in twentieth-century China.

The communist movement grew rapidly among urban workers and intellectuals in China while the imperialist powers continued to support their warlords. With Comintern representatives playing a central role, a United Front was forged between Sun's KMT and the CCP. The Whampoa military academy, headed by Sun's protégé Chiang Kai-shek with Chou En-lai as political commissar, was established, along with a policy of uniting China through a Great Northern Expedition that would defeat the warlords and their imperialist political backers. Through the United Front, the KMP and the CCP strengthened their positions and both were actively opposed by all the imperialist powers.

The death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 led to a complicated power struggle in which Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the dominant figure in the KMT. This created a crisis in the United Front, as many CCP members feared that Chiang, supported by capitalists connected to the compradors, would turn on the United Front. However, the United Front was maintained and the Great Northern Expedition was launched against the warlords in 1926, with nationalist and communist forces uniting to win major victories against the warlords and their allies.

But the imperialist powers, who had never supported Sun or the KMT, much less the KMT-CCP alliance, used their power to defeat the campaign. In March 1927, a combined force of US and British ships and troops attacked KMT troops in Nanking as they assaulted the property of the foreign legations. A month later, an event which changed both the history of imperialism in China and Chinese history itself took place: the April Shanghai massacre. As communist workers and students gained control of Shanghai to welcome troops they saw as liberators, Chiang Kai-shek ended the United Front with great brutality, ordering his soldiers to join with Shanghai criminal gangs to massacre workers, students, and all communists. Li Ta-chao, the CCP's most important founder, was murdered as KMT forces invaded the Soviet embassy. Chou En-lai barely escaped with his life. An estimated 80,000 were killed, and the terror continued as Chiang's forces and local warlords united to hunt down and kill suspected communists.

Now, for the first time, the European imperialist powers and the US recognised and threw their support behind Chiang, who could be counted on to protect their interests in a way they had hoped Yuan would do a dozen years before. Japan, which sought to control all of China, did not support Chiang. The urban CCP was decimated. Attacks

launched by communist military forces against urban areas were repulsed. A commune established by communist activists in Canton was crushed. New CCP leaders, supported by the Comintern, failed to implement policies to reverse the tide.

However, Mao Zedong, a CCP founder and leader who had, in an analysis of the peasant masses in his native province of Hunan, come to see them as not simply an ally of the working class but, given Chinese conditions, a prime revolutionary force, emerged as both the theoretical and practical leader of the party. He established a liberated territory in the northern Kiangsi province (the Kiangsi Soviet) as a base area and a model for a peasant-supported revolutionary army, one in which the party, army, and the masses would be united.

Chiang's KMT regime then focused its attention on destroying the Kiangsi Soviet, prosecuting a civil war with the aid of various warlords. While the world depression intensified, Japanese imperialist penetration advanced. The various imperialist powers had their warlords and some warlords shifted alliances between the KMT and the imperialist powers. The Japanese however, were different from the other imperialist powers in that they sought to control all of China for themselves.

First, the Japanese-controlled Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin participated in the anti-communist terror of April 1927, which spread to other cities. He invaded Beijing and helped to murder the leading communist Li Ta-chao, who was instrumental in Mao joining the communist movement. The following year, when he tried to break with the Japanese and join Chiang, the Japanese murdered him and replaced him in Manchuria with his son Chiang Hsueh-liang. When the latter, who inherited his father's position and warlord army, tried to break with the Japanese in 1931, they invaded Manchuria and established a 'protectorate' which they called Manchukuo. Here they installed Pu Yi (the last Manchu emperor, ousted when he was a small child in 1911) as their puppet ruler.

Japan expanded its role in northern China, buying off local warlords and seeking to turn their regions into protectorates. Meanwhile, Ch'iang's army, with US and German military advisers (the Germans had begun their activities here in the late Weimar period, and continued into the early Nazi era), successfully encircled the main forces of the Kiangsi Soviet. Under Mao's leadership, the revolutionary Chinese communist army began a 2-year march to escape a myriad of murderous enemies and establish a new base area. It was a trek through northern and western China which claimed the lives of two-thirds of its fighters and represents in contemporary Chinese history what Lexington Concord, Bunker Hill, and Valley Forge put together stand for in US history.

By 1936, a series of events rapidly transpired that would lead to full-scale war in China within a year. Chang Hsueh-liang, the former Manchurian warlord who had participated in Chiang Kai-shek's war against the CCP, now urged Chiang to end the war and join with the CCP to fight the Japanese. When Chiang refused at a conference in Sian, Chang held him hostage and threatened to kill him if he did not establish the United Front. CCP leader Chou En-lai then negotiated a United Front settlement which in effect saved Chiang's life. The Japanese, threatened by the United Front (like the Italian and German fascists in Europe, they had used anticommunism to rationalise their attacks on China), then signed a treaty with Nazi Germany. This Anti-Comintern Pact (an anticommunist alliance that served as the origin of the Axis alliance) was designed to intimidate Chiang (who had previously received aid from Nazi Germany) to break the United Front. When that failed, they provoked an incident in Beijing to justify launching a full-scale (albeit undeclared) war against China. In reality, this was the beginning of the Second World War. Within a year, the Japanese military had conquered the major eastern and northern Chinese cities, carried out the infamous mass killing in Nanking, and initiated a war which would claim an estimated 10–20 million Chinese lives.

The response of the imperialist powers was 'neutrality' and continued business with Japan. While the Roosevelt Administration had begun by 1938 to provide limited aid to Chiang's regime,

which had relocated to the western Chinese city Chung-king, the US did not invoke its neutrality legislation, since Japan had not formerly declared war. US oil companies and other corporations continued to supply fuel and other goods used by the resource-poor Japanese Empire for its war machine. Britain's Chamberlain Government, which pursued an appeasement policy in Europe towards Nazi Germany, also pursued a pro-Japanese appeasement policy in Asia in the vain hope that it could turn them away from a fully fledged alliance with Nazi Germany.

While millions of Chinese civilians perished, the CCP in the North expanded its revolutionary armies and mobilised an increasingly effective guerrilla war against Japan. Although the United Front was still in effect, KMT and CCP forces clashed in many instances and Chiang's regime, especially after war broke out in Europe, began to look to the US, in particular, and Britain to eventually defeat the Japanese so that he could continue his civil war against the CCP later.

After the Japanese invasion, Chiang had said famously 'The Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists a disease of the heart', a statement with which all of the major imperialist powers (save of course the Japanese themselves and possibly the US under the Roosevelt Administration) would have agreed. After the Nazi conquest of Western Europe, Japan negotiated a 'tripartite pact' with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in which the three powers pledged to come to the aid of each other if any of the three became involved in conflict with a power not involved in either the European war or 'undeclared' war in China, a treaty aimed at the time at both the US and the Soviet Union.

When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Japanese militarist leadership, divided over whether to join its European allies against the Soviets or to attack British, Dutch, and US positions in Asia, decided on the latter course. By arrangement with the Vichy French collaborator government, Japan occupied French colonial Indochina. The US responded by freezing Japanese assets, and establishing a complete embargo on exports to Japan, especially oil. This had the effect of strengthening the Japanese plan to attack

Pearl Harbor and destroy the US Pacific Fleet, a plan that had been developed before the Nazi invasion of the USSR and the Japanese invasion of Indochina. For the Japanese militarists, the war in China, which was tying down millions of Japanese soldiers and the foundation of their imperialism, was the decisive factor in their decision to attack the US and Britain in the Pacific.

Chiang's China now joined the Allies and received extensive aid from the US in the war. Japan intensified its anti-guerrilla war against the CCP, launching a campaign of 'loot all, burn all, kill all' which led to massacres of Chinese civilians comparable to the Nazi slaughter of the Soviet people. The CCP, although its ranks were initially decimated, grew stronger as the war progressed, winning over millions of poor peasants and landless labourers as it merged a war of national liberation with one of social revolution. US officials in China were aware of this, some foreign-service officials and military officials coming to respect and admire the CCP activists for their courage and honesty compared to the corruption of KMT military and civilian officials. US attempts to encourage Chiang to advance land and other social reforms to liberalise his government failed completely.

As the war ended, the CCP became the de facto government of over 100 million people in northern China. Chiang's regime, having used the US to defeat Japan, now hoped to use it to defeat the CCP in a new civil war. The Truman Administration, in the very early stages of what would by 1947 be called a 'Cold War' against the Soviet Union, the global communist movement, and diverse anti-imperialist revolutionary forces emerging from the war, was glad to try and oblige. The Japanese armies were not demobilised after the Japanese surrender but kept initially by the US as a police force to prevent, as Truman would later admit in his memoirs, CCP forces from sweeping to victory throughout northern China, gaining control of Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities.

The mission by General George Marshall to establish a coalition government of the KMT and the CCP in 1946 broke down. The CCP was willing to participate, believing that it would triumph in elections, but Chiang was not. The

Truman Administration then provided more than £3 billion in aid to the KMT, and arms and advisers for its elite divisions as it launched a major military offensive against the CCP in war-weary China. Although the Truman Administration knew through its internal reports that Chiang lacked mass support, it continued its aid as the military tide turned decisively against the KMT and rampant inflation devastated the Chinese economy.

In Western Europe, the US Marshall Plan was put in place to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the Second World War. But there was no such plan to rebuild the devastated Chinese economy. The US offered only military aid for a corrupt regime seeking to restore the pre-1937 status quo ante. Tens of millions of Chinese actively joined the revolution and hundreds of millions simply withdrew any support from the KMT. The Truman Administration ended its aid in mid-1949, shortly before the fall of Beijing, blaming the defeat entirely on the KMT leadership but offering nothing to the new People's Republic of China.

There were to be important consequences for China, the US, and the world from these events. First, in the developing Cold War, Truman's Republican opposition blamed his administration for the 'loss of China', reasserting the imperialist fantasy that the country was theirs to begin with. Senator Joseph McCarthy built upon these charges to transform the anti-communist Cold War consensus into a national hysteria. McCarthy was even to accuse General Marshall of being a communist and Soviet agent because of his earlier failed mission to negotiate a KMP-CCP coalition.

Unlike Britain and its other allies in the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the US refused to recognise the People's Republic of China and used its veto in the to block the country's admission to the new United Nations. The successful Chinese Revolution was also a factor in encouraging the newly created National Security Council (part of the reorganisation of US Military/Overseas Intelligence in response to the Cold War, created by the National Security Act of 1947) to advocate a globalising of the US 'containment' policy which would require a quadrupling of US military expenditures.

These events prompted the Truman Administration to intervene in late June 1950 in the civil war that broke out in Korea, the former Japanese colony which the US and the USSR had divided into occupation zones at the 30th parallel with no consultation of the Korean people. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the US intervened directly in the Chinese civil war, preventing the People's Republic, which now controlled all of mainland China, from gaining control of Taiwan, where Chiang's KMT Government had retreated and whose fall virtually all international observers considered inevitable. No one expected Chiang's forces on Taiwan to survive, since they had no navy to stop a People's Liberation Army invasion, and had already put themselves in a bad position with the Taiwanese who had been a Japanese colony since 1895 and were in conflict with the KMT mainlanders. In fact, a number of high officials in Chiang's government, including relatives, had already resettled in the US, expecting Taiwan to fall rapidly. When US troops of the UN, led by General MacArthur, ignored warnings from the People's Republic and advanced to the Yalu River on the Korean–Chinese border (six months after the US had sent the Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait to protect Chiang's new Taiwan government), hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops intervened.

The newly created US Central Intelligence Agency began to work with anti-communist elements in Chinese Tibet and former Chinese warlords who had fled to Indochina and gone into heroin production to support attempts to destabilise the People's Republic. Finally, fearful of 'communist expansion' and the 'Sino Soviet World Communist Conspiracy against the Free World' following the victorious Chinese Revolution, the US began to fund the French colonial war in Indochina in 1950. Following the French military defeat, it created a protectorate in 'South Vietnam' in violation of the Geneva agreement which had ended the conflict. These were contentions that the British imperialists who fought the Opium Wars in the name of 'free trade and the rule of law' and all of the imperialist powers who put down the Boxer Rebellion to defend 'civilisation' would have well understood.

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China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities

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Synonyms

China and neocolonialism; Chinese dream; Chinese empire; New colonialism; New world order neocolonialism

The Placement of Discussion

When discussing about "colonialism" and "imperialism," one is immediately related to the policy and practice of domination of Western powerful nations over Africa, America, and many parts of Asia in the past history. Western imperialism and colonialism have been seen by Marxist critical schools of theory, such as the dependency theory and world-systems theory, as the most important factor in causing underdevelopment in the Global South. Underdevelopment is a situation that has been systematically created by colonist exploitation (Frank 1966).

According to critical scholars, one of the distinctive features of Third World industrialization process is the fact that unlike European industrialization, such a process was taking place alongside already industrialized Western countries and was therefore tied to these colonial masters by various socioeconomic and sociopolitical relations. In line with their conceptual understanding, the global system is not a uniform marketplace (free market) with actors freely making mutually beneficial decision and interaction, rather, the system has been historically shaped into powerful *central* and weak *peripheral* economies with the former playing an active and dominant role and the latter a passive and reflexive role, i.e., structural asymmetrical relationship. It is thus assumed that imperialism, which is the mechanism of domination, still exists and still keeps Third World countries from developing, leading to worldwide uneven development. The developed economies of the Northern Hemisphere of the world especially Western Europe and the USA have been at the gaining end of the parasitic and asymmetrical relationship between the wealthy North and the impoverished South.

In the case of China, the European "Age of Imperialism" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was driven by similar economic imperativeness. It coincided with the Chinese "Age of Humiliation," which refers to the "Century of Humiliation" (1839–1949). The period from the first Sino-British Opium War (1839) to the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949) marked the political incursion, economic

exploitation, and military aggression by Western imperialist countries, which undermined the historical glory of the Chinese civilization and humiliated the Chinese nation. China itself was a victim of Western imperialism's pursuit of overseas market and surplus.

The penetration of Western imperialism and the Chinese struggle against imperialism were the central components of its modern history (Ding et al. 1973; Fairbank 1992; Hu 1955). Ever since the last Chinese Qing Empire gradually collapsed as a result of the Sino-British "Opium War," such a history of humiliation has been embedded in the national memory of the aggression and invasion by Western imperialist powers. "Anti-imperialism" reached its initial political climax in the aftermath of World War I, in which China, the allied winner of the war, had to accept the Treaty of Versailles arrangement by Western imperialist powers to grant Japan the right to take over from Germany the resource-rich province, Shandong, which was also the birthplace of Confucius. Since then, "anti-imperialism" became one of the core national missions and the symbol of the Chinese Revolution (Li 2018b).

"Anti-imperialism" continued to be Chinese Communist Party's uninterrupted undertaking even after the founding of new China in 1949. The major internal political movements and external international conflicts and wars in the following decades were in many ways inseparable from the anti-imperialism mission, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cultural Revolution, the China-Soviet split, the export of revolution to China's neighbors, economic and political support to African and Third World independent movements, etc. "Anti-imperialism" had been, among others, the most frequently used political terms in China shaping both its domestic and international politics until the economic reform started in the late 1970s.

However, since the 2000s the world is witnessing the rise of a different China: the country's size, population, and its integration in the world economy have contributed to both prospects and uncertainties; its currency has been a subject of contention; its trade has raised concerns for both developed and developing countries; its demand for energy resources has led to competition and conflict; and the effects of its overseas investments in the Global South have begun to be felt across the world. Beijing's economic performance and its policies on finance, currency, trade, security, environment issues, resource management, food security, raw material, and commodity prices are bearing worldwide implications beyond its boundary. Suddenly, China, a historical victim of Western imperialism, is finding itself to be a "middle kingdom" surrounded by jealousy, admiration, anxiety, worry, and even resentment. It is in this context that the global attention and discussion on "Chinese imperialism" began to emerge.

Furthermore, since 2013 China's Belt and Road Initiative has added lots of input into the global debates (Li 2018a). Some observers view it as "an imperial project" or as an imperial move toward "restoring its historical status as Asia's dominant power (Griffiths 2017; Millward 2018). In addition, China's industrial policy of "made-in-China 2025" is seen as Beijing's plan for hi-tech dominance, aiming at rapidly expanding its high-tech sectors and developing its advanced manufacturing base. Even "Chinese Dream," raised by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, is interpreted as an attempt to restore an "imperial" China (Chellaney 2017a; Daly and Rojansky 2018).

Understanding the Debate on China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism

How to understand the emergence of global debates and discussions on the relationship between China's global rise and the Global South? For example, how do we define China-Africa relations: a South-South partnership or North-South dependency? Many intellectual debates on China-Africa relations have been responsive in associating Africa's past relations with the Global North. Currently, the debates brought about by China's economic expansion and its economic relations with the developing world are related to three conceptual notions, i. e., "neocolonialism," "neoimperialism," and "creditor imperialism."

Chinese Neocolonialism?

"Colonialism" is a historical process through which a more powerful nation takes control of another territory; rules that territory politically, economically, and socioculturally; and exploits the territory's resources for the benefit of the homeland. The notion mainly refers to the world history, as the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* describes: "the process of European settlement and political control over the rest of the world, including the Americas, Australia, and parts of Africa and Asia." Colonialism is fundamentally tied up with the process of "empire building" or "imperialism."

Comparing with "colonialism," a notion denotes the direct control or governance of a nation over a dependent country, territory, or people (various English dictionaries), the essence of "neocolonialism" refers to the practice of using the power of capital, the impact of globalization, and cultural supremacy to influence a developing country in lieu of direct control (imperialism) or indirect political control (hegemony). The modern concept of "neocolonialism" was coined by Kwame Nkrumah, the first post-independence president of Ghana, in the context of African countries undergoing decolonization in the 1960s. He referred it to a phenomenon that "the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside" (Nkrumah 1965). Some Western writers, such as Jean-Paul Sartre (2001), whose Colonialism and Neocolonialism is a collection of his series of essays on colonialism, echoed Nkrumah's definition. This collection remains a powerful and relevant critique that brings the full force of the author's intellectual reflections on France's conduct in Algeria, and its implication is extended to the West's conduct in the Third World in general. "Neocolonialism" in the current era, which is different from the historical notion of "colonialism," connotes two core aspects of the policy of a strong nation in seeking (1) cultural imperialism and (2) political and economic hegemony.

In recent years the global debates about "Chinese neocolonialism" have been long standing, and they are re-emerging with new force due to a number of reasons. One of them is the fact that China is playing an indispensable role in strengthening its sociopolitical and socioeconomic ties with the Global South, particularly with the two continents, Africa and Latin America, which were historically Western colonies and under the Western sphere of interest. Depending on one's perspectives of assessment, Chinese investment patterns and new diplomatic initiatives are bringing about tangible economic and social transformations in these two continents. Another reason is that China's capital outward expansion to the Global South, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, anticipates billions of dollars' worth of infrastructure projects and resource investments. This will inevitably "affect" and "disturb" the existing "global relationships" and "global arrangements," i.e., the "structural power" of the existing world order (Li 2018a). Beijing is seen as attempting to redivide the already divided world.

The critique on "Chinese neocolonialism" is essentially founded on the general patterns of China's economic relations with many developing countries today. These patterns of relationship are claimed to bear close resemblance to the previous European colonial powers' economic relations with colonial countries in the nineteenth and twentieth century. One of the key features of Beijing's relationship with developing countries is that it repeats the "unequal exchange" trade relations, i.e., developing countries export their primary products in exchange for Chinese manufactured goods. The outcome is perceived to generate an old situation under colonialism that "the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected," and consequently, "some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion" (Dos Santos 1970: 231). The eventual consequence is alleged to be that developing countries are becoming heavily indebted to China, China is

able to exert greater weight on local political, cultural, and security dynamics.

Chinese Neoimperialism?

In a close analogy to "colonialism," the notion of "imperialism" characterizes a period of global colonial expansion by European powers from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth century driven by the pursuit of overseas territorial acquisitions and new overseas markets and resources. Likewise, the USA and Japan did in the similar way during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

"Neoimperialism," derived from the historical legacy of the old "imperialism" concept, can be defined as "a collection of thoughts and principles whose advocates critically examine the current social, political and economic implications that structurally result in uneven power relationships in international relations within distinct categories of winners versus losers in a capitalist world economy (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011: 245). It is essentially important to understand the nexus between the inherent unequal structures of the world system conceptualized by imperialism theories and the continuous vulnerabilities and inferior positions of countries and regions in the world system. In line with the world-systems theory's understanding, the system's embedded inequalities have never been changed.

Today, the portray of China as "neoimperialism" power is widely covered in Western media (Harper 2017; Larmer 2017; Manero 2017; Okeowo 2013), which reflects the change in the perceptions of China in the Western mind. The crude stereotypes of the "Yellow Peril" (an xenophobic theory of colonialism imaging the danger of Oriental hordes overwhelming the West) that dominated Western culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have given way to a fear that China will follow in the West's imperial footsteps and dominate the world. In other words, the legacy of imperialism underpins today's Western and certain developing countries' perceptions of China's foreign policy and development objective.

"Chinese creditor imperialism" is a quite new notion. This concept refers to the fact that Chinese global outward expansion, in the Global South in general, and in South Asia in particular, is facilitated through financial credit. The concept implies that in order to finance and build the infrastructure that poorer countries need, China demands favorable access to their natural assets, from mineral resources to ports (Chellaney 2017b). It is also posited that unlike International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending, Chinese loans are collateralized by strategically important natural assets with high long-term value (even if they lack short-term commercial viability). It is a good comparison between China's current "imperialist expansion" and the Chinese own history when China had to lease its own ports to Western colonial powers due to the loss of the Opium War (Britain leased Hong Kong from China for 99 years in 1898). It is claimed that China is now applying the similar imperial "99-year lease" concept in order to access to geopolitically and geoeconomically import resources and ports, such as Hambantota and Djibouti (Chellaney, ibid.). In addition, Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative is perceived as an imperial project aiming to use its financial power to have weak and small states caught in debt bondage to China so that these countries "risk losing both their most valuable natural assets and their very sovereignty" (Chellaney, ibid.).

Objective

Faced with the above varieties of discussions, debates, and opinions, the author intends to (1) point out that it requires more complex inquiries than any simple verification of the two interrelated concepts – neocolonialism and neoimperialism – whose stems were originated centuries ago and (2) provide a framework for understanding these discussions and debates in the current context of the rise of China and the impact it has brought to the existing world order.

This chapter aims to argue that, on the one hand, China's economic success signifies Beijing's movement toward a more positive structural position in the distribution of global wealth, while at the same time it also challenges many "enduring aspects" and "global arrangements" defined by the core powers of the existing world

order. On the other hand, the rise of China's capital and trade expansion in developing countries of the Global South provides them with both opportunities and challenges. China's global rise represents capitalist world system's new rhythmic cycle of the rise of a new hegemon. It offers an opportunity to developing countries in terms of enlarging their "room for maneuver" and increasing their "upward mobility" (Vadell et al. 2014). On the other hand, China's rise also poses a great challenge to many developing countries in terms of outcompeting their market share and technology development and causing their economic "deindustrialization" and "primarization." It is in the latter context that China-associated "neocolonialism" and "neoimperialism" emerge to become a catchy phrase.

Theoretical Conceptualization

Conceptually and theoretically, the study of imperialism can be approached from different perspectives and at different levels of analysis. Metrocentric theories focus on the internal necessity of imperialist states to export their surplus capital. Like Marx, Hobson, Lenin, Wallerstein, and many others, the author intends to emphasize the organic link between growth in capitalism and the expansion of imperialism. In other words, the driving force behind the expansion of imperialism is historically linked with economic factors in terms of capital, wealth, market, resource, and trade. Whereas, systemic theories of imperialism, often identified by realist theories of IR and IPE, see imperialism as an unavoidable competition between great powers (Cohen 1973). Interstate struggle for survival and dominance leads core powers to seize territories, and peripheral territories become target for competition over resources in order to maintain an effective balance of power. The so-called race for Africa was a classic case of imperialism driven by systemic competition in the late nineteenth century.

In line with Marx's understanding, capitalism as global system cannot be constrained within the boundaries of a single country or nation-state

(Marx and Engels 1848). Likewise, Marx's claim of capitalism's inherent tendency of imperialism, i.e., colonialism, is shared by historian Bipan Chandra, who posits that: "by its very nature capitalism could not exist in only one country...it expanded to encompass the entire world, including the backward, noncapitalist countries...it was a world system" (Chandra 1981: 39). Ironically, the imperialist nature of capitalism in Marx's time seems to be much truer today than ever, as one distinguished scholar notes:

> ….. for the first time, capitalism has become a truly universal system. It's universal not only in the sense that it's global, not only in the sense that just about every economic actor in the world today is operating according to the logic of capitalism, and even those on the outermost periphery of the capitalist economy are, in one way or another, subject to that logic. Capitalism is universal also in the sense that its logic – the logic of accumulation, commodification, profit-maximization, competition – has penetrated just about every aspect of human life and nature itself…. (Wood 1997: 1)

Other scholars, such as Hobson, see imperialism as resulting from a capitalist inherent pursuit of additional/overseas markets (Hobson 1965). As productive capabilities in mature capitalist countries increased over time, and following harsh competition among Western nations on existing and emerging industries, Hobson believed that overproduction would sooner or later outgrew the needs of domestic market. In addition, the rise of financial capitalism also began to look for foreign markets for investment so as to increase the profit margin – "surplus capital" (Hobson, ibid.: 82). As Hobson sharply states, "Imperialism is the endeavor of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home" (Hobson, ibid.: 85). Accordingly, newly occupied overseas markets would provide financiers a golden opportunity to further expand their investment operations (Hobson, ibid.: 29). Colonialism (direct political dominance) provided the basis for protecting these overseas expansions.

Chinese Capitalism and Imperialism: From a World-Systems Perspective

Being fundamentally in line with the Marxist and Leninist worldview on the expansion of capitalism and imperialism, the world-systems theory (WST) developed by Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1997, 2004) provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the historical evolutions and transformations involved in the rise of the modern capitalist world system. Seen from the WST, the world system expanded over a long historical spectrum and brought different parts of the world into its division of labor. It is the rigid division of labor imposed by Western imperialism that has led to a perpetual condition of economic core-peripheral relations. Under this single division of labor within one world market, a political structure consisting of sovereign states and multiple cultural systems interacts within the framework of an interstate system (Wallerstein 1974).

The world system is conceptualized as a dynamic one in which changing positions within the system's structural stratifications is not easy, but possible by taking advantage of the "upward mobility" and "room for maneuver" brought about by global capital mobility and relocation of production. Historically, capital mobility and redivision of labor within the capitalist world economy have been taking place continuously, which have periodically brought about and resulted in flows of commodities, labor, and capital across different geographical areas through chains of production, exchange, and investment. China and India are seen as the last reserves (unexploited areas) that have been integrated in the capitalist world system (Li 2008). The WST explains the system's *embedded inequalities* in which nation-states have quite different development stages within a seemingly unified global economy. In other words, different countries are located at different stratifications of the capitalist world system

According to the WST, the world capitalist system is understood to be embedded with fundamental features, characterized by a series of cyclical rhythms – economic prosperity or crisis, upward or downward mobility, and rise and fall of new economic powers. More importantly, this series of cyclical rhythms was followed by the rise and decline of new guarantors (new hegemons) of the world system. The new and each one had its own unique pattern of control (Wallerstein 1997). In line with this understanding, the emergence of China is perceived as a good example of the system's rhythmic cycles in the upward mobility. Despite the fact that China is politically ruled by the Communist Party, China is believed to continue to follow the core features of the capital accumulation and the law of value. Seen from the perspective of liberalism, emerging powers, such as China, are currently the winners in the era of globalization because their economic growth and wealth accumulation are generated from within, not from without, the world capitalist system under the US-led liberal world order (Ikenberry 2008, 2011). It is thus believed that due to its economic integration and market dependence in the system's mode of production and capital accumulation, China will continue to shape and constrain the system's law of value.

When this chapter, like other literatures, establishes the nexus between the expansion of capitalism and the extension of imperialism, it argues that the establishment of capitalism and its global expansion is the outcome of a political economy project (Li and Hersh 2004). The capitalist mode of production was born in Europe, and its starting point was the imposition of ruthless coercion through the compulsory enclosure and enforced formation of new property relations and legal systems. With the restrictive access to land accompanying industrial transformation began a new form of production relations based on capitalist accumulation. Europe's expansion overseas, which began with military conquests and imposed trading relationships, resulted in the imperialist extension of the capitalist system of production. The globalization of the capitalist world system was realized through slave trade, colonialization, "free trade," and world wars, including three historical development phases: a merchant phase of trade, a phase of industrial expansion, and an expansive period of financial capitalism. The capitalist world system has been maintained through fixed "social, political, and economic *arrangements*" (Strange 1988, *italic* added). These

imperialist arrangements are what we know as the current "world order." They "are not divinely ordained, nor are they outcome of blind chance," but rather, they "are the result of human decisions taken in the context of man made institutions and sets of self set rules and customs" (Strange 1988: 18).

Is the global economic and political rise of China represents a contemporary new round imperialist expansion of the capitalist world system? The author, in his newly published ed. volume *Mapping China's One Belt One Road Initiative* (Li 2018a), argues that on the one hand, the economic rise of China is an integral part of the continuously historical process of the global expansion of capitalism, while on the other hand, Chinese production and capital outward expansion would unavoidably challenge the status quo of the patterns of relationships shaped by the existing global arrangements (world order).

The Kautsky-Lenin Dichotomy

In his article in 1914 on "Ultra-imperialism" (Kautsky 1914), Kautsky argued that core capitalist countries were able to find a way out of vicious competition and destructive wars among the industrial powers. He believed that there would emerge a new stage, termed by him as "super-imperialism," in which monopoly had reached such a high stage that it could effect "the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital" (Kautsky, ibid.). According to Kautsky's analysis, the only way that could enable core capitalist countries to sustain the basic profit of the exploitation system, while avoiding economic stagnation, was for powerful core nations to form a "cartel" in order to maintain their export markets and super-exploitation. As a result of capital alliance, he postulated that war and militarism were not necessarily the inherent features of capitalism and that a peaceful "ultra-capitalism" (imperialism) was likely. In the stage of ultra-capitalism, core powers understood the importance of coalition and cooperation as well as the necessity of subsuming their economic contradiction and antagonism to a system of coordination, whereby they would jointly exploit the underdeveloped world.

Contrary to Kautsky, Lenin in his *The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Lenin 1948) strongly opposed Kautsky's postulation of an "ultra-imperialism" world order. He understood capitalism as being in the transition from the stage of free competition to the stage of monopoly. In a similar manner to Hobson's analysis, Lenin argued that capitalism had transformed itself from being a nation-based competitive system in Marx's day into imperial capitalism characterized by huge monopolistic or oligopolistic corporations. As capitalist corporations continued to grow over time, Lenin was convinced that financial banks and industrial companies were quickly developing into monopolies involving "cartels, syndicates and trusts" that would expand and "manipulate thousands of millions" across the globe (Lenin, ibid.).

Lenin added another aspect to Marx's theory of capitalism, i.e., a "fourth law" of capitalism – the law of capitalist imperialism. According to Lenin's analysis, "Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed" (Lenin, ibid.). It is precisely in this connection that Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative is perceived as the coming dominance of monopolies of Chinese financial capital. It is also seen as a means to reintegrate Africa and the Middle East into China's system of accumulation, as a countermeasure or an alternative system to the dominant Western-led system of accumulation (van der Merwe 2018).

In Lenin's view, as industrial nations at the core of the world economy competed to expand their exploitative profit sphere, their interests intersected and conflicted, leading to inevitable wars over overseas markets and sources. Thus, colonialism and imperialism were the consequence caused by economic competition between core states. It is also in this regard that major Western countries, particularly the USA, are resistant to China's Belt and Road project worrying about Beijing's long-term hegemonic objective. An Australian

professor even straightforwardly declares that China's One Belt, One Road is a challenge to the US-led order (White 2017).

Both Kautsky and Lenin intended to raise Marx's analytical level of domestic capitalism to a level of international economic relations among capitalist core states. Ironically, the Kautsky-Lenin debate is perhaps more relevant today than in their time. Kautsky's notion of ultra-imperialism perhaps fits better today's globalization and transnational capitalism in terms of capital alliance not only between national and multinational capitals but also between state companies and state elites of both developing and developed countries. Lenin's comprehension of the crisis of "imperial capitalism" characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic corporations integrated with financial capital depicts today's financial crisis and global competitions more actually than his time. What we are witnessing today is the fact that inter-capital competition is intensifying not only between core capitalist countries but also between them and emerging powers.

For example, the China-led financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the new Silk Road Foundation, intend to support Beijing's "Belt and Road Initiative." Almost all Western powers (excluding the USA and Japan) joined the AIIB. The situation reflects Kautsky's ultra-imperialism theory: Chinese and global capitals intersect and merge in order to jointly extract profits from the rest of the world in a form of amalgamated finance. Ironically, one scholar even argues that the rise of China/BRICS will not lead to any substantial change in the capitalist world system; rather, what we are witnessing is a process of adaptation and co-optation of emerging powers, especially their economic elites, by existing core powers and leading transnational economic classes (Taylor 2016). Today the world has entered into a new age of "imperialism of the corporate state" (Kapferer 2005:12). The incorporation of Chinese capital and its outward expansions is leading the world into a stage of oligopolistic imperialism in which core capitalist countries, including China,

are accelerating both bargaining and conflict over profit distribution, market share, and resource security. In this context, China is obviously torn between coalition and cooperation with the USA and other core capitalist countries on the one hand and competition and conflict with the very same countries on the other. The China-USA trade war since early 2018 seemingly proves Lenin's arguments on inter-imperialist rivalry right.

The Complexities of China's Multifaceted Positions in the Capitalist World System

To put China in the context of the variety of discussions and debates on imperialism presented in the previous sections, the author maintains that China's global economic rise and expansion reflects the key theoretical tenets both by metrocentric theories in terms of internal necessity and driving force and by systemic theories of imperialism in terms of interstate competition for survival and dominance. However, the Chinese case indicates a complexity in which China's economy simultaneously occupies all three stratifications (core, semi-periphery, and periphery) of the world system, and the country is having economic relationships with different countries at different stratifications of the capitalist world system. This implies that the Chinese situation embodies a dual complexity underlining the Kautsky-Lenin dichotomy. Who is right: Kautsky's capital coalition and joint exploitation or Lenin's capital conflict and war? Or the Chinese case actually represents two sides of the same coin?

When looking at China's economic integration with the capitalist world system in the past decades, the world is witnessing the rise of a country that is having multifaceted positions in the current capitalist world system (see Fig. 1). These multiple positions raise a number of interesting questions regarding the interrelationships between China's rise and the different countries that are located in the different stratifications of the world system.

China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities, Fig. 1 The complexities of China's multifaceted positions in the world system. (The author's own figure)

China: From a Victim of Imperialism to an Imperialist Comprador?

During the following decades of China's economic reform in the late 1970s, China had been a *victim* of Kautsky's "joint exploitation of Ultraimperialism." The Chinese elites believed that economic mobility in the hierarchical structure of the world economy entails dramatic structural changes and requires higher levels of production and technology. This implies that China had to push forward greater vertical linkages to the capitalist market place and deepen its internal accumulations through exploitation of surplus labor. Rapid industrialization, in the view of the Chinese neoliberal elites, must attract foreign investment by providing "favorable" concessions to global capitalists and multinational companies and by reducing welfare costs. By doing so, it is hoped that the external linkage of the Chinese economy with the global economy could reinforce the ruling elites and promote internal expansion.

Beijing had been acting as a comprador for global imperialist capitalism during the early reform period. The country was seen as the biggest savior of the capitalist world system by subjecting its economy and vast population to the capitalism's "law of value" and labor exploitation as well as by taking over the low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing in the global supply chains. The penetration of imperialism into the Chinese society and economy was achieved through "(i) investments by transnational corporations, (ii) the activities of global finance, (iii) the influence of international financial institutions like the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, and (iv) the channels of culture and ideology" (Lotta 2009: 29).

Today, China's four-decade capital accumulation has enabled it to create its own alternative financial institutions, such as the New Development Bank (the BRICS Bank), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the new Silk Road Foundation. These institutions

purposefully aim to facilitate China's emergence as a global power. Not denying the anti-imperialism and counter-hegemony elements that underline these China-led global financial institutions, they also reflect Kautsky's ultra-imperialism theory in which Chinese capital and the capital of others core countries merge and intersect in order to jointly exploit the rest of the world in a form of amalgamated finance. The decision by the International Monetary Fund to include the Chinese currency (RMB) in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket paved the way for a broader use of the RMB in global trade and finance, securing China's standing as a global economic power.

But, it will be a mistake to draw an analogy between China as an emerging power and the bloc of Western developed countries. China's accumulation of surplus value extracted from its enormous proletariat and through trade surplus with the USA is also leading in international aid and foreign investments in Africa and Latin America.

China: A Rising Counter-Imperialist Force?

The rise of China with its global economic expansion is invariably "affecting" and "disturbing" a number of established imperialist "global relationships" and "global arrangements" as well as imperialist "structural power" of the existing world order.

After a high economic growth for four decades, China is increasingly becoming an integral force of Lenin's global "financial oligarchy" and "imperial capitalism." Beijing is now engaging in competition with the core capitalist states in terms of capital expansion, overseas resource acquisition, and periphery labor exploitation (Li 2016). Consequently, the incorporation of Chinese capital and its global economic expansions leads the world into a stage of oligopolistic imperialism in which core capitalist countries, including China, are accelerating the conflict over profit distribution, market share, and resource security. The "menace" of the world's most populous country in commodity consumption and wealth collection has largely reduced the profit margin of the traditional core states. China's struggle to move its position up in the global supply chains and to take a larger share of global wealth and resources

is perceived as an attempt *to redivide the already divided world*. To put it more directly, Beijing's rampant capital and wealth accumulation together with its rising military power potentially challenges the capacity of the core countries of the capitalist world system to defend gross inequalities in the world order and the tremendous privilege and power this global disparity of wealth has brought for the core countries in general and the USA in particular.

While most analyses focus on the economic arena (hard power), the Chinese challenge is definitely not only material but also ideational. The Chinese state-led development model is ideologically unacceptable to the defined norms and values of the liberal order. Even today China is not recognized as a "market economy" by many of the existing core powers of the liberal world, such as the USA and EU. The "Beijing Consensus" (Ramo 2004), in opposition to the "Washington Consensus," is a message China sends to the Global South: developing nations must not be constrained by the modernization paradigm defined neoliberal imperialism, and they should establish their own path of development according to their challenges. "China is writing its own book now. The book represents a fusion of Chinese thinking with lessons learned from the failure of globalization culture in other places. The rest of the world has begun to study this book" (Ramo, ibid.: 5). "The Beijing model has grown to become an unavoidable process which can only be neglected at the cost of standing on the wrong side of economic history" (Asongu et al. 2018). As one commentator points out in *The Times*, the global debate some years ago was about whether the Chinese authoritarian-capitalist model would be able to survive in a global free market, and today "China's political and economic system is better equipped and perhaps even more sustainable than the American model" (Bremmer 2017).

Through a double-track strategy in joining and modifying the existing international institutions while setting up its own international financial institutions, China's economic rise is changing Beijing's position from a passive rule-follower to a proactive rule-maker leading to an emerging

world order "with Chinese characteristics." In other words, China has two optional choices today: First, it can choose "to operate from within existing institutions to enhance its position through seeking the redistribution of decision-making authority, or by using its influence to obstruct and contain the progressive evolution of the liberal rules, practices, and norms of an institution in ways that threaten China's interests" (Ikenberry and Lim 2017: 2). Second, if the first choice does not give Beijing the expected result, and then Beijing can create its own international institution. Both choices are affecting in different degrees the *patterns of global relationships* that generate gross inequalities in the world order and tremendous privilege and power this global disparity of wealth and power have brought for the core countries, especially the USA. Currently China is implementing both choices at the same time.

One of the Chinese ways to modify the existing world order which is historically shaped and maintained by Western imperialism is to form across regional alliance, such as the BRICS (Li 2014, 2019, forthcoming). Despite its many weaknesses, the five BRICS countries are playing an important role on the global political stage as they are coordinating foreign policy positions on key issues and are providing direction to different aspects of global and regional governance. BRICS has been converted to an "institutional agency" (Contipelli and Picciau 2015: 93). Many of BRICS' policy positions on, among others, climate change, poverty reduction, nuclear proliferation, etc. are legitimized as an active voice in the claim for a transition toward a multi-lateralism in global governance. In particular, the rise of BRICS as a new actor within the international system accelerates the evolution of a *new agenda* within global governance, such as the G20, the IMF, etc. (Duggan 2015).

A specific area for investigating the changes in patterns of global relationships is international aid system, a Western-led imperialist system dominated by North-South relations. Beijing's increasing role in the international aid system can be seen from two perspectives: (1) China has emerged to become a major actor in the international aid

arrangement, challenging institutions and norms which have been long established by the West; and (2) within the aid system itself, the size and volume of Chinese aid together with global expectations will continue to increase. A major indicator is that China's aggregation of aid resources is increasingly pricing out many Western actors, who a decade ago were undisputable leaders in the field. As one African scholar points out:

> The entry of China into the aid system is changing this power of the traditional aid system to shape the development route, as it offers a new set of ideas and practices that, first, is breaking the monopoly of Western aid to define, and second, is also proving attractive to aid recipient countries, particularly in Africa. (Opoku-Mensah 2009: 12)

China: An Emerging Imperialist?

In the Global South, China has one historical advantage when discussing about imperialism and colonialism. That is China has no history of imperialist aggression or colonial domination, and the country itself was a victim of European imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This shared history with many countries in the South puts China in a good position to project the image of rising China as a benevolent power.

Although it is against China's long-standing self-identity as a leader of developing countries, China's new status as a world economic and political power is paradoxically and inevitably turning Beijing into an image of a global *hegemon*, a perceived imperialist. Today, the debate about whether China is an emerging colonialist predator or development partner to the Global South is still going on, and the majority of the discussions in both media and academia have been ideologically and politically guided by West-dominated opinion makers. Economic relations between China and the Global South are increasingly portrayed as "neocolonialism" for "neoimperialism" (The Economist 2008; Sharife 2009).

Numerous literature point to the fact that China's global competition is causing the peripheralization of existing semi-periphery countries within the current world system. One Chinese researcher within the field bluntly predicted more than a decade ago, "China's competition

will completely undermine the relative monopoly of the existing semiperipheral states in certain commodity chains. The value added will be squeezed, forcing the traditional semi-peripheral states to accept lower wage rates close to the Chinese rates [which they cannot do it]" (Li 2005: 436, 2008). China's competition breaks down the relative monopoly of the existing semi-peripheral states in certain global commodity chains and causes a certain degree of deindustri-alization or peripheralization of many existing semi-periphery countries due to the change of their position from being an exporter of manufacturing goods to being a commodity supplier.

This above line of thinking and argument is shared by many scholars in Latin America (Bernal-Meza 2012; Dussel Peters 2016; Guelar 2013; Sevares 2015). Although trade relations between China and Latin America and Africa brought about "commodity boom" in the regions during the 2000s, the stimulation of the trade was largely due to the fact that China's internal capac-ity to produce commodities was much insufficient to satisfy its worldwide "made-in-China" devel-opment. Following the type of trade pattern, China's capital and production expansion in the Global South unavoidably brings about a new circle of "unequal exchange" reflected in the con-ventional North-South dependent relationships. Some analyses conclude that China is simply implementing a pragmatic mercantilist trade pol-icy that reconfirms Africa's economic position in the world economy as a commodity supplier and a modest consumer market (Holslag 2006; Taylor 2016). The logic goes: when China moves to the core position, it still needs the periphery.

Given by the above arguments supporting Chi-nese "neocolonialism" or "neoimperialism" which focus on a few economic indicators, such as natural resources and trade, it must be empha-sized here that these arguments are too econocentric, and they often ignore other impor-tant transformative role China is playing beyond the economic realm. Beijing is using its influence in the Global South, particularly in Africa, as a leverage to influence economic and political deci-sions in global governance (Kofigah 2014). In

many situations China has repeatedly and increas-ingly been seen as the leader championing the concerns of the South, for example, at the WTO during the Doha round negotiation.

Another critical aspect to remember is that when Western neoliberalism has been shaping and dominating the global development of both theory and practice since the end of the Cold War under "the end of history" paradigm (Fukuyama 1989), China's "economic success with Chinese characteristics" seemingly offers an alternative economic development model to the Global South. Regardless of the depiction of China as imperialism, China's emergence as an alternative aid donor, investor, and economic partner seems to be one of the major sources of attraction for developing countries. According to a report from the World Economic Forum, "To become more like China" has turned the African continent to a positive direction: "The top 10 performing Afri-can countries have a combined growth rate that averaged 7.6% over the past decade. Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique, Angola and Zambia also have a combined popu-lation of around 700 million people" (Borg 2016).

Africans are generally receptive to China's developmental approach, and they treasure the long-standing historical connections built over decades with their Chinese partners; and they feel that China shows Africa far more understanding, sympathy, and respect than paternalistic Western countries (Brautigam 2010). On the one hand, China is indeed investing on and exploiting Africa's natural resources based on economic moti-vation and market dictum, but this must not be automatically identified as the foundation of "neo-imperialism." On the other hand, as one research article sharply points out, "based on the data avail-able, there is no tangible evidence that supports the view that consciously China's intention is to con-trol Africa politically or that China has a hidden agenda to divide some African territoriality for its political gains" (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011: 259).

If neoimperialism refers to the use of eco-nomic, political, and military pressures to control or influence other countries, China is arguably a very different world power who stands in stark

contrast to Western powers. The Chinese principles of "non-conditionality" and "noninterference," among others, have laid the foundation for China's aid and foreign policy strategy since the 1950s. The pillars, which support Beijing's international aid and financial loan principles, deviate in many ways from those of traditional Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries and international banks and stand upon noninterference, mutual benefit, and non-conditionality. Despite the challenges to the long-term feasibility and sustainability of these principles, they have strong "symbolic power" and "norm diffusion" effect that disassociates China with the notion of neoimperialism.

Concluding Remarks: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Very often media tend to apply eye-catching and sensational terms such as neocolonialism and neoimperialism in discussing and interpreting China's recent surge of influence on the Global South, without even understanding the historical context and the very nature of these terms. Even in the imperial history of the Chinese empire characterized by the Chinese historical imperial "tributary system" in Ming and Qing dynasties, the Chinese system was fundamentally different from that of European imperialist relationship with the colonies. The notion of Chinese "tributary system" was coined by Fairbank to refer to "a set of ideas and practices developed and perpetuated by the rulers of China over many centuries" (Fairbank, cf. Lee 2017: 29). It consisted of a network of loose international relations with China as the center, and the "tributary states" were largely autonomous and virtually independent. A worldwide consensus in China is not historically and culturally a Western colonial type of core country that is coercive to impose a relationship between political entities characterized by hierratical core-periphery relations driven by either metrocentric or pericentric interest.

A heuristic way to understand the discussion about "Chinese neoimperialism" is to contextualize China's rise and expansion as part of and within the logic of the capitalist world system's uninterrupted cycles of capital mobility and redivision of labor. In other words, China's global economic rise and outward expansion must be conceptualized as an inevitable consequence of capitalist world system's modus operandi.

Lenin (1917) understood imperialism as a capitalist country's endeavor to find overseas markets and investment opportunities when its domestic economy reached to a maturity with excess surplus and production overcapacity. According to Lenin's theoretical assumption, unless the country were able to keep finding new markets abroad to swallow its domestic overcapacity, it would face an economic implosion, causing internal socioeconomic and sociopolitical instabilities. This is exactly the kind of situation China is facing today. The circumstance is, in line with Lenin's expectation, pushing China toward one option – outward expansion. Beijing's gigantic expansionist "Belt and Road" project was first and foremost designed to sustain domestic economic growth.

When we place China's recent rise in the context of discussing imperialism and anti-imperialism, definitive conclusions do not exist, because we are still in the midst of the process we seek to comprehend and assess. Yet multiple phenomena can be observed, and multiple implications can be generated. The difficulty to make a convincing conclusion is the fact that multifaceted phenomena and multidimensional interpretations are intertwined, which makes it impossible to answer questions, such as "is China a rising imperialist power?" "is China's economic relations with the Global South north-south or south-south?" "is China's Belt and Road initiative an imperialist project?" "does China's global financial role lead to Chinese credit imperialism?" and so on.

When decomposing the Chinese economy, it is not difficult to find that the country is simultaneously occupying multiple positions in all three stratifications of the capitalist world economy – core, semi-periphery, and periphery – by taking into consideration global supply chains (GSCs) and global value chains (GVCs). China's multiple positions are enabling the country to challenge and compete with core countries in high-tech sectors and financial institutions and with semi-

periphery and periphery countries in manufacturing and commodity industries.

In a word, China's capital and trade expansion in developing countries of the Global South represents two sides of the same coin, with one side showing great opportunities in terms of political and economic room of maneuver and upward mobility and another side exhibiting serious challenges in terms of the risk of being outcompeted.

Cross-References

▶ Industrialisation and Imperialism
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism
▶ Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ World-Systems Analysis and Giovanni Arrighi

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C

China's National Question Since 1949

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Description/Definition

The Chinese nation is conceived as a unified state composed of 56 ethnic groups, the majority Han and 55 state-recognized ethnic minorities. In theory they are all equal, though in practice the immense population and other dominance of the Han makes that impossible (in 2010, the ethnic minorities made up only 8.41% of China's total). There is a political system of limited autonomy in the places where the ethnic minorities are concentrated, the five main ones being equivalent in status to provinces. These are the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and the Tibet Autonomous Region.

The minority economies have greatly expanded and modernized, especially in the twenty-first century, and absolute poverty has been vastly reduced. However, serious inequalities persist both within and among the minorities themselves and, with a few exceptions, they are poorer than the Han. Many of these inequalities are due more to regional disparities than to ethnic. Tourism has been greatly promoted since the 1980s and had contributed to economic growth and to preserving ethnic cultures, but has been criticized for exacerbating inequalities and for showing tourists a false and reconstructed culture.

The Chinese state has zero tolerance for separatism. In practice only two minorities have spawned major, though so far unsuccessful, separatist movements, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. In suppressing these two movements, China has been charged with colonial attitudes and serious human rights abuses. In both cases, China's defence is the preservation of the unity of the Chinese nation.

China has been accused of a new imperialism, and its attitude toward its ethnic minorities and insistence on its territorial space are among the reasons. However, neither the theory of ethnic minorities and limited autonomy nor the concept of the unity of the Chinese nation is imperialist.

Introduction

In October 2019, the People's Republic of China (PRC) celebrated its 70th anniversary. Although United Nations demographers believe that India's population will shortly overtake China's, the PRC has since its foundation been the world's most populous nation-state, with United Nations data estimating the total number of people in China in mid-2019 at 1,433,783,686. In terms of territory, China stands in third place, exceeded only by Russia and Canada.

In discussing China's "national question," we need to consider precisely who makes up the population of China in terms of nationality, particularly questions relating to ethnicity.

The Chinese term meaning "Chinese nation" is *Zhonghua minzu* 中华民族. In a major Chinese-language dictionary, Chen Yongling 陈永龄 (1986, p. 573) defines it as "the general term covering all ethnic groups," of which the PRC state has come officially to recognize 56. China's foremost anthropologist and ethnologist Fei Xiaotong 费孝通 (1910–2005, also romanized in the old Wade-Giles system as Fei Hsiao-tung) conceived of the Chinese nation as diverse, because of the different ethnic cultures among the 56 ethnic groups, but also essentially united. He summed up his concept in the phrase "plurality and unity in the configuration of the Chinese nationality" (Fei 1988), the title of a major lecture he gave in Hong Kong in 1988. As scholar Zhou Minglang (2016, p. 128) interprets Fei, the Chinese nation "is a national entity that has developed from a common emotion and morale for a shared destiny of successes and failures."

Certainly, the idea of the Chinese nation has been used by many Chinese leaders to promote national unity. The "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing* 中华

民族伟大复兴) has been a common theme since the late twentieth century. Chinese President (since 2013) and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (since 2012) Xi Jinping equates it with his notion of the "China Dream" (*Zhongguo meng* 中国梦).

The term *minzu* 民族 raises questions in the sense that it has two distinct meanings. One is close to the nation-state that is an internationally recognized entity, with borders, an independent government, and its own national institutions, an example being "the Chinese nation," mentioned above, which is currently coterminous with the PRC. But *minzu* is also a nationality or ethnic group *within* a nation-state. Among the 56 state-recognized ethnic groups in the PRC, the Han is the dominant and most populous one, accounting for over 90% of China's total, while the other 55 are counted as the "minority nationalities" (*shaoshu minzu* 少数民族). The term *shaoshu minzu* is used in Chinese-language publications coming from the PRC. English translation varies, possibilities including "minority nationalities" and, more recently, minorities, minority ethnic groups, and minority ethnicities. This sense of the term *minzu* is interrogated more thoroughly below.

The PRC is a nation-state dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, *Zhongguo Gongchan dang* 中国共产党). The CCP led by Mao Zedong won the civil war against the previously dominant Nationalist Party (*Guomin dang* 国民党) in 1949, leading to the founding of the PRC on October 1 that year. Since that time the PRC has held power in most of those territories claimed as part of China. At the end of 1978, 2 years after Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping instituted policies of reform and modernization, which have exerted profound effects on China's economy, society, politics, and culture.

Territories in which the CCP claims full sovereignty and rules as part of China include some with extensive minority populations, making up about 60% of the total territory. These include Xinjiang in the far northwest, Tibet in the southwest, Yunnan in the south, and Inner Mongolia in the northeast. From time to time diasporas and others have contested Chinese rule in particular minority areas, but the PRC is very firm that Chinese unity is a core principle. There will be separate discussion of Tibetan areas and Xinjiang.

This chapter relies mainly on printed sources, primary and secondary, both in Chinese and English. However, it also appeals to extensive personal experience in ethnic areas in China, the author having traveled frequently in many of them since 1982. (An extensive bibliography of the main items relevant to ethnic minorities is available in Mackerras 2018.)

Politics in the PRC and Ethnic Minorities

The minorities make up only a small proportion of China's population but inhabit a large part of China's territory, much of it near borders. Put another way, most of China's borders are minority areas (*minzu diqu* 民族地区). So the political importance of minorities is far greater and out of proportion to their population.

The Concept of a *Minzu* and Identity

Minzu in the sense of an ethnic group within a larger nation-state has always been officially understood in the PRC according to Stalin's definition of 1913 (1953, p. 307): "a historically constituted group of people, having a common territory, a common language, a common economic life and a common psychological makeup, which expresses itself in a common culture." It is this definition that spawns the concept of minority nationality or minority ethnic group (*shaoshu minzu*).

The Nationalist Party recognized five ethnic groups in China: Han (the majority and the one most commonly associated with "the Chinese"), Manchus (who had ruled China under the Qing dynasty from 1644 to 1911 but were overthrown by Sun Yat-sen and his Republicans in 1911), the Tibetans, Mongolians, and the Hui or Muslims. When the PRC was established, many groups came forward to express their identity, because the new government promised a better life for all oppressed groups. Classification of these ethnic groups was a major project of the 1950s, with "extensive field work" beginning in 1953 to

establish which were genuine ethnic groups and which were not (Fei 1980, p. 94). The final number of 55 minorities was reached in 1979, when a small population ethnic group called the Jino (living in Yunnan Province) was formally recognized as a *minzu*. (For a range of articles on theoretical and identity questions, especially ethnic classification, see Mackerras 2011, Vol. I, pp. 27–203.)

Stalin's definition applies much more readily to ethnic minorities of the past than to those of the present. Migration processes have tended to dilute inhabiting a "common territory," and modernization has affected any "common economic life," while globalism has made "common culture" much less easy to define. However, despite difficulties, Stalin's definition does at least establish some firm criteria, upon which a judgment can be made about who and what make up a specific ethnic group.

Two case studies exemplify important difficulties and raise interesting issues. They are the Hui and the Manchus.

Hui 回is the name applied to people who are Muslim by religion but Han in other ways. They speak and write Chinese and have contributed to Chinese literature. They inhabit areas generally not too different from other Chinese and live all over China, even including the Tibetan capital Lhasa. In general, their "economic life" is very similar to that of the Han. Being Muslim by religion has a very important implication. This is that Han cannot be Hui. Han who change religion to become Muslim also change their ethnic group to be Hui.

The Manchus come originally from the northeast of China. When they ruled China, they greatly expanded its territory but gradually lost their identity and became absorbed into the Han. Nowadays, the Manchu written and spoken language is very rarely used. It is interesting that Cao Xueqin, the main author of the late eighteenth-century social novel *A Dream of Red Mansions* (*Honglou meng* 红楼梦), often considered China's greatest, was Manchu.

In the early days of the PRC, especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Hui and Manchu ethnic identity was very blurred. People who might otherwise be considered Han were not too keen to emphasize their Muslim identity. Manchus might conceal their ethnic identity, because they feared discrimination or contempt as belonging to the minority group that had dominated the Chinese state for so long in the past. In the 1980s, however, ethnic identities revived strongly in China. Referring to the Hui, Dru Gladney (1991, p. x) writes of "the emergence of a new ethnoreligious identity in China." Bai Lian has likewise found that a "reawakened Manchu identity has made the Manchus one of the conspicuous minority nationalities in China." According to the 1982 census, the Manchu population was 4,304,981, but had grown to 9,846,776 according to that of 1990. The main reason for such a rapid growth in so short a time was re-registration by people who had been reluctant, or even ashamed, to claim themselves as Manchu in 1982 but were proud to do so in 1990 because of the political change that allowed for the strengthening of their ethnic identity (Bai 2005, pp. 183–184).

Policy Toward the Ethnic Minorities

The CCP's essential policy on the ethnic minorities is that all ethnic groups are equal, but those in China may not secede. However, they may practice a form of autonomy within the areas where they form a concentrated community. The organs of self-government of the autonomous areas can pass their own laws, though these must be submitted to the central government for approval. The head of the organs of autonomous government must belong to the specific ethnic group exercising autonomy.

The details of this policy of autonomy are spelled out in the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy of 1984, as amended in 2001. They are quite liberal, including the rights of minorities to develop and maintain their own cultures, use their own languages, and follow their own social practices. Article 11 ensures the protection of "normal religious activities," but the same article specifies that "Religious bodies and religious affairs shall not be subject to any foreign domination." The Autonomy Law also provides preferential policies (*youhui zhengce*) in various areas (discussed in Leibold 2016). An example is in education.

Article 71 states that the government will help poor minority families with the education of their children and "in enrollment, institutions of higher education and secondary technical schools shall appropriately set lower standards and requirements for the admission of students from minority nationalities," and special consideration will be given to the "admission of students from minority nationalities with thin populations."

A major limitation to this autonomy system should be noted. Although the head of the governing organ of autonomous places must by law belong to the ethnic group exercising autonomy, this prescription does not apply to the CCP. So, for example, the head of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) must be an ethnic Tibetan, but the Secretary of the CCP in the TAR can belong to any ethnic group, including the Han. In practice, the Party secretary is much more powerful than the government head.

The degree of actual autonomy has fluctuated over the years, depending in large part on the policy of the day. During the Cultural Revolution, autonomy was very restricted, but with the period of Reform under Deng Xiaoping, it broadened greatly and allowed for a much greater degree of freedom. (For a general rundown on autonomy, see Lai 2016.) The policies of greater Sinicization that have followed since 2015 have resulted in a reduction in the degree of autonomy and greater insistence on national unity, both of which have had the effect of restricting freedoms. Personal experience suggests that preferential policies in such areas as education are not affected by these changes.

As of 2003 there were 155 autonomous areas in China including regions, prefectures, and counties. Autonomous regions are equivalent to provinces in level. There are five autonomous regions in China, the earliest being set up before the PRC. The five are, in chronological order of establishment:

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, set up May 1, 1947

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, October 1, 1955

The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 15, 1958

The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, October 25, 1958

The Tibet Autonomous Region, September 1, 1965

The Chinese authorities have always been clear that they have zero tolerance for separatism or independence movements. International relations specialist Enze Han (2013, p. 5) has developed a theory according to which an ethnic group must satisfy two conditions for aspirations toward separation from China to be realistic. These are (i) that independence must offer an "achievable better alternative" to current conditions and (ii) that the ethnic group must get "substantial external support" for political mobilization, with diasporas a major source. In practice there have been enduring separatist movements only among the Tibetans and Uyghurs, both considered separately. There have been occasional suggestions that Inner Mongolia might join with the independent Republic of Mongolia, but such movements have never posed a serious threat to the Chinese state.

Population

The population of ethnic minorities is very small by comparison with China's total but has risen both in absolute and relative terms. As of the end of 2019, there have been six population censuses under the PRC, held in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The 1953 census counted the minorities at 34 million or 5.89% of the total population; that of 1982 showed them at 66.4 million, or 6.62% of the total. By 2000 the ethnic proportion had risen to 8.41% or 106.46 million people, while the 2010 census put the ethnic minorities at a total of 113.79 million people, which was 8.49% of the total population of China. (See also Mackerras 2016, pp. 117–118.)

Reasons for the rapid rise between 1982 and 2000 are manifold. But we may single out two. One is re-registration, to which reference was already made in discussing the Manchus. The

other is that, at the time the Han were subjected to the one-child-per-couple policy, policy toward the minorities was much more flexible, people in areas with sparse populations being allowed more children. Although most minorities did suffer restrictions, they were far more lenient than those imposed on the Han. Rural Tibetans were allowed as many as they wanted (Mackerras 1994, pp. 233–245). At the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, this writer randomly found several families in rural Xinjiang with nine children each.

Populations among the 55 individual minorities vary widely. Figures from the 2010 census show the most populous as the Zhuang, whom we saw above as concentrated mainly in Guangxi, which borders Vietnam, the smallest in population being the Lhoba (3,682) of Tibet and the Tatars (3,556) of Xinjiang. Those with over five million (2010 census) are Zhuang, 16,926,381; Hui, 10,586,087; Manchus, 10,387,958; Uyghurs, 10,069,346; Miao, 9,426,007; Yi, 8,714,393; Tujia, 8,353,912; Tibetans, 6,282,187; and Mongolians, 5,981,840. (See Zang 2015, pp. 4–5.)

Han Immigration

One highly controversial issue is that of Han migration into minority areas. A frequently heard charge is that Han are taking over land that formerly belonged to other ethnic groups and in that way establishing domination over them. China's official position is that, since these territories are all integral parts of China, the ethnic group of residents there is immaterial. Still, three important cases can indicate some realities of the population composition. These are Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

When the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was set up in 1947, Mongolians were only 14.81% of the total population. Although the 1990 census showed the proportion somewhat higher at 19.38% (Mackerras 1994, p. 252), the 2010 census saw a drop to 17.11%, still higher than 1947. In other words, the extensive migration of Han into Inner Mongolia preceded the PRC.

In the case of Xinjiang also, we find that Han migration is not new to the PRC. Early in the

nineteenth century, the Han proportion was already quite high (Millward 2007, p. 306). However, it later fell back in the mid-nineteenth century, and, though it had to some extent recovered by the middle of the twentieth century, Han migration under the PRC has been unprecedented.

Census and other figures show that about three-quarters of Xinjiang's population were Uyghurs at the time the CCP took over. In 1954, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, designed to promote economic development and assure security in Xinjiang, functioned as an organization which Han settlers could join for work purposes. This involved extensive Han immigration into Xinjiang. According to census figures, the proportion of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang population fell from 75.42% in 1953 to 45.48% in 1982, while over the same period, the Han proportion rose from 6.94% to 40.41%. Absolute numbers rose for all ethnic groups, and the total population climbed from 4,783,608 in 1953 to 13,081,633 in 1982 (Mackerras 1994, p. 253). In other words, there was a major reshaping of the population, with most of the Han immigration going to the north and east of the Autonomous Region. The extent of immigration caused great resentment to many Uyghurs, who felt they were being taken over, but justified by the government on the grounds of helping with economic development and national security.

Since the early 1980s, the population has continued to rise in absolute terms. In relative terms, the proportion of Uyghurs and Han has remained reasonably stable. The 2000 census put the Uyghurs at 43.6% and the Han at 40.6%, while official figures for the end of 2015 from the Xinjiang statistical yearbook showed the Uyghur percentage rising to 46.42, that of the Han falling to 38.99.

Some Uyghurs have moved to places outside Xinjiang. Han immigration includes a good deal of rotation, that is, people who go to Xinjiang for short-term work and then return home. In general, the Uyghur population remains concentrated more in the southwest, while Han tend strongly to live in the north and east.

As for Tibet, the issue of Han immigration is extremely fraught, because there is a literature

condemning China for this phenomenon. In July 1996, the Dalai Lama gave a speech to the British Parliament in London in which he claimed that "The destruction of cultural artefacts and traditions coupled with the mass influx of Chinese into Tibet amounts to cultural genocide." In other words, he saw immigration of Chinese into Tibet as on a scale amounting to mass influx, which, combined with the destruction of cultural artifacts and traditions, was equivalent to cultural genocide.

Census data for the TAR suggest that the proportion of Han has always been small. The percentage of Han was 3.68 in the 1990 census, growing to 5.9 in the 2000 census, and 8.17 in that of 2010. Although there are a few Hui, Lhoba, and others, the overwhelming majority of the TAR population is Tibetan.

When talking of a mass influx of Chinese into Tibet, the Dalai Lama includes not only the TAR but also all Qinghai Province and parts of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu Provinces as well. His concept of Tibet is very much larger in area than that of the Chinese authorities. Moreover, when he refers to "the Chinese," he includes not only Han but also Hui. Even including those areas, his charge that Han immigration is one of the two main factors in "cultural genocide" is an exaggeration. Among the studies done on this subject, the most credible is that of Ma Rong, professor of sociology at Peking University. He has access to the most reliable data and has undertaken the most thorough investigation. His conclusion (Ma 2011, p. 79) is that "although the Han population in the Tibetan-inhabited areas has increased to a certain extent, it still comprises a small proportion of the local population, especially in the TAR."

Economic Development

Since the reform period began at the end of 1978, China has experienced an unprecedentedly rapid growth in the economy. This has raised China to be the world's largest economy but one (the United States). The standard of living of the people has risen all over the country.

However, the growth has been uneven. In general, the minorities have always been, and remain, poorer than the Han. Among reasons for this are that they are caught up in two of the biggest inequalities in China.

One of these is the contrast between the urban and rural regions. Leaving aside ethnic issues, cities have always attracted more industry, investment, and money than the rural areas. Minorities tend to be rural, with major cities comparatively few in the ethnic areas.

The second is the regional distinction, between richer north and poorer south, and between much more prosperous east and poorer west. Governments have for a long time focused more attention and money on the north and east than the interior, southwestern, or western regions. The traditionally richest parts of China are mostly Han, not minority.

We should note a few important exceptions to these generalities. The Koreans of Jilin, near the border with Korea, are just as rich as the Han and, according to some indicators, better off. Their literacy rates are the best in China. They have always enjoyed good relations with the Han and share a tradition dominated by Confucianism. The government regards them as a "model" minority (Zang 2015, p. 118). Two others that are probably no worse off than the Han in many ways are the Manchus and Mongolians, while the Hui are hardly different from the Han in matters affecting economic life.

Still, the fact remains that economic inequality has always been a feature of China's ethnic minorities. This inequality applies especially to the relationship between Han and minorities. However, it also applies within and among ethnic minorities. Those of the south are generally much poorer than those of the north. Class distinctions within minority society are not necessarily worse than in Han, but they are traditionally severe all the same. In the past, the Yi practiced a particularly ghastly form of slavery.

The CCP authorities have tried to alleviate these inequalities. They have invested large sums of money in special attempts to raise the living standards of the minorities. We saw earlier that minorities enjoyed "preferential policies."

These applied to many areas, including not only exemption from the one-child-per-couple policy and quotas for educational services but also tax alleviation, employment opportunities in government organizations, and government subsidies of various kinds.

In 2000, the government launched its Great Western Development Strategy. This applied to six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi, Tibet, and Xinjiang), and one province-level municipality (Chongqing), altogether about 400 million people. Although not all these are minority areas, they do include some 90% of China's minority populations. The three main aims were to improve the welfare of the poor, develop the natural resources of the western provinces in environmentally friendly ways to reduce dependence on other countries, and further China's national security and unity (see Bhalla and Luo 2017, p. 117). The main policy is preferential taxation and national investment in key projects of all kinds. After a decade or so of implementation, one scholarly account reached the evaluation that "although the western region has experienced impressive rates of economic growth, regional disparities in China have continued to widen in spite of the western regional strategy" (Grewal and Ahmed 2011, p. 161).

As for the main aim of alleviating poverty, the following quotation from two Chinese scholars suggests that there was indeed improvement but that *region* is actually a greater indicator in accounting for poverty than *ethnicity*. The minorities are poor because of where they live rather than because they are minorities:

> Descriptive analysis reveals that ethnic differences in terms of poverty narrowed from 2002 to 2013. Regression analysis suggests that this might be attributed to the fact that ethnic minorities are mainly located in less-developed regions where their ethnic identity does not make any difference. In fact, when controlling for the regional variables, the level of poverty among Han is even more serious than that among ethnic minorities. It is also worth noting that the coefficient of education among ethnic minorities is significantly larger than that among Han, indicating that the development of education may be a very effective

antipoverty strategy for ethnic minorities. (Liu and Lu 2017, p. 2)

The point about education is also very telling. Literacy and education certainly improved greatly over those years. But regional disparities between east and west were not reduced. If anything, they increased.

Another attempt to improve the economy in areas with large minority populations came with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. The main aim of the BRI is to link China much more with countries to its west, including those of Central Asia, South Asia, Europe, and Africa. Infrastructure, including railways and roads, is vitally important to improving intercommunications. It is still too early to cast authoritative judgments on the success of the BRI, but some main points already stand out.

A very important concept is that of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which Xi Jinping launched during a visit to Pakistan in 2015. CPEC links Kashgar in southwestern Xinjiang, now a special economic zone, with the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, and has become important for the economic development of the regions along the corridor. Admittedly, the CPEC is controversial, because it goes through some territory claimed by India, which is consequently vehemently opposed. However, the CPEC is certainly bringing about economic and infrastructural progress in Xinjiang and Pakistan.

One of the most important aspects of development in contemporary China is urbanization. Indeed, the degree of urbanization under the PRC is possibly the most rapid and thorough in world history. China's urban population was only 13.3% of the total in the 1953 census. According to Liu Baokui (2019), associate research fellow at the Institute of Spatial Planning and Regional Economy of National Development and Reform Commission under the State Council, the urbanization percentage rose from 17.92 in 1978 to 59.58% in 2018, thus increasing by an average of more than one percentage point per year over the first 40 years of the reform policies. Because, with exceptions such as the Koreans, Mongolians,

and Hui, the Han tend to be more urban than the minorities, they have enjoyed much better access to the improved facilities that urban life can bring about, such as hospitals, schools, universities, cinemas, big hotels, good restaurants, clubs, and so on. What this means is that, while the standard of living has risen impressively everywhere, it tends to do so more in the places where Han live than those where the minorities have their home.

So the main points concerning economic development among China's ethnic minorities can be summarized as follows:

1. As with all China, the economy has grown enormously, especially in the twenty-first century, with the standard of living among ordinary people improving dramatically.
2. Absolute poverty has been greatly reduced and in 2019 is nearing elimination, but in general the minority areas remain considerably poorer than the nation as a whole.
3. Serious inequalities persist both within and among the minorities themselves, and, with a few exceptions like the Koreans, Manchus, Hui, and Mongolians, they are somewhat poorer than the Han. Many of these inequalities are due more to regional disparities than to ethnic.
4. The PRC has undergone an intensive urbanization process, which has affected minority areas less than Han but contributed to improving living standards greatly.

Tourism

Because it raises major issues connected with the economy and culture and because of its enormous growth since the period of reform began in the late 1970s, tourism has become an important theme in discussing the ethnic minorities. In the increase in domestic tourism that has accompanied the rise in the standard of living, the number of Han visiting minority areas has been far greater than the converse. As for international tourism, World Bank statistics show the number of arrivals in China from outside rising from 20.034 million in 1995 to 60.74 million in 2017, the second figure being the highest in the world after France (86.861 million), Spain (81.786 million), and the United States (76.941) (World Bank Group 2019).

The economy benefits greatly through tourism and vice versa. Good roads and railways enable people to travel more extensively than they have ever been able to do before, while the hospitality trade leads to improvements in hotels, restaurants, theaters, and so on. In recent years, tourism has been used directly to eliminate absolute poverty by enabling the poorest villages to find enterprises capable of enriching them. There is a great deal of inequality in tourism in ethnic areas, because inevitably some regions are more attractive than others or easier to access.

It is true that the cities in the ethnic areas rarely figure near the top of the list of tourist destinations. Yet in recent years, tourism has been a major government enterprise in the ethnic areas. There are two basic aims: to promote and facilitate economic development and to showcase and preserve cultural and ethnic heritage.

Tourism gives traditional cultures a viable commercial reason to survive. Villages with the people dressed in traditional clothing charm tourists. Public and private buildings are cleaned up and have modern facilities like electricity, but they maintain their traditional style.

One aspect of traditional culture displayed very commonly for tourists is the performing arts, especially dance. "They love to sing and dance" is a familiar introduction phrase. Dance is readily appreciated through its beautiful costumes and movements, irrespective of language, while its styles are easily linked to particular ethnic groups. Performances can be short, requiring little concentration. In China, ethnic dances do not need stages. They can be performed readily for tourists in any open space. Moreover, it is customary to invite the tourists to take part toward the end of a show, so that they have the additional feeling of being part of the society they are visiting.

As the trend toward learning about and appreciating ethnic cultures has increased, the idea of authenticity has grown more significant. In order to attract tourists, Chinese people, including those of the ethnic minorities, revive and recreate traditions that may claim to be authentic, but actually

differ somewhat from originals. Timothy Oakes (1998, p. 229), a foremost Western scholar on China's ethnic tourism, has argued that such tourism is a "false modernity." It is true that the "tourist dollar" and the "tourist gaze" both affect how people display their traditions and their culture. It is also true that traditions shown to tourists are no longer an integral part of the society that created them. But by their nature living cultures change, and it is natural that people should present themselves to the outside world in the best light.

One category of tourist attraction is museums, which are very much about cultural memory and the preservation of histories and traditions. China's museums are not universalist and do not show cultural objects from all over the world. Yet the localized function of showcasing a regional or ethnic culture is also a legitimate function of a museum.

Museums in China, including ethnic areas, share several features in common. Firstly, the buildings that house them are quite impressive relative to the area where they are located. An example is the Regional Museum in Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang, which is enormous and well maintained. Secondly, these museums exist at various levels, even in small towns, where they showcase the local culture. Thirdly, they cover defined cultural categories. For example, one quite small museum in the Dong town of Zhaoxing in Guizhou Province has sections on Dong history, and the customs; marriage and family practices; arts, including performing arts; clothes; diet; and ideologies special to the Dong people. Local governments and people care enough about their ethnic traditions and histories to allocate money and effort to remembering them.

A brand of tourism to have drawn attention is sex tourism. According to Dru Gladney (1994), there is a tendency among the majority Han to objectify minority women as "colourful, exotic and erotic" (e.g., p. 110) and, by implication, inferior. A town that can illustrate sex tourism is Jinghong, the capital of Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province, the Dai being culturally and ethnically close to the Thais of Thailand. In the mind of many Han men,

Dai women are more "sexually promiscuous and licentious" than their Han counterparts (Hyde 2001, in Mackerras 2011, p. 329), and in the 1990s, Jinghong became a major destination for Han men seeking sex tourism. Actually, according to Sandra Teresa Hyde, many of the women practicing prostitution to make money from the desires of these men were not in fact Dai, but Han. However, they could dress as Dai and behave as Dai and thus make money from sex tourism as Dai.

Language

There is one aspect of traditional culture that is generally not showcased to tourists, namely, language. It is not that minorities wish specifically to hide their own language. However, for domestic tourists, which is the great majority, the language used is Modern Standard Chinese (Mandarin), while for overseas tourists it is English or the language most appropriate to the particular tourists.

Language is not only a major part of culture. It is also a highly significant way of expressing and remembering culture. The culture of an ethnic group can survive without its language, but only with the greatest difficulty, and the extinction of a language is also likely to involve the crucial weakening or disappearance of the culture it expresses.

Apart from the Hui, virtually all the ethnic minorities have their own language, many more than one. Among these languages, the Sino-Tibetan phylum is best represented and spoken by peoples living in the central, south, and southwest China. Some minority languages belong to the Altaic language phylum, being spoken by peoples in northeast and northwest China. Remaining languages belong to the Indo-European or other phyla (Tsung 2009, pp. 11–12).

Only a small proportion of the minority languages have their own script, the main ones being Tibetan, Mongolian, Yi, Dai, and Manchu, though this last is now more or less extinct. Some languages like Zhuang use the International Phonetic Alphabet, which is based almost entirely on Latin

script, while others like Uyghur use Arabic script. Nowadays, most of the minority languages are written with Chinese characters.

Official policy promotes the use of minority languages. For example, in autonomous places, government buildings and precincts must have names both in Chinese and the relevant minority language. Every single bill in Chinese currency, from 100 *yuan* RMB to 10 cents (one *jiao*), has "the People's Bank of China" written in Chinese characters, *pinyin* Romanization, Tibetan, Mongolian, Uyghur, and Zhuang.

However, according to a study by Huang Xing from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in fact only five minority languages are in regular use in written form in the public sphere, such as government, the media, publishing, and education. These are Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, Korean, and Kazak (Huang 2003, p. 2). Chinese is the national language and the one that makes it easier to advance in society and gain employment. "At present the language situation in China is that Chinese is prestigious and influential whereas minority languages are weakening" (Huang 2003, p. 4).

The use of minority languages as a medium of instruction in school varies throughout China. But as Linda Tsung points out, real literacy and familiarity with one's own language shows one's ethnic identity:

> Although minority parents are already sending their children to Han Chinese schools for further education and expanded career perspectives, there are still those who want their children to remain in minority schools or classes. In doing so, they believe that they can maintain their language and culture, as well as their ethnic status and identity. (Tsung 2009, p. 201)

The overall trend in the last few years has been for minority languages to weaken, and many will likely disappear altogether over the next decades. Some scholars regard that prospect with alarm, considering that it will not only diminish China as a multilingual society, but could even lead to conflict. One writes that "Many minority languages have become endangered and Beijing's integrative policy has had the perverse but predictable effect of helping to create the inter-ethnic conflicts that it had hoped to avoid, with scenes of ethnic tension in minority regions over the last few years" (Tsung 2014, p. 210).

The Tibetan Areas

Overall, relations among people of different ethnic groups are not necessarily any better or worse than among those of the same group. However, two of China's ethnic minorities have exemplified persistent disunity and conflict. These are the Tibetans and Uyghurs.

Of all regions of China, the one most relevant to the issue of Chinese unity is Taiwan, because China insists as a core value that Taiwan is part of China, whereas many in Taiwan, the West, and elsewhere are unsure of or hostile to that position. Taiwan is not an ethnic issue and need not be considered here.

Among ethnic minorities, the one most relevant to China's unity is the Tibetans, who believe in an esoteric form of Buddhism, headed by the Dalai Lama. Tibetan Buddhism and its icon the Dalai Lama enjoy a very positive image in the West, where this religion partly fills the gap of a spiritual life inherent in the rapid decline of Christianity.

An agreement between the Dalai Lama's government and the central government in 1951 affirmed that Tibet was indeed an integral part of China, but an unsuccessful rebellion in 1959 and the Dalai Lama's escape to India and subsequent establishment of a government-in-exile there reopened the question. Many in the Tibetan diaspora pushed for independence or a degree of autonomy far greater than China was prepared to tolerate. Large-scale demonstrations by monks wanting independence occurred in the Tibetan capital Lhasa in the late 1980s, with the international community appearing to offer support through the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama in 1989.

In a speech in Strasbourg in 1988, the Dalai Lama proposed "genuine autonomy," not independence. He later repeated the suggestion many times, most notably in his speech in London in July 1996. Two issues should be noted here.

One is that "genuine autonomy" involves free elections that could easily remove the CCP from power in Tibet. It also makes the government subservient to the Dalai Lama responsible for education in Tibet. Both might seem reasonable. However, the Chinese government will never tolerate the removal of the CCP from power in a substantial section of China, especially since it believes (with some reason) that the Dalai Lama's government would use its influence in the education system to discredit the CCP in all ways and to win the total support of the population. The result would be that a "genuinely autonomous" Tibet would inevitably later press for full independence.

The second issue is even more important. The Dalai Lama's supporters have a different conception of Tibet from the Chinese government. For the Chinese government, Tibet means the Tibet Autonomous Region, while the Dalai Lama's government considers "Tibet" to cover, in addition, Qinghai Province and other regions, so that the TAR would be only about half the area of Tibet. This means that the Dalai Lama's government is asking for effective political and ideological control over about one-quarter of Chinese territory. In the estimation of this writer, Chinese leaders will do everything they can to prevent such an eventuality and are supported by the overwhelming majority of China's people in this stand.

China's attempts to maintain control include CCP cells everywhere, including in monasteries and units involved in Tibetan culture, and cracking down on what it interprets as signs threatening to the Chinese government rule in Tibetan areas. Although the United States and many other governments and human right activists condemn such activities as serious human rights abuses, including suppression of religious freedom, the Chinese authorities claim them as defensive and as legitimate preservation of Chinese unity.

In March and April 2008, serious disturbances broke out in Lhasa and many other Tibetan areas of China. The Western press interpreted these disturbances as resistance against Chinese oppression and human rights abuse, whereas the Chinese blamed outside interference, especially from the United States. The demonstrations were suppressed and have not recurred up to now. However, the situation remains tense with a great deal of bitterness and resentment. This is evident from a series of self-immolations beginning in 2009 and reaching a peak in 2012, when about 85 Tibetans set fire to themselves (International Campaign for Tibet 2019).

China's response to the problems in Tibet has been to try to develop the economy and modernize. This has been broadly successful in material terms, raising the standard of living to an extent unprecedented in Tibetan history. However, activists still charge that the Han population gets an unfair proportion of the wealth increases, employment opportunities, and improvements in welfare and that ethnic inequalities remain not only profound but unacceptable. (See bibliography on the Tibetans in Mackerras 2018, "Tibet and the Tibetans" and a selection of articles on the same topic in Mackerras 2011, Vol. IV, pp. 1–110.)

Xinjiang and Its Islamic Minorities

As with Tibet, there is a long-standing independence movement in Xinjiang, hoping to set up an "East Turkestan Republic," as well as an active diaspora, the great majority of them actively hostile to China and broadly sympathetic to independence. Unlike the Tibetan case, there is no major disagreement on the borders of this "republic," which are those of Xinjiang. Also in contrast with Tibet, there is no universally admired icon of independence with fame and influence comparable to the Dalai Lama's.

In April 1990, an uprising took place in Baren Township in the southwest of Xinjiang, which a local television report attributed to the separatist Islamic Party of East Turkestan. Although easily suppressed, it showed the existence of Sunni Islamic fundamentalist thinking. For the Chinese authorities, it implied a rise of separatism, extremist religious thinking, and even terrorism among the Sunni Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, especially the Uyghurs.

Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 changed the architecture of

relations to the west of China. It added to the number of Muslim-majority independent republics just to the west of China. The renewed separatism in Xinjiang was undoubtedly among the flow-on effects of the Soviet Union's decline and then collapse, and the rise of ethnic nationalism in an era of globalization.

In April 1996, the Presidents of China, and four newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, namely, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, met in Shanghai to discuss problems like terrorism and separatism. In mid-June 2001, the leaders of these five countries, plus that of Uzbekistan, met again in Shanghai and established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They also signed a document pledging to cooperate to combat separatism, terrorism, and extremism, a clear reference to Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism.

Islamist terrorism was thus already a problem in Xinjiang by the last years of the twentieth century. The destruction of the World Trade Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, just 3 months after the SCO's establishment, worsened the cauldron by increasing the role of the United States in Central Asia. China gave strong support to the war on terrorism, which United States President George W. Bush had declared following the September 11 Incidents.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Uyghur diaspora reorganized itself to exert international influence, especially in the West. In 2004, the World Uyghur Congress was established in Munich, aiming to represent Uyghur interests, both inside and outside China. One of the key members of the Uyghur diaspora is Rebiya Kadeer, a female entrepreneur, who became the richest woman in China. Imprisoned in 1999 for "passing on classified information to foreigners" and for subversion, she was released in 2005 after the intervention of American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and went to take up residence in the United States. Though never as influential or famous as the Dalai Lama, she attained leadership positions in such organizations as the World Uyghur Congress and the Washington, DC-based Uyghur American Association, becoming a kind of icon for the Uyghur diaspora.

Throughout the twenty-first century, the balance of China's ethnic problems has tended to move more toward Xinjiang and away from Tibet. One event of crucial significance was in July 2009. Ethnic riots in the Xinjiang capital Ürümqi killed 197 people, according to Chinese official sources, mostly Han Chinese. China puts the blame on outside forces, especially Rebiya Kadeer and terrorism in Central Asia, while in the West, governments, media, and popular opinion blamed Chinese repression, including Han Chinese takeover of Xinjiang through extensive Han immigration and inequalities in employment, wealth, living standards, health, and power.

Whatever the causes of the disturbances, one thing was very clear, namely, that ethnic resentment in Xinjiang had deepened and, with it, the scourge of terrorism. Over the years following 2009, there were numerous terrorist incidents in Xinjiang and even in the capital Beijing. The war in Syria worsened the problem. Some Uyghurs went there for terrorist training. When the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (1971–2019) made a speech in Mosul, Iraq, in July 2014, announcing himself as caliph of all Muslims, he stated that "Muslim rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine" and more than a dozen other countries and regions. "Your brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue, and are anticipating your brigades," Baghdadi is reported to have told his followers (Olesen 2014). While it is doubtful how much trouble ISIS can really cause in Xinjiang, it would be a foolhardy government that ignored such provocative statements.

Since 2017, reports have emerged of camps where some million Uyghurs and other Muslims are forcibly held under inhumane conditions. There is an increasing number of Western reports, both journalistic and scholarly, on the subject (an example being Zenz 2019), some of it likening these places to internment or even concentration camps. Chinese spokespeople have countered that they are aimed at eliminating radicalism and terrorism and educating people to live productively. They argue that Muslims are still free to practice their faith, provided that they do not disrupt

Chinese unity and that Uyghur culture is being preserved and promoted.

In general, the advanced industrial democracies, especially the United States, have condemned China for human rights abuse and religious and cultural suppression in Xinjiang. In October 2019 the United Kingdom represented 23 advanced industrial democracies, almost all Western, in issuing a statement in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) condemning human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and in December 2019 the United States Congress adopted its severely condemnatory Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.

However, international opinion has not been unanimous. For example, in October 2019, Belarus led 54 countries in the UNGA to oppose Britain's statement and supported China's deradicalization measures in Xinjiang. What is even more striking is that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which describes itself as "the collective voice of the Muslim world," in May 2019, issued a public statement in support of China's attempts to "provide care to its Muslim citizens." In October a dozen or so OIC members sided with Belarus' stand in the UNGA in support of China's deradicalization program in Xinjiang.

China is unlikely to bow to Western pressure over Xinjiang, which its leaders regard as unwarranted interference in its affairs. They are determined to uproot terrorism and to hold Xinjiang within China. The likelihood is for more conflict in Xinjiang, and the situation is very troubling for the minorities and for any form of Islam the CCP regards as hostile to Chinese culture or threatening to its rule.

Meanwhile, as in the rest of China, modernization processes have gathered momentum. Xinjiang is highly relevant to the Belt and Road Initiative, and railways and other infrastructure linking China to Central Asia and Europe pass through it. As noted above, Kashgar is now a special economic zone. It is important for the BRI's success that the region at least remains stable. (See bibliography on the Xinjiang issue in Mackerras 2018, "Xinjiang and the Uighurs" and a selection of articles on the same topic in Mackerras 2011, Vol. IV, pp. 111–211.)

Conclusion: Summary and Relevance to Imperialism and Anti-imperialism

Considering the problems ethnic issues have caused internationally in recent decades, the PRC's overall record over most of its years of control has been positive. It has strengthened the economic life and prosperity of ethnic minorities, along with the country as a whole. It has maintained national unity and its system of limited autonomy for ethnic minorities. The populations of the minorities have grown not only in absolute terms but in relation to China's total. Cultural rights have survived, although modernization and political processes have tended to weaken them. Specialist Michael Dillon sums up compellingly when he writes (2018, p. 220) that "many non-Han people live peaceful and uneventful lives, even as others endure privations and severe repression."

What does this material tell us about imperialism and anti-imperialism? Some observers conceive of China's policy and behavior toward its ethnic minorities as imperialistic, because the majority ethnic group dominates the minorities and state power is in effect in the hands of the Han. They consider the increasing dominance of Chinese, as against ethnic languages, not in terms of strengthening national cohesion, as the state does, but as attempts to undermine legitimate multilanguage diversity. They regard Han immigration as a form of colonialism and takeover of other people's territory. They regard ethnic tourism as an example of "the tourist gaze" and thus as insincere and false attempts to showcase minorities as if in a zoo, not as legitimate and rational attempts to preserve traditional culture at the same time as strengthening ethnic economies. And the issues regarding the Tibetans and Uyghurs are for such observers no more than illegitimate attempts to colonize foreign peoples, not to maintain national unity.

Human rights have played a significant part in discourse in recent years, with China gaining the image of a country where ethnic minorities suffer abuse. To cite one example, China is accused of suppression of religion among minorities, amounting to serious breaches of human rights. And critics regard the excuse that religion in Tibet

and Xinjiang sometimes functions as a threat to the state simply as a pretext for what are in fact naked violations of human rights.

For the Chinese state, there is absolutely nothing imperialistic about a policy of the equality of nationalities, which it aspires to practice within its own borders, even admitting that practice falls far short of policy. While it is true that the Chinese language is increasing in dominance over minority languages, there has been no linguicide (the killing of languages) in China. Nobody doubts continuing inequalities among ethnic minorities in China, but the greater prosperity and vastly improved livelihood of the mass of the people, combined with the radical reduction of poverty, amounts to a good human rights performance, according to Chinese authorities.

We turn finally to look again at the concept of "the Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*). Some commentators regard it as imperialistic, because it sets the boundaries of China to include some ethnic groups over which the Chinese state has no legitimate control. With a couple of major exceptions, it determines the borders according to a historical time (the eighteenth century) when the control of the Chinese empire extended far beyond the core Han China.

On the other hand, the current Chinese state holds as a core value that "the Chinese nation" legitimately includes ethnic groups other than the Han. Most of the ethnic minorities live in territory that has been part of China for many centuries. If one started to question that the territory inhabited by the Miao, to take but one example, should devolve into an independent state, the breakup of China into numerous states would have the potential to loose many wars upon China and the world. Chinese unity is a core value no Chinese state will sacrifice unless forced by extreme circumstance. It is worth adding that virtually all states share China's position on this issue and resist independence movements vigorously. Certainly, they do not regard insistence on territorial unity as imperialistic.

The PRC regards itself as strongly anti-imperialistic and opposed to the domination it sees as coming mainly from the Western powers, especially the United States. Chinese leaders typically cite the century of humiliation that preceded the founding of the PRC as a time when China was prey to foreign powers, especially the United States, Britain, Japan, and France, which ate pieces of its territory and opposed attempts to unify the country. Many of those territories where foreign powers confronted Chinese power were the border regions where ethnic minorities live. Britain was heavily involved in Tibet; Russia (including the Soviet Union) and Britain in Xinjiang; and Japan in Manchuria (the northeast). To this day, the PRC feels its territorial unity and integrity threatened by outside interference in its ethnic affairs. In particular, there are many people in China, both inside and outside the leadership, who still believe that the United States is keen to use terrorism in Xinjiang to tear China apart and bring down the CCP. In this sense, the PRC leadership claims to oppose imperialism, certainly not to take part in it.

As for the future, current signs are that Chinese unity will hold but that the circumstances will remain difficult, despite continuing modernization and improvements in the economy and living standards. Full-scale war will break out in Tibet or Xinjiang only if a foreign power intervenes militarily, and that is highly unlikely. But neither is there any sign that ethnic resentments or small-scale conflict will dissipate any time soon. Dillon (2018, p. 221) suggests that:

> A successful accommodation between minority activists and the Chinese state is unlikely, but there will be periods of relative calm and episodes of great but probably localized violence. What is certain is that the destiny of the minorities is inextricably intertwined with the political culture of the Chinese state.

In other words, despite ongoing conflict, national disintegration is not on the horizon.

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Chinese Dream

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities

Chinese Empire

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ Taiping Rebellion

Chinese History

▶ Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)
▶ Pan-Asianism

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy

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Synonyms

China; Imperialism; Corporations; U.S.-China Cold War; Belt&Road Initiative; Capital Export; Lenin's Theory of Imperialism

Definition

One of the most remarkable developments in world politics in the last two decades has been the rise of China as a great power. Today it is the most important challenger of the USA – the long-time, but now declining, absolute hegemon among the imperialist states – on economic, political, as well as military levels. China's rise has been the result of the combination of a rapid process of capital accumulation based on the super-exploitation of the domestic working class as well as foreign and internal colonies, the existence of a Stalinist-capitalist one-party dictatorship, China's foreign policy projects (e.g., the "Belt & Road Initiative"), and the building of a powerful army.

Introduction

History has experienced repeatedly the rise and fall of Great Powers – the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, or the Ottoman Empire – to name only a few. In the last two centuries, we have seen colonial empires which later either lost its significance (Britain, France, Japan) or simply collapsed (Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia). In recent times we see the decline of the USA – the absolute hegemon in the imperialist world order since 1945. Throughout history such periods of decline have always taken place in parallel with the rise of new, rivaling Great Powers.

Today, there exist several imperialist Great Power beside the U.S. – mainly the European Union, the United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, and, most importantly, China. The later has experienced a dramatic rise in the past two decades. Today, it represents the second largest imperialist power and the most important rival of the USA. In the following essay, we will demonstrate China's rise into the circle of the imperialist Great Powers – on economic, political, as well as military levels.

Economic Power

A process of rapid capitalist accumulation during the 1980s and the 1990s laid the basis for the rise of China as an economic power operating on the law of value. The new bourgeoisie was able to take advantage of several key factors which, in combination, resulted in an extraordinary process of capitalist economic growth. Among these factors were a huge population with a massive reservoir of internal migrants (more on this below), a powerful dictatorship with an experienced repression apparatus and a strategic plan, and, finally, a working class which suffered a historic defeat (Tiananmen Square in June 1989) and hence was massively weakened in its resistance against capitalist exploitation and super-exploitation.

We note in passing that China's economic success is extraordinary but not exceptional. According to one study, China's annual per capita GDP rose from $1,300 in 1980 to $7,700 in 2010, an increase of almost 500% (Jiang and Yi 2015, p. 8; Wang 2014). However, some other capitalist countries – like South Korea and Taiwan – also experienced similar periods of economic growth when a combination of favorable factors was in place (Pröbsting 1996/97). South Korea's GDP per capita increased from 1,537 US dollar in 1960 to 11,985 in 1990 – in other words, it had increased nearly by eight times in the preceding three decades (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Other sources even claim a higher growth rate (Kim 1991, p. 5).

The regime, unbothered by its official "communist" ideology, managed to advance a rapid process of privatization which ensured the creation of a powerful class of capitalists including monopoly capitalists (Pröbsting 2012). According to a study published by the *World Bank* and the *Chinese Development Research Center of the State Council* in 2013, about 70% of the country's GDP as well as of its employment are located in the non-state sectors. The state sector's share in the total number of industrial enterprises (with annual sales over 5 mn RMB) fell precipitously from 39.2% in 1998 to 4.5% in 2010. During the same period, the share of state-owned enterprises

(SOE) in total industrial assets dropped from 68.8% to 42.4%, while their share in employment declined from 60.5% to 19.4% (The World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council 2013, p. 104). Since then, this process has gone much further. According to recently published book, "the state share of industrial production (on a value-added basis) is about 25 percent" (Kroeber 2016, p. 101). Liu He, top economic adviser of China's President Xi, estimates that the country's "private sector generates 60 percent of the nation's output, 70 percent of technological innovation and 90 percent of new jobs" (Bloomberg 2018).

In addition to this, the regime restructured the state-owned enterprises so that most of them operate on a highly profitable basis – both on the domestic as well as on the world market. In the years between 1995 and 2005, the regime fully or partly privatized around two-thirds of its SOEs and state assets. From 1998 to 2004, about 60% of the SOE employees, some tens of millions of workers, were laid off (OECD 2017, p. 35).

As a result of this process of rapid economic growth and the creation of capitalist monopolies, China was able to become a major player in the world market. This becomes even more evident if one compares it with the parallel decline of the USA. When we look at the basis of capitalist value production – global industrial production – we see that the USA's share decreased from 25.1% (2000) to 17.7% (2015), and Western Europe's share also declined from 12.1% to 9.2%, while China's share grew from 6.5% (2000) to 23.6% (2015) (see Table 1). Likewise, while the USA's share in world trade declined from 15.1%

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 1 Share of the USA, Western Europe, and China in global industrial production, 2000–2015

	Share in global industrial production	
	2000 (%)	2015 (%)
USA	25.1	17.7
Western Europe	12.1	9.2
China	6.5	23.6

Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2017, pp. 1, 4

(2001) to 11.4% (2016), China's share rose in this period from 4.0% to 11.5% (see Table 2).

We see the same development when we look to the changes in the national composition of global capital accumulation. According to the data from the OECD about the historical development of global gross fixed capital formation – a bourgeois economic category that reflects the process of capital accumulation – there has been a radical change since 1960 and, in particular, in the past two decades. As Table 3 illustrates, the USA – the postwar, global hegemonic imperialist power – enjoyed, by far, the largest share until the early 2000s. (This leading position was briefly but unsuccessfully challenged by Japan in the early 1990s.) However, since the 1990s, China rapidly caught up to the USA. While its share of global investments was about 6% in the year 2000, this rose to exceed 26% of the world total by 2015. By 2011, China overtook the USA as the world's number one, and the gap between these two biggest imperialist powers has only continued to increase.

Capitalist Monopolies

The same process of China's rise as an imperialist power can be observed when we look at the composition of the world's leading corporations and the global elite of billionaires and millionaires. Let us look at the national composition of the leading capitalist monopolies.

Table 4 shows where the Fortune 500 world's largest companies are headquartered and how that changed in the years between 2000 and 2018. The most important changes have been the dramatic rise of China and, at the same time, the corresponding decline of the old imperialist powers (USA, Japan, UK, Germany, etc.).

The US *Fortune* magazine, a prominent mouthpiece of global capital, is fully aware of the implications of this development and titled a commentary "It's China's World." "As the Chinese Century nears its third decade, Fortune's Global 500 shows how profoundly the world's balance of power is shifting. American companies account for 121 of the world's largest corporations by revenue. Chinese companies account for 129 (including 10 Taiwanese companies). For the first time since the debut of the Global 500 in 1990, and arguably for the first time since World War II, a nation other than the U.S. is at the top of the ranks of global big business." The report continues: "It's true that Chinese companies' revenues account for only 25.6% of the Global 500 total, well behind America's 28.8%. But that's to be expected. China is the rising power, economically smaller but growing much faster" (Colvin 2019).

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 2 Share of the USA and China in world trade, 2001 and 2016

	Share in world trade	
	2001 (%)	2016 (%)
USA	15.1	11.4
China	4.0	11.5

Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2017, pp. 1, 4

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 3 Regional share of global gross fixed capital formation, 1961–2015 (in percent)

	1961	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015
USA	38.04	31.93	24.10	23.17	30.73	17.72	19.49
UK	4.23	4.05	4.35	4.42	3.85	2.50	2.64
Japan	5.36	10.40	12.29	18.11	17.36	8.01	5.60
Canada	2.66	2.68	2.33	2.36	1.89	2.50	1.97
France	–	5.34	6.14	5.42	3.80	3.85	2.84
Germany	–	8.82	8.79	7.86	5.81	4.37	3.65
China	2.85	3.11	2.01	1.62	5.25	18.07	26.43

Source: OECD 2017, Fig. 2.4

	2000	2018	Share in 2018 (%)
USA	179	121	26.4
China	10	119	24.2
Japan	107	52	10.4
France	37	31	6.2
Germany	37	29	5.8
UK	38	17	3.4
Korea	12	16	3.2
Switzerland	11	14	2.8
Canada	12	13	2.6
Netherlands	10	12	2.4

Source: OECD 2018, p. 106, Fortune 2019

	2003		2017	
	Number	Share (%)	Number	Share (%)
USA	776	38.8	565	28.2
China	13	0.6	263	13.1
Japan	331	16.5	229	11.4
UK	132	6.6	91	4.5
France	67	3.3	59	2.9
Canada	50	2.5	58	2.9
Germany	64	3.2	51	2.5

Source: Forbes 2017

The same picture emerges when we compare the *Forbes Global 2000* list – a list of the world's 2000 largest corporations – of the year 2003 with the year 2017; we see that while the USA remains the strongest power, its share has declined substantially from 776 corporations (38.8%) to 565 (28.2%). At the same time, China's share grew dramatically, and it has now become the number two among the Great Powers (see Table 5).

Another study, published by UNCTAD, also confirms China's rise among the biggest global monopolies. It reports that China's share among the largest 2,000 transnational corporations (TNC) has grown so massively in the past two decades so that by 2015 they took 17% of all profits of these top monopolies. The UNCTAD report adds: "Interestingly however, the share of Chinese financial TNCs in top TNCs profit expanded rapidly to more than 10 per cent to total top TNCs profits, exceeding those of

United States financial top TNCs in 2015" (UNCTAD 2018a, p. 58).

These figures demonstrate very clearly that it is an extremely one-sided and wrong view to see China primarily as a kind of global workbench for Western corporations. Chinese capitalist corporations have joined prominently the list of the global leading monopolies and are among the most profitable.

This process is also reflected in China's rise among the world's billionaires. Depending on which list one takes, China has become home to the largest number of billionaires or the second largest in the world. According to the 2017 issue of the *Hurun Global Rich List*, 609 billionaires are Chinese and 552 are US citizens. Together they account for half of the billionaires worldwide (Hurun 2017; Zhu 2017; Pröbsting 2015). The *Forbes Billionaire List*, which is US-based, while *Hurun* is China-based, sees the USA still ahead. According to Forbes: "The U.S. continues

to have more billionaires than any other nation, with a record 565, up from 540 a year ago. China is catching up with 319. (Hong Kong has another 67, and Macau 1.) Germany has the third most with 114 and India, with 101, the first time it has had more than 100, is fourth" (Kroll and Dolan 2017). The 2018 edition of the annual *Billionaires Insights* report published by the Swiss Bank UBS, jointly with Britain's PwC, arrives at similar conclusions (UBS/PwC 2018). While the detailed figures vary in the different reports, the trend in all available studies is the same: the weight of China's monopoly capitalists is increasing.

It is important to recognize that China's capitalism is based not only on a tiny minority of super-rich (in contrast to countries like India or Saudi Arabia) but rather on a broader stratum of small and middle capitalists. As we show in Table 6, China is number two in all categories of millionaires – only behind the USA and ahead of all other imperialist Great Powers like Japan, Germany, France, and Britain.

Belt and Road Initiative: An Imperialist Hegemonic Project

The *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) is China's famous initiative to massively globally expand both its economic relations and its political influence. The Xi regime launched this initiative in 2013, and its financial volume stands currently at a staggering $1.1 trillion. The BRI includes more than 132 countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, East Africa, and Oceania as well as 29 international organizations, among them the *World Bank* and the *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank* (founded by China in 2016).

On the one hand, the *Belt and Road Initiative* incorporates a sea-based *Maritime Silk Road* initiative (also called the *twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road*). The Chinese government has recently published a more detailed plan, dividing the project into three "blue economic passages": the *China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Sea blue economic passage*; the *China-Oceania-South Pacific blue economic passage*; and the one that will lead to *Europe* via *the Arctic Ocean* (Zhao 2017).

On the other hand, the BRI includes the so-called Silk Road Economic Belt involving six land-based economic corridors: the *New Eurasian Land Bridge*, the *China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor*, the *China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor*; the *China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor*; the *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor*, and the *Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor* (this last one has been dropped recently as India refused its participation) (Derudder et al. 2018).

The BRI contains numerous infrastructure projects (ports, highways, railways, etc.) as well as the intensification of trade. Hence, it allows China monopoly capital to find foreign markets for its excess industrial capacity as well as for its abundant capital looking for profitable investment opportunities.

Most countries which participate in the BRI are semi-colonies in Marxist terminology, i.e., they are countries which are formally independent states which are however dependent on and

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 6 The rich and the super-rich by country, 2018

Country	Wealth range (in million US dollar)					
	1–5 m	5–10 m	10–50 m	50–100 m	100–500 m	500+m
USA	14,520,885	1,855,679	902,736	50,144	19,253	1,144
China	3,094,768	235,858	132,701	10,113	5,690	708
Japan	2,627,845	125,377	51,947	2,478	1,027	71
UK	2,247,529	124,244	56,535	3,125	1,422	117
Germany	1,985,627	127,157	63,678	4,078	2,042	203
France	2,002,967	99,252	42,117	2,087	886	64

Source: Credit Suisse Research Institute 2018, p. 125

exploited by the imperialist powers. However, some Western European imperialist countries also participate in the project.

According to a statement of China's vice-minister of commerce Qian Keming in September 2019, "[t]he cumulative investment of Chinese enterprises in countries along the [BRI, Ed.] route has exceeded 100 billion US dollars. Foreign contracted projects exceeded US $720 billion, and investment from countries along the route reached US $48 billion" (China News Portal 2019).

In summary, the BRI is a key project to globally expand the hegemonic role of Chinese imperialism.

China's Capital Export

As a rising economic power, China plays an increasing prominent role in global capital markets. China's rapid growth as a capital exporter has taken place on two levels: productive investment and finance capital (bonds, loans, etc.). As a result of its tremendously rapid accumulation of capital from production, Chinese imperialism has also accumulated huge volumes of finance capital. This finds expression in the extraordinarily rapid growth of the country's foreign exchange reserves. Today, China is the world's largest holder of foreign exchange reserves with $3.1 trillion in October 2019 (People's Bank of China 2019). Most of these reserves are money capital which is put in circulation as loans to return to the holder a share of the surplus value created by the borrowing country. Prominent among these countries is the USA where China has the second greatest amount of US debt held by a foreign country (behind Japan and ahead of Britain).

China is also an active lender in bilateral loans resulting in a substantial and rising indebtedness of so-called low-income countries. According to a recently published study, the geographic scope of China's lending has increased notably. The share of countries receiving Chinese official grants or loans has increased from about 40% (2000) to almost 80% as of 2017. With almost

full global coverage, US official lending is still further-reaching than Chinese official finance, but the gap is narrowing fast (Horn et al. 2019, p. 11).

As a result, the average indebtedness of low-income developing countries to China was 11% of GDP as of 2017. In comparison, so-called emerging market countries owed 6.5% of GDP in debt to China. As of 2018, "the government of China holds more than five trillion USD of debt towards the rest of the world (6% of world GDP), up from less than 500 billion in the early 2000s (1% of world GDP)." If one adds foreign equity and direct investments "China's total financial claims abroad amount to more than 8% of world GDP in 2017. This dramatic increase in Chinese official lending and investment is almost unprecedented in peacetime history, being only comparable to the rise of US lending in the wake of WWI and WWII" (Horn et al. 2019, pp. 5–6).

This rapid rise of indebtedness of semi-colonial countries which are involved in the BRI reflects that this is an imperialist project which results in increasing dependence of these countries to the new imperialist Great Power of the East.

Likewise, China has massively increased its foreign direct investment particularly in the industrial and raw material sector. As China has only recently emerged as an imperialist power, it is still a weaker player in the global market than the USA. However, as we can see in Table 7, China's FDI outflows play a major role. As a result, China was able in the past decade to rapidly catch up with all other imperialist powers except the USA. Hence, as Table 8 shows, China's foreign direct investment outward stock reached about the same level as Germany, Japan, Britain, or France – i.e., those imperialist powers that have dominated international finance for more than a century – as of 2017. This is particularly remarkable as China started its massive foreign investment drive only a few years ago. As of 1990, China's share of global FDI stock was only 0.2% and 0.4% in 2000.

As a result, Chinese monopolies achieved a dominating position in a number of semi-colonial countries. According to a study from McKinsey, Chinese corporations already play a dominant role

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 7 Foreign direct investment outflows by country in 2017 (in millions of US dollars and as share of global FDI outflows)

Country	2017	Share of the global FDI outflows (%)
Total	1,429,972	100
USA	342,269	23.9
Japan	160,449	11.2
Britain	99,614	7
Germany	82,336	5.6
France	58,116	4.1
China	124,630	8.7
Russia	36,032	2.5

Source: UNCTAD 2018b, pp. 184–187

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 8 Foreign direct investment outward stock by country in 2017 (in millions of US dollars and as share of global FDI outward stock)

Country	2017	Share of the global FDI outflows (%)
Total	30,837,927	100
USA	7,799,045	25.3
Japan	1,519,983	4.9
Britain	1,531,683	5
Germany	1,607,380	5.2
France	1,451,663	4.7
China	1,482,020	4.8
Russia	382,278	1.2

Source: UNCTAD 2018b, pp. 188–191

in Africa. About 10,000 Chinese corporations (90% of which are private capitalist firms) operate in Africa. They control about 12% of the continent's total industrial production and about half of Africa's internationally contracted construction market. In Africa, China is also a leader in "green field investment" (i.e., when a parent company begins a new venture by constructing new facilities outside of its home country); in 2015–2016, China invested 38.4 billion US dollars (24% of total greenfield investment in Africa) (Sun et al. 2017, pp. 10, 29–30).

Internal Colonies

China has not only semi-colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America but also internal colonies. About 1/10 of its population belong to national and ethnic minorities, altogether 56 different groups with more than 135 million people (Guo 2017, p. 3). (We note in passing that the regime vehemently denies that any of these groups represents a "national" minority since they all supposedly belong to the "Chinese nation"!) The

most important regions where such national minorities play a central role are East Turkestan (called Xinjiang by the regime), Tibet, and Inner Mongolia.

East Turkestan/Xinjiang has become particularly notorious in recent time because of the brutal oppression of the Uyghurs – the native Muslim population of this region. There are at least about 11–15 million Muslim Uyghurs – according to the *World Uyghur Congress*, it is even up to 20 million (World Uyghur Congress). However, a growing number of them have been forced to flee their native country because of the national oppression by Beijing. In recent past, the Muslim Uyghurs have become a minority in their own country. According to official figures, they constitute 46% of Xinjiang's population. The background of this development is the fact that the Beijing regime systematically suppresses them and colonizes the province by settling Han Chinese people in order to change the ethnical balance. However, ethnic minorities still account for nearly 60% of Xinjiang's population.

In 2018, horrific reports have been published by the United Nation which arrive at the

"estimates that upwards of a million people were being held in so-called counter-extremism centres and another two million had been forced into so-called "re-education camps" for political and cultural indoctrination" (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2018). In many cases, the Chinese authorities even take the children away of parents who are detained. They are brought to schools were they are forced to speak in Mandarin and to adopt the Han Chinese culture. Such assimilationist policy of the regime even goes so far that the regime launched in 2016 the "Becoming Family" initiative forcing Uyghur families to host cadres of the ruling party at their homes for at least 5 days every 2 months (Turdush 2018).

Another example of the massive scale of oppression is the fact that, according to official Chinese government data, criminal arrests in Xinjiang accounted for an alarming 21% of all arrests in China in 2017. This is a dramatic figure given the fact that the population in Xinjiang (of which officially less than half are Uyghurs) is only about 1.5% of China's total (Chinese Human Rights Defenders 2018).

Cynically, the regime justifies the mass detentions as measures "against extremism and terrorism." In an interview, published by the state-run news agency Xinhua, the Xinjiang governor, Shohrat Zakir, said: "Xinjiang conducts vocational skills education and training according to law. The purpose is to fundamentally eliminate the environment and soil that breeds terrorism and religious extremism, and eliminate the terrorism activities before they take place." Zakir added that residents at the internment camps in Xinjiang learn Mandarin "to accept modern science and enhance their understanding of Chinese history and culture" (Kuo 2018).

East Turkestan/Xinjiang is also of substantial economic significance for China. The region is the third largest oil-producing region in the country. Yet the region can be expected to climb to higher ranks in the near future. Only 33% of China's oil reserves are estimated to have been discovered so far, and Xinjiang hosts large amounts of undiscovered oil reserves, particularly in Tarim Basin. Furthermore, Xinjiang is the

China's largest producer region of natural gas (Atli 2016). Add to this the fact that Xinjiang is the leading cotton producer in China on a regional basis, accounting to 74.4% of the total output (Abdulla 2019).

Even more important is the strategic location of all three regions – Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. Since they cover nearly the whole Northern as well as Western border areas, these regions play a key role as transit routes of energy resources imported from abroad. Nearly all oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan cross one of these three regions. Furthermore, four of the six land corridors of the gigantic BRI project cross through Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia.

For these reasons, the regime in Beijing is determined to brutally clamp down any desire of the minorities to implement their right of national self-determination.

Exploitation and Super-Exploitation of the Domestic Working Class

As mentioned above, a key reason for the "Chinese miracle" has been the massive exploitation and super-exploitation of the working class in China. This development is reflected in the drastic decline of the share of wages in income and the corresponding rise of profits. According to a report: "China has kept wages low: wages and salaries as a percentage of GDP fell from 57% in 1983 to just 37% by 2005 through to 2010 – one of the lowest in the capitalist world." This decline has been particularly drastic in the industrial sector – the core of capitalist value production. The share of industrial workers' wages in China's manufacturing value added dropped from 52.3% in 2002 to 26.2% in 2008 (Froud et al. 2012, pp. 12, 20).

The Chinese researcher Qi has published figures indicating a huge rise of the rate of exploitation of China's working class in the past two decades: "Wages constitute less than 10 per cent of total cost of Chinese enterprises, while that for developed countries is about 50 per cent. In the Pearl River Delta, productivity is about 17 per cent that of the US, but workers' wages

are only about 6.7 per cent that of the US. (...) From 1993 through 2004, while Chinese GDP increased by 3.5 times, total wages increased by only 2.4 times. From 1998 to 2005, in SOEs and large scale industrial enterprises, the percentage of total wages/profit dropped significantly from 240 percent to 43 percent" (Qi 2010, p. 420).

In the same period, correspondingly, the Chinese bourgeoisie was able to enrich itself massively. We have already mentioned above the huge increase in the number of Chinese millionaires and billionaires. There are also various other indication which demonstrate that China's social and economic development in the past three decades has been characterized by very similar features like other capitalist countries in the world. Contrary to the official socialist ideology, the share of wages has declined, while profits for the capitalists have gone up. As a result, the income share of the richest top 1% of the population has doubled between 1980 and 2016 from 7% to 14%. If we take the share of the richest 10%, equivalent to the bourgeoisie and the upper middle class, we see the same dynamic. According to the *World Inequality Report 2018* "the share of total national income accounted for by just that nation's top 10% earners (top 10% income share) was 37% in Europe, 41% in China, 46% in Russia, 47% in US-Canada, and around 55% in sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil, and India. In the Middle East, the world's most unequal region according to our estimates, the top 10% capture 61% of national income" (Alvaredo et al. 2018, p. 9).

A crucial instrument for the rising capitalist exploitation has been the utilization of the old household registration system set up in 1958. According to this system (called *hukou* in China), "residents were not allowed to work or live outside the administrative boundaries of their household registration without approval of the authorities. Once they left their place of registration, they would also leave behind all of their rights and benefits. For the purpose of surveillance, everyone, including temporary residents in transit, was required to register with the police of their place of residence and their temporary residence. By the 1970s, the system

became so rigid that 'peasants could be arrested just for entering cities'" (China Labour Bulletin 2008).

This *hukou* system has resulted in the creation of a huge sector of so-called migrants. This category is usually applied to those who move from one country to another. However, in China – a "continent" in itself with a population of nearly double as many as Europe – former peasants or peasant youth, who move to the cities because of the rural poverty and the opportunity for jobs in the cities, are called "migrants." In these cities they are often forced to live illegally and – because of the *hukou* system – have no access to housing, recognized employment, education, medical services, or social security. Their living conditions are very poor; most of them reside in decrepit housing, tents, underneath bridges, inside tunnels, or even in the trunks of cars.

These migrants represent a huge sector of the urban working class. According to an ILO study, their number rose from 143 million in 1995 to 307 million in 2013 (Majid 2015, p. 43). Hence, migrants play a central role in key sectors of the economy where they are usually employed in hard-labor, low-wage jobs. By the late 2000s, the proportion of migrant workers in manufacturing industries and in construction reached as high as 68% and 80%, respectively (China Labour Bulletin 2008). According to another study, rural-to-urban migrant workers have also become the largest proportion of the workforce, making up some two-thirds of all nonagricultural workers. They have become dominant in a number of major sectors: 90% in construction, 80% in mining and extraction, 60% in textiles, and 50% in urban service trades (see Table 9).

Related to this is the existence of a huge so-called informal sector which given its precarious conditions is a breeding ground for super-exploitation. According to official figures of the World Bank and a Chinese state institute, the informal sector accounted in the 2000s for 30%–37% of the total urban labor force (The World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council 2013, p. 351).

Such super-exploitation of the migrants is the material basis for another important

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 9 Rural-to-urban migrants as a proportion of total workforce

Industry	Proportion of total workforce (%)
Construction	90
Mining and extraction	80
Textiles	60
Urban service trades	50

Source: Watson 2009, p. 91

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 10 China, share of labor income (%), 2004–2017

Deciles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2004	0.47	1.19	2.11	3.32	4.71	6.47	8.91	12.51	18.18	42.12
2017	0.44	1.11	2.02	3.24	4.62	6.38	8.84	12.49	18.24	42.62

Source: International Labour Organization 2019

development – the massive inner differentiation of the Chinese working class. Similar to other imperialist countries, the share of the lower and middle layers of China's proletariat is much lower than the share of a small upper layer.

According to a recently published study of the ILO, the lower 3/5 of China's laborers earn a combined share of less than 28.7% of the total labor income in 2017. On the other hand, the top decile earns 42.62% – more than the combined share of the mass of the proletariat! And, as we can see from Table 10, the income share of the lower eight deciles of the laborers has even slightly declined in the years between 2004 and 2017, in contrast to the top two deciles.

We note, in passing, that according to the same ILO study, the income share of the upper decile of China's laborers is even larger than the equivalent figure for the upper decile in the USA (33.12%), Germany (27,32%), or Japan (27,64%)!

This figure demonstrates that the process of capitalist exploitation in China in the past three decades resulted in the creation of a top, more privileged layer. Marxists call this uppermost part of the working class the *labor aristocracy*. This is a layer that consists, primarily, of sections of the better compensated, skilled workers. This section of the proletariat is, in effect, bribed by the bourgeoisie with a better standard of living. In the imperialist countries, this layer constitutes a much larger proportion of the working class

than it does among the semi-colonial proletariat (Pröbsting 2016).

In summary, China's leap to imperialist power has been the creation of a massive amount of surplus value through the super-exploitation of its working class. Throughout the twentieth century, with the exception of the imperialist fascist regimes, there has been no other capitalist power that could so effectively exploit its working class. This is the "secret" behind the Chinese economic miracle.

China's Military

China's rise as an imperialist Great Power has not been limited to the economic field but is also reflected in the rise of its military as well as of its arms industry. As this is a relatively recent development, China lags still behind the USA as well as Russia. However, it is rapidly catching up and has already joined the top league of Great Powers.

According to the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI), China today has the world's second largest military budget, surpassed only by the USA. It has also become the world's fourth largest nuclear-power country behind the USA, Russia, and France (see Table 11). Furthermore, China has become number three among the top exporters of weapons, only behind the USA and Russia (see Table 12).

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 11 World nuclear forces, 2018

Country	Deployed warheads	Other warheads	Total inventory
USA	1,750	4,700	6,450
Russia	1,600	5,250	6,850
France	280	20	300
China	–	280	280
UK	120	95	215

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2018, p. 236

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 12 The world's top ten exporters of weapons, 2016

Exporter	Global share (%)
1. USA	33
2. Russia	23
3. China	6.2
4. France	6.0
5. Germany	5.6
6. UK	4.6
7. Spain	2.8
8. Italy	2.7
9. Ukraine	2.6
10. Israel	2.3

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2017, p. 15

China is also home to large monopolies in the arms industry. According to a recently published SIPRI report, "China is the second-largest arms producer in the world, behind the United States but ahead of Russia." SIPRI also estimates that among the top ten arms companies, three are from China. One should add that SIPRI believes that "[t]hese new estimates are most likely still an underestimate. A lack of transparency in the arms sales figures of Chinese arms companies continues to hinder a complete understanding of China's arms industry" (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2020).

The Cold War Between the USA and China

The decline of the USA and the rise of China as well as other Great Powers constitute the background for the rising global economic, political, and military tensions. Faced with historic stagnation and decline of capitalism – particularly since

the Great Recession in 2007/2009 – the USA, China, Russia, the European Union, Britain, and Japan increasingly push to expand their spheres of influence at the cost of their rivals. As the USA and China are the two largest powers, their rivalry constitutes the central axis of these rivalries (Pröbsting 2019).

The global trade war which started in early 2018 has been the most obvious but by no means only manifestation of this rivalry. The Trump administration imposed punitive tariffs on Chinese imports in order to contain Beijing's economic rise. This has been a cycle of respective countermeasures, and, as a result, the majority of Chinese as well as of US exports was covered with such tariffs. By 1 October 2019, 66% of all US imports of Chinese goods and 60.9% of all Chinese imports of US goods were affected by the tariffs of the respective rival (European Commission 2019, p. 13). Given the fact that these two Great Powers alone represent about 40% of the world economy, this development had massive negative effects on world trade in 2018 and 2019.

While Washington and Beijing agreed to declare a truce in their trade war in January 2020 (the so-called "phase one" deal), this agreement did only mean avoiding a further short-term escalation. First, most punitive tariffs remained in place. Secondly, it is pretty clear that this truce is only of fragile and temporary nature and will sooner or later collapse (Pröbsting 2020).

This is even more so the case since, as demonstrated above, the rivalry between the USA and China is not limited to trade but rather based on a comprehensive strive for hegemony on all levels. True, in terms of general productivity, China is far behind the USA. However, China is a huge country with a highly uneven developed

economy. It contains backward regions with a high share of agriculture as well as hubs of modern industries with advanced high-technology sectors. As a result of concerted efforts, China has made substantive investments on key sectors of informational technology like artificial intelligence or in 5G (the latest generation of mobile networks). Today, China is the world leader in patent applications with 40% of the global total, a share more than two times larger than that of the USA and four times larger than that of Japan (Schoff and Ito 2019, p. 2). The Chinese private corporation Huawei has become a global leader in information technology and the number two among the world's leading smartphone companies – trailing only the South Korean technology giant, Samsung. There are also other Chinese corporations which have become global leaders in information technology like Weibo, Alibaba, JD.com, Baidu, Tencent, and Lenovo.

Hence, it is hardly surprising that US imperialism is highly worried to lose its long-time dominance and tries, mostly without success until now, to force its allies to ban the Chinese giant Huawei. Clearly, there is a lot at stake as the analysts of Stratfor, a bourgeois US think tank, acknowledge: "Huawei represents but one facet of the sprawling global tech competition that will continue to rage between the United States and China. There is much at stake: Winning the race to develop a specific new technology will allow the victor, whether Washington or Beijing, to begin to set that technology's global standards by default" (STRATFOR 2020).

Likewise, the rivalry between the two largest Great Powers takes also place on the military level as we see in the increasing tensions in the South resp. East China Sea. The USA has already shifted its focus when the Obama administration announced its "Pivot to Asia" (Pröbsting and Gunić 2017). Likewise, Beijing also acknowledges the accelerating rivalry between the Great Powers. In the latest issue of its biannual defense white paper, titled "China's National Defence in the New Era," the Chinese government states: "International strategic competition is on the rise. The US has adjusted its national security and defense strategies, and adopted unilateral

policies. It has provoked and intensified competition among major countries. (. . .) As the world economic and strategic center continues to shift towards the Asia-Pacific, the region has become a focus of major country competition, bringing uncertainties to regional security" (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China 2019, pp. 3, 4).

Sooner or later it will result in a kind of decoupling between the two economies, the creation of definite political and military blocs, and, ultimately, this development will raise the specter of another World War. It is hardly surprising that bourgeois analysts are deeply worried about such developments. Such write the *Eurasia Group* in its recently published annual report: "As this decoupling occurs, US-China tensions will lead to a more explicit clash over national security, influence, and values. The two sides will continue to use economic tools in this struggle – sanctions, export controls, and boycotts – with shorter fuses and goals that are more explicitly political. Companies and other governments will find it harder to avoid being caught in the crossfire. This struggle has hard-edged realism – great power rivalry – at its core. It's not yet as starkly ideological as the classic Cold War formulation of capitalism vs. socialism. But as tensions escalate, divergences between the two countries' political structures are bringing irreconcilable differences to the fore. The US-China rivalry will increasingly be waged as a clash of values and animated by patriotic fervor" (Eurasia Group 2020, p. 8).

Finally, it is also worth pointing out that China's rise as an imperialist Great Power is also reflected on the ideological level. As is well-known, Britain and France justified their colonial empires with bourgeois ideologies emphasizing their role as "guardians of civilization." Likewise US imperialism accompanies its global hegemonic role with claiming to defend "human rights" and "democracy."

As a rising power, China is also increasingly elaborating and advocating its specific ideology. The Xi regime takes up the ancient Chinese concept of *Tianxia* (which literally means "all under heaven"). This concept was historically based on an understanding of the world in five concentric

zones with the Emperor ("Son of Heaven"), resp., the royal domain in the center, the domains of the princes, the pacification zone, the zone of allied barbarians, and the zone of savagery (Wang 2012; Dessein 2014; Huang 2013). An alternative interpretation is to divide the world into three areas with diminishing Chinese influence: inner vassal area, outer vassal area, and temporary non-vassal area (Zhang 2010). Despite modifications throughout history, the concept of *Tianxia* has always been a classic Confucian concept legitimizing the empire of the ruling class of Han Chinese empire.

China's rising ideological self-confidence results in viewing itself as a power which should play a central role in world politics. President Xi emphasized China's global leading role in a speech in autumn 2017 when he said: "It is time for us to take centre stage in the world and to make a greater contribution to humankind" (BBC 2017). The CCP's flagship newspaper, *People's Daily*, stated in a substantive editorial that China faces a "historic opportunity" to "restore itself to greatness and return to its rightful position in the world." It emphasizes: "The world has never focused on China so much and needed China so much as it does now." It states: "The historic opportunity is an all-round one, which refers to not only economic development but also the speeding up of science, technology and industrial revolution, the growing influence of Chinese culture and the increasing acknowledgement to the Chinese wisdom and Chinese approach (...) We are more confident, and more competent, than any time in history to grasp this opportunity." Furthermore, the editorial points out that "the global governance system is undergoing profound changes; and a new international order is taking shape." Reflecting the imperialist drive, *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong's biggest daily newspaper owned by Jack Ma's *Alibaba*, titled a report about this manifesto "*Make China great again*" (Bishop 2018; Gan 2018; Xinhua 2018)!

Clearly, this is the ideological accompaniment to China's rise as an imperialist Great Power. It is inevitable that the Cold War between the USA and China will accelerate, and this remains one of the most defining issues of world politics in the coming years if not decades. An editorial of the British *Guardian* reflects the increasing nervousness of a bourgeoisie that continues to be haunted by the catastrophes of twentieth-century capitalism. "There is something eerily reminiscent of the summer of 1914 about the state of US-China relations. Neither side wants a trade war. Both countries would be damaged by a trade war. But step-by-step a trade war comes closer. The latest US tariffs come into force in less than four weeks' time. Without question these are the most crucial weeks for the global trading system since the 1930s. If Mr Trump and China's president, Xi Jinping, miscalculate, as all the signs suggest that they might, the upshot will be a full-blown trade and currency war that will shred business confidence, close factories and increase unemployment" (The Guardian 2019).

Excurse: Modern China and Lenin's Theory of Imperialism

This essay has presented sufficient evidence to show that China has become not only a capitalist country but even a new imperialist Great Power. Such a conclusion has to be drawn also from the viewpoint of Marxist theory. Let us briefly look for this to the understanding of Great Powers as it was elaborated by V. I. Lenin – the originator of the Marxist theory of imperialism.

Lenin described the essential characteristic of imperialism as the formation of monopolies which dominate the economy. Related to this, he pointed out the fusion of banking and industrial capital into financial capital, the increase in capital export alongside the export of commodities, and the struggle for spheres of influence, specifically colonies.

In *Imperialism and the Split in Socialism* – his most comprehensive theoretical essay on imperialism – Lenin gave the following definition of imperialism: "We have to begin with as precise and full a definition of imperialism as possible. Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is monopoly capitalism; parasitic, or

decaying capitalism; moribund capitalism. The supplanting of free competition by monopoly is the fundamental economic feature, the quintessence of imperialism. Monopoly manifests itself in five principal forms: (1) cartels, syndicates and trusts – the concentration of production has reached a degree which gives rise to these monopolistic associations of capitalists; (2) the monopolistic position of the big banks – three, four or five giant banks manipulate the whole economic life of America, France, Germany; (3) seizure of the sources of raw material by the trusts and the financial oligarchy (finance capital is monopoly industrial capital merged with bank capital); (4) the (economic) partition of the world by the international cartels has begun. There are already over one hundred such international cartels, which command the entire world market and divide it "amicably" among themselves – until war redivides it. The export of capital, as distinct from the export of commodities under non-monopoly capitalism, is a highly characteristic phenomenon and is closely linked with the economic and territorial-political partition of the world; (5) the territorial partition of the world (colonies) is completed" (Lenin 1916).

As we have demonstrated in the previous chapters, China has become a leading power among the world's dominating corporations and banks, in the field of capital export, in the military field, etc. Furthermore, it has become a dominating power – through the BRI project, loans, foreign investment, etc. – in numerous semi-colonial countries of the South. And, finally, China has also proven to be a formidable rival for the USA – the long-time hegemon among the imperialist Great Powers.

It is true that China's economy as a whole is less developed than that of the old imperialist powers like the USA, Western Europe, or Japan. However, it is a widespread misunderstanding of the Marxist theory of imperialism to apply the category of an imperialist Great Power only to the most modern developed capitalist country. Marxist theoreticians knew both highly developed *as well as* less developed imperialist powers. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, Marxists usually agreed to characterize not only the USA, Britain, and France as imperialist but also powers which were much less capitalistically developed (e.g., Tsarist Russia before 1917, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Italy). The difference in labor productivity between these different powers at that time was certainly not smaller than it is today between the old imperialist powers and China (Pröbsting 2014, 2019).

This becomes evident from Table 13 where we can see figures of GDP per capita and relative levels of industrialization for several imperialist powers on the eve of World War I. Similar to what we see today, in 1913, there were huge differences in productivity between the Western imperialist powers and their Eastern rivals. Britain's industrial production per capita (serving as the base of comparison with a value of 100) was, for example, more than three times as large as Austria's, four times bigger than Italy's, and six times the size of Russia's.

It would be also mistaken to reject China's characterization as imperialist because of the official adherence to "communism" by the regime. This is not only the case because this ideology is thoroughly infested by chauvinist patriotism or by the comprehensive adaption to the market ideology. More fundamentally, it is simple nonsensical to characterize a given regime by the ideology which it gives itself. Marxists never considered the USA as a beacon of democracy and human rights just because it proclaimed to be the champion of such ideas. Neither could one seriously claim that the Catholic Church represented in the Middle Ages the original ideas of the New Testament despite all its claims.

Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy, Table 13 Relative GDP per capita (column A) and relative levels of industrialization (column B) in 1913

Country	A	B
Britain	100	100
France	81	51
Germany	77	74
Austria	62	29
Italy	52	23
Spain	48	19
Russia	29	17

Source: Crouzet 2001, p. 148

Another argument could be to refer to the small numbers of foreign military bases of China and to compare this with the hundreds of such bases of US imperialism on all continents. This fact certainly demonstrates that the USA has been the hegemonic imperialist powers for more than seven decades, while China is a new, emerging Great Power. However, it would be mistaken to conclude from this fact that China would not be imperialist. The USA has been the strongest imperialist power for a long time. But it was never the only imperialist power. There have been several other imperialist powers which did not possess any foreign military bases since World War II and which did not conduct any military operations abroad. Just take Germany until 1990 or Japan until today. Neither do these powers have any nuclear weapons until this very day. But one could hardly conclude from this that Germany or Japan were not imperialist in this time.

Conclusion

In this essay we have demonstrated that China has become a new imperialist Great Power on the basis of a process of rapid capitalist accumulation in the past three decades. Today, China is a leading power in terms of production of capitalist value, in foreign investment, among the world's top corporations as well as among the global elite of billionaires. It is one of the most important creditors of semi-colonial countries. Furthermore, it has become a significant military power.

As a result, it plays a crucial role in world politics as, among others, the global trade war demonstrates. In summary, China has become the most important challenger of US imperialism – the long-time absolute hegemon in the capitalist world order.

Cross-References

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism
▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism

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C

Chinese Nationalist Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Rights Movements in Taiwan

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On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government declared its unconditional surrender to the Allies after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Taiwan, an island colonized by the Japanese Empire for 50 years (1895–1945) after the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894, was handed over to the Chinese Nationalist regime, known as the Republic of China (ROC), at the end of World War II.

Soon after the arrival of the Nationalist troops taking control of Taiwan at Keelung, on October 25, 1945, Chen Yi (1883–1950), then the governor of Fujian Province, attended the ceremony in the Taipei City Public Auditorium (now known as Zhongshan Hall in honor of the founding father of ROC Sun Yat-sen [or Sun Zhongshan, 1866–1925]) as the Nationalists' official delegate as ordered by Chiang Kai-shek (or Jiang Jieshi, 1887–1975). Chen signed the instrument of surrender along with Andō Rikichi (1884–1946), the last Japanese governor-general of Taiwan. Chen, the chief commander of Taiwan Provincial Garrison, announced that October 25 was the "Retrocession Day of Taiwan," and this marked a new beginning of Taiwan after Japan's colonization.

Prior to the handover from Japan to the Chinese Nationalist government, Taiwan was inhabited by Indigenous peoples, who are members of the Austronesian language group for thousands of years. Taiwan Indigenous peoples have been dominated by various imperial powers throughout history, notably the Dutch (1624–1661), the Spanish (1626–1642), the first Han Chinese-style regime established by the Zheng family (1661–1683), the Qing Empire (1683–1894), and the Japanese (1895–1945) (Chou 2015; Tsai 2009). The influx of Han Chinese settlers into Taiwan beginning in the Dutch colonial era and the dramatic growth of Han population under the Zheng regime's encouragement had transformed the demographics and ethnic landscape of Taiwan significantly and gradually shaped a typical settler colonial structure between different colonial authorities, Han settlers, and Indigenous population, as theorists of settler colonial studies such as Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini have elucidated (Wolfe 1999; Veracini 2010, 2015, 2016; Shih 2011, 2016). As a consequence, the Indigenous peoples in Taiwan have been subjected to the dominant settler society and Han-centered colonial structure since the late seventeenth century.

The end of World War II and Taiwan's handover to the Nationalist government did not bring peace or harmony to the island. The expectation of the Nationalist regime and the hope for a better future after the 50-year Japanese colonization was soon replaced with widespread disappointment among the Taiwanese locals (namely, the earlier wave of Han settlers who lived through the Japanese colonial era) due to the authorities' corruption, deteriorating economic conditions, inflation, food shortage, mismanagement by the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, as well as the cultural and linguistic barriers between mainlanders and Taiwanese locals. The Nationalists' violent military crackdown during the 1947 anti-government uprising – known as the February 28 Incident – unfortunately intensified the conflicting tension among the two groups of Han settlers (the Taiwanese locals and the mainlanders who moved to Taiwan after the handover), as well as Indigenous peoples. All of this resulted in the 38-year long Martial Law from 1949 to 1987 and the Nationalist subsequent authoritarian rule of the White Terror in Taiwan's history.

The tremendous social, political, and economic turmoil during the Civil War (1945–1949) between the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Guomindang* or *Kuomintang*, abbreviated as the KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the end of the second Sino-Japanese War brought about a new wave of Han settlers (mainlanders) moving to the island and

establishing a different settler colonial relationship in Taiwan. Around one to two million mainlanders, including soldiers, civil servants, intellectuals, and social elites, as well as numerous civilian refugees, retreated to the island of Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT. Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the leader of the CCP, proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, with its capital in Beijing.

Even though at first the USA showed no interest in interfering in the conflict between the ROC and the PRC, the American government's involvement in the Korean War in 1950 marked a turning point for the Taiwan-US relationship. Owing to the outbreak of the Korean War, Taiwan under the Nationalist rule became one of the most critical geopolitical sites of the Western Pacific region in the global Cold War structure. With the new American policy of "anti-Communist containment" to prevent the expansion of Communism, the alliance between the USA and the ROC created a space for the defeated Nationalist settler regime to establish its power base in Taiwan. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and the ROC in 1954, as well as the military, economic, and technological assistance from the USA in the following decades, helped strengthen the authoritarian settler state and contributed to Taiwan's "economic miracle," making the island one of the Four Asian Tigers along with Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong during the second half of the twentieth century. In other words, the US global hegemony and its imperialist intervention in Asia during the Cold War era (Shor 2016, p. 599), or the American suzerainty, played a pivotal part in consolidating the Chinese Nationalist settler reign in postwar Taiwan (Wu 2004, p. 18).

In the following sections, this essay will investigate the Chinese Nationalist settler colonialism by looking into the postwar cultural production in Taiwan to see how the Han settler colonial consciousness has been formulated and expressed in cultural texts. Next, this essay will explore Taiwan Indigenous rights movements against the Nationalist settler colonial dominance, with particular focus on the Indigenous cultural revitalization movements as a significant form of decolonial practice in Taiwan since the 1980s.

Chinese Nationalist Settler Colonial Project

At the inception of the Martial Law era, in order to consolidate its ruling power and political legitimacy as the only and authentic Chinese polity; the Chinese Nationalist settler regime, on the one hand, continued to address itself as the ROC and asserted its territorial claim on China, Taiwan, and other surrounding islands. On the other hand, it imposed a unified Han Chinese national and cultural identity upon every person in Taiwan. Mandarin Chinese was promoted as the national language, whereas Indigenous languages, Japanese, and other local languages (such as Hoklo and Hakka that the earlier waves of Han settlers used) were restricted by the authorities. With its goal to retake the mainland and the support from the USA in the anti-Communist containment policy during the Cold War era, the Nationalist settler regime launched a cultural policy to promote propagandistic writing of "anti-Communist literature" (*Fangong wenxue*) and "combative literature" (*Zhandou wenyi*).

In the inaugural preface to *Literary Creation* (*Wenyi chuangzuo*) in 1951, Zhang Daofan (1897–1968), a core member of the Nationalist propaganda committee and one of the founders of the state-funded organization, the Chinese Literature and Arts Association (*Zhongguo wenyi xiehui*), clearly expounded the Nationalist settler propagandistic principle: "As a result of the rising tide of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet fervor, the last two years of literary activity in Free China has experienced an unprecedented flourishing. Countless patriotic writers have fully developed their intelligence and skills by penning works with flesh and blood that sing and cry. The contribution to our fellow soldiers and citizens engaged in combat makes us take pleasure in the fact that the Chinese renaissance is following fast on the national restoration in opening up an infinitely glorious horizon" (Zhang 2014, p. 161). By the same token, the inaugural preface to *Military*

Literature (*Junzhong wenyi*) published in 1954, "Establishing a Modernized, Populist, Revolutionary, and Combative National Literature," also stated that "Today, in our effort to oppose the Communists and resist the Soviets, the most important thing is to inspire the hearts and minds of the people so that they will be unified, and to strengthen the people's nationalist thought so that they will be united. Only then can we fully exercise the strength of our people to resist the encroachment of the Soviet imperialists and destroy the sellouts of our nation. . ..Thus, nationalist literature is an important weapon in fighting the Communists and the Soviets. The establishment of a nationalist literature is an important issue for literary workers today" (Editors of *Military Literature* 2014, p. 164). In addition to the genre of "anti-Communist literature," *Wake Up from Nightmare* (*E meng chu xing*, dir. Zong You, 1951), a propaganda film produced by a state-owned studio, the Taiwan Agricultural Education Studio (*Taiwan nongjiao zhipianchang*), articulates the Nationalist anti-Communist ideology by telling about the tragedy of the patriotic female protagonist's involvement in the Communist Party and her final disillusion. In brief, the anti-Communist state ideology, as well as the Nationalist political and cultural agenda, set the tone for the formation of Han settler colonial consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s.

In addition to trumpeting an anti-Communist ideology, the Nationalist settler government also tried to smooth over the increasing tension between the two groups of Han settlers due to the "provincial conflict" after the February 28 Incident via its propagandistic project. *Descendants of the Yellow Emperor* (*Huangdi zisun*, dir. Bai Ke, 1955) serves as a typical film for the settler state to achieve its aims. This film revolves around a group of elementary schoolteachers with different provincial backgrounds from China and Taiwan. These teachers, particularly the film's female protagonist Lin Xiyun, hold important positions in conveying an orthodox narrative of Chinese civilization to their students. They also take up the heavy responsibility of solving a quarrel between students regarding their distinct "provincial origins" by consistently stressing that all

people in Taiwan today are "descendants of the Yellow Emperor (a mythological figure who is commonly believed the founder of Chinese civilization and ancestor of Han Chinese people)" as they share the same ancestral and cultural roots. Moreover, by recalling the national heroes' stories in Taiwan's settler history either via in-class verbal lecture about the Nationalist leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, or via theatrical performances, such as "shadow puppet theater" and "Gezai Opera" (in which the ruler of the first Han settler regime, Zheng Chenggong, and a martyr-like Han merchant during the Qing period, Wu Feng, are presented on the stage), the film articulates tactically the Nationalist pedagogy through emphasizing the bond between Taiwan and China via its official narrative of Han settler historiography and visual performance.

The teachers' cultural tour to southern Taiwan in the second half of the film embodies the Nationalist settler pedagogy further through their on-site investigation of the Han settler historical monuments, such as the Wu Feng Temple, the Chihkan Tower, and the Temple of Zheng Chenggong, during their journey. The cultural and ancestral ties between China and Taiwan are accentuated through the film's visual manifestations of Chinese traditional architecture and artistic elements, including calligraphy, scrolls, paintings, statues, and several others items at these historical sites. The journey to southern Taiwan therefore serves not merely as "an intensive multimedia exploration," but more importantly, as "a territorial extension/expedition from the north to the south" – a political claim of the Nationalist postwar settler project in Taiwan (Tsai 2018, p. 31). Finally, a very well-organized and highly symbolic group wedding of these schoolteachers on the Retrocession Day of Taiwan at Zhongshan Hall concludes the film with its celebratory atmosphere, indicating that the "provincial conflict" between mainlanders and locals after the February 28 Incident has been resolved smoothly. It is also worth noting that the language used in the film was Hoklo (although it was also dubbed into Mandarin), so that it could reach a larger body of local audience in Taiwan. In contrast to the film's harmonious tone and its propagandistic intention,

Bai Ke, the director of *Descendants of the Yellow Emperor* and the manager of Taiwan Motion Pictures Studio, was accused of spying for Chinese communists and then executed by the Taiwan Garrison Command in 1964 during the White Terror period.

Since one of the chief purposes for the Nationalist government's production of *Descendants of the Yellow Emperor* was to smooth over the provincial conflicts between the old and new groups of Han settlers, the Indigenous characters are almost entirely absent in the film. The only exception is the scene of the "Gezai Opera," in which the story of Wu Feng is presented. In the mythologized version of Han-centric popular tradition, Wu Feng was a Han tradesman and an official in charge of Han-Indigenous relations during the Qing period. According to the folktale in popular tradition, in order for the Indigenous people to abandon their tribal practice of headhunting, Wu decided to dedicate his life to Indigenous civilization by sacrificing his own head. This folktale of Wu Feng had been deployed by the Japanese government to forge its propagandistic project about the backwardness of the Indigenous cultures in Taiwan so as to fortify the legitimacy of the Japanese colonial policies of assimilation and civilization. The assimilative narrative of Wu Feng was adapted into *The Legend of Ali Mountain* (*Alishan fengyun*, directed by Chang Ying and Chang Cheh, 1949), which was the first feature-length narrative film shot and completed in Taiwan after the handover of Taiwan to the ROC in 1949 (Huang and Wang 2004, pp. 146–147; Lu 1998, pp. 33–34). The story was later incorporated into school textbooks by the Nationalist government to rationalize its settler colonial governance (*Research on Wu Feng and Related Issues* 1990; Chang 2015, pp. 181–182).

The 1962 film, *No Greater Love* (*Wu Feng*, dir. Bu Wancang, 1962), produced by the Taiwan Motion Picture Studio, continued to publicize the stereotypical and primitive representation of Indigenous people and glorify Wu Feng's sacrifice in an undisguised manner. Toward the end of *No Greater Love*, the Indigenous people's visit to the Wu Feng Temple implies that Wu has not only been deified and become the supreme spirit of the Indigenous people but also suggests that the Indigenous people will adopt a Han Chinese lifestyle while abandoning their own culture and tradition (Sterk 2015, p. 84). These assimilative and discriminatory narratives based on Wu Feng's folktale, in Hsieh Shih-chung's words, have strongly stigmatized the Indigenous people as backward, violent, and uncivilized and caused them to feel ashamed of, or even to conceal, their ethnic and cultural identity as indigenes (Hsieh 1987, pp. 42–45).

The political legitimacy of the Nationalist settler regime upheld by the American imperialist intervention during the Cold War period had gradually been shaken and diminished due to a series of diplomatic setbacks of Taiwan in the international arena since the 1970s. In 1971, the United Nations recognized the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China. In the same year, the ROC was expelled from the UN, and many countries then declared the severance of their diplomatic ties with the ROC after Taiwan's withdrawal from the UN. US President Richard Nixon's (1913–1994) 1972 visit to Beijing and the issue of the Joint Communiqué with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) in Shanghai acknowledged the normalization of relations between the USA and the PRC. Although Japan and the Nationalist government maintained diplomatic relations after the end of second Sino-Japanese War according to the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, the Japan-China Joint Communique was signed in Beijing to build up diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC in September 1972. On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter (1924–) delivered a speech via a television announcement, proclaiming that the USA and the PRC "have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979." As a result, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and the ROC was abrogated after the USA's shift in diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC.

Responding to the above diplomatic setbacks and crises that Taiwan suffered in the international arena during the 1970s was a revitalization of anti-Japanese war films based on the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).

Mei Chang-ling (1924–1983), the manager of a major state-run studio, the Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC), launched a series of film projects to produce a number of anti-Japanese war films in order to galvanize the audience in Taiwan with highly dramatized and epic cinematic representation of heroism and patriotism. Examples of this film genre include *The Everlasting Glory* (*Yinglie qianqiu*, dir. Ding Shanxi, 1974), *Eight Hundred Heroes* (*Babai zhuangshi*, dir. Ding Shanxi, 1975), *Victory* (*Meihua*, dir. Liu Jiachang , 1976), *Heroes of the Eastern Skies* (*Jianqiao yinglie zhuan*, dir. Chang Tseng-chai, 1977), and so forth. The story of *The Everlasting Glory* is based on the historical figure Chang Tsu-chung (1891–1940), a general of the Nationalist army who participated in the second Sino-Japanese War and died in a battle in Hubei in 1940. *Eight Hundred Heroes*, a remake of the 1938 film of the same title, tells the story of the Nationalist soldiers' defense of Sihang Warehouse in 1937 in order to cover the Nationalist forces retreating west. In the film, Yang Huimin (1915–1992), a young Girl Scout, swims across the Suzhou River to deliver a national flag of the ROC, known as "Blue Sky, White Sun and a Wholly Red Earth," to the troops at the warehouse during the battles of Shanghai. This film carefully presents and highlights the plot of her story, and Yang's image in the film has become one of the iconic images of Taiwanese movie star Brigitte Lin (Lin Ching-hsia, 1954-) who plays this character. *Heroes of the Eastern Skies*, a film produced to commemorate the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, is about a Nationalist commander of the Chinese Air Force, Kao Chih-hang (1907–1937). *Victory* was a blockbuster and a winner of Golden Horse Award for Best Feature Film in 1976. *Victory*'s theme song of the same title in Mandarin Chinese, "The Plum Blossom" (the floral emblem of the ROC), composed by the director Liu Jiachang, was even more popular than the film and has become one of the most well-known patriotic songs in Taiwan. In short, by recalling the courageous and patriotic spirits of these national war heroes via cinematic representations, the Nationalist settler government endeavored to restore its status as a legitimate Chinese polity and, more importantly, to mobilize the Taiwanese people so that they would be united while suffering from international isolation since the 1970s.

The anti-imperialist consciousness embedded in these anti-Japanese war films extended further and evolved into a collective resentment against the American government after the USA terminated its diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1978. *The Land of the Brave* (*Long de chuanren*, dir. Lee Hsing, 1981) serves as a perfect case that manifests this anti-American sentiment among people in Taiwan between the late 1970s and early 1980s. The film begins with the sequence of President Carter's recognition of the PRC and the reaction of the Taiwanese people to this shocking news. In the sequence, the feelings of distress, disappointment, anxiety, and anger among the Taiwanese people are dramatically presented via the interviews, protest slogans, posters, and students' demonstrations against the USA in a pseudo-documentary style, synchronized with the non-diegetic melody of "Descendants of the Dragon" (*Long de chuanren*), the theme song of the film's original title in Mandarin Chinese, performed by a symphony orchestra. The opening sequence is followed by the next scene in which the arrival of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Taiwan on December 27, 1978, is broadcast via a television news report, coupled with the noises of the indignant protesters and their voices singing the song called "I Love China" (*Wo ai Zhonghua*).

The anti-American sentiment expressed explicitly in the opening sequence is translated into a mode of settler nationalism through the unfolding of the film. The story of *The Land of the Brave* revolves around two main characters: Lin Chaoxing, a US-trained doctor in agronomy who returns to Taiwan and works at an agricultural research institute, wishing to dedicate what he specializes in to his country, and Fan Jitao, a college student who gives up the opportunity to study musicology in Italy and instead organizes a choral group to promote "campus folk song movement" (a grassroots music movement that emerged from Taiwan's colleges during the late 1970s in reaction to the American neocolonial

cultural and economic domination in Taiwan during the Cold War era) in Taiwan after the USA's annulment of diplomatic relations with the ROC.

The film actualizes further the patriotism and passion of the two young men through their "tours" to the countryside of Taiwan. Jitao and his cohorts of the choral group visit different rural locales in Taiwan, including logging areas, stackyards, and temples, where they form an intimate connection with the villagers by performing campus folk songs. Chaoxing, on the other hand, initiates an agricultural investigation team to explore the agrarian development in Taiwan's rural areas more closely in order to improve the production and technology for agriculture. These two tours led by the two masculine, energetic, and enthusiastic male protagonists, or more precisely, the two settler expeditions to the countryside of Taiwan, display the Han settler projects of nation-building in both spiritual and physical ways by inspiring the collective national and patriotic consciousness via the music and controlling land by scientific surveys. To borrow Arif Dirlik's words, the process of nation-building itself is exactly a form of colonialism, and settler nationalism in a settler society like Taiwan should therefore be seen as an expression of settler colonial consciousness and a mode of coloniality (Dirlik 2018, pp. 5–6).

The Land of the Brave climaxes with the very last scene, in which all of the main characters in the film attend a flag raising ceremony with numerous other people in front of the Presidential Office Building on the National Day in celebration of the ROC's seventieth anniversary in 1981, watch the national flag waving in the twilight, and together wait for the sunrise. The theme song, "Descendants of the Dragon," one of the most famous songs composed in the trend of "campus folk song movement," is utilized again in the final scene to generate a collective consciousness of settler nationalism and patriotism and, more importantly, to reiterate the Nationalist pedagogy that people in Taiwan are all "descendants of the dragon," because the mythological imagery of the dragon is a symbol of imperial power and a cultural totem for Han Chinese people. No

different from the Han-centric settler ideology that we have seen in *Descendants of the Yellow Emperor*, *The Land of the Brave* employs the same political rhetoric via the song to advocate for the historical continuity and ancestral affinity between Taiwan and China in order to construct a unified Han settler historiography. If the American suzerainty and the US Cold War imperialist intervention in Taiwan had strongly solidified the governance of the ROC and its political legitimacy as an authentic Chinese polity, then the anti-imperialist sentiments against Japan and the USA expressed in the above films after their termination of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, very ironically, were mobilized to provoke a collective consciousness of Han settler nationalism and patriotism to recentralize the ruling power of the Nationalist settler regime that suffered from the international setbacks and the crises of its legitimacy since the 1970s.

Another trend of Han settler cinematic narrative in this period was to explore a collective historical memory of the earlier waves of Han settlers coming to Taiwan since the seventeenth century. Inspired by the "nativist literature movement" (*Xiangtu wenxue yundong*) since the 1970s, films, such as *The Pioneers* (*Yuan*, dir. Chen Yao-chi, 1980) and *The Heroic Pioneers* (*Tangshan guo Taiwan*, dir. Lee Hsing, 1986), attempted to engage with the history of the earlier Han settlement in Taiwan by visualizing the early Han settlers' dangerous venture of immigration, arduous efforts of settlement, and their iron-willed and unbending spirits as pioneers settling in the frontier of Taiwan. *Gone with Honor* (*Xianghuo*, dir. Hsu Chin-liang, 1978) integrates the above tendencies of the earlier Han settlement narrative and the anti-Japanese war genre by telling the story of the Lin family's settlement in Taiwan from the late Qing period to the second Sino-Japanese War. By connecting the hardship of the Han settlement in Taiwan with the Lin family members' participation in the anti-Japanese resistance in China, *Gone with Honor* not only effectively incorporates the anti-Japanese sentiment encapsulated in its cinematic representation of the second Sino-Japanese War into the larger historical narrative of Han settler historiography of

Taiwan but also foregrounds the unbreakable bond between China and Taiwan (as we have already seen in many of the aforementioned films) by laying emphasis on the significance of the family lineage (as the original title in Mandarin Chinese symbolizes) via the Lin family in the film. Although these films to an extent were influenced by the nativist discourse of the 1970s, the Nationalist ideology and official historiography still played a prevailing role in their narratives, treating the island of Taiwan merely as a frontier settlement, an integral part of the mainland.

Concurrent with the Nationalist orthodoxy of the early Han settler history articulated in the above films was a series of opposition movements against the Nationalist authoritarian party state. These political opposition movements against the Nationalist regime since the late 1970s, particularly the 1979 Formosa Incident (*Meilidao shijian*, also known as the Kaohsiung Incident, a pro-democracy demonstration initiated by the members of *Formosa Magazine* in Kaohsiung on December 10, the International Human Rights Day, 1979), facilitated the rise of "Taiwanese consciousness" that called for solidification and deepening of Taiwan's distinct national identity and cultural subjectivity in contrast to the Nationalist China-centered historiography and ideology. They also paved the way for the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (abbreviated as the DPP) in September 1986. Additionally, the tide of sociopolitical movements advocating democratization and localization also provided a ground for the following Taiwan Indigenous rights movements and cultural revitalization beginning in the early 1980s.

Taiwan Indigenous Rights Movements and Cultural Revitalization

Developing along parallel lines with a series of social and political movements, as well as the global Indigenous rights movements around the world, Taiwan Indigenous rights movements and cultural revitalization movements emerged from the early 1980s. The release of the inaugural issue of *High Mountain Green* (*Gaoshanqing*), a magazine founded mostly by Indigenous students at National Taiwan University in May 1983, marked a milestone for the subsequent Indigenous rights movements from the 1980s to the 1990s. With its calls for political democratization, equality of socioeconomic status, and education between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, as well as critiques of the mainstream Han-dominant settler society of Taiwan, *High Mountain Green* played a pivotal part in arousing a collective awareness of Pan-Indigenous consciousness and cultural identity among various Indigenous communities based on their shared experience of colonization and exploitation for hundreds of years.

In December 1984, the first Indigenous nongovernmental organization, the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (*Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu quanli cujin weiyuanhui*, ATA), was established by Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists and intellectuals. After the Martial Law was lifted by President Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988) in July 1987, the Alliance announced the "Declaration of the Rights of Taiwan Indigenous Peoples," clearly stating that Taiwan Indigenous peoples are members of the "Austronesian language group," rather than the "descendants of Yellow Emperor" of which the Nationalist settler regime had imposed upon them and that they are the earliest inhabitants and owners of the island of Taiwan before the arrival of the Western colonial powers (Icyang et al. 2008, p. 192). Based on the demands of the declaration, the ATA called on the mainstream settler society to acknowledge the status of Indigenous peoples, as well as to respect and protect Indigenous cultures, customs, languages, and traditional practices. Additionally, the Alliance actively took more radical actions of street protests against the Nationalist settler government centering on the issues, including Indigenous name rectification, Indigenous autonomy, land claims, environmental justice (e.g., the antinuclear protests against the radioactive waste storage site in Lanyu, an island off the southeastern coast of Taiwan on which the Tao Indigenous people reside), and so forth (Hsieh 1987; Icyang et al. 2008; Yang et al. 2015).

Motivated by the Indigenous rights movements since the 1980s, more and more Indigenous authors began to participate in the trend of social, political, and cultural transformation by creating their literary works in the Sinitic script. In fact, before the 1980s wave of Indigenous rights movements, Paiwan Indigenous author Kowan Talall (Chen Ying-hsiung, 1941–) already has published the earliest volume of Indigenous literature in the Sinitic script, *Traces of Dreams in Foreign Land* (*Yuwai menghen*) in 1971. In 1983, Bunun Indigenous writer Topas Tamapima (Tian Yage, 1960–) published his first short story using his own tribal name as the title, "Topas Tamapima," in *Taiwan Times*, and became well-known after he won the prestigious Wu Cho-liou Literary Award with the story "The Last Hunter" (*Zuihou de lieren*) in 1987. The Indigenous authors during the wave of Indigenous movements not only used their pens to voice their shared experience of successive and multilayered colonization and unjust exploitation under the intersection of various colonial/neocolonial powers and the Han-centric settler structure throughout history but also endeavored to reconstruct different Indigenous historiographies, cosmologies, and epistemologies as a means to resist the dominant Han settler culture in Taiwan. They published in different Indigenous magazines and journals, such as the ATA's newsletter *Indigenous People* (*Yuanzhumin*)*, Aboriginal News* (*Yuanbao*, founded by Rukai author and scholar Taban Sasala in 1989), *Hunter's Culture* (*Lieren wenhua*, founded by Walis Norgan and Liglave A-wu in 1990), and *Taiwan Indigenous Voice Bimonthly* (*Shanhai wenhua*, founded by Paelabang danapan from the Puyuma tribe in 1993), and several other non-Indigenous publications in Taiwan (Sun 2005; Balcom 2005; Pasuya Poiconu 2009, pp. 759–777; Huang 2013; Wei 2013, pp. 262–301).

Echoing the calls of the ATA during the 1980s wave of Indigenous movements, one of the most crucial agendas of Taiwan Indigenous Literature is to reconstruct Indigenous cultural and ethnic identity and call on the mainstream settler society to acknowledge the status of Indigenous peoples as owners of Taiwan. Paiwan Indigenous writer

Monaneng's (1956–) poem, "Recovering Our Names," expresses the marginalization, stigmatization, and alienation that Taiwan Indigenous peoples have long suffered from in history, and his proposal to recover their names and dignity in order to restore Indigenous history, tradition, and culture:

> From "raw savages" to "mountain compatriots"
>   our names
>   have been forgotten little by little at the corner of
> Taiwan's history
>   From the mountains to the plains
>   our fate, alas, our fate
>   receives serious treatment and concern
>   merely in anthropological surveys
>   . . .
>   Our names
>   Have been submerged in the forms of ID cards
>   The selfless view of life
>   wavers on the scaffolds on constructions sites
>   lingers on ship dismantling plants, mining pits,
> and fishing boats
>   The sublime myths
>   have been turned into vulgar plots of TV dramas
>   The traditional morals
>   have been ravaged in red-light districts
>   Heroic spirits and
>   have been silenced along with the church bells
>   . . .
>   If someday
>   we refuse to wander in history
>   please first remember our mythology and
> traditions
>   If someday
>   We are to stop wandering on our own land
>   Please first recover our names and dignity
> (Monaneng 1989, pp. 11–13)

By the same token, in her poem, "Moving beyond Accusation, Living with Dignity," Atayal Indigenous writer and activist Lyiking Yuma (1958–) offers a critical reflection on Taiwan's settler colonial history from the late seventeenth century to the present and calls on Taiwan Indigenous peoples to stand in solidarity by political activism and cultural revitalization for ethnic empowerment and dignity:

> Accuse
>   Of four hundred-year history of sadness
>   From
>   The Netherlands
>   Spain
>   Zheng Chenggong
>   Qing Empire
>   Japan

> To the Chinese Nationalist Party
> Alas. . .
> Continuous oppression by one invader after another
> Owners' lives have gotten worse year after year
> . . .
> Alas. . .
> Rise up! Indigenous peoples
> Transform sadness into strength
> Turn accusation into action
> Let us once again
> Pick up the dignity of our hunting knives
> Honor the spirit of our ancestors
> Move beyond accusation
> Live with dignity
> On our land (Lyiking Yuma 1996, pp. 158–160)

However, the path toward cultural revitalization and ethnic empowerment is never a smooth process, because the Indigenous peoples in Taiwan have long been subjected to a multilayered structure of marginalization co-constructed by Han-dominant settler colonialism and global capitalism in contemporary Taiwan. Inequality of treatment, such as education, employment opportunities, cultural capital, and other resources, has led to a number of Indigenous people to leave for the cities to receive mainstream education or to find jobs. In "Who Is Going to Wear My Beautiful Knit Dress?", Liglave A-wu documents an elder woman's concern about the younger generation that has forgotten the Indigenous cultural practice and tradition due to such alienation from their own Indigenous communities: "I wanted my daughter to grow up to be a useful person, so when she was little, I sent her down the mountain, to a city far away to attend school like those young overseas students from the cities. . .we have been practicing Amis songs and Amis dances. Each time I sing, I get sadder; each time I dance, I feel like I am slapped in the face by my ancestors. For I know my daughter will never learn how to sing and dance the way our ancestors did. Just like my *Ina*, who used to teach me how to draw patterns and make clothes, no matter how hard I try, it is useless. Like a little bird in the sky, my daughter has flown far, far way to the city down the mountain. I don't know when she will come back and who is going to wear the beautiful cloth I weave?" (Liglave A-wu 2014, p. 405).

On top of alienation from their cultural roots and communities, urban Indigenous people in Taiwan have also suffered from exploitation of labor and unfair treatment while working in the cities. As Monaneng's poem "Recovering Our Names" has already revealed, many of the urban Indigenous people work as construction laborers, miners, ocean-liner fishermen, or even juvenile prostitutes. In another poem "The Hundred-Pacer Snake Is Dead," Monaneng portrays a pathetic scene of an Indigenous juvenile prostitute in the urban jungle of Taiwan:

> The hundred-pacer snake is dead
> Stuck in a transparent bottle of medicinal wine
> The label on the bottle reads: *Aphrodisiac*
> A teaser for the guys roaming the red-light district
> The hundred-pacer snake of myth is dead too
> The Paiwan people once believe its eggs were their ancestors
> But today it sits in a transparent bottle
> Now the agent for promoting lust in the big city
> When a man drinks the medicinal wine
> And struts his false majesty into the red-light district
> There, at the brothel door to meet him,
> Is the descendent of the hundred-pacer snake:
> A young Paiwan girl. (Monaneng 2005, p. 163)

In this poem, the hundred-pacer snake, a divine totem of Paiwan Indigenous culture and has been considered the ancestral figure of the Paiwan people in their oral tradition, is degraded as an aphrodisiac to promote lust, which signifies both commodification of Indigenous culture and inhuman exploitation of young Indigenous girls who are forced into prostitution in Taiwan. Without detailed elaboration on the Paiwan girl who struggles for survival, this poem tells a tragedy by the encounter of two Paiwan Indigenous people in the brothel, both victims of Han settler colonialism and capitalism in Taiwan's society.

In brief, the Indigenous authors' intervention in the mainstream settler society via their literary demonstration in the Sinitic script played an indispensable part in Taiwan Indigenous rights movements and cultural revitalization. The Sinitic language, although as "the language of the settler colonizers" to Indigenous writers, had already become a weapon to challenge the Han settler colonial structure and an accessible vehicle to

create a public space for alternative discourses for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous audiences. In Huang Hsin-ya's words, "In 'reinventing' the Sinitic script and turning the indigenous into a writing subject, there is hope that they will turn the process of colonization around. Their literature represents a form of cultural survival, which is read and viewed as a process of resistance, opposition, and decolonization" (Huang 2013, p. 246). Recently, more and more Indigenous authors have engaged in literary experiments through the creolization of Indigenous languages and the Sinitic script, working as translators or mediators among multiple languages and cultures more actively and creatively.

Taiwan Indigenous rights movements since the 1980s have not only been part and parcel of the process of democratization and localization but also played an indispensable role in shaping and developing the alternative media practice in Taiwan. More precisely, in addition to the Indigenous literary journals such as *Hunter's Culture* and *Taiwan Indigenous Voice Bimonthly*, Taiwan Indigenous rights movements also stimulated the transformation of Han-oriented cultural production and inspired the alternative media practice that are far different from the mainstream mode of media within the Han-dominant settler society. One of the important examples was the founding of the Green Team in 1986, a small media collective that had been regarded as the precursor of the New Taiwan Documentary by scholars (Chiu 2015). Wang Chih-chang, a Han cinematographer and member of the Society of Editors and Authors outside the Party (*Dangwai bianji zuojia lianyihui*), had become acquainted with the Indigenous activists and authors from the Council of Minority Ethnicity (*Shaoshu minzu weiyaunhui*, the predecessor of the ATA), and involved in reporting events regarding Indigenous issues and movements of Taiwan, including the 1984 mining disaster in Tucheng of New Taipei City (many of the miners who died in the disaster were Indigenous), the charity concert named "Singing for Mountains" at Taipei New Park (currently known as the 228 Peace Memorial Park) initiated by Indigenous musician and activist Hu Defu (Parangalan, 1950–) in search of support and

funds for the bereaved families in the mining disaster, and the founding ceremony of the ATA at Mackay Memorial Hospital in Taipei on December 29, 1984. Wang was also one of the founding members of the ATA and worked as an art editor for the ATA's newsletter *Indigenous People*.

In October 1986, Wang founded the Green Team with other independent documentary filmmakers, striving to document alternative images and publicize marginalized voices of different minority groups through their direct involvement in various social and political movements, particularly the Indigenous rights movements. During the Martial Law period, Taiwan's media had been dominated by three main broadcast television stations: Taiwan Television (TTV), China Television (CTV), and Chinese Television System (CTS), as well as three major daily newspapers, including *China Times*, *Central Daily News*, and *United Daily News*. Working very closely with activists and protestors, the Green Team played a pivotal role in documenting the social movements that could hardly be broadcast via mainstream media due to the Nationalist government's censorship and distributed these images through underground, independent outlets, such as night markets, street vendors, election headquarters, regional chapters or offices of the DPP, and other campaign events. The alternative cultural practice and involvement in social movements of the Green Team as a small media collective thus served as a critical vehicle of oppositional discourses that were able to mobilize or facilitate a mass movement and as a channel of communication that created "cultural networks" and "webs of political solidarity" (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994, p. xx). According to Wang, the establishment of the ATA as a critical milestone in the process of Taiwan Indigenous rights movements had significantly inspired the founding of the Green Team and its social and political involvement in Taiwan's society.

The images of Taiwan Indigenous peoples, as a consequence, have been becoming more visible since the 1980s. Han Taiwanese filmmaker Huang Ming-chuan's (1955–) film, *The Man from Island West* (*Xibu lai de ren*, 1989), has been widely

taken as the first independent fiction-feature film in Taiwan's film history that takes Indigenous figures as its main characters and deals with the Indigenous themes. The Taiwan Public Television Service Foundation (*Gonggong dianshi*, PTS) also has served as a crucial platform for promoting alternative media regarding Taiwan Indigenous peoples. In 2005, the Taiwan Indigenous Television (*Yuanzhuminzu dianshitai*, TITV) was established to produce and broadcast Indigenous television programs in order to publicize the Indigenous issues further. Moreover, Indigenous and non-Indigenous filmmakers and documentarians in Taiwan, such as Bauki Anao (Pan Chao-cheng, 1956–), Pilin Yabu (1966–), Mayaw Biho (1969–), Laha Mebow (Chen Chieh-yao,1975–), Lee Daw-ming (1953–), Hu Tai-li (1950–), Cheng Wen-tang (1958–), Wei Te-sheng (1969–), and several others, actively dedicated themselves to the creation of Indigenous images.

In addition to transformation in the cultural realm, many political changes, education, and legal reforms have been made thanks to Taiwan Indigenous rights movements since the 1980s. The Wu Feng Township of Chiayi County was renamed into Alishan Township since 1989, and the lesson of Wu Feng was removed from school textbooks and the curriculum in the same year. In 1994, President Lee Teng-hui (1923–) first used the term, *Yuanzhumin*, literally, the original inhabitants, to address the Indigenous people, which indicated that the Indigenous peoples are autochthonous to Taiwan. In the same year, the National Assembly passed a series of Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC to amend the discriminatory and assimilative designation, *shanbao* (namely, "mountain compatriots"), into *Yuanzhumin*. The Council of Indigenous Peoples (*Yuanzhuminzu weiyuanhui*), a ministry-level rank under the Executive Yuan, was established in December 1996 to deal with Indigenous affairs and serve as an important platform between various Indigenous communities and the government in Taiwan. In July 1997, the term, *Yuanzhuminzu*, was written into the Constitution of the ROC to acknowledge the constitutional status of Indigenous peoples and their collective human rights in Taiwan.

After the peaceful transition of power from the Chinese Nationalist Party to the Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP government affirmed the "new partnership between the Indigenous peoples and the government of Taiwan" in 2002 and further promulgated the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (*Yuanzhuminzu jibenfa*) to protect "the fundamental rights of Indigenous peoples" and build reciprocal "inter-ethnic relations based on co-existence and prosperity" in 2005 (Council of Indigenous Peoples). On August 1, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen delivered her formal apology to the Indigenous peoples on behalf of the ROC government and promised to establish the Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee in order to promote social fairness and historical justice for the Indigenous people in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, as many of the settler colonies around the world, the above legal and social reforms since the late 1980s do not mean that the Han settler colonialism in Taiwan has come to an end. On February 14, 2017, several months after President Tsai's apology to Taiwan Indigenous peoples, the Council of Indigenous Peoples organized a press conference on the "Regulations for Demarcating Indigenous Traditional Territories" and proclaimed these new regulations officially on February 18. This policy disappointed many Indigenous communities, as the new regulations for their land rights confined the notion of Indigenous traditional territories only to government-owned public land and excluded private property. In the eyes of Indigenous activists, the exclusion of private land from Indigenous traditional territories was, in fact, a justification of settlers' land dispossession, because a great portion of Indigenous land has been designated as private property.

On February 23, 2017, Indigenous activists, including documentarian Mayaw Biho, musician Panai Kusui, and several others, set up a campsite in front of the Presidential Office Building on Ketagalan Boulevard to protest these new regulations, where they held informal concerts and forums to popularize the issues related to Indigenous traditional territories and land rights in the

public sphere and communicate persistently with Taiwan's society. They painted stones, and invited people to paint with them, and placed their artworks on Ketagalan Boulevard, which made their protest camp a creative gallery of activism. On June 2, the campsite and their artworks were demolished by the government ruthlessly, and these Indigenous activists were evicted from the campsite on Ketagalan Boulevard by police. The demolition of the Indigenous protest campsite on Ketagalan Boulevard, a street name derived from the Ketagalan Indigenous tribe, epitomized ironically various forms of forceful eviction and relocation that continue to take place and harm Indigenous peoples' rights to land and sovereignty in contemporary Taiwan. The rise of the DPP and Taiwanese consciousness since the 1970s, although playing a crucial part in the process of democratization and localization in Taiwan should be viewed as rejuvenation of the earlier form of Han settler consciousness against the Chinese Nationalist Settler regime. Settler colonialism is not yet finished; Taiwan Indigenous peoples' efforts in decolonization continue.

Cross-References

► Cold War
► Imperialism and Settler Colonialism: Xenophobia and Racism in North America
► Settler Colonialism

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Chomsky, Noam (b.1928) and Anti-imperialism

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Geo-political Hegemony; Instrumentalism; Neo-colonialism; Realpolitik; Regime change; Unilateralism; US exceptionalism; US foreign policy; US imperialism; US nationalism

Definition

Noam Chomsky remains a relentless critic of US foreign policy: in particular, the instrumental realpolitik, which displays to advance Geo-Political Hegemony and what as the world's only super power, can be defined as Imperialism. This expanded 2nd edition essay develops in substantial detail Chomsky's anti-Imperialism over the last five decades.

In a very recent article, Noam Chomsky notes of US foreign policy: 'Hegemonic power offers the opportunity to become a rogue state, freely defying international law and norms, while facing increased resistance abroad and contributing to its own decline through self-inflicted wounds' (2013a). Such a statement crystallises well Chomsky's critique of US foreign policy and self-defined 'exceptionalism' on the world stage; a critique he has had (but consistently developed and furthered) for more than 45 years. In a 2010 interview Chomsky gives his critical analyses of US foreign policy which is also an effective summary of this in the second half of the Twentieth

Century and indeed the first 20 years of the Twenty First Century.

> "The problems with American foreign policy are rooted in its essential nature, which we know about. Or we can know about it if we want to. So you go back to say the Second World War. That's the point at which the US became a global power. Before that it had conquered the national territory, pretty much exterminated the population, conquered half of Mexico, pretty much taken control over the Western Hemisphere, invaded the Philippines, killed a couple of hundred thousand people but the real global power up to that time was Britain and others. The United States was not a global power. But it became so after the Second World War. And planners met and carefully laid out plans – they're perfectly public – for how they would run the post-war world." (2010)

Chomsky has remained a relentless critic of US foreign policy and the foremost role given to what he has called its 'Imperial Ambitions' in many decades of overthrowing democratically elected governments and overseeing their replacement by various (often extremely violent, indeed murderous) dictatorships, support for right-wing paramilitaries, embargoes and trade blockades on states it finds unfavourable, and outright military force against all others it has determined must be brought into line. Additionally, Chomsky excoriates the US's historical fondness for ignoring, or 'opting out' of, international law and treaties: perhaps observed most recently and notoriously in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, similar in some ways to the first such invasion in 1991 by George Bush Sr and allies, but without the pretext of it being a response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The 2003 intervention was of course part of the so-called 'War on Terror' declared by then president George W. Bush. No link at all could be made between Al-Qaeda's attacks of 9/11 and Saddam Hussein, nor was any evidence of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' found. However, the US and UK ignored the UN and all countries opposed to military intervention and invaded anyway, and as such, it can be seen as arguably the apotheosis of US exceptionalism, supported and endorsed by the UK prime minister Tony Blair: bilateralism truly coming into its own. The protracted conflagration of Iraq, in which at least one million civilian lives were lost during the Anglo-US

occupation and civil war, and the further vast loss of life that followed, was supposed to have 'ended' with the withdrawal of US troops in December 2011; however, the suffering of the country continues. The invasion of Iraq was supposedly because Saddam Hussein had some link to 9/11 however, following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there was the further black irony of the fact that the Islamist Mujahedeen and one of its most prominent guerrilla leaders Osama Bin Laden had received considerable US support in the 1980s war against the Soviet Union's invasion of that country.

Chomsky was and is an incisive critic of the war and its retrospective justification through erroneous 'proof' of the threat of Saddam Hussein's military capabilities; capabilities that were previously supported by the Pentagon and different Washington administrations. Saddam Hussein's Iraq may have played no part in the events of 9/11 but since it was deemed a 'Rogue State' international law could be 'interpreted' to mean whatever the administration of George W. Bush wanted it to mean, when it was not bypassed altogether as the US acted unilaterally with the UK in invading Iraq. The newly created realpolitik term 'Rogue State' as well as 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' effectively sanctifying invasion and occupation since these terms served as 'the next best thing' in the absence of actual evidence that such newly classified states posed any threat to the US or its allies.

At the time of the invasion, Chomsky noted, 'The most powerful state in history has proclaimed that it intends to control the world by force, the dimension in which it reigns supreme' (2003). Indeed, the severity of the damage done to US and British standing in the international community cannot be underestimated, and the fact that millions of the citizens of both countries protested against invasion and occupation, but were completely ignored, bares distinct similarities to the US's intervention decades earlier in Vietnam, another imperial adventure Chomsky did not spare criticising. Vietnam set the precedent for future decades, in that the war displayed the US military machine's apparent disregard for international opinion, much less international law, something first properly observed through shocking

images of weapons not used or considered acceptable by other states against the civilian population: napalm searing human flesh and the defoliating Agent Orange doing the same to vegetation; all justified and explained as 'necessary' to vanquish the Viet Cong enemy. The war in Vietnam met with monumental resistance in the US, and Chomsky noted at the time (1975) that it was not merely the Republican hawks Nixon and Kissinger who engaged in continuous bombing of the country and (not so) covert efforts to find local support on the ground, but also Democratic president Kennedy whose various military mobilisations earlier had 'involved US forces in counterinsurgency, bombing, and "population control"' (1975). Cambodia and Laos were to meet a similar fate. The 'necessity' of using weapons technologically developed to devastate life, and terrorise 'enemies' into submission at the time set the tone for further Cold War imperial machinations by the US and its Western allies; the US always being, however, the primary actor. Vietnam was 'an indescribable atrocity', Chomsky observed (ibid.).

The year 1973 is an appropriate one in which to pick up the further development of Cold War imperialism. It saw the CIA depose the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile, and install the murderous right-wing Pinochet dictatorship. The date of September 11 was not lost on critics 30 or so years later, and Chomsky was one of (if not the most) stringent of voices to remind the US public that another nation in South America also suffered appalling and brutal loss of life decades earlier courtesy of a lawless and fascistic regime put in power by the US. The fact that the Allende Government had been democratically elected but, being perceived as 'too left-wing' by Washington, was seen as fit to remove, brought out in glaring contrast the contradictions of US foreign policy that Chomsky would underline in all his subsequent political work on the subject. Reflecting on those events 19 years later in a 1994 interview, Chomsky noted: 'They [the CIA] really pulled out the stops on this one. Later, when the military coup finally came [in September, 1973] and the government was overthrown (and

thousands of people were being imprisoned, tortured and slaughtered) the economic aid which had been cancelled immediately began to flow again. As a reward for the military junta's achievement in reversing Chilean democracy, the US gave massive support to the new government' (Chomsky 1994). To be sure, US imperialism was to be violently felt across Latin America throughout the 1970s and 1980s; South America in the 70s under the CIA's 'Operation Condor' programme to destabilise and remove any government it saw as 'left-wing', usually involving considerable support for right-wing and reactionary elements, while other arms of the US state saw to more practical matters such as arming and training them. Chomsky has always been among the many critics pointing out that support for state terror and death squads has been the repeated tactic of the CIA and military, with both Republican and Democrat administrations helping in their facilitation.

Focused on Latin America, Chomsky has remained a tireless critic of US imperialism, against Pinochet's Chile, and also offering incisive criticism of Argentina's military regimes. Argentina experienced a 'Dirty War' under the 'National Reorganisation Process' of successive military dictatorships beginning with Jorge Videla's, every bit as murderous as Pinochet's. Bolivia experienced something similar under Hugo Banzer who took power 1971 with of course strong support from Washington in this case Richard Nixon's administration before its termination following Nixon's demise in 1974 over Watergate. Banzer's military regime was followed by that of Luis García Meza.

Brazil found itself under military rule for a period of no less than 21 years (1964–85), beginning with Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, the typical 'strongman' preferred by Washington. Castelo Branco's successor Emilio Garrastazu Medici met with Nixon in 1971, and in a badly kept secret, discussed the removal of both Allende and Castro. (Cuba has been the Central American sore point for US imperialism, something else Chomsky has never tired of pointing out.)

Paraguay saw the longest unbroken single dictatorship of any Latin American country in Alfredo Stroessner's 35 year rule 1954–89,

seizing power in a coup: 'El Stronato' the decades-long period of Stroessner's authoritarian regime playing a leading role in the CIA facilitated 'Operation Condor' across South America in the 70s which involved assassination, 'disappearances', the use of death squads, torture and terrorizing opponents to enforce political repression in every area of society and in all aspects of life.

Chomsky was one of the original critics of the ideology of 'National Security Doctrine' which was propagated by South American juntas – and the CIA throughout the decade. Speaking in 1979, Chomsky's critique of the mass media and its propaganda function meets his thoroughgoing critique of instrumental US foreign policy in the co-authored article with Edward Herman, *The Nazi Parallel* excerpted from *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*,

> "The ideology designated the "National Security Doctrine" has three main elements: (1) that the state is absolute and the individual is nothing; (2) that every state is involved in permanent warfare, its present form being Communism versus the Free World; and (3) that control over "subversion" is possible only through domination by the natural leadership in the struggle against subversion, namely the armed forces. Because the National Security State is U.S.-sponsored and supported and meets U.S. criteria on the fundamentals, there is another important international consequence: the mass media in the United States play down and essentially suppress the evidence of the enormous inhumanities and institutionalized violence of these U.S. satellites." (1979)

Post-war US realpolitik supporting instrumental US foreign policy and 'Regime Change' in the Caribbean and Latin America can be traced back to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 by Cuban exiles opposed to Fidel Castro's regime. The CIA covertly financed the operation which was undertaken with the planning of President Eisenhower's administration then with the full knowledge of the Kennedy administration, despite Kennedy having been ostensibly hostile to archetypal right-wing military 'Strongman' Fulgencio Batista and sympathetic to the original Cuban revolution.

Batista's Cuba was an impoverished authoritarian and oppressive one party state but had nevertheless been a stopping off point for moneyed international elites whilst maintaining a murderous regime of political repression and Cold War anti-communist paranoia: effectively a bloody Latin American embodiment of McCarthyism which had taken hold of the US the same decade, the 1950s. Bastista's Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities (Buró para Represión de las Actividades Comunistas, BRAC) used terror against its opponents and carried out torture and public executions but also had the support of the US throughout the decade it held power just as the largely shambolic attempted invasion of the Bay of Pigs had funding from the CIA.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion would in turn help bring about the Cuban Missile Crisis in which the world came perilously close to nuclear annihilation for the first time, as Nikita Khrushchev upped the ante by stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba accelerating Soviet alarm and reaction to American missiles with nuclear warheads being based in Turkey thus capable of launching a 'first strike' against which the USSR would not be able to retaliate. Khrushchev stationing missiles in Cuba primed with nuclear warheads meant that in the crack pot 'logic' of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a 'second strike' would be possible against the US: it was The Week the World Stood Still, and "The Most Dangerous Moment" yet for humanity, as Chomsky reflected 50 years later.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who would go on to be one of the leading figures associated with the carnage of the Vietnam War in the latter part of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, "recognized that Cuba was justified in fearing an attack. "If I were in Cuban or Soviet shoes, I would have thought so, too," (2012) he observed at an international conference on the 40th anniversary of the missile crisis.

US interventions in the Caribbean would not become immediately apparent again for almost 11 years and the October 1983 deployment by US President Ronald Reagan of US troops into Grenada in the Caribbean under 'Operation Urgent Fury'. The invasion was ostensibly because Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop had seized power and suspended the country's constitution in 1979 and to protect

Americans in the country, however the pretext for the invasion is unconvincing when is considered that Reagan and his administration's Hawks previously never had any problem with the disputed 1976 election result which returned Eric Gairy to power or his lawless 'Mongoose Gang' secret police trained by security forces from Pinochet's Chile or the intimidation and violence they used against the opposition and the population. Similarly, Bishop and his left-wing New Jewel Movement had considerable popular support in deposing former incumbent Gairy and implementing social policies aimed at reducing inequality and the upward leveling of society in the country, these radically egalitarian measures being unpopular to say the least with Reagan's administration, as they had been with Carter's, hostility to Bishop's "popular socialism", and its notable successes such as increasing literacy to around 98% and reducing unemployment by 35% could not be tolerated being as they were the embodiment of what Chomsky called "the threat of a good example" (1992a)

It should also be borne in mind that the supposed reasons for invading Grenada confected by the Reagan administration were in large part the right-wing conservative consolidation and aggressive furtherance of its Democrat 'liberal' predecessor the administration of Jimmy Carter which severely limited aid to the country and refused to provide emergency assistance after 40% of its key banana crop was destroyed by the hurricane of August 1980. Carter also imposed an additional conditionality that Grenada should be excluded from rehabilitation aid provided to affected countries through the West Indian Banana Exporting Association – something refused by the Association thus US aid was never offered. Additionally following Bishop's coming to power in 1979, Carter's administration granted asylum to exiled former Prime Minister Eric Gairy who used this to broadcast propaganda against Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement. Carter's administration also tried to discourage US tourism to Grenada and refused to recognize the Grenadian ambassador to the US.

Prior to independence from British colonial rule in 1974, the British- approved proposal for a new airport, had been a project which involved international co-operation in the planning and design stages and proved uncontroversial unlike nearly 30 years later when Maurice Bishop's government began construction of Point Salines Airport. Reagan believed that the new commercial airport would be used to facilitate Soviet military buildup in the region and allow both Russia and Cuba a permanent military base and a hub for armaments to left-wing guerrilla groups operating in Central America.

The Bishop government argued that its construction of the new airport was built to allow commercial aircraft carrying tourists, adding that commercial aircraft were unable to land at Pearls Airport at the island's 5,200 feet north end nor could it be expanded because the runway was adjacent to a mountain at one end with the ocean at the other.

Reagan also claimed that Bishop's Grenada allowed the Soviet Union to expand its political presence and influence in the region, an unproven and largely nonsensical claim and again one which can be counter posed with the inconvenient reality over many decades of both Republican and Democrat administrations operating in the region and indeed globally, purportedly to advance US interests but which undermine elected governments because their policies apparently run counter to those of the US just as arming, training and funding anti-democratic and anti-popular groups it finds favorable or malleable is always explained and justified as 'necessary' and, however disingenuously, about 'freedom' and 'democracy'.

The US invasion of Grenada easily overwhelmed resistance in the space of 4 days by the deployment of over 7,000 troops. As to the legality of the military intervention, the United Nations General Assembly voted against Reagan's invasion and condemned it as being "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State" calling on the US for an "immediate cessation of the armed intervention." This was ignored altogether however, as was international condemnation and the UN Security Council's own resolution that it violated international law by being simply vetoed by the US.

Chomsky's critique of US foreign policy and the role the supine corporate media play in cheerleading and promoting it is encapsulated well in his excoriation of both the Carter and Reagan administrations' treatment of Grenada and the mass media's de facto blackout of both Carter's severe limitation and then refusal of aid to the country and engaging in threatening military exercises around the island

"The large-scale military operations simulating an invasion of "Amber and the Amberdines," clearly intended to intimidate the government of Grenada and the Grenadines, passed without mention in the *New York Times.* The only hint was a tiny item noting Grenada's charge that it was the target of "an imminent attack" by the United States, dismissed by the State Department as "ridiculous," with no further details or inquiry." (1989)

Carter's Democrat administration had merely staged military maneuvers around Grenada and mock sorties – not to say all of its political hostility to Bishop's experiment in what he called "popular socialism", but Reagan's conservative Republican administration actually invaded the island using the full force of the US military machine. The media effectively acting as the US President's press office and Public Relations department in this case by remaining largely silent on the US's military 'leaning' on Grenada since it clearly did not wish to publicize the actions undertaken or allow informed debate as to their necessity or desirability: something Chomsky has consistently set out in both his criticism of US foreign policy and the propaganda function of the media at the time and in the 37 years since.

By the time of Reagan's 1983 invasion, the US media had assumed its traditional role spinning a narrative of "rescue" and "liberation" to underscore the aggression as being both necessary and justified, Washington itself choosing obfuscation over such falsities the incursion and military overkill by a Superpower against the small island nation, being to prevent the Soviet Union gaining this Caribbean outpost as a satellite threatening Americans in Grenada and the might of America itself.

Staying in the Caribbean and moving to Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became President in 1990

winning with 67.5% of the vote and achieved substantial social and political progress in a very short period of time. Reducing corruption and stemming the long running exodus of Haitians to the US, Aristide's social reforms were unpopular with elites in the country that had previously supported the dynastic Duvalier dictatorships of François 'Papa Doc' Duvalier and then his son Jean-Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier and as Chomsky has since noted, "The only question in the mind of anybody who knows a little history should have been, How is the US going to get rid of Aristide?

In *Secrets, Lies and Democracy* Chomsky critically elaborates further,

"All of this made Aristide even more unacceptable from the US point of view, and we tried to undermine him through what were called-naturally-"democracy-enhancing programs." The US, which had never cared at all about centralization of power in Haiti when its own favored dictators were in charge, all of a sudden began setting up alternative institutions that aimed at undermining executive power, supposedly in the interests of greater democracy." The 80s Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan had been alarmed by Aristide a decade before he was the Haitian President. Aristides's Liberation Theology meant that "US policy must begin to counter (not react against) . . . the "liberation theology" clergy" (1994)

Following the 1991 military coup ousting Aristide from office, international condemnation was comprehensive, and a trade embargo was initiated by the Organization of American States (OAS), in which the US reluctantly participated. As the country descended into bloody chaos refugees fled Haiti but the administration of George Bush blocked them from entering its borders.

Bill Clinton who won the 1992 US Presidential election and became President in 1993 had admonished the Bush administration for returning refugees to the terror and bloodshed of Haiti after Aristide had been deposed by the military junta "a flat violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which we claim to uphold" (1994) Chomsky noted the following year. Clinton had made promises to end the callous refusal of Bush to grant refugees from Haiti fleeing for their lives entry to the US, but pointedly adopted these policies himself as President-Elect.

Following Bill Clinton's inauguration as US President, Chomsky noted in the same interview in *Secrets, Lies and Democracy*,

"The US Justice Department has just made a slight change in US law which makes our violation of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even more grotesque. Now Haitian refugees who, by some miracle, reach US territorial waters can be shipped back. That's never been allowed before. I doubt that many other countries allow that." (2014)

From the time of Aristide's electoral victory in 1990 to the military putsch which ousted him 8 months later, he was asked – instructed may be a better description – to make concessions to the junta, Chomsky reflected on this in 1994,

"It's perfectly understandable. The Aristide government had entirely the wrong base of support. The US has tried for a long time to get him to "broaden his government in the interests of democracy." This means throw out the two-thirds of the population that voted for him and bring in what are called "moderate" elements of the business community-the local owners or managers of those textile and baseball-producing plants, and those who are linked up with US agribusiness. When they're not in power, it's not democratic." (1994)

Aristide being left-leaning and with a background in Liberation Theology was not prepared however to follow such 'advice' from the US.

Despite participating in international efforts to remove the ruling junta from office, the Clinton administration refused to deport paramilitary leader Emmanuel 'Toto' Constant who was wanted and due to stand trial in Haiti. Constant founded the notorious FRAPH death squad: *Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haitien* (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti) with the covert support of the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and had been a spy paid by the CIA, the DIA encouraging Constant and helping fund his paramilitary group in undermining Aristide for as long as it saw fit, distancing itself and cutting ties as soon as it did not – what it must be said, has been a recurrent pattern. Constant was convicted *in abstentia* over the 1994 Raboteau massacre in which the FRAPH in an unprovoked attack on Aristide supporters killed at least six people and injured many more.

Indeed, the US's involvement in covert campaigns to undermine popular support for Aristide somewhat contradicts its leading international efforts to remove the military junta who ousted him and in which the CIA and DIA were instrumental. This is what is meant by US 'realist' foreign policy following a familiar pattern: in Haiti like elsewhere throughout the 1970s, 80s, 90s and 2000s, and regardless of whether the President was Republican or Democrat the US has done everything possible – using both covert and overt means – to hamstring and politically counter any and all governments it sees as being 'left-wing' or 'socialist'. This has also meant of course, at its worst, making cynical use of right-wing and ultra-conservative fronts and paramilitaries as in Haiti and many other places across the world. The US being the world's only Superpower, also sets the bar for what is understood internationally as being acceptable: having so much influence on the UN Security Council, it simply vetoes any decision or voting outcome with which it disagrees and continues to do so.

It is not a straightforward question of comparing and contrasting Republican and Democrat administrations although there have been and are noticeable differences and the CIA and DIA whilst being independent federal government agencies have operated in large part according to Presidential mandates and the policies of incumbent administrations where already powerful individuals such as Henry Kissinger have come to prominence and exerted an undue influence to lasting and thoroughly malign effect.

The US in Haiti in the early-90s is in many ways an unusual example of its textbook operations of indirectly and covertly and *directly* and *overtly* intervening against any overseas government it deems incompatible with its interests. As this expanded 2nd Edition essay on Chomsky and Anti-Imperialism elaborates further taking the many other countries and events which necessarily could not be included in the shorter First Edition version, the unusual and 'atypical' example of Haiti deserves special attention.

Haiti was and is one of the poorest counties in the world whose history is has been shaped by Colonialism and the Atlantic Slave Trade, and the

revolt of the population against both: the 1792 Haitian Revolution dealing a fatal blow to the Slave Trade across the Americas decades before it was finally abolished everywhere, likewise attempts to re-impose it were successfully resisted.

The US had occupied the island in the early Twentieth Century and there was considerable antagonism from Colonial and Imperial powers toward the rebellious former Slave Colony which had revolted and freed itself rejecting Empire and Colonialism wholesale. This historical background aims to give a brief overview of modern Haiti and the US's intervention in it which was from a distance and covertly at first, then directly intervening to remove the right-wing military junta it had helped bring to power in its ousting of the Liberation Theologian Aristide. The 1994 intervention to remove the formerly favored military junta is unusual because despite this being called 'Operation Uphold Democracy' to re-install Aristide the US had been instrumental in both his removal and in his replacement by the same military regime in late 1990. The fact that Emmanuel 'Toto' Constant and his FRAPH and indeed General Raoul Cédras the latter being de facto Haitian head of state, had overstepped their informal mandate and Bill Clinton saw fit to commit 25,000 troops to ending this, after Diplomatic negotiations involving former US President Jimmy Carter and former US General Colin Powell amongst others failed to persuade Cédras to relinquish power is an interesting example of the US employing both 'soft' and then 'hard' power to 'correct' its own earlier mistakes. In an otherwise pretty standard instrumental foreign policy of helping oust a democratically elected regime it deemed 'hostile' to its interests – after Diplomatic negotiations failed, Cédras was offered USD 1 million to leave office which he took and to go into exile in nearby Panama and where he has remained ever since some 26 years later.

Emmanuel "Toto" Constant nicknamed "The Devil" also quietly went into exile in the United States: "The United States overthrew the military regime, Constant had finally been arrested and ordered deported, he had in 1996 mysteriously been released under a secret agreement with the

U.S. government—even though the Haitian government had formally requested his extradition and U.S. authorities had found photos of his group's victims, their bodies mutilated, pasted to the walls of his Port-au-Prince headquarters like trophies" Grann (2001).

The 1980s saw an escalation of Cold War hostilities, intensified by the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the election of the UK's Conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher. Aggressive overtures were made toward the Soviet Union, and nuclear war (Mutually Assured Destruction [MAD]) seemed a very real possibility for at least the first half of the 1980s. US bases in the UK and Western Europe (notably West Germany) further increased tension, as did Reagan's 'Star Wars' missile programme and withdrawal from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Reykjavik in Iceland in 1986.

Focusing again on Latin America, as Chomsky observed looking back in 2013, "Reagan waged a murderous assault on Central America" (2013b). From Honduras to El Salvador and from Guatemala to Nicaragua, the US backed right-wing paramilitaries against both civilian populations and any political elements seen as 'left-wing'. Chomsky's ceaseless criticism of such cynical US realpolitik won many enemies as well as friends. In Guatemala, the genocidal dictatorship of Efrain Rios Montt, which massacred many tens of thousands of predominantly indigenous Mayans, received strong and enduring support from Reagan, who as Chomsky quotes in the same article, was unequivocal: "My administration will do all it can to support his progressive efforts". The regime's massacres "were carried out with vigorous US support and participation". Among the standard Cold War pretexts was that Guatemala was a Russian "beachhead" in Latin America.

In Nicaragua, paramilitary 'Contras' were used to fight the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega, which Washington viewed with special disdain, being happy to use lethal force against civilians the better to 'promote democracy'. Nicaragua had been under the dynastic Somoza dictatorship across successive generations for 43 years until the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza

Debayle in 1979 by the Sandinistas. As Chomsky noted in 'Teaching Nicaragua a Lesson' *In What Uncle Sam Really Wants*,

> "When his rule was challenged, by the Sandinistas in the late 1970s, the US first tried to institute what was called "Somocismo [Somoza-ism] without Somoza"- that is, the whole corrupt system intact, but with somebody else at the top. That didn't work, so President Carter tried to maintain Somoza's National Guard as a base for US power. The National Guard had always been remarkably brutal and sadistic. By June 1979, it was carrying out massive atrocities in the war against the Sandinistas, bombing residential neighborhoods in Managua, killing tens of thousands of people. At that point, the US ambassador sent a cable to the White House saying it would be "ill advised" to tell the Guard to call off the bombing, because that might interfere with the policy of keeping them in power and the Sandinistas out." (1992b)

Before the Sadinista revolution which overthrew Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979 ending the dynastic and authoritarian tyranny of the Somoza family, Democrat President Jimmy Carter's support had been unwavering flying Somoza's Guard commanders out of the country using Red Cross planes – an act constituting a war crime – and began reforming it on Nicaragua's borders with the participation of Argentina's military regime in doing so. In Nicaragua's civil war of the 80s, the remnants of the National Guard re-appeared in the incarnation of the notorious Contras funded, trained and armed by Ronald Reagan's administration also using the conduit of the CIA, Reagan calling these right-wing paramilitaries who terrorized the population, 'freedom fighters'.

The Somozas' authoritarian klepotocracy had as Chomsky shows, received the unstinting support of Democrat President Jimmy Carter, in the mid-late 70s Carter did everything he could to contribute to maintaining their grip on power. From the start of the 1980s Ronald Reagan's right-wing Republican administration went one better of course, in its unconditional support for the right-wing Contras, not least military support to fight the 'red menace' of the left-wing Sandinistas which it combined with what Chomsky calls "economic warfare" (1992b) against the civilian population. Having cancelled aid to the

country in 1981, Reagan's first administration then began its long battle against the popular government of the Sandinistas: it used all available means to do this, one of which was to also insist other states reduce or limit aid to the country whose radical socialism initiated by the Sandinista revolution it saw as having started the 'Domino effect' of communism and anti-capitalist revolutions across Central America.

Initially, the Contras were primarily Somoza National Guard loyalists and although they comprised a sizable number of right-wing guerrilla fighters through most of the 80s, their numbers were bulked by mercenaries who also had little compunction in drug trafficking, specifically crack cocaine. The CIA – especially certain agents – likewise had a flexible approach to the proceeds from crack which flooded US cities and Black neighborhoods in particular, and would become embroiled in the Iran-Contra Scandal the case of Oliver North in 1987 having ramifications still being felt 33 years later. This very 'dirty war' was of course undertaken using the favored catch-all term of 'counter-insurgency', the covert and largely blatantly *overt* operations of US involvement Chomsky has never ceased to critically incise.

The recent history of Nicaragua and far-right armed groups being aided and abetted by the US military machine and 'Black Ops' of the CIA could be a whole reference entry in itself and the breathtaking scale of covert 'counter-insurgency' measures used over the course of the 1980s against the Sandinistas cannot be compressed here in its entirety, but will nonetheless receive some further attention.

In 1983 the CIA issued two guerrilla warfare booklets to the Contras: the *Freedom Fighter's Manual* was airdropped to known Contra camps, a 15 page manual with illustrations since those it was aimed at were mostly illiterate and consisted of tips for sabotage and other forms of 'economic warfare' aimed at incrementally paralyzing the economy the idea being that this would mean the population turning against the Sandinista government and help weaken it to the point of collapse, it also included instructions for carrying out acts of vandalism and how to make Molotov cocktails.

Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare (1983) meanwhile, advocated the use of 'neutralization' (assassination) of Sandinista leaders and governmental officials involving "selective use of violence for propagandistic effects" (1983) Reagan feigned ignorance of this 'Psy Ops' instruction manual written by the CIA of course, whose very existence was for the express purpose of destroying the Sandinistas.

As the Nicaraguan civil war continued through the decade so did US covert and not so covert involvement. In 1984 the CIA directly involved itself in asymmetric military operations against Nicaragua, mining Crinto, Puerto Sandino and El Bluff harbors with 'acoustic mines' which apparently were not meant to harm just 'scare'. However, they disrupted shipping damaging at least seven vessels and destroyed many fishing boats as well as causing damage to international vessels. The mining of these harbors would form one of the two primary submissions by Nicaragua in the case *Nicaragua v. United States* lodged at the International Court of Justice, launched the same year and settled in 1986. The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the US which it found had violated numerous international laws in ignoring the sovereignty of another state and being in breach of multiple human rights laws in arming, funding and training the Contras and its own covert operations in fighting a 'Dirty War' within the protracted Nicaraguan civil war. The ICJ's summing up decided the US had engaged in the "unlawful use of force" (1984) (1986) in its treatment of Nicaragua and to "cease and refrain" (1984) (1986) in doing so, in addition that it must make reparations to the country however the US refused to acknowledge the ruling or pay reparations to Nicaragua.

Chomsky neatly summarizes US self-defined exceptionalism as well as its long track record of ruthless unilateralism imposed globally regardless of what the international community may think in a 2014 interview with *The Nation* Chomsky reflected on this recurrent pattern,

"Control of Latin America – "our little region over here," as Secretary of War Henry Stimson described it [in 1945], when he called for the dismantling of all regional alliances while explaining that our own

must be strengthened – has always been a core principle of US planning. "Successful defiance" of US policies going back to the Monroe Doctrine was one of the primary charges leveled against Castro in internal documents. When Nixon was plotting to overthrow the Allende government, the National Security Council warned that if we cannot control Latin America, how can we expect "to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world": that is, to rule the world effectively. In the past decade, "defiance" has spread through South America, so successfully that not a single US military base is left – even in Colombia, the last holdout, considered secure after huge US aid (keeping to the well-established principle that US aid correlates very closely with severe human rights violations). Hence Central America and the Caribbean gain greater significance. One factor in Obama's support for the coup regime in Honduras, breaking ranks with most of Latin America and even Europe, was probably concern over the Palmerola air base, called the "unsinkable carrier" when it was used for terrorist attacks against Nicaragua. The bases are no longer justified as defense against Kennedy's "monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" dedicated to global rule, but on other grounds: often the "war on drugs," which has little to do with drugs but a lot to do with counterinsurgency and driving campesinos off the land to facilitate mining and other profitable enterprises (something I've seen first-hand in several trips to peasant areas in southern Colombia); at home, it has to do with sequestering mostly African-Americans, a population rendered economically superfluous in the era of financialization and the off-shoring of production. This might be considered our more civilized version of our clients' *limpieza social* [social cleansing]." (2014)

In almost all the countries in Latin America which experienced right-wing dictatorships in the 70s, 80s and 90s which different US Presidents and the CIA helped into or kept in power, these predominantly military regimes had leaderships that were products of the notorious School of the Americas, since re-named the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation but known by the original title it has found all but impossible to shake off.

This survey of US Imperialism in Latin America and Chomsky's Anti-Imperialist critique of it concludes with George Bush's invasion of Panama and removal of former US and CIA asset Manuel Noriega in 1989. Noriega was what could be called an organized crime boss, or 'Don' whose extensive wholesale drug trafficking

matched those of any international cartel, Noriega also went in for wholesale arms trafficking and money laundering but being a general and politician one who consolidated governmental and military power in the early-80s and effectively becoming President heading up a junta over the rest of the decade. However in spite of this, Washington and indeed the CIA considered him a useful asset something Chomsky has offered wry commentary on,

> "The US government continued to value Noriega's services. In May 1986, the Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency praised Noriega for his "vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy." A year later, the Director "welcomed our close association" with Noriega, while Attorney-General Edwin Meese stopped a US Justice Department investigation of Noriega's criminal activities. In August 1987, a Senate resolution condemning Noriega was opposed by Elliott Abrams, the State Department official in charge of US policy in Central America and Panama. And yet, when Noriega was formally indicted in Miami in 1988, all the charges except one were related to activities that took place before 1984 – back when he was our boy, helping with the US war against Nicaragua, stealing elections with US approval and generally serving US interests satisfactorily. It had nothing to do with suddenly discovering that he was a gangster and a drug peddler- that was known all along." (1992c)

The Bush administration had been vocal about the War on Drugs continuing Reagan's previous policy and rhetoric which also continued the mass criminalization and incarceration of African-Americans who received a disproportionately undue number of convictions and overly harsh sentences. The CIA and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had paradoxically used Noriega as an asset in the War on Drugs, despite his having accumulated a vast fortune from cocaine trafficking and distribution.

The Bush administration offered unconvincing justifications for the invasion of Panama in 1989: the standard claims to be protecting US Citizens in the country, as well as 'defending democracy' and, with a straight face, so as to combat drug trafficking. In advance of the invasion as Chomsky noted,

> "Since we could no longer trust Noriega to do our bidding, he had to go. Washington imposed economic sanctions that virtually destroyed the economy, the main burden falling on the poor non-white majority. They too came to hate Noriega, not least because he was responsible for the economic warfare (which was illegal, if anyone cares) that was causing their children to starve." (1992c)

US foreign policy at its worst, what can be broadly defined as Imperialism or a version of Neo-Colonialism, has spanned the whole world: Central America, South America and the Caribbean closest to home, South East Asia in its most remote outposts, but everywhere in between including of course the Middle East but also Africa which cannot be overlooked.

Angola's war of independence from Portugal which spanned 13 years beginning in 1961 began as an anti-Colonial uprising and became a very complex and protracted war against the last remaining European dregs of Empire: what Frantz Fanon called A Dying Colonialism. The Portuguese Colonial War or 'Overseas War', involved Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, and saw the Portuguese determined to defeat anti-Colonial guerrilla campaigns which it was itself eventually defeated by after more than a decade.

The Angolan war of independence subsequently became a bloody civil war involving multiple actors pitched in conflict against one another but primarily fighting against the former Colonial power of Portugal struggling to hang onto its African conquests pre-dating the British and French on the Continent.

US involvement was both covert and overt and ruthless in what it saw as a Cold War test of its mettle. Opposing Angola's membership of the UN as an independent nation, the administration of Gerald Ford supported Jonas Savimbi's conservative anti-communist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the civil war. The Carter administration tried and failed to broker an agreement between Apartheid South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the independence grouping in Namibia and neighboring countries, as independence insurgencies becoming civil wars reached varying levels of intensity in at least seven African states during this time. Meanwhile, the CIA funded, armed and trained mercenaries to fight against the left-wing nationalist and

communist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), as Chomsky noted in 2014, Washington was instrumental in

> "Providing crucial support for Jonas Savimbi's terrorist Unita army in Angola. Washington continued to do so even after Savimbi had been roundly defeated in a carefully monitored free election, and South Africa had withdrawn its support. Savimbi was a "monster whose lust for power had brought appalling misery to his people," in the words of Marrack Goulding, British ambassador to Angola." (2014)

The Reagan Doctrine of 'roll back' which had substantial support from the right-wing fringes of the Republican Party to aid anti-communist insurgents was very much in evidence in Angola and overlapped with the wider cross border Namibian civil war or South African Border War a conflict taking place in a number of African states bordering Apartheid South Africa, to which the US also gave support.

Apartheid was racist white minority rule which was formally in existence by that name in South Africa, and was uniquely oppressive but to all intents and purposes similar systems of white minority rule also existed in what is now Zimbabwe then Rhodesia and also Namibia, then South West Africa. Apartheid as for the Southern African states with their own white supremacist legislatures enforced racist ideology and pseudo-science through segregation and legal, political and economic subjugation of black majorities in all aspects of life: Apartheid was a form of anti-black Colonial fantasy created in 1948 and lasted until the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990.

The right-wing Republican administration of Ronald Reagan unlike virtually every other Western European country in the world did not oppose Apartheid South Africa or treat it as a pariah and disgraced itself by its policy of 'Constructive Engagement' for the first half of the 80s overlapping both Reagan's Presidential terms until it was vetoed by the US Congress in 1986. The intervention of the US Congress against the President was after Reagan blocked attempts by the UN to impose economic sanctions on South Africa which Reagan had vetoed and rejected. The policy was the creation of Reagan's

notoriously reactionary Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker who made disingenuous play of the 'communist influence' of the anti-Apartheid and anti-Colonial independence movements. The fact that Apartheid was a racist system of anti-black subjugation and subordination that had many similarities with segregation-era America and whose details and origins went back to Colonialism and before that Slavery, was ignored for the sake of making an 'ally' of the pariah state because it was 'anti-communist' and was engaged in the Border Wars against the MPLA and other anti-Colonial forces who had support from Cuba as well as to some extent the Soviet Union.

Congress over-rode Reagan's refusal to implement the UN's policy, and vetoing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act which US lawmakers had sought to implement that imposed sanctions on Apartheid South Africa stopping all trade with and aid to the regime. Chomsky reflected on this and Reagan's insipid pandering to Apartheid-era South Africa,

> "The official policy was called "constructive engagement." I recall it during the 1980s, by then there was enormous pressure to end all support for the apartheid government. Congress passed legislation barring trade and aid. The Reagan administration found ways to evade the congressional legislation, and in fact trade with South Africa increased in the latter part of the decade. This is incidentally the period when Collin Powell moved to the position of national security adviser.
>
> The U.S. was strongly supporting the apartheid regime directly and then indirectly through allies. Israel was helping get around the embargo. Rather as in Central America where the clandestine terror made use of other states that served as – that helped the administration get around congressional legislation. In the case of South Africa, just look at the rough figures. In Angola and Mozambique, the neighboring countries, in those countries alone, the South African depredations killed about million- and-a-half people and led to some $60 billion in damage during the period of constructive engagement with U.S. support. It was a horror story." (2004)

As was noted in the shorter first edition entry for Chomsky and Anti-Imperialism, in outlining US realpolik Chomsky makes his point well when he quotes the Reagan State Department's Thomas

Carothers, who freely admitted that Washington would only accept 'limited, top-down forms of democratic change that did not risk upsetting the traditional structures of power with which the United States has long been allied [in] quite undemocratic societies' (ibid.)

What is most important, as Chomsky shows in his indictment of US imperial ambitions, is that US interests, as understood by a thoroughly instrumental 'realist' theory of international relations, should prevail; that is, geo-political hegemony should be sustained at all costs.

Such geo-political hegemony is of course felt presently by the US's application of 'extraordinary rendition' in removing those it suspects of involvement in terrorism to Guantanamo Bay's Camp Delta and Camp X Ray. The absolute legal limbo into which detainees are thrown for many years (being held without charge but subject to all sorts of interrogation methods widely seen as torture, such as 'waterboarding') is one of the favourite weapons wielded by the US, as the world's self-appointed policeman. The fact that the world's only superpower has sought to underwrite that power by recourse to actions condemned by the rest of the world and the UN, not to mention its own internal critics, can be seen, as Chomsky notes, in the following terms:

> "Principles are valid only if they are universal. Reactions would be a bit different, needless to say, if Cuban Special Forces kidnapped the prominent terrorist Luis Posada Carriles in Miami, bringing him to Cuba for interrogation and trial in accordance with Cuban law. Such actions are restricted to rogue states. More accurately, to the one rogue state that is powerful enough to act with impunity: in recent years, to carry out aggression at will, to terrorize large regions of the world with drone attacks, and much else." (2013a)

Chomsky's anti-imperialism does not absolve a much smaller power's own imperial ambitions, since Israel is certainly a power in the Middle East, not just in its apartheid exclusion and subordination of the Palestinians within its own borders, but in bellicose posturing toward other countries in the Middle East, being well aware that it has the unstinting support of the US. The Israeli state exerts contempt toward the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza that it

seemingly believes cannot ever face serious opposition since it has the strength of the US behind it.

It can certainly be contended that the state of Israel has long found it hard to even acknowledge the existence of the Palestinians, finally ceding a limited amount of recognition, but continuing to maintain de facto apartheid with securitised and punitive measures: Israeli 'settler' settlements in the West Bank, the notorious 'wall', ID checks and Israeli military checkpoints, military strikes against civilian homes in pursuit of 'terrorists' and the fact that the Arab population is vastly, and conspicuously unequal economically, politically, and socially. The fact that all of this is in very large part in contravention of international law, and is continuously pointed out as such by the UN and the rest of the international community, is largely ignored by the Israeli state, since whilst Israel sometimes has minor disagreements with the US (variable according to the different incumbent administrations in both countries), the strength of the relationship is never seriously in question, any more than is the country's own use of arbitrary and disproportionate force against its own displaced Arab population. Chomsky has been a tireless critic of Israel and the US's unflinching support for it, as well as the continued non-status of the Palestinians: a 'Fateful Triangle' as he calls it. 'There are in fact two rogue states operating in the region, resorting to aggression and terror and violating international law at will: the United States and its Israeli client' (Chomsky 2013c).

Chomsky maintains that imperialism can be seen primarily in the foreign policy of the US, and largely irrespective of whether the president is Republican or Democrat. Obama's use of drone strikes on Pakistan (ostensibly targeting Islamist fighters, but often involving an extraordinarily high civilian death toll) being a very contemporary example of that.

The fact that imperialism remains something that can only be imposed by a superpower, and there remains only one of those means US imperialism is really without comparison or equal. Its 'client state' of Israel, and former imperialist power the UK, act internationally (and at least in the case of the latter, some if not all of the time) with the supreme imperial might of the US state behind them.

This being *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism, 2nd Edition* this long essay for the entry on Chomsky and Anti-Imperialism could not conclude without arriving in the present of 2020 and the administration of Donald Trump and Chomsky's own critique of this seemingly unreal Presidency.

Trump of course gained the Republican nomination for US President to the surprise of many commentators in an overcrowded field of largely interchangeable and forgettable candidates. The 2016 election was against Hilary Clinton who won the popular vote but lost the election thanks in large part to the arcane Electoral College system and her personal unpopularity with Middle America.

Trump the extremely rich real estate mogul styled his campaign and has done the same as President as being 'against the Washington elite', despite doing everything he can to further the upward transfer of wealth to the rich and super-rich from the majority though tax cuts for the 1% and indeed the 0.1%, the latter of which he is part and cuts to public services and all social programs which benefit the 99% including most of the electoral demographic which voted for him. However, despite all this Donald Trump dismisses all critics as 'fake news' whilst being happy to spread 'fake news' himself, the term having originally been coined to refer to the output of Breitbart News the online right-wing platform Steve Bannon Trump's first White House Chief Strategist helped found which presents its own right-wing and ultra-conservative op-ed pieces with eye-grabbing headlines and in a format so as to appear as if they were factual news items; cynically aware that such propaganda will be seen and believed and crucially, 'shared' on social media.

Trump ignores all Presidential protocol and all niceties observed by his predecessors as well as what is usually expected from a public figure, something else which would do untold and irreparable damage to anyone else, but which plays very well to his fans wearing 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA) baseball caps. Trump's 'America First' crude non-policy of meshing nationalism and Isolationism is well documented by Chomsky, in an interview in a 2019 interview with Truth Out he noted,

"One of the most appropriate comments I've seen on Trump's foreign policy appeared in an article in *The New Republic* written by David Roth, the editor of a sports blog: "The spectacle of expert analysts and thought leaders parsing the actions of a man with no expertise or capacity for analysis is the purest acid satire – but less because of how badly that expert analysis has failed than because of how sincerely misplaced it is . . . there is nothing here to parse, no hidden meanings or tactical elisions or slow-rolled strategic campaign." That seems generally accurate. This is a man, after all, who dismisses the information and analyses of his massive intelligence system in favor of what was said this morning on "Fox and Friends," where everyone tells him how much they love him. With all due skepticism about the quality of intelligence, this is sheer madness considering the stakes." (2019)

Indeed Trump's opportunist populism, the peculiar mix of nationalism and Isolationism in which the reality of cross border cooperation and international agreements are jettisoned for crude and bellicose lowest-common-denominator demagoguery has played well with the far-right and its 're-branded' 'Alt-Right' incarnation, as well as the Christian Right. Ever since the campaign trail of 4 years ago when Trump started talking about 'building the wall' across the southern US border with Mexico, 'immigration' and the supposed ease and harm it does to Americans is constantly talked up and returned to. Facts are irrelevant and can be ignored, or contradicted at will, the words of one of the founders of defunct data harvesting outfit Cambridge Analytica, which worked for Trump during his 2016 Presidential campaign summing up his own thinking "It needn't be true as long as it's believable" (2018). Kellyanne Conway, Senior Counselor to Trump and formerly his Campaign Manager and Republican Party Strategist offered "Alternative facts" when quizzed on what had been emerging from the White House, a new description for what most would call lies.

In the same 2019 interview Chomsky effectively summarizes his critique of Trump,

"Not that there is no coherent policy. There is one policy that emerges from the chaos – the kind we would expect from an egotistical con man who has one principle: Me! It follows that any treaty or agreement reached by predecessors (particularly the despised Obama) is the worst deal in history, which will be replaced by the Greatest Deal in History negotiated by the most accomplished deal-maker of all time and greatest American president.

Similarly, any other action carried out in the past was misguided and harmed America, but will be corrected by the "stable genius" now in charge of defending America from those who are cheating and assaulting it on all sides." (2019)

This expanded 2nd Edition essay for the entry for Chomsky and Anti-Imperialism finishes with coverage of Chomsky's critical commentary on the Trump Presidency and Trump's reactionary populism is crystallized in the slogans 'Make America Great Again' and 'America First': US nationalism combined with US Isolationism, and what could certainly be contended underwrite Imperialism fuelling the vanity of both Trump and US elites in the Military-Industrial Complex in such lowest-common-denominator flag-waving populism, and to re-work the closing words of the shorter first Edition entry for Chomsky and Anti-Imperialism: Anti-imperialism, of course, is the critique of imperial power, of imperialism, and Noam Chomsky remains its foremost practitioner in incising it in our urgent present of 2020.

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Chronic and Fatal Illnesses

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Cinema and Anti-imperialist Resistance

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Definition

Olivier Assayas's seminal film *Après mai* (2011) includes a key moment when the protagonists, students from France travelling to Italy, participate in an open-air screening of revolutionary film-making on China and Latin America. The depiction of the young revolutionaries in early 1970s Florence, gathered around the screen in perfect counter-cultural outfit, endlessly debating the limits between bourgeois and radical film-making and whether cinema can provide the 'revolutionary syntax' for the new rebellious identities, encapsulates the entire meaning of cinema as a vehicle of anti-imperialist resistance at the time.

Introduction

The mass media explosion in the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan's idea of the 'global village', the technological advances in terms of mobile cameras, editing and film-making in general, but also a more politicised audience ready to be seduced by the cinematic stimuli, played a major role in the dissemination of information regarding revolutionary movements, both through fiction and non-fiction films. This short essay will try to identify the most important exponents of this tendency over time.

Historical Context

Revolutionary film-making has its recent origins in Soviet cinema, and in particular in Dziga Vertov's *kinopravda,* Sergei Eisenstein's intellectual montage, and Aleksandr Medvedkin's Kino-Trains. With a passage through the epic realism of the battles of the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese war against Japan – depicted respectively in the propagandistic documentaries *Spanish Earth* (1937) and *The Four Hundred Million* (1938) by legendary Dutch film-maker Joris Ivens, and *L'Espagne vivra* (1939) by renowned photojournalist Henri Cartier Bresson – film was only consolidated as a revolutionary tool in the 1960s. Several film theorists, predominantly André Bazin, promoted the idea of cinema as a way of 'educating' the masses, who, by way of this public entertainment, could acquire a political conscience and be shocked into awareness. Cinema, as a collective experience, was contrary to the passive consumption of television. The debates that typically followed the screening of the movies heightened, at the time, the feeling of direct involvement. By the end of the decade this attitude was reinforced by the democratisation of film-making – facilitated by technological advances through 16 mm production and distribution, which led to the creation of independent films. According to film theorist Amos Vogel, 'apart from the thousands of films produced by students, independent filmmakers, or political film collectives, there also exist[ed] distribution companies controlled by the New Left' (1974, p. 122). In France the so-called 'States General' of cinema (Les *États* Généraux du Cinéma) asked for a total reshaping and restructuring of the film industry. All the above posed questions regarding the necessity of revolutionary cinema, forming the context of the proliferation of film-making as a means of anti-imperialist resistance.

This trend was reinforced in the mid and late 1960s by the parallel rise of the cinema of denunciation and of social concern, which revolutionised cinema-making both in content and in form. A major exponent of this tendency was introduced by Italian film-maker Gillo Pontecorvo's anti-colonial masterpiece *Battle of Algiers* (1966) – arguably one of the most inspirational political films of all times – that led to the consolidation of this new genre: political cinema. Several French films had referred to the Algerian War beforehand – a conflict over the French Empire's last stronghold that started in 1954, eventually resulting in Algerian independence after years of brutal repression by the French authorities and the parallel rise of a strong local resistance movement, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Both Alain Resnais, in his legendary *Night and Fog* (1955) and later with *Muriel* (1963), and Jean-Luc Godard in *Le Petit Soldat* (1963) included references to French atrocities during the war. Considering that it was a taboo at the time to refer directly to the war in a critical way in France, no-one did it as directly as Pontecorvo.

Seminal Cases of Anti-imperialist Resistance

Pontecorvo's film, shot on location, exposed the brutality of colonial violence, especially after the arrival of the French paratroopers under General Mathieu – a thinly disguised reference to General Massu – which escalated into the so-called Battle of the Kasbah, institutionalising to a large extent the use of torture as an interrogation technique. The film depicts in a powerful way the violence on both sides. The director clearly takes sides, without, however, eulogising FLN's indiscriminate bombings against civilians. The film's anti-colonial overtones soon rendered it a standard reference point for liberation movements, like the PLO, and even radical organisations such as the Black Panthers and the IRA. In cinematic terms, *Battle of Algiers* was shot on location, almost right after the actual events, with Saadi Yasef, FLN's number two in command, playing himself. The truthfulness of the depiction made it resemble real newsreel footage. Regardless of how uncompromised the film was politically, it nonetheless made use of devices of mainstream feature films, such as well-known actors, suspense, and Ennio Morricone's unmistakable score. Pontecorvo would continue making

political films touching on difficult subjects, including Portuguese colonialism in *Burn*! – starring Marlon Brando – and the gripping political thriller *Operation Ogre* (1979), starring Gian Maria Volonté, on ETA's assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco in Madrid in 1973. Recent events related to left-wing terrorism in his home country, and in particular the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978, prompted Pontecorvo to reduce his clear pro-ETA stance in the film's controversial ending.

As a contrast to Pontecorvo's pursuit of leftwing politics with popular cinema devices came Jean-Luc Godard, who was becoming increasingly intransigent, denouncing bourgeois aesthetics in film and establishing a collective cinematic process through the Dziga-Vertov group. Godard argued that cinema could not be truly revolutionary unless its radical content was coupled with an equally radical form. In films like *La Chinoise* (1967) and *Sympathy for the Devil* (1968) he challenged the conventions of 'bourgeois' cinema-making, introducing non-linearity, reflexivity, and the cinematic-essay form that also acted as an instrument of propaganda in favour of Maoism, Third-Worldism and against US imperialism in Vietnam. In the *Dziga Vertov Group* that he initiated together with Jean-Pierre Gorin and films such as *Un Film comme les autres* (1968), *British Sounds/See You At Mao* (1969), *Le Vent de l'est* (1969), *Lotte in Italia* (1969) and *Tout Va Bien* (1972) he brought the tendency of rejecting narrative in favour of incorporating political and social critique in the filmic process to the extreme. The ultimate goal was to force the audience out of its comfortable voyeurism to a more active stance and complicity with the subject matter. In the end, the self-awareness, which was the professed goal, was only achieved by small circles of intellectuals and students who had physical and conceptual access to these highly disjointed and cryptic films.

Even more radical were the Argentines Fernando Solanas and Ottavio Getino, who introduced anti-colonial films as 'critical essays' based on purely 'revolutionary' production values. This trend was later labelled 'Third Cinema': a non-commercial militant mode of cinema used as a weapon of political struggle, addressing specific political causes and directly calling on the viewer to take action. This was juxtaposed to first cinema (meaning studio-produced cinema) and second cinema, otherwise called 'auteur' cinema and characterised by formalism, intellectualism, and a leftist perspective, which reflected the director's creative personal vision when expressing a political message.

The most exuberant example of 'Third Cinema' was surely Solanas and Getino's *The Hour of the Furnaces* (1968). The film is a landmark moment in terms of anti-imperialist film-making. It bombards the viewer with super-imposed images of the European and American imperialist control of Argentina's national economy (i.e. through the beef monopoly or the control of the railway system), attempting to construct a condemnation not only of neo-colonialism, but also of the role of the media and information in manipulating the masses. It is also a complete condemnation of British and US neo-colonialism and a defence of Peronism, blended with the class struggle.

It has a complex structure (a more descriptive, a more reflexive and a more interactive part), including inter-titles that reference Frantz Fanon's idea of violence as a cleansing and liberating force for the colonised (Fanon 2007), Guy Debord's perception that the spectator who had been drugged by spectacular images should be awoken, and Jean- Paul Sartre's conclusion that 'the only way the European could make himself man was by fabricating slaves and monsters' (Sartre 2007, p. lviii). At a crucial point in the film, a shot of the eyes of the dead Che Guevara – the famous Christ-like image – dominates the screen with African percussion in the background, implying that his death was an act of liberation. The very title of the movie refers to Guevara's anti-imperialist revolutionary cry: 'Now is the hour of the furnaces. Let them see nothing but flames'.

Solanas and Getino attempted to be as reflexive as possible, by exchanging information with the militant groups with whom they were working. The film became legendary, particularly in the alternative circles in which it was shown, and it found faithful followers – such as the entire

Cinema Novo tendency in Brazil, and in particular Glauber Rocha (*Antonio-das-Mortes*, 1969), Saul Landau and Haskell Wexler (*Brazil: A Report on Torture,* 1971) and others. Indeed, Solanas and Getino had been screening their film, receiving feedback which made them think repeatedly about the relationship between film and revolution, which they eventually included in the film. This helped them draft their manifesto 'Towards a Third Cinema', showing this way that movies could be turned into a revolutionary tool and that culture could be decolonised. Famously, in their manifesto they argue that 'the projector [is] a gun that can shoot 24 frames per second'. Third Cinema was becoming a 'space of counter-imperialist collectivism' (Guneratne and Dissanayake 2003, p. 148).

Vietnam and Chile: Ivens, de Antonio, Alvarez, Guzmán

A prominent place in anti-imperialist cinema was reserved for films that were programmatically against the war that the US was waging in Vietnam. Joris Ivens is one of the most illustrious exponents of this tendency with such films as *The Seventeenth Parallel* (1967) and *The People and Its Guns* (1968) – which he completed after a trip to, and several films on, Maoist China during both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. As 'being there while it takes place' was one of the major issues in anti-imperialist cinema, crude realism became part of this tendency. At the same time, however, Ivens's films offer a romanticised version of the Vietnamese peasants, with a tone of Brechtean didacticism over a plethora of inter-titles (Waugh 1988). This compares well with the cinema of Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin, and in particular their *Letter to Jane* (1972), a highly reflexive treatment of Jane Fonda's anti- Vietnam involvement.

Jerry Snell's *Hearts and Minds* (1974), a documentary including footage from US helicopters bombing Vietnamese villages and *Mickey Mouse in Vietnam* by Lee Savage (1968) – whereby in just 1 min the trigger-happy cartoon volunteers for the war and dies immediately after reaching

Vietnam – are amongst the most interesting exponents of anti-Vietnam War movies. *Year of the Pig* (1969) by Emile De Antonio needs special mention in this category. An American Marxist, De Antonio tried to create an amiable image of Ho Chi Minh, condemning at the same time the French colonial rule of Indochina as blatantly as he could and the American contemporary involvement in Vietnam as a continuation of the same (neo-)colonial heritage. Combining original rare footage from the 1920s and 1930s and Roman Karmen's restaging of the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 with 1960s footage of Vietnamese monks setting themselves ablaze, De Antonio created a dynamic collage that acted as a mighty indictment of Western involvement in South-East Asia.

Another director dealing with that very central conflict was Cuban film-maker Santiago Alvarez. In his film Hanoi, *Tuesday the 13th* (1967), he exposed 'the daily texture of life in Hanoi under bombardment' (Macdonald and Cousins 1996, pp. 291–297). He would later create an extremely influential film tracing Fidel Castro's trip to Salvador Allende's Chile, not long before General Augusto Pinochet's US-backed coup in September 1973 (*De America Soy Hijo U A Ella me Debo* [1971]). Chile and the downfall of Allende's socialist Government became the subject of Chilean director Patricio Guzmán's monumental documentary *The Battle of Chile.* The three parts of the trilogy – *The Insurrection of the Bourgeoisie (1975), The Coup d'Etat (1976), Popular Power (1979)* – chronicle the battle between revolution and counter-revolution in the country and the decisive role of the US in the triumph of the latter.

Between May 1968 and the Colonels' Dictatorship

A film-maker constituting a separate category of his own is Chris Marker – an idiosyncratic case of a director with a solid pedigree of anti-imperialist film-making who made an early appearance in 1955, with Alain Resnais in *Statues Also Die* (1955). This was one of the first films on the

African experience of colonialism, and was censored in France. Marker continued in the same direction with *Cuba Si*! (1961). His masterpiece is, however, *Grin Without a Cat,* offering a panoramic depiction of the 1960s. Linking May 1968 in France to the war in Vietnam, and the anti-war movement in the US to the disintegration of Che Guevara and Fidel's Third-Worldist movement and the bureaucratisation of the Cuban revolution, the film annoyed both sides of the political spectrum for its outspokenness. At the same time, in a gripping 45-min clip, a tie-wearing member of an American 'military training team' that drilled Bolivian soldiers hunting Guevara asks whether it would have been wiser to keep the guerrilla leader alive in order to prevent the myth that was created after his death. Very close to cinéma-vérité, Marker produced through the dynamic montage of his films a 'chorus of voices'. Instead of following the linearity of textbook history, he reinforced the 'fluidity of meaning and emotion' (Sinker and White 2012) in the depiction of historical processes and revolutionary utopias linked to the liberation movements of the second half of the twentieth century.

Very much in Marker's tradition was a major West German anti-imperialist film, *Germany in Autumn* (1978). The film was co-directed by a collective, comprising legendary director Rainer Werner Fassbinder alongside Alf Brustellin, Alexander Kluge, Bernhard Sinkel, and Volker Schlöndorff, who also excelled in political film-making on similar subject matters (e.g., *The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum* [1975]). The film provided a non-linear account of left militancy across time as it linked Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht to the Red Army Faction, offering a strong critique against the presence of US bases and the Federal Republic's pursuit of American-inspired policies.

As far as the connection between 1968 and anti-imperialism is concerned, Guy Debord's *Society of the Spectacle* (1973) structured an anti-imperialist critique within the language and tools of a situationist *détournement* that rejects essentialist images of war and commodity fetishism. One also has to mention William Klein's powerful satire *Mr Freedom* (1969) – on an American action hero who comes to save France from a Communist takeover at around the time of the Parisian évènements – and his documentary *Eldridge Cleaver* (1970) on the political exile to Algeria of one of the leading figures of the Black Panthers in the US. An interesting feature about Klein is the fact that even though he was very close to a tradition of cinema of social concern – he covered the pan-African Festival among other things – he was also a famous fashion photographer, working for *Vogue.* The double, and somehow contradictory, nature of this occupation (*Vogue* by day, Black Panthers by night) bears the strong imprint of the 1960s counter-culture and is reminiscent of the most iconic representation of this very tendency: Michelangelo Antonioni's signature film *Blow-Up* (1966). On the subject of the anti-imperialist action of the Black Panthers, one has to mention Italian film-maker Antonello Branca and his seminal movie on that party from an insider's perspective in *Seize the Time* (1970). The movie is rich with documentary material, giving a nuanced depiction of the racial tensions within the US through a militant organisation that persistently and convincingly presented them as a guise of US imperialism.

Constantin Costa-Gavras's and Elio Petri's rendering of the political film-making mainstream is also worth mentioning. Gavras's *Z* (1969), *State of Siege* (1973), and *The Missing* (1982) condemn the US role in various contexts, such as the Greek pre-dictatorship police violence (1967–74), the CIA's role in Uruguay, and Pinochet's crimes in Chile, while *The Confession* (1970) is a gripping depiction of Stalinist totalitarianism in post-1948 Czechoslovakia. Raoul Coutard – Costa-Gavras's favourite cinematographer – had worked in Indochina, Africa and San Salvador filming battles with a hand-held camera – a fact that gave his cinematographic style a crisp documentary-esque feel. Elio Petri – with a masterful political thriller regarding the repressive state apparatus in *Investigation of a Citizen Above Suspicion* (1970) – shared Gavras's aversion for the purely militant film and the conviction that cinema should be mainstream enough to oblige a wider public to reflect on political issues. Interestingly,

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both Gavras's *Z* and Petri's *Investigation* won Academy Awards in the Best Foreign Language Film category, which attests to their commercial and global impact.

At the opposite pole from *Z*, but always on the issue of the coming of the Greek dictatorship and the dubious role of the American Embassy and secret services in the coup, was *Kierion* by Dimos Theos (1968). This noir film did not have a global impact but acquired cult status, especially after the fall of the Greek Junta, despite (or maybe because of) its minimal production values, filmed in grainy black and white which 'ha[d] the frightening result of audience involvement', as critic Mel Schuster pointed out (1979, p. 132). It is an investigative thriller on the role of US authorities in framing Greek left-wingers and putting away American journalists in the troubled time around the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. *Kierion* is a typical case of *engagé* cinema of the national kind that fed into the creation of an idiosyncratic Greek political film-making by newly appearing directors, involving some of its own extras, such as Pantelis Voulgaris and Theo Angelopoulos. The latter, in particular, created an epic cinema that reflected on real pieces of recent Greek history, whereby foreign imperialist involvement had most of the time tragic results. His claustrophobic and dark *Days of '36* (1972) is a film on the authoritarian state of affairs Greece in the 1930s, clearly commenting on the 1967–74 dictatorship. Angelopoulos's masterpiece *The Traveling Players* (1975) is a non-linear piece of cinematic historiography, whereby the destructive role of the British and the Americans in Greek affairs is laid out poignantly. Similar to Bernardo Bertolucci's monumental *1900* (1976) – in its scope and sympathy for the heroic but defeated left – initiated a tendency for cinematic revisionism of recent historical events.

Anti-imperialist Films from the 'Eastern Bloc'

Last, but not least, one has to mention anti-imperialist cinema originating in socialist countries and the so-called Eastern Bloc. Mikhail Kalatozov's *I Am Cuba* (1964) is a very interesting case of a Soviet-Cuban co-production, with the great Soviet director attempting to recreate the conditions of the Cuban Revolution on screen and in socialist-realist terms, at a time in which de-Stalinisation was the order of the day in his own country. Long takes, mobile framing, and carefully choreographed sequences characterise the film, departing from the nervous editing of early Soviet cinema and aiming to reveal the material conditions of Cuban life and the on-going results of the revolution. The production values were very high – Kalotozov used a team of 200 people – and the result is visually magnificent, but the film instead of acting as a powerful propaganda weapon to spread the Cuban revolution was ignored after its debut. In Havana it was harshly criticised for exoticising the locals, and in Moscow for lack of revolutionary zeal, despite its evident hope in the socialist future. The film had little impact and remained virtually unknown to the public in the West until its triumphant rediscovery in the 1990s by Martin Scorsese and Francis Ford Coppola.

Of equal interest is *Time to Live*, a Soviet-Bulgarian propaganda film that documents the Ninth Annual Communist Youth Festival held in Sofia, Bulgaria in 1968. The film entails a strong anti-Americanism, demonstrated through condemnations of the Vietnam War, and parallel praise of people's solidarity, world peace, and freedom. Czechoslovak and Yugoslav cinema also stand out. Jan Nemec's *Oratorio for Prague* (1968), that documents both the 'opening' in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring and its violent repression, is the only documentary account of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The film *Jan Palach* (1969), filmed and circulated anonymously outside Czechoslovakia, pays homage to the eponymous student who burned himself in Prague's Wenceslas Square in January 1969 in protest against the Soviet occupation. Yugoslav cinema is a further interesting exponent of anti-imperialism in the East: *Želimir Žilnik's June Turmoil* (1968) was an authoritative documentary manifestation of

1968 in the East and an indictment of repressive imperialist tendencies on the part of the ruling Communist elites. *Žilnik's* film documents the unrest in Belgrade in favour of more liberalisation, inspired by the Prague Spring. One would have to add here as well Dušan Makavejev's idiosyncratic films WR: *Mysteries of The Organism* (1971) and *Sweet Movie* (1974), with their parallel critique of both communist and capitalist excesses –typical of radical Yugoslav film-making. Polish director Andrej Wajda and his use of historical parallels – the period of Terror after the French Revolution in *Danton* (1983) – to refer to Stalinism or the 1981 military coup by General Jaruzelsky is also worth mentioning.

Cinema with a distinct anti-imperialist vocation eventually diminished in the 1980s, turning from being a major tendency to a minor and marginal one, despite the fact that some important film-makers such as Ken Loach (*Land and Freedom*, 1995), Raoul Peck (Lumumba, 2000) and Göran Olsson (*The Black Power Mixtape 1967–1975,* 2011), and even mainstream directors such as Michael Moore (*Bowling for Columbine,* 2002) built from its legacy.

Conclusion

This essay is non-exhaustive and far from all-inclusive. Rather, it has suggested a list of the major exponents of anti-imperialist cinema in the twentieth century, both in terms of alternative and mainstream film-making and the cross-overs between the two. It has tried to examine the reciprocal relevance of cinema for history and history for cinema, within the context of so-called 'political' film-making, by focusing on the politically inflected cinema and 'cinema of social concern' of the 1960s and 1970s, mainly – but not exclusively – in Europe and the United States.

Drawing on a range of films, it concludes that the social and political imaginary of these decades and anti-imperialist militancy and action went hand-in-hand with specific films and the radical messages they sought to convey. In this context, we can safely conclude that cinema's anti-imperialist resistance has left a strong imprint in both the history of film and radical politics, especially from the 1960s onwards.

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Civil Rights Movement

▶ Jazz: *Come On and Let's Get Free*

Civilizing Mission

▶ Cricket and Imperialism

Civil-Political Rights

▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism

Clash of Empires 1914–1918

Class

Class and Race Complexities in Understanding Large-Scale Land Deals as New Forms of Imperialism in Zimbabwe

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Synonyms

Class; Imperialism; Land; Race; Southern Africa; Zimbabwe

Definition/Description

The question of land in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa is fraught with conflict throughout the period of European colonization. This essay examines colonization in Zimbabwe from 1890 and its historical implications for the historic conflict over land with Zimbabwe's Black majority population. Land imperialism has remained an enduring conflict from the imperial era, independence, and into the twentieth Century.

Introduction

Zimbabwe has a historical land question, dimensions of which are interesting as a way to understand neo-imperial processes in post-colonial Africa. In this essay, we trace the land question through various epochs, highlighting how the first encounter with colonisation in 1890 has led to the current land situation. Our analysis provides different ways of conceptualising land imperialism from the colonial to the post-colonial periods. In the post-colonial period, we highlight the various land-reform processes that precipitated indigenous forms of imperialism through land occupations and black political capture of land post-2000. We also use large-scale land acquisitions for biofuel production, mining, and agriculture by various foreign and local actors to further unpack the class and race complexities of the land question in Zimbabwe. Post-2000 Africa has seen the emergence of a wave of land acquisitions from old imperial powers and new emerging rich nations in the Gulf, Middle East, and Asia. Experiences of large land deals in Zimbabwe are different from other areas across Africa. In Zimbabwe, most land is owned by the state and the dynamics of land ownership mean that most communities have usufruct rights. Thus, the experiences of small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe (especially those who got land post-Fast Track Land Reform in 2000) are different from other smallholder farmers across the world. The Zimbabwean case illuminates the interplay of complex political and economic forces that intermix to relegate small-scale farmers in the interests of vast biofuel production. The presence of Chinese government and firms offers a new dynamic which reorients our understanding of 'neo-colonial processes' where it is emerging economic powers and not traditional Western ones that are taking the lead in land deals in Zimbabwe. We also reflect on the complexities of the neo-patrimonial state in an obscure environment where the notion of class

and race plays a critical role in who gets what, when, and how in relation to land.

Large-scale land deals are not peculiar to Zimbabwe but rather have become a widespread phenomenon across Africa in the past 10 years. They represent another phase of continued exploitation of Africa's natural resources. This phase, however, has seen the emergence of new actors including China and oil-rich Arab states competing with traditional imperial powers including the US. Large-scale land deals in Zimbabwe have to be understood within a long history of contestation along race and class lines. The large-scale land deals have been fraught with different class interests that have led to the redefining of class in Zimbabwe, with a few black people entering into the wave of reacquisition of large tracts of land at the expense of the other poor blacks (Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014). Post-colonial Zimbabwe is imbued with contradictions concerning its survival as a nation state, and faces racial and class tensions which must be resolved through land-balancing policies that in close analytical modes reveal the different class dynamics that have led to a widening gap between the poor and rich. This has created new class configurations. Moyo and Yeros (2011, p. 7) argue that:

> to clarify the historical trajectory of sovereignty, we must locate it in four forms of modern imperialism, the rise and fall of mercantile capitalism 1500–1800, the rise of industrial and monopoly capitalism 1800–1945 and the recent phase of systemic rivalry between an evolved monopoly capitalism and the planned autonomous modes of accumulation ushered in by socialist revolutions and national liberation struggles 1945–1990. The fourth being the epochal demise of planned autonomous development and the decline of the capitalist system.

It is crucial to understand how the land question in Zimbabwe has been treated during these four phases of imperialist notions of history. However, as our essay gradually unfolds, answers will be unearthed as to whether the large-scale land acquisitions have created an egalitarian society where class interests have been submerged, or rather the national question has re-emerged through the same subjugation of other classes of people at this historical juncture of correcting the

colonial imbalances, becoming an addendum of the Zimbabwean policy-making fraternity when land issues are discussed.

Imperialism and the Land Question in Zimbabwe

An important point to note is that the colonial experience created laws that made the question of land a social justice issue that could be contested in courts but with the whites being privileged to do so. This created animosity that led to Zimbabwe's war and liberation struggle, centred on solving the land question and removing unequal class interest.

Palmer (1990) points out that the failure of the Rhodesian government to solve the land question during the colonial period meant that post-independent Zimbabwe could still effect changes that could end white supremacy over land ownership. Mabaye (2005) traces the land question in Zimbabwe to the Berlin Conference of 1884, where major European powers met to partition Africa amongst themselves. In September 1890, the Pioneer Column made up of 700 English and Boer white colonialist settlers crossed into 'Rhodesia' as they named it after English colonialist Cecil John Rhodes, seizing land and cattle. This led to widespread dispossession of land from black people, as seen, for example, in the creation of the Gwaai and Shangani reserves after the 1893 invasion of the Ndebele Kingdom. By 1914, 3% of the population controlled 75% of the land, while blacks were restricted to a mere 23% of the worst land in designated reserves (Chitsike 2003). The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 stated that white people were reserved 50.8% and black people 30% of total land area, mainly in poor soil areas. The 50,000 white farmers received 49 million acres while the 1.1 million Africans were settled on 29 million acres of Native Reserve Areas. This forced the blacks who had survived on agriculture to become cheap labourers for the farmers on the large settler farms growing tea, coffee, tobacco and cotton. In 1965, the name Native Reserves was changed to Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). Mazingi and Kamidza

(2010) argue that the white settlers explicitly expressed unwillingness throughout history to share the land equally with the blacks, despite the fact that the majority of them had to live and subsist in the communal TTLs. The colonial regime, and indeed the white settlers, had established the TTLs as essentially reserves of cheap black labour. It is in light of this thinking that the 1925 Morris Carter Lands Commission recommended that, the members of the two races should live together side by side with equal rights. As regards the holding of land:

> they were convinced that in practice, probably for generations to come, such a policy is not practicable or in the best interest of the two races, and that until the Native has advanced very much further on the path of civilization, it is better that the points of contact in this respect between the two races should be reduced . . .. (cited in Yudelman 1964, p. 69)

The Commission's recommendations were taken into account in the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. These pieces of legislation provided a platform for land alienation. Mazingi and Kamidza (2010) further point that, under these laws, white settlers seized the best of the land, about 18 million hectares in prime and fertile arable land which is mostly in agro-ecological regions I, II and III, with good rainfall patterns. The worst areas (remote, low-lying, in some cases tsetse fly-ridden, with poor soil, unreliable rainfall and less suitable for meaningful agricultural activities in agro-ecological regions IV and V) were left to black peasant farmers.

Post-independence Land Reforms: Race and Class Dimensions

At independence in 1980, whites (who constituted 3% of the population) controlled 51% of the country's farming land (44% of Zimbabwe's total land area), with about 75% of prime agricultural land under the large-scale commercial farming (LSCF) sector (Weiner et al. 1985). It was hence inaccessible to the black majority. Farms in the LSCF sector ranged between 500 and 2,000 hectares, with most of them located in the better

agro-ecological regions I, II and III. The Communal Areas (CAs), which were home to about 4.3 million blacks constituting 72% of the rural population, had access to only 42% of the land, three-quarters of which was in the poor agro-ecological regions IV and V. In 1980, the new black government was faced with a crippling land question. According to provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement, which ushered in independence, the government could enforce changes in land ownership structure for 10 years. Land policy in the 1980s followed a strictly willing buyer, willing seller policy. The government's plan initially targeted the resettlement of 18,000 households over 5 years; in 1981 the number increased to 54,000 and in 1982 it further escalated to 162,000 to be resettled by 1984 (Palmer 1990, p. 169). Palmer notes, though, that by the end of July 1989 only 52,000 families (around 416,000 people) had been resettled, which translated to only 32% of the 162,000 target. In terms of land transfer, 2,713,725 hectares had been bought for resettlement, which was 16% of the area owned by whites at independence. After the expiry of the 10 years stipulated in the Lancaster House Agreement, the government was free to increase the speed of land reform.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No 11) (Act No 30 of 1990) and Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No 12) (Act No 4 of 1993) allowed for both commercial and unutilised land to be acquired for resettlement with 'fair' compensation being payable in a 'reasonable time' (De Villiers 2003, p. 17). This was a break from the Lancaster House Agreement which called for adequate compensation that had to be paid promptly. Although introducing the new reforms as a means of empowering the poor, 'the ruling elite have made little more than token resettlement of the landless peasant farmers on acquired land' (Makumbe 1999, p. 14). In 1992 the Zimbabwean parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act, authorising the government to buy land compulsorily. Two years later it was revealed that the first farms compulsorily purchased had been allocated to cabinet ministers, top civil servants, and army generals. Thus, land reform remained frustratingly slow. De Villiers

(2003, p. 18) notes that, by the government's own statistics, of the 162,000 families that needed to be resettled by 1995, only 60,000 had been resettled on 3.4 million hectares. Reasons for the snail-paced nature of land reform are multiple and complex but include government's lack of will, funding, corruption, and class biases that increasingly favoured black business people rather than peasants. While the Land Acquisition Act 1992 seemingly marked a break from the market-based land reform programme, the structural adjustment programme implemented in Zimbabwe ensured the continuation of and further support for large-scale white commercial agriculture. Zimbabwe officially embarked on structural adjustment in October 2001. Since 1980, the World Bank has been Zimbabwe's largest donor and has thus been able to exert critical pressure on government policies (Goebel 2005, p. 16). The process of adjustment (backed by the World Bank) meant the withdrawal of state interest in land redistribution issues as neo-liberal policies which promoted commercial agriculture took root (Gibbon 1995).

Native Imperialism? *Jambanja* and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

In 1997 there was an attempt by the state to acquire over 1,471 commercial farms (Marongwe 2008, p. 124). These farms were designated for acquisition by government, but were later reduced to 841 in number following the de-listing of over 400. Most of the remaining farms were removed from the designation list after owners appealed to the courts: government failed to respond to the appeals within the legally defined period and it subsequently discontinued the process. This, coupled with lack of funding, led to serious frustrations over the pace of land reform among the landless, especially veterans of the armed struggle. Britain began reneging on its 'responsibilities' for land reform. For example, Claire Short (then Labour Government secretary of state), in a letter to Kumbirai Kangai (then Zimbabwe's minister of agriculture) in 1997 distanced the British government from the land issue in Zimbabwe. Part of the letter read:

I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new Government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonised not colonisers. (quoted in Matondi 2007, p. 12)

The British government was not willing to fund any accelerated land reform programme and felt that it had no obligations to Zimbabwe. The Blair Government in fact claimed that it did not feel duty-bound to the agreements and obligations at Lancaster House; in the same vein, the Zimbabwean government was under no obligation to follow these agreements. In the face of this rebuttal, forced land takeovers without compensation became a viable policy option.

In 1998 the Zimbabwean government unveiled the Land Reform and Resettlement Phase II Programme (Matondi 2008, p. 18). Its objectives were spelt out as follows: acquire 5 million hectares from the LSCF sector for redistribution; resettle 91,000 families and youths graduating from agricultural colleges and others with demonstrable experience in agriculture in a gender-sensitive manner. A 1998 Donor's Conference in Harare saw the government making an effort to speed up land reform through democratic means. Some 48 major countries (including Britain, the US and South Africa) as well as donor organisations such as the United Nations, African Union, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, attended. But Masiiwa (2005, p. 218) notes that donor unwillingness to fund land reform in Zimbabwe was underscored at the Harare conference. Here, government unveiled a US$1.9 billion (about ZW$42 billion) fund for its Phase II land reform programme. To the disappointment of the Zimbabwean government, the donors only pledged about ZW$7,339 million, just a drop in the ocean. By early 2000, Zimbabwe was facing an unprecedented social and economic crisis. The deteriorating economic situation adversely impacted on the pace of land reform. The food riots in 1998 were the beginning of open protest against the ZANU-PF establishment in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The economy was severely compromised by the costs of the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and war veterans'

pay-outs in the late 1990s also took their toll. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions took the lead as a conglomeration of civil-society organisations challenging the ruling hegemony. The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 was the first real threat to ZANU-PF's political hegemony in Zimbabwe. The rejection of the draft constitution in February 2000 was a precursor to the land occupations in Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2001, a period popularly known as *jambanja* (chaos) due to the violent nature of the process.

Post-2000, land has remained an emotive issue in Zimbabwe. The government then took over the occupation by instituting the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The former 5,000 or so white farm owners owning 29% of Zimbabwe's land area were reduced in number to 400, now owning approximately 1% of the land. By 2008 there were a total of 145,000 farm households in A1 schemes and around 16,500 further households occupying A2 plots. There are many debates that centre on the fast track land reform programme that occurred in Zimbabwe from 2000. Two categories of academic simulation exist with regards to the debate on native imperialism and its importance in understanding the land issue in Zimbabwe. Revolutionary scholars argue that the spontaneity of the land question was prime because the liberation struggle centred on reclaiming lost land. The occupation of white commercial farms was inevitable as the blacks had to be accommodated in land spaces. They advocate that the fast track land reform was the best that could be attained in those circumstances (Hanlon et al. 2013; Moyo and Yeros 2007, 2011; Moyo and Chambati 2013). Evolutionary scholars argue that the land issue could have been dealt with systematically and following clear-cut policy-making processes that would have led to a sustainable land reform programme (Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2011; Zikhali 2008).

Academic debates in Zimbabwe as outlined above are polarised and tend to be pro- or anti-ZANU-PF. This creates a false debate that essentially turns political and is detrimental to any in-depth understanding of the complex character of land reform. In trying to grapple with the realities of the fast track programme in Zimbabwe, Derman (2006, p. 2) poses the following questions:

> How will fast track land reform be understood? Are Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (2005) correct that there has been a land occupier's social movement that portends, if handled correctly, a national democratic revolution? Will Zimbabwe serve as the warning bell for South Africa to rapidly achieve its own land reform ...? Can it be successfully argued that the land reform has been so fundamentally flawed and unjust that it should be undone or is it the case that no matter how unjust, it will become the new starting point for all new policies and programmes? Or has the mishandling of land reform in Zimbabwe made further land and agrarian transformation more difficult?

In trying to unravel the native imperialism question, we can point to Marongwe's (2008) thesis which specifically addresses who benefited from the land reform in Goromonzi District near Harare. He concludes that the political and social processes governing land allocation created particular classes of beneficiaries whose qualifying characteristics were divorced from agriculture in terms of farming experience, and commitment and skills possessed. Sadomba (2008, p. 168) reveals that war veterans presented a corruption document at a Mashonaland West Provincial Stakeholder Dialogue meeting in 2004, accusing ZANU-PF officials of 'changing farms willy-nilly', leasing farms to former white farmers, and 'deliberately ignoring the mandatory twenty percent allocations for war veterans'. Selby (2006, p. 40) remarks that, in Matabeleland, land allocations among key ruling party and security elites were also strategically decided. For example, many A2 farms are along the course of the proposed Zambezi pipeline project. The spoils of 'fast track' have gone disproportionately to members and supporters of the regime. Virtually every senior party official, army officer, police chief or Central Intelligence Organisation officer has secured an A2 farm or part of an A2 farm. The war veteran leaders have similarly benefited from A2 farms, along with key individuals in the judiciary, the Church and state media houses.

Erlich (2011, p. 2), citing the two studies by Moyo et al. (2009) and Scoones et al. (2010),

concludes that (contrary to popular belief) land reform in Zimbabwe benefited ordinary Zimbabweans. He denies the prevalent reports claiming that fast track land reform was a 'land grab' by 'cronies' bringing about a more unequal distribution of land than what had preceded it. The surveys conducted by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (Moyo et al. 2009) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) (Scoones et al. 2010) found that most beneficiaries of land reform are 'common' people, whereas those who might be categorised as 'elites' constitute a small minority. According to the IDS study, this minority amounted to less than 5%. Hanlon et al. (2013) show that in what has constituted the single largest land reform in Africa, 6,000 white farmers have been replaced by 245,000 Zimbabwean farmers, primarily ordinary poor people who have become more productive as a result. Scoones et al. (2010, p. 77) note that 'impressive investments have been made [by farmers] in clearing the land, in livestock, in equipment, in transport and in housing'. Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe has thus provided livelihood opportunities for many ordinary people who are now highly productive on the farms in spite of various structural challenges such as the lack of financing. The experiences of these farmers are, however, varied, and thus it is erroneous and simplistic to attempt to provide a singular picture of what life on fast track farms entails.

Neo-imperialism and Land Acquisitions in Africa

The huge interest in 'land grabbing' discourse in Africa has sparked fierce debates over foreign ownership of resources on the continent. This is, however, a continuation of historical processes (from colonisation, the resurgence of the political and economic national question, to the rise of multinational companies) where resources in Africa have been controlled by foreign interests. This new wave of foreign ownership is just another phase in a long process of exploitation of Africa by foreigners. Africa's land and resources are not new to exploitation. Various

historical epochs of foreign (mainly white) accumulators have for centuries scourged the continent to finance their own profligate lifestyles. The Berlin Conference in 1884 marked the zenith of this scramble as powerful men sat around a table and shared Africa like a piece of cloth. Olusuga and Erichsen (2010, p. 394) would have us believe that:

> It is a common misconception that the Berlin Conference simply 'divvied up' the African continent between the European powers. In fact, all the foreign ministers who assembled in Bismarck's Berlin villa had agreed was in which regions of Africa each European power had the right to 'pursue' the legal ownership of land, free from interference by any other. The land itself remained the legal property of Africans.

The current discourse of land grabbing is specifically couched in language which claims that Africans remain owners of their land, yet the reality on the ground of communities fenced out and barred from their livelihoods tells a different story. European colonisation of Africa left in its wake a brutal legacy of land and resource conflicts, land litigation, loss of peoples' control over land and natural resources, exposition to alien land tenure systems and natural resources management. In the new dispensation, a neo-colonial agenda driven by transnational companies, oil and cash-rich countries, and Western nations provides a marque era in which African political elites are willing participants in exchange for money. This new era sees the emergence of new players apart from the traditional white accumulators. Cash-rich nations such as China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and some Gulf States are pursuing food-security strategies that seek to secure control of millions of hectares of fertile lands in target nations in the South, most particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Globalisation and neo-liberalism have ably assisted this process, championing liberalisation of land markets and promotion of foreign direct investments. What is clear is that farm grabs and subsequent dispossession of land from people are promoting processes of depeasantisation as opposed to peas-antisation processes. As land increasingly becomes commoditised, we see a

transition from rural communities characterised by large numbers of peasants to a situation that is increasingly based on expansion of corporate capital-intensive production. Peasants are forced into wage employment or to migrate to urban centres for survival. Yet in Zimbabwe post-2000, re-peasantization has been occurring through the radical redistributive programme of fast-track land reform (Moyo and Yeros 2005). People are returning to settle on the land, and rely on farming as an important source of livelihood (Mutopo et al. 2014). Liberti (2013) argues that there is effectively the global 'proletarianisation' of farm labourers. Using evidence from Brazil, he notes:

> I study the old man, the extended family around him, their lifeless expressions, their miserable cultivations, and can't help thinking that theirs is a lost cause. The prevailing model is all around them: the vast plantations. They have no part to play in this model, apart from providing labour as day workers, an agricultural proletariat who no longer control their means of production. Defeat is certain and there is no appeal: this old man and his group are residuals of a world that is bound to disappear. Extensive plantation is modernity, and it will brush them away. (146)

Poulton (2014), however, argues that this is fatalistic as land grabs are driven by an uneven, distorted, and new crisis-laden era of global capital which is subject to twists and turns. What we cannot escape, however, is that local communities have largely been displaced and excluded from their land.

Ferrando (2012) makes the distinction between 'public grabbing' and 'private grabbing'. Private grabbing comprises private sales of land at market price which are not common given that in most African states land is owned by the state and can only be leased to individuals or companies. In public grabbing, the land at the centre of the deal is considered by the host state as 'public or national' on the basis of its own legal order, or is expropriated on the basis of a declaration of 'public interest' or 'public necessity'. Thus, sovereign nations have the right to decide and determine legal and illegal occupation, used and unused land, available and not available land, and of determining who has the right to see his/her property title formalized. For example, in Ethiopia the

Federal Government has according to the constitution provided for a sovereign prerogative to expropriate and resettle people after having identified and declared the existence of a public purpose (Ferrando 2012). They have used this to expropriate 100,000 hectares leased by the Federal Government to Karuturi Global Ltd. Constitutional provisions giving the state power of land are problematic when the state turns into a predator. The predatory nature of the state in Africa has meant peasants and vulnerable groups are at the mercy of various forces without protection from elected officials. These land deals are just another occurrence in a long list of ways the state in Africa has become imperial and turned on its own people. Ferrando (2012) concludes:

> Extending what Erik Hobsbawn had already affirmed in the '50s of the last century about public interest, we can thus conclude that in many circumstances sovereign prerogatives are 'no more than the forces of profit-pursuing private enterprise' which seek 'to turn land into a commodity', 'to pass this land into the ownership of a class of men impelled by reason; i.e. enlightened self-interest and profit', and 'to transform the great mass of the rural population into freely mobile wage-workers'.

Nation states are thus intertwined with global capital to further dispossess citizens of land. The global mechanism of land deals forms a complex web of partnerships and ownership without geography. The relationships between investors, lenders, bankers, and multinational companies are boundless and difficult to define in physical space. To illustrate this, Cotula (2012, p. 659) notes:

> . . . the nationality of the land acquirer does not fully represent the geography of the interests at stake. A large Libyan deal in Mali reportedly involved contracting out construction work to a Chinese company, for example. Similarly, South African consulting engineers have been involved with contracts to build sugar mills and ethanol plants in different parts of Africa (Hall 2011). And some European or North American farmland investments in Africa involve leveraging agricultural know-how from Brazilian expertise (OECD 2010) . . . several biofuels companies active in Africa are listed on London's AIM – which is 'the London Stock Exchange's international market for smaller growing companies' (AIM 2011); but capital invested in these companies may originate from all over the

world. So different geographies of interests may be involved in a single investment project.

Land dealers across Africa are thus involved in complex relationships of global capital which provide a new era of imperialism based on transaction and not Western powers' military might. Imperial imperatives are negotiated within boardrooms and local elites are closely involved in selling away people's livelihoods.

Contextualising Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Zimbabwe as a Neo-imperial Process

In this essay we avoid a situation of universalising attractive concepts such as 'land grabbing' which might not provide detailed understanding of the peculiar situation in Zimbabwe. Matondi (2011) has referred to the 'wacky politics of biofuel', yet in this wackiness is a clear pattern of accumulation propped by a neo-liberal ethos. Chiweshe (2013), however, argues that the Zimbabwean case is unique in its context, organisation, and ultimate goals. Firstly, it goes against the tide of government policy of promoting smallholder farming. Secondly, whilst the mode of displacement was cruel towards households, they complain more about the lack of consultation and alternative resettlement or compensation. For example, in Chisumbanje farmers acknowledge they had always known the land belonged to the government but the company and government could have offered alternative land for resettlement. At Nuanetsi Ranch, Scoones et al. (2010) described 'illegal settlers' who were not recognised by the government. Thirdly, most of the final products were meant for local consumption. Mujere and Dombo (2011) further highlight how Nuanetsi became a target for acquisition because it was defined as 'idle' land, yet families lived and worked there. They noted:

> Governments usually identify what they call 'idle lands' which they then parcel out to private investors. For example in Zimbabwe one of the arguments in support of the Nuanetsi Bio fuels project has been that the area is arid and for a long time there has been little production on the Ranch. The

land is therefore viewed as 'marginal' or underutilized in order to justify the displacement of people and biofuel production. The biofuel project is therefore projected to turn the hitherto arid area into a green belt thereby turning a formerly 'idle land' into productive land. (7)

This fits well into the overly used belief that there is vast unused land in Africa which can be turned into viable large-scale commercial products.

As we continue to understand the workings of international capital and its linkages with national capitalists, there is a need for a contextualised analysis which does not jump on the bandwagon. We require better research approaches that bring out clearly how government is implicit and complicit in whole communities losing access to resources. Such theorising should also begin to focus on agency amongst local communities and understand how they have responded to losing access to their land. Borrowed concepts will be useful up to a point but they may hide nuances of social networks, organisation and relationships that have been born out of these land deals. Analysis should go further to understanding the kind of communities that are emerging in areas affected by land deals. We need to ask about gendered relations, household dynamics; what type of productive and economic markets and relationships are informally emergent? Such an analysis needs to be rooted in rigorous fieldwork that takes into account the knowledge and experiences of people at the grass-roots level. We need to interrogate how valuable 'land grabbing' is as a conceptual tool to understanding large-scale land deals. This is not to deny 'grabbing' per se but to situate this grabbing within a specific socio-historical context. Not all grabbing and grabbers. Motives and implications of land grabbing differ, and, thus, there is a need for a context-specific analysis that provides in-depth insights into how local processes feed into the agreements over land.

Chiweshe (2013) highlights that the land deals in Nuanetsi and Chisumbanje are confusing given the drive towards small-scale production through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme post-2000. He argues:

In Zimbabwe there remains no clear land policy to guide land administration. Large scale land deals provide an example of *ad* hoc land administration. There is no clarity how these two large investments fit into the wider context of land reform which supports small holder commercial agriculture. Are these two the beginning of a much wider speculative era of land acquisitions or are they anomalies which have no bearing on the future land policy? It is difficult to understand how the promotion of foreign funded large scale agriculture fits into the anti-colonization rhetoric of the 2000s. The deals signal a clear warning of how small holder and communal farmers' claims to land remain fragile. The state retains ownership of land, having the deciding power to influence and affect people's claims to land. (69)

The table below provides a comparison of the positive and negative impacts of Zimbabwe's two recent large-scale land deals. It highlights the purported positive impacts of large-scale land deals have for rural communities, including employment, investments, and access to support for smallholder farmers.

Neo-imperialists: Unmasking the Politics of Race and Class in Zimbabwe's Land Deals

Billy Rateunbach, Themba Mliswa and ZANU-PF Cronies

The role of Billy Rateunbach in Zimbabwe's land deals remains murky and controversial. His story represents an interesting example of how race, class, and politics Comparison of Nuanetsi and Chisumbanje

Nuanetsi Ranch	Chisumbanje
Positive impacts of Naunetsi bio-diesel project on local communities	*Positive impacts on Chisumbanje communities*
i. Employment opportunities The sub-activities done within the project area, besides biofuels production, include crocodile farming, cattle ranching, and gamekeeping. These activities have provided employment opportunities for some members of the local communities. For instance, in 2010, it was reported that the crocodile department alone had already created more than 2,000 jobs. *ii. Potential exports?* Preliminary estimates suggests that once fully operational, Nuanetsi ethanol plant will produce about 500 million litres per year, far more than what the Zimbabwean market is able to consume, making it another ideal export product for the country to benefit from.	*i. In-kind compensation* Whilst the local communities, especially farmers were not involved from the start, the company running the project at Chisumbanje has tried to involve and compensate the farmers meaningfully. For example, Macdom Investment Pvt Ltd did set aside portions of land for smallholder farmers to engage in horticulture projects to compensate for their losses. The company also provides the farmers with irrigation services and gives them logistical support. Furthermore, some farmers are also contracted by the company to grow sugar cane which they sell to the company.
Negative impacts of Naunetsi bio-diesel proiect on local communities	*Negative impacts on Chisumbanje communities*
i. Eviction of farmers Although the project's activities (which include dam building, sugar mills and irrigation) are being discussed, all involving significant displacement of people (including perhaps up to 6,000 households from Nuanetsi), what is currently known is that soldiers and police were (in February 200 g) given authority to evict a large number of farmers on Naunetsi ranch so that the project could take off. Some farmers however continued resisting their evictions.	*i. Loss of farming land* Some local farmers had been using the now taken land as fields for their annual cropping in which they planted a variety of crops including maize, millet, sorghum etc. for their survival and livelihood. However, following the agreement between Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) and the private company, the land was no longer available to these farmers. As such, they did lose their farming land.
ii. Boundary conflicts The project has also caused serious boundary conflicts between the traditional leaders of the areas involved. It is believed that Chief Chitanga (who is also Chivi/Mwenezi senator and supports the project) is campaigning for the removal of people under	*ii. Displacement of households* A number of smallholder farmers who had been using the land, especially on a permanent basis, decided to settle permanently on some parts of the estate. Following the launch of the project, these local farmers were asked to

Nuanetsi Ranch	Chisumbanje
the jurisdiction of Chief Mpapa. This has caused serious resistance from Chief Mpapa and his people and which has resulted in a lot of violence as the farmers try to keep what they have.	leave to pave the way for the ethanol project.
iii. Destruction of livelihoods The evictions of farmers in the area have destroyed the livelihood of most local farmers who lost the fields in which they used to plant both cash crops and food crops for their income generating and subsistence consumption	*iii. Increased poverty* As reported by one newspaper, 'Thousands of families are wallowing in abject poverty after their displacement from their communal lands to pave way for a bio-fuel project by the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) and Macdom Pvt Ltd outside the knowledge of local leadership'. The displacement of local community households has pushed some of them into poverty as they lost their means of viable survival.

Source: Makochekamwa (2012, p. 16)

intertwine to produce a land-administrative system in which certain factions of the state can become imperial at the expense of poor people's livelihoods. The emerging large-scale land deals in Zimbabwe, including mining, all seem to be linked to Rateunbach who appears to enjoy huge political favour. This is interesting given his race and the anti-whites rhetoric publicly espoused by ZANU-PF. The excerpt below provides a brief description of Rateunbach and his relationship to Zimbabwe's political elite:

Muller Conrad 'Billy' Rautenbach, born on September 23 1959, is a controversial Zimbabwean businessman who has parlayed his closeness to the Zanu-PF government into a personal fortune and an aura of untouchability – despite being a fugitive for a decade. Rautenbach fled South Africa shortly after the then Investigating Directorate for Serious Economic Offences launched a raid in November 1999 on his Wheels of Africa (WOA) Group, which included Hyundai Motor Distributors …. Camec was key to his ongoing relationship with the Zimbabwean government. The company, through its purchase of Lefevre (an opaque British Virgin Islands company thought to be controlled by Rautenbach), got access to two platinum concessions in Zimbabwe that had been wrested away from their original owner, a division of Anglo Platinum by the Zimbabwe government. In return Camec granted Lefevre a US$100-million loan 'to meet its obligations to the Zimbabwean government' – at a time, in April 2008, when the Mugabe regime was desperately short of cash. (Sole 2009: http://mg.co.za/article/2009-11-20-rautenbachs-fast-and-furious-ride-to-riches)

He is the face of large-scale land deals in Zimbabwe with vast influence on the political processes of natural-resource governance in the country. In 2014, his political connections were further exposed when ZANU-PF Mashonaland West chairperson and member of parliament, Themba Mliswa demanded US$165 million as facilitation fees for introducing Rautenbach to key political figures who facilitated his land and mining acquisitions. The extract below outlines the story, showing how political corruption fuelled large-scale land deals:

Zanu-PF Mashonaland West provincial chair and Hurungwe West legislator Temba Mliswa yesterday said the ruling party's secretary for administration and Minister of State in the Office of the President, Didymus Mutasa, facilitated an out-of-court settlement for him in a US$165 million plus dispute with Mr Conrad 'Billy' Rautenbach. The dispute stemmed from money Mliswa said he was owed for facilitating Mr Rautenbach's interests in Hwange Colliery, Unki Platinum Mine and the Chisumbanje ethanol plant. Mliswa said some of the deals guaranteed him shareholding in the projects … At a Press conference in Harare yesterday, Mliswa reiterated that Arda board chair and former Zanu-PF Manicaland provincial chairperson Basil Nyabadza – and other unnamed politicians – were in the deals. He claimed Mr Rautenbach bought Nyabadza a house in Mutare and gave 'brown envelopes' to several politicians whose names he said he would soon reveal to oil his deals claiming Mr Rautenbach, who he described as Zimbabwe's biggest land owner, owned the Government. Nyabadza yesterday said he was contemplating legal action against Mliswa over the allegation. Mliswa said his multimillion-dollar deals with Mr Rautenbach were entirely verbal and there was no paperwork to confirm them. The politician demanded at least US$i65 million from Mr Rautenbach as facilitation fees and shareholding in the three projects after linking him to several senior politicians pursuant to landing the contracts … On Nyabadza, Mliswa said: 'Basil Nyabadza benefited

with a house in Mutare. You can call him and ask where he got the house from. His companies are not doing well. Billy Rautenbach bought a house for him, no wonder he has become a spokesperson for Billy when you talk about Green Fuel. (Maoodza 2014: http://www.herald.co.zw/165m-saga-temba-mliswa-digs-in/)

International Financing Behind Rautenbach

Further analysis of Billy Rautenbach and the various investment vehicles he represents provides a complex picture of shady international deals that further complicate the true nature of actors in the Zimbabwean land sector. One report from a business news outlet highlights the intricate and complex nature of ownership and control. Simpson and Westbrook (2014) highlight the role of Wall Street hedge-fund firms in Zimbabwe's complex political picture, and allege that they have provided financing to ZANU-PF in exchange for mineral and land rights:

> ... a Wall Street consortium provided the $100 million for the dictator's government. These millions secured the rights to mine platinum, among the most valuable of minerals, from central Zimbabwe. Several firms were involved in the investment, including BlackRock (BLK), GLG Partners, and Credit Suisse (CS). The most vital player was Och-Ziff Capital Management (OZM), the largest publicly traded hedge fund on Wall Street. (http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-21/mugabes-bailout-och-ziff-investment-linked-to-zimbabwe-despot)

Och-Ziff is owned by American Daniel Och and it has an estimated US$45.7 billion in assets. The company is claimed to have had a stake in Central African Mining & Exploration Co (Camec), listed on the AIM exchange in London. Och-Ziff provided 75% of the US$150 million used by Camec to purchase a stake in platinum mines in a joint deal with the Zimbabwe Mineral Development Corporation. Billy Rautenbach is a shareholder in Camec and was involved in buying cars used by ZANU-PF before the 2008 elections. Och-Ziff later sold its stake in Camec, but what is interesting for us is this complex of ownership linked to Billy Rautenbach and how it relates to questions of sovereignty and neo-imperialism. Political elites and international capital are finding areas of convergence and it is the poor masses in Africa that suffer. Frantz Fanon (2002) offers a definitive statement of the economic and psychological degradation inflicted by the imperial powers on their colonies. This is the reason why, according to Fanon, the African state and its apparatus have in some instances become the worst institutions of colonialism rather than agents of development. The wave of large-scale land acquisitions being orchestrated by African governments and foreign capital provide further evidence to support this thesis.

Chinese Angle: Growing Threat to Rural Livelihoods?

Post-2000, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on a Look East policy which saw China emerging as the trading partner of choice. It centred on renewed, broader engagement with China and other Asian countries, which President Mugabe said could be an alternative economic co-operation partner to the West, which Zimbabwe had lost. He argued that 'In most recent times, as the West started being hostile to us, we deliberately declared a Look East policy ... We have turned east where the sun rises, and given our backs to the west, where it sets' (Maroodza 2011). Trade between Zimbabwe and China has increased significantly in recent years, from ZW$760 million in 1997 to ZW$6.9 billion in 2000 (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2004, p. 4). This move coincided with increased Chinese investments across Africa. Liberti (2013, p. 23) notes that 'The war for influence (and market control) between China and the western powers that is being fought throughout the continent, especially in those countries that produce raw materials, unquestionably strengthens the hand of many African governments'. This is especially true for Zimbabwe, given the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries after 2000. Whilst

China has seemingly concentrated on resource extraction rather than land grabbing in Africa, the Zimbabwean case shows an increased interest in agricultural land. In this section of the essay we highlight how this increased Chinese presence in Zimbabwe impacts on access and control over land. Chinese investments in agriculture highlight an emerging trend in land deals, which include direct ownership, lease agreements, and contract farming. The news report below highlights how the Chinese are taking over land which had been given to black farmers under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme:

> The Zimbabwean government has signed a deal with the Chinese government which will mostly affect farmers on previously white-owned land in the Mashonaland East province. Reports indicate that under this so-called 'twinning programme' between Zimbabwe and China, affected farmers will sign a 25-year-renewable contract with their Chinese partners. In return the Chinese will give them money to help them develop farming operations on their remaining farmland, and also buy the crops they produce. Some of these investors – reportedly from China's Hubei Province – are already on some of the targeted properties, according to dispossessed white Zimbabwean farmer Ben Freeth. (Farmer's Weekly 2011: http://farmersweekly.co.za/article.aspx?id=6466&h=Zimbabwe-Chinaland-dealupsetsdispossessedfarmers)

The Chinese have also adopted another model of land access based on government-to-government agreements over contract farming. In Zimbabwe the Tian Ze Tobacco Company represents the China National Tobacco Company. It came into being in 2005 following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Zimbabwean and Chinese governments. Its core business is tobacco contract farming, purchasing (from auction floors and contract farmers), processing and exporting to the Chinese market (Nyamayaro 2012). These contracts ensure the Chinese have unlimited access to tobacco without actually owning the land or being directly involved in agriculture. All this points to an increased Chinese interest in agricultural land which opens the way to new forms of unequal relationships in land between locals and powerful nations.

Accumulation by Dispossession

Large-scale land deals have to be understood within the historical processes of accumulation. There is a growing wave of capitalists who are manoeuvring to exploit the world's looming food and fuel crises. They defy geographical categorisation and come from varied nationalities. Their form of capitalism can best be described as accumulation by dispossession. Local elites are part of this class of accumulators where land has become an important resource. As the poor riot over shortages in places like Senegal and Bangladesh, investors are racing to corner the market on the world's dwindling farmland. Farmers in Mwenezi and Chisumbanje are being divorced from their means of production in a process Marx described as primitive accumulation. He defined primitive accumulation as:

> The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage labourers. (Marx 1977/1867, p. 85)

De Angelis (2004) has noted that primitive accumulation is not so much a historical event as a continuous process by which the institutions that protect society from the market are dismantled. Corson and McDonald (2012) highlight the commodification of spaces and processes hitherto outside the 'circuits of capital', including new forms of nature, and the role of institutions in creating the conditions for global capital accumulation through 'extra-economic' means of dispossession. Accumulation by dispossession is an alternative to Marx's primitive accumulation. For Harvey (2005), accumulation by dispossession is a politically driven process which occurs simultaneously with capital accumulation. It works in a variety of ways from the subtle commodification of once communal property to outright theft. Large-scale land acquisitions are part of processes of commodification, privatisation and suppression of rights, appropriation of assets, and the creation

of institutions to enable these processes. As people are dispossessed from their land it creates a reserve of unemployed labour without any source of livelihood other than wage labour. At a grand-scale large-scale land deals are characterised by people being robbed outright of their livelihoods.

The Zimbabwean case highlights the complex nature of understanding who these accumulators are. Billy Rautenbach's presence is ominous in both Mwenezi and Chisumbanje land deals. In Chisumbanje, his company owns Macdom (part of the investment team); whilst in Mwenezi, DTZ has denied that he owns any shares, noting only that he has interests in projects that develop Zimbabwe. Rautenbach is a multi-millionaire Zimbabwean businessman with close links to ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. In Africa most deals on land require links to the government. Which is why political elites are intrinsically involved. These elites form part of a national bourgeoisie who have used political power to amass wealth, some of it through corrupt means. Elite capture is not a new process in post-colonial Africa. The workings of international capital and local power interests in creating enclaves of accumulation are well documented. Large-scale land acquisition is part of a historical process that has seen local livelihoods being mortgaged for the benefit of the rich and powerful. The environmental costs of such accumulation are borne by communities that remain long after the companies, plants, and factories have left. Dispossession is also spiritual and emotional. Land is an important spiritual asset for local people. It is the link to their ancestors and its value is intrinsic to how they define themselves. The dispossession is thus both physical and metaphysical.

Conclusion

In this essay we have investigated the phenomenon of large-scale land deals, and how they ought to be understood within the processes of historical accumulation and dispossession. We examined how the colonial vestiges in Zimbabwe

throughout history have also been assimilated into the post-colonial state with the post-colonial state also perpetuating the dispossession of communities in Chisumbanje and Mwenezi. Our case study material reveals the complexities that result when large-scale land deals unfold and communities lose land to elites. These elites are continuously involved in the process of land accumulation, in a politically charged environment where issues to do with flexi crops and the political, symbolic, and economic importance of land in a post-colonial state are coming to the fore. We have also investigated how notions of race and class have contributed to the problematic nature of the large-scale land deals in Zimbabwe, with the less powerful black classes under threat of losing land to the powerful political and economic elites. We further suggest the need for policy alternatives that meet the needs of rural populations without undermining their citizenship engagement when large-scale land deals are organised even by the so-called black-led governments.

Cross-References

▶ Agrarian Labor and Peasantry in the Global South
▶ Agriculture, Underdevelopment, and Imperialism
▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Debt crisis in Africa and Imperialism
▶ Food and Imperialism
▶ Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa

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Classical History

▶ Rome and Imperialism

Client State

▶ Korea and Imperialism

Climate Change

▶ Conservation as Economic Imperialism

Coalition of Radical Left (Syriza)

▶ Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

Cold War

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According to popular Western understanding, the Cold War was a political, geopolitical, and ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism, pitting the advanced capitalist economies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan, led by the USA, against the Communist Soviet Union and allied Eastern Bloc. It began after the Second World War and turned nuclear when the Soviets acquired atomic weapons in 1949. Though the prospect of nuclear Armageddon prompted mass movements against nuclear weapons, and though the world came very close to it at least once, there was no nuclear war: deterrence worked.

The Cold War was conducted with armed alliances. On the model of its 1947 Rio Pact with most Latin American countries, the USA sought to encircle the Communist Bloc with the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its west, bases in Japan and the 1954 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) to its east, while the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) to cover the Communist Bloc's southern underbelly failed. The Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact with Eastern European Communist countries and less durable alliances with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and later North Korea and North Vietnam.

When not blaming the Cold War on Communist aggression, the popular Western interpretation equalizes the two sides morally. Cold War antagonisms and propaganda were used for internal political control and repression on both sides. Both sides were also imperialist: if the USA and the West were continuing capitalist imperialism disguised by rhetoric of freedom and democracy, the USSR was also imperialist toward its own constituent republics and eastern satellites, smothering their national identities, and toward countries further afield in which it intervened. The competition of both sides for the allegiance of the newly independent countries of the Third World was rejected by most of them and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of countries rejecting both coercive options emerged.

The Cold War ended when Communist Party rule ended in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the USSR in 1991. Capitalism had won, proving communism was economically and militarily too weak and domestically too illegitimate. The Soviet Union did not live to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Henceforth, the world would become unipolar under US leadership with capitalist liberal democracy becoming the telos of human history (Fukuyama 1989) and would enjoy a "peace dividend."

Practically every element of this popular understanding is questionable: what the Cold War was, when and why it began and ended, who it was directed against, what its domestic and international effects were, whether the two sides were equally to blame, and how the two sides related to the newly independent Third World; the list could go on. In what follows, we seek to provide a more accurate view in which the West turns out to be the greater, if not the sole, aggressor. We begin by locating the Cold War in the geopolitical economy (Desai 2013, 2015) of the capitalist world. Here the Cold War appears as a particularly intensely contested phase in the long-term decline of capitalist imperialism. While historical accuracy alone would necessitate the reinterpretation we propose, recent developments have made it urgent. Neither of the two main expectations engendered by the so-called end of the so-called Cold War have been fulfilled; the world has become multipolar rather than unipolar, with Western capitalist societies failing to remain economic or political models, if they ever were, and, rather than a peace dividend, the level of Western military aggression, from Afghanistan to Iraq, Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela, has been so great as to give rise to talk of a "New Cold War" (Desai et al. 2016).

Of course, the popular Western understanding was contested by the Communist side. That

interpretation, however, remains to be recovered in full, and our own understanding relies chiefly on critical Western scholarship. Western scholarly interpretations of the Cold War have been through four phases. In the first, orthodox, phase, work such as John Gaddis's (1972) stressed Stalinist and Communist aggressiveness and the West's defensive posture. The Vietnam War inaugurated a second phase, when the USA's aggressiveness (and ineffectiveness) could no longer be denied and critical revisionist historians, led by Gabriel Kolko (1969) and Walter LaFeber (1971), questioned the very notion of a Cold War, attributing pervasive international tensions and conflicts to long traditions of US imperialism whose peculiar long-term historical dynamics Williams (1972) laid bare. This interpretation not only agreed with the Soviet interpretation, it prevented a return, in the third phase, to the old blame game. Instead third phase mainstream scholarship was reduced to serving US and Western imperialist interests by stressing complexity and mutual misunderstanding (White 2000).

Since the demise of the Eastern Bloc, the underlying continuities of the Cold War with declining US and Western imperialism have asserted themselves, and many invoke a New Cold War (van der Pijl 2018; Woodward 2017), complete with mushrooming Russophobia. In this final phase, Western interpretations have returned to orthodoxy, blaming Putin and the Russians to justify Western aggression one-sidedly: "only purported 'minuses' reckon in the vilifying, or anti-cult of Putin. Many are substantially uninformed, based on highly selective, or unverified, sources, and motivated by political grievances" (Cohen 2018, 5). These phases of interpretation roughly correspond to those of the Cold War, and we discuss them after the following outline of the geopolitical economy of the Cold War.

The Cold War in the Geopolitical Economy of Capitalism

Critical revisionists, Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, found the Cold War an "egregious term" that "burdens one's comprehension of the postwar era with oversimplifications and evokes the wrong questions," focusing only on "the formal cold peace between Russia and the United States" and occluding the "conflict, war, repression and ever-mounting violence" of "the revolution, the counterrevolution, and the great, often violent, interaction between the United States, its European allies and the vast social and economic transformation in the Third World" (Kolko and Kolko 1972, 6). In effect, the Cold War was hot in the Third World. Official estimates, understated thanks to the Cold War and Eurocentrism, put its toll at 10 million lives compared to the 80 million toll of the Second World War, the world's most lethal conflict.

Cold War conflict in the Third World was not due to rivalry between the two camps: it was more one-sided. For the USA, "the Cold War has been a history of world-wide subversion, aggression and state terrorism" (Chomsky 1992, 21–22) against the Third World (Chomsky 1992, 28) to "block indigenous nationalist forces that might try to use their own resources in conflict with US interests" (Chomsky 1992, 54). Contrary to the popular view of the USA as "anti-imperialist" "reluctant hegemon," already in the early twentieth century, as US capitalism became more concentrated, corporate, and aware of declining British power, it aspired to replace Britain as the "managing segment of the world economy" (Parrini 1969, 13), thus joining the mainstream of Western imperialism.

While the Cold War was certainly an ideological contest between capitalism and communism, and US and Western hostility to communism was certainly unrelenting, it was the tip of the larger iceberg of long-standing imperial opposition to other economies transforming themselves "in ways that reduce their willingness and ability to complement the industrial economies of the West" (Chomsky 1992, 27). The Cold War was essentially motivated by a common imperialist opposition to essentially defensive resistance to Western economic penetration, whether by dint of economic nationalism or communism. If this is not widely known, it is because "[t]hough the principled opposition to independent Third World nationalism is spelled out emphatically in the

[US] internal planning record and illustrated in practice with much consistency, it does not satisfy doctrinal requirements and is therefore unfit to enter public discourse." So it is assumed, on the contrary, that the USA supports nationalism and self-determination (Chomsky 1992, 58) and that communism was a graveyard of nationalities.

Though "Red Scares" conjured out of these threats justified the transformation of the USA's already swollen arms production into its infamous post-war military-industrial complex, contrary to Western perceptions of an inherently expansionist USSR which had to be rolled back or, more "realistically," as George Kennan's 1946 "X article" recommended, contained, the Soviet posture was far more modest. Not only was Lenin's original internationalism replaced by Stalin's socialism in one country, just how far a poor, agrarian, and weak revolutionary regime under siege by powerful capitalist powers could have translated internationalism into effective support for revolution elsewhere can be questioned. This changed, of course, once Stalin successfully industrialized Russia. It could now aid the new socialist countries in Eastern Europe, China, and the People's Republic of Korea. However, even then, its foreign policy remained cautious and defensive. In keeping with the Yalta and Potsdam agreements on spheres of influence with the West, the USSR urged restraint on the strong Communist parties in France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and (initially) China, confining itself to defending itself and its satellites with "tanks in East Berlin, Budapest and Prague and other coercive measures in the regions liberated by the Red Army from the Nazis" (Chomsky 1992, 20–21). Khrushchev's 1959 initiative on Cuba heralded more support for socialist regimes and "targets of US subversion and attack," and the US debacle in Vietnam emboldened it further. Now "[m]aterial support helped these enemies [of the US] to survive, and relations with the Soviet Union imposed limits on US actions, for fear of a superpower conflict" (Chomsky 1992, 27). Nevertheless, the USSR repeatedly called for peaceful coexistence.

In reality, the Cold War was a phase in the dialectical evolution of the geopolitical economy of capitalism in which its advanced core has sought to force open the rest of the world as outlets form its commodities and capital and access their cheap food and raw materials and parts of it resisted (Desai 2013; Patnaik and Patnaik 2016). Critical understandings, stretching back to Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List as well as to Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes (Desai 2013, 29–53), recognize that, thanks to its contradictions, particularly the paucity of demand and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, capitalism is inherently expansive, seeking outlets for excess commodities and capital and cheap sources of food and raw materials. Free market and free trade ideologies only justify industrially superior nations' subordination of weaker nations in *complementary* relationships where the former produce higher value industrial products and the latter produce lower value goods, typically agricultural goods and later cheaper manufactures. Economic nationalists going back to Hamilton and List rejected this fate for their respective countries, recommending industrialization behind protectionist walls to keep out cheap goods and reserve markets for national industries. Their aim was transforming national productive structures to achieve *similarity* with the most advanced countries instead (Desai 2013, 2015). Indeed, no successful industrializer has industrialized in any other way, not even the first, Britain (Chang 2002; Amsden 2007).

As new powers industrialized to challenge British initial industrial supremacy, there was now competition for markets, investment outlets and cheap sources of food and raw materials. Since the world still contained many stateless territories or weak states, this spurred imperial competition for colonies intended to serve as agricultural complements. This industrial and imperial competition, which culminated in the First World War (Hobsbawm 1989), critically foreshadowed the Cold War and its "hotness" in the Third World. War between industrial powers was costly; just how, they found out after 'sleepwalking' into the First World War (Clark 2013) and then into an umbilically linked second with which it formed a single 30 Years' Crisis of 1914–1945 (Mayer 1981). The preferred terrain for competitive capitalist expansionism has

always been what became the Third World, and there violent confrontation, whether between capitalist powers or between them and native forces of resistance, were common (Stavrianos 1981 is perhaps the best chronicle of this process).

A long, slow but inexorable unravelling of imperialism set in following its 1914 high noon. The 30 Years' Crisis profoundly destabilized the imperial order. Not only did it open and close with the Russian and Chinese revolutions and not only did they point to a radically different path to socialism that had been envisaged by the Second International, one that led through struggles against imperial as well as class domination, thus expanding the fronts of opposition to capitalism, three other developments transformed the manner in which the imperial quest for complementary subordination would now be conducted. Nationalisms in the colonial world crested, boosted by resentments against wars' exactions and privations as well as the difficulties caused by the Great Depression which did not leave the colonial world untouched (Rothermund 1996). They sought independence to pursue autonomous economic development.

Secondly, the rise of communism transformed the prospects for these nationalisms. Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points of January 1918 were less about Wilson's alleged "idealism" and more about countering the stunning popularity of the November 1917 Bolshevik publication of Tsarist secret treaties and their Peace Decree (Mayer 1959, 265). While echoing Bolshevik opposition to imperial conquest, Wilson's support for national liberation was confined to Europe, while the Bolsheviks endorsed the liberation of all Europe's colonies. Although limited, Soviet and Communist support for the Third World and its struggle for development tilted the balance against imperialism.

Finally, the hitherto warring capitalist world now united under US leadership: war had devastated its capitalist rivals faced with the further economic diminution of decolonization while boosting US growth to many times levels seen before or since. The USA was uniquely qualified to lead in this new phase. Having arrived at overseas imperialism late, only after completing its

internal colonization (Stedman-Jones 1970), and never acquiring sizeable territory, the USA developed early the arts of subjugating formally independent countries under the Monroe Doctrine (Grandin 2006). This international personality lay at the root of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*: for all its rhetorical support for national self-determination, the USA never learned to accept that some countries might choose to exercise it to refuse US trade and investment. Wars were inevitable, whether through aggressive US actions or defensive actions by the target country or both (Williams 1972). Under US leadership, the West remained hostile to communism: it had fought the fledgling Bolshevik Revolution for half a decade, and while US hostility abated somewhat under Roosevelt (1932–1944), Truman revived and even turbo-charged it.

After 1945, imperialist complementary subordination had to be accomplished against additional barriers: vast territories and populations had already been withdrawn from such subordination by the Russian and Chinese revolutions; newly independent countries were pledged to break out of it after decades and sometimes centuries of colonialism through autonomous industrialization; and the Communist world could and often did aid this effort. After all, the USSR had not only demonstrated its possibilities, its autonomous industrialization had proved (as Gatrell and Harrison 1993 showed) critical to the allied victory in the Second World War. This was why the Non-Aligned Movement, though theoretically equidistant from the two Cold War camps, was practically closer to the Communist world.

Just as the Cold War was not merely against communism, it was not confined to the military and the geopolitical: its political and geopolitical economy meant that, though members of the United Nations with the USSR one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Communist countries stayed out of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which they rightly regarded as Western instruments of capitalist penetration. Indeed, the Russian Revolution sharpened the contest between the Western imperialism and Third

World resistance. If the former became more systematic, conscious, and entrenched (Chomsky 1992, 37), the latter also began to acquire a new consciousness, unity, and determination. Moreover, the postwar posture of the USA also had its unique political and geopolitical economy dimension. Bereft of colonies of any size, only wars had historically provided the USA with the essential external stimuli that every developed capitalism needs. The US leadership was very aware of this, timing entry in both world wars to benefit fully from their economic stimuli to the USA as a supplier of war material (Desai 2013, 74–6, 84–7, 2018).

At Bretton Woods, the USA parleyed its war-wrought dominance to foist the dollar on the world as its de facto currency and fashioned the World Bank, IMF, and GATT into instruments for blocking autonomous industrialization (per Block 1977, even in recovering Western Europe). US trade and investment in Europe and the Third World sought to extend markets, production, and raw materials access. While this is not news, what is clear in retrospect is how limited US and Western success was. As Western Europe erected trade barriers, US corporations were forced into foreign direct investment (FDI) to overcome them (Gilpin 1975). The USA and the West also failed to stop more and more countries from embarking on development projects. Their success may have been limited, particularly in relation to ambitions, but it laid the basis for twenty-first-century multipolarity, the shift in the world economy's center of gravity away from capitalism's homelands for the first time in its history, and a "New Cold War" has appeared to cast doubts on whether the old one ever ended.

The continuity of the Cold War with this longer history of the apogee and continuing decline of imperialism since 1914 does not merely confuse the matter of whether it ever ended or merely transmuted itself into a "New Cold War." It also makes it difficult to pinpoint its start. After the "bizarre and temporary alliance of liberal capitalism and communism" (Hobsbawm 1994, 6) saved the world from fascism, when did the Cold War actually begin? With the confrontations over Greece in 1948 and the announcement of the Marshall Plan? With Kennan's "Long Telegram" recommending containment of the USSR? With Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in early 1946? Or even earlier at Potsdam where, with the cessation of European hostilities, Truman informed Stalin that the USA had the atomic bomb and then demonstrated its horrific power on Hiroshima and Nagasaki a week later? Or did it start already with the Polish crisis which broke out immediately after Truman became president (Mukhina 2006)? These questions arise only because, in fact, no sooner had the prospect of victory appeared than the USA went back to considering the USSR, as Warren Harding put it "a menace that must be destroyed," a "beast" that had to be "slain" (quoted in Chomsky 1992, 37). George Orwell had first used the term "Cold War" in 1945 to deplore the undeclared war already erupting between recent allies, if only to characteristically pox both houses by predicting that if both sides acquired nuclear weapons, the ensuing stalemate would rob "the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt" and that "[u]nable to conquer one another' the opposed sides were 'likely to continue ruling the world between them" (Orwell 1945; Westad 2010, 3).

The sort of reinterpretation of the Cold War that is necessary should now be clear. We hope to flesh it out in the following discussion of its major phases and key elements.

The Phases of Cold War

The roughly half century of the so-called Cold War divides into three stages. Between 1945 and 1959, the opposed camps solidified. The Cuban Revolution in 1959 opened a new phase which continued to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and its immediate aftermath, a phase characterized by increasing conflict between the West and the Third World. It was marked by intense class and international conflicts that shook the foundations of the postwar order in the West and by rifts that also emerged in the socialist camp. The last phase began about 1980 when the Western position appeared to strengthen; the reform process in the USSR spun out of control, restoring capitalism in

Eastern Europe and the USSR by 1991; and the Third World was laid low by the notorious IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs following its debt crisis.

1945–1959: The Solidification of Opposed Camps

In retrospect, the momentous atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be taken to mark the opening of the Cold War. Unnecessary as it was to win the Pacific War, it was a warning to the Soviet Union and the world in general: Secretary of War, Henry Stimson's diaries "clearly showed that before the atomic bomb had been tested, American leaders had begun to calculate that the new force might greatly strengthen their hand against their wartime ally, the Soviet Union" (Alparovitz 1985, 5).

Beginnings in the Middle East and the Balkans

By early 1946, the USSR's refusal to join the Bretton Woods institutions had already prompted Kennan's Long Telegram, whose "realist" policy accepted that Soviet power could not be "rolled back," only contained. Soon thereafter, Churchill had delivered his famous Iron Curtain speech. From here on, the lines of conflict cracked apart more and more of the world.

In the Middle East, the USA sought to displace British influence with its own and ended up confronting the USSR in 1946. It posed as the defender of Iranian sovereignty (Hasanli 2006). Its backing for Turkey against Soviet attempts to secure access to the Black Sea (İnanç and Yilmaz 2012) led to the American Sixth Fleet being on permanent station in the Mediterranean (Khalidi 2009). The following year, it intervened to defeat a Communist insurgency in Greece (Jones 1989). When Israel was founded in 1948, the USA acquired a permanent beachhead in the region though at the cost of provoking the radical Arab nationalism (Shavit and Winter 2016) that overthrew landlord monarchies in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria and looked to the charismatic army officer Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo for leadership (Batatu 1984).

The USA did all in its power to block such nationalist projects. In 1953, the CIA subverted a popular attempt to take over the Iranian oil fields and topple the Shah. The landing of American marines in 1958 frustrated the ambitions of the majority Shiite and Arab nationalists in Lebanon. The CIA then contributed to overthrowing the communist-backed Qasim regime in Iraq in 1964. Meanwhile Israel's defeat of Egypt in 1956 and again in 1967 tied Israel more closely to the USA and set back Arab radical nationalist forces, allowing anti-imperialist feeling to be channeled toward Islamic fundamentalism (Lesch and Haas 2018).

The Soviet response to this US aggression was muted. While Soviet economic and military support enabled Nasser to seize the Suez Canal from British and French investors (1956) in a spectacular move, the Soviets did not back communists in Greece, which they considered part of the British sphere of influence (Roberts and Suri 2011). For Marshall Tito, however, the Greek uprising was an integral part of the wider Balkan revolution, and he led Yugoslavia out of the Soviet camp, rejecting Stalin's control and continuing to aid the Greek rebels, thus embarking on a new foreign policy of nonalignment and experimenting with workers control (Vucinich 1982).

The Yugoslav secession and the announcement of the Marshall Plan, which proved attractive to some in Eastern Europe, threatened the Soviet sphere of influence there and provoked the Stalinization of the People's Democracies beginning with Czechoslovakia (February 1948). Communist parties now monopolized political life, and economic planning became more centralized, while purges, censorship, secret police surveillance, and severe labor discipline became pervasive. While such methods industrialized these hitherto mostly agricultural economies rapidly, they also provoked workers' revolts in East Germany (1953) and most spectacularly in Hungary (1956) and Poland (1956). Soviet troops were used in Germany and Hungary, but in Poland the new popular Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka armed the workers against a threatened Soviet intervention. Of course, repression was no monopoly of communists. The USA and its European and Japanese allies brutally repressed the extreme left and

reinforced authoritarian structures in occupied Japan and West Germany.

Nowhere was the intertwining of the political and geopolitical economy of the Cold War with its military dimensions clearer than in the case of the Marshall Plan, launched in the wake of the Greek crisis by means of a manufactured "Red Scare" to get Congressional approval. Much lauded for making European recovery possible, it was in reality unimportant to it. Instead, it served as an export credit for dumping surplus US production on Europe (Desai 2013, 96–99; Lens 2003, 349; Kolko and Kolko 1972, 359–61) and as a political weapon promoting the economic integration of Western Europe, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and the founding of the NATO alliance in 1949. Western economic integration and rearmament in turn led to the establishment of the Comecon in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955.

The East Asian Theater

The 1949 Chinese Revolution surprised the USSR but stunned the USA. "Losing China" infuriated the China Lobby, invested in Chiang and banking on the victory of his nationalists. Now the stage was set for the Korean War between the USSR- and PRC-backed People's Republic and the American-backed Republic of Korea in 1950. Starting as a civil war, it turned into a contest between the USA and the PRC for control over East Asia, committing the USA to the defense and expansion of capitalist East Asia. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's, decision to intervene, while undoubtedly motivated by anti-communism, was also part of his "great crescent strategy" linking northeast Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, "South Korea was . . . essential to Japan's industrial revival" (Cumings 2010, 24–5). While the Korean War ended in a stalemate that divided the peninsula by 1953, it made the USA more willing to back France in Indochina, beginning its involvement there.

Africa and Southern Asia

British and French colonialism also faced challenges in Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and, more spectacularly, Algeria, while Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal challenged the British and French power more fundamentally (Smith 2008). The 50 or so states of sub-Saharan Africa, mostly under British and French rule, began their march to independence beginning with Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana (1955) and Sekou Touré's Guinea (1958). The USA was ambivalent. While decolonization opened up markets and investment opportunities for US business, national liberation movements' drive for economic autonomy and friendship with the Soviet Union was threatening. Unsurprisingly, the USA supported countries willing to open themselves up to its business and military interests, such as the Philippines, which remained under US military and economic control after independence. While it could hardly oppose Indian independence, the USA rejected her neutralist foreign policy. It backed the nationalist Achmed Sukarno against Communist rivals (1949) but not other nationalists it deemed to be under Soviet influence. It eliminated radical nationalists: Patrice Lumumba of the Congo (1961) was assassinated and Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran (1953) and Abdul Karim Qasim in Iraq (1964) overthrown due to their Communist associations. It also backed the French and British drives to repress Communist anti-colonial movements in Malaysia and Vietnam.

Bandung

Meanwhile the Third World made its formal debut on the world stage at the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Its leading figures, Indonesia's Sukarno, India's Nehru, Egypt's Nasser, and Ghana's Nkrumah, as well as China's Zhou and Vietnam's Ho, expressed concern about the laggardly pace of decolonization in Africa, about Cold War tensions diverting the Third World's scarce resources to military purposes and about continued Western domination, what Soekarno called colonialism in "modern dress" with its "economic" and "intellectual" control which needed to be replaced by what Zhou Enlai called "complete independence" (Kahin 1956 44, 53). The Third World's leftward tilt was in evidence as the conference supported an isolated China amid rising USA-China tensions

and drew her out of its US-led isolation just as the Sino-Soviet split was beginning to widen (Kahin 1956, 15). China's five principles of "peaceful coexistence" – nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence – embodied in the recent Sino-Indian "Panchsheel Treaty", founded a distinct Third World perspective on international affairs, underlining sovereign equality against the universalism that camouflaged the West's imperial intentions and actions.

The Sino-Soviet Split

Before any anti-imperialist alliance between the Third World and the Communist world could solidify, however, differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties began emerging. Khrushchev did not consult Mao before giving his secret 1956 speech denouncing the Stalin cult of personality, exacerbating their personal animosity. There were other problems too: the USSR refused to back China in its dispute with Taiwan and the USA (1958); it demanded a naval base on Chinese territory; it rejected Chinese requests for help with its nuclear program. Within China, economic difficulties following the Great Leap Forward divided Mao from Chinese moderates who Mao likened to the current Soviet leadership, both capitalist roaders seeking peaceful coexistence with the West rather than supporting revolution and anti-imperialism. While the Sino-Soviet split was complex, this political tension was arguably fundamental (Mingjiang 2012).

For his part, Khrushchev pursued détente and peaceful coexistence to avoid nuclear conflict, departing sharply from Stalin's Cold War reversion to the Leninist view that war and antagonism were essential to capitalism and the USSR had to guard against it. However, though he negotiated the neutralization of Austria and sought a unified and neutral Germany, Khrushchev was more aggressive than Stalin in supporting national Third World liberation movements. Soviet aid to Third World nationalist and Communist movements under Stalin had been limited by the postwar balance of forces and demarcation of spheres of influence. Khrushchev not only continued the long-standing Soviet connection to the

South African anti-apartheid movement, as the 1950s wore on, he covertly backed Lumumba in Congo and Arbenz in Guatemala and ventured into an economic and military alliance with Nasser in Egypt. Indeed, under pressure from the increasingly critical Chinese, Khrushchev even challenged Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis.

1959–1981: The Cold War Peaks – The Cuban and Vietnamese Revolutions

The 1959 Cuban Revolution and the 1961 Soviet-Cuban alliance opened the second phase of the Cold War which would end with the USA's humiliating defeat in Vietnam and its aftermath. In this phase, an assertive Third World, aided by the USSR, successfully challenged American dominance even in its own "backyard," Latin America (Hough 1986), revealing how far US and Western abilities fell short of their ambitions.

More broadly, the Third World followed up Bandung and the successes, greater as well as lesser, of national development plans with a fairly coherent international front. It was institutionalized, inter alia, in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and, to cap it all, the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which explicitly recognized the opposition between Western demands for openness and the need for protection in Third World development (Murphy 1984). Such Third World assertion was compounded by, and related to, the onset of the "Long Downturn" in the West (Brenner 1998). At least one major authoritative account (Patnaik 1996), emphasizes the central role of rising commodity, particularly oil prices in the economic troubles of the 1970s, which also exacerbated differences within the capitalist world.

By the 1970s, the USA had to close gold window as the dollar came under more and more pressure from European allies opposed to inflationary Vietnam War spending. Currency and trade volatility followed; stagflation plagued capitalist economies, while the Third World industrialized with practically free capital and the USSR provided limited but still substantial support for

these developments. Amid defeat in Vietnam, US and Western influence stood at their historical nadir, and a veritable "global fracture" in the world economy (Hudson 1973) was witnessed.

The Cuban Revolution

The USA had exercised informal control over Latin America since the Spanish American War of 1895–1898 (Grandin 2006). Though occupying only Puerto Rico and Cuba, it used armed intervention at least 25 times in the Caribbean and Central America to secure its interests (Smith 2005, 50–75). However, this control was not without its difficulties. By 1929 the USA was the leading foreign investor in Latin America, supporting landlordism and military dictatorship. However, the economic hardship of the Great Depression caused political turmoil in 11 of the 20 Latin American republics. In El Salvador (1932), Cuba (1934), and Nicaragua (1927–1934), there was revolutionary violence (Gould 2010, 88–120). Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil installed populist regimes, coalitions of bourgeois nationalists, organized workers, and peasants, which directed national economic development and redistribution to suppress class conflict through national solidarity. They naturally restricted American corporations' activities (Conniff 2012). While Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy refrained from direct intervention, the USA remained wary of populist attempts, for example, to nationalize Mexican oil, or of cautious steps toward land reform in Guatemala.

Postwar, populism remained influential. Brazil's President Getulio Dornelles Vargas (1950–1954) and Argentina's Juan Peron (1946–1954) challenged resurgent American dominance (Bethell 2008; Turner and Miguens 1983) and the power of domestic landlords and capitalists, introducing social welfare and labor legislation and accelerating industrialization. Eventually, however, the combined forces of the USA and the dominant landed and merchant oligarchies forced them out of power. In this it was helped by the 1947 anti-Communist Rio Pact, into which it had corralled most Latin American republics. It considered an attack on one member

as an attack on all. Nearly all Latin America was caught in the US dragnet of counterrevolution. In Bolivia, partial land reform and stepped-up American military aid contained revolution in 1952 (Zunes 2001, 33–49). In Guatemala, the CIA overthrew the Arbenz government when it nationalized the United Fruit Company's plantations (Gleijeses 1991).

Though US control over Latin America appeared all but complete as the 1950s drew to a close, an unease lingered. There was widespread resentment at US domination and the resulting grinding poverty of the overwhelming majority. In an emblematic event, a crowd, angered by US support for the recently ousted military regime of General Pérez Jiménez (1952–1958) and US control over the all-important petroleum industry (McPherson 2003, 9–29), violently assaulted Vice President Nixon's motorcade during his 1958 visit to Caracas, Venezuela. The Cuban Revolution (1959) erupted out of these conditions and raised socialist and anti-imperialist revolutionary hopes throughout Latin America among intellectuals, students, workers, and peasants. Their dominance threatened domestic elites, and the USA intensified its efforts to suppress Communists and radical nationalists (McKelvey 2018).

US political and economic domination of Cuba had led to political instability and recurrent dictatorship. Cuba produced tobacco, coffee, and nickel but depended chiefly on sugar production and export to the USA. In the 1950s, as the Cuban economy stagnated, miring its largely rural population in poverty, Fidel Castro came to lead the Cuban Revolution against the US-backed dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Alongside the Argentinian revolutionary, Ernesto Che Guevara, Castro created guerrilla units among sympathetic poor tenant farmers of the mountains of Eastern Cuba (Huberman and Sweezy 1968). As they scored successes against Cuban regular forces, peasants, trade unionists, and other liberal, Communist and socialist opponents of the Batista dictatorship swelled rebel ranks. By late 1958 Castro had routed the Cuban army, the whole island was in upheaval with revolutionary general strikes, and the guerrillas advanced toward Havana. At the beginning of January 1959, Batista fled, having

looted the national treasury, the USA failed to find an alternative and Castro entered Havana in triumph (Cushion 2016).

Since the revolutionary middle class was small, Castro's radical current easily seized the initiative and put its stamp on the revolution with the land reform of May 1959, dispossessing the Cuban landed elite and US sugar companies (Paz 2011, 25, 7387). The USA was furious and, as early as December 1959, US President Eisenhower, flushed with success in Guatemala, ordered the CIA to prepare for an invasion and launched a campaign of sabotage to soften up Cuba's economy and defenses. With a force of 1500 Cuban exiles at friendly bases in Nicaragua and Guatemala, the CIA launched the invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1960 under President Kennedy. It was easily defeated by the local militia and the Cuban regular army (Jones 2008).

The USSR had already offered economic aid, agreeing to purchase most of Cuba's vital sugar exports at advantageous prices, and it now agreed to defend Cuba from an expected second US invasion by installing short- and medium-range nuclear missiles on the island, a move that would also reverse the strategic nuclear imbalance favoring the USA and reinforce Soviet revolutionary credentials in the face of Chinese criticism. The clandestine installation of Soviet missiles precipitated the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. It brought the world closer to all-out nuclear war than any moment before or since and was averted only because Kennedy stopped at imposing a naval quarantine of Soviet arms. This allowed Khrushchev to stall the merchant fleet carrying more missiles mid-ocean and agree to withdraw Soviet missiles and nuclear weapons in return for US undertakings not to attack Cuba and dismount intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Turkey and Northern Italy (Allyn et al. 1992).

The Cuban Revolution threatened the USA seriously by setting an example of socialist revolution and assertion of national sovereignty for the rest of Latin America chafing under American imperialism (Petras and Zeitlin 1968). Conditions there were not significantly different from those in pre-revolutionary Cuba. Seventy to ninety percent of Latin America's still largely rural population had no land. Monoculture, unbalanced economic development, and dependence on imports and foreign capital characterized most Latin American economies. Foreign, especially, US capital dominated key sectors like banking, mining, and petroleum. US companies were increasingly involved in new consumer industries like automobiles and pharmaceuticals. When the Cuban Revolution erupted, the $8 billion in direct American investment in Latin America represented a substantial percentage of total American foreign investment.

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Latin America

The Cuban Revolution boosted US anti-revolutionary resolve which peaked under Kennedy. With the Cold War stalemated by the Berlin Crisis in Europe and US investment rising in the Third World, prevailing over Communist and radical nationalist forces became more urgent. Focusing on that also helped deflect attention from rising dissatisfaction at home manifesting itself in the civil rights movement and opposition to Cold War conformity (Latham 2011).

Developments in the Third World also contributed to expanding US involvement there. By 1960, Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare* had outlined the foco theory of armed popular revolution against organized state militaries. Guerrilla nuclei or focos would create rather than await revolutionary conditions; and the countryside was the arena for revolutionary struggle and the vector for its transmission to other societies (Wickham-Crowley 2014). It became the manual of guerrilla movements inspired by the Cuban Revolution throughout Latin America, and a first wave of focos appeared in Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti and a second in Columbia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Outflanking orthodox Communist parties prone to legal forms of struggle and mass organizing, these focos advanced a Bolivarian strategy of people's war which, it was assumed, the USA could not control. By 1967, Guevara had made Bolivia his base, fomenting revolution there, and in Peru, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. However, he was captured and killed, and insurrectionary movements across Latin America

suppressed one by one (Besancenot and Löwy 2009). Their last gasp was an upsurge of urban foci in Uruguay and Argentina which continued into the 1970s. The foco concept had proved a dead end and indeed bespoke not a revolutionary strategy but the absence of one (Green and Branford 2012, 91).

In this aperture, the USA arranged a coup d'etat in Brazil and Bolivia in 1964 to quash populist forces (Weis 1993; Field 2014), fixed elections to oust a populist government in Guyana in the same year, and military intervention in the Dominican Republic to thwart what it deemed a Communist takeover the following year. The USA supplemented coercion with strengthening Latin America's substantial middle class of farmers, merchants, bankers, industrialists, and professionals through the Alliance for Progress to foster growth and eliminate poverty, so inoculating Latin America against revolution. Announcing the Alliance for Progress a month before the Bay of Pigs invasion, this alleged Latin American Marshall Plan was projected to combine $20 billion in public and private aid and an estimated $80 billion of local capital to spur growth. While its economic success was highly questionable, it certainly helped insure against revolution (Rabe 1999; Paterson 1989; Livingstone 2009, 39–49).

In the 1970s, coercion resurfaced in US strategy in Latin America's Southern Cone. Nixon ordered the assassination of René Schneider, Chile's constitutionalist army chief of staff, even before the socialist Salvador Allende of the Popular Unity coalition became president. As he began nationalizing public utilities, banks, and basic industries, including the American-dominated copper industry, and implementing a major land reform, the US government, US corporations, and the Chilean business elite responded with an economic and financial embargo as well as a campaign of terror and sabotage. In 1973, pro-American military officers including General Augusto Pinochet, acting in close concert with American naval intelligence officers, staged a coup d'etat, and President Allende preferred to commit suicide in the presidential palace than surrender (Harmer 2011).

When the military seized power in Argentina 30 years later (Munck 1998, 47–107), the Latin America's twentieth-century era of efforts to foster income redistribution and industrial growth by policies of state intervention and limited protectionism ended. Businessmen and bankers turned to the army and police forces to suppress the opposition, trade unions, and peasants. Multinational and American capital was welcomed. A new phase of American domination over Latin America under the banner of neoliberalism had begun, prefiguring the path the USA itself would take in the 1980s (Petras and Veltmeyer 2010, 29). Only the twenty-first-century Pink Tide would end it.

Revolution and War in Vietnam

However, while scoring successes in these in Latin American skirmishes, the USA was sliding inexorably into the biggest defeat of its lifetime: Vietnam. This ultimate proving ground would also unleash a wave of protest that shook not only the USA but also France, Italy, and many other capitalist states around the world. Moreover, the struggle of the Vietnamese people inspired revolutionary movements in Africa, the Middle East, and Central America.

After the French defeat in Indochina, the USA, in violation of the Geneva accords calling for national elections in Vietnam, divided the country, putting the Vietnamese republic in the south under conservative mandarin, Ngo Dinh Diem, and establishing SEATO in 1954 (Blum 1982). Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), founded in 1945, still controlled the north and now faced the US-sponsored regime equipped with an up-to-date army and police force (Kiernan 2017, 400–11). For the USA, dividing Vietnam like Korea or Germany was preferable to conceding the entire country to communism. The client frontline regimes could also help contain communism, a task also made easier by the growing Sino-Soviet split (Kolko 1985).

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), then isolated from its allies, the USSR and the PRC, which affected to be preoccupied with other matters, ineffectually protested US actions and called for national elections. Soon, however,

it acquired a unique military strength based on the deep and wide political legitimacy it cultivated through its radical land reform. Between 1954 and 1959, an estimated 15,000 landlords were killed and 20,000 imprisoned. The land was distributed to a peasantry organized into cooperatives, increasing agricultural output and strengthening rural solidarity and party and state control. These gains facilitated the conduct of the war between 1960 and 1975 immensely, even enabling industrialization over the next decade with some 200 large and 1000 smaller industrial plants constructed with Chinese and Soviet assistance. Run along the orthodox Soviet lines of one-man management, this industrialization forged a modern industrial proletariat working on the basis of cooperative labor. A comprehensive education system, including university-level scientific and technical training, reinforced the workforce's rising sophistication.

Mass solidarity and revolutionary commitment were, therefore, highly developed well before the American phase of the war in 1965. They also formed the modern educational, technical, and industrial infrastructure for the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) as an up-to-date and highly motivated military force capable of directly confronting not only the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) but, ultimately, the US military (Kiernan 2017, 422–30).

By contrast, political oppression and agrarian class struggle exacerbated by the institution of agrovilles or strategic hamlets, i.e., enclosed and guarded compounds of peasants, fomented widespread resistance to Diem in the south. By September 1960, the Lao Dang or Workers (Communist) Party of the DRV had called for full-fledged armed struggle to overthrow of the Diem government and unify Vietnam. By December, opponents of the regime led by Communist Party members created the National Liberation Front (NLF) in a secret meeting in the forests north of Saigon. As cadres flowed from the north, NLF forces began to win important engagements against the ARVN in the spring of 1963 amid growing rural political mobilization and despite stepped-up US military aid (Kiernan 2017, 411–22; Elliott 2003).

Paradoxically, the Sino-Soviet split redounded to the DRV's benefit with the Communist countries competing to lend support and prove their revolutionary commitment. As in the Korean War, moreover, China feared an American attack close to its own border (Mandel 1975; Khoo 2010, 3–42). Kennedy had dispatched 16,000 American advisors before he died in November 1963. They provided Diem's army with military advice, mobility, and firepower. The republic's army moreover began to be deployed more against its own population than the DRV. The problem was that Diem's social base lay in the Catholic minority (10%), and by the Spring of 1963, the repression of the Buddhist majority had already led to such widespread and spectacular demonstrations that Kennedy was forced to oust Diem and deepen US involvement.

Political chaos, upsurge of NLF attacks, and growth of neutralist sentiment ensued after Diem's ouster. Amid popular uprisings and land seizures across the countryside, military officers launched coup after coup in Saigon until General Nguyen Van Thieu stabilized matters through sheer military repression cloaked with a veneer of constitutional government, corruption of the highest ranks of the military, and alliances with the long-standing Chinese and emerging Vietnamese merchant and business classes. By the end of 1965, there were 180,000 American troops in Vietnam, and their number increased to more than 550,000 by 1968, backed by about 2 million more supporting them in neighboring countries or offshore.

Unable to confront massed US power in positional combat, the DRV resorted to a strategy of protracted conflict in which small units aimed to inflict a maximum of casualties and force the dispersal of enemy forces while awaiting a decisive response from the southern populace. This strategy proved effective against the political and military incapacity of the RVN and the ARVN and weakening American resolve and culminated in the famous Tet Offensive. On January 30, 1968, Vietnam's New Year's Day, some 84,000 troops of the NLF and PAVN attacked major southern towns and cities, massively supported by the rural population, while the PAVN stepped up its

offensive against the major American marine base at Khe Sanh close to the DMZ and the Laotian border. There, 6000 marines were besieged by some 40,000 PAVN troops.

The Tet Offensive stunned the Johnson Administration, discredited it politically and fueled the gathering anti-war movement, amplified by the civil rights, black liberation, and student movements. Johnson also had to contend with international dissatisfaction as budget and current account deficits, caused by the combination of runaway spending – on the Great Society domestically and the war abroad – undermined the value of the US dollar (Willbanks 2007). He was forced to abandon plans to send more troops to Vietnam, order the suspension of bombing in the north, and open peace negotiations. He also announced that he would not run for a second term as president leaving Richard Nixon to extract the USA from the Vietnam quagmire through his policies of Vietnamization and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (Kolko 1985). The DRV won because its fighting capacity remained intact, indeed grew as the Communist regime fought the war not only militarily but politically, keeping their people solidly behind what they considered a just war, while the USA increasingly came up against economic, financial, and political limits.

The Vietnam War reverberated far beyond Indochina. While the protests of the 1960s proved to be a flash in the American pan, in France they fomented a genuinely revolutionary crisis in May 1968 which failed to achieve lasting change despite en masse working class support for the revolutionary general strike only because the Communist Party leadership refused to take charge (Abidor 2018). The French upheaval was echoed worldwide in countries as diverse as Great Britain, West Germany, Mexico, South Korea, Burma, Japan, the Philippines, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Turkey, and in Italy protests began earlier and were more prolonged than in France (Gassert and Klimke 2018; Christiansen and Scarlett 2013). Communist success in Vietnam also inspired Third World intellectuals and peoples to deepen the anti-imperialism of decolonization by confronting the landed and mercantile elites that stood in the way of autonomous and genuine development. Central America became particularly febrile. In Nicaragua, a popular revolutionary front toppled the long-standing dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1978. A low-level, but increasingly well-rooted peasant insurgency re-emerged in Guatemala. In El Salvador, Marxist guerrillas mounted a challenge to the power of the coffee and cotton oligarchy during the 1980s. Unrest exploded even in the Communist world, where challenges to bureaucratic socialism developed in Czechoslovakia and China (Gassert and Klimke 2018).

Defeat in Vietnam handicapped US responses to these Marxist-inspired upheavals, in its "backyard" and farther afield in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and even backward Ethiopia. In West Asia, the Marxist People's Democratic Party seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, while Marxist revolutionaries worked to overthrow the US-backed Shah in Iran the following year but lost control to religious revolutionaries riding the same anti-American wave. Inhibited by Vietnam Syndrome, the USA refrained from direct intervention but deployed indirect low-intensity warfare against Third World liberation movements, using counterrevolutionary social and military elements, new military technologies, and economic pressure to contain and tame them (Klare and Kornbluh 1988).

The oil crisis came amid all this. As late as 1968, British and American oil companies controlled nearly 78% of world oil production, about 61% of refining and more than 55% of marketing. However, the 1970s witnessed a wave of nationalizations of oil industries throughout the Third World (Fattouh and Sen 2018, 73–77), and in 1973 even conservative governments in Nigeria and Indonesia joined with radical nationalist regimes such as Libya and Algeria in OPEC to quadruple oil prices and double them again in 1978. It was arguably the most serious blow the Third World dealt to US power.

The USA scrambled to salvage its position. Being a major oil producer and home to major players in the world oil market helped. It rejected proposals to recycle OPEC's oil surpluses through

a multilateral facility to finance oil importers and, instead, persuaded Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC oil states to recycle petrodollars through Western banks. While this launched the long-term trend of financialization, in the short run, desperate to earn interest on funds they had accepted in an era low, even negative, real interest rates, unable to lend in the stagnant West, Western banks went on a lending spree in the Third World and even the Communist world, not only easing the oil crisis but also financing new phases of industrialization with practically free capital.

Saudi Arabia's new found oil money subtly influenced the evolution of the Middle East in a conservative direction favorable to the USA over the next decade, and with the September 1978 Camp David Accords ending the state of war between Israel and Egypt, the erstwhile enemies became allies and US clients.

1981–1991: US Victory?

Whether the West won the Cold War and proved the superiority of capitalism depends on the answer to two questions, those of the economic fate of the West and of why the USSR and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe fell. They are often lumped together: the latter happened because the West was superior, it is believed. In fact, they are unrelated.

The Fate of Western Capitalism

The Long Downturn of the advanced industrial world had mired it in an unmanageable combination of lowering profits, low growth, employment and wage levels, rising inequality, and a declining dollar since the 1970s. Having spent the 1970s trying to overcome it with the postwar economic policy toolkit amid a resurgence of the left and union militancy, with the Volcker interest rate shock of 1979, Western economies radically changed the direction of economic policy-making to a neoliberal one where not high employment but low inflation was the overriding concern. Neoliberalism won chiefly because its opponents, organized labor, and its political parties proved surprisingly weak.

Zealous neoliberal ministrations, however, failed to revive productive economies but ensured the nearly universal financialization of the advanced capitalist economies which peaked in 2008 and is still with us. Specifically in the USA, Reagan inaugurated his presidency with the massive tax cuts for the rich that still distinguish Republican administrations, deregulation of the economy, attacks on organized labor, renewed Cold War rhetoric justifying what looked like a new arms race but turned out to be little more than massive subsidies to corporations to fund the Strategic Defense or "Star Wars" initiative, and covert support for insurgencies against radical governments in the Third World, from Nicaragua to Afghanistan, which were now added to the usual support for right-wing dictators (Kirkpatrick 1979).

The fate of the Third World in the 1980s and into the 1990s was determined by its debt crisis. The recycling of petrodollars through US banks, rather than through an IMF facility to channel oil surpluses to oil-importing countries in need of finance, flooded Western banks with deposits which they needed to lend to earn interest. Lacking borrowers in the stagnant core capitalist countries and subject to overcompetition in the low real interest rate environment, they went on a competitive lending spree in the Third (and even the Second) World. This lending not only covered the high import costs of many countries but, where conditions were propitious, financed a spate of (usually heavy) industrialization in the Third World. Not the least reason for the Volcker shock was to stem the flow of this practically free capital to the Third World (Desai 2013).

The Volcker Shock worked and, more than anything else, contributed to the appearance of Western triumph in this last phase of the Cold War. The Third World debt crisis erupted with the default of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in 1982 and soon ensnared most Third World countries. Faced with a collapsing financial system, the USA and the West responded with bailouts – the term "too big to fail" has its origins here (Ugarteche, forthcoming) – and enlisted the IMF and the World Bank as international bailiffs. Disregarding creditor responsibility, they imposed a particularly regressive burden of the financial crisis on Third World debtors alone, imposing

nearly two "lost decades" of development during which many countries actually registered negative growth. Dependent on imports of foreign oil, expertise, and advanced machinery, many Third World countries had no choice but to accept these economic dictates. OPEC's challenge also seemed to wither. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) proved a means of dividing OPEC countries while strengthening American influence over the Middle East. Reduced demand and new supplies of North Sea, Alaskan, and Russian oil undercut the OPEC monopoly. While the West derived many benefits from laying the Third World low, including declining commodity prices (Patnaik and Patnaik 2016) and declining prices of wage goods produced in the Third World among them, it also paid the price of the accelerated financialization of its economies.

Rather than reviving Western productive economies, neoliberalism financialized them. Financialization was led by the USA and the UK, but by the 1990s, Western Europe has joined the game. Since then, US and Western economies have malingered, capable of little more than bubble-driven growth. By then too, important changes were appearing on the horizon. Having held so much of the Third World in their thrall, the pro-Western biases even more blatantly revealed by their intervention in the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis, IMF and World Bank's portfolios began to shrink. The now famous Goldman Sachs prediction about the fast growth of the BRIC economies displacing Western dominance was made. Communist China began giving the West an economic run for its money. India, despite a serious economic crisis in the early 1990s, continued the growth spurt that had begun in the late 1970s. Russia turned its back on the Shock Therapy era, stabilized, and grew robustly under Putin. And many Latin American countries began a new chapter of growth with equity as one by one, left-of-center governments took power in the so-called Pink Tide. Only a few years into the new century, as the 2008 bubble exposed the weaknesses of the West's financialized economic structure, multipolarity, not unipolarity, had become the byword.

Rather than giving the world a "peace dividend," the end of communism in the USSR and

Eastern Europe inaugurated a new era of US unilateralism supplemented by far from enthusiastic support from its Western allies in the form of ragtag coalitions of the willing, beginning with the 1990 Gulf War (Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal) and continuing into US actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere. Whereas as long as the USSR existed, NATO undertook not a single military intervention, it has been at war almost continuously since, albeit also increasingly incoherently (Desai 2017). However, while, with the USSR gone, at least for a time, the West was less deterred, it was also less capable of reorganizing the world to suit its interests. And by the middle of the 2010s, as Russia's determining involvement in Syria showed, it may no longer be so undeterred.

The Fate of European Communism
The fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe are usually attributed to the USSR's economic failures, lack of political illegitimacy, or the stress of Reagan's second Cold War on its weakened economy. While these beliefs contributed much to keeping the left weak, they hold little water.

Rejecting these explanations, Kotz concludes that "the ultimate explanation for the surprisingly sudden and peaceful demise of the Soviet system was that it was abandoned by most of its own elite whose material and ideological ties to any form of socialism had grown weaker and weaker as the Soviet system evolved. It was a revolution from above" (Kotz 1997, 6). It occurred when an attempt to reform the Soviet system into a more efficient and freer society was derailed into a capitalist restoration by a section of the leadership that had lost its commitment to any form of socialism. Once it happened, however, it became irreversible. Contrary to those who had considered communism a "graveyard of nationalities," Gorbachev conceded the end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe with surprising ease and the USSR itself disintegrated into its component *national* units, revealing communism as something of a nursery of nationalities instead (on this matter, see Suny 1993; Martin 2001).

Polish Solidarity

The need for reform first asserted itself in the eastern periphery of the Communist Bloc.

For 12 years after the Prague Spring was suppressed, Eastern Europe had remained politically quiescent. With Comecon working to supply Eastern Europe's industrial economies with oil, they performed well, better than the stagflating West. Poland first disturbed this calm. Having borrowed from Western banks in the 1970s to finance a failed export drive, its debts mounted, its standard of living fell precipitously, and, beginning in the summer of 1980, factory occupations began. Under the leadership of Lech Walesa of Gdansk's Lenin Shipyards, a new national union, Solidarity, was formed, winning the support of dissident intellectuals and grassroots communists. Its growing following forced the Party to recognize its legality and the Party lost its monopoly of power. As the Party and Solidarity jockeyed for position, General Wojciech Jaruzelski's military asserted itself, promising order and defense of Polish sovereignty against any Soviet invasion. In February 1981 he became prime minister and first Secretary of the Communist Party, and by December he had imposed martial law (Kowalik 2011).

While matters in other Eastern European states were less dramatic, symptoms of economic stagnation and a loss of political will abounded. Matters now hung on developments in the USSR.

Soviet Problems

The long Brezhnev era (1964–1982) had delivered stability, a degree of prosperity and international respect as the Soviet bureaucracy, having ended Khrushchev's frequent political reorganizations and threats to bureaucratic tenure, settled down to a reformed Stalinism, softening police terror and the cult of personality. Soviet citizens were modestly affluent – with high education and urbanization levels, plentiful housing and consumer durables, job security, free medical care, education, and generous social welfare. They could take moral satisfaction in the greater degree of equality and economic and personal security in the Soviet Union over the West.

Internationally the USSR pursued strategic parity with the USA, peaceful coexistence, and Soviet predominance over China in the developing world. Parity in long-range nuclear forces had been achieved by the end of the 1960s. The USSR had also become a naval power with its permanent naval fleets in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. Exploiting differences within the Western alliance, the USSR also drew closer to de Gaulle's France and Brandt's West Germany, eventually forcing détente on the USA, concluding the ABM and SALT I Treaties in 1971 and the SALT II Treaty and Helsinki Accords in 1975. Internationally, notwithstanding the setback of the Chinese rapprochement with the USA and the loss or Egypt, Soviet confidence was also measured through its direct and indirect aid to Cuba and national liberation and revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, South Africa, Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanistan.

However, by the 1980s, matters were made difficult, not by Reagan's tough rhetoric, which merely served to justify his military Schumpetarianism (Desai 2013, 171), but because growth slowed as extensive growth based on centralized marshaling of surpluses of labor and resources was exhausted. Further growth required more intensive use of these factors through technological improvements, a more efficient organization of production, and more effective allocation of resources between economic sectors, and this required reforming Soviet planning, with its inefficient allocation, obsession with quantitative growth, especially in heavy industry, and lack of feedback loops (Clarke 1996). However, the Party had atrophied under Brezhnev. Position and privilege were dispensed through patron-client networks. Corruption, complacency, and intellectual stultification crippled political and technological innovation. While the need for reform was clear by the 1980s, it was by no means necessary to return to capitalism. That outcome was a veritable trahison des clercs at the top of Soviet society (Cohen 2009).

Gorbachev took power from the second of Brezhnev's two short-lived successors in 1984. Leading a reform faction, he initiated *perestroika*, economic restructuring, with bold opening

moves: sweeping personnel changes, dramatically higher production targets, quality controls, higher performance and discipline standards, and a nationwide anti-alcohol campaign. Gorbachev aimed for a sort of market socialism combined with managerial and worker autonomy, cooperatives, small private businesses, and family farming on leased land. When Soviet bureaucracy resisted, Gorbachev mobilized public opinion as a counter. This was *glasnost:* greater openness in public life, more access to information, freedom of expression, press freedom, media, and cultural freedom.

Internationally, Gorbachev met Reagan's empty bellicosity by calling for the humanization of international relations amid growing international interdependence and backed it up with concrete actions: declaring a moratorium on deploying SS-20 intercontinental ballistic missiles, unilaterally suspending underground nuclear testing and meeting with Reagan in 1985, renouncing the arms race with a new military doctrine of reasonable sufficiency instead of parity and eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 1986, withdrawing Soviet forces from Afghanistan and abandoning the Brezhnev doctrine enjoining defense of socialism in allied countries in 1988, and unilaterally cutting Soviet military expenditures and troop levels in 1989. Soviet foreign policy statements no longer spoke of supporting national liberation movements, but of comprehensive systems of international security. States such as Angola and Nicaragua were left to their own devices.

So far so good. Then came Gorbachev's most fateful decision: permitting organizations outside Party control in 1986. Among the many that mushroomed were liberal and nationalist groups. Now the reform process began careening out of control. As planning broke down without markets replacing it, hoarding, scarcity, and inflation became serious. Growth, which had spurted to 4% in 1986, fell to less than two in the next 3 years. Officials became increasingly obstructive. To top it all, democratic elections to broaden support for reform produced a Congress of People's Deputies that became a cockpit for rivalries between so-called conservatives and emergent liberal and nationalist factions. Their struggles led to the end of the Soviet system (Cohen 2009). The liberal leader, Boris Yeltsin, had fallen out with Gorbachev in 1987, and he now united party leaders, intelligentsia, and elements of the underground economy who championed a rapid capitalist transformation based on liberal ideology with considerable encouragement from the West. At the same time, popular revolutions in Eastern Europe, many inspired by Gorbachev's initiatives, overthrew Communist regimes aided by divisions in the USSR.

The Cold War That Never Went Away

That was the so-called end of the so-called Cold War. Thanks to the first revolution against capitalism and imperialism taking place on the periphery of Europe, imperialism, already on the decline with the onset of the 30 Years' Crisis, took the form of the Cold War, entering a peculiarly European- and Western-centric phase. Despite the obscene destruction it has wreaked on the Third World in its attempt to impose complementary subordination, the scorecard since 1914 is filled with US and Western defeats and anti-imperialist advance, including successes at advancing the anti-imperialist project of achieving similarity of economic structure and strength.

The Cold War does not end in a "unipolar" world where capitalist societies are the only model for the world and where the world enjoys a peace dividend. Instead, by issuing to a New Cold War, it has sunk back as a mere chapter of the longer struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism. The struggle is not completed but has certainly advanced further. As core capitalist economies malinger, they lose economic position, principally to China but also fast-growing Third World countries. Western inability to control events in the rest of the world is increasingly apparent as it reacts to these developments with more fits of wildly destructive but still largely impotent rage. The underlying motive for imperialism – preserving complementarity between the West and the rest – has not disappeared; only the resources of the west in pursuing it have

dwindled, and those of the rest in resisting it and achieving similarity instead have grown. This accounts for both the continuities of the Cold War with the stronger imperialism that went before and the weaker one that persists today. So we close our account of the Cold War with an inventory of the key factors making for the 1990s view that the Cold War had ended with a Western victory.

First and foremost, there was the sheer profundity of the crisis of the 1970s. The West's mere survival in its throes – defeat in Vietnam, ailing Western economies, a fracturing world economy, rising socialist and nationalist tendencies worldwide, and increasing divisions in the Western camp and domestic strife – was taken for a victory and given that it emerged from it under the leadership of an assertive right-wing capitalist leadership conveyed a certain capitalist triumphalism. However, both economically and militarily, the decades since demonstrated how vain its efforts to revive capitalism were, indeed, how perverse.

Secondly, disengagement from Vietnam was key. It had proved deeply destabilizing, producing the upheavals of the 1960s and the loss of confidence of the 1970s. Like wars before it, the Vietnam War produced revolutionary conditions, changing lives, mobilizing populations, and transforming consciousness in unexpected and radical ways. Nixon's step-by-step withdrawal from Vietnam was crucial to stabilizing American society and dampening down, if not extinguishing, unrest abroad. When in the decade after defeat in Vietnam, the Reagan administration appeared to score victories against the left in tiny states such as Nicaragua and Grenada, and against a disintegrating USSR, US and Western confidence was further boosted.

There was, thirdly, the weakness of the left. Its importance cannot be overemphasized. Internationally, the Sino-Soviet split had been an unexpected boon to the capitalist West. Open antagonism between Communist powers weakened communist and radical nationalist forces worldwide, and US diplomacy could pit them against one another politically and militarily. Meanwhile in the West, the power of reformist and bureaucratic Communist parties and unions, internal divisions within social democracy, and

New Left's lack of discipline disarmed revolutionary mass movements while also conceding victory to the forces of the New Right domestically.

Finally, neoliberalism appeared to many to have restored capitalism and restored it on capital's terms, rescuing it from its postwar bondage to labor domestically and to the Third World internationally. As the 1980s and 1990s wore on, capitalist governments appeared to impose one burden after another on working people and poor countries. It was only at the close of the century that the reality of the West's bubble-driven, financial crisis-prone neoliberal pattern of growth became clear and was spectacularly confirmed in the 2008 financial crisis. The victory of capitalists cannot necessarily ensure the health or longevity of capitalism.

Cross-References

▶ Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism
▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Arab Socialism
▶ Arafat, Yasser (Abu Ammar) and the Palestine Liberation Organization
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Cold War and Latin America

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Introduction: The Historical Background of US Imperialism in Latin America

In 1935, the US jurist James Brown Scott (1935) noted that Simón Bolívar was the leading precursor of the integration of the territory of the Americas from north to south, and he further suggested that Bolívar was the more obvious inspiration for the Pan-American conferences that had been held thus far. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Commander Hugo Chavez pointed to Bolivarianism as the main source for his anti-imperialist policy, which he sought to spread across the continent, and he linked Bolívar to previous anti-imperialist experiences in the twentieth century. These two examples show the tension between two different ideas used to conceptualize the territory of the Americas: Pan-Americanism and Latin Americanism (Grandin 2012; Ardao 1980; Mignolo 2010). During the twentieth century, these two notions were intricately linked to the imperialism/anti-imperialism dichotomy.

Although the Cold War played a key role in the global construction of the US empire (Stephanson 2005; Arrighi 2010), relations between the United States and Latin America were shaped by a prior history that provided a historical framework and a particular political vocabulary. Dating back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was a Pan-American discourse that asserted the republican nature of states, criticized Europe's old imperial tradition, and, starting in the middle of the century, overshadowed any emerging differences, as well as the interventionist policies deployed by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean. On the other hand, the late nineteenth century saw the rise of an anti-imperialism current that focused on questioning the increasing cultural, economic, and political presence of the United States in the region. The essay *Ariel* by the Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó and *Nuestra América* (*Our America*) by the Cuban José Martí are two early examples that had a strong influence in that wave of anti-imperialism. This criticism in Latin America was linked to the emergence of new forms of popular Latin Americanism that impacted a generation of activists and intellectuals, such as José Carlos Mariátegui, Carlos Haya de la Torre, José Vasconcelos, and Julio Antonio Mella, in the first decades of the twentieth century. With their affinity to radical republicanism, these new revolutionary movements – such as the Mexican Revolution, the APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) in Peru, and the university reform movement in Córdoba, Argentina – questioned the growing role of the United States in Latin-American politics, which was consistently counterrevolutionary, and its links to the oligarchic republican order that these movements sought to transform.

With this background in mind, I will review the ways in which both concepts were used during the

Cold War in Latin America and the United States. By studying the various political and intellectual actors and analyzing certain events, I will attempt to reconstruct the political language of this period, with the aim of understanding the different ways in which US imperialism was imposed, legitimized, negotiated, and resisted. To do that, I will trace the diverse uses of the concepts of Pan-Americanism and Latin Americanism throughout the period.

The Multiple Faces of Pan-Americanism

Pan-Americanism emerged with some force in the context of the post-World War II years. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy during the war, along with the transformations of the so-called Democratic Spring that enabled the restoration of democracy, the legalization of the political activity of leftwing parties and unions, and the promotion of social rights, created a climate in which a closer relationship between the United States and Latin America seemed possible. However, in the 1950s, an agreement similar to the one forged between Europe's social democracy and the United States would prove unfeasible. The social reforms that began in the post-World War era under what was known as the Democratic Spring were soon abandoned in 1948 in the wake of a conservative reaction backed by the United States as the Cold War advanced (Bethell and Roxborough 1997; Grandin 2004).

The United States furthered an institutional arrangement that had already been tested in the Pan-American conferences, but which was now reconceptualized through the free west/totalitarian east dichotomy touted by the imperial power. The establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) entailed the gradual abandonment of a certain social progressiveness associated with political republicanism. Defending freedom against the communist threat became the increasingly prevalent discourse, delivered in a belligerent rhetoric. The treaty of nations that created the OAS was preceded by a military agreement. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), signed in 1947, stipulated that in the

event of an attack by a foreign power, the contracting parties had to act together to defend the country under attack. While theoretically the treaty called for reciprocity, it was in fact a subtle way of aligning the Latin-American nations with the United States in the Cold War (Morgenfeld 2010).

In 1948, the Charter that created the Organization of American States defined the continent's identity as follows: "Confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man." However, as this Charter was being signed in Bogotá, liberal political leader Jorge Gaitán was being assassinated. Because of Gaitán's popularity and the expectations of social reform raised by his candidacy, his death sparked popular outrage. The strong reaction that followed was brutally squashed by the Colombian government, which was quick to justify its actions with claims that it was cracking down on communist-backed protests, drawing on the new discourse legitimized by the OAS.

In terms of the economy, the new world order marked by the Bretton Woods accords sets a scenario in which the centrality of the United States limited the chances that Latin-American countries had of aligning themselves with other powers. In the new global institutional arrangement, linked to the new economic order (International Monetary Fund, World Bank), the United States had significant influential power, which it used to further some of its policies in the region (Marichal 2008). In the 1950s, it worked to secure trade agreements aimed at opening up national economies to obtain complementarities and promote US investment in the continent's industries. While the United States advocated economic liberalization, it paradoxically refused to open up its own agriculture, textile industry, and other areas of its economy. Despite complaints that were aggravated as raw material prices fell and demands for greater cooperation increased, mirroring the situation in Europe with the Marshall Plan, several Latin-American politicians showed an interest

in promoting such agreements. Operation Pan-America, an economic development program proposed by Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, is a clear example of the expectations raised by the possibility of a Pan-American development (Ioris 2014).

In the 1950s, there was still a space in Latin America for Pan-Americanism that focused on advocating freedom and enjoyed a measure of influence among progressive sectors. Patrick Iber (2015) has studied the meeting of intellectuals from various backgrounds – including Spanish republicans, Trotskyists, and members of the first generation of Latin-American organizations such as APRA, or intellectuals connected with the Mexican Revolution – convened by what was known as the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an organization financed by the CIA as part of the Cold War's cultural battle (Iber 2015). These encounters happened in a historical moment in which the communist block also began to develop its own cultural diplomacy, which gained a certain measure of influence in the region (Zourek 2013).

However, as soon as it was evident that US foreign policy was willing to sacrifice freedom in the fight against communism, this form of Pan-American identity grounded on republican values began to lose its appeal. Iber recalls Julián Gorkin's dismay at learning that most of the intellectuals participating in the CCF refused to sign a declaration in support of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who had toppled the constitutionally elected president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, through a military invasion organized by the CIA.

In addition to that liberal disposition in the humanities, which found common ground in the idea of freedom expressed in the CCF, there was also a concern for economic prosperity. This was channeled primarily through a sociology and an economics of modernization that sought to build a cannon for economic and social development in Latin America based on the US experience. The work most clearly representative of this view was Walt Whitman Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, which provided the rationale for a number of

international cooperation projects for the modernization of the Third World (Latham 2000).

Pan-Americanism had one last moment of vitality in the early 1960s. After the Cuban Revolution, the Alliance for Progress emerged as the last Pan-Americanist project that found echo in Latin-American reformist sectors. In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy spoke of a revolution in freedom and tried to reconnect with the demands of the peoples of Latin America and with the identification of the republics as generators of liberty and prosperity.

> This political freedom must be accompanied by social change. For unless necessary social reforms, including land and tax reform, are freely made—unless we broaden the opportunity for all of our people—unless the great mass of Americans share in increasing prosperity—then our alliance, our revolution, our dream, and our freedom will fail. But we call for social change by free men—change in the spirit of Washington and Jefferson, of Bolívar and San Martín and Martí—not change which seeks to impose on men tyrannies which we cast out a century and a half ago. Our motto is what it has always been—progress yes, tyranny no—*Progreso sí, tiranía no!*

It was a fleeting vitality, however, as the program met with resistance in the United States and, shortly after, Kennedy was assassinated. Following Kennedy's death, Pan-Americanist policies revealed their limitations and their primarily rhetorical nature. The United States advocated economic liberalization but refused to open up its economy in areas that were of interest to the countries of Latin America. In politics, it defended liberal democracy, but since the late 1940s, with the argument of combating a communist threat, it had begun justifying multiple dictatorships that halted the social reforms that were furthered by progressive sectors from a range of ideological backgrounds. On the intellectual front, it championed the idea of a universalist scheme for modernization, but it was arguing more and more that modernization needed to be developed through political paths that were different from those taken by western countries. Paradoxically, the United States stopped using the term "America" and replaced it with "the west," thus conceptually locating Latin America in a place different from

the one it had supposedly been granted under Pan-Americanism. Once again the idea of US exceptionalism puts Latin-American countries at a distance, using metaphors that referred to their immaturity and were similar to those used in earlier times.

Moreover, the double standard of its foreign policy was laid bare in the contrast between, on the one hand, a rhetoric that focused on a strongly held political morality regarding liberal democracy and, on the other, the "realistic" implementation of that foreign policy through covert CIA operations and the backing of dictatorships. Operation PBSUCCESS, carried out to overthrow the democratic government of Guatemala, was one of the most representative examples of that double standard, and it made an enormous impact on Latin-American public opinion, prompting a major shift in attitudes toward the United States, which helps understand the growing anti-imperialism that emerged in the 1960s.

Samuel Huntington's book *Political Order in Changing Societies* reflects a post-Alliance for Progress moment in which US policy assumed that the notion of modernization did not allow for a similar process in the countries of the periphery and in which it systematically justified the need for authoritarian governments in order to ensure the process of capitalist modernization. This assumption coincided with the US military's growing influence on the armed forces of Latin America. French and US counterinsurgency tactics, the concept of national security put forward by the United States in the context of the Cold War, and a greater regional integration of the armed forces through the OAS system gradually shaped a particular ideology within the military that would be known as the National Security Doctrine. This doctrine, which was spread through various institutions – such as the School of the Americas in Panama or Brazil's Superior War School – proposed a radical transformation of the armed forces that involved reformulating the traditional task of national armies (Gill 2004; Loveman and Davies 1978).

This change entailed abandoning the traditional objective of the military, which was the defense of national borders, to concentrate instead on the defense of "ideological borders." The aim was to stop any form of socialism in Latin America. For the military, the war against communism – which had its own territories (the USSR, Cuba), but was also seen as infiltrating national societies – entailed reformulating its tasks, changing its practices, and taking over the state in order to guarantee a development and capitalist modernization that would reduce the risk of communism. This doctrine was used to justify the wave of military dictatorships that spread across the region with foundational aspirations, as well as the growing levels of state violence that had already begun in the late 1950s. This process fueled a fundamentalist sentiment among Latin-American military officers, who saw themselves as championing an anticommunist crusade. In that crusade, the notion of Pan-Americanism was overshadowed by the defense of Western Christian Civilization against the communist threat. In the late 1970s, as the Jimmy Carter administration expressed concern over human rights violations committed by South American dictatorships, the region's armed forces criticized the United States for its weakness in combating communism and in some international forums they positioned themselves in the frontlines of the war against communism (Dinges 2005; Armony 1997; Rabe 2012).

The ambiguous policy of the Carter administration, which criticized South American dictatorships while at the same time promoting or allowing massacres to occur in Guatemala and El Salvador, was an interlude that ended when the National Security Doctrine and the new US right came together under the Ronald Reagan administration. The aggressive policy of military intervention in Central America, which represented a great leap with respect to previous decades, and the religious discourse of the new US right, strengthened the anticommunist crusade spirit that limited the idea of a republican Pan-Americanism and justified the systematic perpetration of human rights abuses by the states. Moreover, this period saw a boost in the neoliberal reforms that had already been tested by the Chilean dictatorship through the collaboration of military officers and technocrats connected with the Chicago school.

In their book *When States Kill*, Nestor Rodríguez and Cecilia Menjívar argue that in the context of the Latin-American Cold War, US imperialism involved the development of a new mode of violence and of "different forms of terror, including torture and physical punishment, not in a primitive or 'traditional' manner, but in a politically rational, calculated, modern fashion" carried out by interstate regimes (Latin America-US). While this interstate effort furthered the geopolitical designs of the United States, it also favored the interests of local oligarchic elites and conservative sectors. Terror was used as a weapon against specific enemies, but it also served a disciplinary purpose in Latin-American societies. While a definitive quantification of this interstate violence has yet to be written, the number of individuals killed through political assassinations, massacres, and disappearances clearly runs into the hundreds of thousands. And generally speaking, with the exception of Colombia and Peru, the violence perpetrated by civilians was not even a tenth of the crimes committed by the state. And that does not include the mass incarceration systems and widespread systematic torturing that affected significant sectors of the population. This interstate violence can perhaps be identified as one of the leading legacies of US imperialism in the context of the Cold War.

Anti-imperialism and Latin Americanism

A Latin Americanism that antagonizes the monster of the north, in the words of José Martí, or goes against the Anglo-Saxon utilitarian tradition, as expressed by the elusive José Enrique Rodó, is the intellectual precursor of a political generation that came of age in the 1920s and 1930s and began forging an anti-imperialist identity that was close to popular sectors and distanced itself from what the urban elites first proposed in this sense in the second half of the nineteenth century. (José Martí, Carta inconclusa a Manuel Mercado, 2003) These movements had contradictory tendencies. There were even conservative streaks associated with a spiritualist tradition. But what seems to have prevailed in all of these movements was a radical republicanism that questioned the liberal republican model and asserted the role of popular sectors – and in some cases even indigenous and black sectors – in the construction of the state. In several places, this popular republicanism, together with a growing economic nationalism that emerged during this period, challenged US policies that favored local oligarchies and protected its economic investments. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, however, with its limited interventions and its social reformism, had served to temper that anti-imperialist thrust. (See Samuel Moyn on the 1945 Chapultepec declaration and social reformers in connection with the idea of human rights.)

These initial forms of anti-imperialism were also questioned by the ideological order of the Cold War. Several of these groups that embraced republican traditions and were firm supporters of the idea of national sovereignty marked their distance with the socialist model in the Eastern Bloc that emerged in the postwar era. Many anti-imperialist movements adopted a third position in the Cold War conflict. Developing an anti-imperialism that appeared as an alternative to the Western imperial capitalism led by the United States and to the state-centered socialism of the post-1956 Soviet Union was appealing to many sectors of the Latin American left from the 1930s through the 1950s. Major Latin-American socialist sectors that had moved away from Europe's social democracy were drawn to that alternative stance and in the 1950s increased their support for the Non-Aligned Movement, the People's Republic of China, Yugoslavia, and with the Third-World movement (Drake 1978). There were also intellectual movements that sought to reconcile the European Marxist tradition with the popular republican struggles of the nineteenth century. These groups questioned the markedly Eurocentric nature of the urban internationalist lefts of the first half of the century, their connection with working and middle-class sectors of European descent in the cities, and their disregard of rural popular sectors, which were in many cases indigenous. For example, in Argentina, a group known as the National Left and initially formed by Trotskyist intellectuals, drew on the law of uneven

and combined development of capitalism and called for an emancipating relationship, rethinking the history of rural popular struggles in the nineteenth century in terms of contemporary national liberation movements. These movements' stance toward the United States was complex. While they were for the most part critical, there was a certain degree of ambiguity during the Good Neighbor policy years and the initial period of the Cold War. Several of them participated in a number of initiatives promoted by the United States, such as the CCF.

This moderate anti-imperialism can also be found in economic thinking. In 1949, Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch published *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems*, which became a foundational manifesto of sorts of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC). This United Nations agency recognized the specificity of the subcontinent and called for the implementation of protectionist Keynesian policies to develop the region's economy (Dosman 2008). While written in a technocratic style, the ideas put forward in the text, together with the establishment of ECLAC, had a major political dimension. Ultimately, it challenged the idea that there was a single criterion for modernization and suggested that the subcontinent's path to economic development differed from that of its counterpart in the north. However, that did not mean that ECLAC proponents could not coexist with modernization theorists and even reach agreements with them. Prebisch participated in the Alliance for Progress because he believed it promoted a series of reforms that were in line with ECLAC's agenda.

By the mid-1960s, moderate anti-imperialism had run out of steam. As noted above, US policies were met with growing discontent in Latin America. That sentiment was expressed through a wave of critical protests sparked all over the continent by the coup d'état that toppled the democratic government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 (Gleijeses 1992).

In general, Latin-American Cold War periodizations have pointed to US intervention in Guatemala as a moment in which the United States increased its promotion of authoritarianism

and stepped up its anti-communism in the region (Grandin 2004; Bethell and Roxborough 1997). The region's democratic governments also questioned the restrictions placed on Latin-American commodity exports to the US market and the lack of US cooperation for development plans, demanding a "Marshall Plan" for Latin America. This discontent was evident when US Vice President Richard Nixon toured South America in 1958. In some countries, he even feared for his safety due to the mass – and in some cases violent – demonstrations that were staged throughout his visit. Criticism touched on a number of factors, ranging from US support for dictators and the pressure placed on governments to privilege US investments in the continent. The logic behind the criticism reiterated the idea that the United States was again countering the processes of social reform that were being attempted in different parts of the continent. The hostility and dismissal of the United States against Latin Americans created a leitmotif of mistrust and disdain for the United States in the region in the 1950s that preceded the Cuban Revolution.

In 1961, at the conference in Punta del Este that launched the Alliance for Progress, Ernesto Guevara, in representation of revolutionary Cuba, referred with irony to its initial document:

> According to [the document], a 'new stage is beginning in the relations between the peoples of the Americas.' And it's true. Except that the new stage begins under the star of Cuba, free territory of the Americas. And this conference, and the special treatment that the delegations have received, and the credits that may be granted, all bear Cuba's name, whether the beneficiaries like it or not. Because a qualitative change has taken place in the Americas: a country can now take up arms, destroy an oppressing army, form a new popular army, stand up to the invincible monster, wait for the monster's attack, and then defeat it.And this is something new in Latin America, gentlemen; and it is what makes this new language possible and what makes relations easier between everyone—except, of course, between the two great rivals of this conference. (Guevara 1961)

The Cuban Revolution, and Cuba's rapid withdrawal from the sphere of influence of the United States after the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the missile crisis, created a radically new geopolitical

scenario where escaping US hegemony emerged as a real possibility. The need to move away from that hegemony was not born out of anti-Americanism. Rather it was prompted by the confirmation of the reactionary or counterrevolutionary nature of US foreign policy; as in most cases, it appeared more attuned to the interests of local conservative elites than to those of the promoters of social reform. In order to carry out social reforms, it was therefore necessary to leave the US's sphere of influence.

Although the 1964 victory of Christian Democracy in Chile and its "revolution in freedom" discourse might suggest that the idea of a reformist Pan-Americanism was still alive, a coup d'état that same year in Brazil and the series of military dictatorships it kicked off revealed the tone of US foreign policy and the impossibility of implementing social reforms under the auspices of the United States. It was in that context that Cuba's influence grew. That influence did not just translate into the rural guerrilla *foquismo* efforts, which were ultimately short-lived. Cuba also made it possible for a range of political movements to expand – from left-wing armed organizations and progressive military groups to Liberation Theology Christians, left-wing populists, and left-wing electoral coalitions. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, these movements found common ground in a strong anti-imperialist discourse and realized that in order to carry out social reforms it was necessary to come out from under the hegemony of the United States. In 1973, a Chilean leftist magazine spoke of a Santiago–Buenos Aires–Lima–Havana axis. The agendas furthered by the governments of these countries shared the same anti-imperialist policy (Harmer 2014). However, the duration of that axis was brief.

The Soviet Union's influence over the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America was limited. Some researchers are beginning to study the ways in which the Soviet bloc influenced these movements, but findings thus far show that most of the funding and support provided had to adapt to preexisting networks and that criticism of US imperialism was not necessarily accompanied by a positive stance toward the Soviet Union

(Rupprecht 2015; Pedemonte 2015). In 1967, Ernesto Che Guevara penned his famous and emblematic message to the Tricontinental Conference, where he declared: "Our every action is a battle cry against imperialism and a clamoring for the unity of all peoples against the great enemy of the human race: the United States of America." The role of the Soviet bloc in that anti-imperialist struggle was secondary, and the focus was placed on the peoples of the Third World.

Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution and the US support of the Cuban exiles, and especially the embargo, the government had no choice but to increase trade with the Soviet Union. The US isolation of Cuba through the blockade increased the influence of the Soviet Union in Cuba and opposition to US imperialism and intervention. In the 1970s, the Cuban economy began to develop greater self-reliance and particular socialist forms inspired by the Soviet Union model of socialism.

This political anti-imperialism suffered under the pro-US authoritarian onslaught of the 1970s and 1980s. But it reemerged in new political forms during the progressive cycle of the 1990s–2010s with the reappearance of center-left and leftist governments. Commonly known as the Pink Tide, it entailed a revival of certain Latin-Americanist ideas that was expressed in the development of Latin-American international organizations such as UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) and ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America). In political terms, there were various approaches to US imperialism. While Venezuela's Chavismo brought back the anti-imperialist narrative of the Cold War, after achieving power, others, such as the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, or Workers' Party), initially leaned toward a multilateral stance and later sought to establish good relations with the Barack Obama administration.

The anti-imperialism of the 1960s was not just political. Very early on, it spawned various academic and intellectual expressions in North America and Latin America, giving rise, in both hemispheres, to a new intellectual and political left. The Cuban Revolution strongly influenced the denunciation of US foreign policy within the

United States. Already in 1960, the prominent sociologist and Columbia University professor Charles Wright Mills published *Listen, Yankee*, a critique of US foreign policy (Rojas 2014). Marxist economists such as Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Leo Huberman started to rethink traditional notions of empire in light of capitalist transformations. Their reflections were clearly in dialogue with the political events unfolding in Cuba. In 1959, William Appleman Williams wrote *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, thus paving the way for a revisionist trend in US foreign policy studies, which applied the category of empire and looked at economic processes toward understanding the rationale behind US foreign policy. In 1967, after failing to find reliable information on US policies in the region, a group of university students formed the nonprofit organization NACLA (North American Congress in Latin America) with the aim of denouncing imperialist policies and conducting solidarity campaigns to support various political and social movements in Latin America. Besides these movements, which were for the most part connected with universities, in the United States, the Cuban Revolution also had a profound impact on the ideas of the black movement with respect to the imperial dimension of the construction of the American state (NACLA 2017).

In Latin America, the events of the 1960s also fostered a more systematic reflection on the phenomenon of US imperialism. During that decade, a growing literature produced by intellectuals, journalists, and political leaders took on the task of conceptualizing the role of the United States in the twentieth century. That literature drew on the legacy of intellectuals of previous generations and anti-imperialist struggles, but it also incorporated the debate that was underway in the new left in the United States (Trías 1977; Selser 1974).

In the mid-1960s, these reflections took on a more theoretical dimension with the dependency theory, a new school of thought that emerged within the field of economic sociology. This school combined aspects of ECLAC's developmentalism with Trotskyist influences and, in some cases, the historical revisionism of left-wing nationalist groups of the previous

decades. The result was a sharp criticism of the developmentalist ideas and modernizing proposals put forward by ECLAC and the United States, respectively. According to dependency theory proponents, Latin America's underdevelopment was caused by structural conditions determined by the position occupied by these countries in the world order. They argued that the possibilities of attaining development had more to do with that circumstance than with ensuring the best conditions for productivity, as Prebisch's initial manifesto had suggested. This new theory, conceived primarily by economists and sociologists, challenged the excessively technocratic view of the previous generation, which used only economic variables to explain underdevelopment, without taking into account how the international political order affected the region's conditions for development. Dependency theory proponents instead gave a range of responses to the problem of underdevelopment. For some, such as André Gunder Frank, Theotônio Dos Santos, Vânia Bambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini, revolution was the only way to overcome underdevelopment. That involved changing the relationship of national states with the world order. For others, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, the solution lay in forming new alliances around the state, to further a nondependent development.

Despite their differences, they all shared the view that the international political order was key for understanding the limits of development. They were all also critical of the modernizing discourses that looked at development through a teleological lens, ignoring the historical conditions that had allowed some countries to develop at the expense of the underdevelopment of others. The centrality of the phenomenon of imperialism was evident in these approaches. That centrality provided the starting point for analyzing other social phenomena through the dependency theory. For example, the book *How to Read Donald Duck*, by Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, was a cultural interpretation of imperialism from a dependency theory approach. The liberation approaches in the fields of pedagogy and theology also drew on certain aspects of this school of thought (Kirkendall 2014). The school also

produced texts that were widely read over the following decades. The clearest manifesto of this school was Eduardo Galeano's book *Las venas abiertas de América Latina* (*Open Veins of Latin America*), where the history of the continent is presented as a succession of imperial dominations, with the conquered moving toward their liberation (Marchesi 2006).

Historiographies of Empire

The earliest examples of historiography on US foreign policy in Latin America can be traced back to the Cold War years. Although Latin America lacked a specific historiography on the subject, a series of dependency theory studies offered a historical narrative for understanding US policy in the continent (González Casanova 1979; Flamarion Santana Cardoso and Pérez Brignoli 1999). The majority of the more contemporary works in the field of history, however, were centered on US bilateral relations with individual countries. While these works incorporated the imperial dimension, their localized focus at times hindered a more general discussion on the relationship between the United States and the continent. In the United States, there has been a more systematic reflection on US presence in the region. Several examples in this sense can be found in the country's historiography throughout the twentieth century (Kroeber 1953). Interest in foreign policy and public policy affairs also fostered a greater production of heuristic materials (archives and libraries), as well as the development of academic fields and experts.

Starting in the 1970s, studies on Latin America began to evidence the influence of the dependency theory and the critique from the new left. In a 1974 review of historical studies on the relationship between the United States and Latin America, Charles Bergquist (1974) warned of the emergence of a new conceptual framework that viewed Latin America as the underdeveloped west. However, most of those works focused not on the Cold War era but on the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. It was in the 1980s that the first

historical studies on Latin America were published in which the Cold War appeared as a section of US foreign policy from the revisionist approach that had emerged in the 1960s. Walter LaFeber's *Inevitable Revolutions* and Stephen Kinzer's *Bitter Fruit* are representative examples of that moment and of the relationship of such studies with the debates then underway in US society concerning the Ronald Reagan administration's growing interventionism in Central America.

This trend continued to grow in the 1990s, but it was integrated into studies that incorporated political and ideological dimensions and to a certain extent sought to strike a balance between the revisionism of the 1960s and the post-revisionist approaches that focused again on issues connected with foreign policy and the ideology of the Cold War. These dealt primarily with US foreign policy, and while they drew on Latin-American case studies, in heuristic terms, the sources used were predominantly from the United States.

The cultural shift at the end of the decade impacted scholarship on the subject of empire. The book *Close Encounters of Empire* represented a major innovation in the way the category of empire was conceived in the case of the Americas. It proposed a cultural approach for examining imperial relations from a Gramscian perspective. But it also posited the idea of a contact zone for thinking about imperial relations, in an attempt to offer a more complex, non-dichotomous view of the concrete forms in which such relations were processed through the many circulations of people and ideas that interacted in relations with unequal dimensions. While this compilation presented a new agenda for examining the phenomenon of empire, most of the studies featured did not deal with the Cold War. That approach, however, was connected in different ways with studies conducted during that period, such as the work by Eric Zolov or Stefan Rinke.

The twenty-first century began with the attack on the World Trade Center, which created a new global scenario where discussing the imperial dimension of US foreign policy once again

acquired an indisputable centrality. Although in the 1990s, in the context of the post-Cold War, globalization discourses – even those that took a critical view – relativized the imperial force of the national state, the United States' aggressive policy brought the issue back into public and academic discussions.

In the case of US–Latin America relations, the works by Greg Grandin (2004) and Hal Brands (2012) are representative of the way in which the academic debate on this issue unfolded in the United States. Grandin suggested that the history of Latin America in the twentieth century was structured by the dynamic between revolution and counterrevolution and that the role of the United States tended to lean largely on the side of the latter. His work incorporated the revisionist tradition, along with cultural, social, and political aspects, in a history that had integral history aspirations in the manner of Pierre Vilar. In this approach, the Cold War was analyzed from a perspective centered on Latin-American politics in the broadest sense. The concern focused primarily on the ways in which Latin-American popular politics and social reformisms unfolded under a US-controlled Cold War order in the region. Hal Brands instead viewed the conflict in terms of authoritarianism and democracy. In his study, he described the polarization in Latin America as a phenomenon specific to the region, a phenomenon in which the United States had a limited role and to a certain extent was trapped by that dynamic. Brands argued that while it was in the interest of the United States for democracy, stability, and development to flourish in the region, at times, it was caught in the tension between the two extremes. His study could be considered, in a way, a US version of the so-called theory of the two demons that reduces the responsibility for polarization and political violence to ideological extremes. Paradoxically, in this history, the imperial dimension, although acknowledged at times, is downplayed in the more general narrative. The study repeats a traditional argument in US foreign policy, whereby the errors and horrors furthered by the United States are subsumed under noble aims and attributed to mistaken decisions made in the pursuit of

such aims through the implementation of concrete policies.

The two studies present almost opposing ways of interpreting, in a broader sense, the imperial policy of the United States during the Cold War. In addition to these more general approaches to the period in question, more specific lines of research have attempted to cover not only some particular characteristics of imperialism but also the concrete forms of the period's historical anti-imperialisms (Kirkendall 2014). Besides the many studies that have been conducted on national histories, there is an increasing scholarship on the transnational aspects of these imperialist and anti-imperialist dimensions. The compilation *In from the Cold*, in which Gilbert Joseph and others continue the discussion of several of the methodological concerns posed in *Close Encounters*, but incorporating a more political approach, constitutes an example of a particular way of thinking about imperialism and anti-imperialism in the political and cultural history of the Cold War that has become influential for other works (Harmer 2014; Marchesi 2018). Others have also focused on the history of authoritarianism and human rights movements as a form of resistance in which tensions and the multiple ways of conceiving the relations between empire and anti-imperialism also unfold (Markarian 2005; Green 2010).

US imperialism in the Latin-American Cold War marked a moment in the economic, political, and cultural expansion of the United States in the region. As Grandin and others have noted, this imperial expansion occurred in the context of existing political and social conflicts. In this sense, the revolution/counterrevolution dichotomy seems valid as a general paradigm that shaped the gradual imperial ascent in the region. In contrast to what happened in Europe, social reformism initiatives in the style of European social democracy for the most part had little to do with imperial policies, although there were exceptions. The predominant element in US policy was associated with the social and political elites that resisted the initiatives of political democratization when such initiatives were connected with social democratization. The

different anti-imperialisms were specific ways of articulating those demands for democratization. Moreover, the imperial thrust was connected to a greater openness and dependency of Latin-American economies with respect to the US economy, and something similar can be said about culture. In this sense, the Cold War experience consolidated the political, economic, cultural, and military hegemony of the United States in the region. While in the 1930s and 1940s that hegemony appeared to be disputed with other world powers, by the late 1980s, there was no doubt that the area of influence of the United States extended across all of Latin America.

Although old versions that attempt to hold the United States up as the champion of freedom combating the threat of communism resurface cyclically, the most evident balance of the Cold War in Latin America reveals that it left a great number of political massacres furthered by the United States, as well as economic regimes characterized by greater inequality and more closely integrated to the economic hegemony of the United States.

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Cold War Imperialism and Anti-imperialist Protests at the End of the Cold War

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Synonyms

Cold war; Containment; Hegemony; Imperialism; Militarism; Solidarity

Definition

Although the emergence of the US as a global hegemon had roots in national and international conditions prior to the Second World War, that war provided it with the historical opportunity to expand its informal empire globally and establish a de facto global hegemony. Even before the end of the Second World War, the political elites of the

US were envisioning and planning for a post-war global order that would conform to long-standing economic and political imperatives for freer trade and a political order of pro-Western governments and institutions in the developed and colonial world. US global hegemony in the post-war period was not only a consequence of economic, political, and military superiority, but also a reflection of the diffusion of cultural and ideological orientations that advanced US moral and intellectual leadership. On the other hand, competition to US pre-eminence in the post-war period materialised in the form of the Soviet Union and the spectre of communism, especially as an alternative model for economic and social development. Not without its own messianic presumptions and imperial ambitions, the Soviet Union became the spur for a Cold War. In turn, the Cold War provided the US with an ideological cover for the domestic growth of a military-industrial complex and national security state while perpetuating its global hegemony. Under the geopolitical strategy of 'containment,' the US expanded the global reach of its interventions, especially in the post-colonial Third World, while tethering European and other allies, like Japan, to its imperial projects.

Although the emergence of the US as a global hegemon had roots in national and international conditions prior to the Second World War, that war provided it with the historical opportunity to expand its informal empire globally and establish a de facto global hegemony. Even before the end of the Second World War, the political elites of the US were envisioning and planning for a post-war global order that would conform to long-standing economic and political imperatives for freer trade and a political order of pro-Western governments and institutions in the developed and colonial world. Integral to the post-war global order were the economic arrangements promulgated at Bretton Woods in 1944 that established US financial dominance through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Additional post-war geopolitical projects were embedded in international and multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. For more covert imperial operations, the Central Intelligence Agency was developed to foster favourable governments around the world through interventions and regime change, albeit US interventions and regime changes predated the creation of the CIA (Kinzer 2006). US global hegemony in the post-war period was not only a consequence of economic, political, and military superiority, but also a reflection of the diffusion of cultural and ideological orientations that advanced US moral and intellectual leadership. Among those ideological postures was the articulation of the 'American Century'. On the eve of the US entrance into the Second World War, Henry Luce, editor and owner of *Time-Life* magazines, proclaimed the American Century in the pages of *Life*. Luce's vision of the American Century was predicated on the belief that the US had both the natural right and ordained responsibility to wield political and military power as a guarantor of progress and prosperity throughout the world. Accordingly, 'U.S. global dominance was presented as the natural result of historical progress, implicitly the pinnacle of European civilization, rather than the competitive outcome of political-economic power' (Smith 2005, p. 20).

On the other hand, competition to US pre-eminence in the post-war period materialised in the form of the Soviet Union and the spectre of communism, especially as an alternative model for economic and social development. Not without its own messianic presumptions and imperial ambitions, the Soviet Union became the spur for a Cold War. In turn, the Cold War provided the US with an ideological cover for the domestic growth of a military-industrial complex and national security state while perpetuating its global hegemony. Under the geopolitical strategy of 'containment,' the US expanded the global reach of its interventions, especially in the post-colonial Third World, while tethering European and other allies, like Japan, to its imperial projects. As noted by historian Bruce Cumings, 'the Cold War consisted of two systems: the containment project, providing security against both the enemy and ally; and the hegemonic project, providing for American leverage over the necessary resources

of our industrial rivals' (Cumings 1992, pp. 88–89).

Although the Cold War 'officially' ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 1980s witnessed flashpoints of conflict from Central America to the Middle East and from Afghanistan to Southern Africa. As a consequence of the aggressive foreign and military policies of the Reagan Administration, people in those regions were embroiled in 'proxy wars'. Even Europe did not escape the spectre of war, given the placement of nuclear-armed missile systems (McMahon 2003, pp. 143–168; Westad 2007, pp. 331–363). Yet, the transformations in Cold War imperialism, especially around intervention in Central America and nuclear weapons deployments, were not just the result of the decisions by the political elites and external and internal contradictions. Indeed, the active mobilisation by grass-roots campaigns implicitly challenged the legitimacy of Cold War imperialism and hastened its erosion. According to James Carroll (2006, p. 375), 'a groundswell of ordinary people brought the Cold War to a head'. However, as a consequence of how deeply Cold War imperialism was embedded in the politics and policies of post-1945 America, the anti-interventionist and nuclear disarmament campaigns of the 1980s were more often articulated as moral than political critiques, the latter implicit in the former. Therefore, in addition to an analysis of the anti-interventionist protests and projects against US policies in Central America, a comparative perspective will be offered in the instance of the nuclear disarmament campaigns in order to identify the national and ideological constraints that undermined long-term success of the anti-imperialist content of these protests while highlighting their transnational content.

In order to identify the anti-imperialist content of these protests in the 1980s, one needs to consider the transformations in US hegemony up to this period. Following Immanuel Wallerstein's interpretation of the 'Curve of American Power' in the post- 1945 period, one can see how the 1970s were a transformative moment in that hegemony. As a consequence of the defeat in Vietnam, the rise of OPEC, the declining legitimacy of US political systems, and the collapse of

the Bretton Woods system, fissures were created, both domestically and internationally, that opened up new terrains for ideologically driven economic and geopolitical strategies (Wallerstein 2006, pp. 77–94). In addition, the increasing globalisation of capital with its intensification of migrations and expansion of new systems of communication not only led to the reconstitution of imperial projects but also new sites of political engagement and resistance. Linked to what Christopher Chase-Dunn and Barry Gills call the 'globalization of resistance', new forms of grassroots participatory democracy were created that attempted 'to build bridges and solidarities' across national boundaries (Chase-Dunn and Gills 2005, p. 53).

What were the particular social spaces and political sites around which both national and transnational protests coalesced in the 1980s and the means by which they articulated their anti-imperialist critiques vis-à-vis the hegemonic project of US Cold War imperialism in Central America? Certainly, as noted by Odd Arne Westad, 'the Cold War system of domination was superimposed on nineteenth and early twentieth-century trends, especially as far as Central America and the Caribbean are concerned' (2007, p. 143). Beyond the continuities informing US imperial interventions in Central America, 'conservative activists used (Central America) to respond to the crisis of the 1970s, a crisis provoked not only by America's defeat in Vietnam but by a deep economic recession and a culture of skeptical antimilitarism and political dissent that spread in the war's wake' (Grandin 2007, p. 5).

Against this background, and facing insurgencies and revolutions throughout Central America, US policymakers turned to a variety of strategies to suppress and derail those insurgencies and revolutions. Although the Carter Administration tried to forestall the Sandinistas from coming to power in 1979 in Nicaragua, it was the Reagan Administration that committed itself to destroying the potential for the success of the Sandinista revolution. While the key to undermining the Sandinista Government was sponsoring the Contras, a collection of the remnants from Somoza's national guard and other disgruntled

individuals and groups, who, with the encouragement of Reagan operatives, wrecked havoc on the country while murdering and torturing Sandinista supporters, the US also pursued a strategy of influencing civil society in order to support and foster political opposition to the Sandinistas. Forced initially into covert campaigns against the Sandinistas because of active domestic opposition from religious and peace groups and their allies in Congress (who, in 1984, passed legislation prohibiting the funding of the Contras), the Reagan Administration pursued a wide range of activities from economic embargoes to illicit fund raising and arms brokering (embodied in the notorious Iran-Contra networks) to the internationally condemned mining of Nicaraguan harbours. At the same time, under the guise of 'democracy promotion', the Sandinista Government was kept under siege, losing in the process much of its capacity to deliver on its promises. Although the machinations of the Reagan Administration did face resolute opposition by the Sandinistas, its international supporters, and the US-based solidarity networks, such as Witness for Peace (more on these networks below), the Reagan Administration eventually managed to bleed Nicaragua and to alienate its besieged population into abandoning the Sandinista Government.

While the bleeding in Nicaragua, as a consequence of so-called low-intensity conflict, was insidious but steady, the bloodletting in El Salvador and Guatemala was even more evident and massive during the 1980s. In order to stem the growth of guerrilla movements in these two countries, the Reagan Administration relied on supporting authoritarian military regimes and their brutal counter-insurgency operations that, in turn, led to extensive repression and massacres. According to Greg Grandin, 'US allies in Central America during Reagan's two terms killed over 300,000 people, tortured hundreds of thousands, and drove millions into exile' (Grandin 2007, p. 71; on the Salvadoran and Guatemalan massacres, see p. 90 and passim). This violence and repression was rationalised by the Reagan Administration, especially by its UN ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, as essential to demonstrating the political and moral resolve of the US to

contest so-called 'totalitarian' regimes like the Sandinistas, and any insurgent movements in the 'soft underbelly' of US imperial hegemony.

As a consequence of the violence aided and abetted by the Reagan Administration in Central America and its framing of the conflicts in terms of Cold War threats to US hegemony, there rapidly developed solidarity campaigns and anti-interventionist protests. Those protests built upon the extensive networks of Central American migrants and refugees. In particular, Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrants, along with religious and political networks in the US, organised a number of human rights and solidarity groups in the 1980s that addressed the human rights abuses in Central America and the problems encountered by refugees and migrants from these countries. Those organisations included the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) and the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA). Given their stated solidarity efforts, continuing right-wing hysteria about 'communism', and budding government obsession with 'international terrorism', CISPES and other Central American solidarity activists were subjected to surveillance and even harassment and intimidation.

The fact that the Reagan Administration made Central America a prime target of its foreign policy meant that their framing of the public debates and the mainstream media parroting of Administration claims created an obvious opportunity to challenge and repudiate their ideological assertions (Grandin 2007, pp. 87–158; see also Smith 1996, esp. pp. 18–56). In effect, this protest was as much a consequence of the attempts by the Reagan Administration to set the public agenda as it was a result of the interactions between Central America and the US. It was out of these mobilised networks that key oppositional movements developed around Reagan's Central American policy. In addition to those mentioned above, three specific organisations – Sanctuary, Witness for Peace, and the Pledge of Resistance – mobilised tens of thousands of US citizens who were prepared to transgress whatever legal and/or legislative restrictions the Reagan Administration tried to

impose in order to manifest transnational solidarity.

One of the leaders of Witness for Peace underscored how Reagan's Cold War rhetoric on Nicaragua backfired, especially among those who visited that Central American country as members of Witness for Peace delegations: 'Ronald Reagan made such a big deal about Nicaragua . . ., and it wasn't hard to prove him wrong . . . We just took them down there and they could look around and see it wasn't a 'totalitarian dungeon' . . . We owe him a lot for the strength of the movement (because) his rhetoric was just so infuriating' (Nepstad 2004, p. 121). Another anti-interventionist and solidarity activist affirmed the power of visiting Nicaragua and observing how conditions there challenged the rhetoric and policies of the Reagan Administration: 'Nicaragua became the prime foreign policy obsession of the Reagan people and it was close enough that loads of people could go there and see for themselves. Ninety-nine percent of them came back disillusioned with the Reagan stance' (Nepstad 2004, p. 124). That disillusionment translated into both a discursive and action critique of Reagan's policies in Central America, implicitly and explicitly understood as functions of US imperialism.

As a consequence of the activities and protests of organisations like Witness for Peace, religious missionaries, Church delegations, and testimonies of Central American refugees, anti-interventionism and solidarity led to widespread and influential anti-imperialist protests. In particular, the first-hand stories of Central American refugees, who fled to the US to escape the violence in their countries in numbers close to one million during the 1980s, moved a lot of US citizens to become part of an anti-imperialist protest movement. After hearing some of these stories, one man asked a question many other listeners must have repeated: 'Why is our government sending all this money to a place where people were being slaughtered?' Another woman testified that the refugee narratives 'gave people a human face to the reality in Central America, to this foreign policy debate that was going on in Washington' (Nepstad 2004, pp. 131–133; see also Smith 1996, pp. 133–168). Taking note of how US policies during this period victimised Central Americans and how and why tens of thousands of US citizens 'committed themselves fully to the side of the victims', in a visceral and cognitive sense, Van Gosse helps to situate the solidarity networks in the context of moral protest (Van Gosse 1988, p. 43).

The impact was acknowledged by those protesting Reagan policies and those inside the Administration. One woman activist noted: 'We had a friend who worked in the State Department as this time who, with his wife, had been traveling around in all kinds of little towns throughout the US. He told us he couldn't understand before why this movement was so strong. Yet, in every single town they went to, at some bookstore, or on a corner or a bulletin board somewhere, there was an announcement of an event with someone who had been to Nicaragua, or someone who was coming to speak on El Salvador. He said it was everywhere, everywhere' (Nepstad 2004, p. 127). Catholic missionaries, in particular, motivated by the spirit of Vatican II and liberation theology, translated their experiences in Central America into active critiques of the Reagan Administration's policies. One Maryknoll nun's missionary experience in Nicaragua led her to conclude: 'I was very aware that there was something wrong with US policy' (p. 57). In turn, those religious orders and their lay supporters put increasing pressure on Congress to contest Reagan policies in Central America. William Casey, Reagan's first CIA director, deplored the influence that religious networks had on Congress, asserting 'if Tip O'Neill [the Democratic Representative from Massachusetts who was speaker of the House] didn't have Maryknoll nuns who wrote letters, we would have a Contra program' (p. 53). The Reagan Administration's first-term assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs also deplored the impact that religious organisations and their moral critiques had on Central American policies: 'Taking on the churches is really tough. We don't normally think of them as political opponents, so we don't know how to handle them. They are really formidable' (p. 165).

Certainly, the faith-based communities created a moral context within which antiimperialist protests emerged. According to Sharon Nepstad, 'protest was not simply a strategic means of changing US foreign policy; it was an expression of commitment to ... religious principles and values' (p. 161). Using religious discourse helped to inform and motivate this constituency, as well as moving these individuals and groups to pressure political representatives both locally and in Washington. As a consequence of this activism and pressure, the Reagan Administration faced legal constraints on its Central American policies (e.g. the Boland Amendment that prevented Congressional funding of the Contras) that amounted to a provisional success for anti-interventionist activists. Unfortunately, as asserted by one study of Reagan policies towards Central America: 'Had the White House actually followed the provisions of the US Constitution and other statutes, the movement could have claimed much greater success, especially with Nicaragua' (Smith 1996, p. 372). Instead, Reagan's White House subverted both US and international law. The pursuit of these illegal activities by the Reagan Administration eventually led to criminal prosecution, especially for those involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. In effect, an anti-interventionist politics clearly influenced and, indeed, altered the terms of the debate and imperialist policies in Central America in the 1980s.

Another transnational protest of the 1980s owed its coalescence to a different aspect of Reagan's foreign policy. As a direct response to Reagan's intent to expand the placement of nuclear weapons and missiles in Western Europe, the traditional peace movements in the US and Europe saw a huge increase in their ranks. Although the new weapons systems, such as the MX and Pershing II missiles, had been given the green light by the Carter Administration in the late 1970s, Reagan entered the presidency in 1981 committed to ramping up not only the development and deployment of these and other new nuclear weapons systems but also the Cold War rhetoric. In particular, the unilateral and bellicose assertion by the Reagan Administration to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in a number of Western European countries as a warning about US first-strike capabilities aroused massive opposition, resulting in demonstrations in late 1981 and early 1982 by hundreds of thousands in Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and Amsterdam. For peace activists in the US, such European activism operated as a potential catalyst. Wrote one such activist: 'This movement has created hope and therein lies the hope for us all. They send us a challenge: Why do you not scream, America?' (Meyer 1990, p. 75).

Certainly, the Western European demonstrations and subsequent anti-nuke campaigns inspired US peace activists, as well as garnering attention from the mainstream media (pp. 124–126). As the US Nuclear Freeze campaign kicked into gear and mobilised for what would be the spectacular demonstration in June 1982 of one million people in New York City, it appeared that a significant protest would emerge. However, there were clear limitations to the Nuclear Freeze movement in the US that prevented it from developing a full sense of anti-imperialist politics, unlike what transpired in Western Europe. As argued by David Cortright and Ron Pagnucco, 'The US sociopolitical environment made it difficult for the (Freeze) to move beyond a bilateral Cold War orientation' (Cortright and Pagnucco 1997, p. 82). In highlighting some of the developments and limitations of the Freeze movement, as well as particular eruptions within the peace activist and anti-imperialist networks in the US and Europe during this time, the degree to which such protests were either able to emerge or hampered in their emergence will be underscored. Such an investigation should provide further insight into the formation of transnational solidarity and the globalisation of resistance against Cold War imperialism.

Of course, print communication and global exchanges by peace activists at the time provided vehicles for constituting transnational protests. Such intellectuals and activists as British historian E.P. Thompson and Australian paediatrician Helen Caldicott could be seen as cognitive catalysts in their work. Thompson wrote an impassioned essay in the January 1981 edition of the US progressive journal *The Nation* which implored

citizens of the US to mobilise against the installation of cruise missiles in Europe (Meyer 1990, pp. 151–152). While there were many more voices added to his, the eloquence of his plea and the persistence of the work of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), for which Thompson worked, inspired activists in the US. Caldicott's revival of the organisation, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and her outspoken dramatic appeals against nuclear weapons and nuclear power also had a major impact on public awareness (p. 102).

However, to the degree that public awareness was also shaped by the mainstream media, it placed certain constraints on the Freeze movement and its capacity to project its own political analysis and strategies. As the movement gained momentum in 1982, especially at the grass-roots level with New England town meetings passing resolutions aimed at calling on the US and USSR to impose a freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles, both television news and mainstream newspapers began to run extensive news stories that actually helped to generate public sympathy and support. Nonetheless, many of those stories conveyed a media frame that trivialised and distorted the Freeze movement in a way that depoliticised that movement and added to its own internal contradictions (pp. 119–135). Although those contradictions were evident with the development of the Freeze as a public campaign to attract the middle class and lobby Congress for arms control measures, 'the media had legitimated and appropriated the nuclear fear underlying much freeze support and had translated it into a humanitarian concern that had little to do with policy. This concern was expressed as so moderate and apolitical that it could continue to demonstrate very high levels of support in public opinion polls without having any effect on politics or policy' (p. 133).

Certainly, for those who had been among the founders of the Freeze movement, such as Randall Forsberg, their vision of the movement did embody a more radical and transnational approach. In her presentation to the World Council of Churches International Public Hearing

on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament in November 1981, Forsberg discussed the need to 'mobilize the middle class, to give them hope and to bring them actively into the ranks of those who oppose the arms race'. Such a mobilisation, then, 'would show that human beings can direct their own destiny; that we can harness the arms race; that together, we are stronger than the military-industrial complex . . .. It would demonstrate that we can "democratize" and therefore eventually abolish the ancient, pernicious, elite institutions of warfare and exploitative foreign policy' (quoted in Meyer 1990, p. 162; on Forsberg, see Martin 2011, pp. 5–9). In effect, Forsberg attempted to create a new constituency beyond the previous limited efforts by scientists and policymakers to control nuclear arms. Yet, Forsberg's idealistic rhetoric came crashing down around the narrowly constructed class constituency of the white middle class and the almost exclusive focus on lobbying Congress and electoral politics, impeding in the process the anti-imperialist thrust of the protest.

Nonetheless, within the arena of nuclear arms control, Forsberg and the Freeze influenced the national agenda. Commenting on the role of local and congressional Freeze resolutions, one of the most outspoken congressional Freeze supporters, Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusett), noted: 'Within a very brief time, the Freeze had taken education at the grass roots and translated it into political muscle at the ballot box, delivering to the White House a resounding vote of no confidence in its nuclear buildup' (quoted in Cortright 1993, p. 21). Responding to this shift in public opinion, the Reagan Administration first tried to paint the Freeze as a tool of Moscow, but with increasing support from religious leaders, members of Congress, and former government officials, this charge was difficult to verify and sustain. Instead, according to one White House speech-writer, Reagan's rhetoric was readjusted: 'We tried to portray Reagan not as the crazy cowboy . . . but as having a more thoughtful position' (p. 94). Responding to the clamour over the Freeze, Reagan declared as early as 1982: 'To those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say I'm with you' (p. 95; on the Freeze and Reagan's

attempt to co-opt its rhetoric, in particular, see Carroll 2006, pp. 385–395).

Such rhetoric continued through the 1984 presidential election and into Reagan's second term, culminating in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meetings of 1985 and 1986 which, in turn, led to the agreement in 1987 between the US and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, specifically entitled the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty. To the hawks in the Reagan Administration, such as Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Reagan's nuclear policy 'metamorphosed ... into extreme anti-nuclear talk that resembled the nuclear bashers of SANE' (Cortright 1993, p. 98). On the other hand, Gorbachev acknowledged that without the anti-nuke activism the INF might never have been concluded. Moreover, according to one study of the impact of the INF and all that led up to it, 'the disarmament agreement was the central catalyst for the end of the Cold War' (Mekata 2006, p. 190; on the overall impact of the Freeze movement, see Wittner 2003).

While gaining legitimacy and creating a national agenda around arms control, the Freeze deliberately distanced itself from those peace and justice activists who wanted a broader and more radical and anti-imperialist agenda. This was especially evident in the June 1982 demonstration when voices urging denunciation of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and condemnation of US intervention throughout the Third World were dismissed (on the dissent within the 12 June coalition around such issues, see Mekata 2006, pp. 184–188). In effect, the Freeze created a public awareness and movement with limited national goals while constraining those who wished to generate transnational protests linked to anti-imperialism and global resistance.

On the other hand, the context out of which the Freeze operated did motivate other groups and networks, some of which existed prior to the Freeze, to move towards antiimperialist transnational protest. One such group was the Women's Pentagon Actions (WPA). Growing out of the radical pacifist organisation, the War Resister's League, the WPA mounted its first demonstration in November 1980, shortly after the election of Reagan. Poet and activist Grace Paley announced their solidarity with women and oppressed people around the planet, underscoring in the process their desire to build another world. The second demonstration in November 1981, built on the inspiration of the activism in Western Europe, linked their efforts to express a feminist anti-militarism with a larger political perspective.

While the WPA with its global vision was central to an emergent transnational protest, it was, nevertheless, marginal to the larger anti-nuke movement in the US. On the other hand, what materialised in Western Europe did qualify as an anti-imperialist transnational protest. As a consequence of its ability to look beyond the bilateralism and Cold War politics that constrained the anti-nuke forces in the US, those in Western Europe – such as the CND in Great Britain, the Interchurch Peace Council in the Netherlands, and the Green Party in West Germany – were able not only to challenge the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in their countries but also to mobilise around a global vision of disarmament and peace. In Great Britain, women set up a peace camp outside of the Greenham Common US Air Force base in 1981 that became a lightning rod for transnational women peace activists. In West Germany, a traditional Easter Peace March dating back to 1960 that had been almost moribund gained momentum in the 1980s, reaching half a million by 1986 (Mekata, pp. 188–189; Rochon 1988, pp. 3–8, 11–14 and passim). Hence, at local and national levels, anti-imperialist transnational protests were flourishing in Western Europe as a response to the nuclear threat.

One of the most significant catalysts for that mobilisation and for an anti-imperialist transnational protest was one of the founders of the West German Green Party, Petra Kelly. Born in 1947 in Bavaria, Kelly adopted her last name from her stepfather, an American Army officer. Educated in both Germany and the US, Kelly became the perfect bridge to make transnational connections after she returned to West Germany in 1970 and began her work with the Greens at the end of the decade. That involvement and its connections to

the anti-nuke movement, chronicled in the compilation of her writings and speeches in *Fighting for Hope,* offers further insights into the political parameters of the transnational and anti-imperialist protest that contested the Cold War imperialism of the US *and* the Soviet Union (Kelly 1984).

Having spent extensive time in the US and being thoroughly versed in ongoing political activities among Catholic anti-nuke activists, Petra Kelly acknowledged the necessary links to America. 'The changes that have been taking place in the US, especially among American Catholics, have not sunk in yet over here. But we should look towards America with hope as well as apprehension. Over there, security is not necessarily identical with weapons, and people have not yet surrendered to a provincial cynicism where sentimentality is mistaken for morality, as is so often the case here' (p. 7). For Kelly, then, the moral witnessing and dramatic actions by Catholic activists served as an inspiration to those in Germany. Throughout her writings, Kelly cited the civil disobedience of priests Daniel and Philip Berrigan (pp. 61–62), Molly Rush (p. 62), their fellow Catholic co-conspirator who entered a General Electric weapons factory to hammer on a missile nose cone, and several Catholic bishops –Hunthausen of Seattle (pp. 59–60) and Matthiessen of Amarillo (p. 64) – who not only urged their parishioners to refuse working in any nuclear weapons facility but also declared, in the case of Hunthausen, a refusal to pay part of federal taxes as a protest against Pentagon weapons manufacturing. She also quoted from the long statement made at the first Women's Pentagon Action in November 1980. All of these instances were intended to move her German compatriots to new levels of militancy against the weapons of nuclear war being installed in their own backyard.

On the other hand, Kelly was also cognisant that there was a global movement embracing the power of non-violence not only as a form of resistance but also as a new way of living. In her essay 'The Power of Non-Violence' (pp. 27–32), Kelley cited both well-known classic and lesser-known recent advocates of non-violence from Thoreau to Gandhi to King to Cesar Chavez and German Catholic women activists Dorothee Solle and Ingeborg Drewitz. In addition, she alluded to wide-ranging examples of non-violent resistance from Poland to Bolivia, all of which reinforced her point about the constitutive role of non-violence in shaping what constituted transnational anti-imperialist protest. Bringing all of this home to the Greens, the emergent political movement in West Germany that Kelly helped to build, she posited: 'The Greens seek a new life-style for the Western world, as well as in their own personal lives. They would like to see an alternative way of life without exploitation, and they aim for non-violent relationships with others and with themselves . . ., relationships free from fear and based on mutual support' (p. 20).

Beyond those personal and social transformations, Kelly envisioned the Greens as a different kind of political party, one she designated as an 'anti-party party' (p. 17). Clearly, there was some thought being given to thinking and acting outside of a limited institutional framework. As she noted, 'Nuclear energy, the nuclear state, and the growing use of military force threaten our lives. We feel obliged to take public, non-violent action and to engage in civil disobedience outside and inside parliament, throwing a spotlight on the inhumanity of the system' (p. 18). For Kelly, it was the job of the Greens to expand and revitalise democracy through protests connected to anti-imperialism and global resistance. 'We are living at a time when authoritarian ruling elites are devoting more and more attention to their own prospects', she Kelly contended, 'and less and less to the future of mankind. We have no option but to take a plunge into greater democracy' (p. 11).

At almost the exact same time as Kelly was articulating the need for greater democracy, a leading intellectual luminary of the Hungarian democratic opposition, George Konrad, was completing his book Anti-Politics, which shared similar sentiments about war and peace and the need to get beyond the rule by authoritarian and imperialist elites, whether in the East or West. 'Anti-politics', argued Konrad, 'offers a radical alternative to the philosophy of a nuclear ultima ratio . . .. Anti-politics is the ethos of civil society

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and civil society is the antithesis of military society. There are more or less militarised societies – societies under the sway of nationstates whose officials consider total war one of the possible moves in the game. Thus, military society is the reality, civil society is the utopia' (cited in Kaldor 2003, pp. 57–58). Along with other Eastern European dissident intellectuals, from Adam Michnik in Poland to Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, civil society became the beacon around which transnational protests mobilised.

Linking the emergent ideas about civil society in Eastern Europe with the ferment in Western Europe around war and peace in the early 1980s, Mary Kaldor analysed the common thread of a demand to end the stultifying politics of the Cold War and to develop a mutual solidarity in the creation of another world (2003, pp. 50–77). For her, E.P. Thompson provided the clearest articulation of this need for mutual solidarity. 'We must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East and West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange', asserted Thompson. 'We must learn to be loyal not to East or West but to each other and must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state' (quoted in 2003, p. 61).

From Kaldor's perspective, the political ferment unleashed by thinking beyond the binaries of the Cold War and the reinvention of civil society in a transnational context opened up new frames of meaning and new opportunity structures for citizens and nonstate actors to intervene on the global level. Thus, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had been prepared by the dismantling of Cold War mental blockades. According to Kaldor, 'the year 1989 did represent a profound rupture with the past that is difficult for us to comprehend. In the stirrings of thought that developed beneath the structures of the Cold War were the beginnings of some new concepts and practices that can help us analyze our immensely complex contemporary world' (2003, p. 77). For Kaldor, the key concept was global civil society that 'offers a way of understanding the process of globalization in terms of subjective human agency instead of a

disembodied deterministic process of "interconnectedness"' (2003, p. 142). In effect, new actors in a variety of formats and from diverse sites were prepared to engender and expand these emergent anti-imperialist and global protests beyond the 1980s.

However, while the tools of social media that blossomed in the 1990s and into the 21st century facilitated and complicated the emergence of new and diverse anti-imperialist protests, the residual effects of Cold War imperialism in the so-called 'war on terror' impeded those protests in the US. Perhaps, nowhere was the role of the new social media with its attendant transnational global consciousness and connections more evident than in the massive global demonstrations that mobilised tens of millions of people worldwide on 15 February 2003. As a response to the Bush Administration's threats to attack Iraq, protest marches were organised with the aid of new networks and technology that facilitated what has been called the first truly global anti-war demonstration. From Barcelona to Berlin to Buenos Aires to Bangkok, from Manila to Mexico City to Moscow to Madrid, from Nairobi to New York, from Sao Paulo to Sydney to Seoul to San Francisco, from Toronto to Tokyo to Tel Aviv to Tegucigalpa; in short, in hundreds of cities around the world, on every continent, millions marched, constituting in the process a post-modern version of an anti-imperialist protest. According to Joss Hands, 'the sheer diversity of participants across the globe was self-evidently not sharing a specific set of localised reasons for action but rather, on a global level, the marches were co-ordinated through an orchestration of aims, which were loose enough to mobilise the common interests of all participants: peace, democracy, and human rights, all made concrete by the injustice and illegality of the pending war' (Hands 2006, p. 232).

Even with this massive outpouring, the persistence of Cold War imperial policies in the aftermath of 9/11, especially in the so-called 'war on terror' and the US military intervention in Afghanistan, undermined the capacity to sustain

and develop such protests, especially in the US. Although the US attack on Afghanistan had supposedly been in response to the Taliban support for Osama bin Laden, the history of US involvement in Afghanistan and the actual prosecution of the war, under both Bush and Obama, once more demonstrated the residual repercussions of imperialist policies. Those policies, originally rooted in Cold War gamesmanship, had their covert inception in 1979 with the CIA supporting Afghan warlords and Muslim guerrillas fighting against a Soviet backed government in Kabul. Working in the 1980s with the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, the Reagan Administration began funding the mujahidin most favoured by the ISI, among them, Osama bin Laden. When the Taliban began to achieve prominence in the guerrilla war in the 1990s, the US under Clinton continued its support out of the desire, among other reasons, to help US oil companies construct a pipeline that would avoid going through Iran.

Through now almost a decade of US military intervention in Afghanistan, the war's lingering ghosts of Cold War imperialism are haunting a land often referred to as the 'graveyard of empires'. However, as the body count of dead in Afghanistan mounts, there has been a failure to develop robust antiimperialist protests. While there have been protests against the war in Afghanistan, they have been mostly sporadic and marginal. Certainly, in an era of heightened national security and increased privatisation, there may be a hesitancy to take up the banner of anti-imperialist protest. Given the remoteness of Afghanistan, the lack of pre-existing solidarity networks, the complications in identifying clear allies and alliances, the rise of anti-Islamic prejudices, and the deliberate marginalisation of the conflict by mainstream media, one can better understand why such an anti-imperialist project has not coalesced around the war in Afghanistan. And, yet, if this US imperial venture in Afghanistan and throughout Central Asia is to be challenged, one must recognise that the US military machine with its additional privatised

and secret operations will not collapse on its own, even as imperial overstretch erodes its hegemony. Perhaps, as noted by Mahmood Mamdani, 'Humanity is now left with a challenge: how to subdue and hold accountable the awesome power that the US built up during the Cold War'. Indeed, the final disappearance of Cold War imperialism still awaits more persistent and efficacious anti-imperialist protests.

Cross-References

▶ Cold War and Latin America
▶ Imperialism and Settler Colonialism: Xenophobia and Racism in North America
▶ Non-Aligned Movement (Incorporating Yugoslavia)

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Cold War Politics

Cold War, The

Colombia

C

Communist Party of Greece (KKE)

Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path

Communist Party of Turkey

Comparative Advantage

Compensation

Conflict

Conquering

Conservation

Conservation as Economic Imperialism

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Synonyms

Carbon markets; Climate change; Conservation; Debt-for-nature swaps; Dispossession; Indigenous communities; Payment for environmental services; Protected areas; REDD+

Definition

Environmental conservation is often perceived as a positive outcome, particularly in the context of climate change and extreme environmental degradation. However, the notion of conservation requires interrogation. Under colonial and postcolonial states, people living in resource-rich environments have been subject to dispossession both in the context of development as well as conservation. The natural environment, conventionally exploited for economic growth, has been conserved in formerly colonised states by excluding local communities with violence or the threat of violence, and regulation, all of which represent a hangover of colonial practices. Newer international markets in carbon offsets and credits offer additional avenues for accumulation and profit-making, the burden of which has been borne by indigenous and non-indigenous communities in former colonies. These conservation practices often display a combination of physical or psychological violence, regulation, and market incentives. Conservation is initiated or demanded by institutions of global capital, in conjunction with environmental NGOs, and facilitated by the state. These practices represent a loss of autonomy and democratic decision-making for local communities that may be both dependent on these natural environments for their livelihoods, and may conserve it as part of their aesthetic, spiritual, and

materialist practices. Resistance against both global capital-led environmental degradation and conservation of nature then becomes a space of anti-imperialist struggle.

Introduction

Protected areas (PAs) have historically been viewed as a desirable (and sometimes the only) way to engage in conservation of forests and biodiversity. In 2010, the World Database on Protected Areas recorded nationally designated PAs of 17 million km^2 (or 12.7%) of the world's terrestrial area, excluding Antarctica (including inland waters) around the world. A higher proportion of total area of the 'developing' world (13.3%), is classified as PAs than the 'developed' region (11.6%), with the Latin American region offering the highest level of 'protection' (20.4%) (Bertzky et al. 2012). Popular perception holds that PAs act as bulwark against overextraction by capitalists as well as the local populace.

Since European colonialism, however, the colonised and residents of dominated states, on the one hand, have been fighting against capitalist over-extraction (although this is not to suggest that they have not been incorporated into a consumer society). On the other hand, they have been resisting the imposition of conservation. Forest conservation is viewed as yet another way to control nature and the labour of the dominated population. While conservation is desirable from an ecological perspective, the specific form and nature of conservation require attention because they can mask imperialist aspirations. Conservation under these circumstances would either provide a source of capital accumulation or safeguard imperialist interests, but lead to what David Harvey refers to as accumulation-by-dispossession (Harvey 2003). The incorporation of conservation into the imperialist project forms the basis of resistance against conservation by regulation as well as conservation through market forms. In the interests of brevity, the discussion will focus on the incorporation of forest conservation into imperialism.

Fortress Conservation

Early colonialism was characterised by ecological imperialism (Crosby 1993) and highly intensive extraction of valuable minerals and biological matter (e.g. Clark and Bellamy-Foster 2009) to profit the colonisers. This effected a change in land use across vast swathes of forestland to agricultural and mining purposes. With increasing scarcity of raw materials affecting capitalist production, colonial governments adopted 'scientific' management of forests that dictated land use and land management practices. In the US, while scientific management was adopted with a view to stemming unbridled laissez faire capitalism in the interests of enhanced efficiency (Guha and Gadgil 1989), scientific management in the colonies maintained its efficiency objective but, without a thriving capitalist sector, directed its ire toward the 'natives'. Thus, indigenous (and in British India non-indigenous but local) populations, with their seemingly bewildering and overlapping usufruct rights and incomprehensible use of forest land, were viewed as anathema to advancing planned use and were often removed through the threat or actual use of violence. Thus, the dominant policy was to engage in fortress conservation and the forcible expropriation of the forest commons from its inhabitants.

For instance, the British in India enforced state monopoly by nationalising forests in the late 1800s. The main objective of the Indian Forest Act, 1865 and its subsequent amendment in 1878 was to establish PAs to secure a steady increase in timber production and silvicultural improvement. Forests were categorised according to their commercial value, and the degree to which local communities were excluded was determined accordingly. Images of severe scarcity, famine and environmental annihilation were invoked by colonial foresters to justify the severe social and political costs of expropriating the commons. Indian teak was used in building ships employed by the military in the Anglo-French wars in the early nineteenth century (ibid.). Also, timber extraction for railway sleepers, required to build an extensive rail network in India, exhausted large swathes of forests in the country. The rail network

transported raw materials needed by capitalists and the British state especially during the two world wars. Forests were thus transformed into instruments of state power that allowed the imperialists to discipline the local populations, and at the same time incorporate nature into the capitalist project and aid in war efforts.

The actions of the imperial state were consistent with seeking to resolve the crisis of capitalism. The resolution was through a piece of legislation but enforcement was assumed through means of violence and conflict. However, 'conservation' was undertaken not as a result of a crisis of over-accumulation, but a crisis in the availability of raw materials to fulfil the needs of the imperial state (Magdoff 2003). Colonial policies formed the basis of post-Independence neo-Malthusian forest conservation policies in Asia and Africa (e.g. Fairhead and Leach 2005).

Markets and Forests

While post-Independence states were free of direct control, imperialist interests continue to influence their economic and forest policies. This influence was accentuated with the debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s. Due to the subsequent structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF and World Bank, many economies (willingly or by force) liberalised their trade and investment regimes. Conservation policies were not immune to the tremendous impact of neo-liberalisation consequent to the intervention of the international economic regime. There has been a change in economic ideology, and discourses of the state and local communities. Despite the alleged progressive agenda of community participation and a 'bottom-up' approach, the associated focus on decentralisation has opened the field for market-based forest conservation (McCarthy 2005), and allowed international development and conservation agencies direct access to their intended audience. In many countries, PAs are heavily financially dependent on international organisations. In 2003, only 3% of funds for PAs in Bolivia were supplied by the Bolivian state (La Prensa 2005 cited in Boillat et al. 2008). Furthermore,

in many countries PAs are administered directly by international conservation NGOs (Boillat et al. 2008). This has not diminished the role of the state, which, with its monopoly on legalised violence and significant control on instruments of ideology, facilitates accumulation by dispossession.

Debt-for-Nature Swaps

The debt crises led to significant intervention by the Paris Club, a group of 19 creditor countries formed to resolve and manage international debt. The Paris Club includes debt swaps, including debt-for-nature swaps (DNSs), in its arsenal of debt management instruments. DNSs usually involve an international agency that buys the debt of a 'developing' country in the secondary market. It then sells the discounted debt back to the debtor country for local currency. This money is used by a local government agency or environmental group for use in an environmental programme agreed on by the agency buying the debt and the debtor country. In addition, swap agreements may also include the bank holding the debt. While the Paris Club has been forced to engage in debt forgiveness in some cases, its interventions have proved to be a boon for surplus capital (Harvey 2003). In 1987, the first DNS was agreed on between Conservation International, a US conservation group, and Bolivia. In exchange for the debt, Bolivia agreed to expand the 334,000 acre Beni Biosphere Reserve by 3.7 million acres. By 1993, conservation groups had raised $128 million at a cost of $47 million for 31 environmental projects primarily in Latin America and Africa (World Bank 1993 cited in Didia 2001).

DNS has been made possible by multiple actors – environmental NGOs, development agencies, and governments of the creditor and debtor countries. It has also allowed for a reorganisation of internal social relations to accommodate the needs of international capital looking for a spatio-temporal fix (Harvey 2003). For instance, the Canada/Costa Rica DNS investment was signed in 1995 and the conservation was to be overseen by the Costa Rican National Institute for Biodiversity (INBio), a Costa Rican NGO, and the

Canadian Worldwide Wildlife Fund (WWF-C). It led to the creation of the Arenal project over an area of 250,561 hectares, of which 116,690 hectares were declared as PA; local inhabitants from 108 communities were expelled (Isla 2001). Conservation of trees on this land is sold as pollution credits to countries including Canada. Local inhabitants, previously engaged in subsistence production, are employed by INBio under the direction of the World Bank and are 'service providers'. The employed inhabitants produce inventories of local species which are used in bioprospecting for new pharmaceutical and agricultural products (ibid.). The Arenal project also promotes microenterprises aimed at women's participation in small-scale marketing of biodiversity financed by international funds at an interest rate of 20–30% (ibid.).

As part of the Paris Club, the US has also played a significant role. The US Congress authorised three channels through which DNS was put into practice: (a) in 1989, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID; a federal government agency that disburses and administers foreign aid, and which reportedly has close ties to the CIA) was permitted to purchase commercial debt of foreign countries as part of a DNS agreement; (b) DNS transactions were included as part of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), which promoted free-market reform (Bush 1990), which restructured or sold Latin American debt equivalent to nearly $1 billion (of the total $1.8 billion) and generated $178 million in local currency for expenditure on environmental and developmental projects (Sheikh 2006); (c) an expansion of the EAI model resulted in the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) to include tropical forests around the world, not just Latin America. Since 1998, this has led to the restructuring of loan worth $82.6 million and is expected to raise $136 million in local currency for tropical forest conservation in the next 12–26 years (ibid.). Eligibility for DNS transactions under EAI and TFCA include multiple criteria including co-operation with the US on drug control. Eligible countries are also required to undertake a structural adjustment loan or its equivalent from the IBRD (International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development) or IDA (International Development Association), or an agreement with the IMF and to implement economic reforms to ensure an open investment regime (ibid.).

As a debt-reduction instrument, DNS has not lived up to its promise (Didia 2001; Sheikh 2006). Nevertheless, advocates argue that it stimulates economic growth, international trade, and foreign investment in erstwhile low-income countries. On the issue of conservation, advocates argue that it generates significant conservation funds, though there has not been much evidence to show that this actually reduces over-extraction or increases forest conservation (Sheikh 2006). DNS agreements have resulted in conflict in some cases, especially due to the role of international agencies. In the Beni Biosphere Reserve, for instance, one result of the DNS was the formation of the Central de Pueblos Indigenas del Bolivia. This organisation accused the DNS of contravening the claims of the indigenous people who had lived on the land for centuries. The DNS deal collapsed in 1990 after negotiations between the indigenous Chicame people and the Bolivian government (Hobbs 2012). It was later revealed that government agencies involved in the negotiation received significant funding from concessionaire logging companies that would have potentially been affected by the Reserve (ibid). It nevertheless does not detract from the fact that indigenous communities would also have been subject to the exclusionary policy.

PES, REDD+ and Carbon Sequestration

Following the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, consecutive rounds of the Conference of Parties (COP) negotiations under the UN Framework Climate Change Convention have failed to arrive at any agreement on the limits on carbon emissions for individual countries. However, there is considerable excitement at the prospect of creating carbon offsets that can be traded in the market. One mechanism through which carbon offsets could be produced is carbon sequestration, presently referred to as REDD+ (reducing emissions

from deforestation and forest degradation). It combines offsets with payment for environmental services (PES), which compensates those individuals who contribute labour to the provision of environmental services (WWF 2006). It is expected that providing a market for carbon offsets will compensate forest communities for conserving forests and thus provide an incentive to maintain or restore them (UN-REDD Programme 2010).

The conservation organisation WWF has recently undertaken to experiment with REDD+ projects by creating protected areas (PAs) in 15.5 million hectares of land spread across three key tropical forest regions. These include the Maï-Ndombe region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Kutai Barat District of East Kalimantan Province in Indonesia, and the Madre de Dios region of Peru; these constitute three of the five largest rainforest countries in the world. WWF's report claims the use of participatory planning, recognition of customary rights, and community participation in decision making (WWF 2013). Including funds from recipient countries and the US (in the case of Indonesia), financing is expected through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, a World Bank programme created specially to facilitate REDD+-type projects; and Forest Investment Program of the Climate Investment Funds, of which the World Bank is a Trustee and has fiduciary responsibilities. Funds from the Forest Investment Program are disbursed through multilateral development banks such as the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, and International Finance Corporation. The WWF report does not mention the amount of carbon credits or certified emissions reductions, possibly because currently there is no fully developed and stable carbon market.

Despite the enthusiasm for REDD+, not everyone is convinced of its desirability. Peru, one of the countries in which WWF has undertaken the project, had received $350 million between 2008 and 2011 to implement REDD+ projects (Llanos and Feather 2011). A group of indigenous organisations affected by these projects released an analysis of REDD+ mechanism. One of the leaders of these organisations stated:

> We live here in the Peruvian Amazon where there is a new boom, a new fever just like for rubber and oil but this time for carbon and REDD. The companies, NGOs and brokers are breeding, desperate for that magic thing, the signature of the village chief on the piece of paper about carbon credits, something that the community doesn't understand well but in doing so the middle-man hopes to earn huge profits on the back of our forests and our ways of life but providing few benefits for communities. We denounce this 'carbon piracy' that is one side of the reality of REDD in the Peruvian Amazon. The other side is the big programs of the environmental NGOs, the World Bank, the IDB and the government who promise to act with transparency and respect our collective rights but will this include the respect of our ancestral territories and self-determination? The safeguards and guidelines of the big projects always say that they will respect our rights but the reality is always different. (Alberto Pizango Chota, President of the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP) in Llanos and Feather 2011)

The report notes that more than 10 million hectares have been handed out to various timber, tourism, REDD+ and conservation projects to the detriment of indigenous communities. Notwithstanding criticism of the implementation of REDD+ projects and carbon offsets, the report also discusses the pressure put on indigenous communities to waive their rights to land on highly unfavourable terms; contracts are complex and rendered in English to an illiterate, Spanish speaking audience. Thus, the situation is set up to facilitate land grabs. The report further claims that REDD+ proponents have been manipulating the representation of costs and benefits, and that there is usually either no community consultation or that they are held only after the projects have been put in place (ibid.). Many REDD+ and REDD+-type projects have experienced land grabs, violent expropriation, human rights violations and militarisation; for instance, Papua New Guinea's indigenous leader was reportedly forced to abdicate carbon rights of his tribe's forest at gunpoint (Bond 2012).

Payment for environmental services, which forms the basis of REDD+ projects, requires monetising the value of nature and commodifying

it for market exchange. The benefits of these projects to global capital are manifold. The imposition and rationalisation of property rights, whether vested in the individual or community, provides a lien on the extraction of further surplus value. It could be used as collateral to incur debt (Mandel et al. 2009; Sullivan 2013) and it could lead to real-estate appreciation. Similar conservation projects around the world could potentially absorb surplus capital and hence represent capitalised surplus value, which would be incorporated into the reproduction of global capitalism (see Harvey 2003; Kemp 1967). According to a WWF report, while REDD+ projects only amassed $7.2 billion in actual or pledged funds by 2010, forest conservation could potentially tap into a $100 trillion bond market (Cranford et al. 2011). The actual impacts on sustaining nature and poverty alleviation, the stated objectives of REDD+, may be beside the point.

This explains the enthusiasm for REDD+ even though climate negotiations have been a failure (ibid.). The World Bank has consequently taken the lead in its implementation well before a global agreement about its use and framework has been reached. In addition, unlike previous fortress conservation projects, it is expected that there will be less opposition to conservation efforts even if it is not always clear what the benefits are for the local populace. In cases when local communities are resistant to such projects, the state steps in and uses a combination of physical or psychological violence, regulation, or dangles the possibility of higher market income.

Conservation as imperialism

Control of raw materials has been cited as one of the motivating factors propelling the control of distant territories (Luxemburg 1913/2003; Magdoff 2003). In contemporary times, however, imperialism has been manifested not through direct control of territories but through indirect control, influence of economic policies, and international relations. Capitalist businesses inherently attempt to manage risks through the control of raw materials among other factors, to influence not only the profit rate but also manage capital investment and competitive pressures (Magdoff 2003). This increases monopoly power that serves as a barrier to entry, and controls costs. Given capitalism's penchant for continuous expansion and growth, O'Connor (1998) argues in a Luxemburgian vein that capitalist expansion necessarily requires the degradation of the very conditions necessary for its survival, and that conservation would be viewed merely as costs for capitalism. While important in highlighting the limits to unfettered capitalist growth, O'Connor's analysis falls short in understanding the dynamic nature of capitalism.

Capitalism benefits not only from the current extraction of raw materials from nature, but also requires its maintenance for future extraction. Further, under incomplete substitutability between human-made goods and services and those provided by nature, capitalist production depends on what the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) refers to as the provisioning services of nature. O'Connor's (1998) analysis ignores the profit-making possibilities of environmental degradation (see Burkett 2005). Rather than be constrained by environmental degradation, the economic system has developed a number of solutions to the environmental problem such as free-market environmentalism evident in the rise of 'green' products in the market; cut-and-run environmental frontier approach, which is made possible due to high spatial displacement of capital and an approach often associated with international mining companies; regulation of consumption of nature and environment; and co-opting community management in market endeavours; or some combination of the above. These responses are rooted within the fundamentals of imperialism, though the form of these responses is influenced by historical, geographical, socioeconomic, and cultural factors; thus necessitating the combination of solutions to tackle the problem, and at the same time sharpening contradictions (Biel 2012). These contradictions lie beyond the scope of this essay.

Harvey (2003) argues that if global capital is in surplus and seeks to be valorised, owing to uneven development, it can undertake

geographical expansion, spatial reorganisation, and temporal displacement. This, he argues, explains the absorption of surplus capital into physical infrastructure that has use value and may also lead to appreciation of land value. The same argument could also be employed to explain the increasing attraction of forest conservation projects to finance capital (see Sullivan 2013). The most valuable forests have significant present and future use value. These long-term conservation projects also constitute temporal displacement as the value is realised for profit in the future through the employment of financial instruments. Further, these forests tend to be located in areas of low economic development and are often inhabited by indigenous people or the most marginalised section of society. Due to the current and future productive and consumptive possibilities, these forest conservation projects, whether voluntary or established by force, thus also become sites of asymmetric power and wealth, and unequal exchange.

While the imperial strategy has involved the use of some force in setting up and implementing forest conservation projects, this is not always necessary. The state may participate in the setting-up of institutions and the crafting of domestic and international regulation and treaties, as in the case of climate change agreements (or non-agreements). It may use the threat of economic fallouts and sanctions, as in the case of DNS. This draws our attention to institutions that govern the global circuit of capital, and the unequal exchange that displaces the burden of environmental contamination as well as environmental conservation to the Third World (Clark and Bellamy-Foster 2009; Sutcliffe 1999). For instance, poorer countries are the recipients of both e-waste and funds to reduce carbon and conserve forests (Bond 2012). This is not a contradiction for, as Sutcliffe (1999) argues, despite the existence of ecological limits, the 'privileged can afford to overpollute because the underprivileged are underpolluting'. Conserving forests in poorer countries using 'innovative' mechanisms such as PES and REDD+ displaces the burden of consumption reduction on those who are already underconsuming, so that

industrial and post-industrial countries need only marginally deviate from their high consumption path.

The intervention of imperialist states and international development and conservation agencies in forest conservation is reminiscent of a desire for reintroducing what Max Booth, an editor of the *Wall Street Journal* and an advocate of US imperialism against terrorism, described as 'enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets' (Max Booth quoted in Harvey 2003). If and when a global agreement on the combination of state intervention and market instruments to tackle the problem of environmental conservation is reached, control of nature is likely to lead to monopolies. It would then be appropriate to invoke Lenin:

> Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognised free competition remains, and the yoke of a few monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable. (Lenin 1916/1963: 205)

Resistance against certain forms of nature conservation as well as opposition against environmental degradation thus assume relevance; it becomes a site of anti-imperialist struggle.

Cross-References

▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange
▶ Imperialism and Environment

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Constitutionalism

▶

Containment

▶

Contra War

Control

Convicts

Core-Periphery Relations

Corporations

Council on Foreign Relations and United States Imperialism

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The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the high-command plutocratic body promoting US imperialism, is the world's most powerful private organization, the central think tank of American monopoly-finance capital. It is also a membership

organization and the ultimate networking, socializing, agenda setting, strategic planning, and consensus-forming organization of the dominant sector of the US capitalist class. The CFR's activities help unite the capitalist class to become not just a class in itself but also a class for itself. From its beginnings, it has been a behind-the-scene organization and network led by well-connected financial capitalists of New York's Wall Street. These capitalists are assisted by their expert allies in the professional class, especially from leading American universities, but also the nonprofit, government, law, and media sectors of American society. From its founding, the Council has promoted an imperialistic conception of the capitalist class based on "national interest" of the USA, promoting a hegemonic "primacy" of the USA both regionally and globally. It has been very successful in its aims, setting agendas, and policy as well as putting thousands of its members and leaders into high office in the USA (see Shoup and Minter 1977; Shoup 2015, 2019).

Origins in New York: The First CFR 1918–1920

The CFR had its origins during the World War I period, when the USA rapidly went from a debtor nation with a relatively modest global role to a decisive player in a world system best characterized as made up of competing but often cooperating imperialist societies and states. During the years 1914–1918, the key economic and political operators, European-American ("white") men in both New York and Washington, D.C., saw the carnage and destruction of the Great War as a wonderful opportunity for the USA to expand economically and politically into parts of the world, such as Russia, that had been previously largely closed. The key actors in New York were politically active financial capitalists. The Washington, D.C., protagonists centered around President Woodrow Wilson's postwar planning efforts, called "The Inquiry." Featuring leading American academics, The Inquiry was headed by Colonel Edward House and Walter Lippmann. Leaders of The Inquiry met with allied British

Empire imperialists in Paris at the 1919 Peace Conference, the latter group proposing a joint organization to coordinate efforts for future world domination. Today's CFR developed out of the 1921 merger of these three powerful sets of players. Virtually all were white men, as no women were allowed in the CFR until after 1970 and people of color were also mainly excluded until after that point in time.

New York City, especially the Wall Street financial district, has long been the nerve center of American capitalism and the key headquarters for those driving US imperialism. The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Gilded Age resulted in the creation of vast capitalist class corporate conglomerates, the two largest being the J.P. Morgan group and the National City Bank-Rockefeller-Kuhn-Loeb group. Each of these groups consisted of leading financial, railroad, and industrial corporations under the direction of financial capitalists.

Founded in London in the 1850s, the Morgan group was more centrally controlled and had a strong connection with London and the British Empire. It maintained strong English ties even after the New York branch of the firm became paramount. Already one of the world's most powerful banks by the 1890s, it was soon the premier investment bank of the USA. Over the following decades, it played a key role in financial and industrial consolidation, controlling corporations like the First National Bank, Guaranty Trust, Chase National Bank (later taken over by the Rockefellers), Bankers Trust, and New York Life Insurance, as well as helping to birth companies like General Electric, US Steel, International Harvester, and AT&T. The second and more loosely controlled corporate conglomerate was centered around the James Stillman-controlled National City Bank, with corporate alliances connecting this bank to the Rockefeller oil empire and the Kuhn-Loeb banking interests. National City was also the main influence in the giant American International Corporation (AIC) discussed below.

The outbreak of the imperialist First World War in the summer of 1914 galvanized these two conglomerates and their allies to think big about the role of the United States in the world. Wall Street and especially the British-connected House of Morgan was at the center of the economic boom which resulted from the immense demand coming from Britain and France for financial support and war-connected industrial materials of all kinds. The USA soon became the de facto allies of Britain and France due to its role in finance and supply, with the Morgan conglomerate in the lead. At the same time, New York corporate leaders began to collectively discuss and act on their perceptions of what the new situation demanded. The war among Europe's major powers was sidelining these economic competitors globally. Since the British and French corporations and states were preoccupied with the war, this created an opening for US economic penetration.

At the same time, demand in some key economic sectors in the USA was declining. For example, the international construction firm Stone and Webster concluded that there was not much railroad building still to be done in America and so they needed to go international. The National City-Rockefeller-Kuhn-Loeb leaders adopted this view, and they organized the American International Corporation (AIC) in 1915 to invest American capital globally on a large scale. This corporation was an early version of today's private equity firms. A large volume of capital was put into the AIC with the goal of taking over promising foreign enterprises all over the world, financing them into stronger firms, with the goal of immense profits (Vanderlip and Sparkes 1935, pp. 267–271). Fifty million dollars was quickly raised on Wall Street, and soon the AIC had a portfolio of at least 24 different foreign corporations. While the National City-Rockefeller-Kuhn-Loeb group dominated the AIC, they did reach out and secure representation from the Morgan group. This type of collaboration became the inclusionary model for the two main capitalist conglomerates when they formed a new "semipublic" organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, in 1918.

This, the first CFR, was a relatively small body of well-connected individuals active in the 1918–1920 years: 97 New Yorkers and 13 more from other US cities (Boston, Chicago,

Cleveland, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.), as well as one person from London. Each member paid an annual fee of $100, a cost generally too high for professionals, but not too much for the capitalists involved. Although small in numbers, the people brought into the organization were powerful and well-connected: high corporate officials, key lawyers from top Wall Street firms, ex-government officials, and opinion leaders. About a third were from the world of finance, especially many leaders of the two key conglomerates discussed above, and included four of the AIC's directors. The honorary chairman was none other than Elihu Root, a former Secretary of State and Secretary of War (Council on Foreign Relations 1919). A Wall Street corporate lawyer, Root was the first "wise man" of foreign affairs, the original foreign policy grandmaster who led the transformation of the USA from a regional into a world power during the 1899–1909 period. He was related to, as well as a friend and adviser to, J.P. Morgan. Root favored a large role for the USA in the world and so, of course, pushed for American involvement in World War I at an early date. Others who played key roles in this first CFR included Alexander J. Hemphill, chairman of Guaranty Trust Company, who was chairman of the Finance Committee; publisher Frank N. Doubleday who was treasurer; Kuhn-Loeb bankers Otto H. Kahn and Paul M. Warburg, who served on the executive committee and board of governors, respectively; and Darwin P. Kingsley, president of New York Life Insurance. Also on the executive committee was lawyer and author Richard Washburn Child, the editor of *Collier's Weekly*. Albert Shaw, editor of the American *Review of Reviews*, was chairman of the membership committee (Council on Foreign Relations 1919).

The views of some of these leaders of the first CFR are an important window into some of the ideological currents alive in the organization. For example, Darwin P. Kingsley, called one of the "great American business leaders of the twentieth Century" by the Harvard Business School, believed that world federation, based on the "reunion of the Anglo-Saxon world," would allow the USA and Britain to act as the masters "of war and the destinies of the human race." The British Empire and the USA should unify and establish the basis for the "United English Nations," the "Anglo-Saxon Republic" (Kingsley 1916). Albert Shaw was part of the broad left, a progressive interested in utopian communities. Richard Washburn Child, on the other hand, was an open fascist. In the 1920s he became a close friend of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, even helping this fascist write his autobiography, later serialized in *The Saturday Evening Post.* Child and Morgan partner Thomas W. Lamont, a CFR member at least by the mid-1920s, were the two most influential promoters of Italian fascism in the United States.

The program of the CFR during this 1918–1919 period stressed one overarching aim, the economic expansion of the USA, led by people "concerned in the world's affairs in a large way." To promote this goal, the CFR organized a "continuous conference on foreign affairs" with "international thinkers" leading the discussions. Its aims included cooperation "with the Government and all existing international agencies and to bring all of them into constructive accord" (Council on Foreign Relations 1919). The organization had 14 major meetings in 1918–1919 focusing on trade and tariffs, press and public opinion, and single nations such as Mexico, bringing together top Mexican officials with US experts for two meetings over the course of a month (Shepardson 1960, p. 11). One of the meetings occurred in late 1918 with James W. Gerard, a CFR member and former US ambassador to Germany, speaking on "Radical Experiments in Foreign Lands and their Influence on the Investment of American Capital" (Shepardson 1960, p. 11; Reed et al. 1918).

Origins in Paris: 1919

While the New York capitalists and their professional allies were entertaining their dreams of super profits through foreign economic expansion, World War I was grinding to a bloody

conclusion. The victors soon gathered in Paris to impose their imperialist war aims on the defeated and overthrown powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. But the British had an additional key agenda item, the same one previously articulated by Darwin P. Kingsley of the CFR: joining the Anglo-Saxon world into one empire, headquartered in New York and London. This scheme had British origins, and one key source was the super imperialist Cecil Rhodes, who made his vast fortune exploiting native peoples and resources in Southern Africa. His extreme ambition is captured by his statement that "I would annex the planets if I could; I often think of that" (Huberman 1936, p. 202). More practically, one of his life goals was to expand the British Empire and Pax Britannica, including recovering the United States and making it all part of a larger, even more globally dominating empire (Marlowe 1972). Rhodes' plan, which included the Rhodes scholarship program, was put into motion by Lord Albert Milner, a corporate executive for the Rothschild interests who was a former British Secretary of State for War. He was aided by historian Lionel Curtis with money from the Rhodes Trust (Quigley 1966, pp. 950–952). Beginning about 1908, Milner and Curtis established a network of semisecret organizations called the Round Table Groups in the British Dominions and the USA. Round Table members from the USA, such as the historian George Louis Beer, Morgan partner Thomas W. Lamont, and Round Table correspondent Whitney H. Shepardson, were at the Paris Peace Conference as participants in President Wilson's postwar planning effort, The Inquiry (Shoup and Minter 1977, p. 13).

On May 30, 1919, at the Majestic Hotel in Paris, members of the British and American peace conference delegations, including Curtis, Beer, Lamont, and Shepardson, met and decided to form a new Anglo-American organization. It was officially named the Institute of International Affairs with two branches, one in Britain and one in the USA. Lionel Curtis and Whitney H. Shepardson became the secretaries of the British and American branches, respectively (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 12–14).

1921 Merger: The Modern CFR

While the British Institute of International Affairs moved rapidly to become established as the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), both the American Institute and the first CFR became inactive. In 1920 officers of the Council suggested a merger with the American Institute, and a committee was set up with Shepardson as executive secretary and Wall Street lawyer George W. Wickersham, a board member of the original CFR, as chairman. The new organization retained Elihu Root as honorary president and installed a Morgan attorney, John W. Davis, a former acting Secretary of State, as its president. Paul D. Cravath, another Wall Street lawyer and a fierce Anglophile, was the new vice president, with the Morgan and Harvard connected Edwin F. Gay as secretary-treasurer. Wickersham and Shepardson were among the new directors, as were Kuhn-Loeb bankers Otto H. Kahn and Paul M. Warburg from the original Council. Another Morgan-connected banker, Norman H. Davis, was also a director, as were several scholars who had participated in The Inquiry. These included the Boston Brahmin Archibald Cary Coolidge, a Harvard history professor and a great grandson of Thomas Jefferson. He was also related to soon-to-be President Calvin Coolidge. Another scholar was the geographer Isaiah Bowman, associated with Yale and Johns Hopkins universities and also the founding director of the American Geographical Society. The modern Council on Foreign Relations, an organization heavily influenced by the Morgan monopoly finance capitalist group and the concept of long term Anglo-American unity, was successfully incorporated in New York during the summer of 1921 (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 15–17).

The first Council program was the establishment of a magazine meant to be the "authoritative" source for guiding US foreign policy in an imperialist direction. The first issue of *Foreign Affairs* was published in September 1922 with Archibald Cary Coolidge as editor and Princeton graduate and social register listee Hamilton Fish Armstrong as managing editor. The process of

raising the $125,000 needed to establish this journal is instructive. Half this sum, very large for this period, was quickly raised from the CFR's new board of directors. The rest was raised in only 10 days through a solicitation letter addressed to "the thousand richest Americans" (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 17–18). *Foreign Affairs* largely followed what Gay, the CFR's new secretary-treasurer, had stated in 1898 about the US role in the world: "When I think of the British Empire as our inheritance I think simply of the natural right of succession. That ultimate succession is inevitable" (Heaton 1952, p. 51). *Foreign Affairs* rapidly became what *Time* has called "the most influential periodical in print," read by "the world's most influential minds in business and politics" (Shoup 2015, pp. 70–71).

The Council Between the Wars

While frequent meetings, the "continuous conference" on foreign policy, remained central at the new CFR, another key early program was its think tank, developed in the 1920s and 1930s. Study groups were formed which brought together leading capitalists, scholars, lawyers, and other professionals to study a problem or issue and produce a written product recommending the consensus course of action for the capitalist community and the government. One early such Council study group, called the "Far Eastern Conference Group" resulted in the 1927 book *Ores and Industry in the Far East* by H. Foster Bain. Bain was secretary of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers and a CFR member. He had conducted extended field investigations in China for a New York mining corporation to lay the basis for investment there, and the book covered the investment angle as well as strategic/war potential. Bain begins his book by pointing out that if we want to sell our products in the Far East, we need to know what "sources of untapped wealth exist there and how to bring them into use" to pay for the products we wish to sell (Bain 1927, p. 2). What followed was an immensely detailed study of the mineral and non-mineral wealth of the Far East, including oil

resources, as well as industrial conditions and issues affecting development. The study was no doubt useful to capitalists wanting to invest in and exploit the mineral, industrial, and human resources of various Asian countries.

Another focus of the CFR in the 1920s was aimed at assuring continued close US relations with Great Britain and its empire. In 1928, in cooperation with Chatham House, the Council created an Anglo-American study group. Its members recommended supporting expansionist-imperialist policies and that the two countries coordinate their foreign policies as far as possible (Gorman 2012, p. 178). CFR leaders saw US economic power as extensive as that of its ally, Great Britain. The Council, dominated by corporate bosses, also viewed expansion of US trade and investment overseas as central to preserving the status quo at home. As long time CFR board member Isaiah Bowman put it in 1928, foreign raw materials, imports, and exports were necessary to "avoid crises in our constantly expanding industries" (Bowman 1928, p. 14). This, the "open door," demanded an activist, imperialist foreign policy to assure that foreign markets, resources, and labor were available for US investment and control. During this era the Council was, however, not as dominant in making official foreign policy as it was later to be. Congress had vetoed an overtly activist foreign policy when it rejected full US membership in the League of Nations. The election of Hebert Hoover to the presidency in 1928 did increase the Council's influence in foreign policy formation since Henry L. Stimson, the new Secretary of State, was a CFR member and he tapped Herbert Feis, a member of the Council's staff, to be his chief economic adviser. But with the onset of the great depression in 1929, the USA turned in a more nationalist and domestic direction. Congress passed high protective tariffs in 1930.

The trend toward economic nationalism began a "great debate" over national self-sufficiency and economic independence. Left-wing scholars, such as Charles A. Beard in his book, *The Open Door at Home*, argued that a rational, planned economy could make sure that any "surpluses" could be consumed at home (Beard 1934). This would

require an efficient distribution of income and wealth and would result in full employment and a high standard of living for all Americans. The CFR strongly opposed this approach because it would end the monopoly of economic decision-making by the financial and corporate capitalists that dominated the Council. So the Council counterattacked with *Foreign Affairs* articles and a discussion group on the topic. The CFR's aims included influencing the incoming Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) administration in an imperialist direction. This was facilitated by Norman H. Davis, an intimate friend of both Franklin Roosevelt and the new Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Davis was the Council's vice president (1933–1936) and eventual president (1936–1944). The CFR discussion group on national self-sufficiency began meeting in late 1933 under the chairmanship of John Foster Dulles, a future Secretary of State. As was typical for the Council, the group was high level, with the current secretary of agriculture, budget director, and economic adviser to the State Department participating, along with CFR leaders, a former Secretary of State, a former secretary of the treasury, a Morgan partner, deans from Harvard and the University of Chicago, journalists, and several academic and corporate economists. With self-sufficiency debunked, the Roosevelt administration gradually dropped its initial nationalist stress on domestic reform as the answer to the depression, substituting foreign trade expansion as the solution (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 24–27). Part of this emphasis was closer ties with the strongest imperialist power of the time, the British Empire, long the favored approach of the CFR.

The Grand Area: The CFR and the Drive for Global Hegemony, 1939–1945

Near the end of the World War II, two of the CFR's senior directors wrote that the Council had "served an increasingly useful function in the period of the twenties and thirties; but it was only with the outbreak of World War II in Europe that it was proved to have come of age" (Shoup and Minter 1977, p. 117). It is emblematic of the exalted ambition of the Council that on September 12, 1939, only 12 days after the beginning of World War II and over 2 years prior to direct US involvement, CFR leaders were meeting at the State Department in Washington, D.C., with government officials to begin what was to become one of the largest and most important of the Council's "national interest" strategic planning efforts, its *Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace*. In collaboration with the American government, the CFR study groups developed an imperialistic conception of the national interest and eventual war aims of the USA. This marked a move on the part of the CFR and the USA toward creating a full-blown, globally hegemonic imperialism, the largely successful attempt to organize a single, world-spanning political economy with the USA at the center. The Council had indeed come of age.

With the cooperation of the State Department and over $300,000 in funds from The Rockefeller Foundation, the Council set up five study groups of experts to focus on the long-term problems of the war and plan for a new world order afterward. Four of the groups – the economic and financial, political, security/armaments, and territorial – began meeting in early 1940. A peace aims group, focusing on the war aims of the European powers, was established in 1941. The key people guiding this effort included the seven men who headed up the five groups plus CFR President Norman H. Davis, who by this time was President Roosevelt's Ambassador-at-Large. Alvin H. Hansen, professor of political economy at Harvard, and Jacob Viner, professor of economics at the University of Chicago, chaired the economic and financial group; Whitney H. Shepardson took charge of the political group; lawyer Allen W. Dulles and *New York Times* correspondent Hanson Baldwin led the security/armament group; Isaiah Bowman chaired the territorial group; and Hamilton Fish Armstrong headed the peace aims group. About 100 individuals were involved over the 1940–1945 period. Collectively they prepared 682 separate documents for the State Department and President Roosevelt. That FDR used the Council's work to help formulate policy is indicated by the fact that he carried one

of the CFR memorandums to a cabinet meeting and cited it as the basis for policy conclusions he had reached (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 118–123).

The Council's grand-scale planning took on an even more serious tone after Germany conquered France and threatened the independent survival of Great Britain in the spring and summer of 1940. Faced with an increasingly powerful Germany and an aggressive Japanese Empire, the CFR war-peace planners asked and answered the key question: how much of the world's territory, resources, and labor did the USA need in order to maintain its prosperity and power? How much of this economic living space could it allow to be subtracted from its orbit by these two hostile powers and still avoid a crisis at home and a decisive loss of influence abroad? To answer these fundamental questions, the Council, led by the economic and financial group, began a large-scale study of the world's potential and actual economic blocs in the summer of 1940. The blocs considered were the Western Hemisphere, Britain and its empire, Continental Europe, and the Far East. The Soviet Union was omitted from the calculations. With Continental Europe under German control as a result of the defeat of France and with Britain facing great danger, CFR planners concluded that the global situation in 1940–1941 demanded that the USA frame its policies based on the imperialist control of the "great residual area" of the world open to the USA. The CFR defined this area as consisting of the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire, and the Far East, which included China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. The war-peace planners called this territory the "Grand Area" and saw it as the minimum economic, trade, and resource living space for the USA.

For the USA to become the dominant global power, the "Grand Area" had to be defended. This required rapid rearmament. As the Council planners expressed it in one of their memoranda, dated October 19, 1940, "The foremost requirement of the United States in a world in which it proposes to hold unquestioned power is the rapid fulfillment of a program of complete re-armament" (War-Peace Studies Memorandum E-B 19, October 19, 1940, cited in Shoup and Minter

1977, p. 130). A central contradiction of the "Grand Area" and the US imperialistic drive for "unquestioned power" worldwide was Japan's refusal to cooperate and play the subordinate role assigned to it. Just as Germany had its own living space theory and practice ("lebensraum" in the lands to the east of Germany), Japan had its own Asia-focused Grand Area, called the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Japan's attempt to implement their plan, together with the efforts of the USA to expand into and consolidate the "Grand Area," resulted in a clash of rival imperialisms. This clash became serious in 1941 when, at the CFR's suggestion in a January 1941 memorandum, the US government began a trade embargo, cutting off the sale of vital raw materials to Japan to try to force it to cooperate with US plans (War-Peace Studies Memorandum E-B 26, January 15, 1941, cited in Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 131–133). This resulted in hardline military elements gaining more power in the Japanese government, and they made the fateful decision to go to war to implement their "Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" war aim, part of which involved the seizure of all of Southeast Asia, including the Dutch East Indies (today's Indonesia). Since the USA had made it clear that such Japanese expansion was unacceptable, the Japanese government made the portentous decision to attack the American military in Hawaii, hoping to strike a decisive blow to prevent a successful response. The US victory in the resulting all-out war allowed the Americans to implement their living-space plan an expanded "Grand Area" that included the entire world after the defeat of Germany. As Bowman, the leader of the territorial group of the war-peace studies, expressed it, the enlarged conception of American security interests was required to command areas "strategically necessary for world control" (Memorandum T-A21, January 16, 1942, cited in Shoup and Minter 1977, p. 163). The means used to unify the "Grand Area" during the war could also be adapted to integrate the entire global economy following complete victory. As early as the summer of 1941, Council planners had identified the need for both a top-down empire form of economic integration and a more horizontal

customs union form of economic combination. Such integration also required currency stabilization measures and an international banking institution to provide funds to increase capitalist economic demand in "backward areas." Thus, CFR planners had described the post-war need for an International Monetary Fund and World Bank even before the USA entered World War II (see Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 135–139).

Protecting the Grand Area: Korea and Southeast Asia

The resulting world order that developed after victory in World War II was one in which the United States, led by the CFR and its members, was the hegemonic power, forcing on the world's people an informal imperialism usually operated by local clients who were often tyrants, instead of open colonialist imperialism run directly by outside powers. But there was opposition to US world control. The Soviet Union's version of state capitalism controlled a sizable chunk of the globe, and Mao's victory over the US-allied Chiang Kai-shek added another large piece in 1949. The expansion of state-controlled economic systems made the US ruling class very nervous since the CFR's prior studies – accepted by government leaders who were often Council members – had shown that America needed a very large amount of economic living space indeed. Thus, the CFR and government decision-makers feared the possibility of the loss of additional parts of the expanded Grand Area. This was manifested in June 1950 when a civil war broke out on the Korean Peninsula. To prevent such possible adverse consequences, the USA decided on a full-scale military intervention. Key background to this decision was NSC-68, an early 1950 report to President Truman by the department of state's internal think tank, its policy planning staff. Titled *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, this report and an earlier version produced in 1948 stressed, in an interesting case of psychological projection, that the USA believed that the Soviet Union wanted to "impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world" by

dominating the "potential power of Eurasia" and that this was "unacceptable to the United States." Thus, a line had to be drawn to prevent the erosion of the Grand Area and a shift of world power toward the Soviets. Those making this decision and the choice to draw that line and go to war in Korea in June 1950 and continue the war until the 1953 armistice were mostly members of the Council on Foreign Relations. A partial list of decision-makers favoring the war in Korea who were also members of the CFR in 1950 includes Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles; Directors of the Department of State's Policy Planning during the 1947–1953 period George F. Kennan (author of the famous containment memorandum regarding the USSR) and Paul H. Nitze; President Dwight D. Eisenhower; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk; Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup; and Presidential Adviser W. Averell Harriman.

At the same time that the USA was at war over the future of Korea, the Council on Foreign Relations was beginning to organize a series of study groups focused on the US interests in and relationship to Southeast Asia. The war-peace studies had identified Southeast Asia as a region that was a key part of the Grand Area, one that was economically complementary to the USA and other industrialized regions of the world. This region was seen as a unit that had important raw materials, market possibilities, rice production, and controlled key communication routes. Between 1948 and 1960, the CFR organized and implemented no less than seven policy study groups that discussed the importance of Southeast Asia. The national interest framework established by the Grand Area concept was invariably stressed as the conclusion for government officials to implement. This framework and conclusion were manifested by each of the seven study groups. To cite just one example, in 1954–1955 John Kerry King was the research secretary for a Council study group on US Policy and Southeast Asia headed by CFR member Edwin F. Stanton, a former US ambassador to Thailand. Stanton stated at the outset that Southeast Asia was of "vital importance" because of "strategic position and

rich material resources" (Shoup and Minter 1977, p. 228). After the study group concluded, King published *Southeast Asia in Perspective*, with a foreword by Stanton. King's conclusion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the US national interest was identical to what Council leaders and members had been saying for many years – in "geopolitical terms, Southeast Asia occupies a position of global strategic importance roughly comparable to Panama and Suez" (King 1956, p. 7). King also stressed the strategic importance of US imports of natural rubber and tin from Southeast Asia and the fact that this area was also a crucial trading partner for American allies in Western Europe and Japan (King 1956, pp. 9–10). Almost all of the key officials in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations were CFR members who adopted the Council perspective on the importance of Southeast Asia. Perhaps most famous was President Eisenhower's statement at his April 7, 1954, press conference, when he stated that the possible "loss" of Southeast Asia was "incalculable" due to the "falling domino" principle and the world's need for tin, tungsten, and rubber from this area (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 236–237). Eisenhower remained a CFR member while in office, and later presidents based their views and decisions on similar thinking and publications from the CFR (see Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 236–237 and 252, footnote 58).

In sum, in the 1950s the Council and US government feared the further erosion of the Grand Area, and this fear was manifested in the "stop communism" policies toward Southeast Asia and Vietnam. The numerous CFR study groups and the heavy overlap between Council leaders, members, and the US government helped to forge a strong consensus about the importance of the region among the American ruling capitalist class, a consensus which led to the full-blown invasion of Vietnam against nationalist and left forces beginning in 1965. Noam Chomsky called this war the "most destructive and murderous act of aggression of the post-World War II period" and "the worst crime since World War II" (Chomsky 2016, p. 67, 253).

Once the imperial policies and the resulting war were clearly failures, CFR members and leaders were central to the reversal that took place in 1968. The reversal and move toward a peaceful settlement had many points of origin, most fundamentally the resistance of the Vietnamese to US imperialist plans to force neocolonialism on the country, but rebellion in the USA and among the troops in the field was also important. These factors influenced the informal "Senior Advisory Group on Vietnam" which was advising President Lyndon B. Johnson behind-the-scenes to recommend de-escalation and peace talks. This advisory group was mainly Council members and leaders, including the then chairman of the CFR, John J. McCloy (Shoup and Minter 1977, pp. 242–248).

The CFR as an Organization, 1950s to Present

The modern CFR, like its earlier counterparts, is still a Wall Street-dominated organization. The Rockefeller family and its allies, led by John J. McCloy and David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank, were the single most important force in the Council from 1953 to 1985, superseding the Morgan group, which had dominated the CFR in the earlier era. David Rockefeller, wealthy leaders of private equity firms like Blackstone and The Carlyle Group, and investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Citibank have provided most of the top leadership of the organization since 1985. The Council's current Chairman (2018) is billionaire David M. Rubenstein, a leading figure in Carlyle. Through its leaders, members, and activities, the CFR has a vast domestic and international network, connecting with the US and other governments, top corporations, leading universities, other think tanks, the large foundations, media, lobbying, and advisory groups. Parts of this network include about 170 multinational corporations who are corporate members of the CFR. These connections, the Council's recent programs, and other topics are covered in detail in the author's 2015 book (updated for the 2019 paperback edition), *Wall*

Street's Think Tank: The Council on Foreign Relations and the Empire of Neoliberal Geopolitics 1976–2014.

The Council on Foreign Relations was an entirely male, increasingly elderly, and overwhelmingly white Euro-American organization until 1970. In that year, realizing that it had an image as well as an aging problem, the CFR embarked upon a gradual program of allowing women, younger, and minority members into the organization. It should be noted, however, that the pace of this diversification was very slow, and by 2014, 44 years later, the Council's almost 5000 strong membership was still about 84% white and 73% male (Council on Foreign Relations 2014, p. 6). The rise of Condoleezza Rice represents an example of how diversifying the membership has benefited the CFR and the broader capitalist class. A member of the professional class, Rice was an obscure junior academic at Stanford University when she was elected to the Council in 1984. She became active in the organization, meeting people who could further her career, including gaining highly paid positions like corporate directorships at Chevron, Transamerica, and Hewlett Packard. As a trustworthy minority female, safely initiated in the CFR worldview and with the Council's help, she was able to rise to the position of National Security Adviser and Secretary of State in the George W. Bush administration before returning to academic life as a professor at Stanford. In office, Rice faithfully followed the CFR's foreign policy line, for example, in promoting the US war in Iraq.

The CFR and Neoliberal Geopolitics

Above all else, the Council on Foreign Relations remains a place where the ruling capitalist class, together with its professional class allies, develops the grand strategy and tactics for creating and sustaining an empire based on the global hegemony of the USA and its corporations. Since its founding, the Council has always been an imperialist organization, seeking to impose the needs and interests of the US capitalist ruling class on the national and international working class majority. Its dominant worldview and grand strategy today is best summed up by the term neoliberal geopolitics. Neoliberalism is simply "free-market" fundamentalism, the capitalist goal of unrestrained freedom and property rights for corporations and capital at home and abroad: including free trade, privatization, deregulation, and destruction of unions. It also strives to create new markets in sectors of the economy where public ownership is common, such as public utilities, land use, education, health care, and pollution control. Geopolitics refers to geographically oriented politico-economic thinking to guide the worldwide struggle for power. This includes alliance systems and naval, air, and land military power, as well as control of key world regions, such as the Eurasian global heartland. In a number of publications, CFR member and former Council director Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined what he felt should be the US global geopolitical perspective. As was true of other historic geopolitical thinkers, Brzezinski stressed the centrality of Eurasia to world power and the future of the USA:

> With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America's global primacy and historical legacy. (Brzezinski 1997, quoted in Shoup 2015, p. 183)

More recently, CFR employee and member Walter Russell Mead, wrote a CFR-published book in 2004, outlining the CFR and America's neoliberal geopolitical strategy for world hegemony in the twenty-first century. Early in the book, Mead points out that the USA took over the "British world system" of imperialism and built a US version of it, acting almost like "the policeman of the world" (quoted in Shoup 2015, p. 192). Mead first stresses that the "solid foundation" of the American system of global imperialist domination is military power, including a vast system of bases and alliances which, in turn, connects to control of sea lanes for trade and commodity delivery, especially oil to energy-short Europe, China, and Japan. His second point concerns the set of global economic institutions centered in the USA with incentives and disincentives

that attract others into neoliberal capitalism and make it very difficult for them to exit. A third point is the "soft power" of the USA – an attractive culture and positive values that create legitimacy and seduce people and governments into voluntarily doing what the CFR and US imperialists want them to do, especially to partake in and support the dominant neoliberal geopolitical system. Mead's fourth point is that hegemonic power/world empire results from the three prior points adding up to more than the sum of each part. Importantly, this includes the ability to set the agenda, determining the framework for discussion and debate, something that is also central to the Council itself (Mead 2004, pp. 25–44).

The system of neoliberal geopolitics immensely benefits wealthy plutocrats. They make up the ruling class, operating in coordination with the monopoly-finance capitalist corporations that they own and control. Rank-and-file people get austerity, low wages, no union protections, cuts to the programs they depend upon, inadequate and costly education, expensive wars, dangerous nuclear weapons, and a level of environmental destruction that threatens the future of humanity.

The CFR and Neoliberal Geopolitics in Action: The Iraq War

The Council's worldview and its overwhelming influence in Washington led directly to the disastrous US war in Iraq. Measured by lives lost and people injured on both sides, as well as resources wasted, this war was by far the most expensive for the USA in the twenty-first century. Noam Chomsky stated that the war was "utterly without credible pretext...the major crime of the twenty-first century" (Chomsky 2016, p. 250). A careful study by the British medical journal *Lancet* estimated that about 650,000 Iraqis were killed and an unknown number wounded. Almost 8,000 US citizens were killed and over 100,000 wounded (Shoup 2015, p. 234). The CFR set the climate of opinion about the importance of Iraq, and Council members in and out of government made the key

decision to go to war, set the war aims, and supplied the personnel to implement the resulting neoliberal policies within Iraq.

The strategic power of controlling the main sources of the world's oil was foremost in the minds of the CFR planners as they successfully set the US climate of opinion during the decades leading up to the imperialist decision to invade and conquer Iraq. Since Europe, China, and Japan all needed Iraqi and Middle Eastern oil to survive as relatively prosperous and powerful societies, whoever ruled over this resource could exercise immense power globally. During the 1980–1990 period, two different Council study groups stressed the strategic importance of controlling what was labeled the "oil heartland." Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney testified to Congress that whoever controlled this flow of this oil had a "stranglehold" over the American economy and "most of the other nations of the world as well" (Shoup 2015, pp. 202–203). By the mid-1990s, Cheney, a member and former director of the CFR, was part of a hardline imperialist pro-war organization called the Project for the New American Century. This organization, dominated by Council members and former directors, lobbied for a US war against Iraq to seize its oil resources (Shoup 2015, p. 204).

A CFR book written by Council staff member Kenneth M. Pollack soon followed. *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* was a collective work in the sense that Pollack credits leaders of the CFR who "made the book possible" with paid time off, a foundation grant and the backing of the "full resources of the Council" (Pollack 2002, pp. 425–426). Pollack's advocacy of a war to control Iraq was based on the importance of its oil; he even wrote a follow-up *Foreign Affairs* article on the Persian Gulf in 2003 with a heading entitled "It's the Oil Stupid" (Pollack 2003, pp. 3–4). CFR leaders like former director Alan Greenspan and former head of US military operations and current (2018) CFR director General John Abizaid agreed that the US war on Iraq was based on seizing Iraqi oil. Greenspan said "the Iraq war is largely about oil" and Abizaid stated that "of course it's about oil." Numerous

other CFR leaders, members, and staff were pushing for a war on oil-rich Iraq during the same period, with only one prominent Council member, Princeton Professor G. John Ikenberry, speaking out against what he called a "neo-imperial grand strategy" (Shoup 2015, pp. 210–211).

The CFR's war drive and its view of proper US war aims were adopted by the US government in 2002–2003, resulting in a criminal imperialist war on Iraq and its people. A large majority of those in the key power positions deciding on the war and implementing its aims were members of the Council, including Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, CIA Head George Tenet, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, State Department Policy Planning Director Richard Haass, and Iraq Administrator L. Paul Bremer. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a former CFR member. Five former top government officials consulted on the war, "wise men" types who basically agreed that the war should go forward, were all Council members (Shoup 2015, pp. 212–214).

Once the USA had conquered Iraq, the war aims that resulted from this CFR dominance of US policy-making became a disaster for the people of Iraq, and it resulted in mass rebellion. The goal was to rapidly turn Iraq's state-planned economy into a market-driven, globalized neoliberal economy. The first step was to disempower the Iraqi people and their former leaders by abolishing the Ba'ath Party, banning its members from public office, and dissolving the Iraqi Army. These dictatorial actions created millions of enemies for the new US neocolonialist regime. The Iraqi resistance only deepened when Bremer issued orders that caused mass unemployment: privatizing 200 state-owned enterprises; suspending all tariffs and customs duties; allowing 100% foreign ownership of large portions of the Iraq economy; and establishing a flat tax and other neoliberal policies. Once the resulting resistance by Iraqis had grown to levels that threatened the entire US enterprise in Iraq, the USA resorted to barbaric repression led by CFR members General David Petraeus and John Negroponte (Shoup 2015, pp. 215–226). The repression was ultimately successful, and many of the US war aims were achieved. For example, direct foreign investment in Iraq amounted to over $5 billion annually by 2013 and, despite a drop, was still at about $4 billion annually in 2016. The US-dominated International Monetary Fund approved a $5.3 billion bailout for the Iraqi regime in mid-2016, in exchange for "significant economic changes" (Kent and Nabhan 2016). Multinational oil corporations like Chevron, ExxonMobil, Hess, BP, Shell, TOTAL, and Eni (all of them are corporate members of the CFR) now have licenses to operate in Iraq and are exploiting its oil resources for their own profit. Furthermore, there is evidence that US corporations are receiving preferential treatment in regard to contracts for rebuilding Iraq. On October 18, 2018, the *Financial Times* reported that just as the Iraqi government was poised to give Siemens, the German-based engineering group, a $15 billion contract to supply power generating equipment, the Trump administration intervened, reminding the Iraqi government of the thousands of Americans who had died in the 2003 invasion and its aftermath and suggesting that US-based General Electric be given the contract. One adviser to the Iraqi prime minister stated that US pressure was intense, amounting to the US government "holding a gun to our head" (McGee and Crooks 2018). The result is that General Electric, a CFR corporate member for many years, will likely win out over Siemens, which is not a corporate member of the Council.

The CFR and the Growing Conflict with China

While US imperialism was attempting to dominate the oil-rich Persian Gulf region by conquering Iraq, China was rapidly expanding economically and geopolitically, soon becoming the world's second most powerful nation and the most important strategic rival to the North American colossus. The status quo of the CFR and US government's position on relations with China

was epitomized by a 2007 Council Independent Task Force report titled *U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course* (Council on Foreign Relations 2007). In this report, CFR leaders recognized that the US-China relationship was the most consequential of the twenty-first century, stressing the need for dialogue, transparency, and coordination. Furthermore, they judged that China's behavior, although mixed, was overall "positive" and that China could become a "responsible stakeholder" in the US-created global order (Shoup 2015, pp. 244–251). By 2015, however, this perspective had radically changed, and a new study group published a Council special report: *Revising U.-S. Grand Strategy Toward China* (Council on Foreign Relations 2015). The 43-member strong study group, almost 75% of whom were also members of the CFR, included both Republicans and Democrats, scholars and business people, and numbered many who previously held high positions in the defense and state departments as well as the CIA. After numerous meetings, they concluded that the existing "integration" policy toward China was a failure and should be drastically altered and that a tougher US stance toward China was needed. Their view was that China had not evolved into a "responsible stakeholder"; instead, it was a dissatisfied power wanting to "replace the U.S. as the most important power in Asia" (Council on Foreign Relations 2015, p. vii). The Council's study group concluded that China's current goals conflict with US aims and argued that China's focus is on not just becoming a key "trading state" but rather that China intends to "continue along the path to becoming a conventional great power with the full panoply of political and military capabilities, all orientated toward realizing the goal of recovering from the United States the primacy it once enjoyed in Asia as a prelude to exerting global influence in the future" (Council on Foreign Relations 2015, p. 17). A new American grand strategy was therefore required, focusing on contesting and balancing China's rise so that the imperial "preeminence" of the USA will be maintained both in Asia and worldwide. As the report expressed it, "preserving

U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of U.S. grand strategy in the twenty-first century" (Council on Foreign Relations 2015, p. 4). In an attempted replay of "containment," the CFR recommended a variety of tactics to blunt China's rise, maintain US hegemony, and protect "vital US national interests." These include restricting trade with China in militarily critical technologies; strengthening the American military; challenging China in the South and East China Seas with a stronger naval and air presence; reinforcing US alliances with Japan, Taiwan, India, South Korea, Australia, and six Southeast Asian states (the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Myanmar); building up the military power of several of these allies; and improving the diplomatic management of the China-US relationship (Council on Foreign Relations 2015, pp. 24–33, 39).

Interestingly, one of the leading members of the 2015 Council study group was Harvard professor and former Defense Department official Graham T. Allison, a CFR member for over 40 years. In 2015, at the same time Allison was serving on the Council study group on China, he was writing on what he labels the "Thucydides Trap," named after the ancient Greek historian who wrote on the inevitability of conflict and war between a hegemonic power and a rising power who challenges that dominance. Allison wrote that China's rise represented a "tectonic shift." The "impact China's ascendance will have on the U.S.-led international order" represents the "preeminent geostrategic challenge of this era" for the USA. Allison concluded that "based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead. . .is more likely than not." He added that "war, however, is not inevitable." Sustained attention by the highest levels of both nations and "radical changes" in attitudes and actions by both leaders and publics could avoid the horrific loss of lives and destruction – perhaps the end of civilization as we now know it – that a war between these superpowers would entail (Allison 2015).

Another leading member of the *Revising U.-S. Grand Strategy Toward China* study group was

Paul D. Wolfowitz, another former Defense Department official and long-time CFR member. Wolfowitz was the main author of the famous defense planning guidance document of 1992, which stated, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, that the main objective of the USA should be to retain the status of the world's only superpower, forestalling the emergence of a new rival by preventing "any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." One region specifically mentioned by Wolfowitz was the "Eurasian heartland" (Tyler 1992). With its "Belt and Road Initiative," an infrastructure development plan, China is penetrating this heartland in a big way, setting up possible US-China conflict.

Despite having fewer members of the Council in top policy-making positions than is usual in a US administration (National Security Advisers H.R. McMaster and John Bolton are both CFR members, as is influential Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer, but not the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury), the aggressive, amoral policies on China followed by President Donald Trump, a billionaire who is supported by some and opposed by other CFR members, are dovetailing very well with the hard-line recommendations of the Council. Furthermore, Trade Representative Lighthizer appears to be the strongest voice on US-China policy. A report in the *Financial Times* points out that Lighthizer "really brings a lot of substance to the president's ideology. He's the man who has the plan and the thinking underpinning the vision" (Politi 2018). This indicates that the overall US climate of opinion on China has likely been heavily influenced by the CFR. The result is a strategic reset of the global trade and sanctions order, since the USA is trying to push its sanctions architecture onto other nations' relations with China. Now radical geopolitical uncertainty is being fostered by Trump and his Republican Party, along with sharply rising tension and conflict between the USA and China, with unknown longer-term outcomes. It is hard to overstate this development, since under CFR leadership, the USA has been the world's hegemonic imperial power for many decades and now must face a decline in its dominance, while a formerly subordinate power rises.

Conclusion: The CFR and the Two Existential Threats to Humanity's Future

As this essay has illustrated, the Council on Foreign Relations is the central organization linking plutocratic corporate capitalist class interests to the planning and execution of US imperialism. Their success has made this capitalist class immensely wealthy and powerful but has also created two major and potentially fatal long-term contradictions. First, while so far the Council and the US capitalist class have allowed geopolitical rivals like China to grow and become powerful, they have failed to create a peaceful world order, which would help solve the nuclear weapon problem. Since many states have these doomsday devices, they represent an existential threat to the future of our human species.

The CFR is now encouraging great power confrontation between the USA and China over who will be predominant in Asia, Eurasia, and worldwide. The dangerous and unstable Trump administration has taken up the Council's call for a more aggressive policy. The Council's approach is based on a narrow definition of nationalism and what is best labeled the "national capitalist class interest" in a perilous era where a wise, moral, and democratic policy should be followed, recognizing and promoting the interests of humanity as a whole in cooperation, peace, environmental preservation, full equality, and social justice.

Secondly, as capital rapidly accumulates and expands its reach under the neoliberal capitalist system promoted by the CFR, it impacts more and more of the planet's ecological foundations, upon which all life ultimately rests. As a result, an intensifying, planet-wide ecological crisis is now upon us, which also represents an existential threat to the survival of our species. Humanity currently faces an increasingly dire situation, arising out of the nature and needs of fossil fuel-based capitalism as well as imperialistic interests as promoted by the CFR. This is characterized not only by more intense weather events, such as droughts,

floods, and intense destructive storms, but also more and more ruinous fires, resulting in further destruction of the ecologies upon which all life on earth depend. During the past 30 years, the CFR has organized a number of study groups on what it labels "climate change," but the organization has proved itself incapable of developing any serious proposals to solve this problem. Complacent and intent on keeping their system of profit and capital accumulation going, they and their members prefer to create illusions that something serious is been done to solve this existential threat to our collective future as a species. The bald fact is that fossil-fuel mining and use must be severely limited through a rapid and massive just transition to sustainable transportation, energy, manufacturing, and agricultural techniques (e.g., agroecological farming). Since US military spending and activity require vast amounts of explosive fossil fuels to power its armada, by far the world's largest, it is the biggest single emitter of carbon on the planet and must be sharply curtailed. The best science warns us all of the increasingly ruinous effects of a failure to act decisively to preserve our planet. This blunder, if not reversed, will amount to the greatest crime in human history. It should be clear to all that infinite economic growth on a finite globe is impossible, so an ecologically sound, rational, scientific, decentralized, democratically planned, and controlled ecosocialist system is needed for humanity to not only survive and preserve our beautiful planet but to thrive as a developing species in harmony with the earth and other living things (see Shoup 2015, pp. 277–314). We must choose the dignity of rebellious aspiration and hopeful activism, representing united humanity's path to overcoming imperialism and realizing our dreams.

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Counter-discursive Practices of Vodou: Challenges to Haitian Imperialism

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Definition

The counter-discursive practices of Vodou are strategies and actions adopted to foster solidary and achieve political, cultural, economic, and military aim against the discrimination, suppression, and exploitation of imperialism in Haiti.

Introduction

Haiti has a long history of struggles against imperialism. Throughout its history, imperialist nations have executed many destructive tactics that have obstructed Haiti's development. These tactics, such as indemnities against a French invasion, trading and political domination, high-interest loans, military occupations, embargoes, and laws against the practice of Vodou, can be traced to Haiti's independence in 1804. In the beginning of this newly formed country, which many nations adamantly opposed, some of these tactics were implemented as direct responses to Haiti's independence. From the onset, the people of Haiti have relentlessly fought these tactics through many discursive practices.

This article has two purposes. The first purpose is to highlight the destructive tactics of imperialism in Haiti. We use the US military invasion of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 to uncover the tactics. The second purpose is to reveal Haiti's resistance against imperialism through the use of its Vodou religion. To achieve our objectives, this chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section, "Galtung's Theory of Imperialism," provides the reader with a definition of imperialism and its functions. This section will assist the reader in identifying and understanding the imperialistic tactics in Haiti. The second section, "From Christopher Columbus to 1915," gives the reader a brief history of Haiti prior to its independence and the impetus for its long struggle against imperialism. In the third section, "The US Occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934," we focus on the first part of the first US military occupation of Haiti. We chose this intervention in Haiti's history because most of the tactics employed by imperialist nations were used in Haiti during the occupation. Furthermore, the current conditions of Haiti are partly the result of this occupation. Because Schreadley (1934)'s "Intervention: The Americans In Haiti, 1915–1934" (a doctoral dissertation) provides accurate details of the invasion, we recount the stories it provided in this section. The remaining sections focus on the "Anti-Vodou Laws," "The History of Vodou in Haiti," "The Functions of Vodou in

Haiti," and "Counter-Discursive Practices of Vodou."

Galtung's Theory of Imperialism

According to Galtung (1971), the world is divided into "Center" and "Periphery" nations, and the nations have their own centers and peripheries. For Galtung, imperialism is a dominance relationship between the Center and Periphery nations, in which the Center nations have power over the Periphery nations. This relationship is established when the center (the elites) of a Periphery nation forms a bridgehead for a Center nation. Three things could happen as a result of this relationship: First, there is harmony of interest between the center (elites) in the Center nation and the center (elites) in the Periphery nation. Second, there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nations. Third, there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation (Galtung 1971).

It is important to explain what Galtung meant by disharmony of interest and harmony of interest. According to Galtung, disharmony of interest occurs if the two parties are coupled (interact) together in such a way that the living condition (LC) gap between them is increasing. On the contrary, there is a harmony of interest "if the two parties are coupled together in such a way that LC gap between them is decreasing down to zero" (Galtung 1971, p. 82). The indicators for the LC would be income, standard of living, quality of life, and the notions of autonomy (Galtung 1971).

Galtung (1971) identified two basic mechanisms of imperialism between the nations: the vertical interaction relation and the feudal interaction structure. The vertical interaction relation is the major factor behind the inequality between Center and Periphery. The interaction is vertical when it occurs across a gap in the processing levels. This is when the Periphery nations export primary goods to the Center nations and the Center nations export manufactured goods to the Periphery nations. However, the goods exchanged between the two nations are not the same; in fact, they are very different types of things. Thus, the

processing level generates external economies for the Center nation but not for the Periphery nations (Galtung 1971).

The feudal interaction structure is the factor that maintains and reinforces this inequality. That is, although there are high degrees of interaction between Center nations, there are lesser degrees of interaction between Center and Periphery nations. In addition, little interaction occurs between Periphery nations. The feudal interaction structure is very damaging because it has major economic consequences for the Periphery nations. For example, the Periphery nations mostly trade with one Center nation, whereas the Center nation can trade with multiple nations. That is because the Center nation dictates with whom the Periphery nation can trade and what the Periphery nation can trade. Furthermore, the Periphery nation tends to have one or few primary products to export (Galtung 1971).

The consequences of the vertical interaction relation and the feudal interaction structure are that the Periphery nations have no choice but to depend on the Center nations. It is very difficult for the Periphery nations to develop their own economy with just a few products to export. In essence, in the Periphery nation, its center grows and is more enriched than its periphery, depending on how the interaction is organized between the two. According to Galtung (1971):

> "[F]or part of this enrichment, the center in the Periphery only serves as transmission belt (e.g. as commercial firms, trading companies) for value (e.g. raw materials) forwarded to the Center nations. This value enters the Center in the center, with some of it drizzling down to the periphery in the Center. Importantly, there is less disharmony of interest in the Center than in the Periphery, so that the total arrangement is largely in the interest of the periphery in the Center" (p. 84).

Galtung identified five types of imperialism depending on the types of exchange between the Center and the Periphery nations: political, military, communication, cultural, and economic. Imperialism can start with any of them. Let us briefly discuss each type. Political imperialism indicates that the Center nations produce decisions, whereas the Periphery nations supply obedience. Therefore, the Center nations are viewed as having some superior

structures for the Periphery nations to imitate. The Periphery nations are expected to be obedient imitators of superior structures (Galtung 1971).

According Galtung, military imperialism depends on the economic power of the Center nation. The Center nations have the capacity to develop technical military hardware and possess a modern army. Military imperialism provides protection, officers, and instructors in counterinsurgency to the Periphery, and the Periphery provides the discipline and soldiers needed (Galtung 1971).

As it relates to communication imperialism, the Periphery nations may not have the capacity to develop the latest communication and transportation technology. Therefore, the Center nations sell those technologies, sometimes second-hand, to the Periphery nations as part of their trade structure. When it comes to the cultural and communication exchange between Center and the Peripheral nations, which Galtung referred to as *news communication*, the Center nations control the major agencies of the Peripheral nations. The Center news dominates the Peripheral news media. The Periphery nations do not write nor read about each other. However, they read more about their own centers than about other centers. What is also apparent is "that the Peripheral produces news events that Center turns into news" (Galtung 1971, p. 93).

Cultural imperialism is described as the division of labor between teachers and learners. The Center nations always provide the teachers and dictate what is worthy to be taught, as Galtung put it, "from the gospels of Christianity to the gospels of Technology" (Galtung 1971, p. 93). The Peripheral nations, in turn, provide the learners. Similarly, economic imperialism is the division of labor between Center nations and Peripheral nations, in which the Center nations provide manufacturing goods and means of production and the Peripheral nations provide raw materials and the markets (Galtung 1971).

To summarize, imperialism comes in different forms: economic, political, military, communication, and cultural. It is also an unequal relationship between two nations, a Center nation and a Peripheral nation. The Center nations have dominance over the Peripheral nations. As a result, the Center nations dictate and control every aspect of the Peripheral nations. The actions of the Center nations inhibit the growth of the Peripheral nations.

From Christopher Columbus to 1915

Prior to the arrival of Christopher Columbus in Haiti, no one knew the island existed. Furthermore, no one knew it was inhabited. After the arrival of Columbus, the island was under the control of Spain and France until its independence. Spain and France ruined the island and its people for their own economic gains. It is during this period that we began to see the destructive side of imperialism on the island.

Immediately after the independence of Haiti, many imperialist nations developed relations with the island. However, the relations were based on trade. The unequal exchanges allowed the trading partners to continue raping Haiti of its goods without investing in the island. The impact of those trades has had major consequences on Haiti to the present day. We begin this section with a discussion of Haiti's history from the time Columbus landed in Haiti to 1915. This period set the tone for the struggles that Haiti is currently facing.

On December 6, 1492, Christopher Columbus came ashore on the Caribbean island of Taino, which was already inhabited by Arawak Indians. The Indians called their island either Ayiti, Bohio, or Kiskeya, depending on the tribe. Upon his arrival, Christopher Columbus renamed the island as Hispaniola, disregarding the names that were already given to the island. Seeing that Hispaniola had gold, Columbus built a fort out of the timbers from the wreck of one of his ships, Santa Maria. This fort was meant to safeguard the commercial interests of the investors in Spain who financed Columbus's voyage. The fort has been viewed as the first European military base in the Western Hemisphere (Zinn n.d.).

By the 1520s, the Spanish had lost interest in Hispaniola, instead sailing to Mexico and other parts of the Americas where gold was newly discovered. They had nearly wiped out the Indian population through forced labor and diseases by the time they vacated the island. By 1664, the

French West Indies Company was controlling most of the island. However, the French did not have absolute control of the island until the peace treaty of Ryswick with Spain in 1697, after which they renamed the island Saint-Dominique. Because the Indian population was slaughtered by the Spanish and there was no labor force left, slaves were imported from the continent of Africa to labor on the sugar cane, tobacco, cocoa, cotton, and indigo farms. By the eighteenth century, most of France's wealth came from the African slaves' labor in Saint-Dominique. The French revolution of 1789, however, changed the trajectory of the slaves' future on the island and set the tone for the Haitian revolution (Colmain 2010).

The white aristocracy in Saint-Dominique did not recognize the new revolutionary regime in Paris. The French revolution was grounded on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. However, these principles were not applied to the slaves and the mulattos in Saint-Dominique. The mulattos, who were light-skinned blacks, were better off than the slaves. They were middle-class and could own slaves. Nonetheless, they could not vote nor participate in government. However, everything changed when French commissioner Léger Felicité Sonthonx came to the island in 1791 to reinforce the new regime's policy. When the white aristocracy rebelled against him, Sonthonx assembled an army of local slaves, led by Toussaint Louverture, to crush the rebellion. After the defeat of the landowners, Louverture and his generals went on to free all the slaves on the island – a revolution that lasted from 1791 to 1803 (Colmain 2010).

On February 4, 1794, the French Convention voted for the abolition of slavery. On January 1, 1804, Dessalines declared Haiti's independence and restored the island's original name to Haiti. After the revolution against France, Haiti struggled to maintain normalcy because of its debts to France, a struggling economy, and political uprisings, mostly perpetuated by foreign governments (Colmain 2010).

In 1825, Haiti was forced to start paying the indemnity France had demanded for the loss of land, properties, and slaves that occurred when the French slaveholders were overthrown. By agreeing to pay the indemnity, Haiti had secured relief from political and economic seclusion and immunity from invasion by the French military. To pay back the debt, Haiti took out two significant loans. The first loan was to pay the indemnity France had demanded, and the second was for the excessive commissions of the first loan. Eighty percent of Haiti's government revenue was designated to pay those debts (Bauduy 2015).

While Haiti was scrambling to pay its international debts, it was also struggling to maintain internal stability. Domestically, Haiti was in chaos and President Wilson of the United States was worried. Between 1911 and the beginning of 1915, seven presidents of Haiti were either assassinated or ousted (Pressley-Sanon 2014). US business leaders were pressuring President Wilson to take control of Haiti's customs houses, the main source of Haiti's revenue. Consequently, 6 months before the United States invaded Haiti in 1915, its Marines entered the island and removed $500,000 worth of gold from the National Bank of Haiti in December of 1914 for safe-keeping in the National City Bank of New York. The gold was removed in case Haiti could not pay its debts to US bankers. The removal of Haiti's gold gave the United States unprecedented control over the government of Haiti (US Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34 n.d.).

Haiti's internal disarray was not the only factor that worried President Wilson. World War I was underway in Europe and the German merchants in Haiti were integrating into Haiti's society. Because it was unconstitutional for foreigners to purchase land in Haiti, the German merchants circumvented the constitution by marrying Haitian women (Pressley-Sanon 2014). The assimilation of German merchants troubled President Wilson. He feared that Germany might set up a military base in Haiti near the Panama Canal, which the United States had completed in 1915. The United States also wanted to establish its own naval base in Haiti's northern port of Mole Saint-Nicholas, adjacent to Cuba's Guantanamo Bay. It took the brutal murder of Haiti's President Vilbrun Guillaume by a frenzied mob on July 27, 2015 for the United States to invade Haiti at the request of

the French Minister Girard (US Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34 n.d.).

In summary, from the time Christopher Columbus arrived in Haiti to the beginning of the first US invasion of Haiti in 1915, Haiti was under the control of the Spanish and French governments. These countries exploited Haiti. The Spanish, under the leadership of Christopher Columbus, exterminated the entire Indian population through forced labor and the diseases they brought with them to the island. The French imported slaves from Africa to labor for free with no regards for human dignity. When the slaves rebelled and declared their independence, they were unable to develop their newly formed country because of accumulated debts and internal chaos, which were mostly set off by foreign nations that were against Haiti's independence. Clearly, the concept of imperialism had already been implemented in Haiti in different forms, then continued to take shape in the first US occupation.

The US Occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934
Galtung (1971) stated that imperialism is an unequal relationship between two nations: the center nation and the peripheral nation. The center nation dominates the peripheral nation through the five types of imperialism (economic, political, military, communication, and cultural) depending on the type of exchange between them. Based on the Galtung's theory of imperialism, the first US occupation of Haiti, which lasted from 1915 to 1934, can be viewed as an unadulterated example of the destructive nature of imperialism on the island. To recognize and understand the tactics of imperialism that the United States used during the invasion of Haiti, we retell the story of the invasion in this section.

On July 28, 1915 at 4:50 p.m., under the command of Captain George Van Orden, USMC, 340 officers of the United States Marines and seamen landed at Bizoton, a vacant naval yard about a mile southeast of Port-au-Prince. They then marched into the center of Port-au-Prince, disarming any Haitian soldiers they encountered. A significant number of weapons and ammunition were confiscated from Haitian soldiers. Two Haitian soldiers were killed and ten were wounded from

sporadic gunshots between the Haitian and American soldiers. The American soldiers were then posted at foreign legations, which was then the diplomatic representative office. At nightfall, bivouacs were made in the city. Two American soldiers were killed outside of their bivouacs in the street by their own soldiers, who were firing wildly in the dark on the night of January 29, 1915. By August 18, 1915, 88 Marines and 1941 enlisted had landed in Haiti (Schreadley 1934).

Throughout the initial occupation, there was little resistance from the Haitians. However, Admiral Caperton and his Chief of Staff, Captain Beach, were confronted with Haiti's current political quandary. There were two political factions who wanted to choose the successor of President Vilbrun Guillaume. The first faction, the Committee of Public Safety, who represented the latest revolutionists, supported Dr. Bobo. The Americans described Dr. Bobo as inflammatory, deranged, and anti-American. The second faction, the current Congress, favored Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave, the President of the Senate. To determine who would be the President of Haiti under the occupation, Captain Beach met frequently with the two factions and was convinced that Dartiguenave was a rational and honest Haitian politician – likely because he promised the United States everything they had asked of him, including customs control and Mole St. Nicholas (Schreadley 1934).

On August 6, 1915, Admiral Caperton ordered all Haitian soldiers not living in Port-au-Prince to vacate the city. It was an attempt to weaken Dr. Bobo's movement. On August 7, 1915, Admiral Caperton received his first statement of policy from the Navy Department. He was directed to placate the Haitian people and guarantee them that the United States had no intention of keeping its military forces in Haiti any longer than necessary to achieve the re-establishment of a stable government by the Haitian people. On August 9, 1915, Admiral Caperton received further instructions which said, "Whenever the Haitians wish you may permit the election of President to take place. The election of Dartiguenave is preferred by the United States" (Schreadley 1934, p. 118). More instructions were sent to the American

Charge D'Affaires Davis, directing him to consult with Admiral Caperton and ensure that the following statement was communicated to Haitian politicians (Schreadley 1934):

> First: Let Congress understand that the Government of the United States intends to uphold it, but that it cannot recognize action which does not establish in charge of Haitian affairs those whose abilities and dispositions give assurances of putting an end to fractional disorders.
>
> Second: In order that no misunderstanding can possibly occur after election, it should be made perfectly clear to candidates as soon as possible and in advance of their election, that the United Sates expects to be intrusted with the practical control of the customs and such financial control over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for an efficient administration. The Government of the United States considers it its duty to support a constitutional Government. It means to assist in the establishing of such a Government, and to support it as long as necessity may require. It has no design upon the political or territorial integrity of Haiti; on the contrary, what has been done, as well as what will be done, is conceived in an effort to aid the people of Haiti in establishing a stable Government and in maintaining domestic peace throughout the Republic. (Schreadley 1934, p. 119)

Early on August 11, 1915, Captain Beach delivered the statement verbatim to all Senators and Deputies at an informal meeting. Later that day, the Committee of Public Safety ordered that Congress be dissolved and sent Haitian soldiers to seal the chambers' doors in order to prevent the election of Dartiguenave. Nevertheless, the US Marines drove them away. Captain Beach confronted the Committee and asked them to dissolve themselves or they would be considered public enemies of the United States (Schreadley 1934).

Within a week of the invasion, on August 12, 1915, Captain Beach, on the floor of the Haitian Chambers, supervised the election of President Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave. He was elected with 94 of the 116 votes. President Dartiguenave served as President from August 12, 1915 to May 15, 1922. Without the interference of the United States, the Haitian Congress would have voted for Dr. Bobo, as they always voted on the recommendation of the Haitian Generals. On election day, an American military government was established in the city of Cape Haitian, the second largest city in Haiti. Days after, they occupied the cities of St. Marc, Petionville, and Leogane (Schreadley 1934).

On August 17, 1915, Mr. Davis, the American Charge d'Affaires, submitted to President Dartiguenave a proposed treaty between the United States and Haiti and requested that the Haitian Congress pass the resolution without delay. The next day, however, the secretary of the Navy instructed Admiral Caperton to take control of the Haitian customs service and to use the funds "for organizing and maintaining an efficient constabulary, for conducting such temporary public works as will afford immediate relief to the discharged soldiers and starving populace by giving them employment, and finally for the support of the Dartiguenave Government" (Schreadley 1934, p. 122).

On August 21, 1915, the United States seized the customs houses in Cape Haitian and in Port-au-Prince on September 2, 1915. Navy Paymasters were ordered from the United States to assume an office at each Haitian port as collector of Customs and Captain of the Port. An Admiral Caperton account was opened at the National Bank of Haiti. All funds collected by the Paymasters were deposited on this account. Military commanders were authorized to draw funds from the account for Public Works and for the Military and Civil Government of United States Forces. Additionally, they fixed the exchange rate to five gourdes to the dollar – a move that was opposed by the Haitian people. Furthermore, it became a policy for the Paymasters to give priority to paying Haiti's debts with customs revenue. This policy is said to have hindered the growth of the Haitian economy (Schreadley 1934).

While the Paymasters were overhauling the customs service, President Dartiguenave was having a difficult time getting the Haitian Congress to ratify the American treaty. The Haitian Congress was unhappy with the Americans taking control of the customs service. The Haitian constitution required that both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate ratify the treaty. In an attempt to pressure the Haitian Congress, on September 3, 1915, Admiral Caperton declared martial law in Haiti

and proclaimed that trial before military courts was established for "the publishing of false or incendiary propaganda against the Government of the United States, or the Government of Haiti, or the publishing of any false, indecent, or obscene propaganda, letters signed or unsigned, or matter which tends to disturb the public peace" (Schreadley 1934, p. 127). When that pressure did not work on the Haitian Congress, more pressure was applied to force the Haitian government to comply.

Admiral Caperton froze the salaries of Senators and Deputies, including funds for the expenses of the Haitian Government pending the ratification of the treaty. On October 3, President Dartiguenave threatened to resign unless Congress was paid the overdue salaries. On October 6, 1915, the Chamber of Deputies ratified the treaty by a vote of 75 to 6. However, more opposition grew in the Senate. On November 8, 2015, the Haitian Senate issued a report declaring certain articles of the treaty unconstitutional and recommended a renewal of the treaty. However, on November 12, 1915, the Haitian Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 25 to 9. The vote came after Admiral Caperton was instructed by Navy Secretary Daniels to make the following statement to President Dartiguenave (Schreadley 1934):

> I have the honor to inform the President of Haiti and the members of his Cabinet that I am personally gratified that public sentiment continues favorable to the treaty; that there is a strong demand from all classes for immediate ratification, and that the treaty will be ratified Thursday. I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment in this matter, and I am confident if the treaty fails of ratification that my Government has the intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is accomplished, and that it will forthwith proceed to the complete pacification of Haiti so as to insure internal tranquility necessary to such development of the country and its industry as will afford relief to the starving populace now unemployed. Meanwhile the present Government will be supported in the effort to secure stable conditions and lasting peace in Haiti, whereas those offering opposition can only expect such treatment as their conduct merits. The United States Government is particularly anxious for immediate ratification by the present Senate of this treaty, which was drawn up with the full intention of employing as many Haitians as possible to aid in giving effect to its provisions, so that

> suffering may be relieved at the earliest possible date. Rumors of bribery to defeat the treaty are rife, but are believed. However, should they prove true, those who accept or give bribery will be vigorously prosecuted. (Schreadley 1934, pp. 132–133)

In this section, we have outlined the types of imperialism employed by the United States during the first US military invasion of Haiti. Haiti was clearly the peripheral nation being dominated by the United States, the Center nation. Economically speaking, during the occupation, Haiti's economy, election, government revenue, and security were under total control of the forces of United States. The United States stated that it had to occupy Haiti in order to stabilize the island. Despite this claim, Haiti has not improved. From the perspective of Galtung's theory, Haiti was supposed to be the obedient Periphery nation, imitating the superior structure of the United States, the Center nation. In fact, Haiti was far from being obedient. Throughout its overwhelming history with the United States, the Haitians have used Vodou to fight against an imperialist's occupation.

In the following sections, we provide the history of Vodou in Haiti, its functions, the anti-Vodou laws that were implemented, and the counter-discursive practices of Vodou that have been implemented to fight against imperialism.

The History of Vodou in Haiti

Haitians often speak of "serving the spirits" rather than practicing Vodou. The term "Vodou" originated from the West African Fon and Ewe languages and means "spirit" or "god." The religious practices are typically traced to the Yoruba peoples (from Nigeria), the Fon people who mostly live in the area we now call Benin, and the Kongo peoples (from Angola and Bas-Zaire). Vodun is arguably a fusion of Roman Catholicism and native West and Central African religions (The Pluralism Project n.d.). Once blended, Vodou formed an idiosyncratic collection of rituals. It is a religion that came to Haiti around 1619 and was shaped by the interface between Catholic representations and African religions brought to the New World during the slave trade into the French

colony at Saint Domingue (Brown 2006). Though there are several synonyms for Vodou, this discussion uses the word *Vodun* to refer to these spiritual rituals of Haiti.

The Vodou religion began in Haiti with the West and Central Africans who were taken to Haiti as slaves. Enslaved in Haiti, they had several different languages and often could not communicate efficiently with each other. In fact, they were often forbidden from practicing their native African religions to which they were accustomed. Instead, as slaves they were converted to Catholicism and several restrictions were placed on their religious activities. Resulting from the restraints placed on their religious freedom, they creatively devised ways to continue their practices.

The Haitian citizenry of African descent innovatively used the Catholic images and terms to which they were exposed to represent things in their native religious practices. The blending of the two beliefs resulted in the intermingling of traditional Gods with that of the Catholic saints. The resultant mixture created the current religious practice of Vodou in Haiti. Catholic lithographs of saints are often used as visual representations of the invisible Vodou Gods or loas (Beyer 2019). The history of Haitian Vodou is rife with instances in which laws and other restrictions were imposed to stymie the practice and growth of the religion.

The Functions of Vodou in Haiti

Vodou practices play pivotal roles in Haitians' daily lives. First, they afford the living some sort of protection from evil as well as healing when they perform libations for dead spirits. Because there are no expectations of an afterlife in heaven, Vodou is considered to be a method of assuring healing and well-being in the present world. It is used as a means to better the lives of individuals and those in the wider community (Michel 2006). Commenting on this, Brown (1991) expressed that for Haitians, Vodou is a system that allows them to minimize the pain and suffering of life. For example, Vodou is used to protect and watch over those who believe, it tells them what is happening to their relatives who live abroad, and alerts them to the medicines that are beneficial if they are sick. It operates as a defense mechanism that cushions them against the anguish associated with disasters, pain, loss, and other atrocities. The cultural influence of Vodou is formidable (Hurston 2009).

In addition to providing fortification and other everyday cultural benefits, Vodou possesses the power to uplift and inspire action (Hurston 2009). The pivotal role of Vodou in the Haitian revolution, described as the "the most dramatic revolutionary transformation to occur in modern history," was emphasized by Lundy (2009, p. n.p). Lundy (2009) asserted that grasping the role of Vodou is critical to actually comprehending what ensued. During the Haitian Revolution, Vodou was the galvanizing sway. It fueled and sustained the subjugated Africans' notions of defiance. As a religion, Vodou allowed the slaves to develop what Émile Durkheim (1893) called "collective consciousness." For Durkheim, collective consciousness was the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society. He acknowledged that religious symbols, discourse, beliefs, and rituals easily bind together members of a society, especially in societies where the social group is homogenous. This binding together, Durkheim theorized, produces the collective consciousness. It allows the society to achieve what he termed "mechanical solidarity" – an automatic binding together of people into a collective through their shared values, beliefs, and practices.

In the case of Haiti, the collective consciousness as defined by Durkheim can be readily noted when the events prior to, during, and after the Haitian revolution are examined. Vodou was the glue that bound the African slaves together. It was the essential mystical influence that gave the Africans reprieve. Though the colonists tortured, degraded, and did everything to break their spirits, the Africans maintained their sense of self and culture when they united in their celebrations, dances, rituals, and prayers. Vodou gave them a sense of independence, peace, human dignity, and strength. Durkheim's theory suggests that Vodou allowed the Africans to feel a sense of solidarity with each other. The collective consciousness, as he postulated, allowed the people to work together

to achieve community and functional societies. Vodou allowed the African slaves to establish connections and wage war against the brutalizing structure.

Vodou was used to fight political battles. During several slave revolts in Haiti, for instance, Vodou was repeatedly the subversive influence. Vodou was used as a tool to epitomize the organization of resistance and accord. It regularly functioned as a formidable political force and was used as an anti-establishment influence for accord. This view is supported by the fact that slaveholders made resolute attempts to utterly divest slaves of their African traditions in general, and more specifically, African Vodou. The fear was that the slaves' native beliefs would afford occasions for them to surreptitiously synchronize uprisings (Lundy 2009).

Several African resistance schemes in Saint Domingue targeted the French. Although there were several smaller slave revolts, the 1791 insurrection wrecked more than 200 sugar plantations and about 1,200 coffee plantations, and implicated tens of thousands of escaped slaves. The revolt was orchestrated during clandestine Vodou assemblies that were both coordinated and backed by Vodou priests. In this rebellion, priests performed key roles. Prior to the beginning of the revolution, a Bois Caïman ceremony was held – a ritual that allowed the slaves to formalize their agreement in a Vodou ritual.

The central role of Vodou priests and priestesses must be noted here. For the 1791 slave revolt, for instance, Boukman Dutty, a maroon leader and Vodou priest, officiated the ceremony along with a Vodou high priestess. The role of Vodou is notable because the ceremony involved animal sacrifices, Vodou deities, and other Vodou celebrations (Shen 2015). Similar accounts are given for the US invasion of 1915–1938. The US Marines were so afraid of the power of Vodou that instead of focusing on their mission of attaining peace, justice, and ensuring Haiti recognized and performed its duty towards others, they spent their time trying to eradicate Vodou beliefs and behaviors, which they found very threatening (Woody 2019).

Anti-Vodou Laws

To avert impending insurrections, slaveholders wanted to supplant African Vodou with French dogma to better control the enslaved. In fact, the practice of Vodou has been legally challenged throughout Haiti's history. By 1835, practicing Vodou was a punishable offense by law. The frequency with which such laws had to be enacted and enforced indicate that the success of such laws against different forms of slave healings, assembly, ritual "profanation," and the like were mostly ineffective. The enslaved people continued surreptitiously or with the consent of planters and their agents to practice and transform their religion at both the individual and community levels. Other examples of the use of Vodou in inspiring revolts include Macandal's (a practitioner of Vodou) 1757 poisoning plot against the French planters on the Plaine du Nord and the overthrow of Emperor Henri Christophe.

The first three Haitian founding fathers – Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henri Christophe – all publicly opposed Vodou, mainly because they recognized (or had firsthand knowledge of) its power. These leaders may have privately feared Vodou's power and often venerated it. However, although they publicly rejected Vodou, some leaders may have privately consulted the Vodou priests for advice (Lundy 2009). Toussaint was more likely to have Vodou practitioners killed, but Dessalines and Christophe permitted some level of Vodou practice. For François Duvalier (Papa Doc), Vodou was seen a part of Haiti's cultural heritage. He used Vodou priests as advisors in his political career. By 1972, the practice of Vodou was allowed in Haiti. This was again reinforced during the rule of President Bertrand Aristide in 1986. In 2003, Vodou gained recognition as an official Haitian religion. Currently, this status remains. Vodou continues to be used as a tool of resistance in Haiti (Universe in Universe 1997).

Counter-Discursive Practices of Vodou

Several counter-discursive practices exist in the practice of Vodou. These practices support the multiple possibilities as to why Vodou is an

effective tool of revolt. First, Vodou has no real leaders. Rather, all participants are leaders; they can all incarnate God. Hence, Vodou is a movement that can endure, as there is always someone who can be the leader (Bell 1995).

Second, Vodou worshippers believe that the dead can reenter the world of the living. They believe that these persons are able to come back and assist them in their fights. *Les invisibles,* as they are called, are always with them to help boost their numbers, especially during revolutions. Thus, at the ceremony at Bois Caïman (mentioned previously), the Vodou believers may have felt that they were uniting with the dead. This may have given them both physical as well as spiritual strength. Similarly, Boukman, the Vodou priest who led the Haitian revolution of 1791, believed that if he called on the Lwa and waived a bull's tail around his head, he could not be killed by the French soldiers' bullets (Bell 1995). Vodou is a faith with deep roots. It has been alive for centuries and continues as a cultural movement.

Conclusion

Since its discovery, Haiti has had a depressing history as a result of military occupations and the commercial interests of foreign countries. We have a particular interest in understanding how the people of Haiti have navigated through the destructive nature of imperialism and the tools they have used to rid the country of imperialism. This understanding was captured in this chapter through two periods of Haiti's history: the discovery of the island by Christopher Columbus and the US occupation from 1915 to 1934. Through those timeframes in Haiti's history, we discussed the motives, the processes, and the destructive nature of imperialism.

According to Galtung's theory of imperialism, there are different types of imperialism: economic, political, military, communication, and cultural. Imperialism is an unequal relationship between two nations, a Center nation and a Peripheral nation, in which the Center nations have dominance over the Peripheral nations. Consequently, the Center nations dictate and control every aspect of the Peripheral nations, which hinders the growth of the Peripheral nations for the benefit of the economic development of the Center nation.

From the time Christopher Columbus landed in Haiti to the duration of the United States' first invasion of the island, Haiti has been under the control of Spain, France, or the United States. These countries exploited Haiti with no regards for human dignity. Since its independence, Haiti has struggled to develop itself as a result of accumulated debts, internal chaos, and foreign occupations. Imperialism has destroyed Haiti. As discussed in this chapter, Haiti was clearly the Peripheral nation being dominated by many countries throughout its history. From the standpoint of Galtung's theory, Haiti was expected to be an obedient Periphery nation and an imitator of the superior structures of the all the Center nations that controlled it. The Haitian people, however, mobilized themselves through Vodou to fight against the imperialism, despite the anti-vodou laws against their religion.

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Country

▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

Creoleness

▶ Senghor, Leopold Sédar (1906–2001)

Cricket and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Athleticism; Civilizing mission; Othering; Sport

Definition

The role of sporting cultures in the sustenance as well as the dismantling of the British Empire has been a vibrant field of enquiry within Postcolonial Studies, and the major studies on cricketing cultures (eg. Appadurai 1996; Bateman 2009; Gupta 2004, 2009; James 2005 [1963]; Majumdar 2011; Malcolm 2013; Mangan 1998 [1986]) have provided significant insights into the cultural politics of the British Empire as well as the various postcolonialities that have emerged in its wake. Drawing upon such works, this essay delineates three key ways in which the sport of cricket has shaped imperialist and anti-imperialist cultures: 1) Cricket, as constructed by mainstream discourses of England in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, was projected as an element of national culture which could foster ideal imperialist subjects and thus contribute to the sustenance of the imperialist hierarchies in the colonies. 2) Post-independence, the erstwhile imperialist sport became a site of virulent postcolonial nationalisms in several former colonies, especially in South Asia and the Caribbean. 3) The political economy of cricket in the era of televised, commercialized cricketing spectacles (since the 1980s) has resulted in the emergence of a new hierarchy wherein India has emerged as a super power in the world of cricket administration. This essay therefore seeks to provide a critical overview of the extant scholarship, outlining the ways in which the semiotics and/or the political economy of cricket have

contributed to the processes of imperialism, post-colonialism, and neo-imperialism.

Introduction

Critical appraisals of cricketing cultures have traced the sport's imperialist manifestations as well as the postcolonial transformations of the sport. This essay's discussion of such readings has been arranged in two sections:the first section deals with the Victorian era conception of cricket as a national sport which is capable of moulding imperial heroes as well as civilizing the natives whereas the second section is concerned with the questions of symbolic appropriation, postcolonial nationalisms, and neo-imperialist cultures.

Batting for the Empire

Although cricket is often simplistically described as 'the imperial game', the sport's role in the sustenance of the British Empire is complex and heterogeneous. Several aspects of cricket's imperialist functions have been identified by various scholars, out of which four will be discussed here: the politics of its association with Englishness; its supposed ability to prepare the upper classes to lead the imperial mission; its role in the civilising mission of the Empire; and a problematic portrayal of the (non)-cricketing Other which establishes an exclusive and elite notion of Englishness.

By the nineteenth century, the English began to see cricket as a game that embodies Englishness and this can be attributed to historical contiguity and consequently, the narrative construction of a myth. Dominic Malcolm (2013, chs. 1–2) has argued that this notion is a result of cricket and the very idea of a distinct English character emerging concurrently, subject to the influence of the same social processes: parallel to the process of English political culture becoming more peaceful and orderly with the emergence of the parliamentary system, the rules of cricket were amended to make it a non-violent sport. Malcolm has pointed out that the social class who pioneered both these reforms – the aristocracy – viewed the peaceful resolution of conflicts as a typically

English trait and hence cricket, with its stature as a non-violent sport, was reinvented as a symbol of Englishness by many writers (see Breuilly 2014, p. 172). The key role played by discourse in establishing a link between cricket and the supposed national character has been accepted not only by Anthony Bateman (2009), whose framework is that of literary studies, but also by Malcolm, who analyses English cricket through the lens of figurational sociology. From the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards, a large corpus of English cricket writings celebrated the Englishness of cricket, the most significant works being John Nyren's *The Cricketers of My Time* (1907 [1833]) and Rev. Pycroft's *The Cricket Field* (1859 [1851]). A widely discussed instance of this discourse can be found in the latter:

> The game of cricket, philosophically considered, is a standing panegyric on the English character: none but an orderly and sensible race of people would so amuse themselves . . .. Patience, fortitude, and self-denial, the various bumps of order, obedience, and good humour, with an unruffled temper, are indispensable. . . . As to physical qualifications, we require not only the volatile spirits of the Irishman *Rampant*, nor the phlegmatic caution of the Scotch-man *Couchant*, but we want the English combination of the two; though, with good generalship, cricket is a game for Britons generally. (pp. 25–26)

This passage exemplifies not only the explicit connection that is forged between cricket and the supposedly English character but also the 'imperial' nature of this Englishness. Implicit in this notion of Englishness is a sense of cultural superiority vis-à-vis the Celtic nations (Bateman 2009, pp. 1–2; Malcolm 2013, ch. 2). The argument is that an ideal cricketer should be English, an identity that, it is claimed, subsumes that of Irish and Scottish and this is an instance of what Malcolm terms England's 'imperial nationalism'. English nationalism of the nineteenth century was an 'imperial nationalism' wherein the 'imperialists must define their distinctiveness and/ or superiority in terms of their mission and their creation – the Empire – rather than in terms of the people who created it' (Malcolm 2013: 'Conclusion'). According to Malcolm, this often enabled the English to see the (cricketing) success of the colonies as a sign of their own superiority and thus

the English imperial identity was one which often sought to accommodate the colonial other. He observes that the Celtic nations were subject to a process of 'internal colonialism' and, as a result, the cricketing discourses saw these identities as subsets of Englishness (2013, ch. 3, 'Conclusion').

From the late eighteenth century onwards, the inclusive character of cricket waned gradually. While cricket was once an inclusive, rural sport, a distinction gradually emerged between the 'Gentlemen' or amateurs and the 'Players' or professionals. Not only was the captaincy of the side reserved for the amateurs, but the professionals also dined separately and entered the field through a different gate, and were generally treated as second-class citizens. By the late nineteenth century many cricket fields in both England and the colonies had become an elite social space where the upper and the upper-middle classes mingled with each other and the sport was not only a favoured pastime of the elite classes but it also played a role in the forging of such social groups (Allen 2012, pp. 210–211; Scalmer 2007, p. 434). The Victorian public schools fostered what J.A. Mangan has termed the 'cult of athleticism' (that is, the belief that sports can inculcate moral values), and the upper classes were thus influenced by a pedagogic philosophy which believed that cricket and other sports could train the students to be imperial heroes (Malcolm 2008b, pp. 58–59). Under the influence of Muscular Christianity, a doctrine which equates manliness and spiritual virtue, cricket (and other sports) came to be seen as a means for developing in the students '. . . the basic tools of imperial command: courage, endurance, assertion, control and self-control' (Mangan 1998 [1986], p. 18; see also Stoddart 1988, pp. 653–654). It was widely held that sports would inculcate these qualities in the students and create a generation of imperial administrators who were simultaneously able to control their subordinates and deferential to their superiors (Mangan 1998 [1986], p. 18). One of the key influences on the public school system of the day was Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby School, who preached the need for Christian earnestness, discipline, and self-control.

Arnold's pedagogy was transformed into one in which sport became the locus of all these virtues (James 2005 [1963], pp. 215–217), an appropriation that can be best understood via Thomas Hughes's cult novel *Tom Brown's Schooldays* ([1857] 1993).

A pioneering work of the genre of public school fiction, *Tom Brown's Schooldays* was extremely influential in shaping the imperialist sporting ideology of the day, a claim attested by the fact that the headmasters of public schools (both at 'Home' and in the colonies) used to read out the passages on cricket to their students (Mangan 1998 [1986], p. 133). The novel's imperialist leanings are revealed at the very outset when the narrator notes that the Browns are a family of warriors who are spread all over the Empire, and he asserts that this presence of Browns is the reason for the stability of the Empire (p. 25). The novel features Thomas Arnold as the 'Doctor', the revered headmaster who encourages the virtues of manliness and piety. Ian Baucom (1999) has analysed the text's celebration of Muscular Christianity and has noted that Tom Brown, the protagonist, is a manly sportsman who has become indifferent to spirituality whereas the physically weak George Arthur is a true disciple of the real-life Arnold in that he abounds in faith and moral convictions. Tom's Christian spirit is rekindled under Arthur's influence and the latter is introduced to games and thus made 'manly' by the former. In this way the novel fuses together the two worldviews and celebrates the ideal hero figure of Victorian England: a sportsman who is a Muscular Christian (Baucom 1999, pp. 145–146). In the penultimate chapter of the novel, cricket is praised as a noble game which promotes teamwork, and it is dubbed 'the birthright of British boys old and young, as *habeas corpus* and trial by jury are of British men' (p. 225), thereby emphasising both the Englishness of the game and the pre-eminence of the English culture. In the ensuing conversation, the leadership qualities required of the captain of the cricket team are compared to that of the Doctor, and it is announced that the Doctor's school is the most ably administered part of the British Empire (p. 226). By the logic of synecdoche, the

captain of the cricket team is likened to an imperial administrator who is able to maintain complete control over his subordinates.

The idea of school sports preparing the students for battle was very popular during the age with various newspapers and school magazines tracking the exploits of the public school alumni in the distant outposts of the Empire, reporting both their martial and sporting endeavours (Mangan, 1998 [1986], pp. 63–68). The most well-known expression of the military role of cricket can be found in Henry Newbolt's poem 'Vitai Lampada', which draws a comparison between a batsman bravely fighting for his team during the last moments of a cricket match and a soldier fighting for his nation in a faraway desert (Bateman 2009, p. 42). The unselfish nature of teamwork that is valorised in both the cricket team and the army, and the warrior's obedience towards his superiors (the captain and the colonel) make the poem representative of the imperial sporting discourse of the day. The cricket captain's exhortation, 'Play up! Play up! and play the game!' (Newbolt n.d.) – which the soldier recalls while fighting for his nation – evokes both the loyalty towards the school and the nation, and the role that school sports played in fostering a commitment towards the imperial project.

For the Victorian upper classes, cricket was not only an ideal means of equipping the English to head the empire; it was also a means of imperial control, an ideological tool for disciplining and civilising the natives (Malcolm 2008b, p. 59). These twin functions of imperial cricket have been forcefully articulated by the contemporary writer Cecil Headlam: '[C]ricket unites, as in India, the rulers and the ruled. It also provides a moral training, an education in pluck, and nerve, and self-restraint, far more valuable to the character of the ordinary native than the mere learning by heart of a play of Shakespeare' (cited in Kaufman and Patterson 2005, p. 92). The first line of the passage indicates the widespread belief that cricket would act as a cultural bond, an umbilical cord connecting the colony and the 'mother country', thereby containing the native challenges to colonialism. This hegemonic idea gained acceptance in many colonies (Allen 2009, p. 474;

Bateman 2009, p. 2; Scalmer 2007, p. 435) as evidenced by the Anglophilia in the early cricket writings of colonies as diverse as Australia, the Caribbean, New Zealand and India (Bateman 2009, pp. 124–130). The latter part of the passage indicates the sport's mandate to civilise the natives. The writer has no doubt that the natives' characters needed to be reformed and that cricket was the best way to achieve this aim. The discourse of civilising mission played a huge role in the diffusion of the imperial sport (Kaufman and Patterson 2005, pp. 91–92; Malcolm 2013, ch. 3). The Victorians staunchly believed in their moral obligation to civilise the rest of the world (the infamous 'white man's burden') and in the moral worth of the sport of cricket. Cricket was thus exported to colonies as diverse as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Sudan, India and the Caribbean in the last decades of the nineteenth century (see Allen 2009; Bateman 2009; Mangan 1998 [1986]; Ryan 1999). These sporting missionaries tried to introduce sports in the colonies, mostly through the British-model public schools and the army, in order to 'create a universal Tom Brown: loyal, brave, truthful, a gentleman and, if at all possible, a Christian' (Mangan 1998 [1986], p. 18). The civilising mission enabled the English to see the cricketing successes of the colonies as a result of their efforts at reforming the colonials, and thus fed into the idea of imperial nationalism outlined above (Malcolm 2013, 'Conclusion').

While the discourses of cultural bond and the civilising mission were definitely influential, cricket's introduction and dissemination in the colonies cannot be solely attributed to such intentional aspects of imperialist ideology. Malcolm (2013) has argued that for many imperialists, playing cricket was a way of establishing that their physical prowess had not been affected by removal from the supposedly healthy environment of England and exposure to the tropical climates of the colonies. While an intentionally ideological use of cricket became prevalent later on, the attribution of civilising intentions to the early cricket in the colonies might just be instances of 'post-hoc rationalization' (ch. 3). In a similar vein, Ramachandra Guha has noted that the early cricket in colonial India was a means for

the homesick Englishman to recreate 'Home' in the colony, and, far from having any intentions of promoting the sport, the early cricket clubs were racially exclusive (2002, pp. 4–11). Moreover, as Stoddart (1988) has argued, the diffusion of cricket cannot be attributed simply to the policies of the British colonial governments. In many instances, the sports were adopted by the native communities in order to share the culture of the colonial masters in a subconscious attempt at gaining upward social mobility (pp. 660–661).

The imperialist cricket (and indeed, imperialism itself) was so rife with contradictions that cricket's imperial nationalism with its assimilatory tendencies coexisted with exclusionary discourses. The Othering of non-white cricketers was a prevalent feature of cricket writings and it served to project cricket as an exclusively (white) English game. The narratives on Ranjitsinhji – the Indian prince who became a cricketing sensation in England – are a case in point: Ranji and the discourses on him represent both the supposed power of the cricket field to anglicise the Other, and rather contradictorily, the exclusively English nature of cricket (Bateman 2009, pp. 135–140). While Ranji's cricketing prowess led him to be considered as an English gentleman, his cricket was often depicted in orientalist terms (Sen 2001, pp. 241–243). For instance, Neville Cardus writes, 'The style is the man, and Ranji belonged to the land of Hazlitt's Indian jugglers, where beauty is subtle and not plain and unambiguous' (1977, p. 139). Similarly, the early English accounts of cricket in India suggest that the natives are, by nature, disinterested and inept at the game (Guha 2002, pp. 5–11). Another instance would be the English press's racist portrayal of the touring West Indies cricketers in 1900, wherein the black cricketers were depicted as infants learning the game from adult, white cricketers (Bateman 2009, pp. 158–159).

The practical consequences of cricket's imperialist ideology were numerous and not restricted to the assimilation, exclusion, or disciplining of the colonised. For instance, in countries such as India and South Africa, the intentional diffusion of organised cricket mirrored the regional organisation of the colonial government and thus reinforced the Empire (Allen 2012, pp. 214–215). The hierarchical relationships created by the Othering of the non-whites were reflected in the field of play, with the early non-white cricketers in the colonies being relegated to the plebeian roles of bowlers and fielders. In Victorian England, batting was seen as a genteel activity and was often the preserve of the amateurs, while bowling and fielding were seen as more naturally suited to the working-class professionals, cases in point being the slaves in early Caribbean cricket (Yelvington, cited in Malcolm 2013, ch. 5) and the servant paid to bowl to the English gentlemen at the Calcutta Cricket Club in the mid-nineteenth century (Bagot, cited in Guha 2002, pp. 9–10).

Anti-imperial Playing Fields

Cricket's challenges to, or deviations from, the imperialist ideology consist of: the (post-) colonial appropriation and indigenisation of the imperial cultural artefact; the sport's embodiment of post-colonial nationalisms; and the emergence of neo-imperialist cricketing cultures in the era of globalisation.

The appropriations of the imperial sport have been effected through counterdiscourses and through the modification of the conventions of the sport. The foundational text of post-colonial cricket literature is C.L.R. James's *Beyond a Boundary* (2005 [1963]), which was heavily influential in shaping a post-colonial approach to cricket. This complex and layered text makes several significant interventions in the cultural politics of imperialist cricket, two aspects of which need to be discussed here: firstly, James challenged the very foundation of the imperialist cricket discourses when he insisted that sport is political. His famous question 'What do they know of cricket who only cricket know?' (p. 309) succinctly captures the sociopolitical significance of cricket and counters the imperialist discourses which project cricket as an apolitical field (Malcolm 2008a, p. 25). Throughout the book, James points out that, in the face of the racial inequalities in colonial West Indies, cricket has been a medium through which the (racial) pride and the nationalist sentiments of the native Black

community have been expressed (pp. 72–73). For James, cricket is a popular art which is at once aesthetically pleasing and socially relevant (Bateman 2009, pp. 157–158, 173–178).

Secondly, James refuses to consider cricket merely as an ideological tool of the empire (Smith 2006, p. 95). He asserts both the centrality of cricket to the colonised's notion of their self, and their agency in transforming the meaning of the imperial cultural artefact. Rather than seeking to completely dismantle the imperial culture, James lauds the strict moral code associated with Victorian cricket (2005 [1963], pp. 32–34) and seemingly concedes the success of the civilising mission of the colonisers by suggesting that cricket can transform colonials into Englishmen. However, by implying that Englishness is not territorially bound and that it can be embodied and transformed by the colonials, he is challenging the exclusivity of the Englishness associated with cricket (Baucom 1999, pp. 157–163; see also Bateman 2009, pp. 190–194). Although *Beyond a Boundary's* influence in decolonising cricket is second to none, it must be noted that James's position has attracted some amount of criticism. Scholars such as Brian Stoddart and Helen Tiffin have been troubled by his celebration of cricket's moral codes and have interpreted it as a sign of his inability to critique the English culture when it pertains to his favourite sport (Smith 2006, pp. 96–97). Instead of lauding James's appropriation of Englishness, one may argue that this does not qualify as a challenge and that it can be seen as part of England's imperial nationalism (see above) wherein Englishness is an identity that can be acquired by the colonised as well. Andrew Smith (2006) has strongly defended James's position by arguing that James was not unaware of the illusory nature of cricket's moral codes and that he has noted that cricket in the Caribbean was marked by various kinds of hierarchies and discriminations (pp. 101–102). Smith holds that James valued the 'formal autonomy of the cricketing field' (p. 102) – that is, the perception that cricket is a domain set apart from the everyday world – because he believed that such mythologies enabled cricket to question various imperialist and/ or elitist ideologies. Thus, the various assessments of *Beyond*

a Boundary have been divided along the twin poles of strategic appropriation and assimilation. Ultimately, there can be no absolute resolution of such a debate because the distinction between the two is often one of perception.

The appropriation of cricket can also involve drastic changes to its rules and conventions as in the case of the South Asian spectators in England and elsewhere whose spectator styles are celebratory and passionate as opposed to the calm, dignified behaviour expected of English cricketing culture (Crabbe and Wagg 2005, pp. 210–214; Malcolm 2013, ch. 7). An extreme case of such an appropriation is that of the Trobriand Islands, where the sport was introduced by British missionaries with the intention of containing tribal warfare. The natives sabotaged the civilising mission and introduced into cricket practices associated with their tribal culture. The bowling action of Trobriand cricket was modelled on spear throwing, the width of the stumps was modified, and tribal markings and war dances were incorporated into the game (Stoddart 1988, pp. 825–826).

If in some countries, such as New Zealand and Canada (Mangan 1998 [1986], pp. 162–165; Ryan 1999, p. 62), the imperial sport lost its popular appeal with the emergence of other, nationalist sports, in countries such as India and the Caribbean the game flourished as a symbol of anti-colonial as well as post-colonial nationalisms. Studies on these cricketing cultures (Appadurai 1996; Beckles 2011) stress the indigenisation of the sport by which the performance styles as well as meanings associated with them are modified and – following the Jamesian tradition – the ability of the masses to recognise and consume the anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments associated with the sport. If white loyalism coexisted with Black nationalism in the cricket of the colonial West Indies (Beckles 2011, p. 160), much of early Indian cricket was loyalist with the Indian princes who patronised the sport adopting it as a royal spectacle and way of strengthening the bond with the colonial master (Appadurai 1996, pp. 94–95). At the same time, cricket also became one of the earliest sites where the Indian nation was imagined because the

visiting England teams needed a national team to which they could be opposed and, subsequently, the sport was indigenised through the emergence of media in the Indian languages (Appadurai 1996, pp. 98–99). Indian cricket's role as a vehicle of nationalist sentiment, which began in the 1970s as a result of the national team's improved fortunes, intensified with the expansion of the television networks from the 1980s onward (Mehta 2009; Sen 2002). While West Indian cricketers are no longer the nationalist heroes they were during the early decades after independence (Beckles 2011), the Indian male audience continues to find in cricket 'the erotics of nationhood' (Appadurai 1996, p. 111). The economic globalisation intensified, rather than hampered, the nationalist frenzy associated with cricket, and the sport in contemporary India is located at the intersection of nationalist and capitalist ideologies with the culture industries marketing cricketing nationalism for financial gains.

If, for the bulk of its history as a multinational sport, the West has dominated the governing bodies of cricket, the past few decades have seen the balance of power swing in favour of South Asia, especially India. Scholars (Gupta 2004, 2009; Majumdar 2004, 2011; Rumford 2007) have attributed this shift of dynamics to the changes in the political economy of the sport as a result of globalisation.

Amit Gupta (2004) has argued that a confluence of factors has enabled the non-West to dominate the politics of world cricket. While globalisation of sport usually results in the Western nations dominating the international organisation, the International Cricket Council (ICC) steadfastly refused to exploit the financial potential of the sport. In fact, the commercialisation of cricket was intensified only when Kerry Packer, an Australian media magnate, poached players from the national teams of Australia, England, and the West Indies and formed a rebel league (for a full account of the 'Packer revolution', see Cashman 2011). Gupta has noted that with the emergence of satellite television and cable industries, South Asia and its huge cricketing audience became crucial to the finances of the sport by the 1990s (Marqusee, cited in Gupta 2004, p. 265),

and India emerged as a superpower in the world of cricket administration.

The administration of world cricket had long been the monopoly of England with the 'home of cricket' dominating the Imperial Cricket Conference and its successor organisation, the ICC. The change in the balance of power began in the 1980s and the key episodes in this shift included: the South Asian nations' securing of the hosting rights of the 1987 and 1996 World Cups; the Indian Premier League phenomenon; and, ultimately, the 2014 revamping of ICC's organisation structure. All these tussles are significant to the students of imperialism as the points of contention were the two-tier structures in the world of cricket administration whereby some nations wield a veto power, officially or unofficially.

India and Pakistan's successful joint bid for the right to host the 1987 World Cup was a momentous event in the East–West conflict in the world of cricket administration because it was the first time that the World Cup was held outside England. Majumdar (2004, p. 408) has noted that the sub-continental bid offered a higher compensation package for the participant nations and had the support of the majority of the members including such Western countries as Holland and Canada, but that there was stiff resistance from England and Australia who tried to invoke the ICC rule which stated all recommendations should be made by a majority which included a foundation member (England or Australia). Eventually, the bid was awarded to India and Pakistan on the basis of a simple majority (p. 409), thereby undermining the advantage of the veto power given to England and Australia. Significantly, the Indian administration lobbying for the joint bid saw the tussle as one between the imperial West and the emerging East as evidenced by the comment of N.K.P. Salve, the then president of the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) in his book *The Story of the Reliance Cup* (1987). He wrote that the sub-continent hosting the World Cup:

> would virtually threaten more than a century old era of England's supremacy in the administration of International cricket. The Mecca of cricket all these long years had been Lord's. If the finals of

the world cup, the most coveted international cricket event, were played at any other place, it would shake the very foundation on which the super edifice of international cricket administration was built. (quoted in Majumdar 2004, p. 408)

A similar struggle was waged over the venue of the 1996 World Cup. A joint bid was put forward by India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka which was more financially lucrative for the member nations than that of England (p. 412). Once again, the foundation members' veto power became the bone of contention, with ICC solicitors arguing for the same and the three sub-continental nations successfully arguing that the venue should be decided by a simple majority of the member nations (p. 413). It should be noted that both these anti-imperial victories (as the veto can be seen as maintaining a hierarchical relationship between the two Western countries and the rest) were enabled by the South Asian nations' efficient exploitation of the financial potential of the sport. India's increasing influence in the ICC also resulted in Jagmohan Dalmiya being elected as president of the ICC despite the machinations of the Western lobby (pp. 414–417) and enabled Indian players to challenge the terms of the ICC contracts for the Champions Trophy of 2000 (pp. 426–446).

India's position as the cricketing superpower has been further strengthened with the success of the Indian Premier League (IPL), and Majumdar has argued that the IPL completes the 'decolonisation of Indian cricket' (2011, p. 173). Through the IPL, India has developed an Indian brand that has acquired global recognition (Gupta 2009, p. 204). Along with the financial and political clout the tournament has afforded India, it has also played a role in reversing the sense of racial inferiority that Indians used to experience and has gone to the extent of co-opting Western players (Majumdar 2011, pp. 177–178). As an instance of the latter, Majumdar refers to David Hussey – the Australian player who played for Kolkata Knight Riders – earning the moniker 'Hussey da' ('da' being a Bengali word which means 'elder brother'). Majumdar's formulation of the 'decolonisation of Indian cricket' notwithstanding, his own analysis suggests that Indian

cricketing cultures have acquired a neo-imperial dimension. By comparing the contemporary Indian acceptance of foreign players in the IPL with the reception of Ranji in the Victorian England, Majumdar has brilliantly argued that the acceptance is unstable and contingent upon the player's success, and that slightest failure can immediately relegate him to the status of the Other (2011, pp. 178–179).

The above account makes it clear that while India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka often worked together as a bloc to foil the Western lobby, India has been the dominant player among the three nations. A telling instance of India's preeminence in the world of cricket administration is the short-lived 'Big Three' reforms of 2014, which ushered in a new organisational structure under which the ICC would be dominated by India, England, and Australia. The constitutional amendments, which were accepted after months of controversy, vested much of the power of the ICC in two five-member committees – the Executive Committee and the Finance and Commercial Affairs Committtee – in which India, England and Australia would have permanent representatives with the other two members being selected from other countries on a rotational basis (ESPNcricinfo staff 2014b). Even within this cabal, India was to be the first among equals, with an ICC media release stating that the BCCI will take 'a central leadership responsibility' (ESPNcricinfo staff 2014a, n.p.). The new revenue model adopted as part of the revamp would have also resulted in an increase in the income of the already wealthy cricket boards of India, England and Australia. India's dominance was justified on the grounds that it generates 70–80% of ICC's revenue (see ESPNcricinfo staff 2014c). Not only were such claims been contested (see Ugra 2014), but the formal adoption of a new hierarchy was an instance of neo-imperialism, a blatant adoption of plutocratic ideals. It is worthwhile noting that the imperialist overtones of these developments have been recognised by the media. The new system was termed an 'oligarchy', which afforded the Big Three an advantage reminiscent of the veto enjoyed by the founding members earlier (Bal 2014, n.p.). The irony of the

neo-imperial role of India, which was at the forefront of the struggle to abolish the veto enjoyed by England and Australia, was also noted (see Abbasi 2014). India's pioneering of this reform is a deviation from the policy of South Asian solidarity that BCCI used to adopt occasionally in the past, and while India's increase in clout was initially at the cost of the West's influence, the Big Three reforms saw the old and new powers in the world of cricket becoming allies in heading a new empire. (A detailed coverage of the controversies following the proposals for the revamp and the minor concessions made by the Big Three in the run up to the adoption of the model can be found at the popular cricket website *ESPN Cricinfo* [http://www.espncricinfo.com/ci-icc/content/story/712255.html].) Though this blatant neo-imperialist hierarchy in the administrative set up of world cricket was rejected through a series of further reforms in 2017, the very adoption of such a hierarchial governance model illustrates the power dynamics of contemporary cricket. Moreover, while the administrative set up was made egalitarian, the roll back of 2017 failed to completely negate the tiered system of revenue sharing put in place as part of the Big Three reforms. The short-lived set up left behind a lasting legacy in that it forsook the practice of sharing the ICC revenues equally among all full members, and allotted a disproportionately high share of profits due in the subsequent cycle of tournaments (from 2016 to 2023) to India (See Brettig 2017). Whereas the estimated allocation of US $440 million to the BCCI was reduced to US $293 million as part of the 2017 roll back, this was nearly double the amount allotted to other countries. Furthermore, the BCCI's influence was evidenced in subsequent negotiations over the sharing of profits. The BCCI initially employed confrontational tactics by demanding that their share be raised to US $570 million and hinted at a pull out from the upcoming Champions Trophy by deferring the announcement of the Indian squad. This threat was potent as the non-participation of Indian team, with its unparalleled fan following, would have had a devastating impact on the TV revenues. While this strategy was curtailed by the Committee of Administrators (a

Supreme Court of India appointed committee which was overseeing the functioning of the BCCI at that point), which insisted that the team should be declared immediately, the BCCI's share was subsequently hiked to US $405 million. This amounted to 22.8% of the total revenues whereas the shares of the other full members were between 7% and 8% (Sarkar 2017; PTI 2017). This resolution to the long drawn out tussle evidences the fact that the power hierarchies in contemporary international cricket – as regulated by the ICC – are subject to the dynamics of a transnational media industry and that the Indian cricket board continues to be a neo-imperial entity by virtue of its centrality to the global 'cricket industry'.

Since the nineteenth century, cricket has been associated with imperialist as well as anti-imperialist ideologies. However, it would be erroneous to pin down cricket to a single meaning and label it as an 'imperial', 'anti-imperial' or even a 'neo-imperial' sport. With regard to the last, it is worth remembering that even after the rise of India as a superpower, cricket has not entirely shaken off its imperial past; something proven by the Western media's representation of the sport in the Indian sub-continent which continues to evoke Eurocentric, racist assumptions (Sen 2001). Rather than attempting to fix the meaning of cricket, it would be more analytically fruitful to see it as a cultural practice whose meaning is never monolithic and always subject to change.

Cross-References

▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
▶ Decolonization in South Asia
▶ James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)

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Critique of Development Economics

▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology

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Cuba

▶ Cuba: A Historical Context to Anti-imperialism, Nineteenth Century to the Present
▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

Cuba: A Historical Context to Anti-imperialism, Nineteenth Century to the Present

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Synonyms

Che Guevara; Cuba; Fidel Castro; Imperialism; Internationalism; US hegemony

Definition

From Cuba's earliest history, many of its citizens have struggled against imperialism. The Taino Native Americans, African Cubans, and Cubans of European and Asian descent have fought to rid their homeland, and the wider world, of subjugation and oppression. Throughout these heroic struggles, the names of the Cuban revolutionary leaders have changed; the places in which historic battles were fought are varied; and, of course, the outcomes of these struggles are diverse. What has been, and continues to be, persistent in Cuban history is its people's anti-imperialist fight at home and abroad. This essay outlines Cuba's major struggles against US imperialism and hegemony in South America, Africa, and other parts of the world.

The Cuban people began confronting social, economic, and political oppression long before the modern Cuban Revolution (1953–59) challenged autocracy and imperialism at home and abroad. The first people to fight for their independence, in what became Cuba, were the Taino Native Americans. In 1492 Christopher Columbus claimed Cuba for Spain. In 1511 the Spanish began to systematically exterminate the Taino people. The first hero of Cuba was a Taino chief named Hatuey, who fought against Spanish

imperialism and aggression. Ultimately, in 1512, he was captured and executed by the European invaders. After Hatuey's death, the Spanish began enslaving the remaining Taino people, thus beginning a legacy of enslavement that would plague Cuba until 1886.

In 1526 the Spanish imported enslaved Africans into Cuba. By the mid-nineteenth century, Cuba was engulfed by 'slave' insurrections and revolts. In addition, marginalised Cubans of European and Asian descent began to challenge Spanish authority. These challenges began Cuba's long ascension towards freedom. In the Ten Years War (1868–78) and the Second War of Independence (1895–98), Cubans fought against Spanish hegemony and tyranny. During these legendary freedom struggles, many heroic leaders emerged who helped Cubans gain their freedom and security. Antonio Maceo y Grajales (1845–96), José Quintino Bandara Bentancourt (1834–1906), and José Marti (1853–95) were Cuban leaders who resisted foreign domination and control. These dynamic leaders gave their lives to ensure the eventual independence of Cuba.

The African Cuban, Antonio Maceo, also known as 'the Bronze Titan', was a brilliant and fearless leader who tirelessly struggled against Spanish domination. One of Maceo's best-known military feats occurred during the Second War of Independence. The East-West Invasion (1895), which lasted 3 months, was the first major battle of the war. Along with Antonio Maceo, José Q.B. Bentancourt was a Cuban revolutionary leader who fought against the Spanish. Betancourt and his comrade Maceo led the Mambi Army of Liberation, which was primarily composed of African Cubans who chose to fight for freedom and against enslavement, racism, and despotism. José Marti, known by some as the 'Apostle of the Cuban Revolution', was a journalist, diplomat, and military leader who battled for Cuban independence. He also advocated against one class or group taking complete control of the country once the Spanish were expelled from Cuba. These are just a few of the nineteenth-century Cuban nationalists who opposed Spanish and foreign control of Cuban human and material resources. They also became examples of Cuban

pride and resistance that would be emulated by future generations of Cuban revolutionary leaders.

The Cuban Revolution (1953–59) was inspired by Grajales, Bentancourt, and Marti, among others. The leaders of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro (1926–) and Ernesto Che' Guevara (1928–67), were inspired by Cuban revolutionary history and, as a result, co-ordinated a revolution that was concerned with suppressing imperialism not only in Cuba, but also throughout the world. In 1959 the Cuban people struck a blow against imperialism by toppling the corrupt regime of Fulgencio Batista (1901–73) and initiating a socialist government. The success of the Cuban Revolution not only uplifted the masses of Cuban people, but, as importantly, began an effort of over 50 years to confront imperialism and oppression affecting African America, Angola, and Venezuela.

The relationship between African Americans and Cuba(ns) began in the mid-nineteenth century. It was during this turbulent decade that the anti-imperialist struggles of African Cubans began influencing African Americans such as Fredrick Douglass, Martin Delany, Henry Highland Garnet, and Isabella Baumfree (Sojourner Truth). In an article titled 'Back to the Future: African Americans and Cuba in the Time(s) of Race', Lisa Brock (1994) examines the impact that the large number of Cuban slave rebellions had on many African Americans. According to Brock, 'African Americans increasingly saw Cuba through the prism of their own desire for freedom' (1994, p. 6). This desire to be liberated from enslavement and dread inspired the interconnection between African Americans and their oppressed Cuban comrades. In addition, this call to action influenced the co-ordinated and intense responses of the American landed gentry. To this end, Brock writes, racial unrest in Cuba '... not only framed North American mobilization strategies, but became the standard against which Black nationalists, intellectuals, and activists measured freedom or lack of it in Cuba and the Diaspora' (ibid.).

Many motivational Cuban leaders emerged during these significant nineteenth-century battles

for freedom, justice, and equality. However, few Cuban revolutionaries of this period captivated African Americans to the extent of the poet Gabriel de la Concepcion. Brilliant, bold, and beneficent are adjectives that accurately describe this anti-imperialist/activist. The Spanish retaliated against Concepcion's abolitionism by assassinating him on 28 June 1844.

The proof of Concepcion's influence on nineteenth-century African American leadership can be found in the advocacy of Martin Delany, an early Black Nationalist and Pan-Africanist. Brock postulates that Concepcion, also known as Placido, was the inspiration of Delany's 1859 publication *Blake: or the Huts of America, A Tale of the Mississippi Valley*. According to Brock, this fictional story encouraged slave uprisings within Cuba and the US. She posits, 'In the novel, the central character Henry (Blake) travels throughout the United States and Cuba organizing a general slave insurrection ... Henry, in fact, spends considerable time in Cuba where he receives encouragement from numerous rebels but most significantly from a "thoughtful poet of the revolution" named Placido' (1994, p. 8). Delany was so taken by Concepcion's heroism that he named his son Placido.

It is important to highlight the fact that African Americans have also had a positive impact on Cuban efforts towards securing self-sufficiency and self-governance. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, African American institutions, movements, and leaders stimulated Cubans who aspired to create cross-cultural and diaspora linkages. In the book *Forging Diaspora: Afro-Cubans and African Americans in a World of Empire and Jim Crow* (2010), Frank Guidry submits that people of African ancestry in Cuba and America coalesced in order to combat racism at home and abroad. In the book, Tuskegee Institute's thorough influence on many African Cubans is explored. Guidry discusses Booker T. Washington's efforts to recruit and educate Cuban students who were interested in pursuing an education alongside African Americans. Moreover, the book probes the effectiveness of Marcus Garvey's Pan Africanist Movement on the enlightened Cuban population.

Righteous African Americans and Cubans had been jointly interwoven in anti-imperialist struggles for a century, when the Cuban masses once again rebelled against domination and tyranny during the revolution (1953–59). All through this modern rebellion, the Cubans captured the attention and imagination of twentieth-century Americans of African ancestry. The Cuban Revolution occurred simultaneously with the advent of the African American Civil and Human Rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. While many African Americans were involved with the integrationist struggles exemplified by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr, others were committed to eliminating racial subjugation through revolutionary means. It was the participants in the latter struggle who developed a conscious connection with the Cuban Revolution. In addition, these activists often struggled with their duality: being African and American. Black nationalists would often ask if they could be true to both of their realities, a quandary first addressed by W.E.B. Dubois.

Interestingly, the Cuban Revolution was the catalyst that forced some African Cubans to concurrently ask the same question which mystified their North American compatriots: Can we be both African and Cuban? Soon after 1959, some African Cuban intellectuals began secretly meeting in order to read the works of Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, and Amiri Baraka. This was an act of solidarity, and an attempt to build a unified front that would more successfully challenge imperialism in both countries. Linda Howe, author of the book, *Transgression and Conformity: Cuban Writers and Artists after the Revolution*, speculates that during this period '... the connection between the radical black politics in the United States and in Cuba was solidly forged' (2004, p. 77).

The aforementioned connection was further solidified when on 24 September 1960, Fidel Castro, while sojourning at the Hotel Theresa in Harlem, New York, met the African American nationalist leader Malcolm X. In the article "Review/Harlem Hospitality and Political History: Malcolm X and Fidel Castro at the Hotel Theresa", Joy James writes, 'The meeting of

Malcolm X and Fidel Castro in Harlem came to symbolize an era of Post-World War II decolonization movements and human rights struggles of Black and Third World people on several continents' (1994, p. 2). This historic meeting had a lasting impact on Castro. On 24 May 1990, at the Malcolm X Symposium held in Havana, Castro offered this recollection: 'We have always been in solidarity with the struggle of Black people, of minorities, and of the poor in the United States. We have always been in solidarity with them, and they have been in solidarity with us' (1994, p. 3).

After 24 September 1960, and the subsequent decades, Cuba continued to confront US-based imperialism and sow the seeds of African American solidarity by offering political asylum to freedom fighters who ran afoul of the US government. To this end, Howe asserts, 'Unity between some North American and Cuban blacks continued when the "Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver and Assata Shakur, founder of the Black Liberation Army, were among the prominent black exiles given sanctuary in Cuba; Stokely Carmichael and Angela Davis made well-publicized trips there at the height of their fame." Government officials invited US Black Panther members and politically controversial African American figures, treating them as persecuted heroes' (2004, p. 78).

One of the politically controversial African American figures given sanctuary in Cuba was Robert Williams. Williams was the influential National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) leader from Monroe, North Carolina, who urged the beleaguered African American Community to defend itself from the unrelenting attacks they experienced from white people. In 1961 he was falsely accused of kidnapping a white couple, which led to his exile to Cuba. Williams, along with his wife Mabel, became the quintessential anti-imperialists when they launched their Radio Free Dixie (RFD) programme from Cuba. Radio Free Dixie (1962–65) was established to bring the plight of African Americans to a larger and more diverse audience. In his thesis titled, 'The Sound of Revolution: Radio Free Dixie, Robert Williams, and Music as Protest and Propaganda', Cory LaFevers labels

Williams as a Cultural Nationalist and examines the RFD's format and programming. According to Lafevers, 'Robert and Mabel Williams employed a wide range of African American musical styles on RFD to help gain a listening audience and to support its protest agenda musically. Most of the music played had deep connections with African American protest and cultural history and proved fundamental in encouraging a cultural revolution' (2008, p. 18).

Furthermore, RFD broadcasts also included political editorials and conversations that encouraged African Americans to protest against their unfortunate social, political, and economic conditions. It is important to note that throughout the duration of RFD, it was supported and funded by the Cuban government. Williams's creativity was stimulated, while living in Cuba. In addition to producing Radio Free Dixie, he published the noteworthy newsletter *The Crusader,* which denounced imperialism, capitalism, and racism. In 1962 he also authored the bestselling book *Negroes With Guns*, an analysis of African America's fight against right-wing reactionaries.

Indeed, many Cubans and African Americans have coalesced to combat imperialism and oppression. From the earliest slave revolts, wars of independence, and protest movements, these comrades have provided each other with support, assistance, and encouragement. Cubans have not only provided assistance to their northern neighbours, but they have also expended resources to thwart imperialist machinations on the African continent.

In 1961 Communist Cuba established its first humanitarian, diplomatic, and military relationship with an African country. The Cubans provided aid to the Algerian people as they fought a war of independence against France. Cuba supported the Algerians by giving them medical assistance, military training, and supplies. While Algeria was Cuba's first experience in Africa, it would most certainly not be its last. In late 1964, Castro ordered Che' Guevara to Angola and the Congo in order to support anti-imperialist revolts. In Angola Guevara fought with the Marxist-Leninist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

While in the Congo, he aligned himself with the followers of the slain prime minister Patrice Lumumba, whose devotees were rebelling against the imperialist-backed government led by Joseph Kasavubu. Guevara's attempt at quelling imperialism in Angola and the Congo was unsuccessful. His efforts were thwarted by the Belgian and US-supported mercenary army led by the Afrikaner Mike Hoare. Eventually, in 1965, Guevara slipped out of the Congo, calling his botched foray 'a history of failure'.

Cuba's goal of suppressing imperialism in Africa was not damaged by its previous failure to end the subjugation of the Angolan and Congolese peoples. In both 1975 and 1988, Cuba deployed her army to Angola to assist its long-time ally, the MPLA, confront South African tyranny, racism, coercion, and violence. According to Piero Gleijeses, author of the book (2013b) *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991*, 'Cuba is the only country in the world that sent its soldiers to confront the army of apartheid and defeated the army of apartheid, the South African army, twice – in 1975, 1976, and in 1988'.

Castro, in 1975–1976, responded to South Africa's invasion of Angola by ordering 36,000 Cuban soldiers into the country. The communist forces pushed the South African army into Namibia, which was controlled by South Africa. This joint Cuban and Angolan show of force was significant because it effectively met the challenge of the 'White Giants', as Gleijeses explains: 'This was the first real contribution of Cuba to the liberation of South Africa. It was the first time in living memory that the White Giants, the army of apartheid, had been forced to retreat. And they retreated because of a non-white army. And in a situation of internal colonialism, this is important' (2007, p. 1). The Cubans remained in Angola, thus preventing South African forces from recapturing important towns and cities. In addition, it was during this time that the Cuban Government and the African National Congress began their coalescence.

In 1987 the Cuban–Angolan coalition was, once again, challenged when the South African army intervened in an Angolan Civil War. By early November 1987, the South Africans had trapped Angolan army units in the town of Cuito Cuanavale. The imperialist forces were poised to destroy the beleaguered Angolan Military, until Castro deployed 1,500 soldiers, and his most sophisticated jets, to assist his allies. In the article titled, 'Remembering Cuba's Sacrifice for African Liberation', Gleijeses describes the battle, 'On March 23, 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack on the town.' Gleijeses continues, 'As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault "was brought to a grinding halt" by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces' (ibid.).

After their defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, the retreating South Africans returned to Namibia, which was unacceptable to the Cubans. Cuba was poised to invade Namibia and rid that country of the vanquished South African army. However, at that very moment, the US encouraged both sides to pursue a diplomatic solution to the battlefield quandary. Not only did the anti-imperialist forces of Angola and Cuba win a decisive military victory, but they also proved to be just as skilled at the negotiating table. 'The Cubans' battlefield prowess and negotiating skills', writes Gleijeses, 'were instrumental in forcing South Africa to accept black Namibia's independence … This victory reverberated beyond Namibia' (ibid.).

Cuba's policy in Africa involved/involves developing strategic relationships and ties with African nationalists and socialists. This strategy was successful in preventing South African expansionism and hegemony. More importantly, it is Cuba's timely intervention in Angola (1988) that many scholars, including Nelson Mandela, assert was the event that ultimately led to the toppling of the racist South African Apartheid regime: 'The Cubans destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor … [and] inspired the fighting masses of South Africa' (Mandela 2013).

Cuba's sphere of influence expanded beyond Africa into every corner of the world where the sting of imperialism was felt by innocent populations. In the Caribbean, the relationship with Cuba began in the early 1970s when Jamaica,

Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados (the largest Englishspeaking countries in the region) normalised diplomatic, military, and business affairs with their communist neighbour. Initially, the relationship between these nations hinged on security and the sustaining of the revolution. Gerardo Nunez offers the following observation in the article 'Cuba's Relations with the Caribbean: Trends and Future Prospects': 'Cuban foreign policy toward the Caribbean has been primarily focused on protecting its national security and the survival of the revolution' (2002, p. 6).

In the future, as the relationship between Cuba and Caribbean countries matures, foreign policy issues will expand into more reciprocally advantageous areas. To this extent, Nunez writes, '... Cuba–Caribbean relations have room for further improvement in areas of common interest that have not yet been fully explored, such as migration, and narcotics, terrorism, and the environment. These areas could be the starting point for enhanced and mutually beneficial collaboration and for the development of a common agenda vis-à-vis third parties' (7).

Cuba's most important province of influence, particularly in its unending fight against imperialism, is South America. The earliest Cuban revolutionaries, such as Marti, extolled the virtues of South American freedom fighters. The great Venezuelan Simon Bolivar (1783–1830), also known as 'the Liberator', shared Marti's and Castro's intolerance of totalitarianism and domination. In fact, Bolivar's struggles against Spanish imperialism were emulated by many Cuban leaders of the Ten Years War and the Second War of Independence. In addition, Bolivar's suspicions of the US government's imperialist schemes in South America were also shared by many Cubans. In an 1819 speech in Caracas, Venezuela, Bolivar shared his distrust of the US by saying, '... the United States would seem to be destined by fate to plague the Americas with miseries in the name of freedom' (1829: 135). This sentiment was clearly shared by Marti who, while fighting against Spanish imperialist forces in 1895, said, '... I am in daily danger of giving my life for my country and duty – for I understand that duty and have the

intention of carrying out – the duty of preventing the United States from extending through the Antilles as Cuba gains its independence, and from falling, with that additional strength, upon our lands of America' (Marti 1885).

Cuba has influenced many anti-imperialist efforts in South America such as Chile (1970s) and Nicaragua (1980s). However, Cuba shares its greatest affinity with Venezuela. Central to the contemporary relationship between Cuba and Venezuela is the unbreakable alliance, even in death, between Castro and the late Hugo Chavez (1954–2013). In 1992 Chavez led an unsuccessful coup against the regime of Carlos A. Perez. After serving a 2-year prison term for his participation in the previously mentioned revolt, he became associated with Castro, a relationship that continued throughout the rest of his life.

'At the root of the extraordinary close alliance Chavez built with Cuba', postulates Francisco Toro, 'was a deep paternal bond between two men ... Chavez's extraordinary devotion sprang from Castro's status as the mythical Hero-Founder of Latin America's post-war hard left' (2013, p. 1). For 20 years, Cuba provided sugar, military support, and assistance to the oil-rich nation. Moreover, Cuba became a major exporter of medicine, medical supplies, and physicians. Since the Cuban-Venezuelan Health Care Collaboration, an estimated 53,000 Venezuelans have received free medical treatment from approximately 30,000 Cuban physicians. In fact, Cuba has been practising 'Medical Diplomacy', as a method of confronting imperialism, since the 1960s. In response, Venezuela delivered to Cuba what it didn't/doesn't have: oil, natural energy, and financial support.

The seemingly unbreakable bond between Cuba and Venezuela is a source of immense discomfort for the US government. Nicholas Kozloff, in the article titled 'Washington's war on Cuba and Venezuela' suggests that as early as 1973, the US was suspicious of the connection between these Caribbean countries. Kozloff says that, 'In late 1973, US diplomats expressed concern about Venezuelan moves to end Cuba's diplomatic isolation, and were particularly worried that Caracas might "put together Organization of

American States [OAS] majority in support resolution permitting the reestablishment relations with Cuba" Washington was also perturbed by reports that Venezuelan Navy vessels had departed for Cuba in order to load up on large shipments of sugar, and diplomats contemplated a possible cut-off of aid to Caracas in retaliation' (2013, p. 2)).

To Washington's chagrin, Cuba and Venezuela have continued to present a unified front in the fight against imperialism and degradation, even after the death of Chavez. The new Venezuelan president, Nicholas Maduro, has continued the relationship with Castro's Cuba, vowing that the two countries '. . . will continue working together' (2014, p. 1). Recently, Cuba and Venezuela have signed 51 bilateral agreements related to a multiplicity of activities including health care, education, energy management, and recreation.

Notwithstanding the angst, frustration, and distrust the US has experienced with Cuba, recently there has been a normalizing of relations between the hemispheric neighbours. On 17 December 2015, Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro restored full diplomacy between the two former advisories, ending over 50 years of hostility. The aforementioned Heads of State, on 11 April 2015, exemplified the burgeoning alliance by shaking hands and exchanging pleasantries.

In addition to the reestablishment of diplomacy, the new relationship between the US and Cuba has enjoyed the following accomplishments:

- Prisoner releases
- Establishment of new travel and trade regulations
- Us companies allowed to invest in small Cuban businesses

Some people anticipate that this new era in hemispheric relations will have a positive impact on Cuba's struggling economy. However, any attempt to lift the long standing economic embargo will face stiff opposition from Republican politicians such as Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mitch McConnell, and Senator John Vitter of Louisiana.

Moreover, some people fear that the new thaw in US-Cuba relations may encourage Cuba to return to its racist and fascist past. Only time will reveal if Cuba continues to confront imperialism, aggression, and despotism or if it returns to the corruption and oppression its citizens experienced under the dictator Fulgencio Batista (1952–59).

From Cuba's earliest history, many of its citizens have struggled against imperialism. The Taino Native Americans, African Cubans, and righteous Cubans of European and Asian descent have fought to rid their homeland, and world, of subjugation and oppression. Throughout these heroic struggles, the names of the Cuban revolutionary leaders have changed; the places in which historic battles were fought are varied; and, of course, the outcomes of these struggles are diverse. What has been, and continues to be, persistent in Cuban history is its people's anti-imperialist fight at home and abroad.

Cross-References

▶ Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)
▶ Guevara, Ernesto 'Che' (1928–1967)

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Cuban Revolution

Cultural Imperialism

Cultural Nationalism

Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century

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Empires, to achieve their objectives in pursuing commercial, territorial, and demographic resources by military means, also need to be culturally expansive. They cannot be self-effacing but must exhibit their presence through what they consider to be the superior qualities of their culture, conceived as the central aspects of their identity (MacKenzie 2016). In modern empires, this was always known as the "civilizing mission," a mission which invariably started at home. In the British and Hibernian Isles, Ireland provides the classic case, and it is the cultural influence of England on Ireland that has proved to be most durable. Such cultural characteristics offered both the means and the alleged justification for the apparent ascendancy of imperial peoples. Empires therefore seem impelled to make cultural assertions as part of their acquisitive designs. Such statements take many forms of which perhaps the material presence of the dominant power is the most obvious – that is, the appearance of structures such as fortresses, walled settlements, later commercial, administrative and religious buildings, as well as domestic residences, sometimes at the center of plantations and other agricultural developments. New cities and towns often rise as a powerful expression of the manifestation of the new empire. In addition to this material display, a dominant empire seeks to expand the incidence and usage of its language, aspects of its political system, and its religious observance and associated institutions. It also invariably disseminates methods of socializing the young through education and other activities (MacKenzie 1984). But empires are also adaptable and, whether consciously or unconsciously, invariably assimilate characteristics of the subordinate peoples. Most importantly of all, empires require to seek the

acquiescence of their home populations in their expansive activities.

Such a description of the cultural effects of empires could encompass many empires in human history, and it is no less true of the global spread of British rule, initially hesitant in the seventeenth century, more aggressively in the eighteenth, and finally triumphantly in the nineteenth (Canny 1998; Marshall 1998; Porter 1999). The British, particularly the political, scholarly, and landowning elite, were well aware of the fact that their own territories had themselves been subjected to the imperial rule of the Romans and later the Normans. Progressively, as they made their military, maritime, commercial, and material presence apparent in North America, India, and elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Australasia, they were conscious of following in the footsteps of other historic empires, albeit on a more extensive scale. They were also caught up in a strongly competitive urge to world domination. Spain and Portugal had been the first European states to embark on global expansion, very much bound up with the Roman Catholic Church. In the course of the seventeenth century, this sense of intense competition was particularly associated with the Dutch empire in Southern Africa and in Asia, but by the end of that century, there was no doubt that the principal rival was France. The struggle with France was to continue until the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. It was this fierce commercial and territorial rivalry, heightened by the realization that the French enjoyed considerable power in North America, the Caribbean, and in South Asia and by the recognition that it was a contest between a Catholic and a Protestant power, that was to infuse British imperial culture in profound ways (Armitage 2000). In the eighteenth century, the British also promoted the myth that it was a contest between a liberal and supposedly free political system competing with a royalist autocratic one (Colley 1996).

As the British prosecuted this rivalry through the sequence of wars that marked the eighteenth century, they became more and more convinced not only of the rectitude of their activities (partly confirmed by their apparent success) but also of the superiority of the culture which those exploits

represented. At the same time, this sense of an imperial destiny became closely bound up with patriotism and nationhood, a patriotic impulse which, after 1707, had become inseparably associated with the union between England, Wales, and Scotland, constituting the Britain which would always give its name to the empire (MacKenzie and Devine 2011). After 1800, the union with Ireland (long in effect a colony) brought together all of the British and Hibernian Isles into this imperial constellation. This sense of nationhood became closely associated with overseas expansion and the opportunities this afforded. It also became bound up with the continuing development of naval technology, with the emergence of the Royal Navy as the principal arm of an expanding state, with the commercial companies (such as the East India, Hudson Bay, and Royal Africa Companies) associated with maritime trade, with the great voyages of exploration, and, by the end of the century, with the evangelical impulse of the Protestant churches.

We should perhaps consider some definitions before examining these cultural phenomena in greater depth. We need to distinguish between **cultural imperialism** and **imperial culture.** These may be defined in the following ways. First, **cultural imperialism** involves the conscious efforts at conversion to an imperial culture; the proselytizing urge, in respect of the home population; the migrant diaspora to the colonies of settlement; and the conversion of indigenous peoples. It constitutes the ambitious attempt to create a genuine imperial community united by political, legal, religious, and social ideas, promoted by the material presence of the imperialists in architecture and settlements, as well as in the language, educational, sports, and entertainment forms that they disseminate. All of these incline toward offering a specific allegiance to a symbolic center, notably the monarchy and the metropolitan British state. Cultural imperialism can also be seen as the business of Christian missionaries, not just in religious proselytization but also in education, clothing, economic practices, and many other phenomena, although such an approach has been the subject of controversy among historians (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991,

1997; Porter, A, 2004). The objectives of cultural imperialism are also embedded in the activities of secular educationalists, administrators, elements of the press, the community of authors, and other aspects of print culture and can be additionally conveyed by some fragments of a newly emergent and culturally assimilated indigenous elite.

If cultural imperialism is the process, an **imperial culture** is the desired outcome resulting from the vehicles of cultural imperialism. It is the wished-for product which energizes the economic arms of the imperial state and creates the cohesive community through which imperial objectives can be attained. If it is ever attainable, this may be represented in town planning, architecture, infrastructures (Bremner 2016), and environmental transformations and with musical, dramatic, and, later, cinematic performances of the supposedly settled imperial culture. It can also be reflected in ceremony, pageantry, ritual, the dispensation of laws, and all the other ways in which empires display themselves. This is the ideal which some arms of the imperial state strain toward while always beset by dissenting voices both in the metropolis and in the empire itself.

The characteristic heightening of the patriotic significance of events and the presentation of personalities and key moments leading toward the emergence of an imperial culture became particularly apparent in Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. Such phenomena included, for example, the development of the cult of heroes. The notion of the hero and the heroic life seemed to develop a much more powerful resonance once such heroism was located in exotic geographical contexts. Such heroes became almost superhuman and representative figures associated with the national success of the British state. Naval and military figures came to be elevated to the status of empire builders, celebrated in a whole variety of media (Cubitt and Warren 2000; Sèbe 2013). Admiral Vernon was one of the first of these, associated with the Wars of the Spanish Succession and of Jenkins' Ear, notably with his capture of Porto Bello from Spain. This constituted a relatively hesitant start to the phenomenon until it became a national passion with General Wolfe in his victory on the heights of Abraham in 1759,

one of the crowning victories of the Seven Years' War which massively expanded the British Empire in North America, the Caribbean, and India. Wolfe now became the subject of a major cult of statues, painting (as in the most celebrated "history" painting of the age, the "Death of Wolfe" by Benjamin West), and countless theatrical tableaux. At sea, Admiral Rodney became celebrated for his exploits in the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War, and the War of American Independence. In the latter, the Battle of the Saints against the French off Dominica was seen as saving significant islands of the West Indies for the British. Later, Horatio Nelson became the supreme exemplar of this national passion after his victory at Trafalgar in 1805 (Cannadine 2005). Wolfe and Nelson illustrated the fact that nothing heightened the status of such national figures more than a heroic death at the moment of supreme success. This was also true of a heroic figure in another field, exploration. Captain Cook's succession of voyages in the Pacific and his role in cartography and scientific discovery, followed by his death in 1779 on the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), led to his apotheosis into the highest rank of national imperial heroes, particularly in view of the manner in which British success in the ultimate annexation of Australia and New Zealand was seen as resulting from the fame of his exploits. In all of these examples, artistic representations, statuary, and hagiographical biographies contributed to the developing cult of important imperial events. While some aspects of the consumption of such cults might be seen to be limited to an elite, they became progressively more available to the population as a whole through prints, book illustrations, and the development of spectacular theatrical representations.

Major changes occurred during the nineteenth century which resulted in many additional cultural phenomena representative of the British conviction that their rule constituted the most strikingly progressive empire of human history. These included the elevation of the British monarch, particularly in the reign of Queen Victoria, to the mythic rank of global ruler. This unquestionably contributed to the development of British architectural styles and a passion for monumental

sculpture representing the continents, their peoples, and the role of the British in supposedly bringing so many of them together into a vast empire with an allegedly common culture. Associated with this was the progressive rise in the status and reputation of the military. Famously, although the centrality of the navy led to the development of the cult of the "Jack Tar" or common sailor (Conley 2009), the military in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was often viewed as "the scum of the earth," as Wellington put it, who needed to be turned into heroic, morally elevated figures through the army. As the nineteenth century developed, however, the soldiery came, in many respects, to be lionized, an effect which was heightened by their campaigns in distant and exotic places. Moreover, as western weaponry was transformed by industrial processes, particularly into the fast-repeating machine guns like the Gatling and, more particularly, the Maxim, the ratio of casualties changed such that indigenous opponents were in much greater danger than the British. Thus, soldiering on the part of the British for the extension and protection of the British Empire became less dangerous in terms of conflict but continued to have casualties through disease and the problems of the environment. Such colonial campaigns often became wars against nature as much as against people (MacKenzie 1992, p. 8; Spiers 2004). The reign of Queen Victoria was a time of almost continuous colonial campaigns (sometimes against rebellious settlers and subjects) in North America, Australasia, India, Southeast Asia, and the Far East, as well as in Africa during the period of that continent's partition among the European powers between the 1870s and the early years of the twentieth century. In the same period, after the Cardwell army reforms of 1870, the affiliations of regiments became more local, associated with specific counties, cities, and towns within the British Isles. By this time, the appearance and reputation of the military had become central to imperial culture, in paintings and prints, in the theater and patriotic songs, and in real life in the ceremonial departures and triumphant returns. In these ways, the soldiery became increasingly significant in national and civic events, almost a

ubiquitous sight on the streets of many places in Britain, cheered by the population consciously celebrating their role in creating national identity and in expanding and defending the empire. They also became central to local identities, not least through uniforms as, for example, with the highly visible Scottish soldiers. This was equally true, however, of Wales, Ireland, and individual counties. Yet all such heightening of local identities seemed to feed into the union sanctified by imperial success.

There can be no doubt that in imperial culture generally, the Indian Revolt of 1857 constituted a significant turning point. The events of the revolt were followed very closely indeed in the British press. It has been said that the horrors that were allegedly perpetrated by Indians (some were grossly exaggerated and in any case the retribution exacted by the British took horrendous forms) led to the heightening of racial ideas, a development which was exacerbated by the Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica in 1865 and the actions of the Governor Edward Eyre. Support for Eyre by key figures in British culture, such as John Ruskin, Charles Dickens, Alfred Tennyson, Charles Kingsley, and Thomas Carlyle, served to heighten these racist ideas, although there were others, such as David Livingstone, John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, John Bright, and Thomas Henry Huxley, who took the opposite line. Such racial ideas were further heightened by events in Africa and the attitudes of the dominant whites in Southern Africa and later Kenya and elsewhere. Imperial culture had now adopted notably racist views, although there was always an alternative faction which attempted to mitigate the more extreme attitudes.

Another characteristic development of the nineteenth century heightened all these effects. It was an age which witnessed a massive growth in print culture. Newspapers had their origins in the eighteenth century, but in that period, patriotic ideas and the announcement of events in war were often conveyed by poetry, ballads, broadsheets, and posters which circulated on the streets. The price of newspapers, however, ensured that circulations were relatively low, generally among the elite. However, the significant change came in

1855 when newspapers were freed from the stamp duties which had rendered their cover price too high for a working-class readership, at a time when the extent of literacy was in any case fairly low. After the repeal of stamp duty, papers became available at twopence or a penny, ensuring that at least theoretically they were available to all. Their circulations grew considerably conveying news of imperial campaigns and other colonial events to every corner of the country. Another type of publication that emerged at this time was the illustrated journals such as the *Illustrated London News* (founded 1842) and *The Graphic* (1869) which exploited the new printing technologies with woodcuts and engravings to reproduce illustrations on a major scale, often of imperial campaigns, of heroic events, or of grand ceremonial, for example, in India. While these journals would have been too expensive for many ordinary people, still they would have been seen by the large class of servants in middle- and upper-class households, while the new development of free municipal libraries (after the act of 1850 which permitted local councils to raise a penny on the rates to fund them) made newspapers and illustrated journals available to all. This growth also promoted the striking explosion in advertising that became a characteristic of the age (Ramamurthy 2003). Such advertising, in newspapers, magazines, and on hoardings, often placed products in colonial settings, associating the specific manufacture with events and heroes of the day. The key to the further expansion of print culture and its consumption was the spread of literacy, promoted by the Education Acts of 1870 (in England and Wales) and 1872 (in Scotland).

Indeed, helped by this extensive availability of printed materials, the cult of heroes which had already developed in the eighteenth century grew considerably in the second half of the nineteenth. Major heroes included military figures who had served in the suppression of the Indian Revolt of 1857, the so-called mutiny, such as Henry Havelock, John Nicolson and Colin Campbell, and Lord Clyde (MacKenzie 1986). David Livingstone and his explorations, associated with the suppression of the Indian Ocean slave trade,

became one of the most celebrated heroes of all, complete with his remarkable funeral in Westminster Abbey after his body had been brought out of Africa (Lewis 2018). General Gordon in the Sudan was elevated to powerfully iconic status by his death at Khartoum and by the considerable admiration of Queen Victoria. We can add to these Henry Morton Stanley made famous through his search for Livingstone and other African exploits and Herbert Kitchener who was seen as retaking the Sudan, avenging Gordon, and then defeating the Afrikaans people of Southern Africa in the second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. In the early twentieth century, exploration in the Antarctic produced another crop of heroes including Captain Robert Falcon Scott, who famously died on his return from the South Pole, and Ernest Shackleton who managed, through particularly heroic voyages in small boats, to bring out his followers alive. But, as has sometimes been pointed out, it was heroic failure that seemed to have a particularly heroic resonance for the imperial British (Barczewski 2016).

David Livingstone's heroic reputation had a galvanizing effect upon the continuing development of missionary activity. Catholic missionaries had been involved in the expansion of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires from the sixteenth century, but Protestant missions had relatively weak beginnings in the eighteenth century. Organizations like the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (founded 1698) were as much concerned with domestic society as with overseas. From the 1790s, however, the evangelical urge became an energizing force in developing missionary ambitions among the various Protestant denominations in the United Kingdom, including Anglicans, Baptists, Methodists, Congregationalists, and the Scottish churches. Much of this activity was channelled through missionary societies such as the Baptist (1792), London (mainly Congregationalist, 1795), Scottish (1796), and the Church (Anglican, 1799) missionary societies. The established Church of Scotland and the breakaway Free Church of 1843 both became highly active in India, Africa, and elsewhere. Such missionary societies continued to appear throughout the nineteenth century, with the Universities'

Mission to Central Africa (1860) founded as a direct result of Livingstone's appeal. His death in what is now Zambia in 1873 had the effect of recruiting large numbers of clergy and women missionaries to the cause, and there was an extraordinary upsurge of activity throughout the world. This evangelizing activity was immensely helped by the opportunities of the new and cheaper print culture. Missionary magazines and other publications became available in large numbers, as did cheap books about missionary endeavor and about the figures who were regarded as missionary heroes of the age. Such publications can be found to have had wide circulations down to the inter-war years of the twentieth century.

In addition to all these printed materials, missionary societies were able to propagate news of their activities and raise funds not only through the networks of churches of the various denominations but also through exhibitions in which they exhibited illustrations of their activities in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. This was also a means of selling missionary publications and even postcards. Missionaries on furlough also made lecture tours, perhaps with the projection of magic lantern slides (a significantly popular visual development of the age), to spread news of their missions and also to raise funds. An essential part of this propagandist activity was the self-regarding and satisfying news that peoples elsewhere in the world were not only being converted to Christianity but were taking on the cultural characteristics of the home population, attending schools, wearing western clothes, and learning familiar crafts like brickmaking, carpentering, and printing, while girls were being taught the gendered, domestic activities of the missionaries' home society. In these ways, at a time of considerable piety and extensive church attendance, there can be little doubt that the missionary societies and the extraordinarily extensive network of mission stations which they established throughout the world were among the most potent disseminators of an imperial culture both within Britain and overseas. Moreover, both the national and local press regularly advertised the activities of missionaries and of lecture tours. Evidence from the Scottish newspapers in particular reveals the striking prominence that was accorded the work of missionaries, their schools, and other activities as well as the propensity of missionaries to see themselves as contributing significantly to the civilizing mission. Moreover, societies (sometimes of women) were founded in many towns to support these enterprises. To return to David Livingstone, it is an astonishing fact that in the 50 years after his death almost 100 popular biographies were published to celebrate his life. If there had not been a market for such works, it is highly unlikely that it would have been fed so assiduously.

If missionary publishing was significant, one of the most striking publishing phenomena of the age was the appearance of large numbers of popular books celebrating the empire, both in supposedly factual accounts and, above all, in the tradition of celebrated juvenile literature which extolled the virtues of heroes (and often included their names in the titles) and the events and wars in which they were involved (Richards 1989; Castle 1996). These books became part of a highly popular adventure tradition in exotic locations. There were a number of celebrated authors feeding this market, of which G.A. Henty was perhaps the most celebrated, prolific, and enjoying large sales. He wrote well over 100 adventure stories between 1868 and 1906, the majority of them about imperial events, often with titles that included names of heroes, such as *With Clive in India*, *With Kitchener in the Soudan*, and *With Roberts to Pretoria.* Several other authors wrote similar books for the young, while there were also "Annuals" (for the Christmas market) containing equivalent material. These ideas became so pervasive that they can also be identified in a different form in school textbooks, particularly those dealing with modern history but perhaps more particularly geography and aspects of religious and literary study (Yeandle 2015). Studies of such texts have revealed the extent to which they promoted a patriotic worldview which placed the exploits and achievements of the British at the center of the technological advances of the age, the urge to geographical and scientific knowledge, and the dissemination of British ideas, including, for example, notions of British freedoms and of democratic and libertarian politics, even although

so far as the suffrage was concerned, British society was itself far from being fully democratic. In this respect, settlement territories of the British Empire could be more advanced. New Zealand, for example, although it had been through an era of violence in the Maori wars between 1846 and 1872, had full male and female suffrage from 1893, although the Maori voted in separate constituencies.

Of all the popular conduits through which imperial cultural forms were transmitted, the theater was one of the most influential. Once again, there was a long history to this. The theater had already begun to offer recreations of events that were taking place in the empire and in warfare from the second half of the eighteenth century. At the time of the Napoleonic wars, a tradition of spectacular theater was developed in which battles (even naval ones) were reenacted for the edification and patriotic delight of the audience. These effects were heightened in the nineteenth. Imperial themes became a significant staple of theatrical productions, particularly in the second half of the century when events in India and in Africa were portrayed on the stage (Gould 2011). Themes of class conflict, which had been popular at an earlier period, were often replaced by plots that emphasized racial difference. One of the standard theatrical forms of the age, melodrama, was ideally suited for this kind of material. Imperial patriotism was also transmitted through the popular pantomimes of the age, as well as through some of the increasingly popular presentations of musical theater at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Yeandle et al. 2016). In the same era, the music hall became one of the most popular of all theatrical performances, and dedicated music halls opened throughout the country, both in large cities and in country towns. The music hall often featured patriotic songs, marching soldiers, and tableaux (such as the death of General Gordon in Khartoum, as portrayed in a famous painting by G.W. Joy). Many of these tableaux did indeed assume the form of imperial patriotic paintings, which must have been familiar since they had been disseminated more widely by prints and illustrations in popular magazines or books. In the same period,

statuary and other forms of monumental sculpture became one of the most visible aspects of the display of naval, military, and imperial heroes.

One of the features of the nineteenth century was the emigration of British people from the United Kingdom to colonial territories. Such migration had begun in a smaller way to the Caribbean and the American colonies in the seventeenth century, developing to a certain extent in the eighteenth. But the era of mass migration was only to come in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often on sailing ships, but as the century wore on increasingly on steamships which rendered such voyages shorter, safer, and to a certain extent at any rate more comfortable (Richards 2004). It has been estimated that some 18.7 million people migrated out of Britain between 1815 and 1930, with Ireland contributing more than 8 million, by far the highest proportion of its population among the constituent ethnicities of the United Kingdom. Irish migration was partly impelled by the great famine of the 1840s, but migration continued throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A high percentage of such migrants went to the United States, at least until quotas were imposed in the early twentieth century. But the peopling of the settlement territories of the British Empire, Canada, Australia, from 1840 New Zealand, and to a lesser extent South Africa was one of the characteristics of the age. Such settlement of course went along with the dispossession of indigenous peoples, and settlers were often involved in local wars, both great and small. These colonies remained within the British Empire, although progressive constitutional developments, notably the federation of Canada in 1867, the Australian Commonwealth of 1901, and the South African Union of 1910, leading to the Statute of Westminster of 1931, meant that their emergence as the fully independent countries of today proceeded by gradual stages. Nevertheless, for most of this period, they remained culturally within what has become known as the British World, English-speaking and replicating many of the cultural characteristics of Britain itself. These included the reproducing of the phenomena already described – the appearance of mechanics' institutes everywhere (for the

education of working men, the first founded in Scotland in 1821), the development of an active press of publications (many exported from Britain), the explosive spread of the Christian churches, and the missions to indigenous peoples, the schools, libraries, theaters, and other institutions to be found in the so-called metropolis. Migration contributed to an imperial culture in various ways: through the circulation of leaflets and pamphlets encouraging migration, through advertisements in newspapers, through the lectures of migration agents from various colonies, and through handbooks providing advice for migrants.

This migration of British people around the world has been divided into two major categories, settlers and sojourners. Settlers were generally permanent migrants, although some did return to Britain, particularly in the twentieth century. Sojourners were temporary migrants who travelled, for example, to India to work in administration, commerce, the military, or missionary work. Sojourners also went to the so-called dependent colonies of the empire in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean islands, and above all the African colonies north of South Africa. Some colonies in East and Central Africa acquired settlers who imagined that they would remain there, based upon the illusion that African nationalism lay far off in the future. But in the majority of cases, they did turn out to be more temporary sojourners. In these colonies as well as in the settlement territories (which became known as dominions in the twentieth century), there is some evidence that this English-speaking community did operate, at least for a period, as an imperial whole, drawn together by the monarchy, the military (with local regiments recruited in all the settlement territories), and common passions. For example, there is considerable evidence from the colonial press that the Anglo-Boer War was given a great deal of prominence, with, for example, the celebrations of the Relief of Mafeking in May 1900 receiving wild rejoicing not only in Britain but throughout both the settlement and other colonies. This was partly because there were troops from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand involved in the war. It is perhaps ironic

that this sense of an empire operating together in the pursuit of an imperial campaign actually became an important milestone in the development of national identities in those countries, as is evidenced by the remarkable war memorials that were erected after the war. This was an effect which was of course even more pronounced with World War I. Although there was a fresh wave of migration after that war (and the United States was no longer such a significant destination), the territories which received them were becoming progressively less British, both through the arrival of many migrants from other parts of Europe and because of developing nationalist identities (Fedorowich and Thompson 2013).

Various cultural events were exported around the empire during this period. One of the most significant of these was the idea of the international exhibition. In Britain, the Great Exhibition of 1851 in the Crystal Palace contained a magnificent and much admired section on India, but colonies were not central to the exhibition (Greenhalgh 1988). It was much more concerned with manufacturing and economic rivalry with other European powers. The next exhibition, in London's South Kensington in 1862, had a larger colonial section, but the succeeding one, the Colonial and Indian of 1886, concentrated almost exclusively on empire as its name implied. From this time onward, all exhibitions had this focus. From the 1890s to World War I, they became almost annual events, some of them privately run, with two significant ones designed to celebrate the coronation of George V in 1911. The culmination of this activity came with the massive Wembley Exhibition in 1924–1925, followed by the Glasgow Empire Exhibition in 1938, the last of the sequence. These exhibitions all contained pavilions devoted to individual colonies, showcasing their products, agricultural and mineral, as well as the magnificence of their environments and invariably acting as further recruiting exercises for fresh migration. They also often contained "native villages," living displays of peoples from the colonies which became opportunities for what may be called ethnographic voyeurism (Qureshi 2011). More seriously, there were often stands at which craftspeople from India and

elsewhere worked on the production of the various crafts for which they had become celebrated and which were seen as offering a contrast with machine-made industrial items. The exhibitions were immensely popular, attracting very large numbers of visitors to the great variety of their exhibits and, it must be said, to the funfairs that invariably accompanied them.

But these extraordinary events were not restricted to Britain. One of the most striking aspects of exhibition history is the manner in which they were organized in many other places, both in the United States and in colonial cities. All the principal cities of the colonies of the British Empire mounted such exhibitions, and they became almost a "rite of passage" that revealed the economic, cultural, and organizational maturity of the respective colony. They appeared in several cities of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Southern Africa, and India, with exhibitions being organized even in apparently less likely places such as Zanzibar and Bulawayo. They were often linked to the celebration of specific events or anniversaries and set out to bring aspects of the world, perhaps mainly a colonial world, to the city or town in which they were located while also displaying the peoples, products, design, and other attributes to visitors from overseas. It was a remarkable phenomenon and one which united the empire in what can be seen as striking cultural emporia. They stimulated many publications, press reports, visual materials (including in the twentieth-century postcards), as well as celebrations of scientific progress and the efficiencies of such nineteenth-century technological advances as the posts and telegraphs, the railways, and later electricity and the internal combustion engine.

In addition to these, there were other empire-wide celebrations or commemorations which seemed to create a degree of cultural cohesion. These included the jubilees of Queen Victoria, the deaths and coronations of monarchs, and events associated with imperial heroes. For example, the colonial press reveals that there were various celebrations of the centennial in 1913 of the birth of David Livingstone. There can be no doubt that the monarchy was seen as an effective glue which held the empire together, and celebrations of, for example, Queen Victoria's birthday were an empire-wide phenomenon. Royal tours seem to have been an important part of this and became increasingly frequent as the technologies of travel improved with steamships and railways. Modern royal tours are regarded as beginning in 1860 with the visit of the youthful Prince of Wales (future Edward VII) to Canada and his younger brother Prince Alfred to South Africa in the same year. The Prince of Wales made a highly significant tour of India in 1875–1876, just preceding the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India, while his son, the Duke of York, the future George V, and his wife made an extensive empire tour in 1901, the centerpiece of which was the opening of the federal parliament of Australia in the magnificent 1880 exhibition hall in Melbourne. The Duke and Duchess of York were in India in 1905 and returned for the Delhi Durbar in 1911. In turn, their son made a whole sequence of royal tours in the inter-war years. All of these were accompanied by extensive press coverage with cheering, loyal crowds in the streets (though rather more muted in India), with books being published at the end of each journey. Clearly intended as a prime means of maintaining an overall imperial culture, their efficacy rapidly declined after World War I when the comparative boredom and indifference of the future Edward VIII may well have communicated itself to some at least of those he was supposed to impress. Moreover, the intentions and effects of such tours often diverged. Colonial politicians and indigenous rulers set about adapting them to their own purposes, sometimes at odds with the imperial sentiment that they were intended to propagate (Reed 2016).

However, further technical developments did, albeit temporarily, promote this sense of an imperial community. In the 1890s, the printing of photography had become possible, and this ensured that newspaper reports of events now contained the immediacy of the photographic record. But moving pictures were to have an even greater

effect. There is newsreel film of Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee of 1897 and of her funeral in 1901. These were notable imperial occasions with many colonial troops marching in distinctive uniforms. There are also newsreels associated with the Anglo-Boer War, for example, depicting the departure of troops at British ports for service at the front. As newsreel became more sophisticated, it produced extraordinarily vivid impressions of colonial places and of remarkable events there. There had been some newsreel of the Delhi Durbar of 1903, but this was surpassed by the much more impressive filming (including the application of color) of the grandeur of the Delhi Durbar of 1911 when George V crowned himself as Emperor of India in a massive ceremonial pageant involving the Indian princes and their retainers, as well as many of the regiments and the administrators serving in India. Newsreels of these events were shipped rapidly to Britain (and to other colonies) and were shown in cinemas throughout the land to large and apparently appreciative audiences, at least if newspaper accounts are to be believed.

By this time, cinema was performing a different function, one involving spectacular entertainment in the shape of feature films involving adventures of various sorts in exotic locations. These had their origins before World War I but became standard fare in the inter-war years with a wave of highly popular imperial films being shown in the 1930s, set in India, Africa, and elsewhere. These films had titles such as *King of the Khyber Rifles*, *The Four Feathers* (set in the Sudan), *Clive of India*, *Lives of a Bengal Lancer*, and *Stanley and Livingstone*. More films with similar themes were made after World War II continuing into the 1950s and beyond. These films went around the world to be shown in colonial cinemas which had appeared almost everywhere sometimes as converted theaters but also as a new and dedicated architectural phenomenon (Chapman and Cull 2009). Radio was another medium which promoted a degree of imperial unity (Anduaga 2009). It was a means for the transmission of news and events. In 1924, the

speech of George V opening the Wembley Exhibition was broadcast in Britain, and in 1932 the king made a broadcast for transmission throughout the empire. This was usually followed by documentaries which described the celebration of Christmas across the colonies. These radio broadcasts were obviously important during World War II and continued in the years that followed.

It was also possible for intercolonial sports to become a source of entertainment for distant audiences through newsreels. The British Empire was very much a location for the dissemination and development of sports, perhaps more so than other empires of the day. These included sports for the elite, such as shooting, fishing and pig-sticking in India, as well as big-game hunting in Africa (and this produced a genre of film documentaries demonstrating that big-game shooting could involve the camera as much as the gun). Sports that had been nurtured at British public schools and universities, such as rowing, also became more widely popular, while yacht clubs appeared throughout the British Empire wherever there were coastlines or lakes. Horse racing became a particularly important interest, one that could unite the classes in attendance at race courses and in gambling. Race courses appeared throughout the British Empire, in some cases promoted by the presence of cavalry horses in the British imperial regiments. Other sports that enjoyed a more democratic participation and following were also disseminated around the world. Among these was football, the classic sporting development of the late-nineteenth century, much enjoyed by troops wherever the military went. Football was taken up with particular enthusiasm in Africa where it became a passion among both white settlers and sojourners and Africans. Missionaries were influential in this, seeing football as a means of inculcating a sense of common purpose and imperial virtues of team spirit combined with individual prowess and physical courage. Another sport very much associated with the military which was also encouraged in Africa was boxing which became immensely popular among Africans. Football did

not, however, develop with quite the same passion in Canada, where American sports became more influential as well as those associated with a very cold climate like ice hockey. Perhaps more influential was rugby, which was taken up as a major spectator sport particularly in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Colonial territories adapted sports to their own ends, such as the unique appearance of Australian-rules football. But perhaps most influential and widespread of all was cricket. Cricket seemed to know no boundaries, particularly given climates which suited it well. It became a central aspect of sporting culture of the Caribbean islands, of India (and after partition, Pakistan), Ceylon, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Intercolonial matches started in Australia (that is among the various colonies) in 1850, and the first English tour took place in 1861. One of the great advantages of cricket was that, unlike rugby, it was not a contact sport, and therefore, at a time of racial sensibilities, it became acceptable for different races to play each other. Cricket test matches started in 1877 (England and Australians in Melbourne, Australia, as a federation did not exist then) and became increasingly frequent in the twentieth century, becoming popular fare in the press, in newsreels, and later in radio broadcasts. Although such sports were indicative of an overall imperial culture (a distinctive one since such sports were at this time not played in the other European empires), they soon became very much part of the development of separate identities and distinctive nationalisms across the empire. Thus, as with so many other aspects of an imperial culture, they were transformed from illustrating a degree of unity in the British World to becoming evidence of growing nationalist separate identities. This was particularly potent in the case of Caribbean islands where it soon became apparent that cricket teams had the abilities and skills to beat the so-called mother country at their own game, as it were (Beckles 1998). Another sport of more significance for the future was snooker, a game that was actually invented in India and was to sweep the English-speaking world and become highly popular, particularly after the introduction of color television.

This notion of an imperial culture performing as a dominant ideology in British history, notably in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, has not been without controversy. For a long time, the histories of the British Empire and of the domestic politics and society of Britain were treated as wholly separate categories, seldom fully brought together. It was only in the 1980s that it was suggested that the history of Britain and of its empire should be amalgamated through the study of cultural forms (MacKenzie 1984). This conjunction had always been apparent in economic history, in the extent to which the British economy was bound up with its imperial role (although even here it was thought that, given the extent of British trade with the United States and with Europe, it was possible to exaggerate the centrality of the colonial connection). But it was regarded as much less apparent in terms of social and cultural history. Once the connection had been suggested, however, there was some attempt at a resurgence of older ideas. The historian Bernard Porter suggested that in fact the British had little interest in their empire and that the notorious nineteenth-century phrase of the historian John Seeley "absent-minded imperialists" could indeed be seen to apply to the reactions of the British public to the fact that they were citizens of, as it was always described, the largest empire the world had known (Porter, B, 2004). There are, however, certain problems with this view. The first is that any survey of popular materials indicates the pervasiveness of empire and its ideologies. The second is the central place of imperial themes in publications and in entertainment. While there were of course people who found imperialism not only unappealing but reprehensible, still it appears to have been acceptable in so many popular works and above all in entertainments. The theater and other media would not have devoted so much attention to it if impresarios and filmmakers had imagined that it would alienate audiences. Moreover, so many advertisements of the period sold their products in connection

with current imperial events or by association with imperial heroes that it would be unlikely that those concerned with marketing would have linked their sales to contemporary events which were either unappealing or which inspired boredom. This indicates the extent to which these aspects of an imperial culture were certainly not part of a governmental or elite conspiracy. "The box office does not lie" nor do sales of products. These phenomena flourished because consumers, at least for a period, found them appealing.

There have, in any case, been many other interpretations by historians, political scientists, and anthropologists that an imperial culture was indeed a major phenomenon of British history, even in terms of the public at large. The most important of these was the book *Culture and Imperialism* by Said (1993). The author came from a literary tradition and had become highly influential through his seminal *Orientalism* (1978). His approach adopted the poststructuralist theories of discourse that were to become central to the postcolonial school, and he argued that the nineteenth-century canon of English literature acted as a "polyphonic accompaniment" to the expansion of Europe, interpreting works in the light of contemporary imperial contexts. He argued that "so vast and yet so detailed is imperialism as an experience with crucial cultural dimensions" that it was necessary to think in terms of "overlapping territories, intertwined histories common to men and women, whites and non-whites, dwellers in the metropolis and on the peripheries, past as well as present and future."

Some historians and literary scholars have found this far-fetched, but there can be little doubt that the prominence of the British Empire and its various territories can be tracked through a whole range of cultural forms. This is not to say that the British people, and the colonial migrants who had left Britain's shores, had much knowledge of the dimensions of the empire, of the events through which it had been acquired, or of the peoples who inhabited it. However, there was unquestionably a recognition that the empire had converted Britain into a major world power and

that the empire provided extraordinary opportunities for settlement, employment, and commercial success, not least because it ensured that Britain had by far the largest merchant navy in the world. During the hundred years between the middle of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Britain and its empire became, in a cultural and demographic sense, synonymous. This was heightened by the development of many aspects of an imperial and colonial culture. It was an effect which was perhaps heightened by World Wars I and II, although those same wars would ensure the rise of nationalist sentiment, the creation of new identities, and ultimately the collapse of the empire as a political and social unit.

However, while the creation and experience of these aspects of an imperial culture offer important insights into the dominant ideas of the British Empire at its peak, the breaking down of such cultures of empire is equally instructive for an understanding of the empire's decline. The progressive disintegration of the culture of imperialism took place over a period of many years, at different speeds, and at a variety of levels. Within Britain itself, imperial ideas seemed to become less relevant in the inter-war years of the twentieth century when the comparative decline of British dominance in industrial production, command of shipping and trade, as well as military and naval power became increasingly apparent to both politicians and public. Moreover, the cyclical booms and busts of the world economy exposed major problems of unemployment, social deprivation, and labor unrest in Britain. Some politicians and agencies tried desperately to maintain the imperial connection as a bulwark against these economic stresses, for example, in imperial preference after 1931 and such propagandist bodies as the Empire Marketing Board (Constantine 1986), but by World War II, it was already becoming apparent that these efforts to cling to an imperial past were no longer appropriate or effective. In addition, the effects of the worldwide great depression after the Wall Street crash of 1929 ensured that opportunities for white migration had become more restricted. Yet, despite all that, it was still the

case that particularly in the theater and films, imperial culture survived and in some respects continued to do so until the 1960s (Ward 2001). It seems that such cultural elements can survive beyond the increasing evidence of economic and political decline.

Beyond Britain it was also increasingly apparent that the dominions, following the Balfour Declaration of 1926 (which declared that these former colonies were now equal in status to Britain itself), were emerging as fully independent countries with their demographic makeup changing dramatically with the rapid growth of migration from Eastern and Southern Europe. World War II seemed to create an illusion of an empire once again coming together to fight the enemy, with the exception of Ireland or Eire which remained neutral. Indeed, the effective departure of the Irish Republic from the British system (the monarchy was dropped from the constitution in 1937, and the republic was declared, outside the commonwealth, in 1949) acted as a significant herald for the rapid processes of decolonization that were to take place between the 1940s and 1960s. While it certainly left many significant traces, an overall imperial culture now seemed to have died, although the British royal family, particularly in the person of Queen Elizabeth II after 1952, seemed to hold together its successor body of equal and independent states in the Commonwealth. The queen continues to be monarch of 15 former imperial territories as well as the remaining British Overseas Territories.

So far as indigenous peoples were concerned, this period became one of the acceleration of what has become known as "the decolonization of the mind," the escape from an imperial cultural hegemony. Of course, some Caribbean, African, and Asian people had embraced a British-style education and the use of the English language, occasionally also Christianity, as a route to personal advancement. Sometimes, this included aspects of the accompanying mind-set which became a useful attribute for entry to some, mainly professional and clerical, occupations, though few entirely abandoned traditional cultural norms. Still most people either remained indifferent to such a phenomenon (as was the case in many rural parts of Africa and Asia) or held it at arm's length. Alternatively, many recognized the value of creating hybrid cultural forms in order to face the challenges of the modern world. In India, a sequence of nineteenth-century reform movements, particularly in Hinduism, set about responding to and warding off the apparent seductions of Christian missions with their useful attributes of educational opportunity and access to modern medicine (although traditional medical practices remained important). Nevertheless, Christianity succeeded in maintaining its cultural and spiritual bridgehead in many Asian colonies, and churches, missions, schools, and hospitals remained part of the visible material evidence of an imperial culture. In Africa and the Caribbean islands, Christianity stimulated an extraordinary range of responses, from reasonably conventional religious practices to highly syncretic forms as well as the emergence of a whole range of separatist churches which chose to blend elements of Christianity with indigenous beliefs and performative modes of worship. For example, large numbers of nominal Christians in Africa pursue religious ideas and forms that owe as much to African traditions as to imported belief systems. Similarly, it is possible to identify a whole range of reactions to aspects of an imperial culture from partial acceptance as a pragmatic route into globalized systems through efforts at the creation of syncretic forms (e.g., by some African novelists) to outright rejection. Such rejection took political forms in the development of black movements, often but not exclusively Marxist, which drew inspiration from Caribbean and Black American leadership or from revolutionary movements elsewhere (Schwarz 2003). The former slave communities of the Caribbean islands became the leaders of many aspects of cultural decolonization while still converting the aspects of the formerly dominant culture that were useful to them. As we have seen, western sports were capable of being transformed into attributes of nationalist endeavor and propaganda.

These important intellectual and religious responses to British imperial culture were accompanied by others designed to avoid the visible outward appearance of individuals as well as the commemoration of significant figures in nationalist politics. In India, some Asian former colonies, West Africa, and other nonwhite territories, politicians and their followers set about the rejection of western clothing to return to what was conceived to be more traditional dress. This was particularly significant when certain aspects of clothing took religious forms, as among Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. Much of the celebrated charisma of Mahatma Gandhi was derived from his adherence to simple Hindu clothing, even although he had dressed as a suited western lawyer during his time in South Africa. This was partly bound up with his Swadeshi movement, the boycott of western industrially produced cloth in favor of hand-spun cotton produced on his ashram (Gandhi 1929). Similarly, Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal, the first Indian post-independence prime minister, made a conscious decision to abandon his western suit and turn to a form of Indian dress, a movement which swept through the Indian National Congress by the 1920s. At a later date, nationalists everywhere reacted against the statuary of notable imperial figures which had been a powerful, visible characteristic of the street furniture of imperial and colonial cities. Statues were often attacked and either destroyed or damaged (symbolically heads and arms were often chopped off). Some, like the statue of General Gordon in Khartoum, were sent back to Britain, and some (particularly of Queen Victoria) went to Canada or Australia. While a few survived, as at the Victoria Memorial in Kolkata or in the Mumbai Town Hall, the sculpting of statues of nationalist leaders and heroes became an important response to these symbolic imperial figures (and royalty) that could be found throughout the British Empire. Museums were often converted from institutions propagating an imperial culture to places treating the British Empire as a historical phenomenon that had produced its nationalist response.

The former dominions established their own cultural nationalism, while in South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and earlier, Kenya, black majorities overthrew white minority ruling groups. This inevitably led to the re-establishment of the primacy of the black experience (e.g., in the teaching of history). In Canada and Australia, there were serious moves toward an internal cultural decolonization. In Canada, First Nations peoples finally rejected the efforts of Europeans to integrate them into a European cultural supremacy. White politicians had attempted to educate them, particularly the children, into the dominant and supposedly accepted norms of the white majority. But the First Nations at last succeeded in securing full citizenship and suffrage rights, which they had been denied in the past, and they re-enacted the central symbols and performances of their own cultures, which had never been fully lost. This was also true among the Aboriginal people of Australia. In New Zealand, these processes took place at a rather earlier period, although the cultural effects of warfare and of various forms of proselytization also had to be thrown off. The Maori people re-engaged with their own cultures, never fully abandoned, and to some extent, these entered into the overall culture of the country. In all three, there was at last some acceptance of the indigenous right to a symbolic acknowledgment of the need for whites to accept that they occupied the lands of a pre-existing people. Indigenous art was revalued and came to be valued as important elements in world art and also as constituent attributes of the identity of the former dominions. Such changes of attitudes, as well as of legal and political status, were confirmed by the justice and reconciliation commissions that were formed in various post-imperial territories like South Africa, Canada, and Mauritius. A central aspect of these elements of cultural decolonization throughout the former British Empire was the historical revisionism of the postcolonial school, the realization not only that history had to be rewritten from the point of view of those who had formerly been repressed but also in ways that eliminated the central tenets, often imbued with the celebratory and self-congratulatory notions of the dispersal of civilization and of progress, central to a former imperial historiography.

Cross-References

▶ British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia
▶ Cricket and Imperialism
▶ Empire and Imperialism in Education Since 1945: Secondary School History Textbooks
▶ 'Great Games' in the Literature of Imperialism
▶ Imperial Tastes and Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century India
▶ Language, Translation, and Imperialism
▶ Music
▶ Orientalism
▶ Political Cinema and Anti-imperialism

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Currency Hegemony

▶ Petrodollar Imperialism

Cyprus

▶ Anti-imperialism in Greece and Turkey Regarding Cyprus (1950s and 1960s)

D

Danish Colonialism

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Denmark; Empire; Faroese Islands; Finnmark; Greenland; Iceland; India; Inuit; Postcolonialism; Race; Racialization; Slavery; The Danish Realm; West Africa; Whiteness

Description/Definition

The entry provides a historically informed overview of the history of Danish Colonialism until 1953 from a postcolonial perspective, with a focus on Race and racialization. The analytical focus on processes of racialization within the Danish empire allows for a perspective that describes Danish colonialism from the perspective of its colonized subjects, tying together the diverse colonial regimes within the Danish empire, from Slavery in the Danish West Indies to the racialized colonial rule over the Inuit and the ambivalent racial status of the populations of Denmark's "white" colonies, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Danish colonial regimes are described in Denmark, India, West Africa, the Caribbean, the Finnmark in Northern Norway, The Faroese Islands, Iceland, and Greenland. The entry ends with sketching postcolonial relations between Denmark and the US Virgin Islands, and Denmark and Greenland, respectively.

Introduction

The Danish nation-state has often, both internally and externally, been portrayed as a small, culturally homogeneous nation invested in human rights and global equality. However, this perception and self-image are mostly the result of historical developments taking place in the second half of the twentieth century, and they tend to obscure Danish history as a regional and global imperial power. As Lars Jensen (2015, 2017, 2018, 2019) and others (Burnett and Höglund 2019; Maurer et al. 2010) have argued, Danish Colonialism remains understudied and underdiscussed, primarily with respect to challenging exceptionalist narratives about Denmark as a "benevolent" colonial power (Jensen 2018) by situating Danish colonialism within the global histories of European expansion, genocide, and racist subjugation. Further, discussions of Danish colonial history still too often shy away from critically dissecting this colonial past – in order to better understand its bearings on the present – with the lenses and tools that scholarly fields like Postcolonial Studies, Decolonial Studies, or Whiteness Studies offer by diminishing their relevance for the Danish context or simply ignoring the insights they have

produced. This essay can by no means claim to solve any of these broad issues, but it attempts to endorse Jensen's critique by offering an overview of Danish colonial history that engages with these fields of critical scholarship. In attempting to do so, it includes Denmark's colonial entanglements in the North Atlantic (Greenland, Iceland, Sapmi Lands and the Faroe Islands). Danish historiography has often treated Danish involvement in the trans-Atlantic trade in enslaved Africans (through its colonial possessions in Western Africa and the Caribbean), and the Danish involvement in the European colonization of Asia as "proper" colonialism, but looked at the relationship between Denmark and its possessions in the North Atlantic as being of a very different nature, if not non-colonial altogether (Jensen 2015). While it is true that there were important differences between the ways in which these domains related to the Danish metropole politically, economically, and culturally (Loftsdóttir 2019a), they were all part of the same imperial formation for several centuries and were in various ways tied into colonial relationships with the Danish mainland. The Danish metropole in turn was embedded into an expansionist Europe that throughout modernity increasingly came to understand itself and others through the prism of the naturalized superiority paradigm that was race (Lingner 2016; Lingner and Jensen 2018; Lowe 2015; Mbembe 2017). Taking this last observation as a point of departure, racialization – understood as "processes were race becomes meaningful in a particular context" (Loftsdóttir 2019b, p. 5) – becomes a lens that can reveal a great deal about Danish enrollment into the broader pan-European processes of identity formation while respecting the particularity of different contexts in which the Danish colonial projects manifested themselves. Racialization as an analytical lens allows a discussion of the different ways the various colonized populations were racialized – and resisted, but also sometimes internalized the racial hierarchies of colonial modernity (Mbembe 2017) – without losing sight of the overarching similarities in which race and racialization legitimated colonial rule.

This essay thus engages in a historical mapping of Danish colonialism that attempts to take the critiques referenced above seriously by drawing on insights and concepts produced by Postcolonial, Decolonial, Whiteness, and Racialization studies where appropriate. It starts with a general, historically informed discussion of Denmark as an imperial formation, wherefrom it proceeds to map Denmark's colonial projects by region, starting with the Danish presences in Asia, moving on to the plantation economy in the Danish West Indies and from there to the Danish slave forts in Western Africa. Finally, Danish colonialism in the North Atlantic, namely, in Greenland, Sapmi Lands in Denmark-Norway, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland are discussed. In each case the sections will attempt to simultaneously focus on the entanglements of Danish colonialism into the broader history of European expansion and racial rule, as well as the differences and similarities that constituted the relationships in which the various colonized groups were tied to the colonial metropole that was Copenhagen. The essay ends with a brief discussion of contemporary Denmark as a postcolonial nation and sketches three cases of current renegotiations of Danish colonialism.

The Danish Empire

Historical Overview

The Danish kingdom can be said to have been somewhat of a latecomer to the European colonial expansion. The early forms of modern, European colonialism started at the outgoing of the fifteenth century and picked up speed during the sixteenth, with increasing competition between "first-movers" like Spain and Portugal and newly aspiring colonial powers such as the Dutch Republic and, increasingly, France and England (Horne 2014, 2018). While the kingdom of Denmark-Norway had been the most powerful of the Nordic Kingdoms throughout the Middle Ages, it did not engage in any actual colonization projects outside Europe before the first half of the seventeenth century, during which the Danish crown started to push the engineering of mercantilist policies (Bregnsbo 2017a). This included the crown-backed inception of trading companies holding monopolies (Jensen 2008a), attempting to mimic the success of predecessors like the respective

Dutch and English East India companies (Bregnsbo 2017b; Mentz 2017a). Throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, the Danish Kingdom managed to establish itself as a colonial power by acquiring possessions in Asia, the Caribbean, and on the coast of West Africa (Jensen 2015). Simultaneously, colonial logics and practices quickly came to bear in the relationship to Denmark-Norway's older North Atlantic possessions, as will be explained in more detail later.

The modern, colonial Danish empire experienced its peak in power and wealth during the second half of the eighteenth century. During this period, there were two main factors contributing to its success: Firstly, a maximized sugar production on the Danish West Indies, based on an escalation of the ruthless, and often lethal, exploitation of enslaved African labor, turning the imperial capital Copenhagen into a trading and distribution center for (not only Danish-produced) sugar and other colonial goods for all of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea (Pedersen 2017; Simonsen and Olsen 2017; Vibæk 1966). Secondly, a policy of neutrality pertaining the numerous armed conflicts between the great European powers – especially England and France – throughout the eighteenth century. Denmark-Norway thus managed to keep itself out of any major wars between the years 1720 and 1801, using this position of neutrality to offer otherwise unavailable cargo transportation and capital transfer services to merchants and other parties who found themselves constricted by the ongoing wars. The Danish state thus actively encouraged Danish merchants and ships to help, for example, British or French merchants to dodge trade bans and blockades pertaining to the wars by smuggling their goods under the neutral Danish flag, as well as by relocating parts of their trade to Copenhagen's neutral port (Bregnsbo 2017a; Mentz 2017a, b; Simonsen and Olsen 2017). During this period, Denmark-Norway could be described as a middle-size power militarily and economically compared to other European powers. It commanded a huge fleet, second only to Britain's, and Copenhagen was an internationally recognized metropole due to its role in the colonial trade. It is important to note though, that the situation in the tropical colonies did not necessarily reflect this. The Danish possessions in Asia and Africa were geographically small and surrounded by bigger powers, either local or the expanding domains of other colonial powers, especially Britain. This meant that while the Danish empire was a force to be reckoned with in the Nordic region (at least until the beginning of the nineteenth century), its colonial projects in the tropics were, more often than not, shaped by a rationale that sought to secure a share of the victors' spoils for itself, rather than trying to actually compete with greater imperial powers like Britain (Bregnsbo 2017a). However, it is exactly the Danish attempt to defend its lucrative neutrality policy against British intervention that makes the two empires run afoul each other towards the beginning of the nineteenth century, resulting in two decisive British assaults on Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807. Further, Denmark-Norway found itself in bad standing internationally after the Napoleonic wars, thus having to accept humiliating peace terms dictated by the victors, the most devastating of which was the loss of entire Norway to long-term regional rival Sweden. Plunged in Debt, suffering a state bankruptcy in 1813 as a result of the war against Britain, as well as facing growing civil unrest in its German-speaking southern duchies throughout the first half of the nineteenth century (ultimately resulting in the loss of these domains as well in 1864), Denmark sold its colonies in India and West Africa to Britain in 1845 and 1850, respectively, and gradually dismantled its empire – the Danish West Indies are sold in 1917, Iceland declares itself independent in 1944, The Faroe Islands and Greenland obtain Home Rule in 1948 and 1979, respectively (Bregnsbo 2017c). As can be seen by this brief overview, Danish colonialism in Africa and Asia was terminated before the rise of high imperialism and the rise of colonial states, while Denmark maintained its colonial relationships in the North Atlantic well into the twentieth century. On the contrary, as will be discussed in the section on the North Atlantic, Denmark managed to translate some of its colonial power into its dominant position in the Commonwealth-like construction of "Rigsfællesskabet," or the Danish Realm (Jensen 2018).

An Imperial Conglomerate State

As a state formation, the Danish empire consisted of an accumulation of quite heterogeneous domains, which jointly and severely could claim global reach at the peak of the empires' expansiveness, but nonetheless remained comparatively small in terms of land area, with the vast landmass of Greenland as an exception (Heinzelmann et al. 2006). Not all domains who were subjected to Danish rule during the era of Colonialism were colonies, and their relationships to colonial power were often complex. For example, Norway, which was in a subjected position to the Danish Crown politically, took itself part in the colonization of Greenland and the Sapmi Lands to the north (Jensen 2015). Likewise, the duchies Schleswig and Holstein, which were mainly German speaking, ruled by the Danish Crown, but their elites were endowed with considerable political autonomy and influence (Bregnsbo 2017c). Further, the domains that were colonies did not always have a clear-cut designation as such either, while their relationship to the Danish metropole was colonial in nature – which will be discussed in the section on the North Atlantic. This diversity in terms of political status has led to historians often discussing the Danish Empire as a conglomerate state (Heinzelmann et al. 2006), thereby acknowledging the fact that the various domains under Danish rule differed from each other a great deal in terms of how their relation to the Danish metropole was constituted juridically and organized politically. Further, the populations under Danish rule were religiously, culturally, and linguistically diverse, and, as was common for modern European empires, Danish colonial rule often functioned as a racially constituted politics of difference – albeit in differentiated ways (Lingner 2016; Loftsdóttir 2019b; Rud 2017).

Danish Participation in Other Colonial Projects

The series of military defeats in the first half of the nineteenth century clearly mark the beginning of an unraveling of the Danish Empire, gradually reducing Denmark to a small nation-state with fewer and fewer colonial possessions (Bregnsbo 2017c). It is important to note though that Denmark as a nation of course remained to be embedded in a globally expanding Europe. This means that while colonial expansion is by and large off the table for the Danish state after 1814, Danish citizens and enterprises participated in a long number of other European powers' imperial projects (Jensen 2008b). A significant – and currently understudied – example would be the migration of roughly 300,000 Danes in the years 1870 and 1914, mainly to the USA, and their participation in what was probably the biggest settler colonial project during high imperialism. Other examples are the participation of Danes (and other Scandinavians) in the exploitation and ruination of the Congo Free State (Bregnsbo 2017d) or the colonial lifestyle internationally renowned Danish author Karen Blixen describes in her nostalgic memoir "Out of Africa" (Petersen 2006).

India, China, and the Nicobar Islands

Tharangambadi Under Danish Rule 1620–1845

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, India functioned as a node point for the voluminous trade taking place across the Indian Ocean, connecting the Arabian Peninsula with China (Mentz 2017a). As pointed out by several scholars, Europe, at this point, was an economic and cultural backwater in comparison (Loomba et al. 2005), yet ascending European empires like the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch had worked on establishing their presence in Asia since the late fifteenth century, paying their way into Asian markets with silver looted from the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The Danish monarch Christian VI initiated the founding of a Danish East Indian trading company in 1616, following the council of Dutch merchants. Despite abiding problems with raising enough capital for its initiatives, the company succeeded in negotiating a contract with the local political authorities – who seem to have viewed the Danish presence as a useful counterweight to growing power of the Portuguese – issuing them the right to establish a trading station in the village of Tharangambadi (in

Danish sources usually called Tranquebar). The newly established trading station served the Danish empire as an access point to Asian markets in spices and textiles. From the late seventeenth century on, tea from China also becomes an increasingly lucrative commodity, the trade in which the Danish "Asiatisk Kompagni" facilitates via small trading office in Canton (Asmussen 2018; Mentz 2017a).

Tharangambadi under Danish rule was a colonial trading town with a mainly Indian population of diverse cultural and religious affiliations. At its peak around 1700, the population of the town and the nearest, affiliated settlements numbered around 6000, with a European ruling elite of approximately 300 individuals. In typical colonial fashion, there were different sets of laws for different groups, even though the power of the Danish colonial administration was quite limited. Tharangambadi also housed a small Christian mission established in 1706. Initial differences in upholding contact with the Danish mainland due to the numerous military conflicts between Denmark and its neighbor Sweden circumscribing maritime trade in Copenhagen were overcome in the 1680s and Tharangambadi proves an exceptionally profitable venture around the shift from the seventeenth century to the eighteenth century (Brimnes and Jørgensen 2017a). After this period, the importance of Tharangambadi gradually recedes, both due to the growing importance in the trade with China in which it had no part (Brimnes and Jørgensen 2017b), but also since the technically highly developed production of Indian textiles was increasingly appropriated by the British empire, making middle-man trading stations like Tharangambadi all but superfluous (Lowe 2015). The last blow was the short British military occupations in 1801 and 1808 due to Denmark-Norway's clash with the British empire. After decades of overall unprofitability, Tharangambadi was sold to Britain in 1845.

Serampore and Private Enterprise in India

Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, European presences in Asia could be precarious, as they initially found themselves at the mercy of powerful local political elites, as well as in fierce competition with other European powers. As is well known, this situation was gradually replaced by British imperial dominance on the subcontinent throughout the eighteenth century. After outmatching the French militarily in the beginning of the 1750s, The British East India Company increasingly dominated trade and politics, thereby also circumscribing other European powers' possibilities for expanding militarily or geographically. On the other hand, the political changes in India created possibilities for private enterprise, which were not lost on Danish merchants or the Danish trading company, who profited off the new situation in two main ways (Mentz 2017b).

"Asiatisk Kompagni" succeeded in establishing a new colonial trading station in Serampore (Frederiksnagore in Danish) in 1755, which experienced rapid growth in the ensuing decades. This growth was mainly fostered by an "open borders" policy, granting asylum to merchants and traders – Europeans and Indians – who either had been forced to leave home in the context of the ongoing political unrest brought on by British expansion in the region or who due to accumulated debts or other troubles wanted a fresh start for their business activities. In this way, Serampore is able to count a population of around 10,000 around 1782, among them Christian missionaries of the Herrnhuter brotherhood, who arrived in 1776. Further, Serampore College is established by British missionaries in 1818, a learning institution that contributed importantly to the Indian anticolonial movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like Tharangambadi, Serampore loses its importance as a colonial trading station after the second British occupation, which in this case lasted from 1808 to 1815. Hereafter, Danish possibilities for colonial profits were increasingly squeezed, and even if Serampore maintained a certain significance as a Christian mission and cultural center, it was sold to Britain in 1845 as well (Brimnes and Jørgensen 2017c).

The other way Denmark-Norway was able to profit off British expansion is through Danish merchants (in their capacity as private traders) helping employees of the British East India Company, who had amassed private fortunes behind

the back of the company, to smuggle their fortunes to Europe with the help of Danish ships and/or via Copenhagen port. Consequently, while the Danish empire never succeeds in establishing Danish territorially extensive colonial dominance in India or China, this immensely profitable variant of the Danish neutrality policy contributed significantly to the British plunder of the Indian subcontinent (Mentz 2017b).

The Nicobar Islands

Simultaneously to the foundation of Serampore, a Danish expedition was sent out to colonize the Nicobar Islands, simply on account of that no other European or Indian power had laid claim to them so far. The Islands' populations were not consulted, but usually tolerated the Danish expedition members' presence. From 1755 until 1845, six different expeditions were sent out to the Islands with the establishment of settlements of various kinds in mind. All these attempts fail due to the expeditions quickly being decimated by disease. When the Islands are used by pirates and thus become the target of a British anti-piracy campaign in 1868, the Danish state chooses to simply sign the Islands over to the British, thereby formally ending Danish involvement in the European colonization of Asia (Rastén 2017).

Western Africa

Denmark and the Transatlantic Slave Trade

Compared to other European imperial powers, the Danish Empire asserted their presence in the Gulf of Guinea relatively late. The Portuguese empire had acquired enslaved labor, gold, and other merchandise from the region since the 1400s and managed to monopolize their access to these markets by military means well into the 1500s. During this period, Portuguese hegemony was increasingly challenged by other European imperial powers on the rise, wanting to secure their own access points to the various African dominions in the region and the markets they controlled. After over a century of enduring an enforced Portuguese trading monopoly over the Gulf region's maritime trade, African kingdoms themselves took an active interest in promoting the presence of various European powers, in order to create counterweights to another European power asserting hegemony (Hernæs 2017a, b, c). This created an overall situation, in which European establishments around the Gulf of Guinea usually consisted of rather small, coastal fortifications that functioned as nodal points for the channeling of various commodities, most significantly the displacement of millions of Africans acquired as slaves – and the Danish forts were no exceptions (Gøbel 2016). From the fifteenth until the beginning of the nineteenth century, these forts were dependent on alternating alliances and treaties with regional political elites who in turn are faced with the challenge of balancing the need to secure the advantage of access to European goods – especially firearms, which increasingly became indispensable militarily as European demand for enslaved prisoners of war reshaped warfare in the region – while on the other hand managing to not let a single European power become too dominant (Hernæs 2017d).

The Danish Slave Forts

The Danish Empire, or rather its agents in the form of trading companies, used the break-up of Portuguese hegemony in the 1640s to establish itself at the coasts of the kingdoms of Fetu and Akwamu (both present-day Ghana) were the forts Frederiksborg and Christiansborg are established during the 1660s. While Frederiksborg is overtaken by the British empire in 1685, Christiansborg (today Osu Castle) becomes the headquarter of Danish operations for the time of their stay (Hernæs 2017b).

From the middle of the 1660s onwards the transatlantic trade increases steadily, due to rising European demand for enslaved African labor, facilitating the various, expanding settler colonialist projects and plantation economies that European powers were establishing in the Americas (Horne 2018). The Danish empire became a part of this dynamic through the burgeoning sugar production in its Caribbean colony, the Danish West Indies. When the Danish plantation economy in the Caribbean was amplified by the acquisition of the Island of St. Croix in 1733, the

resulting increased demand for enslaved labor caused the Danish empire to expand their venture by constructing another slave fort, namely, Fredensborg (1736). Additionally, the smaller forts Kongesten (1783), Prinsensten (1784), and Augustaborg (1787) were added, both to boost trade capacities as well as for reasons of securitization (Hernæs 2017d).

The Danish forts in West Africa were thus fortified trading stations which also functioned as temporary prisons for the enslaved. The forts were dependent on contracts and alliances with local African powers and their chief purpose quickly became the facilitation of securing enslaved labor for the plantation economies in the Caribbean. As this function did not require huge numbers of military or administrative personnel, the number of Europeans stationed at the forts usually did not exceed 30 to 40 individuals. Often the European personnel numbered much less than that, not least because various diseases regularly decimated them. Nonetheless, the forts were also the sites of frequent marriages between Europeans and African women, sometimes over various generations (Ipsen 2015). Taken together, this meant that even though the African-Caribbean connection was an important lifeline for the Danish empire economically, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century, the Danish presence at the West African coast did not aim at further territorial expansion inland for the better part of its existence – which quite resembled the situation of the other European powers present around the Gulf of Guinea. This only changed after the Danish crown prohibited Danish ships to participate in the middle passage in 1803 (Hernæs 2017c; Ipsen and Justesen 2017; Ipsen 2015).

Danish Settler Colonialism in West Africa

From the onset of the nineteenth century onwards, the relationship between the European powers entrenched in their slave forts and the regional African powers started to change dramatically. The ending of the middle passage gradually redirected European demand towards other goods, especially palm oil, thereby creating European interests in bigger, fixed investments in West Africa, which in turn generated demands for military securitization of these interests through territorial control. Especially the British empire, thus, increasingly began establishing actual colonial domination in the region. In the Danish metropole, the ban on transporting enslaved labor across the Atlantic spawned lively discussions on attempting to expand Danish territory and establishing a plantation economy driven by slave labor (it was only the transportation of enslaved Africans via the middle passage that was banned in 1803, not the exploitation of enslaved labor), thus replacing some of the production hitherto carried out in the Danish West Indies and even expanding the range of colonial commodities produced under Danish administration. In colonialist circles in Copenhagen, this option is viewed with pronounced optimism during the first decades of the nineteenth century, given the Danish empire's need to recover from the defeat at the hands of the British. However, despite a number of officially mandated plantations being established in the first half of the nineteenth century, due to the Danish metropole getting caught up in the rising civil unrest in its southern Duchies (culminating in the outbreak of civil war in the Duchies in 1848), this brief attempt at establishing a Danish settler colonialist plantation economy in West Africa were dismissed and all Danish possessions sold to Britain in 1850 (Hopkins 2017; Justesen 2017).

The Caribbean

Settler Colonialism in the Caribbean

After a period of Spanish hegemony throughout the sixteenth century, other European powers started to establish more permanent settlements, especially after sugar production picks up from the 1640s onwards. As with the colonial projects in Asia and West Africa, the Danish empire was drawn to the region by the prospects of securing a slice of the wealth that was generated through European plunder, but increasingly also through the facilitation of what Gerald Horne has described as "the apocalypse of settler colonialism" (2018). European settlement in the Americas

throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century was characterized by the violent establishment of plantation economies, enabled by genocidal dispossession of the indigenous populations and maintained through a constant supply of a growing, enslaved workforce of Africans – Thus initiating social formations that were designed to monoculturally produce commodities for the colonial metropoles under abysmally abusive working conditions, and that simultaneously advanced the development of "whiteness" as an entrenched category of identification. After all, even if European empires in the region often fought each other, the establishment of a production regime that depended on an enslaved workforce that usually came to outnumber European colonialists greatly and that rebelled often and fiercely, created mutual interests between different groups of Europeans (Horne 2018). Further, just as the enslaved African workforce, the European populations and their elites were nationally, ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse, not least due to a high degree of mobility amongst the Euro-Caribbean settlements, which further exacerbated the European need for an overarching identity in the face of military threats by unvanquished Indigenous and African populations (Gøbel and Sebro 2017; Horne 2018). Simultaneously, blackness was cast as identical with slavery, ascribing a set of properties to the enslaved population that naturalized their captive condition (Mbembe 2017). As in the other plantation societies in the Americas, the enslaved population was ultimately marginalized, relegated to what Frantz Fanon has termed "the zone of non-being" (Fanon 2016; Gordon 2015).

The Danish Plantation Society

Denmark-Norway established its first Caribbean colony on the island of St. Thomas in 1672, the nearby located islands St. John and St. Croix followed in 1718 and 1733, respectively. The Danish West Indies quickly developed into a quite typical Caribbean plantation economy, with all the features described above, with the exception that the Danish settlers did not encounter the island's indigenous population, who had fallen victim to the Spanish empire earlier (Simonsen

2017). It was especially the taking over of St. Croix, the largest of the three islands and the one most suited for agriculture, and the following systematic expansion of the sugar plantation economy which heralded a period of massive profitability, rendered possible by the Danish neutrality policy which allowed the Danes to ship and sell sugar to European markets in times of war (Simonsen and Olsen 2017), but also by an exacerbated mortality among the enslaved workforce. The mortality rates among the enslaved exceeded the birth rates, which made the entire plantation venture dependent on a continuous supply of newly enslaved Africans (Vibæk 1966). This period lasted approximately from the middle to the end of the eighteenth century, and the sugar economy thus constituted one of the most crucial economic lifelines of the Danish Empire at its peak of power and wealth.

With some exceptions, little is known about the precise national, cultural, lingual, and religious origins of most of the enslaved Africans brought to the Danish West Indies, but it is certain that the approximately 111,000 Africans brought to the Danish West Indies had roots stretching from Senegambia to Angola (Simonsen and Olsen 2017). As enslaved Africans were usually prisoners of war whom the Europeans acquired from the African victors, they would sometimes be sold, and thus arrive, in groups with shared cultural identities. Seen through European eyes, this heightened the potential of uprisings. This was the case in 1733 on St. John, where a newly arrived group of enslaved Akwamu, many of whom had had training as warriors, initiated an uprising, in the course of which they seized the entire island and drove the surviving whites off. Ultimately, the uprising was squashed, but before that, the insurgents managed to defend St John through for half a year, fighting off both British and French troops, who were sent from neighboring colonies to prevent a potentially contagious example of a successful overtaking of a colony by Africans (Gøbel and Sebro 2017). Even if no other armed uprising was carried out until 1848, the enslaved population remained unruly. Marronage, either in order to hide in the remaining woods on the islands or to attempt a full escape to nearby Puerto

Rico – where the Spanish crown had granted freedom to any Maroon who would plead allegiance to the Spanish monarch and embrace the Catholic Faith – was a common practice amongst the African population (Highfield 2012). The Danish West Indies was also the first of the Danish colonies in which the Herrnhuter Brotherhood obtained the crown's permission to proselytize in 1732 (followed by Greenland in 1733, Serampore in 1776, and Western Africa in 1826) not least because Christianization was thought to contribute to the pacification of the belligerent enslaved (Jensen 2005).

The Danish West Indies were originally initiated and managed through a trading company monopoly until 1755, whereafter the colony is administered directly by the crown. The plantation economy on the islands was chiefly initiated by creating incentives for moneyed individuals of all nationalities to settle and invest in establishing a plantation or merchant business, a policy that drew British, Dutch, French, German, Danish, and Spanish planters to the table. As a result, English and Dutch Creole functioned as lingua francas, enabling communication between Europeans and Africans, respectively. This also meant that the planters, the most powerful group in the Danish West Indies, were a nationally very diverse group, who had very specific, localized interests of their own, which often ran contrary to the Danish government's, represented through the administrative and military personnel and the governor. Conflicts regularly revolved questions about how far Copenhagen could regulate, monopoplize, or tax trade, thereby often limiting possibilities to trade with other colonies in the region and even between the three Danish islands themselves. While, for example, Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas was declared a free port in 1764, trade on St. Croix remained tied to Copenhagen. Charlotte Amalie's status was another example of how the Danish empire utilized its neutrality policy economically. Throughout the numerous wars fought between the bigger imperial powers throughout the eighteenth century, the free port served as an international base for trade (not least in enslaved Africans), smuggling, and privateering. This brought huge economic boosts to the town during wartime and making Charlotte Amalie one of the ten biggest towns in the Danish Empire around the turn of the century (Heinzelmann et al. 2006; Riis 2012; Simonsen and Olsen 2017).

The End of Slavery, Fireburn, and the Sale

The plantation economy on the Danish West Indies got under increasing pressure from several sides from the start of the nineteenth century onwards. The discovery of beet sugar made sugar cane increasingly unprofitable (Jensen 2012). The ending of the middle passage complicated the acquirement of enslaved labor, while it became increasingly clear that it was a matter of time until slavery itself would have to end in the Danish West Indies, not least due to abolition throughout the British Empire 1833. Founded in a racist paternalism that doubted the capacities of the enslaved to administer their freedom, but also hoping to avoid having to compensate the plantation owners, the Danish crown opted for a gradual emancipation. This was not well-received among the enslaved, who responded with a coordinated uprising in the summer 1848, forcing the Danish General Governor to proclaim the emancipation of all enslaved individuals on the islands (Highfield 2009; Jensen 2015; Simonsen and Olsen 2017).

Following the end of slavery, however, the new regulation laws were designed to secure the labor supply for the plantations by prescribing binding 1-year contracts, fixed wages, and strict vagrancy laws, a system that advanced growing discontent. Further, the social hierarchies developed under slavery stayed in place, resulting in a society in which crass class inequality roughly corresponded with racial categories (Hoxcer Jensen 1998). The consequential social tensions erupted into another armed uprising, this time by the largely rural, black plantation workers in 1878. The uprising, known as the Fireburn, blatantly underlined the need for social and labor reforms on the island, but the Danish government seemed increasingly uninterested in the problems on the by now deficit-generating colony. Instead,

from 1864 onwards, the Danish government made several unsuccessful attempts to sell the colony to the United States. Meanwhile, political and social discontent on the islands resulted in the emergence of an organized labor movement, led by David Hamilton Jackson. The labor union organized a general strike in 1916, forcing a general rise in wages, but also provoking the Danish government to send a warship out of fear of a new uprising disturbing the newly resumed sale negotiations with the United States. The United States on the other hand were unmoved by the strike, as they had no commercial interest in the islands, but wanted them as a naval base. The sale was concluded in 1917, without any consultation of the population of the islands (Highfield 2009; Olsen 2017).

The North Atlantic

Sapmi Lands

The Kingdom of Norway had formed a union with Denmark in 1380, in which both kingdoms were ruled by the same king, while keeping separate political and administrative systems. This arrangement changed in 1536, after the Norwegian nobility took the losing side in the Danish civil war known as the Count's Feud (1534–1536). As a consequence, the Danish crown enforced Lutheranism by replacing the Catholic clergy with Danes. Further, Norway was from this point on treated as a province of Denmark, with its political, mercantile,and clerical elites in large part consisting of Danish noblemen and merchants, subduing the formerly independent kingdom a peripheral status in relation to the imperial center now squarely located in Copenhagen (Jensen 2015; Willumsen 2013).

However, the northernmost areas of Norway stretched into the use areas of the Sami peoples, spanning from northern Norway in the West to the Kola Peninsula in the East. This region had been used and inhabited by different non-Sami groups for a long time as well, and during the middle ages, Sami and Norwegians moving into the area to settle, hunt, or fish seem to have cultivated a largely peaceful, yet somewhat separate

coexistence. From the 1500 on, these relationships started to change. Sapmi lands had become the scene of a lucrative fur trade as well as timber, ore, and rich fishing grounds in the coastal areas. Thus, the Sapmi lands were claimed by Norway, Sweden, and Russia, all wishing to control the regional resources. Sweden here constituted the main rival to the Danish empire. The National borders between the three imperial powers in Sapmi land were settled during the Kalmar War 1611–1613 and finally the Great Nordic War 1700–1721. For the Sami, this meant intersections of their ancestral lands by national borders installed from far away, as well as a gradual and often forced enrollment into national state formations. Autonomous social structures of the Sapmi become undermined in this process. Furthermore, while increased integration into trading networks sometimes could open up new and alternative possibilities, the Sami were also subjected to an increasingly aggressive Christianization policy (Hansen and Olsen 2014). Part of the confrontation between Christianity and the older beliefs held in the region was the special reputation male Sami had among Christians for practicing witchcraft. This meant that when the witchcraft panics that haunted Europe in the seventeenth century reached Sapmi, while the most victims of the panics were Norwegian women, most Sami sentenced to death for witchcraft were men (Willumsen 2013). In the part of Sapmi seized by Denmark-Norway, roughly corresponding to the area today known as Finnmark, the efforts to Christianize the Sami intensified greatly after the clergy had learned that many nominally Christian Sami stuck to their old beliefs at the same time, sometimes creating their own, hybrid cosmologies. Starting in the 1720s, missionaries turned to systematically seeking out and destroying holy sites and artifacts. This proselytizing fervor would later develop into assimilationist, so-called "norwegianization" policies, undergirded and legitimated through the "race-science" of the nineteenth and twentieth century (Boyle and Carden 2016; Hansen and Olsen 2014). The Danish empire had disappeared as a colonial power from Sapmi by then, having been forced to cede Norway to arch-rival Sweden in 1814.

Iceland and the Faroe Islands

Just like in the case of Greenland, the Danish empire's territorial claims to Iceland and the Faroe Islands were a consequence of Denmark's union with Norway in 1380, yet all three remained part of the Danish empire after Norway became a part of Sweden in 1814. All these dominions had come under the rule of the Norwegian crown during the middle ages, mainly based on the presence of Norse settlements during the Viking Age. This was also case for the Shetlands and the Orkney Islands, who thus come under Danish rule in 1380, but were annexed by Scotland in 1468. The political changes in the Danish-Norwegian union after the end of the Kalmar Union (1523) and the subsequent Count's Feud (1534–1536) were to be felt in Iceland and the Faroese Islands as well, as the replacement of Catholicism by Lutheranism resulted in a new Danish-appointed clerical and administrative elites and the seizing of former church land by the crown (Magnússon 2010; Whylie 2015). In the case of the Faroe Islands, this also resulted in a marginalization of the Faroese language. Both societies were poor, rural societies dependent on fishing and farming, but with long established traditions for local political autonomy, manifested in their local parliaments that had existed since the Viking Age. In both cases, these political bodies lost almost all their power to the Danish crown (Whylie 2015).

Just a few years before his initiation of the first Danish East Indian company in 1616, Danish monarch Christian IV granted two of the newly initiated trade companies the respective monopolies on Greenlandic and Icelandic trade, while the Faroe Islands' trade was administered directly as a crown monopoly from 1529 onwards. For both Iceland and the Faroese Islands, this further undermined any potential for an autonomous national development and created exploitative trading relations. Sigurður Magnússon (2010) has described how in the case of Iceland, Danish merchants could fix prices simply by raising the margins on any imported goods Icelanders needed. Further, trading was mostly conducted as barter, thus preventing any kind of profit or capital accumulation on the Icelandic side. From

1619 to 1662, Iceland and the Faroe Islands were administered by the same trading company. The trading monopoly for the Faroes Islands was then granted to the Gabels, a merchant family from Glückstadt in the southern Duchies. From 1655 until 1709, the Gabels were acting liege lords (including the grant of trading monopolies from 1662 onwards) of the Faroe Islands, who squeezed the already sparse economy of the Island for private gain and through violent means (Whylie 2015).

The Danish trade monopolies over Iceland and the Faroe Islands thus meant an often arbitrarily administered Danish assertion of dominance over the economic and cultural life of the two dominions, restricting mobility and contact opportunities for the populations. Both on Iceland and the Faroese Islands, strongly independence-oriented, nationalist movements develop throughout the nineteenth century, resulting in prolonged political and social struggles with the Danish administration over questions of language and culture, as well as economic and political status, which gradually force concessions from the Danish administration. After having gradually being weakened from the end of the eighteenth century, the trade restrictions for both colonies were lifted completely in the 1850s, resulting in increasing contact with the outside world as well as the onsets of rapid industrializations. After the Danish constitutional reform in 1848, which is usually seen as the onset of democratic self-rule in Denmark, Icelanders are asked if they want to be represented in the Danish parliament but decline the offer in order not to legitimate Danish dominance further by acknowledging Danish sovereignty. The Faroese, on the other hand, are incorporated through two seats, but without being consulted on the matter at all. Further, as a result of the political pressure from the colonies, the local parliaments are reestablished in 1843 (Iceland) and 1852 (Faroe Islands) (Magnússon 2010; Whylie 2015).

For both Iceland and the Faroese Islands, the Second World War marked a watershed in the relations with Denmark, yet with significantly differing outcomes. As a reaction to the German occupation of Denmark, both Iceland and the

Faroe Islands were occupied by British troops. Iceland had gained the status of a separate state in 1918 but was still relegated to the status of a junior partner in a political union with Denmark. Seizing the moment in the face of Denmark being under foreign occupation in 1944, the Icelandic parliament unilaterally terminate the union and declare full independence. In the case of the Faroe Islands, a referendum on independence was held in 1946, resulting in a slim majority for independence. The Danish government dismissed the result, but had to concede to home rule, which is installed in 1948. As a result, the Faroese Islands remain under Danish dominance, today as a part of the Danish Realm, or "Rigsfælleskabet" (Jensen 2015, 2018).

Iceland and the Faroese Islands were thus treated as colonial domains within the Danish empire, but besides the differences from the tropical colonies in their historical, and thus legal relation that subdued them to the crown, there was also the question of racial categorization. Kristin Loftsdóttir (2019b) has explored the ways in which modern processes of Icelandic identity formation were influenced by and positioned themselves vis-à-vis the views on race, nation, gender, and modernity that were prevalent throughout the nineteenth century, especially how they related to the construction of the category of "whiteness" as a colonialist, Eurocentric paradigm of superiority. On the one hand, Icelanders had, due to their status as a subdued and impoverished society, often found themselves portrayed in undignified and diminishing ways in descriptions of Iceland by outsiders, sometimes including direct comparisons to "primitive," non-white societies (see also Magnússon 2010). On the other hand, European enlightenment scholars early on took an interest in Icelandic sagas and language as a sort of Germanic (and thus, in the thinking of the era, white, European) heritage, an interest that increasingly connected with the flourishing European "race science" of the nineteenth century, which in turn saturated debates about nationhood and modernity. The result was a paradoxical positioning of Icelanders in relation to racial and national categories. On the one hand, the Danish mainland viewed Iceland as a sort of repository for ancient Norse culture, thus ascribing to them a glorious past that was thought to reflect the ancestral culture of the Danish nation. At the same time, that very same portrayal cast said past as lost, and contemporaneous Icelandic society as degenerated and hopelessly backwards, thus legitimizing Danish paternalistic dominance through a perceived Icelandic cultural immaturity, and thus incapability for self-government. As Loftsdottir (2019b) demonstrates, Icelanders were not always aware of these views on their society as somewhat pre-modern, but when they were, they often fought them tooth-and-nail, asserting a modern, civilized, European identity on a par with their colonizers for themselves, trying to be recognized as fully valid, political subjects (Magnússon 2010). Unfortunately, this often also meant adhering to the civilizational hierarchies the intense racism against colonized subjects of the nineteenth century purported, for example, when Icelanders fiercely distanced themselves from other colonized subjects in the Danish empire such as the Greenlandic Inuit, who were cast as "primitive savages" (Loftsdóttir 2019b).

In sum, Icelanders occupied an ambivalent position in the colonialist, racialized hierarchies of the nineteenth century, which could be described by Homi Bhabha's (2004) phrase "white, but not quite." While Icelanders were included in the construction of the "European races" and even could claim a rather special place in that construction, they were simultaneously cast as a "pre-modern" society, in need of paternalistic guidance by the metropole. While this was a position that seems to have offered a good deal more cultural and political agency than Greenlanders, let alone the Afro-Caribbean population of the Danish West Indies, enjoyed, it did not prevent the Danish mainland from treating both Iceland and the Faroe Islands with a typically colonialist, arrogant paternalism. Lars Jensen (2018) has argued that the North Atlantic colonies' self-assertion as fully valid political subjects thus had to struggle with a pronounced Danish reluctance to grant any more political autonomy than was unavoidable, an antagonism that was even more pronounced in the case of Greenland.

Greenland

Due to the medieval Norse settlements on Greenland agreeing to pay taxes to the Norwegian Crown in 1261, the Danish crown considered Greenland a part of Norway when Norway became a part of the Danish conglomerate state in 1380. And just as Iceland and the Faroese Islands, Greenland stayed with Denmark after the loss of Norway to Sweden in 1814. Contact with the Norse settlements broke off in the beginning of the fifteenth century, but the Danish crown upheld its claim to the Greenlandic mainland, not as least the region started to reveal economic potential at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Blubber and whalebone were in high demand, and Basque whalers had established a profitable venture from the 1550s onwards. Soon, imperial powers like the British and the Dutch developed an interest, and it is in this context that the Danish monarch Christian IV attempts to assert Danish sovereignty over Svalbard – which at the time was believed to be part of the same landmass as Greenland. Dutch and British whalers were by no means willing to pay royalties to the Danish Crown, but from this point in time on, the ascending Danish colonial empire starts to develop an active interest in Greenland. Christian the IV thus, sent three expeditions to Greenland in 1605, 1606, and 1607 to "reassert" Danish sovereignty over Greenland and try to locate the Norse settlements. This mission fails, but the expeditions kidnap several Inuit to display them at the royal court, a practice that was repeated by European sailors several times during the seventeenth century. Still, European whalers, among them the Danes, also establish sporadic trade relations with the Inuit. Further, several Danish trading companies were established and granted royal monopoly for Greenlandic trade and a handful of trading expeditions were sent out, yet the financial burdens of the 30 Years War (1618–1648) circumscribe the Danish efforts somewhat (Gulløv and Toft 2017).

The first modern colonial settlement is established by the missionary Hans Egede in 1721. The project was enabled by capital from the merchants of Bergen, the king, as well as the Copenhagen-based Royal Mission College. This composition of interests mirrors the tripartite constellation of missionary activity (The Danish Royal Mission from 1721, in competition with the Herrnhuters from 1733), trade monopoly, and state administration that gradually colonized the Inuit societies of Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat in Greenlandic) throughout the eighteenth century. After an initial period of improvised colonialism, it was also this combination of interests out of which a self-asserting colonial governing rationale of paternalistic cultural micromanagement developed, which informed the colonial administration's gaze on the Greenlanders for the next 250 years. More accurately, the economic premise for the Danish colonial project in Greenland was a viable and profitable trade in blubber and seal skin (Seiding et al. 2017).

Sealing was dangerous and required specific skills, so the colonialists were dependent on the activities of the Inuit seal hunters for the colonial project to turn to account. The administration therefore came to see seal hunting as an essential, and praiseworthy, feature of Inuit culture which needed to be culturally preserved and politically promoted. On the other hand, Christianization and a certain degree of Europeanization in terms of medicine and living standards were pivotal to the colonial project as well, so the Danish authorities – from their own point of view – had to strike a delicate balance between cultural preservation and intervention. This problem was further underlined by the debates surrounding the (from 1774 state-owned) trade monopoly. In other parts of the empire, lifting trade restrictions had generated considerable state revenue, but in the case of Greenland, it was feared that a too intensive "exposure" of the Inuit to European culture would corrupt their way of life and thus hunting activities. Ironically, besides alcohol, especially colonial goods like tobacco, tea, and coffee were identified as the culprits. As early on as 1782, the colonial administration tried to prohibit the Inuit population from access to such goods, while also trying to regulate what they saw as an excess of sexual relationships between colonists and Inuit. Colonial paternalism was thus legitimized by a perceived, racially determined, Inuit "vulnerability" to exposure to modernity due to their "cultural

immaturity," and a self-appointed mission as protector from this exposure by the Danish administration, which at the same time protected Danish economic interests. This rationale resulted in a quite typical, colonial politics of difference, where Danes in general enjoyed better political, economic, and social possibilities. Further, Danes were subject to Danish law, whereas the Inuit population lived under locally adapted, non-standardized versions (Rud 2017).

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Inuit population, who increasingly came to understand themselves as Greenlanders under Danish rule, started pushing back through the limited political channels available to them. The missionaries had early on started to build schools, in which the children were taught in their own language, as well as educating Greenlandic catechists to assist in teaching and religious tasks. This was meant to ease the process of thorough Christianization, but also provided Greenlanders with the means to articulate critique and pressure for political participation. In combination with the fact that traditional means of conflict-solving among Greenlanders had been oppressed by the missionaries, this meant that the colonial administration had to gradually allow for various political bodies of – very limited, and frequently overruled, but still moderately expanding – local self-rule by the Greenlanders in the second half of the nineteenth century. This process is informed by frequent Greenlandic critique and pressure for bigger participation possibilities and steps toward equality between Danes and Greenlanders, which were answered with an entrenched reluctance to cease control on the side of the Danish administration (Jensen 2018; Marquart et al. 2017).

The slow march towards Greenlandic self-determination picks up during the first half of the twentieth century. Simultaneously with a more and more vocal Greenlandic pressure for economical, political, and cultural development directed by Greenlanders, the prices for blubber and fur on the world market decreased and a gradual reorientation towards fishing takes place on Greenland. In 1940, the protracted struggle over political power in the colony was interrupted by the German occupation of Denmark, resulting in a break of the Danish-imposed isolation the by the arrival of American troops as well as an increased degree of autonomy during the war years. In other words, the war years rendered the continuation of the Danish colonial regime on Greenland untenable. Furthermore, the subsequent waves of formal decolonization following World War II opened a new, internationally recognized, forum of Greenlandic critique, namely, the UN. In an until today hotly debated negotiation process, the Danish government manages to convince the Greenlandic representatives that the best available option for Greenland is the amendment of its colonial status and integration into the Danish realm. Subsequently, a referendum was held in Denmark, but not in Greenland, and the incorporation of Greenland became a reality in 1953 (Heinrich 2017; Jensen 2012, 2018; Rud 2017). The postcolonial Greenlandic-Danish relationship will be sketched in the next section.

Postcolonial Denmark

Renegotiations

The year 2017 marked the centennial of Denmark's sale of the Danish West Indies (now US Virgin Islands) to the United States, an occasion that generated numerous artistic, scholarly, and activist projects and activities that tried to reflect and sometimes renegotiate questions of Danish colonialism and what its significance for the present might be. Some of the events surrounding the centenary seem to reflect a growing interest in critical self-reflection of Denmark's involvement in colonialism. Taken together with a slowly growing amount of critical literature, art, and activism since the 1990s on Danish Colonialism, the different initiatives, publications, and projects that emerged out of 2017 are far too numerous to list here (see also Lingner and Jensen 2018), so one exceptionally prominent example will have to suffice. Attracting a fair amount of international attention, artists LaVaugn Belle (US Virgin Islands) and Jeanette Ehlers (Denmark) raised a public sculpture entitled "I am Queen Mary," which fuses the commemoration of the 1917-sale and the 1878-Fireburn uprising on the

Danish West Indies with references to the American anti-racist struggles of the 1960s, as well as to the concept of cultural hybridity. At a height of 7 m, the first Danish monument to a black woman places the memory of resistance against (not only) Danish colonialism and racism squarely within Copenhagen's public space (Belle and Ehlers 2019). At the time of writing, due to financial constraints, the sculpture consists of materials that will deteriorate rather quickly, and negotiations with the Danish government about a permanent bronze version are ongoing. However, it is important to note that Danish colonialism also has tangible afterlives outside the borders of the nation-state as well, haunting Denmark's relations with some of its former colonies. The last sections of this entry will sketch two current political renegotiations of Danish colonialism: The demand for an apology from the US Virgin Islands and the current Greenlandic-Danish relationship.

The Call for Reparations and Apology

After the sale of 1917, the former Danish West Indies – now US Virgin Islands – became an unincorporated territory of the United States. Under the current status, the territory does not cast electoral votes for the presidency of the United States and is represented by a single delegate with no voting rights in the US Congress. The United Nations still considers the territory a de facto colony. The African Caribbean Reparations and Resettlement Alliance (ACRRA) was founded on the US Virgin Islands in 2004. The organization's claim for reparations and an apology for slavery had had predecessors in historian Arnold R. Highfield's formulation of the idea of an official Danish apology in 1996, and the establishment of the Homeward Bound Foundation by senator and lawyer Wayne James in 1998, who also formulated claims to reparations from Denmark. However, ACRRA has been the most visible, persistent, and successful group in terms of making its claims heard in Denmark. Typical for Caribbean reparations movements, the group is supported by local Afrocentric religious communities, such as the Rastafaris, but their exact number of active supporters is unknown. The exact claims made by the group have varied over the

years, but entail an official apology from Denmark, initiatives for proper memorialization of slavery, as well as other initiatives to further reparation and reconciliation. The organization builds its claims on pointing out that poverty, inequality, debt, corruption, and the unresolved political status of the territory all must be understood as the consequences of (not only) Danish colonialism. In 2014, the claims for reparations for the US Virgin Islands were reinvigorated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) launching its 10-point reparations plan and incorporating Denmark in the list of countries summoned to the negotiating table. In the course of 2017, ACCRA's claims caught public attention several time and have succeeded in opening a former national debate on colonial history in Denmark to voices from the Caribbean. Yet, an official apology or other official reparation initiatives have not manifested at the time of writing (Andersen 2014, 2017, 2018).

Greenland in the Danish Realm

After the incorporation of Greenland into the Danish Realm in 1953, a rapid modernization process ensued. Industrialized fishing was cast as the country's future and this new mode of production demanded rapid urbanization as well. While Greenlandic politicians initially seem to have welcomed the modernization process, the actual execution quickly raised Greenlandic criticism. The entire process was decided, monitored, and carried out by Danish authorities, who had envisioned Greenlanders as only working in the fish factories and thus not had planned any other educational initiatives, let alone longer educations. Greenlanders increasingly felt that they were belittled bystanders to the rapid transformations taking place in their country. Further, wage disparities of up to 25% between Danes and Greenlanders caused growing frustrations (Rud 2017).

One of the consequences of the modernization in the 1950s was a rebellious youth movement among Greenlanders, whose claims for equality for the former colonial subjects resonated strongly with the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1972, the

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Greenlandic population voted overwhelmingly no to joining the European Economic Community, but joined anyway together with Denmark in 1973, thereby again making clear that Greenland's degree of political self-determination was insufficient. The result was the establishment of Home Rule in 1979, and subsequently, Greenland became the first country to leave the European Community in 1985. During the 1970s, a general reorientation towards Inuit culture took place, culminating in the founding of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in 1980. Though not always free of tension, the Greenlandic political commitment to working with other Inuit living in Russia, Canada, and Alaska is one example of the ongoing development of an increasingly autonomous Greenlandic identity and cultural reorientation (Jensen 2014; Lund Jensen 2017; Rud 2017).

Greenlandic sovereignty was further expanded with the Self-Government Act of 2009, which recognizes Greenlanders as a distinct people with the right to self-determination and the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments are defined as equal parties. Further, two Greenlandic representatives are part of the Danish parliament. Yet, Greenland did not become a sovereign nation. Together with the Faroe Islands and Denmark, it is part of the "Danish Realm" or Rigsfællesskabet. Denmark retains political authority over substantial issues such as Greenlandic foreign policy, security, and international agreements. Just like the Faroe Islands, Greenland receives a yearly block grant from Denmark (Jensen 2014; Rud 2017).

Recent developments have reinvigorated Danish interest in a strong connection to Greenland. Climate Change causes the Greenlandic icecap to melt rapidly, making resources accessible that were unreachable hitherto. Furthermore, due to the prospect to an increasingly ice-free Arctic Ocean, Greenland is quickly developing into a strategically important location for the support of global transportation networks. In this context, Denmark has vital interests in upholding what is left of its sovereignty over its former colony but finds itself negotiating with a progressively self-confident Greenland (Jensen 2014). In this context, Greenland installed a reconciliation commission in 2014 that was to work on the unresolved colonial past. While no demands towards Denmark were articulated, the commission sparked fierce debates, sometimes betraying deep Danish investments in the image of the benevolent Danish colonizer, and Greenlanders as somewhat ungrateful wards (Rud 2017). Further, the work of the commission and the subsequent debates showed that the modernization period in the 1950s is remembered as the most destructive period of Danish sovereignty, as the rapid modernization in parts of Greenlandic society had resulted in social problems much resembling other indigenous communities, such as substance abuse, high suicide rates, and domestic violence. The renegotiation of the colonial relation in the Greenlandic-Danish case is thus entangled with a long list of highly sensitive, yet unresolved issues pertaining the colonial past as much as the colonial present (Jensen 2018).

Cross-References

▶ Dutch Imperialism, Caribbean
▶ European Imperialism in West Africa
▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
▶ Imperial Tastes and Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century India
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism
▶ Nordic Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples
▶ Racism and Imperialism
▶ Resistance to Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1856–1983

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Darfur

▶ Darfur and the West: The Political Economy of "the World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis"

Darfur and the West: The Political Economy of "the World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis"

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Synonyms

China; Colonialism; Darfur; Humanitarian intervention; Imperialism; Oil; Sudan; United States

Definition

This essay seeks to delineate the involvement of foreign actors in Sudan's Darfur conflict. In addition to providing a basic outline of the conflict's origins and historical context, we review the lineage of colonial and imperial incursions into the region, with a particular focus on highly salient, though oft-forgotten, episodes in US–Sudanese relations. Further, we track the recent involvement of outside actors in the Darfur conflict and in Sudan more generally, from the US and China to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU). As we demonstrate, the Darfur conflict is intricately linked to two foreign-policy doctrines that have elicited significant debate in both scholarly and lay circles: humanitarian intervention and the "responsibility to protect" (R2P, in common parlance). Finally, the essay analyses the role of foreign actors in their efforts to mediate the conflict, and point to the paths not taken as a result of this outside involvement.

Introduction

During the peak years of violence in the mid-2000s, the Darfur region of west Sudan became a household word in the West, synonymous with

human tragedy, carnage, and depravity. Indeed, at its height, dispatches from Western reporters almost unfailingly referred to the Darfur conflict as "the world's worst humanitarian crisis." While violence in the region has declined, and the topic has largely disappeared from international headlines, a low-level conflict simmers on in Darfur, with a lasting political solution as distant as ever.

Though Darfur was the recipient of sustained Western interest during the conflict's height, mainstream media coverage was at best superficial, and almost universally failed to provide necessary background information for understanding the conflict – let alone for understanding the role of outside powers in the country (except for the favoured villain, China), or in Africa more generally. That is, little to no attention was paid to critically analysing the dynamics of imperialism in the region, past or present, at least insofar as the West could be implicated.

This essay seeks to address this gap by delineating the involvement of foreign actors in the Darfur conflict. In addition to providing a basic outline of the conflict's origins and historical context, we review the lineage of colonial and imperial incursions into the region, with a particular focus on highly salient, though oft-forgotten, episodes in US–Sudanese relations. Further, we track the recent involvement of outside actors in the Darfur conflict and in Sudan more generally, from the US and China to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU). As we demonstrate, the Darfur conflict is intricately linked to two foreign-policy doctrines that have elicited significant debate in both scholarly and lay circles: humanitarian intervention and the "responsibility to protect" (R2P, in common parlance). Finally, we analyse the role of foreign actors in their efforts to mediate the conflict, and point to the paths not taken as a result of this outside involvement.

The Darfur Conflict

Darfur was an independent sultanate until as recently as 1916, when the British folded it into

the cobbled-together nation of Sudan. Britain's manner of imperial rule, which based itself in Khartoum while largely ignoring the rest of the country, helped to lay the groundwork for the post-independence violence that has haunted Sudan for over five decades. Since it achieved the ouster of the British in 1956, the established pattern of unaccountable domination of peripheral regions like Darfur by the centre has continued. Power is concentrated resolutely in Khartoum and is wielded imperiously, prompting periodic separatist movements in a number of regions, including the ultimately successful breakaway of the south.

The proximate origin of the rebellion in Darfur lay in two uneasy groupings which emerged publicly in 2003: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). The first has Islamist roots. Its then leader had once studied under Hassan al-Turabi, who had a long career as a sinister power-broker in Khartoum. The SLA by contrast was always less coherent and more secular in orientation. As the rebellion dragged on, the rebels splintered into dozens of smaller and typically hostile factions. Often rebel groups descended into mere banditry.

Periodic efforts at reaching a settlement with Khartoum that included most of the rebel forces have proven fruitless. Khartoum, despite having the full force of the Western propaganda machine turned on it, always had the upper hand militarily. Thus it pursued a war of attrition. The rebels, for their part, were bolstered with a false sense of empowerment by the fulsome rhetoric emanating from Washington, which championed the Darfuri plight. The effect quite probably led them to overplay their hand at the bargaining table, as they held out an illusory hope for US-NATO military assistance. Given the balance of forces, securing a just agreement with Khartoum was never on the cards. However, an accord that secured at least a few tangible benefits for Darfur might well have been possible if diplomacy had been conducted differently. The abortive Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 was rammed through by the Bush Administration. Many rebels had not even been given a chance to read the would-be agreement, leading to a disastrous splintering of these groups. One rebel faction signed, while the others abstained. In the years that followed, the disunity and sectarianism of the rebel forces would worsen dramatically, obliterating hope of a settlement that would secure any tangible relief for Darfuris.

Darfur and the "New" Scramble for Africa

Foreign attention – and meddling – is nothing new for Sudan. Indeed, the country was a key battleground during the Cold War as the US and Soviet Union struggled for regional influence and supremacy. Before the rise to power of the more independently oriented Islamist party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), Washington assiduously supported Sudan, particularly during the tenure of Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri. By the mid-1970s, Nimeiri's government was highly valued by Washington, both because it was a geopolitical ally in a strategically important area of the world and because oil had recently been discovered in Sudan.

The resumption of the civil war with the south, which had been raging off and on since independence decades earlier, occurred in 1983. For the next 2 years, until Nimeiri was overthrown by popular unrest in 1985 – a notable but oft-ignored forerunner to the Arab Spring – Washington provided his regime with crucial support as he waged a bloody campaign against the people of the south that would ultimately extract a death toll dwarfing that of the Darfur conflict. Such was the flow of military aid that, according to the regional specialist Douglas H. Johnson, Nimairi's most senior officials warned a group of southern politicians that Khartoum had built an "air bridge" from America to the Sudan for the supply of arms, and the first place such arms would be used would be in the south. This turned out to be no idle threat (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 32).

In waging its war against the southern rebellion, Khartoum also began enlisting and arming Arab-identified militias to its cause and promoting a racist, anti-African ideology. The strategy resulted in horrific atrocities against civilians and was revived decades later in Khartoum's repression in Darfur.

Concurrently with the brutal warfare, in the 1980s the southern and western regions of Sudan were repeatedly struck by grave famines. As Johnson observed (referring specifically to the 1984–85 famine, though the behaviour was repeated in 1988), during this period, "The US co-operated in obstructing the expansion of relief to non-governmentheld areas" (Johnson 2003, p. 146). Some southern refugees would resettle in the US, where they became known as the "Lost Boys of Sudan," producing flurries of anodyne, selfcongratulatory profiles. Pertinent political context, including US efforts to obstruct UN humanitarian relief to the unaccompanied minors, went unreported save in the specialist literature.

Washington was keen to maintain Sudan as a bulwark of influence in the region against Mengistu's Ethiopia and Gaddafi's Libya. Thus mass starvation was regarded as an acceptable outcome to avoid providing any incidental support to the southern rebels. However, the election of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1986 marked the start of a gradual decline in relations with the US. Khartoum strengthened ties with Libya and trumpeted Pan-Arab solidarity. After Sudan incurred massive debt under the Nimeiri dictatorship, the newly elected government balked at prescriptions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The trend accelerated after Omar al-Bashir's 1989 coup. The leadership announced that it would not "follow the dictates of the West" (Burr and Collins 1995, p. 251). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Sudan backed Saddam Hussein rather than the US position. It was not long before Washington began to consider providing support for the southern rebels. Suddenly the US "discovered" that Sudan was a state sponsor of terrorism. The IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights. Washington had switched sides.

The veteran journalist Dan Connell (2003, p. 228) notes that relations with the US "reached their nadir during the Clinton administration, which imposed strong sanctions on Khartoum and appeared to tilt toward a policy of displacing the NIF government, though it held back from providing more than token aid to the rebels challenging the regime." In 1998, US missiles levelled the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, ostensibly in response to the (actually entirely unrelated) US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The pretext for the attack was erroneous intelligence suggesting that the facility was producing chemical weapons.

The strike came after Sudan had offered to extradite to the US two suspects it had detained in connection with the embassy bombings. The offer was ignored. Also ignored after the bombing were pleas for an apology from the US for its illegal act of war. In reality, the plant had UN contracts and produced a substantial portion of the nation's basic medicines, such as antimalarials. Taking into account the resulting lack of access to medication, the German ambassador to Sudan at the time estimated that the loss of the facility may have caused some "several tens of thousands" of deaths (Daum 2001). Only the year before, the US had imposed comprehensive sanctions upon Sudan. There is little doubt that the primary result was to increase hardship for the populace. The unpleasant consequences were of so little interest that no public studies of the impact of the sanctions were ever undertaken.

Sudan's strategic position along the Nile and a vital international shipping lane, once prized by Victorian Britain, is evidently well recognised by the US. Ann Mosely Lesch (1987), writing in *Foreign Affairs*, once observed that the nation's "geostrategic location means that changes in Sudanese political orientations have repercussions on the entire African continent and the Red Sea littoral."

As the *New York Times* noted, the new millennium augured renewed interest in Africa on the part of "Washington policy makers, and one word sums up the reason: oil" (Dao 2002). Though long hampered by warfare, Sudan was finally able to bring its oil operations online in 1999. However, owing to the sanctions and the outwardly hostile relations between the two countries, the US was frozen out of participation in the country's oil trade. In 2006, reflecting Washington's neoliberal agenda and designs on Sudan's oil, President George W. Bush explained that "The pervasive role played by the government of Sudan in Sudan's petroleum and petrochemical industries threatens U.S. national security and foreign policy

interests" (Riechmann 2006). This vexing problem would be significantly ameliorated in 2011 with the breakaway of a US-friendly South Sudan. The prior decade, however, witnessed an oil-fuelled economic boom for north Sudan. Outside Khartoum, the evidence of this new-found wealth was slim, particularly in far-flung peripheral regions like Darfur.

Yet discontent in Darfur is hardly restricted to the last decade. Nimeiri's regime also faced popular unrest in the deliberately neglected region. Though uninterested in developing the impoverished area, Nimeiri was content to collaborate with the CIA in using Darfur as a staging ground for supporting the odious Hissène Habré in neighbouring Chad.

Unsurprisingly, in the post-Cold War era, Sudan's size, oil wealth, and strategic location at the crossroads of the Middle East and Africa have continued to pique the interest of foreign powers. Here, we consider the role of two such powers in Sudan – the US and China – and how their machinations in the country relate to the Darfur conflict.

Media coverage of the Darfur conflict tended to divide foreign actors with an interest in Sudan into two groups, with strikingly different rationales behind their postures towards the country. On the one hand were the benevolent Western countries (that is, the US and European powers), which were said to be engaging in constructive efforts to resolve the conflict thanks to their deep-seated humanitarian impulses. On the other was China, whose insatiable demand for the country's oil resources was argued to be driving it into a strategic alliance with the al-Bashir regime; in turn, it protected Khartoum through weapons transfers and diplomatic foot-dragging. A number of other greedy spoiler (and non-Western) countries, such as Malaysia, were also lumped into the same group, though China was by far the most prominent. According to this narrative, China was essentially all that was standing in the way of Western-led international action that could finally resolve the Darfur conflict.

Yet the US's posture towards Sudan was of course much more complicated – and indeed, nefarious – than this dominant narrative suggests.

Two primary camps wrestled over control of Washington's Sudan policy during the Bush years. On one side was a curious network of advocacy organisations that had mobilised against Sudan's human rights violations (such as the Save Darfur Coalition, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the International Crisis Group), evangelical Christian groups that opposed al-Bashir's self-styled Islamist regime, and neoconservatives who were seeking to remake the world in the US's image. All of them pushed for strong US action in Sudan, perhaps even military intervention.

The other consisted of foreign policy "realists" who saw Darfur and Sudan primarily through strategic lenses. Consisting of major figures from the foreign policy establishment, this bipartisan group pursued quite different aims in dealing with Khartoum. Much like Bashar al-Assad's Syria or Gaddafi's Libya, Sudan was treated warily, but, for the moment, there was little interest in implementing Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's public call in 1997 for regime change. The point was to secure Sudan's continued co-operation in intelligence-sharing relating to the "War on Terror," as well as to avoid upsetting the US-backed north–south peace agreement, and to impede further Chinese influence in the region (as well as its access to the country's oil resources). This camp – which included the leadership of the US State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA – shared the fundamental belief that Khartoum was "too important to be harshly treated." Thus, no matter how loud the protestations from Washington condemning its brutal activities in Darfur, the Sudanese government "should at least be helped even if perhaps not fully supported" (Prunier 2005, pp. 139–140).

While the first group was the loudest, and captured the most headlines, analysts indicated that the "realist" side won "every time" (Murphy 2006). Yet while the former camp was not setting policy, its advocacy implicitly helped to sell the notion that the Pentagon was merely, as some members of the punditry would have it, the "armed wing of Amnesty International" (Hari

2005; see also Cohen 2003). This idle fantasy is sufficiently tenacious that it is worth devoting some words to debunking the delusion. In one telling indication that strategic and not humanitarian interests were guiding US policy in Sudan, according to the prominent Sudan specialist Gérard Prunier (2005, pp. 138–140), "the interest level of US diplomacy on the Sudan question dropped sharply as soon as President Bush was re-elected" in 2004.

In this vein, the Bush administration pressured Congress to water down the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act – signing into law this weaker version of the bill in 2006 – and enacted its "Plan B" to address the Darfur conflict in 2007. This consisted of mild additional economic sanctions and financial measures while avoiding sanctions on a number of key government leaders. These were minor and largely ineffective measures, apparently designed for little more than domestic public consumption. A more realistic assessment of US policy is provided by the 2007 budget justification, which notes, "The United States will maintain its strong support for countries on the front lines in the War on Terrorism, especially Afghanistan, Pakistan, *and Sudan* ..." (US Department of State 2007; emphasis added).

In concrete terms, this translated into a close relationship with the head of Sudan's intelligence agency, Salah Gosh – who also happened to be a chief architect of the Khartoum government's violent scorched-earth campaign in response to the rebellion in Darfur, in addition to having served as Osama bin Laden's former handler in Sudan. His human rights credentials appeared to make no difference to Washington. Indeed, the CIA flew him to the White House in 2005 for discussions on intelligence collaboration. In the same year, a journalist witnessed a "senior CIA agent" give Gosh a "bear hug" at a counter-terrorism conference (Steele 2005).

Similarly, the US ensured that UN sanctions, which were to be targeted against key individuals within the Sudanese regime that bore culpability for the bloodshed in Darfur, would not include figures such as Gosh. As the Center for American Progress noted in 2006:

On the one hand, the United States pushed harder for the sanctions than any other country. On the other hand, U.N. Ambassador John Bolton successfully managed 'to keep top Sudanese commanders' from being targeted. Thanks to Bolton, the sanction list was whittled down to four from eight, only one of whom 'is a Sudanese government official, and a mid-level official at that.' (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 201)

By early 2008, the Bush administration was publicly offering to normalise relations with the al-Bashir regime, should it take sufficient steps to resolve the north–south and Darfur conflicts. For ideological reasons, initially it also openly opposed efforts to use the International Criminal Court to try human rights cases related to the Darfur conflict, and failed to take steps to facilitate the arrival of Darfuri refugees to the US.

In this latter regard, the record is even worse for two of the US's closest allies, Britain and Israel. Despite their militant verbal postures concerning Khartoum's crimes, both countries deported Darfuri refugees back to the region during the height of the conflict. Indeed, Downing Street actively collaborated with Khartoum in the refoulement of refugees back to Sudan, where they faced torture and death. Israel, which joined Washington in trumpeting the crimes of the "Arab" government of Khartoum for political effect, subjected many Darfuri and South Sudanese refugees who had managed to survive the treacherous journey to indefinite detention. Given its well-documented demographic obsession, Israel's primary concern was to stop the unwanted immigrants, lest the country be "flooded," as the interior minister reportedly warned (Fake and Funk 2009, pp. 118–121). In sum, while public rhetoric indicated that Sudan was virtually a part of the famed "axis of evil," the reality of US–Sudanese relations – and relations between Sudan and the West more generally – was quite different.

With a new election cycle under way in the US, leading Democrats were openly calling for aggressive measures against Khartoum. Several key figures called for a no-fly zone over Darfur and even the introduction of US troops into the country. Yet no such strident action was

forthcoming. By the time Barack Obama assumed the presidency in 2009, Darfur was fading from the headlines, though the afflictions facing the region were far from resolved. The "armed wing of Amnesty International" was once again revealed as illusory window-dressing for Western publics. Darfur had become a stabilised, low-intensity conflict, precisely of the kind that normally fails to pique the interest of the US media and political class. Further, with the US-led occupation of Iraq "winding down," Obama turned his focus to Afghanistan and to Asia, thus diminishing Khartoum's utility to Washington as a strategic asset. Finally, with independence for South Sudan then looming, US interests in Sudan revolved around preventing the outbreak of another civil war, and shoring up its alliance with the South, which would be home to the vast majority of Sudan's oil resources.

Throughout these years, blaming China for its more open and comprehensive strategic alliance with Khartoum, and for its failure to pressure the regime over the Darfur issue, became a national sport in Washington. This culminated in an effort to boycott the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. These were not unfair accusations, though they were also hypocritical. Washington itself had its own stable of brutal and authoritarian allies in Africa and elsewhere, and worked much more closely with the Khartoum regime than it was willing to admit publicly. Further, it failed to make common-sense efforts to address the conflict (such as providing sufficient humanitarian assistance, fully funding peacekeeping forces, and pushing for more inclusive peace talks). The larger context surrounding the Sino-US "war of words" over Darfur was what we and several other authors have identified as a new "scramble for Africa," as outside powers – primarily the US, China, and Europe, but also India, Brazil, and numerous Asian countries, among others – jockey to build political alliances and gain control of the region's resources (Carmody 2011). In this sense, recent decades have seen more continuity than change on the African continent.

Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect

In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a landmark report on the "responsibility to protect" (R2P). R2P became a favoured topic in liberal-interventionist circles in subsequent years, re-invigorating the "humanitarian intervention" franchise. According to the report, "humanitarian" interventions carried out under the R2P framework were to be based on four "precautionary principles":

A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention . . . must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored . . .
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction. (ICISS 2001, p. xii)

While these ideas have significant merit, it is unclear whether any real-world interventions – past or present – actually meet these criteria. The principle of "right intention" is of particular note in this regard, for it suggests that powerful, intervening states should act on the basis of "human suffering" instead of self-interest. The real world offers few, if any, examples of such high-mindedness (Walzer 1977, p. 101).

Instead, what have abounded are decidedly non-humanitarian interventions which are cloaked in humanitarian rhetoric. Indeed, perhaps

every intervention in history has been framed in this way by the invaders, from King Leopold's pillaging of the Congo (justified with anti-slavery rhetoric) to Hitler's conquering of Slovakia (which was said to be based on an "earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples dwelling in the area") (Murphy 1996, p. 62).

In turn, according to dominant Western discourses, interventions are "humanitarian" only when "we" are the ones holding the guns. It is axiomatic in the West that the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was based on a sincere desire to help the Afghan people, particularly women, even if reality has departed from the premise. In contrast, Cuba's sending of troops to Angola in the 1970s and 1980s to support anti-colonial forces is seen as an act of self-interest, and ineligible for consideration as a "humanitarian" act. Stephen Shalom (2007) captures the double standard well by citing a hypothetical letter from a concerned citizen. It reads:

> What's going on in Bosnia and Haiti is appalling. I often wonder why our government can't intervene to stop the killing. I know our government isn't pure – far from it – but nor was it pure during World War II and I supported its participation then against Hitler. It's certainly true that in that earlier war our government didn't get involved out of noble motives, but the clear consequence of its involvement was to defeat the Nazi killing machine. And that was good. Today our government's motives are still far from noble. But is that any reason for us not to demand that our government intervene when so many lives are at stake? The human tragedies in Bosnia and Haiti are so profound, that surely this is a time for intervention.

As Shalom asks, are our reactions to this letter the same once we discover that it was written from one Russian citizen to another? Must we not also be sceptical of Western invocations of humanitarianism to justify wars? Are "we" the only ones with the "right" to carry out such interventions?

Many left-leaning commentators and activists were content to point to such double standards as a reason to dismiss any sort of intervening force in Darfur out of hand – even UN or AU peacekeepers deployed with Sudan's consent. Whatever one makes of the theoretical arguments surrounding such interventions, and in spite of

the presumably imperial motives of the involved states, one must also look to a more practical consideration: whether the presence of peacekeepers on the ground will have positive humanitarian consequences. As Justin Podur (2005) frames the issue:

> The real world demands not allowing genuine concern for victims of atrocities to be transmuted by interventionist hypocrites into apologetics for an imperialism that will ultimately produce more victims of more atrocities. But those same victims deserve better than mere denunciations of intervention and its apologists as hypocrites and warmongers.

So what are we to make of the AU, and later the joint AU–UN (UNAMID) force in Darfur? Peacekeepers in Darfur appear to have had mildly positive effects for the civilian population, leading to a moderate – though terribly insufficient – increase in the level of security in the region. Yet they were not the panacea that Western commentators and activists often suggested, nor were they able to compensate for the lack of a lasting political solution to the conflict – a missing piece of the puzzle that never attracted sufficient attention from the West.

Given that these peacekeeping forces were of some limited utility in putting a band-aid on the Darfur conflict, it is instructive to consider the Western, and particularly US, posture towards them. In short, it was to keep the AU and UNAMID forces on a starvation diet – sending along enough resources for them to subsist (barely), but never a sufficient amount for their potential to be fully realised. While US rhetorical support for the people of Darfur was ample, the provision of necessary funds and supplies never became a priority for the US. So extreme were the shortages that the AU force at times lacked, among other necessities, telephone lines and basic communication devices, properly coloured helmets, sufficient fuel to complete its patrols or food to sustain its troops, or the funds to pay its translators – who at one point as a result went on strike for 5 months. As the UNAMID force commander Martin Luther Agwai put it: "We remain desperately under-manned and poorly equipped . . . Our long shopping list of missing equipment

makes shameful reading" (Bridgland 2008). Yet here again, the West's humanitarian rhetoric would fail to materialise into meaningful concrete assistance for Darfuris.

In one particularly shameful episode, UNAMID was unable to persuade donor nations to supply the two dozen helicopters that it requested for its surveillance missions. Disgracefully, this transpired while – according to a report issued by more than 50 non-governmental organisations, entitled "Grounded: The International Community's Betrayal of UNAMID" – European countries had more than sufficient numbers "gathering dust in hangars or flying in air shows" (Withington 2008). Meanwhile, US helicopters were being used for decidedly nonhumanitarian ends in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Though China's role in the Darfur conflict was particularly shameful and unhelpful, China was far from alone, as we have seen, in serving as an obstacle to peace in the region.

Conclusion

Though prospects for justice in Darfur were never bright, a more skilful diplomatic facilitation of the 2006 peace agreement might well have resulted in peace and some genuine concessions from Khartoum. Instead, the violence continued, and indeed still lingers, despite a 2011 agreement between the government and some rebel factions. Rebels are still active, though without any apparent hope of regaining what little political leverage they had in the early years of the fighting. Life in Darfur has been permanently uprooted and reshaped. Many of the millions driven from their homes may never return, having been forced to resettle elsewhere. Meanwhile, in 2011 the country of South Sudan was born, though it is deeply impoverished, and tensions with Khartoum remain high. Elsewhere in the north, in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, Khartoum is waging violent campaigns against restive forces, extracting a terrible toll on civilian populations.

It is doubtful that any genuine peace, let alone prosperity, will reach Darfur while the current regime remains in Khartoum. The National Congress Party (NCP), the successor to the NIF, has managed to successfully weather the Arab Spring, in part by using its much-feared secret intelligence apparatus to arrest, torture, and "disappear" dissidents. Small public demonstrations of dissent are truly brave but have not yet managed to attract a critical mass.

The people of Darfur, once the focus of so much attention, have been largely forgotten by the Western press corps and the White House. Washington is surely pleased to have secured an ally in the region with the formation of South Sudan – which is an ironic outcome after heavily bankrolling mass killings in the south during the 1980s, an episode now thoroughly forgotten. Khartoum, still under sanctions and receptive to China and Iran, remains a nation that the US holds at arm's length. Yet unfortunately, we are far from the day when the people of Sudan can decide their own fate, free from both local tyrants and the machinations of external powers.

Cross-References

► AFRICOM, NATO and the 2011 War on Libya
► Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
► Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism
► European Imperialism in West Africa
► Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa
► US Military Presence in Africa

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Dark Value Transfer

▶ Unequal Exchange

David Ricardo

▶ Marx's Theory of International Price and Money: An Interpretation

De Beauvoir, Simone (1908–1986)

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Definition

Simone de Beauvoir published philosophy and literature that explored the nature of freedom, individual and social responsibility, and subjectivity. As a philosopher, she is best known for her magnum opus *The Second Sex*, which has become an iconic work of second-wave feminism.

A prolific writer, Simone de Beauvoir published philosophy and literature that explored the nature of freedom, individual and social responsibility, and subjectivity. As a philosopher, she is best known for her magnum opus *The Second Sex*, which has become an iconic work of second-wave feminism. Although the reputation of Jean Paul Sartre had at one point surpassed her own as a thinker, recent scholarly interest in her work now recognises her significant and distinct contributions to philosophy and literature (Bergoffen 2004: 80). Some scholars have even speculated that it was *her* guidance that spurred Sartre's intellectual development. Nonetheless, her contributions to political theory and her lifelong activism have yet to be fully recognised. From her autobiographical account of her experience of the Nazi occupation of Paris to her campaign during the Algerian War on behalf of a young

Algerian woman and activist, Djamila Boupacha, the extent to which philosophy, literature, and politics were interconnected for her is clear. As Julien Murphy observes, the issues of colonialism and French imperialism took an especially prominent place in de Beauvoir's political activities and philosophical thought (Murphy 1995).

From an early age, de Beauvoir contested the conventions of her dour, middle-class upbringing. Her biographer, Deirdre Bair, writes that she had always "equated reading with happiness" (Bair 1991: 65). She was part of the first generation of French girls to take advantage of progressive reforms in higher education in early twentieth-century France, which finally allowed them to train for a professional degree. At the Sorbonne, she met Sartre, and they would remain close friends until his death in 1980. Sartre's approach to existentialist ethics contended that the individual alone generates the meaning of the social world. According to his view, ethics was simply an orientation that the lone individual invents rather haphazardly in building meaningful relationships and intellectual projects. She was intrigued by the idea of radical freedom and the problem of nihilism that preoccupied the young Sartre, but would later criticise his view because of the extreme individualism it presupposed.

It was under the Nazi occupation of Paris that de Beauvoir came of age as a political thinker. Although she would later write novels and a drama about the French resistance and post-war French politics (e.g. *The Blood of Others, Who Shall Die?* and *The Mandarins*), the extent of her own participation in the resistance is unclear. Some have even suggested that she and her inner circle colluded with the German occupiers to further their careers and secure steady work (ch. 17). What is clear, however, is that her wartime experience marked her political awakening, motivating her to rethink her pre-war political and philosophical commitments, among which was – as a successful, middle-class French woman – her own relationship to French colonial subjects. She would later describe her wartime experience as throwing her for the first time into the world, forcing her to realise that she could no longer indulge in a life in which she her private and

professional ambitions alone were central. Neither could she defend an existentialist philosophy in which meaning is constructed by lonely, anxiety-ridden individuals. She came to find meaning already abundant in the world around her.

In a 1965 interview in *The Paris Review,* de Beauvoir retrospectively describes her political awakening. She says that she realised that as a young woman she had been "swindled." She then went on to explain that being "swindled" does not simply mean being tricked:

> 'I'm swindled' also implies something else – namely, that life has made me discover the world as it is, that is, a world of suffering and oppression, of undernourishment for the majority of people, things that I didn't know when I was young and when I imagined that to discover the world was to discover something beautiful. In that respect, too, I was swindled by bourgeois culture, and that's why I don't want to contribute to the swindling of others and why I say that I was swindled, in short, so that others aren't swindled. It's really also a problem of a social kind. In short, I discovered the unhappiness of the world little by little, then more and more, and finally, above all, I felt it in connection with the Algerian war and when I traveled. (Gobeil 1965: 35)

Her gradual discovery of the unhappiness of the world is evident in her writing, through which one can trace an arc of moral and political development. Beginning with the musings on the purpose of human engagements that she had jotted down as a young philosophy student in the 1930s, her changing views on the relationship between morality and politics eventually led her to call vehemently on her fellow citizens to end the French occupation of North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. She would also come to defend the right of colonial subjects to engage in violent revolt against their occupiers in the name of freedom and national self-determination.

Her first philosophical essay, "Pyrrhus et Cineas" (1944), did not endorse such a radical political position, but it did contain the germ of an ethical framework that is consistent with the latter. In the essay, the tyrant Pyrrhus advisor, Cineas, ponders the purpose of endless imperial expansion. For, he concludes, at the closing of a day and of a life, one always ends up back where one started: in one's motherland, alone. She uses this dialogue to set the stage for a discussion

about the purpose of undertaking any project whatsoever, given that human finitude is bound to render our projects unsuccessful or, at the very least, incomplete. She defends the importance of human endeavours in spite of their ultimate futility: our finitude is not an obstacle as much as a necessary condition for constructing meaning, since meaning is only possible for mere mortals, rather than gods and archangels. According to de Beauvoir, the latter could never feel the burden of responsibility for their choices because their lives extend into eternity. The capacity for freedom is distinctly human and thus necessarily an expression of human finitude, of the fact that we have a past and a future and that our present will 1 day dissolve in the impalpable instance of our death.

The imperialist overtones of the essay were lost on the young philosopher, and she decidedly sides with the imperialist Pyrrhus, goading us on to undertake projects in spite of their ultimate futility, as Pyrrhus did when he invaded Macedonia, Rome, and Thessaly before returning to rest in his imperial courts. At this point, she does not provide a clear criterion for distinguishing "meaningful" from "meaningless" collective political projects, contending only that action is better than inaction. She simply stipulates the importance of throwing oneself into the social world and of action more generally. The essay nonetheless demonstrates a nascent political consciousness that recognises the importance of others in building a meaningful life: in order to construct a truly free life, one must involve others in it and ensure that they have the minimal autonomy necessary to pursue collective actions. That is to say, one must be attuned to the miseries and strivings of others.

In the essay, she also begins to ponder how a political community that can feasibly undertake collective action is constituted. A single life, after all, is not expansive enough to include everyone nor is it small enough to exclude everyone. All action throws one into the world and requires one to assume one's "situation" – constitutive of a particular social identity and historical and geographic context. How to draw the bounds of political fellowship and to decide who warrants one's concern and who does not is a problem de Beauvoir poses in this early essay but leaves unsolved.

In "Pyrrhus et Cineas," her concern about colonialism and French imperialism, though palpable, is still only implicit. After all, in drawing the boundaries of human fellowship, French citizens must judge whether or not French colonial subjects belong under the arc of their moral and political consciousness. It was not until the publication of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1948) that she first clearly articulated a conception of freedom and subjectivity that is attuned to a social world marred by colonialism and imperialism. It is also here that she begins her lifelong philosophical engagement with Marxism and affirms her commitment to the universal humanism typical of communist and cosmopolitan political philosophies, though she was often a vocal critic, and never a member, of the French Communist Party (PCF).

She definitively breaks with Sartre's conception of radical freedom in favour of a position that takes seriously material and political inequality. In his early work, Sartre had argued that insofar as human beings are conscious, they are free. The onus of choosing a path for one's self and building a meaningful life is equally shared by every selfconscious individual. "[R] elations of unequal power have no bearing on the autonomy of the subject. "The slave in chains is as free as his master because each is equally free to choose the meaning of his own situation." The question of material or political inequality between master and slave is simply irrelevant to their relation as two freedoms, as two absolute subjects" (Sartre, quoted in Kruks 1992: 96). She instead argues that our capacity to make meaningful choices is profoundly influenced by the social world and our relationships with others. One cannot establish radical freedom due to the mere fact that we are all equally self-conscious agents, since many of us suffer exploitation on account of our sex, gender, race, class, religion, and nationality. This is precisely the "ambiguity" she identifies as the ineradicable feature of ethical life: we are neither wholly determined by our social context nor completely free of it. The social world necessarily mediates all our action and thought without wholly determining them.

In the spirit of Aristotle's virtue ethics, in *The Second Sex* de Beauvoir outlines the material conditions of freedom by arguing that women's liberation requires access to material and social "props" (*choregia*). These props consist of access to viable, self-affirming work, quality education, public life, and state-subsidised day care and maternity leave. She also emphasised the importance of reproductive rights, lobbying for contraceptives and the right to abortion. Her emphasis on material and social goods is also representative of her commitment to Marxism. For de Beauvoir, true liberation necessitates a more egalitarian organisation of the basic structure of the social and economic world that would support the civil and political rights we gain.

For her, the essential feature of immorality is the treatment of human beings as mere objects; such treatment undermines the prospect of engaging with others on the basis of the mutual recognition of one another's freedom. She uses several examples from the colonial context to illustrate this point. Colonial overseers often perpetuated atrocities according to a vision of empire that reduces colonial subjects to mere tools subordinate to the end of capital accumulation and the consolidation of power. "Oppression tries to defend itself by its utility" (De Beauvoir 1976: 95). According to this logic, the free market must advance unhampered because of the promise of "productivity"; colonisation exploits resources that would otherwise lie "fallow," thereby generating "value." Thus, in spite of all the violence visited upon colonised peoples, colonisers asserted that they were *benefiting* the latter.

She later develops her account of social and political distortion in *The Second Sex* to incorporate the phenomenon of "Othering." A "sovereign consciousness" defines the identity and worth of another human being in terms of the negative features that he projects onto them, often delegating women and certain racial groups as the "Other." Given the apparent rationality, self-control, and strength of whites and men, women and people of colour are irrational, infantile, and weak. The Other is not perceived to even have the capacity for self-determination – they are a "thing" for the sovereign consciousness to control, define, and exploit.

In her mature political and moral philosophy (*The Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex*), she argues that the existence of *anyone's* oppression limits the freedom of all. She thus espouses the universal humanism that is characteristic of her particular brand of existentialism, which provides her with a conceptual apparatus for expressing solidarity with exploited peoples around the world, including colonial subjects and women of colour. For her, the ideal of reciprocal autonomy must be realised as a collective political project that spans the globe.

For her, the moral ideal is to recognise one another as sovereign subjects equally possessing autonomy and the capacity for self-determination. Although she has historically been associated with white bourgeois feminism, her characterisation and use of her own feminist philosophy galvanised her antiimperialist activism, particularly on behalf of colonised women. She believed that the moral ideal of mutual reciprocity must be achieved between French citizens and France's colonial subjects. In *Force of Circumstances* she explicitly links the oppression of women with colonisation, arguing that the same logic of domination operates in both contexts.

From the end of the Second World War, she made her home available to political refugees and other stateless peoples and dissidents emigrating from the so-called Third World (Bair 1991: 400). Arguably, the 1950s and 1960s were her most politically active period. She travelled extensively and lent her support to various political causes, meeting – among others – Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Mao Zedong, and Franz Fanon. She became actively involved in the liberation movements in North Africa, particularly Algeria.

Presided over by President Charles de Gaulle, the occupation of Algeria protected French business interests in the country, culminating in the Algerian War (1954–62), during which the French army tortured and killed innumerable Algerian citizens in an effort to put down the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the socialist liberation army fighting to end French occupation in the country. Only a year before Algeria would finally win

independence (1962), the violence spilled over to France. The Paris-based guerrilla army of the FLN called on Algerian citizens to protest against the military occupation of their homeland. In a show of solidarity, Algerian families crowded the streets. In her memoirs, she describes how, led by a former Nazi collaborator, Maurice Papon, French police massacred the protestors, throwing their mutilated and broken bodies in the River Seine or hanging them from the Bois de Boulogne in what would later be known as the Paris Massacre.

Along with other prominent French intellectuals, de Beauvoir signed the Manifesto 121 in support of Algerian independence, condemning the French military occupation of Algeria. As a feminist and supporter of the FLN, in 1960 she began to campaign on behalf of a young Algerian woman, Djamila Boupacha: an FLN member raped and tortured by French soldiers during the Algerian War (Murphy 1995). She collaborated with Gisèle Halimi, Boupacha's lawyer and a global advocate for women's rights, to raise awareness about Boupacha's case among the French public and the Western media. De Beavoir and Halimi co-authored a book about Boupacha's ordeal (1962). They would later work together on various feminist causes, spearheading a campaign for the right to abortion and contraceptives in France in the 1970s.

De Beauvoir's anti-imperialist political action forced her and Sartre into hiding in the early 1960s. They became the targets of the right-wing nationalist militia Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS), which planted several bombs in their residences. She was undeterred and continued her activism. Moreover, she did not limit her criticism to French imperialism; she was a vocal critique of the Vietnam War and a member of the Russell Tribunal, which convened in 1967 to assess the consequences of the US's war crimes in Indochina.

In *The Mandarins*, de Beauvoir captures the post-Second World War sentiment of the French. Though many of the novel's political themes are now passé, the novel depicts the general ethos following the war: "This peace [...] gave us back our lives without giving us back our reasons for living" (De Beauvoir 1987: 76). With the end of the Second World War, she developed a moral philosophy that posited the struggle for freedom as expressive of the very fibre of the human spirit, and, to a considerable extent, the struggle for freedom became her own reason for living.

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Debt

▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt

Debt Crisis

▶ Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism

Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Africa; Debt crisis; Imperialism; Neoliberalism;
Public debt; Taxation; Underdevelopment

Definition

This essay argues that not only does the term
'imperialism' have a long history, but there are
various conceptualisations of what it entails,
including its impact on Africa. The discussion
presented here shows that there are contesting
views about the nature and impact of the debt
crisis in Africa and how to reduce it. In this con-
text, 'debt crisis' will be used as a general term for
the proliferation of massive public debt relative to
tax revenues. Imperialism is here considered as
the stage, mechanisms, and processes of interna-
tional capitalism characterised by monopoly cor-
porations and the compulsion to export capital
abroad, especially to the developing regions of
the world (including Africa) for higher profits.
These transnational corporations are supported
and protected by their respective governments.
The essay uses an analysis of secondary sources
to interrogate imperialism and the debt crisis in
Africa, which is one of the regions in the world
most affected by the same.

Introduction

George (2000) criticises imperialism and the debt
crisis with regard to Africa's increasing poverty
and misery. The impact is felt in all aspects of
people's lives, from health to environmental

degradation. This essay starts from the premise
that the concept of imperialism encompasses dif-
ferent meanings to the extent that one needs to
clarify it before using it in a discussion. It argues
that not only does the term 'imperialism' have a
long history, but there are various concept-
ualisations of what it entails, including its impact
on Africa (Abu-Lughod 2000).

The discussion will also show that there are
contesting views about the nature and impact
of the debt crisis in Africa and how to reduce
it. In this context, 'debt crisis' will be used as a
general term for the proliferation of massive pub-
lic debt relative to tax revenues. It has been mostly
used in reference to Latin American countries
during the 1980s, and the US and European
Union since the mid-2000s (Farah and Masongo
2011; Kang 2000).

Concerning different views of imperialism,
some relate it to a process of capital export from
developed capitalist economies to the developing
regions, including Africa. Others address it in the
context of the economic dominance by the world's
capitalist centres in North America and Western
Europe of the world's post-colonial regions. This
involves the exploitative effects of transnational
corporations, their technological dominance of
developing regions, and unequal exchange in
trade (Aglietta 1982; George 2000). In the context
of this conceptualization, inequities between
states, and within the interstate system, create
opportunities for these centres of world capitalism
to exploit peripheral regions. Ravenhill (2001)
looks at imperialism as the predominance of the
US and Western European countries, including
their militarised threats towards the developing
regions of the world since 1945. These hegemonic
processes and mechanisms characterising imperi-
alism could be categorised as 'expansive', on the
side of the dominant powers, and a state of
'dependency' for the developing regions.

In this essay, imperialism is viewed as the
stage, mechanisms, and processes of international
capitalism characterised by monopoly corpora-
tions and the compulsion to export capital abroad,
especially to the developing regions of the world
(including Africa) for higher profits. These trans-
national corporations are supported and protected

by their respective governments. The essay uses an analysis of secondary sources to interrogate imperialism and the debt crisis in Africa, which is one of the regions in the world most affected by them.

Imperialism and Africa's Contemporary Global Political Economy

Some scholars such as Asher (2001), George (2003), and Hussain and Oshikoya (2002) have argued that in order to show the relevance of imperialism to Africa's contemporary global situation, especially its debt crisis, one has to examine imperialism beyond the categories outlined above; that is, contemporary imperialism should be looked at as an integral part of the global political economy of capitalism. Ruppert and Smith (2002) summarise the characteristics of contemporary imperialism as the:

- relentless expansion of capitalism as a socio-economic system on a global scale;
- undoubtedly competitive, expansionist, and warlike character of the developed capitalist states (US and other Western powers);
- unequal nature of capitalist expansion, and the reproduction on a global scale of socioeconomic inequalities and poverty;
- creation on a global scale of structures of inequality of power and wealth not only in the economic sphere, but also the social, political, legal, and cultural ones;
- generation, through the very process of capitalist expansion, of movements of resistance, of anti-imperialism.

In addition to the above features of contemporary imperialism, the transplanted structures of imperialism through its various forms, including colonialism, have created their own seedlings in Africa to perpetuate exploitation through a rapidly growing, and often rapacious, economic and political elite characterised by greed and graft (George 2000).

In his discussion of the new forms of accumulation within the context of Africa and the global political economy, Simon (2000) indicates that using the conceptualisation of imperialism as discussed above does not reduce Africa to a passive recipient of global capitalist intervention. New forms of accumulation emerge within Africa, products of social relations in specific places and their articulation to broader networks of trade and production. There are also complexities to the interplay between state power and private economic power, an interplay that is changing its patterns in response to both external forces and popular movements (Randriamarao 2003). Meanwhile, external forces are themselves in a state of flux as there is a complex set of relations between the imperialist states and their transnational corporations. Furthermore, the financial flows into Africa promote investment by 'home' companies which themselves become sites of contestation as new forms of accumulation are infused with new forms of inequality and social differentiation (George 2003).

Africa and the Debt Crisis

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated that the cash-strapped Zimbabwe could only get new financial aid if its old debts were serviced. The country is faced with a debt amounting to over US$10 billion and has US$142 million in arrears. Zimbabwe is seeking the cancellation of debt from its international creditors in order to relieve itself of the burden of servicing loans so that the money may be used for economic recovery and development. Foreign investment in Zimbabwe had more than halved in 2010, and its industries were either operating below capacity or shutting down (Woods 2012).

Mistry (1988) states that, a century ago, Africa was conquered and plundered by European powers because they had far superior technology. However, to date the continent is still being exploited by the same Western powers because they possess not only advanced weapons but financial capital. Robin (2008) defines financial imperialism as the system and process through which international capital dominated by Western powers exercises authoritarian control over the

economies of the developing world, including Africa. Matthews (2004) reveals a paradoxical situation whereby Africa is spectacularly rich, yet the natural resources benefit other regions of the world. Cline (2002) indicates that the Western capitalist powers use debt as a tool for exploiting Africa and the rest of the developing world. The use of debt to exploit Africa ensures that funds generated in these poor countries are diverted from their developmental investment strategies towards interest payments into imperialist banks.

The Western powers use financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to put African economies, governments, companies, and households into debt, by sucking their incomes as debt interest payments. Indebting African governments allows creditors an instrument with which to take ownership and control of land, public infrastructure, and other property in the public domain. Edwards (2003) looks at the nature of debt historically by arguing that although the concept and practice of debt have been there for centuries, the contemporary debt crisis in Africa is controlled by a dictatorship of international private capital led by a consortium of imperialist banks in pursuit of profit without care for human suffering (George 2003).

However, Hussain and Oshikoya (2002) argue that debt is not the only way in which the capitalist countries keep Africa and other poor regions of the world underdeveloped and deindustrialised. The main weapon financial imperialism uses is the promotion of neo-liberal economic policies through Western institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as through African puppet neo-liberal political parties and elites.

Neo-liberalism and Africa's Underdevelopment

Hill (2002) considers neo-liberalism to be the greatest cancer spreading across the African continent. Neo-liberalism is the promotion of a combination of counter-developmental economic policies (such as privatisation, austerity, and structural adjustment) that put the interests of foreign capital over local labour and the African masses.

Through debt and neo-liberalism, the IMF and World Bank exert de-facto control over the African economies, determining macroeconomic policies and national budgets. The indebted African state is thus left with only its judicial functions; that is, the maintenance of internal public order (Isard 2005).

Farah and Masongo (2011) indicate that financial imperialism ensures Africa cheaply exports raw materials such as minerals, and cash crops such as coffee, sisal, oil, tea, and so forth, and buys them back expensively as industrial products. This situation creates a great problem for Africa, but an opportunity as well. It is a problem because those capitalist countries and their transnational corporations constitute power without responsibility, and for the suffering African masses it means exploitation without justice. It creates an opportunity for Africa by creating awareness of the necessity not only to control its raw materials but also to build the processing capacity of these raw resources which would allow them to be exported as finished products with additional value (George 2000). The following section looks at some of the causes of the debt crisis in Africa.

The Causes of Debt in Africa

George (2003) demonstrates that with the loss of their African colonial territories after the Second World War, the Western European powers' direct military administration and control of these territories was replaced with economic control and domination, which was greater in effect than it had been in the past. The nascent capitalist class in the ex-colonial countries was far too weak to develop the economies of their countries without profound dependence on the rich imperialist states and transnational corporations. For instance, in 1960, the former colonial powers imposed a sum of US$59 billion in external public debt on the newly independent states with an interest rate of 14%. This was designed to maintain these newly

liberated states in perpetual poverty and debt, and keep them servile to their former colonial masters among the industrialist Western capitalist countries. Imperialism merely changed its exploitative tactics. In 2006, the developing countries, including those of Africa, paid almost £540 million interest on their debt every day to the Western banks, governments and financial institutions. This puts the poor developing countries, especially those in Africa, at the mercy of the imperialist powers. The poor masses in these countries stay in a perpetual state of poverty, and remain a massive reserve of cheap resources and labour for imperialist exploitation (Robin 2008).

The energy crisis in the 1970s and subsequent rise in inflation levels led many Western capitalist institutions to lend increasing amounts of money to the poorer ex-colonial countries. However, that money, which was to be used for economic development and the improvement of living standards, was generally spent on arms. There was massive corruption and generally large sums ended up in the Swiss bank accounts of Western-supported dictators such as Mobutu of the then Zaire. Interest rates rose sharply in the 1980s, resulting in more and more money being spent to pay off interest on loan repayments rather than the principal amount. For example, the money borrowed by Nigeria under President Obasanjo of Nigeria in the 1980s was around $5 billion. The country paid about $16 billion and yet it owed the Western financial institutions around $28 billion due to foreign creditors' interest rates.

The indebted ex-colonial countries have to repay these loans in hard currency, such as Euros, US dollars, or the Japanese Yen, which do not fluctuate much in value. Debt crises often occur because of the devaluation of a given developing country's currency; that is, the amount needed to be paid back rises. The indebted countries must generate the foreign exchange in hard currency, which is generally done through exports whose value keep on falling in the world market dominated by the same Western imperialist countries and their financial institutions. Therefore, to pay interest on their debts, the African countries have to export more. Most of them depend on just two or three export crops; that is, minerals or agricultural products whose prices keep on falling in the world market (Farah and Masongo 2011).

Falling export prices for these raw materials means that it becomes increasingly difficult for indebted countries to pay off the interest on the loans, let alone the principal sums. As a result, more and more countries refinance their loans by taking out new loans to cover the old ones, and sink further and further into debt.

In her discussion on the impact of drought on the debt crisis in Africa, George (2003) indicates that the situation was worsened by a prolonged and devastating drought in the 1980s which severely impaired Africa's agricultural production and exports, hence the financial structure of the continent's fragile economies. Furthermore, protectionism in the world's markets for agricultural products and low-technology manufactures makes it difficult for African countries to diversify and increase exports to hard currency markets. This also limits their ability to escape the debt trap.

Edwards (2003) reveals that in the 1990s the Western imperialist countries and their financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF set up the Heavily In-Debt Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to assist the most indebted countries handle their increasing debt payments. The debt of the HIPC countries was, on average, more than four times their annual export earnings, and 120% of GNP.

In order to force the African countries to pay back their debts to the imperialist banks, the World Bank and the IMF imposed so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on African countries. These SAPs involved cutting welfare expenditure, privatisation, and increasing exports to cover debt servicing. The exports are mostly primary commodities such as mineral and agricultural products whose prices have been falling since the 1980s, whilst the cost of imports has continued to rise. This has caused a sharp decline in Africa's terms of trade, as the purchasing power of Africa's exports has been falling since the early 1980s. This is in spite of an increase in the volume of exports. For instance, the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989 meant that cocoa prices continued to fall, costing Africa

substantial amounts of money for development (Woods 2001).

Matthews (2004) elaborates that when a country is in danger of defaulting on its debt, the IMF usually intervenes with these SAPs. The packages are not meant to cancel the debt of these countries, or even significantly reduce it. They are designed to ease debt figures down to a level where they will be 'sustainable'. This means severe cuts to social spending, so that more money can be spent on debt repayment. This type of financial arrangement does not assist the indebted country. It only helps the capitalist countries and their financial institutions by ensuring that they receive payments on their loans. Africa's debt in 2006 amounted to about US$600 billion. This was equivalent to almost three times its annual export earnings. Africa's debt has become one of the most crucial factors constraining the continent's socioeconomic development (African Development Report 2006).

The Impact of Debt on Africa

An analysis of literature sources shows that the debt crisis has had devastating effects on Africa's development as will be discussed below.

Unsustainable Sacrifice

Substantial resources flow out of Africa as the continent struggles to service debt ratios averaging more than 40%. Despite the principal loan amount being smaller than those of other regions such as Latin America, Africa has a severe lack of foreign exchange resources for its developmental needs. The outflow is financed by drastic cuts in imports, in some cases amounting to more than 50% (Isard 2005). This strangles imports which are so crucial for African economies.

This essay contends that Africa's attempt to service the debt and meet repayment schedules amounts to a sacrifice which most African countries are unable to sustain because directly or indirectly it can lead to a reversal in the decline of mortality rates. The United Nations Children's

Fund (2005) blames the debt crisis for an increase in deaths of hundreds of thousands of children in some African countries. Average incomes have fallen by more than a quarter since the 1970s. The number of people living below the poverty line rose from 220 million to over 400 million in 2008 (Woods 2012).

Wasted Expertise

This essay agrees with the view that the continuous monitoring of the debt situation, including negotiations and so forth, takes up a lot of time for the few African experts available in their respective countries. These same experts are also expected to handle economic and financial matters for development policies and programmes. While it is difficult to quantify the loss these countries are incurring through having their experts 'tied down' to the debt crisis and related matters, the loss is substantial (Ndegwa 1990).

Divided not Collective Responses

Cline (2002) shows that the case-by-case approach followed by Western creditor institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund undermines Africa's co-operative efforts against financial imperialism. The African countries are compelled by the Western capitalist countries and their financial institutions to develop policies and programmes in the context of individual national economies. The approach provides no opportunities for the indebted African countries to plan new recovery and development initiatives together. This co-operation could, through collective self-reliance in areas such as food security, minimise Africa's dependence of foreign sources.

Loss of Independence

The detailed and continuous negotiations with creditors, involving close scrutiny of individual African countries' economic and social policies,

undermines those countries' independence. The debt crisis is used by some creditors to impose their political and economic influence on Africa as a continent. Loss of that independence in deciding on their own economic, political, and social policies amounts to a recolonisation, with all its undesirable implications and consequences (George 2003).

Economic Performance

This essay notes that although there are other factors contributing to the poor performance of African economies (including adverse weather conditions, collapse of export earnings, social/political conflicts, economic mismanagement, etc.), the debt problem is also a direct and indirect contributing factor. This is related to the reduction in the volume of imports in order to service the debt. The number of African countries recording GDP growth rates below 3% (i.e. a rate below the average population growth rate of 3.2%) has been increasing since the 1980s (Matthews 2004).

Randriamarao (2003) indicates that there is a strong association between debt crisis accelerating urban unemployment in Africa. In most African countries, the industrial and commercial activities are located in urban areas. Therefore, when these countries implement the stringent financial measures dictated by imperialist financial institutions (involving reduction of food subsidies, bank credit, public expenditure, and in some cases laying-off civil servants), the adverse effects on urban employment are substantial. Furthermore, the scarcity of foreign exchange also constrains economic expansion through shortages of raw materials and spare parts, thereby leading to job losses for workers in the private sector. When such developments are accompanied by consumer price increases, they create social and political tensions which further undermine investment. Real wages have fallen in most African countries by 60% since the 1980s. However, this essay argues that the high levels of unemployment become counter-productive because they result in fewer taxpayers contributing to government revenue.

Health

The poor health of most Africans is staggering. Infant mortality rates are 50 times higher than in the imperialist nations. An estimated 6 million children under the age of five die from malnutrition each year. Another 30 million are underweight. About 20% of the population is anaemic. African women are 50 times more likely to die during childbirth than women in imperialist nations. In the 1990s, two-thirds of African governments were spending less on health per capita than they were in the 1980s. In Zimbabwe, spending per head on healthcare has fallen by a third since the 1990s when the Structural Adjustment Programme was introduced. In Uganda, US$4 per person is spent on healthcare (2014), compared with US$14 per person on debt repayment (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2012). Diseases considered to be eradicated (including yellow fever, yaws, etc.) are emerging again in some African countries due to a decline of treatment and vaccination coverage. West Africa is currently struggling with the Ebola epidemic and depends on Western powers and their financial institutions to deal with the crisis.

Education

African people's education is also affected by the debt crisis. For instance, the Jubilee Debt Campaign in 2007 showed that primary-school enrolment in some heavily indebted African countries fell from an average of 78% in the 1970s to below 50% in the 2000s. Less than a third of all children attend secondary education. For example, the situation in Tanzania – which was hailed for its universal primary education in the 1970s – has changed since the introduction of school fees in the 1980s as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme. Primary and secondary-school enrolment in the country has dropped significantly. Fewer parents can afford to send their children to school.

Food Self-sufficiency

One of the major effects of the debt crisis is that as Africa has become less and less self-sufficient in food, it has become a dumping ground for heavily subsidised European Union (EU) and US agricultural exports. For example, in Burkina Faso, EU grain is sold for $60 a ton, about a third lower than locally produced equivalents; this low price being guaranteed by a Common Agricultural Policy subsidy of $100 per ton. Likewise, the EU exported 54,000 tons of subsidised maize to Zimbabwe, which then had to sell its own stockpile under World Bank advice at a huge loss, leaving it without any strategic food supplies when it was hit by the 1992 drought. Whilst the EU and the US spend over $20bn annually on subsidising agricultural overproduction and export subsidies, the net effect on Africa is to undermine local agriculture, increase unemployment and increase dependence on food imports. Meanwhile, the environment becomes ever more degraded, mainly because of the increasing use of cash crops as a means of generating export income. Fragile grasslands and forests have been turned over to the growth of timber and cocoa, forcing nomadic herders onto poorer grasslands which have suffered intensified erosion. The result is increasing desertification, further reducing any chance of agricultural self-sufficiency (George 2003).

The Way Forward

There are divergent views on solving the debt situation in Africa. Some argue that the debt should be cancelled and then everything would be fine; African countries would be able to lift themselves out of poverty and misery (Aglietta 1982). Asher (2001), on the other hand, argues that cancelling the debt would solve the situation as the problem for Africa is not just about how much debt is cancelled, or the percentage this debt would represent in terms of total world debt. On the contrary, even though these countries might then be able to spend more money on health, education, and other social programmes,

they would again sink into debt. The African ruling elites are far too weak to develop their countries on their own. Most of the companies that operate in Africa or from whom African countries buy products for their various developmental needs (health, education, agriculture, mining, etc.) are from the imperialist countries. The profits created in Africa do not remain there but return to the banks of the imperialist countries (George 2000).

George (2003) adds that it is also in the interests of the imperialist financial institutions to continue this parasitic relationship and keep the ex-colonial world in perpetual debt. They lend the money and, in return, in the form of interest payments, make billions on their investment. Moreover, cancelling the debt is not going to cause capitalism to collapse, or cause it to seriously reform itself. The developing world's debt is essential for the continuation of international capitalism. It provides the imperialists with cheap resources and labour. The debt crisis also demonstrates that one cannot tinker with capitalism because as long as the means of production remain in the private hands of the capitalists, there will always be poverty and the ex-colonies will remain impoverished and indebted (Aglietta 1982). Others argue that not only must the debt of the developing world be annulled, but the major financial institutions of these countries must be nationalised and put under the democratic control of the working class, creating a harmonious plan of production (Callinicos and Rogers 1980).

However, this essay subscribes to the view that in considering future policy, African countries need to concentrate on those areas of critical importance where concrete action can be achieved. They should keep in mind that their situation in dealing with the imperialist financial creditors is different from that of Latin American debtor countries. The latter have bigger debts which enable them to get the attention of the creditors. They cannot be ignored because default on their part could have serious consequences for the imperialist financial institutions. Latin America is also a major market for some of the Western imperialist countries such as the US. It is this weaker position of African countries which, we

agree, demands that they adopt collective action and approaches if they are to exert any meaningful influence in negotiations with their international creditors (Raffer 2001; Ravenhill 2001).

This essay also argues that in spite of its political and social consequences, the debt crisis in Africa is basically financial, arising from African countries' lack of foreign exchange resources to meet their developmental needs. They desperately require foreign exchange for debt service, imports of the necessary items not locally produced, and for further investment. It therefore follows that for as long as they cannot get debt relief from their creditors, they have the responsibility and capacity to reduce the outflow of foreign exchange resources.

Ndegwa (1990) provides three examples of such outflows where African countries could act to great benefit. They are dealt with separately below.

Cutting Imports Which Could be Produced at Home

African countries, through collective self-reliance, could reduce the import of those goods which Africa can produce internally, especially foodstuffs such as grains and vegetable oils. Paradoxically, some African countries used to export the food items they are now importing. Food production is an area of critical importance for the continent's development and maintenance of its political independence and not just for alleviating the debt problem. African countries need to agree on the collective production and trade arrangements needed. As Haddad (1997) indicates, the problem is not technical so much as political, and the African Union (AU) is currently taking this issue seriously (Jemaneh 2012).

Murison (2003) shows that the debt crisis has resulted in reduction of intra-trade within Africa rather than inducing a sustained effort to promote it. This is due to the fact that in cutting down imports to service debts, African countries have reduced imports from each other more drastically than imports from the industrialised countries. Therefore, without harmonisation, co-operation,

and co-ordination in the 'adjustment' policies and programmes, there will be further reductions of intra-African trade as each country cuts down its imports and hopes to promote its exports to others.

Reducing Military Imports

Foreign exchange outflow could also be reduced through cutting down on military imports. In Africa these account for more than 10% of all imports. In some countries, military imports are more than 20% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Okigbo and Eribo (2004) elaborate that in the 1980s some African countries spent more on military imports than on education and health.

Lowering Capital Flight

As well as dis-investment by foreign investors, capital flight due to economic, social, and political factors is another area of concern in Africa. It is estimated that the continent loses more than US$3 billion a year this way through various forms and mechanisms (e.g. over-invoicing of imports, underinvoicing of exports, smuggling of foreign currencies) undertaken by both foreigners and residents. It is suggested that capital flight can only be minimised through sound economic, social, and political management (Labonate 2004).

This is an area for which African governments should collectively accept that only they themselves are responsible and capable of finding solutions. In this case, realism, courage, and determination are crucial and necessary. The objective should be not only to prevent capital flight, but also to create a stable and conducive investment climate for both external and domestic capital. It is argued that attempts to deal with the problem of capital flight through more laws and exchange-control regulations will not succeed. Indeed, in some cases, a reduction in the number of such controls and regulations could be a significant factor in reducing capital flight and establishing a more favourable environment for inflow of foreign capital (Almounsor 2007).

Conclusion

This essay has shown that just as there are different conceptualisations of the term 'imperialism', so there are also divergent views on the nature and impact of Africa's debt crisis and how to solve it. The discussion has revealed that imperialism and the associated debt crisis are great burdens during Africa's developmental efforts. They affect all sectors of society, bring poverty to the masses, and result in environmental degradation. In spite of the argument that Africa will continue to depend on external assistance for its developmental requirements in the same way that the industrialised countries have done during their process of development, adequate relief measures for Africa's debt crisis are a matter of urgency. This essay propagates the view that in considering future responses, African countries need to concentrate on those areas of critical importance where concrete action can be achieved. In doing so they must realise that solving the existing debt crisis should not be regarded as the final objective but one of the necessary enabling conditions for the continent's economic recovery and sustainable development. The discussion has highlighted the continent's limitations in a world dominated by imperialist financial institutions which are driven by profit and pose grave danger to Africa's socioeconomic and political independence. The essay also argues that despite its political and social ramifications, as in the rest of the developing world, Africa's debt crisis is basically financial, arising from its countries' lack of foreign exchange resources to meet their developmental needs.

However, while they cannot get debt relief from their creditors, African countries and their respective governments have the responsibility and capacity to reduce the outflow of foreign exchange resources which occurs at significant levels in some areas. Through collective self-reliance, they should reduce importing those goods they can produce internally; cut down on unproductive military imports; and show courage and determination in lessening capital flight from the continent and establishing a stable and conducive investment climate for both external and domestic capital.

This essay has also emphasised the necessity for African countries to co-operate and co-ordinate their recovery and developmental efforts. This is based on the argument that by continuing to pursue such efforts individually countries will perpetuate their vulnerability to imperialism and underdevelopment.

Cross-References

► Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
► European Imperialism in West Africa
► Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
► Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa
► US Military Presence in Africa

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D

Debt-for-Nature Swaps

▶ Conservation as Economic Imperialism

De-colonialism

▶ Guerrilla Warfare and Imperialism

Decolonization

▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

▶ Labour and Decolonisation, Anti-imperialist Struggles (Australia/South-East Asia)

▶ Nationalisation

Decolonization in South Asia

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Synonyms

Independence; National movement; Partition; Transfer of power; Third World

Definition/Description

Scholars have defined the term "decolonization" in a number of ways, imparting the word with

various meanings and understandings. On one hand, they have used this word to describe the political process of transition from "colonial dependency to sovereignty" (Strang 1991: 429), while, on the other, it has been described as the "transference of legal sovereignty,... [as well as] a movement for moral justice and political solidarity against imperialism" (Duara 2004: 2). Some have offered more radical definitions like "rejection of the civilization of the white man" (Delavignette, cited in Betts 2012: 23) or "...the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men....there is a total, complete, and absolute substitution....a whole social structure being changed from bottom up" (Fanon 1963: 33). M.K. Gandhi also had a radical vision in mind when he wrote in the early twentieth century, "English rule without the Englishman. . .. This is not the Swaraj (home rule/self-governance) that I want" (Gandhi 1921). If we take the narrower definition of decolonization – i.e., if we see decolonization as a political process where empires retreat and sovereign nation-states are established – then it is a process that spanned over centuries and across continents. As David Strang wrote in 1991, "beginning with Britain's continental colonies in 1783 and ending with the Caribbean islands of Saint Kitts and Nevis in 1983, 165 colonial dependencies have become new independent states or have been fully incorporated into existing sovereign states" (Strang 1991: 429). The process is probably not yet over as the world still has 16 "non-self-governing territories" (Betts 2012: 26). But it is generally accepted that the high ("core") period of decolonization was the twentieth century – more specifically, the three decades that followed the Second World War (ibid: 25; Duara 2004: 1). Moreover, scholars do agree that despite being a global phenomenon, decolonization as a process is shaped by historical specificities of different regions. Even within the same region, decolonization is experienced diversely by people of different gender, race, religion, class, and so on. The existing literature does not offer any single explanation behind the reasons of decolonization, particularly why so many erstwhile colonies in Asia and Africa witnessed the transfer of power within a

short span of few decades in the middle of the twentieth century. The postwar economic crisis in colonizing countries of Europe, changing pattern of international politics in the Cold War era, world opinion favoring the end of colonial rule, metropolitan public opinion no longer favoring the maintenance of the colonies, and, of course, the anti-imperialist struggle in the colonies are given importance – in different degrees by different authors.

Introduction

What today is known as South Asia had been attracting European traders and rulers since the sixteenth century. Over four centuries different parts of this region became the colonies of the Netherlands, Denmark-Norway, Portugal, France, and Great Britain. While the Dutch and the Danish rulers could not hold on to their territorial possessions in this region beyond the middle of the nineteenth century, the French, the Portuguese, and the British retained their colonies in South Asia for another 100 years. This article focuses on these three cases as it discusses the process of decolonization in South Asia. In terms of its sheer size, resources, and power, the British Empire was the most important colonizing force in South Asia. It spread across present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. Hence, while discussing the decolonization process in South Asia, the dismantling of the British Empire will receive the primary attention.

Decolonization of the British Indian Empire

Nehru's India

Decolonization of British India became an immensely complex process due to partition and the creation of two separate nation-states – India and Pakistan. Religion was the primary basis of this division as Muslim majority areas in the western and the eastern sides of British India were separated to form two wings of Pakistan (East Pakistan and West Pakistan). There is an extensive

body of work that explains the causes behind partition. Colonial policies and perceptions toward different communities within the Indian society, social movements from within the Hindu and the Muslim communities, economic grievances, a sense of relative deprivation among the educated Muslims in comparison to their Hindu counterparts, increasing political rivalry between the two communities, and the reluctance of the Indian National Congress to accommodate the political demands of the Muslim produced a sharp sense of religious identity and that of mutual antagonism which gained momentum in the late 1930s–early 1940s and led to the partition of British India (Roy, A. 1990, Roy, H. 2018: 16–56).

A Boundary Commission, chaired by a British lawyer Sir Cyril Radcliffe, was given little more than a month to draw the line that would separate India and Pakistan. Partition was accompanied by intense communal violence and massive mass migration. Partition violence can be dated back to the notorious "Great Calcutta Killings" of August 1946. On August 16, when the Muslim League called for a "Direct Action Day" in demand of separate homeland, violence engulfed Calcutta (Kolkata). From Calcutta, riots would spread to Noakhali in Eastern Bengal where Hindus would be targeted, then to Bihar where Muslims would suffer in larger number, and finally to Punjab, Delhi, and Sind, killing innumerable Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. These riots killed 200,000 to 1 million people (Roy 2018: 3). Women were particularly vulnerable as many thousands of them were molested, raped, and abducted by men of other faiths (Butalia 1993; Menon and Bhasin 1993). To escape the riots, people fled to areas where their co-religionists were more numerous. In some areas, Dalits were initially less affected by partition violence as the Scheduled Castes Federation (an important Dalit political party) had supported the Pakistan demand and their leader from Bengal, Jogendra Nath Mandal, had joined the Pakistan cabinet after partition (Rawat 2001: 111–139; Sengupta 2017). But many among them migrated in search of better economic opportunities, in fear of conversion, and as and when their religious

identity overshadowed their caste identity (Bandyopadhyay and Basu Ray Chaudhury 2014). Though Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first president of Pakistan and the undisputed leader of the Pakistan Movement, and Jawaharlal Nehru (India's first prime minister) promised to safeguard the rights and interests of the religious minorities in their respective countries, violence continued and so did migration. Between 1946 and 1965, around 5 million Muslims left India for Pakistan, and approximately 9 million Hindus and Sikhs did the reverse trek (Roy 2018: 3). The migration pattern between West Pakistan and India was very different from that of East Pakistan and India. The governments of India and Pakistan jointly carried out the process of evacuating Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan's Punjab and Muslims from Indian Punjab. Consequently, there was almost a total transfer of population within a short span of time. But migration between East Pakistan and India, discouraged on paper by the concerned governments yet caused by routine communal clashes, bureaucratic apathy, and economic difficulties, continued for decades after partition. The communal violence and the mass migration of people destabilized the subcontinent in innumerable ways and made the process of nation-state building immensely difficult for both India and Pakistan.

Rehabilitating the millions of refugees was the first challenge that India and Pakistan faced. In Indian Punjab the task was relatively easy because of the availability of sufficient amount of properties left behind by the Muslim migrants (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 125–140). Punjab, however, was an exception as the total transfer of population had provided a "clean slate" to the policy makers here. West Bengal, on the other hand, had received 4.26 million of displaced people till 1962 (Chatterji 2007: 998) and did not have adequate land to accommodate them all. Consequently, thousands of refugees (particularly those who were low caste and were assumed to be used to hard manual work) were sent off from this province to the scarcely populated islands of Andaman and the forested terrain of Central India throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Known as the policy of "dispersal," it was supposed to serve three purposes –

(a) reducing the "demographic pressure" from West Bengal, (b) making the refugees "useful," and (c) reclaiming resources and wasteland in remote areas. The refugees were supposed to till the land, build roads, dig canals and wells, and work in industries to be set up by the government. One may mention here that the rationale behind this policy of sending "laborers" to sparsely populated areas and to reclaim wastelands was nothing new as we can trace colonial antecedents in this (Sen 2018a; Gidwani 1992). The dispersal scheme was hugely celebrated in the official discourse as it was seen as the ideal way of linking rehabilitation with the "developmental" needs of the Indian nation-state (Sen 2018b: 71–112).

"Development" was the buzzword of the early postcolonial India. The idea that India "needed" to "develop" had been prevalent since the British rule (Roy 2007: 107–111). But what constituted "development" in material terms and how to achieve it had no single answer. For instance, M. K. Gandhi's *swaraj* and Nehru's vision of modern India had very little in common (Mukherjee 2009). Nevertheless, by the time India had achieved independence, the dominant discourses around the meanings and modes of development had acquired certain common features. As identified by Benjamin Zachariah, in this discourse: claims to 'socialism' – or to some social concern for the poor and downtrodden – were obligatory.... Also invoked were 'science', technology and technical expertise as ways of achieving 'modern' social and economic goals.... To achieve these goals, a good deal of 'national discipline' was required, and the masses were to have to make some sacrifices in the short term, or in the 'transitional period'. And lastly, all solutions to social, economic or political problems had to conform to 'indigenous' values... (Zachariah 2016: 201). In a country ridden with communalism, the Nehruvian elite assumed that the emphasis on "development" could distract people from sectarian nationalism (Zachariah 2012). When Nehru described the big dams as the temples of modern India, he definitely indicated that the spirit of "development" could and should replace religious nationalism in India. This "developmentalist imagination" of Nehruvian time had two distinct components: an interventionist state which would steer the nation

on the way of development and an enthusiastic, disciplined, hardworking people eager to help the state in this developmental journey (Roy 2007: 105–132). Agitational politics and mass demonstrations – be it in the name of religion, language, region, or basic human needs – was seen as a deterrent to India's attempts to "develop." What was legitimate and celebrated form of popular politics to the Indian National Congress in the colonial period became "hooliganism" in the eyes of the national state (Chakrabarty 2007: 35–57).

The Curious Case of Pakistan and the Making of Bangladesh

Pakistan, when created in 1947, was "uniquely experimental" (van Schendel 2009: 107) for more than one reason. Imagined as a Muslim homeland, Pakistan – like Israel, which would be created in 1948 – was a political idea that was defined by religion (Devji 2013). The territorial shape that this idea took made Pakistan's case even more exceptional. It had two parts – East Pakistan and West Pakistan – separated by more than 1000 KMs of Indian land.

From the beginning it was not a smooth sailing for Pakistan. Though attempts were made toward an equitable distribution of assets and liabilities of the British Indian Empire between India and Pakistan (Sengupta 2014), in many ways, the former was the real heir of the colonial India. For instance, only around 80 of 1400 individuals, who manned the Indian Civil Service before 1947, opted to serve the Government of Pakistan (Cohen 2012: 41). Delhi – the capital of British India – became the capital of India as well. Major port cities, commercial centers, and administrative hubs like Bombay (Mumbai) and Calcutta (Kolkata) fell within India. Karachi – a provincial capital since the late 1930s – had to become the capital of Pakistan almost overnight. It did not have the necessary infrastructure to house the administration and the ruling elite of the country (Tan and Kudaisya 2000: 179–186). The condition of Dacca (Dhaka), the capital of East Pakistan, was perhaps worse. A sleepy town spreading across 7.8 miles[2], Dacca neither had a commercial bank nor a cantonment. Apart from a good university, a handful of small industries, and an urban heritage that dated back to the

Mughal era, Dacca had no resources that could distinguish her from other mufassil towns of Bengal (ibid: 165–172).

Pakistan did receive some of the most fertile raw material-producing regions. For instance, 75% of the world's jute-producing areas fell in East Pakistan, whereas West Pakistan was one of the top cotton-producing regions of the world (Begum 1950). But East Pakistan, at the time of partition, did not have a single jute mill and was almost entirely dependent on the Calcutta port for exporting her raw jute. On the other hand, out of more than 400 cotton mills of British India, only 11 fell within the borders of West Pakistan (ibid: 166). It was evident that both the wings of Pakistan needed immediate and rapid infrastructural development and industrialization for effective governance and to develop a self-sufficient national economy. However, in two decades that followed the creation of Pakistan, the development in the western wing outpaced that of the eastern wing largely because of the governmental policies. The government allocated less than 25% of its annual budget for East Pakistan, though it was more populous than the West; education and communication improved in the West far more rapidly than in the East; and the richest Pakistanis were all in West Pakistan (van Schendel 2009: 135–36). This uneven development, not surprisingly, became a reason for contestation between the two wings. But the fault lines between East and West Pakistan first became apparent around the question of national language.

For many Bengali Muslim intellectuals, Pakistan was an expression of their cultural autonomy. For long, they had complained that the Bengali Hindu writers had never tried to represent the Muslim world of Bengal, the language that Bengali Muslims spoke, their culture, and tradition. What went in the name of Bengali language and Bengali literature was the creation of the upper caste Bengali Hindus, where Muslims were either totally absent or were portrayed in negative ways. When the Pakistan Movement began to gain currency, Calcutta-based Bengali Muslim intellectuals formed the East Pakistan Renaissance Society to give this movement a literary and cultural connotation. Their aim was to develop a new Bengali literature for the future Pakistan, a literature that would not imitate the writing styles of the Hindu writers of Bengal. For many educated Bengali Muslims, their participation in the Pakistan Movement was shaped by the coupling of linguistic, regional, and religious identities. From the early days of East Pakistan, many of them became involved in various projects to "de-sansrikritize" Bengali (Shamsuddin 2001: 250–251). This passion, zeal, and enthusiasm of Bengali Muslim intellectuals, now mostly based in Dacca, received a jolt when in late November 1947, Urdu was proposed as the sole national language of Pakistan. Most of them vehemently opposed it. The students of the University of Dacca took out processions and staged demonstrations against this proposal and thus began the political mobilization around language in East Pakistan. In the coming years, the Language Movement escalated steadily. The ruling elite of Karachi/Islamabad and their allies in Dacca made every attempt to curb it by invoking Islam, by portraying Urdu as the only suitable language for the Muslims, and by blaming the "outsiders" (by which they meant India as well as the educated Hindu minorities of East Pakistan) for the agitations. But this complex clash of identities (linguistic/religious/regional) and the consequent production of "hyphenated citizens" (Pandey 1999) (like Bengali Muslims/Bihari Muslims) indicate how "clumsy, complicated and inherently incomplete" (Chakrabarty et al. 2007: 3) the transfer of power was in the Indian subcontinent. The tension between East and West finally culminated into a bloody civil war (known as *Muktijuddho* or the War of Liberation in the nationalist discourse of Bangladesh), and East Pakistan became Bangladesh, a sovereign nation-state in 1971 (Saikia 2004; Alamgir and D'Costa 2011; Bose 2012).

When troubles were brewing over linguistic, regional, and religious identities in East Pakistan, similar fissures were becoming apparent in the political life of West Pakistan as well. In the early years of Pakistan, the government, bureaucracy, and economy were dominated by the refugees (*Muhajirs*) – particularly those who had migrated from various urban centers of northern India. Many of them were highly educated and were proficient in Urdu. (*Muhajir* is a person who accompanied the Prophet Muhammad in his

emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622. The partition refugees from India to Pakistan were generally termed as *Muhajir* in official discourse as well as in common parlance.) They were most visible in the province of Sindh and the capital city Karachi, located in that province. The dominance of one particular group antagonized others, namely, the Punjabis (who had significantly high presence in the military), the Sindhis, and the Pathans. The tension between *Muhajirs* and these groups remained somewhat subdued till the late 1950s. But as Ayub Khan usurped power (he was made chief martial law administrator in 1958 and became the president in 1960), the rifts became apparent. One of the first things that he did was to shift the capital from *Muhajir*-dominated Karachi to Rawalpindi and then to the newly built city of Islamabad. This would be later translated as a calculated move to marginalize the *Muhajirs* in Pakistan's polity, economy, and society. To add to this, the constitution that Ayub introduced seemingly disenfranchised the *Muhajir* through electoral reforms and by the introduction of a complex reservation system (Rehman 1994: 120). The sense of "relative deprivation" among the *Muhajirs* (Haq 1995: 993) would culminate into violent clashes in Karachi and Hyderabad and the formation of "Muttahida Qaumi Movement" (MQM, initially it was called Muhajir Qaumi Movement) in the mid-1980s. In other words, decolonization with partition produced new minorities and new conflicts across the Indian subcontinent. Even after 70 years, as many of these conflicts remain unresolved, people and politics of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are rooted in "partitioned times" (Samaddar 2003: 21). Two examples will elaborate this point: the "problem" of the "Bihari Muslims" in Bangladesh and the ongoing Kashmir conflict.

The Incomplete Business of Partition and Decolonization in the Subcontinent: The Kashmir Issue and the Citizenship Question of the "Bihari Muslims"

Ruled by a Hindu king yet mostly populated by Muslim subjects, Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter mentioned as Kashmir) was one among some 550 princely states that existed within the British Indian Empire. The princely states shared a complex legal relationship with the British Crown. They were technically independent and enjoyed varied degrees of autonomy, yet they were under the British paramountcy. What would be the status of these states of various shapes and sizes in postcolonial South Asia became an important question in 1947. Despite some initial resistance, most of these kingdoms were coerced and cajoled by Vallabhbhai Patel (the first deputy prime minister of independent India) and V.P. Menon (secretary, Ministry of State, Government of India) to join India. As a result, India gained 500,000 miles^2 of territory which more than compensated the loss of 364,737 miles^2 due to partition and the creation of Pakistan (Kudaisya 2017: 47). The nawabs and the maharajas were allowed to retain their titles, privileges, and personal properties and were promised a hefty annual monetary allowance by the Government of India. Often described as a "bloodless revolution" in the nationalist histories written in India, the "integration" of the princely states is projected as a moment of glory for the Indian nation-state, when the subjects of these states became the right-bearing citizens of a democratic country. However, some recent historical writings on the modes of annexing the princely states of Hyderabad (Sherman 2007) and Junagadh (Ankit 2016) by the Indian government have challenged this nationalist discourse of non-violent and voluntary annexation. But more than Hyderabad and Junagadh, it is in Kashmir where this nationalist narrative of "bloodless revolution" gets spectacularly challenged till this day.

Hari Singh, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir, did not join either Pakistan or India as he cherished a dream of independent Kashmir. As a Hindu ruler, joining Pakistan was not appealing to him, and his bitter relations with the Indian National Congress made him wary of a future in India (Guha 2007: 59–64). Singh offered to sign a "standstill agreement" with India and Pakistan on August 14–15 (1947) to ensure that the transfer of power and the creation of India and Pakistan did not affect the economy of his territory. His dream, as one of his ministers noted in early October of 1947, was "to make Kashmir the Switzerland of

the East – a State that is completely neutral" (cited in Guha 2007: 64). By the end of that very month, however, it became clear that his dreams were not going to materialize anytime soon. A significant number of his subjects had different aspirations for Kashmir. The district of Poonch, situated in the west of Srinagar, witnessed a revolt against Hari Singh's regime and a strong demand in favor of merging with Pakistan. On the other hand, there was Sheikh Abdullah, the most prominent opposition of Hari Singh and a very close friend of Nehru, who had been demanding the end of princely rule in Kashmir and the establishment of a popular government which would "then decide whether the State should join India or Pakistan" (ibid: 63). The situation went out of Hari Singh's control when several thousands of armed Pathan tribesmen invaded the valley from the north. Several questions about this invasion do not have definite answers as the narratives that are spun in India and Pakistan widely differ from each other. For instance, it is not clear whether the Pathans came on their own or were they sent by the Pakistan government, whether they came as and when the news of Poonch reached them, or was it an invasion that was being planned independently. But they moved swiftly toward Srinagar forcing the king to flee to Jammu and also to seek help from India. India agreed to help but only after the *Maharaja* had signed the Instrument of Accession. But it was supposed to be a temporary accession, and the Indian government promised to hold a plebiscite to allow the common people of Kashmir to determine whether they wanted the valley to be a part of Pakistan, India, or none of the either. Moreover, by the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, Kashmir was given a special status where "the Indian Parliament's legislative powers in Kashmir were limited to the three areas specified during the state's accession, namely defence, foreign affairs and communication. In all other matters, the state was to be governed by its own constitution" (Kudaisya 2017: 54). The accession was followed by reorganization of the administration of Kashmir with Sheikh Abdullah becoming the head of the interim government and Hari Singh

becoming a constitutional head of the state. The accession also ensured the immediate presence of the Indian forces in the valley. As they fought the tribesmen and the local rebels, Pakistan also sent her forces to combat the Indian Army, and a full-fledged war was fought between the two countries. It ended with an UN-negotiated ceasefire, but by then 5100 miles^2 of territory had been "liberated" by Pakistan from the Indian forces.

Since 1948, Kashmir has remained the trouble spot of South Asia. Despite the insistence of Pakistan and the UN, India did not conduct the promised plebiscite. India and Pakistan have already fought three wars over Kashmir (1947–1948, 1965, and 1999), and armed border skirmishes are routine affairs in the valley. Because of the "security" issues and the "strategic" location of Kashmir (with borders with China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), the Indian Armed Forces are given extraordinary power with absolute impunity. They have been accused of gross human rights violation by the ordinary Kashmiris, the activists and social workers working in the valley, and the international press. Article 370, though irk the right-wing political parties of India, has provided no relief to the people of Kashmir on the face of the brutal military oppression. On the other hand, the valley has witnessed a steady rise of armed militant groups – a few of which adhere to Islamic extremism and many of them receive financial and other supports from Pakistan. Kashmir seems to be trapped in a never-ending circle of violence perpetuated by the Indian forces and the armed militants, each justifying the other's presence and actions. Kashmir remains in perpetual shadow of partition as "Kashmiris were a people who were 'bargained' into Indian/Pakistani nationhood when the British left the region" (Kaul 2010–2011: 43). In many ways the colonial rule has begun in this part of South Asia when the British rule ended in the subcontinent (ibid: 49). To borrow the words of Dipesh Chakrabarty, written in a different context, Kashmir "highlights the colonizing tendencies that an anti-colonial nationalism may also display as it mutates into official nationalism with the assumption of power by the nationalists" (Chakrabarty et al. 2007: 7).

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"Bihari Muslims," also termed as the "stranded Pakistanis," are those whose ancestors had fled from Bihar to Eastern Bengal (the region that would become East Pakistan) during the riots of 1946 or at the time of partition. They were mostly poor and less educated who worked as mechanic, shopkeepers, mill workers, etc. in East Pakistan. Many of them had also joined the railways. Known as *Muhajirs* during the Pakistan period, these Urdu-speaking Muslims had very little sympathy for the Bengali nationalist movement and assisted the Pakistan army and the Pakistani militia during the Liberation War. When Bangladesh became an independent nation-state, violence was unleashed on them. They were killed, their properties were looted, and many women of the community were raped. The camps opened by the Red Cross across the country became their refuge from the ongoing violence (Haider 2016: 429). From then on, they became the subjects of complex international negotiations. Through the International Committee of the Red Cross, as many as 534,792 "Bihari Muslims" asked for resettlement in Pakistan (Ghosh 2008: 169). In a tripartite discussion in New Delhi (August 28, 1973), Pakistan agreed to take a "substantial number of non-Bengalis (who are stated to have opted for repatriation to Pakistan) from Bangladesh" (Farzana 2009: 225). In an accompanying memorandum, Pakistan added that it was willing to take "all those individuals having a permanent residents in West Pakistan (people who may have gone over to East Pakistan temporarily), all employees of the federal government and their families, and a small number of hardship cases (meaning orphans, widows and others who had no immediate relatives in Bangladesh)" (ibid). Moreover, the members of the divided families, irrespective of their domiciles, would be accepted by the country. In another agreement between the three countries, the decisions were reiterated (April 1974). Despite these agreements, the successive governments in Pakistan have been reluctant to act upon it. The repatriation process virtually stopped since the mid-1990s. Apart from MQM, no other political party was enthusiastic about the coming of the "Bihari Muslims." According to a 2016 article, "a total of 178,069 Biharis legally returned to Pakistan out of 534,792 who opted for repatriation through the ICRC. An estimated 100,000 Biharis have moved to Pakistan illegally through India, Nepal, and Burma and approximately, 250,000–300,000 are still staying in Bangladesh. They live in 116 camps across the country" (Haider 2016: 430). The conditions of these camps are deplorable with no privacy for the residents, extremely poor sanitary provisions, inadequate health, and educational facilities (ibid: 432–437). The abovementioned study also showed that only 13% of his respondents still wanted to be repatriated to Pakistan. The rest of the respondents wanted an end to the woes of camp life and resettlement in Bangladesh (ibid: 438). Though according to the court rulings, "Bihari Muslims" are now entitled to Bangladeshi citizenship, they are still de facto stateless as most of them have no access to the rights and entitlements associated with Bangladeshi citizenship (ibid).

Decolonization of Sri Lanka and Burma

An island across the Palk Strait in the south of India, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) had a long history of encounter with the colonial powers. It had a Portuguese past that began in the early sixteenth century and lasted for more than 100 years. The Portuguese power was replaced by the Dutch East India Company, and by the end of the eighteenth century, the British replaced the Dutch. Ceylon remained a British colony till February 4, 1948. Sri Lanka's experiences with the British colonial rule and the process of decolonization were drastically different from that of British India. Sometimes described as a "model colony" (Kumarasingham 2016: 377), this island did not witness any widespread popular uprising against the colonial regime, it had significantly better standard of living, and all the adult inhabitants enjoyed voting rights since 1931. The transition from the colonial regime to the national government was smooth, and Sri Lanka became independent without getting involved in any serious conflict with its colonial masters. The colonial period and the moment of transition did not witness communal clashes either, though the

population of the island was not homogeneous in terms of religion or language. But in less than a decade, the island emerged as the site of intense ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese (mostly Buddhist and constituting the majority of the population) and the Tamils (the minority, mostly Hindus). The roots of this fissure between the Sinhalese and the Tamils could be traced back to the peculiarities of the colonial experiences of Sri Lanka.

The Donoughmore Commission that recommended universal adult suffrage for Sri Lanka in 1931 made no provision for separate electorate or reservations for the minorities of the country. Rather, the existing communal electorates were replaced with a 58-member legislature where only 8 were to be nominated by the governor to "speak for interests otherwise unrepresented" (Kumarasingham 2006: 346). Not surprisingly, this apparently radical electoral reform irked the minorities of the island. The Tamil elites, who had till then enjoyed prominence and some influence in the legislative assembly and within the Ceylon National Congress, were particularly threatened by this move. As Kumarasingham writes, "The new democratic structure thus extensively reduced the influence and numbers of Tamils in the Congress elite and in politics as a whole, removing them from the centre of political leadership. With all positions on the Board of Ministers in the first State Council 1931–36 occupied entirely by Sinhalese, the fears of the Tamil community seemed to be realised" (Ibid: 348). Consequently, Sri Lanka witnessed mushrooming of numerous political parties organized around religion, language, and ethnicity (Kumarasingham 2016: 384). The Soulbury Commission, which was formed by the British government to chalk out the modes of decolonization in Sri Lanka, also did not introduce any significant measure to ensure higher representation of the minorities in the legislature. Therefore, though an independent and democratic Ceylon was created in 1948, it lacked "the constitutional, institutional and social infrastructure" required to govern a multiethnic community (Kumarasingham 2006: 350).

Despite the palpable tension between various groups, most importantly between the Sinhalese

and the Tamils, the first few years after independence was peaceful for Sri Lanka. But the politics of the island would operate around narrow ethnonationalism was quite clear from the very beginning. For instance, the Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948) did not give citizenship rights to the "estate Tamils" (i.e., those who had migrated from India in the nineteenth century as plantation laborers), who formed 12% of the population of the island. But it was in 1956, with the passing of the controversial "Sinhala Only Act" (Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956), the tension between these two communities came on the surface. According to this Act, Sinhalese replaced English as the official language of Sri Lanka, and no such recognition was given to Tamil. This was a watershed moment for the Sri Lankan polity and triggered widespread protests from the Tamil community. When Prime Minister S.W.R.D Bandaranaike tried to amend this act to appease the Tamil protesters, he faced massive backlash from the Sinhalese. The stage for communal riots and civil wars between the two communities were set. The year of 1958 would witness the first major anti-Tamil riot in Sri Lanka, and from then on, the island would remain perpetually volatile. As James Manor has argued, the absence of any popular support of the Colombo-based ruling elite also made them play the sectarian card and prevented any serious attempt of reconciliation (Manor 1979: 21–46).

On the other hand, though Burma was a part of the British Indian Empire for a long time, today it is associated with the countries comprising the category of Southeast Asia. In that sense, the decolonization process of Burma is more intimately connected with the political scenario of these countries than those of South Asia. Therefore, a very brief account of the events leading to the decolonization of this country will be provided here. Burma became a separate entity from India with the passing of the Government of Burma Act in 1935. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Burmese nationalists tried to negotiate with the British for complete independence after the War in return for their support to the Allied powers. When they did not get any positive response, they looked to the East for a Japanese

assurance. Soon, Burma became the battleground between Britain and Japan, causing much distress to the common Burmese people. Japan held Burma from 1942 to 1945. The period of parliamentarianism (1937–1942) and "independence" under the Japanese can be viewed as "part of a single period in which unique circumstances allowed the Burmese to gain fluctuating degrees of independence and experiment with different models of government and political control" (Charney 2009: 46). British Army recaptured Burma in 1945. However, Britain was reluctant to grant independence. The celebrated leader, Aung San, "began a constitutional struggle, demanding the creation of an interim representative government with full powers over the affairs of the colony" (Ibid: 61). The election of a labor government in Britain, Aung San's assassination by political rivals, and growing discontent in Burma made certain that the British had to relinquish their colony. Finally, with the signing of the Anglo-Burmese Treaty on October 18, 1947, the Burma Independence Act was approved by the Parliament, and Burma became independent on January 4, 1948. Being a multiethnic region where the leaders of different communities had come together to form the Union of Burma only after ensuring autonomy in internal administration for the frontier regions (Panglong Agreement 1947), the idea of one nation was not a deep-rooted one in independent Burma among the various minority groups. From the beginning ethnic conflicts and insurgency problems were prevalent in this region (Kipgen 2011). The last phase of colonial Burma (1937–1947) witnessed the demise of the strong nationalist leaders which also proved disastrous for the independent nation-state, as in the absence of these leaders, "their lieutenants would lead Burma headlong into one of the world's longest civil wars" (Charney: 71).

Decolonizing the French Indian Empire and the Portuguese Indian Empire

Since the middle of the seventeenth century, French East India Company attempted to gain foothold in the Indian subcontinent. Like their British counterpart, their initial interest was limited to commercial activities. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, French territorial interests in this part of the world became significant, and clashes with the British East India Company became inevitable. The series of Anglo-French wars fought in the southern and eastern India stunted the French ambitions. But the French Government managed to retain five enclaves till the 1950s – namely, Chandernagore (now Chandannagar in West Bengal), Pondicherry (Puducherry), Karikal and Yanam in Coromandel Coast, and Mahe in Malabar Coast.

With the end of the British Indian Empire, questions were raised about the future of the French Indian enclaves. On June 9, 1948, an agreement was signed between the Governments of India and France for holding a referendum to decide the future of these territories. A plebiscite followed, and the response was overwhelmingly in favor of merger with India. However, it is interesting to note that 38% adults of Chandernagore chose to abstain. Unlike Chandernagore, no plebiscite was held in other four enclaves. Lawlessness and petty violence were the reasons cited by the Indian government against holding a popular referendum (Namakkal 2017). Instead of that, the elected representatives of French India met on October 18, 1954, to vote in favor or against the proposed merger with India. The decision of this vote was in India's favor, and from November that year, these territories were under the de facto rule of the Indian government. The nationalist historiography has presented the merger of French territories with India as an inevitable act. The recent scholarship, however, has shown that despite being scattered and surrounded by the Indian territories, there were no unanimous demands for merger with India from the inhabitants of these enclaves. Several other possibilities were imagined and articulated including autonomy within the French Union and independence from both India and France. Between 1947 and 1954, there were 7 years of uncertainties and possibilities in these four enclaves. The setback of French power in

Indochina and the changing contours of internal politics of these enclaves finally led to the merger (Yechury 2015). As the French power withdrew from the subcontinent, the inhabitants of the erstwhile French colonies were given the option to retain the French citizenship. Since the Indian Constitution does not have the provision for dual citizenship, one could only become either French or Indian. In the erstwhile French territories of southern India, many opted for French citizenship that ensured numerous welfare benefits offered by the French Government (Miles 1992).

Portuguese India, encompassing almost 1500 miles^2 of territory, outlived the British and the French empires in the subcontinent. Portuguese presence in the peninsular India can be dated back to 1498. But it was Alfonso de Albuquerque who established the real foundation of Portuguese power by taking over Goa from the Sultan of Bijapur in 1510. Within another 50 years, Portuguese control extended to Diu and Daman. Portuguese control in these territories remained for little less than four centuries. After 14 years of diplomatic negotiations, followed by a reluctant yet controversial military intervention (Singhal 1962), the postcolonial Indian State managed to establish its control over these territories in December 1961.

Similar to that of the French Indian territories, for the residents of Portuguese India, merger was not the only possible option. Some people opposed merger and preferred an autonomous Goa under the Portuguese rule. There were also those who wanted independence from both Portugal and India. Nonetheless, the pro-merger voices were the most audible ones from the mid-1940s. Depending on their political and ideological orientations, they chose between Gandhian *satyagraha* and revolutionary methods to liberate Goa. The Portuguese Government was not yet ready to let the possessions go and tried to mobilize the international opinion against India, who allegedly was supporting this movement. The Nehru Government, on the other hand, was hesitant to engage militarily against Portugal – a NATO member. But failed diplomatic missions and mounting pressure from various political parties within and outside Portuguese India pushed for a military intervention.

Once the Portuguese power withdrew from Goa, Daman, and Diu, the neighboring states made claims over these territories citing linguistic affinity and territorial contiguity. While Maharashtra demanded Goa, pointing out the significant presence of Marathi-speaking population there, Gujarat laid a claim on Daman and Diu. Such claims were contested by invoking their unique Portuguese past and by citing the large presence of Konkani-speaking people. Goa, in 1987, was declared as the 25th state within India, and Daman-Diu is recognized as a separate union territory within India (for an overview of the political developments in Goa between 1960s and 1980s see Rubinoff 1992).

Concluding Remarks

The above discussion provided an overview of the process of decolonization in South Asia. As it indicated, decolonization here was not an event, rather a "long drawn out process of political transition" (Bandyopadhyay 2016: 2) that began in the colonial period itself through the negotiations between the indigenous elite and the ruling elite, and its ramifications continue to affect the polities of several South Asian countries. Therefore it is important to remember that contrary to the visions of Gandhi or Fanon, the actual moment of the transfer of power did not mean a moment of rupture for the South Asian societal and political structures. There were certain obvious continuities in terms of institutions and people. In postcolonial Sri Lanka, for instance, the Soulbury Constitution provided the legal framework for governance. In the Indian case, the Government of India Act 1935 provided the basis of the constitution to a large extent. The structure of the civil service of British India was retained intact in the successor states after August 14–15, 1947. The transfer of power did not mean a new set of bureaucrats or new faces in police. The same men were there, only now they were serving a new government. They were often accused of treating the citizens as subjects – with the same

brutality and disdain that they were notorious for during the colonial rule (Kamal 2007: 210–217; Das 2001: 7–8). Some of the British men also opted to remain in service under the national governments. The presence of men like Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy of colonial India who became the first governor general of India, and Lord Soulbury, who was a minister in colonial Ceylon and became the governor general of independent Sri Lanka (1949–1954), was also a symbol of continuity between the colonial and the postcolonial regimes (Kamtekar 1999: 50). Despite certain obvious elements of continuity, to many people who experienced the formal transfer of power, it was a moment of rupture. A few historical studies have meticulously detailed the celebrations and festivities that took place across the Indian subcontinent on August 14–15, 1947 (Bandyopadhyay 2012; Kudaisya 2017: 1–8; Guha 2007: 3–11). In some instances, it was orchestrated "from above" by the local political elites. But people did not necessarily follow the script, giving the celebrations spontaneity. Of course, it was not a "common experience" (Chatterjee 2004: 12). People understood, experienced, and narrated the moment differently. For many, who became a minority or a refugee, it was a moment of mourning, yet a new beginning.

That the transfer of power could provide a space for new beginnings inspired the ruling elites, the policy makers, the scientists, the historians, and the literary minds in taking up fresh projects, formulating policies, and in planning new collaborations. For instance, Romila Thapar, perhaps the most important historian of ancient India, took up the responsibility of writing history textbook for school children as to her it was a "national cause." In her words, ". . .the notion of a national cause was very strong. My generation had been imprinted with the nationalism of the forties and early fifties. Its essential characteristic was the sense of enthusiasm that we were involved in the building of a nation and could therefore move away from conventions to some degree so as to encourage the implanting of new ideas. It was from this perspective that I agreed to write a textbook. . ." (Thapar 2009: 88). The rationale for such a project was clear: "We were

distancing our history from that written under imperial auspices - the writing of historians such as Vincent Smith, Edward John Thompson, Geoffrey Garratt and Hugh Rawlinson, or even their Indian counterparts" (ibid: 89). Thus, decolonization – in the radical sense – seemed possible and desirable at this moment. The transfer of power from colonial to a national government had made this moment possible. Decolonization in South Asia coincided with the beginning of the Cold War. As the global political order became bipolar, a wider Third World Network – neither aligned to the United States nor to Soviet Union – was conceived advocating mutual cooperation, end of colonial rule, noninterference, and nonaggression. Known as Non-Aligned Movement, it witnessed positive response from the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. India played a leading role and Sri Lanka participated from the beginning. The formation of a Third World Network and the hope that it would play a crucial role in maintaining world peace was made possible only because the transfer of power was perceived as a break which had radical possibilities. More evidence can be put together to argue that decolonization was a moment of rupture or the reverse – i.e., a process ensuring continuity. Both these perspectives are true, and as has recently been argued, "decolonization in South Asia . . . was a complex and diverse process of continuity and change, fraught with multiple alternative possibilities" (Bandyopadhyay 2016: 19).

Cross-References

▶ Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)

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Deconstructionism

▶ Spivak, Gayatri C. (b. 1942)

De-humanization of Roma/Gypsies

▶ Racialization: Racial Oppression of Roma

Democracy

▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

Democracy Assistance

▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

Democracy Promotion

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Democratization

Denationalisation

Denmark

Dependence

Dependency

Development

Dichotomy

Discrimination Against Gypsy/Roma

Disease and Cultural

Disjunctive Ecological Exchange

Displacement

Dispossession

D

Dollar Diplomacy

Dollar Diplomacy: Roosevelt to Taft 1890–1913

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Synonyms

Capital export; Dollar diplomacy; Imperialism; Informal imperialism; Theodore Roosevelt; US foreign policy; William Howard Taft

Definition

This essay explores what is known as the 'dollar diplomacy' of the United States between the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. Dollar diplomacy was a US foreign policy designed to further US economic interests in South America and East Asia by means of loans made to countries therein, as opposed to the use of military force. By the 1890s, at the forefront of those pushing for an aggressive American policy abroad were various industrial leaders who feared that the US would soon produce more than it could consume. New dependent states could provide markets for these surplus goods, while also securing the supply of raw materials necessary to burgeoning US industry. In 1912,

President William Howard Taft claimed that his administration 'sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse' and that such 'policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets'. Taft's remarks gave formal definition to the term 'dollar diplomacy', a phrase synonymous with the diplomacy his administration pursued between 1909 and 1913. Dollar diplomacy would serve diplomatic means in turning the US into a commercial and financial world power. The export of capital to provide economic stimulus was revived through the Washington Consensus and again by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1980s and 1990s.

By the 1890s, many US leaders had begun to have new attitudes toward imperialistic adventures abroad. The reasons for this were numerous. At the forefront of those pushing for an aggressive American policy abroad were various industrial leaders who feared that the US would soon produce more than it could ever consume. New dependent states could prove to be markets for these goods. Some in business also perceived that in the future, industries would need raw materials that could simply not be found in America (e.g. rubber and petroleum products). In the future, the US would need dependent states to provide these materials. After experiencing a series of economic downturns in the 1870s and 1880s, the US economy had endured enough by the panic of 1893. Soon, business and political leaders needed to look no further than their own industrial over-production for the cause of their economic ills.

In 1912, President William Howard Taft claimed that his administration 'sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse' and that such 'policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets'. Taft's remarks gave formal definition to the term 'dollar diplomacy', a phrase synonymous with the diplomacy his administration pursued between 1909 and 1913. Dollar diplomacy would serve diplomatic means in turning the US into a commercial and financial world power. Ever the lawyer, Taft surrounded himself with like-minded corporate lawyers and the bankers and businessmen who were their clients. The object of foreign policy

became concentrated on assisting US businessmen in the protection and expansion of investment and trade, especially in Latin America and the Far East. Such efforts would raise significant dilemmas regarding the division of public and private responsibilities (Rosenberg 2003, p. 3).

In *The New Empire* (1963), Walter LaFeber argues that America's 'expansionist' policies were a direct result of the maturation of industrialisation. Business and the capitalist economy needed new markets and this meant foreign ones. They would be backed up by a new navy and military power that would easily take away Spain's former colonies in 1898 (and influence most of the Western Hemisphere). LaFeber also incorporates early labour and immigration policies into his argument. He highlights that Secretary of State Seward (1861–69) advocated importing 'cheap labour' and created the 1868 treaty with China to bring in 'unskilled' workers. This was, LaFeber argues, part of his plan for US expansion or imperialism. A central point of his work is that policymakers (mostly presidents, secretaries of state, and businessmen) feared class unrest at home (as strikes and violence reached unprecedented levels in the later decades of the 1800s). Expansion abroad would quell this by unifying the nation and providing jobs both in the Navy and in revitalised industry. The expansion of US economic and militaristic might clearly held implications not only abroad, but at home.

In the first three decades of the twentieth century the US would emerge as a major economic power. US investment bankers would come to play an important role in international lending. During this time, those nations that were deemed stable and had already been incorporated into the world financial system were able to attract capital investment through US private bank loans. Those which were considered unstable, and thus unattractive investment opportunities, became the locations where dollar diplomacy would flourish. These nations would be given loans on condition that they would be under the US government's direct financial supervision in what is best understood as a receivership. Such practice involved the co-operation of three groups: private bankers, financial experts,

and government officials. The process began with private bankers considering which of the 'risky' nations they would lend to, followed by the financial experts who would bear the task of fiscal reorganisation and administrative management of the borrowing country. Finally, government officials would be responsible for orchestrating the entire deal under the guise of furthering global economic integration and strategic alliances for both US national and international interests.

The Open-Door Policy

The basic strategy of the 'open-door' policy, as developed by Charles A. Conant and Paul S. Reinsch, was an alternative to war through developing a worldwide system of investment, rather than one that was globally segmented. It was intended to offer shares in world development rather than spheres of influence closed off by annexationist empires. Its doses of 'insular imperialism' allowed for more emphasis on investment in exercising expansion as opposed to the older territorial forms of imperialism. Reinsch, in particular, saw how investing would require new political relations between the investing and host societies (Sklar 1988, p. 84). This would be the primary method by which the US would begin its expansion into the Pacific, developing island stepping-stones to the major market areas. The modification was not outright colonialism, but its effects could be just as damaging. Historian Martin J. Sklar provides a detailed description of his conception of the basis for globalism and the theory behind establishing the Bretton Woods institutions (81–82).

America's entry into the Spanish-American War and later annexation of territories such as Hawaii, Wake, Guam, and the Philippines was not a reflection of the Manifest Destiny credo, nor the venting of a 'psychic crisis'. In *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, historian Richard Hofstadter expresses US imperialism in the forms of 'destiny and duty', suggesting that 'annexation of the Philippines in particular and expansion generally was inevitable and

irresistible' (1965, pp. 174–185). These new territories were specific targets for the implementation of coaling and cable systems and naval stations that would integrate a trade route which could facilitate America's primary reason for entering the Pacific: to penetrate and eventually dominate the fabled China market (McCormick 1963, p. 156). It also marked a significant turn for US capitalism, which up to that point had been primarily focused on territorial expansion within North America. Such expansion was the result of a westward push to seize what had been Native American land and later nearly half of the Mexican territories at the end of the US–Mexican War (1846–48).

In 'The Economic Basis of Imperialism', Conant held that advanced nations had maximised their investment in production to what was considered profitably manageable. They now faced a 'superabundance of loanable capital' with rapidly diminishing rates of return. Eventually, Conant explained, restless capital would need to turn 'to countries which had not felt the pulse of modern progress' to find profitable rates of interest. Conant claimed it was 'only a matter of detail' whether the US took possession of other lands, established quasi-independent protectorates, or developed a strong naval and diplomatic strategy as the promotional avenue for investment in uncolonised areas. Regardless, the endgame was the restoration of profits and prosperity to the imperial nation while simultaneously spreading productive enterprise to areas receiving US capital (Rosenberg 2003, pp. 15–16).

Ingrained in Conant's theory was a belief that both over-production and declining profits could be identified as the forces driving imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Both J.A. Hobson (1938) and V.I. Lenin (1939) would follow in developing similar theories. Yet, unlike Conant, these later theories had more to say about the adverse social conditions that would follow as a result of such practices. Since the late nineteenth century, Hobson and Lenin had recognised that colonial annexation in the era was a qualitatively new era of capitalism: the monopoly or imperialist stage. Hobson, in particular, argued that the emergence of widespread monopoly forms

would eventually lead to under-consumption (or over-saving), growing foreign investment, and imperialist expansion. Both theorists held imperialism accountable for the formation, development, and expansion of the world market, one built on a competitive search and annexation of colonies as a means of extracting surplus and bringing natural resources back to the imperial acumen. According to Lenin, since the fifteenth century, the world capitalist system had been created and consolidated on a foundational practice that divided the core capitalist powers from peripheral economies. The process permitted the regimes in the developed metropolis to exploit under-developed colonies in the global South by extracting profit, payment, or tribute through a system of unequal exchange where capitalist monopolies controlled and dominated international trade and investment. To assist in the process, a ruling class in the periphery functioned as intermediaries by maintaining an interest in the corresponding patterns of production. As a result, Conant believed that prosperity and profits in the advanced nations would ripple out into moral uplift where all would benefit. Such an economic interpretation is viewed as a celebration of both capitalism and imperialism (Rosenberg 2003, p. 16).

By 1900, opposition to colonialism grew to be so formidable that policymakers had to assume that force was no longer an option for the US when acquiring new territory. Still, such a policy was not conducive to US interests. During the first 5 years of the twentieth century, the Roosevelt Administration developed clear and expansive policies that sanctioned the creation of dependencies but not colonies. New justifications, such as spreading civilisation and securing a favourable economic and geopolitical position, were now the rationales for dollar diplomacy. The aim was to establish a level of control that did not require outright colonial possession (32).

The transition here is a significant one in understanding the changes occurring in the practices of colonialism itself. Harry Magdoff has contributed greatly to our understanding of formal control and direct colonialism or settlement. He argues the importance of considering imperialism

as a necessary means of reshaping the social and economic institutions of many of the dependent countries to the needs of metropolitan centres. In the case of the global South, and the US need for it, there is an intended exchange of capital accumulation for economic stimulus. After capitalist reshaping of local institutions has taken effect, economic forces (the international price, marketing, and financial systems) develop into adequate means of dominance and exploitation by the imperial centre. Reshaping allowed for political independence without making any essential changes or altering the initial conditions for conquest. Such reshaping can be another means of understanding the transition for an older imperialism to what is now referred to as 'new imperialism'. We could surmise colonialism as merely a phase in the process. However, the primary distinction involves the development of two historical factors: (1) the loss of British hegemony and a global competition for territorial influence by advanced capitalist states; (2) the rise of monopolistic corporations in becoming the dominant actors in all the advanced capitalist states (Magdoff 2003, p. 17). Similarly, Lenin emphasised that imperialism did not necessitate formal control. Lenin said as much in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* when describing British imperialism in the nineteenth century: 'The division of the world into … colony-owning countries on the one hand and colonies on the other' did not discount the core–periphery relations between nation states (Lenin 1939/1916, p. 85). Lenin went on to claim that there was no distinction between dependent countries and those which were 'officially' politically independent.

Western observers have often treated the global South's 'under-development' or economic crisis, that was frequently the pitch for securing dollar diplomacy as an original historic condition. It would be as if prosperity has never touched certain regions of the world due to their barren, infertile land or their unproductive people. In *The Political Economy of Growth,* Paul Baran analysed the role of imperialism in reinforcing the economic under-development of those countries considered to be in the Third-World

periphery. He questioned the common practice of assuming all in those poorer peripheral economies had always been relatively backward. He questioned the lack of capitalist development in the periphery, unlike those core regions of advanced capitalist nation states. In addition, he explored the reasons why forward movement in the periphery had either been slow or altogether absent (Baran 1957, p. 136). In his analysis, Baran provided evidence that showed how European conquest and plundering of the rest of the globe had generated the great divide between the core and the periphery of the capitalist world economy that persists today. The analysis provided was clear: incorporation on an unequal basis into the periphery of the capitalist world economy was itself the cause of the plight of underdeveloped countries. This was the 'development of underdevelopment'. Baran concluded that imperialism was inseparable from capitalism. Its central underpinnings were to be found in the mode of accumulation operating in the advanced capitalist world. An international division of labour had evolved which geared production and trade of the poor countries in the periphery significantly more toward the needs of the rich countries in the centre or core of the system than toward the needs of their own populations (Foster 2002).

Roosevelt's Corollary En Route to Dollar Diplomacy

In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to Congress, which stated that the US had the right to intervene in any country in the Western Hemisphere that did things 'harmful to the United States'. Along these same lines, the corollary also stipulated that the US would intervene in Latin America when nations in the region acted improperly. This was essentially a declaration that the US had cast itself as the 'police officer' in the region. 'Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship', Roosevelt said. 'Chronic wrongdoing, however … may force the United States to exercise an international police power'. This was particularly true in the case of the

Dominican Republic, which had repeated failed to repay loans to both Italy and France. Instead, by implementing the Roosevelt Corollary, the US intervened and seized control of Dominican customs collections and took responsibility for distributing the funds to repay both European nations.

During Roosevelt's term, the US used the threat of military power to bring about its foreign-policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean. US marines were often deployed to Central America. While the foreign-policy approach of Taft's presidency is referred to as 'dollar diplomacy', Roosevelt's has been referred to as 'gunboat diplomacy'. The Roosevelt Corollary strengthened US control over Latin America, and justified numerous US interventions in Latin American affairs in the twentieth century. As Roosevelt's successor, President Taft was not as aggressive in foreign policy and favoured 'dollars over bullets', stating that US investment abroad would ensure stability and good relations with nations abroad. Dollar diplomacy should be regarded as the process by which US capitalism became deeply rooted in the political economy of the global South.

Unlike Roosevelt, Taft saw a more significant role for US business to play in foreign policy. Having been long concerned with foreign trade, he recognised an over-abundance of produced goods in the US and an overwhelming need to increase exports. It was by no mere coincidence that in 1910, under the Taft Administration, the US began to export more manufactured goods than raw materials. Herein, the focus of trade changed from industrial nations in need of raw materials to less developed countries that required finished products. Accordingly, those developing areas of Latin America and East Asia were vital in discovering new economic opportunities that provided many benefits. The shift in policy, according to Taft, would provide the solution to the over-production problem plaguing the US economy. In addition, the change would benefit recipient nations, allowing for economic progress and eventually political stability. Such stability would allow for economic development of US interests in these under-developed areas. In his

first annual message at the end of 1909, Taft clearly indicated that the mission of 'American capital' was to seek 'investment in foreign countries' so that 'American products' could more readily seek 'foreign markets'.

To fill his cabinet, Taft wanted lawyers, which is why Philander C. Knox was an ideal candidate for secretary of state. Knox was a wealthy conservative lawyer and former US attorney general and senator from Pennsylvania. He had been what is now known as a corporation lawyer, the Carnegie Steel Corporation being one of his clients. He was thus sympathetic to big business. Knox also shared Taft's position that the protection and expansion of economic interests should be the focus of foreign policy. In doing so, the State Department would begin to support US financiers and businessmen by finding opportunities abroad. Certainly, the introduction and development of dollar diplomacy is significant because it was contrary to normal lending practices. However, its political and economic significance lie in the creation of 'controlled loans' as the vehicles of social reconstruction originally envisioned by Conant.

Fertile Soil: Latin America

In Latin America, where objectives of dollar diplomacy included deterring European intervention and maintaining regional stability, the Taft Administration's approach represented an extension of both the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. Together Taft and Knox viewed Latin America as a region ripe with opportunity for US interests to expand, while offering a jumpstart to what they considered to be an under-developed economy. Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Cuba, and Nicaragua were but a few of the states in the region targeted by Taft's dollar diplomacy.

In China, where the US was a relative newcomer in terms of serious economic engagement, the goals of dollar diplomacy did not stretch far beyond the creation of a safe environment for US banking capital and surplus production. Since the Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary

did not apply to the Far East, the Taft Administration relied on the open-door policy crafted in 1899, in which the US decreed that all nations should have equal trading rights in China, as the basis for its dollar diplomacy there.

As president, Taft sought to extend what Roosevelt had established with his Corollary in securing the US position around the Caribbean. Rather than removing European influence from the region, as the Roosevelt policy had done, Taft and Knox sought to control the finances of the Caribbean countries. The means of doing this was by taking over custom houses as the Roosevelt Administration had done in the Dominican Republic. According to the Taft-Knox doctrine, it was important to get the Caribbean nations to repay European debts by means of loans from US businessmen or at least from multinational groups in which Americans participated. Concerned by the general instability of the Central American governments, Taft and Knox set a goal of stable governments and prevention of financial collapse. Fiscal intervention would make military intervention unnecessary. As Knox told an audience at the University of Pennsylvania on 15 June 1910: 'True stability is best established not by military, but by economic and social forces ... . The problem of good government is inextricably interwoven with that of economic prosperity and sound finance; financial stability contributes perhaps more than any other one factor to political stability' (Rosenberg 2003, p. 63).

Such statements did not mean that Taft and Knox were unwilling to use military power in the Caribbean. They did use it. They thought that fiscal control would lessen the need for intervention. They believed that the US and nations of the Caribbean would both benefit. For the US, an increase in trade, more profitable investments, and a secure Panama Canal would result. For the local inhabitants, the benefits would be peace, prosperity, and improved social conditions.

The flow of foreign capital to Latin America has been massive. Even more than resources or markets, capital comes in search of cheap, easily exploitable labour. Commodities, produced with Latin America's most precious resource (its labour), are destined for export to countries with well-developed markets which make selling at high prices easier. What results is a familiar enough story in under-developed countries. Dominated by foreign capital, they perpetually produce what they do not consume and consume what they do not produce.

Nicaragua

By 1909, relations between the US and Nicaragua had soured, largely due to the embittered reaction of Nicaraguan president José Santos Zelaya to the US building a canal in Panama rather than Nicaragua. Relations worsened as Zelaya accumulated European debt, was increasing hostile toward his country's Central American neighbours, and made repeated threats to end the US–Nicaragua concession, a US-owned mining property.

In October 1909, the US supported a faction of rebel nationalists in a revolt against Zelaya. Taft, aligned with opposition leader Juan Estrada, sent US gunboats and other military forces to Nicaragua to assist in removing Zelaya from power. As Zelaya's successor, Estrada formed a provisional government in 1910 after securing a loan from the US for the stabilisation and rehabilitation of the Nicaraguan economy. In January 1911, the US formally recognised the Estrada Government. However, after a turbulent start, Estrada stepped down after only 6 months in office. His replacement, Adolfo Diaz, signed a financial agreement called the Knox-Castrillo Convention, which in essence was a dollar-diplomacy package tailored for Nicaragua.

Under the new agreement, the US would provide a $15 million bank loan to pay off Nicaragua's European debts. For their part, the US government would gain control of the Nicaraguan customs house to ensure loan payments, and would have the right to intervene in Nicaragua to maintain order when necessary. Additionally, Nicaragua would allow US banks to control the National Bank of Nicaragua and the government-owned railway. Praising the treaty, Taft said it was 'of inestimable benefit to the prosperity, commerce, and peace of the Republic' (Maurer 2013, p. 108).

At home, the Knox-Castrillo Convention faced stiff opposition, particularly in the Senate where it failed to win approval due to growing concern about its interventionist aspects. The reaction among Nicaraguans was equally hostile, resulting in a revolt against Díaz in June 1912. Taft responded to the crisis by sending several warships and a contingent of 2,700 marines to restore order and protect US interests. In the end, the Knox-Castrillo Convention was never ratified. Instead, it was replaced by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, a watered-down version that lacked the interventionist powers of its predecessor. The new agreement was signed by both nations in 1914, when Taft was no longer president. In addition, as a result of revolt and the need to protect American interests, a US military presence would remain in Nicaragua until 1933.

Cuba

Of those nations that were ripe for dollar diplomacy, Cuba was probably the most fertile. After failing to achieve sovereignty at the end of its campaign for national independence ended in 1898, Cuba was first ruled by a provisional US military government and then became a protectorate of the US, as stated by the Platt Amendment to the 1902 Cuban Constitution. Such US influence was expected to ensure the creation of strong institutions and an underlying prosperous attitude, but neither materialised. Instead, the island nation was victimised by a wave of unrestricted foreign capital.

Foreign capital was an attractive short-term solution to finance the costs of reconstruction. It also promised to get the economy off the ground after 30 years of disruption. Employment, tax revenues, and exports were expected to soar. People would have money to spend and the government would obtain the necessary resources to finance projects of reconstruction. These promises were sufficient for the Cuban government to open the doors of the island to US money. The sugar industry became the main beneficiary of foreign investment, so much so that the national economy became almost entirely dependent upon its exports. In 1909, the year in which Taft was inaugurated and dollar diplomacy was made official, the total amount of US investments (not just sugar) in Cuba was $141 million. In 1924, US investment totals were nine times that of the previous figure, nearing $1.25 billion, of which $750 million, or 60%, were invested directly in the sugar industry.

During the dollar-diplomacy era, with the resurgence of sugar production, companies sought and purchased plots of land previously owned by local families in order to create large, profitable land-holdings. It wasn't long before large numbers of peasants were unemployed as families lost ownership of land which had always been their most basic source of security. Foreign investment forced a shift in the state of affairs in two separate yet dependent areas. First, the infusion of foreign investment as a means to resuscitate sugar production allowed for it to become the focus of the Cuban economy. Second, the social structure was vastly changed with the transition in land ownership from mediumsized family-owned plots to large landholdings owned by foreign capitalist corporations.

In the dollar-diplomacy era, however, capitalist forces prompted a change. Because companies were constantly on the lookout for cheap labour to cultivate and harvest their immense landholdings, jobs became insecure and temporary. Seasonal workers had to leave the household during both the dry and the wet seasons in order to obtain a salary. Men were roaming the fields or the city streets for most of the year, which meant that a stable family life was no longer possible. For rural Cuba, this was a new state of affairs that furthered poverty and fuelled unrest. Jobs offered by US companies attracted record amounts of immigration and caused the breakdown of the traditional family structure. This allowed for a shift in the agricultural market in Cuba from one that was community-based, subsistence, and small-scale farming to one where large portions of land were owned by a single entity. The new system was wage-based and demanded large numbers of workers to maximise productivity.

The change in land ownership also reconfigured the system of labour to one that was wage-based and more conducive to capitalist enterprise. The new system also attracted record amounts of immigration from Haiti, Jamaica, and Spain, which caused rising populations on the island never seen before. The overcrowding also adversely affected the labour market as wages decreased with the rising demand for jobs. Due to the lack of sustainable employment, more men were forced off the plantations and into the cities to find work. This caused an increase in impoverished female-headed households and a significant drop in consensual unions. What the influx of foreign direct investment failed to account for was the stabilising societal power that the traditional family nucleus had provided. What was intended to increase the potential of becoming a prosperous nation had resulted in the destruction of the traditional family culture and an increase in the struggle to sustain a living (Smith 1966; Timoneda 2008).

Imperial Legacy

Imperialism is often explained primarily as an outcome of economic expansionism. This is certainly the case in Latin America, where, for example, in the cases of United Fruit in Guatemala and International Telephone and Telegraph in Chile, political and military initiatives were undertaken largely to support the interests of particular corporations and to create the political climate for the expansion of US economic interests as a whole (Harvey 2003, p. 49). However, in the development of neo-liberal capitalist imperialism there has also been the drive to maximise profits by lowering labour costs. The global South has offered numerous opportunities to discover new sources of cheap labour. Repeatedly, the arm of the US state has assisted corporate needs through enhanced government policies designed to lower the cost of labour by any means. This has allowed businesses to take advantage of the massive global over-supply of labour. In his own analysis, Stephen Hymer focused on the enormous 'latent surpluspopulation' or reserve army of labour in

both the backward areas of the developed economies and in the under-developed countries, 'which could be broken down to form a constantly flowing surplus population to work at the bottom of the ladder'. Like Marx, Hymer equated the 'accumulation of capital' with an 'increase of the proletariat'. Herein, the Third World provided a vast 'external reserve army' that would supplement the 'internal reserve army' that already existed within the developed capitalist countries. Accordng to Foster and McChesney (2012), this would serve as 'the real material basis on which multinational capital was able to internationalise production', by maintaining a steady stream of 'surplus population into the labour force' (150). It was Hymer's contention that this would eventually weaken labour globally through a process of 'divide and rule' (Hymer 1979, pp. 262–269).

Early in the twentieth century, when the US began to emerge as a global power, the central question concerning architects of US foreign policy was not whether the US should be a global power, but rather how the US should best go about becoming one. Between 1909 and 1913, President Taft's answer to that question was dollar diplomacy, a series of policy initiatives that attempted to broaden the scope of US economic and political influence around the world through financial measures such as bank loans to developing nations. When those measures alone proved insufficient, dollar diplomacy relied on more traditional foreign-policy practices, such as military intervention, to achieve its objectives.

In the end, dollar diplomacy created more havoc then it originally intended to prevent. The question for the US has never been whether or not it should become a global force, but rather how it should become one. Taft's implementation of dollar diplomacy from 1909–13 was yet another attempt to extend the borders of influence under US control. The exchange of capital accumulation for economic stimulus (the force driving dollar diplomacy) was later reinstated through the Washington Consensus and again by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1980s and 1990s. The imperialist nature of the US state is driven by the ever

expanding nature of capitalist political economy and has been marked by more than a century of continuous military and economic intervention abroad.

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Dollar Hegemony

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Introduction

"Dollar hegemony" is a loosely defined phrase, usually referred to historically determined contexts in which the US dollar is adopted as the main international reserve instrument, unit of account, and means of payment. Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century, it has been used to describe a number of different situations, namely some regional contexts in the Atlantic area in the 1920s and 1930s, the non-Communist world between 1945 and 1989, and the entire global economy afterwards. While originally used almost exclusively in the journalistic jargon in continental Europe, the phrase has progressively "gained currency" with broader audiences, globalizing in both a linguistic and a social sense.

As will be discussed in the sections below, if "hegemony" were measured only in numbers, it would seem fair to claim that the dollar enjoyed a hegemonic condition in progressively larger geographical contexts starting from the 1920s and that it is keeping it today: despite a slight tendency toward decline in the dollar's international use in the second decade of the twenty-first century, at the end of 2018 the US currency still represented around 62% of international official reserves, with its closest competitor, the Euro, around 20% (IMF 2019). But to describe an international monetary situation in terms of a currency's "hegemony" – or, more broadly, as the monetary aspect of a country's "hegemony" – implies more than numbers: it implies establishing a relationship between the position of that currency and a set of special advantages accruing to the political economy of the country that issues it, both in terms of "prestige, seigniorage, balance of payments flexibility, and policy autonomy" and in terms of "capital and

exchange-rate gains [and] long-term commercial, financial and political gains" (Norrlof 2014: 1043). It also implies understanding the international position of that currency as a product of the power of the country that issues it, as well as an instrument for the perpetuation of that same power, in keeping with the common core of all the interpretations of the "H-word" itself since ancient Greece (Anderson 2017). Finally, it implies an understanding of the origins of such privileges and power theoretically distinct – at least in the abstract – from what is communicated by alternative expressions such as "dollar diplomacy" on one extreme and "dollar imperialism" on the other.

As a consequence, the attribution of "hegemonic" features to the position and function of the dollar has never been fully consensual in any of the three broad contexts mentioned above: if anything, no President of the USA has ever referred to "dollar hegemony" in public, even though a former chairman of the US Federal Reserve has recently accepted, at least in principle, that the dollar's international position does confer to it a special "privilege" (Bernanke 2016).

In her contribution to this encyclopedia, economist Ramaa Vasudevan provides readers with an excellent synthesis of how the international position of the dollar since 1945 has contributed and contributes to US power, while also allowing the US political economy to enjoy special advantages unavailable to others: of why, in other words, such a position can be seen as configuring "dollar hegemony" (Vasudevan 2019). In this entry, I take a different approach, moving from words to meanings in the attempt to show how the notion of "dollar hegemony" has evolved over time, what specific situations it has been applied to, and what political and intellectual messages were attached to its use – or to eschewing its use – in different historical and geographical contexts.

Genesis

When in his 1912 annual message to the Congress then-US President William Taft claimed that "the diplomacy of the present administration has

sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse [by] substituting dollars for bullets," the press was quick to coin the expression "dollar diplomacy" to characterize the link that was being established between the promotion of the US currency abroad and US foreign policy (Rosenberg 1999). As numerous countries in Central America and the Caribbean soon came to realize, US foreign policy in the 1910s never really succeeded in doing away with bullets. If anything, Marxist-Leninist critics would not easily distinguish "dollar diplomacy" from outright "imperialism" (Bukharin 2003). But as to the diffusion of the use of the dollar abroad, US policy was definitely successful. It can be said that the concept of "dollar hegemony" – if not the phrase itself – began to take shape in this connection.

The "roaring twenties" saw the dollar consolidate its position in the Americas. Thanks to the so-called "Dawes plan," aimed at reigniting Germany's payments of war reparations, the US currency also made indents in the European heartland (Kindleberger 1973; Eichengreen and Flandreau 2008; Tooze 2014). It is difficult to provide a definitive birth date for "dollar hegemony," but the phrase likely made its first circumstantial appearances in this context, namely in daily newspapers in France and Italy. By the end of the decade, French reporters from various newspapers not only described the Antilles as an "American Mediterranean," where the "hegemony of the American dollar [*hégémonie du dollar*] blew in the sea-breeze" (*"Méditerranée"* 1928), but also reported on Berlin's growing anger at "dollar hegemony" ("L'Allemagne" 1928). They also took comfort in the observation that "in spite of the certainties that they derive from the dollar's hegemony, the natives of Hollywood have not been able yet to produce in series a Bach, a Mozart, a Chopin [...]" ("Le cinéma" 1930). Shortly afterwards, the phrase appeared on the Italian *Corriere della Sera* – usually conservative and then (since 1925) firmly under the control of the Fascist regime: in commenting the hectic meetings of bankers that took place in the aftermath of the suspension of the British pound's convertibility into gold in September 1931, a correspondent explained that it was widely believed

that "the devaluation of the sterling [...] would establish once and for all the hegemony of the dollar [*egemonia del dollaro*] and would move the financial center of the world from London to New York" ("Riunione" 1931). In short, "dollar hegemony" initially carried a rather undefined meaning but also a vaguely pejorative connotation, in line with the use of "hegemony" in commentaries of international politics since the late nineteenth century (Anderson 2017).

The expression does not seem to have circulated much outside France and Italy. In particular, US political and financial elites framed their actions and intentions in different terms: as noted by Anderson, in English, "hegemony" traditionally maintained an even greater derogatory connotation than in other European languages, which made it unacceptable both to the British that were ostensibly the declining "hegemons" of the time and to the Americans who were emerging as the most likely candidates to replace them. In American parlance, "good neighborhood" was the official policy toward Latin America after the 1930s (even though it might have implied that the USA had been a rather bad neighbor until then), and then Henry Luce's "American century" soon emerged besides more sober talk of "American leadership" to designate the USA's role as the main world power during and after World War Two (Luce 1999). To the extent that commentators wanted to highlight the specific role of the dollar in US foreign policy, "dollar diplomacy" remained by far the most popular expression. In turn, Communist newspapers in the Soviet Union and Western Europe used a different language: throughout the 1920s, "dollar diplomacy" in the Caribbean and the "Dawes plan" were but manifestations of "dollar imperialism" [*imperializm dollara*] for Moscow's *Pravda* ("Po inostrannym" 1926) or even of the "super-imperialism of the dollar" [*super-impérialisme du dollar*] according to the French *L'Humanité* ("Plan Dawes" 1925).

Whatever bankers believed, the events of 1931 did not mark the smooth transition of the epicenter of global finance from London to New York, but rather the beginning of the dissolution of the world's economic order and a step towards the creation of the economic-military blocs of World

War Two. Interestingly enough, newspaper and journal archival databases indicate that "dollar imperialism" disappeared from *Pravda*'s vocabulary from 1930 to 1948 – a period corresponding more or less to the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington DC – while "dollar hegemony" came to be used interchangeably with "dollar imperialism" in at least two of the Axis countries ("Amari" 1942; Haraguchi 1942).

Bretton Woods

With the end of World War Two in sight, in the summer of 1944, the international monetary conference of Bretton Woods established a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, guarded by newly created multilateral institutions – the IMF and World Bank – and rotating around the dollar, whose value was fixed against gold at the parity of 35$/oz. In her essay for this encyclopedia, Ramaa Vasudevan characterizes the Bretton Woods system as the "launching pad" for "dollar hegemony" (Vasudevan 2019). As will be seen below, such characterization of Bretton Woods has become rather common since the 1970s, in the context of a broader tendency to use the term "hegemony" – if with diversified nuances – to describe the overall condition of the USA in the aftermath of World War Two, and particularly in reference to Western Europe in the years of the Marshall Plan. But during the first 15 years of Bretton Woods' existence, few observers referred to the USA as a "hegemon," and even fewer hinted at "dollar hegemony."

As US-Soviet relations deteriorated, critics of US power in the Soviet Union and in the Communist parties elsewhere quickly recovered the language of "imperialism" to describe US foreign policy in general, and that of "dollar imperialism" when they wanted to highlight the peculiar capitalist nature of US foreign economic relations. Alexei Leontiev's (1949) highly militant pamphlet, *Imperializm Dollara v Zapadnoi Evrope* [Dollar Imperialism in Western Europe], epitomized this tendency. The booklet oscillated between two extremes: attacking the Marshall Plan both for entailing the penetration of the dollar

in Western Europe and for not providing enough dollars to the Western European economies. And yet, whatever the actual reason for attacking the Marshall Plan, the booklet was straightforward in judging it a quintessential "imperialist" operation, aimed at replicating in Western Europe the "dollar servitude" [*dollarovoi kabali*] already prevailing in Latin America. Where plans of "world hegemony" [*mirovaya gegemoniya*] were attributed to US policymakers, "hegemony" was clearly a mere synonym for "domination" [*gospodtsva*] that appeared in the same passage (Leontiev 1949: 80, 86–87). Coherently, no entries for "dollar hegemony" are recorded on the French and Italian communist dailies for the years up to the 1960s.

On the other hand, supporters of US power likely considered the talk of "US hegemony" and "dollar hegemony" politically incorrect for the opposite reason, as it attributed too negative connotations to the country and the currency that now "led" what loved to call itself "free world" – even though substantial portions of it were actually colonies and autocracies of various types. The phrases "US hegemony" and "American hegemony" did recur occasionally in the Western European non-Communist press (though not in the USA) during the late 1940s and 1950s, but Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (Morgenthau 1948) and other international relations textbooks carefully eschewed it.

Of course, that the promotion of the use of the dollar abroad was not only about trade was clear to anybody who wanted to see. In March 1947, in a *New York Times* article published only a few days after the proclamation of the so-called "Truman doctrine," the renowned Princeton economist Jacob Viner reflected on the virtues and limits of "the use of disposable financial resources as an instrument of diplomacy, conciliatory or coercive": while expressing his support for Truman's "dollar diplomacy," the economist admitted that it was difficult in certain situations involving areas of "weak sovereignty" to distinguish such practice from outright "dollar imperialism" ("In defense" 1947). As far as Western Europe was concerned, given the prevalent association of "hegemony" with a pejorative meaning – if not one as pejorative as "imperialism" – it must have seemed

particularly impolite in certain contexts to dub "hegemonic" the same currency that Western European governments were so desperately begging for. Only scant exceptions can be found: for instance, the Italian conservative *La Stampa* on one occasion assured its readers that "Communism was not a threat in Latin America" because of the "hegemony of the dollar" prevailing there ("Il comunismo" 1950). At any rate, the French bourgeois press, once so bold in making irony about "dollar hegemony," now more soberly called US policies a "means to alleviate our dollar shortage" [*moyen pour pallier notre pénurie de dollars*] or simply "*le plan Marshall*" ("Un S.O. S." 1947).

The situation changed quite dramatically during the 1960s when, as for Molière's Monsieur Jourdain, commentators from many quarters suddenly realized they had coexisted with "dollar hegemony" for almost two decades without knowing it. The dollar's centrality in Bretton Woods came under increasing criticism as the monetary order suffered from the so-called "Triffin dilemma" (from the US-Belgian economist Robert Triffin who theorized it in 1960): in order to provide the system with liquidity, the USA had to run persistent deficits in its balance-of-payments, but these in turn caused weakening confidence in the dollar itself (Triffin 1960). In that context, in September 1960, *Le Monde* was quick to register that "in several quarters the end of dollar hegemony would not be met with anger" ("Une dévaluation" 1960). But in the years that followed no official dollar devaluation occurred – the price of gold remaining fixed at 35$/oz throughout the decade – and a *de facto* overvalued dollar increasingly allowed the US political economy to reap the benefits of *seigniorage* and pass onto others the inflationary effects of US domestic policies and military expenditures (Eichengreen 2010).

In that context, in Paris, the criticism of the dollar's position soon radicalized, leading Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing to famously denounce the "exorbitant privilege" of the dollar, and President de Gaulle to demand, in 1965, the actual conversion into gold of the dollars accumulated by the Banque de France. The instability of Bretton Woods under the strain of the growing

deficits in the US balance of payments, and the increased criticism of the US government's alleged indifference to the problem, led to the quick spreading of the talk of "dollar hegemony" beyond its traditional linguistic boundaries, even though a review of the press commentaries of the 1960s leaves the reader somewhat unsure as to what precisely was happening to the dollar: while in 1963 a Spanish journal reported about "the end of dollar hegemony" [*el fin de la hegemonía del dólar*] ("El fin" 1963), in Mexico, 8 years later, a daily newspaper explained that the Franc had lost so much value after the 1968 protests as to cause the disappearance of "de Gaulle's weapon to threaten the dollar's hegemony" [*el arma degaullista para amenazar la hegemonía del dolar*] ("Francia" 1971). Similarly, in 1966, the Austrian journal *Berichte und Informationen* wrote about a "battered dollar hegemony" [*Angeschlagene Dollar-Hegemonie*] ("Die Angeschlagene" 1966), but in 1970, the *Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung* was of the opinion that the French government could no longer afford to "attack the dollar's hegemony" ("Unter Pompidou" 1970). In London, the *Times* took a somewhat intermediate position when it explained that, after all, "the extent of the American – or the dollar – hegemony was always more circumscribed than showed on the surface" ("From Marshall" 1968).

Also the Communist world(s) participated in the globalization of "dollar hegemony" (here intended as a phrase, of course). The escalation of the US war in Vietnam (which dollar *seigniorage* actually financed) and de Gaulle's dramatic criticism of the dollar gave the chance to *l'Unità*, the Italian Communist' Party house organ, to make its first use of the phrase, when it polemically invited Italy's "anti-gaullists" to show that their "opposition to authoritarianism did not work only to protect the dollar's hegemony, but also against the barbarian methods of the American imperialist authorities" ("La politica" 1965). In the context of the emerging US-Soviet Détente, scholarly volumes in the Soviet Union began to debate the state and prospects of "*gegemoniya dollara*" (Borisov 1963), and the debate intensified as Soviet economists grappled with novelties such as the EEC's designs for a

single currency (Cutler 1982). Of course, in these instances, "dollar hegemony" was still mainly interpreted within an "imperialist" framework, but an implicit – if possibly unwitting – analytical differentiation might also have been at work in the distinction that was being drawn, between the "hegemonic" role of the US economic influence in Western Europe and its purely terroristic methods in Vietnam and the Third World. Be it as it may, a similar distinction does not seem to be applicable to the Chinese case: condemnation of "hegemony" and "hegemonism" became a regular feature in international commentaries during the 1960s, but in a context in which *bàquán* was an extremely derogatory term with virtually no distance from "imperialism" (Anderson 2017).

Most importantly, with Bretton Woods in crisis, 40 years after its European conception, "dollar hegemony" finally entered the political parlance of the country that supposedly was most concerned with it. But this occurred with an ironic twist. What unified all talk of "dollar hegemony" outside the USA during the 1960s was that the phrase was used to refer to the Bretton Woods system: to the extent that increasingly perplexed and outraged trading partners were left with few alternatives to the accumulation of inflated dollars, "dollar hegemony" was being revealed, even though this was precisely what jeopardized it. On the contrary, when "dollar hegemony" entered the US lexicon, this was only to deny its existence and to voice the US establishment's opinion that it would be "unwise," at least as far as public discourse was concerned (Rockefeller 1968: 193).

Dollar Standard, 1971–1989

There is reason to believe that by the late 1960s, US elites were quite conscious that their position in international monetary affairs had indeed something to do with "hegemony." In early 1969, President Richard Nixon created an interagency group on international monetary policy, which took the name of "Volcker Group" (from the name of then undersecretary of the Treasury Paul Volcker, who coordinated it). In its report, submitted to the

President in June of the same year, the group wrote that:

> [US objectives are] the retention of substantial flexibility for the US both in terms of domestic economic policy and foreign spending (including military and aid outlays) [...]; the encouragement of the free flow of goods, services and investment internationally [...]; politically, a substantial element of US control [...]. However, in the interest of facilitating international harmony, the appearance of US hegemony should not be sought. [T]his tends to point to the desirability of working in a context of multilateral cooperation and consultation, so long as this does not [...] frustrate needed change" (Volcker Group 1969: 12–13).

After 2 years of unfruitful negotiations – and increased US "benign neglect" of its balance of payments – on August 15, 1971, President Nixon unilaterally announced that the US Treasury would "suspend" its commitment to redeem gold for dollars and allowed the dollar to float on monetary markets (Eichengreen 2010). Various interim agreements and multilateral negotiations to revive Bretton Woods would punctuate the 1970s, but *de facto* that was the beginning of the period, that lasts to these days, when the world would run on a pure dollar standard. Ramaa Vasudevan indicates Nixon's decision as a passage towards "the consolidation of dollar hegemony" (Vasudevan 2019). And if one follows the logic of the "Basic options" paper cited above, such judgment is indeed consequential. But again, not everyone would have agreed with it at the time.

If "hegemony" meant a quasi-unilateral imposition, one should not be surprised to find that the post-1971 dollar standard was condemned by many as a flagrant imposition of "dollar hegemony." For example, when in March 1972, the Finance ministers of the European Community met to evaluate a set of proposals for monetary cooperation, the *Corriere della Sera* told its readers that the envisaged measures would "bring an end to the dollar's hegemony" ("La lunga" 1972). Similarly, in 1973, then French Foreign minister Michel Jobert publicly invoked increased European monetary cooperation "in order to defend ourselves from the hegemony of the dollar" (Jobert 1973). Others accepted that the *de facto* pure dollar standard in place after 1971 was "dollar hegemony"

but could not believe such situation could last in the future: when the expression entered the official record of the *New York Times* in October 1971, it was to report the opinion of US bankers who claimed it was "unrealistic" to expect the European countries to accept "an inconvertible dollar standard, with its overtones of dollar hegemony" ("National" 1971). In protest with Nixon's decision, economist Fred C. Bergsten even resigned from his position in the National Security Council and wrote that "such dollar hegemony is politically, and therefore economically, impossible [...]" (Bergsten 1975: 40).

But if "hegemony" required an undisputed hierarchical relationship, then the end of Bretton Woods likely meant the end of "dollar hegemony" or at least a severe weakening of it: only days after the closing of the gold window, the Soviet *Pravda* was firm in the judgment that the "undisputed [*besrazdelnaia*] hegemony of the dollar ha[d] been thoroughly undermined" ("Protivorechija" 1971). Political scientists David Calleo and Benjamin Rowland made a not-so-different point when they wrote that the post-war had configured a condition where "nuclear hegemony in NATO ha[d] matched dollar hegemony in the IMF," but defeat in Vietnam and the end of the dollar's convertibility into gold had now opened a new phase, where "US hegemony" in general was simply anachronistic (Calleo and Rowland 1973: 87).

Different understandings of "hegemony" led to different conclusions about the actual existence and possible prospects of "dollar hegemony," but all participants in this multilanguage discussion agreed on one basic point: whatever the degree of legitimacy of the dollar's role under Bretton Woods, in August 1971 that had been lost. Indeed, while he personally disliked the term "hegemony," which he consciously never used, in 1973, economic historian Charles Kindleberger gave the keynote for what successive generations of political scientists would call "hegemonic stability theory," and made the case that, by unilaterally ending Bretton Woods, the USA had virtually renounced its "leadership" position (Kindleberger 1973).

Such judgment was only reinforced in the next few years, when the dollar's post-1971 devaluation contributed to the oil-producing countries'

decision to abruptly quadruple the price of oil (Garavini 2019). The "oil shock" provoked large deficits in the balance of payments of all oil-importing countries, thus compounding the legitimacy crisis of the US currency and challenging US power more generally. According to economist Benjamin Cohen, "the political and economic conditions that made dollar hegemony acceptable-or tolerable-in the early postwar years currently no longer exist. [. . .] Establishment of a new and formal dollar hegemony would inevitably be regarded [...] as illegitimate and exploitative" (Cohen 1977: 233).

Nevertheless, the events of 1971–1973 did not bring the international use of the dollar to an end: as explained by Barry Eichengreen, "there was no shift away from the dollar. Volatility there was in the share of dollars in foreign exchange reserves in the 1970s, but no secular decline. The dollar's share of total identified international reserves remained close to 80 percent in 1977" (Eichengreen 2010: 63). The key for this surprising development was soon identified in OPEC countries' decision to keep oil priced and sold in dollars – which required all oil importers to possess dollars in the first place. Many of the contemporary explanations for the process of creation and circulation of "petrodollars" were largely based on conjecture and ideology, simply assuming that "unfettered markets" were determining outcomes, without ever questioning their own assumptions: in a coherent "neoliberal" perspective, there was of course room only for economic choices that were freely and rationally operated by utility-maximizing individuals, whatever the contrary evidence (Spiro 1999). However, for those who were not convinced that states had simply disappeared from the map of international monetary affairs, the objective permanence of the dollar as the world's main international currency allowed renewed reflections on "dollar hegemony," particularly after the second amendment to the IMF's articles of agreement in 1978 virtually ratified Nixon's *fait accompli*. No sooner had the ink dried on the IMF's amended charter – with its fig-leaf appeal to member states to "assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates" – than the US Federal Reserve impressed a radical u-turn to its "weak dollar" policy by raising interest rates to unprecedented levels in what passed down onto history as the 1979 "Volcker shock" (again from Paul Volcker, now the chairman of the Fed): the move led to 5 years of "strong dollar" policy, squarely placed finance at the heart of the US economy and reverberated globally through the transmission wires of the dollar standard, draining capital from all corners of the world through what the then German Chancellor reportedly called "the highest interest rates since Jesus Christ." As by-products, the Fed's turn supported the military-technological relaunching of the superpower of the Reagan years, destabilized Western European macroeconomic performance, and precipitated a devastating "debt crisis" in much of the Third World and Eastern Europe (Arrighi 2010).

In what seemed an extremely unstable context, but also one with few visible alternatives, reflections on the notion of "hegemony" itself became more nuanced. Recovering some of Antonio Gramsci's reflections from the *Prison Notebooks*, the Italian sociologist Giovanni Arrighi made the case that "US hegemony" after World War Two had determined an "imperial order" whose main products were the "unity of the world market and the transnational expansion of capital," obtained with the collaboration of the dominant classes in subordinate countries: under multiple challenges, during the 1970s, the USA had shed the "formal aspects of hegemony" (the Bretton Woods multilateral arrangement) but had successfully kept – at least for the time being – these "substantive aspects of hegemony" (Arrighi 1982). Owing more or less directly to Gramsci, during the 1980s, a growing number of authors began to represent Bretton Woods as the apex of "US hegemony" for the US elites' capacity to rule the system with means other than pure coercion: but if that had been true for Bretton Woods, what was left "after hegemony" was either a regime that somehow spontaneously survived on its own legs (Keohane 1984) or a renewed hierarchy were US "dominance" was much less tolerated by its subordinates (Cox 1981).

Those who did not consider "hegemony" much dependent on legitimacy, or even equated it with

outright exploitation, had fewer problems concluding that the 1970s were the dollar's "hegemonic" decade by definition. "The current monetary crisis was preceded by the imposition of the hegemony of the dollar by the United States," declared Cuba's *comandante en jefe* Fidel Castro, in his capacity as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (Castro 1980), while *Le Monde* argued that the launching of European Monetary System in 1979 represented "a first response to the formidable disorders created by the hegemony of the dollar" ("Points" 1981). Nor would similar comments disappear after 1985, when the dollar took another u-turn, this time downwards as the Reagan administration began to push US exports ("Il n'y a pas" 1987; "Egemonia" 1987): the central role played by the US currency in world affairs forced all other actors – short of closing their trade and capital markets unilaterally – to adapt their policies to Washington's preferences.

Dollar Standard, 1989–?

Iconically represented by the ruins of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the years between 1989 and 1991 were marked by the collapse of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe and then by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. For some enthusiastic commentators who had previously interacted with the debate on "US hegemony," "hegemony" itself was no longer an issue, since the USA was again simply "bound to lead": to the extent that "power" did support US global preeminence, this was to be intended mainly as "soft power," or the capacity to "attract" others into the USA's own preferences (Nye 1991). Charles Kindleberger now spoke of a recovered "primacy" for the USA, whose currency was widely adopted for international purposes as a simple reflection of the size and vitality of the US economy, which made unproblematic even the structural deficit that was now a regular feature of its trade account (Kindleberger 1996). Be it as it may, in the early 1990s, talk of "dollar hegemony" receded in official circles in the USA: when it was mentioned, it was only to claim

complacently that "the dollar's hegemony of world finance and trade remain[ed] largely unchallenged" (O'Brien 1994: 84).

Things, however, looked differently from other perspectives, including in Europe, where the "dollar's gyrations" [*giravolte del dollaro*] produced unexpected and often unwanted consequences (De Cecco 2003: 21). Indeed, those thinkers that had adapted the Gramscian use of "hegemony" to international relations consolidated their conviction that after the 1970s, "US hegemony" – in general and in the monetary field in particular – had been replaced by a long phase of "hegemonic crisis" or, better, US "dominance without hegemony," sustained not so much by US attractiveness, as by the USA's huge military apparatus, part of whose costs were financed by the USA's creditors, who exported goods and commodities in the USA and received pieces of paper in exchange (Arrighi 1994; Arrighi and Silver 1999). Indeed "US dominance" and "dollar dominance" – located somewhere between the Gramscian notion of hegemony and the old Leninist notion of imperialism – turned out to be successful phrases to refer to the status of the USA and its currency in international affairs in critical, but not simplistic terms (Gowan and Stokes 2012). Otherwise, "dollar hegemony" was always available in its non-Gramscian understanding: in 1998, with East Asian currencies falling like dominoes against the dollar and only months before a dramatic devaluation of the national currency, the Brazilian *Folha de Saõ Paulo* introduced the phrase "*hegemonia do dólar*" to its readership, explaining, contextually, that "money is power" [*dinheiro é poder*] ("Bom artigo" 1998).

An attempt at bridging the gap between alternative understandings of "dollar hegemony" – and of "hegemony" more broadly – was David Spiro's carefully researched work on "petrodollar recycling" in the 1970s: far from relying on supposedly impersonal "market mechanisms," Spiro showed that the US government had actively operated so as to ensure that Saudi Arabia deposit its oil revenues with the US Treasury and with US-based banks, thus objectively violating to its own advantage the rules of cooperation it had established with the other oil-importing countries. To the

extent that such process had implied the maintenance of the dollar at the heart of the monetary order, one could still speak of "hegemony" after the end of Bretton Woods, provided that the adjective "exploitative" be added to it (Spiro 1999).

As had already occurred in the past, talk of "dollar hegemony" intensified when the dollar's position came to be seen as less secure, at least in perspective. The birth of the Euro – sometimes vaguely presented as a competitor to the dollar by European official circles – reignited the debate as early as 1999 (Portes and Rey 1999: 49). Chinese authors began to show particular interest in the subject of "*meyiuan baquan*" (Chin et al. 2015). But it was after the Bush Jr. administration's deliberate aggression to Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 that the phrase received its true consecration as a recognized tag in the global jargon of international politics. As a keyword search on popular online search engines easily shows, mentions of "dollar hegemony" appear in hundreds if not thousands of books after 2003.

While in many cases recent works elaborate on past interpretations, a new trend consisted in linking US military operations in the Middle East (from "Desert Storm" to "Iraqi Freedom" and beyond) directly to the need to preserve "dollar hegemony" – or in some versions "petro-dollar hegemony": owing somewhat to Spiro's research cited above, economist Henry C.K. Liu defined "dollar hegemony" as a phenomenon "created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars" (Liu 2001). From this perspective, Iraq's announcement in 2001 to price and sell its oil in Euros threatened to undermine "dollar hegemony" and what some authors now called an "oil-dollar standard," and should thus be seen as the main reason for the US invasion 2 years later (Clarke 2005; Patnaik 2009; Gokay 2019). To be sure, alternative explanations for the Iraq war have also been also offered, where "petrodollars" were not as crucial (Muttitt 2011). But whatever the "true" motives behind it, the war itself – much like the Vietnam war to which it has often been compared – not only proved a political fiasco but also a drain on US resources, readily

financed with lax monetary and fiscal policy, that is by what some would call "dollar hegemony." Or, in David Calleo's words:

> So long as America has its hegemonic position, the money it needs will flow to it. In other words, American hegemony includes the ability to summon cheap and ready credit from the rest of the world. That credit allows the U.S. to pay for the guns and butter that sustain its hegemonic lifestyle (Calleo 2009).

However, the greater the perception that the USA abused the "exorbitant privilege" of the dollar, the greater the attacks to the dollar's position itself, often in the form of harsh denunciations of "dollar hegemony." While the financial crash of 2008 and ensuing "great recession" called for new criticism from many quarters, the deterioration of US-Russian relations in the second decade of the twenty-first century went along with a particularly steep increase of the number of attacks to, or skepticism about "dollar hegemony" by Russian authors (Perechod and Perechod 2016; Khalina 2019). Understandably, real and potential Chinese divestment from the dollar is usually indicated as a cause of concern for "dollar hegemony." In some of the more recent writings, as was already the case in the past, the "end of dollar hegemony" is presented as near. Other authors are not as sure: in what is possibly the most detailed study of the subject so far, political scientist Carla Norrlof concluded that:

> the evaluation of the relative monetary capabilities of all countries in the world (i.e. their share of GDP, world trade and capital markets) as well as other variables relevant for assessing the potential for currency influence, such as military power and financial openness [...] shows that pessimism about the durability of dollar hegemony is built on faulty premises (Norrlof 2014: 1065–66).

Of course, whatever the forecasts, the fact that talk of "dollar hegemony" now occurs globally, and that it occurs in such terms, brings us back to where we started: if not a synonym of outright "dollar imperialism," "dollar hegemony" carries today a pejorative connotation that indicates a less-than-fully consensual adoption of the US currency for international purposes and hints at the power plays involved in keeping things as they are, as well as in changing them.

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Dollar Standard

▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt

Dollar Standard and Imperialism

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Definition

The dollar's role as internationally accepted money is the outcome of the historical evolution of the United States as the financial center of the global economy and the dominant imperialist power. This chapter explores the implications of the dollar's international role for the working of imperialism. It traces the history of the emergence and evolution of the dollar standard after the Second World War and discusses some of the different analytical approaches to understanding the pivotal role of the international dollar standard in the mechanisms of contemporary imperialism.

Capital exports played a key role in Lenin's analysis of imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century. In a curious breach of Lenin's formulation, the dominant imperialist power in the contemporary global economy, the US, is a major

importer of capital. The growing debt of the US is, however, not a reflection of a decline in imperialist hegemony but rather of its strength. The puzzle of an imperialist country that holds the bulk of the global balance of payments deficits can be explained by the privileged position of the dollar globally as the dominant key currency. The dollar is the main currency used to denominate and settle international transactions. The fact that the rest of the globe uses dollars for its international dealings places the US in a unique position to exercise an 'exorbitant privilege' over the rest of the world. The US can finance its external debt and deficits by issuing its own monetary liabilities, thus enjoying an elastic credit line that is not available to most other countries.

Dominance in the international financial system has allowed the US an easy access to global savings and has given rise to the growing global imbalances that emerged in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The emergence and persistence of global imbalances is a reflection of the international hegemony of the dollar and the central role that the US has come to play in sustaining global demand. In 2007, when the subprime market was unwinding, the dollar entered on one side of about 88% of all foreign exchange transactions, while its closest competitor, the euro, entered on one side of 36% of foreign exchange transactions. At the same time about 61% of foreign exchange reserves were held in dollars, while the euro share of foreign exchange reserves was about 26% in 2007.

The crisis triggered by the collapse of the subprime market in the US brought the hegemonic role of the dollar into sharp focus. Far from setting off a run on the dollar, the complete seizure of financial markets, after the fall of Lehman in 2008, precipitated a global flight to the dollar safe haven. There was a surge in the global demand for US treasury bills and the US Federal Reserve had to extend dollar swap lines to overseas central banks that sought dollar liquidity. The crisis reflected the contradictions of an international monetary system hinged on the dollar standard (Vasudevan 2009a). The key question is whether it also presages the end of the dominance

of the dollar or the decline of the US imperial power.

This chapter explores the implications of the dollar's international role for the working of imperialism. Drawing on Vasudevan (2008), it traces the history of the emergence and evolution of the dollar standard after the Second World War and discusses some of the different analytical approaches to understanding the pivotal role of the international dollar standard in the mechanisms of contemporary imperialism.

The Historical Evolution of the Dollar Standard

The International Gold Standard that prevailed before the First World War hinged around the dominance of Britain and the pound sterling in the international financial system. Britain emerged after the Second World War with its dominant international position significantly eroded. The US, on the other held substantial reserves of gold and was now the leading creditor in the international arena. The world capitalist economy, in the wake of two world wars confronted the emergence of a new balance of forces globally. This changing balance of power paved the way for the establishment of the dollar standard.

The Bretton Woods System and the Launch of Dollar Hegemony

The establishment of an international dollar standard required that the critical problem of a global dollar shortage be solved. In particular, the urgent need was to find means of financing the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan (Eichengreen 1996).

The Bretton Woods negotiations reflected the tensions of forging a new international monetary order under the hegemony of the dollar. Keynes's Plan for an International Clearing Union sought to ease the credit restraints facing deficit countries through the aegis of a supranational authority

that extended the principle of banking to the international sphere, while transcending the narrow political constraints of a system based on the fiduciary issue of a hegemonic country (Keynes 1980). But the actual outcome of the negotiations cemented the dominance of the US and established a de facto dollar standard. The Bretton Woods arrangements involved fixing the dollar's price with respect to gold, while all other currencies were pegged to the dollar.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had initially been conceived by Keynes and White as an institutional mechanism to enable member countries to overcome temporary liquidity problems and balance-of-payments crises, played only a marginal role in the immediate post-war transition; in large part because of its limited resources, US resistance to any increase in IMF quotas, and the increasing stringency of the conditions for drawing on IMF funds. Even when special drawing rights (SDRs) were created as an alternative source of liquidity in 1969, the stringent provisions for drawing and repaying SDR loans meant that SDR arrangements played only a limited role and did not undermine the dollar's international role.

Instead of depending on the mechanisms of the IMF, the US government launched the Marshal and Dodge Plans for the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan, as the means by which the dollar shortage would be alleviated. The US state was also trying to ensure that closer integration with the US economy would circumvent the possibility that these countries would shut out US capital. After the lapse of the Marshal and Dodge Plans, the US began a programme of military and economic aid. These mechanisms of offsetting capital flows enforced the asymmetric dependence of the international monetary system on the dollar for expanding liquidity, and helped solidify the role of the dollar as an international reserve currency. Thus, recipients of Marshal aid could not turn to the IMF for additional funds.

The desirability of dollar-denominated capital flows would fuel the resort to private foreign capital flows to meet the dollar gap, and sections of the US regime actively promoted the expansion of private dollar investment as an alternative to official channels when faced by the problem of international liquidity (Helleiner 1994).

Establishing the international role of the dollar required, in addition, pre-empting any possibility that Britain would reassert the dominant role of pound sterling. The terms of the Anglo-American Loan negotiated after the end of the war targeted the system of Imperial Preference (while pursing the agenda of a liberal trade regime) and the blocked sterling balances of British colonies. The premature launch of convertibility of the pound, as part of this agreement, led to a wholesale conversion of the sterling balances of the colonies into dollars, precipitating the sterling crisis of 1947. Apart from prying open former British colonies to US exports, the vulnerable payments position of Britain also meant that the pound had been effectively set up as a lightning rod for international speculative pressures, providing a measure of insulation to the dollar from the strains that the international monetary system faced (Block 1977).

The Suez Crisis and the ensuing collapse of the pound in 1956 was an important milestone in the effective eclipse of the pound's international role. It marked a shift in Washington's attitude towards the IMF. The IMF was drafted into the rescue of the pound from speculative attacks, in what could be considered its first 'bail-out' operation. The US was also able to use the promise of an IMF bail-out to oust the British from Egypt, while making a minimal contribution to the rescue. With the reinstatement of capital controls following the Suez Crisis, British financiers began to resort to offering dollar loans against their dollar deposits in an attempt to evade these controls. This paved the way for the growth of the euro-dollar market (dollar denominated bank deposit liabilities held in foreign banks or foreign branches of US banks). British banks began to substitute an international financial business based on dollars for one based on sterling, as a way of preserving the role of the City of London as a financial centre in the face of the erosion of sterling's importance.

The dollar's position at the apex of the international monetary system was well established by

the end of the 1950s. However, as Europe and Japan emerged as strong competitors to US industries, the US current account balances began deteriorating through the 1960s and the problem of a dollar shortage transformed into a dollar glut. With the large overhang of short-term dollar liabilities overseas, the possibility of a speculative run on the dollar posed a threat to the international payments mechanism. The rapid growth of unregulated international financial flows, through the eurodollar markets, also came into conflict with the constraints of the Bretton Woods system, precipitating the dollar crisis of the 1960s. However, the US external deficit and debt also reflected the burden borne by the US as the provider of international liquidity (Kindleberger et al. 1966).

A variety of measures were adopted to contain the dollar crisis. The prevailing financial arrangements of offsetting finance and the system of unilateral capital controls failed to prevent speculative flight from the US to Western Europe and fuelled inflation in these countries. The persistent deficits eroded the willingness of foreign central banks to hold dollar liabilities. The growing speculative pressure on gold prices and the demands of financing the war in Vietnam and the Great Society programme in the US brought the crisis a head. Finally, the US government suspended gold convertibility in August 1971.

The Consolidation of Dollar Hegemony Under a Floating Dollar Standard

The closing of the gold window and the subsequent 'float' did not result in the dollar losing its privileged position in the international monetary system. Rather, the dismantling of the Bretton Woods arrangements paved the way for the evolution of a floating dollar standard (Serrano 2003) – an international monetary system based not on a commodity like gold, but on the monetary liability of the leading country. Crucial to this role is the willingness of central banks and private investors to hold dollar liabilities.

With European central banks (Germany and France in particular) displaying increasing reluctance to support the US's exorbitant privilege, the US state drew the growing surpluses of the OPEC countries after the oil price shock of 1973 into the service of financing its deficits. US political and economic power ensured that these surpluses were recycled through the private channels of the euro-dollar markets so that the funds were routed through American banks. The US vetoed proposals to channel these surpluses through multilateral channels like the IMF (Spiro 1999). Initiatives directed at controlling the offshore Euromarket – including the introduction of reserve requirements and limiting central bank borrowings in the Euromarkets – were also blocked. There was a shift in focus to promoting private capital flows as the critical means to finance the US deficit and promote dollar dominance.

Capital controls were lifted in 1974 and in 1980 the Deregulation and Monetary Control Act was enacted in US. The sharp hike of interest rates enforced by the Federal Reserve head, Volcker, in 1979 was directed at battling inflation and stabilising the dollar after the 1978–79 dollar crisis. The Volcker shock was also a defining moment in the launch of the neo-liberal phase.

Internationally, too, the US pushed for a 'liberal financial order' promoting liberalisation of not only trade in goods and services but also flows of capital (Helleiner 1994). Oil surpluses that had been channelled into the eurodollar markets were then recycled to the emerging markets, in particular in Latin America, through syndicated loans in the 1970s. This bonanza of cheap credit came to an end with the debt crisis of the 1980s. This debt crisis was used to give a further impetus to liberalisation of financial markets in emerging markets. The Bretton Woods institutions were also refashioned under the so called 'Washington Consensus' into a means of imposing deflationary policies of fiscal austerity and monetary stringency on indebted developing countries.

There was a revival of capital flows in the 1990s along with a proliferation of new financial instruments including derivative contracts. Unlike the previous wave, the capital flowed increasingly to private entities rather than sovereigns. Apart from Latin America, South-East and East Asia

become important recipients of private capital flows in the 1990s. The continued surge of US deficits throughout this decade propelled international liquidity and capital flows to emerging markets and reinforced the pivotal role of the dollar internationally.

While the surge of private capital flows had helped preserve and expand the role of the dollar, the persistent current account deficits and the gross overvaluation of the dollar in the 1980s would pose a challenge. The US government brokered the Plaza Accord in 1985 that committed the central banks of G5 countries to adjust their monetary and fiscal policies in order to effect an orderly depreciation of the dollar. Two years later, in 1987, US policymakers engineered a new agreement, the Louvre Accord to put a floor on further depreciation of the dollar. Foreign Central Banks were thus drawn into the defence of the dollar and official purchases of dollars. Official holdings of US treasury bills have also played an important role in the multilateral clearing mechanisms of the 'floating-dollar regime'. In fact, the Revived Bretton Woods thesis ascribes the stability of the global adjustment mechanisms primarily to the reserve holdings of current account surplus countries (Dooley et al. 2004). Japan was the principal creditor country through the 1990s with the largest holdings of US reserves. Since 2000, China has emerged as a major holder of dollar reserves. The experience of the Asian crisis in 1997–98 also triggered a pattern of increasing reserve accumulation by developing countries in order to insulate their economies from the debilitating impact of capital flight.

There are thus two dimensions to the process of refashioning the dollar standard after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. It was based, on one hand, on the concerted advocacy of liberalisation of international private financial flows in the interests of preserving dollar dominance. The pivotal role of the US in global financial markets reinforces the privileged status of the dollar, enabling the US to generate international liquidity by running up its trade deficits and external debt. On the other hand, its stable functioning also drew on the interventions of official investors and central banks to buttress the dollar. The

official demand for US treasury bills serves as the basis for the profusion of private financial flows. The dollar is the monetary liability of the US state, but the international dollar standard is constituted by the global private dealer system and its interface with the hierarchy of central banks (Mehrling 2013).

Theorising Imperialism in the Context of the Dollar Standard

The dollar standard is a critical element in the institutional edifice of US imperialism. The precise character of US imperial power exercised through its privileged key currency status involves the interactions and interlinkages of states and private capitalist institutions in the global economy.

Characterising Contemporary Imperialism

There are (at least) three broad characterisations of contemporary imperialism hinged around the dollar standard: first, the domination of other states by the US state in pursuit of its own geopolitical objectives (Hudson 2003); second, the deployment of US structural power in the wider interests of expanding and managing capitalist accumulation globally (Panitch and Gindin 2012); third, the global hegemony of the US and US-dominated finance in the restoration of capitalist accumulation in the neo-liberal period (Duménil and Lévy 2004, 2010).

In Hudson's (2003) view, the dollar-debt standard that emerged after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system signifies a new form of imperialism in which the US state exploits and exercises power over other nations while pursuing strategic advantages and agendas, independent of the profit motives of private corporate capital. The US's dominant status in the international arena was not undermined by the transformation from creditor to debtor status since the establishment of the dollar-debt standard meant that balance-of-payments deficits and rising public debt no longer

imposed a constraint on US policy. Hudson relates the transformation of the US from a creditor to a debtor to US military interventions in Korea and the dollar crisis of the 1960s to the demands of the war in Vietnam. The military adventures of the Cold War were the primary impetus to the subsequent growth of US deficits and debt in Hudson's account. The key role of the dollar-debt standard and this 'deficit strategy' was to enable the US to prosecute its military imperatives while running up debt without necessitating domestic adjustment. He characterises the dollar-debt standard as 'super-imperialism' since the privilege of unrestrained deficits is exercised only by a single state, the US. Super-imperialism entailed the siphoning of surpluses by the US state from the rest of the world through the interventions of central banks and multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank, rather than by the actions of corporations.

In contrast to Hudson (2003), Panitch and Gindin (2012) do not envisage contemporary imperialism as primarily a conflict between the US state and other states. The privileges of the reserve status of the dollar and the related economic and financial hegemony that the US enjoys have not, in their view, been directed to drawing surpluses to the US state or even to exclusively promoting US capital. Rather, the strategic objectives of the US state are directed towards superintending global capitalist accumulation of capital and widening markets for capital in general. As the dominant imperial state, the US has taken on the responsibility for ensuring the smooth reproduction and expansion of capitalism and has overseen the restructuring of global capitalist relations to fashion an integrated global capitalist system by promoting liberalisation. At the intersection of the US state and international finance, the US treasury and Federal Reserve have played a key role in promoting global capital mobility and free trade, and also in containing and managing capitalist crisis. It serves as the ultimate guarantor of capitalist interests. This role is also central to the successful containment of inter-imperial rivalry in their analysis, as the US state acts not in the interests of US capital alone, but of global capitalist system more generally.

While Panitch and Gindin (2012) argue that the US state has promoted neo-liberalism to further the interests of a global capitalist class rather than the specific interests of American capital, Duménil and Lévy (2004, 2010) link the rise of neo-liberalism to the resurgence of the hegemony of US finance (defined as the upper fraction of capitalists and their financial institutions). The euro-dollar market was the terrain where finance launched its revival in the 1970s. The coup of finance that was launched following the hike of interest rates in 1979 paved the way for this revival. With the coup of finance, the neo-liberal model was also pushed globally as a means of sustaining the dollar's international role within a world of floating exchange rates. The dollar's key international role provided the US with a greater degree of freedom in pursuing its broader policy imperatives, and with a measure of insulation against the impact of crisis that other nation states did not enjoy. More important, the US economy can grow and accumulate capital unfettered by its external imbalances. US imperialism is characterised by the US private corporate capital pumping surpluses from the rest of the world in the form of net flows of financial income from abroad. That the US has been earning more income on its foreign asset holdings compared to what it pays out on its liabilities to the rest of the world is a manifestation of imperial mechanisms in their account.

Contemporary imperialism entails the complex and contradictory process of the integration, under the hegemony of the dollar standard, of the interconnected hierarchy of nation states that constitutes the world capitalist economy. The exercise of imperial power by the US state is embedded in the structure of the financial system. The dollar standard has played a pivotal role in relaxing the external constraint on the US economy and the US state as argued by Hudson (2003) and Duménil and Lévy (2004, 2010).

Hudson's (2003) argument that these gains are garnered exclusively by the US state misses the role US imperial power has played in the smooth coordination of global capitalist accumulation system stressed by Panitch and Gindin

(2012). The analysis of Panitch and Gindin (2012), on the other hand, underplays the dominance of US financial and corporate capital over other capitals and the asymmetric gains that US financial and corporate capital has reaped with the neo-liberal backlash and the emergence of a floating dollar standard. It also underplays the extent to which the 1970s crisis constituted a structural break both in the manner in which the US exercised its imperial hegemony and the global regime of capitalist accumulation.

Imperial power and the dollar standard played a crucial role the restoration of profitability after the stagflationary crisis of the 1970s that is central to the analysis of Duménil and Lévy (2004, 2010). The collapse of the Bretton Woods system did signal a fundamental structural transformation of capitalist relations globally in response to this structural crisis. Arrighi (1999) also sees the resurgence of finance and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as the outcome of the crisis of the 1970s, which he characterises as an over-accumulation crisis. The subsequent expansion of finance signalled, in Arrighi's historical world view, the closing moments of American hegemony. Parboni (1985) also saw the floating of the dollar as a reaction to the relative decline of the US economy *with respect* to Western Europe and Japan. However, the post-war period actually witnessed a restructuring of imperial relations and a consolidation of US imperial power under the floating dollar standard as outlined by Panitch and Gindin (2012) and Duménil and Lévy (2004, 2010).

Panitch and Gindin's (2012) elaboration of the manner in which the US deployed its imperial power in the post-war period to mitigate inter-imperial rivalries throws light on an important dimension of imperialism. In particular, the imbrication of rival nation states in international financial markets centred on the US has been a major means though which this cohesion was welded. The integrated global order is thus not simply an outcome of the spontaneous workings of capitalist expansionist tendencies, but has been forged through the concerted actions of states – in particular the US state.

Integrating the Periphery

Contemporary imperialism involves a hierarchy of state power; not just domination of rival imperialist nation states by the US, but also that of the periphery by imperialist countries. The integration of nation states in the periphery into the global circuit of capital under US hegemony entails the articulation of corporate and financial capital from the advanced capitalist countries with changing class configurations within these countries. The trajectory of development in the periphery is fundamentally altered by its absorption into the circuit of capital's global circuit.

Hudson's (2003) account stresses the use of debt as a crucial lever for the exercise of power. Debt enables the US state to pressure foreign governments to align their policies to the imperatives of US policy. The Washington consensus, in his view, encapsulated the strategic objectives of the US and was imposed on debtor countries as part of the conditionalities associated with IMF bailouts and World Bank loans that enforced the dependence of the debtor countries in the periphery on global finance. At the same time, the dollar-debt standard obliged the central banks of surplus countries of Europe and Asia to extend short-term loans to the US in the form of holdings of US treasury bills.

Panitch and Gindin (2012) emphasise the crucial role that the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve play in enforcing the US's geo-political agenda to shape and govern global capitalism. In their perceptive account, the structural power that the US state wields over its informal empire does not depend on wars and military occupation or the interventions of the Pentagon, but more fundamentally on the inter-penetration of elements of the US state in the international financial system. US imperialism has forged a new international division of labour that has embedded domestic capitalist classes in the periphery more deeply in the process of global capitalist accumulation. In a departure from most accounts of imperialism, they argue that nation states in the rest of the capitalist world economy have been absorbed into the informal American empire not solely through US pressure or the actions of multilateral

institutions, but also significantly through the active initiatives of the ruling elites in these nation states who in a sense 'invited' integration within the US informal empire as a strategy for furthering capitalist accumulation and relations. They place short-term capital in US financial markets, not necessarily because of military threat or diplomatic pressure, but because of the unrivalled attractiveness of the dollar.

The dollar standard and the dominant position of US financial markets in the pyramid of global capital markets have, however, also helped preserve the structural vulnerability of the periphery and the fundamental asymmetry of the imperial hierarchy. The coup of finance, launched with the 'Volcker shock', marked an important juncture in US imperial relations in Duménil and Lévy's (2004, 2010) analysis, and brought countries of the periphery deeper into the embrace of the US finance-dominated dollar empire. The integration of the periphery through the ne-liberal phase also helped resolve the crisis of the 1970s.

Apart from restoring profitability and providing a market stimulus, the periphery plays an essential role in ensuring the stability of the capitalist accumulation in the core imperial countries. In Patnaik's (2008) formulation, countries in the periphery perform the functions of being both a market on tap and a shock absorber, imparting stability to the dollar standard. This stability rests on the existence and perpetuation of a reserve army of labour both within core countries and in the pre-periphery. The persistence of unorganised and informal producers within the pre-capitalist sectors in the periphery weakens the bargaining power of workers in the capitalist sectors in both the core and the periphery. This pauperised populace in precapitalist sectors serves an essential function in stabilising the dollar standard by securing favourable terms of trade for the goods produced in the periphery and also by putting a lid on the wage claims of workers in the core. Patnaik (2008) argues that US imperialism under the dollar standard has a dual character, furthering both retrogression in terms of perpetuating the pre-capitalist relation in the periphery on one hand; and on the other hand, enabling a limited diffusion of capitalist relations by providing access to markets in the core countries through its growing deficit.

Apart from stabilising the dollar standard by curbing wages, Patnaik argues that the periphery also helps sustain the growing deficits of the US through triangular patterns of offsetting balances, whereby its surpluses with primary goods exporting semi-capitalist peripheral countries balances deficits with other capitalist countries. This offsetting role is more important, in his view, than the role of the periphery in providing a stimulus to investment. He sees the pressure placed on surplus countries in the periphery to appreciate their currencies as a reflection of the growing strains on these offsetting mechanisms.

But the unfolding forms and strategies of Western imperialism cannot be understood solely on the premise of the continued existence of pre-capitalist regions. Patnaik's account of the role of the periphery in stabilising the dollar standard does not address the implications of financialisation for the functioning of the dollar standard. Financialisation is, however, central to Lapavitsas's (2013) account of the dollar standard. He argues that the US state fostered the 'subordinate financialization' of developing countries in the periphery through the 1990s and promoted private financial mechanisms based on the capital market as the means of integrating these countries into the US imperial system. As primary commodities prices and export of manufactures grew, there was a big surge in the reserve holdings of developing countries. Lapavitsas (2013) sees this stockpiling of reserves by countries in the periphery as a manifestation of their subordinate status; the imperatives of 'selfinsurance' from capital flight and of maintaining favourable exchange rates in order to promote exports. It is not a sign of a fundamental reordering of their place in the imperial hierarchy but an integral dimension of their subordinate financialisation. Since the bulk of these reserves are held as US treasuries, the accumulation of reserves boosted the demand for dollar holdings by foreign central banks. Subordinate financialisation induced uneven development and imposed a significant burden on the periphery in terms of rising interest rate spreads between countries in the periphery

and the US and the cost of sterilisation of these excessive reserves. The reverse flows of capital from the periphery to the core, which stem from interactions between states rather than private capital, are characterised by Lapvitsas as an informal tribute extracted by the US state. This tribute is deployed, in Lapavitsas's framework, not solely to benefit the US state but also private capital more generally.

Vasudevan (2008, 2009a) elaborates on the triangular patterns of adjustment that characterised core–periphery relations in both the floating dollar standard and during the pre-1914 International Gold Standard. The mechanism of recycling surpluses and the export of fragility to Latin America through the unregulated euro-dollar market during the 1970s and early 1980s paved the way for the neo-liberal impetus to liberalisation in international capital markets at the end of the century. The essence of these mechanisms of triangular adjustment is not so much that they provide offsetting finance, as Patnaik (2008) stresses, but that they underwrite the capacity of the US to draw on the surpluses of creditors and continue to incur debt despite growing deficits, and recycle these to other debtor countries in the periphery. These capital flows are instrumental in sustaining the US deficits and the ability of the US to act as a banker to the world. The debtors in the periphery bear the brunt of the burden of deflationary adjustment in the form of recurrent currency crises and serve as a safety valve against speculative attacks on the dollar. The export of financial fragility to the peripheral countries in this framework is an integral component of the triangular adjustment mechanisms that mediate adjustment and liquidity creation and help preserve stability in the centre. This pattern of recycling surpluses that underlies the generation of international dollar liquidity engendered and depended on the tremendous growth of private international capital flows and not just the actions of states, and has been fuelled by the ability of the US to 'borrow' internationally from both official and private investors. These borrowings were then recycled to buttress global demand and restructure the international production system with the relocation of production from the advanced core to developing countries. The US is not merely the banker to the world, it is also the prime engine of global demand.

Finance, World Money and the Dollar Standard

The analyses of Patnaik (2008), Vasudevan (2009b), and Lapavitsas (2013) approach the working of the dollar standard through the prism of Marx's elaboration of world money. In Marx's analysis, world money evolves as the ultimate material embodiment of power internationally, once the money-form 'breaks through the barriers of home circulation to assume the part of a universal equivalent in the world of commodities'. World money serves as 'the universal means of payment, as the universal means of purchase, and as the absolute social materialization of wealth as such' (Marx 1976/1867, p. 242). It is the means by which wealth is redistributed across nations. The distribution of reserves is thus also a measure of power between nations (De Brunhoff 1976).

The international monetary system that Marx was investigating was in essence a commodity standard and bullion was the prevalent form of world money. The actual historical development of the international monetary system has witnessed the evolution of a key currency system, with the dollar currently performing the role of world money among a hierarchy of currencies.

Patnaik (2008) characterises Marx's conception of money as 'propertyist', in that the value of money is determined outside the demand-and-supply fluctuations. Patnaik puts forward the argument that in a fiat money system, like the dollar standard, the stickiness of wages in the key currency country helps ensure the relative stability of the value of money. The pre-capitalist periphery where the pauperisation of large populations has created a price-taking reserve army of labour is essential to stabilising wages in the core. This conception of world money also provides a framework for analysing imperialism, seen here as primarily a relation between the capitalist centre and the pre-capitalist sectors in the

periphery where stability is ensured from 'outside' through the preservation and recreation of this reserve army of labour. The leading key currency country is the dominant imperialist power mediating the relationship between the advanced capitalist nations and the periphery. Its relation with the pre-capitalist periphery is integral to the confidence its currency enjoys among wealth-holders.

Patnaik (2008) also puts forward the argument that the floating dollar standard is still in essence a commodity standard. With the erosion of union power, increased capital mobility, and the erosion of the scope of traditional Keynesian demand management policies since the 1970s, rising wages have not been the primary threat to the stability of the dollar. Rather, he argues that the price of oil, as the critical primary commodity, has become the more pervasive threat to the value of the dollar. Patnaik (2008) characterises the floating dollar standard as an oil-dollar standard, not because oil transactions are denominated in oil or that the oil surpluses are denominated in dollars, but because of the significance of oil prices to price stability. He sees the imperative to control oil resources as a motive force for the US's military adventures in the Middle East.

Patnaik's crucial insight about the link between world money and the international division of labour forged by the exercise of imperial power does not go far enough in situating this division of labour in a hierarchy of international credit relations. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system marked the severing of the connection between the dollar and gold. It also signalled the maturation of a state credit standard, through a process that was embedded in the rise to dominance of finance (Duménil and Lévy 2004, 2010) and financialisation (Lapavitsas 2013). The dollar standard rests on the interplay of the actions of the state and central banks on one hand, and private financial institutions on the other, what Gowan (1999) has christened the Dollar-Wall Street regime.

McNally (2010) ascribes the spread of financialisation to the mutation that occurred in the form of world money after formal convertibility between the dollar and gold was abolished and world money became tethered to the dollar. He argues that the heightened volatility in currencies and the uncertainty in valuation of international transactions precipitated under the new floating dollar standard gave an impetus to trade in foreign exchange. In particular it led to a tremendous growth of trade in new financial instruments, such as exchange-rate and interest-rate derivatives that were designed to hedge against volatility by commodifying risk. While intended to serve as efficient means of hedging risk and reallocating capital, this derivative trade was increasingly used for speculation and evading regulatory requirements, leading to the buildup of leverage and fragility in the financial system. Financialisation in McNally's framework is not only about the rising power of rentiers and financiers and the changing pattern of accumulation to financial channels, or even the pursuit of liberalisation and deregulation, but more fundamentally about the product of this metamorphosis of the money form to a fully fledged credit-money standard and the related transformation of financial intermediation to the riskier terrain of capital markets.

In Lapavitsas's (2013) framework, the monetary basis of contemporary financialisation ultimately also derives from the emergence of the dollar-US treasury bill as world money. The US treasury bill lies at the apex of global capital and money markets, and plays a central role in generating international liquidity. The dollar standard is a reflection of the use of the power of the US state to establish the dollar as key currency by transforming it into a secure financial asset that is perceived to be relatively free from the risk of default. Such a risk-free liquid asset is essential to the smooth functioning of the international financial system (Fields and Vernengo 2013).

However, as Mehrling (2013) has argued, monetary systems are hybrid in that public and private liquidity is interlinked, and hierarchical in that monetary instruments are qualitatively distinct and organised around the dominant key currency – the dollar. Thus, financialisation and the growth since the 1990s of a private, global, shadow banking system has supported the official public dollar system, but its growth has also

eroded the US Federal Reserves's ability to manage the monetary system.

Lapavitsas (2013) also argues that the dollar as a state-backed debt instrument combines elements of fiat and credit money but he treats it as essentially a form of 'valueless tender'. However, once money as a means of payment takes the form of a financial asset, it is not strictly 'value-less', though its valuation is subject to principles of valuation which are distinct from those of other produced commodities. Marx had put forward his formulation of fictitious capital as a distinct basis for valuation of financial assets like public debt. The evolution of the floating dollar standard also implies the emergence of an international monetary system based on fictitious capital (de Brunhoff 1976; de Brunhoff and Foley 2007; Foley 2005; Vasudevan 2009b.

The valuation and management of state debt is thus a useful point of departure for comprehending the link between US imperialism and the dollar standard within the framework of Marx's theorisation of world money (de Brunhoff and Foley 2007; Foley 2005). The US treasury bill is not simply the link between the US state and private capital markets. As world money, the dollar is the link between the US state and a hierarchy of other nation states and private capital in the international sphere. The management of public debt and the development of finance are integral to the exercise of imperial power in the international dollar standard. These were also critical during the phase of British financial hegemony under the International Gold Standard (Vasudevan 2008, 2009b).

The working of the dollar standard requires the willingness of foreign investors to buy the debt instruments of the US state. The growing debt burden necessary to sustain this role would, however, tend to undermine the status of the dollar as world money as it faces the prospect of speculative outflows of capital. This is the crux of the contradictions in the use of a country's currency as international money – the 'Triffin dilemma' (Triffin 1960). The floating dollar standards resolved this dilemma by displacing the thrust of deflationary crisis to debtors in the periphery, while compelling creditors countries in Asia to share part of the burden of adjustment (Vasudevan 2008, 2009a, b).

The privileged capacity to generate and sustain international liquidity and sustain global demand is both a reflection of and mechanism for the exercise of imperial dominance by the US. The ability of the central bank of the key currency country to calibrate capital inflows, without eroding confidence in its credit worthiness, does not depend simply on the magnitude of the debt burden but, more significantly, on the liquidity of the market for its public debt. This liquidity is contingent on the depth and breadth of the key currency country's financial markets and the position of the currency within the structure of international credit relations as the principle means in which international transactions and wealth holding are denominated.

The dollar's role as internationally accepted money is thus the outcome of the historical evolution of the US as the financial centre of the global economy and as the dominant imperialist power. While the contemporary crisis does not necessarily herald the end of dollar hegemony, it does, however, signal a protracted period when the imperial relations fashioned under the US-led dollar standard are being restructured. The future trajectory of global capital accumulation and the evolution of the international monetary system will be shaped by the manner in which the current crisis and the contradictions of the imperial dollar standard are resolved.

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D

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▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
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▶ Kim Il Sung (1912–1994): Partisan from the Edges of Empire

Du Bois, W.E.B. (1868–1963)

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Definition

William Edward Burkhart Du Bois (W.E.B. Du Bois) was born on 23 February 1868 in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. His achievements include founding the Niagara Movement, a

group of prominent black intellectuals advocating the full enfranchisement of blacks through economic and educational justice, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). He authored numerous books, studies and articles including the first large-scale sociological study of African Americans *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), a standard-setting text for sociology.

William Edward Burkhart Du Bois (W.E.B. Du Bois) was born on 23 February 1868 in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. He completed a general undergraduate degree at Fisk University in 1888, before transferring to Harvard University and graduating cum laude with a bachelor's in Philosophy in 1890. He then obtained his PhD from Harvard in 1896 and completed his dissertation 'The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870' (1896) while a professor at Wilberforce University in Ohio. His achievements include founding the Niagara Movement, a group of prominent black intellectuals advocating the full enfranchisement of blacks through economic and educational justice, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). He authored numerous books, studies and articles including the first large-scale sociological study of African Americans *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), a standard-setting text for sociology. Du Bois's earlier works were empirically based, social science-oriented studies that illuminated the plight of and the policies affecting African Americans in the US.

Du Bois's work became decidedly less positivist over time and increasingly critical of 'accommodationist' views, eventually culminating in a Marxist internationalist understanding of race relations and Euro-American global hegemony. He ascribed this intellectual shift to pivotal experiences while on the faculty at Atlanta University (now Clark Atlanta University) from 1897–1910. Specifically, Du Bois cited an incident in which the severed knuckles of Sam Hose, a black victim of a white lynch mob, were displayed in an Atlanta store front, writing 'Two considerations thereafter broke in upon my work and eventually disrupted it: first, one could not be a calm, cool, and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, murdered, and starved; and secondly, there was no such definite demand for scientific work of the sort I was doing' (2007, p. 34). His movement from positivist-based inquiry towards a multi-generic discourse composed of History, Psychology and Sociology paralleled his increasing sense that racism and imperialism were integrally implicated systems of exploitation based in both cultural and material conditions, a condition which could not be dissolved by objective inquiry alone but rather through intellectual activism and political, social, and economic mobilisation. By emphasising the structural and economic forces underlying a system of oppression based on race, Du Bois broke with the long-lasting and dominant tradition of liberal legalistic civil rights activism that had marked the black struggle in America, commenting that as an ideology 'it was not wrong so much as short sighted' (1940, p. 289).

Du Bois is best known for his analysis and critique of race in the US; however, he was also one of the first and most consistent and vocal critics of Euro-American imperialism. He preferred the terms 'semi-colonialism' and 'quasi-colonialism' to 'imperialism', 'deliberately using the term colonial in a much broader sense than is usually given it' (1988, p. 229). Expanding the definition of colonialism emphasised the sometimes subtle methods and indirect practices of continuing colonial rule by Western nations of newly independent former colonies that masked how the real relations of power had remained fundamentally unchanged. Decolonisation, then, was a ruse that hid the ongoing system of domination in which the global South remained in a subservient position to the global North. Du Bois believed that at the core of this system of global inequality was a racialised imperialism that buttressed the global economic and political systems of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and originated with colonial slavery, American racism, and European chauvinism. As his interests became more global in orientation, so too did his race analysis, mirroring his political development, from liberalism to socialism and finally communism.

From his earlier work on slavery in America, Reconstruction and the plight of African-Americans in Philadelphia to his later pan-Africanist cultural nationalism and finally to an internationalist anti-imperialism, Du Bois saw the enduring 'race concept' and the history of racialised slavery in America as the seed of 'modern industrial imperialism,' as well as a template and rationale for the colonisation and domination of native peoples and groups within what would become the US and those farther afield in the global South. His oft-quoted line from *The Souls of Black Folks* that 'the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line . . .' (1903, p. 8) extended his analysis of slavery, Jim Crow segregation in the South, and the 'race concept' to include a worldwide economic, political, and cultural system that privileged white Euro-American interests at the expense of colonised and exploited peoples of colour. For Du Bois, the process that established and perpetuated slavery and racism in America was rooted in economic exploitation and accompanied by three distinct ideological phases. Ideologically, this system first emerged from ideas of European cultural superiority contrasting and hierarchising the civilised white to the 'savage', 'primitive' and/or 'uncivilised' non-European. Later, notions of a taxonomy and hierarchy of human groups based on putative biological differences that loosely correlated with skin colour (scientific racism) were developed to justify and rationalise slavery and colonialism. Finally, arguments of a social technological superiority (during decolonisation) served to justify the continuing exploitation and subjugation, both physical and psychological, of non-white peoples through paternalistic neo-colonial relations. This international racialised system of stratification, born in the slave-holding colonies of North America and exported around the globe with the expansion of capitalism and colonialism was based in the race concept.

In contrast to other prominent critics of racism, slavery, and imperialism of the time, Du Bois argued that both American slavery and modern imperialism were historically exceptional systems unlike earlier forms of slavery, forced unfree labour, and empire. Each was not only distinct in its geography and scope, as the modern form encompassed the globe and subjugated a majority of the world's population either directly or indirectly, but also ideologically unprecedented as both systems were constructed upon pseudo-scientific notions of race, notions that infected the very people they oppressed through an internalised racist psychology he dubbed 'double consciousness'. For instance, the systems of slavery present in ancient Europe were legalistic and based upon social status not physical traits or biological difference. Even the intensive stratification of the medieval feudal system subjugated serfs through a complex social web based on fealty and property relations, not physical traits or race. And he argued, both ancient slavery and medieval serfdom were limited in geographic scope, and, in the case of slavery, duration. Hence, the American example of a global systemic, and therefore imperial, inherited and universal race-based stratification system resulted in the subjugation of entire peoples and lands. Du Bois argued this was nefariously novel since it employed a superficial rationality and pseudo-scientific schema that totalised the experience of oppression and exploitation to include both the mind and bodies of those subject to its force. His earlier understanding of imperialism, in which cultural discourses about the inferiority of non-Europeans figured more prominently than economic factors, prefigures more recent scholarship on neoimperialism, neo-colonialism and post-colonialism while his later analysis tended toward an international class system based upon colonial racism. Yet, even as early as his 1898 dissertation, Du Bois understood American racism and slavery as institutions grounded in economic interests as well as a landed white southern aristocracy, writing 'the development of Southern slavery has heretofore been viewed so exclusively from the social and ethical standpoint that we are apt to forget its close and indissoluble connection with the cotton market' (1904, p. 152). For the time, this was a brilliant and radical departure from the standard moral condemnation of slavery.

As mentioned, Du Bois was one of the first thinkers to see imperialism operating even after

post-Second World War decolonisation. He saw the global hierarchy of nation states as a parallel to the internal racial order of the US and Europe, as, for him, nations were racialised and placed into a strict hierarchy in which white America and Europe were at the top of the political, economic, and cultural order. Of course, he recognised that dominant states still operated directly within foreign lands, but Du Bois argued that they also increasingly operated indirectly through cultural and social domains. Rather than possessing colonies through direct occupation and force, he maintained that imperialism operated within spheres of political influence, frequently protecting the interests of corporations acting with impunity on foreign territory. Hence, he deliberately employed a broad use of the term 'colonial' to explain uneven international relations. Further, these corporations deliberately manipulated cultures and governments for market expansion and control while exporting Western lifestyles, ideas, and values to solidify market control and subdue resistance. Du Bois, then, is one of the first critics of imperialism to argue that culture, in addition to politics and direct military might, is integral to imperialism. This profound insight forms the basis for later post-colonial critiques that see the role of culture as an important, if not *the* dominant facet of expanding, cloaking, and consolidating the control of foreign lands, peoples, and resources by Western powers.

While Du Bois in his early works emphasised the importance of culture as well as racism in the formation and extension of imperialism, he also insisted from his earliest work 'The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade' (1896, published 1904) that the fundamental roots of all forms of imperialism are economic. By his last and posthumously published *Autobiography* (1967), he concluded that while race and gender were important components of a complex web that supported and extended imperialism on all levels, class was the key underlying factor of imperialism. He thus ultimately embraced a Marxist understanding of imperialism, gender, and race, arguing that the global capitalist class dominated a world economic system in which overwhelmingly brown people and nations are exploited for profit. As he

grew increasingly disenchanted with the possibility of reform within the US he gravitated towards the Soviet Union and openly sided with Stalin. Yet, to call Du Bois simply a Marxist is to miss one of his greatest contributions to social theory and social justice struggles: that race and class, while historically and categorically separate, had been blended into one seamless reality for most of humanity. Marx's simple bipartite class division elided over the complex triangulation in which the capitalist elite and white working class exploited the coloured majority of mankind, going so far as to build the nation state upon this foundation. The US, he argued, based its selfcharacterisation, its self-understanding, and its actualisation upon an alliance between rich and working-class whites. In 'The African Roots of War' he wrote, '[The] white workingman has been asked to share the spoils of exploiting "chinks and niggers". It is no longer simply the merchant prince, or the aristocratic monopoly, or even the employing class that is exploiting the world: it is the nation; a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor' (1915, p. 709). Yet both these privileged categories (whiteness and wealth) are the product of the race concept. So, while Du Bois embraced the Soviet Union, he continually emphasised that the global proletariat was overwhelmingly nonwhite. Further, that the white working class in places such as the US and Europe shared in the 'spoils' of Third-World subjugation and exploitation and benefited from an omnipresent racial order.

Unlike Booker T. Washington, Du Bois saw the plight of African Americans in the US as part of a larger global system of race-based oppression that affected the 'darker races of men, who make the vast majority of mankind' (2007, p. 159). Du Bois maintained that culture was an important component of colonisation and imperialism as well as a mode of resistance and the path towards full emancipation, enfranchisement, and decolonisation. He championed the reconstruction of culture to produce 'race pride' and advocated 'black awareness' to counter the colonisation of culture and mind under slavery and colonialism. He proposed fostering a black

elite, the 'Talented Tenth', along with mass agitation and protest in order to transform conditions affecting African Americans. Although a continuous theme in his work, the 'Talented Tenth' underwent lifelong revision. Du Bois originally described the concept as a vanguard of educated black elites who would lead the way out of oppression and poverty for all peoples through an enlightened moral order. Their 'self-knowledge, self-realization and self-control' would allow them to 'guide the Mass away from the contamination and death of the Worst, in their own and other races' (Du Bois 1948, p. 165). Some scholars have criticised Du Bois's cultural nationalist vanguardism as accepting the disparaging premise that African Americans were the victims of a degenerate or stunted culture due to the history of slavery and oppression. But by the end of his life he had shifted his hope away from a black cultural elite to the 'mostly' brown and black working masses. He had become disillusioned with the Jeffersonian individualism of the black elite who served their own self-interests before those of the black masses. The 'Talented Tenth' thus became the 'Guiding Hundredth,' as his original vision of an educated black vanguard leading all Americans out of ignorance, poverty, and oppression morphed into 'the great majority of men, the poverty-stricken and diseased [who] are the real workers of the world' (Du Bois 1944: para. 29). Nevertheless, again, Du Bois never abandoned the race concept entirely. Even in his Marxist reformulation of the Talented Tenth, he maintained that the colour line persisted, producing 'a complete separation of classes by race, cutting square across the economic layers' (Du Bois 1940, p. 205).

Clearly, then, Du Bois's understanding of imperialism was deeply intertwined with what he called 'the race concept' which 'guided, embittered, illuminated and enshrouded [my] life' (2007, p. 71) and which functioned on a material, social, political, and intrapsychic level. While always emphasising the economic dimensions of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism, he also highlighted the intrapsychic or personal effects of institutional and structural race and racism with his concept of the 'veil' and 'double consciousness'. The veil was both a metaphor for racism and the colour line and a referent to the physical, social, and psychological barriers and divisions produced by race. It serves as a marker for the psychosocial moment of recognition and of difference for blacks in a white-dominated society. Du Bois's concept of double consciousness first appeared in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903). Influenced by, but radically different from Hegel's master-and-slave dialectic, double consciousness is a condition that results from a system of racism that produced a split in perception in which the oppressed sees herself both through her own perspective and through the perspective of the oppressor. This causes a split in self-awareness and self-conception that Du Bois argued was antagonistic and contradictory, and that he maintained had produced a bifurcated and alienated identity for the victims of racism and colonialism. And yet this split of consciousness also endows the oppressed with 'second sight': the ability to perceive social reality, and therefore political and economic realities, from the perspective of both the oppressor and the oppressed. This duality of understanding is a burden as well as a type of clairvoyance. The victim of racism intuitively understands the mechanism of race and its effects while the privileged remain entirely ignorant of the most powerful social force of the century.

Du Bois extended the logic of 'second sight' into his analyses of imperialism, connecting domestic and international revolts against slavery and colonialism to a Euro-American revolutionary tradition – one that situated the Haitian Revolution, abolitionism and Reconstruction, and the ongoing project of decolonisation as moments in the unfinished emancipatory project of the Enlightenment. In this sense, it is the 'second sight' of the oppressed that perceives the need for and demands equality and freedom, forcing Euro-American nations and peoples to realise their own historical processes. In this context, the Talented Tenth and the Guiding Hundredth are not merely a reconfigured elitism in the first case, and revolutionary mass in the second, but the assertion that reason and revolution always emerge out of oppression.

While condemning US imperialism, Du Bois also perceived a progressive and emancipatory potential for imperialism to spread democratic institutions and racial tolerance, particularly in contrast to European imperialism, a system he understood to be much more racially rigid and exploitative. At the same time, however, Du Bois understood that this democratic potential would be the product of a white US that dominated foreign markets and land in search of cheap labour because the internal domination of the white working class was unsustainable due to class conflict. In this way, Du Bois prefigures a contemporary understanding of First and Third World, neo-imperialism and globalisation. The colour line is both the problem and solution for America, as he believed that a first-world labour problem (labour shortages and resistance) generates racialised imperialism as a solution to the antagonism between the white working class and capitalist elite at home. This global racial division of labour then aligns whites in the First World as a group, collectively exploiting non-whites in the Third World. This global racial and class order does more than just support racism domestically and internationally, it stabilises and supports a class order as well preserving and protecting the domination, privilege, and power of a small white elite over and against a general underclass that is both white and non-white. Racism forms a type of currency that is used to pacify an otherwise restive white underclass by dolling out gifts of social prestige, psychological superiority, and material benefit. This international racialised division of labour operated in both Europe and the US with some differences:

> Western Europe hopes that without essential alteration in its way of life an accommodation can be made between their demands and the upsurging of the lower classes and peoples. They see this chance in four ways: home labor appeased by elementary education and some political power; with higher wages paid out of profit from investment in foreign lands, which the home labor makes sure by fighting in world wars. (Du Bois 1967, p. 16)

The US on the one hand has an endless flow of immigrants who form the basis of a stratification system ostensibly predicated on achievement or 'boot strap capitalism'. Du Bois tears down the façade of the American dream by pointing to the underlying basis of white assimilation and mobility: black oppression and exploitation. The potential and promised assimilation and mobility into the white elite is only possible against the backdrop of a permanent black underclass under a racialised capitalist system. Some 25 years later, sociologists would rediscover Du Bois's profound insight into the racist foundation of the 'melting pot' (assimilation and social mobility), without ever giving him credit for it, and call it 'segmented assimilation'. On the other hand, the American class and race system can also depend upon an ever-expanding global labour market, a 'worldwide new proletariat of colored workers' (Du Bois 1995, p. 542). These cheap non-US labourers require little in terms of compensation and even less in terms of social welfare (schools, housing, medicine, retirement, policing), enriching the capitalist class in the US to such a degree that with their historically unprecedented massive stockpiles of wealth they are able to undermine democratic institutions and bribe white workers as a racial mercenary class. The white working class are used as soldiers, sailors, and foremen to discipline and police and when necessary kill this 'new proletariat' of 'colored workers'. American imperialism then is merely an extension of American racism and a means to sustain a domestic class system as well as a global racialised division of labour.

Along with his observations that race and class are integral to imperialism, Du Bois mounts a feminist critique of imperialism as well. In *Darkwater* (1920) he argues that black and white women are marginalised groups and that their emancipation is part of the fulfilment of the Enlightenment's promise of equality. Gender thus forms another node in the nexus of oppressive mechanisms that exploit the labour of the marginalised by a system of patriarchal, paternalistic capitalism that has its origins in American racial slavery and, he hoped, its future demise in the international class consciousness that would overcome racism and imperialism.

Du Bois's complex and sweeping body of work defies simple categorisation: positivist social scientist, integrationist, cultural and

economic separatist, anti-imperialist, and communist. Yet he pursued a consistent and clear intellectual project of emancipation, justice, and equality through his attempts to demystify, deconstruct, and resist the totalising and ubiquitous racist-imperialist world system. While his insights operated on multiple levels of analyses, fields of discourse, and planes of action, Du Bois always focused on the inequities produced by an economic system that originated with American racial slavery and that, by the end of his life, had come to dominate the globe. Like a good detective, he relentlessly pursued and documented all the working parts of a cancerous system of exploitation that inter-penetrates human social relations on every level and covers the globe. While never losing hope of fulfilling the Enlightenment's promise of justice and equality, by the end of his life he felt the US was unredeemable. He was indicted as a spy by the US in 1951, something which, despite his acquittal, led to his total disillusionment with the country. He joined the Communist Party in 1961, renounced his US citizenship and decamped to Ghana where he died on 27 August 1963 on the eve of Martin Luther King's march on Washington.

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D

Dual-Use Technologies

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Dutch Imperialism, Caribbean

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Synonyms

African slave trade; Caribbean imperialism; Colonialism; Netherlands Antilles; Racism; Slavery; Struggle for independence

Definition/Description

The Dutch colonization of the world over four centuries has been a major force in the creation of inequality. The Netherlands Antilles were a major geographic center of the slave trade in the Americas as the peoples of the Caribbean islands continue to strive for independence from their colonial masters.

Dutch Imperialism in the Caribbean

In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands – at that time called the Republic of the Unified Netherlands – ruled over a vast empire stretching from Asia to the Southern Cape Colony and coastal trading ports in Africa and, ultimately, to the New World. It was the interest in sugar, slaves,

and salt – a core component of the lucrative herring trade – that led the Dutch in the 1630s to establish vital commercial ports and colonies in the Antilles including the Leewards islands of Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire just north of the Spanish main and the Windward islands of St Eustatius, Saba and St Maarten. Ousted from northern Brazil by the Portuguese in 1667, the Dutch moved northward and established a colony in Surinam. Private trading companies such as the Dutch West India Company (WIC) administered these scattered territories. The Society of Surinam, which governed Surinam between 1683 and 1795, was owned jointly by the WIC, the city of Amsterdam and the Van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck family, relatives of the founding colonial governor. However, the riches – in pursuit of which the Dutch justified colonisation and the brutality of slavery – proved elusive. And in spite of the waning economic importance of their West Indian colonies by the nineteenth century, the Dutch have remained in the Caribbean to this day.

Today, the enduring trans-Atlantic ties that bind the Dutch Caribbean to the former metropole are rooted in the legacy of imperialism. This essay chronicles the evolution of these relations in the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Surinam from the turn of the nineteenth century until the present. In these roughly 200 years, imperialism in the Dutch Caribbean has followed an unlikely course: ranging from metropolitan disinterest at the zenith of the age of 'new imperialism' to, strikingly, an intensified post-colonial investment in the West Indies as Antilleans have insisted on their right to remain within the Kingdom. While other European powers in the nineteenth century undertook 'civilising missions' that stimulated pride and nationalism in the metropole, Dutch officials and their countrymen remained largely apathetic about the flagging colonies of the Netherlands Antilles – then called 'Curaçao and dependencies' – and Surinam. A nadir in this history is the maintenance of slavery until 1863, decades after both the British and French had abolished it. Politically, relations between the metropole and West Indies remained colonial until the Second World War, after which the

governing autonomy of the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname were significantly broadened. In the period of radical anti-imperialism during the 1960s and 1970s, only Surinam followed the seemingly normative model of decolonisation when it exited the Kingdom in 1975. Meanwhile, Antilleans have repeatedly broadened definitions of anti-imperial resistance by insisting that self-determination includes the right to remain under Dutch sovereignty. The tremendous diversity in experiences throughout the Antilles and in Surinam lays bare the ambivalent impact of the imperial project to make the Caribbean 'Dutch'.

Colonial Governance

In the nineteenth century, the administrative organisation of Dutch colonies in the Caribbean began to take a more lasting shape with the transfer of authority from private trading companies to the Dutch government. Despite a more centralised approach to colonial administration in the West Indies, the nineteenth century in the Antilles and Surinam reads in many ways against the grain of 'new imperialism.' Indeed, as the commercial importance of the Dutch Caribbean waned by the nineteenth century so too did the zeal for the imperial project there. Unlike in the East Indies, imperialism in the Caribbean was never a source of pride and national celebration in the metropole. Nevertheless, the structures of governance and patterns of rule that metropolitan and colonial officials forged would endure into the twentieth century.

With the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the establishment of a Kingdom in the Netherlands, the first Dutch king, Wilem I, assumed direct rule over Dutch colonies in the Caribbean. During the Napoleonic Wars and French occupation of the Low Countries, the British had temporarily gained control of Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, which also included the colonies of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. When Wilem I took over the Dutch West Indian empire in 1815, only Surinam and the six Antillean islands – Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, Saba, St Eustatitius and St Maarten – were returned to the

Netherlands. To streamline colonial governance after the demise of the WIC, in 1845 the West Indian empire was divided into two administrative entities: Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, which until 1948 retained the name 'Curaçao and dependencies.'

In political terms, the administrative relationship between the colonies and metropole throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries remained essentially colonial. For most of the nineteenth century, the Crown appointed a governor in each colony who held executive and legislative authority. Governing regulations implemented in 1866 introduced colonial councils (*Koloniale Staten*) to the governing apparatus of West Indian colonies, yet these bodies were advisory in nature, lacked any legislative authority, and were appointed largely by the governor himself. Further, the governor retained the right to adapt any of the councils' suggestions. Predictably, governors and members of the colonial councils were born in the Netherlands or else members of the European colonial elite. Until 1962, the governor of the Netherlands Antilles was invariably a European Dutchman with a military or academic background.

Managing colonial economies was one of the most important tasks of imperial governments. By the mid-nineteenth century, the West Indian colonies failed to turn a profit. Because of this economic state of affairs, The Hague insisted on its right to intervene in the colonies' budgets if they were not balanced. Thus, in spite of the 1866 governing regulations that aimed to broaden the autonomy of colonial governance, the fact that the budget was not balanced in Surinam until the 1940s and in the Antilles until the 1930s meant that into the twentieth century The Hague maintained tremendous authority in approving and adapting colonial budgets.

Slavery and Racial Hierarchies in Colonial Societies

One of the metropole's most significant interventions in the life and economy of its West Indian empire came in 1863 with the abolition of slavery.

For the WIC, who ruled over much of the colonies in the Americas and whose monopoly on the African slave trade ended only in 1730, the traffic in African slaves to the new world was essential business. Indeed, from 1600–1808 – when, during their occupation of Surinam, the British abolished the slave trade – the Dutch were responsible for bringing an estimated half-a-million slaves to the New World. The migration of enslaved Africans profoundly shaped the societies of the Dutch Caribbean, where free European settlers remained in the minority and indigenous populations were virtually non-existent in the Antilles owing to earlier Spanish contact.

Since the initial founding of their colonial empire, the Dutch struggled to impose a rigid racial hierarchy on what was a thoroughly heterogeneous colonial population. The organisation of social relations in Aruba, Curaçao, and Surinam attest to the tremendous variety throughout the Dutch Caribbean. On Aruba, which unlike the other Antillean islands did not have a majority enslaved population of African descent, Amerindians migrating from South America settled on the island and in many cases mixed with the small European population.

Curaçao, the most populous and economically significant of the Antilles, emerges as an outlier amongst Caribbean colonies. Its commercial character and function as a free-trade hub created an atmosphere of relative openness amongst the resident population, although the conditions of life under slavery remained brutal and oppressive. Given the island's commercial character and its arid climate, which prevented the development of large-scale plantation agriculture, slaves worked on the docks, as sailors and domestic servants, and produced food for local consumption. The relatively large segment of a free coloured population on Curaçao is also striking. Although the elite Dutch Protestants and Sephardic Jews of colonial Curaçao married endogamously to protect wealth and privilege, lower-class European Dutch who arrived in the eighteenth century as petty officers and labourers began to marry light-skinned middle-class creole women. Indeed, such marriage patterns attest to the low number of Dutch women who migrated to the New World and the

prevalence of unions – both official and unofficial – amongst males of European descent and females of African and Amerindian descent. White elites viewed this group with anxiety, fearful that a mulatto middle class would upset the boundaries of the colonial racial hierarchy.

Although plantation agriculture was scarcely imaginable in the arid or else small and mountainous terrain of the Antilles, by the eighteenth century Surinam had emerged as a quintessential plantation colony. Contemporary observations about the unique cruelty of planters in Surinam bear out statistically, where each year more slaves died on plantations than were born there. The negative birth rate demanded the merciless importation of more slaves from Africa, upon whose labour tropical cash crops such as sugar and coffee were produced and destined exclusively for Dutch markets. From 1668–1828, between 300,000 and 325,000 slaves were sold to planters in Surinam. On the eve of emancipation in 1863, some 36,000 individuals remained enslaved and 216 plantations continued to operate.

If the nature of colonial slavery varied throughout the Dutch Caribbean, so too did forms of resistance. The jungles of Surinam's vast and uninhabited interior served as a sanctuary to communities of runaway slaves, known as maroons, who often formed tribes alongside the native Amerindians of the rainforests. In the eighteenth century, Dutch officials were forced to conclude a peace treaty with maroon leaders, granting them their autonomy. By the time of emancipation in 1863, maroon communities along the Surinam River constituted a nation within a nation, including some 8,000 people living in isolation from colonial authorities.

On Curaçao, slave revolts erupted several times in the eighteenth century. One of the largest occurred in 1795 and was influenced by the principles of freedom and equality emanating from the Haitian Revolution. On 17 August 1795, about 50 slaves on the plantation De Knip refused to work and deserted the plantation. What initially began as an apparent strike grew in the coming weeks to attempt an island-wide revolt that included some 2,000 – a significant portion of the island's 12,000 slaves. Despite early successes, by September the slave militias had been brutally suppressed by Dutch forces. Today on Curaçao, Tula, the proclaimed leader of the 1795 slave revolt, is recognised as a national hero and 17 August is annually commemorated as a milestone in the struggle for freedom.

Although slave resistance threatened the security of planters and colonial elites, the institution of slavery would not be abolished until 1863. Who was responsible for abolishing slavery and what were their motives? Scholars of Dutch Atlantic slavery have debated the explanation and significance of late abolition – indeed, the British had abolished slavery in 1833 and the French in 1848. Whether metropolitan officials were motivated by the poor economic performance of the colonies, humanitarian reasons, or perhaps simply because they appeared backward amongst their European neighbours for maintaining slavery, what is clear is the lack of a strong abolitionist movement in the Netherlands. Tellingly, one of the most intense debates surrounding abolition, and one that contributed to its late date, concerned the remuneration of planters, not slaves.

Whereas slave labour had already lost its economic importance throughout much of the Antillean islands by the mid-nineteenth century – in fact, in St Maarten slaves had already declared themselves free in 1848 when slavery had been abolished on the French side of the island – in Surinam official emancipation in 1863 and its aftermath would have a different impact. Given Surinam's plantation economy, Dutch officials prepared for a dramatic labour shortage by inviting indentured workers initially from British India and later from Java and China. This second wave of immigration to Surinam in the mid-nineteenth century resulted in the creation of Latin America's most diverse society, with sizable Hindustani (British Indian), creole or Afro-Surinamese, Javanese, Chinese, Maroon, and Amerindian enclaves. Although in the colonial period more people spoke Dutch in Surinam than elsewhere in the Caribbean, the widely spoken creole language of Sranan Tongo reflects the diverse peoples and colonial history of Surinam, as it includes English, Portuguese, Dutch, and Central and West African influences. Meanwhile, the colonial economy in

Surinam continued its downturn in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Faced with increased global competition and declining prices, sugar plantations after 1863 did not recover and the dearth of capital prompted planters to abandon their estates, which were subsequently broken down into small farm plots and typically cultivated by former slaves.

The post-emancipation period in the Antilles and Surinam continued to be characterised by racial inequality, metropolitan disinterest, and elite colonial dominance in the realms of politics and economics. In Surinam, which garnered more metropolitan investment than the Antilles given its larger population and abundance of natural resources, the metropolitan state subsidised Christian missionary activities in the education and conversion of former slaves and their descendants. Although efforts at Afro-Surinamese assimilation were ambivalent at best, a Dutch-language educational curriculum enabled a class of creoles – typically the progeny of white planters and civil servants and Afro-Surinamese female concubines, the so-called 'Surinamese marriage' – to initiate colonial careers. It would be this group who first called for self-government in Surinam.

Resistance, Independence, Autonomy

With changes in colonial social organisation underway by the turn of the twentieth century, the next 100 years would bring dramatic transformation in trans-Atlantic relations. The Second World War is a watershed in this history, ending centuries of colonial rule. Yet unlike familiar narratives of post-war decolonisation entailing bloody struggles for national liberation, in the Dutch Caribbean demands for immediate territorial sovereignty have proven the exception, not the rule. As enduring partners in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the experiences of the Antillean islands demonstrate that struggles for equality need not manifest in demands for unequivocal independence.

Until the Second World War, modernising reforms in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles proved half-hearted. Even after a representative council was introduced in the Antilles in 1936, only 5% of the population was eligible to vote. For metropolitan and colonial officials, parliamentary democracy and fully autonomous governance in the West Indian empire were simply not options.

During wartime, however, a devastated and powerless Dutch government in exile began to accept that colonial governance must change if the empire were to survive. In 1942, Dutch officials proposed reforming the post war Kingdom to become a commonwealth of equal-partner states, each possessing autonomy in internal affairs. The primary purpose of this concession, however, was to maintain Dutch influence in Indonesia, which in 1945 had proclaimed independence. Following a protracted and bloody struggle for sovereignty, the Netherlands at last relinquished control of Indonesia and, for the first time in over a century, was compelled to focus on its lingering imperial investments in the Caribbean. In 1948 the Netherlands honoured Antillean and Surinamese petitions for governing reforms. That year, 'Curaçao and dependencies' became known as the Netherlands Antilles. Both here and in Surinam, parliamentary democracy and the extension of the franchise replaced the powerful rule of colonial governors and undemocratic councils. At this stage, no official mentioned the possibility of independence.

It took until 1954 to produce a comprehensive constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. During a series of round-table conferences initiated in 1948, delegates throughout the Kingdom attempted to strike a constitutional balance between full independence and metropolitan integration. On 29 December 1954, the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands was proclaimed that enacted a new constitutional order for the three ostensibly equal states of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Surinam. While the latter two possessed governing autonomy in internal affairs, the Netherlands was careful to ensure that many responsibilities for Kingdom-affairs remained grounded in The Hague. Among them, nationality, foreign affairs, defence, and the guarantee of good governance would be administered from Europe.

Although the Netherlands undoubtedly retained the upper hand in Kingdom affairs, trans-Atlantic relations after this point can no longer unequivocally be characterised as colonial. The extension of the franchise and the introduction of autonomous and democratic governing institutions issued a fundamental break from the governing regulations laid down a century earlier. Nevertheless, the absence of any Kingdom-wide representative body or judiciary ensured that the Netherlands – its parliament and judicial courts – would have de facto authority throughout the Kingdom.

In an era of heightened radical anti-imperialism, in the late 1960s Curaçao and Surinam began to press for further changes within the Kingdom. On Curaçao, frustration evolved out of a labour dispute amongst workers at the Shell oil plant. In the 1920s, oil refineries established on Aruba and Curaçao brought significant industrial changes to the Antilles, expanding the industrial working class and drawing immigration of skilled technicians from the Netherlands and labourers from throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. Employment cutbacks and the increased reliance on sub-contracted labour by midcentury disproportionately affected the black working class on Curaçao, who received lower wages than immigrant workers. After negotiations failed, on 30 May 1969 downtown Willemstad became the site of a violent protest. Moving beyond its origins as a labour dispute, the protestors railed against the vestiges of Dutch colonialism and the endurance of racial inequality and economic exploitation. Local police struggled to contain the revolt as protestors looted businesses and burned buildings. The Dutch, owing to their promise of mutual aid and the guarantee of defence as outlined in the Charter, aided Antillean authorities in ending the revolt.

Trinta di mei, or '30 May 1969,' although subdued in just a number of days, was a major milestone in the struggle for Antillean equality. For the first time ever, a political party representing the interests of the Afro-Curaçaon working class came to power on the island. Although May 1969 brought relations between the Netherlands and Curaçao to a head, the event also heightened tensions between Curaçao and neighbouring Antillean islands. Aruba, which had long complained of political dominance by Curaçao, worried in particular about the ascendance of radical working-class politics there.

In The Hague, the revolt of May 1969 troubled the new centre-left governing coalition, whose members grew concerned that the perpetuation of 'neo-colonial' ties would frustrate an increasingly progressive Dutch self-image and foreign policy agenda. For Dutch officials, ushering the former colonies to total independence seemed the only course of action. In 1974, the Surinamese government under the leadership of Prime Minister Henck Arron unexpectedly announced its intention to accept independence the following year. Dutch officials were enthusiastic about the prospect, and negotiations over the next 2 years culminated in the peaceful transfer of sovereignty to Surinam on 25 November 1975. Although some radical nationalist movements percolated in the years leading up to independence, no popular referenda on Surinam's political status had ever been issued, and what transpired in 1975 was largely a closed-off, political affair. Popular scepticism surrounding independence is perhaps best expressed in the dramatic exodus that occurred between its announcement in 1974 and 1980, when the Netherlands ceased to recognise the Dutch citisenship of Surinamese. During this time, upwards of one-third of Surinam's population left permanently for the former metropole.

As this dramatic postcolonial exodus suggests, political independence did not meet all of the nationalist aspirations in Surinam. Within 5 years of the transfer of sovereignty, a military coup led by Desi Bouterse, a former soldier, overthrew the democratically elected government. During his military dictatorship, Bouterse was accused of killing 15 of his top opponents and opening the country to drug trafficking and crime. Although independence has delivered on other expectations in Surinam, the country's tumultuous post-independence history became a cautionary tale for other would-be nationalists throughout the Antillean islands.

Aruban leaders cautiously observed the evolving state of affairs in Surinam. Curiously, it was

not separation from the Netherlands that Aruba sought but distance from Curaçao, perceived as a hegemonic political force in the Antillean state. Dutch officials had long been reluctant to break apart the six-island Antillean state, believing the unity of the islands to be crucial for later realising independence. In 1983, however, Dutch officials acquiesced to Aruban separatist leader Betico Croes and agreed to recognise Aruba as a separate constituent country of the Kingdom on the condition that Aruba accept full independence within the next decade. When Aruba achieved its *status aparte*, or separate status in 1986, Aruban officials worked quickly to revoke the guarantee of eventual independence. Strikingly, as this and subsequent changes in the Kingdom reveal, calls for Antillean independence have originated largely in The Hague. Antilleans have resisted such moves while asserting that sovereignty rests in the right to disavow independence and choose amongst forms of associated statehood.

Towards the Kingdom of Today

By the 1990s, The Hague began to accept that their role in the Caribbean would be a permanent one and, barring independence, grew anxious about further decentralising the Netherlands Antilles. Although opinion polls conducted throughout the Antilles in the 1990s indicated general support for the maintenance of the five-island state, by the turn of the twenty-first century, perceived dominance by Curaçao amongst the smaller Antillean islands and Curacao's mounting resentment over its responsibility to the 'little brothers' of the Antilles led to a drastic overhaul of the five-island state. Referenda issued throughout the Antilles after 2000 ultimately laid bare the deep dissatisfaction with the state. Of the four options on the referenda – total independence, separate status within the Kingdom, direct constitutional ties with the Netherlands, or maintenance of the Netherlands Antilles – Curaçao and St Maarten chose to pursue separate status within the Kingdom while a majority of voters on Bonaire and Saba wished to develop direct ties with the Netherlands. Only St Eustatius voted to maintain the Netherlands Antilles, and in a reissued referendum sided with Bonaire and Saba in forging direct ties with the Netherlands.

Overhauling the Antillean state per the referenda would be a significant endeavour for the Netherlands: tremendous Antillean debt to the Netherlands would need to be forgiven in order for economies, in particular in the newly created states of Curaçao and St Maarten, to function independently. And the exact nature of 'direct ties' with Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba, known as the BES islands, would involve years of intense negotiations ultimately resulting in the extension of Dutch borders overseas. By 2006 a plan for constitutional restructuring was in place: on the symbolically chosen date of 10 October 2010 (10/10/10) the islands of the Netherlands Antilles would secede from one another, though each of them would remain within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Curaçao and St Maarten would become autonomously governing member states of the Kingdom, joining Aruba and the Netherlands. The BES islands would forge direct ties with the Netherlands according to Article 134 of the Dutch Constitution, bringing the smallest and least populous of the Antilles under direct constitutional rule as 'public entities' of the Netherlands. In effect, the BES islands would integrate into the European Netherlands, electing representatives in The Hague and being subject to Dutch law.

Despite intense negotiations over debt, government corruption in the Antilles, and the dramatic change in governing coalitions in both Curaçao and Bonaire, which intermittently threatened to halt the process, on 10 October 2010 the next historic phase of Kingdom relations commenced when the Netherlands Antilles – a state that was created and, for most of its history, maintained as a colonial administrative unit – dissolved. For the residents of the former state, little love was lost for a country that many felt had only ever existed in the eyes of Dutch officials.

The dismantling of the Antilles, a major diplomatic undertaking for all parties, pointed up the difficulties of building a more equitable Kingdom. First, Antillean restructuring failed to address the Kingdom's so-called 'democratic deficit.'

Member states do not answer to a single Kingdom-wide legislative or representative body. Although residents of the BES islands now vote for members of Dutch parliament, the fact that Dutch institutions stand in for most Kingdom-wide affairs while representing only constituents in the Netherlands remains a perennial problem. Secondly, discussions over Antillean dismantlement in the Netherlands occurred in a political climate where debates over immigration and increased government spending are flashpoint issues. Proposed measures to restrict the immigration of high-risk Antillean youth to the Netherlands – perceived as poorly assimilated and overrepresented in criminal statistics – have heightened tensions between the Netherlands and the Antilles, for whom Dutch citizenship and access to the Netherlands is a primary reason for remaining within the Kingdom. Lastly, for many in the BES islands, the near total legal assimilation with the Netherlands has threatened traditions of political and cultural autonomy. Controversially, some standards for social security, schools, and hospitals remain lower in the BES islands, while the Dutch parliament has insisted, alternatively, that the islands accept Dutch law on same-sex marriage, abortion, and euthanasia. Sensitivity to these issues amongst religious and political leaders on the islands is compounded by a perceived sense of marginalisation in negotiations over the evolving relations between the Netherlands and its Caribbean public entities, evoking fears of 'recolonisation' on the islands. Here as elsewhere throughout the former Dutch Antilles, contentment over this new phase of post-colonial relations remains under evaluation.

Conclusion

The history of colonialism and inequality that has characterised trans-Atlantic relations throughout most of the past four centuries looms large in contemporary Antillean and Dutch political imaginaries. Although most experts dismiss independence amongst the Antillean islands as an unlikely outcome, the rhetoric of territorial sovereignty continues to resonate – in the Antilles and the Netherlands alike. In the European Netherlands, ascendant anti-immigrant political parties like the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) have notoriously proposed selling the islands on marktplaats.nl, an e-commerce website akin to Ebay. In the Antilles, political parties like Curaçao's leading Sovereign People (*Pueblo Soberano*) continue to proclaim eventual sovereignty as a core component of their platform.

Nevertheless, the Netherlands and the Antillean islands are more closely intertwined as post-colonial partners today than they were two centuries ago. The hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Suriname and the Antilles currently residing in the Netherlands have blown open the long silenced history on the Dutch slave and colonial past, debates that also concern enduring anxieties around racial equality and post-colonial statehood. The fact that in 2010 three Caribbean islands became juridically 'Dutch' after a half-century of political autonomy raises questions about the enduring and ambiguous legacies of imperialism. What remains to be seen, however, is whether an enduring multinational Kingdom can be made more equitable for all its citizens.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)
▶ Danish Colonialism
▶ Enslaved African Labour: Violent Racial Capitalism
▶ France and Imperialism
▶ Grenadian Socialist Anti-colonialism and US Imperialism
▶ James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)
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East Asia

Easter Rising (1916) in Ireland and Its Historical Context, Campaign for an Irish Democracy

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"And the world did gaze in deep amaze at that gallant band but few
For slavery fled 'neath the Liffey swell when they fell on the foggy dew" (The Foggy Dew)

Introduction

This entry focuses on the Easter Rising in Ireland (1916), its causes, and its impact nationally and internationally. As such, this is a study of the development of resistance to British colonial rule in Ireland, the beginnings of Irish republicanism, its challenges to existing power structures such as the Catholic Church, the landowning, and emerging capitalist class and the British Empire, and the resulting tensions and conflicts which emerged within the Irish population and between it and British political and strategic interests. It also discusses the legacy of the Rising and its aftermath in relation to Ireland's place within the world, the continuing uncertainty and unresolved issues around conflict, and peace within Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations today.

The Background to the Campaign for Political Democracy in Ireland

On Easter Monday morning 24 April 1916, armed bands of about 1200 men and women took control of a number of key buildings and areas of Dublin, the capital city and the center of British administration in Ireland (McGarry 2017). Their leader, a man called Patrick Pearse, read out a document which was then posted on the General Post Office in the main avenue, Sackville Street (now known as O'Connell Street). It proclaimed an independent Irish republic free from British rule. Fighting broke out as British troops were sent to retake the buildings. A number of other parts of the country experienced disturbances, but these were of a much more limited nature.

By the end of the week, what the authorities called "the rebels" had surrendered, and a ragtag band of prisoners, most in civilian clothes, were marched away to captivity. An estimated 485 people had been killed, the majority, about 260 of

them, civilians (including 40 children) and nearly 3,000 wounded during the fighting (Glasnevin Trust n.d.; Duffy 2017). In the immediate aftermath, the British authorities, having introduced martial law, executed 14 of the alleged leaders in Dublin, 1 in Cork and a sixteenth later in London. Others were sentenced to life and other various lengths of imprisonment. Throughout Ireland an estimated 3,500 men and 79 women "suspects" were arrested, and nearly 1800 were imprisoned "without trial" in Britain. The Rising appeared to have failed miserably.

The Irish media, the Catholic Church hierarchy, and the main nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party all condemned the Rising. The vast bulk of the population did not rise in its support as had been hoped by the leaders, and indeed contemporaneous reports suggested that many people in Dublin apparently abused the prisoners as they were led away (McGarry 2017:255). Many more men were fighting with British forces overseas in World War I and in the police forces in Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), than were involved in the Rising. Yet in the space of just over 2 years, the "constitutional" Irish Parliamentary Party had been decimated in the 1918 elections, and the republican party, Sinn Féin, had secured an overwhelming majority of seats in Ireland, on a platform of abstention from Britain's Westminster Parliament and establishing an independent Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann. The Rising and in particular the response of Ireland's British rulers to it appeared to have succeeded in awakening what Thomas Davis, the nineteenth-century republican revolutionary, had described (in his celebrated song "The West Awake") as the "slumbering slaves" of Ireland. To paraphrase the Irish poet, W.B. Yeats' "a terrible beauty" appeared to have been born.

Why did the Rising take place in 1916? What did it mean for Ireland and indeed the world, and what has been its legacy?

To understand the 1916 Rising, it is important to look at the context in which it took place. It did not happen in a vacuum but was the result of a culmination of a range of factors in the early years of the twentieth century and a long history of British rule and resistance to it over many centuries. It was that long history which provided part of the incentive for the "rebels" to organize the Rising. It also provided part of the narrative which legitimized their actions in their view and the view of their supporters. The Rising can only be understood in the context of that long-drawn-out struggle to achieve political democracy and in the context of a world controlled by the male property-owning classes of imperial powers.

In the early twentieth century, the island of Ireland was ruled directly by the Westminster Parliament in London as part of what was called the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This entity had been created by the 1801 Act of Union in the aftermath of yet another rebellion against British rule in Ireland in 1798 and its brutal suppression. In reality the people of Ireland had had little say in the creation of this "United Kingdom" or indeed in British rule of Ireland over the previous six centuries. Only about 3% of the population of Britain and Ireland had the vote in 1801, and Catholics, the vast majority of the people in Ireland (80%) at the time, were not allowed to take seats in Parliament. This ban was lifted in 1829 after Daniel O'Connell's Catholic Emancipation campaign, and there was a gradual extension of the vote to more people throughout the nineteenth century through the campaigning efforts of social reformers, socialists, labor unions and suffragettes. However, by 1916 it was still the case that only a small minority (15%) of the people of Ireland actually had a vote in Parliamentary elections.

In 1916 therefore, any notion of democracy in Ireland under British rule was highly underdeveloped. Attempts had been made from the late eighteenth century on to change this, by both revolutionary and "constitutional" means. However on the eve of the 1916 Rising despite a range of promises and a Home Rule Bill, suspended due to the outbreak of World War I and political opposition in Ireland and in Britain, political democracy still appeared to be elusive and a site of continuing struggle.

The Background to the Campaign for Political Democracy in Ireland

Colonialism, Plantation, and the Sectarianization of Ireland

While attempts by power elites on the island of Britain to rule Ireland began with the Anglo-Norman invasions from 1169 on, they were initially successful in only parts of the country, around the greater Dublin area in what was termed "The Pale". Gradually over the centuries most of the country came under English control, through a mixture of invasion, suppression of resistance, bribery, and divide and conquer of local chieftains.

Prior to the Reformation, both colonists (from the island of Britain) and Irish were Christian/Catholic. The main factors distinguishing Irish natives from English rulers/landowners related to language and culture. As time progressed intermarriage and interrelationships led many colonists and their descendants to acquire the Irish language and customs. Fearing the Anglo-Irish were becoming "more Irish than the Irish themselves" (indeed many of the early uprisings against English rule were led by the Anglo-Irish), the English Government in Ireland passed the Statutes of Kilkenny (1366) aimed primarily at stopping the Anglo-Irish mixing with natives (Bartlett 2010:34–79).

It was the Reformation however and responses to it which was to lead to the greatest and most enduring divisions in Ireland. Differences in religion became associated with differences in ethnic/cultural identity and with political and national loyalty and disloyalty. Differential sets of civil, political, and economic rights were also developed by the British state in Ireland based on these religious differences.

After the Reformation and the English King Henry VIII's break with Rome in 1534, the vast majority of the Irish remained Catholic, despite being ruled by a now Protestant England. They were viewed as being "disloyal" because they had sided with Rome and not the King. Clergy were banished and could be executed if captured and Church land confiscated. From that period, the connection between religion, notions of identity,

and loyalty or disloyalty to Britain developed. The fact that the native Irish found themselves in conflict with both a "foreign" religion as well as a "foreign" power strengthened the importance of religion as a bond of identity and solidarity. The same was true for the settlers from Britain, planted in Ireland to provide support for the crown. The result was the creation of an historic bond between Catholicism and a concept of ethnic Irishness on the one hand and Protestantism and the ethnic identity of the colonizer on the other.

Despite the suppression of numerous uprisings, the wholesale confiscation of land, and the imposition of a number of plantations of loyal subjects from the island of Britain, it was not until the early seventeenth century, the Flight of the (last Gaelic) Earls, and what became known as the Plantation of Ulster from 1609, that British control of all of Ireland became complete. The confiscation of land and the plantation of often relatively poor tenant farmers as settlers from England and Scotland had a devastating impact on the socioeconomic position of the Catholic ("native") Irish in Ireland. This was particularly the case in Ulster. By 1704 the native Irish owned about 14% of land in Ireland but only 5% in Ulster (Hayton 2018:134; Corish 1981:74). The Ulster Plantation, in particular, laid down segregated living patterns (where Irish Catholics and Scots/English/Protestants lived in separate communities and separate lives) which exist to this day in parts of Ulster. The dispossession of the native Irish was to be exacerbated, reinforced, and reproduced into the seventeenth century with the imposition of the penal laws.

The Penal Laws

Uprisings continued to disrupt stable control of Ireland until the final crushing of Irish supporters of the English King James 11, a Catholic, by William of Orange's Protestant forces in 1690 in the Williamite War (1689–1691). The penal laws which followed almost completely suppressed native Irish demands for independence from Britain for more than a century. They operated from 1695 until the early years of the nineteenth

century and categorized citizenship rights according to religion. Catholics were discriminated against socially, politically, and economically. Presbyterians also suffered though this was mainly in terms of restrictions on religious practice rather than economic or political participation in society, although Presbyterians could be excluded from holding public office, practicing law or teaching if they refused to accept the sacraments on Sunday according to the English rite (known as the Test Act). Unlike Catholics, Presbyterians with the necessary property qualifications (many of whom did not) could vote and take seats in the Irish Parliament (Connolly 2008:205). Draconian property ownership restrictions were imposed on Irish Catholics, and they were denied access to education. The main purpose was to deprive the majority Irish Catholic population of political and economic power and remove any threat to control by Britain and its loyalist supporters. As a result of these restrictions, which bore most heavily upon the Catholic gentry and lay leadership, political leadership of the Catholics passed to the clergy. As a wealthy international organisation, the Church was the only body which could provide education, albeit outside of Ireland, and thereby give status and power to Irish Catholics. On their return to Ireland as educated clergy, they assumed the leadership role of the native Irish. Thus the tremendous influence wielded by the Catholic Church among Catholics in Ireland up until the twenty-first century "has its roots in the historic elimination of alternative avenues for Catholic political participation in Irish politics" (Probert 1978:21).

Although Catholics in Ireland and their Church were viewed as disloyal, this did not mean that they favored radical social and economic change. Both the Church and its congregation wanted an end to persecution, but for the vast majority, the most that meant was changing the rulers or the way they ruled. There is certainly an argument that since Catholics followed a hierarchal system of religion, similar to monarchy, they would be more inclined culturally to embrace monarchy politically rather than democracy, unlike, say, Presbyterians. As long ago as 1732, Jonathan

Swift had argued, for example, in his "Reasons for Repealing the Sacramental Test" that:

> the Catholics were always defenders of the monarchy, as constituted in these kingdoms, whereas our brethren the Dissenters were always Republican both in principle and practice. (Swift 1964:286)

Whether or not this was true, the depressed state of most Catholic Irish economically, politically, culturally, and educationally meant that when republican ideas were brought to Ireland from revolutionary France in the late eighteenth century, it was primarily educated Protestants and in particular Presbyterians who embraced and promoted them.

The Birth of Irish Republicanism

In the late eighteenth century, it was the Protestant middle classes, not the politically silenced Catholic/Irish, who began to demand greater democracy in Ireland and then an independent republic. Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (1776) and the *Rights of Man* (1791) and the revolutions in both America (1776 on) and France (1789 on) had a profound effect on radical ideas and actions among many throughout Europe, including the educated classes, primarily Protestant, in Ireland at the time. The American struggle for an end to rule from Britain and the French Revolution's struggle for an end to rule by absolute monarchs sparked the imagination of those who saw political democracy as a solution to their economic well-being. The revolution in France in particular showed that not only could governments be changed but that Catholics (in France) could embrace radical change, oppose monarchy, and in the process challenge their own Church hierarchy. In Ulster in particular, the effect of Britain's economic policies (aimed at protecting the economy of Britain rather than promoting the economy of Ireland) had created discontent among those engaged in the new industrialization of the late eighteenth century. The Volunteers were set up as a militia in 1778 ostensibly to defend Ireland in the event that the American revolutionaries would use that country as a stepping stone to attack Britain during the American War of

Independence. However, they used their position of strength to demand greater independence from Britain (and Britain's executive in Dublin) in relation to passing legislation for Ireland. While Grattan's (Protestant) Irish Parliament gained greater legislative powers from London by 1782, the country was still governed by an Irish executive appointed by Britain, and Catholics, the vast majority of the population, remained excluded from political life (Mansergh 2004). It was not until the founding of the United Irish movement in 1791, led primarily by Protestants, that the demand for political rights for Catholics began to be widely articulated.

The United Irish Society was the first major movement in Ireland to articulate the concept of a republic, one which was secular and in which the different religious strands of Protestant, Catholic, and Dissenter would be united together "under the common term of Irishmen." The organization was, in the beginning, open, reformist, and constitutional. The majority of its founders were parliamentary reformers (Moody et al. 1998). Although it initially tried to bring about reform through peaceful means, under increasing state coercion, it turned to revolution, culminating in the failed rebellion of 1798.

The United Irish Society was up initially in Belfast and then Dublin. It established "clubs" throughout the country and a newspaper in Belfast – *The Northern Star*. Wolfe Tone, was one of its main leaders. In the pamphlet, *An Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland* (1791), he called for full Catholic Emancipation and the removal of the remaining penal laws. A series of discussions ("the Belfast debates") developed among Protestants and in particular northern Presbyterians about the idea of equal rights for all religious groups in Ireland. In 1793 Catholics owning or renting property worth two pounds or more were given the vote (on the same basis as Protestants), though they were still barred from sitting in Parliament. They were also allowed to attend university and serve in the military and civil service. However these reforms didn't go far enough in the direction of political democracy for the United Irish. In the same year, Britain went to war with revolutionary France, and those in Ireland who appeared to be supportive of the French revolution were seen a threat to the establishment in Britain. In 1794 the United Irish Society was banned and went underground as the British Government began rounding up, torturing, "pitch-capping" (pouring hot tar on the scalps of victims), and killing suspects. Wolfe Tone escaped to the USA and then to France where he attempted to get military aid for a rebellion in Ireland. By this stage the United Irish had made it clear that it was an independent republic which was required. Tone's diary entry for 11 March 1796 stated:

> Our independence must be had at all hazards. If the men of property will not support us, they must fall; we can support ourselves by the aid of that numerous and respectable class of the community, the men of no property. (Moody et al. 2001:107)

By August 1796, Tone articulated his aims thus:

> To subvert the tyranny of our execrable Government, break the connection with England, the never-failing source of our political evils, and to assert the independence of my country – these were my objects.
>
> To unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the memory of our past dissensions and to substitute the common name of Irishmen in place of the denomination of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter – these were my means. (Bartlett 1998:46)

In 1796 a French invasion fleet was wrecked by storms off Bantry Bay in Cork. Rebellion broke out in May 1798 mainly in Antrim and Down in the North and in Leinster, particularly around Wexford. It lasted 3 months and was brutally suppressed by the government with tens of thousands killed. Many were transported to the colonies as prisoners. Toward the end of the rebellion another French force landed in Co. Mayo in August 1798 but after a short period was surrounded and surrendered. A final French force also landed off the coast of Donegal with Tone on board. It was defeated and Tone was captured and sentenced to death. He took his own life before being executed. The 1798 Rebellion had been another failure in a history of failures of attempted rebellions against British rule in Ireland. What was different about it however were the ideas it was trying to promote of secular republicanism and political democracy – the

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ideas of the French revolution, liberté, fraternité, and egalité. These were ideas which were to influence future generations of republicans in Ireland, and it is from this point that the future Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) which organized the 1916 Rising traced its roots.

The 1798 Rebellion had been largely led by the Protestant Irish, and although Catholics did part in it particularly in Wexford, the vast majority did not. The Catholic hierarchy had vehemently opposed the rebellion, greatly lessening the participation of the Catholic Irish. Some did become involved, especially in Wexford; Father Murphy, the priest who led the Wexford Rising, was excommunicated by the Catholic Church. However, most historians agree that the vast majority of Catholics, especially in the North, spurned it, and many joined government militias, set up in 1793, to help suppress it. Most of the northern rebels who took up arms were Protestants, while the largely Catholic Monaghan Militia was, in fact, one of the mainstays of the government forces in the North (Berresford Ellis 1985:81). While some Catholics fought on the rebel side at Ballynahinch, many more served with the militia (Budge and O'Leary 1973:12).

Catholic Church and British Government Rapprochement

By the late eighteenth century, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the British state had begun to change. One pivotal event was the death in 1766 of the son of the deposed Catholic King James II who had been recognized by the Pope as King of Britain and Ireland while in exile. The Pope did not recognize his son, "Bonnie Prince Charlie," as King. This allowed Irish Catholics to recognize the de facto King George III, removing one particular impediment to their potential treatment by the British authorities as loyal subjects (Phoenix 2001). Besides this by the latter half of the eighteenth century, the Catholic Irish had not rebelled for 100 years. Both the British establishment and the Catholic Church were also terrified of the possible repercussions of the French Revolution, especially as there were

revolutionary rumblings in Ireland in the form of the United Irish Society with links to the French revolutionaries. The new conditions meant that elements in the British Government began to develop a different approach to the Catholic Church in Ireland – the only effective remaining political leadership of the Catholic Irish – and view it as a potentially useful ally, in its rule in Ireland, rather than as a foe.

In 1795, Maynooth College was established with an annual government subsidy. This enabled priests to be educated in Ireland instead of travelling to foreign colleges in Europe where they might be influenced by anti-British or revolutionary ideas (Berresford Ellis 1985:70–83). Of course, even without Maynooth, the Catholic Church, because of its very nature, would not have favored revolutionary change in Ireland, or anywhere else, especially if it was allowed to operate freely by the powers that be. The Catholic Church was anxious to prevent the spread of revolutionary secular republican ideas from France, having actively opposed them in France. It was also anxious to develop and maintain a positive relationship with the British Government. As an international Church, it was important that it developed good relations with the rulers of the states in which it operated. It was not a national Church. It had members in England also. It thus had a different set of interests than those wishing to create an Irish democracy free from British rule. Indeed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries while the Catholic Church was to play a pivotal role in national politics in Ireland, it was always on its own terms and in the interests of the Church. While different priests and indeed bishops may have been influenced by personal political interests (either nationalist, republican, or indeed pro-British), the Church itself usually found itself supporting moderate reform and opposing radical revolution (Ó hAdhmaill 2013).

The Orange Order

While the main leaders of the 1798 Rising had been Protestant and, in particular, Presbyterian, they had also been opposed by many other

Protestants who opposed unity with Catholics and/or who feared the consequences of a rebellion which provided political power to the Catholic majority in Ireland. The massacre of mostly Protestant men, women, and children (viewed as loyal to the British Government) as a revenge attack by rebels at Scullabogue in Wexford during the 1798 Rebellion seemed to justify those concerns. Though condemned by the United Irish as not in their name, it was a terrible reminder to Ireland's minority Protestant community of what could happen to them (Bartlett 1998). The news emanating from France of what was happening to alleged supporters of the old regime from 1789 on also played a part in these concerns.

In 1795, a sectarian battle between Catholics and Protestants in Armagh had led to the formation of a new solely Protestant organization with totally opposite views to the United Irish. Rather than uniting Catholic, Protestant, and Dissenter against British rule, the Orange Order sought to unite Protestants in Ireland against the threat of the majority Catholic population and promote Protestant supremacy and loyalty to the British crown. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was Orangeism rather than republicanism which was to attract the bulk of Protestants particularly after it came to be utilized by the land-owning gentry and big business owners to oppose the Home Rule campaign. It was to play a dominant role in ensuring that the ideals of the United Irish were never realized (Senior 1966).

The Act of Union 1801: "Perfidious Albion"

The abortive rising of 1798 led directly to the 1801 Act of Union. The British Government decided to rule Ireland directly from London. The Irish Parliament was dissolved by the Act of Union (1801) and Ireland incorporated (along with Britain) into the UK. It hoped that this arrangement would create stability in Ireland and rule out further threats to British control. The British were not just concerned about the Irish revolutionaries but the fact that they had had links with the French revolutionaries and the enemies of the British Empire. Indeed a French Army had actually landed in Ireland in an abortive attempt to link up with the United Irish and assist them in the rebellion. The British wanted to prevent any further attempts to use Ireland as a potential stepping stone from which to attack Britain. This had been one of the factors historically which had strengthened British resolve to subdue Irish resistance to their rule.

There was also a view that within the Union the Protestants of Ireland, loyal to Britain, would feel safe even if Catholics achieved political rights, since Protestants would still hold the political majority within the UK. The UK majority would also ensure that Ireland could not easily secede from British rule. Likewise it was felt by the government that only by dealing with some of the grievances of the Catholics could it hope to stave off the possibility of further and potentially more devastating revolution in Ireland. The Catholic hierarchy had proven to be a loyal supporter during the 1798 Rebellion, and the more astute British leaders saw them as a useful ally in governing Ireland. However, the British establishment was not united in this view. Many powerful figures in both Britain and Ireland, including the King, opposed any concessions to Catholics. This was to create an obstacle to reform and be a continuing source of grievance for the Catholic Church and the majority Catholic population in Ireland into the nineteenth century.

In reality, the people of Ireland had had little say in the creation of this "UK" or indeed in British rule of Ireland over the previous six centuries. Although a local Parliament had existed in Ireland in the eighteenth century, its powers had been limited by the imperial Parliament in London. Its membership was also limited to the property-owning class and to the minority Protestant community, descendants, in the main, of colonists/settlers from the island of Britain. The lack of democracy in Ireland was one of the major factors influencing the establishment in Belfast of the United Irish Society in 1791 to strive for a secular republic, initially by peaceful means and then, when this met with repression by the British state, through revolution in 1798.

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In 1801 it is estimated that only about 3% of the population of Britain and Ireland had a vote (National Archives.gov.uk). Catholics had regained the vote (denied during the penal days) in 1793, but this was restricted to those who were wealthy enough to own or rent property worth at least two pounds. Thus neither the Irish Parliament which voted itself out of existence in 1801 under the influence of British Government bribes and threats (Bolton 1966; Geoghegan 1999) nor the British Parliament, which took over its limited functions, actually had any mandate from the Irish people. The vast majority of the population of Ireland were Catholics (80%), yet until 1829 they were barred from Parliament by a requirement that all members should take an oath abjuring Catholicism, a hangover from the penal laws of the eighteenth century. Although the British Government had promised the Catholic hierarchy an end to all religiously discriminatory legislation if they backed the Act of Union in 1801 (which they did), the bar on entrance to Parliament remained.

Ironically the powerful Orange Order was split on the Union. Set up to protect the Protestant Ascendancy in 1795, it opposed any attempts at Catholic Emancipation after the Act of Union. Much of the English and Irish establishment including the King also threw their weight behind this anti-Catholic Emancipation campaign, something that was viewed as another example of "perfidious albion" in relation to Ireland's majority Catholic population and another grievance to add to a list of many against British rule.

"Catholic Emancipation" and the Birth of Constitutional Nationalism

In 1803 a further attempt at rebellion by republican Robert Emmett was again a dismal failure, and this was followed by another failed attempt by the Young Irelanders in 1848. Both were condemned by the Catholic hierarchy and failed to attract much support. Instead the Church threw its weight behind "constitutional" methods to try to end the remaining discriminatory laws. This

approach was buoyed by the success of the Catholic Emancipation campaign in 1829.

The first great Catholic Irish constitutional nationalist leader in the early part of the nineteenth century was Daniel O'Connell. His political activities largely took place within the British political structures, and many future constitutional nationalists were to follow his strategy and tactics. He was strongly opposed to revolution including Robert Emmett's attempted rising in 1803. He also stated that no cause was worth the shedding of one drop of human blood.

O'Connell's great success was in forcing the British to grant Catholic Emancipation in 1829. This allowed Catholics to take their seats as MPs in the Westminster Parliament without having to renounce their faith. This measure had been promised in return for Catholic support for the Act of Union (1801) but had been reneged upon. O'Connell founded the Catholic Association in 1823, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Irish Catholics in support of the campaign. In 1828 he stood and was elected to the UK Parliament and refused to take the oath. The government fearing rebellion in Ireland agreed to remove the oath. Using monster rallies to show the depth of Catholic discontent across Ireland, O'Connell was able to convince the British that reform would be better than rebellion. However the "success" came with a caveat – in return for Catholic MPs in Parliament, O'Connell had agreed to support an increase in the property qualification for the vote. Minor landholders owning or renting property worth at least two pounds had been given the vote in 1793. This was now raised fivefold to ten pounds, reducing the electorate in Ireland from 216,000 to 37,000 men in a population of about 8 million people. As a community disproportionately socioeconomically disadvantaged, this was to particularly affect Catholics, O'Connell's support base. Thus, in the process, many of those who had elected O'Connell in the first place were disenfranchised, and a perceived threat to the British establishment – a large effective Irish vote – was removed.

What was termed "Catholic Emancipation" was not emancipation for the vast majority of Irish people, Catholics or otherwise. Indeed

despite a steady increase in the franchise during the nineteenth century under pressure from democracy campaigners, socialists, and labor unions, by 1916 only an estimated 15% of the population of Ireland could vote in Parliamentary elections, and none of those were women (Dorney 2014). It wasn't until 1918 that all men over the age of 21 got the vote regardless of property or income. Despite the efforts of the suffragettes, no women were to get to vote for Members of Parliament until 1918 and then only those over 30 with property or married to a man with property. A "Government" of Ireland did sit in Dublin, but it was appointed by the British Government in London not elected by the Irish people. It consisted of the chief secretary for Ireland, appointed by the prime minister; the undersecretary for Ireland; the head of the civil service, appointed in Whitehall; and the lord lieutenant (or viceroy), the King's representative, appointed in consultation between the British Government and the monarchy. Socioeconomically, the removal of the penal laws against Catholics did lead to a growth in the Catholic property-owning, business, and professional classes, throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. However, by 1916 the majority Catholic population remained a predominantly poor, disadvantaged sector of society.

Nevertheless for O'Connell and indeed the Catholic Church, the success of the "Catholic Emancipation" campaign appeared to open up new possibilities of using British "constitutional" methods, through the Westminster Parliament, to promote political changes of benefit to the Catholic Church and its flock and also to advance the cause of a more independent Ireland within the empire through the repeal of the Act of Union. The old Irish Parliament dissolved in 1801 had been the preserve of Irish Protestants. Any new Parliament in Ireland would have a majority of Irish Catholics which for both nationalist and religious reasons might appear attractive to the majority of Ireland's population. However, it was at one and the same time viewed as a threat by most of the minority Protestant population whose position of relative privilege, reinforced and reproduced through centuries of land confiscations, colonization, and penal laws, was potentially at threat.

O'Connell was to have less "success" with his Repeal of the Union campaign. With Catholic Emancipation achieved, wealthy Catholics supported by the Church could see an advantage in the return of a Parliament in Ireland which would now have Catholic MPs who, even with the property qualification, would have a majority there. It would potentially mean that laws could be passed which would suit the majority Catholic population there. That was exactly the same reason why many Protestants in Ireland feared the Repeal of the Union and campaigned against it. The British establishment also opposed it. Although O'Connell wasn't calling for independence or a republic but Home Rule within the empire, British legislators feared that such a move might be the thin edge of the wedge. Many in the British establishment had major land holdings and business interests in Ireland. There was also always a fear, which had existed over a number of centuries that Britain's enemies might use Ireland as launch pad to attack Britain. In 1798 the French had landed in Ireland for that same purpose and relations with France continued to be bad throughout the nineteenth century.

O'Connell established his Repeal Association as a mass membership political movement in 1830 supported by sympathetic MPs. The campaign was boosted by the extension of the franchise provided by the 1832 Reform Act, allowing more nationalist MPs to be elected. However, it was not until long after O'Connell's death (in 1847) when Irish nationalist MPs began to hold the balance of power in Westminster that the first Home Rule Bill for Ireland was introduced by Gladstone's Liberal Government in 1886.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Church increased its influence among Irish Catholics, now with the assent of the British state, by an increasing involvement in the provision of welfare and education services for Catholics. This was aided by the laissez-faire attitude of the British Government. The introduction of free primary education via the National Schools in 1831 gave the Church control over the moral and cultural development of virtually all Catholic children in Ireland – as

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well as their obedience – and paid for by the British Exchequer. British state funding of National Schools in Ireland (before similar funding had even been provided in England) was focused primarily on two main aims – the promotion of English as the main language of Irish people (rather than Irish) and the nurturing of loyal (to Britain) subjects in Ireland (Akenson 1970).

By appealing to the power elites in the Irish Catholic community, the state hoped to lessen any threat to its control in Ireland. By coupling this with the repression of those who refused to accept the system, it tried to effectively control dissent in Ireland through a "carrot and stick policy." The result of the policy was to reinforce and reproduce political divisions among the Catholic Irish and the development of sometimes cooperating but often competing political strands of constitutional and revolutionary nationalism. Throughout the nineteenth century, it was constitutional nationalism supported by the Church which captured the bulk of the support and imagination of most Catholic Irish and remained dominant. Revolutionary nationalism continued to exist, but it continued to receive only limited support from Catholics. It was also often denounced by the leaders of the Catholic Church and constitutional nationalism. While it is also from this period that republicanism began to take root among some elements in the Catholic community, it was to take well over another hundred years before the revolutionary strand was able to successfully challenge constitutional nationalism in most of Ireland in the 1918 elections.

The Young Irelanders: "Ireland Long a Province be A Nation Once Again"

By the middle of the nineteenth century, a new nationalist movement had been established in Ireland. The Young Ireland movement founded in 1842 was influenced by other nationalist movements in Europe such as the Young Italy movement which had been established in 1831 to work for a united Italian republic. It aimed to promote the establishment of an independent Irish republic

by developing a "national consciousness" among the people. Comprised of both Protestant and Catholic nationalists, it wished to establish a democratic secular republic in Ireland much like that proposed by the United Irish movement in the 1790s. Like the United Irish, it also started off as an open, constitutional, reformist organization adopting peaceful educational and awareness raising methods. Much of its work centered on the publication of the nationalist journal, *The Nation*, which supported O'Connell's Repeal of the Union campaign. One of its leaders, the Protestant republican Thomas Davis, was to pen some of the most famous patriotic songs still known in Ireland today (such as "The West's Awake" and "A Nation Once Again"). It was the Young Irelanders who introduced the green, white, and orange tricolor flag to Ireland on which the current national flag is based. Modeled on the French tricolor, it was brought over from France by Thomas Francis Meagher and William Smith O'Brien in 1848. It symbolized peace and reconciliation between the native Irish (green) and the descendants of the colonists (orange).

Initially the Young Irelanders and Daniel O'Connell worked together and used *The Nation* to whip up support for his Repeal of the Union campaign. However after O'Connell's arrest and imprisonment following the banning of his big Repeal rally in Clontarf in 1943, he began to explore federalism within the UK as a possibility and came into conflict with the Young Irelanders. O'Connell finally ousted the Young Irelanders from his Repeal Association in July 1846 when they refused to pledge their allegiance to nonviolence and constitutionalism.

The whole movement, exasperated from the effects of the Famine 1845–1847 and the policies of the British, collapsed after a disastrous attempt at a rising in July 1848. 1848 was a year of democratic uprisings throughout most of Europe, and the Young Irelanders hoped to link Ireland to this. However, Ireland was still suffering from the catastrophic effects of the famine, disease, evictions, and continuing emigration. Initially the hope was that the revolution in Ireland could be peaceful. However, increasing British Government repression of the movement and the decision

to suspend habeas corpus and imprison people without trial forced their hand. The attempted rising was ended before it could really get started at a standoff in what became known as the Battle of Widow McCormack's Farm House, at Ballingarry, Co. Tipperary. Most of the leaders were rounded up and transported to Van Diemen's Land (modern day Tasmania). Two who escaped to France and then the USA were James Stephens and James O'Mahony. In the USA they found support from a growing Irish emigrant community, many of whom felt bitter about British rule in Ireland and in particular Britain's handling of the Famine (1845–1847). They would later found in 1858 the Irish Republican Brotherhood (or Fenians) the movement which was active throughout the late nineteenth century and which was eventually to organize the Easter Rising in 1916.

The period of the Young Irelanders movement illustrates some of the tensions which existed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries within nationalism in Ireland about how far demands for independence should go and whether or not constitutional or revolutionary methods were the most effective or justifiable. O'Connell made limited demands for Irish independence and promoted British constitutional means. The Young Irelanders wanted full independence; in the words of the famous Thomas Davis song, 'A Nation Once Again' - "and Ireland long a province be, a Nation once again". They were also prepared (though not effectively able) to use revolutionary means to achieve it. This created tensions between them and O'Connell and an eventual rift.

Tensions between the Young Irelanders and the Catholic Church had also manifested themselves linked to their demands for a secular democratic republic, something which potentially threatened the power of the Church as the leader of the majority of the country's population. The Church also opposed revolution. According to Berresford Ellis (1985:116), Pope Pius I admonished priests involved with the Young Irelanders after pressure from the British, and they were suspended by the Irish hierarchy. One of the leaders, John Mitchel, who wrote prolifically about the period claimed that "the Church had ever been the enemy of Irish freedom" (Mitchell 1854:15).

The Young Irelanders rebellion may have been another abject failure, but it provided another strand to nationalist folklore and the republican narrative which was to nurture and replenish revolutionary republicanism in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The Great Hunger 1845–1847

One of the most calamitous events to ever hit Ireland was the Famine or Great Hunger (1845–1848). It was to have a catastrophic effect on Ireland for decades to come. Not only was it profound in terms of human cost but also in terms of its effects demographically, economically, socially, culturally, and politically. It was to have a huge impact on Anglo-Irish relations for generations to come and was to create a narrative which was reinforced and reproduced in the decades ahead of British cruelty toward and unfitness to rule the Irish. It was also to lead to the creation of an Irish diaspora in the USA which was to become a powerful support base, funder, and supplier of weaponry for future republican campaigns to end British rule in Ireland.

Most of those most badly affected by the Famine was poor tenant farmers paying rents to (often absentee) British and Irish landlords and subsisting on potatoes. The potato, cheap and easy to grow in an Irish climate, had become the main food of the poor. In 1845 and subsequent years, the potato crop was hit by blight, leading to starvation, disease, and eviction as tenants were unable to sell crops and pay the rents. The British Government of the day had a "laissez-faire" attitude to the economy, and while some soup kitchens were provided and Indian corn imported to feed some of the hungry, it was not enough, and food continued to be exported out of the country at the height of the Famine. The inhumane language used by some in the British establishment in describing the Famine, as the fault of the peasant farmers for being idle and not planning for such events or even as God's or nature's way of dealing with overpopulation, did not endear future generations of Irish people to Britain (Crowley et al. 2012). Some like the Young Irelander, John

Mitchel, accused the British of a deliberate policy of extermination, and while there is little evidence of that (Ó Gráda 1999), the lack of response from Britain and the devastation caused led to a lasting hatred, especially among those who emigrated to America.

During the Famine an estimated 1 million died and 1 million emigrated. The 1841 Census in Ireland recorded a population of 8.2 million making Ireland one of most populous countries in Europe (people per acre). As a comparison, the population of England was only 13.6 million. Indeed some British establishment figures were to argue that the Famine was a natural disaster needed to reduce an overpopulated Ireland. After the Famine, the 1851 Census recorded a population of just 6.5 million.

Emigration continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, mainly to English-speaking countries like Britain and the USA, but in effect Irish people emigrated to the four corners of the earth. The result was that by 1911 the population of Ireland had been nearly halved to 4.4 million. At a time when the populations of Europe were growing exponentially, Ireland was one of the few which wasn't. Thus by 2016 the population of the island of Ireland was still only 6.6 million while that of England (by 2018) was just nearly 56 million.

Emigration had another effect of course. Many Irish people were able to make successful lives in other countries, and many continued to remember the mother country and the way its people had been treated by its British rulers. A narrative was created, reinforced, and reproduced by the emigrants and their descendants of oppression, discrimination, and loss and that "cruel England" was to blame. It was that Irish diaspora based in the USA which was to be pivotal in the next stage in the development of the campaign for an independent republic in Ireland.

The Fenians: The Birth of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB)

In the second half of the nineteenth century, both strands of Irish nationalism – constitutional and revolutionary republicanism – continued to develop, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in opposition to one another.

In 1858 the Irish Republican Brotherhood (also known as the Fenian Brotherhood) was set up by, among others, James Stephens and James O'Mahony, two former members of the Young Irelanders. It attempted to take up the mantle of revolutionary nationalism from the Young Irelanders. It was the forerunner of the organization which was to eventually organize the 1916 Easter Rising. With organizations in Ireland, Britain, and the USA, the impact of the emigration since the Famine was now playing out in Irish republican politics. From now on the influence of emigrated Irish and their descendants was to have a major impact on the funding, arming, and promotion of republicanism in Ireland. Irish America in particular was to play an important role not just in the failed 1867 Fenian Rising in Ireland but more importantly in the Fenian dynamite campaign in England in the 1880s. Once again, the British Government attempted to pre-empt any rebellion in Ireland by closing down the Fenian newspaper, The Irish People, in 1865, suspending habeas corpus and arresting the leadership, including Stephens and Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa. Plagued by informers and spies and further arrests, an attempted rebellion in Ireland in 1867 broke out in different areas but was quickly suppressed. More dramatically, in the USA, in the aftermath of the Civil War in which many Irish had fought, a series of attempts to march armies of Fenians into Canada, then ruled by Britain, and take it over, failed. The execution of a number of Fenians in England was however to provide a new set of martyrs for the republican cause. In December 1867, a bungled attempt to free a Fenian prisoner from Clerkenwell jail in London failed, but the explosion led to the death of 12 civilians and 120 injured, and the later execution of Michael Barrett, the last person to be publicly hanged in England, in 1868. In particular, the Manchester Martyrs – Allen, Larkin, and O'Brien – who were publicly hanged in 1867, after the apparent unintentional killing of a policeman while they tried to free fellow Fenians from a prison van, led to widespread anger throughout

Ireland, the erection of monuments, and their immortalization in the republican ballad, "God Save Ireland."

The dynamite campaign in particular was organized from the USA and included notables like Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa and Thomas Clarke who were both to be imprisoned for many years in England. Thomas Clarke was later to be one of the leaders of 1916 to be executed. His name appeared first among the seven signatories of the 1916 Proclamation of the Republic. It was at O'Donovan Rossa's funeral in 1915 that the 1916 leader Patrick Pearse made the famous impassioned speech – "the fools the fools the fools" – often credited with having enthused a new generation to join in the republican struggle. The funeral was an event stage-managed by the IRB for maximum drama and propaganda value.

The dynamite campaign from 1881 to 1885 was influenced by the invention of dynamite by Alfred Nobel in 1866 and the use of explosives during the US Civil War. It was aimed primarily at property in England rather than people and meant to disrupt and damage the economy and everyday life. A number of civilians were killed and injured however, and such incidents led to hostile reactions not just in England but also in Ireland. Bombs were left outside military barracks, police stations, railway stations, and public buildings, mainly in England, and in 1883 a new Special Branch detective service was established by the British to deal with the threat. The dynamite campaign was a new type of physical force campaign, one that was to be modified and used in subsequent republican physical force campaigns in the 1920s, 1940s, and in particular in the 1970–1997 period. It was also used in other armed nationalist, revolutionary, and resistance campaigns throughout the world from the late nineteenth century. Indeed, it could be argued that modern warfare from the early twentieth century has included such methods on a much wider scale with aerial bombardment and the use of long-range missiles to attack property as well as populations.

The activities of the Fenians also led to many of them being imprisoned usually under extremely harsh conditions. This in turn often evoked sympathy. Karl Marx (1818–1883) was one who was moved to write in the Belgium press condemning the treatment of Fenian prisoners in England (Marx 1870). Interestingly enough there was also speculation that Marx's friend and comrade, Friedrich Engels, who co-wrote *The Communist Manifesto* with him, was himself close to the Fenians or rather that his partner Mary Burns was. She was from an Irish background and lived with Engels in Manchester. While Marx didn't openly support the Fenians, he nonetheless believed that an independent Ireland would weaken the British Empire and thus would be a progressive move (Rodden 2008).

Although the Fenians themselves were not overtly socialist, it is clear that they were influenced by the growth in socialist and other radical movements in Britain and Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century (Metscher, 2001). They did make links with other radical movements in Europe, including the First International (International Working Men's Association – IWMA). James Stephens and John Devoy, both founding leaders of the Fenians, joined the IWMA in the USA (Boyle, 1972:45–46; Lane, 1997:22), and the sympathies of the movement were also made clear in its Proclamation of the Republic in 1867:

> . . . we aim at founding a Republic based on universal suffrage, which shall secure to all the intrinsic value of their labour. The soil of Ireland, at present in the possession of an oligarchy, belongs to us, the Irish people, and to us it must be restored. . .
>
> We declare, also, . . . complete separation of Church and State.
>
> . . . thus we intend no war against the people of England – our war is against the aristocratic locusts, whether English or Irish, who have eaten the verdure of our fields – against the aristocratic leeches who drain alike our fields and theirs.
>
> Republicans of the entire world, our cause is your cause. Our enemy is your enemy. . . . workmen of England, it is not only your hearts we wish, but your arms. Remember the starvation and degradation brought to your firesides by the oppression of labour. . . . avenge yourselves by giving liberty to your children in the coming struggle for human liberty. (Lee 2008:56)

Indeed, the IWMA itself stated in 1867:

> Fenianism is the vindication by an oppressed people of its right to social and political existence. The Fenian declarations leave no room for doubt in

this respect. They affirm the republican form of government, liberty of conscience, no State religion, the produce of labour to the labourer, and the possession of the soil to the people. (Marx and Engles 1971:383).

Thus the Fenians were not just calling for "political democracy" in a secular republic independent from Britain but a republic which appeared to exhibit some of the attributes of socialism, demanding workers ownership of the land and the product of their labor. They also adopted an internationalist perspective on workers struggle. From at least the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a socialistic constituent in revolutionary nationalism in Ireland (Metscher 1986). James Fintan Lalor, for example, who took part in the failed Young Ireland revolt in 1848, had said in the same year:

> The principle I state and mean to stand upon, is this, that the entire ownership of Ireland, moral and material, up to the sun and down to the centre, is vested of right in the people of Ireland. . .. that the entire soil of a country belongs . . . to the entire people of that country, and is the rightful property, not of any one class, but of the nation at large. (Lalor 1848)

The Fenians were clearly not just interested in issues relating to "political" democracy either but also "economic" democracy. This was to become a theme and indeed a cause of tension within different manifestations of Irish republicanism in the years to come.

While the constitutional nationalists on occasion cooperated with the more militant republicans when it suited them, tensions also remained between them over a range of other issues including aims and methods. In the late nineteenth century, Isaac Butt had established the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) with a policy of campaigning for a Home Rule parliament within the British Empire. At the same time the IRB was demanding a completely independent secular republic. The IPP believed in working within the British constitutional mechanisms, while the IRB believed that revolutionary physical force was necessary to achieve their objectives.

Into this mix went the Catholic Church whose hierarchy were generally critical of IRB methods

(though not necessarily of their objectives), even though individual Irish priests and even bishops often had their own political preferences, whatever about the official policy of the international Church (Ó Fiaich 1968). For example, despite the moderate nationalist sympathies of figures like Cardinal Cullen, in 1863 the Catholic hierarchy condemned the Fenian Brotherhood, and in 1867 Bishop Moriarty of Kerry denounced them as criminals saying:

> . . ..when we look down into the fathomless depth of this infamy of the heads of the Fenian conspiracy, we must acknowledge that eternity is not long enough, nor hell hot enough to punish such miscreants. (Norman 1965:117)

Pope Pius IX issued in his 1864 encyclical *Quanta Cura*, a condemnation of anyone who supported the separation of Church and state, one of the tenets of Fenian republicanism. In 1870, on the prompting of Cardinal Cullen, he issued a general condemnation of Fenianism (Ó Corráin n.d.). Yet others in the Church were more ambivalent or even quietly sympathetic toward revolutionary nationalism, and this is partly why when independence was achieved for 26 of Ireland's counties, the Church, far from being viewed as divorced from "Ireland's freedom struggle," was mythologized as having led the people then and now. In nineteenth-century Ireland, the ambivalent, or even sympathetic, attitude of some local priests and even bishops to "popular" revolutionary activity meant that the Church could remain closely connected to its flock. Dr. John MacHale, archbishop of Tuam, appears to have been one with some level of republican sympathies, for example. The 1863 Convention of the Chicago Fenians received autographed portraits of him to auction. In 1886 Archbishop Thomas Croke of Cashel contributed five pounds toward a monument in the grounds of Limerick Cathedral to the "Manchester Martyrs" of 1867. However, neither expressed open support for the organization, and the Church continued to oppose revolutionary nationalism, excommunicating members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, for example (McCartney, 1967; Rafferty, 1999). According to Rafferty (2016):

From the time of the papal condemnation of Feni-
anism, Cullen inserted into the Lenten pastoral let-
ters of the Archbishop of Dublin a condemnation of
Fenianism and warned members of his flock of the
spiritual dangers of attachment to the IRB. He also
forbade confessors to give absolution to members
of the Fenian organisation. His successors contin-
ued the practice of condemning Fenianism in their
Lenten pastoral letters, even the advanced national-
ist William Walsh, archbishop from 1885 until
1921. (Rafferty 2016:47)

Ambiguities were also reflected in the Church
attitude to the Land League. Michael Davitt, a
member of the IRB who had been jailed for gun-
running, set up the Land League, Ireland's first
national peasant organization, in 1879. Davitt had
spent a long time in England where he had been
active in trade union activities and had lost an arm
in an industrial accident. The Land League argued
for fair rents, fixity of tenure, and free sale of land.
It demanded rent reductions and organized resis-
tance to evictions and boycotts of landowners.
Indeed the word "boycott" was introduced into
the English language when the League organized
the community's shunning of a bailiff named Cap-
tain Boycott (Ó Raghallaigh 2011). Emotions
raised by evictions often led to violence from
both the police and those opposing the bailiffs.
The Church was concerned about this rising rural
agitation for land reform. While many priests and
bishops had sympathy with the plight of their
parishioners on the land, and many, such as Arch-
bishop Walsh, supported the Land League, there
was also concern that the agitation would turn into
anarchy. Many priests and bishops were also land-
lords themselves. In April 1888, Pope Leo XIII
issued a condemnation of the Land League's Plan
of Campaign and the practice of boycotting
(O'Hara 2009).

During the late 1800s, the Church developed
close links with "Constitutional Nationalists" who
wanted Home Rule for Ireland within the British
Empire. The Church at this time was interested in
the concept of an independent Catholic Ireland.
William Gladstone had won the 1868 election for
the Liberal Party with the help of 65 out of 105 of
the Irish seats in Westminster. He immediately set
about promoting a policy of "Justice for Ireland"

in the hope that this would pacify the Irish. In
1870 the first Irish Land Act was passed which
provided some element of security of tenure for
tenant farmers, providing compensation for evic-
tion. Gladstone's election and apparent interest in
Ireland influenced the establishment of the Home
Government Association, by Isaac Butt, a former
member of the Conservative Party, in 1870. Call-
ing for an Irish parliament, it popularized the idea
of "Home Rule," and in 1873 it became the Home
Rule League. This in turn led after the 1874 elec-
tions to the formation of a separate Home Rule
Party – the Irish Parliamentary Party – by a num-
ber of the newly elected MPs. It included a group
of MPs with close connections to the Fenians
including Charles Stewart Parnell who was to
become the leader. Parnell was a Protestant
nationalist, who although a constitutional nation-
alist working through Parliament, on occasions
used the violent actions of republicans as a lever
to achieve his objectives, at times even apparently
going into alliance with such forces. He publicly
flirted with the Fenians. He also worked with
Davitt's Land League. The combination of popu-
lar and parliamentary agitation induced Britain to
supplement the routine coercion acts with a seri-
ous attempt to solve the agrarian problem (Steele
1979).

Continuing violent attacks on the land eventu-
ally led to Parnell's imprisonment in 1881. How-
ever violent attacks increased to such an extent
that the state was forced to negotiate with him in
jail. Parnell was thus able to use the threat of force
as a lever in his negotiations for greater conces-
sions. He did nevertheless condemn violence
including the killing in Phoenix Park of the new
Chief Secretary Cavendish and his undersecre-
tary, Burke, in May 1882 (Hawkin 1973).

In 1886, after years of campaigning for Home
Rule (within the empire), Parnell's IPP finally
got Gladstone and a British Liberal Government
to support the introduction of the first Home Rule
Bill. It was opposed by the Conservative Party
and a growing unionist lobby in Ireland mobi-
lized by the Orange Order, and a split in the
Liberal Party led to the defeat of the Bill in the
same year.

Then disaster struck Parnell and the IPP. In December 1889 a man called Captain O'Shea filed suit for divorce from his wife citing the leader of the IPP, Parnell, as her lover. The case destroyed Parnell's political career. The Catholic bishops opposed him, and many constitutional nationalists and their supporters refused to support him. The Party split, and while he continued to lead a small minority faction until his death in 1891, his power was ended. A second Home Rule Bill was introduced in the Westminster Parliament in 1893, but it was vetoed by the House of Lords which had a Conservative majority. At that time the House of Lords could veto new legislation. In 1911 the veto was removed and the Lords could then only delay new legislation for a maximum period of 2 years.

The Parnell affair greatly damaged the IPP and its Home Rule campaign. John Redmond (1856–1918) who had supported the minority Parnell faction of the IPP led it after Parnell's death. However, it took a further 10 years for the split in the IPP to be healed (Lyons 1960). By the late nineteenth century, while constitutional nationalism remained important, it was now being augmented by a range of different strands to nationalism developing and evident in different campaigns and different aspects of life. There was also a growing revolutionary nationalist movement, demanding more than simply Home Rule.

The Radicalization of Ireland

By the late nineteenth century, despite the failure of two Home Rule Bills at Westminster, there was a growing confidence among nationalists in Ireland that Home Rule was only a matter of time. The IPP had by far the largest number of MPs elected to the Westminster Parliament by the Irish people. This provided some measure of the support for Home Rule there even though only about 15% of the population had a vote. By this time, the Catholic Irish who, along with their Church, were the most likely to want Home Rule made up not only the vast majority of the population, but they also disproportionately made up the majority of

those without a vote. It was therefore assumed that any further extension of the franchise to include those men without property and women was only likely to increase the vote for Home Rule. With campaigns to extend the franchise ongoing in Britain, it seemed the vote for Home Rule MPs was only set to increase.

However, other elements were also fanning this growing nationalist confidence. The end of the penal laws meant that although the Census figures (1891, 1901, and 1911) showed that the Protestant Irish were still disproportionately represented among the owners of industry, big business and land, as well as in the professions, Catholics were now common among such classes. The Wyndham Land Purchase Act 1903 had also allowed small tenant farmers to buy their land from landlords with government loans. This had encouraged farmers to make improvements on the land without fear of its increased value leading to increased rent as in the past. Security of tenure allowed farmers to invest for the future in agriculture. While poverty remained high particularly in the cities among the Catholic (and indeed Protestant) urban working classes, the National School system had opened up primary education to the masses. Church-run schools often provided grants to allow poorer children to join the children of richer parents to obtain a secondary school education. The nondenominational Queen's Colleges set up in 1845 in Belfast, Cork, and Galway in the mid-nineteenth century opened up university education – once the preserve of Protestants – to wealthy Catholics. They were followed in 1851 by the establishment of the Catholic University of Dublin. The emergence of a new confident educated Catholic middle class was to influence the development of two new cultural movements in the late nineteenth century.

In 1893 the Gaelic League had been set up by Douglas Hyde and Eoin MacNeill to promote the speaking of Irish throughout Ireland. Involving both middle-class (in the main) Catholics and Protestants and nationalists and unionists, it was to become increasingly politicized in the early twentieth century as republicans like Patrick Pearse came to see it as a way of promoting an Irish nationalist consciousness. Indeed many of the

leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising had been involved in the Gaelic League (Conchubhair 2018).

Poets and writers like W.B. Yeats and Lady Gregory also became involved in the Anglo-Irish literary movement. Using the medium of English, they promoted nationalist plays, such as "Cathleen Ní Houlihan" (or in Irish, Caitlín Ní hUallacháin) and poetry associated with nationalism. A number of the leaders and activists of the 1916 Rising were involved in this nationalist literary movement including Joseph Plunkett and Thomas MacDonagh (both of whom were executed after the Rising). Patrick Pearse, the leader of the Rising, also published widely in both Irish and English in prose and poetry.

Probably the most influential and enduring of all the Irish national cultural movements was the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). This was set up in 1884 and aimed to promote Irish athletics and particularly the games of hurling and Gaelic football. It also had a clear nationalist agenda, promoting the concept of an independent Irish nation. It was to be particularly influential among the working classes and the rural poor. The organization itself operated in parishes and usually also had a strong connection with the Catholic Church at both national and parish level. Many of its lay leaders came to be involved in the Irish revolutionary movement in the early twentieth century. Its ability to link nationalism to Gaelic sports, local community, and Church was to have a profound effect on the incorporating of a nationalist political ideology and an Irish cultural identity into the day-to-day community identity of many people throughout the island (Ó Tuathaigh 2016).

In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a number of small republican parties were established though they did not provide much of a challenge to the IPP. Cumann na nGaedheal was set up in 1900 by activists like Arthur Griffith to campaign for an independent Ireland. Belfast IRB members Bulmer Hobson and Dennis McCullough were instrumental in the setting up of the Dungannon Clubs in Belfast in 1905 (named after the 1782 Dungannon Volunteer Convention) to promote the idea of a nonsectarian secular republic. Hobson was also to join with Countess Markievicz in founding Na Fianna Éireann in 1909 (the republican scout movement) in response to the development of an offshoot of Baden-Powell's British Boy Scouts movement in Ireland in 1908. It was Hobson who was to swear Patrick Pearse into to the IRB in 1913. Although on the IRB Supreme Council, he disagreed with 1916 Rising and did not take part. Dennis McCullough was the President of the IRB Supreme Council at the time of the 1916 Rising. He had led the Belfast Volunteers to Coalisland for the 1916 mobilization, but the countermanding order led most to return to the city thinking the Rising had been called off (McCullough 1953).

Cumann na nGaedheal and the Dungannon Clubs eventually merged in 1907 under Arthur Griffith to form Sinn Féin (Ourselves) to campaign for political independence from Britain. In Griffith's view the best strategy was to argue that the 1801 Act of Union was illegal and that in fact the legal constitutional arrangements for Ireland should be those pertaining during Grattan's Parliament – a Home Rule Parliament with a dual monarchy (i.e., under the British crown). Thus although not a monarchist himself, Griffith's Sinn Féin when originally founded wasn't a republican party at all although it included members of the IRB who were.

Griffith disagreed initially with the physical force approach of the IRB and argued instead for a campaign of passive resistance based on MPs being elected and boycotting Westminster and setting up an independent assembly in Ireland, the boycott of British goods, the refusal to pay taxes, and the establishment of alternative courts and local authorities (O'Broin 2009). In many ways these were the tactics which were to be adopted by the First Dáil Éireann when it was set up in 1919. In the early twentieth century, however, Sinn Féin was politically very weak. It had won a few council seats in the 1911 local government elections but little else and had little popular support.

In 1914, after the split in the Irish Volunteers (see later), Sinn Féin members, including Griffith, joined the anti-Redmond faction. They got the nickname "Sinn Féin Volunteers." There was

also a lot of cross-over membership in Sinn Féin, the Irish Volunteers and the IRB. Thus when the 1916 Rising occurred, it was referred to as the "Sinn Féin Rising," though Griffith himself did not take part and Sinn Féin had not been involved in its organisation. After the Rising, Sinn Féin became the banner under which many republicans mobilized, and it was after its 1917 Ard Fheis that the party became committed to a republic for the first time. It was under the Sinn Féin banner that republicans stood in the 1918 election winning 73 out of the 105 seats on a platform of abstention from the Westminster Parliament and the establishment of the independent First Dáil and in the process leading to the demise of the Home Rule Party, the IPP. Sinn Féin also supported the IRA during the War of Independence 1919–1921.

Of course it was not just republicanism and nationalism which was influencing the radicalization of people in Ireland at the turn of the nineteenth century. The suffragette movement and workers movement were also influencing political thought, organization, and action.

A new movement was gaining momentum among women throughout Britain and Ireland campaigning for women's suffrage. Up until 1918, all women were denied the vote in Parliamentary elections, although some who had property were able to vote in local government elections. Indeed very few countries allowed women's suffrage at the time. New Zealand was the first to offer women the vote in Parliamentary elections in 1893 followed by Australia in 1895. In Manchester the Women's Suffrage Committee had been set up in 1867 to campaign for votes for women in the UK. In 1897 it merged with the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS). Impatient with the slow progress of the campaign and with the tactics of the NUWSS, Emmeline Pankhurst established the breakaway Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) in 1903. It aimed to engage in direct action including acts of sabotage and damage to property, to raise the issue. This led to a series of protest actions including bombings carried out in Britain and Ireland aimed at property. At least five such bombings took place in Belfast. Over a thousand women were to be arrested and imprisoned for

actions during this period. From 1909, imprisoned women began to engage in hunger strike as a weapon (something that was to be used later by republican prisoners) to demand their release. The British Government embarked on a policy of release and rearrest when this happened – entitled the *cat and mouse* policy.

In general women's suffrage was supported by socialists but often not very enthusiastically. It was opposed by Conservatives and thus many Unionists who were aligned to the Conservative Party. In Ireland, while the women's movement was active, it was seen as a British-based body at a time when nationalists were demanding independence from Britain, and this caused some problems in terms of developing unity between unionists and nationalists around the issue. Although all the women activists wanted votes for women, there were therefore tensions around whether that should be within the Union (as desired by unionist women) or in an independent Ireland (as preferred by nationalists and republicans). As with the Connolly/Walker debates in Irish socialism (Berresford Ellis 1985:189), there were disagreements within the women's suffrage movement over the issue of Union with Britain.

In light of this, the Irish Women's Franchise League (IWFL) was founded by Hanna and Francis Sheehy-Skeffington in 1908 as an Irish equivalent to Emmeline Pankhurst's Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU). As nationalists they felt that women's suffrage needed to be linked to the cause of Home Rule rather than as part of a campaign for increased rights for women within the UK (Ward 1996).

While republicans were more likely to support women's suffrage than Unionists, there was still resistance among males. Even in revolutionary France, which had so inspired Irish republicanism, the vote continued to be denied to women. In response to the French Revolution, Mary Wollstonecraft as far back as the 1792 had argued in her book *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* that women should be treated as equal to men. However it wasn't until 1945 that women in republican France received the vote on an equal basis as men. Thus the model for many republicans wasn't that good when it came to women.

The Irish Citizen Army the socialist republican organization did support women's suffrage and had a number of women in its ranks including Countess Markievicz. Maud Gonne had established an organization for women republicans in 1900 called Inghinidhe na hÉireann (daughters of Ireland). This became absorbed into Cumann na mBan in 1914, the women's branch of the Irish Volunteers, which also supported women's suffrage.

The 1917 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis (the Ard Fheis when Sinn Féin became overtly republican) declared its support women's suffrage. However, only two women stood for Sinn Féin in the 1918 elections, where there 105 seats being contested. Countess Markievicz became the first woman to be elected to the Westminster Parliament (although she did not take her seat in line with the Sinn Féin abstentionist policy). In 1919 she also became the first woman to become a government minister when she was appointed Minister of Labour in the First Dáil. Only one other woman stood for Sinn Féin much to the consternation of some republican women, Winnifred Carney. A socialist and secretary to James Connolly, she had been in the GPO during the 1916 Rising and had been imprisoned. She stood in East Belfast, a Unionist-dominated area and lost. It was Sinn Féin policy to stand in every constituency in 1918 because they looked on the election as a referendum on Irish independence. Hannah Sheehy Skeffington had been nominated to stand in Antrim but declined arguing the seat was unwinnable (Woggan 2018). While it is clear that at least on the surface republicans were generally supportive of women's rights, when a new Free State was eventually established in 1922 the position of women remained subordinate to men in the public sphere for many years into the future. Markievicz was the last woman minister in Ireland until the appointment of Maire Geoghegan-Quinn in 1979, and up until 1973 female civil servants were still expected to leave their jobs when they were married.

Unionists and Conservatives by and large remained opposed to votes for women, including Sir (later Lord) Edward Carson, the Unionist leader, who in his opposition to women's suffrage at least shared something with John Redmond, leader of the IPP. James Craig (who succeeded Carson as Ulster Unionist leader in 1921) was a supporter, however, and in September 1913 the Ulster Provisional Government which had been set up by the Unionists to oppose the Home Rule Bill and also contained a number of women, promised to support it. Theresa Londonderry leader of the Ulster Women's Unionist Council was also an advocate. In the 1918 elections, however, no Unionist female candidates were nominated to stand.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was also a growing labor movement particularly in the cities, Belfast and Dublin. The Irish Trade Union Congress was set up in 1894, and trade union organizers like Jim Larkin and James Connolly (who was one of the leaders executed after the 1916 Rising) were active in organizing labor to fight for better working conditions. Larkin set up the Irish Transport and General Workers Union in 1910, and when he went to the USA in 1914, Connolly led it until his death. The Dublin Lockout occurred in 1913 when workers were locked out of their employment by employers for being members of the trade union movement. The lockout was organized by William Murphy, Dublin's most prominent business owner, a prominent Catholic, constitutional nationalist, former Home Rule MP, and owner of the *Irish Independent*, *Sunday Independent*, and newspapers. The lockout lasted for 7 months, during which time Murphy used his newspapers to attack the workers and their leaders. Throughout the early twentieth century, the Catholic Church denounced socialism, and it opposed Jim Larkin and the ITGWU during the 1913 Dublin Lockout (Yeates 2000). It even opposed a scheme whereby children of Irish strikers would be temporarily looked after by British trade unionists on the grounds that their souls might be endangered by Protestant or atheist influences (Kostick 2009:18). Republicans such as Patrick Pearse and Countess Markievicz supported the workers in the media, but the lockout ended with the workers having to return to work defeated and forced to sign pledges not to join the ITGWU. The level of police violence used against picketing workers also led to

the ITGWU setting up the Irish Citizen Army to protect striking workers. This organization was pivotal in 1916 in mobilizing socialists and trade unionists for the Rising (O'Connor 2017).

The constitutional nationalists in the IPP continued to have a major influence on politics in Westminster and on the Liberal Party in this period, especially after the Parnell split was mended. Redmond was to lead the party in the early twentieth century until his death in March 1918. After the 1910 election, the Liberals had to depend on Redmond's party to form a government in Westminster. This gave the IPP control over the balance of power and led to the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill in 1912. The Conservative and Unionist control of the House of Lords had ensured the defeat of the second Home Rule Bill in 1893 by using the veto they had on new legislation. However, that veto had been removed in 1911 and replaced instead by an ability only to delay new legislation. As a result it seemed certain to many that Home Rule would be passed by 1914 and Ireland would get its own Parliament (albeit still within the Empire).

However, not everyone in Ireland and Britain was prepared to allow Home Rule for Ireland, and powerful forces which had been building since the 1880s in opposition to Home Rule began to mobilize once again.

The Unionists: "Ulster will Fight and Ulster will be Right"

By the early twentieth century, most (but not all) Irish Protestants, who were in the minority in Ireland and traced their roots back to the descendants of colonists/settlers from the island of Britain, were unionists. They wished to remain part of the UK for economic, religious, and identity reasons and were fearful of an Ireland ruled by the Catholic majority. In general they also occupied a position of higher social and economic status and feared this would change in a new constitutional arrangement. In the main, they had opposed Daniel O'Connell's Catholic Emancipation campaign at the start of the nineteenth century and his repeal of the Union campaign which followed. Utilizing

the Orange Order to promote unity among Irish Protestants for unionism, they mobilized support, especially in Ulster, where they had become a majority since the Ulster Plantation from 1609, in opposition to the Home Rule campaign throughout the nineteenth century. When the third Home Rule Bill was introduced to Westminster in April 1912, Ulster Unionists had responded to it with 500,000 signing the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant pledging to oppose Home Rule "by using all means which may be found necessary" (Buckland, 1973).

Ulster's Solemn League and Covenant (1912)

Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship and perilous to the unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of his Gracious Majesty King George V, humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn Covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right we hereto subscribe our names. And further, we individually declare that we have not already signed this Covenant.
The above was signed by me at

_____

Ulster Day, Saturday 28th, September, 1912.
God Save the King (PRONI, n.d.)

Among the signatories at a massive rally at Belfast City Hall on 28 September 2012 designated as Ulster Day were Sir Edward Carson, Lord Londonderry, Sir James Craig, and a host of other notables including police and civil servants (Connell 2012). In January 1913 a new paramilitary organization, the Ulster Volunteer Force, was also formed. It received support among Unionist

and Conservative MPs. It also appeared to be supported by the military commanders of the British Army in Ireland. In March 1914 in what became known as "the Curragh Mutiny," British officers at their Curragh base in Co. Kildare made it clear that they would be unwilling to enforce Home Rule on Ulster or march against the UVF there (O'Brien 2014). In September 1913, a new Provisional Government for Ulster, composed of a range of prominent members of society, was announced by the Unionists. It was planned that this would take over and rule the province of Ulster in the eventuality of Home Rule being introduced in Ireland. At a subsequent rally on September 13, 1913, addressed by the Unionist leader Sir Edward (later Lord) Carson, at Balmoral Showgrounds, Belfast, a new flag was unfurled for a new state of Ulster, with a red hand of Ulster and a star for each county (Century Ireland, n.d.). In April 1914, an estimated 25,000 rifles and machine guns imported from the German Empire by the Ulster Unionist Council were landed at Larne, Bangor, and Donaghadee for use by the UVF. The Unionists were making it clear that whatever decisions were made in Westminster or by the Irish people as a whole about Home Rule, they were going to resist them by force of arms.

The Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army

By 1913 two other military organizations had also formed in Ireland. The Irish Volunteers (IV) was established as an open nationalist organization in November 1913 with behind-the-scenes encouragement from the secretive physical force organization the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). A unionist paramilitary force, the UVF, had been established with the backing of much of the establishment in the North, to oppose Home Rule, and it was felt that a counterbalancing force was needed to defend Home Rule. However, the IRB also saw this as an opportunity to enable the IRB to organize militarily for a coming rebellion. The IRB asked Eoin MacNeill, from Antrim, a history professor in University College Dublin to lead it.

It was felt that someone of his standing with a moderate political perspective would attract many more followers. In effect at this stage, the IV was viewed not as a revolutionary body but as an organization setup to defend the Home Rule process and not engage in offensive action. Most of the members were supportive of the IPP rather than the IRB and in March 1914 John Redmond, the leader of the IPP fearing a loss of influence in events demanded and was granted seats for his party on the Irish Volunteers Provisional Committee.

In December 1913, the Irish Citizen Army (ICA) was set up by members of the Irish Transport and General Workers Unions, Jim Larkin, James Connolly, and Capt. Jack White from Antrim and included such notables as Countess Markievicz, Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, and Sean O'Casey (though the latter two later resigned). Set up in the context of the 1913 Dublin Lockout to defend striking workers from attacks from police and company vigilantes, it went on to join the Easter Rising with the much bigger Irish Volunteers. It was an overtly socialist organization, unlike the IV, but was still viewed as an open defensive rather than an underground revolutionary organization. In April 1914, despite a ban on the importation of arms into Ireland, the UVF successfully landed 24,000 rifles through Larne. The Irish Volunteers likewise landed arms in Howth. The scene seemed set for an armed confrontation, and one occurred – but not over Home Rule. By 1914 the Liberal Government was proposing that the only way to deliver Home Rule in Ireland would be through partition. The notion was that partition would temporarily allow six of Ulster's nine counties – Antrim, Armagh, Down, Derry, Tyrone, and Fermanagh – to opt out of Home Rule, while the South would get its own Parliament within the Empire. Although many southern Unionists including Carson were dismayed at the idea of partition and of any part of Ireland having Home Rule, the Ulster Unionists saw this as a potential solution. Six counties were chosen purely and simply because they would give the Unionists a more sustainable majority of 66%:34% based on a religious headcount of Protestants and Catholics. If the other three counties of

Ulster (Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan) were included, the majority would be only 55%:45%, and there was a concern that that might be whittled away over time, particularly with a higher Catholics birth rate. That the six counties chosen included two counties – Tyrone and Fermanagh – as well as major parts of other counties and indeed the towns of Derry and Newry, which had nationalist majorities, was not viewed as a problem. This solution might also secure the shipbuilding and engineering industry around Belfast so important to the Empire, for the British.

The proposal however split nationalism. Redmond and his IPP supported a form of temporary partition in order to get any form of Home Rule for the rest of the country from the British and in the hope that the North would eventually rejoin the rest of the country once the Unionists realized there was no threat. The republicans in Sinn Féin and the ICA however rejected the proposal. Connolly who had lived and worked in Belfast, (in the North) for a number of years was particularly concerned. He believed it would allow for the establishment of two conservative sectarian states, North and South, preventing workers' unity and progress toward a united socialist society. In March 1914 he wrote:

> Such a scheme as that agreed to by Redmond and Devlin, the betrayal of the national democracy of industrial Ulster would mean a carnival of reaction both North and South, would set back the wheels of progress, would destroy the oncoming unity of the Irish Labour movement and paralyse all advanced movements whilst it endured.

> To it Labour should give the bitterest opposition, against it Labour in Ulster should\fight even to the death, if necessary, as our fathers fought before us. (Connolly 1914)

In August 1914 World War I broke out between the imperial powers of Europe. Arguments at Westminster in relation to the content of the Home Rule Bill and in particular as to whether six of the nine counties of Ulster should be excluded temporarily from Home Rule were set aside. The Home Rule Bill was passed by the Westminster Parliament and received the royal assent in September but was simultaneously suspended until the end of the war and in fact was never implemented.

The Outbreak of WW1

The outbreak of war was not politically problematic among unionists – the interests of the UK and its empire were under attack and had to be defended. Unionists joined the British army in their tens of thousands to fight for King and country. Nationalism in Ireland was split between those led by Redmond and the IPP who felt it was their patriotic duty to fight for Ireland and the empire (since Ireland was part of the empire) and those like Pearse and the IRB who felt that Ireland's interest lay not in fighting for the British Empire but opposing it. In Europe socialists were divided; the Second International of socialist and labor organizations attempted to develop a united anti-imperialist war policy, but many social democratic parties and trade unionists began to support their own nation states' war efforts. In Ireland too socialists and trade unionists were split. Many followed the lead of Connolly, the Irish Citizen Army, and the ITGWU, whose Liberty Hall banner in Dublin declared "We Serve Neither King nor Kaiser". However, many more followed the Unionists (particularly in the North) or the IPP who advocated support for the empire. Their view was that it was the patriotic duty to support the empire in its hour of need.

Redmond, in the hope of winning British Government support for the implementation of Home Rule after the war, called on Irishmen and the Irish Volunteers in particular to join the British Army and support the British war effort for "the freedom of small nations". British propaganda promoted the view that the war was about the invasion of Belgium by Germany and "a freedom struggle." That both Britain and France on the allied side had massive empires themselves in which many "small nations" were not "free" (including Ireland in the view of republicans) was not lost on republicans. While Redmond pledged the Irish Volunteers to fight for the crown in the belief that in so doing the crown would reward them with Home Rule, Carson the Unionist leader did the same with the UVF expecting the reward to be the maintenance of the Union, at least for Ulster. The socialist and republican George Gilmore claimed to have observed a recruiting poster in

Belfast addressed to Protestants which said "Fight Catholic Austria". He claimed that he took it to Dublin and placed it alongside a poster addressed to Catholics saying "Save Catholic Belgium" (Coughlan, 2015).

Although support for the British war effort was opposed by the IRB, the ICA, and other nationalists and socialists, the vast majority of the Irish Volunteers, about 175,000, followed Redmond, splitting the organization and forming the National Volunteers. A minority of only about 13,500 remained with the Irish Volunteers under MacNeill supporting the call for Irish neutrality. Tens of thousands of nationalists joined the British Army during World War I – many more than were to turn out to fight for Irish Independence a few years later. They tended to join Irish regiments like the Connaught Rangers or Dublin Fusiliers and fought in the 10th and 16th Irish Division, while the unionist volunteers fought in the 36th Ulster Division. It is estimated as a result that about one quarter million Irish men fought on the British side during World War I (Probert 1978:39).

There are many reasons for this. The main nationalist newspapers in Ireland supported the Redmondite strategy. The Catholic Church also provided moral sustenance for those joining to fight the Germans. There was none of the condemnation that had been issued in relation to the Fenians, and they provided padres for the British Army. Thus the recruitment campaign promoted a sense of legitimacy. A general hype was created that everyone should do their duty – the famous Lord Kitchener poster pointing the finger at passersby and saying "your country needs you." Others heard the call of Redmond and joined up for the cause of nationalism. Whole communities of young and not so young men joined up in what was often viewed as a community effort. Joining the British Army was also viewed as something of an adventure. It also provided much needed income for many whose career opportunities were limited in Ireland at the time.

Historically the British Army had been a source of income and adventure for many working class people across the empire. The 1881 Census had shown that in Belfast where Catholics made up 28.8% of the working population and were disproportionately among the most economically deprived, they composed 31.9% of British Army soldiers, though none of these held officer ranks. At the same time Catholics only represented 17.2% of the legal profession, 9.7% of doctors, 7.1% of engineering workers, and 14.7% of shop owners/merchants (Jones 1960:163). James Connolly the revolutionary socialist leader, who was a leader in the 1916 Rising and was executed, had himself been a former British soldier in his youth. Indeed some of those who later returned from World War I, such as Tom Barry, who was to lead a flying column in West Cork, were to join the IRA in what came to be known as the War of Independence (1919–1921).

While many tens of thousands marched off to war, many were not to return. John Redmond's brother Willie who was one of five Irish MPs to fight in World War I was killed in 1917 as was former IPP MP Tom Kettles in 1916. In the last verse of his well-known poem "To My Daughter Betty, the Gift of God," written just days before his death, he appears to challenge those who criticized those Irish who were fighting in the British Army:

> So here, while the mad guns curse overhead, and tired men sigh, with mud for couch and floor, know that we fools, now with the foolish dead, died not for Flag, nor King, nor Emperor, but for a dream born in a herdsman's shed, and for the sacred scripture of the poor. (Pierse 2017:247)

At least 49,000 Irish people are listed as having died during the war by the "In Flanders Field Museum Project" in Ypres, Belgium (In Flanders Field Museum Project). Initially there was a general belief that the war would be over quickly. In the end it was to last 4 years with between 17 and 29 million dead (soldiers and civilians). Any initial romantic notions of heroic fighting for a good cause became subsumed by the horrors.

David Starrett, a young working class unionist and UVF man from Belfast who survived the war, wrote in his unpublished memoir, "Batman":

> So the curtain fell, over that tortured country of unmarked graves and unburied fragments of men: murder and massacre: the innocent slaughtered for the guilty: the poor man for the sake of the greed of

the already rich: the man of no authority made the victim of the man who had gathered importance and wished to keep it.

Greed and lust of power, that was the secret. We were said to be fighting to stop future war, but none believed that. Nor ever will. (Starrett unpublished)

A cold irony is that his views on the war appear similar to those socialists who opposed it and would soon rise against British rule in Dublin.

An interesting point in relation to World War I worth considering is the impact of the growing Home Rule crisis in Ireland on the developments on continental Europe at the time. The killing of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 by Serbian nationalists had set in motion a chain of events far beyond a relatively simple nationalist attack. The Austro-Hungarian Empire's ultimatum to Serbia was rejected, leading to a declaration of war on that country by the empire. This then led to the intervention by Russia on the side of its ally, Serbia, and then the intervention by Germany on the side of its ally the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Britain, France, and Russia had signed a treaty to support one another in the event of war. Thus when Germany declared war on Russia, France, and Belgium, Britain had to decide whether to enter into the war itself. According to Jerome aan der Wiel (2017), archives and memoirs suggest that there was belief among some of the German and Austrian leaders that a potential conflict in Ireland would distract Britain and make an intervention on the side of Russia and France less likely. The threat of potential war in Ireland, between the UVF, the Irish Volunteers, and the British over Home Rule, meant that Britain was reluctant to deploy large numbers of troops away from Ireland to engage in war on the continent. This in turn may have emboldened the Germans in their own war efforts if they believed that Britain would not intervene. In the event the immediate crisis in Ireland was averted (at least for the moment) by Redmond's announcement in the House of Commons on 3 August of support for the British war effort. With his and Carson's agreement, the Home Rule Bill was suspended until after the war. The next day, 4 August,

Britain declared war on Germany (Aan der Wiel 2017a).

This leads to a number of possible speculative perspectives around "what if." What if "Home Rule" had not been a bone of tension in Ireland in 1914? What if the Conservatives and Unionists had accepted that the wish of the vast majority of the people of Ireland was for Home Rule and that this should be respected with limited Home Rule for Ireland within the empire? Would this have placated Irish nationalists (the vast majority of whom seemed to support such a policy in 1914) and marginalized the republicans? Would this in turn have presented a 'united' UK rather than a "disunited" one to Germany and led to diversion from war? Could World War I have been prevented as a result? What if Redmond had refused to support the British war effort in August 1914? Would this have prevented Britain entering the war and saved the lives of tens of thousands of Irish (and British)?

Of course neither of these happened. Britain entered the war with the support of many more nationalists than those who opposed it but a new "opportunity" also now presented itself for the minority of nationalists and socialists who wanted an independent republic in Ireland. Operating on the old Irish nationalist maxim, "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity," the IRB and its nationalist allies set about planning for revolution.

The Lead up to the Rising

The split in the Irish Volunteers over World War I and Redmond's call to support the British war effort provided the IRB with an opportunity to consolidate their control over the organization, and they infiltrated a number of key positions, though Eoin MacNeill remained the leader. Four of the seven signatories to the 1916 Proclamation held important positions – Patrick Pearse, Direction of Military Organisation; Thomas Mac-Donagh, Director of Training; Joseph Plunkett, Director of Military Operations; and Eamonn Ceannt, Director of Communications.

The war itself also presented an opportunity to make contacts with Britain's enemy, Germany, in

the hope of obtaining weapons and possibly other military support, as nationalists had done in previous centuries with other states, such as France and Spain, when Britain was in conflict with them. The IRB set up a secret military council, separate from the Irish Volunteers. The official position of the Volunteers was that it would only engage in military activity if attacked. In May 1915 Pearse had written in *The Irish Volunteer* publication by way of an explanation as to why the Volunteers existed:

> What if conscription be enforced on Ireland? What if a Unionist or a Coalition British Ministry repudiates the Home Rule Act? (*The Irish Volunteer* 1915)

The IRB however had other plans for the Irish Volunteers. It was planning a Rising. The IRB's organization in the USA under John Devoy engaged in communications with the Germans. Both Joseph Plunkett and Roger Casement travelled to Germany in 1914 and 1915 to try and get agreement on weapons' shipments to Ireland and a German invasion force. Although some weapons were agreed, an invasion of Ireland wasn't part of the German war strategy. With the agreement of the Germans, Roger Casement was sent to try and recruit Irish volunteers among British Army prisoners of war held in Germany for a new Irish Brigade to fight the British. He met with little success however and left disillusioned (Aan der Wiel 2017a). He was attacked by the Irish press for his efforts. For example, in 1915, the Belfast-based IPP supporting nationalist paper, the *Irish News*, carried an editorial denouncing Casement's attempt to get "these heroic Irish fighting men" to desert as an "evil scheme" (*Irish News*, 28th June 1915).

One of the problems the IRB had in relation to a Rising was the lack of support among the wider nationalist population. Families had sons and fathers fighting in the British Army overseas, while the Irish Volunteers were marching around Ireland and opposing the war. One incident from the police files from the period reports that a band of Volunteers led by Pearse on a march through Limerick in May 2015 was attacked by stone-throwing women whose family members were fighting overseas (RTE n.d.).

The death of the veteran Fenian, Jerimiah O'Donovan Rossa, provided an opportunity for the IRB to mobilize support for their cause. Taking control of the funeral, they decided to use it as a powerful propaganda event. O'Donovan Rossa's body was brought from New York to Liverpool to Dublin and given a full military funeral with uniformed members of the Irish Volunteers marching behind the coffin and firing shots over the grave in Glasnevin Cemetery. It was one of the biggest funerals ever seen in Ireland. Pearse's eulogy on 1 August 1915 went down in history as one of the most stirring revolutionary speeches ever made in Irish politics:

> Life springs from death; and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations. The Defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the open. They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools! – they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace. (Library Ireland n.d.)

By January 1916 the IRB had decided on a date for the Rising – 23 April, Easter Sunday. There is no doubt that the date was symbolically significant in Catholic Ireland – Easter Sunday celebrates the Resurrection of Christ. Indeed an attempt was even made to try and get the Pope to endorse the Rising. Count George Plunkett was sent to Rome in April 1916 to tell the Pope about the Rising and to ask him to bless it, but he declined (Rafferty 2016:52; Aan der Wiel 2017a:231).

Easter was also a holiday period (Easter Monday being a holiday), and there would be an expectation that many British troops and officials might be on leave. James Connolly who had been increasingly vocal in his own publication *The Irish Worker* about a need for revolution was brought into the confidence of the IRB. Over the period 19 to 22 January, he entered into discussions with the IRB leadership, was sworn into the IRB, and was made a member of their Military Council (Greaves 1976:383–387; Berresford Ellis 1985:218–220).

The IRB in Ireland informed Devoy in the USA about their plans for the Rising in February, and he contacted the Germans and asked for

weapons and other support. They responded by sending the Aud with 20,000 rifles to Ireland. However the British had broken the German code and followed the ship all the way to Ireland where it was captured after failing to land the weapons off the West coast. Roger Casement has been landed on the Kerry coast on 21 April 2016 by a German U Boat to liaise with the Volunteers over the transfer of the arms. However, he was quickly captured by the British. Casement himself was brought to London, where he was charged with treason and hanged in the aftermath of the Rising becoming the 16th leader to be executed.

The evidence suggests that the British must have known about plans for a Rising (Aan der Wiel 2017a:229–231). Certainly this was one of the factors which influenced Eoin MacNeill to make the countermanding order to try and stop it. Eoin MacNeill had initially opposed any Rising on moral grounds, being opposed to armed struggle unless it took place in the context of self-defense. However, the IRB eventually convinced him, with a forged document allegedly from Dublin Castle that the British planned to move against the Irish Volunteers. They told him about the plans for a Rising and of the plan to land weapons from Germany. He initially agreed to go along with the plan for major mobilizations of Irish Volunteers throughout Ireland on Sunday 23 April. However, when he found out about the deception and the loss of the Aud he issued the countermanding order, cancelling the mobilizations (Aan der Wiel 2017a:229). The order which was published in the *Sunday Independent* on Easter Sunday led to a great deal of confusion among the Volunteers, with some mobilizing in different parts of the country and then returning home. A decision was made by the IRB to go ahead with it the following day on Monday. However by that stage, few of the Volunteers were aware of the plans.

The 1916 Easter Rising

'Twas far better to die 'neath an Irish sky, Than at Suvla or Sud el Bar. (The Foggy Dew)

On Easter Monday morning 24 April 1916, about 1200 men and women took control of a number of key buildings and areas of Dublin. Most of them were members of the Irish Volunteers, but they included about 200 members of the ICA as well as members of Cumann na mBan (the women's branch of the Irish Volunteers) and Na Fianna Éireann, the republican scouts movement. The GPO became the headquarters where the leader Patrick Pearse was based along with James Connolly and other leaders. There Pearse read out the Proclamation of the Republic which was signed by seven signatories – Thomas Clarke the veteran Fenian, Thomas MacDonagh, Sean Mac Diarmada, Eamonn Ceannt, James Connolly, Joseph Mary Plunkett, and Patrick Pearse. The Volunteers also took control of a number of other strategic buildings including the Four Courts, Boland's Mill, Jacob's Factory, and St Stephen's Green. These were chosen to command the main routes into Dublin or because of their strategic positions in relation to the major military barracks. They also occupied the College of Surgeons for a while. At one point they attacked Dublin Castle, and there was later speculation that since there was only a limited number of armed police in the Castle at the time due to the holiday, they might have been able to take it over had they proceeded with the attack. The failure to control the railway stations meant that once they were in a position to move troops into the city, the British could do so via train (McGarry 2017).

Outside of Dublin, the countermanding order meant that very few areas rose up. In Co. Galway, 500 rebels mobilized under Liam Mellows and made several unsuccessful attempts to take over a number of RIC Barracks (McGarry, 2016). Mellows, a prominent socialist republican, was to go on to fight in the War of Independence 1919–1921. He also went on to fight on the republican anti-treaty side in the Civil War (1922–1923). He was captured in June 1922 at the Four Courts in Dublin which had been occupied by anti-treaty forces. He was executed by the Free State along with three other leaders, Joe Kelvey, Richard Barrett, and Rory O'Connor, one from each province, in December 1922, in reprisal for the assassination of pro-treaty TD, Sean Hales (Greave 2004).

The most successfully uprising outside Dublin was in Ashbourne, Co. Meath, where Volunteers

led by Thomas Ashe captured several barracks. Enniscorthy, Co. Wexford, was the only other town which was occupied for a period by the rebels. Due to confusion over the countermanding order, the Rising did not take place there until Thursday 27 April. A number of buildings were taken over and held until the general surrender order was made by Pearse on Saturday 29 April (McGarry 2017:258–259). Interestingly the *Evening Herald* reported that the supporters of Redmond's party had turned out to support the police during this period, with 600 including the nationalist mayor enlisting as special constables (Evening Herald, 5th May 1916:1). Thomas Ashe was later to die due to force-feeding while on hunger strike in 1917.

Although there was no Rising in Cork, the RIC had been sent to round up republican sympathizers around the country, and a gun battle broke out at the home of the Kent family when they attempted to arrest the Kent brothers. An RIC man was killed along with one of the brothers, and the other brothers were arrested. Thomas Kent was executed over the incident by the British.

In the North, the IRB President, Dennis McCullough had led the Belfast Volunteers to Coalisland for the 1916 mobilization to meet up with Tyrone Volunteers, but the countermanding order led most to return to the city thinking the Rising had been called off. The plan apparently had been to join up with Liam Mellows in Connaught and not to engage in any armed activities in Ulster (McCullough 1953).

The Proclamation of the Republic reflected the different and sometimes conflicting strands of thinking within the IRB, Irish Volunteers, Irish Citizen Army, and Cumann na mBan at the time. It was different from the Fenian Proclamation of 1867 in that it was not so overtly socialist, but there were nonetheless socialist ideas contained therein. It was clearly nationalist, republican, secular, anti-sectarian, internationalist, and indeed quite feminist for its time.

It started off with its call to "Irishmen and Irish women," making it clear that both were equally important in this republic.

The continuing importance of Catholicism for most Irish people, including the revolutionaries,

was reflected in the wording of the 1916 Proclamation:

> . . . In the name of God and of the dead generations. . . We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it. . ..

However, it is also clear that many of those involved in the Rising had a radical agenda and, while the words might be open to different interpretations, potentially a socialist agenda:

> We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. . .

It promoted the notion of rights for all citizens regardless of creed and indeed reconciliation between all parts of Ireland:

> The Irish Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and all of its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past. . ..

It also linked the 1916 Rising to other rebellions in Ireland down through the centuries, creating a narrative of an unbroken lineage of an old nation which had struggled against bondage for centuries, and in the process legitimizing the claims and actions of those involved in the Rising:

> The long usurpation of that right (to the ownership of Ireland) by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the last three hundred years they have asserted it to arms. (Proclamation of the Republic 1916)

In Dublin, fighting was limited on Monday. The British appeared to have been taken unawares of the Rising, despite historical evidence that they had intelligence on it and the fact that they had just captured Casement and the Aud. Many of the senior military commanders were out of the city, including the military commander in Ireland,

General Friend, who was in London on leave. It wasn't until Tuesday that the British were able to move troops into Dublin and the fighting really began. The Viceroy, Lord Wimborne, declared martial law in Dublin, and on the following day the Cabinet in London extended it throughout the whole of Ireland. The Chief Secretary, Birrell, and the Viceroy both resigned. The Prime Minister Asquith sent General Maxwell to Ireland as Military Governor, and he arrived in Dublin on Friday (Townsend 2016:3).

British troops began sectioning off the city in an effort to isolate the rebels and began to shell the buildings which they occupied. There was a belief among the Volunteers that if they held out for a week, the international community might recognize the legitimacy of the republic which they had proclaimed. They held out for nearly a week, but by Saturday 29 April, the Rising was over, and Pearse had signed an unconditional surrender.

During the week nearly 3,000 had been wounded during the fighting and 485 people had been killed, about 260 of whom were civilians (including 40 children). 126 (about 26%) were British forces (120 British soldiers, 5 Volunteer Training Corps members, and 1 Canadian soldier). 82 (about 16%) were Irish rebel forces (64 Irish Volunteers, 15 Irish Citizen Army, and 3 Fianna Éireann), and 17 (about 4%) were police (14 Royal Irish Constabulary and 3 Dublin Metropolitan Police). All of the police and a number of the soldiers who died were Irish (Glasnevin Trust n.d.).

In the immediate aftermath of the Rising, the British authorities, under General Maxwell's orders, held secret court martials. No details of "trials" or evidence were provided by the media, just a list of names of those sentenced to death or imprisonment. A series of executions took place, drawn out over a number of days. In total 14 of the alleged leaders in Dublin including all of the signatories of the Proclamation and Patrick Pearse's brother, Willie, were executed. Thomas Kent was executed in Cork, and the sixteenth, Roger Casement, was executed for treason after a trial in London. A number of others including Countess Markievicz who had commanded the volunteers in St Stephen's Green and Eamon De Valera, later

leader of the republicans and a future president of the new Irish state, were sentenced to death but had the sentences commuted to imprisonment. Others were sentenced to life and other various lengths of imprisonment (Townsend 2016).

The large number of executions and their long-drawn-out nature with executions every day began to move public sympathy in the direction of the rebels. Redmond appealed to the PM Asquith to stop the executions because they are "causing rapidly increasing bitterness and exasperation" among people in Ireland (*Daily Telegraph*, 9th May 1916:9). On 10 May, after 8 days of trials and 13 executions, Asquith put a stop to the process of trials, but he allowed the executions of James Connolly (strapped to a chair because he had been badly wounded and couldn't stand) and Sean Mac Diarmada. General Maxwell however continued to round up republican supporters. Throughout Ireland an estimated 3,500 men and 79 women "suspects" were arrested. Many were transported to imprisonment in Britain with nearly 1800 imprisoned "without trial" (Townsend 2016).

Reaction to the Rising

When the Easter Rising took place in 1916, the Irish Parliamentary Party like most of the Irish population regarded it as a "stab in the back" for the Irishmen fighting overseas. Many more men were fighting with British forces overseas in World War I and in the police forces in Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), than were involved in the Rising. The vast bulk of the population did not rise in its support as had been hoped by the leaders, and indeed contemporaneous reports suggested that many people in Dublin apparently abused the prisoners as they were led away. The bulk of the Irish media and a number of Catholic bishops and clergy joined the IPP in condemning the Rising.

The British authorities and many in the press referred to the rebels derisorily as "Sinn Féiners." The Unionist *Weekly Irish Times* published immediately after the Rising said that "many instances of cold-blooded murder by Sinn Féiners took

place" (*Weekly Irish Times*, April 26th-May 13th:1). In its editorial, it called for continued martial law saying:

> for many months to come, firm and well-directed military government will be essential to the public safety. (*Weekly Irish Times*, April 26th-May 13th:6)

The daily *Irish Times* in its editorial on 6 May rejected criticism from the nationalist *Freeman* newspaper of its aggressive response to the Rising:

> We said, and we repeat, that the surgeon's knife of the State must not be stayed until the whole malignant growth has been removed. . . We have called for the severest punishment of the leaders and responsible agents of the insurrection. (*Irish Times*, 6th May 1916)

The IPP supporting *Irish Independent* called the Rising "Criminal Madness" in its editorial just after the Rising, saying that it cared little for the fate of the leaders who brought it on themselves by their actions (*Irish Independent*, April/May 1916:2). By this stage, 4 May, three had already been executed.

On 10 May 1916 after 13 executions had been carried out, the *Irish Independent* stated that:

> Some of these leaders are more guilty and played a more sinister part in the campaign than those who have already been punished with severity and it would hardly be fair to treat these leniently because the cry for clemency has been raised. . .Let the worst of the ringleaders be singled out and dealt with as they deserve, but we hope there be no holocaust or slaughter. (*Irish Independent*, 10th May 1916)

This seemed to be a clear reference to James Connolly who had been badly injured in the GPO. Connolly had been a thorn for many years in the side of William Murphy, the owner of The *Irish Independent*. Murphy had tried to break Connolly's trade union, the ITGWU, during the Dublin Lockout in 1913. Two days later, Connolly was strapped to a chair and executed by firing squad. Also shot that day was Sean Mac Diarmada.

The *Irish Catholic*, another newspaper owned like the *Irish Independent* by William Murphy, described the Rising in its edition on 29th May 1916 as both insane and criminal and appeared to support the executions:

> Pearse was a man of ill-balanced mind, if not actually insane. . .selecting him as "chief magistrate"

was enough to create doubts about the sanity of those who approved of it. . .no reason to lament that its perpetrators have met the fate universally reserved for traitors. . . (Berresford Ellis, 1985:230)

The wide gulf between the revolutionaries and the constitutional nationalists was illustrated just a few days after the Rising at the Conference of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. This body which was prominent in mobilizing political support for the IPP at the time was a different organisation from the U.S. organisation of the same name. Developed by the IPP's Joseph Devlin as a support organisation for the IPP it was particularly strong in Ulster. It voted at its conference to condemn:

> the foolish action of the Sinn Fein organisation. . . causing needless destruction of life and property. (*Irish News*, 18th May 1916)

Individual priests were undoubtedly sympathetic to the republican struggle from 1916 to 1922. Indeed one priest, Fr. O'Flanagan, who had been friends with many of the 1916 leaders, was made vice president of a reorganized and overtly republican Sinn Féin in 1917. However, the hierarchy was generally much more hostile (Keogh 2007). Seven bishops publicly condemned the 1916 Rising. Cardinal Logue stated that no one could fault the government for punishing the rebels, provided that it did so "within the laws of humanity." Nevertheless of the 31 bishops and auxiliaries, the bulk, including the archbishop of Dublin, William Walsh, remained silent (Rafferty 2016:52).

In June a subcommittee of bishops was appointed to draw up a statement setting out the Church's hostility to revolution, but by October 1916 they concluded that such a statement would serve no useful purpose (Rafferty 2013). By this stage the ongoing reaction of the British to the Rising was creating increasing hostility among the nationalist population.

The End of the IPP and the Rise of Sinn Féin

In the aftermath of 1916, the sympathy of Irish nationalists began to move to the revolutionaries. People were affected not just by the long-drawn-

out series of executions but by the emergency provisions enacted by the British authorities including internment without trial, house searches, movement curtailment, and harassment by police and troops. This was coupled with a growing anger and disillusionment with the ongoing deaths in World War I. Tens of thousands were continuing to die in Europe in the war, and there was talk now of conscription in Ireland. By 1917 Sinn Féin had come to be the party which represented the IRB and the Irish Volunteers. At its October 1917 Ard Fheis, it made clear that it stood for an independent republic and it began to win seats in by-elections. It was to lead to the rapid demise of Home Rule supporting Irish Parliamentary Party. In the December 1918 elections, standing on a platform of abstentionism from the UK Parliament at Westminster and stating that it would instead establish its own independent Parliament in Ireland, Sinn Féin won 73 out of the 105 seats, most of them uncontested, leaving only 6 for the IPP. Indeed the 6 seats won by the IPP were partly the result of an intervention in Ulster by the Catholic Church, fearful that a split vote there would give the seats to Unionists. As a result an electoral pact was agreed by Sinn Féin and the IPP.

On 21 January 1919, the first Dáil Éireann met with only 27 TDs present, the rest being in jail or "on the run." It proclaimed allegiance to the 1916 republic and declared support for a socialist program entitled the Democratic Programme, a program which it was never able to implement. On the same day, armed men in what was to become known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ambushed members of the RIC escorting explosives at Soloheadbeg in Co. Tipperary, killing two RIC officers. This is often regarded as the first incident in what came to be known in Ireland as the "War of Independence, 1919–1921." In September 1919 the First Dáil was declared illegal by the British who set about disrupting its activities and imprisoning its representatives. While the "war" continued, the British Government passed the Government of Ireland Act 1920 which partitioned Ireland, establishing a Free State Parliament for 26 counties in the South and a Northern Ireland Parliament for six counties in the

North. In December 1921 negotiations between the republicans and the British Government led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Controversially signed by the Irish delegates under a British Government threat of 'terrible and immediate war' if they did not, it was passed by the Dáil by a majority 64 to 57. The treaty agreed to the partition of Ireland with the North remaining part of the UK with its own Parliament and the South becoming a dominion within the British Empire.

The treaty split Sinn Féin and the IRA, leading to a Civil War from June 1922. The Civil War was even more brutal than the War of Independence with former comrades set against one another and ambushes by the IRA followed by extrajudicial assassinations/executions and other reprisal attacks by the Free State. In the 7-month period November 1922 to May 1923, the Free State Government officially executed 77 republican prisoners. This was more executions than the British had carried out in the 5 years from 1916 to 1921 – 40 official executions, 16 in 1916 and 24 in the War of Independence. Free State forces also carried out an undetermined number of unofficial killings, in response to IRA attacks, such as at Ballyseedy Cross, Co. Kerry, in 1922. A formal cessation of hostilities was announced in May 1923 although that didn't end the killings (McArdle, 1924; Campbell 1994).

From 1923 a much reduced IRA (or IRAs) continued to exist with the aim of ending British rule in the North, re-establishing the 32 County Republic proclaimed in 1916, and engaging in attempted armed campaigns to achieve this. The longest of these was from 1970 to 1997 after which the new Sinn Féin party (remaining after a series of splits) agreed to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (1998). While the bulk of the remaining IRA appears to have supported this, what have been termed "dissident" republicans in much smaller numbers have continued to try to develop an armed campaign against British rule in the North.

As for the Free State, in 1937 a new Irish Constitution gave it the name 'Ireland'. Then in 1948 it became an independent state and no longer a British dominion by mutual agreement with the British Government, while Northern Ireland

remained part of the UK with its own local Parliament.

The Legacy of 1916

The Legacy of 1916 is, as many historians have agreed, quite complex. It has proven difficult for subsequent generations of Irish people to come to terms with on a number of different levels.

The move towards total independence and partition

On the one hand, it is possible that without the 1916 Rising Ireland might not have been partitioned. It is possible that if Ireland had united around support for the British effort in World War I, it may have remained united in the aftermath of the war as Home Rule was again negotiated. However, such a scenario was unreal given the circumstances in Ireland at the time.

For a start it seems certain that regardless of World War One, Unionists would not have been prepared to trade their majority status within the UK for a minority status within a semi-independent Catholic Ireland. They feared for the loss of their rights and freedoms; their religion; their ethno-religious identity; their social, economic, cultural, and political links with Britain; and indeed their disproportionately advantaged economic and social status position in Ireland. They also feared that limited independence would simply become extended to full independence over time, providing them with even less protections. It was for these reasons they had set up the armed paramilitary group, the UVF in 1913, and threatened rebellion, with the apparent support of the Conservative Party, the army officers in the Curragh, and prominent members of the business and landowning classes. Even, the Liberal Government under Asquith had come around to the notion of partition by 1914 to safeguard their (and Britain's) interests. With such support from within the establishment, the notion that their position would change or become weakened by nationalist involvement in the war seems naïve.

It is highly unlikely that the British would have contemplated delivering Home Rule to all of Ireland never mind independence sought by republicans. The British Government was not just thinking about domestic politics, Parliamentary majorities, and the balance of power in Westminster. Nor was it simply thinking about the safety of the Unionists in the North: it didn't seem to worry much about the Unionists in the South when it partitioned the island. There were a number of strategic and economic interests at play, linked to concerns for the integrity of the UK and the British Empire. That is why the British wanted to hold onto the treaty ports. They were also interested in maintaining the links to the shipbuilding and engineering industries around Belfast. More importantly perhaps they did not want Ireland to set an example for other parts of its empire, particularly India, in demanding independence. And of course British pride was also at stake. Britain had to be seen to win. That British interests rather than a desire for "peace and reconciliation" were to the fore explains why Lloyd George was prepared to threaten "terrible and immediate war" on Ireland if the republicans were not prepared to accept Britain's imposed "agreement" in December 1921.

It is also important to remember that a large republican and anti-imperialist socialist opposition to British rule had developed in Ireland fueled by British action and inaction, a lack of democracy and self-determination, and a sense of grievance built up over centuries of British rule. That opposition was unlikely to disappear.

Likewise even without republican and socialist opposition, it seems unlikely that support for the war from nationalists could have continued for much longer given the impact of the horror of World War I (on both British and Irish, not to mention other nationalities). By the end of 1916, people in Ireland were sickened by the mindless slaughter and maiming of the war, its long duration, and the lack of any sign of an end in sight. By 1915 it had been clear that the British war effort couldn't depend on volunteers anymore, and in January 1916 conscription had been introduced in Britain (but not in Ireland) with the Military Service Act. The IPP had urged against it being extended to Ireland, realizing that it could weaken its own political support (having supported the

war in the first place). When the British Government decided regardless, in the aftermath of 1916 to extend it to Ireland in April 1918, the IPP withdrew from Westminster in protest. As a result the IPP was now adopting a similar position to Sinn Féin of abstaining from Westminster, something not lost on the population. Now abstentionism, long criticized by the IPP, no longer appeared a mindless or irresponsible idea. Conscription then became a cause celebre in Ireland with the Catholic hierarchy also coming out against it. The result was that the British having enacted it never introduced it in Ireland. The whole process, however, seemed to legitimate even more the Sinn Féin position and weaken that of the IPP. Thus by 1918 the tide of support for the war and for the IPP had turned in Ireland. Among nationalists this meant a move towards republicanism and support for total independence from Britain.

As sympathy for those who had died in the 1916 Rising grew in the face of both the executions and the general aggressive handling of the country in the aftermath by the British, those who had condemned the republicans had to find ways of reintegrating themselves into the dominant discourse which was developing.

The Catholic Church

On a religious level, the Catholic hierarchy and laity had to deal with the contortions of whether or not the square peg of the Rising could be screwed into the round hole of Catholic "Just War" theology (not to mention the Catholic hierarchy's long history of on the one hand condemning "violence" by republicans and on other supporting the rule of law implemented by the British Government). This was made easier by the fact that most of the 1916 republicans were Catholics. The leader Patrick Pearse, in particular, reflected a devotion to the Church and its teachings in his writings (Pearse 1922). Poems like "The Mother" or "The Fool" indirectly linked the sacrifice of dying for Ireland with the sacrifice of Christ. Even Connolly the socialist was reported to have received the sacraments before he died. The Church was to

continue to yield enormous power in the years during the War of Independence and throughout the twentieth century in Ireland. By the 1918 Elections in which Sinn Féin won an overwhelming majority of seats, the Church was more willing to accept Sinn Féin as representing the bulk of the Irish people. However, during the conflict 1919–1921, bishops and priests continued to condemn acts of violence by both the IRA and the British forces. Nevertheless, as during the Land League, different bishops and particularly priests took differing stands. Thus when the bishop of Cork, Daniel Coholan, excommunicated the IRA, Tom Barry, a republican leader in Cork, described how most local priests still administered the sacraments to them (Barry 2013:56–57). As a result the bond between republican volunteers and the Church may have been strained but was never broken. Though they strongly opposed partition, the Catholic hierarchy came out in favor of the 1921 Treaty, before Dáil Éireann had voted on the issue (*Irish News* 10 December 1921). Cardinal MacRory, the archbishop of Armagh, publicly denounced and encouraged the excommunication of anti-treaty republicans during the Civil War including a future president of the Free State – De Valera. Despite this, the Church's power was such that it could retain influence even with those political leaders it had condemned, after the establishment of the Irish state. The Church continued to condemn radical republicanism and socialism in Ireland into the 1930s. In 1931 the bishops issued a statement condemning the IRA and Saor Éire, a left-wing republican organization and the left-wing Republican Congress. After 1921 it continued to be dominant in moral, social, educational, and welfare matters in the new Irish state, and this role was encouraged by the government. De Valera consulted with the Church over the content and wording of the 1937 Constitution, for example. Catholic social teaching and the principle of "subsidiarity," outlined in Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, which rejected state intervention in relation to individual and family welfare, fitted with the conservative and laissez-faire approach of successive governments. Consequently the Irish state developed the character of a "Catholic" state for "Catholic" people.

Provision of schools, hospitals, and social services was usually left to the Church, and most attempts to alter that – such as Noel Browne's 1950/1951 Mother and Child scheme – ended in failure. It was not until the 1980s that the combined effects of EU membership in 1973 and European Convention on Human Rights court cases that Church control and influence over welfare provision and gender and sexual rights began slowly to wane, accelerating from the 1990s onward with the publication of clerical abuse cases and the general decline in vocations. In the North, now controlled by a majority Unionist Government since 1921, the Church operated for the most part as a state within a state. The Unionist state remained hostile to the Church and its followers regarding them as a disloyal fifth column attempting to destroy the entity. Discrimination against this minority was publicly sanctioned and indeed encouraged by successive Unionist Governments and practiced at public and private sector levels (Farrell, 1976). The minority for the most part did not recognize themselves as a minority at all, but part of a majority in Ireland who had been denied democracy in a new all Ireland state. They resented what they felt had been an injustice implemented by force of arms. On occasions when republican attempted to engage in physical force campaigns from the 1920s on to end partition, the Church remained forceful in its condemnation. The Church attempted (along with constitutional nationalist politicians) to negotiate better conditions for its flock with some limited success and remained the most important spiritual and political leader as well as a provider of education of welfare services for its followers into the 1980s and 1990s (Ó hAdhmaill 2013).

Women

While a large number of women were involved in the 1916 Rising, for the most part, they occupied subordinate roles, assisting the men as was the culture of the time. Countess Markievicz was probably an exception in this regard, commanding one of the units. The proclamation seemed to suggest an acknowledgment of equal rights for women, and Sinn Féin, the ICA, and Cumann na mBan all expressed support for women's suffrage. In the aftermath of 1916, however, rights for women were slow in coming. The new Free State did introduce female suffrage on the same basis as males (all people over 21), in 1922 and before this was introduced in the UK. Thus it is clear that at least on the surface republicans were generally supportive of women's rights. However, for much of the existence of the state, the position of women remained subordinate to men in the public sphere. Markievicz was the last woman minister in Ireland until the appointment of Maire Geoghegan-Quinn in 1979, and up until 1973 female civil servants were still expected to leave their jobs when they were married. The Church's influence was particularly determinate in this respect. It was membership of the EEC/EU in 1973 rather than the radical legacy of 1916 which heralded in new rights for women in employment, and it wasn't until the decline of Church power from the 1990s on that gender and sexual rights began to develop and be legislated for.

Socialism

The dreams of Connolly and the ICA of establishing a Workers' Republic came to nothing in the aftermath of 1916. The First Dáil had passed the overtly socialistic Democratic Programme in January 1919.

It stated:

...we declare that the Nation's sovereignty extends not only to all men and women of the Nation, but to all its material possessions, the Nation's soil and all its resources, all the wealth and all the wealth-producing processes within the Nation, ... that all right to private property must be subordinated to the public right and welfare. ... declare the right of every citizen to an adequate share of the produce of the Nation's labour...

It shall be the first duty of the Government of the Republic to make provision for the physical, mental and spiritual well-being of the children, to secure that no child shall suffer hunger or cold from lack of food, clothing, or shelter....all shall be provided with ....proper education....

...The Irish Republic fully realises the necessity of abolishing the present odious, degrading and foreign Poor Law System, substituting therefore a sympathetic native scheme for the care of the Nation's aged and infirm, who shall not be regarded as a burden, but rather entitled to the Nation's gratitude and consideration. Likewise it shall be the duty of the Republic to . . ..safeguard the health of the people. . . (Democratic Programme 1919)

However, there was no ability or inclination to implement the Democratic Programme during the War of Independence. For a short period in April 1919, the Limerick Soviet embodied the hopes of some for a new type of economic as well as political order in Ireland (O'Connor Lysaght 1979). However, the deaths of Connolly and Mellows, the partition of the country in 1921, and the defeat of the republican forces in the Civil War (1922–1923) summoned in conservative and in many ways reactionary governments, North and South, and throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, radical forces had limited impact, either side of the border. As Connolly had predicted about partition:

Such a scheme as that agreed to by Redmond and Devlin, the betrayal of the national democracy of industrial Ulster would mean a carnival of reaction both North and South, would set back the wheels of progress, would destroy the oncoming unity of the Irish Labour movement and paralyse all advanced movements whilst it endured. (Connolly 1914 in Berresford Ellis 1997:275)

In the South, the pro-Free State Cumann na nGaedheal (later called Fine Gael) Government sought to "balance the books," establish "a good credit rating" with the capitalist world, and appear "responsible" in fiscal and budgetary matters. One of the first acts of new finance minister, Ernest Blythe, after the end of the Civil War in 1923 was to cut the old-age pension by a shilling (5c) to try and save on public expenditure. This government was followed by a conservative Fianna Fáil Government in 1932, which introduced the 1937 Constitution, a constitution reflecting Catholic social teaching and promoting "a conservative and distinctly sectarian state" (Powell 1992:220). Thereafter governments in the South were dominated by one or other of these conservative parties. In the North, the conservative Ulster Unionist Party dominated from 1921 to 1972 when direct rule from Westminster was introduced (Farrell 1976).

There are many reasons why the momentum for radical change in Ireland was lost in the 1920s. These include the loss of many progressive elements through conflict and emigration; the division in the labor movement and working classes, caused by both the War of Independence and partition; the absence of a strong industrial base in much of Ireland; the problems with economic development and continuing dependence on Britain for trade and income, North and South; and the persistent, controlling conservative influence of the Catholic Church among Catholics, North and South.

The Competing Narratives of 1916 and Contemporary Politics

One major legacy of 1916 was that despite being a military and political failure at the time and being roundly condemned by major Catholic Church figures, most of the press, and constitutional nationalism, the Rising came to be rebranded and embraced by conservative forces in Ireland and used to challenge and condemn latter-day revolutionaries as representing the antithesis for which those who died in 1916 had stood. Metaphorically speaking the Rising and its leaders were retrospectively canonized by the powerful interests in Irish society – the Church, the political parties, and the business class – and they used the association with the Rising to promote their own particular brand of politics and legitimacy among the masses. Indeed 1916 became commodified, with iconography which could be sold to make a profit. Streets, buildings, and sports clubs were renamed after what became known as the 1916 "martyrs" in the new Irish state. However, in the new Northern Ireland, the new "heroes" of the new Irish state remained the "criminals" and "murderers" they had been branded in 1916. That entity had its own set of "heroes" whose names and images bedecked streets, city centers, and statues – those who had fought to maintain the Union with Britain. Two narratives had emerged of the 1916 Rising, and these were to be reinforced and reproduced throughout the

remaining part of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. In the rush to identify themselves with their fallen heroes, the adherents of both entities made little attempt to promote a concept of a shared narrative, a shared island, or peace and reconciliation, ironically the aim of the 1916 leaders in the first place.

The 1916 Rebellion not only inspired those who were to turn to Sinn Féin and the IRA in the post-1916 era and during the War of Independence 1919–1921, but it also inspired those who were to fight on both sides in the Civil War in 1922–1923 and who were to continue to fight after 1923, during sporadic outbursts of armed struggle, in an effort to end British rule in the North and reunite the country. Indeed allegiance to the 32 County Republic proclaimed in 1916 became part of the constitution of the post treaty IRA (and subsequent versions of it). The 1916 republic was viewed as having been subverted by the British and those who had accepted the treaty. The legitimacy of continuing the armed struggle was in part provided by that Proclamation of the Republic.

It was also provided by the words and ideas of the 1916 "martyrs." At his court-martial in 1916, before being executed, Connolly had provided the ultimate "justification" for future republicans in the physical force tradition:

> Believing that the British government has no right in Ireland, never had any right in Ireland and never can have any right in Ireland, the presence in any one generation of Irishmen of even a respectable minority ready to die to affirm that truth, makes that government forever a usurpation and a crime against human progress. (Connolly 1916)

After the Civil War, two new major constitutional nationalist parties emerged in the South, each intent on inheriting the iconic mantle of 1916. The new Free State Government was led by Cumann na nGaedheal, the party which had supported the Treaty. (which in 1933 became Fine Gael). Fianna Fáil was set up in 1926 by Eamon De Valera and many of those who had opposed the treaty, after splitting from Sinn Féin over their policy of abstention from both partitioned Parliaments in the North and South of Ireland. De Valera hoped the new party would be able to re-establish

the 1916 republic by constitutional means. Both parties tried to outdo one another in proving themselves the genuine inheritors of 1916. De Valera was to go on to create the 1937 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Irish Constitution) which in its Articles 2 and 3 was to lay claim to the whole of Ireland for the Irish state.

> Article 2: The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas.
>
> Article 3: Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the parliament and government established by this constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole territory, the laws enacted by the parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstat Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect. (Bunreacht nah Éireann 1937)

In theory this created a constitutional imperative on behalf of the Irish state to reunite the country. In reality the state did nothing, outside of rhetoric, to achieve this aim. From 1922 to 1972, when the British Government prorogued the Northern Ireland Parliament and introduced direct rule from Westminster, the effect was to link Fianna Fáil to the 1916 republic and to alienate even further Unionists in the North who viewed the claim to "their" territory as a threat. De Valera consistently referred to the North as the "Occupied Six Counties." In 1933 he was elected to the northern South Down constituency as an MP but refused to take his seat. However, he steadfastly refused to allow northern nationalists elected in the North to sit in the Dáil in Leinster House, as had happened during the First (1919–1921) and Second Dáil (1921–1922). He did not wish to upset his own balance of power in the Dáil with the introduction of northern nationalists. He also had no compunction in acting aggressively against the IRA, an organization which refused to recognize the legitimacy of the southern government as much as the northern government and which engaged in armed activity in both parts of Ireland. In the space of 5 years – 1940–1944 – his government oversaw the execution of 6 republicans. In the 51 years of the whole existence of the Unionist Government in the North 1921–1972, only one republican, Tom Williams in 1942, was ever executed.

Fine Gael, for its part, declared the 26 County State a republic in 1948, and this was recognized in mutual legislation in Britain and Ireland. The effect was to link Fine Gael to the concept of a republic, though one that comprised only 26 counties.

By the 1980s, challenged by the ongoing armed conflict in the North and in particular the armed struggle of the Provisional IRA (1970–1997) and by their own inability to do much to achieve Irish unity by constitutional means over 50 years, both parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, began to distance themselves from Articles 2 and 3. In both the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), the Irish Government agreed to aspire to Irish reunification but accepted that this could only occur with the consent of a majority in the North. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (1998) was to copperfasten this in legislation and in changes to the Irish Constitution. The claim to the North was removed and replaced with new clauses declaring a desire "to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland" but accepting the necessity of consent on either side of the border for any reunited Ireland.

> Article 3
>
> It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island. . . .. (Bunreacht nah Éireann 1937). The new Article 2 asserted that everyone born on the island of Ireland was entitled to be 'part of the Irish nation'.

> Article 2
>
> It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. . ..

This right has since been qualified by the Twenty-seventh Amendment. Adopted in 2004, this amendment did not alter the new wording of Articles 2 and 3 but nonetheless limited the constitutional right to citizenship to those born on the island to at least one parent who was already an Irish citizen.

While opinion polls in the South of Ireland continue to show a large majority in favour of Irish unity, including a RedC/RTE/TG4 poll in May 2019 (Red C, 2019), in the North, despite an increasing (and younger) nationalist population and a declining (and older) unionist population, opinion remains deeply divided. The North has witnessed massive change since the onset of the peace process of the early 1990s. A new generation has grown up in a more peaceful,, less militarised, less discriminatory society, albeit one that is still heavily segregated geographically, residentially, socially, economically, culturally and politically. Changing demographic patterns, globalising influences such as increasing foreign travel, increasing immigration and increasing ethnic/religous diversity, the decline of the power of the Catholic Church North and South, the increasing secularization of society, and the advancement of a human rights-based approach to policy and practice are all impacting on society. Whether this will lead to the development of a desire for Irish reunification among northern unionists in the near future,however, remains open to debate. The decision of a majority of the people of England to bring the United Kingdom (and the North) out of the European Union (EU) (while the South of Ireland remains in the EU) raises all sorts of questions. The threat of a 'hard border' being implemented North and South in Ireland (something that hasn't been seen since the late 1990s), and the potential impact on the peace process; the stability of the UK itself given that majorities in both the North of Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in the EU; renewed demands for a border poll (allowed for in the Belfast Agreement 1998) in the North and independence for Scotland, all mean that the future remains very unclear.

The Legacy of the Easter Rising 1916 Internationally

Historically, those who had risen against British rule in Ireland had always looked across Europe for potential allies in order to try and even up the great imbalance between Irish resistance and British control in what was to increasingly become a

highly asymmetric conflict. Looking initially to England's international enemies – Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and France in the eighteenth century – for potential support, the Irish resistance was traditionally based on the premise – England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity. So it was in the early twentieth century when both unionists and nationalists in Ireland sought out Imperial Germany, to obtain weapons for their diametrically opposed causes. Such overseas assistance was based less on support for Irish democracy or self-determination and more on the national and imperial interests of European powers competing with England. The French Revolution and the threat to it from England and other European dynasties did create a bond, however, short-lived between revolutionary France and Ireland with the spread of the democratic ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity to Ireland. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Young Irelanders were also greatly influenced by the liberal democratic struggles throughout Europe culminating in the 1848 uprisings and linked their own struggles to those opposing absolute monarchies there. Daniel O'Connell also became a champion for the ending of slavery in the USA and promoted the escaped slave, Frederick Douglas on his tour of Ireland in 1845. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Irish revolutionaries were also to the fore in labor struggles in Britain. It was the Fenian movement in particular which was to find solidarity in the developing workers movement in Europe in the later nineteenth century, creating close ties with the First International. While constrained in their socialism by the reality of the controlling influence of the Catholic Church over the mass of Irish peasantry, they nevertheless produced an overtly secular and socialistic proclamation of the Republic. Michael Davitt, the land leaguer and Fenian, was active in the labor movement in Britain, as was IRB member Jim Connell who penned the famous socialist anthem, "The Red Flag."

The IRB in 1914 along with a minority of Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army had opposed the World War as an imperialist war and Irish involvement in it. In particular, the 1916 leader James Connolly had argued for anti-imperialist solidarity among working people across Europe and a banner was strung across the doorway of the ITGWU's headquarters, Liberty Hall, in Dublin, proclaiming, "We Serve Neither King nor Kaiser." Connolly and the ICA supported the minority of European socialists like Lenin and the Bolsheviks and Rosa Luxemburg, who refused to side with those fighting a war for capitalist and imperialist gain. According to Aan der Weil (2017b) while Lenin appeared sympathetic to the Irish struggle after 1916, writing that "a blow delivered against the British imperialist bourgeoisie in Ireland is a hundred times more significant than a blow of equal weight in Africa or Asia" (Lenin 1916), the Bolsheviks in general had their own difficulties after 1917, trying to maintain their revolution against western European armies (Aan der Weil 2017b). While attempts were made to obtain Soviet recognition for the First Dáil after 1919, much more important for the republicans was not to alienate the Catholic Church. There was also a belief that the USA could provide more important support for the newly proclaimed republic.

Indeed it was the Irish diaspora in both Britain and the United States which was to have a particular influence on the cause of Irish independence from the mid-nineteenth century onward.

The Great Hunger 1845–1849 led to massive emigration of Irish people and with them went a sense of grievance against British rule. Irish Americans in particular organized and funded the Fenian campaign in the later nineteenth century, and it was to the USA that De Valera and others went after 1916 in search of funds, weapons, and recognition for the newly proclaimed republic. The 1918 election with the landslide win for Sinn Fein and the establishment of the First Dáil led to attempts to get Ireland's case heard at the Versailles Treaty negotiations. While the victorious European powers talked about the freedom of small nations, this only applied to those people formerly ruled by the defeated Austro-Hungarian, Germany, and Ottoman Empires. The empires of the victorious French, British, and Belgians remained intact (Throntveit 2011:445–450). The right to self-determination related only to some nationalities, and, indeed,

by the end of the interwar period, the majority of the world's currently recognized nation states still remained under the control of the colonial powers.

Despite lobbying from Irish-America and the support of a majority of votes in both the US Senate and House of Representatives, President Wilson, under pressure from his British allies, refused to allow the Irish republican representatives a hearing (Phoenix 2019). The British then set about militarily crushing what they saw as a "rebellion" in Ireland. Similar expressions of dissent were also crushed in Egypt and at Amritsar in India, both in the spring of 1919.

The 1916 Rising and the struggle for independence no doubt influenced other peoples' struggling under imperial control. O'Malley (2017) notes in particular the influence on the Indian struggle for independence. Gandhi is said to have been particularly influenced by Griffith's Sinn Fein approach to passive resistance prior to 1916 but actually denounced Sinn Fein's support for physical force during the War of Independence. Those Bengalese involved in the Chittagong Uprising of 1930 are said to have been inspired by the likes of Terence MacSwiney and in particular Patrick Pearse. O'Malley also cites revolutionaries in Egypt, Ghana, Algeria, and Indonesia as having been influenced by Ireland's struggle. She mentions that Tom Barry's Guerilla Days in Ireland had been invoked by a wide range of revolutionaries from Che Guevara and Fidel Castro (Cuba) to Mao Zedong (China), General Giap (Vietnam), and others (O'Malley 2017). It has even been suggested that a young Ho Chi Minh, later the leader of the Vietnamese revolution, who was studying at University in Dublin at the time, was greatly influenced by the guerrilla tactics used by the IRA leader Michael Collins. Ho Chi Minh was also denied a hearing at the Versailles Treaty talks.

The struggle for self-determination in Ireland had the potential to place Ireland firmly in the camp of solidarity with others opposing imperialism throughout the world. However, the close economic, social, and cultural links with Britain, the USA, and latterly the European Union and the reality of survival in a capitalist world often diminished such potential in the post-1921 period. While republicans in the various manifestations of the republican movement since 1921 appeared to forge links with struggles in Spain (1936–1939), the Basque Country, South Africa, Palestine, Latin America, and other struggles in Africa and Asia, as well as the international workers movement, others in the Irish establishment have often sided with the rich and powerful in the world. The execution of the socialist leaders Connolly and Mellows and the defeat of the more radical faction of the IRA during the Civil War (1922–1923) reinforced the position of what Free State Government Minister Kevin O'Higgins (1892–1927) had stated were "the most conservative-minded revolutionaries that ever put through a successful revolution."

After 1922, the new Free State set about proving to its neighbors in Britain and Europe that it was not a threat to capitalist economic stability by balancing the books and relying on the Catholic Church for charitable forms of welfare provision rather than providing state provision as of right. When fascism evolved in Europe in the 1930s, Ireland's own fascists, the Blueshirts, antecedents of the current (more liberal democratic) Fine Gael Government, led by former IRA commander and police commissioner Eoin O'Duffy, held center stage. While republicans and socialists joined the Connolly Column to fight for democracy in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), many more Irish joined to fight for fascism, supported by the Catholic hierarchy.

The new Irish state attempted to forge a pathway based on "neutrality" in international relations, supporting, for example, the acceptance of the Peoples Republic of China into the UN despite US opposition. Its own colonial past and struggle for independence was beneficial in UN peacekeeping missions in the post-World War II period, in post-conflict scenarios in former colonies. However, in later years, such neutrality appears to have been increasingly compromised by the use of Shannon Airport as a staging post for the USA transporting troops to war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq and prisoners for extraordinary rendition/torture in other countries. Ireland's involvement in some EU decisions has also raised similar

questions of Irish neutrality, especially since the establishment of an EU foreign policy, since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the potential involvement of the Irish Army in a new EU army, and more recent Irish state involvement in EU military activities in places like the former French colony, Mali. Increasingly the Irish state may be viewed not as a former colony but as a partner with the other "former" colonial and current neo-colonial powers in the West.

That said, many in Irish civil society and a number of political parties on the Left have not forgotten Ireland's past colony status or its struggle for self-determination, and, up to the time of writing Irish society appears to have resisted the development of overtly racist anti-migrant populist movements which appear to have mushroomed in the West in recent years.

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Easter Rising 1916

Eco-imperial Relations: The Roots of Dispossessive and Unequal Accumulation

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Introduction

Over the last decades, "imperialism" and "environment" have become closely linked concepts (Arnold 2015). Traditionally, scholars of empire had tended to ignore environmental issues (Arnold 2015; Foster and Clark 2004). Yet the surge of the environmental question in the social sciences and humanities in the last two decades has generated a breadth of studies from history, sociology, anthropology, political sciences, and other disciplines, showing how environmental issues at global, national, and local scales are inextricably linked to the history of colonization, postcolonial struggles, and the broader conditions of coloniality and imperialism persisting until this day.

From these new studies, a consensus has emerged that histories of imperialism and globalization are crucial to understand current environmental issues – and that indeed there is a symbiotic relation between imperialism and global environmental changes (DeLoughrey et al. 2015; Foster and Clark 2004). As DeLoughrey et al. (2015) observe, "experiences of environmental violence, rupture and displacement" related to colonization are central ecological challenges across the Global South. Yet, despite the increasing attention to these issues, there is still insufficient conceptualization and empirical investigation of environment-imperialism relations, and there is great variation in the approaches taken to their study (Arnold 2015; DeLoughrey et al. 2015). Most works focus on the *historical* dimension of environmental issues in the formal colonial period, looking usually at one,

though sometimes at several, empires, while more recent works also attend to the recurrent (neocolonial or neo-imperial) manifestations. Some focus on the ecological changes and knowledges that emerge in colonial encounters, others focus on the violent resource extraction processes and toxic effects that accompanied (or still accompany) colonization, and still others focus on conservation initiatives. There are overarching analyses and particular histories of specific resources (forests, energy, waste). And overall, there are many different concepts used, including ecological and eco-imperialism, green imperialism, green colonialism, environmental colonialism, toxic colonialism, energy imperialism, and carbon colonialism. Some of these concepts are used interchangeably to mean the same thing, while the same concept is often used to mean somewhat different things (see Table 1). As Arnold (2015, p. 35) concludes, there is "no clear consensus on what in essence characterizes the eco-imperial relationship" (also DeLoughrey et al. 2015; Dyer 2011).

This chapter presents an integrated, multidimensional approach to analyze how eco-imperial relations manifest themselves in reality and are discussed in the literature. We argue for integrating the multiple dimensions of these relations in both their historical and current manifestations. In the section "Eco-imperial Relations: A Multidimensional Approach," we elaborate five (distinct yet interrelated) dimensions of these relations. For each, we define key issues and identify links to other related concepts. Table 1 presents the different concepts used to refer to this relation, provides definitions and examples, and identifies related concepts. In the section "The Slow Violence of Eco-imperial Relations: Cases from Central America and the Caribbean," we provide illustrations from case studies around the world, using the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas), a worldwide database of environmental justice struggles and we deep into US geopolitical influence and forms if neocolonialism and imperialism in Central America and Puerto Rico. Section "Conclusions" provides a final concluding discussion. We argue for more engagement with *configurations of the multiple dimensions* of eco-imperial relations and for

Eco-imperial Relations: The Roots of Dispossessive and Unequal Accumulation, Table 1 Definitions of concepts referring to eco-imperial relations

Concept	Definition and author	Similar and related concepts	Example
Ecological imperialism	1. *Ecological/biological impacts of the historical process of colonization or "ecological colonization"* (Crosby 1986)		Invasive species and infectious diseases that destroyed native fauna and killed millions of indigenous in the Americas
	2. *Recurring resource extractivism and toxic dumping*: "the pillage of the resources of some countries by others and the transformation of whole ecosystems upon which states and nations depend; massive movements of population and labour that are interconnected with the extraction and transfer of resources; the exploitation of ecological vulnerabilities of societies to promote imperialist control; the dumping of ecological wastes in ways that widen the chasm between centre and periphery; and overall, the creation of a global 'metabolic rift' that characterises the relation of capitalism to the environment, and at the same time limits capitalist development" (Foster and Clark 2004, p. 187)	Environmental colonialism (Concepcion, Atiles-Osoria) Environmental imperialism (Austin and Phoenix, Gonzalez) Mining imperialism (Gordon and Weber) Extractrive imperialism (Veltmeyer) *Related concepts:* Accumulation by dispossession (Harvey), accumulation by contamination (Demaria), and dispossession by contamination (Pellow) Ecologically unequal exchange (Hornborg) and ecological debt (Accion Ecologica)	The invasion and occupation of Iraq for oil, biopiracy by Northern corporations in the Amazon, the exploitation of guano/nitrate by Britain and other imperial countries in Peru and Chile
Eco-imperialism	1. *Imposed global environmental protection policies:* "imperialistic forms of environmental governance – those that constrain participation in societal decision making, or that cause social and even ecological harm under the guise of environmental protection... reflecting inequality and exploitation... shorthand for neo-imperialist manipulations of the political economy, or the more direct territorial interventions and transgressions of traditional imperialism, *but now in the name of environmental protection*...may also be used more positively to test the undesired side effects of otherwise desirable environmental initiatives" (Dyer 2011, pp. 189–190) Other authors: Driessen (2003)	Environmental colonialism (Agarwal and Narain) Carbon colonialism (Bachram, Lyons and Westoby) *Related concepts:* First-world environmentalism (Martinez-Alier) Environmentalism of the rich (Dauvergne)	Global climate change policies and REDD+, environmental provisions of free trade agreements, environmental projects of the World Bank, and conservation initiatives of large international NGOs and corporations
	2. *Conservation areas imposed by Global North (states or NGOs) on Global South* (Hall 1994)	Green colonialism (Kumar, Zaitchick) Environmental colonialism *Related concepts:* Green grabbing (Fairhead et al.) Accumulation by conservation (Büscher and Fletcher)	

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Eco-imperial Relations: The Roots of Dispossessive and Unequal Accumulation, Table 1 (continued)

Concept	Definition and author	Similar and related concepts	Example
Green imperialism	*Environmental awareness and policies "pioneered" by European scientists during colonial period* (Grove 1995)[b]	Green colonialism (Kumar, Zaitchick) Eco-imperialism (Dyer, Driessen)	
Green colonialism	*Conservation areas imposed by Global North on Global South, either historically through colonial-era policies (*Kumar 2010*) or, currently, with similarities to historical processes* (Zaitchick 2018)	Environmental colonialism Eco-imperialism (Hall) *Related concepts:* Green grabbing (Fairhead et al.) Accumulation by conservation (Büscher and Fletcher) Imperial nature (Goldman) Cult of wilderness (Martinez-Alier)	
Environmental colonialism	1. *Recurring processes of extractivism and toxic dumping during and after formal colonial rule* (Concepción 1988; Atiles-Osoria 2013)	Ecological imperialism (Foster and Clark, Austin and Phoenix, Gonzalez)	
	2*. Conservation areas imposed by Global North on Global South* (Nelson 2003)	Green colonialism (Kumar, Zaitchick) *Related concepts:* Green grabbing (Fairhead et al.) Accumulation by conservation (Büscher and Fletcher) Imperial nature (Goldman) Cult of wilderness (Martinez-Alier)	Establishment of protected areas displacing indigenous peoples and peasants, as in Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks in the USA and Serengeti National Park in Tanzania
	3. *Discourse blaming Third World countries for global environmental/climate change* (Agarwal and Narain 1991)	Eco-imperialism (Dyer, Driessen)	Global climate change policies Global forest protection policies, for instance those promoting conservation of the Amazon with a discourse blaming weak enforcement by Brazil and ignoring the demand from the Global North that drives the deforestation.
Toxic colonialism	Export of highly-polluting industrial wastes, products and technologies of the global North on territories of the global South, (Bernstoff et al. 1993) Other authors: Pratt (2011)	Garbage imperialism (Stebbins) Waste colonialism (Basel Convention, Liborion) Nuclear colonialism (Endres)	Côte d'Ivoire petroleum toxic waste dump (Pratt) Toxic waste from France shipped to Benin in exchange for debt reduction Current dumping of plastics, electronics and other supposedly 'recyclable' wastes on global South countries
		Related concepts: Toxic (waste) dumping Accumulation by contamination (Demaria)	
Carbon colonialism	*Carbon trade initiatives that rely upon the implementation of mitigation strategies in the Global South to offset industrial and polluting activities in the Global North* (Lyons and Westoby 2014) Other authors: Bachram 2004	Greenhouse imperialism (Altvater) Climate colonialism (Moe-Lobeda)	Global climate change policies: Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and REDD+ Eucalyptus plantations that are subsidized as carbon-offsetting under dubious calculations and which displace peasant and indigenous communities.
		Environmental colonialism (Agarwal and Narain) Eco-imperialism (Dyer, Driessen)	

(continued)

Eco-imperial Relations: The Roots of Dispossessive and Unequal Accumulation, Table 1 (continued)

Concept	Definition and author	Similar and related concepts	Example
Nuclear colonialism	*"A system of domination through which governments and corporations disproportionately target and devastate indigenous peoples and their lands to maintain the nuclear production process"* (Endres 2009)	Radioactive colonialism (LaDuke and Churchill) Toxic (waste) colonialism (see above) Energy imperialism/colonialism (see below)	To test, produce, and dispose nuclear weapons in low-income countries US nuclear tests in Marshall Islands French nuclear tests in French Polynesia Uranium mining and nuclear waste dumping in indigenous lands in the US
Energy imperialism	*Foreign countries or companies with high levels of energy consumption appropriating and contaminating a region's land or resources in order to generate energy; often done through geopolitical interventions (political, economic, or military) to secure energy supplies* (Gustafson 2017)	Energy colonialism (Batel and Devine-Wright, deOnis) Nuclear colonialism (Endres) Radioactive colonialism Oil imperialism (Alvater) Petro-imperialism (Watts) Petrochemical colonialism (Bullard) Ecological imperialism (Foster and Clark) *Related concepts:* Accumulation by decarbonization (Bumpus and Liverman)	The use of indigenous territory as site for highly polluting energy activities from mining/extraction (e.g. of coal, oil or uranium), related infrastructure (e.g. gas pipelines) to deposit (e.g. of toxic coal ash or nuclear energy waste), often not permitted or not wanted on the imperial power Shell operations in Ogoni territory in Niger delta Gas pipelines passing through Native lands in the US US-UK invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan for oil

[a]Similar concepts are those close to a synonym, though often with some differences. Related concepts are those that link to the concept being defined by referring to a specific process or outcome that is captured within the definition (e.g. the accumulation by dispossession characteristic of extractive forms of eco-imperialism).

[b]Contrary to other authors such as those employing the concepts of eco-imperialism and green colonialism, Grove (1995) does not offer a critique of these policies, but rather makes the straightforward argument that the environmental degradation caused by colonization, led to an environmental awareness amongst colonizers, particularly scientists, who then went on to promote environmental conservation measures.

doing so in comparative perspectives which can underscore similarities and differences over time (from the formal colonial period to current times) and across space.

Eco-imperial Relations: A Multidimensional Approach

Attention to the connections between imperialism and environment suggests that imperial powers influence the ways environments are governed in colonized and post-colonized territories. By imperial powers, we mean not just imperial countries but a global network (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000) also including global or transnational corporations, financial entities (e.g., World Bank or Inter-American Development Bank), and nongovernmental organizations (e.g., World Wildlife Fund or The Nature Conservancy). By governed, we mean how environments are conceptualized and used/extracted or "protected" and how the benefits and costs of these governance actions are distributed within and between regions. These links are both material (managing natural resources and territories) and ideological (ideas, values, and discourses about "the environment" and "nature"). In addition, they often refer to historical process (i.e., during the colonization) and/or to ongoing process. Indeed, post- and decolonial scholars have emphasized the endurance of colonial ideologies and materialities to this day (Mignolo and Walsh 2018). In what follows in this section, we elaborate on five interrelated domains of eco-imperial relations: (1) *as extractivism*, (2) *as contamination*, (3) *as conservationism*,

(4) *as energy and climate control*, and (5) *as knowledge*.

Imperialism as Extractivism: Ecological/Eco-imperialism

As a historical phenomenon, imperialism was centrally a claim over the colonies' land and resources for their extraction (Rutazibwa and Shilliam 2018) and over the people who provided the labor for it. This dimension has been labelled **eco-imperialism** (Dyer 2011; Foster and Clark 2004; Gonzalez 2001), though this concept is also used with other meanings (see Table 1). The history of imperial extractivism is memorably documented in works such as Eduardo Galeano's *Open Veins of Latin America* (1971) and Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1973). Both documented the immense wealth that was extracted by European countries and corporations from free labor and resources in these regions – gold, silver, copper, diamonds, timber, rubber, guano, ivory, soil, etc. – in turn depriving the colonized societies of that wealth. For instance, in South Africa, Mackenzie's *The Empire of Nature* (1988) documented how Great Britain used the vast wild animal resources of the colonies as a material support for its imperial enterprise in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Africa and Asia. He observed a pattern where animals first suffered an initial period of mass exploitation as ready source of food for colonists and lucrative products (e.g., horns, skins) for foreign markets, later were reserved as species for elite hunting, and finally, in a still ongoing phase, became part of conservation and tourism initiatives. Some European colonial scientists critiqued the environmentally destructive practices of colonial projects, leading to some conservation measures (Grove 1995), though not always motivated by environmental concerns. Thus, as we discuss below (section "Imperialism Through Conservationism: Green Imperialism"), from the colonial period, imperial extractivism also became historically interlinked with *conservationism*.

Marx used the concept of **primitive accumulation** to refer to this enclosure and pillage of indigenous common resources in the initial phase of capitalism: "The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production" (Marx 1967, p. 751). These analyses thus help visibilize that the extractivism of imperialism was intricately tied to the historical emergence of global capitalism as a hegemonic ecosystem world (Machado 2018).

However, a focus on the colonial past is insufficient because ecological imperialism – indeed coloniality more generally – is an ongoing process, intimately tied to current neoliberal global capitalism. As Rosa Luxemburg had observed in *The Accumulation of Capital* (2003 [1913]), primitive accumulation is a recurring process inherent to (and an economic prerequisite for) the continued expansion of capitalist production on a global scale: "Capital... cannot manage without the natural resources and the labour power of all territories. Seeing that the overwhelming majority of resources and labour power is in fact still in the orbit of precapitalist production—this being the historical *milieu* of accumulation—capital must go all out to obtain ascendancy over these territories and social organisations" (Luxemburg 2003 [1913], p. 346). Imperialism was "the political expression" of this accumulation process "in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of the noncapitalist environment" (Luxemburg 2003 [1913], p. 426).

Therefore, a broader definition of ecological imperialism is needed, one that captures the recurrent forms of exploitation that characterize it. As Luxemburg did, Foster and Clark (2004, p. 187) draw on Marx to observe that capitalist production requires ever-expansive the control over "material-ecological flows," thus coming to the broader definition of **eco-imperialism**:

> "the pillage of the resources of some countries by others and the transformation of whole ecosystems upon which states and nations depend; massive movements of population and labour that are interconnected with the extraction and transfer of resources; the exploitation of ecological vulnerabilities of societies to promote imperialist control; the dumping of ecological wastes in ways that widen

the chasm between centre and periphery; and over-all, the creation of a global 'metabolic rift' that characterises the relation of capitalism to the environment, and at the same time limits capitalist development"

Simply put, eco-imperialism is "the North's systematic and ongoing appropriation of the South's ecological resources" (Gonzalez 2001, p. 983). (This also includes the "sinks" to which waste is dumped, as we discuss below in the section "Imperialism as Contamination: Toxic Waste Colonialism.") Harvey (2003) identified the continuation of these processes under neoliberal capitalism, referring to a "new imperialism" characterized by what he called "accumulation by dispossession": in search of new sources of accumulation, capitalism separates laborers from their means of production through privatization (enclosure) of commons and public goods, expanding capitalist relations into precapitalist spaces. This is evidenced in the current processes of dispossession of peasants and indigenous communities through **land grabs** by states or corporations for large-scale industrial agriculture, biofuels, conservation initiatives, energy, and other infrastructure projects (Fairhead et al. 2012; White et al. 2012; Yenneti et al. 2016). A clear example is the role of Northern companies in mining in Africa and Latin America. A report by the NGO War on Want found that 101 of the companies listed in the London Stock Exchange – 71 of them British and many others London-based – control at least $1.05 trillion worth of gold, diamonds, platinum, oil, and coal resources in Africa (Curtis 2016). The report observes that UK's policies today are a continuation of British foreign policy goals since 1945, when, as now, one of the main (and often the main) objectives was to promote British corporations' access to and control over Africa's resources. This "scramble for resources" is thus a "new colonialism" (Curtis 2016). Similar observations have been made about Canada and its mining sector in Latin America, in what has been called **mining imperialism** (Gordon and Webber 2017) and **extractive imperialism** (Veltmeyer 2013). As with Curtis (2016), Gordon and Webber's (2017) analysis concludes that Canadian foreign policy in

Latin America is designed to "enable and enhance the profit-making potential of Canadian multinational firms, above all in finance and mining." In both cases, this includes the promotion of liberalized markets and weak environmental regulatory regimes, the active support for military coups (in Haiti and Honduras), the containment or repression of social movements, the weakening of leftist governments, and the opposition to actions against corporate human rights abuses. Another prominent example is the influence of the USA in Central America since the beginning of the twentieth century in relation to the interests of banana production corporations such as United Fruit Company (Pérez-Brignoli 2006).

Eco-imperialism is closely related to the concept of "**imperial mode of living**" (Brand and Wissen 2017), which captures the fact that capitalism implies "uneven development in time and space as well as a constant and accelerating universalisation of a Western production model." This imperial mode is based on three logics: "(i) the unlimited appropriation of resources; (ii) a disproportionate claim to global and local ecosystems and sinks; and (iii) cheap labor from elsewhere" (Brand and Wissen 2017). This concept adds that ecological imperialism is rooted not just in the actions of "imperial countries" or corporations, but in people's everyday practices and identities, normalized in a way that hides imperialist intents, and supported through state institutions.

Finally, the modes of environmental governance and development generated by eco-imperialism reference three additional interconnected processes: **underdevelopment**, **ecologically unequal exchange** (and **ecological debt**), and **extractivism**. The theory of **underdevelopment** explains how colonization and postcolonial processes of resource extractivism created interlinked patterns of development in the North and underdevelopment in the South (Nkrumah 1965; Rodney 1973). Rodney (1973) observed how after formal independence, "Africa has not yet come anywhere close to making the most of its natural wealth, and most of the wealth now being produced is not being retained within Africa for the benefit of Africans." He used the concept of a "Scramble for Africa" to refer to the

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colonial and post-colonial extractivism. Nkrumah (1965) referred to this as "necocolonialism". The difference between dependency theory and eco-imperialist approaches is that the former was concerned mostly with the distribution of wealth (and "development") from the extraction of resources, but did not pay so much attention to the ecological effects (Foster and Clark 2004), nor to the imperialist ideology behind the concept of "development" itself (Escobar 1995). In this sense, **ecological unequal exchange** or trade (Hornborg 1998) highlights the unequal amounts of natural resources (including land and energy) embodied in the products traded in the global market, where, usually, Global South countries provide natural resources (or ecological sinks) for Global North consumption. This type of exchange gives rise to what the NGO Acción Ecológica called the **ecological debt**: "the debt accumulated by Northern, industrial countries toward Third World countries on account of resource plundering, environmental damages, and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, from the industrial countries" (Martinez-Alier et al. 2014; also Foster and Clark 2004). Prominent examples of the ecological debt generated through eco-imperialism are the history of the global guano/nitrate trade during British colonization (Clark and Foster 2009) and the appropriation of the global carbon sink by Global North industries since the industrial revolution – i.e., **carbon colonialism** (Bachram 2004). (A revolution, let us be reminded, financed through the pillage of the resources of the colonies.)

Extractivism, a concept coined by Latin American scholars, is a mode of accumulation based on extraction of raw materials for export (Acosta 2013; Brand et al. 2016; Svampa 2015). This model started with colonization itself but continues as "neo-extractivism" (Acosta 2013; Machado 2014). Even in cases of independent, leftist, and "post-neoliberal" countries (i.e., Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia), which use extractivism to fund social programs, these processes still reflect the eco-imperial relation: they are based in the intensive exploitation of nature for the "colonial fantasy of development," historically associated to **underdevelopment**, in a region which remains in a peripheral, dependent position in the global capitalist system (Machado 2014; Svampa 2015). This neo-extractivism in Latin America is part of global capitalist dynamics with a deepening and expansion of the 'imperial mode of living' capitalist centers and semi-peripheries, including emerging superpowers such as China, driving a continued high demand of natural resources, and a shift (dumping) of 'dirty' industries to the global South (Brand et al. 2016). Svampa (2015) has called this a, "commodities consensus" where, in spite of the global consensus on the ecological crisis' extractivist forms linked to commons enclosure and **dispossession** in the peripheral global South continue to be the dominant economic model (Svampa 2015). These processes are directly linked to environmental conflicts and violence against grassroots movements who oppose to this extractivism; violence includes repression, murders and criminalization (Global Witness 2016; Del Bene et al. 2018) but also other non-direct forms of violence (Navas et al. 2018; Roy and Martinez-Alier 2019).

Imperialism as Contamination: Toxic Waste Colonialism

As the discussion above already suggested, ecological imperialism also manifests itself as a form of contamination. **Extractivism** itself generates multiple forms of contamination – as demonstrated in many cases of water contamination from arsenic and other pollutants in gold mining and the pollution from phosphate mining in Nauru (Micronesia) by Australian and British corporations, which has rendered most of the zone uninhabitable due to contamination (EJAtlas 2017a). But there are other mechanisms. Possibly the first use of the concept, Crosby's (1986) *Ecological Imperialism*, referred to a form of *biological contamination*. He documented how the introduction of exotic animal and plant species and diseases, and the imposition of new land uses (e.g., clearing native forests for large-scale agriculture), led to major shifts in the ecology of the colonized areas and to collapses in the local human and nonhuman populations (see also Piper and Sandlos 2007 in Canada). Crosby's analysis

thus highlights how an "ecological colonization" of the non-European world was toxic for the local environment and generated the conditions for military colonization (and, by extension, also for extractivism).

Another aspect of this dimension is related to the *waste* generated by industrial production, mostly in the North. The term **toxic colonialism**, coined by Jim Puckett from Greenpeace in 1992, refers to the export and dumping of toxic industrial wastes by the rich or "developed" countries (former imperial colonizers) to poorer or "underdeveloped" nations (Bernstorff et al. 1993; Gonzalez 2001; Pratt 2011). It is also labelled as "waste colonialism" (Basel Convention 1989), "toxic waste colonialism" (Pratt 2011), and "garbage imperialism" (Stebbins 1993). This includes "electronic-waste, persistent organic pollutants (POPs), industrial waste, decommissioned ships, municipal solid waste, radioactive waste, and other toxic waste" (Liborion 2018), and it is often illegal or quasi-legal, with organized global criminal networks (Greenpeace 2010).

An example of a legal but clearly colonial arrangement is Benin's acceptance of toxic waste from French traders in exchange for a significant sum of money that would allow Benin to repay loans to France acquired after independence (Pellow 2007). Other examples of quasi-legal and illegal dumping activities include toxic petroleum waste in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) by a Swiss-based oil and commodity multinational shipping company (Pratt 2011); smelter sludge (full of toxic heavy metals) by a Swedish mining company in Chile (Pino Vargas and EnvJustice 2019; EJAtlas 2019a); toxic (including radioactive) waste by an Italian network – some associated to the Mafia and backed by Swiss corporations – in Somalia (an ex-colony of Italy), Nigeria, Western Sahara, Guinea, Mozambique, and Congo, among others (Campbell-Dollaghan 2014; Greenpeace 2010); millions of used car batteries from the USA to Brazil, China, India, and South Africa (Gonzalez 2001); the contaminated discarded ships from European corporations such as Geneva-based Mediterranean Shipping Company broken apart in India, often causing fires and other accidents (Demaria 2016); and the growing electronic waste shipped to Global South regions such as Asia by rich countries, including Japan (Kirby and Lora-Wainwright 2015; Puckett et al. 2002). All of these cases created significant public health problems that are still being dealt with today in the receiving countries.

The recurrence of toxic dumping shows that despite the Basel Convention being approved in 1989 to deal with what it called "waste colonialism," the unequal neocolonial patterns of the transboundary hazardous waste trade still persist (Pratt 2011; Pino Vargas and EnvJustice 2019). The affected countries or communities typically lack the resources, knowledge, political organization, or capital to resist the practice and decontaminate their environment from these hazardous substances. Recurrence is also linked to the **neoliberal globalization** logic where poorer countries and populations are "worth less." As infamously argued by Lawrence Summers when president of the World Bank, the costs of health-impairing pollution would be lower in developing countries since they are supposedly "underpolluted," the economic costs of mortality are lower (i.e., lives are economically worth less), and there are supposedly less demands for a clean environment – assumed as a concern of wealthier countries (Gonzalez 2001).

At the same time, while toxic (waste) colonialism has mainly referred to waste dumping from rich to poor countries (ex-colonies), there is variation in the flows of waste and contamination, and there is also dumping in indigenous territories or marginalized communities *within countries* in both the Global North and Global South – a form of "internal colonialism" (LaDuke and Churchill 1985). In this sense, waste colonialism refers to "how waste and pollution are part of the domination of one group in their homeland by another group" (Liborion 2018). For instance, in the USA, Native American reservations (Ishiyama 2003; LaDuke and Churchill 1985) and working-class Latino and black communities (Pellow 2007; Bullard 2000) are also used as toxic dump sites. In some cases (e.g., Ishiyama 2003; LaDuke and Churchill 1985), these toxics come from nuclear mining and waste, connecting to the **energy** dimension of eco-imperialism (section

"Imperialism Through Energy"). There is also a clear link here to the military-industrial complex, which not only serves to sustain these processes of accumulation by contamination by force, but becomes one of the main perpetrators of this contamination: in the US, for instance, close to 900 of the nearly 1,200 highly-contaminated industrial "Superfund" sites are abandoned military facilities or sites that supported military activities (Webb 2017).

Bernstorff et al. (1993) also refer to the dumping of dirty technologies and products not wanted in the global North, as part of this toxic colonialism. Following this lead, in this chapter, we further expand the concept of toxic colonialism to include how transnational Global North corporations and imperial countries shift to the Global South toxic chemicals used in the extractivist process (e.g., pesticides and herbicides for expanded export-oriented, corporate-controlled monoculture) or for military practices (e.g., napalm, nuclear energy), despite knowing these substances are toxic and hazardous for human health. On occasions, these toxic chemicals are even banned in the imperial countries for health reasons but still exported and used in the Global South, making it also an ethical and a human rights issue. The use of persistent and bioaccumulative pesticide substances generates a toxic legacy as some of these substances remain in the soil, air, and water for decades. The case of the massive expansion of GMO soy in Argentina, heavily dependent on the toxic herbicide Roundup, is a clear example. A case of the use of a pesticide in the Central American banana plantations is discussed in the section "The Slow Violence of Eco-imperial Relations: Cases from Central America and the Caribbean."

Issues of toxic colonialism, and toxic dumping more generally, link to the processes of **ecologically unequal exchange** (section "Imperialism as Extractivism: Ecological/Eco-imperialism"), as well as to **environmental justice**: the inequalities in the exposure to pollution, access to environmental quality, and participation in related decisions, and the often-ensuing conflicts (Demaria 2016; Gonzalez 2001; Pellow 2007). The global toxic waste trade is generated by patterns of capitalist production and consumption in the Global North: wealthier countries (and wealthier regions within countries) consume much more and thus generate much more waste than the poorer countries/regions, yet they often encounter much more regulation and opposition locally and thus have higher disposal costs, leading to the rapidly expanding and lucrative global trade in waste to poorer countries (Gonzalez 2001; Demaria 2016; Pellow 2007). Unequal power relations facilitate this *ecologically unequal exchange*, where "the core, through unequal power relations, manages to export entropy to distant sinks in the periphery" (Demaria 2016, p. 274). As observed by Pellow (2007, p. 17), the unequal exposure to toxics and their risks globally are related to the production of racial, class, gender, and national inequalities which is the "normal, routine, functioning of capitalist economies."

The declaration of Principles of Environmental Justice from the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991 explicitly linked colonialism with environmental justice, stating the commitment of the EJ movement "to secure our political, economic and cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and the genocide of our peoples." Byrne et al. (2002), citing Agarwal and Narain (1991), explicitly link **environmental colonialism** to environmental justice, as a way to underscore that global economic development is an attempt "to colonize not only the labor and resources of societies, but whole cultures and ways of life through an appropriation of the environmental conditions upon which communities depend." Thus, while the political control of the colonial era may be formally over, neocolonial relations of economic dependence, exploitation, and cultural inequality (devaluation of entire non-white populations) are central to current forms of toxic colonialism (Pratt 2011).

Demaria (2016), drawing on Harvey's (2003) concept of **accumulation by dispossession** (section "Imperialism as Extractivism: Ecological/Eco-imperialism"), further links waste

dumping to processes of **accumulation by contamination**: the capitalist processes of socializing the environmental costs and risks from polluting activities (**cost shifting**) in ways that threaten the means of existence/subsistence of people, thus expanding and deepening capitalist relations (Demaria 2016, p. 300). Accumulation by contamination implies a de facto enclosure of commons – the environmental "sinks" where pollution and waste are stored – in ways that surpass their assimilative capacity. These sinks include water and air, but also, as Liborion (2018) observes, the lands where the wastes are often supposed to be dumped or "processed." The consequences most likely fall upon the most vulnerable social groups (e.g., small-scale farmers and indigenous populations in the South, marginalized nonwhite and indigenous/marginalized communities in the North), but society as a whole – both present and future generations – can be affected (Demaria 2016), as evidenced, for instance, by the more than 250,000 tons of plastic waste afloat in oceans worldwide (Eriksen et al. 2014).

Imperialism Through Conservationism: Green Imperialism

A third dimension of imperialism-environment relations is related to *conservation*, especially the creation of protected areas, and more generally also to *environmental protection*. The concepts of "green colonialism" (Kumar 2010; Zaitchick 2018), "environmental colonialism" (Nelson 2003), "neocolonial conservation" (Garland 2008; Hayward et al. 2018), and "eco-imperialism" (Hall 1994) are used to refer to this dimension.

A majority of studies focus on the intimate links between the history of colonization and the creation of protected areas and associated recreational activities (e.g., hunting and tourism) by colonial authorities. Neumann (1995) observes that in Africa, colonial conservation policies were coercive and displaced local settlements and outlawed historical access rights to land and natural resources, to create tourism industries catering to Westerners who wanted to observe or hunt exotic animals (see also Mackenzie 1988). This is precisely what happened with the Germans and then the British in the Serengeti National Park

and other parts of Tanzania, where historical pastoralist uses were restricted to create game and forest reserves (Neumann 1995). Locals, despite being the most affected, were often the last to be notified of these restrictions.

Some authors refer to these historical processes in a positive light. Grove's (1996) *Green Imperialism* argues that the environmental degradation caused by colonization led to an environmental awareness among colonizers, particularly foresters, botanists, and other scientists, who then went on to influence colonial authorities to develop "green" measures to protect these "fragile" ecosystems. Barton (2002) argues along similar lines that imperial forest conservation – starting with Britain's protected forests in India – were "the origins" of today's "environmentalism" and that these measures were taken to protect the "public interest": "In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the most sweeping environmental initiatives emerged under the auspices of British imperialism" which "would serve settlers, industrial development, governance revenue, *and* environmental purposes ... By 1928, British foresters managed environmentally every major forest type in the world" (p. 1). Certainly, these were examples of imperial conservationism, and the environmental concerns of imperial scientists are well documented. But these narratives ignore the historical fact that indigenous peoples had been "conserving" their environments much before the empires came to extract and destroy them (see section "Imperialism as Extractivism: Ecological/Eco-imperialism") and that the imperial science narratives tended to blame local indigenous populations for their supposedly "irrational" and environmentally destructive practices, despite substantial evidence to the contrary (Fairhead and Leach 1996; Kumar 2010). Fairhead and Leach (1996), for instance, show how imperial scientists "misread" the African savannah landscape, erroneously concluding that forest patches where remains of a once extensive forest cover supposedly degraded by indigenous grazing and shifting agriculture. The opposite was true: these patches had been *created* and cared for by the indigenous communities. These colonial and neocolonial conservationist discourses also ignore the underlying political-economic motivations of empires (e.g.,

increasing extraction of resources, revenue, and political control over territories), the policies' impacts on the local livelihoods of indigenous forest dwellers, and their often contradictory conservation results. Indeed, in some cases, conservationism seems to have operated more as a discourse than as an actual practice or operated only partially in some areas subject to protection, while extractivism expanded in others. Extractivist and conservationist eco-imperialism, in other words, were two sides of the same coin. In India, for instance, Kumar (2010) shows how the British attempts at forest conservation (management of natural forests for timber production) under a discourse of "dissecation" and protection of water resources emerged as an anxious reaction to the evident overexploitation of forests that the British themselves had caused and the threats this posed to the expanding resource needs of the colonial apparatus (e.g., wood consumed for shipbuilding, military barracks, and railways). Because these objectives conflicted with indigenous customary uses of forests for shifting cultivation, the British imperialists needed to label these uses as "irrational" and "destructive" in order to achieve total control over the forests. Colonial scientists thus ended up blaming shifting cultivation for the deforestation caused by the British imperial activities.

Some authors draw attention to the connections between colonial policies and current ones: many of the current protected areas around the world were created during colonial times, for colonizers' interests, such as hunting and tourism (e.g., Akama et al. 2011; Garland 2008; Neumann 2001; Zaitchick 2018). Today, protected area creation in the Global South continues to be heavily promoted by imperial countries, by international agencies and conservation organizations from the Global North. Protected area tourism became key to the development plans of the independent governments in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa, despite the fact that "many Africans saw tourism as exhibiting the worst aspects of the old colonial order of European dominance and African subservience" (Neumann 1995, p. 363). In this continuation of colonial conservationist policies, African governments, international environmental NGOs, such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, now World Conservation Union) and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), played a key advisory and influencer role, seeking to continue and expand African conservation initiatives (Neumann 1995). Nelson (2003) argues that the motivations of this postcolonial conservation movement have been similar to the religious motives that were behind the colonization – to "save" Africa from Africans. At the same time, the conservation measures taken (creation of protected areas) mostly appealed to the interests of Western forces, not the needs of African people (Nelson 2003). In Kenya, for instance, the model of safari tourism and wildlife conservation today continuethe historic patterns of exclusion and marginalization of the Masaai tribe developed during the colonial period (Akama et al. 2011). Zaitchick (2018) documents how protected areas often deprive these ancestral inhabitants of control over their own lands, while governments fail to protect the ecology and the indigenous people from encroachment of illegal extractive activities but also undermine conservation by supporting extractive industries and infrastructure projects in these same protected areas. He reminds us that "the founding worldview of modern conservationism...was conceived not during today's battle to save the rainforests and protect the climate but during the genocidal Indian wars waged in the deserts of the American West." Indeed, the first two national parks in the USA – Yellowstone and Yosemite – were created in the late 1800s by forcibly removing the Native American inhabitants and set a template for conservation policies in the twentieth century, based on the idea that "nature" was best protected uninhabited (Zaitchick 2018).

A third group of scholars focus more generally on the imposition of global environmental policies by the Global North on the Global South. This is at the heart of the debates related to global environmental governance and especially climate change policies (Bachram 2004; Dyer 2011; Agarwal and Narain 1991) and is thus related to the concept of "carbon colonialism" (section "Imperialism Through Energy"). For instance, in a World Economic Forum on East Asia held in Singapore 2007, Asian business and government leaders were

critical of the "hypocrisy" of rich Western countries which blamed countries like China for worsening climate change; Malaysia's deputy finance minister labelled this as "**green imperialism**" (The Guardian 2007). Chambers (2010) makes a similar critique, arguing that developing countries should not be asked to curtail their economic growth, while rich countries continue to increase their greenhouse gas emissions. Here, the discussion shifts to the hampering of development opportunities of the Global South, and the double speak of the Global North, rather than to the environmentally destructive practices of imperialism. Indeed, this critique of eco-imperialism as imposition of environmental policies is used both by leftist or progressive scholars and activists (as Agarwal and Narain 1991; Gonzalez 2001) and by free-market fundamentalists critiquing Northern global environmental elite which seeks to hinder "freedom" (a la Hayek) and "development" of the Global South (as Driessen 2003; Chambers 2010). The latter "market fundamentalists" critique any form of global environmental governance and any form of environmental protection as imperialist (Dyer 2011). Gonzalez (2001) recognizes the validity of this critique where Northern countries attempt to impose environmental regulations in the Global South without addressing their own much larger environmental impacts. However, she observes that the conclusion cannot be for the Global South to not adopt any environmental protections and follow the developmentalist path of the North, for that too is eco-imperialism (as seen in sections "Imperialism as Extractivism: Ecological/Eco-imperialism" and "Imperialism as Contamination: Toxic Waste Colonialism"). The global market itself is imperialist (Dyer 2011): it shifts the environmental (and socioeconomic) costs of high levels of consumption of the Global North to the Global South while hindering – through neoliberal "free trade" rules – the freedom of poorer countries to develop environmental protection policies (Gonzalez 2001).

The conservationist dimension links with the concept of "**imperial nature**": the production of a hegemony of "green neoliberalism" by the World Bank – a marriage of sustainable development with neoliberal development which is "remak

(ing) nature in the South, transforming vast areas of community-managed uncapitalized lands into transnationally regulated zones for commercial logging, pharmaceutical bioprospecting, export-oriented cash cropping, megafauna preservation, and elite eco-tourism," along with the forceful relocation of tens of millions of "primitive" people to transform them into a new agro-industrial workforce (Goldman 2006, p. 9). The World Bank's lending is not to alleviate poverty or promote development but to make business for Global North countries and corporations. It is part of what has been called an "internationalized imperialism" (Cooper 1993, cited in Ferguson and Gupta 2002) where Global South countries are indirectly governed by transnational organizations which work with and for the benefit of Global North countries. In this sense, the eco-imperialist critique of imposed environmental policies helps to underscore that said policies are not really meant to protect the environment in the Global South, so much as to greenwash the same old patterns of developmentalism, while opening new business opportunities (Goldman 2006). In this neoliberal context, protected areas become another form of dispossessive accumulation of land and marine resources, an "accumulation by conservation" (Büscher and Fletcher 2015) also referred to as "green/blue grabbing" (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Fairhead et al. 2012).

More generally, the critique of the sustainable development discourse is also connected to the critique of the dominant varieties of environmentalism in the Global North, which Martinez-Alier (2002) considered the alliance between the "cult of wilderness" and the "gospel of eco-efficiency" and which Dauvergne (2016) called the **environmentalism of the rich**: an approach which sees the environment as a luxury good and is focused on more eco-friendly technologies and business and consumption practices and wilderness preservation. This is opposed to the "environmentalism of the poor" (Martinez-Alier 2002), more prevalent in the Global South and indigenous Northern cultures, which defends the environment not only for its "pristine nature" or 'wilderness' but (also) for its intrinsic cultural and livelihood links to communities.

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Imperialism Through Energy and Climate Change

The energy sector provides keen insights into the relations between environment, imperialism/colonialism, militarism, and capitalism. Energy is a key aspect of the modern industrial capitalism, and in comparison to other energy sources, fossil fuels almost perfectly fit capitalist requirements for accumulation (Altvater 2007), hence our system has been appropriately labelled "fossil capitalism" (Angus 2016) and "carbon capitalism" (Di Muzio 2015). Dominant forms of fossil energy are often extracted for export from the Global South to the North, generating toxic contamination at local (air, water, and land pollution) and global levels (climate change), in a process often controlled by Northern corporations and under highly unequal exchanges. The concept of **energy imperialism/colonialism** (Batel and Devine-Wright 2017; Curtis 2016; de Onís 2018a, b; Foster 2008; Gustafson 2017) captures this broad relation. It is used to refer to different but interrelated processes, from the imperial plunder of energy resources of the Global South by countries and corporations of the Global North to the deployment and operation of polluting energy infrastructure. Three related concepts deepen our understanding of energy imperialism through attention to different aspects of this dimension: **oil/petro-imperialism**, **carbon colonialism**, and **nuclear imperialism/colonialism**.

Oil or **petro-imperialism** (Altvater 2007; Watts 2008) refers to the process in which competition for petroleum (oil) (extendable to other fossil fuels) – the main energy sources of the twentieth century – fosters new bids for domination over space and people and the control of oil resources from different dimensions: the strategic control of oil territories, the control of transport and its logistics, the influence on the market oil prices, and the currency in which the oil is invoiced (Altvater 2007). The abovementioned study by the NGO War on Want found that 27 London Stock Exchange-listed companies were working in 27 different sub-Saharan African countries, controlling 6.6 billion barrels of oil worth $276 billion; the main ones are Tullow Oil, which controls 307 million barrels of oil in 12 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and Shell,

which controls 691 million barrels, mainly in Nigeria, and is one of the most well-known human rights and environmental abusers (Curtis 2016), with a long history of pollution and repression in the ancestral lands of the Ogoni people in the Niger delta (Watts 2008). Petroleum has served as a motivation of imperial wars and other imperial geostrategic interventions, as in the US-UK invasions of Iraq, Kuwait (Foster and Clark 2004), and Afghanistan, the strategic alliance of the USA with the Saudi Arabian dictatorship for maintaining imperial influence in the Middle East, and the recent interest of the USA in Africa as a region of "growing strategic importance" (Watts 2008). Under conditions of increasing energy scarcity and rising energy prices (peak oil), 'energy security' becomes a more prominent priority of powerful countries and corporations to guarantee continued processes of capital accumulation, which increasingly take the form of accumulation by dipossession (Altvater 2007). As Foster (2008, p. 12) states, "The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the twenty-first century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies." The military dimension of these processes is further linked to continued unequal ecological exchange and ecological debt of eco-imperialism: for instance, the US Military burns an estimated 340,000 barrels of oil a day – only 35 countries in the world consume more (Klare 2007). Essentially, the US war machine burns oil to capture oil from other countries, to burn more oil. Oil imperialism is also linked to **toxic** eco-imperial forms, as highlighted by cases such as the Caribbean island of Curaçao, an ex-colony of the Netherlands – which ranks in the top ten environmental polluted sites globally due to the emissions of the hundred-year-old refinery "La Isla" owned by Dutch multinational Shell (EJAtlas 2017b). While the focus is mostly on the Global South, energy colonialism can also be analyzed as a phenomenon *within* countries, even Northern ones, where marginalized communities are "colonized" by new energy infrastructures (Batel and Devine-Wright 2017).

The concepts of climate colonialism (Moe-Lobeda 2016; Whyte 2017) and carbon

colonialism (Bachram 2004; Lyons and Westoby 2014) connect the debates about energy with global climate change and associated environmental protection initiatives (section "Imperialism Through Conservationism: Green Imperialism"). Climate colonialism refers to the fact that the imperial countries of the Global North (and the wealthy classes in the "North of the South") have contributed by far the most to the climate crisis, while the Global South is suffering the most impacts from it, as starkly evidenced by events such as the historic hurricanes in the Caribbean in recent years. This inequality manifests a climate debt of the rich to the poor, and it is a reminder that the Anthropocene – or more adequately Capitalocene (Moore 2017) – is ultimately rooted in colonialism (Davis and Todd 2017; Whyte 2017). Carbon colonialism refers to the implementation of carbon trading where Global North corporations and countries, instead of reducing their own high levels of emissions, attempt to "offset" them artificially through "credits" they receive from the financing of projects in the Global South, such as low-carbon energy infrastructure and "reforestation" and forest protection initiatives (Bachram 2004; Lyons and Westoby 2014). Hence, Southern countries are left with the impacts of climate change, and the blame for causing them, but with projects that often translate into forest conservationism or polluting energy infrastructures, at the expense of rural communities' livelihoods (i.e., green imperialism). Climate and carbon colonialism further underscore that the recent decarbonization of European economies is facilitated by the relocation of carbon-intensive industrial production in the Global South – in what Bumpus and Liverman (2008) call **accumulation by decarbonization**.

Finally, **nuclear imperialism/colonialism** refers to "[a] system of domination through which governments and corporations disproportionately target and devastate indigenous peoples and their lands to maintain the nuclear production process" (Endres 2009; also Johnston 2015; Keown 2018; Salvador 1998). It has also been called "radioactive colonialism" (LaDuke and Churchill 1985). As stated above, nuclear colonialism is intimately tied to **toxic colonialism**, since nuclear waste is

part of the toxic waste dumped on poorer regions within a country – such as indigenous territories in the USA (e.g., Ishiyama 2003) – or transported to Global South countries (e.g., Greenpeace 2010). There are three main interrelated processes captured here: the mining of uranium, the disposal of nuclear waste, and the testing of nuclear weapons. In the US, native reservations have been used for uranium mining; the health effects from the mining pollution (on workers and surrounding communities) are combined with those of nuclear testing, and the waste dumped on the same territories (and others) after. Johnston (2015) argues that the combination of atomic science and nuclear militarism created new ecosystems of radiogenic communities "colonized by nuclear militarism" and "located near uranium mines, mills and enrichment plants, weapons production facilities, military proving grounds, battlefields, and nuclear waste dumps." A case in point is that of the Marshall Islands (a United Nations trust territory), where between 1946 and 1958, the USA detonated 67 atomic and thermonuclear bombs, destroying entire islands and filling the inhabited ones with toxic chemicals and mutagenic effects, making dozens of islands uninhabitable (Johnston 2015; EJAtlas 2018a). The US legacy in the archipelago is one of health problems and displacements of local communities seeking to avoid radioactive contamination. This is not the only case – for instance, France also used Polynesia for nuclear testing (Danielsson and Danielsson 1986; EJAtlas 2019b).

Imperialism as Hegemonic Environmental Knowledge

The previous discussions have focused on the *material* dimensions of eco-imperial relation, but these also have a crucial ideological basis, inextricably linked to the material ones. Decolonial scholars have emphasized how the imperial/colonial project (during and after colonization) involved not only control over economy and resources, authority, and gender but also *control over knowledge and subjectivities*: the imposition of the dominant Euro-modern rational-scientific knowledge about the environment – which saw nature as an engineering system and resources separate from humans, to be manipulated and

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used – and the concomitant devaluation and erasure of widely diverse ancestral, rooted epistemologies, i.e., worldviews and ways of life closely related to their environments (Quijano 2000; Lander 2000; Mignolo and Walsh 2018; Walsh 2011). Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2018) has called this the **epistemicide** of a **cognitive imperialism**. These processes were intertwined, because the extractivist, toxic/radioactive, and conservationist processes of eco-imperialism (sections "Imperialism as Extractivism: Ecological/Eco-imperialism," "Imperialism as Contamination: Toxic Waste Colonialism," "Imperialism Through Conservationism: Green Imperialism," and "Imperialism Through Energy") have been justified on the "irrational," "ignorant," and "backward" knowledges and practices of the non-Euro-modern worlds. Indeed, ecology as a "science" flourished during the British Empire (Anker 2001), and it was British ecologists who created a discourse of blaming locals for supposed "irrational" use of forests. The uncolonized areas were seen as a "wild frontier" which had to be conquered and civilized through intensive cultivation of land, hunting, the drying of wetlands, the introduction of new species, and the domestication of natives (Crosby 1986; Gudynas 2004). In sum, the enclosure and dispossession of the material commons were accompanied by – and supported through – an epistemological enclosure.

The foundational acts of epistemicide during colonization have continued to this day. The concept of **development** emerged after the end of World War II and the end of colonial rule in most of the world as a key part of this hegemonic ideology seeking to expand Euro-modern ways of life and knowledges, as well as to advance and consolidate imperial interests, especially of the USA (Escobar 1995). In this sense, Escobar argued, international development policy and practice became akin to a new form of colonialism and "cultural imperialism." As is evident today, the hegemony of "development" is directly related to the current global ecological crisis and, despite being covered in a veneer of "sustainability," today continues to operate in much the same

fashion, promoting large mega-infrastructures, extractive industries, hyper-consumerist lifestyles, and "technological fixes" as the model of society (Goldman 2006).

Lastly, the ideological dimension also emphasizes that ecological imperialism is embedded in "people's everyday practices, including individual and societal orientations, as well as identities," becoming a "mode of living" (Brand and Wissen 2017). We could thus speak of the emergence of eco-imperial governmentalities, in the same sense that scholars speak of colonial and postcolonial subjectivities and environmental governmentalities.

The Slow Violence of Eco-imperial Relations: Cases from Central America and the Caribbean

Central America and the Caribbean is a particularly relevant region to study eco-imperialist relations. The region has long been considered by US imperialists as its "backyard" (Livingstone 2013), as well as a "backward" region in need of pro-"development" interventions. As such, it has been subject to constant geopolitical interventions, often related to extractivist and conservationist initiatives. The Caribbean is perhaps also the region with the most nations still remaining as formal colonies of current and former empires: the USA (Puerto Rico, American Virgin Islands), the UK (British West Indies/BVI), France (Saint Barthélemy, Saint Martin, Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana), and the Netherlands (Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten). In what follows, we focus on two cases: the **toxic colonialism** related to US companies in Central America which have used the pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP) in their banana plantations, even after being banned in the USA (section "Toxic Legacies of Neocolonialism in Central America and the Caribbean"), and the multiple dimensions of **environmental colonialism** associated to industrialization and its disastrous aftermath in Puerto Rico (section "Industrialization and Environmental Colonialism in Puerto Rico").

Toxic Legacies of Neocolonialism in Central America and the Caribbean

While pollution is often caused by toxic forms of extraction and waste disposal, we expand the concept of **toxic colonialism** that manifests in agricultural activities by using toxic chemicals and hazardous substances. The common pattern of these manifestations is the knowledge about the toxicity of these substances (commonly previously banned in the imperial countries) but still being use in the colonies and the **toxic legacy** of these hazardous substances which bioaccumulate in the environmental and human bodies affecting human and nonhumans species over more than one generation. This process of slow-motion, accumulative toxicity from pollutants for human and environmental health is one example of what Rob Nixon ([2011](): 2) has called **slow violence**: one "which occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space... typically not viewed as violence at all", and which is meshed with the long histories of colonial and neoliberal dispossession.

Dibromochloropropane (DBCP) was manufactured by Dow Chemical and Shell Oil Company in 1956 (Benedict and Wohlers [2018](); Babich et al. [1981]()). DBCP is the active ingredient of *nemagón* and *fumazone* – two nematicides used until the late 1980s by several banana companies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Babich et al. [1981](); Slutsky et al. [1999]()). Nowadays, DBCP is discontinued and banned from use; however, health damages and the contamination that it caused remain in the environment, bodies, and memories of dozens of communities worldwide.

In 1977, the first episode of health damage linked to DBCP exposure took place in the Occidental Chemical Company in California where DBCP was manufactured. Through a popular epidemiology process, men workers and their partners began to share among them their inability to father children. After a medical study, researches concluded that workers were suffering from oligospermia (deficient sperm) and azoospermia (absent sperm) leading to different levels of infertility. Studies concluded that exposure to DBCP in their working

place was the main suspected cause (Whorton et al. [1977]()). In response, the US Environmental Protection Agency banned DBCP in 1979. Yet as a clear example of toxic (neo)colonialism, the chemical continued to be exported to the Global South, where banana companies (mainly from USA) used it without any warnings. The **cost shifting** would be absorbed by the health of the workers, while economic profit would be accumulated by the banana companies, a case of **accumulation by contamination** (cf. Demaria [2016]()).

Two decades later, during the 1990s, similar cases of male infertility among banana workers spread out along the countries where DBCP was used: Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and several Caribbean Islands (Slutsky et al. [1999]()). Although the number is contested, approximately 75,000 men are estimated to have been injured (Rogers [2004]()). In Central America, besides infertility in men and women workers, their families and dwellers living near banana plantations have linked the chemical to spontaneous abortions; newborns with malformations; skin and chronical diseases; breast, brain, and uterus cancer; dizziness; and vision problems (Thrupp [1988](); Mora [2017]()). Although Californian men won judgment against Dow Chemical for male infertility, thousands of banana workers in the Global South still have not been compensated, and after 30 years of struggle, people are still demanding justice. Currently, lawsuits related to DBCP are being carried out worldwide in national and international courts in Ecuador (EJAtlas [2015]()), Costa Rica (EJAtlas [2016a]()), the Philippines (EJAtlas [2016b]()), Nicaragua (EJAtlas [2016c]()), Honduras (EJAtlas [2017c]()), Ivory Coast (EJAtlas [2017d]()), and Panama (EJAtlas [2018b]()), but most remain unresolved or have been disregarded. In this case, it seems that the poor are not worth less, they are just "not worth at all."

Industrialization and Environmental Colonialism in Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico, colonized by Spain in 1493 and later by the USA in 1898, offers a clear case of the multiple dimensions of eco-imperialist relations,

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which local scholars have labelled "environmental colonialism" (Anazagasty Rodríguez 2018; Atiles-Osoria 2013; Concepción 1988). As a historical phenomenon, the Spanish exploited the country's mineral resources (and its indigenous *taino* population of course) and later converted the territory into a plantation economy for the empire. This led to massive deforestation – up to 90% of the original forest cover had been lost by the end of the nineteenth century, motivating the Spanish Crown to establish the country's first "forest reserve" (Domínguez Cristobal 2006). After the USA invaded and took control of Puerto Rico as part of the Spanish-American war, eco-imperialism continued. The US government dramatically expanded sugarcane production in the first 30 years of the twentieth century while expropriating land for military bases and for protected areas across the country, planted for high-value timber species and for the model of imperialist **green imperialism** that the government had begun to experiment with indigenous territories in the USA (section "Imperialism Through Conservationism: Green Imperialism").

In the 1940s, the US government changed its policy in Puerto Rico toward one of industrialization, in what it called *Operation Bootstrap* (*Manos a la Obra* or "Hands to Work" in Spanish). The "Operation" was discursively legitimized using racist and colonialist ideologies and US academic research arguing Puerto Rico was too small, overpopulated and lacking enough human and natural capital to develop autonomously (Berman-Santana 1996). In the context of the Cold War, the objective was to turn Puerto Rico into the "showcase of the Caribbean" (*vitrina del Caribe*) for the rest of Latin America to see the supposed "benefits" of "progress" under US capitalist "democracy." The program began with textile factories but quickly shifted to highly polluting petrochemical refineries and, later, to pharmaceuticals. In the 1960s, the need for raw materials to feed the American postwar economic "boom" also led to a proliferation of mineral exploration permits by US companies. A copper and gold pit mine was proposed on 14,000 hectares of the island's central mountainous region, leading to the emergence of the country's first

environmental movement (Berman-Santana 1996; Colón-Rivera et al. 2014; Concepción 1995). That movement made clear the links between national liberation and environmental struggles: for the main groups opposed to the mining project, the natural resources of the country were a national patrimony which should be the basis of the development of an independent republic. Thus, their opposition was mainly based on a critique of the colonial exploitation by American companies, and their slogan was "Puerto Rican mines or no mines" (Concepción 1995). Others, however, questioned the **extractivism** logic of the mining project as an ecocide that should not be carried out under colonial or formally independent rule. Puerto Rican intellectuals identified the increased exploitation of agrarian land and natural resources by the US empire, and its planned exploitation of copper mines and petroleum, as a characteristic of the colonial condition of Puerto Rico (Anazagasty Rodríguez 2015, 2018). Juan Mari Bras, leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, used the specific term "environmental colonialism" to refer to the **toxic** dimension of eco-imperial relations to Manos a la Obra's importation of the most polluting US industries which were not allowed to operate in the USA given that country's recent environmental legislation, but were given "exceptions" to operate in Puerto Rico: for instance, the Sun Oil refinery processed the lowest-quality, highest-sulfur content petroleum, prohibited in the USA (Mari Bras, cited in Anazagasty Rodríguez 2018; (see also Concepción 1988)). The colony thus became the "dump site... of the toxic waste of the most polluting means of US industrial production" (Anazagasty Rodríguez 2018). The petrochemical industries left, but their *toxic legacy* remained in the form of highly contaminated abandoned sites, designated by the US government as "superfunds." Puerto Rico today has 17 sites with this designation.

The fossil energy infrastructure that emerged to fuel the petrochemical industries in this period, and that remains almost intact to date, is a clear example of **energy colonialism** (de Onis 2018a, b) or an *energy slavery* to fossil fuel interests (Massol 2015, 2019), clearly linked to *toxic* processes. An

emblematic case which also shows the complexities of Global North/South eco-imperial relations is the coal plant operated since 1996 by US multinational Applied Energy Systems in the southeast town of Guayama. The south of Puerto Rico is the most polluted region in the country, home to abandoned sugar plantations and most of the petrochemical industries, operating pharmaceuticals, thousands of hectares of experimental genetically modified seed production crops, a cement kiln and tire burning plant, and a regional landfill which has also been receiving the coal ashes (Santiago 2012) – a "South within the South" according to local activists. In the beginning, AES dumped its toxic coal ashes in Dominican Republic, but after birth defects and other health problems started emerging in the communities near the dump site, the Dominican government cancelled the contract and sued the company (successfully). The toxic pollution from the plant's emissions and ashes are associated to numerous health illnesses in the region.

In parallel to (and in support of) these toxic industrial developments, from the 1940s onward, Puerto Rico became a center of a vast system of US military bases for directing operations and experiments in the Caribbean and Latin America (García Muñiz 1983). In the 1960s, the highly toxic "Rainbow" herbicides (used in the so-called Agent Orange and Agent White) were tested in military practices in the El Yunque National Forest – ironically labelled as Puerto Rico's "last wilderness" – to measure their effectiveness at defoliation in similar tropical environments in the midst of the Vietnam war (Wood et al. 2019). Scientists proudly describe these tests as part of a "legacy of large-scale ecosystem manipulation experiments in Puerto Rico" (Wood et al. 2019). By 1978, military spending accounted for more than 60% of all US government spending on the country (García Muñiz 1983). Puerto Rico became the main training site of the US Navy, with the island of Vieques at its center. In Vieques, the Navy expropriated 2/3 of the island's territory and carried out live bombings for over 60 years using toxic chemicals like Agent Orange and heavy metals, until a national movement kicked the military out. As with the factories, the Navy

left, but the legacy of this **toxic militarism** (Santana 2002) remains: lands still unusable because of their pollution and residents with a range of health problems, including rates of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes, that are significantly higher than the average in Puerto Rico. The Navy has dragged its feet on cleaning up the land, and its chosen method to do so – detonating remaining ordinances – is increasing pollution. Furthermore, instead of transferring the land to Viequenses, the US government established a "wildlife refuge" under the ownership of the US Fish and Wildlife Service, in a clear example of **conservationist** dimension of imperialism.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have pointed out in the need to address current environmental issues from the lens of the historical and recurring processes of imperialism. We have led our discussion by an exhaustive theoretical revision and the definition of key concepts to describe different manifestations of eco-imperial relations as forms of political-economic control through the environment. These multiple manifestations are interconnected: extractivism generates contaminant and waste flows and is accompanied by conservationist policies to "mitigate" its effects. They are connected by the way imperial relations facilitate control of the environment and its commons (land, resources, sinks) as a *commodity* to extract and export in international markets, to dump waste, to produce energy, or to conserve in protected areas, in ways that maintain and reinforce existing inequalities.

Analyzing eco-imperial relations helps underscore the historical interdependence and co-constitution between colonialism, global capitalism – in its dispossessive, environmentally unjust forms of "development" and "conservation" – the persistence of these articulations and the global ecological crises of today. This shows how current environmental governance regimes (policies, discourses, relations, behaviors) are shaped by imperial powers' uses of and ideas about the environment during colonization, as

well as in ongoing neocolonial relations. It opens up the understanding of how unequal power relations and the increase of inequality between regions and social groups persist until nowadays, and how these conditions shape the environment, and the global ecological/climate crisis of today. These relations are not homogeneous across space and time, and they cannot always be neatly categorized as North vs South in the terms usually conceived. There is also a South in the North and a North in the South so to speak, as, for instance, evidenced with indigenous peoples within countries in both the North (US) and South (Brazil) threatened with imperialist extractivist/toxic/energy projects and with a colony like Puerto Rico dumping its toxic waste in the Dominican Republic. Eco-imperial relations also make visible how current neoliberal forms of global capitalism are a new form of imperialism, to whose reproduction and expansion the environment is central. In other words, the current processes of marked ecological degradation and the climate crisis are effects directly linked to the history of colonialism and to these enduring colonial-imperial patterns in global capitalism. As such, the topic of "imperialism and environment" connects to key concepts in critical social studies today, such as *primitive accumulation* and *accumulation by dispossession*, *accumulation by contamination*, *land/green/blue grabbing*, *ecological unequal exchange*, *(neo)extractivism*, *ecological debt*, *environmental racism/justice* anthropocene, and capitalocene. Finally, bringing imperialism to the forefront contributes to decolonize environmental studies (DeLoughrey et al. 2015) while simultaneously "ecologizing" studies of imperialism. This is a crucial double task to deepen our understanding of dominant forms of environmental governance today, and possible decolonial, anti-imperial alternatives.

Cross-References

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Ecological Imperialism

▶ Imperialism and Environment

Ecological Imperialism: A Theoretical Overview

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Synonyms

Accumulation by dispossession; Ecologically unequal exchange; Finance capital; International trade; Neoliberalism; Structural adjustments; Transnational corporations; World-systems theory

Definition

As global ecological crises deepen, the scramble by the powerful for what land, water, and resources are left is accelerating. The resulting environmental injustices, whether known as accumulation by dispossession, ecological debt, ecologically unequal exchange, or other related forms, are intensifying. Behind all such trends is a complex global political economy- a capitalist world-system enabling and reinforcing ecological imperialism. Ecological imperialism can be conceptualized as the subjugation of the economic, political, and/or social institutions of a (generally semiperipheral or peripheral) country for the biophysical, metabolic needs of the (generally core or semiperiphery), inextricable from the purpose of making such resources accessible and amenable (in the right quantities and for the right price) to the needs of (foreign) capital accumulation. Understanding the structures and policies that ensure the continued flow of both resources and profit from certain regions and social groups to other regions and social groups is the study of ecological imperialism. The current system of international trade, foreign investment, and international finance, the very pillars of neoliberal globalization built upon a long history of exploitation and dependency stretching back to colonialism, is the very structure through which ecological imperialism currently occurs.

Introduction

In its simplest definition imperialism is the system by which a dominant power is able to control the trade, investment, labor, and natural resources of other peoples. Theories of imperialism have always acknowledged the role of natural resources in global capital accumulation; indeed, imperialism operates as whole, a system, so it is impossible to isolate specific parts such as the exploitation of labor from the exploitation of Nature. But in an era of global ecological crises, it becomes important to emphasize imperialism's ecological aspect. For one, even as mainstream discourses on sustainability are proliferating, economic policies, environmental degradation, and global structures of inequality are continuously treated as separate and unrelated issues. Sustainability itself is a contested political issue. Attempts to explain global environmental crises without explicitly acknowledging the links between the grossly unequal accumulation of capital and consumption of resources by certain groups and the impoverishment and environmental devastation shouldered by less powerful

groups leads to analyses which are consistently fragmented and incomplete, and perhaps most importantly, biased towards business-as-usual solutions. Furthermore, as global ecological crises deepen, the scramble by the powerful for what land, water, and resources are left is accelerating. The resulting accumulation by dispossession, ecological debt, ecologically unequal exchange, and other related forms of environmental injustice are intensifying, driven by a global political economy that is, essentially, neoliberal globalization operating in a capitalist world-system.

This short chapter seeks to provide a brief theoretical overview of the primary characteristics of ecological imperialism and the global political economic system that drives it and enables it. As a complex, ever evolving global phenomenon, such a short entry will undoubtedly neglect many important details and nuances, but this paper seeks to address some of the most salient features. Section "Ecological Imperialism: Some Essential Characteristics" outlines essential dynamics of ecological imperialism, section "Ecological Imperialism and the Hierarchy of the World-System" situates ecological imperialism in the world-system, and section "The Political Economy of Ecological Imperialism in the 21st Century: Neoliberal International Trade, Foreign Investment, and International Finance" discusses the main international economic mechanisms through which ecological imperialism occurs in the twenty-first century, primarily international trade, foreign investment (particularly foreign direct investment), and international finance. All three form the pillars of neoliberal globalization, and all three pivot around an increasing concentration of capital in the form of large transnational corporations.

Ecological Imperialism: Some Essential Characteristics

The first and primary characteristic of ecological imperialism, of imperialism in capitalism in general, is that it is rooted in the endless drive for capital accumulation. It is not, as some may suggest, purely an expansionary outcome due to the physical needs of industrialization but is rooted in capitalist relations of production. Capitalism is an expansionary system, driven by inherent characteristics both normal to its operations as well as by its own inner contradictions. In contrast to other modes of production, in the capitalist mode of production the drive for capital, that is the advancement of value in money form in order to produce more value (M-C-M'), dominates production. Marx had argued that capitalism as a social relation is defined by the complete social separation of the direct producers from the necessary material conditions of production, starting with the appropriation of land. Separated from any way of sustaining themselves, workers become forced to sell their labor-power for wages. Marx denoted this process 'primitive accumulation' and the phenomena of peasants being forced off land still occurs in what many scholars denote 'continuing primitive accumulation. Only now, in an era of global ecological crises, the land has become just as important, and at times even more so, than the labor. With primitive accumulation, these 'freed' material conditions and 'freed' labor are recombined in the wage-labor production of commodities in pursuit of the endless accumulation of capital. From the standpoint of capital, as Marx wrote, the natural conditions of production become 'free gifts' of nature, to be freely appropriated by capital, providing use-values that capital needs to produce and realize surplus-value (Burkett 2006). Capitalism is continuously engaged in a process to appropriate and commodify labor and nature as inputs for production in the pursuit of endless profit.

The problem is that the conversion of labor and nature into separate capital assets for the purpose of creation of profit is fundamentally destructive, both to nature and human development. As Marxist ecologists such as Burkett, O'Connor, and Foster have pointed out, capitalism's reproduction requirements are autonomous from the sustainable reproduction of labor-power and natural conditions. Capitalist reproduction does not recognize any of the processes, complexities, and limits of the natural world. Given its drive of endless accumulation, capitalism has an inherent tendency to overextend the limits of its natural

conditions (Burkett 2006). In capitalist economies, individual capitals use profits to make more profits, which become self-expanding capital. Quantitatively, capitalist self-expansion has no strict limits per se. Nature, which organizes itself on very different principles, very much does. (O'Connor 1998)

Thus, a relatively straightforward explanation for ecological imperialism is that the continued accumulation of capital is utterly dependent upon the accessibility and affordability of 'natural capital,' which is obtained globally. This dynamic underpins the history of capitalism from the very beginning with the exploitation of resources under European colonialism. And it continues today, for example, with foreign investment regimes and multilateral trade treaties that keep strategic resources in the mining sector cheap and accessible to transnational corporations. Magdoff (2003) also pointed out that capital, in its drive for endless accumulation, undergoes technological changes that require specific and strategic resources, many of which are largely found overseas, a process intensified by competition between capitalist powers. Such a dynamic can be witnessed in the current scramble for African resources, not just between individual capitals from the United States and Europe, but emerging 'Southern' countries as well.

On the other hand, a more complex dynamic behind imperialism may stem from spatio-temporal fixes for crises of accumulation- both under and overaccumulation- arising from contradictions that are unresolvable within the capitalist system itself. Classical theorists of imperialism such as Luxemburg (1964) had emphasized how crises of over-accumulation necessitated global expansion in the restoration of the conditions for accumulation. More recently, Harvey (2005) links neoliberalism to an over-accumulation crisis that began in the early 1970s (over-accumulation being the surplus of capital, and potentially also labor, lying idle and having no profitable outlets). He argues that 'accumulation by dispossession' helped solve the over-accumulation problem through releasing a set of assets such as natural resource, and including labor power, at a very low. In Harvey's formulation, over-accumulated

capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use. Neoliberal privatization, he argues, opened up vast fields for over-accumulated capital to seize upon, releasing cheap raw materials, such as oil, into the system, whereby input costs would be reduced and profits thereby enhanced.

Moore's work (Moore 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012) emphasizes how crises of 'under-accumulation' has historically led to new spatial expansions of capitalism and new capitalist appropriation of natural wealth, which, in turn, create new ecological crises and crises of human development while setting the stage for future accumulation crises. Moore argues that capitalism has a tendency to undermine its conditions of production. Specifically, increasing the extraction of surplus value hinges on increasing labor productivity, which does involve technical and social innovation, but most importantly from an ecological perspective, it is the abundance of 'free gifts' which has fueled capitalism's technological dynamism. Capitalism, Moore asserts, has sustained itself on the basis of cheap inputs (Moore 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012). But these dynamics necessarily push expansionary tendencies on a global scale, as they typically reward the rapid exhaustion of nature (and human nature), and instigate ecological crises, which can act as fetters on the accumulation of capital. Thus, when the exhaustion of human and biophysical natures becomes significant enough to fetter labor productivity in a serious way, capitalists and empires begin to look for new frontiers. This dialectic of plunder and productivity, Moore insists, is at the heart of capitalism's recurrent waves of geographical expansion, and he cites the examples of sugar, silver, forest products, fish, iron, and copper, all having moved with the same rhythm: occupying, producing, and exhausting the ecological formations of the North Atlantic.

Additionally, both Foster (2002) and (Burkett 2006) have pointed out that environmental crises do not always create a crisis of capital accumulation, and that ecological crisis itself may be used as a new source of investment and profit- carbon trading, the melting of the Artic from climate change and the rush to obtain the fossil fuel

deposits there, even the global land rush driven by biofuel production for renewable energy could be seen as the more obvious examples. One can also add that the creation of *scarcity* due ecological crises can be a source of profit for individual capitals through rising prices and opportunities for speculation. The global drive to privatize scarce water resources, speculation on fuel and food, among other examples, are attempts within the system to directly expand private riches by exploiting scarcity and are an important dynamic behind certain expansionary appropriations of peripheral resources. Importantly, however, we must realize that it is nearly impossible to isolate one single dynamic driving ecological imperialism. Rather, for any given instance, it is more likely that several dynamics are at work, to be ascertained through concrete analysis rather than an overarching theory.

The second characteristic of ecological imperialism is that it hinges upon the dynamics of unequal power of the world-system. Unequal power can be economic, but also technological, political, military, ideological, and so on. As world-system theory argues, the contemporary dynamics of unequal power originated from the hierarchical international division of labor created during colonialism. However, as capitalism must constantly obtain resources that are cheap and easily accessible, the necessary political economic conditions must be continuously created and enforced. Beginning in the 1970s, that current political economic configuration is neoliberal globalization. Neoliberal globalization arose out of a crisis of profit for the capitalist class in 1970s, on the ashes of Keynesian economies in Global North and the collapse of Third World economic nationalism in the Global South. Neoliberal policies and the unleashing of global capital in the form of multinationalization of production destroyed the fragile compromise between labor and capital in the Global North. It prepared the groundwork for the exploitation of labor in the Global South through structural adjustment policies emphasizing 'labor reform' and labor 'flexibility.' Significantly, such structural adjustment policies also laid the foundation for the 'neoliberalization of nature,' through trade treaties,

foreign investment regimes, and in general export-intensive development plans that emphasized trade liberalization and open arms to foreign investor. The 'neoliberalization of nature,' is a general and intensified trend of commodifying nearly every aspect of environments across the globe (Heynen 2007). For the Global South this neoliberalization not only included the commodification of Nature but also the subjugation of their environments to the transnational corporations of the Global North. The current forms of neocolonialism such as foreign dominance in extractive sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa facilitated through binding multilateral and bilateral trade treaties, or the selling off of huge tracks of land under national laws that enable land grabs, are simply outcomes of the neoliberal policies enforced by the structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, we should also keep in mind that ecological imperialism works in a less direct way than economic policies- it arises as relations of dependency within a hierarchical international division of labor in the world-system. Many peripheral countries, since colonialism, are locked into the export of natural resources as their primary source of income, compounded by their need to pay off international debt.

The third characteristic is that ecological imperialism results in some sort of negative socio-ecological impacts for peripheral countries. If this were not true, what we would be witnessing would simply be the textbook version of international trade. The study of ecological imperialism is the study of the displacement of environmental and social burdens outside of imperial centers borders. Equally important, it is also the study of the capture of profits with the associated economic activity.

Finally, a fourth characteristic is that the form that ecological imperialism takes is also an outcome of the dialectical unfolding of movements and counter-movements that arise in response to social resistances. Ecological imperialism necessitates an amenable political-economic context within the imperialized country; historically this has been met with resistance at certain times. As O'Connor (1998) originally noted, nature, like

labor, must be made available to capital in requisite quantities and qualities, at the right place and time. Contrary to neoclassical economic theory, the price of nature in the periphery depends not only on market supply and demand and ground rent but also on class, anti-imperialist, and environmental struggles. Relatedly, one must note the crucial role of the state and the associated peripheral elites- government officials, the bourgeois class associated with agriculture and the mining sector, etc.- whose interests align with the extraction and exploitation of peripheral environments. The state itself is the extra-economic actor that ultimately resists or acquiesces to the demands of foreign capital, creating the conditions for which nature is made available to capital in requisite quantities and qualities.

Overall, then, we can define ecological imperialism as the subjugation of the economic, political, and/or social institutions of a (generally semi-peripheral or peripheral) country for the biophysical, metabolic needs of the (generally core or semi-periphery), inextricable from the purpose of making such resources accessible and amenable (in the right quantities and for the right price) to the needs of (foreign) capital accumulation. Understanding the structures and policies that ensure the continued flow of both resources and profit from certain regions and social groups to other regions and social groups is, this paper suggests, the study of "ecological imperialism." The current system of international trade, foreign investment, and international finance, built upon a long history of exploitation and dependency stretching back to colonialism, is the primary mechanism through which ecological imperialism currently occurs (though illegal activities like smuggling also occur, and unequal appropriation of the global atmosphere commons could count as well).

Ecological Imperialism and the Hierarchy of the World-System

As stated above, ecological imperialism hinges upon unequal power in the global capitalist world-system. This is not a new formulation per se; Magdoff, for example, recognized the significance of the world-system as a hierarchical international division of labor in enabling imperialism. However, by the twenty-first century, there are some important new characteristics of imperialism, some of which began decades ago, but have now grown or intensified. One of the most important characteristics include the saturation of capitalist relations of production of economies across the globe, driven by multinational corporations that began outsourced manufacturing tasks in the 1960s, and also international finance. Correlated with this has been the rapid economic and industrial growth of emerging economies as they became the recipients of the outsourced manufacturing tasks. As Smith (2016) emphasizes, neoliberal globalization has multinationalized the links in the chain of production and value-creation across national borders, driven by voracious appetite for ever cheaper labor. Compared to previous eras of imperialism (classical imperialism) the world-system is now linked by billions of global commodity chains. As will be discussed, this multinationalization of production has obvious environmental consequences. In addition, global ecological crises itself has shaped ecological imperialism in distinctive ways. Intense competition for resource, the increasing vulnerability of the periphery and marginalized peoples, dwindling supplies of fossil fuels, metals and minerals, land and fresh water have resulted in a fierce form of ecological imperialism, a brutal scramble, with devastating consequences.

With these changes in mind, one can consider how ecological imperialism manifests in the hierarchical international division of labor of the capitalist world-system in the twenty-first century. In world-systems theory the global economy is studied as a hierarchical division of labor where economic tasks are distributed geographically, with each primary part of the world-system- the core, the semiperiphery, and the periphery- playing a distinct role. Though the global economy is increasingly complex as a result of industrial outsourcing and the rise of emerging economies as economic powers, many economic tasks are still geographically distributed. Core countries

remain characterized by high development of forces of production, including high-paid labor, capital-intensive production, and technological advancement. Transnational corporations are primarily headquartered in the Global North, though emerging economies TNCs do exist and South-South investment has increased in recent decades. In contrast, peripheral countries are characterized by low-level forces of production, including low-paid labor and labor-intensive production such as the export of raw materials. Geographically, the core is constituted by the advanced industrial countries, including Europe, North America, and Japan. Peripheral countries include regional areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, and countries in Latin America and Asia. Semi-peripheral economies contain both core and peripheral characteristics. Emerging or middle-income economies occupy an important part of the semi-periphery. Some, such as China, occupy an increasingly ambiguous role as they become economic power houses in their own right.

In the world-system schema, the first fundamental relationship upon which ecological imperialism hinges is the deep inequality perpetuated by the continued dependency and exploitation of peripheral regions, by core regions but also increasingly by emerging economies as well. The origins stem from colonialism, as peripheral economies throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia were re-organized to become exporters of natural resources to fuel the industrial needs of their European colonizers. This relationship continued post-independence, described as 'neocolonial' by such post-colonial leaders as the Ghanian revolutionary Nkrumah, to denote the continued economic, political and technological dependency of Sub-Saharan countries on their former colonial masters. Peripheral countries experience ecological imperialism in two primary ways: first, within the world-system international trade hierarchy, they are exporters of natural resources, leading to ecologically unequal exchange and ecological debt. Second, in places like Sub-Saharan Africa especially, such international trade is controlled by transnational corporations, particularly in the extractive and agricultural sectors, so profit as well as resources flow overseas.

Ecological imperialism manifests through semi-peripheral countries in a more complicated way. In the world-system semiperipheral countries constitute a varied and at times ambiguous category, but nonetheless plays a distinct role. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: 78) define the semi-periphery as:

1. Regions that mix both core and peripheral forms of organization.
2. Regions spatially located between core and peripheral regions.
3. Regions spatially located between two or more competing core regions.
4. Regions in which mediating activities linking core and peripheral areas take place.
5. Regions in which institutional features are intermediate in form between those forms found in adjacent core and peripheral areas.

In regards to ecological imperialism emerging economies occupy an intermediate semi-peripheral status that if often not fully explored in the critical political ecology literature which tends to focus on the extractive or land sectors of the periphery. Importantly, in the twenty-first century the emerging economies of the semiperiphery are the centers of manufacturing and all of its associated industrial degradation, from polluted air to toxic rivers. In a case study on East Asian land grabbing in Cambodia, Frame (2018) argued that emerging economies face a number of complex, contradictory dynamics and pressures that drive ecological degradation both within and outside of their national borders. Specifically, historically such countries have faced an intense, upward competition in a hierarchical capitalist global economy that pressured them to industrialize rapidly, resulting in environmental exhaustion of their own domestic natures. The environmental degradation of China, with its high levels of air pollution, is a prime example. In addition, such countries also continue to engage in peripheral activities that are centered on the extraction and export of primary commodities, and such activities also drive domestic environmental degradation, for example, deforestation due to both domestic   and   foreign-owned   large-scale

agribusinesses and timber companies in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand. In response to both of these dynamics, as well as their increasing levels of consumption resulting from economic growth, emerging economies are increasingly seeking to externally secure land and resources regional ecological imperialism. Particularly for land, the recipient countries are invariably poorer and lower on the world-system totem pole. Other preliminary studies (Singh and Eisenmenger 2010) have also noted the increasing propensity for certain developing countries like China are becoming net importers of biophysical resources.

However, even as some semi-peripheral countries are engaging in forms of ecological imperialism with peripheral countries, they remain subordinate to core economies in a number of ways. To begin with, such countries do not occupy the same position as core countries in terms of the global hierarchy of wealth, even if they are industrializing. Relatedly, in many cases semi-peripheral economies operate as suppliers and subcontractors to corporations in the Global North, and many of their exports end up consumed in the Global North. This is important, because it means that while emerging economies have shouldered the environmental burdens from the outsourcing of manufacturing from core country transnationals, they do not capture all, or even most, of the value-added (Smith and Mahutga 2009). This is a fundamental distinction between the industrialization of the core countries, which historically captured the associated profit, even though the Global North dealt with its own environmental destruction due to industrialization. Third, international financial institutions of the Global North, particularly the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, have been instrumental in promoting the industrialization and neoliberalization of semi-peripheral natures. They have also been instrumental in opening up peripheral economies and allowing the appropriation of their natures by both core and semi-peripheral countries. With rapid economic growth, rising consumptions patterns, and environmentally destructive investments overseas, coupled with the continued degradation of their own environments, emerging economies

occupy the ambiguous role as both the exploiter and the exploited.

The Political Economy of Ecological Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century: Neoliberal International Trade, Foreign Investment, and International Finance

With a brief introduction as to the fundamental dynamics of ecological imperialism and a rough sketch of how it manifests in the hierarchy of the capitalist world-system, we can now look at the global economic mechanisms of international trade, foreign investment, and international finance.

Ecological Imperialism and International Trade

International trade patterns, arising from the hierarchical international division of labor of the capitalist-world system, are the primary mechanism through which ecological imperialism occurs. A highly related and widely substantiated theory is ecologically unequal exchange. Ecologically unequal exchange draws from world-systems theory and argues developed countries are able to appropriate a net asymmetrical transfer of resources from developing countries (Hornborg 2011). There is substantial evidence that international trade has served as a mechanism through which developed countries are able to maintain high levels of unsustainable consumption through offshoring their environmental burdens onto developing countries. For example, a study (Wiedman et al. 2013) using the comprehensive material footprint indicator (Defined as the global allocation of used raw material extraction to the final demand of an economy) found that developed countries achievements in decoupling- the much touted and hoped-for process by which economies continue their economic growth while decreasing their use of natural resources through technological innovation- is small or even nonexistent when using the indicator of material footprint. Rather, the authors found that as wealth grows, countries tend to reduce their *domestic* portion of materials extraction through

international trade, while simultaneously allowing the overall mass of material consumption generally increases. This occurs due to the increasing spatial separation of production and consumption in global supply chains that has led to a shift of resource use and environmental pressures among countries. Wiedman et al. also note that offshoring of environmental burdens has been well-documented for greenhouse gas emissions (Davis and Caldeira 2010; Hertwich and Peters 2009; Wiedmann et al. 2010), land use (Yu et al. 2013; Weinzettel et al. 2013), water use (Steen-Olsen et al. 2012; Feng et al. 2011; Lenzen et al. 2013; Galli et al. 2012), and threats to species (Lenzen et al. 2012).

It is important, however, to see ecologically unequal exchange, or however one wishes to describe such an offshoring of environmental burdens, as the *symptom* of ecological imperialism. It is the symptom of an entire capitalist global economy that facilitates both ecologically unequal exchange *as well as* the continued flow of profits to wealthier nations. As stated above, the fundamental international trade patterns originated under colonialism, where developing countries were forced to restructure their economies as exporters of natural resources. However, even with the end of formal colonialism, such international trade patterns continue due to deliberate economic policies that reinforced developing countries role as exporters of natural resources. It is true that underdevelopment and dependency of peripheral countries on the technology and financial resources of the wealthier nations reinforces peripheral countries position within the world-system, but subjugating neoliberal economic development policies were crucial. As alluded to above, with the debt crises of the 1980s, developing countries globally where forced to undertake extensive structural adjustment plans that re-ordered their entire economies along neoliberal lines in order to borrow loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The central features of neoliberal policy, captured in a set of economic policies known as the Washington Consensus, encouraged trade liberalization, devaluation of currencies to stimulate export-growth, the encouragement of

foreign direct investment, and the securing of property rights, among other policies. As Peet (2009) writes, such policies favored an outward-oriented, export economy, organized through markets, with minimal state regulation along with privatization, trade liberalization and limited state budget deficits. Central to the formation of such policies and to neoliberal economic policies in general is Ricardo's classical liberal concept of comparative advantage which states that, to optimize production output and hence overall welfare, countries should specialize in producing and exporting the goods and services for which they have a comparative advantage. For peripheral countries in Latin America and Africa, this meant, in the eyes of the Western-dominated institutions of the IMF, World Trade Organization and World Bank, specializing in the export of natural resources. Chief among the sectors that are targeted for export-promotion included, and continue to include mining, agriculture and forest products.

Additionally, it is not just that trade liberalization has reinforced the position of peripheral economies as exporters of natural resources. Such liberalization both introduced and reinforced particular *patterns of production* associated with exports that are highly environmentally damaging, i.e., capitalist relations of production, technology, and organization that are geared to the ceaseless pursuit of capital, such as monocropping for exports.

Ecological Imperialism and Foreign Investment

One central point that is often overlooked on the discussion of international trade and the offshoring of environmental burdens is that most international trade is intra-industry trade, occurring within hierarchical, vertically organized transnational corporations as they extract their resources and outsource their production globally. This may be foreign direct investment, in which the investing firm has a controlling interest, or through arms-length subcontracting, in which large transnational corporations outsource to subcontractors, but still coordinate and control their operations. Either way, as the excellent work on

imperialism by Smith (2016) demonstrates, profit is overwhelmingly captured by transnational corporations in the production of most global commodities.

This has several important implications for ecological imperialism. Transnational corporations have, since colonialism, been integral to the system of obtaining peripheral resources in addition to outright political control and plunder. While TNCs were challenged in the brief era of economic nationalism through measures such as nationalizations, primary commodity cartels, and the push for fairer terms of trade through the United Nations platform of the New International Economic Order, these efforts quickly collapsed and capitulated to neoliberal reforms with the developing world debt crises of the 1980s. On the one hand, structural adjustment policies (SAPs) reinforced trade liberalization and export-led growth based on comparative advantage. On the other hand, such 'development' policies deepened global markets and the construction of multitudes of global commodity chains through economic policies and regulations that favored transnational corporations and their capacity to exploit peripheral and semi-peripheral labor and resources. As the other pillar of the neoliberal globalization, SAPs created the conditions favorable to opening up peripheral countries for foreign capital through privatization and various incentives to attract multinational corporations. Even now, attracting FDI continues to be promoted as integral to development and economic growth. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) argue that FDI is central to increasing the foreign exchange of low-income countries and avoiding further build-up of debt.

For example, Frame's work (2016) work on foreign direct investment in African resources found that neoliberal policies were designed to repeal policies enacted during the era of economic nationalism, shifting power, resources, and profits to the side of foreign investors. Such policies could be split into two rough categories; external policies that aimed to bind African countries through a host of multilateral and bilateral trade treaties, such as trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and internal policies that restructured domestic laws particularly in regards to mining and land. The central aim of TRIMs is to provide a safe haven for Western investments with favorable domestic conditions, undermining developing countries' capacity to regulate the behavior of foreign firms for the purpose of development objectives. Internally, since the 1980s the World Bank has promoted a process of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization under the auspices of economic growth, which has resulted in the creation of new regulatory frameworks for mining in Africa. The reforms simultaneously created a more favorable environment for foreign investors while undermining the protection of the environment in the countries concerned. Reforms emphasized creating a stable legal and fiscal framework, including mining codes, contractual stability, a guaranteed stable fiscal regime, and channels for profit repatriation. In practice, such reforms lowered taxation on FDI to negligible amounts, forbade nationalizations, and deregulated land sectors, leaving African countries bleeding billions of dollars in profits overseas. In the era of global ecological crises, the scramble for African resources has been associated with corruption and lack of democracy, the dispossession of local communities in oil-producing areas, and environmental despoliation. Throughout the periphery, foreign dominance in natural resource sectors has left vulnerable peripheral countries witnessing the wholesale grabbing of arable land, water sources, timber, fisheries, fossil fuels and minerals, with the resultant degradation and collapse of ecosystems. Peripheral countries, in turn, have witnessed political and social strife between governmental elites who benefit from their cooperation with multinationals and the citizens who are left with the environmental and socio-economic destruction.

International Finance

The current capitalist world-system is beleaguered by two paradoxical and exacerbating trends; the rapid escalation of ecological crises coupled with a tremendous overaccumulation of capital in the financial sector. The past several

decades has seen a rapid proliferation of what Marx termed 'interest-bearing capital,' signifying a systemic shift in capitalism with the emergence of the hegemony of the financial class and the increasing control of economy by the finance sector. As such, no discussion of ecological imperialism is complete without an acknowledgement of role international finance.

To being with, the financial system, as Marx discussed in Capital Volume III, acts a mechanism of concentration of multiple streams of revenues, from non-reinvested industrial profits (previously exploited surplus value) to the savings of workers. Through banks it centralizes the revenues of various social classes; through this process the multiple scattered, small funds, unable to act on their own accord, become a concentrated money power at the disposal of the financial class. In contemporary capitalism this process is magnified at a global level with a wide array of financial institutions, the sources of revenue even more diverse and the scope and scale exponentially increased. This creates the first fundamental contradiction; trillions of dollars of financial capital circle the global for rates of highest return as global ecological crises intensify.

Second, Marxist scholars have pointed out (Heinrich 2004), what is new in capitalism is that a large number of loans serve the enrichment of the debtors: they borrow money to use as capital. This form of credit, which only existed as an exception in pre-bourgeois societies, is the typical form of credit for capitalist enterprises. In capitalism finance of some sort is implicated in nearly every economic activity, and nearly every economic activity, from extraction, to production, distribution, to consumption, has troubling implications for the environment. As Vasudevan (2017) (https://mronline.org/2017/09/18/the-signifi cance-of-marxs-theory-on-money/), points out, the system of credit accelerates the expansion of the scale of production, development of technology and creation of the world market; the expansion of individual capitalist enterprises need not be limited to the reinvestment of their retained earnings. Further, in contemporary capitalism large financial actors have significant corporate control globally. If it is machinations of the global

capitalist economy that is destroying the planet, then interest-bearing capital as credit and the central source of funding is the lifeblood that enables it and expands it.

Third, in the hierarchical international division of labor of world-capitalist system, this concentrated and internationalized money power, the locus of which is in the developed countries and large emerging economies, is deeply implicated in processes of enclosure and accumulation by dispossession. From colonialism onwards through the structural adjustments of the 1980s and 90s, Third World loans and debts have been instrumental in shaping the economic policies in developing countries conducive to ecological imperialism and ecologically unequal exchange, as discussed above. Peet (2009) traces the substantial influence that the financial sector played in creating the structural adjustment policies, arguing that the structural adjustment policies of the Washington Consensus, through creating export-oriented economies with minimal state spending and private properties rights, maximized the loan capacity of developing countries and ensured the ability of such countries to repay principal and interest. Further, developing country debt itself has encouraged environmental destruction through the drive for intensified exports.

Beyond all of this, financial deregulation, the growth of the international capital market, and the push to diversify of portfolios has created a mammoth source of funding. This has meant that behind virtually every environmentally damaging extractive industry, and even the direct speculation and enclosure of resources, land and water, stands a diverse of array of international financial actors who are as equally responsible as the multinational corporations and corrupt governments involved. (Several NGOs have created website with extensive data collection on the banks and investors behind fossil fuel companies and deforestation. See for example https://fossilfreefunds.org and https://deforestationfreefunds.org.) As long as extractive, environmentally damaging industries remain profitable, the financial sector follows.

Fourth, Marx's other relevant insight was into the extreme fetishism characteristic of interest-

bearing capital; with interest-bearing capital, capital appears to multiply of its own accord, its origination in the appropriation of surplus value is completely obscured. In an era of global ecological crises, the extreme fetishism of globally mobile interest-bearing capital now plays out at international level. Lack of regulation, the distancing of accountability, and opaqueness in the value chain obscure the underlying appropriation and material basis of surplus value. There is no international regulation of financial flows in regards to the environment. While various financial institutions tout their 'greening of finance,' such claims must be taken with a grain of salt. For example, a recent OECD 2019 report on finance and biodiversity loss states that the progress in integrating biodiversity in business and investment decisions remains limited across most corporation, investors, and insurers. Another report by Banktrack, compiled by environmental NGOs, finds that since the Paris Climate Summit, banks, mostly from the Global North, have financed fossil fuels with $1.9 trillion.

Conclusion

At the heart of the global ecological crises today is ecological imperialism, a subjugation of Nature across the Global South that off-shoulders the ecological burdens of production and consumption of wealthier nations while funneling profits and resources for continued economic dominance and unsustainable consumption. Ecological imperialism is a complex and ever-evolving topic which necessitates a deep analysis of the fundamental workings of the global capitalist system. This short essay sought to provide a basic theoretical overview of the salient characteristics of the capitalist world-system that enable and exacerbate ecological imperialism. The world-system itself, with its international division of labor manifesting as international trading patterns originating from colonialism and re-created through neoliberal globalization, is a hierarchy that locks peripheral countries into exporting their natural resources and undermines the environments of emerging economies through rapid

industrialization. Neoliberal economic policies have reinforced the power and dominance of transnational corporations in concrete rules and regulation, cracking open resources and laying bare land for dispossession throughout the Global South while funneling profits overseas. International finance, itself ultimately an accumulation of the surplus value of hundreds of millions of workers globally, coalesces into finance capital, circling the global for highest rates of return and providing the life blood for further extraction of resources and accumulation of dispossession.

Cross-References

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ Ecologically Unequal Exchange
▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ Imperialism and Environment
▶ World-Systems Analysis and Giovanni Arrighi

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Ecological Unequal Exchange

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Synonyms

Disjunctive ecological exchange; Ecologically unsustainable exchange; Embodied emissions in trade; Net export of ecological footprint; Net transfer of "negative entropy"; Non-equivalent ecological exchange; Physical trade balance

The theory of *ecologically unequal exchange* (EUE) posits that "northern" consumption and capital accumulation, to a large existent, is based on "southern" environmental degradation and extraction. A commonly accepted definition has been formulated by Andrew K. Jorgensen:

> [E]cologically unequal exchange refers to the environmentally damaging withdrawal of energy and other natural resource assets from and the externalization of environmentally damaging production

and disposal activities within less-developed/less-powerful countries. It constitutes the obtainment of natural capital . . . and the usurpation of sink-capacity (waste assimilation properties of ecological systems in a manner enlarging the domestic carrying capacity of more-powerful/more-developed countries). It is therefore focused upon the manner and degree to which less-developed/less-powerful countries tend to fulfill a role in the global system as a tap for the raw materials and sink for the waste products of industrialized (and post-industrial) countries, thereby underwriting the disproportionate production-consumption-accumulation processes of more-developed/more-powerful countries. (Jorgenson 2016a, 335–336)

However, EUE has been measured, appraised, and explained from different perspectives. In this overview we separate three different aspects, which can be designated as follows:

1. Disjunctive ecological exchange
2. Nonequivalent ecological exchange
3. Ecologically unsustainable exchange

Disjunctive exchange relates to the effects of trade from the point of view of economic development. This concept is related to the so-called resource curse. Does a country or region that specializes in the exports of natural resources tend to suffer from less growth or distorted economic development in comparison to a country that specializes in the exports of manufactured goods and services? The world-system analysis separates between core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries. Disjunctive exchange is an inherent characteristic of the system – both creating and maintaining the hierarchical international relations.

Nonequivalent exchange relates to various ways to measure the ecological contents of exports and imports. Is a country (or region) a net importer or exporter of an environmentally relevant aggregate, such as energy, material mass, land use, or pollution?

Exchange can be unsustainable in the sense that it hurts the ecological sustainability locally or nationally. Trade can also be ecologically unsustainable for both partners involved and even threaten the global social and ecological system.

Disjunctive Ecological Exchange

Stephen G. Bunker's book from 1985 *Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State* contains a chapter "Toward a Theory of Ecologically Unequal Exchange." The book and a related article published in 1984 (Bunker 1984) are seen as the first effort to establish a concept and theory of EUE. Bunker argues that "when natural resources are extracted from one regional ecosystem to be transformed and consumed in another, the resource-exporting region loses values that occur in its physical environment; these losses eventually decelerate the extractive region's economy" (Bunker 1985, 22). Paradoxically then, the efforts to develop the Amazon Basin has resulted in its underdevelopment.

Bunker's theory combines a concept of nonequivalent exchange with a version of disjunctive exchange. The nonequivalent exchange between an "extractive" and a "productive" economy leads to underdevelopment in one and development in the other. Since there are historical examples of how economies, which have been net exporters of natural resources, still have managed to avoid underdevelopment, it is not evident that being a net exporter of natural resources necessarily involves a disjunctive exchange.

Bunker and Andrew J. Jorgensen have continually deepened and broadened the world-system-inspired studies of ecologically unequal exchange. In an overview article, Jorgensen argues that "ecologically unequal exchange theory helps to address key limitations of both the treadmill of production and ecological modernization approaches, most notably their lack of attention paid to how structural and unequal relationships between nations influence environment and development." He emphasizes the need for greater integration between ecologically unequal exchange theory and environment and development perspectives (Jorgenson 2016b, 227).

Already the mercantilists distinguished between "good" and "bad" trade. "Good" was such exchange which brought into the country natural resources, especially gold, and which made foreigners buy goods incorporating a lot of

labor, especially manufactured goods. James Steuart summarized this mercantilist idea as follows:

> In all trade two things are to be considered in the commodity sold. The first is the matter, the second is the labour employed to render this matter useful. The matter exported from a country is what the country loses; the price of labour exported is what it gains. (Cited in Andersson 1976, 25)

A country was thought to develop its "arts" and industry by exporting labor- and skill-intensive goods and services and to maintain scarce natural resources by importing "matter," goods only slightly processed. According to the mercantilists, foreign trade was a means by which one country could strengthen its economic growth and political power at the expense of its rivals, and the most important aspect of the trade was the type of commodities imported and exported.

Since the mercantilists, several critics of the classical free-trade position have adopted a similar view. One needs only mention Friedrich List, "the apostle of economic nationalism," who prescribed protection of the nascent manufacturing industries and cheap imports of food and raw materials. Other variants of disjunctive exchange are Johan Galtung's "asymmetric exchange," where "trade, or interaction in general, is symmetric, or on equal terms, if and only if the total inter- and intra-actor effects that accrue to the parties are equal." Among these effects, Galtung counted exports of manufactured goods or raw materials, pollution, depletion, and exploitation (Galtung 1971, 38).

"The Resource Curse" and the "Dutch Disease"

The concept of resource curse relates to the finding that countries rich in minerals and other natural resources counterintuitively tend to have a poor or distorted economic growth. Several studies have evaluated the effects of resource wealth on a wide range of economic outcomes and offered explanations for why a resource curse is likely to occur. Factors that often have been found to influence the risks are how the income is spent,

the kind of government and institutions, the sort of resource, and the early or late industrialization (Venables 2016). Especially, if the resources – such as guano, oil, or diamonds – can be appropriated by those who wield political power, the risk for coup d'états and wars is high.

The Economist magazine coined the term "Dutch disease" to describe what the Netherlands experienced during the 1970s. The Dutch discovered a huge natural gas field in 1959. Due to the sharp increase in incomes from the export of gas, the local currency started to appreciate. The higher value of the guilder harmed the ability to export other products and favored imports of goods competing with the local production. Thus, large parts of the Dutch economy were hurt. There are several other well-known instances of the disease, often related to the exports of oil: Indonesia at the end of the 1970s, Nigeria in the 1990s, and Russia, Azerbaijan, and Venezuela in the 2000s. Historically, gold has had similar effects on the economy: Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century and Australia in the mid-nineteenth century. A recent example of the Dutch disease and the resource curse is Suriname:

> Throughout the twentieth century Suriname's economy was dominated by bauxite, but the industry declined as Suriname neared the next century. Gold and then oil became the dynamics for the economy in the early twenty-first century. On the back of gold, oil, and at decreasing levels, alumina exports, the economy expanded from under $1 billion in 2000 to a little over $5 billion in 2014...
>
> As long as the commodity boom ran, revenues flowed into state coffers and bloated employee rolls could be maintained. Commodity largesse also meant that inefficiencies could continue without consequences. Moreover, outside advice was ignored. As the 2016 IMF Article IV report ... observed: "During the boom there was no institutional arrangement to save resources for future prices corrections, and implementation of IMF advice on strengthening the policy framework was limited. Suriname has thus had a much sharper recession, steeper exchange rate depreciation, and larger rise in inflation and government debt than most commodity exporters." (MacDonald 2017)

A somewhat unexpected example of disjunctive exchange, which can be interpreted as ecological, was that between England and Portugal in the eighteenth century. The Methuen Treaty of

1703 has gained a special historical significance, since the exchange resulting from this treaty constituted the empirical counterpart to David Ricardo's famous example of how trade in accordance with the principle of comparative costs benefits both parties. The substance of the treaty consisted in permitting the entry of English woollen manufactures into Portugal, whereas Portugal's wines were to be admitted into England at much lower tariffs than wine from France and other countries.

In Portugal the imports of English woollens quadrupled, eliminating the entire domestic production. At the same time the exports of wine grew rapidly, eliminating both the English domestic production and imports from France. Portugal lost the most dynamic sector at the time and strengthened the position of its landowning, feudal class. But England's concentration on the cloth industry was essential for the process of industrialization. England got "matter," wines, and Brazilian gold, in exchange for "arts," "labor," and cloth (Sideri 1970, 42–49).

However, the fact that some countries, which have been heavily dependent on exports of "matter," still managed to avoid the resource curse shows that the mercantilist position cannot be generalized. Three examples of countries that have strengthened their belonging to the "North," despite their dependence on material exports, are Finland, Norway, and Australia.

Finland's economy used to be dominated by exports of forestry goods – tar, sawmill products, pulp, and paper. However, it managed to create a coherent forest industrial block and to diversify into several high-tech branches. Norway has been able to create the world's largest sovereign wealth fund saving the proceeds from its oil exports. The fund has been used both to stabilize the economy and to provide a considerable income stream for the future.

Australia – named "the wonder down under" by *The Economist (2018)* – has been growing more years in a row without a recession than any other OECD country. A crucial reason for this must be ascribed to the prolonged and fast economic growth in China – the main market for Australian exports. The most important export item has been iron ore, Australia's share of global exports being almost 60%. It has also been a major exporter of wheat, beef, wool, gold, aluminum, natural gas, and coal. Despite this overwhelming dependence on extractive activities, the Australian economy has managed to avoid the resource curse. Whether it has been a victim of disjunctive ecological exchange in relation to China can be discussed, but in comparison to other OECD- or raw material-exporting countries, its development has been outstanding.

Nonequivalent Exchange

Associated with the labor theory of value, the concept of unequal exchange of labor, or nonequivalent exchange, has lingered as a minor theme in the history of economic thought. We find the idea in the works of Smith, Ricardo, and Marx and in a long row of Marxian economic studies. The concept gained a large audience thanks to Arghiri Emmanuel's book *L'échange inégal.* (Emmanuel 1969) (For a historical overview, see Andersson 1976, 38–42.)

In a recent work *Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century*, John Smith (2016) further elaborates a Marxist theory of unequal exchange of labor. He introduces the theme by looking at the production and distribution of three items: the T-shirt, the cup of coffee, and the iPhone. By outsourcing production to low-wage countries, rich countries manage to import considerably more labor than they export.

Instead of using labor as the meter of nonequivalence, ecological economists have used several environmental measures to describe and calculate an ecological unequal exchange: raw material equivalents, ecological backpack, ecological footprint, water footprint, emergy/dollar, embodied emissions, and displaced environmental loads.

Material Flow Accounts

Since trade statistics comprise both value and weight, a relatively straightforward nonequivalence measure is in terms of material

mass. How much does a country's imports weigh in relation to its exports? Such overall material flow statistics has been calculated on a regular basis by national and international statistical offices, such as Eurostat. Measures on direct material inputs (DMI), domestic material consumption (DMC), and physical trade balance (PTB) are available for many countries. However, import and export flows can be expressed in terms of raw material equivalents (RME). The direct imports and exports are converted into raw materials needed to produce the imported and exported products. These estimates can include immaterial items such as electricity and services:

> The EU uses Economy-wide material flow accounts (EW-MFA) to provide an aggregate overview, in thousand tonnes per year, of the material flows into and out of an economy. EW-MFA cover solid, gaseous, and liquid materials, except for bulk flows of water and air. The general purpose of EW-MFA is to describe the interaction of the domestic economy with the natural environment and the rest of the world economy in terms of flows of materials.
>
> While the EU trade balance in monetary values is more or less even, its physical trade balance is clearly asymmetric. The EU imports about three times more goods by weight from the rest of the world than it exports. Quantitatively the physical imports into the EU are dominated by fossil fuels and other raw products which typically have low values per kilogram. On the other hand, the EU exports high-value goods such as machinery and transport equipment. (Eurostat 2018)

Eurostat material flow accounts comprise actual weight of direct material inputs (DMI), as well as the direct and indirect raw material requirements of the traded goods and services, raw material equivalents (RME). In 2016 the actual weight of imported materials was slightly more than 3 tons per capita; in terms of RME, it was over 8 tons. The actual weight of EU exports was more than 1 ton, and in RME terms it was over 5 tons.

Furthermore, total material requirement (TMR) accounts have been used to include the unused extraction – e.g., unused overburden and waste rock in mining and logging residues left to the forests. Methodologically total material flows can be considered as an extension of the raw material equivalent flows, even if the flows are about twice as high as the raw material equivalent flows. The "ecological backpack" concept is defined as TMR, but is mostly used to calculate the weight of individual consumption habits.

In a study of the material flows for Finland for 2015, the direct material imports were 10 tons per capita, RME 32 tons, and TMR 72 tons, while the direct exports 9 tons per capita, RME 34 tons, and TMR 72 tons. Measured in these ways, the Finnish trade seems to be rather well balanced ecologically. The massive imports of fossil fuels were neutralized by the exports of wood-based items (Mäenpää et al. 2017). However, with particular countries, Finnish trade was highly unequal, since the imports of fossil fuels came overwhelmingly from Russia, whereas exports of forest industry products went mainly to other EU countries, the USA, and China.

There are several problems related to using weight as an indicator of unequal exchange. The environmental and social impacts are quite different depending on the kind of material. There are low-volume flows (e.g., toxic metals) with high impacts and high-volume flows (sand and gravel) with low impacts. Many difficult issues related to the material flow analysis are discussed in detail by one of its central researchers (Fischer-Kowalski 1998, 1999).

MFA has been used to assess whether an ecologically unequal exchange characterizes trade between the northern core and the southern periphery. Simon Jit Singh and Nina Eisenmenger cover this discussion and find that "MFA appears to be a useful tool to operationalise the notions of 'unequal trade' and 'accumulation' within the world system perspective." They stress that accounting for flows of materials across regions is not sufficient unless interpreted within the politico-economic context. "The significance of MFA can become more apparent if it serves as a tool not only for 'social metabolism' but also for the 'world system perspective'" (Jit Singh and Eisenmenger 2010, 78).

Land Use and Ecological Footprint Accounting

Land use is another indicator that has been central in measuring ecologically nonequivalent

exchange. Several studies show how the extension of land use for the production of different primary products – such as soya, cocoa, palm oil, shrimps, and cattle – has influenced the environment, reduced the space for local lifestyles, and hurt the wild life. Large flows of biodiversity-threat-implicated products from Africa, Asia, and Latin America come into North America and Western Europe. How trade has been an important driver of deforestation in the South has extensively been made known by Jorgensen (2010).

Land use is related to the concept of biocapacity, the biological capacity of an ecosystem to produce renewable useful natural resources and to filter or absorb other materials, such as carbon dioxide. Biocapacity is measured in terms of global hectares. A global hectare is an adjusted unit that represents the average biological productivity of all productive hectares on Earth in a given year. It is possible to calculate the global hectares that it takes to satisfy the yearly consumption of a population.

A comprehensive way to measure biocapacity and the land and water area required for the consumption of a population is the ecological footprint (EF). The ecological footprint accounting (EFA) was established by Wackernagel and Rees (1996) in 1996.

The EFA has been further elaborated by the *Global Footprint Network*. The network continually publishes the ecological footprints of practically all countries, as well as for the Earth as a whole. "[T]he simplest way to define ecological footprint would be to call it the impact of human activities measured in terms of the area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the goods consumed and to assimilate the wastes generated. . .Ecological Footprint accounting measures the *demand* on and *supply* of nature" (Global Footprint Network 2018).

The EFA shows a close connection between the ecological footprint and the GDP per capita. It also shows that there are many rich (but also poor) countries that have an "ecological deficit," that is, they consume more biocapacity than is available inside their own territories. One can therefore suggest that these deficits are reduced thanks to imports of biocapacity – maybe from poor

countries that have no other option than to export part of their biocapacity. This would be a clear instance of an ecologically unequal exchange. This possibility was pointed out already by Wackernagel and Rees and has been further elaborated and measured by several researchers (Torregrosa-López et al. 2007).

James Rice, describing ecologically unequal exchange as disproportionate appropriation of environmental space measured in terms of ecological footprints, found, based on data for 137 countries, that low- and middle-income countries tend to be victims of EUE. Although they themselves consume less environmental space than the high-income countries, they still are net exporters of biocapacity. "The results contradict neoclassical economic thought. We find trade shapes uneven utilization of global environmental space by constraining consumption in low and lower middle-income countries" (Rice 2007, 1369).

A study using embodied ecological footprints to assess whether we can find nonequivalent patterns in trade between core (OECD), semi-peripheral (BRIICS), and developing countries was made by Dam et al. (2017) at the Jena University. There empirical results show a pattern that confirms the following five hypotheses:

1. Net export of ecological footprint increases with higher relative abundance of the environment (biocapacity per capita).
2. Net export of ecological footprint increases with less stringent environmental policy.
3. Rich countries are more likely to become net importers of ecological footprint.
4. Net export of ecological footprint decreases with the greener production and increases with the greener consumption.
5. The higher the biocapacity per capita and the less stringent the environmental policy, the higher is the net FDI inflow in case of EF net exporting countries.

These, and similar results from other studies, answer the question put by Daniel Moran et al. who, using EF as a pivotal indicator, doubted that there existed a systematic ecologically unequal exchange between low-income developing

nations and wealthy developed nations. Instead they asserted that "high income nations are mostly exporters, not importers, of biophysical resources" (Moran et al. 2013, 185).

Dorninger and Hornborg (2015) took issue with the method used by Moran et al., and although skeptical to environmentally extended multiregional input-output analyses, they maintained that current research on EEMRIO-based flows of embodied materials, energy, land, and labor in international trade confirms the theory of ecologically unequal exchange.

An interesting study combining ecological footprint accounting with accounting in terms of labor was made by Jit Sing and Ramanujam. They focused on the Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal from 1880 until 2000. Since the islands represent a small area that has been specialized in the same product – coconuts and copra – all the time, it was possible to make rather exact calculations of embodied labor, land, and energy in the exports of copra and the imports of cloth and rice. During the British rule, the Nicobar Islands were disadvantaged in terms of land and megajoule. Under independent India, the exchange value of copra in terms of rice improved considerably, thanks to a copra price support scheme and to the supply of rice at subsidized rates. In terms of embodied labor, the Nicobarese were always a big gainer. In 2000, for 1 ton of rice, the islands paid 51 man-hours and received 758; for 1 ton of cotton textiles, they paid 1087 man-hours, receiving as much as 16,422. The authors contend that it would be difficult to view the Nicobarese as victims of this exchange. Coconuts were in abundance and land was not a limiting factor (Jit Sing and Ramanujam 2010, 35).

Energy, Emergy, and Exergy

Efforts to use energy as a descriptive or normative measure of economic value have a long, although hidden away history (Martinez-Alier 1987). As a measure of value transfers between nations, the term emergy – "embodied energy" or "energy memory" – was developed by Howard T. Odum. He defined emergy as a measure of energy used in the past. "The unit of emergy (past available

energy use) is emjoule, as distinguished from joules used for available energy remaining now." Odum calculated differences in the emergy/dollar ratios between different parts of the world and concluded that the periphery was being underpaid for the emergy content of its natural resources (Odum 1995).

Torbjörn Rydberg has continued Odum's effort to calculate emergy flows in order to define unfair or unequal exchange. He sees emergy as "an environmental accounting tool that can compare work of the human economy with "work" of the environment in terms of a common metric. Its theoretical and scientific base is in thermodynamics and systems ecology" (Rydberg 2010, 49). Rydberg calculated the solar emergy flows for 1 US dollar in international trade for Sweden, Nicaragua, and Switzerland. Whereas Nicaraguan exports had an emergy/dollar quotient of 16×10^{12} solar emjoules, the corresponding figure for Sweden was 1.4×10^{12} and for Switzerland 0.7×10^{12} sej/USD:

> This means that every dollar that circulates between these two countries transfers 11 times more real wealth to Sweden from Nicaragua than what is transferred in the opposite direction... Trade between Nicaragua and Switzerland favors Switzerland with approximately 22 times more real wealth. (ibid. 59)

According to Rydberg, trade that maximizes profits in terms of money is not geared to fairness. When trade is not equal in emergy terms, it maintains inequality in the world. "If our prosperity and sustainability are dependent upon draining other nations and regions of their resources and the production capacity of their ecosystems, then our kind of wealth creation and 'sustainability' must be considered fatally flawed" (ibid. 60).

The book, *The Power of the Machine*, written by Alf Hornborg, contains a chapter called "The Thermodynamics of Imperialism: Toward an Ecological Theory of Unequal Exchange." Hornborg objects to Odum's use of emergy as a measure of unequal exchange. "The notion that the dissipated energy is somehow still there in the object only confuses things" (Hornborg 2001, 41). The correction Hornborg makes changes the perspective. He prefers the concept of exergy – the part of energy that is available for mechanical work.

Exergy is a standard concept of thermodynamics and relates to entropy. "Up to the point where the final product is sold, there is a negative correlation between the price and the proportion of the original exergy that is left in a set of processed substances. The more of the original exergy that has been dissipated, the higher the price" (ibid. 42).

Hornborg links exergy to Ilya Prigogine's concept "dissipative structures" – "systems that stay far from thermodynamic equilibrium by continually drawing in exergy from the outside and exporting entropy, or disorder, they produce in the process" (ibid. 42). Energy is the foundation of the industrial system, and Hornborg sees the appropriation of productive potential trough unequal exchange as a requisite for continued capital accumulation. His conception of imperialism reminds of that of Rosa Luxemburg. Capitalism – in Hornborg's view industrialism – is incapable of maintaining itself without a continuous exploitation of the periphery:

> Calling trade exploitative . . . is more than a value judgement. It is an inference based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics. If production is a dissipative process, and a prerequisite for industrial production is the exchange of finished products for raw materials and fuels, then it follows that industrialism implies a *social* transfer of entropy. . . The net transfer of "negative entropy" to industrial centers is the bases for techno-economic "growth" and "development". . . The ecological and socioeconomic impoverishment of the periphery are two sides of the same coin, for both nature and human labor are underpaid sources of high-quality energy for the industrial "technomass." (ibid. 11)

Chen and Chen introduced the concept "global embodied exergy density" (GEED) as the "ratio of the global cosmic exergy consumption to the surface area of the earth." They calculated "the embodied exergy ecological footprint (EEEF) for China and found that EEEF can serve as a modified indicator of EF reflecting the ecological overshoot of the general ecological system. Chen and Chen argued for their choice of indicator by referring to a notional limit to human exergy consumption:

> Since the anthropogenic exergy use is in the order-of-magnitude of 1% of the global exergy consumption of the material earth and can be dominant for some terrestrial processes, the budget of cosmic energy can be regarded as a necessary indicator for ecological evaluation as it raises a unified

thermodynamic metric for objectively evaluating resource depletion, environment degradation and ecological overshoot and provides an essential measure of "use scarcity" of the real power driving the earth system. (Chen and Chen 2007, 373)

Pollution and Embodied Emissions in Trade

Economic activity causes different pollutants. From an environmental point of view, a country can gain from trade if it is able to import more goods that embody local pollutants than it exports. In an article that thoroughly discusses different measures of EUE, Roldan Muradian, Martin O'Connor, and Joan Martinez-Alier preferred to use embodied emissions to define "environmental terms of trade" (ETT) and "balance of embodied emissions in trade" (BEET):

> [I]f consumption is assumed as the key economic force 'steering' the environmental transformation, the assessment of the environmental performance of a national economy requires us to make the distinction between environmental costs borne and caused by a nation, and therefore, to expand the scale of analysis beyond the national political frontiers. Inter-country flows of goods and services (trade) and transboundary flows of pollutants are the two main ways by which international links can be established between local consumption and foreign environmental degradation, or vice versa. (Muradian et al. 2002, 52)

The authors define "displaced environmental loads" as environmental pressures, such as pollution, land transformation, and resource depletion, which are linked to international trade. They calculated the embodied emissions in trade for different pollutants and presented the balance of embodied emissions in trade, as well as the environmental terms of trade for different regions of the world. The results did not unambiguously confirm that the periphery is subjected to an ecological unequal exchange, since even though Western Europe and Japan had a positive balance and improving ETT in relation to the periphery, the opposite was the case for the USA.

However, the authors found an increase in the embodied emissions over time that indicated an increasing environmental displacement in the industrialized world. Therefore, the

environmental Kuznets curve did not necessarily reveal a decoupling between economic growth and environmental degradation, but rather was the result of an increasing transfer of environmental loads abroad as countries become richer.

Christina Prell examined the distribution of pollution and wealth over a 20-year period. She studied pollution produced inside a country as well as pollution triggered along global supply chains. The pollutant she chose was sulfur dioxide. Core countries consume more pollution-intensive goods that are produced around the world and trigger pollution along global supply chains. Furthermore, they also generate high amounts of pollution within their own countries. "Said differently, core countries may indeed disadvantage others though patterns of trade, but they are also experiencing environmental costs at home as well" (Prell 2016, 119).

Kanemoto et al. (2014) found that the Kyoto Protocol targets were undermined since countries – mostly developed – that managed to holding down their emissions often increased their imports of embodied CO_2 from less-developed countries. The study concluded that "if regulatory policies do not account for embodied imports, global emissions are likely to rise even if developed country emitters enforce strong national emission targets" (Kanemoto et al. 2014, 58).

An elaborate study of how trade between China and the EU also involves embodied emissions has been made by Tian et al. (2017). It covered two types of footprints: environmental and resource footprints. The environmental footprints included seven different emissions, which cover global warming, acidification, and tropospheric ozone formation. Four resource footprints were also taken into account: energy, land, materials, and water. China's exports to EU countries embodied much higher quantities of environmentally sensitive goods than its imports. This disadvantage for China took place despite the fact that China's environmental and resource footprints per capita were smaller than EU's (Tian et al. 2017, 329). Similar results of pollutive trade between "North" and "South" – including China – were shown by Shuijun Peng, Wencheng Zhang, and Chuawang Sun:

14%–30% of air pollutant emissions in the South were caused by consumption in the North in 2007. There is a large 'pollution deficit' between the North and South, which significantly increased during the period 1995–2007, that favors the theory of ecologically unequal exchange. (Peng et al. 2016, 147)

In a thorough study of the environmental load of Dutch private consumption that took place abroad, the authors found rather remarkable results:

A large proportion of the environmental load of Dutch private consumption takes place abroad. For greenhouse gases this amounts to 49%; for pesticide use to 56%; for summer smog to 61%; for eutrophication to 64%; for acidification to 74%; and, for land use to 84%. (Nijdam et al. 2005, 167)

Most land use was found to take place in developing countries, whereas most emissions occurred in industrialized countries.

Water Footprint

Although water is a critical resource for the existence of life, and access to fresh water is becoming scarcer, embodied water in trade has seldom been an object for investigation. An exception is a study by Jared B. Fitzgerald and Daniel Auerbach on water footprints and unequal exchange. The authors define the water footprint of production as "the amount of local water resources that are used to produce goods and services within a country." The water footprint allows researchers to examine water used in the entire production process by taking into account virtual embodied water as well as the origin of water usage.

Fitzgerald and Auerbach found that a country's position in the global economy mattered. Lower-income countries are not able to displace their water footprint to the same extent as high-income countries. They, however, did not want to interpret the results as exploitation, or as a zero-sum game:

Instead of direct exploitation, our results elucidate disparities within a world economy where there is inequality in trade relationships in that high-income countries are able to benefit their water resources through trade with other high-income countries. Lower-income countries, on the other hand, have disadvantageous positions in the global economy

which do not allow them to displace the burdens on their water resources to the same extent. This demonstrates, we believe, a nuance to the ecologically unequal exchange literature. (Fitzgerald and Auerbach 2016, 13)

Ecologically Unsustainable Exchange

Ecological nonequivalent exchange, however measured, is inherent in any economic system. Areas with plenty of natural resources do export more materials, energy, or footprints than they import from densely populated urban localities. Nonequivalence does not necessarily imply that a country or region is a "victim" of unequal exchange even though it is a net exporter of natural resources. Actually, it can quite often be a net importer in terms of labor time.

Even if a region or country is the victim of a disjunctive ecological exchange, its economic development being weak or lop-sided, it can still be ecologically sustainable. It may even be the case that a country, whose economic growth is fast, runs a greater risk of being a victim of pollution and unsustainable extraction. Originally "development" referred to investments making land more valuable for humans, i.e., projects that increased the value of property. This generally implied economic growth, but at the same time destruction of existing ecosystems. From an ecological point of view, disjunctive exchange might hurt the fast-growing country more than the slow-growing.

EUE theory should concentrate on whether trade is ecologically sustainable or not. In order to do that, a clear definition of ecological sustainability is needed. A useful definition is provided by the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm:

> Ecological sustainability includes everything that is connected with the Earth's ecosystems. Amongst other things, this includes the stability of climate systems, the quality of air, land and water, land use and soil erosion, biodiversity (diversity of both species and habitats), and ecosystem services (e.g. pollination and photosynthesis). When it comes to the ecological systems, it is often possible to give quite a good definition of sustainability. Production of goods and services must not compromise the carrying capacity of ecosystems, i.e. nature has to be able to regenerate utilised resources. (KTH 2018)

Ecological sustainability is not necessarily linked to the territory of a nation. Mostly it refers to a certain locality, a region, a civilization, and even to the globe as a whole. However, since the political power is concentrated to the state level, and the responsibility for the preservation of sustainability lies with the national governments, it is meaningful to ponder whether a country is ecologically sustainable or not. If a country – or group of countries – can "import" sustainability at the cost of sustainability in other parts of the world, we can design this type of ecologically unequal exchange as unsustainable. This is evident if we live in a "full world," which is threatened by different ecological disasters (Andersson and Lindroth 2001; Andersson 2010).

How do our different measures fit the need to indicate whether ecologically nonequivalent exchange also can be characterized as unsustainable exchange?

Material flow accounts are problematic indicators at the national level, although they can have serious effects locally. However, if a country is heavily dependent on the export of a resource – say oil and gas, iron ore, or forest products – the extraction of which exceeds the rate of new discoveries or regeneration, it would be appropriate to characterize the situation as unsustainable. The total weight of material exports would be a too vague indicator, since we do not have a measure of the limits to how much weight that could be used without damaging the sustainability.

Pollution would fit the purpose better. Some pollutants have a clear territorial effect; some of them crossing national borders. Some – such as carbon dioxide and freons – affect the globe as a whole, although different parts in different and uncertain ways. Trade that involves local pollutants could be used to assess whether the trade is unequal and unsustainable, but to assign the global pollutants to trade of certain countries is more problematic. It is easier to show that, e.g., Chinese exports do cause pollution that seriously damages the land, water, and air of the country, than to assign the responsibility for carbon emissions between two trading countries.

How the overuse of carbon emissions could be allocated to the actors has been discussed by Jiun-

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Jiun Ferng. He combines the benefit and the ecological deficit principles. The benefit principle assigns the responsibility of pollutant emissions to those consuming the goods and services that cause the emissions, not to the direct emitters. The ecological deficit principle assigns responsibility to a country if its emissions exceed its capacity to assimilate them. How much weight should be given to each of the two principles?

> On the basis of the following three reasons, this paper suggests that a country is responsible for the CO2 emissions associated with its imported production inputs. First, from the perspective of the adopted demand driven criterion, a country's demand for imported production inputs is a main force that drives the origin countries of its imports to produce these products. Second, the imported inputs help to realize the domestic production of the importing country, and thus contribute indirectly to its income generation from domestic production. Third, in the context of global warming, incorporating this indirect benefit might help to discourage carbon leakage. (Ferng 2003, 128–129)

Ferng also estimated the amount of carbon "over emissions" of a country by subtracting the net amount of carbon sequestered by local ecosystems from the emissions calculated according to the benefit principle. Thus, a country can "export" sustainability to the world by improving its capacity to absorb carbon emissions.

Of the measures used to identify EUE, the ecological footprint fits an assessment of sustainability best. EF accounting comprises a conception of a limited capacity of the Earth to transform solar energy into biomass. It covers all renewable natural resources and the most important pollutant: carbon dioxide. A high ecological footprint in relation to the available biocapacity indicates that an ecosystem is unsustainable – unless it is able to "import" enough sustainability. Natural capital is depleted or degraded when there is an "ecological deficit" or "overshooting" in terms of ecological footprints. Strong ecological sustainability implies that nature's capacity to reproduce biomass on a continuous basis is not contracting. Material flow accounting, overall pollution, and embodied energy can be complementary to EF accounting, but their connection to sustainability is vaguer. As Siche et al. (2010) have shown,

reckoning in terms of emergy can come close to the EF indicator, but it is more difficult to estimate the limits to emergy use.

A problem of using EF accounting in order to assess the sustainability of a certain country is the fact that half, or even more, of the calculated footprints is due to the need to absorb the carbon emissions by forestation. If this need for forest land is disregarded, the world, and most countries, would seem to be sustainable. The damage caused by CO_2 emissions affects the whole globe and only partly the emitting country and the country importing the goods causing the emitted carbon. EF, therefore, is only partly an indicator of how EUE affects the sustainability of the trading nations in question.

Using EF measures, it is possible to roughly divide the countries into six different groups, depending on whether they have an ecological deficit or not and whether they are net exporters or importers of biocapacity.

1. Countries with an ecological surplus that exceeds the net exports of biomass and sink capacity. Their ecological capital is intact or increasing. Australia, Brazil, and Russia belong to this group.
2. Countries with an ecological surplus smaller than their net exports. This implies a loss of ecological capital, in particular if the carbon footprint is small in relation to the deficit. Angola and Honduras are probably in this category. Indonesia and Costa Rica used to have a small reserve, but now belong to group 3.
3. Countries with an ecological deficit that nonetheless are net exporters. Their ecological capital is being damaged and reduced. Several African countries, such as Algeria, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, are in this group. So are most of the former soviet republics in Central Asia and Caucasus.
4. Countries with an ecological deficit larger than their net imports. Their natural capital decreases although they gain from a non-equivalent exchange of EF. Examples are the USA, Germany, China, India, and Egypt.
5. Countries with an ecological deficit smaller than their net imports. Their ecological capital

is preserved thanks to an unequal exchange in terms of biomass and sink capacity. Ireland with a small deficit (and a large carbon-related footprint) is a possible example.

6. Countries with an ecological surplus and yet are net importers in terms of EF. They are able to preserve and even increase their sustainability both by a moderate use of their biocapacity and by enjoying imported capacity. Sweden and Finland, with large reserves, very likely belong to this group.

The world and most countries do have ecological deficits. The greatest number belongs to the groups 3 and 4. Of the large regions, Oceania and probably South America belong to group 1. Africa is in group 3, with Asia, Europe, and North America in group 4. If the carbon footprint is disregarded, Asia is the only continental region that still has an ecological deficit.

Countries in group 2 and 3 can be said to be victims of a "unilateral unsustainable exchange," which damages their ecological sustainability. If they trade with countries in group 4, which, even though they are net importers, do not manage to reproduce their ecological capital, we may call the situation "mutually unsustainable exchange." It implies that the stronger nations are not strong enough to maintain a unilaterally unsustainable exchange with the weaker nations.

Since ecological unsustainable exchange is not easily observable and most countries eagerly participate in a game of positional competition – economically, militarily, culturally, and ideologically – the risk for ecological overshoots is imminent. This risk is gravely reinforced by the capitalist accumulation imperative and by the status-driven consumerism spreading all over the world.

Free trade and free movement of capital imply that any agent rich enough may decide – directly or indirectly – how global biocapacity is used. The losers can be the less rich, the poor, other living beings, or future generations. Røpke (1994) and Gale (2000) argued from an ecological and justice point of view that there was a case for limitations on trade. International trade and anonymous multinational capital blur the responsibility for the ecological effects of production and consumption.

The more overexploited the ecosystems become, the more likely nonequivalent ecological exchange will be transformed into an unsustainable exchange. In a full world, the consequences of sharp income inequalities are fatal both socially and ecologically. The rampant commodification of all resources emphasizes the inequalities and spurs international rivalry as well as individual consumerism. The environmental space for the poor deteriorates, at the same time as the rich can buy at least temporary release from global ecosystems destruction. International trade in a full and unequal world is something very different from the story told by standard economics.

Cross-References

▶ Conservation as Economic Imperialism
▶ Emmanuel, Arghiri and "Unequal Exchange"
▶ Food and Imperialism: The Corporate Regime and Global Peasant Resistance
▶ Food, Imperialism, and the World System
▶ Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law
▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
▶ Imperialism and Environment
▶ Industrialisation and Imperialism
▶ Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa
▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism
▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery
▶ Unequal Exchange
▶ Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice (1930–2019)

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Ecologically Unequal Exchange

▶ Ecological Imperialism: A Theoretical Overview
▶ Unequal Exchange

Ecologically Unsustainable Exchange

▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange

Economic Cycles

▶ Political Economy of the European Periphery

Economic Inequality

▶ Political Economy of the European Periphery

Economic Stakes of the First World War

▶ First World War and Imperialism

Egypt

▶ Yemen, Imperialism in

Eland

▶ James Connolly: Labor, Empire, Ireland

Electronica

▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

Emancipation

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa

Embodied Emissions in Trade

Embourgeoisement

Emigration

Emmanuel, Arghiri and "Unequal Exchange"

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Definition

Arghiri Emmanuel was a Greek-French Marxian economist who came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s for his theory of 'unequal exchange'.

Arghiri Emmanuel was a Greek-French Marxian economist who came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s for his theory of 'unequal exchange'. In the 1930s, Emmanuel received a degree from the high school of economics of the University of Athens and another from the faculty of law. In 1942, he volunteered for the Greek liberation forces in the Middle East, and he was active in the leftwing uprising of the Middle Eastern forces against the government-in-exile in Cairo in April 1944. Emmanuel would later find his way to the Belgian Congo, where his family was involved in the textile industry. His experiences there provided a microcosm of the capitalist world, revealing an economy with certain characteristics which inhibited investments in the downward phase of the business cycle, precisely when they would be needed.

In the 1970s Arghiri Emmanuel reformulated Marx's (1967) contribution to the transformation of value into prices of production as a means of explaining why the terms of trade for developing countries are consistently unfavourable. He coined the term 'unequal exchange' in his theoretical exposition of the trade relationship that existed between the 'core' and the 'periphery' (1972). In particular, this provides an explanation of the growing inequalities that have been observed in the terms of trade between developing countries and the advanced industrialised economies. In recognising the possibility that the rate of profit is to be equalised on the world scale, Emmanuel also understands that there are huge differences in both wages and rates of exploitation between advanced and developing countries. Because of the international mobility of capital, substantial gaps in profits have seemingly been eliminated. Accordingly, Emmanuel claims that wages 'can vary enormously in space but very little in time' (1972: 120). For him, wage differentials between rich and poor countries explain why it is that commodities produced in the Third World are so cheap in comparison with those produced in the West. This, he argues, is a primary reason for the wide and growing gap in economic development between the two regions. In this regard unequal exchange acts as the basis for a process of unequal development on two separate fronts. First, capital is attracted to demand, so that the high incomes generated by unequal exchange attract further investment, and start a cumulative process of development. Second, high wages lead to the use of capital-intensive methods of production, which raise productivity and promote development. Emmanuel explains:

> Even if we agree that unequal exchange is only one of the mechanisms whereby value is transferred from one group of countries to another, and that its direct effects account for only a part of the difference in standards of living, I think it is possible to state that unequal exchange is the elementary transfer mechanism and that, as such, it enables the advanced countries to begin and regularly give new emphasis to that unevenness of development

that sets in motion all the other mechanisms of exploitation and fully explains the way that wealth is distributed. (1972: 265)

Continued prosperity in rich countries increases the speed of their overall economic development. This, according to Emmanuel, allows for additional raises in wages, while the narrowness of the internal market of poorer countries means that accumulation is retarded, allowing for unemployment increases and decline in wages. As this gap widens, the consequences of unequal exchange grow dire for those underdeveloped areas. Most importantly, Emmanuel attacks any notion of international working-class solidarity, claiming that any class struggle must be understood within the conflict between rich and poor countries and the central divide in world capitalism. He identifies workers in the advanced countries as the chief beneficiaries of unequal exchange and as no longer having a common interest with those in developing areas, whose continued exploitation provides for their high standard of living. Such loyalty to nation, according to Emmanuel, transcends class interests, and 'national integration has been made possible in the big industrial countries at the expense of the international disintegration of the proletariat'; he goes on to suggest that in the coming global revolution, workers in the West are likely to be on the wrong side (1972: 339–340).

At its core, Emmanuel's contribution can be viewed as a rejection of Ricardo's theory of comparative costs and international division of labour because of its assumption that capital was immobile and wages could be equalised in a full-employment economy. According to Emmanuel, the rate of profit was equalised because of the mobility of capital, thus contributing to Marx's Labour Theory of Value in its understanding that wages may not always be determined by biological factors, but must recognise the impact of sociological and factors as well. For example, Emmanuel highlights trade unionism as an essential factor in determining higher wages in developed countries. Consequentially, in developing countries the product of their labour will have lower value in international trade in comparison to the amount of labour in a developed country. Emmanuel contextualises imperialism as a means

of exploitation and inequality rather than political or military domination of one country over another. Such a view underlines an essential feature of imperialism, whether colonial or not, which is that it is mercantile in character. While this is not a direct intention of Emmanuel it does serve as a by-product of his analysis (Bernal 1980; Brewer 2012).

In terms of development, Emmanuel cites unequal exchange as a mechanism that permits relatively high wages in one country without a corresponding relative depression of profits. He argues that the 'organic composition of capital' occurs when capitalists try to minimise costs by substituting means of production for labour when wages are high. By exploiting the means of production produced in low-wage countries they can avoid price increases occurring from high-wage labour (Brewer 2012). The consequence for the highwage country is a reduction of employment in much the same way as that effected by substitution of lower-priced for higher-priced products, and a reduction in the attraction of capital to the production of non-traded goods in high-wage areas. Emmanuel argues that the cause of development and under-development is the transfer of value involved in international trade. There is a transfer of value from underdeveloped countries to developed countries which is sufficiently large to cause development in the recipient countries and underdevelopment in the countries from which value is drained. Simply put, relatively high wages preceded and are the cause of economic development, and low wages cause underdevelopment (Emmanuel 1972: 103). Emmanuel argues that once wage disparities exist, a 'cumulative' process of interaction between economic development and wage levels results. The mechanism which operationalises and sustains this process is unequal exchange, through which value is transferred from the underdeveloped countries, thus retarding accumulation, to the developed countries to fuel accumulation. Herein, 'the impoverishment of one country becomes an increasing function of the enrichment of another . . . super-profit from unequal exchange ensures a faster rate of growth' (Emmanuel 1972: 130).

Through the integration of 'unequal exchange and the theory of international value into the general theory of value' (1972: 266) Emmanuel demonstrates that exploitation of underdeveloped countries by developed countries takes place through international trade. Draining value from underdeveloped countries severely handicaps the ability to accumulate capital and therefore prevents economic development. Developed countries offer high wages, high organic composition of capital, continual technological improvement, and high productivity of labour. In contrast, developing countries have low wages, low organic composition of capital, a lack of technological improvement, and low productivity of labour. Such exploitation of developing countries through international trade was a product of manipulated exchange by mercantilist policies during colonialism before 1840. After 1870 unequal exchange continued under the guise of 'free trade' (Emmanuel 1972: 186–188).

Whereas raw materials and certain agricultural products have to be sought where they can be found, Emmanuel suggests that the movement of capital is not an increasing but a decreasing function of difference in incomes. Because of the limits to import-substituting industrialisation the advanced countries are too rich to be able to absorb all the new capital that is formed in them, and the underdeveloped countries are too poor to offer attractive investment prospects to this same capital, apart from their few import-substitution industries. All this, in turn, keeps them poor, or makes them even poorer. Imperialism is not self-destructive: it is self-reproducing (Emmanuel 1974). It is possible, despite these general deficiencies, for certain marginal movements of capital to enable a developing country to cross the threshold of development. Such examples would include the ability of an individual to rise out of their social or economic class. The prospects, however, for underdeveloped countries becoming developed are so slight that there is no danger of capitalists losing a workforce to operate the factories, and it is perfectly reasonable to believe that those countries in the periphery will continue to follow the same path. In a separate analysis, Stephen Hymer (1979) refers to the enormous 'latent

surplus-population' or reserve army of labour in both the backward areas of the developed economies and the underdeveloped countries, 'which could be broken down to form a constantly flowing surplus population to work at the bottom of the ladder'. Hymer reinforces Marx's understanding (1967) of the accumulation of capital as an increase of the proletariat. The vast 'external reserve army' in the Third World, supplementing the 'internal reserve army' within the developed capitalist countries, constituted the real material basis on which multinational capital was able to internationalise production – creating a continual movement of surplus population into the labour force, and weakening labour globally through a process of 'divide and rule' (Foster and McChesney 2012).

Consequently, Emmanuel concludes that in order for developing countries to push up wages at home and thus improve their trade position, they will have to resort to policies of economic diversification and protectionism rather than seeking to select and develop industries which have proved to be dynamic in the developed world. In recognising that no country can hope to improve its living standard without trade, Emmanuel argues that unequal exchange cannot be rectified simply by channelling additional funds into poor countries in the form of investment capital, foreign aid, expanded exports, or higher commodity prices. These funds must also be transformed by one means or another into an increase in the general wage level in the country. Herein he identifies 'a link between the variations in wages and those of development . . . based directly on the incentives to invest, on capital movements, and on the subsequent specialisation and techniques'. Thus it is not unequal exchange that determines development, but the very rise in wage itself (Emmanuel 1972: 54).

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Emphasis on the Individual Freedom

▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism

Empire

▶ Danish Colonialism

Empire and Imperialism in Education Since 1945: Secondary School History Textbooks

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Description

Modern imperialism not only heavily impacted many people's life across the globe during the era itself, it still exerts an important influence on the political, social, economic, and cultural domain of present-day societies worldwide. It might hence be obvious that representations of empire and modern imperialism are included in history textbooks for secondary education across the world. The question arises as to how these representations look like and how their outlook can be explained. This is what this contribution examines in history textbooks since 1945 in different countries in the world, both former colonizer and colonized countries, in an international comparative perspective. History textbooks are compared on their content, the perspective they take, the agency they attribute, their tone and judgment, the way they (do not) connect past and present to each other, the extent they relate to academic historiography, their representation of "the other", the identity construction they put forward, and the goals they aim for. That way, it is examined to what extent in this postcolonial world, the representation of modern imperialism is still colonial or has been decolonized.

Introduction

Since its establishment as an autonomous secondary school subject in the nineteenth century, history education has been attributed with different rival and even contrasting aims. In many countries, particularly throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, history education had to contribute to nation-building and social cohesion and to the fostering of a national identity (Berger and Lorenz 2010; Carretero 2011; Grindel 2017). A second main goal that was attributed to history education, particularly from the 1960s onwards, in substitution for the aforementioned goal, was the fostering of a transnational (sometimes even global) citizenship and critical democratic civic participation. This often led to the replacement of attempts to build a national identity by fostering a global identity, which in practice, however, came down to a Western and Eurocentric-oriented identity-building attempt (Arthur et al. 2001; Van Nieuwenhuyse and Wils 2015). Those two aims can be

considered as two sides of the same coin, as they both orient history education toward supporting certain identity construction processes and the transmission of values. A third aim for history education concerns a different coin, as it puts a disciplinary understanding to the fore, in educational terms called "historical thinking" (Wineburg 2001; Seixas and Morton 2013).

Those three divergent and competing aims hold many differences in approach of history education. The aims of "nation-building and social cohesion" and "democratic participation and civic behavior" do not only rely on academic historiographical representations of the past yet include social representations and historical myths within collective memory as well (Van Nieuwenhuyse and Wils 2012). Both clusters hence testify to the fostering of a rather naïve historical consciousness. The aim of "disciplinary understanding" by contrast relates much more solely to the academic discipline of history.

Despite the differences, however, some similarities can be discerned as well. All three aims, for instance, include the idea that a certain content needs to be taught to students and that historical knowledge and understanding need to be transferred. Each of them also connects past and present to each other, be it in differing ways: the first two in a rather naïve way, believing that the past can provide *exempla* for present-day behavior, and the third in a constructivist way, emphasizing that historical knowledge is always constructed in a present that exerts influence on the construction of historical representations. All three also aim to foster a certain historical consciousness, an awareness that past, present, and future are interconnected, on a societal level but on a personal level as well. Young people are situated in a continuum past-present-future; present-day society serves as the starting point for reflection on who they are and how they will act. In so doing, young people take the past into account and reflect for the future. The way in which they do so, nevertheless, differs significantly according to the pursued aim (Rüsen 2005).

Present-day society hence has an equally important place as the past in history education. In both studying the past and considering the present, one can rightfully observe that both past and present have been fundamentally influenced by empire and imperialism. Modern imperialism – by which is meant the colonial past from the mid-nineteenth century up to decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s – constitutes the object of study of this contribution. Modern imperialism had a huge and global impact on many people's life during the era itself. Even though almost all former colonies have meanwhile turned into postcolonial countries, and despite the fact that European youth seems to emphasize discontinuity between the imperial past and the global present (Licata et al. 2018), modern imperialism still exerts an important influence on the political, social, economic, and cultural domain of present-day societies worldwide. The looting and racketeering of natural resources in parts of Africa, the unequal power balance and relations between the global north and south, the shaping of collective identities, phenomena as (intercontinental) migration and multiculturalism, and the worldwide entanglement of countries, nations, social, ethno-cultural, and religious groups and individuals, as well as so many other phenomena, can be directly linked to the imperial past. Understanding modern imperialism is hence a crucial issue to be addressed in history education, in order to foster a historical consciousness among young people.

The question then arises as to how modern imperialism actually is understood by young people within societies in a postcolonial world. Is modern imperialism still understood in a colonial or rather in a postcolonial way? Has the understanding of modern imperialism been decolonized, meaning that a mindset arose enabling to exercise critical distance from a colonial and Eurocentric regime of truth of the West and the Rest (Hall 1992) and from binary oppositions between former colonizers and the once-colonized (Grindel 2017)? A related question is where young people come into contact with representations of modern imperialism. Where do they learn about it, in order to build an understanding of the phenomenon? Representations of the modern imperial past circulate in different areas. In popular historical culture, young people

encounter statues, museums, heritage sites, television documentaries, historical films, family stories, etc. related to the modern imperial past. Often, however, those carriers offer a rather dichotomous representation of the modern imperial past, attempt to contribute to specific identity constructions, and hence to not contribute to decolonizing young people's minds. In academia, the approach of the imperial past has fundamentally changed since the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of the so-called New Imperial History. It pays much more attention than before to transnational, intercultural, and non-Western perspectives in colonial history. New imperial historians no longer start from a nation-centered model but concentrate on links between metropolises and colonies, on reciprocal encounters and influences, on cultural and social interconnection, and on migration (Grindel 2017; Stanard 2018). A third area in which representations of modern imperial past are disseminated is secondary school history education. This is a very important one, as in many countries history is a compulsory school subject, meaning that young people certainly encounter colonial representations here. History education can be situated in between popular culture and academia, as research has extensively shown that secondary school history education draws on both in constructing historical representations.

It is not easy to study history education from an international comparative perspective, as its outlook is different throughout the globe. In some countries, history is an autonomous school subject, while in others it is combined with other disciplines in subjects such as social studies or *géohistoire*. Furthermore, the subject is not always composed of one general history course yet sometimes of different ones such as general history, world history, or East Asian history (in the case of South Korea, for instance, see Kang 2017). Also, history education serves various goals in different countries, has different curricula, and is attributed a different weight (in terms of hours/week). An entry to nevertheless conduct international comparative research on history education concerns the analysis of history textbooks, as around the world, history textbooks are published and used in history classrooms. Of course, textbooks cannot be considered as a literal reflection of concrete classroom practice – far from that, textbooks are complex media, hard to interpret – and represent only one element of teaching practices; nevertheless, they provide a valid insight in what happens in history classes worldwide and in how modern imperialism is represented and young people are exposed to it.

Research Question and Method

This contribution examines representations of empire and imperialism in secondary school history textbooks in different countries in the world, both former colonizer and colonized countries, in an international comparative perspective. The analysis will be done in a diachronic perspective, starting from the post-World War II era (1945). It focuses on representations of modern imperialism, meaning the colonial past from the mid-nineteenth century up to decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s. History textbooks will be compared on the content they offer with regard to modern imperialism, on the perspective they take, on the agency they attribute, on their tone and judgment, on the way they (do not) connect past and present to each other, on the extent they relate to academic historiography, on their representation of "the other," on the identity construction they put forward, and on the goals they try to achieve. That way, it can be examined to what extent in this postcolonial world the representation of modern imperialism is still colonial or has been decolonized and what possible explanations for the findings might be.

In so doing, this contribution draws on concepts and theories of different fields, such as New Imperial History (history discipline), us-them thinking and homogenization (social psychology), historical thinking including notions such as multiperspectivity and agency (history education research), collective memory and memory cultures (memory studies), and structures of thought, cultural framing, and categories of representation (postcolonial studies). From the field of the history of education, it takes into account

the notions of the grammar of schooling (describing the structures and rules that organize and regulate education, whose inherent inertia and resistance to change often hinder educational innovation, see Tyack and Tobin 1994; Roldán Vera 2018) and of educationalization (the process enacting young people's induction into socially desirable or societally required norms and values, see Depaepe 1998).

The international and diachronic analysis of textbooks leans on two types of sources. For a number of countries, such as Belgium, France, and England, history textbooks themselves have actually been analyzed. The second type of sources concerns secondary research literature particularly about representations of modern imperialism in history textbooks, such as special issues of three scientific journals the *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* [*International Textbook Research*] (Grindel 2008a), the *Journal of Education Media and Memory Studies* (Fuchs and Otto 2013), and the *International Society of History Didactics Yearbook* (Wojdon 2014); contributions in recently published handbooks on history education research, such as the *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education* (Carretero et al. 2017); and a recently published edited book entitled *The Colonial Past in History Textbooks: Historical and Social Psychological Perspectives* (Van Nieuwenhuyse and Pires Valentim 2018). The latter contains contributions not only on representations of modern imperialism in history textbooks from former (European) colonizer countries – the object of most studies in this field (Müller 2018) – yet also from former colonized countries. Ultimately, textbook representations from no less than 23 countries have been taken into account in the analysis: from Belgium, Chile, Cameroon, DR Congo, England, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malta, Mozambique, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United States, and Zimbabwe.

In what follows, history textbooks will first be interpreted as educational media, at the same time addressing the question how to consider their content. The next part consists of the actual international and diachronic comparative history textbook analysis and includes possible explanations. Findings will be discussed afterwards.

The Complex Nature of History Textbooks as Cultural, Commercial, and Pedagogical Artifacts

History textbooks constitute much more than pure didactic teaching aids. They are commonly considered as cultural artifacts, as concrete manifestations of the historical culture(s) in a society (Klerides 2010). The values and norms that a society (through its government) considers important and wants to propagate are also present in history textbooks, as they underlie them to an important extent. History textbooks hence provide cultural clues about the society in which they are made and in which they are used. Does this at the same time mean that history textbooks are to be considered a mirror of the mentality within a society and of the dominant popular historical (and political) culture? This is subject of great debate among textbook researchers. Roughly speaking, a distinction can be made between maximalists and minimalists (De Baets 2004; Vanhulle 2009). Maximalists consider textbooks to be representative of the mentality of society and an expression of the knowledge that society expects young people to master (Müller 2018). In their view, history textbooks are socialization instruments that propagate norms and values with which society legitimizes itself. For textbooks support the societal consensus on the past and thus help to guarantee the cultural continuity of society. Minimalists, on the other hand, do not deny the ideological backgrounds of textbooks but rather regard textbooks as a reflection of the perspectives, understandings, and opinions of their authors and publishers. They also refer to the requirements that accompany textbooks as commercial and pedagogical products (such as the use of short texts and speaking images, or not deviating too far from existing learning content) and the influence they exert on the production process of textbooks and their

content. This debate clearly shows that many (f) actors have an impact on the outlook and content of history textbooks.

Governments control textbooks, to a certain extent. This control can be exercised directly, through a system of official approval before permission of distribution. In other countries, where such system does not exist, control often takes place indirectly, via the issuing of curricular standards, delineating the objectives to be achieved by the students (Grindel 2017). If textbooks want to be successful as a commercial product, they must take these objectives into account. In that sense, (history) textbooks partly reflect – to a greater or lesser extent – the societal and political expectations as expressed in standards. Nevertheless, within one country, differences between textbooks are always to be observed, in terms of attention for different topics and of tone (critical, judgmental, neutral).

This immediately indicates that (teams of) *textbook authors* also have an impact on the historical representations in textbooks. These authors can be both teachers and academics. This finding can help explain why some textbooks lean more toward representations from popular historical culture, while others relate more to academic historiography. The time pressure that publishers impose on authors to prepare a new edition also plays a role. This pressure can bring about that textbook authors often rely to a considerate extent on previous versions of textbooks in preparing a new version and limit themselves to only few substantial changes. That way, textbook narratives form a relatively autonomous, stable, and fixed, not very changeable, vulgate, which develops independently of academic historiography (Tutiaux-Guillon 2006).

Besides authors of textbooks, *publishers of textbooks* also play a role. Not only the aforementioned time pressure that they impose on authors but also their commercial interests exert an influence on the historical representations in textbooks (Apple 1989). After all, a textbook is a commercial product that must be sold (Fuchs and Henne 2018). In the very competitive market of textbooks, with its often small profit margins, publishers hesitate to disseminate and sell textbooks that are too innovative and too different from what the customers (teachers and students) are used to and that contain too much controversial information. In that sense, publishers contribute to ensuring that textbooks closely reflect and reinforce the prevailing mentality and popular historical culture in society as well.

Since textbooks are intended for use in education, *pedagogical-didactical theories* also influence the editing of textbooks. "Traditional textbooks," as Klerides (2010) calls them, mainly situated in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, reflect the then dominant pedagogical model that considered education mainly in terms of the pure transfer of knowledge from experts to novices. This model strongly influenced the content and outlook of the textbooks. Textbooks till deep into the 1950s (and even 1960s) of the twentieth century consisted mainly of text. Visual and other source material was scarce. The texts were very "closed": they did not distinguish between past and history yet rather presented their representation of the past as "the historical truth," with no eye for suggesting alternative interpretations. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a paradigm shift took place in both pedagogical and historical science. Constructivism, the theory that places the student at the heart of the educational learning process, because he/she actively constructs knowledge, came to the fore. In historiography, the idea that historical knowledge is always constructed and that history is a construction and interpretation of the past gained importance (Donnelly and Norton 2011). Both evolutions influenced history textbooks. They underwent a process of didactization, meaning that source material was included in textbooks, in order to allow students to actively construct knowledge. Here and there, divergent, sometimes conflicting historical interpretations by historians, received attention in history textbooks.

In addition, history textbooks show a number of typical genre characteristics. They approach the past in a very abstract, structural, and social sciences way, through which they aim to identify broad and underlying patterns in the past. In so doing, they have little eye for the concrete human

being of flesh and blood or for microhistory. Moreover, common people are often not attributed much agency (Wilke et al. 2018). The ability to act actively and take decisions, to bring about change in the past (agency), is almost exclusively attributed to large, nonhuman actors, such as "the government," states, or powerful groups ("the army"). Such an approach also involves a very specific use of language. The language in textbooks is often very abstract and terse and avoids words that bring in doubt or irony and thus the existence of different historical interpretations. At the same time, the narrative of textbooks is very concise, connected with a formal template, in which each theme is assigned only a limited number of words.

Content and outlook of history textbooks are therefore not self-evident to analyze. They are influenced by many and diverse factors and also evolve over time (Christophe et al. 2018). The latter aspect makes any analysis even more difficult, since new generations of textbooks always rely on previous ones. Textbooks as cultural artifacts can therefore be considered as a palimpsest (Christophe and Schwedes 2015). Traces of different underlying narrative templates, different traditions, and different underlying norms and values can be found in one and the same text. This immediately makes it clear that textbooks always only reflect to a particular extent the prevailing mentality and popular historical culture of a certain time.

Comparative Analysis of Textbook Accounts Since 1945 on Empire and Modern Imperialism

The accounts on empire and modern imperialism in history textbooks worldwide since 1945 differ significantly in time and in space. In what follows, first the representations in textbooks since the end of the Second World War until decolonization (occurring from 1945 until mainly the 1970s) are examined; second, the influence of the decolonization on the textbook accounts; and third the current accounts in history textbooks.

History Textbook Accounts Since the World War II Until Decolonization

In history textbooks across European countries that possessed colonies, a lot of attention was paid to empire and modern imperialism. The same applied to the history textbooks used in the colonies. The colonizers had the monopoly on education there and imported European textbooks written by Europeans to be used in the colonial school system (Bentrovato and Van Nieuwenhuyse 2019). The textbooks of the various countries in first instance especially addressed the own empire and did so within the chapters on the national history (Grindel 2017; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2014). Besides, in separate chapters, they also included an account of modern imperialism in general and paid attention to the situation across Africa, Asia, and Oceania, as well as to both European and non-European (such as the United States, Japan, and Russia) colonizers. Those accounts were very extensive, yet "closed": they only offered one representation of the imperial past and presented that as "the historical truth."

Modern imperialism was almost exclusively framed in national terms and hence looked at through a nation-state lens (Grindel 2017; Müller 2018). Other perspectives, such as a pan-European, gender, or social class perspective, were not presented. The "own" empire and modern imperial endeavor were always perceived in a positive way and depicted as a *mission civilisatrice* (Müller 2018). Textbook authors emphasized that the own nation-state brought education, medical care, abolition of slavery, infrastructure, etc. to the territories it colonized (e.g., Haydn 2014). The violence and racism inherently accompanying modern imperialism were almost completely ignored (e.g., Pires Valentim and Miguel 2018). It is interesting to note that on the other hand, history textbooks across Europe were sometimes rather critical for other European colonizers. Belgian textbooks, for instance, stressed that Europeans (particularly the British, French, Spaniards, and Portuguese) brought order in indigenous territories as well as prosperity and development yet on the other hand imposed an authoritarian white rule and exploited the colonized territories (Van Nieuwenhuyse 2018). British textbooks then criticized the

exploitation of indigenous people in the Congo Free State under the rule of Belgian king Leopold II (MacKenzie 1985).

The accounts of the own imperial past (and present) that were very positive, even triumphalist, served the fostering of a national identity. Textbook authors took national pride from their own nation, from a homogenized "us" (the national "in-group") bringing civilization to a homogenized "them," the uncivilized, backward, primitive indigenous peoples, who constituted the "other" or the "out-group." That way, modern imperialism was "constitutive of the self-characterization of the nation" (Müller 2018, p. 284). It was presented in very dichotomous terms, and very simplistic identity markers were used to foster a national identity (Grindel 2013, 2017; Müller 2018).

In so doing, history textbooks across colonizer countries reinforced the "stereotypical dualism" (Hulme 1986) of a civilized West versus an inferior and backward rest of the world. They confirmed the (since the seventeenth century) long-existing "regime of truth" of "the West and the Rest" (Hall 1992, p. 205), in which "the West" refers to a developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern society and provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies can be judged upon and ranked. Those criteria concern simplifying dichotomies (developed versus underdeveloped, modern versus backward, civilized versus uncivilized, etc.). This idea of "the West and the Rest" privileged a view as if the West walked a distinctive path into modernity, "excluding non-European trajectories" (Grindel 2017, p. 260). Europe's and the Western World's slow but steady rise toward democracy and freedom was set as the standard to judge other societies upon.

Textbook authors considered the modernity of the own nation as the driving force behind the nation's imperial enterprise and at the same time the modernization of indigenous territories as the outcome of the colonial expansion (Grindel 2017). Taking this perspective, they ascribed agency solely to the colonizers: white Europeans seemed to be the only agents in the modern imperial endeavor. The indigenous, colonized peoples were represented as nothing but passive objects.

That is, at least, if they were mentioned at all. For not only was the pre-colonial past of indigenous peoples almost completely ignored yet often were the territories that had been colonized described as "virgin lands" without any political and social organization. While for Asian societies the existence of a pre-colonial culture was acknowledged, particularly sub-Saharan Africa was represented as *terra nullius*, as if African territories were "uninhabited lands, rich in natural resources, waiting to be occupied and exploited without resistance" (Brescó de Luna 2018, p. 85; also see Macgilchrist and Müller 2012; Pires Valentim and Miguel 2018; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2014, 2018).

The triumphalist, ethnocentric, nationally oriented, and oversimplified history textbook accounts from the 1940s to 1950s reflected the state of the art in both popular historical culture and contemporary academic historiography. Here as well, the angle through which modern imperialism was approached was a national perspective. Furthermore, academic historians also lauded modern imperialism as a *mission civilisatrice* and made use of binary oppositions in their narratives in terms of modernity versus tradition, civilization versus a savage existence, or Europe versus the Orient and Africa.

History Textbook Accounts in the Era of Decolonization

Decolonization brought about a – gradual, not abrupt – shift in textbook accounts around the globe. The process of decolonization appeared on different moments in time. In 1946, the Philippines gained independence from the United States and India in 1947 from Great Britain. Many French colonies gained their independence throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960, just as Somalia from Italy. Several colonies of Portugal gained independence after the Carnation Revolution in 1974. Even though the timing differed, decolonization nevertheless caused similar evolutions in history textbook accounts on empire and modern imperialism.

In *European and American history textbooks*, it is first of all notable that the attention for modern imperialism, both in general and with regard to the

own colonial enterprise, decreased, once the own colonies gained independence. Furthermore, the textbook accounts limited themselves more and more to a description and analysis of what happened in Asia and in Africa and to European states as imperial agents. Imperialism in Oceania, and the United States, Japan, and Russia as agents of imperialism, was increasingly ignored. The nation-state lens to look at modern imperialism, which was common during the imperial period itself, kept prevailing in many American and European history textbook accounts after the decolonization of the "own" colonies (e.g., Carretero et al. 2002; Grindel 2017). The attention paid to the "own" national imperial enterprise nevertheless decreased. Sometimes, even a true amnesia for the own modern imperial past occurred, as was the case in Belgian history textbooks, especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Van Nieuwenhuyse 2014). They started to ignore to a large extent the Belgian-Congolese colonial past.

The tone in which modern imperialism was addressed in most European and American history textbooks became somewhat more critical after the decolonization of the "own" colonies. Although they continued to present imperialism as a *mission civilisatrice*, history textbooks nevertheless launched debates about whether empire was a force of good or bad and started to pay more attention to colonial violence and at the same time to colonial resistance (e.g., Haydn 2014; Jackson 2018). This means they started to attribute – to a limited extent only – to the indigenous peoples. Textbooks also showed an increasing awareness of racism accompanying the imperial enterprise or resulting from it (Haydn 2014). Some textbook authors connected the imperial past and the present to each other. They established a link between the poor state in which the former colonies were in as well as the existence of a "Third World" on the one hand and the preceding modern imperial past on the other (e.g., Kokkinos et al. 2014). Other authors, however, did not make a connection between the imperial past and the contemporary state of the (third) world and passed the responsibility for the bad state of the former colonies solely onto the new independent states themselves (Van Nieuwenhuyse 2015). In general, the critical

tone of European and American history textbooks with regard to modern imperialism should not be exaggerated. Although some bad sides of imperialism were somewhat mentioned, the overall judgment of the imperial enterprise remained positive.

Textbooks also kept addressing the "own" imperial past in a less critical way than modern imperialism in general. This is very obvious in, for instance, Russian, Portuguese, and Belgian history textbooks (Khodnev 2014; Pires Valentim and Miguel 2018; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2014). At the same time, however, in the first of two decades after decolonization, textbooks in many countries made less efforts to foster a national identity via their account of empire and modern imperialism. As a result of, among others, the diminishing attention for modern imperialism altogether in the whole of the textbook account; the call for a more global approach of history in history education in the 1960s and 1970s; the introduction of a more structural, social sciences approach of history education in that same period; and the troubled course of the decolonization process in several countries, textbook authors started to address the imperial past in a more distant and neutral way. Although in words a global identity was adhered to, in reality, a Western and Eurocentric rather than a national identity-building attempt came to the fore. This did not really contribute to decolonizing students' minds.

Also, this evolution from a national to a Western identity construction underpinning the textbook accounts was not always continued. In Britain and France, for instance, in the 1980s and following decades, fierce debates took place about the extent to which the own empire was a force of good or evil and whether it should be taught about in a critical or a pride-stirring way. Conservative, right-wing voices required that history education in general, and the accounts on empire in particular, would approach the own nation in a positive way and instill national pride. Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State for Education in Thatcher's first administration and considered to be the architect of the first version of the National Curriculum (introduced in 1991), argued that "pupils should be taught about the spread of

Britain's influence for good throughout the empire in the 18th and 19th centuries. . . These things are matters in which we should take great pride" (cited from a speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 1998, in Haydn 2014, p. 27). More patriotic forms of school history celebrating Britishness and British values were adopted since in English history education (Grindel 2013; Haydn 2014).

When comparing the American and European history textbook accounts for secondary education on empire and modern imperialism with the state of the art in academic historiography, it can be found that from the 1960s to 1970s onwards, a divergence commenced, with textbooks substantially departing from an academic historiography beginning to distance itself from the triumphalist discourse and to critique imperialism. The novel perspectives arising from the New Imperial History international research tradition since the 1980s, such as transnational, gender, and social class perspectives, and the constructed nature of historical knowledge of the imperial past were not adopted by most history textbook authors, who kept looking at empire through a nation-state and a quasi-exclusive Western lens (see Grindel 2012, 2013; 2017; Müller 2018; several contributions in Van Nieuwenhuyse and Pires Valentim 2018). This can be related to processes of educationalization, as many governments or other agents responsible for education were convinced that history curricula and textbooks should not introduce students to the most recent state of historiography but should rather foster national pride. Coinciding with a growing globalization trend and increasing intercontinental migration flows since the decolonization wave of the 1960s, such a view gained strength. Other reasons for the widening gulf between secondary school history textbooks and academic historiography might be found in the fact that textbook writing was passed on much more into the hands of history teachers rather than of academics and – illustrating the abovementioned notion of "grammar of schooling" – in the fact that textbook authors often relied on previous editions of their textbooks while writing new ones and only confined themselves to slight changes, rather than making significant changes. Textbook representations hence rather clung to representations of imperialism in popular historical culture within society at large than to historiography.

In the former colonies, it often took some years before the new independent states succeeded in establishing own national curricula for history education and, based on these, history textbooks. When analyzing the *history textbooks from former colonies* in the decades after their independence, a number of common characteristics come very obviously to the fore (see e.g. Bentrovato 2018; Bentrovato and Van Nieuwenhuyse 2019; Cabecinhas et al. 2018). First, these textbooks put a lot of emphasis on the own history and in many cases by extension on the region they belong to. Many African history textbooks, for instance, testified to a pan-African perspective. Second, they paid a lot of attention to the precolonial history of their country or broader region. Third, the textbooks focused on colonial violence and accompanying resistance. In so doing, fourth, they testified to a very dichotomous approach of empire and modern imperialism, in terms not only of violence versus resistance yet also of good versus evil, homogenized colonizers versus colonized (without attention for in-between stances), and a presumed (and often illusory) national "us" versus Western "them." Arising from this, fifth, was a very morally oriented rather than analytical approach of the past, being very critical for the West. Sixth, in all the history textbooks from former colonies, a clear and explicit connection was made between the contemporary situation of the country (and broader region) and the preceding imperial past, thereby again pointing at the preponderant responsibility of the West for the often difficult contemporary situation of its former colonies.

Current History Textbooks from Around the Globe

Empire and modern imperialism are systematically present in current history textbooks worldwide, also in states which never colonized others, such as Switzerland (Minder 2011). No history textbook series for secondary education exist that simply ignore those issues. The reach of

imperialism is often shown via maps, on which all colonizers and colonized areas are specified. In the written accounts, however, the focus is particularly on Africa and Asia, leaving Oceania as colonized area and the United States, Japan, and Russia largely out of the picture (apart from these countries themselves of course; see Cave 2013; Khodnev 2014). The "own" imperial past, in those countries having been either colonizer or colonized, still receives the bulk of attention. It is, however, much more than before located in a regional and global context (Fuchs and Henne 2018; Schissler and Soysal 2005). The "own" national imperial past, in other words, is often not addressed in a separate way anymore in chapters on the national past yet regionally or globally contextualized.

Compared with the 1940s and 1950s, the amount of attention paid to modern imperialism decreased in most history textbooks in Western countries (e.g., Cave 2013; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2014). In former colonies, by contrast, the attention remains high, both in Asian and in African countries. Another difference that can be noted is that Western history textbooks continue to mention Africa (and to a lesser extent Asia) only in relation to the West, when discussing imperialism. Furthermore, the representation of particularly Africa as "virgin land" or as *terra nullius* continues to exist (Abadia and Collins 2018; Brescó de Luna 2018; Gorbahn 2014; Marmer et al. 2010; Pires Valentim and Miguel 2018; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2018). This is also visible on maps: those areas not having been colonized at a certain time are simply left blank (literally, as white spots) without any explanation in the accompanying legend. History textbooks within former colonies on the other hand address to a large extent the pre-colonial past of their own area and emphasize the enormous disruption modern imperialism caused (Müller 2018).

In almost all countries worldwide, a nation-state lens to look at modern imperialism continues to prevail or even gains strength again, as is the case in, for instance, Britain, France, and Portugal (e.g., Abadia and Collins 2018; Azzopardi and Buttigieg 2018; Grindel 2017; Otto 2018; Pires Valentim and Miguel 2018). History textbooks in

Europe do, for instance, still not discuss imperialism as a European project but continue to address it predominantly from a nation-state standpoint (Grindel 2008b; Müller 2018). The nation-state perspective is often closely connected to goals of nation-building and a national identity construction. Furthermore, it is accompanied by an underlying ethnocentric approach of the past. In Europe and the West, it concerns a Eurocentric approach and in Africa a pan-African approach (Gorbahn 2014; Holmén 2011), hence continuing to support a very simplistic and dichotomous identity-building process, in terms of homogenized us-them thinking (see, e.g., Abadia and Collins 2018; Pires Valentim and Miguel 2018). Two notable exceptions where the nation-state does not serve as a lens to look at modern imperialism, yet nevertheless with the aim to support a national identity, are Spain and Chile. In Spanish textbooks, the own modern imperial past is not paid much attention to and is dealt with rather critically, contrary to the premodern imperial past, which is addressed much more extensively and in laudatory and even triumphalist terms (Brescó de Luna 2018). In Chile, having been colonized in premodern time but being a colonizer country itself during the era of modern imperialism, history textbooks focus mainly on the different European colonial powers and the Western world. The "own" imperial past and particularly the conquest and occupation of the Araucanía territories where the Mapuche people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the Chilean state are completely silenced (Figueiredo and Gazmuri 2018). For Chile does not acknowledge this as a form of imperialism yet called the occupation of the Araucanía territories an act of "pacification." Only in 2017, Chilean president Michelle Bachelet formally apologized for the historical injustice done by the Chilean state toward the Mapuche. To what extent this will influence future history textbook accounts is unclear at the moment.

The tone in which empire and modern imperialism is addressed in Western history textbooks has become more than before rather neutral, as a consequence of the textbook accounts taking a more structural and social

sciences approach (e.g., Brescó de Luna 2018; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2018). Causes for and consequences of modern imperialism as well as different kinds of imperial systems are described in a somewhat distant way. At the same time, critical noises reverberate, as the violence accompanying the imperial enterprise is addressed in the accounts (without, however, being emphasized very much) and even debated (Cave 2002; de Michele 2011; Grindel 2017; Lantheaume 2013; Müller 2018; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2015, 2018). The finding nevertheless remains that in many textbooks, the "own" modern imperial past is addressed in a less critical way than that of other former colonizers (e.g., Haydn 2014; Khodnev 2014); in Flemish-Belgian textbooks, particularly the remote imperial past is critically dealt with the more recent past far less (Van Nieuwenhuyse 2015). Some textbooks start to include multiple perspectives in their account of the imperial past and, in so doing, to acknowledge the constructed nature of historical knowledge, hence – very carefully though – starting to foster young people's historical thinking and a critical historical consciousness. In the history textbooks from former colonies, the tone is much more morally judging and condemning (Bentrovato and Rath 2018; Gorbahn 2014). Imperialism is strongly convicted, and violence is explicitly acknowledged as a constituent part of modern imperialism. At the same time, these history textbooks also use rather heroic terms while emphasizing the indigenous peoples' colonial resistance.

This also means that current history textbooks in former colonies attribute a lot of agency to indigenous peoples (Bentrovato 2018; Cabecinhas et al. 2018; Müller 2018). The role of local population resisting the colonizers often gets the most attention. In Western history textbooks, by contrast, it is still the (homogenized) colonizer who is the most important agent. Indigenous peoples in the colonies, equally homogenized, are only sparsely attributed agency. Bentrovato and Rath (2018), for instance, clearly demonstrate this with regard to the representation of the First World War in European and African

textbooks. They come to the conclusion that only few European textbooks include portrayals of Africa's and Africans' active participation in the Great War, while African textbooks include much more depictions of active Africa's and African involvement.

History textbooks from former colonies also pay explicit attention to the continued effect of modern imperialism on the present-day world. They strongly connect past and present to each other, and emphasize that the difficult circumstances the former colonies often find themselves in are the consequence of the imperial past and are hence the responsibility of the Western former colonizers, are the consequence of imperialism and hence the responsibility of the Western former colonizers (Bentrovato 2018; Cabecinhas et al. 2018). In Western history textbooks, this continued effect is not always present in the accounts, even though the tone with regard to modern imperialism as such became more critical. Some textbooks indeed acknowledge the connection between modern imperialism on the one hand and racism, feelings of superiority, Third World problems, and the existence of a North-South divide on the other hand (Grindel 2017; Otto 2018; Raudsepp and Veski 2016). Others, however, ignore or silence this connection, as is, for instance, the case in all but two current Belgian history textbooks (Van Nieuwenhuyse 2015). In that sense, also taking into account the various degrees to which a national identity is supported and multiperspectivity is included, it can be stated that history textbooks worldwide only to limited extent instigate a critical historical consciousness and contribute to the decolonization of young people's minds.

The latter finding can be closely connected to another finding by one, namely, that history textbook authors worldwide seem to not really or only to a limited extent connect with the current state of academic historiography on empire and the imperial past (e.g., Abadia and Collins 2018; Cajani 2013, 2018; Khodnev 2014; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2018). For New Imperial Historians precisely draw attention to multiple entanglements between colonizers and colonized, thus transcending a nation-state perspective, illuminating the

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transnational and intercultural dimensions of colonial history, and emphasizing the interpretive nature of history (Stanard 2018). Several reasons can be found to explain this gulf between secondary school history textbooks and academic historiography. The notion of "grammar of schooling" helps to explain that both publishing houses and textbook authors are reluctant to change too much in new history textbook versions, as customers (teachers and students) are presumed not to like too much change. As a result, both recent historiographical and educational insights do not or only very slowly trickle through school history textbooks. Besides, the notion of "educationalization" helps to understand that school history and academic historiography serve different goals. While academic historiography seeks to connect to the current state of affairs and in the research field and to expand historical knowledge, secondary school history education is primarily oriented toward the personal, social, and intellectual development of young people. The school subject is expected to induce young people into socially desirable or societally required norms and values and to support them in coming to a private understanding of the past, enabling to either urge upon them a certain identity or support them to develop their own identities (Husbands 1996).

Conclusion and Discussion

When looking in general at the history textbook accounts on empire and modern imperialism worldwide since 1945, it is striking to see that a number of characteristics remained the same throughout the past seven decades. All textbooks contain basically rather simplified than complex and nuanced historical narratives of the modern imperial past. They all start from a nation-state perspective and, in so doing, largely ignore other perspectives such as transnational, gender, or social class perspectives. This finding closely relates to the agency textbook authors attribute. This is done in very simplistic ways, not only with regard to the acknowledgment and amount of agency attributed but also with regard to the

homogenization of agents. Textbook authors often offer very stereotypical and binary representations of the parties involved in modern imperialism, namely, colonizers versus colonized and Western versus indigenous peoples. More in general, textbook accounts are riddled with "stereotypical dualism" and simplistic dichotomies between good and evil, right and wrong, and us and them, "which in many ways remains 'colonial knowledge' instead of 'postcolonial knowledge'" (Grindel 2017, p. 265). These accounts fail to facilitate complex, multiperspectivist and nuanced understandings. The complexity of the whole phenomenon of modern imperialism, the very existence and consequences of the entanglement that occurred throughout the imperial past, and the very mixed and various positions people involved in the imperial enterprise took are to a large extent silenced in the history textbooks. In so doing, history textbooks clearly do not truly connect to recent academic historiography written by New Imperial Historians.

When evaluating the history textbook accounts on empire and modern imperialism in the light of the main goals attributed to history education as discussed in the introduction, it is obvious that in many countries, the textbook accounts primarily (still) serve the aims of nation-building, reinforcing social cohesion and fostering a (homogeneous) national identity. Deconstructing identity construction processes or supporting an open and global identity-building, as well as fostering a global and critical citizenship or historical thinking, including taking into account multiple perspectives, is far less pursued. This is an important finding, as previous research has shown that the approach history education in general and many history textbooks in specific take has important consequences on young people's historical thinking and worldviews, in terms of a narrow-minded and colonial instead of postcolonial understanding of the past and an ethnocentric stance toward intergroup relations (e.g., Licata et al. 2018; Marmer et al. 2010; Van Nieuwenhuyse 2019). History education and textbooks hence still have a long way to go in bringing young people to a true postcolonial understanding of the modern imperial past in this post-colonial present.

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Empire Education

▶ Brexit and the End of Empire

Empire of Capital

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Empire-Building

▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism

Endless Global War

Enlightenment

Enslaved African Labour: Violent Racial Capitalism

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Synonyms

African enslavement; Manufacturing; Mode of exploitation; Primitive accumulation; Racial capitalism; Slavery

Definition

This entry reconsiders the relation between early colonial capitalism and European enslavement of Africans. The paper addresses two standard Marxist readings: the first positions slavery as part of the primitive accumulation of capital; the second reading sees capitalism as exclusively the exploitation of "free" wage labour. In contrast, this article argues colonial plantation slavery as a mode of exploitation within mercantile capitalism. This approach extends Marx's value theory to include slavery as a racialized mode of labour exploitation, an early phase of colonial capitalism with its own especially oppressive characteristics, and an early form of racial capitalism. The violent working to death of enslaved Africans on the sugar plantation was a matter of calculation by the slave owner, weighing value produced against the costs of purchase and maintenance. Moreover the cost of slave purchase relied on the supply of Africans seized from their home continent. This approach suggests continuities as well as changes from colonial forms of sugar plantation slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean into the "second slavery" of the nineteenth century, epitomized by cotton plantations in the US South.

Introduction

Even though not based on wage labour, in what sense did slavery and other forms of coerced labour in the colonies nonetheless constitute an early form of capitalist production? This paper considers African enslavement in the Americas as an instance of the general condition of labour in the colonized world and reflects on what this means for the closely related debates on the birth of capitalism and the nature of the capital-labour relation in categorical-theoretical terms. It provides an interpretation that sees capitalism's slavery as a racialized mode of exploitation, a parallel form to manufacture which was the prevalent form of the labour process of emergent capitalism in Europe. The plantation was an early form of specifically capitalist enterprise, in that the enslaved African's labour power was purchased in order to create surplus-value through the production of commodities, in a process that relied on the continual European looting of other continents to provide that labour power. The article connects with related literature on "racial capitalism" and the "second slavery." Not only was this "first slavery" strongly linked with merchants and banking capital through circulation, but there were aspects of the production process that were identifiably capitalist. The interpretation offered here views the plantation as a division of labour similar to manufacture, with violence as a lever of production.

In what follows, Sects. II, III, IV, and V survey and critique various aspects of Marx's *Capital* insofar as colonized labour is concerned; so equipped, Sects. VI and VII consider the origins and theorization of the colonial plantation slavery; and Sect. VIII offers concluding remarks.

Surplus-Value as an Entry Point to the Problematic

The study of the capitalist mode of production has many entry points, and they need not coincide with a genealogy of its historical origins. Marx in *Capital* Vol. 1 gives us at least four entry points to the capitalist mode of production. The first is to begin at the beginning, the analysis of the simplest value-form as the commodity and then money in Part 1, Chapters 1–3. There is a well-rehearsed debate over the role of the logical and the historical in this difficult opening, especially on the issue of simple commodity production. Did simple commodity production exist as a historical stage, or is it simply a layer of abstraction, the simple commodity *form*, within the developed capitalist mode of production that is already present? The weight of argument has tilted against Engels' historical stage view. Yet Marx's unfolding of the concepts through a series of determinations leaves a major problem at the end of the beginning, Part 2 on the transformation of money into capital. The movement is from the simple commodity form of exchange that starts with one commodity that is sold and ends with another that is purchased, with money as the intermediary, as expressed by the notation C-M-C; to the capitalist form of exchange that starts with money and ends up with more money through the purchase and sale of a commodity as the intermediary, as expressed by the notation M-C-M′, where M′ is greater than M. The derivation of value that starts from the commodity ends with a flip in the sequence of exchanges, transitioning from the simple commodity form of value to money capital as value, a flip that appears to be just formal but in historical terms is immense. The significance of Marx's chosen opening is that it proves the necessity of surplus-value as the essential internal mainspring of the capitalist mode of production, independent of any particular form. Surplus-value is both the means by which money capital expands itself and the product of a social relation of exploitation of labour power that has been purchased as a commodity.

Contrast this with the second beginning which Marx puts toward the end of Vol. 1, in Part 8; where he picks out the main elements of a broad historical narrative from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century and beyond under the heading the so-called primitive accumulation, so-called because Marx disagrees with the legend of Adam Smith that this was in any way a benign process and emphasizes the violence involved in the birth of the capitalist mode of production. Magdoff (2013) rightly suggests that Marx's meaning in the original German is better translated as "primary accumulation" or, suggesting a theoretical content that is distinct again, "original accumulation," to emphasize this was the original accumulation *of capital*. The last chapters of Vol. 1 are written in the historical narrative mode, synthesizing the genesis of capitalism. Marx here resists classical political economy's universalistic paradigm on the grounds of history, by insisting on the historical and hence transitory nature of capitalism as a mode of production that came into being and will be superseded, whose fetters must and will be cast asunder. Marx provides here a clarion call and a suggestive outline, but not yet a full history.

Sandwiched between the above two starting points, the logical and the historical, there is a third, which is more internal and starts from the production of surplus-value, which takes shape in the sequence in the middle parts of *Capital* Vol. 1. According to Marx's headings, Parts 3 and 4 are about first absolute surplus-value and then relative surplus-value. These are explained succinctly as:

> The production of absolute surplus-value turns exclusively on the length of the working day, whereas the production of relative surplus-value completely revolutionizes the technical processes of labour and the groupings into which society is divided. (Marx 1976, p. 645)

While Marx's focus is on conceptual development, Parts 3 and 4 relay a transition narrative *within* the capitalist mode of production. This order of exposition has led many Marxists to believe that absolute surplus-value came before relative surplus-value in a linear fashion, and there are indeed textual grounds from Marx himself for this reading. Marx's apparently linear presentation brings to the fore the turn that took place

in England around 1850 from "machinofacture" to "Modern Industry," an important point of inflection in its own right and certainly the dominant economic change in Marx's adult lifetime.

Marx of course presents a complex argument that through the power of abstraction begins to approximate to the multifaceted complexity of his subject. The notion of simple sequence from absolute surplus-value to relative surplus-value has a counterpoint that punctuates the linear narrative interpretation at three points. Firstly, Chapters 7–9 which, despite falling under the heading "The Production of Absolute Surplus-Value" are rather an introduction to the concept of surplus-value *as such*, in outline prior to its breakdown into particularities. The second disruption to the sequential narrative, that first came absolute surplus-value and then came relative surplus-value, occurs in Chapter 13 on Cooperation, where it is explained that both absolute and relative surplus-value arose together in the form of the labour process that Marx terms "manufacture," a collective workshop production but with a division of labour under the command of a capitalist owner-manager. The manufacturing capitalist increases relative surplus-value by taking advantage of cooperative labour, by reorganizing the labour process to increase output. The idea of historical sequence is thirdly countered in Part 5, Chapter 16 where Marx considers absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value interacting dialectically in various combinations with labour intensity; all three must be present.

Even as Marx isolates one aspect of surplus-value and then another, we have highlighted here the totality that is present as an undercurrent. All labour processes in whatever mode of production entail both duration of labour effort and a degree of labour productivity; there cannot be one without the other. Beyond this, Marx points out the necessary connection between labour duration and productivity within the capitalist mode of production (1976, p. 646), labour exploited by capital must be sufficiently productive to create more commodities than the equivalent required for the labourers own consumption, and at the same time, the surplus labour, and from

that surplus-value, can be increased by extending the working day.

There is a fourth angle on the emergence of capitalism in Vol. 1, another underlying theme, which is the idea of capital subsuming the labour process. Subsumption is introduced in Chapter 16 and developed in the appendix *Results* (1976, pp. 949–1066). Marx looks at the social forms of labour before capitalist production and their transition through a conceptual lens that distinguishes between the "formal subsumption" and "real subsumption" of labour to capital, which he connects to absolute and relative surplus-value, respectively. In formal subsumption capital lays hold of the labour process without yet changing its material technical foundation, whereas in real subsumption, the labour process is restructured, recast, and revolutionized.

Summing up this section, capital can increase its surplus-value by applying the lever on absolute surplus-value or relative surplus-value, but these categories should not be reified; both must be present as co-determining dimensions of surplus-value.

Marx on Wakefield and the Theory of Colonization

So far we have considered Marx's presentation of surplus-value as an interaction of theory and history. Now we question the fullness of Marx's articulation from the perspective of *social geography*, and here we identify gaps in Marx's theory of surplus-value.

The violent colonial phenomena Marx highlights in Vol. 1, Part 8, and that he recognizes in several other places, are nonetheless not brought into sustained theoretical focus in *Capital*. There are many scattered insights into plantation slavery but not a substantive analysis of it. The slave plantation needs to receive a parallel theoretical treatment in terms of its specific social relations of commodity production as did domestic manufacturing production in Parts 3, 4, and 5. If we are to reach a more inclusive theoretical account of the capitalist mode of production in Marx's own time, this analysis is required, as are

plantation slavery's colonial trade and finance relations with the parallel development of industry in the colonial centers.

Let us now consider how far the colonial dimension comes into Marx's theory of capitalist exploitation. To unravel the tangle of knots that awaits, we pick up a thread that begins at the end, or at least at an apparent ending, which is the final chapter of *Capital* Vol. 1. In this chapter Marx discusses "the modern theory of colonization" put forward in his day by E. G. Wakefield writing about Western Australia. The subject of Wakefield's concern is not colonized labour, the aboriginal first nations; indeed for him the colonized people are invisible. The problem that Wakefield addresses is the procurement of white settler labour. The subject is colonies settled by Europeans, as Marx makes clear "we are dealing here with true colonies, i.e. virgin soil colonized by free immigrants" (1976, p. 931).

Wakefield's preoccupation is how to draw surplus labour from the influx of white colonizers in a capitalist fashion. For capitalism to flourish in Australia, the mass of white colonizers must be prevented by the state from settling on the newly taken land, for if they are allowed to do so, they would prefer working on their "own" plot rather than labouring for a capitalist (assumed to be another class of white settler). Here the reproduction of capitalist social relations appears as a policy choice that the English colonial state in Australia should create one type of regime rather than another if it is to oversee the continuing accumulation of capital. Wakefield recommends a prohibitive land policy to ensure the reproduction in a colonial setting of capitalist social relations that the state set an artificial high price on land because if immigrants were to have free access to that land, they would set up a small farm and not volunteer as workers, and they would produce for themselves and not for capital, so the question for Wakefield becomes free land or free labour? His answer is that white immigrants must be prevented from settling on the land.

Marx turns this discussion of colonial policy into a matter of essence; he says that in Wakefield the truth of the capital labour relation is revealed. More pertinently, Marx says the essence of the capital labour relation at home *in England* is revealed by Wakefield's discussion:

> It is the great merit of E.G. Wakefield to have discovered, not anything new *about* the colonies, but, *in* the colonies, the truth about capitalist relations in the mother country. (1976, p. 932)

For Marx that truth is the separation of the immediate producer from the means of production as the presupposition of the capitalist mode of production. Marx leaves this as the capstone on the analysis already presented in the previous six chapters. But something new did need to be said about the colonies.

As we have noted, the historical mode of Part 8 contrasts to the dialectic of system-logic unfolding from the commodity which is the presentation form Marx takes in the opening parts of Vol. 1. The end chapter of *Capital* Vol. 1 is not a neat and symmetrical response to the book's opening; rather than a conclusion, it is more an alternative opening that poses new questions. Some of these are partially answered in the draft materials assembled as Vol. 3 of *Capital* that Marx had already worked on but were destined not to be published until 1894, under Engel's editorship, more than a decade after Marx's death and nearly 30 years after the first edition of Vol. 1. The way Marx puts the problem of white immigrant labour in the colony in Chapter 33, shows he anticipates answers already prepared for Vol. 3. Of these the most elaborated but difficult is his surplus profit theory of rent, how capitalism works in agriculture and associated sectors of operation such as mining and logging, a theory that in turn depends on the modification of the law of value to take account of its specifically capitalist character, wherein simple value is converted into prices of production. Wakefield's policy is that the colonial state should impose a land tax that would operate like an absolute rent (in Marx's Vol. 3 terminology) to prevent the movement onto the land of poorer whites.

Returning to the closing of Vol. 1, Marx's concluding paragraph is:

> However, we are not concerned here with the conditions of the colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the New World by the political economy of the Old World, and loudly

proclaimed by it: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property as well, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of that private property which rests on the labour of the individual himself; in other words, the expropriation of the worker. (1976, p. 940)

Turning to the "fundamental condition" of the capitalist mode of production in "the Old World," Marx deliberately *switches the argument away from the specific character of the colonial capitalist relation*. But then, what of the "New World," the colonies where the expropriation of the labourer also takes place?

David Harvey (2016) seeks to pick up the journey again from this fork in the trail. According to Harvey, from this point Marx returns in Vol. 2 to the internal contradictions of the capitalist mode of production rather than giving systematic treatment to capitalism in its external relations. Marx writes elsewhere on Britain's unfolding colonial relations with India, Ireland, and so on, but not in a systematic and theoretical way. Marx does begin to do this in his analysis of social relations in Ireland as a distinct illustration of the general law of accumulation that was different to England. Despite the famine and mass emigration, in Ireland the immediate producers had not yet been forced off the land entirely; they were exploited in situ through colonial land rents. These conditions of colonial occupation gave rise to the Fenian national independence movement (Marx 1976, pp. 854–870; Higginbottom 2014).

Harvey rightly notes that occasionally in *Capital* Marx refers to national differences, but does not make this the focus of sustained analysis. In short, Harvey poses anew the problem we seek to address, suggesting a turn toward systematic theorization of capitalism's colonial policy. Harvey's approach is still for many reasons unsatisfactory to our purpose; he persists in framing colonization as an *external* relation of capitalism, stressing that the frontier is an outer transformation resulting from an inner dialectic, a "spatial fix" in his terms. But this manner of spatial framing is itself one sided, insofar as its shifts attention away from the *internal* transformation to the social relations of the capitalist mode of

production that is inherent in this very drive to colonial expansion. Colonialism is not an external bolt-on to capitalism, it is part of it; and the theory of colonial capitalism must therefore affect the central social categories of what we understand capitalism to be, specifically the concept of surplus-value. Moreover, capitalism's colonial "spatial fix" does not resolve its inner contradictions, but reproduces them differently and at a higher level.

We now come to the strategic debate within Marxism concerning the domestic and overseas colonial faces of accumulation. To argue, as Brenner (1977, 1985) does, that not only the origins but also the *essence* of the capitalist mode of production is uniquely found in the social relations and class struggles of its emergence and early stages in England (and by extension in Western Europe and the global North) reduces the epistemological role of the colony to no more than an illumination or reflection back on this essence, to assist in its revelation. Are not colonial conquest, the modes of labour exploitation and the oppressed nation and class struggles of resistance that it involves also constitutive of the essence of the capitalist mode of production? *Pace* Brenner, we argue that colonialism is not external to the capitalist mode of production but part of its very conditions of existence. Accordingly critical political economy has to put colonized labour at the center of its theoretical project. What is considered as the totality of the capitalist mode of production has to be reconceived to take colonialism into account, not only as an external relation or limit but as an expanding *internal* relation that includes the occupation of colonized territories and *the coercive expropriation of the colonized labourer*.

In an excellent introduction to the topic, Barbara Solow posits the central question for the colonial powers was "by what methods did Europeans solve the problem of exploiting overseas conquests in regions with abundant land?" (1991, p. 38). She argues that colonial occupation was necessarily a different setting for the origins capitalism, as the state had to set up the conditions of private ownership of the means of production on which capitalist accumulation depended.

She identifies two routes that the colonial power could take in ensuring a labour supply, free labour and coerced labour. So, from the colonial capitalist perspective, slavery offered another solution to Wakefield's problem, but Marx does not follow up this line of thought. Taking another direction again, both to the turn taken by Marx from Wakefield and by Harvey: capitalism's colonization should be seen as an expanding frontier of expropriation; what constitutes the capitalist mode of production mutates to exploit labour in different ways as it expands geographically, as it occupies new territories, and the land and peoples it "discovers" there, subordinating them for its own purposes.

Free Labour and Subjugated Labour at the Multiple Birth of Capitalism

The "original sin" of capitalism was not one immaculate conception; it was multiple rape. The dispossession of the producer from their means of subsistence was not just one transition, at one place at one time in one way, but a series of struggles in many places, at many times, and in many ways. It was a contradictory accumulation of transitions over a historical epoch. This is the argument sketched out by Immanuel Wallerstein who wrote not of one unique transition from feudalism to capitalism but many transitions by which the expanding capitalist world economy both incorporated and rendered internal processes such as the "proletarianization of labour and commercialization of land" (1976, p. 278). Wallerstein's work founded the world system approach, which was largely coincident with many Latin American authors of the dependency school that crystallized independently in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In direct critical contrast, Robert Brenner insists that the birth of capitalist production took place specifically in the English agriculture around the sixteenth century (Brenner 1985). Basing his argument on a selective reading of Marx's primitive accumulation chapters, Brenner emphasizes class structure, power relations, and class struggle as the explanation over the

alternative demographic model (population changes) and the commercialization model (increased trade). He sees "surplus-extraction relations" as conflictive property relations in a declining serfdom. Peasant resistance to feudal landowners resulted in some being expelled from ties to the landed estates; they became free labourers. Thus there arose an agrarian capitalism, involving a tripartite relation between landlord, capitalist tenant, and wage labour that succeeded to replace serfdom in England, Brenner argues, because of its greater productivity. These conditions both freed up labour and created a home market:

> English economic development thus depended upon a nearly unique symbiotic relationship between agriculture and industry. It was indeed, in the last analysis, an agricultural revolution, based on the emergence of capitalist class relations in the countryside, which made it possible for England to become the first nation to experience industrialization. (1985, p. 54)

The issue to be addressed here is not the concrete analysis of how agrarian capitalism emerged in England, so much as the ontological inferences that Brenner and his school built from it, especially their downgrading of colonialism's systemic role in over centuries as a long running relationship that accelerated the movement from preindustrial capitalism to manufacturing and then on to industrial capitalism (Brenner 1977).

The Brenner school sharpened its approach in opposition to the world systems theory, the classic confrontation being between Brenner and Wallerstein. This is a debate that jumps around from one point of focus to another. The literature is expertly reviewed in Spanish by Astarita (2009 [1992], 2010), who is sympathetic to Brenner, and in English by Tomich (2003), who is more sympathetic to Wallerstein. Banaji (1983, 2013) has made subtle contributions, critiquing both Wallerstein and Brenner. Seabra (2015) provides a collection in Portuguese of contributions from the dependency perspective.

Historical sequence does not confer logical priority of one phase over others in the final outcome. Yet Brenner selects one element in Marx's synthetic account of the primitive accumulation

of capital and magnifies its importance. Here Brenner is contrary to the internationalism of Marx. In Marx's own account, the combined effects of internal transitions and European colonialism are treated in a much more holistic manner. Notably in contrast to the developed capitalist mode of production itself, Marx does not specify any "laws of motion" of the primitive accumulation of capital. Adopting Hegel's notion idea here, Marx does point to the different elements of a systemic totality in movement:

> The different moments of primitive accumulation can be assigned in particular to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England, in more or less in chronological order. These different moments are systematically combined together at the end of the 17th century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern taxation system, and the system of protection. These methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, as in a hot-house, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. (1976, pp. 915–916)

It hardly needs adding that by the end of the seventeenth century, the Americas had already suffered two centuries of violent colonial wealth extraction and that large parts of Africa and Asia as well as the Americas had by then been attacked by European expansionism. Thus for Marx the predatory colonial dimension was a part of the processes of primitive accumulation of capital taken as a whole. One does not need to argue that Spanish and Portuguese societies were already capitalist at the time of the conquest, but rather that they had contradictions that gave birth to a capitalistic impulse, an expansionist project seeking to profit from conquest overseas. The external expression of these societies was that they most frankly and greedily sought precious metals as the universal bearer of value. The plundering egoism of the merchant class was the freest of any constraints; obligations to the crown and the church only fuelled the conquest and the mercantile profiteering that proceeded to dominate the colonial economies.

We can now reflect on the distinction between the Brenner school and the dependency school,

which articulates a different historical experience of the birth of capitalism that connects capitalism inseparably with colonial and neocolonial extraction. One of the school's most celebrated authors, Eduardo Galeano, identified in the *Open Veins*' two different categories of labour, *free* labour and *subjugated* labour (1973, p. 147). This distinction is of course a broad generalization, but it is one of cardinal importance. If the test of capitalist social relations is restricted narrowly to the emergence of "free labour," then capitalism did not emerge in most parts of Latin America until well into the twentieth century, most typically around transport workers and other wage labourers involved in commodity export chains. If the test is subjugated labour, then we go right back to the years following the conquest onward as early capitalist enterprises, as argued by dependency authors (Bagú 1949; Frank 1971).

The Brenner thesis is one of the more unrepentant expressions of Eurocentric Marxism. Blaut critiques Brenner by looking at colonial relations in the seventeenth century, before the generalization of manufacturing and clearly before the industrial revolution and factory production. Blaut argues "the key question is this: How central was the role played by colonial and semi-colonial enterprise in seventeenth century rise of Europe and the rise of capitalism within Europe?" (1993, p. 199; see also 1992, 1999). This question refers to a central tenet of the dependency thesis that Europe became rich by extracting wealth from the Latin American colonies, thus at the same time actively impoverishing Latin America, and furthermore that the colonial enterprises were a key mechanism of value transfer. We need then to analyze the mechanisms of production behind the value transfer, how colonized labour produced the value that ended up being transferred.

The hundreds of thousands of indigenous labourers put to task digging out Potosí, as evoked by Galeano and still part of the collective memory, could hardly be described as free labour. The response from the Brenner school is that because the silver miners were not free labour, then by definition, it could not have been capital that exploited them, and so they must have been

exploited in a pre-capitalist relation. The tautology is based on the simple identity that capitalism = wage labour. This concerns the form of employment of labour power, which is important in its own right, but stops there and does not enquire into the content of the exploitation relations even though not expressed in the form of wage labour. The point is that wage labour is the simplest and most general form of the purchase of labour power in the capitalist mode of production; it is not the only and exclusive form (Wallerstein 1976, p. 280).

The question resolves to this, how does subjugated labour fit into the theory of Marx? Neither Brenner nor Wallerstein answers this satisfactorily, largely because they do not engage critically with the theoretical problematic of labour's production of surplus-value elaborated in the central chapters of *Capital* Vol. 1. The primary candidate to take the analysis deeper must be the theory of surplus-value. Brenner (1977, pp. 30–31) takes from Marx's argument in *Capital* Vol. 1 a sharp contrast between relative surplus-value and absolute surplus-value, repeating the received wisdom that capitalist production based on relative surplus-value presupposes and follows on after production based on absolute surplus-value. The Brenner school privileges "free labour," because it is considered as more productive labour, producing relative surplus-value through the employment of machinery. The upshot is that for Brenner capitalism is defined theoretically and politically based on the prevalence of relative surplus-value, without including colonial exploitation as a necessary component. This fits in the Eurocentric tradition of identifying the *essential* characteristics of the system as a whole as only those features which were first or most prominently manifest *in Europe.* This false universalization from the European experience leaves the manifestations of the birth of capitalism in the colonized world as particulars and the nexus of colonial relations of exploitation as *inessential to specifying the core relations of the mode of production.* In this way the colonial manifestations of capital accumulation are relegated to the periphery of theory, and so there is an epistemological reproduction of the core-periphery but in this case in a system of knowledge claiming Marxist heritage.

Just because a region produces commodities for the world market, argues Brenner, does not make it capitalist. He characterizes colonized Latin America as a pre-capitalist region. Compare this to the characterization by Wallerstein (1976) of a capitalist system, not a mode of production, a definition in which the production of surplus-value and the role of labour are left in the background. Brenner characterizes world system theory as ignoring the social relations of production and hence being too "circulationist" in its approach, which is overly concerned with the world market and commodity circulation, as opposed to the relations pertaining to commodity production. Wallerstein does however emphasize the international in the definition of capitalism, for he argues that capitalism starts with the formation of the world market. At least Wallerstein's perspective allows for, although he does not provide, more substantive analysis of how subjugated labour is surplus-value producing. We therefore have two incomplete sides, both miss capitalism as a colonial international social relation of production in which different forms of exploited labour power produce surplus-value as an essential of the capitalist mode of production.

Another version of the question is reposed in another classic debate: was there a significant reinvestment of profits gained from slavery into early forms of industrial capitalism in England? The pioneering work of Eric Williams (1994 [1944]) responds to this question by pointing out various mechanisms of profit transfer, for which he gives extensive evidence, but he does not analyze the conditions that created these same profits. Williams' innovation is that he treated slavery in international relation terms, but his limit is that the analysis is still not in value production terms, and this "conceptual fragmentation makes Williams vulnerable to his critics" as Dale Tomich notes (2011, p. 308). It is a fair criticism of Williams at least that he only makes a "circulationist" case of the connection between slavery and capitalism.

In contrast to Williams, while also writing from the dependency perspective, Ruy Mauro Marini stands out as the author who does look at the social relations of production of subjugated labour

in Latin America. Marini's original contribution occupied the huge gap between the Brenner and the Wallerstein camps, the one giving priority to labour conditions in Europe and the other to the market relations of colonial extraction. The gap is evidently the political economy of colonized labour and its role in international value production. Marini's grounding of unequal trade relations in labour super-exploitation in the colonies and former colonies remains the foundational breakthrough that opens up an entire field of conceptual development and critical analysis (Marini 1973). For summaries in English, see Higginbottom (2010) and Latimer (2019).

As we proceed we will find Marini's concept of labour super-exploitation provides a vital means to analyzing "New World" slavery in historical materialist terms, in their relation to Marx's theory. Before reaching that point, there are other aspects of the origins of capitalism under colonial conditions of exploitation that we need to draw into the picture.

What Class Turned Capitalist?

Each theoretical generation comes back to this argument between the internal and external origins of capitalism, in terms set by that generation's particular challenges. The Brenner-Wallerstein debate was itself a reprise of an earlier exchange between Dobb and Sweezy concerning the emergence of capitalism. We explore this briefly to bring out another important aspect of the overall picture, which is through what class did capitalism emerge? What class turned to capitalist production? Here again we find a multiplicity of answers rather than one single defining experience.

In his study of the breakup of feudalism and the origins of capitalism in Western Europe, Maurice Dobb (1963) builds his theoretical structure around the distinction of two ways that capitalist production relations came into being drawn from Marx. The specific quote from Vol. III of *Capital* reads:

> The transition from the feudal mode of production takes place in two different ways. The producer may become a merchant and capitalist, in contrast to the

agricultural natural economy and the guild-bound handicraft of medieval urban industry. This is the really revolutionary way. Alternatively, however, the merchant may take direct control of production himself. But however frequently this occurs as a historical transition – for example, the English clothier of the seventeenth century, who brought weavers who were formerly independent under his control, selling them their wool and buying up their cloth – it cannot bring about the overthrow of the old mode of production by itself, but rather preserves and retains it as its own precondition. (Marx 1981, p. 452)

The first way was from below; the immediate producer such as an artisan or a better off peasant becomes a capitalist. Procacci (1976, p. 137) exemplifies this process with the social base of Cromwell's New Model Army in England in the seventeenth century, demanding a fuller, more democratic political transition than Cromwell produced. The second way of transition into capitalism was decidedly from above. The example given here by Marx was the "putting out" system, whereby merchants controlled scattered wool weavers, who continued to work in their own household even though they were squeezed by capitalist pressure. As Marx points out, the merchant's "sway over production" was still quite limited at this point: domestically produced wool, the seventeenth century, in England. This would be an example of merely formal subsumption by capital of the legacy labour process, referred to above.

To build an entire theoretical structure of the transition to capitalism around this one quote from Marx from a chapter concerning the historical facts about merchant's capital is limiting historically and geographically. The result is an arbitrary narrowing of scope and a limited understanding of the sweep of transitions taking place to form early capitalism through a multiplicity of connected yet different paths. Evidence of Dobb's historical selectivity even as far as England is concerned comes from *Capital* Vol. 1 Chap. 13 on Cooperation, where Marx explains that by the eighteenth century, and with variations by sector, the transition "from above" began to take on different forms of division of labour in production. Colonial monopoly was a hothouse for domestic manufacture. The

eighteenth century sees the English state combining mercantile trade and slavery as impulses to *manufacturing* production, which they protected from the competition of better and cheaper cotton goods from India, in an expanding system of colonial exploitation and capital accumulation (Inikori 2002).

Merchants becoming capitalists did so primarily by bringing together the producers into a workshop or similar unit of manufacture, by putting labourers to work in cooperation within labour processes under capital's direct command. The way that capitalism emerged "from above" had moved from the scattered producers of the putting out system, which continued to persist alongside manufacture according to the sector. Significantly, Marx positions this material on the rise of manufacture not as a moment of primitive accumulation but within his conceptual determinations of the capitalist mode of production *as such* and builds its determinations around capital's direct appropriation of surplus-value from the labourers employed. To emphasize, according to Chap. 13, an early yet distinctively capitalist mode of production was present and becoming generalized through the spread of manufacturing in England in the eighteenth century. The merchants turned manufacturers were by then clearly capitalist and found their expression in the political economy of Adam Smith at the last point before industrialization. The capitalists were not yet building factories, not yet using machines comprehensively, but they were directing labour processes that relied on an increasingly extensive and minute division of labour.

We come to the evident geographical selectivity of Dobb's theoretical construction. Western Europe's centuries-long transition from feudalism to capitalism did not only occur on its own territories; colonization was a major component of this broad process. In the colonies there was not an emergence of capitalism flowing "spontaneously on the basis of the formal subsumption of labour under capital" (Marx 1976, p. 645), cited in (Brenner 1977, p. 31). To the contrary there was a world-shattering rupture, violent conquest and occupation, and a forced march from many types of pre-capitalist society to early forms of capitalist production. That is, there was a *colonial* movement from the merchant to the capitalist which involved the appropriation of subjugated labour rather than free labour. There was a distinct colonial face of the merchant-to-capitalist transition, that involved the exploitation of colonized and forced labour in the mines and on the plantations from the sixteenth century, and was based from the start on imposed forms of labour cooperation.

Furthermore the Latin American colonial experience of the transition into capitalism included a long interregnum in which the Europeans occupied the land and extracted indigenous labour tied to landed estates in a semifeudal manner and from the white settler *latifundistas* and *hacendados* classes another; now a fourth way of transition into capitalism emerged, from a class not even mentioned in the above quotation from Marx. The fourth way of transition into capitalism was also from above but through the colonially empowered *landowners* (neither the immediate producers, nor merchants) becoming commodity producers for export. The examples of this are many and become the main current in the period of neocolonial informal empire of the nineteenth century on.

Finally, for the sake of completeness for now, we can readily identify a fifth way also well known to Marx (1981, pp. 808–9) and used as a point of contrast by Galeano, which was the white settlers of North America who were granted cheap land to become proto-capitalists based on the first instance on the labour of their families. This route of the small farmer becoming capitalist echoes the rich peasant way but in a colonial setting of racial privilege based on the dispossession of the original immediate producers, fundamentally qualifying the claim that this way is as democratic as a racially exclusionary "democracy."

Summarizing this section, in addition to the two paths that Dobb highlighted in England, we have identified at least three further ways that capitalist labour relations of production were established in the American colonies: from the colonial merchant turned capitalist, from the colonial landowner turned capitalist, and from the colonial small farmer turned capitalist. Each of these paths involved different early forms of

capitalist relations with colonized labour. From this prolonged prologue, we now turn to the installment of plantation slavery in the colonized "new world."

Plantation Slavery: The "Genius" of Columbus?

Among the many things that Columbus brought with him to help colonize was the *intent* to enforce labour in order to make profit. Columbus' journal comment on 16 December 1492 was "The Indians . . .need only to be given orders to be made to work, to sow, or to do anything useful." According to Chaunu such remarks "bear the mark of genius. After such a trial and amid such anxiety and uncertainty, he could show this lucidity and this unhurried attention" (cited in Solow 1987, p. 10).

Unhurried or not, Columbus' will to command was *not* "genius" – it was part of the social formation he carried with him across the ocean. He was already well acquainted with slave production for profit, and it sat alongside the looting of precious metals as his primary motive. An orthodox textbook records that Columbus:

> Married in 1480 with Felipa Moniz de Perestrello, daughter of Bartolomé Perestrello, discoverer of the Madeira . . . [and] . . . lived some time in the possessions that the Perestrello had in Puerto Santo. (Losada 1990, pp. 20–22)

However, this sanitized version fails to record that Columbus's father-in-law was in fact a slaveholder. In the years before he set sail, Columbus had been groomed in slaveholding. Indeed behind the individual figure lies an entire inter-generational process of formation, the transmission belt of slave plantations from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic that was controlled by Italian merchants over three centuries. The westward movement dates from the Capture of Tyre from the Fatimids in 1123: "Venice proceeded to engage in the sugar industry that it found in its new possessions." Islands were preferred locations. From Crete and Cyprus, "the Italians transferred the sugar-slave complex, which they had developed as a means of colonial exploitation, to

Madeira, the Canaries, and the West African islands. . .to Sao Tome to Brazil and to the Caribbean" (Solow 1987, p. 6). It was only once the sugar-slave complex reached Madeira, by the middle of the fifteenth century, that the Genoese began enslaving peoples from West Africa. "It was black slavery that was chiefly used in Madeiran sugar production" writes Solow, who concludes that "the spread of the slave-sugar complex played a major role in the discovery and economic exploitation of America" (1987, p. 6).

If capitalist slavery had already arrived in the Americas with Columbus, it was not until the sugar plantation took hold that it really prospered. Lochardt and Schwartz reveal the sugar *engenho* in Brazil as a profit-making engine, based on exploitation. It is hard to imagine a more complete and brutal regime; these authors describe it as hell on Earth. Slaves could replace their purchase price within 3 years and were worked to death within 6 years, to be replaced by newly bought arrivals (1983, p. 218). The *engenho* was a system that had no need for children; to buy a new adult labourer from the slave traders was cheaper than to raise them. And so the voracious appetite for profit in the Americas continued the depredation of Africa, for three centuries and more. There is no sense here of a mode of labour exploitation that is concerned to generate its own conditions of reproduction; *in this regard* we are not yet at the developed capitalist mode of production creating the basis of its own reproduction.

As Moreno Fraginals (1976) details in the case of Cuba, the sugar plantation went through a series of transitions both in its technical basis, especially concerning the mechanization of sugar manufacture, and in the supply of labour. The slave plantations were set up in order to accumulate capital, by adapting a "primitive" form of obtaining their labour supply. European merchant capital did not only steal goods from other societies; it stole live human beings from the African continent and forced them to work to death in the Americas. Merchant capital moved out of circulation and into the realm of production to expand itself. In this respect the slave plantations were an advanced point, an anticipation of

how the more developed forms of capitalism would operate as a mode of production, in that labour power was a commodity that had been obtained solely because it was the source of surplus-value and hence profit.

Theorizing Plantation Slavery: Moving Beyond the Impasse

The primitive accumulation of capital involves different processes, one is direct looting of resources that are then sold as commodities for profit; this is what the *conquistadors* and the Atlantic slave traders did; another is putting the enslaved Africans to work, creating surplus-value to be realized and spent as revenue or accumulated as capital. The various processes that Marx summarized as the primitive accumulation of capital were not all pre-capitalist; rather they constituted capitalism in its becoming, the early stages of capitalism as a mode of production. The processes were the original accumulation *of capital*. The slave plantations from the beginning demonstrate major characteristics of capitalist enterprise: the purchase of labour power, setting enslaved labour to work in order to produce commodities for sale, and the realization of a profit. How then do we conceptualize enslaved African labour in terms of the production of value and surplus-value?

What is at issue here is not so much the description of slave plantations as work to death camps but testing the limits and adequacy of Marx's concepts as applied to those conditions. In her analysis of the Jamaican plantation, Abigail Bakan gives a well-articulated version of a standard Marxist view. She rightly argues that:

> The critical feature in defining the capitalist mode of production in the historical sense is not the presence of wage labour as a phenomenon, but the *social relationship* between wage labour and capital. The distinct feature of the wage labour form is not primarily how it is paid for, but that it stands, in Marx's terms, as "capital-positing, capital-producing labour." (1987, p. 77)

Bakan also rightly distinguishes different uses by Marx of the term capitalist "mode of production," which she designates as either the entirety or the particular, in which "each historical instance is a distinct 'mode.'" From this dual definition of mode of production, a dichotomy between the historical and the technical follows:

> Jamaican slavery can be identified as part of the general historic epoch during which capitalism became predominant as a "mode of production" on a world scale. Yet the specific form of labour exploitation was not marked by the wage labour/capital relationship. In the *technical* sense of the concept, Jamaican plantation slavery therefore cannot be considered to be a capitalist "mode of production." (1987, p. 74)

And again, the theoretical framework:

> must point out not only the similarities between slave and free labour in the capitalist mode of production in the historical sense, but also the features which differentiate them from one another as modes of production in the technical sense. (1987, p. 85)

Depending on how one defines the capitalist mode of production, slavery is part of it, or not. It is at this point the analysis peters out, for Bakan has reached an impasse, from which there is no escape within the premises of the argument. Bakan takes seriously the question of slavery's correspondence with surplus-value and searches for a theoretical grounding in absolute surplus-value:

> Plantation production was based on absolute surplus-value, though it differed from the classic form Marx describes in *Capital*. (1987, p. 74)

Bakan recognizes the need for an analysis of nonwage labour in the capitalist mode of production, but here we come to sticking point of an analysis that modifies Marx's existing categories marginally rather than moving beyond them in a necessary determination. *The production of surplus-value by enslaved labour cannot be fully understood by the two categories of absolute surplus-value and primitive accumulation alone*, for two major reasons. In the first place, as Moreno Fraginals (1976) demonstrates, the production of sugar involved increasing labour productivity, that is, relative surplus-value is also necessarily part of the valorization process on the slave plantation. Secondly, to resolve the conceptual impasse, a further determination is needed.

What is missing between two senses of mode of production presented as the universal and the particular is the intermediate concept of *mode of exploitation*, a concept present embryonically in Marx in his contrast of the slavery of antiquity with modern capitalism (1981, p. 923). Slavery as a mode of exploitation was qualitatively different to wage labour and cannot be reduced to it without eliding the racial oppression involved. The enslavement of African labour had specific characteristics of white supremacy within the capitalist mode of production (in the broad sense), with its own contradictions. The enslaved labourer did not own their labour power; they were owned and sold by another. The commodification of their labour power involved the capture of their body and the commodification of their entire being, including the capacity to labour. The enslaved labourer's entire life, not only their working life, was lived under the racial domination of the exploiting class.

If not a combination of primitive accumulation and absolute surplus-value, in what theoretical terms were the plantation system a capitalist labour process? Plantation slavery was a colonial form of cooperation adopted in the period of capitalist manufacture that had many similarities as well as crucial differences with it. Marx sums up the chapter on cooperation as follows:

> In the simple shape, as investigated so far, co-operation is a necessary concomitant of all production on a large scale, but it does not, in itself, represent a fixed form characteristic of a particular epoch in the development of the capitalist mode of production. At the most it appears to do so, and that only approximately, in the handicraft-like beginnings of manufacture, and in that kind of large-scale agriculture, which corresponds to the period of manufacture, and is distinguished from peasant agriculture, mainly by the number of the workers simultaneously employed, and the mass of the means of production concentrated for their use. Simple co-operation has always been, and continues to be the prevailing form, in those branches of production in which capital operates on a large scale, and division of labour and machinery play but a subordinate part. (1976, pp. 453–4)

We have seen that the first appearance of the capitalist mode of production in manufacturing occurred in the sixteenth to eighteenth century.

Marx shows that cooperation between labourers in the labour process, the creation of the collective workforce, can have major advantages for capital over leaving the work to be carried out by fragmented individual labourers. In the first place, bringing the workforce together in simple cooperation, even when the workers each do the same kind of work, can create advantages in terms of labour productivity.

Beyond that, in industries where critical moments occur, such as at harvest time, cooperation allows for a "large mass of labour to be thrown into the field of production" (Marx 1976, p. 445). Marx points out that the twofold nature of capitalist direction of social labour – "on the one hand, a social process for the creation of a product, and on the other capital's process of valorization" (1976, p. 450) – means it must be despotic. Even as wage labourers, the workers' cooperation is not voluntary. Marx identifies two forms of division of labour in the manufacturing system, depending on the nature of the article produced. The concept of increasing relative surplus-value therefore does not depend exclusively on machine production but rests initially on reorganization of the labour process under capitalist direction. Moreover, it is clear that Marx distinguishes two forms of the capitalist mode of production and two periods in its history, precisely around this point. This is the transition from manufacture (Chap. 14) to machinery and large-scale industry (Chap. 15).

Many of these insights can be applied with appropriate modification to the analysis of colonial plantation slavery in its different forms. Except cooperation in the labour effort took place on the premise of force at every step and in every sinew (Craton 1974). Marx designates the separation of the mental and the manual as a product of the division of labour in manufacture. The further special product of the division of labour on the plantation was the separation of the overseeing parties who would perpetrate violence and those who received it. The calculated use of force was a constant lever in production.

This argument has already been made in more detail in the work of Sidney Mintz, who writes:

The seventeenth century was preindustrial; and the idea that there might have been "industry" on the colonial plantation before it existed in the homeland may seem heretical. First, it has been conceived of as predominantly agricultural because it was a colonial enterprise and manned mostly by coerced, rather than free, labour. . .. It may seem a topsy-turvy view of the West to find its factories elsewhere at so early a period. But the sugar-cane plantation is gradually winning recognition as an unusual combination of agricultural and industrial forms, and I believe it was probably the closest thing to industry that was typical of the seventeenth century. (1985, p. 48)

The one difference I have with this is to lower the claim, to deliberately align it to manufacture in Marx's terminology rather than the factory.

Conclusion

The becoming of industrial capitalism from pre-capitalism passes through both the manufacturing workshop and the slave plantation. The availability of colonized, subjugated, and enslaved labour was, just as much as free labour, a presupposition of the capitalist mode of production. The original sin of colonial capitalism was twofold: violent plunder and the plain robbery of accumulated wealth, followed by ruptures that tore labourers away from their homelands and communities and threw them into labour *for the purpose* of their exploitation. The combination of profit-making and force renders colonial slave enterprises open to conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, the systematic use of force by the masters on the enslaved could disallow the relation to be considered capitalist; on the other hand, the formation of the relation was clearly impelled by the profit motive.

The social relation between plantation master and the enslaved Africans in the Americas was forged under conditions of a colonial capital accumulation. The enslaved labourers produced value and surplus-value through commodity production. Plantation slavery is best interpreted within a Marxist framework as a form of colonial capitalist enforced "cooperation," with many features similar to manufacture, but with the key distinction of racial violence that has the purpose of even more exploitation through domination. Sugar

plantation slavery is here considered akin to the manufacturing workshop in England, an early form of capitalism with a single point of command and a division of labour set in motion to accumulate capital, although still not yet with the generalized use of machines. The plantation was not quite the factory in the field, but rather the workshop in the field.

For this reason it is not enough to leave the theoretical definition of plantation slavery outside the internal relations of the capitalist mode of production, as an element of the original accumulation of capital, or as a pre-capitalist form as does Brenner. The form has to be analyzed in terms of value production and surplus-value expropriation. Although Marx did not make this analysis, he provides us with the tools and methodology to do so. But we also reached the limits of a literal application of Marx to the problem.

We have shown how selective readings of Marx are used to validate a Eurocentric reading. However we have not yet solved the problem beyond that critique. Within the conceptual framework of *Capital 1*, there remains a problem which is the limitation of the concept of surplus-value to absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value. It has been argued that on the one hand, the enslavement of Africans was an early form of the capital labour relation, hence of the production of surplus-value, and yet on the other hand, the categories of surplus-value from Marx are in and of themselves insufficient to explain the relation. If we are to use Marx, it must be in a modified way. Based on the work of Marini, we have opened up the argument that as a mode of labour exploitation, plantation slavery combined absolute surplus-value, relative surplus-value, and intense labour within an envelope of violent *racial super-exploitation* of the workforce.

For close on four centuries, enslaved Africans in the Americas produced value and surplus-value for the Europe-centered world capitalist system. This essential truth concerning racial capitalism should be beyond denial. This chapter thus fits well with other readings of "racial capitalism" from its origins in Europe (Robinson 2000) to the nineteenth century "second slavery" serving industrial capitalism (Johnson 2017: Tomich

2017), to imperialism and white supremacy in South Africa, and to the structural reproduction of racial oppression in contemporary capitalism (Bhattacharyya 2018).

This analysis suggests a reversal of Robin Blackburn's view that slavery was an "extended primitive accumulation" lasting well into the nineteenth century (1997, p. 572). The length of extension is not in issue, it is the connotation of primitive accumulation that is misleading. The current presentation conceives colonial plantation slavery from the sixteenth century on as an early if particular form of capitalist super-exploitation. Adapting the more apposite term "para-industrial," also from Blackburn (1988, p. 520), the capitalist colonial slavery mode of exploitation corresponded to a form of *para-manufacture* that did indeed persist over centuries as a node of value production within mercantile and then industrial capitalist systems.

Labour productivity in an agricultural context involves another aspect, the climate and fertility of the land appropriate to the crop, and what this means for capitalist surplus-value production. Plantation owners sought to increase productivity by moving to new lands, either on the same island or in new territories. This aspect is noted here as a limitation of the present study; it became all the more important in the rapid expansion of cotton production to meet industrial demand.

We will see further that subjugated or super-exploited labour in the Americas is not only an artifact of the original accumulation of capital that is later converted into free labour under the wage form; rather it is a continuing essential feature of the capitalist mode of production, which is reproduced as capitalism reproduces its class relations on a world scale.

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Environmental Load Displacement

▶ Unequal Exchange

Epeli Hau'ofa (1939–2009)

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Definition

Epeli Hau'ofa was a Tongan-Fijian activist, writer, and scholar. Criss-crossing the Pacific in both life and work, Hau'ofa became one of its most prominent advocates. To many scholars of the Pacific, he is best known for his essay 'Our Sea of Islands', first published in 1993.

Epeli Hau'ofa was a Tongan-Fijian activist, writer, and scholar. Born to Tongan missionaries in the Australian-administered Territory of Papua in 1939, he attended school in Papua, Tonga, and Fiji before entering the University of New England in Armidale, Australia. After a stint at McGill University in Montreal and in the West Indies, he returned to Australia to study social anthropology at the Australian National University in Canberra. His PhD thesis, directed by Marie Reay and Michael Young, was published in 1981 under the title *Mekeo: Inequality and Ambivalence in a Village Society*. After teaching at the University of Papua New Guinea, Hau'ofa became a research fellow at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva, Fiji. From 1978 to 1981, he was appointed deputy private secretary

to His Majesty, Tupou IV, King of Tonga, in charge of keeping the palace records of Tonga. In 1981 he returned to academic life and became the director of the newly created USP Rural Development Centre in Tonga. Hau'ofa returned to Fiji in 1983 to become head of the Department of Sociology at USP's main campus in Suva, teaching sociology and anthropology. In 1997, Hau'ofa became the founding director of the Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture at the USP in Suva. A naturalised citizen of Fiji, he died in Suva in 2009.

Criss-crossing the Pacific in both life and work, Hau'ofa became one of its most prominent advocates. To many scholars of the Pacific, he is best known for his essay 'Our Sea of Islands', first published in 1993. In this much cited piece, Hau'ofa criticised the long and fraught history of outlanders belittling Pacific islands and their peoples and thus robbing them of control over their future. Stressing the power of Pacific traditions, Hau'ofa argued that there is 'a world of difference between viewing the Pacific as "islands in a far sea" and as "a sea of islands"'. Oceanians (Hau'ofa's preferred term) have long thought of themselves as ocean peoples whose shared home – the Pacific Ocean – connected them through ancestral myths, seafaring, and trade. It was only when 'continental men' from Europe and North America came to the Pacific that this interdependent 'sea of islands' came to be reduced to 'islands in a far sea'. The long-term effects of this symbolic (and often very material) violence on Oceania and its peoples, he noted, were still visible in contemporary debates about the political, economic, and environmental future of the region. For Hau'ofa, 'smallness is a state of mind' and needed to be overcome to achieve a more self-determined future for Oceania. He concluded his essay by proclaiming: 'We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically and psychologically, in the tiny spaces that we have resisted accepting as our sole appointed places, and from which we have recently liberated ourselves'. For him, decolonisation of Oceanian minds was far from complete with the

achievement of political independence. Ultimately, the rebirth of Oceania would begin with the rediscovery of its rich communal past.

Hau'ofa's powerful call for solidarity and its lucid presentation in several speeches reverberated across the region. Many Pacific islands had gained their formal independence between the 1960s and 1980s (from Western Samoa in 1962, Tonga and Fiji in 1970, to Vanuatu in 1980), but long-established political and economic dependencies were harder to leave behind. Economic advisors, non-governmental activists, and government officials from the West descended on the Pacific to help 'develop' the region. It was in this context that Hau'ofa's essay intervened with a powerful call for Oceanic solidarity based on a proud history of inter-island exchange. He repeated and refined his argument in other essays and soon matched his rhetoric with institution building. After complicated negotiations with university administrators and donors, the Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture opened under his leadership at the USP in Suva in 1997. As the Centre's founding director, Hau'ofa became the mentor for a whole generation of aspiring young artists, writers, dancers, and musicians from all parts of Oceania.

Hau'ofa's involvement with the Oceania Centre for Arts and Culture was the culmination of a lifetime spent in the productive spaces between academic research, political activism, and creative writing. To many Oceanians outside of the academy, he is best known for his satiric writing in verse, and both short and long prose. In his short story collection *Tales of the Tikongs* (1983), and his only novel *Kisses in the Nederends* (1987), he poked fun at the contradictions of contemporary life in the Pacific. From the Christian orthodoxy of his missionary parents to the myth of the 'lazy native' still persistent among many outlanders, Hau'ofa's narrative voice used comic allegory and biting self-irony as weapons in the fight against economic exploitation, political corruption, and individual irresponsibility. His satirical fiction drew on Tongan tall tales, which rely on humour and self-deprecation to critique individual and institutional misbehaviour. In his own words, Hau'ofa attempted 'to translate into writing the

cadences of sounds produced in the islands by story-tellers, preachers, orators, people in supplication, people giving orders, arguing, quarrelling, gossiping and so forth' (Hau'ofa 2008: 108). He saw himself as a clown who liked to laugh a lot, and his creative writing brimmed with anarchical laughter about the absurdities of modernity in Oceania. In the opening story of *Tales of the Tikongs*, for instance, Manu, our guide on the fantasy island of Tiko, challenges an old preacher by claiming: 'Our people work so hard on Sunday it takes a six-day rest to recover'. As proof, Manu tells the story of his great relative Sione Falesi, who prefers playing cards with his secretary instead of securing foreign aid for his island. In stories like these, as in Hau'ofa's more explicitly political non-fiction, 'truth comes in portions, some large, some small, but never whole' (Hau'ofa 1983: 7).

Hau'ofa's biography around the Pacific world – from his birthplace in Papua to his education in Australia to his chosen home in Fiji – informed his creative and political work between disciplines and identities. He persistently cultivated his status as an outsider – to academic circles, church communities, and the political and class establishment at large. Fluent in several Pacific languages (including New Guinea Pidgin, Tongan, and Fijian), he not only moved from island to island, but also from genre to genre. His creative writing began early in youth and continued to evolve in dialogue with more academic and political work. During his time in Tonga in the late 1970s, for example, Hau'ofa edited a bilingual literary magazine, *Faikara,* in collaboration with his longtime wife Barbara. Besides short stories and an autobiographical novel, he also wrote numerous poems about nature, colonialism, and belonging (many of which were first published in the groundbreaking literary magazine *Mana*). Like other writers from the Caribbean (such as Édouard Glissant), Hau'ofa saw a productive tension in fearlessly straddling genres and adopting different masks. And like other Oceanian writers of his generation (such as the Samoan author Albert Wendt), he combined a firm rootedness in his local environment with a cosmopolitan approach to the global challenges Oceanians confronted. Hau'ofa's

attention to place and scale was visible from his anthropological thesis on the social relations of the Mekeo in Papua New Guinea to his later political speeches and essays on the need for an expansive Oceanian community.

Hau'ofa's historical and political diagnosis of the state of Oceania shone through in both his fiction and non-fiction. For him, three C's shaped the lives of people in Oceania, mostly for the worse: colonialism, Christianity, and capitalism. As he put it in 1984: 'To me the most unfortunate things that colonialism, Christianity, and international capitalism have given to the Pacific Islands have been, first, the transformation of hitherto self-sufficient, proudly independent people into wards of rich and powerful countries; and, second, as a consequence of forced dependence, the compulsion on people to compromise their integrity and use all manner of trickery in order to survive in an economic and political world over which they have no meaningful control' (Hau'ofa 2008: 106). According to Hau'ofa, the psychological damage done to Oceanians by colonial exploitation – political, economic, as well as spiritual – outlasted the end of formal colonial rule. As became particularly clear in his fiction, his sympathies lay with the underdogs who were trying to do the best with what was done to them. Much of his popularity in Oceania and beyond can be attributed to this heartfelt identification with the victims of Euro-American imperialism. As he acknowledged himself in an interview: 'For me, this capacity for laughter, for grabbing moments of joy in the midst of suffering, is one of the most attractive things about our islands' (2008: 139).

If Hau'ofa clearly differentiated between elitist and grassroots perspectives on the future of Oceania, he was acutely aware of (and uncomfortable with) his partial complicity in the former. After his return to Tonga in 1978, he found himself 'an Expert on more things than I care to enumerate' (Hau'ofa: 103). After all, he was one of only two residents in Tonga with a PhD. As evidence, he cited his study of overpopulation and environmental challenges in Tonga, *Our Crowded Islands* (1977), initially a 'ten-or-so-page paper . . . miraculously transformed into a forty-page mini-picture book that instantly established me as an Expert on

population problems and environment' (Hau'ofa 2008: 103). As adviser to the Tongan King, Hau'ofa certainly exerted considerable influence on top-level policy decisions, at least for a few years. As an academic and university administrator at the USP, he also helped shape the educational future of the region.

Hau'ofa's call for Oceanian unity against continuing Euro-American imperialism has not remained unchallenged. As the protracted struggles to establish educational and political institutions in Oceania have shown, forging unity across such a vast ocean remains a formidable challenge. Some scholars have charged Hau'ofa with downplaying longstanding cultural, political, and economic differences and antagonisms among Oceanian islands and their peoples. Conflicts among Samoans, Tongans, and Fijians, for example, reach back as far as the distant genealogical past, but continue to inform present-day interactions, including those taking place far away from the islands themselves. Hau'ofa's vision of a powerful 'sea of islands', other critics objected, amounted to little more than 'postcolonial utopianism' and risked foundering on the shoals of self-interested *realpolitik*. Hau'ofa, for his part, treated such criticism with characteristic self-deprecation when he quipped: 'I have written very little in fact, and the little that I have written has had no impact on anyone or anything' (2008: 102). His self-belittlement revealed itself most clearly as the mask of a skilled artist when he wrote about the natural environment of the Pacific.

For Hau'ofa, the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean served as the basis for a common regional identity among Oceanians. In his essay 'The Ocean In Us' (1997), he returned to his earlier argument in 'Our Sea of Islands', founding his vision of Oceanian unity on the common inheritance of the sea: 'An identity that is grounded in something as vast as the sea should exercise our minds and rekindle in us the spirit that sent our ancestors to explore the oceanic unknown and make it their home, our home' (Hau'ofa 2008: 42). Reminding his audience of the courage of earlier generations, he called for solidarity among Oceanians to confront the challenges of an endangered natural environment that knows no post-colonial condition. Faced with rising water

levels, deep-sea mining, and droughts, many Pacific Islanders bear the brunt of climate change and environmental exploitation mainly driven by the large and growing economies that encircle their ocean. Present developments, Hau'ofa made clear, have to be seen within the longer history of ecological imperialism in the Pacific. Then as now, the people living on the islands most affected by these environmental changes were rarely asked for their opinion. Against this reality of disempowerment, he proposed a radical return to the natural environment that surrounds Oceanic peoples. Echoing Derek Walcott's dictum that 'the sea is history', he captured his vision in the essay's last paragraph: 'The sea is the pathway to each other and to everyone else, the sea is our endless saga, the sea is our most powerful metaphor, the ocean is in us' (2008: 58).

Oceania's natural environment played a central role in Hau'ofa's personal life as well. Upon his return to Fiji in the early 1980s, he bought a farm in the hills of Lami and enjoyed the relative quiet of the countryside just outside Suva. And when this exuberant spirit ceased his lifelong wanderings across Oceania in 2009, his body found its final resting place in the womb of the land he so loved.

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Eritrea

▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

Ethiopia

▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

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Synonyms

1970s; Africa; China; Communism; Colonialism; Cuba; Decolonization; Democracy; Eritrea; Ethiopia, Famine; Maoism; Marxism-Leninism; Military rule; National liberation; Repression; Revolution; Socialism; Somalia; Student movement; USA; USSR

Definition

Imperialism is a global economic system based on the exploitation, oppression, and sometimes outright colonization or occupation of less developed countries by aggressive more developed ones. Social imperialism is "socialism in words, imperialism in deeds," or imperialist practices disguised by revisionist, falsely socialist rhetoric as practiced (according to certain schools of thought) by the Soviet Union in the era of its decline in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

Description

Before the 1970s, imperial Ethiopia was politically aligned with the agenda of US imperialism in Africa as well as dependent on it for arms and aid. A mass uprising in 1974 challenged the rule of the authoritarian emperor and demanded democratic reforms. But the revolution was hijacked by the shadowy military committee known as the *Derg* which soon found itself at war with much of the civilian Ethiopian left and various national liberation movements including the one in Eritrea on the Red Sea coast. The *Derg* began to institute dramatic economic reforms tempered by an appetite for strong social control and repression. After a 1977 coup, the military regime moved sharply to the Soviet sphere of influence, leading leftist

opponents of the regime to charge the USSR with "Soviet social imperialism" and military aggression. This article examines the roots of the 1974 revolution, the conflict between revolutionary forces and the new government, a debate over the meaning of socialism itself, and the implications of Soviet domination and influence up until the fall of the *Derg* regime in 1991.

In the 1960s, Ethiopia was a strong ally of the United States on a continent undergoing a historic transition away from European domination. Its military was dependent on American aid, its policies in line with US imperialism's aggressive agenda for the continent as it emerged from colonization: It lent, for example, troops to the imperialist mission in the Congolese civil war. Yet the following decade, Ethiopia was to host thousands and thousands of Cuban troops, hundreds of Soviet advisors, and was allowing the Soviet Union to advise it in remaking its economy and political order on the model of other Soviet client states in the global south.

What happened? Was socialism taking a step forward in Africa?

While the military government that ruled the country starting in the mid-1970s would have answered "yes" to this question, a deeper look at Ethiopia's 1974 revolution and its aftermath reveals a far more complicated story. Civilian Ethiopian leftists opposed to that military regime talked about the USSR as they had once talked about the United States:

> The Soviet Social imperialists are striving frantically to turn Ethiopia into their colony and to exploit our people blindly. At the same time, the Moscow hegemonists are advocating the 'sanctity of Ethiopia's frontiers' as if they had not been the most notorious violaters of other nations' frontiers. The aim of the social imperialists is quite clear — they want to control Ethiopia and at the same time they want to assure that 'their' Ethiopia assumes full control of Eritrea as Moscow needs the Red Sea ports as part of its grand hegemonist design in the whole region. Thus, the social imperialists manoeuvres vis a vis Eritrea. (EPRP Foreign Committee, "Eritrea: The Soviet Manoeuvre Must Fail!!," *Abyot*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Feb–Mar. 1978)

So, what actually happened? What was the actual story of the Ethiopian revolution? Could it be that the Soviet Union actually replaced US imperialism as regional exploiter and predator?

Of all the nations in Africa, only the empire of Ethiopia successfully resisted European conquest. The 1896 defeat of an invading Italian army at Adwa by the Ethiopian emperor Menelik and his warrior consort, empress Taitu, was a rare military and diplomatic triumph that allowed Ethiopia's ancient and complex feudal society to survive into the twentieth century. While the Italians and other Europeans clung greedily to border and coastal regions surrounding the empire, Ethiopian sovereignty over most of the country was preserved until the eve of World War Two when Mussolini's legions exacted a brief but gory revenge. When the calls to defend Ethiopia – or Abyssinia as it was often known – from Italian fascism in the 1930s seemed to stir only global communities of the radical and far-sighted, the resulting occupation lasted only a few short years but inflicted a heavy human toll. By some estimates, 7% of the population perished.

In the aftermath of the war, the coastal region of Eritrea was first federated to and then annexed by the restored Ethiopian empire, having been ruled separately by Italian colonists for decades. As decolonization swept the continent through the 1950s and 1960s, Emperor Haile Selassie shrewdly positioned his regime as its champion and as a proponent of African Unity. But he also positioned himself as a pro-Western bulwark against the advancing tide of African socialism gaining widespread support in the continental independence movement. Ethiopian troops fought in the UN coalition during the American war against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in the early 1950s, and as mentioned earlier, in Congo in the 1960s. The emperor forged close political relations with the United States and Europe, but he did also maintain cordial ties with the avowedly anti-imperialist camp of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and smaller players such as Tito's Yugoslavia. His travels became legendary, one minute being fêted in Washington, the next in Moscow and Beijing.

By 1960, sharpening political contradictions led to an abortive military coup, quickly drowned by the regime in blood but exposing cracks in the façade of an otherwise tightly controlled and managed society. Facing the obvious challenges of modernization in the context of the heavy pressures of neocolonialism, the emperor prioritized higher education, seeing it as a kind of factory for turning the children of the country's nobility and upwardly mobile classes into docile technocrats. But within a few years of the 1960 coup, the student community he had allowed to grow began to transform itself into a mass political opposition movement. In 1965, a secretive radical student group called The Crocodile Society emerged. Its first action was a demonstration of several 1000 calling for "Land to the Tiller," and other democratic reforms in a country dominated by feudal land tenancy schemes.

Over the next few years, fueled by contact with the global student movement of the late 1960s, a mass Ethiopian student movement soon widely embraced extraordinarily radical politics. In a country without legal political parties or freedom of the press, the student movement – cross fertilized by the thousands of Ethiopian students who were completing their education in the universities of North America, Europe, and the Middle East – began to fully embrace a spectrum of radical politics ranging from anti-imperialism to outright Marxism-Leninism. Student journals were transformed into forums of revolutionary debate. Openly inspired by everyone from the Vietnamese fighting American aggression, to guerrilla hero Che Guevara, to the nascent Black Power movement in the USA, to the canon of revolutionary literature written by the likes of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, the student movement began to strategize what it would take to end imperial rule. (See Bahru Zewde's *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement* for further detail on the Ethiopian Student Movement.)

A 1968 resolution presented by the World-Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students to a Vietnam Solidarity conference in Europe gives the flavor of the student movement's deepening anti-imperialist mood:

> Believing that US government is a war criminal in Vietnam murdering and slaughtering heroic people of Vietnam who are fighting for national salvation...Realizing that the so called US aid is

a tyrannical instrument for plundering and subverting the economic development of recipient countries…Believing that the US government does not protect the rights of the Afro American of the USA, [We]…Support with all things we can master the heroic people of Vietnam to see that the American aggressors are shamefully defeated, Alert all the people of the world to defend themselves against US aggression, cultural, political, economic and military as well, Support Stokely Carmichael and the Black Power Organization, we confirm our resolute determination to fight American imperialism and its running dogs. Down with US imperialism and its lackeys!… Vietnam Is Our Example. (WWFES Flyer, "Solidarity! Solidarity…" Feb. 2, 1968)

That same year, Ethiopian students studying in France secretly formed the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, known by the Amharic acronym *Meison*. Led by a young linguist named Haile Fida, the group would spend the next few years in the shadows building an underground network of activists in the diaspora student movement in Europe and the United States. Like an increasing percentage of the global revolutionary left in that moment, its politics looked more toward the militancy and confrontationalism of Mao and People's China than to the accommodationist *realpolitik* of the Soviet bloc.

But even at home, leaders of the student movement began openly suggesting that it transform itself from a movement of students into a party of professional revolutionaries. Revolutions, after all, are not made by students, at least, not alone. The rule of the emperor himself was questioned, as was the right of Ethiopia to rule over the patchwork of ethnic and national minorities in its border regions. Open sympathies were expressed for rebellious peasants, and even for separatist rebels in the northern province of Eritrea. That key strategic area, now that it had finally been formally annexed by the emperor, was home to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF was at first a small guerrilla force building support largely among Eritrea's Muslim population and aided not only by nationalist Arab regimes but by the People's Republic of China. The imperial response to that rebellion included a vicious anti-insurgency campaign by the US- and Israeli-armed and trained Ethiopian military that didn't hesitate to target civilians.

The Eritrean liberation movement rejected Ethiopian sovereignty of Eritrea completely, even suggesting that the historical relationship between the two nations was overstated, and that its incorporation into Ethiopia was the fruit of imperialist manipulation. An ELF statement read, "Modern imperialism in tight control of the empire-state which Haile Selassie inherited demanded an outlet to the sea. And Ethiopia's 'legitimate need for adequate access to the sea' was precisely formulated by the USA and its satellites for the common imperialist interest" (ELF Foreign Information Bureau, *The Eritrean Revolution: 16 Years of Armed Struggle*, Beirut, 1977). The Eritrean rebel analysis eventually came to understand Eritrea not just as an issue of a national minority demanding self-determination but as an issue of Ethiopian *colonialism* over a captive nation.

The student movement experienced a watershed moment in its radicalization in 1969. Student leaders were jailed for publishing attacks on the emperor. A small group of Ethiopian students led by a founder of The Crocodile Society, Berhane Meskel Redda, hijacked an airplane from Ethiopia to Khartoum in neighboring Sudan. The group soon set up shop in revolutionary Algiers, building an exile base for a future revolutionary organization and hobnobbing with other exiled revolutionaries including the US Black Panther Party and representatives from dozens of national liberation movements from across the globe. It pitched its cause without much success to representatives of Cuba and People's China; in the end, finding some material support from the Palestinian resistance. Fighting for political hegemony in the diaspora student movement, this group would go on to form a second secret and clandestine revolutionary organization that would eventually call itself the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Their first official congress was a small meeting in West Berlin in 1972; by 1975, they formally announced themselves as a full party with a congress in Addis Ababa. (See Kiflu Tadesse's extraordinary *The Generation*, Parts 1 and 2, for a full account of the rise and fate of the EPRP.)

The end of 1969 was marked by the assassination by presumed government agents of Tilahun Gizaw, the very popular head of the student body at Addis Ababa University. Imperial repression spiked: mass gatherings to protest the assassination were met with live fire, killing dozens. The government used arrests and temporary university shutdowns to tamp down the movement. Many, many student activists fled into temporary exile; others staying behind to spread a revolutionary message to incoming classes as well as to younger high-school students.

The early 1970s was marked by massive ideological ferment in the student movement both at home and in the diaspora. Behind the scenes, cadre from the two competing secret leftist organizations waged a struggle of words to influence the direction of the movement and prepare it for engagement with the escalating social struggle on the ground. The main differentiation between the two revolutionary Ethiopian factions at this point was that Haile Fida's *Meison* presumed a long march lay ahead of the Ethiopian left while the faction that would go on to form the EPRP believed that a revolutionary conjuncture was imminent and that the left had no time to waste in preparing for it.

In Eritrea about this same time, ELF split, generating the somewhat more radical Eritrean People's Liberation Front or EPLF. Significantly, EPLF gained significant support among Eritrean Christians, which weakened (but did not eliminate) the frequent charge that the Eritrean rebellion was just an excuse for some kind of Arab/Muslim encroachment on Ethiopian territory. Both groups fielded guerrilla forces in rural regions, eventually setting up liberated base areas.

The radical movement developed an understanding of imperialism that put it the strategic core of their message. An editorial in a journal of the Ethiopian Students Union in North America in 1971 read:

> The question of national liberation is intimately tied to the problem of imperialism. With its global system of control and its gigantic military power, international imperialism today is the most serious opponent of national liberation struggles. Without imperialism, the life span of the puppet regimes in many countries, Ethiopia included, would be much shorter…. It is therefore essential for any popular struggle, at every stage of its development, to make adequate ideological, political and military preparations against imperialism. Any movement that fails to put the question of imperialism at the heart of its calculus cannot be revolutionary. (Melesse Ayalew, "Editorial: Imperialism and National Liberation," ESUNA *Challenge*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan. 1971)

The oil embargo of 1973 organized by OPEC nations against Israeli allies in the aftermath of the October War had an intense effect in Ethiopia. Petrol price hikes brought taxi drivers strike to the country in February of 1974; that job action set off a chain-reaction of walkouts by teachers, students, and airline workers. Military units mutinied. Soon after, the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions, or CELU, organized the previous decade with the assistance of the CIA and the American labor movement to promote labor peace, shocked the country by mobilizing a general strike of the country's small but influential urban working class. Minority Muslims, priests from the state Ethiopian Orthodox church, and even prostitutes held mass marches and protests. Revolutionary leaflets were distributed everywhere. These actions became known as the *Yekatit* revolution, after the Ethiopian month corresponding roughly to February. (See John Markakis and Nega Ayele's classic *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia* for a full examination of the 1974 revolution and the economic and social forces which led up to it.)

Haile Selassie was forced to withdraw price hikes and to reorganize his government. Liberal-minded aristocratic politicians were brought in to replace conservative ones, and by the middle of the year, a committee of mid-level military officers began to insist on its right to influence state policy. That committee of officers, its makeup and organization largely secret after the ways of Ethiopian politics, became known as the *Derg,* and the summer of 1974 is often described as the period of a creeping coup. But as the *Derg* demanded a greater role at the seat of power, the popular movements in the street did not subside: the Ethiopian population continued to politicize, radicalize, and mobilize.

While the Ethiopian workers and students had been exposed to revolutionary ideas via the student movement, most of the organizational power of the radicals was outside the country. The initial strikes were not led by radical organizations, though small collectives of leftists had begun to establish themselves. But this began to change as radical students and other exiles abroad realized the time had come to return home and put their ideas into practice. One student activist of the time, recruited to an underground leftist cell in 1974, recalled in a memoir:

> We mostly read and discussed books that were shipped from Russia and China. Ideologically, we preferred the books from China. We thought the Chinese revolution was purer and more profound, and held relevant lessons for our situations. All of us…were fascinated by how a small group of guerrilla fighters who started from a small base of operations in a remote area could finally defeat a powerful government and establish the People's Republic of China. (Mohamed Yimam, *Wore Negari: A Memoir of an Ethiopian Youth in the Turbulent '70s*; Xlibris/Self published 2013 paperback)

The group that would soon become the EPRP began to publish an underground newspaper called *Democracia*, or "Democracy." Haile Fida's *Meison* would follow suit with an underground paper called *Ye Sefiw Hizbe Demts*, or "Voice of the Broad Masses." The two groups began to raise the call for a popular provisional government, making broad democratic demands and winning substantial support among the Ethiopian population.

Parts of Ethiopia were hit by a devastating famine that year, and in September of 1974, after painting the emperor as cruel and insensitive to the starving rural masses, the military announced that it had deposed the emperor and seized the reigns of power. Haile Selassie was driven from his palace in a VW beetle to the house where he would die in powerless obscurity the following year. There was jubilation in the country, tempered by concern over the prospects of military rule. The *Derg* would mark the September coup as the revolution's actual anniversary, despite the lack, in that moment, of popular participation. To the surprise of many, the *Derg* announced

that the ruling philosophy of post-Haile Selassie Ethiopia would be something they called "Ethiopian Socialism." And with that, the great powers of east and west took notice.

The military created the PMAC, the Provisional Military Administrative Council, as a triumvirate of three officers – two of whom were members of the *Derg* – to rule the country. (Eventually, the word *Derg*, Amharic for "committee," came to refer to the military regime in general, not just the ad hoc committee established earlier that year.) Those three were Chairman Aman Andom, a general of Eritrean ethnicity renowned for liberal and progressive views, and two vice chairs, Major Atnafu Abate and the American-trained Major Mengistu Haile Mariam. The peaceful overthrow of the imperial regime was widely welcomed and celebrated, and the socialism promised by the PMAC and the *Derg* was painted in progressive, nationalistic terms. However, in November of that year, things took a dark turn when Aman Andom was killed in a shootout, and 60 prisoners, largely officials and nobles of the *ancien regime*, were executed without due process. Major Mengistu was believed to be behind the violence, but Aman Andom was replaced in the PMAC junta by another outsider to the *Derg*, General Teferi Bente. The government began to announce various revolutionary initiatives such as the *zemecha,* where tens of thousands of urban students would be sent to the countryside to evangelize the revolution (and stay out of urban protests). It announced the nationalizations of banks and many businesses, along with urban and rural property in quite radical reforms. But at this same time, it also became quite clear that the *Derg* was more than willing to use repression to silence dissent. A number of radical students were arrested, and further executions followed (Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux's *The Ethiopian Revolution*, and René Lefort's *Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?* remain excellent sources on the rise of the *Derg*, despite a discernable bias toward the military regime).

Despite the revolutionary rhetoric of socialism, the *Derg* displayed very little depth in the way of ideology. It initially remained dependent on the United States for arms, and it remained dependent

on those arms to continue its campaigns against the Eritreans and various other regional rebels. The rallying cry of the new regime, *Ityopya Tikdem*, or "Ethiopia First," served as a cry for political unity behind the new regime but also as a warning to separatists and ethnic nationalists.

The United States, facing its final defeat in Vietnam, beset by the political crisis of Watergate and its aftermath, wearily and warily watched the apparent leftward motion of the country with only half an eye, exhausted and preoccupied elsewhere. The *Derg* made ample use of anti-imperialist messaging in its appeals, despite availing itself of US and Israeli military assistance. But the *Derg* did begin to look for sponsorship and assistance from what it saw as the socialist camp, sending delegations to the USSR, People's China, and North Korea to beg for aid. Little substantial was particularly forthcoming, but Mengistu especially seemed to have begun a behind the scenes relationship with Soviet advisors. The Soviets did offer political training to members of the military, of which the *Derg* promptly began to avail itself.

The Ethiopian left began to fracture. *Meison* switched from advocacy of a democratic civilian government to a policy of supporting and advising the military regim*e*. While leftists of all stripes agitated inside the military, there is no evidence that *Derg* members had more than casual exposure to Marxist-Leninist ideology until a number of student movement veterans, members of *Meison* included, began to tutor them. Major Mengistu was one of the most apt students, becoming a quick study in using radical rhetoric to maneuver inside the new regime. Eventually, *Meison* leaders were invited into the government, acting as part of an informal *politburo* that advised the *Derg* and focused its ideological messaging. *Meison*'s leader, Haile Fida, is believed to be largely responsible for the 1976 National Democratic Programme of Socialist Ethiopia, a document intended to serve as a blueprint for the country's path to socialism.

The activists behind *Democracia*, however, formally launched the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party with a congress in 1975, soon attracting a mass following to its red,

hammer-and-sickle laden banners. The EPRP became fierce foes of the military regime; while they expressed critical support for most of the regime's reforms, they accused the military of hijacking the revolution, of stifling democracy, and limiting the revolution's potentials. For this they earned the wrath of the regime. They also urged peaceful and democratic resolution of the various national rebellions, eventually even advocating Eritrean independence. Their continued insistence on the right of the people to rule themselves in actuality not in formality brought them support among radical students and other young people, but also among workers in a number of industries, and even among layers of the *petit bourgeoisie* including urban traders and shopkeepers. They had mass organizations for women and for youth; they managed to win control of CELU, the trade union confederation, and when the *Derg* banned it in favor of a state-organized association, they set up a new red trade union.

A statement from pro-EPRP Ethiopian students in Europe explains the orientation of the party to revolutionary democracy:

> The demand for a popular provisional government is neither reformist nor utopian. It is a concrete demand to further the development of the revolutionary process in Ethiopia. . .. With characteristic contempt for the masses. . .the military rulers state that the masses are not conscious enough to take their destiny into their own hands. So what is the solution? The military rulers say: 'We will stay in power and make sure that the masses become conscious!' Therefore, anybody who asks for the right to organise, who demands the formation of a provisional government made up of the true representatives of the popular masses is labelled as an 'extremist' by the military and repressed as such. To all this, our masses have answered clearly by saying: 'We are conscious and we don't want an American-backed military rule.' The masses say: 'We want a popular provisional government that will be a step ahead in the bitter class struggle we are engaged in to end all exploitation.' (Editorial, "The Fight Against the Reactionary Leaders of ESUE," *The Proletariat*, labelled Vol. 1, No. 1 1974 but actually 1975, published by the Ethiopian Students' Union in Holland)

By the end of 1976, the country was increasingly riven by political divisions. The *Derg* purged its ranks, in one case executing a high-

level figure, Major Sisay Habte. It evinced little tolerance for dissent, and arrests and persecution of dissidents became commonplace. By this time the two main civilian left factions, EPRP and *Meison* had moved into opposing corners, waging fierce arguments over the future of the revolution. The arguments became increasingly heated, and laden, as *Meison* was in some ways now part of the state apparatus, with a controlling relationship to the forces of repression. At first, the arguments were civil, carried out in meetings, rallies, and in the press; pseudonymously in the mass media still formally subject to censorship, and in the pages of the two groups' underground albeit widely circulated media. But by late 1976, *Meison* apparently began drawing up lists of EPRP members to handover to local police authorities. The *Derg* began to arrest and execute EPRP members, the work itself often carried out by *Meison* members inside the state apparatus. The EPRP responded by creating an urban defense wing, initiating a campaign of targeted assassinations against government officials and *Meison* members who had snitched them out, and even making an attempt to assassinate Mengistu himself.

While both groups had roots in similar ideological circles of Marxism-Leninism, influenced by Maoism without identifying as such, the split over their respective orientations to the military regime pushed their politics further and further apart. The EPRP program, for instance, called for popular democracy and such basics as the right of workers to strike; the *Meison* program made no such promises, actually not even mentioning the military control of society that loomed over everything.

By the beginning of 1977, the faction-ridden *Derg* and the various left parties looked like they might pull back from the sectarian conflicts that were threatening something close to civil war, but bold action on the part of Mengistu nipped civil peace in the bud as he staged a coup against General Teferi Bente. The general was executed along with several of his associates, including at least one *Derg* member who was said to be close to the EPRP and urging reconciliation. A shootout after the executions took the life of an important pro-*Derg* leftist, but when the smoke cleared,

Mengistu was in absolute control of the government. While his co-vice chair survived a few months longer, he was also eventually executed.

Upon seizing power, Mengistu immediately moved to strengthen the ties of the regime to the Soviet Union. It is highly likely, in fact, that his Soviet advisors had been well aware of his plans to take control of the PMAC: on the eve of the coup, Soviet and American embassy officials held a secret meeting where the Soviet Political Counselor probed his American counterpart for US attitudes toward the regime and its "socialist" character. While Mengistu seems to have been listening to Soviet advice for some months, with the coup Ethiopia definitely moved into the so-called socialist camp of the Soviet Union. Treaties of friendship and cooperation soon followed, in turn followed by a rush of advisors and experts from countries in the Soviet bloc including East Germany, South Yemen, and most importantly, Cuba.

1977 would be a massive turning point. Upon seizing full control of the government, Mengistu began an extermination campaign against the EPRP. He eventually called it the "Red Terror," after the campaign against counterrevolutionaries in the early years after the Russian Revolution, though ironically the red-flag waving communist dissidents of the EPRP were his main target. Estimates vary, but by the end of the period of mass killings in 1978, the toll had reached into the hundreds of thousands. Torture, rape and sexual abuse, the total absence of due process, piles of corpses left on street corners, and even charging parents for the bullets used to execute their children were standard features of the terror. Soviet warnings against excess were balanced by Soviet calls for the regime to purge the Ethiopian left of Chinese influences. (See Dawit Shifaw's *The Diary of Terror* and Babile Tola's *To Kill a Generation* for more on the "Red Terror.")

The 1970s was the decade of the Sino-Soviet split. Simmering tensions had brought the former allies of the USSR and PRC to an actual brief border war in 1969. An almost generational split in the world left followed, each side examining the ideological ramifications. Whether it was simply an argument over ideology or geopolitical

positioning, those Chinese influences in Ethiopia were identified by the Soviets as a threat to the consolidation of Mengistu regime. "The Soviet Ambassador directed Mengistu's attention to the anti-socialist and even anti-Soviet (Maoist) propaganda which is being disseminating by certain private publishing houses. Mengistu declared that implementation of the program of propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas has indeed been unsatisfactory. . .. Concerning the Chinese, Mengistu noted that they are not only disseminating literature, but are rendering direct support to Eritrean separatists and extremists" (A. P. Ratanov, Ser. No. 276, "Notes of Conversation with Chairman of PMAC of Ethiopia Haile Mariam Mengistu," 29 July 1977; Wilson Center digital archive). Thus, the Soviets enabled the campaign of violence directed against the civilian left.

Despite its attempts to fight back, EPRP's leadership was decimated in the killings, and its presence in Ethiopia's urban areas was devastated. EPRP members fled to rural base areas of the EPRP's military wing, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army, or EPRA, and attempted to rebuild and reorient their opposition to the *Derg* as guerrillas waging people's war.

Sensing weakness in the regime, those "Eritrean separatists and extremists" of the EPLF launched a massive offensive in Eritrea encircling important cities like Asmara and Massawa. And the neighboring Somali Democratic Republic, itself ruled by a Soviet-backed avowed Marxist-Leninist general, launched an invasion of Ethiopia's eastern regions in July, allegedly in support of ethnic Somali rebels. This military crisis provoked a dramatic regional realignment, with the Soviet Union openly siding with Ethiopia, abandoning its former ally in Somalia, which promptly turned for assistance to the United States. The *Derg* severed its floundering treaties and military arrangements with the United States.

Mengistu displayed an increasing unwillingness to share power with left parties he could not control. Deeply suspicious of the tight new Soviet embrace of Mengistu and sensing an imminent turn against their presence in the state apparatus, it was *Meison*'s turn to break with the military

regime. Its leaders fled into exile or into the countryside where many were soon captured. Its members were then also targeted by the "Red Terror," suffering the same kind of extreme losses that *Meison* had helped the government inflict on the EPRP. It is worth noting that both *Meison*'s Haile Fida and EPRP's Berhane Meskel Redda, former movement comrades turned mortal enemies, were captured and later executed secretly on the same day in 1978. Other small leftist parties met similar fates.

The Somali invasion was defeated with the assistance of hundreds of thousands of Cuban troops. Mengistu evoked the national spirit of the 1896 battle of Adwa and largely successfully rallied the population behind the war effort with appeals to patriotism. The Cuban regime, known in the 1960s for its support of global national liberation movements, had once postured as a friend to the Eritrean revolution. Fidel Castro outwardly claimed his aid to the *Derg* was only meant to deter imperialism; he claimed Cuban troops would not be shifted to the northern front against the EPLF. But behind the scenes, he condemned the rebels as agents of the West allied with reactionary Arab regimes, and the presence of Cuban troops in the east of the country freed up Ethiopian regulars to head north. The Soviet Union had no apparent need to make such claims; it sent skilled military advisors to help the *Derg* route the Eritrean advance directly, which it soon did. Some of those advisors were captured by Eritrean rebels.

The Eritrean advance was turned back in the late 1970s; the rebels retreating to arid base areas and one liberated town which the government never recaptured. It was not until a decade later that rebel offensives began to bear new fruit. Outside Eritrea, the left disappeared from Ethiopia's cities, its membership killed or imprisoned, the lucky survivors fleeing to guerrilla bands in the countryside, escaping abroad, or otherwise forced into silence. The EPRP's guerrilla army EPRA wound up bogged down in a conflict with the Tigray People's Liberation Front, or TPLF, a national liberation movement in the country's northern Tigray province which was closely allied to the EPLF. While the EPRP

criticized the TPLF for being "narrow nationalist," and anti-socialist, eventually a secret core of the TPLF called the Marxist-Leninist League would go on to identify itself as followers of the international line established by the late Albanian leader Enver Hoxha. The TPLF turned out to be able to win support among the peasants of Tigray province in a way that EPRP/EPLA had not been able to.

Through the 1980s Mengistu attempted to consolidate and legitimize his regime. After destroying the independent civilian left, he created the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) with himself as chairman: the leadership bodies were overwhelmingly military. He created new mass organizations like trade unions, peasant associations, and women's groups. An analysis of these shows they were instruments not of popular empowerment but of social control. The models for all these groupings were the state-sponsored top-down parties and fronts that were a hallmark of Soviet-client state social organization.

Much of the conventional narrative about the Ethiopian revolution of the 1970s omits detail about the civilian revolutionary movement in lieu of a narrative of radical military seizure of power, followed by the imposition of Soviet-style socialism, lasting until the overthrow of the *Derg* in 1991. It paints the *Derg*, after the regime's own propaganda, as some kind of authentic Marxist-Leninist movement instituting popular and radical reforms while battling it out with the agents of US imperialism. And it paints Cuba and the Soviet Union as the nation's saviors in a time of need. There are a few kernels of truth within this narrative – Cuban troops did defeat a foreign invasion – but overall it is a great disservice to the actual revolutionary movement that was co-opted, stifled, and ultimately exterminated by the military regime.

While as we have seen, the Ethiopian left grew up with a deep respect for Mao and the Chinese path, they initially avoided open declarations of affinity out of the pragmatic need for solidarity from anyone who would offer it. But as the *Derg* got closer to the Soviets, and began to institute policies cribbed from modern Soviet practice, many on the left began to draw conclusions. In

understanding what was happening on the ground in that time, it is especially instructive to look at the words of the key players themselves to see how they struggled to come to terms with the radical transformation of the Soviet Union from revolutionary ally to unwelcome oppressor.

The issue of political democracy was initially central. Had not Lenin stressed the relationship between socialism and democracy? The EPRP questioned whether the Ethiopian military, fundamentally still the same armed body of men that served the emperor, had any interest in actually sharing power with the people. An article in an issue of "Voice of the Air Force," an underground publication by EPRP supporters inside the military, confronted this quite clearly as early as 1976.

> [O]fficers who say that they have gone to the Soviet Union to learn how to form a political party should stop declaring that 'democratic liberties should not be accorded to the masses during revolutionary times.' They should stop their deceitful actions because we know fully that they want to cling to power under the pretext that the 'masses are not still organised.' We know (and we did not have to voyage to the Soviet Union to know this) that 'a revolution without an organisation and an organisation without democratic liberties' cannot just come about. 'Revolution is a festival of the oppressed,' *[quoting Lenin, ed.]* and we know quite clearly that popular democracy is necessary (crucial) during the time of revolution. … We have heard that these persons taking courses in the Soviet Union have erased from Marxist books what Marx and Marxists have said on (a) the need to destroy the army set-up by the oppressing classes and build a new (people's) army and (b) the incapability of soldiers to lead the socialist revolution. Our intelligent philosophers (!) have made this revision on the ground that 'Ethiopia's revolution is different from all other revolutions'! Bravo socialists! But this is not socialism. ("Voice of the Air Force," reprinted in the EPRP's *Abyot*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 30, 1976)

Eventually, as the hammer of repression came down upon them, the EPRP began to label the *Derg* "fascist," and the judgment of its Soviet allies became much harsher.

> Democracy, according to our party, EPRP, is not simply a means to mobilize the masses against the fascist regime. On the contrary, EPRP believes that democracy [is] a crucial feature of its internal make-up and of the kind of society that it was to establish in Ethiopia.… We do not aim to be another Soviet Union or East Germany where socialism means

dictatorship of a clan of exploiting bureaucrats over the working people. Hence, EPRP's conception of socialism is intrinsically linked with the broadest democracy for the proletariat and the working masses. ("EPRA Successfully Conducted a Vast Rectification Campaign," *Abyot*, Vol. 2, No. 7, Nov. 1977)

The repression they experienced, fully celebrated in Soviet organs like *Pravda* lauding the Mengistu regime, forced the EPRP to make ideological conclusions. A pro-EPRP student journal wrote in 1978,

The supply of arms, 'experts,' interrogators, etc. and the diplomatic support the USSR is giving to the crumbling fascist state cannot be isolated from the nature of today's 'Soviet' state. *Abyot* describes the 'Soviet' Union as a 'country where democracy has been stifled. It is a country where a clique of bureaucrats rule with iron hands in the name of the working class. It is a country where the working class has no say either in the running of the government or the industries. It is a country where the people are muzzled, where genuine Marxists are hounded, sent to concentration camps or destroyed in psychiatric hospitals. In the Soviet Union (and in East Europe) Socialism is a mask behind which ruthless counter-revolutionary revisionists hide.' ("Soviet Hegemonism Exposed," *Forward*, WWFES, January 1978, Vol. 2, No. 4)

As the relationship between the *Derg* and the USSR tightened, the revolutionary opposition to the military regime extended its analysis. By 1978, Ethiopian leftists were fully calling out the Soviet Union not just for having an inadequate, revisionist version of socialism but for being an imperialist, or more specifically, a *social-imperialist* power.

Pro-EPRP Ethiopian students in the diaspora published an extensive statement detailing the nature of the problem, detailing the predatory economic and political practices of the modern Soviets and bluntly calling for opposition to Soviet "aggression." The statement explained that "The Ethiopian masses, through their own experience, are learning that the Soviet Union today is an imperialist state engaged in aggression and expansion everywhere and desperately contending for world hegemony" (Statement of the Central Committee of the Ethiopian Students Union in North America, "Soviet Social-Imperialism and the Ethiopian Revolution," *Combat*, ESUNA, March 1978, Vol. VII, No. 3).

It was not just the military intervention at issue. According to these Ethiopian civilian revolutionaries, the *social-imperialism* of the Soviet Union actually served to limit the revolutionary transformation and liberation of the country. The statement continued, "However much the Soviet revisionists trumpet their propaganda alleging theirs is a socialist country, their theory and practice and real life shows that they are, in fact, socialists in words and imperialist-in-deeds. Lenin says that, 'We judge a person not by what he says or thinks but by his actions.'" They used "social-imperialist" to communicate that the USSR was not guilty just of an aggressive, interventionist foreign policy but of attempting to exploit the underdeveloped countries in its orbit. "Soviet social-imperialism, in securing a neo-colonial stronghold, wants to exploit the labor of millions, plunder our rich mineral and agricultural resources, and dump its shoddy commodities while imposing fascist reaction on our people" (Statement of the Central Committee of the Ethiopian Students Union in North America, "Soviet Social-Imperialism and the Ethiopian Revolution," *Combat*, ESUNA, March 1978, Vol. VII, No. 3).

The EPRP condemned this new exploitation of the Ethiopian economy for Soviet benefit:

The social imperialist drive to control Ethiopia in all spheres is being intensified. High ranking envoys of all sorts continue to flock to Addis Ababa from Moscow and its puppet countries. Economic agreements are signed, 'courtesy visits' increased, good are dumped on Ethiopia and more vital materials taken out of the country to Moscow and Eastern Europe. The Social imperialist drive to neo-colonize Ethiopia fully is a vivid reality. (EPRP Foreign Committee, "The Process of Ethiopia's Neo-colonisation" *Abyot*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Feb.–Mar. 1978)

Struggling for survival, the EPRP took terminological clues from the anti-revisionist wing of a polarized world left movement and finally labelled the Soviet regime "new Tsars." "For the new Tsars in the Kremlin turning Ethiopia to a Russian neo-colony constitutes the cornerstone of their African policy. That requires maintaining Mengistu's regime in power and destroying the Ethiopian revolution" (EPRP Foreign Committee, "Social-Imperialism Undertakes 'Rescue'

Operation to 'Save' Fascist Junta from Crumbling," *Abyot*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan. 1978).

This was not just name-calling. The EPRP backed up its accusations against the Soviet Union not with anti-communist epithets but with arguments straight out of its vision of Marxism-Leninism.

> Russia today is no longer the Union of *Soviet Socialist* Republics. The changes that took place in the one time USSR have transformed that country greatly. The dictatorship of the proletariat has been replaced by the dictatorship of the ruthless bourgeoisie. The party of Lenin, the CPSU, has become a counterrevolutionary bourgeois party. In their foreign policy, the present day rulers of Russia have thrown overboard the Marxist-Leninist motto of 'proletarians and oppressed peoples of the world, unite.' The revolutionary principle of proletarian internationalism has been replaced with counter-revolutionary and imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other countries, parties and revolutions in order to destroy proletarian or national democratic revolutions. They are involved in a fierce contention with US imperialism to divide and re-divide the world. . . . Like other imperialists, it has become not only an imperialist power but one of the two super-powers in the world. (EPRP Foreign Committee, "Social-Imperialism Undertakes 'Rescue' Operation to 'Save' Fascist Junta from Crumbling," *Abyot*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan. 1978)

Worst of all, the EPRP's statement continued, the Soviets were actually mimicking the historical role of US imperialism:

> On basis of what considerations the Kremlin Tsars decided to be committed to a crippled regime, is not yet known. One thing, however, is obvious, i.e.: they are trying to fulfill an imperialist task which US imperialism could not succeed in fulfilling: mainly to maintain a stable neo-colony in Ethiopia. To keep a tottering regime in power, which is threatened by a dynamic social revolution from below, they had to do exactly what the US imperialists did in Indo-China. . . . Just like the US imperialists, the social-imperialists are also doing all they can to keep the fascist junta in power. (EPRP, "Social-Imperialism Undertakes 'Rescue' Operation to 'Save' Fascist Junta from Crumbling," *Abyot*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan. 1978, p. 4)

For its part, *Meison*'s critique had a less ideological flavor, but was still harsh. Writing in the 1980s, surviving *Meison* cadre Abera Yemane-Ab wrote,

> [T]en years of overwhelming Soviet presence in Ethiopia has resulted in the reversal of the democratic gains of 1974 to 1977 and the virtual annihilation of the Ethiopian Revolution. During the last ten years, with Soviet approval and encouragement, the military government of Mengistu Hailemariam has committed untold crimes against the Ethiopian peoples and their Revolution. The National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) has been systematically undermined and repealed but for its name. (Abera Yemane-Ab, "The Defeat of the Ethiopian Revolution and the Role of the Soviet Union," manuscript prepared for the Conference on the Ethiopian Left and the Revolution, May 1987, New York)

Further, *Meison* found that Soviet economic advice felt more like exploitation than mutual assistance.

> Following the increasing dependence of the Derg on the Soviet bloc countries in general and the 20-year 'Friendship Treaty' with the Soviet Union in particular, the non-aligned foreign policy and thereby the national independence and sovereignty of the country is capriciously and continuously humiliated. . . .[T]he local and foreign policies and therewith the destiny of the country at present do not lie in the hands of its own citizens but in those of foreigners who are operating as 'experts' in the different government agencies and regions of the country. ("Editorial: Another February Is Inevitable," *New Ethiopia Newsletter*, Me'isone Foreign Section, Spanga Sweden, May 1980)

Exiled *Meison* spokesperson Frewe Abayneh predicted in a 1979 interview that Soviet economic exploitation would only get worse:

> But one cannot get the real measure of Soviet bloc economic ties with Ethiopia by what has already been achieved but rather by what lies ahead if resent trends are allowed to develop unchecked. East Germany, now the second most important buyer of Ethiopian coffee, is holding key posts in the Ethiopian planning commission thus disposing of an important instrument to control the Ethiopian economy and gear it to the needs of the Soviet bloc countries. (in *New Ethiopia Newsletter*, Me'isone Foreign Section, Spanga Sweden, March 1980)

For the Eritrean rebels, it all came down to the military struggle they were waging to liberate Eritrea. The EPLF called out Soviet hemming and hawing with platitudes about peace as a cover for sheer aggression. The EPLF-aligned Association of Eritrean Students wrote,

The Soviet Union has stayed, prior to its all-out aggression at this stage, on the fringes — sometimes indicating that it 'favoured' a non-military solution to the Eritrean question. But this was essentially, connived in order to delude progressive opinion. … . The blatant Soviet aggression negated the fundamental leninist principles on the sovereignty of a people — the rights of nations and peoples, however weak, however small, to freely determine their affairs. It is an affront to all peace-loving peoples, but more particularly to world revolutionary forces since this crime is being committed on a just and genuine revolution in the name of 'defence against imperialism,' 'proletarian internationalism' and other 'revolutionary ideals'. … . [We call] on all the revolutionary forces, all the peace-loving forces and countries to condemn Soviet aggression. ("Condemn Soviet Aggression in Eritrea," in *Resistance*, Newsletter of the Association of Eritrean Students, Nov/Dec. 1978, Vol. 1, No. 2)

The EPLF itself said the war against the national liberation forces was actually being waged by the Soviets directly. "Soviet Generals and other high ranking officers are leading this deplorable offensive. Hundreds of Soviet troops, pilots and marines are involved. The heavy guns and artilleries shelling our positions are fired and manned by Soviet troops. The Migs which are strafing our liberated areas and civilian centers are flown by Soviet pilots" ("Statement on Soviet aggression in Eritrea," *Mekalih Sewrana*, Newsletter of the EPLF, Dec. 1978, Vol. 1, No. 2).

After routing the EPRP from Tigray province, the Tigray People's Liberation Front spent the 1980s struggling to build base areas despite intense food insecurity in the province and continued military pressure from the *Derg* and other opposition groups. Towards the end of the 1980s, they began marshaling allies into an offensive to challenge not just the provincial but the central government, coinciding with the advance of the TPLF's allies in the EPLF. They too felt themselves up against the Soviet domination of the regime, though as the cold war heated up in the 1980s, they were keen to not be seen as supporters of *American* imperialism instead. A statement issued by the TPLF in 1988 reads,

In the Ethiopian situation the main enemies are the ruling classes, Soviet imperialism, and the dependent capitalist bourgeois system in power. These are enemies who are exercising dictatorial state power. Although feudalism has been weakened by the resolute struggle of the people, it has not been completely destroyed and must still be considered as an enemy. To identify Soviet imperialism as the main enemy in the Ethiopian situation does not indicate that American Imperialism has ever ceased to be an enemy of the Ethiopian peoples or that Soviet Imperialism can be fought by siding with American imperialism. America Imperialism is a fundamental enemy which can never be considered as an alternative. (Joint Communique of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement [EPDM] and the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF], May 10, 1988)

On a side note, observers of post-1991 TPLF rule might find this statement full of ironies.

Official statements from the period by the Ethiopian and Soviet governments are full of platitudes about lasting friendship and solidarity. Behind the scenes, it is clear the Soviets were settling in to seize the wheel. One secret document declassified after the fall of the Soviet Union was a memo documenting a discussion between Russian and Cuban diplomats in Ethiopia that spells out some of the advice being dispensed to Mengistu and the *Derg*. The advice was a bit of a warning to put the brakes on social change.

The PMAC needs to solve the following political tasks: 1. To take additional measures to strengthen its social base. In order to achieve this it is necessary to make the socio-economic policy more concrete, so that it could assure the peasants that the land would remain in their possession, and that the regime would not rush with collectivization. In addition, some measures in order to, as a minimum, neutralize the national bourgeoisie, are necessary to assure it that the regime would not expropriate its property. 2. To develop the nationality policy and to make it more concrete (to create autonomous national regions), even though now it would not be an easy task because cadres from non-Amhara nationalities which were discriminated against before the revolution have not been prepared yet. 3. To create a political party and a broad people's front with participation of not just workers and peasants, but also with the national bourgeoisie. ("Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military official Arnaldo Ochoa," July 17, 1977; Wilson Center digital archive)

Another declassified document records a discussion between East German and Soviet advisors in Addis Ababa in late 1977, which seems to suggest that the regime actually start talking *less* about any kind of socialist transformation.

On the question of non-capitalist development with Socialist orientation: Within the leadership there is nobody who knows what this state of development really means. It is presented as a Socialist revolution. For example, the development of kulaks is rejected. 75% of the rural population is still involved in a produce-based economy. Who should develop agricultural production? There are no social statistics on which the development of the Ethiopian village could be based. There are regulations for private investments but they are not propagated. The bourgeoisie has money but is afraid to invest because it fears nationalization. One should follow the example of the USSR and develop a NEP [New Economic Policy], thus providing a prospect for all social classes….[T]here is the danger that the PMAC will become too distant from the people. ("Memorandum of Conversation, East German official with Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov, Addis Ababa," 6 December 1977 [dated 7 December], *CHWIP Bulletin*, p. 83)

So what happened in the end, to "Socialist Ethiopia" and its revolution?

Mengistu developed a taste for heroic statues designed in North Korea and giant Russian-style posters of Marx and Lenin in public places, but failed at creating a cooperative, democratic society. By all accounts he held on to power through continued personal ruthlessness, with frequent purges and a heavy-handed security service brooking little dissent. His politics were hollow, his real interest, maintaining his personal privilege and prestige. He pretended that the creation of the WPE was following the traditions of a Leninist vanguard party, when it actually was just a channel for control from the top and for corruption and social-climbing from the bottom. (See former *Derg* official Dawit Wolde Giorgis' *Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution* for more on the state of Ethiopia in the 1980s.)

The era of the student revolutionaries (referred to in today's Ethiopia wistfully as "The Generation") was effectively over by the early 1980s. They had been brutally driven into silence at home. Diaspora communities were now host to waves of political refugees being resettled, setting aside the Lenin and Mao study groups as exiles began new lives and professions. EPRP continued to field its EPRA in base areas through the 1980s, never quite finding mass support. EPRP and *Meison* remained alienated from the ascendant TPLF, with most of their urban support and their

leaders either silenced, imprisoned, or in exile. Maneuvers with the central government aimed at political inclusion on the eve of the TPLF victory ensured continued enmity between the TPLF and the civilian opposition. By then both EPRP and *Meison* significantly jettisoned the open Marxist-Leninist content of their programs, on the EPRP's part fully transitioning to a form of progressive social democracy.

The Soviets had funneled billions and billions of dollars into the Ethiopian military regime's war chest, but successes on the battlefield were short-lived; all that aid money wasn't able to fix what ailed the country. Massacres of civilian villagers didn't win hearts or minds. And neither, apparently, were Ethiopian agricultural exports enough to hold Soviet attention when the USSR entered its terminal crisis with the era of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. The devastating famines that swept northern Ethiopia again in the mid-1980s barely registered as priorities for the government or its Russian sponsors, leaving Western charities to perform the heaviest relief work. A nominally civilian run government was established in 1987, yet the faces ruling the new People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia remained dominated by figures from the *Derg* era including Mengistu himself, a head of state who simply turned in his military fatigues for a business suit.

At some point, the Soviet Union began to cut back on aid, urging reforms before backing out of its commitments altogether as pro-Soviet regimes began to fall from power in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Abandoned by the Soviets, by the time Mengistu attempted a more market-based change in course to preserve his regime, it was too late. He boarded a plane to Zimbabwe and tanks from a broad multiethnic opposition alliance led by the TPLF entered the Ethiopian capital in May of 1991. The new government led by the TPLF's umbrella coalition the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) definitely announced it would not follow a socialist direction. Some *Derg* figures and "Red Terror" criminals were imprisoned, but both the EPRP and *Meison* were effectively banned by the new EPRDF regime, which promptly imprisoned or disappeared a number of leading activists from both groups.

Marching separately, the EPLF liberated the main cities of Eritrea about the same time, and shortly afterwards held a referendum in the region that lead to a declaration of independence. Ironically, in 2018 post-Soviet Russia and independent Eritrea began discussions for some form of Russian naval presence in the strategic Red Sea nation (Neighboring Djibouti is now already home to a Chinese military base).

Much of the *Derg*'s economic failures may be ascribed to its heavy-handed and top-down methods. Markakis and Nega note that while the radical land reform that utterly dispossessed the landlords won the support of large numbers of the dominant peasant classes, the peasants were not particularly self-empowered by the reforms. "It would not do to grant a real measure of self-government to the peasantry, any more than it would to allow worker participation in the management of the economy" (Markakis and Nega, p. 188). In the words of Ethiopian political scientist Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia, "in the Ethiopian case, both in land reform and other revolutionary undertakings, politics and economic were apparently dissociated; the people were not empowered and hence government policies were not effectively implemented" (Ghelawdewos, p. 175). This meant that in the face of micro-managing from the military government, the peasantry acted in ways not always proactive, farsighted, or in the national interest. The land reforms didn't cause the famine of the 1980s but they laid the basis for the mismanagement and poor planning that contributed to it. (See Christopher Clapham's late 1980s study *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* for a wealth of detail on the economy of the *Derg* period.)

The economy of Ethiopia had always been bureaucratically dominated and managed; the emperor himself had personally owned quite a number of businesses and companies. It remained underdeveloped as imperial control passed to state control under the *Derg*. Foreign investment was important to the emperor and to the military regime, but development stagnated until the EPRDF/TPLF regime opened the floodgates to privatization.

The rapid economic growth since the fall of the *Derg* has been twinned with low salary growth, oppressive working conditions, environmental destruction, and the one constant, repression of dissent. None of this has involved democratic participation. Ironically, Chinese industry is perhaps the biggest beneficiary of the Ethiopian economy today, and EPRDF-ruled Ethiopia has acted as a regional military proxy for the United States. That, as they say, is another story.

Understanding the pernicious nature of political revisionism as practiced by the late Soviet Union and its allies is a complicated task: words of the Marxist-Leninist canon become twisted in ways both subtle and severe. Truth must be pursued through rigorous investigation of the realities behind claims and platitudes. As Mao Zedong once wrote, "no investigation, no right to speak," and this introduction to the big issues presented by the Ethiopian revolution and its diversion and defeat demands attention beyond a single short essay.

That Socialist Ethiopia was not actually socialist, that Soviet aid was actually a beachhead of a new brand of imperialism, these are claims requiring something other than the repetition of government propaganda. A starting point must be the reaffirmation of concepts themselves: what is socialism? What is imperialism? Further, the acceptance of appearances must be met with a study of events as they actually unfolded. Revolutions are surely acts of violence, this is true. But what kind of revolution murders hundreds of thousands of its own children? These are the contradictions and standards that must be unearthed to understand reality in a useful way.

Facing unimaginable repression, the EPRP continued to publish its underground journal *Democracia* even in the face of insurmountable odds and the physical extermination of a large percentage of its membership and base. This passage from a 1979 *Democracia* editorial affirms that the stakes are high for getting it right. If one believes imperialism is still a vampiric threat to the world's peoples, and socialism is still a realistic hope, then a clear-sighted vision of reality and possibility is not optional, it is a necessity.

> Socialism is a system in which the proletariat and broad masses organize themselves in many forms to be able to administer themselves. Socialism is a system in which the proletariat and broad masses acquire more democracy, welfare and development than the

capitalist system in the political economic and cultural fields….For the social-imperialists and fascists, socialism means a system of which a regime of handful few dictators has the control of the masses and when the people do not have any control of the government. For them, socialism is being against democracy, anti-proletarian, anti-people and which combines the reactionary superstructure and practices which enables them to maintain their fascist and exploitative rule. The difference between the socialism we are fighting for and the 'socialism' of the social-imperialists and fascists is as wide as heaven and earth. To us socialism is a system in which the proletariat and broad masses hold state power; in which they take part in all responsible positions, in which the right of the people to call or change the officials of the government elected locally or at a country-wide level is guaranteed, in which there is a proletarian-led regime that stood for the broad masses of the people….. There is no socialism if the proletariat and broad masses do not take part in decisions of government affairs and if they do not administer themselves in a democratic system. Socialism is not democracy for the ruling class and government officials and dictatorship over the masses as it is like in the Soviet Union and its allies. Socialism cannot be a system in which those who oppose are imprisoned, kept in concentration camps, tortured, executed and where the freedom of speech of the masses is abolished. (EPRP, *Democracia*, Vol. 5, No. 4, quoted in *Abyot*, Feb.–March 1979 issue, Vol. 4, No. 2)

For a deeper investigation into the political and economic realities of the Ethiopian revolution as it confronted US imperialism and fell prey to Soviet social-imperialism, the following sources are highly recommended.

Cross-References

▶ Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)
▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ Cold War
▶ US Militarism and US Hegemonic Power
▶ US Military Presence in Africa

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Ethnic Cleansing

▶ Genocide and Imperialism
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▶ Ukrainian Capitalism and Inter-imperialist Rivalry

Eurocentricity

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Imperialism; Modernization

Definition

Eurocentricity is an ideological attitude that takes Europe as the norm to assess or compare societies, cultures, and histories. It has been used to justify imperialism to the people of colonizing countries and to colonized peoples. Eurocentricity has created anthropology and has informed archaeology, geography, history, economics, development studies, and international relations. Some Dependency and World-Systems writers on the one hand and Global History and Post-Colonial Studies writers on the other, all of whom claim anti-imperialism, have criticized each others' views with the charge of Eurocentricity.

Introduction: Formal Definitions

Eurocentrism or Eurocentricity is an ideological aspect of imperialism. These terms are used interchangeably, both deriving from the adjective Eurocentric, according to the Oxford English Dictionary. Eurocentricity has resulted from and justified -both to ordinary people of the imperialist power and to the subject peoples- the colonialism, slavery, the "civilizational projects" of the Spanish in the sixteenth century, of the English and French in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the neocolonialism of the twentieth century. Eurocentrism and its avatars have "distorted...[social science] analysis and its capacity to deal with... problems of the contemporary world" (Wallerstein 1999: 169).

Eurocentricity cannot be separated from the history and political economy of capitalism. As imperialism was germane to capitalism, Eurocentricity was germane to imperialism. It has served to shape public opinion -through education, media and academic discourse- in support of imperializing efforts on the part of capitalists and the dominant states in which they are located. Possibly, without such effort, imperialism would have been harder to "sell" to the citizenry of imperialist states.

A simple focus on Western Europe -its culture, politics, history, institutions, etc.- is an inadequate explanation of Eurocentricity. The term "European" includes the history, culture, etc. of the off-shoots of Western Europe: Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand -but not of Latin America presumeably because Latin America remained "backward" and was therefore not "European" or "Western." Similarly, a simple focus on Europe or "the West" *can* be perfectly valid. A history of colonialism that indicts the West is not Eurocentric.

A general definition of Eurocentricity might include: (a) a focus on Western Europe or "the West" as if its history and rise to power can be explained in terms of itself alone; (b) a celebration of Western Europe's history, society, culture and "achievements" as models for others to follow; and (c) a tendency to use "the West," Europe, or the "European" as a norm against which other peoples, cultures, or social formations are judged.

J. M. Blaut defined Eurocentricity in history as diffusionist. Diffusionist meant that all good ideas and inventions originated in Europe; that all places gained from the diffusion of these; that non-Europe was socially and technologically stagnant; and that Europe was rewarded for diffusion by the wealth of other places being returned to it (Blaut 2000: 7).

Immanuel Wallerstein (1999) says Eurocentricity is expressed in five ways: (1) historiography -the explanation of European dominance of the world in terms of some quality – psychological, cultural or social, that Europeans have evinced; (2) universalism – in the social sciences expressed as a stageist theory of history in which the present is the outcome of the past;

stages of history are universalized to include the history of all societies, and the present assumed to be better than the past; (3) civilization -defined in the social sciences by its supposed opposites- barbarism or primitiveness; historically, to be "civilized" meant that the colonized had adopted the colonizer's values and norms; (4) Orientalism ". . .a stylized and abstracted statement of the characteristics of non-Western civilizations. . . [which]. . . creates a binary view of the world. . ."; (5) the idea of 'progress' which "became the consensus viewpoint of nineteenth century Europe. . . the underlying explanation of world history. . . the rationale of stageist theories [and]. . . the motor of applied social science" (Wallerstein 1999: 173– 176). Normative Eurocentrism asserts the universalism of Euroamerican values (Dirlik 1999).

Loci of Eurocentricity: The Social Sciences, History, and Economics

Eurocentricity is pervasive within academia -from mathematics (Anderson 1990; Joseph 1987) to feminism (Mohanty 2003). Practitioners of natural science have a priori relegated the knowledge systems of earlier societies to the category of folk wisdom, or superstition, thus manifesting a closed attitude which may have lost accumulated knowledge. The areas in which Eurocentricity most damages perceptions and distorts analysis are the social sciences and history.

Eurocentricity has two loci: the intellectual arenas where Eurocentricity is manifested, and the ways in which Eurocentricity has been applied. The social sciences are Eurocentric in: the denigration and disparagment of non-Westerners, the idea that the West did something special and good, and in normative and prescriptive propositions. Anthropology and Oriental Studies belong to the first category.

Anthropology was created by colonizers to study non-Western, non-literate societies in order to dominate them. This involved attributing to the objects of anthropological study certain characteristics which portrayed them as other-than human. Anthropology dehumanizes its objects of study by denying them a sense of time or of past history

(Fabian 1983). As a sense of history is normal to human-ness, the anthropologized became, by definition, other-than-human. Asmarom Legesse (1973), an anthropologist from Ethiopia, criticized fellow anthropologists for their inability to view the peoples they studied as having rationales and histories, and analyzing them in terms that made sense to the anthropologists but not to their informants. "Tribe", so beloved of anthropologists, is not an analytical category, but originally was a colonial concept denoting a people "destined for contempt" as Franz Fanon (1968: 211) said. The term "tribe" has served to give Africa a "counter-identity" to the West by creating a comparison between "dynamic" Europe and "static" Africa. "Tribe" has functioned to "disaggregate the social foundations of power." It has limited a proper understanding of how the capitalist world-system functions by reducing the problem of global inequality to explanations internal to societies (Ngaruka 2007). The British in India tried to re-introduce "caste" for similar reasons (Samarendra 2011).

Oriental Studies was the field through which the colonizer "knew" about those societies which constituted "great civilizations" of Asia. This meant that the civilizations were characterized by writing, sophisticated numeracy, monumental architecture, well-developed divisions of labor and social hierarchies, and well-developed agricultural and other technologies. Little attempt was made to apply the techniques of analysis used in anthropology, or to construct a political economy of any oriental society living or dead. Oriental Studies confined itself to translating (religious) texts. As a variant, ancient and defunct societies of Asia were the focus of archaeological reconstructions, and the deciphering of ancient languages. The approach was to classify them as mid-level in a hierarchy of stages, or consign them to the "Asiatic Mode of Production," a catch-all category for societies that were not "primitive" in terms of social organization or technology, but which were not industrialized like the West.

For the colonizers the problem was how to explain this "underdevelopment" to justify colonization. The answer was two-fold: that Asians

were more concerned with religion than with material conditions, and social conditions were unchanging due to the existence of the Oriental Despot, who supposedly owned or controlled all the resources (especially water) and who exercised life-and-death control over all subjects. The result was a lack of motivation to invest, acquire skills or property, or make rebellions or political changes (Wittfogel 1957). (Japan's industrialization challenged this, but because Japan is an Asian country its development in the twentieth century "...ensured a more...effective penetration of normative Eurocentrism in East Asia" (Paik 2000: 74–75)).

Thus, Asian societies, like African ones, were constructed to give the West a counter- image of itself, and concealed the functioning of the capitalist world-economy. Conflicts among the colonized could thus be explained away as "ages-old" religious conflicts or used to prevent unity against the colonizer. Colonization could be promoted as the herald of emancipation and change and a regulator of ancient sectarian (hence, irrational) conflicts. Oriental Studies devolved into Orientalism, a cultural construct, which sees the West as rational and the East as irrational and in need of "control" and modernizing, an image promoted in the media, literature, and the social sciences (Said 1979).

Two academic fields presenting Europeans as natural masters of the world have been geography and history. The various cartographic ways whereby the world is mapped carry subtle visual suggestions. The centering of the global map around the Atlantic; the exaggeration of the size of temperate and cold zones, and the presentation of the northern hemisphere (where Europe is located) on the upper side have connotations with respect to importance and hierarchy. Mercator's Projection, which combined these features, was consciously adopted in British maps after 1830 and influenced atlas and map-making in France, Germany, and the United States. Following Edward Quinn's *Historical Atlas* (1830), world atlases used colors to hierarchalize different parts of the world in accordance with the European evaluation of levels of civilization. Such maps were often used in schools. Thus,

children learned the appropriate social hierarchy of the world's peoples (Black 1997).

J. M. Blaut identified eight historians that he believed were *egregiously Eurocentric*: Max Weber, Lynn White, Robert Brenner, E. L. Jones, John Hall, Michael Mann, Jared Diamond and David Landes. Explanations of what made Europe world-dominating included references to: climate and geography, Christianity, personality traits, and social institutions. Weber alone relied on a straightforward racism (Blaut 2000: 200–202). These authors assumed that European domination can be understood by reference to Europe alone. Entirely missing was any mention of imperialism or expropriation of other societies' wealth. As these authors form part of the canon of European history, such historical constructions commonly appear in university curriculums and school textbooks. Thus, such views become "naturalized" among the population.

Economics has been Eurocentric ever since Adam Smith explained the differences between "civilized" nations and "the savage nations of hunters and fishers," with civilization bringing higher levels of consumption and general well-being, despite the fact that he possessed books which attested to the general well-being of hunter-gatherers (Marchionatti 2012). In the nineteenth century neoclassical economics assumed as normal a rational, self-interested individual who was utility-maximizing, subject only to his or her own tastes and budget constraint. Such behavior rejects the ethics of altruism or reciprocity (Mehmet 1995: 136–37). Economics is defined as the study of the efficient allocation of scarce resources through the market activities of hedonistic, rational humans, activities which result in the common good. While economists claim universal validity for this framework, it is Eurocentric insofar as non-capitalist societies practiced reciprocal exchanges and redistribution as well as market exchanges (Polanyi 1957). Economic development models which were implemented in decolonized countries after 1945 accepted the industrialized societies as the model to strive for (Hoogvelt 1997: 36). Economic growth in itself may be considered a Euroamerican goal.

International Relations is Eurocentric in its basis because its analytical unit, the nation state, is an institution that originated in Euramerica between the late eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century. Its theoreticians are mainly European. The field has been criticized for ignoring the legacy of colonialism (colonial conquests, anticolonial struggles, suppression of anti-colonial struggles, the relations of colonies and neo-colonies with dominating states), and the counter-insurgency activities of dominating states in the periphery and semi-periphery during the Cold War. There has been no sustained analysis of major wars in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, Chad, Congo or Liberia (Gruffydd Jones 2006).

Eurocentricity in Time Perspective and Challenges to It

Eurocentricity has had a long history. Its origins may go back to ancient Greece where, in the dramas of Aeschylus and Euripedes, Asia, "...that hostile 'other' beyond the seas... speaks through and by virtue of the European imagination..." (Said 1979: 56). In the Middle Ages, Europeans posited an ideological dichotomy between Christendom, then largely coterminous with Europe, and 'others', dangerous infidels who required conquest and/or conversion.

A type of civilizational project can be discerned during the Spanish conquest of the Americas. It imposed Christianity on Native Americans and constructed them as Spanish peasants, while it institutionalized Africans as non-humans and therefore enslaveable (Todorov 1992). This hierarchalized an "international division of labor."

Seventeenth century English settlers in North America justified the expulsion of Native Americans from their lands with the notion that the Natives did not make the land "productive" in the Lockean sense -i.e. did not make commercial use of their land- nor privatize it as property. This was against Natural Law. Reference to Natural Law appealed to the educated elite. Ordinary people used the rationale that Native Americans did not use the same housing forms, clothing styles,

food, legal or religious frameworks and marriage customs as Europeans did. They were therefore savages, and so, removable (Hodgen 1967).

The Enlightenment was ambiguous in its attitude towards non-Western peoples. Voltaire admired China. West European high society welcomed visits from South Sea Island natives. Yet the Enlightenment thought about non-Europeans was contradictory -they were "simultaneously exotic and familiar, exemplary and exploitable." While advocating the "brotherhood of Man" the Enlightenment thinkers could not bring themselves to condemn slavery, perhaps because many of them had interests in the transatlantic trades. The eighteenth century saw the start of classification of humans by physical appearance (Outram 1995).

In the nineteenth century Africa, China, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia were brought into the capitalist world-economy, the exploitation of India intensified, and the US government carried out genocide on the Great Plains. The motive for these expansionary policies was to obtain new sources of raw materials, cheap labor, land and markets. French colonial occupations were justified by the term *mission civilizatrice.* The British had their own model for the 'civilizing mission' based on Darwin's concept of evolution. A notion of historical stages with Europe at the apex of a developmental hierarchy was promulgated by Herbert Spenser. In Liberal mainstream thinking, Europeans had a right and a duty to "civilize" non-Europeans.

Karl Marx introduced his own stages, suggesting that all societies should pass through modes of production characterised as primitive communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist. This scheme reflected the Liberal notion of progress, and was distilled from European history. Marx (1853) was ambiguous on the effects of colonialism; but in his later work he had second thoughts about historical stages (Lindner 2011). However, *Marxists* made his early scheme of consecutive stages into a dogma.

Eurocentricity was first challenged in the 1930s and 1940s in the work of A. Appadurai, C. L. R. James, R. P. Dutt, Eric Williams and van Leur (Blaut 2000: 8). After World War II

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colonized territories became politically independant. Anti-Eurocentric scholarship continued. "Third World" scholars such as Ramkrishna Mukherjee (1957), and Walter Rodney (1972) exposed colonialism's destructiveness; Anouar Abdel-Malek (1977) predicted cultural revival in the "Third World." Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* books (1987, 1991, 2006) raised an Afro-centric challenge to the civilizational project. Marshall Sahlins' 1974 study of hunter-gatherers showed that non-technologically advanced people could be affluent -living within their means, they were people of leisure amidst plenty. In 1972 Arno Peter's map of the world gave greater emphasis to the southern hemisphere (Black 1997). Yet Western ideas of state formation, economics, household practices, ideologies of gendering, race, and ethnicity as well as their opposites informed politics almost universally (Dirlik 1999: 9–10).

After 1949 the US government promoted the idea of "development" primarily to make raw materials available on world markets (Hoogvelt 1997: 35), but also as a weapon in the Cold War. The intellectual underpinning for "development" was modernization theory popularized by W. W. Rostow (1960). (It is no accident that the subtitle of Rostow's book was "... *a non-Communist manifesto*.") Poverty in the Third World was ascribed to stagnant traditionalism. Rostow adopted the stageist view of history, and suggested that all countries model their societies on Western nations in order to "catch up" with them economically. In practice "development" meant industrialization and Western-style consumerism.

Dependency theory was a reaction to modernization theory. S. Amin (1988), A. G. Frank (1967), W. Rodney (1972) and others showed how structural relations between the metropole, or core countries (Euramerica) and colonies or semi-colonies in Latin America, Africa and Asia, caused and deepened economic polarization between these groups, which explained underdevelopment. There could be no catching up.

For Frank there were no stages. Amin criticized Marxist dogma for universalizing *European* stages, but invented other stages. Amin wished to

revive the Enlightenment universalism that recognized the validity of all humans, but his view that all societies could become capitalist was Eurocentric. All Dependency theorists were Eurocentric, because of the implied assumption that all societies aspired to the consumption and life-styles of the Western metropoles.

Immanuel Wallerstein, the main exponent of World-Systems Analysis, also criticized developmentalism, and challenged Liberal epistemologies in the social sciences. World-Systems analysis is not a theory but a lense through which may be seen the historical processes by which Euramerica (and now Japan) have increasingly dominated the rest of the world in a social system called capitalism. Capitalism has structures. One is the division of the world into three economic zones: the core, highly developed and wealthy; the periphery, ruralized and impoverished; and the semi-periphery, an intermediate zone. An alliance between capitalists and the state was another structure, and households of a certain type were another. Capitalism also has typical processes: commoditization, proletarianization, and incorporation into the system to name a few. Labor has historically been waged, slave labor, or near gratis labor: serf, debt bondage or household (usually women). There is a world-scale division of labor in which, where any individual stands has been determined by race, ethnicity, gender and class. There is a dynamic between core, periphery and semi-periphery in which historically the core became wealthy at the expense of the periphery. World-Systems proponents do not see modernism as good; the Industrial Revolution was not the apex of human achievement; and historically capitalism is thought to have generated a negative balance sheet for the world's peoples and environment.

World-Systems Analysis, International Political Economy and Dependency have recently come under attack from Global History, Post-Colonial, and Subaltern Studies. Global History scholars purport to be anti-Eurocentric because they claim capitalism or modernity (and therefore rationality) developed in ancient Chinese and Islamic civilizations. They base this claim on the existence of long-distance trade in these

civilizations. Hence Europe was not exceptional. Examples of the Global History school are Andre Gunder Frank's and Barry Gills' *The World System—Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand* (1993), John Hobson's *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization* (2004) and Janet Abu Lughod's *Before European Hegemony* (1989). Meanwhile, Post-Colonialism and Subaltern Studies claim to attack Eurocentricity by rejecting "meta-narratives" or "foundational narratives" which their practitioners say erase differences among peoples, ignore the local, deny subjectivity to the colonized or subalterns in their own history (Bahl and Dirlik 2000).

Wallerstein's answer is that Global Historians are *very* Eurocentric because: they have no substantive basis on which to argue for capitalism in former societies, and we still have to account for the European conquest of the world. Most importantly, "[Their] view of... history... accepts the significance of the European 'achievement' in precisely the terms that Europe defined it..." (Wallerstein 1999: 179). True anti-Eurocentricity rejects the idea that what Europe did was an achievement. Finally, Eurocentricity leaves no room for alternative possibilities.

Bahl and Dirlik (2000) accuse Frank of attempting to "erase capitalism from history." They contend that Global History does this in order to hide the fact that globalization is really modernization theory, but in a new guise - one in which the dominant players are as likely to be members of Third World elites as Western ones. Bahl and Dirlik suggest that Post-Modernism, Post-Colonialism, and Subaltern Studies disguise the recolonization of the world, and that dismissing meta narratives "...makes it impossible to confront power systematically." In their promotion of "difference" practitioners of these intellectual trends become complicit in the defusion of collective resistance to this process.

According to Dirlik (1999), culturalist critiques of Eurocentricity provide no explanation for its hegemony. What is needed is a connection to the political economy of imperialism. The notion that "to speak of oppression... erase[s] the subjectivities of the oppressed" ignores the fact that not to speak of oppression "...is to return

the responsibility for oppression to its victims," while Third World revolutions are a reassertion of subjectivities (Dirlik 1999: 16, 21).

Conclusion: Toward a New Universalism

Many have pointed out that the response to Eurocentricity cannot be positing other ethnic-centrisms; this would not comprise a project for humanity. If capitalism is intolerable and unsustainable, a new universal project is called for.

The findings that societies have through most of history successfully constructed redistributive systems and practiced reciprocal exchanges outside markets, and that non-market-dominated societies have enjoyed affluence, seriously question the assertions of the advocates of capitalism with respect to human nature. Hence a universalist project to replace the system that Eurocentricity has been used to maintain may have to be constructed from the wealth of knowledge and historical experiences of all societies.

Cross-References

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▶ Orientalism
▶ Racism and Imperialism
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Eurocentrism

▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism
▶ James Connolly: Labor, Empire, Ireland

Eurocentrism and Imperialism

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Introduction

Human development is a process whereby transformations take place as a result of social change and political struggle between opposing forces. It

would be naive to believe that the process of transformation is the result of a painless natural selection progression. Historians in the Marxist tradition are aware of the dialectics of history-making as the result of the balance of forces between different actors/agencies in a social formation. In the worlds of Karl Marx:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. (Marx (1852/1958): 247)

Not only is history made under conditions not chosen by the people involved, but interpretations of the transformation processes confront each other and reflect an arena of struggle where opposing positions face each other. This axiom applies with equal strength, or even more forcibly, in the case of conflict in the sphere of inter-societies and interstate contradictions. Nowhere else is this recognition of the limits of history-making as exposed as in the explication of the capitalist world system and the divisions created through its *modus operandi*.

The study of world history is still at the stage of groping with the task of assembling the various narratives of the different parts of the world in order to make sense of their contributions to the project of conceptualizing and understanding the development of global capitalism which has led to the present state of world order/disorder. Simply stated, the problematique is to what extent the "European Miracle" (capitalism) was a self-made and independent endeavor which didn't require the contribution of non-European peoples and civilizations. As the anthropologist Jack Goody formulates, the problem is related to the fact that the interpretation of world history has been hijacked and monopolized by the traditional European narrative:

> 'The theft of history' ... refers to the take-over of history by the west. That is, the past is conceptualized and presented according to what happened on the provincial scale of Europe, often Western Europe, and then imposed upon the rest of the world. That continent makes many claims to having invented a range of value-laden institutions such as 'democracy', mercantile 'capitalism', freedom, individualism. However, these institutions are found over a much widespread range of human societies. (Goody 2006: l)

However, reluctantly there is an increasing confrontation within the realm of social sciences concerning the appropriate historical paradigm for understanding the origin and formation of the process of capitalist expansion encompassing the entire world.

One suggestion finds the attempts at creating a "world history" while seeking to avoid over-estimation of the European contribution to be legitimate (Bihr 2018). This notwithstanding, it comes with warnings that this should not lead to the notion that the West had not, initially, been the main actor in this process of globalization and the transition from feudalism to capitalism. However, the paradigm of development which gives prevalence to an interpretation-based "European exceptionalism" and "non-European backwardness" fails to explicate the reasons for the divide between "early comers" and "late comers" in the evolution and growth of human history and underplays the question of imperialism as the organizational pattern of the world to serve the interests of the "European Miracle." The supposition that capitalist imperialism was/is a benevolent philanthropic model and pattern of political economic relations conducive to the establishment of a harmonious commonality deserves to be questioned and rejected as not consistent with past or present experience and reality.

The Clash of Narratives

The global system which entailed the forced submission of non-European peoples in the world to serve the interests of the Atlantic imperialist states was/is central to the rise of the ideological superstructure encapsulated in the implicit notion of "Eurocentrism." As a consequence, the praxis of the so-called advanced core nations attributed to Westerners the vocation of imposing worldwide capitalism and presenting Europe's model of development as the key for the emancipation of non-Europeans. However, the economic, political, and ideological hegemonic project under the slogans of "The White Man's Burden" and

"mission civilisatrice" did not aim at the universalization of the world's peoples from the colonization period up to the present. As posited by Samir Amin, the discourse of Western universalism is convoluted:

> Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different peoples. Eurocentrism is therefore anti-universalist, since it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. But it does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our time. (Amin 1989: VII)

The corollary to the European (Western) constructs of capitalism and colonialism was the emergence of political imperialism which expressed itself, on the one hand, in the reduction of non-Europe to a sublevel and, on the other hand, in a structure of competition between advanced capitalist nations for extraterritorial aggrandizement and, of course, the control and access to economic resources. The division by the core nation-states of the territories and colonies in the periphery led to interstate antagonisms and competition between imperialist powers. The struggle for colonies and semicolonies outside the European cultural sphere encouraged the emergence of military conflicts and wars between various "advanced" nations. Imperialism in this sense resonated with the *Pax Britannica* as not necessarily characterized by direct conquest of states but on having the social and ideological power of the bourgeoisie become the leitmotif of hegemony during this phase of dominance. Liberal imperialism characterized a new phase slowly being replaced by the welfare nationalist state (Cox 1981: 142). Old and new imperialism simply denote the incorporation of the periphery into the exchange relations where the main difference was direct or indirect control over the state apparatus and thereby linking colonies more closely to their imperialist metropoles.

As Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy put it in their book, *Monopoly Capital*, the question of the relationship between capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, and militarism has a past history which is affecting the present-day structure of the international system:

> From its earliest beginnings in the Middle Ages capitalism has always been an international system. And it has always been a hierarchical system with one or more metropolises at the top, completely dependent colonies at the bottom and many degrees of superordination and subordination in between. (Baran and Sweezy, p. 178)

The importance of the features of imperialism was/is crucial to the functioning of the system from the very beginning of European capitalism but whose context have been ignored or denied by liberal economists as well as underestimated by some Marxist social scientists. The question of whether imperialist militarism was a function of capitalism or the reverse is of academic relevance in the present era. To a certain degree, the recognition of the primal synergy between capitalism and imperialism represents a challenge to the Leninist conceptualization of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism (Lenin 1917/1951). In the words of Baran and Sweezy, militarism not only played an important role in the capitalist development until today as "... it would be quite impossible to understand the role of armed forces in capitalist societies without placing the international character of the system at the very center of the analytic focus" (ibid.).

The Contemporary World Order/ Disorder

The analysis of the contemporary world order/ disorder created needs to reflect on the dichotomies of the past. Present-day modernity is in fact the child of the genesis of capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, and militarism pitting nations against one another. Seen through this prism, the twentieth century showed itself to be an epoch of various transformations in the world system of capitalism: inter-imperialist conflicts, World War I, the Socialist Revolution in Russia, the Great Depression, World War II, atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US attempt at establishing a regime of benevolent domination over "collective imperialism," survival of the USSR in the war against Nazism, the rise of the Cold War, the Keynesian Welfare State, the military-industrial complex,   the   decolonization   and   national

liberation movements of the colonies, the Maoist victory in the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War pitting the US against North Korea and China, the Cuban Revolution, the wars in Indochina, the rise of the Japanese and East Asian capitalist developmental state, the demise of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of socialism in Europe, the rise of the neoliberal counterrevolution and globalization, the end of Cold War I, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the neoconservative upsurge and the unipolar moment of US "full-spectrum dominance," the restart of Cold War II, the rise of the People's Republic of China as the second economy in the capitalist world system, 9/11 and World Trade Center, the US-led war on terrorism, as well as the destabilization of the Greater Middle East.

All these interrelated and interconnected events lead to the conclusion that the present turbulence in the world is subsumed in essence to the downturn in the economic and political ability and capability of US hegemony. How can the analysis of present world disorder be interpreted in any other way than showing the contours of the future world system? How does an "America First" strategy harmonize with the centrifugal tendencies which "Making America Great Again" are bound to release on the international plan? These aspects of the Donald Trump "doctrine" that acknowledges a certain weakness ought not to be seen, however, as a repudiation of the foreign policy doctrines of previous administrations projecting superiority and power.

Contrary to the proclamation of the "end of history," the world order is going through seismic rumblings below the surface that are bound to bring about a tectonic transformation that will affect the future landscape of geopolitics and economic structures. That we are going through such a transition is discernible for those who refuse to be blinded by ideology. It is apparent that this work in progress is an ongoing process which the dominating Western discourse and political practice attempt to hide behind a curtain of ignorance and the use of "weapons of mass distraction"!

To measure the scope and distance of the ideological discourse that arose on the heels of the victory of the West in the Cold War against the USSR, it is worth reflecting on what Francis Fukuyama explicitly had in mind concerning the future of the hegemony of the United States following the meltdown of the Soviet Union. He was proclaiming an end of the socialist ideological challenge to liberal democracy which later morphed into the neoconservative hubris of perpetuating "the unipolar moment" through the expansion of the scope of global US supremacy. In the last instance, this meant, implicitly, a vision of permanent American hegemony in the world system:

> What we are witnessing, is not just the end of the cold war, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama 1989: 1)

Contrary to this agenda-driven mindset, the task at hand for sociopolitical science is not only to identify the forces at work and their interplay but likewise to project the contours of the future organization of the world (i.e., a US-driven unipolarism versus a Russo-Chinese-driven multipolarism). The attempt to conceptualize and contextualize the ontological transformation that is in store requires a toolbox which only inclusive economic history can provide. The difficulties that arise in this context are related to the fact that history is not an objective and neutral field of study in the Weberian mold but a battleground between different ideologies, actors, agencies, and causes. Thus, while history is an objective process, its comprehension is subjective as suggested by the development economist Gunnar Myrdal.

The ideological and political struggle encapsulated in the interpretation of history was also recognized by George Orwell. The following formulation in his book *1984* is heuristic and helpful in contextualizing historical development: "Those who control the present control the past and those who control the past control the future." Thus, as the present analysis aims to show, the shape of the future will depend on the outcome of the contemporary contradictions and struggles within the world system. History may be made by people, but not in conditions of their own

choosing, as Marx wrote in the context of the defeat of the French Revolution.

The road to the resolution of present and future conflicts and contradictions is twisted and open-ended. The complexities of the contemporary dichotomy, i.e., world order/disorder, are related to the constellation of forces on the international stage. In essence, the future prospects will depend on the outcome of the age-long non-European challenge to the prevailing historical Western dominance of the capitalist system. This awareness was recognized by the political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, who, in opposition to the end of history thesis, promoted the "clash of civilizations" as the new paradigm of international relations. Although this construct did not in fact exclusively focus on ethnicity and cultural/civilizational differences between the Muslim world and the West, it became popularized almost exclusively as a confrontation between Christianity and Islam, especially after the 9/11 destruction of the World Trade Center in New York. (It ought to be pointed out that "the 9/11 Commission Report" did not conclusively prove Jihadist participation in the hijacking of the planes. Nevertheless, the crime opened a window of opportunity for the United States to wage war first on Afghanistan and Iraq to be followed by the wars against Libya and Syria.)

Writing before 9/11, Samuel P. Huntington projected an alliance between Confucian and Islamic countries based on economic complementarities which would challenge the existing Western world order. The assumed perspective was that the resulting confrontation would pit the West against the Rest (Huntington 1993).

Consequently, he was warning that the Western world needed to take this menace seriously and consolidate its political and military unity. Simultaneously and bringing balance in his thesis, he showed awareness to the fact that the expansion of the West and the emergence of the European capitalist world system that had taken place during and following the industrial revolution had not been the result of a harmonious cultural/political process, but had been the outcome of the application of force and coercion:

> The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do. (Huntington 1998: 51)

The juxtaposing of the two opposite post-Cold War paradigms, from within the US foreign policy establishment, concerning the state of the world can help clarify the trajectory of the development of modern capitalism and perhaps its destination. While Fukuyama is respectful and in awe of liberal democracy, failing to mention the historical costs this process entailed, Huntington on the other hand touches upon the collateral damage of "organized violence" the West imposed on the rest. Nevertheless, neither positions projected rejection of "American exceptionalism" whose birthmark, "Manifest Destiny," is to be found in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 whereby the United States declared itself to be the sole "protector" of Latin America from the European imperialist powers.

The Shape and Trajectory of Historical Capitalism

It is undeniable that the historical contact between Europe and the rest significantly influenced the rise and trajectory of Western capitalism. In this connection the question of the costs and burdens imposed by the West on the non-Europeans has not been given its proper due by mainstream sociopolitical science. Consequently it is mentioning that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx, from different ideological positions, recognized the importance of the (forced) contribution by the non-Western world to the emergence and direction of European capitalism. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith goes as far as to note that "The discovery of America, and that of the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest events recorded in the history of mankind." Simultaneously and in contrast to his present-day adherents, the "father" of classical economics expressed skepticism concerning the

benefits these great occurrences would bring to the non-European peoples (Frank 1998: 13).

Almost a century later, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, adjusting to the time laps with the publication date of Smith's magnum opus, were even more adamant and explicit in their acknowledgment of the importance of the "discoveries" for the transition of European feudalism to capitalism:

> The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development. ...Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. (Marx and Friedrich (1872/1958): 35)

Not only is there no explicit mention of the non-European contribution in this document, but the "fathers" of socialism/communism actually praised the forceful expansion of industrial capitalism relative to what at that time were called inferior societies. They expressed that the transformation of the world is ascribed to a dynamic European capitalism:

> The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese wall, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. (op cit.: 38)

It is not possible to conclude that Karl Marx was unaware of the connection between national capitalisms and the world economy. However, in the opinion of Baran and Sweezy, Marx did understand the determining importance of the international structure of capitalism but, because of the plan of the project of writing *Capital* as well as the fact that Marx did not live to complete his work, has given the impression that he considered the international character of the system to be of secondary importance or significance. This made many later-day Marxists insist on assuming that capitalism as an international system could only be understood as a collection of national capitalisms (Baran and Sweezy op. cit., p.178).

Regardless of the dominance of the discourse of Christianity in Europe, the trajectory of European national capitalisms that took place together with the globalization of a capitalist world economy was far from being a natural peaceful process. As put by Karl Polanyi, while "primitive" economies (meaning precapitalist societies) were built on social obligations and coercion, modern market/capitalist economies depended on deliberate state action/intervention in society. Consequently "regulation and markets, in effect, grew up together" (Polanyi (1944/1957): 68). The evolution toward the development of capitalism depended on a process of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter) of traditional society. This destruction was implemented in both the European context and in the realm of colonialism. To quote Polanyi once again:

> Eighteen century society unconsciously resisted any attempt at making it a mere appendage of the market. No market economy was conceivable that did not include a market for labor, but to establish such a market, especially in England's rural civilization, implied no less than the wholesale destruction of the traditional fabric of society." (Polanyi ibid.: 76)

Politics and violence likewise played a determining role in shaping the world from the time of the conquest of the Americas, the European-dominated triangular trade between Africa, Americas, and East Asia (China and India), the transfer of slaves to the plantations of the Americas, the colonization of Africa, and settler colonialism in South and North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand. All these activities contributed to the creation of the international division of labor whose implementation became the mission of the military enforcement agencies of the metropolises.

Consequently, while the European project of creating "a world after its own image" (Marx) succeeded, it took more than enforced commercial and trading relations to establish the world system of capitalism. Of greater significance than the economics and politics involved in the process

was the fact that European ideological dominance portrayed itself as the prototype model for non-Europe to emulate. At the same time though, the colonial powers (chiefly England) were doing everything possible to prevent others (including European latecomers) from catching up or reaching a higher stage (Chang 2002). This British developmental strategy fomented conflictual relationships which would inherently lead to colonial wars and inter-imperialist armed conflicts.

The Entrance of International Political Economy

The argument can be made that the world expansion of European capitalism created the need for an analytical toolbox to understand the direction of its past trajectory as well as its perceived destination. Unfortunately for the sake of comprehending the workings of the system, the dominant narrative has until relatively recently been monopolized by proto-Westernized social and political sciences. Critics of this dominance in Western theory-building realized that this was related to the fact that it was embedded in Eurocentrism. The political scientist Robert C. Cox makes the point that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (Cox 1981: 128). The meaning, in the context of the present analysis, is that international theory-building has not produced a value-free universalist paradigm of interstate relations. Instead, international relation has provided a body of knowledge that celebrates and defends Western civilization as the main subject and player of world politics. According to one scholar, Eurocentrism can take varied forms which can be imperialist-friendly or anti-imperialist (Hobson 2012). In our optic, though, we would argue that Eurocentrism should mainly be seen as an ideology that is imperialist-friendly.

This state of affairs makes it imperative to critique the established status quo paradigm because it prioritizes the conceptualization of the world as the domain of Western hegemony and control. As the social scientist Ziauddin Sardar puts it, in a developmental context, the control of the tools of analysis and definitions of

concepts by the West needs to be understood and seriously opposed:

> The real power of the West is not located in its economic muscle and technological might. Rather, it resides in its power to define. ... To understand Eurocentrism we thus have to deconstruct the definitional power of the West. (Sardar 1999: 44)

Especially with regard to the conceptualization of the interstate system, did the question of Eurocentrism create its share of fallacies and misunderstandings? Not least in the comprehension of imperialism as a benign bearer of change and transformation. It is necessary to understand that in fact the tensions that came to the fore in the field of international affairs and interstate relations in the context of the world system's expansion and institutionalization were more related to the rise of imperialism and interstate competitive relations than to idealistic and realism motivations. As two students of international relations note: "The discipline of IR had its real beginnings in the study of imperialism, not in world order, as has so often been suggested" (Olson and Groom 1991:47).

As children of their time, nearly all known classical theorists, including Karl Marx (who it seems never used the term imperialism), the liberal British politician John A. Hobson, and the Russian revolutionary Lenin, were to various degrees Eurocentric in their analyses of capitalism as a world system (Wilson 2005: Chap. 5). Their approach toward imperialism and the colonies was to a large extent affected by economism as their focus centered mostly on the question of economic surplus creation and utilization/reproduction in the metropoles, with Great Britain as the principal exemplar (Hobson 1902). The axiomatic and intrinsically contradiction between underconsumption and income distribution played a key role in their conceptualization of surplus absorption through the export of capital.

Essentially this was a natural follow-up to Marx's assumption concerning the expansion of capitalism in non-Europe, which he originally saw as a positive development since it would inevitably lead to the negation of capitalism and fit in with the unilinear scheme of historical development. According to this schematization of human evolution, humanity had gone through different

stages of societal transformation from primitive communism, slave society, feudalism, and capitalism before arriving at the stages of socialism and communism. The first two stages being relegated to the status of prehistoric social formations, feudalism, and capitalism are singled out for putting humanity on the path of socialism.

At the time of the *Manifesto*, the projection of European history as valid for non-European history-making reveals a Eurocentric ideological deformation. Samir Amin, for instance, rejects the dominant view of world history which posits a progression from the Greco-Roman classical world to Christian feudalism and the European capitalist system as it excludes the Arab Islamic world or the so-called Asiatic mode of production (China and India). In order to surmount the hurdle created by the utilization of the non-inclusive notion of European feudalism, Samir Amin proposes the more inclusive concept of "tributary mode of production and accumulation" with different modalities applicable to especially East Asia and the Arab world (Amin 2010).

The critique of the Marxian approach encapsulated in a schematic Eurocentric historical narrative has given rise to serious criticisms leveled against the authors of the *Manifesto*. One such criticism shares that: "The general tone of Marx's views on the non-European world is set in *The Communist Manifesto*" (Avineri 1968: l). The charges laid at Marx's door concerning his interpretation of world history as based on Eurocentrism is to be taken seriously. In his book *ReORIENT*, Andre Gunter Frank goes as far as exorcizing Marx and Engels from the ranks of critical anti-imperialist scholars.

This notwithstanding, basing the critique of Marx mostly because of some formulations found in the *Manifesto* when Marx and Engels were in their early 20s shows a certain narrowness of mind as well as scholarly fatigue or more seriously being part of a hidden agenda to reduce the appeal of Marxism in the non-European world.

Methodologically the question that arises is whether Karl Marx was a hard-core Eurocentrist immune to the irregularities that weakened the central axioms of Eurocentrism as implied by the critics. We know with Thomas Kuhn (1962) that

the scientific method consists in incorporating the anomalies that question the accepted norms and narratives, thus bringing new understanding and interpretation of a phenomenon to a higher level.

Consequently, it should be pointed out as Samir Amin did in one of his last writings that "Marx himself continuously developed and revised his views throughout his lifetime" (Amin 2018: 17). As a matter of fact, it can be argued that this appears to have been part of the method employed by Marx. As shown by various scholars, this way of doing scientific work involves revising one's assumptions and certainties when accessing new knowledge concerning the object of analysis. In the words of Kevin Anderson:

> Over the years, I will argue, his perspectives on these [non-European] societies evolved. In the 1840s he held to an implicitly unilinear perspective, sometimes tinged with ethnocentrism, according to which non-Western societies would necessarily be absorbed into capitalism and then modernized via colonialism and the world market. But over time, his perspective evolved toward one that was more multilinear, leaving the future development of these societies as an open question. (Anderson 2010: 2)

It has been argued that Marx's adherence to the unilinear scheme of societal change was related to the intellectual mood of evolutionism which was particularly strong in European thought at the time. The strength of this mindset is its acceptance of change as a necessary element of reality, while its most important lacuna was the optimism and unilinear determinism ascribed to it. According to Teodor Shanin who makes this point, Marx seemed to have been unhappy with the unilinear simplicities of the evolutionary scheme. The way out of this conundrum laid in the conceptualizing of a more complex and more realistic global heterogeneity of social forms and interdependence:

> In consequence and already by 1853 Marx had worked out and put to use the concepts of Oriental Despotism and of the Asiatic Mode of Production, its close synonym, as a major theoretical supplement and alternative to unilinear explanations. (Shanin 1983:. 4–5)

Unfortunately the exit from the evolutionism schema via the acceptance of a more heterogeneity-based understanding of societal

formations did not signify a clear-cut break with Eurocentrism. At the same time, and in relation to the critiques of Marx for placing the capitalism of Europe as the model to be followed ought to be tempered with his other writings criticizing the ideological construction of European exceptionalism and superiority. This comes to light in his analysis of British rule in India:

> The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. (Marx 1853, n.d.: 88)

Not only did Marx show contempt for the violence involved in the implementation of colonialism especially in India and China, but he was becoming more open to the possibility of these social formations taking over the lead of the march toward socialism and thereby implicitly the possibility of bypassing capitalism. In an article published in the "New York Daily Tribune" in 1853, Marx ironically raises the paradox of a more politically advanced Asia:

> It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom and economy of government, may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire [China],-the very opposite of Europe,-than on any other political cause that now exists ... [Marx, no date: 15] See also the discussion in Wolfe (1997: 391–393)

Remarks such as these showed comprehension by Marx of the evolution of non-Europe which had been subjugated to European (British) colonialism as well as a rejection of the xenophobic overtones of the ideological construct of Eurocentrism. Unfortunately, residues of this mindset have survived in latent form and are increasingly becoming once again part of the Western's paradigm in world affairs.

Eurocentrism as the Avatar of Imperialism

Following the defeat of Fascism and Nazism in World War II, open "scientific" racism and "raw" imperialist discourses were erased from the dominant Western body of theories of international relations as the task now was to make room for the inclusion of the postcolonial world as newly independent nation-states. During the conflict in the European theater, troops from the colonies had participated in the war against Nazism and had thus been introduced to the democracy discourse of the colonial metropoles and the Soviet ideology of socialism. Likewise African-Americans had fought in the segregated US troop contingent in Europe and the Pacific to save democracy, while, at home, American society was still struggling with segregation and the legacy of slavery.

Consequently, the emerging Third World entity had to be integrated in a new institutional framework and ideology of postcolonialism based on a value system of universalism and acknowledgment of interdependence. Simultaneously the emergence of a socialist bloc (essentially the Soviet Union and China) impacted on the balance of forces between the hegemonic countries (the Western powers and former colonial metropoles) and the new nation-states who were now becoming members of the United Nations. With the entrance of these newly liberated countries on the diplomatic stage, the task that arose in the post-1945 world called for a necessary overhaul of Western colonialist ideology and terminology (Eurocentrism). Not to be forgotten, of course, was the emergence of the USSR as a competitor to the capitalist world and as the promoter of a socialist ideology and development model. Consequently the debates concerning British or American dominance contributed to the replacement of the concept *hegemony* with neorealism and liberal theories, while the notions of "civilization versus barbarism" were modified to the notions of "modernity versus tradition" (Hobson 2012: 10).

As a consequence of the complexities of decolonization, the implicit recycling of Eurocentrism, by modernization theory, propelled the Western capitalist economies as the development model to be emulated by the "new" nations. This discourse appears to have been used as an ideological cover thrown over the past in order to disguise the brutality of the organized violence of colonialism. This period of world history cannot be understood

without reference to "the structures of power that EuroAmerica produced over the last five centuries, which in turn produced Eurocentrism, globalized its effects, and universalized its historical claims" (Dirlik 1999: 8).

By projecting the European capitalist model of development during the post-World War II period, Eurocentrism became the cultural and ideological vindication for the imperialism of the West. In this context, it is significant to point out a main difference between two types of colonialism/imperialism. While in pre-World War II, European direct rule colonialism was territory-based to the extent that the colonies were seen as the property of the colonialist powers, American imperialist strategy did not, on the whole, take over the administration of colonies. As the US victor of World War II had not participated in territory-based colonialism, apart from the Philippines, the discourse of modernization signified the reentrance of a type of neocolonialism similar to the indirect rule the United States had practiced toward the independent nations of South America. The dependency of these countries was thus based principally on economic ties with the United States, but as sovereign nations, while simultaneously "protected" by Washington from European imperialism since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine (see Julien (1968), Arévalo (1961), and Nearing and Freeman (1966)).

The modernization school of development theory, by offering the Western capitalist model, recycled the Eurocentric-based supposition that the natives of the developing countries were incapable of devising their own paths. Like old wine in new bottles, the basic assumption of European superiority is implicitly recognized. In this way, the legacy of European colonialism is reproduced in more modern settings such as an environment of nominal political independence.

Consequently, modernization theory implicitly depicted colonial subjects as childlike, uncivilized, backward, and weak in contrast to the perceived material and moral superiority of European/Western civilization. Seen in this perspective, the ideological construct was/is the product of inherent racism, which Pieterse views it as "the psychology of imperialism, the spirit of

empire, because racism supplies the element that makes for the righteousness of empire. Hence racism is not simply a by-product of empire but... part of the intestines of empire" (Pieterse 1990: 223). Hobson alternates a dialectical relationship by ascribing a *pioneering agency* to the Western imperialist countries, who in their self-serving imperial civilizing mission, i.e., "paternalist Eurocentrism," are able to "auto-generate or auto-develop into modernity while conversely Eastern societies are granted *conditional agency* and are unable to auto-generate or self-develop" (Hobson 2012: 6).

Understanding the Modus Operandi of Capitalism

Like all living organism, capitalism, as an organic socioeconomic and political structure and organization pattern of human activities, has a past, present, and future. These three parameters are dependent upon one another for the survival and expansion of the system. Seen in this light, the history of capitalism needs to be understood in order to comprehend the present opportunities and dangers which may influence the shape of the future(s). In this context, the comprehension of the system is itself a subject of confrontation between at least three main bodies of perspectives or ideologies, liberalism, economic nationalism, and Marxism, which at the same time contributed to the implementation and generation of varied forms of capitalism on the world scale.

When this is said, projecting the Western experience with societal development as the ideal-type model for newly independent former colonies was a cynical attempt to deflect attention from the responsibility of imperialist nations for the state of underdevelopment in the postcolonial Third World nations and their continuous exploitation. This was done consciously by conventional Western social scientists during the decolonization period and in competition with proto-Marxist interpretations of imperialism. The volume by W.W. Rostow "The Stages of Economic Growth" with the subtitle: "A Non-Communist Manifesto" (Rostow 1960) exemplified the attempt to cement

Eurocentrism in development studies while implicitly seeming to attack Marx's disputable thesis of unilinear development.

While the "dependency school" of development studies rejected and criticized "modernization theory" for its projection of the Western model based on integration in the international division of labor, a tendency within the Marxist approach seemed to accept arguments of the stages of economic growth. Thus, the theoretician, Bill Warren, attempted to turn the table on the Leninist understanding of imperialism as well as the dependency approach for its rejection of relations with the capitalist world (delinking!) in favor of greater "self-reliance" in socioeconomic and political development. As indicated in the provocative title of his book, Warren was implying that imperialism in fact had not exploited the periphery enough and that the expansion of Western imperialism was a pioneer of development in the Third World! (Warren 1980).

It is not our aim here to take a position pro or against this approach to development, but it is worth signaling that the demise of socialism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe, as well as the opening of China (and Vietnam!) to the capitalist world market changed the apparent balance of forces between socialism and capitalism toward the closing of the last century. Even Cuba and North Korea are knocking at the door wanting to become involved in world trade and liberalization of their economies in a capitalist direction. (We will come back to this problematic toward the end of this analysis.)

The question that arises in this connection is whether the globalization of capitalism is an all-inclusive process which will guarantee all participants decent rewards in the form of basic standards of living and protection from the ecological problems and climate change which the existing mode of capitalist production participated in creating. Will the future world be as flat as the US journalist Thomas Friedman promised?

In order to answer this question, the process of capitalist production and distribution has to be taken into consideration. Can the system accommodate the expectations that have/are being created? To what extent was the conceptualization of

the world in the schematic categorization proposed by world system theory (Wallerstein 1974) which recognized a stratification of the global economy. According to this approach, the division of the capitalist international system is defined by three types of participation in the world economic and political system: (1) the core (under the hegemony of a leading nation), (2) the periphery (which includes most of the postcolonial world), and (3) the semi-periphery (the nations that have reached an intermediate space between the other two). The explanatory strength of the schema is due to the fact that it takes into consideration the upward or downward mobility over time of the nations composing the world system, for example, changes of hegemonic leadership over the core or movement of core nations to a higher or lower position. With regard to upward mobility from the periphery, three possibilities come to the fore: "Successful strategies of national upward mobility include 'promotion by invitation', 'self-reliance', and "seizing the chance" (Hoogvelt 1997: 60).

Needless to point out is that geopolitics as well as geo-economics played/plays a determining role in the strategic decisions of the American hegemonic power. This explains the contrast between US policies in Latin America preventing the emergence of economic growth strategies like those that were implemented in the East Asian model of the "developmental state." Likewise the convergence of Chinese willingness to open itself to the world market and the US acceptance of normal economic relations with China influenced the American geostrategic confrontation with the Soviet Union. This proved to be a short-term advantage for Washington. As far as China was concerned, the transformations in the geopolitical context of East Asia and the Cold War with Russia allowed the three strategies of upward mobility from the periphery to the core to be implemented.

It should be noted that the opening of the Chinese economy to the capitalist world system was not a departure from the Maoist model. In fact, it had been the United States that had attempted to isolate China through an economic boycott. Consequently, the strategy of self-reliance and delinking which the Chinese

leadership followed after the victory in the civil war was making a virtue of necessity.

Looking Back at the Genesis of Capitalism

The historical emergence of independent (liberated) former European capitalist colonies after World War II forced itself on the agenda of Western socioeconomic and political sciences. The difficulties of interpretation the new relationship between core and periphery were seemingly connected to the fact that capitalism is considered by many to be a structural construction rather than as a process giving it analytical fluidity.

Based on a prototype Marxian approach, the historian Henry Heller presents and discusses the origin of capitalism, its nature, as well as its sustainability now that the question of environmentalism has belatedly come to the fore. In the attempt to clarify the trajectory of capitalism, he offers a global perspective that includes the following four points of repair: "that capitalist development was drawn out over a long period, three centuries and counting; that class struggle and changes in the relations of production were historically decisive in their emergence and evolution; that home and world markets developed simultaneously; and that the territorial state was, and remains, an integral component of capitalism" (Heller 2011: 9).

Shaping the conceptualization and contextualization of capitalism are the narratives that can be derived from including the ideologies and perspectives which in time came to influence the evolution of this mode of production and distribution as well as its internationalization. What is implied here is that a methodology and categories of analysis have to be taken into consideration in such an endeavor. The implication of course is that in the course of its internationalization/globalization, capitalism affected other societies while these in return influenced its evolution. The result of this process was the rise of variants of capitalisms: core, periphery, and semi-periphery as well as different modalities in the implementation of development strategies. This opened the way for understanding the upward and downward mobility of nations in the world system as well as explaining wars and conflict in the age of imperialism.

The body of rivalling ideologies and perspectives that addressed the rise of capitalism and its trajectory was composed of liberalism, economic nationalism, and last but not least Marxism. These were not only descriptive analyses of the process involved but were also politicized doctrines as they each had sociopolitical agendas and agencies to push development forward in the preferred directions. In other words it would be erroneous to consider capitalism purely as an economic construct. As Henry Heller puts it, "Capitalism is certainly a mode of production, but it should not be looked upon in merely economic terms" (Heller 2011: xii).

Regardless of the logic behind this argument, such an approach is probably one of the main weaknesses of economic liberalist theory which operates on the assumption "that a market arises, spontaneously in order to satisfy human needs and that, once in operation, it functions in accordance with its own logic" (Gilpin 1987: 27). But operating with the notion of spontaneous market creation is a huge misunderstanding of the rise of capitalism or worse. Historically, the transition from feudalism to capitalism was a highly politicized process which, although underplayed by economic liberalism, needs to be recognized. The approach to market creation and the transition to capitalism were not, and could not be, in the context of social change, anything but the result of violent struggles and class creation. The dispossession of agrarian laborers in order to force them into the new industrial production structure could not be left to the forces of nature (Thompson 1963/1968).

As the scholar of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, Karl Polanyi points out there was a fundamental anomaly in the liberal paradigm of market creation:

> The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism. To make Adam Smith's 'simple and natural liberty' compatible with the needs of a human society was a most complicated affair. (Polanyi 1944/1957: 141)

Another shortcoming of economic liberalism is related to the conceptualization of the international expansion of capitalism in the world. Around the time of the Industrial Revolution in England, the English economy did not have a dominant comparative advantage with especially the economies of East Asia (China) and sub-Asia (India). Britain was in fact running serious deficits in its trading relationship with these nations. This was a serious weakness for the takeoff of British dominance in the world economy. The inherent disadvantage of this trading relationship was due to the fact that there was no demand for British goods in China, while the opposite was the case in Britain where there was an important demand for Chinese and Indian produce and commodities. As a matter of fact, these countries had a comparative advantage in their commerce with Britain. To resolve the problem of the imbalance in the trading relation, Britain, after having established its hegemony over India and forcing it to grow opium, waged the so-called Opium Wars in order to make China import the narcotic. Empire building required the agency of the state!

Not only that, Britain also put tariffs on imports of Indian and Chinese textiles in order to protect "infant" British light industries from the competition that came from Asia. It was first after having established itself as an industrial power that economic liberalism promoted the discourse of "free trade" and "comparative advantage." The hypocrisy of British political economy was recognized by the theoretician of economic nationalism, Friedrich List (1885/1977).

While the self-regulating market is assumed to be the best agency for "rational maximizing creatures," this institution will contribute toward equilibrium and inherent stability over the long term for humanity. This assumption was harshly critiqued in connection with World War II by Karl Polanyi who argued that the failure of economic liberalism had a large share of responsibility for the great conflict (Polanyi 1944/1957).

As Robert Gilpin implicitly points out, the proponents of the self-regulating market are immune to criticism. This is done by covering their ideological and political agenda with idealistic and humanistic notions but do not explicate the formation of the world structure of capitalism:

> In essence, liberals believe that trade and economic intercourse are a source of peaceful relations among nations because of the mutual benefits of trade and expanding interdependence among national economies will tend to foster cooperative relations. (Gilpin 1987: 31)

Contrary to this assumption which is based on a convoluted reading of economic history, the ideology/perspective of economic nationalism offers a different interpretation based on the struggle for economic development. In short, while the vision of liberalism proposes a harmonization of relations based on market relations between countries in the world system, economic nationalism dismisses this understanding. Its main proposition is that economic development is the responsibility of the national state which implies subordination of the market to the strategy of industrialization and a strong military in order to defend the nation. According to the economic nationalism perspective, and based on history, the leading nation of the system (Britain) was more interested in preserving and expanding its control of the world rather than assisting the "catching up" of competitors.

Not only did England implement protectionism in its early development against more advanced nations at the time, but once the state-directed intervention in the domestic economy had succeeded in making it the leading nation in the world, it proclaimed the tenets of economic liberalism, i.e., "laissez-faire" and free trade, to be of universal validity. The challengers to British hegemony in the end of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries were the three nations of the United States, Germany, and Japan. These "latecomers" did not follow a strategy of economic liberalism in their catching-up strategy which resulted in dislodging Britain from its position of leadership of the world.

It is worth mentioning that the statist/nationalist approach to economic development was bound to come into conflict with British hegemony (which, truth be told, was not less nationalistic!). The aim of the three upcoming countries was not to replace the world system of capitalism but to

achieve a better position in it. In so doing they did not follow an anti-imperialism strategy but remained in a position of "contra-imperialism." Consequently, the resulting inter-imperialist contradictions initiated a conflict for the redivision of colonies leading to both world wars. Japanese imperialism aimed at establishing a co-prosperity sphere in Asia through its brutal occupation and control of Korea and China and during World War II tried to "liberate" the European colonies (and the United States) from their metropoles. This was a challenge of huge proportion to the Eurocentric cultural sphere on the part of a non-Western source.

The Marxist Search for the Negation

Of the three ideologies/perspectives which the genesis of capitalism in Europe gave rise to (economic liberalism, economic nationalism, and Marxism), it was the latter approach that attempted on the basis of a normative commitment to socialism (Heilbroner 1980: 20–21) to propose an exit (over the "long durée") from the conundrum of capitalist development. Socialism was accordingly conceived as the next stage in the evolution of human development.

This in itself distinguishes the Marxist approach from the other two analytical perspectives of European capitalism. Consequently, economic liberalism and economic nationalism appear as belonging to the problem-solving theoretical tradition within social sciences rather than to the body of critical theories who goes beyond descriptive explanations in order to analyze the essence of a phenomenon (Cox 1981).

Besides proposing socialism as the outcome of capitalism, Marxism proclaimed the class struggle to be the agency capable of instrumentalizing the transition. While economic liberalism assumes the existence of "economic man" as "a rational maximizing creature" responding to the self-regulating market (Gilpin 1987: 31) and economic nationalism marginalizes the individual and prioritizes the nation-state, Marxism builds on the assumption of "political man" behaving within a collectivity through class adherence.

Through an irony of history, the class struggle in the European context contributed to improvement for the population although the two world wars decimated young generations of members of working classes. The nexus of the class struggle to the colonialism and imperialism of their nations did result in the improvement of the conditions of the masses in the imperialist countries but was a difficult conundrum for the fundamental socialist perspective. The theoreticians of Marxism were aware of this political contradiction rather early on. For example, Friedrich Engels in a letter to Karl Kautsky comments the position of British workers to colonialism:

> You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general: the same as the bourgeoisie think. There is no workers party here... and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies. (Engels 1882 n.d.: 340)

The inability of surmounting the economism of the labor movements in the imperialist nations did both improve the standards of living of the general populations and neutralize the struggle for socialism in their societies. Under these circumstances nationalism and Eurocentrism were strengthened, while solidarity with the fate of the colonial people was reduced. In his pamphlet on imperialism, Lenin quotes the British politician, Cecil Rhodes, for the following argument for colonialism:

> I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for "bread," "bread" and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism.... The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists. (Lenin 1917/1951: 513–534)

Superseding Marxism's tendency of focusing on a theory of domestic capitalist political economy, Lenin converted the approach to a theory of international political relations between capitalist state formations. The lines of inquiry which Lenin conceptualized and contextualized with his understanding of imperialism revolved around (1) imperialist rivalry (war and peace as well as uneven development) and (2) the impact of

capitalism on non-capitalist social formation (development and underdevelopment). In other words, Lenin "internationalized" the doctrine of class struggle by bringing in rivalry and uneven development in the analysis of capitalism as an international system. In doing so, he dismissed Karl Kautsky's argument of "ultra-imperialism" whereby the imperialist powers could collectively exploit the colonies. According to Lenin the "law of uneven development" between them would prevent "collective imperialism" in the long run.

A fundamental theoretical shortcoming in the Marxian approach to the question of capital accumulation in the context of European capitalism weakened awareness of the fact that non-capitalist formations also contributed to the process of accumulation and reproduction. By giving the impression that exploitation of European societies was exclusively the source of accumulation, this may have made organic solidarity between the working class in Europe with progressive elements of non-Western societies more difficult.

Taking her point of departure in Karl Marx's opus magnum "Das Kapital," Rosa Luxemburg became critical of its methodological approach. The model of accumulation proposed by Karl Marx appeared to her to be wanting. She had arrived at the conclusion that this pattern of accumulation was based on the analytical assumption of capitalism as a closed system composed only of laborers and capitalists. She rejected this proposition and argued that capitalism since its origin had needed the contribution of non-capitalist labor (peasants and artisans) both in the capitalist sphere and in the colonies:

> Thus capital cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist organisations, nor, on the other hand, can it tolerate their continuous existence side by side with itself. Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organisations makes accumulation of capital possible. (Luxemburg 1913/1968: 416)

Even though the claim can be made that the Marxist critique of capitalism at times concentrated mostly on its modus operandi in the capitalist/imperialistic European nations, there were instances when the cannibalism of capitalism was acknowledged. Marx and Engels on certain occasions recognized the incorporation of non-capitalist nations in the capitalist world system as a menace to the metropoles.

Conclusion: The Rise of China

The opening of Japan by the American Commodore Mathew Perry in 1853 resulted in the Meiji Reformation which became the agency for the strengthening and revival of Japanese nationalism and its joining the imperialist club of nations and then challenging Western presence in Asia. Similarly, the Western (and Japanese!) encroachment on the Chinese mainland following the Opium Wars led to the imposition of unequal treaties on China. A development opened for Chinese concessions in different regions of China to all the imperialist powers. Both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels toyed with the thought of how this might affect the future of capitalism now that isolationism was made impossible to sustain. In prescient words of Engels:

> But as soon as Chinese competition sets in on a mass scale, it will rapidly bring things to a head over here (London). And thus the conquest of China by capitalism will at the same time furnish the impulse for the overthrow of capitalism in Europe and America.... (Engels 1854, n.d.: 348)

This is a lesson which the US elite did not pay attention to when it played the Chinese card against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Opening the door to the capitalist world economy to post-Mao China has been a step the United States could not control. There is no space here to go into an analysis of this evolution, but the consequences are bound to be felt in this century (Schmidt and Hersh 2018). Eurocentric imperialism may not be challenged by any anti-capitalist entity at the moment, but the rise of China and partly India and Russia encompasses a challenge to the hegemony of Euro-Atlantic dominance.

Cross-References

▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology

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Eurocommunism

▶ Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

Europe

▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

European Imperialism in West Africa

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Definition

The imperialist venture in West Africa was vast and spanned many years and epochs, and hence, cannot be covered in any chapter comprehensively. It will give a brief definition of imperialism, highlight some aspects of imperialism in West Africa, look at some reasons for imperialism in West Africa, examine the effects of imperialism in West Africa, present some of the responses to imperialism, and thereafter conclude. The study is done from a critical anti-imperialist point of view.

Introduction

It is important to note from the outset that an essay on European imperialism in West Africa cannot be comprehensive as the imperialist venture in West Africa was vast and spanned many years and epochs. No doubt the topic is the subject of entire textbooks and university courses. Because of this, this essay is by its nature skeletal and selective. It will give a brief definition of imperialism, highlight some aspects of imperialism in West Africa, look at some reasons for imperialism in West Africa, examine the effects of imperialism in West Africa, present some of the responses to imperialism, and thereafter conclude. The study is done from a critical anti-imperialist point of view.

The term 'imperialism' can be defined in a broad or narrow sense. In the broad sense it includes all that the dominant centre does to dominate and control peripheries that may be outside it, while in the narrow sense, as A.K. Dutt states, it is how the 'dominant economic and political elements of one country expropriate for their own benefit the land, labour, raw materials, and market of other countries' (2010, p. 393). A.K. Chaturvedi writes that imperialism is 'the extension of control by one country over another. This can take the form of colonialism, the attempt to establish overt political control and jurisdiction over another country; neo-colonialism, control exercised through economic domination; or cultural imperialism, the destruction or weakening of an indigenous culture and the imposition of an alien one' (2006, p. 143). This is a very broad and inclusive definition. In fact imperialism includes all of the above. For A. I. Okoduwa and S.E. Ibhasebhor, 'imperialism can be seen as a situation in which a particular country or a group of countries impose its control on another. It involves expansion of economic spheres of influence and sometimes the forceful plunder and exploitation of the economic resources of the countries so dominated' (2005, p. 7). But the subject of this essay is the classic form of imperialism as colonialism that took place in West Africa. This is no longer in place, as all the countries of West Africa have gained independence from their former imperial powers such as Britain and France. Classic imperialism, as O. Igwe writes, involves a 'coerced unequal relationship between states or peoples, especially between a victorious imperial state and its

militarily vanquished empire' (2005, p. 197). This form of classic imperialism was imposed upon the peoples of West Africa as they were subdued, oppressed, and exploited by the European imperial powers.

Imperialism in West Africa

European interests in West Africa date back to the beginning of recorded history. Y. Akinyeye (2012), citing Herodotus, writes of the quest for a road that would lead to the gold reserves of the Negroes of the Sudan. Akinyeye states further: 'The French and the British were also engaged in brisk business in gold with West Africa, which they called Guinea, at this time, from the 15th century. By the 17th century, the British were already toying with the idea of conquering West Africa as a way of undermining the Moorish trade in that commodity. The British were making plans for the conquest of the major rivers such as Niger, Senegal, and Gambia. Even though not much came out of this plan, there is no doubt that Europe benefited immensely from the gold trade in West Africa, through North Africa' (2012, pp. 148–149). As Akinyeye writes, when Germany and Italy grew more powerful around 1871, Germany displaced France as it had a larger population after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 a larger percentage of the German population was between 18 and 35 years and could bear arms in war:

> This was at a time when France nursed the hope of revenge against Germany for her humiliation in the Franco-Prussian War, and victory in battle was still largely a function of number under arms than fire power. In case of another war, therefore, France was more vulnerable to defeat by Germany. She needed to look for extra-European sources of manpower for her army. As already shown elsewhere, West Africa was the most advantageous area to recruit soldiers to offset French numerical disadvantage in relation to Germany. This quest for military manpower both for the defence of metropolitan France and overseas imperial ventures was the major idea behind the French policy of 'la force noire'. (Akinyeye 2012, pp. 149–150)

France also needed abundant supplies of iron and coal as she had lost the coal-mining towns of Alsace and Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War, and at the same time her iron ore was not very profitable for the making of steel because it contained too much phosphorus (Akinyeye 2012). For all these reasons France needed an overseas territory such as West Africa. As for Britain, after 1870 her naval power was threatened by the emergence of the German Empire, especially when Emperor Wilhelm II argued for the creation of a strong navy to enable Germany to control the seas (Akinyeye 2012). This undoubtedly meant that the 'German market could no longer be assured for British industry and Germany herself would need overseas market. Also, the naval rivalry could lead to war and in that case adequate arrangements had to be made for British security' (Akinyeye 2012, p. 150). The British acquired coaling stations in Freetown, Accra, Lagos, and Portharcourt, and from these places they began to make inroads into the hinterland of West Africa. As for the French, they acquired Dakar and some other locations along the coast from which they would control the French West African territories.

It is important to note that earlier, from the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, European powers had been involved in the transatlantic slave trade. As France's involvement in West Africa grew, with its attention focused on the Senegal River, it began to implement a policy of assimilation; this meant that its West African territories effectively became part of France. At the same time, the British were also expanding their hold on the region. By the time of the Berlin Conference in 1884–85, each European power already had an area of influence and control; from that time onwards the French controlled Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Niger, though they did not implement a policy of assimilation in all of their territories.

While European powers acquired some territories in West Africa forcefully, through military tactics, many other areas were acquired by means of treaties. These treaties varied, and the African people involved often did not know their full implications. A European company, such as the Royal Niger Company (RNC), would make an

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agreement with the local chiefs or leaders that permitted it to trade, and soon afterwards it would invite its own government to take over the territory in order to protect it. In some cases a treaty came about as a result of a local chief himself inviting the colonial power to come in and protect its territory without seeing the implications. For instance, before Nigeria was under the control of the RNC until it became a British colonial territory in 1900.

The British colonies in West Africa included the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. As a result of the slave trade and the search for resources such as gold and ivory, British merchants already had trading posts in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, and elsewhere. S. Chilsen (2009) notes that with the abolition of the slave trade, the movement for industrialisation in Europe, and the loss of the American colonies to revolution, there was a need to be more involved in West Africa. This led to many explorers going to Africa in the 1870s and the beginning of the scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, at which the European powers divided up the continent of Africa. Two articles produced at the conference indicated how territories were to be acquired and controlled.

In order to establish effective control over the territories that she claimed, Britain used the RNC until she was able to assert control and to rule, and exploit them directly. The RNC was invested with political rights and had its headquarters in Asaba, with a police force, a high court, and many agents to handle its trading posts (Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor 2005). Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor (2005) show that in 1897 the RNC and its forces fought and defeated Bida and Ilorin and began the process of the conquest of north Nigeria; but because of challenge from France, the British Government abrogated its charter and took over the territories.

The Consequences of Imperial Activities in West Africa

The effects of imperialism have been recounted by many African authors and others. Walter Rodney (1972), without fully acknowledging some limitations and weaknesses in Africa's past, blames the imperialists for depriving Africans of their capacity to develop the resources of nature, administer themselves, and make military progress and for replacing these with European models of exploitation. Frantz Fanon (1968) also has examined how colonialism made Africans 'the wretched of the earth'. According to Kwame Nkrumah (1965) there is no doubt that the purpose of the Europeans was the economic exploitation of Africa. As Rodney (1972) puts it, the Europeans, with their superior navigational equipment, ships, machines, and weapons, turned the ports of Africa into economic satellites and ensured that all the roads and railways led to them in order to facilitate the exportation of resources to Europe.

White European powers showed no regard for the dignity and rights of West Africans, who were seen as less than human. The region was carved up arbitrarily into various countries to be ruled by the British and French without regard for the West Africans. At the Berlin Conference in 1884–85 they were fought over and divided up without their consent. What mattered to the imperialists was what would enhance their exploitation of the peoples, the land, and its resources. They had no respect for traditional land boundaries, sacred rivers and mountains, languages, or cultures. Peoples who had lived together and shared a common language and culture all of a sudden found themselves in different countries separated by artificial national boundaries. Fanon is largely right when he writes that 'European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been founded on slavery, it has been nourished with the blood of slaves and it comes directly from the soil and from the subsoil of that underdeveloped world. The well-being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians, and the yellow races' (1968, p. 96). It is not true, however, that all that Europe has accomplished comes from its exploitation of other peoples.

One of the fundamental effects of imperialism is what it has done to the African psyche. The imperialists condemned most of the aspects of

African culture and life that they encountered. They condemned African traditional religion as pagan and superstitious and regarded whatever they could not understand as magic and evil. They viewed Africans as having no knowledge of the true God. Seeing African names as evil, they renamed geographical features and locations. They made Africans see themselves as inferior, and this is the mentality that many Africans still carry today.

P. N. Chikendu (2004) classifies the effects of imperialism in political, cultural, and economic categories. In the political area, he writes that West Africans lost their autonomy and sovereignty, for instance when the British colonised Lagos in 1861 in order to control the governance of Lagos: an alien political system was imposed on the colonised country. The people of West Africa also lost their cultural autonomy: their spiritual, religious, and social beliefs, attitudes, and practices were subjugated, and a way of life that was foreign to them was imposed on them through education. In terms of the economic effects, the colonies were milked of their resources and made to work to export crops to Europe, for little or no pay.

The Reasons for Imperial Activities in West Africa

One of the main motives that drove imperialism was the search for raw materials and other resources in foreign territories (Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor 2005, p. 7). For some writers, such as John Hobson (1902), it was the drive for new markets for goods produced by the imperialists that propelled the conquest of other foreign countries: they had surplus goods and services which the purchasing power of the working class could not meet, and so customers had to be found in foreign countries. Vladimir Lenin (1917) viewed imperialism as the inevitable consequence of capitalism, stating that the goal of capitalists is a global monopoly of the market forces and the domination and exploitation of other nations' resources. It has been argued by Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor (2005) that in Hobson imperialism is a

result of capitalist maladjustment, but in Lenin it is the necessary consequence of capitalism.

With regard to imperial activities in Africa, including West Africa, Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor (2005) indicate that there were economic, political, and social factors. The economic factors included 'the quest for raw materials for manufacturing industries in Europe', 'the search for markets', and 'investment of surplus capital'; among the political factors were 'the need to maintain balance of power in Europe', and the social factors were the 'need to solve socioeconomic problem in Europe' and 'racialism' (Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor 2005, pp. 21–26). According to Dutt, the reasons for imperialism in West Africa may have included 'the dominating nature of human beings and groups; strategic and security advantage; giving other people a superior way of life or freeing them from tyranny; and obtaining access to resources, investment outlets, and markets for the products of the center' (2010, p. 393).

There are those who justify imperialism as being humane and beneficial to the colonised. While it is true that there may have been some benefits that came from colonialism, the damage it did to West Africans was greater and should not be overlooked. Chikendu (2004) quotes Lugard, a governorgeneral of Nigeria, who argued that colonialism benefited the colonised because they received services from the colonisers in return for raw materials and a cheap market. Chikendu (2004) also cites Kipling, who claimed that Africans were wild beasts and needed to be civilised by the white race.

The Response to Imperial Activities in West Africa

The main response to imperial activities can be summed up in the word 'nationalism'. The experience of West Africans during the Second World War opened their eyes to the need to struggle for their right to govern themselves. Before nationalist movements organised for national independence, there were various other responses that are important to note here. They include anti-

colonial organisations led by Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, P.S. Nije, and Dauda Jawara, aimed at immediate socio-political, cultural, and economic national self-administration.

Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor (2005) have described various patterns of African response to European invasion, which are summarised in this paragraph. African leaders did not surrender their territories to the Europeans voluntarily: the European took them by force, false treaty, or hand-twisting diplomacy. In Ghana, the Asante people fought the British and defeated them in 1864, but eventually the British captured Kumasi in 1896 and exiled their king, Prempe. In Nigeria, the Sokoto caliphate resisted with bows and arrows until it was defeated. Samouri Toure fought the French between 1882 and 1898 to preserve the Senegambia area until he was defeated. In other places African leaders entered into diplomatic treaties with the Europeans supposedly to protect their areas, but these were effectively traps, as very often the Africans did not understand their full implications. For instance, in 1880 Seku Ahmadu of Senegambia signed a treaty of protection with the French, but the French were nevertheless bent on acquiring his territory, and he had no option but to resist through force until the French defeated him in 1893. In West Africa, according to Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor (2005), Professor E.A. Afikpo affirmed that there were many Igbo people in south-east Nigeria who resisted through the use of medicine and by calling on spiritual powers to destroy the white man. Again according to Okoduwa and Ibhasebhor (2005), A.I. Asiwaju (1977) stated that some resisted the French in French West Africa by migrating from their territories because they did not want a physical confrontation with the French.

The major response to imperialism or colonialism in West Africa occurred in the form of the nationalist movements. This response is summarised here from information given by Chikendu (2004). There were both nationalist uprisings and nationalist movements in French West Africa and British West Africa. In Nigeria the Nigerian National Democratic Party was initiated by Herbert Macaulay in 1923, arising from an elective principle in the 1922 Clifford Constitution. According to A.A. Babatunde (2014), the Clifford Constitution gave birth to a new legislative council for the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate that replaced the 1914 Nigerian Council; in the north the governor general remained the sole legislator. Though it was an advisory council, as the governor general had a veto power, the elective principle in the constitution encouraged the formation of political organisations through which the people could express their political aspirations, and it was during this period that Herbert Macaulay set up the first political party in 1923 (Aghalino 2006).

The formation in 1934 of the Lagos Youth Movement, which later became the Nigerian Youth Movement, also fanned the flames of nationalism. In 1944 the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons was formed. Other parties would eventually be formed in Nigeria, such as the action group formed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Northern People's Congress. With the nationalist drive informing more constitutions and conferences, Nigeria eventually became independent of British imperial rule on 1 October 1960. In Ghana, the former Gold Coast, after the First World War, Joseph Casely Hayford founded the National Congress of British West Africa. In the 1930s the global economic depression led to restiveness the world over, including Ghana. A youth conference was founded in the country by Dr J.B. Danquah. With the end of the Second World War, nationalistic agitations grew rapidly in the 1940s, precipitating the formation of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. When Dr Kwame Nkrumah returned to Ghana from studies abroad he joined the UGCC; he eventually left and formed the Convention People's Party (CPP) with two others. Nkrumah was sentenced to prison in 1950, but while he was in prison the CPP won overwhelming victories in the municipal elections and the governor-general, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, released him; upon his consequent electoral victory, Nkrumah became Ghana's first independent prime minister in 1957. In the Gambia, the first of the four British West African countries, the first of her main

political parties, the United Party, was formed in 1957, followed by two other political parties, the People's Progressive Party and the People's Society on Progress for the Protectorate. The Gambia became an independent nation in 1965 with Sir Dawda Jawara as prime minister. In Sierra Leone, owing to the presence of two distinct groups of peoples, the Westernised freed slaves along the coast and the Islamised people in the interior, nationalism did not begin until the introduction of a new constitution in 1952. Through the leadership of Sir Milton Margai the country gained independence in 1961.

Chikendu (2004) has indicated that Francophone West Africa was administered as an integral part of France, and so nationalism was late in coming. Because of the French policy of assimilation, educated Africans were regarded as full French citizens and could be elected into the French national assembly or chamber of deputies from 1946. When the educated Africans came to realise that assimilation estranged them from their African roots they began to agitate for independence, often inspired by the writing of Aimé Césaire, especially his essays on *Négritude.* Because of the unusually inhuman treatment meted out to Africans, the African members of the chamber of deputies formed a nonparty bloc to argue for their African interests (Chikendu 2004). Nationalistic feelings heightened when in 1946 a group of African leaders, gathering in Bamako, Mali, formed the political organisation Rassemblement Democratique African (RDA). With inspiration from the RDA, nationalism grew in French West Africa, and eventually French West African countries gained independence like their British counterparts.

Conclusion

It is insufficient to attribute the entire range of failures of West Africa, and indeed of all of Africa, to imperialism. While it is true that imperialism raped and ravaged West Africa, West Africans have also contributed to the sufferings of their sub-region through eth-nicism and tribal rivalries that followed independence, corruption and embezzlement of public funds, inept leadership, wars over natural resources, and so on. There is a need for Africans to become mentally free and to take the challenge of the development of their regions of the continent into their own hands. It is true that European imperialism damaged and impeded the development of West Africa and of the entire African continent. It is now time for Africans who have long been politically independent to ensure that they draw on their authentic African and global values to build up their continent. It is important to note that Africans did not surrender to imperialism. Many brave and courageous Africans resisted imperialism, and many lost their lives in the struggle for freedom and formal independence. The nationalist movement also contributed, and several African countries gained their independence through the struggles of various nationalists. Imperialism was essentially for the European interest. Yet, in spite of the havoc it caused, it is now time for Africans to assert their freedom in every area of human existence.

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European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism

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The Core-Periphery Debate

Economic development is a complex and puzzling phenomenon. There is no telling where, when, and how it will happen – why some countries and regions become rich, while others remain desperately poor. The classical notion that free factor flows would lead to convergence in development has long since been confounded by the glaring disparities in the levels of income that now prevail across the globe.

On a global scale, the most tantalizing issue is why Eastern civilizations, once very advanced, lost out to the West and why in Europe the Iberian and Mediterranean countries gave way to Northern Europe. That Europe, or at least part of it, came to dominate the political, economic, and cultural life of much of the world in its heyday in the nineteenth century is not open to question. When it emerged from the Dark Ages, it steadily extended its control and influence over the vast majority of the Earth's surface, from 7% in 1500 to 84% by 1914.

Yet for all its supremacy, Europe itself was a continent deeply divided, politically, economically, and socially. The core of modern development lay in the northwest corner, while to the south and east, there was persistent lagging, from the Iberian Peninsula along the Mediterranean, into the Balkans up through European Russia, and back into Poland and the Baltic states. The dividing line was Austria-Hungary, not quite up to western standards, but far better than the periphery here outlined. There were exceptions to this geographical categorization of course. The Scandinavian countries would not fall into this category, nor would Switzerland. More doubtful cases are Italy and Finland.

Such was the lagging in these peripheral countries that some historians have tended to regard Europe's peripheral states as also-rans in the process of modern development, dependent for much of the time on the core nations of the West. Many scholars likened the laggards to countries of the Third World. Spulber (1966, 7–8), writing in the 1960s, compared the East European countries with the developing nations of Asia and Africa. Even Spain was seen as an economic colony of the advanced nations by the economic nationalists of the 1920s.

The core-periphery debate, with its Marxist overtones, is a complex one which has been applied more generally to the twentieth-century less developed countries. However it is not without its relevance to the nineteenth- *and* twentieth-century Europe. The main tenets of the thesis are that peripheral countries are poor and less civilized and tend to concentrate on low-technology primary production by virtue of their dependence on richer countries, which in turn exploit the international division of labor for their own benefit, thereby reinforcing the peripheral states' dependent role in the international economy. There is therefore a certain degree of inevitability in the process. As some countries develop industrially and become wealthy while others lag behind, the latter will tend to take on the characteristics which bracket them as dependent economies.

Poor countries have generally laid the blame for their unfortunate circumstances on the capitalist exploiters of the West for, as Landes (1999, 252) once noted, "It feels better that way." But the nineteenth century cannot be regarded as one of complete suppression of modern development in

peripheral regions by the advanced core. Berend and Ranki (1982, 9) while admitting that the relationship was fundamentally an unequal one which tended to benefit the core while often proving destructive to the periphery, felt that it was also beneficial to the latter by acting as "an inducement to development, serving – under appropriate conditions – to lift the area from its peripheral position."

The core-periphery analogy is complicated in its application to Europe since it was not simply a question of an East-West, North-South split. It was in fact replicated at a more microlevel in many regional and local guises. For example, the Habsburg dynasty had its own East-West gradient, with the more industrialized western half serving as market for the products of the agrarian-based eastern sector, while the Balkans were in turn dependent on Austria-Hungary's large domestic market. At more local levels, the developing industrial/commercial centers such as Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Istanbul, Athens, Barcelona, Madrid, and Lisbon acted as magnets for the more backward agricultural hinterlands. In some cases there was even a reversal of the stereotyped roles. The nascent industrial sectors in the Baltic states, Poland and Finland, served as suppliers to the more backward imperial regime of Russia.

The core-periphery/dependency theory can also be somewhat misleading if it is put in a politico/economic context since economic subordination was not synonymous with political status. Some peripheral countries had a more independent existence than others. Spain, Portugal, and Greece after 1830 were autonomous countries in their own right, yet they were clearly laggards in development. And while much of the rest of peripheral Europe was in thrall to the crumbling empires of Ottoman Turkey, Russia, and Austro-Hungary, political dependence did not always mean economic subservience. The Baltic states and the western parts of Poland were more advanced than their political masters and became important industrial suppliers to Imperial Russia, whereas the Balkans could never really throw off the Ottoman yolk even when they secured independence.

Another point to bear in mind is that peripheral or marginal areas have changed over time and that some of the later laggards were once at the cutting edge of development. But what is noticeable is that there have always been marginal regions or countries, even though they may have changed over time. As Pollard notes, there has always been a marginal Europe, but the players have changed hands over the centuries. Greece and Rome were the power points of civilization in their heyday. England, Wales, and Scotland, along with the Scandinavian countries and Hungary, were the peripheral locations in the period when the prosperous core was located in Italy, Flanders, the Rhineland, and Southern Germany (Pollard 1997, 10, 267). At what stage the "golden triangle" of North-west Europe emerged as the key center of modern economic development is still open to debate, but there is little doubt that it had been well established by the nineteenth century.

The Backwash of Western Development

Whatever the exact timing of the global divide, there can be no doubt that by the latter half of the nineteenth century, the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe were seriously lagging and could be regarded as marginal players as far as the process of modern economic development is concerned. Not that peripheral Europe remained completely unaffected by developments in the West. As Berend (2003, 137) noted, "The fringe of an unprecedented European prosperity carried the sleepy, stagnant, unindustrialized countries along." Western influence came through many channels, via trade, imported capital, the influx of foreign workers and entrepreneurs, foreign technology, the construction of railways, and the creation of western style institutions, especially in banking. In the later nineteenth century, the underdeveloped countries of Europe tried to foster industrialization by tariff protection and other forms of state assistance, especially in Hungary, the Balkans, and European Russia.

The process was a slow and erratic one, and it sometimes led to lopsided and inefficient development. When western enterprise and capital were directly involved, it was often concentrated in the exploitation of minerals and raw materials

for use in the investing nations' own markets. This was true, for example, of the pyrites and mining concerns in Spain, which became foreign enclaves of development with most of the cash benefits being drained off by overseas operators, and perhaps even more so in the resource exploitation of the Balkan countries. The development of the Romanian oil industry was dominated by foreign companies, while 40% of western industrial investment in Serbia went into extractive industries (Berend 2003, 157). Railway construction was also heavily dependent on outside capital and enterprise. However, much imported capital was indirect in the form of loans to state governments which was used for military purposes, to cover budgetary deficits and for building up the state apparatus, and only a small proportion found its way into what might be called productive investments. As a result of official profligacy, most of the Balkan countries were insolvent by the end of the nineteenth century, Greece being the classic example.

Given the poverty of these countries, modernization was inevitably very dependent on western assistance in one form or another, but this had the unfortunate effect of leading to unbalanced development either in the form of foreign dominated enclaves, especially in resource extraction, or in the shape of heavy dependence on specific sectors, notably agriculture, in order to serve western markets. Thus Hungary and much of the Balkans and parts of European Russia became the granary of Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately cereal monoculture regions or countries heavily dependent on a handful of agricultural products were rendered very vulnerable to market changes. This was especially so in the case of cereals when American producers invaded Western Europe in the later nineteenth century. In this respect the Balkan countries were more vulnerable than either Hungary or Poland since the latter had a more diversified economic structure.

Within marginal Europe there was of course a considerable divergence in economic performance and the extent of industrialization. The degree of political subordination was not necessarily a good indicator of the rate of progress. While Balkan backwardness might reflect relics

of Ottoman rule even after independence was secured, the same excuse cannot be used for the Iberian Peninsula, that is Spain and Portugal, which had once waxed high in the European firmament. Pollard (1981, 243) believes that both the Iberian and Balkan Peninsulas did not get beyond the beginnings of the industrialization process except in very limited sectors and regions, and even then it was not internationally competitive. By contrast the Baltic countries did somewhat better industrially than their political master and became important industrial suppliers to the less developed Russian Empire. Poland too, despite its political subordination to three countries, developed a worthwhile industrial base. Hungary, as part of the Dual Monarchy, also boasted a more diversified economic structure, though falling behind its more advanced partner.

In the decades before the First World War, most of the peripheral countries probably kept pace with and in some cases exceeded the economic performance of the richer western nations. It should be stressed however that they all started from a very low base and also estimates for domestic output expansion are not the most robust. Even so, by and large the peripheral countries remained largely agrarian and/or raw material producing entities where islands of capitalism or industry floated in a sea of primitivism.

The low levels of income per capita by the end of the long nineteenth century tell their own story. They were but a fraction of those of the more advanced countries of the West, one half or less, and possibly as low as 20% in the case of Albania and Turkey. For those none too happy with the reliability of national income estimates for this era, there are plenty of other indicators to illustrate the degree of backwardness. Data on levels of industrialization, railway mileage, and agricultural productivity confirm how far these countries lagged behind the West. Per capita levels of industrialization were but a fraction of those in the UK, Belgium, and Germany, and the same is true of the density of railway development. The most telling statistics are the very low level of goods transported and the journeys made per inhabitant compared with those in Western Europe. For example, the number of railway journeys made per inhabitant

annually in the Balkan countries and Spain and Portugal was miniscule compared to the number in Britain, Germany, and Belgium. Even more significant was the very low level of human resource development. As well as being predominantly agrarian-based, the population of these countries was very illiterate judged by western standards. Many of the countries had illiteracy levels of 40% or more in the early twentieth century, in Portugal the rate was over 60%, while in the case of Albania and Turkey it was as high as 80–90%. Only Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states had reasonable literacy levels (Aldcroft 2006, 5).

There is little doubt that all of the peripheral countries, with perhaps the exception of little Albania, showed some signs of development and change through the long nineteenth century. Yet when all is said and done, much of the change was of a marginal type, and by 1914 all of the peripheral countries could be classed as underdeveloped. Agrarian employment was still dominant and structural change had made very little impact on them. Referring to the eastern and southern provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkans, Berend (2003, 180) writes: "The phase of modern structural changes remained a distant goal in the overwhelmingly agricultural and raw material producing countries. Despite its economic progress and advances, the region humiliatingly failed to modernize." Lampe (1989, 202) came to a rather similar conclusion with regard to the Balkan regions: "The sweeping structural changes that turn growth into development would not appear in the Balkans until after the Second World War." As we shall see, before then there were dramatic shifts in the peripheral landscape as a result of the changes wrought by two world wars and a great depression.

The Reconfiguration of Europe After 1918

The Great War marked a significant turning point in the history of Europe. Europe's power and influence in the global arena waned visibly in the ensuing decades as political and economic forces worked against it. The map of Europe was transformed as a result of the postwar peace settlement. The great empires which had once manipulated the European power system were gone. In their place emerged several weakened national powers and a motley collection of new and reconstituted states, mostly small, backward, and weak, which struggled in a hostile climate and against the political machinations of the larger nations to retain independent identity. These were the countries which constituted peripheral Europe.

In all fairness it was only a matter of time before the old order of prewar Europe was undermined because of national rivalries, nationalism, and ethnic unrest and greater participation in government. Apart from Germany, the older empires were rotten from within and were crumbling visibly before 1914. The Ottoman Empire was at its last gasp in Europe; it had steadily lost territory during the nineteenth century, and, following the destructive Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, when Serbia, Greece, and Romania had made substantial gains at its expense, it was left with only a toehold on the mainland of Europe. The same wars signalled the virtual end of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a great power, which, along with the Ottoman Empire, had long been regarded as decaying dynasties. Despite its creditable economic record, it was surrounded by virulent nationalist forces on all frontiers which it had been powerless to accommodate within its unwieldy imperial structure. Simultaneously revolutionary forces and social ferment in Russia were also having a disintegrating effect on the Romanov Empire. Thus, even without a major war, it seems very likely that much of the formal imperial control of Europe would have crumbled in short order.

The war in effect completed the process of imperial disintegration. As the European empires faded away (Austro-Hungarian, Romanov, Ottoman, and German), many lively and independent states emerged from the ruins. Even before the formal peacemaking exercise got under way, aspiring contenders were laying claims to former imperial territories, and many of these were later confirmed by the peacemakers in the treaties concluded with ex-enemy powers.

The result was the largest redrawing of the map of Europe ever undertaken. Most countries were

affected in one way or another except for the neutrals. Apart from Spain and Portugal, all the peripheral countries gained or lost something. The Baltic states secured their release from Russian control, while Albania's prewar independence was confirmed, but only just. The ex-enemy powers were cut down to size so that both the main parts of the Dual Monarchy – Austria and Hungary – became shadows of their former selves. Turkey managed to retain a toehold in Europe, and Bulgaria's frontiers of 1914 were more or less confirmed which meant she sacrificed most of the gains made in the First Balkan War. Poland was resurrected as a united and independent national state from the component parts which had been under German, Austrian, and Russian control since the partitions of the later eighteenth century. Serbia, along with Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and a few other bits and pieces, formed the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and thankfully shortened to the more manageable title of Yugoslavia in 1929. The most spectacular beneficiary was Romania which was rewarded somewhat lavishly for being an unreliable ally of the western powers, by gaining large tracts of territory at the expense of Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. As a result the size of the country more than doubled in terms of both area and population. Greece, who had joined the Allied side late in the conflict, was another significant gainer though falling short of her original expectations.

The peacemaking exercise was scarcely a resounding success, and it probably caused more problems than it solved. It created a multitude of small and weak states and left many national minorities under alien rule. Though the peace settlement reduced minority status compared with before the war, around one third of the inhabitants of East European successor states were left stateless in the sense that they constituted national minorities. In the case of Hungary, nearly one third of its citizens were located outwith its borders. The fact that nations were defined largely in ethnic terms served to heighten national perceptions of ethnic perfection, giving rise to demands for ridding nations of "alien" elements which had once lived and worked fairly peacefully together

and fostering claims for the reconciliation of expatriates. Ethnic nationalism was in fact to become a major force in the rise of fascist movements in these countries.

Most of the peripheral states had large minority populations with diverse religious affiliations. In Poland and Romania, the proportion approached one third. The worst case was that of Yugoslavia which had a dozen or more minority groups. Though Slavic interest accounted for the majority of the population, the two main groups the Serbs and the Croats were scarcely the most congenial of partners, nor for that matter were the Slovenes. But apart from the main Serbo-Croat contingent, there were a dozen or so assorted minority interests including Germans, Magyars, Romanians, Albanians, Turks, Poles, Italians, Bulgarians, Czech/Slovaks, Macedonians, and Gypsies, none of whom could assimilate easily with one another. Perhaps no other country in Europe had to use Tiltman's terminology, such an "ethnological souffle" (Tiltman 1934, 266).

Weak states, ethnic rivalry, limited social cohesion, and right-wing political forces were to become grist to Germany's ambition to extend its influence in Europe. The political vacuum created in Central/East Europe provided an ideal opportunity for a determined predator since the new and reconstituted states were, in Newman's words: "extremely weak reeds to place in the path of Germany, and they possessed few features that would lead to any hope of their being anything but satellites . . . of Germany, Hitler or no Hitler" (Newman 1968, 27, 201). The battle for the control of the region enjoined France and Germany almost from the first moment of peace, with Germany's claims fortified by what she considered to be her ignominious treatment at the peace table and the significant pockets of Germans living in many other countries.

What Price Peripheral Independence? The Transwar Period

Like the African states which one by one secured independence from colonial rule in the later 1950s onward, the new European states were poor but

hopeful for their future once released from western domination. They were free at last and initially they readily embraced parliamentary democracy and all its trappings. Domination by foreign powers may have stunted their development, but they did benefit in some degree from spin-offs of western industrialization. The way forward was therefore to build on these limited foundations and in particular to shed their heavy dependency on the primary sector and raise the educational standard of their workforce. Again, as with the postcolonial African states, they were soon to be disappointed in the hostile conditions of the interwar years.

During the early postwar years, it was a question of battling with the problems of reconstruction in a very turbulent period and no sooner had these difficulties been surmounted than their economies were shattered by the impact of the Great Depression in the early 1930s. In desperation they resorted to autarchic measures, and one by one most of the countries jettisoned parliamentary systems and moved to authoritarian regimes. These soon fell prey to the ambitions of Nazi Germany, and they became increasingly dependent on that country for markets and military hardware. The outbreak of the Second World War completed the circle since most of the peripheral states were once again subject to external domination in one form or another.

For much of the 1920s, most European countries were grappling with the problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation. At the end of the war, much of continental Europe was literally destitute, and most countries were desperately in need of external assistance to prevent starvation and revitalize their economies. The war had affected every conceivable aspect of economic and social life. Apart from the severe setback to economic activity, serious physical destruction was fairly widespread, population losses and movements were severe, former markets had been lost, government finances and currencies were in disarray, and transport systems were in a chaotic state. Added to these problems were the tasks of assimilating the new territorial arrangements, setting up new constitutions and unifying economic, legal, and administrative systems. All this at a time when resources were very short, people were starving,

social and revolutionary ferment was widespread, and border disputes over territory and populations were rife.

The peripheral countries, apart from Spain and Portugal, were in a far worse position than the major powers and the neutrals. The Baltic states had lost their main market and were engaged in disputes with Germany and the Soviet Union. Greece was in confrontation with Turkey, while Albania was fearful of losing her newly won independence. Hungary and Austria were trying to get to grips with a much reduced size, while for Romania it was the reverse situation. For Poland and Yugoslavia, the two most severely devastated countries, there was the enormous task of welding together disparate economic and administrative systems. Of the two Yugoslavia had the most formidable problem for, unlike Poland, there was no true sense of national identity but a large conglomeration of assorted ethnic groups and religious affiliations that made it virtually impossible to forge a truly coherent national state. Eastern Europe as a whole was in a very bad way at the close of the war since social and economic systems were very close to the point of collapse.

Unfortunately the relief program that was organized under the auspices of the Supreme Economic Council, the bulk of the assistance coming from the United States, was too short and totally inadequate. Most of the relief consisted of food and a small amount of clothing and 20 European countries were recipients of supplies mostly on a credit basis. The official relief program was terminated abruptly in August 1919, and thereafter relief activities were confined to private and semiofficial charities which dispensed small amounts of food and clothing.

The upshot was that countries were forced to seek their own salvation. In desperation governments were driven to adopt extreme measures to cope with relief and reconstruction and ease the pressure from political and social disorder. Most countries ran large budgetary deficits, allowed their currencies to depreciate and inflation to take its course. Such policies provided temporary relief and gave an artificial boost to economic activity, but in the longer run, they proved

disastrous, resulting in currency collapse and violent inflation, with five countries (Hungary, Poland, Austria, Germany, and the Soviet Union) experiencing hyperinflation.

Most of the poor peripheral countries suffered bouts of inflation, and for much of the decade, they were grappling with the task of restoring financial and currency stability. As a consequence full recoveries from the ravages of war were delayed, and in Eastern Europe, economic activity had not been restored to prewar levels even by the middle of the decade.

Conditions were somewhat more propitious for sustained development in the latter half of the 1920s when political and economic conditions were more stable internationally than in the early postwar years. Most countries, apart from Poland, were able to surpass prewar levels of output by the end of the decade. Despite progress the peripheral countries did not experience any significant structural transformation of their economies which remained backward and economically vulnerable. By western standards both agriculture and industry were highly inefficient, and the policies employed to encourage industry tended to foster inefficient and high-cost enterprises. Primary production still tended to predominate, and most of agricultural Europe (The term "agricultural Europe" is largely synonymous with peripheral Europe which is usually taken to include the following countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Yugoslavia.) remained extremely sensitive to trends in the international economy because of their dependence on the export of primary products at favorable prices. Some countries were also becoming heavily dependent on the influx of foreign capital.

Given the vulnerability of the peripheral countries, the onset of the great depression was little short of catastrophic. Primary product price fell by about 60% between 1929 and 1933, whereas manufacturing prices fell by 41% with the result that the terms of trade for primary producers declined by around one quarter. For farmers and peasants, the price collapse was devastating, and initially producers made the situation worse by increasing output to bolster their gross revenues.

Farm incomes collapsed and many farmers were heavily in debt. Throughout Eastern Europe agrarian indebtedness was a pervasive problem. One contemporary observer who made an extensive tour of the region reckoned that 70% of all peasant holdings in Eastern Europe were threatened by debts and that peasants were worse off in terms of real purchasing power than they had been before the war (Tiltman 1934, 118–120, 169, 249).

The final blow came with the financial crisis of 1931 which led to a drying up of foreign capital and credits and a scramble for liquidity which rendered many countries virtually insolvent. In such circumstances it was inevitable that countries resorted to autarchic measures to stave off complete collapse. External accounts were defended by every conceivable form of trade and payment restriction barring blockade which meant that by the mid-1930s, trade volumes had sunk to an historical nadir. Debt burdens were considerably eased by partial or complete suspension of debt servicing in 1931 and 1932 and in some cases by the outright repudiation of external debts. On the surface trade restrictions and exchange control served their immediate purpose. The upshot was a shift in trade patterns within specified blocs, including the sterling area and exchange control countries. The latter involved the negotiation of clearing agreements among exchange control countries which specified the bilateral balancing of claims between countries, thereby minimizing the use of free foreign exchange. The first agreement was concluded between Austria and Yugoslavia in January 1932 to be following by a whole raft of similar agreements among Central and East European countries and to a lesser extent the Baltic states. By the end of the 1930s, much of the trade of Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, the Balkans, Greece, Albania, and Turkey was conducted by means of bilateral clearing (Berend 1998, 270).

One of the inevitable consequences of the closer affinity among exchange control countries was the growing economic and political influence of Nazi Germany in many of the peripheral countries. Germany became the major trading partner of the Balkan countries, the Baltic states, Hungary, Albania, and Turkey. This trend was also

facilitated by the growing trend of nationalism in the peripheral countries and the steady shift toward authoritarian regimes and autarchic policies which eased the way for German infiltration. Whether these countries gained from increasing domination has been the subject of much but somewhat inconclusive debate. It was difficult to resist Germany's encroachment since she was one of the few countries prepared to buy agrarian products and other commodities at prices above those ruling on the world market. In the glutted commodity markets of the 1930s, the German outlet was invaluable. On the other hand, it can be argued that Germany exploited the countries for strategic purposes to gain access to food and raw materials. In the process her trading partners piled up large blocked Reichsmark balances which could only be used to purchase German goods the most famous examples of which were aspirins and cuckoo clocks. These were allegedly dumped in large quantities on the erstwhile suppliers, such that Yugoslavia received enough aspirins to last a decade, while Romania, a key target for Germany because of its importance as an oil producer, was even more lavishly supplied with aspirins to relieve 500 years of headaches (Einzig 1938, 26; Jones 1937, 76–77).

In the long run, it all ended in disaster as the wheel turned full circle. Germany's economic influence was but a prelude to political and military domination. Germany in fact used her trade connections as a smoke-screen in Southeastern Europe in particular to infiltrate Nazi agents who spread the Nazi gospel. Under commercial disguise political agents were widely employed throughout the region, and by the end of the 1930s, Nazi agents were thick on the ground. Contemporary accounts record the case of a German soya bean factory in Romania employing no less than 3000 commercial agents to spread the Nazi creed, while in Bulgaria German military experts dominated the army. By this time it was too late to disengage, and one by one the unfortunate countries were swallowed up the German military machine. The 1930s also saw the beginnings of slave labor camps on Germany territory which were later to become major generators of labor for the German war machine.

The 2 years following the outbreak of the Second World War brought a remarkable transformation in the map of Europe as it was steadily engulfed by the Third Reich. Hitler's march across Europe, which started in a preliminary way before September 1939 with the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, proceeded virtually unchecked, and by early 1942 the new German Empire was practically synonymous with that of continental Europe. It stretched from the Channel Islands and Brittany in the West to the mountains of the Caucasus in the East and from the Artic tip of Norway to the shores of the Mediterranean. At its peak the new empire embraced about one third of the land area and included half the population of the continent. States and territories disappeared almost overnight under Hitler's onward drive, and only a few managed to retain their autonomy. The latter comprised the neutral countries of Spain, Portugal, Eire, Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey, none of which could be said to be wholly unsympathetic to the German regime. The neutrals were fearful of antagonizing Hitler following his spectacular blitzkrieg strategy until it was eventually stalled by the Soviet Union's failure to "collapse on schedule." In addition, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and possibly Finland slipped from neutrality to quasi-alliance with Germany by joining the latter as military allies. They retained a semblance of sovereignty though in practice they became very much satellite dependencies of the Reich.

The new Nazi regime consisted of a motley collection of states and territories at different stages of development, embracing a bewildering array of ethnic and religious affiliations. They were acquired in an unsystematic manner and ruled in different ways reflecting in part their diverse historical development. Thus in the case of the dissection of Czechoslovakia southern Slovakia, Western Ruthenia and the sub-Carpathian Ukraine went to Hungary, Bohemia-Moravia became a protectorate of the Reich, while the rest of Slovakia was set up as a nominally independent state. Poland received similar treatments in the autumn of 1939. Western Poland, including the Free City of Danzig, was incorporated into Germany; Central Poland became a protectorate

under the General Government of Poland, while the remainder of Poland was absorbed by Russia. Following the invasion of the latter in the summer of 1941, the Russian Polish territories were occupied by Germany. The turn of Yugoslavia came in April 1941. Northern Slovenia and most of the Dalmatian coast went to Italy which also acquired Montenegro as a protectorate. Other parts of Yugoslavia were distributed among Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italian Albania, while Croatia (including Bosnia and Herzegovina) was set up as a semi-independent puppet state under German and Italian military influence. Croatia served as a model for regional domination in the Balkans and was responsible for the mass murder of many Serbs and Jews. Finally, Romania, one of the main gainers of the postwar peace treaty settlements, lost a large proportion of territory to Russia (Bessarabia and northern Bukovina), to Hungary (the northern part of Transylvania), and to Bulgaria (southern Dobruja). These territorial arrangements remained firm until the latter half of the war when Germany's hegemony was on the wane.

It is difficult to discern any consistent and logical strategy in Hitler's territorial ambitions. In some respects the changes harked back to the nineteenth century insofar as the territorial incorporations into Germany and Hungary reflected the former German and Magyar spheres of influence in Europe. On the other hand, there is little evidence of a concerted attempt to rectify the imperfections of the fragmented units and population displacements arising from the peace treaty settlements after 1918 since Hitler's dispensations tended to multiply the number of administrative units, currencies, fiscal systems, and legal frameworks.

According to Mazower (1999, 149), the Third Reich accorded the new Europe with a patchwork of more or less provisional regimes. In practice as each piece of territory was acquired, Hitler assigned to it, in an ad hoc manner, the type of governance that seemed least likely to prove a threat to The Third Reich's military security. Initially there was also some notion that in the long run, a New Order for Europe would be established which envisaged the formation of a single economic community for the whole continent, working under German domination with the Reich constituting the industrial hub of the system. In fact this concept was soon relegated to the back burner in the face of concentrating on the war effort and exploiting all occupied territories for the benefit of the German war machine.

Indeed, Germany exploited most of the territories over which it had direct control mercilessly to service its military needs. Occupied territories had to yield labor, resources, and industrial products in increasing quantities. "Like a gigantic pump, the German Reich sucked in Europe's resources and working population" (Kulisher 1948, 27). In fact after 1939 much of the increase in national product available to Germany came from foreign contributions and levies including foreign labor which accounted for around a fifth or more of the civilian labor force at the peak. It is difficult to give an exact figure for the total foreign contribution to Germany's domestic product for the war period. Occupied Europe probably contributed about one quarter of the economic burden, and this rises to nearly one third if dependent, but non-occupied Europe, is included. But even these figures may underestimate the total contribution (Klemann and Kudryashov 2012, 36, 104–105, 108). The method of extraction and use was not however the most efficient because of the ruthless and harsh fashion in which it was carried out. The sheer waste of resources is evidenced by the loss of labor, some of it highly skilled, through the horrendous extermination program of killing Jews, prisoners of war, and anyone who appeared to pose a threat to the regime. Increasingly the SS driven Holocaust strategy also consumed scarce resources such as labor, fuel, and transport capacity, thereby adding to the problems of the Nazi war effort.

The End of an Era

Europe as a whole was more devastated and prostrate by 1945 than it had been at the conclusion of the Great War. Occupied Europe and the Soviet Union were especially badly affected, whereas the damage and losses in the Western sector were less

severe. The extent of the damage and loss of production was more serious than it had been in the First World War. Manufacturing industry was paralyzed, commerce almost at a standstill, agricultural output well down, and communications badly disrupted. Shortages of almost everything prevailed over a wide area of the continent and starvation was prevalent. Financially most countries were in an extremely weak state, with huge budgetary deficits, swollen money supplies, a severe shortage of hard currency, and strong inflationary pressures. Very few countries, part from Sweden and Switzerland, had not suffered severely from several years of hostilities. Europe's position stood out in sharp contrast to that of the United Sates, and it soon became apparent that the task of rebuilding Europe would depend on the policies adopted by that country since without substantial external assistance, the prospects of an early European revival looked very grim indeed.

Fortunately the postwar settlement proved neater and more effective than that following the First World War. It did not involve an extensive carving up of the continent. In fact the victors did not rush into formal peace treaty negotiations with the losers, but instead they arranged informally among themselves what boundary adjustments should be made. Strong political differences between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union inevitably resulted in the marking out of spheres of influence in Europe leading to the east-west split and the onset of the Cold War. Although territorial changes were less extensive than those after 1918, they were significant in terms of later events, and they did involve considerable movements of population. The major losers were Germany, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, while the Soviet Union was the chief beneficiary, not only in terms of population and territory but also because she was left in a strong position to exercise control over the Baltic states and the East European nations especially with the transition of the latter countries to full-blown socialist regimes in the immediate postwar years.

Two other features were an improvement on the First World War settlement. The long wrangle over war debts and reparations was largely avoided, while more lavish assistance was provided to aid recovery and reconstruction. War debts proved much less of an issue after 1945 thanks to American munificence, while though reparations were exacted from ex-enemy countries by the Soviets, these were less pernicious than those imposed after 1918. Relief assistance was in fact inaugurated long before the end of the war under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), set up in November 1943, at the behest of the United States to organize and distribute supplies and aid to newly liberated territories. This was subsequently replaced by the more lavish Marshall Aid program started in April 1948. The shift was prompted partly by the turn of political events, notably the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union including the hardening line over Germany, culminating in the blockade of West Berlin. Fear of political and social disturbances and the threat from emerging communist regimes in the East played no small part in the launching of the new program of assistance. When the offer was first announced in June 1947, it was made clear that it would be confined mainly to countries in Western Europe. It was fortunate that the United States did not, as it had done after 1920, retreat into glorious isolation, but instead became the universal provider of Western Europe which meant that reconstruction and recovery were more rapid and sustained than anything that could possibly have been contemplated in 1945.

With the help of Marshall Aid, recovery in Western Europe was fairly rapid, and by 1950 most countries had well surpassed their prewar levels of output, though income per capita gains were less striking because of an overall lagging in the agrarian sector. In the East recovery was somewhat more protracted because of the upheaval arising from the transition to new political structures and also because of the exactions imposed by the Soviet Union on Hungary, Poland, and East Germany.

After the main recovery and reconstruction phase through to the early 1950s, there followed the golden age of economic growth when output and incomes expanded at a faster rate than ever

before, both in Europe and also in the wider world. According to Bairoch's calculations, European income per capita expanded at around 4.5% per annum in the postwar decades, whereas it had barely reached 1% a year over the long period from 1800 to 1950 (Bairoch 1976, 298– 99). In short, in the generation from the late 1940s, income per capita had made greater progress than it had in the century and a half since 1800. Virtually all countries experienced continuous expansion including those along the periphery of Europe. In fact the communist countries appear to have expanded more rapidly than those in the West though there is some doubt as to the reliability of the data sets for the Eastern Bloc countries.

Expansion slowed down with the onset of the financial turbulence and inflationary conditions in the 1970s and 1980s, and serious problems emerged in the Eastern Bloc countries which served eventually to undermine their regimes. Though they had expanded rapidly in the postwar era, consumers did not enjoy the same real income gains and lifestyles of people living in the West, partly because of hefty state exactions to bolster investment in capital intensive sectors including defense procurement. Hence the consumer sector was squeezed severely. Secondly, rigid state direction and detailed systems of control over economic activity tended to lead to high cost and inefficient production and a deterioration in technological competence. The absence of price and profit signals in the command economies resulted in a misallocation of resources, and in time the socialist countries found that they were not at the cutting edge of technical development.

With increasing political and social unrest in Eastern Bloc countries including the Soviet Union, it was only a matter of time before the socialist regimes collapsed. This occurred in spectacular fashion at the end of the 1980s with the disintegration of the Soviet Union's command economy and its loss of control over her Eastern Bloc neighbors. One by one the Baltic states and the countries of Eastern Europe were released from the grip of the Soviet Union. They were at last free to establish their own brand of political and economic regimes and eventually to make application to join the West as members of the

European Union. Sadly, the euphoria that accompanied the revolutionary phase of 1989–1990 soon gave way to grim reality as economic activity fell dramatically and unemployed soared following the collapse of communism. It would take many years before these countries recovered from the shock of regime transformation.

In conclusion, it had taken two centuries before marginal or peripheral Europe was able to free itself from the clutches of the dominant European powers. Whether this will prove to be more than cosmetic is open to debate. The core-periphery dichotomy may in fact be a never-ending continuum since the economic and financial interests of the western powers within the EU will remain the dominant force along the periphery. The subordinate status of the peripheral countries was starkly demonstrated in the fiscal and debt crises of 2012 when Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and several Balkan countries were forced to seek bailouts. The extent to which the eurozone economies had diverged rather than converged was evident in the differentials in bond yields. In May 2012 Germany, regarded as the safe haven for investors, was able to issue 2-year bonds at virtually zero rate of interest, while yields on 10-year bonds were at a record low. By contrast, Greece, the weakest member of the eurozone, was shut out of bond markets, while Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Bulgaria struggled to find buyers for their bonds notwithstanding attractive yields of interest, for the simple reason that investors were not convinced that their money would be safe. This was in marked contrast to the optimistic years of the eurozone when any country's sovereign bonds were regarded as a safe bet, an illusion that helped to create the crisis. It owed much to the cultural differences among member states. The efficient and hardworking Germans were prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to get through a difficult period engendered by absorbing the costs of reunification. Conversely, many of the peripheral countries had attitudes that were the polar opposite of the German. Their governments elected to gamble and invest unwisely, shirking the opportunity to enact structural reforms to modernize their economies to bring them nearer the German level. The absence

of financial discipline, low levels of productivity, and lack of competitiveness in many peripheral countries remained ever-present, and rescue packages could serve little more than "sticking plasters" so long as fundamental problems continued to linger.

In short, despite some major transformations in the map of Europe by the new millennium, the peripheral countries were still the poor relations on the European continent, whose real incomes and lifestyles fall far short of those in western countries. So far, under the umbrella of the EU, it has not proved possible to eradicate the disadvantages of the past, and on present trends it seems very likely that the peripheral countries of Europe will remain in a subordinate status for some time to come.

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European Union

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European Union Economic Inequality

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Fanon

▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)

Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Biography; Colonialism;
Fanon; Postcolonialism; Psychiatry

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of West
Indian psychiatrist, political philosopher, and
anti-colonial revolutionary Franz Fanon
(1925–1961).

Frantz Fanon remains one of the most impor-
tant theorists of anti-imperialism born in the twen-
tieth century. Widely read in Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, the Americas, and Europe, his texts
have been used in anti-colonial, black theory, anti-
imperialist, feminist, cultural, post-colonial, and
visual studies. He has been a reference for
scholars, artists, filmmakers, and activists alike
and his remarks, arguments, and analysis continue
to resonate in communities around the world
which are engaged in a struggle against exploita-
tion and subjugation. Born Martinican but later
thinking of himself as Algerian and trained as a
psychiatrist, Fanon joined the Algerian National
Front of Liberation and became an ardent advo-
cate of emancipation from the colonial yoke.

Fanon was the first theorist to powerfully artic-
ulate the link between political and individual
emancipation, between race and modernity,
between psychic life and the political, between
the look and subjectivity, between national revo-
lution and its aftermath. Fanon engaged with
issues that authors, singers, and poets such as
Aimé Césaire, Richard Wright, James Baldwin,
Léon-Gontran Damas, or Rabindranath Tagore
among many others had explored in their writings:
the malaise of the colonised, his estrangement
from his body and psyche, his rage, his anger,
his desire to live as 'a man among other men'.
Yet Fanon did not impute all the failings of the
national struggle or of the post-colonial state to
the colonial regime. One cause was 'also the result

of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual penury, and of the profoundly cosmopolitan mould that its mind is set in', as he argued in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon called for an active role for intellectuals, who 'must take part in action and throw himself body and soul into the national struggle', and for the people, since the 'collective building up of a destiny is the assumption of responsibility on the historical scale' (Fanon 1990: 152). Finally, Fanon clearly and forcefully rejected the idea of a nation based on ethnic identity, on a defined and fixed 'ethos'.

'Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its own mission, fulfill it, or betray it', Fanon wrote (1990: 166). His generation discovered its mission through its participation in the fight against Nazism and the struggle against racism and colonialism, through the *Négritude* movement, the emergence worldwide of new nation states born out of the defeat of European colonial empires, Bandung, and the African cultural and political emancipation movement. Yet Fanon foresaw many of the problems faced by decolonised countries, the consequences of the hegemony of asymmetric relations maintained by global capitalism and its racial element as well as the failures of the national bourgeoisie. His work challenges ahistorical approaches or the illusion of a natural order of things to explain failures by post-colonial nation states, and it is important for an understanding of the colonial roots of contemporary social realities.

Although *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) are his best-known texts and are widely translated, his articles written for *El Moudjahid* collected in *A Dying Colonialism and Toward the African Revolution* testified to Fanon's wide range of concerns, his attention to cultural difference, his understanding of the nature of violence, and his knowledge of the imperialistic project.

At the beginning of *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon wrote, 'I do not come with timeless truths' (1967: 7). This suggests a revolutionary programme open to difference, the unforeseen and unexpected, one that Fanon feared would not be followed by the decolonised dominant classes and leadership of the future.

Biography

Frantz Fanon, writer, psychiatrist, activist, was born on 20 July 1925 at Fort de France, Martinique, at the time a French colony. His parents, who were of mixed heritage, belonged to the urban middle class. His father, Félix Casimir Fanon, worked in the French customs service; Eléanore Médélice, his mother, was a shopkeeper. Fanon studied at the Lycée Schoelcher, where one of his teachers was the poet and writer Aimé Césaire, whose writing style and passionate denouncement of colonial racism had a major influence on Fanon. At 18, Fanon took part in agitation against the Vichy regime in Martinique and travelled to Dominica to join the Free French Army. Sent for military training to Algeria, he encountered racism and later became disillusioned with the cause of freeing Europe from Nazism. He wrote to his elder brother, Joby, that 'Nothing there, nothing justifies this sudden decision to make myself the defender of a farmer's interest when he himself doesn't give a damn' (Julien 1996). Wounded in battle in the winter of 1945, he was decorated with the Croix de Guerre. After 2 years of military service, he returned to Martinique, where he worked for Césaire's election campaign.

Awarded a veteran's scholarship in 1947, Fanon left Martinique for Paris, and then for the University of Lyons, where he enrolled at the faculty of medicine and read psychiatry. In 1952, he married Marie-Josèphe Dublé (know as Josie). They had a son, Olivier, that same year; a daughter, Mireille, had been born in 1948.

Fanon was an avid reader of post-war French philosophers – Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty – of journals such as *Présence africaine, Esprit*, or *Les temps modernes*, of African-American literature, of poetry and drama. He read the postwar psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who were highly critical of French psychiatry and of the branch of psychiatry developed in the French colonies.

Fanon obtained his diploma in 1953 and left for Algeria in the same year to lead a psychiatric ward at the hospital of Blida-Joinville. Travelling throughout Algeria, Fanon discovered the

corruptive element of the French civilising mission: anyone of European descent could exploit and brutalise the Algerians. He was appalled by the poverty of the Algerian population, by the racism and the plundering of resources. In November 1954, the war of national liberation started. Fanon was contacted by Algerian nationalists and agreed to treat their wounded soldiers in the hospital.

In 1956, Fanon was present at the First World Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Paris. In a speech, he criticised colonial racism and called for it to be ended through struggle. That same year, Fanon resigned from his post at Blida and went to Tunis. There he worked as a psychiatrist at the Clinique Manouba and in May 1957 became a spokesman for the Algerian National Front of Liberation; he wrote for its paper *El Moudjahid*, and acted as an ambassador for the Algerian cause with the newly independent African nations.

In 1961 in Rome, Fanon met Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, whom he admired immensely. Fanon had already conceived the idea of writing a manifesto for the Third-World revolution, and he fervently discussed the idea with Sartre. In 1961, he started to write what would be his second seminal text, *The Wretched of the Earth*, and Sartre agreed to write the preface.

Fanon never saw his book in its final form. While visiting Ghana he was diagnosed with leukaemia, and he went to the Soviet Union for treatment. In October 1961, he was persuaded, despite his reluctance, to travel to Washington, DC, to receive treatment at the Bethesda Hospital, where he was admitted on 10 October. On 6 December 1961, Fanon died. His body was taken back to Tunisia and carried by soldiers of the Algerian National Front of Liberation for burial in Algeria following his wishes. Fanon was survived by his wife, son, and daughter.

'Total Liberation'

Fanons's work proposed three interacting processes in the move towards total liberation: *restitution* of land, of rights, of customs, of culture, language, and history that had been ignored,

denied, viewed with contempt by the colonial order; *reparation*, financial, economic, and psychic; and *reinterpretation* of the past, of ideas and ideals, made possible by rejecting the colonial images, representations, and ideas that the colonised had assimilated. It was about starting anew, and this would be accomplished through revolution, a cleansing through its fire, the redemptive and cathartic fire of violence.

The recovery of land and rights went along with a psychic recovery. To Fanon, his work as a psychiatrist, which he pursued until the end of his life, was inseparable from his struggle for the end of imperialism. The recovery of land and political independence had to be accompanied by regaining the dignity and self-esteem which had been damaged by colonial racism.

When Fanon was pursing his studies, psychiatry in France was slowly emerging from a rigid framework according to which madness was seen as a threat to society and patients were locked into cells, abandoned to their suffering. Though the debt of Fanon to Lacan has been widely discussed, the influence of the psychiatrist Francisco Tosquelles, a Spanish refugee who after the Second World War had become a leading theorist and practitioner of institutional psychiatry, was more important. A member of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, or POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification), Tosquelles had invented new ways of treating the trauma of Spanish republican soldiers and had looked at the psychic consequences of fascism. As an intern with Tosquelles, Fanon learned his methods, such as group therapy and non-hierarchical relations between nurses, doctors, and patients. For Tosquelles, the hospital had to be organised around the social reality of the patient, and workshops and group activities had to take place in common rooms in order to encourage all patients to participate. This school of institutional psychiatry was critical of the ways in which psychiatry had until that time been punitive and repressive, and it advocated a radical reassessment of the asylum, working to transform it into a convivial place and to encourage new relations between the therapist and the patient. The move was revolutionary and opened the

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way for new therapeutic methods. Fanon fully adopted this vision of institutional therapy and applied its insights to the study of the colonised's psyche and colonial racism as well as in Blida.

Although the theories and goals of psychiatry and psychoanalysis have been perceived by many anti-colonial revolutionaries as too Western to be useful (an opinion still widely shared; the Marxist Cedric Robinson (1993: 82) has written that *Black Skin, White Masks* had a 'petit bourgeois stink'), Fanon found in them the tools to make sense of torments and sufferings that could not be solely assigned to the loss of land or civic rights. In the last chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*, 'Colonial War and Mental Disorders', Fanon remarked: 'Because it is systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly: "In reality, who am I?"' (Fanon 1990: 200). He inscribed the powerful and contradictory sentiments at work in the unconscious in the larger political, social, and cultural context of destruction, alienation, racism, and subjugation that European imperialism had brought to the world, and gave them meaning. However, 'Psychoanalysis is a pessimistic view of man. The care of the person must be thought as a deliberately optimistic choice against human reality' (Fanon 1967: 16); its insights could be useful but its full theory and practice could not. But if 'total liberation' should 'concern all sectors of the personality', it was important to free the colonised from the 'untruths implanted in his being', and psychiatry could help (Fanon 1990: 250). His analysis, which preceded two other influential studies of the psychology of the colonised, Albert Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957) and Ashis Nandy's *The Intimate Enemy* (1983), belongs to a long literary and philosophical tradition (to which he acknowledged his debt) that had explored colonial alienation. Fanon foresaw the insights of the theorists of anti-psychiatry, that madness is not disease but a story, the story of a situation and of the impossibility of being heard. He opened the way to a school of post-colonial psychiatry, critical of the Western racialised and gendered nomenclature of mental disorders yet concerned with the psychic dimension of human life and with social and political emancipation.

Discovering, as had so many before him, that he was a 'Negro' when he arrived in France, Fanon sought to deconstruct 'The Fact of Blackness' ('L'expérience vécue du Nègre', the title of chapter 5 of *Black Skin, White Masks*), the lived experience of being black and male in a society whose modernity had been founded on racism. Influenced by Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*, by Jean-Paul Sartre, and by the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Fanon looked at the constitutive role of the 'look' as a site of power knowledge and at the fetishisation of skin colour. For decolonisation to occur, the issue of representation and subjectivity could not be dismissed.

Fanon insisted on the importance of *listening* to patients, to women, to peasants, to soldiers, to the oppressed, to all of those who had been put at the bottom of society. The psychiatrist had to remain attentive to potential misunderstanding which could bring to light the 'impossibility of finding a meeting ground in any colonial situation' (Fanon 1965: 125). Thus, in an article that has been widely discussed, 'Algeria Unveiled', Fanon made a powerful argument about women's emancipation in a colonial situation, arguing that the veil was 'a technique of camouflage, a means of struggle' (Fanon 1965: 35–67, at 61).

Looking at the long history of capitalism and at its intimate relation with colonialism, racism, and predation, Fanon argued that the 'total destruction of the colonial system' would mean getting rid of fear, of the 'fashion and of the images of the colonialists' (Fanon 1988: 105), taking risks, not being afraid of death, building transcontinental alliances, and being ready to constantly assess what was at stake. Echoing Aimé Césaire's opinion of a French left contaminated with colonial thinking – paternalism, racism, feeling of superiority, desire to guide – Fanon criticised a posture of conditional support, foreseeing the limits and pitfalls of the abstract discourse of human rights that disavows excesses and pleads for

reconciliation in the hour of war. The left had to accomplish its own process of decolonisation and recognised that 'In a very concrete way, Europe has stuffed itself with the gold and raw materials of the colonial countries: Latin American, China and Africa' and owed its ' renown to millions of deported slaves' (Fanon 1990: 81). Western democrats had to acknowledge that their social formations had been structured by colonial racism and the privileges and advantages that they had thereby acquired.

Fanon advocated violence as a cathartic process for the colonised and as an inevitable step towards emancipation. Revolutionary violence had a humanistic aim because it led to the creation of a society in which health could be gained, and it would never reach the level of colonial violence. Once this had been accomplished, a new step would take place and the Third World would 'start a new history of Man [sic]' (Fanon 1990: 254). This would be accomplished by dropping the European model, which had failed to live up to its promises of progress, had justified crimes, and had legitimised slavery. There was no reason either to envy or to blame Europe; the objective was for humanity 'to advance a step farther' (ibid.).

The reading of Fanon's theory has been dynamic: his work is regularly assessed, criticised, read anew. His view of the colonial society and regime as monolithic and rigid has been challenged; his praise of violence as cathartic has been questioned; his celebration of the peasantry as the true revolutionary class and his suspicion of the proletariat and the urban classes have been shown to be problematic; the position of women in his theory has been criticised by black feminists. These critiques have spurred new defences of Fanon, creating a whole field of Fanonian studies and testifying to the continuing relevance of his texts.

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FARC in Colombia: Twenty-First-Century US Imperialism and Class Warfare

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Synonyms

Colombia; FARC-EP; Inter-imperialist rivalry; US imperialism

Definition

Imperialism in Latin America is not a distant memory. No country is free of its new variations and developments. This chapter is about the armed struggle against US imperialism in Colombia waged for over 50 years by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army, FARC-EP). Since the late 1990s, there have been significant developments within Latin America in the mass redistribution of wealth, the recovery of sovereignty, and moves to promote regional integration. Mass movements throughout the continent have risen

against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Leaders in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Argentina have emerged bringing hope of greater independence from imperialism. US efforts to isolate Cuba have changed to incorporation within the imperialist chain. No longer are the Organization of American States (OAS) and FTTA reliable mechanisms for the imposition of US interests on the region. Most recently, the Colombian government and FARC have been engaged in peace talks since 2012. This chapter argues that these important new developments have led to a readjustment of US domination in Latin America, not its ending. These changes were pivotal to the transformation of US imperialism in Latin America and are a reflection of the growing, global, inter-imperialist rivalries of the US, China, and Russia.

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Since the late 1990s, there have been significant developments within Latin America in the mass redistribution of wealth, the recovery of sovereignty, and moves to promote regional integration. Mass movements throughout the continent have risen against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Leaders in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Argentina have emerged bringing hope of greater independence from imperialism. US efforts to isolate Cuba have changed to incorporation within the imperialist chain. No longer are the Organization of American States (OAS) and FTTA reliable mechanisms for the imposition of US interests on the region. Most recently, the Colombian government and FARC have been engaged in peace talks since 2012. These important new developments have led to a readjustment of US domination in Latin America, not its ending. These changes were pivotal to the transformation of US imperialism in Latin America and are a reflection of the growing, global, inter-imperialist rivalries of the US, China, and Russia.

Colombia provides an extreme example of this unusual accommodation with US imperialism, described here as 'twenty-first-century imperialism', with a reimposition of the Colombian comprador bourgeoisie and its rapprochement with neighbouring Venezuela. In this context, the FARC is the leading force resisting a twenty-first-century imperialism where the twentieth-century counter-insurgency and destabilisation programmes continue through new forms of control and domination.

Origins of FARC and US Imperialism in Colombia

Since the Wars of Independence against Spain, the Colombian ruling class has fought for its title to land. Simon Bolivar's attempts to carry out a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador failed. Colombia's semi-feudal backwardness, historic formation, and geography preserved the hacienda system left behind by imperial Spain (Hylton 2006; Safford and Palacios 2002). In the nineteenth century, Colombia was composed of small agricultural communities widely dispersed and often isolated by mountains, rivers, jungle, and savannah.

From the time of the Spanish departure in 1823, the fundamental problem in Colombia was that all land was owned by a small but powerful oligarchy. Colombia's land problem and the failure of the Liberal and Conservative Parties to resolve it after nearly 125 years unleashed a civil war, *La Violencia*, from 1948–58.

In the 1946 Colombian presidential election, a Liberal Party candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, attempted to unite the majority of Colombians against the landowning oligarchy. Conservatives saw Gaitan as a threat to the social order (Pearce 1990). The Liberal Party and the leadership of the Partido Comunista de Colombia (Colombian Communist Party, PCC) presented Gaitan as a political rival. When Gaitanistas won control of the Colombian Congress in 1947, there were strikes and protests in the cities and land seizures in the countryside (LeGrand 1992). When right-

wing paramilitaries killed 14,000 protestors, Washington saw an emerging revolutionary situation (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1945; National Archives of the United States 1948; US State Department 1943). On 8 February 1948, Gaitan led a silent protest in Bogotá of 100,000 supporters demanding peace (Márquez 1978). Two months later the populist leader was shot dead in a Bogotá street, instigating *La Violencia* (Idels 2002; Weiner 2008).

In the capital, Bogotá, Gaitanistas and Communists blamed the new Conservative government for Gaitan's murder (FARC-EP 2000). Radicalised students called for juntas *revolucionarias* similar to those formed during the Wars of Independence (Hylton 2006). The urban masses attacked police stations and government offices during the *Bogotázo* uprising. This popular upsurge failed to bring about a revolutionary transformation (Braun 1986). Conservatives formed paramilitary groups in the cities uniting with wealthy landowners' paramilitary forces in rural and remote areas to crush the rebellion. The army and police were purged of Liberals. All public officials were appointed by Conservatives (Hobsbawm 1963). Paramilitary groups of citizens and police carried out military operations against Communists and Gaitanistas (Sánchez et al. 2001).

The PCC called for the 'people's mass self-defence' to resist the rising level of violence (Partido Comunista de Colombia 1960). Reviving a guerrilla tradition dating back to the Independence Wars, the PCC established a guerrilla base and organised a peasant armed resistance (Bailey 1967). *La Violencia* – which cost the lives of approximately 300,000 Colombians, with 600,000 wounded, maimed, and traumatised – came to its official end in 1958 with the National Front's election (Campos et al. 1963; FARC-EP 2000; Hecht 1977). The social conflict did not end. Instead, 'the violence' was largely concentrated in the countryside (Campos et al. 1963).

When *La Violencia* ended, Washington found in Colombia a willing Cold War. The National Front blamed *La Violencia* on communism. Information on the state's enemies, known or suspected, was centralised. Pacification programmes or 'military civic action' forced poor peasants into 'rehabilitation programs', as Communist guerrillas remained at large (Gomez 1967). These operations would be constructed under the direction of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress (AFP) programme of 1961 (Vieira 1965). The 'land problem' was replaced by the communist problem as the root cause of Colombia's disorder.

With US aid and assistance Colombia became a 'showcase state' in the Latin American Cold War. The commercial export-oriented agriculture of bananas and coffee was the dominant sector of Colombia's economy and major landowners controlled the government. The AFP made Latin America more reliant upon the US and attempted to negate the radicalising effect of the Cuban Revolution (1959) through military, technical, and economic aid (Randall 1992). In Colombia's Communist-held regions, selective agrarian reforms were implemented.

In April 1955, the Colombian security forces led by General Rojas Pinilla launched a ground and aerial assault on a guerrilla stronghold at Villarrica in Tolima Department, forcing them into a strategic withdrawal and displacing 100,000 peasants (Hylton 2006; Ospina 2008; Pérez and Lenguita 2005). At Tolima, several hundred guerrillas defended 20,000 peasant families fleeing the government's extermination campaign (FARC-EP 2000; Pérez and Lenguita 2005). In their withdrawal, the guerrillas formed two fighting columns and embarked on a long march over hundreds of miles (FARC-EP 2000; Ospina 2008). Under attack by the army and air force, half the Communist guerrillas retreated to Sumapaz. The other half trekked towards the cordillera, crossing the Magdalena River to establish settlements in El Guayabero in western Meta and El Pato in north-western Caqueta. The number of guerrillas and peasants killed on this march numbered several thousand (Partido Comunista de Colombia 1960). Those captured were interrogated, tortured, and killed (ibid.; Pérez and Lenguita 2005). The surviving guerrillas became guerrilla commanders and founded Marquetalia, rebel agrarian communities at Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, El Pato, Guayabero, and Santa Barbara

(Arenas 1972; Kirk 2003). The attacks on the guerrilla forces led to strikes and street protests in Bogotá, forcing General Rojas Pinilla's resignation.

On 18 May 1964, a US counter-insurgency force of 16,000 troops, tanks, helicopters, and warplanes attacked Marquetalia (Black 2005; Colby 1996; Osterling 1989). US advisers and Colombian veterans of the Chinese Civil War (1945–49) and the Korean War directed the operation (Grandin 2006). The surviving guerrillas retreated into Amazonia's agricultural frontiers (Schneider 2000). The Cuban revolution and the growth of guerrilla movements throughout Latin America marked the beginning of Colombia's geo-strategic importance to US hemispheric domination (Petras 2012). The FARC was considered a greater threat to US interests than the Vietcong in Indochina by Kennedy's policymakers (Grandin 2006).

On 20 July 1964 the FARC issued a 'revolutionary agrarian policy to change the root social structure of the Colombian countryside, integrating the land completely free to campesinos working or wanting to work the land' (FARC-EP 1964). At its 10th PCC Congress, the FARC was officially recognised as a revolutionary movement by Castro's Cuba, the Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China (FARC-EP 2000; Gott 1970).

The Liberal Gaitanistas and the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (Revolutionary Liberal Movement, MRL) left the Liberal Party in 1959, when Gaitanistas and former Liberal guerrillas, opposing the PCC, formed the Frente Unido de Accion Revolucionaria (United Front of Revolutionary Action, FUAR), a coalition of primarily left-wing intellectuals. Until 1964, the official PCC did not support armed struggle. The FUAR and a group of Bogotá students called the Movimiento de Obreros, Estudiantes y Campesinos (Movement of Workers, Students and Peasants, MOEC) failed to build an urban guerrilla movement (Bethell 1995). The FUAR and MOEC members were devoted to 'Gaitanismo' (Hobsbawm 1963). Through the 1960s and 1970s, the broad Colombian left remained MRL Gaitanista (ibid.).

In 1965, militants from the FUAR and MOEC formed the Cuban-inspired National Liberation Army (ELN), combining Marxism-Leninism with Christian Liberation Theology. In 1968 the Maoist-oriented *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (Popular Liberation Army, EPL) was also established to wage revolutionary war in the countryside against the National Front dictatorship (Richani 2002). The EPL emerged because of the Sino-Soviet split and the ELN remained opposed to the PCC despite the party supporting rural insurgency. The PCC's change in policy occurred because of the increasing prestige of the Cuban regime among left-wing forces in Latin America and its friendship with the Soviet Union. Widespread opposition to the National Front by the Colombian left compelled the PCC to endorse the FARC's revolutionary army of 3,000 peasant fighters (Bethell 1995; FARC-EP 2000).

The War of Position and Development of Twenty-First-Century Imperialism

Since the mid-1960s, the revolutionary forces have maintained a 'war of position' against the Colombian state and Washington. As a consequence, two different 'Colombias' emerged. Defended by US imperialism, the first Colombia represented the coffee and manufacturing interests in Antioquia, the Western Andean Departments of Valle, Caldas, Risaralda, Quindio, and the Caribbean port of Barranquilla. This 'richer' Colombia received government assistance and direct American investment through the AFP programme (Hylton 2006). Those 5% of Colombians owned more than half of the land, received half of the national income, and represented the 'developed Colombia' (Ospina and Marks 2014). The FARC's 'Colombia' covered 70% of the remaining territory. Blacks, Indians, frontier settlers, the poor, and landless lived and worked in this second undeveloped Colombia of the southern and eastern plains, lowlands, the Pacific and Atlantic coasts (see Map 1). This Colombia received no electricity, few public services, and minimal infrastructure from the state (Richani

FARC in Colombia: Twenty-First-Century US Imperialism and Class Warfare, Map 1 Map of Colombia. (Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/colombia_rel_2001.jpg)

2002). In this second 'undeveloped' Colombia the FARC emerged as a virtual state-making force.

In 1974 the National Front period ended when the Liberal Alfonso Lopez Michelsen was elected president, promising to make Colombia the 'Japan of South America' (Zamosc 1986). During the Lopez presidency, Colombia's growing cocaine trade channelled funds to the political campaigns of both Liberal and Conservative Parties (Strong 1995) by money-laundering its

drug money through the Banco de la Republica (Hylton 2006). Lopez promised land reform but sacked many public-sector workers and responded to trade-union action with repression. In September 1977, a national strike of over 5 million workers by Colombia's four largest trade unions (the Conservative Union de Trabajadores Colombianos [UTC]; the Liberal Confederacion de Trabajadores Colombianos [CTC]; the Communist Confederacion Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia [CSTC]; and the smaller Confederacion General del Trabajo [CGT]) paralysed the nation for several days (Hecht 1977). The strike was the first general strike in Colombia's history. Falling wages and growing popular opposition to the government's imposition of structural adjustment and privatisation programmes fuelled it (ibid.). Lopez saw the mobilised working class as a catalyst for another *Bogotázo,* responding with armed repression leaving 80 workers dead and 2,000 injured (Hanratty and Meditz 1988; Hecht 1977). Plans for land reforms were abandoned.

The Lopez regime faced a resurgence of FARC and ELN activity throughout the countryside and an urban-based insurgency. After the FARC's 'final eradication' by Conservative president Misael Pastrana Borreo (1970–74), Washington shifted its attention from communism to drugs. Under pressure from US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the issue of drugs became paramount in Bogotá. After Kissinger's fact-finding trip to Colombia, President Nixon believed that Lopez was 'totally committed' to 'go to war' against drugs (Friman and Andreas 1999). Lopez's neoliberal policies created 'the informal sector' which, by 1980, employed more than half of the urban workforce in the 'narco-economy' (Hylton 2006).

President Reagan declared a war on 'narcoterrorism' in Colombia, linking the 'drug war' to the FARC, the Soviet Union, and other left-wing forces (Scott and Marshall 1998). The US 'War on Drugs' in the 1980s occurred during Colombia's 'cocaine decade' when the Medellin and Cali cartels fought for supremacy. The drug cartels along with the largest landowners maintained repression in the countryside and the continuous supply of cocaine to the huge American market (Lee 1998; Richani 2002). The CIA worked with Colombian military officers to reorganise Colombia's intelligence network, strengthening the anti-guerrilla death squads with direct links to drug cartels, to wage a counterinsurgency war against the FARC (Scott 2003; Stich 2001).

Deepening unrest threatened the peace of the 'first Colombia' as urban workers took strike action in the major cities throughout the 1980s. A paramilitary organisation called Muerte a los Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers, MAS) was established to kill guerrillas who kidnapped members of the national business class for ransom. MAS murdered leftists, trade unionists, civil rights activists, and peasants working with the FARC (Scott 2003).

Conservative president Belisario Betancur (1982–86) extended the internal repression. In contrast, the Liberal Party found new sources of funding and support from an emerging narco-bourgeoisie which, by the end of Betancur's presidency, ended Conservative rule in Colombia (Strong 1995). In 1985, the FARC founded the Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union, UP) as part of a strategy to combine 'all forms of struggle' with peace negotiations that the guerrillas and other Colombians sought with the Betancur Administration (Dudley 2004). From 1985–95, 5,000 activists and leaders including elected officials, candidates, and community organisers of the UP were assassinated (Amnesty International 1988).

A virtual 'narco-state' subservient to US interests controlled the 'first Colombia' (Villar and Cottle 2012). Since the 1980s, elected regimes in Bogotá rule 'stable' Colombia where paramilitary death squads arrest, torture, and kill those identified as 'enemies' (Robles 2012; RPASUR 2012). In 1985, the FARC and ELN formed the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Co-ordination, CGSB). Together with M-19, a short-lived indigenous rebel group named the Quintin Lame, and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia, PRT), the CGSB formed an armed united front (FARC-EP 2000). In 1980, the EPL announced it

had abandoned Maoism and prolonged war (Richani 2002). By 1991, EPL had been infiltrated and absorbed into MAS's successor paramilitary organisation the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC) (Hylton 2006). The AUC were death squads formed by landlords and cattlemen with links to politicians and businessmen who wanted rebel forces killed. In response, FARC moved to eliminate the EPL. In 1991, the EPL initiated 'peace talks' with the Cesar Gaviria Trujillo Government where 2,000 EPL fighters 'demobilised' to form the political party Ezperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace and Liberty).

In 1989, as the Cold War and the 'cocaine decade' ended, progressive Latin American writers and intellectuals including Gabriel Garcia Marquez urged the FARC and ELN to lay down their arms and to pursue reform through peaceful means (Bergquist et al. 2001). With the end of the Cold War, the US devised and sponsored the 'Central American Peace Accords' (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1991), which demobilised leftist insurgencies and armed struggles against the US-backed juntas in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala (Huntington 1991). Contradicting the expectations in Bogotá and Washington, the revolutionary war in Colombia continued.

In 1991, a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report identified the Liberal senator Alvaro Uribe Velez as one of the 'more important Colombian narco-traffickers contracted by the Colombian narcotics cartels for security, transportation, distribution, collection and enforcement of narcotics operations in both the US and Colombia' (National Security Archive 2004). As governor of Antioquia, Uribe established a 'civilian-military force' known as Convivirs (meaning to 'cohabitate') which were absorbed by the AUC. By 1995, over 500 Convivirs existed throughout the country coercing rural civilians to act as paramilitaries under its local military command (Aviles 2006; Tate 2002). Thousands of trade unionists, students and human rights workers were murdered, disappeared or displaced (Feiling 2004). The creation of 'civilian militias'

was endorsed by the RAND study, 'The Colombian Labyrinth', which argued for the restructuring of US counter-insurgency operations (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). A DIA 'top secret' report concluded that the FARC could defeat Colombia's military within 5 years unless the armed forces were drastically restructured (Farah 1998).

Responding to this conclusion, President Clinton authorised 'Plan Colombia', a $1.3 billion US package to fight the 'War on Drugs' in 2000. The plan provided greater military assistance, including helicopters, planes, and training, a massive chemical and biological warfare effort, as well as electronic surveillance technology (Storrs and Serafino 2002; Villar et al. 2003). Plan Colombia's budget expanded to $7.5 billion, of which the Colombian government pledged $4 billion, the US $1.3 billion, and the European Union and other countries $2.2 billion (Livingstone 2003). Colombia ranked second to Israel and Egypt in US military aid and assistance, reflecting the sense that, as stated in the RAND study, the US needed to prevent FARC from taking state power there in the twenty-first century: 'The Colombian government, left to its own devices, does not have the institutional or material forces to reverse unfavourable trends' (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). President Pastrana described the American penetration and concentration of Colombia as a 'Marshall Plan', involving greater investment by developed countries and an official document which could serve 'to convene important US aid, as well as that of other countries and international organisations' by adequately addressing US concerns: the FARC and growing leftist forces in the region (Pastrana 2005; Petras 2001b).

Plan Colombia involved a close relationship between the CIA and paramilitary death squads which carried out most of the political killings in Colombia (Amnesty International 2001; National Security Archive 2008). Regionally, the Clinton intervention equipped Colombia to become a launching pad for future military interventions and destabilisation programmes in the hemisphere. Internally, Plan Colombia completely militarised the nation with a focus on southern

and eastern areas of Colombia, two of the country's main coca-producing regions (Martin 2012). By the late 1990s, 30% of Colombia's total wealth derived from the cocaine trade, according to Colombia's Central Bank, thereby strengthening the growing influence of the drug trade's operators (Villar 2007). Plan Colombia prepared right-wing forces to fight FARC and other left-wing forces in the twenty-first century.

During Pastrana's presidency (1998–2002), FARC controlled San Vicente Del Caguan, known as the *zona de despeje* or the demilitarised zone (DMZ). The DMZ consisted of five municipalities the size of Switzerland, where tens of thousands of workers and peasants lived and participated in its daily management (Leech 2002). San Vicente Del Caguan was described as '"FARClandia," the world's newest country', where negotiations between the FARC and the government took place (Lamb 2000; Novak 1999). On 21 February 2002, Pastrana accused the FARC of drug-trafficking and hiding kidnapped victims (Ruth 2002). Under pressure from US President George W. Bush to wage 'War on Terrorism', Pastrana ordered the Colombian military to invade the zone and the Colombian air force to bomb its communities (Hylton 2006). Anticipating a military attack on San Vicente, FARC ordered residents to evacuate and retreat to mountain hideouts.

In 2001, President Bush added $550 million to Plan Colombia, to terminate 'narcoterrorism' (Giordano 2001). Between 1996 and 2001, US military aid to Colombia increased from $67 million to $1 billion (Tickner 2003). Pastrana's support for the 'War on Terror' prepared the way for Alvaro Uribe, who became president from 2002 to 2010. Uribe had run as an independent Liberal presidential candidate on a war platform to defeat the FARC and ELN. 'Uribismo' found its coherence in Colombia Primero (Colombia First), a political movement of the far-right which campaigned for Uribe in the 2002 and 2006 presidential elections (Ospina 2008). Uribe declared there was no 'conflict' in the country, whereas past presidents acknowledged that FARC and ELN were an inherent part of the nation's troubled history (Gardner 2000). Uribe declared that 'narco-terrorists' were attempting to overthrow a democratic state. 'If Colombia [did] not have drugs, it would not have terrorists', Uribe told the Organization of American States (OAS) Permanent Council (2004).

In October 2002, US special operations teams were ordered to eliminate 'all high officers of the FARC', and 'scattering those who escape to the remote corners of the Amazon (Garamone 2004; Gorman 2002). In March 2008, FARC's chief negotiator, Raul Reyes, and another senior member, Ivan Rios, were murdered. On 3 March, in the mountainous area of Caldas, Rios was shot dead by Pedro Pablo Montoya 'Rojas', his bodyguard. Rojas stated that he was 'betrayed' by state authorities who had offered a reward for Rios's death. Rojas was imprisoned for 54 years for kidnapping and rebellion but not for the murder of Rios and his partner (RCN Radio 2011). Reyes was slain in a targeted killing by army and air force personnel.

In 2010, US President Barack Obama praised Colombian security forces for the murder of FARC Comandante Jorge Briceno (Mono Jojoy) (Feller 2010). Obama compared the death of the FARC leader to killing Osama bin Laden, stating that Colombia had come '180 degrees' from being a failed state to a country 'exercising leadership' in the region (Burns 2010). In 2011, Alfonso Cano, who had replaced the 84-year-old veteran Manuel Marulanda on his death as the FARC leader in 2008, was also murdered in a military raid. It was concluded that these deaths weakened the FARC, causing 'desertions' and 'organisational decay' (Brittain 2010). Uribe and his deputy Santos claimed victories over the FARC which involved false body counts or Falsos Positivos in which thousands of young men from slum districts were murdered by the Colombian military then dressed as guerrillas killed in combat (National Security Archive 2009). Uribe dismissed these revelations as 'false accusations' invented by the FARC (McDermott 2009; Terra Colombia 2008). President Uribe was hailed by his Western supporters as winning the war against narcoterrorists (Shifter 2010). In reality, it

demonstrated that a military approach was incapable of bringing peace to a country riven by war. With Plan Colombia's work to hold back FARC in the countryside accomplished, 'the evil hour' had passed with cocaine seemingly no longer a state-security problem. Colombia's leaders and the US were prepared to face a new century of challenges.

The Impasse: Social Imperialism and the FARC

In contrast to the restoration of liberal democracy in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Central America in the 1990s, Colombia's political system remained unchanged under the presidencies of Uribe and his successor Juan Manuel Santos (Petras 2012). Plan Colombia set out to militarise the country by consolidating the extreme expression of oligarchic rule (Ospina 2011). 'Uribismo' and its 'war on terror' exposed Colombia's two-party system with far-right extremism and narco-paramilitarism. In 2005, Santos cofounded Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (Social Party of National Unity), composed of former Uribistas, power brokers, and leading members of the Colombian elite. Since the inauguration of President Santos, political differences between himself and Uribe have surfaced reflecting the divisions within the elite. Santos promised reparations to victims of the conflict and the restoration of lands seized from peasants by right-wing paramilitaries and landowners. Unlike Uribe and the narco-bourgeoisie, Santos represents Colombia's urban, cosmopolitan bourgeoisie and is more closely intertwined with the interests of US finance capital and the Colombian comprador class (Justice for Colombia 2014b; Wilpert 2012). Uribe argues that Santos has weakened his opposition to the FARC and has criticised him for strengthening diplomatic relations with Venezuela (Boadle 2011). According to Santos, Uribe sought peace negotiations with FARC for 5 years during his term in office (Edling 2012). Their main area of disagreement is Santos's new counter-insurgency approach, based on the recognition that the FARC cannot be defeated militarily (Ince 2013).

Uribe's military focus kept Colombia back in the mid-twentieth century. On 1 March 2008, relations between Colombia and Venezuela broke down when Uribe ordered the Colombian air force to bomb a FARC encampment near the Ecuadorian border. The FARC emissary Raul Reyes and 24 foreign sympathisers (including four Mexicans and an Ecuadorian) died in the bombing raid, provoking the worst crisis of inter-American diplomacy of the last decade (Marcella 2008). Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa ordered his army to the border and suspended diplomatic relations with Colombia. Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez mobilised troops on the border. Chavez had begun mediations between FARC and Colombian government representatives before Uribe terminated the talks and launched the bombing raid (Marcella 2008). After the raid, Chavez urged the FARC to free its prisoners of war and end the armed struggle (BBC News 2008).

Chavez's announcement was welcomed by all Latin American leaders including Fidel Castro, who offered a critique of the FARC. He argued that US military interventionism was imposed on Colombia from outside the country and not from the class struggle within Colombia. Castro called for peace without US military intervention (Petras 2008; Ruiz 2009). This reconfiguration of the Latin American left was immediately registered in Washington, with Republican presidential candidate John McCain hoping 'the FARC would follow Chavez demands to disarm' (Petras 2008). For the leftist forces which followed Chavez's parliamentary road to twenty-first-century socialism, Latin American capitalism reflected a shift in the balance of power that promised state survival with diplomatic and economic ties to Colombia. It would also strengthen ties with America's imperial rivals China and Russia. It would require an accommodation with US imperialism by opposing all guerrilla movements and refraining from criticising the Castro-Chavez vision for regional integration. By 2005, twenty-first-century imperialism was undeniably imposed on Latin America by the US, the European Union, the rise of China and a reassertive Russia through

competing trade agreements and security arrangements penetrating the entire continent. Despite the social developments in Latin America and multilateral changes in international relations through the growing opposition to US intervention in the Middle East and the formation of the 'BRIC' countries, these developments could only be 'progressive' or 'socialist' in name, not in actuality.

In 2005, a centre-left social-democratic party, Polo Democratico Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole, PDA), emerged to oppose the Uribistas in the Colombian electoral system. The PDA sought to reform Colombia but could never challenge the power of the oligarchy or US imperialism (Leech 2011). In a country where 60% of the population did not vote in recent presidential elections, a parliamentary resolution to Colombia's internal conflict remains unachievable, despite growing support for peace and reconciliation with the FARC from Colombian society. Among those supporting peace are: the former Bogotá mayor Gustavo Petro, banned from public office; the former Liberal senator Piedad Cordoba, who has been banned since 2010; and the Marcha Patriotica (Patriotic March) movement which opposes the Colombian oligarchy. This movement stands for a 'second and definitive independence' from colonialism and imperialism (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2010; Marchapatriotica.org 2012; Colombia Reports 2013). The revolutionary left has campaigned to reinstate the Patriotic Union (UP) Party into the electoral process from which it was eliminated in the 1980s through state terror. According to UP spokesperson Nelda Forero, the party will serve as a 'political platform for the results achieved in Havana' which, under the auspices of Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, and Chile, the FARC has been demanding land reform for peasants and an opening of democratic space for workers (ABC News 2012; BBC News 2013b; Hansen-Bundy 2013). Despite the survival of the left, political assassinations and arrests targeting FARC supporters, unionists, and human rights workers continue throughout Colombia (Jordan 2012; Justice for Colombia 2014a; Leech 2011).

The Reimposition of the Colombian Comprador Bourgeoisie

Santos inherited Uribe's war. Plan Colombia set out to eliminate the FARC and secure foreign capital investment. A focus on the latter through an accommodation with the FARC has underlined Santos's counter-insurgency approach. The failure to defeat the FARC is, in part, caused by the insurgency's Plan Rebirth of 2008 which switched to more frequent 'hit and run' tactics with smaller units, improvised explosive devices, and 'nomadic leadership' (Martin 2012; Willis 2012). In 2011, the Colombian state's complete intelligence database was leaked to the public, prompting Santos to replace his entire military command except the National Police director (Alsema 2011; Noto 2011). Uribe's militarist strategy toward the FARC actually reminded the insurgency of the strategic value of fighting as guerrillas and not as a regular army. A 2011 RAND study, reported:

> Until the 1980s, the FARC engaged in small-scale attacks on military and police units in remote areas of Colombia. In the late 1990s, the FARC attempted to make a qualitative jump to a higher stage of military operations by engaging and defeating battalion-sized units of the Colombian army (Las Delicias in August 1996 and El Billar in March 1998). However, the sequence of successful large-scale attacks on isolated army units was broken toward the end of the decade when the Colombian military learned to combine air power with land forces to defeat FARC attempts to overwhelm local garrisons. Since then, the Colombians have used air-land synergies to prevent guerrilla concentrations. (Rabasa and Chalk 2011)

In 2012, the British multinational Emerald Energy shut down operations in San Vicente del Caguan, and other companies, including the American Occidental Petroleum, threatened to follow suit unless security was maintained (Martin 2012). Attacks against Colombia's oil industry increased 300% in the first 6 months of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, limiting oil production in the departments of Putumayo, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Arauca, and La Guajira (Pettersson 2012b). Reports of closures by petroleum and energy companies reflect 'growing industry concerns' of a deteriorating security situation in

Colombia (Kraul 2011). According to *Colombia* Reports, the security environment deteriorated following the FARC's two-month unilateral ceasefire on 20 January 2013. FARC attacks against security forces and infrastructure reportedly exceeded pre-peace talk levels, with 33 attacks following 20 January, eight being directed at oil and mining companies (Pettersson 2013). Both the FARC and the Colombian government maintained that negotiations in Havana were advancing with FARC pressing for land reform, rural development projects, legalising coca, regulations on multinationals, and greater autonomy in relations with the US (Alsema 2012; BBC News 2013a).

Amid the talks in Havana, the war continued as Santos sought to secure infrastructure for foreign investment rather than the defeat of the insurgency. Plan Colombia's militarisation of the country led to a huge increase of police and military resources which never neutralised FARC's strategic capacity. Traditional FARC strongholds in remote and border regions were maintained (Martin 2012). Military patrols have attempted to capture these regions of hundreds of square miles of inhospitable jungle (Center for International Policy's Colombia Program 2009; DeShazo et al. 2007; Giugale et al. 2003; GlobalSecurity. org 2010). A temporary military presence in the Amazonian war zone demonstrated that the Colombian state was capable of only a limited security and sovereignty.

On May 2012, Obama rewarded Santos with a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), whose main beneficiaries were the landlord and business classes (O'Hagan 2014). Plan Colombia's goal of capturing land through state terror for neoliberal trade had succeeded (El Espectador 2012). Colombia's former minister for mining and energy, Carlos Rodado Noriega, described it as a 'piñata of mining concessions', which allowed compradors, landowners, and narcotraffickers to buy up mining concessions to speculate on their price rising with the arrival of US and Western multinational companies (El Espectador 2012). The FTA has opened the door to foreign extractive capital, favourable treatment, guarantees and protections to safeguard investments aligned with US finance

capital and the elimination of tariffs and trade barriers. These companies included Harken Energy (US), Drummond (US), Exxon Mobil (US), Occidental Oil (US), Conquistador Goldmines (Canadian/Colombian – subsidiary of US Corona Goldfields through front company San Lucas), Sur American Gold (Canadian), BMR (Canadian), Barrick Gold (Canadian), Greystar (now Eco Oro, Canadian), Pacific Rubiales (Canadian), Anglo American (UK), Rio Tinto (UK/Australian), Xstrata (Swiss), B2 Gold (South African) (Ismi 2012; Leech 2004; O'Connor and Montoya 2010; Richani 2010).

Santos's 'Law 1148' promising the restitution of lands to victims of cattle ranchers, narcotraffickers, landowners, military and paramilitary officers and multinationals has proven to be a chimera (El Universal 2012). Some 40% of Colombian land has been licensed to or is pending approval for 'multinational corporations in order to develop mineral and crude oil mining projects'. US and Western transnational monopolies own the rights to mine over 12 million acres of land with South African AngloGold Ashanti holding the largest share. Eco Oro trails behind with nearly 100,000 acres of land. Oil companies have been granted over 90 million acres for oil exploration and production across Colombia. The American corporation Cargill, the world's largest agribusiness, recently bought 220,000 acres (Richani 2012b). The Israeli company Merhav has invested $300 million in 25,000 acres for the production of sugar cane to produce ethanol. Over 280,000 acres have been sold to foreign companies for biofuel crop production (Ahumada 2012; Dominguez 2012; Semana 2012). If land 'reform' is to be taken seriously, it would mean having to reverse decades of neo-liberal underdevelopment rivalling Brazil and Guatemala in land concentration. On a scale of 0 to 100, Colombia ranks 86 which, according to Colombia's GINI index, is close to complete inequality (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2011).

Santos's economic success, under the banner of 'desecuritisation', has meant waging Uribe's war without holding any expectations. Santos is silent about the 'war on drugs' and 'war on terror' without any change in its violence against the

insurgents. In January 2012, Santos launched Operacion Espada de Honor (Operation Sword of Honour) to reduce the FARC's capacity by half in 2 years. His aim was to repel the insurgency's repeated attacks on mining, energy, and oil companies (Martin 2012; Murphy and Acosta 2012). According to intelligence analyst Colby Martin, Espada de Honor, was not a major strategic shift in the war against insurgency and crime but an admission by the Santos Government that 'the end of the violence in Colombia is not around the corner'. Santos has 'put aside the goal of completely defeating the FARC and other groups, instead focusing on strategically defending its interest by disrupting the enemy through tactical offensives' (Martin 2012). Generals David Patraeus, the former CIA director, and Stanley McCrystal, former commander of Joint Special Operations in Iraq, have advised Colombia on a new strategy to restrain the insurgency, which continues to attack comprador businesses (Richani 2012a).

During the Summit of the Americas in April 2012, the US Army's General Martin Dempsey and President Obama visited Colombia. Dempsey recommended that US Army and Marine Corps colonels who commanded combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan should be sent to Colombia (Richani 2012a). Obama and Santos discussed a new military regional action plan to include training police forces in Central America along the lines of Plan Colombia (US Office of the Press Secretary 2012). This ongoing US military intervention in the region occurs when there is increasing support for the current peace talks in Colombia. Supporters of the peace process include Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo, the first billionaire in Colombia and ranked 55th in the world by *Forbes Magazine,* over 70% of Colombians, the Castros in Cuba, and Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro (Forbes 2014; Ospina 2013; El Tiempo 2012).

Santos's efforts to secure foreign investment for Colombia has been achieved through low-intensity violence throughout Colombia, a massive PR campaign, and the logic of US counter-insurgency experts. Colombia has the worst human rights record in the Western Hemisphere with state forces linked to death squads responsible for 97% of forced disappearances (Human Rights Watch 2007, 2010; United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013; Vieira 2008). Under Uribe and Santos, over 250,000 leftists have 'disappeared', according to the Colombian investigative journalist Azalea Robles. Wikileaks confirmed a total of 257,089 'disappeared' (Kovalik 2012). During Uribe's second term in office and the election of his successor, approximately 38,255 leftists 'disappeared'. Colombia's twenty-first-century *desaparecidos* outnumber the recorded mass murders committed by the military juntas of Guatemala (200,000), Argentina (30,000), Chile (3,000), and Uruguay (600) in the previous century, and was, according to Azalea Robles, lowered through unmarked mass graves and secluded crematoria (Robles 2011). Since 2005, 173,183 political assassinations of leftists have been carried out. Nearly 10,000 political prisoners ranging from academics, unionists, and students, to guerrilla combatants were gaoled without trial in Colombia and are subject to systematic torture and abuse (Peace and Justice for Colombia 2006; Robles 2012). With a population of over 46 million Colombia has 5.2 million displaced persons, mostly poor peasants, because of the Colombian state's war against them (Manus 2011).

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), foreign direct investment in Colombia increased from $11.2 billion in 2000 to $74.1 billion in 2009 (UNCTAD 2010). Most of the FDI inflow was concentrated in mining and quarrying for gold, coal, and oil extraction. The US is the largest source of FDI in Colombia's resources (Kalin 2009; Manchego 2011; Portfolio.co 2011; Pro-export Colombia 2010; US State Department 2010).

Conclusions? The Imperialist Chain of Control and Command for an American Century?

As the Colombian war demonstrates, the comprador bourgeoisie reassert their power in Latin

America with a policy of peaceful coexistence with US imperialism. The Colombian oligarchy maintains power through state violence and social immiseration. The post-Uribistas have unrestrained political and military power backed by an evolving 'War on Terror' which includes the extradition of FARC guerrillas from neighbouring countries (Bargent 2011; Greenwald 2013). Santos was forced to prosecute a different war against FARC to Uribe's 'total war' strategy. Colombia's position in the imperialist chain (from pro-US imperialist Latin American nations to the European Union to the US rivals China and Russia) makes it central to the US strategy by balancing the forces of twenty-first-century imperialism in one geostrategic pressure point. Latin American regional political and economic integration, unlike the FARC, is not opposed to US imperialism. Latin America's twenty-first-century capitalists (like their BRIC nation counterparts) have devised a strategy to compete in the world market by encouraging imperial rivalries for the best economic outcome. Plan Colombia had sought to turn the tide of social change on the continent with containment before rapprochement.

The Obama doctrine in the post-Bush era has developed a targeted killing policy. Leading commanders of the FARC secretariat have been killed. Latin American leaders who have criticised US policies have fallen ill (Gye 2011; Watson 2013). Venezuela has made frequent allegations of assassination plots against former President Hugo Chavez and has recently accused Uribe of ordering President Maduro's assassination (Mallett-Outtrim 2013; Marquez 2004). According to Venezuelan interior minister Miguel Rodriguez, a plot was thwarted on 13 August 2013 with the arrest of two Colombian hitmen on orders from the former Colombian president. President Maduro said it involved far-right Venezuelan opposition figures in Miami (Agence France Presse 2013). Reports of US destabilisation efforts in Venezuela have prompted officials in Caracas to allege that Uribe has played a role in recent disturbances and violence through the use of Colombian mercenaries (Bhatt 2014; Pearson 2014).

During the *Bogotázo* and throughout *La Violencia,* the Colombian oligarchy maintained its interests through parliamentary parties against Gaitanismo. Fearing the poor peasantry and sections of the urban workers would support the FARC, the Uribe-Santos regime combined infrequent elections and state terrorism backed by the narco-bourgeoisie (Lopez 2013; Villar and Cottle 2012). Paramilitary groups such as the 'anti-land restitution army' and Aguilas Negras known generically as *bandas criminales* (BACRIMs) are active throughout the country (Ospina 2013; Stringer 2013). The three largest are Los Rastrojos, El Ejercito Revolucionario Popular Anticomunista de Colombia (ERPAC) and Los Urabeños, which in the recent presidential elections urged citizens to support Santos as the 'candidate of peace' (Bedoya 2014; International Crisis Group 2012). One-third of Colombia's newly elected senators are suspected of having paramilitary ties (Vieira 2014).

Colombian officials claim the FARC makes up to $3.5 billion annually from drug trafficking. No irrefutable factual evidence has ever been provided to support this allegation (O'Gorman 2012). FARC is rumoured to have acquired surface-to-air missiles from the black market and Venezuela, but the insurgents have never used them (McCleskey 2013). According to the US, successful 'antidrug trafficking operations' have forced the FARC to expand into other activities such as illegal logging, mining, and in Colombia's oil and gas industries, which if true fund their war against US imperialism (Fox 2012). How the 'war on drugs and terror' in Colombia is exported to Mexico and Central America remains an unquestioned mystery in most analyses, allowing the Colombian narcoruling class to fulfil their imperial obligations. The Colombian bourgeoisie are represented by two factions. The oligarchic rural elite composed of narco-traffickers, landowners, military and paramilitary officers, agribusiness and cattle ranchers. The most prominent representative of this narco-connection is Alvaro Uribe Velez (Villar and Cottle 2012). The other faction has been represented by the presidents of recent years: Gaviria, Samper, Pastrana, and now Santos. They are the modernising, transnational,

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urban elite of industrial and finance capital joined by some agro-industrialists and supported by President Obama. Their 'candidates of peace' and 'smarter' wars have replaced their narcopredecessors as Colombia's compradors in twenty-first-century imperialism. The Fidelistas and Chavistas are wrong in their expectations for social change through adaptation and accommodation. Increasing incorporation into the global economy via China or any other imperial competitor does not put their revolutionary programmes on hold. Paradoxically, it risks losing them altogether at the expense of revolutionary transformation. US–China relations are central to the control and command structure of US imperialism globally, and the FARC in Colombia represents a 50-year old unresolved and unwanted problem. Those who benefit most from this imperial architecture are the rising business classes as in Colombia: mostly, but not exclusively, the agro-mineral, financial, and manufacturing elites linked to Latin American and Asian markets.

In 2011, Obama pledged his support to fight 'narco-terrorism' by providing $600 million in military aid to Colombia and to protect 'a potentially failed state under terrorist siege' (DeYoung and Duque 2011; Shifter 2010). Colombia's military spending nearly doubled from $5.7 billion in 2000 to $10.42 billion in 2010, $7 billion was funded by the US (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012). Since 2000, Colombia's military has almost doubled in size to over 350,000 soldiers (Petras 2013). Santos has announced plans to recruit 25,000 more soldiers into the Colombian armed forces and to allocate an extra $5.7 billion in the budget to combat the FARC (Pachico 2012). Since 2013, efforts have been underway to consider Colombia a potential member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO 2014; Pearson 2013).

The Colombian insurgency is a revolutionary war of the twenty-first century. In the new millennium, the FARC's 'war of position' has changed to a 'war of manoeuvre', through consolidating popular support amongst the poorest in Colombian society. The Santos Government has responded by promising basic services and jobs to

large sections of Colombian society and reducing the endemic inequality (El Heraldo 2012; Pettersson 2012a). In regions under FARC control, land has been redistributed to the peasants (Brittain 2010; Leech 2011; Richani 2002). In the cities, FARC militias and support bases exist in an ephemeral clandestine form where unions, NGOs, students, and intellectuals are violently repressed by the Colombian state through forced displacement, 'disappearances', or political exile (Brittain 2010; Petras 2001a; Villar 2012). Since 1993, the FARC has been building the Clandestine Communist Party (Partido Comunista Clandestino Colombiano, PCCC). It argues that conditions for open political work in Colombia remain dangerous for the revolutionary left. Since Plan Colombia was devised, the FARC's membership was reduced from 40,000–50,000 in 2005 to 6,500 and 10,000 at the end of Uribe's term according to some estimates (Brittain 2010; Mares 2012). Given the FARC's current fighting capacity and the Colombian state's change in counterinsurgency policy, these estimates are either exaggerated, manufactured, or speculation. The real number of the FARC is unknown as its members are condemned as 'narcoterrorists' while currently in peace talks with the government. By one estimate in 2013, the FARC operates in 25 of the country's 32 departments, which is consistent with the insurgency's actions against state forces (InSight Crime 2013).

The long Colombian war sparked by the *Bogotázo* was never about Liberal and Conservative Party loyalties. Nor did it degenerate into terrorism. The National Front blamed *bandoleros* and terroristas as the 'national problem' to deny class justice and a solution to the land problem. Since *La Violencia,* the Colombian state has never totally controlled the country. Despite Santo's strategy of accommodation with the insurgency, the central state is unable to project its control and extend its authority throughout the country. The geography, ecological diversity, and population imbalance of the 'two Colombias' constitute obstacles to state normalisation and comprador peace. There have been regional elites which have historically preferred to defend their local

fiefdoms over a nation under siege. As in most of Latin America, Spanish colonialism left a legacy which restored a wealthy, landowning oligarchy who both fear and despise the poor nonwhite majority, and, who are often in conflict with themselves.

Colombia's history of social upheaval has always been viewed by the Colombian state as a security threat. Defence minister Juan Carlos Pinzon has accused the FARC of 'infiltrating ongoing protests' and seeking to 'rope peaceful farmers into their struggle against the government' (Murphy and Peinado 2013). In Havana, Cuba, the FARC has demanded a general constituent assembly to integrate the people in the peace talks. The oligarchy which Gaitan had opposed reject any such proposal. If the insurgency is too powerful to be defeated then so must its support base be which enables the guerrillas to negotiate from a position of strength. Between 1999 and 2003, the FARC maintained a military presence 16–50 miles from the capital (Brittain 2010). The remote regions of jungles, mountains, and plains are where the most severe social and economic inequality is present. The land problem will remain until Latin America breaks free from imperial-comprador relations shaped by twenty-first-century imperialism. It is argued (Bernard et al. 1973; Brittain 2010; Richani 2002) that the popular insurgency has consolidated 'political power at the local municipal levels instead of seeking outright military victory', choosing instead 'political consciousness', to build the Colombian revolution.

The FARC represents a dangerous idea like those of Che Guevara, who argued that not only is it just to fight imperialism but also that its defeat is possible. The FARC expects nothing and fights for the liberation of Colombia from US imperialism.

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FARC-EP

▶ FARC in Colombia: Twenty-First-Century US Imperialism and Class Warfare

Faroese Islands

▶ Danish Colonialism

Federzoni, Luigi (1878–1967)

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Definition

Luigi Federzoni was an important Italian cultural and political figure in the first half of the twentieth century. He was founder of the Nationalist Party and a leading member of the Fascist Party. He served as Fascism's first colonial minister from 1922 to 1924 and from 1926 to 1928. Afterwards, he mobilised institutional support for colonialism and shaped a nationalist imperial discourse that survived Fascism.

Luigi Federzoni was an important Italian cultural and political figure in the first half of the twentieth century. He was founder of the Nationalist Party and a leading member of the Fascist Party. He served as Fascism's first colonial minister from 1922 to 1924 and from 1926 to 1928. Afterwards, he mobilised institutional support for colonialism and shaped a nationalist imperial discourse that survived Fascism.

Born in Bologna in 1878, a generation after Italian unification, he belonged to a family that had solidified its place among the provincial elite in Reggio Emilia through his father's connection to the poet Giosuè Carducci. His father, a specialist in Dante Alighieri, had been among Carducci's first students at the University of Bologna. Luigi was among the last. Luigi gained privileged access through his father to Carducci's circle, which included professors at the University of Bologna, national literary and artistic figures, and many former students who had swelled the ranks of Italy's intelligentsia and political classes.

As a university student bent on becoming a famous writer in his own right, Federzoni fell under the sway of Alfredo Oriani, a colourful local figure who championed the cause of colonialism after the disastrous Italian defeats of Dogali (1887) and Adua (1896). Federzoni participated in the tail end of the Florentine nationalist revival, becoming a close disciple of the nationalist and imperialist writer Enrico Corradini. Unsuccessful as a novelist, Federzoni tried art criticism before settling on a career in journalism. In 1910, together with Corradini and others, he founded the Italian Nationalist Association (ANI). Owing in great part to Federzoni's leadership, the ANI's leaders transformed the group from a cultural association bent on revitalising national self-esteem into a doctrinaire, neo-conservative political party bent on expansion in the Mediterranean and the defeat of liberalism and socialism at home.

As an editor of both the ANI's official organ, *L'idea nazionale,* and the important Roman daily *Il giornale d'Italia,* in the period leading up to the

First World War, Federzoni developed imperial memes that were later central to the Fascist world-view. He argued that imperialism was both a political programme and a cultural way of being. The one required the other. He insisted that acting and thinking imperialistically was an essential part of what it meant to be Italian (*italianità*) even as most members of the political classes, including Benito Mussolini, then a socialist, had turned their backs on imperialism. Federzoni's conception of the term drew on his neo-classical formation under Carducci, his informal schooling in imperialism under Oriani, his friendship with Corradini, and his reading of the nationalist writer Giuseppe Mazzini. Federzoni argued that imperialism signified both a reclaiming of Italy's classical heritage and a point of departure for the Risorgimento. To this he added a strong dose of social Darwinism, arguing that only imperialism could enable the national organism to capitalise on its most valuable natural resources – the fertility of its people. For him, uncolonised spaces in Africa were simply voids for Italians to fill. Italy's historic mission was to supplant indigenous populations with its own, thus creating a modern *mare nostrum*. His conception of imperialism is also remarkable for the manner in which he united colonial aspirations in Africa with irredentism – an older political movement aimed at annexing the so-called unredeemed lands from Austria-Hungary, where Italian speakers lived outside the borders of unified Italy. Federzoni's imperialist designs, however, did not stop with the *terra irredenta*. He envisaged Italian hegemony over Albania, Greece, Switzerland, Corsica, and Malta.

Italy's leading political figure in the early twentieth century, Giovanni Giolitti, unwittingly contributed to Federzoni's political success when he provoked war with the Ottoman Empire (1911–12). The war marked a fundamental shift in Italian politics. Most Catholics had been estranged from national politics up to that point. They now enthusiastically supported the war, and even the Vatican gave its tacit blessing. In contrast, the Italian socialists and most radicals, republicans, and democrats actively opposed it. Thus, unlike Italy's colonial

ventures in East Africa in the nineteenth century, imperialism in the twentieth century bridged the gulf between the church and the state and derailed efforts by left-leaning liberals like Giolitti to narrow the gap between liberals and the democratic and socialist left.

Federzoni was the first politician to exploit this shift successfully for political gain. As a war correspondent for *L'idea nazionale* and *Il giornale d'Italia*, he conflated the war for Libya with a concurrent battle over the extension of the suffrage. He painted the democrats as un-Italian men who hid behind pacifism, humanitarianism, and respect for indigenous African populations abroad in order to derail Italy's historic mission of bringing civilisation to Africa and asserting Italy's standing as a Great Power. During the war, when a scandal broke in the army that involved Freemasons, a group associated with the political left, Federzoni conducted a survey of leading intellectual, political, and military leaders about the place of Freemasonry in modern society. He published the responses in *Il giornale d'Italia.* They overwhelmingly portrayed the Masons as a foreign group associated with the Ottoman Young Turks on the one hand and with radical, republican, and socialist advocates of atheism, divorce, and democracy on the other. Federzoni's prominence spread as newspapers picked up the story. A few months later, he ran successfully for parliament against an incumbent Socialist deputy and a centre-left candidate. Imperialism played an important role in the election. Federzoni attacked his opponents as un-Italian enemies of imperialism. He demanded a more active imperialist policy that took the Italo-Turkish War as a starting point for further expansion. Many on the right who were dissatisfied with the leftward drift of the political classes under Giolitti were attracted by Federzoni's blending of nationalism and imperialism as the basis for an anti-socialist, anti-democratic, and anti-liberal alliance of forward-looking conservatives and Catholics.

After volunteering in the First World War, Federzoni ran successfully for re-election and encouraged the nascent Fascist Party to align itself

with the Nationalist political platform, which was still aimed at expansion in the Balkans and Africa. As Mussolini's movement gained ground and drifted rightwards, Fascism found a valuable ally in Federzoni. Once Mussolini renounced his anti-clericalism and his opposition to the monarchy, the Nationalists were ready to back Mussolini. Federzoni's support earned him the post as colonial minister in Mussolini's first cabinet. In 1923, the Nationalist and Fascist parties merged into a single party, with the Fascists adopting the Nationalist Party's ideology as its own.

Federzoni's tenure as colonial minister was divided into two periods: 1922–24 and 1926–28. The intervening period coincided with the Matteotti Crisis, when Federzoni took charge of the interior ministry from Mussolini and shored up Fascism. As colonial minister, Federzoni was markedly more ambitious than his liberal predecessors. He continued their efforts to reassert control over the coastal regions of Libya, which had been weakened during the First World War. But he also sought ascendency over the interior, which meant the abrogation of previous agreements with the Senussi Muslim confraternity. This policy strengthened the insurgency against Italian domination. In response, Federzoni demanded the same harsh treatment that his predecessor had used. In 1928, when Federzoni resigned, owing to a political realignment in the government, the Senussi had not yet been defeated. His successors would intensify Italian efforts, utilising new methods, including the establishment of concentration camps.

Federzoni advocated a more effective exploitation of Italy's colonies by supporting public-private ventures aimed at increasing the importation of colonial agricultural goods to Italy and the exportation of Italian settlers to the colonies. At the same time, he applied the same heavy hand in the colonies to tame Fascist *squadrismo* as interior minister. He also created an important precedent for later racial policies by forbidding *fasci*, or local fascist groups, in the colonies to admit indigenous people. Federzoni rejected the idea that indigenous people could become Italian, an idea

he dismissed as the French form of colonialism. Instead, he saw himself implementing a British form of colonialism predicated on the separation of the races.

Federzoni believed that the creation of a culture of imperialism was an important facet of his duties as colonial minister. He intended that the production and consumption of cultural life connected to imperialism – art, music, theatre, architecture, the humanities, the social sciences, and the pure sciences – should serve as a matrix for the creation of the Fascist 'new man' and as proof of the racial vigour of modern Italians. He created an annual celebration dedicated to colonialism and used his network of friends to speak to local audiences about the essential imperialist nature of being Italian. He sent artists to the colonies to re-imagine the world according to an imperialist gaze and sponsored exhibitions to awaken the middle classes to their role as imperialists.

Federzoni's tenure as colonial minister was also marked by two important administrative innovations. In December 1922, he created the Consiglio Superiore Coloniale (Superior Colonial Council) to serve in an advisory capacity on colonial matters for the state. He also oversaw the drafting of the *Legge organica per l'amministrazione della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica,* or Organic Law (26 June 1927), which defined citizenship in Libya and established a new administrative and legal basis for colonial rule there. It created separate legal standings for Italians and indigenous Jewish and Muslim populations, giving the Jews a more favourable standing owing to his belief that they had in them the seeds of *italianità* for having served as agents of Italian culture and civilisation under Muslim rule. The Organic Law also strengthened the governor's powers and paralleled the decidedly authoritarian trend in the metropole.

After 1928, Federzoni continued to play an important role in propounding a culture of imperialism. As president of the Istituto Coloniale Fascista (Fascist Colonial Institute; 1928–37) and the Istituto Fascista dell'Africa Italiana (Fascist Institute of Italian Africa; 1937–43) he

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strengthened his position as a gatekeeper to governmental largesse, publishing opportunities, and the professoriate for those in the younger generation in academic fields that could be linked, even tangentially, to colonialism. As director of Italy's premier scholarly journal, the *Nuova antologia* (1929–43), he made imperialism a leading topic by opening its columns to explorers, geographers, historians, linguists, theorists, and colonial administrators. As president of the Italian Senate (1929–39), he took a keen interest in imperialism and made sure that the Senate gave visible support for the Ethiopian War (1935–36) and the proclamation of the empire. When Mussolini appointed him president of the Royal Academy of Italy (1938), he again used his position to foster scholarship on imperialism, now emphasising Italian expansion in the Balkans. He dedicated significant parts of the academy's resources to expanding scholarship that emphasised ancient Roman and medieval Italian legacies in Albania and Yugoslavia, economic ties between the two sides of the Adriatic, and ethnic, linguistic, and historical studies that demonstrated enduring relationships between Italians on the one hand and Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, and Greeks on the other. In 1939 he had the academy's charter revised so that he could have the Albanian Franciscan Friar Giorgio Fishta appointed to it.

Federzoni wrote hundreds of articles and gave numerous speeches on imperialism. He also edited important works and wrote several studies of his own, including *L'Italia nell'Egeo* (Rome: Garzoni-Provenzani, 1913); *La Dalmazia che aspetta* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1915); *La politica economica in Eritrea* (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1923); *Venti mesi di azione coloniale* (Milan: Mondadori, 1926); *Contributo degli italiani alla conoscenza del continente africano* (Rome: Sindacato Italiano delle Arti Grafiche, 1928); *La rinascita dell'Africa romana* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1929); *Il re in Eritrea* (Rome: Nuova Antologia, 1932); *A.O.: il 'posto al sole'* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1936); and *Dal regno all'impero* (Rome: Reale Accademia dei Lincei, 1937).

After going into hiding in 1943 and seeking refuge in Portugal and Brazil after the war, Federzoni returned to Italy and connected with scholars with whom he had worked under Fascism. Many of them participated with him in recuperating Italy's imperial legacy by writing histories that glossed over any negative aspects of Italian efforts to dominate the Balkans, East Africa, and Libya and painted Italian efforts at colonialism as a benign exception to a malefic period in world history.

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Feminism, Third World

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Fidel Castro

▶ Cuba: A Historical Context to Anti-imperialism, Nineteenth Century to the Present

Film Festivals and Imperialism

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Definition

Looking at film festivals through the lens of imperialisms and anti-imperialist struggles illuminates the power relations embedded in the multiplicity of festival networks. It also complicates the common understanding of film festival networks as alternative, while they are at the core of global strategies of powers.

Film festivals and their networks have both built upon imperialist strategies and taken part in anti-imperialist struggles. As part of a privileged circuit for the international circulation of films as cultural, commercial, and ideological products, film festivals constitute an ideal platform for articulating various geopolitical and economic interests, and a visible stage for the performance of global powers and counter-powers. Looking at film festivals through the lens of imperialisms and anti-imperialist struggles illuminates the power relations embedded in the multiplicity of festival networks. It also complicates the common understanding of film festival networks as alternative, while they are at the core of global strategies of powers.

Developed as a sub-field in its own right in the last 20 years, film festival studies has been mostly structured around a European history, justified by the idea that Europe was the 'cradle' of film festivals (de Valck 2007). While research has focused on contemporary global networks and economies, it has paid less attention to histories of non-Eurowestern film festivals, such as Third-World film festivals of major importance, and their central role in the shaping of the global circulation of films. Examining the relations of film festivals to imperialism provides new narratives in addition to the Eurowestern capitalist ones that have been applied in order to read the growth of film festivals and their marketing strategies in comparison and/or opposition to Hollywood. It reminds us that other heterogeneous political economies were also involved in shaping the film festival circuit. Re-inserting undermined geographies, histories, and industries in the study of the constitution of film festival networks underlines the highly political role of film festivals. As a result, Eurowestern logics should be considered as only one among many understandings of film festival networks since their inception in the early twentieth century, and one that is inevitably connected to, and influenced by, a multiplicity of unacknowledged global players.

This introduction to an anti-imperialist and a de-Westernized history of film festivals is therefore unfortunately limited by, and dependent on, the extent of the research conducted on non-Eurowestern film festivals and their networks. The focus in film festival studies is gradually shifting towards new geographical regions. However, extensive research is still needed in order to have a clearer account of the role that Latin American, African, and Asian film industries played in the development of international regulations of film circulation in the mid- twentieth century; the connections between Third-World film festivals and the Eastern and Western blocs during the Cold War; the role of Soviet film festivals and their networks; the current festival industries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as the way they all relate together and with Eurowestern festivals; diasporic festivals and how they negotiate identity politics and global networks; geopolitical readings of online film festivals; and networks of solidarity that successfully avoid or re-appropriate the logics of global capital. Finally, there is a need to look at different types and sizes of film festival and to keep in mind the social and political disparities within the ensembles taken into consideration.

Early Film Festival Circuit and Imperialisms: 1930s to the Post-War Period

Spreading and Countering Fascisms
Strategies of ideological imperialism are tightly connected to politics of nationalism and

internationalism, which played a central role in the formation of film festivals in the inter-war period in 1930s Europe. In the wake of the First World War and the economic depression, European nation states worked to consolidate themselves through new alliances. Highly political gatherings from the start, film festivals were conceived as spaces for diplomatic exchanges, exhibition of power, and claims of authority or opposition. Not only did the powers at play in film festivals reflect larger political tensions and repartition of forces, but festivals themselves had a role in reinforcing alliances and conflicts. The two first major festivals, in Venice and Cannes, were created respectively in 1932 and 1939 in an increasingly tense political climate that saw the rise of German and Italian imperialist fascisms in Europe as a result of the poor management of the peace process in 1918. Hitler's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 actually prevented the first edition of the Cannes festival from happening, and the festival was finally launched after the Second World War, in 1946. The Venice film festival, which grew as a very profitable extension of the long existing Art Biennale (1885), offered a model whereby nations were invited to present their finest selection of national productions in an international setting. Directly supported by Mussolini, the festival became a tool to legitimise and spread fascism through an international cultural event that would arguably profit the glory of all European national cinemas. The Venice Mostra served the intensification of the ideological ties between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany with the visit of the German minister of propaganda, Goebbels, in 1936, and the awarding of the Mussolini Cup prize to Leni Riefenstahl's *Olympia* in 1938. In turn, the Cannes festival resulted from the collaboration between France, Great Britain, and the US to respond to the German–Italian alliance, which reflected the division of forces in the coming Second World War.

Early film festivals provided a showcase for national representation through a set of films selected by national committees, while maintaining ambiguous relationships with industrial and commercial forces seen as threatening and imperialist, such as Hollywood. Hollywood

was in fact considered as the dominant film market against which European cinema had to compete. However, the US, backed by the United Kingdom, contributed to the creation of Cannes. In addition, in Cannes and Venice, Hollywood commercial strategies were both exploited and re-appropriated to celebrate the glory of nations. In Venice, the festival meant to both raise cinema at the level of high art and enable a larger population, including the middle class, to access productions that would encourage adhesion to the regime (Stone 1999). This tension between the elitist and the popular encouraged borrowings from the Hollywood model that offered reconciliation through the use of the glamour, also re-asserting the power of Hollywood cultural imperialism. Moreover, while the emphasis on nationalism over commercialism countered the Hollywood logic, the MPPDA (Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America) was a guest of the festival and used it as a stage to show off American stars (de Valck 2007). Early film festivals were therefore not primarily meant to boost national film industries. Rather, they were exhibiting film industries' already existing power to promote national culture but also tourism, as a way to showcase both national cinemas and the national space of exhibition. As a result, while serving the imperialist endeavours of fascist Italy and Germany, the international showcase of national cinemas also led film festivals to negotiate the cultural imperialism of the Hollywood industry as both an enemy to counter and a strategy to exploit.

Cultural Imperialism and Imperialist Protectionism

This is not to say that film festivals were not embedded in major economic logics and networks. In the post-war period especially, film festivals in Europe were more than ever serving protectionist strategies to support not only economic regional ensembles (Europe versus the US) or national cultural supremacies, but also the ruling of colonial empires, whose foundations were starting to vacillate. Hollywood industries came out of the Second World War strengthened by the US's victorious position, and with renewed

support from the MPAA (the Motion Picture Association of America, replacing the MPPDA). The department of the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) was created to unify American film productions' exportation fees in order to have more impact on foreign exchanges, a strategy that was reinforced by local bilateral agreements that favoured American film distribution in Europe. The urge to develop circuits for European film distribution then became even more pressing in the late 1940s than it was in the 1930s. Film festivals mushroomed in Locarno (1946), Karlovy Vary (1946), Edinburgh (1946), Brussels (1947), and Berlin (1951), but would be soon caught up in the Cold War as a cultural, economic, and political support to the international crisis.

Therefore the European countries that had seen the political potential of festivals gathered to keep control over the multiplication of film festivals. They foresaw the possibility of a network that would quickly exceed the European borders, and initiated collaboration with regimes in Latin America. The Fédération Internationale des Associations de Producteurs de Films (FIAPF) was created in 1939 (as opposed to 1933: Moine 2011) and reinstated in 1948 as a way of being in command of international regulations. The FIAPF had substantial consequences for the development of film festivals. The presidency was shared between France and Italy, but also included extra-European members such as Mexico and Argentina. Film festivals were at the core of the FIAPF's mandate, and the 'Producer's Charter' ('La charte du producteur') that formed the basis of the association's renewal was launched at the 1949 Venice festival. The festival became an institution where legal issues could be discussed, as it hosted several yearly assemblies that the member countries and also the US attended. Primarily, the FIAPF sought to organise all festivals within one unique network that fell under its jurisdiction, which led to the establishing of the festival calendar. The first project was to create a global showcase of nations called 'Olympic of Films', but this was greeted with general reluctance. The FIAPF finally gained control by establishing a classification that would restrict the number of competitive

film festivals to the following categories: 'competitive festivals', which included only Cannes and Venice at the time (A); 'non-competitive film festivals' (B); 'special events' (C); and 'national events' (D) (Moine 2011). The charter also aimed to increase the control of producers over the exhibition of films, and therefore over festivals' programming. However, the very definition of the role of the producer was left uncertain because different models coexisted in Europe and the Americas, which were the areas then covered by the global agreement. Finally, the protectionist model advocated by the FIAPF tended to be in contradiction to the development of film markets on the side of film festivals that encouraged open film trade, as was the case in Cannes from 1950 (Moine 2011). The charter was therefore designed to privilege European interests but soon faced the need to integrate its festival network globally.

Film Festivals and Diplomatic Imperialism

The federation's stance against the US's cultural and economical domination became confused when the MPEA joined the FIAPF in 1951, at a moment when Cold War logics complicated mere economic interests. The FIAPF in the early 1950s then became dominated by the US's diplomatic demands. It constituted the stronghold of the so-called Free World and a continuation of the Marshall Plan, which aimed to rally countries potentially interested in joining the Eastern bloc. As a result, non-European countries were also represented within the FIAPF, including Turkey, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and Japan, in addition to the preexisting members Mexico and Argentina. Coincidentally, film festivals emerged in Mar del Plata (Argentina, 1954) and Cartagena (Colombia, 1960), both accredited to the FIAPF and supported by military regimes. Film festivals were of major importance for the West as a means of gaining a foothold in the Eastern bloc. The Berlinale was initiated in 1951 by Oscar Martay, a film officer of the American military administration in West Germany, and was aimed at audiences from both the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc. It screened only Western productions, which it promoted in border theatres in order to introduce Eastern populations to

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Western ideology until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. Similarly, Karlovy Vary (1946) and Moscow (1959) became accredited as competitive festivals to the FIAPF, extending its control further east but also enhancing the diplomatic power of the Eastern bloc. In fact, the Soviet Union, which maintained a strong national film industry, boycotted Cannes and Venice in some years, according to the state of its relationship with the US (Gallinari 2007).

The multiplication of film festivals worldwide under the FIAFP's control followed the aims of the Club International du Film created in Cannes in 1947, which took as a model UNESCO's defence of the role of cinema as a central weapon in international relations, but also served collaboration with extra-European military regimes. The imperialistic international reach of the FIAPF and its regulation endeavours coexisted with the ongoing colonisation of nations that were forced to be part of the Cold War by default, while discontent was growing in the colonies. Protectionism in film industries was not only applied against hegemonic competitors, but also functioned to restrict indigenous productions, as in French Africa, where laws such as the Laval decree forbid Africans to produce their own films (Diawara 1992). Film festivals in turn also played a central role in the development of indigenous film industries and the popular struggle in the decolonising world.

Anti-imperialisms and the Proliferation of Film Festival Networks: from the Post-War Period to the 1980s

Third-World Film Festivals and Regional Anti-imperialist Movements

While the Cold War was shaping new international dynamics and divisions, the FIAPF relentlessly tried to constrict the festival circuit to one network serving the interests of the Western bloc. Yet the processes of decolonisation introduced new players to the world's map of exchanges, opening up the way for alternative networks of film circulation. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was constituted at the

Belgrade Conference in 1961 after a first gathering at Bandung in 1955. It then comprised African and Asian countries that were newly independent or in the process of decolonisation, but the movement became tri-continental in 1966 at the Havana Conference. The new states gathered to develop the 'Third World Project', a political alliance that asked for 'a redistribution of the world's resources, a proper rate of return for the labour power of their people, and a shared acknowledgement of the heritage of science, technology and culture' (Prashad 2007). Film festivals became integral to the Third World Project because they were ideal vehicles for the new national theories that it promoted, which that would revolve not around the idea of race but around the historical struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Film festivals also responded to the need to develop structures that could showcase widely the new indigenous cinemas emerging from decolonisation. The Third World's international ethos therefore required a new model of film festivals, one that would serve not the competition between countries, but their dialogue and alliances. At the end of the 1960s, both Latin America and Africa had developed their own multiple networks, which had yet to be connected together.

Third-World film festivals therefore started as separated regional projects. In Latin America, Viña del Mar (Chile) and Mérida (Venezuela) became the two major events for the development of a Latin American cinema. After several attempts starting in 1963, Viña del Mar was finally called Festival de Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano in 1967, whose appellation gave its name to the regional film movement. Mérida in turn focused on documentaries, and contributed to the importance of the genre in Latin American cinema. Both Viña del Mar and Mérida were structured around a competition, which facilitated the circulation of the prizewinning films outside the regional confines in other market-free networks. In fact, the Pesaro film festival, established in Italy in 1965, bridged European audiences and films from Latin America, to which it dedicated its 1968 edition premiering Fernando Solanas's *La hora de* los

hornos (1968). Political filmmakers were also instrumental to connecting the different film festivals together as they travelled from one festival to another. Viña del Mar had organised an encounter between Latin American filmmakers in 1967 and 1968, placing discussions and debates at the heart of the festival's mandate. Similarly, Pesaro included conferences and political debates, and these also reflected on the structure of European film festivals, which started to be contested in the late 1960s.

The regional impetus was even stronger in Africa, where film festivals ambitiously served as a platform for conversation between not only filmmakers but also politicians and activists, and generated fundamental initiatives. The first and only edition of the Pan-African Culture Festival in Algiers in 1969 was funded by the Algerian state and the Organization of African Unity, and gave birth to two important statements. First, the festival issued the 'Pan-African Cultural Manifesto' in order to consolidate African unity. It also allowed filmmakers to gather and create the continental organisation that took the name of Fédération PanAfricaine des Cinéastes (Fépaci) and was established in 1970 at the Tunisian Journées Cinématographiques de Carthage (JCC). Fépaci was designed to make possible the development of African and Arab cinemas outside the control of foreign distribution companies. It also aimed to strengthen the Pan-African vision through the nationalisation of film distribution and production, and the creation of regional film schools such as the Institut Africain d'Études Cinématographiques (INAFEC), founded at the University of Ouagadougou in 1976. Created in 1969 in collaboration with the French Ministry of Co-operation, the Festival PanAfricain du Cinéma de Ouagadougou (FESPACO) in Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) developed to meet these expectations. In addition to following what had become a recurring feature of Third-World film festivals, namely organising symposiums and debates, the FESPACO was also dedicated to archiving African cinema. The project took shape in 1989 with the creation of the Cinémathèque Africaine de Ouagadougou.

Connecting the Third World with the Two Blocs

By the early 1970s, and thanks to the platforms of exchange allowed by film festivals, many African countries had nationalised their film industries and had connected them through an inter-African distribution network that bypassed the French-American monopoly. In the continuity of film festivals, ties were strengthened between the two continents, and exchanges developed between filmmakers from Latin America and Africa. In December 1973 and 1974, the Third World Cinema Committee met in Algiers and Buenos Aires to implement the Third World Project through cinema. Yet these networks were not isolated from the Western and Eastern blocs, a fact which complicates binary understandings of imperialism and anti-imperialism. For example, the Rencontres Internationales pour un Nouveau Cinéma in Montreal in 1974 sought to include Third-World filmmakers and militant cinema groups from the Free World in a common dialogue against imperialist strategies of distribution, which was thought in direct continuity with the meetings of the Third World Cinema Committee. Another example is that of delegations from Third-World countries sent in the 1970s to the Tashkent Film Festival (Uzbekistan), which served as a major meeting point in the Eastern bloc. In addition, some countries were truly dedicated to the communist ideology, including Cuba, for which the idea of a Latin American cinema became a key concept in international diplomacy. Havana was a hub for film circulation between the Eastern bloc and the Third World, in a context where the Cuban film industry was supported by strong national institutions such as the film school *Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográficos* (ICAIC). In turn, Pesaro and other festivals in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom constituted important relays to introduce 'New Latin American' productions labelled as political cinema to the Western bloc. Some productions would also infiltrate mainstream festivals such as Cannes (Isaza 2012). Yet the Third-World film festival networks

were also regularly in conflict with circuits identified as imperialist and grounded in their own geographical space. In Latin America, Viña del Mar and Mérida were in open confrontation with official festivals organised under military regimes, such as those in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Mar del Plata (Argentina), the latter being also accredited to the FIAPF (Mestman 2002). Already present in Latin America, the FIAPF tried to assert its authority in Africa and accredited a new festival in Cairo (1976), trying to further expand the influence of the Western bloc while also being welcomed by the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and his policy of offering an 'open door' to foreign investments (Intifah). The FIAPF also attempted to become involved in North Africa by calling on the JCC to respect its regulations. As a result, the Fépaci was partly constituted at the JCC in 1970 in order to respond to the FIAPF's injunction with a strong declaration of independence.

Challenging the Imperialist Structures of Eurowestern Film Festivals

Third-World cinemas reached Western film festivals quite soon after the Second World War, and the introduction of this new aesthetic contributed to a crisis in 1968 during which the structure of the European festivals was challenged. In the late 1950s, dissatisfaction started to grow against the nationalist format of film festivals, which was regarded as antiquated and conservative. French critics in particular protested against the glamour and prizes of Cannes, and asked for more attention to be paid to alternative auteur cinema, which privileged independent filmmakers and low-budget equipment over big productions and was spreading from France to other parts of Europe. Protests culminated in 1968 when the head of the Cinémathèque Française, Henri Langlois, was dismissed and the festival had to be shut down. In other words, the capitalist strategies that had served the nationalist discourses of early film festivals had become inadequate to the new generations of alternative cinema, which included not only European new waves and Eastern films, but also Third-World productions. Berlin and Venice went through similar crises, and European leading festivals were reconfigured to include a parallel section dedicated to alternative cinemas (the Quinzaine des Réalisateurs in Cannes, the Forum des Jungen Films in Berlin, the Giornate del Cinema Italiano in Venice).

Ultimately, this re-structuring was a direct attack on the supremacy of the FIAPF's ruling, which went against artistic freedom for the benefit of geopolitical purposes then largely related to Cold War logics (de Valck 2007). While the A-status of these festivals was finally maintained, the FIAPF still had to re-adjust its regulations regarding the selection procedure. The national selection committees disappeared, and the decisionmaking was handed down to festival directors. Festivals therefore went from a model where capitalist states were omnipotent to a format where artists and films were considered as individual entities, which allowed both more co-productions and the inclusion of new national productions. However, the new parallel sections in the leading European film festivals framed the new indigenous cinemas as 'discoveries', which repeated the colonial enterprise of mapping the emergence of cultures by perpetuating a Eurocentric point of view.

Globalisation and the Rule of Capital: from the 1980s Onwards

The intensification of financial and trade flows in the 1980s, reinforced in the 1990s at the end of the Cold War with the opening of new markets, had numerous consequences for the festival industries. Expanding globalisation thickened film festival networks worldwide, enhanced the competition between the major players, allowed the emergence of new economic actors, and endangered festivals that were depending on less viable national economies. As mainstream festivals became increasingly market-oriented and less state-sponsored, networks were reorganised according to corporate interests and niche industries that grew out of new politics of programming. By the 1980s, the Third World was completely crippled by corruption and debts, and

depended on the assistance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Prashad 2007). As the economic gap between rich and developing countries increased, the Third World Project withered away and the NAM countries came to be understood as part of the unclearly defined ensemble of the Global South, which encompasses all developing countries in the context of globalisation. In the early 2000s, however, new regions came to the fore, such as East Asia and the Gulf area. Regional urban centres have gained global attraction and become home to strong media industries and financial decisional bodies. Moreover, the multiplication of transnational co-productions, facilitated by film festivals, has complicated a clear North–South divide. Yet as new hegemonies are arising, new gaps have been created within the regions.

Recuperation of the Third World Project and New Politics of Programming

On the one hand, the shift in programming politics enabled Eurowestern and A-list festivals to negotiate the arrival of new cinemas and incorporate them within the logic of global capital. Framed as anti-Hollywood, global film festivals however still partake in imperialist logics of economic expansion. The shift in programming also served enhancing the discrepancy between the film economies of the North and the South, although only to a certain extent, since these logics have also been exploited by very competitive emerging festival industries. The re-structuring of film selection practices in Eurowestern film festivals and the focus on art cinema since the late 1960s led to the specialisation of film festivals and to the rise of 'thematic film festivals' (de Valck 2007). This specialisation had been initiated with the creation of parallel sections in Cannes, Venice, and Berlin due to the introduction of auteurist discourses on Eurowestern films which were also being applied to new national cinemas from the Eastern bloc and the Third World. Similarly, many festivals emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s that built on the new waves coming from the South in order to constitute a supposedly alternative network away from mainstream glamour. Therefore, when in the late 1970s revolutionary festival

projects in Latin America and Africa started experiencing difficulties in existing without sustainable and independent funding, they were recuperated by festivals in Europe and North America, which capitalised on Third-World cinemas that they uniformly categorised under the appellation 'world cinema'.

World cinema has now penetrated the global market beyond thematic festivals and niche networks, and has become very prominent in A-list film festivals. Filmmakers of the South have profited from the international exposure that these niche markets and, later, wide networks have allowed, and for that reason have prioritised them over exhibiting their productions at home. The system of premieres, which is predicated on the accumulation of cultural capital preserving the status quo, and its centralisation in the hands of few dominant festivals categorised as A-list by the FIAPF or other growing institutions, such as the Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF), have helped to push away festivals of the South towards other networks in the peripheries of global capital. Festivals in Africa such as the FESPACO are now competing against thematic festivals such as the Milan African Film Festival (Italy), Vues d'Afrique in Montreal (Canada), or the Amiens International Film Festival (France), but also mainstream festivals in Cannes, Venice, Berlin, and London (Diawara 1994). Conversely, in Cuba, the International Film Festival of New Latin American Cinema in Havana was created in 1979 in order to rekindle the political flame of the 'Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano' in the region. The Havana festival soon became a meeting point for leftists from all over the world, including Europe and North America. As well as facilitating collaborations with the Toronto International Film Festival (Canada) and Sundance (Salt Lake City, US), Havana also worked as a catalyst for capitalisation on the Latin American cinema brand (Isaza 2012). The play on the category of regional cinema has therefore allowed both the submission of ensembles in the South to capitalist logics and the exploitation of the global network to the regions' own ends, blurring clear distinctions between anti-imperialist struggle and adhesion to imperialist logics.

Film Festivals, Trade, and the Rise of New Regional Hegemonies

Processes of regionalisation, which were central to the anti-imperialist Third-World struggle, have developed and taken other shapes as a result of globalisation. The current phenomenon of regional film festivals is connected to the flourishing of film markets within film festivals, and to the new importance of cities now functioning as central nodes in the global networks of trade that is not limited to the West (Sassen 2001). In Europe, film markets that existed on the side of festivals have been incorporated in the official structures since as early as the 1980s (Cannes, from 1983; Berlin; Rotterdam). In China, festivals created in the 1970s by state initiatives have been gradually sold to corporations, and have become modelled on profit-making commercial enterprises. Their success attracts sponsors, and the cities in which they are set accumulate both financial and media capital (Hong Kong International Film Festival, since the 2000s; see Cheung 2009). Emerging economies embracing late capitalism have profited from the new centrality of trade within festivals. For example, in the Gulf region, the Abu Dhabi and Dubai festivals were created around their film markets in the 2000s. In the same decade, East Asian film festivals acquired high profile through their film markets (Hong Kong, 1997; Tokyo, 2004; Busan, 2006; Shanghai, 2007).

As a result, categories of world cinemas have also become economic weapons exploited by emerging industries, and are deeply entangled with processes of region-alisation. The new role assigned to global cities, in which film markets participate, has changed the previous dynamics that were still inflected by national interests. Having had their roles reinforced after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, film festivals and film markets have strengthened the circulation between three major poles within East Asia: Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Busan. This network and other lesser ones including Taipei and Taiwan have favoured the discursive formation of a regional cinema – echoing the rhetoric of 'world cinema' and 'Latin American branding' – marketable to both internal and external buyers, and

competing with major industries and mainstream festivals (Ahn 2012; Cheung 2011). As they build on the rise of global cities, however, processes of region-alisation as discursive formations tend to hide new imbalances of power within these discursively unified ensembles. Moreover, other regions are left out from global capital dynamics because of internal dissensions. For example, heavy politics of sponsorship have not favoured the development of the Pan-African festival FESPACO in the context of the economic crisis of the 2000s. Rather, these politics have benefited tourism more than Pan-African cinema; tourism is judged more profitable by a state whose legitimacy has been more and more contested by the population (Diawara 1994; Dupré, 2012).

Film Festivals: New Functions, New Imperialisms?

The centralisation of capital in global festivals has also impacted on their function within the film economy, and enhanced them with additional prerogatives. Previously limited to exhibiting and facilitating distribution, film festivals now also play the role of producers. Funds are developed to help 'world cinema' as it has become a major asset in the marketing strategy of global film festivals. These funds also create new networks of influence, reinforcing pre-existing power relations or constructing new regional discourses. As an example of the latter, set in a city that has become a centre for arts sponsorship in the Gulf area and is itself in rapid economic expansion, the Abu Dhabi Film Festival developed the SANAD Fund (from the Arabic word for 'support') in the 2000s to help the post-production of Arab films. On the other hand, in 1988, the International Film Festival of Rotterdam launched the Hubert Bals Fund to support filmmakers from developing countries. Similarly, the fund Cine en *Construcción (2002)* is a joint initiative of Donostia–San *Sebastián* International Film Festival (Basque Country/Spain) and the Rencontres Cinémas d'Amérique Latine de Toulouse (France) and aims to help the post-production of uncompleted Latin American features. While it builds upon the historical ties that constituted the Ibero-American sphere, it also implies a certain economic dependence among

Latin American productions (Ross 2010). These funds however also reveal the importance of transnational co-productions, which complicate unilateral power relations that would always disadvantage countries of the South. Diasporic film festivals, for example, because they foreground collaborative work in co-productions, provide good models for challenging clear binaries.

Alternative networks of international solidarity of various forms have tried to exploit the potentialities of globalisation to their own ends, and have strived to exist outside globalised film economies. However, there is always a risk that activist festivals will become other thematic events susceptible to being capitalised upon, or placed under the control of overarching organisations such as international non-governmental organisations that are subjected to their own global aid economy. Following the growth of Human Rights Film Festivals worldwide since the 1980s, the Human Rights Film Network (HRFN) was launched in 2004 in Locarno (Switzerland) as a regulating authority. The HRFN is supported by a charter that offers definitions of human rights, which have been accused of primarily reflecting Western conceptions. Moreover, as the category of 'human rights film' is formulated, its penetration into global festival markets is also made possible (Grassili 2012), which reveals the difficulty of constituting worldwide networks without global capital. Similarly, LGBT and queer film festivals first developed as grassroots formations. As they have mushroomed globally, they have developed a niche market around New Queer Cinema that has tamed the previous activist endeavours (Loist and Zielinski 2012). However, the impact of queer film and video festivals is still important locally (e.g. in Taipei and Seoul), and contributes to shape counter-publics (Kim and Hong 2007; Perspex 2006).

Conclusion

Because their primary function is to establish networks, film festivals have been central to historical and global negotiations of geopolitical powers through the circulation of films. Film festivals have reflected, actively participated in, and been shaped by imperialism and economic, discursive, political, and cultural strategies both disabling and empowering political formations, sometimes simultaneously. They have also served the articulations between various geographical scales such as the city, the country, the region, and the global that nuance preconceived understandings of political ensembles and the relations between them, often shaped by imperialism and capital. Film festivals therefore allow us to understand imperialisms and antiimperialisms as forces of organisation and networks of influences that are in constant evolution and vary from one geopolitical space to another.

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Finance

Finance Capital

Finance Capital, Financialization

Finance Capitalism

Finance, Finance Capital, Financialization

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Synonyms

Banking; Finance; Finance Capital, Financialization; Imperialism; Liberalisation; Neoliberalism; Privatisation

Definition/Description

The relationship between finance and imperialism has been a constant dynamic for more than a century. Viewed by leading scholars as a source of extraction and exploitation, finance capital has been used to pillage colonies and semi-colonies in the Third World through extracting surplus value through capital investments. The system of financial investment has deepened in the era of neoliberalism as the withdrawal of state protection has

expanded the capacity of capital to transfer value from the Global South to the Global North.

The late 1800s and early 1900s witnessed a wave of colonial expansion and increasingly hostile rivalries among major capitalist countries, while at the same time significant transformations were taking place in these countries' economic structures. Capital concentration and centralisation were growing, integration between financial and industrial capital increased with finance seemingly having the upper hand, and cross-border capital movements expanded. Hobson (1902), a British left liberal, provided a first explanation that brought these two developments together and a number of Marxists, including Hilferding (1910), Luxemburg (1913), Kautsky (1914), Bukharin (1917), and Lenin (1917) theorised the relationship between the rise of finance and imperialism. The broad argument was that the concentration and centralization of capital indicated a new era in capitalism and competition was giving way to monopolies. In order to sustain profitable accumulation, these monopolies had to constantly expand, not only to export products but also to export capital. In the meantime, finance capital acquired greater power and a dominant position, pushing the state towards imperialist expansion to secure its international investments and to acquire colonies.

The concept of *finance capital* was first used by Rudolf Hilferding, who analysed the rise of the financial capitalists in the context of Germany and Austria and focused on the relations between credit, banks and industrial capital in *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*, published in German in 1910. Hilferding (1910) argued that under modern capitalism 'free competition' was replaced by a process of concentration and centralisation of capital that led to the creation of cartels and trusts. This process brought banks and industrial capitalists together as finance capital – a close integration of the financial capital of banks with industrial capital in which banks acquired a dominant position and representatives of banks started sitting on the boards of corporations in a reflection of not just economic leverage but direct control as well. Finance capital was created as large monopolistic corporations had to rely increasingly on banks to finance their investments. This new institution was not only economically important but it also impacted social and political power as finance capital pushed governments to implement policies that would protect it domestically while supporting it internationally in efforts towards global expansion. Hilferding (1910) wrote:

> The demand for an expansionist policy revolutionizes the whole world view of the bourgeoisie, which ceases to be peace-loving and humanitarian. The old free traders believed in free trade not only as the best economic policy but also as the beginning of an era of peace. Finance capital abandoned this belief long ago. It has no faith in the harmony of capitalist interests, and knows well that competition is becoming increasingly a political power struggle. The ideal of peace has lost its luster, and in place of the idea of humanity there emerges a glorification of the greatness and power of the state …. The ideal now is to secure for one's own nation the domination of the world. (335)

Hilferding thought that imperialism was a direct outcome of finance capital, but he did not regard imperialist wars as the inevitable outcome. Instead, he saw the dominance of finance capital over the state as a structure that could be taken over and used by the working class. Later, Bukharin (1917) defined imperialism as 'a policy of finance capital' in *Imperialism and World Economy*. Lenin (1917) took the core arguments of Hilferding and Bukharin and produced what would later become the classical Marxist theory of imperialism in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. He saw finance capital as directly related to imperialism since states attempt to gain power not only through trade but also through export of capital. The rise of finance capital resulted in the establishment of trade barriers, the export of capital, and a drive towards militarism and imperialism. Imperialist powers searched for colonies where finance capital could export its excess capital and surplus. Lenin particularly emphasised that imperialism was not a political choice but a necessity rooted in the modern capitalist system; the centralisation and concentration of capital both underlay finance capital but were also given added impetus by it. Therefore, finance capital was inseparable from imperialism:

[F]inance capital, literally, one might say, spreads its net over all countries of the world . . .. The capital exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But finance capital has led to the *actual* division of the world. (66–67, emphasis in the original)

The characteristic feature of imperialism is *not* industrial *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital and the weakening of industrial capital, that from the eighties onwards, gave rise to the extreme intensification of annexationist (colonial) policy. (91, emphasis in the original)

Hobson (1902) had argued that the principal driving force behind capital export was insufficient demand among lower-income groups of the core countries, and had suggested that the problem could be solved by a redistribution of income. Lenin (1917) did not see this as a possibility and argued that within the context of finance capital, since the world was already divided, further expansions would result in a struggle for a re-division and this would be the principal reason for imperialist wars. Hence, imperialist wars were a direct outcome of the dominance of finance capital.

At the time, this theory of imperialism was both new and sophisticated and seemed to provide an explanation for the events that were unfolding. The period from 1914–45 witnessed two world wars, one great depression and the emergence of the Soviet bloc. After 1945, the capitalist world entered a new era. The conflict among capitalist powers gave way to the Cold War, while a process of decolonisation changed the nature of the relationship between advanced capitalist countries and the rest of the world. As the uncontrolled expansion of finance was seen as one of the major causes of the Great Depression, the international financial system and domestic financial structures were strictly regulated and attention turned towards state-led economic growth. This led to a change in the focus of theories of imperialism, since in this new set-up the thesis of finance-driven imperialism seemed out of date. New theories of imperialism relied on concepts such as monopoly capital (Baran and Sweezy 1966) and dependency and unequal exchange (Amin 1974; Frank 1966; Emmanuel 1972;

Wallerstein 1974) rather than finance capital. In fact, the finance capital thesis was criticised for representing more of a transitional phase that only applied to Germany but not the US or UK. Instead, the new focus was on management-controlled and largely self-financed corporations and it was argued that imperialism occurred mostly through trade, not so much through finance. In this view, surplus is transferred from the dependent periphery to the core, while excess surplus in the core is directed to wasteful expenditures such as military spending.

The multifaceted crisis of the 1970s, which included declining profitability and stagflation in leading economies and the collapse of state-led, import-substitution industrialisation strategies in less-developed countries, paved the way for major changes. As all these countries opened their doors to neo-liberal policies in the 1980s, finance was once again ascendant, this time globally. The concept of *financialisation* was developed as a means of analysing this era. It refers to the increase in the size, importance, and power of financial markets, as well as transactions, institutions, motives, and financial elites in the functioning of the economy. Some describe the financialisation process as a shift from productive activities to financial activities, while others emphasise the dominance of finance in general over economic activities. Indicators of financialisation are abundant. For example, total global financial assets as a percentage of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 109% in 1980 to 263% in 1990, 310% in 2000 and 355% in 2007. Moreover, the size of the financial sector with respect to the GDP, financial incomes as a percentage of national incomes, financial corporations' profits with respect to non-financial corporations' profits, debt to GDP ratios, non-financial corporations' financial incomes, and financial payments have all shown sharp increases in the last three decades (Orhangazi 2008, 2011). Financialisation has also entailed an increase in cross-border capital movements in the forms of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment flows. In some regards, the era of financialisation bears similarities to that of Hilferding's and Lenin's theorisation: the world economy is dominated by large corporations

(though these are more multinational today), capital export has substantially grown, the role and power of finance has substantially increased, and imperialism has reasserted itself. However, there are no trade barriers corresponding to territorial powers. Moreover, in the new era, finance is not limited to banks, not even to financial institutions, as large non-financial corporations now also run sizeable financial operations integrated with productive and commercial operations.

This new rise of finance led some scholars to argue that it has played a key role in securing the hegemony of the US as the leading imperialist power (Gowan 1999; Hudson 2003). Some have interpreted financialisation as a 'sign of autumn' marking the decline of the US as an imperial power (Arrighi 1994). According to this approach, as rivalries among economic powers intensify, a financial expansion centred around the hegemonic power in decline occurs and a new locus of power in the world economy begins to emerge. In this formulation, these financial expansions are repeated throughout capitalist history at times of imperial decline. The prime reason behind this is the over-accumulation of capital – reflected as an exhaustion of profitable investment opportunities in the real sector, preceded by increased competition in product markets. Profits grow relative to stagnant business opportunities and this gives rise to financial liquidity. The difference between the post-1980 period and the early twentieth century is that the US, as the major imperialist power, now has greater potential than Britain did to preserve its declining hegemony through 'exploitative domination', which includes both taking advantage of financial flows into the US and the use of military power to secure resources (Arrighi and Silver 1999). However, financialisation undermines the hegemonic power's imperial position at the same time, since it weakens the industrial sector as US firms turn to offshoring. The US economy becomes more and more a *rentier* economy with respect to the rest of the world, while domestically it shifts towards a service economy (Harvey 2003).

Leaving aside the debate about whether US hegemony is in fact facing a decline, the relationship between financialisation and imperialism is presented through the argument that financial mechanisms are managed by the imperialist power(s) and work in their interests. In particular, the US Federal Reserve, together with the US Treasury and Wall Street, sets the conditions for financialisation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank support this set-up globally. The US Federal Reserve can largely determine the levels of international interest rates by moving its domestic interest rate targets. Washington decides the level of financial regulation and supervision through its (de)regulatory interventions. When faced with international financial crises, the US Treasury and the IMF intervene in the interests of the large financial corporations and investors of the core countries.

The US and other leading powers benefit from this set-up through the availability of low-cost funds from the rest of the world. This is ensured in the US case by the reserve role of the US dollar and in the UK case by the London-based banking system. While the role of the US dollar as a reserve currency was created before the era of financialisation, it has been dramatically strengthened in recent decades (Vasudevan 2008). Moreover, the dollar holdings of developing countries in the form of reserve accumulation – mostly in US Treasury bonds – have become a seigniorage tax levied by the US on the rest of the world (Hudson 2003). However, in contrast to the earlier era of finance capital when Britain was a major capital exporter, the US is a large capital importer. In the late 2000s, the US economy received financial investments from the rest of the world equal to more than twice the amount of US financial investments abroad. However, there is an asymmetry here since the rates of return realised on US capital exports are about twice as high as the rate of returns obtained from capital exports to the US from the rest of the world. A main reason behind this is the composition of these investments. A significant portion of capital exports to the US goes into low-return treasury bills. While capital incomes coming from abroad now constitute a large and increasing portion of capital income in the US, other major powers – including the UK, Germany, and France – also acquire large flows of financial income from the rest of the world

(Duménil and Lévy 2011). Furthermore, the financial centres located in core countries capture a share of the globally produced surplus value as they provide financial services, including loans, to the rest of the world; and in return, they receive large sums of interest and other financial payments, both from government and private enterprises. In addition, by financing the operations of the core's large corporations either through bank financing or through the stock market, they enable concentration and centralisation of capital globally.

Furthermore, the increased cross-country mobility of financial capital together with frequent financial crises have been effective in imposing on countries in the periphery an increasingly deregulated and liberalised financial system that works in the interest of imperialist powers and a small group of elites in these countries. Financial crises have been occasions for furthering financial deregulation and liberalisation, while financial capital has used them for quick returns and transfers of ownership, and hence power in its favour. The crises in Latin American countries in the 1980s, the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2001 crisis in Turkey are all examples of this (Dufour and Orhangazi 2009; Wade and Veneroso 1998). Increasing unemployment and impoverishment, as well as the loss of public services through privatisations after these crises, led to a shift in the tone of anti-imperialism as well.

In short, the nexus between finance and imperialism has been theorised since the early 1900s. Even though there is no definite fully fledged theory of the link between financialisation and imperialism, there is much interest in the issue. Clearly, there is still a need for more empirical work examining the propositions advanced in the literature. On the other hand, the 2007–08 US financial crisis and the ensuing global financial crisis and economic slowdown suggests that while the US and other leading powers might have benefited from being able to manage the process of financialisation, the future of financialisation and the position of the core within this set-up remains uncertain.

Cross-References

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Financial Capital

► Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt

Financial Inflows

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Financial Outflows

► Taxation, Capital Flight, and Imperialism

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► Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism
► Racism and Imperialism

First World War and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Political economy of the First World War; Capitalism and the First World War; Economic Stakes of the First World War; Clash of Empires 1914–1918

Definition

Imperialism, the worldwide expansion of capitalism, motivated by the lust for raw materials such as petroleum, markets and cheap labour, involved fierce competition among great powers such as the British Empire, czarist Russia, and the German Reich, and thus led to the Great War of 1914–1918, later to be known as the First World War or World War I.

The First World War was the product of the nineteenth century, a "long century" in the view of some historians, lasting from 1789 to 1914. It was characterized by revolutions of a political, social, and also economic nature, especially the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, and ended with the emergence of imperialism, that is a new, worldwide manifestation of capitalism, originally a European phenomenon. This essay focuses on how imperialism played a decisive role in the outbreak, course, and outcome of the "Great War" of 1914–1918; it is based on the

author's book, *The Great Class War 1914–1918*, James Lorimer, Toronto, 2016.

When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, the nobility (or aristocracy) constituted the ruling class in just about every country in Europe. But because of the French Revolution and other revolutions that followed – not only in France – in 1830 and 1848, the *haute bourgeoisie* or upper-middle class was able, by the middle of the century, not to unseat the nobility, but to join it at the apex of the social and political pyramid. Thus was formed an "active symbiosis" of two classes that were in fact very different. The nobility was characterized by great wealth based on large landownership, had a strong preference for conservative political ideas and parties, and tended to cultivate clerical connections. The upper-middle class, on the other hand, favored the ideology and parties of liberalism as well as free-thinking and even anti-clericalism, and its wealth was generated by activities in commerce, industry, and finance. The two had been on opposite sides of the barricades during the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848, when the bourgeoisie had been a revolutionary class and the aristocracy the counter-revolutionary class *par excellence*. What united these two *propertied* classes, namely in 1848, was their common fear of a class enemy that threatened their wealth, power, and privileges: the poor, restless, and potentially revolutionary "underclass," *propertyless* and therefore known as the proletariat, the "people who own nothing but their offspring."

The upper-middle class ceased to be revolutionary and joined the nobility on the counter-revolutionary side after the revolutions that shook Europe in 1848. Those events revealed that the lower classes aspired to bring about not only a political but also a social and economic revolution that would mean the end of the power and wealth of not only the nobility but also the bourgeoisie. In the second half of the nineteenth century, then, and until the outbreak of the First World War, the nobility and the haute bourgeoisie formed one single upper class, one single "elite" or "establishment." But while the bourgeois bankers and industrialists enjoyed more and more *economic* power, *political* power tended to

remain a monopoly of the aristocrats in most countries, and certainly in big, quasi-feudal empires such as Russia. In any event, all members of the elite were obsessed by the fear of revolution, increasingly embodied by proletarian political parties that subscribed to revolutionary Marxist socialism.

The nineteenth century was also the century of the Industrial Revolution. In all countries where that revolution took place, the economy became much more productive. But this eventually caused the economic supply to exceed the demand, as was revealed in 1873 by the outbreak of a totally new kind of economic crisis, a crisis of *overproduction.* (Earlier economic crises had always been crises of *underproduction*, in which supply was insufficient in comparison to demand, for example, the infamous potato famine in Ireland in the 1840s.) In the most developed countries, that is, in Western and Central Europe and in the USA, countless small industrial producers disappeared from the economic scene as a result of this economic depression. The industrial landscape was henceforth dominated by a relatively restricted group of gigantic enterprises, mostly incorporated, joint-stock companies or "corporations," as well as associations of firms known as cartels, and also big banks. These "big boys" competed with each other, but increasingly, they also concluded agreements and collaborated in order to share scarce raw materials and markets, set prices, and find other ways to limit as much as possible the disadvantages of competition in a theoretically "free" market – and in order to defend and aggressively promote their common interests against foreign competitors and, of course, against workers and other employees. In this system, the big banks played an important role. They provided the credit required by large-scale industrial production and, at the same time, they looked all over the world for opportunities to invest the surplus capital made available by the megaprofits achieved by the corporations. Big banks thus became partners and even owners, or at least major shareholders, of corporations. Concentration, gigantism, oligopolies, and even monopolies characterized this new stage in the

development of capitalism. Some Marxist writers have referred to this phenomenon as "monopoly capitalism."

The industrial and financial bourgeoisie had hitherto been very much attached to the liberal, laissez-faire thinking of Adam Smith, which had assigned to the state only a minimal role in economic life, namely that of "night watch." But now the role of the state was becoming increasingly important, for example, as buyer of industrial commodities, such as guns and other modern weapons, supplied by gigantic firms and financed by major banks. The industrial-financial elite also counted on the state's intervention to protect the country's corporations against foreign competition by means of tariffs on the importation of finished products, even though this violated the classical liberal dogma of free markets and free competition. (It is one of the ironies of history that the USA, today the world's most fervent apostle of free trade, was extremely protectionist at that time.) "National economic systems" or "national economies" thus emerged, and they proceeded to compete fiercely against each other. State intervention – to be labelled "dirigism" or "statism" by economists – was now also favored because only a strong state was able to acquire foreign territories useful or even indispensable to industrialists and bankers as markets for their finished products or investment capital and as sources of raw materials and cheap labor. These desiderata were not normally available domestically, or at least not in sufficient quantities or at sufficiently low prices, they privileged a country's industrialists and bankers vis-à-vis foreign competitors, and they helped to maximize profitability.

The kind of territorial acquisitions that could only be achieved under the auspices of a strong and interventionist state, also suited the nobility, the partner of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie within the ruling elite, and in many if not most countries still the class with a near-monopoly of political power. The aristocrats were traditionally large landowners, so it is only natural that they favored territorial acquisitions; the more acreage one controlled, the better. In noble families, moreover, the eldest son traditionally inherited not only

the title but the family's entire patrimony. Newly acquired territory overseas or – in the case of Germany and the Danube Monarchy – in Eastern Europe could function as "lands of unlimited possibilities" where the younger sons could acquire domains of their own and lord it over natives who were to serve as underpaid peasants or domestic servants, just as the Iberian Peninsula's Reconquista had provided "castles in Spain" to junior aristocrats during the Middle Ages, the nobility's golden age. Adventurous scions of noble families could also embark on prestigious careers as officers in conquering colonial armies or as high-ranking officials in the administration of colonial territories. (The highest functions in the colonies, for example, that of Viceroy of British India or Governor General of Canada, were indeed reserved almost exclusively for members of aristocratic families.) Finally, the nobility had started to invest heavily in capitalist activities such as mining, a branch of industry interested in overseas regions rich in minerals. The British and Dutch royal families thus acquired enormous portfolios of shares in firms that were prospecting for oil all over the world, such as Shell, so they too were likely to profit from territorial expansion.

Like its upper-middle class partner in the elite, the nobility could also expect to gain from territorial expansion in yet another way; such expansion proved useful as a means to exorcize the spectre of revolution, namely by co-opting potentially troublesome members of the lower orders and integrating them into the established order. How was this achieved? First but not foremost, considerable numbers of proletarians could be put to work in colonized lands as soldiers, employees, and foremen on plantations and in mines (where the natives served as slaves), low-ranking bureaucrats in the colonial administration, and even missionaries. There they could not only enjoy a higher standard of living than at home but also a certain amount of social prestige, since they could lord it over, and feel superior to, the colored natives. Thus, they became more likely to identify with the state that made this form of social climbing possible and to be integrated into its established order. Second, within the mother

countries themselves, a similar socialization of an even larger segment of the lower orders resulted from the acquisition of colonies. The ruthless "super-exploitation" that was possible in the colonies, whose denizens were robbed of their gold, their land, and other riches, and be made to slave away for virtually nothing, yielded "super-profits." In the mother country, the employers could thus offer somewhat higher wages and better working conditions to their workers, and the state could start to provide modest social services. At least some of the proletarians in the mother lands thus became better off at the expense of the oppressed and exploited denizens of the colonies. In other words, the misery was exported from Europe to the colonies, to the unhappy lands that would later collectively be known as the "Third World." (In the USA, the prosperity and freedom of the white population was similarly made possible by the exploitation and oppression of Afro-Americans and "Indians.") In any event, under those conditions, most European socialists (or social-democrats) increasingly developed warm feelings towards a "fatherland" that treated them better, so they gradually abandoned their traditional Marxist internationalism to become rather nationalistic; discreetly, they – and their socialist (or social-democratic) parties – also ceased to believe in the inevitability and necessity of revolution and migrated from Marx's revolutionary socialism to socialist "reformism." This explains why, in 1914, most socialist parties would not oppose the war but would rally behind the flag to defend the fatherland that had presumably been so good to them. Third, territorial expansion also offered an advantage much appreciated by the many members of the elite who subscribed to Malthusianism, a trendy ideology at the time, which blamed overpopulation for the great social problems that ravaged all the industrialized countries. It made it possible to dump the restless and potentially revolutionary demographic surplus in distant lands such as Australia, where they could acquire land and start a farm, for example, by expelling or even exterminating the natives.

Projects for territorial acquisitions, undertaken under the auspices of a strong and even aggressive state, then, were favored by the aristocratic as well as the bourgeois factions of the elite. And they received considerable popular support, because they appealed to the romantic imagination and, more importantly, because even some of the proletarians could help themselves to the crumbs that fell off the table. The second half, and particularly the final quarter, of the nineteenth century thus witnessed a worldwide territorial expansion of European as well as two non-European industrial powers, the USA and Japan. However, the conquest of territories, where desiderata such as precious raw materials were to be found and where there existed plenty of investment opportunities, was rarely possible "next door." The great exception to this general rule was provided by the USA, who grabbed the vast hunting grounds of the Native Americans, stretching all the way to the coast of the Pacific Ocean, and robbed neighboring Mexico of a huge part of its territory. It was generally more realistic, however, to dream of territorial acquisitions in faraway lands, above all in the "dark continent" that was to become the object of the famous "scramble for Africa." Great Britain and France acquired vast territories, mostly in Africa but also in Asia. The USA expanded not only on its own continent but robbed Spain via a "splendid little war" of colonial possessions such as the Philippines, and Japan managed to turn Korea into a dependence. Germany, on the other hand, did not do very well, mostly because it remained focused for too long on the establishment of a unified state; as a latecomer in the scramble for colonies, it had to settle for relatively few and certainly less desirable possessions, such as "German Southwest Africa," now Namibia. In any event, the industrial giants of Europe, plus the USA and Japan, without exception states organized according to capitalist principles, morphed at that time into "mother countries" or "metropoles" of vast empires. To this new manifestation of capitalism, originally a purely European phenomenon, that was henceforth spreading itself over the entire globe, a name was given in 1902 by a British economist, John A. Hobson: "imperialism." In 1916, Lenin was to offer a Marxist view of imperialism in a famous pamphlet, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

Imperialism generated more and more tension and conflicts among the great powers that were competing to acquire control over as many economically important territories as possible. At that time, social Darwinism was a very influential scientific ideology, and it preached that competition was the basic principle of all forms of life. Not only individuals but also states had to compete mercilessly with each other in a struggle for survival. The strongest triumphed, and thus they became even stronger; the weak, on the other hand, were the losers, and they were left behind in the race for survival and were doomed to perish. To be able to compete with other states, a state had to be economically strong, and for that reason its "national economy" – that is, its corporations and banks – had to have control over as much territory as possible with raw materials, potential for the export of goods and investment capital, etc. Thus was generated a merciless worldwide scramble for colonies, even for lands one did not really need but did not want to fall into the hands of a competitor. Considering all this, the British historian Eric Hobsbawm drew the conclusion that capitalism's trend towards imperialist expansion inevitably pushed the world in the direction of conflict and war.

However, in spite of tensions and crises, including a conflict about East African real estate that brought Britain and France to the brink of war in 1898, the Fashoda Crisis, Europe's imperialist powers managed to acquire vast territories without fighting a major war against each other. By the turn of the century, the entire globe seemed to be partitioned. According to historian Margaret Mac-Millan, this means that the imperialist powers no longer had any reason to quarrel, and she concludes that an accusing finger cannot be pointed at imperialism when the causes of the First World War are discussed. To this it can be replied – as the French historian Annie Lacroix-Riz has done – that there remained at least one "hungry" imperialist power which felt disadvantaged compared to "satisfied" powers such as Great Britain, was not prepared to put up with the status quo, aggressively pursued a redistribution of existing colonial possessions, and was in fact willing to wage war to achieve its objectives. That "hungry" power

was Germany, which had belatedly developed an imperialist appetite, namely after Wilhelm II became emperor in 1888 and promptly demanded for the Reich a "place in the sun" of international imperialism, in other words, a redistribution of the colonial possessions that would provide Germany with a larger share. Colonial possessions, Lacroix-Riz points out, may have been *distributed*, but they could be *redistributed*. That redistributing the colonial possessions was possible, but also unlikely to be achieved peacefully, was demonstrated by the case of former Spanish colonies like the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, which were transformed into satrapies of America's "informal empire" as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Moreover, a considerable part of the world did in fact remain available for direct or indirect annexation as colonies or protectorates, or at least for economic penetration. MacMillan herself acknowledges that a "serious scramble for China," similar to the earlier, risky race for territories in Africa, remained possible, the more so since not only the great European powers but also the USA and Japan displayed much interest in the land of unlimited possibilities that the Middle Empire seemed to be. The imperialist wolves were also keenly – and jealously – eying a couple of other major countries that had hitherto managed to remain independent, namely, Persia and the Ottoman Empire.

The competition between the imperialist powers was and remained very likely to lead to conflicts and wars, not only limited conflicts such as the Spanish-American War of 1899 and the Russian-Japanese War of 1905 but also a general conflagration involving most if not all powers. It almost came to such a conflagration in 1911 when, to the great chagrin of Germany, France turned Morocco into a protectorate. The case of Morocco shows how even supposedly satisfied imperialist powers such as France were never truly satisfied – just as immensely rich people never feel that they have enough riches – but continued to look for more ways to fatten their portfolio of colonial possessions, even if that threatened to cause a war.

Let us consider the case of the "hungry" imperialist power, Germany. The Reich, founded in

1871, had entered the scramble for colonies a little too late. It could actually consider itself lucky that it was still able to acquire a handful of colonies such as Namibia. But those hardly amounted to major prizes, certainly not in comparison to the Congo, a huge region bursting with rubber and copper that was pocketed by minuscule Belgium. With respect to access to sources of vital raw materials as well as opportunities for exporting finished products and investment capital, the tandem of Germany's industry and finance thus found itself very much disadvantaged in comparison to its British and French rivals. Crucially important raw materials had to be purchased at comparatively high rates, which meant that the finished products of German industry were more expensive and therefore less competitive on international markets. This imbalance between extremely high industrial productivity and relatively restricted markets demanded a solution. In the eyes of numerous German industrialists, bankers, and other members of the country's elite, the only genuine solution was a war that would give the German Empire what it felt entitled to and – to formulate it in Social-Darwinist terms – what it believed to be necessary for its survival: colonies overseas and, perhaps even more importantly, territories within Europe as well.

In the years leading up to 1914, the German Reich thus pursued an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy aimed at acquiring more possessions and turning Germany into a world power. This policy, of which Emperor Wilhelm II was the figurehead, has gone down in history under the label of *Weltpolitik*, "policy on a worldwide scale," a term that was merely a euphemism for what was in fact an imperialist policy. In any event, Imanuel Geiss, an authority in the field of the history of Germany before and during the First World War, has emphasized that this policy was one of the factors "that made war inevitable."

With respect to overseas possessions, Berlin dreamed of pinching the colonies of small states such as Belgium and Portugal. (And in Great Britain a faction within the elite, consisting mostly of industrialists and bankers with connections to Germany, was in fact willing to appease the Reich, not with a single square mile of their own Empire,

of course, but with the gift of Belgian or Portuguese overseas possessions.) Nevertheless, it was above all within Europe itself that opportunities seemed to exist for Germany. Ukraine, for example, with its fertile farmland, loomed as the perfect "territorial complement" (*Ergänzungsgebiet*) for the highly industrialized German heartland; its bread and meat could provide cheap food for German workers, which would permit keeping their wages down. Likewise eyed by German imperialists was the Balkan, a region that might serve as source of cheap agricultural products and as market for German commodities. Germans in general were impressed with America's conquest of the "Wild West" and Britain's acquisition of the Indian subcontinent and dreamed that their country might similarly obtain a gigantic colony, namely by expanding into Eastern Europe in a modern-day edition of Germany's medieval "push to the East," the *Drang nach Osten*. The East would supply the Reich with abundant raw materials, agricultural products, and cheap labor in the shape of its numerous, supposedly inferior but muscular natives; and also a kind of social safety valve, because Germany's own potentially troublesome demographic surplus could be shipped as "pioneers" to those distant lands. Hitler's infamous fantasies with respect to "living space," which he was to reveal in the 1920s in *Mein Kampf* and to put into practice during the Second World War, saw the light under those circumstances. In this respect, Hitler was not an anomaly at all, but a typical product of his time and space, and of the imperialism of that time and space.

Western Europe, more developed industrially and more densely populated than Europe's east, was attractive to German imperialism as a market for the finished products of German industry, but also as a source of interesting raw materials. The influential leaders of the German steel industry did not hide their great interest in the French region around the towns of Briey and Longwy; that area – situated close to the border with Belgium and Luxembourg – featured rich deposits of high-quality iron ore. Without this ore, claimed some spokesmen of German industry, the German steel industry was condemned to death, at least in

the long run. It was also believed that Germany's *Volkswirtschaft*, its national economy, would profit greatly from the annexation of Belgium with its great seaport, Antwerp, its coal regions, etc. And together with Belgium its colony, the Congo, would of course also fall into German hands. Whether the acquisition of Belgium and perhaps even the Netherlands would involve direct annexation or a combination of formal political independence and economic dependence on Germany was a matter of debate among the experts within the German elite. In any event, in one way or another, virtually all of Europe was to be integrated into a "great economic space" under German control, The Reich would finally be able to take its rightful place next to Britain, the USA, etc. in the restricted circle of the great imperialist powers. (The historian Fritz Fischer has dealt with all this in his classical study of Germany's objectives in World War I.)

It was obvious that Germany's ambitions in the East could not be realized without serious conflict with Russia and the German aspirations with respect to the Balkans risked causing problems with Serbia. That country was already at loggerheads with the Reich's biggest and best friend, Austria-Hungary, but it was supported by Russia. And the Russians were also very annoyed by Germany's planned penetration of the Balkan Peninsula in the direction of Istanbul, since the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were at the very top of their own list of desiderata. St. Petersburg was almost certainly willing to go to war to deny Germany direct or indirect control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

The German ambitions in Western Europe, and Belgium in particular, obviously ran counter to the interests of the British. At least as far back as the time of Napoleon, London had not wanted to see a major power ensconced in Antwerp and along the Belgian coast – and certainly not Germany, long a great power on land but now, with an increasingly impressive navy, also a menace at sea. With Antwerp, Germany would not only have at its disposal a "pistol aimed at England," as Napoleon had described the city, but also one of the world's greatest seaports. That would have made

Germany's international trade far less dependent on the services of British ports, sea lanes, and shipping, a major source of revenue of British commerce.

The real and imaginary interests and needs of Germany as a great industrial and imperialist power thus pushed the country increasingly rapidly, via an aggressive foreign policy, toward a war. But the possibility of war raised no great concerns within the elite of the military giant that Germany had already been for quite some time. To the contrary, among the industrialists, bankers, generals, politicians, and other members of the Reich's establishment, only some rare birds did not wish for a war; most of them preferred a war as soon as possible, and many were even in favor of unleashing a preventive war. Of course, the German elite also featured less bellicose members, but among them, there prevailed the fatalist feeling that war was simply inevitable.

That the merciless competition between the great imperialist powers – a struggle of life and death, as seen from a social-Darwinist viewpoint – was virtually certain to lead to war, was also demonstrated by the case of Great Britain. That country marched into the twentieth century as the world's superpower, in control of an unprecedented collection of colonial possessions. But the power and wealth of the Empire obviously depended on the fact that, thanks to the mighty Royal Navy, Britannia ruled the waves. And in that respect a very serious problem arose around the turn of the century. As fuel for ships, coal was quickly being replaced by petroleum on account of its far greater efficiency. Albion had plenty of coal but did not have petroleum, not even in its colonies, at least not in sufficient quantities. And so the search was on for plentiful and reliable sources of oil, the "black gold." For the time being, that precious commodity had to be imported from what was then the world's foremost producer and exporter, the USA. But that was not acceptable in the long run, since Britain often quarrelled with its former transatlantic colony about issues such as influence in South America, and the USA was also becoming a serious rival in the imperialist rat race. Looking out for alternative sources, the British found a way to

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quench their thirst for petroleum, at least partly, in Persia. It was in this context that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was founded, later to be known as British Petroleum (BP). However, a definitive solution to the problem only appeared in sight when, still during the first decade of the twentieth century, significant deposits of oil were discovered in Mesopotamia, more specifically in the region around the city of Mosul. The patriciate ruling Albion – exemplified by gentlemen like Churchill – decided at that time that Mesopotamia, a hitherto unimportant corner of the Middle East destined to become Iraq after the First World War, but then still belonging to the Ottoman Empire, had to be brought under British control. That was not an unrealistic objective, since the Ottoman Empire was a large but weak country, from whose vast territory the British had already previously managed to carve attractive morsels, for example, Egypt and Cyprus. In fact, in 1899, the British had already snatched oil-rich Kuwait and proclaimed it a protectorate; they were to transform it in 1914 into a supposedly independent emirate. Possession of Mesopotamia, then, was seen to be the only way to make it possible for unlimited quantities of petroleum to flow unperturbed toward Albion's shores.

However, in 1908, the Ottoman Empire became an ally of Germany, which meant that the planned acquisition of Mesopotamia was virtually certain to trigger war between Britain and the Reich. But the need for petroleum was such that plans were nonetheless made for military action. And these plans needed to be implemented as soon as possible. The Germans and Ottomans had started to construct the *Bagdad Bahn*, a railway that was to link Berlin via Istanbul with Baghdad, the Mesopotamian metropolis, situated close to Mosul, and that raised the prospect that barrels full of Mesopotamian oil might one day start to roll toward Germany for the benefit of the Reich's growing collection of battleships, which happened to be the most dangerous rival of the Royal Navy! Since the *Baghdad Bahn* was expected to be completed in 1914, quite a few British political and military decision-makers were of the opinion that it was better not to wait

very long before starting a war that appeared unavoidable in any event.

It was in this context that London's traditional friendship with Germany came to an end, that Britain joined two former archenemies, France and Russia, in an alliance known as the Triple Entente, and that the British army commanders started to work out detailed plans for war against Germany in collaboration with their French counterparts. The idea was that the massive armies of the French and the Russians would smash Germany's host, while the bulk of the Empire's armed forces would invade Mesopotamia from India, beat the Ottomans, and grab the oil fields. The Royal Navy also promised to prevent the German Navy from attacking France via the English Channel, and on land, the French army was to benefit from (mostly symbolic) assistance by the relatively tiny British Expeditionary Corps (BEF). However, this Machiavellian arrangement was concocted in the greatest secrecy, and neither the Parliament nor the public were informed about it.

On the eve of the Great War, a compromise with the Germans remained possible and even enjoyed the favor of some factions within Britain's political, industrial, and financial elite. A compromise would have provided Germany with at least a share of the Mesopotamian oil, but London sought to achieve nothing less than exclusive control over the "black gold" of Mesopotamia. The British plans to invade Mesopotamia were prepared as early as 1911 and called for the occupation of the strategically important city of Basra, to be followed by a march along the banks of the Tigris to Baghdad. Complemented by a simultaneous attack by British forces operating from Egypt, this invasion was to provide Britain with control over Mesopotamia and much of the rest of the Middle East. This scenario would indeed unfold during the Great War, but in slow motion, as it turned out to be a much tougher job than expected, and the objectives would only be achieved at the end of the conflict. Incidentally, the famous Lawrence of Arabia would not suddenly appear out of nowhere; he was merely one of the numerous Brits who, during the years leading up to 1914, had been carefully selected and

trained to "defend" their country's interests – mostly with respect to oil – in the Middle East.

The conquest of the oil fields of Mesopotamia constituted the prime objective of Britain's entry into the war in 1914. When the war broke out, and the German and Austrian-Hungarian partners went to war against the Franco-Russian duo plus Serbia, there seemed to be no reason for Britain to become involved in the conflict. The government in London was confronted with a dilemma; it was honor-bound to keep the promises made to France but that would have revealed that these plans had been concocted in secret. However, Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality provided London with the perfect pretext to go to war. In reality, the fate of the small country was of little or no concern to the British leaders, at least as long as the Germans did not proceed to grab Antwerp. Neither was the violation of a country's neutrality deemed to be a big deal; during the war, the British themselves would not hesitate to violate the neutrality of a number of countries, namely, China, Greece, and Persia.

Like all plans made in preparation for what was to become the "Great War," the scenario concocted in London failed to unfold as anticipated. The French and Russians did not manage to crush the Teutonic host, so the British had to send many more troops to the continent – and suffer much greater losses – than foreseen. And in the distant Middle East, the Ottoman army – expertly assisted by German officers – unexpectedly proved to be a tough nut to crack. In spite of these inconveniences, which caused the death of about three quarters of a million soldiers in the UK alone, all was well in the end; in 1918, the Union Jack fluttered over the oil fields of Mesopotamia.

This short survey demonstrates that, as far as the rulers of Britain were concerned, World War I was not fought to save "gallant little Belgium" or to champion the cause of international law and justice. At stake were economic interests, the interests of British imperialism, which happen to be the interests of the rich and powerful British aristocratic gentlemen and bourgeois burghers whose corporations and banks lusted for raw materials such as petroleum – and for much else.

It is also obvious that for the patricians in power in London, the war was not a war for democracy at all. In the conquered Middle East, the British did nothing to promote the cause of democracy, to the contrary. Britain's imperialist interests were better served by subtle and not-so-subtle un- and even anti-democratic arrangements. Occupied Palestine was ruled by them in approximately the same way that occupied Belgium had been ruled by the Germans. And in Arabia, London's actions only took into account its own interests – as well as the interests of a handful of indigenous families that were considered to be useful partners. The vast homeland of the Arabs was parcelled out and distributed to those partners, who proceeded to establish states they could rule as if they were personal property. And when many denizens of Mesopotamia had the nerve to resist their new British bosses, Churchill ordered bombs to rain down on their villages, including bombs with poison gas.

On the eve of the outbreak of the Great War, in all the imperialist countries there were countless industrialists and bankers who favored a "bellicose economic expansionism." Nevertheless, many capitalists – and possibly even a majority – appreciated the advantages of peace and the inconveniences of war and were therefore not warmongers at all, as Eric Hobsbawm has emphasized. But this observation has wrongly caused the conservative British historian Niall Ferguson to jump to the conclusion that the interests of capitalists did not play a role in the eruption of the Great War in 1914. For one thing, countless industrialists and bankers and member of the upper-middle class displayed an *ambivalent* attitude with respect to war. On the one hand, even the most bellicose among them realized that a war would have most unpleasant aspects, and for that reason, they preferred to avoid war. However, as members of the elite, they also had reason to believe that the unpleasantness would be experienced mostly by others – and of course mostly by the simple soldiers, workers, peasants, and other plebeians to whom the nasty jobs of killing and dying were traditionally entrusted.

Moreover, the assumption that peace-loving capitalists did not want war reflects a binary,

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black-and-white kind of thinking, namely that peace was the alternative to war and vice-versa. However, reality has a way of being more complex. There was in fact another alternative to peace, namely revolution. And that other alternative to peace was far more repulsive than war to most if not all capitalists and other bourgeois and aristocratic members of the elite. The aristocracy and the bourgeoisie had been obsessed with fear of revolution ever since the events of 1848 and 1871 had revealed the revolutionary intentions and potential of the proletariat. Afterwards, working-class parties subscribing to Marx's revolutionary socialism had been founded, had become increasingly popular, and remained officially committed to overthrow the established political and social-economic order via revolution even though, as we have seen, they had in fact discreetly become reformist. The decade before the outbreak of war, finally, ironically called *Belle Époque*, witnessed not only new revolutions (in Russia, in 1905 and in China, in 1911) but also, throughout Europe, a never-ending series of strikes, demonstrations, and riots that seemed to be harbingers of revolution in the very heartland of imperialism. In this context, war was promoted not only by philosophers such as Nietzsche and other intellectuals, by military and political leaders, but also by leading industrialists and bankers as an effective antidote to revolution.

During the years leading up to 1914, countless members of the bourgeoisie (and the aristocracy) thus imagined themselves to be witnessing a race between war and revolution, a sprint whose outcome could be decided at any time. Which one of the two was going to win? The burghers, fearing revolution, prayed that war would be the winner. With revolution, rather than peace, as the most likely alternative to war, even the most peace-loving capitalists definitely preferred war. And since they were afraid that revolution might win the race, that is, might break out before war, the capitalists, and the bourgeois and aristocratic members of the elite in general, actually hoped for war to come as soon as possible, which is why they experienced the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 as a deliverance from unbearable

uncertainty and tension. This relief was reflected by the fact that the famous pictures of folks enthusiastically celebrating the declaration of war, taken mostly in the "better" districts of the capitals, almost exclusively featured well-dressed ladies and gentlemen, and not workers or peasants, who are known to have been mostly depressed by the news.

In its imperialist manifestation, capitalism was definitely responsible for the many colonial wars that had been waged and was also responsible for the Great War that broke out in 1914. Countless contemporaries realized this only too well. As the great French socialist leader Jean Jaurès already declared in 1895, "capitalism carries war within itself just like the thundercloud carries the storm." Jaurès was a convinced anticapitalist, of course, but many members of the bourgeois and aristocratic elite were also keenly aware of the link between war and their economic interests, and occasionally acknowledged this. General Haig, for example, who would command the British Army from 1915 until the end of the war, declared on one occasion that he was not "ashamed of the wars fought to open up the markets of the world to our traders." It was the fateful emergence of the imperialist version of capitalism, then, that, to use Eric Hobsbawm's words, "pushed the world to conflict and war." In comparison, the fact that numerous individuals among the industrialists and bankers may privately have cherished peace is of little or no importance and certainly does not permit the conclusion that capitalism did not lead to the Great War. It would be equally fallacious to conclude that Nazism was not really anti-Semitic and did not play a role in the origins of the Holocaust, because quite a few individual Nazis were personally not anti-Semitic.

It is also because imperialist aspirations were responsible for it, that the war that broke out in 1914, essentially a European conflict, developed into a world war. We should not forget that there was fighting not only in Europa but also in Asia and Africa. While the great powers would fight each other primarily, and most "visibly," in Europe, their armies would also do battle in each other's colonial possessions in Africa, in the

Middle East, and even in China. Finally, in Versailles, the victors would divide and claim not only the relatively modest booty represented by Germany's former colonies but especially the petroleum-rich regions of the Middle East that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire.

Let us take a quick look at the role played by Japan in the Great War. With its victory over Russia in 1905, the "land of the rising sun" revealed itself to be the only "non-Western" member of the restricted club of imperialism's great powers. Like all other imperialist powers, Japan was henceforth keen to acquire additional lands as colonies or protectorates in order to make raw materials and such available to its industry, thus making it stronger vis-a-vis the competition – for example, from the USA. The war that broke out in Europe in 1914 provided Japan with a golden opportunity in this respect. On September 23 of that year, Tokyo declared war on Germany for the simple reason that this made it possible to conquer the Reich's mini-colony (or "concession") in China, the Bay of Kiao-Chau (or Kiao-Chao), as well as its island colonies in the Northern Pacific. In the case of Japan, it is obvious that the country went to war in order to achieve imperialist objectives. In the case of the Western imperialist powers, however, we continue to be told that in 1914, arms were taken up solely to defend liberty and democracy.

The Great War was a product of imperialism. Its focus was therefore on profits for the big corporations and banks under whose auspices imperialism had developed and whose interests imperialism purported to serve. In this respect, the war did not disappoint. It was admittedly a catastrophe for millions of human beings, for the plebeian masses, for whom it offered nothing but death and misery. But for the industrialists and bankers of each belligerent country – and quite a few neutral countries, such as the USA before 1917 – it revealed itself as a cornucopia of orders and profits.

The conflict of 1914–1918 was an industrial contest in which modern weapons such as cannon, machine guns, poison gas, flamethrowers, tanks, airplanes, barbed wire, and submarines were decisive. This materiel was mass produced in the factories of the industrialists, yielding gargantuan profits, profits that were taxed only minimally in most countries. Profitability was also maximized by the fact that in all belligerent countries the wages (but not the prices) were lowered, while the working hours were lengthened and strikes were forbidden. (That was possible because, as we have seen earlier, imperialism had integrated the leaders and the rank-and-file of the supposedly internationalist and revolutionary socialist parties – and labor unions – into the established order and turned them into patriots, who in 1914 revealed themselves ready to rush to the defense of the fatherland and make the sacrifices presumably required to ensure its victory.) The most famous of the arms manufacturers to be blessed with war profits was Krupp, the world-famous German producer of cannon. But in France too, "merchants of death" did a wonderful business, for example, Monsieur Schneider, known as the French Krupp, who in 1914–1918 enjoyed "a veritable explosion of profits," and Hotchkiss, the great specialist in the production of machine guns. State orders for war materiel signified huge profits not only for corporations but also for the banks that were asked to loan the huge sums of money needed by governments to finance these purchases and the costs of the war in general. In the USA, J. P. Morgan & Co, also known as the "House of Morgan," was the undisputed champion glutton in this field. Morgan not only charged high interest rates on loans to the British and their allies but also earned fat commissions on sales to Britain by American firms that belonged to its "circle of friends," such as Du Pont and Remington.

In the spring of 1917, after a revolution had broken out in Russia and the French ally was rocked by mutinies in its army, it was feared that the British might lose the war and therefore not be able to pay back their war debts. It was in this context that the Wall Street lobby, headed by Morgan, successfully pressured President Wilson to declare war on Germany, thus enabling Albion to ultimately win the war and avoid a catastrophe for the US banks, especially Morgan. This development likewise illustrates the fact that the First

World War was primarily determined by economic factors, that it was the fruit of imperialism, a system that purported to serve the profit-maximizing interests of corporations and banks – and did.

With respect to the entry of the USA into the great clash of imperialisms of 1914–1918, another remark is in order. It was clear that the imperialist powers that would exit the war triumphantly would pocket great imperialist prizes, and that the losers would have to cough up some of their imperialist assets. And what about the neutrals? In January 1917, the French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand, publicly gave the answer, obviously anticipating a victory for the Triple Entente; neutral countries would not be invited to the peace conference and would not receive a share of the loot, that is, of goodies such as German colonies, the oil-rich regions of the doomed Ottoman Empire, and concessions and lucrative business opportunities in China. In this respect, Japan, America's great competitor in the Far East, had already made a move in 1914 by declaring war on Germany and pocketing the Reich's concession in China. In the USA, this conjured up the risk that Japan might end up monopolizing China economically, excluding American business. It is extremely likely that Washington took Briand's hint and that this consideration also influenced the decision, taken in April of 1917, to declare war on Germany. In the 1930s, an inquiry by the Nye Committee of the American Congress was to come to the conclusion that the country's entry into the war had indeed been motivated by the wish to be present when, after the war, the moment would come "to redivide the spoils of empire."

The war provided a mighty stimulus for the maximization of profits made by corporations and banks. But was that not one of the reasons why they had looked forward to war? (Another reason was of course the elimination of the revolutionary threat.) But the conflict also yielded them other considerable benefits. In all belligerent countries, the war reinforced the trend toward gigantism, that is, the ongoing emergence of a relatively small elite of very big corporations and banks. This was so because only big firms could benefit from the state orders for weapons and other war materiel. Conversely, small producers did not profit from the war. Many of them lost their personnel, their suppliers, or their customers; their profits declined, and many of them disappeared from the scene, never to return. In this sense, it is true what Niall Ferguson has pointed out, that during the Great War, the *average* profits of businesses were not very high; however, the profits of the big firms and banks, the capitalist big boys who dominated the economy since the emergence of imperialism were in fact considerable, as Ferguson himself acknowledges.

Class conflict is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, as Domenico Losurdo has emphasized in a book on that topic. It is not merely a bilateral conflict between capital and labor but also reflects contradictions between bourgeoisie and nobility, between industrialists of different countries, between the colonies and their mother countries, and also between factions within the bourgeoisie. An example of the latter is the conflict between big and small producers, big business and little business, the upper-middle class or haute bourgeoisie, and the lower-middle class or petite bourgeoisie. Imperialism was – and continues to be – the capitalism of the big boys, the corporations and big banks, and it was imperialism that gave birth to the Great War. It is no coincidence that this big war also favored the big capitalists in their struggle against the little capitalists.

The Great War also privileged the upper-middle class, the gentlemen of industry and finance, vis-a-vis their partner within the elite, the landowning nobility. The nobility had also wanted war, because it expected many advantages from it. But the conflict revealed itself as something very different from the old-fashioned kind of warfare they had expected, in which their beloved cavalry and traditional weapons such as swords and lances would be decisive but, as Peter Englund has written, "an economic competition, a war between factories." The Great War was an industrial war, fought with modern weapons mass-produced in the factories of the bourgeois industrialists, and in the course of the war, representatives of corporations and banks – such as Walter Rathenau in Germany – played an

increasingly important role as "experts" within governments and state bureaucracies. The bourgeoisie thus managed to increase not only its wealth but also its power and prestige – very much to the disadvantage of the aristocrats, whose weapons and expertise proved useless for the purpose of twentieth-century warfare. Until 1914, the haute bourgeoisie had been the junior partner of the nobility within the elite in most countries but that changed during the war and because of the war. After 1918, within the elite, the industrial and financial haute bourgeoisie was on top, with the nobility as its sidekick.

The Great War was very much determined by economic factors, and it was the product of the merciless competition among the imperialist powers, a competition about territories with considerable natural and human resources. It is therefore only logical that this conflict was eventually decided by economic factors; the imperialist powers that emerged as victors in 1918 were those who already controlled the greatest colonial and other territorial riches when the war started in 1914 and were therefore abundantly blessed with strategic raw materials, especially rubber and petroleum, needed to win a modern, industrial war. Let us examine this issue in greater detail.

In 1918, Germany managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, so to speak, because in the spring and summer of that year, the Reich had actually come tantalizingly close to achieving victory. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed with revolutionary Russia on March 3, 1918, had enabled the Reich's army commanders, led by General Ludendorff, to transfer troops from the eastern to the western front and launch a major offensive there on March 21. Considerable progress was achieved at first, but the Allies succeeded time and again to bring in the reserves of men and materiel needed to plug the gaps in their defensive lines, slow down the German juggernaut's advance, and finally to arrest it. August 8 was the date when the tide turned. On that day, the Germans were forced onto the defensive and had to withdraw systematically until they finally capitulated on November 11. The allied triumph was made possible by the fact that they – and especially the French – disposed of thousands of trucks to quickly transport large numbers of soldiers to wherever they were needed. The Germans, on the other hand, still moved their troops mostly by train, as in 1914, but crucial sectors of the front were hard to reach that way. The superior mobility of the Allies was decisive. Ludendorff was to declare later that the triumph of his adversaries in 1918 amounted to a victory of French trucks over German trains.

However, this triumph can also be similarly described as a victory of the rubber tires of the Allies' vehicles, produced by firms such as Michelin and Dunlop, over the steel wheels of German trains, produced by Krupp. Thus it can also be said that the victory of the Entente against the Central Powers was a victory of the economic system, and particularly the industry, of the Allies, against the economic system of Germany and Austria-Hungary, an economic system that found itself starved of crucially important raw materials because of the British blockade. "The military and political defeat of Germany," writes the French historian Frédéric Rousseau, "was inseparable from its economic failure." But the economic superiority of the Allies clearly has a lot to do with the fact that the British and French – and even the Belgians and Italians – had colonies where they could fetch whatever was needed to win a modern, industrial war, especially rubber, oil, and other "strategic" raw materials – plus plenty of colonial laborers to repair and even construct the roads along which trucks transported allied soldiers.

Rubber was not the only strategic type of raw material that the Allies had in abundance while the Germans lacked it. Another one was petroleum, for which the increasingly motorized land armies – and rapidly expanding air forces – were developing a gargantuan appetite. During a victory dinner on November 21, 1918, the British minister of foreign affairs, Lord Curzon, was to declare, not without reason, that "the allied cause floated to victory upon a wave of oil," and a French senator proclaimed that "oil had been the blood of victory." A considerable quantity of this oil had come from the USA. It was supplied by Standard Oil, a firm belonging to the Rockefellers, who made a lot of money in this type of business, just as

Renault did by producing the gas-guzzling trucks. It was only logical that the Allies, swimming in petroleum, had acquired all sort of modern, motorized, gas-guzzling equipment. In 1918, the French not only had huge quantities of trucks but also a major fleet of airplanes. And in the war's final year, the French as well as the British also disposed of cars equipped with machine guns or cannon and above all of large numbers of tanks. If the Germans had no significant quantities of trucks or tanks, it was also because they lacked petroleum; only insufficient amounts of Rumanian oil were available to them.

The Great War happened to be a war between imperialist rivals, in which the great prizes to be won were territories bursting with raw materials and cheap labor, the kind of things that benefited a country's "national economy," more specifically its industry, and thus made that country more powerful and more competitive. It is therefore hardly a coincidence that the war was ultimately won by the countries that had been most richly endowed in this respect, namely the great industrial powers with the most colonies. In other words: that the biggest imperialisms – those of the British, the French, and the Americans – defeated a competing imperialism, that of Germany, admittedly an industrial superpower, but underprivileged with respect to colonial possessions. In view of this, it is even amazing that it took four long years before Germany's defeat was a *fait accompli*. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the advantages of having colonies and therefore access to unlimited supplies of food for soldiers and civilians as well as rubber, petroleum, and similar raw materials, as well as a virtually inexhaustible reserve labor force, were only able to reveal themselves *in the long run*. The main reason for this is that in 1914, the war started as a continental kind of Napoleonic campaign that was to morph – imperceptibly, but inexorably – into a worldwide contest of industrial titans. In 1914, Germany, a military superpower, still stood a chance to win the war, especially since it had excellent railways to ferry its armies to the western and eastern fronts – and more than enough of the coal needed as fuel for the steam trains. This is how a big

victory was achieved against the Russians at Tannenberg. However, after four long years of modern, industrial, and in many ways "total" war, economic factors revealed themselves as decisive. By the time Ludendorff launched his spring-offensive in 1918, the prospects for a final victory had long gone up in smoke for a German Reich that was prevented by a Royal Navy blockade from reaching territories where it might have been able to fetch adequate amounts of the collective sine qua non of victory in a modern war – strategic raw materials such as petroleum, food for civilians as well as soldiers, cheap labor for industry and agriculture, and so forth.

The Great War of 1914–1918 was a conflict in which two blocks of imperialist powers fought each other for the possession of lands in Europe itself, Africa, Asia, and the entire world. The result of this titanic struggle was a victory for the Anglo-French duo, a major defeat for Germany, and the inglorious demise of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In reality, the outcome of the war was unclear, confusing, and unlikely to please anybody. Great Britain and France were the victors but were exhausted by the enormous demographic, material, financial, and other sacrifices they had had to bring; they were no longer the superpowers they had been in 1914. Germany had likewise paid a heavy price, found itself punished and humiliated at Versailles, and lost not only its colonies but even a large part of its own territory; the country was allowed to have only a tiny army, but it remained an industrial superpower that was likely to try once again to achieve great imperialist objectives, as in 1914. Moreover, the war had been an opportunity for two non-European imperialisms to reveal their ambitions, namely, Japan and the USA. The struggle for supremacy among imperialist powers, which is what 1914–1918 had been, thus remained undecided. To make the situation even more complex, along with Austria-Hungary yet another major imperialist actor had departed from the scene, though in a very different way. Russia had morphed, via a great revolution, into the Soviet-Union. That resolutely anti-capitalist state revealed itself to be a thorn in the imperialist side, because it functioned not only

as source of inspiration for revolutionaries within each imperialist country but also encouraged anti-imperialist movements in the colonies. Under these circumstances, Europe and the entire world continued to experience great tensions and conflicts that were to yield a second world war or, as many historians now see it, the second act of the great "Thirty Years' War of the 20th Century."

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Focoism

Folk

Food and Imperialism

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Introduction

Issues of food and land have always been central to both exploitative systems and to the fightback against them: peasants have been held in thrall to landed property relations, ruling classes justified themselves as organisers of farming, revolutions often demanded 'bread and land'. In one sense, the situation under imperialism merely gives specific form to contradictions stretching back to the origins of class society.

But in another sense, capitalism fundamentally changed things, in ways essential to our understanding of imperialism.

Previous agrarian structures, however exploitative, had safeguarded a sphere of self-sufficiency, localism, and grassroots autonomy. Some lands were held in common, and even more importantly, knowledge was a commons: farmers experimented, shared, and transmitted experience; seeds and animals were selectively bred and a broad spread of different strains maintained as genetic material for future experimentation; most people consumed what they produced and there were few 'food miles'. With capitalism, in the metropolitan countries, common lands became 'enclosed', people lost their livelihoods and were forced to migrate to towns. The new urban proletariat then had to be fed, which forced the rural economy to raise productivity of both *labour* (a shrinking proportion of the population engaged in farming) and of *land* (having reached the limit of enlarging the cultivable surface through deforestation, land had to be farmed

more intensively). For colonies it was even worse: they were super-exploited for cash-crop production and exposed to famine.

One question persistently haunts capitalism/ imperialism: in order to keep revolution at bay, urban-industrial populations must be fed somehow. Early on, Thomas Malthus warned that food supply would never keep pace. And although at certain periods this has been repressed by a modernist propaganda of scientific omnipotence, underlying anxieties resurface. Hunger currently afflicts at least an eighth of world population (FAO 2012); mostly in the global South, but in the North, too, austerity policies, which respond to crisis by prioritising the interests of the rich, leave working people hungry.

A big question therefore arises: Given the existence of this food insecurity, is it merely a distributional problem? Amartya Sen's argument (Sen 1982) is appealing from an anti-imperialist standpoint because it highlights exclusion and inequality: there is indeed plenty of food 'around' today, it simply doesn't reach those in need, partly because so much is wasted – estimated at 30–50% of what is produced (IME 2013) – and partly because some sectors overconsume and poor people lack entitlements.

However, it could be a fatal error to assume that the current form of food 'plenty' is sustainable into the future. Food is genuinely insecure; not, however, as Malthus thought, because it is *absolutely* impossible to produce enough but rather because capitalism and imperialism are set on a course diametrically opposed to the only viable way this could be achieved. In order to understand why, I will briefly sketch a conceptual framework, building especially on the work of Marx and Malcolm Caldwell.

Conceptual Framework: The Fundamental Basis of Imperialism's Food Crisis

The impact of capitalism was not just to change the ownership of land, but also to start treating farming as an offshoot of industry. Initially,

this was particularly the chemical industry, synthesising fertilisers – in place of natural composting and manures – to supply nitrogen (derived from a fossil-fuel feedstock), potassium, and phosphorous. The results of this bid to conjure away the Malthusian spectre were to prove disastrous; its impact was however *delayed,* 'exported to the future', to become fully apparent only in the longer term.

In this respect, Marxism successfully predicted what capitalism has today *become.* Engels thus warned in general terms that 'Each victory ... [over nature] in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first' (Engels 1970, p. 74); and Marx, more specifically, that 'all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art not only of robbing the laborer, but of robbing the soil, as well; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a period of time is progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility' (Marx 1954, p. 506). It should therefore have come as no surprise that the twentieth century revealed a law of diminishing returns in chemical fertiliser application (Carlson 2005, p. 100): statistics show a fivefold increase of fertiliser inputs for only a twofold increase of cereal yield per hectare in the 50 years up to 2010 (H.M. Government 2011, p. 79). And only in the twenty-first century have we witnessed the full effects of the export to the future of the climate effects generated by emissions from the food system.

One interesting general definition of imperialism might be: the era in which latent contradictions of capitalism rise to the surface and the mode of production begins to unravel. The case of food would illustrate this well.

As a result of treating agriculture like industry and forgetting that it is part of nature, food became not just a *condition* for capital reproduction (feeding the urban proletariat so they can work in industry), but *part* of it, a major site of accumulation and more recently of speculation by finance capital.

In this context, Caldwell's contribution was to link circuits of accumulation/exploitation to a loss

of quality or structure; that is, an increase of entropy. It thus becomes possible to represent, and to some extent quantify, imperialism through its flows of energy (Caldwell n.d.), in particular in relation to the food chain – which both consumes and provides energy – a challenge Caldwell was beginning to undertake (Caldwell 1977) prior to his untimely death in 1978. Specifically, his notion of 'protein imperialism' – taking the meat industry as a case – depicts a process, at the same time both a degradation of nature, and an exploitation of the global South by the world-system's parasitic core.

If we bring together Caldwell's insights with those of Marx, adding in recent scientific developments around soil and its relationship to climate, we can succinctly explain the workings of this loss of quality as follows. In nature's cycles the 'waste' of one process serves as an input to another (de Rosnay 1979). With capitalism, there comes a 'rift' in these metabolic loops, a realisation fundamental to Marx's argument and developed in an interesting way by Bellamy Foster (Bellamy Foster 2009). Because of this rift, we could say the loops become 'unplugged': for example, water, sewage and compostable solid waste are not ploughed back. Waste products then become ejected; however, these ejecta don't just disappear, they feed back into the system, only now in a destructive rather than constructive form, primarily in the shape of climatic disturbance through the disruption of temperature regulation in the wider earth system.

A key manifestation of this entropy is the loss of the soil itself (cf. Montgomery 2007). As a result of natural evolution, a healthy soil is a complex system possessing its own metabolism, a symbiotic interaction of mineral and organic components, worms, microorganisms, fungi and bacteria (Bourguignon and Bourguignon 2008), which in turn forms an integral part of the carbon cycle regulating temperature in the wider earth system. Only when capitalism broke these cycles did soil-structure begin to be lost, a development which is arguably the fundamental basis of today's crisis. The interaction with climate is key: a healthy soil sequesters carbon, and in the same process augments its fertility (Lal 2004). Today, through capitalism/imperialism's metabolic rift, the soil loses carbon, a loss which then feeds back through the greenhouse effect in the form of extreme weather events.

Having defined the above conceptual framework, we can now fill in some details of the history of food and imperialism.

From Colonialism to Neo-colonialism and the Green Revolution

The imperialist era witnessed great strides both in the technical and organisational scope of capitalism. R&D, driven by both corporate interests and state military research, developed apace, with huge effects on farming. Chemical fertilisers were now complemented by pesticides and herbicides, mechanisation took off, farms gave way to plantations while agribusiness became just another facet of capitalism, notably in the factory farming of animals. The energy demands were immense, at least 10 calories being required to produce one calorie of food, and the entropy this released being expressed in CO_2 and methane emissions.

These developments in turn had big political implications: they raised the possibility of new forms of imperialism *through* food.

While the idea of ruling a people through their food is not new (witness British dominance in Ireland), the vast new scope of agribusiness in all its ramifications took this to a qualitatively new level which happened to coincide, in the second half of the twentieth century, with both the Cold War and decolonisation. The crucial role of food in the international politics of that period is not always appreciated, and I would argue that control over the food system was actually a critical condition for the transition from direct rule to neo-colonialism: it's safe to decolonise if you control how people are fed. And this in turn laid the foundations for succeeding forms of food imperialism.

A key approach was to arm-twist countries of the South to espouse 'development' strategies dictated from the North. In the preneo-liberal

'modernisation' phase (till about 1980), policies pushed by people like Walt Rostow (a development economist doubling as US psy-ops mastermind) presented traditional societies as 'backward' where they were able to rely on the produce of their fertile land (Rostow 1958, p. 159). In order to escape this 'backward-ness', they were instructed to industrialise *rapidly,* which would mean extorting, somehow, a massive food surplus from the countryside (to feed the urban population) even though investment was all flowing into industry. The result could only be to undermine food autonomy in the South, which is exactly what happened with lasting results.

Rostow's role might suggest this was all a conspiracy, which is partly true, but at the same time it is essential that we do not lose sight of the *structural* dimension of the imperialist era, an area where we can continue to learn from dependency theory. After all, the strategy of squeezing farmers to feed the city found a certain basis, too, in Soviet policy (Amin 1981), and proved seductive to populist nationalist regimes with a semblance of anti-imperialism – Egypt under Nasser being just one case. Mao Zedong in China was one of very few to realise that such an approach would be disastrous for development, including that of industry (Mao 1977, p. 286). As Amin showed, in contrast to a theoretical closed-economy model where the proceeds from exploiting farmers would remain within the national economy, accumulation circuits are in reality global (Amin 1974): any surplus extracted from the Southern agricultural sector therefore tends to flow to the core. I would argue that many lessons of the dependency school still apply (Biel 2000), and the global food chains, which impose such horrific exploitation on Southern rural dwellers (Patel 2008), can still be understood as expressions of accumulation on a world scale. It should be noted, too, that dependency implies its opposite: a delinked model in which national development serves agriculture in the first place (Amin 1980, 144 ff.). Here, too, the dependency school merits recognition as an antecedent of the food sovereignty movements which we will discuss below.

By starving its rural sector of investment, a country would depend on imports, either of food itself or of agricultural technology. With respect to the former, a pattern was introduced, which persists to this day, through which parts of the imperialist core where agribusiness productivity is very high become major staple food exporters to the South, often displacing indigenous staples (such as sorghum) in the process. Cold warrior Henry Kissinger spoke openly of using 'food as a weapon' (Linear 1985); and in his secret National Security Study Memorandum of 1974 (NSSM 1974), he advocated that food aid be tied to population reduction, thus revealing the Malthusian undercurrent beneath the surface modernist triumphalism.

If imports of food itself became a major tool of imperialist control, we could say this even more of *technology* imports.

The paradigm for this was the Green Revolution, a programme – beginning in the 1940s but enjoying its heyday in the 1960s – to push hybridised 'high-yielding varieties' (HYVs) of rice and wheat. What is fascinating about the Green Revolution is the structural evolution within imperialism itself as it explored and refined an interaction between power politics, corporate profit, and scientific research. As with GMOs later, HYVs were bred specifically to 'require' high inputs of the very chemicals (fertiliser, pesticide, etc.) and machinery manufactured by the corporations which sponsored it (Glaeser 1987). And because F1 (first generation) hybrids from two parent strains do not reproduce true to type, Southern farmers were left dependent on the seed supplier. One of the worst results was to make global food security dependent on an extremely narrow range of crops and strains. Pre-capitalist systems had always made a point of reproducing the widest possible variety of strains, because each has its own evolved forms of resistance (to pest, disease, weather) which may prove vital in future unforeseen circumstances. Through the Green Revolution, much of this genetic variety, along with traditional staples, disappeared; the result being an extreme lack of resilience which now leaves the world tragically exposed to twenty-first-century climate challenges.

The Neo-liberal Phase

While the Cold War/decolonisation phase set the tone for much of what followed, the advent of neo-liberalism around 1980 introduced further major qualitative changes.

Since its origins, imperialism has had a dual character: from early capitalism it inherited the notion of expanding international trade, through a process where each country should specialise in sectors where it supposedly enjoyed 'comparative advantage'; this would mean scrapping any form of localism or self-sufficiency, and create scope for exploitation through unequal exchange. However, in reality, imperialism remained strongly statist and security-obsessed. This found many expressions, such as national industrial policies, but nowhere more so than in food. In the First World War, Britain used food sanctions to starve Germany; in the Second World War, Germany sought to retaliate, and imperialism retains an autarkic streak pulling against the 'free' trade discourse: definitions of food security as an offshoot of national (military) security persistently trump definitions in terms of the well-being and livelihoods of communities. During the Cold War, the UK discreetly raised its food self-sufficiency to a point where (in the early 1980s) 95% of indigenous-type food was locally grown (Barling et al. 2008, p. 11).

The neo-liberal era revolutionised this picture with a massive increase of global food trade and a further reduction of local and national self-reliance. Alongside dependent food production for local consumption in the South (à la Green Revolution), development orthodoxies were now tweaked, forcing Southern countries – notably through World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment – to seek niche agricultural export markets; and as a way to control these niche exports, buyer-driven chains took shape, dominated by core supermarkets. This of course intensified Southern dependence on staple food imports, since if you are growing cash crops you won't be growing for local consumption.

Complementary to World Bank/IMF tyranny, there occurred the final phase of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Uruguay Round) and its transition to the World Trade Organisation (WTO): by the early 1990s food was at last brought fully within the sphere of globalised trade, undermining the scope for countries to protect themselves, for example by combating dumping or imposing food safety rules. In effect, because state powers in relation to food were weakened in the South *relatively* much more than in the North – where agricultural protectionism and subsidies remain rife – the subservience of the former greatly increased.

Besides its provisions *directly* addressing food, GATT/WTO also brought in something of even more massive significance to food imperialism: Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). By this, the knowledge commons were 'enclosed' by private property rights, enforceable internationally. In essence, we could say, just as the Green Revolution had facilitated a 'safe' decolonisation, TRIPS now removed the risks from freeing up food trade by entrenching corporate control over agricultural technology and genetic resources. Notoriously, corporations embarked on a field day of patenting organisms which are the fruits of both nature and of painstaking selective breeding over millennia by traditional farmers.

Currently, mainstream propaganda spares no effort to convince the world that GM is the future. In this sense, GM seems an extension of the Green Revolution, and in fact the corporate interests and institutions forged during that period are still active. Thus, the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR), effectively run by the World Bank, still quietly co-ordinates global research agendas (Alston et al. 2006, pp. 326–327). It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the genetic uniformity of crops which are forced on farmers, corporate interests require *variety* of germplasm as a basis for their own experimentation – hence a new form of food imperialism led by CGIAR in collaboration with the Global Crop Diversity Trust (CGIAR 2013) over genebanks, including the Svalbard Global Seed Vault ('doomsday vault'), a massive frozen seed repository sponsored by the Gates Foundation.

The question of whether GM is simply Green Revolution Mark II raises, however, important issues. There have been immense developments in the sciences during the imperialist period, some of which can have great progressive potential; but, of course, besides being generally driven by militarism, even civil applications under corporate control often encapsulate the most reactionary tendencies of capitalism, as the case of agriculture illustrates only too well. But could this science be used in a different and progressive way under popular control? In the case of the Green Revolution, since there is nothing wrong with hybridisation per se and the problem was entirely the imperialist goals it served, this argument would probably apply. A similar argument *might* be made about GM, but in this case there is a strong counterargument, namely that the approach which reduces the functioning or evolution of the organism as a whole to the individual gene is intrinsically misguided (Goodwin 1994; Ho 1998; Noble 2006; Shapiro 2011). This will be an important future issue for anti-imperialist movements.

The Food Crisis of the Twenty-First Century

The ecological context, more specifically that relating to food and agriculture, is indispensible to any understanding of capitalist crisis as a whole (Perelman 1987). Since about 2007–08, capitalism/imperialism has evidently been sick, the finance crisis being just one expression. In part, this sickness reflects the exhaustion of a particular accumulation regime, and food, like everything, is dragged into this. But the food crisis also proceeds from its own intrinsic, and much deeper logic, which would in no way be alleviated even if capitalism were eventually, in a narrower sense, to discover a new accumulation regime (in itself improbable – cf. Biel 2006). From a technical angle, we may analyse three factors to explain this: first, diminishing returns from chemical inputs, to which the system responds by a *fuite en avant* towards ever madder scientific fixes; second, the loss of the soil itself, a loss of structure

which is equivalent to an increase in entropy, graphically illustrated by dust storms now sweeping many regions; third, climatic factors, themselves a reflection of the unleashing of carbon which in a natural system would be sequestered in the soil: these include localised extreme heat, water-loss, erosion etc. and more generally the increasing frequency of extreme events.

An era of grave food insecurity – manifested most notably in wildly fluctuating prices – therefore began around 2007–08, which in the deepest sense reflected a qualitative, step-level change in the above factors. Although this food crisis was fundamentally distinct from the structural economic crisis with which it happened to coincide, the latter latched onto, *and magnified,* it in the worst possible way. And through this interaction, two key characteristics identified by imperialism theory assert themselves: parasitic finance capital and militarism.

A case which illustrates both these facets is land grabs. While in one respect a continuation of colonial practices (which reflects a broad unity running right through the history of exploitation), a highly specific contemporary form of land grabbing began to define itself (Rice 2009). On the one hand (the aspect linked to militaristic definitions of food security), there were grabs of tracts of land in the South, particularly Africa, carried out by states as a reflection of resurgent nationalist reflexes; on the other, grabs by speculative capital, partly because (with other investments now insecure) land is the surest value; partly because, as food runs out, this is a way to hedge other risks. These processes perfectly illustrate a wider trend whereby imperialism parasitises the insecurity it itself causes (Biel 2012).

The historic link between hunger and social unrest therefore returns to plague the system, highlighted by recent research wherein academics warn the US State Department (Lagi et al. 2011) to take seriously a strong statistical correlation – evident since the watershed of 2007–08 – between high food prices and social unrest. The ruling interests' fear of this scenario then further intensifies the headlong rush to risky technologies like GM, both as a temporary fix to stave off revolution by providing the food which

conventional chemical-based agriculture (plagued by diminishing returns) can no longer do; and to deepen still further the core's stranglehold over technology.

Counter-Imperialist Struggles Over Land and Food

But the correlation of hunger with unrest misses the key point: what really counts is not 'unrest' but struggle. The thing which probes the reality of imperialism most profoundly is always struggle against it, which we will now briefly discuss.

Crisis has proved the catalyst for a new generation of social movements, to which food is central (Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009), and these are not merely reactive to food insecurity, but look forward to strategic alternatives. They thus take up the challenge issued at the very outset of the imperialist era by Peter Kropotkin (Kropotkin 1892), that revolutions must make it their central task to feed the people.

In one sense, these new movements are a prolongation of peasant-based national liberation or landless struggles which have persisted from colonialism through the Cold War/neo-colonial era and beyond.

But what changed has been, first, a sense of the systemic importance of food in structures of dominance; second, a commitment to realistic and convincing alternatives: for in order to respond meaningfully to Kropotkin's challenge, it cannot be enough just to proclaim an intention to deliver food security, you must say *how*. The precursors of this new consciousness go back some way: we could cite the leadership of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso in the mid-1980s, who not only castigated food imperialism in his speeches, but, in a constructive spirit, collaborated with Algerian/French organic agriculture pioneer Pierre Rabhi to develop concrete alternatives, premised both on self-reliance and sustainable technical practices.

We may say that a qualitative step came in the second half of the 1990s, of which two examples can be given: the Indian Farmers' Movement against the GATT/WTO rules, which at its height mobilised hundreds of thousands on issues of intellectual property, something which had never been seen before; and the Zapatistas in Mexico, who not only critiqued the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) – among whose many disastrous effects has been its assault on Mexicans' nutrition – but also posited, both in theory and practice, the issue of autonomy in a radical new way, one which was to influence profoundly thinking on food independence. While the main focus of these struggles was in the global South, food-related fightbacks by working people in the North were complementary (Carlsson 2008) and introduced interesting features.

Such movements soon gave rise to the notion of 'food sovereignty' (Rosset 2009), which came to prominence at a meeting of the grassroots umbrella organisation La Via Campesina in Mexico in 1996. Parallel to this, 'food security' has been given a more radical expression in the form of the Right to Food, particularly in the hands of the progressive UN Special Rapporteurs Jean Ziegler and Olivier de Schutter.

Food sovereignty, while not being contradictory to the Right to Food, takes it into new territory. It contains an element of state sovereignty, which is logical given the WTO's drive to smash all national barriers restraining corporate interests. But the most interesting and innovative aspects concern grass-roots autonomy. As Michel Pimbert says, referencing the work of Ivan Ilich, food sovereignty reflects a fightback against a dominant trend to 'replace non-marketable use-values with commodities by reshaping the social and physical environment and by appropriating the components that enable people to cope on their own' (Pimbert 2009, p. 3). It is therefore about people recapturing the power to do things independently. The Indian version, for example, draws on Gandhian notions of swaraj (self-rule) which is as much about community self-reliance as about conventional sovereignty in a state-centric form.

The usefulness and validity of the term 'food sovereignty' is itself up for debate (Yale University 2013). But in any case, whatever the popular movement decides to call it, the essence of a commitment towards communities reclaiming the equipment to determine their future

will not go away. In this sense, the food issue is now, and will continue to be, a rallying-point for struggles against imperialism more generally.

The urgency lies in the fact that the current food system is not only socially unjust – which would be reason enough to challenge it – but has also exhausted itself ecologically. So a new farming practice must mean fundamental changes both in landholding and farming technique. In this sense, we could consider agroecology the practical 'wing' of food sovereignty/autonomy.

Agroecology signifies a commitment to a new agricultural science, one which recognises that methods of farming cannot be separated from socio-institutional change. It thus addresses both institutional dimensions (structures of autonomous local power) and technical ones (agricultural practices which act in harmony with natural processes and restore the soil). The intrinsic principle linking the two is that both proceed by unleashing the creative forces of self-organisation (emergent order) in complex systems, of which both society and the soil are examples.

In an institutional sense the guiding principle is *commons*, applied both to property relations (e.g. in land) and to creating a cooperative approach to knowledge and technique, which will facilitate the invention of a new paradigm. While such principles have always been around in peasant struggles, they are qualitatively deepened in today's movements, notably by an infusion of indigenous perspectives and ecofeminism; they thus explicitly break with capitalist/imperialist attitudes to the natural world and our relationship with it. In the words of the People's Agreement of Cochabamba, 'Humanity confronts a great dilemma: to continue on the path of capitalism, depredation, and death, or to choose the path of harmony with nature and respect for life' (PWCCC 2010). The definition of commons becomes in this case less a form of 'ownership' – of land, genetic resources or ideas about farming technique – and more one of stewardship.

In the first place, agroecology recognises that grass-roots experimentation and popular knowledge systems *are* science, and are indeed

its foundations because they offer a way of reconnecting with traditional sustainable practices. At the same time, research institutes and laboratories will have an indispensible role. In this respect, Cuba provides a valuable example, where research institutes offer practical high-tech support for grassroots experimentation (Rosset 1996). In the Cuban case, the degradation of the soil has been seriously addressed (Gersper et al. 1993), and there is evidence that a Marxian approach to science – holistic and less reductionist – has been key (Levins 2005). It is therefore not just a question of freeing agricultural R&D from corporate agendas – which would be the minimum requirement – but more profoundly of a recognition that complexity and holism are both the creative edge of 'official' science and the central principles of traditional knowledge, and can therefore be the unifying principle between the two. Self-organising systems look in the direction of autonomy and robustness in response to system perturbations (Heylighen 2008), which will in fact be the only possible human response to the acute climate challenges of the future.

In all these respects, the imperialism of food is already beginning to generate its opposite.

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Food and Imperialism: Food Regimes, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony

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Synonyms

Agriculture; Colonialism; Food scarcity; Green revolution imperialism; Peasants; Rural labour

Definition/Description

To understand food, this chapter conceptualizes the entire agri-food system and global supply chain, including seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, machinery, implements, fuel, and logistics. The agrifood industry is dominated by the large global multinational corporations in the North supporting affluent consumers and marginalizes rural workers.

Introduction: The Mutations of Imperialism

According to the economist Samir Amin, imperialism is 'the perpetuation and expansion of capitalist relations abroad by force or without the willing consent of the affected people' (Amsden 1998, p. 728). Imperialism has always been closely related to agriculture and food. This is particularly clear from the work of Rosa Luxemburg (Kowalik 1998), who, putting agriculture at the centre of imperialist relations of exploitation, defined imperialism as 'the political expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what is still left of the noncapitalist regions of the world' (Amsden 1998, p. 728).

Modern imperialism has also been defined as a certain period in the history of capitalism, from around 1870 to 1914. However, it has been recognised that imperialism has adopted new forms and is still a current phenomenon. This is important if we focus our attention that we give to food, more precisely, on the political economy of food.

Imperialism and Food Regimes

Food goes beyond agriculture. Therefore it is more accurate to speak of an agri-food system, which includes inputs into farming (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, machinery and implements, and fuel) as well as purchasing farmers' products, processing, transporting, wholesaling, and retailing (Belasco 2009; Burch and Lawrence 2007; Friedland 1994; Magdoff and Tokar 2010). The agrifood system comprises a net of global commodity chains which links developed and underdeveloped countries and regions (Fold and Pritchard 2005). Therefore, understanding the relation between imperialism and food is particularly useful to the food regime theory, developed from the perspective of Marxist political economy (McMichael 2009). According to this framework the subordination of food to the self-regulating market system involves specific methods of disembedding the economic relations of land and people. On the other hand, capitalism and its self-regulating market must become world systems in order to reproduce their existence. Capitalism can only be world capitalism, and in the realm of world capitalism the food regimes have emerged, together with imperialism, as certain periods of stable relations in the areas of power, production, and consumption in the world food economy

(Friedmann 1993, pp. 220, 214). Three food regimes have been identified. The first one (1870–1914) functioned around Great Britain as hegemonic power. (Friedland (1990) suggests that it started with capitalism and with the modern form of slavery at around the middle of the seventeenth century, and was based upon sugar and slavery.) After a period of turbulence the second food regime (1945–80) took shape under the leadership of the US. The third food regime began to appear in the 1980s and is still under construction.

Fundamental to the first food regime was the trade in agricultural products (foodstuffs and raw materials) from the colonies and other underdeveloped countries to the centre of the British Empire, which at the same time played the role of 'the workshop of the world'. In this case, cheap food from abroad was the key to keeping the wages of the growing industrial labour force low and to increasing the urban population in the developed world. At the same time, these regions and countries were forced to specialise as exporters of such products.

During the second food regime a link was created between agriculture and 'national' development, supported by protectionism. The axis of this regime was the mechanism of foreign aid, which allowed the US to channel its agricultural surplus abroad through subsidised exports. This increased the vulnerability of other countries to American subsidised agricultural exports, which they were forced to assimilate. Thus their domestic agriculture remained underdeveloped and their economies became increasingly dependent on imported food. The transnational integration of agri-food sectors was also consolidated. The 'Green Revolution' promoted the industrialisation of agriculture, whose products changed from final consumer goods to industrial raw materials for the manufacture of processed foods. Farms became integrated with and subordinate to agri-food industries. These industries, linked to key sectors such as chemicals and energy, have since then been some of the most dynamic parts of the advanced capitalist economies. Farmers in intense competition with each other were on a 'technical treadmill'. They had to buy industrial inputs (foodstuffs for animals, chemicals and machinery

for crops) and to sell their products, at low prices, to food-processing industries, and increasingly had to borrow capital, thus struggling to strike a balance between their own livelihoods and the commercial criteria of farming businesses (Friedmann 1993, pp. 222–225). The imposition of the industrial agriculture in the Global South was initially carried out by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund through 'development' aid and later imposed through structural adjustment programmes and the rules of 'free trade' of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Several authors (Friedland 1990; Le Heron and Roche 1995; McMichael 1992) identified the first signs of the birth of a third food regime during the 1970s and its consolidation in the 1980s. This food regime is characterised by the dominion of corporate agribusiness, which has begun to develop 'industrial' production systems and contractual integration arrangements in which decisions about how to produce crops and animals are increasingly being taken over by the large agribusinesses. Moreover, contractual integration reduces independent farmers to the position of labourers, but without the rights of workers to bargain collectively (Lewontin 2000). At the same time, in the third food regime trade flows of fresh fruits and vegetables are the pillar of a new 'international division of labour', whereby underdeveloped countries and regions must specialise in the production and export of these products for consumption by the affluent strata in the US, the European Union, and Japan.

Hegemonic Central Powers, Food Regimes, and Counter-hegemonic Social Movements

From the point of view of an imperialism and anti-imperialism analysis it is important to highlight the fact that each food regime has been centred on a particular hegemonic power: Great Britain in the case of the first one, the US in the second, and corporate transnational agribusiness in the present third food regime. We speak of hegemony in the Gramscian sense, that is, as economic and political dominion together with intellectual and moral

direction or leadership. This is valid in the realm of nation states as well as in the international or global economy and politics (Gill 1993; Morton 2007), and it has been especially significant in the second and third food regimes, because the economic and political elites in underdeveloped countries have usually entered into alliances with foreign governments and companies and have shared with them the profits of the exploitation of their own peoples. Besides, it has often been the case that such elites promote the dominant ideology and try to replicate the way of life of the metropolis in their own countries. (The Mexican experience of the triumph of neoliberalism during the government of Carlos Salinas is a good example of this phenomenon; see Morton 2007, pp. 153–167.)

For more than a century, the world food economy has shown a tension between expansion of the self-regulating market system and the self-protection of society (Friedmann 1993, p. 218). In each food regime counterhegemonic or anti-systemic movements have emerged to challenge the imperial hegemony. The dialectic of expansion of the self-regulating market system at different levels (nation states, international relations, global economy), and the corresponding movements of self-protection of peoples and societies faced with the disruptions caused by the aforementioned expansion, explain the relationship between imperialism and anti-imperialism in each of the three food regimes.

Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in the First Food Regime

In the first food regime the growth of capitalist industrial and agricultural production in Europe included the huge expansion of a class of workers whose income was in the form of money and whose food was obtained through markets. Poverty, together with the opportunities offered by flourishing food markets, created the basis for a world food market. Many Europeans, unable to survive either on the land or in labour markets, migrated en masse, mainly to North America, Australia, and Argentina. They settled there at the expense of the indigenous peoples, whom they forcefully dispossessed. Many of them became not peasants but commercial farmers directly involved in world markets, and their grain and livestock products were cheaper than those of the Europeans. The flood of imports of these foods into Europe further impaired domestic agriculture and displaced more people, who too became potential migrants. Particularly relevant was the world wheat market, which linked waged workers in Europe to European settlers in the Americas and Australia. Both workers and settlers promoted movements for selfprotection, demanding governmental social welfare for workers and price regulation for farmers. Tensions and contradictions within the first food regime engendered social and political movements against the British imperial rule. The struggle for independence and national sovereignty in the former colonies, together with the breakdown of the civilisation of the nineteenth century (Polanyi 2001, p. 3), put an end to the first food regime centred on British political and economic power (Friedmann 1993; Friedmann and McMichael 1989; McMichael 2009).

Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in the Second Food Regime

The forms of self-protection that emerged at the end of the first food regime, after a long period of turbulence, were the background of a second food regime, in which the selfregulating market expanded and new movements for self-protection appeared. In this regime, capitalist enterprise swelled thanks to the state regulation of land, labour, and agricultural products, and expanded the selfregulating market system beyond the limits of national economies. The problems of disembedding food, land, and labour from their social contexts led to attacks on the old forms of self-protection, which created obstacles to further expansion. The second food regime depended on the US having a monopoly over world trade and its own subsidised exports, and it conditioned by the Cold War. The US food aid policy was used as a weapon against the

expansion of Soviet influence on the Third-World countries. Later, the monetary and oil crises allowed several countries to join world markets in ways that weakened the status quo. Underdeveloped countries, which had borrowed to pay for oil and food imports in the 1970s, entered the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Since then they have been forced to export at any cost, and their nontraditional agricultural exports deeply transformed the second food regime (Friedmann 1993, pp. 218–219, 227).

Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in the Third Food Regime

Following the crisis of the second food regime, the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of the third food regime, whose principal features are the concentration of corporate power in the hands of transnational agribusiness and the increasing relevance of fresh vegetables and fruits in global trade flows. In this regime the power is exercised not just by a single country, like Great Britain in the first food regime and the US in the second, but above all by corporations whose economic and political interests do not always coincide with the immediate aims of American and/ or European governments. However, usually the governments of the hegemonic nations, as well as those of the subordinated nations, are in the service of these corporations. They control the key points of the global commodity chains of the agri-food system, from the seed sector and the agri-chemical market (Monsanto, Aventis, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow) to the food manufacturing sector (Nestlé, Unilever, Philip Morris, Kraft, Coca-Cola, Pepsi) and even the retail sector (Wal-Mart, Kroger, Carrefour, Albertsons, Safeway, Ahold, Tesco) and food service sector (McDonald's and Burger King). These powerful companies decide what is produced, chiefly in underdeveloped agri-export countries, to satisfy the demand from developed nations and also the high-income strata of Third-World societies. But they also exercise a considerable influence on patterns of consumption around the world, particularly in poor countries. The transformation of

people's diets in the Global South has also been encouraged by the US Government through 'aid' programmes. At the same time, overwhelming marketing of Western cultural values and products (especially foods that are high in fat, sugar, and salt, and low-fibre fast foods and soft drinks) is carried out by transnational companies. Important effects of this penetration have been the high levels of migration from the countryside to big cities slums, the promotion of crops for export, and the growing dependence on cheap food imports from the US (Magdoff and Tokar 2010). However, eco-imperialism is negatively affecting people in developed as well as underdeveloped nations. Accordingly, there are critical responses throughout the world, some of them mostly based in the European Union and the US (for instance Slow Food, Food Sovereignty, community-supported agriculture, the promotion of the local over the global), and others more related to the Global South (for instance Fair Trade, La Vía Campesina). In addition, several non-governmental organisations are playing an important role in these struggles, and even within international organisations such as the WTO there is some room for anti-imperialist initiatives (Bello 2009; Morgan et al. 2006; Patel 2013; Wright and Middendorf 2008).

Conclusion

Under certain circumstances foodstuffs can be treated as commodities, but the total commodification of food is a complete nonsense and tragic mistake, because access to food is first of all a human right (Magdoff 2012; Rosset 2006). However, the commodification of food has been the channel for reproducing imperialist rule over peoples and nations, and the central form of imperialism today is eco-imperialism or agribusiness imperialism, which allows corporations to control energy, water, air, land, and biodiversity (McMichael 2000). To break this imperialist rule a radical transformation of the global agri-food system is necessary and must be promoted as a movement for the self-protection of society against the unlimited expansion of the market

economy that supports the corporate agri-food system. This movement may lead to a new agri-food system, whose underlying principle must be 'food for people, not for profit'. It may follow a path of re-ruralisation, because 'Food means farming, and farming means rural livelihoods, traditions and cultures, and it means preserving, or destroying rural landscapes. Farming means rural society, agrarian histories; in many cases, rural areas are the repositories of cultural legacies of nations and peoples' (Rosset 2006, pp. 9–10), stopping the coercion of trade liberalisation, and re-writing the rules of trade to favour the local (Magdoff and Tokar 2000).

In the current circumstances of climate change, peak oil, and food crisis, the selfprotection of society means the recovery of dignity and sovereignty, the conquest of sufficiency and satisfaction through selforganisation. In other words, the struggle is for the recognition that all beings and all peoples are equal and have rights to the earth's resources.

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Food and Imperialism: The Corporate Regime and Global Peasant Resistance

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Definition

The international peasant movement aiming at the re-establishment of peasant autonomy is prevalent worldwide. Its representative organisation, La Via Campesina (The Peasant Road), comprises about 150 local and national organisations in 70 countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas, and has become a global platform where alternative theses on agricultural production are being formed and numerous interventions are being organised globally. The emergence of such a global peasant movement is closely related with the transformation of the food regime in the neoliberal era.

Marx, who metaphorically described the French peasantry as a 'sack of potatoes' to emphasise their disconnectedness from each other, would be surprised to witness the worldwide extent and connectedness of the recent international peasant movement. Its representative organisation, La Via Campesina (The Peasant Road), 'comprises about 150 local and national organisations in 70 countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas' (see Via Campesina 2015), and has become a global platform where alternative theses on agricultural production are being

formed and numerous interventions are being organised globally (Borras 2004; Desmarais 2007; Edelman 1998, 2002). The emergence of such a global peasant movement is closely related with the transformation of the food regime in the neoliberal era. Rural producers have always claimed to hold two powers that stand in the way of agricultural capitalism. First, within the boundries of the natural and local conditions, they have claimed their right to choose what to produce and how (particularly regarding inputs). Second, they have claimed their power to resist the complete commercialisation of agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilisers by reproducing them naturally (Lewontin 1998, p. 75). This essay addresses the destruction of the peasant autonomy and the almost complete proletarisation of peasants by the corporate food regime (see McMichael 2005), which has in turn led to the emergence of a global peasant movement aiming at the re-establishment of peasant autonomy by presenting a holistic, radical alternative for food production and consumption.

Food Regimes

Because the history of the decline of peasant autonomy runs in parallel with the transformation of the imperialist system, it is necessary to trace this historical path in order to grasp the deepening of this process in the neoliberal era. In this regard, the concept of the food regime, developed by Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael during the 1980s, identifies 'the ways in which forms of capital accumulation in agriculture constitute global power arrangements, as expressed through patterns of circulation of food' (McMichael 2009, p. 140), and thus provides a useful theoretical framework to understand the shifting modes of power relations with regard to agriculture and food production (see Friedmann and McMichael 1989; McMichael 1998, 2009). The first global food regime, which emerged during the era of classical imperialism led by Britain, was based on the global division of labour in agricultural and industrial production. Within this division of labour, powerful European states, particularly

Britain as 'the workshop of the world', focused on industrial production, while the colonies and settler colonies undertook agricultural production. Following the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Britain, which abolished all traditional mechanisms of protecting and feeding wage labour, in 1846 the government repealed the Corn Law, which had protected cereal producers in Britain and Ireland. This enabled the task of feeding the huge proletarian masses that capitalism was creating in cities to be outsourced to the colonies. Thus, the emerging international food market linked agricultural production in the wider colonial world that was based on bloody practices, such as 'extermination of indigenous populations and the seizure of extremely productive lands, alongside with continuing plantation slavery and unpaid family labour' (Araghi 2009, p. 122), to industrial production based on the wage labour system in the industrial centres. In this way, underpriced food kept wages in Western industrial centres low, thereby increasing the rate of accumulating surplus value.

The post-colonial food regime that emerged after the Second World War took a developmentalist economic perspective that aimed to integrate the agricultural and industrial sectors within newly independent nation states (see Harriet 1982). Thus, following decolonisation, the food policies of sovereign states were reformulated on the principle of self-sufficiency, with agricultural modernisation being introduced as the only way to achieve this aim. Rapidly introduced agricultural technologies were accompanied by land reforms that rearranged class relations and moderated conflict in rural areas. The 'Green Revolution', first implemented in Mexico in the 1940s before spreading to South Asian states like India and the Philippines in the 1960s, fundamentally transformed the agricultural sector. New factors in agricultural production, such as agricultural machinery, irrigation systems, hybridised seeds, and synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, resulted in the dependence of agriculture on the emerging agri-industrial sector. Moreover, the expansion of agricultural development agencies in many countries and the dispersal of their 'experts' and 'technicians' into all rural areas led to the consolidation of nation states and a spreading of their developmentalist perspective in the countryside.

This post-colonial food regime, however, was not to last, undergoing a gradual transformation which opened the way for corporate power to dominate, primarily because of the US and European invasion of world cereal markets. Specifically, after the Second World War, the production surplus of the US agricultural sector, created mainly as a result of the New Deal's agricultural policies, was pumped into underdeveloped countries as food aid or through agricultural loans offered by the US Government with long terms and low interest rates. This process was seemingly contradictary: on the one hand, the Green Revolution introduced highly efficient agricultural technologies; on the other hand, US-originating food aid and low-cost food import loans made agricultural imports highly attractive for the same countries. The result was decreasing agricultural production and growing food import expenditure across the entire underdeveloped world, where the ratio of food imports to food exports increased from 50% in 1955–60 to 80% in 1975 (Manfredi 1978, quoted in Araghi 1995, p. 350). In contrast, the US increased its exports in agricultural products between 1970 and 1980 by 150%, and was followed by France with an increase in exports of 100% (Edelman 1998, p. 106). Thus, having gained independence as nation states, the countries that had previously fed the European proletariat during the colonial era became increasingly dependent on the food surplus produced in the US and Europe. Moreover, their rulers were quite happy with this dependence, considering it a cheaper way to feed their own newly emerging urban masses. However, the destruction of rural life was appalling, with farmers who were unable to compete with cheap food imports abandoning the countryside to become the 'new workers' of the global South. In short, an intense depeasantisation was experienced (see Araghi 1995).

This gradual transformation was accompanied by the emergence of corporate agribusiness, particularly in the US, with an expansion of businesses mediating the oneway food traffic

between the US agricultural surplus and underdeveloped countries. In this new regime, the US Government provided financial incentives to US agricultural producers, and the resulting agricultural surpluses were then bought by giant corporations at low cost before being mostly distributed to underdeveloped or developing regions of the world under various international agreeements signed by the US Government. That is, US agricultural policies actually functioned to transfer public resources to facilitate the emergence and development of global giants of agribusiness, such as Cargill and Continental. They also allowed the capital of corporate agribusiness to become increasingly concentrated: 'In 1921, 36 firms accounted for 85 per cent of U.S. grain exports. By the end of the 1970s, six giant "Merchants of Grain" controlled more than 90 per cent of exports from the United States, Canada, Europe, Argentina, and Australia' (Shiva 2000, p. 27). This concentration increased further thanks to the industrialisation of food production, both as an incentive for and as a response to the escalation of mass consumption. Meanwhile, agricultural products gradually became inputs for these industries. In particular, increasing meat consumption led to the creation of a huge 'meat complex':

> Beef, the symbolic centre of the post-war diet, after staying steady for the first half of the century, increased 50 per cent after 1950. Much more impressively, poultry consumption per person, also steady from 1910 to 1940 at about 16 lb/person, increased almost 45 per cent between 1940 and 1950, and almost tripled to 70.1 lb/capita in 1985 ... To supply this consumption livestock producers were increasingly linked to corporate purchasers that processed and distributed livestock products on an ever-extending scale geographically and socially. (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, p. 106)

This transformation in meat production also created its own agricultural supply chain. To meet the demands of the feedstock industry supplying large-scale animal husbandry, there was widespread adoption of capital-intensive production of hybrid maize. The durable food industry also triggered the integration of similar products. For instance, since sweeteners were one of the main inputs of this industry, the production of sugar cane, sugar beet, and later, with the increased use of high-fructose corn syrup, corn became integrated into the durable food industry.

Hence, the post-war food regime brought about the almost complete linkage of agricultural production to agribusiness at all levels, thereby creating a corporate food regime. However, the neoliberal era should be understood as the radicalisation and institutionalisation of this tendency at a global scale, rather than as a rupture. During this era, the impractical ideal of agricultural self-sufficiency was abandoned both ideologically and politically. In 1986, when the process that would end in the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 started, John Block, the US Minister of Agriculture, described this transformation as follows: 'The idea that developing countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure their food security by relying on US agricultural products, which are available in most cases at lower cost' (quoted in McMichael 2003, p. 174). The necessary condition for removing all remaining obstacles to this ongoing process was the elimination of various public interventions in agricultural production in order to make it subject to the rules of the free market. After 1980, this process was conducted first by the World Bank and then by the International Monetary Fund through structural adjustment programmes which imposed the decreasing of the agricultural supports and making agricultural loans further controlled by finance-capital. However, the key moment in forcing agriculture to engage with the rules of free trade was the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.

When GATT was originally signed in 1947, the agricultural sector was not even included within its system. After GATT's replacment by the WTO in 1995, agriculture was opened up to the global regulations of trade liberalisation. When the Agreement on Agriculture was signed by most of the underdeveloped or developing countries, the main motive was to increase their foreign exchange revenues by increasing agricultural exports. Given that the public agricultural subsidies were mostly implemented by the US and other developed countries, others were expecting

to benefit from the free trade rules enforcing the removal or at least reduction of such subsidies. However, because of the WTO's complicated and unfairly implemented subsidy regime, the result has been the total opposite of what had been originally expected. While the demands of Southern governments for subsidies with 'legitimate environmental, economic, and rural development purposes' were caught in the net of the WTO subsidy regime, Northern countries maintained in various ways their own domestic agicultural subsidies, export subsidies, and other dumping practices (Schanbacher 2010, p. 36). The 'world price' that emerged from these practices was totally disconnected from actual production, with world agricultural prices falling from a mean of 100 in 1975 to 61 by 1989 (McMichael 2005, p. 278). The invasion of the markets by corporate agribusiness through these artificial prices further accelerated the elimination of small producers in the global South, while food expenditure in those developing countries that had signed the WTO agreement in the expectation of increasing their foreign exchange revenues increased by 20% between 1994 and 1999.

Another dimension of corporate agribusiness domination has been built on new patented gene technologies, known as the second Green Revolution. While the first Green Revolution made peasants dependent on the agricultural industry, the second one deepened this dependency almost to the point of slavery. For instance, the modified and patented seed industry made peasants totally dependent on corporations, as became obvious in the case of Indian peasants forced to pay transnational companies for patented Basmati rice, although such rice had already been produced and enriched for centuries by Indian peasants themselves. Underpinning this process were regulations related to intellectual property rights. For example, the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), signed when the WTO was established, concerns intellectual property rights that are subject to trade, and is now one of the major threats against rural producers. Unsurprisingly, Jose Bové, one of the celebrities of the global peasant movement, defines genetically modified products 'a technique of tyranny', and their patenting as the most significant tool of this technique (Bové and Duvour 2001, p. 89). The use of genetically modified products has expanded rapidly because of government policies. According to one report, '2012 marked an unprecedented 100-fold increase in biotech crop hectarage from 1.7 million hectares in 1996 to 170 million hectares in 2012 – this makes biotech crops the fastest adopted crop technology in recent history' (ISAAA 2012). This development can undoubtedly be considered as embodying the new imperial practices of seizure in agriculture, defined by Harvey (2003) as 'accumulation by dispossession'.

And lastly, as a resut of the 'supermarket revolution' (Reardon, Timmer, and Berdegué 2004), processing between the production and consumption of the food started to be controlled by large companies, such as Carrefour and Wal-Mart, namely the giants of the retail sector where capital is highly concentrated. Because of the 'the technologies of seed modification, cooling and preserving, and transport of fruits and vegetables as nonseasonal or year-round', seeding times and size of agricultural products have become detached from their 'natural cycle' to become instead subject to the supply chain management of the global retail companies that increasingly represent – or in fact, create – the demands of Western consumers (McMichael 2009, p. 150; see Burch and Lawrence 2007). Consequently, more and more Southern peasants have been turned into contract workers of these retail corporations.

A Radical Alternative: Food Sovereignty

The opposition of La Via Campesina to the corporate food regime can be traced back to the Declaration of Managua, drawn up by representatives of eight agricultural organisations that convened in a congress held in Nicaragua in 1992. Officially, however, the organisation was established one year later by 46 farmers' leaders assembled in the Belgian town of Mons. La Via Campesina made its international debut at the

Global Convention of Food Security in Quebec, Canada, in 1995, before making its first significant impact by attending the Food Security Conference of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome one year later. La Via Campesina refused to sign the conference declaration drawn up by non-governmental organisations and asserted its independence from both government agencies and non-governmental organisations that had, until then, held decision-making powers on agriculture on the international arena. From this point on, La Via Campesina gradually increased its authority to become the internationally recognised representative organisation of the global peasant movement.

La Via Campesina struggles in particular against the elimination of small producers or their conversion into the proletariat of the corporate food regime, with the consequent loss of autonomy. In this sense, the international peasant movement is engaged in a struggle against both the free trade regulations, implemented and administered by a global power network comprising international financial institutions, the WTO, free trade agreements, transnational corporations, and governments, and the practices of agribusiness based on the notion of 'accumulation by dispossession'. From 'the dumping of food at prices below the cost of production in the global economy' and a policy of 'food aid that disguises dumping, introduces GMOs into local environments and food systems and creates new colonialism patterns' to the 'technologies and practices that undercut our future food producing capacities, damage the environment and put our health at risk', such as transgenic crops and industrial biofuel monocultures, La Via Campesina has a huge agenda of opposition (see Declaration of Nyéléni 2007).

Despite this, La Via Campesina should not be regarded as a mere oppositional organisation because the approach it takes implies an alternative constitutive tendency. This sustainable agriculture perspective, which centres on small producers, is expressed in the concept of 'food sovereignty'. The 2007 Declaration of Nyéléni describes food sovereignty as follows:

Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007, p. 1)

This presents a model which conflicts in every aspect with the corporate model. While the corporate model reduces agricultural products to a matter of global commodity trade, the food sovereignty model, which takes the food as a basic human right, is predicated on the principle of local, national, and regional self-sufficiency. The corporate model is capital-intensive with the incentivised use of machinery, chemicals, and genetic technology, while the ecological agriculture model has a labour-intensive character based on the balance between the producers' historical experience and the ecological environment. However, the contrast is not just a matter of production. First, the former model is company-based while the latter is family- and community-centred. Second, while the alternative model sees the increase of geographical distance between production and consumption as a problem, the industrial model is based on this very principle. Finally, the corporate model wishes to impose a diet intended to become globally standardised, while the alternative model highlights product diversity and localism, and therefore diversity of diets. That is, the alternative agriculture advocates cultural diversity.

In brief, the alternative agriculture model, developed within a framework of food sovereignty, is not just an opposing model; rather, it is based on a far-reaching perspective regarding how food production and consumption, two of the basic activities of human life, should be organised. It is a model which integrates many issues within its struggle: the prevention of rural poverty; prioritising women's labour as the principal and determinative force in rural areas; problematising the spatial distribution of production and consumption; and highlighting the relationship between the human and ecological environment and diversified food consumption. In this sense, the food sovereignty movement is also

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transformative for most of the participating peasant organisations. Stedile, a leader of the Brazilian Landless Movement, summarises this rich blending of ideas and experience in La Via Campesina as follows:

> From the time of Zapata in Mexico, or of Juliao in Brazil, the inspiration for agrarian reform was the idea that the land belonged to those who worked it. Today we need to go beyond this. It is not enough to argue that if you work the land, you have proprietary rights over it. The Vietnamese and Indian farmers have contributed a lot to our debates on this. They have a different view of agriculture, and of nature – one that we've tried to synthesize in Via Campesina. We want an agrarian practice that transforms farmers into guardians of the land, and a different way of farming, that ensures an ecological equilibrium and also guaren-tees that the land is not seen as private property. (Quoted in Metres 2004, p. 43)

As a model describing food not as a commodity, but a basic human right, food sovereignty, first, is predicated on local distribution networks that directly connect small producers with consumers against the dominance of companies and agricultural product markets; second, it highlights the organised knowledge of producers regarding agricultural production against capital-intensive technologies; and third, it includes the ecological sustainability as a fundamental principle. Thus, the food sovereignty model carries the potential of surpassing the conventional limits of the concept of sovereignty: 'Food sovereignty is the right of peasants, as subjects of production, to control production, land, seed and water, and it is at the same time the right of consumers to choose safe foods to consume' (Whan 2006, p. 30). In contrast, other definitions tend to force the concept to fit into more conventional limits of the idea of sovereignty and to convert it into a merely governmental policy: 'Food sovereignty is defined as the right of peoples and sovereign states to democratically determine their own agricultural and food policies' (IAASTD 2008, p. 15). As a matter of fact, the food sovereignty concept was actually first proposed to overcome the limits of an officially approved concept, namely 'food

security', which is recognised by international governmental agencies such as the FAO. Food security attributes sovereignty to governments, imposing on them the obligation to provide sufficient nutrition to their population. It therefore surrenders all decision-making processes to nation states or relevant institutions of the international system created by nation states. Thus, food security, which before the neoliberal era was defined within the general principle of 'agricultural self-sufficiency', has been redefined in the last two decades as something attainable through the mechanisms of global trade which necessitates the reshaping of global regulations and nation states accordingly. The break signified by the notion of food sovereignty is, therefore, deeply ideological and political. According to McMichael (2004, p. 4),

> Whereas food security is a concept associated with the state/system, food sovereignty is at bottom a non-state concept, concerned with political and economic rights for farmers as a precondition of food security. Food security and food sovereignty represent distinct organizing principles shaping development trajectories at the turn of the twenty-first century. Each concept represents a model of agriculture: whereas food security has come to depend on the agroindustrial model, food sovereignty is rooted in agro-ecological relations.

Thus, food sovereignty represents a radically democratic reconstruction of relations within the agricultural sector, predicated primarily on the power of production communities and standing against the global capitalism represented by the corporate food regime. This perspective carries it onwards from being a mere agricultural movement to a wider force regarding the structuring of a radically alternative society. As Hardt and Negri put it,

The most innovative struggles of agriculturists today, for example, such as those of the Confédération paysanne in France or the Movimento sem terra in Brazil, are not closed struggles limited to a sector of population. They open new perspectives for everyone on questions of ecology, poverty, sustainable economies, and indeed all aspects of life. (Hardt and Negri 2004, p. 125)

Cross References

► Food and Imperialism
► Food and Imperialism: Food Regimes, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony
► Food, Imperialism, and the World System

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Food and the International Division of Labour

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There have always been many vital reasons for a significant interest in the study of food. Starvation (and its continuation by other means such as famines), social determinants of obesity, the question of national "food security" or people's right to "food sovereignty" and the need for agricultural surplus as a prerequisite of any kind of economic development are a few of the many topics of significant interest. This well-founded interest and wide range of topics are nevertheless not enough to establish any evident link of food with imperialism, nor with the main question of this essay: the international division of labour. Yet, let us recall that the question of food has been part of states' agenda since the early days of colonialism and, as we will see, a concern of the students of imperialism since the very beginning of its theorising.

A single issue, terms of trade, (sometimes known by its acronym NBTT, for net barter terms of trade), has dominated the debates about food and the international division of labour in the twentieth century. It is only recently that new perspectives and other topics have been debated at reasonable length. We will begin by summarising early views on this issue in the works of Kautsky as a first critical approach to the "agrarian question." Then we will move from this and other subsidiary remarks in the formulation of the classical theories of imperialism to its predominance in the first formulation of the concepts of centre and periphery in the thought of Latin American structuralism and its long-standing influence in dependency and world-systems theories. We will present a summary of the enormously wide empirical and theoretical questions and criticism raised about the structuralist formulation. Finally, we will briefly review the renewal of the agenda on the question of food and the international division of labour as seen, for example, in the study of global value chains and food sovereignty.

Kautsky: Food Production in Transition

While trying to lay out the foundations of how to understand the process of the expansion of capitalism's social relationships in the countryside and its various tendencies and counter-tendencies, Kautsky (1988) formulated several systematic observations on agriculture in the international division of labour. First of all he noted that the last quarter of the nineteenth century had involved a change in the terms of trade of agricultural products. Despite these being favourable to agriculture up until 1870, Kautsky observed that the movement has been reversed since then and proposed that this was the consequence of the expansion of industry. It should be noted that this was at odds with what classical and neo-classical economists alike expected, due to diminishing returns in the production function of primary products. Kautsky's explanation was an early insight into the idea that competition in the world market operates by articulating different modes of production. For Kautsky, the deterioration of food's terms of trade stemmed from its prices not being determined by costs of production under regimes of simple commodity production. Instead, prices were formed below those costs as a desperate response by agriculturalists to state tax pressure and indebtedness (by-products of militarism and national debt under imperial rule). This in turn could be sustained over time because most food producers did not depend on wages for their subsistence but rather on their own production (and were thus subject to over-exploitation). Kautsky predicted that people in colonial countries thus became vulnerable to the outbreak of famines after integration into the vortex of world competition, a measure of whose power and atrocity is blatantly illustrated by the image of countries

exporting food while their farmers starve. On the other hand, European producers faced productive reorganisation as a consequence of competition. Landowners had to convert their production to manufacturing activities: breweries, sugar factories, and distilleries became common in the countryside. Thus, Kautsky expected that the growth of agro-industries would become centralised and concentrated. In other words, the industrialisation of agriculture left smallholders even more bound to the monopsonist power of capital, leading them to become serfs of industrial capital.

In sum, what stems from Kautsky's masterpiece is a picture of food production as a residual pre-capitalist production that is facing strong transformation with worsening terms of trade (though presumably transitionally) as the system moves quickly towards agro-industrialisation.

The Prebisch/Singer Hypothesis

Almost half a century later, Latin American Structuralism (also known as *cepalismo* after CEPAL, the Spanish acronym for the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean]) also began by ascertaining that the terms of trade vis-à-vis manufactures were worsening for food and other primary products in which developing countries had a major interest. This was the basis for a theoretical framework intended to bolster a development strategy that sought to replace imports with the production of value-added goods domestically, which would entail a long-term widening and horizontal integration of manufacturing industry. Their "manifesto" (Prebisch 1949) proposed an innovative view attributing the ongoing changes after the 1930s to a response to the new international situation, in sharp contrast to the dominant neoclassical interpretation that assumed there were no alternatives to primary exportled development. It understood the moment as a long catastrophic conjuncture for economic growth. structuralists interpreted this crisis of export-led development (something they termed *desarrollo hacia afuera,* and whose limits and social

drawbacks they took the opportunity to criticise) as a positive transition towards internally oriented urban-industrial development (*desarrollo hacia adentro*) that opened up the opportunity for a reshaping of the international division of labour. Their proposal was to further support this transformation of world trade with the help of the state in order to overcome backwardness and income inequalities by sponsoring a project of industrialisation.

But if this was the context that these theories originally attempted to explain, their enduring influence went well beyond these initial parameters. The question of the deterioration of terms of trade of agricultural products (and other primary products) is at the core of Structuralist ideas, as well as those of Dualism which posits that the world can be divided into a "centre" of industrialised countries and a "periphery" of primary products exporters. Their key policy proposal presupposed the idea of unequal exchange as well: a framework to advance late industrialisation in order to overcome underdevelopment.

Against the neo-classical narrative of comparative advantage, Structuralists popularised the hypothesis of the deterioration of the periphery's terms of trade, named ever since the Prebisch/Singer Hypothesis, after Prebisch (1949) and Singer (1950). Defined as the ratio between the unit prices of exports and imports, the terms of trade decline when the relative price of the country's imports increases. Besides highlighting the obvious pressures that this situation places on the current account (exacerbating a trade deficit), Structuralists also attempted to verify the empirical validity of the hypothesis that relative prices have been constantly moving against peripheral countries, understood as primary producers since 1870. The shift from agricultural prices to national trade was not the only difference with Kautsky: the causes of adverse terms of trade were grounded on quite different arguments. Instead of resorting to the articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, they proposed the concept of structural heterogeneity and pointed towards the structure of the periphery's international trade.

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Structural heterogeneity is the second level of Dualism in *cepalino* thought. Structuralists argue that the centre and periphery have different production structures arising from a certain historically constructed international division of labour. The periphery has "another economy," in the sense that it is supposedly governed by a different set of rules (Love 2005). At the same time, the productive structure of the centre is assumed to be homogeneous, whereas the periphery suffers from structural heterogeneity; that is to say, dualism on an international scale is replicated *within* the peripheral countries. Structural heterogeneity is defined mainly in terms of productivity: homogeneous countries have highly productive sectors all across the economy, whereas in peripheral countries a "modern pole" coexists alongside "primitive sectors whose productivity and income per capita are probably comparable to those that prevailed in the colonial economy or even in the pre-Columbian era" (Pinto 1970). High productivity is usually restricted to a small enclave dedicated to agricultural or other primary exports, generally owned by foreign capital, and to a large extent isolated from the rest of the economy. Thus, there are few potential spillovers from "progress" within the "modern pole"; for instance, profits are expatriated via imported luxury goods or remittances. Structuralist ontology thus begins by dividing the world system into centre and periphery, and then further applies this dualism to the internal dimensions of peripheral countries.

The deterioration of terms of trade was explained both from supply and demand sides. In the former, structural heterogeneity implies a situation characterised by high rates of long-term rural (and urban) unemployment in which many producers subsist on small-scale food production. This in turn exerts a pressure on wages that ultimately prevents redistribution of productivity improvements in the peripheral modern sector and thus unit costs fall, allowing a transfer of productivity gains to the buyers; that is, to the centre. From the demand side, the story is better known: a disparity in income elasticities of imports in centre and peripheral economies favours the increase in prices of products produced by the centre. As the periphery exports food and other primary products while importing luxury goods, any rise in the income of the periphery leads to an increase of the demand of imported goods and a further deepening of its imbalances. At the same time, the centre improves its balance of payments, even as its income rises. Union pressures in industrialised countries contribute as well to this price distortion mechanism. This dynamic, together with the oligopolistic protection of the rate of profit, prevents a decline of manufactured products' price proportional to the constant rises in their productivity. Cardoso's correct inference of this statement, namely that in ECLAC's view, agents of production "manage, by virtue of their *politico-organizational* strength, to obstruct the operation of the [international] market" (Cardoso 1977, p. 12) shows the causal hierarchy behind their reasoning: at the core of structuralist thought, institutions are conceived in a normative fashion as separate from (and above) social relationships of production and exchange (see Grigera 2013).

Latin American Structuralism inspired a few other traditions that departed from ECLAC's thought in different ways. One was Dependency Theory, a more revolutionary break with free-trade liberalism. For Dependency, not only were terms of trade uneven for food exporters, but this was in turn creating a wicked class structure in the periphery: the domestic bourgeoisie was becoming a *comprador* class, a lumpen bourgeoisie that was unable to lead national development. The only way out of this perverse structure of the international division of labour was a socialist revolution that would unlink from the world market or heavy state intervention.

Critiques and Alternatives to the Prebisch/Singer Hypothesis

This characterisation of the trends in terms of trade was rejected both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Neo-classical economists were first in advancing a strand of critique against Structuralism. Viner (1951) argued that because of an economic law – ignored by structuralists – that technology would advance most rapidly in the manufacturing sector relative to agriculture, terms of trade should, *pace* the structuralists, actually

favour agriculture in the long term. Viner's line of argument would later be quite closely replicated by Baumol (1967), regarding the relative prices of manufacturing and services, a process that came to be known as "Baumol's disease." Criticism of structuralism stemming from Marxism, on the other hand, often pointed out the lack of relevance of physical quantities to understanding the nature of (international) exchange; that is, to the difficulties in accounting for labour differences. Thus, terms of trade is not to be expressed in physical quantities but in exchange value terms; that is to say, according to amounts of abstract labour for each kind of commodity.

These critiques were acknowledged and partially answered, but showed the quite different theoretical influences behind structuralism and Dependency Theories. While structuralists engaged in a deeper reformulation of international trade theory that further departed from neo-classicism's comparative advantages premise mainly on its empirical inadequacy, some dependency theorists tried to reconcile their findings with Marxist thought. One such attempt was an alternative to the idea of declining terms of trade: "unequal exchange" that stemmed from a strong imbalance of wage levels between centre and periphery and equalising of rates of profit. The unequal exchange hypothesis implied that value was transferred to the centre not just in the export of primary products but rather with any kind of commodity. For instance, Marini (1973) reconciles the law of value with unequal exchange through the idea of over-exploitation; that is to say, a wage level consistently below the cost of reproduction of labour power. For Marini, this situation could be sustained in the long run due to the existence of a large relative surplus population (ultimately a product of structural heterogeneity). Others in turn questioned the applicability of the law of value for the international market. They showed that Marx's writings on international trade (despite being incomplete) acknowledged the theoretical possibility for unequal exchange of labour and exploitation in international exchange. For instance, Marx in *Theories of Surplus Value* argued that in the world market "the law of value undergoes essential modification. The relationship between labour days of different countries may be similar to that existing between skilled, complex labour and unskilled, simple labour within a country. In this case, the richer country exploits the poorer one, even where the latter gains by the exchange" (Marx 1975, pp. 105–106; for a recent review see Itoh 2009).

Along with these discussions on the causes of declining terms of trade, the debates on the pertinence of statistical data and ultimately on the actual empirical existence of such a tendency were quite important as well. First, the data originally used by Prebisch to rest his statistical case measured the terms of trade of under-developed countries against the United Kingdom only, so it was argued that it could not serve as a proxy for industrial countries as a whole, as Prebisch intended. Then, these statistics mixed food and other primary products imported by the centre that where sourced from the periphery and the centre itself, valuation was inconsistent (imports where valued cost insurance freight [CIF], i.e., including insurance and freight charges, whereas exports were expressed in free on board [FOB] values, that is to say free of any shipping costs) and price indexes could not properly account for quality changes in manufactures over time. The choice of base years was also subject to controversy, as the "secular" deteriorating trend was not to be confirmed but from 1870–1940 and with a smaller magnitude than what Prebisch originally suggested (Spraos 1980). Extending the analysis beyond those years resulted in a trendless pattern. Moreover, after 2000, a significant improvement occurred in the terms of trade of food and other commodities, thus reopening the question of how to explain both the deterioration of the relative prices of food between 1870 and 1940 and the contemporary reversal of this trend.

The Contemporary Agenda

Over the past three decades, a renewal of the agenda within political economy has brought new analysis of food and the international division of labour that finally moves beyond the debate on terms of trade. The perspective of global value chains (GVC) applied to food products, the political debate over "food security" and "food sovereignty," and the

encompassing approach of the political economy of food are amongst the most relevant.

Even though global supply chains have been part of business and management concerns for a long while, it is only since the early 2000s that the concept of GVC has become popular among academic analysis of the global organisation of industries and their value chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi and Lee 2012). As a loose prescription of how to describe the multiple dependencies behind a single final product and a concern on where surplus is accumulated, the application of GVC in the case of food products has led to varying results and conclusions. These range from cases where (in line with a general world-systems perspective) profit concentrates in the centre (such as the contemporary coffee chain; Ponte 2002) to others where peripheral countries have or had strong market power, were prime pricemakers, and developed cutting-edge technology in production (see Topik et al. 2006).

The question of "food security" has served both to reveal the multiple tensions behind the international division of labour and as a tool for many developed countries in reshaping it. Defined as the right of states to determine food policies and intervene in food systems, under the sponsorship of several international organisations (such as the World Bank or United Nations), a detailed analysis of risks and possible shortages of the food provisioning systems and research on improvements to food productions was developed. "Food security" served other purposes as well, such as defending the controversial subsidies to local agriculture in Europe and North America during GATT and WTO negotiations.

With a different emphasis, the international peasant movement Via Campesina has countered "food sovereignty" with the idea of "food security" by focusing on the decisions of those who produce, distribute, and consume food as opposed to the market and corporations. They have justly criticised the impact of the "Green revolution" that increased crop yields without resolving the multiple situations of hunger and starvation and the "food from nowhere" regime (Bové and Dufour 2001), though at the expense of romanticising non-corporate agrarian production.

Finally, the analysis of "food systems," as complex, distinct systems of provision (whose uniqueness is presupposed on the significance of organic factors, the structural position of agriculture and household, and the persistence of articulation with non-capitalist forms of production) has been the trademark of the literature on the "political economy of food." Among other issues, the idea of a strict separation of agriculture and industry has generated several debates crucial to understanding the picture of the international division of labour behind structuralist and Dependency Theories. This view (that could be traced to classical economists) associated a strong agricultural sector with the impossibility of development. That was, for instance, the apparently inoffensive opening of Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question* (1988, p. 13): "With the exception of a few colonies, the capitalist mode of production generally begin its development in *towns*, in *industry*." Whether capitalist social relationships have completely disintegrated agriculture as a distinctive non-commodity production rumbles on after more than a century of debates about the nature of food production and its relation to industry.

Overall, after almost a century dominated by a static view of the international division of labour, where food production was associated with underdeveloped non-capitalist countries with adverse terms of trade, a new scenario is re-opening both new perspectives that transcend its theoretical assumptions and a contemporary and historical reappraisal of its actual patterns.

Summary

Despite the many dimensions in the study of food (starvation and famines, food sovereignty, agricultural surplus) its link with the International Division of Labour has been dominated by the question of terms of trade. This entry summarizes the first debates in Kautsky as a first critical approach to the "agrarian question," moves to the role of this debate in the classical theories of imperialism and in the debate after Latin American structuralism, dependency and world-systems theories. It summarises the long empirical

and theoretical questions and finalizes with a few remarks on the recent renewal of the agenda on the question of food and the international division of labour.

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Food Import Dependence

Food Scarcity

Food, Imperialism, and the World System

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Definition

Throughout recorded history some people have gone hungry while others have feasted. Even

today, perhaps $+/-15$ per cent of the world's population suffers from hunger-related malnutrition. This finds expression in their reduced life expectancies, susceptibility to illness and diseases, and an abject quality of life. Famine has involved a more intense and periodic worsening of this situation leading to mass starvation, epidemic disease, a large rise in mortality, a fall in the birth rate, and mass migration in search of food and security.

Introduction

Humanity is part of the Earth's constantly changing ecological system. Settled agriculture has involved an attempt to subordinate 'nature' to human needs and wants in order to supply us with food, raw materials (especially for clothing), and fuel. But throughout recorded history some people have gone hungry while others have feasted. Even today, perhaps $+/-15$ per cent of the world's population suffers from hunger-related malnutrition. This finds expression in their reduced life expectancies, susceptibility to illness and diseases, and an abject quality of life. Famine has involved a more intense and periodic worsening of this situation leading to mass starvation, epidemic disease, a large rise in mortality, a fall in the birth rate, and mass migration in search of food and security.

Crises of subsistence, dearth, and famine have also existed throughout recorded history. Thomas Malthus famously argued that famines are a natural check on population growth; they are 'the last, the most dreadful resource of nature ... [which] ... levels the population with the food of the world'. (Malthus 1992/1798, p. 42) Neo-Malthusianism was a dominant way of thinking about famines in the 19th and early 20th centuries and it is still found in popular discussions. But in historical and scientific analysis it has been displaced. Malthus and his followers tended to overestimate the rate of population growth and underestimated the expansion of the food supply within modern capitalism. Beyond this there is now widespread recognition that the growth of population, the

growth of the food supply, and food distribution are all moulded by how society is organised, whether on a local or global scale.

If the food supply has seemed to be a problem, this has been partly because of what we eat and how we eat it; partly because of how we produce food; and partly because of how we distribute it. This has been analysed in terms of a succession of food regimes based on structures of production and consumption built around the changing forms of power of the advanced states. A focus on socio-economic forms, modes of production, and their different priorities is also necessary for a real understanding of famine dynamics when there is a catastrophic failure in a system. Famine, wrote Michael Watts, is 'an environmental crisis [that] not only probes the darkest corners of environmental relations, but throws into sharp relief the organisation and structure of social systems' (Watts 1983, p. 352).

In pre-industrial societies most of the population was rural and employed in agriculture. Today, in the most advanced countries, less than 2–3% are employed in agriculture. In the previous two centuries, world population increased some 6–7 times but agricultural output grew some 10 times. This was made possible by rising productivity, which enabled the most advanced societies to become urban-industrial-service ones. On a global scale, too, the world's population became predominantly urban around 2000. But the gains in the world's poorer regions have been less impressive. On one estimate, some 11 million people in 2000 worked in agriculture in the most advanced countries. In the poorer countries, which contain most of the world's population, some 1.3 billion (US) got their living directly from agriculture.

There has been a tendency for some to romanticise the pre-capitalist and pre-colonial past and to picture the development of capitalism from the sixteenth century onwards as disrupting ecological equilibrium. This view has been caricatured as a model of Merrie England, Europe, Africa etc. But the evolution of human society beyond the hunter-gatherer stage involved the unequal control of the means of production, the development of social classes, and conflicts over any

surplus. Pre-capitalist subsistence crises could therefore be serious, reflecting a dynamic interaction between humans, their forms of social organisation, and the environment. There is more support for the argument that pre-capitalist societies did evolve some ways, albeit varying ones, to enable them to try to reduce (but not eliminate) the risk of famine, and that these societies also had some customary mechanisms to try to reduce some of the consequences of famine when it broke out.

With the development of capitalism as a mode of production, the organisation of agriculture became more sophisticated but also more contradictory. This makes the analysis of agriculture an important part of the wider discussion of capitalism and imperialism. Although output increased, in the short to medium term, the development of capitalism created new patterns of production and trade that undermined traditional support mechanisms. This has led to the argument that over the last few centuries the world has seen first an intensification of famines, and then their retreat. This, the argument continues, is to be explained by the particular historical evolution of capitalism and the changing forms of imperialism and colonialism within it. In the longer run major famine appears to have disappeared, save in areas of political turmoil. But new issues have arisen. With rising incomes has come a 'nutrition transition' involving a diet of higher value meat, dairy, vegetable, and fruit foods. This is straining production capacity. Food is also now highly processed. No less, if malnutrition and a daily struggle for food marks the lives of one part of the world's population, others struggle with obesity and everywhere clear class gradients continue exist in what is eaten, in what form, and how much of it.

Global food consumption per head, 2005–07 (kg per person per year, FAO Data)

	Population million	Cereals	Meat	Milk and Dairy	Cereals All uses	Daily Total Calories
Developed	1,351	167	80	202	591	3,360
Developing	5,218	155	28	5^2	242	2,619
World	6,569	158	39	83	314	2,772

Agriculture and the Global Division of Labour

From the sixteenth century onwards a global capitalist economy gradually developed based on an unequal geographical division of labour. Economic, political, and military power enabled the most advanced countries to seek to determine the opportunities available for development on the periphery. In this division of labour the poor countries (for a period as colonies then as independent countries known variously as the 'underdeveloped world', 'the Third World', the 'developing world', 'the South', the 'emerging markets', and so on) produced and continue to produce lower value goods which they exchange for higher value goods and services produced in the core. Until the late twentieth century this division of labour led to their exporting foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials and importing manufactured goods. The table below shows the dominance of agricultural goods in poor countries' exports before the Second World War.

In the late twentieth century, some countries (and most notably China) began to produce and export more basic industrial goods, but agriculture remains important and now many of these poorer countries import subsidised Western agricultural exports creating even more distortion in the role of agriculture.

Throughout history, most trade has been between advanced countries, although the precise share has varied. In the colonial era some 70–75% of Europe's imports came from other European or advanced states and some 70% of exports went to these states. The rest of the world has always been involved in the smaller part of world trade and this remains the case today. Indeed, despite the predictions of mainstream economists, most international trade in agricultural goods has also tended to be between the more advanced countries. This is not to say, however, that some businesses in the advanced economies have not had a strategic dependence on certain foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials produced in the poorer countries.

With the arrival of Columbus in the Americas, a process of 'ecological imperialism' was set in

motion. With European penetration (and sometimes ahead of it in the case of diseases), new plant and animal species were transferred and established themselves as part of the agricultural economy. Many of the foods that we think of as growing 'naturally' in different countries are in fact a product of such a diffusion, structured in no small part by food and raw material needs set at the core of the evolving global system.

In the Americas (and later Australia and New Zealand), the indigenous population was reduced in number and economically marginalised by European settlers. In the Spanish colonies, land grants enabled those favoured by the monarchy to establish large *latifundia* alongside smaller-scale forms of agricultural settlement. In the Caribbean and the southern US, plantations were developed to supply sugar, tobacco, and cotton to the Atlantic economy. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some Europeans migrated as free men and women but many went as indentured servants and labourers. But the major part of the plantation labour force was made up of black African slaves and their descendants. Some 9.6 million were transported between 1451 and 1870 with the highest numbers in the eighteenth century. Free agriculture in North America, which became more important during the nineteenth century, tended to involve grain and livestock production.

While slaves, tobacco, sugar, and cotton dominated the trade in the Atlantic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the east it was the high-value spice and silk trade pioneered by the Portuguese, but then controlled for a long period by the Dutch, that was the initial means of a closer link between East and West.

Commodity composition of Third-World exports (%), 1830–1937

	1830	1912	1937
Agricultural raw materials	29.9	34.7	39.9
Food stuffs	47.2	50.2	46.3
Drugs	7.9	3.9	1.7
Metals	7.0	2.8	3.2
Manufactured	8.0	8.5	8.9

European Expansion, Colonialism and Agriculture

In the nineteenth century a more extended and deeper global economy developed in which the balance in agricultural trade and production shifted. While some early colonies gained independence in the Americas, there was a new round of colonial conquest so that European rule reached its peak in the first half of the twentieth century. The number of colonial subjects rose from some 205 million in 1830 to 725 million in 1930 – around a third of the world's population with 75% of these colonial subjects in Asia and 20% in Africa. But establishing economic influence and political control on the ground took some time, especially when formal colonial rule was established by drawing lines on maps in European capitals. What some call the 'imperial high noon' lasted a relatively short time, from 1918–39. In the 1930s, in particular, the economic crisis encouraged the imperial states to look to tie their colonies more closely to the 'mother country'.

From the early nineteenth century to the Second World War, Britain was the world's leading colonial power. But its role was distinctive. As early as the 1800s, agricultural employment had fallen to less than 40% and by 1851 Britain was 50% urban. By the 1900s, agriculture provided only some 10% of employment – a share that would fall to less than 1% a century on. Agricultural output rose consistently, but by the 1900s Britain was importing over 70% of its food needs; a dependence on global agriculture that no other major economy had at this point. Britain's ties with its formal and informal colonies were very close. In the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill described Britain's colonies less 'as countries, carrying on an exchange of commodities with other countries, but more properly as outlying agricultural or manufacturing establishments belonging to a larger community' (Mill 1940/1848, p. 685) In many other advanced states, domestic agriculture would continue to play a more prominent role in the food supply system until the second half of the twentieth century.

Trade in the global economy, subject to significant shorter-term variations, has historically tended to grow faster than production. In the nineteenth century, the crude estimates available suggest that trade may have risen from 3% to 30% of output. This was made possible by improvements in communications and transport, economic reorganisation, and the increasing commoditisation of production. But the trade of the colonial countries started from lower levels and grew slightly less fast and more unevenly than world trade. Nevertheless, by the late nineteenth century, the first multinational agricultural businesses had emerged linking the different parts of the food chain and helping to supply and mould changing food-consumption patterns in the advanced countries.

In thinking about the development of the wider food supply system in the colonial era it is normal to divide the world into three zones. Within Europe (to the north in Scandinavia, to the east as far as Siberia, and to the southern shores of the Mediterranean), a heavily agricultural semi-periphery developed exporting grain, fruits, and dairy products to Western Europe. Here could be found differing mixtures of landed estates run by more or less modernising aristocracies and a mass of peasant producers, themselves divided into richer, middle and poor peasants, the latter struggling to resist decline into a landless class.

A second zone was made up of areas of European settlement; initially the Americas but then also Australia and New Zealand. Forms of slavery and unfree labour migration continued to be important into the nineteenth century. Some 160,000 'convicts' were transported to Australia between 1787 and 1868 to create a new labour force there. But free labour movement became more important for these areas. Some 44 million migrated from Europe between 1821 and 1915. Alongside the traditional plantation crops of the Americas, the production and trading of grain, animals, and dairy products became increasingly important, assisted by developments in communications and shipping. The area under crops in Europe and these regions of European settlement doubled between 1850 and 1930 as frontiers were pushed outwards. These regions had the most

sophisticated forms of agriculture, with the highest levels of agricultural exports per head, and relatively high levels of per capita income. This stimulated new patterns of food consumption. The high per capita income in late nineteenth-century Canada and the US is well known, but Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay too had relatively good per capita incomes based on their agricultural export trade to Europe and not least the United Kingdom.

The third zone was made up of the largely tropical colonies in Africa and Asia acquired in the nineteenth century. Here agriculture was much less directly focused on meeting imperial needs. The larger part of food production continued to be subsistence or for local markets, and most colonies had relatively small shares of output going into international trade. Europeans saw themselves having a civilising mission in which the imposition of more advanced liberal market economic processes was central. The scale of the consequent disruptive impact is highly contested. Some colonies had high levels of exports per head; for example, Malaysia, Sarawak, and Mauritius. But in many, exports per head were very low. In the cases of India (a formal British colony) and China (formally independent but prey to European influence), exports per head were tiny even though overall these countries were important to the international economy. But the fact that some more advanced sectors were created did help to define the wider political economy of the colonies.

Commercial exploitation of agriculture in these states involved the creation of cash crops. Where continuous cropping was possible and some capital larger inputs were needed, commercialisation involved the creation of plantations under settler control or management. This included the production of goods like tea, coffee, some palm oil, and raw materials such as rubber. Where crops were annual and capital inputs smaller, cash cropping took the form of peasant farming, as in the production of cocoa and groundnuts. Here, risk was pushed onto the shoulders of the peasant household and this encouraged a degree of self-exploitation to survive. In both instances, however, to create the basis for

commercialisation the traditional forms of land ownership and labour had to be undermined to create a more market-based system.

The dynamic of colonial accumulation was uneven. Crop acreage expanded (on one estimate by 70% in these regions between the 1850s and the 1930s) more slowly than in more advanced regions. Output grew but productivity was low and its growth less impressive. Another sign of the weaker integration was the limited infrastructure development, it being designed to secure political rule and to get agricultural goods and other raw materials to the ports rather than to lay the basis for sustained development. By 1930, Latin America had only 13% of the world's railways, Asia 11%, and Africa 5%.

It was once common to talk of an economic dualism between a backward, traditional sector and a more modern 'enclave'. More radical accounts recast these arguments in terms of social formations, perhaps combining different modes of production. The practical difficulty is to understand how different forms interpenetrated, directly and indirectly, rather than existed side by side.

There were also other flows that were important in this third zone. In the Indian Ocean and Pacific, the nineteenth century also saw the development of a growing trade in rice. Migrant labour moved too, especially from India and China. Trade in agriculture-based drugs was also important; not just tobacco but for a period a high-value trade in opium under British control. This helped to open up the Chinese economy and laid the basis for some still-surviving multinationals as well as feeding the general process of accumulation.

From the late nineteenth century until the late twentieth century, political discussion of the problem of agriculture, colonialism, and imperialism was bound up with what was called 'the agrarian question'. Given that industrial capitalism characterised the smaller part of the world, radicals focused on whether 'the peasantry' could be an agent for political and social change either independently (or led by intellectuals) or as part of a worker-peasant alliance led from the towns. But the peasantry, described by some as 'an awkward class', proved an ongoing political and theoretical problem. There was a widespread

agreement that land reform had to be part of a process of rural change. This took place in a number of countries in the twentieth century, sometimes from above, sometimes pushed from below. But, even where it had a positive impact, it did not realise popular hopes and create the basis for sustained rural prosperity.

Famine and European Capitalism

In Europe, the heartland of the early capitalist economy, subsistence crises gradually disappeared as incomes rose, agricultural output increased, and it became possible to import food from other regions and states. Famine disappeared first in Southern and Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the European periphery, however, major famines occurred in the nineteenth century including Ireland and Finland in the mid-century and Russia from 1891–92. By this point, these economies were already part of the wider global capitalism. While some starved, food was exported and governments tended to watch fatalistically for fear of disrupting what many at the top saw as a natural correction of population to the means of subsistence. The famine in Ireland from 1845, when a million died and another million migrated (reducing the population from 8.2 to 6.5 million between 1841 and 1851), is often seen as a paradigmatic case for the debate over the relation of famine to capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism.

In the twentieth century, mass famines did occur in Europe, especially in Russia in 1921–22, 1932–33, and 1946–47, but these were more clearly linked to war and state policies, though these too can be argued to have had their roots in the deeper political economy of global capitalism.

Famines and European Expansion and Control

European expansion from the sixteenth century onwards began to integrate the Americas, Africa,

and Asia into an evolving capitalist world economy. In the sixteenth century, the biggest changes were in the Americas where conquest and the spread of 'old world' diseases had a catastrophic effect on local populations. Estimates are more or less speculative but all point to huge population losses. But most attention in famine history has been devoted to the impact of informal and formal imperialism and colonialism in the two centuries after 1750. China escaped formal subjugation but its economic development was disrupted by successive wars and crises in which competing European interests played a role. Elsewhere, in Asia (but not Japan), and in Africa, formal colonisation took place in the nineteenth century. Where the incorporation of new regions into European empires involved the deployment of force and plunder, this often provoked immediate famine crises. These were an indirect product of the disruption of conquest but also a direct product of military action. The extent to which colonial armies deliberately destroyed crops and agriculture to enforce their domination is often not appreciated.

The colonial stage of integration into the global economy and its imperial subsystems was more systematic though still uneven. Commercialisation and new forms of taxation threw more risk onto the weaker sections of the rural and urban populations in many colonies. This increased their vulnerability in bad years. The worst period came in the late nineteenth century when, as Mike Davis puts it, 'there is persuasive evidence that peasants and farm labourers, became dramatically more pregnable to natural disasters after 1850 as their local economies were violently incorporated into the world market' (Davis 2001, p. 288). Harvest problems intensified in Africa, India, and China, creating major famines in the late nineteenth century. Within some colonies there could also be shifts in the areas affected. In his study of famines in Zimbabwe, Iliffe argued that 'whereas early colonial famines centred where the European impact was least, later colonial scarcity concentrated where the European impact was greatest' (Iliffe 1990, p. 79).

After the First World War, the scale and frequency of famine in most (but not all) colonies diminished. As in Europe, most twentieth-century famines have been a product of war and political action in existing or newly decolonised states (e.g. India, 1942–43; China, 1958–62; parts of Africa, 1960s–1980s; North Korea, 1995–2000).

Analysing Famines

Deaths in famines are hard to estimate because famines have tended to occur in societies whose weak administrative structures are disrupted further by a famine crisis itself. There are also political pressures to understate. In the great Indian famine of 1876–78, the governor of Bombay said there were 150,000 dead but an official enquiry said 5 million. In other cases, critics of regimes have been accused of exaggerating the scale of famine deaths. Population losses (deaths plus the fall in the birth rate) are more speculative too. But crude estimates suggest that in the nineteenth century some 100 million might have died in famines and in the twentieth century some 70 million. These are huge numbers but they are less than the cumulative impact of premature mortality from everyday hunger and disease. They are also less than those who died in wars but, given the close links between war and some famines, drawing too clear a line between them is not sensible.

Accounts of colonial famines seek to integrate a number of elements. There is the manner of incorporation of formal and informal colonies into the global economy; there is the scale and nature of their subsequent vulnerability to external shifts. There is the longer-term issue of the creation of new forms of land rights and the creation of wage-labour relations as well as the greater degree of commercialisation and specialisation involved in rural life. There is also the disruption of traditional forms of customary protection and moral economy in favour of colonial state policies based on a market political economy.

Here the work of historians interacts with that of other social scientists and, not least, economists. Amartya Sen (1981) has been especially influential in undermining both Malthusian accounts and those which attribute famines to

simple market failures. Sen argues that the problem is not the lack of markets but the way that they function to reduce the purchasing power of some (reducing what he calls 'entitlements' to food) while enabling others to command a greater share of the food supply. The normal functioning of the market price mechanism can therefore be a key part of the famine process. Sen's radical critics regret that he incorporates too many of the assumptions of conventional economics, but his analysis of the contradictions of markets has been important in both undermining earlier arguments 'from within' and encouraging the view that active policies of income support can help deal with famines.

The Internal Nature of Famines

If the causes of famine are rooted in global and social inequalities, so too are its processes. Famine victims tend to be the poorest as they have least access to food and are most susceptible to the diseases that accompany famine crises. The Cooper Memorandum (1881) on Indian famine said that 'If the famine mortality in 1879 be tested it will be found that about 80% of the deaths come from the labouring classes, and nearly the whole remaining 20% from the cultivators owning such minute plots of land as to be hardly removed from labourers' (Ambirajan 1976, pp. 8–9). It then dismissed these victims as a class 'low in intellect, morality and possessions'. This class nature of the famine process has been confirmed time and again (and is supported by Sen's analysis of who gets what). Amongst the poor the victims then come disproportionately from the very young (especially babies who have been weaned) and the old. The one peculiarity is that in some instances adult women have been found to have had higher survival rates than men. Whether this is because the texture of household relations is more nuanced than accounts often suggest or because women have better biological, individual, and collective ways of coping remains unclear.

The term 'famine victim' is itself controversial. People do not wait passively to die. They struggle to survive but are forced to make 'tragic choices'. Survival involves various household strategies. These include looking for work, scavenging, selling off less important possessions. The balance between animals and humans shifts in favour of the humans. As hunger intensifies it then becomes necessary to sell off (in a more or less structured way) tools, animals, and land with the most irrevocable decisions left till last. When this fails, survival then might involve fleeing as refugees to escape death or to find it in new places if the gamble to migrate does not work.

Part of our difficulty in understanding this is that outsider accounts tend to veer between the sensational, stressing how famines bring out the worst in human beings (abandonment, murder, and cannibalism), to accounts that stress fatalism and passivity to other accounts which focus on 'coping' by co-operation and mutual aid.

Recovery is also part of the famine process. Demographic recovery may be quick. A famine not only increases the death rate, it reduces the birth rate. Marriage rates fall, sexual activity diminishes as the human body weakens, conception is harder, spontaneous abortions and stillbirths more frequent and infant mortality (often unrecorded) rises. But with increased nutrition, marriage and birth rates can rise quickly and the death rate falls to pre-famine levels. But some health analysts speculate that the human body continues to carry the hidden scars of famine in later life, and is reflected in development problems and susceptibility to later disease and diminished life expectancy. Little is known about any long-term 'psychological' and ideological wounds.

Famine processes involve winners as well as losers. Someone must buy the land, animals, tools, and possessions that are sold. In the process, buyers increase their relative position and status. At the macro level, Mike Davis has stressed the contribution of famine to a larger global process of proletarianisation on the one side and accumulation on the other. 'The great Victorian famines were forcing houses and accelerations of the very socio-economic forces that ensured their occurrence in the first place' (Davis 2001, p. 15). But we have too little knowledge of how this

might have worked at particular times and in particular places and what was done with the different possessions that some gained from the dispossessed.

Famine Policies

The recognition of the role of policy in famine has led to claims that famines involve acts of genocide. But few non-fascist governments appear ever to have seriously willed the death of part of their own population. Culpability arises rather because other priorities have helped cause famine and created the justification for doing too little too late to deal with famine once it occurs. One common factor has been a reckless determination to accept a degree of rural suffering as part of the process of development; an idea brutally expressed in the late nineteenth-century Russian comment that 'Even if we starve we will export grain'. (Figes 1996, p. 158) In war, too, victory at all costs has meant a willingness to risk famine for parts of your own population (apart from imposing hunger on your enemy through blockages etc.); something seen in the notorious Bengal famine of the Second World War.

'Other priorities' have also helped mould weak policy responses. In the nineteenth century, responses were further constrained by the economic thinking that saw famine as a necessary correction and all but the harshest forms of relief as a disruption of the market mechanism; a situation evident in both Ireland and India.

Development of the Modern Global Food System

The Second World War disrupted the existing colonial ties, and aspirant imperial powers in the form of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan briefly attempted to create new agricultural hinterlands for themselves. Although the older colonial ties were re-established after 1945, decolonisation came fast from 1948 to the 1970s, by which point only a number of smaller European colonies were left.

This helped shift the global food regime from one built around European colonialism to one, from the 1950s to the 1980s, structured by US policy and the Cold War. Then, from the late 1980s, another shift took place to an increasingly (but still largely US-dominated) neo-liberal corporate regime.

Before 1945, only Japan of the peripheral countries had managed to achieve a degree of sustained industrial growth. After 1945, Japan, along with many European states, modernised agriculture, industry, and their wider economies. Then, in the late twentieth century, some newly industrialising countries in Asia began to follow them, significantly reducing the role of agriculture in their own economies.

This was possible because after 1945 there was a massive but uneven growth of agricultural output. Land devoted to agriculture globally increased from 1.2 to 1.5 billion hectares. Forests have been cut down to grow grains for humans and animal feed, a necessary step as richer people consume a higher share of their diet as meat. But the main cause of the output growth was 'the green revolution': a combination of specialised breeding of grains and animals to increase yields, and the intensification of agriculture with the use of equipment, energy, chemicals, and water. Ecological problems and the high inputs involved mean that there are serious doubts about the possibility of projecting this model indefinitely into the future to meet the needs of a larger global population with higher incomes.

Increase in population, calorie supply, and agricultural production (FAO Data)

	World		Developed		Developing	
	1961/ 1963	2005/ 2007	1961/ 1963	2005/ 2007	1961/ 1963	2005/ 2007
Population Million	3133	6569	1012	1351	2140	5218
Cereals (million tonnes)	843	2,068	500	904	353	1,164
Meat (million tonnes)	72	258	52	109	20	149
Daily energy supply index	100	100	134	121	84	94

In the global South as a whole, the rural economy became ever more closely tied to a wider global economy dominated by rich states and their agri-businesses. Neo-liberal policies, pushed by the powerful capitalist states, focused on opening up agricultural markets but, with agricultural production heavily subsidised in the dominant economies, this created further problems in the global South. These policies continue to involve the use of the 'visible hand' of the state to encourage a continuing process of 'accumulation by dispossession'. The exact pattern that has emerged varies by region and country but the general tendency has been towards an intensified commercialisation and commodification of land, labour, and capital in the countryside, and more high-level food processing, especially for urban consumers.

The global food system is now often described as an hourglass with large numbers of farmers at the top and large numbers of consumers at the bottom but linked by narrow channels controlled by a small number of agribusinesses. These agribusinesses have grown at a national and regional level, pushing aside local actors and co-operatives. But they have also increasingly come to be dominated by global transnationals. These (e.g., Monsanto) control inputs like equipment, seed, fertilisers, and other chemicals. They involve wholesale traders, sometimes called the 'invisible giants' of the global economy who buy up most of the world's harvest of major crops (Cargill, Bunge, Archer Daniels Midland). There are the global food processers and manufacturers (e.g., Kraft, Unilever) and more recently we have seen the rise of global supermarket chains which not only dominate retailing in many countries but now also control parts of the food-supply chain as well (e.g., Walmart, Tesco, Carrefour). This has also involved the development of different forms of contract farming which directly tie producers at the bottom end of the food chain to companies and consumers at the top. With this concentration, it is not surprising that perhaps one-third of global agricultural trade now takes place as intra-company trade. 'There isn't one grain of anything in the world that is sold in a free market. Not one! The only place you see a free market is in the speeches of politicians,' said the CEO of Archer Daniels Midland in the 1990s (Patel 2008, p. 99).

Some countries continue to develop with strong agricultural sectors. Brazil is now a major food exporter of red meats, coffee, corn, and soybeans. But more rapid growth in much of the developing world has more often led to these economies becoming net importers; a trend that is likely to grow with the current structure of production and distribution. Subsistence forms of agriculture have been pushed to the margins of the rural economy and many poor countries now export specialised agricultural products to the advanced ones (fruits, vegetables, flowers etc.). But they have become net importers of more basic grains, often from subsidised production in the advanced countries.

Within countries, the process of rural dispossession has reduced the numbers of peasants both relatively and absolutely. There is significant debate about the extent to which 'a classical peasantry' still survives as a class. In the countryside, landless labourers live alongside small-holding households whose family members are forced to engage in offfarm work to keep the household going. They do this either by working on bigger farms or in local trades or by migration to the towns, often joining the burgeoning informal economies that characterise southern cities. These processes help to increase the reserve army of labour but do not lead to sustained industrial growth. They also impact in new ways on internal rural and household relations, including the role of women, rural community support networks, consumerism etc. as well as on forms of social action and political perspectives.

The unequal command of food supplies in the global system is generating new issues or a reformulation of old ones. 'Food security' is a problem for those with little food but also for richer states, including developing ones. China moved ahead of the US as a food importer in 2012, for example. There is a growing interest from both the Middle East and China in land

deals in Africa. These are, in part, a product of concerns about future food availability. This has led to speculation that new forms of agri- and food-based imperialism will mark the twenty-first century in the ways that they have marked previous centuries.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the evolution of international agencies began to allow the monitoring of famine threats and some forms of inter-state international aid began to develop. Non-governmental organisations began to take up the question of famine. The Save the Children Fund was created in the aftermath of the First World War. Oxfam was created during the Second World War. At the end of the century, famine was taken up as a global issue by pop stars and the music industry. But some governments saw such interventions as foreign interference. Others argued that if national priorities were distorted, so too were global ones. In the late 1980s, when famine hit Ethiopia, the resources devoted to dealing with mass starvation there are estimated to have been less than 0.01% of global military expenditures.

Today it is commonly argued that, compared to the past, only smaller-scale local famines are possible. But endemic hunger marks the life of a significant minority of the world's population. In the future, food demand will rise, partly because of global population, which will peak sometime in the next century, and partly, perhaps, because of rising incomes. The capacity of global agriculture to meet this as well as the global sustainability of an even more intensive industrialised agriculture is far from assured. Problems will also worsen if the current patterns of consumption based on meat consumption, high levels of food processing, and the move into bio-fuels etc. are maintained.

The likely scale of food problems in the future is disputed but, as with persistent hunger and famines in the past so in the future, endemic hunger cannot be seen as natural. It arises as an organic part of the way that the global capitalist economy has been and is organised. One political manifestation of this has been the return and likely persistence of food riots as those at the bottom of the system have protested against shortages, price rises, and speculation, and have looked towards a different and more moral economy for food production and distribution.

Capitalism therefore continues to develop as a contradictory system. But these contradictions take a dynamic form in which the one constant is capitalism's inability to equalise relations between person and person, state and state, and the countryside and the town. In a global population of seven billion, the world's poorest people and those most affected by hunger are often those closest to the production of food.

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Force

▶ Structural Violence and Imperialism

Forced Migration

▶ Racism and Imperialism

Forced migration and Imperialism in the Neoliberal Era

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The nature of contemporary migration cannot be understood without a deep understanding of the nature of contemporary capitalism and imperialism. One of the main features of the current global architecture, boosted by the emergence of one of the most distressing global crises since the Great Depression, is the assault on the labor and living conditions of the majority of the working class, and in particular the migrant labor force, which stands among the most vulnerable segments of the proletariat.

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze some of the key aspects underlying the context in which contemporary migration is embedded, with emphasis on the process of segmentation and growing precariousness of labor markets worldwide. More specifically, it aims to unravel (a) the re-launching of imperialism (policies of global domination) in search of cheap and flexible labor, as well as natural resources from the Global South; (b) the growing asymmetries among and within countries and regions; (c) the increase and intensification of social inequalities; (d) the configuration of a gigantic global reserve army of labor associated with the emergence of severe forms of labor precarization and exploitation; and (e) the predominance of forced migration as the primary mode of human mobility under conditions of extreme vulnerability. From this perspective, the migration and labor questions are two sides of the same coin, whose currency translates into unbearable conditions of systematic oppression of the working class. To combat this, there must be, among other things, a unity of social organizations and movements in alliance with progressive intellectuals in order to foster social – anti-systemic – transformation processes.

Imperialism Today: The Restructuring of Monopoly Capital

While the monopoly position of the labor aristocracy in the Global North has been eroded in the neoliberal era, the commanding heights of global capitalism remained solidly entrenched there, with increasing monopolization of finance, production, services, and trade, leaving every major global industry dominated by a handful of large multinational corporations (MNCs). In the expansion of their operations, the agents of corporations, or monopolistic engines of capitalism, have created a global network and process of production, finance, distribution, and investment that has allowed them to seize the strategic and profitable segments of peripheral economies and appropriate the economic surplus produced at

enormous and unbearable social and environmental costs. Thus, while labor faced increasing global competition, it confronted an increasingly centralized and concentrated capital, fundamentally altering the balance of class power in the favor of capital.

In the international political economy, monopoly capital has become, more than ever, the central player, to the extent that Samir Amin (2013) portrayed contemporary capitalism as the "era of generalized monopolies." Through mega-mergers and strategic alliances, monopoly capital has reached unparalleled levels of concentration and centralization: In 2014 the top 500 largest MNCs acquired 31.2 trillion USD in sales revenues (Fortune 2015), equal to 40% of the world's GDP (World Bank 2015). More important is the fact that, in the neoliberal era, monopoly capital has undergone a profound restructuring process characterized by:

1. The *upsurge of monopoly-finance capital*, i.e., the ascendancy of finance capital over other fractions of capital (Bello 2005). Finance capital began this ascendancy with the onset of an overproduction crisis in the late 1960s, when German and Japanese capital recovered from the devastation of World War II and began to compete with US capital on world markets (Brenner 2002). With the lack of profitable investment in production, capital began shifting toward financial speculation based on an unprecedented reserve of fictitious capital: In 2007 global financial assets, 206 trillion USD (McKinsey 2015) nearly quadrupled global GDP, 57 trillion USD (World Bank 2008). The result has been the financialization of the capitalist class, of industrial capital, and of corporate profits (Foster 2010).

2. The *configuration and expansion of global networks of monopoly capital* as a restructuring strategy led by the large MNCs, which, through outsourcing operations and subcontracting chains, extend parts of their productive, commercial, financial, and service processes to the Global South in search of abundant and cheap labor through *global labor arbitrage* (Delgado Wise and Martin 2015). This strategy, supported by Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) and the wide range of reducing labor costs by taking advantage of global labor arbitrage, is exemplified by the export platforms that operate as enclave economies in peripheral countries. This turn toward global production chains has been impressive: "[the] top one hundred global corporations had shifted their production more decisively to their foreign affiliates [mainly in the South], which now account for close to 60 percent of their total assets and employment and more than 60 percent of their global sales" (UNCTAD 2010). This represents a "new 'nomadism' [that] has emerged within the system of global production, with locational decisions determined largely by where labour is cheapest" (Foster et al. 2011a, p. 18). Moreover, an outstanding feature of contemporary global capitalism is the degree of network articulation and integration with the operations of large MNCs dominating international trade: at least 40% of all global trade is associated with outsourcing operations, including subcontracting and intra-firm trade (Andreff 2009); an estimated 85 million workers directly employed in assembly plants in the Global South; and over 3500 export processing zones established in 130 countries (McKinsey 2012). This restructuring strategy has transformed the global geography of production to the point that now most of the world's industrial employment (over 70%) is located in the Global South (Foster et al. 2011b).

3. The *restructuring of innovation systems* through the implementation of mechanisms such as outsourcing (including offshore) the scientific and technological innovation process allows MNCs to benefit from the research of scientists from the Global South. This restructuring reduces labor costs, transfers risks and responsibilities, and capitalizes on the advantages of controlling the patent

process (Delgado Wise 2017). Five overarching aspects characterize this restructuring process:

(a) The increasing internationalization and fragmentation of research and development activities. In contrast to the traditional innovation processes occurring "behind closed doors" in research and development (R&D) departments internal to large MNCs, this trend is known as "open innovation" (Chesbrough 2008).

(b) The creation of scientific cities – such as Silicon Valley in the United States and the new "Silicon Valleys" established in peripheral or emerging regions, principally in Asia – where collective synergies are created to accelerate innovation processes (Sturgeon 2003).

(c) The development of new methods of controlling research agendas (through venture capital, partnerships, and subcontracting, among others) and appropriating the products of scientific endeavors (through the acquisition of patents) by large MNCs.

(d) The rapidly expanding highly skilled workforce in the Global South – particularly in the areas of science and engineering – is being tapped by MNCs for research and development in peripheral countries through recruitment via partnerships, outsourcing, and offshoring (Battelle 2012).

(e) *The creation of an* ad hoc *institutional framework* aimed at the concentration and appropriation of products created by the *general intellect* through *patents*, embodied in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Delgado Wise and Chávez 2015).

Since the late 1980s, a trend toward ad hoc legislation has been initiated in the United States, in line with the strategic interests of large MNCs regarding intellectual property rights (Messitte 2012). The rhythm of patenting has increased exponentially in the last two decades, tied to the logic underlying "free trade" agreements (NAFTA, ASEAN, TFTA) as an imperialist strategy for controlling/administrating global markets by the large MNCs, mainly based in the United States. (According to PCT-WIPO data in the last two decades, the United States held one of every four patents granted in 2014.) In fact, this trend can also be conceived as a higher stage in the development of the global networks of monopoly capital, as the New International Division of Labour moves up the value-added chain to R&D and monopoly capital captures the productivity and knowledge of a highly skilled workforce in the Global South.

4. The renewed trend toward *extractivism and land grabbing* led by the continuing overconsumption of the world's natural resources and the expansion of carbon-based industrial production. The growing urbanization and industrialization in Asia, particularly China, has increased demand for raw materials, which, combined with the transformation of commodities from a hedge asset to a speculative asset for finance capital, created a commodities boom since 2002 that has recently declined with the de-accelerating Chinese economy. Soaring prices for commodities have driven the exploration for and production of nonrenewable natural resources into remote geographies, deeper into the oceans and the jungles, in the process exacerbating social conflicts over land and water (Veltmeyer 2013). This new extractivism has worsened environmental degradation, not only through an expanded geography of destruction but also by global extractive capital's strategy of environmental regulatory arbitrage (Xing and Kolstad 2002). Moreover, despite 25 years of increasingly dire warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global consumption of fossil fuels continues to rise, "triggering a cascade of cataclysmic changes that include extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks and a sea-level rise affecting hundreds of millions of people" (World Bank 2012). Given that the revenues of some of the world's most powerful and

profitable MNCs depend on fossil fuel consumption, this pattern will likely continue, setting the world on the path toward a deepening *ecological crisis*.

This planetary "order" or "disorder" encompasses deep and dangerous contradictions (Harvey 2004) that sparked a global crisis that began in the 1970s, a crisis that opened the door for the introduction of neoliberalism and which it has not been able to shake off. On the contrary, the capitalist hydra with its new faces has only presented false and limited solutions to the current crisis, and even worse, far from opening up new paths toward a phase of sustained growth in the global economy, at each step it has led to a deepening of the crisis and let loose the storm. In the words of Humberto Márquez:

> The crisis that faces contemporary capitalism represents a break in the process of capitalist expansion fostered by the core countries, led by the United States, since the 1970s. It is a failed restructuring that has resulted in the collapse of its own core, of the world capitalist system, and above all of the most powerful financial and industrial centres, and which has been swiftly communicated to all of the sectors, networks and corners of capitalism. However, we cannot lose sight of the strategy of restructuring and expansion that has occurred with growth in its principal goal: to concentrate capital, power and wealth in the hands of a small elite of transnational capitalists and, simultaneously, has brought about a drastic deterioration in the conditions of life and work for the majority of the population. (Márquez 2010: 67)

As a result, contemporary capitalism is facing a profound multidimensional crisis (e.g., financial, economic, social, ecological) that undermines the main sources of wealth creation – labor and nature – to the point that it can be characterized as a civilizational or epochal crisis with a potentially catastrophic outcome (Foster 2013; Arizmendi 2016). It is crucial to realize that it demands both engaging in a radical social transformation process as well as constructing a social transformation agent capable of confronting the current power structure. Unfortunately, this power structure has responded to this multidimensional crisis with desperate attempts to maintain this unsustainable and unstable form of capitalism.

The Labor Question Today

One of the main engines of neoliberal capitalism is cheap labor. Costs of labor are lowered by any and all means, as capital takes advantage of the massive oversupply of labor, reflected in growing levels of unemployment and precarious employment the world over. With the dismantling of the former Soviet Union, the integration of China and India into the world economy, and the implementation of structural adjustment programs (including privatizations and labor reforms) in the Global South, the supply of labor available to capital over the last two decades has more than doubled from 1.5 to 3.3 billion, in what Richard Freeman calls the "Great Doubling" (Freeman 2006). This rapid expansion of the global reserve army of labor has occurred most dramatically in the Global South, where 71.3% of the "reserve" global workforce can be found (ILO 2019).

The exorbitant size of this reserve army of labor is dialectically related to the abysmally low wages and chronic insufficiency of "decent" employment that characterizes contemporary capitalism, since the global oversupply of labor has scaled down the global wage structure and increased the overall precariousness of labor. According to estimates of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the number of workers in conditions of labor informality rose to 2 billion (61%) in 2018, encompassing more than half of the world's workforce, with 700 million receiving a salary of less than 3.2 US dollars per day and nearly half of those finding themselves in situations of extreme poverty – while the global number of unemployed continues to rise (ILO 2019). This, in turn, has led to growing structural pressures to emigrate internally and/or internationally under conditions of extreme vulnerability.

Neoliberal capitalism restructured labor markets and reconfigured the global working class in the following ways (Márquez and Delgado Wise 2011):

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1. *The creation of a dispersed and vulnerable proletariat attached to the global networks of monopoly capital.* The social and productive fabric of the MNCs covers strategic and profitable economic sectors, such as agriculture, mining, industry, services, trade, and finance. The neoliberal restructuring of labor markets has dismantled labor protection and imposed a "new labor culture" based on competitiveness, while creating a regime of job insecurity characterized by labor flexibility and precariousness. Outsourcing stands out as the main corporate management strategy to cheapen labor costs and generating a permanent threat of layoffs. Business requirements have also led to a new profile of labor: desperate young workers without union experience and willing to work under insecure and poorly paid conditions. The new proletariat is compelled to subject itself to high levels of exploitation, in order to access a source of income. This labor becomes increasingly alienated from its sense of class belonging, and its place in the socio-economic and geographic fabric, given the predominance of what resembles abstract forms of capital – that is, global capital that depersonalizes, even more so than in the past, the relationship between capital and labor in a transnational arena. These abstract expressions of capital leave the proletariat without a human referent for their exploiters, only a faceless, mobile, and de-territorialized corporate entity that, if necessary, can quickly shift production to other factories. This abstract form of capital undermines the development of a consciousness of what happens in the work process and prevents workers from building long-term relations necessary for cooperation and solidarity when confronting employers; the daily struggle to earn a livelihood occupies their vital energies with little social cohesion.

2. *The covert proletarianization of the scientific and technological laborer.* Monopoly capital has managed to absorb scientific and technological labor into an innovation system, protected by patents, that generate extraordinary profits for the large MNCs. In this way, the fruits of technological progress are directly appropriated by monopoly capital. Scientists and technologists constitute a privileged segment of the working class, and do not conceive of themselves as workers, but, rather, as part of the global ruling class, and even promoters of social transformation inasmuch as their innovations affect everything from production patterns to the daily lives of ordinary people. This highly qualified workforce has gradually lost, directly or covertly, its relative autonomy and control over the means of knowledge production and the tools of their labor (laboratories, research agendas, etc.). In this sense, scientific and technological labor is subsumed by the large multinational corporations, while researchers' awareness of the work process is progressively lost. One of the strongest forms of scientific and technological labor appropriation and subsumption is that of the disguised proletarianization of this type of worker under forms of outsourcing and offshoring, embedded in the dynamics of the restructuring of innovation systems, as previously described. Given the precariousness of labor and lack of worker control over the means of knowledge production, MNCs drive R&D research agendas and appropriate the products of the research.

3. *The real or disguised proletarianization of the peasantry.* A global agribusiness system dominated by large multinational corporations controls all stages of the productive, financial, and trading processes, leaving practically no room for small-scale agricultural production. Like other economic sectors, agribusiness employs subcontracting schemes that degrade peasant autonomy and entail visible, or covert, forms of proletarianization with a high degree of precariousness. "Accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2007) dismantles the peasant subsistence system and expands the presence of large-scale agribusiness production for export, annihilating political attempts at local food sovereignty, appropriating the nature and biodiversity, blocking public resources from being channeled into the peasant sector, and "freeing" the workforce from the land so that it can, in turn, be employed in precarious and unsafe

conditions in manufacturing, trade, or services. In order to subsist within the new institutional framework of neoliberal capitalism, peasants are forced to either (i) become a proletariat working for agribusiness, even on lands they might have formerly owned; (ii) migrate to the cities in search of precarious jobs, many of them offered by the large multinational corporations, and in areas such as the maquiladora industry zones; (iii) survive within the ranks of the lumpenproletariat, through black market or criminal activities; or (iv) migrate abroad to work in vulnerable social conditions and in degraded, poorly paid jobs. These processes of overt or covert proletarianization and sub-proletarianization have exacerbated further the dynamics of semi-proletarianization already in place before the neoliberal onslaught. Despite the social decomposition of the peasantry as a subaltern class that lies even below the proletariat, it is worth noting that some of the most visible and consistent anti-globalization movements come precisely from the ranks of the peasantry and indigenous groups (i.e., Via Campesina, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Mexico, CONEI in Ecuador, and the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil), which demonstrates that many of these groups retain the social and geographic space necessary to develop counter-hegemonic ideologies and bases of resistance (Scott 1992).

4. *The expansion of the reserve army of labor and the proliferation of pauperism, including the growing presence of a lumpenproletariat.* These surplus workers suffer from the worst living and employment conditions and are confined to the lowest social strata. This is a highly degraded and large segment of the global population. To survive, the poorest of the poor work on the margins of society and, often, on the margins of legality, participating in petty crime, organized crime, human trafficking, and prostitution. They also carry out activities in public spaces, working as mendicants, shoeshiners, announcers, vendors, and street musicians, among many other things. This group also includes door-to-door vendors and informal workers. The dysfunctional nature of their work, their detachment from the institutional framework, and the discrimination they endure prevent these groups from developing a class identity or interacting openly with power, capital, or other categories of the proletariat.

5. *The sub-proletarianization of forced migrants.* Neoliberal capitalism has accelerated mechanisms of social exclusion and dispossession. The most evident result of this is the creation of a population that has no means of earning a living and whose livelihood is precarious at best. These social groups – as will be discussed in the following sections – are forced to migrate domestically or internationally in order to access any source of income that will enable family subsistence. Migration in this context is far from being a free and voluntary movement; rather, it is a structural imperative. A wide range of social subjects are forced to move from their places of origin: peasants deprived of land or unable to make a living out of it; unemployed or poorly paid workers; youths with no employment prospects; professionals without access to social mobility; women lacking access to the labor market; and skilled workers with few or no opportunities for work and income. Those who participate in forced migration are placed in relatively more adverse conditions than native counterparts; they become a highly vulnerable proletariat, or sub-proletariat, facing social exclusion, wage discrimination, the lack of social and labor rights, loss of citizenship (or a precarious citizenship status), and criminalization. This massive contingent of the labor force works under conditions of insecurity, vulnerability, and considerable risk; as proletarian subclass, they are often subject to conditions of super-exploitation which hark back to precapitalist features of coercion, bordering on new forms of slavery (Márquez and Delgado Wise 2011).

Under these circumstances, working conditions erode the social wage, and the social welfare system excludes the subordinate classes from accessing basic needs to such a degree that wages no longer ensure subsistence, and thus

labor is super-exploited. This and other violations of basic labor and human rights engender a situation of systemic violence and human insecurity affecting the majority of the world's population.

The Mushrooming of Unequal Development and the Emergence of a New Mode of Unequal Exchange

A major and inescapable feature of the current form of capitalism is unequal development. The global and national dynamics of capitalist development, the international division of labor, the imperialist system of international power relations, the conflicts that surround the capital-labor relation, and the dynamics of extractive capital have made economic, social, political, and cultural polarization more extreme between geographical spaces and social classes than ever before in human history. A conspicuous output of this development is the disproportionate concentration of capital, power, and wealth in the hands of a small elite within the capitalist class. Nowadays, the richest 1% of the world's population concentrates 40% of total global assets (Davies et al. 2008). Moreover, "from 1970 to 2009, the per capita GDP of developing countries (excluding China) averaged a mere 6.3% of the per capita GDP of the G8 countries" (Foster et al. 2011a).

In fostering the above trend, global labor arbitrage has become a key pillar of the new global architecture. Arbitrage refers to the advantage of pursuing lower wages abroad. This allows capital to "earn" enormous monopolistic returns, or imperial rents, by taking advantage of the relative immobility of labor and the existence of subsistence (and below) wages in much of the Global South. Through the mechanism of global labor arbitrage, social and geographic asymmetries are reproduced on a global scale. Social inequalities are one of the most distressing aspects of this process, given the unprecedented concentration of capital, power, and wealth in a few hands while a growing segment of the population suffers poverty, exploitation, and exclusion. Increasing disparities are also expressed, ever more strongly,

in terms of racial, ethnic, and gender relations; reduced access to production and employment; a sharp decline in living and working conditions; and the progressive dismantling of social safety nets.

A fundamental mechanism in the promotion of this new global architecture and its underlying trend toward unequal development has been the implementation of structural adjustment programs in much of the Global South and former socialist economies. These programs have been the vehicle for disarticulating the economic apparatus in the periphery and its rearticulation to serve the needs of core capitalist economies, under sharply asymmetric and subordinated conditions. In particular, these programs served the needs of capital through the export of labor in its two modalities, indirect and direct, which are key to conceptualizing this process. On the one hand, the indirect, or disembodied, export of labor is associated with the configuration of global networks of monopoly capital through outsourcing, offshoring, and subcontracting operations to the Global South, as previously described (Delgado Wise and Márquez 2007; Delgado Wise and Cypher 2007). In this case, the main input of domestic origin in the exported commodities is the labor used in the assembly, service, or commercial process. On the other hand, the direct export of labor refers to international labor migration, mainly composed of South to North and South to South flows. In fact, 187 million of the existing 258 million migrants, or 72%, come from the periphery (World Bank 2017; IOM 2018).

It is crucial to realize that the export of the workforce, i.e., the export of the most critical commodity characterizing the capitalist mode of production, labour power, underlies the materialization of a new international division of labor along the South–North axis. This, in turn, implies the advent of new and extreme modalities of unequal exchange. Regardless of the centrality that the concept of unequal exchange had in past decades to explain the dynamics of unequal development, the nature of the ties between core countries and emergent or peripheral countries (as conceived by the Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLAC, as well as among

dependency theorists) demands its inclusion in the analysis of contemporary capitalism. It is important to keep in mind that most of the debate on unequal exchange was and remains limited to an analysis of the international division of labor that places the periphery in the role of source for raw materials and the developed countries as the providers of industrialized goods. And although this division remains relevant for a significant number of peripheral countries, it has stopped being exclusively a feature of new North–South relations. Some recently industrialized peripheral countries – principally in Asia – ever more frequently play the role of providers of industrialized goods. Even more important is the fact that, to this classic mode of unequal exchange, a new factor has been added in the age of neoliberal capitalism, and one that is increasingly playing a key role: the direct and indirect export of the workforce.

In order to analyze this factor, with its dual fronts, it is important to note that these mechanisms of unequal exchange are more disadvantageous to the periphery than the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. On the one hand, the indirect export of the workforce, associated with the participation of peripheral nations in adding value to global commodity chains, carries with it a net transfer of profits abroad. This represents an extreme form of unequal exchange, which implies a transfer abroad of practically the total surplus generated by the workforce employed in the maquiladoras, or assembly plants, in the export processing sector. This mechanism, which revives the logic of the export enclave, inhibits any economic growth and development derived from the export process performed under the guise of manufactured exports, by the peripheral nation. In fact, its key contribution to the process of national accumulation is limited to a meagre income flow from low wages that, in the best of cases, contributes to a small multiplier effect by way of consumption. Even more, the installation and operation of assembly plants in peripheral countries are usually supported through generous subsidies and tax exemptions, which put the weight of reproducing the workforce on revenue-strapped governments of the Global South, while imposing collateral

damage through precarious labor markets and environmental degradation.

Another aspect of the indirect export of labor power, which has begun to gather force in the context of peripheral or emerging countries, is the creation of joint scientific–technological complexes, as we have seen, in the restructuring of innovation systems in some of the more developed countries, with the United States in the lead role. By way of these complexes, which function under subcontracting arrangements, associations, or other forms of partnership, intangible benefits are transferred abroad that have a value and a strategic significance beyond the net profits accruing from the maquila and assembly plants. We refer to the transfer of development and technical capabilities, which takes the form of competitive advantages and extraordinary profits, from South to North. The knowledge and technical skills that have historically played a central role in the transformation of peripheral economies to developed ones are now captured by the Global North through the new geography of innovation.

On the other hand, the direct export of the workforce, via labor migration, implies a transfer of the anticipated future benefits that arise from the costs of training and social reproduction of the workforce that emigrates. These costs – as the case of Mexico has shown – are not compensated in the flow of remittances (Delgado Wise et al. 2009). On the contrary, in a more profound sense, this transfer implies the loss of the most important resource for capital accumulation in the country of origin: its workforce. Furthermore, the export of the highly skilled workforce exacerbates this problem by seriously reducing the sending country's capacity to innovate for its own benefit and drive its own technology-intensive development projects.

To analyze these new modes of unequal exchange presents theoretical, methodological, and empirical challenges, which require changes in the perception and characterization of categories typically used to interpret contemporary capitalism. Without disregarding the significant contributions of ECLAC to advance the understanding of these new modes of unequal exchange, it is important to bring to bear Marxist

theories of unequal exchange in its dual aspects. In both a strict and a broad sense, these theories provide a solid and fertile conceptual basis upon which to advance the conceptualization of the emergent modes of unequal exchange, implied by the direct and indirect export of the workforce (Emmanuel 1972). On the one hand, unequal exchange, in the strictest sense, places wage differentials (or differentials in surplus value) derived from barriers to population mobility at the center of the analysis. On the other hand, unequal exchange, in the wider sense, expands those differentials to include value emanating from diverse compositions of capital, such as the differentials arising from scientific and technological progress (Críticas 1979). We take into consideration that the internationalization of capital in the framework of neoliberal globalization seeks incessantly to lower labor costs – including those relating to the highly skilled workforce – while maximizing the transfer of surpluses generated from that labor from peripheral to core countries, which is the purpose in taking advantage of wage differentials in the first place.

Another key piece of this plot is the unbridled growth of social inequalities at previously unimaginable levels: "Currently, the richest 1% of the world's population possess more wealth than the other 99% of people on the planet. Their power and privileges are used to manipulate the economic system and widen the gap, stealing hope from hundreds of millions of poor people" (OXFAM 2017).

Forced Migration in the Era of Generalized Monopolies

According to recent United Nations (UN) figures, there are 258 million international migrants (UN 2017) and 750 million internal migrants worldwide (Swing 2015). This implies that one out of every seven and a half inhabitants and nearly one of every four members of the working class is a migrant, in most cases exposed to vulnerable, discriminatory, and precarious labor conditions (ILO 2015a). Regardless of the strategic importance of this phenomenon, migration studies and

public perceptions of human mobility are fraught with myths that distort reality under a unilateral, decontextualized, reductionist, and biased view. The recent refugee crisis in Europe has hardened this narrative and exacerbated the problematic and challenges posited by migration in the international arena.

The dominant political and research agendas in the field tend to reproduce – not disinterestedly – much of the prevailing mythology, ignoring the context in which contemporary migration takes place and its root causes. They assume human mobility is a free and voluntary act oblivious to any kind of structural conditioning and/or national or supranational agents. The multiple economic, demographic, social, and cultural contributions made by migrants to host societies and nations are often ignored, hidden, or even distorted, regardless of their legal status and categorization (economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, etc.), to the point where the former are portrayed as a socioeconomic burden for destination countries and in times of crisis are turned into public scapegoats. Moreover, this narrative has yielded significant dividends in the political-electoral arena, opening a broad avenue for the rise of extreme right and neo-fascist regimes in various countries and regions across the world.

In this regard, it is crucial to realize that in the current capitalist context, migration has acquired a new and fundamental role in the national and international division of labor. Uneven development generates a new type of migration that can broadly be characterized as *forced* migration. Although the conventional concept of "forced migration" does not apply to all migrants (Castles 2003), the most current migration flows are forced *displacements* and therefore require a more accurate descriptor. In the field of human rights, the term "forced migration" refers specifically to asylum seekers, refugees, or displaced persons. From a dominant perspective, most migrants cannot be grouped under this category since these population movements are supposedly carried out voluntarily and freely. However, it is a fact that the dynamics of uneven development have led to structural conditions that foster the massive

migration of dispossessed, marginalized, and excluded populations. People are literally expelled from their places of origin and are compelled to search for access to means of subsistence or at least minimal opportunities for social mobility. Under these circumstances, migration has essentially become a *forced* population displacement encompassing the following modalities (Delgado Wise and Márquez 2009):

1. *Migration due to violence, conflict, and catastrophe.* Social, political, and communitarian conflicts, natural disasters, major infrastructure developments, and urbanization can severely affect communities, social groups, families, and individuals, to the point of forcing them to abandon their place of origin and sometimes their country. This category includes refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons. These modalities, which tend to mainly affect populations in the Global South, have been acknowledged in international law and there are protection instruments in place. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures, there are 65.6 million people affected worldwide, including 22.5 million refugees, 40.8 million internally displaced, and 3.2 million asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015).

2. *Human trafficking and smuggling.* This modality of forced displacement has increased at an alarming rate in recent years, becoming a highly lucrative business due to the restrictive policies of receiving countries and increasing hardship in less developed ones. Human trafficking is associated with coercion, abduction, and fraud and includes sexual exploitation and illicit adoptions among other serious violations of human rights. The global response to the sustained increase in this form of criminal activity – which has become an increasingly profitable activity for organized crime – includes the United Nations' Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in Palermo in the year 2000, and the subsequent Protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children. It is estimated that at least 21 million people are currently engaged in forced labor because of internal and international human trafficking (ILO 2015b).

3. *Migration due to dispossession, exclusion, and unemployment.* As argued in this section, the most current labor migration falls under this category, which is characterized by extreme vulnerability, criminalization, discrimination, and exploitation. It is by far the largest category of forced migration encompassing around 600 million international and internal "economic" migrants. Instead of adequately categorizing the problems and risks to which these migrants are exposed, they are generally subsumed under the notion of "economic migrants," which assumes they travel in a context of freedom and opportunities for social mobility in transit and destination countries, ignoring the growing vulnerability, insecurity, and forced disappearances to which these migrants are subjected.

4. *Return migration in response to massive deportations.* This is a growing trend in international migration associated with the irregular status faced by an increasing proportion of migrants derived from a State policy by destination countries – not a criminal act. It entails a process of *double* forced migration: they were forced to leave their countries origin and they are forced to return under increasingly vulnerable and insecure conditions.

In a less strict sense, migration due to overqualification and lack of opportunities can be considered as a fifth type of forced migration. It ensues from the restructuring of innovation systems and the structural imbalances in the labor market and limited institutional backing in peripheral countries, which result in many highly qualified workers being unable to find suitable occupational opportunities in their own country. This category of forced migration encompasses nearly 30 million professionals. While these migrants do not face serious problems when moving or seeking to cover their basic needs, they migrate to fulfil their labor and intellectual capacities, even if they are often subjected to labor degradation and wage discrimination in destination countries.

The Global Governance of Migration Under Scrutiny: The Win–Win–Win Fiction

In line with the recognition of the critical challenges propelled by human mobility, the global governance of migration has become a fundamental issue on the international agenda. Contrasting with other transnational issues such as trade and finance, the creation of a UN institutional framework for the governance of migration has followed a complex and uncertain route (Betts 2010).

Derived from the need to discuss pressing issues on the international migration agenda, a broader initiative for building a global migration regime was envisaged at the UN General Assembly with the launching in 2016 of the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (UN-HLD), conceived as a formal event with a strong emphasis on policy issues that would be held at the UN headquarters every 7 years. The first HLD gave rise to the creation of a yearly state-led, nonbinding, related forum, alternatively hosted by a migrant-receiving and a migrant-sending country: the GFMD. To provide institutional support for this emerging process, the UN Secretary-General created an interagency coordinating mechanism, the Global Migration Group, integrated by 15 entities of the UN system "to promote the wider application of international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated interagency approaches" (IOM 2017). It is important to note that the World Bank stands as a key member of this group – as well as many other UN initiatives – playing a leadership role in establishing the dominant framework within which the debates surrounding the migration-development nexus have been entrenched.

In September 2016, the UN General Assembly formally designated the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as the UN migration agency. On that occasion, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was adopted by its 193 Member States, giving rise to an intergovernmental consultation and negotiation process that culminated with the adoption of a global compact for safe, orderly, and secure migration in December 2018.

To varying degrees, this process has been dominated by a perspective which envisions family remittances as an essential tool in the development of migrant-sending, peripheral countries. This perspective is essentially one-sided, decontextualized, and misleading. It overlooks the context in which contemporary migration is embedded, and disregards human and labor rights as central and intrinsic elements of coherent migration and development policies, as well as the exploitation, social exclusion, human insecurity, and criminalization suffered by international migrants. In addition, it masks most of the fundamental contributions made by migrants to the destination countries and ignores the costs of migration for the countries of origin, costs that greatly outweigh the overemphasized "positive" impact of remittances (Delgado Wise 2018).

Despite the insistence of international bodies and governments regarding the alleged positive effects of migration and remittances as detonators of development in countries of origin, there is no empirical evidence to warrant this assumption. Among the cardinal elements of the dominant discourse, we can mention remittances, microfinance, human capital (a term that reflects a narrow economistic view), and, perhaps more importantly, the pretention to govern or manage migration without changing or even mentioning its root causes.

It is worth adding that the practices and discourses under the label of *migration management* advocated by the World Bank, the IOM, and other multilateral agencies have been promoted through new narratives that distort reality, depoliticize migration, negate the existence of divergent interests or asymmetries of power and conflicts, and promote an unsustainable and incoherent triple-win scenario in favor of the interests of the migrant-receiving countries, and more specifically, the large MNCs rooted in such countries. In this view a "good migrant," regardless of his or her status and condition, is respectful of law, flexible to market needs, and eager to contribute to the

development of his or her country of origin (Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

Toward an Alternative Agenda: Resistance from Below

The development of social alternatives must address two fundamental aspects. The first one has to do with deconstructing the power of capital and the state – a constituent, structural power that acts as a hegemonic force that must be confronted. Not doing so will nullify any attempt to develop alternatives and justify illusory, naïve, and irrelevant positions. The second consideration involves detecting points of weakness or rupture, or spaces from which subordinate social segments may generate social transformation alternatives. This challenge is at the center of the debate between those who attempt to achieve social change without seizing power (e.g., by limiting change to institutional reform or developing noncapitalist economic forms of organization within capitalism) and those who propose the need for a thorough change: another world, a different economy and society, and a social transformation process that is more equitable and socially inclusive, and sustainable in terms of both the environment and livelihoods. Without going into details, it must be stressed that, from a South-based perspective, the current social order (or disorder) is perceived as an unfair, inhumane, and predatory system: there is a need for counter-hegemonic alternatives.

From a critical perspective (that is to say, one that questions the institutional structure of neoliberalism and, more fundamentally, the structural dynamics of capitalism and imperialism in order to promote social alternatives that benefit the majority of the population), resistance from below – not passive or reactive, but transformative in essence – is understood as a process of social construction that starts by creating awareness: the need for change, organization, and social participation in order to generate a popular power that can then strive for social emancipation. This involves eschewing socially alienated relations that deprive people of their merits, destroy the environment, and damage social coexistence.

As revealed by Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune (Marx 1968 [1871]), revolutionary transformation is not something that can be derived exclusively from theoretical reflection: it is nurtured by the experience of revolutionary struggle and the resistance of popular movements against each and every advance of capitalism, and the systematization of these experiences in a dialectical learning process. In this regard, there are important lessons derived from the theory and practice of social movements in Latin America – particularly, the Zapatista movement (Delgado Wise and Martínez 2017) – that are of special relevance for our analysis. First, the social transformation process must be centered on human life and conceived in opposition to capital and its demand for the highest possible profits. The realization of this first element is necessary but not sufficient, since it can remain in the realm of abstract humanism. Real human development requires social conditions that can enable equity and social justice on all social and spatial levels. Sustainability requires, in turn, that the strategy of development be feasible, realistic, and long-lasting, with solid social, political, economic, cultural, and environmental foundations. This implies the need to redirect the development of productive forces toward what may be conceived as an *alternative modernity*, i.e., the "… possibility of a non-capitalist modernity... [which] would not be an unfinished project; it would be, rather, an ensemble of possibilities explored and updated only from one perspective and in only one way, and be prepared to approach from another side and illuminate with a different kind of light" (Echeverría 2011, p. 70). It essentially means to foster an alternative development of the productive forces that privilege their use value and which are in harmony with nature.

Second, human development cannot be defined *ex ante* as a globally applicable model; it is not a prefabricated, one-size-fits-all design. It requires proposing and specifying concrete strategies, having initially addressed structural barriers, institutional restraints, local peculiarities, regional cultures, and the practices of involved social actors. In this vein, the Zapatista movement has envisioned an emancipatory future that could be summarized in a simple but eloquent concrete utopia: to build a *world encompassing many worlds*.

To round-up the argument, the current model of world accumulation and its power system cannot be dismantled nor shifted without the development of an autonomous and independent social power. There is currently no collective agent that can confront the power of the major MNCs, imperialist governments and their armies, international financial organizations, and the associated actors that provide them with ideological, diplomatic, and political support. There have been, however, major local, domestic, and international efforts to organize social groups and movements that have defended their rights from the neoliberal onslaught and proposed some alternative ideas and projects. Resistance from below is expanding and growing on the local, national, and, above all, international levels. The forging of a counter-hegemonic social power is advancing and cannot be postponed, as evidenced by initiatives such as the International Peasant Movement: La Vía Campesina, the World Social Forum, the People's Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights, and the World Social Forum on Migrations, among others.

The conclusion that we draw from the analysis is that the capitalist system in the current conjuncture is facing an epochal or civilizing crisis that necessarily weakens the social and institutional structure of the system, generating forces of change. It is important that in this conjuncture the global working class not take a purely defensive position against the current imperialist offensive, but go on mobilizing the forces of resistance. It is also important that in this counteroffensive the global labor movement be strategic and form alliances with other forces of resistance that share its vision of a world beyond neoliberalism, imperialism, and, ultimately, capitalism.

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

▶ South–South Co-operation

Foreign Labour

▶ Labour and Decolonisation, Anti-imperialist Struggles (Australia/South-East Asia)

Fourth World

▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism

France and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Exploitation; French colonial empire; National liberation; Nationalism; Nation-state

Definition

This essay describes the expansion, development, and decline of France's second colonial empire (1830–1962), as the nineteenth century saw a politically and economically resurgent France move away from the Western Hemisphere and begin to colonize large parts of Africa and South-East Asia, eventually constructing an empire second only to Great Britain's in size and population. This empire would take many forms, from formal *colonies d'exploitation* in Indochina, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa, to the so-called protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and, later, to the mandates of Syria and Lebanon. The essay concludes with an examination of the legacies of colonialism in contemporary France.

The Construction of Empire

Like other European nations in the nineteenth century, France had numerous, varied, and contradictory reasons for constructing a colonial empire. Economically, a newly industrialized France sought to monopolize vast sources of raw materials to feed its emerging factories, as well as new export markets in which to sell its growing supply of manufactured goods. Politically, the rising tide of nationalism throughout Europe led French politicians, intellectuals, and social commentators to view imperial expansion as a source of national prestige and even of geopolitical survival. Culturally, many Frenchmen and women saw it as their moral duty to spread "civilization" to the "backwards" peoples of the world. And yet, the harsh if rarely acknowledged reality of imperial rule was its utter reliance on exclusion, racism, and violence. For this reason, throughout its roughly 130-year existence, France's empire drew intense criticism from its colonial subjects. Ultimately, only an end to institutionalized exclusion or, failing that, the use of violence itself would finally bring France's imperial epoch to a close.

As part of its first colonial empire, France's Bourbon monarchy controlled present-day Haiti,

Guadeloupe, Martinique, La Réunion, coastal Senegal, and much of North America. In the mid-eighteenth century, however, this empire began to disintegrate. First, France lost its colony of Quebec to Great Britain in the 7 Years' War (1757–1763). In 1803, amidst the chaos of the French Revolution, Napoleon then sold France's largest landholdings in North America to the USA. Finally, France's most profitable sugar-growing colony, Saint-Domingue, successfully defeated the French army and renamed itself the independent nation of Haiti in 1804.

This essay will focus on France's second colonial empire (1830–1962), as the nineteenth century saw a politically and economically resurgent France move away from the Western Hemisphere and begin to colonize large parts of Africa and South-East Asia, eventually constructing an empire second only to Great Britain's in size and population. This empire would take many forms, from formal *colonies d'exploitation* in Indochina, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa, to the so-called protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and, later, to the mandates of Syria and Lebanon. Formal colonies entailed direct rule over French imperial subjects; protectorates ceded part of their sovereignty to France while their inhabitants retained their own nationalities. The League of Nations gave France control over newly created mandates after the First World War with the stipulation that France prepare these territories for formal independence in the distant future.

France's most prized asset, however, was the North African settler colony of Algeria, due to its proximity to Europe, its large and diverse European population, and its unique legal status. The invasion of Algeria in 1830 represented the beginning of France's second wave of imperial expansion. From Algeria, the French army would spread south and west throughout much of Africa. To be sure, the initial invasion met with heavy resistance under the leadership of the charismatic young marabout Abd-al-Qadir (1808–83), who organized Algeria's tribal leaders under the banner of an Islamic holy war against the French invaders. According to one contemporary, French soldiers had free reign to "kill all the

men above fifteen, take all the women and children . . . in a word, annihilate all of them who do not grovel at our feet like a dog" (Lucien François de Montaignac, quoted in Crapanzano 2011, pp. 41–42). Only in 1847, after 17 years of fighting, did the French ultimately quash Abd-al-Qadir's resistance. Nevertheless, from this point forward, Islam would serve as a useful rallying cry for uniting Algerians against colonial rule.

Despite such violence, Algeria's proximity to Europe and fertile coastal farmland rendered it an attractive place of settlement for Europe's laboring and peasant classes. By 1848, amidst a republican revolution in France, the estimated 115,000 Europeans in Algeria convinced the French National Assembly to legally assimilate Algeria to the French metropole. Algeria would henceforth consist of three French departments – Oran, Algiers, and Constantine – each of which would have the right to send French representatives to the French legislature and, theoretically, to govern itself with the same republican institutions used in the metropole. In 1848, the French government also extended limited citizenship to the inhabitants of its "old colonies" in the Caribbean and coastal Senegal. In Algeria, however, French settlers saw the practice of Islam – especially the use of Sharia law – as incompatible with democratic governance, and used this belief to withhold all political rights from indigenous Algerians. Throughout the imperial epoch, Algeria's Muslims had to renounce their Islamic legal and familial status in order to gain French citizenship, a requirement which only a handful of Algerians fulfilled in the 130 years of French rule. (In 1870, the Crémieux Decrees granted automatic citizenship to Algeria's roughly 5,000 Jews.)

The creation of a society based on the racial and religious exclusion of the majority of the population only engendered continued violence. On 1 March 1871, a rebellion broke out in the mountainous northern region of Algeria known as Kabylie. The rebellion stemmed from the extension of French civilian rule over previously self-governing tribal areas, and from a horrific famine in 1867 that caused at least 300,000 Algerian deaths. Led by the young tribal leader Muhammad

al-Muqrani (?–1871), whose call for religious jihad inspired over a million native Algerians, the rebellion occupied the French military until October 1871. In the end, the French crushed the uprising, killed al-Muqrani, and responded with intensified land confiscation of 500,000 ha and total reparations of Ff65 million francs. The rebellion only hardened the French desire never to extend citizenship rights to the Muslim population of Algeria.

France ruled Algeria for 50 years before it looked to expand elsewhere. In the 1880s, however, prime minister Jules Ferry (1832–1893) began a series of colonial wars that consolidated the empire overseas. As Ferry informed the French Senate in 1884, "The considerations that justify the policy of colonial expansion [are] the need for outlets . . . and places of supply, shelters, and ports for defense" (Ferry 1897). These economic and military needs led Ferry and his successors to incorporate Tahiti and Polynesia in 1880, Tunisia and Indochina in 1881, Djibouti in 1885, and Madagascar in 1886. Further, after intense military campaigns in West and Central Africa, France fixed its two largest administrative units to include French West Africa (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Guinea, French Soudan, Mauritania, and Niger) with its capital at Dakar, and French Equatorial Africa (Western Sudan, Gabon, Middle Congo, Oubangui Chari, and Chad) with its capital at Brazzaville.

Again, this effort met with heavy resistance. In the Tukolor Empire of West Africa, the army struggled repeatedly to overcome raids led by Sultan Ahmadu Seku. In Western Sudan (Mali), Samori Touré, leader of the Islamic Wassoulou Empire, rallied 35,000 men in a 13-year campaign against the French military before he was finally subdued in 1898. In France, meanwhile, leaders like Paul Déroulède on the right argued that the military should work to retake the territories of Alsace and Lorraine that it lost in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 rather than expand abroad. On the left, socialists like Jules Guesde saw imperial expansion as a distraction from working-class politics. In the end, neither could compete with the nationalist rhetoric of prime minister Léon Gambetta, who proclaimed that France "lies not just between the Atlantic and the Alps, the Vosges and the Mediterranean, but wherever there are French interests and wherever French industry and trade are active" (quoted in Conklin et al. 2011, p. 68).

Colonial Administration, the *indigénat,* and the Civilizing Mission

By 1914, France and its empire encompassed 100 million people, 60 million of whom were colonial subjects. These subjects fell under the jurisdiction of about 4,000 French administrators and their indigenous auxiliaries. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the government in Paris divided each colony into administrative units under the rule of a governor general, who in turn subdivided his territory into districts (*cercles*) led by a French civil commander (*commandant*) responsible for collecting taxes, facilitating commerce, and administering justice.

Despite touting a republican rule of law at home, the French instituted a different legal regime abroad. First used in Algeria in 1881, the *Code de l'indigénat* applied exclusively to indigenous subjects and allowed French authorities to mete out arbitrary justice for even the smallest infractions. It was, in the words of one historian, "perhaps the most important element of the administrative tool kit." (Mann 2009, p. 334). Under the indigénat, French officials could administer fines and jail sentences of up to 15 days for offences ranging from travelling without a permit to failing to show proper respect for colonial officials.

Enforcement of the indigénat varied from colony to colony and, because it was never codified, depended on the whim of the local commandant. In 1930s French West Africa, a French official invoked the indigénat to force villagers to wade into the Niger Delta in the middle of the night and slap the water with their hands in order to quiet the incessant din of frogs that interrupted his sleep. Elsewhere, commandants in Senegal applied the indigénat to jail or even physically bind peasants for failing to collect enough peanuts or for growing too much pepper. More prosaically, the colonial regime could require indigenous subjects to

provide unpaid labor every month to build roads and undertake other "public works" to promote trade.

The indigénat, as a "regime of exception," coexisted uneasily with the official justification for French empire, the *mission civilisatrice*. The French used the ideology of the civilizing mission to sell their empire both at home and abroad. The paradox of this ideology stemmed from its two opposing goals: it at once sought to "uplift" France's imperial subjects and assimilate them to French "civilization" and, at the same time, to preserve these subjects' "essential" cultures and traditions. As prime minister Jules Ferry told the Chamber of Deputies in 1883: "Gentlemen, we must speak more loudly and more honestly . . . the higher races have a duty to civilize the inferior races" (Ferry 1897). This duty took many forms. Here, we will consider the mission as it took shape in education, religion, urban planning, and bourgeois culture.

The French saw education as key to the civilizing mission. Despite an almost unceasing stream of educational rhetoric, however, at no time in any French colony did more than 10% of the native population ever set foot in a French school. The handful of colonial subjects who did attend such schools learned primarily that they were racially and ethnically different from their French rulers. On 1920, elementary textbook exhorted students to recite the following: "I live in Africa. I am an African. I have black skin. I belong to the black race. I am a black African". Students then repeated similar statements about the "whiteness" of their French teachers (quoted in Kelly 2000, p. 192). Ultimately, this system of colonial education produced a small cadre of educated elites or so-called *evolués* – some of whom, such as Franz Fanon, Léopold Senghor, and Ho Chi Minh, would later become anti-colonial critics – and a rather larger number of low-level colonial functionaries.

At times, religious missionaries could offer a better, if no less contradictory, educational experience. By 1900, an estimated 58,000 Catholic missionaries had fled anti-clerical persecution in France to open up schools, orphanages, and hospitals throughout the empire. Indeed, despite the growing scorn for Catholic clergy in metropolitan France in the decades before the First World War, one of the leading anti-clerical politicians, Léon Gambetta, could proclaim that "anti-clericalism is not an article for export," especially not to the French colonies, where missionaries provided valuable services for little or no pay (quoted in Ageron 1972, pp. 196–197). The Jesuits, who were expelled from metropolitan France in 1881, continued to work with colonial authorities in places like Madagascar, where they served as geopolitical allies in the fight against English Protestant rivals. Politically naïve missionaries, however, could also invoke the ire of the colonial state. In one notorious incident from 1888, French adventurer Charles-David de Meyréna used missionaries in Indochina as guides through the jungle, eventually proclaiming himself King Marie I of the Sedang tribe, an act that put him into direct competition with French authorities.

In addition to teachers and missionaries, engineers and architects also hoped to use the colonies as laboratories for their own pet projects. By the 1890s, French engineers had set up vast networks of railroads and canals that transported colonial cash crops and resources to coastal capitals like Dakar, Brazzaville, and Algiers on their way to the French metropole. Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934), the governor general of Morocco, undertook what was perhaps the most ambitious engineering initiative. In 1912, he began to capitalize on a lack of building codes and bureaucracy to construct a model "rational" city that could both "civilize" Moroccans and provide a template for urban planning in France itself. To this end, he expropriated property, levied exceptional taxes, and coordinated zoning policies to construct the ideal modern city. Lyautey's project, however, remained dogged by a lack of finances and the stubborn refusal of Moroccans to accept their new built environment. Elsewhere, urban initiatives were designed to separate the French from their colonized subjects. In Indochina, the colonial "hill station" of Dalat provided a refuge from both the tropical climate and Indochinese subjects alike. Similarly, in large cities such as Hanoi and Saigon, colonists built entire French quarters of

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residential and commercial districts off limits to non-Europeans.

Finally, the civilizing mission entailed attempts to impose European bourgeois culture on indigenous families. This effort provided one of the rare opportunities for French women to actively partake in empire building. Many Frenchmen felt that women's "apolitical nature" and "natural maternal instincts" rendered them perfect vessels for spreading proper notions of motherhood and domesticity to indigenous women (Horne 1998, p. 35). Feminist groups like the Society for the Emigration of Women to the Colonies (established in 1897) or the Society for the Protection of Cambodian Children and Mothers (established in 1926) hoped that Frenchwomen could both keep European men from "going native" and train indigenous mothers in the arts of childcare and housekeeping. French colonial wives like Marie Bugéja actually saw Muslim women as "the fulcrum by which the Algerian Muslim population could be elevated to the level of French civilization" (Bowlan 1998, p. 177). In response, colonial authorities invoked the "degraded" state of women under Islamic law to argue that Muslim men did not deserve political rights or citizenship. Still other commentators contended that the French should respect Islamic law by not undermining a "naturally patriarchal" society. In any event, these claims served to mask very real gender inequalities in France itself.

In the end, whether in the realms of education, religion, industry, or family values, the civilizing mission repeatedly ran up against the reality of economic imperatives. For only through the use of authoritarian rule and forced labor could French officials coerce colonial subjects into contributing to an economic system that redounded only to the benefit of the French themselves.

First World War and the Inter-War Years

The First World War (1914–1918) marked a turning point in the history of the French Empire. For the first time, the war effort required that large numbers of colonial subjects come to the metropole itself. Ultimately, this experience would provide many of them with a first-hand glimpse of the rights and privileges enjoyed by French citizens on European soil. These men would in turn draw on French traditions of liberty, fraternity, and equality to demand an expansion of their political and social rights. Only when this effort failed did many begin to demand full independence for themselves as members of new nation states.

Despite not enjoying the rights of citizens, colonial subjects owed both taxes and military service to the French state. In 1914 the military enlisted upwards of half-a-million colonial soldiers, or *troupes indigènes*, and 220,000 colonial laborers to contribute to the war effort. Colonial workers received less pay, put in longer hours, and became the objects of more intense scrutiny than their European counterparts. French authorities worried in particular over the inevitable interracial intimacies that arose between Frenchwomen and colonial men, as such relationships reversed the customary colonial practice of Frenchmen taking indigenous concubines. As a military censor noted in 1917, for a colonial man to have sex with a French woman "was not only a pleasure . . . but also a form of vengeance" (quoted in Fogarty 2009, p. 54). To keep knowledge of such subversive relationships from spreading to the colonies, French censors worked tirelessly (and illegally) to read and confiscate the mail sent home from France by colonial soldiers and workers.

The war's end led to further unexpected changes for the empire. First, the newly created League of Nations granted France "mandate" – or tutelary – power over the former Ottoman Empire's territories of Syria and Lebanon. Second, France now had to confront the prospect of thousands of colonial subjects remaining in the metropole. Although nearly 80,000 colonial soldiers lost their lives fighting for France, their service and continued presence only heightened the public's fear of interracial relationships and "racial degeneration." French author Ludovic Naudeau warned that immigration from the colonies would "blur the boundaries between the ruler and the ruled," adding further that, "France will not sustain our place in the world if we do not

remain what we have always been: a white nation" (quoted in Camiscioli 2005, p. 228). Such anxiety led to a new citizenship law in 1918 requiring colonial subjects to prove that they and their families were "accustomed to a French lifestyle and education" before gaining French citizenship (Conklin 1998, p. 75).

Despite such trepidations at home, the demographic and economic losses of the war only bolstered efforts to consolidate French influence abroad. On the most fundamental level, the empire finally began to make economic sense. By 1939, France aimed fully 40% of its exports at the colonies, which in turn accounted for 37% of its imports. Much of this trade resulted from an increased emphasis on colonial *mise en valeur*, or rational economic development of agriculture, infrastructure, and social services. To be sure, the economic benefits of such development continued to elude the large majority of colonial subjects.

To tout the supposed success of this new policy, Paris hosted the ostentatious European Colonial Exposition of 1931. Organizers provided European tourists with "authentic" recreations of the "natural habitats" of colonial subjects, accompanied by images of the massive public-works projects undertaken by the French government to modernize such habitats. As the exposition's official guidebook boasted, "for the first time in Paris, Morocco appears to us in its entirety" (Anon 1931, p. 87). Tourists could also dine at food stalls "served by indigenes themselves." The event's centrepiece, a full-scale reconstruction of the Cambodian temple of Angkor Wat, depicted the glorious but supposedly long stagnant history of Indochina. Ultimately, such pavilions portrayed an ahistorical colonial culture in order to demonstrate the superiority of French civilization and the necessity of spreading it abroad.

And yet, the inter-war years also saw a handful of intellectuals from Africa and the diaspora embrace this caricatured portrayal of their supposedly static and irrational culture and use it to push for French citizenship. Léopold Senghor (1906–2001) and Aimé Césaire (1913–2008) helped found the largest such movement, Négritude. Writing in journals like *La Revue du Monde Noir* and *L'Etudiant Noir*, Senghor and Césaire hoped to probe the limits of European reason and the capitalist and exclusionary society it fostered. Senghor, like many other colonial intellectuals, received an elementary education from French missionaries near Dakar and later graduated from the University of Paris. Drawing from elements of both Surrealism and Marxism, his poetry valorized unreason, instinct, and emotion as necessary antidotes to Western individualism. Similarly, Césaire, a French-educated poet and dramatist from Martinique, rewrote African history in a triumphalist narrative in an attempt to rescue it from decades of European condescension, which itself had provided the ideological foundation for the civilizing mission since the 1880s.

Finally, a handful of Algerian intellectuals in the inter-war years began to contemplate the idea of full independence from France. To attenuate such demands, France's coalition of leftist parties known as the Popular Front, led by Léon Blum, drafted the Blum-Viollette proposal in 1936 (named after Algerian governor general Maurice Viollette). The bill would have extended citizenship to French-educated Algerians while still allowing them recourse to Islamic law in social matters such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Although the proposal would have only enfranchised 21,000 out of 5 million native Algerians, the colony's European community (later known as the *pieds-noirs*, or "black feet") stymied the move before it could even come to a vote in the National Assembly.

Regardless, Algerian activists like the young Messali Hadj (1898–1974) rejected the bill for not going far enough. Messali, an Algerian of Turkish origin who resided in Paris, founded in 1926 the first modern movement for Algerian independence, known as the Étoile nord-africaine (North African Star). The group called for freedom of the press and association, universal suffrage, and an increased focus on Arabic schools in Algeria. In 1927, Messali attended the Anti-Imperialism Congress in Belgium, where he met Ho Chi Minh and won initial support from the French Communist Party. In 1929, however, the government banned the *Star* and Messali lost communist

support as he narrowed his focus from workers' rights in general to Algerian nationalism in particular. Messali returned to Algeria in 1937 and created the Parti du peuple algérian (PPA) to incorporate the working classes into the independence movement. Although his efforts proved invaluable in organizing both military and political resistance to French rule, in the 1950s the PPA would ultimately be eclipsed by a new, more radical nationalist group known as the Front de libération nationale, or FLN.

Second World War and the End of Empire

The onset of the Second World War marked the beginning of the end of the French Empire. First, Germany's rapid defeat of the French army revealed its relative susceptibility to armed resistance elsewhere. Second, the numerous human rights abuses committed by the Nazi regime only served to galvanize postwar public opinion against similar abuses in the European colonies. Third, for the second time in a generation, colonial troops proved invaluable to the Allied war effort and now saw either more equitable incorporation with the metropole or outright independence as the only forms of just recompense. Finally, once the possibility of equitable integration became more than empty rhetoric, French taxpayers proved less than willing to foot the bill for extending metropolitan labor laws, healthcare, and education to colonial subjects-cum-citizens.

The empire's disintegration began during the war itself and took many forms. After the fall of France to Nazi Germany in 1940, the Free French Resistance movement, spearheaded by General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), granted independence to Syria and Lebanon to prevent them from falling into Nazi hands. Next, in September of 1940, the Nazi-allied Vichy regime in France allowed the Japanese military to occupy the colony of Indochina. Elsewhere, the majority of French colonial administrators remained loyal to the Vichy regime throughout the war. Only Félix Eboué, the Guadeloupe-born governor of Chad and the only black governor in France's entire empire, worked to aid the French Resistance effort.

At the war's close, France sought to salvage the remnants of its empire by granting significant concessions to its colonial subjects. These concessions marked a shift in the very conception of empire – from the belief that "colonies were supposed to pay the costs of their own repression" to the concept that colonies formed an integral part of France and as such deserved access to metropolitan social benefits (Cooper 2003, p. 5). In 1946, a newly formed constituent assembly invited elected deputies from throughout the empire to help draft a new constitution for the Fourth French Republic. In the ensuing debate, representatives like Lamine Guète from Senegal and Félix Houphouet-Boigny from the Ivory Coast succeeded in abolishing the notorious indigénat legal code. In addition, Réunionnais deputies Raymond Vergès and Léon de Lepervanche joined with Caribbean deputies Gaston Monnerville and Aimé Césaire to push for and win full integration of the old colonies of La Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guiana as French overseas departments (*départements d'outre-mer*, or DOM). As such, departmental prefects now replaced governors general to bring the former colonies more in line with metropolitan departmental administration. Finally, the resulting constitution of 1946 officially renamed the French Empire the French Union and granted all colonial subjects the opportunity to join the Union as full French citizens.

Much of the intellectual fodder for these and later reforms came from activists like Senegal's Aliounne Diop (1910–1980), an early member of the Négritude movement who in 1947 founded the journal (and, later, publishing house) known as *Présence Africaine*. The journal invited writers from Africa and the diaspora to contribute articles and poetry that rehabilitated African cultures and promoted the liberation or equitable assimilation of peoples under colonial domination. In 1956, editors at the *Présence Africaine* helped to

organize the first international Congress of Black Writers and Artists in Paris. Diop invited Pablo Picasso, whose cubist paintings themselves drew inspiration from African art, to design a commemorative poster for the event. The intellectuals who gathered at the Congress would go on to form the influential Society for African Culture. Overall, the journal, congress, and society all shared the belief that a common cultural identity existed among all peoples of the African diaspora and that this identity had to be celebrated and liberated from European tutelage.

Elsewhere, however, colonial activists unwilling to join the new French Union resorted to violence to win full independence. In 1947, anti-colonial violence flared in Madagascar, where French troops killed as many as 100,000 Malagasy nationalist fighters. This continued obstinacy would lead to two of the most protracted and bloody wars in the history of decolonization: first in Indochina from 1946 to 1954, and immediately after in Algeria from 1954 to 1962.

Organized resistance to French rule in Indochina dated from the 1930s and revolved around the Communist Party and its leader Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969). An attendee at the founding of the French Communist Party in Tours in 1920, Ho organized his own Vietnamese Communist Party and guerrilla forces known as the Viet Minh to reject French rule in the inter-war years. After helping to repel Japanese invaders during the Second World War, Ho established a provisional government in 1945 to negotiate Vietnamese independence with the Allied forces. To his dismay, however, the Allies divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel and returned the southern half to France. In 1946, French military commander Thierry d'Argenlieu then moved to retake the North by bombarding the port city of Haiphong, leading to 6,000 casualties. The Viet Minh retreated to the countryside, where they formed rural guerrilla squadrons to ambush French forces. The decisive battle occurred at the strategic valley of Diem Bien Phu, where in March 1954 Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap began a

2-month siege of French troops. Ultimately, although Viet Minh casualties reached upwards of 30,000, compared to 7,000 for the French, Giap succeeded in taking the valley.

This defeat forced the imperial government in Paris to either commit more troops – an option favored by few – or to concede defeat. In 1954, Pierre Mendès-France was elected prime minister on a platform of ending the war and on 20 July 1954, he signed the Geneva Accords, which granted independence to the Indochinese colonies of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Again, Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel, with Ho Chi Minh gaining control of the North and the Catholic politician Ngo Dinh Diem presiding over the South. Ultimately, in an effort to prevent a communist electoral victory in South Vietnam, the US unilaterally cancelled elections scheduled for 1956, thus marking the beginning of American-Vietnamese hostilities that would last until 1975, when a unified Vietnam finally gained independence.

No sooner had France extricated itself from the war in Indochina than it entered another war, this time with its most prized possession. Although Tunisia and Morocco would win independence peacefully in 1956, Algeria, as legally assimilated to the metropole and as home to nearly a million European settlers, presented a more complicated puzzle. Despite his desire to end the war in Indochina, Mendès-France himself asserted that "the Algerian departments are part of the French Republic ... Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession" (quoted in Crapanzano 2011, p. 49).

Violence began in 1945, when the end of the Second World War sparked celebrations throughout Europe and the colonies. In the town of Sétif, parades turned into protests as Algerians unfurled banners calling for independence. The French police responded by firing on and killing a number of protesters. Violence quickly escalated and, after 103 pieds-noirs were murdered, the French undertook brutal reprisals that cost anywhere between 6,000 and 45,000 Algerian lives. For nationalists like Ahmed Ben Bella (1916–2012), the Sétif

massacre "succeeded in persuading me in the only path: Algeria for Algerians" (47).

By 1954, Ben Bella and Hocite Ait Ahmed had assumed leadership of the nationalist movement known as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its military wing the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). This consolidation of power entailed the brutal suppression of nationalist rivals in Algeria and France, including Messali Hadj's Mouvement National Algérien. In the so-called Café Wars of Paris, the FLN used military cells to wipe out its Algerian rivals, resulting in as many as 5,000 deaths. When the war moved to Algeria, the FLN's adoption of terrorist tactics drew influence, in part, from the writings of Franz Fanon (1925–1961), a French-educated doctor from Martinique. Fanon argued that colonial revolutionaries must resort to violence in order to overthrow colonial regimes that were themselves founded on coercion and domination.

The Algerian War began on All Saints Day, 1 November 1954, when FLN militants coordinated 30 attacks across Algeria using bombs, fires, and armed combat. These "events" – as the French government labelled them until 1999 – quickly escalated and by 1956 the French had sent upwards of 400,000 troops to Algeria. The FLN targeted French civilians and ambivalent Algerians alike, murdering and mutilating men, women, and children in an attempt to turn the French public against the war and to intimidate hesitant Algerians into supporting independence. The French military, for its part, resorted to systematic torture of anyone suspected of aiding the FLN. Waterboarding, electroshock, and rape all comprised what prime minister Guy Mollet called "extended questioning" tactics. The French public remained largely unaware of such torture until Henri Alleg, a journalist and member of the French Communist Party, published *La Question* in 1958. The book recounted Alleg's own torture at the hands of the French military and helped erode global support for the "events" in Algeria.

The war's turning point came with the 10-month-long Battle of Algiers. The battle began on 30 September 1956, when the FLN recruited three women to detonate bombs in two popular European cafes, the Milk Bar and the

Cafeteria, and in an Air France airline office. Throughout the battle, the FLN imposed a general strike on Muslim workers in Algiers that coincided with the United Nations debate on the escalating crisis in Algeria. Although France won the battle militarily – capturing FLN leader Saaidi Yacef and killing his chief lieutenant Ali la Pointe – it lost the support of global public opinion. Further, when the government in Paris began to contemplate an exit strategy, French generals under the leadership of Jacques Massu took control of the city of Algiers and threatened to stage a military coup to overthrow the government in France itself.

Ultimately, this uprising led to the fall of the Fourth Republic, and on 1 June 1958, a 67-year-old Charles de Gaulle was invited by the National Assembly to form a new government under the name of the Fifth Republic. General de Gaulle immediately visited Constantine to announce his "peace of the brave" plan, which would have allowed Algerians to join France as equal citizens. After FLN leaders rejected this proposal, de Gaulle reversed his position and, in 1959, first uttered the words "self-determination." De Gaulle opened talks with the FLN at the town of Evian in May 1961 and, after a series of stalled negotiations, finally agreed on a ceasefire on 10 March 1962. In an ensuing referendum, 91% of the French electorate and 98% of the Algerian electorate voted for an end to the hostilities and an independent Algeria. Only the pied-noir community and the right-wing terrorist branch, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS), continued to support French Algeria.

Despite, or perhaps because of, their refusal to see Algeria as anything other than part of France, Algeria's European community chose to immigrate to France en masse following the ceasefire. The French state welcomed these settlers as "repatriates." For the 200,000 Muslim Algerians who remained loyal to France throughout the war, however, the government proved less accommodating. Known as Harkis, these Algerians scrambled desperately to flee to France and escape FLN reprisals. The French government classified them as "refugees," and ultimately only about half were admitted to the metropole, while as many as

40,000 died at the hands of the FLN in Algeria. In total, historians estimate at least 800,000 Algerians and 25,000 French died during the war for independence.

In Algeria and elsewhere, however, even independence did not end conflicts that began in the colonial era. Further, many Africans continued to favor equitable integration to France over formal independence. African politicians were still debating the issue when, in 1960, the French government itself voted to break formal ties with its federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Léopold Senghor, as the first president of an independent Senegal, quickly moved to suppress his more radical rivals and in 1962 imprisoned his prime minister Mamadou Dia (1910–2009) for allegedly planning a coup. Dia – a teacher who had attended the French-run William Ponty School in Dakar – had supported independence long before Senghor, who up until 1958 still hoped to keep Senegal part of the French Union. The two erstwhile allies eventually split over the issue of socialism, as Dia hoped to reform the lucrative groundnut industry that was controlled by wealthy Islamic marabouts previously allied with French business interests. This radical move sparked the alarm of Senghor, who with French support had Dia imprisoned from 1962 to 1974.

Despite the formal end of empire, 2.5 million French citizens continue to live in overseas departments today, and they continue to divide French opinion. In the 1960s, the government in Paris initially hesitated to extend social welfare legislation to overseas citizens because of the continued belief that such people were "naturally poor." Ironically, it was conservatives like one-time prime minister Michel Debré (1912–1996) who, as a deputy from La Réunion in 1963, helped create the Fonds d'Action Sanitaire et Sociale Obligatoire (FASO) to provide subsidized housing, healthcare, and employment opportunities for the largely impoverished indigenous communities. In doing so, Debré hoped to outflank local Communist Party calls for full independence. This "welfare colonialism" (Finch-Boyer 2013, p. 133) remains an attractive alternative to national sovereignty in France's overseas departments today.

Finally, the legacy of empire continues to shape metropolitan France as well. Since 1962, an estimated 5 million postcolonial immigrants and their families have fled to France in search of work or refuge. Most of these immigrants are concentrated in the notorious *banlieus* – or suburban slums – that encircle large cities like Paris and Marseilles. France's 4 million residents of North African origin have in particular struggled to gain acceptance in a society that mandates strict *laicité,* or an absence of religion from public spaces. The right-wing National Front party has famously called for an expulsion of all North Africans – even those born in France – due to their supposed failure to integrate into French secular society. This fear culminated in a 2004 law that prohibited Muslim girls from wearing the headscarf, or "veil", in all public schools. In 2011, a similar ban prohibited Muslim women from wearing face covering veils in any public space whatsoever. As these laws demonstrate, France continues to struggle, as it did throughout its period of imperial rule, to accept cultural, religious, and ethnic differences within its supposed belief in universal republicanism.

Cross-References

▶ Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism
▶ Ben Bella, Ahmed (1918–2012)
▶ European Imperialism in West Africa
▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
▶ France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism
▶ French Indochinese War, 1945–1954
▶ Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)

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France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism

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Keywords

Imperialism · Militarism · Finance capital · National security · "2008 moment" · France

Definition

Imperialism has been going through different historical configurations of the relations between the dynamics of capital accumulation and the interstate system – which includes military power as a key component. Imperialism defines, on the one hand, a general feature of capitalism as a global political economy and, on the other

hand, a particular practice of individual states. The contemporary period is analyzed against this analytical background. The case of France is offered to confirm the relevance of imperialism's theories.

This essay addresses two main issues. One is the relevance of theories of imperialism to investigate the contemporary period and two to describe where France stands on the world space. Its goal is not to deliver an exegesis of what Marxist said about imperialism one century ago, neither the divergences between them, no more than to list the actual relevance of the main characteristics they deciphered at their time. The core of the argument deployed for the purpose of this essay, drawing on the common substance of Marxist theories of imperialism, is twofold. One, for over one century, imperialism has been going through different historical configurations of the relations between the dynamics of capital accumulation and the interstate system – which includes military power as a key component. Two, imperialism defines, on the one hand, a general feature of capitalism as a global political economy and, on the other hand, a particular practice of individual states. Put otherwise, general features of imperialism are crystallized in concrete forms in countries that can be thus labelled as imperialists. The case of France is offered to confirm the relevance of imperialism's theories.

This essay is sketched out as follows. Its first part proposes to draw on the methodological substance of classical theories of imperialism to decipher the main features of the contemporary era. This implies that the world space constitutes the conceptual starting point to understand countries' concrete practices, concrete being defined as "the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse" (Karl Marx (1857–1861), "Grundrisse" [Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy], "Introduction"). More precisely, the international positioning of a country in the world hierarchy depends on its economic and military power. Then, the paper argues that at the end of the last decade, dramatic changes took place shaping what can be characterized as the "2008 moment." On the economic side, the 2008

financial crisis morphed into a long recession, increasing economic competition between large transnational corporations and also between top powerful countries. On the geopolitical side, the US inability to manage the chaos in Iraq following the adventurist war launched by G.W. Bush combined with the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis closed what, in a controversial way, was called the "unipolar moment" created after the USSR falling apart. Also, time-epochal is the emerging of China as a major geoeconomic power and Russia's military assertiveness. A major feature of the "2008 moment" is that economic and military power became closer with each other at the world level.

Part II of the essay is centered on France. It underlines the double singularity of France: the centrality of state in social and economic relations and centrality of the military in state institutions (Serfati 2017). It then provides an overview characterizing France's positioning in the world space. The "rentier" features of France, already observed one century ago, did not disappear. Nor did the importance of Africa for France's geopolitical and economic interests. As a way to explore theoretical hypothesis laid out in the paper, the last section connects France's military surge since the end of the last decades with the transformations that took place at the world level. France is with the United States, the western country where economic and politico-military powers are the most interwoven in the shaping of their international position, even though France and the United States are obviously not competing in the same league. France attempted to leverage its military power as a "competitive advantage" on the world space, while it suffered a loss of "economic competitiveness." The surge was driven by external drivers, the opportunities and constraints resulting from the "2008 moment," and internal drivers, the deep embeddedness of military institutions and ecoon. The military leverage is wielded for complementary objectives at the world level and at the European level (Serfati 2019), while at the national level, providing arguments for increasing military and security budgets which consolidates the weight of military-related vested interest.

The Relevance of Imperialism Concept and the "2008 Moment"

The Basic Message of Marxist Theories of Imperialism

Following groundbreaking Hobson's *Imperialism* (1902), Marxists contributed to highlight the major transformations in capitalist dynamics. They differed in their analysis on several points, and as noted by A. Brewer in his critical survey of *Marxist Theories of Imperialism* "Different writers used the word differently," something that led him to make no attempt to present a definition of imperialism (Brewer 1980). In the early 2000s, calls for the return of imperialism came not only from conservative American thinkers but also in Europe from T. Blair's former adviser, Robert Cooper (Cf Boot 2001; Cooper 2002). On the Marxist side, "classical" theories were revisited. Theories of imperialism elaborated one century ago were criticized by influential scholars for both their obsolescence (Panitch and Gindin 2013; Wood 2003) and their fundamental inadequacies, even to analyze the reality of the early twentieth century (Harvey 2007), while their relevance argued by others (Callinicos 2009).

The purpose of this essay is not to survey the debate (For a survey, see Serfati 2018a) but, considering that the framework offered by Marxist theories of imperialism is relevant, to adapt it to the realities of the early twentieth-century capitalism. For that, it is useful to expose our reading of the concept of imperialism. From around the 1880s on, a new era emerged from the development of capitalism, a process already perceived by Marx and Engels in the *Manifesto* and theorized by Marx as follows: "The development of the product into a commodity is fundamental to capitalist production and this is intrinsically bound up with the expansion of the market, the creation of the world market, and therefore foreign trade" (Theories of Surplus Value, Marx 1861–3, Chapter XV, Ricardo's Theory of Surplus-Value, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/ch15.htm), and Marx adds: "The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself" (Grundrisse: Notebook IV – The Chapter on Capital, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch08.htm). Against this framework and decades after Marx's writings, Marxists theories of imperialism pointed to two major changes in capitalism that can be summarized in the definitions given by Lenin and Luxemburg. For Lenin, "Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established" (Lenin 1916). For Luxembourg, "Imperialism is the political expression of the accumulation of capital" (Luxemburg 1913). These definitions deliver two messages. (1) Accumulation and reproduction of capital lead to the creation of a finance monopoly capital which controls the different types of capital: productive, merchant, interest-bearing money, land, real estate, etc. (2) In her definition, Luxemburg means by "political expression" the creation of a world space – a term better adapted to the new reality than world market – which is deeply influenced by states, what she calls the "system of states," which hold a core role in the international reach of finance monopoly capital. For Luxemburg, it is not a definition by passing, as different chapters in her *Opus magnum* are devoted to the multiple facets of state's involvement in imperialism (on the system of international loans, militarism, etc.).

These definitions shed light on the two drivers of transformations of capitalism into imperialism: the dynamics of capital and the international system of states. These underlying drivers transformed imperialism over time, with different configurations – rather than stages – taking place. To the era of "classical imperialism," which survived until World War II, succeeded the 1945–1991 period and then the 1990s and 2000s decades, with a turning point analyzed as the "2008 moment" (below). Each of these configurations was characterized with different combinations at the world level of the mix between economic and political-military power.

The World Space as Totality and Nations as "Concrete Hence Unity of Diversity"

This reading of Marxist theories helps us to propose that imperialism as a concept bears two meanings. Imperialism as an analytical

framework can apply both to the general configuration of capitalism existing since the end of the nineteenth century and to practice of individual states and national capitalist classes in the global political economy. Of course, as stressed by all Marxists analyzing imperialism, the distinctive characteristic of the latter is that "national economic organisms [became] parts of a much larger sphere, namely, world economy" (Bukharin 1915). That means that the "world economy" constitutes the starting point which allows to understand countries' concrete practices, concrete being defined as "the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse" (Karl Marx (1857–1861), "Grundrisse" [Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy], "Introduction"). Marx applied this method to connect the world market and a home market, when he wrote that "the world market [. . .] is not only the domestic market in relation to all the foreign markets existing outside it, but at the same time the domestic market of all foreign markets, as, in turn, components of the home market" (Karl Marx (1857–1861), "Grundrisse" [Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy], "Notebook II – The Chapter on Capital"). A similar method is also at the basis of the uneven and combined development hypothesis formulated by Trotsky when he refutes Communist International Stalin-inspired views: "It is false that world economy is simply a sum of national parts of one and the same type. [. . .] In reality, the national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic features of the world process" (Trotsky 1931). It is with the capitalist expansion acceding to a global reach that in some particular – and exceptional – situations, a country "under the whip of external necessity" proceeds through a combined development "by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms" (*History*, chapter 1 "Peculiarities of Russia's Development").

This analysis, which gives further substance to the "materiality of nations" (On the relevance of uneven and combined development as an analytical framework to analyze contemporary capitalism, see Desai (2013). For an application to the

European Union, see Serfati (2015)), explains the role of the interstate system, in interaction with capital accumulation dynamics, in the transformations of the world space. Of course, an international state regime preexisted to nineteenth-century capitalism (Teschke 2003), but it did experience dramatic changes both in its content and its shape in relation with the development of capitalist relations. As early as 1875, in a letter to the United Workers' Party of Germany, Marx stressed that "the 'framework of the present-day national state', for instance, the German Empire, is itself, in its turn, economically 'within the framework' of the world market, politically 'within the framework' of the system of states" (Marx 1875).

The dynamics of capital accumulation put the international system of states at a very far cry of moving toward a transnational state as claimed by some (Robinson 2007). A major reason for that is that the "universalizing tendency of capital, which distinguishes it from all previous stages of production" (Marx, K. Grundrisse: notebook v – the chapter on capital) does not proceed on a levelling "playing field," as social relations – and capital is a quite specific type of social relations – are territorially bounded and politically organized in separate countries (Serfati 2013) which constitute the interstate regime. As said, the existence of the contemporary interstate system cannot be seen as a residual legacy, still less a "vestige" of nation-states constituted before the development of capitalism, even though the latter transformed the form and content of the interstate regimes. Capitalism does not – and cannot – abolish the national or the local, but makes for denser, overlapping socio-spatial networks increasingly dependent upon national states to help arbitrate between the different scales of the circulation of capital (Brenner 1997).

This is one reason why speaking of "global capitalism" could be misleading. This expression introduces a confusion between two processes: the cross-border circulation of interest-bearing money capital (called fictitious capital by Marx) circulating at an electricity speed all around the world thanks to three decades of deregulation of financial markets on the one hand and the material condition of value which are made possible only

through a labor process on the other. The latter is anything but "global" even when it is organized within the global value chains created by large transnational corporations (TNCs). Most TNCs go on depending on a regional and national base for a large share of their activities and in a number of industrial sectors the relations with their home government remain essential. "Global capitalism" constitutes what could be called an "empty abstraction."

Moreover, the role of states in developed countries is not limited to supporting "big business" (large TNCs). As autonomous entities being separated from the immediate process of value creation, they are in charge of maintaining the cohesion of capitalist-dominated social relations, which "reflect relations of production in their totality" (Marx 1847). Reproducing these social relations over time requires several factors which by definition go beyond the immediate process of production; they include the existence of a repressive apparatus and protecting property rights law enforcement. It should be added that governments have to take in charge a number of activities which capitalists are not prepared to assume because of their lack of profitability (education, transport infrastructure, etc.). In short, the state reflects the whole society, even though it rules for specific capitalist interest.

At the world level, the contemporary interstate system, based upon international organizations (IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.), helps to reproduce capitalist social relations everywhere in the world, and in that way, it performs a role similar to the one played out by most powerful national governments within their territories. It still does so this within very limits. One, there is no "global state" able to claim the monopoly of legitimate coercion at the world level, as the latter remains a space for economic competition between "many capitals" and for political rivalries between states. Two, the cohesion of the international system of states is strongly dependent on capital dynamics which is plagued with contradictions culminating in economic crisis, and the way those contradictions and their explosion are mediated by the most powerful states further undermines this cohesion. This is because powerful governments resort to a variety of instruments to defend their ruling class and to preserve the reproduction of social relations within the territory on which they have the "monopoly of the legitimate coercion." To sum up, it can be said of the alliance of most powerful countries on which the interstate system is based what Marx said that from capitalists in their national economy: "Capitalists form a veritable freemason society vis-a-vis the whole working-class, while there is little love lost between them in competition among themselves" (Marx, Karl, *Capital* Vol. III Part II, chapter 10). It's a reminder that agents, including the most powerful states at the macro- (national) or international level, are submitted to chaotic laws of capitalist competition which operates at the world level.

Military Power as a Key Component of the World Space

In the context of a global space shaped by the intertwining of capital accumulation dynamics and the interstate system, this section addresses the building blocks of the status of any particular country in this world space. This status depends on its economic might – what in mainstream economics is called its "international competitiveness" (its economic performances on the world market), which is generally measured by the size of its gross domestic product (GDP), its share of world market exports, and the magnitude of foreign direct investments carried out by its large corporations (transnational corporations). Another criterion of "international competitiveness" of a country underestimated by mainstream economists is its ability to accumulate financial incomes from abroad, a core feature in the theories of "classical imperialism." Today, in finance-capital-dominated regime (Chesnais 2016), draining value created in other countries remains one of the main characteristics of asymmetrical power in international economic relations.

The military power constitutes, besides economic power, the other crucial dimension of the international status of a country. That economic and military power matters was obviously the case before 1914. As seen in Table 1, the more powerful economic countries were also the most militarized. The same hierarchical ranking in the share

France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism, Table 1 Top military countries in 1913: share of world military expenditures and of world GDP (%)

	Share of world military expenditures (1)	Share of world GDP (2)
United States	8.4	18.9
Germany	15.9	8.7
Russia	15.0	8.5
United Kingdom	12.9	8.2
France	12.5	5.3
Italy	4.9	3.5
Japan	3.6	2.6

Source: Author from (1) Jacobson's world armament expenditures, (2) Maddison Historical statistics
In data collected by J.M. Hobson (1993), Germany overtook Russia by the volume of its military expenditures

France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism, Table 2 Top 20 countries by GDP and military expenditures (Milex), 2017 current dollars

Countries	2017 GDP	2017 Milex
United States	1	1
China	2	2
Japan	3	8
Germany	4	9
United Kingdom	5	7
India	6	5
France	7	6
Brazil	8	11
Italy	9	12
Canada	10	14
Russian Federation	11	4
Korea, Rep.	12	10
Australia	13	13
Spain	14	17
Mexico	15	32
Indonesia	16	27
Turkey	17	15
Netherlands	18	23
Saudi Arabia	19	3
Switzerland	20	38

Source: Author from *World Bank Indicators* and SIPRI data

of world military expenditures and of world GDP confirms that the relation between economic and military power was strong. An outstanding exception was the United States, and it was only from the 1940s onward that this "anomaly" would be corrected by the status of world leader endorsed by this country. Over the 1870–1914 period, France was the country with the higher military expenditures-to-GDP ratio (4.8%), ahead of the United Kingdom (2.95%) and Germany (2.86%) (Offer 1993).

It is also worth to note that in 1913 France, Germany, Italy, and the United States accounted for almost 44.6% of world military expenditures, while in 2017 the same countries which form the top core of NATO accounted for about the same share of world military expenditures (46.3%, SIPRI data).

One century later, economic and military power remains firmly linked in the international positioning of country. Table 2 ranks the top 20 countries by their 2017 GDP and their military expenditures. A couple of observations can be made. One, most countries are included in both lists, with the exception of Mexico, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Conversely, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and Taiwan are in the top 20 countries by military expenditures but not by their

GDP. Their respective rankings (Milex and GDP) are for Israel (16 and 31), Iran (18 and 26), Pakistan (19 and 40), and Taiwan (20 and 22, the latter figure being estimated from domestic sources, as the country is not listed in World Bank indicators)). Two, for many of them, the ranking in both lists is similar or pretty close. Exceptions are Japan and Germany on the top end, Russia on the middle end, and Saudi Arabia on the lower end of GDP countries. Eleven countries rank in both lists with a (small) margin difference in their place being between 0 and 3. Three, these quantitative data, while showing the proximity of economic and military power, do not deliver on how those two components combine with each other in the international positioning of countries. Despite the relative proximity of the two indicators, there are substantial differences in the way countries are managing their material capabilities. Suffice to think of the differences between France and Germany (For a detailed comparison between the

international positionings of the two countries as far as military power is concerned, see Serfati 2019). To understand how the two components combined in leading countries, a theoretical background is needed.

On the side of mainstream scholarship, the responses to the issue of economic and military power interaction are a large source of debate from "hegemonic stability theories," as developed by Kindleberger, Gilpin, and others to Kennedy's thesis on the US "imperial overstretch," to Nye's emphasis on the role of "soft power" as an instrument indispensable to powerful countries' domination called "leadership." In J. Nye's widely known parlance, military and economy are the basis for "hard power," while culture boost countries' "soft power," which represents an "attractive power." As hard and soft power are often interpreted as being independent and concurrent sources of leadership – for example, by opposing US hard power and EU's soft power – Nye is eager to remind that "Markets and economic power rest upon political frameworks, which in turn depend not only upon norms, institutions, and relationships, but also upon the management of coercive power" (Nye 2011). This is an extension to international affairs of A. Smith's claim that the "invisible hand" of the market needs an "iron fist" to thrive in a country ("Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all" Smith Adam (1776), *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Book V, Chapter 1). The theoretical framework on the relations between economy and military underlying the international positioning of countries proposed in the next section is quite different from the mainstream approach as illustrated in the next section.

The "2008 Moment" and the Tightening Economic and Military Power

A new configuration of relations between economy and military took place at the world level at the end of the last decade with a new combination in the capital accumulation-interstate system nexus. The "2008 moment" closed the historical period opened in the early 1990 by the collapse of the USSR. The "2008 moment" was a conflation of economic and geopolitical seismic changes that had been simmering since the early 2000s. On the economic side, what began as a financial crisis morphed into a long recession (Carchedi and Roberts 2013). The overt or latent overproduction produced by the accumulation of manufacturing capabilities – not an exclusivity of China – is visible in a couple of sectors going beyond the steel one. In late 2017, a survey showed some or significant overcapacity in over half of sectors globally (Williams et al. 2017). And while the recovery is applauded in mainstream reports, between 2007 and 2018, the mass of debt fueled by a generous (for business) very low interest rates policy rose by 78% in constant dollar rate for the world nonfinancial corporations sectors (MCGI 2018). This ballooning of the private debt signals that the world economy is set again for a financial crisis of a wider scope and effects than in 2008.

On the geopolitical side, what, in a controversial way, was called the "unipolar moment" crumbled with the US inability to manage the chaos in Iraq following the adventurist war launched by G. W. Bush which combined with the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis at its epicenter. This US imperial disaster, which, "from a strategic point of view, is worse than Vietnam" (Thompson 2011), facilitated the return of Russia as a major geopolitical factor, as well as it opened the way to the ambitions for Iran to emerge as regional power in the Middle East. Also, the destabilizing effect of this war and other imperialist wars in the region was an accelerator for the "Arab Spring," whose deep roots were the protracted economic blockage that produced explosive social consequences. Finally, this profound change in the international status of the United States which characterizes the 2008 moment was also provoked by the full-speed development of the Chinese economy and the strengthening of its military and technological capabilities.

In this context, after having massively intervened in their national economy through rescue packages offered to banks and manufacturing industries (automotive) in the aftermath of the

crisis, governments of developed countries have continued to intervene, and they even widened the range of instruments to defend the economic interests of their country. Protectionist measures are on rise with, according to research, 73.5% of G20 exports facing some type of trade distortion in foreign markets, ten times the trade coverage of protectionism reported by the WTO (Jones 2017). Protectionist measures are in priority used by the top world economies: the world's top 60 economies have adopted more than 7000 protectionist trade measures on a net basis since the financial crisis and tariffs are now worth more than $400 billion (Evenett and Fritz 2017). They are now backed up with invocation of national security by governments. This acts as a covert form to promote a protectionist policy while governments go on speaking of "free trade." Despite the systematic recourse to national security, it is noticeable that "national security" is a loose notion ill-defined both in international and national regulation (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2018).

The increasing resort to the argument of national security by governments to erect protectionist barriers signals a clear reversal of trade and foreign investment policies carried out during post-World War II six decades ago. Architects of GATT – the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade set in after World War II – and their successors at WTO were aware of the risks of including in the charter the "possibility by any Member of measures relating to a Member's security interests because that would permit anything under the sun" (Bhala 1998). GATT's Article 21 still provided states with a "security exception" with practically no chance for a country to challenge the decision before the dispute settlement body as nothing in the GATT prevents a WTO member from taking "any action which it considers necessary" to protect its "essential security interests," making each WTO member the sole judge of whether its trade-restrictive actions are justified (Murrill 2018). The strong growth of international trade in post-World War II decades limited the need for governments to resort to Article 21's protectionist clause. Then, the dangers of over-using national security concerns seemed lowered with the creation of WTO (World Trade Organization) in 1995 – at the heyday of the triumph of the "Washington Consensus" (deregulation, liberalization, privatization). One, WTO mechanisms were oriented toward legalizing dispute resolution and depoliticizing investment disputes through the widespread use of investor-state arbitration instead of diplomatic protection. Likewise, trade and investment treaties that multiplied until the 2008 financial crisis involved a relative separation between the economic and security realms (Roberts et al. 2018). Two, the continuation of the strong growth in international trade marginalized the rare cases of states invoking Article 21.

This period seems over since the end of the last decade. As the related WTO's Article 21 was hardly used during the heydays of 1990s and early 2000s trade expansion, it has now so frequently used as to become a core concern that "the GATT provisions [...] come closest to allowing a member to be a "cowboy" (Bhala 1997–1998). Arguing national security concerns to defend their national capital by large powerful countries against foreign competition reflects the deep unevenness of international relations, as a majority of countries must comply with what is decided by a small set of countries. Such rhetoric has also as a direct consequence to increase tensions between most powerful countries, as it transfers competition from the economic field to existential threats against the integrity of the country, something which reminds the pre-World War I's international relations. The US Administration is very active and this conduct began before Trump election. The number of mergers and acquisitions by foreign entities reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the government body in charge of determining the effect of the transaction on the national security of the country, doubled from 65 in 2009 to 143 in 2015 (CFIUS, Annual Report to Congress for CY 2015, 09/2017). Since that date, the Trump Administration repeatedly used the threats to national security rhetoric and mixed economic competition coming from China and Russia with the military challenges to US national security. In December 2017, the US National Security Strategy deemed China a "revisionist power" and a

"strategic competitor" that uses "predatory economics" to intimidate its neighbors and declared that "economic security is national security." The United States-China competition is thus a fresh reminder that economy and military power interact with each other in most powerful countries' agenda, with the United States setting the tune for the whole international relations and triggering in turn reactions from China. In a somewhat different vein, but still aggressively, D. Trump also linked economic and political leverage vis-à-vis the EU when he simultaneously declared that the "EU was formed, partially, to beat the United States on trade" and that NATO's European members aren't paying enough for defense, with the risk of United States withdrawing from the alliance (Johnston Jules, "Donald Trump says EU exists to compete with US presidential hopeful hits out at EU, WTO and NATO, Politico, 7/24/16).

Putting Economic Competition-War Relationships in Context: From Globalization of Wars to "Wars of Globalization"

For free trade believers, the current wave of protectionism risks to morph into trade war and fatefully to pave the way to war. Since the French philosopher Montesquieu declaring in his 1734 *Spirit of law* that "Peace is the natural effect of trade" to Norman Angell stating in 1912 that interdependence of nations and growth in trade relations would make war obsolete to the 1990s mainstream economics and political sciences based on the "Peace-Democracy-free markets" (PDF)-format globalization, the claim that free market and free trade capitalism consolidate peace and that protectionism is a prelude to war has a well-established tradition. Indeed, it's a too narrow framework to establish a direct correlation between free movements of goods and capital and peace. This correlation is based on the belief that interdependence means politico-military equality between nations and on the economic side, mutual gains between trading countries. On the contrary, on the world space, the reality is interdependence in unevenness, where rules of the game are set by the most powerful countries.

"Interdependence" in economic relations was at length underlined by students of "classical" imperialism, which entailed an extended practice of cooperation between rival countries as well as between their competing large firms. Cooperation went through the setting up of cartels in industries and bank syndicates to lend to dependent countries. Cooperation went so far to involve the top arms producers of Britain (Vickers), France (Schneider), and Germany (Krupp). Also, governments of rival countries massively traded with each other, including in the sector of arms. As late as 1912, the Russian government went on buying naval equipment from Germany. European governments also cooperated to conquer markets and distribute territories, with the well-known "scramble for Africa," jointly deploying violent and deadly means against indigenous populations. Still, interdependence also meant rising tensions, including through localized armed conflicts between large powerful countries between 1880 and 1904. In short, wars were not incompatible with increased economic and financial interdependence between most powerful countries.

After World War II, the relations between economic competition and inter-capitalist countries' wars dramatically changed mainly because of the economic and military US domination unchallenged by other western countries and the overarching presence of the Cold War, along with a massive popular condemnation of massive extermination ("never again"). Wars between developed countries ceased, and the breaking apart of USSR confirmed for many commentators the disconnection between economic competition and armed conflicts. In this context, wars at the time of "classical imperialism" were reinterpreted in mainstream literature as driven by "precapitalist forces," a thesis already defended in the aftermath of World War I by J. Schumpeter. On the Marxist side, E.M Wood notes that "For the first time [since 1945] in the history of the modern nation state, the world's major powers are not engaged in direct geopolitical and military rivalry." She goes on that "Capitalist imperialism has become almost entirely a matter of economic

domination" and concludes "it can be a very bloody business. But once subordinate powers are made vulnerable to those imperatives and the 'laws' of the market, direct rule by imperial states is no longer required to impose the will of capital" (Wood 2003, *op. cited*, p.153).

The view adopted in this essay is different. Wars did not disappear from the scene since the end of World War II, no more than the collapse of USSR, labelled as the "empire of evil" by R. Reagan, put an end to wars. True, they did not involve western countries fighting with each other, but several post-war military US interventions or "covert actions" to impose regime changes (Iran's Mossadegh, Guatemala, Chile, etc.) had as main goal not only to protect the interests of US companies against recalcitrant governments supported by rival countries (USSR/Russia, China). They had also a "demonstration effect" vis-à-vis European and Asian allies and otherwise economic competitors. Likewise, France in over hundred military operations launched since decolonization, mainly in Africa, aimed at preserving its geopolitical and economic interests – both are closely knitted with each other. French military operations – and still more US ones – have also a "demonstration effect" for allied countries: France cannot be rivalled by any country member of the "transatlantic bloc" (For an initial description of the "transatlantic bloc," see Serfati (2004), and for its updating in Serfati (2019), *op. cited*.) to cope with the chaos affecting large African territories, and this buttress its military expertise on the ground which is largely acknowledged, and even welcomed by the US military, more accustomed to fight from the air. As said by some experts, the French Barkhane military operation in Sahel has become the UN "life insurance" (Mena Analysis, "French Military Strategy in the Sahel" 16 January 2016, p.2). The conduct of the United States and France offers some similarities with what happened over one century before: controlling militarily areas of influence – through formal or informal colonization – was a way to resist economic competition from other countries. In short, "imperatives and the 'laws' of the market" have to be *permanently*

military monitored, even though today, there is no formal colonization any longer for several reasons, including the too much costly financial burden of "white man's that should be borne out to promote education, health, etc. in countries plagued with 'local wars'."

More broadly, militarism and war must be put in context. The era of "classical imperialism" was marked by globalization of war, a process foretold by Engels three decades before the outbreak of the world war when he wrote "And, finally, the only war left for Prussia-Germany to wage will be a world war, a world war, moreover, of an extent and violence hitherto unimagined. Eight to ten million soldiers will be at each other's throats and in the process, they will strip Europe barer than a swarm of locusts" (Engels 1988).

What has emerged from the 1990s onward are armed conflicts often called "new wars" but which could better be defined as "wars of globalization" substituting to 'globalization of wars' as observed in the twentieth-century. Most wars thriving in less developed countries are a *component* of "really existing globalization." Local wars are connected to the world economic (trade, finance, arms) and geopolitical setting through several channels (Aknin and Serfati 2008). This analysis contrasts with what researchers at the World Bank's calls "ethnic wars" which plagues dozens of countries and which they interpret as a *consequence* of their insufficient economic integration in "globalization" and of not adhering to "good governance." Not only those wars did not wind up since the early 1990s, but they have been on rise in last 10 years. The number of armed conflicts in the world in 2017 was 49, leading a think tank collecting data on them to observe that between 2008 and 2017, there has been an ongoing deterioration in global peacefulness (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018), with the human cost of conflict – death and forcibly displaced – rising to 68.5 million people in 2017 (roughly 1% of the world population) from 39.5 million in 2006 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2018 World Humanitarian Data and Trends report).

The Case of France

Two Singularities of France

A brief historical overview highlights two singularities of France (Serfati 2017, *op. cited*). One is the multisecular centrality of state institutions in social and economic relations. Sure, the power of the state with it "systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system" was necessary everywhere in Europe to hasten the transformation of the feudal to capitalist mode of production (K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, chapter 31). Still, the way state institutions operated in each country depended upon class relations, and the configuration of class relations in France accounts for the centrality of state. In France, the violent conflict between the Monarchy and the nobility led the former to organize a highly centralized bureaucracy. Then, the absolute monarchy fought against bourgeoisie's claims through consolidation of the aristocracy and the church. The aristocracy was directly interested to accept the maintenance of the old system, as many of them acted as *fermiers généraux* (office holders) and collected of revenues flowing from seigneurial rights (Soboul 1956), further reinforcing the grip of state power on people. The momentum gained over centuries by state institutions consolidated during the 1789 revolution. The antagonism between the aristocracy, which had increasingly been integrated as key component of the absolute monarchy, and the bourgeoisie (This presentation is different from Teschke who argues that "In the run-up to Quatre-Vingt-Neuf, the class distinctions between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy had become blurred," Benno Teschke Bourgeois Revolution, State Formation and the Absence of the International," p.12), drawing on the nascent proletariat (in Paris, the *sans culottes*), led the bourgeoisie to overthrow the monarchy and in turn to seize the state machinery to defend at home against royalists and abroad against the European coalition.

Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx, in their comprehensive analysis of France, and despite their opposite political position, converged to underline how embedded was the strong sate centralization of the country (box).

> Toqueville wrote: "The reason why the principle of the centralization of power did not perish in the Revolution is that this very centralization was at once the Revolution's starting-off point and one of its guiding principles centralization fitted so well with the program of the new social order (after 1789, C.S.) (De Alexis De Tocqueville, "The Old Regime and the French Revolution," Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, p.60) [. . .] "I assert that there is no country in Europe in which the public administration has not become, not only more centralized, but more inquisitive and more minute it everywhere interferes in private concerns more than it did; it regulates more undertakings, and undertakings of a lesser kind; and it gains a firmer footing every day about, above, and around all private persons, to assist, to advise, and to coerce them" (De Alexis De Tocqueville (183–1840), *Democracy in America*, vol. II, Part 4, chapter V).
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> As for Marx, it was in the *18 Brumaire* that he analyzed the economic and social content of *Bonapartism* and concluded: "The executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its wide-ranging and ingenious state machinery, with a host of officials numbering half a million (besides an army of another half million) — this terrifying parasitic body which enmeshes the body of French society and chokes all its pores, sprang up in the time of the absolute monarchy" (Marx 1852).

All over the nineteenth century, the growth of state apparatus in France responded to a mix of drivers. One, all struggles between social classes generated by the development of capitalism – mainly between the working class and the bourgeoisie and to a lesser extent between peasants and large landowners – and also the struggle

within the ruling classes (finance, industrial, merchant) were arbitrated and settled by a further centralization of state apparatus and the strengthening of Paris vis-à-vis *province* (the countryside). Two, the hyperdevelopment of state institutions consolidated the bloc of financial interest over industry, as the public debt supported a mighty financial aristocracy and the growth of a strong banking system, while the industrial bourgeoisie conquered a more modest place than in England and later in Germany. The weakness of "entrepreneurial spirit" made the industrial bourgeoisie strongly dependent on industrial policy and more generally on state institutions. As Marx put it, "In England industry requires free trade; in France, protective tariffs, national monopoly alongside the other monopolies" (Marx 1848). The weakness of private entrepreneurship was somewhat compensated for by the development of a technical elite, trained in high school, a unique French system separated from universities and based on a strong selection of the top students, which carried out large technological projects in infrastructure (railways, water) and more recently in defense industry with weapon and nuclear systems. Moreover, this generated a permanent circulation of elites between large industrial groups and state institutions, reinforcing osmotic links between business and state. Three, in a country where class struggles have a long tradition, state institutions were inflated because of the need for the ruling class to codify social rights in state institutions (Note that institutionalization within state is not inevitable. The major social conquests won by the French working class at the end of World War II were institutionalized in the system of *Security Sociale* (SS) which was co-managed by labor and capital's representatives. The process of "étatisation" of SS accelerating after the 1973 crisis is an attempt to expel the labor of the direct control on the budget constituted by their contributions (seen in France as a "salaire différé," or deferred wage, that is as a part of their wage labor in case of illness, for retirement, etc. and not as a gift coming from a welfare state)). Four, the centrality of state in France was a consequence of the capacity of any state bureaucracy to reinforce its

power and trigger a self-growth process. Mechanisms of self-growing bureaucracy, explicitly analyzed in Marx's *18 Brumaire* (or by Trotsky in the case of bureaucratization of the Soviet regime),, are a cogent vaccine against Marxist analysis reducing the state to an "instrument" of capital.

Two, the centrality of the military institution in the making and the consolidation of the state constitutes another singularity of France. As documented by the historian C. Tilly, it has been a common feature in the consolidation of modern state (Cf chapter 3 "How War Made States, and Vice Versa," Tilly C. (1990), *Coercion, Capital, and European States*). The turn taken by political and social struggles in France however gave a prominent role to the armies, long after the wars – waged to extend the territories and populations on which taxes and rents could be collected – and Colbert's economic dirigisme were made inseparable under the long Sun King reign (1643–1715) (A statistical estimate, presented by their authors as *only illustrative* is that war expenditures accounted roughly 57% of total expenditure in 1683 and about 52% in 1714 (Eloranta and Land, 2011). According to some, the development of absolutism in France, based on a permanent reinvestment in the means of coercion by the ruling class, for internal rent extraction and external plunder, remained the normal strategy for expanded reproduction which entailed a "geopolitical accumulation" (Teschke 2006). This long tradition of "geopolitical accumulation" is rejuvenated, although in a quite different setting brought about by capitalism, in the "2008 moment" (below).

In a comparison with Prussia, it has been noted (Posen 1993) that the development of a mass army needed the spread of literacy, initially down to the level of the noncommissioned officer, to facilitate command, training, and political motivation. The first mass army depended ultimately upon a political revolution whose ideology, redolent of nationalism, stressed the equality and community of all Frenchmen. Even when conscription was abolished by the Bourbons in 1814, addressing education for soldiers remained an objective. A study of incoming conscripts in the late 1820s revealed that only about half could read.

Regimental schools were also instituted to teach the necessary skills.

Armies were deployed in the numerous wars with other European countries as well as to conquer colonies, but they also played a critical role at home to promote regime changes, generally provoked by popular working-class movements. A short chronology indicates the extent to which social insurrections interacted with regime changes. The 1815 Charles 10's Bourbon restauration came in the aftermath of Napoleonic regime crumbling and meant the return to an extreme reactionary monarchic regime. In 1830, a popular insurrection ended the French Bourbon monarch and ascent of his cousin Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans, setting domination of the "finance aristocracy" (Marx) and provoking in reaction between 1831 and 1835 a number of uprising in France (*Canuts* at Lyon, barricades in Paris, etc.). Then in 1848 a proletarian demonstration with the rallying cry "République sociale" – first stage of the "People spring in Europe" – paved the way to a short-lived Second Republic and then, in 1852, to Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte's imperial regime. In 1870, the rout of Napoléon 3 to Prussia was followed by the *Commune de Paris* (April–May 1871). The latter was massively repressed by the armies with thousands of deaths during the *semaine sanglante* (bloody week).

After the Third Republic was proclaimed in 1870, following Bonapartism' meltdown, as archetypal of a parliamentary democracy, governments set in a new role for the army. Its democratic mission was encouraged with the introduction of universal *military* conscription. The conscription now extended to all males was accompanied by series of laws (1880–1882) that made education compulsory and free for children aged 6–13. The patriotic content of the curriculum aimed at reinforcing nationalism and it was instrumental for the preparation of the next war ("la revanche") with Germany and for colonial conquests to bring "barbarian" people the benefits of highest races' civilization (Jules Ferry, the architect of the deep reforms of the education system, said: *" les races supérieures ont un droit vis à vis des races inférieures [. . .] Elles ont un devoir de civiliser les races inférieures"* (Highest races have a right

upon lowest races [. . .]. They have the duty of civilising lowest races)., *Journal Officiel*, 28 July 1885). Mixing education at home and civilization mission abroad was also aimed at infusing in popular class' conscientiousness the benefits of colonization, the latter being on the side of "us" while colonized people being "them."

In this section, we focus on the role of army against the "enemy within," i.e., the "laborious classes" transformed into "dangerous classes." In 1902, at the interior minister, an emergency plan was elaborated to cope with a general strike at the national level (Cooper-Richet 1998). Coal mine workers were particularly targeted, with Eugène Schneider and other bosses "from the largest to the smaller company, calling for army during all the century, as soon as mine workers protest" (Id., p.64). But they are not the only workers in this case. Gendarmerie, which received from Napoleon 3 (1 March 1854 decree) the mission to "restore order in case of popular riots or rebellious demonstrations," was frequently mobilized, but has to be shouldered by army so frequently between 1871 and 1914 that two historians remark that "There was no decisive stage in the worker's movement in which the troops were not called to reinforce gendarmerie" (Mayeur and Rebérioux (1987). The army intervened in one out of five strikes between 1870 and 1890, but this rate increased in the early 1900s. Houte (2008)). Comparative studies show that the use of the army against workers were more frequent in France than in other European countries (For a comparison with Prussia, see Johansen 2001). Faced with the difficulty to use draftees – often sociologically close to workers demonstrating and prone to fraternization with workers – the French government created in 1921 a specific military force, *la gendarmerie mobile*, the role of which is to address social demonstrations, a proposal already made by the military staff in the early 1900s.

The connection between the "enemies within" and colonization was even physically established when Marechal Bugeaud, celebrated for his strategy of permanent warfare against Algerians struggling to resist French colonization, proposed to King Louis Philippe to crush the revolution at

home (the 1848 French revolution), stating that "he had never been lost a fight, either on battlefields or against insurrection" and was keen to "destroy the rabble" (Cited in Marx, K., who wrote with Engels' support an article on Bugeaud in *The New American Encyclopedia* (1858)).

Despite the central role held by the armies in France and in colonial conquests between 1871 and 1914, the Third Republic could never get a total loyalty to Republic's value from the officers. A number of them were anti-Republicans (Monarchists, Bonapartist, etc.). They often took side with the Catholic Church to challenge the Republic. The Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906) was a climax in antisemistism and antirepublicanism, with the minister of war leading the charge. A few decades later, when Maréchal Pétain was appointed as ambassador to Franco's Spain in 1939 by the Daladier government, he considered his mission as a way "to expiate the sins of the Popular Front" (Szaluta 1974), even though he was fully trusted by the former *Front populaire's* Prime Minister Léon Blum (1936–1938) at the time of his appointment in Spain. Back to 1932, he had overseen a report on the "enemies within" (*ennemis de l'intérieur*), mainly the Communist and other left-wing parties which he believed could take advantage of German aerial bombing to organize an insurrection (Général Voiriot 2001).

Pétain was obviously by no means an exception. During the interwar, a large share of the officer's cast was anti-Republican, and a number of them were active in extreme-right secret movement that attempts to topple elected governments. Another enduring feature is that many of them cultivated hatred of the extreme-left parties (Paxton 1966).

A "Usurary Capitalism"

The previous section gave some insights on the centrality of the state and the military in France's social relations. This section focusses on some peculiar characteristics of France on the world space. Marxists writing on imperialism were aware that the general features of imperialism, as a new historical era, found concrete determination in particular practices by leading countries in the

world economy (above). In their comparison between the few imperialist countries, they noted France's singularities. Lenin noted in his major opus that, "unlike British colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism" (Lenin (1916), *Imperialism…*, op. cited, chapter 4.); Trotsky wrote that "France is the classic land of finance capital" (The Struggle For State Power Democracy, Pacifism And Imperialism (30 June 1917)). Since Marxists saw the domination of finance capital as an outstanding feature of the new capitalist era, that France was archetypal in this way needs some clarification on the concept of finance capital. In short, it is needed to leave Hilferding's challengeable definition of finance capital as "capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists" (For a critical reading of Hilferding's *Finance capital*, see Serfati 2018b) and for that to consider capital as a social relation based on exploitation of labor *simultaneously* incarnated into productive equipment and property rights. Our reading of Marx (Id.) is that financial revenues (dividends and interests) are endogenous to capital as an exploitative social relation and not only to loan capital. Then, as underlined by Lenin, "Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation [between productive and property capital, C.S.] reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy" (Lenin 1916, *op. cited*, chapter 3). Sure, creation value only proceeds through a labor process. However, capitalism is not a mode of production but of social domination based on private ownership. Holding property rights (shares, bonds, loans, etc.) allows individuals and nations to claim a share of value created and by anticipation on future value. Put otherwise, for capitalism, producing goods is always a mean to produce value, never an end. In remarks anticipating what would become decades later the triumph of rentier capitalism, Marx notes that "All nations with a capitalist mode of production are therefore seized periodically by a feverish attempt to make money without the intervention of the process of production" (K. Marx, Capital Volume

II, Part I, Chapter 1, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1885-c2/ch01.htm).

What is suggested in Lenin's and Trotsky's citation is that, while everywhere the capitalist dynamics became at their time dominated by finance capital, the "feverish attempt" for investments in property capital (in the sense of usurary capital) was more marked in France. This preference was due to several factors. One, the pregnancy of a mighty rentier class, whose birth dates back to the large sovereign debt of French public finances (due to wars and high military expenditures) well before the nineteenth century. Then, all over the nineteenth century, the thriving of a rentier class was facilitated by the presence of a large peasant population maintained thanks to the fragmentation of land ownership following the French revolution. The peasants, together with retail shoppers, were leveraged as a political counterweight to working-class movements by governments and in army to repress working class' strikes. Two, the successive regimes facilitated the consolidation of financial interests. It was the case during the Louis Philippe regime (1830). As said by Marx "It was not the French bourgeoisie that ruled under Louis Philippe, but one *faction* of it: bankers, stock-exchange kings, railway kings, owners of coal and iron mines and forests, a part of the landed proprietors associated with them – the so-called *financial aristocracy*" (Marx, K., *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*, January–October 1850, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/class-struggles-france/index.htm). Then, the Bonapartist regime (1852–1870) ran an industrial development based on large state-funded projects in infrastructures combined with a firm support to the banking system (the *Credit Mobilier*, a large French joint-stock bank founded in 1852 by Pereire brothers, represented a major experience of collecting savings to fund entrepreneurs).

The Third Republic (1871) was an era of prosperity for the rentiers. Their number considerably grew until World War I, reaching by 1910 eight million of depositors in French savings banks, and in 1913 their total assets were close to six billion francs – equivalent to around 18% of the French national debt (Ferguson 1994). A general improvement in revenues facilitated by strong macroeconomic growth increased considerably the wealth accumulated in France and made Paris "the quintessence of what one might indeed call a 'rentier society'" (Piketty et al. 2011).

Even after the defeat to Prussia, the French government was able to issue with a huge success two 5% government bond issues of 1871 and 1872 to finance war indemnities. Encouraged by a strong rentier social base, the French governments took measures to stimulate Paris as a major financial place with, as an evidence of state centrality, a tight control on the financial markets. In particular, it encouraged to invest in foreign securities with such a success that in 1911, foreign security purchases accounted for 38% of total French portfolio, from 25% in 1887 (Arbulu and Vaslin 2000). An appreciated measure was the passing of a law in the late 1880s exempting sovereign bonds from the introduced income tax and charging lower rates of stamp. Governmental initiatives facilitated the development by top French banks of a large network of foreign subsidiaries to promote foreign securities purchases.

This activism to issue foreign securities paid off for rentiers. On the 1880–1913 period, the return of foreign securities was much higher in France than in Britain: for the shares 12.84% vs 7.66% and for the bonds 6.88% vs 4.42% (Esteves 2011).

Three, the appetite for rent – and increasingly for foreign rents – could have been linked to a neglect for investing in domestic stocks. A research found that "French investors neglected French investments as the expected rate of return decreased, and turned to foreign assets when the anticipated rates of return on these investments increased" (Parent and Rault 2004). The authors conclude that it is a rational economic behavior based on diversification of portfolios in order to maximize the return-security couple. In any case, high, attractive returns on foreign securities were strongly linked to French government's involvement, something which made loaners more confident. The case of Russia is quite significant with an estimated 1,600,000 underwriters in France to the 14 loans negotiated with Russia until 1914 (Feis 1930). After 1880, Russia became the

leading recipient of French foreign investments, accounting for over 27% percent of them in 1914, from 7% in 1882. Russia was such a protected area for French finance capital, that in 1914, of the government owned debt 80% was held in France and only 14% in Great Britain. Nevertheless, the rate of growth of net overseas private long-term assets was considerably lower for France than for the United Kingdom (Fishlow, Albert, "Lessons from the Past: Capital Markets During the nineteenth Century and the Interwar Period," *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 3, Summer).

In the literature, the difference in respective orientation of foreign capital between France and the United Kingdom is often underlined. A majority of foreign securities was sold by French financial institutions to governments, an outstanding feature when compared to other developed countries. In several contracts negotiated with foreign governments, a clause required by the French government was that loan was conditional upon acquisition of French equipment by the borrowing country. Outstanding example is the Franco-Russian loan. They were associated with an active involvement of French companies, some of them through exporting from their home country, others by setting up local subsidiaries in metallurgy, mechanical equipment, oil, and mines.

Military orders were still key to the loans. To give an example, the French government used the occasion of the loan negotiations of 1909 to get orders for naval yards and equipment despite they were more expensive than their German rivals, as they could not have won the contract "in conditions of normal competition" (Spring 1988). Large French weapon producer Creusot took a direct part in the negotiation of loans proposed by French governments, and often the armament firms made advances, until the state of the market and disposition of the government should permit the issue of a public loan (Id., pp.127–128).

Other examples include the Bulgarian loan of 1896, when confronted to a contest between Krupp (Germany) and Schneider (France), the French government insisted on orders as a condition of placing the loan in Paris. A few months before the world war broke out, the bulk of a loan to Turkey was used for military preparation.

Turkey ordered in France six destroyers, two submarines to be built by Creusot, mountain guns, and seaplanes. Symptomatic of the conduct of governments and armaments firms, at the same time, a French mission was strengthening the Greek army and fortifications, and French firms received orders for weapons paid by the Greek government with the loan made by France (Feis, H, *op.* cited, p.329). Note that selling arms to two belligerent countries as were Greece and Turkey is a tradition French governments have kept on in the last decades (e.g., selling to India and Pakistan) .

All in all, Paris was a major financial power, ranking three behind London and New York in 1914, organizing complementary with London and benefiting from a very concentrated structure encouraged by the government.

France's Geopolitical and Economic Interests in Africa

France is one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In 2018, it ranked sixth in terms of world gross domestic product, seventh in terms of Portfolio Investment Assets (which are pure financial assets invested abroad), fifth in terms of Portfolio Investment liabilities (International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)), and eight in terms of both outward and inward foreign direct investment position (OECD, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics: Data, Analysis and Forecasts, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/statistics.htm). The extraction of value produced in foreign countries by developed countries, a major feature of "classical imperialism," has not remained an exclusivity of the United States. As showed in Fig. 1, since 2009 net financial services (receipts less expenses) that accrue to French banks and other financial institutions (right scale) have continuously increased. Likewise, a few dozens of French transnational non-financial corporations have been accumulating a growing amount of revenues from their offshore activities (left scale) while repatriating at home a growing share of these revenues: the share of dividends in total revenues from their offshore activities has jumped to 79% in 2017 from 49%

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Fig. 1 Revenues from foreign activities by large industrial and financial groups. (Source: Author from Balance of Payments data)

Source : Author from Balance of Payments data

in 2005). It is one reason for why France ranks also in the top of countries in terms of global gross financial assets of private households, sixth by the number of millionaires despite a limited total population compared to other industrialized countries (Crédit Suisse, *Global Wealth Report 2018*, October).

France is also a major military power. In 2017, according to SIPRI data, it ranked fifth in terms of military spending and sixth in terms of arms exports. France also stands as a major geopolitical power, thanks to the holding of a permanent seat at the Security Council. This position was awarded in 1945, when the countries having won the war gave themselves permanent membership, enjoying a privileged situation, with an exclusive veto power on world affairs. France's permanent seat is based on two pillars: the holding of nuclear weapons and the ambition to play a role in the world order through its strong regional presence in Africa and, to a lesser extent, in the Middle East. This explains that at the 1945 San Francisco conference and in the next decade, France, with the help of Britain and Belgium, waged an enduring action to prevent the UN to create a supervisory role for the UN in colonial territories (Pearson 2017).

The next sections focus on the role of Africa, which, by the interaction of economic and geopolitical factors, allowed France to remain a world power, while its economic influence on the world space has seriously declined in the last 10-plus years. It addresses the role of the region for French interest under "classical" imperialism and, then,

its enduring importance in contemporary era as evidenced by an acceleration of large military operations.

"Classical Imperialism": The Role of Colonies

On the eve of World War 1, France and Britain controlled most colonies in the world, and France possessed the largest Empire in African history.

There has been a long debate, backed on historical research to discuss the relationships between imperialism and colonialism. Both are sometimes considered as identical in the literature, a critic at times made to the Marxist approach to imperialism, as *real* colonization by European powers is said to have brought about limited economic benefits. Still, in the Marxist literature, imperialism is not equated with colonialism. There is a compelling evidence that Lenin did not confuse both processes (See his major opus, but also his notebook preparatory to the latter, "*finance capital (monopolies, banks, oligarchy, buying up,* etc.*) is not an accidental excrescence on capitalism, but its ineradicable continuation and product.... Not merely colonies, but also (a) export of capital; (b) monopolies; (c) a financial network of connections and dependencies; (d) omnipotence of the banks; (e) concessions and bribes.*" See also Stokes 1969) (who shows that the objective of Lenin's major opus was not to explain the formation of colonial empires but the driving forces leading to war). Instead, the deep interaction between economic, political, and cultural drivers is present in this literature.

As regards France, it is only by proceeding with economic reductionism and having a deep misunderstanding of the role of Africa in the history of French capitalism that it could be claimed that colonies are not a structural component – which go beyond the sole economic factors – of French imperialism. Extra-economic drivers include ideological factors, with the "moral issue" being the most outstanding feature of imperialism impulse (Brunschwig 1960) – e.g., bringing civilization to primitive people, a tradition long established and still alive in the "patrie de la déclaration des droits de l'homme" (One of the early designers of colonization, A. Sarraut, stated that: *La France qui colonise va organiser l'exploitation pour son avantage sans doute, mais aussi pour l'avantage général du monde* (colonization carried out by France is for her own interest, but also aims at improving the welfare of the world), Coquery-Vidrovitch (1979)). Political factors, both internal and external, played also a role. Among internal factors, after 1870, French military found in colonial conquest a response to the humiliation provoked by a sweeping military defeat, the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, and the *Commune de Paris*, led to a significant migration of people from the Alsace and Lorraine to the Maghreb region. That colonization was at least partially a desire to quell social unrest has been also underlined in the British case (See Cain and Hopkins 1980). An external overarching political motive could have been that conquering colonies was the better way to prevent other developed countries to take possession of new territories and paved the way for further use when needed. It was the case for France after World War I. The closure of Russia as an important outlet for financial and trade exports led manufacturers and banks as well to increase their activities in direction of colonies (Girault 1993). Thus, a new appreciation of African colonies emerged during the interwar period. In the process, economic rent became a stated objective of trade with Africa, and the banking reform proposals of 1931–1932 (implemented by the *Front populaire* in 1936) aimed at "substituting a trade system integrated in capitalism to the existing economy of looting" (Coquery-

Vidrovitch, *op. cited*, p.59). According to historical research, it was during the interwar period that a modern conception of use of African colonies emerged in political and economic circles. Between 1913 and 1936, trade with African colonies massively increases. In proportion of total French trade, imports rose from 10% to 28.5% and exports from 14% to 33%. The apex in metropolitan-African colonies was reached in the 1950s, when a dramatic regime change took place in the post-war era: in 1958, 37.5% of French exports went to and 27.6% of imports came from the French zones. The growing importance of trade with African colonies, which reflected the loss of weakness of competitiveness on foreign markets and was mainly based on the exploitation of natural resources (e.g., cotton) and not on the development of industrial capabilities in colonies, was accompanied with harsher social conditions. Forced labor, a well-established practice on the continent, was massively used in the interwar period to build infrastructures (ports, railways, roads) and exploit natural resource dimension (Chafer 2016). Its extension was facilitated by the increase in taxation, a vivid example that "primitive accumulation" remained a permanent process. Economic rentability of business in Africa became a stated objective, and banking system reforms proposed in 1931–1932 (and also implemented by the *Front populaire* in 1936) aimed at "substituting a trade system integrated in capitalism to the existing economy of looting" (*la réforme bancaire devait permettre de substituer à l'économie de pillage antérieure un commerce integré au capitalisme*) (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1979, p.59).

Finally, military factors mattered in the possession of colonies. One, the armed forces were keen to have a training field to prepare more serious conflicts with developed countries which were simmering. Two, unlike Britain, French Africa sent 450,000 soldiers to Europe during the 1914–1918 War, with the largest contingents coming from Algeria (172,800), West Africa (90,000), Morocco (37,300), and Madagascar (34,400) for the defense of the metropole (Koller 2008). Africa also provided 135,000 wartime workers (most from the Maghreb) for French factories (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1978). After

the end of the war, the return to the traditional flow of imports (palm oil, palm kernel and peanuts) from France would destroy these nascent industries in North Africa (Koller 2008, *op.cited*, p.112) and destroy the nascent industrialization of the colonies brought about by the import of industrial goods by the Metropole during the conflict.

During World War II, the contribution of African troops was still more important accounting for 9% of total French troops against 3% during World War I.

Africa Remains Central for the International Status of France

The process of independence of colonies that occurred at the turn of the 1950s was accompanied by a comprehensive Gaullist strategy to maintain domination on these territories or, in De Gaulle's words, to move from "colonization to cooperation." Economic interests remained fundamental, with 138 conventions or cooperation agreements on economic issues were signed between France and its former colonies between July 1959 and July 1963 (Meimon 2007). Protection of economic interest was buttressed by a massive military presence was agreed on by most former colonies' governments and 13 formal defense and military cooperation accords were signed in the early 1960s. Thanks to these accords, France did not wage a war but responded to a formal call for assistance from a sovereign African government whose national security is under threat.

Over decades, the number of military troops deployed in Africa was seriously reduced, reflecting a variety of reasons, including budgetary constraints in France, a growing reluctance of African population, and changes in African government policy, keen to be rid of a total dependence on France. The flow of bilateral trade between France and its former colonies also declined in proportion of their global trade. Already in 1971, the trade of France with its former colonies in proportion of its total foreign trade was only 5.9% (exports) and 4% (imports). Those ratios went on declining in the last decade, but they were to some extent compensated for by the flows of trade with other African countries since in 2017 the whole Africa accounted for 13% of total exports and 11% of imports. Given France trade deficit reaching a disastrous 80 billion euros in 2017 (with the main deficit being with the EU), the 2.9 billion euros surplus registered with Africa the same year appears as a boon for France.

These macroeconomic data do not, however, expose the full scope of economic ties between France and Africa. For example, the French presence in Africa through foreign direct investment and flows of trade is focused on the critical and strategic sectors of most French blue chips, including Areva, Total, Vivendi, France Telecom, Bouygues, Suez, Veolia Environnement, and Bolloré, confirming Schumpeter's (1951) analysis of imperialism as a boon to sectional interests. The Sahel region, where most military operations are carried out, is a strategic region from a nuclear perspective. In 2017, France imported 98.7% and China 1.3% of African uranium exports (BCAO (2018), Rapport Sur Le Commerce Extérieur De l'UEMOA En 2017, Dakar, August). In France, where around 75% of electricity generation is nuclear produced and added to the role of nuclear deterrence, preserving the French nuclear power giant's Areva presence in Africa is vital. The group has remained strongly dependent on Niger's uranium, even though its share of its total production which accounted for more than 30% of its total production fell to 21% in 2016, as the French group has been prospecting for years in other countries (Canada and Kazakhstan). Africa is also vital to France's oil supply. Total, for instance, relied in 2017 on Africa (excluding North Africa) for 22% of its production and 25% of natural gas (2017 registration document). The French blue chip is the largest major based on the volume of hydrocarbon production and by the number of Group-branded service stations (over 4500) on the African continent. French interests are also highly present in public infrastructure such as telecommunications, roads, and water and in timber and plantation agriculture. In all of these ways, French capital has established deep and resilient claims in Africa and thus has been able to resist or fend off the dramatic changes in the continent over the past decade. From the standpoint of French capital in the former

colonies, this deep penetration serves as a platform for expansion across the continent as a whole. Other countries endowed with huge mineral reserves, including Gabon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mauritania, etc., are under strong influence of French large transnational corporations. Finally, although Africa accounts for only a modest share of French military exports, it remains an important ground for testing and using the weapons that France produces, as discussed below.

This centrality of the continent for French interest is confirmed by the fact that from 2000 to 2017, the rate of growth of French foreign direct investment (FDI) positions to the continent (+802%) (Computation from *Banque de France data* by the author) considerably overtook those realized in the world (+208%). FDI to the French Franc zone increased much more (+569%) than to OECD countries (+188%) reflecting an attempt for further embeddedness in the African "précarré."

In short, from a strictly economic perspective, Africa offers the following benefits: a large trade surplus that helps to compensate for France's global trade deficit; large financial incomes from direct and portfolio investments by French TNCs; and secure access to strategic and critical raw materials.

Another dimension of France's economic interest in Africa is the monetary zone, which was established in 1948 to create a preferential space for French capital and state interests. For decades, this monetary regime has allowed France to virtually control the monetary policies of its former colonies. Neither the devastating effects of structural adjustment policies, which resulted in a massive devaluation of the Franc CFA in January 1994, nor the creation of the euro, put an end to the French-controlled monetary zone in Africa. The French Ministry of Finance determines the rate of exchange for the Franc CFA, which is used by approximately 130 million Africans. A collateral advantage of the monetary zone in the context of financial deregulation is the large scale of capital outflows, which often escape the control of regulatory institutions. In fact, the level of capital flight from former French colonies is impressive, and the existence of a "zone Franc CFA" is a condition for this to occur. As the Franc CFA is convertible to euros and freely transferable to France, large French companies and other investors in Africa can exploit differences between the euro and the French CFA to repatriate capital to their own benefit and to that of other French financial institutions. What is clear is that capital flight from the countries of the former French empire, including Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo, could not occur without the economic connections to France and the persistence of dense "Franceafrique" networks. The Franc CFA is a tool of finance capital for imposing a neocolonial relationship on Africa (Ndongo Samba Sylla, "The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa," http://roape.net/2017/05/18/cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-africa/).

Acceleration of Large Military Operations and Foreign Projection

That the African former colonies are of critical economic and geopolitical importance is evidenced by the number of military interventions carried out by France during the last decades. Indeed, no official record exists, a significant reflection of the nature of political institutions (the Gaullist Fifth Republic) with large and uncontrolled power given to the president of the Republic and the absence of check and balance. Comparative research characterizes the French parliament as "one of the most impotent parliaments in foreign and defense policies" (Ostermann 2017). Another factor facilitating the military surge is the overcentralized decision-making process, buttressed on right-wing political consensus and compounded by an absence of significant anti-war movements, whose the capacity of mobilization fall behind a considerable margin from those acting in other European countries (e.g., in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Nordic countries).

Estimates on the number of military foreign operations range from 111 between 1991 and 2015 to 130 entre 1960 and 2011 (See Serfati, Claude, *op.cited*). In relation with the "2008 moment," France's use of force to protect

geopolitical and economic interests in its "backyard" (*précarré*), increased in number and intensity in recent years, with major operations engaged in Africa (Ivory Coast and Libya in 2011, Mali 2013, Central African Republic 2013), Sahel (2014), and in the Middle East (Syria and Iraq, 2014) . The concentration in time and the large scope of aforementioned operations marked a further amplification of French interventionist policy. In a speech which is a reminder of what was said a decade before by G. W. Bush when he decided to go to war in Iraq, President Hollande declared in the early days of military intervention in Mali that France "will stay with you [in Mali] as long as necessary" (Speech by François Hollande, Bamako, 2 February 2013), leading authoritative *Le Monde* to write 5 years after this claim that "Mali is our Afghanistan" (Christophe Ayad, "Le Mali est notre Afghanistan," *Le Monde*, 16 November 2017). In late 2018, Hollande's commitment was still confirmed by E. Macron, his successor (Cf *Le Figaro* "La France engagée au Sahel 'jusqu'à la victoire' contre les djihadistes, assure Emmanuel Macron" (France will stay in Sahel until "we win" against terrorists' confirms Emmanuel Macron), 17 December 2018).

In 2018, there were almost 20,000 soldiers deployed abroad, of which about 10% were involved in special operations, a significant increase in the number of such deployment. An international comparison in the ratio of force deployed in military operations abroad (overseas territories excluded)-to-total forces shows that in 2016 France ranked two with 8.90% behind the United States (14.9%), slightly ahead of United Kingdom (8.8%), Russia (6.7%), and Germany (1.7%) (Pwc (2017), *Global Defense Perspectives* 2017, November). A comparison between France and the United Kingdom when overseas territories are considered offers interesting insights on their geopolitical priorities. The quasi-totality of French presence abroad is split between (1) Africa and half of military there is concentrated in the Sahel region, reflecting the priority given to the protection of its geopolitical and economic interests in its "backyard," and (2) French overseas territories (over 54% of its military abroad). Both the Sahel region and overseas territories

(Caribbean, New Caledonia, French Polynesia (The United Nations includes Polynesia in its list of Non-Self-Governing Territories since 1986), Réunion/Mayotte, etc.) are the backbone of the international geopolitical presence of France and as such are listed as top priority in France's defense strategy. Thanks to this overseas territory, France boasts to have the second-largest exclusive economic zone worldwide after the United States. By contrast, the UK military abroad are overwhelmingly concentrated in Europe (73.8%), reflecting the full integration of UK forces in NATO, while North Africa and sub-Saharan region accounts together for over 20%.

There are a set of interacting drivers that account for the resurgence in France's military interventions in Africa. One is the need for France to preserve its geopolitical and economic interest in Africa. Military interventions are one vector for keeping France as a world power. It is not by chance that the country is particularly active at the Security Council on Africa issues, accounting for 70% of UN resolutions on matters regarding the continent, and acts as the "penholder" (The penholder system emerged around 2010. A council member may act as a penholder "when it is deemed to add value, taking into account as appropriate the expertise and/or contributions of Council members on the subjects" (presidential Note 507 updated in 2017)) for Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, and Mali.

Given the strategic importance of Africa for France, the decline in the last years of French economic position in the region is worrying. This is not only due to China's ambitions, but to European competition, with Germany becoming the first European exporting country in the African continent. In the context of a new "economic scramble" for Africa, for France the preservation of leading position in its former colonies is still more needed, and military operations to support local governments is part of this strategy.

Then, the role of military cannot be underestimated. At the top, there is the Chief of the Military Staff of the president of the Republic in charge of preparing foreign interventions well beyond contingency plans. Indeed, French

expertise in foreign engagements draws an emphatic assessment from US military. "The expeditionary culture that serves the French army" is confirmed by a French analyst, who describes "today's marine regiments' approach explicitly as 'colonial'" (Shurkin). Another driver to military interventions is the defense industry. The unique features of the defense industry have been long analyzed in the United States and often named "military-industrial complex" after 1961's President Eisenhower farewell address. Rather than this loose wording, and drawing on findings in industrial economics, the French industry has been analyzed as a meso-system, based on dense and interactive market and non-relations between its components. The French Armament meso-system (FAMS) is, because of the centrality of military in France, endowed with endogenous mechanisms of self-reproduction (Serfati 1995). Major agents in the FAMS are large defense contractor group with ten industrial groups accounting for over 80% of arms production and over 20% of total (civilian and military) French exports and also defense and nuclear related-technological agencies. Also central is the *Délégation Générale à l'armement* (DGA), the MoD's body in charge of procurement policy which acts as the backbone of the FAMS and is in permanent interaction with the armies to define operational needs. The FAMS draws a benefit from both increase of defense budget and military operations serving as a "combat-proven" label well appreciated by customers. As emphatically observed by the Ministry of defense, "'the combat-proven label of French weapons constitutes a major industrial advantage in sales'" (Ministère de la défense 2018).

The balance sheet of domination of French geopolitical and economic interests on its former colonies is pretty bleak. Focusing on the sub-Saharan region, when measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), the record is even appalling. Mauritania ranks 156, Mali 179, Burkina Faso 183, Chad 185, and Niger 188 that is the last in the UN list. One century and half ago, as colonization paid off for French ruling class and local elites, its costs for the colonizing power was a modest 0.29% of French annual budget. Of that sum, 83% went to military and central administration and only 17% to French West Africa's development (Huillery 2014). This imbalance in priorities funded one century ago is striking, but it is more revealing that a significant imbalance in favor of military is still visible in actual French policy. Figure 2 compares for the 2013–2016 period (2016, last available year for Official Development Assistance, ODA) the cost of foreign military operations in the Sahel area and the amount of ODA allocated to social infrastructure and services (education, water, sanitation) by France to the five countries making up the "G5 force" which French governments set up to "Africanise" war to terror. Public aid considerably trails behind military expenditures, with the

Source: Author, based on French parliamentary reports and OECD data on Official development Aid (ODA). Conversion of euros in dollars based on OECD National Accounts Statistics.

France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism, Fig. 2 Military costs of interventions in Sahel region and France's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to this region (million euros). (Source: Author, based on French parliamentary reports and OECD data on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Conversion of euros in dollars based on OECD National Accounts Statistics)

ODA-to-OPEX ratio oscillating between 0.15 and 0.28. Clearly, the intensification of military interventions is given priority over developmental objectives.

Another dark picture is that the sub-Saharan region is also the lowest-scoring region on the corruption composite index established by the NGO *Transparency International*, which include corruption, democratic, and free media issues. "Bad governance," as said by the World Bank, is quite compatible with an intensive support given by the former colonial power in the region to authoritarian governments.

France's Military Surge and the "2008 Moment"

The increased military involvement in Africa is only an element of a more broader France's military surge observed since the end of the last decade. Three other trends are revealing on this military surge. One, on the 2007–2017 period, defense expenditures (Milex) and public order and safety (We follow here the COFOG classification) have increased at a higher rate than the total of general government expenditures (Table 3). Not only the increase of spending is significant by absolute numbers, but it the contrast with the evolution of key civilian budgets is also impressive. As education enjoyed a more limited growth than Milex and security, large cuts were made in environment, housing and community amenities, environmental protection, development recreational and sporting services, and housing development budgets.

France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism, Table 3 General government expenditure by main functions governmental expenditures

2007–2017 growth	%
Total	23.6
Public order and safety	39.4
Defense	31.5
Education	16.1
Environmental protection	5.7
Cultural services	7.0
Recreational and sporting services	3.4
Housing development	-12.0

Source: Author from *National Accounts*

Moreover, in the pluriannual law on public expenditures (2018–2022), the rate of growth in military expenditures is much higher than other any civilian budget, including education and health.

Two, arms exports have increased by a margin in relation with the intensification of military operations. Ever since the earlies 1960s, weapon exports have been a major objective of the French meso-system of armaments, with a share of 30% of production exported being necessary to alleviate the defense budget's burden. According to SIPRI data, France delivered major arms to 81 countries in 2013–2017. Figure 3 gives the evolution of arms exports deliveries and orders between 2009 and 2017. As those figures have to be cautiously read, given the strong differences in data according different sources, they still indicate an increase in arms exports resulting of an active "military diplomacy" based on an unrelentless quest of customers, including when weapons could be used against civilian populations, as it is the case in Egypt and Yemen, triggering claims of a possible France's complicity in war crimes.

Three, as showed in Table 3, France has also been increasing its internal security apparatus, and the trend began much well before the terror attacks that hit Paris and the country in 2015. French governments have reacted to terror attacks by the implementation of a state of emergency in France, and the mobilization of 10,000 soldiers deployed in metropolitan France to protect the population against attacks is still active 5 years after.

Indeed, France could be, among western countries, an outstanding example of the tightening of defense (against foreign enemies) and security (at home) relations. The defense-security nexus, blurring the boundaries between external and internal threats, has a long historical record in France (above); it has strengthened after terror attacks, combining with a protracted targeting of "visible minorities" (For an analysis of the defense-security nexus, Claude Serfati, *Le militaire*, op.cited, chapter 5 "Vers l'état d'urgence permanent?"). France is the only country among democratic countries hit by terror attacks to have set for

France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism, Fig. 3 French arms exports 2011–2018, million euros. Source: Authors, from Ministry of Defence, French customs, SIPRI database

18 months long a "state of emergency." This "addiction," as it is called by a number of NGOs (Benedicte Jeannerod, "France is addicted to the state of emergency. Put an end to it, Mr. President," 11 July 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/11/france-addicted-state-emergency-put-end-it-mr-president), stopped only to be replaced by a series of laws further criticized by NGOS as establishing a permanent state of emergency that could harm citizens' rights to liberty, security, freedom of assembly, and religion. The UN special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism expressed concerns about the 2017 counterterrorism law, which incorporates state of emergency powers into ordinary law and includes insufficient safeguards in the use of non-criminal measures against terrorism suspects. There is few doubt that the ease with which public and civil liberties can be further restricted in France is encouraged by overcentralized French political institutions, combined with a long established tradition in the country of the domination of the "executive power over the legislative power . . . [which] in contrast to the legislative one, expresses the heteronomy of a nation in contrast to its autonomy" (K. Marx, in his analysis of Bonapartism in France, *op. cited*, chapter 7).

Moreover, France's police, well known for a massive use of violence for decades, is the only one in Europe to deploy infamously called "nonlethal" weapons such as the Flash-Ball (or LBD), a gun that fires high-speed rubber bullets, which mutilated dozens of demonstrators during the 2019 "yellow vest" movement.

Conclusion: Analyzing French Military Surge in the Broader Context of the Global Political Economy of Imperialism

This essay is based on a hypothesis which allows to characterize the actual global political economy, defined as the "2008 moment," as a new configuration of imperialism. This framework is useful to analyze the French military surge.

The components making up the "2008 moment" had serious consequences on France's international status. On the economic side, the global deterioration of France's economic situation observed since the early 2000s is still more visible when compared to Germany. Both countries are leading the EU economy with over one-third GDP (respectively, 21.4% and 14.9%) in 2017. For over one decade, the divergence in economic performances on the world and EU markets between the two countries dramatically

increased. This growing asymmetry is not only a further source of instability for the EU, as the French-German "couple" has been the backbone of EU developments ever since 1958. It has also become a concern in French political establishment that their country becomes a junior partner in economy-related matters because of the growing role of Germany in the governance of the Union.

The "2008 moment" had also deep geopolitical effect on France. The turn in US Administration as regards its foreign military wars, which combined with the "Arab Spring" in countries with large French geoeconomic interests, compelled France to military intervene to defend its interests in Africa and in a lesser extent in the Middle East. It also opened a "window for opportunity" to the government to reassert its leading role among the very few group of countries able to complete and if needed replace the United States in its role of western leader in some regions of the world. Sarkozy's stubborn support to Tunisia's Ben Ali authoritarian regime until January 2011, after massive demonstrations demanding his removal which initiated the "Arab Spring" was replaced 2 months later by a war in Libya dressed in humanitarian clothes to defeat a dictator ((Gaddafi had been received in France with an incredible pump a few years before by Sarkozy, travelling with an entourage of 400 officials and erecting a Bedouin tent for his stay close to the *Palais de l'Elysée* (presidential house) . The two parties signed a cooperation accord including the sale by France of nuclear facilities and military equipment)), to which France successfully embarked its NATO allies (March 2011). The France-inspired regime change in Libya had deep destabilizing effects on the region, as two million working immigrants (mostly from sub-Saharan Africa) out of seven million residents were working in Libya and sent remittances to their families. The regional chaos, in turn, triggered a series of French military interventions in the Sahel region (notably in Mali in January 2013) and in the Middle East.

The general features of the world situation – more precisely that the tightening of economic and military links encapsulated in the "2008 moment" – are useful to understand this military surge. France is with the United States, the western country where economic and politico-military powers are the most interwoven in the shaping of their international position, even though France and the United States are obviously not competing in the same league. And, as the interaction between economy and geopolitics became closer since the end of the 2000s, this reflected in a French military surge that took diverse forms described above. In short, France attempted to leverage its military power as a "competitive advantage" on the world space, while it suffered a loss of "economic competitiveness." This military leverage is wielded for different objectives. At the world level, it aimed at protecting geopolitical and economic interests. At the European level, because of the growing imbalance between France and Germany in their economic performances weakening the role of France in EU governance, it supports France's activism to promote an EU defense agenda which would allow the country to remain a key factor in EU developments (Serfati, Claude, *The French military*, op. cited). At the national level, it provides some arguments for increasing military and security budgets. Here, the role of agency must be factored in. Given the historical centrality of military in France, powerful vested interests are at work. They include the executive power, totally dominated in France by the president who control the military establishment – active in favor of military interventions – through top officer seating as "special president's chief of state" (*chef d'état-major particulier du Président)*, who is the only one not to be hit by the "spoil system" after presidential election. It also includes the French Armaments Meso-System (FAMS). To sum up, the "structural" drivers at work at the world level impact the national level but they do so in a way which is peculiar to any country. As far as France is concerned, the historical centrality of the military in sociopolitical relations and the proximity of economic and geopolitical interests in the international positioning of the country are key éléments to understand France's military surge since the end of the last decade.

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Francophone Caribbean

► Louverture, Toussaint (c.1743–1803)

Francophonie

► Senghor, Leopold Sédar (1906–2001)

Free Officers

► Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Free Trade

► Neo-liberalism and Financialization

Freedom

► Jazz: *Come On and Let's Get Free*

Free-Trade Areas

► Ukrainian Capitalism and Inter-imperialist Rivalry

French Colonial Empire

► France and Imperialism

F

French Colonialism

► Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism

French Indochinese War, 1945–1954

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Synonyms

Cold War, The; US War in Vietnam, 1954–1975

Definition/Description

Overview of the war, from its causes to the implementation of the peace agreement, from the viewpoint of international history. The connections of this war with the overall development of the Cold War, in Europe as well as in Asia, are a fundamental characteristic of this colonial conflict.

Introductory Paragraph

The peculiarity of the French Indochina war among conflicts of decolonization consists in the

intensity of its connections with the general dip-
lomatic history of the period. This is why the
history of the war has benefited invaluably from
the international history of the Cold War which
has developed since the early 1990s. Furthermore,
very recent openings of archives provide informa-
tion on the decision-making process of the French
and Vietnamese communist parties. The present
entry synthetizes these findings.

The war can be divided in two distinct periods.
Up to June, 1950, it was a colonial struggle of
regional significance and moderate intensity. The
Korean War transformed it in a major East-West
conflict.

French Indochina

The conquest of Indochina by France is a by-
product of the "opening" of China in the mid-
nineteenth century. It started in 1858 as a response
to the assassination of Catholic missionaries in
Vietnam, a tributary state of China, and was
extended northward as France looked for an
inland waterway to China. When French Indo-
china – named Indochinese Union in 1887 –
took its final form in 1900, Vietnam had been
divided in one colony (Cochinchina/Nam Bô in
the South) and two protectorates (Annam/Trung
Bô in the center, Tonkin/Bac Bô in the North). The
Union also included two non-Vietnamese protec-
torates, Cambodia and Laos. The legal distinction
between colony and protectorates meant little in
fact: the kings of Cambodia and Laos, and the
emperor of Vietnam who reigned in Annam,
were only nominal monarchs. French civil ser-
vants ruled in the five "countries," and the Union
as a whole was supervised since 1891 by the
Colonial Office. In addition, France was endowed
with a sphere of influence in southwestern China,
linked to Tonkin by the Yunnan railway.

There were few French residents in Indochina,
consisting mainly of civil servants, military per-
sonnel, and businessmen. Indochina was the eco-
nomic "jewel" of the French empire, thanks above
all to the large rubber plantations in Cochinchina
owned by companies such as Michelin and to rice
exports from the Red River delta in Tonkin. At the
local level, French administration relied on village

chiefs. Vietnamese personnel, deemed more
"enlightened" by the French, often served as
junior administrative personnel in Cambodia and
Laos. French citizenship was granted to some
assimilated Indochinese. These were a select
few, since higher education was limited. Vietnam-
ese Catholics, who had often served as interpreters
during the conquest and had been rewarded with
land, the landed elite of the Red River delta, and a
few important Chinese and Vietnamese tradesmen
could be counted either as supporters of French
rule or as members of a "loyal opposition" which,
at least before World War II, asked for a constitu-
tion but not for independence.

French rule had been accepted on the whole in
Cambodia and Laos, since it has prevented these
weak states from being partitioned between Siam
and Vietnam, but Vietnam was not officially pac-
ified before the end of the nineteenth century. At
this time, traditional civil servants (mandarins),
who previously had led the resistance to French
rule, were coopted as agents of a limited, conser-
vative modernization. This policy inspired, for
instance, the education provided to emperor Bao
Dai (1913–1997), who was to be acquainted with
French thought and civilization, but not enough to
cause political trouble, and the promotion of local
varieties of Buddhism in Cambodia and Laos to
contain Siamese influence.

A non-communist nationalist opposition existed
in Vietnam since the beginning of the twentieth
century, inspired by republican China and imperial
Japan. The main party of this persuasion was the
Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD), modeled
after the Chinese Guomindang. But after an aborted
insurrection in 1931 which was severely repressed,
the VNQDD survived only in exile. The Marxist left
prospered during the more politically lenient popu-
lar front governments of the late 1930s, but it was
deeply divided between Stalinists and Trotskyists,
and communist organizations of all stripes were
banned when France entered World War II.

World War II: Crucible of the Vietnamese Revolution

The Japanese occupation of Indochina provided
the setting which made possible the Vietnamese

revolution of 1945. The Japanese army occupied Tonkin in September 1940 and the whole Indochina in July 1941, both to deny use of the Yunnan railway to the Guomindang government, then located in Chongqing, and to base air forces that would strike further South. The 1940 armistice between Germany and the Vichy regime had left all French colonies intact, and Japan likewise acknowledged French sovereignty over Indochina. French authorities were left in place, but Indochinese material resources were diverted to the Japanese war effort. To divert the population from collaboration with Japan and Siam, Admiral Decoux, the governor general, took several measures to promote both national and Indochinese cultural identities (for instance, the creation of a cycling tour of Indochina). But unavoidable submission to Japanese demands undermined the legitimacy of French rule. For instance, during the mass starvation of 1944–1945, French authorities diverted rice from public granaries to feed the Japanese army.

The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) seized the opportunity provided by the Japanese occupation of Tonkin to launch an insurrection in Cochinchina in November 1940. It was badly coordinated and severely repressed. This complete failure wiped out the ICP apparatus in the South, leaving the Trotskyists as the dominant force on the left in this part of the country. From then on, the rural Northwest of Vietnam, near the Chinese border, would be the stronghold of the ICP.

From his travels in China, Hô Chi Minh (1890–1969), the Annamese-born Komintern operative who had founded the ICP in 1930, had a firsthand knowledge of the "New Democracy" line adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1937. Like the New Democracy, the Vietminh (Alliance for Independence of Vietnam, founded in clandestinity by the ICP on May 19, 1941) was a broad national front which prioritized national liberation over class struggle, but only as a temporary tactic, since according to party leaders, the anti-imperialist struggle itself, in the context of the world war, could hasten the socialist revolution. Just like the CCP, the ICP viewed itself as a part of the communist movement led by the Soviet Union, but had to adapt its methods to a country endowed with a large peasantry and a small proletariat, under conditions of foreign occupation. Vietminh fighters were able to seize several granaries and distribute the rice to peasants during the starvation of 1944–1945, thereby gaining their sympathy.

The Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, provided the Vietminh with an opportunity to plan a general uprising. After a raid of the US Navy on the coast of Vietnam, on January 12, 1945, the Japanese military jailed French officials to prevent them from assisting in an eventual Allied landing. The Japanese abolished French sovereignty over Indochina, reunified Vietnam, proclaimed independence of the three states, and forced the monarchs to nominate nationalist cabinets. Even before the coup, the Japanese had encouraged several nationalist entities such as the Cao Dai (urban) and Hòa Hào (rural) sects. They filled the new cabinets with genuine nationalists, but handed them very limited powers and did not cease requisitions. The popularity of their protégés declined accordingly. This political situation, and the fact that a sizeable part of the French repressive apparatus was now in jail, prompted the Vietminh to act. When Japan surrendered on August 10, 1945, the Vietminh launched a general uprising.

The Vietnamese Revolution

If the Japanese surrender made the Vietnamese revolution possible, the interallied conference at Potsdam (July 17–August 2, 1945) determined its characteristics. The conference assigned the disarmament of Japanese troops and the temporary occupation of Indochina to Chinese military authorities North of the 16th parallel and to British ones in the South. When Japan surrendered, neither the British nor the Chinese were present in Indochina. Since it was the Japanese that US President Harry Truman had invested with police tasks before the arrival of the allies, French authorities remained in jail. The Vietnamese revolutionaries took advantage of this power vacuum, and Japanese troops let them operate, defending only the buildings of the Indochinese central bank.

The resignation of the Trân Trong Kim cabinet on August 13 set off a series of peasant uprisings,

some spontaneous and others communist-inspired, which allowed the Vietminh to march South and take Hanoi on August 19. Emperor Bao Dai abdicated. A "Southern Committee" and a coalition cabinet were formed in Saigon and Hanoi, respectively, composed of a majority of communist members and a minority of non-communist nationalists. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was founded in Hanoi on September 2, 1945, with Hô as president. The power of the Vietminh was much more secure in the North than in the South, where it had to compete with the sects and the Trotskyists.

Of course, the independence of the three states was legally null and void, since it had been unilaterally proclaimed in wartime by the Japanese enemy. The Provisional Government of the French Republic (PGFR) never thought of granting them recognition, for if the Free French accepted to endow Indochina with some measures of social welfare and a limited dose of parliamentarism, they agreed with Vichy that the empire was the main claim of France to great power status. The PGRF did not even accept the reunification of Vietnam.

British military authorities in Saigon sympathized with GFR delegates. Both ignored the Southern Committee, which reacted by calling a general strike. In response, General Gracey proclaimed martial law and, on September 23, evicted the Committee from the Saigon town hall. The Committee and its troops fled to the countryside, where they were pursued by British soldiers and the French Expeditionary Corps to Indochina (FEC), which had now arrived in Cochinchina, using Japanese troops as auxiliaries. The FEC then proceeded to Cambodia, where the nationalist prime minister, Son Ngoc Thanh, was arrested on October 15. King Sihanouk signed in January 1946 an agreement with France which mentioned the internal autonomy of Cambodia, but within the limits set by the *Union Française* (French Union, the new name of the empire). These were unspecified at the time of the agreement, since they would be set by the new constitution that France would adopt in 1946. The agreement also provided that Cambodia would get a constitution with universal male suffrage.

North of the 16th parallel, the Chinese occupation was a blessing in disguise for the DRV. The Chinese military looted the country, and they exerted such political pressure in favor of minority VNQDD members of the cabinet that, to prevent a Chinese coup in their behalf, the ICP nominally dissolved itself in November 1945, thereby earning the suspicion of Stalin. (The party simply went underground.) But the occupation allowed the Vietminh to gain time, since China would not let the FEC reenter Tonkin prior to the relinquishment of French extraterritorial rights in China. The Sino-French treaty was signed on February 26, 1946.

China even saved the DRV from the military repression that the Southern Committee had suffered. General Leclerc, the commander of the FEC, wanted to land in Tonkin in March 1946, to gain time, if necessary, to repress a local uprising before the rainy season. Tide calendar made it imperative to land on March 6 at Haiphong, the port of Hanoi. On March 5, the Chinese government conditioned the landing to the prior conclusion of a political treaty between France and the DRV. Jiang Jieshi needed peace at his southern border to concentrate on the civil war against Maoists in northern China. It was also feared that , if Chinese military authorities had allowed the French to land without any agreement with the DRV, the Vietnamese might have exacted revenge against the Chinese community in Tonkin. Hence the agreement of March 6, 1946, between France and the DRV. This text recognized the DRV as a "free state" within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. It provided for a referendum on the reunification of Vietnam and allowed the FEC to remain on DRV soil for no more than 5 years.

The FEC then proceeded to Laos, where the nationalist Lao Issara (Free Lao) cabinet was deposed on April 25. The three princes who headed the Lao Issara followed different paths: Phetsarath fled to Thailand, Souphanouvong (who had married a Vietnamese) became an ally of the DRV, and Souvanna Phouma played the political game within the French Union. Like Cambodia, Laos became a constitutional monarchy within the Union.

The Political Deadlock Between France and the DRV

Militarily, the March 6 agreement gave time to the DRV to smuggle arms from China and, should war start with the French, to plan the removal of its political and military apparatus to the countryside. Politically, it allowed it to negotiate the conditions of its "association" with France. But since the agreement had been extorted by China, the French were reluctant to negotiate with the DRV. Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, the new high commissioner in Indochina, a fervent Gaullist, was keen to implement the declaration on Indochina proclaimed by the PGFR on March 24, 1945. This text envisioned the creation of a new "Indochinese Federation" consisting of five "countries" – the reunification of Vietnam was not on the agenda. Civil liberties and equal access to public charges were granted, but only a limited kind of parliamentarism would be allowed: ministers would be responsible to the governor of Indochina, not to local parliaments. The governor would keep very large economic powers, for French planners wanted Indochina – which contained coal in Tonkin and hydroelectricity in Annam – to replace defeated Japan as the industrial powerhouse of East Asia. (The war would soon dry up the public funds that such a plan called for.) D'Argenlieu was certain that De Gaulle, who resigned from the presidency of the PGFR on January 19, 1946, would soon return to power, and he wanted the Gaullist vision for Indochina to be implemented. His unilateral decisions infuriated his superiors in Paris, but they were never countermanded, for Georges Bidault (1899–1983), who was prime minister during the negotiation with the DRV, belonged to a Christian Democratic party which professed to be "faithful" to De Gaulle; he was also very anti-communist and a hard-liner in colonial matters. Even Marius Moutet, the socialist minister of colonies, did not object to the initiatives of d'Argenlieu.

Moutet even inspired the measure that the DRV found the most provocative. Since the March 6 agreement provided for a referendum on the reunification of Vietnam, Moutet advised d'Argenlieu to launch a propaganda on the theme of "Cochinchina for the Cochinchinese." On June 1, d'Argenlieu created a provisional autonomous Republic of Cochinchina, presided by Dr. Nguyên Van Thinh. This initiative was unacceptable for the DRV, since it preempted the referendum and, should Vietnam remain divided, the DRV, locked in Tonkin, would not be able to develop the economic complementarity between the three parts of the country (rubber in Cochinchina, hydroelectricity in Annam, coal and rice in Tonkin).

Negotiation between France and the DRV began on July 6, not in Paris, but in the nearby town of Fontainebleau, to isolate the Vietnamese delegates. On July 22, d'Argenlieu unilaterally convened a conference with Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos, to define the details of the Indochinese Federation. For the DRV, which negotiated directly with the French government, the Federation was an option; for d'Argenlieu, it was a given. When the conference opened at the mountain resort of Dalat in Annam, on August 1, the Vietnamese delegation suspended the talks in protest.

The conference was supposed to resume in January 1947. On September 15, 1946, Moutet and Hô Chi Minh (who had traveled with the delegation to Fontainebleau) concluded a provisional agreement which stipulated a cease-fire, effective October 30, between the French and Vietminh armies South of the 16th parallel. Both sides duly implemented the cease-fire, but Vietminh terrorist units intensified their assassination campaign against pro-French leading citizens. In the meantime, the cause of autonomous Cochinchina did not prove very popular, to such extent that Léon Pignon, the political advisor to d'Argenlieu, began playing the traditionalist card by establishing contact with Bao Dai, who had fled to Hong Kong. Dr. Thinh committed suicide on November 19. In the North, the DRV had assassinated its main political opponents during the summer with the tacit agreement of the French army, since these non-communist nationalists were more vocally opposed to France than the DRV professed to be. The end result was that in autumn 1946, the DRV had established its firm political control in the North and was gaining ground in the South.

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To counter this trend, d'Argenlieu planned a coup against the DRV government, to be carried in January 1947. But in November 1946, the Bidault cabinet denied the needed military reinforcements. The French government did not want to grant Vietnam an association between equals, such as between Britain and India, because France would lack the economic and military means to impose its will on Vietnam in such a setting. It did not want to create in Vietnam a precedent which would give arguments against French rule to the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. But in the context of the decolonization of British India, it did not want a coup which would be difficult to justify abroad.

The short-term aim of the French military was to stop the smuggling of arms from China to the DRV. Custom services in Haiphong were reinforced in October. The interception of a junk loaded with fuel caused the French Navy to bomb Haiphong on November 23, killing between 300 and 6000 people, including many civilians. During the bombing, Vietminh fighters discovered a copy of the coup operation planned by d'Argenlieu, which was carried by a French soldier. The DRV could not know that the French government had just shelved this option. From then on, the Vietminh prepared for a preventive war.

This war started on December 19, 1946. On December 18, the French high commissioner in Hanoi, Jean Sainteny, had ordered the removal of barricades from the streets of the European district. This decision led the Vietminh to believe that an assault was imminent. On December 19, at 8:00 PM, DRV authorities fled to the countryside and called for a general insurrection. Since the Vietminh had initiated the fight, France could now claim to wage a defensive war.

Soon afterward, the DRV issued several peace feelers. Sincere or not, they were deliberately ignored. On January 3, 1947, during the inspection trip of Moutet in Hanoi, Hô Chi Minh sent him a message calling for an immediate cease-fire and a meeting. The letter was intercepted by the French military and never delivered to the minister. On April 19, Hô again asked for an immediate cease-fire and peace talks. The answer came on

May 12, 8 days after the dismissal of communist ministers from the French government: the DRV would have to relinquish 50% of its armament; hand over to the FEC all hostages, prisoners, and defectors; and allow the FEC full liberty of action North of the 16th parallel. General Valluy, the new commander in Indochina, had drafted these conditions with the expectation that they would be turned down, since he did not want to compromise the large offensive that he was planning for autumn. Indeed, they were turned down, and the war started for real.

The causes of the war are clear. France and the DRV could not come to terms, since France refused to grant independence, whereas the DRV considered independence as a given and accepted only to negotiate the terms of a temporary association with France, on an equal basis. But the French government was wary of a full-blown war. The French military in Indochina and, through them, the Gaullists forced the hand of Paris.

A Colonial War

French intransigence was based on the assumption that the DRV was militarily weak and that war would be short. Indeed, in October 1947, the FEC almost captured Vietminh leaders. But they escaped and the war went on.

The early years of the war were very difficult for the Vietminh. Its troops, concentrated in the North, were thinly spread. Communications between North and South were very slow – hence, the importance of short-wave radio. The regular army – as opposed to guerilla irregulars – was entirely staffed by volunteers up to November 1949. Political commissars supervised officers and men, but communists were a minority among the military. So as not to alienate "bourgeois specialists," whose technical skills were needed, socialist measures were delayed: rents were reduced, but land was not redistributed. The cult of Hô Chi Minh was instituted to mobilize the masses, but "national salvation" associations devised to control the population remained understaffed. The Vietminh traded opium against

armament – as the French did – but arms procurements became scarce, especially once the French were able to seal the border between Tonkin and China in October 1947. The main provider was Thailand, whose armed forces gladly sold arms which would be used against the FEC, since Thailand had been forced to relinquish the provinces of Western Laos which it had acquired during World War II with Japanese backing. The Free Thai movement, which had opposed Japan, also sold arms, since it maintained good relations with the Vietnamese community in Eastern Thailand. But when Bangkok granted diplomatic recognition to the State of Vietnam in February 1950 to obtain American armament, supplies from Thailand quickly dried up.

The diplomatic position of the DRV was just as shaky. The Soviet Union prioritized Europe, and India went no further than barring the French Air Force from flying over its soil. Without the Maoist victory in China, the DRV would have risked isolation. DRV leaders were aware of the situation, and in the middle of 1949, they diverted soldiers to South China, to fight Guomindang troops there jointly with local communist forces, a gesture which was warmly appreciated by Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.

France was in a much more comfortable position, but it too had problems. The FEC was dominant in the South and controlled cities and the main roads in the whole country. But terrorism was rampant in Hanoi and Saigon up to 1951, and the roads were frequently blocked. Due to the paucity of French citizens in Indochina, and to avoid sabotage by communist recruits, conscripts were not sent to Indochina, and the FEC was entirely staffed by professional soldiers, including colonial troops from Africa and North Africa. War expenditures were contained, from 4% of overall public spending in 1947 to 7% in 1950, but conversely worn-out armament was seldom replaced. American aid, which started in March 1950, was a real relief.

On the whole, French public opinion remained indifferent to the war. Communist ministers had been dismissed from the government after communist representatives had failed to approve the military budget in March 1947 (they abstained but

did not oppose it), but communist workers did not impede arm shipments to Indochina before November 1949. The Communist Party had started such actions at the request of the Cominform, which wanted it to engage in more offensive tactics. So, all in all, French governments could operate with a relatively free hand, and what is striking is that they did not offer more generous conditions to non-communist nationalists than to the Vietminh. The war was ostensibly waged as an anti-communist cause, but its real motive was the preservation of the French empire.

The official position was that France accepted to negotiate in good faith – but not with the "treacherous" Vietminh – within the limits set by the constitution of the Fourth Republic (October 27, 1946). This text invested the French government with full authority on the foreign and military affairs of the French Union, including Indochina, and it created a new status of "Associated States" whose relations with France would be negotiated on a bilateral basis. Although the constitution did not preclude the independence of these states, they could in fact be at most protectorates, endowed with full internal autonomy but having their foreign affairs managed by France. Bao Dai, to whom the VNQDD and similar parties had rallied, signed on December 6–7, 1947, an agreement on this basis, which mentioned the unity of Vietnam. But the treaty contained a secret protocol which conferred to the French high representative in Indochina all the powers of economic coordination previously mentioned in the Indochinese Federation project of 1945–1946. The protocol even added the creation of separate courts of law for French citizens, on the model of capitulations in the Ottoman Empire.

Bao Dai was unable to convince his followers to accept such conditions. Since new concessions were not forthcoming, he retired on the French Riviera. He could not rely on external support. The Truman administration was certain that French intransigence played in the hands of the Vietminh, but it remained passive, since the DRV was communist and France was the main power in continental Western Europe. So Bao Dai resigned himself to sign, on March 8, 1949, a new

agreement which created a united Vietnam as an associated state within the French Union. France had not offered new concessions. Bao Dai signed because, had he waited longer, France might have concluded a deal with General Nguyên Van Xuân, the head of the nominal Republic of Cochinchina.

Since war operations made it impossible to hold elections or a referendum, the State of Vietnam had no constitution. Cabinets were responsible only to the "chief of state," Bao Dai. When the "chief" returned to Vietnam, he was denied use of the palace of the French high commissioner in Saigon and retired to Dalat.

Cambodia and Laos were granted similar status. From then on, collaboration between France and the Associated States was conducted at the High Council and at the Assembly of the French Union, two bodies created by the 1946 Constitution. The High Council was an intergovernmental organization mandated to "assist" the French cabinet on the general policy of the Union (Constitution, Article 65). It met at irregular intervals, and its head was the French president. The Assembly, where metropolitan France was allotted 50% of the seats, was only a consultative body.

A War by Proxies Between China and the United States

The creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, provided relief to the Vietminh. Helping the DRV was a priority for Mao: it was an internationalist duty, and it might deter the United States from using Indochina to back Guomindang military operations in Southern China. But the PRC imposed nothing to the Vietminh. It was the DRV which asked for Chinese arms, money, and military advisers.

The PRC recognized the DRV on January 18, 1950, prompting the Soviet Union to do the same on January 30. This situation forced the US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, to recognize immediately the State of Vietnam (on February 7), although he would have preferred to make this recognition conditional on French assurances than the association agreement would be implemented in a liberal spirit. Non-communist

Asiatic states doubted that the Associated States were really independent: only Thailand recognized them.

Conversely, the creation of the PRC prompted the United States to start arming the FEC, provided that France expressly renounces to recognize Beijing. Since the start of the Malayan insurrection in 1948, Great Britain had urged Washington to assist France so that Indochina could resume its rice exports to Malaya. But it was China policy which prompted the United States to back France. The "China lobby" in the Republican party and at the Department of Defense kept asking for continued military payments to the Guomindang, which Acheson considered a failed state. Acheson much preferred military spending South of China, which would be both more effective and less provocative to Beijing. The first US shipments of war material were landed in Vietnam in March 1950. They were still of modest size, but the Korean War would soon quicken the deliveries.

Chinese reinforcements allowed General Vo Nguyên Giap (1911–2013), the Vietminh commander in chief, to attack in force at Cao Bang, in October 1950, the FEC troops which were retreating from the Chinese border. That was the military turning point of the war: from then on, the border between Tonkin and China would remain open, and Chinese material could flow freely to Vietnam. The DRV would now have the means to mobilize the whole population in its zones in Tonkin and Annam, at the price of a heavy regimentation. Military service had been made compulsory for men aged between 18 and 45 in November 1949, but many peasants did not want to leave their villages. To mobilize them, China and the Soviet Union urged the DRV, in 1951, to move from rent reduction to land redistribution. Chinese advisers taught the Vietminh propaganda devices such as the cult of working-class heroes. They convinced a reluctant Hô Chi Minh to mobilize women for portage (not for combat). Starting in September 1952, portage duty became compulsory for citizens of both sexes aged from 18 to 50. The counterpart was agrarian law, which was announced in January 1953, but implemented only after the war.

Chinese advisers did not dictate on the DRV. It was on his own volition that Giap engaged the FEC in pitched battles in the Red River delta as early as 1951, with disastrous results. (At Vinh, French planes poured napalm over enemy forces.) But this failure allowed Chinese advisers to prevail upon Giap and have the war zone extended westward, toward the mountains of Tonkin and Laos, to force the FEC to dilute its resources.

After the recognition of the DRV by China and the Soviet Union, there was no point for it to keep hiding its communist identity. The ICP was revived in May 1951, but was divided in three separate parties: Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese. This reorganization was meant to enhance the "national" character and patriotic appeal of the Cambodian and Lao communists: the communist branch of the Khmer Issarak (Free Khmers) and the Pathet Lao (Lao state). The Vietnamese controlled the Cambodian and Lao parties. This made sense in the short term, since the two new parties were much weaker and Indochina had become a single, unified theater of war, but it was the seed of the bitter relations between the Cambodian and Vietnamese parties during and after the American war.

France, as well as the DRV, was on the verge of overstretch, in spite of American help. The United States paid for some 70% of war expenses in 1954, and these expenses decreased from 9% of French public expenditures in 1952 to 4% in 1954. But increased help to the FEC was only one aspect of American policy during the Korean War. The Truman administration also called, in autumn 1950, for an immediate and massive rearmament of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries and of West Germany. Accordingly, overall defense spending jumped to 30% of French public expenditures in 1951 and 1952. Such amounts dwarfed economic returns from Indochina: French capital had fled to other parts of the empire soon after the beginning of the war, plantations offered obvious targets for sabotage, and metropolitan exports to Indochina accounted only for an average 40% of French war expenditures.

The war, waged by professionals, depleted French units outside Indochina of officers and noncommissioned officers. The creation in 1951 of a Vietnamese National Army (VNA) by Bao Dai, at the urging of General De Lattre de Tassigny, then commander in chief, and of the United States, did not really change the situation, since this army needed many French instructors who would train it to interoperate with French units in the context of the French Union. Political rivalry between France and West Germany increased difficulties. To avoid the politically explosive creation of a German army so soon after World War II, France proposed at the end of 1950, and NATO accepted, the foundation of a European Defense Community (EDC). Germany would contribute 12 divisions to this entity. The project divided the French parliament so much that it was not called to vote before August 30, 1954. But one thing was certain: for the EDC to have a chance to pass, France had to contribute at least as many divisions as Germany; otherwise, Germany would have been the dominant power in the organization. Socialist representatives, whose vote was crucial to obtain a majority, insisted on this condition. And since, without the EDC, Germany had no army, NATO needed a vote as soon as possible. This made it necessary to end the Indochina war quickly, to bring the FEC back to Europe.

Relations between France and the Associated States were just as difficult. Cambodia and Laos, eager to save rice for their own citizens, refused to implement the customs union with Vietnam which was an essential part of the French economic program. The three states complained about the slow devolution of internal powers by French administrations. Grumbling against France became a resource for internal politics. King Sihanouk of Cambodia resented the Democratic Party which had won a large parliamentary majority at the 1946 election. This party asked for complete independence from France and a fully parliamentarian regime, whereas Sihanouk wanted to retain absolute power. In June 1952, with French backing, the king sacked the Democrat cabinet, had party leaders arrested, and nominated submissive ministers. Since independence from France was a popular theme, Sihanouk used it to consolidate his new powers. At the beginning

of 1953, he started asking for full independence. France refused to deal with him, the United States asked him to compromise, but since Vietminh troops had entered Laos and Northeast Cambodia in 1953, it was France which had to compromise.

This compromise was brought by the "scandal of piasters." The piaster was the currency of the Associated States. Its market value was inferior to its official value, set by France in 1945. By exchanging francs with piasters on the market, and then presenting these piasters to the central bank, which was bound by charter to buy and sell at official value, one realized a profit of more than 40%. The Vietminh, Bao Dai and his ministers, FEC soldiers, and all French political parties save the communists partook in the traffic.

The weekly *L'Observateur* exposed the affair on May 7, 1953. To cut the scandal short, Prime Minister René Mayer devalued the piaster on May 8, without prior consultation with the Associated States. This was a breach of sovereignty, since the independence association agreements made currency a joint responsibility of France and the three states. Bao Dai reacted immediately by joining Sihanouk in opposition to France. On May 20, Vietnam asked for a complete overhaul of institutional arrangements between the Associated States and France.

After the fall of Mayer (caused by the EDC), Paul Reynaud, minister for Associated States in the new Laniel cabinet (June 1953–June 1954), renegotiated the relations between France and the three states. According to Reynaud, a fiscal conservative, very favorable to the EDC, Indochina had become a burden for France. The talks transformed the French Union in a voluntary association of equals, comparable to the British Commonwealth. Although this was a flat contradiction of the 1946 Constitution, neither parliament nor the French people were consulted. Negotiations proceeded smoothly with Cambodia and especially Laos, but were much more difficult with Vietnam, to the point that when peace was concluded on July 21, 1954, the new independence and association treaty between France and Vietnam had only been initialed. It would never be signed. Angered by the slow proceedings, Bao Dai reacted by making Vietnamese participation

to the Geneva peace conference conditional on a prior French promise not to partition Vietnam, which Bidault, now foreign minister, had to give. This would have grave consequences for peace.

Peace on the Agenda

The demands of the Associated States against France were concomitant with the thaw in international relations after the death of Stalin, which made possible the Korean armistice of July 27, 1953. In this new context, the opinion that the conjunction of rearmament in Europe and continuation of the war in Indochina was beyond French means gained ground. The most eminent proponent of this thesis was Pierre Mendès France (1907–1982), a representative from the Radical (center-left) party. After the fall of Mayer, Mendès failed to be elected prime minister by only 13 votes. If one added the communists, a majority of French representatives were now in favor of peace.

The new prime minister, Joseph Laniel, elected on June 27, 1953, declared that his cabinet would negotiate "untiringly" to end the war. The difference with Mendès – which was left unsaid – was that foreign minister Bidault would not negotiate with the DRV. Bidault hoped that a relaxation of the Western commercial embargo against China – more severe than against the Soviet Union since the United Nations Organization (UNO) had declared the PRC an aggressor in the Korean War – and French assent to admission of the PRC at the UNO would induce Beijing to desist helping the DRV, thereby making possible a French military victory. The deal would be concluded at the political conference on Korea, planned for Spring 1954 in Geneva, for Article 60 of the Korean armistice allowed for the discussion at this conference of other topics than the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The program that Bidault set for himself contradicted the "wedge" policy of the US Eisenhower administration, which relied on a harsh treatment of the PRC to cause a rift between Beijing and Moscow. Bidault had to negotiate

very hard with the new, Republican secretary of state, John Foster Dulles (1888–1959), to have him issue the declaration of September 2, 1953, which stated that the Geneva conference could lead to peace in Indochina if China desisted from its aggression, but warned that an open Chinese intervention in Indochina would provoke a US military reaction which, if necessary, would be extended to China itself (Dulles had in mind operations on Hainan island).

The communists, too, aimed at military victories to maximize their bargaining power. After the Korean armistice, China warned the DRV that it would not send soldiers to Indochina. China had had to borrow two billion dollars to the Soviet Union to fund the Korean War. It could not afford a new war so soon. This caused DRV war plans, based once again on a large offensive in the Red River delta, to be rewritten at Chinese insistence. China asked for a consolidation of military positions in Northwest Vietnam and Laos. The main battle would have to take place at Diên Biên Phu, a large fortress in the mountains of Northwest Tonkin, which General Navarre, the new French commander in chief, had chosen to cover Laos and to start a counteroffensive. Such concentrations of fire power in remote locations had proved very effective in the past to bait and kill Vietminh soldiers, but their supplies had to be delivered by air, and at Diên Biên Phu, thanks to massive Chinese supplies of artillery, the Vietminh was able to neutralize the airstrip at the start of the battle on March 13, 1954. From then on, the Vietminh had the upper hand, and Diên Biên Phu would capitulate on May 7, the very day when negotiation on Indochina started in Geneva. Of course, Navarre had posted only a portion of the FEC at Diên Biên Phu, and operations continued in the rest of Vietnam.

The political objectives of the major communist powers were clearly defined. The Soviet Union wanted the EDC to be shelved, and it was ready to offer France a graceful exit from Indochina as a quid pro quo. There would be no formal linkage, but Moscow hoped that the end of the war would create a détente that would make French parliamentarians conclude that the EDC had become unnecessary. Moscow also wanted the

West to accept the PRC as a full member of the international community. China shared both of these goals, and to achieve them, it stood ready to give reassurance to foreign powers. It is during the Geneva conference that Beijing decoupled anti-imperialism from the exportation of revolution, a distinction embodied in the Sino-Indian treaty of peaceful coexistence (April 29, 1954).

This strategy might prove detrimental to the DRV, since if the independence of the whole Vietnam under Vietminh rule could not be gained in Geneva, both China and the Soviet Union accepted a temporary partition at the 16th parallel as a second best. The three communist powers coordinated their positions during a conference in Moscow in April 1954. The DRV and the PRC, both regional powers which were parties to the conflict, would table propositions, and the Soviet Union would act as an umpire and a broker with Western powers, as befitted the leader of the coalition. It is unclear if, in Moscow, the DRV formally accepted temporary partition as a fallback option. Partition, even temporary, was a sacrifice for the DRV, for during the whole war, it had maintained a foothold South of the 16th parallel, the Interzone 5, around the cities of Quang Ngai and Qui Nhon.

Among Western powers, it is very possible that, without the EDC in the balance, Dulles would have vetoed discussion of Indochina in Geneva. At the Berlin conference of the four occupying powers in Germany (January–February 1954), Bidault and his British colleague Anthony Eden (1897–1977) implored Dulles to accept this negotiation. According to the Churchill cabinet, a government that had ended war in Indochina would be in a good position to pass the EDC in parliament. Britain opposed a continuation of the war which might bring China in the conflict. Western allies knew that in such case, American war plans prioritized operations in China, with nuclear bombings if need be, and allotted few resources for the defense of Southeast Asia itself. It was not necessary for Britain to run such a risk, for the border between Malaya and Thailand was now secure, and, should the Sino-Soviet pact be activated, American air bases in England, where nuclear bombs were stocked, would have been a prime target for the

Soviet Air Force. For all these reasons, Eden accepted a definitive partition of Vietnam as a reasonable compromise. (He would agree to temporary partition only later, during the Geneva conference.) Dulles was not convinced, but he relented for fear that, should Indochina not be discussed in Geneva, the French parliament might definitely turn against the DRV.

Nevertheless Dulles tried to sabotage the conference. In late March 1954, the French and American chiefs of staff informally discussed the possibility of a massive American bombing around Diên Biên Phu (Operation "Vulture"). The Laniel cabinet secretly requested the bombing on April 4. What the Eisenhower administration offered instead was "United Action," a pursuit of the war until victory with massive American air and naval support. Congressional leaders asked that US allies provide the ground troops. That was not what Bidault needed, but Diên Biên Phu has received such attention that, after several weeks, he agreed to "United Action" if that was the price to obtain "Vulture." Eden killed the whole scheme by refusing British participation to "United Action" which, he understood, would have made negotiation in Geneva impossible.

Dulles issued new military threats during the conference itself. On May 8, he secretly offered France an American intervention in the war. The Laniel cabinet studied the proposition, but again American conditions did not fit French needs. France was asked to declare that it would maintain its forces in Indochina for the whole duration of operations, whatever turn they might take. Laniel, with his slim parliamentary majority of two votes, could not give such assurances after 8 years of war, and Dulles withdrew his offer on June 11. From then on, the Eisenhower administration was secretly resigned to the partition of Vietnam, even though it publicly condemned it.

Since major newspapers such as the *International Herald Tribune* mentioned in general terms these talks between France and the United States as early as May 15, American threats had a real influence on the conference. Vietminh armies were very tired after Diên Biên Phu and could not have sustained an extension of the war, not

to mention an American intervention. Dulles gave arguments to China and the Soviet Union to convince the DRV to settle for partition.

The Geneva Conference (April 26–July 21, 1954)

During the first weeks of the conference, the United States issued military threats but did not contribute propositions. Both the State of Vietnam and the DRV demanded the whole of Vietnam. Bidault refused to meet Pham Van Dông (1906–2000), the head of the Vietminh delegation. So, by default, it was left to Eden and his Chinese and Soviet colleagues, respectively, Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) and Viatcheslav Molotov (1890–1986), to conduct serious diplomatic business.

Since the United States refused that China chair the conference, a rotating chair was impossible, and the debates were co-chaired by Britain and the Soviet Union. From the outset, Zhou and Molotov tried to create an atmosphere favorable to negotiation. Zhou had Pham Van Dông agree to contact between French and Vietminh officers about the evacuation of the wounded at Diên Biên Phu. This technical commission would later be used as a sounding board to explore informally the possibility of partition. It is in this setting that the DRV would mention partition for the first time on June 10. Molotov accepted that negotiation of an armistice should be given priority over that of a political agreement and that this armistice be supervised by an international commission. Eden proposed that the conference convene in secret meetings as well as in official sessions. From then on, negotiation would progress mostly through private contacts.

Zhou made the first political opening on May 20, accepting that the wording of agreements could differ in each Associated State. It was an important concession, for even though the Pathet Lao and the Khmers Issarak depended on Vietminh assistance, they controlled one third of the Cambodian and Lao territories. But if China had backed them to the end, Cambodia and Laos might have called the United States to the rescue. Zhou took another important initiative on June 15,

when he forced the DRV to move its armed forces out of Cambodia and Laos and to renounce to have the Khmers Issarak and the Pathet Lao invited to the conference. Without these concessions, Western ministers, prodded by Dulles, might well have closed the conference without an agreement.

Mendès, who had been informed in general terms of "Vulture" and "United Action" by Edgar Faure, a fellow Radical and minister in the Laniel cabinet, revealed the affair in parliament, obtained a vote of no-confidence against Laniel, and was elected prime minister on June 17. He set himself 1 month to get an agreement in Geneva; otherwise, he would resign. It would be inaccurate to oppose Mendès the negotiator to Bidault the warrior. Mendès had talks with Pham Van Dông – whom Bidault had refused to meet – but he too issued military threats. On July 7, he declared that, should the conference fail, his last initiative as prime minister would consist in asking parliament to send conscripts to Indochina. Mendès, like Bidault, was an anti-communist. He accepted the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel only, not the 16th, so that Laos could be linked to the sea by a road running in non-communist territory. He insisted that the referendum on the reunification of Vietnam must take place 2 years after the peace agreement, not 6 months as Pham Van Dông would have liked, to give time to South Vietnam to put its house in order.

Mendès succeeded because Molotov and Zhou wanted an agreement. Zhou accepted a 2-year interval between peace and referendum; agreed that Pathet Lao forces would regroup in the Northeastern provinces of Phongsaly and Sam Neua, well to the North of the 17th parallel; and even threatened to cut all funds to the DRV if it did not give its assent to the 17th parallel. Molotov admitted that Cambodia and Laos, although they would be neutralized just like Vietnam, would be allowed to call foreign forces to their rescue if they deemed it necessary for their security. Molotov also agreed that, since the United States refused to sign any treaty with China, the political document of the conference – not the cease-fires – would be issued as an oral declaration. All these Chinese

and Soviet concessions made it possible to conclude peace on July 21, 1954.

Peace Terms

The Geneva agreement consists in three cease-fires (one for each Associated State) and a political declaration.

The three cease-fires are signed by the military commanders of the DRV and France. France and the DRV had chosen this arrangement to circumvent any objection from the State of Vietnam, since Bao Dai had delegated military powers to France for the duration of the war. In each state, the cease-fire is supervised by an international control commission comprising India (neutral, in the chair), Canada, and Poland. These commissions have very limited powers: they must report breaches of the armistice but cannot issue recommendations.

The cease-fires declare the three states neutral, neutrality terms being stringent in Vietnam only, where military reinforcements (both armament and military personnel), and the creation of foreign military bases, are strictly prohibited.

In Vietnam, Vietminh troops must regroup North of the 17th parallel and the VNA in the South. Vietnamese citizens are given 300 days after the cease-fire to regroup North or South of the 17th parallel, as they wish. This provision would allow the Catholics of Tonkin, who had fought against the Vietminh, to flee en masse to the South, where they would become the main political base of Ngô Dinh Diêm. The 17th parallel is only a provisional demarcation line, since Article 14a of the cease-fire mentions the future general election in all Vietnam (not its date). Therefore, it is illogical to separate the cease-fire from the political declaration, which mentions the interval of 2 years between the peace and the referendum.

The oral form of the declaration does not make it less binding, since oral agreements have the same legal value than written treaties. The declaration enjoins Vietnamese authorities North and South of the 17th parallel to get in touch on July 20, 1955, to organize general elections which will

take place in July 1956, under the supervision of members of the cease-fire commissions. Article 13 provides that the co-chairmen of the conference, Britain and the Soviet Union, will consult in the future, at the requirement of the control commissions, to "study" the measures necessary to enforce the three cease-fires. This wording is intentionally vague, but it allows for some form of cooperation between the two sides of the Cold War to maintain peace.

The United States and the State of Vietnam are not parties to the declaration. The United States only "took note" of it, excluding Article 13, since it did not want to cooperate with communist powers to preserve an agreement which it disapproved. The delegation of the State of Vietnam rejected both the cease-fire and the declaration. The move came from the new prime minister, Ngô Dinh Diêm (1901–1963), not from Bao Dai who had reluctantly assented to temporary partition as early as July 4. The chief of state had chosen Diêm to coopt the extreme nationalists who resented his cooperation with France. The nomination had taken place on June 16, at a moment when peace was still far from certain. If war continued, it would be with increased American participation, and Diem, with his well-known connections in the United States, was the man of the situation. He had officially applied for the position in May, the Saigon station of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had started lobbying for him at the end of the month, and Bao Dai may have consulted with Dulles before choosing him. Laniel and Bidault, too, gave the green light to his nomination: it was their last contribution to the war effort.

The conference overlooked the protestation of the State of Vietnam because, in July 1954, this entity was not yet fully independent: the transfer of French powers was finalized only on December 31, 1954. But the day after, when South Vietnam became really independent, was it or not the successor state of France to the Geneva agreement? If it was, its protestation had no value. But it was not: according to the new treaty of association between France and Vietnam, initialed on June 4 1954, 17 days before the Geneva agreement, Vietnam would be the successor of France only for the treaties concluded *before* this convention itself.

And on both sides of the Cold War, nobody would take the risk to pressure South Vietnam to comply with the Geneva agreement.

The Consolidation of Partition

For all the talking about the unity of Vietnam, Dulles decided immediately after Geneva that reunification must never take place, since a communist success at the "general election" was likely. Diêm, who opposed any dealing with the DRV, was the ideal partner for such a policy. France and the two co-chairs did not object, and China was sidelined, since it was neither a co-chair of the conference nor a member of the control commission. The United States now took the initiative.

First, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were included under the umbrella of the Manila Pact, or Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, September 6, 1954). Technically, the neutrality of Indochina was respected, since the three states were not parties to the treaty, but Zhou Enlai felt cheated. SEATO was an offshoot of "United Action," the coalition that Dulles had tried to create before Geneva. Eden had refused a coalition before the conference, which would have hampered the negotiation, but welcomed it after the peace. He shelved his project of "Asian Locarno," a cooperation between communist, neutral, and Western powers to guarantee peace in Indochina, which was unacceptable to Dulles. Now that war had been averted, Britain no longer interfered with American policy.

Moved by the same spirit of peaceful coexistence as Eden, Mendès would have liked the wording of the Manila Pact to insist as much on economic development as on defense, but he was in no position to insist nor to object to American initiatives in Asia in general. Mendès had brought the EDC to a vote on August 30, 1954, but had not asked for a vote of confidence over the project, and it had been defeated. From then on, until the French parliament definitely agreed to the admission of Germany into NATO (effective May 5, 1955), France ran the risk that the United States might rearm Germany on a bilateral basis, without any conditions.

For the same reason, Mendès did not extend recognition to Hanoi and Beijing after Geneva and accepted that the DRV be submitted to the same severe commercial embargo by Western powers than the PRC.

Neither could France pressure South Vietnam to implement the peace terms relative to reunification, since its contribution to the defense of the country was coming to an end. In Geneva, Mendès had promised that the FEC would leave South Vietnam if Saigon so requested. In September 1954, Diêm asked that this departure take place no later than March 1956. Anyway, the FEC was now needed in Algeria, and the Algerian war put Paris in the dependence of Washington. Technically, only the United States could provide the helicopters needed to trace the guerilla. Politically, since the Algerian independence movement was not communist, American support for this new war, crucial in the United Nations, was more difficult to obtain than in the case of Indochina. Possibly with these factors in mind, Mendès eased the transition toward defense of South Vietnam by American troops by secretly allowing, in January 1955, that all civilians within the US military mission in Saigon be replaced by military personnel.

The Soviet Union, too, renounced to interfere. Moscow convened three meetings of the co-chairmen: after Saigon failed to establish contact with Hanoi to prepare the general election in July 1955; after the rigged referendum of October 19, 1955, which established in South Vietnam a republican regime presided by Diêm; and in April 1956, when Diêm, prompted by the United States, reiterated his repudiation of the Geneva settlement, but promised unilaterally to respect the cease-fire. At each meeting, Britain defended South Vietnamese initiatives, and, more tellingly, the Soviet Union issued only mild and formal protests. Chinese and North Vietnamese calls for a new Geneva conference, in 1956, were ignored.

In fact, after Geneva, both the Soviet Union and China prioritized the consolidation of North Vietnam over reunification. Moscow refused to grant Hanoi a defense treaty, but, like China, offered generous economic aid. Both Molotov and Zhou Enlai advised a long-term strategy of national front in the South, so as not to provoke an increased American presence there. As long as Beijing and Moscow were in good terms, Hanoi had to bend to their will. The Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s and 1970s would provide the DRV with its historic chance; for now that Beijing and Moscow vied for primacy in the socialist camp, none of them could afford to let down the anti-imperialist cause of North Vietnam.

Conclusion

In retrospect, the Algerian war underlined the colonial character of the French Indochina conflict. The French defeat in Indochina encouraged the Algerian insurgents. The French military, who had become acquainted in Indochina with Maoist and Vietminh methods of indoctrination, were now keen to implement them in Algeria, in the most violent way. But the most distinctive feature of the French Indochina conflict remains its linkage with the general course of East-West relations in Europe as well as in Asia, since the EDC exerted a decisive influence on the course on the war and on the terms of the peace.

The same remark applies to the two other Indochina conflicts: the American war and the war between Cambodia, Vietnam, and China, which cannot be separated from the passage of Soviet-American relations from coexistence first to détente, then second Cold War, from the course of Sino-Soviet relations from rivalry to reconciliation, nor from the evolution of Sino-American relations from glacial Cold War first to unspoken alliance, and later to mutual indifference. The Indochina wars provide the classic example of the connection between local and global rivalries during the Cold War.

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French Revolution

▶ Louverture, Toussaint (c.1743–1803)

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

G

Gaddafi, Muammar (1942–2011)

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Introduction

Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi (the name of the late President of Libya has been alternately spelled as "Moammar/Muammar Gadaffi/Gaddafi/Gathafi/Kadafi/Kaddafi/Khadafy/Qadhafi/Qathafi". For the purposes of this article, the name will be spelt as Gaddafi, except when quoting the name from other sources) was born in 1942 near Qasr Abu Hadi, a rural area outside the town of Sirte, in western Libya. He joined the ancestors on October 20, 2011, after being captured alive, sodomized, and killed in cold blood. Days after his brutal killing, NATO announced that it was its most successful military operation ever. The lessons of the life and death of Gaddafi open may avenues for an understanding of imperialism and anti-imperialism at the end of the twentieth century. Gaddafi's tenure as President of Libya after the 1969 coup d'etat can be compared to leaders such as Sukarno of Indonesia, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and Gamal Nasser of Egypt who were anti-imperialists in their lifetime but were unable to marshal the social forces in their society who could genuinely give material reality to a policy of anti-imperialism. Gaddafi was an admirer of Nasser's Pan-Arabism and mobilized his society around the idea of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. As an exercise in socialism from above, this experimentation with radical anti-imperialism could be distinguished from the anti-imperialist project of the Vietnamese and the Cubans who built alternative institutions.

The Libyan government under Gaddafi organized annual anti-imperialist sessions called the Mathaba and gave material support to fighters for freedom against apartheid in Southern Africa. This endeared Gaddafi to citizens of those states who referred to him as "brother leader." At the end of apartheid, Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa, personally intervened to end the international sanctions against Gaddafi and his family. Gaddafi gravitated toward radical Pan-Africanism and became a champion for the full unification of Africa. For this goal, he became a threat to those forces in Europe that exploited Africa. The convergence of these elements in Europe, exemplified by the French President along with the Wall Street firm of Goldman Sachs, precipitated the NATO intervention that destroyed Libya. No less a body than the British House of Parliament, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs noted that the intervention in Libya was based on lies. President Barack Obama noted that the support for the NATO intervention in Libya was the worst mistake of his presidency.

However, what Obama saw as a mistake arose from the logic of contemporary imperialism with the attendant forms of militarism and accumulation by dispossession.

Growing Up in the Era of Bandung

The Italians were decisively defeated at the Battle of Adwa (Ethiopia) in 1896. This defeat robbed Italy of its possible foothold in Africa after being excluded from the spoils that were shared by the imperialists at the infamous Berlin Conference of 1885. As the junior partner of European imperialism after the partitioning of Africa in Berlin in 1885, the Italians had occupied Libya after 1911. Without a developed industrial base, Italy populated Libya with settlers, and the economic crisis in Europe brought the fascists to power early in Italy. Fascist Italy unleashed untold terror on the peoples of Libya, and one of the outstanding characteristics of this Italian occupation was the sterling resistance of the Libyan peoples against external rule. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism were stamped into the political culture of Libya with Omar al Mukhtar being one of the most internationally known freedom fighters against Italian fascism. Nearly all households in Libya were affected by colonial rule, and the family of Muammar Gaddafi was no exception. Some of the biographers of Gaddafi assert that his father, Abu Meniar, was one of the resisters against Italian colonialism.

Libya became a battleground between differing imperialist forces in the Second World War, and Gaddafi was born in the midst of this inter-imperialist rivalry that had thrust the world into destruction and genocide. Major battles were actually fought on Libyan soil with one of the seminal turning points occurring with the defeat of General Rommel in Libya. At the end of this war, the British imperial forces were granted the authority over Libyan society, and the young Gaddafi grew up in the atmosphere of war and the handing over of the country to the British. Formal colonialism ended in Libya in 1951 when the United Nations created the United

Kingdom of Libya, a federal state under the leadership of a monarch, Idris. This king with no legitimacy within the traditions of resistance or within the political system sought to maintain power by banning fledgling political parties and centralized power in his monarchy.

This attempt at the centralization of power in the hands of the Libyan King occurred at the same historical moment as the Egyptian revolution, which deposed King Farouk in July 1952. This revolt had been led by the Free Officers Movement, a group of army officers led by Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Three years later, Egypt played a crucial role in convening the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in Indonesia to be a platform for anti-colonial and anti-imperialist forces. While western scholars pontificated about imperialism from the comfort of intellectual enclaves in Europe and North America, the anti-colonial forces placed new questions on the agenda. Thinkers such as Edward Said and Frantz Fanon theorized on the relationships between the culture of capital and imperial domination. Fanon made the unique contribution on the psychological and mental disorders emanating from imperial rule. In real life, the peoples of Vietnam, Cuba, South Africa, and Palestine produced some of the foremost thinkers on imperialism and anti-imperialism. The generation of Muamar Gaddafi matured at a period when the Algerian war of independence and the Egyptian revolt of Nasser stimulated young leaders from the Cape to Cairo.

After completing secondary school, Gaddafi was trained as an officer in the military. The biographers of Gadhafi reported that after he enrolled in the Royal Military Academy in Benghazi in 1963, he quickly sought to organize fellow recruits in an organization that had been patterned after the Free Officers Movement of Egypt. In 1964, Gaddafi founded the Central Committee of the Free Officers Movement of Libya. This formation organized clandestinely to replace the monarchy until they succeeded in 1969.

Military Coup d'etat 1969
Gaddafi had come to power as the leader of Libya after a coup d'etat removed King Idris on

September 2, 1969. As a group of military officers, there were few organic links with the other sectors of society such as the working peoples, students, teachers, civil servants, and the intelligentsia. The political underdevelopment of the political forces in the Libyan society meant that the dominant space for politics and organizing was in the military and in the mosque. It was in this political milieu where the 12 member of the central committee of the Free Officers proclaimed themselves the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the government of the new republic in 1969.

Lieutenant Gaddafi became the RCC Chairman, and therefore the de facto head of state, also appointing himself to the rank of colonel and becoming commander in chief of the armed forces. Gaddafi quickly asserted his authority and over the following years and emerged as the maximum leader. (For an elaboration of the career of Gaddafi, see the MA thesis of Musa Kusa, "The Political Leader and his social background" Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan Leader, "Michigan State University, 1978. See also David Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution, Little Brown, 1987 and Dirk Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State Building, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. See especially chapter 4 "From Kingdom to Republic.") In the 42 years when Gaddafi was head of state, the politics of the society went through many twists and turns, but remained relatively stable. Ruth First, the South African revolutionary historian, after studying the Libyan experiment had termed the Libyan revolution, the elusive revolution (First 1974). This term was important in so far as it captured the reality of an anti-imperialist force that did not seek to ground its politics within the organized sectors of Libyan society. Like Sukarno of Indonesia and Saddam Hussein of Iraq, the political leadership in Libya attempted to orchestrate state-led anti-imperial politics without a full political and ideological mobilization of the people. Tragically, Gaddafi, like Sukarno and Saddam Hussein suffered from imperialist intervention, destruction, and demise.

Pan-Arabism and the Context of the Nonaligned Pressures of the 1970s

One year after the coup that brought Gaddafi to power, his hero, Gamal Abdel Nasser, died in November 1970. The new government in Libya had proclaimed itself to be aligned to the pan-Arab and Pan-African anti-imperial ideas of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. By 1960, the question of the future of Congo had inserted itself inside the Bandung and Pan-African movements with grave consequences for the future of African self-rule. Leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Nasser had anticipated the holding of a Second Bandung Conference in Algeria in 1965, but the intense activities of imperial diplomats ensured that the Second Bandung Conference did not take place. Gaddafi had come of age in the midst of the killing of Sukarno and Patrice Lumumba and had anticipated that Egyptian technical experts would assist in the social transformation of Libya. The Libyan revolt of 1969 looked to Nasser and mimicked the "socialism from above" posture that had been characteristic of the Nasserite government. Libyan "revolutionaries had anticipated that technical experts from Egypt would support the Libyan 'revolution,' and they embraced the traditions of Nasser of supporting anti-imperialist projects while suppressing communists and progressive intelligentsia.

After Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser in Egypt, the relations between Egypt and Libya deteriorated as the political leadership of Egypt grew closer to the United States and Israel. The ideological weaknesses of Nasserism without Nasser became very clear in North Africa with both Niemeri of the Sudan and Gaddafi of Libya seeking to project radical nationalism within the context of militarized states. Imperialism had taken the guise of promoting neoliberal economic projects to prop up global capital, and Egypt became a prime candidate for IMF interventions. After the 1973 war between Israel and Egypt, Gaddafi critiqued the capitulation of Sadat to the United States and fancied himself as the genuine supporter of the cause of the rights to self-determination for the Palestinian peoples. There were efforts to create a new state between Egypt, Libya, Syria,

and the Sudan, but these efforts foundered in the absence of proper planning, preparation, or real political work to transform the ideas of Pan-Arabism into practical reality. Flush with funds from the increased prices for petroleum products, Gaddafi sought to use money to buy political influence. This proved to be a flawed strategy that brought disaster after disaster with tragicomedy consequences.

Recovering the Independence of Libya and the Great Man-Made River

The first period of Gaddafi's tenure as the Head of State 1969–1977 was one where the society was supposed to be run by the Revolutionary Command Council. Radical initiatives occurred in this period such as the nationalization of oil companies and banks and the expulsion of the US military from the Wheelus military base in Libya. In September 1969, the government launched a "Green Revolution" to raise agricultural productivity so that Libya could rely less on imported food.

One of the most ambitious projects undertaken by the government of Gaddafi was the Great Man-Made River Project. The objective of the project was to bring water from the great underground aquifers of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System to the agricultural areas of Libya and to the urban areas. This project had been started in 1984 and was conceived to develop in five stages. On August 28, 1984, Muammar Gaddafi laid the foundation stone in Sarir area for the commencement of the construction of the Great Man-Made River Project. By August 28, 1986, Muammar Gaddafi inaugurated the Brega plant for the production of the prestressed concrete cylinder pipes, which are considered the largest pipes made with prestressed steel wire. The first phase had required 85 million m^3 of excavation and was inaugurated on August 28, 1991. The second phase (dubbed First Water to Tripoli) was inaugurated on September 1, 1996.

In order to provide the technical and industrial basis for this project, Gaddafi entered into agreements with Italian, Spanish, and Korean companies to undertake this project that was termed the eighth wonder of the world. By the time the project was well into its third phase, it consisted of the largest underground network of pipes (2,820 km (1,750 mi)) and aqueducts in the world. It consisted of more than 1,300 wells, most more than 500 m deep, and supplies 6,500,000 m^3 of fresh water per day to the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirte, and elsewhere. The total cost of the project was over US \$25 billion. In this project 1,000 million euros were invested for the installation of 50,000 artificial palm trees for water condensation. Characteristically, the imperial forces opposed this project just as they opposed the Transaqua Project to replenish Lake Chad.

What is significant in the study of imperialism and anti-imperialism in Libya is that the European imperialists felt threatened by this water transfer scheme, and during the NATO intervention in Libya, the factory in Brega that produced the pipes for the man-made river was bombed.

Political and Intellectual Limits of Gaddafi's Anti-imperialism

After Nasser passed away and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966, imperialism intensified the efforts to dominate the political economy of Africa. Cuba had stood as an example of organized anti-imperialism, but the anti-communist stance of Gaddafi meant that his political organization did not seek to learn how Cuba survived US sanctions and blockade. Gaddafi and the Revolutionary Council in Libya had no real models to anchor their experiment in radical nationalism. Despite the lack of anchoring, the elementary claims at recovering national wealth were seen as threatening by the imperial forces. Libya had emerged within OPEC as a radical force, and by 1977, the US Department of Defense listed Libya as a potential enemy of the United States (for a chronology of the actions of the Libyan leadership in this period, see Libya since Independence: Oil and State Building). There was no doubt that Libya was no longer simply an outpost for western companies. However, the contradictory postures, alliances, and partnerships that were proposed left Libya isolated because of the personalized nature of diplomacy under Gaddafi. As one author summed up this period:

Pushing his policies of anti-Zionism, anti-communism, and anti-imperialism, Qadhafi became something of a champion of reawakened Arab pride, an exemplar to many young Arabs of commitment to Arab Unity and of sincere and dedicated endorsement of the Palestinian cause. …. Such widespread admiration was nevertheless relatively short-lived. It was not long before Qadhafi had begun to antagonize other Arabs with his disregard for diplomatic convention and his inflexible insistence on the absolute righteousness of his own policies and philosophies. (Harris 1986, p. 86)

After proposing a series of schemes to unite with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria, the Gaddafi regime became isolated. This was especially the case with the Palestinians where Gaddafi attempted to dictate in the internal matters among the Palestinians.

While representing himself as a revolutionary, Gaddafi exposed his lack of understanding of international politics and his own ideological limitations by the alliances that he attempted to forge. Although Libya had been placed firmly within the ranks of the nonaligned movement under Gaddafi, the political leadership did not have a profound understanding of the difference between rhetoric and reality when it came to many of the leaders in Africa. It was this ideological and intellectual limitation that influenced Gaddafi to develop strong relations with autocrats such as Omar Bongo of Gabon, Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, and Idi Amin Dada of Uganda. In the specific case of Amin of Uganda, Gaddafi provided military and financial support to a leader who had killed hundreds of thousands and waged war against Tanzania, a society that was enduring the most of the battles against apartheid at that historical moment.

Throughout the first 20 years of the Gaddafi regime, the Libyan government was embroiled in the internal politics of Chad supporting differing factions and deepening the involvement of the Libyan military in a prolonged military scraps in the Aouzou dispute. The extended Libyan involvement in the military wrangles that has been journalistically termed the "Toyota War" diverted the attention of the African freedom struggle and gave legitimacy for the French military intervention in Central Africa. (Azevedo 1998. This war is also called the Toyota War by some western journalists.) Gaddafi's enamorment with self-styled "rebel" leaders and organizations meant that there was a steady traffic of individuals such as Charles Taylor who made pilgrimages to Libya. What Gaddafi did not know was that during his relationship with Charles Taylor, the latter was working as a US intelligence asset (2012). Through the organization named Al Mathaba, the Libyan leadership proclaimed itself to be at the forefront of anti-imperialism, but the Green Book, the theoretical basis for this revolutionary posture, was as contradictory as the policies of Gaddafi.

In 1977, there was the Declaration of the Establishment of the Peoples Authority, and from March 2, Libya was renamed the Socialist People's Arab Jamahiriya. One author traced the twists and turns of the forms of rule where Gaddafi took the title as a Guide. This author explored the periods 1969–1977, the period 1977–1988, the period of sanctions and isolation, the period of the 1990s, and the energetic period of what this author called Gaddafi's "conversion." This was the period after September 11, 2001, when Gaddafi and his sons worked hard to ingratiate himself with the United States and Britain and begged to be an ally in the Global War on Terror. Luis Martinez described these zigs and zags as the *Libyan Paradox* (Martinez 2007). Shukri Ghanem and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi were two central figures in the paradoxical relationship with the West.

Gaddafi and Libya in the Context of Western Militarism

In the period of neoliberal capitalism and imperial domination, the Libyan society managed to escape the worst prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund because of its large deposits of fossil fuels. Prior to the major discoveries of fossil fuel by US oil companies in the 1950s, Libya was a poor country whose principal export was scrap metal. Italian capitalism did not invest in the infrastructure of the society, and the social and technical backwardness was very evident in all regions of Libya. After the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the petroleum sector in Libya was dominated by British and US oil companies. By 1957, there were about a dozen companies operating in Libya on about 60 different concessions.

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The companies operating there included the seven majors (called the Seven Sisters of oil and alternatively Big Oil) and the French para-statal Compagnie Française des Pétroles. There was also Oasis, a consortium of three companies new to international petroleum exploration, Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips, and Marathon. (The Oasis Group (originally the Conorada Group) is a consortium composed of three US "independent" oil companies: Amerada (now Amerada Hess), Continental (now ConocoPhillips), and Marathon. Bidding independently, the companies won concessions throughout Libya during the first auction of oil rights in 1955. For details of the oil companies, see Martinez, Luis, *The Libyan Paradox*, and Vanderwalle, Dirk, *Libya Since Independence: Oil and State Building.*) Following the concession awards, the Oasis companies pooled their acquisitions. By 1965, when Libya opened a second round of concession bidding, Oasis was the number two producer of oil in Libya, bringing in more than 300,000 barrels per day. The energetic activities of these western companies expanded Libya's petroleum sector so that by 1970, at the time of the revolution, Libya was exporting 3.3 million barrels of oil per day (BPD).

Once the revolution took place in 1969, the Libyan government had started to tax the oil companies, but the intransigence of the oil companies speeded the processes of nationalization and control by the Libyans. After the 1973 war between Egypt and Israelis, the Libyan regime began to take an aggressive position in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and by 1979, the example of radical nationalization established by Libya had been followed by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Over the 15-year period after the revolution in Libya, countries such as Iraq, Venezuela, Nigeria, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates fully nationalized the holdings of the western oil companies (Juhasz 2009, p. 101). The leadership of Libya within institutions such as OPEC led to confrontations with the West culminating in the 1977 ranking of Libya as number 4 in the potential enemies list of the United States (the other enemies were the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Libya. Cuba was ranked fifth on this list. See Ronen, Yehudit. *Qaddafi's*

Libya in World Politics, p. 15). It followed from this ranking that the differences between the countries expanded to the point where the Reagan Administration bombed Libya in April 1986 in a clear effort to eliminate the leader of Libya (see op cit pp. 32–34).

The political leadership of Libya had used the increased resources from oil to develop a robust program of social and economic reforms. In March 1978, the government issued guidelines for housing redistribution, attempting to ensure the population that every adult Libyan owned his own home and that no one in Libya would be homeless. Following the social democratic traditions of Europe, the Libyan government bestowed greater access to health, education, housing, childcare, and support for newlyweds. These initiatives were called socialist, and in 1978, Gaddafi called for the People's Committees to eliminate the "bureaucracy of the public sector" and the "dictatorship of the private sector"; the People's Committees took control of several hundred companies, converting them into worker cooperatives run by elected representatives.

Despite the claim that the People's Committees were in control of the economy of Libya, the leadership encouraged sycophancy in the ranks of the bureaucracy while discouraging genuine working class leadership and organization. The underdevelopment of the political class in Libya meant that outside of the close-knit circle of sycophants and hangers on, the Libyan society had few resources to respond to the psychological and information warfare that had been launched against Libya. As Libya became enmeshed in the geopolitics for energy resources, the social science of empire was unleashed against Libyan society and its leaders.

Tribal Libya, rogue state, terrorist state, radical Islamist, and other prerogative social science categories obscured the achievements of this society and reproduced the divisions between Libya and Africa. This information war was actually supported by active measures by western intelligence services to foment divisions within Libya. Libya and Gaddafi became the basis for one of the most sustained efforts at psychological warfare and disinformation with Gaddafi being labeled

as a state sponsor of terror and terrorism. The National Security Directive Decision (NSDD) 205 of 1986 intensified the psychological war against Gaddafi to the point where historians will be hard pressed in the future to distinguish facts from fiction in relation to the many "terrorist" acts that were supposed to be orchestrated by Libya during the period of the Reagan Administration (Wehrey 2019). The US NSDD 295 had worked to incite internal dissent against Qadhafi with the objective of his removal from power. NSDD 224 of the Reagan Administration provided the justification of the bombing of Libya in 1986 on the grounds that Libya had been implicated in a number of terrorist attacks, especially the bombing of a night club in West Berlin on April 5, 1986.

After the bombing of Libya by the Reagan Administration in 1986, there were US military planners who argued that the bombing was an exercise in psychological operations (Goldstein 1997). Many books and scholarly articles drew from the disinformation campaign of the United States and the British in their covert wars against Gaddafi. One of the ironies of history was that while the Reagan Administration was accusing Gaddafi of sponsoring terror and terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency had started to recruit Libyans, Algerians, and Egyptians to fight in Afghanistan with Osama Bin Laden (Coll 2004, see also Bergen 2001). It was this history of disinformation that renders very problematic the information on the bombing of the Pan Am Flight in 1988. Notwithstanding that the Libyan government under Gaddafi paid compensation to the families of those who perished, this episode exposed many of the contours of imperialism and anti-imperialism at the end of the cold war.

Gaddafi as a Beneficiary of Anti-imperialist Organization After the Cold War

Throughout the period of US imperial hegemony, the three forces that had been very successful in opposing US and imperial domination were the forces of the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnamese struggles, and the anti-apartheid struggles. In particular, the anti-apartheid struggles had mobilized the Pan-African forces globally to oppose white racism internationally. This opposition at the international level divided the world into those who saw the African National Congress and Nelson Mandela as terrorists. The military defeat of the apartheid forces along with their moral defeat had been a boon to the forces of peace after Nelson Mandela was released from detention in 1990. After the blundering of relations with Idi Amin and Bongo, Gaddafi drew closer to the freedom fighters in Southern Africa and provided material and financial support to African freedom fighters. Hence, when Gaddafi was demonized by the West, he was labeled as the "dear brother leader" by the ANC of South Africa.

The relationships between Gaddafi and the global Pan-African movement deepened after the seventh Pan-African Congress that was held in Kampala in 1994. The resolution of the Congress had stated that the next Pan-African Congress would be held in Libya. That resolution could not be enacted in 1994, because by that time, Libya and Gadhafi were under sanctions by the United Nations for the downing of the Pan Am Jet in 1988. In 1994, Nelson Mandela became the Head of State in South Africa, and for a short moment, the balance of the anti-imperialist forces tipped to the side of the oppressed.

Nelson Mandela had openly acknowledged the support of Cuba, Libya, the Palestinians, and other fighters for freedom who had supported the African National Congress. Nelson Mandela who had been declared a terrorist by the white racist minority regime and by western intelligence agencies undertook to successfully mediate between the government of Britain and the United States to have the sanctions against Libya lifted. Even in his advanced age, when he could not fly directly to Libya, Mandela undertook shuttle diplomacy to mediate between Gaddafi and the British. Mr. Mandela shuttled between Britain and Libya until he made a breakthrough where Libya agreed to the principal demand, that is, handing over Libyans who were accused of placing the bomb on the Pan Am Flight.

The UN sanctions were lifted in 1999 after the Libyan government agreed to hand over "suspects" to be tried in Europe.

One of the compromises that came out of these negotiations was that those accused of the 1988

Lockerbie bombing be tried outside Scotland. Hugh Roberts discussed at great length the sophisticated diplomatic maneuvers by Gaddafi and the Libyan government after these negotiations so that Libya could reenter the western fold without accepting responsibility for the Lockerbie disaster:

> It was only in 2003–4, after Tripoli had paid a massive sum in compensation to the bereaved families in 2002 (having already surrendered Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhima for trial in 1999), that sanctions were lifted, at which point a new reforming current headed by Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi emerged within the regime. (Hugh Roberts, "Who Said Gaddafi had to go?" London Review of Books, November 2011)

Roberts is among the few scholars who penetrated the diplomatic push by the Gaddafi regime to end the sanctions without admitting anything in relation to the Lockerbie affair. It is worth quoting Roberts at great length:

> It is often claimed by British and American government personnel and the Western press that Libya admitted responsibility for Lockerbie in 2003–4. This is untrue. As part of the deal with Washington and London, which included Libya paying $2.7 billion to the 270 victims' families, the Libyan government in a letter to the president of the UN Security Council stated that Libya 'has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103, and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials'. That this formula was agreed in negotiations between the Libyan and British (if not also American) governments was made clear when it was echoed word for word by Jack Straw in the House of Commons. The formula allowed the government to give the public the impression that Libya was indeed guilty, while also allowing Tripoli to say that it had admitted nothing of the kind. The statement does not even mention al-Megrahi by name, much less acknowledge his guilt or that of the Libyan government, and any self-respecting government would sign up to the general principle that it is responsible for the actions of its officials. Tripoli's position was spelled out by the prime minister, Shukri Ghanem, on 24 February 2004 on the Today programme: he made it clear that the payment of compensation did not imply an admission of guilt and explained that the Libyan government had 'bought peace'. (Hugh Roberts, "Who said Gaddafi had to go?")

From the moment of this tragic bombing of the Pan Am Flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, there had been conflicting reports from western intelligence agencies on who was responsible for this bombing. Shukri Ghanem, the quintessential insider of the regime and one of the "reformers," categorically denied that Libya had anything to do with the Lockerbie bombing.

The general line on Libya by western scholars and analysts was that the Gaddafi regime had undergone a "conversion," but Martinez in his book on the *Libyan Paradox* explained in great detail the fears of Gaddafi for his life. As a scholar working from French resources, Martinez would have been aware of the evidence produced by French journalists of the plans by British intelligence and the Islamic Fighting Group of Libya to assassinate Gaddafi in 1996. This was only one of the many assassination plots that Gaddafi had survived after coming to power in 1969. In November 2002, the British newspaper *The Guardian* reported that "British intelligence paid large sums of money to an al-Qaeda cell in Libya in a doomed attempt to assassinate Colonel Gadhafi in 1996 and thwarted early attempts to bring Osama bin Laden to justice" (Bright 2002). For further details of the relationships between western intelligence agencies and the Islamscists in Libya and Saudi Arabia (see Brisard and Dasquie 2002).

Imperialism and the Weaponization of Finance in the Age of Neoliberalism

Gaddafi had escaped the net of sanctions with the support of the Pan-African movement, but he became more ensnared into the web of international finance capital after the sanctions were lifted. There were a number of tracks of western penetration of Libya: trapping Libya in the web of the financialization of energy markets, demonizing Gaddafi, military penetration and support for known Islamists, supporting reformers inside the Libyan bureaucracy, and working to isolate Gaddafi in Africa.

With the assistance of South Africa and the new leaders that emerged in Africa after 1994, Gaddafi was rehabilitated within Africa with a steady stream of activists joining the pilgrimages to International Mathaba that was held in Tripoli every year. Gaddafi had created the International Mathaba as one component of the Libyan

Socialist Jamahiriya. The Mathaba's mission statement had been clear with the objectives, "to resist imperialism, racism, fascism, zionism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism." From 1982 forward, the Mathaba had international meetings where groups of freedom fighters from all over the world participated. While the bona fides of some of the organizations that attended the Mathaba meetings were questionable, the meetings had provided a space for governments such as that of Fidel Castro of Cuba, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela to link up with African freedom fighters at the political and diplomatic levels outside of the UN forum. Western governments were incensed because Gaddafi gave visible support to African-American opponents of racism as well as to the American Indian Movement.

These genuine liberation movements could be distinguished from the others such as Blaise Compaore (the president of Burkina Faso and the person who played a significant role in the overthrow and assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987) and Yahya Jammeh, the president of Gambia. The Al Mathaba confraternity brought together selected anti-imperialist activists from Africa, the Caribbean, and North America, but many of these activists never challenged the ideas of monarchical dreams which culminated in Gaddafi declaring himself, Kings of Kings (Anderson 2011).

There was opposition to Gaddafi from the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were opposed to the radical ideas expressed by the Mathaba and Gadhafi. Western intelligence agencies such as the MI6 of Britain kept back channel links to those who opposed Gaddafi such as the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The evidence of the complicity between the Saudi and western intelligence agencies in supporting the Islamic Fighting Group revealed the reality that the plans for the military destabilization and removal of Gaddafi were not new, nor did they suddenly arise after the February 15, 2011, uprisings in Libya. The book *Forbidden Truth* had opened one window into the world of the relationship between groups such as the

Carlyle Group and the oil companies and Libya. Condoleezza Rice, as an executive of Chevron oil company, was enmeshed in the web of intelligence, finance, and international politics that transcended Libya. While she was Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visited Libya in September 2008 and articulated with clarity that the United States has no "permanent friends in Libya, only permanent interests."

Western scholars took time to study the investment of the Gaddafi family to end isolation, and particular interest was focused on Saif al-Islam Gaddafi who had earned a doctorate at the London School of Economics (the title of the dissertation is "The Role of Civil Society in the Democratisation of Global Governance Institutions."). Shukri Ghanem, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Musa Kusa were three of the more influential sectors of the bureaucracy that promoted market reforms, and these were dubbed the "neo-liberal forces within the Libyan establishment. Organs such as the General People's Congress which was supposed to be the harbinger for the establishment of a 'regime of people's power' and 'direct popular democracy' at the grassroots never found a real base among workers, poor farmers, students and patriotic business persons. The inner circle of Gaddafi stifled genuine social engagement while the western educated bureaucrats worked to bring Libya into the fold of 'market reforms.'"

The connections and discussions between the Libyan leadership and western liberal scholars created an ambivalent relationship that exposed the hollow ideological basis regime of the intellectual apparatus of the leadership. Libyan universities did not produce rigorous scholarship because of the sycophancy that was promoted nationally and internationally around the Gaddafi family. When Libya signed a multibillion dollar exploration and production deal with British Petroleum in 2007, BP promised to spend US $50 million on education and training project. The ambivalence toward Europe that was expressed in political rhetoric was not matched inside the educational system. Those with resources in Libya sent their children to schools in North America and Western Europe. The Al

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Mathaba was established as a vehicle for anti-imperialism, but this was hollow and depended on the whims and caprices of the "brother leader." In this situation, those who had been educated in elite western universities dominated the bureaucracy and promoted western-type "democracy" neoliberal "reforms" so that Libya could enjoy better relations with the United States and Britain. Various scholars had identified, Musa Kusa, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (son of Gaddafi), Mahmoud Jibril, Shukri Ghanem, Aziz al Isawi, and Tarek Ben Halim as the neoliberal reformers inside the government of Libya (this line of reasoning has been developed by Martinez and Prashad (2012). These functionaries had been so schooled in western ideas about economics that despite the massive reserves of Libya, their mantra was that Libya needed to open up to the West in order to attract "foreign investment capital create free trade zones and enhance the fledgling stock market" (Martinez and Prashad 2012 pp. 136–138). Despite the dominance of the "reformers," the zigzags of Gaddafi in relation to the international policies frustrated British and US interests who wanted to have a dominant say in the future of the Libyan economy. During the period of sanctions, European firms from Italy, Germany, Spain, Austria, and Turkey had done brisk business in the oil sector, but the Gaddafi family wanted to be accepted by the United States and went all out to ingratiate itself to Washington and the associated intellectual networks of US capitalism.

Finance Capital and the Libyan Investment Authority

Five years after the NATO intervention in Libya and the killing of Gaddafi, there was the judgment in the High Court of London in October 2016 during the Libyan Investment Authority versus Goldman Sachs case. (Case Number HC-2014-000197. https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/libyan-investment-authority-v-goldman-sachs/. The details of the case which have been published online can be accessed from https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/lia-v-goldman.pdf. Some of the issues bordering the case are raised in the article "Goldman Sachs vindicated but bruised in court battle with Libyan fund" posted by Reuters

on October 16, 2016. See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-swf-litigation/goldman-sachs-vindicated-but-bruised-in-court-battle-with-libyan-fund-idUSKBN12G0QE. Two days earlier, viz., October 14, 2016 there was an article posted by Reuters titled "Goldman Sachs wins $1.2billion with Libyan Sovereign Fund" This article is also available online at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-swf-litigation/goldman-sachs-wins-1-2-billion-dispute-with-libyan-sovereign-fund-idUSKBN12E1GL. It can be understood from these articles by Claire Milhench that the $1.2billion dollars was part of LIA's $67billion sovereign wealth fund. It has revealed another $2.1billion battle between the LIA and the French Bank Societe General.) This was the outcome of a 2.5-year legal battle between Goldman Sachs and Libya's $67 billion sovereign fund over the use of the resources of Libya in the speculative activities of the financial oligarchy in the world. Gaddafi and the Libyan government had established the Libyan Investment Authority to manage the massive holdings that were held by the Libyan government in foreign financial institutions.

At the outset of the establishment of the LIA, the Libyans were concentrating on the country they knew, Italy. Gaddafi had made 11 visits to Italy where the Italians promised to pay reparations, and Gaddafi undertook to be the police for Europe in preventing would-be immigrants from crossing the Mediterranean. Soon after the establishment of the LIA, Libya took stakes of between 2% and 3% in Italian bank UniCredit and Italian aerospace and defense company Finmeccanica. It also took a 7.5% stake in the Italian soccer club Juventus. Other notable investments included a 0.7% stake in Belgian financial group Fortis, a 3% stake in British publisher Pearson, and a 1% stake in Russian aluminum company Rusal. By 2010, the Libyan Investment Authority had amassed over US$53 billion in assets and held these in different parts of the world. Later it was estimated that the Libyan government held approximately US $200 billion in investments throughout the world (Paul 2011).

The oligarchs of Wall Street ached to get their hands on the funds of the Libyan Investment Authority, and the tale of this "dalliance" remains

one of the lesser told aspects of the relationship between Gaddafi and the West. One can read from the *Wall Street Journal*, the principal financial newspaper in the United States, how the Libyan Investment Authority lost money and the acrimonious fallout of these losses:

> In early 2008, Libya's sovereign-wealth fund controlled by Col. Moammar Gadhafi gave $1.3 billion to Goldman Sachs Group to sink into a currency bet and other complicated trades. The investments lost 98% of their value, internal Goldman documents show. What happened next may be one of the most peculiar footnotes to the global financial crisis. In an effort to make up for the losses, Goldman offered Libya the chance to become one of its biggest shareholders, according to documents and people familiar with the matter. Negotiations between Goldman and the Libyan Investment Authority stretched on for months during the summer of 2009. Eventually, the talks fell apart, and nothing more was done about the lost money. Coker and Rappaport 2011

The case in the High Court in London in 2014–2016 brought out the inelegant measures that had been used by Goldman Sachs to get the Libyans to invest in questionable securities to the point where Libya lost US $5 billion.

When Gaddafi had sought to hold Goldman Sachs accountable, the company had dithered, but in the mood after the collapse of Lehman brothers in 2008, Goldman Sachs was trapped and had little room for maneuver, but the Libyans were the ones with the resources. With the full knowledge that the financialization project was orchestrated through the financial sector in Dubai, the Libyan Investment Fund moved to consolidate its position in the "dark markets" world of the emirates. Libya had entered into the opaque world of financing energy markets and because it was awash with funds could move internationally in ways beyond the control of Wall Street or London. After December 2010, the Central Bank of Libya took the controlling position in the Arab Banking Corporation based in Bahrain. The Arab Banking Corporation was owned by Kuwait Investment Authority, Central Bank of Libya, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and other shareholders with minor shares. Any move for making independent decisions in the Arab Banking Corporation threatened the web of

speculators in the derivatives industry that depended on the recycling of petrodollars from the oil-rich nations of Kuwait, Libya, and the Emirates. Libya had gone for the jugular by seeking to capture the base of the Intercontinental Exchange. After February 17, when the Libyans started to move to divest their funds from their overexposure with British and US financial institutions, there was the freezing of the assets of Libya prior to the façade of protecting Libyans by Britain, France, and NATO.

The destruction of Libya and the killing of Gaddafi meant that Goldman Sachs felt that they were in the clear, but even after the death of Gaddafi, the Libyan Investment Authority prosecuted Goldman Sachs in the courts in England. Understanding the time line of the external efforts at a transitional government and the outbreak of the war between the Dignity brigade and the Libya Dawn forces in 2014 may shed some light on the role of international financial organizations in Libya.

In the ruling of the British High Court on the Libyan Investment Authority (henceforth LIA) against Goldman Sachs, the learned judge, Judge Vivien Rose, found that Goldman Sachs did not have a case to answer for. This judgment exposed the subservience of the judiciary system of the United Kingdom in the same manner in which the factional fighting in Libya continues to relate to who will control the US $200 billion plus in reserves which is still frozen. In the world of finance capital, countries such as Libya had been able to avoid the chokehold of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and western banks because the financial sector of Libya was kept under strict control. More importantly, the leader of Libya made the case for using the vast reserves of the Libyan state to anchor the proposed African currency. This placed the leadership in Libya on a path of direct confrontation with the train of financialization that had overtaken most societies of the world.

Gaddafi and the African Union

After the intervention of Nelson Mandela to end the sanctions against Libya, Gaddafi had moved rapidly to engage with the global Pan-African

movement. With the encouragement of Tajudeen Abdul Raheem and Salim Ahmed Salim, Gaddafi convened an extraordinary meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Sirte in 1999. The Sirte Declaration that came out of this meeting was the resolution adopted by the Organization of African Unity on September 9, 1999, at the fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of African Heads of State and Government held at Sirte, Libya. The Declaration announced the decision to establish the African Union and to speed up the implementation of the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, to create an African Economic Community, African Central Bank, African Monetary Union, African Court of Justice, and Pan-African Parliament, with the Parliament to be established by 2000.

With the energetic encouragement of Gaddafi, there was the preparation and ratification of the Constitutive Act of the African Union by December 31, 2000. When it was found out that a number of states could not sign on to the Constitutive Act because of outstanding dues to the OAU, Gaddafi paid the dues of these countries. There were summits at Lomé in 2000, when the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted, and at Lusaka in 2001, when the plan for the implementation of the African Union was adopted. The first session of the Assembly of the African Union was held in Durban on July 9, 2002. Thabo Mbeki of South Africa became the first Chair of the AU after the summit in Durban in 2002.

Western states were surprised by the speed of the adoption and ratification of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The AU had differed from its predecessor the OAU in so far as the mandate of the Constitutive Act gave the AU the authority to intervene in serious circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. By 2004, the Peace and Security Council of the AU became operational with the broad mandate to enhance peace and security in Africa.

At the third AU summit, held in Libya in July 2005, Gaddafi called for greater integration, promoting the long-standing call of the global Pan-African movement for a single AU passport, a common defense system, and a single currency, utilizing the slogan: "The United States of Africa

is the hope." At the 50th anniversary of Ghana's independence in 2007 at the AU summit in Ghana, Gaddafi again called for the rapid unification of Africa with a common currency. When he became the AU Chairperson in 2009, Gaddafi pledged to use the reserves of Libya to underwrite the African currency. This drive by Gaddafi to promote anti-imperialism in African Unity speeded his demise.

In March 2011 before the NATO intervention, Sarkozy who was then the President of France emailed the then US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, and set out clearly why the intervention took place. The information came out in 2016 during the elections in the United States. As content of the email revealed in March 2011, Sarkozy spelt out the following five reasons why there had to be intervention in Libya:

1. France wanted to gain a greater share of Libyan oil production.
2. The intervention was necessary to increase French influence in North Africa.
3. To improve the internal political situation in France. That the internal political situation in France is dependent on the instability of Africa.
4. To provide the French military with the opportunity to reassert its position in the world.
5. To address the concern of his advisers over Gaddafi's long-term plans to supplant France as the dominant power in Francophone Africa.

The role of France and its relationship with Libya and Africa became central to the NATO intervention that led to the fall of Gaddafi.

NATO, the Destruction of Libya and the Killing of Gaddafi

The NATO intervention in Libya started in March 2011. This intervention came in the period when there had been uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia deposing leaders Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. The first Libyan demonstrations against the Gaddafi regime occurred on February 15, 2011, but by February 21, 2011, there were reports that there was imminent danger that innocent civilians were about to be massacred by the army. These

reports on an imminent massacre were embellished by reports of the political leadership calling the rebellious forces "rats." The United States, Britain, and France took the lead to rush through a resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations, invoking the principle of the "responsibility to protect."

The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 2011 had been loosely worded with the formulation "all necessary measures" tacked on to ensure wide latitude for those societies and political leaders who orchestrated the NATO intervention in Libya. (Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 established a no-fly zone over Libya, authorised the enforcement of an arms embargo, and authorised "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1973, 17 March 2011, para. 6. and para 13.) In the next 9 months, the implementation of this UN Resolution exposed the real objectives of the leaders of the United States, France, and Britain. With the western media fuelling a propaganda campaign in the traditions of "manufacturing consent," this UN Security Council authorization was stretched from a clear and limited civilian protection mandate into a military campaign for regime change and the execution of the President of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi.

The deployment of information warfare capabilities had defined the nature of the NATO engagement in Libya. The psychological warfare and disinformation from the era of the Reagan Administration were refined to justify the NATO bombing of Libya. Early in the campaign, the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates had outlined why it would not be necessary to have boots on the ground in Libya. Though it was the planning of the NATO commanders that electronic warfare and bombing would bring the regime to its knees, after 3 months of bombing, the regime of Gaddafi was still in place. A new arena was opened in relation to information warfare when in April 2011 the bombing had failed to dislodge the Gadaffi government. There was the buzz of referring Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for killing his own people. Together with the sanctions mandated by Resolution 1973,

international public opinion was mobilized to condemn the leadership of Libya. These maneuvers meant that it was necessary to dismiss and diminish the efforts of the African Union to mediate between the Libyan government and the opposition National Transitional Council (NTC). In fact, the NTC refused to meet the team of the AU. Despite the overwhelming bombing campaign, the NATO form of warfare required ground troops. These were provided by Chad, Qatar, and Sudan.

Imperial militarism experimented with a new mode of warfare in Libya. The first aspect of this warfare is to bomb by air. In 78 days the NATO forces (also called the coalition) flew more than 38,000 sorties. Despite the post-intervention stories of the success of the bombing campaign, the vaunted cooperation between the forces were hampered by the lack of interoperability between the computerized systems of the United States and the other "allies." There was no cooperation in relation to battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES). After the intervention there had been recriminations among analysts about the inability of NATO to advance information sharing. US forces utilized the SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network), and these capabilities were not shared. Electronic warfare accompanied the bombing so that the command and control capabilities of the Libyan leadership and Libya's telecommunication system were jammed. Secondly, NATO deployed Special Forces what the United States call Special Operations forces. Thirdly, NATO made use of local militias; and fourthly, they employ foreign forces that were aligned with them. This is how they went into Libya. Before this time, however, there had been enough information warfare on Africans and across the world to garner support for this warfare and its approach.

The vacuous nature of the political base of the Libyan leadership under Gaddafi was laid bare by the fighting for Tripoli after the NATO forces entered Tripoli with foreign troops from Sudan and Qatar. Before the entry of NATO in Tripoli in August 2011, the spokespersons for Gaddafi had boasted that Gaddafi had an army of over 65,000 military personnel to defend

Tripoli. The Libyan armed forces had been degraded under Gaddafi because the regime feared a coup d'etat. This fear was intensified after the rebellion broke out and officers such as General Younis defected. The western reports on the divisions in the army have outlined the depth of the infiltration of the Libyan establishment after years of seeking reconciliation with western states. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi had developed deep relations with the intellectual front persons for imperialism, and Muammar Gaddafi had enabled the imperial intervention by his close collaboration with their intelligence agencies.

During the initial stages of the integrated Qatar/special forces/private military contractor assault on Tripoli, the spokesperson for Gaddafi boasted that the regime had 65,000 armed personnel ready to defend Tripoli. Yet, when the Special Forces of NATO and Qatar showed up in Tripoli with Belhadj (of the LIFG) as the Head of the Tripoli Military Council, the 65,000 armed personnel who were supposed to defend Tripoli were nowhere to be seen. It devolved to citizens who opposed NATO to defend their communities.

The mythical 65,000 forces had been superseded by militias under the sons of Gaddafi. These "paramilitary" forces of Libya under Gaddafi were better at internal repression than in dealing with foreign threats. From the annual studies of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it was possible to obtain detailed information on the military expenditures under Gaddafi. According to these sources there were supposed to be over 120,000 persons under arms in Libya by January 2011: Army 45,000, paramilitary 40,000, Air force 8,000, Air Defense 15,000, and Navy 8,000 (Libya 2011). Undoubtedly, the Libyan armed forces were no match for the sophisticated weaponry of Britain, Canada, France, the United States, and other forces of NATO, but what the Vietnamese had shown was that political mobilization and organization of citizens to defend their society could neutralize superior weaponry. Gaddafi did not learn this elementary lesson.

Although the Libyan armed forces were composed of a number of paramilitary forces and

security services, these armed elements in Libya acted as a means of controlling the power of the regular military and providing Gaddafi and his family with security. The narrative of "tribal" loyalties ensured that the military units around Sirte, the birthplace of Gaddafi, were the best equipped and were supposed to be the most loyal. Libya had billions of dollars, but Gaddafi did not know how to buy weapons, maintain them, or spend the money to uplift the technical and intellectual level of the army. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in dabbling with Islam and neoliberalism only served to confuse the soldiers as to where they should stand. Thus, when a real war emerged, Gaddafi who had been spending about a billion dollars per year on weapons was full of bluster but had no real army.

The execution of Gaddafi was a coordinated affair of British French and US imperialism. The gory details of the execution and sodomization have been documented by this author in the book *Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failures in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the forging of African Unity.*

NATO's Failure and the Place of Gaddafi in History

In April 2016, President Obama said what happened in Libya was the worst mistake in his presidency. Was it a mistake or that the US administration had been driven by the demands of finance capital and Wall Street? Obama, in saying that this was a mistake, sent a signal about differences within the US military and financial establishment over the future of imperial military interventions (Goldberg 2016). In his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of the *Atlantic Magazine*, Obama blamed the British for what is called the Libyan "Shit Show." After Obama described what happened in Libya as a mistake, the British Parliamentary Committee admitted that what happened in Libya was based on lies. The British Government and the media said that the government claimed, without evidence, that Gaddafi was about to kill his citizens in Benghazi. Additionally, the British Parliamentary Committee said that NATO rushed into military intervention without pursuing other options (This observation had been made earlier by the

abstentions during the vote in the security council of UN to intervene in Libya).

The re-evaluation of the role of western governments in the killing and destruction in Libya is caught between the disinformation that had been propagated against Libya and the realities of the thousands of militias that have made life unbearable for Libyan citizens. Western intellectuals who had dubbed the NATO intervention a "civil war" had great difficulty in rationalizing the plans for reconstruction of Libya based on plans of "transitions to democracy."

In the United States and Britain, there is a re-evaluation of happenings in Libya consistent with the new mea culpa from Obama and House of Commons select committee. Such a re-evaluation is reinforced by the studies of German specialists who question the use of force for regime change in Libya. This notwithstanding, when academics and Western agencies inundate African institutions with grants to study terror, clearly, there is a studious avoidance of the implications of the intervention in Libya for the present instability in the Sahelian region of Africa.

Conclusion

The life of Muamar Gaddafi exposed the pitfalls of anti-imperialism without a clear ideological position. Gaddafi had been born into the era of anti-colonialism and the Bandung era of the struggles for bread, peace, and justice. Struggles against US imperialism had defined this period of anti-imperial history. In North Africa Gaddafi was caught between the pressures of Islamization and the need to provide a better standard of living for the people. Samir Amin had critiqued this form of leadership in the book *The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggle*. Gaddafi opposed the classic understanding of class struggles in Libya and designated his society a state of the people. While this designation was being propagated in theory, in practice, British, French, Italian, and US capitalists were working hard to train a class of Libyans who internalized the ideas of private property and the inviolability of the market. The bureaucrats who managed the apparatus of the state with Gaddafi internalized these ideas

with his own son emerging as one of the "reformers."

After the ending of sanctions with the intervention of the global Pan-African movement, there were intensified pressures by western finance capital to dominate Libyan society and its resources. Gaddafi was of the view that he was smart enough and equipped to navigate the entreaties of western suitors and western banks. When the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt occurred, Gaddafi proved that he was very much out of touch with the realities of his own society and the societies around. His own hubris as to his popularity with his people ensured that he remained in Tripoli long after real support had disintegrated by the massive bombing campaign of NATO. The army of Gaddafi disintegrated, and Gaddafi was hunted down and killed.

In the world of imperialists and anti-imperialists, those from the imperial zone of disinformation and psychological warfare provided justifications for the killing with the mantra that he was about to kill his own people. Initially, US President justified the operations of NATO stating that that it meant that "the shadow of tyranny over Libya has been lifted." Three years later, Obama revised his opinion after the killing of the US Ambassador Christopher Stevens and the thousands of militias making life unbearable for the people.

Similarly in the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister David Cameron stated that he was "proud" of his country's role in overthrowing "this brutal dictator" until the select Committee of the House of Parliament reported that the Libyan operation had been based on lies.

The French were the only imperial force not to have any critical assessment of their involvement in Libya. Seven years later when France supported the Dignity battalion of General Haftar, there were open disputes between Italy and France over the role of France in Libya. The Deputy Prime Minister of Italy, Matteo Salvini, blamed France for supporting General Haftar in 2019 stating that "it would be very serious if France for economic or commercial reasons had blocked an EU initiative to bring peace to Libya and would support a party that is fighting. Some think that the [2011 Nato-led military intervention] in Libya promoted by [then-French

President Nicolas] Sarkozy was triggered more by economic and commercial interests than by humanitarian concerns."

> I hope we are not seeing the same film all over again.

The position of imperial states was very different from the states of the nonaligned world. Countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and South Africa praised Gaddafi, while in most parts of Africa, there are those who call for exposure on the role of France in Libya.

After NATO declared victory, there were elaborate plans for the reform agenda in Libya. The supporters of Gaddafi were persecuted, and black Libyans were killed as mercenaries. The NTC orchestrated an elaborate process for parliamentary elections and a new government in 2012, but the case of the Libyan Investment Authority against Goldman Sachs thrust Libya again into war until the British High Court Judgment in 2016. Since then, the United Nations has attempted to create the basis for a government of National Unity, but the differing external forces that had come together to defeat Gaddafi could not agree. Libya is now caught in a war with Egypt, France, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia supporting one faction led by general Haftar, while Italy, Qatar, Turkey, and other members of the EU supporting the UN back government in Tripoli. War and destabilization has plagued the peoples of Libya since 2011. The absence of real organization of the people by Gaddafi took a heavy toll on Libyan society.

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Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)

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Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi described as the man who shook the mighty British Empire with a pinch of salt, provokes political controversy, ambivalence, and opposing judgments. He is revered as a political saint and reviled as a mascot of the bourgeoisie, hailed as a critical anti-imperialist and rejected as a betrayer of the peasants, celebrated as an apostle of nonviolence and

castigated as creating the Hindu–Muslim divide. Gandhi led and was considered to be the chief architect of one of the most effective anti-imperialist movements in the world – the movement to gain independence for India from the British Empire. On 14 and 15 August 1947, British India was partitioned into two countries – Pakistan and India. While he was completely determined to overthrow the British Empire, he himself argued that the goal was to attain perfect self-control (*swaraj*) rather than national control (*swatantra*) over the government of India. Thus his anti-imperial ideas were based on a sense of individual duty to the common good and local welfare, rather than control over the nation state granting rights to citizens.

This essay will examine Gandhi's imperialism and anti-imperialism in the context of his life and examine the changes in his political thought and practice. Beginning with three educational years in London (1888–1891), going on to legal practice and adult life in South Africa (1893–1914) and on to middle age and political activism in India (1914–1948), we shall examine the evolution of his thought historically. The growth of his nationalist and universalist ideas will be examined simultaneously with his ideas of empire.

Early Life

Gandhi grew up in two small principalities (Porbandar and Rajkot), overseen by the British resident but ruled by native princes in the southwest corner of present-day Gujarat state. He was educated at a "modern" high school but was an indifferent student. As a young student, he admired British civilization, seeing its mastery over India as a sign of its greatness. He believed that its masculinity and strength were to be emulated and adopted. The purpose of adopting British ways of life, at the time was to overcome the humiliation of being of a subject race, at least according to his autobiography written from 1924–1925 (English translation published 1927–1929).

He was married at the age of 13 to Kasturbai, also 13, and their first child was born soon after

the death of his father, when he was 15. The child survived for only a few days. When Gandhi finished his schooling, he was advised and was himself taken with the idea of going to London to train as a barrister, so he could inherit his father's mantle of working in the Princely State of Porbandar. He was in London from 1888–1891 and was called to the bar at the Middle Temple before he returned to India. He said in an interview published at the time that he saw London as the center of civilization (Hunt 1993, p. 6).

From London he returned briefly to India to look for work as a barrister, but not being able to establish himself at the bar in Bombay and finding that he couldn't find employment in his father's former position as prime minister (*Diwan*) in Porbandar or Rajkot state, he took up the offer to work in South Africa for a Durban-based Indian firm. He went to South Africa intending to stay for a year (1893) but ended up making his career there for the next 21 years.

Critique of Government Policies in South Africa and Support of Empire

In London and South Africa, Gandhi engaged deeply with critics of Western life and culture such as the theosophists, vegetarians, naturopaths, and also Protestant Christian advocates. From them, he reoriented his youthful fascination with British culture and civilization to critique its basis and premises. Thus he began to question the basis of economic activity for being steeped in self-interest and rejected a model of citizenship that relied on unquestioning obedience to authority. Yet, he felt that he belonged to the local society of London and Durban as a member of the wider imperial world of Britain. It was also in this period that he had a growing conviction that Indian thought and spirituality were superior and Indian understanding of truth had a lot to contribute to this wider world. At this time, he was also in conversation with Raichand Mehta (later famous as Srimad Rajchandra), recognizing the importance of Jain *anekantvad* or *syadavada* – the recognition of multiple truths. He began developing his idea of duty and *dharma* (righteousness) as something more crucial in determining human

action than a sense of rights whose sole purveyor was the state.

During his time, in Durban, Natal, and Johannesburg, he looked on empire as a force for good. He said in his autobiography, referring to 1896, "Not that I was unaware of the defects in the British rule, but I thought that it was on the whole acceptable. In those days I believed that British rule was on the whole beneficial to the ruled ... colour prejudice ... I thought, quite contrary to British traditions, and I believed that it was only temporary and local" (Gandhi 1927, pp. 400–401).

From the first days of his entry into the legal profession in South Africa, Gandhi had faced color prejudice, and, with growing racial legislation in Transvaal, he – with the Natal Indian Congress and other organizations of colonial Indians there – actively began to petition the government to demand removal of disabilities being imposed by the newly independent Natal and Transvaal legislatures. Laws like the franchise to elect the legislature being framed to exclude Indians, the tax on laborers electing to remain in South Africa after indenture, and the restrictions on trading practices and locations of residence and movement were the issues the Natal Indian Congress engaged with in the period between 1893 and 1906. Gandhi was associated primarily with Indian merchant groups in South Africa – both Hindu and Muslim. It was for these groups that he demanded equality with the Whites. He distinguished Whites and Indians from both working-class Indians and the black African population. The methods of engagement were vigorous demonstrations, petitions, and marches.

Gandhi's demands for inclusion and equality in South Africa were based on an appeal to imperial fairness and justice. In this argument, empire was considered to retain a possibility of justice. The ideology of empire was seen as providing for an empress who was so far away from the population that this figure was equidistant from all the local factions and thus would not favor any particular group. The empress would treat all her subjects equally in accordance with their own traditions and thus be the epitome of justice. Gandhi read this notion of empire-as-

justice into Queen Victoria's often quoted 1858 Proclamation (Mukherjee 2010). According to him, writing in Indian Opinion on Empire Day celebrations, the Queen wrote to her prime minister that the Proclamation "... should breathe feelings of generosity, ... point out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown ...." Gandhi goes on to suggest that "Expansion of trade and the acquisition of territory are not the only things true Imperialists aim at. There is a greater and a nobler ideal to work for: that of producing ... happy-hearted human creatures" (Gandhi, CWMG 1961, Vol. 5, p. 326).

Another basis for his claim that Indians were eligible for inclusion and should not be saddled with discriminating laws and regulations, was that they had inherited an "advanced" Aryan civilization from ancient Sanskrit/Vedic texts and culture. In the context of making political claims, he distinguished Indians from "native" Africans and did not form alliances with movements like the Bantu and Zulu rebellions fighting vicious land grab and exploitation.

Gandhi also argued for reforming traits that were ascribed to Indians and held responsible for holding them back. For example, in response to accusations of being dirty, he made cleanliness an important tenet of his movement. This remained so throughout his career in India as well. The radical idea of his cleanliness was that he made every upper caste member of his establishment responsible for cleaning the nightsoil and other "unclean" jobs traditionally performed by lower caste members.

Gandhi accepted that the groups of White, Indians, and Africans existed in a system of racial hierarchy, and he was not arguing for abolishing this. His demands were merely to remove specific disabilities for Indians in this system of racial hierarchy and color prejudice. After 1909, his politics does extend beyond the merchant class of Indians in South Africa to other Indian origin groups like the indentured labourers. However, the various different racial groups agitating for removal of specific restrictions facing their group continued their politics separately never reaching out to each other (Desai and Vahed 2015).

Critique of Modern Civilization

During this period, his critique of modern civilization, initiated to some extent in London, was going on apace. In 1904, after a blinding revelation on reading John Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, determined that he must alter his way of living, he set up a new establishment where all could live by their own labor. Thus came the establishment of Phoenix Ashram (a place of communal living) outside Durban in 1904. This became the place where his journal *Indian Opinion* was produced, as well as where his family was settled and they could live in a self-sufficient manner.

Gandhi extended the critique which is directed at modern society by Ruskin, Tolstoy, Thoreau, and others to demonstrate how the modern extractive civilization is based not only on alienation of labor from produce but also based on the availability of cheap resources and external markets made available by the exercise of political control over other territories by industrial countries. The extension of the market destroys the craft and economic base of the other countries held in colonial subjection as well as in the home country. Thus he extends the critique of modern civilization, making it also a critique of colonial economy. Indian nationalists like Dadabhai Naoroji, whose *Poverty and UnBritish Rule* (1901) and R.C. Dutt's *Economic History of India* (1905) were crucial in developing Gandhi's arguments regarding colonial economic extraction and the immiseration of Indian society under colonial economic relations.

As an imperial subject, he protested against those aspects of imperial rule that he saw as not living up to empire's ideals. Also, as an imperial subject, he felt compelled to perform the righteous duty of defending the empire to which he felt he belonged, by participating in imperial wars to the best of his ability – organizing an ambulance corps in the Boer War (1900) and a stretcher-bearer corps during the Zulu Rebellion (April 1906), and, later on, a medical mission in London (1914). Loyalism was the basis from which he critiqued empire. His participation in the imperial wars including later in the First World War and recruiting for the Indian army fighting in Europe,

has been seen as a betrayal of his principles of nonviolence as well as support for a government he was criticizing. Clearly, Gandhi was not a revolutionary and was not attempting to overthrow the establishment, his critique aimed to hold the establishment to its own professed promises of equality.

Changing Tactics – Development of *Satyagraha*

From after the Zulu Rebellion, which Gandhi claimed was not a war but a manhunt, one senses a greater disaffection with government. The failure of repeated petitions and letters, even delegations to the colonial secretary in 1906, to achieve any changes to government's discriminatory practices and policies led him to stronger actions, as in 1908's burning of the certificates of residence introduced to document and restrict future migration of Indians into Transvaal. It was in fighting these discriminatory laws against Indians by the local governments in Transvaal and Natal that he defined his politics of action as *satyagraha*. Initially called passive resistance following Thoreau and Tolstoy, Gandhi felt that the word suggested weakness (1927, p. 292). He therefore felt that a new name must be thought of for their specifically Indian practice. He announced a prize for coming up with a name for the movement in *Indian Opinion*. Maganlal, his nephew and manager of the paper, came up with the name *sadagraha*, and Gandhi reformed it to *satyagraha* (loosely translating as "insistence on truth").

The year 1909 was another turning point in his ideology with the writing of his foundational text Hind Swaraj (Gandhi 1997). With the failure of repeated petitions and letters from the *satyagraha* movement from 1906 onwards, as well as the ineffectiveness of a personal delegation he led in 1909 when the Union of South Africa was being negotiated in London, Gandhi's critique of imperial politics was becoming stronger. Already the *satyagraha* agitation was recognizing the higher law with which governments must also be held to account. In July 1909, in London, he also engaged with "revolutionary" Indians – Madanlal Dhingra,

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Vinayak Savarkar, and others. He was as much aghast at their ideas as impressed by their patriotism and fervor to "do and die." In response to the rejection of the petitionary delegation of Indians he led to London, and the revolutionary will of the India House clique, he wrote in a furious 10 days his most foundational critique of modern life and politics: *Hind Swaraj*. In this text he demanded change which he called *Sudharo* (improvement) in Gujarati and *Civilization* in his English translation). Both the terms used in the text demonstrate that Gandhi presented his ideas not as revolution, but reform of the current practices. Menon has noted the sources of this text in the deep problems of industrialization in South Africa, a glorification of an imagined ancient, rural Indian ideal, and a disaffection and fear of the rising power of the working class in Europe. His criticism of contemporary industrial civilization was from a deeply conservative perspective that did not recognize the inherent hierarchies that were already being criticized by many of his compatriots and colleagues (Menon 2017).

Back in South Africa, the period from 1909 onwards was one of intensive protest against the growing racialist legislation there against Indians. His crowning achievement was the long march of striking mine workers and indentured labor from the coast to Johannesburg, achieving a coalition of middle-class Indian merchants with Indian indentured labor to argue for better rights of residence and travel between the provinces of the newly constituted South Africa, the repeal of a tax on laborers and their families living without indenture, and, the recognition of non-Christian marriages. This coalition was bringing together already politically active indentured workers, with the different Indian organizations under Gandhi's umbrella. Gandhi became the sole negotiator with Smuts, denying the further exposure of the violence of indenture in the mines and plantations to the Solomon Commission. Gandhi was apologetic about the violence undertaken by the indentured workers in their own defense, and their valiant sacrifices for the struggle were seen as mistakes in the correct practice of nonviolent resistance. Thus, he himself only valued the sacrifices of the satyagrahis – primarily middle class

Indians. Even in this major mobilization, he made no attempt to involve other black African labor. He thought the differences between the grievances of the Indian and African communities meant that it was not possible to speak of the two in the same breath (Desai and Vahed 2015, p. 302). Thus, if a struggle against apartheid is a struggle for equality for all the races of South Africa, then Gandhi cannot be seen as its first proponent. If, however, the anti-apartheid movement can see its beginnings in simple objections to particular racist legislation, then the Gandhian movement maybe considered to be one of their progenitors.

Gandhi in India (1914–1919)

Gandhi returned to India from South Africa in 1914. His reputation for fighting for the rights of Indians in South Africa had preceded him and he was welcomed as a hero by many in the Indian National Congress. Yet, his position as an outsider allowed him to take stock of the political situation in India by travelling around the country. He established his ashram in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, in western India (1915) and took up campaigns of local interest which helped him build his reputation as an activist who could mobilize popular support.

With Peasants His first campaigns with peasants were the Indigo farmer's campaign in Champaran district in the present state of Bihar (April 1917–March 1918), No-tax campaign in Kheda, Gujarat (March 1918). These campaigns were crucial in building up a reputation for Gandhi as a peasant leader. Though he earned relief for the peasants, not all the demands were met, nor did he establish Gandhian practices amongst these peasants. As analyzed by subaltern scholars, Gandhi's language and goals and renunciative persona struck a chord with the peasant groups and he was immediately and widely adopted as a redemptive leader by these groups. However, their interpretations of his message were their own and often beyond what he was preaching (Amin 1994).

With the Imperial War Effort In early 1918, Gandhi still argued for serving the imperial war

effort, advocating the recruitment of soldiers for the British Indian army to serve in the war. There is a sense here, as well as in his earlier support for imperial wars, that if Indians organized and did their duty by supporting the empire, the empire would fulfill its duty of providing for home rule and repealing unjust and exploitative aspects of its rule. As he said at his sedition trial in 1922, he had hoped that active support of the war would earn his compatriots equal rights in the Empire.

With Industrial Labor In early 1918, he jumped into the Ahmedabad textile mill workers' strike (February–March 1918). The strike lasted a few months in conditions of plague in the city, the workers were asking for a wage hike. He negotiated with the mill-owners, elaborating his ideas of trusteeship. He also established a worker's association called the *Majoor Mahajan*. The term Mahajan – the great men an anti-thesis to a union and parallel to the owner's traditional associations called Mahajan = great men. The tradition of labor-management cooperation set up by Gandhi is seen as a one of the reasons for the failure of the autonomous dalit and worker's movements in Gujarat, the western Indian state where he had his first establishment in India. His work with the textile mill labor is his most extensive work with industrial workers and demonstrates his anti-revolutionary activities most extensively.

Critique of Imperialism

At the end of the war, the government announced new legal acts enshrining repressive war-time provisions in law (The Rowlatt Act, 1919). In response to this draconian curtailing of civil liberties, Gandhi through the Indian National Congress made his first national call. He called for a general strike and this was taken up in different parts of the country with varying levels of enthusiasm. However, the biggest event of the Anti-Rowlatt Act demonstrations was the shooting of an unarmed gathering of hundreds of demonstrators at a walled garden in Amritsar – the Jallianwala Bag. This massacre and Gandhi's heading of the Congress inquiry into the events,

as well as the government's acquittal of General Dyer who had ordered the shooting, became a turning point in Gandhi's relationship with empire. In February 1922, he wrote the piece which occasioned his trial for sedition: "No empire intoxicated with the red wine of power and plunder of weaker races has yet lived long in this world, and this "British Empire", which is based upon the organized exploitation of physically weaker races of the earth and upon a continuous exhibition of brute force, cannot live if there is a just God ruling the universe"(Gandhi 1922a).

This statement came after 2 years of sustained agitation to demand the return of the Holy Lands to the Turkish Caliph (Khilafat agitation, 1920–1922) and a refusal to co-operate with the government of India. As part of that non-co-operation, Gandhi encouraged lawyers to give up legal practice, doctors to give up medical practice, and students to give up government education. He also advocated the use of locally manufactured items and bonfires of foreign produce, primarily cloth. In this period, he discovered the spinning wheel and adopted it as the symbol of his commitment to local self-reliance and disaffection with industry. It was also during non-co-operation that Gandhi developed a consistent vision of politics based on *panchayats* – a village-based system of government. He advocated panchayats for solving village problems, and they were used first in Champaran during the Indigo investigations.

This period of agitation after the war gave the basic outlines of Gandhi's anti-imperial position. It rested on his advocacy of local self-reliance and spiritual engagement. He advocated a bio-moral regimen to reorient individual commitment to politics. Thus he advocated bodily purity for the pure work of establishing just rule. The *swadeshi* (self-sufficiency) ideal was demonstrated through the collection and burning of foreign cloth, as well as the emphasis on the questions of rural development, spinning, and basic education. His economic program was now elaborated beyond the notion of commune and "bread labor" to a conception of village-based growth of self-sufficiency.

The sedition trial and subsequent period (1922–1929) was a period of constructive work and village development. Gandhi's constructive program and his idea of trusteeship (i.e., ownership of capital/ property in trust for its use for national good) remained the basis from which he critiqued both imperial government and the national bourgeoisie. The critique thus mounted, and his toleration of multiple layers of gradual transformation and his insistence on spiritual and voluntary change permitted in effect continuation of the modern economy, working in favor of the bourgeois nationalists. As Suniti Ghosh has shown, Gandhi's economic program was seen as compatible with imperial capital and Indian business (1989). Indian business, including large industrialists like G D Birla and Purushottam Thakurdas, were staunch supporters of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. However, they were not averse to deals with the imperial rulers that benefitted them, to the betrayal of the non-cooperation movement. Thus, at the end of the salt *satyagraha* in 1931, they agreed that non-cooperation could be withdrawn, if certain types of government tariffs would be withdrawn. Thus, Ghosh has outlined how Birla was in touch with British authorities in London and chambers of Commerce to outline how Gandhi would be agreeable to various demands they might make, if there were concessions to local businesses. Gandhi's economic policies, in the wake of his compromises with Viceroy Irwin (March 1931) did not threaten the economic domination and power of the capitalists. Gandhi differed most from the socialists and communists in their belief in the necessity for class struggle. He considered class struggle as inculcating hatred and violence, and contrasted it with *satyagraha*. Thus, instead of compulsory divesting capitalists of their wealth, he believed the capitalists should be encouraged to voluntarily give up the wealth for personal use and devote themselves to being trustees of the wealth, using it for common good (Hardiman 2003, p. 83). Thus, it would seem that despite his rather revolutionary ideas about social worth and public duty, his policies and practical actions worked to benefit business interests, both national and global.

Constitutional Engagement

Despite the growing organized political movement by Indians, the British government announced a purely British group to constitute a commission (the Simon Commission) to review the Government of India Act coming up for this decennial exercise in 1929. The Simon Commission was boycotted and there was a split within the major political groups in India (the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League) which the government chose to reinforce but also amend by declaring a series of meetings in London for the principal parties chosen by the government. These round table discussions were first boycotted by the Congress, and they declared a renewed popular agitation to demand self-government.

This, the second major mass movement of the Gandhian agitation began with a declaration of the demand for full independence on 26 January 1930 followed by an announcement to disobey specific civil laws, primarily to break the salt law from March 1930. The program of civil disobedience captured the popular imagination, filling the colonial jails and showing up the imperial government as the draconian and oppressive force it was. The movement was suspended after a year in late February 1931 following a pact between Viceroy Lord Irwin and Gandhi. In this pact, Gandhi agreed to several reforms of the law which benefited local industry, and, he agreed to travel to London to negotiate the terms of the new Act for the Government of India which would lay the constitutional basis of government. His participation at the Round Table Conference proved futile and there was no agreement with the other disputants for power sharing in the government. The Congress opposed the demand for separate communal electorates for the minority religious groups and for the Dalit or Depressed Class communities. In spite of this, the Government announced the Communal Award (August 1932).

From prison, Gandhi then announced a fast unto death to oppose specifically the provisions of the award for the depressed classes. Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891–1956) was at the time the chief advocate for separate electorates for the

Depressed Classes. Gandhi ended his fast when there was an agreement with the various parties to have a system of joint electorates to elect selected Depressed Classes candidates to reserved seats for them in the provincial governments. These reserved seats were to guarantee political representation for Depressed caste groups; however, the candidates were voted for by all sections of the electorate, not only members of the Depressed Classes. This "agreement" provoked Ambedkar to write his most trenchant critique of the caste system, Gandhi, and the Congress.

Thus, in the 1930s Gandhi engaged with the terms of constitutional forms of centralized government. However, throughout this process, he remained dismayed by their structure and articulated this sense increasingly in the 1940s. Gandhi clearly accepted political engagement in discussing the formation of the post-colonial state, yet he remained unconvinced by it. In his political discussion, he based his democracy at the level of the village. His interpretation of *swaraj* – translated as Self Rule – was as much personal and individual as governmental.

He critiqued not only British power but also state power, and his critique was mounted from the perspective not of state but of self. His ultimate freedom was not control over government but control of the self. In order to achieve this perfect control over the self, one needed not an excess of identification with the state or society but an immersion of the self into the common good. Thus, not personal rights but collective duties were the watchwords of freedom and antiimperial action.

Subsequent to this political compromise, Gandhi's health was severely affected and he announced his retirement to Wardha, Seagaon (later called Sevagram), where he established a new refuge. However, even from this distant rural location, he participated actively in Congress affairs and was sought for advice regarding governmental policies as the Congress participated in elections in 1937 and formed nine provincial governments and ministries from 1937–1939.

With the start of the Second World War and the conflict within the Congress between Gandhi and Subhash Chandra Bose, the Congress ministries

resigned from power. The Peasant and Workers' Parties and the Congress Socialists were also active in this period, organizing and working with local peasants and workers. Nehru, set up the National Planning Committee of the Congress from 1938–1939, and it began to operate to discuss the planned growth of the national economy. Gandhi's economic policies of voluntary renunciation of property by industrialists and businessmen, or equalization of landholding by voluntary donations, were hardly followed by his industrialist supporters or Nehru's planning committee. The industrialists espoused his politics, as they found them more amenable to their own interests and policies than the radical autonomous peasant movements across the country that flourished in the umbrella of the broad nationalist front that the Congress developed.

Gandhi persuaded the Congress not to support the war effort, even though he recognized that the war against Fascism must be fought and he supported Britain in that effort. Yet he felt that India as a nation in bondage could not freely support the war effort. Thus he began the limited campaign of individual *satyagraha* whereby individual chosen candidates publicly declared their lack of support for the war effort and gave themselves up for arrest. Within 2 years, the Congress stepped up their opposition and declared self-government in 1942 with Gandhi calling for the British to Quit India. The movement was led by local Congress and non-Congress leaders as the Congress leaders were jailed within the very first days of the declaration on 8 August 1942. The *Quit India* movement was the last in the phase of Gandhian movements before independence.

Imperialism and Nonviolence

Gandhi emphasized that this self-control and control over the government could not be achieved by violence but by acting according to one's conviction of truth, One should always speak of it and convince the opponent not by opposition but by admitting that she/he too has an aspect of truth. Thus, no opponent was an enemy, but always the object of friendship. The power that Gandhi

sought was the power of brotherhood rather than that of brute force. This is what he called ahimsa or nonviolence.

Yet Gandhi was not afraid of violence and in fact welcomed the encounter with violence which could demonstrate the active insistence on nonviolence. He also felt that violence was better than compliance and cowardice. Thus, in 1944, he explained the violence of Congress members in the wake of the Quit India movement as the response to extreme oppression (Gandhi, CWMG, 1979, Vol. 77, p. 141, 150).

Gandhi's Universalism

Gandhi projected a universal appeal from a particularly "Indian" and anti-imperial political space. Yet there is no nativist genealogy to his anti-imperial traditions. His critique of modernity crucially drew on European and American thought. His colleagues were carefully drawn from multiple racial groups. The primary category by which he implemented his political praxis – both ideologically and in practice – was "Truth"; an absolute Truth that could be known in multiple dialogic ways through multiple conversations; an absolute Truth that could be known imperfectly by a single human being and therefore always ready for amending and rethinking. As a consequence of this view of Truth, Gandhi was always ready to amend his ideas and change his mind about actions already undertaken and underway. This has been criticized by many, even in his own times as being inconsistent or being opportunistic.

This position on Truth and its multiplicity did not deprive Gandhi of a means to action, as his Truth was not relative. He accepted that there were certain things that were wrong and these needed to change. Not only that, every seeker of Truth was required to work to change as the insistence on Truth could not be passive, could not be without action against Untruth.

In examining the way Gandhi proposed action, we have assessed here primarily aspects of his thought as they engaged with empire and generated an anti-imperial politics. He held, however, that all aspects of living and life could contribute to a considered anti-imperialism – the way the

children were brought up, educated, food was eaten, clothes worn; how sexual activity, marriage, and work were practiced.

Gandhi's leadership of this movement for political rights within and outside the empire reflected his imperialism and anti-imperialism. He was a maker of political praxis. He thought and he wrote and he acted; and while aspects of his thought and action were criticized as betrayals of the ideals he professed of truth, nonviolence, and justice, others have still found much in it that can apply to the contemporary situation, often finding it useful to continue to locate their critique in Gandhi. The postcolonial state is seen as inadequately overthrowing empire and continuing an exploitative/extractive relationship with its people. Yet a critique of Gandhi must recognize that the anti-imperialist position charted by him is not able to adequately address the concerns of various "fragments" of the nation such as women, Dalits, and Muslims. Thus to understand the anti-imperial subject position, internal divisions within the imagined community must be examined. Gandhi was conscious of these differences. He wrote extensively about the role and position of women, Dalits, and Muslims. He saw all of them as having to devise their own politics on the basis of their own inspirations. Thus, he asked women to be the authors of their own emancipation. Gandhian women have progressed their own politics to build on his arguments as well as diverge from him. Dalits and Muslims have not used Gandhi in similar emancipatory ways on a wider scale, arguing that not only did he not address their concerns but he actively opposed those who did. Ambedkar was Gandhi's strongest critic from the position of the Depressed Classes or Dalits.

What was it that Gandhi achieved as an anti-imperialist? How did he rock an empire? Was he a nationalist? There are multiple answers to these questions based on the various perspectives and on a selection of Gandhi's writings and the particular period in his life. Gandhi was a notoriously prolific writer and all his writing has been preserved with great care. Thus we have 99 volumes of his collected writings published by the Indian government. Gandhi was context-sensitive as well as constantly evolving and adjusting his points of

view; thus, many different views can find support in his writing. The critical trajectory of change in his thinking on imperialism was from a loyal imperialist seeking justice from empire in the best tradition of the Black Jacobins, to a universalist against empire, but not on the basis of an ethnic nationalism. He spoke from a particular place of Hindu thought but assumed that this personal space would be the same in truth value as other personal spaces, located in their own religious and cultural traditions.

Cross-References

- ▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
- ▶ British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia
- ▶ Decolonization in South Asia
- ▶ Gender and Violence
- ▶ Immigration and Imperialism
- ▶ Mandela, Nelson (1918–2013)
- ▶ Roy, Arundhati (1961–)
- ▶ Rule of Law and Imperialism
- ▶ Women's Movements, Indian Anti-colonial Struggle

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Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940)

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Definition

Born on 17 August 1887 in Saint Ann's Bay, Jamaica, Marcus Mosiah Garvey is remembered as the leader of among the largest mass black political movement of the twentieth century.

Born on 17 August 1887 in Saint Ann's Bay, Jamaica, Marcus Mosiah Garvey is remembered as the leader of among the largest mass black political movement of the twentieth century. Garvey left school at 14, and in 1906 he moved to Kingston. Working as an apprentice under the guidance of his godfather, he read intensively, increased his skill in printing, organised youth meetings, published small newspapers, and took part in political debates and strike actions. Garvey left Jamaica in 1910 and travelled in various parts of Central America, founding newspapers in Costa Rica and Panama and criticising the imperialistic presence of the American United Fruit Company in the Caribbean. In the spring of 1912, after a brief return to Jamaica, he arrived in London in order to complete his informal education. He soon started writing for the *African Times and Orient Review*, a pioneering pan-African newspaper edited by the activist and actor Dusé Mohamed Ali (1866–1945). Criticising the global frame of colonialism and denouncing worldwide discrimination, Garvey's articles were published alongside texts by leaders like Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois (1868–1963) from the US and Joseph Ephraim Casely-Hayford from Gold Coast, whose *Ethiopia Unbound* (1911) was a classic work read by Garvey and most of the leaders of the black nationalist movement in the early twentieth century. During his years abroad, Garvey met various African seamen, traders, and activists, and he acquired a holistic view of the conditions of black and working-class peoples. Visiting mainland Europe on the eve of the First World War, he also gained a critical knowledge of European nationalism.

Reading Booker T. Washington's autobiography, *Up from Slavery*, Garvey was inspired by the idea of gaining self-confidence and autonomy through skilled and professional work and became interested in founding a Jamaican educational establishment modelled on Washington's Tuskegee College in Alabama. Back in Kingston in July 1914, he wrote a letter to Washington asking for an invitation to visit Tuskegee. However, Washington died in 1915 before Garvey could plan his trip. Garvey also started to think about the foundation of a global solidarity movement which would gather Africans from across the Western world on the basis of their race or colour. On 1 August 1914, Garvey and Amy Ashwood, who would become his first wife 5 years later, founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the African Communities League (UNIA-ACL). However, since Garvey left Jamaica in 1916, the first Jamaican branch of UNIA remained experimental.

The Early Years of the UNIA-ACL

In 1916, Garvey arrived anonymously in the US for the purposes of visiting Tuskegee College in Alabama and paying tribute to his mentor. After the visit, while preaching and travelling in the Southern segregationist states, he radicalised his views on racial issues. The years 1916 and 1917 saw rising numbers of racial riots and attacks in the US, and the safety and living conditions of African Americans worsened in most of the Southern states and the Northern urban centres. In 1918, hoping to re-form the UNIA, Garvey set up home in the black neighbourhood of Harlem, New York. Within a few months, the UNIA opened several chapters, working as a welfare and social organisation, and Garvey bought the Harlem Liberty Hall building on 135th Street and Lenox Avenue to establish his international headquarters. An outstanding speaker and debater, famous for his irony and emphatic tone, Garvey became the best-known black leader and the greatest polarising figure in Harlem and the black world.

A large number of Garvey's disciples opened branches of the UNIA in the US and the rest of the world, leading the movement to attract up to four million members in the early 1920s. With its militarily organised and disciplined African Legion and its Black Cross Nurses, the UNIA served as a response to the nationwide racial disturbances decades before the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. Thanks to Garvey's commitment to the "Negro Race," the UNIA was also the first Afrocentric mass organisation calling for black economic empowerment and cultural independence, and promoting the return to Africa as a prerequisite for liberation and a better future. To set his projects in motion, Garvey founded a shipping line, the Black Star Line, to organise the resettlement of

blacks in Africa and to promote international trade between African American, Caribbean, and African businessmen; its first boat was named after Booker T. Washington. Moving to the poor urban black areas but developing an anti-communist rhetoric, Garvey also encouraged the establishment of black factories and corporations, and the rise of a black capitalism. Restaurants, shops, barbers' shops, clubs, and factories were funded by or affiliated with the UNIA headquarters.

In August 1920, Liberty Hall hosted the International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World, which was attended by a crowd of 25,000 from more than 40 countries in the world. Some 2000 delegates drafted the "Declaration of the Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World." They hailed the red, black, and green of the UNIA flag as colours of African unity, and they appointed a government which was headed later by Garvey, the self-proclaimed Provisional President of the future Republic of Africa. The impressive and colourful street parade, the pompous ceremonies and concerts, and the enthusiasm of UNIA followers hailing Garvey as a "Negro Moses" provoked a range of criticism from Harlem radical militants who saw Garvey as a "Black Napoleon." His autocratic style of leadership caused defections in the ranks of the UNIA executive committee, including the departure of his wife Amy Ashwood in 1920. While Amy Ashwood kept her distance from Garvey and became involved in the global pan-African movement, Amy Jacques, Garvey's second wife, became his secretary and helped to secure the fame of the Jamaican leader. Amy Jacques later made a compilation of Garvey's letters, writings, and speeches which preceded Hill's edition of the UNIA papers (see Garvey 1980 and Hill 1983–2006).

Tactical and Ideological Confrontations: Garvey and the Globalisation of the UNIA-ACL

Wearing his classic plumed hat, Garvey developed his own iconography. His sense of pride in being African developed in a very fertile environment. Revisiting Negro cultural history in a positive way, the Harlem Renaissance bloomed in the presence of the UNIA. Large numbers of artists, scholars, intellectuals, and celebrities, including those who supported DuBois against Garvey, were definitively engaged in the Garveyist goal of the redemption of the Negro race (Martin 1991). Mastering the media propaganda, ready to make an alliance with the racist Ku Klux Klan to impose the repatriation of African Americans in the national agenda, and using populist expressions to raise the sense of black pride, Garvey clearly represented a new generation of black leaders. However, despite his growing popularity among the masses, he became more and more isolated and was criticised by the black establishment for his ambiguous and undiplomatic opinions. Above all, his Back-to-Africa campaign made him a target. Garvey's typical rallying cry "Africa for the Africans" was perceived as a threat to the Western colonial powers, which feared that his ideology of liberation was mobilising and uniting the black masses in Africa and the Americas.

The *Negro World*, the UNIA's weekly newspaper, was published in English, with some French and Spanish pages, from 1918 to 1933 and was widely disseminated across the globe by seamen, adventurers, and traders. Garvey's impact frightened the British colonial authorities. To oppose the Garveyist propaganda, they established the *British West Indian Review* and formally prevented the circulation of the *Negro World*, which was nevertheless sent from Sierra Leone to Kenya via southern Africa. Studying the circulation of the *Negro World* serves to highlight such subversive networks of communication; for instance, copies were sent from France to Dahomey by Kojo Tovalou Houenou, and were also circulating in the other French colonial territories.

In his tactics and ideology, Garvey had been deeply influenced by the Caribbean visionary thinker Edward W. Blyden (1832–1912), who spent most of his life working for the repatriation of blacks in West Africa, mainly Liberia (Akpan 1973). Garvey shared Blyden's evocation of the great African civilisations of the past as times of plenty and splendour to be restored. By praising cultural nationalism, and by re-creating a political

hierarchy with such titles as "Duke of Niger" and "Knight of the Nile" for his comrades in arms, Garvey captured the imagination of blacks as though they were a people and government in exile, waiting to return to their native land. This conquering position was problematic since Garvey had previously believed that Africans from the Western world should go back to Africa "to assist in civilizing the backward tribes of Africa" (Garvey 1980: 38). Like Blyden, Garvey developed a symbiotic relationship with Africa, although the UNIA leader never visited the land of his ancestors. Sent in 1920 and 1924 to organise the resettlement in Liberia, the UNIA missions were prevented from buying the land by lobbying by the US Firestone Company and by the hostility of President King of Liberia and the French and British authorities regarding the implantation of a subversive movement next to their respective colonial possessions, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. The UNIA's petitions to the League of Nations in 1922 and 1928, demanding that the German colonies in Africa be returned to native Africans as a sovereign black states, were also unsuccessful. As the Harlem-based UNIA organisation reached its highest phase in the early 1920s, thousand of branches followed individual trajectories worldwide, adapting the global themes of Garveyism to their own needs. The highly eclectic Garveyist movement interacted with several subversive African groups, and some UNIA emissaries and Garveyites played a role in anti-colonial politico-religious revolts in the Caribbean and in Africa; for example, strikes and social disturbances in the Huileries du Congo Belge corporation in Belgian Congo in 1921 were attributed to an alliance of African American Garveyist and communist tenants (see Lewis 1988). Some branches of the UNIA were opened in British West Africa, and Garveyism spread in the French-speaking colonies (Okonkwo 1980).

Indeed, in the US as in Africa, Garvey was opposed to DuBois, who served as the official US emissary in Liberia. The rivalry between the populist and grassroots UNIA movement and the black middle-class and integrationist groups represented by W.E.B. DuBois and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) are well documented. Loaded with sarcasm and personal attacks, the rivalry between Garvey, the dark-skinned "Negro," and DuBois, the light-skinned "mulatto," saw harsh ideological confrontations over the concept of race and integration. While Garvey was calling for a black state in Africa or a separatist black state in the US, DuBois was advocating the end of segregation and racist legislation in order to assimilate blacks as full American citizens. However, some polemic and inadequate accounts may exaggerate the opposition between these two figures, who both promoted the improvement of living conditions for blacks. Colin Grant noted that "especially following his death, the story of Marcus Garvey was largely told from the perspective of his enemies" (2008: xii). Later, the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah put the UNIA colours and the Black Star on Ghana's flag out of respect for Garvey. Malcolm X, whose father met Garvey during a UNIA meeting in Canada, was also deeply influenced by him; Campbell (1987) and Erskine (2005) highlight the Garveyist heritage in culture and politics, focusing on figures like Bob Marley and Walter Rodney.

Deportation, Exile, and Death: Garvey, Fascism, and the Italo-Ethiopian War

Garvey's experience in the US was shortened by government harassment. In 1923, after reporting on UNIA activities for 4 years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under J. Edgar Hoover's control decided to open an official case against Garvey. The UNIA leader was convicted of attempted fiscal fraud in running the Black Star Line, and he was sent in 1925 to the Atlanta penitentiary to serve a 5-year prison sentence. Some UNIA militants petitioned on his behalf and, in November 1927 Garvey was released and immediately deported to Jamaica. Back in his native island, Garvey tried to re-form his movement at the 1929 UNIA Convention in Kingston; he also created *The Blackman*, an anti-colonial newspaper, which was regularly seized by the colonial authorities before publication was stopped 2 years later. Garvey tried in vain to enter the Jamaican political arena, but he was defeated at the 1930 elections for the legislative

council. While he was marginalised by the colonial system and the local elite, his political failure was counterbalanced by his exceptional influence on African cultural history in Jamaica. Before the French *Négritude* movement revised and took advantage of the stereotyped term "Negro" in the 1930s, and decades before "Black is Beautiful" became a self-emancipating ideal, Garvey issued repeated calls for the uplift of the Negro race, popularising the concept of mental emancipation from the psychological chains of racial inferiority (Cronon 1969). In the religious sphere, Garvey opposed the Christian Westernised representation of white as good and black as evil by asking black peoples to worship a black divinity and to enrol in the African Orthodox Church. His fervent Back-to-Africa statements were endorsed by the Rastafari movement. This socio-cultural and political movement was born in Jamaica in the early 1930s, as soon as the black masses heard that Ras Tafari had been crowned Emperor of Ethiopia under the name of Haile Selassie, in Addis Ababa in November 1930. From this moment onwards, Haile Selassie was deified and Marcus Garvey, the "Black Messiah," acquired the status of a prophet in Rastafarian theology. Although he advocated a black theology of liberation, Garvey neither embraced the Rastafarian cult nor praised Haile Selassie; see Campbell (1987) and Erskine (2005).

In 1935 Garvey settled in London. When Italy invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, Garvey got a unique opportunity to assume the leadership of the black resistance. Ethiopia, the only African country that was never colonised, had inspired the UNIA's "Universal Ethiopian Anthem" and was defined as the focal point of repatriation. Despite having branches all over the Americas and Africa, in England, and even in Australia, the UNIA and Garvey failed to play a unifying role on the front line. Breaking with the cohesive pro-Ethiopia spirit which invigorated the pan-African united front, Garvey publicly expressed strong criticisms regarding of Haile Selassie's exile and responsibility. Refusing to call for the liberation of Ethiopia on behalf of the UNIA, lacking the political understanding to analyse the global stakes of this war, and reporting with great awkwardness the similarities in propaganda between the UNIA and the fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini,

Garvey lost his audience and was discredited. Above all, some younger black Caribbean activists like C.L.R. James and George Padmore were taking stronger and more clearly articulated positions on the Italo-Ethiopian War, which was perceived as a crystallisation of racism, colonialism, and capitalism. Unable to embrace the black internationalist movement that had been born in solidarity with Ethiopia, Garvey became very unpopular and came to be seen as outdated. In 1937, Garvey made a tour of Canada for the eighth UNIA convention, and stopped off in Jamaica, where he made a last attempt to reform his movement, in vain. Finally, he went back to London, where he died in obscurity on 10 June 1940.

Garvey's Legacy

Garvey was declared Jamaica's first National Hero in 1964, and his remains were returned to Jamaica and buried in the Kingston National Park. Politically speaking, his pan-Negro ideology continues to impact African American and African nationalisms, and his transnational struggle calls into question the political and social boundaries in the history of the Caribbean. Although very few UNIA branches are still active today, the Garvey movement had a monumental influence on such groups as the Rastafarians, the Nation of Islam, the Ethiopian World Federation, and several African and Caribbean political parties. The Garveyist social environment was part of the background of many civil rights and Black Power activists (Sewell 1990). While his Back-to-Africa movement has lost ground despite the greater access to travel, his cultural legacy has kept growing. Some of the greatest reggae singers (Bob Marley, Peter Tosh, Burning Spear) have helped to popularise his life beyond the boundaries of the black communities, giving him the status of a folk hero. Academic meetings have regularly discussed the enduring weight of his words and actions and his relevance today in pan-African, black, and African studies. Finally, his unifying statements "One Aim, One God, One Destiny" and "Africa for the Africans at home and abroad" still echo in the minds of black peoples who celebrate his birthday each 17 August.

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Gender

▶ Women's Rights and Western Imperialism in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Gender and Violence

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Internationalism; Middle East; Patriarchy; Race; Revolutionary feminism; Social relations; Solidarity; State violence; War

Definition

In understanding the relationship between gender, violence and imperialism the key question is: What social relations (re)produce, sustain, or at times adjust, violence against women? We may also ask: How should we make sense of the incomprehensible acts of killing, raping, harassing, or defacing girls and women in public or private spaces; or comprehend the burden of discrimination, inequality, displacement, dispossession, war, occupation, or militarisation on women? In addressing these questions, imperialism appears as the core co-ordinating force of a wide range of social, political, and economic relations. This analytical framework calls for a leap in our understanding of imperialism and its co-constituent relations with patriarchal and racialised capitalist structures of power. This analysis treats imperialism not as an abstract category, but rather as capitalist social relations which is profoundly classed, gendered racialised, and globalised, and understands it as a set of complex and contradictory social relations with *very* tangible impacts on women's lives locally and globally.

In this essay, the concept of imperialism is historicised as a feature of capitalism formed in the course of transition from its commercial, laissez-faire to the current monopoly stage based on finance capital, leading to enormous concentrations and expansions of power in economy, politics, culture, and ideology. Imperialism is thus not understood as a spatial/geographical *thing,* but as a set of complex social relations where local and global structures of power continuously influence and (re)shape each other. Violence, in this essay, includes both individual and structural forms, and is a *universal* form of gender power relations with the propensity to develop *particular* characteristics in different spaces and places based on norms, values, traditions, cultures, modes of social relations, and historical epoch. In this sense, imperialism subsumes elements of capitalist patriarchies *universally* but transforms them relatively, considering the *particularity* of each situation.

Another core argument in this essay is that capitalism has enormous power to organise and

institutionalise violence against women through mechanisms of consent and force. This dual characteristic of capitalism forces it to enter into a symbiotic relationship with other social forces (nationalist, religious, and racialised patriarchies) to create, sustain, and perpetuate violence against women. The specific imperialist forms of violence against women are largely entrenched in this collusion and are exercised at the levels of the state and civil society. Therefore, more than other social formations, violence against women in imperialism is structural and ideological with global reach. The scale and intensity of violence under imperialist capitalism has connected the struggle of women for justice and freedom globally. It has also reawakened feminist-anti-imperialist consciousness and the need for international solidarity to a level unprecedented in the history of capitalism. The two main sections of this essay will highlight women's global experience with violence in state and civil society, and will conclude with women's contemporary challenges in building a platform for global resistance against patriarchal imperialism.

Gender-based violence has exploded globally. Reports covering wide-ranging acts of violence against women have populated social media and policy debates. These reports, mostly prepared by women's groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), United Nations agencies, and supranational agencies such as the World Bank or human rights organisations, speak to the persistence and/or (re)emergence of interpersonal and structural forms of violence against women on a global scale. The public outrage and the efforts of courageous women globally to stop violence have had limited impact on its eradication. Paradoxically, the perseverance of gender-based violence is taking place in the context of the explosion of feminist knowledge and activism on this topic (see Lentin 1999; Steger and Lind 1999; Weldon 2002). It appears that the more we know about violence against women and the more inventive we are in our strategies to stop it, the more it (re)appears in all aspects of women's lives. Thus, the key question remains: What social relations (re)produce, sustain, or at times adjust, violence against women? We may also ask: How

should we make sense of the incomprehensible acts of killing, raping, harassing, or defacing girls and women in public or private spaces; or comprehend the burden of discrimination, inequality, displacement, dispossession, war, occupation, or militarisation on women? In addressing these questions, imperialism appears as the core co-ordinating force of a wide range of social, political, and economic relations. This analytical framework calls for a leap in our understanding of imperialism and its co-constituent relations with patriarchal and racialised capitalist structures of power. This analysis treats imperialism not as an abstract category, but rather as capitalist social relations which is profoundly classed, gendered racialised, and globalised, and understands it as a set of complex and contradictory social relations with *very* tangible impacts on women's lives locally and globally.

In this essay, the concept of imperialism is historicised as a feature of capitalism formed in the course of transition from its commercial, laissez-faire to the current monopoly stage based on finance capital, leading to enormous concentrations and expansions of power in economy, politics, culture, and ideology. Imperialism is thus not understood as a spatial/geographical *thing,* but as a set of complex social relations where local and global structures of power continuously influence and (re)shape each other. To put it differently, imperialism is an intricate system of capitalist accumulation, one that is neither the simple sum of its parts nor a purely geographic phenomenon, but rather constitutes a complex network of relations with its own systemic dynamics. However, imperialism should not be reduced to 'capitalism on a world scale' or 'globalisation'; nor is imperialism is the same thing as colonialism. Violence, in this essay, includes both individual and structural forms, and is a *universal* form of gender power relations with the propensity to develop *particular* characteristics in different spaces and places based on norms, values, traditions, cultures, modes of social relations, and historical epoch. In this sense, imperialism subsumes elements of capitalist patriarchies *universally* but transforms them relatively, considering the *particularity* of each situation.

Building on Zillah Eisenstein's groundbreaking anthology *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (1979) and Maria Mies's influential work on *Patriarchy and Capital Accumulation on a World Scale* (1986), there are two core arguments in this essay. First, there is global violence against women, to the extent that we can claim there is a 'war-on-women' (to evoke the imagery of 'war-on-terror' or 'war-on-drugs'). This is not a 'cultural' war, though cultural differences enact violence on women differentially. In other words, and to stress, culture per se is not the root cause of violence. Eisenstein proposed that to grasp the origin and the function of modern capitalist patriarchy, we should approach 'the mutual dependence of capitalism and patriarchy' dialectically. She wrote, 'Capitalist patriarchy, by definition, breaks through the dichotomies of class and sex, private and public spheres, domestic and wage labour, family and economy, personal and political, and ideology and material conditions' (Eisenstein 1979, p. 23). Mies, following Eisenstein almost a decade later, argued that the origin of contemporary violence against women is in capitalism; however, it manifests specific enough characteristics to set it apart from the violence women experienced under slavery or feudalism. She wrote (Mies 1986, p. 169):

> In the centers of the capitalist market economies, the expropriated *men* were turned into the new class of 'free' wage-earners, who own nothing but their labour power. But as *owners* of their labour power, they formally belong to the category of bourgeois 'free' citizens, who are defined as those who *own property,* and who can thus enter into contractual relationship with each other on the basis of the principle of exchange of values equivalent. Therefore, the proletarian *men* could be seen as historical subjects, as free persons...
>
> The women, however, have never been defined as free historical subjects in a bourgeois sense. They themselves, their whole person, their labour, their emotionality, their children, their body, their sexuality, were not their own but belonged to their husband. They *were* property; therefore, following the formal logic of capitalism, they could not be owners of property. (emphasis all in original)

The notion of 'property' in Mies's articulation is crucial for our understanding of the (re)production of violence against women in imperialist capitalism. In this sense 'property' means the *logic* of

capital to own women's labour power and women's bodies as the reproducer of one's own labour power and the human species (for an intensive theoretical discussion of capitalism, women, labour power, work and reproduction, see Barrett 1980; Dalla Costa and James 1973; Ebert 1996; Federici 2012; Fortunati 1989; James 2012; Weeks 2011). At the core of current imperialist forms of violence against women is the intensification of the scale of propertied women's bodies and sexuality that require further explication.

My second core argument is that capitalism has enormous power to organise and institutionalise violence against women through mechanisms of consent and force. This dual characteristic of capitalism forces it to enter into a symbiotic relationship with other social forces (nationalist, religious, and racialised patriarchies) to create, sustain, and perpetuate violence against women. The specific imperialist forms of violence against women are largely entrenched in this collusion and are exercised at the levels of the state and civil society. Therefore, more than other social formations, violence against women in imperialism is structural and ideological with global reach. In other words, imperialist forms of violence are *violence of scale* and *violence of intensification*.

The scale and intensity of violence under imperialist capitalism has connected the struggle of women for justice and freedom globally. It has also reawakened feminist-anti-imperialist consciousness and the need for international solidarity to a level unprecedented in the history of capitalism. The two main sections of this essay will highlight women's global experience with violence in state and civil society, and will conclude with women's contemporary challenges in building a platform for global resistance against patriarchal imperialism.

Imperialism and the 'War-on-Women'

I use 'war-on-women' as a metaphor to capture the extent of imperialist forms of violence against women. The imperialist 'war-on-women' is masculinised, militarised, and culturalised. It is happening in the state, the market, and civil

society; in short, it is structural and ideological. The discussion in this section is organised under two broad categories of 'state' and 'civil society' with the full understanding of interconnectedness of these two spheres of social relations where they reinforce and (re)produce racial, sexual, and class power relations. Therefore some level of repetition and overlapping of ideas is to be expected under these categories.

State Violence

The emergence of capitalism created major transformations in the division of labour worldwide. During the 'primitive accumulation' of the early stages of capitalism in Western Europe and its colonies, agrarian labour, usually under conditions of serfdom, was separated from the means of production and transformed into wage labour. This process replaced the rural subsistence economy based on production-for-use with the capitalist economy of production-for-value. This new mode of production appropriated and transformed the sexual division of labour, and thus thrived on the accumulation of value through slavery and women's labour and reproductive power. At the same time, the population of indigenous hunting-and-gathering societies found in Africa, the Americas, Oceania, and other territories was transformed into slave labour and appropriated directly, especially in the British and Spanish colonies of the Americas (Bhavnani 2001; Federici 2004; Linebaugh and Rediker 2000; Midgley 1998; Mies 1986; Smith 2005).

The international system in the imperialist era is full of contradictions between imperialist powers and colonised countries/peoples, between major imperialist powers and minor ones, even between continents, Europe and Africa, rich and poor countries. The organising of this international system is rooted in violence, including the two World Wars, which started in Europe. Women participated in these wars, but they were also raped and turned into 'comfort women,' for instance in Japan, to satisfy the demands of patriarchal nationalism and the sexual desire of patriarchal militarism (Enloe 2000; Soh 2009; Tanaka 2009).

Feminist theorists have argued that the capitalist state or nation states are patriarchal systems where the exercise of state power is also the exercise of masculine structural violence and coercion through which women are oppressed and exploited (Bannerji 1999; Jayawardena 1986; Jayawardena and De Alwis 1996; Joseph 2000; Moghadam 1994; Narayan and Harding 2000; Pettman 1999; Smith 2005; Walby 1992; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999). The patriarchal capitalist state consists of institutions such as the military, police, prison, and law, which enable the state to institutionalise and organise forms of violence against women. Through the functioning of these institutions, the capitalist state gains the monopoly of violence (INCITE n.d.). Let us consider, as an example, the imprisonment of women in the US. Browne and Lichter show that in the early history of the US imperialism, women were imprisoned for failing to conform '... to cultural norms of the feminine ideal' (Browne and Lichter 2001, p. 613). They argue that most of these women were under the age of 25 and their crimes included '"moral offenses" such as stubbornness, idleness, disorderly conduct, serial premarital pregnancies, keeping bad company, adultery, and venereal disease. Women and girls also were punished for being sexually molested or raped' (ibid.). Reporting the result of a study that Browne and Miller conducted in the 1990s at New York State's Maximum Security Prison for women, they observe that (ibid., p. 618):

> ...the majority of incarcerated women in this setting had suffered severe violence, sexual attack, or sexual molestation prior to their incarceration. Women in the study were an average age of 32; about half were African American, one-quarter were Hispanic, and 13% were White non-Hispanic. Over two-thirds (70%) had been severely assaulted by at least one caretaker during childhood, over half (59%) had been sexually molested before reaching adulthood, and nearly three-quarters (37%) had been physically assaulted by an intimate partner. Three-quarters had been the victim of physical or sexual attacks by non-intimates as well. When all forms of violence were combined, only 6% of these women had not experienced physical or sexual assault over their lifetime. (emphasis in original)

Other studies have similar findings. The same pattern of a masculine patriarchal law-enforcing

mechanism is being experienced by Aboriginal women in Canada. They comprise 4% of the total population, but they comprise 34% of the prison population (Canadian Human Rights Commission 2003). This number increased by about 90% in one decade between 2002 and 2012. Women's incarceration is an instance of state structural violence, which is an integral part of capitalist sex, class, and race relations (Sudbury 2005).

Women's bodies are the source of instantaneous profit making on a global scale (Chin 2013; Jeffreys 2009; Kempadoo 2005; Kempadoo and Doezema 1998). Joni Seager shows topographically and statistically that the global sex trade is a multi-billion dollar industry (Seager 2003, p. 56). She argues '[T]he global sex trade is sustained by astounding levels of coercion, torture, rape and systematic violence' (ibid.). She also presents us with the astonishing statistics: 'An estimated 50,000 women are trafficked into the USA each year', 'Up to half a million women and children are thought to be trafficked into western Europe each year', and 'Prostitution and sex trafficking represents 2% of GPD in Indonesia and 14% in Thailand' (ibid., p. 57). Commoditisation of women's bodies is a privilege of power. It is exercised by males individually, such as by committing rape at home or on streets. It is also institutionalised, such as rape of women prisoners by prison guards and police or rape of women in refugee camps (Global Migration Group 2008). Massive displacement, forced migration, and sex trafficking of women as a result of military and economic aggression have created a catastrophic level of poverty where women are becoming new slaves (Elshtain 1987; Giles and Hyndman, 2004; Hynes 2004; Meintjes et al. 2001; Nikolic-Ristanovic 2000; Skjelsbæk 2001; Aafjes et al. 1998). Seager states that 'The poorest of the poor are women' and they 'not only bear the brunt of poverty, they bear the brunt of "managing" poverty: as providers or caretakers of their families, it is women's labour and women's personal austerity that typically compensate for diminished resources of the family or household' (Seager 2003, p. 86).

Poverty is also racialised: women of colour, migrant and refugee women, native women, black and Latino women, in particular in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, will constitute the majority of the estimated 1 billion people living in extreme poverty in 2015 (World Bank). To comprehend the racialisation and commoditisation of women's bodies, it is important to remind ourselves of the *inner* contradictory logic of patriarchal imperialism. It has the enormous power to absorb en masse women's labour power to onset global accumulation of wealth, but simultaneously disempower women, cheapen their labour power, enslave their bodies, and create a global condition of precariousness for them where their bodies are dispensable and disposable (Bales 1999; Butler 2004; Feldman et al. 2011).

Imperialist wars serve the purpose of reinforcing and realigning patriarchal, racialised, and colonised capitalist forces. A distinctive feature of imperialism is its dependence on war and militarisation as a mechanism to (re) produce itself and sustain its global hegemony. Imperialist wars in recent decades have penetrated all spheres of life from economy to schools, to borders, refugee camps, culture, and entertainment (Cole 2006; Eisenstein 2007; Moser and Clark 2001; Riley et al. 2008). Women and girl children have suffered greatly in the most complex and contradictory ways by wars. In the decade of the 1990s, the world also witnessed the genocide in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where rape, forced pregnancy of women, sex trafficking, and forced prostitution became part of the machinery of war. Feminist ethnographical studies show that women in war zones are regularly harassed and assaulted on their way to fetch water, get food from the market, or reach the headquarters of international humanitarian aid services where they are often forced to give their bodies to receive food (Moser and Clark 2001; Aafjes et al. 1998). The horrific atrocities committed against women under the conditions of war lead us to conclude that imperialist wars are symbolically and literally fought on and over women's bodies. Women signify land, nation, culture, ethnicity, religion, and community to be captured, controlled, covered, or securitised. They are the 'honour' of the nation and culture; they are the property. They either save or betray the

community through the conduct of their body and sexuality as ascribed by the patriarchal and racialised rule.

The Western imperialist powers involved in the former Yugoslavia's war in the 1990s, after intense legal wrangling, finally recognised the systemic use of rape as a 'weapon of war' against women in Bosnia Herzegovina (Giles and Hyndman 2004). As women in Bosnia Herzegovina, Africa, Palestine, and other war-ravaged regions were struggling with the aftermath of the war in refugee camps and more and more became the head of household or widowed, or were pulled into informal war economy, the imperialist powers were preparing for other wars. This time, though, women were used to justify war. To 'liberate' women in Afghanistan and Iraq and to install 'democracy' in the Middle East became the imperialist raison d'être to further plunder the region (Abu-Lughod 2002; Chishti 2010; Hirschkind and Mahmood 2005; Russo 2006; Stabile and Kumar 2005). The 1991 and 2003 US wars on Iraq and the 2001 attack on Afghanistan were, much like those of the colonial past, in pursuit of economic, military, and political interests of European and US imperialist powers (Klein 2007). Not surprisingly, imperialist wars helped the re-traditionalisation, re-tribalisation, and re-primordialisation of these societies (Mojab 2010). In other words, the imperialist wars and occupation created conditions in which the tamed feudal and religious patriarchal forces, which had been suppressed by the emerging capitalist, nationalist, secularist, and modernist states since the early twentieth century, were resurrected and (re)emerged with a vengeance. However, the presence of foreign occupying troops, lack of security, violation of human dignity, the rise in poverty, government corruption, in short the disappearance of the social in its totality, unleashed the force of patriarchy and legitimised the fierce controlling, disciplining, and punishing of women and girls by internal/native and external/foreign patriarchal forces (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Zangana 2007).

The purpose of citing prison, poverty, and war as forms of state violence is to make visible the scale and intensification with which capitalist patriarchy has gendered, racialised, and sexualised its imperialist domination. The hegemonic relations are established through the dual mechanism of consent and coercion. The capitalist patriarchal order utilises ideology, culture, and law to hold up the weight of its structural violence. For example, patriarchal capitalism has the capacity to execute legal reform to ameliorate gender, race, and class differences. In 'essence', though, the legal reform 'formalises' state violence through legitimising the dominance of the patriarchal, sexualised and racialised class in power. In other words, the ruling class has monopolised the state, in particular its instruments of political suppression and the legal system. This reality raises a serious consideration for the feminist anti-imperialist and anti-violence strategy: Is this colossal power reformable? If it is, would not legal reform inevitably lead us back into the very framework of the system which is fundamentally the cause of women's oppression and exploitation? To confront white-male hetero-normative dominance in the institutions of the state or in the military, some feminist activists and scholars have proposed 'feminisation' of these institutions. These debates undoubtedly have slightly improved gender, sexual, and racial discrimination, but one may argue that they have failed to eliminate violence but have added women, people of colour, and Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) persons to the hierarchy of these institutions. Cynthia Enloe's study of the militarisation of women's lives raises an important quandary: Do we make the military more equitable or do we militarise equality by legislating the rights of racial and sexual minorities to the military (Enloe 2000). To better grasp this dynamic (that is, the elasticity and proclivity of capitalist patriarchy to reform), let us think through its function within civil society.

Civil Society and Violence

Feminist theories have clearly shown that much gender violence is also committed outside the sphere of the state; that is, in civil society. Yet the state mediates and regulates patriarchal

violence against women (Fraser 1997; MacKinnon 1989). Civil society encompasses a wide array of social and ideological structures such as family, Church, media, and education. Contrary to the liberal notion of civil society as a 'third space' mediating between state and market, I understand it as an embodiment of racial, class, and gender power relations with strong ties to both the state and market. Therefore, civil society is not an autonomous space, free from the exercise of patriarchal capitalist forces. In the private sphere of home, Seager argues, 'Women suffer cruelties,' and 'For millions of women, the home is the most dangerous place they could be' (Seager 2003, p. 26). The Canadian Women's Foundation reports (Canadian Women's Foundation 2013, p. 2):

> On any given day in Canada, more than 3,300 women (along with their 3,000 children) are forced to sleep in an emergency shelter to escape domestic violence. Every night, about 200 women are turned away because the shelters are full. . . . As of 2010, there were 582 known cases of missing or murdered Aboriginal women in Canada. Both Amnesty International and the United Nations have called upon the Canadian government to take action on this issue, without success. . . . In a 2009 Canadian national survey, women reported 460,000 incidents of sexual assault in just one year.

A similar pattern emerges in other regions of the world to the extent that the United Nations' 2010 *The World's Women* reports on violence against women as a universal phenomenon which appears in the particular forms of physical violence committed by intimate partners, sexual molestation and assault, femicide, and female genital mutilation (United Nations 2010). The report, addressing the role of media, argues 'Images in the media of violence against women – especially those that depict rape, sexual slavery or the use of women and girls as sex objects, including pornography – are factors contributing to the continued prevalence of such violence, adversely influencing the community at large, in particular children and young people' (United Nations 2010, p. 127). Other studies also indicate a strong link between pornography and sexual abuse and marital rapes (Bergen 1998). Hearn suggests that '. . .virtual violences in intimacy through ICTs, such as forced use of pornography, use of pornography

with children, digi-bullying, cyberstalking, internet harassment, "happy slapping", threatening blogging . . . use of sex dolls, sex robots and teledildonics creates further possibilities for violence and abuse' (Hearn 2013). The point of reiterating, albeit briefly, the result of some of the statistical or analytical studies on forms of violence committed against women in the sphere of home, or on internet and media, is to show the boundless patriarchal capitalist attempt to enslave women's bodies and sexuality. The issue to consider is not only the matter of spatiality of violence (that is, private/public or state/market/civil society spheres), it is rather the scope and intensity of the imperialist 'war-on-women' globally.

Let us consider a different setting for the exercise of 'ideological' or 'cultural' violence against women. The imperialist wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were conducted primarily through high-tech military assault. However, the imperialist powers, led by the US, also undertook a cultural and ideological invasion through expansive 'post-war reconstruction' projects with 'democracy promotion' as its ideological core (Mojab 2009, 2011; Mojab and Carpenter 2011). The training of women to 'manage' and reassemble the society in ruins, and funding their activism in a variety of NGOs, replicated the historical process of co-opting social movements through funding mechanisms and reinventing racist, colonialist, orientalist, and imperialist feminist praxis (Amos and Parmar 2005; INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2007). Imperialist feminisms entered the scene of 'post-war reconstruction' with goals to 'liberate' and promote 'democracy' through 'women empowerment'. Their function is to legitimise militarised imperialist foreign policy based on the accumulation of wealth by dispossession. More significantly, they realign the foreign and domestic policy on controversial matters such as morality, family, sexuality, or women's reproductive rights. The renewed imperialist feminist tendencies in the last few decades have achieved three main goals. First, they have transnationalised religious-fundamentalist patriarchy. Second, they has relativised, localised, pragmatised women's struggle against patriarchal capitalism. Finally, they have discredited

feminism globally and thus made the building of a revolutionary and internationalist feminist anti-imperialist project an insurmountable task. Financial, political, and ideological dependency on imperialist feminism have contributed to a culture of spontaneity, corruption, class animosity and rivalry of masculine-capitalism among women's organisations and activists. More significantly, they has depoliticised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and fragmented the women's movement to the extent that the struggle against feudal-religious-capitalist patriarchy, or women's resistance against militarisation and securitisation, has been limited to vacuous human rights discourse and reform of legal structure. This point will be further expanded below.

In this context, military experts in collaboration with some political scientists and anthropologists produced new literature arguing for a closer link between 'postwar reconstruction' projects, civil society, and humanitarian-aid efforts with the armed forces (Natsios 2005). The *U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (with a foreword by David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, and John A. Nagl and with an introduction by Sarah Sewall) attracted huge interest when it was published in 2007. In 2008, it was downloaded 2 million times (see Biddle 2008, pp. 347–350). In the history of the academic publishing industry, it was the first time that a university-based publisher had published an army manual. The seeds of the idea of the collaboration of military and civil society were cultivated in the Bush Administration National Security Strategy (released in 2002), in which 'development' was one of the 'three strategic areas of emphasis (along with diplomacy and defense)...' (Natsios 2005, p. 4). The release of this document drew attention to the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the major player in the 'post-war reconstruction' projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Based on the strategy of 'defence, diplomacy, and development', in the same year (2002) the Bush Administration announced an umbrella programme of reform called the Middle East Partnership Initiatives (MEPI), covering the area from Morocco to Pakistan. Zaki Salime argues that: 'MEPI followed a political rationality of "soft"

reforms through enhancement of citizen-entrepreneurship, women's empowerment, and capacity building of "civil society," as a means to uproot "terrorism" and spread "democracy"'. She contends that MEPI, 'has also mobilized funds to support NGOs and provide training for women, youth, entrepreneurs, and political players' (Salime 2010; 2011, pp. 215, 218). Thus, ideas of civil society, and NGOs, in particular women's NGOs, were promoted as venues for establishing capitalist democracy, in which the absolute rule of the patriarchal state would be realigned with the absolute rule of the patriarchal market/ privatisation and capitalist 'democracy' to strengthen the condition of oppression and exploitation for women (for a comprehensive critique of the NGO-isation of women's movement in Palestine post-Oslo peace process, see Abdo 2010; Hanafi and Tabar 2003).

The position of women is varied within and between different societies, and while there is certainly more that we need to learn about the extent of atrocities committed against women in each society, there are two arguments to be made. First, the state response to demands of women for a safe, equal, free, and just life are protracted over decades. Weldon, in her cross-national comparison study of democratic governments' response to violence against women writes, 'Although some national governments reformed rape laws or began funding shelters in the mid-1970s, many countries did not begin to address the problem of violence against women until the latter half of the 90s, and many more only in the first half of the 1990s' (Weldon 2002, p. 19). She emphasises that without a strong women's movement, this level of policy and legal reform would not have been achieved (2002, p. 61). In the 'Introduction' of the influential anthology *The Color of Violence* (Women of Color Against Violence 2006, p. 1), we read:

> However, as the antiviolence movement has gained greater prominence, domestic violence and rape crisis centers have also become increasingly professionalized, and as a result are often reluctant to address sexual and domestic violence within the larger context of institutionalized violence. In addition, rape crisis centres and shelters increasingly rely on state and federal sources for their funding.

Consequently, their approaches toward eradicating violence focus on working *with* the state rather than working *against* the state. (emphasis in original)

The allusion to 'professionalization' and 'working *with* the state' above are significant for this discussion. Critical feminist studies show that the co-opting of women's movements within the state and international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and UN-based gender agencies, or other philanthropic foundations since the 1970s have depoliticised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and fragmented women's movements worldwide. The imperialist agenda of import/export of patriarchal networks, networks that include corporations, NGOs and humanitarian agencies, religious institutions, military and security forces, and cultural organisations have transnationalised capitalist patriarchy in such a way that there is little escape for women.

Second, since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack against the US, and the subsequent wars in the Middle East and North Africa, in some significant respects imperialist wars have interconnected and interrelated the oppression and exploitation of women in ways unparalleled in history. They have revived and realigned pre- and post-colonial tribal, religious, national, and sectarian grievances, disputes, and conflicts throughout most of Asia and Africa. Religions have taken a central stage in public lives, and thus secular space is shrinking globally (Amireh 2012; Moghissi 2013). Religious doctrines, from Islam to Christianity, Judaism, or Hinduism, are governing women's bodies, sexuality, and gender relations. Regimes of 'gender apartheid' are established in Saudi Arabia (since its inception in 1932), in Iran (1979), Afghanistan and Iraq (2003). Women's rights are continuously violated which include their right to property, inheritance, child custody, or free choice in marriage, reproductive rights, education, employment, travel, and a life free from sexual harassment at home, schools, workplaces or on the streets. The widespread rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, 'honour killing', or humiliation and degradation are embedded in the social relations and the prevailing religious and cultural practices that women experience daily (Bennoune 2013;

Reed 2002). Religious groups have joined forces to stop, protract, and reverse the outcome of more than a century of women's resistance against patriarchal and colonial capitalist domination. The alliance of religious forces at the UN-sponsored global conferences on women since the 1970s (Mexico, 1974; Copenhagen, 1980; Nairobi, 1985; Beijing, 1995) has dragged down the demands of women to safe and free access to abortion, contraception, and the right to same-sex marriage. The notions of 'culture' and 'diversity' have been evoked in these settings by the state representatives to legitimise the rule of 'local', 'particular' patriarchy. The logic of 'cultural authenticity' and at times anti-Western or anti-imperialist rhetoric is being used by the state and civil-society sector to preserve the right of the particular nation state to misogynistic religious practices.

A characteristic of today's imperialism is the convergence of its domestic and international relations. For instance, 'War-on-Terror' is an instantiation of the overlap of domestic and international forms of co-dependency in surveillance, racialisation, incarceration, or policing. The cyclical crisis of capitalist economy since the 1980s has incorporated surveillance, security, and incarceration into public policy (Feldman et al. 2011). There is an emphasis on disciplining and punishing the public, in particular women, youth, aboriginal peoples, poor, and people of colour, through such mechanisms as 'War-on-Terror' or 'War-on-Drugs'. Angela Davis argues that the 'Prison Industrial Complex' is a new addition to the 'Military Industrial Complex' (1998). The disciplining apparatus of the state is extensively privatised, militarised, and has turned the securitisation and incarceration of people into profit. The migrant and refugee women, the sex trafficking of women, raising wired borders between the US and Mexico or building 'separation walls' in Israel and 'normalising' the right of the state to securitise citizens in border crossing or in schools are forms of racialised and genderised violence (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2009). 'War-on-Terror' policy absorbs public resources and (re) forms the crisis of patriarchal capitalist economy through the process of privatisation. 'War-on-

Terror' is a violent model to inscribe law and order in 'lawless' capitalist-imperialist social order where, as Colin Dayan suggests, 'law is a white dog' (Dayan 2011). She traces the legacy of slavery in the contemporary US supermax prison facilities and shows the way the legal system on matters such as torture and punishment prepared the way for abuses committed by the US in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay prisons (ibid.). The policy has shifted attention from the state responsibility for human security to 'terrorism' and thus has targeted women, racialised, sexualised migrants and refugees mostly fleeing conflict zones.

Women are fiercely opposing and struggling against this complex network of patriarchies. Their resistance, courage, and resiliency are extraordinary. They have joined armed forces, and engaged in armed struggles, are combatants, suicide bombers, refugee camp social workers, community organisers, peace activists, refuseniks, humanitarian aid workers, leading protests and marches, and much more. The point is that they are not 'victims'; they participate, protest, dissent and resist in order to put an end to imperialism and its violence.

Anti-imperialism: A Revolutionary Feminist Rupture

Women and girls, day and night, go through the world frequently guarded against physical, sexual, emotional, cultural, religious, or economic assaults. They carry these burdens throughout their lives. Capitalism has produced a complex network of patriarchies to facilitate the accumulation of capital and to maintain social control. Capitalist patriarchy has conflictual and contradictory relations with women. Women are a social force to be managed and engaged with, but they are also to be controlled, punished, and disciplined. When analysed deeply, one can see remarkable homogeneity in the 'gender project' of patriarchal imperialist order, despite its apparent diversity. Imperialist patriarchy has fragmented women's movements globally and has forced them to become donor-driven; the

two forces of fundamentalism and imperialism are driving the global 'gender project', though opposing each other to divert attention away from the struggle around the oppression and exploitation of women. The two belligerent forces of imperialism and fundamentalisms are forcing women into a framework of patriarchal family roles, motherhood, morality and decency, nationalism, and cultural practices to reinforce gender violence. They have transnationalised the apparatuses of punishment and control of women's bodies and sexuality through instruments such as 'War-on-Terror', 'War-on- Drugs', torture, and surveillance.

Under these conditions, some theorists claim that imperialism is in the process of transforming into a new regime called 'Empire', characterised by eroding national borders and a dissolving nation-state system, which will leave the imperial(ist) order without leaders or centre (Hardt and Negri 2000). This is an optimistic, 'post-imperialist' scenario in which sovereignty is deterritorialised, leaving room for increasing mobility of labour, fluidity of capital, on-going migration, and organising on an international level. In this context of the 'withering away' of the nation state, human beings are said to be able to realise the dream of building a world that will turn its back on pillage and piracy and move towards equality and justice. However, developments in the first decade of this century point in a different direction. Although the world order is in a situation of flux, capitalist states today, as in the past, combine the need to cross national borders (for purposes of accumulation) with the urge to maintain spheres of influence (through war and occupation).

The global scene is messy and chaotic. We can conclude that the global explosion of violence against women coincides with the heightened finance capitalism in the past three decades, and remarkably resembles the globalised violence against the whole of humanity. At the core of current imperialist forms of violence is the intensification of the socialisation of production and the private appropriation of (re)production. At stake is building a global women's movement that can relinquish itself from the restraining

forces of reformism, relativism, essentialism, and pragmatism, and set a stage for a renewed revolutionary social transformation.

Cross-References

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General Law of Accumulation

▶ Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International

Genocide

▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism
▶ Racism and Imperialism

Genocide and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Ethnic cleansing; Ethnocide; Extermination; Liquidation; Mass killing; Politicide

Definition

Under Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide is legally defined as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to

prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

The historical relationship between imperialism and genocide is vast and well-established. This relationship is generally understood to be rooted in acts of physical violence perpetrated by imperial powers in the processes of conquest and territorial expansion. What is less understood is the connection between imperialism and genocide found in indirect physical violence and other forms of violence carried out by settler-colonial regimes and the colonial powers. There is a reason for this. The imperial and colonial powers actively worked to ensure that the legal definition of genocide codified in the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948; abbreviated to Genocide Convention from this point forward) did not contain elements that would implicate them in the commission of genocide.

There are numerous and important texts that provide summary overviews and in-depth analyses of historical cases of imperial genocides. Less so are the texts that question the legitimacy of the Genocide Convention itself based on it being an example of colonial law – law significantly shaped by the imperial and colonial powers in ways that served their interests by protecting them from the scope of its reach. This essay seeks to address this gap by illustrating the ways in which the original concept of genocide changed during its drafting process from one that incorporated elements that directly tied genocide to imperialism to one that has been applied almost exclusively to mass killings perpetrated by authoritarian states. It begins by summarizing the evolution of Lemkin's concept of genocide from its earliest stages to the one he included in the first formal draft of the Genocide Convention. Next, it provides an overview of the historical connections between imperialism and genocide, with mention of some of the significant texts in the field. This is followed by an analysis of the evolution of the legal meaning of genocide and the means by which Lemkin's concept of genocide and its relationship with imperialism were excluded from the

legal text. Bringing together the previous sections, the next part explains why the Genocide Convention is an example of colonial law. In the final section, suggestions are made regarding how to decolonize genocide.

Lemkin's Concept of Genocide

Lemkin's concept of genocide was "the culmination of a long tradition of European legal and political critique of imperialism and warfare against civilians. All of the instances about which he wrote for his projected world history of genocide occurred in imperial contexts," such as the destruction of Carthage, the Crusades, massacres of the Herero, and genocides under Ottoman rule, or involved deliberate attacks on civilian populations in warfare (Moses 2010: 25).

The term "genocide" was first used in print by Raphael Lemkin in his seminal work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, published in 1944. Lemkin created the term "to denote an old practice in its modern development" (Lemkin 2005: 79) by combining the ancient Greek word *genos*, meaning race or tribe, and the Latin *cide*, meaning killing. Though Lemkin focused heavily on Nazi Germany and its transnational policies in his effort to illustrate his concept of genocide, it is clear in his larger body of writings on genocide, the evolution of his ideas and conceptualization of genocide, and his contributions to the first formal draft of what would become the Genocide Convention that Lemkin believed genocide was closely connected not only to German imperialism but the policies and associated impacts of imperialism more broadly.

Lemkin was particularly concerned with the cultural and physical destruction of national and social collectivities that occurred in conquest, territorial expansion, and colonization. In 1933, Lemkin presented his early ideas about genocide at the International Conference for Unification of Criminal Law. He proposed that "acts of barbarity" and "acts of vandalism" be considered "offenses against the law of nations." Lemkin

defined acts of barbarity as "attacks carried out against an individual as a member of a collectivity" with the goal being "not only to harm an individual, but, also to cause damage to the collectivity to which the latter belongs" (Lemkin 1933). Acts of vandalism were defined as "systematic and organized destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and achievement of a collectivity are revealed in fields of science, arts and literature" (ibid.). According to Lemkin, perpetrators of acts of barbarity and vandalism make evident their "asocial and destructive spirit" that is "the opposite of the culture and progress of humanity" (ibid.).

By 1944, Lemkin's acts of barbarity and vandalism grew to encompass what he referred to as eight techniques of genocide in various fields. The eight techniques include political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral (Lemkin 2005). They represent the primary activities by which a perpetrator commits genocide. In simplest terms, Lemkin defined genocide as "the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group" (ibid.: 79). More specifically, Lemkin wrote, "Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of the national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves" (ibid.). The objectives of genocide are to disintegrate "the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups" (ibid.).

As indicated in his reference to a "coordinated plan," Lemkin saw the eight techniques of genocide when implemented together as a "synchronized attack on different aspects of life" (see Butcher 2013). Each of the eight techniques shares some relationship with one or more of the other techniques. For example, the political technique involves the destruction of local institutions necessary for self-government, along with the

imposition of the occupier's system of institutions and administration. This is accompanied by the elimination of any reminder of the former national character. Local political parties are replaced by those of the occupier, and streets and buildings are renamed, with the new names corresponding with the language of the occupier (Lemkin 2005).

The political technique merges with the social technique, as dissolution of local institutions and administrative capabilities are accompanied by the abolition of local laws and courts. As Lemkin wrote, "The social structure of a nation being vital to its national development, the occupant also endeavors to bring about such changes as may weaken the national, spiritual resources. The focal point of this attack has been the intelligentsia, because this group largely provides the national leadership and organizes resistance against [the oppressor]" (Lemkin 2005: 83). The political and social techniques also interconnect with the cultural technique. The abolishment of the local language is not limited to the naming of streets and buildings. The cultural technique prohibits the local population from using their language in schools and the printed word. Measures are also implemented to stymie expression of the national spirit (ibid.). The occupied must not be able to make cultural contributions as members of their formal collectivity because doing so would contribute to the maintenance of the group's cultural vitality. Thus, "All persons engaged in painting, drawing, sculpture, music, literature, and the theater are required to obtain a license for the continuation of their activities" (ibid.: 84). Additionally, to deprive them of inspiration, the oppressor destroys national monuments, libraries, archives, museums, and galleries of art to be replaced by works produced by the occupier's group.

As the spirit of the occupied is being broken, so too is their ability to resist. Lemkin describes the economic technique as the "destruction of the foundation of the economic existence of a national group" (Lemkin 2005: 85). Destruction of the foundation requires crippling the group's development, even causing a developmental regression. According to Lemkin "The lowering of the standards of living creates difficulties in fulfilling

cultural-spiritual requirements. Furthermore, a daily fight literally for bread and for physical survival may handicap thinking in both general and national terms" (ibid.). A weakened and despondent population is easier to forcibly remove, assimilate, or even exterminate, depending on the totality of the occupier's objectives as well as the level of resistance mounted by the occupied peoples.

The biological and physical techniques intersect with the economic technique. Together, the biological and physical techniques represent two ways to eliminate the existence of the group by preventing future births and killing its members. The former can be achieved by imposing measures calculated to decrease the birthrate of the targeted group. Such measures include prohibiting marriages among members of the group, separating the group's men and women, and keeping parents malnourished, which can have the effect of lowering the birthrate and "lowering of the survival capacity of children born of underfed parents" (Lemkin 2005: 86). Meanwhile, the physical technique takes three primary forms: discrimination in feeding, undermining the health of members of the group, and mass killing. Malnourishment that results from discrimination in feeding has health impacts beyond the biological; it will lead to a decline in overall health and increase the death rate. Other means of endangering health include denying members of the group adequate clothing and shelter, withholding medicine and medical care, and generally imposing living conditions inimical to the long-term health and survival of group members. Finally, the existence of the targeted group can be eliminated by organized murder of its members. With the final two techniques – religious and moral – the perpetrator seeks to disrupt the national, religious, and moral influences of the people (Lemkin 2005).

Lemkin emphasized the importance of a group's "derived needs." According to Lemkin, "These needs find expression in social institutions or, to use an anthropological term, the cultural ethos. If the culture of a group is violently undermined, the group itself disintegrates and its members must either become absorbed in other cultures which is a wasteful and painful process or

succumb to personal disorganization and, perhaps, physical destruction" (quoted in Moses 2010: 25). Lemkin believed that national collectivities, even those without formal sovereignty, hold an inherent right to exist as such (Short 2010). It is in this regard that Lemkin opposed the forcible assimilation of weaker societies into stronger outsider ones.

As is indicated above, Lemkin was especially concerned with loss of culture. In 1946, he impassionedly wrote, "Our whole heritage is a product of the contributions of all nations. We can best understand this when we realize how impoverished our culture would be if the peoples doomed by Germany, such as the Jews, had not been permitted to create the Bible, or to give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not had the opportunity to give to the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie; the Czechs, a Huss, a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy and a Shostakovich" (Lemkin 1946: 228). Indeed, though Lemkin included a cultural technique of genocide, "culture" is not only what is produced by a national or social group but also the source of its production. Thus, Lemkin explicitly connected genocide and imperialism because of the resultant "specific losses to civilization in the form of the cultural contributions which can be made only by groups of people united through national, racial or cultural characteristics" (Lemkin 1947: 147).

Genocidal Imperialism

Lemkin's concept of genocide is illustrative of a preoccupation with *the occupation* of land and peoples by foreign powers. This overwhelming concern makes even more evident the connection between Lemkin's concept of genocide and imperialism. For Lemkin, the "destruction of a nation" was defined by two phases – destruction of the occupied group's national pattern and the imposition of a new pattern. According to Lemkin, "This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization by the

oppressor's own nationals" (Lemkin 2005: 79). The process of genocide, then, involves a coordinated plan of different actions conducted by an outside group that aims to destroy a group by forcibly relocating its members, taking over their territory, and transforming it so that it reflects the occupier's institutions and values or by imposing the occupier's institutions and values on members of the group and the territory on which they reside.

Conquest, territorial expansion, and colonization employ a variety, if not all, of Lemkin's eight techniques of genocide and progress through the two phases referred to above. As Norman Naimark states in *Genocide: A World History*, "Genocide has been a part of human history from its very beginnings.… Extended families, clans, and tribes routinely engaged in genocidal actions against their rivals, just as ancient empires and modern nation-states enacted their murderous hatred for imagined or real enemies in mass killing" (Naimark 2017: 1). What some refer to as "modern genocide" finds its origin in the beginnings of the world order that continues today. This world order is largely dominated by western imperialist states, harking back to Spain's conquest of the "New World," Britain and France's conquest of North America, US expansionism, and European conquest of Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Asia.

There are significant works by some of the leading genocide experts who have chronicled the innumerable cases that exemplify the relationship between imperialism and genocide. In his massive work, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, like Naimark, Ben Kiernan notes the likelihood that genocide was a phenomenon present at the earliest stages of human history. With a primary focus on its modern manifestations, Kiernan records 600 years of genocide. Beginning with the 1400s, he discusses the genocidal nature of Spanish conquest, which "devastated the most populous islands and destroyed the most powerful kingdom of the New World, dispatched massive quantities of plunder back to the Old, opened up the Americas to other European powers and settlers, and established grim new precedents for

their murder of indigenous peoples" (Kiernan 2007: 72). Kiernan also documents cases of genocide and genocidal massacres during territorial expansion and ethnic conflict in East Asia to 1800, as well as genocidal massacres committed by Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists in Southeast Asia from the 1500s to 1800. Regarding these latter acts of genocide, Kiernan writes, "In all these cases, aggressive territorial expansion combined with cults of antiquity, and pastoral ideology of cult of agriculture to form an intellectual backdrop to mass killing" (Kiernan 2007: 133).

In addition to works like Kiernan's, there are others that take a predominantly theoretical approach to conceptualizing genocide, including its association with imperialism, such as Leo Kuper's *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (1982), Claudia Card's *Genocide and Social Death* (2003; see also Card 2010), and Martin Shaw's *What is Genocide?* (2007). Some focus on a particular region including, among others, Ward Churchill's *A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present* (1997), Andrew Woolford's *This Benevolent Experiment: Indigenous Boarding Schools, Genocide, and Redress in Canada and the United States* (2015), Benjamin Madley's "Patterns of Frontier Genocide 1803–1910: The Aboriginal Tasmanians, the Yuki of California, and the Herero of Namibia (2007)," and Kelly Maddox's "Genocide in the Japanese Empire: Tracing the Genocidal Dynamics of Japanese Imperialism (2015)." Still others address the issue of cultural genocide and its connection to imperial and colonial history, such as Lindsay Kingston's "The Destruction of Identity: Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples (2015)," Elisa Novic's *The Concept of Cultural Genocide: An International Law Perspective* (2016), and Lawrence Davidson's *Cultural Genocide* (2012).

In his aptly titled *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, Adam Jones addresses colonialism and neocolonialism (see also Kiernan 2007: 165–390). On colonialism, Jones writes, "The units that we know as states or nation-states were generally created by processes of imperial expansion.… The designated or desirable

boundaries of the state were first imposed on coveted lands through imperialism, then actualized, rationalized, made 'legible' and exploitable by the imposition of members of the dominant group or its surrogates upon adjacent or nearby territories and populations" (Jones 2017: 90). Where there was resistance or further desire to expand territorial control, the colonizer's actions "inevitably assumed a genocidal scale and character, and continues to do so" (ibid.: 91). What is implied in Jones' discussion of colonization is made explicit in Aimé Césaire's claim that "no one colonizes innocently" (Césaire 2000: 39). Furthermore, according to Césaire, a "nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization – and therefore force – is already a sick civilization, a civilization which is morally diseased, which irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, one denial to another, calls for its Hitler, I mean its punishment" (ibid.).

This sickness, as Césaire refers to it, is especially evident in settler-colonial contexts, but can also be seen in the process of decolonization and the continued reach of former and new colonizers through neo-colonization. Regarding the former, writes Patrick Wolfe, "The question of genocide is never far from discussions of settler colonialism. Land is life – or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus contests for land can be – indeed, often are – contests for life" (Wolfe 2006: 387). Similarly, writes Jürgen Zimmerer, "Space is a finite quantity for which people (by definition indefinite in their numbers) compete. The need for land can be real or imagined (it can include imaginative landscapes, for example, plans for settlements, economic or agricultural use, or fear of land shortage)" (Zimmerer 2014: 273). The sickness is not merely found in the move to expand and settle the land of others; it is in the placing of the settler's needs, often non-derived needs, ahead of the most basic of needs of the settled peoples. Put simply, "Settler colonialism destroys to replace" (Wolfe 2006: 388).

Decolonization was sometimes accompanied by periods of extreme destructive violence between those attempting to preserve the colonial restraints and those attempting to throw off the binds of colonization. France's resistance to Algerian self-determination exemplifies a genocidal response to a decolonial movement. As the suppression of cultural rights intensified, some members of the oppressed population began to organize and consider armed resistance. Rather than accept the demands of the colonized people, France resorted to force to maintain its control over Algeria. Describing France's use of force to suppress the legitimate rights of Algerians, Muhammad El-Farra wrote in 1956, "Entire villages are shelled, bombed, or burned; acts of genocide are committed against the inhabitants of towns and villages; an indiscriminate campaign of extermination is now taking place. . .These are acts of genocide committed against people whose only crime is their love for liberty and their desire to preserve their own culture" (El-Farra 1956: 7).

The period of decolonization has been followed by new forms of imperialism and with them new forms of physical and structural violence. A primary driver of colonial genocide was the pursuit of economic expansion by the colonial powers (Short 2016). Hence, resistance to decolonization and the advent of neocolonialism were rooted in, first, the maintenance of economic, as well as political and cultural, control and influence and, second, the development of new forms of control and influence. Indeed, Jones writes that under neocolonialism "formal political rule is abandoned, while colonial structures of economic, political, and cultural control remain. The resulting exploitation may have genocidal consequences" (Jones 2017: 91).

Despite the obvious connection between Lemkin's concept of genocide and its associated techniques to imperial and colonial genocide, the application of Lemkin's concept of genocide to the treatment of occupied and colonized peoples that does not involve mass killing has been deemed controversial or mistaken by some in the field of genocide studies. This is at least in part because significant elements of Lemkin's concept of genocide, including many of the elements that connected imperialism and genocide, were omitted from the adopted text of the Genocide Convention and are similarly omitted from some of the prevailing scholarship.

G

Imperializing Lemkin's Concept of Genocide

There are significant disagreements among scholars in the field of genocide studies regarding what constitutes the crime of genocide, leading Jones to conclude that genocide "will forever be an 'essentially contested concept'" (Jones 2013: 5–6). Perhaps the most significant source of this disagreement is the definition of genocide codified in the Genocide Convention. The concept of genocide Lemkin presented in 1944 in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* remained largely unchanged when he participated in the creation of the Secretariat Draft (1947) of the Genocide Convention in 1947. Though Lemkin was one of three experts tasked with developing the initial draft of the treaty, Lemkin's influence on the text is readily apparent (Novic 2016).

What was likely a pragmatic change for purposes of a legal document, Lemkin narrowed his eight techniques of genocide to three methods – physical, biological, and cultural. All three of the methods were included together in Article II of the Secretariat Draft (1947), illustrating their interconnectedness. Retaining various elements of Lemkin's eight techniques, physical genocide was defined as "causing the death of members of a group or injuring their health or physical integrity." Acts of physical genocide included the following:

(a) Group massacres or individual executions
(b) Subjection to conditions of life which, by lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, or excessive work or physical exertion, are likely to result in the debilitation or death of the individuals
(c) Mutilations and biological experiments imposed for other than curative purposes
(d) Deprivation of all means of livelihood, by confiscation of property, looting, curtailment of work, and denial of housing and of supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of the territory concerned

Biological genocide involved the restriction of births among members of a group by:

(a) Sterilization and/or compulsory abortion
(b) Segregation of the sexes
(c) Obstacles to marriage

Meanwhile, cultural genocide was defined as destruction of "the specific characteristics of the group." Acts of cultural genocide included:

(a) Forcible transfer of children to another human group
(b) Forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group
(c) Prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse
(d) Systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications
(e) Systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses and destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship

Seven of Lemkin's eight techniques of genocide – political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, and religious – those that draw a clear line from imperialism to genocide, were included in the Secretariat Draft (1947) definition of genocide. However, during the subsequent drafting process that involved states negotiating the terms of the treaty, meaning its provisions, prohibitions, and obligations, imperial and colonial powers chipped away at Lemkin's concept of genocide, leaving little of it and its connection to imperialism remaining in the legal definition included in the adopted text of the Genocide Convention.

Established in March 1948, the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide comprised of seven states, including the United States, Soviet Union, France, China, Lebanon, Poland, and Venezuela, produced the second formal draft of the Genocide Convention. Using the Secretariat Draft (1947) as a foundation from which to work, the Ad Hoc Committee retained Lemkin's three methods of genocide, but isolated cultural genocide in Article III from physical and biological genocide, which

were included in Article II. This was done primarily at the behest of the United States, with France's support, in order to allow the United States to recognize the legitimacy of physical and biological genocide in Article II while also rejecting the concept of cultural genocide in Article III (Bachman 2018).

Perhaps because it was separated from the physical and biological methods, the Ad Hoc Committee Draft (1948) of the Genocide Convention retained much of Lemkin's concept of cultural genocide. However, the erosion of Lemkin's methods of physical and biological genocide in the text is evident. In the Ad Hoc Committee Draft, physical and biological genocide are limited to killing members of a group, impairing the physical integrity of members of the group, inflicting on members of the group measures or conditions of life aimed at causing their deaths, and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. The specifics of Lemkin's concept of genocide are imperative for our understanding of what the above acts entail. Gone from the Ad Hoc Committee Draft were the political, social, and economic techniques, as well as much of the physical and biological techniques.

This trend would continue when the Ad Hoc Committee Draft was opened for broader discussion and revision at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in late 1948. Just as Lemkin's political, social, and economic techniques of genocide were essentially eliminated from the Genocide Convention, and the physical and biological techniques were significantly abridged, cultural genocide was, for all intents and purposes, omitted altogether. All that remained of Lemkin's technique and method of cultural genocide when the Sixth Committee sent its draft to the General Assembly for adoption was the forcible transfer of children from one group to another. However, in the final text, the forcible transfer of children is not viewed as an element of cultural genocide but rather a means by which to commit biological genocide by impeding members of a group from producing new members of the group (Moses 2010).

As with negotiations at the Ad Hoc Committee, the United States was the most vocal opponent of the inclusion of cultural genocide. However, the United States was no longer satisfied with isolating cultural genocide from physical genocide. Instead, it insisted on cultural genocide's removal entirely. The United States even went so far as to threaten to undermine support for the Genocide Convention if cultural genocide were retained. Notably, at the time of the negotiations, the United States was engaged in many of the acts included in Lemkin's concept of cultural genocide (Bachman 2018). As Ward Churchill asserts, in successfully excluding cultural genocide from the Genocide Convention the United States accomplished "a maneuver serving to exempt a range of its own dirty linen from scrutiny" (Churchill 1997: 365).

With the omission of cultural genocide, which Lemkin referred to as "the most important part of the Convention" (quoted in Moses 2010: 37), the final blow to Lemkin's concept of genocide, and its direct connection to imperialism, had been landed. Lemkin was treated as if he did not understand genocide, "despite the fact that he invented the term and went to great trouble to explain its meaning" (ibid.: 21). Gone were the explicit connections to war, settler colonialism, colonization, neocolonialism, and structural violence. The imperial and colonial powers used their positions in the negotiations to ensure that their policies, whether those that were ongoing or those in their recent pasts, could not be used to implicate them in the commission of genocide. Even with their accomplishments in hand, they did not stop there.

At the 11th hour, the United Kingdom proposed the following text, which is included in the Genocide Convention under Article XII: "Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible." In explaining its proposal, which the Soviet Union referred to as the "colonial clause" (Abtahi and Webb 2008: 1824), the United Kingdom claimed that it had been custom over the previous 20–30 years for multilateral treaties to contain such language. In addressing criticism of its proposal, the United

Kingdom argued that opposition was based purely on "political motives" in order to "create difficulties" for the colonial powers (ibid.: 1815). Seemingly without any recognition of the irony, the United Kingdom also claimed that it could not decide for its colonies whether they would accept and be bound by the Genocide Convention and, more importantly, whether they could be victims of genocide. Essentially, the United Kingdom argued that because colonial territories were not present to represent themselves at the negotiations, as only states could participate, colonial territories could not be obligated to abide by the terms of the Genocide Convention by the colonial powers without first obtaining their consent. The United States supported the United Kingdom's position, stating that it was "extremely reasonable" (ibid.: 1816).

With the inclusion of Article XII in the adopted text of the Genocide Convention, the imperial and colonial powers achieved the final success in severing the genocidal relationship between the occupier and the occupied. What remained of the imperial characteristics of Lemkin's concept of genocide was made essentially inapplicable. The imperial and colonial powers exploited the timing of the Genocide Convention negotiations just as they exploited the people, land, and resources under their direct and indirect control. Had the Genocide Convention originated years later, there might have been a very different outcome.

Colonial Law

Though the Soviet Union referred only to the United Kingdom-proposed and United States-backed Article XII as "colonial," the entire Genocide Convention is an example of colonial law. At the time of the negotiations that shaped the final text of the treaty in ways that greatly benefited the colonial powers, as well as those states that faced significant internal political opposition, colonization and threats to the existence of indigenous peoples as such remained a widespread reality, a threat that continues to this day.

When the United Nations was formed in 1945, there were 51 original members. At the time,

among these members, nine maintained trust and/or non-self-governing territories, including Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These 9 states accounted for 93 of the 105 trusts and non-self-governing territories. The other 12 territories were administered by Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which themselves did not become UN members until December 1955. The 105 trusts and non-self-governing territories birthed 79 independent states over the next 54 years.

To put this into greater perspective, at the time the text of the Genocide Convention was negotiated and then voted on for approval at the General Assembly on December 9, 1948, only four African countries were eligible to participate – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. These four countries accounted for only 7% of the total vote (LeBlanc 1988). Therefore, the most colonized continent in the world was unable to participate in a process that could have allowed the colonized to retain in the Genocide Convention the very practices they were subjected to by the colonial powers. Asia accounted for 22.5% of the votes, with 13 voting members (ibid.). Notably absent from the voting rolls was much of colonized Southeast Asia. Europe accounted for nearly 30% of the votes and the Americas encompassed 38% of the vote. The remaining 3.5% of the vote was represented by the Oceanic countries of Australia and New Zealand (ibid.).

Territories under colonial control that would later gain their independence were denied the right to participate in the drafting of the Genocide Convention, its negotiating process, and in voting to determine whether it would become open for ratification in the form it ultimately took. Furthermore, it is doubtful that it would have taken its final form had formerly colonized territories and representatives of indigenous groups been permitted to participate in the drafting and negotiating processes. Related to this latter point, Haiti – itself made up of people who had to utilize extreme violence to gain their independence – proposed at the Sixth Committee that members of groups affected by genocide have legal standing to call upon the United Nations for their own protection.

Haiti argued that if only states were able to report genocide, and not the members of victimized groups, the possibility remained that a state could be both the perpetrator of genocide and the only organ with the authority to initiate protective proceedings (Abtahi and Webb 2008). Haiti's proposal failed to elicit any debate. The chairman of the Sixth Committee noted that Haiti's amendment had been read at the 101st meeting. Unfortunately, the chairman noted, the Haitian delegation was not present at the time. None of the negotiating parties present at the meeting spoke in favor of the Haitian amendment, so it was presumed that minds were made up on the subject (Abtahi and Webb 2008). This raises some questions: Why wasn't Haiti present? Was the Haitian delegation aware that its amendment would be read at the 101st meeting? Why didn't any other negotiating parties speak in favor of the amendment? The answer to these questions, as well as to the question of why indigenous and colonized peoples were not included in the Genocide Convention's drafting and negotiating processes, is a simple one; most states had no interest in empowering their victims – past, present, and future.

Had the Genocide Convention been drafted and negotiated after wider decolonization, Leo Kuper argues that the "representatives of the colonial powers would have been somewhat on the defensive, sensitive to criticism of their policies in non-self-governing territories" (Kuper 1982: 31). Thus, colonial powers that were vested in protecting their interests were allowed to colonize the law just as they had colonized significant portions of the world, while the very groups impacted by colonization were unable to ensure that the relationship between imperialism, colonialism, and genocide was made explicit in the law that defined and prohibited the crime. This historical reality significantly shaped the resultant text of the Genocide Convention.

Decolonizing Genocide

Decolonizing genocide requires the reinstitution of a Lemkinian concept of genocide that explicitly reconnects genocide to imperialism in both its historic forms, including conquest, territorial expansion, settler colonialism, and colonization, and its more modern iterations, such as wars of aggression, including in some cases "humanitarian intervention," neocolonialism, economic and cultural imperialism, and structural violence.

Decolonizing genocide also requires the inclusion of the voices of victims and survivors – the voices of resistance – and not on the terms of the states that have committed genocide and colonized the Genocide Convention but rather on the terms of the affected peoples. Decolonization cannot take place when the colonizer dictates the terms. If we are to have a concept of genocide for the twenty-first century, one that reflects the realities of group-based violence – cultural, physical, and structural – that threaten the survival of peoples as such, it must incorporate the lived experiences of those who have been targeted with such violence. Anything less is an abdication of control over defining genocide to the very powers that have benefitted the most historically from the original drafting and negotiating processes and will gladly continue to reap the benefits in the future.

Finally, decolonizing genocide requires that past genocides not be left in the past, including those that preceded the adoption and entry into force of the Genocide Convention and those that do not fit neatly under the legal definition codified within. Perpetrators of genocide must not be permitted to ignore and whitewash their histories on founding myths, revolutionary ideologies, and claims of benevolence. There must be redress for past, as well as present and future, acts of genocide.

Cross-References

▶ Australia's Colonisation and Racial Policies
▶ Dutch Imperialism, Caribbean
▶ European Imperialism in West Africa
▶ France and Imperialism
▶ German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933
▶ Imperialism and Settler Colonialism: Xenophobia and Racism in North America
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism

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Geographical Value Transfer

Geo-political Hegemony

George Padmore

George Weekes

German Colonialism and Nazism as Anti-imperialism

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Definition

Approaching Nazism as *anti*-imperialism places the focus on Nazi sources, their self-conception and self-projection, their ideology and propaganda. The perception of being the victim of long-lasting domination by foreign powers in a struggle for sovereignty is not to be underestimated as a main reason for the radicalism and totality of Nazi German foreign, settlement, war, and extermination policies.

A Change of Perspective

To approach Nazism as anti-imperialism might at first glance lead to some consternation. Extensive research has addressed the imperial or colonial nature of Nazi Germany. The German concept of *Lebensraum* or living space in the East, the war of extermination, and Auschwitz indicate the atrociousness of Nazism as an aggressively imperialist and colonising power. On the other hand, it may be argued that the anti-Semitic drive for total extermination defies the categories of colonialism

or imperialism. Approaching Nazism as *anti*-imperialism, however, places the focus on Nazi sources, their self-conception and self-projection, their ideology and propaganda. The perception of being the victim of long-lasting domination by foreign powers in a struggle for sovereignty is not to be underestimated as a main reason for the radicalism and totality of Nazi German foreign, settlement, war, and extermination policies. Nationalism and anti-imperialism, drawing on modern concepts of sovereignty and national self-determination, were intertwined with racist and imperialist notions of German superiority, and most importantly with the anti-Semitic idea of powerful and threatening Jewish aggression from both outside and within.

This essay sets out to situate Nazi anti-imperialism within the history of German imperialism and colonialism with and without colonies. After discussing imperialism and colonialism as phenomena of capitalist modernity, it will briefly sketch out the genesis of racism, anti-Semitism, and Darwinism. The question of whether and to what extent European colonialism, and especially German genocidal policies in Africa, contributed to creating the conditions in which Auschwitz somehow became 'thinkable and executable' (Zimmerer 2005, p. 211) will then be addressed. The First World War and the Weimar Republic will be dealt with as a caesura of utmost importance, as the Versailles experience melded perceptions of racist and imperialist superiority with ones of 'colonised' and powerless inferiority. The impact and importance of anti-imperialist elements in Nazi thought will be thematised by drawing upon Carl Schmitt, Goebbels, and others who construed and depicted as reactive and defensive the pursuit of an imperial sphere of influence. The idea of a 'natural' order along the lines of race or *Volkstum* contrasted with the purportedly aggressive and imperialist universalism of democracy. By addressing Germany's main enemies – Britain and later on the US – as 'plutocracies', Nazi thought and propaganda used a specific term encompassing all of the ideological ingredients of Nazi antiimperialism. Furthermore, Nazi propaganda outside of Europe, which at its core presented the Reich as an anti-imperialist and

anticolonialist power, has long been understudied. Thus, in the final portion of this essay, the main topics and themes of Nazi foreign propaganda will be outlined, taking the massive propaganda effort aimed at the Middle East and North Africa as an example.

Capitalist Modernity

German colonialism falls into the period of high imperialism between 1880 and the First World War. That said, the entangled history of imperialism and colonialism makes it necessary to delineate these concepts first. Imperialism *could* be defined as the (direct or indirect) policy of (economic and/or military) force to externally safeguard a nation state's interests, presupposing the modern nation state and the logic of capital accumulation, and incorporating, although not necessarily, colonialism. Reinhard (2008, p. 1) characterises colonialism as the territorial acquisition and domination of people based on the 'economical, political and ideological exploitation of the developmental differential' between two groups. Osterhammel (1997, pp. 16–17) supplements this account by suggesting that colonialism is a system of domination resulting from the process of territorial acquisition and is a hegemonic 'relationship between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders'. According to him, the 'fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis [on "imperial infrastructure" see van Laak 2004]. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and their ordained mandate to rule' (Osterhammel 1997, pp. 16–17). Osterhammel refers to a pursuit of *capitalist* interests. The acquisition by force of luxury goods and raw materials for the developing industry and market expansion were cause and effect of unfolding capitalism. Bourgeois society and Enlightenment thought were materially based on slave labour and colonial trade and commerce (Cheney 2010); it can be argued that 'the

economic practice of slavery – the systematic, highly sophisticated capitalist enslavement of non-Europeans as a labour force in the colonies – was increasing quantitatively and intensifying qualitatively to the point that by the mid-eighteenth century it came to underwrite the entire economic system of the West' (Buck-Morss 2009, p. 31).

Through slave labour and the overhaul and restructuring of local economies towards metropolitan needs during early globalisation of markets and production, indigenous and transferred populations were integrated into the evolving system of a global division of labour, under conditions of coercion and violence (Braudel 1981–84; Wallerstein 1989, 2011). This is also emphasised in Sebald's study on Togo under German rule: by preventing indigenous populations from accessing education, confining them to the lowest echelons of colonial administration, enforcing the cultivation of cotton for export, determining low purchase prices and employing forced or low-wage labour, the colonialists actually '*broadened* the socio-economic development differential between colony and metropole' (Sebald 1988, p. xxi).

This process was paralleled by ideological knowledge production: the mapping, classification, and hierarchisation of a world that was penetrated by European traders, missionaries, soldiers, and scientists. The fundamental difference between those who possessed at least the abstract commodity of their own manpower and those whose body was somebody else's property (and who were thus not producers of exchange value) was at the core of the modern racialisation of 'blacks' as opposed to 'whites' (Schmitt-Egner 1975). Racism was the 'ideological justification for the enduring hierarchization of the workforce and its highly unequal distributions of reward' (Wallerstein 1983, p. 78), as social inequality had to be reconciled with universalistic principles such as freedom and equality, even more so following abolition of slavery.

The central ideological process of modernity, it could be argued, can be identified as the colourisation, ethnicisation, or biologisation of the social. By the end of the nineteenth century,

the discourse on the *Other* had become fully biologised, reinforced by scientific discourses and Darwinist notions of evolution and selection that were transferred to the human sciences (Foucault 2003; Miles and Brown 2003). In the Indian or Arab colonies, the European colonists deemed the respective populations 'unfit' to rule due to the 'Orientals'' lower level of development. The colonists not only artificially preserved 'traditional' structures and elements of society, but also overhauled local economic structures, thus preventing local accumulation and creating arbitrary boundaries between or through territories and ethnicised groups (Al-Khafaji 2004; Beinin 2001, pp. 1–20; Gran 2009; Maddison 1971, pp. 35–70). In Europe, processes of state building paralleled by the advent of nationalism led to the formation of 'imagined communities' whose members conceived of themselves as the *same*, and different from the *Other*, on the basis of an ethnicised national identity 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each' (Anderson 1991, p. 7; Hobsbawm 1991). Colonial projects or imperialist discourses stabilized and shaped these 'imagined communities' through the externalization of social tensions and nationalist homogenization (Wehler 1969). The idea of an ethnic nation (*Volk* in the German context) rooted in the soil gained ground, and nation and race became reality as 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid' (Foucault 1980/1977, p. 194). The *Other* outside (e.g. the indigenous colonial subject) was complemented by the *Other* within; modern anti-Semitism associated Jews, who had been 'imprisoned' in the Holy Roman Empire's sphere of economic circulation for hundreds of years, with the abstract, the incomprehensibility of modern capitalism and its circulation sphere (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002; Postone 1986). Inherent in this fatal association was the claim to explain 'a world which had rapidly become too complex and threatening for many people' (Postone 1986, p. 305). Modern and traditional, abstract and concrete, maritime and continental, 'a

conspiracy bent on world domination on the one hand, and a principle of upright openness on the other' – in its various expressions this 'dichotomy's initial pole is one of the opaque forms of society's principles of exchange: *Tauschen* that Carl Schmitt linked, in an etymologically suggestive manner, with a principle *of Täuschen* – of deception' (Diner 2000, p. 34).

German Colonialism

In 1940 George Orwell wrote that Nazi Germany was turning 'the subject peoples into a reserve of slave labour. It is quite practicable, so long as the myth of "inferior races" is believed in. [...] Hitler is only the ghost of our own past rising against us. He stands for the extension and perpetuation of our own methods' (Orwell 2001, p. 170). At the same time, Orwell criticised pacifists and others who opposed the war, stating that he 'would sooner side with the older imperialisms – decadent, as Hitler quite rightly calls them – than with the new ones which are completely sure of themselves and therefore completely merciless' (172). So what is imperialist and what is German in German imperialism?

As Conrad sums up in his concise colonial history:

> German colonialism was [. . .] linked to global economic competition and the hunt for raw materials and new markets for the industrializing countries, to global political conflicts between the European powers, and to the ideologies of evolutionism and Social Darwinism, which were increasingly linked to discourses of racial differences. (2012, p. 17)

The colonial project was preceded by discursive as well as political shifts in the wake of the founders' crash and crisis that led to more interventionist and protectionist policies of the Bismarckian state; for example, the 1879 introduction of protective tariffs. Moreover, colonialism was promoted by the trade and industrial associations, with their growing concentration of economic power and their protective and expansionist aims. In this shift, liberal economics were abandoned in favour of a straightforward nationalist perspective in discourses of *Weltpolitik*

(world politics) and *Lebensraum* (living space) (Smith 1986, pp. 52–111). While *Weltpolitik* focused on overseas colonies and maritime armament against the background of the competition between global powers, the theoreticians of *Lebensraum* focused on 'traditional' agriculture and, geographically, on Central and Eastern Europe. The latter's romantic and anti-modern discourse at times clashed, at times merged, with *Weltpolitik.* The Reich was seen as strong enough to steer the economy towards expansion and as entitled to do so (Schinzinger 1984, p. 163). Colonial fantasies were fuelled by:

> liberal models of a benign, protective father state that would naturally release its children from tutelage once they had grown up; by growing nationalist resistance against French military and cultural imperialism, accompanied by a drive for national unification; and, eventually, by the militantly competitive assertion of difference and strength vis-à-vis all of Germany's European neighbors. (Zantop 1997, p. 202)

German colonialism was started by private enterprises, as Bismarck focused on Europe and relations with Britain. Merchants bought land in what later became German South-West and East Africa. Later, Togoland was claimed by an 'Imperial Commissioner' to secure areas of interest for German trade companies and missionaries. All of the colonies were then enforced by the German military (i.e. the Navy), which established its own colony in Kiautschou, vis-à-vis local and European powers. The latter colony is also symbolic of the great powers' 'informal imperialism' in China, which at times relied upon brute force (Kuß and Martin 2002; Leutner and Mühlhahn 2007). Trade in and administration of these 'protected areas', or *Schutzgebiete,* was to be organised by private actors to reduce the Reich's burden, yet after a few years all colonies were placed under direct imperial administration. The history of German colonialism has been researched more thoroughly in recent years, whether concerning German South-West Africa (Kaulich 2003; Zimmerer 2001, 2003), German East Africa (Baer and Schröter 2001; Becker and Beez 2005), Togo (Knoll 1978; Sebald 1988, 2013) or Cameroon

(Schaper 2012; Schulte-Varendorff 2011), to name the best-known examples. The German colonial enterprise had direct and indirect economic and fiscal effects (Schinzinger 1984). While the share of colonial goods in German trade was marginal, the construction of railways reduced the costs of the transport of raw materials and goods and led to an increase in stock turnover in German colonial ports, to the benefit of shipping and trading companies. Moreover, railway projects and the massive expansion of the fleet as the main guarantor of the colonial enterprise brought an economic upswing for German industry, especially the iron, steel and mechanical engineering industries and shipyards. However, state expenditures significantly exceeded the revenues (Schinzinger 1984, p. 156, 160).

That said, it is not the economic history, but rather the history of colonial ideas and of colonial genocide that remains the focus of researchers. The German extermination campaign in South-West Africa killed at least 70,000 people and is generally seen as the first genocide of the twentieth century and the first German genocide (Schaller 2011; Zimmerer 2001, 2003, 2011). With a focus on 'law and administration of the racial state' and 'unfree labour, expulsion, and genocide as elements of population economics' (Zimmerer 2011, pp. 40–138), the controversial question of the connection between the philosophies of colonial rule and administration on one hand and the Nazis' later genocidal quest for *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe on the other is raised (Baranowski 2010). Some scholars underline 'the decidedly colonial nature of the Nazi geopolitical project and the largely colonial dimensions of Nazi genocide' (Kakel 2013, p. 3), and explain 'the Nazi Holocaust as part of the emerging global histories of imperialism, colonialism and genocide (rather than a "unique" historical event)'. In this narrative, Auschwitz is described as 'colonial genocide' or 'exterminatory colonialism' (Kakel 2013, p. 4). This question of continuities or causalities is not new, as Orwell, cited above, was only one of the first to discuss it. Later, Hannah Arendt argued that the period of German imperialism was a 'preparatory stage for coming catastrophe', setting the stage

'for all possible horrors' (Arendt 1958, p. 123, 221). Arendt stressed the destructive and self-radicalising principles of expansion as 'a permanent and supreme aim of politics' and of power as an end in itself, hinting on parallels in the economic sphere. In so doing, she was building on Luxemburg's argument for a fundamental conflict between production capabilities, and consumption driving capital to market expansion. Capitalism is understood here as a mode of economy 'which tends to engulf the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies, tolerating no rival at its side', at the same time being in need of 'other economic systems as a medium and soil' (Luxemburg 1951, p. 467). Arendt pointed to the connection between exploitation and racism, as well as the 'totalitarian' consequences of the idea of 'natural laws' and man as the incarnation of the forces of history, not acting as an individual or on behalf of a group of individuals, but as the agent of a collective greater than the sum of its parts or of its will. This calls to mind Elie Kedourie's critical history of nationalism and the ideas of sovereignty and general will since the French Revolution: 'Consciousness of right bred a righteousness which excesses could never destroy, but only confirm' (Kedourie 1961, p. 18).

There is no question that there are many important connections between German colonialism and Nazi imperialism. The colonial project was driven by and reinforced scientific and popular discourse about the *Other* (Grosse 2000). Bolstered by Darwinist and other scientific theories in the second half of the nineteenth century, modern ethnologists and anthropologists were important actors in racist knowledge production. Laboratories, as well as the popular *Völkerschauen* ('human zoos'), were supplied with material appropriated by a host of German actors in the colonies (Baer and Schröter 2001). *Völkerkunde*, anthropology, eugenics, and connected scientific discourses influenced modern science and (bio-)politics in Europe and North America at least until 1945, delegitimised only by the sheer atrociousness of the German 'racial war'. The basic 'truth' shared by most scientists, journalists, and politicians of the time was that of a world divided into races, each race having

biological features that determined its intellect and behaviour as different from others. Society was understood and described in biological terms. Ethnic nations (*Völker*) were engaged in a 'fight for survival', a 'natural struggle for existence', necessarily expanding as a 'healthy' nation or declining to be exterminated (Schmitt-Egner 1975, p. 82).

In the colonies, natural or primitive peoples (*Naturvolk*) were differentiated from cultural nations (*Kulturvolk*), unproductive from productive labour. The indigenous populations were forced into wage labour; resistance was interpreted as stubbornness and laziness (Schmitt-Egner 1975, pp. 96–97). In concepts of the 'education of the negro', superior or differentialist racism and Christian missionary universalism at times formed forceful symbioses (for the German context, see Bade 1982). Legislation constructed and enforced colourised (i.e. 'visible') borders between *self* and *Other*, especially in the matter of mixed marriages, or *Mischehen*. Debates on public health and morals attacked the mixing of races as a threat to Volk and nation.

Finally, the colonial wars, especially the 1904–07 war against Herero and Nama, constituted a turning point regarding the administrative organisation and bureaucratisation of genocide. In a centrally planned and controlled 'war of pacification', physical extermination:

> was no unintended by-product of brutal warfare [...] but the aim almost from the beginning. Moreover, the war combined the genocidal massacre with ethnic cleansing and extermination through neglect in internment camps. This also reveals the extent of ideological firmness and political centralization that seems to be absent in other colonial contexts. (Zimmerer 2011, p. 22)

Colonialism Without Colonies

In the words of Enzo Traverso:

> the guillotine, the abattoir, the Fordist factory, and rational administration, along with racism, eugenics, the massacres of the colonial wars and those of World War I had already fashioned the social universe and the mental landscape in which the Final Solution would be conceived and set in motion. All

those elements combined to create the technological, ideological, and cultural premises for that Final Solution, by constructing an anthropological context in which Auschwitz became a possibility. (2003, p. 151)

It is obvious that there is a 'road from Windhuk to Auschwitz' (Zimmerer 2011), but only in the sense of *necessary conditions*. While Nazi policies imply racial discourse, colonial (even genocidal) practice and experience (collectively 'remembered' and institutionally retained), scientific and popular knowledge of the *Other*, and a modern bureaucratic state, they are not an inevitable result of the latter (see Traverso 2003, p. 152). In the words of Arendt, the latter are the origins, not the causes of the former (for the ongoing debate on the origins and causes of the Shoah, see Bauer 2001, pp. 1–118).

Moreover, for Nazi radicalisation and extermination policies to become reality, these origins had to coincide with modern anti-Semitism and a specific anti-imperialist self-perception and worldview under specific social and political conditions. The early enthusiasm for and subsequent brutality of the First World War remained a formative element for generations. At the same time, the deep penetration of enemy lands in the early days of the war had aroused colonial desires at unprecedented levels. Between 1914 and 1939, after the Great War had forced the end of the German colonial project, dozens of popular and research works on colonialism, different colonies, missionary enterprises, and the 'colonial question' in general were published. Against the backdrop of this 'colonialism without colonies' a German history of colonisation and conquest since the Early Middle Ages was imagined and constructed. It was based on an extensive corpus of colonial 'fantasies' that had accompanied and supported German colonial policies since the very beginning and were associated with 'positive identificatory figures such as Columbus, Humboldt, and "German" conquistadors' of the past (Zantop 1997, p. 202). It was stated that:

> We Germans are the best colonizers, but not the best colonial politicians. The former is based on the strength and talent of our nation [*Volk*], the latter has its basis in the agelong fragmentation of the state and powerlessness [*Ohnmacht*] of the German

nation. However, the latter is a result of the former, and thereupon our right to colonial possessions is based. It is impossible to exclude the best nation of colonizers from colonial policy forever after it is finally molded into a cohesive state unit. (Jacob 1939, pp. 8–9)

At the centre of the post-1918 discourses on *Weltpolitik* and *Lebensraum* stood the 'colonial guilt' of Germany's enemies, who had 'brought war to Africa', 'robbed the German colonies' and 'tarnished the reputation of the white race' (13). While attacking the 'lie of German colonial guilt' (e.g. allegations of bad treatment of the indigenous populations) in books, magazines, and *Völkerschauen*, Germans indulged in memories of a glorious colonial past, complaining about injustice and foreign arbitrariness. The loss of the colonies was integrated into the greater revisionist discourse on the Treaty of Versailles, which, according to the Social-Democrat Scheidemann, was intended 'to extort the declaration of its own unworthiness' and the 'consent to merciless fragmentation' from 'a great nation' and could be summarised with the words: 'Germany waives, waives, waives!' (Philipp Scheidemann's speech of 12 May 1919 to the National Assembly, cited in Heidegger 1956, p. 334; on German social democracy and colonialism, see 175–183) A German colonial project beyond the equator was on the German and especially the Nazi schedule at least until 1941 (Linne 2008; Ustorf 1995). While *Lebensraum* in the eastern provinces had already been a relevant topic for discussion and state policy since the nineteenth century, it became the focus of public attention with the formation of a Polish state and the loss of those provinces, which, in the words of the first foreign minister of the Weimar Republic, were the cause of 'severe damage' for 'the nutrition of our nation [*Volksernährung*]'. Internally, the government discussed Versailles, the 'diktat of shame', and its results for the 'German East', referring to the ethnic or racial composition of the provinces and the *völkisch* will of its population (e.g. Reichsminister 1919). At the time, the differentiation between ethnic nationalities (*völkische* or *Volksgruppen*), associated with the right of nations to self-determination in the

ambivalent tradition of the French Revolution, was common among all members of the League of Nations. Prior to the First World War, as nationalist discourse took up Darwinist and biologised concepts of nation and state, many had already been looking to ('dreamland') East or South-Eastern Europe for 'space' to be settled and 'cultivated' (Jureit 2012; Thum 2006). Romantic criticism of modernity propagated agriculture and the need for 'living space', associating modernity with the overwhelming process of industrialisation, with unemployment, rural exodus, and urbanisation, with isolation and alienation. Simultaneously, the modern nationalist conception of the natural and necessary identity of state, nation, and *Volk* made the question of national or *völkisch* space and its borders an urgent matter. In the nineteenth century, Friedrich Ratzel had already presented a theory of ethnospatial evolution in which he described spatial expansion as the final stage of a *Volk*'s process of taking root in the soil. It was in this tradition that geographers would state in the 1920s that 'German national soil' (*Volksboden*) is where the German nation settles (Jureit 2012, pp. 241–244). This sounds similar to what Hitler wrote in the same year: land and soil exist 'for the Volk that has the strength to take it and the diligence to cultivate it' (Hitler 1943, p. 147). The ideological processing of a claustrophobic panic prompted by perceived existential loss of space after Versailles (Jureit 2012, pp. 219–220; Smith 1986, pp. 196–230) is notably captured in Hans Grimm's successful and influential 1926 novel *Volk ohne Raum* (Nation without Space). The story of a farmer's son confronted with 'crowdedness' and 'density', coupled with the alienation of industrialisation and urbanisation that threaten his natural sphere of life, struck a chord with feelings of constriction and impotence experienced by a major section of German society in the Weimar years; a society in permanent crisis and contingency in the social, political, or familial spheres in times of general insecurity (Jureit 2012, p. 266; Peukert 1987). Grimm's 'nation without space' is situated in the area of tension between the German colonial project in Africa, the post-1919 colonialism without colonies which laments the victors'

'robbery of German lands' in Africa and 'Germany proper', and the discourse on 'living space' and the 'German East'. The novel connects with the nationalist, Darwinist, and anti-Semitic interpretive paradigms and thought patterns of the time and builds upon the dominant understanding of Versailles as a violation of the German nation and its natural rights: 'We demand the justice of space for all nations according to number and performance [*Leistung*]' (Grimm 1926, p. 1243). As a result of the distorted perception of the reparation regime after Versailles, nationalist and racist chauvinism fused with self-perception as the victim of aggression, colonisation and foreign domination; merging the struggle against Napoleon during the constitutive phase of German nationalism with the political critique of England and France in Versailles and the anti-Semitic conception of Jewish domination of the nation, foreign and domestic at the same time (Koller 2005).

Corresponding but not identical with *völkisch* nationalism was the 'conservatist' current ('Konservative Revolution') around Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, and others (see Weiß 2012); to take a comparative look at other European countries might be especially worthwhile in this context. In Italy, to give just one example, concurring proto-fascist and fascist intellectual currents like Enrico Corradini's nationalism and Paolo Orano's or Robert Michels's 'revolutionary syndicalism' theorised the 'proletarian nature' of the 'corporate' Italian nation since the beginning of the twentieth century, defending colonialism and war as preconditions for national redemption (Sternhell et al. 1994). As 'socialism empowered workers against the bourgeoisie', it was argued, nationalism or a 'national socialism' would 'empower Italians to transcend their decadent state and revive the nation, both morally and materially' (Marsella 2004, p. 208).

Nazi Anti-imperialism

Nazi anti-imperialism is not the analysis and critique of imperialism as defined above. An

ideological form of thought, it purports to explain complex economical and political conditions and relations through personalisation. It merges anti-Semitism and reactionary chauvinism with ethno-nationalist or *völkisch* geopolitics, political geography, and law. Taking up the formula of 'nation without space', its theoreticians wanted geopolitics to 'expand and recover' the 'constricted and mutilated Middle European living space' to solve the question of 'overpopulation' (Haushofer 1928, p. 49). Coining terms like *Volksdruck* (population pressure) and *Raumkörper* (space body), one of these theoreticians defined Germany as a major nation [*Großvolk*], the only one of seven 'world powers' that is 'oppressed, enchained and not free to arm and defend itself [*wehrfrei*]'. Apart from the assumption that one-third of its 'national comrades' or *Volksgenossen* were separated from its *Raumkörper*, 'the distress caused by a density that is the result of an unbearable overpopulation of living space' was perceived as forcing the state to push the frontier of this very *Raumkörper* (Haushofer 1934, p. 84). Resulting from this density and pressure, the natural right to expand arises for nations like Germany, Italy and Japan, 'an enormous ethical difference' in contrast to the plain material motivation or attraction to power behind the French and British colonial projects according to Haushofer (ibid.). Thus, Haushofer sets the just, natural, and defensive expansion of a *Volk* against an unjust, unnatural, and aggressive expansion, associated with imperialism, capitalism, and Britain, the 'nation of merchants'. German geopolitics could therefore be defined as 'an ideology legitimising international domination through putatively natural, hence timeless or unchanging principles' (Diner 2000, p. 27). While industrialisation, machinisation and urbanisation are associated with 'the Jewish', the category of *Raum* (space) signifies 'a positive existential form that, while connected to reigning circumstances, stands opposed to them'. As anti-Semitism thus is the internal or domestic manifestation of 'Haushofer's simultaneously rationalized and mystagogic rejection of and struggle against abstraction, seen as the product of Western capitalist social formation [...] Haushofer's anti-

British stance, apparent in his attack on the "plutocrats", represents its external dimension' (Diner 2000, p. 31). The same applies for Carl Schmitt, whose theory of a new ethno-national or *völkisch* 'order of greater spaces' in International Law – introduced shortly after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia – relates to Haushofer's works. Schmitt picks up the core principles of the US Monroe Doctrine, applying it to the European or 'Greater German' context, emphasising the 'prohibition on intervention by external powers', or rather powers 'alien to the space [*raumfremd*]'. Based on the idea of *völkisch* racial substance or belonging as the prior, natural category of order, Schmitt devises an 'order of greater spaces' that revolves around the principle of 'protection of the ethno-national character of every ethno-national group [*Volksgruppe*]' and the idea of dominant 'greater powers' to forcefully organise and structure the greater space following this criterion. According to Schmitt, who takes up earlier concepts of *Lebensraum,* 'greater' encompasses not only the merely quantitative, but also the qualitative meaning, implying a completely new conception of space (Schmitt 1941, pp. 75–76). The Reich, a 'concrete order', should replace the abstract state, led by the dominant *Volk* carrying the political idea of this new order. Thus, German hegemony would be natural and just – as opposed to the arbitrary and 'only political' concept of the US doctrine. Already, in 1932, Schmitt had criticised US 'economic imperialism' and the Monroe Doctrine, questioning its theoretical legal basis and its practical arbitrariness, but ignoring the economic context of European imperialism (Schmitt 1940a/1932). In this way, he wanted to highlight the dangers of imperialism 'for a nation on the defensive'. According to him, the Allies were still waging war against Germany – after Versailles by other, 'legal' means (Schmitt 1940b/1938, p. 247). Final defeat would only follow the acceptance of the alien vocabulary and concept of law, chiefly international law (Schmitt 1940a/1932). It is on the basis of this understanding that Schmitt elaborates his concept of an ethnopolitical new order of greater spaces, paying heed to the assessment that imperialist hegemony is founded in

international acceptance and thus legalisation of a major power's exclusive right to define, interpret, and apply a doctrine regarding its foreign affairs.

Moreover, Schmitt theorises the National Socialist attack on equality (*Gleichheit*) as abstract and artificial sameness opposed to racial homogeneity (*Gleichartigkeit*), associating the radical universalistic idea of equality with imperialist aggression against the concrete particular, and the universalistic world principle of the abstract state with the violation of concrete territory as a *völkisch* space (Diner 2000, pp. 60–63). With a complex ethnic mosaic in the East and South-East, where ethno-national or linguistic demarcations were impossible, the German Reich was the only entity capable of taking the lead. Schmitt thus legitimises German imperialist expansion based on and propagating an anti-imperialist anti-universalism or particularism implying hierarchisation. From this point of view it is exactly the radical racism of National Socialist law that renders it 'non-imperialistic and non-aggressive'; to protect blood as the 'fact' that organises mankind is totally defensive. The universalistic totality of states as tools of an indirect power or an 'international class' – associated in Nazi thought with 'plutocrats', 'democrats', 'capitalists', 'freemasons' or 'Jews' – would yield an 'international civil war'; only the idea of '*völkisch* totality' or the primacy of the Volk in the state would enable a stable international order (Schmitt 1940c/1938, p. 256; 1940d/1939, p. 286).

Goebbels and the Nazi propagandists used the term 'plutocracy', rule of the rich, to defame Great Britain and later also the US as aggressively capitalist states steered by rich and powerful elites, Jews, and freemasons (Goebbels 1997–2006). Through a homogenised concept of *Volksgemeinschaft* and the dichotomous distinction between 'creating' and 'money-grabbing' capital, the contradictions of modern capitalist conditions were projected outside (Britain and the US) and onto the *Other*. German industry was considered productive as opposed to the unproductive sphere of circulation that was associated with the Jews and 'plutocrats', whose aim was understood to be the colonisation and exploitation of Europe by any means. In this view, the

First World War and Versailles represented two sides of the same coin.

Nazi Anti-imperialism Abroad: The Case of the Middle East

Nazi propagandists went to great lengths to fight international 'plutocracy', even using a host of underground radio stations appealing to English workers and pacifists. Moreover, a massive propaganda effort focused on Middle Eastern and North African countries that had been a target for German economic penetration since the end of the nineteenth century and for military and propaganda activities during the German comradeship-in-arms with the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (Lüdke 2005; Schwanitz 2004).

Propaganda leaflets and broadcasts easily blended the Nazi's *völkisch* and anti-Semitic anti-imperialism with anti-colonialist attacks on the British (and French to a certain extent) and the Zionist project in Mandatory Palestine (Goldenbaum 2014; Herf 2009), reaching out to or communicating with the political public spheres of local elites and urban *effendiyya* who were struggling for their share in state power under secular or Islamised discourses on national sovereignty (Schulze 2002). The single most important vehicle for German foreign propaganda was short-wave radio, which was broadcast across Middle East and North Africa in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. The broadcasts had been established to 'spread out the Empire's embarrassing issues' after the BBC had started German-language broadcasts in the wake of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Recent research has found that the programmes consisted mainly of international and local news combined with daily political and weekly religious talks (Goldenbaum 2014). From the outset, the chief idea was to counter any critique of German imperialist aggression by attacking British imperialism and policies in the colonies, especially in Mandatory Palestine. In line with the Schmittian differentiation between German defensive *Raumpolitik* and English colonial despotism, the broadcasts presented world

affairs as an historical struggle between 'young nations' longing for sovereignty and independence from the British, French, and later also US yoke on one side, and their democratic (meaning plutocratic) oppressors fighting to preserve foreign domination on the other. In Germany, and since 1941 at the latest also in the foreign-language broadcasts, Russian 'Bolshevism' threatening Europe and the rest of the world joined the 'plutocrats' as an eternal enemy. As the latter were associated with an aggressive universalism of democracy, so the Soviet Union was associated with an aggressive universalism of communism, both being connected through the alleged Jewish conspiracy targeting nations and cultures. News on the nationalisation of Romanian oil companies hinted at foreigners and 'rich Jews' being forced out of the country, while news on the collapse of the French front contained reports of Jews fleeing the country carrying gold bars (ibid.).

The message was clear: in Europe and the region, the nations were engaged in a threefold struggle against colonisation; the direct colonisation of their countries by the imperialist democracies and the indirect economic colonisation of their countries by the Jewish plutocrats as well as the Zionist colonisation in Mandatory Palestine aiming 'to deport the Arabs from Palestine, Syria and Transjordan'. The radically anti-Semitic appeal – including the one to Islam and tradition – is to be situated between the diverse regional and transregional discourses of nationalism and self-determination on the receivers' side. The local conflict in Palestine that was taken up by nationalist elites in the region as a central rallying point, playing an important part in secular and Islamised debates in the Arab political public sphere, was skilfully associated in the German broadcasts with the anti-Semitic themes and imagery used to legitimise and describe racist and anti-Semitic aggression in the European theatre (ibid.).

It was stressed again and again that Germany as a young sovereign nation, led by its *Führer,* having just emerged from the Versaillian yoke of foreign domination, was attempting to establish a 'new order'. An emphasis on German military might and the homogeneity of the nation appealed

to powerless nationalist activists. Local social and political conflicts in the colonies were used to defame the colonialists' malicious chauvinism and the dysfunction of democracy. Nationalist collaborators would appear in the broadcasts to declare that 'the English turned out to be the bitterest enemies and the cruellest oppressors of the Arab countries'. They complained that Britain had 'sacrificed the blood of foreign nations and fobbed them off with phrases instead of truly granting them freedom, justice and sovereignty' (Das Archiv 1942, p. 102). While the German propaganda effort could build on the fact that the colonial situation and thus the 'economical, political and ideological exploitation of the developmental differential' (Reinhard 2008, p. 1) was a reality, and German radio was widely listened to, it is wrong to assume that the audiences in the region would automatically have adopted the contents of the propaganda or generally identified with National Socialist Germany. Speculations along these lines have been criticised with good reason in recent publications (see Nicosia 2015, pp. 1–17). Listeners followed different and competing broadcasts. A pro-German or pro-Allied stance during the Second World War cannot necessarily be derived from positive or negative attitudes towards the colonial powers or towards the political situation in general (see Gershoni 2014).

Starting from this observation, and regarding assumptions of 'ideology transfer' as too simplistic, a shift of focus might prove insightful: in comparing the historical context of modern anti-Semitism's genesis in Europe with the context of its reception as Nazi anti-imperialism in the Middle East during the 1930s and 1940s, the connection between the two becomes obvious. During the 'crisis of classical modernity' (Peukert), a form of thought gained ground:

> in which the rapid development of industrial capitalism with all of its social ramifications is personified and identified as the Jew. It is not that the Jews merely were considered to be the owners of money [...], but that they were held responsible for economic crises and identified with the range of social restructuring and dislocation [...]: explosive urbanization, the decline of traditional social classes and strata [...] etc. In other words, the abstract domination of capital, which [...] caught people up in a

web of dynamic forces they could not understand, became perceived as the domination of International Jewry. (Postone 1986, p. 306; cf. Claussen 2005, pp. 29–36)

The urban spaces in the Middle East and North Africa targeted by German propaganda were at the time in a similar situation of societal transformation. The main recipients of the broadcasts were urbanised elites and the precarious *effendiyya*, disconnected from their traditional and the urban colonialised context at the same time. Secular and Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, which at the time corresponded with and was the focus of German propaganda, participated in the secular nationalist discourse and struggle even though the *form* of the Islamist discourse was Islamic (Schulze 2002, pp. 9–11, 73). If Nazi anti-imperialism had a lasting impact on the region or rather on actual processes of the formation of ideologies, it was through the provision of anti-Semitic *semantics* to explain the dynamic forces that people could not understand; not just the economic forces in the process of integrating the region as a periphery into the evolving system of a global division of labour, but also the world historical and political forces that led to the creation of Israel and the 'Palestinian *nakba*'. It is anti-Zionism, often anti-Semitic, that at times was, and is, used by post-colonial regimes to mobilise and distract their populations. It is anti-Semitism that became one of the most influential forms of thought in the region in the second half of the twentieth century.

Nazi anti-Semitic anti-imperialism – as well as racial discourse and colonial (genocidal) practice and experience – was not only a necessary condition for the radicalisation of German policies in Eastern Europe that culminated in the war of extermination and the death camps, it also globalised its own anti-Semitic semantics that pretended to explain the upheavals of modernity. Furthermore, German propaganda played a role in the internationalisation and politicisation of the 'Israeli-Palestinian conflict' at a time when Jews were fleeing the Reich or were being exterminated in the East, and before Israel was even founded in the shadow of this 'caesura in civilization', Auschwitz.

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German Communist Party (KPD)

German Empire

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Germany; Imperialism; Social democracy; Social imperialism

Definition

This essay provides an overview of the development of the German working class in relation to the imperialist character of the German state and society. It focuses on the political aspect of embourgeoisement as entailing working-class incorporation within a state based on policies of conquest, plunder, and the exploitation of foreign labor. The essay relates the economic and political development of the German working class between the founding of the German Reich in 1871 and the voting into power of fascism in 1933 to the phenomenon of social imperialism (Sozialimperialismus). It argues that between 1871 and 1933, the better-off German workers, as represented politically by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and organized within the SPD-affiliated Free Trade Unions of Germany (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, ADGB), were prepared to compromise with imperialism insofar as it secured for them a rising standard of living and enhanced political representation.

German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933

This essay provides an overview of the development of the German working class in relation to the imperialist character of the German state and society. It focuses on the political aspect of embourgeoisement as entailing working-class incorporation within a state based on policies of conquest, plunder, and superexploitation. The essay relates the economic and political development of the German working class between the founding of the German Reich in 1871 and the voting into power of fascism in 1933 to the phenomenon of social imperialism (Sozialimperialismus). It argues that between 1871 and 1933, the better-off German workers, as represented politically by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and organized within the SPD-affiliated Free Trade Unions of Germany (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, ADGB), were prepared to compromise with imperialism insofar as it secured for them a rising standard of living and enhanced political representation.

Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify the terms "imperialism" and "social imperialism." Imperialism is the product of the concentration and centralization of capital on a world scale. The tendency to monopoly at home compels rival national capitals to acquire larger markets, secure control of key raw materials, and expand production so as to exploit relatively cheap foreign labor. In so doing, an increasing part of the imperialist country's wealth is created abroad and transferred home by a variety of means, including through taxation, debt servicing, profit repatriation, and unequal exchange. Modern imperialism is thus the military and political effort on the part of advanced capitalist countries to siphon and extort surplus (value) from other, typically underdeveloped, countries.

Social imperialism is the attempt by the imperialist bourgeoisie to assimilate the core nation working class into the capitalist polity by means of granting (sections of) it political, cultural, and material gains (Neumann 1943: 153–155). The benefits afforded this "labor aristocracy" can

take the form of extensive enfranchisement, increased leisure time, higher wages, legal pay arbitration, the right to organize, public welfare services, higher education, and relative cultural esteem. Within an imperialist country, there is a strong tendency for an inter-class national alliance to be formed, ideologically expressed through what Lenin called "social chauvinism," that is, support for the retention and/or extension of said benefits on the basis of the status quo ante.

Social Imperialism and the German Working Class (1871–1914)

As an area geographically marginal to the conquest of the New World and the subsequent slave trade, the bases upon which "primitive" capital accumulation was accomplished, by the mid-nineteenth-century Germany was in European terms a comparatively backward feudal economy. Rubinson (1978) describes how Germany moved from this semi-peripheral position to become a core country in the capitalist world system. For Rubinson (43), Germany could move toward core nation status only because the geographic expansion of capitalism that had taken place between 1800 and 1870 opened up enormous opportunities, within the British Empire especially, for investments in the construction of the world's railways and in cash-crop agriculture. The ascent of Germany to the semi-peripheral *core* of the world economy in the course of the nineteenth century thus related directly to the growth of capitalism in its colonialist and empire-building phase, that is, to the enlargement of the peripheral and exploited Third World. As Rubinson notes:

> The expansion of the size of the peripheral areas of the system allows for the expansion of the size of core areas for two basic reasons. First, increased peripher-alization means an increase in the amount of labor in the system, and this increase allows more areas to capture a larger share of the value produced by this increase of labor. Second, with such an increase, more areas can shift their position in the division of labor to specialise in core activities and benefit from the structure of unequal exchange between core and periphery. (44–5)

Germany's industrial revolution occurred between 1850 and 1873 (Wehler 1970). From 1862, under Prime Minister, later Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, capitalist industry began to consolidate its institutional power within the state, having become allied to big agrarian interests (partly as a political move to halt the liberal-democratic tide). German capitalism had matured within the national market created by the customs union, or *Zollverein*, including all of the component states of Germany, established in 1818 and the subsequent unification of the country between 1862 and 1867. The German Empire (*Kaiserreich*) was founded in 1871 on the basis of Prussian dominance in the new military-state and the traditional "alliance of steel and rye" between landlords and industrialists. This alliance had first been established in the aftermath of the abortive 1848 revolution (the last gasp of German liberal democracy before 1919) and was later renewed in Prussia's National Liberal Party finance minister Johann von Miquel's consensus policy (*Sammlungspolitik*) of 1897–1898. *Sammlungspolitik* was subsequently cemented through the 1902 Bülow tariff and consolidated in 1913 through the support of petty bourgeois groups from the "old *Mittelstand*" (middle-class). As Fischer (1991: 40) notes, persisting as the hard core of reaction within German society, these groups played a decisive role in the rise to power of Nazism in 1933.

Monopoly Capitalism and the Origins of Social Imperialism in Germany

Imperialism and social imperialism were born of the Depression. The world economic crisis of 1873 was caused by overproduction precipitated by the increasing mechanization of industry and improved transportation networks. France and Germany especially saw demand for their agricultural output slump insofar as grain could be purchased and imported more cheaply from North America, Argentina, and the Ukraine (Halimi 2009). The ensuing period of depression up to 1896 in Germany saw the rapid growth of monopoly capitalism (Lenin 1970/1916). Syndicates and cartels were formed to limit production, divide territorial markets, and set prices, while the need to expand production demanded credit which only powerful banks could provide (ibid).

In response to German industrialization, British capitalism was compelled to expand its colonial empire (the foundation of its supposed "laissez-faire" economy) (Patnaik 2006) and introduce preferential tariffs (Krooth 1980: 19). The landed Junker aristocracy (Germany's former absolute rulers) shifted from a position of dependence upon free trade with Britain to demanding protection from foreign competition. At the same time, Germany's hitherto free-trading commercial bourgeoisie sought guaranteed foreign markets to absorb the enhanced productive capacity of industry. Both of these fractions of capital came to advocate naval armament and a militaristic colonial foreign policy. The Navy League (Flottenverein), formed in 1898 to garner mass support for Germany's naval program, was the largest and most successful interest group in Imperial Germany, larger in terms of membership than even the SPD. While some socialists opposed the subsidization of shipping lanes to the Far East and Australia as an "imperialist levy," a majority of the SPD supported it, arguing that it would help the working class by encouraging employment (Kitchen 1978: 183). Whereas, previously, German capitalism could afford to conduct its business outside of the state's direct intervention, after 1870 sections of German capital actively sought the help of the state to secure and protect colonial territories wherein they would enjoy supreme economic privilege (Geiss 1976: 46). East German scholars have explained the relative failure of German colonial ventures in the Bismarck era by emphasizing the unwillingness of bankers and industrialists, as opposed to shipping and trading concerns, to engage in colonialist activities. Germany's colonialism was launched before the nation had reached the stage of mature monopoly capitalism. Banking and industrial interests had at that time no urgent need for colonial supplies or investments (Dorpalen 1985: 255), though, as Dorpalen argues, the few profitable opportunities in the specific territories acquired by the Reich would certainly have discouraged any potential investors. Studies have borne out Lenin's thesis on the intimate connection between imperialism and capital exports in the German case:

> [It] was the abundance of British and French foreign investments and the lack of sufficient exportable capital on Germany's part that so greatly concerned German political and financial circles during the pre-1914 period and that played into the hands of the warmongering forces. (276)

Ardent colonialists established a number of interest groups that were to have a considerable impact, among which the German Colonial Association (Deutsche Kolonialverein) and the Society for German Colonization (Gesselschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation) were the most important. The former was established in 1882 on the initiative of Freiherr von Maltzahn, and its members included not only middle-sized businessmen, professionals, and merchants but also leading bankers, industrialists, aristocrats, and Reichstag members. These groups were to persuade the Bismarckian state, and its successor from 1890 under Kaiser Wilhelm II, that colonialism was an essential part of a wider anti-cyclical strategy to achieve economic stabilization. Moreover, men such as landowner and colonial propagandist Ernst von Weber argued that Empire alone would be able to overcome Germany's chronic crises of overproduction and overpopulation. Its absence, he averred, must ensure that the country would be faced with a bloody social revolution (Kitchen 1978: 180).

German Colonialism and Imperialism

By 1906, Germany had built up a colonial system consisting of bases, duly settled by its "white" citizens, in East Africa, South-West Africa, Cameroon, New Guinea, Togo, the Caroline, Pelua and Marianne Islands, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, and Kiauchau. On the eve of the First World War, the German Colonial Empire had a landmass of 1,140,200 square miles, an area roughly the size of India today (the world's seventh largest country at 1,147,949 square miles) (Henderson 1962: 131). Germany took a predominating influence over national economy in Italy, Russia, Switzerland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, and, above all, Turkey (Krooth 1980: 35–36). Its hegemonic ambitions in Europe, however, were restricted by the intransigence of the ruling Osmanlis, Bulgars, Magyars, Poles, and Austrians. Moreover, even

with an economic union of the four Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Turkey), it would be a long time before the Bulgarian and Turkish peasants could apply the intensive land cultivation needed to feed Germany's growing working-class population. Moreover, Asia Minor could not furnish the copper, copra, India rubber, or palm oil required by German industry. Germany feared the Entente and feared above all that Britain would monopolize such tropical products from the colonies, products that Germany could not herself produce (38).

It was therefore imperative that German monopolies control sources of raw materials. On a world scale, the Caribbean, South America, Africa, Asia, and Oceania provided all rubber, about 73% of all colonial produce, some 54–60% of all oilseeds, almost 50% of all textiles, about 34–35% of all cereals and other foodstuffs, 24–28% of all fertilizers and chemicals, and 17% of all cereals alone. Indeed, only in fuels and wood pulp did the imperial nations produce more than half of the world's production of raw materials (Krooth 1980: 84, citing data from League of Nations 1926: 9–20). German imperialists foresaw that colonial raw material production could be increased over the longer term and German industrial dependence on foreign competitors thereby reduced in key fields.

Moreover, German banks contemplated the profits to be made from railway building and economic development. Indeed, profit rates were high in the colonies:

> The German East Africa company ([Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft] DOAG), which had a monopoly in the colony – it controlled the biggest trading network, the only land concessions, the big plantations and the two banks – paid a 5% dividend between 1906 and 1908, 6% in 1909, 8% in 1910 and 1911, and 9% in 1912. The South Cameroon Company also prospered after adapting to the [anti-settler] changes in colonial policy: it paid 8% in 1910 and 1911, and 5% in 1912. The biggest plantation in the German colonies, the West African Victoria Company, paid 15% in 1910 and 1911, 18% in 1912 and 20% in 1913, and its shares rose from 75% in 1907 to 450% in 1914. [Stoecker 1977: 202]

Yet such investments were a small fraction of total foreign investments, with only 2% of

German foreign investments going to the colonies in 1905 (Kitchen 1978: 198). As such, while individual companies made handsome profits from the colonies, the expense to the Reich was high.

Capital export was not the only way that the German *haute-bourgeoisie* was able to fleece the workers of underdeveloped countries with which Germany had economic relations (as noted below, non-equivalent exchange in trade was also important, especially in Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire). However, by 1914, Germany was the third largest exporter of capital in the world, after Britain and France. Germany exported RM23.5 billion in 1914, of which approximately RM13.8 billion was invested in underdeveloped countries, that is, in Russia, Turkey (Including Asiatic Turkey), European countries outside Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, Africa (including German colonies), Latin America, Asia (including German colonies), and other areas. This is a larger sum than the RM20 billion Germany was to pay as reparations to the victorious Allied powers in 1921 (Craig 1981: 437). Crucially, in the case of the non-capital-exporting countries, the transfer of value thus affected was entirely one-way. Not only did this process allow higher profits per se for the net value-importing country, but insofar as workers in the export dependencies were remunerated at levels below those prevailing in the imperialist country, it meant greater quantities of surplus value and, hence, higher *rates* of profit than would otherwise have prevailed. Nominal German wages in industry were around RM1,000 in 1914 (Broadberry and Burhop 2009). Even if only a quarter of German investment in underdeveloped countries was for the purposes of hiring labor power there, then, making the conservative assumption that workers in underdeveloped countries received the same wage rates as did German workers, we may safely estimate that the labor of 3.5 million foreign workers was transferred to Germany in 1914. At least half of this was certainly *surplus* value not paid for by German capital. There were approximately nine million German workers in 1914, so surplus value imported from underdeveloped countries would

thus have represented perhaps one-fifth of that created domestically. It is, therefore, not hard to see how the wage levels of the upper stratum of German labor were sustained.

Undoubtedly, German imperialism was much more than colonialism, and its main thrust was in Europe and the near East, rather than Africa and the Pacific. Yet colonies, obtained and kept by brutal military force (including the infamous massacre of around 60,000 Herero people residing in what is today Namibia between 1904 and 1906) (Curry 1999), not only enriched private treasuries and thereby sustained the profit rate in Germany but also improved the country's international status and fed her national chauvinism. Notably, overseas colonial expansion stimulated German capitalism's avaricious demand for rich raw materials and markets closer to home, from the heavy metals of eastern France to the granaries of the Slavic steppes (Krooth 1980: 26). Furthermore, the meager economic significance of its existing colonies makes it abundantly clear why Germany was bent on seizing or penetrating the colonies of other powers and, in particular, why it pursued the aim of a German Central Africa (Mittelafrika). The racial theories developed in German South-West Africa provided fuel to the fire of master race (*Herrenvolk*) thinking which, as Kuhl (1994) shows, was developed in its Nazi form with direct reference to its US eugenics pioneers. Indeed, as Schmitt-Egner (1975: 5i cf. Sarkisyanz 2002) writes, "all the decisive elements of the later fascist ideologies were perfected [in colonial ideology]." (Table 1)

Social Democracy and Imperialism before the First World War

Within the labor movement, the formal internationalism of the SPD, and opposition to the use made by capitalists of the imperial ideal, led to the more militaristic brand of social imperialism being greeted with hostility by workers (as during the state-orchestrated events of 1913 celebrating the centenary of Germany's liberation from Napoleonic rule). In practice, the social imperialist policy proclaimed by the Second Reich sat uneasily with the repression meted out to the labor movement. However, despite its ambiguity and internal

German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933, Table 1 Geographical distribution of German long-term foreign investment in 1914 (billions [US] of marks)

Europe		Outside Europe	
Austria-Hungary	3.0	Africa (including German colonies)	2.0
Russia	1.8	Asia (including German colonies)	1.0
Balkan countries	1.7	US and Canada	3.7
Turkey (including Asiatic Turkey)	1.8	Latin America	3.8
France and Great Britain	1.3	Other areas	0.5
Spain and Portugal	1.7		
Rest of Europe	1.2		
	12.5		11.0

Source: Feis (1965: 23, 51, 74)

contradictions, the reality of social imperialism in Germany can be witnessed in the incorporation of leading and increasingly well-off sections of its working class into the structural mechanics of the monopoly capitalist state. Crucially, what Dahrendorf (1968: 15) has referred to as the survival of "authoritarian and anti-democratic structures in state and society' resulted less from workers" "blind prostration before the imperial myth than because [they] perceived good reasons for associating the chances of reform with the fortunes of empire" (Eley 1976: 287). This was particularly true of the best-off workers organized within the SPD and the ADGB.

Those sections of the German working class which were most strongly unionized and better paid tended to be employed in industries in which monopoly was most clearly present (export-oriented industries; the chemical, armament, and mechanical engineering industries; and certain steel works) and where employers could thus afford concessions to trade union demands. Unions were also strong in the expanding urban construction industries (where labor was in very high demand), the mechanical engineering industries (where labor was highly skilled), and in those industries where the labor form most closely resembled those artisanal trades which were strongly unionized earlier in the imperial period (leather workers, book

printers, typesetters, and woodworkers) (Tenfelde 1990: 252).

The SPD drew the bulk of its membership from this labor aristocracy. Thus, Wilhelm Liebknecht (co-founder of the SPD with August Bebel in 1869) frankly stated at the Party Congress of 1892: "The greatest portion of you who sit here are certainly to a considerable extent aristocrats among labor – I mean with respect to income." According to prominent Russian Bolshevik Grigory Zinoviev (1984: 488): "The predominant mass of the membership of the Social Democratic organization consists of the better-paid strata of labor – of those strata from which the greatest section of the labor aristocracy arises." Blank (1905: 520), meanwhile, estimated that non-proletarian supporters of the SPD approximated one-quarter of the total, equating to three-quarters of a million votes in 1903 (cf. Marks 1939: 345).

Statistics from 1886 to 1911 demonstrate that wages in Germany were rising more rapidly than the cost of living, although the intensity of labor may also have increased and the labor aristocracy undoubtedly "won a much greater increase in real wages than did the mass of the proletariat" (Marks 1939: 339, 342) (see Table 2).

On top of these unevenly distributed wage earnings must be counted the system of social insurance instituted by Bismarck, which considerably enhanced the material and legal position of the German working class. Germany's social insurance system, a forerunner of the welfare state as such, was built up in three stages: health insurance was introduced in 1883, followed by accident insurance in 1884, and old age and invalid insurance in 1889. Each new law covered

German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933, Table 2 Real wages in Germany (1887–1914)

Years	Mass of workers	Labor aristocracy
1887–1894	100.0	100.0
1894–1902	102.0	111.1
1903–1909	106.1	116.1
1909 to 1913–1914	105.1	113.2

Source: Kuczinski (1934: 25); Marks (1939: 341)

cumulatively larger sections of the working class. Over the same period, the Reich introduced pensions, national medical provision, and the right to education. State insurance for ill or disabled workers was coupled with stringent efforts to control and repress communist agitation (Berghahn 1994: 251–253). In 1907, economist Sartorius von Waltershausen wrote:

> The present age of social politics, which operates towards favouring the mass of the people and burdening the well-situated minority by means of direct taxes, contributions to workers' insurance, legal regulations, and administrative measures, is particularly suited to rear a middle-class out of the lower class. (von Waltershausen 1907: 429, cited in Marks 1939: 342)

As the wages of the German labor aristocracy rose with the expansion of big business, the SPD came to constitute a social-liberal opposition to capitalism, focusing on democratic reform and conservative trade unionism to the exclusion of all other political considerations actually or potentially facing the workers' movement (Rosenberg 1936: 1–68, passim). Through reformism, the expanding trade union movement, and the survival of petty bourgeois artisan traditions, the SPD quickly became assimilated to the existing social order in Germany. Thus, "revisionism" (avowed commitment to revolutionary socialism at the same time as advocating contrary ideals or practices) in Germany was based on the reality that socialist success at the parliamentary and municipal levels could translate into real gains for the working class and the trade union movement. As Fletcher (1984: 108) notes:

> [Conditions] appeared to be improving after [the curtailment of the anti-Socialist laws in] 1890, holding out some hope of a peaceful, piecemeal working class integration into the political nation. In any event, such developments as the gradual bureaucratization of the labor movement, the growth of a labor aristocracy and rising working class affluence made a revolutionary upheaval increasingly improbable.

In the decade before the First World War, the mainstream of the German labor movement had shifted decidedly to the right both in terms of its domestic strategy and regarding imperialist and militarist foreign policy, with the SPD's Reichstag deputies introducing resolutions to improve

premilitary youth training in the public schools and to procure for social-democratic cooperatives a share in supply contracts for the army (Schorske 1983: 245). The center of the SPD, represented above all by Karl Kautsky, envisioned the peaceful resolution of inter-imperialist conflict, tacitly identified with imperialism as such. Kautsky explicitly affirmed that with the military rivalries of the Western European countries set aside, czarist Russia would be contained by a "Western alliance for the mutual, rather than competitive, exploitation of the underdeveloped sectors of the globe" (ibid). Kautsky considered that the German middle classes would be supportive of this agenda, thus providing a convenient platform to consolidate a wider base for SPD electoralism.

Social-democratic views on imperialism before the First World War can be divided into four main tendencies. First, the avowed "social imperialists" in the SPD, among whom Ludwig Quessel was particularly influential, who considered that the workers' interest was in fully supporting the state in the imperialist struggle (263). Second, Eduard Bernstein was committed to the "ethical" mission of imperialism but baulked at supporting German militarism, particularly as directed against Britain. Third, the group represented by Kautsky, Hugo Haase, Theodor Liebknecht, and Georg Ledebour would go on to form the Independent Social Democratic Party as a non-revolutionary anti-war grouping. These placed various degrees of emphasis upon the need to work against war within the capitalist framework of promoting the development of international cartels (264). Finally, the "left radicals" in the party tended to focus on the negative aspects of imperialism for workers (higher tax burdens and costs of living and the increased difficulties of trade union struggles), ignoring the potentials of harnessing imperialism to a reform agenda (ibid). They urged the use of mass action against war. None of these sections of German socialism were able to mount an effective revolutionary opposition to imperialism or prevent the impending inter-imperialist war.

Republicanism, Imperialism, and the German Working Class (1918–1933)

The decline of the semifeudal Ottoman Empire brought rivalry between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia as to who would gain control over its territories. Russia sought to dominate those southern Slav states, particularly Serbia, under weakening Turkish control. By doing so it would have control over the major trade routes through the Balkan straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Great Britain, meanwhile, sought to safeguard its interests in the Turkish sphere of influence and Austria-Hungary to extend its sway in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary's imperial ambitions thus clashed with Russia's. When Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist, Austria-Hungary demanded burdensome concessions which Serbia refused. In support of Serbia, Russia mobilized its armies. Germany, allied to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, agreed to support its claims on Serbia and declared war on Russia and France. After Germany invaded Belgium, Britain declared war on Germany and Austria. All of Europe was then at war for the first time in a hundred years (Kennedy-Pipe 1998: 14–15).

The First World War was the product of imperialist nationalism on the part of the Great Powers of capitalist Europe (Bayly 2004: 472; Schevill 1951: 706). Germany's general aims in the First World War were twofold. First, it sought the elimination of France as a great military, economic, and financial power, thus creating a "*Mitteleuropa* economic system [embracing Austria-Hungary, a Poland severed from Russia, and possibly other neighbouring states, including Romania – ZC] dominated by German interests" (Fischer 1991: 57–58). Second, the "general aim of the war" was to drive Russia eastward, and to cripple her permanently by separating her "non-Russian vassal peoples" from her. As early as 6 August 1914, the German imperial chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, personally described the object of the war as "the liberation and military protection of the peoples (*Stamme*)

oppressed by Russia, the repulse of Russian despotism back to Moscow" (ibid).

During the First World War, German monopoly capital and businessmen like Krupp, Stinnes, Thyssen, Hugenberg, Roetger, as well as their representatives in the Reichstag and the Prussian diet (politicians such as Gustav Stresemann and Ernst Bassermann of the National Liberal Party) advocated the annexation of Longwy-Briey in France and the acquisition of the entire French market in Luxembourg, Belgium, Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, Romania, rump Russia, Turkey, and, not least, in France's colonial empire. To placate agriculture, industry advocated the concession of Eastern European land in Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, Estonia, and possibly Byelorussia either indirectly or through annexation. A trade treaty was to be imposed upon Russia as well as an "independent" Poland and Lithuania for the unrestricted admission of seasonal rural labor. Throughout this new German colonial and neocolonial empire, there was to be unlimited right of entry for German manufactures and unhindered export of raw materials for German industry and its workforce. The internal colonization considered a threat to the economic wherewithal of the large estates was to be diverted to the eastern Reich through the acquisition of land for an involuntary resettlement of small farmers and war veterans, thus also serving as a social and political counterweight to urbanization and the concomitant growth of the potentially revolutionary industrial workforce. Agricultural and demographic scientists were recruited to plan for "living space" (*Lebensraum*) in the northeast of the "New Germany" (Fischer 1991: 64–65).

Aside from the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party, the Serbian and Romanian Social Democratic parties and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik), all of the parties of the Second Workingmen's International, including the SPD, voted for war credits for their own government in the months preceding the First World War. In 1918, however, German imperialism was forced to admit defeat.

Social Democracy and the Reconstruction of Imperialism

In 1918–1919, the SPD augmented the capitalist *Sammlung* in Germany at the expense of the revolutionary Spartakusbund (the Spartacists, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht) and the Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD), a loose-knit coalition of anti-war defectors from the SPD. SPD politician Philipp Scheideman proclaimed the Weimar Republic on 9 November 1918, to counter a declaration of the "Free Socialist Republic" made (under pressure from his radical supporters) by Spartacist leader Karl Liebknecht and became its first chancellor. After commander-in-chief Gustav Noske of the SPD (inaugurated as such by Colonel Reinhardt, Prussian minister of war), Colonel Maercker and other officers led six Free Corps (Freikorps) units under the command of General Luttwitz against the striking workers of Berlin in January 1919, another general strike called in protest was shot down during the week of 8–15 March. In this period, around 1,500 men, women, and children were executed under the orders of social-democrat ministers (Crook 1931: 503–504).

In the space of 2 months, the elite that had led Germany into the First World War were safely ensconced in their briefly tenuous positions of power. They had seen off the attempt by revolutionary communists, left-wing social democrats, and anarcho-syndicalists (who would in 1921 combine to form the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) to institute a socialist regime based upon the nationalization of heavy industry, the abolition and purging of the monarchy from governmental positions, and the breaking up of the large estates. The Republic's first president the SPD's Friedrich Ebert – of whom Field Marshal and later President Paul von Hindenburg of the Centre Party commented that he was "a loyal German who loved his fatherland above everything" (Carsten 1967: 94) and who declared in 1918 "I hate revolution like sin" – and its first defense minister, the SPD's Gustav Noske,

instead placed their faith in the newly formed Free Corps (Freikorps, illegal paramilitary formations of private volunteer armies raised to evade the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty) and the goodwill of the ruling class.

Subsequently, the Weimar Government employed martial and semi-martial law to repress revolutionary organizations of workers, notably, the Spartacist risings of 1919, the communist workers of the Ruhr in 1920 (Jones 1987), and the SPD-KPD Coalition Government of Saxony in 1923 (Price 1999: 155–157). On May Day 1929, communist demonstrations were shot at on the orders of Berlin's SPD police president Karl Zorgiebel, with many casualties ensuing. Later the same year, the KPD's Red Front Fighter's League (Rotfrontkämpferbund, RFB) and the League of Struggle against fascism (Kampfbund gegen den Faschismus, KgF) were banned by the SPD minister of the interior in Prussia, Carl Severing (Merson 1985: 316n).

Throughout the Weimar period, the SPD persistently rejected all KPD overtures to an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist United Front of the working-class parties (see Johnston 1999: 165; Olgin 1935: 115; Peukert 1976: 48; Schmidt and Burger 1995: 191–192). Instead, it preferred to pin its hopes on the "moderate" forces of German big business, including in its pre-fascist and semi-fascist forms of rule (Dutt 1978: 186).

Colonialism and Imperialism in the Weimar Era

Aggressive foreign policy was not far from the political surface in Weimar Germany. Hitler's aim of colonizing Eastern and Southeastern Europe was anticipated and partially realized by the Weimar Government's pursuit of informal economic hegemony in what was referred to in the 1914–1918 "war aims" debate as the *Österreich* (the eastern part of the greater "German Empire"). Indeed, the SPD was extremely anti-Soviet and, in matters of foreign policy, favored concerted Western opposition to the USSR even more than did Conservative German politicians. Kochan (1954) documents the course of German foreign policy toward the USSR and the SPD's part in its

formulation. The KPD consistently accused the SPD of an anti-Soviet and pro-imperialist bias in foreign policy. On 5 December 1926, for example, the SPD newspaper *Vorwärts* ran a story about an alleged Junkers arms factory operating in Russia. August Creutzberg, a KPD deputy in the Reichstag, accused the SPD of trying to curry favor with Britain: "Come what may you want to bring about a breach between Germany and Russia" (quoted in Kochan 1954: 121). Creutzberg pointed out that the SPD was not the enemy of the Reichswehr it claimed to be since it had recently and willingly employed its services against the working class. Ebert had previously declared himself "surprised and embittered" at the signing of the 1922 Rapallo Treaty (quoted in Kochan 1954: 58), which cemented German-Soviet diplomatic and economic ties. The SPD was undeniably a political opponent of the Rapallo Treaty and supporter of the Locarno Treaty of 1925 which consolidated the ties between Germany and Western European imperialism.

With the traditional German ruling class secured in its position by force of arms sanctioned by Social Democracy, "Wilhelmine concepts of Germany's Great Power status and her position as a 'world power' remained intact beyond 1918 to influence Weimar foreign policy in varying degrees" (Lee and Michalka 1987: 149–150). Indeed, there was real continuity in the foreign policy of the Second and Third Reich and the intervening Weimar Republic: "[Following] the Great [1929 Wall Street] Crash, Berlin concentrated both economic and foreign policies on Eastern and Southeastern Europe, so that Hitler had only to take up the threads of this policy" (151).

Politicians and senior diplomats in the Weimar period conceived of German trade policy as a means to impose economic and political hegemony upon the underdeveloped nations of the non-Soviet East. Weimar Germany thus attempted to set up a "penetrating system" of financial investment "in the weak and impressionable economies of the newly-liberated Eastern states" (91). The over-reliance of Polish capitalism, for instance, upon the products of German heavy industry (particularly iron wares, shovels, coal, machine oil, tipcarts and chloride explosives, salt, and leather) created a

situation of non-equivalent exchange whereby these were traded for Polish agricultural produce (potatoes, clover seeds, lupines, ores, pit props, meat, and eggs) (Spaulding 1997: 153). Germany strove to restrict the export of machinery and capital goods that would boost the industrial productivity of the Eastern European countries and imposed tariffs upon the products of those industries which might compete (particularly the non-cartelized coal, iron, and steel industries of Poland). The labor movement supported such tariffs in the name of protecting German jobs but pleaded for trade concessions to Polish agricultural producers in the name of cheaper food for German workers (158). Meanwhile, the dynamic export sector of German industry (which relied upon Polish markets for its goods) put up only half-hearted resistance within the Reich Association of German Industry (Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, RDI) to the protectionist demands of heavy industry. German politicians welcomed signs of Polish economic distress in the hope that the Polish state (whose leaders grossly overestimated its short-term capacity for capitalist self-reliance) might collapse and its frontiers be revised in Germany's favor. Throughout the period of Weimar *Osthandel* (Eastern European trade policy), Germany's political negotiators connected trade rights with border issues and the right of Germans to settle on Polish territory (the so-called right of domicile) (159).

A pseudonymous 1926 article by Politicus in Moscow's *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (International Affairs) argued that after its late start in the pre-1914 race for colonies and after having suffered from the loss of its fleet and its overseas possessions at Versailles, German imperialism was resurgent: "Objectively Germany is once again being pushed into an activization of her foreign policy with the aim of consolidating favourable conditions for the expansion in every way of her industrial exports and for the resumption of the export of capital" (quoted in Kochan 1954: 144). Hence, Germany signed trade treaties with and made large-scale investments in Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Persia, South America, Greece, Yugoslavia, China, and Siam. Politicus even spoke in Bismarckian terms of a *Drang Nach Osten*, a yearning for the East, only, of

course, in relatively "pacific" forms. These tendencies led in the 1930s to the threat, and then the actuality, of war over preferential trade agreements, tariff barriers, and trade routes, protected markets for investments and manufactures and sources of raw materials (Hehn 2002).

In the imperialist countries of the 1920s, as Krooth (1980: 76) writes, "the monopolists, the farmers and workers teamed up with the bankers" in a national alliance which could only lead to war. Indeed, in the inter-war period, the SPD was directly committed to the furtherance of specifically colonial ambitions in the Weimar era. The prominent SPD politician Eduard David wrote in the SPD journal *Vorwärts* in June 1918 that "we would have no objections ... if our colonial possessions were rounded off and enlarged by way of compensation and agreement" under the terms of a peace treaty (Ruger 1977: 298). The right wing of the SPD attempted to convince the German workers that the colonies would become the nationalized property of a social-democratic republic and would assure all German citizens of an "increase in production and wealth," full employment, and "human happiness." At the International Socialists' conference held in Berne in February 1919, the SPD openly protested the fact that the Versailles Treaty had divested Germany of its colonies and called for their restitution (300). In arguing for the "civilizing role" of imperialism in the colonies, Eduard Bernstein approvingly quoted Ferdinand Lassalle, founder of the General German Workers' Association in 1863, the SPD's precursor: "People who do not develop may be justifiably subjugated by people who have achieved civilisation." While there were differences in ideological emphasis between the openly colonialist right wing of the SPD (Gustav Noske, Ludwig Quessel, Max Cohen, Hermann Kranold, Max Schippel, Paul Lobe, Paul Kampffmeyer, and others around the leading revisionist journal the *Socialist Monthly* (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*), the "moderate" majority of the SPD preferred to call for mandates for German colonies to be awarded by the League of Nations (307). On 8 May 1925, the SPD involved itself in the formation of a colonialist lobby in the Reichstag with deputies from the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum), the German

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Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP) and the DVP, whose leader, Foreign Minister von Stresemann, had recently resurrected First World War colonial official Hans Grimm's (the "German Kipling") slogan of "Volk ohne Raum" (people without space) to further popularize the colonial mission. In 1925, at the Second Congress of the Labor and Socialist International in Marseilles, SPD spokesman and finance minister Rudolf Hilferding again demanded colonies for Germany (Edwards 1978: 39).

The Political Economy of Imperialist Social Reformism

Imperialism in Weimar Germany combined pursuit of the trade interests (*Handelspolitik*) of monopoly industry with social policy (*Sozialpolitik*) aimed at securing the loyalty of the organized working class to the state (Abraham 1986). Social imperialism was seen as very much in the interests of capitalist development by the dynamic export fraction of German industry and their political and intellectual representatives:

> The re-establishment of Germany's economic potential and international stature required a national consensus, which would be based on reintegration of a chastened but still strong SPD. The antisocialist bloc gave way to a class-compromise bloc, a fragile compact for a period of limited growth and progress. It was possible for ascendant members of the dominant economic classes, in this case the dynamic-export fraction, to abandon the interests of other economically dominant fractions, wholly or in part, in favour of more thoroughgoing collaboration with parts of the organized working class. [125]

Both export and heavy German industry in the Weimar period were dominated by monopolies. However, only the export sector was truly dynamic and competitive on a world scale. Heavy industry required protection from imperialist rivals and could not afford the social policies which export industry supported. Heavy industry was not social-imperialist until the Nazi dictatorship began to provide it with the produce of colonized land and labor. In Britain, by comparison, the colonies allowed for social-imperialist platforms for both fractions of monopoly capital to pursue their divergent agendas (Cope 2012: 95–96).

The advance of Weimar *Sozialpolitik* can be witnessed in the following figures: employer contributions to health insurance rose 58% between 1925 and 1929 and then declined 31% by 1932; state expenditures on social insurance rose by 57% between 1925 and 1930 and then declined only 13% through 1932; state spending rose a full 25% from RM8 billion to RM10 billion in 3 short years from 1925 to 1928, declining only 2.4% in 1930; public spending for education (significantly easing pressure on the job market) was in 1925 already 45% above pre-war levels and in 1929 rested at 208% of 1913 levels. As rising unemployment threatened the contractual, social-partnership basis of *Sozialpolitik* after 1929, organized labor successfully obtained a transfer of RM2.4 billion from the General Treasury, a sum equivalent to 45% of the amount paid in by all employers and employees and a full 28% of the entire tax revenue of the Reich and Lander governments.

Given the general economic upturn occasioned by increased industrial productivity and the stagnation and subsequent decline of agricultural prices, for employed workers both nominal and real wages rose substantially after 1924. At the start of 1924, average wage rates were 10% below 1913 levels. Yet from 1924 to 1930, the cost of living rose modestly (by about 15%) while nominal wages rose substantially (over 60%). Hourly real rates rose by 40% from 1924 to 1929, more than 20% above 1913 levels. Real hourly and weekly earnings rose even further than the corresponding real rates: almost 55% and 60%, respectively. Real hourly earnings kept rising until 1931, at which time they were 30% above pre-war levels. As Abraham (1986: 238–242) notes: "If the gross annual earnings of fulltime employees in the fifteen largest industries is indexed (1913 = 100), then annual earnings in 1929 and 1930 exceeded 180 – a level not reattained until the late 1950s at the earliest."

In sum, Abraham suggests that organized labor made dramatic material (in terms of real wages and working hours), political (in terms of representation), and legislative (in terms of the extension of trade union rights, legally binding collective wage agreements, and a system of

compulsory arbitration) gains in the Weimar period. These were made possible by the high profits accumulated by dynamic export industries in the 1920s, which were able to tolerate welfare taxation and wage rises.

When the economic crisis of 1929–1933 came, however, the heavy industrial fraction of capital favoring policies of protection and the demolition of the welfare state, in renewed alliance with the agrarian lobby, saw the destruction of the so-called *Gewerkschaftsstaat* ("trade union state") as imperative. The Great Depression of 1929–1933 saw capitalist industry in Germany become politically united to overcome the gamut of economic and political policies of *Sozialpolitik*. Hitherto, the dynamic and export fractions of monopoly German industry had been opposed to the price fixing and quotas of the heavy industrial cartels in iron and steel which raised their own production costs considerably. Since these dynamic and export fractions of German capitalist monopoly made super profits through international trade in which they were highly competitive and had a high organic composition of capital, they could afford to ally politically and electorally with the ADGB and the SPD and deliver social reforms that improved the lives of most, if not all, German workers. This alliance pressured the heavy industry monopolies into mitigating their demands and ensuring that the protectionism which they craved was not fully implemented to the detriment of Germany's international trade.

Once the world market became moribund with the onset of world depression, however, the dynamic and export industries became more dependent upon the home market for their profits and thus more committed to reversing the social and wage gains of organized labor. The latter was prepared to see the German Republic collapse into oblivion rather than abandon *Sozialpolitik*. It thus refused to revive parliamentarianism whether of the left (allying with the burgeoning forces of the KPD) or of the right (allying with the DDP). By 1931, fissiparous German industry was seeking "a Bonapartist solution to the political crises and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis" (Abraham 1986: 157). Politically, by July 1932, the Nazi Party was the only force which might "provide a mass base while conceivably offering a program acceptable to both fractions of industry" (16).

Conclusion: Social Democracy and Social Fascism

The SPD sacrificed its liberal principles to enter into an alliance with the imperialist elite of the German Empire, ostensibly to prevent a drift toward extremism of the left or right. The predominant section of the German working class in the Weimar period, like its middle-class compatriots, refused to be proletarianized or pushed into an alliance with the KPD (whose sole base of support lay in the working class, including the unemployed). But the social forces to which its reformism was indissolubly wedded guaranteed that capitalist militarism and imperialism were to undermine the foundations of the alliance more or less rapidly.

Space prevents our discussing here the details of the Nazi seizure of power or the role of the SPD in facilitating it (Harsch 1993). Suffice to note, however, that despite its being almost an article of faith among historians of the Weimar Republic that the KPD line that Social Democracy paved the way for fascism in Germany was wrong and resulted in a disastrous political strategy, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the label of "social fascist" had a real frame of reference at the time of its coinage. The analysis of Social Democratic policy as social fascist was first put forward by Zinoviev in 1923 and was based on SPD support for the DVP's Stresemann rather than KPD politician Heinrich Brandler. It was then discarded only to return with redoubled force between 1928 and 1934, during which time the KPD gained many supporters. Ukrainian-born Dmitry Manuilsky, a member of the Comintern Executive Committee, defined social fascism thus:

> If in the epoch of the general crisis of monopoly capitalism, its general tendencies lead to fascization, i.e. to the abolition of the social and political gains of the working class, to an increased resorting to methods of political terror and the growth of reaction, a party which in practice repudiates the proletarian revolution, and therefore stands for capitalism, cannot help passing through the whole of capitalism's process of evolution, together with it. (1933: 28)

Social democracy's emphasis on fascism as being based on the negation of parliamentary democracy, while formally correct, does not address the precise class composition of fascist reaction. Instead of confronting capitalism and its major social pillars (the imperialist bourgeoisie and its beneficiaries), the social-democratic conception of fascism tended to obscure the difference between fascism and its revolutionary opposition. It posited an unbridgeable chasm between fascism and other forms of capitalist rule where, in reality, there are elements of class dictatorship in monarchies, constitutional monarchies, and bourgeois republics with narrow and broad franchises. Fascism is a change in the form much more than the composition of class rule (though it allows for sections of the hitherto politically marginal petty bourgeoisie to exercise power and accumulate wealth).

The German fascist state was an exceptional historical form of the bourgeois German state. German socialist Richard Löwenthal (1983/1933: 338–339) excellently summarized the conditions for fascist power:

> Fascism comes to power that much more easily in a country, the deeper its economic crisis and the smaller the reserves it has to alleviate it. It also comes to power that much more easily the fewer areas of imperialist influence, colonies, etc. the country has in relation to the needs of its capitalist class. It comes to power more easily in a country dependent on imported capital and with international debts, than in a capital exporting country which can live off its revenues. It comes to power more easily in a country with a large number of economic dead-weights which reduce its international competitiveness, than in a country enjoying rapidly increasing production and an expanding world market. It is therefore an essential characteristic of fascism that it has to make the most vigorous assertion of its imperialist claims, precisely because the basis for such claims is relatively weak. Fascism exemplifies the imperialism of those who have arrived late at the partition of the world. Behind this imperialism lies a huge need for expansionary opportunities, but none of the traditional weapons for realising them. It is a form of imperialism which cannot operate by means of loans, since it is so much in debt, nor on the basis of technical superiority, since it is uncompetitive in so many areas. It is something novel in history – an imperialism of paupers and bankrupts.

In 1933, there occurred what one historian has said amounted to a "quasi-guerrilla warfare" in Germany's poorest areas, with the superior force employed by the Brownshirts winning the battle of the streets and destroying the KPD's last bastion in society (Evans 2003: 243). As the battle raged, the German middle classes strongly sympathized with the Nazis, preferring the protection of their property to forestalling the drive toward one of history's most terrible bloodbaths. Along with 5–6 million European Jews (Hilberg 1986) and 5–6 million Poles, imperialist Germany's invasion of the USSR (1941–1945) cost that country between 25 and 30 million deaths. During the war, about 15% of Soviet women aged 20–49 died, while the mortality rate of men in the same age group reached the rate of 40% (Allen 2003: 115–116).

Cross-References

▶ German Colonialism and Nazism as Anti-imperialism
▶ US Imperialism and Nazi Germany

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German Revolution

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

German Social-Democratic Party (SPD)

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

Germany

▶ German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933

Giovanni Arrighi

▶ World-Systems Analysis and Giovanni Arrighi

Global Capitalism

▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism

Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt

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Synonyms

Debt; Dollar standard; Financial capital; Money capital; World money

Definition/Description

This essay provides a historical geographical political economy of the deep connection between global capitalist finance, global flows of capital in the form of money, and modern imperialism. It argues that the money-power of capital to

appropriate living labor and extra-human natures has expressed itself in particular violent ways in the spaces of the global capitalist economy successively referred to as the peripheries, the colonies, the Third World, and the Global South. The essay suggests that a crucial factor of explanation for the violence of the money-power of capital in those spaces is that they have retained a *subordinate positionality* in the network of space and power relations within which money-capital flows. This has been largely due to a multitude of imperialist policies and practices on the part of advanced capitalist economies and powerful agents and institutions located within them.

Introduction

The 1980s Third World debt crisis was a painful reminder of the tight link between the operations of capitalist finance, global flows of capital in the form of money, and modern imperialism. As is well known, the "resolution" of the crisis entailed the brutal disciplining of Third World states via the imperialist imposition of structural adjustment plans designed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), large private commercial banks, and advanced capitalist economies (the Paris Club of creditors), significantly contributing to the extension and deepening of capitalist property relations in the Third World. While often welcomed by local ruling elites, the policy prescriptions largely benefitted transnational capitalist firms, mining and extractive companies, global banks, and the interests of advanced capitalist countries. The consequences in terms of social and human costs, socio-ecological destruction, and globally organized dispossession across much of the Third World are well documented (e.g., Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005).

There is no doubt that much has changed in the global capitalist economy since this dramatic historical episode, including in terms of the organization and workings of capitalist finance, global patterns of financial capital flows to the Global South, and the political, institutional, and regulatory arrangements that underpin them. Developing

economies have received extremely large volumes of global financial flows since the early 2000s, reaching a high of USD12 trillion (an equivalent of over 20% of world GDP) in 2007 (IMF 2016a: 5). Financial markets in emerging capitalist economies have become increasingly open, deep, liquid, but also well-supervised and regulated. Financial centers such as São Paulo, Johannesburg, Shanghai, Mexico City, Istanbul, and Beijing have become deeply integrated in the global financial system and are now key sites of financial innovation, particularly at the regional level. Moreover, growing volumes of financial capital is now flowing into so-called "frontier" markets (countries in this group include Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia (IMF 2016b: 24)). According to Bloomberg figures, stock market capitalization in frontier market, driven by global financial inflows, has reached more than USD700 billion in 2017. The global financial architecture has also experienced significant transformations (Grabel 2018). There has been a growing participation and assertiveness of emerging economies in multilateral financial governance (for instance, in the G20). Emerging economies have designed a variety of bilateral, subregional, and regional financial and monetary mechanisms, including currency swaps, reserve pooling arrangements, credit lines, bilateral aid, and development finance, often with the explicit aim to seek independence from the IMF (see Alami 2018a). They have also expanded the capacities of their national development banks, many of which now dwarf the volume of lending of the World Bank and regional multilateral development banks. As a whole, then, and though narratives about "the decline of the West" and "the rise of the rest" are often largely exaggerated and the recent hype around the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other groupings of so-called "emerging" markets has gradually died down, it is clear that developing economies across the Global South play an increasingly important role in the reproduction of the financial world market (Marois 2012).

And yet, despite those remarkable geographical transformations, there is also still much in

common with the 1980s Third World debt crisis, both in terms of the specific conditions and modalities that led to its buildup and in terms of the power relations involved in its resolution. In June 2018, the IMF returned to Argentina, despite the fact that its policy "recommendations" in the early 2000s triggered one of the worst capitalist crises that the country experienced. Argentina is currently implementing austerity and structural reforms to restore the confidence of international investors. A couple of years earlier, a US court forced Argentina to pay billions of dollars to its creditors. This was because six hedge funds (based in tax heavens and world financial centers such as New York and London and representing only 7% of Argentina's creditors) had refused the proposed deal to restructure Argentinian sovereign debt and sued Argentina in New York federal courts. The Argentinian state agreed to pay billions in order to regain access to global financial markets. In 2018, the IMF also returned to a number of developing countries including Haiti, Guinea, and Egypt. In exchange for emergency lines of credit, it forced governments to lift energy subsidies – despite the fact that those are vital for the daily life of much of the population – and to privatize state-owned companies. The social unrest and spontaneous riots that ensued led to the death of dozens of people. The Congo republic is currently negotiating a deal with the IMF, which has insisted that its financial package will only be delivered "once *compliance with all relevant IMF policies* has been established" (quoted in Reuters 2018, emphasis added). Critical commentators have denounced a return to "classic forms of conditionalities" (CADTM 2018). In Puerto Rico, which declared bankruptcy in May 2018, a draconian austerity plan is being imposed by a non-elected US-appointed fiscal control board, to the benefits of the large US mutual and hedge funds that hold much of the debt and despite the fact that the territory was recently devastated by two hurricanes. Emerging economies have not been immune either: many have recently experienced severe financial issues associated with volatile global financial capital flows, often dramatically worsening domestic sociopolitical crises (for instance, in Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine).

Due to large-scale and sustained capital flight from Turkey, the Turkish lira fell to a record low in August 2018. Turkey is in the midst of its worst financial crisis since the early 2000s. This poses risks of wider financial contagion to other emerging markets – bond markets in South Africa and Mexico have already been affected – but also to other developing economies. Indeed, developing economies across the income range have recently experienced a rapid buildup of external debt, partly due to economic difficulties associated with the end of the primary commodity supercycle (since 2013 or so), but also due to the strong international investors' demand for developing countries' debt: in a context of abundant international liquidity fueled by quantitative easing programs in advanced capitalist economies, international investors have been searching for high yields, and financial capital flows have poured in developing economies. There are concerns that mounting levels of external debt could lead to a generalized debt crisis across the developing world, with potential consequences for global systemic financial stability (IMF 2018).

This raises a series of questions: What makes developing and emerging economies particularly vulnerable to the movement of money-capital across the world market? What makes financial crises so recurrent and violent? What is it about the operations of capitalist finance that continues to reproduce deeply unequal power relations between national states across the world market, at the expense of developing and emerging economies? How and why is financial fragility and vulnerability exported to those spaces of the global capitalist economy? This essay suggests that the answer to those questions lies in what Patel and Moore have aptly called the deep entanglement of "the rhythms of world money and world power" (2017: 96). Put differently, this essay is concerned with the remarkable historical continuity of capitalist finance as a key vector of imperialism. It explores the mechanisms through which the fundamental relation between the operations of capitalist finance, the global flow of capital in the form of money, and modern imperialism has been historically entrenched and reproduced. In order to do so, the essay provides

a *historical geographical political economy* of the entanglement of world money and world power. *Historical*, in the sense that it takes a longue durée approach: it provides an overview of the various historical cycles of global financial capital flows to the spaces of the global capitalist economy successively called peripheries, the colonies, the Third World, and the Global South, since the early days of the world market in the sixteenth century to the contemporary period. It examines their changing drivers, patterns, composition, and crisis dynamics, with a focus on the spaces at the receiving end of those flows. The analysis if also *geographical*, inasmuch as it is concerned with how the spatial-territorial dynamics of expansion/contraction of capitalist finance, the geographical organization of the circuits of financial capital (the financial system), and the functional/spatial configuration of convertibility between different currencies (the global monetary system), has shaped changing geographical patterns of global financial capital flows to developing economies. The historical geographical political economy is grounded in the Marxian theory of money and the central role it plays in capitalist social relations of production. This is absolutely fundamental for the purpose of this essay, because at the most basic level, the global financial system is about "the assemblage and dispensation of money-power" (Harvey 2010: 52). As Marx was at pain to emphasize, the self-movement of capital in the form of money (thereafter, money-capital) represents "the common capital of a class"; it expresses the disciplinary power of "capital-in-general" (Marx 1894/1991; Clarke 1988). Indeed, it embodies the essential social relation of power and inequality between those who possess money and those forced to sell their labor power in order to get access to money and reproduce themselves. Money, or rather the lack thereof, endlessly coerces workers back into the act of market exchange and compels them to sell their alienated labor (Hampton 2003). Consequently, despite its appearance as a neutral object, money is the most preeminent, abstract, and "autonomous" social incarnation of class power (Clarke 1988; McNally 2014). When money is converted into capital, it stops being a "rational means to

satisfying social needs" and becomes a forceful and "irrational" general form of social regulation, subjecting social reproduction to the discipline and logic of capital, i.e., to *the money-power of capital to appropriate surplus labor time and extra-human natures* such as land, natural resources, and biodiversity (Clarke 2003; Arboleda 2017). Indeed, "inevitably, payments to banks [and other financial institutions] happen by exploiting workers and appropriating the rest of nature's work as much as possible" (Patel and Moore 2017: 98). Adopting such an approach, the essay shows, is crucial to understand the operations of capitalist finance, patterns of money-capital flows, and the global relations of power, value, exploitation, and dispossession that underpin them.

The central argument developed in the essay is the following: the money-power of capital to appropriate living labor and extra-human natures has expressed itself in particularly violent ways in the spaces of the global capitalist economy successively referred to as the peripheries, the colonies, the Third World, and the Global South. The essay suggests that a crucial factor of explanation – though it is certainly not the only one – for the *violence of the money-power of capital* in those spaces is that they have retained a *subordinate positionality* in the network of space and power relations within which money-capital flows or in what have been called the "relational geographies of money-power" (Alami 2018b). Importantly, spaces of the Global South have remained in a subordinate positionality in those geographies because of the weakness of capital accumulation (for instance, in terms of the heavy dependence of some developing economies on primary commodity exports to the world market), but also because of a *multitude of imperialist policies and practices* on the part of advanced capitalist economies and powerful agents and institutions located within them. The essay shows that there has been nothing natural about the concrete and distinct geographies of money-power, which have been socially constructed and enforced in a variety of ways that benefit core advanced capitalist economies. As a result, the subordinate positionality of developing economies has been a phenomenon of *remarkable*

historical continuity. Those arguments are substantiated throughout the essay by an examination of seven historical periods and cycles of money-capital flows to the developing world. The essay concludes by discussing questions of strategic-political organizing for emancipatory struggles.

From Sixteenth-Century Merchant Capital in the "Age of Discoveries" to 19th Industrial Capital

The early sixteenth century saw "the emergence of capitalism as a system of accumulation on a world scale" (Arrighi 1994/2010: 33). The process started with extremely vast and coerced transfers of wealth and resources across the globe. Expeditions led by European "explorers" and motivated by trade and treasure-seeking initiated the brutal conquest of the New Worlds by Portugal and Spain. This allowed the creation of gigantic territorial empires. In Asia and Oceania, sea trade monopoly by the Portuguese and then the Dutch was the main source of wealth extraction. In Latin America, wealth in the form of precious metals was savagely plundered and transferred to Europe, where they were used as commodity moneys. Imperial colonies also became a privileged outlet for Spanish and Portuguese exports (Dunn 2009). Those waves of money and capital flows during the early days of capital colonial expansion, notably on the part of commercial capital, set up important "path-dependence and locational lock-in" that importantly shaped subsequent cycles of money and capital flows (Martin 1999).

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, during what is often termed the mercantilist era, international capital exports were performed by state-sponsored merchant capital with the double objective of supporting trade activities (establishing outposts; setting up banking, insurance, and financial services; ship maintenance) and furthering strategic economic and political goals (Dunning and Lundan 2008). The main actors of these investments were colonial merchants from Holland, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and the American colonies. Famous examples of joint-stock companies created at the time by wealthy merchant

capitalists include the British East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, and the Royal African Company. These companies were granted foreign trade monopolies in particular regions of the world by royal charter. A significant part of these international investments was to develop overseas trade backed by naval power and to bolster colonization and land development – particularly in the Americas – with the development of plantations (Arrighi 1994/2010). The so-called transatlantic slave trade epitomized this period of large flows of capital, labor, and wealth, organized and controlled by merchant capitalists with the support of imperial powers. The vast accumulation of wealth associated with imperial dispossession (what Marx refers to as "primitive accumulation") contributed, though not systematically, to the development of capitalism in some of the metropolitan countries, particularly Britain. As Marx put it:

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. (1863/1981: 905)

The eighteenth to nineteenth centuries saw the forceful incorporation of vast new regions into the world market and its division of labor, such as the Russian empire, the Ottoman Empire, India, and West Africa. Meanwhile, declining profitability due to overaccumulated commercial capital triggered an increasing penetration of capital into the sphere of production (Clarke 1988). This paved the way for the industrial revolution and brought about changes in the motivations for capital exports, not least because industrial capitalists became important actors. Global capital flows became driven by the need to secure access to raw materials and conquer/protect foreign markets (Dunning and Lundan 2008). For instance, the development of textile manufacturing in Britain heavily relied on the colonial empire as both sources of raw materials (imported cotton from the American colonies and Egypt) and markets to export surplus commodity production (Dunn 2009). As such, global capital flows were strongly associated with the politics of empire building.

Britain, the leader of world trade, rapidly became the main capital exporter, as it recycled the large liquidities accumulated as a result of the industrial revolution (Dunning and Lundan 2008). Powerful merchant banks such as Rothschild, soon followed by joint-stock banks, were managing world trade and finance from London, which hosted international capital markets (Stallings 1987). Most money-capital flows from Britain consisted in portfolio investments (bonds and debt instruments) primarily in railway, shipping, and public utilities, predominantly in European countries and white settler colonies (Bloomfield 1968).

In the 1820s Latin America received large money-capital inflows, as newly independent states sought financing in international capital markets (Marichal 1989). State-issued bonds denominated in foreign "hard" currency (often sterling) on the London Royal Exchange. On the demand side, investors in London capital markets (particularly London banking houses) were highly tempted to invest in the gold and silver mines, recently freed from Spanish and Portuguese control. Latin American sovereign debts soared: "In this irrationally exuberant climate, Latin American states raised more than 20 million pounds during 1822–1825" (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009: 93). This ended up in these states almost all defaulting in 1826–1828, following a financial crisis in Britain and resulting in their exclusion from international capital markets until the 1850s (Marichal 1989). A second wave of money-capital flows happened in 1850–1870, with the return of Latin American states to international capital markets in the context of rapid world trade expansion. The stock of British investments in the region soared to 179 million pounds (Della Paolera and Taylor 2012). These developments further accelerated during 1870–1914, a period often dubbed the "first wave of financial globalization."

"High Imperialism" and the First Wave of Financial Globalization

The period 1870–1914 saw an unprecedented surge in world trade and international capital mobility. The stock of foreign assets grew from 7% to about 20% of world GDP (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 55). A series of innovations in the realms of transport (especially railway and steamship, triggering a sharp decline in both land and maritime transport costs) and communications (such as the invention of the telegraph) provided the technical backdrop for rapid growth in world trade and increasing global financial market integration. The growth of trade and money-capital flows was also facilitated by the almost complete absence of capital controls (Eichengreen 2008).

The continuous industrialization process in core capitalist countries demanded increasing amounts of raw materials, minerals, and agricultural products such as tea, cocoa, coffee, tobacco, rubber, tropical fruits, sugar, and meat (Dunning and Lundan 2008: 175). Capital was therefore invested in both the "direct" exploitation of these resources (in mining, plantations, farming) and the transport infrastructure (ports, railway, bridges, and other facilities) to enhance the flow of the exploited resources toward the world market (Bloomfield 1968). According to Dunning and Lundan, "about 55% of the global foreign direct investment stake in 1914 was directed to the primary product sector, 20% to railroads, 15% to manufacturing activities, and 10% to trade, distribution, public utilities and banking" (2008: 174). The new forms of capitalist organization that emerged to manage these foreign investments and operations were the forefathers of the modern transnational corporation such as "...Colt, Singer, Coca-Cola, Gillette, Heinz, Ford, United Fruit ...Siemens, Bayer, Bosch" (Dunn 2009: 120–121).

The direction of money-capital flows changed in the 1880s, in part due to a rise in tariff barriers and other protectionist measures in industrializing countries (European countries, the USA, and Japan) (Hobsbawm 1999; Dunn 2009). This surge in protectionism, coupled with a lack of economic dynamism in the core capitalist countries due to a major capitalist crisis (the first Great Depression 1876–1896) and to the growing power of the organized labor movement, pushed Britain to redirect part of its trade and capital exports to the peripheries and particularly to the regions under its political and economic control (both formal and informal empires). Money-capital

flows further expanded during the 15 years that followed (1897–1913) as Britain and other core capitalist countries embarked on a new phase of imperialism (mainly in the form of colonization), leading to the "division of the world among the great powers" (Lenin 1917). Major capital exporters in this period were Britain, the USA, France, and Germany, though the rise of Paris, Berlin, and New York as important financial centers in the early twentieth century did not threaten British financial hegemony. By 1913, "Britain owned perhaps £4,000 million worth abroad, as against less than £5,500 million owned by France, Germany, Belgium, Holland and the USA put together" (Hobsbawm 1999: 125).

While money-capital flows to the peripheries were highly geographically concentrated (according to Bloomfield (1968), as much as 75% of Britain's stock of foreign investments in 1913 was concentrated in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, and Argentina), Latin America attracted growing volumes of flows in the 1880–1890s. Investment stocks reached unprecedented levels:

> British investments in the region were £426 million, more than double the 1880 total. Of this, £194 million sat in government bonds, now for the first time surpassed by a slightly higher amount, £231 million, in securities issued by private enterprises. (Della Paolera and Taylor 2012: 4)

Thirty-seven percent of total flows went to Argentina, 17% to Mexico, 14% to Brazil, 7% to Chile, and 5% to Uruguay (Taylor 2003). Much of those flows were driven by speculative operations, resulting in growing difficulties by national monetary authorities in debtor countries to maintain monetary stability and service their debt. Those countries were hit by severe financial crises, with consequences much worse than previous ones, as banking and financial systems in these countries had significantly grown since the 1880s, particularly in Argentina and Brazil. The crisis in Argentina in the 1890s was "arguably the world's first example of a modern 'emerging market' crisis, combining debt crisis, bank collapses, maturity and currency mismatches, and contagion" (Della Paolera and Taylor 2012: 5). Money-capital exports from France and Germany remained

largely directed to Europe, but flows to their colonies (especially in Africa) rapidly increased as well in the early 1900s. Overall, this early period of financial globalization was characterized by a remarkable integration of international capital markets: "Prior to World War One, a vibrant, free-wheeling [sic] capital market linked financial centers in Europe, the Western Hemisphere, Oceania, Africa, and the Far East. A nineteenth-century reader of *The Economist* newspaper could track investments in American railroads, South African goldmines, Egyptian government debt, Peruvian guano, and much more" (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 16).

Importantly, this process of global financial integration was facilitated by a particular functional/spatial configuration of convertibility between different currencies that deserves further elaboration. It was underpinned by the establishment of the first global monetary system, the classical gold standard, where currencies were convertible into predetermined quantities of gold. The system, which was first adopted in 1821 in Britain and some of its colonies (Ireland, Mauritius, New Zealand, and South Africa), was a "mechanism of class control" (Hampton 2006: 147). Indeed, by linking the quantity of money in circulation to the amount of gold hoarded in the coffers of the central bank (and then to the total global supply of gold when the gold standard became internationalized), the gold standard ensured that economic adjustment was guided by the rule of money in its most abstract form. Its purpose was to push the costs of adjustment onto labor, with wages, employment, and working-class consumption and living standards being the variables of adjustment (Kettell 2004; Hampton 2006).

The gold standard then internationalized. By the 1880s, most European capitalist economies and large chunks of their empires had adopted it. This led to the establishment of a global monetary system characterized by fixed exchange rates (currencies were pegged to the same metal standard) and high capital mobility: exchange rates were determined by international private flows of gold and credit (Hampton 2006). The internationalization of the gold standard was gradual and negotiated, but underpinned by the power of British

capital and the British state (Clarke 1988). This is because Britain was the leading power in both finance and international trade. London was the dominant international capital market, and it provided clearing facilities for sterling-denominated bills of exchange (mainly the Bill of London) that served as the main means of payment and purchase in international trade. Sterling became the main reserve currency: at the end of the nineteenth century, sterling accounted for 40% of foreign exchange reserves (Eichengreen 2008). In that context the British state and the Bank of England actively managed the internationalization of the gold standard, using a mix of cooperation with metropolitan capitalist economies and imperialism, with the double objective of enforcing the money-power of capital in the world market while maintaining sound money at home. Put differently, the whole international financial system was managed with the overall purpose of maintaining monetary stability and limiting value destruction in its core.

Consequently, the relative overall stability of the international financial system and its ability to weather crises over the period masked considerable geographical unevenness. While financial stability was relatively successfully maintained in the core, the costs of adjustment and capital devaluation were disproportionally borne by the peripheries. The export of financial fragility, a result of active policies by Britain and to a lesser extent France, Germany, and the USA, provided a "buffer" for core economies (Vasudevan 2009: 479). For instance, Britain imposed the "colonial sterling exchange standard" in its colonies and informal empire, in order to prevent the outflow of gold from Britain to the regions with which it carried trade deficits (Vasudevan 2009; Knafo 2013). Colonies had to fully back their currencies with reserves in pound sterling. In order to convert their currencies into gold, they were forced to first convert them into sterling. A portion of these sterling reserves had to be placed in London (Berlin and Paris for the other imperialist powers) under the form of British treasury bonds and bank deposits (De Cecco 1984; Eichengreen 2008). British financial institutions could then recycle these liquidities through money-capital

exports to countries on the peripheries, providing them liquidity to buy capital goods from British capitalists and generating considerable income from interests and dividends for Britain. Furthermore, during crises, and thanks to its privileged position of main global creditor and capital exporter, Britain could shift the brunt of devaluation costs to the peripheries by withdrawing British deposits and reducing loans and investments ("pulling capital away") (Gallarotti 1995: 38; Vasudevan 2009). The Bank of England was also able to direct international movements of gold and credit by manipulating its base interest rate (De Cecco 1984). Increasing the base rate could attract capital flows from the peripheries and trigger liquidity crises in countries that had otherwise balanced accounts and/or strong fiscal positions. These imperialist practices were relentlessly implemented, in part because of the shared view among core capitalist economies that "problems at the periphery would not threaten systemic stability" (Eichengreen 2008: 38).

In sum, while the international gold standard enforced the disciplinary money-power of capital over labor and extra-human nature in its most abstract form, the brutal adjustment mechanism was highly asymmetrical, and its costs were unevenly spatially distributed (Vernengo 2003). The very money-capital flows necessary to preserve stability in a few core capitalist countries and their financial centers (London, Paris, Berlin, and New York) were highly destabilizing to the peripheries (Gallarotti 1995). The following figures clearly illustrate this unevenness. During the period, core capitalist countries were hit by seven financial crises, while countries on the peripheries experienced 25 crises (Bordo and Eichengreen 2002). Britain maintained the gold standard for more than a century, other core capitalist economies for about 39 years on average, and countries on the peripheries about 14 years only (Vernengo 2003: 16). The financial history of poorer countries during the gold standard era was a history of volatile capital flows, financial instability, monetary crises, and repeated convertibility suspension. This was a key manifestation of the deep entanglement of capitalist finance and modern imperialism.

Hegemonic Decline, Capitalist Crisis, and the Fall of the Gold Standard

Global money-capital flows to the peripheries resumed in the early 1920s, led by the growing financial power of the USA and its booming capital markets (Eichengreen 2008: 67). After WWI, the USA emerged as the new global creditor, and Britain financial and commercial hegemony was increasingly eroded (Hobsbawm 1999). International banking gradually moved from London to New York (Marichal 1989). The international status of sterling was seriously challenged by the US dollar, which became the main reserve currency in the 1920s. US capital exports expanded first in nearby regions such as Central America and the Caribbean and then further south. US banks gained influence in the region at the expense of British banks (Stallings 1987). The period marked the beginning of US imperialism in Latin America and the so-called dollar diplomacy, whereby banks' activities became closely linked to US imperialist policy. More systematically than British imperialism in its informal empire, the central objective of US imperialism was to "[establish] the political conditions for capital accumulation in what was now defined as the American sphere of influence" (Panitch and Gindin 2012: 39). Increasing volumes of US capital were invested in railroads, plantations, mining, and oil extraction (Stallings 1987).

The monetary system that underpinned this expansion was the result of a joint endeavor of the USA and Britain to establish a new international gold standard, to make sure that states were submitted to the discipline of gold, in a context of growing popular unrest, labor militancy, and trade unionism, and the rise of parliamentary social democratic parties in core capitalist countries' domestic politics (Panitch and Gindin 2012; Eichengreen 2008). The system established in the 1920s was a gold-*exchange* standard, as countries held their reserves in gold and in foreign exchange (mainly dollar and sterling), reflecting the previously mentioned reconfigurations in the hierarchy of the world market. The system performed poorly during its short existence, as gold and money-capital flows ended up worsening macroeconomic global imbalances instead of adjusting them (Eichengreen 2008). The global capitalist crisis of overaccumulation of 1929 sounded its death knell. The monetary regime was first suspended in the (more financially vulnerable) peripheries in 1929. Countries in the peripheries were severely hit by deflationary crises when capital inflows suddenly stopped and the revenues from primary commodity exports fell due to the collapse of world trade. Several states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) suspended the gold standard in order to service their debt and tame severe deflationary crises. Other countries soon followed, resulting in the complete disintegration of the gold standard at the peripheries, which in turn "further undermined its stability at the center" (Eichengreen 2008: 70). In core capitalist countries, the gold standard also proved particularly unfit for crisis management, aggravating deflationary spirals. Investors lost confidence in states' capacity to maintain the value of their moneys and sought refuge in gold (ibid). Britain abandoned the gold standard in late 1931, effectively marking the collapse of the international monetary regime (Panitch and Gindin 2012).

This meant a return to manage floating exchange rates, with the widespread deployment of exchange and capital controls and a collapse in global capital flows: the stock of foreign assets fell from about 20% of world GDP in 1914 to about 8% in 1930, 11% in 1938, and 5% in 1945 (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004: 55). This had far-reaching implications in terms of the geographical distribution of financial risk and adjustment costs. Indeed, Vasudevan (2008) interestingly remarks that during this period (1919–1939) of "hegemonic decline, war, and economic instability in the center, the incidence of crisis in countries in the periphery was less than that in the core . . .[as] the imperial countries lost much of their control over their possessions, the absence of the safety valve that the countries of the periphery provided led to the concentration of financial crises in the countries of the capitalist core itself."

Postwar State-Led Development and the Bretton Woods System

The postwar period saw the establishment of a system that aimed at facilitating world trade and international investment, which were deemed essential to restore accumulation on a world scale after a devastating world war. The Bretton Woods agreement, signed in 1944, was a coordinated attempt (though largely under the hegemonic leadership of the USA) to establish a framework for the regulation of money and cross-border money-capital flows that allowed significant scope for domestic economic policy-making. More precisely, it established a gold-dollar exchange standard: a fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime, whereby currencies were convertible into US dollar at a specific parity and the dollar was in turn convertible into gold at the defined rate of 35 dollars per ounce of gold. As such, the USA could create money that would flow into the world market, facilitating trade and rapid capital accumulation, while huge gold reserves allowed maintaining it "as good as gold" in value terms. The framework was complemented by the creation of international financial institutions to manage international monetary affairs: the IMF was created in order to correct imbalances by providing short-term liquidity during balance-of-payment crises and overseeing exchange rate adjustments. The World Bank was set up to fund longer-term development projects, first in the context of Europe reconstruction and then in what became the Third World.

This particular functional/spatial arrangement of convertibility between different currencies was associated with a change in the geographical pattern and composition of global capital flows. Two important trends can be identified. Firstly, within the framework of the Marshall Plan, a significant component of these flows were US government loans (recycled trade surpluses, denominated in dollar) to Western Europe and Japan and then increasingly to Third World countries (Soederberg 2005). Contrarily to previous waves of loans to the peripheries, the power of imposing sanctions and incentives was mediated by the IMF and the World Bank (ibid). Secondly, private capital flows mainly consisted in foreign direct investment. As Swyngedouw puts it, "the spatial expansion of commodity production became the preferred 'spatial fix' in which financial capital was intimately link with the need to transnationalize commodity production and exchange" (1992: 44). Indeed, by insuring relatively stable foreign exchange markets, the global monetary regime deterred "speculative geographical currency arbitraging," reduced risks and uncertainties associated with currency fluctuation, and "stimulated location strategies based on considerations of cost and of spatial differences in workers' resistance and working-class power" (Swyngedouw 1992: 46). Foreign investment from US firms was first chiefly directed to Western Europe and Japan. From the mid-1950s, foreign investment also flowed to Latin America and Southeast Asia, as US, European, and Japanese capital sought to invest in these regions in order to re-export the finished product, profiting from a low-wage workforce heavily repressed by collaborative and authoritarian regimes (ibid). On the receiving end of the flows, the state and local bourgeoisies actively encouraged (and, in some cases, managed) these flows. This was facilitated by the Bretton Woods system, under which various forms of capital and exchange controls played an important role in allowing states to nationally process class relations in relative isolation from the speculative movement of money-capital (Holloway 1995). In the Third World, the system (temporarily) allowed enough autonomy for the consolidation of the modernist developmental project and for the construction of "centralized capitalist states, to counter possible revolutions from below and to preside over the formation of exploitable laboring classes" (Selwyn 2015: 529). Many countries across the Third World also opted for a variety of development strategies of industrialization by import substitution, which included a combination of subsidies and tariffs and a mix of capital controls which allowed for a multiple exchange rate system promoting devalued currencies for exporters and appreciated currencies for importers.

From the mid-1960s, changing power relations between capital and labor precipitated a mounting global capitalist crisis. An international cycle of

working-class struggles, both in the realms of production and reproduction, ruptured global capitalist accumulation and broke the Keynesian class compromise (Cleaver 1989; Holloway 1995). In advanced capitalist countries, struggles in the workplace were complemented by various emancipatory political struggles, such as civil rights and anti-war movements and student protests. Struggles also raged in the socialist bloc and in the Third World, including insurgencies and late anti-colonial struggles (ibid). Industrialization by import substitution strategies and developmentalism were reaching their limits as well. Their reliance on acute forms of exploitation and heavy labor suppression, while failing to provide public infrastructures; the exclusion of the majority of the population from development gains; and increasing inequalities were generating more and more resistance. The crisis soon manifested itself as declining profit rates, generalized inflation, slowdown in productivity gains and investment, balance of payment deficits, and a crisis of the welfare state in advanced capitalist countries (Clarke 1988). As a result, the global demand for and the supply of credit grew enormously. This importantly transformed the geographical pattern and composition of capital flows to the Third World (as discussed in the next section) and increasingly undermined the geographical foundations of the Bretton Woods system.

Indeed, transnational corporations, global banks, and other financial institutions became growingly involved in "speculative geographical currency arbitraging" and in the use of Euromarkets in order to escape national regulation and find profitable opportunities (Swyngedouw 1992). Euromarkets are offshore financial markets for currencies, loans, bonds, and other financial instruments. They originated in the dollar-denominated bank deposit liabilities held in foreign banks or in foreign branches of US banks. US banks set up branches in London, which first emerged as a "hub," but offshore markets then developed in other countries, including Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and the Bahamas (Roberts 1994). Consequently, the space of circulation of the US dollar became

increasingly distinct from its space of regulation (Corbridge and Thrift 1994; Martin 1994). Increasing international capital mobility further aggravated the outflow of dollars from the USA. Moreover, there were growing pressures on the US balance of payment pressures as a result of growing competition from countries such as Japan and West Germany. US gold reserves melted away, which meant that the gap between the quantity of dollars in circulation and the quantity of gold hoarded by the USA was growing (Dunn 2009). As a result, the USA had growing difficulties maintaining the dollar-gold parity, and a generalized speculative run was more and more threatening (Vasudevan 2008). Printing more dollars became increasingly inflationary, especially in the context of spiraling military expenditures associated with the Cold War. Eventually the Bretton Woods system collapsed, after Nixon's unilateral decision to suspend the dollar convertibility in 1971.

The collapse of Bretton Woods and a series of political economic transformations had far-reaching consequences for the geographical patterns and composition of capital flows to the Third World over the period. The global geographical reorganization of production, accompanied by the unfolding of a new international division of labor, led to growing imbalances in international payments which were financed by massive expansion of international credit (Charnock and Starosta 2016). International credit creation was compounded by mounting global conditions of capital overaccumulation and by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (which removed the "metal limit" on credit creation), resulting in speculative movements of liquidity across the world market. In that context, growing volumes of overaccumulated capital and "petrodollars" flowed into the Third World under the form of syndicated bank loans – mostly from large American and European banks – and public bond issues on Euromarkets (Vasudevan 2008). As state-led development strategies of industrialization by import substitution were increasingly reaching their limits (including a slowdown of economic growth, balance-of-payment problems, inflation, intense social unrest), states across the

Third World increasingly tapped into abundant and cheap international liquidity and resorted to large money-capital inflows in order to sustain productive capital accumulation and finance the brutal repression of working-class struggles (Clarke 1988; Cleaver 1989). This "bout of uncontrolled lending in the 1970s and early 1980s' catastrophically ended up with the Third World debt crisis, after the huge hikes in interest rates triggered by the 'Volcker shock' in 1979–1982" (Corbridge and Thrift 1994: 13). Sovereign debt levels doubled from 8% of GDP at the beginning of the 1970s to about 22% in 1982 (Vasudevan 2008). Mexico defaulted on its sovereign debt in August 1982. This provoked a generalized loss of confidence in international financial markets, a sudden stop of commercial lending and capital flight from the Third World to the USA. The crisis soon spread to more than 40 countries, prompting the international financial community to elaborate a plan to prevent a general financial collapse.

Neoliberal Restructuring and the Basis for Subordinate Financialization in the 1990s

A series of plans were therefore implemented in order to organize the devaluation of capital, but also to ensure that debtor states remained within the bounds of the international financial system (Soederberg 2005). As discussed in the introduction, the imperialist imposition of structural adjustment plans designed by the Bretton Woods Institutions and advanced capitalist countries was a crucial aspect of crisis resolution, at heavy social and environmental costs. Importantly, a number of neoliberal policy prescriptions – including full convertibility of the current account and a unified exchange rate system, the lifting of capital controls on both inflows and outflows and non-discrimination between local and foreign investors, the opening of banking systems to foreign banks, and domestic financial liberalization – deepened the financial integration of Third World countries and further subordinated them to the money-power of capital.

Other aspects of the crisis resolution also had momentous consequences for the relationship between capitalist finance, global patterns of capital flows, and the particular form of subordination of the Third World to the money-power of capital. The first one is the 1989 Brady plan, which consisted in securitizing debt claims by turning them into Brady bonds that could then be traded in secondary markets (Vasudevan 2008). While this allowed international investors to diversify sovereign risk, this also established developing countries' dependence on international financial markets and encouraged short-term foreign borrowing in order to finance fiscal deficits (Painceira 2012; Kaltenbrunner and Karacimen 2016). As a result, the imperative of maintaining "creditworthiness" became an absolute priority in policymaking, at the expense of working-class interests, especially in areas of fiscal and monetary policies, exchange rates, but also labor and environmental standards and political stability (leading to the violent repression of social movements and forms of state authoritarianism) (Soederberg 2005). Rolling over state debts also meant that developing states had to ensure the generation of high financial returns to international investors. Secondly, the development of capital markets in Third World countries, promoted by international financial institutions, and their growing integration into global markets, created new opportunities and needs for local capitalists in order to fund their operations, access foreign exchange, and hedge financial risks, increasing the dependence of nonfinancial firms upon international financial markets (Kaltenbrunner and Karacimen 2016). Those forms of financial dependence have shaped the particular form of "subordinate" financialization that has unfolded across developing states since then (Powel 2013; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015, 2017).

These processes deeply transformed the geographical pattern and composition of money-capital flows to the developing world, which recovered in the early 1990s. Firstly, capital inflows became driven by portfolio investment (often dubbed "hot money" due to their volatility) and foreign direct investment rather than official and bilateral loans. Portfolio flows have been

largely driven by interest rate spreads between advanced capitalist economies and developing economies, providing an incentive for speculative carry trade and geographical currency arbitrage. Indeed, the deregulation of interest rates in developing economies has resulted in the tendency for high interest rates in order to attract money-capital flows. The composition of debt flows also changed from a dominance of sovereign debt to private debt (banks and corporations). Foreign direct investment flows have been motivated by the ongoing process of geographical reorganization of capitalist production on a planetary scale, but also by the opportunities provided by the large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises and opening of public sectors in developing economies.

Throughout the 1990s, money-capital flows to the developing world proved to be extremely volatile. They followed a highly destabilizing boom-and-bust pattern and catalyzed a number of macroeconomic dynamics, including the formation of asset price bubbles in real estate and capital markets, as well as credit-fueled consumption. They provided incentives for short-term borrowing denominated in foreign currencies, with high foreign exchange risk due to maturity and currency mismatches. They also contributed to the tendency for exchange rate overvaluation, often deteriorating external competitiveness, worsening trade deficits, and aggravating dependence on short-term money-capital inflows. Periods of boom inevitably ended in busts (i.e., a sudden stop and/or capital flight), triggering rapid currency depreciation and difficulties servicing external debts. In many cases, this resulted in a generalized financial crisis spreading to other developing economies, forcing the deployment of violent state-enforced bouts of austerity in order to restore creditworthiness and regain the confidence of international investors, largely at the expense of workers, peasants, the poor, and environmental protection. As Corbridge and Thrift put it, "the victims of sound money policies [were] rarely the same as the progenitors of the earlier round of easy money" (1994: 4). According to IMF figures, "in Mexico the 1994–1995 crisis cost 20% of GDP, Brazil's 1994 crisis

cost 13%, Thailand's 1997 crisis cost 44%, Russia's 1998 crisis 6%, Argentina's 2001 crisis 10% and Turkey's 2001 crisis 30%" (Marois 2015: 30). International financial institutions and advanced capitalist economies blamed those costly and recurrent financial crises on developing countries' alleged high corruption levels, poor monetary and fiscal management, and lack of political stability and robust institutions for the protection of property rights. Moreover, the very same international financial institutions and advanced capitalist economies used those crises as political opportunities to push for further domestic and international financial liberalization across the Global South. In order to boost credibility and enhance investor confidence, developing economies were also "strongly encouraged" to let exchange rates freely float, build high primary budget surpluses to signal fiscal responsibility, adopt inflation-targeting frameworks to maintain price stability, and accumulate vast amounts of foreign exchange reserves to self-insure against sudden capital flight.

Commodity Super-Cycle, Money-Capital Flow Bonanza, and the Post-2008 "Brave New World"

Money-capital flows to developing countries increased considerably in the 2000s, driven by large volumes of liquidity on international financial markets and by the primary commodity boom. They skyrocketed from an average of 487 billion USD in 2003–2005 to more than USD12 trillion in 2007. Over the same period, many developing economies across Asia, Latin America, and Africa streamlined and consolidated their domestic financial and banking systems to mitigate the risks associated with volatile cross-border money-capital flows. This is what Thomas Marois calls the institutional development of more "muscular" state financial apparatuses (2012, 2015). This has included a variety of the "self-insurance" policies such as large reserve accumulation, but also the empowerment of central banks and treasury departments and other state institutions involved in the management of financial and

monetary affairs; the design of policies and institutions to socialize financial risks and the costs of financial crises, such as funds earmarked for bank bailouts and the recapitalization of foreign banks, credit, and deposit guarantees; and active state intervention to rationalize and strengthen failed domestic financial and banking systems, their upgrading to international norms such as Basel I and Basel II. As mentioned in the introduction, this also involved the design of a variety of bilateral, subregional, and regional financial and monetary mechanisms, including currency swaps, reserve pooling arrangements, credit lines, bilateral aid, and development finance, often with the explicit aim to seek independence from the Bretton Woods Institutions and to avoid the type of external crises that had plagued their development in the 1990s early 2000s.

The 2008 global financial crisis sparked a brief but brutal episode of capital flight, with money-capital flows to developing economies contracting to less than 500 billion USD in 2009. In a context of drying up of liquidity, international investors sought refuge in what are deemed "safe" and "high-quality" assets, mostly in the USA and other core advanced capitalist countries, which triggered sharp currency depreciations in developing and emerging economies. Global money-capital flows to the Global South rapidly recovered between 2009 and 2013, amidst much enthusiasm within the international financial community: developing and emerging economies had weathered the 2008 global financial crisis relatively well, the postcrisis economic recovery had been swift, growth prospects looked much better than in advanced capitalist countries (the so-called "two-speed" recovery), and primary commodities and asset prices were booming. There was also much talk of geographical rebalancing of power in the global capitalist economy and of emerging economies becoming the new engine of global growth. Developing and emerging economies' sovereign credit ratings and funding conditions improved. In addition, vast interest rate differentials between developing countries and advanced capitalist economies provided a highly lucrative opportunity for speculative carry trade and geographical currency arbitrage operations (interest

rates in the latter group of countries being close to zero or negative in the context of quantitative easing programs). Put differently, cheap money borrowed in the core was invested in spaces across the Global South that provided both opportunities for short-term capital gains and better prospects of exploitation of living labor and extra-human natures. Large volumes of money-capital flows poured in.

A combination of factors, including the end of the commodity boom, the worsening of the Euro crisis, the US Fed "taper tantrum," and a looming crisis in China, led to a deterioration in global economic conditions and rapidly changing global risk aversion from 2013 onward. Developing and emerging economies were badly hit, and money-capital inflows sharply slowed down or reversed, in a context of sovereign credit downgrades, falling currencies, and financial distress. State authorities implemented violent bouts of austerity, in desperate attempts to restore international investor confidence, often dramatically worsening domestic sociopolitical crises (for instance, in Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Ukraine). As discussed in the introduction, many countries have called the IMF again to the rescue. In order to understand the mechanisms at play in this particular historical sequence, it is necessary to examine the contemporary geographical organization of the circuits of money-capital and the functional/spatial configuration of convertibility between different currencies and how they have shaped postcrisis geographical patterns of global money-capital flows to the Global South.

The Global South in the Contemporary Geographies of Money-Power

Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, the deregulation of exchange rates, and the widespread liberalization of the capital account, the functional/spatial configuration of convertibility between different currencies is defined by "the right to switch currencies at will" (Hampton 2003: 5). This means that the relative value of currencies (the exchange rate) is, in principle, determined by supply and demand

on foreign exchange and currency markets. The structure of the current global monetary system, though, is ridden with power relations and is underpinned by the international hierarchy of national states and imperial power. As such, it is best described as a pyramid of currencies. Those currencies have different "liquidity premiums" which depend on their "degree of convertibility" (Andrade and Prates 2013). This degree relates to currencies' ability to perform internationally the functions of money, such as unit of account, means of payment, and store of value. The currencies of core capitalist states are at the top of the hierarchy, with the US dollar in leading (though contested) position, given that it "serves as a universal unit of account, while the monetary liabilities of the U.S. state function as a universal means of purchase, means of payment and a key reserve asset" (Ivanova 2013: 63). The currencies of developing and emerging economies lie at the bottom of the pyramid, due to their extremely poor ability to perform the functions previously mentioned. There is therefore a built-in structural and spatial asymmetry in the contemporary global monetary system. This asymmetry translates into the unequal capability of states to attract global money-capital flows, systematically penalizing developing economies. This is most blatant in crisis contexts. As the geographical unfolding of the global financial crisis has shown, "drying up" of liquidity during crises amounts to capital flight from developing countries (and currency collapse) and a rush to "safe" assets denominated in advanced capitalist countries' currencies. It is worth highlighting that this "flight to safety" to assets in advanced capitalist countries reinforces the "safe haven" character of the latter's currencies. Put differently, during crises, currency instability in developing countries contributes to maintaining currency stability in advanced capitalist countries, as well as the value of the assets in which they are denominated. This is a key manifestation of contemporary imperialism, and it entails a highly uneven spatial distribution of financial vulnerability and deflationary adjustment. Consequently, the crisis-driven bouts of state-enforced austerity and labor disciplining in

order to maintain/restore creditworthiness and confidence in the national money have been harsher in developing countries, crucially shaping their trajectory of capitalist development and incurring high social costs disproportionately borne by the working class.

This asymmetry in the functional/spatial arrangement of the global monetary system is compounded by a second set of geographies that concern the spatiality of the global financial system. The multiple markets and institutions of the financial system are integrated into "distinctive geographical and institutional hierarchies from the local to the global level" (Clark 2005: 99). World financial centers such as London, New York, Frankfurt, and Tokyo dominate this hierarchy, centralize and concentrate the money-power of capital, and exert control functions over the global financial system as a whole (Martin 1999). While financial centers in emerging economies such as São Paulo, Johannesburg, Shanghai, Mexico City, and Istanbul have become important regional sites of financial innovation, this has not challenged the dominance of the aforementioned world financial centers, which remain disproportionately located in advanced capitalist countries and largely control the global orchestration of money-capital flows (Bassens 2012; Clark 2015).

There are at least two ways through which world financial centers exercise huge power on the wider geographies of the global financial system, with important implications for developing and emerging economies. Firstly, powerful actors of the global financial system, such as global investment banks, organize their scale of operations and diversification into other geographical markets, *from* those world financial centers. This has a considerable impact on patterns of global money-capital flows, particularly in case of financial distress, during which those actors tend to consolidate their activities in advanced economies at the expense of operations elsewhere, shaping the uneven geographical unfolding of crises and often penalizing developing countries. Secondly, world financial centers exercise huge power on the wider geographies of the global financial system because they are the leading sites of

production of financial instruments and knowl-edges. Credit rating agencies and other special-ized firms produce financial knowledge that "categorize" the uneven geographies of global finance, shaping the global circuits of money-cap-ital (Lee 2011). The production of this knowledge is permeated by a set of power-laden imaginaries and representations, such as Western- and capital-centric views of history and modernity, stagist/linear conceptions of development, imperial/neo-colonial imaginaries, racism, and specific norms of masculinity (see Alami 2018b for a fuller expo-sition of those arguments). This is reflected in processes of risk valuation, resulting in the repre-sentation of developing and emerging economies as a cluster of asset classes with relatively high risk/reward ratios. This, in turn, has four very concrete material consequences which are partic-ularly important for understanding patterns of money-capital flows to developing economies and their shifting financial reputation.

Firstly, money-capital flows to developing economies are extremely pro-cyclical, often wors-ening periods of financial distress (Lee 2011). Secondly, the clustering together of ECE assets has implications for crisis transmission and con-tagion between developing countries categorized as "emerging" or "frontier" markets (as the mul-tiple crises during the 1990s and 2010s showed). Thirdly, in order to attract money-capital in a context of international competition between developing economies, states have to deploy eco-nomic policies that provide high rewards to the application of capital in its money form, such as extremely high interest rates. Fourthly, this leads to the buildup of particular forms of external vul-nerability characterized by the large presence of nonresident investors in short-term financial assets (including bonds, shares, foreign exchange derivatives, etc.), making developing economies highly exposed to capital account reversals (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015, 2017). All four aspects result in developing economies being significantly penalized by the way the global financial system structures and orchestrates the global flow of money-capital. This is essential for understanding the recent global financial

crisis, its uneven geographical and temporal unfolding, and associated patterns of global money-capital flows. This is also a key factor of explanation of the violence of money-power, expressed through the operations of global capi-talist finance in the global South.

Before concluding, it is worth insisting that those geographies of money-power have been enforced and maintained through various imperi-alist policies. The collection of essays in Panitch and Konings (2009), for instance, shows how the institutional framework of American finance shaped the global finance system and how "the institutional linkages between the American state and the structural power embedded in the system of global finance have functioned to enhance the power of the US state" (2009: 8). Similarly, Norfield (2016) explores the imperialist policies implemented by the UK to retain control of the global financial system through the City of Lon-don since the 1980s.

Conclusion

The essay has provided a historical geographical political economy of the entanglement of world money and world power. As such, it has gestured toward a theoretically informed explanation of the violence of the money-power of capital in the peripheries. The key argument, substantiated throughout the essay by adopting a longue durée view, is that while the global flow of money-capital must be understood in terms of the money-power of capital to appropriate living labor and extra-human natures, the latter has also been mediated by relations of imperialism since the birth of the world market. The essay has shed light on a particularly crucial aspect and manifes-tation of that process, which is the production of specific *spatial relations*. Indeed, money-capital does not flow in a void. Its flow is organized and structured by what has been referred to as geog-raphies of money-power, which are constituted by the geographical organization of the global finan-cial system and by the functional/spatial arrange-ment of the global monetary system. The concrete

and distinct geographies of money-power, while experiencing radical transformations throughout the history of global capitalism, have been consistently underpinned and enforced by imperial power, at the expense of the spaces of the world market successively referred to as the peripheries, the formal and informal colonial territories, the Third World, and the global South. In fact, the subordinate positionality of those spaces in the geographies of money-power, and the associated violence of expression of the money-power of capital, has been a phenomenon of remarkable historical continuity. Importantly, the essay has shown that this has in turn contributed to reproducing imperial-hierarchical relations between spaces across the world market.

This analysis of the entanglement of world money and world power is important for three reasons: firstly, for understanding how financial fragility and vulnerability, as well as the costs of adjustment during crisis, are unevenly distributed across the world market, largely at the expense of workers, peasants, the poor, and non-human natures in the Global South; secondly, for making sense of the global relations of power, value, exploitation, and dispossession that underpin the operations of capitalist finance and global patterns of money-capital flows and how those contribute to the reproduction of pervasive inequalities on a planetary scale; and finally, it has also implications for questions of strategic-political organizing and emancipatory struggles. Indeed, the analysis suggests that anti-capitalist struggles against capital's drive to reduce human life and lifeworlds to economic resources and money abstractions (through privatization, commodification, marketization, and financialization practices) must, by necessity, also be *anti-imperialist*. These must involve struggles for the reconfiguration of the relational geographies of money-power and against the imperialist practices that underpin them. This points to the need for transnational forms of solidarity that can bridge those geographies, involving workers in both countries that receive large amount of money-capital flows and in those that are the source of those flows.

Cross-References

▶ Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism
▶ Dollar Standard and Imperialism
▶ Finance, Finance Capital, Financialization
▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
▶ Neo-liberalism and Financialization

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Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law

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Introduction

In their 1953 *Economic History Review* article "The Imperialism of Free Trade," historians John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson made two points that are still relevant for thinking about the relationship between global trade, imperialism, and international trade law. First, they emphasized the informal mechanisms that, alongside formal rule, ensured British expansion throughout the nineteenth century and, by doing so, they questioned the orthodox view that divided the century in periods of imperialism and anti-imperialism, emphasizing continuities instead. Secondly, they articulated a critique of the link between free trade and anti-imperialism that was thought to characterize this period, thereby challenging the conventional view according to which "free" trade could dispense with Empire. Taking the cue from this seminal article, the first section of this entry engages with the Empire of Free Trade, highlighting the role international law mechanisms and free trade ideology played in ensuring commercial expansion; the second analyzes this role in the context of the post-war multilateral trading system, focusing on the mismatch between free trade rhetoric and actual trade practice; and the third brings the preceding analysis to bear on current international trade relations.

The Empire of Free Trade

The "Imperialism of Free Trade" was an influential intervention in the debate about nineteenth-century theories of imperialism. Despite the focus on Britain, it has since generated broader discussions about the relationship between capitalism, imperialism, and free trade. In it, Gallagher and Robinson took issue with the view that, unlike the early and late parts of the nineteenth century – seen as the apex of British imperialism – the mid-Victorian period had been "indifferent" toward Empire. Between 1841 and 1851 alone, they pointed out Britain had directly occupied or annexed "New Zealand, the Gold Coast, Labuan, Natal, the Punjab, Sind and Hong Kong." In the 20 years that followed, it asserted control over "Berar, Oudh, Lower Burma and Kowloon, over Lagos and the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, over Basutoland, Griqualand and the Transvaal; and new colonies were established in Queensland and British Columbia" (1953, pp. 2–3). The myth of "indifference" surrounding this period becomes more difficult to sustain if the analysis of imperialism goes beyond these examples of direct rule (i.e., annexation or occupation) to include techniques of political and commercial control, for instance, those exercised through paramountcies (in Malaya centered on Singapore) and suzerainties (in West Africa) and, importantly, through so-called free trade and friendship treaties. The latter in particular were widely used to achieve commercial expansion: between 1836 and 1861, treaties were signed with Persia, Turkey, and Japan, among other states, enabling Britain to conduct trade with these regions (1953, p. 3). Often referred to as "unequal treaties" because of the asymmetry in power relations, these agreements contained unequal obligations for the parties involved. For instance, the Treaty of Nanking signed as a result of the Opium War required China to cede Hong Kong to Britain and open five Chinese ports for trade, while also establishing a favorable tariff regime for British goods (Anghie 1999, pp. 36–37). Gallagher and Robinson's point was, therefore, that throughout the nineteenth century, the British government had ensured the protection or acquisition of commercial interests, by

"informal means if possible, or by formal means if necessary" (1953, p. 13).

This combination of formal and informal mechanisms was however not new, nor did it pertain exclusively to nineteenth-century British imperialism. It was inextricably linked to processes of capital accumulation, which in turn relied on the construction of powerful racial hierarchies enabled by, among other means, international law. As critical legal scholars have pointed out, international treaties and doctrines have been powerful techniques of commercial expansion and racialization since at least the sixteenth century (Knox 2016). Francisco de Vitoria, the famous Spanish theologian and jurist, asserted the "natural law" right to freely trade, forcefully in the event this right was denied by another country. As gold was "discovered" in America in the fifteenth century, and the feudal law of the time applied only to members and enemies of the *Respublica Christiana*, a different legal regime was needed to discipline relations with the native populations. According to Vitoria, the natives possessed "reason" but were also governed by a law of nations (*jus gentium*) which included the right to trade and the right to evangelize; and denying such rights, which were premised on the superiority of Christian civilization, could give rise to "just war." The regime of early colonialism led by the Spanish was to give way in the seventeenth century to the mercantilist system led by the Dutch and the British (Chimni 1993). This system was centered around trade monopolies exercised not by means of formal control but through trading companies. The role played by legal doctrines to legitimate this regime was, again, crucial. Thus, writing in the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius developed the theory according to which the sea was open to the trade of all nations. The doctrine of *Mare Liberum* was his response to a request by the then Dutch United East India company for a legal opinion that would grant them the right to trade in the East Indies against Portuguese claims of exclusive rights (Esmeir 2017, p. 83).

Mare Liberum therefore points to the role that trading companies have played in the development of imperial regimes as well as to their

influence over the evolution of international law. Companies were granted the right to trade, make peace and war, as well as the power to exercise sovereign rights over non-European peoples, which included profiting from the slave trade and the sale of slave-produced goods (Knox 2016, p. 14); but whereas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they were mainly concerned with making profits, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they became increasingly involved in acquiring and governing territories (Anghie 1999, pp. 32–33). This shift reflected, at least in part, the changing circumstances of capital accumulation: as the British industrial revolution revealed the need for colonies to absorb the "flood of products pouring out of the new factories" (Chimni 1993, p. 228), direct control became the preferred means for transforming their societies into markets for manufactured goods. Positivist international lawyers enabled this enterprise by crafting the standard of "civilization" which, relying on ideas of racial inferiority, granted some non-European territories legal personality (particularly in order to sign treaties) depending on whether or not they were deemed to meet European social norms, including those which guaranteed the rights of property and the freedom of commerce (Koskenniemi 2002; Anghie 2005). Therefore, the relationship between formal and informal control as well as that between state and corporate interests is complex and has shifted over time, but it is not something limited to nineteenth-century British imperialism.

Having called into question the idea that the middle part of the nineteenth century was a period of anti-imperialism in British history, the second point Gallagher and Robinson made was about the mismatch between governments' declarations in relation to free trade and actual policies, a point which enabled them to challenge the conventional view according to which free trade beliefs could dispense with imperialist attitudes. They noted that it was during the Gladstone government – the liberal government of anti-imperialist reason – that Britain "annexed Basutoland in 1868 and Griqualand West in 1871" (1953, p. 3). But their target was not only policy-makers and the Manchester School who had sought to make free trade

principles the basis of government policy. It was also those who had seen imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, applying historically to the period after 1880. They were referring to the exponents of the classic theories of imperialism and in particular to Hobson and Lenin who, they claimed, had seen late-Victorian imperialism as a significant shift in the nature of British expansion and a "sharp deviation" from the static liberalism of the middle of the century (1953, p. 2). Gallagher and Robinson's argument was that, despite their differences with the Manchester School, the critics of imperialism shared the view "that mid-Victorian 'indifference' and late-Victorian 'enthusiasm' for empire were directly related to the rise and decline in free-trade beliefs" (ibid.). The views of classic theorists of imperialism (e.g., Hilferding, Luxemburg, Bukharin, Lenin) were much more varied than Gallagher and Robinson acknowledged. However, the important point they made is that, instead of a correspondence between free trade beliefs and anti-imperialism, a mismatch between free trade thinking and actual trade practice had characterized government policy in this period. Indeed the appropriate slogan for Free Trade Empire should not be "trade not rule" but rather "trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary" (1953, p. 13). In other words, free trade theory could not explain government policy; instead, commercial expansion was at issue when free trade was invoked as the basis of government action.

Now, the classic theory of "free trade" appears only in the eighteenth century when French physiocrats and British classical political economists reject the economic assumptions of the mercantilist system that had dominated over the past two centuries, posing instead the universal applicability and desirability of what were to become the twin pillars of free trade: international specialization (Smith 1776) and comparative advantage (Ricardo 1817). According to these principles, provided each country specializes in the production of the goods it can produce more efficiently (i.e., at a lower cost), and exchanges them for those it cannot produce efficiently at home, all countries benefit from trading with one another.

In other words, international specialization guided by the "law" of comparative advantage promises to deliver world prosperity. There are however two observations scholars have made with regard to the global dimension and universal assumptions of the theory.

The first is that historically British trade policies followed free trade prescriptions at a particular point in time and only to a very limited extent. The system of protection practiced since Henry VIII was certainly a crucial factor in English industrialization (Chang 2007) as were the vast territories on which Britain exercised formal and informal control to extract raw materials. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the protective legislation of other countries became an obstacle to further expansion of British trade: protection at home was unnecessary given the competitiveness achieved by English manufacturers, although it continued to benefit the landed aristocracy. However, protection of agricultural goods desired by the latter meant the price of labor in the manufacturing sector had to be kept at a certain level to allow workers to reproduce; so the repeal of English import duties on food and grains provided an opportunity to lower its cost through cheaper imports and consequently to further increase the competitiveness of manufacturing.

The unilateral repeal of the Corn Laws (i.e., tariffs on food and grains) in 1846, often portrayed as the foundational act of faith in free trade by a European government, can be seen in a different light: it came at the end of a struggle between the landed aristocracy and the industrial capitalists, with the latter prevailing. The intellectual superiority of free trade that was invoked at this point in time was also to affect a particular international division of labor, one favorable to British manufacturing interests. As Engels put it (1888, p. 2): "To convert all other countries to the gospel of Free Trade, and thus to create a world in which England was the great manufacturing centre, with all other countries for its independent agricultural districts, that was the next task before the English manufacturers and their mouthpieces, the political economists." Such division of labor concerned the relationship with other European nations as well as that with the colonies. The Cobden-Chevalier treaty signed by Britain and France in 1860 to reduce tariffs between the two countries is one example of the bilateral treaties signed between European states, supposedly under the influence of free trade theory. These treaties however applied selectively to specific goods rather than across the board. Free trade theory was also invoked to persuade former colonies to continue specializing in the production and export of agricultural goods; but, as Chang (2007) points out, it was Hamilton's rejection of free trade "wisdom" that paved the way to US industrialization. This possibility however was not open to other colonies, particularly those racialized as "uncivilized" and in need of assistance by European states (article 6 Berlin Conference, 1885). There is therefore very little evidence in the nineteenth century of free trade theory being "applied" uniformly, with all countries benefiting from trading with one another.

The second observation regards the conceptual apparatus of free trade and can be derived from Marx's critique of classical political economy. Marx challenged both Say's law, which excluded the possibility of excesses in the market as it assumed supply generated its own demand – thereby obliterating the role that colonial markets performed in absorbing such surpluses; and the principle of comparative advantage, which naturalized an unequal division of labor between countries. Both postulates can be found in Ricardo's writings. Marx (1848, p. 1) focuses on the conditions that await the working class "under the reign of perfect Free Trade" and asks:

What is the natural normal price of the labor of, economically speaking, a working man? Ricardo replies, "Wages reduced to their minimum – their lowest level." Labor is [therefore] a commodity as well as any other commodity . . . [With free trade] "that labour being equally a commodity, will equally sell at a cheaper price" – that you will have it for very little money indeed, just as you will have pepper and salt.

"Freedom" in "free trade" is therefore for Marx freedom of capital but his is not a defense of protectionism, which he describes as the "artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers" (1867,

p. 921); it is only because of his assumption that free trade could lead to international labor solidarity that he declares himself in favor of free trade (1848). The broader point deriving from his analysis is that the pitting of free trade against protectionism is misleading: what is at stake is selective and strategic liberalization, with different capitals articulating different interests and exercising different pressures on governments. The power to enact strategic liberalization, however, clearly depended on the country at issue. As shown by the Berlin Conference convened in 1884–1885 to settle European rivalries over the so-called scramble for Africa, free trade and liberalization "meant nothing other than the naked exploitation of raw materials from the colonies" (Dembour and Stammers 2018, p. 174; see also Rodney 1972). And while the need for the colonies to keep their markets open to the trade of all nations was enshrined in the early legal instruments contemplating their future self-determination (articles 22 and 23, League of Nations, 1920), the imperial powers continued to protect their domestic markets.

The mismatch between free trade theory and government practice was to provide one important continuity between the Empire of Free Trade of the nineteenth century and the international trade relations of the twentieth century, although the old imperial regime was to give way to a new multilateral trade system.

Free Trade and the Post-war Multilateral Trading System

The assumptions about the universal beneficial effects of trade liberalization were refined at the beginning of the twentieth century when Ohlin (1933) introduced the neo-classical reformulation of free trade theory. For them, international trade arises not because of the differences in labor productivity alone (as Ricardo had thought) but because countries are "endowed" with different supplies of the factors of production, and different supplies entail different prices. The policy prescription of the "factor-endowment model" is that countries that are endowed with large supply

of labor should specialize in the production of labor-intensive products, while countries rich in capital and/or technology should specialize in the production of capital and/or technology-intensive goods. The post-war international division of labor is said to be based on these "universal" principles, which are then supposed to have been translated into multilateral law with the entry into force of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. The GATT, which applied to trade in goods, did not eliminate tariffs and other forms of government intervention overnight but contained legally binding obligations for contracting parties to progressively reduce these measures. This commitment to liberalization was deemed necessary to enable "market prices" to reflect "real prices" as closely as possible, thereby facilitating the operations of comparative advantage on the world market.

The problem with this view of the post-war international trade system is that it cannot explain why sectors of major export interest to the soon-to-be independent countries – taking the logic of the factor endowment model at face value – were excluded from liberalization. Agriculture and, in the 1960s, textiles were not subject to the same liberalization rules that applied to manufacturing and remained largely protected in industrialized countries through tariffs, non-tariff measures, and subsidies. In other words, the free trade principles were said to inform that legal system could not, once again, explain trade practice. This differential treatment was enshrined in the law of the GATT despite the concerns articulated by the seven so-called "less developed" countries which denounced the double standards embodied by multilateral trade rules (Brown 1950). Expressed in part through arguments about the past of colonial exploitation that had shaped the state of their economies, these concerns were dismissed because the conference, it was claimed, dealt with purely "economic" matters, while "political" claims in relation to colonialism and "development" were best dealt with within the United Nations. Former colonies, however, gradually acquired independence (except Latin American countries which had become independent in the nineteenth century) and by the 1960s could

count on their numerical superiority to articulate their discontent with the international trade system. "Developing" countries saw the GATT as "structurally" disadvantaging their trade for at least three reasons. First, GATT law treated industrial products differently from primary products, enabling protection of the latter and therefore curtailing the earnings newly independent countries were expected to make according to free trade theory. Secondly, as more and more independent countries came to specialize on raw materials and primary commodities (the other sector of export relevance to their economies), their prices started to plummet because of the "rigid" demand from industrialized countries, again compromising their export earnings. And finally, as GATT law did not allow developing countries to support their "infant" industries, their manufactures were unable to compete with goods from industrialized countries.

These concerns were articulated in terms of dependency, core-periphery, and world systems theories (e.g., Prebisch 1959; Frank 1969; Cardoso 1973; Amin 1976; Wallerstein 1979). Despite their differences, these schools placed their emphasis on the structural inequalities generated by the international economic system, of which the trading regime was an integral part. Their insight was that past colonial and capitalist relations had generated an international system in which those countries which were the centers of capital accumulation still relied on the economies of other countries to export goods and capital and extract cheap materials to sustain underconsumption or overproduction at home. This system in turn generated unequal relations concerning technological development and terms of trade (Fischer 2015). Raul Prebisch, one of the major exponents of the dependency school, became the first Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), around which many countries coalesced in the 1960s to demand structural change of the international system as a whole. UN resolutions such as the one on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the one launching the New International Economic Order extended beyond trade and contained proposals for reforming international economic relations, including those concerning foreign investment. Trade and investment law and policy were indeed seen as closely connected as they concerned the regulation of the movement of goods and capital. Originally, when the rules of the post-war international economic system were designed, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was meant to administer both trade and investment rules. It never came into force due to the refusal of the US Congress to ratify the Charter, and what was instead adopted was its chapter on trade, which then became the GATT.

The attempt to obtain multilateral rules favorable to foreign investors was however never abandoned. As Sornarajah has pointed out, the emerging international law on foreign investment, a creature of the post-colonial period, represented an attempt by capital exporting countries to argue for the existence of international norms and standards that allowed for the protection of foreign investors beyond the level provided by the domestic laws and courts of the newly independent states (Sornarajah 1994). These efforts were successful to an extent, particularly as bilateral investment treaties signed between capital importing and capital exporting countries contained high standards of protection, including the obligation to not discriminate between foreign and domestic investors. But they did not succeed at multilateral level as capital importing countries resisted both the call to adopt a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would have provided uniform high standards of treatment (Picciotto 1998); and also attempts made through arbitration to universalize these standards by deeming them to have acquired the status of customary international law (Sornarajah 1994).

Reforms were however achieved within the multilateral trade system. Developing countries' engagement with the structural inequalities of the GATT resulted in their right to not reciprocate when industrialized countries made tariff concessions (GATT, Part IV). This exception to the reciprocity principle of the GATT prepared the ground for so-called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). While for some scholars non-

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reciprocity – together with the refusal to extend national treatment to foreign investors at the multilateral level – resulted in considerable levels of industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s (Rodrik 1997), others point to the fact these countries would have achieved better results had full liberalization been rolled out (Lal 1983). And the second argument seems to have prevailed in the 1990s when the neo-liberal revolution of the multilateral trade regime took place (Lang 2011).

There were however important material factors that played a role in such a transformation, including the end of Cold War with the respective spheres of geo-political influence (Faundez 2017); the debt crisis that many countries in the Global South which had borrowed from the United States experienced as a result of its decision to increase interest rates; the structural adjustment policies that were imposed to reschedule their debt requiring countries to liberalize their tariff regimes (Gowan 1999; Tan 2014); and, importantly, the loss of competitiveness that the old industrial centers (United States, Europe, and Japan) witnessed as newly industrialized countries took the lead in manufacturing. Indeed, if in 1972 North Western European countries and the United States were still responsible for over a half of world exports, the situation had changed greatly in the 1990s as Asia had increased its share "from about a sixth to a third, at the expense of all other continents" (Federico and Tena-Junguito 2018). The search for new comparative advantage in the three industrial centers was therefore on and it accelerated at the end of the 1980s: the loss of competitiveness in manufacturing, it was thought, could be compensated by the gains to be made through the liberalization of services and capital, on the one hand, and the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), particularly those on technological innovations, on the other (Preeg 1995).

The post-war multilateral trading system could not "liberate" the new comparative advantage because it only dealt with trade in goods – and mainly industrial goods given the fact that agriculture continued to be protected. The World Trade Organization (WTO) established in 1995 accomplished such an objective: it extended free trade universal assumptions to areas not covered by the GATT, including services, investment, and intellectual property rights. But there was also a qualitative change in the way the multilateral trade system was to approach the regulatory powers of members states. Whereas the GATT had embodied a system of negative regulation in that it prevented states from discriminating against foreign (industrial) goods for protectionist purposes, the WTO enacted a system of positive regulation (Ostry 1990) detailing what states had to do to comply with WTO norms and mandated standards such as those relating to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and so-called technical barriers to trade. As Lang (2011) has pointed out, "ideas," particularly those articulated by trade lawyers, played a role in this transformation. Chief among these was the adoption and elevation of the world market as a "free" market, a space unencumbered by obstacles, particularly those posed by government regulation, that may disturb the conditions of "perfect" competition. The key move, he has argued, was "to define a barrier to trade primarily in terms of its economic effects, rather than its form or intention. In this approach, a governmental action constituted a barrier to trade if – and to the extent that – it 'distorted' the conditions of competition . . . as compared to the conditions of competition which would exist in an imagined 'free' market. . ." (2011, pp. 226–227).

The imagined "freedom" involved in this global market was, as Marx noticed with respect to "free" trade, that of capital: when the rules on the uniform protection of IPRs and the liberalization of services and investment are considered together with those requiring countries to adopt standards and regulations which had been set in the three industrial centers – the WTO emerges as a powerful legal structure, supported by an effective dispute settlement system, that provides ample support for foreign investors and their capital (Alessandrini 2010). And while the WTO agreement on services also provides for the liberalization of "natural persons," the movement of labor, particularly unskilled labor, continues to be impeded, and agricultural goods continue to be highly protected in the Global North (Hunter 2003; Orford 2015).

The mismatch between free trade theory and practice is therefore a characteristic of the post-war multilateral trade system. This discrepancy is made possible, at least in part, because the economic and legal regimes of "developing" states continue to be regarded as "inadequate" or "deficient." Within the GATT, developing countries' economic policies, especially those relying on import substitution, were seen as failing to deliver higher volumes of trade, comparable to those of industrialized nations, and improved standards of living. With the WTO, the "lack" of appropriate institutional arrangements is considered responsible for the ineffective working of the markets so that in addition to the new standards (Intellectual Property standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical standards, and regulations) developing countries have to implement mechanisms such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (which monitors countries' compliance with WTO norms) and the Integrated Framework (which provides assistance to those least developing countries that integrate trade in their growth plans) have been put in place to ensure that countries' legal regimes are kept in check.

Global Free Trade and Imperial (Dis) continuities

What does this very limited excursus into the evolution of the post-war multilateral trade system say about imperialism and the ideology of free trade with which Gallagher and Robinson were concerned? By considering the complementarity between formal and informal rule, together with the mismatch between free trade theory and actual practice, they came to the conclusion that imperialism was "a sufficient political function of th[e] process of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character [being] largely decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and time" (1953, p. 5). There have been more recent attempts to engage with their work. Desai, for example, has called for an understanding of these complex and changing relationships in terms of "uneven and combined development" where past dominance by single powers, whether actual or attempted, is being replaced with a multipolar system in which powerful countries attempt to "maintain unevenness and resolve the contradictions of their capitalisms at the expense of weaker ones – but are less likely to have their way in the face of more numerous and stronger contenders and larger populations capable of aspiring to more than bare survival" (Desai 2013, p. 17).

The evolution of the post-war international trade system points to ceaseless attempts by leading trading powers to maintain economic dominance through a discourse about "free" trade and its universal validity and desirability which finds correspondence neither in the international trade law that is supposed to translate it nor in the practice of the multilateral trade system that is supposed to give it effect. In this sense there is continuity in the way "free" trade rhetoric is invoked as universally beneficial while selective trade interests are being pursued instead. From this angle "free" trade and international trade law can be seen as informal mechanisms of control and capitalist expansion which remain important areas of analysis for studies of imperialism (Gracott and Grady 2014) together with the way in which "development" discourses continue to order societies and prescribe courses of action in the name of a superior economic rationality (Anghie 2000). However, there are also arguments about discontinuities that merit attention.

It is, for instance, argued that the non-reciprocity developing countries obtained through their denunciation of the structural imbalances created by the GATT left them relatively free to not comply with its obligation to reduce tariffs on manufactured goods, even as industrialized countries reduced theirs. The claim is that GATT rules allowed for policy space, and scholars make a similar point with regard to the flexibilities built in the WTO system (Santos 2012). It is however important to acknowledge that this freedom was relative for, while developing countries were allowed to support their industries under the GATT, their exports continued to be hindered and the associated earnings continued to be compromised. Also, as soon as the conditions of competitiveness

changed against "old" industrialized countries, charges of "unfair" trade practices were levied against newly industrialized countries, anti-dumping duties were imposed on their products to protect domestic markets, and non-reciprocity was eventually withdrawn in favor of an "equal" playing field that required all countries to reciprocate (Gibbs 1998, p. 3). This freedom was relative also because, while it became possible to talk about exceptions from the norm the multilateral trade system embodied (i.e., trade as a means to accumulate capital in order to "develop"), the norm itself was never open to challenge: countries could opt for more or less liberalization but they had to industrialize, grow, and "develop." Indeed, "development" has played a crucial role alongside the myth of free trade in the transformation of entire societies in the wake of decolonization (see Escobar 1995; Pahuja 2013). And, finally, the policy space of individual states continues to be relative because regulatory autonomy is always affected by (trans)national arrangements that shape the global economy, not only trade and investment arrangements but also those concerning global finance, whether states are formally part of them or not (Linarelli et al. 2018).

Another argument concerns the shift in the global balance of power that is associated with the rise of China and other emerging economies, which are increasingly seen as leading sites of capital accumulation capable to resist the demands of powerful trading nations. For instance, during the first and only round of WTO negotiations, the Doha Round, developing countries have formed coalitions to block attempts by the United States and the European Union in particular to negotiate multilateral rules providing further protection to foreign investors (Faundez 2017). The inability to pursue this agenda at WTO level is seen by some as having contributed to the surge of mega-treaties like the suspended Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – with which the United States and EU would have agreed to enhanced liberalization of trade and protection of foreign capital; and the now defunct Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), with which the United States has attempted to get countries relying on access to its market to

agree to higher standards of protection of foreign capital, thereby also trying to curb the rising influence of China (O'Donoghue and Tzouvala 2016). The US administration has abandoned such efforts in favor of direct trade action against China, allegedly because of her "unfair" trade practices, in a move that is reminiscent of US actions against newly independent countries in the 1980s (Gibbs 1998, p. 3). China has indeed become a permanent concern for leading agencies of capital accumulation. This seems to be confirmed by recent trade data which shows that: "Until the early 1990s, the fall in the share of 'old rich', from 56% to about 40% of world exports, was compensated by the relative increase of exports from the 'other OECD' countries – most notably Japan. [However] In the last 15 years, exports from the advanced countries decreased further to slightly over a third, the other OECD countries returned to a sixth, their level for the 1970s, and the 'rest of Asia' (mostly China) jumped to a quarter of the world market" (Federico and Tena-Junguito 2016, pp. 1–2).

The dominant position that former imperial states enjoyed within the multilateral trade system in the post-war period is thus no longer taken for granted; however, whether changes in trade imbalances conclusively point to a shift in the global balance of power is an open question. Scholars have, for instance, pointed out that, although capitalism has always been transnational, since the 1970s production has become increasingly more fragmented, taking place through global chains and networks, which makes it difficult to ascertain the value produced by each firm operating along these chains as well as that captured by states where these firms are supposed to reside (Hamilton and Gereffi 2009). From this standpoint conventional trade data, particularly that concerning trade balances, says very little about global power relations. One particular issue, as Fischer has argued, is that the current system of international accounts is still based on an outdated conception of the post-war world where capital flows were restricted and international trade consisted of national economies exchanging final goods and services with one another. As he points out: "The difficulties such

a system faces in accounting for activities between a transnational parent company and its foreign affiliates, for instance, help to explain the dissonance between the deterioration of recorded US trade balances and the increased profitability of US companies operating in the global market" (2015, p. 721). These difficulties call into question the argument according to which shifts in geopolitical power are reflected neatly into trade imbalances; at the same time, they point to the need for more thorough investigations into the ways in which economic value is produced and distributed along these chains to understand how commercial expansion and capital accumulation take place in the global economy.

The pitting of "free" trade against protectionism, which can be traced back to the nineteenth century and the debates Gallagher and Robinson examined, does little to address these complexities so to explore those "changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion" that give imperialist processes their character (1953, p. 5). The multilateral trade system appears today more complex and fragmented than it was in the post-war period. Taking a longer historic look at these changing relationships, however, reveals that "imperial formations" are constantly shifting and have never been "steady states" in the sense of being securely bounded, regular or well regulated within stable geographical boundaries (Stoler 2006, pp. 135–136). For its part, international trade law has provided and continues to provide a powerful mechanism through which these formations are articulated; it does not simply translate free trade theory into, acting as conduit for, international trade practice.

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Global Health and US Imperialism

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Interventions in the field of public health are a significant form of "soft power" by which imperialism extracts profits from the world's poorest billions. US involvement in the health field is intended, inter alia, to help ensure efficient use of low-cost labor in transnational production chains; to support and rationalize military interventions; to create and exploit worldwide markets for health-care products, especially pharmaceuticals; and broadly to consolidate control over the lives and bodies of Global South people. Crucial to the enterprise is a complex network of charitable foundations, US government initiatives,

international institutions, national health ministries, and NGOs, all steered by the interests of Western capital. By far the most influential force within this network is the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), the world's largest private charity.

"Global health imperialism" has been characterized as an informal system with the following features:

- Global health crises are held to *originate from* poor countries and constitute a *threat to* wealthy countries. Response to such crises is regarded as a security concern.
- Westphalian national sovereignty is considered an impediment to effective management of transnational health issues.
- Overarching health-care planning, policies, and programs for the people of poor countries are determined by the experts and financiers of wealthy countries. Foundation funding is used as leverage to ensure that national health systems cannot function independently.
- Existing national and local health-care management is subordinated to, and must be cooperative with, the goals of Big Philanthropy and Western capitalism.
- Militarization of health-care delivery and disaster management is deemed appropriate and necessary. Military forces involved are drawn from the United States, NATO, and allied countries.
- Health philanthropy is modeled on the philosophy and practices of private corporations. Health-care funding is conceived as an investment activity; quantifiable return on investment is the guiding principle for grant-making.
- Big philanthropy underwrites vertical initiatives potentially profitable to Western-based transnational corporations – for example, vaccines and other pharmaceuticals – instead of supporting primary care and strengthening national health systems. Drugs and other health-care commodities produced by Western TNCs are financed by the taxes of the poor.
- Existing systems of international health-care governance are being superseded by new forms of supranational governance comprising

the formal institutions of global capitalism – the World Bank, the G7 – as well as health-related TNCs, the major US- based foundations, and associated networks of NGOs. The scope for democratic participation by the people in their own health care is radically narrowed (Levich 2015: 732).

Health philanthropy is nevertheless widely seen as a creditable endeavor. Like the *mission civilisatrice*, it allows the global ruling class to conceal its operations behind humanitarian postures.

History

Systematic public health regimes originated as military programs during the era of colonial expansion. Florence Nightingale's advocacy in the wake of the Crimean War inspired the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Health of the Army, which instituted sanitation measures in order to slow the death rate among British troops occupying India. Modern epidemiology can be traced back to the efforts of US Army physician Walter Reed, who studied yellow fever in order to facilitate the construction of the Panama Canal.

Private charities entered the field as colonial conquests were consolidated, and the West became concerned with maximizing the exploitation of imperialized labor. The first schools of tropical medicine were established in Britain and the United States in the late nineteenth century with the explicit aim of increasing the productivity of colonized laborers while safeguarding the health of their white overseers. As a journalist wrote in 1907:

> Disease still decimates native populations and sends men home from the tropics prematurely old and broken down. Until the white man has the key to the problem, this blot must remain. To bring large tracts of the globe under the white man's rule has a grandiloquent ring; but unless we have the means of improving the conditions of the inhabitants, it is scarcely more than an empty boast. (quoted in Brown 1976: 897)

Hence the formation of the Rockefeller Foundation, incorporated in 1913 with the initial goal of eradicating hookworm, malaria, and yellow

fever. In the colonized world, public health measures encouraged by Rockefeller's International Health Commission yielded increases in profit extraction, as each worker could now be paid less per unit of work, "but with increased strength was able to work harder and longer and received more money in his pay envelope" (Brown 1976: 900). As well as enhanced labor efficiency – which was not necessarily a critical challenge to capital in regions where vast pools of underemployed labor were available for exploitation – Rockefeller's research programs promised greater scope for future US military adventures in the Global South, where occupying armies had often been hamstrung by tropical diseases.

As Rockefeller expanded its international health programs, typically in close collaboration with US government agencies, additional advantages to the imperial core were realized. Modern medicine promoted the benefits of capitalism to "backward" people, undermining their resistance to domination by imperialist powers while helping to create a native professional class increasingly receptive to neocolonialism and dependent on foreign largesse. Rockefeller's president observed in 1916: "[F]or purposes of placating primitive and suspicious peoples medicines have some advantages over machine guns" (Brown 1976: 900).

After World War II, public health philanthropy became closely aligned with US foreign policy as neocolonialism thrust "development" on Third World nations. The major foundations collaborated with USAID and allied agencies in support of interventions aimed at increasing production of raw materials while creating new markets for Western manufactured goods. A section of the US ruling class, represented most prominently by Secretary of State George Marshall, argued that increases in the productivity of tropical labor would require greater investments in social infrastructure including public health. In a 1948 address to the Fourth International Congress of Tropical Diseases and Malaria, Marshall, a leading architect of US policy during the early years of the Cold War, outlined a grandiose vision of health care under "enlightened" capitalism:

Little imagination is required to visualize the great increase in the production of food and raw materials, the stimulus to world trade, and above all the improvement in living conditions, with consequent cultural and social advantages, that would result from the conquest of tropical diseases. (quoted in Packard 1997: 97)

Paul Hoffman, president of the Ford Foundation during the 1950s, regarded public health programs as defensive weapons in the Cold War: "[T]he Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War taught the 'lesson' that Communism thrived on social and economic disorder" (Hess 2003: 319); the mission of postwar philanthropy was therefore to encourage development schemes that might pacify Third World peoples. The seminal Gaither Report, commissioned in 1949 by Ford, explicitly charged the foundations with advancing "human welfare" in order to resist the "tide of Communism . . . in Asia and Europe" (Gaither 1949: 26).

Prestige in the field of public health became especially important to the United States as Third World governments and peoples learned of the tremendous achievements of socialist health programs. Inspired by the "barefoot doctor" program that revolutionized public health in the People's Republic of China, the 1978 International Conference on Primary Health Care promulgated the Alma Ata Declaration, reframing public health as a collaborative effort among sovereign nations and embracing the goal of "health for all." Alma Ata proposed a philosophy of primary care in which the people were held to have "a right and duty to participate individually and collectively in the planning and implementation of their health care" (Declaration of Alma Ata 1978). Wealthy states and philanthropists were encouraged to assist the developing world but only on condition of respecting local concerns and national sovereignty.

In response to Alma Ata, US foundations and ministries sought to strike a delicate balance, operating so as to placate Third World peoples without unduly encouraging real reform or de facto independence. In rare cases, the foundations relinquished control of infrastructure and trained personnel to national health ministries, but in no case were the health systems of imperialized countries permitted to become self-sustaining, and actual investment in Third World health care was meager

in comparison with the extravagant promises of Cold War rhetoric. Nevertheless, manufacturing a semblance of collaboration with Third World governments was deemed necessary in the context of the postwar struggle for "hearts and minds." With the end of socialism in Russia and China, however, both the theory and practice of international health assistance underwent a drastic change.

Global Health Governance

The concept of "global health governance" (GHG) arose in the West in the early 1990s, reflecting Washington's confidence that the fall of the Soviet Union would usher in a unipolar world dominated by US interests. President Bush's announcement of a "new world order" found its way into scholarship as "global governance," describing a loosely defined transnational regime effectively led by the United States and consisting of both public institutions and some combination of private actors, including TNCs, private foundations, and NGOs. This was a vision of diffuse, omnipresent power to be exercised collaboratively by the institutions of global capitalism and guaranteed, in the last resort, by the US military. Such a regime would function most effectively without the traditional impediments of democratic accountability and Westphalian sovereignty (see Levich 2015).

In the field of public health, "nonstate actors" – meaning primarily foundations, NGOs, and public-private partnerships (PPPs) – were recognized as having significant scope and authority to function in an area once reserved to national governments. The Alma Ata principles became moot as structural adjustment programs demanded disinvestment in public health throughout the developing world. In their place arose a profusion of foundation- and state-sponsored NGOs, based primarily in the West and funded more or less directly by multibillionaires. As national health systems were hollowed out, health spending by donor countries and private foundations rose dramatically. Far from providing support for national health-care operations, the new global philanthropic regime systematically bypassed or compromised national health ministries via "public-private partnerships" and similar schemes. Western governments and foundations saw an opportunity to affect a "shift to a post-Westphalian framework" (Ricci 2009: 1).

The attenuation of national sovereignty is only rarely discussed as a conscious aim of GHG. Instead, global health governance is proposed as a necessary defense against disastrous transnational epidemics. The world, advocates say, now stands at a critical, unprecedented juncture – one at which the acceleration of cross-border travel, urbanization, and trade has made "emerging infections" inevitable and potentially catastrophic. The menace is framed in terms reflecting colonialist assumptions and summoning racial fears: communicable diseases are invariably discussed as phenomena *emerging from* poor countries and *threatening to* the Western world.

Hence, GHG was easily folded into the larger discourse of "security" that arose in the wake of the 9/11. Worldwide alarm about bioterrorism provided an opportunity to "link together two previously separate fields: health and national/international security" (Rushton and Youde 2015: 18). This linkage was envisioned as reciprocal: not only would health-care workers "open up a medical front in the War on Terror" (Elbe 2010: 82), but also military forces would routinely be mobilized as a response to health disasters. For example, global health security was a major pretext for the US response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which entailed military invasion, occupation, and ruthless commandeering of national resources and governmental operations. Imperial interventions in the health field began to be justified in the same terms as recent "humanitarian" military interventions: "[N]ational interests now mandate that countries engage internationally as a *responsibility to protect* against imported health threats or to help stabilize conflicts abroad so that they do not disrupt global security or commerce" (Novotny et al. 2008: 41; emphasis added).

Some analysts denounced the militarization of public health as worryingly authoritarian and strategically counterproductive, but to Bill Gates, the world's second richest man, it was a welcome development:

> One of the things I am saying that is pretty radical – and people may disagree – I'm saying the military should be cross-trained not just for military action but for natural disasters and epidemics. … If you pair them with this so-called medical corps, you get something pretty dramatic without spending. (Fried 2015)

Gates' endorsement was especially significant because his foundation had become the leading exemplar of philanthropy in the era of global health governance.

The Gates Foundation

Established in 1999 and initially endowed with a portion of Bill Gates' Microsoft riches, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) is now by far the world's largest private foundation; with more than $50 billion in assets, it dwarfs once-dominant players such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation (BMGF 2017). Within the United States, BMGF invests in "education reform" (i. e., school privatization), but the bulk of its activities are directed at the people of the imperialized world, where its ostensible mission involves providing birth control and combatting infectious diseases.

BMGF exercises power not only by means of its own spending but also through steering an elaborate network of "partner organizations" including nonprofits, government agencies, and private corporations. As the third largest donor to the UN's World Health Organization (WHO), it is a dominant player in the formation of global health policy. It orchestrates elaborate public-private partnerships – charitable salmagundis that tend to blur distinctions between states, which are at least theoretically accountable to citizens, and profit-seeking businesses that are accountable only to their shareholders. BMGF is the chief funder and prime mover behind prominent "multi-stakeholder initiatives" such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (formerly GAVI), a public-private partnership between the World Health Organization and the vaccine industry. Such arrangements permit BMGF to leverage its stake in allied enterprises, much as private

businesses enhance power and profits through strategic investment schemes.

The Foundation funds NGOs that lobby governments to increase spending on the very initiatives that it sponsors. The powerful NGO known as PATH (Program for Appropriate Technology in Health), which supports the development and distribution of vaccines, is funded by BMGF and is so closely linked to the Foundation that it functions effectively as a subsidiary. From time to time, BMGF also intervenes directly in the agendas and activities of national governments. Although Foundation publicity frequently bemoans the sorry state of public health care in the imperialized world, BMGF declines to spend its funds on rehabilitating the national health apparatus of poor countries. Instead, it invests almost exclusively in health-care "verticals" – initiatives targeting specific diseases and other health conditions that can be managed from top to bottom by the Foundation and allied organizations. The effect is to outflank and further disable health ministries already crippled by neoliberal disinvestment.

BMGF has been compared to "a massive, vertically integrated multinational corporation (MNC), controlling every step in a supply chain that reaches from its Seattle-based boardroom, through various stages of procurement, production, and distribution, to millions of nameless, impoverished 'end-users' in the villages of Africa and South Asia" (Levich 2014). It is a functional monopoly in the field of public health. In the words of one NGO official: "You can't cough, scratch your head or sneeze in health without coming to the Gates Foundation" (Global Health Watch 2008: 251). The Foundation's global influence is now so great that former CEO Jeff Raikes was obliged to declare: "We are not replacing the UN. But some people would say we're a new form of multilateral organization" (Pickard 2010).

BMGF, Big Pharma, and the Vaccine Business

The chief beneficiary of BMGF's activities is not the people of the Global South but the Western

pharmaceutical industry. The Gates Foundation's ties with the pharmaceutical industry are intimate, complex, and long-standing. Soon after its founding, BMGF invested $205 million to purchase stakes in major pharmaceutical companies, including Merck & Co., Pfizer Inc., Johnson & Johnson, and GlaxoSmithKline (Bank and Buckman 2002). The relationship has grown in subsequent years, creating a revolving door that now routinely shuttles executives between BMGF, Gates-controlled NGOs, and Pharma's Big Five.

This symbiosis between BMGF and Big Pharma arises from the particular requirements of pharmaceutical capital. Despite annual revenues approaching $1 trillion, the industry has been unable to reverse a declining rate of profit and finds itself in a perpetual state of crisis. Pharmaceutical innovation is trending downward, and the search for exploitable new molecules is becoming increasingly frantic and expensive. As drugs become more expensive and less efficacious, profit margins are increasingly undercut by necessarily massive marketing operations. Therefore, Big Pharma seeks to supplement declining sales and rising costs in wealthy Western countries by exploiting largely untapped "pharmerging markets." Since 70% of the world's population lives in countries so designated, profits are potentially enormous. Thus, BMGF's interventions, designed to create lucrative markets for surplus pharmaceutical products, are crucial to the industry.

BMGF's collaboration with Big Pharma is strikingly evident in the area of vaccines, Bill Gates's particular obsession and historically the central business of his foundation. BMGF entered the field in 1999 with a $50 million contribution establishing the Malaria Vaccine Initiative. Here, Bill Gates saw an opportunity for his fledging foundation to dominate, instantly and decisively, an entire field of charitable endeavor: "With one grant . . . we became the biggest private funder of malaria research. It just sort of blows the mind" (Strouse 2000). Since then, BMGF's involvement in vaccine development and delivery has been transformative, integrating private corporations and investment capital into a field where, until

quite recently, the profit motive had played a relatively minor role.

State-sponsored immunization programs spread widely during the twentieth century and doubtless saved millions of lives, especially in countries that were able to integrate immunization into robust public health programs. The most widely distributed vaccines were not patented. Although Big Pharma spokesmen were happy to take credit for immunization successes, vaccines were in fact a neglected corner of the drugs business; in the capitalist world, industry involvement was a matter of manufacturing doses and selling them in a buyer's market shaped by government procurement programs that tended to depress prices. Margins were so slim that by the mid-2000s, many firms contemplated exiting the business altogether ("A Smarter Jab" 2010).

BMGF's response has been to fund R&D aimed at creating new and reformulated vaccines that are patentable while eschewing involvement in the proven vaccines traditionally deemed necessary for robust immunization programs – those for diphtheria, mumps, pertussis, tetanus, etc. BMGF has consistently focused on promoting precisely the new and expensive "blockbuster vaccines" that pad Big Pharma's profit margins. The bulk of its early investments were geared toward immunization against pneumococcal disease (with a vaccine developed by Pfizer), hepatitis B (GlaxoSmithKline and Merck), and the flu-like bacterial infection Hib (Merck and Sanofi); over time, numerous branded drugs have been added to its roster. As of 2017, four of the five projected top-selling vaccine products worldwide – Pfizer's Prevnar-13, Merck's Gardasil, Sanofi's Pentacel, and GSK's Bexsero – had been heavily subsidized and promoted by the Gates Foundation (EvaluatePharma 2017: 22).

An additional advantage of vaccines to pharmaceutical capital is the sheer size of the market. Whereas the profit potential of most drugs is limited by their addressable population, i.e., sick people, vaccines address the universe of healthy people and are therefore exponentially more lucrative. Revisions to national immunization calendars in Global South countries can expand the addressable population by hundreds of millions;

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therefore, BMGF employs a variety of strategies to pressure health ministries into adopting branded vaccine products. For Big Pharma, this creates a predictable annual return and obviates the need to spend hundreds of millions on marketing.

Because poor countries are often reluctant to commit huge tranches of their meager health budgets to vaccine purchases, BMGF has developed a variety of financing mechanisms designed to assimilate national health systems into the global market. In 2009, Gavi pioneered the use of a new type of development financing, the Advance Market Commitment (AMC), as a means of subsidizing the sale of Pfizer's new pneumococcal vaccine, Prevnar, to low-income countries (Gavi 2009). Through Gavi, BMGF and five wealthy countries – Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Russia – offered a contract guaranteeing a viable market for the drug, committing to buy new vaccines at a negotiated high price purporting to cover development costs. The pilot country was impoverished Rwanda, which was converted overnight into a market for 1.6 million doses of the patented vaccine (Misbah and Ngoboka 2009). As a condition of the vaccine program, Rwanda agreed to add Prevnar to its routine national immunization program, though it was unclear how the country might hope to finance its commitment to future purchases once Gavi subsidies lapsed Sheikh & Ngoboka (2009). Soon thereafter, Benin, Central African Republic, and Cameroon were also enlisted, expanding the market by further millions. AMC financing proved so effective that Prevnar became the world's leading vaccine product, with projected 2022 sales of $6 billion (Evaluate Pharma 2017: 32). Gavi, meanwhile, had demonstrated "proof of concept" of an elaborate neoliberal scheme that transferred public funds to private coffers.

A more recent addition to Gavi's array of services is "innovative development financing," a debt-based mechanism that taps capital markets to subsidize vaccine buyers and manufacturers. Through an intermediary, the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm), Gavi floats bonds on the Japanese uridashi market. The bonds are secured by the promise of government donors to buy millions of doses of vaccines at a set price over periods as long as 20 years. The system is hailed in development circles as a neoliberal "win-win": although capitalists take a cut at every stage of the value chain, poor countries are said to benefit from access to vaccines that might not otherwise be affordable. Bondholders receive a tax-free guaranteed return on investment, suited to an era of ultra-low interest rates. For Gavi, this "organizational form without country presence" offers a powerful means of steering peripheral vaccine markets from the core while outflanking the political inconveniences of traditional development aid. Hence, IFFIm now annually supplies as much as 39% of Gavi's cash (Atun et al. 2012).

Pharmaceutical firms, meanwhile, are able to peddle expensive vaccines at subsidized prices in a cash-poor but vast and risk-free market:

> By creating a predictable demand pull, IFFIm addresses a major constraint to immunisation scale-up: the scarcity of stable, predictable, and coordinated cash flows for an extended period. (Atun et al. 2012).

Although Gavi's involvement in vaccine pricing is typically praised as though the organization is dedicated to setting price ceilings, in fact it acts invariably to raise the floor.

Recent BMGF/Gavi activities in Sri Lanka offer a virtual case study in what has been called "pharmaceutical colonialism." Gavi targeted the country in 2002, offering to subsidize a high-priced vaccine supplied by Crucell, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. The vaccine, known as pentavalent Hib, was a cocktail adding *Haemophilus influenzae* type b immunity to the traditional DTwP shot; it was this new formula that made the drug patentable and thus profitable. In exchange for Gavi's support, the country agreed to add the vaccine to its national immunization schedule. (The agreement was reached; it should be noted, against the backdrop of a genocidal civil war that left Sri Lanka's health ministry in desperate need of funds.)

Within 3 months of the vaccine's introduction, 24 adverse reactions including 4 deaths were reported, leading Sri Lanka to suspend use of the vaccine. Subsequently, 21 infants died from adverse reactions in India. Critics pointed out

that Hib is a minor public health issue in South Asia and that adverse reactions could be projected to cause the deaths of 3125 children for every 350 lives saved by the vaccine (Kalyanam 2013). Thus the customary argument in favor of new vaccines – that the significance of a few drug-related deaths is far outweighed by the number of lives saved – was flipped on its head. Nevertheless, WHO, a Gavi partner, promptly stepped in to declare the vaccine safe, whereupon Sri Lanka reversed the suspension. Presumably pressures were brought to bear both on WHO and the Sri Lankan government.

Once pentavalent vaccine was firmly ensconced in Sri Lanka's national immunization program, Gavi began to phase out its financial support. Sri Lanka continued to buy the Gates-prescribed vaccines, presumably diverting money from other areas of the public health budget. In effect, Gavi secured Sri Lanka's legal commitment to buy patented vaccines on an ongoing basis, using subsidized prices as a loss leader, and then left the country on the hook with a perpetual obligation to buy. Gavi calls this process "graduation." In a write-up appearing on Gavi's promotional website, Sri Lankan health minister Ananda Amarasinghe purported to reveal "the secrets behind the country's immunisation success story." Collaboration with the consortium has been effective, Dr. Anand suggests, because "our *colonial masters* established a good foundation" (Endean 2015; emphasis added).

Should financial schemes fail to create the markets required by pharmaceutical capital, imperialism may resort to more forceful methods. Actual or threatened military aggression is a reliable strategy. The de facto US/UN military occupation of Haiti following the 2010 earthquake provided an opportunity to thrust new healthcare schemes on the country, including a massive immunization program entailing purchases of an experimental rotavirus vaccine as well as patented pentavalent vaccines for diphtheria, tetanus, *Haemophilus influenzae* type B, and hepatitis B. (Evans 2013). Another typical form of pressure is the shakedown: the World Bank has proposed making development aid and debt relief conditional on the achievement of vaccine targets

(World Bank 2010: 33). The array of tactics available to the imperialists means that poor countries are all but powerless to resist. As public health journalist Srinivasan (2011) has written of PATH, "the agenda is to look for ways to introduce the vaccine into the national immunisation programme. The question is not 'whether' but 'when' and 'how.'"

Medical Experimentation

The US medical industry routinely uses imperialized nations as laboratories for new and often dangerous treatments and drugs. The practice is rooted in domestic medical experiments in which slaves, and later poor African-Americans, Native Americans, and Puerto Ricans, were used as guinea pigs for surgical procedures, radiation tests, and risky pharmaceutical trials. The "Tuskegee experiment" is only the most notorious of countless similar operations (see generally Washington 2006). After the civil rights struggle curtailed such practices within the United States, offshoring of medical experimentation became common.

Today, BMGF assists the pharmaceutical industry in relocating clinical trials to emerging markets, where drug safety testing is seen as relatively cheap, speedy, and lax. GlaxoSmithKline CEO Jean-Pierre Garnier has frankly characterized this process as "massive arbitrage" facilitated by globalization: "arbitrage in labour cost, in financial cost, but also in pools of skilled employees and in regulatory and administrative hurdles" (Petryna 2009: 82). According to anthropologist Adriana Petryna:

> The geography of clinical testing is changing dramatically. In 2005, 40 percent of all trials were carried out in emerging markets, up from 10 percent in 1991. . . . GlaxoSmithKline ran 29 percent of its trials outside the United States and Western Europe in 2004; by 2007, that figure grew to 50 percent. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals conducted half of its trials outside the United States in 2004; that figure rose to 70 percent in 2007. (Petryna 2009: 12)

The consequences of this strategy were briefly publicized in 2010, when seven adolescent tribal girls in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh died after

receiving injections of HPV (human papillomavirus) vaccines as part of a large-scale "demonstrational study" funded by the Gates Foundation and administered by PATH. The vaccines, developed by GSK and Merck, were given to approximately 23,000 girls between 10 and 14 years of age, ostensibly to guard against cervical cancers they might develop in old age.

Extrapolating from trial data, Indian physicians later estimated that at least 1200 girls experienced severe side effects or developed autoimmune disorders as a result of the injections (Mehta et al. 2013). No follow-up examinations or medical care were offered to the victims. Further investigations revealed pervasive violations of ethical norms: vulnerable village girls were virtually press-ganged into the trials; their parents bullied into signing consent forms they could not read by PATH representatives who made false claims about the safety and efficacy of the drugs. In many cases, signatures were simply forged.

An Indian Parliamentary Committee determined that the Gates-funded vaccine campaign was in fact a large-scale clinical trial conducted on behalf of the pharmaceutical firms and disguised as an "observational study" in order to outflank statutory requirements. The Committee found that PATH had "violated all laws and regulations laid down for clinical trials by the government" in a "clear-cut violation of human rights and a case of child abuse" (Parliament of India 2013). Once the flurry of newspaper coverage died down, BMGF and Big Pharma resumed and expanded offshore trials. In India in 2011, more than 150,000 people were involved in at least 1600 clinical trials, conducted on behalf of British, American, and European firms (Buncombe and Lakhani 2011). R&D offshoring is now so widespread in the Global South that clinical trials are considered a normal part of health-care delivery. As a South African newspaper declared: "We are guinea pigs for the drugmakers" (Child 2013).

Contraception and Population Control

The ideology of birth control embraces two very different traditions. Whereas feminists generally have supported contraception and abortion as a way of enhancing the health and freedom of women, capitalist elites have sought to leverage birth control in order to manage population trends, especially in the Global South. Marxist feminists warned that by the 1970s

> the influx of professionals into the cause [had] changed the goals of the birth control movement, from a campaign to increase the area of self-determination for women and all working-class people to a campaign infused with elitist values and operated in an elitist manner. These professionals were mainly of two groups: doctors and eugenists. (Gordon 1977: 10)

This transformation was enthusiastically sponsored by Western foundations and governments. The Rockefeller Foundation invested in eugenics research beginning in the 1920s and helped found the German eugenics program that undergirded Nazi racial theories (Black 2003). After a brief period during which widespread horror at Nazi atrocities forced eugenic theory underground – as neoconservative jurist Richard Posner lamented, Hitler had given eugenics "a bad name" (Posner 1992: 430) – a number of powerful white men, notably John D. Rockefeller III, became obsessed with "differential fertility." Taking note of the higher birth rate in poor countries, some imagined a future world overrun by hungry, unruly brown masses – people who would inevitably demand food and justice, enforcing their will through the sheer weight of numbers. Rockefeller organized the Population Council in 1953, predicting a "Malthusian crisis" in the developing world and financing extensive experiments in population control. These interventions were embraced by US government policymakers, who agreed that "the demographic problems of the developing countries, especially in areas of non-Western culture, make these nations more vulnerable to Communism" (Critchlow 1995: 85).

In India, traditionally the laboratory of choice for Western demographic experimentation, the Ford Foundation worked with USAID to tie development aid to "contraceptive acceptor targets," i.e., numerical quotas. Ford Foundation money, coupled with pressure from the Population Council and USAID, culminated in an era of

unbridled aggression in the area of government-sponsored "family planning" and incentivized a brutal sterilization campaign that forcibly vasectomized 6.2 million men and killed at least 1774 during the 1970s (Biswas 2014). Thereafter India redirected its efforts toward women, using a "target-driven" approach that resulted in further thousands of deaths and countless coercive procedures, often conducted in camps designed for mass sterilizations.

Widespread horror at these policies inspired the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), which issued a Programme of Action that became known as the "Cairo Consensus." The ICPD condemned coercion and repudiated sterilization quotas; however, much of the ICPD Programme reflected the values and imperatives of market capitalism, emphasizing above all "individual rights" that would permit "individual choice and responsible decision-making." At the same time, the ICPD's criticism of state actors meshed conveniently with a key part of the imperialist agenda: increased intervention by Western nongovernmental actors, not excluding private enterprise. The Population Reference Bureau declared with satisfaction that "NGOs, religious and community leaders, and the private sector (what the UN calls 'civil society') are now active partners with governments in deliberations on new policies and programs" (Population Reference Bureau 2004).

Thus Cairo set the stage for the 2012 London Family Planning Summit, at which representatives of more than 70 governments, NGOs, and private firms announced their financial commitments to a stunningly ambitious program of population control. Unlike the ICPD, which had made some gestures toward inclusion of Global South feminists, this was a top-down, ruling-class affair, organized and orchestrated by the Gates Foundation. Melinda Gates, who emerged as the world's most visible spokesperson for access to contraception, revealed that BMGF intended to donate $1 billion toward supplying birth control to 120 million women and prevent 110 million unwanted pregnancies by 2020 (Goldberg 2012); an additional $3.6 billion was pledged by organizations ranging from Planned Parenthood to the

foundations endowed by Michael Bloomberg and Hewlett-Packard. With one flamboyant stroke, commentators agreed, BMGF had moved contraception to the top of the global public health agenda.

The putative urgency of the project was puzzling to say the least. In fact the global rate of population growth had been in steep decline for more than four decades. From its peak of 2.1% in 1971, the rate had fallen to 1.17%, a postwar low, in the year of the London Summit (World Bank 2017). In order to marshal support for a crash contraceptive program targeting Third World women, BMGF and its allies had needed to manufacture a sense of crisis. This was done in part through a canny reframing of the issue of "differential fertility" that had so troubled an earlier generation of family planning advocates. The world's poorest countries, mostly in Africa, still reported alarmingly high fertility rates (the highest of these include Niger, with an average of 6.76 children born per woman; Burundi, 6.09; and Mali, 6.06 (CIA 2015). These numbers were repeatedly deployed by BMGF and friendly journalists in what appeared to be a coordinated effort to rekindle overpopulation hysteria. In the post-Cairo world, however, it was advisable to avoid any taint of racism and eugenics. Thus publicity surrounding the Summit blithely revived long-discredited arguments that overpopulation is the cause, rather than the result, of poverty, climate change, and all manner of social ills. According to Melinda Gates: "When women and their partners have access to contraceptives, everyone benefits. Maternal mortality rates drop, children are healthier and better educated, and incomes rise" (Gates 2015).

In fact, human fertility rates reflect prevailing social conditions and vary greatly across class, time, and region (Rao 2004: Chapter 3). Following the Industrial Revolution, Western countries underwent a "demographic transition" from large to small family sizes; this transition was linked to an improved standard of living and had very little to do with the availability of contraception. This rise in living standards was attributable largely to massive transfers of wealth from the periphery to the core; but while the West prospered, the

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imposition of imperialist forms of production on the periphery had profound social and economic consequences for poor countries. Imperialism "brought down death rates through modern technology but ... could not bring down birth rates because [it] increased social inequality and undermined the economic security and self-sufficiency of the masses" (Bandarage 1994: 43). Ironically, then, the West was able to complete demographic transition only through a system of exploitation that relied on the prevention of a similar transition in the South. Mahmood Mamdani's research demonstrated that Third World agricultural laborers and middle peasants required large families because family labor was essential to their survival and prosperity: children were needed both to work the land and to provide support for their parents in old age (Mamdani 1972). At the risk of oversimplifying, it is not "overpopulation" that causes poverty but vice versa.

Yet the contraception industry and its supporters persist in touting population control initiatives as the key to alleviating poverty, a myth is further cloaked in quasi-feminist rhetoric about "reproductive health" and "women's empowerment." According to Melinda Gates, such empowerment is to be achieved via the widespread distribution of long-acting, reversible contraceptives (LARCs) – primarily injectables like the notoriously dangerous Depo-Provera and subcutaneous implants such as Norplant. In a 2012 Newsweek profile, Melinda Gates described visiting remote clinics in sub-Saharan Africa where, she claims, women literally begged her for Depo-Provera injections – supposedly their only means of hiding contraceptive use from "unsupportive husbands" (Goldberg 2012). Injectables are ideally suited to Third World countries, she opined elsewhere, because they enable women to "receive a shot behind [their] husband's back" (quoted in Posel 2015). In the high style of imperial feminism, her putative support for poor women was yoked to disdain for poor men.

Publicly BMGF promotes LARCs in the name of freeing women to make responsible choices; however, there is reason to believe that Western family planners prefer these methods precisely because they afford Global South women *the least choice possible* short of actual sterilization. LARCs leave far more control in the hands of providers, and less in the hands of women, than condoms, oral contraceptives, or traditional methods. Some methods, like Norplant, can render women infertile for as long as 5 years.

Recent events in India suggest that LARCs are being promoted as a soft form of sterilization. The country's mass sterilization programs, which persisted even after Cairo, became politically inconvenient after 15 women died as a result of botched "cattle camp" tubal ligations in 2014. After a highly publicized meeting between Modi and Mr. and Mrs. Gates, the prime minister felt empowered to introduce injectable contraceptives in the national family planning program as a next best substitute for sterilization (Barry and Dugger 2016). Seventy prominent Indian feminists, scholars, and health workers signed a statement in vehement protest of the decision, to no avail (Nigam 2015).

Additional support for this view can be found in BMGF's close relationship with EngenderHealth, Inc., which is listed on the Foundation's website as a family planning "partner." Founded in 1937 as the Sterilization League for Human Betterment, the organization was frankly devoted to the eugenic project of "fostering all reliable and scientific means for improving the biological stock of the human race." Later, with funding from Hugh Moore, it was rechristened Birthright and during the 1970s played a lead role in USAID's sweeping sterilization campaigns in India and elsewhere in the Third World (Dowbiggin 2006). In the wake of Cairo, the organization rebranded yet again, downplayed promotion of sterilization as such, and shifted its focus to "long-acting and permanent methods" of contraception (LAPMs): intrauterine devices (IUDs), injections, and implants, as well as tubal ligations and vasectomies. To this end, EngenderHealth has received more than $36 million in BMGF funding. This close partnership between BMGF and an organization primarily devoted to the sterilization of Global South women makes little sense if "reproductive choice"

is indeed the goal. Rather, in a post-Cairo ideological climate that makes open advocacy of sterilization indecorous, BMGF and its partners apparently see long-lasting, provider-authorized contraception – effectively a form of temporary sterilization – as a politically acceptable means of top-down fertility control.

Pushing LARCs in India and other imperialized countries appears to be a means of quietly advancing the traditional population control agenda under the bright new banner of reproductive choice while not incidentally creating vast new markets for the pharmaceutical industry. The reasons underlying imperialism's ongoing commitment to population control are multifold and can be summarized as follows:

Ideology: The myth of overpopulation supplies reliable cover for the ruling class as it expropriates ever greater shares of the people's labor and the planet's wealth. Recently, for example, imperial ideologists have discovered the advantages of blaming climate change on population growth on the Global South. As stated in *Aspects of India's Economy*, "Malthus's heirs continue to wish us to believe that people are responsible for their own misery; that there is simply not enough to go around; and to ameliorate that state of wretchedness we must not attempt to alter the ownership of social wealth and redistribute the social product, but instead focus on reducing the number of people" (Chakrabarti 2014).

Global "security": The Western ruling class appears to share Dean Acheson's view – famously ridiculed by Mao Zedong – that population growth engenders revolutions by "creating unbearable pressure on the land" (Mao 1949). During the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the Chinese Revolution, it was commonly thought by US planners that too many Third World "mouths to feed" would inevitably create conditions hospitable to Communism. The fall of the USSR failed to alleviate such fears but instead transferred them to a new set of adversaries: popular resistance groups primarily located in the Middle East and typically designated with the catch-all term "terrorists." Thus the 1986 report of the US Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism warned that "population pressures create a volatile mixture of youthful aspirations that when coupled with economic and political frustrations help form a large pool of potential terrorists" (Public Report 1986: 1).

The Reserve Army: Population control can be seen as a way of optimizing the size and distribution of the global reserve army, thereby assisting the West in striking the balance necessary to maintain sufficient leverage over workers while controlling emergent resistance. Ruling class management of surplus labor does not necessarily require reducing the size of the world's population *tout court*; rather, the interventions contemplated are targeted toward specific regions and classes in a system of global "demographic arbitrage" recently proposed by European think tanks (European University Institute 2008).

Hegemony: Population control is, in a broader sense, one of the instruments of social control. It extends ruling-class jurisdiction more directly to the personal sphere, aiming at "full-spectrum dominance" of the developing world. Like laws regulating marriage and sexual behavior, such interventions in the reproduction of labor power are not essential to capitalists but remain desirable as a means of exercising ruling class hegemony over every aspect of the lives of the working people. Population control as such directly targets the bodies and dignity of poor people, conditioning them to believe that life's most intimate decisions are outside of their competence and control.

As ever, the relationship between bourgeois ideology and imperialist practice is dynamic and mutually supportive. As David Harvey has observed: "Whenever a theory of overpopulation seizes hold in a society dominated by an elite, then the non-elite invariably experience some form of political, economic, and social repression" (Harvey 2012: 63).

Outlook

In 2017, the World Health Organization granted BMGF "official relations" status, solemnizing its leading role in the international public health system. Later that year, when Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus was named WHO Director General, Bill Gates was widely understood to have been the kingmaker (Huet and Paun 2017). As a public health official in Ethiopia, Tedros had been deeply involved in BMGF initiatives, supportive of public-private partnerships, and given to bestowing lavish praise on the billionaire. Meanwhile, the militarization of health care proceeded apace: in 2018, amid escalating attempts to destabilize the Maduro government, the United States dispatched a 900-foot navy vessel to the coast of Venezuela, purportedly to provide medical care in aid of a "humanitarian crisis" (Daniels 2018). Current trends promise further expansion and consolidation of global health imperialism.

Yet resistance is growing. In 2016, after Filipino parents realized that a mass dengue vaccination program was making their children sick, protests and widespread vaccine refusal forced Sanofi to concede that its product, Dangvaxia, posed significant health risks. Subsequently, the Philippine government suspended the program, which unsurprisingly had been pushed and subsidized by BMGF (Editorial Board 2018). The Fourth Annual People's Health Assembly, held in Savar, Bangladesh, in 2018, brought together some 1200 grassroots health activists in protest of the neoliberal NGO-ization of health care. They called for a revival of the Alma Ata principles and denounced the health impacts of corporate power (Baum 2018). Further people's struggles for health justice can be expected. How much can be achieved in the absence of socialist revolution remains to be seen.

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'Global Labour Arbitrage' and the New Imperialism

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Synonyms

Capitalism; Exploitation; Global labour arbitrage; Marxism; Neoliberalism; Superexploitation; Value transfer; Wage differentials

Definition

This essay argues that the most significant transformation wrought by the past three decades of neo-liberal globalisation is the tremendous expansion of the southern proletariat, whose living labour contributes most of the value that is unequally shared between 'lead firms' headquartered in North America, Europe, Japan, and outsourced producers in the low-wage economies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This is the principal form taken by the 'global labour arbitrage'-driven globalisation of production, in which cheap and flexible workers in low-wage countries replace relatively expensive workers in the imperialist countries. It signifies a new, qualitative stage in the globalisation of the capital–labour relation, a principal result of which is the greatly enhanced dependency of northern capitalists on the super-exploitation of southern living labour. This reality is obscured by supposedly objective statistical data which records value generated by low-wage workers in countries from China to Bangladesh to Mexico as 'value-added' by firms – multinational corporations (MNCs) and their numerous service- providers – in the countries where there products are consumed. This new, qualitative stage in capitalism's evolution possesses a very specific quality: the globalisation of the capital–labour relation, in the context of and on the foundation of a pre-existing division of the world into oppressed and oppressor nations, entails the internalisation of this division. Neo-liberal globalisation is, therefore, the unfolding of the imperialist form of the capital relation.

> We have yet to see a systematic theory of imperialism designed for a world in which all international relations are internal to capitalism and governed by capitalist imperatives. That, at least in part, is because a world of more or less universal capitalism . . . is a very recent development. (Wood 2005/2003: 127)

Introduction

The most significant transformation wrought by the past three decades of neo-liberal globalisation is the tremendous expansion of the southern

proletariat, whose living labour contributes most of the value that is unequally shared between 'lead firms' headquartered in North America, Europe, Japan, and outsourced producers in the low-wage economies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This is the principal form taken by the 'global labour arbitrage'-driven globalisation of production, in which cheap and flexible workers in low-wage countries replace relatively expensive workers in the imperialist countries. It signifies a new, qualitative stage in the globalisation of the capital–labour relation, a principal result of which is the greatly enhanced dependency of northern capitalists on the super-exploitation of southern living labour. This reality is obscured by supposedly objective statistical data which records value generated by low-wage workers in countries from China to Bangladesh to Mexico as 'value-added' by firms – multinational corporations (MNCs) and their numerous service-providers – in the countries where there products are consumed. Another result is the transformation of the global working class: three decades ago, half of the world's industrial workers lived in low-wage countries, now 80% do. Neo-liberal globalisation has hurled the workers of the dominant nations and the workers of the global South together, in competition with each other and yet bound together in mutual interdependence, connected by globalised production processes, their labour power exploited by the same banks and MNCs. But this new, qualitative stage in capitalism's evolution possesses a very specific quality: the globalisation of the capital–labour relation, in the context of and on the foundation of a pre-existing division of the world into oppressed and oppressor nations, entails the internalisation of this division. Neo-liberal globalisation is, therefore, the unfolding of the imperialist form of the capital relation. The division of the world into oppressed and oppressor nations, which Lenin emphasised was the essence of imperialism, lives on in the form of the racial and national hierarchy that makes up the so-called 'global labour market'. To put this another way, the globalisation and global shift of production signifies that the oppression of nations is now internal to the capital–labour relation, giving rise to a mutant,

imperialist form of the law of value. This transformation of the essence of capitalism, of the capital–labour relation itself, was first proposed by Andy Higginbottom:

> The wage labour relation is not only between capital and labour, but between northern capital and southern labour. In this sense, class exploitation and racial or national oppression are fused …. The working class of the oppressed nations/Third World/global South is systematically paid below the value of labour power of the working class of the oppressor nations/First World/global North. This is not because the southern working class produces less value, but because it is more oppressed and more exploited. (Higginbottom 2011: 284)

As a result, this latest stage of capitalist development has been leading not to convergence with the 'advanced' countries and the waning of the North–South divide but to global apartheid, in which the southern nations have become labour reserves for super-exploitation by northern capitalists. The suppression of the free international movement of labour is the linchpin of a vast system of racism, national oppression, cultural humiliation, militarism, and state violence that imperialism has imposed on the proletarianised peoples of the world. It is a weapon of class warfare, wielded in order to enforce the highest possible overall rate of economic exploitation and to wage political counter-revolution – to divide and rule, to impede the emergence of the international working class as an independent political force fighting to establish its own supremacy.

This is imperialism on an entirely capitalist basis, in an advanced stage of its development, in which capitalism and its law of value has fully sublated the old colonial division of the world; in other words, it has discarded all that is inimical to it, and preserved and made its own all that is useful to its continued dominion. Just as Karl Marx could not have written *Capital* before its mature, fully evolved form had come into existence (with the rise of industrial capitalism in England), so it is unreasonable to expect to find, in the writings of Lenin and others writing at the time of its birth, a ready-made theory of imperialism capable of explaining its fully evolved modern form. This accords with a basic axiom

of materialist dialectics: there cannot be a concrete theoretical concept of a system of interaction which is not itself fully concrete and developed. An urgent task is still before us: to understand the evolution of the capital–labour relation in the era of what Jyoti Ghosh calls 'imperialist globalisation', in which the relation between capital and labour has increasingly become a relation between imperialist capital and low-wage southern labour. In other words, the task is to develop a theory of the imperialist form of the law of value.

Central to this task is the development of a concrete concept of 'super-exploitation'. For present purposes, exploitation and super-exploitation can be simply defined. If the working day comprises two parts – necessary labour-time (the time a worker takes to create value equal to what he/she consumes) and surplus labour-time (the time spent producing surplus value for the capitalist) – the rate of exploitation is the ratio between them. Super-exploitation signifies a higher rate of exploitation than the prevailing average domestic rate of exploitation within the imperialist economies. It is argued here that international wage differentials provide a distorted reflection of international differences in the rate of exploitation; and that northern capitalists, in ways to be explored, can increase their profits by relocating production to nations where the rate of exploitation is higher than average; that is, where living labour can be super-exploited.

Imperialism and super-exploitation are brought together in the increased dependence of northern capitalists on the proceeds of super-exploitation of low-wage workers in the global South, as captured in the term 'global labour arbitrage', which denotes the substitution of relatively highly paid domestic labour by low-wage southern labour. This can take the form of shifting production processes to low-wage countries or importing migrant labour from low-wage countries and super-exploiting them at home. The former, in the words of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is 'the more important and faster-expanding channel, in large part because immigration remains very restricted in many countries' (IMF 2007: 180).

Global Labour Arbitrage: 'An Increasingly Urgent Survival Tactic'

By uprooting hundreds of millions of workers and farmers in southern nations from their ties to the land or their jobs in protected national industries, neo-liberal capitalism has greatly stimulated the expansion of a vast pool of super-exploitable labour. Suppression of the free mobility of labour has interacted with this hugely increased supply to produce a dramatic widening of international wage differentials between 'industrialised' and 'developing' nations, vastly exceeding price differences in all other global markets. This steep wage gradient provides two different ways for northern capitalists to increase profits: through the emigration of production to low-wage countries, or the immigration of low-wage migrant workers. The IMF's *World Economic Outlook 2007* (IMF 2007), which included a special study of 'labour and globalisation', made the connection between outsourcing and migration quite precisely: 'The global pool of labour can be accessed by advanced economies through imports and immigration', significantly observing that '[t]rade is the more important and faster-expanding channel, in large part because immigration remains very restricted in many countries' (180). But not precisely enough: by the 'global pool of labour' they mean the global pool of low-wage labour.

What the IMF calls 'accessing the global labour pool' others have defined as 'global labour arbitrage' (sometimes 'global wage arbitrage'), whose essential feature, according to Stephen Roach, the economist most associated with this term, is the substitution of 'high-wage workers here with like-quality, low-wage workers abroad' (Roach 2004). Roach argues that '[a] unique and powerful confluence of three mega-trends is driving the global arbitrage'. These are 'the maturation of offshore outsourcing platforms . . . e-based connectivity. . . [and] the new imperatives of cost control' (Roach 2003: 6). Of these, 'cost control' is the most important, 'the catalyst that brings the global labour arbitrage to life'. The first two mega-trends, in other words, merely provide the necessary conditions for the third – reducing the

cost of labour – to express itself. Expanding on this, Roach explains that:

> In an era of excess supply, companies lack pricing leverage as never before. As such, businesses must be unrelenting in their search for new efficiencies. Not surprisingly, the primary focus of such efforts is labour, representing the bulk of production costs in the developed world; in the US, for example, worker compensation still makes up nearly 80% of total domestic corporate income. And that's the point: Wage rates in China and India range from 10% to 25% of those for comparable-quality workers in the US and the rest of the developed world. Consequently, *off-shore outsourcing that extracts product from relatively low-wage workers in the developing world has become an increasingly urgent survival tactic for companies in the developed economies*. (ibid., my emphasis)

This is a much sharper and richer description of neo-liberal globalisation's driving force than the one offered by the IMF's technocrats – or indeed than is to be found anywhere in the radical, 'value chain' or Marxist literature. We might ask, though, why Roach says 'extracts product' instead of 'extracts value' – capitalists, after all, are not interested in the product of labour but in the value contained in it. We suspect that to say 'extracts value' would imply that these workers create more wealth than they receive in the form of wages – in other words that they are exploited, challenging the very foundations of modern economic theory, which categorically denies that capitalism is a system of exploitation, and opening the door to its Marxist critique, which calls the difference between the value generated by workers and what is paid to them *surplus value,* the source and substance of profit in all its forms. It is notable that, in order to give the most concrete possible definition of this most important phenomenon, Roach felt obliged to dispense with the empty abstractions of mainstream economics and invoke Marxist concepts and, almost, Marxist terminology.

Despite being jargon, which can act as a code, giving access to those with the key while mystifying everyone else, there are two reasons why 'global labour arbitrage' is much more useful than any of the core concepts so far developed by value-chain analysts, proponents of global production networks, or neo-Marxist theorists of

'new imperialism' and 'transnational capitalism'. First, 'global labour arbitrage' foregrounds the labour–capital relation, spotlights the enormous international differences in the price of labour, and encompasses the two ways in which northern capitalists can profit from wage differentials: outsourcing and migration. Second, it focuses attention on the fragmented and hierarchically organised global labour market which gives rise to these arbitrage opportunities. 'Arbitrage', in the economists' lexicon, means profiting from imperfections in markets that are reflected in different prices for the same product. By communicating prices across segmented markets, arbitrage causes existing price differences to narrow, thereby improving the efficiency of markets and promoting their unification (in contrast, speculators bet on the future movement of prices, typically amplifying price swings) unless some artificial factor (in this case, immigration controls) intervenes to prevent price differences from being arbitraged away, in which case arbitrage becomes an opportunity for open-ended profiteering. In general, the bigger the market imperfections, the bigger are the price differences and the bigger the potential profits; and there's no market more imperfect than the global labour market. (For a useful discussion of the difference between arbitrage and speculation in modern financial theory, see Miyazaki 2007.)

That capitalist firms seek to boost profits by cutting wages is hardly a startling revelation. Their employees don't need Stephen Roach to tell them this. Indeed, Roach's advice is not intended to alert workers to the challenges they face but to advise capitalists what they need to do more of. Stephen Roach is not alone in according primacy to capitalists' voracious appetite for low-wage labour. Others include Charles Whalen, a prominent labour economist, who has argued that '[t]he prime motivation behind offshoring is the desire to reduce labour costs … a U.S.-based factory worker hired for $21 an hour can be replaced by a Chinese factory worker who is paid 64 cents an hour' (Whalen 2005: 13–40, 35). David Levy is another international business scholar who explicitly recognises that what he calls the 'new wave' of offshoring … is a much

more direct form of arbitrage in international labour markets, whereby firms are able to shift work to wherever wages are lower (Levy 2005: 685–693, 689). According to Levy, two things have unleashed this 'new wave': 'low-cost and instantaneous transmission of data that embed engineering, medical, legal, and accounting services' combined with 'the increasing organizational and technological capacity of companies, particularly multinational corporations, to separate and coordinate a network of contractors performing an intricate set of activities'. However, Levy considers 'increasing organizational and technological capacity' to be the 'core driver of the latest form of offshore sourcing', confusing the driving force (desire for cheap labour) with the means of harnessing this force.

Roach's views deserve the attention given to them here because when he expressed them he was not an academic viewing the world from an ivory tower but chief economist for Morgan Stanley, the leading investment bank, with particular responsibility for its very active Asian operations; and because he has gone further than most in analysing how and why wage arbitrage is the essence of outsourcing. Roach's emphasis on the 'extraction of product' from 'like quality' low-wage workers in India, China etc. by MNCs headquartered in 'developed economies' – and his plain speaking – contrasts with the general rule in academic and business literature, which is to obfuscate this most important point and treat labour as just one factor of production among others, making glancing, desultory references to wage differentials as one of a number of possible motives influencing outsourcing decisions. IBM CEO Samuel J. Palmisano gave a classic example of this in an article in *Foreign Affairs*:

> Until recently, companies generally chose to produce goods close to where they sold them …. Today… companies are investing more to change the way they supply the entire global market …. These decisions are not simply a matter of offloading noncore activities, nor are they mere labour arbitrage. They are about actively managing different operations, expertise, and capabilities so as to open the enterprise up in multiple ways, allowing it to connect more intimately with partners, suppliers, and customers. (Palmisano 2006: 127–136, 129–131)

Anwar Shaikh points out that 'cheap labour is not the only source of attraction for foreign investment. Other things being equal, cheap raw materials, a good climate, and a good location … are also important … But these factors are specific to certain branches only; cheap wage-labour, on the other hand, is a general social characteristic of underdeveloped capitalist countries, one whose implications extend to all areas of production, even those yet to be created' (Shaikh 1980: 204–235, 228).

Global Labour Arbitrage and the Theory of 'Comparative Advantage'

A survey of outsourcing literature published by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Hong Kong-based Fung Global Institute (FGI) asks two questions which serve well as a starting point for this discussion: 'Why did firms in advanced economies find it profitable to increasingly offshore tasks or parts of the production process to developing economies? And does international trade theory need a new framework to study this phenomenon of global supply chains?' (Park et al. 2013: 29). Their answer to the first question – 'Vast absolute differences in unskilled labour wages between developed and developing economies, driven by differences in factor endowments, made cross-border production sharing profitable' – accords well with Stephen Roach's concept of global labour arbitrage, and – if we strike out 'driven by differences in factor endowments' – shares its qualities of clarity and directness. 'Differences in factor endowments' is a euphemistic reference to the vast unemployed and underemployed reserve army of labour, dehumanised and converted by the bourgeois mind into a 'factor of production', and the purpose of its inclusion is to justify the authors' affirmative answer to their second question, which is that no, 'international trade theory' does not need a new framework. Production outsourcing to low-wage countries, the WTO-FGI researchers argue, 'stays true to the concept of comparative advantage, as defined by the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade' in which each country 'use[s] its relatively abundant factor of production relatively intensively' (30).

Fleshing out their 'concept of comparative advantage', the WTO-FGI researchers predict that 'a relatively unskilled, labour abundant developing economy would complete and export the relatively unskilled labour intensive tasks …. Similarly, a relatively capital or skilled labour intensive country would export intermediate products, such as capital goods and design and research and development services' (29–30). This boils down to a banal assertion that each country will try to use its resources to its own benefit. The Heckscher-Ohlin [H-O, sometimes rendered as H-O-S-S with the addition of Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson] model turns this simplistic truism into a theoretical model by making three false and far-fetched assumptions. The first is that products for final sale cross borders but 'factors of production' do not – there is no place in the H-O model for foreign direct investment or indeed any international capital flows, and this also rules out structural trade imbalances, since the resulting accumulation by one country of claims on the wealth of another is tantamount to foreign investment. As for the immobility of labour, this is treated as a fact of nature that needs no explanation. The second assumption is that all 'factors of production' are fully utilised, a necessary condition for 'equilibrium'; that is, for supply and demand to be balanced and for the 'factors of production' to be rewarded to the full extent of their contribution to their firm's output. It assumes, in other words, the validity of 'Say's law', after the classical economist Jean-Baptiste Say, who more than 200 years ago argued that supply creates its own demand. Heterodox economists question whether the ideal state resulting from these two assumptions has any practical relevance. Marxists argue that this ideal state is itself absurd, pointing to the third and most important of the fallacious assumptions upon which 'modern trade theory' and indeed the entire edifice of economic theory is based: the conflation of value and price, or the presumption that the value generated in the production of a commodity is identical to the price received for it. This conflation is achieved by making the production process invisible; the value of commodities is not only discovered but, in the world of marginalist economics, is determined by the confrontation in the marketplace between sovereign and equal individual buyers and sellers. As Marx said, the value of commodities 'seem[s] not just to be realised only in circulation but actually to arise from it' (Marx 1991/1894: 966). Modern trade theory, in essence, is constituted by substituting individual nations for individual property owners.

The WTO-FGI researchers contrast the H-O model of comparative advantage with what they call the 'Ricardian model': 'The Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade argues that technology is freely available across countries and hence comparative advantage is determined by relative factor endowments. In contrast, the Ricardian model of trade stresses differences in technology as the basis of international trade – countries tend to specialise in activities about which their inhabitants are especially knowledgeable' (Park et al. 2013: 30). The 'Ricardian model' is given its moniker because 'differences in technology' imply differences in the productivity of labour, and David Ricardo's original theory hinged on the difference in the productivity of weavers and winemakers in Portugal and England. Yet on closer inspection, this theory has much more in common with the H-O approach than with Ricardo's original theory. Ricardo, along with Karl Marx and Adam Smith, espoused the labour theory of value, according to which only one 'factor of production' – living labour – is value-producing; materials and machinery merely impart to the new commodities already-created value used up in the process of production (Bhagwati 1964: 1–84). Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin replaced Ricardo's labour theory of value with a two-factor (labour and capital) model in which the relative abundance of each determines where the supply and demand curves intersect, which in turn determines the value of commodities and thus the productivity of the labour that produces them. The so-called Ricardian model does essentially the same thing with its two-factor production function; both are founded on a tautological identification of value and price and on the circular reasoning which springs from this. The difference between them is where in the circle they choose as their starting point.

Outsourcing and Migration: Two Forms of Global Labour Arbitrage

The wildfire spread of outsourcing during the past three decades is the continuation of capital's eternal quest for new sources of cheaper, readily exploitable labour power. Nearly 150 years ago, Karl Marx gave prominent place, in his 1867 address to the Lausanne Congress of the International Workingmen's Association, to a prescient warning that 'in order to oppose their workers, the employers either bring in workers from abroad or else transfer manufacture to countries where there is a cheap labour force' (Marx 1867a). Intense rivalry between competing imperialist powers inhibited the development of this trend within Europe, but not so in North America, where, as Gary Gereffi's recounts, 'In the early 20th century in the United States, many industries . . . began to move to the US south in search of abundant natural resources and cheaper labour, frequently in 'right to work' states that made it difficult to establish labour unions. The same forces behind the impetus to shift production to low-cost regions within the United States eventually led US manufacturers across national borders' (Gereffi 2005: 4). What began as a trickle in mid-nineteenth-century Europe had become a steady stream in North America in the early twentieth century, and by the end of that century and the beginning of the next was an enormous floodtide, 'a systematic pattern of firm restructuring that is moving jobs from union to non-union facilities within the country, as well as to non-union facilities in other countries' (Bronfenbrenner and Luce 2004: 37–38).

The three quotations cited in the above paragraph have a common theme: a central motive of capitalists' outsourcing impulse is, in Marx's words, 'to oppose their workers', to negate efforts by workers to organise themselves into unions and counter employers attempts to force workers into competition with each other. Unfortunately, trade unions in the imperialist countries did not heed Marx's warning and nor did they act upon the advice which immediately followed it: '[g]iven this state of affairs, if the working class wishes to continue its struggle with some chance of success, the national organisations must become international'.

Aviva Chomsky, in *Linked Labour Histories*, a multi-layered study of the coevolution of the labour movements in New England and Colombia since the late 1900s, recounts how New England textile mills relocated first to North Carolina in the first decades of the twentieth century, then, in the 1930s, to Puerto Rico, thereby becoming the true pioneers of international production outsourcing in the Americas, before moving to Colombia and beyond in the post-war period. Chomsky points out that 'most accounts place this phenomenon in the second half of the 20th century. I argue that the events of the late 20th century continue a pattern begun by the earliest industry in the country, the textile industry, a century earlier' (Chomsky 2008: 294). She calls this phenomenon 'employers' 'capital flight' away from strong trade unions and towards cheap labour', and makes an essential observation: 'most accounts treat immigration and capital flight separately. My approach insists that they are most fruitfully studied together, as aspects of the same phenomenon of economic restructuring'. She also persuasively argues that '[c]apital flight [i.e. outsourcing] was one of the main reasons the textile industry remained one of the least organised in the early to mid-20th-century, and it was one of the main reasons for the decline of unions in all industries at the end of the century'. Chomsky draws attention to another specific quality that immigration and outsourcing have in common: 'immigration and capital flight . . . relieve employers of paying for the reproduction of their workforce' (3) by giving employers access to a ready-made workforce in southern nations, who are sustained in part by remittances from migrant workers in the imperialist economies, by foreign aid and public debt, and not least by unpaid labour performed in the family or informal economy. William Robinson (2008: 204) similarly argues: 'the use of immigrant labour allows employers in receiving countries to separate reproduction and maintenance of labour, and therefore to "externalise" the cost of social reproduction'.

Bangladesh provides a particularly vivid example of how, during the neo-liberal era,

outsourcing and migration have become two aspects of the same wage-differential-driven transformation of global production. Speaking of 1980s and 1990s Bangladesh, Tasneem Siddiqui reported that 'the continuous outflow of people of working-age . . . has played a major role in keeping the unemployment rate stable' (Siddiqui 2003: 2). According to the International Organisation for Migration, 5.4 million Bangladeshis work overseas, more than half in India, with the rest spread between Western Europe, North America, Australasia and the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. Some $14 billion of remittances flowed into households in Bangladesh in 2012, equivalent to 11% of Bangladesh's GDP. In the same year, Bangladesh received $19 billion for its garment exports (80% of Bangladesh's total exports), but this includes the cost of imported cotton and other fabrics, typically 25% of the production cost. In other words, net earnings from garment exports in 2012 approximately equalled total remittances from Bangladeshis working abroad. And while only a small fraction of export earnings are paid out in wages, all of the latter flows directly into poor households.

The World Bank reports that in 2013, each of Britain's 210,000 Bangladeshi migrant workers, the largest concentration of all imperialist countries, sent home an average of $4,058, close to the average for other imperialist countries. In comparison, average wages following the 2013 increase in Bangladesh's textile industry were $115 per month, or $1,380 per year. Thus, each Bangladeshi working in Britain remits in 1 year what it would take his (most Bangladeshi migrant workers are male) wife, sister or daughter 3 years to earn working in a garment factory.

Neo-Marxists and the 'Global Labour Arbitrage'

Most of the scholars and analysts cited so far in our survey of 'global labour arbitrage' have been from mainstream or heterodox schools. This is because Marxist academics have, by and large, neglected this subject. This is epitomised by an anthology of essays published in 2005 by Marxist scholars entitled *Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader* (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). Its front cover is a photograph of women working on a production line somewhere in Asia, yet – despite the many insightful articles it contains – not one of them discusses the super-exploitation of southern labour, male or female, or asks how capitalist firms in imperialist countries reap super profits from them, or recognises that this might be not just relevant to 'neoliberalism' but its very essence.

What is so special about 'global labour arbitrage', apart from its great force, is that it takes place entirely within the orbit of the capital–labour relation. 'Global labour arbitrage', or the globalisation of capitalist production processes driven by the superexploitation of low-wage southern labour by northern capital, is capitalist imperialism *par excellence.* Here, capitalism has evolved ways of extracting surplus value from the so-called 'emerging nations' which are proper to it, which are effected not by political-military coercion but by 'market forces' – what Ellen Wood in *Empire of Capital* calls the 'internationalization of capitalist imperatives' (2005/2003: 118).

As Wood recognises, the exercise of military power by states continues to play a central and very active role in constituting the imperialist world order, policing it and violently removing obstacles in its way, whether these be forests and forest dwellers, insubordinate despots, rebellious social movements or radical governments. But, in common with other neo-Marxist theorists of 'new imperialism' and 'global capitalism', her theoretical framework gives no place to the most important, most direct, most pernicious and most quotidian exercise of coercive violence by the state in the global political economy: the suppression of the international mobility of labour. Apart, that is, from one cursory mention, a brief and passing acknowledgement that '[n]ot the least important function of the nation state in globalisation is to . . . manage the movements of labour by means of strict border controls and stringent immigration policies, in the interests of capital' (137). Yet she gives neither this nor the massive relocation of production processes to the global

South any further attention, despite their obvious relevance to her stated aim of defining 'the essence of capitalist imperialism' (7).

International Differences in the Rate of Exploitation

Critics of dependency theory used to argue that, if there were differences in the rate of exploitation between imperialist and semicolonial countries, the much higher productivity of labour in the former means that workers in imperialist nations may even be subject to a higher rate of exploitation than in the Third World, despite their much higher levels of consumption. Thus, in their 1979 exchange with Samir Amin, John Weeks and Elizabeth Dore argued that '[s]ince it is in the developed capitalist countries that labour productivity is higher, it is not obvious that a high standard of living of workers in such countries implies that the exchange value of the commodities making up that standard of living is also higher' (Weeks and Dore 1979: 62–87, 71). Nigel Harris put forward essentially the same argument: 'other things being equal, the higher the productivity of labour, the higher the income paid to the worker (since his or her reproduction costs are higher) and the more exploited he or she is – that is, the greater the proportion of the workers output [that] is appropriated by the employer.' (Harris 1986: 119–120).

The globalisation of production processes has fatally undermined this argument: the consumption goods consumed by workers in the North are no longer produced solely or mainly in the North. To an ever greater extent, they are produced by low-wage labour in the global South; what matters is *their* productivity, *their* wages. Nevertheless, these arguments continue to be advanced to the present day – Alex Callinicos argues that '[f]rom the perspective of Marx's value theory, the critical error [of 'theorists of unequal exchange such as of Arghiri Emmanuel and Samir Amin'] is not to take into account the significance of high levels of labour productivity in the advanced economies' (Callinicos 2009: 179–180); while Joseph Choonara believes that 'it is a misconception that workers in countries such as India or China

are more exploited than those in countries such as the US or Britain. This is not necessarily the case. They probably [!] have worse pay and conditions, and face greater repression and degradation than workers in the most developed industrial countries. But it is also possible that workers in the US or Britain generate more surplus value for every pound that they are paid in wages' (Choonara 2009: 34).

Ernest Mandel uncomfortably straddled the dependency thesis and its 'Marxist' antithesis without achieving anything in the way of synthesis. This equivocation is evident in his major economic work *Late Capitalism* (1975/1972). In the chapter entitled, he admits that 'the existence of a much lower price for labour-power in the dependent, semicolonial countries than in the imperialist countries undoubtedly allows a higher world average rate of profit' (Choonara 2009: 68), implying that its value is also lower, that it endures a higher rate of exploitation. Later, in the chapter on unequal exchange, he appears to reiterate this, referring to 'vast international differences in the value and the price of the commodity labour-power' (Mandel 1975/1972: 353), but on the next page he argues the opposite, that there 'exists in underdeveloped countries . . . a lower rate of surplus value', spending several pages developing a numerical example in which the oppressed-nation workers endure a *lower* rate of exploitation than in the imperialist countries – with no explanation or justification. Either way, neither the vast differences in the value nor the price of labour-power make it into the ten features defining 'the structure of the world market' that concludes his analysis.

Wages, Productivity . . .

It is argued here that global wage differentials have driven and shaped the global shift of production. It is therefore important to remind ourselves just how wide these differentials are. Data on average wages, in both rich and poor countries but especially in the latter, are notoriously unreliable. Masking growing wage inequality, they include the wages of skilled workers and

managers, they typically count only those in formal employment, and they take no account of widespread underpayment and of illegally low wages. Bearing this in mind, the US government's Bureau of Labour Statistics reports that, despite decades of wage stagnation in the US and years of above-inflation wage rises in China, average hourly 'labour compensation' (wages + benefits) of US manufacturing workers in 2010 was 20 times greater than in China ($34.74/hr vs. $1.71/hr), or 14 times greater when Chinese wages are measured in PPP$. This obscenely high ratio underestimates the global picture, since labour compensation in countries like Canada, Germany and Denmark is higher than in the US, while Indian, Sri Lankan, Indonesian and Vietnamese workers are even cheaper than Chinese workers. Bangladeshi wages are lowest of all: there, the minimum wage in the garment industry is just 31¢ per hour – and this after a 77% increase wrested by hard-fought strikes in 2013. Wages elsewhere in Bangladesh's economy are even lower. Dhaka's *The Daily Star* reported in May 2013 that tea-pickers are paid 55 taka ($0.71) for a day's work ('Tea worker's daily wage only Tk 55', in *The Daily Star*, 25 May 2013).

Clearly, wages are profoundly affected by conditions in labour markets – like repression of unions, massive unemployment and underemployment – none of which have any direct bearing on the productivity of workers when at work. This is one reason to question the widespread belief of mainstream economists that differences in wages reflect differences in productivity and that low wages in 'emerging economies' merely reflect the low productivity of their workers. That Western firms are so keen to outsource production to the other side of the world is proof in itself that the low wages they find so attractive are not cancelled by low productivity. As Larudee and Koechlin found (2008: 228–236, 232), in the case of FDI into low-wage countries, multinational firms carry a considerable share of their productivity with them. Why is this important? Because, to the considerable extent that international wage differentials do not reflect differences in productivity, they must reflect international differences in the rate of exploitation. And a higher rate of

exploitation implies that more of the wealth created by these workers is captured by capitalists and turned into profit. There is nothing more important in political economy than understanding how this happens, and how it is rendered invisible in standard interpretations of economic data.

A theoretical concept of 'productivity' is essential if we are to understand anything about global political economy. But productivity is especially complex because it can be measured in two mutually exclusive ways: by the quantity of useful objects created in a particular amount of time, or by the quantity of money that these useful objects can be sold for. The 'use value' and 'exchange value' definitions of productivity produce very different results. For example, if Bangladeshi garment workers increase production from ten shirts per hour to 20 shirts per hour, they are, according to the first measure, twice as productive as before; but if the multinational firm they are supplying imposes proportionate cuts in the price of each shirt, the 'exchange value' measure of their productivity will remain unchanged. These two definitions of productivity are contradictory, mutually exclusive, incompatible. To formal logicians and vulgar economists, they cannot both be true. But to dialecticians, these contradictory definitions reflect a really existing contradiction inherent in commodities and therefore in the labour that produces commodities. While the mainstream concept of productivity attempts to solve this puzzle by abolishing the use-value definition, obliterating it; for Marxist political economy, 'productivity' is a contradictory unity, embodying what Marx counted among the greatest of his discoveries: 'the two-fold character of labour, according to whether it is expressed in use value or exchange value' (Marx 1867b: 407–408).

To mainstream economics and in the brain of the capitalist, 'productivity' always refers to the monetary value of the goods and services generated in a given period of time; in other words, value-added per worker. But this gives rise to a series of paradoxes, anomalies and absurdities; for example, those in Europe and North America who stack shelves with imported goods appear to add

much more value (i.e. to be many times more productive) than those who produce these goods. Another example is that the outsourcing of labour-intensive production tasks boosts the productivity of the workers whose jobs are not outsourced – even if nothing about this work or the payment received for it changes in any way. Thus, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg contend that 'improvements in the feasibility of offshoring are economically equivalent to labour-augmenting technological progress' (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006: 15). A further example is provided by per capita GDP, which, leaving aside relatively minor variations in the proportion of a nation's population who are economically active, is synonymous with average productivity. On this measure, six of the eight most 'productive' nations on earth are tax havens, which by definition produce nothing of use; meanwhile, Bangladesh languishes in 192nd place out of 229 nations. Its garment workers produce large quantities of use values – but insufficient exchange value to allow their employers to run safe factories or pay a living wage.

. . . and the GDP Illusion

Statistics on GDP, trade, and productivity suffer from much more severe defects than those afflicting wages. Here, the problems are conceptual, not technical. Bangladesh's garment-exporting industry – in the global spotlight since the death of 1,127 garment workers in the collapsed Rana Plaza building in April 2013 – provides a glaring illustration of this. Few, apart from mainstream economists, would deny that Primark, Wal-Mart, H&M and other high-street retailers profit from the exploitation of Bangladeshi garment workers. A moment's thought reveals other beneficiaries: the commercial capitalists who own the buildings leased by these retailers, the myriad of companies providing advertising, security, and other services to them; and also governments, which tax their profits and their employees' wages and collect 20% VAT from every sale. Yet, according to trade and financial data, not one penny of the profits reaped by US and

European retail giants derives from the labour of the workers who made their goods. The huge mark-up on the costs of production, typically 60–80% and often more, instead appears as 'value-added' in the UK and other consuming countries, expanding their GDP by far more than that of the country where these goods are actually produced.

However, by redefining 'value-added' as value captured, our perception of the global economy is transformed. It allows us to see that the lion's share of the value produced by low-wage workers in China, Bangladesh, and elsewhere is captured by corporations and governments in the imperialist countries. A closer look at this key mainstream concept makes clear why such a redefinition is necessary. Value-added, the fundamental constituent of both GDP and productivity, is the difference between the prices paid by a firm for all inputs and the prices received for all outputs. According to mainstream economic theory, this amount is automatically and exactly equal to the value generated in the firm's own production process, and cannot leak to other firms or be captured from them. The process of production is thus not only a black box, where all we know is the price paid for inputs and the price received for the outputs; it is also hermetically sealed from all other black boxes, in that no value can be transferred or redistributed between them. Marxist political economy rejects this absurdity and advances a radically different conception: 'value-added' is really value captured. It measures the share of total economy-wide value-added that is captured by a firm, and there is no direct correspondence between this amount and the value created by the living labour (or, if you prefer 'factors of production') employed within that firm. Indeed, many firms supposedly generating value-added are engaged in non-production activities like finance and administration that produce no value at all.

If, within a national economy, value produced by one firm (i.e. in one production process) can condense in the prices paid for commodities produced in other firms, then it is irrefutable that, especially in the era of globalised production, this also occurs between firms in different countries. To the extent that it does, GDP departs ever

further from being an objective, more-or-less accurate approximation of a nation's product, becoming instead a veil that conceals the increasingly exploitative relation between northern capitals and southern living labour; in other words, the imperialist character of the global capitalist economy.

Three important conclusions flow from this.

It is impossible to analyse the global economy without using data on GDP and trade, yet every time we uncritically cite this data we open the door to the core fallacies of neoclassical economics which these data project. To analyse the global economy we must decontaminate this data, or rather the concepts we use to interpret them.

Redefining 'value-added' as value captured reveals that the globalisation of production is driven not just by international wage differentials but by international differences in the rate of exploitation.

Redefining 'value-added' as value captured also reveals the heightened dependence of capitalists and capitalism in the imperialist countries on the proceeds of the higher rates of exploitation of living labour in the global South. The imperialist division of the world that was a precondition for capitalism is now internal to it. Far from marking a transition to a post-imperial world, neo-liberalism therefore signifies the emergence of the fully evolved imperialist form of capitalism.

Conclusion

Armed with the concepts developed in this essay, the door is open to understanding how surplus value extracted from workers assembling Dell computers and Apple iPods in Foxconn's Chinese factories, and those producing clothing and footwear in Bangladesh and the Dominican Republic for Wal-Mart, H&M and so forth, massively contribute to these firms' profits even though there is no trace of this in GDP, trade, or financial flow data. It allows us to see that a major part of the revenues and profits from the sale of the products

of global value chains accruing to firms based in imperialist countries, their distributors, and their employees (and therefore appearing in the GDP of the consuming countries), and the very large cut which is taken by governments and used to pay for foreign wars, the social wage and so on, represents the unpaid labour of super-exploited Chinese and other low-wage workers. It allows us to understand why, according to standard interpretations of GDP and trade data, these massive transfers of wealth are invisible but no less real. And, finally, it allows us to see that profits, prosperity, and social peace in Europe, North America, and Japan are, more than at any time in capitalism's history, dependent upon the super-exploitation of low-wage labour in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Acknowledging this reality is to acknowledge that neo-liberal globalisation marks not the supersession of imperialism but the culmination of capitalism's imperialist trajectory.

Boosting profits through increasing relative surplus value is generally held by Marxists to be the pre-eminent driver of advanced capitalism. A modification of this view has long been required; comprehension of the global outsourcing phenomenon now demands it. In the era of neo-liberal globalisation, the rate of profit in the imperialist countries is sustained by not one but three ways to increase surplus value: increasing relative surplus value through the application of new technology in the classic manner intensively studied by Marx in *Capital;* increasing absolute surplus value by extending the working day, a major feature of capitalist exploitation in today's global South; and 'global labour arbitrage', the expanded super-exploitation of southern labour power made possible by the depression of its value to a small fraction of that obtaining in the imperialist countries. The trajectory of capitalist accumulation and crisis is determined by the complex interaction of all three elements. Of these three, 'global labour arbitrage' stands out as really new and specific to neo-liberal globalisation.

It is understandable why members and aspiring members of privileged social layers in imperialist countries might find it convenient to take statistics on GDP and labour productivity at their face value – by doing so they can avoid confronting

the disturbing and complacency-shattering consequences of recognising the relations of exploitation, imperialism, and parasitism that are intrinsic and fundamental to the contemporary capitalist world order and to their social position within it. On the other hand, for workers in the other imperialist nations, the globalisation of production means that nationalist-reformist attempts to protect workers' living standards and access to social services behind protectionist barriers, including border controls on the free movement of labour, are not only reactionary, they are also futile. If US and European workers do not wish to compete with their sisters and brothers in Mexico, China, and elsewhere, they must join with them in the struggle to abolish the racial hierarchy of nations and the tremendous disparities associated with it, and to achieve an authentic globalisation – a world without borders – in which no one has any more right to a job, an education, or a life than anyone else. The path to socialism goes through, not around, the eradication of the gigantic differences in living standards and life chances that violate the principle of equality between proletarians. As Malcolm X said, 'Freedom for everybody, or freedom for nobody'.

Cross-References

▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism
▶ Third Worldism and Marxism

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Global Labour Arbitrage

▶ 'Global Labour Arbitrage' and the New Imperialism

Global Production Networks

▶ Uneven Development Within Global Production Networks

Global Securitization

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Global South

▶ Postcolonial Social Movements

Global Trade

▶ Uneven Development Within Global Production Networks

Global Value Chains

▶ Uneven Development Within Global Production Networks

G

Global Value Transfers and Imperialism

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Definition

Imperialism is the unequal transfer of economic value across space, a form of super-exploitation by powerful states or firms in one location visited upon weaker states/peoples/firms in another place. *Global value* transfer, surplus *drain*, and surplus transfer are employed as synonyms here.

> Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed. (Albert Einstein 1926)

Imperialism is the unequal transfer of economic value across space, a form of super-exploitation by powerful states or firms in one location visited upon weaker states/peoples/firms in another place. I employ *global value* transfer, surplus *drain,* and surplus transfer as synonyms. Similar

terms that appear in the literature include 'geo-graphical transfer of value', 'economic drain', 'surplus extraction', 'capital drain' or 'transfer and unequal exchange' (Amin 1974; Emmanuel 1972; Kohler and Tausch 2002; Raffer 1987).

Because capitalism is characterised by commodification of everything, everywhere (Wallerstein 1983), the basic form of surplus extraction derives from the production and sale of commodities. Capitalists are compelled toward imperialism because the system is based on mini-mising costs of production in order to maximise profits. A distinguishing feature of surplus drain lies in the need for capitalists to widen the reach of the system in order to ensure the capture of lower costs. The cheapest costs are rarely near at hand, so commodified production stimulates an expanding territorial search. Consequently, global value transfer is a driving force that causes accu-mulation of wealth and power at the core and stagnation of the periphery (Amin 1974; Baran 1957; Frank 1969; Wallerstein 1974, 1983).

Without global surplus transfers, there can be no worldwide capitalism. The capitalist world-system is a 'hierarchy of core-periphery *complexes,* in which surplus is being transferred' (Frank 1969: 98). It is important to realise that 'peripheral does not mean marginal in the sense of dispensable: without peripheries, no core [and] no capitalist development' (Hopkins 1982: 13). Indeed, core and periphery are not geographical or national categories but relationships of imperi-alistic global surplus transfer. 'Such a relationship is that of coreness–peripherality . . .. The losing zone [is] a *periphery* and the gaining zone a core.' All commodities culminate from production chains that generate its components. Often located in a peripheral territory, subordinate producers generate value that is embedded in the traded commodity, and that value is far beyond the costs of production plus profit for which they are paid. These lower costs of production, particularly to the disadvantage of labour, generate high levels of value transfer to distant buyers and often super-profits for capitalists. Marx (1993: vol. 3) briefly explored superprofits (extra surplus value) as above-average profits derived from monopolistic control over resources or technologies, leading

to land rents, mining rents, or technological rents. Lenin (1964: vol. 23, 105–120) explored the notion more fully. For recent discussions, see Amin (2010), Smith (2011), and Higginbottom (2013). Through global transfers, core citizens 'liv[e] off the surplus value produced by others' while peripheral residents are 'not retaining all of the surplus value they are producing'. As a result, a majority of the world's surplus capital accumulates at the core, 'making available dispro-portionate funds' that capitalists utilise 'to gain additional competitive advantages' (Wallerstein 1983: 31–32).

This essay will examine four conceptual themes that pinpoint the ways in which imperial-ism is structurally embedded in capitalism.

1. Expropriation of surpluses across space is an historical and increasing source of polarised wealth accumulation in the world. Such global transfers take many forms, their economic centrality varying over time. Probably the most basic of these forms is differential costs of labour.
2. The relentless pursuit of lower costs is a driv-ing force of global imperialism, so capitalists seek to maximise profits by constructing long-term *degrees of monopsony* that disadvantage both labourers and capitalist competitors.
3. Imperialism structures hidden drains of sur-pluses not only from underpaid labour but also from unpaid labour and the externalisation of costs to ecosystems, communities, and households. I conceptualise this process as the expropriation of *dark value transfers*.
4. Core citizens benefit greatly from the con-sumer surpluses that derive from peripheral dark value drains, so they are not likely to support anti-imperialistic movements against this system of global value transfer.

Global Value Transfers Through Differential Labour Costs

Karl Marx insisted that all history is the history of class conflict in which the subordinate class resists the seizure by elites of the surpluses they produce

(Marx and Engels 1848). In accord with Einstein's opening quotation, we will not be able to see global surplus transfers unless we widen Marx's theoretical lens. In this vein, we need to recognise that capitalism has exhibited a history of territorial conflict in which subordinate groups resist the seizure of their surpluses by external elites; that is surplus expropriation across space. In addition to the historic forms of plunder and tribute, global value transfer takes many forms; for example, production monopsonies, sales monopolies, politically manipulated trade, tariffs, loans, and exchange rates. The form that is examined here is that based on differential production costs.

Theoretical Foundations

Even though global value transfer is an extension of Marx's analysis, it is a fundamental problematic that he barely broached in the work he published. Moreover, surplus drain is an idea that has either been rejected or ignored by most Marxists and most other economic theorists (Amin 2012). While classic Marxist theorists of imperialism focused on monopoly capitalism as the driving force behind the new form of imperialism of their day, they largely ignored explicit analysis of surplus drain. Hobson (1902), Luxemburg (1951), Lenin (1964: vol. 1), Bukharin (1972), and Hilferding (1981) did not focus on cheap labour or the problem of integrating a theory of monopoly capitalism with Marx's labour theory of value. Instead, they grounded their arguments in analysis of superprofits that derive from capital and commodity exports to the periphery.

Starting in the 1950s, some neo-Marxist theorists shifted the analytic focus from core exports of capital and commodities (Lenin 1964: vol. 1) to core foreign direct investment and commodity imports from the (semi) periphery. Extrapolating from Marx's (1993: vol. 1, parts 3, 4, 5) theory of surplus value, Paul Baran (1957) introduced the concept of *economic surplus* (as distinct from surplus value) as key to economic growth, and he contended that loss of economic surplus blocks peripheral development. Frank (1969) expanded

this by arguing that colonialism structured *development of underdevelopment* to ensure surplus transfers to the imperial core. However, Baran (1957) and Frank (1979) paid little attention to the linkages between cheap labour and surplus drain, choosing instead to prioritise surplus transfers from international trade, taxation, and repatriation of investments. In making this conceptual choice, they moved away from the orthodox Marxist emphasis on the linkage between labour exploitation and surplus creation. It was not until Emmanuel's (1972) theory of *unequal exchange* that international wage differentials were recognised as major sources of surplus drain. Subsequently, Amin (1974) incorporated this notion into his analysis of 'accumulation on a world scale'. Concurrently, Wallerstein (1974) introduced world-systems analysis, a perspective in which a multi-state capitalist system is driven by surplus drain, particularly the value extracted from underpaid labour throughout the system. Recent extensions of global value transfer theory include Cope (2012) and Higginbottom (2013).

The New International Division of Labour

The classical theories of imperialism (e.g. Lenin 1964: vol. 1) were responses to a restructuring of the world-economy as a result of declining profit rates. That restructuring included the massive export of capital, as loans, to the Third World. In the 1970s, a new imperialist structure of accumulation emerged, again in reaction to declining profit rates. Scholars analysed this continuing worldwide transformation as a *new international division of labour* (Frobel et al. 1980) to acknowledge the relocation of core manufacturing to semiperipheries. Analysis of this epochal change gave rise to a proliferation of concepts previously unknown, such as deindustrialisation, newly industrialising countries, export-led development, fragmentation of production, outsourcing, transnational corporations, commodity chains, global value chains, supply chains, global production networks (Dicken 2011). This phase of restructuring reflected an historical shift

from the core export-oriented imperialism (capital and products) to import-oriented imperialism (peripheral commodities).

Frobel et al. (1980: 41) pointed to the most imperialistic aspect of this restructuring: 'the *worldwide* organized allocation of the elements of the production process to the cheapest labour force that could be found'. More broadly, the shift indicated an intensification of capital's normal search for unpaid costs, always a basic element of the global value transfer, and it resulted in dramatic change in the world class system. The fuller capitalist incorporation of China, India, and Russia doubled the size of the world working class (Freeman 2008: 687). The newly integrated workers were cheap labour and disproportionately female (Pyle and Ward 2003), with a majority trapped in the informal sector (International Labour Office 2007). Concurrently, the size of the transnational capitalist class expanded, and the role of the *comprador bourgeoisie* (Amin 1974) and its associated professional/managerial cadres shifted from that of traders to overseers of production (Robinson 2004). Since this restructuring of the world economy followed the logic of unequal exchange, it integrated vast numbers of workers and subordinate capitalists as new exploited classes to supply cheap labour and services.

Unequal Exchange and the Imperialism of Free Trade

Unequal exchange is a concept grounded in the logic of semi-permanent differential costs of production and the logic of trade between competitive capital and monopoly capital (for an overview of unequal exchange theories, see Raffer [1987]). It is reasonable that the theories should focus on the price of labour and international trade since these are areas in which spatial cost differentials are highest. Unequal exchange theorists contend that the primary mechanism of global value transfer is the *imperialism of free trade* rather than monopoly profits based on control of economic systems through military imperialism. Gallagher and Robinson (1954) coined the phrase

'imperialism of free trade,' arguing that 'the main work of imperialism' was the geographical expansion to new areas and the deepening of free trade mechanisms in areas that were already controlled. Basically, unequal exchange theories are attempts to place spatial value transfer from cheap labour at the heart of Marxist theory. In doing so, they emphasise the reality that free trade entails the exchange of cheap, low-profit peripheral exports for high-priced, high-profit core imports. These global value transfer chains accumulate surpluses disproportionately at the core through mechanisms of unequal exchange (Clelland 2013, 2014).

The imperialism of free trade is structured through global commodity chains in which the various components, starting with raw materials, are produced and combined. Such transnational chains were among the basic features of historical capitalism (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986). In recent decades, many core 'lead firms' have offshored a majority of their production to the (semi)periphery. Typically, the lead firm designs the product, establishes patent rights over its innovations, develops quality standards for component parts, organises and governs the supply chain, and controls the distribution and sales of the finished import (Gereffi et al. 2005).

A commodity chain is the most important mechanism for the extraction of surplus across space, and unequal exchanges are embedded in each of its transfer points. The relationship that exists between nodes in the commodity chain has the same basic form as the core/periphery relationship, and, in turn, the same form as the relations of production within each node of the chain. This abstract model assumes that all of these relationships are not usually between equals (as in the abstract model of neo-classical economics), but between unequals. At all levels, then, the relationship is one of surplus extraction (Clelland 2012).

Imperialistic Impacts of Wage Differentials

How has the new international division of labour exacerbated global wage differentials? Greater

trade liberalisation increased the importance of the relative wages of the unskilled labourers who comprise a majority of the new industrial labour force in the Global South. On the one hand, there has been a 'race to the bottom' in wages, as labour's share of the GDP continues to decline in most Southern countries (International Labour Organization 2010). On the other hand, transfer of industry has been accompanied by greater wage inequality between North and South, as well as greater wage inequality within peripheral and semiperipheral countries.

What, then, is the size of global value transfers that are derived from these wage differentials? Applying mean core–periphery manufacturing wage differentials to the adjusted total value of core imports from the periphery, Cope (2012) concluded that the global value transfer is approximately US$2.8 trillion annually, or nearly one-third beyond what was paid for the imports. (For estimates of the global value transfer through differential production wages, see Amin [1974, 2010], Emmanuel [1972], Kohler and Tausch [2002].) This transfer equates to about 6% of the core GDP. Clelland (2013, 2014) offers an alternative method by comparing the consumer price consequences of different wage levels. For instance, the total payment to peripheral workers for the production of a pound of coffee is only 16% of the price. If the cost of similarly skilled US workers at minimum wage levels were substituted for average US farm worker wages, the labour cost would nearly double the price to consumers. Similarly, the peripheral labour cost for the production of an Apple iPad is only 9% of the consumer price. If the costs of similarly skilled US minimum-waged workers were substituted for the widely variant costs of lower-paid Asian labour in the production chain, the price of the iPad would nearly double.

Global surplus transfers that result from differential wages are a much larger proportion of the economy of the periphery than of the core. Indeed, the worst impact of these 'imperialistic rents' is that they remove about half of the potential profits of the Global South (Amin 2012: 4). Moreover, those transfers exceed the capital that is annually invested in expanded reproduction of those societies (Kohler and Tausch 2002). The impacts of these surplus transfers are not just measured in short-term livelihood disadvantages. The long-term loss to the (semi) periphery of this global transfer is significant, for the basis for investment in expanded economic and social development is reduced (Baran 1957; Frank 1969).

Imperialism Through Degrees of Monopoly

A fundamental assumption of classical Marxist and neo-classical economics is that capitalism is based on nearly pure competition over the long term, thus providing the laws or tendencies that drive the system. (Marx [1993: vols. 1, 3] assumed nearly pure competition in his labour theory of value and his conceptualisation of the falling rate of profits.) In this view, neither price differentials nor monopoly persists in the long run. In sharp contrast to this scholarly assumption, Kalecki (1939: 252) contends that monopoly is 'deeply rooted in the nature of the capitalist system' and is 'the normal state of capitalist economics.' Similarly, Braudel (1981: vol. 2, 412–422) drew a sharp distinction between the competitive market facing most firms and the 'anti-market' sphere of 'real capitalism,' the realm of the monopolists who shape and dominate the capitalist world-system. In short, the capitalist struggle for monopoly is an historical driving force of capitalism. To emphasise the gradational nature of monopoly, Kalecki (1954) coined the concept *degree of monopoly:* the relative ability to set prices in the distribution process, as opposed to the determination of prices by the competitive market. (Kalecki [1954] also uses the synonymous terms *degree* of *market imperfection* and *degree of oligopoly.* Marx [1993: vol. 3, part 6], Amin [2012] and other Marxist theorists [e.g. Sau 1982] use the terms *monopoly rents*, *imperialist rents*, and *superprofits* in ways that are parallel to my applications of Kalecki's *degree of monopoly.*)

Many discussions of monopoly point to: (a) collusion among potential competitors in setting high prices in order to collect high profits; and/or (b) state protection of selected capitalists.

In contrast, the logic of imperialism that is built into capitalism is the search for lower costs to attain a more monopolistic position. In addition, degree of monopoly is commonly based on economies of scale, increased productivity through technology, barriers to entry, patent rights, advertising and marketing, as well as invention of a unique product or productive system. But the greatest of these is *barriers to imitation* through international policing of intellectual property rights. In other words, a capitalist constructs a degree of monopoly through the ability to lower costs or raise prices beyond what would be possible in a purely competitive economy.

Dominance Over Subordinate Capitalists Through Degrees of Monopsony

Any national core economy may be described as a form of monopoly capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Hilferding 1981). However, the larger capitalist world-economy is a *degree of monopsony* system in which a few buyers dominate a context in which there are many sellers (Robinson 1993). Current imperialism is based less on obtaining superprofits through export of core finance and goods than on securing imperial rents by controlling the prices of peripheral imports (Amin 2012). The most powerful monopsonists are the firms that have established a high degree of monopoly by employing the mechanisms indicated above. Because of their large size and small number, these firms enjoy the privilege of unequal power in the negotiations with smaller, very numerous suppliers. Indeed, this is the unequal trade at the heart of unequal exchange. Kalecki (1954) defined degree of monopoly as the ability to control the mark-up, the difference between total costs and revenue. In contrast, contemporary imperialism is largely the ability to control 'mark-downs'; that is, the power to force down the cost of production in the periphery. From the origins of capitalism, agricultural trade from the periphery took the form of production by a multitude of peasants who sold to a small number of traders, who in turn exported to a small number of core buyers (commission merchants), the original

transnational capitalist class (Wallerstein 1974). Those core buyers used the competition among sellers to force down the costs of production, prices, and profit rates. Both small producers and compradors worked informally for monopsonistic core traders/wholesalers who obtained the bulk of profits. Setting aside the many boom periods of initial production, these profits are often termed *imperial rents* (Amin 2012), in recognition of the limited energy expended in trade as contrasted with the amount of labour required in the production process. These rents, sometimes termed *monopoly rents*, were largely *monopsony rents*. The heart of the current form of imperialism is an expanded, more organised, more rationalised version of the original system. It is a monopsonistic system of 'free trade' designed to expand global value transfer.

The new compradors are the peripheral capitalists who do the real work of providing or raising investment funds, constructing factories, purchasing supplies and equipment, hiring labour, and organising production. Having a low degree of monopoly, the peripheral capitalist struggles to cut costs but obtains little increased profit. In order to remain a competitive seller to the monopsonistic buyer, that subordinate capitalist must turn those lower costs into lower prices. This is an imperialistic system in which the monopsonistic final buyer becomes a rentier who obtains imperial rents by outsourcing production to subordinate competitive capitalists who must accept lower profits. Quite often, such firms are double rentiers since their high monopoly profit rates were already based on technology rent or design rent insured by legal barriers to imitation. Today, such capitalists hold a position similar to the hated landlords of Ricardo's (1817) time. They obtain their share of the economic surplus from claims of property rights, leaving actual production to others.

Degrees of Monopoly Through Cheap Labour Exploitation

Of all the differential costs of production upon which the system of imperial monopsony is

built, the most important are the highly divergent costs of labour. In the classic Marxist model, the capitalist who hires workers and organises the labour process obtains profit from the extraction of surplus value from those workers. How do contemporary subordinate peripheral capitalists extract surplus value from workers in order to drive down costs? Analysis of a core corporation that has outsourced production to Asia provides a good overview of the kinds of tactics that subordinate capitalists employ to slash labour costs. In 2010 and 2011, the vast majority of Apple's Chinese subcontractors engaged in a mix of the following practices: (a) below minimum wages that violated national and local laws; (b) excessive overtime hours at wage rates that did not meet legal requirements; (c) wage deductions to discipline workers; (d) gender discrimination in wage rates; (e) employment of lower-paid underage and foreign bonded labourers; (f) failure to implement safety measures; (g) structuring unpaid work time into the daily routine; and (h) deducting fees from wages for equipment and uniforms (Fair Labour Association 2012). All these strategies are efforts to increase absolute and relative surplus value, much of which is captured by the lead firm. To maximise cost-cutting strategies, peripheral subordinate capitalists employ cheap indigenous professional and managerial cadres. These 'hired-hand' capitalists are proficient at: (a) recruiting cheap waged workers; (b) effecting organisational efficiency and time management; (c) speeding up worker productivity; and (d) expropriating hidden unpaid labours from workers. Managerial personnel drive waged workers through Taylorist speed-ups, shift quotas and longer work weeks than are legally tolerated in the core. Like the workers they exploit, these overseers of production are the servants of monopoly capitalists.

The value transfer from subordinate to more monopolistic capitalists is clear in empirical analyses of surplus extraction. In the iPad commodity chain (Clelland 2014), the subordinate capitalists who organise the production and supply chains are primarily transnational corporations headquartered in South Korea and Taiwan, but nearly all the production occurs in China. While these semiperipheral capitalists retain about 15% of the total profits from iPad sales, 76% is captured by Apple. The operating profit margin (OPM) for this core corporation is about 25% of its revenues, but the OPM for the subordinate semiperipheral capitalists is quite narrow (only 7%). Reflecting that there may be several tiers of subordinate capitalists in a production chain, the tightest OPM in the iPad chain occurs for those smaller Asian capitalists to whom the semiperipheral corporations subcontract parts of the supply chain. While most of the responsibility for cutting labour and other production costs is most heavily externalised to lower tiers of subordinate subcontractors, they capture very little of the surplus value and attain a slim operating margin that drives them to slash labour costs even more deeply.

A similar pattern of global value transfer occurs in the coffee commodity chain (Clelland 2013). The ability to capture surplus does not lie in the hands of those organising and supervising labour power, but in the hands of the transnational corporations that hold high degrees of monopoly. In the case of coffee, the total profits are about 17% of the retail price, but only about 2% of the price is retained by peripheral capitalists. While peripheral capitalists organise and control 86% of the productive labour, they have little control over the capture of the surpluses that are generated by their efforts to keep costs of production low. The degree of monopsony possessed by a small number of wholesale coffee roasters and distributors allows them to usurp most of the surplus value generated by the large number of peripheral subordinate capitalists.

Imperialism Through Global Transfers of Dark Value

The global transfer of value occurs through two types of surplus drain. The first is *bright value transfer*; that is, the movement to the core of profits from sales in the periphery. These are monetarised and measured with transparent accounting techniques (Clelland 2012: 199–200). In contrast to these visible global surplus transfers, there is a second type of surplus

drain that I term *dark value tranfer*; that is, the movement to the core of peripheral products containing large amounts of differential costs. For Marx (1993: vol. 1) the value of a commodity is based on the labour time involved in its production. However, there are important components of value that are more deeply hidden, for capitalism is 'an economy of unpaid costs' (Wallerstein 1999: Chap. 5). The savings from under-compensated peripheral labour and inputs are such unpaid costs or dark value. Capitalists attempt to transform dark value into bright value (profits) simply by maintaining prices despite low costs. This transformation of nothing (non-payment) into something (monetarised bright value) is a form of value capture for accumulation (expanded reinvestment). Alternatively, the dark value costs may be used to cut output prices. In this case, the dark value is embedded in the product and captured as extra value for the buyer.

How, then, is this dark value produced and captured? The sources of dark value may be found in any of the factors of production (capital, labour, land, resources, energy, environment, knowledge) when a capitalist obtains a component of production at less than the average world-market price. The following sections examine how dark value is embodied in: (a) under-compensated waged labour; (b) under-compensated informal sector labour; (c) unpaid inputs from households; and (d) ecological externalities.

Dark Value from Under-Compensated Waged and Salaried Workers

Much of the material basis for global value transfer lies in the exploitation of cheap export production workers in the (semi) periphery. Dark value is transferred from these workers because capitalists pay them at levels well below core averages. The dark value added (value for which no payment is made to labour) in periphery to core exports is worth 30–100% beyond the market prices (Clelland 2013, 2014). If the unpaid differential costs of core versus periphery salary payments to

cheap engineers and managers were taken into account, another 35% would be added to the dark value of high-tech peripheral imports (Clelland 2014) and another 13% for low-tech peripheral imports (Clelland 2013). In the case of the Apple iPad, the total dark value hidden in the services of low-paid Asian engineers and managers is worth more than five times the bright value that appears in the accounts of its key suppliers (Clelland 2014).

Dark Value from Under-Compensated Informal Sector Workers

The new international division of labour not only captures the cheapest waged workers possible but also devises deeper exploitation of forms of labour outside the formal sector. Dark value is drained from informal sector workers in two ways: (a) subcontracting with capitalists for production in export chains; and (b) support of under-paid waged labourers in these chains. Increasingly, transnational capitalists subcontract with subordinate peripheral capitalists who outsource at cheaper-than-wage rates to several forms of informal sector workers (Dedeoglu 2013), including industrial and agricultural subcontracting with households (United Nations 2011). For this reason, a majority of the world's new jobs are being created in the informal sector (International Labour Office 2007).

Rather than eliminate those informal forms, subordinate capitalists routinely integrate them into their production systems, as mechanisms to lower labour costs. The capitalist who lowers production costs most deeply through such strategies attains a greater degree of monopoly than a competitor who is unable to capture the same level of cheap informal labour. Through subcontracting of home-based production to women in their households, for instance, capitalists super-exploit labour by: (a) paying below subsistence remuneration for produced items; (b) integrating unpaid child labour into the production process and (c) by externalising costs of production, such as electricity and equipment, from capitalists to households (Pyle and Ward 2003).

In addition, informal sector workers subsidise the low incomes of formal sector waged labourers. Beyond each under-paid waged worker is a large support staff of food producers and informal service providers who contribute to the reproductive capacity of this worker. By supplying low-cost survival needs to the waged worker, these poorly remunerated labourers subsidise low capitalist wages. Because they help make cheap export production wages possible, they are part of the extended chain of global value transfer. The daily life of the under-compensated peripheral waged worker entails the unequal exchange of her labour time for more hours of labour time from informal producers. For example, she may drain dark value from a lower-paid child care-giver who makes it possible for her to work for wages outside her household. This flow of dark value cheapens the reproduction costs of peripheral labour and, thus, the wage level that capitalists pay. If paid at the core minimum wage and rendered visible in costs of production, the informal-sector labour embodied in each iPad would add almost 30% to its retail price. Even though most scholars would consider them to be outside the commodity chain, the savings from the underpaid services of the Chinese underclass contribute dark value that is nearly equivalent to Apple's gross profit margin for each iPad (Clelland 2014).

Dark Value from Unpaid Reproductive and Household Labour

The wages of paid labour are included in the commodity price, but what about the price of the basic commodity, the cost of reproducing labour? Like other components of any commodity, labour has a chain of suppliers, but they are unpaid. The vast dark energy used up in this production is excluded from the formal accounting of production costs and from prices. Though mainstream economists and most Marxists do not view such unpaid labour as producing surplus value, this household work is a crucial source of surplus value because it provides the capitalist with the basic component of production. While Marx (1993: vol. 1, 176) claimed 'the secret of profit

making' lay in exploitation of waged labour that occurred in the hidden abode of the factory, we really need to enter the hidden abode of labour reproduction, the household, to find that secret. While many other costs of production are bought for prices that cover replacement, labour is provided without inclusion of its reproduction costs, so it is simply 'rented.'

Global outsourcing to capture dark value from cheap waged labour also captures dark value from household labour. Not only workers directly employed in export production, but also most of the peripheral population contributes a portion of their household and/or informal labour power to global transfer of value. Peripheral households and women absorb the costs of reproducing, maintaining, educating, and socialising the labour force (Dunaway 2012). Capitalists are able to drain hidden surpluses from households because a majority of the world's workers earn only a portion of their livelihoods from waged labour. Indeed, these *semi-proletarianised households* pool the greater proportion of their resources from non-waged activities, inadvertently encouraging capitalists to pay 'the lowest possible wage' (Wallerstein 1983: 91). Concealed in profits and cheap consumer prices is the unpaid reproductive labour of millions of peripheral households. In addition, unpaid family members provide much of the support labour for male-dominated, household-based enterprises (Dedeoglu 2013; United Nations 2011). The dark value of uncosted household hours is embedded, not only in finished products, but also at every level of the production and distribution chains, until it reaches the core consumer at a price that does not reflect the value of all the embodied labour (Clelland 2013, 2014). How economically significant is unpaid household labour? If paid at the core minimum wage and rendered visible in costs of production, the unpaid reproductive labour embodied in each iPad would add almost 25% to its retail price (Clelland 2014).

Dark Value from Ecological Externalities

A large share of the world's peripheral resources are either owned by core multinational

corporations or are contracted out by states at low prices (Magdoff 2013). Had ownership been retained in peripheries, the continuing cost of resources would be much higher than it is today, in order to provide 'resource rents' to the owners. These flows are not just an unpleasant result of past imperialism, but follow on today as 'continuing dispossession' (Harvey 2003). In addition to the visible, documented drains of ecological surplus, there is the hidden problem of uncosted and plundered resources. The consequences of such drains have been studied in the flourishing research about 'ecological unequal exchange' (Jorgensen and Rice 2012).

In the case of natural resources, surplus is not just that which is available after the reproduction costs of the ecosystem have been met, for surplus is enhanced by the destruction of the system itself. Natural capital is withdrawn from the ecological world bank, without replacement. Consequently, realistic cost allocation would entail either a decline in capitalist accumulation or price increases. On the one hand, every commodity has an environmental footprint; that is, the total ecological base needed for its production and distribution (Wackernagel et al. 2002). To the extent that the footprint is not fully costed, the capitalist absorbs dark value. On the other hand, commodity production leaves a large footprint in the form of threats to the survival of local communities and households. Peripheral areas absorb the side effects of the capitalist's unpaid ecological damage, reflected in public taxes for clean-up, health risks to residents, and loss of access to ecological resources that once supported local food security. Moreover, damage to world ecosystems (especially global climate change) is disproportionately borne by peripheral areas, reflecting another deeply hidden form of dark value drain. If ecological recovery were costed at core levels and rendered visible, the dark value savings to Apple from outsourcing some ecological externalities would add 38% to the retail price of the iPad. Moreover, this ecological unequal exchange is nearly double Apple's operating profit margin (Clelland 2014).

How Do Capitalists Utilise Dark Value?

In a purely competitive system, all captures of dark value would quickly be matched by competitors, but this does not happen in real capitalism (Braudel 1981: vol. 2, 413–422). Thus, capitalists who capture significant levels of dark value can utilise it in three ways. First, the capitalist might monetarise some portion of the dark value in order to expand accumulation through reinvestment. Second, the capitalist can employ the dark value to attain protection from competitors through degrees of monopoly. Third, they can apply the hidden value to roll back prices in order to attract a greater volume of consumers than their competitors.

Consumer Surplus as Deterrent to Anti-imperialism

The commodity chain is the imperialistic globalised structure that is devised to ensure capital accumulation in the core. However, it is also a surplus extraction chain that is grounded in unequal transfers from lower-to higher-wage sectors. Thus, capitalism is not only imperialistic because it accumulates most of world surplus at the core, but also because it delivers cheap goods to a majority of core citizens by means of the expropriation of dark value from peripheral workers. Expanded consumption in the core provides the opportunity for increased drain of value based on unequal production prices between core and periphery. Since core lead firms have a high degree of monopsony over peripheral capital and labour markets, these capitalists can extract massive savings through the dark value embodied in cheaper labour. Unlike core unionised workers, peripheral waged workers have been unable to drive the price of labour very much above the subsistence level. As a result, workers who do the same tasks with similar skills and equipment earn hourly wages that differ by as much as a ratio of 15:1 across regions of the world (for analysis of average wages by country, see Bureau of Labour Statistics [2013]).

It can be generalised from Clelland (2014) that the total value transfer approximates one-third of the core GDP. When dark value arrives in the core, it can be distributed three ways: as profits, as wage payments, or as consumer surplus. For example, core capitalists distribute the embedded dark value from a pound of coffee three ways. It can be estimated from (Clelland 2013: 84) that about one-fifth of dark value is transformed into profits while another 15% is allocated to wages (about half to salaried workers). However, most of the embedded dark value is captured by customers because it is worth nearly 50% more than the market value of the coffee (Clelland [2013: Table 4.1; 2014: Tables 1.5]). As we see in this example, most dark value collected by core firms is not transformed into profit but into lower consumer prices than would result from core production. The difference between the price of the commodity if it were produced in the core and the actual price that benefits from capture of peripheral labour is *consumer surplus*. This argument is a radical variant of the neo-classical economic concept of consumer surplus. My use of the concept differs from that by most other scholars, who focus on subjective utility, the difference between real price and what an individual would be willing to pay (see http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/consumer-surplus.html). This methodology points toward the objective reality of the hidden value of unpaid costs to consumers.

At a minimum, the value transfer is worth about $4,000 annually to the average core household. Surprisingly, the imperial project invented and administered by the core transnational capitalist class benefits the core population more than the capitalists. The undercosted peripheral hours remain embedded in the purchased product. If dark value were fully costed, profits would be diminished and/or the prices of commodities would be increased. The vast majority of core citizens, including most of the working class, depend upon imperialism to acquire much of their affluence through the structural transmission of value from the periphery.

Global Value Transfer and the Aristocracy of Labour

This is the story of the hidden surplus that capitalist imperialism drains from its peripheries to benefit its core capitalists and consumers. Since the beginning of capitalism, the essence of imperialism has been the capture of value and its transfer across space. Both logic and evidence point to the benefits of lower costs that are transmitted from the point of origin to the place of their realisation. This capture of surplus is grounded in transfers derived from the extraordinary differences in labour costs between periphery and core, and the transferred value is significant.

Most of this transfer would not occur in a world economy that was purely competitive. In such a system, the capitalist who captured the lower price of production would also capture the benefit in the form of higher profit. In reality, core buyers of peripheral products receive the captured value of cheap labour. This transfer of value is based on the monopsonistic power of a few core firms to push down the prices, wages and profits that can be attained by the many peripheral firms in a highly competitive context. In this monopsonistic relationship, those peripheral capitalists act as underpaid subordinates who slash export production costs, especially labour.

The core–periphery structure of global value transfer is the essence of imperialism. The differential wage component of global value transfer is based on the idea that two classes of labourers, working under similar conditions, produce commodities of equal market value. The difference in surplus value produced by the cheaper labour class may be considered as dark value derived from underpayment. Concealed in periphery to core exports, this dark value approximates the bright value of trade prices. Since dark value is extra surplus expropriated through underpayment of labour costs, much of it is readily transformed into bright value of imperial rent.

However, cheap labour could not be as cheap without that deeper level of dark value expropriated from even cheaper workers who reproduce labour power through unpaid or ultra-cheap inputs

from households and the informal sector. This hidden labour is embedded in the production of all surplus, and it is concealed in all commodities. When we take its value in labour time into account, the size of the global value transfer from periphery to core roughly doubles. Surprisingly, capitalists do not capture all the dark value obtained from the various forms of cheap peripheral labour involved in periphery to core exports. Most of the dark value is captured by core consumers because capitalists utilise it to reduce prices. This consumer surplus is value beyond price and it is part of the imperial rent. Its value is greater than that captured by core capitalists.

World capitalism is a system that delivers the goods to its core population at the expense of the world majority. Since capitalists transfer part of their dark value surpluses to them, most of the core working class becomes a consumerist *aristocracy of labour* (Brown 2013; Communist Working Group 1986). (This viewpoint is an expansion of the 'aristocracy of labour' thesis of Lenin [1964: vol. 23, 105–120] that is found in Amin [1974]. For overviews of the aristocracy of labour debates, see Post [2010] and Cope [2013].) Cheap goods consumerism is now the driving force of the world economy. In the core, what was once Lenin's (1964: vol. 23, 105–120) small 'bribed' section of the working class has been transformed into a broad aristocracy of labour comprised of ordinary citizens who have little reason to oppose the imperialistic system from which they obtain rewards. Objectively, the majority of the Global South population should resist surplus drains. However, most (semi)peripheral elites, state leaders, emerging professional/managerial classes and middle classes benefit from the expropriation and export of dark value embedded in the imperialistic value transfer system. The workers who most need to unite are those of the (semi)periphery. They have nothing to lose but their commodity chains of global value transfer.

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Global War and the Battle for Afghanistan

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Synonyms

Battle of Afghanistan; Central Asia; Empire of Capital; Endless global war; Just war; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); U.S. Imperialism

Definition/Description

This chapter on Global War and Afghanistan demonstrates that violence is used as a vital element in the Empire of Capital as it seeks to supress any competing system which seeks to advance collective welfare and reciprocity that are embeddedin precapitalist systems. The chapter argues that violence is a necessary component in suppressing popular resistance in the imperialist system dominated by the capitalist states (Empire of Capital), represented by the United States and its allies. The US is capable of defeating Afghanistan and other states through the overwhelming control over military violence.

Throughout the endless occupation of Afghanistan, many people in the West have continued to believe the myth that this country is a remote, worthless land populated by backward, hostile people. The influential author Andrew Bacevich (2009) wrote: 'NO SERIOUS [sic] person thinks that Afghanistan – remote, impoverished, barely qualifying as a nation-state – seriously matters to the United States.' Given the general level of ignorance about Afghanistan perpetuated by intellectual elites, political and military leaders, and mainstream media it is not surprising so few of the taxpayers footing the bill and the families sacrificing their loved ones for the ongoing military expedition question the story of why a small coalition of states, led by the US, invaded Afghanistan and continue an occupation with no end in sight. The accepted story is that the invasion was a necessary act of retaliation that would eliminate the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks, which in the process would somehow liberate Afghan women and girls, give democracy to Afghans, and generally make the world a safer place. The passion for war has ebbed as the toll in blood and resources mounted and the combat mission has been transformed into a mission to train Afghan forces. Still, the myths used to justify the invasion and ongoing occupation of Afghanistan prevail.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to counter the myth that Afghans are backward and hostile. It suffices to repeat what some Afghans told me during my visits: 'If you come to Afghanistan as a guest we will treat you with the greatest hospitality, but if you come as an imperialist – as a thief to steal from us – we will kill you.' I would reply: 'If you invite me to your home, I will come in friendship to enjoy your hospitality; I will not search through your cupboards looking for whatever I can steal.' I can attest to the fact that when one visits on these terms, Afghans are extremely hospitable. Moreover, many Afghans – even many considered illiterate by Western standards – are acutely aware of their place in the historical progression of global political economy. Many Afghans maintain that they defeated the British and Soviet imperialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and contend that they will ultimately defeat the US-led forces whom they also perceive as imperialists. This is not to suggest that most Afghans seek isolation from the West: many would welcome engagement and trade on fair terms; however, many fear they are sacrificial pawns in this latest rapacious mode of militarised capitalist expansion. Depictions of Afghanistan that suggest the ongoing warfare is rooted entirely in tribal, ethnic, and religious conflicts, or a supposed global clash of civilisations, obfuscate the many material rationales rooted in an expanding global political economy that Afghans identify for the successive foreign occupations of their land since the beginning of the nineteenth century (Skinner 2013). The tribal, ethnic, and religious conflicts that stretch beyond the borders of Afghanistan throughout the region of greater Central Asia are certainly important factors in understanding warfare in Afghanistan, but these are issues beyond the scope of this essay. These are not causal issues; they are symptomatic. None of these issues – even if they did indeed threaten world peace and the very foundations of global civilisation, unlikely as that widely propagated explanation seems – explains the real strategic and economic interests the most powerful and wealthiest nation states have had in Afghanistan, since the beginning of the nineteenth century and to the present day.

This essay does counter the myth that Afghanistan is a remote and worthless land by examining the geostrategic value of Afghanistan in the context of the historical expansion and evolution of capitalism and the emergence of an 'Empire

of Capital' (Wood 2003). Afghanistan is a land of immense natural resource wealth; Afghan mineral resources are estimated to be worth one trillion US dollars (Najafizada and Rupert 2010; Risen 2010), and the total value of all extractive resources, including oil and gas reserves, may be as much as three trillion US dollars (Najafizada 2011). Afghan resources are of significant value, but their greater value lies in catalysing the development of a trans-Eurasian network of transport, energy transmission, and communications infrastructure with Afghanistan as a central node – Afghanistan lies at the geopolitical centre of the struggle to expand an emerging Empire of Capital throughout Eurasia. Barely more than two centuries after Elizabeth I granted the East India Company its royal charter in 1600, the paramilitary forces of the East India Company pushed northwards through India to make their first forays into Afghanistan. The expansion of capitalism was, however, stalled at the borders of Afghanistan for almost another 200 years until the US-led forces 'liberated' Afghanistan with the invasion of 7 October 2001. Feel-good propaganda stories aside, few Afghans and especially few Afghan women and girls were liberated by the invasion. International investors, however, were truly liberated – investors are now free to profit not only by extracting Afghanistan's wealth, but even more so by developing the infrastructure to make use of its strategic position at the centre of expanding capital across Eurasia. Afghanistan is a geopolitical and economic keystone poised to become a central node of transport, energy transmission, and communications networks spanning Central Asia that will ultimately connect the disparate regions of the Eurasian supercontinent. The US Government and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) call this initiative the 'New Silk Road' (Clinton 2011).

Building physical infrastructure, however, is only part of developing the New Silk Road. Hillary Clinton's (2011) comments when announcing the New Silk Road demonstrate that creating the political-legal-economic infrastructure, which she described as 'new rules for the 21st century', are equally important. The strategic and economic importance of global trade in various resources wax and wane with changes in technology or consumers' whims, but a remaining constant is the growth of the physical transport, energy transmission, and communications networks, as well as the less tangible but no less real political-legal-economic infrastructure of empire. Building this superstructure of dominance lies at the heart of building empire. The Bush and Obama administrations' expanding regime of new rules, which is enforced by military dominance at least as much as political influence, strengthens the concept of New World Order originally conceived by Woodrow Wilson. This New World Order, nearing its centenary, relies on the hegemonic leadership of the US in partnership with other powerful wealthy capitalist states – partnerships tied together by a growing matrix of state, sub-state, and supra-state governance and military organisations; non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and corporations. The theorist Ellen Meiksins Wood (2003) describes this complex matrix of domination as an 'Empire of Capital'.

In this essay, I first examine the vast resource wealth of Afghanistan. Second, I examine the development of the New Silk Road as a means not only to exploit this wealth but more importantly to expand US and allied dominance in Central Asia and throughout Eurasia. Third, I argue that the invasion of Afghanistan was not necessary in the legal sense defined by international law; however, the invasion and continuing occupation are necessary, from the perspective of geostrategists, to expand capital and maintain US dominance in the global political economy. I conclude that the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan constitute one battle of many in an endless global war for the expansion of capital that demonstrates the emergence of an Empire of Capital. The US continues to compete for global dominance, but the empire that the US leads is becoming increasingly multinational in composition as the most powerful and wealthiest capitalist states ever more closely align their interests towards global and not exclusively national capital expansion. The invasion of Afghanistan failed to liberate most Afghan women, but it successfully liberated capital, by destroying Afghan normative systems of collective ownership.

The Wealth of Afghanistan

On 31 January 2010, Hamid Karzai, then president of Afghanistan, announced that an 'almost-finished' report by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) indicated that Afghanistan's non-fuel mineral resources are worth a trillion US dollars (Najafizada and Rupert 2010). More recent surveys show that Afghan oil and gas reserves may be worth as much as an additional two trillion US dollars (Najafizada 2011; USGS 2011). The story of Afghan resource wealth had been reported for decades in the business pages and extractive industries journals in North America and Europe; however, it was never front-page news until 13 June 2010, when the *New York Times* published a headline proclaiming, 'U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan' (Risen 2010). The *New York Times* journalist James Risen wrote that US geologists had 'stumbled across an intriguing series of old charts and data at the library of the Afghan Geological Survey in Kabul that hinted at major mineral deposits in the country'. News of the occupation forces accidentally stumbling upon hints of vast Afghan mineral wealth may have surprised many in the West; however, Afghans, no doubt, found the idea that their unexploited riches were only recently 'discovered' preposterous.

For at least five millennia, the various peoples who populated the territories that would later make up Afghanistan mined their vast resource wealth and traded their products throughout Eurasia and North Africa via the ancient Silk Road. The immense copper resource of Mes Aynak is one of many resource sites that have been mined for centuries and in many cases millennia and which demonstrate the historical wealth of Afghanistan. The archaeological site at Mes Aynak shows evidence of five thousand years of copper mining. Located 40 km (25 miles) southeast of Kabul, Mes Aynak covers an area of 450 square km (280 square miles). A five-thousand-year-old Bronze Age mining town lies below a Buddhist city that reached its height of prosperity in the fifth to seventh centuries (Afghanistan MOMP 2014). Today, the Aynak copper deposit is recognised as the second largest in the world, containing as much as 20 million

metric tons of exploitable copper (Huntzinger 2008, p. 24). In 2007 – in a deal that will be analysed more thoroughly later in this essay – the government of Afghanistan awarded the concession to extract the copper at Aynak to a joint venture consortium of two Chinese state enterprises, with China Metallurgical Construction Corporation (CMCC) as 75% owner and Jiangxi Copper Company (JCC) as 25% owner. It was widely reported that the consortium paid $3 billion for the concession, but documentation shows a payment of $4.39 billion (Hong Kong Stock Exchange 2008). Yearly copper extraction at Aynak could be as high as 200,000 metric tonnes, which is 1.3% of current annual world production. Afghanistan could become among the top 15 copper producers in the world on the strength of only this one of several rich copper deposits in the country. Gross revenues from Aynak are expected to reach $1.404 billion per year, with annual profits after tax of $304 million. A 15% royalty will net an annual state income of $390 million (Huntzinger 2008, pp. 24–29). The entire mining sector was forecast to generate annual revenues for the government of Afghanistan of between $500 million and $1.5 billion by 2016 and more than $3 billion by 2026 (Global Witness 2012, p. 7). Recent events demonstrate that the forecasts for development time were overly optimistic, but the fact remains that investors will ultimately exploit Afghanistan's vast resource wealth. The immense multi-billion-dollar mining project in Aynak and an iron mining project currently being developed by an Indian–Canadian consortium in Hajigak are the first of numerous projects of similar scale, with many smaller projects also in early production stages (Skinner 2008, 2013).

As early as 1808, surveyors embedded within the paramilitary units of the British East India Company scrambled through Afghanistan attempting to exploit its riches ahead of their Russian competitors (Elphinstone 1815, p. 306; Shroder 1981). A primary objective of the first commercial expedition to Kabul, led by Captain Alexander Burns in 1836–37, was to find coal to power the East India Company's Indus River fleet (Grout 1995, p. 192). Unfortunately, Burns's

expedition had greater success in propelling the East India Company into the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839–42. Another captain of the East India Company, Henry Drummond (1841), documented one of the first modern geological surveys of Afghanistan, which he conducted during the war. In his report, Drummond refers to an earlier 'voluminous Geological Report' prepared by Captain Herbert, which attracted the attention of 'practical men and capitalists in London' (Drummond 1841, p. 76). Drummond reported that, in addition to the many mineral deposits he surveyed, the extent of existing excavations as well as quantities of slag at various Afghan mine sites bode well for the profitability of mining investments. Drummond observed excavations at the Aynak copper mines 'so large, that they have more the appearance of caverns than mining galleries' (1841, p. 79), indicating the massive amounts of copper that had been mined during five millennia of artisanal mining.

In a rationalisation of imperialism prescient of the arguments that political and military leaders would make again in the twenty-first century, Captain Drummond claimed the 1839 British invasion of Afghanistan would not be perceived as an 'act of aggression', because the reorganisation of the existing system of Afghan mine management and improvements in the working conditions of Afghan miners would lead to an 'era of peace, of prosperity, and of permanent tranquility in Afghanistan' (quoted in Grout 1995, pp. 193–194). The British envoy to Kabul, Sir W.H. Macnaughten, wrote in 1841 that developing Afghanistan's resources would employ the 'wild inhabitants . . . reclaim them from a life of lawless violence' and increase the wealth of the Afghans as it increased the wealth of the East Asia Company (quoted in Grout 1995, p. 193). However, the British never did secure enough of a foothold in Afghanistan to establish commercially viable mines. Nonetheless, they maintained 'a comprehensive interest' in Afghanistan's resources throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries until the British army and air force finally retreated from Afghanistan in 1919 to end the Third Anglo-Afghan War (Ali and Shroder 2011, p. 5).

After the last British retreat, in 1919, a new Afghan government – a democratic parliamentary monarchy based on the British system – encouraged exploration and development. In 1927, a Soviet surveyor, Vladimir Obruchev, published a report titled 'Fossil Riches of Afghanistan' and detailing his oil and gas discoveries (Ali and Shroder 2011, p. 5). The Obruchev depression in the natural-gas-rich Amu Darya Basin still bears his name (Klett et al. 2006a). In the early 1930s, the Afghan Government granted the American Inland Oil Company a 25-year exclusive concession to oil and mineral exploration rights. However, the company withdrew from the deal, upsetting the Afghans in 'their first real experience with voluntary foreign penetration' (Shroder 1981, p. 44). After the Second World War, the Afghan Government initiated large-scale geological exploration. It sought technical and financial assistance from American, Western European, Czech, and Soviet sources, often pitting First-World and Second-World surveyors against one another on overlapping but secretive exploration projects. By the 1970s, more than 700 geological reports indicated that a wealth of resources awaited exploitation (Shroder 1981; Tucker et al. 2011). The Afghanistan Ministry of Mines and Resources and the United Nations (UN) in Kabul concealed numerous reports containing 'information on resources perceived to be world-strategic and therefore a threat to Afghan independence should too much notice be attracted' (Shroder 1981, p. 45).

A USGS website claims: 'During the 1980s and 1990s, the USGS conducted broad regional oil and gas resource assessments in northwestern Afghanistan' (USGS n.d.). Considering that north-west Afghanistan was occupied by Soviet troops during the 1980s, this claim seems contentious. It may indicate that USGS surveyors worked with the American-backed mujahedin during the 1980s. During the 1990s, in view of the close relations between the US and the mujahedin military commanders, the USGS may have conducted assessments on the ground. 'Mujahedin' – the plural of 'mujahedi' – translates as strugglers, or the fighters of jihad. In the Afghan context, seven rival mujahedin

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organisations, based on political, regional, tribal, ethnic, and religious differences, gained power in different parts of Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. All of the mujahedin organisations maintained bases in Pakistan and all received financial and logistical support and arms supplies, from the US as well as from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, during the Soviet occupation. US support continued after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 until one of the mujahedin factions – Jamaat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani – succeeded in invading Kabul to overthrow the socialist government in 1992 (Coll 2004; Rashid 2000, 2008). A number of mujahedin factions financed their anti-Soviet insurgency not only with US support, but also via mining (DuPée 2012). One particularly successful mujahedin commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, financed his military campaign with his profitable gem-mining industry in Panshir. When Jamaat-i-Islami seized power from the nominally socialist government to establish the first Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 1992, Massoud, became defence minister and nationalised his gem mines. With assistance from the Polish company Intercommerce, the Panshir mines generated US$ 200 million of revenue per year during the rule of the short-lived Islamic republic (DuPée 2012, p. 12). Following the Taliban takeover in 1996, the deposed Jamaat-i-Islami and two other rival mujahedin factions coalesced as the United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UINFSA), better known in the West as the Northern Alliance. The UINFSA commanders operated nearly 100 emerald mines prior to the US-led invasion in 2001 (DuPée 2012, p. 13).

Despite Afghanistan's holding some of the world's largest known deposits of fuel resources and minerals, only limited development of oil, gas, salt, coal, building materials, emeralds, lapis lazuli, and various other gemstones began after the Second World War. The American authors of an influential book published during the Soviet occupation, titled *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited*, argued that the Soviet invasion was a resource grab for Afghan minerals, oil, and gas, as well as a strategic gambit to gain access to the Persian Gulf oil fields (Klass 1987). However,

during the Soviet occupation, industrial-scale development was limited to the few areas the Soviets could secure, such as the northern gas fields. Nevertheless, from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, Afghans derived much of their foreign exchange from natural gas sales to the USSR (Noorzoy 1990, 2006). The Soviets also briefly mined uranium at two locations during the 1980s (McCready 2006, p. 8). During the civil war of 1992–96, development all but halted. After the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, the US initiated negotiations, which ultimately failed, to develop various projects, including the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline, with both the Taliban, which controlled most of Afghanistan, and the UINFSA, which controlled some territory in the north (Foster 2008; Gilman 1997).

On 20 March 2002, the USGS published its first post-invasion report, listing more than 1000 deposits, mines, and occurrences in Afghanistan on the basis of a compilation of existing data and literature (Orris and Bliss 2002). Subsequent reports have been informed by increasingly detailed ground and aerial surveys, including imaging spectrometer data collection conducted over most of Afghanistan in 2007 (Tucker et al. 2011). A partial list of the abundant minerals of Afghanistan includes copper, iron, gold, mercury, cobalt, lead, and uranium; rare metals including chromium, cesium, lithium, niobium, and tantalum; and rare earth elements. In 2002, the USGS also identified oil and gas reserves that far surpassed Soviet estimates (Klett et al. 2006b; *Oil & Gas Journal* 2006; Shroder 2007). Each subsequent assessment has shown larger deposits of oil and gas. In 2006, the USGS assessment of potential Afghan oil and gas listed 1.6 billion barrels of crude oil, 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 500 million barrels of natural gas liquids (Klett et al. 2006a: vii). In 2011, the assessment was increased to 1.908 billion barrels of crude oil, 59 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 667 million barrels of natural gas liquids (USGS 2011). In 2012, Chinese state enterprises began oil and gas production in Afghanistan (Hall 2013; Shalizi 2012) and construction of a $700 million oil refinery (Baraki 2012). A joint venture between an

American company, FMC, and an Afghan company is building another oil refinery which is projected to generate annual revenues of $400 million per year (Wadsam 2012).

In view of the extensive history of resource exploration and extraction in Afghanistan, Risen's (2010) claim that American geologists were ignorant of Afghanistan's vast resource wealth until 2004 when they fortuitously 'stumbled' upon some old Soviet-era documents is ludicrous. The numerous post- 2001 joint studies conducted by the USGS, the British Geological Survey, the Afghanistan Geological Survey, and the Canadian Forces Mapping and Charting Establishment (USGS 2008) confirmed the facts known in the West, since the nineteenth century, that Afghan mineral and petroleum resources were of vast quantity and of significant economic and geostrategic importance. The only news in Risen's frontpage article of 2010 was that Afghanistan's natural resource wealth, previously estimated to be worth billions of US dollars (Skinner 2008), could instead net trillions. Clearly, throughout the twentieth century, American and allied strategic planners were either knowledgeable of Afghanistan's vast resource wealth or incredibly negligent in their duties.

Despite its economic and geostrategic significance – or arguably, precisely because of this significance – exploitation of Afghanistan's resource wealth was constrained throughout the twentieth century. A key obstacle throughout the century was the lack of transport, energy transmission, and communications infrastructure. Political instability since the early 1970s and the Soviet invasion on 25 December 1979 created even greater obstacles. Foreign investors might have hoped that the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, and the US-backed mujahedin victory over the nominally socialist government in 1992, would have opened Afghanistan to foreign investment. However, the internecine civil war that immediately erupted between rival mujahedin factions precluded hopes for development. In 1996, the Taliban seized control of Kabul, fracturing Afghanistan into two quasi-states, with the US-supported UINFSA entrenched in the north. Yet, despite these many physical and political obstacles blocking Afghan resource development, the greatest obstacle dissuading foreign investors throughout the twentieth century was a fear of nationalisation, because 'minerals were traditionally considered state property' (Shroder 1981, p. 49). Even the mujahedin warlord Massoud nationalised his profitable gem mines when he became defence minister of the first US-backed Islamic republic in 1992.

If the US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' invasion of 2001 accomplished nothing else, it secured the freedom for foreign investors to profit from Afghanistan's resource wealth by destroying the last vestiges of its poorly developed and badly broken state enterprise system. The US Department of State (2010) reports that Afghanistan 'has taken significant steps toward fostering a business-friendly environment for both foreign and domestic investment'. Afghanistan's new investment law allows 100% foreign ownership and provides generous tax allowances to foreign investors, but does not provide protection for Afghan workers or the environment (Noorzoy 2006). A few analysts have employed crude analyses to argue that the US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan simply to secure possession of its resource wealth, but the potential of reaping a few trillion dollars' worth of natural resources is not an adequate rationale for launching a military expedition that cost at least as much or more. Resource extraction in Afghanistan, nonetheless, plays an increasingly large strategic role in catalysing development of a New Silk Road, which is an integral factor in expanding capital in Central Asia to ensure dominance of the US-led Empire of Capital throughout Eurasia (Skinner 2008, 2013).

The New Silk Road

Clearly, Afghanistan is of significant value as a source of economically and strategically significant natural resources, but is it as remote as popular mythology would have us believe? On the contrary, Afghanistan is poised to become an important node in a trans-Eurasian network of transport, energy transmission, and communications infrastructure. For millennia, the land now

known as Afghanistan was a strategic land bridge at the centre of a trans-continental trade network known as the Silk Road. The various peoples who populated this land not only exported the gems and minerals they mined, as well as the once bountiful agricultural products they produced; they also profited by maintaining the trans-Eurasian trade routes and providing logistics and security to facilitate transporting trade goods through their territories. However, with the advent of cheaper, faster, and more reliable sea travel from the fifteenth century, caravels and eventually supertankers and container ships superseded the camels, donkeys, and horses that travelled the ancient Silk Road.

Although Afghanistan lost its central place in global trade from the fifteenth century onwards, it resumed geopolitical significance in the nineteenth century, for a different reason: the leaders of the British, Russian, and Persian empires used Afghanistan's rugged terrain as a *barrier* to separate their empires (Rubin 1995). The East India Company's initial forays into Afghanistan as early as 1808 ultimately resulted in the ignominious defeat of the British in three Anglo-Afghan wars fought between 1839 and 1919. Unable to effectively exploit its riches, the British had to be content with using Afghanistan as a strategic barrier to protect the Indian jewel of the British Empire to the south from the Russian Empire to the north. After forcing the British military forces out of Afghanistan to end the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, Afghans enjoyed a brief period of freedom from military interventions, and they had hopes of opening the country to trade and commerce on their own terms. However, during the Cold War, the US and USSR resumed using Afghanistan as an inter-imperial barrier (Rubin 1995). Consequently, the development of modern transport, energy transmission, and communications infrastructure that took place elsewhere in the region throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries bypassed Afghanistan. With the collapse of the USSR, the strategic need to use Afghanistan as a *barrier* separating rival empires also collapsed; instead, Afghanistan can now be used as a *bridgehead* to expand capital.

The transition of Afghanistan from a barrier separating rival empires to a bridgehead from which to further expand the reach of capitalism is a key to strengthening the US-led Empire of Capital. As the former national security advisor to the Carter Administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued, 'the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America's global primacy' (1997, p. 51). The nation state or empire that can dominate trade on the supercontinent will dominate the globe; dominance over the process of reconnecting Eurasia via Afghanistan and the Greater Central Asia region is an integral component of this strategic quest for power. The shortest routes between China and Europe, as well as between India and Russia, are via Afghanistan. Railways, highways, oil and gas pipelines, electrical transmission lines, and fibre-optic cables will eventually criss-cross Afghanistan to connect Eurasia. As in previous imperial ages, the empire that achieves primacy is the one that, among other aspects of power, establishes itself as builder, protector, and arbiter of trade routes. Development of Afghanistan is inevitable, but the US and its closest allies have no economic advantage to dominate development in this region; their only clear advantage is military power. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a convenient pretext to exercise this power. This is not to argue that the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Global War on Terror are necessarily part of some vast conspiracy: opportunistic strategists seized the opportunity provided by the terrorists. The wealth and strategic importance of Afghanistan may not be well known in the West, and were no doubt purposely obfuscated by effective propaganda, but they were not a state secret.

Hillary Clinton announced the US Government's New Silk Road strategy in Chennai, India, on 20 July 2011. In her address, Clinton called on Indian leaders to help build a New Silk Road as an 'international web and network of economic and transit connections'. 'That means', Clinton said, 'building more rail lines, highways, energy infrastructure … upgrading the facilities at border crossings … and removing the bureaucratic barriers to the free flow of goods

and people.' Clinton also stated: 'It means casting aside the outdated trade policies that we are living with and adopting new rules for the 21st century' (Clinton 2011). Clinton's remarks indicate that creating the political-legal-economic regime is as critical as building the physical infrastructure. Throughout the centuries of expansion and evolution of capitalism, the strategic and economic importance of global trade in various resources waxes and wanes with changes in technology or consumers' whims. A constant that remains is the growth of the physical transport, energy transmission, and communications networks as well as the less tangible but no less real political-legal-economic infrastructure of empire. Building this entire infrastructure of dominance lies at the heart of building empire – a process evident in the battle for Afghanistan.

The idea of building a new Silk Road was formulated long before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997 (Gilman 1997) and Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 (Bereuter 1999) did not pass into law; nonetheless, documentation of their debate demonstrates the strategic thinking of US decision makers in the 1990s. The initiator of the first failed act, Benjamin Gilman (1997), aimed 'to focus American diplomatic and commercial attention, as well as American foreign assistance, on the important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia' in order to rebuild 'links to Europe and Asia'. While Gilman's bill focused on facilitating oil and gas exports to the West, it also aimed more broadly to establish 'economic interdependence' and to develop 'open market economies and open democratic systems' in the region. Gilman designed the bill to 'help promote market-oriented principles and practices', 'assist in the development of the infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, and energy and trade', and 'support United States business interests and investments in the region' (1997, pp. 2–3). According to Doug Bereuter, who chaired the subcommittee meetings on the 1997 bill and sponsored the attempt to resurrect it in 1999, 'the collapse of the Soviet Union has unleashed a new great game, where the interests of the East India Trading Company have been replaced by

those of Unocal and Total, and many other organizations and firms' (US Congress 1998, p. 6). As Gilman (1997) indicated in the bill, the US objective is to secure investors and liberate capital in general, of which the oil and gas sectors are vital commercial interests but by no means the only ones; mining is also of great concern. However, US legislators failed to pass either Silk Road Strategy Act into law, as US negotiators simultaneously were unable to finalise agreements with the rival governments of a divided Afghanistan. The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan while the UINFSA ruled a rump state in the north. The invasion of 2001 eliminated the difficulty of having to negotiate with these rival Afghan governments. In their place the US-led invasion force installed an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai, composed primarily of warlords from the UINFSA (Skinner 2013).

Within days of the invasion, the editors of the *Christian Science Monitor* expressed concern that the US might be perceived to have invaded Afghanistan for control of its resources. The editors wrote:

> As late as 1998, two years after the Taliban took over, the US company Unocal was negotiating with that radical Islamic regime about a pipeline that would run through Afghanistan and down to Karachi in Pakistan. Some Taliban officials even visited the US to discuss the matter. Also in that year, then-oil-industry executive and now Vice President Dick Cheney was captivated by the Caspian's potential. 'I can't think of a time when we've had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian,' he told a large group of oil-industry executives in Washington. (*Christian Science Monitor* 2001)

These editors were concerned that 'the conspiracy-minded in the Middle East and elsewhere will see the hand of Big Oil at work in creating a puppet government in Kabul'. However, by definition, conspiracy denotes secrecy – the Silk Road strategy was not secret. Nor was Dick Cheney's proposal 'to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests' secret (1993, p. 4). Indeed, the institutions of the US state publicly identify US interests and objectives, even if these tend to be couched in euphemistic language.

The US National Security Strategy of 2002 outlines a two-track strategy. The first track is to *engage* currently compliant but potential challengers of US dominance in the globalising capitalist system – particularly China, but also Russia – in mutually profitable economic activities. The second track is to be prepared to militarily *contain* any rival state should it demonstrate non-compliance (Bush 2002). The forward presence of US and allied forces in Afghanistan facilitates achieving both objectives. Not surprisingly, according to a RAND publication, 'China feels very vulnerable where its sea lines of communication are concerned'; consequently, 'there is great interest in building pipelines' and other 'strategic passageways' to Central Asia, Russia, and Pakistan (Beckley et al. 2014, p. 25). American strategists seek to *engage* China along with all other states in the region in these industrial endeavours within the rubric of the US-led global economic system, while setting the rules to maintain dominance of American corporate and state interests. However, should any state not co-operate, the *full-spectrum dominance* and *forward presence* of the US military with the support of its closest allies will militarily *contain* any hostile power. The US-led combat mission in Afghanistan has been transformed into a training mission. Nonetheless, a sizeable foreign military training force will probably remain in Afghanistan indefinitely to maintain a forward presence to contain China or Russia if necessary and to continue the ongoing containment of Iran. This objective looms large among the other strategic objectives supporting resource extraction, development of the New Silk Road, and the general expansion and security of capital.

The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency advertises that 'Afghanistan is ideally situated to again function as a strategic gateway', offering 'a point of access to an extended regional market of more than 2 billion people' (AISA 2010). Afghanistan is a new frontier for capital development: building and operating the necessary infrastructure to exploit this potential will be a capital-intensive but highly profitable and power-enhancing venture. A key agency in co-ordinating development of the New Silk Road, since 1996, is the Central Asian Regional Economic Coordination Program (CAREC) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Between 2001 and 2011, CAREC invested more than $17 billion in 'regional infrastructure and initiatives to promote connectivity and trade' and open 'previously unexploited resources' throughout Central Asia (CAREC 2012, p. 1). Afghanistan remains the missing link in the system. Only 7% of roads in Afghanistan are paved, four provincial capitals are not connected to the regional network, and 70% of inter-provincial and inter-district roads are in 'poor' condition (ADB 2014, p. 2). In the late 1970s, the French rail company SOFRERAIL proposed building a railway linking Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran to develop Afghanistan's then fledgling mining industry; however, the proposal collapsed because of disagreements between Afghanistan and Iran and the eventual political turmoil in Iran and Afghanistan (Shroder 1981, p. 47). The only railways existing in Afghanistan are 75 km of recently renovated railway from Uzbekistan, initially built to supply Soviet forces based near Mazar-e-Sharif, and the preliminary sections of an Iranian railway under construction from Iran that will terminate in Herat (Skinner 2013).

There is a symbiotic relationship between mines and railways, but co-ordinating investment in these correlated industries is difficult. The inherent conundrum is that investors will not invest to develop a large-scale mine not serviced by a railway, but investors will not invest in a railway unless there are reasonable prospects of profiting from existing developments. The fix for this conundrum in Afghanistan was to utilise state enterprises to aggregate these mutual interests. When the government of Afghanistan granted the development concession for the massive Aynak copper deposit to the consortium of CMCC and JCC, commentators such as Robert Kaplan (2009) and Michael Wines (2009) were incensed. Why, they asked, should the Afghans award the Chinese a treasure liberated by the sacrifices of US and allied soldiers and why should these soldiers protect the investments of Chinese state enterprises? But awarding the Aynak mine to the CMCC–JCC consortium may

have been a shrewd calculation on the part of US and allied strategists in co-operation with China and Afghanistan. The Chinese consortium will construct a 400-megawatt power plant to feed the mine and its smelters, develop a nearby coalmine to feed the power plant, and construct a railway that will stretch from west China through Tajikistan to the Aynak mine and on to Pakistan. This railway will also eventually link to the Herat terminus of the Iranian–Afghan railway. Excess electrical power will supply nearby Kabul, and the railway will service the equally massive Hajigak iron mine that an Indian–Canadian consortium is currently developing as well as many other future developments. On 22 September 2010, the Afghanistan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) announced an agreement with the CMCC–JCC consortium to build a railway to service Kabul and the Aynak copper mine that will 'connect Afghanistan to the railways of Pakistan, India, and South East Asia and to the extensive rail system of China, Europe, and Central Asia'. The railway will be designed 'to carry the heaviest of loads . . . and commercial goods for transit, agricultural products, passengers and normal freight', according to the MOMP (Afghanistan MOMP 2010). The railway will be built on the 'BOOT' principle – Build, Own, Operate, and Transfer. The Chinese consortium will own and operate the railway until it recovers its capital cost, at which time it will train Afghan staff prior to transferring ownership to the government of Afghanistan. Capital costs for the railway are estimated at between US $4 billion and US $5 billion (Afghanistan MOMP 2010). This is in addition to the US $4.39 billion that CMCC–JCC paid for the mining concession, plus the unpublicised costs it will incur to build the mine. A Canadian mining company, Hunter-Dickinson, was initially expected to win the Aynak concession, but it was unlikely that any private company could have undertaken such a large project in view of the high capital cost for not only mine development but also the necessary railway and power-generation infrastructure, compounded by the political risks of investing in Afghanistan and the commercial risk of investing in a resource with high market volatility. The

American, Canadian, and British governments operate state-financed insurance schemes to protect investors from political risk in foreign investments, but they will not insure investments of this scale. The CMCC–JCC consortium clearly had an advantage of scale as a state enterprise that few if any private corporations could match. Moreover, China's growing economy needs a growing supply of copper regardless of its market price. Most importantly, by engaging China economically, the US and its allies align China's interests with the interests of the Empire of Capital (Skinner 2008, 2011, 2013).

Among other elements of the New Silk Road currently in development are the CASA-1000 and TAPI energy transmission projects. The CASA-1000 is a 1222-km network of high-voltage electricity transmission lines that will export high-voltage electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Pakistan and Afghanistan (CASA-1000 2015). This project is under the direction of the Central Asia–South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) project with funding from the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, Islamic Development Bank, and World Bank. The TAPI (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) pipeline will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to markets in Pakistan and India (Hormats 2011). This project, which has facilitated cooperation between India and Pakistan as well as engaging both China and Russia as investors (Muzalevsky 2011), surpasses the ideas of the architects of the initial TAP pipeline and the Silk Road Strategy Acts of 1997 and 1999. Plans are now under way for an equally ambitious gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Tajikistan and Afghanistan to China (Samimi 2012).

Clearly, the economic and strategic value of Afghanistan will be exponentially multiplied if the New Silk Road can indeed be realised. The geostrategic power of the US-led Empire of Capital will be strengthened by ensuring its hegemonic position in every aspect of development in Afghanistan and Central Asia, which is key to power across Eurasia. However, as during every

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historical epoch of rapid development and capital expansion, there will be vast differences between the winners and the losers. The leadership and investors in the Empire of Capital are manoeuvring to be the biggest winners. The losers will be Afghans who are dispossessed of their traditional lands and livelihoods to make way for development. Although the post-invasion Afghan government instituted a legal regime purportedly to protect Afghans, it is inadequate and skewed to disproportionally protect investors' property rights. Consequently, continuing conflict is inevitable, and the foreign occupation to secure capital expansion in Afghanistan is unlikely to end in the foreseeable future.

The Battle for Afghanistan: Just War or Just One Battle of Endless Global War?

The invasion of Afghanistan is often portrayed as the necessary war – the just war – in contrast to the unnecessary invasion of Iraq. The myth persists that, having been provoked and given no other option but war by the terrorists who attacked New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the US and its closest allies fought a just war in Afghanistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks are frequently compared to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. However, a more accurate historical comparison is with the terrorist attack that provided the pretext for Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia, which triggered the First World War. In that case, the allied victors – the US, the UK, and France – found Austria-Hungary and its ally Germany guilty of the international war crime of aggression. The act of terrorism that was the *precipitating cause* of the current global war, like the terrorist attack that precipitated the First World War, did not make war necessary; in both cases, the criminal terrorists could have been dealt with by numerous diplomatic, police, and military actions short of launching a global war. Instead, the US and its closest allies used the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a pretext to remove the recalcitrant Islamist Taliban regime from power; the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided a pretext to remove the recalcitrant Serbian

nationalist regime from power. In both cases, the *precipitating cause* of war was a criminal act perpetrated by a non-governmental terrorist organisation. In both cases, the *immediate cause* of war was the desire of the invaders to remove a recalcitrant regime that acted in ways contrary to the interests of the invaders. In both cases, the *deep cause* of the war was a complex of factors rooted in the tensions of expanding empires manoeuvring for geopolitical advantage. Opportunistic leaders of wealthy powerful states, in both cases, seized the opportunity provided by a terrorist attack to launch retaliatory military actions with aggressive geostrategic objectives that reached far beyond merely eliminating or punishing the terrorists.

A notable proponent of the Global War on Terror, Michael Ignatieff, quipped: 'There might be reason, even though the awakening has been brutal, to be thankful to the barbarians. After all, they are, as the poet Celan said, a kind of solution. They have offered the empire a new *raison d'être* and a long-term strategic objective: the eradication of terror' (2003, p. 6). However, as Ignatieff also observes, the American public and its political leaders are uncomfortable with recognising they are citizens of an empire. Americans, according to Ignatieff, are 'a people who remember their country secured its independence by revolt against an empire, and who have often thought of their country as the friend of antiimperial struggles everywhere. It is an empire in other words, without consciousness of itself as such. But that does not make it any less of an empire, that is, an attempt to permanently order the world of states and markets according to its national interests' (2003, p. 2). Consequently, the leaders of empire must continuously invent popular rationales for war as a façade for aggressive military actions.

When George Bush declared the Global War on Terror on 20 September 2001, he stated that the military operations to come would be retaliatory in intent, but would achieve 'far more than instant retaliation' (G.W. Bush 2001a). In fact, since the invasion began on 7 October 2001, retaliation has disproportionately affected millions of Afghans who bore no responsibility for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. An astounding 96% of Afghans have been

personally affected by death, injury, disability, and the destruction of their homes, assets, and livelihoods (UN 2010, pp. 2–8). Retaliation as a reason for war may have satisfied a critical mass of Bush's constituency. Retaliation was also politically useful for demonstrating that the US and its closest allies possess both the political will and the military capacity to punish any challengers, regardless of the human, material, and political costs. Retaliation, however, is an illegal rationale for war according to international law: only *self-defence* and last resort meet the legal criteria for war (Duffy 2005; Mandel 2004). Special Operations Forces from the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with additional air support from Germany and France, unilaterally invaded Afghanistan, avoiding debate in the UN Security Council regarding the legality of this aggressive force. Proponents of the invasion argue that UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (UNSC 2001) sanctioned and legalised this use of aggressive force. The resolution is certainly a strongly worded condemnation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which urges states to seek out and bring the perpetrators to justice, but it does not in any terms sanction the invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, no mention of Afghanistan exists in the document.

What did occur was that the US, with the support of a small but powerful military coalition, instituted new de facto international law by overtly violating the laws of war. The leaders of most other powerful states tacitly acquiesced. Unable to legitimise the invasion of Afghanistan on the criteria of extant law, President Bush attempted to justify launching a global war using broad philosophical rationales. Bush stated (2001a): 'This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom . . . Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us'. Laura Bush (2001b) added that the 'fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women' and because 'in Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us'. A self-claimed right to illegal retaliation and abstract concepts of securing freedom and the

rights of women and girls were the initial stated objectives of the Global War on Terror and its first battle – the invasion of Afghanistan, codenamed 'Operation Enduring Freedom'.

The Bush Administration later defined what it really meant by 'freedom' in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (G.W. Bush 2002), popularly referred to as the Bush Doctrine. In a chapter titled 'Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade', the Bush Doctrine defines 'real freedom' as free trade (17–20). Pre-emptive warfare, which most analysts identify as the radical innovation of the Bush Doctrine, is a means to liberate capital; however, neither pre-emptive warfare nor wars fought to expand free trade are departures from the historical practice of the US state. The truly radical action of the Bush Administration was to so clearly articulate the objective of free trade and to rationalise the use of aggressive pre-emptive warfare in its pursuit. Few state leaders objected to the Bush Administration's claim to these new de facto legal rights, nor did the Obama Administration repudiate the de facto international law that the Bush Doctrine invented. Instead, the Obama Administration tried to rebrand the global war as 'Overseas Contingency Operations' (Burkeman 2009; Wilson and Kamen 2009), but nevertheless expanded global warfare. We should take George W. Bush at his word when he declared a global war on 20 September 2001 – this is truly a war of global scale without end. Afghanistan was the first of many battlefronts in this global war with far-flung overt and covert operations in Pakistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa, as well as in the Philippines, South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (G.W. Bush 2007; US Congressional Research Service 2009). The Obama Administration, instead of ending the war, has expanded it into Libya and Syria and has re-invaded Iraq. President Bush's declaration of global war and the subsequent Bush Doctrine overtly declared the mode of violence necessary to expand capitalism.

In the case of Afghanistan, the long-delayed exploitation of resources and transformation of the ancient Silk Road trade network into a modern

transport, energy transmission, and communications infrastructure would eventually occur with or without Western investors. However, to maintain global hegemony, it is necessary that the US-led Empire of Capital manoeuvre not to only grab the eventual lion's share of profit from these processes, but, more importantly, to maintain its dominant position to rule over these processes. But the US and its closest allies have few political or economic advantages in Central Asia; military power is their only clear advantage in this region. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided an opportunity to rationalise employing the military in *creative destruction* to lead to *stabilisation and reconstruction:* this is warfare and state-building with imperial intent. The US and its allies may establish advantages in financing, designing, constructing, and servicing the trans-Eurasian transport, energy transmission, and communications infrastructure and developing resource extraction to expand capital. More importantly, the US and its allies will determine the political-legal-economic regime to rule this trans-Eurasian network. Moreover, they will profit economically and politically from the military and security complex needed to protect this system, essentially as a regional affiliate of a global protection racket. The best-case scenario, from the perspective of imperial strategists, is to further *engage* China, Russia, India, and the less powerful states of the region in expanding capitalism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Nonetheless, the US and allied militaries will remain in situ to *contain* any potentially hostile state from intervening in Central Asia outside the rules set by the Empire of Capital. Whatever the outcome in Afghanistan and Central Asia – even the worst-case scenario of a further collapse into total chaos and warfare in the region – investors in the military-industrial complex and its sibling, the development-industrial complex, profit from war (Skinner 2013).

The Empire of Capital: Expanding and Evolving Capitalism

In this latest stage of capitalism, the Bush and Obama administrations' expanding regime of new rules – enforced by military dominance at least as much as political influence – strengthens the concept of New World Order originally conceived by Woodrow Wilson. This New World Order, nearing its centenary, relies on the hegemonic leadership of the US increasingly in partnership with other powerful wealthy capitalist states – partnerships tied together by a growing matrix of state, sub-state, and supra-state governance and military organisations; NGOs; and corporations. An 'Empire of Capital', as Ellen Wood (2003) describes it, is emerging – this is a US-led empire that can no longer be described merely as an American empire. The *dominant* US state requires the support of closely allied *subdominant* states that not only act in concert with the *dominant* state, but can also substitute as the dominant state. For example, the US and the UK, playing its subdominant role, jointly declared their intentions to invade Afghanistan and later Iraq. When the US and the UK became preoccupied with invading Iraq, Canada fulfilled its *subdominant* role to temporarily command the occupation of Afghanistan. This *subdominant* role of imperial partnership contrasts with Canada's historical *subordinate* role within the British Empire. The subdominant states of the Empire of Capital remain as independent nation states and competing national capitals, but act in concert within a unified empire when their interests are aligned and it is mutually beneficial to do so. One the most important roles of the *dominant* US state in this empire is to aggregate the interests of competing nation states and their national capital.

This conception of an Empire of Capital contrasts with William Robinson's (2004) idea of transnational capital. While this emerging empire does demonstrate a distinct tendency towards transnational capital it, nevertheless, remains rooted, at present, within the existing multinational framework of competing nation states. Moreover, there are indications that an Anglocentric hierarchy persists to further mitigate movement towards truly transnational capital. For example the so-called 'Five Eyes' – the security-military apparatuses of the five Anglophone powers, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – remain more closely linked to

each other than to their counterparts in other allied states. The fact that the invasion of Afghanistan was led on the ground exclusively by the Special Operations Forces of this Anglophone quintet indicates not only the depth of security-military interoperability, but also the depth of interoperability at every level of state apparatuses. Nonetheless, this also demonstrates the exclusion of other allied states from this exclusive Anglophone club. It is not evident that state, military, and corporate leaders of the most powerful and wealthiest capitalist states have yet transcended xenophobic nationalism to move toward truly transnational capital. The brief renaming of French fries as 'freedom fries' across America was laughable, but also indicative of the fractures existing in this imperial system. The US-led Empire of Capital does, nevertheless, demonstrate an increasing degree of multinational co-operation and interdependence among the most powerful and wealthiest capitalist states.

There are significant fractures in the empire. For example, many analysts mistakenly refer to the invasion of Afghanistan as a joint action by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the US, the UK, Canada, and briefly Germany were the only NATO states to engage in combat prior to 2003, after which NATO assumed command of the UN-sanctioned International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). Moreover, the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom forces that unilaterally invaded Afghanistan remained separate from the less aggressive ISAF until the Obama Administration unified these separate forces under one command in 2008. The reticence of the European members of NATO to participate in the aggressive military actions of Operation Enduring Freedom may have come about because state leaders feared the limits of their own military capacities or the costs associated with aggressive combat. They must have recognised the fact that international law and the UN Charter, which show that the invasion of Afghanistan is a war crime of aggression, supersede NATO treaty obligations. Perhaps most importantly, European leaders certainly knew that popular opinion was against joining the invasion on the basis of the massive protests in their countries and around the world in September and October 2001, which demonstrated opposition to the invasion (Skinner 2013).

The social relationships of domination and subordination inherent in the capitalist system are extremely conflictual at all of the system's interstitial fault lines; thus the global expansion and intensification of capitalism require increasing securitisation and militarisation. To maintain their dominance to ensure the pursuit of their mutual interests, the wealthiest and most powerful capitalist states must co-ordinate a full spectrum of power to suppress any possible threats not only from non-compliant states, but also from any organisation or popular movement that demonstrates resistance to capital expansion. Throughout the twentieth century, the US increasingly assumed the role of hegemonic co-ordinator to aggregate the interests of capitalist states. George W. Bush's declaration on 20 September 2001 of the Global War on Terror – a global war that is still expanding without either end or boundaries – is a conjuncture in the history of global political economy. Nonetheless, this latest global war demonstrates as much continuity as exception in the centuries-long history of the violent expansion and evolution of capitalism. Moreover, Bush's conception of New World Order is not a radical departure from the New World Order that Woodrow Wilson conceived at the end of the First World War. The Obama Administration rebranded its global military expeditions as Overseas Contingency Operations in an attempt to differentiate its foreign policy, but, despite superficial differences, successive US administrations continue to build the regional infrastructures and overall superstructure of dominance of an expanding Empire of Capital to aggregate the mutual interests of the wealthiest and most powerful capitalist states. The inseparable structures of militarism and capitalism have expanded and evolved throughout the centuries of the emergence of capitalism. During the 100 years since the First World War, the most powerful and wealthiest capitalist states under the leadership of the US have increasingly co-ordinated these inseparable structures to the point where it is no longer possible to identify an American empire

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that is distinct from the emerging Empire of Capital. The battle for Afghanistan is one of many battlefronts in the global war of imperial expansion that illustrate the emergence of this multinational empire.

Violence is a necessary component of the Empire of Capital, because the remaining foundations of pre-capitalist systems, particularly any competing normative systems of collective welfare and reciprocity, must be destroyed if capitalism is to continue its expansion. Violence is needed to contain or destroy any state that fails to conform to the imperial standards dictated by the empire. Furthermore, violence is needed to suppress the popular resistance that flares up within the interstices of the imperial system in reaction to the destruction of traditional norms and livelihoods. Violence is also needed to suppress any popular resistance within the centres of empire. Finally, violence is needed to crush any possible alternative to the globalising Empire of Capital. In many respects, this latest violent mode of imperialism is not new, but merely a more overt iteration of past imperial practice. Nonetheless, this imperial system requires a radical reorganisation of the pre-existing international system and an increasing capacity for overwhelming military dominance by the US and its allies. What is truly unique at this historic conjuncture is the unrivalled position of power of the US and its closest allies in every facet of social relations and the relative weakness of any potential state-based challenger. Nonetheless, as Brzezinski (2009, p. 10) recognises, US global leadership is threatened not only because the 'global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific', but also because of 'intensifying popular unrest'. The Global War on Terror forcefully contains both of these perceived threats by strengthening the powers of state and private security forces throughout the empire to suppress popular resistance while aggressively thrusting a US-led military coalition deep into Central Asia in an endless occupation of Afghanistan. It is impossible to argue that the invasion of Afghanistan was a necessary response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Moreover, the supposed objectives of promoting

democracy and liberating women and girls were not achieved. Nevertheless, from the perspective of imperial geostrategists, the necessity of this act of military aggression is clear: the invasion of Afghanistan did liberate capital.

Cross-References

▶ Agrarian Labor and Peasantry in the Global South
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ US Imperialism and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

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'Great Games' in the Literature of Imperialism

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Definition

The term 'Great Game' was coined in the nineteenth century to describe the rivalry between Russia and Britain. The game motif is useful to describe the broader rivalry between nations and economic systems with the rise of imperialism and the pursuit of world power.

The term 'Great Game' was coined in the nineteenth century to describe the rivalry between Russia and Britain. Britain sent spies disguised as surveyors and traders to Afghanistan and Turkestan and, several times, armies to keep the Russians at bay. The Anglo-Afghan war of 1839–42 was precipitated by fears that the Russians were encroaching on British interests in India after Russia had established a diplomatic and trade presence in Afghanistan. By the nineteenth century, there was already no such thing as neutral territory. The entire world was now a gigantic playing field for the major industrial powers, and Eurasia was the centre of this playing field.

The game motif is useful to describe the broader rivalry between nations and economic systems with the rise of imperialism and the pursuit of world power. This game goes beyond British rivalry with Russia over Afghanistan, for the heart of Eurasia really encompasses both Central Asia and the Middle East, what was once Turkestan, the Persian Empire and the Ottoman Caliphate, comprising the Persian, Turkic, and Arab worlds, peoples which are mostly Muslim.

To clarify the complexity of imperialist strategies from the twentieth century onwards, I defined

three 'games' in *Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the Great Games* (Walberg 2011). During the nineteenth-century imperial game (which I call Great Game I [GGI]), Britain kept Afghanistan, Iran, and the Ottoman Caliphate as nominally independent political formations, though in compliance with British interests. The former were carefully monitored by Britain, while in the latter, the weakened Ottoman rule had turned the Caliphate into a useful neutral actor allowing the various imperial powers to pursue trade in the region without resorting to war.

This situation changed radically with the First World War. This was a disaster for all the European imperial powers, and the Russian Revolution in 1917 was a declaration of war against the imperialist system itself. This marked the beginning of what is called here Great Game II (GGII): the Cold War between imperialism and communism, where the US united its former imperial rivals Britain, Germany, France, et al. to fight the antiempire forces, though this game did not take centre stage till the end of the Second World War. The period from 1917 to the Second World War can be called the endgame of GGI.

In the Middle East, cynical British plans to carve up the Ottoman Caliphate after the First World War were exposed when the Russian communists immediately published British diplomatic correspondence with Tsar Nicholas II, much as WikiLeaks exposed diplomatic mendacity in 2010. Britain went ahead anyway in 1918, carving up the Caliphate as a political compromise in the region with the rival interests of France, Germany, and imperial Russia was no longer necessary. Apart from the Turkish Anatolian heartland, the Caliphate was divided into quasi-colonies ('mandates') with a radical plan to create a Jewish state in the Palestinian heartland.

Turkestan was now part of the new communist politico-economic formation. Until the end of GGII, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it remained out of bounds to imperialism, a backwater, an integral part of a kind of secular caliphate, where borders meant little and people were united around a stern communist faith rather than nationalism or religion. In the 1920s, the USSR divided it up roughly according to ethnicity

into *pro forma* administrative divisions Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (in order of population), the 'stans', plus Azerbaijan. These were developed in accordance with Soviet central plans, achieving a high standard of living compared to non-socialist neighbours Afghanistan, Iran, and colonial Pakistan, but at the expense of Islam, which was largely repressed. (Stalin had approved an Islamic Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan during the Second World War to mobilise Central Asian Muslims against the Nazi invasion and from the 1960s madrasahs in Tashkent and Bukhara were allowed to function, but observing the faith was severely restricted.)

As the Soviet Union was not viewed then as an imperial threat to British India, Afghanistan, a weak monarchy, lost its geopolitical importance as a Russian gateway to India during the GGI endgame. Iran, which straddles the Middle East and Central Asia, was also a weak monarchy, but by the late nineteenth century was becoming far more important than Afghanistan, as vast oil reserves had been discovered there, and coal was being replaced by the much more practical oil as the fuel to run the growing empires. Iran was occupied by Britain and imperial Russia during the First World War, and again by Britain and the Soviet Union in the Second World War, during the GGI endgame, to keep it from siding with Germany and to ensure access to its oil. It became vital to the support of the empire in GGII but took on a radically different role as GGIII got underway.

The Great Game II Endgame

The embrace of Islamists by Reagan and the collapse of the Soviet Union were a pageturner. Truth is indeed stranger than fiction.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in 1989–91, and the beginning of what is called here Great Game III (GGIII), the Middle East and Central Asia once again came together as a new Silk Road, stretching as it did a millennium earlier from Italy to China. It is once again accessible to all comers and takes in at least 17 new political entities: the former Yugoslav

republics of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Kosovo in the Balkans; Armenia, Azerbaijan. and Georgia in the South Caucasus; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; with Moldova and Ukraine in eastern Europe.

But instead of being united under Islam or the Mongols, today it is largely under the sway of the US and its multilateral military arm the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The way stations on NATO's twenty-first-century caravan route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Chinese frontier reveal the nature of the current game. All the above new countries have official ties with NATO, and two former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia and Croatia) are now full members. Most have provided troops for US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has military bases in Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is directly arming and training Georgia's military forces, occupies Iraq, and is waging war in Afghanistan from Pakistan.

The region, from the Balkans to the borders of China, has been one of intrigue and war for a century, more so now than ever. US-NATO interest in this vital crossroads is keen. The region is important in geopolitical-strategic terms: US control there means containing Russia, China, and Iran, the dream of British strategists in GGI and of American strategists in GGII and III. It is also the location of most of the world's petrochemical resources, from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf in the south to Kazakhstan in the north and Iran in the east. This, of course, might explain why the US is so keen to take and keep control of it and has gambled its all in pursuit of this goal over the past decade. The three major wars conducted by the US in the past decade – Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) – all lay on this legendary Silk Road.

Pre-modern, Modern and Post-modern States

An important GGIII institutional innovation has been the shaping of a new type of state out of the traditional GGI and GII nation states and the remains of the socialist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of 22 new states (15 ex-Soviet, 7 ex-Yugoslav), all of which were eager to carry favour in Washington, up to and including permission to establish bases via Status of Forces agreements. These states have been dubbed post-modern as opposed to pre-modern (or failed) and modern (the traditional post-Second World War nation state). 'The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has become a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages' (Cooper 2002).

The political elites of the new states of the socialist bloc and ex-Soviet Union were eager to renounce whatever sovereignty necessary to join the European institutions, and welcomed NATO commissions which proceeded to restructure them militarily and politically in accordance with US-NATO requirements. Even Iraq's new army and security forces are supposedly being structured and trained in accordance with US-NATO requirements. EU president Herman Van Rompuy confirmed this when he said that 'the time of the homogenous nation state is over' (quoted in Johnson 2010); hence, the notion of post-modern imperialism.

Review of New Great Game Literature

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there came a rush of 'new Great Game' literature dealing with the obvious political manoeuvrings of the US in Central Asia in search of the Mackinder/ Brzezinski Holy Grail, almost exclusively focused on oil. Apart from Dugin (1997), the collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as merely an opportunity for 'brash new, Wild West-style entrepreneurs' and securing long-term US energy needs. Most, like Baer (2004), Engdahl (2004), and Johnson (2007), argue that the US-British strategy is dominated now by oil security.

The classic work in this field is *The Grand Chessboard* by Brzezinski (1997), which inspires his protégé Obama's 'geostrategy' in Eurasia.

> The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.... For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia. (Brzezinski 1997, p. xiii)

Brzezinski marvels that throughout history, world affairs have been dominated by Eurasian power but that 'for the first time ever, a non-Eurasian power [the US] has emerged not only as the key arbiter of Eurasian power relations but also as the world's paramount power' (31). Fortunately for America, Eurasia is too big to be politically unitary. For Brzezinski, history began in the fifteenth century; however, he rightly identifies 'the Eurasian chessboard' as 'the setting for "the game"' (31, 35).

His vision of the future is of a world in thrall to US cultural imperialism with post-Soviet Russia a post-modern state much like his native Poland, a willing handmaiden of a US world order, with only China to be cajoled into acquiescence. The era of direct invasions ended with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The much more sophisticated US would be able to co-opt local elites and feed them on Hollywood blockbusters to establish the necessary control over Eurasia.

He condemns the neo-con wars, but his hubris blinds him to his own vital role in preparing the stage for precisely today's nightmare. He remains unapologetic about his policy of supporting Islamists against the Soviet Union (thereby facilitating the antiimperialist Islamic awakening), ignores Israel completely in his analysis and policy prescriptions, and desists from calling the US an empire, referring to a 'common global community': a 'trilateral relationship among the world's richest and democratic states of Europe, America, and East Asia (notably Japan)' (Brzezinski 1993, pp. 221–222). Even without the neo-con nightmare, he is pessimistic about the future of this 'community' unless the US discards its consumerism and overcomes its 'spiritual emptiness', apparently oblivious to his own argument that US mass culture is an essential tool in the imperial project.

The term 'new Great Game' has become prevalent throughout the literature about the region, appearing in book titles, academic journals, news articles, and government reports. The mainstream literature simply compares the British–Russian nineteenth-century stand-off with the twenty-first-century situation, granting that the playing field is complicated by transnational energy corporations with their own agendas and the brash new entrepreneurs who have taken control after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Kleveman argues, 'Regional powers such as China, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan have entered the arena, and transnational corporations (whose budgets far exceed those of many Central Asian countries) are also pursuing their own interests and strategies' (Kleveman 2004, p. 3).

Mullerson, a 'liberal' imperialist, argues that the pre-First World War Great Game and the current one have 'as their components respective *missions civilatrices*' (Mullerson 2007, p. 98). There are many games now and players change teams depending on what game is being played. China and Russia are watching how the West and the Muslim world exhaust each other in the war over terrorism (78), yet Washington co-operates with China and Russia on 'terrorism' and drug trafficking. The games are not always zero-sum competitions. Russia and China too are competitors in Central Asia for markets, resources, and political influence, but on a world level are allies, counterposed to US hegemony. Europe is a faithful member of the US team and plays no independent role in either Central Asia or the Middle East.

Mullerson dismisses religion as a legitimising factor in general and in Central Asia in particular. He argues that Islamic parties there such as the Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajik), which was part of United Tajik Opposition that fought Tajik authorities in a 5-year civil war, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (renamed the Islamic Party of Turkestan), and Huzb ut-Tahrir are really political parties advocating 'religious totalitarianism' and using terrorism. He cites Thomas Friedman and Bernard Lewis (112), approving their view that

these ideologies must be wiped out to end terrorism. The West must carry on with its *mission civilatrice.* 'The road to democracy, as the Western experience amply demonstrates, is long and hard, full of pitfalls and obstacles' (112).

A Johns Hopkins University paper 'The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy' tries 'to visualize the kind of Afghanistan that might come into existence after US troops begin pulling out in 2011. The basic idea is that instead of being a lawless frontier, post-war Afghanistan should turn into a transit route for Eurasia, providing trade corridors north and south, east and west', requiring more roads, railways, and pipelines, making 'Afghanistan a hub rather than a barrier' (Starr et al. 2010).

Critique

The new Great Game literature is weak on important counts. Even where imperialism is alluded to, there is no acknowledgement that the politics of Central Asia is part of a larger game which centres on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with Israel a major player. The Johns Hopkins study makes no criticism of the invasion and the right of the US to decide on how Afghanistan should be developed, and ignores the geopolitical aim to bypass Russia, Iran, and China. It draws inspiration not from the ancient silk route but from the conquest and subjugation of America itself which culminated in building the transcontinental railroad in 1869 to promote capitalism regardless of the wishes of the natives.

Only in relation to Russia is the overt imperial nature of US moves in Eurasia discussed openly and opposed in mainstream and popular writings. The Eurasian geopolitical theorist Alexander Dugin has provided a radical reinterpretation of the nineteenth to twentieth-century geopolitics of Mackinder and Haushofer in the context of post-Soviet collapse Russia, aimed at opposing US imperialism. In *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia* (1997), he declares that (and here I paraphrase) the battle for the world rule of Russians continues, and Russia remains the central actor in a new anti-

bourgeois, anti-US revolution. Dugin predicts that a Eurasian Empire will be constructed on the understanding of a common enemy: refusal to accede to Atlantism and US hegemony, both political and cultural, not necessarily leading to military conflict. Russia's natural resources and its strategic position at the heart of Eurasia should be used to oppose US plans and to promote a new Russian-European alliance without US hegemony, based on a Russo-German axis, excluding Britain since it is part of the Anglo-American axis. He advocates rapprochement with Japan and encouraging China to assert its hegemony in South-East Asia rather than Siberia. His focus is Russian resurgence and he does not incorporate Israel into his analysis, though he promotes the idea of a 'continental Russian-Islamic alliance', based on a Russia-Iran understanding, dismissing al-Qaeda and 'international terrorism' as instruments of the West. US sponsorship of new postmodern players is a move in itself in the new Great Game, which is not acknowledged in the mainstream literature. The new states were created by undermining the Soviet Union, instigating the subsequent colour revolutions and invading Afghanistan and Iraq; all important moves by the imperial hegemon to reshape the entire Eurasian region to create a new playing field and a new game.

In GGI and GGII, too, British colonies and protectorates were shaped consciously by the colonial office to play quasi-independent roles in some future informal empire (depending on the type of colony, i.e. a privileged settler one like Canada or one like India). Over time, these players developed in ways sometimes unforeseen, such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.

The Moscow-based Institute of Oriental Studies analyst Knyazev argues that the US strategy is to create its own secular 'postmodern caliphate' to encompass the Middle East and 'Greater Central Asia [which] calls for the dilution of borders between the five post-Soviet states and their merger with Afghanistan and Pakistan' which he dubs a 'geopolitical marasmus' (Radyuhin 2011). However, such an ambitious project of adjusting borders and state-creation is hardly within the scope of current US geopolitical

capabilities, nor is Israel any help in bringing together Muslim nations throughout the region into a subservient commonwealth.

The qualitative difference between GGI, GGII and GGIII is not clearly seen in the literature. Edwards (2003) sees in the original Great Game (my GGI) the 'forerunner of the Cold War struggle' and in the current game 'the last remnant of the struggle between USA and Russia', conflating my GGII and GGIII. Mullerson (2007) refers to a Great Game II, which picks up where Kipling lay off, ignoring imperialism as the underlying system, the subsequent Cold War, and the role of Israel.

Mullerson downplays historical parallels as 'more interesting than useful and more superficial than profound' (38) reflecting his lack of appreciation of the underlying continuity of these imperial games. He acknowledges that Washington is expanding its influence in region but denies it has any long-term interests in staying, and he condemns Dugin's Russian Orthodoxy-inspired messianism (not unlike US manifest destiny) preordained to clash with the West, as a reversion to Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, and Czarism.

Mullerson notes the interesting irony that, as sole superpower, the US has now lost its Cold War legitimacy as the leader of the anticommunist bloc, suffering the burden of providing world order and security (he is an Estonian immigrant to Britain). Therefore, today it 'needs more military power than would have been necessary … since today it would be necessary to carry out the hegemonic burden on a global scale' (111). But he could just as easily argue that after collapse of the enemy the victor should need less military force. He thereby implicitly acknowledges that the current new world order the US is enforcing is not a voluntary association of free nations, that security and peace are defined by the US (i.e. by accepting US hegemony, you have freedom from subversion by the US). While he dismisses the Russian geopoliticians and their pursuit of Russian empire, is there really much difference between the peace and security of Genghis Khan and that of the US today?

His support of secularism and respect for Friedman and Bernard Lewis shows his ignorance

of the long history of imperial use and promotion of Islamist 'totalitarian ideologies', and the fact that the US engineered the collapse of the Soviet Union using Islamists, allowing the Wahhabis to penetrate Central Asia and the Middle East, while supporting oppressive secular regimes. His proposal to snuff out these movements just adds fuel to a fire that the US has been stoking irrationally for decades.

An interesting description of post-Soviet Central Asia is provided by Rob Johnson, who sees it experiencing 'the recreation of a pre-communist Khanate' (Johnson 2007, pp. 33–34), with increasing unrest as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union: the 1988 Armenian/Azeri war and riots in Ashgabat, conflict between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in Ferghana in 1989, between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh and between Tajiks and Armenians in Dushanbe in 1990, the Chechnya separatist uprising of 1991–2000, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists in Georgia from 1990 on, civil war in Tajikistan 1992–97, the Uzbek uprising in 2005, and the riots in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. US interference in the form of 'democracy support' and pursuit of its geopolitical strategies is merely adding oil to the flames.

Ex-CIA agent Baer, while excoriating the US for the invasion of Iraq, would also like to nudge Central Asia (the whole Muslim world for that matter) towards a secular modernity, but at least he emphasises that we can't force this on tribal societies that will change only slowly (Baer 2004). The closest in the mainstream media to an accurate understanding of the source of terrorism and the need for the US and Israel to pull in their claws are so-called 'paleoconservatives', who have long criticised US imperial adventures. Voices crying in the right-wing wilderness include Ron Paul and Eric Margolis (2009), who, while agreeing that it's all about oil, call for the complete US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and for Israel to make a just peace by granting the Palestinians a state.

None of them recognises the distinction between Muslim Brothers and what I call neo-Wahhabis, the former genuine followers of Islamic civilisational traditions, the latter adopting

anarchist strategies of mass terror deriving from GGI and GGII; that is, from the imperialists themselves. The best analysts of the Great Game strategies, the GGIII wars, and the role of Israel include M.K. Bhadrakumar, Pepe Escobar, Israel Shamir, and others cited in the main body of Walberg (2011).

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Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

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Synonyms

Alexis Tsipras; Andreas Papandreou; Anti-Americanism; Coalition of Radical Left (Syriza); Communist Party of Greece (KKE); Eurocommunism; Greece; National Independence; Orthodox communism; Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK); Paternalistic capitalism

Definition

Anti-imperialism as ideology and strategy is embedded in left parties' political identity, especially in a country with the semi-peripheral position of Greece, at least until the 1980s. Throughout Greek history the quest for "national independence" took the form of frequent anti-imperialist struggles, which during the post-war period were mainly anti-US based on a diffuse anti-American sentiment in large parts of Greek society. Anti-imperialism as a political strategy was implemented mainly by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and Andreas Papandreou in the 1970s-1980s and the Coalition of Radical Left (Syriza) and Alexis Tsipras during the 2010s.

Introduction

Anti-imperialism was a crucial factor for the development of Greek left party strategies during

the democratic era (1974-today) and it has been a distinctive feature of the left's political identity throughout Greek history and a successful tool for the expansion of its political influence in the post-war period. Three features of Greek anti-imperialism can be defined: (a) in principle connected with a notion of "national independence" which always gave anti-imperialism a supra-class appeal, thus making it an effective party strategy; (b) predominantly a left case and especially a communist case; (c) in its various forms (anti-fascism, anti-Americanism, anti-Germanyism), primarily constituted as a public sentiment from below, mobilised through a political strategy from above. Greek left, throughout its historical development, was closely connected with communist ideas and practices, something that affected the content of anti-imperialist strategies. The Greek context is characterized by the absence of a traditional social-democratic party; the first labour party in Greece, the *Σοσιαλιστικό Εργατικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος* (Socialist Labour Party of Greece – SEKE), founded in 1919, aligned itself from its early beginnings with the Communist International and was quickly transformed into *Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας* (Communist Party of Greece – KKE). Consequently, anti-imperialist strategies were inspired by Marxism-Leninism, thus incorporating the norms of official Soviet ideology on this issue. Nevertheless, the Greek left's adherence to Soviet norms was not one-sided but tended to include the real socio-political conditions in the country, something that made anti-imperialist discourse appealing also to non-communist political forces.

Development of Greek Anti-imperialism (1930–1974)

Greek anti-imperialism is rooted in the interwar years. In 1934, KKE described Greece's "dependence on foreign capital" as the main reason for the "feeble development of industry and productive forces." Moreover, it pointed out that "the dependence of Greece upon foreign capital, especially English and French capital, is expressed, first of all, by the existence of huge external debt" (KKE 2008a/1934, p. 70; all translations from Greek sources in the present essay are by

the author). In that sense, "socialist revolution" would be preceded by a "bourgeois-democratic" stage of revolution that would achieve "the liberation of the country from the yoke of foreign capital," as a prerequisite for socialism (23–24). This theoretical framework was reconceptualized during the Axis invasion in Greece in 1940–1941 as "patriotic"; as put by KKE's general secretary "today all Greeks, we are fighting for our freedom, honor and national independence" (Zachariades, 2011/1940). Under Axis Occupation of Greece, anti-imperialist struggle developed "anti-fascist" features. KKE created the *Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο* (National Liberation Front – EAM) as its resistance organization, and the *Εθνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός* (National Liberation People's Army – ELAS) as its armed branch. In EAM's most publicized pamphlet, it is pointed out that its struggle is a "national liberation struggle and only if it is understood and organized like that can it bring the desirable result" (Glenos, 1944/1942, p. 39). EAM helped KKE acquire an extremely massive popular base after the end of Occupation – 500,000 members in mid-1940s from 18,000 in mid-1930s – and praise as the most respected champion of "national resistance" and "social liberation" in Greek politics.

After liberation (1944), KKE, responding to Greek right's growing aggressiveness, reiterated its inter-war anti-imperialist strategy by confronting British and (especially) American "imperialism." In December 1944, ELAS forces engaged in large-scale battles with British and right-wing forces in Athens; and from 1946 to 1949, its successor *Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας* (Democratic Army of Greece [DSE]), fought against the governmental army which was strongly backed and supplied by the US. In this context, anti-imperialism was primarily conceived as anti-Americanism, following the outbreak of Cold War in the late 1940s. The defeat of DSE in 1949 was accompanied by the advance of a semi-democratic political system, which was grounded on the political exclusion of communists. Apart from the malfunctioning institutions of post-war Greek polity (parliament, elections, King and Army), the US Embassy played a

particularly intrusive role in the domestic political arena in order to ensure the pro-US and anti-communist direction of Greek political life. Its interventions, sometimes aggressive and tactless, cultivated a rising anti-US popular sentiment which enabled the semi-legitimate Greek left to re-articulate its anti-imperialist appeals.

After 1951, the banned KKE formed, along with other left-wing groupings, the *Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά* (United Democratic Left [EDA]) as its legal political front to run in parliamentary elections. EDA tried to take advantage of the growing social unrest against the semi-democratic regime by stressing the impact of the US interventions on the quality of democracy in Greece. Moreover, the management by the US and Britain of the Cyprus issue (which in the eyes of many Greeks at the time was seen as "pro-Turkish" and "anti-Greek") enabled EDA to display its anti-imperialist appeals as "anti-NATO." In that sense and after the shift that Khrushchev initiated after the 20th CPSU Congress, KKE, through EDA, employed the strategy of the *"*National Democratic Change" which highlighted anti-imperialism as the basic means for democratization. This strategy strongly influenced the political forces of the liberal "Centre" (the *Ένωσις Κέντρου* [Centre Union] led by Georgios Papandreou) which gradually tended to endorse EDA's slogans and pursue coalitions with the latter at local government and civil society organizations.

The victories of the Centre Union at the 1963 and 1964 elections, after an 11-year period of conservative rule, was considered as a major step for the country's democratization; nevertheless the clash between Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and King Constantinos in July 1965 resulted in the fall of the former's government and the outbreak of massive and violent public demonstrations of an anti-royal and ultimately anti-American character which radicalized a large part of the Centre Union's party cadres and electorate. The formation of an informal centre-left within the Centre Union, under the Prime Minister's son Andreas Papandreou, paved the way for an approach to EDA. Andreas Papandreou, a US citizen and former Professor of Economics at University of California, Berkeley, supported the view that Greece should pursue its independent path to economic development without being bound by US interests.

The military coup d'état on 21 April 1967 and the establishment of a military dictatorship (1967–1974) halted this path of convergence but made the questions of democratisation and national independence for the anti-dictatorship political forces more urgent than ever. The Colonels' regime triggered a polymorphous resistance movement, not very massive at first, which resulted, in November 1973, in the Athens Polytechnic School uprising which was the most striking sign of the regime's lack of legitimacy (Kotsonopoulos 2009). In the eyes of many Greeks, the coup d'état was orchestrated by the US, which resulted in the deepening of the anti-US sentiment in parts of Greek society (Lialiouti 2015, pp. 44–46) and pushed the resistance organizations to mere anti-imperialist discourse. It is characteristic that the main slogan written on the gate of the Polytechnic School during the 1973 uprising was "US Out! NATO Out!" revealing a diffused anti-American sentiment in parts of Greek society.

For his part, Andreas Papandreou chose to form a resistance organization, the *Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο* (Panhellenic Liberation Front [PAK]), inspired by liberation movements in the Third World, and he radicalised his theoretical perspectives by adhering to the "Dependency School" and especially the group of theorists behind the *Monthly Review* journal (Tassis 2009). Papandreou developed his own theory of "paternalistic capitalism" (Papandreou 1972) through which he connected U.S. aggressiveness and expansionism with the domination of managerial elites and national security managers on economy planning that enhanced the paternalistic tendencies of the system. Imperialism in that sense (though he didn't use this term) was the inevitable consequence of the paternalistic character of US capitalism. In the case of Greece, "all kinds of [US] corporations [...] invaded Greece" and imposed a longstanding "procedure of economic colonization" (Tassis 2009, p. 128) which called for

national independence as a basis for a socialist and popular economic program. In February 1968, the KKE experienced an internal split which created the Eurocommunist *KKE Εσωτερικού* (KKE of the Interior [KKE (int)]). The latter challenged, unsuccessfully in the end, the primacy of the pro-Soviet KKE in the left political space and extended its anti-imperialist rhetoric by downplaying the realignment of the country to the East instead of the West. In any case, anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism was defining the resistance initiatives of both parties.

Anti-imperialism in Democratic Greece: The 1970s and 1980s

The transition to democracy was accomplished by the conservative government led by Constantinos Karamanlis in 1974–1975. One of the first moves of the new Prime Minister was to withdraw Greece from the military section of NATO, clearly a choice that corresponded with the ascending anti-US sentiment in the country. This choice by a political leader, known for his pro-US positions prior to the dictatorship, proved the readiness of the Greek public to embrace an anti-imperialist discourse. On these grounds, the parties that represented the Greek left during the 1970s attempted to combine the goal of democratisation with "national independence" and anti-imperialist struggle (Karpozilos 2019).

On 3 September 1974, Andreas Papandreou founded the *Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα* (Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK]) as a new socialist party that aspired to dominate the centre-left political space. In its founding document, PASOK claimed to be a "political movement" that struggles for four political aims: "national independence," "popular sovereignty," "social liberation," "democratic procedure" (Spourdalakis 1988, p. 291). Moreover, it declared that "the seven dark years which passed under the gloomy military dictatorship and the tragedy in Cyprus are nothing but a particularly crude expression of Greece's dependence upon the imperialist establishment of the USA and NATO" (289). In that sense, for PASOK, "real democratisation" passed through the total disengagement of the country from its relations with the

US and its commitments to NATO. PASOK's anti-imperialist discourse appeared mainly through anti-right appeals, against the New Democracy party, with the latter being considered as the cardinal proponent of the imperialist interests in Greece. Papandreou invested in this rhetorical construction to polarise party competition and enhance his own party's electoral fortunes. There is a single slogan that PASOK has elaborated until its ascent to power in 1981: "Greece belongs to Greeks." This contradicted Karamanlis's long-time motto "Greece belongs to the West"; meaning that, in PASOK's eyes, the Western world was not a source of well-being for the country but the root of its misery. For Papandreou, Greece was not an exclusively Western country but also Balkan and Mediterranean one, and in this sense was more of a developing than a developed economy.

Therefore, PASOK's anti-imperialist strategy meant specific positions on foreign policy issues. For example, PASOK supported the cautious reorientation towards the Soviet Union; it rejected Karamanlis's moves for rapprochement with Turkey after the 1974 invasion as actions imposed to him by NATO; it established friendly bonds with several Third-World liberation movements and socialist regimes such as the Syrian Baath Party, Gaddafi's Socialist Jamahiriya, Palestine Liberation Organisation, North Korea etc.; it initiated the common action of South European socialist parties – (Spanish PSOE and the French and Portuguese PS) in opposition to traditional European social democracy; it disagreed with the country's accession to European Economic Community (EEC), dismissing the latter as just another "imperialist machinery" with the extremely popular slogan "EEC and NATO are the same syndicate"; it asked intensively for the removal of the NATO military bases in Greece – "Bases of death out!." This string of positions increased Western misgivings on a potential PASOK Government but at the same time created in the domestic political arena the image of a "popular movement" that fought "boldly" for the country's "national independence." In this context, PASOK's victory at the 1981 elections was considered as a major step for a "change" in the course of Greek politics and the consolidation of

the young democracy, with a non-interrupted transition to power from a right-wing government to a non-right-wing.

PASOK, while in government (1981–1989), maintained its rhetorical stress on anti-imperialism, but at the same time favored a more pragmatic approach to the actual issues of foreign policy. For example, while PASOK recognized PLO as soon as it undertook governmental responsibilities and Andreas Papandreou welcomed Yasser Arafat in Athens in 1982, on the other hand, in 1983, it came into a controversial agreement with the US that NATO military bases in Greece would be removed only after a period of five years; without however ensuring that this removal would actually take place following the deadline. Papandreou chose to hold a rigid stance on issues not affecting directly the Greek state and a more compromising stance on major foreign policy issues such as the NATO bases or the country's accession to the EEC, which were nevertheless the peaks of PASOK's electoral appeals. Especially on the EEC issue, PASOK shifted from a non-negotiable anti-Europeanism to soft euro-scepticism in the mid-1980s and critical pro-Europeanism in the early 1990s. In that sense, PASOK managed to retain the symbolic value of its anti-imperialist appeals, without actually fulfilling its pre-election pledges, implementing a version of "rhetorical anti-imperialism." This shift, of course, was the result of PASOK's expansionary and distributive economic policies in the same period which were supported by EEC funds. In any case, this highlighted the retreat from anti-imperialism as an election-winning strategy to Europeanism as a counter-measure to the country's decreasing dependency upon the US. The continuous presence of PASOK in government gradually altered its political scope from a popular movement with a clearly anti-imperialist orientation to a government party with a growing pro-Western allegiance.

On the other hand, the communist and Euro-communist left seemed to become minor partners of PASOK's rapid march to power, preoccupied with their own internal competition. Their emphasis on anti-imperialism was unequivocal, just as was their common assessment of an imminent crisis in the imperialist system (KKE 2008b/1973; KKE (int) 1974). However, they had different approaches to what international allegiances Greece should pursue. KKE, following Soviet Union's foreign policy directives, demanded the country's immediate "release" from its "imperialist affiliations" and favored the development of "cordial relations" with the countries of the "socialist world." KKE was the main proponent of the anti-US spirit, and in some ways was "idolised" in democratic Greece due to its long-time struggle against imperialism and its domestic "defenders." Its staunch pro-Sovietism became a distinctive feature of the political identity it attempted to carve, and probably resulted in it abandoning its aspirations for a more decisive role in Greek politics, something that reveals also the limits of anti-imperialist strategy, especially as re-orientation towards the "socialist camp."

This was a crucial point of KKE (int)'s differentiation from its "orthodox" counterpart. Greek Eurocommunists found in the developing EEC project a new international political space that could disengage Greece from the bonds of "US imperialism." KKE (int) declared that it tried to foresee the various and multifaceted contradictions in the prevailing and resurgent international alliances, in order to locate Greece's position in a changing international system. Of course, this version of "reformed communism" that KKE (int) was promoting, apart from a call for "national unity" against the "polarization" that PASOK and KKE were betting on, was defined by an arduous attempt to create a political identity that could outdo some of the determinants of left politics in post-war Greece (anti-imperialism, anti-Europeanism, pro-Sovietism).

PASOK's victory in 1981 was apprehended by the two communist parties as a partial "restoration" of the injustices Greek leftists experienced in the previous years. Papandreou's "rhetorical anti-imperialism" was convenient for KKE's policy aims, nevertheless the former's back-and-forth tactics created animosity between the two parties, resulting in a clash in the late 1980s. KKE came to regard PASOK's anti-imperialism as a cover for the latter's intentions to loot the former's

electoral base. At the same time KKE (int) grad-
ually discarded its communist symbols, being
rebranded as *Ελληνική Αριστερά* (Greek Left
[EAR]) in 1987, and dismissed anti-imperialism
as nationalism in the making. Both parties co-
existed in a short-lived, abrasive political coali-
tion. This was called the *Συνασπισμός της
Αριστεράς και της Προόδου* (Coalition of Left
and Progress [SYN]) and positioned itself
strictly on an anti-PASOK basis. It eventually
led to KKE's second internal split in 1991. Anti--
imperialism seemed to be a secondary issue when
it became apparent to all leftists that "real social-
ism" was facing its historical decline.

Anti-imperialism in Democratic Greece: The 1990s and 2000s

The collapse of communism pushed the Greek left
into a spiral of constant identity crisis and
brought to Greece's doorstep a Balkan region
shattered by ethnic strife and economic recession.
Moreover, the country's accession to the Euro-
pean Union (EU) in 1992 made the process of
"Europeanisation" a national goal for the
country's power elite while the social
legitimisation of the Europeanisation project
signalled the marginalisation of "national inde-
pendence" as a collective goal and "anti-imperial-
ism" as party strategy. These developments
affected the strategies of the Greek left parties.

PASOK endorsed a "Third Way" kind of polit-
ical programme under the term "modernisation,"
coined by Costas Simitis, Andreas Papandreou's
successor as leader of PASOK. Simitis dismissed
Papandreou's "rhetorical anti-imperialism" as
"populism" and emphasised the need for Greek
society's "convergence" with its European coun-
terparts. Simitis's Governments (1996–2004)
have been linked with several foreign policy
choices that have provoked public outcry: the
management of the Imia/Kardak crisis (1996);
the capture of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan
in Kenya (1999); the participation of Greece in
the Kosovo War (1999); the neutral stance it held
during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (2001 and
2003). The fact that the abovementioned events
were met with mass demonstrations in Greece
with a clear anti-US orientation shows that anti-

imperialism was still rooted in Greek political
culture even when the political actors themselves
did not employ corresponding strategies. Thus,
the modernizing and pro-EU PASOK still inclined
to the necessity of bringing back the "rhetorical
anti-imperialism" by inviting Yasser Arafat to its
1999 Congress or letting its youth organization
participate in the mass anti-war rallies.

KKE, on the other hand, which, after the 1991
split, remained a hard-line Communist Party, still
insisted on a traditional "anti-imperialist" strategy
consisting of the denial of Western (military)
intervention in the Balkans and rejection of the
EU as "another imperialist formation." KKE calls
for "international solidarity" for "movements and
parties" that were fighting for their "national inde-
pendence" against imperialism; the party searched
out in this version of "anti-imperialism" a state of
normality in the diverse and anarchical post-com-
munist international system. Also it quickly diag-
nosed that anti-Americanism as a cultural frame of
reference for anti-imperialism retained its strong-
hold in the Greek public sphere. KKE played a
pivotal role in the demonstrations against
Öcalan's capture and especially against the
Kosovo War in the late 1990s, something that
helped it ensure its electoral survival in a highly
hostile socio-political environment.

SYN became a single party in 1992 by includ-
ing the expellees of the 1991 KKE split and the
former Eurocommunists of EAR. The distinctive
feature of its political identity in the 1990s was its
pro-EU stance, which distanced it from traditional
anti-imperialist strategies. SYN held a pacifist
anti-war stance during the Kosovo War, while
certain elements inside the party kept up an old-
fashioned left discourse though with no explicit
communist appeals. In the early 2000s the party
pursued a "left unity" strategy with several radical
left parties and groupings that resulted in the for-
mation of the *Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής
Αριστεράς* (Coalition of Radical Left [Syriza]) in
2004 as an electoral coalition at first and a political
coalition later. Syriza aligned itself with the grow-
ing anti-globalization movement, co-organized
with the Greek Socialist Workers Party (SEK)
the 4th European Social Forum held in Athens
in 2006, and embraced a notion of "anti-

imperialism" not grounded in Greek left political tradition, but in international debates concerning global justice, alter-globalization, neo-liberalism and grassroots movements. In this context, Syriza attempted to present itself as the main proponent of a different kind of anti-imperialism which was de-connected from the traditional notions of "national independence" and "imperialism," and for this reason was highly criticized by the KKE.

Anti-imperialism During the Economic Crisis (2009–2019)

The arrival of the economic crisis is connected to the revival of a popular old style anti-imperialist sentiment of a predominantly anti-German character. The management of the crisis by the European elites with the imposition of a "Memorandum" between Greece and the so-called Troika (European Commission, International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank), that included severe austerity measures, resulted in the loss of national sovereignty since Troika's representatives functioned as commissioners over the Greek government's agencies (Eleftheriou and Papadopoulos 2018). This state of affairs, which could be defined as a "colony of debt" (Kotzias 2013), triggered a wave of anti-Germanyism that was presented with explicit references to the 1940s and Axis Occupation of Greece (Lialiouti and Bithymitris, 2013), something that made it also plausible to right-wing pundits and audiences. PASOK, being blamed as the government that brought the IMF in Greece, eventually lost most of its electoral influence on its party base, as well as its political integrity. The radical left faced in an ambiguous manner this public sentiment: Syriza developed an anti-Troika discourse with references to "national independence" from the Troika rule that resembled to the "rhetorical anti-imperialism" of PASOK in the 1980s, personified in the leadership of Alexis Tsipras; the KKE tried to re-state "anti-imperialism" as "anti-capitalism" by not embracing the anti-German tendencies in public discourse.

Syriza managed to exploit the electoral losses of PASOK and become the main opposition party after the June 2012 elections. From 2012 to 2015 it attempted to prepare itself for governmental duties, meaning that it should present itself as credible actor to be tolerated by the country's debtors. In its discourse, it preserved the "rhetorical anti-imperialism" of the anti-Troika appeals while it moderated its policy proposals, mainly by accepting the necessity of negotiating with Troika a new bailout agreement, rather than abolishing the previous one (that was the position of Syriza's majority faction). The minority faction of Syriza opted for a "Grexit" strategy, believing that the solution in the country's crisis was to be found outside the Eurozone framework. This strategy was framed by formulations of "national independence" that echoed a traditional left anti-imperialist discourse. During its first governmental spell (January 2015-August 2015). Syriza utilized its quasi anti-imperialist discourse during the negotiations with Troika, in order to preserve a coherent domestic base of support; these tactics reached their peak at the 5th of July referendum. After its defeat and acceptance of a new bailout programme and the departure of the minority faction that formed *Λαϊκή Ενότητα* [Popular Unity], Syriza gradually shifted from this quasi anti-imperialist discourse, by negotiating in a less conflictual manner with Troika and partially embracing US foreign policy goals in the Balkans. In any case, the reinvention of Greek anti-imperialism during the crisis demonstrates the persistence of a public sentiment converted into a political strategy, considered to be a relic from the past and a remnant of the nation-state, in the context of a rapidly changing global environment. Nevertheless, it seems that for the left political forces (even for KKE) anti-imperialism tends to become less desirable, mainly due to the fact that an anti-imperialist power strategy is conceived to be non-feasible in the EU context.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Anti-imperialism in Greece and Turkey Regarding Cyprus (1950s and 1960s)
▶ Arab Socialism

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Green Revolution Imperialism

Greenland

Grenada

Grenadian Socialist Anti-colonialism and US Imperialism

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Synonyms

1983 invasion; Grenada; Marxism-Leninism; Maurice Bishop; New Jewel Movement; US imperialism

Definition

This essay describes the struggle for socialism and independence in Grenada. It focuses on US efforts to subordinate the country to its own economic interests, culminating in the 1983 US invasion. It describes the legacy of revolutionary socialist Maurice Bishop and his New Jewel Movement in struggling against US imperialism.

Grenada is a group of three small islands in the southern Lesser Antilles Archipelago in the southeastern Caribbean Sea in the western Atlantic Ocean, covering a land area of 344 square kilometres. In 2013, more than 80% of Grenada's population of 105,900 were of Afro-Caribbean origin, 10–13% of European and mixed racial origin, and 5% of South Asian origin. About 2% of Grenada's population are of Arawak, Carib, or Amerindian indigenous origin (World Bank 2015). In the 1970s, the vast majority of Grenadians were descendants of former slaves transported from Africa to the Caribbean by European slave traders from the 16th to the nineteenth century. They lived as peasants in small towns and villages in rural areas. In the twentieth century, the Grenadian class structure was dominated by privileged Europeans and mulatto landholders who subordinated descendants of African peasants lacking access to higher education (Henry 1990, pp. 51–82).

Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement

Born in Aruba on 29 May 1944 to the son of a Grenadian nationalist and populist leader, Maurice Rupert Bishop was a revolutionary leader and prime minister of the island nation of Grenada. Growing up in Grenada in abject poverty, he was drawn to political life in the context of British colonial control and its disregard for the island's Afro-Caribbean majority working-class and peasant population. Like many other Third-World anti-imperialists, Bishop was drawn as a young adult to antiracism, Marxism, and then Leninism. After earning his law degree in the UK, he returned to Grenada in the early 1970s to join forces with the growing number of

anti-imperialist nationalists seeking to both end British colonial rule and to establish an egalitarian, antiracist society through building a peasant and workers movement among the Afro-Caribbean majority. To achieve these goals, Bishop was a founder of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) in 1973, a socialist anti-colonial party organised by Grenada's Afro-Caribbean activists devoted to independence and socialism.

The NJM (New Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) was a popular organisation for Grenadian independence and national revolution that mobilised the peasant majority for socialism and equality from its formation in 1973 to 1983, when it was overthrown by a US military invasion. In 1979, the NJM achieved national power through the popular insurrection and armed rebellion which overthrew the Government of prime minister Eric Geary, viewed as corrupt and subservient to British colonial rule. According to Henry (60), 'The emergence of peripheral capitalism in Grenada was accompanied by particular patterns of class exclusion, class inclusion, and distributions of authority . . . The transition from colony to nation was . . . a period marked by changes in the existing patterns of class relations, thus also demanding the generation of new symbols' which contributed to demands for both national independence and socialist re-distribution 'to resolve the illegitimate foundations of the colonial state'. The nationalists who obtained power in the 1960s were primarily beneficiaries of the entrenched system of class domination that was rooted in the control of the Grenadian state by European and mulatto landholders (60–62).

In the 1970s, the NJM transformed into a political party with a platform of nationalising the island's major infrastructure, redistributing land to peasants, and recovering a greater share of revenues derived from the tourism industry, which was providing a growing share of the national gross domestic product. The NJM struggled to break the dominance of the pro-British Government of Eric Geary, who served as Grenada's premier as the island archipelago transitioned to independence. The NJM gained a popular base among the majority of Grenada's

peasant inhabitants, who were seeking to gain equality along with independence. In 1973, the NJM formed a military wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), modelled after Third-World armed revolutionary fronts. It comprised an activist base of committed revolutionaries who were devoted to armed struggle to achieve independence and socialism. According to Joseph Ewart Layne, an NLA activist, 'members of the NLA could be called on at any moment to give their lives to the struggle' (Ewart Layne 2014, p. 2). From 1973–74, the NLA mobilised popular opposition to remove Geary from leadership.

First elected premier with British support in 1967, Geary assumed the post of prime minister when Grenada gained independence on 7 February 1974. A trade union leader in the colonial era, he was widely viewed as corrupt and beholden to British and foreign interests. Independence was viewed by many Grenadians as a formal procedure which would continue British suzerainty and cement imperial domination over the island chain (1–6). Bishop played a decisive role in the NJM's growth through advancing a Marxist democratic political programme to nationalise the island's sparse economic resources and form an egalitarian society.

Bishop and the NJM tapped into the popular sentiment that independence from the UK also required redistribution and greater equality. Upon taking power, with popular support the NJM established a People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) modelled after the Cuban system of socialism in the 1970s. During its 4 years in power, the PRG /NJM enacted popular reforms including universal popular education (which allowed the peasant majority to attend school), social insurance, and health care. The revolutionary PRG mainly enacted reforms to expand social and class rights but did not depose the landholding class from its position of privilege. While the PRG outlawed competing political parties, a pluralist opposition remained through the Church, a dominant bourgeois press which was highly critical of the PRG, and the active organisations of the upper class, which was able to activate dissent against the state with the support of the US State Department and Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives. Meanwhile, the fledgling PRG did not have the resources for political education, and thus turned to Cuba for assistance in defending the revolution. As Henry (1990, p. 74) notes, 'the PRG had to engage in more extensive programs for political education than the nationalist leaders. They had to go beyond established styles of political education within Grenadian parties'.

Using this Cuban socialist model, the PRG vastly expanded the participation of women and youth to expand their rights in state and public affairs through the National Women's Organization, National Youth Organization, Young Pioneers Movement, and the Centre for Popular Education, which was responsible for increasing literacy among the masses. The bourgeois press and media and the Grenadian Church leadership fiercely condemned the PRG's founding and nurturing of these popular organisations. They opened the door to foreign imperialist intervention on behalf of the upper classes (Henry 1990, pp. 51–82). While the PRG admirably developed mass organisations which included thousands of members, including a People's Militia, it was unable to consolidate power in the 4 years it was in power before it was deposed in the US foreign invasion and coup d'état of October 1984.

US Military Intervention in Grenada

The PRG and NJM were able to withstand the internal opposition but did not have the military strength to withstand an armed US invasion backed up by a political operation choreographed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon. Opposition to the PRG intensified with a greater level of covert support following the election of Ronald Reagan as US president. The popular backing and resilience of the PRG is demonstrated by the inability of the US government to dislodge its leadership from 1981–83 without direct military intervention. Behind the scenes, US military intelligence fomented dissent among PRG leaders which led to Bernard Coard, the deputy prime minister, seizing power on 13 October 1983.

Bishop was placed under house arrest and the Grenadian army took control of the major military and communication installations. However, popular support for Bishop broke into mass demonstrations which overwhelmed the military government. On 16 October, protesters overtook the beleaguered military guard, setting Bishop free. In the ensuing days the Grenadian army fired rounds of ammunition into large crowds shielding Bishop at Market Square and the Fort Rupert military installation in St George's, Grenada's capital. On 19 October, Bishop and five other Cabinet ministers in the NJM (Fitzroy Bain, Norris Bain, Jacqueline Craft, Vincent Noel, and Unison Whiteman) were executed without trial immediately after the military overpowered the masses protecting them at Fort Rupert. Nonetheless, since the majority of the population continued to support Bishop and the NJM, the military government stood on shaky ground. In the immediate aftermath of the US invasion, foreign critics charged that internal divisions in the NJM leadership contributed to the loss of popular support for the government (Marable 1987). But these assessments did not account for the genuine support which the NJM had built among the peasant population or the significance of US covert operations which fomented division in the PRA and supported the coup d'état which installed Coard as leader of a military government.

While Bishop advocated unwavering opposition to US imperialism, his faith that the US working class was an ally in the struggle against imperialism proved highly overstated and mistaken: 'We certainly place a great deal of importance on the activity and the potential, and the possibilities of the American working-class movement . . . in terms of the potential for doing mortal damage to the international capitalist and imperialist system from within the belly of the main imperialist power on earth' (Bishop et al. 1983, p. 10).

What Bishop failed to recognise was that US imperialism is supported by most workers, and certainly organised labour in the US, which has historically conspired with the State Department and CIA to counter authentic workers' movements and help install unions supportive of US imperialism. Moreover, as US imperialism relies on control over critical economic resources, the US working class benefits from foreign interventions which cheapen the labour costs and the price of raw materials produced by Third-World workers. Indeed, an ABC-Washington Post survey conducted shortly after the invasion showed that 71% of the US public favoured it, while 22% opposed it (Beck 1993, p. 2).

The US military invasion of Grenada, called 'Operation Urgent Fury', was a prototype of American imperialism in the Caribbean, utilising an admixture of covert operations and deceptive propaganda to establish the basis for overthrowing democratically elected governments with popular support in the region. The US Grenadian intervention also consisted of a spurious claim that US citizens were endangered by the NJM Government, which the US destabilised through arming and supporting opponents to Bishop. On 25 October 1983, 2 days after the bombing of the US government's military installation in Beirut, Lebanon, US president Reagan ordered an invasion of Grenada on the grounds that growing popular unrest and the presence of Cuban forces posed a threat to US medical students (who were, in fact, known to be out of harm's way). This was the first overt use of direct armed intervention by US forces since the Vietnam War and indicated that the US was willing and eager to use military power to protect its economic interests worldwide.

In 1983, the Reagan Administration invaded Grenada with the US Rapid Deployment Force joined by a small delegation of troops from Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St Lucia, and St Vincent. They routed all opposition, imprisoned activists, and killed leading officials in the NJM. Subsequently, the Grenadian government arrested 16 leaders of the military that had overthrown and killed Bishop and sentenced them to life imprisonment (Crandall 2006, pp. 105–169). However, more than 20 years after the coup d'état, popular support remains among Grenada's working class and peasants for the legacy of Bishop, who sought to bring economic

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justice to the island where poverty is rampant and inequality continues to grow.

Shaping Public Opinion Through Media as Organs of Propaganda

In retrospect, the US military invasion of Grenada can be seen as a decisive victory against a small and ragtag opposition. The US government used the intervention to build popular US support for a wider use of force in the Americas and throughout the world to secure economic and political supremacy over regional powers as the Cold War with the Soviet Union was coming to an end. The intervention occurred at the dawn of the Information Revolution, as cable television news broadcast services permitted 24-h coverage of current events and instantaneous commentary and assessment of significant events.

US Armed Services and the CIA mobilised public opinion through directly feeding propaganda to news outlets, claiming that US medical student's lives were under threat. In addition, the military released a report noting that the intervention and defeat of the NJM were supported by a popular majority in Grenada. To this end they sponsored what they called 'the first scientifically-structured public opinion survey conducted in Grenada' in December–January 1983 and 1984 to exhibit public support for the invasion which removed the NJM (United States Congress 1984). The report to Congress about a pleased Grenadian population does not reveal the deliberate distortion of events and indiscriminate attacks on civilians by the US military following the invasion. It includes mostly fictitious claims about US fire-fights with Cuban advisors defending Fort Richmond, a prison where Bishop had been taken and then assassinated. In addition, the US military conducted Psychological Operations (psy-ops) to calculatingly provide misinformation to the press and public and create the impression that its forces had already quelled all popular opposition and controlled key installations such as the harbour in St George's. Investigative reporters who managed to reach Grenada found these reports to be untrue. Bernard Diederich, a correspondent for

Time, reported that he obtained more accurate information from the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army than the US military:

> The PRA soldiers who careened down to the 'Carenage' (waterfront) from Fort Frederick in their little jeeps had, as it later turned out, more accurate information. They informed us that the old folks home behind the town near Fort Frederick had been bombed and thirty people killed. Actually it was the mental hospital that had taken 250-pound bombs, resulting in the death of eighteen bedridden inmates. (Diederich 1984)

The US military shaped a general view of a population pleased with US intervention. However, most Grenadians viewed the troops as an occupying force of reckless marauders who had brazenly killed innocent civilians and endangered the general welfare of the population.

In fact, the Western media was prevented by force from entering Grenada during the invasion. According to Jacqueline Sharkey of The Center for Public Integrity, a liberal think tank:

> The 1983 invasion of Grenada gave the Pentagon its first opportunity to try . . . news-management techniques. Pentagon personnel, with the knowledge and approval of the White House, barred journalists during the first days of fighting. Reporters who tried to reach the island by boat were detained by US forces and held *in communicado.* Journalists who tried to fly in were 'buzzed' by a Navy jet and turned back for fear of being shot down. Nearly all the news that the American people received during the first two days was from US government sources. White House and Pentagon personnel reported that the conflict had been enormously successful and, in the words of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, 'extremely skillfully done'. (Sharkey 1991, p. 5)

While the international press was prevented from accessing Grenada to report on US military operations, in the days leading to the invasion, for all intents and purposes, leading foreign-news reporters for major newspapers like the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* served as the mouthpiece for the Pentagon and White House. Both papers reported that the White House spokesman said the redeployment of naval ships to the south-eastern Caribbean was precautionary and possibly to protect foreign students studying in Grenada. Only after the US invasion did the two papers unsuccessfully

attempt to cover the invasion, but their earlier general silence reflected a long-standing policy of non-interference in US foreign policy by major press outlets which continued into the early twenty-first century. Given that Grenada was the first large-scale, direct, military operation by the US since the war in Indochina, the debacle which ensued between the White House and press corps was quickly put to rest and a new policy of co-operation between the major media and US foreign policy was established to support US invasions in the Western Hemisphere and throughout the world (69–76). Since the 1983 invasion of Grenada, reporters for major newspapers which report on foreign policy are frequently reliable former operatives of the US military, with ties to the CIA and secret services.

The main purpose of a public opinion poll among Grenadian civilians held in the aftermath of the US armed intervention was to create the aura of support for the overthrow of the NJM. However, the main purpose of the military report was to pursuade popular opinion to support US armed intervention. Grenada was the model for all future invasions. In subsequent examples, the military and State Department have falsified evidence to show heroic armies welcomed by the general populace, and have provided disinformation when reports have criticised their operations.

Late-Cold War Anti-imperialism and US Militarism

The Grenadian Revolution was quintessentially a late twentieth-century anti-imperialist struggle against centuries of colonial domination and capitalist exploitation of the island's peasant population for the extraction of cloves and spices. According to Brian Meeks, the Grenadian Revolution bears striking similarities to comparable anti-imperialist movements of the late 1970s. Mainly, these revolutions were triggered by an aversion to post-colonial domination over economic resources and the failure to shift away from subjugation for the economic extraction of natural resources by the peasantry.

While Grenada was far smaller and less significant economically to the imperial ecumene than Iran or Nicaragua, it served as a crucial first object lesson of the potential consequences for Third-World revolutionaries in defying the system of US economic domination. In the aftermath of the Vietnam Wars from 1954–74, the US and UK were indifferent to the notion of formal democracy and sought to prop up corrupt and dictatorial governments that were of strategic economic importance to Western capitalism (Meeks 2001). The revolutions in Iran, Nicaragua, and Grenada were generated by growing peasant and working-class opposition to the pretence of the appearance of free markets and formal democracy in post-colonial states under the tight military and economic command of the Americans and British. Meeks suggests that the US defeat in Indochina in 1975 created an opportunity for popular movements to liberate themselves from de facto imperial domination. Correspondingly, in the late 1970s, popular movements for national liberation also broke out and won independence for their respective countries in the Portuguese African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. In each case, as in Grenada, the US and UK used proxies to undermine and overthrow popular governments, and funded mercenaries and rogue armies to foment inter-ethnic rivalries and civil disorder. Meeks notes that the 'international window of possibility' of antiimperialist revolt of the late 1970s was shortlived and unsustainable for weak states like Grenada and Nicaragua (ibid.).

As a founder of the NJM, Maurice Bishop was a charismatic leader and dynamic orator who rallied the masses to support land reform and generate economic resources in the island-nation, which was dependent on the export of cloves as a cash crop. In 1974, following 300 years of colonisation, Grenada had gained independence from Britain at the same time as the NJM was gaining wider support among the working class and peasants through Bishop's comprehensive plan to transform the country. However, Sir Eric Matthew Gairy, Grenada's first prime minister, engaged in political repression and violence against his radical opponents to undermine growing labour and peasant unrest on the islands.

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He formed an infamous internal security force known as the Mongoose Gang to kill workers and political opponents of the government. Bishop's own father, Rupert, was among those murdered by the paramilitary organisation. In the country's formative years of independence, the Gairy Government was charged with massive electoral fraud to prevent the NJM from taking power.

In March 1979, tens of thousands of the island's small population of about 100,000 were mobilising against Gairy, demanding an improvement in living conditions. To counteract the protests, Gairy mobilised the Mongoose Gang to kill the NJM leaders. The NJM discovered the plot, timed to take place during Gairy's visit to the United Nations in New York. To prevent bloodshed, the NJM seized power with the support of the majority of the country's population. Upon taking leadership, Bishop reaffirmed the party's commitment to democracy and egalitarianism. He promised protection of political and religious freedoms, elections without fraud, and that the people's revolution was 'for work, for food, for decent housing, and health services' for all Grenadian people (Crandall 2006, p. 126).

The NJM leaders sought to create a democratic society with greater equality through land reform and redistribution of wealth. As the Cold War was coming to an end, and neoliberal policies expanded in the US, United Kingdom, China, and a growing number of other countries, popular support for socialism in Grenada propelled Bishop and the NJM to power. Once in office, the NJM sought to align with ostensibly socialist countries such as Cuba, which provided vital technological and economic assistance, and the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, Bishop's political support expanded dramatically among the island's working class and poor population as economic reforms were implemented by him and the NJM Government.

With a poor economy enjoying few natural resources, and isolated by the US, Bishop turned to Cuba to provide medical assistance and help in advancing the nation's economy through promoting tourism and trade. Immediately following the Revolution of 1957–59, the Cuban government

had not overtly embraced a socialist transformation, but had primarily been motivated by opposition to US imperialism. It had gradually nationalised its economy, especially its sugar industry. The Cuban revolutionary government had been committed to removing the worst features of comprador capitalism manifested under the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista from 1952–59. This had been tied to powerful criminal organisations (mostly US-linked) and had turned Havana into a major centre for gambling, prostitution, and illicit drug trading. The revolutionary government had striven to improve the quality of life for the majority of workers and peasants in Cuba, and opposed US domination over Cuba's economy and society. In the ensuing years, the Cuban government provided military support to anti-colonial and antiimperialist movements in Africa, notably Angola and Ethiopia. The NJM primarily sought out Cuban military support as a means to prevent US foreign intervention, and posed no military threat to the region.

Cuba began assisting in building an airport capable of accommodating large commercial aircraft for foreign travel and tourism, while providing foreign funding through trade. While the airport included an airstrip that could accommodate military aircraft, as is the case in virtually any modern airport, Grenada did not possess military aircraft that could have been used for aggression against any regional state, and surely did not pose a threat to US interests in the region. Some worried that Cuban military aircraft could have used Grenada as a regional base. But Bishop and the NJM Government denied that the airport would be used for military purposes.

Grenada never posed a military threat to US hegemony in the Caribbean, but the NJM was considered a thorn in its side, especially as the country drew closer to Cuba for medical, educational, and military assistance. In 1981, in the wake of Reagan's election as president, steadfast critics committed to overthrowing Bishop and the NJM were appointed to key posts in the US State Department. Indeed, historians have found documentary evidence that the CIA orchestrated a political crisis in Grenada in 1982 and 1983, staging a coup d'état against Bishop by arming

military supporters of his former law partner Bernard Coard, who was also a former deputy prime minister. Coard seized power on 13 October 1983, and 6 days later mass demonstrations against the military putsch fomented a national crisis. To many observers at the time, it appeared that the US military was more intent on suppressing popular dissent than fighting against a dangerous foreign power. According to a study by Robin Andersen for Fairness and Accuracy in Media, 'When reporters were finally allowed onto the island, the warehouses they found were half empty. Some contained cases of sardines, and most of the weapons were antiquated' (Andersen 2006, p. 120). The report further documented that the weapons found were appropriate for small defensive operations in Caribbean island nations and that figures on the number of Cubans on the island 'were greatly inflated'. The report quotes Stuart Taylor of *the New York Times*: 'Over three days the Pentagon estimate of the number of Cuban fighters who had met the invading force seems to have plunged from more than 1,000 to fewer than 200, including the estimated 30 to 70 Cubans who were killed' (ibid.; Taylor 1983).

Conclusion: Legacy of Grenadian Radical Anti-imperialism

The legacy of the Grenadian revolution and the overthrow of Bishop during a US-sponsored military intervention and coup d'état demonstrates the subservience of countries in the Caribbean Basin to US imperialist domination, especially if they seek an independent path. Even Cuba could not defend the NJM Government from US military intervention. While the US government dominates the island chain, popular majorities in Grenada are proud of the legacy of Bishop and the NJM. In 2015, more than 35 years since the Revolution, Grenadian citizens continue to honour the tangible inheritance of Maurice Bishop's revolutionary anti-imperialism in both popular lore and benefit from the concrete improvements that were enacted during his short tenure in government leadership. Historian Shalini Puri finds:

... even as leftist leaders across the region renounced the strategy of armed seizure of state power, armed uprising as a political solution remains an active popular discourse. Like the stubborn rumors of arms caches hidden throughout the countryside, it persists. It is no coincidence that the 2008 and 2003 elections were replete with references to the Revolution [and] to Bishop as an iconic figure. (Puri 2014, p. 260)

Under the NJM Government, Grenada instituted major health and education programmes, including the National Insurance Scheme, maternity leave law, and free primary school education. Puri notes: 'It is doubtless such policies that lead to even some of those who were imprisoned by the NJM to cite the People's Revolutionary Government as the government that had most helped the country' (260).

This admiration for the revolutionary legacy is supported by Joseph Ewart Layne, a leading activist in the NJM Government who was imprisoned for more than two decades after the US-sponsored coup in 1983. He aptly writes that the NJM was 'the first successful revolution ever to take place in the English-speaking Caribbean' (2014, p. xii), and was only defeated by a four-and-a-half year campaign of external destabilisation. To defeat the Grenadian revolution, the Reagan Administration orchestrated a coup and assassination of Bishop and dispatched more than 6,000 US marines and two aircraft carrier groups, and yet 'it still took six days of fighting before the US Goliath could silence the Caribbean David' (ibid.). Given the array of imperial military forces lined up against the small island nation, which sought to chart an independent course, the NJM can be viewed as exemplary in demonstrating that a sparsely populated small nation with few natural resources can resist the dominant world imperialist power.

What seemed correct and certain in the aftermath of the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 has been proven to represent disinformation in the three decades since. Grenada never posed a threat to US regional hegemony and its invasion demonstrated that the White House and Pentagon would use manipulation and force to overthrow governments in the Third World.

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Guerilla Warfare

Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla Warfare and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Cold war; Colonialism; De-colonialism; Guerrilla warfare; Partisan war; Social revolution

Definition/Description

This chapter examines the historical definition and practice of guerrilla war that has a long legacy and tactics that can be found in all historical epochs since antiquity. The modern form of guerrilla war hars its origins in the Spanish resistance to the Napoleonic forces and has extended into the contemporary era in major anti-imperialist struggles.

Guerrilla Warfare and Imperialism

Like all historical phenomena, guerrilla warfare has its roots in the past. Elements, mostly in tactics, that constitute this form of war can be more or less found in every historical period since antiquity. But the guerrilla as we know it, however surprising, is a modern form of war. Most writers agree to place its origins in the Spanish resistance to Napoleonic forces (the term *'guerrilla',* meaning a small war, was transferred into the English

language from this conflict) during the Peninsular War from 1808–14. The most important war theoretician of that time, Carl von Clausewitz, devoted a chapter to 'The People in Arms' in his monumental 'On War'. This form of fighting was adopted during the 19th and early twentieth century by conquered and oppressed nations and ethnicities, as European imperialism was progressively conquering the entire globe. Episodes like the Philippine resistance to US occupation, the Boer War (often described as the greatest nineteenth-century partisan war), the wars in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire (as in Libya and Morocco) and at its heart (in Turkey after the First World War) spread guerrilla warfare worldwide. During the inter-war period, guerrilla warfare intertwined with the communist movement in the Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression, and found its more important modern expert in the person of Mao Zedong. The Second World War marked the return of guerrilla warfare to the European continent, then heavily occupied and exploited by Nazi Germany, in the form of 'partisan war'. This successful reappearance initiated its renewed practice in the other continents as the high hopes of an end to colonialism were frustrated by the realities of the Cold War and the aggressiveness of old and new imperialisms. The Cuban Revolution became a symbol of the victorious guerrilla strategy and a paradigm for other insurrections. Forms of guerrilla warfare, usually combined with other tactics, persist to this day, although their identification is becoming more difficult as they are blurred with 'terrorism' and their political goals are sometimes indistinct.

People and Nations under Arms

> 'Like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces.' (Carl von Clausewitz)

Guerrilla warfare is fought by small groups of volunteers, armed civilians defending their land from foreign intervention. The two elements – small groups (militias) and civilian character – were piecemeal intertwined in eighteenth-century Europe and during the American Revolution. Small detachments, auxiliary to the tactical forces, were used by the middle of the eighteenth century

in Europe, for example by the French against the British. These fighters were often mercenaries and foreigners, despised by army officers but nevertheless employed. Across the Atlantic, groups of civilians started riots against the British administration in America and later fought as 'irregulars' against British troops, gradually building a local identity and forming a regular army from and besides the initial militias (Polk 2008, pp. 4–18).

The idea of civilians bearing arms to defend their homeland originated in the modern era from the French Revolution and the rise of the democratic citizen instead of the royal subject. Until then (and well after that in many territories), a non-military bearing arms was simply an illegal fighter, an outlaw, and his punishment was usually death without trial. Armed resistance against any kind of oppression was sometimes associated (and almost always treated as such) with banditry. Banditti, haiduks, kléphtes, 'primitive rebels' (Hobsbawm 1981) were the ancestors of the modern revolutionaries and guerrilla fighters. The introduction of the general military conscription transformed the way of waging war by setting new laws. But the guerrilla fighters, engaged in an illegal practice, were still excluded from any protection, even if operating in co-operation with tactical forces.

The massive participation (*levée en masse*) by conscription to the Revolutionary Wars marked the turn from the professional armies of the monarchs to the modern massive armies of the nation states. War was thus 'democratised' and from then on the use of arms and military training became common knowledge, at least in Europe. Ironically enough, the first conflicts characterised as guerrilla fighting were in fact a reaction to this procedure and its outcomes. This was the case of the revolt in the Vendée, the uprising by locals against military conscription in 1793, caused also by the local reaction to the revolutionary state's measures against the Roman Catholic Church. Similarly religious features can be found in the original *guerrilla* of the Spanish people against the French, and 'atheist', occupation of their country during the Napoleonic wars (1808–14). There, the basic elements of the guerrilla, as we shall know it, were crystallised: armed civilians in small groups fighting a superior foreign army to

liberate their homeland. As no tactical army existed there to assist it, the guerrilla became the main form of war. But a crucial parameter was the aid given to the Spanish rebels by the British navy; from then on, external aid was considered a basic element for guerrilla warfare.

Foreign authorities or institutions loyal to them were overthrown, popular support was obtained and new authorities (the *juntas* in the Spanish case) were organised in liberated areas. It was a people's war with no military end, while the society continued to resist the invaders. This idea of continuing the resistance in the name of the society or the nation, while the state had capitulated, would have radical repercussions in the twentieth century. The Spanish throne, wisely enough, dismantled all guerrillas and juntas after the French withdrawal.

As the phenomenon of armed popular resistance was growing, military theory acknowledged it, beyond legal considerations; after the Napoleonic Wars, Carl von Clausewitz treated this matter in his famous Chapter 26 entitled 'The People in Arms'. Having studied, and actively participated in the Napoleonic Wars of his time, he formulated a general war theory based on his experiences. Concerning the popular uprising, he promoted its combination with regular army operations and pointed out successfully some main characteristics, such as the national character of this kind of war and its success in rather mountainous or otherwise inaccessible lands. Despite its early theorisation and limited documentation, Clausewitz's chapter on people's war was unique for a long period. Therefore it was used by supporters of the guerrilla tactics and even thoroughly studied by partisan leaders until the Second World War, as in the case of the Central Committee of the Greek People's Liberation Army (*ΕΛΑΣ*). But times had changed, and with them guerrilla fighting had gone a long way before returning to the Old Continent.

Resisting Colonialist Expansion

> 'I never saw a Boer all day till the battle was over and it was our men that were the victims.' (General Sir Neville Lyttelton)

During the second half of the nineteenth century and until the outbreak of the First World War,

Europe remained peaceful. It was the imperialistic era and the Europeans were off to conquer the world. A kind of total war was therefore fought against the natives; the efforts to establish rules in the wars between 'civilised' nations in Europe had no place in the rest of the world. No distinction was made between fighters and civilian population and the extermination of the latter was a gloomy forerunner of the horrors of the Second World War. The inequality between the opposing sides was growing with the use of modern weapons and other fruits of the industrial revolution (Traverso 2003, pp. 63–68).

In the colonies, national sentiment was growing and with that the ideas of independence and the overthrow of the foreign yoke. A series of national parties and leagues were founded between 1881 and 1914; amongst them, the Indian National Congress and the Panindian Muslim League, the Chinese Tongmenghui, the Indonesian Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam, the Young Arab Society and the Filipino Katipunan. From the latter emerged the Filipino guerrilla army of Emilio Aguinaldo against US occupation. Against the massive and brutal American colonial war against the population (waged by 150,000 US troops in 1900, as in Iraq in 2007), a guerrilla campaign was deployed which, despite its official defeat, continued to fight the Americans, then the Japanese and then again the Americans, in the form of the Hukbalahap and more recently, the New People's Army.

But the most notorious guerrilla war of this period was fought between Europeans in the south of the African continent: the Boer War. As British imperialism was reaching the edges of the world in search of rich resources, it came to confront previous Europeans settlers of Dutch origin in South Africa. These settlers, known as Boers, fought back, trying to preserve their control of the land and force out the new invaders. They deployed guerrilla tactics, setting ambushes and inflicting serious damages on British tactical forces. The British, in order to crush Boer resistance, deployed measures until then imposed only on, 'inferior races'. The civilian population was imprisoned in concentration camps, behind barbed wire, where they died in their thousands. To defeat the Boer guerrillas the British Empire

had to wage its largest land campaign of the century, larger even than its effort against Napoleon (Joes 1996, p. 42). The Boer War ended at the beginning of the twentieth century. Sixty years later, another armed struggle would appear there, that of MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe), the armed branch of the African National Congress (ANC) under the leadership of Nelson Mandela against South African apartheid (Seddon 2005, p. 323).

People's War

> 'The strategy of guerrilla war is to pit one man against ten, but the tactic is to pit ten men against one.' (Mao Zedong)

Despite the spread of guerrilla tactics, these had proved quite unsuccessful by the end of the nineteenth century. The use of modern weapons, like machine guns and chemical weapons, radically transformed warfare into an industrialised operation. The concept of total war was also developing during the First World War, as parts of populations were seen as targets. Amid this mass carnage in battlefields between trenches, there was no room for guerrilla tactics.

In this transitory period, the ascent of the communist movement would change the nature and status of guerrilla warfare. While not used in the Great War, the October Revolution or the subsequent Civil War in Russia, the importance of guerrilla warfare was acknowledged by Lenin in an early article ([1906] 1998), in his conception that no method of struggle should be excluded on grounds of principles.

But it was in China, where peasant revolts periodically broke out, that the Communists deployed an epic guerrilla campaign, under the name of the 'People's Protracted War', from 1927 until the seizure of power in 1949. That was a guerrilla war with an essential difference from all previous ones; it was organised and led by a Communist Party and thus was not waged to defend a prior state of affairs but to combine national independence with radical social revolution. The areas controlled by the guerrillas would abolish the old laws and became the nucleus of a new authority, legitimised by the struggle against the foreign aggressor and reforms in favour of the local peasant population.

The Chinese peasantry was for a long period on the brink of insurrection against a central government whose cohesion and power were fragile. The provinces were exploited by local warlords and bandits, while revolts erupted sporadically. Most probably, it was the Japanese conquest and occupation policies that gave the spark that started the 'prairie fire' of the first successful communist-led guerrilla war (Moore 1966, pp. 201–223). In 1934 the Red Army began its Long March to its base in Yan'an, and soon Mao Zedong became the leader of both the Party and the Army.

In 1938, the Japanese had occupied the biggest part of northern and central China, the main harbours and all the industrial centres. But, as the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kaishek retreated inland, the Communists under Mao Zedong gained support in the occupied countryside, established their power in liberated areas and from there unleashed guerrilla warfare against their enemies. This year, in Yan'an, Mao would give a series of lectures, later published under the title 'On Protracted War'; he supported the secondary but absolutely essential role of guerrilla warfare in combination with what he called 'mobile warfare' of tactical forces (point 95). American journalist Edgar Snow wrote that the Chinese communists had created 'the largest guerrilla organization in the world'. In the final stage of the war against Japan, in December 1941, while partisan fighting was dynamically reappearing in Europe, the Communist Party decided upon dispersing its Eight Army and concentrating on guerrilla warfare. By the time of Japan's defeat in 1945, at least one million fighters were under communist command (Rice 1990, p. 85). After a four-year civil war, the revolution had won in this immense country.

Partisan Warfare

> 'In the occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated.' (Stalin)

The reappearance of guerrilla war in Europe during the Second World War was a successful one. This success led to the spread of such methods in the post-war world, from the anti-colonialist

struggles to the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Political as well as military-technical factors allowed this successful re-emergence of guerrilla tactics in Axis-occupied Europe. At first, the density of the Axis forces was not equal in the vast occupied areas of Europe, including the Balkans and parts of the Soviet Union from spring-summer 1941 onwards. Especially in the Balkans, the mountainous landscape multiplied the strength of forces necessary to control it, just at the time that all resources and manpower were required for Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union. In the critical period of autumn 1941, partisan warfare broke out in Yugoslavia, inaugurating a successful resistance against Axis occupation in the Balkans. Moreover, the military needs of the German attack plans created two different levels within the German army: the first-quality troops were used in the military operations and the second-quality troops were assigned to controlling and policing the occupied territories. The latter were an easier adversary for the partisan fighters.

Soon the Second World War took the form of a total war; the orientation of all social functions to the service of massive military mechanisms turned all aspects of social life into 'targets'. With more than the two-thirds of the 60 million victims being civilians, the word 'civilian' lost its meaning. Under these circumstances, the choice to resist behind enemy lines became more popular (Margaritis 2014).

The Soviet leadership openly called for resistance behind the enemy's lines and the population of the country, facing extermination by Nazi racial policies to 'germanise' their land, organised a strong partisan movement, backed by the remains of the state and the Communist Party.

The British, once more facing a Continental blockade, decided to unleash an 'ungentlemanly warfare' using a special unit, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to 'set Europe ablaze', in Churchill's phrase. This unit, trained in sabotage and information gathering, deployed guerrilla tactics and systematically co-operated and supplied partisan armies in occupied Europe. Nearly 150 years after the Peninsular War in Spain, the British found again in these modern *guerrilleros* an ally against the greatest Continental power.

Leaving aside Soviet and British goals, armed resistance in Europe emerged as a new phenomenon; it resulted from the quick collapse of the European states' sovereignty and the reaction against Axis policies aiming to enslave populations or even annihilate some of them. In several cases, resistance took the form of secession from the body of Hitler's 'New Europe', with movements facing the challenge of administering liberated territories long before the actual end of the war. The political forces of the resistance movement – characteristically the Communist Parties – were grossly designing a political programme for the post-war period. No intention for return to the *status quo* ante bellum existed in this case. On the contrary, belief was strong in the coming of a new era which would bring radical social changes, deep-rooted reforms or even revolution. These aspirations were based not only in political programmes but also in the reality of the liberated areas, where partisan movements – as in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece – established their own governments in the form of Committees of National Liberation (Skalidakis 2014).

Post-war Europe was no place for guerrillas. In some cases, conflicts originating from the war or even before it endured for years before fading away, as in Spain against the Franco regime (1944–50) or in the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Poland against the Soviet Union. Perhaps the only guerrilla conflict worthy of the term was the Greek Civil War (1946–49). As the massive leftist movement of the country, originating from the resistance against Nazi occupation and its collaborators, was suppressed by the old establishment, under British tutelage, a civil war began, mainly in the mountainous countryside. The fighters of the Republican Army of Greece (Dēmokratikos Stratos Ellados – DSE) applied guerrilla tactics successfully until 1948, but it failed to secure a necessary liberated base and the National Army prevailed in 1949. Meanwhile, the US had replaced Great Britain as the protector of the country, the Truman Doctrine for aid in Greece being the forerunner of the Marshall Plan and eventually the Cold War. The country became

a laboratory for applying counter-insurgency methods while American military experts pored over the various Wehrmacht reports about partisan war in the Balkans. On the other hand, the glory of the victorious anti-fascist Resistance fostered the expansion of guerrilla warfare around the rest of the world.

Decolonisation

> 'Strike to win, strike only when success is certain. If it is not, then don't strike.' (General Vo Nguyen Giap)

After the Second World War, the Cold War era emerged but the so-called 'First' and 'Second' worlds remained relatively peaceful. It was the Third World that would from then on be the scene of endless wars. Between 1945 and 1983, more than 20 million people died 'in major wars and military actions and conflicts' in this part of the globe; and during this period guerrilla warfare seemed to be the primary form of fighting (Hobsbawm 1995, pp. 434–437). It was adopted by the various movements of national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin and Central America in their struggle to gain national independence from colonial powers and to defend this independence from neo-colonialism and mainly imperialistic US intervention. As the colonial powers or the local settlers resisted the path to decolonisation, theatres of guerrilla warfare opened up in Indochina, Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia in South-East Asia; Angola, Guinea-Bisau, Mozambique, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Congo in Africa. The strategy of the colonial powers facing this new situation differed. The French chose to wage full-scale war against their rebellious colonies while Great Britain took a more political stance, trying to suppress the dangerous, that is mainly communist, elements of the various movements and to negotiate with the rest for a controlled disengagement.

After the Second World War, the British Empire was in decline. During the war, the British made several concessions in order to maintain it, but the dynamic of decolonisation was stronger than the Empire's resistance. British governments after 1945 thus promoted a process of reforms aiming towards a 'Commonwealth of Nations'.

Nevertheless, the British fought against a guerrilla campaign in Malaya while bitter fighting burst out also in British Africa, notably in Rhodesia and Kenya, where the white settlers were against the Empire's disengagement strategy.

On the other hand, post-war France didn't opt for a federal-type Commonwealth but for a centralised 'Union Française' (1946). What that meant was foreshadowed by the symbolic events in Algeria on 8 May 1945. The same day that Europe was celebrating the end of the war and the defeat of Nazism, the French police opened fire on a demonstration of natives in Sétif supporting independence. Over the following days, French repression left thousands of victims.

The national insurrection in Algeria finally began in 1954, but until then the French had confronted another guerrilla army and fought and lost another colonial war far away from the Mediterranean in Indochina. This vast area was lost to the French during the war but after that, they meant to take it back. That was not acceptable to the Viet Minh independence movement and its leader Ho Chi Minh who had fought the Japanese, and another war began in 1946. The Vietnamese applied guerrilla tactics in the country's jungles and benefited from the Chinese Revolution after 1950. Guerrilla warfare spread to Laos and Cambodia, while China and the Soviet Union officially recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Finally the Viet Minh forces, under the leadership of Vo Nguyen Giap, crushed the French in their base at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. It was the first time that a colonial European power had been defeated by 'natives' in the twentieth century – the only previous such incident being the Italian defeat in Ethiopia in 1896 (Margaritis 2014).

This debacle didn't seem to dishearten France, which prepared its next colonial war in insurgent Algeria that same year, 1954. The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was established on 1 November and the revolution began. In a greatly inferior position, the Algerian insurgents gradually gained support, men and weapons as French repression of the population grew. Guerrilla tactics were then applied in the countryside, in the form of *wilayah* (district) war. Small groups of

locals would ambush isolated French detachments, seizing their weapons and other supplies. In the area of Kabylie, a counter-government was established providing political status to the movement (Polk 2008, pp. 138–142). But, in this case, it was the events in the capital during the Battle of Algiers, and their political repercussions, that finally forced the French, after years of brutal repression and use of torture, to withdraw from Algeria in 1962.

While the Algerian revolution broke out, the baton was decisively passed from the French to the Americans in Vietnam, as the first military mission arrived in November 1954. The Ngo Dinh Diem Regime, backed by the US, used repression against South Vietnam's peasantry, creating thus an even more favourable environment for the Viet Minh. Relocation of hundred of thousands, incarceration in concentration camps and exploitation paved the way for another guerrilla war waged by the experienced Vietnamese movement. The pattern of a successful insurgency was once more applied; the insurgents gained popular support, abolished previous structures of authority, and imposed their rule in liberated areas before finally accomplishing a military victory (Polk 2008, pp. 173–174).

Another example of guerrilla warfare against colonial rule took place in Portugal's African colonies. The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), the Partido Africano da Independencia do Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) of Amilcar Cabral in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bisau, FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) shook the Portuguese 'New State' during the 1960s. These movements led to large military expenses and subsequent decline of the Portuguese economy, causing social unrest and accelerating the fall of the country's dictatorship (Galván 2009, p. 2731). The murder of Patrice Lumumba in Congo in 1961 consolidated the viewpoint that no political compromise was possible with imperialism. We hear this realisation in the words of Amilcar Cabral in his address delivered to the first Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America held in Havana in January 1966:

The past and present experiences of various peoples, the present situation of national liberation struggles in the world (especially in Vietnam, the Congo and Zimbabwe) as well as the situation of permanent violence, or at least of contradictions and upheavals, in certain countries which have gained their independence by the so-called peaceful way, show us not only that compromises with imperialism do not work, but also that the normal way of national liberation, imposed on peoples by imperialist repression, is armed struggle. (Cabral 2008, p. 138)

Social Revolution

'It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.' (Che Guevara)

At the peak of the Cold War, the unexpected triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the ascent to power of Fidel Castro, who had started the campaign with a handful of supporters, gave am almost mythical (and mystical) dimension to guerrilla warfare. After Vietnam and Cuba, guerrilla warfare became an irresistible method for revolutionaries worldwide. A theory was even created preaching that guerrilla warfare could succeed even if political or social conditions were unfavourable; the guerrilla as a focus would concentrate the necessary means so that the revolution could triumph. This was 'focalism' or 'foco', supported by Che Guevara and formulated by the French journalist Régis Debray as the predominance of military (guerrilla) tactics over political strategy: 'the principal stress must be laid on the development of guerrilla warfare and not on the strengthening of existing parties or the creation of new parties' (Debray 1967, p. 115). These estimations would in fact sadly fail the same year, along with Guevara's execution and Debray's arrest in Bolivia, after an unsuccessful attempt to expand the revolution.

This omen wasn't enough to restrain the spread of guerrilla wars in Latin America and Africa, as movements of national independence continued their struggle and a new spirit of social revolution was growing all over the world in 1968. The symbol of Che and his cry for 'two, three, many Vietnams' was calling to action thousands of militants and conquered the hearts and minds of

youths in universities all over the globe. World revolution was envisaged as guerrilla wars broke out throughout the Third World, leading to the dispersal and defeat of the US military and the growth of support by Soviet Union, China or Cuba, as a contemporary writer formulated it (Vega 1969).

Indeed, guerrillas emerged in almost all Latin American countries – Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru – with some of them surviving in various forms down to the present day. One of the most well-known surviving guerrilla armies in Latin America is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In a country with longstanding political violence, guerrilla resistance emerged in the 1960s in the countryside, under the influence of the Cuban Revolution, and in 1966 the FARC was founded. In the 1980s it participated in political negotiations with the government and since then has formed several political fronts. In the 1990s FARC's military strength continued to increase while counter-guerrilla operations were held by paramilitary groups in a 'dirty war'. Since 2002, the Colombian government has received counter-terrorism funding from the US as part of the latter's 'war on terror' (Leech 2011). The fighting in Colombia continues today as a proof of guerrilla warfare's enduring presence in the twenty-first century.

Several other guerrilla campaigns have similarly continued from the 1970s to the 1990s, gradually transforming into political parties and even taking governmental power. The most notable cases are the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNLF) in power now in San Salvador, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in power in Nicaragua in the 1980s with its leader Daniel Ortega being president today. José Mujica, current president of Uruguay, was a member of the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN-T), a former urban guerrilla group there. Other more radical guerrillas didn't adjust to the political system after the revolutionary tide, and still continue their armed struggle. The most notorious among them is the 'Sentero Luminoso' (Shining Path) in Peru. This guerrilla was organised by the Maoist Communist Party of Peru, a splinter-group from the initial Peruvian Communist Party with its roots in the university campuses and its leader a former university professor, Abimael Guzmán (Gonzalo) now in prison. It started its armed struggle in 1980 following the classic Maoist methods of guerrilla warfare; that is, abolishing state institutions in the remote countryside and creating counter-state organs. At the beginning of the 1990s, Shining Path's control of the countryside had expanded significantly when in 1992 its leader Guzmán was arrested and the downfall began. Nevertheless, its activity has not ceased entirely even today.

The radicalisation of social and national struggles in the 1960s with the rise of guerrilla warfare affected also pre-existing conflicts in Europe. Characteristically, the Basque movement for national self-determination shifted to the left, adopting social demands. A significant part of it, Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), embraced armed struggle. A former faction of the youth of the Basque nationalist party PNV, ETA became an independent organisation in 1959 and rapidly radicalised in the 1960s. National oppression by the Franco dictatorship was combined with an intensified social conflict as the Basque Country became the epicentre of labour protest and political opposition to the dictatorship. From the late 1960s until the late 1970s, half of all labour protest throughout Spain was Basque in origin. In the context of world-wide armed struggles against imperialism and aspirations for social revolution, ETA considered the Basque Country as a land colonised by Spain and opted for revolutionary, that is guerrilla, warfare. This strategy was fully applied from the 1970s onwards and continued unchanged after the fall of the dictatorship. Violence escalated at the end of the decade as military factions of ETA chose terrorist methods to respond to the growing state repression. There were dozens of victims. Another tactic was to take the war to 'the enemy', choosing targets in Spain, outside the Basque Country. In recent decades, a series of peace negotiations and ceasefires have paved a way for a politicisation of the conflict (Dowling 2009).

After the Cold War

'Marcos is all the exploited, marginalised, oppressed minorities resisting and saying "Enough". He is every minority who is now beginning to speak and every majority that must shut up and listen.' (Subcomandante Marcos)

As the revolutionary tide began to ebb in the 1970s and 1980s, many guerrilla movements faded away while others degenerated in internal clashes for regional power. The end of the Cold War had multiple consequences, such as the withdrawal of external aid for and against armed movements challenging state power in Africa. But, as the post-Cold War period didn't prove to be one of sustainable peace and growth, as had been declared by its 'winners', guerrilla warfare continued to be a means of challenging political, national and economic realities. In Africa, guerrilla war was in essence related with movements of national independence and not of socialist aspiration. The 'failure' of the existing states to handle the post-colonial inheritance fuelled numerous contemporary guerrilla campaigns as a 'manifestation of rage against the patrimonial "machinery" of [these] dysfunctional states' (Bøås and Dunn 2007: 36–37). Often seen as remnants of the past, these 'non-classical' guerrillas are nonetheless expressions of political reaction against the reality of many African states, in the context of the current form of imperialistic international relations, that is globalisation.

The emblematic guerrilla of the globalisation era has undoubtedly been the Zapatistas movement (EZLN) since its insurrection in the Mexican state of Chiapas in 1994. Its strategy of creating autonomous institutions while not aiming to seize state power has been very influential in political theory and philosophy and has inspired many forms and actions of the anti-globalisation movement. Nonetheless, some more 'classical' guerrillas continue to exist or have emerged during this period. In Nepal, a guerrilla war was launched by the (Maoist) Communist Party in 1996 with remarkable results, as the centuries-old monarchy was finally abolished 10 years afterwards and a federal democratic republic established. The wars in Afghanistan, lasting from the resistance to the British and the Soviets to the contemporary form

of religious war against US intervention, and the expansion of the guerrilla war by the various Sunnite groups as a form of jihad in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, must also be mentioned.

As our world becomes more obscure, with a threatening global economic crisis triggering international disputes, the long-celebrated globalisation reveals its essential nature; imperialism is still a valuable term to describe the current phase of the capitalistic system. While history didn't finally end, nor did politics. To return to Clausewitz and his famous quotation 'War is merely the continuation of policy by other means', we must expect to see variations of guerrilla fighting in the future.

Cross-References

► Cold War
► Cold War and Latin America
► French Indochinese War, 1945–1954
► Mozambique, Imperialism and
► Naxalite Movement: An Anti-imperialist Perspective
► Roy, Arundhati (1961–)

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Guevara, Ernesto 'Che' (1928–1967)

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Synonyms

Biography; Che Guevara; Cuban revolution; Focoism; Guerilla warfare; Marxism

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of Argentine Marxist revolutionary, physician, author, guerrilla leader, military theorist, and diplomat, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (1928–1967).

We all appreciate heroes whose actions and historical stature help enable us to recognise our potential as human beings and who give us the impetus to be better than we are – more courageous, more selfless, more committed to making the world a better place. This is especially true today when our world is on the verge of planetary catastrophe at the hands of a transnational capitalist class and its corporate clientele and a US-led imperialist order seemingly willing to forsake millions of lives in favour of protecting its corporate interests through a shameful complicity with the brutality and aggressiveness required as the 'leader' of the 'free world' (Robinson 2008). Today, as we witness the world's only superpower using its divinely ordained pre-emptive power to 'democratise' rogue countries through the savagery of war, symbolically delousing its new immigrant populations from the south by highlighting their supposed cultural inferiority, and deploying surveillance and cyber capabilities to steal industry secrets and sabotage financial systems in order to advantage its domestic industry and spy on its own citizens and those from countries around the world, we can safely say that while democracy clearly has no historical present in the US, it could possibly have a future should a socialist alternative to capitalism be one day realised. Yet, this seems unlikely in today's historical juncture, in a world harrowed by war, famine, racism, and ecological destruction.

Any vestiges of social responsibility are trampled into dust by a world corporate media system that deploys its own 'heroes' – i.e., Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Mark Zuckerberg, the Walton family – to ensure that the capitalist marketplace is venerated as the motor force of democracy. Humanity appears weak and puny in the face of the entrenched dominance of the capitalist mode of production and its billionaire heroes, and alerts us to the seemingly insuperable task of emerging victorious against any and all forces aligned with

the interests of capital accumulation. As Peter McLaren (2010) notes:

> In a world torn between the oppressed on the one side, and those who esuriently exploit them, on the other, there seems little hope today of a grand alternative for the wretched of the earth. They seem forever caught between the jaws of those scrupulously respectable people who offer them the slavery of wage labour and a lifetime of alienation in exchange for their labour power, and those who loathsomely criminalize their very existence, or feel justified to leave them to suffer whatever cruel fate the market has in store for them. (102–103)

The unmitigated lie that we are destined to be passive participants in history and unable to act in a world of necessity becomes evident when we come to know and recognise the valiant self-fashioning of those who – despite being locked within the prison house of capitalism with its dislocation and disaggregation of person identity – create spaces of protagonistic agency that enable them to act with integrity, valour, and commitment toward a 'collective struggle' (Darder 2011). What we need is to learn of and from the heroes who stand among real men and women and who have made profound contributions in our lifetime precisely because of their humanity – because somehow conditions in and around their lives forced them to demand of themselves more than most of us dare to do. The real heroes of our world are those whose disquieting commitment to resisting the brutalisation of everyday life convinces us that we too can be revolutionaries – that in the substantive and aggregative nexus of our historical experiences, we all have the capacity for courage, for honouring others, and for revolutionary love.

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara was a man from whose storied legacy we can glimpse the possibilities of an authentic humanity, recognising at the same time that he was also one of the most important socialist revolutionaries of the twentieth century and beyond. His accomplishments as an intellectual and a military commander continue to be felt in the hearts of those who knew him and among new generations who continue to discover him anew (Löwy 2007). His gift to his own generation and future generations was his refusal to give succour to despair, his diligent focus on the

world-historical antagonisms of his day, the clarity he achieved in redressing social injustices of his time and his pedagogy of revolution that was based on a critical engagement of Marxist-Leninist theory and the philosophy of praxis he developed from the basis of such an engagement (Harris 1998). Through the words with which he agitated, incited, and persuaded men and women to fight for a socialist alternative, we witness the honesty, self-reflection, and integrity that he argued were necessary characteristics of the 'new [wo] man' and socialist revolutionary (Löwy 2007). His Guevarian pedagogy and socialist imaginary were not the product of some privileged access to his own internal reflection but came through a commitment to truth, a struggle for solidarity, a belief in the political efficacy of guerrilla warfare, and a search for a coherence between theory and practice, a coherence that has informed various revolutions since and provides great insights into how we, as critical educators, can begin to attain proletarian hegemony through a pedagogy of love, revolution, and social justice.

A Legacy of and for Revolution

Che is revered as an epic symbol of revolutionary heroism among disenfranchised communities across the globe and especially in his native América Latina. His extraordinary willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice of his life to liberate humanity, his unwavering commitment to his Guevarian (Marxist) pedagogy, and his courageous and unflinching affront to capitalism and US imperialism support the image of a knight from Arthurian legend, a secular Christ, or an avenging angel wielding a fiery sword promulgated and instructed by divine ordinance to slay the hydra-headed beast of US imperialism. For many of us on the left, he inspires and energises us to continue to fight for what we know is right and just, and instils a sense of solidarity and love that reminds us of our purpose.

Hundreds of books and articles have been written about Che, the man who, alongside Fidel Castro, spearheaded a socialist revolution that brought down the dictatorship of Fulgencio

Batista in Cuba in 1959 and played a key role in various aspects of Cuba's transformation into communism. In 1965, he moved on to develop and support other socialist revolutions in Congo-Kinshasa and in Bolivia, where he was eventually captured and assassinated by the Bolivian army with CIA assistance. He was and continues to be a controversial figure, idolised by poor, indigenous, and otherwise brutalised communities worldwide and intensely hated not only by the transnational functionaries of the capitalist superstructure and the restrictive circle of the ruling class but also by those of the working class whose enduring embourgeoisement positions Che as a determinate threat to their upward mobility (McLaren 2000).

A man who grew up in the so called middle class with privilege and opportunity and became a physician, Che renounced what could have been a lucrative medical profession to bring an end to the unnecessary suffering of people caused by what he recognised not only as the unconscionable and gluttonous greed of the capitalist class but more importantly as the very system of capitalism itself in which it was impossible to function humanely since it was powered by overaccumulation and the expropriation of surplus value from the poor in order to serve the interests of the rich. Those who have deeply studied his life, including his writings, whether divinising him as a revolutionary hierophant or misguided romantic adventurer, consistently point to a man who held a deep love for humanity and an abiding belief that human beings could and would change through the development of a socialist-humanist consciousness in both immanent and productive ways. He grasped keenly the full extent to which capital expands and encroaches upon every aspect of social life, including our social and political values and the ways in which we engage with each other and our world. He denounced capitalism and imperialism on the basis of the devastation and unfreedom it creates for the masses of exploited peoples and the inhumanity that it engenders in individuals and society. He argued that capitalism necessarily spawns inequality and creates human beings who are motivated by a stygian individualism that results in the negation of the essential qualities of humanity – love of and for our fellow

human beings, responsibility for the wellbeing of all, honesty, creativity, voluntary labour, solidarity and a sense of community (Löwy 2007).

The obsessive focus on the self that characterises much of how we engage in the world, including our explanations for success and failure, is part and parcel of the totalising effect of capitalism that breeds a deep-seated survival of the fittest attitude that normalises poverty and other forms of human suffering. This individualism runs throughout all institutions under capitalism, including education, where the opportunity to learn is determined through competition for grades and scores as if these were not related to a host of other social factors and in particular poverty and the availability of material resources. It is considered a superior human quality to strive to be the best of the best and to leave others trailing behind. Given this capture of education by individualism, it is not surprising that people learn early on to see themselves not as part of a social group working collaboratively to achieve goals with the benefit of mutual support but in an antagonistic relationship to each other. Capitalism pits human beings against each other such that 'man' becomes 'man's' worst enemy. A central aspect of Che's revolutionary goals was the transformation of (wo)man into human beings who, through the alchemy of critical consciousness, could transmute historical experiences of exploitation into a praxis of liberation by embodying the values of revolutionary socialism – values that could only be fully achieved outside of capital's value form. In other words, the problem was not only to rid the world of capitalists, but capital as a social relation. McLaren (2010) writes:

> The fact that all Washington administrations are populated by a particularly venal cabal of career opportunists, theocratic sociopaths, anti-Enlightenment activists, pathological liars and vulpine opponents of democracy should in no way confound us into thinking that the problem of capitalism is rooted in acts of political malfeasance by clever but corrupted politicians. Such acts may be torturously accommodating to capital, and lead to impoverishment, bloodshed, repression, misery, and eventually to genocide and even to the obliteration of entire nations, but they are not the source of the problem. The problem itself can be traced to Marx's world-historical discovery: the alienated

character of the very act of labouring and the exploitation that is a fundamental part of selling one's labour-power for a wage. (105)

Historical conditions set the stage for what came to be for Che a life of tremendous self discipline, theoretical clarity, and revolutionary vision invoked through a profound love for humanity and a conviction that a society that callously exploited, bestowed cruelty, and created or accepted barbaric living conditions for any of its citizens needed to be radically transformed. Che suffered throughout his life from terrifying asthma attacks that may have sensitised him to people's suffering. Indeed, he worked in his youth with leper communities and was deeply affected by the way in which they were treated with disdain. He was an avid reader of the classics and many revolutionary texts from his early youth onwards. He was raised in a politicised household with parents who actively took part in dissident political activity. At the age of 23, he embarked on a journey with a close friend that took him through South America, where he witnessed for himself the abject poverty, hunger, disease, drug addiction, and indignities impoverished peasants and workers experienced at the hands of those who seemed unable or unwilling to see or feel their suffering. His journaling throughout this time suggests that these experiences were deeply troubling to him and offered the opportunity for reflection that spawned both the desire and commitment to do something meaningful in his life. As Guevara (2004) wrote in his now famed *Motorcycle Diaries*:

> The person who wrote these notes passed away the moment his feet touched Argentine soil again. The person who reorganizes and polishes them, me, is no longer, at least I am not the person I once was. All this wandering around 'our America with a capital A' has changed me more than I thought. (25–26)

The concerns and questions evidenced in these diaries ultimately developed into a revolutionary consciousness that involved a deep capacity for honest self-reflection and a Guevarian pedagogy that brought triumph to the Cuban Revolution and a strong belief that the only way to defeat US imperialism was with a united América Latina.

This latter antiimperialist and, particularly, anti-US position was solidified as he evidenced the overthrow of Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz with the assistance of the CIA in service to the interests of the United Fruit Company. It is believed that his vision of a united América Latina, was beginning to see fruition as he moved to support Bolivia's revolution and planned to follow thereafter with insurgencies into his native Argentina. Alas, as the US recognised that his enormous courage, his charm and gift of persuasion, and his brilliant socialist pedagogy were a daunting if not indomitable force to be reckoned with, the CIA hunted him down and put an end to his socialist internationalist agenda. He was captured in Bolivia in 1967 and summarily executed on the orders of the CIA (McLaren 2000).

A key moment in revolutionary history was the fateful meeting of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in Mexico City when Fidel and his men were exiled from Cuba after serving 2 years in prison as a result of being captured during their first attack against the dictatorship of Batista in 1951 (Fidel's 26 July Movement in Cuba had only a narrow base composed largely of middle-class intellectuals). After training in Mexico City, Che, Fidel, and other Cuban exiles boarded the *Granma* that took them to Cuba and so began the Cuban Revolution that toppled the Batista Government with a final victorious battle led by Che and peasant guerrilla forces at Santa Clara in 1959. This historic achievement and the years that followed serve as testament to Che's extraordinary bravery and commitment, and to the significance of a Guevarian pedagogy – a testament that lives on today despite an overwhelming campaign to domesticate Che into yet another superhuman hero of the market in an attempt to mystify his extraordinary but very real and human revolutionary accomplishments.

The commodification of Che's name and face – which are now plastered on coffee mugs and T-shirts and sold to consumers across the world, but especially in the US – is a strategic attempt to diminish Che's image as a revolutionary and attenuate the potential of his dialectical thinking in helping today's youth

achieve critical consciousness. The iconisation of Che extracts his humanity and with it the socialist ideals that he embodied and that gave millions the hope for a socialist alternative. It serves to turn Che against himself as he becomes the commodified form that he rejected and against which he courageously fought. We recognise the marketisation of our heroes as strategies of hegemonic control but also note the contested spaces within which Che is made and iconised. As McLaren (2000) states elsewhere:

> Even though there appears to be more of a willingness by rank-and-file North American commentators to de-reify Che as saint or sinner and to place him somewhere in between, we must remember that every encounter with that irrepressible force known as Che occurs in an occupied space. It is a space of reception dense with public signs and personal memories, a space de-limited by the discourses and 'ways of telling' that are most available to society, most overdetermined within society, and carrying the most currency within today's economy of ideas – especially in the public media. (7)

Yet people are not always duped by the anesthetising impact of shopping mall politics. Che stands, among other human heroes in history, to remind us that even within the totalising system of capital that aims to eclipse the virtues inherent in our existence, there are essential aspects to our humanity that remain, perhaps buried deep within the interstices of our self-and-social transformation, that can be nurtured, recovered, and brought forward to create new revolutionary heroes among us and in future generations until we can finally find ourselves in the moment of true victory, when humanity is vindicated from the treacherous workings of capital and its attendant antagonisms and we can move into the light of our secular salvation.

Indeed the extraordinary – some would say miraculous – reappearance of Che's body on 28 June 1997, near the airstrip where it had been discarded thirty years earlier, seems a prophetic reminder and admonition to the world that a martyr was made of Che to liberate humanity, such that we may find the fortitude to rise toward this most fearsome of goals, lest his execution be in vain (McLaren 2010).

A Guevarian Pedagogy

Che was a man devoted to the revolution, fully willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in order to free humanity from its enslavement to the chillingly individualistic and devouring monsters of capital. His readings of Marx, Lenin, and other revolutionary theorists began early in his youth but later became sources of study – to be analysed, critiqued, and built upon. A brilliant Marxist, Che believed wholeheartedly that revolution was the ultimate course in which the world was headed, that capitalism would suffocate humanity until the threat became too much to be endured at which time the people would rise up against it. However, he did not believe in uncritical idolatry or teleological accounts of historical victory over capitalism but rather argued that a revolutionary philosophy of praxis must be adapted to specific socio-historical contexts (McLaren 2000). As such, he recognised and denounced the enormous and growing power of US imperialism and its inextricable link to capital interests.

Che, however, was also a brilliant guerrilla warfare strategist who was not content to merely wait for conditions to be ripe for revolution. He argued that conditions for revolution could and should be accelerated to liberate the millions of people that at the time faced poverty and other inhumanities. His Guevarian pedagogy involved the idea that revolution required a short period of preparation, to ensure sufficient support among the people, and then a hard strike against those who would support the state apparatus, specifically against the state military.

Although he believed that armed struggle was and should always be a last resort, he was convinced that a socialist revolution was synonymous with armed conflict, and that it must be thus since the capitalist class and the imperialist powers would never give up their presumed right to exploit under a mantra of false ideologies that serve their interests. According to Löwy (2007, p. 79), 'the principle of the inevitability of armed struggle was [for Che] derived precisely from the sociology of the revolution: because the revolution is socialist it can be victorious only through revolutionary war' (79).

For Che, a socialist revolution could only survive under conditions of profound love – a love that was deeper than the romantic version used to commodify feelings and to turn people into possessions under capitalism. In Che's now famous words:

> Let me say, with the risk of appearing ridiculous, that the true revolutionary is guided by strong feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality. This is perhaps one of the greatest dramas of a leader; he must combine an impassioned spirit with a cold mind and make painful decisions without flinching one muscle. Our vanguard revolutionaries must idealize their love for the people, for the most sacred of causes, and make it one and indivisible. They cannot descend, with small doses of daily affection, to the places where ordinary men put their love into practice. (Anderson 1997, pp. 636–637)

Che was a man of love and his love for humanity reached the ultimate crescendo as he transcended the presumed natural state of self-preservation engendered through capitalism and embraced a socialist consciousness that included a vision for something far greater than one individual's needs – the struggle for humanity's liberation. Thus, within this socialist framing, we can recognise his now famous words uttered proudly and unflinchingly moments before his execution to reflect this revolutionary vision: 'Shoot, coward, you are only going to kill a man' (cited in Kunzle 1997).

And although these courageous words impel an image of an heroic being beyond what any mere mortal can presume to emulate, we learn that this was not an instinct held deep within him but something that was fostered during his youth when he was said to be a risk-taker – something that allowed him to push himself to the limits of what a young man could endure as he played rugby despite his life-threatening asthmatic condition. We see his vigilance of character enacted through self-reflection as he wrote during a battle in Cuba's Altos de Merino:

> Upon arriving I found that the guards were already advancing. A little combat broke out in which we retreated very quickly. The position was bad and they were encircling us, but we put up little resistance. Personally, I noted something that I had never felt before: the need to live. That had better be corrected in the next opportunity. (cited in Anderson 1997, p. 327)

With this profound love and respect for humanity, Che was clear that a true revolutionary must necessarily harbour a deep hatred toward any who would destroy the opportunity to liberate humanity.

> Hatred is an element of struggle; relentless hatred of the enemy that impels us over and beyond the natural limitations of man and transforms us into effective, violent, selective, and cold killing machines. Our soldiers must be thus; a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy. (Guevara 1999)

And yet he showed profound empathy for his captured enemies and afforded them the dignity he perceived the right of every human being. Rooted firmly within the Latin American humanist tradition, for Che, the 'standard of dignity' to which all revolutionaries should adhere is reflected in the words of José Martí: 'A real man should feel on his own cheek the blow inflected on any other man's' (cited in Löwy 2007, p. 24).

Those who wish to discredit his name and destroy his legacy of bravery that was built upon his love take a righteous moralising position that his statements and actions regarding armed struggle reflect a dark and murderous side. These capitalist moralists who direct massacres without bloodying their own hands suggest that love and hate as claimed by Che are contradictory. Löwy (2007) argues otherwise:

> To hold life in profound respect and to be ready to take up arms and, if need be, to kill, is contradictory only in the eyes of Christian or pacifist humanism. For revolutionary humanism, for Che, the people's war is the necessary answer, the only possible answer, of the exploited and oppressed to the crimes and the institutionalized violence of the oppressors …. (24)

Zizek (2008) talks about the ultimate cause of violence as the fear of the neighbour. But he also describes what he calls 'divine violence'. He sees divine violence as an infusion of justice beyond the law. It is extra-moral but not immoral. It is not a divine licence to kill. It is divine only in a subjective sense, in the eye of the beholder, or in the mind of the person enacting such violence. It is Walter Benjamin's Angel of History looking forward as he/she moves backwards, slaying the masters of progress, restoring the balance to the history of the world. It is a violence that refuses a

deeper meaning; it is the logic of rage, a refusal to normalise crimes against humanity, either by reconciliation or revenge; it is, in other words, a refusal to compromise with injustice. Zizek describes divine violence as pure power over all of life for the sake of the living, it is a type of sign that the world is unjust. It is not the return of the repressed, or the underside of the authoritarian legal order. Nor is it the intervention of some omnipotent God. Rather, it is the sign of the impotency of God. There is no objective criterion with which to judge divine violence. Zizek claims that Che's comments are united in Che's motto: *Hay que endurecerse sin perder jamas la ternura.* (One must endure [become hard, toughen oneself] without losing tenderness).

The legal monopoly of violence in capitalist society is embodied in the institutions of the state, or political society, and clearly the social forces that constitute state formations are not static but historically contingent. While it is clear that the state is both an instrument of coercion as well as the production of consent, it is a matter of debate whether contemporary developments in civil society can result in an augmentation of state violence. Suffice it to say that, given his analyses of state formations, international relations and the political economy of his day, Che was committed to the inevitability of armed conflict in the struggle for socialism.

Che argued that fundamental to revolution was the making of the 'new (wo)man'. Not only was the development of characteristics and values among the people that would support the revolution essential to its success but it was also at the heart of the goals of a socialist revolution. Liberating humanity was not merely about redistribution of resources but about changing the ways in which human beings related to each other and to their world. This required a pedagogy of revolution – the critical understanding of what the revolution was ultimately about, beyond the initial desire for bringing justice and greater resources to the suffering masses.

Che was known to always carry books with him and to spend time reading them to the men who fought alongside him, often in addition to providing literacy instruction since many of the men who fought the Cuban Revolution were poor peasants who had never had the opportunity for schooling. In Che's words we hear a vision that can readily map into the ideas set forth a decade later by Paulo Freire (1970) in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and which spawned the Critical Pedagogy movement. Specifically, Che recognised that a revolutionary praxis would bring a socialist consciousness and would engender the unequivocal demand for justice and restore the necessary sense of agency to lead their struggle.

> The first step to educate the people is to introduce them to the revolution. Never pretend you can help them conquer their rights by education alone, while they must endure a despotic government. First and foremost, teach them to conquer their rights and, as they gain representation in the government, they will learn whatever they are taught and much more: with no great effort they shall soon become the teachers, towering above the rest. (cited in Löwy 2007)

Through his words, we recognise, as McLaren (2000) notes, that he was not only 'a teacher of the revolution but a revolutionary teacher' who saw the emancipatory nature of teaching and rejected traditional teaching pedagogy that is characterised by oppressive teacher/student relations in which the teacher holds all the knowledge and doles it out at will while simultaneously discrediting the knowledge of the oppressed. We can see how this traditional teaching approach sustains the status quo as the oppressed are led to feel grateful for the opportunity to learn without the opportunity to question and transform the existing social relations that oppressed them in the first place. Che's revolutionary pedagogy was an affirmation to the ontologies and epistemologies of the workers and peasants to which only the oppressed are privy by virtue of their social and historical positioning. As Che indicated, in the tradition of Marx before him and Freire after him, a revolution must be a people's revolution, even though it may be initiated by a vanguard which fights not for them but whose actions ultimately should reflect the people's decisions.

The new (wo)man would be a product of a new society within which education would play a vital role. Socialism, Che believed, would engender individuals that were responsive to the needs of the whole group and who held a deep commitment to the development of humanity and the

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revolutionary cause. Socialism requires a different set of values, the value for social justice, for communal efforts, for sacrifice, for equally supporting others, for labour as a creative endeavour, and shared responsibility for those tasks that a society deems necessary but that no one really wants to do, a responsibility that helps individuals develop in community (Martí 1999).

His actions and personal testimonies about him reveal a man who did not stand above the rest but lived to the best of his ability through the values that he professed. He was said to hold enormously high expectations of others and to be even more demanding of himself. He lived, to the best of his ability, his Guevarian politics but he was quick to point out his own deficits as a socialist revolutionary, recognising the imprint of capital's seemingly intransigent stranglehold on every aspect of our lives. In Cuba, where an 82- foot statue of Che stands, marking his mausoleum in Santa Clara (often called 'the City of Che'), children are encouraged to be like el Che – to develop the characteristics that he espoused and exemplified as a revolutionary (Martí 1999).

Che in the Context of World Capitalism

Our current transnational capitalist world has reached a level of destruction unprecedented in the history of humanity. Famine, war, racism, sexism, hatred are all implicated to various degrees in the incessant necessity for capital accumulation underwritten by an imperialist creed that legitimises US exceptionalism and the quest for power beyond what the imagination can condone. William Robinson (2008) makes a clarion call for action as he relates the disastrous fate capital has procured:

> The system of global capitalism that now engulfs the entire planet is in crisis. There is consensus among scientists that we are on the precipice of ecological holocaust, including the mass extinction of species; the impending collapse of agriculture in major producing areas; the meltdown of polar ice caps; the phenomena of global warming, and the contamination of the oceans, food stock, water supply, and air. Social inequalities have spiraled out of control, and the gap between the global rich and the

global poor has never been as acute as it is in the early twenty-first century. Driven by the imperatives of over accumulation and transnational global control, global elites have increasingly turned to authoritarianism, militarisation, and war to sustain the system. Many political economists concur that a global economic collapse is possible, even probable. (vii–viii)

Indeed this is Marx's prophetic critique of capital restated in the context of today's crisis of capitalism; yet it is still uncertain if capitalism will bring about its own demise as a result of workers rising up in response to their destitute conditions.

The ideological marriage of democracy to capitalism that sustains the image of the US as a benevolent protector of the 'developing world' serves to conceal its treacherous dealings against any socialist alternative, even when this is the popular will of the people, in service to transnational capital. Evidence of US-sponsored massacres can be found across the globe, but particularly in América Latina, which has served for centuries as a killing field for US profit and power. Indeed, the massacres of greed and hatred can be traced to the infamously historic year of 1492, when a colonial power matrix was instituted that placed wealth and power in the hands of white, able-bodied, Christian men through a murderous war waged materially and ideologically against indigenous communities. According to decolonial theorists Ramon Grosfoguel, Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, and others, the continual violence enacted upon the peoples of the global South is a founding aspect of Cartesian Western epistemology, instituted as the universal truth on the basis of the *ego cogito* (I think, therefore I am) that rises out of the historic and epistemic conditions of possibility developed through the *ego conquiro* (I conquer, therefore I am) and the link between the two is the *ego exterminus* (I exterminate you, therefore I am) (Grosfoguel 2013). The genocide perpetuated by Western imperialists on the indigenous populations of the New World and African slave populations of the Middle Passage was followed by epistemicide – the demonisation and disappearance of indigenous knowledges that accompanied the expansion

of the US settler-colonial state. Today we search for the wisdom of the autochthonous societies of our lost ancestros – the Arawaks, the Caribes, the Chibchas of the Antillean coastline, the Tapuyas, the Arucanos, the Incas, the Patagones, and countless other tribes massacred, tortured and enslaved by the European invaders.

Che was far ahead of his time in his understandings of the social conditions in América Latina. His conviction that only a united Latin America could emerge victorious against US imperialism seems prophetic in our age of financialisation, monetarism, hedge-fund hucksterism and fictitious capital. From his socio-historical and political location in the global South, Che's epistemology challenged and extended Marxist thought. For Che, imperialism was not an extension of capitalism as Marx would have it but intricately imbricated in its conditions of possibility. As Robinson (2008) explains, colonisation was the first of multiple stages in the development of capitalism that has continually expanded in subsequent waves to reach today's totalising formation. Che's revolutionary ontology was forged out of the converging and worsening crises of capitalism, society, and civilisation, the dictatorship of ownership, first-hand experience of the coloniality of power (*patron de poder colonial*), the brute force US capitalists were able to wield through the military-industrial complex, and the privileged geopolitical positioning of the US and its proximity to Latin America that had correspondingly undermined the dignity and livelihood of countless populations throughout Las Américas. As he witnessed Cuba's professional class flee the country in droves after the victory of the revolution, he came to recognise that the bourgeoisie would rather sell their soul to the highest bidder, side with the imperialist ambitions of the US, and take refuge in the certainties of the past than give up their perceived right to lands in favour of agrarian reform.

Yet, at the time, the guerrilla warfare deployed by Fidel and Che and the promise of a future free from the jackboots of imperialism helped secure a socialist alternative for Cuba, and thus it was

believed that the same victory could be realised by other national liberation movements. In today's transnational capitalism, the accumulation of wealth by the largest transnational corporations is based on the hyper-exploitation of the peoples of the 'developing' world, particularly exacerbated through the North American Free Trade Agreement. The concentration of the transnational capitalist class's wealth and power enables it to wield tremendous influence in national and international policy. Not surprisingly, it is fiercely opposed to large-scale socialist developments (such as Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution) that may upset the 'democratic' stability of the nations that procure their profits. A massive military industrial complex and a narco-terror war that has militarised the US-Mexican border serves to bolster US surveillance and intimidation of all Latin America in the service of transnational corporate interests (Monzó et al. 2014).

Yet even under this hyper-capitalist world order, Che's heroic legacy continues to inspire and hold promise for the marginalised communities of América Latina and to spur and inform new socialist movements. Revolutionary struggles that have come to bear Che's foundational signature include the Cuban Revolution, the Sandinista Revolution, the Zapatistas indigenous movement in Chiapas, Mexico, which is explicitly inspired by Che's teachings, and the Bolivarian Revolution led by Hugo Chavez that began in 2007. However, these are small-scale movements in comparison to the large-scale socialist alternative that Che envisioned.

A Guevarian-Informed Critical Pedagogy

Although Che recognised, as Marx did, the totalising and self-reproducing aspects of capital, and although his vision of socialism transcended nationalised boundaries of identity (although not gender ones), he did not come to see the extent to which capitalism would persevere nor the magnitude of destruction and human suffering it would engender. Today's globalised world and the unyielding and supreme power of the US

make localised guerrilla warfare politically unserviceable. While we support social movements in which the oppressed masses extol their collective power to fight for justice, emancipation, and freedom from oppression and exploitation in Latin America and across the world, we believe that a different type of war must be simultaneously waged within the imperialist powers themselves; an ideological war or, in Gramscian terms, a 'war of position'. This is a concerted epistemological challenge to US cultural hegemony, the ideological underpinnings that hold the capitalist system together. According to Gramsci, a war of position is a necessary precursor to a 'war of manoeuvre' in which social movements collectively attempt through a united front to topple the state apparatus. Che recognised this ideological war must be waged through education and the creation of the revolutionary consciousness in the new (wo) man. There is no blueprint available today for the road to socialism, only those with the courage to remake history using the insights gleaned from a very unreliable attempts to control the social production of labour power by the workers. As McLaren (2010) remarks:

> The stages of liberation that were to follow lockstep from the contradiction between the forces and the relations of production – the accumulation of evolution powered by a law of dialectical development that would inevitably lead from the economic contradictions of capitalism to the establishment of a classless society under 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' – did not follow in the wake of the quixotic predictions of the dogmatists (a condition into which a great many fundamentalist Marxisms fall), ensuring the final victory of socialism over the cut-throat capitalists, the end of alienated labour and the flourishing of human culture. What young radicals such as Che had discovered in the interim was that it was not history that should drive the revolution but the other way around – the peasants and the workers should direct their own fate, making economic decisions and deciding which share of production is to be assigned to accumulation and which share to consumption . . .. But today, nearly forty years after Che's death, when the contradictions at the heart of the market economy are more exacerbated than they were in Che's day (even in the industrialized capitalism of Marx's day!), there

are no completed socialist revolutions to serve as a living model for the world, only those that have been ceaselessly and violently interrupted, or those that, following in the intrepid footsteps of Simon Bolivar, are being tested in the barrios of Caracas or los alto-planos of Venezuela. (103)

A revolutionary critical pedagogy is a philosophy of praxis that interrogates the ideological conditions and contradictions that sustain societal structures as if such were natural or the best possible democratic options available. A host of institutionalised structures are in place in the US that serve to keep the masses of workers anesthetised to the suffering of others and duped into believing that our capitalist system is the best of all possible worlds, including the corporate media and our increasingly privatised school system. Normalised ideologies about human 'nature', including individualism and competition are so culturally embedded in the way society functions that people find it difficult to conceive within the lineaments of their technocratic rationality that individuals could thrive within a set of values that emphasise overcoming necessity for every person through collectivist cooperation. Closely associated with individualism are ideologies that serve to create and sustain discourses necessary for identity construction, such as those associated with race, class, gender, and sexuality. However, as important as identity construction has became in today's culture of racism, homophobia, patriarchy and ableism, the formation of these identities is often used by the transnational capitalist class to divide workers against each other by administering a specific image of what it means to be 'American', and in doing so masking the role of capital as an 'equal opportunity' exploiter and effectively circumventing class struggle and the construction of protagonistic political agency.

A Guevarian informed revolutionary critical pedagogy re-inserts the values of freedom from necessity, provides spaces for self-and-social critique, encourages self-reflection and sacrifice for the good of humanity, promotes anti-racist, anti-

sexist, and anti-homophobic curricula and pedagogical practices, and encourages an informed public to learn from and with those whose epistemologies are rooted in the histories and struggles of the global South. Within a Guevarian informed revolutionary pedagogy, education is not only freely available to all but carries with it a responsibility for each person to meet the needs of society's most aggrieved populations. Within such a framing, teachers are viewed as committed intellectuals who create the conditions of possibility for the development of a socialist consciousness so that they may actualise their own power and recognise this as an inherent human capacity, leading to a renewed sense of agency and the will to act toward the creation of a new sociality.

For the youth of our nations, Che offers an alternative to the individualistic and greed-based consumer logic to which they are socialised, and offers opportunities for students to create a protagonistic political agency. The feeling that we are powerless to change the world's suffering is not an accident – it is a strategic aspect of class relations. Hope is the first step that must be taken to enable us to act towards something bigger and better than the world we have constructed. In Joel Kovel's (1997) words:

> Therefore capital must go if we are to survive as a civilization and, indeed, a species; and all partial measures and reforms should be taken in the spirit of bringing about capital's downfall. Nothing could seem more daunting than this, indeed in the current balance of forces, it seems inconceivable. Therefore the first job must be to conceive it as a possibility, and not to succumb passively to the given situation. Capital expresses no law of nature; it has been the result of choice, and there is no essential reason to assume it cannot be un-chosen. Conceiving things this way is scarcely sufficient. But it is necessary, in both a moral and a practical sense. (14)

Far from being an ambivalent space that defies categorisation, love is a foundational element in a Guevarian informed revolutionary pedagogy. The media exalts a capitalist-based love in which people become the possession of others in the name of love. A revolutionary love is one that does not encounter state boundaries or colour lines and one that encourages freedom of spirit and a commitment to the well-being of others. It is a feeling that honours the dignity of human beings above all else. It is a love willing to sacrifice for humanity and its freedoms. It is a love that will spawn new revolutionary heroes in our lifetime and generations to come until we finally achieve the most fearsome of victories – a socialist alternative in which all of humanity can live and love freely.

Cross-References

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▶ Imperialism, Uneven Development, and Revolution: The Example of Amilcar Cabral

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Anti-imperialism: National Versus Communitarian

By the turn of the twentieth century, the global composition and relative proportion of Karl Marx's industrial proletariat was confined to a marginal Western minority. Outside the West, there was no comparable industrial development or concentration of the working class. The vast majority of production forces remained rural and agricultural, while the relation of production appeared to have preserved most aspects of feudalism. Marx has originally predicted that socialist revolution to take place in the most advanced industrial nations where the proletariat is most concentrated. But Marx's prediction has never been materialized, while Russia, and despite its

small working class, was the first to experience the triumph of a socialist revolution.

Vladimir Lenin needed to stir a great deal of agitation to place Marxism in the context of an international revolution. In an effort to justify revolutions in Russia and in undeveloped countries, he sought to transform Marxist interpretations of socialist revolution beyond the strict dialectic of industrial relations.

After all, capitalism was hardly a comprehensive global phenomenon. Uneven capitalist development placed the Western proletariat in and at the center of global wealth. Leninism synthetically advanced the proposition that world capitalism is characterized by fundamental contradictions that pit advanced Western industrialism (imperialism or monopoly capitalism) against mostly resource-based, dependent nations (Third World or underdeveloped countries). National liberation or a democratic revolution is, thus, established as an essential prerequisite for socialism (Lenin 1916; Stalin 1913). The alliance between workers and peasants as well as those of the oppressed nations in the Third World was considered fundamental to the defeat of world capitalism (Lenin 1905), through a permanent (Trotsky 1906–1930) or staged (Stalin 1929) international revolution. Imperialism was set as the highest stage of capitalism whose demise depended on an ingrained cyclical economic crises as well as on the Third World's national liberation and, consequently, international revolution (Lenin 1917).

However, anti-imperialist national liberation and democratic revolutions in the Third World failed to follow a deterministic or historic inevitability. Throughout the twentieth century, theoretical and strategic differences resulted in opposing perspectives among leftist movements. Disagreements oriented various responses to central questions such as the following: How could the national struggle be linked to the international? What types of alliances were needed to be forged between classes? Which national classes could be considered anti-imperialist? Who should lead the alliances? Which political programs were to be pursued? (Conversi 2017).

Relative consensus, however, remained in attributing Westphalian traits to the nation state. The nation or the national group is thought to be comprised of a population, confined to a geographic territory, and linked by a shared identity. It was a prerequisite for a democratic revolution to be centered around the transformation of state power from bourgeois to socialist. Lenin's view did not dwell on details in efforts to unravel the determinants of a nation but created space for discussion of the attributes of a national group brought together in a political union against dependency and exploitation. Consequently, the Westphalian state became the target for revolutionary transformation.

A century after Lenin, the national question has yet to pave the way for a democratic or a successful national liberation synthesis. Firstly, it became evident that postindependence nations were territorially constructed and imposed by colonial design rather than through an indigenous awakening. This is exemplified in the 1916 Sykes-Picot secret Agreement that divided the Ottoman Middle East into different spheres of colonial direct and indirect influences. Secondly, and as a consequence of such actions, the affiliation of communitarian groups within national territories was widely disputed by primordial and cross-national affiliations that refused detachments, such as the case of the Kurds or sectarian groups in the Arab region. Some states such as Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine were granted independence through a gerrymandering of national territories to reflect particular sectarian compositions suitable to the preservation of colonial interests. Thirdly, nation states, including those formed following the anti-imperialist liberation movements (and in order to force the unity and assimilation of different groups) soon degenerated to repressive autocratic regimes (Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Southern Yemen, etc.), inciting anti-nationalist communitarian grievances. Assimilation projects in Iraq under the Arab Socialist Ba'ath party, for example, witnessed a demographic engineering aimed to undermine ethnic Kurdish and Shiite Arabs conglomerate powers. Lastly, post-Soviet globalization trends seem to have deterritorialized

geopolitics, revoking requisites that traditionally served as the essence of nation states' sovereignty and independence (Salamey 2017). Economic liberalization and collective security, for example, increased states' dependencies on global market and governance.

Thus, the original challenge in establishing an anti-imperialist alliance formed around a national platform consistently proved problematic. Communitarian affiliations (ethnic, religious, racial, tribal, linguistic) that were rooted in primordial cultural solidarity emerged resilient to modernizations or states' territorializations. Communitarianism stood robust against the assimilation of the oppressed within a national liberation project. The Jewish question, for instance, presented an early dilemma where leftist disagreements revolved around whether recognizing Jewish communal, national assimilation, or national secession would contribute to the strength or weaknesses of the working class and those of oppressed "nations" (Marx 1843; Lenin 1905–1918; Trotsky 1934).

Thus, when Jewish nationalism sought an independent state in Palestine and assembled behind the Zionist movement, leftist responses split on the issue of whether Jewish separatism served or opposed imperialism (Rodinson 1973; Ben-Zvi 1957). Division was further deepened by the communitarian and religious nature of this nationalist brand. Quarrels centered around whether Zionism enhances or undermines the development of a working-class consciousness. Marxists have traditionally opposed religious indoctrination and mobilization on the ground of having to contribute to dogmatism and false consciousness.

The question emerged equally divisive following the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, which was founded on religious communitarian rather than nationalist principles. The revolution overthrew the monarchy, stood in direct confrontation with the United States and Western imperialism, and promised the redistribution of wealth and welfare. Despite its wide crackdown on left opposition, Tudeh, the Iranian communist-leaning party, stood in support of the Islamic theocracy. This support proved to be in vain as loyalty to the Ayatollahs did not spare the party from political prosecution. In 1983, the party was disbanded, and its members imprisoned or executed. Thus, religious communitarianism in Iran presented a two-edged "liberation" scenario in the struggle against imperialism: while being largely inspired by the philosophical tenants of Husseinism that rejected global injustice and stood against Western imperialism, it had no tolerance for class politics that stood against perceived unity of the community (Ummah). Twelvers Shiism's Husseinism served well the revolutionary fervor while metaphorically reverting to the lessons extracted from perceived injustice committed against the Prophet Muhammed's grandson and his ultimate martyrdom for righteousness.

Still, the Islamic Revolution held another intriguing peculiarity that echoed international revolutions and drove another wedge in the anti-imperialism debate. Its communitarianism recognized no national boundaries and promised liberation of the dispossessed from colonialism and enslavement everywhere. Naturally, the deprived and dispersed Shiite communities within the predominantly Sunni-majority nation states were most susceptible, sparking a region-wide Shiite communitarian awakening to demand emancipation and an Islamic State. Substantial-sized Shiite communities in Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon were among the most inspired by the Iranian Husseinist fervor, enthusiastically responding to communitarian appeal while moving away from left and national secularism. In Lebanon, for example, and throughout the 1980s, the Lebanese Communist Party and The Communist Workers Organization witnessed an exodus of their majority Shiite members, switching rank in favor of own communitarian parties: Amal and Hezbollah. The latter waged an assassination campaign against leftist intellectuals in the early 1980s.

Communitarian Shiite parties, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hezbolda'awa in Iraq, aimed to reinvent Khomeinism in their own countries, echoing traditional communist parties' efforts to reincarnate Leninism in national experiences. Their international was thus replicated by a

Velayat-e Faqih or the Guardian of Islamic Jurist, providing a forum for leadership guidance and coordination across countries (Salamey and Othman 2011). The evolution of militant Shiite groups in MENA states demonstrated a changing regional environment that favored a communitarian political discourse. To what extend has this shift challenge the political economy of world capitalism and those of imperialism? This paper aims to provide a preliminary response.

It analyzes the experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon as a communitarian political party. It also assesses the extent to which such a communitarianism has provided an antithetical discourse to imperialism. The assessment is formulated within an analytical framework that utilizes globalization's Double Movement theory, which lays the foundations for a dialectical interpretation of rising communitarianism and the demise of nationalism (Salamey 2017). Conclusions are accordingly formulated to support this analysis.

Hezbollah and Shia Communitarianism

The Lebanese confessional composition gave primary impetus to Hezbollah. The country had initially recognized 18 sectarian groups divided between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The 1943 political pact formed among sectarian elites vested power in the hands of a Christian Maronite President and to a lesser extend a Sunni Prime Minister. The Shia Parliament Speaker and the Shia community, in general, fared the worst in the distribution of power. The Shia had been historically marginalized in Lebanon and in the wider region. Successive rule by Sunni dynasties has subjugated non-Sunnis to discriminatory treatment. French colonial mandate over Lebanon injected secular liberalism and modernization that helped reverse more than 500 years of historic discrimination practiced against Christians; however, it failed to do the same for the Shiites.

Thus, throughout French rule and post-independence periods, relative deprivation among the Shia community incited radical appeals. Its population was predominantly made of poor peasants, agricultural laborers, and a newly formed proletariat brought to urban centers in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. The community was denied fair access to jobs, public services, and public offices and, hence, excluded from the process of liberalization, while its bourgeoisie had difficulties developing along Lebanese national lines. Shia youth were highly recruited by revolutionary secular Arab nationalist, Palestinian, socialist, and communist parties.

The 1975 Lebanese Civil War witnessed the mobilization of Shiite youth by left-wing parties assembled under the Lebanese National Liberation Movement, demanding reform and access to the Maronite-dominated nation state. The defeat of the left by the Syrian and Israeli military incursions and the triumph of the Iranian Revolution brought the Shiite closer to recognizing their strength through the community. Initially, the Shiite Amal movement gained grounds by forcing the communist party out from Shiite strongholds before cleansing the Palestinians. Later, Hezbollah presented a radical and transnational communitarian alternative. It distinguished itself from Amal by rejecting the entire Lebanese national arrangement, calling for its replacement by an Islamic State. Its aims were first articulated in its 1985s "Open Letter to the Oppressed" (Hezbollah 1985). Both groups clashed for a short period of time, and Hezbollah gained significance following from those who had lost faith in the "national project." Many of its new recruits had fought in the past alongside leftist and Palestinian organizations for democratic state reforms. It was Hezbollah's well-orchestrated armed campaign against Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon and radical challenge to the state apparatus that captured popularity among the community (Salamey 2019; Salamey and Tabar 2012).

Practically, the rise of Hezbollah in the 1980s and its expansion throughout the 1990s signified a turning point in Lebanese and regional politics. Not only did this phenomenon coincide with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of left-opposition discourse in the region but also signaled the beginning of an overarching transnational communitarian paradigm challenging Arab and Lebanese nationalism.

The Double Movement and Hezbollah's Communitarianism

Two major coinciding and interdependent historic developments can explain modern communitarianism. The first is an intensification of globalization that featured the integration of post-Soviet states with the rest of the democratic world through ultra-capitalist expansionism. Liberal views describe the phenomenon as a third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991). It features a movement of many states toward capitalism while global economy being revolutionized by modern communication technology with production, investment, and commerce flooding Third World markets. Second, and consequently, a phenomenal decline of nation states undermined states' relevancy in the protection of their own productive forces: bourgeois and labor alike. Liberal literature characterizes this development as a decline in state's sovereignty and independence (Axtmann 2004). Evidently, international laws regulating the world economy and trade removed essential states' barriers and undermined the ability of underdeveloped nations to stand against global capital, particularly those centered in industrial nations. The national bourgeoisies, long considered protectionists, were turning into cronies (such as the case of Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen).

However, globalization's interconnectedness of countries and its exposure of Third World national economies to a vicious and predatory ultra-imperialism incited transnational communitarian resistance and region-wide protectionism. By the turn of the twenty-first century, national debts brought many world's nation states to the verge of bankruptcies. By 2018, Lebanon's public debt reached 152% of the country's GDP. Thus, a Double Movement was unleashed where globalization paved the way for market integration and deterritorialization, on the one hand, and communitarianism mobilized groups across countries for protectionism, on the other (Salamey 2017). Most communitarian movements in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, manifest these Double Movement dialectics.

Communitarianism, inspired by the Iranian and Afghani models, claimed protectionism within local and across regional politics. On the state (Israel, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia) as well as non-state level (Hezbollah, ISIS, Qaeda, Nusra, Houthies, Kurdish parties, etc.) politics turned bluntly communitarian and often transnational. The post-Arab Spring politics witnessed a spectacular rise of communitarian movements throughout the Arab region, demanding rights and empowerment (Salamey 2018).

Evidently, under intensive globalization, Hezbollah's communitarianism had many advantages to offer compared to leftist and national bourgeois parties. In contrast to nationalism, its communitarianism has been rooted in primordial cultural bonds rather than disputed modern territorial, and largely colonial, national constructs. Such affiliation has moved beyond class emancipation that was promised by leftist ideologies. The common destiny that binds the community together is extracted from centuries old of unbroken history, compared to a highly contested modern national or class consciousness. In Hezbollah's narrative, it began throughout Shia plight for justice against universal subjugation and inspired by Imam Hussein's martyrdom (680 AC). The oppression against the community that was carried out by successive "false Islamic" rules, mostly Sunni, has been extended to contemporary times through colonial and imperialist Western-backed regimes. The community has been entrenched in an existential struggle, threatening its entirety with collective prosecution and extermination. Thus, Hezbollah's community is expanded beyond the confinement of national boundaries or class economy to express a holistic inclusion of all its productive forces being attached by a common destiny everywhere (Hezbollah 1985). An irredentist ideology evokes historic rights to restore justice through a "cultural-identitarian" political movement (Elsenhans et al. 2015).

Therefore, Hezbollah established itself as a protectionist for Lebanese Shiites, not only in confronting external threats and global dominance but also in containing domestic rivalry presented by competing communitarian groups, Sunnis and Maronites alike. Communitarian struggle in the

Lebanese context is projected as existentialist, and the stakes in the confessional politics are heightened on the account of national or class consciousness. Despite the limited and short-lived experiences of secular and cross-confessional worker unions and syndicate organizations during the 1960s and 1970s, intra-class competition has consolidated the fragmentation of the working and middle classes along confessional loyalties. This rapture has been interlocked by competition for jobs and services. Hezbollah along the Amal Movement have, thus, provided the Shiite community with means to assert own interests in the confessional bargain and, ultimately, to be charged with an unprecedented level of empowerment (Salamey and Tabar 2012).

Distinct from most nationalist and socialist political practices, the party awaited neither reform nor the capture of the state's institutions to act on its promises. Since inception, it enforced its program within the practices of own community and among followers, thus acting as a state within the state in proximity to a dual power arrangement (Sharara 2008). It ran a voluntary communitarian economic networks that relied on local Islamic informal Shiite system of taxation (Al-Zakat and Al-Khums) that collects approximately one-fifth of individual income. Charitable and religious services constituted additional sources of income. Activities, tied to the formal economy, established and managed by the party, were expanded to include construction, community services, education, medical, security, investment, commerce, banking, telecommunication, and housing sectors. Illicit economic operations incurred important revenue directly benefiting the community while being protected and facilitated by the party. In addition to the harvesting and exporting of hashish, these activities included cross-border transactions such as the smuggling of weapons, oil, drugs, food, and merchandize as well as money laundering. A comprehensive communitarian governance system complements economic activities to include a political, judicial, and enforcement institutions (Salamey and Pearson 2007).

In short, a communitarian economy, or what can be labeled as "economunitarianism," captures the modes of activities immersed within the community. Religiously rooted traditions of taxation, as well as funds gathered through donations and nongovernmental organizations, financial institutions, semiformal as well as nonformal and illicit economic activities, cross-border transnational networks, and conglomerated sectarian trading zones, are among the variety of functions consolidating the foundations of a welfare-based communitarian economy, thriving on rentierism (Salamey 2017).

Globalization further enhanced the party's ability to maneuver national boundaries and expand the strategic relevance of the community across countries. It provided the party with unprecedented access to technology, communication networks, and financial markets. Technological advancements expedited its capacity to utilize sea, air, and land transportation systems. The liberalization of global markets, despite US sanctions, undermined restrictions and loosened scrutiny against its financial operations – including cash transfer.

Regional interconnectedness elevated its security relevance in the contestation of power. In addition to liberating Lebanon from occupation, the party's historic armed resistance against Israel has served multiple strategic purposes. It placed the party among the favorable proxies to both Syria and Iran. Backed by local Shiite community and relying on a low military budget, it demonstrated effectiveness in asymmetric warfare against Israel, the region's most advanced and equipped army. Following Hezbollah's well-orchestrated and organized military operations, in 2000, Israel was forced to end a 25-year occupation of the predominantly Shia Southern Lebanese territory. The victory strengthened Shiite's domestic advantages, restored Syrian influence, and invited Iran to play a prominent role in the country's balance of power.

Yet, in 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated another strategic depth during a renewed conflict with Israel. It bombarded Israel's northern borders with short- and medium-range missiles, forcing hundreds of thousands of Israelis to flee. The confrontation elevated the potential of the party to prove relevant in any regional showdown, particularly in a hypothetical Israeli-Iranian conflict.

Since then, Iranian financial and military support to the party has intensified to include advanced precision and long-range missile systems (Kenner 2018).

Hezbollah's regional depth continued to deepen while playing a central role in strengthening Shiite alliance across the region. In 2012, it was called for the rescue of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad who was threatened by an armed Sunni Islamist insurgency. Hezbollah responded by sending waves of fighters across the borders to help defeat the armed opposition and restore the well-being of the largely Alawi regime (The Alawi is a subsect of Shiism and controls major military and power posts in Syria, including the Presidency.). In coordination with the Iranian, Syrian, and Russian military forces, Hezbollah's fighters demonstrated a stunning success that awarded them strategic role and increasing Iranian support. The party is also believed to have extended logistic and training assistance to Shia fighting groups in Iraq and Yemen.

Whether Hezbollah's Communitarianism Is Anti-imperialist

Leninist conceptualization of anti-imperialism deviates from those offered by Hezbollah's Communitarianism. Important traits assert the party's anti-imperialism in the age of globalization. To begin, it has successfully staged a liberation movement against foreign Israeli occupation and as part of a region-wide resistance rejecting foreign imposition. It promoted itself as the party of the oppressed fighting the US-Israeli alliance, accused of attempting to dominate and subjugate the region against the interests of the local inhabitants. It vowed to continue the struggle until achieving the full liberation of Palestine from Zionist occupation. Its social welfare network, financed by local and diaspora contributions as well as Iranian foreign backing, provided a safety net for the poor amid degenerated state services (Hezbollah runs a pseudo rentier economy, where its areas of control are "deregulated" and turned informal while receiving social services in return for support). In this sense, it laid the foundations

of a dual power, where the community appeared relatively independent from state's apparatus and jurisdictions (Salamey and Pearson 2007). Also, the party's clerical and populist orientation helped establish and complement a socioeconomic solidarity or "economunitarianism" that diffused the rigidity of strict class stratification, typical of most industrial societies. A mutuality of class interests provided through a protectionism role offered to both local bourgeois and labor within the framework of communitarianism. Thus, while the party helped improve the Shiite bourgeois position in the confessional share of national market and state power, it offered the working class and the poor a protective umbrella against state and global capitalist incursions deemed harmful to lower classes. This duality was demonstrated in its activities throughout post-2005 Syrian pullout from Lebanon where it played a pivotal role in restructuring the Lebanese confessional balance of power in favor of Shiite's elite. At the same time, it rejected the state's privatization and regulations that aimed to strengthen capitalist economy, often imposed by the World Bank and conditioned by local and international lending institutions (Salamey and Pearson 2007).

For these reasons, Hezbollah shares important attributes with "progressive" nationalist movements in the Middle East that were characterized as anti-imperialists (Nasserism and Baathism). Its communitarian solidarity for self-preservation echoes national unification and self-determination. Nonetheless, distinctions differentiate its communitarianism from those that called for the defense of the fatherland. Its irredentism defies territoriality and evokes a wider regional and global movement opposing imperialism.

Limitations to the party's anti-imperialism echo those of "progressive" nationalists. The party, after all, is not an anti-capitalist party nor does it aim to end the monopoly of global capitalism. It is rather a Shiite Jihadi party committed to the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih and Islamic justice. It tolerates no otherworld religious views, including what could be its own Shia deviations. Despite tactical alliances formed with non-Shiites, it ultimately seeks the primacy of its own sect. Hence, Hezbollah's Shiism is like nationalism,

confined to a community of adherents with evi-
dent chauvinism. Such a characteristic contributes
to the consolidation of communitarian false class
consciousness and undermines the unity of the
poor across divides. Thus, when the Arab Spring
against autocratic rules culminated in a Sunni
Islamists' empowerment across the different Arab
countries, Hezbollah stood critical and dispatched
its own fighters against Syrian Islamist opposition
groups. The party even praised Russian military
intervention and joined the Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian-
Russian defense alliance to crush Syrian Sunni
Islamists.

But major deviation from nationalism lies in
Hezbollah's social indoctrination. From a leftist or
a liberal perspective, it stands for ultraconservatism.
Not only in its gender outlooks but in its entire
religious indoctrination that submits to supernat-
ural forces and cultist collectivism while rejecting
liberal individualism and social egalitarianism.
Having abandoned the immediate demand for an
Islamic State, it has continued to oppose state
secularism and flex its maximum tolerance to co-
opting with Lebanese multi-confessional state
(Hezbollah 2009).

Beyond its conservative ideological complex,
the regional political economy deconstructs the
party's anti-imperialism. Hezbollah is tied to the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard and commanded by
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei through
a Velayat-e Faqih regime. Though it projects Shi-
ite empowerment on regional level, the Guards'
fundamental role is to protect the Islamic Revolu-
tion of Iran. As previously discussed, Hezbollah's
communitarianism has presented a mutuality
between Lebanese and Iranian Shiism on a strate-
gic as well as political levels. But the expansion of
Iranian power in the region has been essentially
linked to its efforts to secure an important share of
the world oil market. Its rivalry for regional dom-
inance with oil-rich Saudi Arabia has been a major
driver of conflict, thus further awaking and deep-
ening Shia-Sunni feuds. Hezbollah has joined this
struggle in confronting and undermining Saudi
influence mostly in Lebanon and Syria. From
this perspective, the Iranian plight for the share
of the oil market, to supply advanced capitalist

industrial states, detaches Hezbollah from a fun-
damental anti-imperialism discourse.

Prospects of Communitarian Anti-imperialism in the Age of Globalization

In summation, globalization's Double Movement
has simultaneously unleashed two political forces
with each aiming to reconstruct post-Soviet global
order: one that seeks the integration of economic
markets and political systems (mostly global
financial and capitalist institutions centered in
the North) and another that sets in motion a trans-
national communitarian power contestation
(mostly regional powers along associated non-
state militant groups in the South). The first
searches for the deconstruction of market barriers
and the universalization of global regulations, and
the second mobilizes associations and alliances
across borders to assert respective power rele-
vance and protect own resources. As globalization
advances, the world appears as a union of com-
munitarian associations brought together by mul-
tiple constructs that encompass interests beyond
territoriality. While the EU represents an early
manifestation of an economic conglomeration in
the North, various communitarian associations
have been brought together by primordialism
across Southern nations. In the MENA region,
communitarianism expresses transnational pri-
mordial affiliations while being polarized along
sectarian Sunni-Shia camps and led by regional
powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) but also
along ethnic, provisional, and tribal lines
(Salamey 2018). Major regional states, such as
Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, have attempted
to improve their respective global relevance by
expanding their power along transnational com-
munitarian trajectories.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
sectarian-communitarianists in the Third World,
such as Hezbollah, have come to dominate the
political arena, some posing as viable alterna-
tives to communists and nationalists in rejecting
imperialism. The rise of Hezbollah, formed on
the eve of collapsing Soviet Union, represented a

direct challenge to Lebanese nationalism, the Left movement, and the Israeli occupation and captured the complexity of new communitarianism. Despite distinctiveness and multiple military successes in resisting foreign occupation and in opposing the dictation of world financial institutions, Hezbollah's experience attests to the fact that it has aimed to improve communitarian power position on the national and regional levels.

Like nationalism, Middle Eastern communitarianism invites divergent assessments over its transitional and anti-imperialist orientations. Evidently, by altering and restructuring the MENA regional spheres of influence, it presents a revisionist movement against the twentieth century's postcolonial order. By mobilizing the community against historic subjugation, it displays anti-imperialism and liberation tendencies. Yet, its political economy seems to synchronize with rather than to antagonize global capitalism. Regional resource-supplying states (Saudi Arabia and Iran) aim, through regional communitarian mobilizations, to improve their respective bargain in the demand-side market. Oil- supplying states thrive on the well-being of industrial capitalism. Undoubtedly, industrial states help infuriate contradictions and competition among suppliers to maintain open access to resources and control of prices. There are also aspects of compradorialism where communitarianism provides intermediary states with strategic role relevant to global powers (Turkey and Israel). Thus, while communitarianism rises to provide stronger protectionism compared to those offered by territorial nationalism, its primary purpose is to improve own stands in the global capitalist economy.

This analysis suggests that Middle Eastern communitarianism, particularly its revisionist type (Shiite), reduces class contradictions in the context of a rent-based welfare economy. However, at no point does it help formulate a class consciousness or spark an anti-imperialist transitional revolution of the Leninist type. Under communitarianism, the ability of the proletariat to establish an independent anti-imperialist movement is significantly curtailed.

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Hip Hop

▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

History

▶ Korea and Imperialism

▶ United States Imperialism, 19th Century

History, Transnational Connections, and Anti-imperial Intentions: The League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (1927–1937)

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Definition

The text summarizes the scope and scale of the League against Imperialism's (LAI, 1927–1937) transnational and global ambitions of becoming a stern petitioner against colonialism and imperialism. Established in 1927 at the "First International Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism" in Brussels (10–14 February), the LAI immediately earned an international reputation; however, the trajectory and development of the organization was one that faced several internal and external organizational and ideological turns throughout its existence. This article aims at discussing these dimensions of the LAI.

The League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI) was established at the "First International Congress Against Imperialism and Colonialism" in Brussels on 10–14 February 1927. This essay about it is based on my doctoral dissertation and book (Petersson 2013). The Congress was attended by 174 delegates from 34 countries, representing 134 organizations, associations, or political parties.

On 13 February, the German communist and member of the German Reichstag Willi Münzenberg (1889–1940), the prime mover and

organizational force behind the Brussels Congress, stated that "[O]ur congress requires no director [...] All parties and organizations, through the participation of their delegations and representatives, have unanimously agreed upon the establishment of a World League against Imperialism" (Munzenberg 1928, pp. 4–10). This corresponded with Münzenberg's vision of gathering "prominent" left-wing trade union and social-democratic leaders, bourgeois radicals, pacifists, and intellectuals, to stand side by side with "liberal radical elements in the imperialist countries" and colonial delegates.

Participating at the congress were several characters who later assumed leading positions in the decolonization process in the colonies after the Second World War: Jawaharlal Nehru as delegate of the Indian National Congress, the Indonesian Mohammad Hatta of Perhimpunan Indonesia, and Reginald Bridgeman, British socialist and devoted advocate of anti-colonial and pacifist ideals. Other well-known characters in Brussels were trade unionist Edo Fimmen from the Netherlands, Josiah T. Gumede from South Africa, and delegate of the African National Congress and the Senegalese delegate of the French-based Committee in Defence of the Negro Race Lamine Senghor. While Albert Einstein supported the foundation of the LAI and was appointed a member of its Honorary Presidium in Brussels, Mahatma K. Gandhi politely declined to get involved, informing the Hungarian communist Laszlo Dobos, Münzenberg's right-hand-man in preparing the congress, that this anti-colonial movement brings "a certain fright".

The Communist International, Anti-imperialism, and the Road to Brussels

The original plan for the congress had been set in motion by Münzenberg in 1925 during the proletarian solidarity campaign Hands Off China in Germany. The process leading to establishment of the LAI and the euphoric anti-imperialist demonstration in Brussels 1927 was complex, involving the moral consent and material support of the principal provider: the Communist International (Comintern, Third International, 1919–1943) in Moscow. The relationship between the LAI and the Comintern determined the decisions and activities of the organization throughout its existence from 1927–1937. The LAI was the result of the Comintern's aspirations to find a path to the colonies. After the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in October 1917, and once the Comintern had been established in the shape of a "world party" in Petrograd (3–7 March 1919), the colonial question represented an enigma that haunted the international communist movement. Regardless of the colonial disorder that had erupted on a global scale in connection with the peace negotiations at Versailles in 1919 (concerning Egypt, India, China, and Korea, for example), the symbolism of US president Woodrow Wilson's message of national self-determination and independence was not enough to curb the desire of anti-colonial activists residing in or visiting Europe. The prospect looked promising for the Comintern to assume authority over the colonial question, however, and despite several attempts to address it (e.g., the Lenin–Roy debate at the Second International Comintern Congress in Moscow, 19 July–7 August 1920), the "First Congress of the Peoples of the East" in Baku (September 1920), the Sino-Soviet collaboration between Sun Yet-sen's Kuomintang and Chinese communists in China, frequent obstructions or difficulties contributed to keeping the Bolsheviks and the West European communist movement out of touch with anti-colonial activists living in the colonial and semicolonial countries. Linked to this dilemma was the meticulous surveillance by national security services in monitoring communist activity in the colonies. The Comintern realized that Europe was the key for developing contacts between the communist and anti-colonial movement, especially in colonial power centers such as London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels.

In 1924, Dmitri Manuilski (1883–1959), the Ukrainian communist veteran and leading

secretary in the Comintern apparatus in Moscow, conceded that the Comintern had "to win the revolutionary movements of liberation"; however, he was not capable of introducing any method to do so. Attempting to answer Manuilski's wish, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) authorized the Indian communist Manabendra Nath Roy, by then considered the colonial expert in the Comintern, to lead the International Colonial Bureau in Paris, which aimed its activities at finding contacts with anti-colonial movements and prominent characters in France and Great Britain (Haikal 1993). The bureau turned into a futile undertaking, shaken by internal conflict and lack of resources, and when the French Sûreté deported Roy from France in January 1925, the initiative seemed to be lost.

Münzenberg is key to understanding the history of the LAI (Gross 1967; Petersson 2013). The attempts described above were failures for the Comintern to manifest the colonial question in the international communist movement, or proved its incapacity to find reliable contacts within the anti-colonial movements in Europe. Münzenberg, acting as general secretary of the communist mass organization the Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (Workers' International Relief, IAH, 1921–1935), began to address the colonial question in various public campaigns in 1925. However, in comparison to the imperialist nations in Europe (Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium), Germany had no colonies as a consequence of the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919. The colonial question thus filled a political field in a Germany which felt humiliated by that treaty. From 1925–1927, Münzenberg and the IAH conceived the anti-colonial project together with the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters. In February 1927, this culminated in the Brussels Congress.

Paving the way for the congress involved staging and coordinating a number of public campaigns (relying upon the active involvement of European intellectuals) such as: Hands Off China (1925; in support of the Shanghai textile workers' striking in protest against the violence of the British mandate forces); Against the Cruelties

in Syria Committee (1925–1926; supporting the Syrian nationalist movement against the French military's bloody response); and protests against the "draconian measures of oppression" by the Dutch mandate forces in Java and Sumatra in January 1927. Münzenberg succeeded in getting prominent intellectuals across Europe (known for their engagement in pacifist, leftist, or humanitarian questions) to sign petitions and resolutions, for example: the French author Henri Barbusse, Georges Pioch, Emilie Chauvelon, Léon Werth, Albert Fournier, Helen Crawfurd, Frances Countess of Warridge, Arthur James Cook, the British socialist George Lansbury, Arthur Holitscher, Alfons Paquet, Helene Stöcker, Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt of the League for Human Rights in Germany, the German authors Ernst Toller and Eduard Fuchs, the artist John Heartfield, the manager of the left-wing theatre Weltbühne in Berlin Erwin Piscator, and the well-known communist figurehead Clara Zetkin. However, Münzenberg realized in January 1927 that the frequent use of these names made them "no longer that effective."

The central fact to explain the birth of the LAI in 1927 was Münzenberg's idea of forming the League against Colonial Oppression (Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung [LACO]) in Berlin at the "Rathauskeller" conference on 10 February 1926, an event which gathered 43 delegates representing anti-colonial movements in Berlin and Europe. The primary purpose of the LACO was to coordinate and prepare the Brussels Congress, something Münzenberg had been anticipating since the success of the Hands Off China campaign in Germany in 1925. The establishment of the LACO also signified Münzenberg's dependence on receiving support from the Comintern to sponsor the preparations for an international congress against imperialism and colonialism. This entailed giving the Comintern authority over the political direction of the congress and, later, the LAI. This was a task laid upon Roy in Moscow. After examining the results from the LACO conference in Berlin, Roy introduced his conclusions to the ECCI secretariat in Moscow (and later sent them to Münzenberg), stating that "the object of the League [LAI]" should be "to act as a neutral

intermediary between the Communist International and nationalist movements in the colonies" (RGASPI 542/1/3, 10–11).

Transnational Anti-imperialism and the League Against Imperialism

The Brussels Congress was Münzenberg's finale, arising from which he expected a massive demonstration against imperialism and colonialism, and recruits for communism. However, Münzenberg and the Comintern had not anticipated that the Brussels Congress would turn into such a huge political success, stirring up euphoric emotions among the participants and prompting widespread international attention in the press. The "Organisation Resolution," adopted at the Brussels Congress, had stipulated the urgency with which the LAI should develop activity on a national basis; that is, establish national sections across the world. Yet, while trying to capitalize on the heady feeling of collective joy in the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, the principal organizers and governance behind the LAI – Münzenberg's IAH and the Comintern – were initially at a loss about what to do next. For the nerve center of the LAI, the International Secretariat in Berlin, and the individuals working there (Gibarti, the Indian nationalist revolutionary Virendranath Chattophadyaya [Chatto], and the Chinese communist Hansin Liau of the Chinese National Agency), this caused confusion due to poor communications with Comintern headquarters. With questions about the LAI's organizational structure and relation to the Comintern leaving finances and budget unresolved after the Brussels Congress, the LAI's International Secretariat nevertheless advanced the project to establish sections in Europe (Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium), the US and Latin America, and Japan. However, it soon became evident that it was difficult to organize sections in Asia, India, and Africa. The expansive phase of the LAI came to a halt after 1927, but aside from external factors such as the Kuomintang putsch against the communists in China in April 1927, increased antagonism from the Labour and Socialist International, and scrutiny of the LAI by European national security services in 1927, the major damage was caused by the Comintern. By responding slowly and with suspicion to the magnitude of the LAI, both politically and organizationally, the Comintern's indecisive behavior in settling the organization's future direction after the Brussels Congress proved to be a serious setback.

The geographical setting of the LAI was global in scope and intent, aiming to question and criticize the system of colonialism and imperialism. Posing as an international petitioner against these systems, it was limited by the possibilities of political spaces and physical places to enact its activism. The center for the LAI was Berlin, which housed about 5,000 colonial residents and resembled a "global village" for the Comintern and communism during the inter-war years before the Nazi Party (NSDAP) assumed power in 1933. Other anti-imperialist centers of similar magnitude were few and far between. The LAI section and its secretary Reginald Bridgeman in London were under strict surveillance by MI5 and Scotland Yard and received almost no support from the Communist Party of Great Britain; the French section experienced an even more desolate situation, isolated by the Partei Communiste Francais and circumscribed by the Sûreté. The Dutch section had a promising position with Fimmen assuming a leading position, supported by Hatta's Perhimpunan Indonesia. However, the sectarian behavior and methods of the Communist Party of Holland more or less broke up the section in 1928. The US section experienced a downward spiral despite receiving support from author Upton Sinclair, Professor William Pickens of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union. Despite using New York as the center for its operations to connect with Latin America, Earl Browder, leader in the Communist Party of the USA, stated later in 1930 that the section had turned into a political space for "fascist agents." In conclusion, the British Home Office and the Colonial Office in India

managed to thwart any anti-imperialist tendencies emerging in the country after the Brussels Congress, as highlighted especially by the infamous Meerut Conspiracy Trial (1929–33).

Anti-imperial Intentions and Transformation of the League Against Imperialism

Berlin continued to function as the operative center for the LAI. The Comintern had nonetheless expressed a wish to move the LAI's International Secretariat to Paris in 1927, the "colonial metropolis" in Europe. This question developed into a dispute between Münzenberg and the Comintern, only reaching a conclusion once the Comintern acknowledged that the mooted relocation was impossible. From Berlin, the LAI developed anti-imperialist propaganda by issuing leaflets, pamphlets, and newsletters (*Pressedienst; Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus; The Anti-Imperialist Review; Der koloniale Freiheitskampf* to mention but a few), material intended for global circulation and perusal by the anti-imperialist movement. The LAI could not, however, avoid being caught in the ideological maelstrom of the international communist movement. This related especially to the Comintern's continuous policy shifts, reflecting the ongoing upheavals in the Soviet Union's societal and political scenery. While the LAI was established in the period known as the "united front" (the second period was termed "from above"), with the Sixth International Comintern Congress in Moscow in August 1928 the "new line" was introduced: no collaborations outside of the communist movement, a political position characterized instead by the infamous epitome "class against class." The Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow (3–19 July 1929) corroborated this new policy as correct, which as Comintern secretary and Finnish communist Otto W. Kuusinen explained at one of the sessions: "The united front strategy, which we used to carry out from below, we have since then no longer pursued from below, but from above. We

have through our tactic a stable position among the broad working masses, [and] in the mass movements of the proletariat" (RGASPI 495/168/120, 1–25). In 1930, Bohumíl Smeral, Czechoslovakian communist, emissary of the Comintern, and secretary at the LAI's International Secretariat in Berlin concluded that it was "unfortunate" for the LAI since it was established in the "second period." These policy shifts in the Comintern had the effect of "epileptic zigzags" on the international communist movement, stated the Catalonian communist Andreu Nín in 1928.

Smeral's pessimism was grounded in the political results and consequences of the LAI's "Second International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism" in Frankfurt am Main (21–27 July 1929). In comparison to the Brussels Congress, the Frankfurt Congress turned into a vitriolic scene of disputes and polarization between the communist sector and noncommunist delegates. The congress was, in size, a larger event than the Brussels one, attended by 263 delegates from 31 countries and regions representing 99 organizations, and preceded by an anti-imperialist youth conference on 20 July. The sources tell of a carefully planned plot by the communists, carried out to perfection for the sole purpose of showing who was in control over both the LAI and the antiimperialist movement. The political *leitmotif* at the congress was twofold: to highlight the pending war threat against the fatherland of socialist construction (the Soviet Union); and to declare support for the Soviet Union. The effect of this scheme worked in reverse, exposing the communist nature of the LAI and leaving the organization at a loss over how to act, plunging the anti-imperialist movement into a year of confusion. After the congress, the majority of noncommunist members in the LAI Executive Committee left voluntarily (Fimmen, Nehru, Pickens, Hatta, and Baldwin). Albert Einstein (the honorary president) severed his ties after considering the LAI's attitude on the Arabic question to be anti-Semitic; whereas James Maxton, chairman of the LAI and leader of the British Independent Labour Party, was expelled by the British LAI section in September 1929. The ensuing

crisis and organizational turmoil forced the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters to reassess the very purpose of the LAI, a process that paved the way for turning it into a hub of the anti-imperialist movement in Europe. This latter undertaking was left in the hands of the LAI's international secretary Virendranath Chattophadyaya, with a focus on finding anti-colonial activists in Berlin, London, Amsterdam, Marseilles, and Hamburg to act as vital links in the global spread of anti-imperialism.

Fields of Activity: Propaganda, Recruitment, and Education

The LAI succeeded in three particular fields: the creation of public campaigns to raise awareness of global political events; the recruitment of anti-colonial activists in Europe; and the establishment in Berlin of an educational ethos at its center for anticolonial activists who lived in Europe from 1927–1933 (Petersson 2013, 2014). First, the Meerut Conspiracy Trial was the central question for Bridgeman and the British LAI section, an operation sanctioned by Kuusinen and supervised by Münzenberg. Other campaigns involved: the political disorder in Latin America and against American imperialism; protests against the Manchurian crisis in 1931; attracting support in Europe for the defendants in the Scottsboro Trial in 1931; and developing the anti-war campaign in Germany in 1932. The latter idea resulted in the Amsterdam Anti-War Congress in August that year, and later evolved into the Amsterdam-Pleyel Movement in 1933, one of the first bodies of opposition to the Nazi regime and Hitler's rule over Germany.

The non-public side of the LAI was harder to define, but it was intended to function as a hub. This objective had been part and parcel of the Comintern's original idea in establishing an organization "to act as an intermediary" to the colonies. Chatto was the mastermind behind such activity, having at his side the active assistance of the Indian nationalist and journalist A.C.-N. Nambiar and the "Indian Bureau" in Berlin.

The latter was a subsection of the International Secretariat, established with money from Nehru's Indian National Congress (INC) in February 1929. The bureau aimed, wrote Chatto, to function as "a centre for recruiting students, for finding out the best and most reliable among them, to take up the question of sending literature and also for obtaining journals, books and other literature on India, which are not directly available without payment by the League" (RGASPI 495/19/312, 38–42). The bureau connected with other individuals of the anti-colonial community dispersed across Europe, originating from China, Japan, India, West Africa, and North Africa. Chatto advocated the use of curricular activities and academic courses on imperialism and socialism to test the "candidates"; that is, by educating anti-colonial activists in the Marxist-Leninist conception of imperialism, the LAI International Secretariat examined if these candidates were useful, reliable, or suitable to undergo further education in one of the educational units of the Comintern in Moscow (e.g., the International Lenin School, or the Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka [Communist University for Eastern Workers, KUTV]).

The above constituted an essential role for the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, in which the LAI was part of a larger network, engaged in accumulating intelligence on political and social events across the world. The organizational structure of the LAI facilitated this process. Hierarchical relations determined this method, working from top to bottom, and vice versa, having the International Secretariat answer to the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow (the Eastern Secretariat), while the national sections were obliged to gather and send information to the International Secretariat which then passed on the documents to the Comintern in Moscow for evaluation. Chatto's work to perfect the LAI as a hub fitted this scheme perfectly, as it created a network of trusted individuals in various parts of the world. However, while national security services feared the extent of this network, in reality it was a limited and fragile structure, sensitive to external or internal disruptions.

League Against Imperialism: Dissolution and Heritage

Mustafa Haikal's study on the LAI in 1992 (the first study to use documents from the formerly secretive Comintern Archive in Moscow after its opening-up; see more below) concluded that the LAI began its "disintegrative process" at the LAI General Council in Brussels (9–11 December 1927) (Haikal 1992). First, the LAI General Council met only once; and second, the sessions focused on solving "organizational questions rather than discussing political issues," according to Münzenberg (Münzenberg 1928). The statement illustrates the LAI's inherent problems, characterized by the radical "turn to the left" at the Frankfurt Congress in 1929 which was symptomatic of how Stalinization transpired and manifested itself within the international communist movement and its "Solar System" (the national parties, the mass and sympathizing organizations). The LAI's charisma definitely vanished when the communists adopted a harsher attitude towards noncommunist members as seen publicly at the Frankfurt Congress for the first time.

However, other factors are equally relevant for explaining the LAI's downfall: its International Secretariat in Berlin was gradually isolated because of the political milieu in Weimar Germany at the start of the 1930s, and with the national sections barely able to function due to lack of resources and repression from security services, the anti-imperialist network disintegrated. Further, Chatto was summoned to Moscow in 1931, accused of having committed "political dishonesty," a case built on the charge that his Europäische Zentralkomitee der Indischen Nationalisten (an anti-British committee active in Europe, run by Chatto and Mahapragya Acharya in Berlin and Stockholm, also known as the "Berlin Committee") had cooperated with, and received money from, the German government during the First World War. The accusation deprived Chatto of his position as international secretary, and in September 1937 he was executed in Moscow.

Chatto's departure from Berlin in 1931 confirmed the sectarian tendencies that had emerged

in the LAI at the Frankfurt Congress in 1929. From this point on until the Nazi's assumed power in Germany on 30 January 1933, the LAI had to combat daily political struggles and humiliating police raids in Berlin, while the national sections barely existed on paper, aside from the British one, which focused its activities on the Meerut Trial.

With Hitler and the NSDAP gaining power after the General Election on 30 January 1933, this foreboded the end of German communism and socialism. On the night of 27 February, the end arrived with the Reichstag Fire in Berlin. However, the LAI's International Secretariat (which held its last meeting on 30 January) had prepared for the possibility of being forced to escape to Paris. In February, the German LAI functionary Allo Bayer dismantled the international secretariat and sent most of the bureau's material to Paris, but the greater part of these documents seems never to have made it across the German-French border.

By relocating the LAI's International Secretariat to Paris in March 1933, the ambition was to revive and reconstruct the anti-imperialist network. But for those involved, especially for Münzenberg (who escaped from Germany by car in the first days of March), it was no longer possible to resurrect the LAI. He requested the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow to remove him from the position of general secretary, and to transfer the International Secretariat to London. Osip Piatnitsky, the Russian communist and administrative key figure in the Comintern apparatus, approved Münzenberg's request in August 1933, authorizing Bridgeman to assume responsibility for the LAI International Secretariat in London. The organization Bridgeman was handed was not comparable to that of its former glories. He concluded that "it was necessary to reconstitute the work of the LAI from the beginning" (RGASPI 542/1/61, 1–43). Despite Bridgeman's socialist ethos, the LAI was still controlled by British communists (Harry Pollitt, Percy Glading, Shapurji Saklatvala) and drifted into an abyss of inactivity, managing to create a minor protest campaign on the Abyssinian crisis in 1935, and produce a

pamphlet in defense of the Chinese nationalist struggle in 1936. From 1933–1937, the LAI had London as its base; however, Bridgeman resolved to replace it with the Colonial Information Bureau (CIB) in 1937, a socialist association which publicly renounced the former communist ties of the anti-imperialist movement. Bridgeman nonetheless acknowledged the historic heritage left by the LAI:

> Since its foundation in 1927 the League against Imperialism has done consistent work in connection with the different aspects of the colonial struggle; but it is essential that we should advance from the position of a small group of people interested in the colonial struggle, seriously restricted in their activities because of their association with a 'banned organization', and activate the working class organizations and peace societies. (Saville 1984)

A similar argument was given by the president of Indonesia, Achmed Sukarno, in his introductory speech at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia (17–24 April 1955). He reminisced in nostalgic terms of how:

> Only a few decades ago it was frequently necessary to travel to other countries and even other continents before the spokesmen of our peoples could confer. I recall in this connection the Conference of the 'League Against Imperialism and Colonialism' which was held in Brussels almost thirty years ago. At that Conference, many distinguished delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence. [. . .] It was not assembled there by choice, but by necessity. (McTurnan Kahin 1956, p. 40)

The history of the LAI exposes how difficult the actors found it to create an anti-imperialist utopia, a dilemma which confirms the utopianism of communism; that is, the LAI was an expression of communism and belonged to the complex ideological and administrative system of international communism at that time. The LAI was unified by two factors: first, the ambition to create a public platform against the system of colonialism and imperialism; second, its inescapable part in a movement wanting to spread communism on a global scale. Stripped of its communist ties, the LAI resembled a business enterprise or a religious clique, unable to act due to a weak financial structure, and riven by contesting ambitions for power within its hierarchy. Its legacy was as a nostalgic

reference for the decolonization movements which emerged after the Second World War.

LAI Archives and Collections

LAI documents are located in a number of archives. The primary resource is the Comintern Archive, part of the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RGASPI) in Moscow. The LAI has a special *fond* (collection) in the archive containing approximately 100 files (resolutions, reports, correspondence, drafts, budgets and calculations, lists of members and attendance at conferences, congresses, meetings). Since the Comintern was itself an organization (with links to other mass and sympathizing organizations of the communist movement, comprising numerous governing and institutional bodies), documents on the LAI are located in both vertical and horizontal horizons in the Comintern Archive. The Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO BA-ZPA) in Lichterfelde, Berlin, contains a number of sources on the LAI, principally documents of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD), reports of police surveillance on Berlin's communist habitat, press clippings, and memoirs. The National Archive in Kew Gardens, London, illustrates how the British security service monitored the activities of the LAI in Great Britain and the British colonies. This involved an exchange of intelligence between national security services (Germany, the Netherlands, and France), as well as building up a vast quantity of personal dossiers on individuals tied to the LAI (Münzenberg, Gibarti, David Petrovsky, Chatto, to mention but a few). The Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam has an LAI collection, consisting primarily of the LAI's publications and congress material, material which gives a good insight into LAI's public side. Some documents on the LAI are located in the Stockholm City Archive, material which adds depth to the organization's political campaigns. The published documents (resolutions, congress manifesto, speeches, and greetings) from the Brussels Congress, gathered

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together as Das *Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont. Offizielles Protokoll des Kongresses gegen koloniale Unterdrückung und Imperialismus Brüssel* and issued under Gibarti's editorship, and distributed by Münzenberg's publishing company Neuer Deutscher Verlag in June 1927, still stands out as an exceptional eyewitness account that captures the conviction and euphoria among the individuals attending the congress.

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Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Communism; Land reform; Leninism; Marxism; National liberation; People's war; Socialist construction; Third international

Definition/Description

Ho Chi Minh was the leader in the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation from the French and U.S. forces and was instrumental in the country's independence and efforts to transition to socialism. As a Third Internationalist, Ho Chi Minh gained support from the Soviet Union in Vietnam's liberation struggle from the French in 1954 and then the American imperialists. While he did not live to see the Vietnam's independence from the Americans, Ho is viewed as the primary leader in the country's national liberation.

Overview

Ho Chi Minh – also known as Nguyen Sinh Cung, Nguyen Tat Thanh, and Nguyen Ai Quoc – was the central figure in the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation in the twentieth century. He was born in Nghe An province in central Vietnam on 19 May 1890. His father, who passed the Mandarin exams after three attempts but passed up the opportunity to be a royal bureaucrat, taught him the Chinese script. Forced to stop his formal schooling when he was accused of participating in a peasant strike, Ho signed on as a mess boy on a French ship and left Vietnam in 1911. As a mess boy, cook, and crew member on various vessels, he visited, among other places, New York, London, Paris, Algeria, Tunisia, and Senegal over the next few years. His first significant political act was presenting the 'Petition of the Annamese Nation' to the Versailles Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. But by his own account, the transformative event in his life took place in 1920, when he came across Lenin's 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions'. This touched off a remarkable career in the international communist movement. He was one of the founders of the French Communist Party, and he went on to serve in several countries, particularly in China, as an operative of the Third International that was set up to assist revolutionary struggles globally.

In 1930, he chaired the conference that unified the different Vietnamese communist organisations in Hong Kong. There followed a number of years where he was side-lined and assigned to Moscow, probably owing to differences with the then prevailing line of 'Third Period Line' of the International, which placed equal emphasis on opposing imperialism and carrying out the domestic class struggle. This line, Ho apparently felt, undermined the creation of the broad nationalist front that was needed to break French colonial rule.

With fascism on the rise in Europe, the Communist International abandoned the Third Period line in favour of a strategy of forming broad 'Popular Fronts'. This paved the way for Ho's return to Asia in 1939 and, in 1941, to Vietnam, where he chaired the Eighth Congress of the Indochinese Communist Party, which sought to create the broadest national united front against imperialism and fascism. From thereon his leadership of the revolution was undisputed.

In August 1945, the Communist Party launched a general insurrection to seize power, and on 2 September he read the country's Declaration of Independence from French colonial rule in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square. Ho tried to negotiate France's peaceful withdrawal from Vietnam, but when this failed, he led a nine-year struggle that culminated in the cataclysmic French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, Vietnam was temporarily partitioned into two zones that would be united after national elections 2 years later, which Ho was expected to win handily.

When the US went back on the agreement and set up the government of South Vietnam, 20 more years of warfare ensued, which ended with Washington's total defeat in 1975. Ho did not, however, live to see final victory and the country's reunification, passing away on 2 September 1969. But he never wavered in his confidence that Vietnam would be unified. This defiant mood was captured in the statement he issued as the US stepped up its bombing and prepared to send more troops to Vietnam in 1966: 'The US imperialists can send to this country 500,000 troops or more ... The war can go on for five years, ten years, twenty years or more. Hanoi, Haiphong,

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and a number of towns and enterprises can be destroyed. But the Vietnamese people are in no way frightened! Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. When the day of victory comes, we will rebuild our country and make it more beautiful and more magnificent' (quoted in Vo Nguyen Giap 2011, p. 42).

Legend

Ho Chi Minh was a legend in his time, and like all legends, he manifested a variety of personae to people who worked with him, met him, or studied him. To the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, Ho was a living 'saint of communism':

> I have met many people in the course of my political career, but none has made such a particular impression on me. Believers often talk of the Apostles. Well, through his way of living and his influence over his peers, Ho Chi Minh was exactly comparable to these 'holy apostles'. An apostle of the Revolution. I will never forget that gleam of purity and sincerity in his eyes. His sincerity was that of an incorruptible communist and his purity that of a man totally devoted to his cause, in his principles and in his actions. (quoted in Brocheux 2007, p. 144)

In contrast, for Sophie Quinn-Judge (author of the best study of Ho's activities from 1919–41), although Ho was motivated 'by sincere patriotism and a deep resentment of French imperialism':

> He was not some sort of communist holy man. He lived with women at various times, made compromises and infiltrated other nationalist parties. He was not always straightforward – in many situations he would have regarded it foolhardy to be honest about his political beliefs. The depth of his attachment to communism is difficult to gauge – the one thing one can say is that he had little interest in dogma. The path he followed was often chosen from a range of options narrowed by events outside his control. (Quinn-Judge 2002, p. 256)

Ruth Fischer, a contemporary and colleague in the Communist International, offers yet another view, more nuanced than those of Khrushchev and Quinn-Judge:

> Amid these seasoned revolutionaries and rigid intellectuals, he struck a delightful note of goodness and simplicity. He seemed to stand for mere common

decency – though he was cleverer than he let on – and it was his well-earned good name which saved him from being caught up in internal conflicts. Also, he was temperamentally far more inclined strongly toward action than toward doctrinal debates. He was always an empiricist within the movement. But none of this detracted from his colleagues' regard for him, and his prestige was considerable. (quoted in Lacouture 1968, p. 44)

The Man of Action as Writer

The man of action *par excellence*, Ho nevertheless did a lot of writing and thinking. He was, for instance, quite a skilled propagandist. His short piece on lynching, which he subtitled 'A Little Known Aspect of American Civilisation', written in 1924, has lost none of its immediacy and power over 80 years later, and a great part of the reason is his command of irony and sarcasm:

> Imagine a furious horde. Fists clenched, eyes bloodshot, mouths foaming, yells, insults, curses . . . . This horde is transported with the wild delight of a crime to be committed without risk. They are armed with sticks, torches, revolvers, ropes, knives, scissors, vitriol, daggers, in a word with all that can be used to kill or wound.
>
> Imagine in this human sea a flotsam of black flesh pushed about, beaten, trampled underfoot, torn, slashed, insulted, tossed hither and thither, bloodstained, dead . . ..
>
> In a wave of hatred and bestiality, the lynchers drag the Black to a wood or to a public place. They tie him to a tree, pour kerosene over him, cover him with inflammable material. While waiting for the fire to be kindled, they smash his teeth, one by one. Then they gouge out his eyes. Little tufts of crinkly hair are torn from his head, carrying away with them bits of skin, baring a bloody skull . . ..
>
> 'Popular justice' as they say over there, has been done. Calmed down, the crowds congratulate the organizers, then stream away slowly and cheerfully, as if after a feast, making appointments with one another for the next time.
>
> While on the ground, stinking of fat and smoke, a black head, mutilated roasted, deformed, grins horribly and seems to ask the setting sun, 'Is this civilization?' (Ho 1969 [1929], pp. 20–21)

Though Ho wrote a lot, theoretical innovation was not his forte. This was something he readily admitted. In fact, Ho is rumoured to have said not without sarcasm, that he did not need to

write since Mao Zedong had written all that needed to be written (Masina 1960, p. 18).[1]

So why read Ho? Well, not so much to encounter theoretical originality but to experience how a committed revolutionary with an agile mind sought to translate the concepts and ideas he was coming across as an international activist in Marxist-Leninist circles into the strategy, tactics, and organisation that would successfully liberate a colonised country in the first half of the twentieth century, defeating in the process two empires: France and the United States. As we read him, we witness a creative collision of Marxism with colonial realities, resulting in the innovative modification of a paradigm of class and class conflict originating in Europe as it migrated to Asia.

The Young Ho

Ho came to political maturity in the turbulent era unleashed by the First World War. For almost a decade after 1911, the year he left Vietnam, he was mostly at sea as a ship's cook or mess boy, visiting different parts of the world, including New York and London, before finally settling in Paris for a few years beginning in 1919. An activist for Vietnam's freedom from the very beginning, he first drew attention while lobbying foreign delegations for Vietnam's freedom during the Versailles Conference of 1919. Like many other representatives of colonised nations, he was drawn to the gathering by President Woodrow Wilson's promise of self-determination for subjugated nationalities.

The young Ho or Nguyen Ai Quoc, as he was known then, was not shy about expressing the primacy of the struggle against colonialism as a criterion in determining whom he would work with. At the historic Tours Congress where the French Socialist Party voted to join the triumphant Russian Bolsheviks' Third International, Ho intervened on the floor, saying, 'The Socialist Party must act effectively in favour of the oppressed natives . . .. We shall see in the Socialist Party's joining the Third International the promise that from now on it will attach to the colonial questions the importance they deserve'.

What distinguished Ho from other nationalists and colonial revolutionaries, according to the noted French war correspondent Bernard Fall, was that while he was passionately committed to Vietnamese independence, he understood that Vietnam's status as a colonial country was 'typical of the whole colonial system' (quoted in Fall 1967: vi). He felt a strong affinity with other peoples caught in the same web of systemic oppression and all his life he held the conviction that liberation had to be not only national but universal. His 'Report on the National and Colonial Questions at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International' (Text 13) was not only a comprehensive description of the system of French colonialism but an angry statement of solidarity with Arabs, Africans, and Pacific peoples who were under French rule. For Ho, the national question was intimately tied to the class question.

Ho's worldview was shaped not only by his youthful experience as the son of an impoverished teacher who chose not to serve as a bureaucrat in France's client kingdom, but also by his class status as a coloured person eking out a living for almost a decade as a messboy on ships plying international routes. There are few workplaces more international in their labour force than ocean-going vessels, and this experience of common hardship with co-workers of all colours could not have failed to be a factor in his embrace of Marxism.

The Encounter with Lenin

The key link to Ho's socialist future was Lenin. Here it is worth quoting Ho's road-to-Damascus experience that he recounted in an essay entitled 'The Path which Led to Leninism' (Text 42):

> What I wanted most to know – and what was not debated in the meetings – was: which International sided with the peoples of the colonial countries?
>
> I raised this question – the most important for me – at a meeting. Some comrades answered: it was the Third, not the Second International. One gave me to read Lenin's 'Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' printed in *L'Humanité*.

> In those Theses, there were political terms that were difficult to understand. But by reading them again and again finally I was able to grasp the essential part. What emotion, enthusiasm, enlightenment, and confidence they communicated to me! I wept for joy. Sitting by myself in my room, I would shout as if I were addressing large crowds: 'Dear martyr compatriots! This is what we need, this is our path to liberation!'

Lenin's 'Theses' was probably the most significant document produced by the Third International. It was there that the Russian revolutionary leader made three key points that were to be central in the formulation of the strategies of the Vietnamese and other Asian communist parties later on. First, the 'cornerstone of the Communist International's national and colonial policy must be the uniting of the proletarian and working masses of all nations and countries in a joint revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Only such a union can guarantee the victory over capitalism without which it is impossible to suppress national inequality and oppression' (Lenin 1974, p. 279).

Second was the 'necessity of supporting the peasant movement in backward countries against the landowners, against the possession of large estates, against all customs and remnants of feudalism, and of striving to give the peasant movement a revolutionary nature, bringing about a closer union between the West European Communist proletariat and the revolutionary movement of the peasants in the east, the colonies, and in the backward countries in general . . .' (ibid.).

Third, the immediate task with respect to the colonies and oppressed countries was to support the bourgeois democratic national movements in the colonies and backward countries – though this should be 'only on the condition that the elements of the future proletarian parties. should be grouped and educated in the knowledge of their special tasks – those of a struggle against the bourgeois democratic movement within their nation' (1974, p. 282). The socialist revolution would come later.

These theses, which might seem non-controversial today, were of momentous significance when they were first articulated.

The first point addressed head-on the neglect of the colonial question which was, in fact, prevalent among European progressives in the inter-war period. During the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in 1925, a frustrated Ho carried Lenin's argument one step further, affirming that, without decisively dealing with the colonial question, socialists could not expect successful revolution in the West.

> You must excuse my frankness, but I cannot help but observe that the speeches by comrades from the mother countries give me the impression that they wish to kill a snake by stepping on its tail. You all know today the poison and life energy of the capitalist snake is concentrated more in the colonies than in the mother countries. ... Yet in our discussion of the revolution, you neglect to talk about the colonies. ... Why do you neglect the colonies, while capitalism uses them to support itself, defend itself, and fight you? (Nguyen Ai Quoc 1974, p. 309)

The second point, on the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in the colonies, was also something that tended to be slighted. This was not simply because of the socialists' preoccupation with the leading role of the European working class in the world revolution – which was still expected to be ignited in the developed capitalist countries. It was also because of classical Marxism's disdain for the peasantry, as expressed in Marx's comment about the 'idiocy of rural life' and his comparing peasants to a 'sack of potatoes' in terms of their capacity for political organisation.

The third proposition was what most attracted Ho. It was also the idea that would elicit the most controversy in the history of the Communist International. This thesis eventually came to be known as the 'two-stage' theory of revolution. It was, from one perspective, simply an effort to formalise the Russian revolutionary experience in 1917 – which began with the February democratic revolution and was followed by the October socialist revolution – to serve as a strategy for progressives in the 'backward societies', with one key modification being that the first stage would not only be a struggle for democratic rights but for national independence.

Theoretical and Political Tensions

Lenin's two-stage formulation became the foundation of Ho's strategy for liberating Vietnam. Looking back at the development of the strategy almost 30 years after the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, Ho recounted in his 1959 'Report on the Draft Amended Constitution' (Text 40):

> In Vietnam following World War I, the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie were unable to lead the movement for national liberation to success. The Vietnamese working class, in the light of the October Revolution, charted the course of the Vietnamese revolution. In 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party, the political party of the working class, was founded and showed that the Vietnamese revolution should go through two stages: the national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.

The reality was, however, more complex. The two-stage theory, in fact, bedevilled the Third International and Communists in the East with several tactical controversies. One was how the revolutionary party would relate to its non-Communists allies, especially the 'national bourgeoisie' and pro-independence elements of the landlord class, during the struggle for independence. Another was what would be the main demands of the 'national democratic' stage, especially in regards to the land issue.

These were theoretical questions with great practical import, the resolution to which, Ho realised, would have a great bearing on the outcome of the revolution in the colonies. In his 'Reports on Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China' to the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Ho – writing then under the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc – asserted that in Vietnam, 'the class struggle does not occur in the same manner as in the West (cited in Song Thanh 2012, p. 103). 'During the period when the Nghe-An Soviets were being organized, Ho's attitude was somewhat ambiguous. While he most certainly did not approve of the action taken he took no steps to stop it. During a Thought Reform course in 1953, it was disclosed that Ho had voted against the solution calling for a peasant rising,

but he was in a minority of one and submitted to the will of the majority. Whatever the truth there is no doubt that this was the first occasion on which Ho lost control of the movement under his charge' (McAlister 1969, p. 94). 'Nationalism', he asserted, 'was the great motivating force' (ibid.). In another piece based on his lectures to Vietnamese cadres in Guangzhou, he wrote, 'The workers and peasants are the masters of the revolution . . . are its root . . . while the students, the small traders and landowners, who are also heavily oppressed by the capitalists, even though not as heavily as the workers and peasants, are the revolutionary friends of the latter' (cited in Song Thanh, 2012, p. 109). According to later interpreters such as Song Thanh, these comments indicated that Ho had early on placed the emphasis on a united front of classes against imperialism in the 'bourgeois democratic revolution', in contrast to the position that the domestic class struggle must be given equal priority: 'Starting from the reality of a colonial country, he does not consider that these tasks must be necessarily carried out at the same time, in the same manner, but gives priority to the anti-imperialist task, for national liberation whereas the anti-feudal task, to distribute land to the tillers, will be realized gradually' (2012, p. 113).

It was the Chinese cockpit that provided the grist for the mill for the different sides in the debate on strategy and tactics for the colonial and semi-colonial world. In China, application of the two-stage approach under the direction of the Comintern translated into the Chinese Communist Party's support for the Nationalists or Kuomintang. This was not just a case of forming an alliance with the Kuomintang, but of helping to build the latter organisationally and militarily. The policy ended in a debacle in 1927, when Chiang Kai- Shek turned on the Communists and massacred large numbers of them.

Ho was working for the Comintern in Canton from 1924–27, so he was familiar with the fatal dynamics of the Nationalist- Communist 'United Front'. By the time he was sent by the Comintern to Hong Kong to unify the Vietnamese Communist movement in 1930, the Third International had entered its notorious 'Third Period', where

Communists directed the 'main blow' against the Social Democrats – labelled 'Social Fascists' – in the capitalist countries and abandoned united fronts with bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalists in favour of 'worker-peasant-soldier' governments in the colonies.

Ho was able to impose a fragile unity among the competing Vietnamese communist factions and establish the Indochinese Communist Party. But unification was based on an interpretation of the two-stage theory according to the radical Third Period line, which was in the ascendant during that period. Ho's 'Appeal Made on the Occasion of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party' (Text 15), dated February 18, 1930, also known as the 'Abridged Platform', called on the Vietnamese 'workers, peasants, soldiers, youth, school students' to: 'overthrow French imperialism and Vietnamese feudalism and reactionary bourgeoisie': 'make Indochina completely independent'; 'establish a worker-peasant-soldier government'; 'confiscate the banks and other enterprises belonging to the imperialists and put them under the control of the worker-peasant-soldier government'; and 'confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants'.

Was this Ho speaking or was it the Comintern? Or had Ho temporarily been won over to the Third Period line? It seems that Ho was articulating the Comintern line while having serious reservations. Giap, for instance, pointed out that the 'Abridged Platform did not advocate the motto "land reforms and land to the tiller," which is the key task of the anti-feudal revolution' (Vo Nguyen Giap 2011, p. 7). Moreover, this passage advocating broad union appeared:

> The Party must have frequent contact with the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, the middle-peasants, the youths, members of the Tan Viet Party, etc. As for the rich farmers, small and middle-sized landowners and Vietnamese bourgeoisie who have not yet expressed anti-revolutionary inclinations, we should try to neutralize and win them over, and take advantage of their position. (119)

These moderating elements, however, did not go unnoticed, and in October 1930, on orders from the Communist International, which passed a resolution nullifying the February programme of action authored by Ho and returning strictly to the simultaneous anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and anti-capitalist line of the International. For Ho, this repudiation began almost 8 years of marginalisation from the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party, most of which were spent in Moscow.

Nonetheless, Ho tried his best to prevent the Third Period line from completely wrecking the broad anti-imperialist front that he still saw as necessary (119–120). He opposed the peasant uprisings that the newly unified party instigated in the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in north-central Vietnam in 1931, and which saw the establishment of village soviets. Ho probably had a premonition that the Third Period line would lead to a disastrous policy in terms of political alliances. And it did. As John McAlister, Jr. (1969, p. 99) notes:

> Perhaps the most fundamental mistake was that the Communist terrorism was almost exclusively directed at lower-echelon Vietnamese officials who were exercising authority for the French administration, rather than at the French themselves. ... The Communists attributed this misstep to the shortcomings of the Theses on the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution in Vietnam, adopted by the Indochinese Communist Party in October 1930. ... As one Vietnamese Communist critic has seen it, this program 'committed the error of advocating the overthrow of the national bourgeoisie at the same time as the French colonialists and indigenous feudalists. ... [For] this bourgeoisie had interests which were in conflict with the imperialists . . . [and] they ought to have been drawn into the ranks of the bourgeois democratic republic and not systematically separated.'

Influenced by Lenin's careful – some would say opportunistic – policies on political alliances, Ho had a strong bias against excluding anyone solely on the basis of class origins, and this would not be the last time he would vote against and criticise an exclusionist policy. Asked who were the Communists' allies and who were their enemies, Ho would probably have said, along with Lenin: That depends on conditions, time, and place.

Creating a Broad Front

The Comintern shifted to 'Popular Front' politics in 1935 following Hitler's coming to power in Germany. With its championing of broad anti-fascist alliances, the new approach appealed more to Ho's instincts about the kind of tactics that would advance the independence struggle. His period of marginalisation ended and he returned to Asia and Vietnam, where he oversaw the articulation of the new party strategy for Vietnam. The key points of the new approach, contained in a report titled 'The Party's Line in the Period of the Democratic Front (1936–1939)' (Text 16), were:

1. For the time being the Party should not put forward too exacting demands (national independence, parliament, etc.). To do so is to play into the Japanese fascists' hands.

   It should only claim democratic rights, freedom of organization, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and freedom of speech, general amnesty for all political detainees, and freedom for the Party to engage in legal activity.
2. To reach this goal, the Party must strive to organize a broad Democratic National Front. This Front should embrace not only Indochinese but also progressive French people residing in Indochina, not only the toiling people but also the national bourgeoisie.
3. The Party must assume a tactful, flexible attitude towards the national bourgeoisie, strive to draw them into the Front and keep them there, urge them into action if possible, isolate them politically if necessary. At any rate, we should not leave them outside the Front, lest they fall into the hands of the reaction and strengthen it.

By the time the Second World War broke out, the conditions were in place for the Communists to lead Vietnam's independence struggle. Not only had their tough organising enabled them to survive fierce French repression in the aftermath of the Nghe An and Ha Tinh soviets, but their only competition – the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD) – had been destroyed by the French.

As in China, they now had an extraordinarily supple tactic – the Democratic National Front – to unite the nation against both the Japanese and the French colonial government that had submitted to Japanese control. Yet even as he invoked the patriotic feelings of all Vietnamese, Ho made it a point in his 'Letter from Abroad' (Text 17), to link the struggle for independence with the class revolution in the country and with the world revolution:

> The hour has struck! Raise aloft the banner of insurrection and lead the people throughout the country to overthrow the Japanese and the French! The sacred call of the Fatherland is resounding in our ears; the ardent blood of our heroic predecessors is seething in our hearts! The fighting spirit of the people is mounting before our eyes! Let us unite and unify our action to overthrow the Japanese and the French.
>   The Vietnamese revolution will certainly triumph!
>   The world revolution will certainly triumph!

He was not a communist for nothing.

The Leninist in Action

Jean Lacouture, one of Ho's biographers, points to the strong influence on Ho of two Leninist ideas: the notion of the 'favourable moment' and the concept of the 'main adversary' (Lacouture 1968). Nowhere was his mastery of these two principles more in evidence than when he declared Vietnam's independence in 1945. The 'favourable moment' is akin to Louis Althusser's concept of an 'over determined contradiction', a particular confluence of forces and circumstances that, if taken advantage of, rewards bold political action. Analysing the Russian Revolution as an 'over-determined contradiction', Althusser writes: 'Russia was overdue with its bourgeois revolution on the eve of its proletarian revolution; pregnant with two revolutions, it could not withhold the second even by delaying the first. This exceptional situation was "insoluble" (for the ruling classes) and Lenin was correct to see in it the objective conditions of a Russian revolution, and to forge its subjective conditions, the means of a decisive assault on this weak link in the

imperialist chain, in a Communist Party that was a chain without weak links' (Althusser 1969, pp. 87–128). Such was Lenin's decision to seize power in October 1917. And such was Ho's decision to launch a general insurrection and declare independence in August and September 1945, taking advantage of a conjuncture where the French had been disarmed by the Japanese, the Japanese themselves had just capitulated to the Allies, and the French had as yet no means of reclaiming the colony (Lacouture 1968, pp. 100–101). It was, like Russia in 1917, a situation virtually inviting the Communists to step in. August and September 1945 saw an insurrectionary takeover, but a relatively bloodless one, with the Communists utilising to the maximum the legitimacy that they had gained from their leading role in the five-year anti-fascist struggle against the French colonial regime and its Japanese supervisors.

The crafting of the 'Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam' (Text 20) showed Ho's command of the united front tactic – the main purpose of which was to isolate the 'main adversary' – not only at the national but at the global level. The key problem in 1945 was to prevent the Western imperial powers that had vanquished the Japanese from ganging up on the Vietnamese. Ho was very well aware that the US was an imperial power. But he was also conscious that Americans themselves had an anti-colonial tradition, and that this was a fly in the ointment in US post-war policy in Asia – one that made Washington very uncomfortable at being seen as supporting the restoration of French rule in Indochina, though the Free French Government in exile had been a wartime ally of the US.

The good relations established between the Communists and operatives of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the anti-Japanese campaign provided a base for Ho's strategy. His invocation of the first lines of the US Declaration of Independence – 'All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness' – at the very beginning of Vietnam's declaration of independence was a master stroke designed to deepen the rift between the mightiest global power and a colonial power that had been severely weakened by the war.

The years from 1946–54 saw Ho at his peak as a leader. He negotiated an agreement with the French high commissioner Jean Sainteny that recognized Vietnam as a 'Free State at the heart of the French Union'. It was a controversial deal, and to gain popular acceptance, Ho shared the complex rationale of his moves with a hostile audience at the municipal theatre in Hanoi:

> We have actually been independent since August 1945 but so far no power has recognized our independence. The agreement with France opens the way to international recognition. It will lead us to an increasingly more solid international position, which is a great political achievement. There will only be fifteen thousand French troops and they will stay for five years. ... It is a show of political intelligence to negotiate rather than to fight. Why should we sacrifice fifty or one hundred thousand men when we can attain independence through negotiation, maybe within five years? . ... I, Ho Chi Minh, have always led you on the path to freedom. You know that I would rather die than sell out my country. I swear to you that I did not sell you out. (quoted in Brocheux 2007, p. 116)

The speech turned the crowd around. It also, incidentally, revealed what Lacouture describes as Ho's penchant for debate as a method for resolving issues: '[O]ne thing about Ho [that] is beyond dispute is his passionate desire to persuade people, his thoroughly democratic urge to win acceptance for measures by argument rather than compulsion (Lacouture 1968, p. 219).

Future events would show that Ho's linking of the deal with Sainteny was a wise tactic, one which put the French on the defensive and cast a pall of illegitimacy over their breaking the deal and their subsequent war of reconquest. It was also an audacious military move that gave the Vietnamese, according to Ho in his 'Political Report at the Second National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party (Text 30), 'nearly one year of temporary peace [that gave] us time to build up our basic forces'.

Ho and the People's War

War is the pursuit of politics by other means. With no-one was this Clausewitzean dictum truer than with Ho, who oscillated masterfully between negotiations and war, always keeping his eye on the ball, which was an independent Vietnam. By December 1946, with the collapse of negotiations with the French, it was back to war.

While General Vo Nguyen Giap is often credited as a military genius owing to the strategic and tactical brilliance with which he conducted the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Ho's writings also reveal a comprehensive grasp of the principles of people's war. In his 'Appeal Issued after Six Months of Resistance' (Text 23), issued on 14 June 1947, Ho presciently outlined the course of the next 7 years:

> The enemy wants to win a quick victory. If the war drags on, he will suffer increasing losses and will be defeated.
>
> That is why we use the strategy of a protracted war of resistance in order to develop our forces and gather more experience. We use guerrilla tactics to wear down the enemy forces until a general offensive wipes them out.
>
> The enemy is like fire and we like water. Water will certainly get the better of fire.
>
> Moreover, in the long war of resistance, each citizen is a combatant, each village a fortress. The twenty million Vietnamese are bound to cut to pieces the few scores of thousands of reactionary colonialists.

Discussions of warfare comprise much of Ho's writings after 1947. In them he continually reiterates the essentials of what he called the 'protracted war of resistance':

- The party must guide military strategy;
- Cling to the people because they are the source of strength of the army;
- The aim of guerrilla warfare is 'not to wage large-scale battles but to nibble at the enemy, harass him in such a way that he neither eat nor sleep in peace, to give him no respite, to wear him out physically and mentally, and finally to annihilate him' ('Instructions Given at a Conference on Guerrilla Warfare', Text 33)

- Guerrilla war is a necessary phase, but inevitably as the balance of forces shifts towards the people's side, the war passes from the defensive to the phase of active contention to the 'general counteroffensive'. While it is possible to determine the major stages on the basis of the general situations ... it is not possible to separate one stage completely from the other, like slicing a cake. The length of each stage depends on the situation at home and in the world, and on the changes in the enemy's forces and in ours. ('Political Report at the Second National Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party', Text 30)

The similarity of these prescriptions to Mao's theory of people's war is striking, but it is questionable whether Ho, or Giap for that matter, simply lifted them from Mao. The principles appear to have emerged largely from a process of experimentation and learning from mistakes in the monumental process of trial and error that was the Vietnamese Revolution.

This is not to say that some cross-fertilisation between the two roughly simultaneous people's wars did not take place, given Ho and other Vietnamese Communists' close contacts with the Chinese and, in Ho's case, direct participation in the Chinese Revolution at certain points in his revolutionary career.

The Crucible of Land Reform

Even as the military struggle went on, the problems encountered in managing the different classes involved in a national independence struggle were not easily resolved, and, in a people's war, resolution of these issues had an impact on the military equation. Here, Ho's writings evince a tension between satisfying the demands of the peasantry, who constituted 90% of the population, and neutralising the upper classes, particularly the landed class.

During the Japanese occupation and the first years against the French recolonisation, Ho and the party's policy was to postpone land reform and promote rent reduction, along with confiscation of

land belonging to the French and pro-French Vietnamese (Text 30).

Rent reduction meant forcing landlords and rich peasants to reduce their rent to 20% from 50%, the operative principle being 'limiting the feudal landlords' exploitation of the peasants while at the same time proceeding with changes in the property system so long as this measure does not impede the United National anti-Colonialist Front' (government directive cited in Brocheux 2007, p. 153).

With the final victory over the French at hand in 1953, the party decided to finally implement radical land redistribution. Brocheux suggests that it was a challenge from Stalin and the newly triumphant Chinese that prompted Ho to push land reform (145). This is unlikely given the centrality that he and his comrades had placed on agrarian reform as the 'main content' of the bourgeois democratic stage of the revolution. What is true though is that Ho felt that reform should be carefully planned and implemented owing to the complexity of the rural social structure. Indeed, early in his career as a Communist, he underscored the differences between the European countryside and Asian rural society:

> [The] social conditions of small landlords with ten to one hundred *mau* are complex and unpredictable. With that amount of land, a peasant could end up being exploited, an exploiter, or neutral. ... [T]he class struggle does not take shape the way it does in the West. The workers lack consciousness, they are resigned and disorganized. ... In this way, if the peasants have next to nothing, the landlord does not have a great fortune either ... The one is resigned to his fate, the other moderate in his appetite. So the clash between their interests is softened. That is undeniable. (158–60)

While he was not directly involved in implementing it, it was Ho who laid out the strategic direction of the land reform programme in 1953 ('Report to the Third Session of the National Assembly', Text 34):

> [T]he key problem remains unsolved: the peasant masses have no land or lack land. This affects the forces of the resistance and the production work of the peasants.
>   Only by carrying out land reform, giving land to the tillers, liberating the productive forces in the

countryside from the yoke of the feudal landlord class can we do away with the poverty and backwardness and strongly mobilize the huge forces of the peasants in order to develop production and push the war of resistance forward to complete victory.

But even as he laid out the strategy of radical land reform, Ho cautioned that the wiping out of feudalism must proceed 'step by step and with discrimination'. Specifically, this meant that 'in the course of land reform, we must apply different kinds of treatment to the landlords according to their individual political attitudes. This means that depending on individual cases we shall order confiscation or requisition with or without compensation, but not wholesale confiscation or wholesale requisition without compensation'.

These cautionary notes were, however, forgotten in the whirlwind that was visited on the countryside where land reform became, in many places, an organized *jacquerie*. Many abuses were committed and many people were killed – according to Bui Tin, more than 10,000 people were eliminated, 'most of them Party members or patriots who had supported the Revolution but were reasonably well off (Ruane 2000, p. 67). Ho then personally intervened to 'rectify' the campaign, which involved dismissing Truong Chinh – who was close to the Chinese, who had closely involved themselves in the process – from his post as secretary general. Ho led the process of party self-criticism, but left it to General Giap, a trusted favourite, to voice his opinions and issue the party's public criticism of itself at the 10th Congress of the Party Central Committee:

(a) While carrying out their anti-feudal task, our cadres have under-estimated or, worse still, have denied all antiimperialist achievements, and have separated the Land Reform and the Revolution. Worst of all, in some areas they have made the two mutually exclusive.

(b) We have failed to realize the necessity of uniting with the middle-level peasants, and we should have concluded some form of alliance with the rich peasants, whom we have treated in the same manner as landlords.

(c) We have attacked the land owning families indiscriminately, according no consideration to those who have served the Revolution and to those families with sons in the army. We showed no indulgence towards landlords who participated in the resistance, treating their children in the same way as we treated the children of other landlords.

(d) We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror which became far too widespread.

(e) Whilst carrying out our Land Reform programme we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas.

(f) In regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners.

(g) When reorganizing the Party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to the political qualifications alone. Instead of reorganizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the Party, executions, dissolution of Party branches and cells. Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during Party reorganizations. (quoted in O'Neil 1969, pp. 166–167)

Though he did not directly guide the land reform and thus could not be held directly accountable for the abuses that were committed, Ho was reproached for not intervening even when he was warned of grave cases of abuse, and for limiting himself to expressing concern (Bui Tin 1999, p. 28). Yet there is no doubt that the Chinese-style land reform contradicted Ho's previous emphasis on uniting rather than dividing, negotiation ahead of battle, education instead of bureaucratic or organizational measures, and rectifying people instead of turning them into pariahs.

The Marxist as Humanist

Like Mao, Ho had a moralistic streak. But, in his exhortatory essays, Ho adopted a very un-Maoist approach to revolutionary morality, refraining from characterising people he disagreed with in the party as class enemies or 'capitalist roaders', always urging unity above momentary differences, always holding up the possibility of redemption and urging cadres to assist people who had fallen by the wayside. For instance, in 'To Practice Thrift and Oppose Embezzlement, Waste and Bureaucracy' (Text 32), Ho says:

> There are people who are enthusiastic and faithful in struggle; they fear neither dangers, hardships, nor the enemy, thus they have served the revolution well; but as soon as they hold some authority, they grow arrogant and luxurious, indulge in embezzlement, waste, and unconscious bureaucracy, thus becoming guilty in the eyes of the revolution. We must save them, help them recover their revolutionary virtues. Others while pretending to serve the Fatherland and the people, indulge in embezzlement and waste and harm the Fatherland and the people. We must educate them, and lead them to the revolutionary path.

One of the most impressive things about Ho was his projection of a solid ethical core, the quality that, as noted earlier, led Khrushchev to characterise him as a 'communist saint' and Ruth Fischer, a colleague in the Third International, to say he stood out 'amid seasoned revolutionaries and rigid intellectuals' because he struck a 'delightful note of goodness and simplicity'. Ho's ethics derived from multiple sources, Marxism being only one, though the most important, of them. Confucianism was one important source. As Giap noted, 'The amount of Chinese culture which he absorbed in his childhood was so substantial and so deeply imprinted in his mind that he could compose poems in Chinese characters, as was the case of his famous poetry. Therefore, it's not surprising that in his speeches and writings, he did use Chinese concepts and quoted Confucian dictums to express more clearly his thoughts' (Vo Nguyen Giap 2011, p. 53).

> When it came to ethics, there was a refreshing lack of dogmatism that marked his politics. One cannot,

for instance, imagine the same expression of humanism coming from Mao:

> The good side of Confucianism is selfimprovement in personal ethics. The good point of Catholicism is benevolence. The good point of Marxism its dialectical method. The good point of Sun Yat Sen doctrine is that it fits in with the conditions of Vietnam. Confucius, Christ, Marx, Sun Yat Sen shared common points, isn't that so? They are all in pursuit of happiness for mankind and welfare for the society. If they are still alive today and sit together, I believe they would live together in perfect harmony as close friends. I'm trying to be their humble student. (52)

There was an ascetic quality to Ho. This was manifested not only in his disciplined lifestyle, which included hard work and regular morning exercises, but most obviously in his celibacy. Ho, says Sophie Quinn-Judge, had relations with women, but no long-term ones. When asked about it, his explanation was very much like the Vatican's rationale for celibacy among priests, with the difference that he did not impose it on others:

> When I was young and acted as an activist overseas, I was not too ugly to be loved by girls. Wherever I went, there was at least two or three girls attracted to me. Some even expressed wishes to become my companion . . .. However . . . to realize my dream, I always had to work in secret. I thought that wedlock would restrict my work because if I had a wife and children, I could hardly hide myself. During the time I was staying in France, lots of French Communists advised me to get married. The same thing happened when I came back to China and met Zhou En-lai, Zhou De, and so on. I explained my reasons to them, and they understood. (quoted in Khanh Hong 2010, p. 91)

A sketch of Ho's personality would be incomplete without calling attention to a chivalrous quality that not only embraced women and friends but extended to enemies. Among the latter was General Raoul Salan, who accompanied Ho on his visit to France in 1946 in his unsuccessful bid to secure French recognition of Vietnamese independence. With war having resumed between the French and the Vietnamese, Ho learned that Salan had been appointed commander-in-chief of the French forces in Indochina and wrote him a letter which contained the following passage: 'We were good friends. Now circumstances beyond our control have transformed us into adversaries and I think that regrettable. On my part, the sacred duty of a patriotic citizen obliges me to struggle for my homeland and my fellow-countrymen. On your part, your responsibility as a combatant also obliges you to do what your heart does not wish to . . .. Because we are obliged to fight each other, I hope you will prove to be a chivalrous combatant and gentlemanly adversary, waiting [for] the moment when we again become friends' (quoted in Song Thanh 2012, pp. 528–529).

This affirmation of friendship that transcended national and ideological barriers even as Ho planned to fight to the death was rare, prompting a Vietnamese commentator to call the Ho–Salan relationship 'a struggle between genuine knights' (529).

From Fond Uncle to Stern Father

What is interesting is that Ho's humanism and courtly behaviour coexisted with a steely determination to get what he wanted. There were times when he resorted to extreme measures, especially when he felt dialogue had become impossible with the Communists' competitors for the loyalties of the Vietnamese. As Lacouture (1968, p. 210) notes:

> The fond uncle is quite capable of playing the heavy father when he wishes. In the North his firm hand was felt by the anticommunist nationalists (VNQDD). . . . and the Catholics between September 1945 and July 1946. And in the South he dealt sternly with the Trotskyites and the Hoa Hao recalcitrant.

The standard story that is brought up to illustrate Ho's tough side is that he caused the arrest of the venerable Vietnamese nationalist Phan Boi Chau in order to rid himself of an attractive rival among Vietnamese political exiles in Canton in 1925. It must be pointed out, though, that some scholars, like Sophie Quinn-Judge (2002, pp. 74–76), dispute Ho's role in Phan's arrest.

With the Trotskyites, he was vituperative in his language and was eager to show his loyalty to Stalin: 'With regard to the Trotskyites there can

be no compromise, no concession. We must do everything possible to unmask them as agents of fascism and annihilate them politically' (Text 16). That such a strong statement could lead not just to political but to physical elimination by Viet Minh partisans is not surprising. It is reported that the Viet Minh eliminated the Trotskyists by tying several of them together and throwing them into a river to drown. It is also said that in 1946, the Viet Minh 'apprehended Nguyen Ta Thu Than, the most gifted Trotskyite leader and writer, at the train station in Quang Ngai, then took him to a sandy beach and put a bullet through his head' (Moyar 2006, p. 18). Ho may not have been personally responsible for these deeds, but he cannot escape accountability for a harsh political line that encouraged such abuses.

From National Democracy to Socialism

During his lifetime, Ho was dogged by the question of whether he was principally a nationalist or a communist. For his rivals in the nationalist movements in Vietnam, as well as for his enemies in Paris and Washington, he was the agent of world revolution, the man of the Communist International *par excellence*. For the Trotskyists, and for some of his rivals in the Indochinese Communist Party, he was either a petty bourgeois nationalist or was guilty of 'nationalist deviation'. Stalin is said to have suspected him of unhealthy nationalist tendencies and dared him to enact the radical land reform to smoke him out (Brocheux 2007, p. 145).

The situation after the defeat of the French in 1954, however, showed Ho to be a faithful Leninist. Faithful, that is, to Lenin's 'Theses on the National and Colonial Question', which contained the theory of a bourgeois democratic revolution followed by a socialist revolution that had had such a big impact on Ho in the early 1920s. With Vietnam divided into the sovereign North and the US-controlled South, Ho adapted the theory to the particular circumstances of the country:

> [T]wo tasks confront the Vietnamese revolution at present: first, the construction of socialism in the North, and second, the completion of the national democratic revolution in the South. These tasks have a common aim: to strengthen peace and pave the way to reunification on the basis of independence and democracy. (Text 40)

The demands of socialist revolution and national independence were, in Leninist fashion, creatively reformulated to meet the particular historical conjuncture, but there was no doubt that socialism in an independent nation was the strategic aim. Ho had been dead nearly 6 years by the time the country was rid of the Americans and reunified in March 1975. But, faithful to his Leninist vision, his followers immediately moved to declare the national bourgeois democratic revolution completed in the South and christened the whole country the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. For Ho, genuine nationalism meant working to bring about socialism to a nation state that would be part of an international order of independent socialist nation states.

A Marxist Pragmatist

Ho left no significant theoretical innovations, much less an integrated body of theory. This has of course not prevented some in the Vietnamese Communist Party from claiming that he left behind 'Ho Chi Minh Thought', which was described as a new development in Marxist-Leninist theory. Not surprisingly, this elicited a certain amount of scepticism since Vietnamese knew that Ho did not leave behind any body of theoretical writing (Quinn-Judge 2002, p. 256).

Where Ho did excel was in his ability to adapt abstract Leninist ideas to Vietnamese realities, developing a strategy and tactics of national revolution based on these, and creating an organisation, the Communist Party, to put this into effect. Perhaps his analytical approach was best articulated in the speech he gave inaugurating the first theoretical course of the Nguyen Ai Quoc School on 7 September 1957:

> Reality is problems to be solved and contradictions lying within things. We are revolutionary cadres,

our reality is problems to be solved that the revolution puts to us. Real life is immense. It covers the experience drawn from the work and thought of an individual, the Party's policies and line, its historical experiences and issues at home and in the world. In the course of our study these are realities to be kept in touch with.

He continued:

Thanks to its ability in combining Marxism-Leninism with the actual situation of our country, our Party has scored many successes in its work. However, the combination of Marxist-Leninist truth with the practice of the Vietnamese revolution was not complete and brought about many mistakes namely those committed in the land reform, readjustment of organization and economic construction. At present, in building socialism, although we have the rich experiences of brother countries, we cannot apply them mechanically because our country has its own peculiarities. Disregard for the peculiarities of one's nation while learning from the experiences of the brother countries is a serious mistake, is dogmatism. But underemphasis on the role of national peculiarities and negation of the universal value of the great, basic experiences of the brother countries will lead to grave revisionist mistakes. (quoted in Woddis, pp. 111–112)

Ideas do matter in history. And it was Ho's ability to translate revolutionary ideas into a pragmatic but inspiring programme, with a tough organisation to carry it out successfully, that made him exceptional.

Ho and Socialist Construction

How useful Ho's ideas, especially those that have to do with 'constructing socialism', are today – as Vietnam seeks to break out of underdevelopment, and classical socialism has been discredited – is an interesting question.

During both the period of revolution and socialist construction in North Vietnam, Ho was always extremely sensitive to the state of agrarian class relations. One of the reasons for this was his vision of making agriculture the key sector of the economy, at least in the early stages of national development. 'If we want to develop industry and the economy generally speaking, we must take agriculture as the foundation. If we don't develop agriculture, we will have no basis for developing industry because agriculture supplies raw materials and food to industry and uses commodities made by industry' (quoted in Song Thanh 2012, p. 359). At another time, arguing against a colleague who advocated focusing resources on heavy industry to achieve rapid industrialisation, he is reported to have said, 'It is a subjective decision if we want to industrialize in great haste. Therefore, in economic planning, we must promote agriculture first, then come handicrafts and light industry, and only afterwards comes heavy industry' (358).

Ho displayed the same sensitivity to class relations in the city, and for reasons that had to do not only with keeping the middle classes and entrepreneurs on the side of the revolution but national reconstruction. Had Ho been alive in the late 1970s, one can certainly see him having put a stop to the expropriation of shops and small factories belonging to the Sino-Vietnamese that triggered the flight of the 'boat people'. One can imagine him calling a retreat after the programme of accelerated socialist construction created tremendous dislocations in both the countryside and the cities in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But would he have gone so far as to support market reforms, the revival of the private sector, and the courting of foreign investors that have marked Vietnam's political economy in the last two decades? Given the strong streaks of pragmatism and humanism that he mixed with Marxism, one suspects that he would have, though he would probably not have endorsed one commentator's assertion that '[o]wing to the law of development, in society, there will be a part of the population that gets richer first, and other parts after, but the people's standard of living is higher and raised step by step' (354).

Vietnam has, in broad strokes, followed Deng's path of stimulating rapid capitalist development through integration into the global economy to achieve the prosperity that Ho felt was an essential pillar of socialism. It has achieved some success, becoming one of the world's top exporters of rice and coffee. Unfortunately, its post-1978 model of development has also reproduced the Chinese pattern of sharply rising income inequality. Though the country's Gini coefficient (the best measure of inequality) is

low compared to other South-East Asian countries, it is rising. In 2013, the number of extremely wealthy people in Vietnam grew by 14.7%, the second fastest rate in South East Asia after Thailand, leading the Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong to warn: 'The rich–poor divide ... shows signs of getting worse'. Trong added that the gap existed even inside the Party. 'Some Party members have gotten richer so quickly, leading a lavish life that is miles away from that of the workers' (Thanh Nien News 2013).

How would Ho have reacted to this situation were he alive? It is hard to imagine such a development not worrying him, or his not taking steps to reverse it. But much like the country's current leaders, he would have been hard put to contain a process where the very mechanism chosen as the route to prosperity – rapid capitalist development – spawns the conditions which create the sharp inequalities pushing the country farther and farther away from its avowed goal of achieving socialism.

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Hobson's Research on Imperialism and Its Legacy

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Definition

John Atkinson Hobson (1858–1940), who signed his name as J.A. Hobson, can be considered a major theorist of imperialism. His book *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) is arguably *the* single most-influential work for this study field.

John Atkinson Hobson (1858–1940), who signed his name as J.A. Hobson, can be considered a major theorist of imperialism. His book *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) is arguably *the* single most-influential work for this study field. Although it claims to isolate the 'taproot of imperialism' and inspired mass struggle leaders, its significance lies also in its thematic heterogeneity and possible contradictory interpretations. Some exegeses are thus vital when presenting this text and Hobson's wider *oeuvre,* for he wove original ideas together with the essential strands of British Liberalism.

On Thrift, Poverty, and Monopoly Capital

Hobson was born in Derby, England, to a regional newspaper proprietor, attending grammar school before attending Oxford University and then working as an extension course lecturer. *The Physiology of Industry* (1889), which he wrote with A.F. Mummery, a celebrity businessman, attacked the thrift ideal of economics, that saving increased wealth and spending decreased it. To be effective, the authors held that capital gains needed commensurate rises in consumption: 'real saving' helped to do so, unlike 'nominal saving'. Employment and wages would be higher if the wealthy did not periodically withhold capital from industry and cause 'over-supply', where goods became unaffordable for many people. Competition informed over-production, since capital-holders saved, hopeful of larger future profits. It was not that saving never reduced aggregate consumption, varying who consumed: limits existed as to how much anyone could ever consume.

The Physiology of Industry related unemployment and bankruptcies after 1873, when the Long Depression began, to how the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) informed heightened consumption and subsequently an abrupt return to normal conditions. Manufacturers initially enjoyed windfalls, but then, after the conflict, greater profits were made by retailers, whose fortunes declined as failed producers entered

their field. Against views that recession was due to scarce gold, commerce informed monetary value, rather than *vice versa*.

Mummery and Hobson ruffled academic feathers: the latter never obtained a permanent lectureship. Extension work, however, informed his first single-author book, *Problems of Poverty* (1891), a response to public concerns about an 'outcast' class following the 1889 London dock-workers' strike. It argued that price changes meant that a 'labour aristocracy' purchased more goods with £1 than before, owing to new manufacturing techniques, yet the poorest were unable to afford even basic items. Residential and commercial rents appeared to be another salient issue, having risen by 150% in five decades. Employers 'sweated' homeworkers to avoid labour laws and the costs of premises, with women who were isolated from trade unions, the most affected, still performing domestic chores and having below-subsistence wages. This was made possible since their needs were met partly by spousal or parental earnings, informing masculine discourses on the contradictory 'freedoms' of employability and 'protecting the fairer sex'.

Problems of Poverty also linked over-saving and under-consumption to competition and capital concentration, the issue of 'big survivors' producing without regard for current demand. If business 'combinations' proved infeasible when many firms were in existence, monopolistic conditions facilitated pacts to 'sheathe the price-cutting weapon': as a self-preservation policy, fights used 'blunted lances'. The pioneering of 'trusts' – 'the highest reach of capitalistic evolution' – went further, where a trustee board governed nominally independent companies that pooled capital for dividends. Mimicking these trends, Hobson perceived 'labour combines' as forming, which regularised, and thereby diminished, the aggregate friction between labour and capital.

The Evolution of Modern Capitalism (1894) affirmed Hobson's motif of over-production and under-consumption, linking mechanisation and an enhanced division of labour to its heightened modern state. Credit made such developments possible, besides aiding

consumption (an 'expansion of the time-market'). Nevertheless, the book's greater novelty was its relating of such issues to monopoly. Loose agreements to *lessen* competition culminated in formalised 'trusts' – entities that increased the might available *for* competition. If railways extorted isolated farmers and Standard Oil set prices for suppliers and consumers, like cases represented not 'unfair competition' but 'an application of those same forces always operating in the evolution of modern capital'.

'Trusts' did not *ipso facto* mean lower or higher prices: adjustments related to the degree of (perceived) competitive threats. With monopoly prices determined by different considerations from competitive ones, inferior plant that might yield marginal profits would be idle in a 'trust', since producing more or fewer items meant suboptimal profits. Investment was concentrated in ideal sites, raising efficiency, output, and startup costs. Demand figured thus even less in business calculations. 'Trusts' also informed growing net unemployment, a proliferation of distributing classes (made possible owing to monopoly production profits), and political divisions between unionised workers in large industries and other labourers. With minimal competition, 'trusts' practically owned their employees.

The Problem of the Unemployed (1896) reiterated earlier themes, arguing that monopolies wasted labour power in ways analogous to unemployment *per se,* with 'clerks, advertisers, shop-assistants, *etc*.' doing 'excessive and useless' work as viewed from a 'social standpoint'. The 'central fact' of unemployment studies was over-capitalisation, a matter arising from 'unearned income', where an individual's revenues did not correspond to their 'outgoing effort'. As some people saved far beyond any possible personal use, they lent via banks to expanding businesses; investor confidence hinged on whether goods were sold. If over-production occurred, lending ceased. The remedy was not abolishing what Karl Marx claimed to be 'unearned income', since Hobson deemed property vital for encouraging anyone to work at all. Instead of challenging the social organisation of production,

consumption standards needed to be raised, if necessary by taxing 'unearned income'.

On Imperialism and War

As tensions between the British Empire and the Boers grew during 1899, *The Manchester Guardian* commissioned Hobson to visit the Transvaal. His article 'Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa' (1900) argued that the eventual war (1899–1902) benefited only monopoly and financier interests. Mining giants, chiefly Cecil Rhodes, backed by investment banks, were cosmopolitan cohorts formerly against Crown rule and championing Boer independence because it did not risk plans for a chartered company. Such ilk turned into British 'patriots' after failing to get their way with Boer officials through 'stealthy means'. It was vital to overturn a state shunning policies aiding large capital.

Transvaal stakes grew as new gold fields were located in 1886, drawing an influx of British miners and petty traders. Hobson observed that these classes would never benefit from Rhodes and others running the territory: ending Boer rule meant losing out to cartels using 'compounds' (unfree native labour and company stores). An attempted coup in 1896 implicating Rhodes – the 'Jameson Raid' – did not inspire Transvaal Britishers. Although disenfranchised, they had few major grievances, since the underdeveloped mining sector paid handsomely. Monopolists and financiers subsequently changed tack, appealing to a wider audience. Although from diverse nations, they pressured the British state: its subjects faced 'repression'. 'Activists' demanded democracy (*sans* citizenship obligations) for white male temporary residents. Cape Colony newspapers, bought by large capital, sent libels around the empire, fuelling a 'race-lust frenzy'.

To Hobson's mind, though the financiers of monopolies appeared as 'the most-powerful guiding force in aggressive Imperialism', they succeeded only by 'cooperating with and moulding for their purpose weaker forces having purer

and less definite aims'. Other major beneficiaries – the armed and civil services, weapons manufacturers, public contractors, and so on – seemed antithetical by nature to liberal values seldom supported elsewhere. *The War in South Africa* (1900) expanded on the causes and effects of hostilities unsought by Boers and Transvaal Britishers. The state's claim of the latter as its subjects had been 'treacherous': it claimed 'suzerainty', refused negotiating in good faith, censored conciliatory Boer statements, and precipitated conflict by marshalling border troops. Hobson foresaw disaster for all except monopolists and financiers, since massive 'compound' mining profits would result from a British Army victory. Ending certain Boer taxes was alone believed to raise dividends by £2.5 million p.a.

An aspect of the war appealing to people sceptical that Boers were striving for 'racial supremacy' over Britishers concerned black exploitation. While some Boers kept slaves, humanitarianism obscured *the* issue. In principle, the farmer with one or two slaves differed little from a 'compound'. Yet the quantitative difference implied great changes: 'put concisely, war is being waged to secure for the mines a cheap supply of labour'. Black workers appeared inexpensive as they were 'abundant' in number, with livelihood means other than wages – demanding suppression of tribal occupations, paying chiefs 'premiums' to remit men, and building low-fare railways, besides implementing 'hut' and 'labour' taxes, the latter payable annually by males lacking 4 months' waged employment.

Controlling Transvaal politics hence facilitated super-profits. However, the *type* of capital entering South Africa seemed unable to sustain any manufacturing or 'progressive agriculture' potentially informing an expanded white settler civilisation. Imperialism here looked *different*, with its lopsided form of development. One sector utilised capital and labour in disproportionate quantities compared with all others, injuring their growth. 'Serf-society' existed, deploying 'forcible methods' on behalf of a 'race-based aristocracy'.

The Psychology of Jingoism (1901) discussed British cultural conditions that 'inverted patriotism' and made it 'the hatred of another nation', hiding class stakes behind policies. Multiple 'instruments of instruction' overtly or insidiously propagated an imperialistic mindset: music halls and churches represented 'screens' for strategic financier interests. 'Lie factories' (the press) spent fortunes prating about their impartiality, while police connived in assaulting peace campaigners. Other nations derived mirth from imperialists angry at foes never 'standing on the sideline waiting to be shot'. When jingoism faltered, another 'screen' rolled out: 'protecting savages'.

Every theme Hobson elaborated before 1902 can be discerned in *Imperialism*. Colonialism equated to a community's expansion, colonies becoming autonomous partners; after 1884 there were subordination and competing empires, causing extreme nationalism. Areas under this 'new Imperialism' were Crown Colonies (*sans* representative or responsible rule) with sparse white settlement. Although they were 'irrational from a national standpoint', their costs benefited *some* classes. Public funds repaid loans (plus interest) for military and expedition supplies (aiding certain manufacturers) and increased armed and civil service positions. Annexations fluctuated currencies (aiding speculators), secured foreign markets or investments, and gave engineers, missionaries, prospectors, ranchers, and others employment.

Hobson judged that one correlation best evinced his 'vested interests' thesis. For 18 years, although foreign trade with imperial rivals grew, its total value declined in relation to internal transactions. Simultaneously, investment incomes from abroad doubled, dwarfing external trade profits by 5:1. Fully 15% of British wealth was invested overseas, half as foreign and colonial state borrowings and the rest held in railways, banks, telegraphs, municipal services, or 'industries directly-dependent on land values'. Foreign policy appeared to be 'primarily a struggle for profitable investment markets' as classes living on interest did so ever more from holdings abroad, with an incentive to extend their portfolios and safeguard existing revenues.

Imperialism distinguished two investor types. A 'rank and file' were cat's-paws, commercially and politically, for 'general dealers' who, rather

than use stock to earn dividends, speculated with it in currency markets. Imperialist forays also benefited underwriting public debt and company flotations; any policy affecting asset values needed their sanction. While 'imputing so much power to financiers seems a too narrowly economic view of history', Hobson wrote, 'finance is rather the Imperial engine governor' (1902: 66). This body ran on 'patriotic fuel', empowering 'adventurism, military enterprise, political ambition, and philanthropy'. Enthusiasm for expansion – 'strong and genuine, yet irregular and blind' – was regulated by lenders to states. They made the 'final determination' on the basis of their interests, with newspapers 'putting into minds beliefs influencing policy, thus affecting money markets' (66–67).

Hobson linked his finance judgements to how 'trusts' informed ever greater amassed capital sums. 'Automatic saving on an unprecedented scale' resulted because the hyper-rich did not consume adequately, with their profit-seeking investments creating a 'stricter economy of existing capital'. As lucrative opportunities in 'trusted' industries diminished, 'investment markets beyond the home area were forced' (1902: 80). Such territories often required annexation (it being implicit that an apt capital protector was necessary). Over-production and under-consumption thus linked to foreign policy. 'If the British raised their consumption and kept pace with rising productive powers, neither excess goods nor capital could clamour for Imperialism' (86). Since distribution did not directly relate to need (a matter governed by 'other conditions'), Hobson argued against imperialism as 'industrial progress demanding new markets and investment fields'. Modern capitalism's inequities informed *over-saving* – from rents, monopoly profits, and 'other unearned income' – which was *the* reason for recent world developments.

Hobson considered that taxes funding empire management never fell unduly on the classes constituting imperialism's 'taproot'. While Britain had millions living in poverty, steady indirect taxes paid debt financiers and landowners 'dole money'. Fluctuating direct taxes were 'paraded' to fool people that all paid their way. Many taxes

appeared to be protectionism renamed, raising prices and portending Great Power tensions over key resources. Liberalism seemed dead, with debates inside the British state taking place only between rival imperialist camps.

Imperialism also assessed an expanding empire's corrupting effects in its heartland. Southern England was packed with 'autocracy-trained' men returning from life overseas, running for office and, hostile to liberty, 'bringing despotism home'. They defended 'Western parasitism': elites drawing vast tribute from abroad, who supported 'tame masses of retainers' performing 'minor industrial' or personal services. Various discourses buttressed imperialism for such 'cultured' classes and *hoi polloi*. 'Social efficiency' appeals (also known as 'scientific racism') – wrapped in 'thin convenient theories' from biology and sociology – indoctrinated the former with 'moral grandeur'. For the latter, there was 'hero-worship, glory, and sporting spirit: history falsified in coarse flaring colours' (1902: 234).

Although few world regions were unclaimed by imperialists, Hobson contended that land rights meant little without labourers. Imperialism depended on 'forced labour' as different from 'unfree contracts' of the waged *partout*. Acquisition methods included seizing community resources, issuing travel passes (impeding mobility), promulgating militia levies to actually supply businesses with workers, and stoking unrest that justified martial law. Taxes were designed, as was 'forced labour', less for revenue than for compelling labourers to seek wages. Indenture particularly injured remitting communities, since the able-bodied vanished entirely from a locale.

On Internationalism

Hobson's works after *Imperialism* asserted that Liberal principles informed prosperity, peace, and equality. *International Trade* (1904) argued how tariffs spurred internationalism and were a sectarian policy. Protection helped some industries, reflecting their political weight, yet harmed commerce overall by skewing capital distribution and consumption. As in the case of imperialism,

tariffs inflamed national antagonisms, with beneficial exchanges misrepresented as rivalry for limited markets, stymieing demands for wealth redistribution. Privileged classes increased rents and profits at the community's expense, consolidating capitalist structures to repress competition better. Cartels injured trade, since 'the real question' amid non-competing groups was monopoly's worth, and exchanges did not involve like production costs.

Measures to lessen inequality were proposed in *The Crisis of Liberalism* (1909): public ownership of land, popular control over credit and insurance, plus free transport networks and industrial power. Any monopoly would be tackled. This 'practicable Socialism' disavowed 'abolishing the competitive system and socialising instruments of production, distribution, exchange', and so on, instead offering workers 'economic conditions requisite to the employment of their personal powers for private advantage and enjoyment' (172–173).

An Economic Interpretation of Investment (1911) revealed that only 10% of British investment was in the country; foreign revenues had risen by 90% over 20 years, mostly from state bonds, municipal stock, railway securities, or construction, manufacturing being incidental. No European country now figured in the top ten destinations: the Americas or colonies were preferred. Writing for a business press, Hobson claimed that imperialism was changing: 'nationalist aspects weakening and giving way to an economic internationalism exercised with little political control, the minimum affording asset security' (117). Finance seemed 'the aptest peace instrument'. Wars started because of 'reckless insults' – even weapons manufacturers 'lost out'.

Hobson rejected his recent conclusions in *Towards International Government* (1915). With a progressive publisher, he argued that the 1914 war served the interests of arms dealers, who bid states against one another, knowing their secrets. It complimented how politicians backed 'their' investors and traders, with quarrels arising over tariffs or markets where special interests were claimed. War was 'mainly a product of these antagonisms', specifically financier competition

over concessions in undeveloped countries. *Pace* his 1911 work, 'political weapons' made all the difference: free capital movements were 'normally a pacific force', binding creditor and debtor by 'mutual advantages' (1915: 139).

Democracy after the War (1917) proposed that European upper classes deemed their interests and survival to involve hostilities, not peace. While investment struggles in the Balkans, Turkish Empire, and Morocco underpinned the ongoing war, other reasons existed. Capitalists earned vast profits from conflict financing and contracts, aiming also to 'settle industrial unrest threatening revolution' as 'impossible by constitutional methods' (41). German landlords urged war for staving off property taxes and an ending of agrarian customs. Britain was similar, albeit with its aristocracy 'fused more completely with the industrial plutocracy' (42). Akin to what *Imperialism* noted abroad, conscripts now laboured in factories under military law.

Taxation in the New State (1919) observed how war-debt interest was a colossal £350 million p.a. for lenders, with conflict also massively expanding the capital of many manufacturers, farmers, brewers, and mine-owners. Public funds paid cash for destroyed assets and shortages helped profiteers. Banks earned from enlarged credits and deposits that doubled in 5 years. By writing down securities, which 'safely' recovered value later, businesses kept profits 'out of income'. Capital applied to plant enlargement, rather than dividends, escaped taxes, *gratis* bonus shares then being issued. Assets that the state bought at inflated prices were sold back to former owners below market rate. Elites netted 'several thousand million pounds' in such ways.

The Morals of Economic Internationalism (1920) proposed that the US must help reconstruct Europe. If some nations could not pay, those with surpluses had to provide credit too. It was not 'charity' but 'an intelligent sense of self-interest'. Allowing Central and Eastern Europe to starve risked dangerous reactions, with any protectionism threatening insular nationalisms. 'In Britain', Hobson wrote, the latter policy meant 'heaping fuel onto the class war fire'; America needed to 'learn lessons from Russia and Hungary' (54–55).

Problems of a New World (1921) reiterated how the Bolshevik revolution changed global affairs. A different imperialism appeared as a ruling class strategy for avoiding social unrest, one where self-preservation 'trusts' substantially replaced competition. Concerted action through the League of Nations (which needed to include Germany) might inform international and industrial peace by 'substituting a race cleavage for that of class'. Undeveloped countries with 'cheap labour' would export produce 'to well-paid, short-houred and contented Western workers, employees of combines, who transform it by scientific manufacture'. Capitalists aimed to 'make them partners in a sweating-system involving foreign exploitation', and 'favoured proletariats' becoming 'little shareholders'.

Hobson noted that the imports essential for satisfying home populations 'cannot be bought by their full equivalent in exports'. Under free exchange, raw materials and food-stuffs would long 'remain on a higher level than manufactured exports', owing to different efficiencies. Syndicates were induced to organise production abroad 'cheaply': 'forced or sweated labour and using Governmental aids to obtain land or business opportunities at minimal cost' (1921: 185). Most overseas produce would thus 'arrive' as monopoly rents or super-profits on native labour, a portion of this surplus gain becoming available for supporting Western workers in relative comfort: higher real wages, low import prices, shorter hours, and so on. States taxing the wealth that imperialist exploitation made possible, or leasing 'Crown lands' for revenue, might then offer their citizens enhanced social security. The moral temptation was 'a limited international, under which an oligarchy of great nations shall live on the resources and subject peoples of undeveloped countries'.

Legacy

Hobson lived long enough to observe, analyse, and predict several profound world developments. His ideas became known internationally through their adoption by major figures in twentieth-century history. Two contrasting men are especially significant. On the one hand, John Maynard Keynes, who did more than any economist of the period to save capitalism, borrowed heavily from Hobson's work. On the other hand, Vladimir Ulyanov, also known as Lenin, cited *Imperialism* extensively and favourably in a pamphlet of the same title (1933). Hobson's relation to these personalities informs – indeed overshadows – many divergent readings of his bibliography.

Economists discussing Hobson and Keynes usually uphold the latter's views, with the former styled as a lesser (albeit inspiring) thinker. Keynes notably proposed that underinvestment relative to profit rates appeared to be of greater significance in determining crises than boom-period under-consumption. This perspective focused attention on interest rates and the minted money supply. For Hobson, of course, these matters were palliatives: *the* issue was equalising property distribution, not temporarily ending abstention. Thus conservative critics of Keynes, highlighting his 'Hobsonian' debts (more than he did), attack the foundation of the production–consumption disequilibrium, proposing that effective demand can rise. Omitted are Hobson's points about how the wealthiest literally fail to unproductively consume more (hence the larger productive investments, possibly informing capital exports, until confidence disappears), enduring class divisions, and imbalances that are potentially reproducible at ever grander scales.

The renown of a 'Hobson–Lenin thesis' rests on the former's ideas and the latter's deeds. Lenin added little to any imperialism 'theory' *per se*, self-admittedly clarifying mainly how Hobson's logic (and that of other monopoly capitalism students) necessitated civil war. No radically independent 'Leninist' view exists. The proletarian state leader's endorsement consequently informs more heat than light as to a Liberal's work, something compounded by the fact that both *Imperialism* texts are generally assessed in isolation from their political contexts and their authors' other concepts.

Supporters and detractors of 'Marxism' (or Lenin in particular) traverse two paths: they appeal to empirical data, that is, if it 'matches' what either *Imperialism* claimed, and they compare select propositions against universal principles, that is, whether an author proved 'consistent'. Notably, Lenin's favour drew attention only after Hobson's death. While Western historians during the 1920s and 1930s affirmed the latter's negative 'national' cost-benefit analysis for 'new Imperialism' colonies, they ignored his capital export theory and how prominent socialists, who also included Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, and Nikolai Bukharin, utilised it. A decade on, many writers presumed to be 'Marxists' lacked *any* explanation for empire growth. After 1945, however, the translation of Soviet Union materials citing Lenin became commonplace, with Hobson's *Imperialism* a key text for partisans contending whether capitalism inevitably meant colonies and competing empires.

Notwithstanding that the Soviet Union exported capital much like its capitalist rivals, Hobson's insights and modern relevance were subsumed by Cold War polemics. Divorcing his text from debates about decolonisation or neo-colonisation, most Western academics claimed that nothing 'economic' informed *de jure* (not *de facto*) territorial control. Both *Imperialism* texts needed rejecting, commonly via an article by Joseph Schumpeter, 'The Sociology of Imperialisms' of 1919 (1951b). Although this perceived 'new Imperialism' as greed-driven, it was deemed possible only in autocratic contexts, that is, 'unlike' many North Atlantic societies after 1918. Atavistic behaviour was not simply 'irrational' (the view of some Liberals against Hobson), but represented 'feudal' elements struggling for power; it diminished as industrial capitalism developed.

Scholars making claims about what kind of imperialism the British Empire epitomised overlaid 'economic *vs*. cultural' discussions after about 1960 with nineteenth-century case studies. Aiming to refute 'Marxism', historians proposed Hobson's *Imperialism* as reductionist, introducing

a non-existent 'new imperialism' break, and with inadequate primary data. Alternative contributions included discussions of how Hobson/Lenin 'really' explained world war, not annexations, and arguments that 'informal' free trade zones or defence of sea routes defined 'new imperialism'. Analysts during the 1970 and 1980s stressed events abroad, neither 'economic' nor 'metropolitan', as informing empire growth. An important 1990s view, which alleged that Hobson failed to explain pre-Industrial Revolution imperialism and saw manufacturers as driving policy, nevertheless highlighted undemocratic financier ties.

International disputes concerning reformers or revolutionaries, and exchanges that *Imperialism* generated years after its publication, often mean that Hobson's longterm Liberal Party allegiance is overlooked. Historians of the period are divided between those observing a 'consistent' *laissez-faire* disciple or state-interventionist and others who perceive an 'inconsistent' mixer of these creeds. A more recent argument has been that Hobson purposefully transcended genres, seeking political propaganda effects from this technique, his only steady ideals being free trade and equality of subjects. It remains to be seen whether social movements against monopolies and socialism today, advocating small-scale property, will make anything else of Hobson's career.

Afterword

Hobson once jested about his origins: 'the middle stratum of the middle class of a middle-sized industrial town' (1938: 15). Before the 1920s were out, this cohort's political vehicle, the Liberal Party, was broken, with reactionary and socialist forces defining a new economic and ideological era. For Hobson, the agendas of such polarities endangered not just his class but property *in toto*. Over 40 years, he countered the discourses that rival theorists offered, developing their aspects that were compatible with liberal beliefs and contesting those that were inadmissible. Struggles in imperialist societies for 'the

middle class' and its political weight, regularly observed by him, perhaps also help explain the possible class-contradictory readings of his works.

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Hollywood

▶ Political Cinema and Anti-imperialism

Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

▶ Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolutionary Anti-imperialism, and Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

Human Self-Destruction

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

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▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Hymnody

▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

I

Iceland

Ifeoma Okoye

Ifeoma Okoye (1937–)

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Synonyms

Ifeoma Okoye; Nigeria; Nigerian marxism; Socialist-feminism; West African radicalism

Definition/Description

Ifeoma Okoye is Nigeria's preeminent socialist-feminist novelist. Neo-colonialist Nigeria under "flag independence" has been a theater of conflict where women's rights have been suppressed as part of an imperialist ideological crusade. Okoye's

oeuvre presents us with examples of how individual women, as well as radical collectives, can find agency even as exploitative structures tighten their grip on the country.

Introductory Paragraph

Ifeoma Okoye, Nigeria's preeminent Marxist, socialist-feminist novelist is 82 years old this year (2019). Three years ago she published a grammar compendium aimed at ESL learners. In 2013, she came out with her masterpiece, *The Fourth World*, a novel that dealt with Enugu's eponymous shanty and the avenues for reclaiming human agency there. Her long literary career started in the 1970s and has continued up to this day, with children's books, young readers' tomes, novels, and short stories all aimed at the liberation of the private sphere in neo-colonial Nigeria. In this article, her novel *Behind the Clouds*, written as an intervention against the mistreatment of childless women, is examined in detail.

Imperialism and the Private Life of the "Native"

From the times of the Spanish Reconquista and the subsequent Iberian assault on the life-worlds of "natives" on three continents (Grosfoguel 2011), Euro-colonials saw themselves as harbingers of proper conduct. The British Empire positioned itself as the civilizing force that

outlawed the sati in India and the killing of twins in Nigeria's South-East, Igboland (Imbua 2013). The rising bourgeoisie of the UK, despite advances in science, found it elevating to "bring Christianity to the heathens," and most especially to end the practice of cannibalism that it saw as diametrically opposed to every Christian value. It would have shocked Edwardian gentlemen that non-Christian commentators had long deciphered the Christian Eucharist as *will-to-cannibalism* (from the point of view of Jewish Ultra-Orthodoxy, an uncompromising view is put forward regarding this by Rabbi Tovia Singer today) (Singer 2018) but also that in the case of a radical Nigerian practitioner of the Western visual medium of oil painting, a masterful statement in the early 1960s also brought forward the same proposition from the point of view of the self-decolonizing radical African artist: Erhabor Emokpae in his The Last Supper (Okeke-Agulu 2015, pp. 248–252). "Christendom" may have had a fixation with cannibalism precisely because of the cannibalistic impulses of its most sacred ritual.

In truth, British colonizers had brutally altered the private lives of "native" populations under their rule, tore the texture of the societies that they held captive, and in the case of Nigeria's South, they created newly mint, disruptive patriarchies in a region that had hitherto been either governed by matriarchies (Amadiume 1987a) or by a delicately balanced two-track parallel structure whereby men and women had separate political authority structures (women governed the marketplace, had their own leadership, deities, and market shrines) (Matera et al. 2013). *Flag independence* (copyright Bade Onimode) and neo-colonialism arguably made things worse in this department. In Nigeria where forms of gender fluidity had existed (Amadiume 1987b) before and under the British, today we see the worst aspects of heteronormative machismo, complete with a legal ban on homosexuality and the wide spread financialization of sexual relationships.

Ifeoma Okoye's Marxist-Feminist Anti-Imperialism

In Nigeria, socialist-feminist voices were among the most vocal against imperialism since at least the year 1946, when Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti transformed the Abeokuta Ladies' Club to the Abeokuta Women's Union by also admitting market women beyond the socialites who had used it primarily as a venue for high tea. The new women's union battled traditional rulers and the colonial authorities, and catapulted its leader to international fame. Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, who was also the musician Fela's mother and who would later die as a result of her defenestration by Obasanjo's soldiers from his son's Kalakuta Republic compound, was so radical that in 1953, she became one of the vice presidents of the Women's International Democratic Federation, a Soviet sponsored umbrella organization headquartered in East Berlin; and in 1970, she received the Lenin Peace Prize. FRK started an avalanche in Nigerian radical feminism. Gambo Sawaba, Bene Madunagu, Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, and Amina Mama all followed in her wake, each representing new sensibilities that enriched Nigeria's socialist feminisms (Sawaba came from the Muslim North, Madunagu participated in a commune and is a Trotskyite, Ogundipe-Leslie's poetry and theoretical work are of global renown, and Amina Mama fights US securitization in Africa under AFRICOM today) (Mayer 2016a). Nigeria's trade union conglomerate, the Nigeria Labour Congress, adheres to a very progressive women's policy since the early 2000s and a 30% quota system (Nigeria Labour Congress 2003). It helps Nigerian radical feminists considerably that in the country, patriarchal oppression in the "traditional" form does not hark back to precolonial times (except in urban Kano and similar Northern bastions of Islam), or to premodern times, or the fog of prehistory. On the contrary, *the "traditional status quo" is obviously a product of the early twentieth century when Britain (tried to) put an end to women's political power*. The assertive qualities one finds among women in Nigeria, is factually and

historically rooted in the real socio-political traditions of the country, as opposed to the imagined community and invented traditions of colonial sanction. The brutality of neo-colonial arrangements is partly due to the strength of those traditions that obviously negate the imperialists' ideological ballast by their very survival. In the cultural sphere, this manifests in the suppression of everything to do with pre-Christian traditions as "idolatry" in the Southern regions of the country, from traditional art to other components of *habitus*. The unrelenting onslaught of televangelism and charismatic fundamentalist Christianity on Nigeria's South is among other things the cultural expression of this violent, neo-colonial form of collective imaginary that erases the region's authentic past from the collective consciousness.

In this article, I focus on the Igbo socialist-feminist writer Ifeoma Okoye, the foremost radical woman novelist of Nigeria, by way of examining her take on the plight of childless women under Nigeria's pervasive neocolonial social and political system. It would be tempting to see the plight of childless women as a problem that was uniformly rooted in inadequate knowledge structures and insufficient health care before and during colonialism (although in the latter case, the responsibility of the ruling Euro-colonials would of course already be proven). As Ifeoma Okoye shows us, there is much more to this problem than first meets the eye. It is indeed the traditional lack of awareness as to the biology of conceiving a child that had once formed an important part of the oppressive weight of societal expectations on women of child bearing age and quite often child bearing "responsibility" in Igbo contexts. On the other hand, the colonial destruction of the politico-economic power in the hands of women and with it all the creative solutions that women had found in such situations before the arrival of the European norms of the nuclear family, actually also provided the sociopolitical background to the survival of those selfsame, inadequate knowledge structures as they manifest in the early neo-colonialist era that Okoye describes in her novel.

In the 1970s as well as today, these social and epistemological ills together form the most suffocating status quo in Nigeria, complete with hair raising double standards for women and for men in many communities. The confluence of inadequate schooling/insufficient health care and social "conservatism" (in fact: *neophyte neo-colonial patriarchy that conserves nothing authentic of its context, history and provenance*) make sure that women are abused and bear the worst consequences of the patriarchal/neo-colonial system, the Southern Nigerian subsystem of imperialism.

Chimamanda Adichie's mainstream liberal Igbo (Nigerian) feminism is world famous today. According to the critic Oyekan Owomoyela, Enugu's own Ifeoma Okoye is, however, "the most important female novelist from Nigeria after Flora Nwapa and Buchi Emecheta," (Owomoyela 2008, p. 142) signaling how Igbo feminist women have continued to shape and define Nigerian women's writing since the early 1960s, and also Ifeoma Okoye's special status among radical feminist authors in the country.

There are around 12 peer reviewed journal articles that deal with Ifeoma Okoye's *oeuvre* that appeared in the last decade. Beyond Owomoyela's sympathetic exposition, Onyemachi looks at gender issues especially in Ifeoma Okoye's 2013 magnum opus, *The Fourth World* (2013) (the novel according to her "oscillates between ecofeminism and environmental psychology") (Onyemachi 2016, p. 348). For Onyemachi, "*The Forth World* represents the maternal bond shared between the female gender and nature, which are two great sources of reproduction" (Onyemachi 2016, p. 348). Onyemachi, as well as, no doubt, Okoye, link environmental decay and poor governance with Nigerian versions of patriarchy. Ifeyinwa J. Ogbazi offers a sensitive structuralist reading of Okoye, especially *Behind the Clouds* (Ogbazi 2011). Chikwenye Ogonjo Ogunyemi, a refugee academic who fled Nigeria because of Abacha's dictatorship, is a masterful African feminist voice that still influences how we think about African women writers. Ogunyemi's analysis (in true 1990s fashion) still euphemistically refers to

Ifeoma Okoye's political views as "pan-African-ist": this is true in itself but it does not do justice to Okoye's *unified socialist-feminist theory* as I shall demonstrate here.

Femi Osofisan was another important critic in terms of categorizing Okoye. He did this through an act of self-conscious group-self-denial, wherein he demonstratively included Okoye in what he called a cohort of "warriors of a failed utopia" (along with himself), in the mid-1990s (Osofisan 1996). What he meant was that she was a socialist and socialism was of course done for, with the then alleged end of history... Nonetheless, Osofisan's placing Okoye in this (for him, misguided) crème of Nigerian literature is in itself telling.

Finally, Mayer in 2018, after uncovering the history of Nigerian Marxisms in his *Naija Marxisms* (2016a), wrote a celebratory essay where Okoye's role in that movement and the role of Marxism in her oeuvre were finally addressed in an adequate way (Mayer 2018). Naturally, as relevant as Marxism has been for Okoye as a writer, there have been less politically radical, and perhaps even somewhat ethno-centric, frameworks employed in unlocking Okoye's message. The feminist critic Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi calls Okoye "*Omunwa*" (Igbo for "the mother without," the "daughter of the soil") (Ogunyemi 1996, pp. 45; 303), the mother in the public domain (Ogunyemi 1996, p. 45). *Omunwa*s for Ogunyemi represent the nurturing side of Nigerian womanhood under incredible duress. Traditionally in Igbo areas, the marketplace had been a public place under the power of the women of the given community. It had had its own rules and its own shrine and deity, until the warrant chiefs of the British unsettled and later *ended* this parallel system (Matera et al. 2013; Amadiume 1987a) along with all vestiges of outright matriarchy (Ogunyemi 1996, p. 49). Women of stature had had a very important role in Igboland before colonization, so much so that the famed Women's War/*Ogu Umunwaanyi*/Aba Riots gave concrete political expression to their dissatisfaction with the shifting grounds and the loss of agency under colonial rule (Matera, Bastian and Kent 2013). Of course, it is also possible for us to understand Ogunyemi's insight in terms of

historical materialism and posit that when intellectuals such as Ifeoma Okoye stand up for the vulnerable (from young children generally to the adolescents of shanties and women of all walks of life) in their works, they perform a function that is not "natural" in the biological sense but that is rooted in specifically Nigerian forms of social resistance and historical social formations that had been matriarchal.

The Okoyes: Radical Lives

Ifeoma Okoye was born on December 21, 1937, in Anambra State, in the then Eastern Region, in Igboland. She studied in Ogbunike, in Anambra's Oyi local government area, where she received a teaching certificate in 1959. She worked at an international school in Enugu for 4 years in the late 60s. In 1974, she started university at the University of Nigeria Nsukka. She gained her BA in English in 1977 there. In 1986–1987, she studied at Aston University in Birmingham. She earned a post graduate degree (MSc in Teaching English for Specific Purposes). She went on to lecture first at Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu (1978–1992) and then at Nnamdi Azikiwe University at Awka, Anambra State (1992–2000). They had four daughters and a son with her husband Mokwugo Okoye, the revolutionary independence hero of Nigeria that the British had jailed for sedition in 1950, and who subsequently became the best-known Nigerian Marxist essayist, belletrist, and public intellectual from the 1950s to almost the turn of the millennium (died 1998). Mokwugo Okoye did not define Ifeoma Okoye: their relationship, however, resulted in the mutual cross-pollination of ideas, foci, and commitment. Although Mokwugo Okoye's political career ended early, when future president Nnamdi Azikiwe broke with incarcerated radicals to please his British patrons (Zik's *volte face* stretched from 1949 to 1954). Okoye embarrassed a number of Nigerian administrations, military, and "democratic" with his Promethean bravado that baffled Nigeria's comprador class. Mokwugo Okoye was as incorruptible as Robespierre, and he chose to drive a dilapidated Peugeot 403 even in the 1990s (Mayer 2016a, p. 126), and even as he sat on the Board of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation. The shocking

fact about the Okoyes always was that they lived on their legitimate income and nothing else. Mokwugo was a prolific writer, an autodidact and a light hearted, open-minded essayist in the vein of Lin Yutang, the Chinese belletrist he admired. Mokwugo's Marxism was open, non-sectarian, and critical of the USSR, where he was treated as guest of honor during his visits. His numerous volumes include A Letter to Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, African Responses: A Revaluation of History and Culture (a panoramic work in the vein of Basil Davidson's African Genius), The Beard of Prometheus, Points of Discord, and another about 15 volumes (See more: Mayer 2016a, pp. 126–133). Ifeoma Okoye, although she touched on matters of political economy and party politics in works such as *Man Without Ears* (sic) and *The Fourth World*, examines *the political of the personal* in her other works.

Ifeoma Okoye is a household name across Africa for her young readers' series. She also writes highly successful and award winning adult books and short stories: *Behind the Clouds* (novel, 1982; received Spectrum Books Award); *Men Without Ears* (1984; Best Novelist of the Year Award by Association of Nigerian Authors; translated also into Russian), *Chimere* (novel, 1992); *Nowhere to Hide* (novel, 2000); *The Fourth World* (novel, 2013/2016, shortlisted for NLNG Literature Prize); "The Pay Packet in Touch Stone" (short story, 1993); "The Power of a Plate of Rice" (short story, 1999), "Waiting for a Son" (short story, 1999, 2000); The Trial and Other Stories (a collection of powerful short stories, 2005). "Waiting for a Son" won the Commonwealth Short Story Competition (in the African Region) for the year 1999.

Behind the Clouds: The Childless Woman as Outcast and as Rebel

After a series of extremely successful children's books and young reader's books where Ifeoma Okoye taught her target audience the virtues of community, sharing, play, thrift, and the love of learning, she decided to start writing adult literature, inspired by the example of countless contemporary African writers, especially within Longman's Drumbeat Series that gave a venue to the new generation of writers who started

publishing after independence (Ifeoma Okoye's personal communication). Behind the Clouds also appeared in Longman's Drumbeat series in 1982. The novel's plotline is not complicated: Ije Apia, the protagonist, a representative of the comfortably well-off professional class (the lower rungs of the bourgeoisie, really) cannot conceive of a child. Her shy, kind, and decent architect husband Dozie Apia, whom she had helped to graduate in the UK, years prior to the novel's timeframe, is now subject to grueling pressure from his mother and the wider family to take another wife, in order to secure that an heir is born to the clan. Virginia, Dozie's one-time paramour (and turned such only under the influence of alcohol, we are assured) suddenly shows up, claiming to carry Dozie's child, and is allowed to stay in the family's house as a "second wife," until Dozie finds out that the child is in fact not his. At that juncture, he decides to finally consider the possibility that it is him who is the real cause of the Apias' childlessness. A small operation ensues in the UK, after which Ije (who had, in the meanwhile, taken up residence elsewhere and found an office job) forgives him and the Apia family reunites in happiness. All this is told in a matter-of-fact tone, with an economy of language that revels not in flourish. I claim that this novel is an example of realism in the Lukacsian sense, including the notion that it presents a typical situation (Lukacs 1980). A number of twists in the plot make the plotline sound unrealistic or even contrived to an average Western reader. When the "second wife" shows up to claim that she has a child from the "man of the house," she is allowed to stay on, given a car and a driver, and is in fact eulogized by the man's mother, while the "first wife" suffers emotional trauma in sunken disbelief – while the husband actually loves her (!). Subplots of the novel are similarly reflective of West African social realities: "herbalists" (*juju* men) are employed by the educated and Westernized protagonist; a women's social club forces its members to participate in every ceremony it throws and charges fines in cases of skipping (as well as applies subtle pressure to ensure that members wear a new dress for each occasion); a Pentecostal faith healer (Apostle Joseph) "cures" infertility by sleeping with the affected women

of his congregation (and fathers a number of children even in the case of the protagonist's friend Beatrice); the husband finances the construction of an entire village church; the "second wife" maltreats domestics to such an extent that they run away; Ije is accused of sprinkling poison on her husband's food by the "second wife." Is it possible to treat such scientific ignorance, social carelessness, and vile attitude to life as "regular," and is it reasonable to call this a realist novel? If one considers the testimony of Marxian analyses of how Nigeria, its political economy, and its knowledge economy functions (from Mokwugo Okoye to Bade Onimode, from Bene Madunagu to Claude Ake, notably including radical feminist thinkers), and if we consider the history of cultural movements in the country from the Pentecostal revolution to Nollywood home videos and their most important themes, including the testimony of daily papers, then we must answer this question in the affirmative, with a resounding "yes": indeed, Ifeoma Okoye's novel is a prime example of realism in literature despite *or even because of* the outlandish injustices that occur throughout their narratives. It is also useful that we rid ourselves of comforting platitudes on "traditional culture" and the exotic pull of *juju*, if we aim at understanding the writer. Ifeoma Okoye makes us realize that these phenomena today serve obscurantist, socially retrograde purposes in the country. The "law of the land," feudal customary law, is a source of law along with common law and *sharia* in Nigeria; and juju has legal sanction in the case of the country's federal land law. Okoye does not allow us to imagine that the (mostly) invented traditions of the primeval forest would solve today's problems in Nigeria or elsewhere. Solidarity, genuine affection, and human emotion are the real living forces in Africa's emotional life for Okoye, while the conservatism and ignorance of the mother-in-law is in fact a useless ballast that impedes the light, while the unnecessary luxuries of Nigeria's neo-colonialist consumer culture (from bleaching creams to lace materials and related ostentation) only result in further loss of direction. The most important message of the novel, however, is a positive one: Ije gives generously (to her husband in London) but can withdraw her generosity (she leaves the house at a certain point); and she has real agency as a woman: she can take up employment, she can rent an apartment on her own, she is not defined by her husband. Dozie, her husband, is not a strong man but neither is he evil: Okoye treats his infidelity with quite a bit of understanding and allows him to reunite with his wife who gently manages his life for the sake of both of them. As Behind the Clouds appeared in the early 1980s, the landlord in the novel only asks for 6 months' rent in advance (today an entire year's rent is charged as caution money by landlords in the country). The novel's main aim is, of course, to draw readers' attention to the plight of childless women in Nigeria but also to present the social forces that provide the causal explanation for such plight. Finally, it also offers solutions as to how a woman may reclaim agency even as those social forces are at play.

Conclusion

Ifeoma Okoye belongs to the generation of Nigerian writers who would scoff at ideas of *English as lingua franca*. In fact, Okoye believes in standard English to such an extent that she published a grammar book for EFL learners just 3 years ago and where British grammar is *de rigeur* (Okoye 2016). The same goes for her attitude towards science and education in general. Okoye believes in the redemptive qualities of science, study, personal effort, and rigor. She despises escapism and especially the kind that focuses on the primeval forest and *juju*, forces that had lost their socially progressive characteristics and that had long degenerated and became useful for reactionary forces in the country. She equally detests crooked Christian pastors who destroy extant traditions. She wants to keep every useful facet that international exposure has brought to Nigeria: from English (in what she views as its correct form) to standards in public education. In this her attitude differs sharply from the similarly Marxist Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o who maintains that local vernaculars should be used for writing progressive literature and who criticizes English for "'colonizing the mind." Despite this difference in opinion over the redemptive possibilities that

vernaculars offer, Ifeoma Okoye still fights against the forces that underpin the economic, social, and political alliance of Nigeria to imperialist powers. In *Men Without Ears*, she points to Tanzania as an example (this was in 1983), in *The Fourth World*, she explicitly highlights the role of radical organizers in keeping alive her protagonist, and she makes ample references to her Marxist commitment (Okoye 2013). In *Behind the Clouds*, the consequences of the new "status quo" are laid bare as they really define family life in a neo-colonial country: with inadequate public health structures, on the one hand, and repressive, "double standard" spousal relations, on the other (only the woman is blamed for infertility, the traditional method of co-wives in separate houses in the same compound is not even *discussed* as an option, help from co-wives and shared labor is unthinkable, individualistic considerations seep in to dominate, there is no adjudication by women's groups as would have happened prior to the arrival of British sanctioned warrant chiefs, etc.). Thus have neo-colonial family units become *loci* of treachery, and extramarital affairs avenues for con women, says Okoye. Thus did alienation from one's own emotional labor appear in Igboland. In Ifeoma Okoye's novel, the protagonist solves these contradictions through immense personal effort while she grows and finds true agency. In her subsequent novels and short stories, though the personal effort remains, agency will be found with the help of the new, socialist collective. Does this make *Beyond the Clouds* less of a radical novel than subsequent ones? It does not: *Beyond the Clouds* is a radical novel already. In it Okoye shows us how a radical woman in a private setting may tackle the forces that are sustained by neo-colonialism and imperialism *all by herself*, and this is at least as important as any other sociopolitical fight in the Nigerian arena.

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Illicit Financial Flows

▶ Taxation, Capital Flight, and Imperialism

Immanuel Wallerstein, Dependency Theory

▶ Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice (1930–2019)

Immigration and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Asylum; Imperialism; Migration; Refugees; Remittances

Definition

This chapter discusses the contemporary role of migration within imperialist capitalism, with particular attention to how migration is structured by borders.

Introduction

While migration has always been a feature of human societies, it has taken specific characteristics within imperialist capitalism. Although migration is often presented as an anomaly or disruption to the "normal" functioning of capitalist societies, it can be more accurately understood as "an integral element of the evolving process of production restructuring and working-class reconfiguration" (Pradella and Cillo 2015: 47; also Hanieh 2018). Borders structure imperialism, enabling multiple regimes of accumulation, differentiated geographically and socially.

Migration has taken various forms throughout the development of imperialism; this chapter focuses predominantly on the contemporary context, since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Following an introductory discussion, the chapter outlines the role of immigration controls enforcing international divisions of labor; the production of migrants as a reserve army of labor; immigration controls' creation of differential conditions for exploitation within the same country; and the role of racism. The consequences for class structures and class struggle are further explored through a case study of Britain.

Many scholars have noted the role of borders in sorting and filtering labor under capitalism (e.g., Anderson 2010a; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Hanieh 2018). Bloch and McKay (2016) note the "uneven opportunities to migrate, with border controls aimed at excluding some groups while the global elite can move freely; the growth of forced migration as a consequence of North/South relations and the need of capitalism for low-paid and often precarious workers" (5). In recent decades, a hardening of borders has been accompanied by increased "cooperation as neighbouring states work together against shared threats to their sovereign control over their territories" (Jones 2016: 68–9). Border controls have proliferated, both internally, within states' national territory, and externally, through imperialist states' control over workers' movements beyond their borders, both directly, for example, European Union and NATO deployments of warships against migrant boats in the Mediterranean, and through paid proxies, such as the EU's deal with Turkey since 2016 and the US "Southern Border Plan" involving Mexico.

Just as imperialism develops as a direct consequence of the internal contradictions of

capitalism (Lenin 1916/1975; Yaffe 2006), racism and immigration controls are driven by the imperialist division of labor (Williams et al. 1979; Cross 2013). Migration of labor and export of capital are part of the same process: countries' relation to capital shapes conditions for migration by its citizens, and where labor-intensive processes are required close to the point of consumption, it is difficult to export production, and so instead labor is often imported to imperialist countries. Social care, catering and hospitality, construction, and some parts of food processing, logistics, and agriculture are all typical of this tendency. For example, in the USA, three quarters of agricultural workers were born in Mexico, and over half of these lack immigration papers and are therefore more susceptible to exploitation (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2013: 127). Immigration controls regulate mobility according to the needs of capital and create differential terms for inclusion. Racism reflects these differentiated conditions and encourages their acceptance as "natural."

Lenin (1916/1975) defines imperialism as a stage of capitalism characterized by the domination of the economy and society by monopoly finance capital, resulting from intrinsic capitalist tendencies toward expansion and concentration (for more recent applications, see Yaffe 2006; Petras and Veltmeyer 2013). Finance capital represents the fusion of banking and manufacturing capital into massive multinational companies, whose operations are international but whose ownership and management are concentrated in a handful of countries. "Imperialist" and "oppressed" are used in this chapter as shorthand for countries' relationship to this system. There are significant differences of degree and quality within each category, including whether an oppressed country has political independence, which leads Lenin (1916/1975) to sometimes use "dependent" to refer to "countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence." Countries' relationship to imperialism is understood here as fundamentally rooted in their material relation to global capital, mediated by such other factors.

Maintaining Imperialist Divisions of Labor

Foster et al. (2011) point to the dependence of imperialist super-exploitation on the immobility of labor, highlighting the role of borders in containment and differentiation as well as exclusion. Production and reproduction operate across the uneven space of international capitalism, with caring relations shaped by the demands of differentially constituted labor regimes and restrictions on movement and rights of migrating workers' "dependents" (Strauss 2015). Since the 1970s, a new international division of labor has developed "to separate labor-intensive industrial production operations from information-rich capital intensive operations, and to relocate the former closer to new overseas strategic sources of cheaper labor" (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2013: 118). As these authors demonstrate using the case of Mexico, structural adjustment policies during this period created new arrangements to open oppressed countries to foreign capital, leading to production for export and the dismantling of many countries' forces of production, both agricultural and industrial, contributing to a huge surplus population and increasing pressure to migrate. Over the same period, immigration controls tightened in many imperialist countries, containing the vast majority of this surplus population within oppressed and underdeveloped countries.

This is part of a longer history. Feldman (2012) points to the similarities between contemporary restrictions on migration from poorer to richer countries and previous policies of "containment" against the Soviet Union, which aimed at undermining the potential for socialist countries to inspire revolution in Europe and elsewhere. He quotes the American diplomat George Kennan, credited with designing the Cold War containment strategy, who wrote in 1948:

> We [the USA] have 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. In this situation, our real job in the coming period ... is to maintain this position of disparity. To do so, we have to dispense with all sentimentality ... we should cease thinking about human rights, the raising of living standards and democratisation. (cited in Feldman 2012: 78)

This parallel, between the containment of socialism and the containment of the poor, is not coincidental. The relative privileges of large sections of the population of imperialist countries depend on both maintaining the incorporation of oppressed countries within capitalism and preventing their populations from escaping exploitative conditions through migration. To put this another way, autonomy of mobility for some workers is enabled through restrictions on geographical mobility for other workers, which enforce profitable mobility within the capitalist labor process.

Migrants as a Reserve Army of Labor

Marx (1890/1967) argues that capital accumulation necessarily produces a relative surplus population or reserve army of labor (RAL). Marx (1890/1967) assigns the RAL the importance of "a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production" (592), disciplining the active labor army (ALA) through competition, forcing workers "to submit to overwork and to subjugation under the dictates of capital" (595), and determining overall wage levels, to the extent that "the general movements of wages are exclusively regulated ... by the varying proportions in which the working-class is divided into active and reserve army" (596). The RAL-ALA composition is thus central to the labor-capital relation.

In an earlier period of capitalism, emigration from Europe to the Americas and Australasia provided an outlet for surplus workers, totalling around 70 million people between 1850 and 1920, equivalent to 17% of Europe's population in 1900, limiting the expansion of the RAL and consequent impoverishment within some of the major imperialist countries (Smith 2015: 108–109). In the more recent period, migrants from oppressed countries have often been described as an RAL for imperialist countries, who can be called on during periods of increased labor demand and sent home when demand falls (Castles and Kosack 1973; Wills et al. 2010). Pradella and Cillo (2015: 48) argue that today's global RAL "is accessed by Western European capital

through outsourcing/offshoring, trade and immigration." Smith (2015: 110) outlines the important role of migrant labor from oppressed nations in imperialist countries over recent decades, including the USA, EU, and Japan, and argues that in the USA the "much larger inflow of super-exploitable Southern labor [during the 1990s] partly explains the United States' relative economic dynamism vis-à-vis Europe." But as Miles (1986) points out, many of those who migrate were in work prior to migration, contradicting their characterization as an RAL en masse. While the RAL today is overwhelmingly concentrated in oppressed countries (Foster et al. 2011), attempts to move are met with systematic violence, and the numbers who move are negligible in shifting the international distribution of the RAL.

An empirically grounded and nuanced application of the concept of the RAL to migration might be achieved by considering the impact of borders in creating class fractions with differing RAL-ALA distributions (Vickers 2019). Restrictions on migrants' rights in many imperialist countries force them disproportionately into the RAL – whether through precarious and/or low-waged employment that makes migrants constantly on the lookout for the next job or an additional job or through outright unemployment, both representing available labor from employers' perspective. Within segmented labor markets, the higher RAL-ALA ratio of migrant populations contributes to lower wages and consequently higher profit margins. State immigration controls play a central role in producing migrants as special forms of cheap labor.

Migration and Immigration Controls

Migration allows for fluctuations in demand for labor and provides skilled labor without the normal costs of training. Internationally, trends are converging toward temporary and seasonal labor migration under a discourse of "managed migration." In the USA, despite a trend toward more Mexican migrants settling for the long term, they "are often subject to labor precarization and social exclusion," including substandard housing,

discrimination in public schools, low wages, and limited access to health care (54.1% lacking health insurance) (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2013: 129). The operation of borders has shifted, in ways that Hanieh (2018) summarizes as the securitization of borders, the growing involvement of private capital and nongovernmental organizations in migration management and the externalization and extra-territorialization of borders. These developments have increased the discipline exercised by states over the working class, incorporated increasingly wide layers of the population within the physical and ideological operation of racialized border controls, and sharpened lines of differentiation.

The percentage of the world's population who are resident outside their country of origin has not changed substantially in recent decades, although a growing global population has led to an increase in absolute numbers (Crawley et al. 2018: 14). Migration occurs on a significant scale between imperialist countries and between oppressed countries, with the latter increasing in significance in recent years, "often clustering in special economic zones located on borders, and producing goods within regional production chains . . . partly indicative of the regionalization of capitalist production circuits, and the emergence of new poles of accumulation in places such as East Asia" (Hanieh 2018). Imperialism also creates structural tendencies for migration from oppressed to imperialist countries, on terms that leave little agency for migrants, and politicizes these movements as a "problem" requiring management. This results in class fractioning within imperialist countries, mirroring the international division of labor.

Some of the main drivers of contemporary migration include conditions of poverty and inequality that lead families to sponsor some of their members to move for work and send back remittances; authoritarian state practices in many oppressed countries, driven by the need to enforce exploitative conditions; wars, resulting from imperialist countries' pursuit of profits against their rivals or as the intervention of last resort against governments that refuse to cooperate with imperialist exploitation; and environmental destruction, resulting from the unplanned and

inherently expansionary nature of capitalist production. "Development" under imperialism does not reduce out-migration; indeed, within sub-Saharan Africa, wealthier countries tend to have higher rates of out-migration than poorer ones (Bakewell 2011: 132–3). As Cross (2013) shows in detail regarding West African migration to the EU, movements of people have been shaped in part by systematic dispossession of households from their means of production and subsistence affected by capitalist development, alongside the development of sites of transit and recruitment that create opportunities for the sale of labor power.

Remittances provide an important source of foreign currency for oppressed countries to buy imports, benefiting multinational companies, and enable the reproduction of labor power in oppressed countries despite a lack of waged employment and state welfare. For example, Smith (2016) reports: "in 2013 each of Britain's 210,000 Bangladeshi migrant workers remitted an average of $4,058, three times the annual wages of his (most Bangladeshi migrant workers are male) wife, sister, or daughter working in a garment factory back home" (44). The World Bank (2018) estimates remittances to low- and middle-income countries totalled $466bn in 2017 and the real figure is likely to be higher because many informal transfers are unrecorded. One in seven of the world's population, more than a billion people, is involved in remittances as senders or recipients. Consequently, Hanieh (2018) argues that "migration (and its associated remittance flows) is a major route through which much of the world's population is integrated into global capitalism," and attacks on migrants have ramifications for their dependents back home. Recipients' reliance on remittances encourages migrants to tolerate poor conditions. A survey of low-paid migrant workers in London found 71% sent money home, on average remitting 20–30% of their income, mostly as contributions to daily subsistence. Those with the highest levels of remittances were also those working the longest hours (Datta et al. 2007b: 51–9). In some cases, such as the EU following the 2007–2008 financial crisis, economic downturns have not led to a

decline in migration and remittances, because of migrants' willingness "to endure considerable hardships to support their families back home" (Schierup and Castles 2011: 17). In a survey of 402 migrants in North East England during 2014–2015, out of those who said they lacked sufficient money for necessities for themselves, 31% said they still remitted money (Vickers 2019). In other cases, such as Saudi Arabia following the fall in oil prices in 2014, mass deportation campaigns spatially displaced the effects of economic downturns onto migrants' countries of origin (Hanieh 2018). Remittances thus do not combat inequalities within imperialism but rather sustain them in multiple ways.

Migrants' experiences are becoming increasingly polarized, in terms of "access to labour markets but also modes of entry into nation states" (Bloch and McKay 2016: 16). Yet, compared to an earlier period following World War II, today "not only less skilled but also skilled migrants are now subject to temporary-migration schemes" (Piper 2011: 70–71). This conditional mobility of labor combines with highly mobile capital to result in a situation in which "workers everywhere no longer have a quasi-monopoly of jobs but must now compete with an apparently 'inexhaustible pool of potential labour' in the global economy, creating for capital a supply of labour of comparable efficiency but at different prices" (Lewis et al. 2015: 581). Exports of capital and imports of labor operating under differentiated regimes are thus part of the same process, and internal differentiation has been intensified by reductions in state welfare in many imperialist countries that have accentuated "the differentiation of the conditions of exploitation and reproduction of labour-power of heterogeneous complexities through the superimposition of the formal mediation of citizenship (and/or through the reassertion of the formal mediations of race, ethnicity, and gender)" (Starosta 2016: 83).

Smith (2015: 112) points to the contrast, between surplus labor trapped by immigration controls in oppressed countries and the large numbers of skilled workers who migrate. For example, estimates suggest that more than half of the doctors and a quarter of the nurses trained in Ghana

emigrate (Bakewell 2011: 136–7) and from 1995 to 2004, Tanzania lost 78.3% of its doctors this way (Smith 2015: 112). This "brain drain," echoed in many other oppressed countries, represents another form of national exploitation, enabling imperialist countries to benefit from training paid for by oppressed countries and creating pressure for oppressed countries to raise wages for professionals, driving within-country wage inequality (Smith 2015: 112).

"Replacement migration" chains have developed based on countries' relative positions within imperialism, involving, for example, the migration of British nurses to the USA or Canada, replaced by South African nurses, in turn replaced by Zimbabwean nurses, all seeking better conditions, or similarly Polish nurses migrating to Sweden, replaced by Moldovan nurses, in patterns that are sector-specific and gendered (Piper 2011: 64). Farris (2015) points to the connection between the precariousness of migrant women's work and their concentration in the so-called reproductive sector, with 42% of migrant women across the EU-15 countries working in "the care-domestic sector in private households, the care sector in hospitals, residential care and home care and cleaning activities," not including undocumented migrants performing private domestic work in households in the "shadow economy" (6–7). In many major destination countries, an increase in female participation in the labor market has created demand for low-paid care-related services, fulfilled for the most part by migrant women (Piper 2011: 65–6; also Farris 2015). Gendered migration has thus enabled an increase in non-migrant women's availability for waged labor, offering the illusion of progress toward gender equality.

International inequalities in wages, conditions, state support, and overall standard of living lead some people to accept wages and conditions that are poor by the standards of their country of residence, but compare favorably to their country of origin (Anderson 2010a; Wills et al. 2010: 7). For example, in Mexico the average wage for manufacturing jobs is US$2.57 per hour. In the USA, an undocumented Mexican migrant can expect to earn US$5 per hour for similar work,

considerably more than if they remained in Mexico even though it is far below the formal US employment rate of US$16.45 (Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2013: 128). These wage differentials are further supported by circuits for the reproduction of labor power that extend across borders, for example, through circular migration and transnational family structures, which partially extend the lower costs for the reproduction of labor power in oppressed countries to migrants from these countries within imperialist countries (Hanieh 2018). This contributes to qualitative differences in workers' relationship to capital, combining with differential rights connected to immigration status.

Beyond borders' role as a filter for labor according to capital's spatially differentiated needs, they also help to shape the character of labor. As Anderson (2010a) argues:

> Immigration controls function both as a tap regulating the flow of labour, but also ... as a mould shaping certain forms of labour. Through the creation of categories of entrant, the imposition of employment relations and the construction of institutionalised uncertainty, immigration controls work to form types of labour with particular relations to employers and to labour markets. (301)

Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 101–102) argue that immigration controls do not only "mold" those who cross international borders but also wider class structures. Categories produced through borders have material, legal, and ideological dimensions, combining to harness the creative capacity of living human beings to generate surplus value for the capitalist class.

All migration has implications for labor, not only that which takes place under formal economic migration categories. Complementing this, Anderson (2010b) points out the complexity of the factors that lead to segmented labor markets, including employers' racialized stereotypes about "types" of migrants and the requirements of jobs, from formal skills to "soft skills" and preparedness to work in certain conditions (109–11). Social networks can also play an important role in structuring migrants' position within the workforce, helping migrants find work but sometimes sustaining disadvantaged positions and carrying

obligations that can deepen migrants' oppression (Bloch and McKay 2016: 12).

Paine (1977) argues that the general population do not directly benefit from migration but instead see the consequences of "ghetto housing, overcrowded schools and hospitals, sexually frustrated young men, etc., all of which generates social tension which gets blamed on the migrants themselves" (207). The more that the ruling classes benefit from the super-exploitation of migrants, by keeping down social provision in the areas where they are concentrated, the more they appear in everyday experience to be a burden. In the absence of strong political movements capable of offering a systematic analysis of the causes of people's problems, this fuels the growth of racism.

The Role of Racism

Often, academic literature focuses either on migration *or* race. For example, Datta et al. (2007a: 404) note the predominant framing in much of the British industrial relations literature of workers according to ethnicity regardless of migration background. Racism has a long history, predating capitalism, but in its current form, it is shaped by the divisions produced through imperialism, with borders playing a central role in structuring racialization (Hanieh 2018). As Smith (2016) points out, racialization is shaped not only by identities or differential conditions within Britain but also international competition and consumerism:

> The increasingly global character of the social relations of production and the increasing interdependence between workers in different countries and continents objectively strengthens the international working class and hastens its emergence as a class 'for itself' as well as 'in itself', struggling to establish its supremacy, yet, to counter this, capitalists increasingly lean on and utilize imperialist divisions to practice divide and rule, to force workers in imperialist countries into increasingly direct competition with workers in low-wage countries, while using the cheap imports produced by super-exploited Southern labor to encourage selfishness and consumerism and to undermine solidarity. (46)

Migration forms a particularly intense and contested component within this wider system of divisions, leading to the racialization of British immigration controls (Sivanandan 1991). By dividing the working class, racism and nationalism increase "the precarity of labour relations and intensif[ies] the exploitation of virtually all workers" (Pradella and Cillo 2015: 47).

National oppression forms the basis of racism toward migrants from oppressed countries (Williams et al. 1979), their descendants, and anybody else associated with these countries through skin color, religion, accent, dress, or other markers. As Cope (2015: 62) says:

> The development of capitalism on a world scale produced deep-seated economic, political and cultural inequalities which, in the minds of its defenders (also its beneficiaries), have congealed *ideologically* around the ascription of supposedly natural characteristics – those which fit them for domination or subjection – to peoples and nations.

This explains the targeting of people that may be diverse in many ways, but have in common association with an oppressed country. Hierarchical racialized categories shift over time, for example, Karakayali and Rigo (2010: 127–31) trace the dominant "figures of migration" in Europe since World War II, moving through the "guest worker" to the "refugee" to the "illegal migrant." Connections can be traced from these figures to the changing needs and conditions of European capitalism, as the labor needs of postwar expansion gave way to falling labor demand and the strategic use of asylum for Cold War "dissidents" to demonstrate the supposed moral superiority of capitalist democracies (Schuster 2003), and on to the deepening capitalist crisis and consequent drive to create super-exploitable workers without rights through "illegalization" (Oliveri 2012).

Today, racialized systems of governance reconcile systematic violence and deprivation of liberty with liberal values and obscure borders' political role:

> One of the most shocking features of this new racism is its capacity to develop reasonable discourses, apparently based on matters of fact, race-neutral principles and politically correct postures, through which discriminations become de facto and de jure acceptable for a large share of the population, still believing in democratic and egalitarian values.... Besides the crucial criminalizing frame, there are many other discursive strategies that essentialize, racialize and orientalize migrants while depicting them as a threat and as a resource in relation to the main interests of the receiving societies – security, well-being and identity. The representation of migrants as victims completes the picture: it contributes, at the same time, to patronize and de-politicize them and to offer a positive self-presentation of Western societies as 'doing good things for migrants' such as rescuing them from oppressive regimes, miserable living conditions and backward cultures. (Oliveri 2012: 800–801)

Furthermore, Mishra (2018) describes the connections between racialization and imperialist foreign policy: "launching military campaigns, often without bothering to secure the consent of a frightened people, and while supporting despotic leaders they talk endlessly of their superior "values" – a rhetoric that has now blended into a white-supremacist hatred . . . of immigrants, refugees and Muslims" (6). People categorized as "ethnic minorities," who might be more accurately described as racialized minorities to reflect the active process of racialization (Oliveri 2018), are thereby placed in an oppressed position susceptible to super-exploitation. This helps shape class relations, in ways that are particularly acute in imperialist countries, illustrated below through a case study of Britain.

Case Study: Migration to Imperialist Britain

Applying Lenin's definition, Britain has pronounced imperialist characteristics. In recent decades Britain's economy has been increasingly reliant on surplus value drawn in from overseas investments and the financial sector in myriad ways, including returns on loans and export of financial services (Norfield 2016). In 2014 Britain's external assets (foreign investments) totalled £10,171.7bn (ONS 2015), more than 5.5 times gross domestic product (GDP). Rates of return from foreign direct investment, which accounts for around 10% of Britain's total overseas assets, were 9% for investments in Africa and 13% in Asia in 2014, compared to 5% returns on

investments in Britain and the north of Ireland (ONS 2015). This represents imperialist super-exploitation.

A large part of Britain's investments abroad takes the form of loans, an example of what Lenin (1916/1975) calls a "gigantic usury capital" that is typical of imperialism. Britain is highly dependent on the import of goods, with a net deficit of £123.7bn in 2014, and finances this to a great extent through the export of services, with a net surplus of £89.1bn (ONS 2015). Twenty-nine percent of Britain's service exports are accounted for by financial services, the highest for any of the G7 group of wealthy countries. Financial and insurance services employed more than a million people in 2013 and accounted for 6.8% of GDP, again the highest proportion for any G7 country (Banks et al. 2014). Financial services do not produce anything but simply redistribute surplus value produced elsewhere in the global economy into the hands of British finance capitalists. This reliance on the financial sector places the City of London at the heart of British capitalism, making it vital that the city's global position is sustained.

New Migration to Britain

Low-skilled, strongly gendered, and often temporary migration to the EU from outside has grown rapidly in recent decades, alongside highly skilled migration from outside and various forms of movement within the EU, with increasing polarization. Schierup and Castles (2011: 23) identify tendencies across Europe toward inclusion of migrants in formal rights alongside ongoing "real economic and social exclusion," enforcing acceptance of low-paid, insecure work. Migration to Britain continued despite the economic crisis, and protecting continued mobility for "highly skilled" workers has been a major concern within discussions about Britain's departure from the EU (*Financial Times*, 19 October 2016). In total, around 8.3 million residents of Britain and the north of Ireland were born abroad, around 12.5% of the total population (Alberti 2017).

In 2008, the labor government introduced a points-based system for migration from outside the EU, representing a new stage in the fine-tuning of immigration to the needs of British capital. This system allocates points according to attributes including qualifications, skills, English language competence, age, and income, with a top tier in which "high-skilled" migrants, generally from more middle-class backgrounds and speaking excellent English, are granted greater rights, followed by workers with more limited rights, often tied to specific employers. The bottom tier, for "low-skilled migrants," was indefinitely suspended as soon as the system was launched, given the availability of labor from other parts of the EU. Differences in migrants' class position within Britain correspond closely to the position of their countries of origin within imperialism. As Datta et al. (2007a) note:

> ...those coming to Britain from high-income countries have been crucial in helping meet a still growing demand for high-skilled workers, with around a third (36%) of those coming from Japan and a little under a quarter (23.1%) of migrants from Germany who are now living in London finding employment in managerial positions. (412)

A policy advisor from a business membership organization reported that the ability to quickly meet skill needs in response to changing customer demands was a significant motivation for British companies to recruit internationally (Vickers 2019). They indicated migration chains in some sectors, where graduates in digital and IT industries were leaving North East England for London, increasing the need to bring in migrant labor or outsource to workers resident in another country. At the other end of the workforce in terms of status and pay, key sectors of the British economy are reliant on low-skilled migrant labor.

In 2004, eight formerly socialist countries in Eastern Europe joined the EU, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. They entered the EU in a position subordinate to the interests of the big European imperialist powers; this offered British capital access to a substantial new source of labor, and their subordinate status was reflected in the treatment of migrants from these countries. Poland was the largest single source of EU migrant labor during this period. Prior to joining the EU, Poland had experienced the fastest growth and fastest privatization of all the former socialist

countries in Eastern Europe, the highest unemployment rate of any EU Member State, and lower per capita GDP than many other Eastern European countries. It shared other typical features of the formerly socialist countries, wherein:

> Job security has been replaced by insecurity, through casual contracts.... [The] unemployed rely on low-value state benefits and on informal legal and illegal income-generating activities.... employers resort to the use of self-employment contracts, enabling avoidance of health and safety responsibilities, regular pay increases and payment of social contributions, and to shed staff more easily.... In some workplaces employers have been quick to dismiss workers who try to join or organize unions. (Hardy 2008: 6)

This offered a ready supply of unorganized labor under pressure to migrate.

Migrant workers from Eastern Europe have faced systematic discrimination within Britain, based on attributes such as accent and language (Ashe and Nazroo 2016; Vickers et al. 2016), and have been disproportionately concentrated in poorer sections of the working class. In 2014–2015, 83.7% of Polish adults in Britain were classified as economically active, compared to 59.4% of the general population. This reflects the conditional nature of their presence within Britain, dependent on the sale of their labor power. This conditionality has been enforced by special restrictions on access to out-of-work benefits and some other forms of state support, beyond those affecting British citizens and backed by the deportation of those without means to support themselves. State-enforced compulsion to work reduces the possibility of turning down work because of low pay or poor conditions. In 2014–2015, 31.4% of Polish migrants in work were employed in "elementary occupations," more than three times the percentage for the general population, and Polish workers' median hourly pay was £7.94, compared to £10.81 for the general population. The reliance on EU migrant labor in some sectors reached around 40% for "packers, bottlers, canners, and fillers" and "food, drink, and tobacco process operatives" (Morris 2017: 24–5). Dustmann and Frattini (2014) show that EU migrants who arrived during 2001–2011 made a net contribution of £20bn to Britain's public finances, representing a massive transfer of wealth to Britain. Although demographics and sectorial compositions differ across Britain, the prevalence of differential inclusion is consistent. Labor segmentation has coincided with social exclusion, including divisions between migrants from different countries, undermining potential for class-based solidarity against exploitative working practices (Datta et al. 2007a: 422–3). Since 2008, growing numbers of people have also moved to Britain from Southern Europe, fleeing the even more intense impacts of economic crisis and austerity in those countries (Alberti 2017).

Meardi et al. (2012) argue that the benefits of EU10 migrants for British employers have resulted as much from their mobility, as from their readiness to accept low wages:

> It would be simplistic to see intra-EU mobility as just a strategy, by governments and employers, to lower labour costs and weaken trade unions.... In fact, wages seem to have been affected only marginally in the EU15 . . . real wages had already been stagnant in Western Europe for a while, and unions declining, so there was no urgent need for EU employers to import foreign labour to stop wage or union growth.... more than low costs, the specific attractive feature of the new labour supply relies exactly on their 'mobility', which offers a corrective to the longblamed 'sclerosis' of European labour markets. (8)

Sporton (2013: 445) connects the deregulation of labor markets since the 1990s and the shift to "managed migration" since 2002, as part of a neoliberal drive to create a workforce within Britain that is "flexible" from the perspective of employers but "precarious" from the perspective of workers themselves. As part of this shift, they point to the explosion of agency employment, from 775,000 to 1.37 million between 1997 and 2007. In a survey of over 1000 employers, all of those who employed a disproportionately large number of EU migrants had recruited them via an agency (CIPD 2013: 16). This has led to invisibility for many migrant workers at the bottom of supply chains, because their employment via agencies means their employment is recorded in the category of "administration, business, and management" – the largest sector of employment for Eastern European workers by far according to

the Border and Immigration Agency in 2008 (Hardy 2008: 10).

The tailoring of immigration controls to the needs of British capital has been further reinforced by restrictions on migration on grounds other than employment or investment, for example, to study, for family reunification or for asylum (Vickers 2012, 2019). This reflects compliance with waged labor or private ownership of capital to invest as the dominant forms of conditionality for migration to imperialist countries. Alongside the intensifying capitalist crisis, Britain's border controls have extended internally, intensifying conditions for super-exploitation.

Internalizing Immigration Controls: The "Hostile Environment"

In 2013, the Home Office created the Interventions and Sanctions Directorate (ISD), with the explicit aim of building partnerships to push undocumented migrants out of Britain:

> The unit has overall responsibility for removing incentives for people to stay illegally and encourage those who are in the country unlawfully to regularise their stay or leave the UK.… The unit works closely with government departments and a range of other partners across the public and private sectors to identify those migrants accessing such services and benefits to which they are not entitled. (ICIBI 2016)

In 2014 the government passed an Immigration Act that extended border controls into many areas of everyday life (Wemyss 2015), including health care, private-rented housing, employment, banking, and driving private vehicles. This built on pre-existing arrangements for data sharing to enable immigration enforcement, for example, a relationship between the Home Office and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), established in 2005 and extended in 2008 (ICIBI 2016), and restrictions on benefits and health care. A further Immigration Act in 2016 continued down the same road, increasing sanctions for non-compliance.

Businesses, local authorities, charities, and Members of Parliament (MPs) have also been involved in the hostile environment. For example, Bales (2017) discusses the "arrest by appointment" of 35 workers in July 2016, after their employer, Byron Burgers, told them to attend meetings deliberately timed to coincide with immigration raids. Protests opposing this collusion followed outside several Byron outlets across Britain. As with many other elements of the hostile environment, this represented an intensification and systemization of longer-term trends, with precedents including alleged collaboration between the University of London School of African and Oriental Studies (SOAS) and the Home Office to deport cleaners fighting for a living wage in 2009 (*The Guardian*, 27 June 2009). In another example, Corporate Watch (2018) documents collaboration between at least 12 London borough councils, the Greater London Authority, homelessness charities, and the Home Office to deport homeless migrants, with similar practices reported in Bristol, Brighton, and other cities with large numbers of rough sleepers. A high court ruling in December 2017 found the deportation of EU citizens on grounds of street homelessness to be unlawful, but campaigners allege their involvement continued. During 2012–2018, MPs reported more than 700 people for suspected "immigration abuse," presumably mostly constituents approaching them for help (*The Independent*, 23 June 2018).

Migration and the Labor Aristocracy

Phizacklea and Miles (1980: 6) use the concept of "class fractions" to describe "objective position[s] within a class boundary which [are], in turn, determined by both economic and politico-ideological relations," whose composition and relationships must be empirically established. This offers a way of understanding class divisions arising from imperialist borders and immigration controls, including polarization within long-established racialized minority sections of the working class, differentiation among recent migrants, and forms of relative privilege enabled by imperialist super-profits, giving rise to a "labor aristocracy." The remainder of this chapter focuses on the latter, in relation to migration. The term "opportunism" (Lenin 1915/2005) expresses political tendencies toward the defense of narrow, short-term interests of particular class fractions rather than the long-term interests of the entire working class. Within

Britain, this has taken the form of chauvinist trends within the working class, who align their interests with imperialism and follow the lead of the British ruling classes against workers from other countries. These divisions are unstable, and while processes of fractioning are always underway, distinct fractions often become visible only in moments of intense struggle, when underlying processes burst to the surface in mass collective action.

Within Britain, trade unions have often failed to represent the interests of the whole working class and have instead tended to consolidate the position of a labor aristocracy whose privileges rely on the maintenance of imperialism and consequently complicity with racism (Clough 2014; Carbonella and Kasmir 2018: 14). This gives the labor aristocracy an interest in the fragmentation and subjugation of the working-class majority and provides a material basis for chauvinism and racism among the working class, beyond the purely ideological dimensions discussed by Virdee (2014). This material basis suggests that such divisions are intrinsic to imperialism.

While a minority of racialized minority workers has been drawn into the labor aristocracy, particularly since the 1980s, and their example has been used to encourage aspirational individualism, the majority remains in a super-exploited position that has much in common with new migrants. The enduring insecurity of racialized minority sections of the working class was vividly illustrated by the attacks on the so-called Windrush generation, which made headline news in 2018. The Windrush generation refers to people who moved from the Caribbean to Britain in the decades after World War II as commonwealth citizens, symbolically represented by the docking of the MV Empire Windrush on 22 June 1948. They were granted British citizenship as part of the 1971 Immigration Act, alongside restrictions on further migration. In 2016 reports began to appear about people within this group being refused access to state services because they had no documents to prove their citizenship. For example, Albert Thompson, who arrived from Jamaica as a teenager 44 years before, found

himself denied cancer treatment by the NHS (*The Independent*, 25 April 2018). Hundreds more are thought to have been deported (*The Guardian*, 5 June 2018). Home Secretary Amber Rudd responded to the ensuing public outcry by saying this was all a mistake and subsequently resigned, and Prime Minister Theresa May promised compensation. Yet, these apologies are undermined by the existence of a Home Office pamphlet, first issued in 2010, titled *Coming Home to Jamaica*, which offers guidance to those deported after decades living in Britain. This demonstrates the extent to which lines of entitlement are shifting in the current British context, and borders are expanding their operation to ensnare growing numbers of people. As Schierup and Castles (2011: 24) argue, established members of racialized minority groups have weaker claims to social citizenship than white citizens and, in the context of the capitalist crisis, are moving closer to the situation of temporary migrants and refugees.

Britain's labor aristocracy has taken various forms, from industrial sectors directly connected to colonialism in the late nineteenth century, to higher-paid public sector workers in the second half of the twentieth century, and workers in the financial sector today. Trade unions in Britain today largely fail to organize among, let alone represent, the most oppressed sections of the working class. Membership has fallen, in absolute terms and as a proportion of the workforce, and has become more middle class (BIS 2017). In 2016, union membership among people earning over £1000/week was proportionally higher than among those earning less than £250/week (BIS 2017: 29). Higher-paid trade unionists outnumbered those in lower-paid roles by 4:1 in 2016, increasing from 2014 when it was 3:1. This was at a time when there were 5.1 million low-paid workers. The concentration of highly paid workers within Britain's unions cannot be accounted for by gains won through struggle. Indeed, the "trade union premium," wage differentials associated with union membership, actually fell between 1995 and 2016 from 15.3% to 7.6% for the private sector and from 30.4% to 14.5% for the public sector (BIS 2017: 41).

Following a series of mergers, Britain's trade union movement has become dominated by massive monopolies, with the biggest three unions, Unite, Unison, and GMB, together accounting for over half of Trade Union Congress (TUC) membership. This has included the merger of unions whose members are employed at very different levels of seniority, meaning that low-paid workers may be forced to be in the same branch as their managers. In addition, these mega-unions have a significant stake in the system, including huge investments in properties and shares. In 2009 the big three unions received a total income of £386.5 million and paid out only £3 million in strike pay (Clough 2010). These characteristics of union membership, structures, and financial membership help to explain the historical tendency for British trade unions to be reluctant to support migrant workers or to be outright hostile (Richmond 2002). Trade union membership in 2016 was 16.2% among workers born outside Britain, compared to 25% among workers born in Britain (BIS 2017: 5).

Yet despite these tendencies to divide the working class, disunity and antagonism is not a foregone conclusion. The labor aristocracy is not a mechanical consequence of relative privilege, but also political, and therein lies the possibility for opportunism to be challenged and alliances to be formed. Britain's engineering construction worker strikes of 2009–2010 provide an example of both the pressures toward opportunism and the possibility for more internationalist positions to win through.

These strikes began on 28 January 2009, when workers at Lindsey Oil Refinery in North Lincolnshire were told that IREM, an Italian company that was due to take over a third of the contract, on behalf of the French multinational Total, was refusing to employ British labor. Another subcontractor, Shaw's, had issued 90-day redundancy notices in mid-November 2008, meaning that workers already facing redundancy in mid-February would not be allowed to apply for the IREM jobs. They were also told that the Italian and Portuguese workers IREM was planning to employ would be housed on floating barges for the duration of the job and would be bussed back to the barges for lunch – interpreted as an attempt to keep them separate from British workers and trade unions. The entire workforce across all subcontractors voted for strike action, and the following day over 1000 workers from Lindsey, Conoco, and Easington sites picketed Lindsey. The strike called for international equality and unionization, driven by grassroots unofficial action, as Gall (2009) describes:

> …when the assembled workers voted to walk out, the entire stewards' committee (on advice from Unite EUOs) resigned in order to distance the union from 'unlawful action'. An unofficial strike committee was then elected which formulated the strikers' demands following approval at a mass meeting on the strike's third day. These were: no victimisation for taking solidarity action; all ECI [Engineering Construction Industry] workers in Britain to be covered by the NAECI [National Joint Council for the Engineering Construction Industry] agreement; union controlled registering of unemployed and locally skilled union members, with nominating rights as work becomes available; government and employer investment in proper training/apprenticeships for a new generation of ECI workers; all migrant labour to be unionised; union assistance for immigrant workers – including interpreters – and access to union advice to promote active integrated union members; and building links with construction unions on the continent. (418)

Following this, the unofficial strike spread to over 20 sites across Britain.

Neither local strike leaderships nor their unions ever officially endorsed the slogan "British jobs for British workers," which some workers used on placards in the early days of the strike, quoting Labor Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Attempts by the far-right British National Party (BNP) to intervene in the strikes and recruit to their "solidarity" union front were firmly rebuffed, and BNP members were reportedly chased out of the car park outside a mass meeting at the Lindsey plant. Yet "British Jobs for British Workers" was used to characterize the strikes in much of the capitalist media, ignoring the context in which it had been raised:

> Following the government's spending billions of pounds of public money in bailing out banks and indemnifying them against their losses, the strikers sought to make the point that they too demanded government protection.… The first strike at

Lindsey concerned IREM's practice of exclusively using Italian and Portuguese workers specifically brought into Britain for this work and excluding local labor, whether British or non-British. So this was not a strike against the use of overseas workers per se, and the strikers did not call for the expulsion, repatriation, or sacking of "foreign" workers.... After the strike committee asserted itself, the slogans on the placards changed to "fair access for local labor" where "local" meant already domiciled worker and was not a cipher for "British" or white "British" workers. The two unions then repeatedly made statements like, "Our fight is with the employers who want to tear up our [NAECI] agreement and undermine our hard-won conditions at Staythorpe and wherever else. Not with the workers they seek to exploit" (Gall 2009: 422).

The strike was settled with an agreement that included an end to the segregation of foreign workers.

Following these successful strikes, in June the same year, 51 workers employed by Shaw's at Lindsey were made redundant without consultation, or the industry norm of the opportunity to transfer to another of the site's contractors, and with only a week's pay in lieu of notice. Simultaneously another subcontractor at the site took on 60 new workers to perform similar work. According to a GMB union press release, a senior manager at the site blamed the refusal of a transfer option on "an unruly workforce who had taken part in unofficial disputes and who won't work weekends." Workers responded by calling for unofficial solidarity actions across the industry. Three days later contractors, with the backing of Total, announced the sacking of a further 647 workers for participating in unofficial strikes. Total initially agreed to talks with unions and the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), but failed to turn up. The 647 workers were given the option to reapply for their jobs, seemingly an attempt to weed out leading trade unionists. Workers responded by publicly burning their dismissal notices; solidarity strikes spread to more than 20 sites, including Polish workers at Drax in North Yorkshire, with 900 contract workers at the Sellafield plant in Cumbria stopping work for 3 days. Faced with such unity, Total made a statement expressing hope that its subcontractors at Lindsey would soon reach an agreement allowing work to resume. As 2000 workers rallied outside Lindsey, the Unite and GMB unions announced their official endorsement of the strikes, with GMB pledging a £100,000 hardship fund. The strike ended with an agreement between Unite, GMB, and the managing contractor Jacobs, including the full reinstatement of all sacked workers for at least 4 weeks, following which national terms would be followed for any further redundancies.

These strikes demonstrated that despite material divides within the working class, and attempts by the capitalist media and politicians to encourage chauvinism, a more internationalist approach can win out. Faced with determined and independent action by workers, the unions had little choice but to give official support, if only to end the dispute. The strike committee at Lindsey played a crucial role in maintaining a degree of independence from the union leadership to drive the action forward. However, it is important not to overstate these victories: even after the 2009 strikes, employers continued to employ migrant workers below industry rates (Gall 2009: 426–7). Similarly, the danger of a chauvinist direction to trade unionism in the industry did not disappear and required constant political struggle. Other examples suggest continuing failures by Britain's major trade unions to integrate migrants, leading to splits in recent years from Unite and Unison to form new workers' organizations including the IWGB and United Voices of the World (Alberti and Peró 2018).

Conclusion

While immigration controls produce tendencies toward class fractioning, to the detriment of the working class, migration itself offers opportunities for international alliances and solidarity. Although some have suggested that the presence of immigrants weakens worker solidarity and radicalism, Strikwerda and Guerin-Gonzales (1998) argue that the evidence for this comes "almost exclusively from the pre-World War I United States or contemporary Western Europe – both periods of apparent 'failure' or 'conservatism' of

the labor movement as a whole" (24–5). The authors cite other examples where unions have included and in some cases been led by migrants. Virdee (2014) gives other examples of migrants who have been part of working-class leaderships in Britain, and Alberti and Però (2018) discuss more recent examples (also Oliveri 2012, 2018; Vickers 2014). Writing about the exploitation of Russian migrant workers in Europe in an earlier period of imperialist crisis, Lenin (1913/1977) points to mutual learning and class development through international migration, both taking workers "out of their semi-feudal conditions and . . . putting them in the ranks of the advanced, international army of the proletariat" and introducing new methods, for example, "Workers who had participated in various strikes in Russia introduced into America the bolder and more aggressive spirit of the mass strike" (454–7). This reflects the potential for special kinds of exploitation to produce special forms of resistance and for international migration to strengthen the working class.

Cross-References

▶ Forced migration and Imperialism in the Neoliberal Era

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Imperial Ecology

▶ Imperialism and Environment

Imperial Tastes and Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century India

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Definition

This essay attempts an analysis of how imperial expansion was intertwined with the dynamics of trade and networks of production, consumption, and exchange of psychoactive substances. The intake of psychoactive substances has encoded meanings with cultural, social, spiritual, meta-physical, and transmutative effects. Exploring this vital dimension of the impact of addictive commodities in shaping patterns of dominance (in this context, sugar, tea and opium), this essay explores the economics of opium, the politics of the Empire and its role in effecting a metamorphosis of landscapes and livelihoods in the Indian subcontinent.

It was through the networks of distribution that the stories of sugar, tea, and opium were set to intersect and entwine the colonial British Empire in Asia. What linked the commodities were the shifting patterns of dietetics that sugar and tea fostered first in England and later Britain. The adding of milk to tea was reported in France around 1680 but that practice was not originally connected with adding sugar. The physician and philanthropist John Coakley Lettsom (1744–1815), in an essay of 1772 titled "Natural History of the Tea-Tree" (about the various benefits gained from drinking tea), recommended it as an alternative to "vegetable infusions" on the grounds of superiority in "taste and effects."

Soon, tea drinking began to be associated with wide-ranging discourses from culture of health to culture of respectability, to becoming a symbol of patriotic zeal. In 1783, the annual consumption of tea in England was about 5,000,000 lb. and the tea duty was 27%. In 1784, Pitt, lowered this duty to 12%, thus, extending the use of tea among the

poorer classes of society. Tea and sugar consumption were considered to be patriotic as they supported the British Empire. There exists sufficient evidence to document the enormous increase in sugar trade in consequence of the increased consumption of tea. Medical articles of the early nineteenth century hailed sugar as a most valuable article of diet, as a "restorative" and capable not merely of supporting but strengthening life. Superintendent of agriculture Charles Alfred Barber, a botanist and taxonomist (in his essay titled, "Sugar Cane and Health," *Knowledge* [1892]) reported that 72 lb. of sugar per head was consumed annually by the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland, 52 lb. in the US, 25 lb. in France, and only 17 lb. in Germany.

The "Psychoactive Revolution," which Courtwright (2005: 1) mentions is what triggered the mass consumption market, was followed first by massive mercantile pursuits and later by an advocacy of imperial dominion in Asia and Africa. Consumption mannerisms have been significant indices of power relations, a view echoed in Sidney Mintz's classic study of sugar where he has explored the impact of commodities in shaping patterns of economic dominance and also as "platforms" in challenging and, in many instances, reverting the prevailing order. Mintz claimed that sugar in nineteenth-century Britain pioneered the principle of mass consumption. The growth of sugar plantations in the Caribbean islands acted as a catalyst in propelling the demand for tea. Interestingly, in the period 1600–1800, to quote Robert William Fogel (Fogel and Engerman 1974), "slave produced sugar was the single most important internationally traded commodity, dwarfing in value the trade in grains, meat fish, tobacco, spices, cloth or metals." Tea was introduced in the second half of the seventeenth century, and its general employment was not adopted without bitter opposition. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to gain the right to trade with China, and the first to drink tea. Around 1514, they reached the South China coast and were the first to introduce tea to Europe. In 1643, an attempt had been made in the

English parliament to forbid its use. Over time, however, it came to characterise British ideas of gentility and respectability in the 18th and the nineteenth centuries; a historical incident attended by wide-ranging ramifications. The therapeutic properties of tea were being widely recognised in France and England where it was believed to be a preventive against cholera.

Tea came to be regarded as "necessary for life," the enhanced consumption of which was upheld in great measure by custom and was essentially dependent on the use of sugar for enhancing its flavour. By the early years of the nineteenth century, tea drinking was no longer a luxury. It was eulogised as a "national drink," the consequence of which, as Sidney Mintz observed, was that "the production of tea was developed energetically in a single vast colony and served there as a means not only of profit but also of the power to rule." Consumption triggered production and trade. Incidental to the increased demand for tea was an upsurge in the demand for exotic Chinese ceramics for the tea and sugar ritual. Its widespread adoption in Britain and Europe led in large part to an upsurge in the demand for both the products (tea and sugar) fuelling the need for economic expansion in Asia and the Indies.

While the Orient was exotic (early European explorations and maritime contacts creating a spectacle of material indulgence and economic prosperity with the discovery of spices, silk, Chinese wares, cotton, and tea), the Occidental goods did not appeal to the Chinese. This lack of interest in European goods was to continue through the nineteenth century and its effects profoundly shaped the contours of the East India Company's trade. This lure of the "riches of the East" was to lead to a severe drain on resources, a reverse flow of precious metals, particularly silver from Europe to Asia, in particular China, from whom the British imports included silk, ceramics and tea.

The East India Company used capital raised from sales of Indian cotton in Canton. A system of credit was developed whereby the Company sold bills (redeemed in London) and used this silver to buy Chinese tea. Expenses on tea from China

were annually draining England of its precious metals, including silver, from the Spanish colonies. By 1813, Britain was buying about 32 m lb. (14.5 m kg) of tea. China accumulated vast amounts of silver, which became the standard global trading currency of the period. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, China gained about $26 m in her world balance of payments. An effective solution to the drain of metals from Europe was revealed in the export of two Indian commodities: raw cotton and opium. Opium sales to China rocketed year after year to serve, after Carl Trocki, as "incubators of capitalism." Opium proved an amazing commodity. In Montgomery Martin's work entitled *Colonies of Great Britain* (Martin 1834) it appears that the East India Company alone sold the following quantity of opium: in the year ending 1800: 4054 chests for 3,142,591 Sicca Rupees (hereafter s); in 1810: 4561 chests for 8,070,955 s; in 1820: 4006 chests for 8,255,403 s; in 1830: 8778 chests for 11,255,767 s and in 1837: 16,916 chests for 25,395,300 (Martin 1834).

The pattern of economic growth and capital accumulation in the East and the West was reversed towards the end of the eighteenth century with opium making a significant contribution towards reshaping the trade balance. In fact, drugs and the trade in intoxicants like coca, tobacco, and opium have acted as facilitators in the formation of the British Empire and in the creation of a global capitalistic economy. However, the conjunction of "relentless commodification" of drugs, their redefinition and appropriation as powerful symbols of exploitation, and domination provides an interesting insight into the basis of intentional intoxication, where the "Addiction" of one leads to "Corruption" of the other. Herein, lay the crux of the economics of opium: politics of the Empire and its role in effecting a metamorphosis of landscapes and livelihoods.

In his pioneering study *Phantastica: Narcotic and Stimulating Drugs*, published in 1924 during the Prohibition Movement, the renowned German toxicologist Louis Lewin divided drugs into five categories. His work was the first effort ever at studying drugs by their effect. The categories are euphoriants, excitants, hypnotics, inebriants, and phantasticants. As per his classification, tea and caffeinated products (of which sugar was an important constituent) were grouped as "Excitantia," and opiates, including cocaine were "Euphorica." Nevertheless, they were all psychoactive substances, consumption of which was capable of inducing significant physiological and psychological changes in mind and body over a period. Moreover, the three linked commodities (sugar, tea, and opium) share a similar trajectory of attraction and repulsion (Lewin 1924: 23–27). They began their careers as exotic, but with significant therapeutic properties. Contemporary medical journals such as the *British Medical Journal* carried articles which hailed sugar as a "muscular food," a nerve restorative, a most valuable article of diet". Tea was regarded as a preventive against cholera; its simulative properties being upheld all over Europe. The protagonists of the Temperance Societies in England even urged people to replace drinking gin and whisky with tea. Opium also went from being a medicine to mass drug food.

It was their "downward filtration" as articles of mass consumption which led to their being denounced as potent agents of physical degeneration, social turmoil, and moral failing. It is recorded that sugar was the first luxury indulged in "next to the actual necessaries of life"; its use being limited by the price. The "use/abuse dichotomy," the demarcation between "pleasure and aesthetic qualities" and "medicinal side" and "euphoric side" were all located within the eighteenth-century European discourse of science and medicine, assigning to the commodities meanings within the prevailing discourse.

The consumption process from elite to mass is suggestive of geographic and cultural fluidity, with symbolic connotations attending each mutation. Although trade was a prime carrier in the "Europeanisation" of commodities, the tentacles of the Enlightenment era's prosperity and the notion of progress which it spawned provided a

thrust to the desire for control, over both distribution and production of commodities to ensure their constant availability. The medical/botanical debate, motivated by the necessity to control production, further spurred the demand for exotic commodities. Along with the movement of plants, which followed the growth of botanical sciences, it was peasant agriculture and tropical plantations that were patronised to ensure an increasing supply of crops for the world market.

Europe was enriched by a range of products (tobacco, maize, potato, cocoa, and beans) from the New World. Tea took them towards Asia, where China was the home of the brew whose lure proved more enchanting than either spices or textiles. The English East India Company outmanoeuvred the Dutch to monopolise the entire tea trade with China, which was to inaugurate a long phase of confrontation between the two countries. The English had after a slight skirmish managed to establish a small base at Canton in 1637, and continued there for 150 years till 1664. This was in stark contrast to their spirit of commercial enterprise. Attempts to establish free and direct access to the tea trade via diplomatic relations were met with stiff resistance from the Chinese, who viewed all foreigners suspiciously and likewise the expansionist policies of Europe in Tibet, the East Indies, Philippines, Burma, and Nepal.

As British mercantile interest in China swelled, in opium, the British finally found something that the Chinese would buy in large quantities. Prior to 1796, opium was admitted into China on payment of a duty when a few hundred chests were imported. Yet clandestine sales, of 20,000 chests imported towards the latter half of the nineteenth century, heavily drained the Chinese exchequer. Opium turned the balance, establishing itself as a powerful commodity financing British economic and political expansion. This was done by structurally linking the economies of China, India, and Britain in a trade triangle. By 1773, the establishment of an opium monopoly in India ensured and regulated supply, with profits from opium trade being ploughed into buying exports of tea from China.

"Opium Made the World Go Round"

The Portuguese traders first realised and capitalised on the sale of opium, establishing a trade in the early sixteenth century. The Portuguese initially sold tobacco from their Brazilian colony in exchange for China's silk. Like other European nations, Portugal quickly discovered that opium provided a much better tool for trade. Dutch merchants were quick to enter the increasingly lucrative opium trade. Like the Portuguese, they focused their efforts on controlling the Chinese market. Hence, the British did not *introduce* the Chinese to opium but were *more efficient in supplying* it than previous importers.

In 1773, following the conquest of Bengal, Warren Hastings, the East India Company's governor there, redesigned the system of ensuring monopoly rights in opium. Nobody was allowed to cultivate the poppy except with a licence from the government, and every cultivator was bound by law to sell the opium produced from his crop to the government. It was to be administered by the Bengal government, although the operations extended into the North West Provinces, Oudh, and Punjab of British India and also into the native states in central India and Rajputana. Initially, the East India Company tried to prevent British importation of opium into China since the illegal business interfered with its legitimate trade. Based in Canton, representatives of the Company asked Warren Hastings to halt exports from India to China. As a result of financial and political realities, Hastings allowed the export of 3450 chests of the contraband in two ships. In 1773, opium earned the Company £39,000. Twenty years later, the annual revenue from opium sold in China alone had ballooned to £250,000. The popular drug was incrementally beginning to reverse the imbalance of trade between Britain and China. Between 1806 and 1809, China paid out seven million Spanish dollars (*peso de ocho*) for opium. The East India Company kept the price artificially high, which meant that only the upper classes could afford it. It was not just profit motive that made opium expensive and beyond the budget of Chinese; the drug was officially illegal, and the East India

Company did not want to antagonise the Chinese government.

- A technological innovation upset the equilibrium. This was the invention of the steam engine and the mechanised production of cotton by factories in the North of England. The surplus found a ready market in India, whose merchants paid for the product in cash. However, to pay for the ever increasing amount of cotton, the Indians needed to cultivate and sell more opium. As a result, opium flooded into China. Opium began as an answer to a crisis, but by the end of the nineteenth century it had itself developed into a major crisis. The Indian opium entering China in 1839 was enough to supply 10 million addicts. By 1900, there were an estimated 40 million addicts in China. The following statement exhibits the consumption of opium spanning a period of 20 years. In the year ending 1800: 4054 chests for 3,142,591 *Sicca Rupees* (hereafter s)
- In 1810: 4561 chests for 8,070,955 s.
- In 1820: 4006 chests for 8,255,403 s.
- In 1830: 8778 chests for 11,255,767 s
- In 1837: 16,916 chests for 25,395,300 s (Martin 1834).

Opium wrought havoc. Opium purchased from the cultivators was sent to the two factories at Ghazipur and Patna (in Bihar), to be manufactured into articles of commerce, the "Excise (Abkaree) opium" and the "Provision opium." Excise opium was the manufactured opium retained for consumption in India through vendors, and Provision opium was sold monthly by auction in Calcutta to merchants who exported it. The government issued advances to the peasants.

It was claimed that Indian opium maintained a high reputation in the Chinese market as the drug was admitted to be far superior to the drug produced in China. After 1833, when the monopoly of trading by the East India Company ceased, this operation had become too profitable to be shut down. Thereafter, opium traffic was run as a British government enterprise, and this included raising and harvesting the crop, preparing the opium, licensing the smuggling operations, and laying

out necessary bribes in China. Thus was forged a structural trade link between the economies of India, China, and Britain which was to set on course a massive worldwide deliberation on the politics, economics, and significantly the ethics of Britain's Indian opium trade with China.

What did British India stand to gain? From 1870–1914, India ran an annual surplus of about £20 m with China. In 1870, opium accounted for at least £13 m: two-thirds of India's surplus with China. Europeans of this period preferred the "informal empire" because it seemed to protect all interests that were really vital or profitable without the considerable cost of ruling over an alien society. John Fairbank has observed in his *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, has hinted on the centrality of the opium trade to the British commercial interests rather than tea (Fairbank 1953). In addition, opium was no "cotton or molasses." It was endowed with a power to create dependencies, destabilise societies, and sustain empires. The gigantic dimensions assumed by the opium trade led to the Chinese rebellion, the utter exhaustion of the imperial exchequer, and ultimately to the growth of tea plantations in the Indian colony.

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Imperialism

Imperialism and Environment

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Synonyms

Ecological imperialism; Imperial ecology

Definition/Description

What is the relationship between imperialism and the global environment? This entry examines this question through the gaze of Global Ecological Political Economy (GEPE) and argues that imperialism must be understood as an *ecological* phenomenon, in the sense that the expression of power, dominance, and oppression inevitably (re)produces systemic environmental consequences. Conversely, this entry adds to this formulation an important corollary: global environmental change and responses to it are in turn enmeshed with the forces of imperialism and often exacerbate unjust social relations and power imbalances across and between societies and states.

Introduction

In his masterpiece work, *The Open Veins of Latin America* (1973), Eduardo Galeano recounts five centuries of European imperialism in the Southern continent. His historical narrative weaves through the plunder of Latin America's natural resources – from gold and silver, cacao and cotton, rubber and coffee, fruit, hides and wool, petroleum, iron, nickel, manganese, copper, aluminum ore, nitrates, and tin, and so on. The account draws connections between the material exploitation of these resources and the lasting legacy of social domination and impoverishment faced by the

people of Latin America following centuries of what at its core amounts to "theft" of its natural capital. As many scholars have argued, a similar trend of material and subjective exploitation continues in the twenty-first century, albeit in new forms and featuring new flows, as the global structure of neoliberal globalization locks the "Global South" into patterns of "unequal exchange" (Emmanuel 1972), economic coercion, military dominance, and overbearing cultural influence (Duménil and Lévy 2004; Harvey 2003; Kiely 2006; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001).

Scholars have, however, only more recently begun to consider the *ecological* consequences of these imperial forces. This entry asks "what is the relationship between imperialism and the global environment?" and examines this question through the lenses of Global Ecological Political Economy (or GEPE) – a theoretical approach which "consider[s] the structural political-economic dynamics involved in human-environment interaction and advocate[s] historically contingent change to underlying productive and social relations with the normative aim of confronting socio-ecological injustices, broadly defined" (Katz-Rosene and Paterson 2018, p. 8). It argues that imperialism must be understood as an *ecological* phenomenon, and conversely global environmental change should be interpreted not as some socially neutral phenomenon, but rather an anthropogenically influenced force which has the effect of reproducing, echoing, and in some cases prompting new imperialist responses. That is, the expression of power, dominance, and oppression tends strongly to reproduce systemic environmental consequences, and in turn global environmental changes often exacerbate unjust social relations across and between societies and states.

Ecological Imperialism

At its most fundamental level, the European conquest of distant continents (and in particular the Americas) completely transformed the world in ecological terms – not only through the infrastructural and commercial developments which facilitated the exploitation, processing and transport of

minerals and other commodities which eventually made their way from hinterland to imperial core, but also through the introduction of new species of flora, fauna, and various pathogens – many of which had an invasive impact on indigenous flora, fauna, and regional ecology both in colonized regions and in the European colonizing countries. One of the first works to popularize this notion was Alfred Crosby's *The Columbian Exchange* (1972), which recounted the massive transfer of lifeforms between Europe and the Americas as successive waves of colonists brought "old world" crops, plants, animals, seeds, bacteria, and viruses (both knowingly and unwittingly) along with them on their ships, and similarly brought "new world" species back to European colonial centers. As hinted above, the impacts of this "ecological exchange" were wide-reaching and world-altering, not only in terms of their impact on various cultural practices (the widespread adoption of tomatoes in Italian cuisine, chocolate in Swiss confectionary, or chilies in Indian food, for instance, was only possible due to this exchange) – but more importantly via the "invasive" character of many of these species which had no natural competitors or prey in their new environments. The smallpox virus, for instance, was responsible (along with other communicable diseases never before found in the Americas) for the deaths of many millions of indigenous peoples (by some estimates killing upward of 90% of the original inhabitants of the continent, see Diamond 1998). In another example, common earthworm species – now ubiquitous throughout North America – did not exist prior to the European conquest of the continent (Eisenhauer et al. 2007). The wide-ranging ecological exchange which occurred as a by-product of European imperialism completely rewrote the world's ecology and generally facilitated the imperial expansion of European kingdoms around the world (with a notable exception being Central Africa, where pathogens unfamiliar to Europeans helped *delay* their conquest, see Crosby 1986; Diamond 1998; Mann 2005, 2011).

Thus from its very origins in European empires, modern imperialism has been by definition an *ecological* phenomenon. Another early observer of this dynamic was Karl Marx (Clark and Foster 2009). In his writings about the nineteenth-century guano trade (wherein European powers fought for control over nitrate-rich islands off the coast of South America), Marx identified what would come to be known as the "metabolic rift" – at its core an ecological imbalance between various spaces and places engendered by capitalist exploitation. For Marx, this was made visible in the transfer of soil nutrients from countryside (where it was usable and required) to urban areas (where it was not), occurring as industrialization gave rise to rapid urbanization, requiring more intensive fertilization of agricultural lands in the countryside to satiate the rising demand for food from wage laborers. This in turn created the impetus for nitrate-rich guano and the commodification (and requisite market competition, and interstate rivalries it engendered) for various fertilizers as commodities. In short, for Marx the imperial rivalries in the Pacific were clearly tied to the forces of industrialization, capital accumulation, and – more to the point – this was causing the vast ecological transformation of the European countryside (though he would not have expressed it in these terms). Building on Marx's concept of metabolic rift, Clark and Foster identify how today a global metabolic rift is the legacy of historical and contemporary forms of imperialism which are endemic to capitalism: "The social metabolic order of capitalism is inseparable from such ecological imperialism, which is as basic to the system as the search for profits itself" (Clark and Foster 2009, p. 311).

The drive to accumulate capital – a requirement in capitalist societies – leads to a range of ecological transformations and imbalances of this sort. These include the build-up of pollution around export-processing zones in the Global South as multinational corporations seek production sites with lax environmental laws (Frey 2003); the growing specter of plastic pollution in the world's oceans as disposable single-use plastics are prioritized for cost reasons over reusable or regenerative materials (Parker 2018); or even the accumulation of climate-changing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere as the world's largest oil companies (both private and state-owned)

prioritize profit over the known traumas that will ensue from global warming (Riley 2017). These are just some examples of the global-scale metabolic (ecological) rifts engendered by the neoliberal stage of imperialism.

Managing the Anthropocene

It is clear then that we live in a global capitalist system which is structured by the past and ongoing present of imperialism, and that this system has a range of ecological manifestations. At the same time, however, the modern efforts to "manage" the known environmental consequences of capitalism themselves have imperial origins. That is, the origins of dominant forms of Western environmentalist thought – with its focus on "environmental management" – can themselves be linked to early European imperialism. Two sorts of discursive transformation occurred alongside early imperialism in Western thought which contributed to this early form of environmental knowledge (Katz-Rosene and Paterson 2018). The first was a shift from seeing the world holistically toward seeing it as an inert set of specific species, organic chemicals, natural resources, and so on – a shift which occurred alongside the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century as early innovators like Galileo and Newton made their respective scientific discoveries (see, for instance, Merchant 1990; Plumwood 2002; Thomas 1996). The second involved the manifestation of powerful forms of "othering," notably xenophobia and Orientalism, which occurred as Europeans traveled the world and encountered peoples whom they failed to interpret as human (Saïd 1978). That is, they constructed the peoples they encountered in their minds as part of nature, not part of humanity (Todorov 1984), a logic which gave rise to the exploitation and oppression of indigenous peoples alongside the exploitation of nature itself. Both of these discursive transformations, of course, contributed to an ethos of colonial management and control of both the natural world and any peoples who were not of European ancestry. Perhaps the best example of this dual transformation is the manifestation of the plantation economy in the Americas, made possible only thanks to the combined domination of land (via deforestation and monocropping of select commodity crops or mining of select precious metals) and people (in this case African slaves and indigenous peoples of the Americas) (Obeyesekere 1992; Studnicki-Gizbert and Schecter 2010).

This imperialist framing of ecology notably served to justify the expropriation of wide swaths of land and territory in the global British Empire. It was expressed most significantly by John Locke, whose Second Treatise on Government served to justify British colonialism by explicitly arguing that the indigenous peoples of North America should be understood within the category "nature" rather than "humanity," and doing so precisely by reference to how they used the land. Since, claimed Locke, the indigenous inhabitants of North America did not appear to enclose land or issue private rights to property, they could not be said to be "improving" it in the way contemporary land title was understood in Europe, and thus – he reasoned – so gave up their rights to it (Locke 1966; Wood 2005). Of course, the rolling out of enclosure and private property rights which was facilitated by this dual philosophy has a range of legacies today: on the one hand, the social *and spatial* stratification along the lines of gender, race, and class stemming from the policies of forced displacement, land-grabbing, expropriation, and unjust laws which saw only white, wealthy, men own land; and on the other hand, a system wherein natural resources are predominately controlled, if not owned, by private capital (or at least strongly *influenced* by private capital in those cases when it is owned by the state).

As early as the mid-eighteenth century, some concerns about what is now termed "environmental degradation" emerged, yet they were initially noticed in colonial contexts and framed within the logics outlined above. In other words, early concerns about (local) environmental change were often stimulated by observations made by colonial managers worried about how such changes might impact imperial modes of production and accumulation. For instance, Grove (1995) shows in great detail how this occurred on many small islands in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans which

served as supply posts for British (and to a lesser extent French) colonial ships: Many of these islands were rapidly deforested to make space for plantations to supply ships with food, and yet after being deforested, rainfall patterns shifted, significant amounts of soil erosion occurred, and flooding and other related problems ensued – problems which were in essence *ecological* but also experienced by colonists as being of a *commercial* nature. Unfortunately, constrained by colonial norms, such observations about ecological damage tended to (with some notable exceptions) result in conservationist efforts which in practice exacerbated the displacement of colonized people through efforts such as "forest conservation" systems (initiated in India in the mid-nineteenth century, then imported back to Britain through the Forestry Commission created in 1919), or which further marginalized impoverished communities. The latter occurred as the notion of "resource scarcity" became enmeshed with colonial-era advancements in the study of human demography and population growth. Thomas Malthus' population thesis – which articulated a concern about whether food production would be able to keep pace with an exponentially growing human populace (Malthus 1959) – was rank with contempt for poor peoples, and failed to recognize how human development and more equitable forms of wealth distribution could potentially address population growth rates while improving quality of life. While Western environmentalism has many roots and variations, this version has become integral to hegemonic forms of environmental management today, represented for example by the "neo-Malthusian" arguments of Paul Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin, and the original *Limits to Growth* report (Ehrlich 1968; Hardin 1968; Meadows et al. 1972).

Neo-imperialism and the Reproduction of Global Ecology

While the empires of Europe were slowly eroded and eventually disbanded with the end of formal colonialism in the late twentieth century, the socio-environmental legacy of imperialism would continue to manifest in neo-imperial and neo-colonial forces. Despite the emergence of an embedded form of liberalism in the post-war Bretton Woods global order (Ruggie 1982), and a doubling down of laissez-faire neo-classical economics in the 1980s (Harvey 2005), the founding ethos of "freedom" underpinning modern globalization was certainly not enjoyed by all. Namely, the "rolling back" of the state and "rolling out" of business-friendly regulations which accompanied neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2007) have facilitated the continued domination of capital over nature (Castree 2008), and rich over poor (Piketty 2014). Drawing from Hornborg's theories of "ecologically unequal exchange" (Hornborg 1998) and Moore's theory of the "Capitalocene" (Moore 2017), this section demonstrates how contemporary neo-imperial relations within the global political economy – as embedded in the existing structures of global finance and investment, international trade, and official development assistance (ODA) – have an essential *ecological* quality.

As Bunker identified long ago (Bunker 1984, 1985), contemporary international trading relations include the same character of "embedded" energy, water, and other materials that travel alongside traded commodities. For instance, the exportation of an orange from South Africa to Europe is as much the exportation of *the water* contained in the fruit and the energy embodied in it – now transferred to a different continent. At the scale of a single commodity, this may seem inconsequential, but viewed at the macro-scale, it raises serious social and ecological questions about the "virtual trade" of water and energy from countries which lack access to clean water and affordable clean energy to countries where it is readily available. Hoekstra (2002) notes that 13% of all water used for agricultural production is in fact exported in this virtual format – through agricultural commodities. Picking up on this dynamic, authors like Hornborg and Rice (Hornborg 1998; Rice 2007) have drawn upon Emmanuel's notion of "unequal exchange" (Emmanuel 1972) to emphasize the latter's *ecological* character. That is, the notion of "ecologically unequal exchange" identifies the deep imbalances which exist in contemporary

trade relationships, not solely in terms of economic injustices between richer and poorer nations, but also in the character of material environmental consequences stemming from this trade.

As a result of a number of forces relating to neoliberal globalization, much of the production of goods consumed in the Global North has increasingly been displaced to areas in the Global South. These forces include the rise of the multinational corporation as a powerful entity *vis-à-vis* the state (Schmidt 1995); the "flexibilization" of labor and weakening of collective bargaining laws (Stone 2005); and the "financialization" and corresponding rise of service-based economies in industrialized nations (Epstein 2005). That shift is thus simultaneously a shift in the distribution of environmental risks – workers now engaged in many of the world's dirtiest industries are located in the Global South. Shipbreaking and electronics manufacturing and recycling are perhaps the iconic industries representing this shift (Demaria 2010). This transnationalization of production is usually understood as arising out of two specific dynamics – "industrial flight" and "pollution havens." In the former, MNCs react to stricter environmental regulations and seek when possible to move production to jurisdictions with weaker standards; in the latter, the impetus comes from developing nations compelled (often via conditional loan stipulations mandated by the World Bank or International Monetary Fund) to lower the regulatory burden for multinational producers in a bid to bring in foreign investment (Levinson and Taylor 2002).

This dynamic is mirrored also within the Global North: That ecologically damaging production which *has* remained within the Global North (or North-North exchanges of hazardous waste for that matter) produces a similar pattern of spatial injustice – wherein ecologically damaging production processes, as well as the dumping of hazardous industrial wastes, tend to be predominantly located in poor communities, and the social costs are unfairly borne by lower income or marginalized communities (Chavis 1993; Cole and Foster 2001; O'Neill 2000).

The Injustice of (and Resistance to) Imperial Ecology

As global responses to environmental problems have progressed since their colonial articulation in the mid-eighteenth century (and modern iterations in the early 1970s), they have been shaped by imperial dynamics in important ways. At the initial UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, Indira Gandhi famously contested the imperial neo-Malthusian framing of the global environmental crisis as one pertaining largely to the growing masses of (undifferentiated) humans threatening a finite set of increasingly scarce resources. Gandhi took issue with the articulation at the time that *all* must make sacrifices to save the planet; this was, after all, only very shortly after a range of newly independent countries had shaken off colonial shackles and were beginning to pursue accelerated economic and social development – the rhetoric of crisis struck her as a strategy by the rich of "pulling up the ladder behind them," so to speak. In fact, there is some fairly direct evidence that this was a strategic proposal by some in the Global North; notably, Hardin's infamous "lifeboat ethics" article (1974) explicitly argued that within the context of a global environmental crisis, rich countries ought to abandon the developing world to save themselves.

Over time, this imperial dynamic in "global ecology" (Sachs 1993) shifted to being less about controlling and limiting development in the Global South, and more about instrumentally seeking accumulation opportunities in responses to environmental change. By the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992, hegemonic environmental discourse had become framed in the context of the shift to neoliberal globalization (Bernstein 2001; Paterson 1996) and thus responses to the issues of the day – biodiversity, climate change, and deforestation, in particular, and "sustainable development" more broadly – were understood through the promotion of novel markets, the protection of intellectual property rights, and the expansion of the global reach of transnational corporations (TNCs). In Hildyard's

(1993) terms, it entailed putting "foxes in charge of the chickens."

The global biodiversity crisis was thus framed as one of protecting genetic diversity (Shiva 1993). Countries from the Global North, pursuing the interests of their burgeoning biotech sectors, argued successfully that the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, one of UNCED's two treaties, should make no distinction between "in situ" and "ex situ" conservation of biodiversity (Kothari 1992). Biodiversity was to be protected not only by conserving and enhancing forests and wetlands, but further by enabling TNCs to identify and extract the specific genetic properties of organisms. A gene bank where the genetic diversity of a huge range of species is "conserved" would have the same status in the treaty as a highly diverse standing forest or wetland. Of course, Big Biotech was advocating this discursive shift because its largest firms in the medical/pharmaceutical and agricultural sector were immersed in a rapid race for novel genetic modifications of organisms for commercial purposes (McAfee 1999).

This strategy was closely mirrored in the strategy within the trade regime. The same companies (with allies in this case in the entertainment sector, see Tyfield 2008) were lobbying aggressively for the inclusion of patent protection in the negotiations for what became the World Trade Organization in 1994. This resulted in the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as a key part of the WTO treaty. To maximize accumulation from investment in biotechnology, companies needed to globalize Western patent protection rules, which TRIPS sought to enforce (Purdue 1996). This is where its imperial dimensions become particularly clear. The "development" of new genetic strains by Western biotechnologies mostly arose out of the identification of particular genes in plants and animals (including humans, with genetic material taken at times without consent from indigenous peoples in various parts of the Global South), on which patents were then claimed. In many cases, the specific properties of the varieties of plants or animals were already known among its communities of users, so the companies were in effect engaging

in a form of "primitive accumulation" – appropriating things or knowledge previously held in common and then seeking to enforce their private property rights to those things or knowledge. Vandana Shiva (Shiva 1999) termed this "biopiracy." There were various egregious examples of this, such as a California company taking out a patent on basmati rice, grown for centuries in South Asia (Woods 2002).

Neo-imperialism and Climate Governance

In the case of climate change, the regime under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) became similarly organized around transnational corporate interests. In this case, intellectual property rights were less central, but instead the global climate governance regime became organized around the creation of novel markets – markets in rights to emit greenhouse gases (GHGs) or in promises *not to emit* them (Betsill and Hoffmann 2011). The Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the UNFCCC, signed in 1997, created three such "carbon markets" (Newell and Paterson 2010). Kyoto's successor, the Paris Agreement of 2015, created the possibility of others, albeit in a different institutional context (Carbon Brief 2018). Carbon markets have thus become central to climate policy and governance in many countries, such as the EU, China, South Korea, and in subnational jurisdictions in the USA and Canada (see the World Bank's "Carbon Pricing Dashboard" for a survey of such policies; The World Bank 2018).

Carbon markets have an explicitly neoliberal ideological agenda. Their intellectual origins trace back to Ronald Coase, a Chicago economist and friend of Milton Friedman. He argued that environmental problems were problems of inadequately specified property rights (Coase 1960). Rather than state-led interventions such as regulation or taxation, Coase advocated decentralized solutions via litigation or establishing clearer property rights (Lane 2012; Solomon and Gorman 2002). This eventually became the logic for establishing new property rights in GHG (or

"carbon") emissions, which could then be traded as commodities.

As a neoliberal solution, carbon trading was then pushed heavily not only by governments ideologically attached to such "market-based mechanisms," but also by many companies that saw distinct economic opportunities in these markets. Coalitions of TNCs started to push for such markets from the mid-1990s onward (Meckling 2011; Newell and Paterson 2010; Paterson 2012). Some of these were financial companies who would engage in the actual trading, but most were companies that would be regulated by carbon markets. They saw that if regulation of GHGs was coming, then carbon trading was considerably preferable to carbon taxes but especially to direct regulation (governments forcing the adoption of particular technologies, for example). It gave them flexibility in how they met their obligations – whether to invest in emissions reductions or seek to purchase additional allowances within the market, in particular. But it also gave them an asset at the same time as an obligation: emissions allowances have a market value and thus can be turned into financial strategies by companies as part of their overall commercial strategy.

But in the context of global negotiations, this solution was neo-imperialist in at least two ways (see especially Bachram 2004; Lohmann 2005, 2006). First, while it had already been the case (following precedent in almost all other environmental agreements) that countries' obligations to reduce emission were expressed in the UNFCCC in terms of departure from their current emissions levels (as opposed to for example on some abstract principle like equal per capita emissions across countries), the emergence of carbon markets turned this into a property right. For example, if (say) Canada had agreed to reduce its emissions by 6% under Kyoto, then this became a right to emit 94% of its 1990 emissions in the 2008–2012 in the so-called Kyoto commitment period, and thus each tonne of the 433 Mt of carbon emissions that make this amount up was turned into a tradable allowance – an "Assigned Amount Unit." Yet at the same time the world knew that there was a finite "carbon budget" that all countries could collectively emit over time without incurring dangerous or even catastrophic climate change (although disagreement existed and persists about how big that budget is). In other words, high emitting countries (like Canada) were appropriating the "atmospheric space" and in effect depriving low emitting countries access to that space.

Second, carbon markets are imperialist in that alongside "cap and trade" markets (where allowances are allocated to countries or companies which can then trade them) there are additionally "carbon offset" markets (where a company or country can invest elsewhere to reduce emissions, thus "offsetting" their own emissions). In this process, a company seeks to develop a project, say a windfarm, in the Global South. It applies to have it registered with the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), or one of the NGO certification organizations that have emerged in the last two decades, and has to go through a process by which it seeks to demonstrate that the project reduces GHG emissions compared to what would have been the case without the project. If it succeeds, then emissions credits are issued for the projects which are then sold to actors in the Global North seeking to offset their own emissions. These markets thus not only enable actors in the North to continue high levels of emissions (a particular twist on the logic of ecologically unequal exchange), but they also can generate more actively imperial dynamics (for instance, cases of displacement of people and other human rights abuses have been exposed in numerous carbon offset projects (see Corbera and Brown 2010; Wittman and Caron 2009). With forestry projects in particular, the problem of imperial control arises heavily since it requires the project developers to ensure that the forest is not cut down or otherwise damaged by local communities, so that credits can keep flowing for the lifetime of the project.

Correspondingly, a good deal of social movement resistance in relation to global environmental governance can be understood as anti-imperialist mobilizing. In the climate regime, an early reaction to hegemonic framings of climate change, by Indian environmentalists Anil

Agarwal and Sunita Narain (Agarwal and Narain 1991), explicitly argued that such framings were a case of "environmental colonialism." They showed that the World Resources Institute's 1990 report (1991), the first to include GHG emissions, produced a ranking of countries by GHG emissions based on the simple measure of absolute emissions. China and India both appeared in the top five emitters on that measure. This reflected the underlying imperialist framing of environmental degradation as produced by an undifferentiated humanity, as we saw in the 1970s and late eighteenth century. Ignored entirely, Agarwal and Narain showed, were questions of either per capita emissions (i.e., how much the typical Indian emitted compared to the typical American), or of the social purpose of those emissions, which they argued should be separated into "luxury" and "survival" or "subsistence" emissions. For instance, why should the emissions of those flying round the world for leisure or business be counted the same as those of a subsistence rice farmer?

This argument has formed the basis of recurrent opposition to global environmental governance. Since the mid-2000s, it has mostly been articulated through "climate justice" movements, focused mostly on opposition to carbon markets (on the basis of the above critical arguments), but also on the inadequate pace of measures in the Global North to transform economies away from fossil fuels, with the consequent production of disasters and insecurity for many in the Global South. These movements have often invoked a notion of "ecological debt" (Roberts and Parks 2009), deployed to show that, given the finite character of the global "carbon budget" over time, and given how the Global North has already used more than its fair share of that budget, by any defensible measure of distributive justice, the North in practice owes debts to the South to redress the imperial dynamics in climate change itself (for a quantitative assessment of the historical value of climate debts among nations, see Matthews 2016). These notions of climate justice and ecological debt have become the basis of a widespread upsurge in environmental protest around climate change focused variously on UNFCCC conferences (Hadden 2015), other UN events (Giacomini and Turner 2015), oil pipelines (Barry 2013; Gunster and Neubauer 2018), and divestment from fossil fuels (Mangat et al. 2017), among other mobilizations and campaigns for social and ecological justice.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this entry has examined the relationship between imperialism and environment through the lenses of GEPE. It has shown how the forces of imperialism and environmental change have a long-standing dialectical relationship which continues at present in a variety of ways. Whether it is the various "metabolic rifts" created through the neoliberal governance of global trade, finance, and development regimes; the "neo-Malthusian logics" inherent in rich countries' efforts to "manage" global environmental challenges; the various dimensions of injustice witnessed in the lived-experience of environmental damage; or efforts to commodify and profit from the practice of climate change mitigation (or even critical social responses to such commodification), the legacy of imperialism and new iterations of neo-imperialism are clearly intertwined with the manifestation of ecological change, and vice versa. This is to say that the imperial expression of power, domination, and oppression often generates ecological impacts, and conversely, environmental changes have had the effect of prompting or exacerbating neo-imperialist responses. As the world approaches various climatic and biodiversity thresholds and "tipping points" in the twenty-first century (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018; United Nations Environment Programme 2012), the imperialism-environment dialectic is one to which those concerned about global inequities and social justice ought to pay close attention.

Cross-References

▶ Eco-imperial Relations: The Roots of Dispossessive and Unequal Accumulation
▶ Ecologically Unequal Exchange

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Imperialism and Settler Colonialism: Xenophobia and Racism in North America

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Synonyms

Assimilation; Colonialism; Conquering; Cultural imperialism; Disease and cultural; Displacement; Invasion; Racism; Slavery; White supremacy

Definition

This essay examines the historical trajectory of the colonization of North America by imperial European forces spanning from the 15th to 18th centuries. The primary focus concentrates on the treatment and removal of indigenous peoples with particular attention paid to the development of settler colonialism by the English Crown and the xenophobic foundations of Americana.

The expansive ramblings of settler colonialism, particularly its goal of eliminating indigenous culture carried out primarily by strategies of disavowal, have been identified by Ostler (2015) as "a convergence between settler colonial ideology and the project of continental empire-building" (p. 42). Native American opposition to colonial empire (and the United States) has rarely been framed as anti-imperialism in historical context. Perhaps doing so would challenge the doctrine of American exceptionalism for which the empire is embedded. The very notion of American culture (and its European origins) relies heavily on dispelling the origins of an indigenous people. Wilson (1998) observes the significance of the oral tradition to Native American culture in which there is little distinction between "story" and "history." Accordingly, there is an excess of "anecdotes and legends" used by each tribe or

nation to explain "the creation of the world and its own origins and experience." These "histories" have largely been dismissed by most Western scholars, regarded simply as "myths" from which nothing can be ascertained concerning the past or the origins of the indigenous peoples in North America (pp. 4–5).

The subjugation of autonomous Native American nations by European empires occurred by military and pseudo-legal means. Settler colonial discourse relied heavily on historical narratives to conceal the existence of these nations. Such perspectives attempt to separate American colonialism with previous types dependent on the elimination of pre-existing inhabitants and fail to recognize anti-colonial forces seeking to retain substantial political and economic autonomy (Ostler 2015).

There are 554 legally recognized "Indian tribes" currently in the United States, representing a combined population of nearly two million. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed a drastic decline of indigenous population making much of their current number a product of the last century. Wilson reports that nearly "twenty-five million or more United States citizens are known to have some Native American ancestry." He also suggests that the "lack of recognition in America of indigenous peoples leaves many feeling unseen, a people without a past" (p. xxiv). Much of this can be interpreted as the result of the European invasion of America four centuries ago.

The total amount of land that remains under tribal control is estimated at some 55 million acres. This is a massive decrease from the pattern of people and cultures that existed in 1492. Since then the entire nations have been uprooted and deposited thousands of miles from their homelands. Tribal isolation is no longer an exotic existence, but rather a suburban nightmare strewn across an abandoned landscape. Native America currently represents a forgotten, invisible culture buried in the American past confined to reservation communities where struggles with obesity, alcoholism, and other various addictions are the norm.

Native Americans were victims of repeated assaults on their "social, psychological and spiritual world." Wilson contextualizes this "breathtakingly ambitious experiment in social engineering" as the cause of a devastating "historical trauma" for Native Americans infected by Eurocentric ideals (Wilson, p. xxv). After condemning their cultural and spiritual practices, Anglo-Saxon superiors further subjugated Native Americans by forcing them to assimilate. Such practices included removing children from their tribal existence and sending them to boarding schools where they were forbidden from speaking their native languages. These attempts to transform Indians into Americans sought to supplant their history and sense of identity. This would eventually be referred to as the American "melting pot" (p. xxvi).

The "Savage" Conquest

Much of the colonial mission in the Americas was predicated on the use of propaganda that presented indigenous people as uncivilized "savages." Wilson (1998) offers such descriptions as "simple and rude in manners, and destitute of the knowledge," used for determining that Native Americans were "most apt to receive the Christian Religion, and to subject themselves to some good government." This was partially an assurance made to ease colonists and investors coming to the New World in the hope of developing a "paternalistic relationship with grateful natives" (Wilson, p. 64).

England's conquest of Ireland in the 1560s and 1570s were instrumental in determining policies toward the "savage people." Canny (2001) suggests that Ireland, in particular, was an apprenticeship for the colonization of the New World. Excessive measures of brutality against the Irish were justified because they were considered "savage heathen" following the teachings of Catholicism which the English considered a form of "paganism" objected to by all Protestant Europe. The Irish, like Native Americans, were cast as nomads because they practiced "transhumance" which entailed moving herds of animals from one area to another during the course of the year to graze. Such was barbaric behavior, and, as

such, they should be "treated like wild beasts" (Wilson, p. 64).

The use of Biblical accounts has long served as the greatest means for reinforcing our basic perception of reality. Wilson describes the Bible as a confirming history as "a linear process whose meaning comes from change." It is a perspective that emphasizes movement as progress, particularly as we move further away from our own beginnings, in this way conquering our own ignorance and irrationality. In the wake, Wilson claims, "we leave behind other, less 'developed' peoples" (p. 13). Barbarous tribes and non-European peoples were believed to hold a particular position in history. Functionally, they were intended to represent that which had escaped history itself. The founder of modern anthropology, Edward Tylor (1871), identified the "savage state" as representing the early condition of mankind, "out of which the higher culture has gradually been developed or evolved" (Wilson, p. 14).

European colonization grew out of late feudal era changes that resulted in new trading networks and militaristic nation-states. These forces accelerated a century-old drive to conquer nature along the medieval borderlands – the moors, coastal and river marshes, forests, and floodplains that, in the mind, stood for darkness and waste – and were sharpened by a heightened religious fanaticism generated during the Crusades. Europe's culture of colonization was framed by dispossession of indigenous peoples in Moorish Iberia and Celtic Ireland, by looting of the Inca and Aztec empires, by piracy along the Spanish Main, by racist convictions applied to Africa, and by an almost insatiable appetite for territorial conquest (Wilson 1998; Judd 2014).

The anti-Muslim Crusades were designed to control Muslin trade routes to the Far East, while "domestic crusades against heretics and commoners were carried out to terrorize poor people" (p. 32). Peter Linebaugh (2008) describes such Crusades as "a murderous device to resolve a contradiction by bringing baron and commoner together in the cauldron of religious war" (pp. 26–27). As a precursor to later patterns of colonial capitalism, the impact of the Crusades was somewhat paradoxical insofar as while they

encouraged sectarian intolerance of Islam in Europe, they also helped shape European perceptions of other cultures. The results of the conflict helped fuel an intense paranoia that drove efforts to expand European influence (Wilson 1998).

The colonization of the Americas was initialized by Europeans, "heirs to rich and ancient cultures, social relations and customs in their lands of origin, whether Spain, France, Holland or England" (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, p. 32). As they made passage into the Americas and were introduced to indigenous inhabitants, Europeans abandoned their known social relations, entering into a culture of conquest. Here they engaged in violence, expropriation, destruction, and dehumanization. This was nothing new, yet a continuation of what European institutions had formed several centuries before during the Crusades to conquer North Africa and the Middle East, which lead to unprecedented wealth in the hands of a few. European merchants and settlers were largely responsible for establishing profit-based religion in the Americas. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (2014) identifies this "deadly element" utilized for seeking personal wealth. Reflecting on the use of the Christian zeal as a justification for colonialism she writes:

> Coupled with a militaristic tradition, also developed in western Europe during the Crusades, allowed for a mercenary status against the "pagan" peoples of the world. Urban II began the call for such ventures by granting soldiers the right sack and loot Muslim towns and cities, which promised wealth and prestige back at home. (Dunbar-Ortiz, p. 32)

The perception of Native Americans as having an underdeveloped culture has justified European attitudes since the time of Columbus. The dominant settler ideology was a doctrine of superiority, one that tied Eurocentrism to God as the guide of superior force. Europeans were self-proclaimed as the chosen people, predestined to stake claim over the New World. This "vision" promised a return to grace and identified a providence that demanded subduing the wilderness and supplanting the Indian. In large part, the conquest of Native Americans was driven by an understanding that coexistence was not an option as the notion of equality was objectionable to the European "reality"

(Wilson, p. 15; Deloria 1975, 1988). Such reality was built on an image of the indigenous peoples as relics of the human past.

The rise of the modern state in Western Europe was based on the accumulation of wealth by means of exploiting human labor and displacing millions of subsistence producers from their lands. The armies that did this work benefited from technological innovations that allowed the development of more effective weapons of death and destruction. When these states expanded overseas to obtain even more resources, land, and labor, they were not starting anew. The peoples of West Africa, the Caribbean, Mesoamerica, and the Andes were the first overseas victims. South Africa, North America, and the rest of South America followed.

The "discovery" of America seemingly increased the differences between Native Americans and Europeans, rather than reduce them. The European attitude toward people who did not look or act like them was served as a foundation for their future relations with indigenous tribes. Trade was essentially a key aspect in forming the relationship between them, one that would prosper and stabilize in the century that followed Columbus. Trade was largely responsible for shaping the expectations that each side had of the other. This was, however, not to last as the balance in trade would eventually tip in Europe's favor. The New World would increasingly be drained of its wealth becoming part of the European colonial empire. The fate of Native Americans would be nothing short of "catastrophic collapse by means of conquest and disease" (Wilson, p. 57).

Jamestown, 1607

The colonial enterprise has been characterized as "a mixture of bullish arrogance, ruthless pragmatism and unrealistic expectations" (Wilson, p. 64). For its part, England began its colonial mission in America with Raleigh's Roanoke colony on an island off the North Carolina coast. The expedition was driven by the pursuit of nonexistent gold mines, and no time was invested in growing crops or other forms of sustenance. The settlers became extremely dependent on indigenous peoples for food, which they either took or engaged in skirmishes to obtain. Within a year the settlement perished only to resurface again in 1607 with the Jamestown Colony, what is now the Virginia coast.

Halfway through the first summer most of the original colonists in Jamestown perished either from starvation or disease. The survival of the colony was made possible only by assistance offered by Native Americans. In 1705, the colony's historian, Robert Beverly coined the years 1609 to 1610 as "the starving time." As with the Roanoke settlers before, the willingness of Native Americans to provide, "Bread, Corne, Fish, and Flesh in great plentie," would save these "feeble men" who otherwise would have perished. The "relationship" was extremely one-sided as the settlers were dependent on their native hosts. Both practical and psychological issues would create vast inconsistencies in English attitudes toward the natives. The supremacy of Christian civilization was at stake. It could hardly be used as the central justification for colonial expansion if the conquers were reliant on the yet to be conquered.

For the settler who longed for comfort, Native American communities offered a refuge where ample diet and relative freedom were available. The threat of severe punishment for deserting their posts did not stop many from fleeing. Any "appreciation" of native culture, however, did not live long. Scorn and resentment would eventually surface leading to aspersions concerning the Natives' real motivation. There were suggestions of malicious intent accusing the natives of seeking to undermine and "threaten English security and self-esteem." Captain John Smith was soon convinced there could be only one explanation, "their chief God they worship is the Devil" he announced, "they ... serve him more of fear than love" (Wilson, p. 67).

Smith's leadership was a rallying cry that galvanized an awareness that the settlers' dependence on the Natives was leading them astray. Their ceaseless need for food became a point of tension in their relations with them. Under Smith, the English developed a system of compulsory

purchase: if the Indians refused to sell corn, they took it by force, leaving a few trinkets as token payment. In times of desperate hunger, they simply stole what they wanted, threatening or killing anyone who tried to stop them. As a result, the Native Americans frequently went hungry or did not have enough seed to plant for the following year.

In an effort to ease the tension that had formed with the English settlers, Native Americans sought to teach them how to grow corn and construct more efficient means of fishing. These were mostly rejected by the settlers who were more interested in producing tobacco for export back to England. Knowing that they could bully food out of the Native Americans appeared an easier means for sustenance that having to actually do it for themselves. The Indians would become increasingly frustrated with the brutal asymmetry created by English settlement. Any hope for achieving balance with the settlers failed regardless of symbolic exchange or display of strength and status. It was no long before the natives became acutely aware that, irrespective of their intent, the balance of power was rolling away from them.

New England, 1617

The colonization and conquest of what was to become known as "New England" brought about drastic changes for existing indigenous cultures. Deadly epidemic pathogens were introduced altering the composition and number of indigenous populations. The transformation of the ecological system caused numerous imperial conflicts. In the wake of such disruption, the decline of indigenous groups increased, while European populations grew expeditiously.

In 1617, while exploring the northern coast for a company of venture merchants, John Smith landed on an area he would later coin as "New England." Smith was taken with the landscape of southern New England, which had been transformed by a tribal custom of removing trees and burning undergrowth to create vast open spaces. Smith, the self-appointed "Admiral of New England," had been educated by the colonial experience in Jamestown. He rejected the search for gold in favor of fishing as a source of wealth. He recognized the significance of natural resources in abundance and envisioned a commercial empire in New England. He was also aware of the need for laborers needed to transform the region.

Smith's conquest of the region was largely supported by Sir Ferdinando Gorges, a military man who commanded the harbor fort of Plymouth, England, and an ardent proponent of American colonization. Gorges and Smith had a complex relationship, one mired in debt and patronage. Woodward (2008) describes Gorges as a "leading figure in the North Virginia Company," who had previously been given "authority to settle North American land roughly between the Potomac River and present-day Bangor, Maine" (p. 105). In 1615, Gorges financed Smith's in a second voyage to New England. The venture failed, as Smith was captured by a French privateer in the Azores.

Six years prior to Smith's original visit, a series of epidemics, perhaps smallpox or chickenpox, had swept through the coastal tribes, killing nearly 90% of the population. The desultory trade relationship that was force upon Native Americans through their contact with Europeans was not the most pressing danger or problem. Rather, it was the ominous presence of unfamiliar pathogens for which the Europeans were armed. Because they lacked Native exposure to the infections that their new neighbors had weathered, a result of be subjected to crowded urban conditions and the company of livestock, they were ill-equipped to defend themselves from fast-spreading diseases that had been transported to the New World. These diseases were rampant and indiscriminant as they ravaged the New England coast beginning in 1616 with an outbreak of smallpox or bubonic or pneumonic plague. These epidemics occurred in cycles and traditional native remedies – sweat lodges, fasting, and emetic herbals – only worsened the effects of these virulent fevers. Estimates suggest that between 75% and 90% of coastal inhabitants died, and deaths among starving and abandoned survivors, or from secondary

infections, added to the toll. Not only was the mortality rate high, but the suffering was terrible.

In tragedy, Gorges recognized opportunity to develop a new, more elaborate plan for large-scale colonization which led to the sealing of the Mayflower Charter on November 3, 1620. Smith had attempted to tie himself to the negotiations after becoming aware that a congregation of Separatists were considering New England as their new attempt to settle outside of England. Having previously fled England for Amsterdam and Leiden, they had now secured investors from the Virginia Company of London to settle a plantation along the Hudson River, immediately south of New England.

Smith had a strong dislike of religious radicals, but it did not stop his attempt to lobby for a position as their military commander. As Woodward (2008) explains, these negotiations failed as the "Separatists, whose late start and faulty navigation would lead them to found a New England plantation at Plymouth instead of on the Hudson" would ultimately rejected Smith's services. Smith later reported that a Separatist leader had said "my books and maps were much better cheape to teach them, than my selfe" (pp. 111–112).

The Mayflower Charter landed on Cape Cod in November 1620 with approximately 100 prospective colonists. The members of the Mayflower Charter, having recently left behind a rigidly authoritarian and legalistic society in England, were immediately troubled by the fluidity and dynamism of Native American culture. They would much have preferred to avoid all contact and maintained what were essentially "foraging expeditions" as their primary food supply. Much of this consisted of finding leftover food that the tribes had discarded. This was acceptable because it meant they were able to avoid the actual natives. By 1621, such methods of gathering food proved inadequate. As there first winter settled in, they became more desperate, and by the spring, their number had decreased by half as many died from disease and starvation.

It was clear that these new colonists were in need of help. They were ill-prepared to survive in New England. The neighboring Wampanoag, seeking to establish a balance of power in their relation with Europeans, would eventually come to their rescue. Massasoit, the Wampanoag leader, viewed an alliance as a means of restoring equilibrium. Massasoit sent a delegation with an offering of food to the members of the Mayflower Charter. This resulted in a formal treaty and became the first official agreement between the colonists and natives in the colonization of America.

The historical representation of this agreement depicts a "fair and even-handed" arrangement one that demonstrated "good faith on both sides" (Wilson, p. 79). More accurately, the "treaty" sowed the seeds from which further misunderstanding and conflict would flourish. Several clauses "clearly favored the English" including one which required that any Indian guilty of an offense against the English should be handed over to the colony for trial. But, there was no reciprocity for English offenses against the Wampanoag. Fundamentally, this was an agreement that eliminated Wampanoag sovereignty. It was legal manipulation used to undercut tribal influence.

On the surface "King James would esteem of him [Massasoit] as his friend and ally," but this had different meanings across cultures. The Wampanoag were convinced that they were entering into an equal partnership. As far as England was concerned, Massasoit "acknowledged himself content to become the Subject of the Sovereign lord the King." Salisbury (1984) comments that "the English regarded the treaty as one not of alliance and friendship between equals but of submission by one party to the domination of the other." From the Native American perspective, the significance of the treaty lay not in the document itself but in the exchange of gifts and speeches accompanying it, which ritually ended the enmity between the two peoples and redrew the boundaries separating them. The new relationship was not merely a political alliance but a spiritual realignment that brought the two peoples into a shared social network where they were bound together by mutual obligation.

Building a "City on the Hill"

Rationalized origin stories are located at the center of most modern nation-states. This is nationalist propaganda, the kind that fosters patriotism and loyalty to the state. Dunbar-Ortiz (2014) identifies the English founders of the first North American colonies, leading to the United States, as making the most of "providential opportunity." There can be no mistake that the teachings of the French religious reformer John Calvin "coincided with the advent of invasion and colonization of the Americans." Calvinism was a Protestant Christian movement with a strong separatist political component. Central to it was the doctrine of predestination for which "Calvin taught that human free will did not exist" (p. 47).

In the founding of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the Pilgrims, as they became known for their strict puritanical beliefs, drew upon the Calvinist ideology. Generally viewed as the spiritual founders of America, the Pilgrims settled had come to the New World hoping to find a permanent home where they could practice their religion undeterred. They would soon become a heartening symbol for generations of immigrants seeking a fresh start in America. Originating from a small Protestant sect that was critical of the Church of England, accusing it of corruption, the Pilgrims sought to obey the injunction in the Second Book of Corinthians: "come out from among them and ye be separate, saith the Lord."

Prior to their voyage to the Americas, the Pilgrims tried to establish a new way of life in the more tolerant atmosphere of the Netherlands, but both their distinct identity – and their Englishness – was a perceived threat. After a brief return to England, they found passage to the New World via the Mayflower Charter. In keeping with the strict separatist doctrine, they avoid other communities, particularly Native Americans, whom they tried to completely avoid.

Between 1624 and 1629, other religious dissidents settled in the region, specifically Cape Ann and Salem. The Massachusetts Bay Colony was formally established in 1630 when John Winthrop and a thousand settlers arrived. Grouping their huts and dugouts into nine or ten villages around Boston Harbor, these "Puritans" prepared the way for the "Great Migration," the arrival of 20,000 colonists from southern England during the next decade.

As the primary architect of the new colony and its first governor in 1630, John Winthrop was a trained lawyer who devoted considerable thought and ingenuity to establishing a legal basis for colonization. In doing so, he advocated for the widely accepted theory of *vacuum domicilium*, which deemed "unsubdued" (European-style cultivation) land as that which could be legitimately possessed and "improved." This was the "legal" basis by which land was acquired since most of the territory used by the Native Americans was, by this definition, "unsubdued." In addition, because they were identified as "savages," the indigenous had no "civil government" for which to exercise its own sovereignty. As such it followed that they neither had a "natural" nor a "civil" right to the land (Wilson, p. 83). This was significant because it would render tribal independence within the colony's boundaries as nonexistent. The transfer of land and authority was to benefit only one party – the settlers, colonialists, English, or Europeans.

The Massachusetts Bay Company recognized that, in practice, Indians might "pretend right of inheritance" to those lands in which they were living. In such cases, colonists were instructed to make "reasonable composition" (Wilson, p. 84). Such laid the groundwork for what eventually become known as *eminent domain* and the *takings clause* of the US Constitution. Reference or understanding of "composition" in the Native American political system was, at best, an alliance between two distinct groups, one that might signify appointment of new leadership or a change in order. While new rights and tributes may have been a factor, there is no such understanding that would ever require a tribe to be completely evicted from an area or risk losing their autonomy or ethnic identity.

I

Biological Warfare

The wholesale transfer of land from indigenous to Euro-American hands from 1492 onward has less to do with European invasion, variable technology, or material possession. Instead, it was the bacteria that they unwittingly brought with them that led to the massive depopulation of Native Americans. Nearly 100 epidemics and pandemics of European diseases were unleashed on Native Americas between first contact and the beginning of the twentieth century. There can be little doubt that the decline of the Native American population "was an increased death rate due to diseases introduced from the Eastern Hemisphere" (Thornton 1987, n.p.).

Both Eurocentric desire and Christian doctrine were used to justify both physical and natural disasters that befell these populations. For example, in 1633 a prolonged drought brought havoc on both Natives and settlers which ended only when – as both sides seemed to have agreed – the English God responded to the Puritans' prayers by sending rain. This had significant meaning for both sides when it came to empowerment and defeat. For the Puritans it meant superiority of a winning God, while Native American tradition of ritual and ceremony were left to be questioned and doubted. After a devastating outbreak of smallpox swept through New England, leaving the colonists virtually untouched but killing a large number of Narragansetts and their neighbor the Pequot, colonists reacted by claiming that these tribes had clearly been targeted by the English God for daring to challenge the colony. The interpretation that the epidemics were proof of the Europeans' greater spiritual power was widespread. Religious potency – held by those who were barely affected by the epidemics – led to a number of deathbed conversions to Christianity. The Pilgrims themselves looked for a religious meaning in the epidemics. Such discoveries were certainly self-serving with claims of God favoring the European beginning in the New World by "sweeping away great multitudes of the natives … a little before we went thither, that he might make room for us there." Governor Winthrop drew a similar conclusion when he wrote, "God hath hereby cleared our title to this place" (Wilson, p. 86).

For those Native Americans who survived the epidemics, there were other problems to consider such as the loss of crucial phases in the annual subsistence cycle – planting, harvesting, and hunting. Such circumstances brought many to the edge of starvation. The tribal structure suffered with the elimination of entire lineages of sachems and other high-ranking individuals. This had significant consequences as it disrupted the complex web of kinship and authority that held communities together. The greatest impact undermined Native Americans' confidence in themselves and their view of the world. As Francis Jennings (1976) writes, "The American land was more a widow than a virgin." Challenging the perceived history of desolation, Jennings places the Europeans in a wilderness of their own making in describing Jamestown, Plymouth, Salem Boston, Providence, New Amsterdam, and Philadelphia as "sites previously occupied by Indian communities." He concludes by casting the "so-called settlement of America" as nothing more than a "resettlement of a land made waste by the diseases and demoralization introduced by the newcomers" (Wilson, p. 77).

Dismissive historical perspectives on the loss of Native American life often conjure theories that portend to blame the victim for their own demise. This instance is no exception. In 1863, Francis Parkman directly accused the New England tribes as being their own worst enemies by suggesting that the indigenous just "melted away, not because civilization destroyed them." Instead, Parkman claimed it to be "their own ferocity and intractable indolence" that made it impossible for continued existence. Such iteration was furthered by the US Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, who believed that some "strong exciting" racial characteristic impelled native people to "their own ceaseless hostilities [which] have, more than any other cause, led to their melancholy depopulation." Popular European perceptions were tainted by this chaos theory which allowed for Native Americans to be dismissed as "savages." Chaos, in this regard, suggested animalism and a lack of self-control. In reality, this was just an illusion. While

the tribal communities in North America may have "managed their relationship with the land and with each other in a profoundly different way, their world was at least as orderly as contemporary Europe's" (Wilson, p. 47).

The Pequot War

The Pequot War is considered a major turning point in colonial history. In the 1630s, the Pequot were a dominant and plentiful tribe that controlled what is now eastern Connecticut. The Pequot established a commercial monopoly with the Dutch in the 1620s, controlling the fur trade and accumulating a considerable fortune of the highly prized *wampum*. In adopting an European economic system, the wampum was a Native artifact that was used more and more as a kind of currency throughout New England. In the early 1600s, it was formally recognized as legal tender by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

When the Pilgrims settled the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 1620s, the Pequot maintained 15 villages along the Mystic River in Connecticut. The Pilgrims, who were aware of Spanish colonizers' barbarous abuse of native peoples in the Caribbean and Central America, were determined to establish more humane Euro-Indian relations. Yet, as Judd (2014) explains, "despite these promising beginnings, the lower Connecticut Valley quickly became a contested region, with Pequot, Mohegan, Narragansett, Niantic, Dutch, Pilgrim, and Puritan jousting for land and furs" (p. 52).

In the years that followed, several confrontations and reprisals resulted in numerous casualties, but none so damaging as the death of the Englishman John Stone. The Pequot, who at the time were seeking an English alliance in fighting off Dutch traders, were accused of the murder. The Puritans called for action against Stone's killers. Historically, such retribution has been described as leverage in pursuit of their own ambitions in the valley, suggesting "subjugation more than alliance" (Judd, p. 52). In 1633, the Pequot were inflicted with numerous disasters that incited a period of internal crisis. The Dutch responded by dealing with other tribes in the region. After a new smallpox outbreak devastated the coastal tribes, the Pequot grip on their tributary tribes started to wane. This coincided with a large-scale English settlement that was beginning to wreak havoc on a finely tuned system of tribal relationships (Wilson, pp. 87–88).

In 1636, the Massachusetts Bay colony ordered Captain John Endecott to sail to Block Island and kill every Indian male he found there. Ninety Indians were murdered, most of them Narragansett, unconnected to the Pequot. Endecott then attacked the Pequot, burning two of the villages that resulted in the death of one man. The actions of Endecott, while appearing senseless, left the Connecticut River settlers, particularly Plymouth, as targets for a Pequot counterattack. On April 23, 1637, warriors, believed to be Pequot, attacked the colonists. This set the stage for what was to be a full-scale war.

Within a month of the attack, a Puritan militia, along with its Mohegan allies, stormed the Pequot village on the Mystic River and torched it. 300–600 inhabitants were shot and burned; most of them were women, children, and older men. The motives behind the massacre have since been the subject of great debate, the consensus of which suggests fear of the Pequot as the primary motive. The colonists, who were camped only five miles away, believed the tribe was a threat to their civilization. The slaughter itself was unlike any tactic or result ever witnessed by Native Americans whose warfare typically "prescribed low-casualty conflicts, hit-and-run tactics, and the taking of live captives" (Judd, p. 53). It is generally considered an act of genocide. As Judd explains, "Pequot survivors were parceled out as slaves among the victors, and for all practical purposes the tribe was exterminated" (p. 53). Central to the outcome of the war was the realization that there was very little possibility for the two peoples to live together in peace. The Pequot War nearly exterminated one of the most powerful indigenous groups in New England. It also created a foundation of conflict that would lead to other disputes, as witnessed in a second conflict, known as King Philip's War, in 1675.

Colonial Expansion

Throughout the sixteenth century, the colonial map across North America dramatically increased. In 1664, England seized New Netherland from the Dutch and renamed it New York. Edmund Andros was later appointed by King James II to be the new colony's Governor. The New York Colony did not envision itself a "city on the hill" like the founders of New England. Rather, Andros was a pragmatic royalist who sought merely to build a powerful foundation for an English empire. In doing so, he viewed Native Americans not as a threat but instead as a potential asset in intensifying the struggle between France, Spain, and England for mastery of North America. His approach was radically different in dealing with the Native Americans, and it would set the tone for much of Britain's relations with them for the next century.

Andros came to office almost as King Philip's War erupted in New England which represented a major effort by the natives to drive the English colonists out of New England. King Philip, also known by his Wampanoag name of Metacom, was the son of the tribal leader Massasoit. Fearful that the conflict might develop into a general uprising against the English, Andros proactively incited the Mohawks to launch the fatal attack that would eventually break the rebellion and allowed "refugees" to flood into New York prohibiting any other Colony from pursuing them. Andros also refused to return the seven principle Indians responsible for instigating the war. In 1677, he called for a conference at Albany, at which the Mohawks undertook not to carry out raids in New England, and the Puritans agreed, in return, that New York should treat directly with the Iroquois. New York was a royal possession and therefore could not be challenged or ignored with impunity.

The contrast in tribal-colonial relations in New England and New York was vast. In what is now upstate New York all the way west to the Great Lakes region, the six Iroquois peoples – Mohawk, Onondaga, Seneca, Oneida, Cayuga, and Tuscarora – never surrendered the right to define themselves or their conviction to run their own lives. Certainly, their culture has been altered by means of forced assimilation, but their commitment to sovereignty continues even today. Such endurance can only be attributed to their unique spiritual and political confederation, known as the League of Five (later Six) Nations. Such was the vehicle by which they have been able to maintain a separate identity and destiny from that of their European counterparts. Wilson cites the League as that which enabled them "to play a crucial role in the history of colonial America which still has repercussions today" (p. 98).

In making the Iroquois the cornerstone of his Native American policy, Andros entered into a treaty with the Five Nations acknowledging their preeminent position and allowed them to pull other tribes – their children – into an alliance with the English. Andros referred to this as the "Chain of Covenant," which seemingly had different meanings for both sides. The Iroquois saw it as an extension of the same principles they already shared among the Five Nations. This was an association of essentially autonomous peoples who combined for mutual defense. The English, however, chose to view the "Chain" as a kind of pyramid, with New York at the top, the Iroquois (and, to some extent, the New England colonies) in the middle, and the various dependent indigenous nations at the bottom. Authority over all these peoples and their lands flowed down the hierarchy from its ultimate source in the English Crown.

Structurally, the "chain" replicated the feudal intent of the seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century Europe by creating a defensive apparatus for England's settlement and sovereignty over any group that sought protection from the League. Given the centralization of their power, England thus encouraged the Iroquois to extend their influence far beyond the existing colonies into the interior. This would allow the English to acquire "title" to vast tracts of North America. As Jennings reflects, the British had created a reasonable alternative in donating "an empire to the Iroquois in order to claim it for themselves."

After 1677, the Covenant Chain was expanded to include several English colonies, most notably Massachusetts and Maryland, along with those colonies' subject Indians. The upshot of these

arrangements was that the Iroquois cooperated with their colonial partners in subduing and removing subject Indians who impeded settler expansion. Still, Andros was fully aware of England's precarious position being far too reliant on the Iroquois' protection and goodwill. In the eighteenth century, European competition for American colonies became even more intense as French traders moved far into the interior and along the Mississippi River. In 1701, France appointed its first Governor, asserting colonial territory and in 1718 founded New Orleans as the capital of its new province. Concurrently, the Spanish were moving north and east into the Plains region setting their sights on the Alamo.

As the English pushed south and west, establishing their colonial dominance along the eastern coast, their trading agreements with the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, and neighboring tribes, brought them closer to both French Louisiana and Spanish Florida. The constant movement and settlement led to numerous conflicts between opposing European forces. For 38 of the 74 years between 1689 and 1763 England (and, after the Act of Union in 1707, Britain) was at war with one or both of her colonial rivals in North America, who also spent much of the time fighting between themselves. In almost every one of these conflicts, Native Americans played a crucial part, often contributing the bulk of the troops for colonial war parties – which sometimes contained no more than a handful of Europeans – and almost invariably suffering the heaviest losses.

The diverse native societies encountered by Europeans throughout the seventeenth century were not static isolates lying outside the ebb and flow of human history. Rather, they were products of a complex set of historical forces, both local and wide ranging, both deeply rooted and of recent origin. Although their lives and worldviews were shaped by long-standing traditions of reciprocity and spiritual power, the people in these communities were also accustomed to economic and political flux which allowed them to absorb new peoples (both allies and antagonists), objects, and ideas, including those originating in Europe. Such combinations of tradition and innovation

continued to shape Indians' relations with Europeans, even as the latter's visits became permanent.

Native American Anti-Imperialism

The most appropriate conception of Native American resistance can initially be summed up as a group of single tribes and alliances that took up arms to defend their lands and ways of life. Such defenses were largely grounded in critical view of European Americans and against those who were willing to enter into alliances with them. Militant tribes, seeking to protect their own way of life, often targeted factions within their own nations seeking compromise with Americans. Identifying targets of an anti-imperialist movement does not always recognize imperial power alone but also those in collaboration with it (Ostler 2015).

In seeking an alternative means for survival, Native Americans rejected dependence on Empire. These anti-colonial interpretations have been derived from the actions of educated tribal leaders who boldly articulated a rejection of nationalist aspirations in favor of conditions that would make sovereignty possible within space controlled by the United States. Such rejections included adherence to the moral authority of Christianity and US political traditions. In doing so, Native Americans appealed to Euro-Americans on their own terms, having educated themselves on secular institutions which had published anti-colonial critiques and proposed reforms. Understanding their predicament, they sought not an end of colonialism, but rather conditions by which they could continue living in the same manner than once had in a preserved space allowable under colonial rule.

The wave of settler aggressions in the late 1760s and 1770s led many Indians to regard Americans as their most serious threat. The fate befallen scores of Native Americans in New England and Virginia was a strong indication of what awaiting the rest. Such recognition prompted the Shawnee Tecumseh, to ask: "Where today are the Pequots? Where the Narragansetts, the Mohawks, the Pocanets and many other once

powerful tribes of our people? They have vanished before the avarice and oppression of the white man" (Wilson, p. 148).

Consequently, many Indians believed that the disaster and chaos at the hands of whites had been something of their own doing. In embracing certain aspects of European culture, they had neglected the spiritual roots of their own power. Many sought a return to their own rituals and ceremonies, but doing so would require rejecting alcohol, Christianity, and other impurities introduced by the whites. This was the only way in which Native Americans found the strength needed to overcome what was by that point was identified as their enemy. The revival of "traditional values" was created a new phase in the evolution of Native Americans. What they had lost at the hands of their colonizers was far more internal than external. Since they had never been a material culture, they were to look at the material ways which they had adopted. Spiritual strength that had once held all of their traditions together had become infected with disease. The source of the illness, like many recent epidemics, had been delivered from European shores.

Building a new diplomatic network among Native Americans signified many changes to the former aboriginal system of ad hoc alliances. The very notion of tribal sovereignty, once held as a cornerstone of the indigenous way of life, need to be reconceived as one far more durable and extensive if they, as a people, were to defend themselves against the whites. As a people, their origins were clear. It began with the Five Nations stretching outward from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, draw together a network that included scores of peoples, some of them once enemies, now bounded for a common cause. Ostler (2015) cites an unnamed Shaman who described how the anti-American alliance would later indict the colonists for having taken "away all their lands and cruelly and treacherously treated some of their people" (p. 43). The Native Americans charged the Europeans with delivering an unjust war upon their nation, one that destroyed many of their tribes.

While the building of the US continental empire can clearly be categorized as a case of imperialism, the suggestion that the colonization of North America was a product of imperialism is not the norm. Certainly, the effort to eliminate Native Americans merges the settler colonial ideology with continental empire-building (Veracini 2010). As always, the justification for this brutality was the supposed "savagery" of the Indians. Before the Revolutionary War began, they had already begun to charge the British with damaged by making them dependent on alcohol and other trade goods, destroying game, and encroaching on their lands. In 1763, Indians launched a series of attacks against British posts, igniting Pontiac's War. Warriors from numerous tribes joined the uprising in an effort to drive British soldiers and settlers out of the region. The war is named after the Odawa leader Pontiac, the most prominent of many native leaders in the conflict.

Native Americans sensed opportunity with the outbreak of the American Revolution. In early 1776, the Cherokees were invited to join a party of Mohawks, Shawnees, and Delawares in forming a pan-Indian alliance against the colonists (Wilson, p. 150). The opposition gave outsiders and other observers insight into indigenous thought. The one British Mohawk leader, Joseph Brant, who called on Iroquois warriors to fight the Americans, was later credited as the one who "began this Rebellion to be sole Masters of this Continent" (Ostler, p. 43).

In the decades following independence, economic problems, rampant speculation, and disputes over title drove more and more settlers west in search of their own land, keeping the United States in almost permanent conflict with Native Americans. Indians objected to the "highly offensive" treaties imposed on them after the war. They challenged the way in which US officials spoke to them as people who "must . . . submit to the dictates of a proud conqueror." In the late 1780s, the western tribes formed a confederacy that included Shawnees, Delawares, Mingoes, Wyandots, Miamis, Ottawas, Ojibwes, Potawatomies, Creeks, and Cherokees to defend against further advances by the United States. Dowd (1992) describes the unification of several distinct communities for political purposes, as

"creative argumentation, intricate diplomacy between tribal communities, management of internal dissent, and strategic planning" (p. 99). As a result, religious practices, including the Green Corn Ceremony, were renewed. Powerful emetics were consumed as a means of purifying the soul from the ill effects inflicted by the European ways of life. Prophecy was of central importance of the movement in casting the Europeans as demonic beings, "pale faces" with "great white wings." The "insatiable avarice," of Europeans was cited as being driven by its "encroachments on the red men." Such visions were targeted by specific actions that would "not be satisfied until they had crowded the Indians to the extreme ... pushing those who should escape ... all would at length be exterminated" (Dowd, pp. 101–109; Ostler, p. 44).

In 1787, the passage of the Northwest Ordinance intended to encourage American settlement and development of the region. It was poorly received by Native Americans who saw it as an immediate threat. The Ordinance would eventually lead to the dispossession and conquest of Native American lands clearly stated that it (land and property) "shall never be taken from them without their consent" and that they "shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress." By 1790, hundreds of aggrieved warriors were up in arms. Two expeditions sent by President Washington to "pacify" any rebellion were destroyed by a coalition of Shawnee, Potawatomis, Ottawas, Ojibways, and Delawares led by the Miami chief Little Turtle. The coalition would eventually fall in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 (Wilson, p. 154; Ostler, p. 72).

In 1795, following the Battle of Fallen Timbers, terms for peace and concessions were agreed upon, and a treaty was signed at Fort Greenville, Ohio. The treaty was supposed to bring an end to the conflict in the Northwest, and, in particular, the Ohio country. New territorial lines were drawn relegating Native Americans to northwestern Ohio. It also introduced the practice of annual payments following land concessions. The treaty became synonymous with the end of the frontier in the Northwest Territory.

The response to the Fort Greenville Treaty, in the first years of the nineteenth century, was a refocused effort by Indians in building a new anti-imperial movement. Among the Shawnee many Indians sought a spiritual path that leads them to abstain from alcohol and to reject European trade goods and technology. They returned to their pre-European modes of dress and consumption. Central to this "new way" was a strict adherence to renewed religious rituals. The movement drew spread to include large numbers of Delawares, Kickapoos, Potawatomies, Ottawas, Ojibwes, Menominees, Ho-Chunks, Sacs, Foxes, and Iowas. Those who joined the new movement were critical of any Indian leaders who cooperated with the United States. Chiefs who signed the Fort Greenville Treaty were charged with witchcraft and crimes against their people. As Ostler states: "In this instance, then, the immediate target of an anti-imperialist movement was not the imperial power; it was those perceived to be collaborating with it" (p. 45).

The critique of US imperialism would become a rallying cry for the indigenous tribes in North America. Following the Fort Wayne Treat in 1809, which led to more cession of land through the use of bribery and violence, Tecumseh noted further "the treachery of the British" toward Indians. In the transition from British to what was now a Euro-American phenomenon, Tecumseh claimed that their "new fathers the Americans ... told us they would treat us well." He concluded that the "Americans" were no different as they too would murder "men, women, and children." Tecumseh took charge of such momentum by seeking support from the British in Canada and by traveling to several other tribal nations throughout what was the United States and beyond its western borders. All diplomatic efforts with US emissaries were designed to re-acquire all Indian lands east of the Mississippi River.

The outbreak of war in 1812, between Britain and the United States, was again viewed as an opportunity for Native Americans to come together in rebellion against what were now the "Americans." Tecumseh called for his people to seize the moment, "to form ourselves into one great combination." The British were keen on

the prospects of Tecumseh's ability to deliver Natives in supporting them in the conflict, appointed him a brigadier general. While he was effective in scoring a string of spectacular victories in the Great Lakes area, the strength of the American military proved to be too much. In October of 1813, during the battle of the Thames, US troops routed British and Indian forces, killing Tecumseh as he tried to rally his men. Six months later, to the south, Andrew Jackson led troops against the Creek Red Sticks, killing over 800 at Horseshoe Bend.

The battles of the Thames and Horseshoe Bend can be seen as marking the defeat of a string of interrelated anti-imperial movements that had waxed and waned for over 50 years. At their strongest moments, these movements had adherents in scores of Indian communities from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes and posed a serious threat to US imperial ambitions. During this time, they succeeded in created new forms of political organization and identity, positing a "polygenetic theory of human origins, a separate creation and correspondingly different ways of life for 'red' and 'white' people." Though placing "red" people in a superior moral position, the Confederationists' theory of racial division was pluralistic, as it held that the Creator had given each people specific technologies and separate lands, rather than hierarchical, as in European and US racial theory, which regarded "civilization" as inherently superior to "savagery." The Confederationists also articulated a systemic critique of European and US imperialism. Prophets not only received visions and preached moral regeneration and the revival of ritual; they developed a historically and empirically informed analysis of imperial interests and strategies and used this analysis to mobilize supporters, assess current conditions, and forecast future possibilities. Although the anti-imperialist Confederationists developed the most robust oppositional ideology of any Indians in the early nineteenth century, critiques emerged from communities that had already been colonized. Until the 1830s, however, oppressive conditions generally worked against openly anti-colonial articulations.

Racial Attitudes and the Birth of "Redness"

The initial impact of the differences between Europeans and Native Americans designated superior and subordinate groups, respectively. Central for to the conflict was a new racial consciousness, one in which indigenous people no longer identified as members of specific tribes but as part of a more unified "red race" poised in opposition to the invading "race." The belief that the Native American and "white" worlds were essentially irreconcilable clearly reflects a long history of broken promises. As Wilson observes, "repeated removals profoundly shaped nativist beliefs." He also includes the story of an unnamed Shawnee shaman who died and traveled to the "sky world," where he had been given a "dire warning" about following the white man's beliefs. "Beware of the religion of the white man," the Shaman was told, ". . . every Indian who embraces it is obliged to take the road to the white man's heaven; and yet no red man is permitted to enter there, but will have to wander about forever without a resting place" (Wilson, p. 150).

The Europeans, and certainly the English, had long held that "savage" and "civilized" societies were incapable of coexisting. This view deemed indigenous people as untamed, like the wild animals with which they share the wilderness. It seemed impossible, to Europeans, that they were capable of more advanced and virile civilization. Instead, the dominant view was that they would disappear. The only hope for Native Americans was to break their tribal allegiance and become "civilized."

In 1826, Elias Boudinot published *An Address to the Whites*. Boudinot was Cherokee with about one-sixteenth of "white" blood. At age 16 he adopted a European name, dressed like a southern gentleman, and spoke in flawless English. Having been educated at a mission school, he had been "properly" assimilated into the Euro-American way of life. His *Address* rejected the necessity to "darken these walls with deeds at which humanity must shudder." Instead, he sought to detail Cherokee progress toward civilization. He sought appeasement and "mercy" to allow Cherokees to

avoid the common fate of "the poor aborigines [to] melt away before the white population." Denson (2004) contends that Cherokee histories offered portrayals of white Americans as "treating them with kindness" and then follow with how recent "U.S. actions had betrayed a long-standing friendship" (pp. 40–41).

The continual representation of Native peoples as savages is what made "temporal interest and eternal welfare" that much more difficult. Konkle (2004) adds that "a Native person has to endure being responded to as a savage Indian, no matter how 'civilized' his appearance" and characterizes Boudinot's writings as "emerging oppositional critique" (p. 51). In doing so, Boudinot addresses the discrepancy between white knowledge about indigenous peoples and the Native American reality. While he admits that Natives may be "ignorant," "heathen," and mad "savage," he stresses that they (Natives) are "no more than all others have been under similar circumstances. Eighteen centuries ago what were the inhabitants of Great Britain?" (p. 69).

The American Indian

Native Americans remain a tiny minority, representing less than 1% of the US population. Scattered throughout the country with heavy concentrations in the west and southwest, more than half of all Indians live in Oklahoma, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska, and Washington State. These populations tend to be dispersed among other groups, rather than to congregate in "Indian areas" where might be easily identifiable. There are high concentrations in urban areas. Most of the remaining tribal lands – which many urban Indians still regard as home – are relatively isolated, so travelers and visitors to major centers are unlikely to see them without going out of their way (Wilson, p. xxiv).

The traditional Indian is no more. Some, as the result of intermarriage with non-Indians, do not even look racially particularly distinct. For someone whose only image of the "Indian" is still some furred, feathered and beaded figure staring inscrutably out of a nineteenth-century photograph, they

seem unsettlingly inauthentic and unclassifiable. In fact, it is profoundly unrealistic to suppose that any people, especially Native Americans, will look the same as they did a hundred years ago. All cultures evolve. American Indians, in addition, have faced pressures and enforced changes that are almost unimaginable to most other peoples.

Dunbar-Ortiz (2014), in a somewhat prophetic reminder, recalls the original settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopting "an official seal designed in England before their journey." It depicts a "near-naked native holding a harmless, flimsy-looking bow and arrow and inscribed with a plea, 'Come over and help us.'" Some 300 years later, US military veterans of the Spanish American War revealed a similar seal showing "a naked woman kneeling before an armed US soldier and a sailor with a US battleship in the background." This "altruistic theme" she suggests can be traced "into the early twenty-first century, when the United States still invades countries under the guise of rescue" (pp. 49–50).

The genocidal conquest of indigenous lands in the settler colonies of North America is the basis for agriculture, railway building, urban development, and mineral extraction in those countries. Today, whereas more than 400 native peoples remain within the 48 contiguous states of the United States and over 200 within Canada, these currently reside in reservations or "replacement lands" comprising a mere 3% of the continental United States and a lesser portion of Canada. Despite this, having never ceded it by treaty or other formal means, native North Americans retain legal title to around one third of the US land mass and even more of Canada's. The reservations into which they have been forced were effectively "dumping grounds" for Native Americans, whom they were not in any way intended to benefit. Aside from a layer of smaller Native entrepreneurs, ranchers, and bureaucrats, the principal beneficiaries of the reservation system have been large mineral and energy monopolies; these are vital to the health of the US economy:

> It is one of history's supreme ironies that this same 'worthless' acreage turned out to be extraordinarily rich in minerals, endowed with an estimated two-

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thirds of what the U.S. now claims as its own uranium assets, as much as a quarter of the readily accessible low-sulfur coal, 15–20 percent of the oil and natural gas, and appreciable deposits of copper, bauxite, zeolite and other strategically/commercially crucial ores. These minerals, plainly belonging to the indigenous nations within whose reservation boundaries they lie, constitute what federal economic planners now like to call 'U.-S. domestic reserves.' Without these resources, America's contemporary business as usual could never have been created, and would presently come to a halt in a hot minute. (Churchill 1998, p. xii)

Yet not only would the proceeds from the natural resources found on reservation land make Native Americans the largest per capita landholders of any group in the United States, and the richest, they are by far the most impoverished.

Cross-References

▶ Genocide and Imperialism
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism
▶ Racism and Imperialism
▶ Settler Colonialism

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Imperialism in Antarctica

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Introduction

Antarctica has no indigenous population, and so there has been no domination and resistance of peoples as is usually associated with colonialism and imperialism. It is nevertheless possible to understand Antarctic territory as having been the object of imperial endeavors. Proposals for

how to govern the continent as well as what is perceived the relevant international law to be applied to Antarctica have also reflected an imperial outlook. The history of interstate relations concerning the governance of Antarctica can be understood in terms of three waves of Antarctic imperialism: the first led by Spain, the second by Britain, and the third by the United States. Each was part of a broader imperial project. Viewing the history of Antarctica in imperial terms helps us recognize the relationships of power that have infused the geopolitics of Antarctica and relates it to the broader international political context in which Antarctic politics has necessarily been embedded.

The First Wave of Antarctic Imperialism

The territory that was to become the states of Argentina and Chile came into contact with the European states system during a wave of European expansion that took place between about 1400 and 1715. The outcome of a series of papal bulls and the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal was that Spain considered itself to have authority to commission its explorers to claim territory not already discovered west of a line drawn from the Arctic pole to the Antarctic pole 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. Spain proceeded to acquire the land that became Chile and Argentina with the belief that its rights extended all the way to the South Pole. It should be remembered that until the early nineteenth century, Antarctica remained a purely hypothetical continent (Howkins 2010).

The Captaincy-General of Chile within the Viceroyalty acquired its independence in 1810 as the modern state of Chile and the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata emerged in 1816 as the independent state of Argentina. Both successor states considered themselves to have inherited the entire land that had been granted to Spain. The Chilean-Argentine frontier was generally uninhabited and unmapped at independence (Véliz 1968, p. 405). The successor states in South America were highly centralized, with cities at their core and

vast distances between the urban areas and the peripheries. In many cases the boundaries between the states were quite vague.

Argentina and Chile spent much of the century after independence negotiating portions of their mutual boundary. The starting point in these negotiations was the South American legal doctrine of *uti possidetis, ita possideatis*, literally "as you possess, you may continue to possess." In other words, the status quo was to remain. A limitation of reliance on this principle was that in many cases there had been no settled boundary between the colonial administrative units. Where there had been an official demarcation, this often differed from the boundary in practice. One thing that was agreed, however, was that no *terra nullius* remained and that no future colonization or foreign intervention would be tolerated (Duran-Bachler 1972, p. 61).

During the nineteenth century, Chile and Argentina worked to settle their mutual boundary in the Magellan Straits, Patagonia, and Puna de Atacama. Where negotiations on their own were inadequate, they proceeded to arbitration. In the early twentieth century, they turned their attention to their boundary in Antarctica. The principle of *uti possidetis, ita possideatis* was particularly inadequate here because there had been no Antarctic boundary. Negotiations held in 1907–1908 were inconclusive (Scott 2004, p. 67).

Further efforts were made in the 1940s, but bilateral diplomacy was to prove unsuccessful. According to their general treaty of arbitration, the next step would be arbitration, which was in the first instance to be requested from His Britannic Majesty's Government. This was not a viable option in this scenario since Britain did not recognize the rights of either state to Antarctic territory.

As we have seen, Spain was the imperial power during the first period of Antarctic imperialism. To be precise, the object of this imperial project was not Antarctica itself but the land and resources of South America. There has been very little recognition of what has been described as the first wave of Antarctic imperialism within the English language literature on Antarctica. It

tends to be amalgamated with the second for reasons that will be explored below.

The Second Wave of Antarctic Imperialism

The first sighting of the Antarctic continent by Europeans was probably as early as 1820 (Headland 1989, p. 26), but the second wave of Antarctic colonialism was a twentieth-century phenomenon; it is best understood as having emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century and having undergone most of its development between the world wars. Britain was the dominant colonial power during this second wave; France, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand were involved in this colonial project, although the latter two primarily as the recipients of British policy.

In contrast to what was described above as the first wave of Antarctic imperialism, this consciously imperial project had Antarctica as its object. It followed on from the "new imperialism" of about 1870–1910 during which European states gained extensive territory on the African continent. European states believed that they had a right to make claims to any "non-civilized" territory. France acquired an area 20 times the size of France itself (Barraclough 1964, p. 62).

The legal regime within which the European colonizing states divided up the territory in Africa was confirmed in the General Act of the Berlin Conference signed on 26 February 1885. A claim was not to be valid until and unless followed by annexation and effective occupation, and the colonizing power would be expected to notify other states. The applicability to Antarctic colonialism of the requirement of effective occupation was debated given the difficulty of long-term occupation in Antarctica but was in general terms accepted, certainly by Britain.

The British Antarctic claim is based on Royal Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917 and by the end of 1919 Britain appears to have developed a policy of Antarctic imperialism (Beck 1983, p. 457); British policy-makers deemed it desirable to incorporate the whole continent into the British Empire (Beck 1983). This did not come to pass, however, most basically because France and Norway also began to demonstrate interest in Antarctica, and there was an understanding shared by colonial powers that they should not deny another "civilized" state the right to make a territorial claim nor be overly critical regarding the claims of other states.

Britain went on to negotiate boundaries between its claimed Antarctic territory and that of France and Norway. France formally declared sovereignty over Terre Adélie in 1924, and Norway's claim to Dronning Maud Land is dated from 1939. A British Order in Council in 1923 provided for the government of the Ross Dependency by the Governor of New Zealand and an Order in Council of 7 February 1933 established the Australian Antarctic Territory.

By the outbreak of World War II, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, France, and Norway had divided up the whole continent other than the territory between 80° and 150° West of Greenwich. There was some speculation as to whether the United States might claim this portion of Antarctica. Some privately financed expeditions by US nationals such as those by Byrd in 1929–1931 and 1933–1935 advanced claims on behalf of the United States. The United States nevertheless reserved its rights in respect to questions of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica (Myhre 1986), and several US scholars (e.g., Reeves 1934) rejected the idea that Antarctic territory might be acquired by effective occupation, suggesting that Antarctica might be *res communis* as opposed to *terra nullius*. US Antarctic policy was from the 1920s to the 1950s undergirded by what became known as the Hughes doctrine, which meant:

(i) That the United States made no claims to territory in Antarctica because no "actual settlement" could be made even though first discovery could be proved.
(ii) The United States would not recognize claims by other countries because this condition of "actual settlement" was not fulfilled (Hall 1989, p. 137).

Efforts to Resolve the Conflicting Outcomes of the First Two Waves of Antarctic Imperialism

The portion of Antarctica claimed by the United Kingdom overlapped the South American Antarctic, the most accessible and strategically important part of the continent, bringing the outcomes of these two waves of Antarctic imperialism into direct conflict. Meanwhile, actions by Chile and Argentina could be interpreted not only as furthering their efforts at boundary delimitation but as belated attempts to participate in colonial claim-making as per Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand. A standard account of the evolution of Antarctic geopolitics such as that in Joyner (1998, p. 17) therefore proceeds along the following lines:

> The earliest claims to Antarctica were made by European powers. The onset of World War II, however, broadened interest in the Antarctic, and two non-European states soon joined the ranks of territorial claimants to the frozen continent.

Chile is viewed as having been the first to move. A Chilean Decree of 6 November 1940 defined the "Chilean Antarctic Territory" as consisting of "[a]ll lands, islands, islets, reefs of rocks, glaciers (pack-ice), already known, or to be discovered, and their respective territorial waters, in the sector between longitudes 53 and 90W" (Bush 1982b, pp. 310–312). Argentina is in most standard accounts deemed to have followed with a claim made in 1943 (Hall 1989, p. 138) amended in several Argentine maps published in 1946 (Joyner 1998, p. 18).

A dual reading of these actions is facilitated by the fact that "occupation" has meaning within both regimes: it was relevant to the placement of a boundary in South America, but "effective occupation" was also a means of acquiring territory in the new imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. When their positions were viewed in terms of the dominant legal regime of new imperialism, the position of both Argentina and Chile appeared weaker than that of the United Kingdom because as we have seen, key actions they took to demonstrate effective occupation over territory that overlapped that claimed by the United Kingdom also succeeded those of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom proposed several times between 1947 and 1954 that a case be submitted to the International Court of Justice (Scott 2004, p. 75). In Notes to Argentina and Chile of 21 December 1954, the United Kingdom suggested as an alternative course of action, an arbitral tribunal to decide on their respective rights "under international law to the territory designated by the Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917 as Dependencies of the Falkland Islands" (Bush 1982b, p. 5). The United Kingdom went so far as to make two unilateral applications to the Court the following year, but in 1956 the Court issued orders removing both cases from the list because both Chile and Argentina denied the Court jurisdiction.

The South American states were no doubt concerned that if the case were to reach the Court, the now dominant law of new imperialism would be the relevant law applied, so leaving them in a weaker position. Both saw themselves as anti-colonial states. At the San Francisco conference in 1946, for example, Argentina recorded a reservation to Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations that dealt with colonial possessions (Bush 1982a, p. 615). Argentina and Chile perceived their interests in Antarctica as nationalist and anti-imperial, developing the idea of a "South American Antarctica" to further their anti-imperialism (Howkins 2010, p. 41).

There were several other attempts during the 1940s and 1950s to initiate processes aimed at resolving the conflicting outcomes of what has been described here as two periods of Antarctic imperialism. In 1940, for example, Argentina proposed an international conference to determine the juridico-political status of Antarctica, an invitation that was repeated on several occasions (Scott 2004, p. 74).

The United States proposed the internationalization of Antarctica. In 1948 the United States distributed a draft agreement by which Antarctica would become a United Nations trusteeship. The preamble to the agreement referred to Article

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75 of the UN Charter as having provided for the establishment of an international trusteeship system. Article 3 stated that Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States would be designated as the "administering authority of the trust territory." The administering authority would "carry out in the trust territory the basic objectives of the system as set out in Article 76 of the Charter, so far as they may be applicable in the trust territory." The United States was thereby associating itself with the European wave of Antarctic imperialism and effectively asking the South American states to have their positions interpreted in terms of twentieth-century European colonialism as now inclusive of the United States and to then merge those rights with others.

This proposal was not well received, and the United States went on to make another proposal to internationalize Antarctica; this time the United States proposed a condominium (US Department of State 1948). By Article 2, parties were to

> Merge and join their claims to, and interests in, specific portions of the area covered by this agreement and vest such individual claims and interests in the special regime hereby established, each agreeing not to seek a division of the territory in the area, but to join with the others for the purposes embodied in this agreement.

This proposal was not much better received by states believing that they enjoyed territorial rights in Antarctica; nor did they welcome the suggestion by India in 1956 that the "Antarctic question" be discussed at the General Assembly, India hinting at the possibility of a trusteeship. The Unite States and Soviet Union showed some sympathy for the proposal (Howkins 2008).

Interestingly, a key component of discussion regarding internationalization options was the universal or planetary importance of knowledge being gained through scientific research in Antarctica. Science was to become the dominant theme in rhetoric regarding international cooperation that ultimately resulted in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. The preamble to the Antarctic Treaty acknowledged the "substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in

Antarctica" and to the benefits of establishing a "firm foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation."

There were 12 original signatories of the treaty: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Article 4 accommodated the differing positions as regards territorial rights. Article 4 provides:

1. Nothing contained in the present treaty shall be interpreted as:
   (a) A renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
   (b) A renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica
   (c) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other states right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force.

Article 4 is generally regarded as the cornerstone of the treaty.

The Dominant Postcolonial Perspective on the Antarctic Treaty

Since entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty in 1961, Antarctica has been governed by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). By Article 1(e) of the Environmental Protocol to the treaty, the ATS is

defined as "the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under that Treaty, its associated separate international instruments in force and the measures in effect under those instruments." What could be referred to as the dominant postcolonial interpretation of the treaty is of its Article 4 as having "frozen" the territorial status quo, thereby rewarding pre-treaty colonialism and prolonging its significance (Dodds 2006).

The number of Parties to the Antarctic Treaty increased gradually, but when the ATS commenced negotiations for a convention by which to regulate mining, Malaysia under Prime Minister Mahathir took the lead among Third World countries, critiquing the ATS as being non-transparent and perpetuating the privilege of a few. Mahathir presented his position as anti-colonial (Hamzah 2013, p. 97), asserting that Antarctica did not belong to the claimant states any more than colonial territories belonged to colonial powers.

The "Question of Antarctica" remained on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly from 1982 to 2005, during which period regular debates were held regarding governance arrangements for the continent and whether it should be brought within the United Nations. Although key players in the ATS defended the System over the period, the "neocolonial" challenge by developing countries to the legitimacy of the system did serve to shape subsequent developments in the ATS (Haward and Mason 2011). It was one factor influencing the rejection by the ATS of a convention providing for mineral exploitation in Antarctica and its effective replacement by an Environmental Protocol, Article 7 of which prohibits activities relating to mineral resources other than scientific research. Malaysia acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 2011, which is sometimes interpreted as an example of a broader tendency of the ATS to co-opt its postcolonial critics (Chaturvedi 2013).

The Third Wave of Antarctic Imperialism

The Antarctic Treaty can also be read as not only freezing colonialism but as itself a product of colonialism. Howkins (2010, pp. 47–48) interprets the treaty as a "reformulation" of the practices of settler colonialism. "Contemporary scientific claims to legitimacy in Antarctica rest on the idea of doing some good, making use of the landscape in a particular way."

If we are to discern a product of imperialism, we need also to identify an imperial power. The United States can be viewed as having served as the hegemon during a third wave of Antarctic imperialism. During its rise as a world power, US rhetoric made much of its being anti-colonial, and the United States is often assumed to be an anti-imperial power. But there is also a literature (e.g., Ferguson 2004; Odom and Dujarric 2004) that accepts the United States as having constituted an imperial power, even if its version of imperialism was "surreptitious" (Immerwahr 2019).

During its years as a world power, the United States has very rarely acquired formal colonies. The United States has, rather, permitted other states to acquire or retain their own independence and to conduct their foreign policy as sovereign entities. But the United States has then used multilateral treaties and institutions to disseminate its policy preferences, and although other states may have participated in the negotiation of those instruments, the broad policy direction was in most cases steered by the United States. The net effect of the United States protecting its own legal system from external interference but disseminating its policy preferences via international law has been an increase in US influence over the policy choices of other countries (Scott 2012).

Viewed from this perspective, the Antarctic Treaty did not only freeze the colonial claims of others but constituted an act of imperialism on the part of the United States. Despite having made no territorial claim of its own, the United States would, by Article 4, be able to go anywhere on the continent and to use the continent for all but non-peaceful activities.

> In formalistic, black letter law terms, the territorial rights of the claimant states have been preserved and nothing that takes place during the life of the ATS can detract from the status of those asserted rights. On the other hand, and bearing in mind the

distinction between formal and effective sovereignty, the fact that the Antarctic Treaty did not include provisions that in practice respected the asserted sovereign rights of the claimants meant that the effective sovereignty of those states would likely be diminished over time by state practice and by developments both internal and external to the Antarctic Treaty System. (Scott 2011, p. 58)

It is in this sense that Article 4 functioned to disguise US hegemony in the name of science.

Recent Scholarship on Antarctic Settler Colonialism and Imperialism

Dodds (2006) noted that polar scholars have not embraced postcolonialism as much as might be expected, with Indian scholar Sanjay Chaturvedi being one of several notable exceptions (others include Collis 1999 and Hains 2002). There has, however, been considerable literature emerge in the last two decades, emanating from several disciplines.

Recent scholarship on Antarctic settler colonialism includes, for example, that by Howkins (2010) who, in distinction from the historiographical approach presented here, views South American expansionism as a relatively understudied example of settler colonialism. Leane and Nielsen (2017) have provided an account of the role played by dairy cows in facilitating Byrd's Second Antarctic Expedition in 1935; through this account they provide insights into the symbolic promotion of US colonial interests in Antarctica.

An imperial lens is also being applied to contemporary activities. Dutton (2009), for example, has examined contemporary French and British Antarctic travel writing, to find that the imaginary of the ice continues to be shaped by colonialism. Collis and Stevens (2007) investigated McMurdo and Mawson Stations and the anatomy of their spaces as examples of contemporary colonialism.

There is, of course, a politics to the scholarship on postcolonial Antarctica. In response to the postcolonial critique of the ATS as exclusively benefiting its participants, it could be pointed out, for example, that the original parties to the treaty have not only been members of a privileged "club" but have at the same time assumed responsibilities toward the continent that non-parties do not have. Treaties are not automatically binding on third parties, but states wanting to demonstrate continuing commitment to their asserted territorial rights have needed to actively reinforce their position. Indeed, it may be construed as valid for countries geographically proximate to the continent, including Argentina, Chile, Australia, and New Zealand to influence to a disproportionate extent Antarctic governance.

While in no way asserting any direct correlation between the two, and noting that postcolonial literature has emanated from scholars in claimant states, it might also be noted that US scholars including Joyner (1998) have perceived Antarctica as a global commons, those such as Chaturvedi (2013) from non-claimant countries have criticized the colonialism embedded in the treaty, and those from claimant states such as Kaye and Rothwell (1995) have made particularly notable contributions to analyzing the detail of legal claims in Antarctica.

Conclusion

Despite its lack of an indigenous population, Antarctica has not been removed from imperialism. There is increasing scholarly interest in analyzing that imperialism. This contribution has identified three waves of Antarctic imperialism, each of which has essentially subsumed the previous wave within its own framework of political understandings and international law. Antarctica was not the direct object of the first wave, which resulted in Spanish colonization in South America, but was very much the object of the second wave in which the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand claimed portions of the continent.

Since the emergence of twentieth-century Antarctic imperialism, the actions of the South American states have been interpreted within the "new imperialism" framework of justifying claims via effective occupation. The majority of English language accounts portray both the states involved in European Antarctic imperialism and in South

American boundary delimitation as having been engaged in the same process of colonial "claim-making." The historiographical interpretation presented above has distinguished between these two waves of Antarctic imperialism. Viewing them all as having been involved in an equivalent process of "claim-making" tends to favor the position of the United Kingdom over that of Argentina and Chile.

What has been described as a third wave of Antarctic imperialism did not require any of the claimant states to renounce their claims but superimposed a governance system justified by the universal and non-political nature of science. The fact that the United States led the negotiation of the treaty and that it benefited disproportionately from that treaty insofar as it had made no territorial claim of its own but would now have access to the whole continent supports the assertion that this was an example of US informal empire. Viewing the history of Antarctic geopolitics in terms of successive waves of imperialism does not only elucidate the place of Antarctica within shifting global relationships of power but also points to the possibility that there may be additional imperial moves or proposals for the governance of Antarctica and its resources as global relationships of power continue to evolve (Scott 2017).

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Imperialism of Trade

▶ Unequal Exchange

Imperialism, Uneven Development, and Revolution: The Example of Amilcar Cabral

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Synonyms

Amilcar Cabral; Colonialism; Guinea-Bissau; Imperialism; Portuguese imperialism; Post-colonialism; Revolution; Uneven development

Definition/Description

This chapter examines the concept of post-colonialism through the lens of the theory and practice of Amilcar Cabral, who was a leading figure in the struggle for Guinea-Bissau's independence from Portugal. Cabral endeavoured to forge a country that was rooted in anti-imperialist struggle through unifying diverse ethnic groups in a common struggle for national liberation and independence and through building a common national consciousness rooted in the mobilization of the peasants, dispossessed and multiple class forces unified in the struggle to create a socialist government of national unity, forming the basis for a post-colonial society.

> It is important for us to identify the new victims and the new victimizers in the neocolonial era – for we do not live in a postcolonial era as the postmodernists claim. We must struggle together both locally and globally. The local struggle must be combined with global or international struggle and solidarity. We must fight on all fronts . . .. We must carry on a continuous resistance, a continuous dissidence, which will forge the way to a better future for the peoples of the world. (Nawal El Saadawi 1997) The masses are the torch-bearers of culture; they are the source of culture and, at the same time, the one entity truly capable of preserving and creating it – of making history. (Amilcar Cabral 1973)

The paralysis and inconsequentiality of post-colonial theory and criticism concerning globalised capitalism are so patently clear as not to warrant rehearsing again the objections of Aijaz Ahmad (1995), Arif Dirlik (1997), Neil Lazarus (1999), and others (see Schulze-Engler 1998; Stummer 1998). The charges range from the discipline's fetishism of textuality and its corollary metaphysics, its sly if civil evasion of 'contemporary imperialist practices' (Davies 1998, p. 23), to what Benita Parry calls the 'elective disaffiliation' of post-colonial critics 'from the variable articulations of an emancipatory politics' (1998, p. 48). This is not just because this genre is devoted to specialised studies on widowburning or British colonisation of the Indian subcontinent, Australia, Canada, and South Africa (Ashcroft et al. 1989). The explanation is more than theoretical or discursive. Robert Young, the editor of the new magazine *Interventions: The International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* put his finger on its symptomatology: 'The rise of post-colonial studies coincided with the end of Marxism as the defining political, cultural and economic objective of much of the third world' (1998, pp. 8–9). This diagnosis is more wishful thinking than a factual statement. To be sure, the 'Third World' as a homogenised entity never claimed to elevate Marxism as its all-

encompassing objective; no one does this, anyway. Another agenda lurks in the background.

Post-colonialism seems to require a post-Marxism as 'supplement', a prophylactic clearing of the ground (Loomba 1998; Moore-Gilbert 1997). What is meant by post-Marxism or the 'end of Marxism' is really the reconfiguration of the international class struggle between the imperial metropoles and the revolting masses of the periphery. It signifies the end of the bourgeois national project initiated by the Bandung Conference led by Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno (Ahmad 1995) and its project of plural national-liberation trajectories (Denis 1982). This project of post-colonial states modernising on the basis of anti-communism and pragmatic philosophy, reliance on Soviet military support and cynical playing of the 'American card', collapsed with the bankruptcy of most neo-colonial regimes that succumbed to World Bank/IMF 'structural adjustment programs' and conditionalities.

Post-colonial normativity inheres in its claim to discover complexity and difference hitherto submerged by totalising axioms. The principle of uneven and combined development, as adumbrated by Marx and Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and others in the socialist tradition, renders all the rhetoric of ambivalence, syncretism, and hybridity redundant. But this principle has been ignored or neglected because a linear teleological narrative of social evolution has been ascribed to classical Marxism, conflating it with ideas of unidirectional progress and developmentalism from Jean Bodin to W.W. Rostow and the gurus of modernisation theory (Patterson 1997). I want to elaborate on this distortion of Marx's position because it functions as the crucial basis for arguing the alternative rationality of unpredictable social change offered by post-colonial theory. The metaphysical idealism underlying post-colonial dogma, its hostility to historical materialism (the dialectical theory of comprehensive social transformation), and its complicity with the 'New World Order' managed by transnational capital can be made transparent by juxtaposing it with Marx's thesis of an uneven and unsynchronised process of development in specific social formations.

In essence, the most blatant flaw of post-colonial orthodoxy (I use the rubric to designate the practice of Establishment post-colonialism employing a post-structuralist organon) lies in its refusal to grasp the category of capitalist modernities in all its global ramifications, both the regulated and the disarticulated aspects. A mechanistic formula is substituted for a dialectical analytic of historical motion. Consequently, in the process of a wide-ranging critique of the Enlightenment ideals by post-colonial critics, the antithesis of capitalism – proletarian revolution and the socialist principles first expounded by Marx and Engels – is dissolved in the logic of the global system of capital without further discrimination. The obsession to do away with totality, foundations, universals, and systemic analysis leads to a mechanical reification of ideas and terminology, as well as the bracketing of the experiences they refer to, culminating in a general relativism, scepticism, and nominalism – even nihilism – that undercuts the post-colonial claim to truth, plausibility, or moral high ground (see Callinicos 1989; Dews 1995; Habermas 1987).

A typical exercise in repudiating a historical materialist approach can be seen in Dipesh Chakrabarty's objection to the institutional history in which Europe operates as 'the sovereign theoretical subject'. Modernity – 'the meta-narrative of the nation state' – is understood as European imperialism in collusion with 'Third-World' nationalisms. What is at stake is the question of a history of India written from the subaltern (peasantry) point of view. Chakrabarty calls for 'radical critique and transcendence of liberalism (i.e., of the bureaucratic construction of citizenship, modern state, and bourgeois privacy that classical political philosophy has produced)', a call that he believes finds resonance in Marx, post-structuralism, and feminist philosophy (1995, p. 386). While he seeks to provincialise Europe by demonstrating the limits of Enlightenment rationalism (its coercive violence suppressed the heterogeneity of other cultures and civilisations), he also rejects cultural relativism and nativist histories.

Chakrabarty's obsession is to unmask, demystify, or deconstruct the themes of citizenship

and the modern state as though they were permanent, transhistorical, and ubiquitous. In the end, Chakrabarty negotiates for a compromise which he labels a 'politics of despair': 'I ask for a history that deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and practices, the part it plays in collusion with the narratives of citizenships in assimilating to the projects of the modern state all other possibilities of human solidarity'. His intent is to unfold a radically heterogeneous world 'where collectivities are defined neither by the rituals of citizenship nor by the nightmare of "tradition" that "modernity" creates' (388). Not to worry. The dreams of repressed subalternity in India and elsewhere await a Foucauldean genealogical excavation that the group of elite academics like Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, Gyan Prakash, and Gayatri Spivak have already begun. On the other hand, the status quo of existing property relations and asymmetries of actual power relations (articulating class, gender, locality, religion) in India remain untouched.

Remembrance as Prophecy

Central to the post-colonial malaise is the belief that history or historical narratives of colonised peoples by Europeans have been permanently damaged, hence they are useless for recovering native or indigenous originality. Eurocentric knowledge (whether expressed by Cecil Rhodes or Joseph Conrad, by Black Elk or Fray Bartolome de las Casas) can never disclose the truth about the colonised. Following Lyotard, only local narratives can have validity from now on. Unless postcolonial historians naively believe they can return to a past where local narratives of tribal groups ran parallel and never intersected, the notions of locality and place are unintelligible outside of a wider global space from which they can be identified. What is missing in the critique of Eurocentric history is a dialectical comprehension of such relations – the relation between Europe and its Others – that precisely constitute the problem of one-sidedness, falsity, distortion, and all the evils that post-colonials discern in

modernity (including Marxism as a peculiarly European invention). Parallel or coeval modernities need to be theorised within a differentiated, not centralised, ontology of determinate and concrete social formations if we don't want to relapse into essentialising metaphysics.

In 1878, Marx wrote a letter to a Russian journal that complained of a certain tendency that mistakenly elevated his hypothesis about capitalist development in Western Europe to a 'suprahistorical theory'. He wanted to correct the misapplication to Russia of his notion of the transition from feudalism to capitalism given in *Capital:* the emergence of capitalism premised on the expropriation of the agricultural producers can occur only when empirical preconditions exist. Russia will tend to become capitalist only if it has transformed the bulk of the peasantry into proletarians. Marx explains that this did not happen in Roman times when the means of production of the plebeians or free peasants were expropriated; they became 'not wage workers but an idle mob more abject than those who were called "poor whites" in the southern United States'; after this, there appeared not a capitalist but a slave mode of production. Marx objects to his critic's attempt to generalise the hypothetical conclusion of his empirical inquiry:

> [My critic] absolutely insists on transforming my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophical theory of the general course fatally imposed on all peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves placed, in order to arrive ultimately at this economic formation that ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labor, the most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. (It does me both too much honor and too much discredit.) [Here follows the instance of the Roman plebeians.] Thus events that are strikingly analogous, but taking place in different historical milieux, lead to totally disparate results. By studying each of these developments separately, and then comparing them, one can easily discover the key to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there with the master key of a historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being suprahistorical. (Marx 1982, pp. 109–110)

Now, it is clear that events cannot be judged in themselves apart from the historical milieu, and

that there is no 'master key' to unlocking all phenomena – which is not to say that one doesn't need some schematic framework or methodological guidelines for gathering data, testing and evaluating them through some principle of falsifiability or verification, and finally formulating general albeit tentative observations. I think Marx was not disclaiming the validity of the notion of primitive accumulation he outlined, nor the scheme of historical development enunciated in the 'Preface' to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859). The fundamental insight on the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production, manifest in class struggles and in the global phenomenon of uneven development, has served as a fertile *problematique* or framework of inquiry – paradigm, if you like – in which to raise questions and clarify problems of social change and historical trajectories.

There are at least two examples in Marx's theoretical practice that evince a sensitivity to the heterogeneous and disparate motions of diverse collectivities. The first deals with the subject of the Asiatic mode of production, which departs from the teleological assumptions of Marx's theory of transition from the ancient and feudal to the capitalist mode of production. No necessary succession is implied in the unfolding of the transition sequence. Because the socio-economic specificity of Asiatic society has led to a notion of despotic, stagnant, and arbitrary societies quite inferior to the dynamic Western counterparts, the notion has become problematic and controversial. Karl Wittfogel's book *Oriental Despotism* (1957), which examined the hydraulic economy of China and diverse societies under a centralised 'patrimonial' bureaucracy (inspired by Max Weber's studies), however, became a weapon in the Cold War against Stalinism.

Marx and Engels first became interested in investigating non-European societies when they engaged in journalistic criticisms of British foreign policy in 1853. They noted that despotism and stagnation characterised certain societies where the state management of public works (irrigation) predominated together with the self-sufficient isolated village community, as in ancient China. Later on, in Grundrisse, Marx emphasised the fact of the communal ownership of land by autarchic communities, the stable basis for the social unity embodied by the state. In *Capital,* Marx presented the Asiatic mode as one way in which the social product is communally appropriated; this system is founded on the social relations of the self-sufficient village anchored to the unity of handicrafts and agriculture. The 'secret of the unchangingness of Asiatic society' rested on the absence of private property (which precluded the rise of social classes as agents of change) and the simplicity of production methods. It is of course questionable how autonomous self-sufficient villages could coexist with the powerful interventions by centralised absolutist states whose origin also needs to be elucidated.

From a Weberian perspective, the stationary Asiatic mode displayed a lack of civil society and the dominance of a centralised state apparatus. Some scholars have claimed that Marx and Engels justified the 'progressive' role of British imperialism in creating private property in land and thus destroying the stationary Asiatic mode. This modernising effect, carried out through the railway system, free press, modern army, and means of communication (all technological determinants incorporated into social relations) has been used to apologise for if not legitimise imperial expansion as the only way of exploding an otherwise immutable and backward social formation. Here is Marx's own 'apologia' for British rule in India written for the New York *Tribune* (25 June 1853) in Marx's original English:

> England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is: Can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. (Marx and Engels 1959, pp. 480–481)

Faced by the 'cunning of Reason' (to use the Hegelian phrase), Marx counsels us to put aside 'whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for our personal feelings' because we, tutored in

Enlightenment wisdom, are also aware of the advances made possible by imperial cruelty: the destruction of barbarian egoism, the Oriental despotism which 'restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies' (1959: 480). Postcolonial sceptics condemn this narrative schema as reductive and positivistic. To my mind, however, it is the most graphic triangulation of opposites, a cognitive mapping of ruptures and contradictions that epitomises the genuinely dialectical vicissitudes of history apprehended by Marx in his survey of historically specific milieus and concrete conjunctures.

The other example catalysed by the discovery of the Asiatic mode of production is the possibility of a non-capitalist road to communism exemplified by Russia in the nineteenth century. In the midst of revolutionary struggles in Russia, Marx revised his early conception of Russia as 'semi-Asiatic' and examined the nature of the Russian *mir* or commune. Could it provide the foundation for socialism or arrest its advent? Marx and Engels held that it could, provided that capitalist relations of production do not strangle the whole countryside and that working-class revolutions in Europe would coincide with any vast social change in Russia. Plekhanov disagreed with this, but it only proved that there is no deterministic and unilinear paradigm, or an evolutionary mechanistic formula that would dictate how stages of development would unfold. It was Stalin who decreed in 1931 that Asian societies were subsumed under the categories of slavery or feudalism, thus pursuing the path of Western European development from primitive communism and then sequentially to slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist stages. But, of course, that is not the end of the story.

It was the return of a serious concern with non-European routes to modernity in the 1960s (such as the Asiatic mode and the Russian commune) that spurred discussions over dependency, uneven development, and underdevelopment, world systems theory, the specificity and complexity of 'Third- World' societies, and African

socialism. The theoretical liabilities of Orientalism incurred by the Asiatic mode have been spelled out by Bryan Turner: 'its theoretical function was not to analyse Asiatic society but to explain the rise of capitalism in Europe within a comparative framework. Hence Asiatic society was defined as a series of gaps – the missing middle class, the absent city, the absence of private property, the lack of bourgeois institutions – which thereby accounted for the dynamism of Europe' (1983, p. 36). Nonetheless, the notion functioned as a heuristic tool that Marx deployed to eliminate any teleological determinism or evolutionary monism in his speculative instruments of historical investigation.

On the pivotal significance of these socioeconomic formations, Eric Hobsbawm calls attention to its implicit thesis of human individualisation through the historical process, via exchange conceived in terms of reciprocal interactions. It is in the course of demarcating the precapitalist *Formen* – before full-fledged commodity production set in – that Marx revealed his commitment to an emancipatory if utopian vision. Whether in ancient Greek and Roman, Asiatic, or Germanic versions, these tribal communities contrasted favourably with the bourgeois epoch because 'man always appears ... as the aim of production, not production as the human goal ...'. Marx continues: 'In fact, however, when the narrow bourgeois form has been peeled away, what is wealth if not the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc. of individuals, produced in universal exchange?' In effect, the totality of human development, 'the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions' and human powers signifies a 'situation where man does not reproduce himself in any determined form, but produces his totality' (1965, pp. 84–85). Informed by this synthesising impulse in which dealienation of labour becomes the aim of revolutionary praxis, Marx's method of historical specification does not degenerate into the disintegrating, anomic reflex that vitiates post-colonial discourse. Marx's empathetic understanding and interpretation of the past in their uniqueness, which post-colonial hermeneutics inflates into an axiom of incommensurability, does not preclude a synoptic,

all-encompassing apprehension; in fact, it presupposes that stagnant and paralysing continuum that, as Walter Benjamin (1969) puts it, must be blasted apart to release the forces of change.

It is in this context that Marx seized the moment of 'the break-up of the old village communes' in India by British imperialism as a disastrous event pregnant with its contrary. It is progressive in the sense that it releases or unfolds human potential. On the other hand, Marx believed (in a letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881) that if the Russian village commune (mir) were left free to pursue its 'spontaneous development', then it could be the point of departure for 'social regeneration in Russia'. This shows that Marx, far from being a unilinear determinist, posited the dialectical-materialist view that the peasantry can acquire a communist consciousness, depending on which aspects (the collectivist or privative) of the *mir* would be enhanced by a changing historical environment (Levine 1978, p. 175). This anticipates what Mao, Cabral, and others have recognised in appraising the conjuncture of forces in any contested situation, namely, 'the sovereignty of the human factor in revolutionary warfare' (Ahmad 1971, p. 147).

George Lichtheim reflects that Marx's ideas on the various forms of social metabolism which are crystallised in different stages of society illustrates the modes in which humans individualise themselves through the historical process of 'evolving various forms of communal and private property; that is, various ways of organising his social intercourse with nature and the – natural or artificial – preconditions of work .... The forcible disruption of the Indian or Chinese village community by European capital completes the process by rendering it truly global' (1967, p. 85). In any case, a revolutionary Marxist position does not prescribe a causal monism or a freewheeling causal pluralism. Gregor McLennan has summed up succinctly the dialectical imperative of the Marxist approach: 'Structural principles must be complemented by, or even include, notions of individual action, natural causes, and "accidental circumstances"…. Nevertheless, material and social relations can be long-term, effective real structures that set firm limits to the nature and degree of practical effect

that accident and even agency have' (1981, p. 234). In other words, Marxism views the world not as a closed totality but as an 'open, structured whole, with irreducible differences' (Haug 1984, p. 16) comprehended dialectically, mindful of the play of contradictions.

I have dwelt at length on this topic because of the post-colonial critic's insistence that the method of historical materialism is fatally compromised by its Enlightenment provenance. If Marx is a Eurocentric apologist for the 'civilising mission' of imperialism, then we should have nothing to do with his indictment of capitalism and advocacy of socialist revolution. It might be instructive to note that the charge of Eurocentrism levelled against Marx does not permit a nuanced and rigorous appraisal of his critique of bourgeois philosophy; the polemic of Eurocentrism does not distinguish the nature of capitalist modernity as a specific epochal form, one which is constituted by the complex, uneven relation between coloniser and colonised. Capitalism disappears when all of modernity, both positive and negative elements, becomes ascribed to a geopolitical region (the metropole vis-à-vis the periphery) that cannot be divorced from the world-system of which it is an integral part.

Samir Amin has perspicaciously described the historical genealogy of Eurocentrism in the drive of capital to subordinate everything to exchange value, to accumulation, hence the need for standardisation. But this drive to uniformity also precipitates its opposite, unequal accumulation or impoverishment of the masses. For Amin, the most explosive contradiction generated by transnational capital inheres in the centres/peripheries polarisation and its corollary, the 'imperialist dimension of capitalist expansion' (1989, p. 141). Post-colonial affirmation of cultural difference, or the interstitial and syncretic by-products of the centre/periphery dynamic, evades a critique of economism and reproduces itself as an inverted Eurocentrism that cannot resolve the crisis of inequality. A genuine universalism cannot emerge from incommensurable and provincialised cultures, no matter how valorised as singular or cosmopolitan; the impasse can be broken only by a national popular-democratic

breakthrough instanced by national liberation struggles.

Sublimating Contradictions into Heterogeneity

It is not exorbitant to state that today all social relations and practices, as well as the process of social transformation, labour under the imperatives of accumulation, competition, commodification, and profit-maximisation. Post-colonial paradigms of hybridity and ambivalence are unable to offer frames of intelligibility that can analyse and critique the internal contradictions embedded in the neo-liberal reality and ideology of the 'free market.' Driven by a pragmatic empiricism, post-colonialism cannot offer a frame of intelligibility for a 'cognitive mapping' of all those historical trends that marked the breakdown of developmentalism, modernisation theory, and other theoretical solutions to the crisis of monopoly capital from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 up to the scrapping of the Breton Woods agreement and a unitary monetary system. As many have noted, postcolonialism, its logic and rhetoric, coincides suspiciously with the anarchic 'free market' and the vicissitudes of finance capital on a global scale. Bound by its problematic, the post-colonial critic cannot even entertain the crucial question that Amin poses: 'how can we develop the productive forces without letting commodity relations gain ground?' (1977, p. 101).

There have been many explanations for this inadequacy and limitation. Amin (1998) locates it in post-colonialism's rejection of modernity, the Enlightenment narrative of emancipation and convivial democracy. The excesses of instrumental reason are ascribed to the teleology of progress instead of the logic of capitalism and its presuppositions (private property, entrepreneurship, wage labour, technological improvement, laws of the market). The conflation of the ideals of Enlightenment with the telos of utilitarian capitalism and its encapsulation in the historiographic fortunes of modernity has led to a sceptical, nominalist conception of subjectivity and agency. Disavowing modernity and the principle of collective human agency (humans make their own history under determinate historical conditions), post-colonialism submits to the neo-liberal bourgeois cosmos of fragmentation, individualist warfare, free-playing decentred monads, and a regime of indeterminacy and contingency. This ironic turn damages post-colonialism's claim to liberate humans from determinisms and essentialisms of all kinds.

I think the fundamental error may be traced to two sources whose historical matrix I have alluded to earlier. We have, first, the inability to conceptualise mediation or connections in a dialectical manner, substituting instead a seriality of differences whose equivalence or solidarity remains unpredictable; and second, entailed by the first premise, the incapacity to conceive of the conjunctural moment of society as inscribed in the uneven or unequal development of the world-system. Uneven development involves the inescapable polarisation of the world into peripheral and central economies, tied with the intrinsic contradiction between labour and capital and the international division of labour whose boundaries were laid by the history of European colonialism and later by finance or monopoly capital. Why theorise mediation and uneven development in a precise historicised fashion? Because our intent is to 'master' and so escape the 'nightmare of history and to win a measure of control over the supposedly blind and natural "laws" of socioeconomic fatality' (Alavi 1982). As Fredric Jameson suggests, historical reconstruction, 'the positing of global characterisations and hypotheses, the abstraction from the "blooming, buzzing" confusion of immediacy, was always a radical intervention in the here-and-now and the promise of resistance to its blind fatalities' (Jameson 1998, p. 35).

From a historical-materialist perspective, the dynamic process of social reality cannot be grasped without comprehending the connections and the concrete internal relations that constitute the totality of its objective determinations. Several levels of abstraction have to be clarified, among them the relation between the knowing subject and the surrounding world (both nature and the built environment), knowledge of which is

desired. Truth in this tradition comes from human practice, the intermediary between consciousness and its object; and it is human labour (knowing and making as a theorised synthesis) that unites theory and practice. As Lenin puts it, everything is mediated and connected by transitions that unite opposites, 'transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property, into every other' so that 'the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal' (1963, p. 132). The reciprocal interaction of various levels of formal abstractions has been elaborated by Bertell Ollman (1993) under the categories of 'metamorphosis' and contradictions. These levels of abstract mediation, however, need to be transcoded into their concrete manifestation without necessarily succumbing to the one-sided immediacy of empiricism or pragmatism. Otherwise, what Fabian (1983) calls the allochronic orientation of Eurocentric thought with its taxonomic, non-coeval representation of Others would continue to prevail.

What is required next is to confront the second-order mediations which are historically specific and transcendable; namely, the market, money, private property, the transformation and subordination of use-value to exchange value. These are, in short, the sources of alienation and perversion of what Meszaros calls 'productive self-mediation' of individuals in social life. Alienation on the level of national struggle can only be resolved in the colonised people's conquest of full sovereignty, 'the socialisation of the principal means of production' (1983, p. 13) and reproduction in a socialist transformation. Indeed, it is these historical phenomena of alienation and reification that post-structuralist thought hypostatises into the nihilism of modernity, converting mediation (transition) into serial negation and occluding its prefigurative, transformative phase or aspect (Lukacs 2000). Contradiction, sublation, and over-determination do not figure as meaningful concepts in postcolonial theorising.

Without a concept of totality, however, the notion of mediation remains vacuous and useless. All determination is mediation, Roy Bhaskar reminds us in his magisterial study *Dialectic*

(1993). Totality in its historical concreteness becomes accessible to us in the concept of uneven development, and its corollary ideas of overdetermination (or, in Samir Amin's thought, 'underdetermination'), combined development in the coexistence of various modes of production in a specific social formation, or in another framework: Wallerstein's world-system mapping of periphery and core societies. We have come to accept as a commonplace the differential rhythm of development of societies, the uneven pace due to presence or absence of cumulative growth in the use of production techniques, labour organisation, and so on, as reflected in Marx's inquiry into Russia and Asia as mentioned earlier. It is indeed difficult to explain how the old imperial polities of Britain and France were superseded by Germany and the US, and how West Germany and Japan have occupied dominance today.

Uneven development results from the peculiar combination of many factors which have marked societies as peripheral or central (Lowy 1981; Novack 1966). In many societies shaped by colonial conquest and imperial domination, uneven and combined development is discernible in the co-presence of a modern sector (usually foreign-dominated or managed by the state) and a traditional sector characterised by precapitalist modes of production and ruled by merchant-capitalist and feudal/tributary ruling classes. In these peripheral formations, we find a lack of cumulative growth, backward agriculture limited by the lack of an internal market, with the accumulated money capital diverted from whatever industrial enterprises there are into speculative activities in real estate, usury, and hoarding (Mandel 1983). This unsynchronised and asymmetrical formation, with variations throughout the post-colonial geography of post-Second World War excolonised countries, serves as the ideal habitat for 'magic realism' and wild absurdist fantasies (Borges, Cortazar), as well as all those cultural expressions and practices described as hybrid, creolised, syncretic, ambivalent, multiplicitous, and so on, which postcolonial theory and criticism have laboured so hard to fetishise and reify as permanent, everrecurring, and ineluctable qualities (San Juan 1998).

In my view, this historical conjuncture of uneven and combined development can only be grasped by a dialectical assessment of imperialism such as those propounded by Gramsci, C.L.R. James, Walter Rodney, Amilcar Cabral, and others in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. It was Lenin who remedied the classical limitation of the Second International and the social-democratic parties by integrating in his idea of world revolution the revolt of the industrial working class in Europe with the mass uprisings of colonised nations, as well as peasant revolts against landowners. Lenin's post-1914 writings – the Hegel Notebooks, the article 'The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-determination', etc. – theorised how the 'particular' of national liberation movements can, under certain conditions, become the road to the universal of socialism. In this discourse, mediation assumes the form of contradiction between oppressed peoples in the colonies and oppressor nations. As Kevin Anderson argues, 'Lenin's theory of imperialism has become dialectical in the sense of pointing not only to the economic side of imperialism but also to a new revolutionary subject arising from within global imperialism: national liberation movements' (1995, p. 142). Unless we can improve on Lenin's theory of national liberation with its processual or dialectical materialist method, we will only be indulging in postcolonial verbal magic and vertiginous tropology that seems to be infinitely reproduced by a delirious 'otherness machine' (Appiah 1991, p. 356).

Portuguese Imperialism Begets its Antithesis

As for the concrete translation of the Leninist tradition into situated historical praxis, I can only allude to the brilliant and enduring example of Amilcar Cabral and his achievement. In what way does Cabral supersede the mechanical version of decolonisation as a valorisation of interstitiality, syncretism, and transculturation?

A few key features of Cabral's thought need to be underscored. Cabral's theory of national revolution is a creative application of Marxism as a dialectical theory of action in which history generates the unforeseen within the parameters of what objectively exists. Cabral understood the Marxist insight that 'the process of history seeks itself and proves itself in praxis' (Lefebvre 1969, p. 162). He theorised national liberation in his concrete milieu (the Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde islands) through the paradigm of interacting modes of production in history. Cabral insisted on the centrality of the level of productive forces as the 'true and permanent driving power of history' (1973, p. 42). Imperialist rule deprived the colonised peoples of agency, the vocation of shaping their own history. Since imperialist domination negated 'the historical process of the dominated people by means of violently usurping the free operation of the process of development of the productive forces, the goal of decolonisation is 'the liberation of the process of development of national productive forces' (43). The struggle for national liberation is not simply a cultural fact, but also a cultural factor generating new forms and content in the process (1979, p. 211).

For Cabral, culture is the salient or key constituent of the productive forces. Culture becomes the decisive element in grasping the dialectic of subjective and objective forces, the level of productive forces and the production relations, as well as the uneven terrain of class struggles: 'Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history, by the positive or negative influence which it exerts on the evolution of relationships between man and his environment, among men or groups of men within a society, as well as among different societies' (41). But Cabral urges a concrete differentiation of tendencies and possibilities: 'Nor must we forget that culture, both as a cause and an effect of history, includes essential and secondary elements, strengths and weaknesses, merits and defects, positive and negative aspects, factors both for progress and stagnation or regression, contradictions, conflicts . . . . Culture develops unevenly at the level of a continent, a "race," even a community' (210, 212). If liberation is an act of culture, it is also a struggle to shape a richer culture that is simultaneously 'popular, national, scientific and universal' (212).

Framed within the problematic of a nonlinear narrative, Cabral conceives of national liberation as a wide-ranging transformation of the combined political, economic, and cultural institutions and practices of the colonised society. It is not narrowly culturalist or merely superstructural because culture refers to the 'dynamic synthesis of the material and spiritual historical reality of a society'. In a broad sense, it is the recovery of specific African forms of subjectivity, a 'regaining of the historical personality of the people, its return to history through the destruction of imperialist domination'. This recovery is staged as a popular cultural renaissance with the party as the chief pedagogical agency wielding the 'weapon of theory', the organised political expression of a mass, national-popular culture in the making. This renaissance occurred in the praxis of the liberated zones controlled by the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) where the culture-changing processes of criticism and self-criticism, democratic discussion, teaching and learning from the participants, and so on were encouraged and institutionalised. This will recall Marx's dialectical thesis of an alternative to unilinear evolutionism of the Russian village commune: if the subjective force of the peasantry acquires consciousness and organised identity, the objective situation can be transformed in a liberatory direction (Marx 1971/1850–52). In the context of the African Gold Coast, C.L.R. James formulated this Marxian thesis as the objective process of the 'movement of a people finding themselves and creating a new social order', the basis of unity being the actual conditions in which the people live (1992, p. 351).

Cabral was called by his people *Fundador da Nacionalidade:* Founder of the Nationality, not Founder of the Nation. According to Basil Davidson, this is because 'the nation was and is a collectivity and necessarily founds itself, but [Cabral was the] founder of the process whereby this collectivity could (and does) identify itself and continue to build its post-colonial culture' (1986, p. 39). Cabral also believed that 'the dialectical nature of identity lies in the fact that it both identifies and distinguishes' (1979, p. 208). Seizing

the strategic initiative, Cabral exhorted his comrades and fighters to engage in a double and totalising task cognisant of the uneven cultural and ideological strata of the geopolitical terrain:

> Every responsible worker and every militant of our Party, every element of the population in our land in Guinea and Cape Verde, should be aware that our struggle is not only waged on the political level and on the military level. Our struggle – our resistance – must be waged on all levels of the life of our people. We must destroy everything the enemy can use to continue their domination over our people, but at the same time we must be able to construct everything that is needed to create a new life in our land. (quoted in Cohen 1998, p. 44)

Cabral combined national and social elements into an insurrectionary movement in which the partisan unit, no longer a local entity but a 'body of permanent and mobile cadres around whom the local force is formed' (Hobsbawm 1973, p. 166), became the germ of the 'new life', the embryonic nationality becoming the nation.

Developing certain themes in Fanon, Cabral's Marxism is unique in concentrating on the potential nation as 'a form of revolutionary collective subjectivity' mediating actual classes, sectors, and groups into a 'nation-for-itself' that can reclaim the 'inalienable right of every people to have their own history' based on its right to control 'the process of development of national productive forces'. Cabral located the roots of this subjectivity in the cultural resistance of the masses which was 'protracted and multiple . . . only possible because by preserving their culture and their identity the masses retain consciousness of their individual and collective dignity despite the vexations, humiliations and cruelties they are exposed to' (1979, p. 209). It is that notion of integral 'dignity' that lies at the centre of Cabral's 'weapon of theory'. As Timothy Luke acutely remarked, Cabral valued the 'emancipatory forms of collective subjectivity' in the colonised subjects and so promoted 'the politically organised and scientifically rationalised reconstitution of the traditional African peoples' history-making and culture-building capacities' (1990, p. 191). Cabral urged his activists: 'I am asking you to accomplish things on your own initiative because everybody must participate in the struggle' (quoted in Chaliand 1969, p. 68). Cabral's originality thus

lies in his recognising that the nation-in-itself immanent in the daily lives of the African peoples can be transformed into a nation-for-itself, this latter concept denoting the peoples' exercise of their historical right of self-determination through the mediation of the national liberation movement, with the PAIGC as an educational organising force that seeks to articulate the national-popular will.

Contrary to post-colonial speculation, Cabral's project is the making of a nation in the course of the anti-imperialist struggle. Comprised of numerous ethnic groups living apart, highly fragmented with over a dozen languages, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde did not fulfil the orthodox qualifications of a nation laid down by Stalin: 'a stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in the common culture' (1970, p. 68). Cabral's exceptional contribution consists in articulating the nation-in-process (of transition from potentiality to actuality) in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism. The project of the party he founded, the PAIGC, aimed to generate national awareness by mass mobilisation of the peasants in conjunction with the petty bourgeoisie, the embryonic proletariat, and the declassed youth. Through skilful organisation and painstaking ideological education, the PAIGC converted the cultural resistance of the tribal villages into a dynamic and formidable force capable of defeating a technologically sophisticated enemy.

Cabral began from the paradoxical phenomenon of the indigenous petty bourgeoisie beginning to acquire a consciousness of the totality by comparison of the various parts of colonised society. He exhorted the petty bourgeoisie to commit class suicide in order to coalesce with the peasantry (the workers constituted a tiny minority; a national bourgeoisie did not exist); but Cabral had no illusions that such alliances would spontaneously firm up in a post-colonial environment. He stated shortly before his assassination on 20 January 1973: 'You know who is capable of taking control of the state apparatus after independence . . .. The African petty bourgeoisie has to be the inheritor of state power, although I wish I could be wrong. The moment national liberation comes and the

petty bourgeoisie takes power we enter, or rather return, to history and the internal contradictions break out again' (quoted in Davidson 1969, p. 134). Cabral's insight warns us of the dangers of reifying post-colonial culture as an interstitial, ambiguous space of contestation devoid of any outside from which critique can be formulated. Contradictions persist even in transitory class alliances (the famous unity of opposites in Lenin's discourse), hence the need to calculate the stages of the struggle which demand strategic mutations and tactical alterations, while keeping in mind a constant theme: 'the masses keep intact the sense of their individual and collective dignity' (Cabral 1973, p. 69). The axiom of uneven and combined development rules out such post-colonial assumptions of contingent heterogeneity and incommensurable disparities of individuals that ignore mass native cultural resistance. Cabral upheld the anti-post-colonial belief of the 'supremacy of social life over individual life', of 'society as a higher form of life' (1979, p. 208), which in effect contradicts the neo-Kantian attribution of moral and rational agency to bourgeois individuals, a criterion that 'postpositivist realists' (Mohanty 1995) and assorted eclectic deconstructionists espouse.

Notwithstanding the resurgence of armed anti-imperialist insurgency in 'Third-World' neocolonies like Colombia, the Philippines, and Mexico (Chiapas), the moment of Cabral might be deemed irretrievably remote now from our present disputes. However, the formerly subjugated peoples of colour grudgingly acknowledged by Western humanism (following Kant's axiom of rational autonomy and Adam Smith's notion of the 'free market') cannot be simply pacified by reforming capitalism's international division of labour. The post-colonial cult of the Leibnizian conceit (Harvey 1996), in which alterity and marginality automatically acquire subversive entitlement, has carried out the containment of Marxist ideas and ideals of national liberation by an aestheticising manoeuvre analogous to what Neil Larsen discerned in cultural studies: 'a subtle transfer of emancipatory aims from the process of objective social transformation to the properly "cultural" task of intervention in the "subject"-forming play of discourse(s)' (1995, p. 201). But as long

as capitalism produces uneven and polarising trends in all social formations, there will always exist residual and emergent agencies challenging the reign of 'the law of value' and post-modern barbarism (Amin 1998).

We cannot of course return wholesale to the classic period of national liberation struggles indexed by the names of Nkrumah, Cabral, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevarra, Fanon, and others. My purpose in bringing up Cabral is simply to refute the argument that historical materialist thinking is useless in grasping the complexity of colonialism and its aftermath. Would shifting our emphasis, then, onto studying the subaltern mind remedy the inadequacies and limitations of post-colonial theory? I might interpolate here the view of two Australian scholars – Jon Stratton and Ien Ang – who believe that the limits of the post-colonial/diasporic trajectory can be made up by the voices of the indigenous and the subaltern within the context of the 'relativisation of all discursive self/other positionings within the Anglophone cultural studies community' (1996, p. 386). This intervention in the site of textual-discursive representation is salutary, but the problem of articulating a counter-hegemonic strategy focusing on the 'weak links' (where the IMF/World Bank's 'structural conditionalities' continue to wreak havoc) remains on the agenda. For it cannot be denied that within the hybridising, syncretic, borderless milieu of the post-colonial episteme one encounters, without much uncanny afterthought, 'the still globally culturally hegemonic realm of the USA' (King 1995, p. 117).

Finally, I want to situate post-colonialism as a symptomatic recuperation of finance capital, at best the imaginary resolution of contradictions between exploited South and exploiting North, within the altered geopolitical alignments of the world-system (Wallerstein 1995).

The 'Third World' was a viable conceptualisation of the nationalist bourgeois struggles that led to the independence of India, Ghana, the Philippines, Egypt, Indonesia, and other nation states after the Second World War (Hudis 1983). The classic post-colonial states created the Bandung coalition of non-aligned states which gave a semblance of unity to the 'Third World'. However, US hegemony during the Cold War continued until the challenge in Vietnam,

Cuba, and elsewhere. The last expression of 'Third-World' solidarity, the demand for a 'New International Economic Order' staged in the United Nations, came in the wake of the Oil Crisis of 1973; but the OPEC nations, with their political liabilities, could not lead the 'Third World' of poor, dependent nations against US hegemony. Notwithstanding the debacle in Vietnam and the series of armed interventions in the Caribbean and elsewhere, US world supremacy was maintained throughout the late 1970s and 1980s by economic force. This mode of winning consent from the 'Third World' used monetarist policies that caused lower export earnings and high interest rates, reducing these polities to dependencies of the IMF/WB and foreign financial consortia. The defeat of the 'Third World' bloc in 1982 allowed the US-led Western bloc to exploit 'international civil society' into a campaign against global Keynesianism. From 1984 to the 1990s, however, global Reaganomics, the instability of the financial markets, the fall of the dollar, worsening US deficit, etc. posed serious problems to the US maintenance of hegemony over the Western bloc. Despite the success, and somewhat precipitous collapse, of the Asian Newly-Industrialising Countries, the 'Third World' as an independent actor, with its own singular interests and aspirations, has virtually disappeared from the world scene. What compensates for this disappearance is post-colonial theory and criticism whose provenance owes much more to finance capital than has heretofore been acknowledged or understood, a disappearance masked by the carnivalesque regime of simulacra and simulations that, despite its current hegemony, fails to repress, I dare say, the labour of the 'old mole' burrowing underground. Wherever neocolonialism (Woddis 1972) prevails, the ideal and practice of national liberation will continue to thrive.

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Improvisation

► Jazz: *Come On and Let's Get Free*

Independence

► Decolonization in South Asia
► League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

India

► Danish Colonialism
► Yemen, Imperialism in

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism

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Introduction

Lenin had written his famous book *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* at a time when the World War I was looming large, the entire third world was divided into areas of domination by the nation-state backed finance capital of the colonizers. The colonialism imposed on countries like India resulted in a situation where the

potentialities of capitalist development in these countries were severely retarded, primarily because the economic surplus of these countries was siphoned off to the colonizing power. Since this happened across the third world, a division of the word into two clear segments, with the advanced capitalist countries oppressing the third world colonized ones, was clearly visible. Theories of imperialism starting from Rosa Luxemburg to Lenin have emphasized on imperialism as being a structure whereby the advanced capitalist countries oppress the poorer third world countries.

It can be argued that this entire process of subjugation of the third world countries by the advanced capitalist countries seems to be irrelevant in the present conjuncture due to two sets of reasons (for a fuller discussion on these issues, see Chowdhury (2018)). First, the erstwhile colonies are now independent nations with the process of decolonization. Today's developing countries or the erstwhile colonies are politically independent. Lenin was talking about a time when the capitalist countries in aid of their respective nation-state based monopoly capital were marking out territories for exploitation. This entire architecture, at least at the political level, does not exist anymore. This marks an important departure from the world conjuncture in Lenin's time. Second, it has been generally argued within the literature that imperialism retards capitalist development in the colonies or the developing countries. However, contrary to this analysis, the world is witnessing significant capitalist development in the developing countries like China, India, etc. China currently is the second largest economy in the world having the highest share in world exports. India has witnessed significant increase in its growth rates since the early 2000s. According to the billionaire list brought out by *Forbes,* China has 373 dollar billionaires in 2018 (increase of 54 since 2017), with a net worth of $1123 billion. In 2018, India had 115 dollar billionaires, increase of 18 since 2017 (*Forbes,* available at https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#156677ce251c). Just two decades back, hardly any Indian businessman found an entry into this list of the richest people on earth. But now India ranks third in the number of dollar billionaires in the world.

But what has been the reason behind this increase in the capitalist accumulation in India? What are the processes that are driving the accumulation? Has this increase in growth and capital accumulation resulted in a betterment of lives for the people at large? What has happened to the issue of inequality in the country? These issues will be discussed in the remaining part of the paper primarily focusing on the post-reform period in India and linking up the developments in India with global capitalism and imperialism.

Genesis of the Liberal Economic Development Path in India

India was a British colony for two centuries. The loot and plunder of the economy orchestrated by the British resulted in a situation where massive deindustrialization, pauperization of the peasantry, mass poverty, hunger, and unemployment became the defining features of the country. The Indian freedom struggle therefore not only argued to overthrow British rule but also articulated demands for the amelioration of the conditions of the people. It was felt by the policy makers that colonialism was imposed and implemented in India under the slogan of "free trade" with the British virtually making India an open field for global capital to exploit. Moreover, as a result of colonialism, the Indian capitalist class, on the eve of independence was lacking both in terms of resources as well as establishing its political hegemony over the state structure in the country. Two consequences immediately followed from this – First, the state envisaged a planned development trajectory for solving the problems of underdevelopment; second, the bourgeoisie had to strike a compromise with the landlords and big farmers in the rural areas to tighten its hold over the country, which was predominantly rural in nature.

The planning process therefore suffered from a number of contradictions. On the one hand it had to maintain a high rate of investment in the heavy industries sector. Simultaneously, it had to ensure that there was adequate surplus food output available at a reasonable price from the agriculture sector to feed the workers in the industrial sector.

Two problems immediately arose. First was the problem of employment. Since the focus of the initial planning strategy was to invest in heavy industries, it could not generate adequate employment for the people because of it being more capital-intensive. It was envisaged that the small scale sector, which was labor-intensive, would take care of the employment problem.

Second was the problem of ensuring an adequate and growing surplus of food from the agriculture sector to feed the non-agriculture workers. The production condition in Indian agriculture did not permit such increase in production and surplus due to a multiplicity of reasons. First, the prevalence of landlordism in the countryside sucked out resources through the imposition of absolute ground rent, which left the farmers with very little to improve investment and production. Second, the prevalence of money-lenders and usurious rates of interest further eroded the income of the farmers. Third, as a result of the compromise that the Indian bourgeoisie stuck with the landlords and peasants, the terms of trade tilted in favor of agriculture, relative to manufacturing products (Mitra 2004). This was achieved through the policy of increasing the Minimum Support Price for the farmers. Since the production of crops was dominated by large farmers, the increase in the minimum support price greatly benefited them. But the increased income that they received was not spent on mass consumption goods belonging to the small-scale industry. Rather, they spent it on luxury and imported items which had very little impact on employment in the country.

The tilting of the terms of trade against manufacturing and in favor of industries had other serious consequences. Manufacturing uses agricultural products as raw materials. If the prices of agricultural products increase relatively more than manufacturing products then the real price of raw materials will increase which will escalate the cost of production in the manufacturing sector. This increase in the cost of production in the manufacturing sector can be passed on to the final consumers by increasing the price of the manufacturing products. But because of an increase in terms of trade in favor of agriculture, the price of food witnessed a steep increase. Now, at a given money wage, this implies that less money would be available for the workers to buy industrial commodities, assuming that the workers maintain a stable food intake. Therefore, the demand for industrial products from the general masses will decline. On the other hand, faced with an all-round inflationary situation, if the working class organizes to demand higher wages, industrial disputes, strikes, and intensification of conflict between labor and capital will rise. This is precisely what happened in India during the 1960s–1970s, where huge inflation of essential items were accompanied by industrial stagnation, food shortage, and rising working class action against these conditions.

It became a very volatile situation. Contrary to the promises of the development planning policy, growth rate stagnated, unemployment increased, and the economy witnessed very high rates of inflation. Politically, the rising working class movement, the unrest within the middle class and sections of the peasantry, compelled the state to take some drastic measure. As a result, Emergency was imposed on the country in 1975. Democratic rights were withdrawn, the opposition was put behind bars and the freedom of press was severely curtailed.

The Emergency marked a break from the earlier policy of development planning. After recovering from the electoral losses immediately after imposing Emergency, Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980. After her come back, the government's policy moved away from statist policy of planning towards a more pro-business policy approach (Kohli 2007). There were essentially three components of this new model of development – first, the state prioritized economic growth as its goal, second, to achieve this goal, big business was supported, and third, this shift towards big business also necessitated a taming of labor (Kohli 2007). With the coming to power of the Rajiv Gandhi government, in 1984, the policy towards supporting big business was followed more intensely. Most of the controls imposed on private corporate business, like licenses, were abolished; Indian economy was opened up towards the world economy.

The planners, contrary to the above-mentioned analysis, construed the Indian state to be a supra-class entity. In order to maintain the policy of

development, adequate public investment had to be undertaken. The only way to mobilize resources for such high public expenditure was to impose taxes on the rich. The planners assumed that the state would be able to extract the resources from the capitalists. But for this to happen, the capitalist class had to be disciplined and compelled to make the necessary tax payments. However, this did not happen since the capitalists found various means to evade taxation (Patnaik and Chandrasekhar 2010). Even during the 1980s, when the public expenditure-GDP ratio increased, resources were primarily mobilized through indirect taxes, with capitalists and rich being given tax concessions (Kohli 2007). Thus, the state was continually moving towards a fiscal crisis with its commitment towards public expenditure to maintain the development plan being not met by adequate taxes. Second, the demand for mass consumption goods did not improve, because the size of the home market was limited due to absence of land reforms in the rural areas. Third, in spite of import restrictions, with the capitalists trying to emulate the lifestyles of the rich in the advanced capitalist countries, there was always a latent demand for commodities produced in the developed countries (Patnaik and Chandrasekhar 2010). This led to import leakages (through smuggling) hurting India's balance of payments position. When the rich and the capitalists gained significant economic and political power, they demanded liberalization of trade to avail these commodities. This continued pressures led to the policies of reforms being adopted since 1991 in India.

The discussion above shows that crisis was looming large in the Indian economy on many counts. First, the fiscal position of the state was getting worsened because of its inability to collect taxes. Second, employment did not improve, nor did production in mass consumption industries. Third, the current account deficit had a tendency of moving towards a crisis. All this culminated in the balance of payments crisis of 1991, following which the Indian government opted for a policy of (neo) liberal economic development trajectory, practically abandoning the policies of development planning.

Characteristics of Liberal Economic Development in India

Our analysis of the transition of the Indian economy from development planning to liberal economic model showed that this change was a result of changes in the economic parameters as well as the class nature of the economic processes. The Indian capitalists, as it were, shred two constraints from the initial days of planning to the current period of reforms – first, there was dissociation from the rural rich and landlords, who were there prime allies immediately after independence. This was done not through an overthrow of landlordism or a redistribution of land. Rather, Indian capitalism accommodated the rural landlords and big farmers politically but curtailed their economic strengths considerably. Demographic factors, changes in the nature of capitalist penetration in the rural areas, and other developments played their parts in this process. Basu and Das (2013) point towards a decline of landed property as the prime source of political, economic, or social power in today's India. Mitra (2004) argued that the MSP was used as a weapon by the landlords and big farmers to tilt the terms of trade towards agriculture. But in today's India, we are witnessing huge farmer rallies demanding a rise in MSP, which is supported by all major political parties including the communists. The persistence of an acute agrarian crisis has led to this situation.

Second, with time the Indian capitalists gained in economic and political strength and did not want the state to dictate terms to them. As a result, the policies of licenses and other kinds of restrictions were abolished. "State intervention" was argued to be the root cause of most of the problems afflicting the economy. It was suggested that the state or the government should not be involved in business. Therefore, privatization of public sector units and public utilities became a very important part of the liberal economic policy framework.

This so-called "withdrawal of the state" was not merely limited to privatization. The policy framework also entailed a cut back on the fiscal space of the state. This entailed both a cutback on public expenditure as well as the fiscal deficit. The false theory of public investment crowding out

private investment was argued within the policy establishment to cut back on fiscal deficit, a theory which was proved to be wrong by Keynes way back in 1936 (Patnaik 2017). This cut back on public expenditure or the fiscal deficit had got nothing to do with crowding out private investment. This policy of curtailing public expenditure pointed towards another very crucial political–economic change in India, viz., the embrace of global finance capital.

One of the crucial aspects of the pre-reform period economic policy making was that it was relatively autonomous to global capital. The experience of the colonial period was one of exploitation by global capital which pauperized India. Therefore, economic policy making immediately after independence was envisaged as being relatively autonomous to global capital and imperialism. That is why the planners put controls on the movement of capital and commodities and modeled India as a closed economy. This policy was helped by the global situation where India remained non-aligned to both the socialist camp led by the USSR as well as the imperialist camp led by the USA. In doing so, India could bargain with both and gained technology and capital, while maintaining relative autonomy from both. But with the weakening of the East European and Soviet socialist countries and their final demise, the world situation completely changed in favor of the USA and global capital. The domestic class dynamics within India as well as the crucial change in the world conjuncture pushed the country towards embracing policies of liberal economic reforms and opening up to global finance capital.

The global finance capital also underwent significant changes as compared with the period when Lenin was theorizing imperialism. The character of the current finance capital is different from that of Lenin's conception in three fundamental ways. First, while Lenin had emphasized on finance capital as capital "controlled by banks and employed in industry," the new finance capital is not necessarily tied to industry in any special sense. Rather, it moves around the world in the quest for quick, speculative gains. Secondly, finance capital in Lenin's time had its base within a particular nation, and its international operations

were linked to the expansion of national "economic territory." But the finance capital of today, though of course it has its origins in particular nations, is not necessarily tied to any national interests. The distinctions between national finance capitals have become meaningless today and we can talk of an international finance capital. This international finance capital is detached from any particular national interests and has the world as its arena of operations. Thirdly, in order to ensure such uninhibited global operation, the world should not be split up into separate blocs or into economic territories that are the preserves of particular nations and out of bounds for others.

A number of conclusions follow from the above. Firstly, since finance capital has turned into international finance capital which is highly mobile, the autonomy of the nation-state in policy-making has been reduced. If it is profitable for international finance capital to move freely from one place to another without hindrance then the role of any nation-state in controlling this flow of capital is curtailed. Precisely, this has been sought to be achieved with the introduction of the policies of neoliberal globalization across the globe which essentially is nothing but a policy of allowing free movement of finance capital. Finance capital opposes government intervention which is not beneficial for itself. As a result, states across the globe have cut back on their expenditures, particularly earmarked for development. Secondly, since finance capital needs the entire globe for its operations and does not want the world to be split up into separate blocs, intra-imperialist rivalry remains muted. Thirdly, speculative activities take the center stage of global economy rather than industrial activities because the role of the international finance capital is essentially to reap rapid speculative profits from one part of the world to another (Chowdhury 2018).

India, once being brought into the vortex of global finance capital, has to play by its dynamics, as enumerated above. The privatization of public sector assets, the reduction in fiscal deficit, and government expenditure were first implemented in India in accordance with the Structural Adjustment Program advocated by the IMF and then it became state policy. Secondly, the government

has to continuously ensure that it remains attractive to international finance capital. Since international finance capital is globally mobile, any policy which is not appreciated by them will result in a massive outflow of capital from the country causing severe problems in the external sector. Therefore, countries like India have to appease global finance capital. Since finance capital does not like fiscal deficits, it should be curbed, and since labor militancy is abhorred by finance, labor needs to be tamed, so on and so forth. Thus, India from a position of maintaining relative autonomy vis-a-vis global capital was sucked into the vortex of international global capital with the implementation of liberal economic policy model.

This change in the relationship of domestic capital with international capital also meant a change in the nature of the Indian bourgeoisie. As has been already argued, earlier it was believed that imperialism thwarts the capitalist development in the third world countries. But the current conjuncture has witnessed that the big bourgeoisie of countries like India and China have become major players in the international market. As has been already noted, within the richest bourgeoisie in the world, China and India have a very high number. These companies have global ambitions and are operating across the globe both in the financial as well as the industrial sector. For example, a company like the Tata Motors from India has bought off the Jaguar Company, one of the leading automobile companies in the world, located in the UK. (TATA buys Jaguar in 1.15 billion pounds deal, *BBC News*, 26th March, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7313380.stm (Accessed on 8th July, 2016)) The Indian company Reliance has a worldwide reach and is engaged in oil and gas exploration all across the globe. There are even reports that Indian companies are buying huge tracts of land in African countries like Ethiopia for business purposes. (Anuradha Mittal, "Indian land grabs in Ethiopia show dark side of South-South co-operation," *The Guardian*, 25th February, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/feb/25/indian-land-grabs-ethiopia (Accessed on 8th July 2016)).

Thus the adoption of the policies of liberal economic development marked the ascendancy of the Indian capitalist class both in the domestic as well as the international economy. It also marks a decline in the fiscal space of the government in the economy. But that does not necessarily mean a withdrawal of the state from the economy. Rather, as we will see presently, it marks a change in the nature of state intervention, where the state favors capital at the expense of the working people. How have these developments impacted on inequality in India? We now turn to answer this question.

Inequality in India

As is well known, the household surveys in India, conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization, collect data on household consumption rather than income. As a result, researchers have generally used the consumption data to arrive at some notion of inequality in India (Pal and Ghosh (2007), Sen and Himanshu (2004), Mazumdar et al. (2017)). However, with the publication of tax data by Indian authorities, it has become possible to estimate income inequality in India. Banerjee and Piketty (2005) first estimated income shares of top 1% and top 10% of the population in India, up to the year 2000. Subsequently, Chancel and Piketty (2017) updated this data and came out with some striking numbers (see Fig. 1).

At least three empirical observations are immediately evident from Fig. 1. Firstly, as per Chancel and Piketty's (2017) estimate, the income share of the top 1% in India is currently higher than it was during the British rule; it is in fact highest ever, within the period considered by the authors. In 1922–1923, the top 1% income share was 13%, which increased to 20.7% in 1939–1940, declined to 6.2% in 1982–1983 and then subsequently increased to 21.7% in 2013–2014. Secondly, during the period of planning in India, the inequality remained stable and declined to a historic low in 1982–1983. Thirdly, the period of rapid increase in inequality, as captured by the top 1% income share, coincides with the period of economic reforms and globalization in India. Post 2000, this increase in inequality also coincides with the period when India witnessed highest rates of growth in its history. While Chancel and Piketty

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism, Fig. 1 Top 1% income share in India: 1922–2014. (Source: Reproduced from Chancel and Piketty (2017))

(2017) do not put forward any theory or hypothesis to account for the changes in the top 1% income share, the congruence of these changes with various growth phases of the Indian economy is not coincidental. Rather, one can account for these changes within the changing political economy of India.

In Fig. 1, it is clear that the share of income in India going to the top 1% has reached historic levels, even higher than the level witnessed during British rule. Thus over time, inequality in India has increased steadily. It is also the case that this inequality is increasing at a much faster rate, as compared with many other economies in the world, as seen in Fig. 2.

From Fig. 2, it is seen that there has been an increase in the income share going to the top 10% in all the selected countries. However, what is striking is that rate of increase of this share in the case of India is the highest and currently the income share of the top 10% is highest in India, among the selected countries.

It is not only the case that income share of the top income earners have drastically increased in India, it is also the case that there has been significant increase in wealth inequality in the country, as has been shown by Anand and Thampi (2016) based on All India Debt and Investment Survey data collected by the NSSO. The top 10% owned around 51% of the total wealth in the economy in

1991, which has subsequently increased to 63% in 2012. Similarly, the share of the top 1% in terms of wealth has increased from around 16% to 31% during the same period (Table 1).

Even in terms of consumption expenditure, Mazumdar et al. (2017) show that there has been a significant increase in the real consumption expenditure of the top quintile classes as compared with the lower ones, particularly in the post-reform period in India. They identify two patterns of growth of real consumption expenditure in the post-reform period. Initially, between 1993–1994 and 2004–2005, only the top quintile experienced above than average growth rate in real consumption expenditure. But the growth of the lowest quintile was higher than the middle ones during this period. However, in the subsequent period, 2004–2005 to 2011–2012, while the topmost quintile witnessed higher than average growth in real consumption, all descending quintiles had a lower growth than the preceding quintile. It must be remembered that this was the period when India witnessed the highest rate of growth of GDP, but still the lower quintile could not increase their real consumption expenditure.

The preceding discussion showed that there has been a significant increase in inequality in India, particularly during the post-reform period. The increase in inequality has happened in terms of income, wealth, as well as consumption. In other

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism, Fig. 2 Top 10% income share across the World. (Source: Reproduced from World Inequality Report 2018, World Inequality Lab)

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism, Table 1 Top wealth share (Net Wealth)

Year	Top 10 (%)	Top 1 (%)
1991	50.5	16.1
2002	55.6	24.4
2012	62.8	30.7

Source: World Inequality Database, https://wid.world/data/

words, while there can be debates about the exact methodology on the basis of which various authors have arrived at their numbers, the basic trend of rising inequality in India is indisputable.

Explaining Rising Inequality: A Debate

More than the data what lies at the center of the debate is how to interpret the Chancel and Piketty (2017) and other results showing a rise in inequality. Ghatak (2017) believes that the entire evolution of the inequality, as represented by Chancel and Piketty (2017), can be explained by the Kuznets curve. He writes,

> In the early stages of development, those who are richer are better poised to take advantage of the new opportunities while an excess of supply of unskilled labour keeps average wages down.

Therefore, in the initial years, the per-capita income in India was low, hence inequality was low. But with liberalization as "new opportunities" started coming in with an excess supply of unskilled labor, inequality has risen. But with capital accumulation taking place at a rapid pace, demand for labor will increase, which in turn will increase the real wage rate and result in decline in the inequality. Thus, Ghatak (2017) argues "growth is not the enemy," rather focus should be on providing education and health to the masses to help them gain skill and catch up with the structural transformation in the economy.

Kuznets curve was first proposed by Simon Kuznets in a seminal paper (Kuznets 1955). The essential argument basically posits an inverted U-shaped curve with respect to income inequality and growth. Thus it implies that in the initial periods of growth, income inequality will increase and then as growth progresses, it will decline. Ghatak (2017) argues that instead of negating Kuznets curve, Chancel and Piketty's (2017) findings actually support it, since at lower levels of growth, inequality was low and then it increased with increase inequality.

Which is a lower or higher level of growth depends on the starting and end time point. It must be remembered that Chancel and Piketty (2017) provides data since the British period, when the growth rate of income was close to zero (Habib 2017). With independence, the growth rate increased substantially. In fact, estimates suggest that after independence in 1947, the

per capita growth rate in India increased five times. But the Chancel and Piketty's (2017) study, as seen in Fig. 1, suggests that in spite of such a huge increase in growth, inequality in India did not witness any secular increase, immediately after independence. Those who defend the Kuznets curve (like Ghatak (2017)) would argue that per-capita income was too low for any increase in inequality. However, what is important from the point of view of Kuznets is to look at the growth rates of per-capita income and inequality, not the level. Secondly, India was not an egalitarian paradise even in 1950s. It was marked by huge inequalities in land and wealth. Still, an increase in growth did not materialize into an excessive increase in inequality, maybe because of the fact that planning ensured that capital is kept under some kind of control. Moreover, public investment was increased; the economy was oriented towards a growth trajectory which was predominantly state led. In such an economy, rising inequality would have jeopardized the legitimacy of a state-led growth path. Hence, it was kept under control.

This is not to argue that the dirigisme regime in India was an ideal egalitarian system. Neither is this to argue for going back towards license raj-like system. However, the point is that a simple relationship that Ghatak (2017) expects between income inequality and growth does not hold. Rather, a complex set of factors determine the exact relationship. For example, planning in India was not disbanded and liberalization ushered in due to the fact that inequality was low, or that growth rate did not increase. In fact Chakravarty (1987) shows that the growth rate of GDP was much higher during 1980–1981 to 1983–1984 as compared to 1950–1951 to 1959–1960. Planning was disbanded as a result of the internationalization of finance capital and the incapacity of the Indian state to reign in the capitalists and maintain a fiscal balance aimed at higher public investment, as has been already mentioned above.

With the opening up of the economy and a more business-oriented policy making, inequality in India has increased quite dramatically. An analysis of the organized manufacturing sector in

India sheds further light on the issue of increasing inequality in the country. Basu and Das (2018) show that there has been an increase in the rate of profit, which has been mostly driven by a rise in the profit share or a redistribution of income from the workers to the capitalists. During the period of study (1982–1983 to 2012–2013), the capacity utilization (or demand factors) did not change much. There was increase in labor productivity but not real wage. In other words, the increase in productivity was mainly appropriated by capital. Basu and Das (2018) conclude that "regressive income redistribution and not technological progress has kept profitability rising over the long run in India's manufacturing sector." Now, most of the arguments explaining rising inequality have been based on the assumption of technological progress, which to begin with favors those who have higher education and capital. But Basu and Das (2018) showed that technology had very little role to play in increasing the profit rate in India. In fact, the output-capital ratio actually declined. Rather there has been an increase in labor productivity (propelled by a rise in capital-labor ratio) but real wages has declined or at best remained stagnant.

Now, the share of labor in income can be expressed as w/x, where w=real wage rate and x = labor productivity. The trend of the share of labor in organized manufacturing sector is shown in Fig. 3.

This fall in the wage share is obviously the mirror opposite of a very significant increase in the profit share in India, which the Basu and Das (2018) paper allude to. The question is what explains the fall in the wage share in India? While a detailed answer to this question is beyond the scope of this entry, certain important points can be made with the help of some preliminary empirical observations.

Firstly, there has been a huge increase in the proportion of contractual workers in the organized sector in India (see Fig. 4). The wage rates of the contractual workers are less than those of the permanent workers. Therefore, with the increase in proportion of contractual workers, the average real wage in the organized industry have come down. The reason for the increase in

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism, Fig. 3 Share of labor in net value added in organized manufacturing. (Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various issues)

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism, Fig. 4 Share of contractual workers in organized manufacturing sector. (Source: Same as Fig. 3)

the contractual workers, however, is a question that needs to be answered. With the opening up of the economy, Indian manufacturers are facing competition both in the international as well as domestic market. Cost cutting, therefore, is imperative in the competition to survive. Particularly, Indian exports have increased

significantly during this period, which is again regarded by many as the stimulus through which growth rate in the economy has increased. Moreover, changing nature of technology and capital has brought in flexible technologies which promote casualization and contractualization of labor. Lastly, with vast masses of informal and

underemployed labor in the country, workers' bargaining power has declined, which has retarded their capacity to increase the real wage or resist contractualization. As a result, the share of contract workers in India has increased, even with high growth and thereby reducing the wage share in Net Value Added.

The secular decline in the wage share points towards two important issues. First, it shows that the Ghatak (2017) argument is wrong. With increase in growth rate, as compared to the pre-reform period, real wages should have increased, according to this argument. But that has not happened. Second, this shows another crucial manifestation of the rising inequality in terms of the growing gap between profit earners or capitalists and the wage earners or the workers. The earlier discussion of rising inequality mainly pertained to an inter-personal comparison of inequality. But the falling wage share points towards the growing inequality between the two classes.

Indian Growth Process and Inequality

As has been already pointed out, the policies of reform in India increased the growth rate of GDP, as compared with the pre-reform period, particularly since 2003. This increase in growth rate of output has not resulted in an increase in growth rate of employment. Rather, with an increase in growth rate of output, there has been a decline in the growth rate of employment and an increase in the growth rate of labor productivity. While the growth rate of output increased from 4.7% during 1981–1982 to 1991–1992 to 6.2% during 1992–1993 to 2015–2016, the growth rate of employment actually declined during this period from 2% to 1.3% (Table 2). Thus, the post-reform growth experience of the Indian economy can be characterized by three stylized facts – (1) increase in growth rate, (2) increase in inequality, and (3) reduction in the growth rate of employment. Chowdhury (2014) argues that these three stylized facts are not disjoint. Rather, they constitute a totality of the growth process that India has witnessed. In other words, these three features are linked.

India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism, Table 2 Average growth rate of employment, output (value added), and labor productivity

	1981–1982 to 1991–1992	1992–1993 to 2015–2016
Growth rate ef Employment	2.0	1.3
Growth rate of value added	4.7	6.2
Growth rate of labor productivity	3.1	5.7

Source: KLEM Database, Reserve Bank of India

Essentially, the growth rate of employment is the difference between the growth rate of output and the growth rate of labor productivity. Table 2 shows that there has been an increase in labor productivity in the post-reform period as compared with the pre-reform period. This has resulted in a decrease in the growth rate of employment. The question is what has caused the growth rate of labor productivity to increase.

Chowdhury (2014) argues that the increase in the growth rate of productivity is a result of the growth process that India has witnessed. The main stimulus of growth for the Indian economy during this phase has come from exports and an increase in consumption of the rich. In order to export in the international market, there has to be technological progress to compete with other players. As a result, an economy transiting towards an export-led path must have significant increase in technological progress and labor productivity. Moreover, as already argued before, cost cutting through increased employment of contractual workers are also resorted to. This results in a stagnant real wage and employment in the economy. But the growth process also results in huge capital accumulation and profits for the corporate sector. These two contrasting phenomenon of stagnant real wage and increasing profit immediately gives rise to inequality. Therefore, it can be argued that the phenomenon of rising inequality is embedded within the growth process itself. However, even if the economic processes in the country can tend to increase inequality, the state can try and reduce the income inequality by taking redistributive policies. In other words, there exists a relation between the

state policy and inequality in the economy. We now turn to a discussion of these issues.

State and Inequality in India

In the paper by Chancel and Piketty (2017), there is a striking observation that the authors make. According to them,

> The wealth of the richest Indians reported in Forbes' India Rich List, amounted to less than 2% of National income in the 1990s, but increased substantially throughout the 2000s, reaching 10% in 2015 and with a peak of 27% before the 2008–9 financial crisis.

This huge increase in the wealth of the dollar billionaires in India is concomitant with the increase in the share of the top 1% in income. Now, an argument can be made that this huge increase in income and wealth of the rich is not something to worry about. Rather, it can be argued that they have talent to innovate, and the income/wealth that they have accumulated is a return to that innovativeness. This is the basic argument of capitalism for high inequality.

In the case of India, however, this argument is false. In a paper looking at the wealth of dollar billionaires in India, Gandhi and Walton (2012) report that only 15% of the total wealth accumulated by the billionaires are self-made, rest of the wealth can be categorized as inherited and growing. Now, even within capitalist logic, if we grant that the amassing of this huge wealth is a result of innovativeness, their progenies should not get the wealth in inheritance (since they too must earn their wealth), but prove their talent. This, however, is not happening in India. In the absence of a wealth tax, wealth flows to the next generation automatically and perpetuates wealth and income inequality. The nonexistence of the wealth tax is not due to capitalist logic. Rather, it exists because the power structure in the country is such that the rich families can protect their wealth not only for themselves but also for their progenies.

The second important observation of the Gandhi and Walton (2012) paper is that around 60% of the wealth of the billionaires are coming from the "rent thick" sectors. These are not the sectors which are undertaking innovations in the economy. But these sectors are essentially resource-based sectors like real estate, petrochemicals, spectrums, etc., which are directly dependent on the government for getting licenses to run their companies. In each of these sectors, there are cases of corruption where government land, or spectrum, or oil fields have been given to private corporate companies for a song. This granting of public wealth or natural resources to the capitalists constitutes a case of primitive accumulation of capital, where the capitalists gain the resource or wealth gratis from the state. This has hugely increased the wealth of the capitalists in India. In other words, the balance was tilted in favor of the capitalists not because of any inherent logic of the growth process. Rather it was tilted through government policy, exogenous to the growth process. This point is most evident if we look at the issue of tax concessions provided to the corporate sector in India. It has been estimated that the total amount of tax revenue forgone as a result of giving tax concessions to the corporate sector, between 2005–2006 and 2014–2015, was more than Rs 6 trillion. In the recent period, the share of corporate tax concessions to GDP has increased from 1.7% in 2013–2014 to 2.8% in 2017–2018 (calculated from Government of India budget figures).

The aforementioned discussion needs to be read jointly with the issue of falling labor income share in India. In spite of the fact that contractualization has increased at a rapid pace in the country, the constant clamor for labor market flexibility shows that trade union activities, rights of workers are under serious threat. The proportion of workers who report to be members of trade unions in India is declining as per NSSO data. The falling number of strikes in India show that the capacity of the working class to put up a fight has declined. The contractualization of workers and overt and covert impediments towards trade union activities are tilting the balance in favor of capital.

Till now, we have mainly looked at capital-labor relationship and discussed the issue of income shares of classes based on a model capitalist economy. But Patnaik (2015) points out that the capitalist sector does not operate in isolation

but is surrounded by precapitalist settings. With the tendencies of primitive accumulation of capital infringing on the precapitalist sector, petty producers in the latter gets dispossessed. But not all can be accommodated into the capitalist sector as wage earners. Thus, the average income of the petty producers declines with primitive accumulation. This gives rise to inequality in the system, taking the capitalist and the precapitalist sectors together. The primitive accumulation of capital enlarges the labor reserves, which in turn has a downward pressure on wages in the capitalist sector. Thus, with primitive accumulation of capital, the tendency of inequality in the system goes up. Bhaduri (2018) shows how, in India, a more favorable climate for private investment was created through various policies including massive transfer of land and related natural resources to capitalists at highly subsidized prices. Those who were displaced from such land grab could not be accommodated within the corporate sector because of its high labor productivity. This in turn has fueled the informal sector, which puts downward pressure on wages, even in the formal sector. Such change in the policy environment and state's incentives towards capitalists are difficult to sustain in an electoral democracy. But policy convergence within the parties is a major bulwark of sustaining such a policy regime. This in turn is a result of correlation of class forces favoring the rich within a matrix of power in India dominated by the nexus of corporates, politicians, and the bureaucracy.

Within this milieu of domination by capital across the economic and political spectrum, the promise of capital to the poor working people is the promise of equality of opportunity. The promise is that anybody with talent can move out of poverty or underdevelopment in India, irrespective of hierarchies. This is, however, not happening in India. Iversen et al. (2017) show that occupational mobility in India, particularly for lower-end occupations, is very low. They find that the odds ratio of a laborer's son remaining a laborer rather than becoming a professional (as compared to a professional's son becoming a laborer rather than remaining a professional) was 55. What is even more worrying is that there exist much higher risks

of downward mobility among different sections of the population. For example, while only 4.3% of sons of forward caste professionals became manual laborers, compared to 9.4% of OBC professionals' sons, for SC and ST the numbers are 21.9% and 24.2%, respectively. In short, caste still plays a significant role in India in deterring occupational mobility and is therefore an important marker of inequality.

This discussion points towards an important aspect of Indian political economy. The capitalism that we have in India has resulted in inequality in the system. This inequality, however, has two dimensions to it. On the surface, researchers have tried to explain this inequality based on the workings of the economy itself. In other words, they have tried to endogenize the distribution parameters. It is indeed the case that the working of the market economy generates certain inequalizing trends endogenously. However, the overall outlook of the state determines to a great extent the evolving dynamics of inequality, as is evident from the above discussion. Since, state policy to a large extent determines the locus within which the distribution parameters vary within an abstract market economy, inequality trends become a matter of politics. Class struggle and politics therefore can change the distribution parameter in favor of the workers.

Conclusion

The transition of India from a planned economic development model towards neoliberalism is a result of developments both within the boundaries of India and outside. Within India, the contradictions of planning, the rising to dominance of the bourgeoisie, and the downward influence of the landed elites, not through land reforms but through an accommodation within the capitalist growth process, ushered in the policies of neoliberal capitalism. On the external front, the rise of international finance capital and policies of globalization meant that the Indian ruling class felt that its interests lay in allying with metropolitan capital rather than opposing it. This had its benefits for the capitalists and the rich, their wealth reached

unprecedented proportion. But this was at the cost of the workers and the poor. On the one hand, the share of wages in Net Value Added declined, and on the other hand, the share of income going to the top 1% of the population increased phenomenally.

This increase in inequality, we have argued, is tied with the economic processes unleashed in India. However, this provided an incomplete picture of the dynamics of inequality in India. The state, even though it propagates the policy of "withdrawal" has played a decisive role in shifting the income distribution towards the rich. What we are witnessing, therefore, in India is a very high degree of inequality, which the state is not recognizing. Rather, there is an implicit promotion of this inequality through various concessions that are provided to the corporates and the rich.

The state has evolved a twofold policy in this regard. First, domestically, there is no discussion about redistributive policies, apart from certain schemes which provide some basic relief to the poor. Second, at the international level, with the rise of the Indian bourgeoisie; they are demanding a seat in the high table of power. As a result, in some cases the interests of the Indian bourgeoisie comes into conflict with that of metropolitan capital. Nonetheless, this conflict is not oriented towards devising a policy autonomous to imperialism or metropolitan capital. Rather, this conflict only signifies the growing aspiration of the Indian bourgeoisie for a slice of world power. In the meantime, the condition of the poor remains abysmal with massive unemployment and underemployment and a huge increase in inequality. The struggle for an egalitarian India therefore should be primarily aimed at the Indian bourgeoisie and the state. While this struggle will be long drawn, the growing inequality and its various manifestations are becoming increasingly evident. One can only hope that the Indian masses would be able to follow an alternative path of development, whereby such glaring inequality can be reduced.

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Indian Classical

► Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

Indian Independence

► British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia
► Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts Against British Imperialism

Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts Against British Imperialism

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Synonyms

Agrarian Rebellion; Anti-colonialism; British colonialism; Indian independence; Indian Rebellion of 1857; Land settlement policy; Sepoy mutiny

Definition

This essay examines the Indian Rebellion, or 'Sepoy Mutiny' of 1857, a major uprising in India in 1857–58 against the rule of the British East India Company in the country. Rather than viewing the Indian National Rebellion of 1857 as a momentary outburst, and so limiting its significance within a short historical time frame, the essay locates the ways in which the rebellion was preceded by and influenced other anti-colonial protest movements. It is suggested that in order to have a 'holistic' reading of the Rebellion, it is necessary to explore the period from the 1830s to the 1870s, one which witnessed colonialist expansion and also the challenges posed to British rule by a number of peasant and tribal movements in the context of exploitative and oppressive British land settlement policy. The 1857 Mutiny carried different meanings for different social classes and communities. In fact, it represented many mutinies, and any one homogeneous characterisation is grossly inadequate in capturing its multiple meanings. The essay anticipates that future historians will unearth other hidden meanings of the Mutiny by exploring new archival materials and asking different sets of questions.

Michel Foucault's journey in *Discipline and Punish* started with a vivid description of a spectacular case of torture near the Church of Paris in 1757. Among so many legal changes in Europe and the US, Foucault noted 'the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle' by the end of the 18th and the beginning of the nineteenth century (Foucault 1995: 3–8). However, British colonial rule in India signified a different trajectory of power. It enjoyed a 'monopoly of violence'. In fact, 'the infliction of pain as a mode of punishment was an insignia of power for the British in India'. In the context of the aforesaid modalities of British power in India, one eminent historian of the 1857 Mutiny, Rudrangshu Mukherjee, noted in his discourse multiple instances of unprecedented insurgent violence and counter-insurgency violence during and after the rebellion. The Mutiny witnessed looting, killing, and destruction by the insurgents. The targets included the British, their property, and government buildings. The punishment for the rebellion was 'exemplary' and 'spectacular' (see Mukherjee 2007: xvi, xx, 23, 36, 39). The revolt was ruthlessly suppressed as the British army moved into the rebel territories. Sepoys (native Indian soldiers) were blown off from canons, even on the mere suspicion of being

involved in the Mutiny. The counterinsurgency measures included public execution of the rebels and indiscriminate burning of native villages (Bandyopadhyay 2004: 169; Metcalf 1998: 43).

It is pertinent to prepare a broad chronological catalogue of the course and extent of the rebellion before analysing its character. As the sepoys of a regiment at Meerut refused to load the new Enfield rifle in the early summer of 1857, they were sentenced to imprisonment and sent off to jail in fetters. The sight of their compatriots' humiliation led the XI Native Cavalry, based in Meerut, to mutiny on the night of 10–11 May 1857. The mutineers then marched to Delhi where the reluctant and ageing Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, was installed as the symbolic head of the revolt. The revolt soon spread to the areas north and west of Delhi (Bose and Jalal 1998: 90–92). By the end of May, the rebellion had spread to Ferozepur, Muzaffarnagar, Aligarh, Naushera, Etawah, Mainpuri, Roorkee, Etah, Nasirabad, Mathura, Lucknow, Bareilly and Shahjahanpur. Between 1 and 13 June, Moradabad, Badaun, Azamgarh, Sitapur, Neemuch, Banaras, Kanpur, Jhansi, Dariabad, Fatehpur, Nowgong, Gwalior, and Fatehgarh had witnessed uprisings. There were uprisings in Hathras and Indore on 1 July (Joshi 1957: 379–380).

The spectacular subversive events connected with the 1857 Mutiny include: the rebels' taking possession of Kanpur under the leadership of Nana Saheb; capture of Jhansi Fort, restoring power to Rani Lakshmi Bai; the rebels' siege of the Lucknow Residency, the citadel of British power; Tatya Tope dislodging the British from Kanpur and recapturing it; Kunwar Singh capturing Arrah and Azamgarh. The tragic events in the Mutiny include: Bahadur Shah Zafar's surrender to the British, the deaths of Kunwar Singh and Lakshmi Bai; and the hanging of Tatya Tope (Joshi 1957: 379–382).

In the aftermath of the Mutiny, the British colonial rulers gave it specific meanings through their technologies of power such as photography, memorials, and history writing. The most authoritative 'prose of counterinsurgency' that appeared after the revolt was the massive three-volume

History of the Sepoy War in India by Sir John William Kaye. 'Kaye's history was not so much about the Black Man's rising as about the White Man's suppression of that rising' (Amin 2007).

The Mutiny of 1857 had many dimensions. It started with the sepoys of the Bengal Army rising in revolt against the British Raj in northern India from 10 May 1857 onwards. Diverse social classes (landlords and peasants, princes and merchants) and religious communities (Hindus and Muslims) participated in the revolt, each for their own reasons. Large areas of the region remained out of British control for a year and more (Metcalf 1998: 43).

The land settlement policy introduced by the British in northern India immediately before the Mutiny adversely affected both the peasants and the landlords. British annexation of Awadh in 1856 had antagonised the sepoys of the Bengal Army, of whom several thousand recruits originated there. The revolt was preceded by around 14,000 petitions from the sepoys about the declining conditions of the peasantry and the hardships faced by them due to the summary settlements in 1856 which followed the annexation of Awadh. The landlords (*taluqdars*) also were adversely affected by the settlements, which led to the dispossession of a number of powerful *taluqdars* (Bandyopadhyay 2004: 171–173).

The Mutiny had religious dimensions. Rumours were circulated in the summer of 1857 about the cartridges of the new Enfield rifle being coated with the fat of cows and pigs, about forced conversions to Christianity, and about British intentions to disarm the sepoys. These rumours spread from village to village, from bazaar to bazaar, and from one sepoy line to another (Mukherjee 2007: 46). This testifies to the deep-rooted suspicions that prevailed between the Hindu and Muslim communities about the intentions of the British. It should be mentioned in this connection that in the post-Mutiny period the British administrators felt the urgent need to understand the minds of their native subjects. This is evident in the statement of W.W. Hunter, an eminent member of the Indian Civil Service: 'The chronic peril which environs the British

power in India is the gap between the Rulers and the Ruled' (Hunter 2002/1871: Dedication).

The discursive field of the 1857 Mutiny is highly contested. Karl Marx, on the basis of observations made by Disraeli, characterised the Mutiny as a 'national revolt' (Marx and Engels 1978: 142). The nationalist historians of India have tried to appropriate it as an organic part of India's nationalist movement. However, in the centenary year of the Mutiny, P.C. Joshi, the general secretary (1935–48) of the undivided Communist Party of India, noted large-scale peasant participation in the major sites of rebellion around Meerut and Delhi in northern India (Joshi 1957: 295). It may be mentioned in this connection that the posthumously published book of Eric Stokes, the eminent British historian of colonial India, was titled: *The Peasant Armed: The Indian Rebellion of 1857* (Stokes 1986).

The question of the Mutiny's leadership has been much debated by historians. Stokes coined the phrase 'peasants in uniform' to characterise the sepoys (Joshi n.d.). He argued that coming from the small land-owning families of Awadh, the allegiance of the sepoys was to the land. Consequently, the distinction between the sepoys and the peasants got blurred. Stokes identified 'elites' or 'magnates' such as *taluqdars/zaminders* (landlords), who had been marginalised and squeezed by the British, as leaders of the rebellion. Rudrangshu Mukherjee did not accept this interpretation. Stoke's emphasis on magnates suggests that peasants were subordinate to or manipulated by the elites. On the contrary, Mukherjee argued, 'peasants and clansmen could and often did act outside magnates' initiative' (for the debate, see Priti Joshi n.d.).

Nationalist leaders of diverse shades supported the 1857 rebellion. V.D. Savarkar, 'intellectual guide to Hindu chauvinistic politics', wrote the first full-length Indian version of the story of 1857 in his book *The Indian War of Independence of 1857*. He found to his 'great surprise the brilliance of a War of Independence shining' in the Mutiny (Savarkar 1909: vii). The great Indian revolutionary, Bhagat Singh and his comrades also regarded 1857 as a war for independence. The prominent leader of the nationalist movement and the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, wrote about the place of the rebellion in the history of British rule in India, while in Ahmednagar Fort jail (1944). He did not subscribe to the path taken by the Mutiny, but he did not deny that it 'assumed the character of a popular rebellion and a war of independence'. It may be mentioned in this connection that the government of India led by Nehru commissioned Dr. Surendranath Sen to write a definitive history of the Mutiny on the occasion of its centenary (for diverse nationalist assessments of the rebellion, see Singh 2007: 44–66). All of this goes to show that the 1857 rebellion created an anti-imperialist spirit which touched the minds of the proponents of Hindu nationalism, liberal nationalism, as well as the revolutionary tradition of nationalism in British India.

On the occasion of the 1857 Mutiny's 150th anniversary, historians have opened up fresh dimensions by exploring further archival materials, asking new questions and doing ethnographic research. The special issue of the *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW) bears testimony to this work. In his theoretical intervention, Dipesh Chakrabarty has enlightened us about two different kinds of recall of 1857: as incitement for popular politics, and as a festive time on the national calendar. In this context, he mentioned the fact that the Forum for Democratic Initiatives in Delhi held a conference at the Gandhi Peace Foundation on 20 March 2007 on '1857 and the Legacy of Peasant Resistance' with the subtitle, 'Tebhaga, Telangana, Naxalbari and Now, Singur'. Chakrabarty argued that this is an instance of looking on 1857 as the precursor of many other rebellions to come (Chakrabarty 2007: 1695). Recent ethnographic research shows that the memory of the 1857 Mutiny has been carried in the oral folk-tale and folklore traditions of the Dalit (lower castes) in northern India. Other than establishing their own heroes and heroines, such narratives have contested the monopoly of the elite icons of the Mutiny such as Kunwar Singh, Tatya Tope, and Nana Saheb. Rani (queen) of Jhansi is the dominant woman icon in the elite discourse of the Mutiny. Ethnographic research has located stories about brave women

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martyrs of 1857 in the Dalit narratives, such as Jhalkaribai, Avantibai, Udadevi, and Mahaviridevi. The martyrs of Dalit communities have often been deified and are found to be worshipped by the villagers in different regions of northern India. Moreover, many Dalit icons have been incorporated in contemporary Dalit political discourses to glorify their traditions (see Tiwari 2007: 1734–1738).

William Dalrymple, in his presentation in December 2006, argued that earlier generations 'have, perhaps, underplayed the power of faith and religion' as a motive force behind the 1857 Mutiny. He drew our attention to 'the huge weight of emphasis on this factor given in the rebels' own documents' (Dalrymple 2007: 37–38).

The historians of the Mutiny mostly concentrated their attentions on regions situated in the 'Gangetic heartland' of northern India. On the occasion of the Mutiny's 150th anniversary, some researchers (L.N. Rana, Sanjukta Das Gupta, and Shashank Sinha) have drawn our attention to the participation of Jharkhand tribal communities in eastern India (Bhattacharya 2007: 69–142).

Rather than viewing the Indian National Rebellion of 1857 as a momentary outburst, and so limiting its significance within a short historical time frame, one should locate the ways in which the rebellion was preceded by and influenced other anti-colonial protest movements. It is suggested that in order to have a 'holistic' reading of the Rebellion, one needs to explore the period from the 1830s to the 1870s, the period which witnessed imperialist expansion and also challenges posed to the British rule by a host of peasant and tribal movements (Pati 2010: 4).

The rebellion in 1857 created a crisis of authority in the British Empire. Within weeks of its outbreak, the government of India sent a dispatch to the Cape Colony requesting an urgent transfer of troops. In addition to providing military support, the governor of the Cape Colony, Sir George Grey, assisted officials by providing financial assistance for those in India affected by the violence. In fact, the rebellion provided an opportunity for Britons throughout the world to show their loyalty to the Empire. In the wake of the uprising, colonial officials throughout the Empire expressed fears of native rebellion and justified the greater use of force to maintain British control and hegemony (Bender 2013, pp. 1–23).

The 1857 Mutiny carried different meanings for different social classes and communities. In fact, it represented many mutinies, and any one homogeneous characterisation is grossly inadequate in capturing its multiple meanings (for diverse interpretations and the historiography, see Ray and Chaudhuri (n.d.)). It is expected that future historians will unearth other hidden meanings of the Mutiny by exploring new archival materials and asking different sets of questions.

Cross-References

▶ British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia
▶ Decolonization in South Asia
▶ Imperial Tastes and Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century India
▶ India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Women's Movements, Indian Anti-colonial Struggle

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Indian Ocean

► Yemen, Imperialism in

Indian Rebellion of 1857

► Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts Against British Imperialism

Indigenous Autonomy

► Nuclear Imperialism

Indigenous Communities

► Conservation as Economic Imperialism
► Nuclear Imperialism

Indigenous Peoples

► Adivasis and Resistance to Imperialism
► Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America

Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Eurocentrism; First Nations; Fourth World; Genocide; Imperialism; Settler colonialism

Definition

This entry describes the historical expansion of imperialism as inseparable from the colonial subjugation of indigenous peoples on a planetary basis. It argues that without the subjugation of indigenous (or "aboriginal") peoples, imperialism in any of its modern forms would have been not only impossible but inconceivable. The entry describes the colonialist appropriation of knowledge, natural resources, labor, and wealth from

indigenous societies, and the genocidal logic that propelled it. Mainstream conceptions of the origins of scientific, cultural, and historical "progress" are demonstrated to be thoroughly imbued with Eurocentric colonial prejudice.

"Imperialism" has been defined in a number of ways. Irrespective of the definition employed, however, the phenomenon described is inseparable from the colonial subjugation of indigenous peoples on what has long since become a planetary basis. Indeed, without the subjugation of indigenous (or "aboriginal") peoples, imperialism in *any* of its modern forms would have been not only impossible but inconceivable (Nietschmann 1994). As Shuswap resistance leader George Manuel observed more than 40 years ago, the Earth's several thousand First Nations comprise a Fourth World, and its near-total subjugation has been the veritable bedrock upon which all three of the other "worlds" delineated at the 1955 Bandung Conference were constructed (Manuel and Poslins 1974).

In the Bandung formulation, the First World consisted of the industrially advanced capitalist/ imperialist powers situated primarily in Western Europe, North America, and Japan; the Second World comprised the Eurasian socialist bloc countries, which were construed as being anti-capitalist and therefore inherently anti-imperialist; and the Third World was composed of the First's Afro-Asian colonies and former colonies; Latin America was grafted onto the basic schema at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, held in Havana (Prashad 2007, pp. 31–50, 105–115). The formulation is noticeably different from that embodied in the "three worlds theory" later propounded by Mao Zedong, wherein the USA and the Soviet Union comprised the capitalist/imperialist First World; Western Europe and Commonwealth countries, as well as Japan, all of them imbued with a "dual character," comprise the Second; and the Third World is made up of the remaining countries (states), each of which is construed as being fundamentally anti-imperialist (on the Maoist formulation, see Melkote and Merriam 1998, p. 10). It follows that perfecting the contemporary imperial edifice of globalization is contingent upon continuation and intensification of Fourth-World subjugation.

Invariably, the effects of the subjugating process have been genocidal, both in terms of the coerced and often compulsory cultural emulsification of aboriginal societies and, not infrequently, the outright physical liquidation of indigenous populations (either through direct killing, imposition of what Raphaël Lemkin termed "slow death measures" [1944], or a combination of the two). As Davis and Zannis (1973, pp. 19–20) observe, "slow death measures" are delineated in the so-called Secretariat's Draft of the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, largely prepared by Lemkin, as systematic deprivation of adequate nutrition, clothing, housing, sanitation, and medical care, especially in combination with forced labor or other debilitating physical exertion. Imposition of such measures typically arises in the context of the perpetrators' expropriation of the victimized population's land-base, natural resources, and attendant economy. Hence, the dissolution and ultimate disappearance of Fourth World peoples, at least in the sense that they've traditionally understood themselves to *be* such, and often in terms of their biological existence as well, must be seen as integral and inherent to colonialism, thence imperialism, a reality entirely consistent with Lemkin's original conception of genocide:

> By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group . . . . Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings . . . . It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of [eradicating] the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group . . . . Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor . . . . Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of a national pattern. (Lemkin 1944, pp. 79–80)

Lemkin goes on to explain that he believes the word "denationalization" to be "inadequate [to describe the phenomenon he is discussing] because: (1) it does not connote destruction of the biological structure; (2) in connoting the destruction of one national pattern, it does not connote the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor; and (3) denationalization is used by some authors to mean only deprivation of citizenship" (p. 80). Following Lemkin's definition (having literally coined the term, one suspects that he above all others knew its meaning), it is impossible to contest Sartre's "controversial" conclusion that colonialism is *inherently* genocidal (Sartre 1968).

In this respect, it matters little whether a particular imperial system or project is associated more with the "civilizing mission" ascribed by Lewis Feuer to imperialism's "progressive" variant, or with what he refers to as the "regressive" objectives of conquest, unadorned material exploitation, and/or repopulation ("settlement") of forcibly acquired territories with racially preferred "breeding stock." Feuer offers "the Alexandrian, Roman, British, French, and Dutch" empires as examples of "progressive imperialism" which supposedly "elevates living standards and cultural life ... brings education and the arts to its more backward areas [and] establishes a universal rule of law and security of person." As examples of "regressive imperialism," he points to "the Nazi variety and, in several respects, the Mongolian and Spanish" (Feuer 1986, p. 4). Nor does the political ideology of the system have much bearing. Insofar as the impacts upon Fourth World nations have been virtually indistinguishable over the long term, such distinctions are ultimately cosmetic or, perhaps more accurately, deliberately obfuscatory. Invoking Sartre once again, "there are neither good nor bad colonists: there are colonists" (Sartre 2001 [1957], p. 51).

It may be this inconvenient truth, more than anything else, that explains why the significance of Fourth World subjugation, despite its clearly foundational location within the architecture of colonialism/imperialism, has been consistently neglected in currently predominating theorizations and analyses of the imperial phenomenon as well as attendant anti-imperialist discourse.

Decolonization of Fourth World nations and concomitant resumption of their genuinely self-determining existence(s) find no place within any "reasonable" paradigm of liberation. Correspondingly, consideration of such questions has been largely relegated to the realms of historical interest or delineations of "minority rights" whenever it not been avoided altogether.

Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2000) is instructive. In the entirety of its 400-page text (there are also 78 pages of notes and index), "Native [North] Americans" are the only indigenous peoples characterized as such, and, apart from a passing reference on p. 177 to "genocidal wars" having been waged against them by the USA, are discussed only in a 4-page span (pp. 169–172). Here they are depicted only as a transient barrier to US territorial expansion "from sea to shining sea" during the first century of the country's existence. Presumably, the authors believe that this barrier was ultimately overcome through total extermination, leaving Native North Americans no less extinct than the carrier pigeon, since they offer no hint in their discussion of the subsequent evolution of US imperialism that it might be in any sense contingent upon the ongoing subjugation of indigenous peoples and expropriation of their resources within what the USA claims as its domestic territoriality. The misimpression thus conveyed is strongly reinforced, moreover, by their unequivocal (and erroneous) assertion that indigenous peoples were from the outset, and by implication remain, "outside the Constitution as its negative foundation: in other words, their exclusion and elimination were [and are] essential conditions for the functioning of the Constitution itself" (p. 170).

In *The Sorrows of Empire* (2004), to offer another prominent example, Chalmers Johnson acknowledges that the "real" beginning of US imperialism can be dated from 1898 (as Hardt, Negri, and many others have contended) only if "one [is] willing to regard the lands of Native Americans and Méxicans as essentially uninhabited" (p. 190), but the insight is otherwise unremarked. Moreover, in a later book, *Dismantling the Empire* (2010), Johnson effectively nullifies the insight itself by making no mention whatsoever of Native Americans, thereby leaving

a distinct impression that the continuing subjugation of Fourth World nations within the USA is to be viewed as something other than an integral part of its imperial construction. So, too, Andrew Bracevich's *American Empire* (2002), while in Niall Ferguson's *Empire* (2003), expansion of the USA to continental proportions merely "implied colonization" of Native North America (p. xii). Scores of comparable examples (a few of them deployed hereinafter) might as readily be cited.

While such deficiencies have prompted the emergence of a parallel literature devoted to explicating the facts and implications of Fourth-World colonization, the mainstream of anti-imperialist thinking, notwithstanding the undeniably high degree of sophistication it often displays in other respects, has thus remained distinctly ungrounded, an elaborate castle not so much built on sand as suspended in mid-air. This literature has burgeoned over the past 40 years, and now includes such mature and expansive works as Lauren Benton's *A Search for Sovereignty* (2010), Anthony J. Hall's *American Empire and the Fourth World* (2004), Anthony Pagden's *Lords of All the World* (1995), and Robert A. Williams's *The American in Western Legal Thought* (1990), to name but a handful. At one level, the result has been a considerable amount of self-contradiction within anti-imperialism's theoretical/analytical corpus; at another, we have seen the widespread embrace of prescriptions for "liberation" which, whatever else might be said of them, would in their fulfillment embody consummation of Fourth World genocide on a planetary basis.

The State

Although, globally, it assumes a vast array of forms, the sociopolitical organization of indigenous societies is unified by the absence of the sort of centralization of authority and concomitant concentration of power characteristic of the state (Nietschmann 1987, pp. 1–3). Fourth World nations are "stateless," not because they have never attained the capacity to enter into statist trajectories, but rather, as Pierre Clastres concluded, because they have consciously set themselves "against the state," typically

developing complex sets of relations actively precluding consolidation of socioeconomic and political hierarchies and attendant structures of juridico-bureaucratic rationalization and coercive enforcement.

Clastres worked closely with the Aché (whom he unaccountably refers as "Guayaki," a colonial term meaning "rabid rats") of present-day Paraguay, and they figure centrally in his book *Society Against the State* (1974). For that reason, his work has been misconstrued/misrepresented as focusing exclusively on "hunter-gatherer societies." In actuality, as he explained at length (1974, pp. 62–82), the term itself is essentially a misnomer, accurately applicable to only a very narrow range of peoples, with the great majority of those thus labeled either deriving some often substantial portion of their subsistence from agriculture, or having demonstrably done so in the past. As he observes, even the Achés, "who are [now] pure hunters and nomads of the forest, gave up cultivating corn towards the end of the sixteenth century" (p. 69).

That this abrupt abandonment of agriculture/ retreat to the forest was precipitated by Spain's establishment of Asunción in 1537, and the steady spread of settlers and Jesuit missions throughout Aché territory, seems rather obvious. It should be noted that, as was detailed by Mark Münzell (1974), Norman Lewis (1976), and others around the time Clastres's book was published, Paraguay commenced an "informal" campaign to exterminate what remained of the Achés, often using machetes rather than guns as a means to avoid incurring the expense of ammunition. Survivors, mostly children, were sold into the country's still-thriving slave market (Arens 1979a).

In many instances, the decision to do so arose from direct experience, an unknown but substantial number of First Nations having experimented with statism to varying extents and found its anticipated benefits sufficiently outweighed by its costs that they elected to dismantle whatever state apparatus had been created. A prime example is that of the sprawling Mississippian ("Mound Builder") culture which began to emerge somewhere around 1000 CE and within two centuries encompassed most of the eastern

half of what is now the USA. By the latter point, Cahokia, its "capital city," located near present-day St. Louis, Missouri, had reached a population of perhaps 40,000 (larger than either London's or Rome's at the time), a matter reflecting an extraordinarily high degree of agricultural attainment (Martinez et al. 2016, p. 4). The increasing concentration of political authority and resultant socioeconomic stratification attending the process were apparently deemed unacceptable to the bulk of the populace, however, and by roughly 1350, the residents of Cahokia had dispersed, resuming the "tribal" identities and decentralized lifestyles they had led prior to its rise. The pattern of dismantlement thereafter spread throughout the remainder of the culture and was still ongoing in some areas at the time of the initial European invasions, c.1550–1650.

In contrast, although statism and imperialism may often function symbiotically in terms of consolidation and refinement, the formation of empire *requires* a state. This has been true since establishment of the earliest known imperium (that of Assyria, c.2500 BCE) and includes the "empires" attributed to the Maya, Inca, México (Aztec), and other First Nations, albeit in many such cases the term may well be misapplied. Mayan civilization, which originated at least as early as 2000 BCE and existed in its "classic" form from approximately 250–900 CE, attained an astonishingly high level of cultural sophistication, including not only flourishing agricultural and trading economies, but, among other things, written language and a system of mathematics incorporating the concept of zero and enabling them to apprehend extremely complex numbers without the aid of computers, to measure time more accurately than was possible in Europe until the later nineteenth century, and thus to achieve a remarkably precise understanding of astronomy (Foster 2002, pp. 248–262; Slater and Traxler 1983, pp. 101–110).

Although the civilization was both sustained and expansive, eventually incorporating virtually all of the distinct peoples indigenous to the Yucatan and contiguous areas of what is now Mexico, as well as present-day Belize, Guatemala, and western Honduras in their entireties, it never exhibited the "center" ("metropole")

indicative of imperial order. Rather, it seems to have consisted of a number of "mini-empires," somewhat resembling city-states, bound together mainly by the development of cultural affinities, and a broader range of trade relations. Even that arrangement appears to have ultimately proven to be too sociopolitically/economically stratifying, as dismantlement of its statist structures commenced at some point in the tenth century CE and was largely completed by the Mayapan revolt of 1441 (well before the Spanish invasion) (Coe 1999).

The Tenochtitlan-centered Aztec Empire (Tenocha) of present-day Mexico comes much closer, although it was never a true territorial empire. Its power extended as much by trade as by military force, and was maintained as much by intermarriage and diplomacy as by coercion. It was, moreover, relatively short-lived, having been established through the "triple alliance" of 1427 and destroyed by the Spanish invasion of 1519 (Carrasco 1999). Whether its statist structure would have eventually been dismantled by the Méxicas themselves will thus remain unknown. The Incas perhaps came closest to establishing a genuine imperialist system, although the inception of their empire, centered in what is now Peru, dates from 1437 and, like Tenocha, was effectively destroyed by the Spanish less than a century later. We are thus left with the same unanswerable question regarding the Incan state (McEwan 2008). While the effects of statism/imperialism on the Fourth World have been negative from the outset, however, their inherently genocidal dimension did not become fully apparent until the advent of the modern state through a process initiated by the coronation of Charlemagne as "Holy Roman Emperor" in 800 CE.

While, to quote Voltaire, the resultant territorial/governmental "agglomeration" was "neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire" (quoted in Renna 2015, p. 60), its establishment triggered the invention of Europe, otherwise known as "The West," both geographically and culturally. Notwithstanding the title conferred upon Charlemagne by Pope Leo III, the term "Holy Roman Empire" originated in 1254 and was applied to his domain only retrospectively. From its capital,

situated not in Rome but in the small Frankish city of Aachen, the Carolingian dynasty Charlemagne founded forcibly expanded its dominion outward in all directions so that by 814 CE, it encompassed everything south of present-day Denmark to a point about halfway down the Italian peninsula, and from the present French/Spanish border in the West through Carinthia in the East. The western half of the area was for the most part encompassed within the prefiguring Frankish kingdoms of Neustria, Burgundy, and Austrasia, which Charlemagne essentially inherited upon receiving the imperial crown. Aachen was situated in Austrasia, its location central to the empire after its initial phase of eastward expansion (Riché 1993).

It should be noted that a rather similar, but always separate, prefigurative process had commenced in Britain as a result of Anglo-Saxon invasions during the fifth and sixth centuries. It would not be until the Norman conquest of 1066 that a dynamic comparable to that unleashed by Charlemagne made its appearance, however. By 870 CE, the empire's eastward thrust had reached the far side of Moravia, a push that was relentlessly pursued by the Carolingians' successors over the next several centuries, prompting the conceit that those presiding over the European subcontinent were "entitled" to anoint their realm not merely "a continent in its own right" but, ultimately, "*the* Continent" upon which the world was centered (Barbero 2004).

As Kenneth C. Davis observes, "This may come as a severe shock to Conservatives in Great Britain's Parliament and to other European traditionalists who have strong views on Europe's cultural superiority. But, sorry folks . . . Europe, including the British Isles, is simply a large western peninsula of Asia" (1992, p. 129). Indeed, although Europeans had by then been describing their land-base as such for centuries, Lewis and Wigen point out that Europe's supposed (and entirely arbitrary) geographic demarcation from Asia was not identified as the Ural Mountains until 1730 (1997, pp. 27–28). Suffice it to say that, geographically speaking, the existence of a "European continent" is purely invented.

Politically, the Carolingian Empire consisted of several relatively autonomous states (the number changed over time, and always included a welter of duchies, city-states, and other subdivisions), the heads of which were invariably confirmed through professions of fealty to both the emperor and the papacy. This in itself was unremarkable. The Carolingians were unprecedented, however, in the emphasis they placed on attacking the core spiritual beliefs from whence the plethora of "tribal" peoples whose territories were incorporated into the various states, and thus the empire, derived their distinct cultural identities. They imposed instead the unitary doctrines of Western ("Roman," "Latin," "Catholic," or "Occidental") Christendom (McKitterick 2008).

This was in stark contrast to earlier/other empires, which were by and large content to extract various forms of tribute from those they conquered or otherwise colonized without stripping them of their cultural identities or imposing their own. There was no effort on the part of the Mongols to "convert" non-Mongols into Mongols, for example, or of the Méxicas to absorb tributary peoples into their own culture. Quite the opposite, in fact. The late Roman Empire was perhaps an exception in that, having adopted Christianity as its official religion, it set about imposing it upon the very peoples targeted by the Carolingians. The result, of course, was that the infuriated "barbarians" promptly sacked Rome, forcing the imperial center eastward to Constantinople (Mohawk 2000, pp. 62–71; Burns 1994). Each state was thus distinctly imperial in its internal construction as well as its external allegiances and ambitions.

For two centuries, beginning in 1096, the culturally genocidal synthetization of European identity set in motion by the "Carolingian Renaissance" was reinforced and advanced at a steadily accelerating rate by the organization of a series of nine papally ordained "Crusades" pitting Western Christendom against both its Eastern counterpart (Byzantium) and their mutual theological rival, the "Eastern" religion of Islam, which predominated in Christianity's Levantine "Holy Land." In 1147, a series of "Northern Crusades" was also launched against the eastern Baltic Slavs (from the Latin word *sclavus*, meaning "slave"), while yet another, known as the Reconquista, was undertaken on the

Iberian peninsula to wrest it from Islamic control (Christiansen 1980; O'Callaghan 2003).

The First Crusade was authorized by the Council of Claremont in 1095 and the last was undertaken in 1291. The last of the Northern Crusades ended in 1290, and, by 1294, the Islamic dominion in Iberia, which had once extended to roughly the present French/Spanish border, had been reduced to the area around Grenada (Grenada itself was not "reconquered" until 1492). It will be noted that, while the Reconquista has always been framed as a contest between "The East" (signified by Islam) and "The West" (signified by Western Christendom), the Iberian peninsula is in fact the most westerly portion of the European landmass. Even in the figurative sense of theological distinctions, the contrivance of an east/west dichotomy was from the outset nonsensical, given that both religions, based as they are on the same preexisting Hebraic text (the "Old Testament"), originated in exactly the same place. The nuances of scriptural interpretation by which Western Christendom distinguished itself from Eastern (Byzantine) Orthodoxy were, moreover, in no small part derivative from Islamic interpretations (Rodinson 1987, pp. 15–17; Djaït 1985).

The heads of each state and substate were responsible for mustering and leading the forces necessary to mount these protracted campaigns, a matter which, while solidifying the authority vested in statist rulers, served to inculcate an increasing sense of commonality among troops drawn from the multiplicity of tribal cultures/societies encapsulated within each state's boundaries. Amplified by the harsh realities of combat once battle was joined, this preliminary outlook rapidly cohered into a genuinely collective sense of "us," a term whose meaning yields itself only in contradistinction to "them." Self-evidently, "us" consisted exclusively of those "on our side." while "them" was not only "other" but by definition "the enemy." From there, it was but a short step to the perception that while "we" (of The West or "Occident") were fully human, "they" (the "Others" of "The East," also referred to as the "Orient") were less so, perhaps of another species altogether (Churchill 2011, p. 19).

The sheer virulence manifest in this seminal "crusader mentality" would seem to have arisen from a deep-set and abiding sense of cultural inferiority among the subcontinent's élites; the very name "Europe," after all, derives from the Phoenician word *"erub,"* meaning "darkness" or, some would say, "ignorance." This, in turn, triggered a compulsive and sustained drive by the West to compensate by asserting its "rightful" ownership not only of such material "property" as might be possessed by others, but, as will be discussed below, of their intellectual attainments as well. Most Semitic languages contain variations; the Akkadian *erebu*, Arabic *maghreb*, and Hebrew *ma'ariv* as examples. For obvious reasons, neo-Aryanist scholars prefer to believe that it originated in a combination of the Greek words εὐρύς and ὤψ/ὠπ−/ὀπτ-, ostensibly meaning "wide-gazing" (Bernal 1987, pp. 367–399). Since, as Martin Bernal demonstrated in the third volume of his magisterial *Black Athena* (2006), Greek terminology was substantially based on Phoenician prototypes, however, the Aryanist argument is vacuous at best. It was amidst this snarl of pathologies that, as Lumbee legal scholar Robert A. Williams Jr. has shown, the conceptual template upon which the West would thereafter define its relations with all Others, indigenous peoples in particular, was forged. Williams dates this to the mid-thirteenth century commentaries of Pope Innocent IV on Innocent III's *Quod super his*, completed in 1209 (1990, pp. 13–15).

That the mentality involved has lost none of its original substance or lethal intensity over the near-millennium that has elapsed since the medieval Crusades is abundantly apparent in Hitler's framing of the German bid to establish an eastern empire during the 1940s, as well as the cogency with which Aimé Césaire, among others, subsequently linked the Hitlerian framing to Western colonialism/imperialism as a whole. He aptly observed that Hitler was belatedly reviled by Europeans, not for "crimes against humanity," per se, but instead for "the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India [and] the blacks of Africa" (Césaire 1972 [1955], p. 14). Insofar as

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they were then struggling mightily to maintain their overseas empires, or at least substantial portions of them, he continued, countries like Britain, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands (all loudly condemning of the "Nazi horror") were themselves busily "chewing on Hitler's vomit" (ibid., p. 63).

Through it all, The West's peculiar version of the state, formed, maintained, and continuously refined on the basis of internal colonialism, has been instrumental, indispensable to the evolution of European imperialism in each of its phases and typologies. By the late twentieth century, only a handful of Europe's multitudinous indigenous peoples (notably, the Basques [Euskaldinak] and Sámis [pejoratively known as "Lapps"]) remained sufficiently in touch with their autochthonous traditions to struggle for resumption of a self-determining existence on that basis (Watson 2007; Mörkenstam 2005). As American Indian Movement (AIM) leader Russell Means once put it when arguing that indigenous peoples, no less than others, are entitled to exercise the right of self-determination:

> For Europe to colonize the whole planet, it first had to colonize *itself*. At this point, Europeans have been colonized for so long, and so thoroughly, that they've actually forgotten the fact of their own colonization. Since it's hard to imagine being more colonized than *that*, it seems to me that Europeans are the ones most desperately in need of decolonizing.

Imperial Reach: Phase 1

From at least as early as the First Crusade, the West harnessed itself to the task of fabricating what was purportedly "its own" civilization, self-anointedly superior to all others, through a peculiar mode of cultural imperialism against Others. This initially devolved upon a form of what might be best characterized as intellectual cannibalism wherein the Western intelligentsia systematically credited itself with the achievements of Eastern (primarily Islamic) philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists, while denying that those whose knowledge was thus appropriated

had either produced it or were culturally capable of having done so.

With respect to mathematics, for instance, although the word itself derives from the Arabic term "*al-jabar*," Western scholars have historically (and routinely) attributed invention of the algebra to the Greek Diophantus, during the third century CE. In fact, the algebraic method was conceived in its modern form by the Persian polymath Ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī around 820 CE (Boyer 1991: pp. 228–229, 234). In the same vein, many of the "brilliant innovations" credited to Europe's later mathematicians were outright plagiaries of much earlier discoveries by their Islamic counterparts. The theorem attributed by the West to Nicholas Copernicus in 1543, for example, is virtually identical to "Tūsī's Double," a theorem set forth by a Persian, Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, in 1247 (Saliba 2007, pp. 197–200). Copernicus also plagiarized the work of a fourteenth century Syrian predecessor, Abu'l-Hasan ibn al-Shātir, to such an extent that al-Shātir is sometimes referred to as "the Pre-Copernican Copernican" (Roberts 1957, pp. 428–32).

Similarly, "Viète's Laws" of numerical analysis, supposedly discovered by the Frenchman François Viète during the sixteenth century, were lifted from al-Tūsī; so, too, the "Ruffini-Horner method" of computing the derivative of polynomials, supposedly devised by a pair of Europeans during the late eighteenth century (Berggren 1990, pp. 304–309; Ypima 1995, pp. 531–551). "Wilson's Theorem," credited to the Englishman John Wilson in 1770, was already employed by the Arab mathematician Ibn al-Haytham ("Alhacen") by 1000 CE. Such illustrations of the West's claiming Islam's mathematical knowledge as the product of its own "intellectual tradition" are seemingly endless, extending not just to algebra but to such rarefied domains as calculus, trigonometry, non-Euclidian geometry, and number theory. Even the numerals, together with the attendant concepts of zero and decimal fractionation, essential to Europe's eventual mathematical sophistication, were swallowed whole from "Eastern" Others (Sesiano 2000, pp. 137–166).

One result (particularly as regards the plagiarism of Ibn Sīnā ["Avicenna"], Ibn Rushd

["Averroës"], and others among Islam's Aristotelian philosophers) has been the West's conjuring of a proud "history" which it falsely claims originated in the culture of ancient Greece. In actuality, as John Mohawk observes:

> The West had no direct intellectual connection whatsoever to the thinkers of classical Greece: important works of the ancient Greeks had largely disappeared from the [Western] world by the second century. Aristotle's writings were already rare by the first century . . .. Pope Gregory the Great ordered the library of Palatine Apollo burned and forbade laymen to read even the Bible. Jerome, an early father of the Church, boasted that the classical authors were being ignored; in 398 [C.E.] the Fourth Council at Carthage forbade [even] Church leaders to read them. Young monks bragged of their ignorance of classical writings, and books and libraries were systematically destroyed. John Chrysostom, a father of the Greek [or Eastern Orthodox] Church, declared his satisfaction that all trace of the writings and philosophy of antiquity had disappeared under the early hegemony of the Christian Church. (Mohawk 2000, pp. 67, 70)

Much the same procedure was/is evident in such less rarefied fields as architecture, engineering, agriculture, and medicine, with concepts, crop types, and technologies developed in the Islamic East ingested wholesale under the guise of being "invented" by the West. Kirkpatrick Sale, for example, has argued that a "new rationality" signified by the appearance of such technological marvels as the public clock, eyeglasses, paned glass windows, paper, the printing press, and (most of all) guns and gunpowder during Europe's "High Renaissance" enabled its unparalleled outward thrust, beginning in the mid-fifteenth century (Sale 1990, pp. 41–42). In reality, such rationality was "new" only to the West; every one of Sale's examples, and many others besides, had appeared much earlier in The East.

Public clocks were in use in Baghdad by 750 CE, and in 797 Hārūn al-Rashīd, the city's calīf, is known to have presented an especially elaborate one to Charlemagne (Turner 1997, p. 184). Eyeglasses, the invention of which is credited to the Florentine Salvino D'Amarto in 1284, were already being worn in China by 1260 (Durant 1950, pp. 995–996). High-purity, clear, colorless glass was first produced by Abās ibn Fīrnā, an Andalusian Berber, c.850 (he developed both quartz-based and silica-based methods of making it), while Islamic artisans had perfected the techniques of making stained glass and assembling paned windows at least a century earlier still (ibid., p. 342). Paper was invented in China around 105 CE, where it was developed to near perfection before the techniques of making it, together with ink, were passed along to the Persians during the eighth century, and thence to the West during the thirteenth century. The printing press (or, more accurately, moveable type) was developed by China's Pi Sheng in 1041, about four centuries before Gutenberg (Durant 1935, pp. 727–730).

Although there were efforts during the thirteenth century to credit Roger Bacon with inventing gunpowder, it had by then been known in China for some five centuries and was "discovered" by the West only by way of Islam. It may be that Europeans discovered the process of "corning" gunpowder during the 1420s, thereby making it more reliable and easily transportable, but without Islamic chemists having perfected techniques of purifying saltpeter c.1240, there would have been no weapons-grade powder to corn. As was recorded by the Bishop of Léon, cannons were already in use by Muslim forces during the Battle of Seville in 1248, while the first known use of such weapons by Europeans came nearly a century later during the 1346 Battle of Crécy (Kelly 2004, pp. 19–37; Morgan 2007, pp. 174–175).

Even Islamic institutions were copied, universities and hospitals being but two salient examples. The world's first university, al-Qarawiyyan ("Karaouine"), was established in present-day Morocco in 859 CE. The second was Egypt's al-Azhar, founded in 972 CE, followed by Persia's seven-campus Nizamiyya system, centered in Baghdad, which was developed during the eleventh century (Durant 1950, pp. 287–288; Crist 2017, p. 232). The West finally got in the act with establishment of the University of Bologna in 1088, and the Universities of Oxford and Paris in 1096 and 1150, respectively. Revealingly, the mandate of the Bolognese undertaking was from the outset to glean knowledge from "the more advanced countries" (i.e., those of The East).

Even such standard scholarly practices as peer review were simply lifted from Islamic prototypes (Spier 2002, pp. 357–358).

Similarly, the world's first hospital (*bimaristan*) was established in Baghdad in 805 CE, thereafter proliferating rapidly throughout the Islamic world. Europe's first was founded by the French king Louis IX shortly after his return from the Seventh Crusade in 1254 (he'd inspected Muslim medical facilities during his stint in the East). European medical practices and technologies remained reliant upon those long-since developed in Islam for the next several hundred years, with Ibn Sīnā's 14-volume *Canon of Medicine* (*Al-Qanun fi al-Tibb*), completed in 1025, still in use as an instructional text for training medical aspirants at the University of Paris until the mid-eighteenth century or later (Cesk 1980, pp. 17–23; Weisser 2017, p. 109).

Nonetheless, by the early 1400s, it had become obvious that Europe lacked the capacity to penetrate the "Near Eastern" barrier presented by Islam, thereby securing either ports on the Red Sea or overland access to the broad range of much coveted goods (most famously, silk, tea, and spices) produced in the "Far East" (i.e., Cathay [China] and India [Hindustan]). The goods were for centuries moved over the 4,000-mile Silk Road, originating in eastern China, traversing the "Middle Eastern" domain of Persia, and terminating in Anatolia, the Levant, and Egypt. Goods produced in India were transported north along routes intersecting the Silk Road at various points (Wolf 1982, p. 28). Trade was conducted all along the way, with the result that, even after sea routes were opened across the Indian Ocean, only a relatively small portion of the initial loads were still available for acquisition by European traders (through Muslim brokers) by the time they arrived in the eastern Mediterranean (Abu-Lughod 1991, p. 202, 239–241; Hobson 2004).

Cutting out the Islamic middlemen obviously stood to substantially increase both the profit margins of Venetian and other European commercial enterprises and the quantity of goods available in the West. Hence, in 1434, the Portuguese set out to find a water route to the Far East by circumnavigating Africa. The expedition failed to accomplish its mission (the Cape of Good Hope was not rounded until 1488) but it did succeed in establishing the first European toehold on sub-Saharan Africa's Atlantic Coast. Quite unexpectedly, this opened up a very different source of wealth with which to build the West's then embryonic economies (Wolf 1982, p. 129).

Over the next four centuries, the lucrative trade in black chattel slaves inaugurated by the Portuguese, and subsequently participated in by the Spanish, English (later British), French, Dutch, Danes, and various of their settler colonies/states, precipitated the forced, permanent removal of perhaps 20 million Africans from their homelands, with untold millions more killed while resisting enslavement or by the rigors attending the forced marches by which they were moved from inland locations to coastal "port factories." There is considerable and ongoing dispute over the numbers. Hence, contrary to the assertions of many European/Euro-American scholars, there is no "scholarly consensus." I've taken the widely accepted figure of 15.5 million slaves having arrived in the "New World" (of whom roughly one-third did not survive initial stints in "seasoning camps" in the Caribbean), added a further 2.5 million who did not survive the Middle Passage across the Atlantic, and yet another million who perished while being held at European-owned/-garrisoned "port factories" along the African coast while awaiting shipment (Elmina, Bonny, and Benguela in particular) and simply rounded off the sum to arrive at 20 million (Inakori 1982; Rodney 1982, pp. 96–97).

By some estimates, a roughly equal number of people died while resisting capture in the interior or during forced marches to the port factories. This would make the total impact of the Atlantic slave trade upon west Africa's indigenous societies about 40 million. Even if the actual number was somewhat less, the sheer scale of the losses incurred by indigenous African societies from Senegambia in the north through present-day Angola in the south during the Maafa (as the Atlantic slave trade is known in Kiswahili, meaning "great disaster") left them forever devastated, unable in the aftermath to regain either their original cohesion or the levels of material security

their economies had provided (Inikori and Engerman 1992).

It should be noted that the impact of the West's transatlantic trade in black slaves was to an extent exacerbated by a complicated Islamic trade in the same "commodity" lasting from roughly 650–1950 CE. While the volume of the latter is sparsely documented, the closest studies to date suggest that it was conducted in a far less intensive fashion and on a noticeably smaller scale than was its European counterpart; i.e., somewhere between 3.5 and 10 million sub-Saharan Africans were enslaved by Muslims over a period of more than thirteen centuries. Raymond Mauvy has argued for a higher total of 14 million, while Basil Davidson holds that even the 3.5 million estimate may be too high (Segal 2001, pp. 56–57). The sources of black slaves for the Islamic trade, moreover, were primarily the eastern Sudan and Africa's east coast. Its effects thus exhibit little overlap with those attending the transatlantic trade.

That said, it is worth mentioning that one reason the scale of Islamic commerce in black flesh was much smaller than that of European Christians (at least until the nineteenth century) was that there was less demand. Muslims were as inclined to enslave Slavs and the "white" peoples of the Transcaucasus (especially Georgians and Circassians), as well as Western Christians, as blacks. There are at present no reliable estimates of the numbers at issue apart from Robert Davis's recent study, in which he concludes that perhaps 1.25 million slaves taken from the West were traded/held along North Africa's Barbary Coast alone between 1530 and 1780 (2003, p. 23). Based upon that limited sample, it seems reasonable to suggest that, overall, the Islamic market may have been satiated through the enslavement of rather more whites than blacks.

This outcome was effectively ensured through a more insidious process wherein African leaders were selectively co-opted through formal, albeit duplicitous, recognition by the participating Western powers as "legitimate heads of state" in their own right. Invariably, the quid pro quo demanded was that in exchange for European support vis-à-vis regional rivals (as well as steady supplies of guns, munitions, liquor, woolens, and other manufactured

goods), the African participants would facilitate the trade by providing copious numbers of captives taken from other peoples. Thus were the prototypes of what would become Westernized state structures implanted on "the Dark Continent," a circumstance in itself foreclosing upon the prospect of restoring preexisting modes of sociopolitical and economic organization when "the shameful trade" finally ended during the mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile, as has been documented by Walter Rodney, among others, the profits accrued by the British alone were sufficient to underwrite England's late-eighteenth century "Industrial Revolution" in its entirety (1982, pp. 82–90; Galeano 1973, pp. 91–96).

Imperial Reach: Phase 2

Since millions of black slave laborers were neither needed nor desired in Europe itself, the vast influx of developmental capital attending the Occidental trade in their flesh was contingent upon a second factor. Word of Vasco de Gama's arrival in Calcutta by way of the Cape having not reached Europe until 1499, Spain had commissioned Christóbal Colón (the surname literally translates as "colonizer") to seek an alternative route to the Far East by sailing due west (i.e., to circumnavigate the globe itself). The result, of course, was that in October 1492, the "Great Navigator" made landfall on a large island half-a-world away from where he thought he was and promptly pronounced himself successful. While Colón was never aware of it, he had stumbled upon the outer reaches of an entire hemisphere, much of it well-populated and sustaining a multiplicity of thriving cultures, the existence of which had previously been unknown to the West. The "West" is used here strictly in the sense of its contrivance.

Certainly, the Norse (resident then and now to the western edge of the Asian landmass) had established settlements in present-day Labrador and Newfoundland roughly five centuries before Colón's celebrated "Voyage of Discovery," and, having subsequently explored both southward and inland, cannot be characterized as having been "unaware" of North America's existence

(Ingstad and Ingstad 2000[1991]). Nor could the Basques, who are known to have been fishing off the coast of Newfoundland for at least a century before Colón set sail (Kurlansky 1998, pp. 27–29; Kurlansky 1999, pp. 58–59). There is also strong evidence of a West African presence in Mexico long before its "discovery" by the Spanish, as well as a distinct possibility that the indigenous Guanches of the Canary Islands, exterminated by the Portuguese during the fifteenth century, had originated in the Americas and traversed the Atlantic from west to east (Forbes 1988, pp. 6–21).

Having secured the title of governor, Colón returned in 1493 to the island he'd christened Española (present-day Haiti and the Dominican Republic), situated in a body of water he depicted as "the Caribbean Sea" (the word "Carib" translates as "cannibal"). In his journals, Colón habitually insisted that indigenous peoples with whom he'd had no contact were "Caribs" (a label with which all non-Arawakan native cultures of the Caribbean basin remain afflicted to this day) (Sale 1990, pp. 129–132). Here, he was simply employing an already common Euro-supremacist trope whereby the "savagery" of Others was signified by allegations of their supposed cannibalism. In actuality, as was demonstrated by William Arens in *The Man-Eating Myth*, there has never been tangible evidence that anthropophagy was/is an integral feature of *any* culture. Nonetheless, there remains a strain of scholarship (referred to as "cannibology") obsessed with proving the opposite (Churchill 2000).

In any case, as governor of Española Colón established the prototype of the plantation economies that would predominate throughout not only Spain's but all European colonies in the Caribbean and appreciable portions of both North and South America until the late nineteenth century, in many areas until much later (in some, it lingers still). This entailed the wholesale and intensive use of slave labor to clear previously uncleared land and cultivate certain crops highly valued in the European "mother countries" (primarily sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee, and cocoa, but others as well) in increasingly massive quantities, milling and refining them as needed. Much of the land

was of course already in cultivation before the European invasion(s) and was simply reallocated to the growing of commercial crops rather than foodstuffs. The policy quite predictably induced mass starvation among the indigenous peoples whose fields were thus expropriated even as they were harnessed to such heavy labor as cutting cane and clearing additional acreage (Galeano 1973, pp. 71–120).

Initially, indigenous peoples were enslaved en masse for such purposes, forced to perform heavy labor under conditions so harsh that entire populations died in astonishingly short periods. Of Española's indigenous Taínos, who by the contemporaneous estimate of Bartolomé de Las Casas had numbered perhaps 3 million in 1493, fewer than 100,000 remained alive by 1500, when Colón was recalled to Spain, and by 1550, they were "extinct." It should be noted that during the 1960s, Sherburne Cook, Woodrow Borah, and other scholars of the "Berkeley School" concluded that Las Casas's estimate was, if anything, far too low, i.e.: that the Taíno population of Española may have numbered as many as 8 million when Colón first arrived (Keen and Haynes 2012, p. 12).

The same pattern was everywhere evident as the Spanish rapidly expanded their dominion on the continental landmass of this "New World" to include everything from Péru in the south to what they called California in the north. In Péru, for example, as historian David Stannard recounts:

> [B]etween a third and a half of the annual quota of coca workers died as a result of their five month service in the fields and those who did survive, and the fewer still who lived out the remainder of the year, had only the next round of work to face in the coming season . . .. Within a century following their first encounter with the Spanish [in 1528], 94 to 96 percent of [the indigenous Andean peoples'] once-enormous population had been exterminated; along their 2000 miles of coastline, where once 6,500,000 people had lived, everyone was dead. (1992, pp. 89, 91)

Stannard acknowledges that a large proportion of these deaths were caused by "measles, mumps, typhus, influenza, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and haemorrhagic smallpox" (ibid., p. 91), European-

imported diseases to which America's indigenous peoples had no prior exposure and a correspondingly low level of acquired immunity. To his great credit, however, he refuses to follow the now fashionable practice of invoking Alfred Crosby's (1986) "virgin soil" hypothesis as a basis upon which to dismiss the staggering toll as "unintended and inadvertent," thereby exculpating both the particular colonizers involved and the West more generally. Instead, he observes that in view of the grotesquely debilitating conditions imposed upon enslaved indigenous populations in the Americas, their resistance to disease would have been reduced to the point that they would have died by the millions no matter *how* many generations of acquired immunity they had inherited (Stannard 1992, pp. xii, 138–139). Certainly, as evidenced by the catastrophic rate of disease mortality suffered by Slavic slave laborers under the Nazis, this was the case with twentieth century Europeans (Mazower 2008, pp. 309–312).

As such "extermination through work" depleted what had begun as substantial indigenous populations in region after region, a spiraling demand for replacements spawned a significant, and far too little remarked, trade in American Indian slaves captured in the hinterlands, which was sustained until the mid-eighteenth century (in some areas until much later). Rather perversely, under the circumstances, a seldom remarked factor contributing to indigenous population decline was the export of native people for sale in European slave markets. While data in this connection is sketchy, Renápe/Lenápe historian Jack Forbes (1992) points to the sale of some 4,000 in Seville alone between 1493 and "the early 1500s," and estimates that as many as 30,000 were owned in Spain by 1700 (some portion were likely sent to the Canary Islands, a Spanish colony). The Portuguese owned thousands more, not only in the mother country but also in the Azores, while the market in Antwerp, supplied mainly by Dutch slavers until 1650, attracted purchasers of still other thousands from as far eastwards as the Hapsburg (Austro-Hungarian) Empire (Forbes 1988, pp. 26–42). All told, an overall estimate of 50,000 or more seems quite reasonable.

Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, however, the preferred method of replenishing the ranks of slave laborers in the Americas increasingly became importation of black chattel from Africa's Atlantic coast, a process justified on the basis of scriptural interpretation (i.e., a reading of the biblical story of Ham which led to the conclusion that blacks "lacked souls," were therefore nonhuman, and should thus be deemed "natural slaves" [in an Aristotelian sense]) and, correspondingly, there arose the preliminary formulations of what would become known as "race law" and an arc of "racial science" culminating in eugenics during the twentieth century (Haynes 2002; Gould 1996). Ironically, the best-known "Aristotelian" depiction of black subhumanity was/is probably that of the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, while successfully arguing (during his celebrated debate with Juan Ginés de Sepulveda at Valladolid in 1550) to the opposite effect with regard to the peoples indigenous to America (Hanke 1959).

This, in turn, unleashed what Patricia Williams (1991) has aptly described as an "alchemy of race and rights" throughout the West. So too, the pursuit of "scientific" (biological) explanations for supposedly innate differences between "races" which ultimately crystallized in eugenics, an "empirical" doctrine founded in England during the 1880s, virtually hegemonic within the US intelligentsia from 1910 to 1930, and most thoroughly applied by the Nazis between 1932 and 1945 (Kuhl 1994). Following the Second World War, eugenics research has been continued under such rubrics as "social biology," and governmental policies have been influenced accordingly (Black 2003, pp. 411–444).

The growth of the transatlantic slave trade paralleled the steep decline of the native population throughout Iberian dominions in the Americas, peaking during the eighteenth century. Although the first African slaves arrived on Española in 1502, less than 5 per cent of the trade's total volume is estimated to have occurred by 1600, during which period indigenous peoples were still available in sufficient numbers to satisfy demand. As the effects of indigenous population

decline became increasingly pronounced during the seventeenth century, the trade expanded accordingly, with a further 16 per cent of its total volume dating to the period 1601–1700. During the eighteenth century, with the hemispheric indigenous population having been reduced by upwards of 90 per cent, the trade surged dramatically, with more than half of total volume having been carried out between 1701 and 1800. A further 28 per cent of total volume dates from the nineteenth century, despite the British and US bans on the international trade in 1808 (Brazil continued to maintain black chattel until the late 1880s, as did the Spanish colony of Cuba) (Curtin 1969, pp. 265–268; Stannard 1992, p. 171).

The US ban was rather cynical, since, as Henry Wiencek has recently shown, "America's favorite slaveholding philosopher of freedom" Thomas Jefferson had already realized that by outlawing importation while retaining the domestic system of slavery the value of each slave already in the country (and all who could be "bred" from them) would be driven sharply upwards, thereby greatly increasing the real and potential wealth of owners such as himself. Jefferson also pioneered the monetization of slaves, thereby allowing their conversion into capital (Wiencek 2012, pp. 8–9, 85–100). This had the effect not only of hollowing out the societies indigenous to much of the western and central sub-Sahara, but of greatly confusing the newly contrived racial nomenclature assigned by the colonizers to the remnants of indigenous peoples surviving in the New World.

As Forbes (1988) has shown, the inclusion of both indigenous Americans and black Africans within the slave-labor forces maintained on most plantations over spans of several generations produced what might be properly termed "red-black peoples" in many regions. Since persons of "mixed-race" were automatically denominated as being other than "Indio," the physical eradication of the New World's indigenous peoples was augmented by the residue's being thereby "defined out of existence." It has been argued that the Spanish term "Indio" derives not from Christóbal Colón's belief that he had reached the "Indies" (now Indonesia, although he was actually looking for Cipango [Japan]) but from his original

description of the Taínos as being "una gente en Dios" ("a people in God") (quoted in Matthiessen 1984, p. 3).

Be that as it may, under the legal codes effected throughout Spain's New World colonies and Portuguese Brazil, it was applicable *only* to "full-blood" Indians while all others were defined as being something else, depending on their specific "racial admixture." Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz lists two-dozen terms formally assigned to different combinations and "degrees" of "red-black-white" descent (1974, pp. 129–130). Although the biolegal construction of "Indianness" was rather simpler in the Anglophone colonies of North America, and subsequently the USA (all those born of "red-black admixture" were defined as black, those whose pedigree included white lineage as well were cast as "colored"), there were/are roughly 30 colloquial terms employed to classify different biracial and triracial combinations. Examples of the latter include "Croatan," "Melungeon," "redbone," "buckhead," and "brass ankle" (Berry 1963, pp. 32–36).

The drive to extinguish indigenous cultural identity was further reinforced by a process of what the Osage scholar George Tinker has termed "missionary conquest" (1993), wherein priests and others dispatched by the papacy for such purposes offered "salvation" to people severely traumatized by the devastating of their societies, but only on condition of their abandoning their own spiritual beliefs in favor of Catholicism's "one true God," pledging fealty to an Iberian Crown, and seeking to emulate their colonizers' ways of life. For a full half-century, beginning with the promulgation of Juan López de Palacios Rubios's *Requerimiento* in 1513, such comprehensive Westernization was in fact compulsory throughout the Spanish New World dominions, on pain of death or enslavement. The law, derived from Pope Alexander VI's 1493 Bull *Inter caetera* extending Church authority over the whole of the New World, was typically read to indigenous people by a priest in untranslated Spanish. It specifically required them to:

> acknowledge the Church as the Ruler and Superior of the whole world, and the high priest called Pope, and in his name the King and Queen . . . our lords, in his place, as superiors and lords and kings of these

islands and this [land] . . . and that you consent and give place that these religious fathers should declare and preach to you'. It then informed them that, 'if you do not do this . . . we shall powerfully enter into your country, and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can'. It thereupon concluded with a pronouncement of self-absolution, asserting that any 'deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their Highnesses, or ours, nor of these cavaliers who come with us. (quoted in Williams 1990, pp. 91–93)

As secular law, the *Requerimiento* was a bald attempt at post hoc justification, given that mass enslavement of "Indios" had already been underway for 20 years on Española, and there had been no shortage of attendant slaughter. Although it was officially repealed in 1556, the law had by then largely accomplished its purpose and would in any event continue to be invoked for another 50 years. While nothing so straightforwardly draconian appeared in Portuguese colonial law, missionary practice in Brazil was essentially the same (Schmink and Wood 1992, pp. 35–54).

In any case, the insatiable demand for slaves, whether indigenous to America or to Africa, was fuelled by more than the plantation system alone. There was to be sure an infrastructure to be built; fortifications, cities and towns, roads, mills, refineries, and port facilities, all of which required the investiture of heavy labor in massive quantities, and all of which proliferated with remarkable rapidity throughout the Spanish New World colonies in particular. And then there were the mines. From 1503 to 1660, Spain took some 185,000 kilos of gold and 16 million kilos of silver from its New World possessions (a quantity three times greater than the precious metals possessed by the West *as a whole* in 1500); while, during the eighteenth century, the quantity of gold arriving in Lisbon from Brazil "exceeded the total volume . . . Spain had taken from its colonies in the preceding two centuries" (Galeano 1973, pp. 33, 64).

In terms of sheer magnitude, this sudden influx of wealth to Iberia, and thence the West more broadly, was utterly unprecedented. Initially, it accrued all but entirely from the Spanish plunder of the superbly crafted gold and silver jewelry and ornamentation ubiquitous throughout both the México and the Inca domains, but, as these sources were quickly exhausted, the labor-intensive turn to mining of the metals began almost immediately. While rich veins of ore were found in hundreds of locations, that unearthed from the Cerro Rico site at Potosí, in present-day Bolivia, was by far the most spectacular. Between 1556 and 1783, in addition to tens of thousands of indigenous people (mitayos), some 30,000 black slaves were "expended" in the course of bringing 41,000 metric tons of silver up from the depths of that one mine, reputedly "enough . . . to make a bridge from the tip of the Cerro to the door of the [Spanish] royal palace across the ocean" (ibid., p. 33).

All told, as Eduardo Galeano has noted, the quantities of gold and silver at issue were in themselves more than sufficient to have underwritten the West's vaunted industrial revolution, not only in England, but *in its entirety*. Such industrialization did not occur in Iberia, however. Galeano sketches the process through which the vast quantities of gold and silver simply washed through or past Spain, expended by the Crown on the acquisition of arms and manufactured goods produced by "lesser" peoples to the north (mainly those of the Low Countries and westerly Germanic states), thereby financing development of *their* industrial base. While lavish expenditures on luxury goods temporarily allowed the "Spanish nobility [to enjoy] living in a contra-historical Middle Age," such imperial "delirium . . . simultaneously sealed the ruin of Spain" (ibid., p. 29), a matter signified by a drastic *decline* in Iberia's domestic productive capacity during the first century of its vast New World empire (e.g., of an estimated 14,000 looms operating in 1550, roughly 400 remained operational 50 years later) (ibid., pp. 33–42).

Nor was this all. At the time of Colón's 1492 "discovery," roughly two-thirds of all vegetable foodstuffs now commonly consumed by humanity were under cultivation in the Americas and nowhere else. Many of these (corn, beans, and

potatoes as examples) do not exist in nature and had come into being only as the result of extensive hybridization by the broad array of native peoples whose economies centered on farming them (Lowes 1986, pp. 62–71; Weatherford 1988, pp. 59–78). Acquisition of these three crops, especially the potato, rapidly transformed European agriculture, allowing the West to attain an otherwise inconceivable level of nutritional stability even as the cultures that had created and thrived on them were systematically pushed beyond the bare margins of subsistence and otherwise annihilated (Stannard 1992, pp. 56–57).

Potatoes became a staple of the Western diet (albeit, only a handful of the 3,000-odd varieties developed in Peru prior to the Spanish invasion were cultivated in Europe), an eventuality resulting not least from the plant's general hardiness and the fact that its average yield of about 50,000 pounds per acre was considerably greater than most Old World crop types (Nunn and Qian 2011, pp. 594, 599–605, 643–644). Beans, the yield of which varies by type but is nonetheless substantial, added an important protein component lacking in potatoes (Kaplan and Kaplan 1992). The effect of corn ("maize") was somewhat more indirect in that it was grown mainly to feed livestock. Nonetheless, since it is a richer grain with a per acre yield about three times greater than that of wheat and other Old World alternatives (Galinat 1992; Warman 2003, p. 117), its cultivation underpinned a substantial increase in meat proteins and animal fats available for consumption by average Europeans.

The dazzling cornucopia of additional items introduced to the Western diet by way of invading the New World, ranging as they did from "chilies to chocolate," afforded it not only an inestimably greater nutritive balance but also a diversity now enshrined as Spanish, Italian, French, and other distinctive "national cuisines." To get the idea, one need only try and imagine what Italian cuisine would be like without tomatoes, peppers, beans (apart from garbanzos and favas), squash (especially zucchini), chocolate, and vanilla, none of which was known to the West until its invasion of the Americas (Foster and Cordell 1992; Weatherford 1988, pp. 99–116). The idea of noodles (pasta) was, of course, lifted from China, while coffee (espresso) was introduced by Islam.

Other products of indigenous American knowledge cannibalized by their Western colonizers were no less valuable. These included such pharmacological marvels as quinine, ipecac, coca, arnica, witch hazel, and petroleum jelly, to name but a handful of the more important, as well other medicinal knowledge, including cures for scurvy, intestinal worms, goiter, headaches, and constipation. Quinine is used both to treat and as a prophylactic against malaria. Ipecac cures amoebic dysentery, and, in a milder dosage, is still prescribed as an emetic. Coca is mainly known as a stimulant (especially as the base from which cocaine is made) but is also highly effective in treating altitude sickness. Arnica remains a popular remedy for pain and swelling attending sprains, while witch hazel is widely used to relieve the ache of strained muscles. Petroleum jelly is perhaps the most commonly used skin ointment in the world today (Weatherford 1988, pp. 175–200). All but quinine were used by America's native peoples for the purposes indicated prior to the arrival of Europeans, and they discovered its utility in treating malaria shortly after the invaders introduced the disease to the New World.

Although it is seldom acknowledged, the West still very much relies upon the level of medicinal knowledge native Americans had attained long before the European invasions. Kelp, for example, was used by the Incas to cure goiter and remains the essential ingredient in drugs prescribed for the condition. Similarly, the indigenous headache remedy contained a close relative of today's aspirin (i.e., acetylsalicylic acid). The bark of a shrub used by California's indigenous peoples to cure constipation contains properties "modern science" has been unable to synthesize or improve upon; the bark itself remains the active ingredient in all laxatives common in the West. As with quinine, the cure for scurvy (acute deficiency of vitamin C) offers an especially clear example of Europe's cannibalization of indigenous knowledge (Vogel 1970, pp. 267–414).

To these must be added a range of medical/surgical techniques and technologies such as rubber tubing and syringes (indeed, rubber itself), completely unknown to the Old World. The Méxicas had by the early sixteenth century developed especially advanced surgical techniques, documented by the Spanish as including a method of repairing broken bones closely resembling what is now termed "medullary fixation" (i.e., inserting a rod to reinforce the repair) unequalled by Western surgeons until the twentieth century. Méxica surgeons were also adept at removing tumors, are known to have successfully performed cranial surgery, and employed scalpels allowing greater precision than anything available in the West until lasers came into use. Their practice, moreover, was based on one of the more accurate apprehensions of human anatomy in the world. The broader Méxica practice of medicine (which included dentistry) was divided into specializations, prefiguring the adoption of a similar arrangement in the West by about three centuries (Schendel 1968, pp. 45–61).

Probably the most significant medical insight the Méxica and other indigenous physicians imparted to their Western counterparts (albeit the notion was fiercely resisted by the West until the early nineteenth century) was the importance of sanitation and personal hygiene in preventing disease. (Europeans at the time the New World invasion began, and for a considerable period thereafter, routinely dumped raw sewage into the street and actually believed that bathing *caused* certain illnesses, often living their lives without once cleansing their bodies.) (Vogel 1970, pp. 253–261; Lowes 1986, pp. 51–52; Weatherford 1988, pp. 189–190).

The intellectual cannibalism apparent in the West's earlier-remarked attribution to itself of Islamic knowledge has in some ways been even more pronounced with regard to that obtained from America's indigenous peoples. The antimalarial properties of "cinchonine," as quinine was known in the West until 1820, was, for instance, "discovered" by the Countess of Chinchona only by virtue of her having been the first European treated with quina-quina (bark of barks), the

traditional Incan remedy for fevers, in 1638 (Hobhouse 1986, pp. 3–18). Similarly, the cure for scurvy was not "found" by the British naval officer James Lind during the 1780s; the cure, as he contemporaneously recorded, was shown to the French explorer Jacques Cartier by the Wyandots in 1535. Nor was ipecac "discovered in Brazil during the 1600s" or its use in curing "the flux" (amoebic dysentery) first revealed by the Dutch physician Helveticus in 1688. Rather, it had long been employed for that purpose, and in mild doses as an emetic, by peoples indigenous to the Amazon Basin from whom the Portuguese learned its uses, c. 1550 (Weatherford 1988, pp. 181–183).

In the same vein, the Venetian polymath Fausto Veranzio was not, as Wikipedia would have it, "the first" to design a suspension bridge in his *Machina Novae* (1616). Spanish conquistadors began reporting the existence of such bridges, and not infrequently attaching sketches, shortly after their 1532 arrival in Peru, where native engineers had designed and constructed more than 200 of them in the course of completing the Incas' 25,000-mile road system (von Hagen 1976). Veranzio's design was of a structure not only bearing a remarkable resemblance to those already conceived and built by the Incas, but specifying use of the very same materials.

Actually, Veranzio offered two variations of the design in *Machina Novae*. The first was of a rope and wood construction virtually identical, both in form and materials, to that of the Incas. The second was of a type developed in China as early as 300 BCE, utilizing exactly the same engineering principles, but substituting iron chains for the primary ropes (Kirby 1990, p. 139; Lay 1992, pp. 336–337). The Incan and Chinese variations were apparently developed independently of one another (at least there was no known interaction between the two civilizations). In any case, Veranzio credited neither. Any number of additional illustrations might be offered, and a few will be mentioned below, but it should for the moment be sufficient to observe that "Irish" potatoes were never Irish (albeit, it will in fairness be noted, that it was the English colonizers, not the colonized Irish, who coined the term).

Imperial Reach: Phase 3

Establishment of Iberia's New World empires during the early sixteenth century, and shortly thereafter those of the French, English, Danes, Swedes, and Dutch (even the tiny Duchy of Courland sought to join the parade) made possible the realization of the West's imperial ambitions on a planetary scale. The Iberian New World dominions derived from Pope Alexander VI's Bull *Inter caetera* of 1493, which purported to divide it between them. Hence, Portugal's empire in the Americas was lodged in Brazil, while that of the Spanish encompassed the rest of South America, all of Central America and present-day Mexico, more or less all of the present-day continental USA west of the Mississippi River and as far north as Oregon, plus Florida and most of the Caribbean islands (Williams 1990, pp. 80–81).

Brazil declared itself an independent empire in 1822, and Portugal, after an unsuccessful effort to contest the matter militarily, conceded the point in 1824 (Fieldhouse 1967; pp. 122–125). (Brazil, from which Uruguay separated in 1828, remained officially an empire until a coup d'état led to its becoming "a dictator-led republic" in 1889.) In the meantime, a series of wars of independence in Mexico, including the northern half seized by the USA in 1848, and Spanish holdings in South and Central America, waged from 1810 to 1822, led to Spain's formal relinquishment in 1836 of its continental New World empire as a whole, and recognition of the newly formed states of Gran Columbia (from which Venezuela separated in 1830, and Panama in 1903), Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, the United Republics of Rio de la Plata (later Argentina), Mexico, and the Central American Republic (the provinces of which later separated, becoming Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica) (ibid., pp. 112–120). Thereafter, all that remained of Spain's empire in the Americas were the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico, both of which were seized by the USA in 1898. Puerto Rico remains a US colony at present (Rivera Ramos 2007).

The dominion of "New France" was proclaimed in 1534 with respect to an area initially encompassing the present-day Canadian province of Québec as well as the area then referred to as Acadia, which included present-day Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. By the early seventeenth century, however, French territorial claims had dramatically expanded its "Upper Country," extending northward to surround the southern half of Hudson's Bay and westward to a point beyond Lake Winnipeg (in present-day Manitoba), while the two compartments of "Louisiana" extended southward from the Great Lakes to encompass the entire Mississippi River basin (broadly defined). Nova Scotia and "Prince Rupert's Land," the area around Hudson's Bay, were ceded to England in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, and the balance in the Treaty of Paris a half-century later (Steele 1994, pp. 159, 222–225).

The only French colony in South America, Guiana, was established in 1602 and remains an "overseas department" of France at present. In the Caribbean, France established the colony of St. Domingue (now Haiti) on the western third of Española in 1664, but lost it to Toussaint Louverture's successful slave revolution (1800–1803). Meanwhile, it had also taken control of the Lesser Antilles in their virtual entirety, retaining three of the islands (Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Marie-Galante) as overseas departments even now (another island, St. Barthélemy, is currently designated as being part of the French "overseas collectivity") (Fieldhouse 1967, pp. 120–122; Steele 1994, pp. 34–49, 59–79; James 1963).

England's first move towards forging an empire in the Americas came in 1583, with its chartering of the colony of Newfoundland (headquartered at the trading port at St John's, established in 1520). This was followed in 1586 by the launching of a failed effort to establish a colony, to be known as Virginia, at Roanoke (in present-day North Carolina). The "Lost Colony," as Roanoke is known, was redeemed in 1607, when the Virginia Colony was successfully established at Jamestown. In 1620, the Plymouth Plantation was founded to the north (i.e., at a point roughly equidistant between Virginia and Newfoundland) and merged with the subsequently established Massachusetts Colony in 1691. An area around Plymouth still known as "New England" had also been filled in by establishment

of the Province of Maine in 1622, the New Hampshire Colony in 1623, the Connecticut Colony in 1633, the Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (present-day Rhode Island) in 1636. South of New England, the "Maryland Province" was founded in 1634, New York and New Jersey Provinces were ceded to England by the Dutch in 1664, and Pennsylvania Province was established in 1684 (with Delaware Colony splitting off in 1704). South of Virginia, the Province of Georgia was founded in 1670, the colonies of North and South Carolina in 1710 (Steele 1994, pp. 37–57, 80–109).

At that point, English colonies encumbered the entire Atlantic coast of the present-day USA north of Spain's colony of La Florida (established c.1559–65), as well as a small portion of that in what is now Canada. All of "New France" was then ceded to England under the 1763 Treaty of Paris, thus expanding its purported dominion to encompass virtually all of North America east of the Mississippi River (ibid., pp. 207–225). In turn, the British were compelled to relinquish all claims to territorial sovereignty south of Canada in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, by which it recognized US independence, while Canada remains part of the British Commonwealth.

England's other New World holdings were relatively small, consisting primarily of the Caribbean islands of Barbados (1625), Nevis (1628), Monserrat (1623), the Bahamas (1648), Anguilla (1650), Antigua and Barbuda (1666), Jamaica and the Caymans (1670), and sometimes St. Kitts and St. Lucia (beginning in 1623). Anguilla, Monserrat, and the Caymans remain British "overseas territories" at present. A small enclave on Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast, declared an English protectorate in 1655, was maintained for over a century, but Britain's only actual colony in Central America, "British Honduras," was not established until 1862. It gained independence as Belize in 1973 but remains part of the British Commonwealth (as do Antigua, Barbuda, Nevis, St Kitts, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and several other Caribbean islands) (Fieldhouse 1967, pp. 57–83).

Apart from Greenland, which it claimed in 1721, the Danish New World empire consisted only of the Caribbean island colonies of

St. Thomas (established in 1671), St. Jan (now St. John, established in 1718), and St. Croix (purchased from France in 1733). The "Danish West Indies," as they were known, were sold to the USA in 1917 and are now referred to as the "US Virgin Islands." Dutch imperial adventure in the Americas began with construction of Fort Nassau (present-day Albany, New York) in 1614, followed by the more ambitious trading center of New Amsterdam (present-day New York City) in 1625. In 1655, "New Netherland," as the colony was called, expanded by absorbing the colony of New Sweden to the south, but was ceded to the British in 1667 under the Treaty of Breda. In exchange, Britain ceded to the Dutch its settlements in Surinam (now Suriname) which, together with the Caribbean islands of St. Maarten, Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire, became the Netherlands' longest-held New World possessions (Fieldhouse 1967, pp. 50–51, 343; Steele 1994, pp. 110–130).

Even the Courinans tentatively established the colony of "New Courland" on Tobago in 1654 but were shoved aside by the Dutch 5 years later. They regained control of the island in 1660 but abandoned it in 1666. Unsuccessful attempts were made in 1668 and 1683 to renew planting operations before the Duchy finally gave up altogether, selling its interests to the Netherlands in 1689 (Jekabson-Lemanis 2000). Without the abrupt and massive infusion of wealth in the form of precious metals, to say nothing of profits accruing from the trades in African slaves and plantation-produced commodities, Europe would have lacked anything near the wherewithal necessary to rapidly refine certain of the technologies it had acquired from Islam, armaments in particular, thereby gaining an ever increasing advantage in its drive to dominate Others. These "tools of empire," as Daniel Headrick termed them (1981), would prove decisive, affording the West a capacity to dictate terms to the world that remains unrelinquished.

Of similar importance were the crops acquired in the Americas. Regularization and exponential expansion of the transatlantic trade as well as that with India and China, exploration of the vast reaches of the Pacific, meeting the burgeoning

requirements attending maintenance of a seaborne military presence across far-flung regions, all were heavily contingent upon the West's ability to provision ever larger numbers of ships with such nonperishable staples as dried "navy" (haricot) beans. Still more significantly, the tremendous improvement in Western agricultural productivity following the introduction of New World crops enabled an unrivalled population growth in Europe. Estimated as having been about 73 million in 1492, the number of Europeans nearly tripled over the next three centuries, reaching roughly 200 million by 1800, while Africa's remained constant at about 100 million and that of America's indigenous peoples essentially collapsed, plummeting from 100–125 million to around 6 million (Rodney 1982, p. 97; Dobyns 1966; Lord 1997, p. 25).

By 1850, the population of Europe had reached 250 million, and thereafter it *really* began to grow, mushrooming to 468 million by the second decade of the twentieth century. From 1850 to 1900, an average of 400,000 people per year were exported from Europe to an array of settler colonies/states. By 1914, the number had reached a million per year, and a third of the planetary population was of European descent. The extent of the West's increasingly gross overpopulation made the exporting of "surplus" people something of a priority from the beginning of the nineteenth century onward, allowing it to undertake a process of "replenishing the earth" through the establishment of settler colonies/states in which indigenous peoples were/are literally replaced on what had been their lands, having either been exterminated entirely or their numbers reduced to the point that the remnants were soon buried beneath an overburden of Europeans (Belich 2009, pp. 79–87). This, it should be noted, was precisely the model adapted by the Nazis for application in Eastern Europe under their notorious Generalplan Ost in 1941. Therein, a third of the resident Slavic population was to be rapidly exterminated, a third driven from the vast area intended for repopulation by Germans, and the remaining third reduced to serving as slave laborers (Mazower 2008, pp. 204–211, 281–286).

In the US portion of North America alone, there were more than 4 million white settlers and 1 million black slaves by 1800, figures that rose to approximately 67 million and 9 million, respectively, during the nineteenth century. After 1865, blacks in the USA were, at least in a formal sense, no longer slaves. Although it is a common misconception that the huge mass of settlers arriving in the USA during the nineteenth century were mainly English and (Scotch-)Irish, the largest number were German (Luebke 1990, pp. 161–163, 173–174). The indigenous population of the Canadian portion of North America has been estimated to have been as high as 3.5 million when European colonization commenced. According to a comprehensive government tally undertaken in 1875, there were fewer than 160,000 surviving, and by 1900, the number had dropped to 101,000. The settler population, on the other hand, had reached about 5 million in 1800 (Dobyns 1966, p. 414; Price 1950, p. 197).

British colonization of Zimbabwe began in 1890, with the construction of Fort Salisbury (present-day Harare), and white settlers began to arrive shortly thereafter. By 1927, a point at which the number of settlers had yet to reach 44,000 in the still new colony (named "Rhodesia," after Cecil Rhodes, the British imperialist who had chartered its establishment) and despite there being upwards of 3 million indigenous Africans within its boundaries, the implementation of a white supremacist order was complete. In 1965, the settler minority (by then 308,000, as opposed to nearly 8 million blacks) unilaterally declared independence from Britain, thereby, after constitutionalizing white rule in 1968, converting Rhodesia into a fully fledged settler-state. The indigenous population, which still numbered perhaps 1 million at the beginning of the century, had been reduced to less than a quarter of that by 1890 (Townsend 1941, pp. 73, 79–81; Martin and Johnson 1981, pp. 35–72).

Much the same pattern prevailed in other Anglophone dominions, notably Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Hawaii, as well as Ibero-American settler-states such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. Variations on the theme,

wherein settler rule was meant to be permanent despite the white population remaining much smaller than that of the subjugated, were also evident in French colonial Algeria, the Dutch/British Cape Colony (South Africa), and British Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and elsewhere. The first British (penal) colony in Australia, New South Wales, was established in 1788, at which time the indigenous population was about 750,000. By 1900, the "aborigines" had been reduced to 93,000 (with one native people, the Palawas ["Tasmanians"], having been completely exterminated) while the population of mostly British settlers had grown from fewer than 6,000 to over six million (Rowley 1970, p. 385; Price 1950, p. 197; Elder 1998). The Maori population of Aotearoa (New Zealand) numbered some 200,000 in 1800, at which time there were 50 Europeans in the islands (which were proclaimed a British colony in 1840). By 1900, there were fewer than 40,000 surviving Maoris, while the settler population had reached nearly 1 million (Price 1950, p. 197; Price 1963, p. 95).

The Kanaka Maoli (indigenous Hawaiian) population is estimated to have been as large as 800,000 when the British first visited the islands in 1778. By 1898, the year it was annexed as a US "territory" (i.e., colony), the number of indigenous people had been reduced to fewer than 40,000, while the population of non-Kanaka Maoli had risen to over 150,000. The latter figure is somewhat deceptive; however, as the "settlers" were predominantly Japanese and Chinese imported during the nineteenth century by a small group of white missionaries cum planters, mostly to provide cheap labor on their sugar plantations. In 1893, the planters, backed by the US military, overthrew Hawai'i's constitutional monarchy and established the Republic of Hawaii, with themselves in charge. Following annexation, the white population surged to more than 100,000 by 1940, while that of the Kanaka Maoli, including those of mixed ancestry, rebounded to about 64,000 (Stannard 1989; Kent 1983, pp. 39–40, 60).

Argentina holds the dubious distinction of being second only to the USA in terms of the number of European settlers (6.6 million) imported during the nineteenth century. Concomitantly, its indigenous population, conservatively estimated at 300,000 at the onset of Western colonization, had been reduced by something in the neighborhood of 90 per cent by 1900 (data in this regard is quite sketchy) (Trinchero 2006; IWGIA 2011). Uruguay is unique in that it is the only country on the continental landmass(es) of the Americas to claim that, apart from a small number of *mestizos* (mixed-bloods), its indigenous population had been completely eradicated by 1800. It is thus populated *entirely* by European settlers (Albarenga 2017).

By 1800, the nonindigenous population of Brazil consisted of about 1.5 million mostly Portuguese European settlers and a slightly greater number of black slaves. By mid-century, a further 2 million or more slaves had been imported from the sub-Sahara, while the white settler population had grown to roughly 3 million. As the slave trade became increasingly problematic thereafter, the emphasis shifted and more than 2 million additional European settlers, predominantly Italian, were imported during the last quarter of the century (a further 2 million had been imported by 1930). The remarkably diverse indigenous population, reflecting at least 188 distinct languages, had been reduced by an estimated 95 per cent (i.e., from 6 million or more at the beginning of Portuguese colonization to roughly 250,000 in 1900). In the process, three-quarters of the societies known to have existed in the sixteenth century, including major agricultural complexes along the coast, had been rendered extinct (Stannard 1992, pp. 91–94; Davis 1977).

France colonized Algeria in 1830. Nearly a million Pieds-Noirs had "permanently" settled in Algeria by 1960, about 800,000 of whom returned to France after the colony's hard-won independence 2 years later. While they never outnumbered the Muslim population (about 85 per cent of which was/is Arab and the rest indigenous Berbers ("Moors"), which numbered nearly 23 million in 1960, the settlers' subjugation of the "natives" was sufficiently harsh and degrading as to be characterized as genocidal by

Sartre (1968). Algeria's official estimate is that some 1.5 million Algerians were killed by French troops and Pieds-Noir militias during the colony's war of national liberation (1956–1962), while millions more had perished due to French-imposed deprivations during the preceding 125 years of colonial rule (Naylor 2000, p. 274).

What became South Africa began as the Dutch Cape Colony in 1652. The colony was ceded to Britain in 1814, and the Boers (Dutch settlers) promptly moved northward to form both the Orange Free State and the Republic of Transvaal (known as the Boer Republics). Following the second Boer War (1899–1902), Britain merged the three entities as the Union of South Africa in 1910 and granted its independence in 1931. The Republic of South Africa, as it was renamed in 1961, was from the outset specifically constituted as a settler state. While whites (Dutch and English combined) never exceeded 13 per cent of the country's population, they maintained absolute control over its power, property, and wealth under the legally codified system of racial hierarchy known as apartheid. The indigenous (black) population, which comprised three-quarters of South Africa's 40.6 million people in 1990, was excluded from government, consigned to 13 per cent of the land (divided into "Bantustans," or "Black Homelands," as they were also called), and generally subjected to conditions of abject poverty until 1994, at which point a sustained and mounting black insurgency led to the end of de jure white rule (Fredrickson 1981).

The Spoils of Empire

Without quinine, of course, the prevalence of malaria throughout the tropics would have precluded the full flowering of European overseas colonialism in its "classic" form, not only in much of Latin America but also South and South-East Asia, and sub-Saharan African. Indeed, demand for the drug, obtainable only from the bark of the Andean cinchona tree, led to the literal theft of seeds and cuttings from Peru and Bolivia during the early-to-mid-nineteenth century and establishment of what would become well over a hundred cinchona plantations on Java and other islands in the "Dutch East Indies" (now Indonesia), and scores of others in the British colonies of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and India. The Dutch naturalist Justus Hasskarl smuggled cinchona seeds out of Péru in 1852, sprouted them, and established the first plantation on Java 2 years later. Plantations there were by far the most successful, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Java accounted for 90 per cent of the international trade in cinchona bark, while the quinine factory at Bandung was the world's largest producer of the drug itself (Hobhouse 1986, pp. 16–33; Headrick 1981, pp. 71–73; Headrick 1988, pp. 234–235).

The British continued limited production in northern India, but most planters in Ceylon had converted to growing tea by 1900. The French also attempted to establish cinchona plantations in several locales, and to some extent succeeded in Indochina (as they called the area encompassing what are now Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), but never managed to produce enough quinine to meet the needs of their personnel in the colony itself. Not only did the wholesale conversion of substantial areas to the cultivation of cinchona seriously undermine the traditional economies of peoples indigenous to such areas (especially Java's Baweans and Baduis) but the increasing availability of quinine made possible a considerable acceleration in the establishment of plantations devoted to raising other cash crops, thereby obliterating such economies altogether (Cavanagh 1983).

European colonization of the African interior, with all its devastating impact on the proliferation of societies indigenous to the region, already badly damaged as many of them were by the ravages of the slave trade, was never viable until quinine became widely available during the late 1860s (Headrick 1981, pp. 62–64, 73). This set off the "Scramble for Africa," culminating in the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 (also known as the "Congo Conference"), during which Europe's imperial powers essentially divided the continent among themselves, partitioning its entire land-mass into colonial compartments (the "Belgian Congo," "French Equatorial Africa," "British

Kenya," "Spanish Morocco," "Portuguese Angola," "German South-West Africa," and so on) with consequences that continue to plague Africa's Fourth-World nations to this day (Pakenham 1991).

Following Charles Goodyear's supposed discovery of "vulcanization" in 1839 (actually, the Quechuas of Brazil and Peru were already employing the process long before the Spanish invasion), and especially after John Dunlop unveiled the pneumatic tire in 1888, rubber became another major factor. Although variants can be found in landofia vine native to equatorial Africa, as well as the Assam (Ficus) tree in South-East Asia, the term "rubber" refers to the sap of the Hevea tree, found only in Amazonia prior to 1550 (less preferred cousins, the Manihot and the Castilloa, are native to Central America and southern Mexico). "Vulcanization" is simply the mixing of sulfur into heated rubber to increase its elasticity and durability while eliminating its natural surface stickiness and substantially reducing its odor. Having thus processed the material, which they called *caoutchouc*, the Quechuas (as was recorded by the Spanish during the 1530s) used it not only in making the earlier mentioned medical devices, but rain-proof ponchos, shoe soles, balls and other children's toys, tie-down ropes akin to what are now called bungee cords, and a number of other items (Wolf 1982, pp. 325–326; Weatherford 1988, pp. 47–48; Headrick 1988, pp. 243–244).

As the rise in demand shifted from dramatic to explosive with the advent of motorized vehicles during the final decade of the nineteenth century, little overstatement is embodied in the observation that Belgium's King Leopold transformed his vast "Congo Free State" into a gigantic rubber plantation. Prior to 1890, rubber production was an exclusively Brazilian enterprise, entirely dependent upon the tapping of wild trees. Total output at the time of Goodyear's "invention" was less than 30 tons per year. By 1900, Brazil's output of "wild rubber" had reached 26,000 tons, and would peak at 35,000 tons in 1920, but demand vastly outstripped its capacity. In the latter year, world production totaled slightly over 310,000 tons, nine-tenths of it accruing from newly established rubber plantations in Central Africa and South-East Asia (Wolf 1982, pp. 329–330; Headrick 1988, pp. 244–248).

It is often contended (incorrectly) that rubber production in the Congo accrued from the native landofia vine rather than the Brazilian Hevea tree. While output was initially dependent upon landofia (both wild and cultivated), that was so only until much higher yielding, but newly planted, Heveas reached the age at which they could be tapped (typically 6–7 years). By 1906, more than 600,000 acres had been converted into Hevea plantations and the proportion of total rubber product attributable to landofia was both greatly diminished and rapidly declining. It is also worth mentioning that by the same year some 250,000 cocoa plants were under cultivation, in expectation of establishing cocoa plantations in the near future. Other cash crops originating in the New World which were also being grown in appreciable quantities, again with an eye toward expansion, included vanilla trees, cinchona trees, and coca. Entire peoples in the colony's interior were conscripted as forced laborers under conditions rivaling those imposed by the Spanish and Portuguese upon indigenous Americans more than three centuries earlier, and with entirely comparable results: by 1903, the colony's black population, which had numbered over 20 million in 1885, had fallen to barely 8.5 million (a near two-thirds reduction in less than 20 years) (Hochschild 1998, pp. 226–233, 278).

In Malaya (now Malaysia), while the effects were far less lethal, the indigenous Malays and Senois were completely dislocated and in a sense lost beneath an avalanche of laborers imported from China and India (they comprised nearly 70 per cent of the colony's population by 1910) as the British converted two-thirds of the peninsula's cultivated land into rubber plantations. By 1920, Malaya's output totaled half of world rubber production, a proportion diminished over the next several years by the rapidly expanding share claimed by the Dutch East Indies, where some 875,000 acres (mostly on Java and the east coast of Sumatra) had been used to establish even larger-scale plantations (Townsend 1941, pp. 455, 524–525; Fieldhouse 1967,

pp. 331–354; Headrick 1988, pp. 245–246). The French, too, cashed in on the boom, although somewhat belatedly, converting upwards of 500,000 acres into rubber plantations in the colony it called Indochina during the 1920s. More specifically, the plantations were/are concentrated in southern Annam and Cochinchina, the most southerly portion of Vietnam. Output reached 60,000 tons in 1939, but by then this came to only 5 per cent of global production (Headrick 1988, pp. 247–248).

Other New World crops placed in cultivation, plantation style, in the West's African and Asian colonies included tobacco and vanilla. Although the vanilla tree is native to Central America, and is still grown there for commercial purposes, the former French colony of Madagascar now provides 80 per cent of the world's supply. Between vanilla plantations and logging operations, the island's biologically unique habitat has been in large part devastated, with predictable effects on the indigenous Malagasy peoples (Allen 2019, pp. 32–49, 171–201; Steavenson 2019). By 1550, commercial production had begun earnest, both in Brazil and on a number of Caribbean islands. While neither was indispensable to Europe's expansion in the manner of cinchona, or to the evolution of its technology in the manner of Brazilian rubber trees, both were/are quite profitable and thus figure not insignificantly in the ever-increasing concentration of global wealth in Western hands.

More important, however, was the proliferation of the plantation mode of agriculture itself, pioneered with sugarcane in the Caribbean and Brazil during the sixteenth century, adapted to other crops in various American locales during the seventeenth century, and thereafter imposed by the colonizers in every quarter of the world. While the first sugar plantation was established by the Portuguese on Madeira, in 1452, and in 1484 Spain had established a second in the Canaries, the idea did not really take hold until the first harvest on Española in 1501. The Portuguese began planting it along the coast of Brazil in 1516, by 1530, the Spanish had opened at least a dozen sugar plantations on Cuba and the other Caribbean islands, and a century later, the English

had commenced the process of felling all the timber on Barbados en route to converting the entire island into a sprawling cane-growing/slave-importing/sugar refining enterprise which, by 1790, served as the hub of what had become "easily the most important trading activity of the British nation" (Ponting 2000, pp. 481–482; Hobhouse 1986, pp. 51–52, 59–60, 70).

Roughly half of the indigenous Africans imported to the New World were consumed on Brazilian and Caribbean sugar plantations at the rate of 1 black life for every 2 tons of sugar produced, while the rapidly rising demand for iron gears to equip the hundreds of cane-milling operations springing up in both areas was among the more significant stimulators of the Industrial Revolution in its early phase (Hobhouse 1986, p. 62; Benitez-Rojo 1996, p. 93). By the early nineteenth century, moreover, the immense and steadily growing popularity of sugar among Europeans and their settler diasporas generated a commerce so lucrative that had prompted a global proliferation of cane plantations, most notably those of the Dutch on Java, the Spanish in the Philippines, and Anglo-American settlers in Louisiana and Hawai'i (Knight 2007, pp. 32–42; Quirino 1974, pp. 21–34; Follett 2005, pp. 19–25; Kent 1993, pp. 35–41).

Overall, the profitability of plantation agriculture was such that it was adapted to the cultivation of a range of crops other than sugar and, as mentioned earlier, cinchona, Hevea, and vanilla for consumption by European/Euro-settler markets. These included tobacco, indigo, hemp, jute, copra, sisal, oil palm, coconuts cacao, coffee, opium poppies, and, of course, the British East India Company's "prize commodity," tea (Hartemink 2005, pp. 11–12; Robins 2006, p. 3; Rappaport 2017). Cotton grown on slave plantations was by far the most important commodity produced in the USA during the first half of the nineteenth century, dominating its niche in the global trade, the profits accounting for the country's greatest concentrations of wealth and providing the motor force behind its economic/industrial development (Bruchey 1967; Baptist 2014, pp. 245–246, 317–323, 350). Before the end of the century, US corporations like United

Fruit (now Chiquita Brands) were establishing vast banana plantations in Central America, while, in Hawai'i, "king sugar" was on the verge being rivaled by corporate pineapple plantations (Chapman 2007; Kent 1983, pp. 78–90).

There was certainly land available to accommodate such undertakings since, by 1914, Europe's imperial powers, together with their settler state offshoots, enjoyed colonial dominion over fully 80 per cent of the earth's landmass. From the colonies, both external and internal, came not only the array of agricultural products necessary to maintain the privileged "quality of life" attributed to the superiority of "Western civilization," but the minerals crucial to the military/technological advantages accruing from its burgeoning industrial order. Along appreciable quantities of cobalt and uranium, nearly 10 per cent of the world's copper was extracted from Katanga, in the Belgian Congo, for instance, while the British garnered over a third of the tin from Malaya (Townsend 1941, pp. 15–23; Ansprenger 1989, p. 305; Headrick 1988, pp. 265–276).

It was truly, as Samir Amin has put it, "accumulation on a world scale," the material culmination of "Eurocentrism" in its most crystalline form (Amin 1974, 1989). The colonizers' "modern world system" was functioning with ever-mounting efficiency to accomplish certain of its intended purposes, i.e., enlistment of comprador élites to assist in stripping the colonized populace of their resources, rendering them so destitute that they would "voluntarily" submit to a de facto mode of slavery, laboring under unspeakably grueling conditions in the mines and fields in return for little more than bare subsistence. Those denied or who refused such "employment" were left to try and eke out an existence from whatever tiny plots might be left to them, become social criminals of various types, or starve (Wallerstein 2011; Sartre 2001 [1956]; Rodney 1982, pp. 147–173; Galeano 1973, pp. 225, 258–273; Stolnitz 1965).

The situation was most acute for the myriad peoples indigenous to the "shatter zones" created by the slave trade in Africa and the Americas (Wolf 1982, p. 231; White 1991, p. 14; Ethridge 2006, p. 208). Having been not only decimated but subjected to the most extreme forms sociocultural disruption over a period of centuries, their traditional economies obliterated, they were especially vulnerable to "proletarianization" or, in the alternative, being merged into a "detribalized" mass of "peasantry" (Arrighi 1970; Littlefield and Knack 1996). When they were not being actively disparaged as retrograde "tribalists," the relative few still able to reject colonization en toto, retaining their traditional identities and ways of life, were targeted for "assistance" in "overcoming" the "plight" of "primitivism" or simply ignored (Anghie 2005, pp. 163–178).

This was in fact a matter of law. While the right of self-determination was taken up by the League of Nations in 1918, affirmed in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, and enshrined as bedrock principle of international law in the 1945 UN Charter, First Nations were omitted at every step (Fisch 2015, pp. 192–197). It was not until 1957 that they were first mentioned in an international instrument, the International Labor Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention (No. 107). Therein, rather than self-determination, they were accorded a "right" to be absorbed into the "broader societies" of whichever states or colonial entities had usurped their territories (Anaya 2004 [1996], pp. 54–56). In effect, they were entitled only to accept the process of "dark vanishings" to which they were existentially opposed (Brantlinger 2003).

"Decolonization"

While a half-millennium had been required to construct Western Europe's global order, its dismantlement took only three decades. In 1945, the European powers emerged from the cataclysm of World War II so weakened that none of them was able to forestall the rapid dissolution of its colonial empire. Sometimes by negotiation, often through bitterly fought wars of national liberation, all but a handful of The Continent's overseas "possessions" had attained formal independence by 1975 (Smith 1975; Ansprenger 1989, pp. 208–289).

Concomitantly, the end of hostilities consummated a shift in "the nomos of the earth" from the

Old World to the New that had been underway for some time, with North America's predominating settler state, the USA, assuming the imperial mantle of defining the rules by which the system of imperial exploitation would be reorganized (Schmitt 2003 [1950], pp. 227–232, 290–292). Here, the key ingredients were the US-initiated formation of the United Nations in October 1945, in large part to effect "the progressive codification of international law," and the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, also engineered by the USA, creating both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the entity soon to be known as the World Bank (Bennis 1996, pp. 1–13; Anghie 2005, pp. 191–195, 263–268).

Through these mechanisms, Western Europe's overseas colonialism was rapidly supplanted by what Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah (1965) termed "neo-colonialism," which he described as "the last stage of imperialism." At issue was the reality that where decolonization was negotiated, the newly "independent" colonies were legally bound either to honor concessions granted by their former colonizers to private corporations or "pay compensation according to internationally determined standards" (Anghie 2005, p. 214). Honoring the concessions left First World transnational corporations in control of Third World economies and extracting more wealth than ever, while "postcolonial" governments opting to buy them out and thus burdened with the resulting "debts," were in desperate need of financing to underwrite their own enterprises (Barnet and Müller 1974, pp. 123–147; Escobar 1995, pp. 21–54).

Both the IMF and World Bank were ready and willing to arrange loans from First World lenders, always inadequate but carrying onerous terms and always contingent upon recipients' effectuation of policies and expenditure of funds in ways ensuring an "investment climate" appealing to First World transnationals: "favorable" royalty and tax rates, low wages and barriers to the unionization of workers, establishment of an effective state security apparatus, "austerity" with respect to health care and social welfare programs, building of infrastructure desired by foreign corporations rather than local populations, and so on (Chaliand 1976, pp. 24–32; Prashad 2007, pp. 69–71, 225–238; Budhoo 1994).

The upshot has been the routine accrual of "super profits" to First World banks and corporations, perpetual impoverishment of Third World populations, and a mushrooming mountain of debt incurred by the "postcolonies" (Barnet and Müller 1974, pp. 152–162; Bello 1994; Mbembe 2001).

> In 1970…the sixty [Third World countries] classified as 'low income' by the World Bank owed commercial lenders and international agencies $25 billion. Three decades later, [their] debt…had ballooned to $523 billion…. These are not 'poor' countries. Over the course of these three decades, the sixty states paid $550 billion in principle and interest on loans worth $540 billion. Yet they still owe $523 billion. The alchemy of international usury binds the darker nations. (Prashad 2007, p. 276)

To be sure, a number of postcolonies sought to reject the neocolonial script. They were, however, invariably subjected to a continuum of coercive tactics ranging from pointed denials of access to both credit and markets to internal subversion culminating in "regime change" (Olson 1979; Ray et al. 1979, pp. 1–46; Prados 1986, pp. 91–107). Noncompliant leaders like Patrice Lumumba were assassinated, and in some cases, most prominently that of Indonesia in 1965, the repression suffered by those opposing First World agendas assumed the form of mass murder on a genocidal scale (De Witte 2001; Bevins 2020, pp. 137–158).

While the preferred posture of most postcolonial governments was initially that of "nonalignment" (neutrality) in the Cold War contest between the First and Second World countries, the treatment accorded them by the former prompted many to seek assistance from and in some instances openly side with the latter (Prashad 2007, pp. 46–50; Rakove 2014). The inclination was strongly reinforced by the necessity of liberating the French colonies of Indochina and Algeria as well as Portugal's African colonies through armed struggle, and, following the success of the Cuban revolution in 1959, the rapid proliferation of unabashedly Marxist guerrilla formations throughout the neocolonies of Latin America. For a while, it was argued that the 1966 Tricontinental Conference marked "the coming of a

New International" capable of eradicating imperialism once and for all (Windrow 1998; Horne 1977; McQueen 1999; Abbott and Rodrigues 1998; Gross 1995; Prashad 2007, pp. 105–115; Gerassi 1971, pp. 74–76).

The reef upon which this hopeful scenario soon foundered was the extent to which it hinged upon the willingness and ability of the Soviet Union and China, the principle Second World powers, to provide sustained and substantial material support to Third World countries. The 1961 "Sino-Soviet split" had left them deeply at odds, however, the Soviets pursuing a policy of "peaceful co-existence" with the First World, China counterposing what it framed as an uncompromisingly confrontational stance (Lüthi 2008; Zhai 2000, p. 21). Accordingly, rather than working in concert to facilitate and bolster "revolution in the Third World," each sought to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the other by bringing post-colonial countries into its own politico-economic orbit (Chaliand 1976, pp. 161–165).

To that end, the USSR and China each proffered military, technical, and economic assistance, albeit always conditionally and, with very few exceptions, never in amounts sufficient to meet the needs of recipients (Goldman 1967; Larkin 1973; Friedman 2010, pp. 257–263). Certainly, having scuppered the hallowed principle of "socialist unity," neither was able on its own to muster the wherewithal to seriously challenge the economic clout wielded by the US-centered "Free World" (as the First World preferred to style itself). The Soviet interest, moreover, seems to have been largely confluent with that of the USA in preventing any serious disturbance of the geopolitical status quo by insurgent Third Worlders (Wallerstein 2017 [1995], pp. 47–49).

China's hopes of selectively dispensing its far more limited resources to destabilize the prevailing order were dashed by the US-backed Indonesian bloodbath in 1965 (Garver 2016, pp. 218–224; Bevins 2020, pp. 124–128, 165–167). Nonetheless, the USA having decided for a variety of reasons to use Vietnam as a showcase for its presumed ability to militarily crush not only guerrilla insurgencies in colonial/neocolonial settings but the "people's armies" of even

the strongest Third World countries as well, China had little alternative during the second half of the 1960s but to incur the tremendous expense of supplying the Vietnamese with weaponry, munitions, and other war materials (Giap 1961; Jian 1995, p. 379; Zhai 2000, p. 135).

Cross-References

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
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Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America

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Synonyms

Agriculture; Indigenous peoples; Latin America; Mining and minerals; Natural resources; Neo-extractivism

Definition/Description

This chapter examines the hundreds of years of dispossession of indigenous peoples by the imperialist powers of the West. The system of imperial plunder has continued into the present era as foreign imperialist powers and multinational corporations extract agricultural commodities and natural resources with the support of comprador classes. This examination of Bolivia under Evo Morales reveals a modest effort to in part reverse the pillage of the first populations in Latin America.

One year after the conclusion of US president George W. Bush's second term in office, James Cameron's 2009 film *Avatar* struck a chord with viewers from both the developing and developed worlds. From the first indigenous president of Bolivia (Aymara coca-grower and labour organiser Evo Morales) to Western scholars of social

science and environmental studies (Hage 2011; Taylor 2010), the story of the confrontation between the indigenous Na'vi on the richly vegetated planet of Pandora and their imperialist invaders in search of mineral resources proved widely resonant. However, as Ecuadorian human rights activist Luis Saavedra has recently explained, rarely has this confrontation between indigenous and non-indigenous people ended as heroically as depicted in *Avatar* (Saavedra 2013). The romanticised encounter between the technologically advanced but militaristic 'West' and the materially impoverished but spiritually attuned 'Rest' is a fiction long lamented by indigenous communities (DeLoria 1998) and brutally belied by the recent intensification of violent conflict over natural resource extraction in Latin America that has led to growing accusations of imperialism on the part of primarily Canadian, Chinese, and American transnationals (Bebbington 2012; Gordon and Webber 2008; Sassen 2010).

According to the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America (OMCAL), worldwide mineral exploration expenditures have increased tenfold since the 1990s. During the period from 1990–2001, four of the top ten destinations for mining investment in the world were in Latin America, and in the 2000s alone mineral investments quadrupled (Bebbington 2012; Bridge 2004;). Vast swathes of national land in countries such as Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Guatemala have been opened to transnational mining companies through lenient tax codes and promises of windfall profits and maximum royalties, leaving some countries with more than 50% of their land in the hands of foreign mining companies (Veltmeyer 2013, p. 89). One of the many downsides of this opening-up is that there are more than 195 mining conflicts currently active in Latin America. Driven in part by a surge in global demand for electronics, and having already depleted many of the world's most profitable reserves of good quality ore, major industry players such as BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Goldcorp, Barrick Gold, and Newmont are moving into ever more remote locations where reserves are harder to extract, less concentrated, closer to drainage basins, at significantly greater geological depths, and surrounded by more fragile ecological systems (Canel et al. 2010).

A disproportionate number of these territories are also home to indigenous communities, particularly in places like Peru and Chile which, in 2012 alone, registered 34 and 33 such conflicts respectively. One of the most brutal of these conflicts took place on 5 June 2009 in the Amazonian town of Bagua in Peru, when a coalition of indigenous and non-indigenous activists blockaded a highway to register their anger over not being consulted about an oil concession in their territory, a situation that is increasingly common following the Garcia Government's decision to privatise much of the countryside in 2008 (Bebbington 2009). By the end of the day, ten local protestors and 23 policemen were dead and scores of others were injured. While not all such conflicts have ended as tragically as that in Bagua, indigenous, human rights, and environmental activists have faced growing criminalisation and other forms of state and corporate-sponsored violence over the past few years everywhere from Guatemala's goldfields to Chile's copper mines. According to the Foro de los Pueblos Indigenas Mineria, Cambio Climatico, y Buen Vivir (Forum of Indigenous Mining Communities, Climate Change, and 'Good Living'), convened in Lima in 2010, the exploitation of mineral resources in Latin America has reached unprecedented levels. Similarly, the London-based human rights group Minority Rights Group International issued a 2012 report warning of the intensification of the resource scramble which is affecting nearly all the world's 370 million indigenous people. Nowhere is this happening more than in Latin America, home to 40 million indigenous peoples (Walker 2012). Borrowing from Karl Marx's description of the late 17th- and early eighteenth-century processes of 'primitive accumulation' that transformed English subsistence farmers into wageworkers, growing numbers of scholars have followed David Harvey in conceptualising this latest round of corporate 'land grabbing' as a form of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2005; Gordon and Webber 2007; White et al. 2012). Unlike the 'accumulation by exploitation' that provided the impetus for much of the

mid-twentieth-century labour organisation and subsequent nationalisation of the mining industry in countries such as Bolivia and Argentina, 'accumulation by dispossession' refers to the wave of water and land privatisations begun in the 1990s that has forced growing numbers of indigenous communities from their ancestral territories. It is in large part as a result of these 'land grabs' that many scholars have returned to the category of imperialism which, just two decades ago, had begun to seem outmoded.

For the first time in more than two decades, in the early 2000s, imperialism made a dramatic comeback across the social sciences as political liberals (Ferguson 2008) and neo-Marxists (Hardt and Negri 2000; Harvey 2005) alike penned tracts about the re-emergence of US-led empire. While the former approved of this ostensibly benign successor to the British Empire, recognising a new role for the US as a 'global moral leader', the latter remained sharply critical, worrying about the increasingly de-territorialised conglomeration of multinational companies that seemed poised to extract additional value, labour, and primary commodities from peripheral territories in the service of what Leslie Sklair has called 'the transnational capitalist class' (Sklair 2002). Following the 1990s when the ecumenical buzzword 'globalization' had largely eclipsed the class-based terminology of imperialism that had characterised the work of critical scholars of development in the post-Second World War period, the precise meanings, dynamics, agents, and social processes of twenty-first-century imperialism came to be widely debated in Latin America and beyond (Grandin 2006; Robinson 2006).

The concept of imperialism has a long and varied history in Latin America, waxing and waning in relation to cycles of anti-colonial struggle and subsequent military and economic 're-colonisation'. Following the term's regular invocation by the nineteenth-century independence fighters in their struggle against both Spanish and US colonialism (from Simón Bolívar in the 1820s to José Martí in the 1890s), imperialism began to be used systematically by scholars to analyse the region's uneven integration into the

global economy in the first decades of the twentieth century. On the heels of the 1898 Spanish-American War, which inaugurated the only period in American history when the US obtained overseas territories, this was a period of intense monopoly power on the part of US corporations and a period when 'imperialism' was on the lips of both supporters and opponents alike. While supporters such as Theodore Roosevelt enthusiastically celebrated the fact that 'expansion has been the law of our national growth', less sanguine observers sought to expose how the colonial extensions of the former European empires had laid the groundwork for the continued subjugation of the now formally independent countries of Latin America (Johnson 2004, p. 29). No longer subject to Spanish rule, these countries found themselves 'protected' by the paternalistic Monroe Doctrine (1823) which prohibited further European involvement in the region. At the same time, however, they also found themselves subject to increasingly direct economic and military intervention on the part of the US. Primarily because this was a period characterised by a substantial expansion of US corporate involvement in export-led development in Latin America on the part of firms such as Standard Oil, historians have dubbed the period between 1850 and 1930 the 'second conquest' of Latin America (Grandin 2006; Topik and Wells 1998). As private corporations in the extractive sectors moved more and more aggressively into Latin America, it was small-scale agriculturalists, itinerant miners, and indigenous communities who bore the brunt of this expansionism. Despite high levels of foreign investment and company promises to deal with the 'social question' by 'modernising' living facilities, inculcating North American work ethics, and providing relatively high salaries, the extractive enclaves overseen by US companies often left the countries of the region either economically stagnant or considerably worse off. This was particularly evident in increased alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and other forms of familial dislocation occasioned by the development of extractive enclaves (Klubock 1998). Between 1822 and 1964, US troops were sent to the region

36 times to quell nationalist uprisings, many of them in opposition to the expropriations of US companies (Banerjee 2009, p. 7).

The beginning of the Cold War ushered in what promised to be a significantly less imperialistic era in US–Latin American relations. As President Harry Truman famously announced in his 1949 inaugural address:

> Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labour go into these developments. The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing. (quoted in Grandin 2006, p. 161)

Despite these promising words (echoes of which we find repeated in contemporary discourses of 'corporate social responsibility' in the mining sector), by the 1950s, scholars of Latin America were already beginning to identify the new forms of US-led imperialism they saw unfolding around them. In the two decades between 1950 and 1970, as decolonisation struggles swept across Africa and Asia and nationalist leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement rose to power on explicitly anti-imperialist platforms, development economists opposed to the modernisation paradigm began to write about 'informal imperialism' or 'the imperialism of free trade' (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). Inspired by Rosa Luxemburg's argument that imperialism was the 'direct result of the expansion of the capitalist mode of production into precapitalist modes of production', and that periodic crises of capitalist accumulation structurally necessitated the ongoing colonisation of precapitalist spaces and modes of life, dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and world-systems theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1974) argued that the 'core' industrialised capitalist countries had systematically under developed the countries of the 'periphery' (Topik and Wells 1998, p. 23). In perpetual search of cheaper raw materials, lower labour costs, and better terms of trade, North American companies not only failed to bring the promised 'modernisation' to the countries in which they operated (these theorists argue), but they were, in fact, responsible for their deepening poverty and instability. As well as facilitating a net loss of profits to the northern economies, they sharply exacerbated tensions between the city and the countryside, rural and urban, indigenous and non-indigenous. Despite the fact that most of the countries with sizeable indigenous populations (including Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru) were able to maintain some rights to communal landholding throughout this period (largely owing to variously aggressive efforts at agrarian land reform), indigenous labourers remained subject to ethnic stereotypes that resulted in their double exploitation at the hands of both foreigners and national elites. Frequently construed by export-oriented *criollo* elites as subhuman, insufficiently modern, the bearers of 'traditional values', or otherwise culturally backward, they were repeatedly condemned for holding the region back from a fully fledged capitalist take-off.

And many of these dynamics began to worsen in the 1980s. This was a period described by development economists as the 'Lost Decade' and characterised by two central and overlapping processes of what could justifiably be called US imperialism: the first economic and the second military. First, as a more or less direct result of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) instituted by the major global lending organisations headquartered in Washington, DC (the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank), economic growth slowed and even declined across the region. Between 1980 and 2000, GDP rose 6% per person (in comparison to 75% per person during the period 1960–80; Johnson 2004). The international financial institutions (IFIs) lent millions of dollars to countries throughout the region on the condition that they 'adjust' their macro-economic policies to facilitate reduced or eliminated trade barriers, diminished capital controls, the privatisation of national industries, and the reduction of state subsidies for agriculture and health. With the controversial and still-debated exception of Chile, the effects of these policies were largely disastrous for

indigenous communities, which saw their livelihoods decimated as local markets became flooded with heavily subsidised agricultural imports and extractive companies, lured by the promise of near 100% repatriation of profits, moved in to rapidly take control of formerly nationalised industries (Gill 2000; Gledhill 2004. The second and equally lethal process was the intensification of long-standing US-backed wars against 'communist insurgents' in which hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples lost their lives in places like Guatemala and El Salvador. Committed to stemming the red tide of communism and protecting the freedom of free trade throughout the hemisphere, the US actively funded military regimes such as the right-wing Contras in Nicaragua and the Ríos Montt dictatorship in Guatemala, often more or less explicitly in the service of the interests of big business such as United Fruit (Nelson 1999). By the early years of the 1990s, 75,000 people had lost their lives in El Salvador and more than 200,000 people, mostly Mayan, were dead as a result of the 'scorched earth' campaigns in Guatemala.

Despite the fact that indigenous communities have long mobilised in opposition to the demands of both colonial capitalism and US imperialism, it was not until the 1990s that indigenous people organising for political, economic, and cultural rights gained significant ground throughout the region (Yashar 1998). The beginning of the 1990s witnessed an unprecedented mobilisation of indigenous peoples in opposition to both the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and free-trade agreements such as the 'Free Trade Agreement of the Americas' that aimed to both further liberalise their economies and abolish critical protections for communal landholding (such as Article 27 of the Mexican constitution). The immediate symbolic impetus for this mobilisation was the 1992 quincentenary of the arrival of the Spanish colonisers. During that year, indigenous peoples rose up in the streets in country after country demanding an end not only to the macroeconomic policies of the World Bank and the IMF since the 1980s, but to what they called the 500 years of 'genocidal subjugation' since the arrival of Christopher Columbus. From the

Spaniards to the Americans to their own national elites at whose hands they had long suffered the racism, classism, and cultural discrimination of 'internal colonialism', their dispossession, they argued, had been one of unbroken imperialist expropriation. As Eduardo Galeano and others have shown, it was the original incapacity of the Spaniards to understand the use-value of gold (rather than simply its exchange-value) that led to the first pillage of the continent, with enough metal extracted by the end of the seventeenth century to build a bridge across the Atlantic (Galeano 1971). From the infamous sixteenth-century Bolivian mines at Potosí to the privatisations of the mining sector in the 1990s, 'extractive imperialism' has been at the centre of nearly every stage of this expropriation (Veltmeyer 2013). While in the early part of the twentieth century it was primarily surplus labour that was extracted from mine workers (both indigenous and non-indigenous), by the late 1990s it was the natural resources themselves that were of greatest interest as mining jobs became increasingly reserved for highly skilled foreign labourers (Petras and Veltmeyer 2014). As Saskia Sassen has observed: 'One brutal way of putting [this] is to say that the natural resources of . . . good parts of Latin America count more than the people on those lands count as consumers and as workers' (Sassen 2010, p. 26). In response to this increasingly direct invasion of their territories, and emboldened by the passage of key international legislative frameworks such as ILO Convention 169, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Inter-American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, indigenous federations in places such as Ecuador and Bolivia began to powerfully rise up throughout the 1990s, successfully ousting a number of the national administrations that had most egregiously permitted the foreign expropriation of their 'national patrimony' (Becker 2011; Sawyer 2004).

The result of much of this mobilisation throughout the region has been the extension of cultural, educational, and linguistic rights to indigenous minorities or what Charles Hale has called, 'neoliberal multiculturalism' (Hale 2002).

However, this extension of cultural rights has frequently been accompanied by an active undermining of substantive political and economic rights. In particular, governments have refused to acknowledge the rights of indigenous self-determination, including the right not only to 'free, prior, and informed *consultation*' (FPIC) about mining activities in their territories, but 'free, prior, and informed *consent*' over whether those activities go forward in the first place. In most countries, despite some constitutional recognition of 'pluri-nationality' or 'pluri-culturality', governments have been reluctant to surrender their rights to decision making about critical national resources, often maintaining direct control over sub-soil resources. Private companies in the mining sector are increasingly involved in corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts that they hope will offset the more environmentally damaging of their practices (and indeed, a small consulting industry has cropped up around CSR in the mining industry). At the same time, however, many of these same companies have also been actively involved in the writing of highly investor-friendly country mining codes that undermine indigenous rights (most vividly in countries such as Colombia) and advocating free-trade agreements that both break up communal landholdings and mitigate against indigenous decision making about extraction (Canel et al. 2010; Hogenboom 2012; Li 2011).

It was at least in large part as a result of these contradictions that the mid-2000s saw a substantial shift in power across the region toward what many scholars call 'post-neoliberal governance' (MacDonald and Ruckert 2009), as radical-populist regimes rose to power in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela on explicitly anti-imperialist platforms, and more moderate governments like Brazil and Argentina nationalised key industries that had formerly been privatised. As states took control of their natural resources (nationalising the oil industry in Venezuela, assuming ownership over natural gas in Bolivia, and insisting on significant windfall taxes and royalties from mining companies in Ecuador), the prices of primary commodities soared and with them the capacity of these 'twenty-first-century socialist' administrations to invest in social and material infrastructure, robust programmes of redistribution, and an expanded public sector. In addition, in both Bolivia and Ecuador, constitutions were approved that explicitly rejected the models of limitless capitalist growth assumed by most neoliberal economists and that advocated instead indigenously inspired conceptions of living more harmoniously with a more diverse set of human and non-human others. Despite these gestures toward more economically just and ecocentric post-neo-liberal polities, however, the governments of the region have continued to be accused of what Eduardo Gudynas calls, 'a new extractivism' (Gudynas 2010).

From Morales's radical-left MAS (Movement For Socialism) party in Bolivia to the more centrist administration of Ollanta Humala in Peru, national governments that have enacted some of the most far-reaching post-neo-liberal policy transformations are at the same time engaging even more aggressively than their neo-liberal predecessors in extractive projects over which indigenous communities have little control. The result has been sharply intensifying confrontations between indigenous communities and the nation states of which they form a part. Indigenous federations like the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) in Ecuador and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) in Bolivia have turned against their own governments which, in response, have moved to criminalise their protest. Historically, most of the movements against mining have been movements against 'accumulation by exploitation' led by ethnically mixed trade unions which have agitated for higher wages, better working conditions, and an increased voice for workers in decision making (Bebbington et al. 2007). While such mobilisations continue around mines like La Escondida in Chile, the battlefields have increasingly shifted to the more remote territories of indigenous nationalities, a move that has been accompanied by a marked resurgence in cultural and racial discrimination. As former president of Peru, Alan García argued in 2009: 'Enough is enough. These peoples are not monarchy, they

are not first-class citizens. Who are 400,000 natives to tell 28 million Peruvians that you have no right to come here? This is a grave error, and whoever thinks this way wants to lead us to irrationality and a retrograde primitivism!' (Bebbington 2009, p. 13). In the years since, indigenous peoples have increasingly been turned against by both the leftist administrations they helped to elect and by large numbers of the nonindigenous poor who have been the main beneficiaries of the new redistributive programmes. They increasingly find themselves in a paradoxical position: symbolically exalted in national constitutions for their alternative development models while at the same time constructed as 'infantile environmentalists', enemies of national sovereignty, or allies of foreign NGOs when they try to actually put those models into practice. To the 'socialists of the 21st century' who are in power in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, these alliances testify to a new kind of imperialism in which indigenous communities are deeply implicated: not the imperialism of free trade, but the imperialism of NGO-led conservationist environmentalism.

Despite, then, considerable continuities in the dynamics, methods, and agents of 'extractivist imperialism' over the preceding centuries, there are also considerable changes that will inevitably demand more nuanced theorisation in the years to come. At least four of these changes are worth mentioning by way of a conclusion. First, with the decline of US global hegemony, the dominant players in the mining industry in Latin America are no longer overwhelmingly from the US, but increasingly Chinese, Canadian, and, though to a significantly lesser degree, Australian. After more than a century of US-orchestrated economic and military imperialism throughout the region, the beginning of what many are already calling 'the Asian Century' is heralding a shift toward significantly less binary models of extractive influence that are just as frequently South–South as they are North–South. Second, as Robinson has similarly pointed out in his critique of models of imperialism that remain too closely tied to outdated twentieth-century models of a nation-state-based global geopolitical order, not only are these regional blocs shifting, but the nature of the

relationships between state, capital, and non-state (NGO) groups is undergoing dramatic change. New alliances between state-owned extractive industries, foreign investors, and both conservationist and business-oriented NGOs make it increasingly difficult to talk about unified or coherent sets of political actors. Third, with the shift to the left that began in the early 2000s, discourses of imperialism are being wielded by Marxist-inspired presidents in ways that depart significantly from the strongly class-based and US-focused anti-imperialist projects characteristic of the Latin American left throughout most of the twentieth century. As part of these shifts, in many South American countries, environmentalist strands of indigenous thought and practice have been reenvisioned as the products of imperialist intervention on the part of foreign NGOs, the result of which has been a deepening of splits within indigenous movements between those who support and those who oppose extractivist development. And finally, the iconic image of anti-imperialist opposition to foreign control over extraction is arguably no longer the mestizo male mineworker or trade unionist of the mid-twentieth century, but the indigenous woman. Although women have historically played central roles in Latin American social mobilisations throughout the twentieth century (e.g. the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina), over the past decade indigenous women like the Defensoras de la Pachamama in Ecuador have played increasingly visible roles as opponents of mining projects, often paying the price in death threats from extractive companies or time spent in jail. After more than 500 years of foreign-dominated extractivism (colonial, republican, nationalist, neo-liberal, and now post-neo-liberal), it is these women who have emerged as the central voices of resistance to twenty-first-century 'accumulation by dispossession'. While the sanitised encounters depicted in *Avatar* may little resemble the actual confrontations ongoing throughout the hemisphere, it is clear that the struggles over natural resource extraction in Latin America will only intensify in the years to come, and that the imperialism to which they bear witness urgently demands more nuanced theorisation.

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Indigenous Struggles

Indonesia

Industrialisation and Imperialism

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Definition

There are many cases where imperialism has hindered industrialisation in peripheral countries while directing their development toward benefiting core countries. This has been seen across the world, even though imperial power has been exercised to varying degrees and under a wide range of circumstances.

There are many cases where imperialism has hindered industrialisation in peripheral countries while directing their development toward benefiting core countries. This has been seen across the world, even though imperial power has been exercised to varying degrees and under a wide range of circumstances. India, for example, was formally a part of the British Empire, while other countries, such as Egypt, were subjected to more indirect forms of imperial influence. Industrialisation, or the lack thereof, under imperial rule has been examined by recent research employing empirical evidence, quantitative analyses, and theoretical advances. Bringing this work together allows for a more complete analysis of the complex interactions between industrialisation and imperialism. Imperial influences have often stunted local industrialisation in the periphery, while promoting industry only to the extent that it benefited the base of imperial power. These trends are seen across countries, whether they were subjected to direct or indirect imperial rule.

Marxist scholars have identified three main phases through which the relationship between the countries at the centre and the periphery of the global economy has passed (Sutcliffe 1972). These phases are: (1) when wealth was extracted from peripheral countries while manufactured goods were exported there from the centre; (2) when monopoly capitalism developed and the contradictions of capitalism compelled capital to flow from the centre to the periphery; and (3) the post-colonial phase when the growth of peripheral countries was repressed in order to secure the lead of the advanced capitalist countries (172). Much of the dependency theory and world-systems research in the 1970s focused on this third category (e.g. see Amin 1977; Wallerstein 1979). Yet in order to appreciate the developments that took place in recent history, it is useful to have an understanding of the ways that imperialism and industrialisation were connected in the more distant past. Recent research has tended to move

away from the broader scope of older theories of imperialism. Instead, more narrowly focused empirical studies highlight the complexity of the history of industrialisation and the relationship of this process to the influences of imperial power.

Recent research on long-run economic growth is also relevant for an analysis of the connections between industrialisation and imperialism. Much of this literature stems from the work of Acemoglu et al. (2001), who focus on how institutions shape economic growth. These researchers find that the institutions established by colonial-era European settlers overseas shaped countries' long-run economic growth trajectories. These authors also note, however, that institutions can be improved to promote economic growth, as in 1960s South Korea or the Meiji Restoration in Japan.

In a subsequent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2002) take urbanisation in 1500 as a proxy measure of economic prosperity, and find a negative correlation between economic prosperity in 1500 and 1995. Again, institutions are the main focus of their analysis. They argue that strong private property laws promote investment and economic growth. Other researchers, such as Ferguson (2003), make similar arguments about the importance of the protection of private property for shaping a country's development. Part of the analysis in Acemoglu et al. (2002) looks at the connections between industrialisation and economic growth. It finds that institutions that were conducive to industrialisation (e.g. through securing property rights) 'played a central role in the long-run development of the former colonies' (p. 1236). This vein of the literature offers examples of how theories connecting institutions to industrialisation, and to economic growth more broadly, can be studied empirically. Yet this empirical economics research suffers from the lack of a more nuanced historical analysis of how imperialism affected industrialisation. To this end, it is useful to look beyond the economics literature and to incorporate the insights of other disciplines into a broad-based analysis of industrialisation and imperialism.

Brenner (2006) asks 'What is, and what is not, imperialism?' For the purpose of exploring the connections between industrialisation and imperialism, a starting point is his identification of 'the classical capitalist imperialism of the years 1884–1945, which witnessed states' construction of ever larger imperial units that aimed to restrict the economic advantages made possible by formal and informal empires to their own national capitals' (87). The history of industrialisation, however, antedates Brenner's timeframe, and a comprehensive analysis of imperialism and industrialisation would extend at least as far back as the late eighteenth century, when Britain's industrial revolution began. Also, industrialisation (and de-industrialisation) remains an important issue in the post-colonial era. Still, the focus of this analysis is the late eighteenth century through the early twentieth century, when the major developments in the industrialisation of peripheral countries were shaped by the influence of imperial powers.

The distinction between direct and indirect imperial rule offers an analytical framework through which to view the development, or lack thereof, of industries in peripheral countries. Austin (2003) highlights how different terms have been used in the literature to describe the various degrees of an imperial power's involvement in peripheral countries. Gallagher and Robinson (1953) use the terms 'formal' and 'informal' imperialism, while dependency theorists make the distinction between 'colonial' and 'neo-colonial' influences. Austin offers a general definition of imperialism as 'foreign control of assets and decisions, including where such control exists in fact but not in law' (2003: 145). Robinson (1972), while employing a similar definition of imperialism, develops it further to account for local agency and the non-European foundations of European imperialism. It is with this range of degrees of imperial influence in mind that the terms 'direct' and 'indirect' imperialism are employed herein to discuss a range of cases in which imperial power was imposed in varying levels of directness. However, this analysis demonstrates that it is not essential to make these distinctions when analysing industrialisation under imperial influence. Whether under direct or indirect imperial rule, peripheral countries had their industrial development shaped by imperial power.

I

Previous researchers, such as Gallagher and Robinson, have made the distinction between various degrees of directness of imperial rule in order to highlight the observation that imperial power was exercised in areas beyond the formal confines of a given empire. In the case of the British Empire, '[f]or purposes of economic analysis it would clearly be unreal to define imperial history exclusively as the history of those colonies coloured red on the map' (Gallagher and Robinson 1953: 1). This is an important insight, and it is useful to adopt this broader conception of imperialism when analysing how industrialisation did or did not develop in countries under a range of types of imperial influence. It is significant to note that imperialism had similar effects on industrialisation in peripheral countries even as the directness with which imperial power was imposed varied by country. Thus, the distinctions that appear throughout the literature on imperialism between direct and indirect power are useful in this analysis insofar as they allow the framework to extend beyond countries that were formally under imperial rule. Yet the distinction between levels of directness of imperial rule does not lead to a conclusion that industrialisation was impacted differently depending on the degree of imperial power that was exercised. On the contrary, industrialisation was shaped by imperial power, whether that power was imposed directly or indirectly.

While distinguishing between direct and indirect imperial rule, it is useful to examine the causal mechanisms through which imperialism affected industrialisation in peripheral countries. Channels of influence through which core countries impacted the industrialisation of peripheral countries include the drain of surplus from the periphery, trade policy imposed on the periphery, and support for agriculture at the expense of industry in the periphery. India and Egypt serve as case studies of how these processes hindered the industrialisation of peripheral countries under imperial rule.

India offers an example of industrialisation in a peripheral country under direct imperial rule. British economic interests and imperial ambitions in India can be dated from 1600, when the East India Company was given a Royal Charter (Riddick 2006). The Company moved from having more narrow economic goals to actively administering large regions of India after Robert Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757 (Riddick 2006). How the British presence in India affected industrialisation has been a subject of much debate. One vein of the literature argues that it resulted in de-industrialisation as local manufacturing was undermined by the new division of labour (e.g. see Bagchi 1976; Harnetty 1991; Perlin 1983). Similarly, others argue that India's industrialisation was undercut by a general de-skilling of local labour under imperial influence (Headrick 1988). But recent research calls aspects of these claims into question. Roy (2009), for example, finds that for the Indian iron industry, nineteenth-century knowledge transfers were adopted successfully by technically skilled Indian blacksmiths, while other aspects of the iron production process, such as iron-smelting, were laden with high-cost activities that hampered the benefits that knowledge transfers potentially offered in India. Similarly, Roy (2000) argues that traditional Indian industry was not completely destroyed by British imperialism, but rather that it adapted and some sectors were able to compete with modern industry. Specifically, Roy argues that 'other than textiles, there are almost no examples of significant competition [from imported goods] and technological obsolescence' (1444). Roy is thus critical of nationalist adherents of the de-industrialisation school of thought who, he argues, extrapolate from the example of the textile industry to the economy at large in their attempt to make imperial rule appear to have been a universal disaster for the Indian economy.

Still, the textile industry makes for an instructive study of how imperialism negatively impacted Indian industry. Patnaik identifies this process as taking place mainly during the 'second phase' of the colonial destruction of the pre-capitalist Indian economy (1972: 212). The first wave of this destruction was a 'drain of wealth' process led by the East India Company, but after the Napoleonic wars the destruction occurred as imported textiles out-competed urban handloom production and rural weaving industries. In the

face of such widespread economic disruption, Patnaik argues that '[i]t is hardly surprising in these conditions that Indian industrial capital did not grow' (213). He goes on to build a case for attributing the lack of industrial development in India to the power that the British had in that country. This is tied to the directness of British rule in India, which was powerful enough to hamper industrialisation through 'discriminatory interventionism' in favour of British capital, along with British control of the banks. This made for significant constraints binding the growth of Indian industrial capital (213). Despite these factors restricting India's industrialisation, it is important to emphasise that British rule in India did not result in the total obliteration of Indian industry. Roy's studies suggest a more nuanced interpretation of the effect that imperialism had on Indian industry. While some Indian industries, namely textiles, were indeed ruined by imperial trade policies, this should be interpreted as part of the broader 'commercialisation' of India's economy (Roy 2000).

There is no way to answer with certainty the question of how India would have industrialised had the British not had so much control over India's politics and economy. Eventually the British did act to encourage the development of Indian industry (as seen in the 1920s when protectionist policies were enacted in favour of infant industries) but these policies were implemented only because of pressure imposed by Indian nationalists (Austin 2003). However, the overall outcome of Britain's direct imperial control in India is associated with the underdevelopment of Indian industry. Pomeranz suggests that '[t]he British probably did not frustrate an industrial breakthrough [in India] that was otherwise highly likely … but nineteenth-century changes may have made such a breakthrough even more difficult than it would have been otherwise' (2000: 295). Still, Pomeranz blames British policies in India for the 'development of [Indian] underdevelopment' (ibid.). This process was influenced, at least in part, by the fact that 'each act of [industrial] investment became an isolated episode, no more than a shift of some processes in the manufacturing chain from

England to India' (Patnaik 1972: 213). The key aspect of this argument is based on British political control and the restriction of Indian capital. Patnaik (1972) argues that this deprived India of benefiting from the positive linkage effects that evolve in environments where capital is able to be invested freely. And since 'British firms in India were outposts of Britain' and there was no desire to invest in high levels of training for Indian workers, British-promoted industries in India did not yield the full potential of positive externalities for the Indian economy (Mukerjee 1972: 209). Taking a long-term view, up through the present day, leads to a characterisation of this process as being 'the transformation of traditional economies into modern underdeveloped ones' (Headrick 1988: 4).

India, as the 'Jewel in the Crown' of the British Empire, is a prominent example of how direct imperial rule shaped the path of industrialisation in a peripheral country. Areas subject to indirect imperial rule during the last quarter of the past millennium also had their industrialisation impacted by imperial powers. Egypt, for example, was occupied by the British, who proceeded to shape industrial policy there. China offers another example of a country where imperial powers influenced political and economic developments even less directly. Several European countries, including the British in Hong Kong and the Portuguese in Macau, had coastal outposts in China, but only directly exercised their power inland during active military campaigns. Imperialism in these cases influenced the development trajectory that local industries followed, even though the imperial influence was less direct and lasted for a shorter period of time than in the Indian case.

The British presence in India lasted for nearly three-and-a-half centuries, but the British only entered Egypt in the late nineteenth century. This is not to say that there was no British presence in Egypt before then; European capital was so heavily invested in Egypt that when the Egyptian state became bankrupt and unstable in the early 1880s, the British felt compelled to invade it in order to secure their interests there (Davis 1983; Moon 1972). To safeguard their interests in Egypt,

the British invaded in 1882 and began four decades of formal occupation. They soon found themselves in a position where they had to stay in Egypt to stabilise the country through managing its debts, and to prevent the Ottomans and French from regaining more influence there (Cain and Hopkins 2002; Davis 1983). To work toward paying down Egypt's debt, the British promoted the widespread cultivation of cotton for export. A contemporary observer noted that British occupation 'transformed the entire Nile Basin into a gigantic cotton plantation' (Salama Musa, quoted in Davis 1983: 45). This led to far-reaching changes in Egypt, which influenced the direction of its industrial development.

While the British occupation of Egypt was directed toward getting Egypt to pay down its debt, it also made Egypt a more attractive destination for foreign investment (Davis 1983). Most of this foreign investment went into agriculture (Beinin and Lockman 1987). This happened either directly or indirectly. 'Foreigners directly invested their capital in land companies, established mortgage and credit companies and banks, and gained control of the import and export trade. European banking houses also lent vast sums of money to the Egyptian state, which used most of it to develop the country's infrastructure – irrigation, railroads, port facilities – in order to facilitate the cultivation and export of cotton' (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 8–9). While these developments directed the course of early industrial development in Egypt, they did not result in widespread industrialisation, as they were narrowly focused on the particular goal of promoting the cultivation of cotton for export. As in India, however, there is more to this story than a simple case of the complete hindering of industrialisation in Egypt. As Beinin and Lockman note, '[d]espite the contention of some proponents of dependency theory . . . the subordination of Egypt's economy to the dictates of metropolitan capital did not permanently preclude industrial development' in Egypt (1987: 10). Egypt eventually developed a broader industrial base in the post-First World War era (Beinin and Lockman 1987; Radwan 1974).

The initial phase of industrial development in late nineteenth-century Egypt was based on cotton production. As the Egyptian countryside was positioned toward large-scale cotton cultivation for export, industrial development in Egypt also began to be shaped by these same forces. The development of large estates for producing cotton as a cash crop led to the increased mechanisation of agriculture and the promotion of industries related to preparing cotton for export (Alleaume 1999). Some of this development took the form of improved transportation and communications infrastructure (Davis 1983). Irrigation projects were another significant outcome of the increased cotton production, as pumping stations and irrigation and drainage networks had to be built to supply water for the cotton plantations. The Egyptian government and large landowners relied on British capital for these investments. By directing foreign capital toward developing the infrastructure needed for large-scale cotton production, these forces resulted in the Egyptian economy being centred on primary commodity production rather than manufacturing. Under the British occupation of Egypt it was argued that 'it was to the benefit of both Britain and Egypt that the former should engage in manufacturing while the latter confined itself to the production of agricultural raw materials' (Barbour 1972: 54). The development of this centre–periphery relationship suggests the stymying of Egyptian industrialisation under imperial rule. But, as mentioned above, this relationship does not describe the entire history of Egyptian industry, as local institutions such as Bank Misr promoted the broader industrialisation of Egypt after the First World War (Beinin and Lockman 1987; Davis 1983). Nonetheless, imperial power initially promoted industry in Egypt to serve British interests, and this shaped the structure of industry in Egypt.

Egypt offers an example of how industrialisation was directed along a path to underdevelopment under less-than-direct imperial rule. Egypt was free from direct European rule for the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, and then was under British occupation (without formally being part of the British Empire) from 1882 through the end of the First World War. Initially,

industry failed to develop in Egypt, unless it was for the processing of cotton for export. Limited industrial development did occur in Egypt, then, along with the state bureaucracy that was needed to co-ordinate irrigation projects and improved means of communication to facilitate the expansion of cotton production. These changes to the Egyptian economy and state laid the foundation for the industrialisation that did eventually take place in Egypt (Davis 1983). Davis, following this line of reasoning, argues that 'foreign capital [in Egypt] established the prerequisite for native industrialization by providing capital accumulation for the large landowners, facilitating national integration among sectors of the upper class, creating a stratum of skilled managerial personnel and familiarizing certain landowning families with the techniques of capitalist enterprise' (1983: 195). In Egypt, as in India, imperialism directed industrialisation along a certain path; one that served the interests of the imperial power overseeing the running of these economies. Yet imperial rule also led to the development of state bureaucracies and capitalistic local elites, which proved to be important for later industrialisation in these peripheral countries.

Whether a country was directly or indirectly subjected to imperial rule, industrial development was still shaped to suit imperial interests. British manufacturing and financial interests in India and Egypt offer examples of these processes. In his broader study of economic imperialism, Austin reaches the same general conclusion: 'At an imperial level, colonies were expected to specialize in the production of primary commodities, and their administrations rarely did much to promote manufacturing' (2003: 151). Yet there were cases where industrial development did occur under imperial rule, and not just in the settler colonies (for an analysis of the role that British capital played in the development of the US, Australian, and Canadian economies during the 'age of high imperialism', see Edelstein 1982).

To bring these exceptions from the trend of under-industrialisation into this analysis requires the study of other, non-British, imperial powers. North Vietnam, beginning in 1894, and the Dutch East Indies, starting in the 1930s, each saw limited industrialisation led by textile production. Protectionist policies were an important part of these developments, and it is also important to note that these industries were owned by outside powers: French in the Vietnamese case, and various European, Chinese, and US owners in the Dutch East Indies (Austin 2003). Industrialisation in Korea was also shaped by an imperial power, as Korea developed heavy industry while under Japanese rule (Kohli 1994). This process was shaped by the colonial institutions put in place by the Japanese in Korea, as well as by Japan's goal to develop Korea in order to support the military strength of the Japanese Empire. So industrialisation was not impossible to achieve for peripheral countries under imperial rule, but it only occurred in isolated cases and when it suited the interests of the imperial powers; whether to support imperial business owners in Vietnam and the Dutch East Indies, or to strengthen the military power of imperial Japan.

Imperialism affected industrialisation through myriad and complex channels. The main outcome of this relationship was the shaping of the industrialisation processes by imperial power. Whether in India, where the British presence influenced policies for centuries, or in Egypt, where the formal British occupation lasted for only four decades, industries were developed to serve the imperialists' interests. As under-developed countries today continue to suffer lower levels of economic performance than the former imperial powers, the impact of imperialism on industrialisation remains an important historical factor for understanding contemporary global inequality.

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Inequality

Inferiorization and Stigmatization of Gypsy/Roma

Influence

I

International Political Economy

International Trade

Internationalism

Interwar Period

Inuit

Invasion

Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Neoliberalism; Trade; Imperialism; Transnational capitalist class (TCC)

Definition

The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism included in free trade agreements extends into domestic policy spaces and disciplines governments into maintaining the most favorable conditions for capitalist accumulation. Serving as a form of continuity between past imperial relations and present articulations of subjugation and control, ISDS is both linked to, and dependent upon, imperial domination in earlier epochs. The uneven development of capitalism that resulted from imperialism has provided the incentives for the geographic dispersal of both production processes and financial flows in the neoliberal era. ISDS thus serves to protect the processes associated with the transnationalization of capital through internalized, universalized interventions.

Introduction

Bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements have proliferated in recent decades, becoming increasingly qualitatively encompassing in terms

of the issues over which they preside and challenging the sovereignty of governments at all levels. The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism included in such agreements, in particular, extends into domestic policy spaces and disciplines governments into maintaining the most favorable conditions for capitalist accumulation. Specifically, ISDS authorizes investors to bring disputes directly against governments for adopting new regulations with the potential to negatively impact future profitability or market share, including those designed to protect the environment and human health. Designating such measures as acts of indirect, or creeping, expropriation, investors are authorized to seek compensation for the deprivation of earnings that might have been realized in the absence of the measure. Circumventing national-based judicial system, disputes are arbitrated by private, ad hoc tribunals under the auspices of the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), drawing on principles of international commercial arbitration (see Van Harten 2005; Nichols 2018). In spite of significant public opposition around the world, efforts are currently underway to establish a permanent multilateral investment court, indicating that there is a sustained commitment to the maintenance, and even expansion, of the ISDS regime (European Commission 2015).

Included for the first time in a multilateral free-trade agreement in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and subsequently duplicated in numerous other bilateral and multilateral agreements, ISDS was rhetorically cloaked as an effort to protect against judicial impropriety. In reality, however, it has been advanced to universalize capitalist discipline on a global scale by locking in the most favorable conditions for capital wherever it might flow (Nichols 2016). ISDS is the culmination of a series of highly organized efforts by business lobby groups to redefine the boundaries of property rights by selectively advancing the most expansive definitions of property in the US juridical context, legal principles that remain unsettled in both domestic and international law (for a discussion of these efforts, see

Nichols 2016). Indeed, the development of the regime has depended on both national and transnational fractions of capital, as well as other social groups, seeing their interests as "tied to the mast of a neoliberal market-based system of global economic governance" (Gill 1997: 21–22).

Crucially, ISDS serves as a form of continuity between past imperial relations and present articulations of subjugation and control. It is both linked to, and dependent upon, imperial domination in earlier epochs since the uneven development of capitalism that resulted has provided the incentives for the geographic dispersal of both production processes and financial flows in the current era. As noted by David Harvey, "new rounds of primitive accumulation attack and erode social relations of production achieved through preceding rounds" (Harvey 2006b: 437). The current accumulation strategies have driven the demand for the ISDS regime for its ability to lock in state commitments in the face of popular contestation. While linked to past forms of imperialism, however, the argument proposed here is that current processes of subordination associated with ISDS correspond to a qualitatively different world order, whereby a dominant transnational capitalist class (TCC) seeks to articulate its interests through both national and supranational apparatuses, namely, those related to universalizing the conditions for capitalist accumulation, globally.

Accumulation strategies linked to control over peripheral regions have been a consistent feature in the history of capitalist development. Indeed, the territorial expansion of political rule and, ultimately, the extension of capitalist relations to areas previously outside of the logic of the market have been essential to the system's required growth and expansion. While many varieties of empire have existed historically (for a discussion, see Harvey 2006b: 436–445; Maier 2006), the territorial extension of the British Empire represented the "first empire to be driven by capitalist logic," the accumulation strategy of which was to create value through competitive production and export capitalist relations to its colonial holdings (Wood 2003). In addition to territorially expanding its empire, however, Britain used its power to extend the conditions for capitalist

I

accumulation through informal forms of control, including sponsoring unequal trade and investment treaties that would ultimately replace direct colonialism by the late twentieth century (Panitch and Gindin 2005: 105). The use of these practices to extend control over peripheral areas would find continuity in the economic strategies advanced by the United States when it took on the role of reconstructing the system of global capitalism in the post-World War II era that saw the end of direct colonial rule. The strategies advanced by the United States would evolve in the economic restructuring undertaken as the capitalist system was again threatened by crisis in the 1970s. Moreover, these developments would usher in a new epoch in the history of capitalist development that would require new forms of control that, while sharing certain features in common with imperial domination, respond to the imperatives of a different world order in which a transnational, rather than a nationally based, capitalist class is dominant.

Informal Empire Under Pax Americana

Emerging from World War II as the preeminent political power in the capitalist sphere, the United States began reconstructing a new world order. Among other things, this included leading the creation of a variety of supranational institutions for the purpose of establishing the conditions conducive to spreading and securing capitalist relations. Processes of informal imperialism were undertaken during this period, taking shape in the military, economic, and cultural dominance of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world. These processes differed in substantive ways from imperialisms of the past, however, in that the United States, rather than seeking to secure national control over other territories for the purpose of excluding capital from other states, instead forged a strategy to expand capitalist relations for the general benefit of global capitalism.

The post-World War II period of decolonization produced dozens of newly independent nations with formal sovereignty. The power

relationships underpinning the imperial system, however, did not disappear with the formal end of colonialism. The economic development strategies advanced by leaders in the United States and other Western countries, in collaboration with elites in postcolonial states, locked these new states into a pattern of dependency, prioritizing large-scale infrastructure projects and Western technologies over local self-sufficiency and autonomy (McMichael 2008). The relationships forged during this period reflected a form of empire, characterized by Maier as a "particular form of state organization in which elites of differing ethnic or national units defer to and acquiesce in the political leadership of the dominant power" (Maier 2006: 33). Crucially, it involved institution building, the dissemination of cultural values, and was backed by the material political and economic power of the United States.

The most consequential institutional building during this period culminated in the 1944 establishment of the Bretton Woods system, which included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Providing the institutional foundation on which the economic development of postcolonial countries would be linked to the priorities of elites in the core capitalist countries, a primary goal of these efforts was to maintain access to resources and markets in the developing world. The overarching strategy guiding the institution building was to improve economic conditions to prevent the spread of communism and to stimulate the demand for goods and services originating in the First World. More specifically, the strategy involved supporting economic growth in postcolonial nations by providing loans and technical expertise to enable them to expand their primary exports and earn the foreign currency necessary for importing First World infrastructural technologies and commodities. Based on Keynesian macroeconomic principles that had become dominant following the Great Depression, the Bretton Woods Institutions moved funds to countries that needed purchasing power, thus "lubricating the world economy" (McMichael 2008: 59).

This model of development would begin to reverse the colonial division of labor created by the Europeans whereby colonies provided mostly primary goods to the metropole, with manufacturing moving to lower cost sites of production in the Global South. The urban bias of the project, which required importing highly subsidized food products from the First World to feed urban workers, destroyed agricultural self-sufficiency, as large agribusiness corporations drove farmers into bankruptcy. These processes would further tie the fate of newly sovereign postcolonial nations to that of the United States and former imperial powers, creating new economic dependencies. Crucially, these developments would also establish the foundation on which the next stage of (neoliberal) economic restructuring would build.

The development strategy led by the United States in this period corresponded to a world system and structure of accumulation characterized by a particular dominant mode of social relations of production, which placed historically specific requirements on the nation state (see Cox 1987: 397–398). Concretely, the liberal state of the previous epoch was transformed into a welfare state and called upon to resolve the contradictions that threatened the viability of capitalism by promoting nationally oriented economic growth through Keynesian economic principles, providing a basic social safety net for the working class and poor in order to quell social unrest. Internationally, the strategy involved incorporating newly sovereign states into a system that prioritized national development and, reflecting Keynesian ideals, stimulating demand for Western goods and services through policies designed to generate purchasing power in states and regions lacking it. Oftentimes, these policies sacrificed the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the "beneficiaries," leading to contradictions and, ultimately, crisis, which would surface as the postwar economic boom began to come to an end.

As the postwar economic boom began to wind down in the late 1960s and early 1970s, crisis once again threatened the stability of the capitalist system, and the gains made by labor following the Great Depression were interpreted as barriers for accumulation (Harvey 2006a). At this point, the United States again led efforts to resolve the crisis and reconstitute the conditions for accumulation, this time through neoliberal restructuring. Specifically, the restructuring included dismantling the barriers to flows of both financial and productive capital. Following the removal of such barriers, capitalists positioned to take advantage of the cost savings associated with reconfiguring supply chains across multiple jurisdictions began engaging in wage, regulatory, and fiscal arbitrage, an opportunity that existed because of the uneven development of capitalism generated by the earlier period of imperialism and the associated processes of primitive accumulation. The jurisdictional exit option introduced by liberalization enhanced the structural power of mobile capital as governments considering adopting new regulations or taxes faced the threat of capital flight. Reinforcing the shifting power dynamics of the social forces, working-class solidarity was eroded, as the geographical dispersal of the production process fragmented the working class in national contexts and exacerbated cleavages between workers in different jurisdictions.

In addition to extending production processes across jurisdictions, the 1971 abandonment of the dollar-gold standard, established as part of the Bretton Woods system, and its replacement with a system of floating currencies, provided the impetus for the creation of a variety of new lucrative financial products. Initially designed to enable firms to hedge against the risk of currency fluctuations and lock in rates through the purchase of derivatives, a growing market for speculative financial products provided another outlet for accumulation. As global financial institutions imposed requirements on countries forcing them to remove capital controls, as well as other regulations designed to stabilize currency and financial markets, opportunities were introduced to speculate against fluctuations in the value of currencies and other commodities (Stiglitz 2002). These developments similarly reflect vestiges of imperialism, as the processes that emerged from decolonization and Western-

led development created the conditions in which global financial institutions gained access to domestic policymaking in postcolonial countries, enabling dominance to be exercised while formal sovereignty was maintained.

The liberalization of finance also increased the structural power of capital, providing the backdrop against which large capitalist entities diversified their holdings. The integration of financial and industrial capital rendered largely obsolete the cleavages that historically existed between these two fractions of capital. The combination of the erosion of working-class solidarity and the increase in the structural power of transnational capital provided the conditions under which capitalist accumulation was reestablished, albeit in a qualitatively different world order than that which previously existed. Specifically, the shift from a capitalist system based on flows of capital and the trade of goods between discrete nation states to one characterized by a system of globalized financial flows and the transnationalization of production and supply chains redefined the relationship between capital and territoriality.

The transition to a new regime of accumulation, however, is dependent on the outcome of class struggle (Jessop 1990: 308–9). With the cleavages between traditional fractions of capital having become less salient given firms' diversification of activities across both sectors and states, transnational class alliances were constructed, disrupting the existing national-based class structures (Robinson 2004: 49–54). Given that the capitalist state is tasked with reproducing the conditions of production (Robinson 2004: 87), these developments transformed the state to correspond to the imperatives of the dominant social forces. The state thus ceased to serve as a national container for mediating class compromise in the ways that it did in the previous epoch. Instead, it came to function to advance the interests of an increasingly dominant transnational capitalist class (TCC), namely, universalizing the most advantageous conditions for global circuits of capital. ISDS would become one significant component of this global strategy.

The Transnational Capitalist Class and ISDS: Continuity Between Imperial Past and Present

Vigorous debates are waged over both the composition and even the existence of the TCC (see Robinson 2004). It is proposed here that the TCC consists of a class-conscious group of transnational elites, including leaders of transnational firms, as well as sympathetic political actors, scholars, and media executives, who share an interest in global, rather than national, circuits of capital. Advancing its interests through a network of national and supranational institutions that function as a "collective authority for a global ruling class," and institutionalize class relations between capital and labor, globally (Robinson 2004: 88; 2014), the TCC articulates power differently than the nationally rooted capitalist classes of earlier periods. Moreover, while imperialist states of the past exercised direct control over peripheral populations based on accumulation strategies corresponding to the interests of national-based capitalists locked into competition with rival capitalists in other jurisdictions, the leaders of capitalist states exercise new forms of political control that are driven by a logic that is not rooted in territorial-based competition. While the United States, for example, is heavily implicated in establishing the conditions for capitalist accumulation, globally, these processes should not simply be understood as a project driven by the state on behalf of capital rooted exclusively in its territory.

Indeed, the state is constituted by the existing social forces and mediates the interests and demands of the various groups, with policies reflecting the balance of power among them (Poulantzas 1976; Cox 1987; Jessop 1990). The neoliberal state thus reflects the increasing dominance of transnationally oriented capitalists relative to other social groups, including capitalists whose operations are limited to the domestic market. In this way, while the United States, having emerged politically dominant from the two World Wars, has served as the "point of condensation for pressures from dominant groups to resolve problems of global capitalism" (Robinson 2004: 138),

this exercise of power neither relies directly on traditional forms of domination, nor does it imply that such efforts are driven by a competitive interest in maximizing the state's power vis-à-vis other states.

Indeed, the logic of the accumulation strategy that has emerged is transnationally oriented and thus relies on the development of supranational institutions and practices to secure the conditions of its reproduction. With barriers to capital flows eroded, transnationally oriented capitalists sought to construct hegemony, as understood by Antonio Gramsci, during this period by articulating their specific interest as in the general interest (Gramsci 1971), namely, the notion that economic growth is sacrosanct and that foreign investment is necessary for achieving it. Moreover, as capitalism reached the limits of its geographical expansion, having been spread to nearly all corners of the globe, the maintenance of accumulation came to increasingly depend on subjecting spheres to the logic of the market that was not previously commodified in a process of intensive capitalist enlargement (Robinson 2004; Harvey 2006a; Panitch and Gindin 2005). From health care and education to the environment, living organisms, and even investment risk, the increasing commodification of social relations has, in a dialectical process, amounted to what David Harvey identified as accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2006a). Specifically, as a new range of social and political goods are subjected to the market, groups lacking sufficient economic resources are dispossessed of their access to them. These processes have, unsurprisingly, generated popular opposition sufficient, in some cases, to force the reversal of such policies. It is in light of this reality that the demand for a supranational legal and regulatory structure to instill neoliberal discipline, globally, began to be articulated by the increasingly dominant TCC.

While these processes of intensive capitalist enlargement are not rooted in territory in the same way as those associated with extensive, or geographic, enlargement, there is indeed a nexus between the two sets of processes. Previously, capitalist states, driven by competition and compelled to promote their industrial growth, undertook expansive strategies to procure raw materials and secure markets for surplus capital. The associated processes of political control, subjugation, and extraction established a particular colonial division of labor that would eventually be restructured into a decentered system of domination universalized to secure the most beneficial conditions for accumulation in the epoch to follow. The intensive enlargement of capitalist relations has thus relied upon the uneven development generated by the imperial practices of outward expansion and control of earlier periods. In this way, rather the North-South divisions of the global class structure disappearing, they still function as sites of opportunity for capitalist accumulation, albeit through different, and decentered, modes of domination.

In much the same way that the era of formal colonialism produced elites in local contexts that benefited from their relationship, however, subordinate, to the imperial power, well-positioned transnational elites in the Global South share a common interest in global circuits of capital, along with other transnationally oriented elites in other jurisdictions. Thus, to the extent that the conditions generated through the uneven development of capitalism in their "home" jurisdiction provide a basis for accumulation, their allegiance is to the shared agenda in its promotion.

As Russell, Noronha, and D'Cruz note in their study of the emergence of a TCC in the information technology sector in India, a distinction should be made between the current era and that of previous forms of imperialism. Noting that Indian capital is developing "not so much in competition with other national capitals but in conjunction with their evolution" (Russell et al. 2016: 115), such a view is in contrast to the classical theories of imperialism advanced by Lenin and Hobson, which conceived of rival national capitals, as well those associated with world-systems analyses (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1998). Instead, the conditions created by neoliberal restructuring should be understood as a historical rupture that witnessed the ascendance of the TCC, which emerged from historically specific processes of economic exploitation culminating in

the transnationalization of production and finance (Cox 1987: 355).

It is in this context that ISDS should be understood. While the effects of imperialist practices of past eras are imprinted in the modes of domination articulated in the current epoch, the regime serves the historically specific disciplinary requirements advanced by the TCC, namely, those associated with the dominant social relations of production characterized by the decentering of production and finance. As one component in a diverse, decentered network of institutional apparatuses, ISDS thus represents the establishment of a supranational legal regime that both sanctions and articulates the social relations of production at the global level (Hall 1978; Nichols 2018: 246). In this way, it exists as a coercive form of political authority, the strategy of which is to manage and protect the processes associated with the transnationalization of capital through internalized, universalized interventions (Robinson 2004: 139; Panitch and Gindin 2005: 104). Functioning similarly to modes of discipline that established and protected the dominant social relations of production in earlier epochs, it serves to institutionalize neoliberal ideology, globally, and insulate such policies from social contestation and political reversal. In this way, ISDS should not be understood as an extension, or deepening, of empire but rather as a coercive disciplining mechanism for an "imperial machine defined by a whole series of new characteristics, such as the unbounded terrain of its activities" (Hardt and Negri 2000).

Expanding Property Rights Under ISDS: Accumulation by Dispossession

In the wake of hundreds of disputes brought under ISDS challenging environmental and other regulations (see Public Citizen 2018) since the adoption of NAFTA and other agreements that include such provisions, debates have been reinvigorated over the appropriate distribution of costs between the public and the private associated with governmental measures. Efforts to shift the costs away from private actors at significant expense to the public have taken shape in concerted political maneuvers to expand the boundaries of property rights beyond the standards previously established by US domestic courts, which have served as the juridical foundation for the arbitration of ISDS disputes at the international level (Nichols 2018). Conservative legal theories advanced, first, by Wesley Hohfeld (1919) at the early part of the twentieth century and later by Joseph Sax (1964, 1971), Frank Michelman (1967), and Richard Epstein (1985) have provided the conceptual framework used to justify the broadening of property rights and ultimately investor rights, under ISDS. Viewing the government as in competition with owners of private property over public use, these legal scholars sought to replace the patchwork of juridical tests with a single test that would standardize and marketize the private-public allocation of costs generated by regulatory measures (Coase 1960; Michelman 1967).

These ideas have been used to legitimize the notion that property need not be of a physical nature but rather should be conceptualized as a set of rights corresponding to an abstract form of economic value, represented as a bundle of sticks, the diminution of which amounts to an act of expropriation if a given act impacts the value beyond some theoretical threshold (Nichols 2018). Business groups advocating for ISDS have echoed these legal principles and selectively cited US domestic court rulings that reflect the most expansive conceptualization of property rights and, ultimately, expropriation. The jurisprudence remains far from settled, however, and protracted political struggles have been unfolding around the definition of property rights as it pertains to findings of expropriation under ISDS.

Lying at the heart of the ongoing struggles around property rights in the context of ISDS is the interpretation of a few key provisions. First, ISDS provisions, such as those that exist in the NAFTA, provide a highly ambiguous definition of the term *investment*, the defining of which is necessary for determining what exactly is being protected under the regime – and what is not. For example, Article 1139 of the NAFTA seems to

conflate the term *investment* with *property*, thus providing an opening for arbitrators to find a violation of property rights in any case of state interference with the anticipated benefits associated with a broadly defined investment, including those of both a tangible and intangible nature. It must only be demonstrated that an investor has put assets at risk and that they are somehow bound up with the fortunes of another country for something to be categorized as a protected property right, or investment, under ISDS (Posner, Interview 2011). Included in this category would be anything from registering a patent to making a series of decisions with the expectation that a given set of risks would be rewarded, opening up the door to disputes beyond those associated with control over physical property to intangible, and even speculative, assets, such as portfolio investment, future earnings, and market share. Regulations are inherently adopted in response to new information or conditions and generally generate some cost to private property. For this reason, the authority to adopt such measures has historically been protected under the state's police powers. Enclosing the regulatory environment and treating any interference with it as a violation of property rights that requires public money be used to compensate private investors thus represent the socialization of the normal business risks required of investing.

Second, the interpretation of the term *expropriation* itself lies at the center of the debate over ISDS. Article 1110 of the NAFTA states:

> No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Part in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of an investment ('expropriation') except: a) for a public purpose; b) on a non-discriminatory basis; c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6. (North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 11, Article 1114)

The legal ambiguity of the term "expropriation" and "measures tantamount to nationalization or expropriation," combined with the fact that they remain mostly undefined in the treaty text, means their definitions have been evolving "in the absence of a doctrinal basis" (Holbein and Ranieri

2008: 25). The stakes over the interpretation of this controversial legal concept are high, as the question of when a measure should be categorized as a non-compensable government regulation, protected under the state's police powers, hinges on such a determination. In particular, the notion of an act being "tantamount to expropriation" remains one of the most controversial and ill-defined aspects of ISDS provisions, with debates unfolding over whether it implies a higher standard of treatment for investors that requires compensation for any act of the state that generates private costs beyond some point.

A third set of issues is related to the invocation of three related ISDS obligations alongside Article 1110 on expropriation, the combination of which has the effect of expanding investors' rights. Under NAFTA, for example, Articles 1102, 1103, and 1105 on National Treatment, Most Favored Nation, and Minimum Standard of Treatment, respectively, were adopted to prevent discrimination based on nationality and to ensure that some ambiguously defined minimum standard of treatment be afforded to foreign investors (NAFTA 1993). Significant debate has unfolded, however, over the question of whether governments are required under customary international law to provide a standard of protection that is higher than that which is guaranteed to domestic-based companies and investors (OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2004). Adding to these debates, more recent ISDS provisions have included a "fair and equitable treatment" (FET) standard, which has been interpreted by some to require an even higher level of protection than that which exists under customary international law, as it authorizes disputes to be brought if investors find that their "legitimate expectations" have been violated with respect to the future use of their investment (Brown 2013). A frequent litigation strategy has emerged to use the FET standard in conjunction with the expropriation provisions in order to challenge what investors view as overly intrusive government acts. These provisions thus serve as a locus of struggle around the expansion of property rights and, ultimately, investors' rights in host countries.

Finally, the circuitous logic of the ISDS provisions complicates the general exceptions included to ostensibly empower governments to regulate for the public good. For example, while NAFTA Article 1114(1) holds that provisions must not be construed in such a way that parties would be prevented from taking actions required to ensure investments are undertaken in an environmentally sensitive manner, it goes on to state that measures must otherwise be consistent with the chapter's requirements (North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 1993). The uncertainty over whether regulatory measures are protected under the state's police powers means that any measure has the potential to trigger the compensation requirement if other provisions are violated, including those related to investors' expectations, the degree of economic impact, and other such considerations.

Given the juridical ambiguity of ISDS requirements, the assessment of the appropriate balance between the private and public costs associated with regulatory measures has fallen to tribunal arbitrators, who are tasked with evaluating the merits of a given dispute in light of the evolving, and generally inconsistent, jurisprudence. Specifically, they are tasked with adjudicating the threshold between a legally permissible regulatory measure that merely represents a diminution of value and does not give rise to expropriation and an act that constitutes a property rights violation and, therefore, expropriation. In arbitrating such disputes, tribunals apply one of two legal litmus tests, or a combination of the two, to determine whether the state named in the dispute must provide compensation to the affected investors for the costs associated with the measure. One test focuses on the purpose of the law or regulatory measure, implicitly acknowledging the right of policymakers to regulate for the public good, as long as the measure is nondiscriminatory and not of a protectionist nature. A second test focuses exclusively on the economic effects of the measure on the dispute-bringing investor. To the extent that arbitrators strictly apply the second test, eschewing the first test's evaluation of the measure's purpose, the government named in the dispute will be required to compensate in nearly all cases if the investor is impacted beyond some theoretical threshold.

As Marx identified, property relations represent the legal expression of production relations (Marx 1894). Given that states use law to direct and sanction the relations of production and exploitation through the construction of rights around private property (Poulantzas 1978: 322, 324), juridical ideology lies at the heart of class struggle (Edelmann 1973: 22–23). The struggles around ISDS should thus be understood as class based, with the regime functioning to extend capitalist relations into new realms, subjecting social, environmental, and economic protections to the logic of the market, and dispossessing social groups of the ability to translate popular demands into public policy. Codifying and articulating the social relations of production at the supranational level, the regime thus locks in market discipline and establishes a "worldwide institutional grid that offers transnational capital multiple exit options within putatively suboptimal regulatory environments (Brenner et al. 2014: 129).

The pattern established by arbitrators in their choice of litmus tests is thus highly revealing for what it signals about the nature of the class struggle playing out around property rights in the context of the ISDS regime. An analysis of the NAFTA disputes arbitrated thus far (for a survey of disputes, see Nichols 2018) suggests that tribunal arbitrators have selectively drawn from a diverse range of opinions issued from US courts, overwhelmingly applying a litmus test that interprets expropriation as broadly as possible, thus eroding the distinction between non-compensable regulations and state acts defined as expropriation. Consequently, any governmental act adversely impacting private assets beyond some threshold is likely to be categorized as expropriation in the face of an ISDS dispute. Crucially, the evidence also suggests that, by conflating the terms *property* and *investment*, they are establishing new categories of intangible property that include highly speculative assets and market share.

These developments provide an example of the establishment of a "commodity fiction" (Polanyi 1957), a narrative that has been used to advance a

myth of the existence of a new set of property rights where none formerly existed. By treating the maintenance of a business-friendly regulatory environment as a legal obligation, ISDS confirms marketization as the sole means for apportioning the costs generated by a given measure between the public and the private. Moreover, it establishes a new set of property rights where they had not previously existed, delinking political, social, and economic resources from their "real historical existence or processes of production" (May 2000: 22–23).

Conclusion: ISDS and Contemporary Global Capitalism

The direction in which ISDS jurisprudence has been developing has dramatic consequences for what it reveals about the dominant accumulation strategy in the neoliberal era of global capitalism and the form of domination that has emerged to secure the conditions for its reproduction. As Stuart Hall noted, the particular articulation of the social relations of production depends on the current stage of capitalist accumulation (Hall 1978: 186–194). ISDS was developed in a historically specific context characterized by the culmination of neoliberal restructuring that had been pursued in response to the capitalist crisis of the 1970s and had led to the rapid decentralization and, ultimately, transnationalization of production and finance. It is in this context that the regime came to sanction and articulate the social relations of production at the supranational level in order to secure the most beneficial conditions for capital wherever it may flow. Universalizing neoliberal policies and insulating them from popular debate and decision-making, ISDS serves as the "political-juridical counterpart to disciplinary neoliberalism" (Gill and Cutler 2014: 5). It does so, specifically, by intensifying the scope of market discipline, subjecting the costs associated with the regulatory environment to the market and socializing them to the public.

Given the relationship between the juridical-political and economic spheres, these developments have strong implications for what they

signal about the relationship between the global and the national, particularly as it pertains to the commodification of social relations underpinning the expansion of capitalism (Gill 1998; Robinson 2004; Nichols 2018). Given the exhaustion of the geographic expansion of capitalism as an accumulation strategy following the incorporation of nearly every corner of the globe into the logic of capitalism, ISDS should be understood as a mechanism to secure and safeguard the conditions for intensive enlargement as the commodification of social life is deepened. Rather than intervene directly in formally sovereign jurisdictions as imperial powers did in the past, an increasingly dominant TCC has developed a coercive tool by way of ISDS that serves to universalize neoliberal ideology and redistribute power from other social groups, transnationally. As noted by Robinson, global capitalism "requires an apparatus of direct coercion to open up zones that may fall under renegade control, to impose order, and to repress rebellion when it threatens the stability of the system" (Robinson 2004: 137).

As barriers to the flow of capital were largely abolished in the latter part of the twentieth century, the uneven development of capitalism resulting from centuries of imperialism has provided the conditions under which new strategies of accumulation were developed. New dominant social modes of production emerged with the deterritorialization of production and finance, creating the impetus for alternative forms of domination and control that would universalize neoliberal discipline and secure the conditions for accumulation in the face of opposition that might emerge in response. ISDS has therefore provided one such tool, enabling coercion to be exercised by the TCC, while formal sovereignty is maintained, one of many such qualitative differences between the current epoch of global capitalism and earlier periods of imperialism.

Cross-References

▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Rule of Law and Imperialism

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Iraq

Iraq Invasion

Iraq War

Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law

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Synonyms

Gulf War; International law; Iraq; Imperialism; Mandate; Occupation; Sanctions; Third World Approaches to International Law

Introduction

Iraq has had a unique, extraordinary, and contradictory historical relationship with international law and world order. From its inception as a modern and sovereign state in 1932, it was considered the pride of the new postwar order – a triumph of the "peaceful" workings of the international institution of the Mandate system of the League of Nations. By the first Gulf War in 1991 and later the 2003 invasion, it was labeled a "rogue" and "outlaw" state that needed to be put in its place by the "civilized" world through the instruments of war, economic sanctions, and unilateral invasion. This chapter will explore this contradictory relationship and its dynamics in history. The manner in which imperialism operated in Iraq could not be understood without a closer look at its relationship with international law and its institutions from 1921 to the 2003 Iraq War, as well as the geopolitics of political economy. My argument is that Iraq's continuous centrality to core questions of world order, whether during the Mandate period, the first Gulf War, or ultimately the 2003 invasion, were no coincidence but rather illustrates Iraq's (and the region's) geopolitical and economic importance to imperialism and the interests of empire.

This chapter will show how certain questions of international law, including claims of "newness" of world order (in particular during the Mandate period, the 1991 Gulf War, and the post-9/11 "War on Terror"), could be understood in relation to the history of imperialism in Iraq. The tracing of how international law and its concepts continued to further imperialism puts emphasis on the continuities rather than discontinuities of the imperialist project in relation to the modern history of Iraq. The shifting patterns of the international legal order and the various interpretations of "world order" during the past century will be explored in the context of Iraqi history. This chapter will show how the case of Iraq reveals the manner in which questions of international law were principally linked to the economic control and exploitation of the natural resources of the region and in turn to the global political economy. Iraq's geographical location explains its centrality to imperial rivalries during both world wars and the Cold War as it lay at the "crossroads between Europe and the Mediterranean to the west and inner Asia to the east," as well as being a "connecting route" to the Indian Ocean and bordering countries to the southeast (Penrose

and Penrose 1978). It was not only Iraq's unique geographical location but its geopolitical importance in relation to its rich natural resources that would turn it into a theater for war and ultimately a target of the neoliberal transformation of its economy.

This retelling of Iraqi history will rely on Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). TWAIL scholarship and methodology has consistently revealed how colonialism and imperialism are in fact constitutive of international law and its discipline (Gathii 2011; Anghie 2004). In other words, international law could only be grasped by studying the historical processes of imperialism that were central to its development and expansion. TWAIL reveals that imperialism and the expansion of capitalism in the Third World were historically juridified through international law and its processes. As Makau Mutua wrote, "[t]he construction and universalization of international law were essential to the imperial expansion that subordinated non-European peoples and societies to European conquest and domination" (Mutua 2000). TWAIL scholars assert that international law was born out of this "colonial encounter" and that in turn European imperial expansion had enduring consequences on modern international law (Okafor 2008).

There are two ways that TWAIL will be used in this chapter. The first is with regard to history and its interpretation. TWAIL scholarship has used a historical method to explore the relevance of the history of imperialism to modern international law and to expose how deeply imbricated international law is with imperialism. This "turn to history" traces certain continuities to help us understand international law today. TWAIL scholars consider the historical method as vital to contextualize certain contemporary legal practices and concepts, tracing their (inter) connections with the past. Anghie, one of the most notable TWAIL scholars, has traced today's modern international law and the doctrines of Francisco de Vitoria, which were used to justify the Spanish conquest of the indians of the Americas in the sixteenth century (Anghie 2004). By connecting and contextualizing a series of historical events and eras starting with

fifteenth-century Scholasticism, the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, the Mandate system of the League of Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and all the way to the invasion of Iraq, Anghie emphasizes that what might appear as new in international law and world governance is in fact fairly old. Furthermore, he illustrates how questions of "governance," "sovereignty," and "the rule of law" have historically and intrinsically been linked to capitalist pursuits of commerce and trade. This chapter will undertake a similar analysis of Iraqi history by showing how capitalist exploitation of Iraq and control over the region was the driving force of imperial powers, and this in turn would be translated into questions of world order and international law.

The second way in which this chapter will use the TWAIL perspective is by deconstructing the claim of "newness" of world order that was used to justify the necessity of reforming the fundamental norms of international law and its order. Obifor Okafor has revealed how claims of "newness" were in fact a political maneuver used by Great Powers, more recently the United States, to reassert imperialism and justify the 'war on terror' and the invasion of Iraq – responses that would otherwise be untenable under international law. A close look at the workings of the imperialism of international law in Iraq reveal how these claims of "newness" were made to mystify reality. In 1932, Iraq's advancement through the Mandate process into a "civilized" sovereign state, becoming a member of the society of nations, was heralded as a prime example of the coming of a "new" world order whereby the peaceful settlement of the colonial question led to the formation of new states. The reality of course was quite different as Iraq's sovereignty was a legal fiction. Iraq remained under a disguised form of imperialist control sanctioned by international law. A similar claim of newness occurred in 1991 when after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US decided to wage a war on Iraq to "liberate" Kuwait. This event was claimed to be the assertion of a "New World Order," where the rule of international law would be imposed by force, while the UN Security Council was to finally become effective in advancing "world peace and security." The fact

was that it merely intersected with the consolidation of US imperial power and interests in the region. By 2003, the US invasion of Iraq under the (illegal) doctrine of "preemptive war" or the so-called Bush doctrine was considered to have ushered yet another shift in (some called it a crisis of) world order, whereby imperialism would redefine itself in relation to international law.

A broad sweep and synthesis of the modern history of Iraq during some of its most crucial periods from the Mandate until the invasion will therefore reveal how these various claims of "newness" of world order by imperial powers were not new after all. Iraq and its people were always victims of colonialism and imperialism, especially through the mechanisms of international law and its institutions, from its establishment as an independent modern and "civilized" state in 1932 up until its classification as a "rogue" state deserving of economic sanctions and finally its complete and utter destruction after the 2003 invasion and occupation with the aim of reintegrating it into the global capitalist economy.

Iraqi "Independence" Through the Mandate System of the Interwar Order

The first significant event in the history of modern Iraq in relation to world order was the establishment of a sovereign state of Iraq in 1932 through the protracted process of the Mandate system of the emerging postwar international order following the Treaty of Versailles, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and the formation of the League of Nations. The Mandates system was consequently established after the end of World War I with the intention of creating a lasting peace in the former territories of the German colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific Ocean, including the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This system was based on Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and provided for a "sacred trust of civilization" to promote the well-being of the natives of these colonies, which were said to have been "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern

world" (Pederson 2015 Mazower (2009)). The idea of this "civilizational" process of the Mandate system reflected the idealism of the League in attempting to organize a peaceful order and to prevent war. The mandatory power was meant to govern and advise the administration of the mandated territory until its people were able to stand on their own. It was also meant to protect the native populations from pillage, exploitation, and annexation that would have been acceptable in the former Westphalian order. Iraq was designated as an "A" Mandate, as opposed to a "B" or "C" Mandate of Africa and the Asian Pacific. The "A" Mandates were recognized as being developed and "semi-civilized" enough to gain "provisional" independence sooner than the other designations, following tutelage by the mandatory power, which had a supposedly limited role of giving administrative and technical advice.

Britain, which had already occupied Iraq during the war, was chosen as Iraq's mandatory power at the San Remo Conference in April 1920. The native population of Iraq however was so vehemently opposed to any form of control, "mandatory," or otherwise, that a popular revolution broke in 1920. It was only after this revolution was ruthlessly crushed that Britain accepted the idea of a national self-government as being necessary to the fulfillment of its mandatory obligations. The Hejazi, Emir Faisal was eventually handpicked and installed by the British government to be the future King of Iraq at the 1921 Cairo Conference. The mandatory relationship was expressed in the form of the first Anglo-Iraq Treaty signed in 1922. This treaty incorporated the provisions of the Mandate, although it expressed Britain's mandatory relationship vis-à-vis the League, but not vis-à-vis Iraq (Quincy 1930). The instrument of the treaty was used to distance Iraq from any reference to the much-hated Mandate, while it maintained an institutional structure that gave the British significant control over the Iraqi state. The Treaty required that the Iraqi government appoint British advisors to shadow every ministerial post, creating a parallel advisory system, which ensured British influence over the Iraqi state and its institutions. Furthermore, the 1925 Constitution or Organic Law guaranteed that the provisions of the Treaty

would be upheld as it allowed wide executive powers to the king and cabinet. It limited the state's constitutional structures and gave the king the power to veto legislation and override parliament. The 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which was an instrument of international law, therefore gave the British wide room to influence and control the Iraqi state (Sluglett 2007).

On September 1929, the British government agreed to support Iraq's entry to the League of Nations and in turn its formal independence by 1932 (Pederson 2015). A new treaty was ratified in 1930. The 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty maintained a "close" alliance between the two states. The provisions of the Treaty limited Iraq's sovereignty, especially with regard to Britain's right to move troops on Iraqi soil, as well as the employment of British advisors. The economic dimensions of the Treaty were couched in military terms, while the administration of the strategic sites of the Port of Basra and the Iraq Railways were left under British semi-autonomous control. In Geneva, the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), the main body of the League responsible for supervising the Mandates, determining whether Iraq had reached the "degree of maturity" acceptable for independence, began its deliberations. The British High Commissioner, Henry Dobbs, submitted a report to the PMC, which concluded that Iraq had "all the working machinery of a civilized government" and could "stand alone" administratively, even if it cannot do so militarily or economically, and that was sufficient (Pederson 2015). The British government claimed that it had appropriately fulfilled its obligations as a mandatory power.

Although the PMC were skeptical throughout its deliberations, it unanimously agreed to admit Iraq into the Society of N ations after requiring a declaration confirming Britain's continuing "moral responsibility" to the implications of Iraq's independence. In October 1932, Iraq became the first mandated state to gain formal independence through the processes of the Mandate system. The reasoning that the members of the PMC, who as lawyers and jurists were well aware that they were making international law, reveals an attempt to construct a unique doctrine of sovereignty that ensured the geopolitical and economic dominance of Iraq and the region as a whole, especially when it came to access to oil (Hammoudi 2016).

Hence, although Iraq not only appeared independent, but also was independent under international law, in reality it remained (economically, militarily, politically, and geopolitically) under imperial British dominance and control. Iraq's sovereignty was swiftly given by the Great Powers through the League of Nations with the main purpose of ensuring Western access to oil through a legal mechanism that was enshrined under international law and in line with the principles of the world order of the time (Hammoudi 2016). In fact, Iraq's sovereignty was meant to be a model for the entire Middle East, a region with a unique geopolitical significance for imperialism, especially given the importance of its oil deposits for the capitalist world economy.

The 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and its corresponding doctrine of (limited) sovereignty in international law had severe consequences on the people of Iraq, especially the working class and the poor peasants. The curtailment of Iraq's sovereignty and Britain's ability to influence and intervene in nearly all the affairs of the Iraqi state allowed a small clique of *Sherifian* ex-Ottoman officers, to run the government, maintaining their political power and in turn British imperial interests. The Treaty (along with the oil concessionary agreements) was the legal mechanism(s) by which oil was to be extracted and transported westward across the desert to the shores of the Mediterranean, while Iraqi labor was superintended to ensure the smooth operations of the infrastructure of economic dominance.

The most advanced sectors of the working class were concentrated in the colossal industrial enterprises and privately owned and administered enclaves of the oil fields in Kirkuk and the semi-autonomous Port of Basra and railway system. Despite the fact that these wage earners were in better conditions than their counterparts elsewhere (not to mention the serf-like conditions of the peasants), they embodied the contradictions of the capitalist system in the colonies, living under wretched conditions, low wages, and racism (Batatu 2004; Hammoudi 2016).

The oil workers, for instance, lived in miserable conditions within company camps that were segregated from the larger gated villas where British staff resided. This colonial-type segregation was even more evident in the 12 mini-company towns that were built across the desert in parallel to the (Kirkuk-Haifa-Tripoli) oil pipelines (Mitchell 2011; Bet-Shlimon 2019). The wage gap between Iraqi laborers and British staff was enormous. Moreover, Iraqi workers were frequently discharged without notice and had no protections despite the 1936 Labor Law, a basic law that was passed but never applied by the government or the company. Such a system of extreme class exploitation was a direct result of the legal arrangements described above. Similar semi-colonial legal structures governed the railway system and the Port of Basra, both managed by semi-autonomous administrations headed by British administrators and experts. The Treaty ensured that these strategic sites would remain under British control after Iraq's formal independence. Like their counterparts in the oil fields, the railway and port workers received inadequately low wages, while they lived in wretched conditions, some in tiny mud huts in the outskirts of the cities. The processes of the international institution of the Mandate and the Anglo-Iraq Treaty would therefore continue to affect common Iraqis in their everyday lives even after so-called independence.

It was not surprising then that the Iraqi working class would begin to organize themselves under the guidance of anti-imperial groups such as the illegal Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and trade unions to fight for better conditions, simultaneously waging an overall struggle against the imperialism embedded in the international legal structures of the Treaty. Beginning with the railway workers, concentrated in the *Schalchiyyah* workshops in Baghdad, who organized the first major postwar labor strike in 1945, demanded higher wages and the right to form their own unions. Similarly, the port workers drafted a petition, specifically calling for the consistent application of the labor law to all grades of port workers, especially the most vulnerable cargo workers who were governed by a piecemeal system of employment (Batatu 2004). The port

workers organized their first experiment in strike action in May 1947, which was swiftly suppressed by police. The oil workers' union waged some of the most militant strike actions against the Iraq Petroluem Company (IPC). Most famously, during the Gawurbaghi strike of 1946, when municipal police coordinated with the British Embassy and the IPC to violently repress the strike, leading to the death of at least 18 workers (Bet-Shlimon 2019). Although all these strikes were violently suppressed, these experiences were formative for the Iraqi labor movement and would be of utmost value for the wider nationalist and anti-imperialist struggle that erupted in 1948.

The Wathba of 1948: The Spark of Revolutionary Anti-colonial Struggle in Iraq

After Iraq gained its independence in 1932, the state was still quite unstable as various military factions struggled to gain power from those who were seen as too compliant with British imperial interests. In 1936, a military coup led by General Baqr al-Sidqi led to the formation of a short-lived government alliance with the progressive social democrats. In April 1941 another coup led by the Arab nationalist Rashid al-Gaylani overthrew the pro-British monarchy until it was reinstalled by a second British invasion and occupation a month later.

The Iraqi people persisted in their struggle against the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty, the juridical manifestation of imperialism in their country. The *Wathba* uprising of 1948, which was described by Hanna Batatu as the "the most formidable mass insurrection in the history of the monarchy," was the moment when the people's anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle against the social and legal order sparked the processes that would lead up to the 1958 July Revolution, which would overthrow the British sponsored monarchy a decade later (Batatu 2004). Led by an alliance of workers and students, massive demonstrations were sparked on the streets of Baghdad by news of the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, which was meant to revise the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty to make it more consistent with the UN Charter. However, the reality was that this Treaty maintained the British connection under a new

guise, as it gave British "experts" a say in Iraq's military planning and maintained British military bases on Iraqi soil. The Portsmouth Treaty turned out to be a mere extension of the 1930 Treaty with "new-fashioned terminology," which reestablished the continuation of British intervention in Iraqi affairs under the new liberal international legal order (Batatu 2004).

The *Wathba* was one of the largest mass demonstrations in the history of the Iraqi monarchy. It was a culmination of all the previous struggles by the workers and students that seemed to be confined to the workplaces and universities. The anger spilled onto the streets. The well-organized movement, which was led and guided by a couple of people's steering committees compromised a heterogeneous group of Iraqis and united the working class, the underclasses and the middle class (whether communists, social democrats, or Arab nationalists). Iraqis from all walks of life – students, lawyers, workers, and squatters – marched together to oppose imperialism and its preservation by the ruling class. The movement called for the annulment of the new Treaty and the resignation of the cabinet. The massive *Wathba* strikes and demonstrations spread with fire-like intensity to other parts of the country. Fearing all-out revolution, the regent decided to renounce the Treaty in a public statement. This splintered the movement as right-wing nationalists were satisfied, while the left saw it as a mere tactic, calling for more than the mere cancellation of the new treaty but the end of imperialism in the country and the cancellation of the still operative 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty. Moreover, workers and the poor called for economic justice and "bread" considered as essential for any "political freedoms" (Haj 1997). By January 27, police were directed to shoot into a crowd of protestors on the Ma'mun Bridge, killing at least 300 unarmed Iraqis. This bloody event would eventually lead to the resignation of the government. Although the cancellation of the Portsmouth Treaty was achieved, the "caretaker" government eventually imposed martial law, while suppressive police tactics were used in other parts of the country to break labor strikes and suppress all forms of dissent, which continued for several months thereafter.

The *Wathba* had a significant impact on the decolonization of international law (Hammoudi 2016). It struck a thunderous chord against imperialism in the region and the Third World more broadly. It showed how the common people of Iraq struggled for a vision of a new social and legal order in their country that was based on an equitable and just international legal order. As they waged their struggles on the streets and in their workplaces, they were attempting to affirm their human dignity as reflected in the emergent principles of the UN Charter. They rejected the continuation of the imperialism that was imposed upon them through the Mandate system and called for a truly independent Iraq that would be a part of a Third World that was free of colonial subordination and imperial influence. In other words, with their very actions, they sought a free Iraq that would break away from the web of imperialism and its manifestation in yet another juridical guise.

The *Wathba* awoke a spirit of determination of anti-colonial struggle that persevered throughout the coming turbulent decade until the monarchy was overthrown by the 1958 July Revolution, sparked by the actions of the Free Officers under the leadership of Brigadier ʿAbdul Karīm Qāsim (Romero 2011). The *Wathba* inspired the grassroots organized protest actions to come, opening the way for the Revolution. During the riots of the 1952 *Intifada*, there were calls for the "renewal" of the revolutionary *Wathba*, while the 1956 Uprising of Najaf and Hayy was launched in response to the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal (Batatu 2004; Bashkin 2009). Labor strikes intensified throughout this period, most notably with the massive dockworkers strike of Basra in 1953, which completely shut down the entire port city. The government continuously imposed martial law to crush these upheavals. In the end, it was because any demands for social reform from the people were consistently and violently suppressed by the regime that the Free Officers decided to take things into their own hands by planning a military coup that would initiate the revolutionary process of the liberation of Iraq and its people from the British imperial yoke.

The July Revolution of 1958 and Iraq's Break from the Orbit of Imperialism

The July Revolution of 1958 should be analyzed not only in the context of the *Wathba* and the *Intifada* of November 1952 but other significant events in the region, such as the Palestinian *Nakba*, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, as well as the signing of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. The Baghdad Pact was considered by the Iraqi public as yet another attempt to reimpose imperialism in Iraq and the region after the demise of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948 (Romero 2011). The Free Officers, who were clearly influenced by Nasser's revolutionary clandestine methods, organized a military coup in anticipation of a people's revolution, with aim of shattering the *ancien régime* of the pro-British Hashemite monarchy and its oppressive social order. Proclamation No 1 read out on Baghdad Radio announced the establishment of a people's republic, promised the participation of the Iraqi people in shaping their future, and ended Iraq's close alliance with the West by declaring a neutralist foreign policy in line with the principles of the 1955 Bandung Conference. The Proclamation was clear that its revolutionary claims were in line with the principles of international law of the time and the UN Charter, as well as the non-alignment of the Third World that were asserted in Bandung:

> ...[W]e have undertaken to liberate the beloved homeland from the corrupt crew that imperialism installed...Rest assured that we will continue to work on your behalf. Power shall be entrusted to a government emanating from you and inspired by you. This can only be realized by the creation of a people's republic, which will uphold complete Iraqi unity, tie itself in bonds of fraternity with the Arab and Moslem states, act in keeping with the principles of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Bandung Conference...Accordingly, the (new) national government shall henceforth be called the Republic of Iraq... (Quoted in Batatu 2004).

The Revolution uprooted the legal structures that maintained the old social order starting with the elimination of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and with it the imperialism of its international legal structures, which was maintained for nearly three decades after the emergence of a novel liberal international order with the signing of the UN Charter in 1945. Decolonization was just beginning to sweep the Third World, and in Iraq the anti-colonial struggles finally materialized with the initial actions of the revolutionary officers. Within 2 weeks, a Provisional Constitution was drafted that frustrated the constitutional structures of the 1925 Organic Law, which constricted the people's popular sovereignty. Furthermore, a new Agrarian Reform Law was passed, which finally ended the "semifeudal" system, a remnant of British imperial policy, bringing the tribes and rural areas into the purview of state law (Marr 1985).

Iraq's emergence as a republic ruled by a nationalist military regime ensured that it would be a contested zone of rivalry during the Cold War, especially between Arab nationalists and communists. A coup led by Ba'athists trained by the CIA brought down the revolutionary Qasim regime in 1963, before it too was overthrown 8 months later by another military coup led by Nasserites (Mathews 2011). The US returned the Ba'ath to power in a coup in 1968, opening up the path for Saddam Hussein's ascent to power, which would materialize in 1979 with the purging of his rivals. Iraq under Saddam would become a totalitarian regime for over two decades, ruling over the party apparatus, the military, and Iraqi society with an iron fist. A year after gaining power, Saddam plunged Iraq into military adventurism going to war with Iran (1980–1988) following the fall of the Shah, with the support of the US, which supplied both sides with weapons.

The First Gulf War (1991): The Punishment of a "Rogue State" During the New World Order

Following a devastating and pointless 8-year war with Iran, Iraq's economy was in tatters. Kuwait exceeded its OPEC quota, further depressing Iraqi oil prices and in turn it's economy. In addition, Kuwait was allegedly drilling into Iraqi territory at the border and extracting oil from the Rumailah oil field. After receiving a seemingly indifferent response in relation to Iraq's oil dispute with Kuwait from the US ambassador (widely regarded as a "green light"), Saddam Hussein, a longtime

ally of the US (considered Kuwait's actions as tantamount to military aggression), ultimately decided to invade Kuwait in August 1990. To his surprise, his resort to invasion, annexation, and occupation would ignite "one of the most significant international crises of the post-1945 epoch" (Halliday 1994).

The US swiftly began to assemble a coalition of states to counter Iraq's action with the initial aim of recovering the sovereignty of a UN member state. President George H.W. Bush not only turned to international law and its mechanisms but also evoked the concept of a "New World Order" to justify a US-led war against Iraq. After all, the UN Security Council was now free from the bipolar constraints of the Cold War and able to operate collectively against aggression for the maintenance of peace – the very basis of the system of collective security and self-defense embedded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

President Bush immediately deployed a US military force to Saudi Arabia. The US administration began employing pressure on member states to pass a series of UN resolutions, the first of which was Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops. Economic sanctions and a trade embargo were swiftly imposed through Resolution 661, completely isolating Iraq from the outside world. Member states were called upon to prevent the transfer of any funds to Iraq or Kuwait for trading purposes, the supply of all goods, with the exception of "foodstuffs intended for humanitarian purposes." Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was declared null and void under international law (S.C. Res 664, UN SCOR, 45th Sess. 2937th mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/664).

In November 1990, President Bush approached the Security Council for a resolution sanctioning military force against Iraq. The Council adopted Resolution 678, which did not expressly mention military force, but authorized "Member States... to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660... and to restore international peace and security in that region." On January 16, 1991, President Bush, blocking all diplomatic efforts, launched military action against Iraq, resting the legality of his action on Resolution 678 (Quigley 1992). Despite the fact that this war was presented with a cloak of legality, it was in fact illegal for various reasons, but especially the fact that Resolution 678 was constructed in such an ambiguous way that it was described by one observer as "a masterpiece of obfuscation" (Springborg 1994). It was worded in a way to invoke the authority of Article 51 ("the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense") and Article 42 (that limits the right of self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security," which in this case was already taken through economic sanctions) of the UN Charter without any explicit reference to them (Springborg 1994). In other words, the resolution's appropriation of the phrase to "restore international peace and security in the area" from Article 42 was merely meant to convey a vener of legality to the blatantly unlawful use of force.

The effects of the war that began in January 1991 were devastating to a scale never seen before in the history of warfare at the time (Simons 1996). American missiles and aircraft were the main source of mass destruction – around 88,500 tons of bombs were dropped, including napalm, cluster bombs, and "daisy cutter" bombs in contravention of the laws of war. The fact that these bombs were dropped in heavily populated urban areas meant that colossal civilian death was virtually certain. Coalition air sorties, which covered over most of Iraq, for nearly a month before the ground offensive began, bombed at will, while "carpet" bombing by B-52 deliveries had nuclear-like destructive effects on towns and villages. A UN report later described the effects of the bombing as "near apocalyptic" and argued that it reduced life in Iraq to a "pre-industrial age" (*Excerpts from UN Report on Need for Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq*). US military planners completely destroyed Iraq's civilian infrastructure, following a deliberate policy, which in the words of Secretary of State James Baker was intended to turn Iraq into a "backward and weak state" (Simons 1996). Sewage and water treatment facilities, electrical generators, hospitals, and clinics were all targeted and

destroyed. As Iraqi soldiers were complying with UN demands by withdrawing from Kuwait, US aircraft mercilessly attacked those fleeing at the Jahra-Basra road with cluster bombs and uranium creating a bloody wreckage of metal, corpses, and limbs. This incident was to become one of the most horrific massacres of the war. The US war on Iraq was therefore a clear and calculated attempt to destroy the very social fabric of Iraqi society and its economy.

The manner in which the US administration operated the levers of international law and its mechanisms to justify its military action on Iraq has been argued to be the development of a form of "hegemonic international law," whereby the hegemon not only appropriates and navigates the existing international legal mechanisms but, in breaching certain aspects of it, is confident that it was simultaneously creating new rules for its own advantage (Alvarez 2003). Prominent international lawyers, such as Richard Falk and John Quigley, have detailed how and why the US were in violation of the UN Charter despite their uses of international mechanisms. Quigley argued that the high level of force took US action outside the parameters of the Resolution 678 standard of "necessary" means (Quigley 1992). This was not to mention the fact that the resolution itself violated the UN Charter, which clearly stipulates that military force must be a measure of last resort. "The presence of aggression does not always enable the Council to use military force to oppose it," wrote Quigley, "[t]o the contrary, the Council may use military force only if other [less drastic] means will not succeed" (Quigley 1992). Similarly, Falk emphasized that once the shift was made from sanctions to war, "the UN's role was fundamentally flawed from the view point of international law... [as] [t]he Security Council violated its own constitutional framework to the extent that it allowed the coalition to operate independently..." without any oversight and without exhausting all nonmilitary options (Falk 1994). In this way, the UN was not only manipulated by the US administration to justify its waging of unrestricted warfare against Iraq, but it was also entirely complicit in the war, especially in the brutal sanctions regime established thereafter.

The reference to the coming of a "New World Order" dedicated to "peace, security and the rule of law" in countering the aggression of a "new Hitler" was certainly meant as a powerful rhetorical device. President Bush ceaselessly insisted that this crisis was "between Iraq and the entire world" (NYT, August 23, 1990) and framed Iraq's actions solely in terms of being a threat to world order, arguing that the US was merely stepping in to reestablish the rule of law and order in the region. The underlying contextual reality, however, was that Saddam Hussein was not just any aggressor and Kuwait was not just any state. It should not be forgotten that Hussein was not only considered an important US ally in the region, but also that the US administration provided him with stockpiles of weapons during the Iraq-Iran war. At this conjuncture, economic interests and important concerns of geopolitics within the context of the maintenance of US imperial power in the region were at stake. Simply put, the US could not allow a Third World leader, who controlled such vast energy resources, to dictate the price of oil. This certainly explains its overwhelming use of force to get its point across.

The first Gulf War was therefore not a "test" case for the principle of collective security and the mechanisms of the UN as often treated, but rather it was the manifestation of an overdue US policy pronounced by President Carter in 1980, which at the time was a warning to Soviet expansion. "The Carter Doctrine" considered any attempt by an outside force to control the Persian Gulf region as an "assault on the vital interests of the United States of America," and that such an assault would be repelled "by any means necessary, including military force" (da Vinha 2017). President Bush fashioned a corollary from this doctrine emphasizing that Persian Gulf oil was untouchable. As Daniel Yergin, an American strategist and oil expert, wrote, "No single nation had dominated the Persian Gulf region since oil was discovered there; were one to do so, the global balance of power would be changed" (Yergin 1991). Oil therefore was (and remains) a major determining factor of US foreign policy in the region.

The International Regime of Economic Sanctions and Its Violent Effects

Economic sanctions, which were initially put into place as a non-violent means of putting pressure on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, remained in place, to ensure compliance with Resolution 667 – a resolution that was drafted in Washington and London and set the terms and conditions of Iraq's surrender. According to one UN diplomat, Resolution 667 contained "precedent-setting" provisions that were "highly intrusive" and impinged on Iraqi sovereignty "by design" (Malone 2006). The resolution affirmed all previous resolutions and established the most comprehensive international regime of economic sanctions in UN history. The terms and requirements for lifting the sanctions included UN demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border; the unconditional destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under international supervision, including all chemical and biological weapons; Iraq's acceptance of liability for damages arising from its invasion of Kuwait with a fund to be created to meet claims from Iraqi oil revenues; and a UN Compensation Commission to administer it based in Geneva. In addition, a UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created to oversee the destruction of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons.

Resolution 687 effectively criminalized the Iraqi regime as a part of a "punitive peace" that was very similar to what was done to Germany with the Treaty of Versailles (Simpson 2004). It stigmatized Iraq as a "rogue state" under international law. As Gerry Simpson has shown, international law and the structures of world order have historically functioned in this manner – treating some states as "sovereign equals," while others are singled out as "rogue states" with the aim of maintaining the geopolitical interests of the Great Powers (Simpson 2004).

The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq, which would go on for the next 12 years until the 2003 invasion, were the cruelest in the history of international governance and international law (Gordon 2010). It reduced a population whose general standard of living was that of the most developed and industrialized countries of the Middle East into one of the most impoverished – a society notable for its scientists, engineers, and doctors would become dominated with Mafioso-type criminals, thieves, beggars, and corrupt profiteers (Gordon 2010). It was impossible for Iraq to restore any of its destroyed vital infrastructure – electricity, telecommunications, transport, sewage treatment, and water – and meet its urgent humanitarian needs, as long as these extremely restrictive sanctions were in place. The sanctions eliminated Iraq's ability to sell its oil on the international market, which was catastrophic for a country that was dependent on oil sales for its gross domestic product. Moreover, Iraq's high dependence on imports (nearly 70% on food) meant that the effects of sanctions were immediate and cataclysmic for ordinary Iraqis (AlNasrawi 2001).

Sanctions would directly lead to a dramatic increase in child mortality, malnutrition, and waterborne diseases. Numerous studies and UN reports strongly suggest that at least 500,000 children under the age of 5 died directly as a result of the sanctions (Gordon 2010). When asked about this shocking level of child mortality, US Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, famously said, "We think the price is worth it" (CBS news, 60 Minutes, May 12, 1996). The US administration was in fact unwilling to consider the lifting of sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. Robert Gates, the head of the CIA at the time, made it clear that only when there is a new government could any easing of sanctions be considered. Iraqi compliance with any UN resolutions was consequently of no relevance (Simons 1996).

The sanctions regime involved a very complex bureaucratic and institutional framework of international governance made up of various UN bodies tasked with its administration – the most important of which was the "Iraq Sanctions Committee" (Von Sponeck 2006). This committee initially tasked with reviewing the Secretary-General's reports and, to compile information regarding the implementation of Resolution 661, began to take broader responsibilities, especially with regard to the determination of which goods were allowed into the country as humanitarian exemptions.

The US administration, however, had enormous influence over every aspect of the application and administration of the sanctions as it unilaterally interfered with the committee's tasks, ensuring that the majority of requests – of even the most basic humanitarian goods – were denied, usually on the basis of potential military use or "dual use." Chlorine, necessary for sanitization in hospitals, for instance, was consistently prevented from being imported on the basis that it could be used to manufacture chemical weapons (Abdullah 2006). Although an "Oil-for-Food program" was finally adopted by the Security Council and accepted by the Iraqi government in 1996, it did little to significantly alleviate the impact of the sanctions especially on the most vulnerable sectors of society.

The sanctions led to such a high level of death and suffering that it was argued to be a policy aimed at the destruction of the Iraqi people – a form of "genocide" perpetrated by the UN Security Council (Halliday 2000). Veteran UN officials, most famously, the coordinator of humanitarian relief to Iraq, Denis J. Haliday, and later his successor Hans von Sponeck, would ultimately submit their resignations in protest of what they considered a deeply immoral policy (Von Sponeck 2006). It was no wonder that the UN was held with deep resentment by the people of Iraq.

The international regime of sanctions that was imposed on Iraq is a perfect example of how violence is inherent within the existing international legal order itself. It also reveals the pliancy of international law and institutions to imperialist interests. The assertion of a "new" world order where waging war and starving an entire population was presented as the imposition of "the rule of law" over aggression was more than just a necessary façade, but as Falk emphasizes was the same civilizational discourse that characterized "the settler conquests of indigenous peoples in the 'age of discovery' and of colonial warfare ever since" (Falk 1991). The war and the imposition of a medieval policy of sanctions on a defenseless population were not any different from the actions of imperialism throughout history. What has become more sophisticated is the

legal reasoning and mechanisms used to justify these brutal policies. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 would be a continuation of the imperialism of US foreign policy and international law.

The 2003 Invasion and Occupation of Iraq: The (Re)integration of an "Outlaw State" into the "Civilized World"

A decade of sanctions made it clear that US policy of "regime change" through containment was a failure, and as international outcry over the sanctions grew, the US could not allow for a post-sanctions Iraq to emerge with an unhindered regime after all that happened. A group of "neo-conservative" ideologues in Washington, associated with the think tank called a "Project for the New American Century" (PNAC), and which included Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, were of the view of the necessity of waging a war on Iraq. In September 2000, the PNAC published a white paper that made the argument for a significant shift in American foreign policy, including a militaristic expansion of US power by taking advantage of the "unipolar moment," with the aim of preserving its geopolitical supremacy and precluding the emergence of a Great Power rival. The report advocated for the waging of strategic "theater wars" around the world, emphasizing the importance of controlling Middle Eastern oil as a matter of US national security (PNAC 2000). What was needed however was a spark – "some catastrophic and catalyzing event...a new Pearl Harbor" (PNAC 2000). This event came in September 11, 2001, when al-Qaida attacked New York and Washington.

The newly elected administration of George W. Bush's US National Security Strategy followed a similar logic to the PNAC report. It articulated the doctrine of "preemptive war," which was used to justify the invasion of Iraq. Bush claimed that the US was in an endless "global war" against terrorism and their supporters, which included Saddam Hussein's Iraq. On September 12, 2002, Bush declared to the UN General Assembly that Iraq

was one of the "outlaw . . . regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions" (Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2002). Although no credible link was ever found between al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime, the Bush administration fabricated a dubious connection, making its case at the UN that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) even after the International Atomic Energy Agency and subsequently the newly formed UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) had confirmed through its inspectors that there was no evidence of any nuclear programs in Iraq.

As it would became clear during the war that WMDs were nowhere to be found, the Bush administration shifted its justification for war to the notion that the Iraqi people were being liberated from a dictatorial regime, evoking the cause of democracy and human rights. Bush declared in his speech to the UN General Assembly that, "liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. . .Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder" (President's address to the UN in New York, 38 Weekly Comp. Press. Doc 1529, 1530–1532, Sep. 12, 2002). Regime change was after all the official US policy ever since the passing of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 in Congress, which avowed the ultimate goal of removing Saddam Hussein's regime to establish a "democratic" government in Iraq. In this way, the very nature of Iraq's regime was presented as being a threat to world security and peace, guaranteeing that Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions would not be enough to halt US war plans. Iraq had become the focal point for the "war on terrorism."

The Legal Justifications for the Invasion, the Myth of Newness, and the Doctrine of Preemption in International Law

The US administration endeavored to construct a legal argument to justify its plans to wage a war on Iraq. It deployed the notion of self-defense as a preventive measure, insisting that it did not need UN authorization to go to war to protect the "civilized" world from the potential threat of terrorists.

The entire basis of the UN system was premised on the notion of collective self-defense through the workings of its mechanisms and only authorized the use of force in the very narrow circumstances of an "imminent" threat. These established principles of world order emerged out of the Nuremberg trials, where aggression was affirmed to be the "supreme international crime." The Charter itself explicitly favors resolving disputes using peaceful means and through multilateralism. This was a system therefore that was instituted for the very purpose of preventing war. The Charter's preamble clearly emphasizes the need to "save succeeding generation from the scourge of war." It was consequently more of a stretch to justify the notion of unilateral use of force on the basis of preemption in international law as "legal vigilantism" is not permitted by the Charter (Simpson 2005). It was no wonder that the majority (at least 80%) of international lawyers around the world considered US actions as a dangerous legal precedent – an amendment to the principles of the international legal order. For them, the Iraq War was clearly illegal (Paulus 2004).

The US's endeavors to transform the structures of world order in its favor by invading Iraq would have wide-ranging detrimental effects on what was accepted under international law – instituting what one legal scholar referred to as a "Texan international law. . .that emphasizes the threat from outlaws, the need for self-help, the unreliability of institutions and the frontier spirit" (Simpson 2005). Furthermore, the Bush administration's reasoning that the existing institutional structures of world order needed to be altered to correspond to a "change of circumstances" of post-9/11 was merely the deployment of what Okafor has called, a "technology of imperialism" where a "myth of newness" is propagated to justify its imperial actions (Okafor 2005).

The US Invasion, the Destruction of the Iraqi State, the Slaughter of the Iraqi People, and the Cleansing of Its Cultural Heritage

Although the US failed to secure a resolution from the UN Security Council (France, Russia, Germany, and China were all in firm opposition), it

decided that it would go ahead with its war plans. Consequently, against the will of the international community and in defiance of the unprecedented anti-war protests of millions of people around the world, the US-led collation, which included Britain, launched its war offensive in an operation, codenamed "Iraqi Freedom" on March 20, 2003. It began with a massive campaign of aerial bombardment in the form of a tactical "Shock and Awe" that aimed on inflicting maximum destruction and overwhelming psychological harm on the people of Iraq. By the time American tanks entered the city, Iraqi soldiers had abandoned their posts, avoiding confrontation and returning to their homes. Saddam Hussein's regime had collapsed with astounding ease, its leadership having fled into hiding. Although the Iraqi people and army did not rise up to defend this brutal regime, American troops were not welcomed with "flowers and candy" as was propagated by the media and Iraqi exiles. By May 1, all combat operations had come to an end.

US plans to stabilize postwar Iraq were a complete fiasco. What would ensue post-invasion was not merely chaotic but reflects the collapse of the Iraqi state. It would amount to nothing less than the intentional "cultural cleansing" of Iraq and its heritage (Baker et al. 2010). Iraq's already crumbling infrastructure was entirely demolished, while state institutions were subject to organized looting, pillage, and obliteration. Looters broke into government buildings (including, ministries, hospitals, libraries, and universities). US troops were ordered to safeguard only the oil fields, the Ministry of Oil, and the Ministry of Interior. As they stood by, mobs of looters, some led by criminal gangs and others driven by poverty, grabbed anything and everything they could get their hands on. Ministries, hospitals, libraries, and universities were ransacked.

The epitome of this devastating turn of events would be the tragic looting of Iraq's National Museum and the burning of the National Library and Archives. Tens of thousands of artifacts, many dating back to antiquity, were looted, while entire archival records and irreplacebale manuscripts were burned to ashes. Although the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headed by retired Lt. General Jay Garner (who was initially appointed to run postwar Iraq in January 2003) had drawn up a list of the most important cultural sites in the country that needed protection, it was ignored. This was clearly a deliberate move calculated to "cleanse" not only all vestiges of the former Iraqi state but the unique history and cultural heritage of a proud people, so as to follow destruction with the reconstruction of a capitalist neoliberal, free-market order, and the imposition of the most extreme economic "shock therapy" on the region (Klein 2008).

The New World Order of Economic Plunder, the Bremer Orders, and the Transformative Occupation of Iraq

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to replace the ORHA in May 2003, thwarting Garner's plan to hold national elections in 90 days. The CPA's mission was "to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future... and ... [to facilitate]... economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development" (Halchin 2006). The CPA would become the official governing body of the occupation, having full executive, legislative, and judicial control over Iraq, until "sovereignty" was officially handed over 14 months later. Bush appointed Paul Bremer III, a longtime foreign service official and at the time a private consultant, to head the CPA. Bremer's very wide discretionary governing powers – he was able to create laws with the stroke of his pen – earned him the title of "American Viceroy of Occupied Iraq" in the press (Bremer 2006).

The UN Security Council Resolution 1483 passed in May 2003 recognized and formalized the CPA as the occupying power in Iraq. The resolution affirmed the CPA's responsibility to govern the country under the law of occupation under the principles of international law, which prevent the occupying power from undertaking any significant transformative changes to the structures of the occupied state or its economy. The resolution emphasized, "the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own political future and

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control of their natural resources"(UNSC Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483). The CPA, however, would practice an extremely intrusive form of occupation that was in clear violation of the basic principles of international law as it embarked on far-reaching legal reform to entrench a deep transformation of Iraq's economy (Rittich 2018). Moreover, as the UN Security Council finally lifted sanctions, it established a Development Fund for Iraq, which would be controlled by the CPA. In other words, the UN not only legitimized the occupation but also granted control of Iraq's economy and reconstruction (including its oil revenues) to the US and in turn to the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank – "the pillars of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus" (Doran 2012).

Upon his arrival to Baghdad, Bremer, who lacked expert knowledge of the country and did not speak Arabic, had one primary mission, and that was to radically reorganize Iraq's economy, promote free-market policies, and privatize state-owned industries, opening up the economy to foreign investment, including Iraq's oil wealth. In other words, his job was to restructure the plundering of the Iraqi state and its economy. The tearing down of the semi-socialist economic structures of the Ba'athist regime was to be, in Bremer's own words, "a very wrenching, painful process, as it was in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall" (Chandrasekaran 2009). Although it is true that the US clearly failed to adequately plan for a postwar Iraq, this was not the case with the economy, which was always a priority for US designs.

As the officially recognized occupying authority, the CPA swiftly introduced a wide range of regulatory and legal reforms covering everything from banking, public employment, labor law, public ownership, and foreign investment. As Bremer emphasized this point when he said, "We're going to create the first real free market economy in the Arab World" (Chandrasekaran 2009). The process to impose this economic model was to be cataclysmic as it subjected Iraq's closed and state-centered economy to the mercy of global capitalist forces through the passing of 100 executive orders (passed with Bremer's

signature and referred to as "the Bremer Orders"). These orders would lay the foundations for the new neoliberal Iraqi state, permanently altering the social and economic structures of Iraqi society in a profound way. In effect the result was the abolition of the entirety of any social safety net in place, plunging ordinary Iraqis into unprecedented levels of poverty and unemployment (Rittich 2018).

Order no. I was issued on May 16, 2003, and inaugurated the process with the "De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society." It removed all members of the Ba'ath party from their positions in state institutions, including ministries, universities, hospitals, and schools. During Saddam's reign, nearly every public servant, especially those in middle to high-level positions, had no choice but to be a member of the party. Therefore, Order no. I amounted to the sacking of 500,000 Iraqi state administrators and civil servants from their jobs overnight (Juhasz 2006). The order also prevented former members of the party from being employed by the new state, leading to massive unemployment. The key positions were later filled largely by US-sponsored Iraqi exiles. Order no. 2, "Dissolution of Entities" further exacerbated the situation by dissolving the Iraqi armed forces and essentially putting a large number of armed and military-trained Iraqis into unemployment and desperate economic circumstances. The order worsened the security situation and would eventually bring about the rise of sectarian militias during the civil war a few years later.

Order no. 39, "Foreign Investment," opened up the Iraqi economy to foreign investment to the detriment of local investors as it prevented preferential treatment of Iraqis. Considering the fact that large parts of Iraq's economy were publically held, this order had a profoundly transformative effect on the structure of the Iraqi economy. Although natural resources and oil were excluded, the order basically ensured massive privatization of nearly all major state industries by lowering eliminating taxes and eliminating custom duties on foreign companies. Order no. 37, for instance, replaced the progressive tax structure with a flat tax rate for both individuals and corporations.

Rather than encourage investments, these reforms increased capital flight and unemployment, as local industries were unable to compete. The "market fundamentalists" of the CPA did not factor in the fact that the already devastated Iraqi economy was in dire need of protections to get off to a good start (Abdullah 2006). Order no. 87 dealt with "Public Contracts" and established open competition in the process of awarding contracts, without protecting local contractors. In other words, it made sure that the contract work in relation to the reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq would be handed to foreign companies (especially US companies like Halliburton, Bechtel, and Fluor) rather than allowing Iraqis to rebuild their own country. Finally, Order no. 100, "Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority," ensured that these CPA laws would continue to be in force until they were amended by the transitional government or its successors. However, this was a difficult task for any future government, as any changes to these arrangements might compel a government to provide payment of compensation for lost profits under international foreign investment rules, exposing it to liability under international trade law. Order no. 100, therefore, further entrenched these structural changes, locking future Iraqi governments and constraining its capacity for policy-making.

The Bremer Orders were in clear violation of international law, namely, the 1907 Hague Convention, which precludes an occupying power from transforming a society to its likeness. Nevertheless, the US occupation of Iraq as described above could be considered to have brought about a new form of "transformative" occupation under international law. As legal scholar Andrea Carcano has shown, "the occupation of Iraq stands out because it . . . [was] 'transformative'. Not since the aftermath of World War II and the post surrender occupations of Germany and Japan had the world witnessed as occupation undertaken to install a new political and economic regime in lieu of an exiting one on a grand scale" (Carcano 2015). One could go further to argue that through the CPA and its orders, the US administration

"legalized" the economic plunder of the Iraqi state (Mattei and Nader 2008).

US plans in relation to Iraq's oil were more elusive until leaks of secret talks emerged on the drafting of a new hydrocarbon oil law, whereby production sharing agreements (or the like) would be used to allow foreign oil companies complete access to oil, notwithstanding Iraqi legal ownership (Muttitt 2011). This cosmetic arrangement was developed due to the high sensitivity of the question of oil in Iraq and to avoid any mass outcry. The new oil law would have significantly altered the balance of power between the Iraqi government and the foreign oil companies that was altered after the 1961 Law No. 80, which resisted the exploitative terms of the foreign-owned Iraq Petroleum Company and which initiated the nationalization of Iraq's oil wealth – a process that was completed in 1972, when every Iraqi oil field was nationalized. The US and foreign oil companies were looking to reverse this long process of nationalization. In the end, the plans to fully privatize Iraq's oil were abandoned due to the exploding of mass resistance of Iraqi civil society and trade unions, especially the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions (Muttitt 2011). Through incessant protests and strikes, Iraqi workers and civil society were able to shift the national conversation, successfully preventing (for the time being) the passing of this colonial oil law, which would have led to the complete foreign control and the privatization of Iraqi oil under the legitimacy of a democratically elected Iraqi government.

Conclusion

The CPA transferred "sovereignty" to an Iraqi Interim Government led by an American picked, Ayad Allawi, on June 28, 2004. This was followed with the Iraqi Transitional Government in May 2005, and national elections on May 20, 2006, which elected the first Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki. The new 'democratic' Iraqi institutions that emerged from the occupation were sectarian by structure and design – something that never existed in the past. With no plans for actual

reconciliation, sectarianism would be reflected in every aspect of the emerging political process, whether it was in the elections for the National Assembly or the drafting and adoption of a new constitution at the end of 2005 (Al-Ali 2014).

What emerged after the invasion and occupation of Iraq was an extremely weak state with a political system divided across ethno-sectarian rather than nationalist lines. For these reasons, it was easily swayed by regional powers, not to mention terrorists groups, such as ISIS. Iran, for instance, gained a major foothold through its influence of the Shia'a political parties in power. The constitution, which was so hastily drafted and passed by an unelected group of conservative individuals, did not turn into a document for national unity and reconciliation but rather sowed division and distrust among Iraqis, particularly the Sunni community, who felt they were excluded from the constitutional process. Moreover, it ensured that the powers of the federal (as opposed to provincial) government were so limited that Iraq would become one of the weakest states in the world (Al-Ali 2014). The constitution therefore "set in motion a destructive cycle that has wrought havoc since the day it was entered into force" (Al-Ali 2014). This would erupt in a bloody civil war, which would tear apart the country for years to come.

This chapter has reconsidered some of the most important events of the modern history of Iraq, focusing on its relationship to imperialism, international law, and world order. I have shown how in every "world order" since World War I, Iraq had a central place in strategies of imperial powers, and this was principally due to its geopolitical significance, especially its vast oil resources. The "sovereign" Iraq that emerged after the Mandate system was constructed to ensure Great Power access to Iraqi oil, while the first Gulf War and the 2003 invasion were planned to ensure US supremacy over the region, for whoever controls the "global oil spigot" that is the Persian Gulf controls the global economy (Harvey 2003).

International law was an important part of the workings of US imperialist schemes and strategies to wage war, impose sanctions, and invade, occupy, and transform Iraq. There is no doubt

therefore that one could not adequately understand Iraq's past or present without grasping how imperialism, international law, and the global political economy are intimately connected and how they always diverged there. Finally, the notion of a New World Order was evoked on every turn, and this clearly illustrates a truism highlighted by Noam Chomsky: "The New World Order is "new" only in that it adapts traditional policies of domination and exploitation to somewhat changed contingencies; it is much admired by the West because it is recognized to be a device to keep "the countries and people of the world" in their proper place. *The bottles may be new; the wine, however, is of ancient vintage*" (Chomsky 1994). A close examination of the modern history of Iraq certainly affirms this persistence to be a characteristic of imperialism in the Third World.

Cross-References

▶ Rule of Law and Imperialism

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I

Irish History and Imperialism

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John Stuart Mill wrote in 1868: "Englishmen who know India are the men who can best understand the social ideas and economic relations of Ireland." A few years earlier, Karl Marx also made a comparison between the two: India was "from a social point of view…the Ireland of the East." The reversed order here is significant because it was at least partially through their study of Ireland and its history that Marx and Engels came to question their earlier optimistic assumptions about the global spread of capitalist production. English involvement in Ireland preceded capitalist industrialization by over half a millennium. The fact that prolonged English rule in Ireland seemed to have created not an advanced economy but a social catastrophe did not bode well for later colonies of the British Empire (Marx and Engels 1978; Mill 1868).

The first "imperial" invasion of Ireland in the twelfth century was part of a wider process of feudal expansion across Europe. By the mid-thirteenth century, the feudal knights – owing allegiance to the English monarchy – had taken control of most of the country and established a network of towns especially along the south and east coasts. The English rulers introduced a feudal system of government and social organization similar to that being established across most of Europe. At the core of this social order was a manorial economy worked, in the main, by servile labor. The sale of the agricultural surplus encouraged the growth of towns (Anderson 1974; Down 1987).

The Anglo-Norman conquest involved not merely a replacement of rulers, but the imposition of a very different social order. Cattle-rearing was at the heart of the Gaelic economy. Land was owned by the kin group and was allocated by one's position within the clan, but cattle were individually owned. Cattle were also the main form of exchange and tribute. This form of social organization imposed significant obstacles to surplus extraction. There was very little opportunity for labor intensification, and herders could flee from the territory with their cattle if they faced excessive exactions from chiefs. Aside from this, cattle tended to be dispersed to minimize disease, which helped promote strong kinship bonds. This social context limited the authority of the Gaelic chiefs and discouraged the concentration of social power, contrasting sharply with the structures of feudal society.

One significant difference between the Norman feudal conquest of England and Ireland was that while the former was a mainly aristocratic affair – knights and clerics – the conquest of Ireland included a significant plebeian element. This difference was in part a consequence of the demographic expansion that occurred in England in the preceding century and in part a consequence of the difficulties the conquerors encountered in bringing to heel the indigenous population. At the margins of feudal Ireland, in upland areas and in the west and north, a distinctive clannic-pastoralist social order endured. Its persistence had long-term consequences for Ireland's historical development.

In the conquered areas, the new rulers established a manorial economy based upon an extensive arable agriculture, involving a significant shift from pastoral husbandry. The divide between settler and native became an important aspect of the structure of power in medieval Ireland. The rural population was divided into two layers: a small stratum of free English-speaking peasants and the unfree *betagh* – serfs – the original Irish population. The manorial economy produced a sufficient surplus to maintain a vibrant commercial order and to help finance England's wars against France and Scotland. The towns were exclusively English.

Toward the end of the thirteenth century, the European feudal order experienced a generalized crisis which strongly impacted on Ireland. Demographic expansion had reached its environmental limits; climate change – a mini ice age – tipped the feudal order over the brink. Over the course of the fourteenth century, there was a significant decline in production and trade which was magnified by

the arrival of the Black Death from the 1340s. Population fell by up to two fifths. The feudal aristocracy responded to the crisis by increased warfare and pillage and by attempting to increase the level of exactions on the peasantry.

In Ireland, the outcome of the feudal crisis was shaped by the distinctive features of an ethnically divided peasantry and by the survival of a clannic-pastoralist social order at the margins. The formerly free English-speaking peasants found themselves increasingly squeezed by lordly exactions, while the Gaelic-speaking peasants were in a better position to flee to marginal zones. Attempts were made in England and across Europe to reimpose conditions of servility. In Ireland, this was combined with efforts to maintain English law, customs, and language.

The feudal crisis in Ireland led to the breakdown of most of the manorial economy. The English-speaking stratum largely disappeared, serfdom collapsed, and the urban centers experienced significant decline. Gaelic clans regained control over large areas of the country, reestablishing their distinctive social order in which pastoral production predominated. Even in the lowland areas of the south and east where the colony was strongest, the feudal lords had to make significant concessions to the indigenous population and a hybrid social order emerged that combined Gaelic and feudal elements. By 1500, English rule in Ireland had shrunk to a small area around Dublin, known as the Pale (Coakley 2012; Down 1987; Nicholls 1972).

Across Europe, the systemic crisis of feudalism led to the emergence of centralized states which sought to establish uniform systems of law. Feudal lords struggled to maintain their control over their own regions and were amenable to accepting the power of a strong monarchy. In England, the centralization of monarchical power, especially in the legal sphere, was closely linked to the development of vernacular literacy. This process coincided with the religious reformation, which led to prolonged conflict ending with Europe divided – roughly speaking – between a Protestant north and a Catholic south (Anderson 1974).

The Tudor program for the (re-)incorporation of Ireland was different from the original Anglo-Norman conquest in a number of ways. It sought to incorporate the Gaelic chiefs into the English state system and to anglicize the Gaelic regions. It also involved reformation of the Irish church.

A combination of coercion and conciliation secured the formal acquiescence of the leading Gaelic chiefs and Anglo-Norman lords alike. This formal compliance enabled the English government to introduce a program of structural reorganization, focused around a scheme of "surrender and re-grant." The chiefs and lords formally surrendered their lands to the monarch who regranted them under conditions of English law. This was intended as a precursor for a more general imposition of English law on Ireland. In effect, collective ownership of land, structured through kinship, was to be replaced by individual ownership. In practice, the English state for most of the sixteenth century lacked the power to carry through a thorough reorganization of Irish society. The attempts by the chiefs and by the Anglo-Norman lords to increase their local power and their level of surplus extraction resulted in widespread resistance and deepening social conflict. This social unrest was compounded by the Tudor monarchy's attempt to impose the Protestant reformation on Ireland.

A feature of the reformation across Europe was the widespread use of vernacular languages for religious services and scripture as part of a general project of making religion more accessible to the lay population. In Wales it seems that the translation of the Bible and other sacred texts into Welsh played a crucial role in promoting a Welsh reformation and incorporating Wales into the English political system. In Ireland, the reformation was disseminated through English, a language spoken by very few people. Over the course of the sixteenth century, opposition to the English state's secular policies of social engineering fused with hostility to their project of religious transformation.

Ireland had been Christianized a half millennium before the Anglo-Norman conquest when following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire the Christian church was at its weakest. The early Christian missionaries adapted to the Gaelic social order developing a decentralized

church organization and establishing a Gaelic literate tradition.

England's battle to incorporate Ireland coincided with intensified interstate competition, sharpened by the rise of European naval powers. With the beginnings of the colonization of the Americas and the rise of an Atlantic economy, Ireland came to acquire a new geopolitical importance, especially in the context of English rivalry with Spain and France. For the English rulers, pacifying Ireland had come to involve much more than land acquisition; it had come to impact on the security of their kingdom.

The Gaelic chiefs who had initially accepted the English reformation found themselves in a precarious situation. They had never possessed a monopoly of power in their own territories, and while their new alliances with the English authorities may have strengthened them at a material level, it also reduced their level of popular consent. Trapped between a disgruntled population and an overbearing government, they threw their lot in with Counter-Reformation Spain. Religious conflict, contrasting modes of social organization, and geopolitical rivalries combined to ensure that the incorporation of Ireland took the form of a full-scale deeply destructive conquest, involving a huge loss of life (Canny 2001; Coakley 2012; Lennon 1994).

The Elizabethan rulers had hoped to encourage a mass English settlement in Ireland, but while significant numbers did migrate, they were much too few to overwhelm the native population demographically. Only in Ulster, where Gaelic resistance had been strongest, did a sufficiently dense settlement occur, and even there most of the settlers were Scottish, though there was a significant minority of settlers of English descent.

The defeat of the Gaelic revolt had coincided with the end of the Tudor dynasty in England and the merger of the English and Scottish polities under the Stuart monarchy. While the new king was of Scottish origins, the center of gravity of the unified kingdom was very much in the South of England. The political unification of England and Scotland did create some religious tensions, which had ramifications in Ireland. The Scottish Protestants were Calvinist (Presbyterians), while the Church of England (Anglican) was first and foremost a national church, with its own hierarchy.

A popular revolt in Ireland in 1641 sparked a civil war throughout the islands as parliament and monarchy in England vied for control of the newly established standing army that was being raised to crush it. The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland that followed was devastating. William Petty, a Cromwellian official, conservatively estimated that over a third of the Irish population died in the course of the conquest. The officers of the Cromwellian army were compensated for their services with large grants of Irish land (Smyth 2006).

In Ireland, religious adherence rather than skin color or place of birth came to guard the borders of power. In 1600, 80% of land in Ireland was owned by Catholics; a century later that figure had fallen to 14%. Catholics were excluded from the legal system, from the parliament, from the military, and from the state employment. Landownership, education, and most of commerce were dominated by Protestants. Despite all this, there were significant limitations to the power of the Irish Protestant landed elite. They still had to make a profit from the land, and outside of the northeast region, settler numbers were too few to work the land themselves. More than that, the high death tolls from the conquests meant that labor was a scarce commodity in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The peasants possessed a demographic advantage in this period, and the landowners had little choice but to rent out the land to a layer of middlemen who came to accommodate the customary practices of the peasantry. Social peace was established by permitting the peasantry to maintain, to a considerable degree, a traditional way of life (Beames 1983; Coakley 2012).

The Far Side of Industrialization

The industrial revolution in England had a huge knock-on effect on Ireland, as it did on Scotland, but with very different outcomes. Urbanization within England created a huge market for food,

and the Irish landowners began a serious effort to reorganize agrarian society in order to profit from the new opportunities. From the 1780s, the Irish population began to rise rapidly to about eight million in 1840, not least as a consequence of the ubiquity of potato farming. The demographic balance turned in favor of the landlords. However, the attempts to restructure landholdings came up against fierce resistance from clandestine peasant movements who had a deep commitment to maintaining the right of access to land. The effective exclusion of Catholics from the legal system worked against the formation of a stable alliance between a more prosperous stratum of peasantry and the landlords. More than that: the Irish parliament had passed legislation that ensured that any improvements made by tenants which increased the value of the landholdings could be confiscated by the landlords, while tenants enjoyed minimal legal protection. The combination of factors ensured that the Irish peasantry had no material interest in any form of agricultural improvement (Ó Tuathaigh 1990).

The contrast with (lowland) Scotland is striking. There, a layer of capitalist "yeoman" farmers emerged who, in alliance with the landowners, exercised considerable power over the increasingly landless laborers. From the second half of the eighteenth century, lowland Scotland came to develop a three class agrarian social order of landlords, capitalist farmers, and landless laborers, similar to England. This layer of capitalist farmers helped to create a mass market for consumer goods in the countryside, which in turn fostered industrial production in the Scottish cities (Coakley 2012).

There were significant social changes and economic advances in Ireland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Agriculture became more commercialized and markets more widespread especially in the eastern regions. Literacy spread and the confessional-based social order in Ireland came under increasing strain. The success of the American drive for independence encouraged the (mainly Protestant) Irish middle classes to challenge English mercantilism and to seek parliamentary reform and greater autonomy from Westminster. In the 1780s many

of the discriminatory laws against Catholics were abolished, though they were still prevented from becoming members of Parliament.

The success of the French Revolution radicalized the reform movement. The fact that the revolution occurred in a Catholic country undermined the confessional stereotypes and raised the prospects of an Irish political and social revolution that transcended religious boundaries. Support for the United Irish movement – as the local Jacobin supporters were called – was particularly strong among the Presbyterians of east Ulster, many of whom had links with the American rebellion. By the late 1790s, the United Irish movement had acquired mass support across the east coast (Whelan 1996; Smyth 1992).

Almost as many people died in 1 year in the course of the suppression of the United Irish revolt – 30–40,000 – as were sent to the guillotine throughout the whole of the French Revolution. One political consequence of the defeat of the United Irish rebellion was a change of government structure. The Westminster government concluded that the settler ruling class in Ireland could not be trusted to govern the country. With the passing of the Act of Union in 1801, Ireland became, formally, an integral part of British state, the United Kingdom. What would become known as the "Anglo-Irish" ruling class was integrated into the British political order, where they were elected as members of parliament and appointed to the House of Lords. While the British government in Westminster governed Ireland directly, they also maintained a distinct governmental apparatus within Ireland. Westminster appointed a Lord Lieutenant – effectively a colonial governor – who controlled an increasingly centralized executive apparatus to rule Ireland. This enabled them to introduce measures like the creation of the national policing force or a primary educational system distinct from the rest of the United Kingdom and which could act as test cases for administrative changes closer to home. The Lord Lieutenant's office also commanded a substantial military force and later an armed constabulary (Kenny 2004).

The exclusion of Catholics from Parliament was challenged by the election of Daniel

O'Connell, a Catholic lawyer, to the House of Commons in 1829. Westminster responded by removing the prohibition against Catholics while simultaneously reducing the size of the Irish electorate from 100,000 to 10,000 (Ó Tuathaigh 1990).

In the first decades following the industrial revolution in England, there was a significant expansion of domestic textile manufacturing across Ireland, primarily spinning and weaving, but this largely collapsed with the rise of factory production in England, accentuating Ireland's socioeconomic problems. As England industrialized, Ireland became a major exporter of agricultural products to English markets. By the 1840s Ireland had become England's granary. These changes in agricultural production were not accompanied by a transformation in agrarian social relations. On the contrary, the "middleman" structure of land tenancy intensified. Each layer of middlemen extracted substantial rent, crushing those at the bottom. The commercialization of Irish agriculture came up against customary practice. Despite the popular resistance to landlord-directed agrarian transformation, the process of parcellization of the land in Ireland continued with more and more peasants driven to the most marginal lands. The process was facilitated by the widespread adoption of the potato as the premier subsistence crop. Increasingly a huge section of the population became dependent upon a single crop for their survival. The potato crop was grown on only one twentieth of Irish farmland, but it fed most of the population. By the 1840s, this disproportion had reached a perilous state. A potato blight in 1845 pushed Ireland over the edge into a full-scale famine (Ó Tuathaigh 1990).

Throughout the famine years (1845–1849), large quantities of grain and other food products continued to be exported to England. Famine relief was grossly inadequate, and many landowners took advantage of the famine to clear their property of uneconomic tenancies.

In *Late Victorian Holocausts*, Mike Davis described the internment camps established by the British in India to manage famine conditions in the 1870s. The workhouses performed a similar function in Ireland in the 1840s, separating parents from children and husbands from wives. Many were ill, but all were forced to work because of the widely held belief among the English and Anglo-Irish elite that the primary cause of Ireland's social problems was the indolence and backwardness of the native population. Over a million people died of starvation or related diseases. In the years following 1845, another two million people emigrated.

In 1848, the London *Times* which had opposed expenditure on famine relief expressed the view that the Irish people "have always been listless, improvident and wretched, under whatever rulers...They have not participated in the great progress of mankind...We do pity them, because they have yet to be civilised." Political economists like Malthus had argued that Ireland was overpopulated and needed radical reconstruction if a modern capitalist form of agriculture was to be established. Much of the English and Anglo-Irish ruling class welcomed the famine as an opportunity for clearing the land. A further factor facilitating the high death toll in the famine was the belief in ruling circles that assisting the starving peasantry with government relief would interfere with the workings of free trade. The Great Famine coincided closely with the rise of free trade as the global gospel of the British Empire. Nassau Senior, a leading economist and adviser to Queen Victoria, remarked that the famine "would not kill more than one million people, and that would scarcely be enough to do any good" (Davis 2001; Eagleton 1995; Kinealy 2002; McDonough 2005).

In the wake of the famine, there was a sharp reduction in the practice of the subdivision of landholdings. Without access to land, the peasantry increasingly opted for emigration as a survival mechanism. Alongside spiralling emigration was a process of the centralization of landholdings and the emergence of a more prosperous peasant stratum. Despite this, the Irish countryside never became dominated by large labor-employing farms. Small farms remained the norm; the great majority had less than 30 acres. Only 5% of tenants held plots of over a hundred acres; another 10% rented plots of over 50 acres. The landlord class showed little inclination to develop a long-

term alliance with them. Westminster passed an act in 1860 giving landlords complete power over their estates and blocking any customary rights to tenants. The more prosperous peasants could not afford to put too great a distance between themselves and the mass of the peasantry.

One legacy of the famine was the radicalization of a younger generation who concluded that it was necessary to destroy landlordism and achieve complete independence from Britain. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) founded by exiles in Paris built up a clandestine organization determined to politicize the population and plan for insurrection. The insurrection of 1867 was easily enough suppressed, but the Fenians (as the IRB became known) helped politicize the popular social classes. In particular, Fenians played a crucial role in instigating the Land War in the 1870s and 1880s (Coakley 2012)

Competition from the new settler economies in North America, Argentina, and Australia led to a collapse in agricultural prices. The spectre of famine returned. Attempts by landowners to use the crisis to push through land clearances provoked a wave of popular resistance led by Fenians (or ex-Fenians) and the formation of the Land League in 1879.

The "Land War" began in the poorest western regions of Ireland but quickly spread throughout the country. Fears of another famine combined with a new level of political awareness (and the arrival of mass literacy) encouraged the formation of a mass movement that paralyzed the state and exposed the structural weakness of the Anglo-Irish landlord class. Within a year of its formation, the Land League had over a thousand branches and 200,000 members. William Forster a leading government official wrote: "the Land League is supreme...I am forced to acknowledge that to a great extent the ordinary law is powerless." To broaden its base, the Land League developed an alliance with the constitutional nationalists and their leader, Charles Stuart Parnell. The "New Departure" as it became known called for peasant proprietorship, full self-government, and complete independence from Westminster. It also opposed imperial expansion (Bew 1978).

The scale of the popular resistance in Ireland and the political threat posed by the alliance between republican radicals and the constitutional nationalists created a major challenge to the British state. Coercion was attempted but with limited effect. Gladstone, Prime Minister and Liberal leader, was forced not only to adopt a conciliatory approach to the agrarian protest movement but also to accept the need for radical political change in Ireland: the ending of landlord power and the institution of limited self-government.

Gladstone's support for Home Rule divided British Liberalism. Landed interests remained dominant within the British ruling class at least until the World War I. The granting of Home Rule for Ireland was perceived as a major erosion of landed power. More than that: it undermined the empire. While Gladstone sought to draw analogies with Canada during the parliamentary debates, the question of India kept arising.

The Home Rule debates brought out the stark contrast between Ireland's formal integration into the British state and its colonial heritage. Tory leader Lord Salisbury described the Irish Home Rule members of parliament as "eighty foreigners." Sir George Campbell, former governor of Bengal, wrote that Ireland "is a colony which we have only partially colonised, and in which the natives have neither been exterminated nor thoroughly assimilated and we have the race difficulties in the way of self-governing institutions with which we are familiar with in other colonies, but in a more aggravated form" (Coakley 2012).

The divisions created within the British ruling class by the Home Rule crisis signalled an erosion of liberal imperialist culture. In the mid-Victorian era, liberal theorists like John Stuart Mill had argued that Britain's role toward its colonies was essentially that of a benefactor, analogous to that of parents toward their children. The native populations of the colonies were at an early stage of social and cultural development, akin to children, who needed careful supervision. Once they advanced to a higher level, at some point in the future, they would be permitted independence. The revolt in India and the mutinous behavior of the Irish had demonstrated not only the ingratitude of the natives but also their incorrigible character.

By the late Victorian era, it became widely accepted in British ruling circles that there existed a fathomless chasm between the civilized peoples and those they ruled over. This expressed not just divergent levels of development but a deeper divide between higher and lower races. This shift in elite opinion seems to have been sharpened by the reemergence of social unrest within England, giving greater weight to the need for domestic social cohesion. The innate superiority of British civilization, and of the English race within that civilization, became a cardinal belief of the era, shared high and low (Mantena 2010).

Conservatives and Liberal Unionists responded to Gladstone's initiative by focusing on Ulster, the only part of Ireland where there was any significant popular opposition to Home Rule. The northern province of Ulster was the only region of Ireland where a colonial mass settlement had been successful. However, in Ulster, there were two fairly distinct settler communities, Presbyterians from Scotland and Anglicans from England. Though not as severely maltreated as the Catholics, the Presbyterians did experience significant levels of exclusion, and over the course of the eighteenth century, they became increasingly alienated from the governing order. Heavily influenced by the American settler revolution, with which many had close connections, they played a leading role in the United Irish rebellion.

In the wake of the 1798 rebellion, the predominantly Anglican landlord class made an effort to reunify the Protestant communities in the province, upholding the informal traditions of the "Ulster Custom," which gave tenant farmers far greater levels of security than existed elsewhere in Ireland. As a consequence, there existed in Ulster, especially in the eastern regions where Protestants were concentrated, a more prosperous layer of tenant farmers than was found elsewhere in the country. The Presbyterian tenant farmers of the north largely supported the demands of the Land League but were more cautious about the rebellious spirit it seemed to encourage.

The northeast was the only region in Ireland to experience any significant level of industrialization in the nineteenth century. The linen industry was slower to mechanize than the other textile industries, and by the mid-century, the Belfast region had become the main geographical center for linen production. Later in the century, the industrialization of the Belfast region was consolidated by the development of a passenger shipbuilding industry. This industrial growth enabled the northeast to escape the worst of the underdevelopment that marked the rest of Ireland, but it remained much too limited to overcome the wider Irish socioeconomic context. Specifically, it was insufficient to provide employment for the "surplus" population of Ulster, much less the rest of Ireland. Many more handicraft textile workers were made redundant by the process of mechanization than were employed in the new factories. Between 1841 and 1911, Ireland lost half its population, while Ulster lost a third. The limited character of industrialization in the Belfast region encouraged the reemergence of a confessional politics in the region. Anglican laborers imported the anti-Catholic Orange Order into Belfast in the early nineteenth century. Later, as a nationalist mass movement developed, Orangism broadened its social appeal. From the period of the Home Rule bill in the 1880s, Ulster Unionism and Orangism effectively merged. The alliance between Conservatives and Liberal Unionists (they would later merge to form the Conservative and Unionist Party: the Tory Party) proved sufficiently powerful to block Gladstone's Home Rule bills in the 1880s, but they were unable to suppress the nationalist political movement in Ireland or to curtail a resurgent nationalist popular culture.

What a Conservative government did do was to initiate a policy of peasant proprietorship in Ireland: the state lent money to tenants to buy out the landlords. This policy, "killing Home Rule by kindness," had a major long-term effect, though by the time of the World War I it had only been partially implemented. It helped to strengthen a stratum of large farmers and, alongside them, an emergent Catholic middle class (Coakley 2012).

Ireland and the Imperialist War

Throughout the long period of its global ascendancy in the nineteenth century, Britain avoided becoming involved in fixed alliances with other European states, preferring a more flexible "balance of power" approach. This changed in the early twentieth century. Growing rivalry with Germany and increased dependence on India to maintain sterling's role as the world's hegemonic currency compelled Britain into an alliance with Tsarist Russia (which was seen as a potential threat to British rule in India). This geopolitical logic for war was reenforced by the need to unify their domestic population against deepening political antagonisms and social unrest. The Irish drive for independence played a key role here (De Cecco 1984; Newton 2015).

After the 1910 election, the Liberal Party was dependent upon support from the Irish Home Rule Party to govern and was compelled to introduce a new Home Rule bill. Despite the fact that the Home Rule bill granted Ireland very limited powers of self-government, it was strongly opposed by the Tories. The Tories encouraged militant opposition in Ulster, and the British state apparatus acquiesced in the arming of Ulster loyalist volunteers, who were determined to use force if necessary to block Home Rule. Irish nationalists responded by developing their own force of armed volunteers.

The European war was welcomed by many in the ruling class because it seemed to offer the prospect of overcoming these domestic conflicts and unifying the kingdom against an external enemy. Both the leadership of the Ulster Unionists and of the Home Rule Party supported the war effort and encouraged the volunteers to enlist in the British Army.

If Europe's leaders imagined that a large-scale war would instill widespread social discipline, they miscalculated badly. The sheer scale of the slaughter undermined the legitimacy of their rule, not only in Europe but throughout the colonial world. The 1916 insurrection in Dublin by the radical separatists of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the labor leftists in the Irish Citizen Army captured the popular imagination in Ireland, as well as inspiring opponents of empire across the world.

The extent of the transformation of Irish political life became evident in 1917, when the British government attempted to impose conscription on Ireland. The anti-conscription movement was the broadest and deepest mass campaign in Ireland since the Land War. Not only was the conscription plan defeated, but it laid the groundwork for Sinn Fein's victory in the 1918 elections. Both socially and politically, Sinn Fein was a coalition of forces, ranging from left-leaning radical republicans to more moderate nationalists who were alienated by the Home Rule leaders' support for the war.

The elected Sinn Féin members refused to go to Westminster, meeting instead in Dublin to declare a separate Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann, and an independent republic. This triggered a battle of independence with the republicans developing a guerrilla war strategy. Though poorly armed, they succeeded in paralyzing the workings of the British state in Ireland.

The war of independence was also accompanied by a wave of social unrest. In rural areas there was a new upsurge in land agitation. Half of the land was still owned by landlords, and small holders struggled for access, especially where land had been allocated to graziers. There was also a wave of labor struggles provoked by a wartime wage freeze. Both struggles were encouraged by a paralysis of the state, which enabled a huge growth of trade union membership (Campbell 2005; Kostick 2009).

The war of independence revealed the weakness of the British state in Ireland: its conspicuous failure to establish any significant degree of hegemony. But it also revealed the social conflicts within nationalist Ireland. Rising social tensions within Ireland encouraged both the British government and the Sinn Fein leadership to seek a compromise solution.

The 1921 Treaty accepted partition and the British insistence that Ireland remain part of the British Empire. The six counties in the northeast, Northern Ireland, remained part of the United

Kingdom but acquired a separate parliament and a regional government. The "Irish Free State" would have dominion status within the empire, similar to Canada or Australia. The British monarch would remain head of state, and all members of the Irish parliament would have to swear allegiance to the crown. The Royal Navy would also retain control of a number of ports.

The Treaty was passed narrowly by the Dáil but opposed by most of the republican activists. The civil war that followed was won by the Free State forces with the assistance of the British state. The defeat of the republicans was also accompanied by a suppression of agrarian radicalism and a rolling back of labor rights and organization (Lee 1989; Regan 1999).

The two new states in Ireland bore the marks of their origins. The Cumman na nGaedheal government of the Irish Free State sought to maintain institutional continuity with the British order. The civil service and the legal system were retained more or less intact, and there was little change in social or economic policy. The effect was to continue Ireland's subordination to Britain. The vast bulk of Irish exports – overwhelmingly agricultural – went to Britain. The Irish currency was tied to sterling. Interest rates were determined by the Bank of England and the Treasury in London. The government was dominated by ministers from large farming and upper middle-class backgrounds who were reluctant to adopt any policies of state-led development or import substitution.

Only with the coming of the depression did matters change. Fianna Fáil, formed from elements of the losing side in the civil war, came to power in 1932 and began a program of encouraging industrialization through import substitution and protective tariffs. Semi-state bodies were formed to promote development, and some effort was made to reduce the worst of the poverty. They introduced a major program of publically owned house building. The Fianna Fáil government ended the Oath of Allegiance to the monarchy and began the process of distancing themselves from the British Empire. These policies did lead to some growth in industrial employment and did something to improve social conditions, but it was never enough to compensate for the "flight from the land" or eliminate the legacies of uneven development.

Northern Ireland was the only part of the United Kingdom permitted a devolved government. It was ironically the only part where a mass movement opposing devolution existed. The Northern Irish state was dominated from its formation by the Ulster Unionist Party, the local branch of the Tory Party. Almost all the Unionist members of parliament were also members of the Orange Order, which helped it secure majority support from all classes of Protestants in Northern Ireland. The Unionist leaders had envisaged that Northern Ireland was economically the most advanced part of Ireland, but in the interwar years, economic stagnation was even more extreme than in England. Both shipbuilding and linen industries were in decline, and unemployment and emigration rates were much higher than elsewhere in the United Kingdom, though at all times, these rates were far higher among Catholics than among Protestants. The practices of systematic exclusion of Catholics from most areas of public and private employment left a legacy of discontent which would later explode and engulf the state in decades of civil warfare (Farrell 1976; Lee 1989).

Cross-References

▶ Easter Rising 1916
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ James Connolly: Labor, Empire, Ireland

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J

J. A. Hobson and Economic Imperialism

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Synonyms

Biography; Capital export; Imperialism; John A. Hobson; Underconsumption

Definition

This essay explores the work of British social liberal and writer John Atkinson Hobson (1858–1940), focusing on his evolving understanding of economic imperialism, its causes and its consequences. It concludes with an assessment of Hobson's contemporary significance.

In 1902, John Atkinson Hobson (1858–1940), published *Imperialism: A Study*. In this, his most famous work, he argued that there was a systemic mal-distribution of income and of wealth in advanced capitalist societies that led, on the one side, to under-consumption by the masses; on the other, to over-saving by the few rich. He went on to claim that, unable to find profitable markets at home, this over-saving was translated into investments in overseas markets and had been, amongst other things, the primary motivation behind Britain's recent imperial expansion in Africa and Asia. This is undoubtedly Hobson's most famous anti-imperial argument but two cautions are necessary. In the first place, *Imperialism* offered far more than just a bald theory of economic imperialism and was actually a brilliant critique of many aspects of British imperial ideas and practice. Second, although the fullest and most compelling of his works on empire and imperialism, Hobson lived a long life and changed his mind on the subject on more than one occasion.

Hobson's Early Writings

Hobson was the son of a provincial newspaper owner who supported the Liberal orthodoxy of free trade, low taxation, and a very limited role for government in the economy. Hobson did not initially think differently. After taking a disappointing degree at Oxford, he became a schoolmaster in Exeter. In the mid-1880s, he moved to London where he wrote a weekly column for his father's paper on national and international affairs, and then began to contribute to the periodical press. In the late 1880s he approved of British 'free trade imperialism' in China as a means of encouraging exports: and when alerted by Charles Booth's survey of the London masses to the dire poverty of so many of them, his first reaction was to fear that their position would be made worse by the looming industrialisation of Asia under Western auspices; that inclined him to hint that protection was a solution (Hobson 1891).

Also, when Joseph Chamberlain, a leading imperialist politician, suggested in 1896 the establishment of an imperial Zollverein which would put a tariff barrier around the white empire, Hobson was quite supportive of the idea.

However, by the mid-1890s, his views on the economy were changing swiftly. In 1889 he and A.F. Mummery produced *The Physiology of Industry* which challenged the orthodox notion that full employment was the norm towards which free markets were constantly tending. At first this theoretical revolution had little impact on Hobson's policy views: but, partly under the influence of radicals such as William Clarke, by 1896, in *The Problem of the Unemployed,* he was claiming that inequality was producing underconsumption and over-saving; and that they could only be corrected by redistribution of income and of wealth (for the development of Hobson's thinking, see Allett 1981). At the same time, Hobson's rather complacent approach to British imperialism was shaken by the financier Cecil Rhodes's failed attempt to overthrow the Afrikaner government in the Transvaal. That was widely seen on the left of politics in Britain as a prime example of an emergent 'financial imperialism'. But it was only in an article of 1898 that Hobson finally linked domestic economic imbalance with expansion of empire (Hobson 1898). On the strength of that article, Hobson was sent to South Africa by the *Manchester Guardian* to investigate the growing crisis there as Joseph Chamberlain tried to force the Afrikaner republics, whose gold wealth threatened to make them the dominant force in South Africa, to recognise British authority. That confrontation ended in the South African War of 1899–1902. His trip convinced Hobson that Rhodes and other gold magnates had used the British government for their own ends and that, through control of the press, had fooled the public, in South Africa and in Britain, into believing that the war was fought for noble ends rather than to fill the pockets of mining millionaires. Much of his thinking on South Africa was published in *The War in South Africa* (1900) and *The Psychology of Jingoism* (1901). *Imperialism: A Study* went much further and was nothing

less than an attempt to explain the nature of modern imperialism in general.

Hobson and the Radical Tradition

Because Lenin found *Imperialism* useful in constructing his own interpretation of European expansion overseas, historians have often talked of a 'Hobson-Lenin' theory of imperialism. In fact, Hobson's approach owed nothing to Marxism but did reflect a long radical tradition of hostility to imperial expansion which can be traced back as far as Adam Smith and Tom Paine. Radicals were supportive of capitalism: what they objected to was privilege and monopoly; and, of course, they identified the landed interest as the chief example of that. Radicals such as Paine, Bentham, and James Mill also pointed to aristocratic control of the state across Europe and aristocrats' use of government to fight wars and grab colonial possessions with which they could enrich themselves and their allies in the military services and business. Richard Cobden and John Bright, two of Hobson's radical heroes, took up the fight in the mid-nineteenth century, attacking land monopoly, demanding an end to protective duties on agriculture as a form of privilege, claiming that taxes were damaging industrial investment and that their proceeds were too often spent on wars and colonialism that produced jobs for the aristocracy's allies. Herbert Spencer, an enthusiastic Cobdenite whose work Hobson became familiar with, divided the world into 'militant' societies that were aristocratic, hierarchical, warlike, and imperialist; and 'industrial' societies that were based on voluntary co-operation, were economically progressive, and which forged peaceful links with other nations (for more detail on radicalism, see Cain 2002, pp. 47–53).

Once radicalised, Hobson eagerly adopted the Cobden-Spencer line on imperial expansion but he made two great innovations to it. Firstly, he recognised that by 1900 the power of aristocracy had waned and he suggested that it had been superseded, as the chief force maintaining the status quo at home and driving expansion abroad,

by finance and foreign investment: 'militant' society still existed but it was now itself subject to the powers of 'parasitism', a complex of forces centred on the City of London but also now rampant on Wall Street in New York and on the Paris Bourse. Secondly, he linked this financial imperialism directly with his analysis of underconsumption, thus arguing forcefully that the remedies necessary to cure the latter ailment – such as more progressive taxation – would simultaneously remove the pressure for overseas expansion and thus solve the imperial problem that plagued all advanced capitalist societies.

Imperialism: Hobson's Analysis

In *Imperialism,* Hobson was right to identify London and the service sector of the South East of England as the area from which most foreign investment sprang, and in suggesting that it had a big economic stake in imperial expansion. His assumption that foreign investment was largely the concern of a small, wealthy elite also has historical credibility. However, Hobson's attempts to analyse the costs and benefits of imperialism statistically were severely flawed. To begin with, he overestimated the costs of imperial expansion after 1870. He assumed that all increases in defence expenditure since that time could be debited to imperial expansion, whereas only a part of the army costs and a smaller fraction of the naval expenses were so attributable.

Nor did Hobson make a good job of proving his contention that finance gained far more in material terms than any other economic sector and that it was the only sector that gained more than it paid out in terms of the taxes needed to support imperial expansion. In pursuit of this objective, Hobson tried to prove that industry gained very little from the new markets of Africa and Asia. However, he reached this conclusion by using very contentious methods. When estimating the value of exports to the economy, he claimed that this value arose from the extra profit that was gained by selling abroad rather than at home. This 'net value' approach to foreign trade was even challenged by some sympathetic to his general

position. Given that the costs of imperial expansion were lower than Hobson believed, those critics who had a rather more generous view of the importance of foreign trade to the economy could make a reasonable case for saying that new territories were beneficial to industrial exports. Moreover, Hobson failed to engage seriously with the argument that the value of new territories to the economy would be much greater in the future once imperialist control had been fully established.

Hobson also assumed that the returns on foreign investment were much higher than those on foreign trade but, in doing so, he failed to compare like with like. As we have seen, he valued foreign trade in *net* terms but he then went on to compare that with the gross returns on foreign investment, ignoring the possibility that the capital could have found outlets at home, albeit at lower rates of return. Hobson, therefore failed to prove that the returns to investment from imperialism were higher than the returns on trade. In addition, it must be said that he compounded the difficulties of his position by failing to say anything precise about the distribution of British foreign investment. He produced figures which proved that more foreign capital went to areas such as the US and the white British colonies than to areas subject to recent imperial exploitation; but he said little to indicate, for example, which parts of Africa had received large amounts of capital and which had not. His argument that Cecil Rhodes and his financial associates were directly responsible for Britain's imperial aggression in South Africa was asserted rather than proved.

Hobson's other main line of argument was that finance, or rather financial elites in the City of London, controlled the political and military process of expansion. More specifically Hobson identified a cluster of mainly Jewish financiers, operating from the City of London and a number of lesser financial centres, as controllers of the main flows of international capital. In a famous passage he argued that the 'motor power' of imperial expansion was provided by soldiers, traders, missionaries, statesmen: but that finance was the 'governor of the imperial engine, directing its energy and determining its work' (Hobson 1988/1902, p. 59).

Elsewhere in *Imperialism,* however, Hobson unconsciously subverted his simple argument about the dominance of finance in different ways. He was trying to generalise about the whole Western world rather than just explain British imperialism; and when writing of the US, where the relations between finance and manufacturing were different to those in Britain, he spoke of 'the great controllers of industry' as key players. When he was thinking about imperial expansion from a British point of view, Hobson was inclined to present it as the result of a conspiracy engineered by a small group of financiers who had an exceptional degree of power and influence: when considering the US, on the other hand, he was really attributing expansion to 'finance capitalism', a conjunction of industrial and financial interests described in terms that Veblen, Hilferding, or Lenin would have recognised.

He also developed another argument concerning the complicity of a congeries of propertied interests in British imperial expansion which, interesting though it was, undermined the argument that finance was 'the governor of the imperial engine'. At this point he claimed the following:

> The city ground landlord, the country squire, the banker, the usurer, the financier, the brewer, the mine-owner, the ironmaster, the shipbuilder, and the shipping trade, the great export manufacturers and merchants, the clergy of the State Church, the universities and the great public schools, the legal trade unions and the services have … drawn together for common political resistance against attacks upon the power, the property and the privileges that they represent. (142)

Hobson was here describing what Gramsci later called an 'historical bloc' of forces that exercised cultural as well as economic 'hegemony' over the nation and which used imperialism as a means of maintaining the status quo at home. But it is noticeable that in Hobson's list of villains, the financier is accorded no special place.

Lastly, it is evident that Hobson believed the extraordinary influence of financial interests came partly from the fact that they encouraged imperial fervour and even presented expansion as a moral duty, while remaining immune from any emotional commitment to empire and clinically intent on pursuing their economic agenda. Financiers pursued rational economic goals: all other interests involved were irrational, uninformed, or deluded. Hobson's discussion of the wide variety of arguments used to justify imperialism and imperial expansion was often brilliant and arresting. He was also extraordinarily sensitive to the ways that imperialists could cloak essentially materialist concerns – and the violence and exploitation that sometimes involved – in the language of morality, mission, liberty and destiny. Yet in the process he often showed that the financiers were also prisoners of imperial ideology, that they could be as much wedded to causes like 'the civilising mission', as much misled by heightened imperial rhetoric, as anyone else.

Hobson on China and Africa

Much of the emotional force behind the arguments of Imperialism came from Hobson's involvement in South Africa. Yet when in 1898 he first discovered the connection between over-saving and imperialism, his immediate inspiration came from thinking about the growing battle for control of China between the European imperial powers. A careful reading of *Imperialism* reveals clearly what Norman Etherington (1984, chaps. 3–4) has argued: that Hobson thought of the South African crisis as an early stage in the unfolding drama of imperialism, a drama whose central scenes would be acted out in China, the place where the future course of civilisation would be determined. Like many of his contemporaries not only in Britain but also across Europe and the US, Hobson was sure that China's population and resources were so immense that the manner of their development would radically affect the political as well as the economic structures of the globe in the twentieth century. Some British and American writers argued that the powers that controlled China and its market would be pre-eminent for the foreseeable future, and that those who failed to establish themselves would be depressed into the second rank. Certainly, this fear of being left out of what was

potentially the greatest market in the world was a potent force in Great Power diplomacy in China around 1900. But opinion in Britain and other imperial powers was also strongly influenced by a more complex vision of a 'Yellow Peril'. In his *National Life and Character,* first published in 1893, Charles Pearson predicted that China, like Japan, was rapidly learning the economic arts of the West, would soon industrialise itself on modern lines and then become a formidable military power. Western civilisation would be thrust back to its pre-imperialist borders. European powers would be impelled into greater militarism to protect themselves, and into heavier tariffs to contain Chinese competition, stifling the dynamism that had driven Western civilisation for the previous four centuries, and inducing both economic and cultural stagnation and possibly outright decline.

As we have seen, Hobson had anticipated Pearson's predictions about industrial decline in Europe in 1891 though he believed that China could only industrialise under European control. In 1902, Hobson still did not think that China could achieve autonomous economic development: it would, he thought, become such a sink for foreign capital that no one country could command the resources necessary to the task. The outcome would be what Hobson called 'inter-imperialism' (1988/1902, p. 332), a combination of European, American, and Japanese capital resources which would ensure the exploitation of China over the coming generations without military conflict. Based on Western capital and on an abundance of cheap, highly submissive labour, the Chinese economy would be brutally transformed into the mightiest manufacturing nation in the world. As a result, industry in the West would be largely destroyed and its economies would become dependent on services and dominated by financial capitalism. True to his radical perspective, Hobson claimed that the decline of industry in the West would involve far more than simply a loss of economic resources: it would also mean the extinction of liberty, democracy, and progress in general; and Britain, like other Western nations, would become parasitic on the progress of Asia.

Despite the fierceness of his critique of expansion, Hobson shared some of the prejudices of the imperialists he criticised. The first was that no nation or community had the right to cut itself off from international trade and the progressive ideas that such trade brought with it. Secondly, he accepted the common Western assumption that the ancient civilisations of the East had ceased to progress and that they had needed an infusion of the West's energy to awaken them, though he felt that the stimulus given by trade and other informal contact was all that was now required to galvanise them. Besides that, Hobson was convinced that the 'mushroom civilisations of the West' (1988/1902, p. 326) had much they could learn from the East. Thirdly and in contrast, Hobson, like most of his contemporaries, failed to appreciate the richness of the African past and talked of 'lower races' (see the heading of pt II, chap. 4 in *Imperialism*) who could only progress under direct Western leadership because otherwise the local populations would be exploited by European capitalism. But given his belief that current Western governments were in thrall to their business leaders, Hobson argued that, in an ideal world, leadership would be provided by some form of international authority rather than by particular European nations. It was in this context that he first became a vigorous supporter of the idea of international government, and of the League of Nations formed after the First World War, which established the idea, in theory at least, that European nations held their colonial dependencies as mandates granted by the League.

Imperialism and Hobson's Later Writings

In 1902, Hobson painted a black picture of the future partly because he wanted to shock his readers into realising where present policies might lead and to stimulate action against them. His own solution was simple and drastic. Progressive taxation and state welfare spending would eliminate over-saving and, therefore, the main source of foreign investment, and thus reduce the need for imperial expansion. Simultaneously, redistribution would give a boost to domestic

demand and divert to the home market a large part of the produce previously destined for export. The implication of that analysis was that, under this new regime and despite free trade, he expected that the amount of international trade would decline. Economic development in the West would then proceed on lines dictated by local democracy rather than by an international financial oligarchy; and those countries like China that were subject to forced industrialisation under foreign control would be released to develop in ways that best suited their own genius. 'Industry', understood in the broad sense as all forms of productive activity, would triumph over 'parasitism'.

Imperialism is now a 'classic' text but it was not a great success when first published and even some radicals who were impressed by Hobson's domestic arguments thought of empire and imperial expansion as both economically necessary and morally defensible (see e.g. Samuel 1902, pp. 301–325). Although the book was republished in 1905, this was only made possible by a subsidy from a radical organisation. Indeed, from 1910–14, Hobson had drifted far from the arguments of *Imperialism* and was now writing of European expansion overseas as a phase in the extension of a benign, global capitalist network and one that would eventually lead to an economic convergence between the developed and underdeveloped worlds, to global peace and to some form of world government. This strain in Hobson's thinking is most evident in *The Economic Interpretation of Investment* (1911). After 1914, and in the face of world war and then acute economic depression, Hobson drew away from that pre-war optimism. His book *Democracy after the War* (1917) repeated many of the arguments of *Imperialism* and extended some of them. His inter-war writings on imperialism were a sometimes uneasy compromise between the stern denunciations of *Imperialism* and *Democracy after the War* and the rather Panglossian assumptions of 1910–14.

In 1938, aged 80, Hobson decided to republish *Imperialism*. By the late 1930s, middle-class public opinion in Britain was becoming much more critical of empire and imperialism. Under growing

Marxist influence, there was also an increasing tendency to offer economic interpretations of imperial expansion and control, and writers such as John Strachey (1938, pp. 85–89) and Leonard Barnes (1939, p. 195) began to think of Hobson's work as a precursor of Marxism. Encouraged by the new interest and convinced that the approaching war was about re-dividing the imperial spoils, Hobson decided that his ancient text was worth reprinting. But in republishing it, and despite adding a new long preface, he did not attempt to update the argument. Nor did he give any indication that he had ever held different views. His autobiography *Confessions of an Economic Heretic* (1938), published in the same year, suffered from the same degree of amnesia. However, in that autobiography Hobson did confess that he now thought that the stress laid on economic causation in *Imperialism* was overdone (Hobson 1938, pp. 63–64); and he now admitted that economic gains should also be seen as a means of exercising power rather than simply as an end in themselves (especially in Hobson 1937, pp. 13–14, 24). This line of thinking was probably influenced by his reading of Thorstein Veblen but it was not mentioned in the preface to the 1938 edition of *Imperialism* and thus it fell out of view, along with most of the other ideas he had had on the subject before and after 1902.

Hobson's Significance

Hobson's analysis has often been found wanting by historians and economists both in general terms and in specific cases. Nonetheless, a recent analysis by Cain suggests that he still has a lot to offer historians interested in the economic elements of the scramble for territory and influence in Africa and Asia in his own time (2002, chap. 8). Speaking more generally, *Imperialism* remains a book worth reading because the questions it poses about the role of foreign investment in provoking imperial expansion remain on the agenda: for example, Hobson's ideas were important to Cain and Hopkins in helping them recently to reinterpret the evolution of British imperialism (Cain

and Hopkins 2001). It is also true that books like Naomi Klein's *No Logo* (2000), which analyses modern US imperialism, approach their subject from a radical rather than a Marxist perspective and one that is recognisably Hobsonian though Klein might not be aware of it. *Imperialism* also has extremely interesting things to say about the politics, the psychology and even the theology that lay behind imperial expansion in its time, and its commentary on the ideological foundations of the so-called 'civilising mission' are extraordinarily acute. Indeed, some of Hobson's analysis could be applied to empires throughout history. He was, for example, aware – in a way most of his contemporaries, including other critics of empire were not – of just how easy it was for Britons to assume that the possession of military and economic power not only gave their nation the *ability* to possess empire but also the *right* to possess it because it was assumed that the material power was the result of a moral superiority. That was an insight that can be applied to empires from the Assyrian one to the current Chinese hold over Tibet.

If Part I of *Imperialism,* which deals with the economics of empire, is full of errors as well as inspirational ideas, Part II probably deserves a bigger audience from historians than it has so far received. *Imperialism; a Study* may have been published over a century ago but it is still a living text rather than just another item in the historiography of empires.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Finance, Finance Capital, Financialization
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism

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James Connolly: Labor, Empire, Ireland

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Synonyms

Constitutionalism; Easter Rising 1916; Eland; Eurocentrism; First World War; Irish literature; Irish Revival; Nationalism; Republicanism; Revolution; Second International; Separatism; Subaltern Studies

Definition

This entry concerns James Connolly, the most important Marxist thinker and activist Ireland has produced. Famous for his part in the Easter Rising of 1916, Connolly also was intensely active in labor politics, Marxist theorization, and radical historiography. His work is now recognized to contribute to the critique from the imperial margins and global South of the Eurocentrism of the mainstream Marxist tradition, and as such as is seen as proleptic of thinkers as various as Amin and Guha.

James Connolly (1868–1916) is one of the heroic figures of Irish revolutionary history. A leader of the Easter Rising of 1916, he was the last of the signatories of the Proclamation of the Irish Republic to be executed at Kilmainham Jail in Dublin – tied into a chair because his wounds prevented him from standing and shot to death by firing squad.

Yet Connolly was the odd man out among his executed colleagues. He was a proletarian, a labor leader, and a Marxist. These qualifications mark him out for his exceptional status in the pantheon of Irish historical figures of note. More than most of his colleagues – except perhaps the IRB veteran Thomas Clarke – Connolly saw himself for most of his adult life as a *revolutionary.*

Connolly's very prominence in Irish popular affection is peculiar given the history of the Irish Left and the way that Ireland's relationship to empire has mostly been understood. This essay will seek to tease out these complications and anomalies, noting their political and disciplinary, even methodological, roots. Ranked fourth in a 2010 poll of "greatest persons in Irish history" (behind John Hume, Michael Collins, and Mary Robinson and ahead (thankfully) of Bono), Connolly's life is yet little known, and his internationalism is rarely given serious discussion. Mostly, he is associated with the Dublin Lockout of 1913 and then with his part in the Rising. The wider framework and the larger spaces in which he moved and found his political identity and purpose are infrequently considered in Ireland.

A number of reasons account for the ways in which Connolly, his life, activities, and ideas, have been framed and received in Ireland. These reasons consist of factors operating both in the wider society and political system and in the narrower, but no less "political," academic sphere. Most broadly speaking, Connolly's isolation among the Rising leaders illustrates the fact that in the revolutionary period 1880–1922, the predominant political currents in Ireland were those concerned with nationalism – either constitutional (the Home Rule movement and its political analogues in the Irish Parliamentary Party, led by Charles Stewart Parnell and then John Redmond) or militant (the Irish Republican Brotherhood and those forces that came in its wake, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army) – and with empire (represented in Ireland by the movements against Home Rule and in favor of the preservation of the Union (most strikingly the Ulster Volunteers)). This great opposition between nationalism and unionism, which changed the "Irish question" as it was known in the nineteenth century into the "national question" in Ireland in the twentieth century, structured the political sphere and seemed for many people to exhaust the range of possibilities of political action, social positioning, cultural allegiance, and ideological thinking in Ireland, both in Connolly's time and long after it. This overwhelming polarity is one which contemporary Ireland still wrestles with, and it's one which events and forces operative long after independence and partition still seem shaped by.

Such has been the power of the national question that other modes of action and understanding – most obvious for our purposes in regard to Connolly, the mode of thinking and acting in society and politics on the basis of *class*, but also the modes of feminism, of regionalism, and of minoritarianism – have been weak and have found it hard to win themselves an audience. Over and over again, in Connolly's lifetime, the national question would trump or override other issues. The felt need for secession from the United Kingdom, the opposition to Britain, appeared to be *the* radical mode of thinking and acting politically, socially, and culturally. Other angles of vision were, apparently, irrelevant, or a damaging distraction, or a disuniting force, in the single-minded push for Home Rule or independence.

This powerful framing did not, of course, operate only at the level of discourse. It emerged out of solid historical factors. Most obviously, the constitutional question had been a crucial feature of Irish politics for hundreds of years: that is, the source of sovereignty and, arising from that, the ability of the Irish polity (or polities) to legislate for itself had been fundamentally determined by forces beyond the island, whether in London or in Rome. In 1155, Pope Adrian IV empowered King Henry II of England, by way of a "bull," to reform the Irish Church and people. This proposal was not acted upon, but it served as a retrospective justification for later actions and events. In 1166, the Gaelic Irish king of Leinster, Dermot MacMurrough, invited Richard FitzGilbert, the Earl of Pembroke, to assist him militarily against his local Irish rivals. FitzGilbert – known in Ireland as "Strongbow" – was promised Dermot's daughter, Eva, the Leinster succession and fine fiefdoms for his lieutenants. Strongbow's full-scale intervention began in 1170, but he was wise enough immediately to place his conquests in Ireland under the protection of Henry II. In this way, English sovereignty in Ireland found its origin and its basis. Pope Alexander III reinforced this dispensation, by granting Henry II the lordship of Ireland. The emergence of Parliament in Ireland followed that in England, deriving from the Magna Carta which provided for a Magnum Concilium, called in Ireland by the Crown's representative, the viceroy. This assembly, initially only of great lords and church prelates, operated more or less successfully as English power expanded or decreased in Ireland. In 1494, with English power shrunk to the small eastern region around Dublin known as the "Pale," and therefore in danger of being overawed by the great Gaelic lordships and the independent Norman magnates, the Irish Parliament passed Poynings' Law, effectively subordinating itself to the London Parliament.

The great features of Irish history for the next 200 years, principally, the erosion and then collapse of the Gaelic order and the implantation of colonies in at least three major waves, Laois and Offaly in the midlands and the southern province of Munster in the 1500s and then, under James II, the most successful and serious plantation of Ulster in the 1600s, though possessed of their own dynamics and details, can also be read principally as mutations in the constitutional status of Ireland. Parliament sat infrequently – usually at the start of a monarch's reign and then only to pass legislation at the monarch's request or that of the viceroy. As colonization increased, Parliament became a representative forum and a legislative mechanism for that Anglo-Protestant colonial community. This sectarianization of the legislature was most firmly reinforced by the passing of penal legislation against Roman Catholics, starting soon after the victory of William II in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1689. Catholics could vote in parliamentary elections until 1728, but taking a seat in Parliament was forbidden to Catholics. Yet because of the subordination of the Irish economy, and Parliament, to London, the Anglo-Irish suffered a depletion in numbers during the eighteenth century. Many emigrated to the American colonies, and this pattern eventually bore fruit when the "patriot" tradition of Protestant-led Irish autonomy vis-a-vis Britain eventuated in "Grattan's Parliament" of 1782. Henry Grattan and his allies sought the independence of the Irish Parliament and, to this end, won the repeal of Poynings' Law. Furthermore, Grattan's "patriot" politics – essentially a politics predicated on Protestant leadership of a constituency composed both of Protestants and Catholics – saw the Irish Parliament pass a Roman Catholic Relief Act in 1791 (matching comparable legislation passed in Westminster) which permitted Catholics once again to vote in elections, though not to attain membership of Parliament. The constitutional progress which many would see in this brief phase was snuffed out in the wake of the United Irishmen's great rebellion in 1798 and the Act of Union of 1800. The attempted republican revolution and secession, led by Wolfe Tone and partially aided by revolutionary France, was put down in a brutal war, and, in the context of the fear of revolutionary and then Napoleonic France, Britain sought to quash Irish dissent and unrest by abolishing the Dublin Parliament. From 1801 to 1922, the Irish would have no legislative independence, and their Parliamentary representatives sat in Westminster.

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In his masterpiece, *Labour in Irish History*, Connolly would provide a formidable critique of the tradition sketched out here: that characteristic oscillation between "constitutional" (or parliamentary) politics, on the one hand, and armed or violent secession (associated with "republicanism" after the 1790s), on the other. Connolly's crucial insight was into the class presuppositions of both legislative and militant nationalism. This powerful wedge which he pushed into Irish political and historical interpretation accounts for his importance in his own time and his ongoing importance in ours.

Early Life

James Connolly lived a short intense life, which crossed national borders, juxtaposed cultures, mixed ideas, and combined action and reflection in a particularly dramatic way. He was a true internationalist, and this issued eventually in his explicit and highly articulated anti-imperialism. Connolly was born in 1868, in a desperately poor area of Edinburgh named Cowgate, to Irish immigrant parents. As with so many cities in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Edinburgh's core has undergone profound processes of revanchist gentrification, turning former working class and residential areas into tourist zones or expensive new housing. Cowgate has been part of this process, but in Connolly's day, it was known as "Little Ireland," and it housed a large and impoverished Irish community. The actual building in which Connolly was born is long gone, but on the building now on the site, a modest wall plaque reads:

TO THE MEMORY OF JAMES CONNOLLY
BORN 5TH JUNE 1868 AT 107 COWGATE
RENOWNED INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION AND
WORKING-CLASS LEADER
FOUNDER OF IRISH SOCIALIST REPUBLICAN
PARTY
MEMBER OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF
IRISH REPUBLIC
EXECUTED 12TH MAY 1916 AT KILMAINHAM JAIL
DUBLIN

The plaque's wording neatly summarizes Connolly's career – noting his internationalism, pointing out his work as a union leader of the working poor, his standing as the founder of Ireland's first explicitly Marxist political party, and then his fate as a guerilla commander and leader of the projected Republic, his execution cutting short his hoped-for contribution to the anticipated polity.

James's father, John, was a collector of horse manure off the streets of Edinburgh. His third son James received his only formal education at St. Patrick's School, near the family home. Young James took up his first job at the age of only 11 years in 1879. He worked as a printer's assistant; his elder brother, John, was already a compositor at the *Edinburgh Review*. The skills the boy learned in his first job would be essential to his political work in later life, for Connolly would become an inveterate radical journalist and writer, mostly publishing his work in leftwing and union newspapers he often set up and edited himself.

However, the economic prospects were dim for the Connolly family, and in 1882, James joined the British Army. At 14, he was underage, of course, and when he deserted in 1891, he compounded the illegality of his enlistment by the way he left the British service, putting himself forever after at risk of capture and court-martial. Yet it was the Army which brought him first to Ireland, and it is fair to suppose that coming to the country of his patrimony wearing the uniform of the Army of the metropolis can only have stirred his sense of restless Irish nationalism while at the same time keeping him in mind of the fact that that very Army was staffed mostly by the poorest of the poor like himself, of whatever ethnic identity. It's also worth noting that, shortly after the moment of his desertion, Connolly's unit was due for deployment to India. Obviously, such a posting would have put James at a very great distance from his wife, for a prolonged period. But, with the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, Indian secessionist nationalism was stirring at this moment also, and Connolly may have noted this. He would later write about British governance of India and the independence movement there.

Connolly served several tours in Ireland, but this did not prevent him from meeting and

courting the woman who became his wife, Lizzie Reynolds, in Edinburgh, and though he had left formal education behind him, he became (and remained for the rest of his life) a formidable autodidact, immersing himself in reading history and also leftist thought, including some of the work of Marx and Engels.

Connolly's first involvement in socialist politics was, in fact, in Scotland, shortly after his desertion from the Army. Following his brother John, he became involved with and then secretary of the Scottish Socialist Federation. Influenced by the SSF's John Leslie, Connolly learned the stress on propaganda, information, and education which would become the hallmarks of his maturity. Working with the SSF and also with the Independent Labor Party of Keir Hardie, Connolly also observed the wave of what was called "the new unionism" sweeping Britain. The "new unionism" was a movement, marked by strikes and protests, which concentrated on recruiting into the union organizations workers who had previously fallen outside of their ambit and scope. Trades unionism by this time was dominated by powerful craft unions which catered to the needs and priorities of skilled labor. But for the unskilled poor – doing the kind of basic and menial work his father had done – there were no organizations or representation. This focus on those who fell out of the bottom of the labor movement would crystalize most powerfully for Connolly when he was close to the foundation of the Industrial Workers of the World, during his residence in America. And it would help shape his revolutionary positions also, since he shifted from an emphasis on avowedly political organizations – the leading party – to radicalized unions, such as the IWW and the Irish Transport and General Workers, as the vehicles for his revolutionary activity.

The "new unionism" was eventually crushed by the British government, and Connolly became more involved with the ILP. But it was the ILP's relationship with Irish politics which eventually soured Connolly's affiliation with this party. The ILP aspired to a political alliance with the British Liberal Party, but this move would also put it into sympathy with the Home Rule movement, insofar as the latter had networks of sympathizers and

campaigners in the Irish community in Britain. In other words, Connolly realized, and learned with Leslie, that the ILP was tied, via the Liberals, to mainstream Irish nationalism, which had little time for socialism or the working class. Leslie published a pamphlet, *The Irish Question*, which was crucial in shaping Connolly's views at this time. Leslie made a powerful attack on any linkage between Scottish or British leftwing politics and the generality of the Irish nationalist movement. Leslie supported Irish independence, but he shrewdly realized that the Irish nationalist elite, with its links into the Irish communities in Scotland, was thoroughly in hock to capitalism generally and specifically to a structure of economic dominance of Ireland by the larger island. Irish nationalism, Leslie pointed out, was a middle-class social and economic formation, and the Irish working classes needed to affiliate to their true class allies in seeking to make connections beyond Ireland's shores: "The emancipation of their class from economic bondage meant emancipation from all bondage . . . if they refuse to be any longer the mere pawns in the great chess-game of the lay and clerical state gamblers for power and place, then they will clasp hands with the workingmen's parties of all other countries" (Leslie 1894: 12–13). This vision analysis decisively shaped Connolly's political activism in Ireland thereafter. Needless to say, it did not make him popular with the local outriders of the Home Rule movement, the Irish National League.

Contesting the 1894 Edinburgh local elections on the SSF ticket, but failing to win a seat, Connolly, always on the lookout for opportunities of both work and activism, was invited by the Dublin Socialist Club to become its organizer. The wage was a modest £1 per week, but Connolly, giving up a plan to emigrate with his wife and young children to Chile, arrived in Dublin in May 1896.

The Irish Context

Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century was primarily an agrarian society. Dublin, the capital, was the center of the administration and along

with Belfast and Cork the country's main port. But it was not a hub of manufacturing. That distinction fell to Belfast and its environs in the northeast, where, through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industries such as rope-making, tobacco, heavy engineering, and, preeminently, linen and ship-building made the city a major element in the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom and integrated the city in the trading networks of the Empire. This development, combined with the much older sectarian divisions which developed after the colonization of Ulster in the seventeenth century, contributed to the contention over Home Rule and independence which would be the crucial frameworks for Connolly's political career in Ireland.

Arriving in Dublin, Connolly moved into a city and country in ferment. The great wave of political and cultural activity which constituted the Irish revolution was in the early years of its gathering in the 1890s, and Connolly's activities must be understood as both a part of this seething excitement and also as embodying or at times articulating one of the most formidable critiques of it in its own time and since. Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century was, as explained earlier, a constituent part of the United Kingdom. The Dublin Parliament having been abolished under the terms of the Act of Union, Irish political representatives sat in the Houses of Parliament in London. The nineteenth century being the century of "questions," the main answers offered to the Irish Question at this time were (1) Home Rule, or the drive for Ireland to attain, once again, legislative autonomy within the United Kingdom, and (2) violent secession from the Union as envisaged by republican revolutionary militants. The primary vehicle for the "constitutional" campaign for Home Rule was the Irish Parliamentary Party, founded by the Wicklow landlord, Charles Stewart Parnell, in 1882 and led by him until his death in 1891. Due in part to Parnell's skillful leadership of his party and its possession of a balancing minority in the Commons, British Liberal governments had been forced to bring forward Home Rule Bills in 1886 and 1893 (under Gladstone), but the legislation had been blocked initially by a split in the Liberal Party, and then by the rejection of the House of Lords. With Parnell's early death, the IPP and the Home Rule movement were becalmed at the time of Connolly's arrival in Dublin. Meanwhile, the revolutionary movement of the day was the Irish Republican Brotherhood, with its American Fenian affiliates. Founded by James Stephens, John O'Leary, and others in 1858, it had been active in a variety of ways, organizing a failed uprising in 1867, and, following the execution of the Manchester Martyrs, running a bombing or "dynamite" campaign in Britain in the 1880s. The IRB was a secret, oathbound society of revolutionary conspiracy, whose primary tenets were that Ireland should attain independence from the Union and that the most effective way to achieve this goal was by military means.

These two elements – the Home Rule movement and the Republican movement – dominated the Irish political scene, as Connolly found it. But it would be seriously mistaken to suppose that he found no leftwing or socialist movement. On the contrary, a fertile and active labor movement provided a ready-made ideological context for Connolly and his activism. Forms of unionization or "combination" of rural laborers had developed in Ireland since the eighteenth century. Mostly illegal, their rise accompanied that of Whiteboy rural agitation. One might note, for example, that Parnell, forming the Irish National League out of the ruins of the Land League in 1882, was immediately given the support of the Irish Labor and Industrial Union, which mostly represented rural workers. The ILIU dissolved itself into the new organization, in a crucial example of the (self-)subordination of Irish labor politics to the politics of Home Rule or nationalism – a pattern which would become all too familiar in the twentieth century.

Meanwhile, Ireland in the 1880s and 1890s was also undergoing an intellectual and cultural transformation of a very profound kind. As we noted above, Connolly is a political writer and activist, but he could not but be influenced by the situation in which he found himself and in which he found Irish society more generally. Paraphrasing *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, one might suggest that Connolly was

an important actor in events in Ireland between 1896 and 1916, but he did not always act under conditions of his own choosing. The nineteenth century had witnessed sweeping changes in Irish society – changes that could be characterized reasonably as the most radical since the plantations of the seventeenth century. Looked at schematically, these changes might be put thus:

1. The emergence and tremendous growth of a mass Anglophone politics, through the O'Connellite campaigns for Catholic Emancipation and then for the repeal of the Act of Union. O'Connell succeeded in fostering an Anglophone politics of the masses, even before the Famine swept away the poorest of the rural population (and those most likely to speak Irish).
2. The catastrophic effects of the Great Famine of the 1840s, which killed one million people by starvation and disease and which induced the emigration of another one million in those brief terrible years and set in train a wider pattern of emigration which helped shape Irish society for the following century.
3. Partly as a result of the Famine, which effected an extraordinary and brutal rearrangement of Irish rural society, and the politics of land and agriculture which came out of it – most notably the agitation of the Land League – the British government began in the 1870s a process of land reform which would by the early twentieth century produce a new large and politically and culturally crucial class of small farmers.

Exemplifying the structural paradoxes of nationalism, a political tendency which generally combines progressivist and often democratizing forward movement legitimated by a backward glance at a sometimes mythologized past or invented tradition, the very changes wrought by O'Connell and the Famine made possible, motivated and drove the cultural revival of the nineteenth century. Translations of ancient, medieval, and more recent Irish writing were produced and circulated. In a society which was officially integrated into the United Kingdom, whose high politics was focused on London, whose economy traded mostly with Britain and America, and

where the machinery of the state – education, policing, welfare, and the army – was overwhelmingly Anglophone, the rise of interest in and dissemination of songs, ballads, poetry, and other kinds of writing translated from the Gaelic came with a powerful sense of discovery or rediscovery. By the late nineteenth century, this had issued in a battery of cultural, civic, and political institutions. To the arrival of the Literary Revival – in the work of WB Yeats, Standish O'Grady, Lady Gregory, JM Synge, Lennox Robinson – in the sphere of high culture corresponded the creation of organizations such as the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association in the sphere of mass culture. WB Yeats, Edward Martyn, and Lady Augusta Gregory founded the Irish Literary Theatre in 1899, which became the Abbey Theatre in 1904. The Gaelic League was founded by Douglas Hyde in 1893, to promote the Irish language – even before the Famine, the language was in decline. And in 1884, Michael Cusack founded the Gaelic Athletic Association, which aimed to promote Irish field games and other aspects of Irish culture. The upshot of such developments was the creation of a powerful, popularly based, and variegated culture of nationalism in Ireland. National consciousness was not simply new in Ireland, but we can recognize that in breadth and depth the movements of the late nineteenth century achieved a penetration and range in Irish society unattained by either prior movements for constitutional change – the "patriot politics" of Henry Grattan and Henry Flood in the 1780s, the "Repeal" campaign of Daniel O'Connell of the 1840s, or Isaac Butt's Home Rule campaigning after the Famine – or prior revolutionary movements for change by force, the United Irishmen's Rebellion of 1798, the Young Ireland Rebellion of 1848, and the Fenian Rebellion of 1867.

In retrospect, we look back now and realize that these institutions (all of them still in existence) were the cultural institutions of a proto-state, elaborations (in Gramsci's terminology) of a rich counter-hegemony in both "high" and "mass" culture. This was the cultural sea in which Connolly swam: a complex *mélange* of ideas, principles, and projects, all of them variously shot through with the spirit of change and

the hope of the new. To the political "revolution" which would occur eventually in 1916 and afterward corresponded (approximately) this sense of "cultural" revolution or at the very least revolutionary possibility – a world where all values were there to be remade or transvalued. The point here is not to make an argument that Connolly, in fact, was a "revivalist" in any simple sense, however. He consistently argued the importance of the "historical materialist" vision of history promulgated by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* and *The German Ideology*, and as such was often skeptical of what would now be called "culturalism." Yet his radical activist and intellectual energy partakes of the general ferment in Irish society at this time, his interest and effort in political propaganda, and his capacity to deploy various rhetorics or registers – speaking and writing – were frequently augmented by his love of poetry and literature. We see this in his frequent quotation of both poetry (James Clarence Mangan, Alfred Lord Tennyson) and popular song, buttressed by his sense of street theater and the value of political balladry.

Connolly and the Irish Socialist Republican Party

Connolly immediately and rapidly reorganized the Dublin Socialist Club and renamed it the Irish Socialist Republican Party (ISRP). Although the party was never more than a very small organization – it is estimated that membership never exceeded one hundred – it was an important formation in the history of the Irish Left. In its very name, the party embodied and dramatized the problematic around which most Irish leftwing political organization has revolved ever since – the tension between class and national struggle, the quandary as to the possibility for making a coherent and appealing affiliation between socialism or Marxist political activism, on the one hand, and republicanism, on the other. Though the party dissolved in 1904, it must be seen as having a crucial element in Connolly's career. The ISRP ran candidates in local Dublin elections, and it also produced Ireland's first

Marxist newspaper, edited by Connolly himself: *The Workers' Republic*.

Connolly's Marxism was of the moment of the Second International. What does this mean? The International itself was formed in 1889, the year Connolly became involved in socialist politics, and it collapsed in the year of Connolly's death, broken by the nationalism unleashed across Europe by the Great War. So we can say that Connolly's career parallels that of the International and the particular phase of Marxist thought and praxis which it represented. Where the First International – the International Working Men's Association of Marx and Engels, founded in London in 1864 – was an affiliation of various socialist groups, the Second International was an umbrella organization for the unions and socialist mass parties of Europe, dominated by the German Social Democrats, which could muster millions of voters and hundreds of parliamentary seats. Strikingly, the expansion of the socialist movement in Europe, while spurred by a major recession in European economies between the 1870s and the 1890s, ran concurrently with the economic boom of the turn of the century, the era of high imperialism and monopoly capitalism. That the International was both a source of opposition to that form of capitalism, and fundamentally imbricated with it, is illustrated by its benefiting from parliamentary reforms across Europe which opened the vote to working men in Britain and Ireland in 1884, in Germany in 1871, in Spain in 1890. This parallel of the expansion of socialism and the expansion of empire and monopoly capital is in part to be expected – an expanding capitalism was producing an expanding proletariat – but it brought with it tensions which would be exposed to devastating effect with the coming of the First World War.

Despite their growth, the socialist parties of Europe were still largely marginal to the overall political systems in which they operated. Consequently, they were mostly reformist in orientation: their rhetoric was usually far in advance of their actual policies. Parties spoke aggressively about capitalism, while the unions to which they were often affiliated sought modest adjustments in the workplace. Their Marxism was inherited from Engels and was often interpreted in a dogmatic

and pseudoscientific manner. So they saw the demise of capitalism and the rise of socialism as inevitable and the task of socialist parties as being to help that trend on its way.

Connolly's thinking both partakes of this intellectual and ideological context and sits outside or athwart it. It is precisely this aspect of Connolly's work and thought that makes it particularly valuable and exemplary now. His position dramatizes and flushes out into the open that paradoxical conjuncture described above – the parallel between the Second International and the era of high imperialism, the Berlin Conferences, and the "Scramble for Africa." Another way to put this is to note that Connolly wrestles with the problematic of producing a Marxist understanding of a region which was (and still is) peripheral to the great flows of capital and the redoubts of political power which structured the world-system in his time and continue to do so in ours. Connolly's Marxism is notable in the way it openly discusses the issues of peripherality which would be so formative for decolonizing movements and Marxisms later in the twentieth century.

Of course it also must immediately be admitted that Marxist thought and agitation outside of the European core economies and states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy) would produce, just a year after Connolly's death, the great revolution of 1917 in Russia – not a peripheral territory of a major economy the way that Ireland was, but a great empire – yet an empire whose place in the global economy remained, in fact, peripheral due to the truncated and partial development of industrial capitalism in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Russian Marxist revolutionaries – Lenin and Trotsky preeminent among them – would wrestle with problems proximate to those which Connolly mulled over. Furthermore, we need to remember too that Marx and Engels themselves had taken an intense interest in Ireland, its status within the United Kingdom and its restless and troubled politics. From an early argument that the main engine of Irish progress would be proletarian revolution on the larger island, Marx toward the end of his life reversed his prior position to realize that a leftist uprising in Ireland could have a decisive effect on the

political balance in Britain. We can say then with confidence that Connolly wrote and acted within a rich and complex Marxist tradition of consideration of the "Irish Question" and that the focus on Ireland's peripherality, while significantly developed by Connolly, did not start with him.

The Marxist theory of the Second International was dominated by a "stage-ist" model, exemplified in the work of Karl Kautsky, itself an inheritance from Engels. If the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, then, as Kautsky saw it, this would happen no matter what positions human actors might take on the stage of history, since the historical process was understood to move in accordance with ineluctable scientific laws. But this model was problematic for a figure such as Connolly, working on the periphery of Europe. The briefest study of Irish history revealed significant "deviations" from the general pattern of development of the European core. Furthermore, the determinism of Kautskyan thinking left no space or requirement for human agency. If the process of capitalism's demise and socialism's victory is always already structured into the future, then what need for activism, campaigning, strike or protest, parliamentary maneuver, legislative reform, or violent insurrection? It would take Lenin's break with the International for a more flexible and nuanced model of historical development to be put forward.

But meanwhile the International advocated propaganda-making and consciousness-raising as the primary task of socialist parties and activists. Connolly worked within this paradigm, and he also accepted the International's stress on parliamentary politics. This issue had been the occasion of the expulsion of the anarchists from the International's Congress of 1893. At least until his departure for America in 1903, Connolly saw political good for socialism in contesting parliamentary elections and hoping for seats in national legislatures. He did not give much thought – as Marx had not before him – to the importance or value of the state, whether for its seizure or destruction or for its actual workings. Connolly tended to assume the state as a machinery for the management of capitalism, though his interest in and affiliation with syndicalism after 1907 would

produce a profound change in his view. Connolly's approach to parliamentarism and to the state thus contrasts with the secret and conspiratorial approach to the seizure of the state as adopted by his republican contemporaries.

We can therefore say that Connolly differed from his colleagues in the International, in the voluntarism of his politics, and in his strong sense of Irish history. Yet the "stage" model of the historical process as a general rule retained its attraction for him, and this issues in torsions and paradoxes in his historical vision as it touches on other European peripheries or on territories elsewhere in the imperial world. Connolly was well aware, and was eager to show, that the tracks of Irish history sometimes cross over or run athwart metropolitan British or European patterns. At the root of this seeming contradiction is Ireland's status as – arguably – England's oldest colony, dating back as we have seen to the high Middle Ages, and yet a colony which was folded into the constitutional heart of the metropolis by the Act of Union of 1800. In retrospect, we would now say that this incorporation of periphery into metropolis occurred too late for it to be fully politically effective, for it took place only after an Enlightenment civic nationalism had found expression in the country (in Grattan's Parliament and then the United Irish rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century). Accordingly, in Connolly's time, Ireland was gripped by a pervasive and powerful secessionist nationalism which manifested itself in terms we would now call "anti-imperialist" and "anti-colonial."

The activities and ideas of the ISRP reflect this overdetermined intellectual and political location on which Connolly found himself planning and campaigning. Ireland was a country riven with the greatest class divisions, intersected with religious and regional differences. Such differences ran between the intensely industrialized northeast around Belfast and the agrarian south and west of the country, between a residual "ascendancy" landed gentry (now losing its economic base as land reform and redistribution took place) and the mass of small farmers and tenants. Connolly, as we've outlined, prosecuted an oppositional politics in a field already contested by rival parties or

groupings which jostled him and his comrades for electoral and ideological space. The electoral franchise had been expanded in 1884, and the 1889 Local Government Act had opened up local government as a cockpit for working-class politics. The ISRP published in *The Workers' Republic* a bold national program in 1896, which called for the nationalization and public ownership of the means of production and all infrastructure, for free secular education up to university level, for the abolition of private banks, and for restrictions on the length of the working week. Asserting this position compelled Connolly constantly to work out his location and that of his party on the plane of ideas and policies. He argued that the Irish nationalist movement had been taken over by – if it had not always been in the control of – middle-class or bourgeois forces and equally that revolutionary republicanism was largely lacking in a class analysis of the Irish situation. Connolly's overall point – and this remained consistent for the rest of his career – was that nationalism, parliamentary or militant, was likely to reproduce the existing distribution of wealth and privilege in any autonomous or independent Ireland that might emerge under their aegis.

Connolly's felt the need to articulate simultaneous critiques of bourgeois constitutional nationalism and revolutionary republicanism is related to his anti-imperialism. It must be remembered that at this time, the term "imperialism" referred specifically to the imperial polities of Europe – the British Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire – and their rivalries and alliances. It did not yet refer to the projection of power overseas and the relationship of metropolises with peripheries that the term has come to mean in more recent times. This usage prevailed even with the Marxist thinkers of this generation (with the possible exception of Rosa Luxemburg).

Connolly, Ireland, and Empire

Two particular events in the 1890s help us see Connolly's political position-takings in their complexity and peculiarity: the centenary of the 1798

Rising and Irish responses to the South African War (1899–1902). Preparing for the centenary of the United Irish rebellion, so-called 1798 Committees sprang up around the country. The ISRP both joined this action and took a class angle on it by forming its own "Rank and File '98 Club." Connolly's purpose was to reveal the bourgeois nature of the Enlightenment republicanism of the United Irishmen, which had posited sectarian unity, but which was predicated in part on class superiority. Nationalist sentiment, Connolly rightly asserted, had clouded the memory of the Rising. Wolfe Tone's ideas were revolutionary insofar as they touched on class, but it was important to realize that the rebellion was betrayed by constitutional nationalists as much as by failed French revolutionary assistance.

In 1899, the Second Boer War began. Britain tried to contain the drive to independence of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State. The empire had previously struggled to assert control of the valuable natural resources of this region, and now war broke out again and the Boer cause attracted considerable Irish interest and sympathy. The 1890s had seen a wave of Irish migration to the Transvaal. Figures who would later attain high prominence in the Irish revolution, such as Arthur Griffith (founder of Sinn Fein) and John McBride (the husband of Maud Gonne and a senior combatant in the 1916 Rising) had moved to southern Africa. McBride was invited to form and lead an Irish brigade to fight for the Dutch republics. Though McBride turned this command down, he did part in the ensuing fighting. Three hundred Irish Volunteers joined this pro-Boer commando. Sympathy for the Boers swept Dublin: street protests and rallies were held, and the Transvaal flag was flown. Advanced nationalists openly supported the Boers in their struggle with the might of empire and so did Connolly and the ISRP. Connolly argued that the war showed that Britain was complacently reducing its garrison in Ireland in order to provide troops for the suppression of the Boers, because it regarded Ireland as entirely pacified. He argued that any struggle which saw the empire bested or damaged was one worth supporting. As with the 1798 centenary, Irish nationalist and

republican opinion was intensely engaged by the Boer secession, but, to Connolly's disgust, when a "Transvaal Committee" was set up, republicans invited Home Rule constitutional nationalists to join it. This confirmed Connolly's class critique – bourgeois political forms would make common cause, even across the divide of the debate on violence, and republican "revolutionaries" would abandon their working-class allies and the economic dimension in order to push forward their own agenda. Furthermore, it was not only the Irish angle in this contest that was difficult for Connolly to negotiate: we see also his failure (along with that of other putatively radical political activists in Ireland) to recognize that while the Boers were courageously resisting incorporation into the empire, this very resistance had as a major condition of its possibility a colonial-racist exclusion of the native peoples of southern Africa. Black Africans were invisible to Connolly's anti-imperialism – whether as oppressed or displaced victims or as historical and political agents in their own right. The irony of history shows us that just 13 years later, the South African Native National Congress – the forerunner to the African National Congress – was formed in Bloemfontein by Sol Plaatje, John Dube, and their comrades. Black Africans becoming the subjects of their own history was a possibility inconceivable to even as radical and revolutionary thinker and agitator as Connolly.

Connolly and Theory: *Erin's Hope and Labour in Irish History*

Connolly was constitutively skeptical of theory: he rejected "theorickers" early in his career while always describing himself, from early on, as a "revolutionary." He would have agreed with Antonio Gramsci's description of Marxism as a *philosophy of praxis*. Nevertheless, he produced two extended essays on Irish history, *Erin's Hope* (1897) and *Labour in Irish History* (1910), which have a decided theoretical underpinning. This undergirding comes from various sources. Both works are derived from Connolly's Marxism, of course, but they also partake of the spirit of the

Irish Revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Not merely this, but *Labour in Irish History*, written while Connolly was in the United States, shows the influence of his immersion in that country in syndicalist politics.

Erin's Hope is a pamphlet, published shortly after Connolly's arrival in Dublin, which shows the influence of James Fintan Lalor, arguably the most radical, or class-aware, of the leaders of the Young Ireland movement of the 1840s. Young Ireland was notable for its fostering, through its newspaper *The Nation*, of a very wide readership for cultural and political nationalist ideas and content, in English. The movement ran in parallel (though not always in agreement) with the late career of O'Connell and partook of that same development of a mass politics. Like O'Connell's Repeal movement, it was decapitated by the Famine. Lalor had advocated the political mobilization of the Irish peasantry and also for the crucial nature of the land question in the Irish countryside. Connolly edited and introduced a collection of Lalor's writings, *The Rights of Ireland and The Faith of a Felon*, which would be published in 1900. At the root of Connolly's thesis in *Erin's Hope* is the argument, which transgresses Marxist interpretations, that in Ireland both feudalism and capitalism were accretions of firstly Norman and then English colonization. Following nationalist historians of the day, such as Alice Stopford Green, Connolly argued that Gaelic Ireland had been characterized by a "primitive communist" society of the kind mentioned by Marx and Engels. He noted that under the Irish Brehon legal system, land was held in common ownership, and this joint possession persisted longer in Ireland than elsewhere. Further, this arrangement offered a model, Connolly suggested, for the development in what were still primarily agrarian societies, like Ireland. Irish capitalism had been too recent a growth, and too much under British influence or tied into British markets, for it to have much hope for strong future development. Connolly hinted that industrialism could actually be bypassed as a "stage" on the road to socialism in a country like Ireland.

Connolly's interpretation, both in *Erin's Hope* and later in *Labour in Irish History*, was and

remains a controversial one. He gave "primitive communism" a positive value, contrary to Engels and Marx who had seen the replacement of primitive communism by the regime of private property and capital accumulation as inevitable and progressive: only in such ways could the forces of production be expanded and developed. At the heart of Connolly's deviation from Marxist orthodoxy lie different visions of the historical process. Marx and Engels, though they reckoned to have inverted Hegel with their interpretative mode of historical materialism, remained creatures of the Hegelian and indeed Enlightenment traditions. By this we mean that their view of history was subtended by a grand progressive "narrative" of increasing optimism, human development and betterment, and economic and political modernization. But Connolly's historical vision cuts across and troubles this vision. It does so in a number of ways. Firstly, and as we'll see with *Labour in Irish History*, Connolly provides a series of interpretations of notable Irish political or even revolutionary conjunctures and shows each time how what might have been progressive developments were betrayed or compromised by their bourgeois leaderships. Secondly, Connolly's vision partakes of the "revivalist" spirit of his own day, in that he suggests, however loosely, that the Gaelic past offers a model of the desired future. That is, Connolly's vision of the future partakes of an image of the past. In this, he joins with the language revivalists of the Gaelic League and the fascination of writers such as WB Yeats, Lady Augusta Gregory, and John Millington Synge with the great myths of the Irish Celtic past. This revivalist element of Connolly's thinking is not linear, in the Marxist or Enlightenment sense, but cyclical, more in the manner of Vico or Nietzsche.

The problem with Connolly's structure of vision is that his view of the Gaelic past is rather more positive than most professional historians allow that the evidence suggests. Connolly argues forcefully for socialist answers to the national question, but is led into paradoxes and contradictions which would reappear at later points in his career and in his writing. His foundational assumption that capitalism and a class society

were constitutively alien to Ireland represents an essentialism of his thought which would lead him in the future to take a more positive view of nationalism than was warranted by his own instincts and analyses. Flowing from this would be his inclination to see a contradiction between republicanism and capitalism – a contradiction which is itself contradicted by historical evidence from republicanisms of many kinds in many countries – and would lead him sometimes to misunderstandings of Irish capitalism and of Irish republicanism's class revolutionary potential. An example of this kind of error can be seen in Connolly's efforts to make alliance with Arthur Griffith and Sinn Fein. Connolly cooperated with Griffith, who was a member of the IRB and was anti-imperialist, in the Boer War protests. But this was to pass over the fact that Griffith's sympathies with the Boers and his opposition to the British war was based on openly racist and supremacist grounds, and he eagerly anticipated the expansion of Irish capitalism in any independent Irish state which might eventually be won.

Connolly and Syndicalism

By the early 1900s, Connolly, with the ISRP still struggling to make an impression on the Irish political scene, had become aware of the American Socialist Labor Party, which seemed to be attaining some successes under the energetic leadership of Daniel DeLeon. The context for Connolly's learning of the SLP and DeLeon was a debate within the Second International on the question of socialist parties making alliance with bourgeois parties: DeLeon and his SLP were fiercely opposed to such marriages of convenience, as were Connolly and the ISRP. He tried to use the example of the SLP to force a leftward move in British socialism and to wean it away from its support of Home Rule, with its reformist, bourgeois, and pro-capitalist tendencies. But this effort, which involved shuttling back and forth between Ireland and Scotland, did not pay substantial dividends. Connolly then took the drastic step of emigrating to America, with his wife and young family following him in stages.

We will not enter into the detail of Connolly's sojourn in America, which began in 1903 and ended in 1910. But it's important to note the outlines of the shifts in Connolly's ideological positioning which were occasioned by his American stay. He quickly quarreled with DeLeon, finding him authoritarian and dogmatic. By 1905, Connolly was drifting away from the SLP and was caught up in the foundational drama of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), nicknamed the "Wobblies." Emerging from mining disputes, the IWW was formed at a congress in Chicago in 1905. Well to the left of the SLP, the IWW also was deeply critical of the dominant American craft union, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), for its reformist attitude to capitalism and its refusal to accept unskilled workers into its membership. The IWW was a trenchantly and explicitly syndicalist organization, with its motto of "one big union" for all workers and its resistance to the elitism, racism, and sexism of the AFL, which had no space in its ranks for female or immigrant workers. The IWW was also an expression of the powerful energy given to the labor movement globally by the Russian uprising of 1905, which seemed to demonstrate the revolutionary potential of the general strike as a weapon of the proletariat.

Syndicalism is a movement on the anarchist side of socialism. It is predicated on workers' initiative, militancy, and power and workers' organization and an approach to the political realm founded in the place of work. It was often known in America as "industrial unionism," because of its stress on organization and action within the industrial workplace. The term "syndicale" is of course the French term for a union; this reveals the roots of the phenomenon in the labor movement. In Europe, syndicalism stood as a rebuke to the mainstream socialist or social democratic parties, which it saw as bureaucratic, corrupted by parliamentarism and compromise with the bourgeois state, too inclined to a reformist acceptance of capitalism. To destroy capital, the workers must concentrate their struggle in the workplace. Syndicalism was strongest in those European countries (such as Spain) with an anarchist tradition and also with little experience of centralized collective bargaining.

Connolly was galvanized by the unadulterated revolutionism and militant aggression of the IWW. Here was an organization of the workers and of the poorest of the poor, which regarded them as the engine of the revolution and of history. Here was a workers' organization which was as forceful in its stress on revolution as any "physical force" Irish republican secret society. On his return to Ireland in 1910, his activity in the increasingly febrile years leading to the Easter Rising would be considerably shaped by what he learned from syndicalism.

This activity would be underpinned by the historical and theoretical arguments of *Labour in Irish History*. In a strong sense, this book, Connolly's most sustained work, could be seen as a syndicalist history of Irish politics. At each of its stages, it tries to attend to the fate of the working poor. At each of those stages, it finds that Irish political action, both nationalist and republican, has worked by stirring the sleeping giant of the sentiments and energies of the massed poor, sought to control this motive force, and then ultimately abandoned it or even betrayed it in the pursuit of bourgeois goals.

Labour in Irish History was mostly composed in America. In 16 brief chapters, Connolly offers a critique of mainstream views of Irish history of a ruthlessness and penetration few modern "revisionists" can match. Repeatedly, the highlights of Irish nationalist political history are interrogated and found wanting in class terms. Studies of Jacobite heroes, of eighteenth-century "patriot" politics, of the Enlightenment radicals of the United Irishmen, and of Daniel O'Connell and his campaigns for Catholic Emancipation and the Repeal of the Act of Union show each time the cynical class compromises that repeatedly were made. Connolly sees nationalism as the "idealized expression of class interests," but he also hoped for a more "authentic" nationalism.

The antinomies which complicate Connolly's work are those we've already delineated. On the one hand, he recognizes and compels his reader to see that there is in his time and has for a very long time been a greater identity of interests and goals between the Irish owners of capital and those of Britain, than exists between the Irish bourgeoisie

and the Irish workers and peasants. Herein lies Connolly's radicalism. On the other hand, he wishes, partly for tactical political reasons, to find resources for action, grounds for alliance, in the Irish revolutionary tradition, dominated as it is by republicanism. Part of the book's project, therefore, is to scour the republican tradition for hints of class-orientated progressivism. Herein lies Connolly's compromise with his context.

At its most abstract, Connolly's argument is that the understanding of private property in Ireland is and has been different from that in England. This is the political-theoretical version of his point in *Erin's Hope* that feudalism and capitalism in Ireland had only arrived by way of Norman and then Tudor colonization. But in this later and longer book, the stakes in the argument are higher. As we've noted earlier, and indeed as Connolly writes himself, *Labour in Irish History* is a work of the Irish Revival, and this is not only a matter of context but of the book's subtext. In a manner similar to the discovery – or, more importantly, rediscovery – of an ancient Irish Gaelic culture, and hence "nation," which was to be discerned in cultural nationalists of Connolly's own time and earlier, such as Standish O'Grady, Samuel Ferguson, WB Yeats, and Lady Gregory, Connolly reads back into the historical evidence an idea of Irish national character, even an idea of Irish national consciousness. Modern historians, certainly of the liberal "revisionist" kind, and also of the Marxist kind, would argue that Connolly over-interprets his materials. Modern historians of nationalism, mostly nowadays working in the wake of the important writings of Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Miroslav Hroch, Eric Hobsbawm, and Shlomo Sand, would argue that nations are mostly *post-factum* "inventions" or "invented traditions" and that national consciousness emerged in Europe mostly in the nineteenth century. Not merely this, but Connolly ascribes to that national consciousness attributes of coherence, self-consciousness, organization, and resistance which are difficult to verify in positive terms. In particular, his chapters on agrarian radicalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – the Whiteboys of the 1700s and the Ribbonmen of the 1800s, for example – remain

both provocative and problematic. Connolly makes the wager – a hermeneutical maneuver finely balanced between political and historical interpretation – on their having forged a national (as against local or regional) program of resistance. In his reading of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, he excoriates "patriot" politics of the kind associated with the parliamentarism of Grattan and Flood for its bourgeois character. But in doing so, he also fails to see the potential radicalism of the new middle classes, both Protestant and Catholic, which would form the engines of nationalism after the failure of the United Irish rebellion in 1798. Connolly is hesitant to see nascent radicalism in the middle-class movements for separatism. Middle-class nationalism for him is inauthentic. Yet further, Connolly reads into the agrarian movements of these pasts, and of his present moment, a desire to return to the supposed ancient Gaelic modes of commonage. In the context of the Revival, of course, the implication is that the spirit of Irish "primitive communism" is latent within the rural poor of the present, just waiting to be reawakened by the right ideological and political leadership.

This helps to account for Connolly's positive view of the United Irishmen. He admires Tone's forceful Jacobinism, but that admiration helps to gloss over the bourgeois character of the United Irish movement (whose famous newspaper, *The Northern Star*, staunchly defended property rights). So too with Connolly's assessment here of Young Ireland, and, once again, James Fintan Lalor. As we saw with *Erin's Hope*, Connolly focuses on Lalor's left-leaning stance within the Young Ireland group, with its stress on a radicalized and nationalized peasantry. Not only this, but, in an echo of his sympathy for the South African Boers, he passes over John Mitchel's late-career support for slavery in the American South.

Labour in Irish History is undoubtedly Connolly's masterpiece. With all its flaws, it remains one of the most remarkable and radical essays in Irish historiography. That it is not a "professional" academic history is both a source of its weakness and of its strength or importance. Just as Georg Lukacs's towering *History and Class Consciousness* (published in 1923, just after the Hungarian revolution of 1919) represents both a formidable critique of German Idealist philosophy and a manual for proletarian revolution that works by re-reading Marx in that tradition, written during the revolution, so Connolly's book should be understood both as a theoretical underpinning of his syndicalist vision and as a text taking part in the attempted revolution in Ireland between 1913 and 1923.

Connolly and the Irish Revolution

Connolly's return to Ireland in 1910 was to a country wracked increasingly by political and social turbulence. The Home Rule crisis of 1912; the accompanying Ulster crisis, where a massive movement was forged to resist Home Rule; the great Dublin Lockout of 1913; and then the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 – all of these events demanded of Connolly an exceptional political and intellectual effort and agility. Even as he threw himself into the work of the new syndicalist union formed by James Larkin in 1909, the Irish Transport and General Workers, Connolly was also writing and reflecting on revolutionary movements elsewhere: in other territories of the British Empire such as India and Egypt and also in Russia and other areas of Europe. The Ulster crisis offered him particular problems for the kind of activism and ideological positioning Connolly stood for, as it revealed that the most powerful and dynamic political force, in the region of Ireland most industrialized and linked into the global trading and industrial economy, was still the reactionary sectarian and ethnic movement which he had been arguing against for years. In other words, the region which ought, in the analysis of the International, to have been most politically and ideologically advanced and radical, had proved also to harbor the most formidable anti-revolutionary forces and sentiments. The 1913 Lockout was one of the decisive battles for the militant left in the south of Ireland, and it was a battle ultimately lost, a crucial moment in the consolidation of the social and economic forces which would come to rule Ireland in the

independent Free State after 1922. The First World War itself broke open the consensus in the International and among the various elements of the European left. On or around August 4, 1914, the leaders of most of the socialist parties of Europe declared their patriotic support for the war policies of their governments. The only opposition came from the Russians and the Serbs and from Connolly and some of his Irish comrades. In the north of Ireland, the Ulster Volunteers proudly declared their support for the Empire and for war. The Home Rule movement declared support for war, and the Irish Volunteers, a nationalist and pro-Home Rule militia formed in opposition to the Ulster Volunteers, was split, with the largest grouping, under the leadership of the head of the Irish Parliamentary Party, Parnell's successor John Redmond, joined the Crown forces in huge numbers. Connolly was one of a handful of principled figures in the European left – among them Lenin and Luxemburg – who opposed the war. Connolly, like the Bolsheviks, saw that the war must not simply be opposed on Kautskyan "humanitarian" grounds of pacifism, but must be used as an opportunity for revolution.

Connolly's first move in the context of the war was to call for general strike across the continent of Europe. Action by the workers who were being conscripted into the vast forces now arrayed against each other would cause the war effort to grind to a halt. He helped to found the Irish Neutrality League and *The Workers' Republic* proclaimed in its headlines that "We serve neither King nor Kaiser." But his arguments fell on deaf ears, and this became only more apparent as the war went on. By 1916, it was clear that neither nationalists nor the workers shared Connolly's vision. The former had joined the British forces in large numbers in the hope that a display of "loyalty" to the empire would bring Home Rule after the war; large numbers of Ulster anti-Home Rulers joined up with a view to attaining the contrary goal. The bases on which Connolly had argued for Irish anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism were being washed away under his feet.

As the grounds on which Connolly had constructed his hopes for the Irish working class,

and the workers of Europe were eroded, his thinking also changed. He was always clear that the main task of revolutionary socialism was to end the war as speedily as possible. But at the same time, the war was an opportunity for revolutionary action. The balance of these angles of vision had turned by the middle of the war. For Connolly, the perfervid eagerness of the mass of Irish workers to serve in the British forces, in a war against their German brethren, represented a kind of degeneracy, and he reckoned that violent uprising could help to shake off this reactionary tendency. It's in this context that one must judge his willingness (along with many other "advanced nationalists" in Ireland at this time) to put some of his faith in imperial Germany. At the most basic level, the IRB's seeking alliance with Germany (via Roger Casement's mediation) in its Easter 1916 rebellion was an example of the simplest and most brutal political-military calculus: "My enemy's enemy is my friend." For Connolly, the liberal rhetoric of the great powers of the Triple Entente – that, in the words of Lloyd George, the war was being fought for "the rights of small nations" – was the most arrant hypocrisy. No alliance of which anti-Semitic imperial Russia was a part, no alliance which supported a brutal colonial power such as Belgium, and no alliance of imperialist powers such as Britain and France which spoke for liberal values while holding millions in subjugation could be taken seriously. In this conjuncture, Germany, with its developing welfare state, and with its enormous and well-organized working class (which would rise up against its imperial rulers at war's end anyway), was an acceptable ally. Connolly's willingness – in a position of extreme isolation and desperation – to negotiate the historical moment with a view to prosecuting revolution (his goal, above all else) by a tactical alliance is easy to judge negatively, in retrospect, just as we judge his support for the Boers in the same manner. But such judgment is arguably both unfair and unhistorical. Connolly wished to strike out from Second International passivity and collapse in the face of the nationalism of the great powers. The likelihood of Irish insurrection in alliance with a particular balance of republicans, nationalists, and

allies abroad seemed to him like the opportunity for such a blow.

It is this context that led Connolly ever closer to the separatist revolutionary republicans of the IRB, who had by this time also come to control the remainder of the Irish Volunteers who did not follow Redmond's call for service in the British Army. The course of the Easter Rising does not need to be rehearsed here, but it is noteworthy that the small militia which Connolly founded to protect striking workers after the Lockout, the Irish Citizen Army, brought out almost all of its strength to join the Irish Volunteers and their IRB leaders, and Connolly's own military participation and leadership were recorded as courageous and capable. The British government's reaction to the Rising was swift and ruthless, with all of the Rising leaders court-martialed executed during May 1916. Connolly was the last to die.

Reaction to the Rising abroad was complex and interesting. Parts of the British left saw the Rising as a militarist coup and a betrayal. But in Europe, views were more nuanced. Many Marxist leaders were skeptical of the capacity of national revolutions on the peripheries of the continent to damage imperial great powers. The Austrian Karl Radek expressed this view shortly before the Rising, and just before Connolly's execution on May 9, he reiterated his view, considering the Easter Rising no more than a nationalist putsch, which could never have been class-progressive because of the process of land reform which had been carried out since the late nineteenth century by the colonial government. Trotsky, too, was dubious. But Lenin, writing a year later with the Russian revolution only months away, was more positive: the Irish rebellion was premature, but it showed that, though small peripheral national revolutions were on their own powerless against empire, they helped to produce the ferment necessary for the primary revolutionary agent, the proletariat, to appear on the stage of history.

Connolly crammed more action and drama into his 48 years than could be contained in several ordinary lives. He always considered himself a revolutionary, from the start of his political activity. Both in his ideas and in his actions, he helps show us the dynamics and complications of the anti-imperialist Marxist left, in his time and in our own, differentially located between class, nation, and capital. Irish attitudes to Connolly's legacy have tended to swing between uncritical hero-worship and unnuanced liberal condemnation of his seeming final affiliation with nationalist violence. Modern international scholars and intellectuals of the postcolonial world, such as Robert Young and David Lloyd, have taken a much more productive and nuanced view. They have seen in Connolly a harbinger of the radical critique of the Eurocentrism both of liberal and Marxist thought. Connolly's peculiar relationship with the stage-ism of the Second International combines with the radical vision of peripheral precommunism and Utopian syndicalism in *Labour in Irish History* to offer a harbinger of the critique of Western historicism elaborated by intellectuals such as those of the South Asian Subaltern Studies group. Ranajit Guha and his confederates in the 1980s sought to produce a model of historiography which could attend to the inner logics of apparently fissiparous and ephemeral Indian popular protests, riots, strikes, and rebellions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rather than dismiss them as mere "outrages" or "meaningless violence" as had been done by both British imperial and Indian nationalist historians hitherto. This has led them to profound questioning of the traditional metanarratives of class war and development and modes of production which have underpinned traditional thought on the left. Lloyd and also Greg Dobbins and Spurgeon Thompson see in Connolly an anticipation of such "provincialization" of the Eurocentric left. Connolly, whose work critiques nationalist radicalism half a century before Frantz Fanon's incendiary analyses in *The Wretched of the Earth*, negotiates dialectically the uneven temporalities and anomalous spatialities of Ireland – located geographically near the heart of the *imperium* but functionally marginal to it. It is in this extraordinary quality of his thought and his praxis that his importance lay and still lies.

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Cross-References

▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
▶ German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933
▶ Irish History and Imperialism
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
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Life of a Revolutionary

The black Trinidadian historian and writer Cyril Lionel Robert James was one of the most eloquent and critical anti-imperialist figures of the twentieth century. It is easier, as James noted at one point in *The Black Jacobins* (1938), his masterful history of the Haitian Revolution, 'to find decency, gratitude, justice, and humanity in a cage of starving tigers than in the councils of imperialism' (James 2001: 229). *The Black Jacobins* analysed the transformation of colonised Saint-Domingue into the world's first independent black republic outside Africa from 1791 to 1804, and its publication on the eve of decolonisation established James as 'a thinker who posed questions about "postcoloniality" well before his contemporaries realized that all empires must fall' (Scott McLemee, dustjacket of Worcester 1996). As well as writing a classic of revolutionary anti-colonialist literature, James was also a leading militant Pan-Africanist activist, novelist, playwright, sports writer, literary critic, and penetrating commentator on cultural matters. Perhaps above all, James was a creative and original revolutionary Marxist theorist who felt towards the end of his life that his 'greatest contributions' had been 'to clarify and extend the heritage of Marx and Lenin' and 'to explain and expand the idea of what constitutes the new society' (Buhle 1986: 164).

C.L.R. James was born on 4 January 1901 in Trinidad, a tiny Caribbean island then languishing as a 'Crown colony' in the economic backwaters of the British Empire, essentially ruled by a governor appointed by the monarch on the advice of the secretary of state for the colonies. His parents, Robert and Ida Elizabeth James, were black and lower middle class, and both their fathers had worked their way up from almost nothing as immigrants from Barbados. On his father's side, James's grandfather succeeded as a pan boiler on one of Trinidad's huge sugar estates (a post traditionally reserved by the white owners for other whites) and so into the nascent emerging black middle class of Trinidad after the abolition of colonial slavery in the 1830s. His struggle enabled his son Robert James to escape a life of manual labour on the sugar estates and become a

respected teacher, and later headmaster. Possessing only 'cultural capital,' the James family invested this in the only place they could, preparing their son C.L.R. to sit the entrance examination for the island's elite school, Queen's Royal College (QRC). C.L.R. James was an uncommonly gifted boy and, aged just nine, became the youngest boy ever to win the necessary exhibition. Yet expectations that he would graduate from QRC with a scholarship to go abroad and study for a profession in medicine or law were to be dashed. James clearly could have chosen such a route had he wanted to, but his interest was increasingly distracted by life outside the classroom. Instead of paying full attention to Oxbridge-educated teachers of Latin and Greek, James indulged his love for the game of cricket and for reading English literature.

After he left QRC in 1918, all the contradictions of British colonial rule – the hypocrisy, tyranny, and injustice – dawned on James. His public school education had trained him to lead men forward for 'King and Country', but when James tried to do just this by enlisting with an army officers' regiment in 1918, he was blocked on account of being black. When a mass nationalist movement took off in the mid-192os around Captain Cipriani, a charismatic workers' leader who often declared himself 'the champion of the barefooted man', James – now teaching English and history back at QRC – took notice. 'My hitherto vague idea of freedom crystallised around a political commitment: we should be free to govern ourselves' (James 1969: 119). James, a writer of implicitly anti-colonialist short stories about life in the poor 'barrack yards' of Trinidad's capital Port of Spain for shortlived local magazines such as *Trinidad* and *The Beacon,* became a supporter of Cipriani's social-democratic Trinidad Workingmen's Association (TWA). James's first published book would be a political biography, *The Life of Captain Cipriani* (1932), in which he passionately, and with his characteristic devastating wit, exposed the lie behind the dictatorial British colonial authorities' line of 'self government when fit for it', showing how the growth of the TWA demonstrated beyond doubt that Trinidadians were manifestly ready for 'self government'. As James later noted, 'the basic

constituent of my political activity and outlook' was first set out in 'the "human" aspect' of *Minty Alley* (1936), a novel he wrote in 1928 about the working people of one 'barrack-yard' he stayed with that summer (Grimshaw 1991: 94).

In 1932, James made the 'voyage in' to imperial Britain, and after a brief stay in London he stayed in the Lancashire cotton textile town of Nelson with the family of his friend and compatriot, the legendary cricketer Learie Constantine. James's ten months in Nelson would be 'ten months that shook James's world': he did not only witness the devastating effects of the collapse of the Lancashire cotton industry, but also saw, alongside mass poverty, a working-class community of resistance proudly fighting back. In Nelson, James was also inspired by reading the *History of the Russian Revolution* of Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), and he began independently to politically orientate himself towards revolutionary Marxism, joining the tiny Trotskyist movement in 1934 after witnessing the rise of fascism across Europe on the back of mass unemployment created by the worst crisis in the history of capitalism. The rise of Hitler onto the world stage proclaiming himself the saviour of the Aryan race meant that James now defiantly also adopted a more radical, transnational identification with other black people (and their culture) – breaking from his earlier ingrained identification with 'imperial Britishness' as a British colonial subject and evolving from a campaigner for 'West Indian self-government' into a militant Pan-Africanist.

James, having by now moved from Nelson down to London – and having secured a prestigious job reporting cricket for the *Manchester Guardian* alongside Neville Cardus – was soon to establish his reputation on the wider British left as a leading anti-colonial activist. In 1935, James – by now a member of the Trotskyist 'Marxist Group' inside the Independent Labour Party (ILP) – played a critical role in the organization of opposition to fascist Italy's barbaric war against the people of Ethiopia, co-founding and chairing the International African Friends of Ethiopia (IAFE) alongside Amy Ashwood Garvey, former wife of the famous Jamaican Pan- Africanist Marcus Garvey. In time-honoured fashion, Mussolini had in 1935 declared his

criminal invasion and occupation of a sovereign nation 'a war of civilization and liberation', even a war 'of the poor, of the disinherited, of the proletariat!' (quoted in Padmore 1972: 153). James cut through what he called 'the mountain of lies and nonsense' which surrounded Mussolini's war, lies which had confused even sections of the left in Britain, damning the role of not just fascist Italy but European imperialism in Africa more generally in a series of outstanding articles in the ILP's paper, the *New Leader*, and in fiery speeches up and down the country. James challenged the idea that the League of Nations, dominated by the Great Powers of Britain and France who had carved up most of Africa between them already, would act decisively to defend the people of Ethiopia from Mussolini, and argued that to call for action by the league, 'to come within the orbit of Imperialist politics is to be debilitated by the stench, to be drowned in the morass of lies and hypocrisy'. Instead of demanding league sanctions on fascist Italy, James urged an alternative strategy of 'workers' sanctions': international industrial action to stop Mussolini's war machine:

> Workers of Britain, peasants and workers of Africa, get closer together for this and for other fights . . . Now, as always, let us stand for independent organisation and independent action. We have to break our own chains. Who is the fool that expects our gaolers to break them? ('Is This Worth a War? The League's Scheme to Rob Abyssinia of its Independence', *New Leader,* 4 October 1935, quoted in James 1984: 16)

Alongside his political campaigning and cricket reporting, since arriving in Britain, James had also made time to research the Haitian Revolution, regularly visiting archives in Paris, and in 1934 he had turned his research into a remarkable anti-imperialist play focusing on Haiti's revolutionary leader Toussaint Louverture. In 1936, James's *Toussaint Louverture: The Story of the Only Successful Slave Revolt in History* was staged at London's Westminster Theatre, with the American singer and actor Paul Robeson in the title role; this was the first time black professional actors had starred on the British stage in a play by a black playwright (and the only time Robeson ever starred in a play by a black playwright). James had by now been re-united in London

with his boyhood friend from Trinidad, George Padmore, a former leading figure in the Communist International who in 1933 had broken away in protest at the Soviet Union's apparent betrayal of the anti-colonial liberation struggle. In 1937 James had helped Padmore found the militant Pan-Africanist International African Service Bureau (IASB) in London together with other figures including Amy Ashwood Garvey, Jomo Kenyatta, Ras T. Makonnen, Chris Braithwaite, and I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson. James edited the IASB publications *Africa and the World and International African Opinion* and wrote a path-breaking short history of revolutionary 'black internationalism', *A History of Negro Revolt* (1938).

This little work was however destined forever to be overshadowed by James's magisterial *The Black Jacobins*, another work written with African resistance to European colonialism in mind. James demonstrated how the Marxist theory of permanent revolution illuminated not just anti-colonial struggles in the age of socialist revolution, but also the antislavery liberation struggle in the age of 'bourgeois-democratic' revolution, with the Haitian Revolution intrinsically intertwined with the great French Revolution throughout. In the process of recovering one of the great world-historic revolutions, James revolutionised scholarly understanding of Atlantic slavery and abolition, intellectually demolishing much-cherished British nationalist mythology as created by 'Tory historians, regius professors and sentimentalists' and other 'professional white-washers' of the historical record. *The Black Jacobins* did not simply restore slave 'agency' but insisted that the self-activity of the enslaved themselves was central to the story of emancipation from slavery.

James's thrilling and dramatic demonstration of how 'the transformation of slaves, trembling in hundreds before a single white man, into a people able to organize themselves and defeat the most powerful European nations of their day' represented 'one of the great epics of revolutionary struggle and achievement', was written to ideologically arm colonial liberation struggles (James 2001: xviii, 11, 15). As George Padmore noted in his review:

[C.L.R. James] has combined with great skill history and biography without sacrificing one to the other. Mr. James is a real historian, with the sensitive mind of the scholar and an excellent literary style . . . *The Black Jacobins* is a fascinating story, brilliantly told, and should be an inspiration to Africans and other colonial peoples still struggling for their freedom from the yoke of white imperialism. ('Toussaint, The Black Liberator', *The People,* 12 and 19 November, 1938, quoted in Høgsbjerg 2014: 196–197)

The Black Jacobins also contained an outstanding materialist analysis of capitalism and slavery – one that would influence James's former student, friend, compatriot, and fellow historian Eric Williams (1911–81) – and also of the dynamics of race and class in a colonial situation. 'The race question is subsidiary to the class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to make it fundamental.' At the close, James noted, 'imperialism vaunts its exploitation of the wealth of Africa for the benefit of civilization. In reality, from the very nature of its system of production for profit it strangles the real wealth of the continent – the creative capacity of the African people.' Yet 'the blacks of Africa are more advanced, nearer ready than were the slaves of San Domingo . . . the imperialists envisage an eternity of African exploitation: the African is backward, ignorant . . . they dream dreams' (James 2001: 230, 303–304).

In the 1930s, James had also played a critical role as the intellectual driving force of British Trotskyism, editing the journal *Fight* and writing *World* Revolution, *1917–1936* (1937), a pioneering anti-Stalinist account of 'the rise and fall of the Communist International'. In late 1938, James embarked on what was meant to be a six-month speaking tour of the US for the American Trotskyist movement, but he ended up staying in America for the next 15 years. In April 1939, James spent a week with Leon Trotsky himself in order to discuss the strategy and tactics of black liberation struggles in the US. James's radical and original attempt to solve what was then known as 'the Negro question', developed after actively organising among striking black sharecroppers

in south-eastern Missouri and carrying out wider anti-war agitation, would in the 1960s influence important groups in America such as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.

After Trotsky's murder in 1940, James under the pseudonym 'J.R. Johnson', alongside Raya Dunayevskaya ('Freddie Forest') and Grace Lee Boggs, formed the 'Johnson–Forest Tendency' within American Trotskyism in order to attempt to deal with the profound crisis the movement was now thrown into. The tendency made a highly original attempt to make, as James wrote in 1948 in *Notes on Dialectics*, a 'leap from the heights of Leninism' through breaking with 'orthodox Trotskyism' and returning to the writings of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin in order to face up to the new realities after the Second World War (James 1980: 150). James refused to treat Trotsky's writings of the late 1930s as sacrosanct but instead attempted to develop Marxist theory theoretically so that it could make sense of new realities. The Johnson–Forest Tendency's development of a theory of state capitalism to understand the Stalinist regimes enabled it, like the French group 'Socialisme ou Barbarie' around Cornelius Castoriadis and the Socialist Review Group around Tony Cliff in Britain, to preserve an orientation around Marx's central theoretical insight that the emancipation of the working class would be the conquest of the working class itself. The Tendency also attempted to 'Americanise' Marxism and Bolshevism, and James's wide-ranging writings on culture and society in this vein included *American Civilization* (1949–50) and *Mariners*, *Renegades and Castaways* (1953), a fascinating study of Herman Melville, the author of *Moby Dick*.

However, for all James's grasp of Marxism as a living, ever-evolving theory, the rising tide of McCarthyism at the height of the Cold War had inevitably damaging consequences, and in 1953, he was forced to return to Britain. The Johnson–Forest Tendency soon split and broke up, though its analysis of state capitalism was to be vindicated by events such as the rebirth of Workers Councils in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. James's own lifelong anti-colonialism was also to be vindicated with the victories of national independence movements across Africa and the

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Caribbean, not least in Ghana under the leadership of Padmore's protégé Kwame Nkrumah (1909–72), and in Trinidad itself with the rise to power of the People's National Movement (PNM) led by Eric Williams. Yet, perhaps as a result of his objective political isolation as a revolutionary Marxist and perhaps as a result of his personal connection with the leaders of many national liberation movements, James now seemed to shift away from classical Leninist strategy and tactics to accommodate himself to the new situation of decolonisation – something Lenin had not foreseen as a possibility in his study *Imperialism.* In *World Revolution* (1937), James had approvingly quoted Lenin when he 'called for "determined war" against the attempt of all those quasi-Communist revolutionists to cloak the liberation movement in the backward countries with a Communist garb' (James 1993: 234). Yet now amid decolonisation, James refused to wage any such 'determined war' and indeed showed a disastrous misjudgement of many autocratic leaders of 'Pan-African Socialism', cloaking the likes of Nkrumah in a communist garb, only to then have to break bitterly from those he had previously declared anti-capitalist revolutionaries on a par with Lenin (see his speech praising Nkrumah in Accra, Ghana, in 1960, in James 1977: 164).

Aside from playing a leading role in achieving a significant symbolic victory in the appointment of Frank Worrell as the first black captain of the West Indian cricket team, James's return to Trinidad in 1958 to play his part in the movement towards independence was not a political success for him personally. As a supporter of Williams, James became secretary of the Federal Labour Party, the governing party of the embryonic West Indies Federation, and took on the editing of the PNM's weekly paper *The Nation*. By 1960 however, as James detailed in his book *Party Politics in the West Indies*, he had been forced to break with Williams as a result of the breakup of the West Indies Federation, and the latter's agreement to the retention of a US naval base at Chaguaramas and more general abandonment of nonalignment in favour of support for America in the context of the Cold War. In 1960, James

gave a lecture series on Marxism in Trinidad, lectures which seem to reveal a return to a more classical Leninist understanding of imperialism as a system after the dashing of his high hopes in Third- World nationalist movements. 'The passing of colonialism . . . is a sign of the weakness of the capitalist bourgeois state . . . nevertheless there is no question about it: the basic opposition to imperialism must come from the proletariat of the advanced countries' (James 1973: 90). The publication of these lectures – under the title *Modern Politics* – was banned in Trinidad, and James returned to England a few days before Trinidad's independence in 1962.

In 1963, James published his seminal semiautobiographical cultural history of West Indian cricket, *Beyond a Boundary* (1963), another pioneering study of how the dynamics of race, class, and nation in the 'dramatic spectacle' of cricket played themselves out amid the rise, decline, and fall of the British Empire. In 1965, James made another attempt to intervene in Trinidadian politics, only to be briefly placed under house arrest by the increasingly autocratic Williams on his arrival. His attempt to then electorally challenge the hegemony of Williams's PNM through founding a new political party, the Workers' and Farmers' Party, was not successful. James now travelled widely between Britain, the US, Canada, and the Caribbean, lecturing, writing, and finding a new audience among a new generation of radicals both in the Caribbean and internationally, including the historian and activist Walter Rodney (1942–80). In the 1980s James moved to Brixton in London, where he lived in a room above the 'Race Today' collective, and, though confined in his movements, lived to see the eruption of Solidarity in Poland in 1980–81 and, just before his passing, the opening scenes of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. Such challenges to the Soviet empire for James served not only as a vindication of his revolutionary democratic perspective of 'socialism from below' but also as a reminder of an elementary, essential truth – one that James did so much to powerfully elucidate in all his work – that liberation from oppression and exploitation can come only from

below, from the mass movements and struggles of the oppressed and exploited themselves.

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Japan

Japanese Colonialism

Japanese History

Jazz

Jazz: *Come On and Let's Get Free*

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Synonyms

Civil Rights Movement; Freedom; Improvisation;
Jazz; Liberation; Music; Nationalism; Post-
Nationalism; Race

Definition

Jazz is a product of the New World, embedded
with the history of slavery, imperialism, and
decolonialization. Constructed from elements
found in African and European musical tradi-
tions, jazz originated in the United States, but
was later embraced by many musicians and lis-
teners beyond the borders of its country of origin.
Jazz not only allowed for the expression of old
and new beliefs and issues resulting from the
mixture of people in the New World, but also
welcomed the incorporation of non-U.S. ele-
ments, creating the possibility of adaptation that
allowed for a potentially global musical tradition,
that addressed issues of imperialism and anti-impe-
rialism. By examining moments of cultural borrow-
ing, destabilisation, and decolonization in jazz,
different processes of identity construction and
negotiation in the U.S. become visible.

When thinking of jazz, thoughts of imperialism
and decolonisation may not be the first that come
to mind. One thinks of leisure time spent in
dancehalls and late-night clubs before issues of
hegemony and self-determination. But it could be
argued that jazz is one of many products that
formed out of the hundreds of years of cultural
interaction throughout the course of the New
World slave trade. This cultural product and pro-
cess first coalesced in the city of New Orleans at
the beginning of the twentieth century and later
spread throughout the US and the rest of the globe
before, during, and after the World Wars. And
with the spread of jazz, the process of identity
maintenance, contestation, and reconstruction
accompanied the music. Throughout the history
of jazz, this undercurrent of identity negotiation
intensifies in moments of cultural borrowing,
destabilisation, and decolonisation. The hope of
this work is to outline some of these moments in
jazz's history and provide a resource on some of the
literature, recordings, and films on the processes.

Most literature on jazz addressing issues
around imperialism is found in discussions on
jazz and its relationship to black nationalism or
social protest (e.g. Baraka 1963, 1967; Budds
1978; Carles and Comolli 1974; Floyd 1995;
Hobsbawm 1993; Kelley 2002, 2012; Kofsky
1970 and 1998; Monson 2007). Very little litera-
ture deals with jazz in relationship to imperialism
or decolonisation overtly. During this research, I
found only Lane (2013) and McClure (2006).
Many jazz musicians and listeners of jazz see
jazz and its tradition as a celebration of freedom.
Such ideas and feelings are what initially draw
many people into jazz, myself included (first as a
listener and later as a performer and a scholar).
Cornell West sums up these feelings best and how
they are embedded in the process of democracy in
his book *Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight
Against Imperialism,* stating:

> [One of the] crucial traditions [that] fuel deep dem-
> ocratic energies [is] the mighty shield and inner
> strength provided by the tragicomic commitment
> to hope. The tragicomic is the ability to laugh and
> retain a sense of life's joy – to preserve hope even
> while staring in the face of hate and hypocrisy – as
> against falling into the nihilism of paralyzing
> despair. This tragicomic hope is expressed in Amer-
> ica most profoundly in the wrenchingly honest yet
> compassionate voices of the black freedom strug-
> gles; most poignantly in the painful eloquence of
> the blues; and most exuberantly in the improvisa-
> tional virtuosity of jazz. (2004: 16)

The potential of jazz to propel the process West
calls 'tragicomic hope' is undeniable to those who
love the music. Jazz (along with voices of the
black freedom struggle and the blues) can prevent
individuals and society from falling into despair.

Such a notion is liberating. But we rarely see discussions on such transformation in the traditional literature on jazz, except in the autobiographies by jazz musicians or the writings of non-musicians like Ralph Ellison, Jack Kerouac, Albert Murray, and others who adore the music from a distance.

Additionally, by taking a larger and wider view from an international perspective, one can begin to see jazz as an agent of social change and by extension see decolonisation and anti-imperialism throughout its history. In his introduction to the book *Jazz Planet,* E. Taylor Atkins outlines how jazz is not only the precursor to globalisation, but is also simultaneously a national and a post-national music:

> Jazz, though certainly born on U.S. soil, was both product and instigator of early-twentieth-century processes and trends that were global in scope: the mass manufacture of culture, urbanization, the leisure revolution, and primitivism. It is this fact – combined with the sheer, and early, ubiquity of the music – that leads us to conclude that, practically from its inception, jazz was a harbinger of what we now call 'globalization'. In no one's mind have the music's ties to its country of origin been severed, yet the historical record proves that it has for some time had global significance, if not necessarily for the commonly accepted, purely aesthetic reasons. Jazz exists in our collective imagination as both a *national* and *postnational* music, but is studied almost exclusively in the former incarnation. Our purpose here is to recuperate its career as a transgressor of the idea of the nation, as an agent of globalization. (2003: 13)

The failure to see jazz as more than a national music and simultaneously a national and a postnational music hampers the discussion of jazz and its true and greater potential for anti-imperialism. We begin to see that since its beginning, jazz is a music that originated in the United States, but at the same time had success beyond its country of origin due in part to its hybridity as a product of the centuries-old process of cultural mixture between Africa and Europe. Jazz has of course spread to all parts of the world like Africa, Asia, Australia, the Middle East, and South America. In discussing jazz around the world, Atkins borrows the term 'jazz nationalism' from Japanese jazz critic Yui Shoichi to explain the simultaneity of jazz as national and post-national music through the rejection of an idea of America:

> [Yui's] theory of 'jazz nationalism'... maintained a faith in the much-proclaimed 'universality' of jazz as a language, while incorporating nationalistic themes of fundamental ethnic difference and Japanese exceptionalism to distinguish Japanese jazz and accentuate its originality. As Yui wrote in liner notes for the CD reissue of the TAKT Jazz Series in 1996, 'The movement for "national [ethnic] independence" that surged through each country [in the sixties] became the motive power for what must be called "jazz nationalism" [*jazu nashonarizumu*], "to be free of America" [*Amerika banare*]'. (2001: 246–247, additions in the original)

My hope is to show that moments of cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation in jazz in the U.S. can be seen as an internal process within jazz's native country 'to be free of America'. By juxtaposing the tension of laughter in the face of hate and hypocrisy in West's notion of tragicomic hope with the tension of Atkins's depiction of jazz as both a national and postnational music, the true anti-imperialist potential of jazz can be better understood. Without these two dynamics, jazz might not have spread around the world and continued to evolve outside the U.S. in the twentieth century. By recognising moments of cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation in jazz, we can illustrate and celebrate jazz's anti-imperialist character.

Before going forward, these ideas of cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation should be explained. The three exist on a spectrum with varying degrees of cultural mixture and disruption. For cultural borrowing to occur, certain elements and ideas are simply incorporated from one culture into another. For cultural destabilisation to occur, traditional elements and ideas within a culture are challenged. For cultural decolonisation to occur, traditional elements and ideas are removed and replaced with alternative or hybridised ones. Viewing the three processes on a spectrum helps to unpack some of the cultural exchanges that take place throughout the history of jazz. And one of the first and most important exchanges happens before jazz begins.

While waiting for a train late one night in 1903, brass band conductor and cornetist W.C. Handy

heard what would later be called the blues for the first time, and to his ears it was '. . .the weirdest music [he] had ever heard' (Handy 1941: 74). These new sounds sung and performed by an African-American guitarist casually at a train station and other experiences he had while traveling in the South would have a profound effect on Handy's musical output. Beginning in 1912, he first published 'Memphis Blues' that included the 'earthy flavor' (78) he was so enamoured with. Handy would later pen such famous songs as 'St. Louis Blues' (1914) and as a result would be known as the Father of the Blues, not because he invented the blues, but because he wrote it down. Handy's borrowing of these southern sounds fused with his brass band experience would create a foundation for what would later become jazz.

Many agree that the first jazz record ever made was 'Livery Stable Blues' in 1917 by the Original Dixieland Jazz Band, five white musicians from New Orleans billing themselves as the 'Creators of Jazz'. Previously, New Orleanian and Creole cornetist Freddy Keppard was offered the chance to record for the Victor Talking Machine Company, but refused, worrying that other musicians might copy his recordings (Giddins and DeVeaux 2009: 88). The members of the Original Dixieland Jazz Band would become very successful touring the country and travelling all the way to London to perform for King George V in 1919. But controversy surrounds this success as many feel that the all-white Original Dixieland Jazz Band did not deserve their place in history. This is only the beginning of the dynamics of race and jazz. In 1923, Paul Whiteman (who later dubbed himself the 'King of Jazz' and was the originator of a new music called 'symphonic jazz') commissioned pianist George Gershwin to compose a piano concerto to be debuted at Aeolian Hall in New York City as part of an all-jazz concert entitled 'An Experiment in Modern Music'. Gershwin heard jazz in Harlem and befriended pianist James P. Johnson. Gershwin incorporated much of what he heard of early jazz in his new piece *Rhapsody in Blue* (1924), which was hugely successful at Whiteman's concert. But these two moments in jazz's early history are associated with musicians who are not fully representative of the community

that produced the music. My aim here is not to start a debate on the validity of the contribution to jazz made by white musicians, which has already been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Lees 1994). Rather, my emphasis is on the cultural borrowing and the use and appropriation of music by the Original Dixieland Jazz Band and Gershwin. On the positive side, their successes most definitely helped propel future successes by musicians both black and white.

In a letter to the editor of *Downbeat* in 1938, pianist and composer Jelly Roll Morton stated that he invented jazz in 1902. And when Morton's recording of pianist Scott Joplin's 'Maple Leaf Rag' (1899) on *The Smithsonian Collection of Classic Jazz* is compared to one of Joplin's piano rolls on the same collection (Morton 1938; Joplin 1899/1916), such an assertion can begin to be entertained. Morton's improvisatory contribution and adaptation of Joplin's original composition are noteworthy. But Morton's letter was aimed as an attack on Handy as the creator of jazz. Handy would later admit that he made no such claim and did not even consider himself a jazz musician:

> I . . . would not play jazz if I could, but I did have the good sense to write down the laws of jazz and the music that lends itself to jazz and had vision enough to copyright and publish the music I wrote so I don't have to go around saying I made up this piece and that piece in such and such a year like Jelly Roll . . . (Handy 1938: 37)

Interestingly, Morton is commonly credited with jazz's first composition in 1915 with 'Jelly Roll Blues'. This bickering is typical of the early arguments regarding the creation of jazz and legitimisation of musicians both black and white.

In the same year that Gershwin and Whiteman debuted *Rhapsody in Blue,* jazz's first great soloist and trumpeter Louis Armstrong arrived in New York after a thorough apprenticeship under Kid Ory, King Oliver, and others. Shortly thereafter, jazz's first great composer and pianist Duke Ellington started working regularly at the Cotton Club in Harlem in 1927. Both Armstrong and Ellington would record songs that would foreground race. First, Ellington recorded 'Creole Love Call' in 1927, which featured a haunting melody sung by Adelaide Louise Hall. And in

1929, Armstrong recorded Fats Waller's '(What Did I Do To Be So) Black and Blue?' from Waller's hit Broadway show *Hot Chocolates*. The song tells a story of personal damage that results from social discrimination based on skin colour:

> Even the mouse, ran from my house
>> They laugh at you, and all that you do
>> What did I do, to be so black and blue?
>
> I'm white, inside
>> But, that don't help my case
>> That's life, can't hide
>> What is in my face
>
> How would it end? Ain't got a friend
>> My only sin, is in my skin
>> What did I do, to be so black and blue?
>> (Armstrong 1929)

Armstrong's foregrounding of race is a moment of cultural destabilisation. His admonition is powerful and begins to open doors to discuss issues of race. Only a decade later, in 1939, Billie Holiday made her landmark recording of 'Strange Fruit' (and later, a chilling re-recording in 1956). Her song illustrated the horrors and violence of lynching in the South, climaxing in the final verse:

> Here is a fruit for the crows to pluck
>> For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck
>> For the sun to rot, for the tree to drop
>> Here is a strange and bitter crop
>> (Holiday 1939)

Holiday's performance of the song for mixed audiences at New York's Café Society can be considered not only a moment of cultural destabilisation, but also a moment of cultural decolonisation for listeners in how it provided them with such a graphic account of violence predicated on skin colour. Armstrong and Holiday are opening the conversation within jazz to create an alternative dialogue around race. Coincidentally, around the same time these discussions were happening, clarinettist and bandleader Benny Goodman broke the colour line in jazz by hiring and predominantly featuring pianist Teddy Wilson in 1935 (and a year later including vibraphonist Lionel Hampton) as both part of his big band and in a special small combo with drummer Gene Krupa.

A much more subtle version of cultural decolonisation can be seen in the recordings of saxophonist Charlie Parker. Simply by looking at his composition 'Ornithology' (1946), we can see a manifestation of what could be called cultural decolonisation on a sonic level. 'Ornithology' is a contrafact, which is a new song based on previously used chord progression. Having evolved from the blues, which uses a small combination of chord changes to create several new pieces of music, it should come as no surprise that jazz would do the same. In the case of 'Ornithology', Parker borrowed the then popular song 'How High the Moon' from the Broadway review *Two for the Show* (1940). Clarinettist Benny Goodman had recorded a hit version of 'How High the Moon' the year the review debuted. For 'Ornithology', Parker developed a new melody over the 'How High the Moon' chord progression, thus creating something new out of something old. 'Ornithology' has since become a jazz standard. And the origin of the song is not lost, as singer Ella Fitzgerald reversed the process in her famous live performance of 'How High the Moon' on *Ella in Berlin* (1960) by singing the melody of 'Ornithology' during her scat solo. This process may not seem as powerful as Armstrong's, Ellington's, and Holiday's contributions, but Parker has subtly embedded a jazz standard with a history of cultural decolonisation.

Additional moments of cultural borrowing that could arguably lead to cultural decolonisation by providing alternative narratives are the many suites of Ellington (recorded 1947–71) and the 'jazz impressions' and other non-traditional recordings of Dave Brubeck (recorded 1957–67). Both musicians had toured the world and were official cultural ambassadors for the U.S. The history and the cultural dynamics of their and other musicians' global tours have been documented (see Davenport 2009; Sehgal 2008; Von Eschen 2004), but the globally influenced recordings of Ellington and Brubeck are a testament to the adaptability of jazz. For example, Ellington wrote suites that either incorporated elements from or were dedicated to regions of the world like Africa (both Liberia and Togo), England, Eurasia, the Far East, and Latin

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America. Brubeck made recordings with elements from and homages to Germany, Japan, Mexico, and Turkey. Both musicians also created new music and homages to their home country. Without delving deeply into each recording, these recordings are a manifestation of the openness of jazz in addition to its adaptability. These recordings illustrate Atkins's concept of jazz being simultaneously a national and a post-national music.

Now we come to the more documented and discussed period of jazz in relationship to ideas of imperialism and self-determination. The recordings made in the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s embody the social issues of the time from the Civil Rights Era to the Black Power Movement. Musicians like bassist Charles Mingus, drummer Max Roach, and saxophonist Archie Shepp also incorporated issues and themes directly from the Civil Rights Movement. In his 'Fables of Faubus' (1959) and its later incarnations, Mingus criticised Arkansas governor Orval Faubus and his segregationist politics for not letting nine African-American students (known as the Little Rock Nine) attend a recently desegregated, public school in 1957. Roach referenced the Greensboro sit-ins on the cover of his album *We Insist! Freedom Now Suite* (1960) with a photo of three African Americans sitting at a lunch counter. Shepp composed several pieces of music in honour of Malcolm X. And these are just the most notable examples from each musician. In addition, musicians like Cannonball Adderley, Art Blakey, Ornette Coleman, Charlie Haden and his Liberation Music Orchestra, Joe Henderson, Roland Kirk, Joe McPhee, Sonny Rollins, Pharoah Sanders, and Randy Weston recorded music with similar themes. Many of the relevant recordings of these and other musicians are included in the Discography.

John Coltrane also reflected historical moments from the Civil Rights Movement with compositions like 'Song of the Underground Railroad' (1961a) and 'Alabama' (1964), homages to heroes of the freedom struggle, like Harriet Tubman, and also its casualties like the four African-American girls killed in the 16th Street Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama. But of a more spiritual nature, Coltrane's masterpiece

A Love Supreme (1965d) was a four-part suite that acknowledged his victory over his drug addiction and subsequent spiritual enlightenment as a result. In the form of a letter to the album's listener, Coltrane detailed the experience and explained the intent of the recording in the liner notes:

> During the year 1957, I experienced, by the grace of God, a spiritual awakening, which was to lead me to a richer, fuller, more productive life. At that time, in gratitude, I humbly asked to be given the means and privilege to make others happy through music. I feel this has been granted through His grace. ALL PRAISE TO GOD . . .
>   This album is a humble offering to Him. An attempt to say 'THANK YOU GOD' ...

After *A Love Supreme* and as part of this new consciousness, Coltrane would begin to explore more freely structured music and include elements from the musics of Africa and India. His wife Alice Coltrane would take such cultural mixture further after his death by borrowing culturally from Indian, Egyptian, and other Middle Eastern philosophies and religions. Other musicians also incorporated non-Western musicians and instrumentation in their recordings. For example, guitarist John McLaughlin worked with world-renowned tabla player Zakir Hussain in their group Shakti starting in the mid-1970s.

Though not necessarily directly related to specific historic events, trumpeter Miles Davis would also create music that was reflective of the social changes of the time. After spending time in France recording the soundtrack to *Ascenseur pour l'échafaud* [Elevator to the Gallows] (1958), Davis returned to the U.S. with a different mindset, as he was treated differently and more respectfully in Europe than he was in the U.S. He began to take artistic risks in his recordings, most notably the blues-influenced *Kind of Blue* (1959) that was very minimal in contrast to the dense harmonies of bebop and the aggressive rhythms of hard bop. A year later, Davis recorded the ethereal, flamenco-influenced *Sketches of Spain* (1960), augmented by a large ensemble arranged by Gil Evans. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Davis converted his ensemble from acoustic instrumentation to a more rock-oriented instrumentation. Davis exchanged the acoustic piano and upright bass for synthesisers and electric

bass with additional electric guitars and percussion. After seeing rock musicians like Jimi Hendrix and Sly Stone, Davis had hoped to attract a younger audience. Davis fused rock rhythms and textures with jazz harmonies and extended improvisation on such recordings as *In a Silent Way* (1969) and *Bitches Brew* (1970a). Many alumni of Davis's bands from this time went on to form successful fusion ensembles and make ground-breaking recordings, most notably Chick Corea's *Light as a Feather* (1972) with Return to Forever, Herbie Hancock's *Headhunters* (1973), and Joe Zawinul's *Heavy Weather* (1977) with Weather Report. This is not the typical cultural borrowing that had happened earlier with the Original Dixieland Jazz Band and Whiteman, as Corea, Hancock, and Zawinul all helped pioneer fusion with Davis. But it should be noted that these three musicians and others made music after their tenure with Davis that they might not have made before. Davis would continue to use the latest forms of technology until his death in 1991. Two of his most successful later recordings referenced the social and political struggles in South Africa: *Tutu* (1986), a homage to South African bishop (later archbishop) Desmond Tutu; and, *Amandla* (1989), a Xhosa and Zulu word meaning 'power'. Davis continually borrowed from many sources, both technological and cultural.

In the 1970s, cultural destabilisation continued. Band leader and keyboardist Sun Ra had been making recordings since the 1950s. But his ideas of interstellar space travel as a metaphor for cultural disruption and evolution crystallised in his movie *Space is the Place (1974).* Sun Ra had constructed a persona for himself based on the idea that he was originally from Saturn. His belief was that humanity did not understand its origins and was therefore out of step with its destiny. Sun Ra's ideas were an attempt at a cultural decolonisation of the mind. Mark Dery would later group Sun Ra's philosophies and others like it under the term 'Afrofuturism' (1994: 180), which combines ideas of technology and science fiction with ideas of race and magic realism. One could view both Davis's and Sun Ra's uses of technology as a gateway to another place or

space. Though they may not overtly discuss the use of technology, such themes of exodus and desire to move to a new world had appeared earlier in the music like Ellington's piano concerto *New World A-Comin'* (1945), inspired by the 1943 Roi Ottley book of the same name, Eddie Harris's *Exodus to Jazz* (1961), Lee Morgan's *Search for the New Land* (1964), and others. So Sun Ra's philosophy can be seen as an extension of an earlier theme of exodus in jazz. In the film *Space is the Place,* Sun Ra invited people to join him in his space travels by registering with his employment service. The recruitment pitch stated: 'If you find Earth boring / Just the same old, same thing / C'mon, signup / With Outer Spaceways, Inc'. Though comical here and serious elsewhere, such themes of exodus are obviously anti-imperialistic and are aimed at promoting cultural decolonisation. And starting in the 1960s before Sun Ra's invitation, many musicians formed groups and associations as an alternative to record companies and to help promote their own music (for example, the Association for the Advancement of Creative Musicians (AACM) in Chicago, the Black Artists Group (BAG) in St Louis, the Jazz Composers Guild in New York, the Union of God's Musicians and Artists Ascension (UGMAA) in Los Angeles, and others).

The process of augmenting the conversation of jazz with new issues continued through the 1980s. Most notably, saxophonist Fred Ho drew heavily on the black freedom struggle and applied its issues and challenges to additional groups, such as Asian Americans, Latin Americans, and women. Ho not only has an extensive catalogue, but was also an accomplished author. The trend to augment the conversation of jazz continued through the 1990s with musicians like bassist William Parker and saxophonist John Zorn, both associated with the downtown scene in New York. Parker established the group Other Dimensions of Music to provide an alternative to the neo-bop young lions like the Marsalis brothers, Nicholas Payton, Joshua Redman, and others. Parker's group was firmly rooted in the free jazz tradition of Ornette Coleman and others, as opposed to the hard bop tradition of the young lions. Parker was key to establishing the Sound Unity Festival in the

1980s and later the Vision Festival beginning in 1996. Zorn widened the conversation by emphasising Jewish culture in his work, starting in the 1990s with his various incarnations of the Masada groups and the accompanying repertoire. Zorn also founded the record label Tzadik in 1995 to document his output and continually cultivate younger musicians. Zorn opened his own venue, The Stone, in 2005 to support his own output and the music of other adventurous musicians. Parker and Zorn, both prolific authors, have borrowed from other sources in order to destabilise the norm of jazz performance. Parker's further development of free jazz and Zorn's incorporation of Jewish culture both widen, contest, and attempt to decolonise the jazz tradition as envisioned by the neo-traditional young lions since the 1980s.

It should be noted that both Marsalis brothers have reinterpreted and recorded Coltrane's *A Love Supreme* (see B. Marsalis 2002; W. Marsalis 2004). Wynton Marsalis recorded multiple works by Mingus with the Lincoln Center Jazz Orchestra (2005). And Branford Marsalis recorded Rollins' *Freedom Suite* (2002). Plus, trumpeter Terrance Blanchard has paid tribute to Malcolm X both on the soundtrack for Spike Lee's *Malcolm X* (1992) and his own album *The Malcolm X Jazz Suite* (1993). It could therefore be argued that these young lions have recolonised and thus canonised what were originally disruptive music and themes. To be fair, all three musicians have also released adventurous original music in some way. Branford Marsalis worked with Sting and released albums by his hip-hop project Buckshot LeFonque (1994–97). Wynton Marsalis wrote and recorded the Pulitzer Prize-wining *Blood on the Fields* (1997) and the thought-provoking *From the Plantation to the Penitentiary* (2007). And Blanchard composed and recorded music inspired by the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath on three different occasions: the soundtrack to Spike Lee's documentaries *When the Levees Broke: A Requiem in Four Acts* (2006) and *If God is Willing and Da Creek Don't Rise* (2010), plus his own album *A Tale of God's Will: A Requiem for Katrina* (2007).

Venturing beyond the boundaries of jazz, it should be noted that the musical contributions of jazz musicians have not only spread around the world, but have also been sources of inspiration for non-jazz musicians. Since the late 1960s, a vibrant scene of improvisatory rock bands (known as jam bands) has flourished in the U.S. Bands like Blues Traveller, the Dave Mathews Band, Gov't Mule, Phish, Widespread Panic, and others all have roots in bands like the Allman Brothers Band, the Grateful Dead, and the Jimi Hendrix Experience, which based much of their improvisatory nature on jazz. Improvisation and the openness to collaboration may be the only markers shared with jazz, but to ignore jam bands and leave them out of a conversation of music and anti-imperialism would be short-sighted. Most of these jam bands have received little to no radio support. And though they all have created a large repertoire of original material, their fans attend their concerts repeatedly to witness each band's exploration of the musical possibilities of their repertoire with hopes of new discoveries. Thus, jam bands have borrowed improvisation from jazz, destabilised the usual radio-friendly, single-dependent structure of rock, and arguably decolonised the attitudes of many young people to make them open to more exploratory musical environments.

To close this examination of moments of cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation in jazz, there are three more recent examples that show that these processes continue. First, French multi-instrumentalist Michel Henritzi released the album *Keith Rowe Serves Imperialism* in 2007. The title of the album references composer Cornelius Cardew's book *Stockhausen Serves Imperialism (1974)*, criticising both John Cage and Karlheinz Stockhausen, and denouncing his involvement with the avant-garde. Similarly, Henritzi believes that the music of improvisers like English table-top guitarist Keith Rowe are non-subversive. In the album's liner notes, Henritzi criticises the idea of a recorded improvisation, arguing that once recorded, an improvisation is no longer an improvisation: 'The manufactured record [of an improvisation] is deifying the living moment of the performance into a finished work, into an object which is just feeding the market of Art'. Instead, Henritzi has taken improvisations

conducted at separate times and places and assembled them into a performance, stating:

> [The musicians] were all ignorant of the other one's music. But this is precisely where improvisation is taking place, just through the arbitrary collage . . . We are not free with our choices. The record as an object gives us a restraint with which we must deal. The market is selling us its norms and we need the market to sell our cultural production. (2007)

Henritzi is trying to redefine (and thus decolonise) the idea of recorded improvisation. This may just be a mental exercise, but it reinforces the idea that improvisation needs to be experienced in the moment. And once it is over, it cannot be repeated.

Another moment of cultural destabilisation (and potentially decolonisation) is pianist Robert Glasper's Grammy win for his album *Black Radio* (2012). This may not sound like a moment of destabilisation at first. But in spite of the fact that Glasper is a product of the jazz tradition and the album was released on a jazz record label (Blue Note), the recording won a Grammy for Best R&B Album. Granted, Glasper was working under the moniker the 'Robert Glasper Experiment' and included many R&B, hip-hop, and other non-jazz musicians on the album such as Erykah Badu, Yasiin Bey (formerly known as Mos Def), and Me'Shell Ndegéocello. But for a musician rooted in jazz to be able to cross over and win in a non-jazz category is noteworthy. Previously, pianist Herbie Hancock won Album of the Year with his album *RIVER: the joni letters* (2007), but Glasper's cross-genre shift is more of a departure from the norm.

The final example of cultural decolonisation is the music video released by bassist and singer Esperanza Spalding entitled 'We are America' (2013), which calls for the closure of the U. S. detention facility known as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The music video also features other famous musicians such as Harry Belafonte, Janelle Monáe, and Stevie Wonder. The song does not appear on any of Spalding's albums and was released solely as a music video. And though more of an R&B song, Spalding's association with the greater jazz community firmly attaches 'We are America' to the jazz tradition. The song

itself does not reference Guantanamo Bay, but the video features quotations regarding the facility, statistics of detainees, and its closure. Spalding repeatedly states: 'We are America / In my America / We take a stand for this' and 'Let 'em out', both phrases reinforcing the quotes in the music video.

Hopefully, the above-mentioned examples will begin a discussion surrounding cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation in jazz. Keeping West and Atkins in mind, jazz serves as a model where one can remain calm during moments of adversity, but also have multiple identities that are rooted in different ways. Recently in the *New York Times*, Herbie Hancock commented on how and why jazz keeps evolving: 'The thing that keeps jazz alive, even if it's under the radar, is that it is so free and so open to not only lend its influence to other genres, but to borrow and be influenced by other genres. That's the way it breathes' (2013: AR25). The more recent moments in jazz of borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation seen in the work of Henritzi, Glasper, and Spalding are in agreement with Hancock's statement. And the many moments from W.C. Handy to John Zorn also fit into Hancock's statement. The necessity is to keep breathing, and the breath or exchange is the balance between borrowing and being borrowed, destabilising and being destabilised, and decolonising and being decolonised.

The title of this work 'Come On and Let's Get Free', is borrowed from the lyrics of Funkadelic's song 'Good to Your Earhole' on their album *Let's Take it to the Stage* (1975). In many ways, funk bands in the 1970s continued many of the same ideas of cultural destabilisation found in jazz. The idea of dancing as a way to 'get free' is not too far from the previously discussed ideas. But the real message of these moments of cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation is best stated in the lyrics of the title track of Funkadelic's album *Free Your Mind and Your Ass Will Follow* (1970): 'Freedom is free of the need to be free'. The projects of anti-imperialism and decolonisation and their corresponding agendas could not be more accurately expressed. Though not the first to say this, trumpeter Nicholas Payton reminded the

readers of his blog that the word 'jazz' is a pejorative term that should be avoided and is not reflective of the music and its tradition:

> 'Jazz' is an oppressive colonialist slave term and I want no parts [sic] of it. If jazz wasn't a slave, why did Ornette [Coleman] try to free it? Jazz is not music, it is an idea that hasn't served any of us well. It saddens me most that some of my friends can't see that. (2011)

The word and its history are problematic. But it may be appropriate that the word and its history embody the very cultural and historical struggle that produced the music. Hopefully, these and other moments of cultural borrowing, destabilisation, and decolonisation in jazz (or whatever one calls it) can be seen as progress toward the goal of getting free, and maybe even getting beyond the need to be free.

Cross-References

▶ Baraka, Amiri (1934–2014)
▶ Malcolm X (1925–1965)
▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

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John A. Hobson

Jones, Claudia Vera Cumberbatch (1915–1964)

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Synonyms

Origins

Definition

Claudia Vera Cumberbatch Jones was a major contributor to the articulation of black left feminism, bringing together her political orientation as a Marxist-Leninist with a commitment to advancing the rights of women, workers, and black people in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Caribbean. Her primary vocation as a journalist, honed in Communist Party USA (CPUSA) media, provided her with the means to articulate these positions and the experience to create institutions to serve her various communities. The *West Indian Gazette and Afro-Asian Caribbean News* was the first black newspaper in London which she founded in 1958 and through which created the first London carnival in 1959. These provided some of the opportunities for the growing Caribbean community in England to begin a process of self-definition.

Introductory Paragraph

Claudia Vera Cumberbatch Jones was a journalist, editor, intellectual activist, anti-colonial/imperial communist theorist, community leader, and human rights advocate. She was born on February 21, 1915, in Belmont, Port of Spain, Trinidad, to

Charles Bertrand Cumberbatch and Sybil Logan Cumberbatch and died in London in December 1964. She was the only black woman elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party USA (1945–1946) and for this was tried and punished (1952–1953) for being a communist. She became a political prisoner in 1955 in the United States for delivering a speech entitled "International Women's Day and the Struggle for Peace" on International Women's Day in 1950 which was cited as the "overt act" in her subsequent arrest and during her trial. After serving 10 months in the Women's Penitentiary, Alderson, West Virginia, beginning January 11, 1955, she was released October 23, 1955 after numerous petitions on her behalf for health reasons. Her one (1) year and a day sentence was commuted for "good behavior," but she was ordered to be deported by December 5, 1955. Technically still a "British subject" as she was denied US naturalization because of her early membership in CPUSA, she left for England on December 9 and arrived in London on December 22, 1955.

Despite suffering the ill effects of incarceration, once she got to London, she began a life of activism to support the many needs of the growing Caribbean community in England following the large-scale migration after the now legendary Windrush 1948. There she became the founder of the first black newspaper in London, the *West Indian Gazette* (*WIG)* in 1958 which subsequently became the West Indian Gazette and Afro-Asian Community News. She organized the first London carnival in 1959 under the theme "A People's Art Is the Genesis of Their Freedom" in response to the Notting Hill and Nottingham racially – motivated riots. In this way, her praxis bridged the Caribbean, the United States and United Kingdom informed by the black world politics of decolonization.

Political Formation

In assessing her political life up to the point of deportation, Claudia Jones described the themes which defined, motivated, and guided her activism:

> I was deported from the USA because as a Negro woman Communist of West Indian descent, I was a thorn in their side in my opposition to Jim Crow racist discrimination against 16 million Negro Americans in the United States, in my work for redress of these grievances, for unity of Negro and white workers, for women's rights and my general political activity urging the American people to help by their struggles to change the present foreign and domestic policy of the United States. (Interview with George Bowrin)

This combination of women's rights, workers' rights, and black rights would consistently reappear in her writings as in her organizational approaches. As a result, she would become an active organizer among African American communities in the US and Caribbean communities in the United Kingdom on a variety of issues such as inadequate housing and employment biases, discriminatory immigration practices, and aesthetic and cultural hierarchies which negatively impacted black people.

Seeking Full Equality: Race, Gender and Class Activism

Claudia Vera Cumberbatch (Jones was an adopted name to protect herself and family from intrusive FBI surveillance) joined the Young Communist League in 1936 and was its New York State Chair and National Council Member in 1938. She worked as a journalist and editor for several communist party organs culminating in 1945 as the Editor of Negro Affairs for the *Daily Worker* when she was elected full member of the National Committee, CPUSA, at its 1945 annual convention.

Claudia Jones was a part of the first wave of Caribbean migration to the United States. She arrived in New York at the age of 8 in the middle of what would be the Harlem Renaissance and came of age in the depression era of the 1930s. Irma Watkins-Owens (1996) and Winston James's (1998) works provide some of the historical and sociological contexts for this period. There were 40,000 immigrants between 1900 and 1930, many of whom settled in Harlem with 1911–1924 being the heaviest period. Caribbeans were able to enter the United States unrestricted until the 1924 Immigration Act which instituted and placed Caribbean colonies under quotas.

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Many were the educated elite or working-class urban dwellers who began, as the Garvey movement indicates, to interact socially with African Americans. A secondary group of migrants were former Panama Canal workers, largely male. Amy Ashwood Garvey in the early 1920s co-founder of the UNIA joined Garvey in 1918, but lived for a time in Panama as well, so there were also black women who worked in various capacities in the Panama Canal Zone. Several migrants to Harlem were single and young, male students like Harlem Renaissance poet Claude McKay or Panafricanist/Communist activist George Padmore. Many came with a sound primary and secondary British-style education. Several soon became entrepreneurs. But above all they experienced racism and ethnic oppression common in the United States at the time. Several Caribbeans joined the Communist Party (Turner 2005; Perry 2009).

Claudia credits her political activism as having been generated by two incidents, one domestic and the other international. Organizing in defense of nine black youth, called the Scottsboro Boys, accused erroneously of raping two white women in a train in Scottsboro, Alabama, in 1931 and tried repeatedly from 1931 to 1937, led many, including Rosa Parks, to activism on racial issues. The Mussolini invasion of Ethiopia (1935) was a similar international event which catalyzed organizational responses in Harlem in particular but in other black world locations as well. This twinned domestic and international approach would mark Claudia Jones's politics consistently.

Her work in women's rights was more explicit when she became secretary of the CPUSA Women's Commission in 1947 and began to write a women's rights column titled "Half the World" for *The Daily Worker*. Assigned by Party to work with working class and black party women for peace and equality, she toured 43 US states, including the West Coast, reorganizing state-level Women's Commissions, recruiting new party members, and organizing mass rallies. Claudia Jones is credited with putting consistently on the platform of the Communist Party the triple oppression of black women based on their race, class, and gender and for popularizing the triple

rights call on behalf of workers, women, and black people. During her trial, she asserted publicly in her "Speech to the Court" before sentencing in 1953 the place of the intellect for black women: "You dare not, gentlemen of the prosecution, assert that Negro women can think, and speak and write!" (Speech included in *Claudia Jones, Beyond Containment*).

Claudia consistently qualified her communist politics with her identities as a black woman from the Caribbean and did not see any contradiction as she embraced all her identities and political positions. Throughout the 1950s, during the oppressive House on Un-American Activities (HUAC) Red Scare period, many activists, entertainers, and intellectuals were targeted. Claudia Jones who was a member of the Communist Party USA would experience a variety of arrests, detentions, and incarcerations. Arrested, finally, under the Smith Act, along with 16 other communists and convicted in 1953, she (along with Elizabeth Gurley Flynn) was sentenced to 1 year and a day, to the Federal Women's Penitentiary, Alderson, West Virginia (beginning January 11), after the group lost all appeals. Released on October 23 after numerous petitions on her behalf for health reasons, her deportation order was finally executed on December 5, 1955. She left by ocean liner for England on December 9 and arrived in London on December 22, 1955. There she was able to have a major role in shaping the nature of black community and institution-building in London because she arrived along with the first massive influx of Caribbeans identified as beginning with the Windrush, another ocean liner, in 1948. Though now "doubly or triply diasporized," Claudia Jones was able to use her communication and organizing skills developed in New York to aid a community in need. Her last published essay, "The Caribbean Community in Britain" (1964), documents the demographic and sociocultural turns ushered in by Caribbean migration to the United Kingdom but is also clear about the troubled future of the Caribbean islands themselves under US imperialism:

> A special importance attaches itself to the Caribbean, where there is evidenced the two paths to national liberation: either the path of

obsequiousness to US imperialism and neo-colonialism or the high road to Socialist advance as exemplified by Socialist Cuba. Particularly in the Caribbean, where United States imperialism threatens socialist Cuba; infringes on the national sovereignty of all Latin American peoples; intervenes in the internal affairs of British Guiana and Panama; and whose pretensions of a "free America in a free world" stands exposed before the massive hammer lows of the mounting Negro liberation struggle . . .. (181)

Claudia Jones is identified as being an advocate for African-Caribbean and Asian migrants to Europe and the larger international community. With the Committee of Afro-Asian and Caribbean Organizations, she organized a parallel "March on Washington" to the US Embassy in London. She worked with the African National Congress to organize a hunger strike against apartheid, to boycott South Africa, and for the freedom of political prisoners such as Nelson Mandela. She participated in protests outside the South African Embassy in London and spoke at rallies against the UK Immigration Act of 1962. As a delegate to the 10th World Conference against hydrogen and atom bombs in Japan, she served as Vice Chair of the Conference Drafting Committee where she also proposed a resolution in support of liberation struggles in the third world. In the last year of her life, she visited China, as a guest of the China Peace Committee, where she met Chairman Mao and interviewed Soong Ching Ling, wife of Sun Yat-sen.

Claudia Jones suffered from complications of hypertensive cardiovascular disease throughout her adult life, was hospitalized for 21 days at the end of her trial, was repeatedly hospitalized during and after incarceration and upon arrival in London, and once during a visit to Moscow in 1962 was hospitalized in the Crimea. The exact date of her death on or around December 25, 1964 is attributed to heart failure and the fact that she did not show up for a Christmas party she was scheduled to attend. Her January 9, 1965 funeral and cremation in Golders Green, London, drew international recognition from governments around the world, diplomatic representations, and media coverage including an obituary read by Ruby Dee. Her ashes were interred in a plot purchased by her partner Abhimanyu Manchanda to the left of the grave and bust of Karl Marx, in Highgate Cemetery, London (February 27).

Anti-imperialism and Women's Rights

When Claudia Jones entered the Communist Party USA, there were already very active examples of black communist women and men who had visible identities that she could emulate and positions she could advance. What marks her instead is that she became both an **organizer** and a leading **theoretician** in the CPUSA. Claudia Jones, following Lenin on the Woman Question, would advance the position that black working-class women had to be at the vanguard of these struggles and would therefore argue for a parallel gender, race, and class advancement for black women or minimally "An End to the Neglect of the Problems of Negro Women" (1949). Her landmark essay which advances this position is "We Seek Full Equality" (1949) which actually begins "Taking up the struggle of the Suffragists, the Communists have set tasks, new objectives in the fight for a new status of women" and continues "Marxism-Leninism exposes the core of the woman question and shows that the position of women in society is not always and everywhere the same, but derives from woman's relation to the mode of production." This woman, race, and class orientation would become a central feature of the Communist Party USA during the time of Claudia Jones and would have subsequent articulations in the work of Angela Davis (*Women, Race and Class* 1983).

Recent work of Jeffrey B. Perry, *Hubert Harrison: The Voice of Harlem Radicalism, 1883–1918* (2009), reveals a range of active communist women such as Williana Jones Burroughs as a teacher, union activist, and communist and Grace Campbell of Caribbean and African American descent as well as " British Guiana-born office worker and communist Hermie Dumont Huiswoud" (2). Joyce Moore Turner's *Caribbean Crusaders and the Harlem Renaissance* (2005) has pretty good detail on Huiswoud and Grace Campbell (1882–1943) who had moved from Washington DC in 1905. Grace Campbell is identified as from Georgia originally, the daughter of a Jamaican father and an African

American mother (77) and the sole woman member of the African Blood Brotherhood (77) with an "unwavering dedication to the socialist cause" (78).

The issue of imperialism and its effect on colonized peoples would be more directly addressed in the work of the Lenin component of Marxism-Leninism which Claudia would consistently invoke. Her essay "American Imperialism and the British West Indies" (1958) offers the best summary of her anti-imperialist position which is one of the earliest to bring together an analysis of the conjunction between British colonialism and American imperialism: "For Britain, the West Indies is not only a source of cheap food and raw material, it is also a market for her manufactured products. Britain holds a predominant position in West Indian trade...But despite all obstacles, American business has penetrated this market" (158).

This position which identifies the operations of both forms of imperialism (the United States and the United Kingdom) and their operations in the Anglophone Caribbean then on the verge of forming a Federation which would collapse soon after it was instituted (1958–1962) offers a timely assessment of the conditions at that point in history which would hamper the full realization of subsequent independence movements. It also offers a set of recommendations including full civil liberties, the freedom to travel, and protection of rights of minorities. She was also critical of the fact that the national bourgeoisie class was making the decisions which would forever hamper full Caribbean national independence. Still for her, "What united the all-class struggle of the West Indian peoples' opposition to foreign imperialism" (163).

Basically then, Claudia Jones is in the leadership of an anti-colonial/anti-imperial Caribbean feminism which was able to link the conditions of working women to the larger working-class interests, both domestically and internationally. Claudia Jones, a transatlantic activist and a black radical intellectual from the Caribbean, opened up Marxism-Leninism to theorize the specifics of the superexploitation of black women. There is a clear influence here of Lenin's discussion on "The Woman Question" with Clara Zetkin that provides a full reasoned analysis of the issue and relevance of gender. Claudia Jones is indicated as having this work republished by CPUSA Women's Commission while she was its secretary, in her essay "For Unity of Women in the Cause of Peace."

Conclusion

Claudia Jones's critique of imperialism runs through her entire political trajectory from her early essay "Jim Crow in Uniform" 1940 where she critiques British imperialism and asserts that it is "only the abolition of imperialism, of the whole system of the war makers, will guarantee peace and security for all peoples" to her final essay, on "The Caribbean Community in Britain" (1964). The domestic operations of these practices on women, on working class, and on black peoples allowed her to make the link with the international nature of imperialist practice, particularly the conjoined British and American manifestations.

By these means, she found ways to reshape her politics and expanded Marxism-Leninism to account more fully for black women in the United States, people of color in general, African-Caribbean, and Asian migrants to Europe and so impacted that society that her burial left of Karl Marx in London is a fitting statement of the nature of her politics as of her life.

Claudia, for her part, was well aware of the complication that her gendered identity posed and says as much to interviewers whenever she was questioned. The interview with George Bowrin indicated earlier is a good place to understand these combinations. Ironically, it is her subjectivity as a "British Subject" of Afro-Caribbean origin which renders her more visible in the smaller UK context. Still, Jones's internationalism in the United States had already provided her with the tools to read the US and British varieties of imperialism as well as its "immigration" policies.

Interestingly it is important to say in closing that the case against Jones and her co-defendants, the 13 communists prosecuted and punished for having communist ideas, was remedied in a subsequent case Yates vs. the United States (1957 – 354 U.S. 298) which argued that having political views was not the same as acting on them. Whereas the Smith Act which had made it illegal to have communist ideas and prosecuted and

punished communists on this basis, "the Court held that for the Smith Act to be violated, people must be encouraged to do something, rather than merely to believe in something. The Court drew a distinction between a statement of an idea and the advocacy that a certain action be taken." But by then, though Jones could have returned and have her case overturned, many of her colleagues had been so embattled and had moved on to other lives or indeed had had their lives significantly destroyed by the state. In my view, Jones was by then so heavily involved in the London community that a return to the United States would not have been any more interesting to her. She had other vistas that she wanted to engage – China, Japan, Russia, and definitely her own developing Black British/Afro-Caribbean community. In the last year of her life, she visited China and as reported in the *People's Daily* on what Claudia Jones thought of socialist China:

> When she talked about her visit to China followed by her participation in the 10th Anti-Hydrogen Bombs Conference in Tokyo, she said, "In the struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism, China is their greatest friend. (October, 1964)

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)
▶ Cold War
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
▶ Resistance to Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1856–1983

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Just War

▶ Global War and the Battle for Afghanistan

K

Karl Marx

▶ Marx's Theory of International Price and Money: An Interpretation

Kemalism

▶ Turkish Left and Anti-imperialism in the 1970s

Kenya: Repression and Resistance from Colony to Neo-colony 1948–1990

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Introduction: The Dialectics of Repression and Resistance

Kwame Nkrumah (1962), in his quote, 'The enemy is imperialism, which uses as its weapons, colonial (1962ism and neo-colonialism', sums up the struggle in Kenya and Africa – historical as well as current. It also provides the context and the scope of this article. Repression by imperialism and people's resistance in response to it cannot be seen in isolation from each other. These opposites – repression and resistance – are in a cause-and-effect relationship with each other, with the process having been started by colonial repression in 1884. The struggle continued in the 1960s as African countries achieved political independence: now it was neo-colonialism that people's forces had to fight. Neo-colonialism's grip on African countries is now as entrenched as was that of the colonial powers in the earlier period. The contradiction between imperialism and people was, and is, the main feature of life for working people in Kenya and Africa. The global "cold war" between capitalism and socialism was reflected in Kenya in the contradiction between the conservatives and the radicals in KANU in the independence period. Later this developed into the contradiction between the comprador ruling class and resistance movement maintaining the line of Mau Mau and seeking socialist solutions.

This contradiction needs to be seen not only in its particular manifestation in Kenya but also in its global, universal aspect as well. History is sometimes seen in mutually exclusive country-perspectives, and thus the complete picture of global repression and resistance is missed. Imperialist repression, exploitation, and oppression in Kenya can only be fully understood in the context of similar repression in India or Malaysia, for example. Similarly, the resistance of the peoples of Kenya and India, among others, has much in common with each other. Only such an overarching approach can help us understand, not only the

geographical aspects of repression and resistance in different countries, but also the historical links between events at different historical periods in any one country.

At the same time, it is necessary to understand the reasons that imperialist repression started. It was not, as some imperialist apologists have claimed, to "civilize natives" but to acquire for free the wealth, land, resources, and products of labor from the colonial- and imperialist-dominated world. While military was the primary weapon that they used against people, other, subtler, methods were also used. These included ideological, economic, cultural, and social attacks that reinforced the military aspect. The main method of imperialist exploitation was the creation of capitalist relations so that capital controlled colonial resources and power, while the working class, peasants, and others linked to them were forced to provide labor, land, and other resources which swelled capitalists' pockets. In this way, capitalism created classes and class divisions which destroyed the previous system based on relative equality for all. However, the introduction of capitalist relations also inculcated class consciousness among people. They thus became aware that class exploitation and social oppression were not an inevitable part of social life but were inherent in capitalism and imperialism. It was this awareness that helped to liberate their minds from the blinkers created by imperialism and prepared people for their battles against colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism. As the enemy came in these three guises, so did people's struggle for liberation contain three aspects of resistance: anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism. This resistance did not aim only at opposing colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism: it was a proactive movement to create a society that was not capitalist and was opposed to imperialism. It was a socialist society, based on principles of justice and equality for all, that Mau Mau aspired to, not always by name, but certainly in their aspiration and aims. That such a prospect was attacked so vehemently by forces of neo-colonialism and imperialism indicates that they understood clearly that what people wanted was nothing less than the destruction of the very

system of economic exploitation and social oppression: capitalism and imperialism. Their aim was to replace this with socialism – in theory and practice.

That is the context of repression and resistance in Kenya from colonial to neo-colonial stages. That remains the struggle of the people of Kenya to date.

Note:

The term "nationalities" is used to indicate various ethnic groups in Kenya, for example, the Kikuyu and the Luo. They were labelled "tribes" by the colonialists.

The Colonial Period: 1948–1963

Repression

The scope of this article is limited to the period 1948–1990. This does not imply that there was no repression or resistance before and after this period. Indeed, British colonialism had to use severe repressive measures to suppress people's resistance in Kenya long before this period. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (2013) records the methods used by the invaders to suppress resistance:

> The conquest of state and territory for British settlement and exploitation in Kenya was achieved through colonial violence. To force Africans into submission, the colonial administration in Kenya conducted 'punitive expeditions' in the 1890s against what they called 'recalcitrant tribes'. There were military expeditions against the Nandi in 1901, 1905, and 1906, against the Embu in 1905, against the Abagusii in 1904, 1908, and 1914, against the Kipsigis in 1905 and against the Abagishu and Kabras in 1907 . . . Practically everywhere in Kenya, as was the case in the rest of Africa, the imposition of colonial rule was resisted. Such resistance inevitably provoked military retaliation from the colonial powers. Better armed and employing crack shot mercenaries, colonial powers imposed their rule by violence and/or military expeditions. This was particularly the case between 1895 and 1914; a phase of pacification of 'recalcitrant tribes' fighting for the preservation of their political, cultural and economic independence. The period was thus characterized by an unimaginable degree of human rights abuses against defenceless Africans. The military expeditions were accompanied by crimes such as theft, rape, death and destruction

of property by the colonial soldiers or their associates. Such actions defy the view that the British colonialist used humane and gentle methods to impose their rule in Kenya.

This then is the background to the period covered in this article. There were clear economic reasons that drove colonialism and imperialism to invade large parts of the world. Woddis (1960, p. 1) sums up:

> The history of Africa's relations with the West has been a history of robbery – robbery of African manpower, its mineral and agricultural resources, and its land. Even though direct slavery no longer exists, labour, resources and land remain the three dynamic issues over which the struggle for the future of Africa is being fought out. The form of this struggle, it is true, is a political fight for national independence; but the abolition of foreign control of labour, resources and land is the substance for which this independence is being sought.

Thus labor, resources, and land were the central aspects of the contradiction between Britain and Kenyans. These formed the reason for colonial exploitation and repression, which in turn led people to resist. The demands of the people were for land and freedom – hence the Kenya Land and Freedom Army, with the term "army" indicating the method of achieving land and freedom.

The strategic importance of Kenya for Britain after the Second World War is summed up by Sik (1974, p. 21):

> After World War II the importance of Kenya for the British imperialists was increasing. Having lost a whole series of strategic bases in the Near and Middle East (India, Egypt, Palestine), they found Kenya most fitted to be developed into a strategic base. To attain this aim they had to build roads and airfields, to develop agriculture and industry, and these projects needed – in addition to capital – the assistance of the settlers who aspired to independence and the more intense utilization of the cheap (and in part free) labour of African millions... Accordingly the post-war policy of Britain was directed towards increased economic development of the colonies, by breaking the resistance of Africans and silencing their demands, by forcing them to serve meekly the united interests of monopoly capitalists and settlers.

The control over land, labor, and natural resources fuelled the industrial revolution in Europe at the expense of Africa. The contradiction

between colonialism and the people of Kenya is well summarized by Laski (1954?, p. 7):

> The climate of much of the territory [Kenya] is excellent for agriculture, and it is free from tropical diseases. These conditions, however, have encouraged the settlement of Europeans who have invaded the healthy areas and alienated the land formally owned and tilled by Africans. The African population must now either perish or work for starvation wages on the farms they and their parents owned for countless generations. In addition they are compelled to pay a Poll Tax to sustain the Administration which has deprived them of their land.

Thus, the so-called land question was also linked to other issues, such as land ownership, particularly of the most productive land, the enforced movement of peasants from their land to work as cheap labor in colonial plantations and industries, as well as government policies on taxation. The reality of land grabbing by the colonial authorities in Kenya is examined by Woddis (1960, pp. 2–3):

> In Kenya, some 4,000 white farmers have been given the monopoly of 16,500 square miles of the White Highlands, which are estimated to contain no less than thirty per cent of all the good land in Kenya.

Then in July 1920, the British Government declared Kenya a "colony." Singh (1969, p. 9) explains the reasons for this:

> This was aimed at ensuring that the British could deal with the land and labour of African people as they thought fit. It was to guarantee that the land taken away from the African people and given to settlers would remain settlers' land and that the forced labour system prevailing in Kenya could be further tightened. Secondly a conspiracy began to be organised to make Kenya a "White Man's Country" and to establish a white settlers' government. Thus the African people were being turned from a "protected people" into a slave people.

The overall contradiction in Kenyan society during the entire colonial period has been summed up by Singh (1969, pp. xi–xii):

> There was now a fierce struggle between two great forces. On the one hand were the British rulers, helped by settlers and other employers. They were determined to perpetuate for ever their complete domination over the African people and exploit the human and natural resources of Kenya for the benefit of imperialism and colonial interests. On the

other hand were the African and other freedom-loving people. They were bent upon resisting, attacking and defeating the imperialist colonial rule and its consequences – land robbery, forced labour, low wages, long working hours, compulsory registration system, racial segregation, colour bar, oppressive laws and such other practices. The basic contradiction was the main driving force throughout the colonial period in Kenya and has influenced the historical development in Kenya.

The struggle over land had implications for the entire economic, political, and social life of people. Koinange and Oneko (1952, pp. 10–11) examine some of these related aspects of colonial policies:

'Colonial development' which seeks merely to produce more food and raw material for export, without reference to African needs, will fail. Cheap colonial food that relies on cheap colonial labour is not a contribution to development. Wages are already very low . . . The lives and destinies of more than five million Africans are controlled arbitrarily by 29,000 Europeans in general, and 3,000 European Settlers in particular. This arbitrary rule by a small minority raises many questions . . . Believing in full democracy, we aim at a common roll for all the peoples of Kenya, to eliminate racial, religious and colour discrimination . . . With these discriminations, there are others: so that in education, health, and many other aspects of life, the Africans of Kenya are placed in a position of relentless inferiority. They, alone of the inhabitants of Kenya, have to carry passes which control and restrict their freedom of movement.

The scene was thus set for violent clashes between British colonialism and the people of Kenya.

Resistance

In the early period, resistance to colonialism was led by peasants from different nationalities. As these were defeated by colonial bullets and atrocities, there was a need for a qualitative leap in resistance to this superior firepower. This was provided by a combination of people power, trade unions, and armed resistance, each working in unison with the other. Capitalism and colonialism had consolidated class structures, and the working class now joined other forces to resist colonial repression. Maxon and Ofcansky (2000, p. 167) explain the class basis of Kenyan history:

On the whole, those who joined the armed struggle against colonialism and European supremacy

were the poor and landless, while those who were wealthy, called loyalists, supported the colonial government.

Trade-union activities, such as strikes, were then added to peasant resistance to create a new level of resistance guided by a clear ideology and a stronger organization. Thus, the strength of the working class added the missing element to confront colonialism. The three aspects of this united front against colonialism were the peasants and people's militancy, the trade unions, and the armed resistance by Mau Mau.

The first aspect of this new people power was the united action of millions of people. That was the advantage that people had over the occupying colonial forces, but it was not merely a matter of numbers. It was how this numerical advantage was used in combination with other advantages, such as the radical trade-union movement, the working-class ideologies that supported the liberation of people, and the organizational structures developed by people over many decades. Singh (1969, p. 4) shows how it was people's resistance that led the anti-colonial movement in Kenya:

In order to struggle against foreign occupation of the country, against seizure of African lands and against forced labour, the African people, wherever possible, resorted to armed harassing of the British authorities, attacks upon labourers building the railway, and boycott of work for settlers and other employers. All this resistance was sporadic but secretly organised. At times it used the tribal organisation with sanction or tacit consent of a patriotic chief. At other times it was organised by secret tribal groups in spite of opposition from stooge chiefs.

Colonialism came with a number of methods to subjugate people, the primary one being armed repression. This was reinforced by attempts to control people's world outlook and thinking, using mass media and educational and religious systems to create thinking friendly to colonialism. One of its highly effective methods was to create disunity among people based on "tribes," religion, region, ethnicity, and gender, among others. Yet another method was to destroy people's awareness of their history and, in particular, history of people's resistance – not only in Kenya but throughout the world where imperialism faced

resistance. In this and other ways, colonialism created a dependency mentality among people, killing their creativity and self-confidence by destroying their culture and lifestyle while also depriving them of means of survival.

In this situation of multiple attacks on people, resistance in Kenya was also multidimensional. Independent schools were set up to give knowledge and mental tools to Kenyans to face colonialism. Cultural activities such as songs and dance reflected local and national pride; publishing of newspapers and other means of social communications allowed people to talk to people, often using nationality languages to bypass colonial censorship; independent church organizations reflected local conditions and needs. Unity among workers of all nationalities was forged in cities, towns, and plantations where workers from all nationalities came together and charted joint resistance. These methods were then linked to the armed resistance under Mau Mau which then created a national, multidimensional armed resistance force. Some aspects of this resistance are examined below.

Trade Unions

The introduction of capitalism in Kenya consolidated and sharpened class relations, class divisions, and class consciousness and struggles. The people who had cultivated land for generations were displaced from their land and became landless "squatters" or were forced into selling their labor on lands now "owned" by settlers and plantations owned by multinationals. Other people were forced from the countryside into towns and cities where they found employment in industries, domestic service, or government departments. At the same time, the construction of railways and roads strengthened class consciousness among workers as they organized and struggled for better working conditions. The formation of trade unions became the defining feature of this period. The development of the working class was given a boost by people taking up employment for subsistence and to pay taxes such as the hut tax and the poll tax. Indeed, the colonial tax system was designed to force people to take up employment in order to provide cheap labor to capitalist institutions.

The trade-union movement provided other requirements for resisting capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism: a committed leadership, guided not by personal greed but a clear ideological vision in the interest of the working class. Taken as a whole, the crucial factors of leadership, ideology, and organization made the trade-union movement a formidable force to combat colonialism. The trade-union movement understood that the economic interests of the working class could only be safeguarded if it, at the same time, protected their political interests. For this reason, it became active in politics and influenced the ideological direction of the progressive forces generally but in particular Mau Mau. Gupta (1981, 50) provides a brief overview of the trade-union movement:

> Labour movement – organised effort on the part of wage earners to fight for their social and economic betterment – in Kenya had manifested itself in several directions. In a short span of 40–50 years of colonial conditions, it had acquired maturity and its own structure. It had grown as a response to growing capitalist exploitative institutions in Kenya. Kenyan trade unions have been bargaining with capitalism. In the context of Kenya the settlers represented the capitalist class. The Kenyan workers have fought to raise their standards of living, to organise a struggle for democratic rights and to end the domination of European settlers.

The struggle of the working class in Kenya thus included the political struggle for independence. The input from South-Asian Kenyans, in terms of links with working-class struggles from India, provided valuable lessons in class struggles. Gupta (1981, p. 56) traces some aspects of this history and the links with India:

> Ever since its origin the trade-union movement in Kenya had a sharply pronounced anti-colonial character; it developed in the struggle for national independence, for political rights and freedom. During the absence of political parties, workers' organisations were the only mass organisations representing and defending the interest of the broad masses. Struggle for the rights of the workers tended to be the struggle against the foreign capitalists who controlled the means of production.

> For many years it was difficult to separate the trade-union movement from political struggle against colonialism. During the post second world war period, particularly during emergency (1952–61)

many trade-union functionaries developed into prominent political leaders and later became high ranking statesmen of Kenya.

The trade-union movement in Kenya had a long history of struggles. It had used its main weapon – strikes – very effectively. Some of the first strikes took place as early as 1900, as documented by Singh (1969). That history points to yet other factors that Britain feared: the trade unions had no room for the divisive "tribal" or regional policies instigated by Britain. Workers were spread throughout the country, and the railway system helped to unite and organize the working class countrywide. Plantation and other rural workers not only provided a strong link with the peasants but helped to overcome the urban-rural split that colonialism sought to use as yet another divisive factor against the people. It was this unity that the British feared. It was a force that could not be isolated, divided, and destroyed by colonialism.

A brief survey of earlier trade-union activities from Durrani (2018a, pp. 89–90) provides a background to the later advances made by the working class:

1921

The Kenyan workers demonstrated their strength in 1921 by forming the first politico trade-union organization, the East African Association (EAA), under the leadership of a telephone operator, Harry Thuku. EAA organized the resistance of plantation workers to fight against the employers' proposal to reduce wages.

1930s

In the 1930s, the trade-union movement among the African workers took a new turn. Under the leadership of Makhan Singh, a Marxist, an Asian worker union was set up in 1934 on East African level – the Labour Trade Union of East Africa (LTUEA). Ever since the inception of LTUEA, Makhan Singh attempted to unite African and Asian workers.

1937

Various strikes led by LTUEA took place, including one for 62 days in April. A settlement was reached with employers agreeing to a wage increase of between 15% and 22%, an 8-h week, and reinstatement of all workers.

1939

Realizing the importance of labor organization, the KCA was cooperating with the Labour Trade Union of East Africa. African workers joined the Union in large numbers. In 1939, Makhan Singh celebrated May Day. This was the first time that a workers' meeting was held on the workers' day. The most significant development in Kenya trade-union movement was the August 1939 Mombasa strike. The strike began with the municipality workers for higher wages and quickly spread to electricity, docks, and post and telegraph workers in the town. Nearly 6000 African and Asian workers stopped work. The strike was sponsored by the LTUEA and supported by KCA (Kikuyu Central Association). The LTUEA and the KCA held a solidarity meeting of Asian and African workers in Nairobi. To break the strike, the government used all the high-handed methods. One hundred and fifty workers were arrested. However, the strike was a success and ended in workers' favor.

A new situation developed after 1947 under increasing activities by the trade-union movement. There was a general strike in Mombasa on 13 January 1947 when over 15,000 workers took part and led to the formation of the African Workers' Union, later renamed the African Workers' Federation. Following the Mombasa strike, there were strikes in other towns. The colonial government was fast losing its control over events and people. It reacted by arresting the trade-union leaders. In 1951, the working class replied by staging a boycott of colonial buses and foreign beer in protest against colonial repression. The stage was set for the period of armed resistance.

Mau Mau Armed Resistance

The earlier anti-colonial struggles by peasants, the nationalities, the general people's resistance, the nationalist struggles, and trade-union activism ultimately led to armed resistance under Mau Mau. However, this transition did not happen overnight. These different strands of resistance fed the overall resistance and taught lessons that

then became resistance strategy. Soon after the Second World War, the hopes of peaceful removal of colonialism from Kenya began to fade. The revolutionary line of armed, organized people's war began to emerge by around 1948. The lessons of the past struggles were clear to the politically aware workers: the contradiction with colonialism and imperialism could not be resolved without an organized, armed confrontation. This realization began to be put into practice gradually as the subjective and objective conditions developed. It was becoming clear that, in the meantime, intense working-class struggles under Makhan Singh and Fred Kubai had developed ideas and experiences of working-class struggles and organizations which added to the anti-capitalist arsenal at the disposal of working people. Soldiers returning after the Second World War, the resistance in India and other places, as well as the examples of revolutions from USSR and China added to people's knowledge and understanding of the need and strategies for resistance.

It is important to see what the aims of Mau Mau were. Barnett (Barnett and Njama 1966, p. 199) sums these up:

> The *secular* aspects of Mau Mau ideology was revealed most clearly in the oft-repeated demands of the Movement for higher wages, increased educational opportunities, removal of the colour-bar. . ., return of the alienated lands and independence under an all-African government.

These aims thus encompassed the demands for independence as well as the class demands for land for the peasants and higher wages for the working class.

At the same time, social and political activists had decided that the formation of a strong resistance organization was necessary to meet the new challenges of fighting colonialism. Thus was born Mau Mau. The name came later, but its organization, ideology, vision, and strategies were all decided by the conditions of the time. Its struggle was against a foreign power that had captured people's land, labor, and resources and, in the process, had created an unequal and unjust system under capitalism in order to maintain its power to exploit, to oppress, and to govern without the people's authority.

A study of the differing forms of organization of Mau Mau at different times reveals that changing conditions at different stages of the struggle gave rise to corresponding changes in its organization. The changes were also reflected in a refinement of strategies and tactics so as to better reflect changing conditions. Thus, the organization of the revolutionary movement was different in its early years (i.e., before October 1952) from that which evolved after 1952. Further changes meant that the organization was different again by 1955 and also by 1960.

At a political level, new organizational structures began to emerge. After about 8 months of armed warfare, during which valuable military and guerrilla warfare experience had been gained, it was decided to call a representative meeting of the various units. The meeting was held in August 1953 near the Mwathe River and came to be known as the Mwathe Conference. After an exchange of ideas and long discussions, it was decided to form the Kenya Defence Council as the highest military and political organ of the armed struggle. The Mwathe Conference then elected the leadership of the Kenya Defence Council and organized the fighting forces into eight armies. Kimathi was elected the President of the Kenya Defence Council, with Gen. Macharia Kimemia as Vice-President, Gen. Kahiu-Itina as the Treasurer, and Brig. Gathitu as Secretary.

Changing needs at a later time led to the formation of the Kenya Parliament. A meeting of the Kenya Defence Council was held in February 1954. Eight hundred delegates attended the meeting, and after intensive discussions, a decision was taken to replace the Kenya Defence Council by a new body – the Kenya Parliament. This was a change of fundamental importance. The Kenya Parliament was the first legitimate African government of Kenya. Its aims were to separate political and military aspects of the struggle, making the former paramount, to emphasize the national character of the freedom movement, to ensure the representation of all Kenyan nationalities, and to assume authority over liberated and semi-liberated areas and people. Militarily, it established its authority over all fighting units and

prepared a new military offensive. It also formulated a foreign policy and sent representatives to foreign governments. Twelve members were elected to the Kenya Parliament, and Kimathi was elected the first Prime Minister. Their first loyalty was to the Kenya Parliament and not to their former armies. Macharia Kimemia was elected as Field Marshal. Kimathi was now free to devote his full attention to the political sphere and to the affairs of Kenya Parliament. In addition, all the 33 districts of Kenya were represented in the Kenya Parliament, thus making it a national body.

In the early years, new cadres were recruited and given political education in preparation for a time when they would become fully active in the resistance. Prospective members were placed under observation, then given the first oath, that of unity. They were then set specific tasks to test their commitment and provided with opportunities for practice. At the same time, they were placed in an underground cell structure and assigned to work at a democratic level in legal organizations. Many of these became part of the Mau Mau intelligence-gathering network.

The guerrilla forces established their own government in the areas they liberated from colonial forces. They controlled law and order and ran an effective administration with its own legal system and a policy for financial control with its own taxes to finance the war effort. It was this tax levied in liberated and semi-liberated areas in the enemy territory that bought guns, ammunition, food, and other supplies for the guerrilla army. It established hospitals as well as factories for the manufacture of armaments and other necessities such as clothing. As the armed struggle advanced after 1952, Mau Mau forces liberated more areas. They maintained a large administrative machinery, which had jurisdiction over vast areas with hundreds of thousands of people for whose economy, welfare, education, health, and security they were responsible.

Achievements of Mau Mau

Mau Mau has been given a negative interpretation by imperialism. Its achievements are either ignored or misrepresented. The following section looks at some aspects of its work that mark it out as a pioneer in Africa as well as a strong anti-imperialist force.

Anti-imperialist Ideology

Three strands of Mau Mau's ideological stand were anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and a proletarian-world outlook in the struggle against capitalism. They thus represented the unity of workers and peasants and all those who were not allied to the colonialists. This stand was derived from peasants' anti-colonial struggles and from the trade-union movement and working-class struggles in the liberation struggle as well as from the nationalist forces resisting colonialism through political organizations over a long period.

Different aspects of the ideology became dominant at different times, and freedom fighters responded differently at different times depending on the particular needs of each period. Just as at the political level, different organizational structures were created in response to specific needs, so at the ideological level, different perspectives came to prominence in keeping with the specific contradictions and needs in the struggle at the specific times.

As time went on, there was a gradual shift in the struggle from an anti-colonial phase to an anti-neo-colonial one. This change in ideology reflected a change in the material condition at the time. In the period leading to independence and the period after independence, imperialism, the main force that Mau Mau fought, changed from colonialism to neo-colonialism. In keeping with this change, Mau Mau also changed its political and military priorities.

The class stand of Mau Mau was clear right from the beginning. The enemy was not seen in terms of the color of their skin, as the colonialist propaganda had insisted and, in effect, encouraged. Indeed, black homeguard collaborators were prime target of revolutionary wrath. Kimathi explained in a letter he wrote from his headquarters in Nyandarwa in 1953, "the poor are the Mau Mau." Poverty can be stopped, he explained, "but not by bombs and weapons from the imperialists. Only the revolutionary justice of the struggles of the poor could end poverty for Kenyans"

as Kimathi stated in his letter to the Nairobi newspaper, *Habari za Dunia* (Odinga 1968). Thus the movement was not against European people or Black people but against colonialism and capitalism. It is also clear that Kimathi and the movement were taking a definite class stand.

As the enemy that Mau Mau faced came in three guises of colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism, so did people's struggle for liberation contain three aspects of resistance: anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism. This resistance did not aim only at opposing the imperialist status quo: it was a proactive movement to create a society that was not capitalist and was opposed to imperialism. It was a socialist society based on principles of justice and equality for all that Mau Mau aspired to, not always by name, but certainly in their aspiration and aims. That such a prospect was attacked so vehemently by forces of neo-colonialism and imperialism indicates that they understood clearly that what people wanted was nothing less than the destruction of the very system of economic exploitation and social oppression. Their aim was to replace this with socialism – theory and practice.

Organization

No struggle as large and facing a vastly superior military power as did Mau Mau could have existed without a strong organization. The organizational strength of the movement needs to be recognized. Edgerton (1990) provides a succulent summary of Mau Mau's organizational structure:

> The Mau Mau movement was directed by what they usually called "Muhimu," or the Central Committee. The Central Committee consisted of 12 men, including Kubai and Kaggia, with Eliud Mutonyi as its chairman. When the police began to make arrests at oathing ceremonies, the Central Committee created another group, known as the "30 Committee," to direct oathing and to shield the true directorate from government detection. Under the direction of Fred Kubai, the 30 men on this committee were responsible for coordinating the activities of local leaders in the tribal reserves and townships. In addition, the leaders of Man Mau were advised by what they called the KAU Study Circle, a kind of brain trust composed of four or five KAU members and an equal number of outsiders who were sympathetic to KAU's stated goals. These men prepared

background research on policy matters that the Central Committee might need to address in Kenya, as well as international concerns, especially ways of attracting foreign support.

The formation of the Kenya Defence Council and of the Kenya Parliament indicates the importance that Mau Mau gave to organizations at national level. Its organizational structures at other levels have also been well documented, for example, by Barnett and Njama (1966) and Mathu (1974). Further evidence of Mau Mau's strong organizational structure is provided by Edgerton (1990):

> No rebels fought from forest camps. The rebellion also depended on the support of sympathizers in the reserves, and in Nairobi and other towns. Until mid-1954, the Central Committee and its War Council still purchased weapons, organized food supplies, and recruited new fighters for the forest armies. These new recruits were issued special identification cards in order to prevent infiltration by government informers. Meanwhile, men and women in the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru reserves continued to supply money, information, food, and weapons. Many risked their lives as often as those who fought in the forest. In fact, much of the actual fighting was done by men and women who lived in the reserves, and in Nairobi or smaller towns. Units from the forests often entered the reserves at night, and spent the day sleeping in the houses of sympathizers or hiding in a secluded area, before carrying out their raids and returning to camp. But others who had never entered the forests were sometimes called into action by a local leader, usually with the approval of higher Mau Mau authority. Sometimes they were ordered to kill a Kikuyu traitor, at other times to raid a Homeguard or police post for weapons.

Strategy

The strategy that Mau Mau used against a militarily stronger enemy was crucial in its struggle. Mau Mau saw Kenyan peoples' contradiction with imperialism as an antagonistic one, which could not be resolved peacefully. It thus used the methods of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, and people's struggle against imperialism. But it made a distinction between the three aspects of the enemy. Against the colonial military forces, it used the method of guerrilla warfare and military battles (both offensive and defensive), which included attacks on military

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targets, on prisons to free captured guerrilla fighters, and on arsenals to procure arms.

The other "face" of the enemy was white Settlers, many of whom benefited from free or cheap land and had taken up arms against the people of Kenya. The Mau Mau movement used another method to deal with this threat. The Settlers' main concern was to protect "their" property on which their wealth depended. Indeed, their main aim in settling in Kenya was to appropriate, or acquire very cheaply, peasant land and labor and use it to produce wealth for themselves. The freedom fighters attacked them where it hurt most: the property itself. This served not only to threaten the very economic base of the Settlers; it also helped the guerrillas to procure food and rations they needed to continue their armed struggle, thus providing the material base for the armed revolution.

Mau Mau used yet another method against the third "face" of the enemy, the African homeguards. Considering that many had been forced either by economic reasons or through force or ignorance to become collaborators, many of those deemed capable of reforming were given advance warnings to stop betraying the cause of national liberation. Only when these were ignored was action taken against them, depending on the seriousness of their collaboration, but sanctioned by Mau Mau courts. In this way many who had initially sided with the enemy were won over to the nationalist side, and some of them then made important contributions to the anti-imperialist struggle. Many whose economic base was tied too strongly to imperialism refused to reform and had to be dealt with more severely in order that they did not pose a threat to the armed resistance forces.

Another tactic used against the collaborators involved information warfare aimed at demoralizing them. An example of this was spreading favorable news about guerrilla successes in enemy-held territory. Pinning large notices on trees and walls near schools, police stations, and social halls was one such way. It was not only the message of these posters that put fear in the enemy but the very fact that such notices could be placed in areas under colonial control. Despite the fact that strict security measures were taken by the colonial armed forces, the Mau Mau activists managed to reach areas in the very heart of the city to pin these posters thus showing their strength and demoralizing enemy soldiers and civilians.

It would be incorrect to deny that there were contradictions among the ranks of Mau Mau fighters and among the people. These became sharper under enemy attack. But these were not antagonistic ones, at least at the beginning, and were resolved by the use of non-violent means. In the main, democratic methods were used to resolve these contradictions. One of the aims of Mau Mau was to form a democratic society where everyone would have equal rights and duties and an equal access to the wealth produced by their joint labor. They put their ideas into practice in the liberated areas even as they engaged the enemy in a fierce battle.

The democratic method involved the use of meetings, conferences, and congresses where free discussions could be held and ideas could be expressed without fear of persecution. After long discussions, decisions would be taken on basis of majority vote. Questions of leadership were settled through secret ballots, and elections were held at every level in so far as war conditions allowed.

Mau Mau's military strategy ensured that the military might of the greatest military power at the time was kept at bay for over 4 years.

Infrastructure

There is no doubt that Mau Mau was well organized as a military and as a political organization. The colonialists were aware of their abilities, as they had discovered many examples of infrastructure in towns and forests even as the war of independence was going on. They deliberately chose to hide these facts and set out to destroy such evidence so as to continue their myth that Mau Mau was a primitive group of people who had nothing to do with the War of Liberation. Such structures included hospitals, libraries, social halls, as well as rules and regulations and records of civil and legal practice that guided the movement.

Politics of Information

Mau Mau's information and communication strategy reflects different aspects of its overall work. Each of the elements of governance, such as ideology, organization, and strategy, required effective flow of information between different units and parts of the resistance movement. This flow was the lifeblood of the organization. This is essential in peacetime in any organization but was of particular significance in an underground movement facing a war situation against a heavily armed enemy. Survival depended on this life-giving process of flow of information and communication. And yet this was difficult to achieve in the war situation created by the imposition of the state of emergency by British colonialism which relied not only on its military and political might but also on its experience of oppression in its other colonies, particularly India and Malaysia. The difficulties for Mau Mau were compounded by the absence of global networks such as the Internet and the imposition of information embargoes by colonialism. Thus experiences from the resistance forces in India and other countries were not easily available to the resistance organization. It was to prevent the availability of such information that the Kenya colonial government banned various progressive publications, including many from USSR, People's Republic of China, and India. That Mau Mau managed to develop sophisticated information policies and practices is a reflection of its strength as an advanced twentieth-century resistance movement.

Leadership

All the aspects of governance, the actual conduct of warfare, the political aspects of Kenya Parliament, and other Mau Mau actions were not spontaneous acts happening in a political, social, and military vacuum. There was a guiding force behind them all. And that force was Mau Mau leadership, which is often ignored or minimized by historical studies. Mau Mau leadership needs to be seen in a dynamic level in all its aspects. It is not possible to see Mau Mau leadership in the sense that one sees the leader of a Western country personalized in the person of a president or a prime minister. True, Kimathi and other leaders did stand out. But the reality of fighting against the superpower of the day with limited resources dictated that a different model of leadership had to be found if the movement was to succeed. At the same time, the war of independence in Kenya was not directed by an organized political party as happened in Mozambique under FRELIMO or in Namibia under SWAPO. Such forces in Kenya were coming together to form a political-military organization before British colonial government preempted the development with its excessive use of force under the guise of an emergency. Of necessity, Kenya's war of independence was led and organized in a way that suited local conditions.

Independence and Neo-colonialism: 1963–1990

By about 1956–1957, it became clear that colonialism was no longer sustainable in Kenya. The departure of British colonialism was a matter of time. In just a few years of warfare, Mau Mau had changed the balance of power. Kenya became independent on 12 December 1963. Now an African prime minister and an African government ruled the country. The old order had given way to the new. And that achievement was due entirely to Mau Mau.

And yet it was not the independence that those who participated in the war of independence had fought for. The changes were soon seen for what they were: the replacement of colonialism by neo-colonialism and the replacement of European Settlers by African "owners" of land. European Settlers remained, as did multinational corporations as the rulers behind the scene. Government policies were handed down by financial forces in London and New York. Policy "guidance" came from the IMF and the World Bank. The only aspect that did not change was the condition of the working class, and the situation of those who fought in the war of independence deteriorated. It was, in effect, independence for the ruling classes (black and white this time) to rule, kill, massacre, suppress, and loot as they pleased. And suppress, kill, and massacre they needed to do in

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order to remain in power as the people who had sacrificed all were not yet ready to hand over control to new masters with the same agenda. But the new masters were fully backed by the same imperialist powers which had engineered their coming to power.

Repression by "Independent" Government

The British colonial government's legacy of impunity as it massacred, murdered, and tortured people at will was then bequeathed to the governments it set up after independence. The lesson that colonialism passed on to the comprador regime was that it was acceptable to eliminate and destroy people who oppose their policies. The TJRC Report (2013, Vol. IIA, p. 72) records the events of the time:

> Kenyatta, having realized that he would not be able to meet the needs and expectations of all Kenyans, engaged in measures that would ensure political survival and self sustenance of his government. This lead to a strengthening of the role of the security agencies similar to the role they played during the colonial period, and particularly aimed at controlling, and suppressing dissent and organized political opposition. In brief, in the words of Charles Hornsby, 'the Independent State soon echoed its colonial parent's repressive attitudes to dissent'.

It was not only the Kenyatta government that used force to remain in power. The Moi-KANU government that followed it did the same, as TJRC Report (2013) says:

> Political assassinations have occurred under each of the three successive governments since independence. The motives associated with these assassinations have varied, from getting rid of political competition, weeding out ambitious politicians, and removing perceived "dissidents" of the government or those who posed as "threats" to power. Evidence of state involvement and subsequent cover-ups is evident in the majority of political murders. Propaganda and commissions of inquiry are often used as smokescreens to get to "the bottom of the matter," and often have the effect of masking the motives and faces behind the assassinations. Prominent figures in government are said to be implicated. Key witnesses into the assassinations disappear or die mysteriously. No real perpetrators have ever been prosecuted, much less effectively investigated.

Under the KANU governments of Kenyatta and Moi, issues relating to the return of people's land were not resolved. Instead, the local and settler elites and transnational corporations consolidated their grip on this basic national resource. They were, in fact, further aggravated. Landlessness, the single most significant issue in Kenya before and after independence, continued to increase. Moi continued the torture, killings, executions, and massacres. The three pillars of resistance – Mau Mau, trade union organisations and people's forces – were responsible for the achievement of independence in 1963. But imperialism saw the danger that this combined force posed to its continued exploitation after independence. The comprador regime systematically attacked all the three. Mau Mau fighters in the forests were killed in large numbers by colonial military forces and those who continued the struggle were hunted down and killed; others who came out in good faith at independence were ruthlessly murdered by armed forces. The radical wing of KANU which represented the demands of Mau Mau was systematically attacked and rendered ineffective. The trade union movement was weakened by attacks on militant trade union movement and the marginalisation or detention of its militant leaders. Thus, all the avenues of militant political action were banned. All public resistance activities were suppressed either "legally" or by the use of force.

The murder in 1965 of Pio Gama Pinto, a socialist who was active in Mau Mau, signalled a new period of repression in Kenya. The banning of opposition political parties followed. In 1969, the Kenya People's Union was banned, and its leadership was arrested and detained. This one chance of having open radical politics in Kenya was lost. All political activities now went underground as did the expression of any independent ideas and opinions.

Resistance

Throughout the 1970s, underground groups flourished and articulated their vision of a Kenya free from capitalism and imperialism, issuing various underground pamphlets. Some of these are recorded in Durrani (1997). These included *Mwanguzi* and *Kenya Twendapi* which questioned the direction Kenya was taking after

independence under the new elite. Many former Mau Mau combatants began to recount their experiences and stated that they had not suffered during the anti-colonial struggles merely to see a minority elite getting all the benefits of independence. Many such views could not be published within Kenya and were published overseas. The murder in 1975 of the popular politician, J.M. Kariuki, brought out a national unanimity in anti-government feelings. It also saw the publication and distribution of a large number of underground leaflets in support of basic human and democratic rights. The key feature of this period was the continued resistance by workers, peasants, and progressive people's movements.

An important feature of resistance after independence was the lack of the strong united force such as the one that opposed colonialism in the earlier period. The strict censorship by the independent governments ensured that no strong, radical, organized working class and trade-union movement survived, nor did it tolerate any form of people's resistance. Political parties that supported Mau Mau's vision were also not allowed. Such suppression of resistance was the legacy that colonialism left in Kenya, and it curtailed, initially at least, the resistance of people. Nevertheless, resistance was not suppressed totally as the following section shows.

People's Resistance

Worker Resistance

Worker resistance throughout the country was in the forefront of direct action through strikes and related actions, reminiscent of the practice during the colonial period. Seen as an overall systematic resistance, these strikes and other struggles helped to build a movement against the government which has come down heavily against trade unions. It banned strikes and imprisoned trade-union leaders. And, in the end, the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU) was affiliated into the ruling party, KANU, thus ending its role as a workers' organization to fight for economic and political rights of working people. But this did not suppress working-class militancy

as activists and shop stewards continued resistance, isolating the official, conservative leadership. Year after year, thousands of workers broke KANU laws and went on strikes for their rights.

The militant activities of the earlier radical organized trade-union movement were absent in this period. But it was the daily struggles of the workers that gave true significance to the growing worker movement. Not willing to accept the situation, which meant daily erosion of their already very low standard of living, the workers intensified their struggles for a decent living wage and their economic, social, and political rights. Mwakenya (1987b, p. 4) breaks down the workers' demands into three categories:

- Economic demands: for higher wages, land, and employment
- Social demands: safety at places of work, improved working conditions, adequate health facilities, and adequate and relevant education
- Political demands: right to organize, right to assembly, union rights, support other workers, and liberation from the entire oppressive system

It is significant that Kenyan workers saw workers' rights in the same way as Mau Mau did: that workers' rights should include social and political as well as economic rights as legitimate demands of the trade-union movement. This was the main plank of the trade-union movement set up by Makhan Singh, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, and others during the colonial period under the East African Trade Union Congress. The colonial administration, as well as the independent Kenyan government, legislated to remove workers' political rights from trade-union remit – an aspect that has gravely weakened the trade-union movement in Kenya. Workers' resistance in this period took various forms: strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, work-to-rule, and refusal to accept unfair practices.

Peasant Resistance

Landlessness remained a key factor in resistance after independence. Peasants and pastoralists

reverted to their colonial practices of resistance. No week passed without reports of peasant resistance to the Moi government's policies and attacks on government officials. They used varying methods of demanding their rights and often used violence against corrupt government officials and armed police supporting new landlords. At the same time, because of the shortage of land which resulted in high prices, it often became necessary for a large number of peasants to pool their resources together to purchase one farm. This came in useful when they faced common problems: thousands of small land owners found strength in defying government directives, whereas individual plot owners may fear taking direct action. Peasants as a class joined hands with workers in resisting the policies of the government. Conditions were ripening in the countryside for a more systematic and organized resistance by peasants. Underground resistance movements got much support from the peasants. Indeed, the government's use of force against peasants showed its fear of this resistance building up into a formidable force.

Student Resistance

Students throughout the country joined workers and peasants in opposing government policies. In representing their own interests as students, they also articulated the aspirations of the working people. The youth derived their political consciousness from the material conditions of their own lives as well as from the experiences of their parents who in the main were workers and peasants. The government attempted to turn students into docile acceptors of its policies, including those in the education field such as the curricula. School, college, and university syllabi were controlled to remove any progressive ideas, similarly removing the militant ideology and aims of Mau Mau and the war of independence. Their cultural and social activities were vetted to ensure that there were no mentions of facts and events which could inspire independent thought. In short, the whole educational process was geared to produce supporters of capitalism and comprador rule.

But students never accepted this. They consistently resisted not only the colonial and imperialist-oriented elements of the education system itself but also the socioeconomic system that blindly followed Western capitalist ideas and encouraged corruption. They instead sought a united student national movement which would ensure free circulation of ideas and links with fellow students from Africa and other progressive students from around the world. The strength of student resistance was indicated in 1988 when thousands of students throughout the country went on strike.

Students were also in the forefront of writing and distributing underground pamphlets setting out their demands. This was especially the case at universities. Students at the University of Nairobi, for example, produced a vast amount of such literature, reflecting the militancy of the students there. Indeed, a tradition of at least one enforced closure per year was the norm as the government dealt with student protests by sending in the dreaded paramilitary general service unit (GSU) and closing the institution. New repressive regulations were introduced after every closure, but this did not stop student militancy. Most student union leaders ended up being thrown out of the University and jailed, detained, or murdered. The student newspaper produced at the School of Journalism reflected socialist tendency among students. Mwakenya (1987a, p. 12) summarizes student resistance:

> After the banning of K.P.U., democratic opposition was led by University and Secondary school students. Nairobi and Kenyatta University students unions played a major role in fighting for democracy and human rights, and opposing neo-colonialism and foreign military bases in Kenya. They demonstrated in the streets, wrote leaflets, spoke in public and student gatherings, and in so many ways helped expose the reactionary character of the KANU regime.

The significance of these student activities was that they represented a new generation which refused to accept a corrupt, man-eat-man society. The future of Kenya in reality lay in their hands. And they indicated their rejection of the regime's policies which were to accommodate capitalism and imperialism in Kenya.

Release Political Prisoners Group and the Assassination of Karimi Nduthu

National and overseas campaigns forced the government to make constitutional changes. It repealed Section 2A of the Constitution in 1991, thus ushering in the multiparty system. This, however, did not bring change as many of the people who had been jailed for fighting social injustice remained in prison. In response to this situation, the Release Political Prisoners Pressure Group (RPP) was formed in the same year to put more pressure on the government. The group mobilized mothers of some political prisoners and presented a petition to the Attorney General demanding the release of all political prisoners. After presenting the petition, the mothers headed to Uhuru Park (Freedom Corner) and staged a hunger strike (surviving on water and glucose). Their demands were, however, not taken seriously by the government which sent the police on 3 March 1992 to disperse them. In the process they beat them up. The government later rounded up the mothers and forcefully took them to their respective homes. This government action did not weaken the women's resolve to fight for their children's freedom. The following day they came back to Nairobi and continued with their hunger strike. They were hosted by Reverend John Njenga of All Saints' Cathedral. The government continued to harass them by sending police to the cathedral and arresting members of RPP. The campaign ultimately bore fruits as by late 1992, all political prisoners except Odhiambo Apiny had been released from prison. RPP believed political prisoners were not only those confined and serving a jail term but anyone whose freedom, livelihood, conscience, ethics, values, and principles were compromised by state powers. Based on this tenet, RPP members worked tirelessly with people in the community to try to resolve their problems and overcome their challenges. The group was at the forefront of fighting for reforms and challenging unjust laws. RPP also partnered with the underground Mwakenya, and this sharpened its members ideologically. The national coordinator of Mwakenya, Karimi Nduthu, was also the Secretary General of

RPP. Due to Nduthu's unwavering commitment to social justice, the enemy of the working people sent its agents to his residence in Riruta Satellite, a suburb of Nairobi, where they brutally murdered him on 24 March 1996. The assassination of Nduthu did not kill the spirit of RPP members. They continued their struggle by raising awareness among the masses at grassroot level and also organizing demonstrations against injustices by the state. The government kept arresting its members and charging them with illegal assembly. The sacrifice of Karimi Nduthu and the commitment of RPP members, together with other social movements, were not in vain as this, together with other developments, helped to force the regime to agree to the drafting of the new Constitution.

Organized Resistance

It was comparatively easy for the government to control people's resistance as it lacked a central ideology, leadership, and organization. It was often focused on local issues of relevance to a comparatively small number of people. What was lacking was the nationwide perspective that the radical trade-union movement and Mau Mau provided in the anti-colonial stage. This was rectified by the organized underground movements, the chief one being the December Twelve Movement that provided ideological direction, an analysis of history, and proposals for future action. In this way they provided the overall strategy for socialism that opposed the capitalist direction of the ruling party and class.

December Twelve Movement

Earlier attempts by radical groups to continue the vision of Mau Mau within KANU had failed, reflecting the total surrender of the comprador class to imperialist interests. It became the historical role of underground resistance movements to articulate the new phase in Kenyan politics where open opposition to the government was not possible. The tradition of organized underground resistance in Kenya goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century and continued throughout the colonial period and post-independence. Moreover, it carried on throughout the

period of Kenyatta's regime and intensified under Moi, as the US-backed regime consolidated its neo-colonial grip on the country. Among the key underground movements was the December Twelve Movement (DTM) which later emerged as Mwakenya.

DTM's activities represented a continuation of resistance from pre-independence days. DTM opposed the capitalist outlook of the ruling class and their party. It was active in articulating its ideological position, policies, and outlook, not only among its active members grouped in secret cells but also in disseminating these to its actual and potential supporters among the masses. It was not a mass movement, and only accepted into its membership were those who showed a clear grasp of its ideological stand and were willing to put into practice their commitments. The emergence of the DTM marked the end of the attempts by democratic forces to form legal opposition parties. DTM's activities and ideological stand are best seen in its publications.

One of the most important underground publications of DTM was *InDependent Kenya*, (Cheche Kenya 1981) published by the group Cheche Kenya, an earlier name of the DTM. *InDependent Kenya* documented, from the perspective of the Kenyan working people, the history of Kenyans' struggle for independence, the struggle of militants and conservatives within the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the corruption that became a way of life within the regime, and the cultural dependency on imperialism. *InDependent Kenya* was cyclostyled and widely distributed through underground channels in Kenya. It was published in book form in London by Zed Press in 1982, sponsored by the Journal of African Marxists "in solidarity with the authors."

It was DTM's newspaper *Pambana, Organ of the December Twelve Movement*, however, which had the widest circulation and the greatest impact in post-independence Kenya. The first issue was published in May 1982. DTM's program became, in effect, an alternative to that of KANU's essentially capitalist one. DTM stood for a national democratic revolution which could unite all national forces opposed to imperialism and the neo-colonial comprador regime. As *Pambana* made clear, the December Twelve Movement supported all genuine Kenyan organizations and individuals, "fighting any aspect of local or imperialist reaction." It set out the tactics of achieving a broad unity of all democratic forces, and, in the process, it clearly isolated the comprador class.

The short-lived coup of August 1982 was, at one level, a reflection of the developing democratic forces. The coup's message (Kenya Coup, 1982, Broadcast) reflected the desire of millions for an alternative political system from the one KANU offered. It was clearly a vindication of DTM's program, which appears to have influenced the coup leaders.

The aftermath of the coup altered the political scene in Kenya. Realizing how little public support it had, the KANU Government took repression to new heights and relied even more on the military. Many people who were active before the coup were brutally murdered or illegally detained. All pretenses of democracy disappeared. Economically, the Moi regime aligned itself even more firmly with US imperialism, which now acquired military facilities in the country in return for supporting the unpopular regime. At the same time, the coup ended prematurely the developing revolutionary forces from gathering more support and setting up an appropriate organizational and ideological framework to challenge the government on a stronger basis. The coup also gave the Moi government an excuse to undermine every strand of resistance to its rule and to arrest, detain, and eliminate those it saw as opposing its rule. This included the growing trade-union and student movements and also DTM. With strong support from Britain and the USA, it re-established its rule, but this time it would be even more oppressive. It is difficult to speculate how the forces of resistance would have developed had Moi not used the coup to silence all opposition. It is fair to say, however, the resistance movement suffered a setback with Moi's reign of terror unleashed in the wake of the coup.

The DTM just about survived Moi's attacks on all forces opposed to him but as a much-weakened movement following the jailing, detention,

or elimination of its members and leaders. It continued the production of *Pambana*, and the second issue came out in July 1983. It summed up the experiences following the coup and exposed the attempts of "the ruling clique and their army to instil fear amongst the people." It identified the root causes of the problems facing people and resolutely called for unity to defeat "the enemy." *Pambana* drew strength from the revolutionary traditions of the Mau Mau's use of struggle songs to mobilize people.

DTM also carried on its struggle overseas through Umoja in London, as recorded later in this article. In its short life, DTM left a legacy of progressive policies, vision, and experiences reflected in its publications. These provided an alternative vision of a free, socialist Kenya.

Mwakenya

Mwakenya came into existence in the late 1980s and was composed largely of members of the December Twelve Movement (DTM), the revolutionary movement formed in mid 1970s. DTM members partnered with other progressive forces and formed Mwakenya. By the1980s, the Moi regime had become increasingly repressive and did not tolerate any divergent views. Mwakenya as an underground movement played crucial role in exposing the ills that the regime was committing against the people. It summed up the democratic mood of the underground resistance under its slogan *Ni haki yetu kupingania haki* (It is our right to struggle for our rights). One of the rights denied to Kenyans was the right to organize. For this reason, Mwakenya concentrated in organizing people and distributing its literature throughout the country in secret.

Mwakenya was guided by the following fundamental goals or objectives:

1. The recovery of national sovereignty and integrity
2. The building of an independent and integrated national economy
3. The establishment of genuine democracy
4. The establishment of social justice for all classes and nationalities
5. The promotion of a patriotic and democratic national culture
6. The building of a strong people's defense force
7. The pursuit of an independent foreign policy

Events were to prove that many practices of DTM which had given it strength were not carried on into Mwakenya and that this perhaps led to its decline in the long term. DTM's strict recruitment policy was discarded. Instead Mwakenya became a mass party by opening up membership to all, irrespective of ideological commitment, clarity, and experience in the struggle. The earlier requirements of study and practice were also dispensed with.

And yet there were important contributions made by Mwakenya. Its greatest achievement was the creation of a clear political and ideological framework in opposition to the KANU government's pro-Western, pro-capitalist program. It did so with an evidence-based analysis of the conditions of the time and the state of contradictions in the society. Based on such analysis, it produced two important documents setting out its vision.

The first document was Mwakenya's *Draft Minimum Programme* which set out the history of neo-colonialism in Kenya and also traced the history of resistance in Kenya. It also gave the background to the formation of Mwakenya itself and recorded its publications and Congresses. The most significant part was "the Fundamental Goals and Objectives of Mwakenya." The publication *Draft Minimum Programme* marked a new stage in the anti-imperialist struggle in Kenya. Once again, an underground opposition party challenged the monopoly of KANU as the true spokesperson for the masses of Kenya. No longer could KANU claim its exclusive right

to speak for all the classes in Kenya. It now became obvious that KANU spoke for the comprador class in Kenya, while Mwakenya and allied progressive movements represented the interests of the rest of the people. The challenge to KANU was on ideological and organizational fronts as well, as Mwakenya set out the demands of the "oppressed and exploited classes of Kenyan people" and called upon the people "to overthrow the entire neo-colonial system, seize political power and establish a peaceful state of democracy and social progress." The silent class struggle since independence was formally brought into broad daylight. Under its slogan "In Struggle Lies the Way Ahead," Mwakenya proclaims its stand, *Ni haki yetu kupigania haki zetu* (It is our right to fight for our rights).

The other publications by Mwakenya were *Mzalendo Mwakenya* and *The Register of Resistance*. The publications exposed the deceptions of the Moi regime and attracted a wider readership from the people who were looking to resolve some of the problems facing the country. The period saw a large number of strikes and demonstrations. According to the *Register of Resistance* (1986), a total of 65 strikes involving over 42,000 workers took place in over 44 towns. Moi's regime unleashed its security agents (police, GSU) to quell the resistance but with little success.

The history of Kenya shows that resistance builds on the achievements of an earlier period of struggle. The ideas of earlier anti-colonial struggles influenced Mau Mau, just as these ideas then influenced DTM-Mwakenya.

Overseas Resistance

From Kenya Committee to Umoja
The suppression of people's rights led many of the vocal academics as well as progressives to seek asylum abroad. These newly resettled asylum seekers continued the activities that had been frowned upon by the Kenyan regime. These included campaigning for the release of political prisoners, and it was on this basis that the Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners in Kenya (CRPPK) was established in London on 2

July 1982. The Committee acted as a solidarity organization for those who were arrested, detained, or harassed for their political activities in Kenya. Its objectives were:

- To campaign for the release of political prisoners in Kenya
- To express solidarity with the people of Kenya in their struggle for democratic rights (e.g., political, cultural, and trade-union freedom)
- To sensitize international public opinion on the repressive nature of the Kenyan regime
- To support Kenyan people in their opposition to US military bases and all foreign military presence in Kenya

The Committee continued its campaign throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s publishing the influential *Kenya News* bulletin and coordinating with other Kenyan democratic and solidarity movements abroad. In October 1987, a number of resistance groups abroad came together and formed United Movement for Democracy in Kenya (Umoja) which was committed to:

- The restoration of national sovereignty
- The building of a truly democratic society
- The restructuring of the economy for the social progress of all Kenyans

It had constituent branches and contacts in Britain (where the Secretariat was based), Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the USA, and also some African countries. Umoja also liaised and worked with progressive groups in Kenya among them Mwakenya though on a principled basis.

Conclusion: Uhuru Bado [not yet Independent]

The history of Kenya parallels trends in many other countries. The colonial government passes on power to a comprador class which it created and nurtured. This anti-people ruling elite then rejects the interests of people who had borne the brunt of fighting colonialism and imperialism. Working class and other people are then relegated to the

margins of society by the new comprador ruling class. A "show-democracy" creates a number of political parties and a parliamentary system that represents the interests of the ruling class.

The crucial dividing line between the contending forces in Kenya is which class is in power and on whose behalf it rules. This class struggle is obscured by propaganda from the ruling classes. The contradiction between homeguards and Mau Mau was that the former sought superficial political change, while the latter demanded economic, political, and social transformation in the interest of the working class. That contradiction has not yet been resolved. If the workers' forces are to continue the legacy of Mau Mau and fight for justice, equality, and socialism today, they will need to arm themselves with revolutionary ideology and organize themselves as an effective fighting force to confront imperialism and its local allies. Among their first tasks will be to liberate their minds from colonial and imperialist world outlook and to recognize that their liberation can be achieved only through a struggle against their class enemies.

Mutunga (2017) sums up the current situation in Kenya:

> The Kenyan elite, like many in Africa, has not identified or supported our national interests. They do not represent us patriotically in national relations with either the West or the East, preferring to build their own personal power bases among foreign interests, national and international cartels ...The bottom line is – This status quo MUST GO!

There can be no better way to understand Kenya's past than to study Pio Gama Pinto's analysis (Pinto 1963, quoted in Durrani, Shiraz, Ed. 2018b, p. 246) at the time of independence:

> Kenya's Uhuru must not be transformed into freedom to exploit, or freedom to be hungry and live in ignorance. Uhuru must be Uhuru for the masses – uhuru from exploitation, from ignorance, disease and poverty ...The sacrifices of the hundreds of thousands of Kenya's freedom fighters must be honoured by the effective implementation of the policy - a democratic, African, socialist state in which the people have the right to be free from economic exploitation and the right to social equality.

Events have shown, however, that the aims of the Uhuru that Pinto and others died for have not been met even after 55 years of independence. The struggle that earlier generations, the radical trade-union movement and Mau Mau, waged continues.

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Kenyatta, Jomo (c. 1893–1978)

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Definition

Jomo Kenyatta was one of the leading figures in Kenya's independence movement from Great Britain. As the head of state after Kenya's independence from Britain, Kenyatta invoked Pan-Africanism rhetorically, but did little to actively pursue Pan-Africanist policies.

Introduction

Jomo Kenyatta was one of the leading figures in Kenya's independence movement from Great Britain. He served as the country's first prime minister (1963–64) and president (1964–78). Both during his lifetime and after his death, Kenyatta has been criticised for increasing the political power of his native majority ethnic group or Gikuyu (see Kenyatta 1965, pp. xix–xx; 1968, pp. 226–231; Lonsdale 1992). It was as a spokesperson for Kikuyu interests that Kenyatta

first became politically engaged and began to oppose British colonial rule. As a student in Britain, he worked closely with Pan-African, African-American, Afro-Caribbean, and African intellectuals and activists. He wrote his thesis on the Kikuyu at the London School of Economics under the supervision of the famous Polish-born anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. This would later be published as *Facing Mount Kenya,* which remains an important work of African anthropology. During his time abroad, Kenyatta played an important role in the growth of Pan-Africanist politics as the leadership of the movement shifted from intellectuals among the African diaspora to Africans. As the head of state after Kenya's independence from Britain, Kenyatta invoked Pan-Africanism rhetorically, but did little to actively pursue Pan-Africanist policies. Initially, he worked to forge co-operation with neighbouring East African states. Internal challenges to his political authority led him to focus on consolidating power, silencing potential enemies, and turning Kenya into a single-party state.

Early Life and Kikuyu Politics

Kenyatta was born Kamau wa Ngengi in the town of Gatundu in British East Africa. Because of the absence of birth records, the precise year of his birth is unknown and is listed in various biographies between 1889 and 1894. His parents died while he was still a child. His grandfather, a Kikuyu medicine man, raised him. Kenyatta would later note that the education he received from his grandfather informed his discussion of Kikuyu rites in *Facing Mount Kenya.* The book's second chapter on land tenure is also particularly relevant to Kenyatta's biography because his entry into politics occurred in the context of the colonial restructuring of the Kikuyu agricultural economy. Colonial rule brought with it the creation of chiefs who would administer the African districts. Local councils had previously governed the Kikuyu. The introduction of chiefs was a colonial invention, which functioned both to help govern the population and to turn it into a cheap labour source for colonial officials and

settlers. (A deeper account of the creation of the chiefs and the political and economic motivations can be found in Elkins 2005, pp. 18–19; and a study of the effects of colonialism on agriculture and labour in colonial Kenya is Berman and Lonsdale 1992). It was against this setting that the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) was established by educated Kikuyu to rival the power of the chiefs and campaign for Kikuyu interests. Kenyatta, who had changed his name to Johnstone Kenyatta after converting to Christianity in 1914, joined the KCA in 1924. He was soon promoted to be its secretary and founded the organisation's monthly newspaper *Muigwithania* (Reconciler) in 1928.

Kenyatta first travelled to London in 1929 to lobby on behalf of the KCA. In that same year, a long-brewing political conflict over the issue of clitoridectomy would come to a head. In response to an effort by missionaries to ban the practice, the KCA leadership argued for the reconcilability of Christianity and traditional Kikuyu practices (the early years of the KCA are covered very well by Anderson 2005, and Elkins 2005). The issue helped the KCA to put the chiefs on the defensive because they relied on support from missionaries and the colonial government. Kenyatta echoed the KCA's official position and wrote articles on the subject in European publications. He would later revisit the issue and reiterate his defence of clitoridectomy in *Facing Mount Kenya.* After his second visit to Britain in 1931, he established his home there to further pursue his education, and his active participation in KCA politics decreased. It was at this time that Kenyatta started to associate with the community of radical Afro-Caribbean and African students and intellectuals living in Britain. In particular, he was a member of the intellectual circle of the Trinidadian communist writer and labour activist George Padmore. Radical political affiliations brought him to Moscow in 1933 to study economics at the Comintern School. Kenyatta left Moscow in 1934 to return to London. In 1935, he enrolled in the London School of Economics to study social anthropology with Malinowski. He would publish his thesis under his new name Jomo (translated as 'Burning Spear') Kenyatta.

Anthropology and Anti-colonialism

In 1938, *Facing Mount Kenya* was published in Britain and included an introduction by Malinowski. Malinowski noted the significance of having a study written by an African with intimate knowledge of the social structure and practices of the Kikuyu. The book stands out for this reason as well as for offering an insight into Kikuyu society in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. In it, Kenyatta is particularly attentive to the ways colonial life transformed and, in his own lifetime, continued to transform the lives of the Kikuyu. Yet, in this respect, there is an unmistakable political undertone to the work. As has also already been indicated, Kenyatta's discussions of social hierarchy, land tenure, and rites, such as clitoridectomy, had a direct bearing on the debates that dominated Kikuyu political concerns and discourses. But several sections of the book are also distinguished by the contrasts Kenyatta draws between pre-colonial and colonial life. Perhaps one of the more striking sections is the oft-cited Kikuyu myth regarding the dispute between a man and an elephant. This tale, in which an elephant appropriates a man's hut from him, is clearly a criticism of European incursions on African lands and properties, the grander enterprise of colonialism, and the more specific land disputes between the Kikuyu, white settlers, and the chiefs serving colonial authorities (Kenyatta 1965, pp. 48–52).

Kenyatta remained in Britain throughout the Second World War, working on a farm. The end of the War seemed to offer an opportunity for a renewed challenge to colonialism. This prompted a group of Afro- Caribbean and African intellectuals, led by Padmore and Ghana's future head of state Kwame Nkrumah, to plan a meeting that would outline the demands and positions of colonised peoples in the aftermath of the war. The Fifth Pan-African Congress was held in Manchester on 15 October 1945 (see Cooper 2002, pp. 58–59; Padmore 1947). It was framed as a successor to the four preceding congresses, the first of which had been organised by W.E.B. Du Bois in Paris in 1919. Du Bois played little role in the organisation of this event. Nevertheless, he

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attended and was given the title of President. This congress, however, was distinct from previous meetings insofar as Africans played a greater role in its planning and organisation. Though representatives came from other British colonies and protectorates, much of the discussion centred on African affairs. Further, despite claims on the part of the participants that they spoke on behalf of colonised peoples throughout the world, the attendees came entirely from British colonies. Kenyatta's own role in the planning and events of the meeting is difficult to gauge. It is interesting to note that, when compared to the strong anti-capitalist positions of the West African resolutions, the East African resolutions, which it is likely that Kenyatta played a large role in drafting, were altogether more moderate in tone and focused on particular grievances. Nevertheless, later in life, he would reflect proudly on his participation in the Congress, but gave little clear indication of his part in it (see Adi and Sherwood 1995, p. 165). According to Padmore, Kenyatta served as assistant secretary (Padmore 1971, p. 133).

Return to Africa and Independence

The long-term effects of Pan-Africanism on the larger movement for African independence remain in question. Kenyatta would assert that the ideology remained an important facet of his thought throughout his life (Kenyatta 1964, p. 32). Yet, as Frederick Cooper has observed, there is little evidence that the Pan-African position advanced at the congress was of central importance for the subsequent politics of the participants (Cooper 2002, p. 59). When Kenyatta returned to the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1946, the anticolonial struggle there was already facing its own distinct challenges. Kenyatta soon re-entered Kenyan politics. In 1947, he was elected president of the Kenyan African Union (KAU), which had been founded in 1942 and secured itself as the successor to the KCA. Under Kenyatta's leadership, the KAU formed itself into a powerful political party in

the independence movement. By 1952, Kenyan anti-colonial activities took a more violent turn. A series of attacks by different groups, which the British summarily referred to as 'Mau Mau', were carried out against both the colonial authorities and white settlers (for an account of the 'Mau Mau' from the standpoint of a participant, see Barnett and Njama 1966). But the Mau Mau revolt also created deep rifts within Kikuyu society. British colonial policy had manufactured a society in which a number of Kikuyu benefited greatly from colonialism; for example, the chiefs and their supporters. The revolt prompted a violent campaign of suppression by the British with thousands of Mau Mau and suspected Mau Mau killed or imprisoned in camps (the major studies of this period are by Anderson 2005, and Elkins 2005).

Kenyatta tried to distance himself and the KAU from the revolt (Kenyatta 1952). The British declared a state of emergency and the Rebellion was used as a pretext for banning the KAU and arresting its leadership. Kenyatta was arrested in October 1952, imprisoned and detained until 1961. He was one of six Kenyan nationalist leaders – defended by the Labour politician and barrister D.N. Pritt – who were tried and known collectively as the Kapenguria Six. Although he was charged as a supporter of Mau Mau, there is little evidence linking him to the Rebellion. When the state of emergency was lifted in 1960, the KAU was renamed the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and re-emerged as a major political party. Kenyatta was elected president of the party during his detainment. Upon his release, he represented KANU at the 1961 and 1962 Lancaster Conferences in London to negotiate with British authorities the terms of Kenya's independence. Here, the KANU, which supported a unitary state, was opposed by the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which campaigned for a federated state. The KANU won a majority of the seats in the Legislative Council in the 1963 election and Kenyatta was named prime minister. On 12 December 1964, Kenya declared its full independence and Kenyatta became the country's first president. Soon after, he began to be referred to as 'Mzee' (Elder).

Head of State

On 25 May 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed and held its first meeting at Addis Ababa. The OAU's stated aim was to forge co-operation among the newly independent African states and to continue to press for the decolonisation of the remaining regions of Africa under either European or white African domination. But the meeting also served to indicate the future fault-lines in the continent's politics. Nkrumah appeared in the hope that this meeting would serve as a precursor to a federation of African states. His support came from more radical states, like Guinea, and many of the North African states, which formed the so-called Casablanca bloc. But Nkrumah was opposed by the Monrovian bloc, led by Senegal's Léopold Senghor, which sought closer ties to the newly formed French Community. Nkrumah's former ally Kenyatta also opposed his call for the immediate creation of a united states of Africa. Instead, Kenyatta allied himself with Tanzania's Julius Nyerere who advocated the gradual creation of a federation (Kenyatta discusses the one-year anniversary of the gathering in Kenyatta 1964, pp. 33–45, and there is an extensive discussion of Kenyatta's handling of the legacy of the Mau Mau in relation to his efforts to unify the country in Branch 2009). Early on, Nyerere and Kenyatta entered into talks with Uganda's Milton Obote about the possibility of forming an East African regional federation. Increasingly, he was confronted by internal problems within Kenya and focused his attentions there.

Unlike many of his contemporaries in other newly independent African countries, Kenyatta did not oust the many European civil servants working in Kenya. Instead, Kenyans gradually assumed the positions that had been held by Europeans. Kenyatta maintained much of the colonial infrastructure and retained close ties with Britain. As the West and Communist East wrestled over influence in Africa, Kenyatta remained staunchly pro-Western. In the wake of independence, Mau Mau left lingering hostilities, including among those Kikuyu who had

participated in the rebellion and those who had supported the British. Nationalism served as a means for unifying the country as well as a justification for disempowering tribal leaders (note discussion in Peterson 2012, pp. 14–15). It was in the context of efforts to unite the recently independent country that Kenyatta used the slogan 'Harambee' ('Let's all pull together'). Kenyatta also faced foreign conflicts. Land disputes with neighbouring Somalia led to military confrontations between the two countries for which Kenyatta sought British military aid. Kenyatta's modernisation policies relied upon his efforts to win diplomatic support from Western countries and investment from Western companies. Although Kenyatta's policies might be understood as an effort to maintain a unified state in an unstable political climate, his politics took on an increasingly autocratic turn which favoured his political party and ethnic group. In 1964, the KADU, Kenya's major party of opposition, was dissolved and joined KANU.

After his re-election in 1966, Kenyatta changed the constitution to extend his powers, and established KANU as Kenya's only legal party. He and his political allies amassed an enormous fortune during his presidency. Political dissension within KANU became increasingly apparent. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya's vice-president and a leading figure in both the KAU and KANU, became a public critic of Kenyatta's consolidation of power and, in 1966, resigned from Kenyatta's Government to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU) in opposition. Odinga was later arrested in 1969 after an argument with Kenyatta. His fall from power came as a relief to Kenyatta's Western supporters who viewed him as potentially too radical (for more on Kenyatta and Odinga, see Branch 2011, pp. 56–65).

But a stroke in 1968 led to increasing worries about Kenyatta's health and, more importantly, who would succeed him. Kenyatta expressed hopes that it would be his second vice-president, Daniel arap Moi, who had formerly been a leader of KADU. At the same time, Kenyatta's erstwhile ally and minister of economic planning and

development, Tom Mboya, had been building a strong political base for himself. Only in his early 30s, Mboya had already had an outstanding political career having worked with Nkrumah, briefly led his own political party, and been instrumental in establishing student exchange programmes with the United States. Though Mboya could boast a base in growing urban regions as well as among members of Kenya's parliament, he had also marginalised the labour movement in his efforts to discredit Odinga (Branch 2011, pp. 69–81). His attacks on Odinga gained Mboya strong support from the West. Mboya was assassinated on 5 July 1969. Though mourners at his funeral protested against Kenyatta's attendance and alleged that he had been responsible, no definitive evidence to this effect has emerged.

Final Years and Legacy

The KPU was banned after Odinga's arrest in 1969. The left wing of KANU had joined the KPU and was ousted from power. KANU was the only party on the ballot in the 1970 and 1974 elections and Kenyatta was the only presidential candidate. Without any opposition parties, Kenyatta continued to consolidate power and played a direct role in most of the country's political affairs. Political power was solidified in the hands of the Kikuyu majority. Kenyatta often suspected Luo and Kalenjin peoples of seeking to overthrow him and worked to consolidate his Kikuyu base. During the final years of his life, an increasing number of associations were formed to advocate the rights of the smaller ethnic groups, such as the Luo, but any attempt to form political parties was blocked. Moi increasingly took on Kenyatta's responsibilities as the latter's health worsened. Kenyatta died on 22 August 1978. Moi succeeded him and retired from politics in 2002 amidst charges of corruption and human rights abuses.

Kenyatta was a pivotal figure among the first generation of African intellectuals who would later lead their countries to independence from Britain. Unlike many of Africa's first political leaders, he was an experienced and weathered political activist by the time he became a head of state, with anywhere from one to three decades' seniority. His

scholarly training and the fact that he had already produced a study of major intellectual significance just as other future African leaders were first becoming politicised only serves to further distance his personality and biography from theirs. From this standpoint, Kenyatta's politics appear very different from those of his fellow leaders of independent African states. The political problems and concerns that shaped him were those of a distinct and earlier period of anti-colonial politics, which makes it more difficult to bring him into dialogue with younger African politicians. As a politician, Kenyatta's career was marred by autocratic tendencies. He turned Kenya into a singleparty state with power consolidated around himself. He barred any possible opposition groups from political participation ranging from tribal leaders to members of his own cabinet. He solidified the power of a Kikuyu elite, which had begun to emerge under colonialism and retains much power in the country today. His family continues to exert enormous political influence (for more on political corruption in Africa, see Bayart 2012). In this respect, the contemporary complexities of ethnic conflict in Kenya, taking both the form of physical violence and disputes at the ballot box, must be cast in the light of Kenyatta's legacy.

Though a man who flirted with left-wing politics in his youth, Kenyatta adopted increasingly conservative positions as Kenya's president. While Kenyatta has at times been labelled a Pan-Africanist or socialist, his biography does little to support such claims. It is perhaps more fruitful to understand him as a Kikuyu nationalist. Throughout his career, he remained concerned with Kikuyu political affairs above all. His politics might also be best understood by situating him in the context of colonial-era agrarian politics, which most directly affected the Kikuyu. His most significant intellectual work, *Facing Mount Kenya,* was largely a study of and political intervention in discussions about the effects of colonialism on the Kikuyu. It is, at the same time, impossible to ignore Kenyatta's essential role in the development and strengthening of a succession of political parties, beginning with the KCA and culminating with the KANU, which continually challenged colonial authority and guided Kenya to independence.

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Kim Il Sung (1912–1994): Partisan from the Edges of Empire

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Synonyms

Anti-Imperialism; Biography; DPRK; Imperialism; Kim Il Sung; North Korea

Definition

This chapter explores the life, political practice, and legacy of Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), the first President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

When the first Comintern-affiliated communist party was established in Korea proper, in Seoul in April 1925, Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsŏng) was 13 years old and living in China's Jilin Province, a part of north-eastern China historically known as Manchuria. The Korean Communist Party did not last long. It disbanded in November 1928 after suppression by the Japanese imperial government, but it left an impressive legacy, many of its members holding leadership positions two decades later in the inaugural Korean Workers' Party (KWP) of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). One member of that early communist party, Pak Hŏnyŏng, was the first secretary of KWP. Pak, a veteran revolutionary who had studied at the International Lenin School in Moscow (from 1929–31, when his friend Ho Chi Minh was also studying in the city), was also the minister of foreign affairs of the first DPRK cabinet. The young Kim Il Sung and the veteran Pak Hŏnyŏng were both comrades and rivals, and after the Korean War Pak was blamed for the failures of the conflict and put to death on Kim's orders. Kim was not part of Korea's early history of socialism, as Pak was, but he joined its surviving members as Korea's radical activities continued as an anti-imperial movement and eventually as a state-building project in the post-liberation period.

Kim Il Sung and his family had moved to Manchuria in 1919, to the village of Fusong in Jilin, so that the family could find more economic opportunities (a response common to many Koreans at the time). His father, Kim Hyŏngjik, a nationalist activist, continued to participate in the independence movement in Manchuria, where the chances of arrest by the colonial police were less than in Korea proper. Such a practice was common in the diverse struggle for independence from Japanese colonialism. Manchuria was a kind of frontier in East Asia, and it became an important location for activists to remobilise themselves, whether as intellectuals writing

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pamphlets or as partisans fighting in the mountains. The backgrounds of the people in the anti-imperial resistance in Manchuria were diverse. They were not just Koreans from Korea proper but also Chinese-Koreans, Soviet-Koreans, and of course the Chinese themselves. Their political ideologies too varied, from capitalist conservatism and socialist nationalism to Leninism and anarchism. They fought as comrades, and sometimes they fought each other. Kim's beginnings took place in this situation, at the edges of an empire. In many ways, the theme of *manoeuvring from the margins* continued throughout his life; as a guerrilla in Manchuria (1930s), as a minority power in North Korea's early revolutionary government (1950s), as a leader of a young state situated between China and the Soviet Union (1960s and 1970s), and as an aging ruler of an isolated state-socialist country in East Asia (1990s).

Kim Il Sung was born on 15 April 1912, in South P'yŏngan Province's Taedong county, now part of Man'gyŏngdae district in the western part of the capital city Pyongyang (P'yŏngyang). Kim is the surname (written and spoken in East Asia as the first syllable of the whole name), and his family belongs to the Kim clan of the Chŏnju region in the south. His birth name is Sŏngju, which means 'to attain the essence'. He took on the nom de guerre Ilsŏng (officially spelled Il Sung, meaning 'to attain the light') in the early 1930s as he joined the partisan forces in Manchuria. His father, Hyŏngjik, held several occupations, including being a schoolteacher, and from the time Kim was a young child, he was an activist in the independence movement. His mother, Kang Pansŏk, was a fellow activist and a devout member of a local Presbyterian Church, where her father was a deacon; her name means 'bedrock', and it is a Chinese-Korean transliteration of the biblical name Peter (which also means 'rock'). Many members of Kim's mother's family were serious Protestant Christians, and although there is no record of Kim being baptised, he was surely raised in a Christian household. In the missionary work of western believers in Asia, the monotheistic nature of Christianity sometimes transmuted into a sense of anti-monarchism and anti-

imperialism, all in the name of the Christian deity. Kim's view of the modern world seems to have first come from his Christian upbringing.

Other than a few years of school back near Pyongyang in the mid-1920s, Manchuria was where Kim spent his young adulthood attending Chinese schools and learning to speak and read Chinese fluently. He first studied Marx and Lenin in middle school, in 1929, taught by a young Chinese teacher named Shang Yue, who later became a respected historian in China (Wada 2002, p. 41). Kim's initial experience in a radical movement was around this time as well, as he joined a youth communist association and was even arrested for engaging in anti-Japanese activities. Biographies of Kim published in North Korea tell the story that Kim, as a young teenager in Manchuria, formed his first armed organisation called Down-With-Imperialism Union. Most scholars outside North Korea do not think this is true, but he seems to have joined an organisation founded by a militant radical named Ri Chongrak, an organization that sometimes went by the name Down-With-Imperialism Union. This organisation was disbanded by Japan in 1931. Soon after, Kim joined his first Comintern-affiliated party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which at the time accepted many Korean socialists.

Japan began colonising Asia in the late nineteenth century, starting with Taiwan in April 1895 and annexing Korea in August 1910. In September 1931, Japan invaded China through Manchuria after a bomb exploded at a railway owned by Japan's South Manchuria Railway Company. Known as the Manchurian Incident, the bombing is known to have been staged by Japan to create a cause for military invasion. The entrance of the Japanese military into Manchuria further galvanised the Chinese and Korean nationalists and socialists in the area. Kim's guerrilla days began during this time as he, in the spring of 1932, joined the Chinese National Salvation Army based in Antu. Partly due to the difficulty of sustaining a unified communist party in colonial Korea, and partly due to the Comintern's 'one country, one party' directive of 1928, Korean independence fighters in Manchuria were largely absorbed by the Chinese Communist Party in the

early 1930s. This is not to say that the Chinese communist leadership was in full control of Korean fighters, for in certain branches of CCP in Manchuria, especially among CCP's guerrilla units, Koreans were the majority of membership (Armstrong 2003, p. 29).

The international situation of anti-colonial forces in Manchuria was grounded in solidarity, but it was also one of mistrust and suspicion that, in 1933, erupted into a series of purges by the CCP. Suspecting pro-Japanese and anti-communist Koreans of having infiltrated the party, the CCP carried out a campaign to 'clean up' the Korean membership, arresting and expelling thousands and executing several hundred others. Kim himself was arrested in late 1933 but was absolved in early 1934. One major result of the purges was a reorganisation of the guerrilla forces in Manchuria, resulting in the formation of the North-East Anti-Japanese United Army (NEAJUA) in early 1934. Kim fought as a member of NEAJUA from June 1934 until October 1939, when NEAJUA was defeated by imperial forces. At his height, under the authority of the CCP, he commanded a detachment of several hundred fighters, and in June 1937 he and his unit engaged in a battle at Poch'ŏnbo, a border town on the Korean side, against a Japanese police garrison. The Battle of Poch'ŏnbo later became the most famous battle of Kim's guerrilla days, although its actual military significance at the time was likely small. In late 1940, with NEAJUA crushed by Japan, Kim and his unit retreated into the Soviet Far East, a region where borders are shared between Korea, China, and Russia.

For the next year-and-a-half, they stayed at a Soviet military camp in Vorosilov (today's Ussuriysk), just north of Vladivostok. In August 1942, Kim and his partisans were called up to Vyatskoye near Khabarovsk and reorganised as part of the 88th Special Reconnaissance Brigade of the Soviet 25th Army. The commander of the brigade, which had about 600 soldiers, was Zhou Baozhong, a veteran Chinese leader of Manchurian partisans. Kim attained the rank of captain and commanded his own battalion of some 200 troops, of whom 60 were Korean (Seiler 1994, p. 33). The partisans of the 88th Brigade

who remained loyal to Kim became the most important officials in the DPRK's beginnings, including Choe Yonggŏn, who became the commander of the Korean People's Army and the defence minister, and Kim Ch'aek, who became deputy prime minister and industry minister.

Kim's life in the Soviet military camp was one of both respite and restlessness. He had been a fighter living dangerously for more than 10 years, but for the next 5 years he stayed within the Soviet Union without seeing battle. He studied, trained, and devoted himself to the Soviet Red Army. An important reason for the relative isolation of former Korean partisans was the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of April 1941, which kept the two countries from going to war until 8 August 1945, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. As guerrilla fighters in Manchuria, they had not been obliged to observe international treaties, but as soldiers in the Soviet army, albeit with greater resources and recognition, Kim and his fighters now had to manoeuvre within the legal boundaries of nation states.

Kim Il Sung's time in the Soviet Far East included having a family with his partner Kim Choŏngsuk. She was a fellow partisan, and they were married in September 1940. (This was Kim's second marriage. His first had been with another partisan named Han Sŏnghui, who had mistakenly been presumed dead after her arrest by the Japanese police. Kim reconnected with her years later.) Born in 1917 in North Hamgyŏng Province's Hoeryŏng, in north-east Korea, Chŏngsuk had joined Kim's NEAJUA unit in 1937 and is believed to have fought alongside him in many battles, including the Battle of Poch'ŏnbo. Their first child, a son, was born on 16 February 1942. He was named Yuri Irsenovich Kim. After the family's return to Korea in September 1945, Yuri was given a Korean name, Chŏngil (officially spelled Jong Il). Another son was born in the Soviet camp in 1944. He was called Alexander Irsenovich (Shura for short), and was later named in Korean as P'yŏngil. He died in the summer of 1947 in Pyongyang in a drowning accident.

The two children born in the Soviet military base were officially given Russian names, even following the custom of using their father's first

name as their middle names (Kim's Russianised first name was Irsen). An interesting aspect of Kim's life during this time is that he perhaps did not envision returning to Korea, much less a socialist Korea, but rather saw his future as an officer in the Soviet Red Army (Lankov 2002, p. 57). The Kim family went on to have a daughter in liberated Korea, born in May 1946. She is Kyŏnghui, a party central committee member, a powerful politician in her own right, and the wife of Chang Sŏngt'aek, who was ordered to be executed by his nephew, Kim Jong Un (Kim Chŏngŭn), in December 2013. Chŏngsuk did not live to see North Korea for long: she died in September 1949 in childbirth, along with the child. Kim Chŏngsuk is memorialised in North Korea as a martyr and a heroine.

Kim married once more, in 1952, to Kim Sung Ae (Kim Sŏngae), his former secretary. They had a daughter in 1952 (Kyŏngjin) and subsequently had two sons. The elder son, Pyong Il (P'yŏngil), was born in 1954; he was named after the dead son from the previous marriage, who was, in turn, posthumously renamed Man'il. The second Pyong Il is the current DPRK ambassador to Poland. The younger son, Yong II (Yŏngil), born in 1955, was also a diplomat. He died in Germany in 2000 from illness. The daughter Kyŏngjin is a diplomat, too, and her husband, Kim Kwang Sop (Kim Kwangsŏp), currently serves as the DPRK ambassador to Austria. Kim Il Sung is known to have had two more children with two other women: a son named Hyun (Hyŏn) in 1971 with Madame Chegal, Kim's former nurse, and a daughter named Paegyŏn with a woman named Kim Songjuk. Kim Hyun is thought to have been killed by Kim Jong Il in 2001. In his relatively long life, Kim married three times and, with four women, had three daughters and five sons.

The empire of Japan ended when it surrendered on 15 August 1945. The Second World War was also over. The final days of the empire were singularly tragic: enormous death and destruction that culminated with atomic bombs on Hiroshima, on 6 August, and Nagasaki, on 9 August. The colonies of the empire were free, but for the people of Korea, freedom was very brief. Colonialism was quickly replaced by another kind of

occupation, by the US in the South and the Soviet Union in the North. Washington's proposal for the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel, on 10 August, was immediately accepted by Moscow, which, having declared war on Japan on 8 August, was already landing troops on the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula at the port cities of Unggi, Najin, and Ch'ŏngjin. Various native governing bodies freely emerged throughout the peninsula, but they now faced two powerful hegemonic entities growing more hostile toward each other. The occupation of Korea by the militaries of the US and the Soviet Union was a fiercely divisive issue among the Koreans. Left-wing nationalists opposed both sides; right-wing nationalists supported it from an anti-communist standpoint; and socialists and communists, including Kim Il Sung, tended to support it with the goal of a revolution on the entire peninsula. Korea's liberation in 1945 was thus simultaneously a moment of lamentation: freedom had come not through the efforts of Korean independence fighters; and the occupation divided the land for the first time in at least 500 years.

The Soviet occupation of North Korea began with the deployment of the 25th Red Army stationed in the Fast East; it arrived in Pyongyang on 26 August. The Korean and Chinese partisans of the 88th Brigade were initially left out of Moscow's plans, and they did not accompany the first wave of Soviet troops into Korea. Moscow understandably had more trust in the Moscow-trained Soviet- Koreans than in rebels such as Kim Il Sung, indicating that Kim was not a hand-picked puppet of Stalin. The Chinese and Korean guerrilla fighters of 88th Brigade thus independently prepared to return to their homelands. Kim Il Sung and 60 other Korean fighters formed the Korean Work Team at the end of August and left Soviet territory on 5 September 1945. During the time between the Work Team's formation and departure from Far East Russia, Kim travelled to Moscow and met Stalin, who then approved Kim's separate entrance (but not much more). After 2 weeks of travelling, on 19 September, Kim and his team of 60 partisans disembarked at Wŏnsan. Kim had returned home after two decades of life as a guerrilla fighter. He

was 33 years old. The legend of Kim Il Sung was already in the making.

In the political terrain of Soviet-controlled North Korea, Kim's close group of Manchurian partisans was a minority, both in number and political strength. His group competed and collaborated with at least six other groups in the aftermath of liberation: the Chinese-Korean group from Yan'an who had participated in the Chinese revolution; the Soviet-Koreans dispatched by Moscow and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the socialists and communists based in Seoul whose leadership, headed by Pak Hŏnyŏng, had moved north; the communists from the northern part of Korea known as the Kapsan group; the powerful Korean Democratic Party led by the Christian nationalist Cho Mansik; and the populist Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party formed by the activists who followed the native religion of Ch'ŏndogyo.

The Soviets governed through the Soviet Civil Administration (SCA), established on 3 October 1945. The SCA's role in North Korea's founding is the topic of much debate that continues today. One view, particularly from the right, is that the SCA was an extension of Stalin's imperialistic and totalitarian grip, placing a puppet government in the North with Kim as its figurehead. Another view, espoused by the DPRK, is that the SCA recognised Kim as the leader from the start, because he had the full support of peasants and workers. The actual situation was a bit of both. Moscow was indeed interested in backing a pro-Soviet government in the northern part of Korea, but it was cautious of a full socialist revolution lest it should provoke the US into taking military action. As for personnel, the SCA had brought the Russianspeaking Soviet-Koreans, who were well educated and well trained in bureaucracy, but it also saw that popular support was an aspect it could not manufacture. The support of the people lay more with the nationalists, including Cho Mansik's Korean Democratic Party and the Ch'ŏndogyo Young Friends Party, than with elite socialists. Another player with growing popular support was Kim Il Sung, who embodied the ideas of patriotism, direct action, and social reform, while having connections with the Chinese and

the Soviets. The objectives of SCA and the situation on the ground eventually elevated the socialist and communist leaders who had the support of the masses. One result was the weakening of the non-socialist Korean Democratic Party; Cho himself was placed under house arrest in January 1946 for opposing Soviet and US occupations of Korea. The SCA also placed advisors in the central government, especially on foreign affairs, and in provincial governments; but below the provincial level, the SCA did not seem to have much influence (Armstrong 2003, p. 54).

Kim Il Sung quickly gained the support of fellow socialists, the Soviets, and the ordinary people. In the first legislative organ, the North Korean Provisional People's Committee (NKPPC), founded on 8 February 1946, Kim was elected chairman. NKPPC was the coming together of representatives from political parties, social organisations, and local governments called people's committees. Functioning as North Korea's first law-making institution, the NKPPC ordered two major reforms that were revolutionary in scale. First was the land reform of March 1946. NKPPC confiscated land from Japanese landowners, large Korean landowners, and private institutions (such as Churches) and redistributed the properties for free to over 700,000 households, the majority of whom had never owned land before. The second reform was the nationalisation of industries beginning in August 1946. Over 1,000 industrial sites were nationalised within a year, from steel and mining to chemical and consumer goods. The SCA undoubtedly approved and advised these reforms, but the newly formed Korean leadership, led by Kim, was the essential source of change, along with the ordinary people, who were willing to work with the new regime.

Kim's emergence in the political world occurred along with the gradual political ascent of his former partisan comrades. At the first congress of the Korean Workers' Party in August 1946 (then called the North Korean Workers' Party, as an ally to the South Korean Workers' Party), the central committee of 43 members had only four members from the Manchurian partisan

group, with Kim as deputy chair (Sŏ 2005, p. 178). The dominant groups were the Soviet-Koreans, domestic communists, and the most numerous Chinese-Koreans. The number of Kim's group in the central committee increased with each party congress, while, except for the communists from northern Korea, the numbers from other groups decreased. At the fourth congress in September 1961, called the 'Congress of Victors,' Kim's group had placed 31 members in the 85-member central committee, with Kim as chair, while the Chinese-Korean group and Soviet-Korean group had three and one, respectively (Sŏ 2005, p. 796). Noteworthy in Kim's gathering of political power is that he was very capable of negotiating and compromising with various groups and linking actual progressive changes in people's livelihood with the nationalist ideals of his own group. This meant, at crucial moments, attributing failures to others and, with little due process, removing them from positions of authority, which usually meant sending them to the countryside. Executions in North Korea certainly happened, but they were symbolic events and far less in percentage than in China and the Soviet Union. This is not to downplay the violence of the Kim regime but to talk about its complexity in practice. As much as its 'purging' was extralegal and arbitrary, the regime relied on the influence of exoneration and rehabilitation: within the authority of Kim Il Sung, anybody could be punished, and anybody could be forgiven. Such a practice of power fits with Žižek's interesting statement that socialist 'totalitarian' regimes were 'regimes of mercy' (2008, p. 676).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in September 1948, 3 weeks after the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in the South. The chance for a unified Korea was fading by late 1947, as the US-Soviet Joint Commission failed to negotiate the terms for a single independent country. The 'Korea Question' was turned over to the United Nations, which established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) in November 1947. One role of UNTCOK was to observe a nationwide election in Korea, but the UN-sponsored election was rejected by North Korea, forcing the election to be held only in the South, in May 1948. This election established a legislative body, which, in turn, elected a president, Rhee Syngman (Yi Sŭngman), and proclaimed the founding of ROK on 15 August 1948. North Korea saw ROK as an illegitimate entity and carried out its own election on 15 August 1948, establishing the legislative organ the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). The SPA declared the founding of the DPRK on 9 September 1948. Kim Il Sung became the prime minister of the cabinet, while the position of the chair of the SPA (a position of the head of state) went to Kim Tubong, a veteran soldier from the Chinese-Korean group. Kim himself did not become the head of the SPA until 1972, when the presidency system was implemented, at which point he became the president of the DPRK, a position he held until his death in 1994. In 1998, the DPRK abolished the presidency system, reinstated the cabinet system, and symbolically elevated Kim as the last and eternal president of the DPRK; a move not unlike the posthumous promotion of George Washington in 1976 as the highest-ranking military officer of the United States (for eternity).

From the moment of the formation of two separate nation states, each side loudly expressed the desire to unify the land, even if that meant a war. The ROK president Rhee Syngman spoke about the DPRK as a puppet state of the Soviet Union, and Kim publicly lamented that the US had set up a colony in the southern half and was exploiting the Korean people. Both sides built up the military and engaged in conflicts along the border. The Korean War, that is recognised by most of the world started on 15 June 1950, with an invasion by North Korea, and ended on 27 July 1953 with an armistice. What is less recognised is the situation leading up to the June clash: the guerrilla insurgencies in South Korea and 9 months of border fighting that together resulted in thousands of casualties. While they envisioned different futures, Kim and Rhee during this time shared the manoeuvres of strengthening the military, acquiring the support of powerful allies, and waiting for the right provocation to initiate attack (Cumings 1997, p. 251). The moment came earlier for North Korea when, first, the well-trained

Korean soldiers who fought with the CCP in the Chinese revolution returned to ultimately form an army of over 100,000 soldiers and, second, Mao and Stalin decided to support North Korea when it launched an attack (China with a 'volunteer' army and the Soviet Union with weapons). The war that started in June 1950 was thus the most ambitious offensive (a tragic continuation) in the belligerent relationship between the two states since 1948.

Death, displacement, and destruction produced by the Korean War were a political opportunity seized by Kim Il Sung and his partisan group. Post-war economic reconstruction required a strong state, which could only follow a massive political consolidation. The removal of groups from positions of authority was, at the time, a justifiable act for the failures of the war. The purging lasted throughout the decade and involved a nationwide party membership renewal, public trials of rival groups, teach-ins at all branches and regions of the government, censorship of intellectuals, and repatriation of Soviet-Koreans back to the Soviet Union. It even lasted through the attempt to overthrow Kim in August 1956 by the Chinese-Korean and Soviet-Korean groups, an event known as the 'August Factional Incident'. By the fourth party congress in September 1961, Kim and his partisan group (and their loyalists) had control in the cabinet, legislature, party, and military. The once diverse world of North Korea's politics, which reflected the various actors in the resistance against Japanese imperialism, was reduced to Kim's partisan group as the sole legitimate representation of the people.

The anti-imperial past of Kim Il Sung was a crucial factor in the shaping of his political authority. In the eye of North Korea's party-state machinery, imperialism did not end in Asia with the dissolution of the Japanese empire. The new enemy was the US, and it had once again colonised the Korean people in the South and set up a military-capitalist outpost. North Korea had valid reasons for this outlook. First was South Korea's export-oriented light manufacturing industry geared toward American and Japanese consumers. From the late 1960s, South Korea's cities became centres of exploitative factory work

for millions of young women and men. They left their home towns for low-wage work that placed them in unhealthy and dangerous work settings with little legal or union protection. Another reason was the establishment of dozens of US military bases across South Korea after the signing of the Status of Forces of Agreement (SOFA) in 1953. The most notorious was the US Eighth Army's base in central Seoul, the same location in which imperial Japan had stationed its army for three decades. (After six decades, the Eighth Army is in the process of relocating to a base outside Seoul.) With SOFA came the twice-a-year joint military exercises between the US and South Korea that were live simulations of another war on the peninsula. North Korea's leadership sent out the message that it had defended itself in the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War, largely because of Kim's military strategy and his brotherly ties to Mao and Stalin. These two features originated from Kim's days as a guerrilla fighter in Manchuria, and as long as imperialism is a threat to North Korea, Kim would be the leader. Enemy making is a universal tool for the political unity of a nation, and the making of North Korea's new enemy in the US further fostered the people's trust in the Kim Il Sung regime.

Kim's rise within the DPRK officialdom accompanied the production of devotion toward him and the Manchurian partisans. The devotion toward a political leader is often called the 'cult of personality'. State-socialism from the Soviet Union to Vietnam suffered from the culture of glorifying leaders, and in no other place was it stronger than in North Korea. Filled with images of tearful adulation, dancing children, and large statues, the cult of personality is a quality that immediately seems bizarre and conjures up a sense of brainwashing. But it must be said that monarchies, national histories, and celebrity cultures everywhere also depend on personality worship, with their own ways of publicity, consumption, and socialization (or brainwashing). As bizarre as it may seem, the cult of personality is not a matter of absence or presence (because it is pervasive in our world) but a matter of degree. A major degree of difference in places like North Korea was the involvement of the education system. Kim Il Sung

and his partisans were hyperbolised from early on, but a systematic production of devotion began with the publication of *The Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Partisans* in June 1959. The book was read by the whole society, especially in schools. The others who also fought for independence were either portrayed as part of Kim's command or excluded from the new revolutionary history of North Korea. Beginning in 1972, around the time of the promulgation of his *chuch'e* ideology, the system of glorifying Kim placed him above all other revolutionaries, including Stalin, Mao, and even Marx. Kim's actual authority, however, was in decline, as his son Jong Il rose in the ranks and orchestrated his father's place in history. (In almost all cases, personality cult reaches its height when actual power diminishes.) Through literature, movies, songs, and textbooks, all that seemed decent about living in North Korea was attributed to Kim. On the one hand, it was a simple process of learning the rationale, from childhood, that Kim Il Sung was the ideological source of happiness and that its opposite was caused by the enemy: the US military and capitalism. On the other hand, the process of attribution had a strong effect on language and performance. Every person learned to speak and to act in a certain way according to the situation, not unlike etiquettes and manners in church or at a formal dinner. Publicly, the people of North Korea praised his life, wept about his sacrifices, and shook their fists at the US; but in private life, behind closed curtains, they lived a life beyond the rhetoric and performance. Kim's personality cult was produced at a great level and became a part of children's education, but, as with any belief, the actual hold varied among the people.

The attribution of Kim Il Sung to North Korea's progress was rooted in real economic growth. Between 1946 and 1960, North Korea claimed to have experienced a 2,000% increase in industrial output, a 683% increase in national income, and a 539% rise in labour productivity (Central Statistical Board 1961, pp. 22–28). These numbers are questionable, but given the low starting point, there is little doubt of a large absolute economic growth. Industrialisation (focused on heavy industries like steel, chemical, and mining) created hundreds of thousands of jobs and urbanised the country. The Three-Year Plan from

1954–56 had raised production back to pre-war levels, and the Five-Year Plan from 1957–60 completed the co-operativisation of agriculture and the nationalisation of all forms of production (finishing a year early in 1960). Modern industrial management of time, space, and wage took place in conjunction with mass campaigns, such as the famous Ch'ŏllima Movement that began in 1959. One important achievement in the process was the proletarianisation of the workforce, as farmers and private producers became wage-workers in the fully nationalised economy. Within a decade after the Korean War, North Korea had established the foundations for a state-led socialist economy. This meant the state would appropriate that total surplus created from production and decide how it would be utilised. The state also controlled distribution through its ration system, although small private plots were allowed in the countryside. At least formally, the force of the market was removed from production, distribution, and consumption. By the late 1960s, North Korea was meeting the minimum need for food, housing, and clothing, while providing employment, medical care, and education for the entire population. Some regions were still poor, but until the 1980s, the people of North Korea on the whole fared better than their neighbours in the South.

In the setting of political unity and economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, Kim Il Sung developed the idea of *chuch'e* (officially spelled Juche). As Kim's most defining thought, Juche is the guiding principle of North Korea's official sectors, including the party, the military, economic planning, and education. Although the word itself is a common one in East Asia, meaning 'subjectivity' and 'self-reliance', in North Korea it takes on the message that one's life is determined by oneself, and by extension, the progress of a nation state is determined by its people (Kim 2012, p. 72). The origin of Juche is considered to be Kim's speech in December 1955 titled 'On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Our Ideological Project'. But theorisation did not happen until the early 1970s when Kim organised a group of scholars for the task, a group led by the philosopher Hwang Jang Yop (Hwang Changyŏp, 1923–2010) who

went on to serve as chair of SPA's standing committee. (In February 1997, he became the highest ranking official to defect to South Korea, where he lived a second life as a vocal critic of Kim and the DPRK.) Two international events further influenced the development of Juche. First was the diminishing foreign aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Economic independence, especially in consumer goods, was a growing necessity. And second was the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s during which North Korea criticised both states: the Soviet Union for being soft against capitalism (especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962); and China for ignoring the situation of the people (with the Cultural Revolution of 1966) (Kim 2012, p. 76). Juche was thus a response to the changing international context of less foreign aid and growing antagonism between two socialist superpowers. At the same time, Juche was a positive manifestation, an expression of North Korea's success in post-war reconstruction and nationalised industrialisation.

The announcement of Juche to the public (especially the foreign public) in 1972 was a year-long event. It was written about in popular magazines. Kim Il Sung gave interviews to foreign newspapers, one of which was Japan's major daily *Mainichi Sinbun*. And throughout the 1970s, North Korea took out full-page advertisements in Western newspapers, including the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Guardian*. As the world experienced the Vietnam War and uprisings in every region, Kim's Juche had a moment in the sun. Post-colonial developing countries saw North Korea's economic expansion as a model, and Kim's Juche was an empowering text for emerging regimes and radical organisations. One interesting case was the Black Panther Party in the US, whose leading member, Eldridge Cleaver, visited North Korea in 1969. Endorsing the Juche idea, Cleaver, in 1972, wrote the foreword to an English-language book on Kim's writings. '[T]he manuscript before me is one that *must* be read and understood by the American people above all', Cleaver wrote (Kim 1972: ix, emphasis in the original). For two decades, in the 1960s and 1970s, Kim's regime represented a successful alternative outside the domination of superpowers. Especially for those critical of liberal democracy, North Korea had achieved political and social unity, equal distribution of wealth, and independence from the hegemonic policies of the US, China, and the Soviet Union.

In the 1980s, while his national image grew more righteous and virtuous under the direction of his son, Kim Il Sung's international reputation waned. This was the period of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union; Deng Xiaoping's China embraced the market economy. The world increasingly viewed North Korea as an isolationist country with a failing economy. The economy had started to seriously weaken in the mid-1970s when trade among socialist countries slowed down and North Korea had to borrow from foreign banks flush with oil money (as did many other developing countries). North Korea defaulted the loan in 1980. Meanwhile, South Korea's economic growth overtook North Korea's and climbed at an astonishing rate. Like China's Deng Xiaoping, Kim Il Sung invited foreign capital investment into North Korea with the announcement of the Joint Venture Law in 1984. Initial investments came from companies originating in Japan, France, and Hong Kong, but foreign investment was not enough to offset the decline. The dissolution of state-socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union further devastated North Korea's economy. In the early 1990s, North Korea began to experience a dramatic decline in agricultural production, and with dwindling foreign aid and import of fuel, food shortages soon appeared as a major crisis. And as much as Juche was seen as an outcome of progress, it was perceived as the cause of misery. Kim was now viewed as a tyrant who had created a disastrous economy and indoctrinated the people to obey his words. He was indeed a tyrant who ruled with absolute power, and the Juche ideology had turned him into a guiding light of the masses. But what needs to be juxtaposed is that: first, almost all post-colonial states have remained poor for complex reasons; and, second, ideological control of a people is never complete. Ideology, including Juche, is largely about rhetoric and performance. Even under great oppression by the state, people create their own everyday life that is

distanced from any complete ideological hold. The people of North Korea are no different.

The last days of Kim Il Sung are indelibly marked by the catastrophe of famine and the global portrayal of North Korea as a possible nuclear threat. He died from a heart attack on 8 July 1994 at the age of 82, probably knowing that the people of North Korea were beginning to die from hunger. That situation would continue until the end of the 1990s. The last efforts at trying to revive the economy involved the strengthening of the nuclear programme and the selling of weapons on the international market. Kim Il Sung had initiated a nuclear programme in 1959 with assistance from the Soviet Union, and by the early 1990s the two countries were building a nuclear power plant on the east coast (Kotkin and Armstrong 2006, p. 119). When the joint project came to a halt due to financial reasons, North Korea turned to selling missiles and nuclear technology on the arms market, while accumulating plutonium independently. In the summer of 1994, North Korea tested ballistic missiles and rejected an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Washington and Seoul considered using military strikes on North Korea's nuclear sites. But as the peninsula braced for another war, during what is now considered the first nuclear crisis, Kim Il Sung met with the former US president Jimmy Carter in June and negotiated a deal to stop the nuclear weapons programme and to work with a multinational consortium including South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Kim did not live to see the agreement, but at the end of his life he was shifting the course of his country. He was welcoming the partnership with governments that he had once vowed to destroy.

There exists a photo of Kim and Carter from that summer. They are on a boat and smiling. Kim looks like a gentle old man, not the ruthless politician who crushed his rival groups, not the tyrant vilified in postwar South Korea's anti-communist education system. Then again, Kim was not a singular character; no one who achieves greatness ever is, for better or worse. 'Rice is socialism', he frequently said. Socialism was a space in which he manoeuvred as an anti-imperialist, as a populist, and as a compromiser. But one aspect remains unbroken in Kim's life: power is constant movement, something he realised early on as a partisan in the mountains among more formidable forces.

Cross-References

▶ Korea and Imperialism

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Kim Il Sung

▶ Kim Il Sung (1912–1994): Partisan from the Edges of Empire

Kim Jong Un

Kleptocracy

Korea

Korea and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Client state; East Asia; History; Japanese colonialism; Kim Jong Un; Korea; Moon Jae-in; North Korea; South Korea; Strategic location; Trump; US Imperialism; US-China rivalry

Definition/Description

The Korean peninsula is where Russia, China, Japan and the United States meet and contest. It is the most strategically valuable location in the world and inevitably has been of consuming interest to imperialism, either to use as a strategic base for onward expansion or to deprive competitors of control. The actors have changed over the course of history – the Mongol and Japanese empires are no longer and the hegemony of the recently

arrived US empire is under challenge especially from China. Korea, divided by the US into North and South in 1945 as part of its strategy against the Soviet Union, is still struggling to find a way to reunification and independence. Current US policy on Korea can only be understood within the framework of imperialism and resistance to it.

Introduction

The Korean Peninsula has been a prime site of contestation for US imperialism since the defeat of Japan in 1945 and for Japanese imperialism in the preceding half century. Any analysis of imperialism must be grounded in specifics – a lazy, undifferentiated, and historically decontextualized description is inimical to understanding – but because of its importance, a study of imperialism in Korea can offer insights into the nature of contemporary imperialism. Moreover since US imperialism is a global phenomenon (the Japanese variant was essentially regional), looking at imperialism in one theatre in isolation makes no sense, though it is often done by apologists and by mainstream writers generally. Thus talking of "the North Korean problem" as if the issue emanates from Korea and is limited to a bilateral interaction with the USA either directly or in its guise as "the international community" obfuscates as perhaps it is intended to do. Instead we must look at the Korean case within the context of the empire as a whole, whether that is American or Japanese. That inevitably brings us to a contemplation of imperialism, its nature, its constituents, its motivations, and its constraints. Thus the specific and the general are inextricably linked, each giving meaning to the other. At the same time because of the limitations of the author's knowledge and the constraints of space in a short chapter, the focus will be on US imperialism for reasons which need no elaboration.

A discussion of the general issues about imperialism that the Korea case study throws up starts with the simple question, why Korea? It is necessary to understand what is it that makes the Korean Peninsula of such interest to imperialism. This chapter is not an attempt to formulate a

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general theory of contemporary imperialism but simply to contextualize the Korean case which in turn may deepen our understanding of the concept of imperialism.

After addressing the question of why Korea is of such importance to imperialism, we turn to a historical overview to familiarize the reader with the basic facts. It hardly needs to be noted that this is important because most writing on the subject comes from an imperialist perspective where lies, obfuscation, and myth happily mingle to mislead us.

Why Korea?

There are four main reasons why imperialism is interested in a particular place. The strength of a reason will vary with the specific imperialist power; what applies to Japan may not apply to the USA.

1. History and Destiny

    The place may have a special role in the history of the imperial power. Mussolini's attempt to resurrect what he could of the Roman Empire and Israel's claims in Palestine are examples. If the target country is not part of the past, it might be seen as part of the future, as inherent in the nation's destiny. The American concept of Manifest Destiny, of a nation from sea to shining sea and across the Pacific, provides a foundation for the US presence in Korea (Cumings 2009).

2. Resources

    Gold, silver, and oil are obvious historical examples, but are less pressing reasons in the modern world where the question is not access itself, but the terms of access. The USA did not invade Iraq in 2003 simply to seize its oil because it was able to buy it commercially, and the Iraqi government was not threatening to curtail that. The reasons were deeper. Countries, especially in times of war, may take action to prevent a resource being available to, or seized by an adversary: the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 is a case in point ("Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran" 2018). This was not an issue in Iraq 2003, nor is there any

reason to see it being applicable to Korea. The US invasion of Iraq was driven by a complex combination of motives: the power balance in the Middle East; the particular role of Israel; general antipathy toward independent governments, even if they had been friends and allies the day before; and a general desire to control the supply and sale of oil. This in turn involved the issue of petrodollars, and Iraq's attempt to move to Euros, an issue which was paralleled in Libya and the continuing confrontation with Iran (Doran 2012). The use of dollar for trade in oil is a subset of the larger question of the role of the US dollar as the world's trading and reserve currency, which leads to the very heart of US imperialism. So the motives for the US conquest of Iraq in the twenty-first century were very different from the Spanish plundering of Latin America for silver and gold in the sixteenth century though that simple avarice for resources had momentous global consequences.

There are reports, perhaps exaggerated, that North Korea has substantial mineral resources (Mollman 2017) but this provides no compelling rationale as such for US policy since North Korea has long sought foreign investment (Shi 2014). The issue is respect for sovereignty. With Japan not merely were the historical circumstances different, but Korea's resources were a magnet, rice from the south and from the "mineral-rich north," gold, iron ore, and coal (King 1975; Roy 2015).

3. Labor

    Capital without labor is valueless, and the search for suitable labor is a constant theme in imperialism, from the African slave trade to the Americas to low-paid workers today in the Global South. Again, for the USA, Korea's labor resources were initially of no interest; it was much more plentiful in Japan and China. Today South Korea is a major economy with workers who are skilled, disciplined, and notoriously overworked (Haas 2018), but only 6% of the 27 million labor force are employed in foreign companies ("FORCA Brochure" 2018). Of more interest to US imperialism, now is the military "labor force." According to the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, the combined total of the three types of military personnel (active, reserves, and paramilitaries) in South Korea is 5.1 million, by far the largest in the world, outstripping that of the USA (2.2 m), Russia (3.5 m), China (3.4 m), and North Korea (2.0 m) ("Military Balance 2017" 2017). Since the South Korean military is under the "wartime" Operational Command (OPCON) of the USA, this is a formidable asset (Jun 2018a).

4. Geopolitical Location

Although resources and labor were important considerations for Japan, by far the most important and enduring reason for imperialism's interest in the Korean Peninsula is its unique geopolitical location. It is the only place in the world where all the great powers, other than the Europeans, come together. This is where Russia, China, Japan, and, from across the "American Lake," the USA meet and contest. This is the place, in the words of the Australian scholar of Northeast Asia, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "where empires have collided" (Morris-Suzuki et al. 2018). Imperialism abhors a vacuum and a crossroad such as the Korean Peninsula will not be ignored.

The Korean Peninsula in the past has been the conduit whereby Buddhism and Chinese culture, particularly Confucianism and its writing system, flowed through from the Asian mainland to Japan. In the future it will hopefully serve as a transit corridor for gas pipelines from Russia and have railways linking Japan with the west of Europe – what Kim Dae-jung dubbed an Iron Silk Road (Kim 2006) – though for obvious strategic reasons, this would not find favor in Washington.

From a strategic perspective, the Korean Peninsula has two functions. It may serve as a staging post and a corridor toward the main objective. This is how the Mongols and the Japanese used it. Or it may serve as a barrier and a bastion against incursion from adversaries. This was, and remains, the Chinese perspective. Or, it may serve both functions: that is the American position.

How have these various objectives played out in history?

Historical Overview

Perhaps few states in history have not displayed attributes of imperialism, state creation usually being a violent business originating in greed and ambition. The northern Korean state of Koguryo (Goguryeo) which dates from roughly 37 BCE to 668 CE extended its territory far beyond the Amnok River (Yalu) into the plains beyond into what are today parts of China's Northeast, Inner Mongolia, and Russia; it was according to a South Korean website a "Korean empire whose brilliant history flourished on a vast expanse of land in East Asia" ("Koguryo Proud History of Korea" 2018). In 2004 a controversy erupted between Chinese and South Korean historians as to whether Koguryo had been a tributary state of China or "truly Korean." The debate was arcane and ultimately unresolvable because modern concepts of nationalism cannot be easily applied to the past, but it had important modern implications. China considers itself a multiethnic state built to a large extent on cultural soft power, and the tributary system was a manifestation of that. Under that concept a historical state which was militarily independent poses no challenge to the modern Chinese polity. If Tibetans and Manchus, Mongols, and Miao can be Chinese citizens, why not Koreans? This conflicts with a vision of a "Korean empire" that once held sway over a large part of what is now China and might do again one day; as the *New York Times* put it: "China Fears Once and Future Kingdom" (Brooke 2004). It was a coming together of two aspirations, Korean revanchism and American interest in the dismemberment of China. It is unknown to what degree South Korean dreams are shared in the North, but since Pyongyang was the major capital of Koguryo, it would be surprising if that were not so.

In the event Koguryo was destroyed by an alliance of the Chinese Tang dynasty and the southern Korean state of Silla which absorbed it. With the consolidation of state power in China, and elsewhere in Northeast Asia, the possibility of an extension of formal Korean rule beyond the peninsula faded although interaction, sometimes peaceful, sometimes bloody with the semi-sinicized peoples to the north, such as the Jurchen/

Manchu, was unremitting. However the end of Korean imperialism did not mean that imperialism was finished with Korea, given its strategic location that was impossible.

This process of focus on the peninsula itself culminated in the two centuries long seclusion policy of the latter days of the Choson Dynasty (1392–1910). Isolationism was a reaction to foreign incursions of various sorts and was ultimately fruitless, but it is a common phenomenon. Incursions may be military, commercial, or intellectual (usually religious), but if too strong they threaten to destabilize the existing social order which, unable to cope, erects barriers against the outside world. Some societies are able to cope. The rulers, realizing that the old gods are not as powerful as the foreign ones knocking on the door, embrace the new religion, be it Catholicism or capitalism. The spread of Islam throughout Southeast Asia and the transformation of Germany under Bismarck are examples. In some circumstances relatively peaceful adaptation is possible; in others the process of transition is traumatic and frequently bloody.

All three East Asian countries – Japan, China, and Korea – embraced forms of seclusion under the Western impact. China's was nuanced – welcoming Jesuits with their knowledge of cartography and cannon-making under the Ming, keeping foreign traders (many of whom were drug dealers) as far away from the capital as possible during the Qing. The geography and size of Japan and Korea allowed for more absolute measures. The *Sakoku* ("closed country") policy of the Japanese under the Tokugawa shogunate tried to extirpate Christianity, which was seen as not merely subverting the social order but placing Japan under the control of foreigners in a way that acceptance of Chinese culture had not. Foreign trade, previously flourishing, was stifled although some was tolerated, mainly through the distant southern city of Nagasaki. This was brought to an end by the Americans in the person of Commodore Perry who in 1854 "opened up" Japan and imposed the first of the "unequal treaties" (Rabson 2016). This exercise in gunboat diplomacy, still a staple of imperialist statecraft today, had profound consequences, some of them unintended. It led to the

Meiji Restoration and the modernization of Japan, but also to Japanese imperialism which was to challenge America at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Korea's opening up was also produced by force, but there was a preceding experience of imperialism which needs to be sketched.

Korea had long been a tributary state of China, and while this was an imperialistic relationship, it had its own special characteristics which need to be considered. There are, in a sense, two Chinas – one is those dynasties such as the Tang, Song, and Ming – which were ruled by the Han, the dominant ethnicity in China. Then there were the two "barbarian" dynasties when China was under the rule of people from the steppes – the Yuan (Mongols) and the Qing (Manchus). Han China was essentially inward looking because the outside world had little to offer. Horses from Fergana in Central Asia were prized, and of course Buddhism from India had a profound impact and wide acceptance, but in most respects the Middle Kingdom was richer and more advanced than anything in its purview. This is in distinct contrast to the imperialism of the Portuguese and their fellow Europeans who, utilizing military superiority, went scouring the world for riches – gold, silver, spices, slaves, and land. There are interesting, if partial, parallels here between China and the USA whose imperial expansion was not based on a simple lust for foreign riches. Han China's interest in peripheral states, such as Korea, was primarily a desire for stability on its borders. The states paid tribute, of more importance symbolically than economically, and in return were accorded legitimacy by the Chinese emperor. Again this is similar to the modern American system where legitimacy, the difference between being a government and a regime, is seen as something that can only be bestowed by Washington (Dulles 1957). The American ideology of "exceptionalism," the USA being a "city on a hill" to which the world looks for inspiration and leadership in many ways, mirrors the traditional Chinese concept of "culturalism" where the superiority of Chinese culture is evident to all and irresistible to barbarians who even if they have military superiority (as did the Mongols and Manchus) inevitably become sinicized (Fairbank 1942).

The non-Han dynasties had other priorities. The Mongols were hugely expansionist, creating the largest land empire in history, and the economic basis of their imperialism was rent-seeking in the form of extracting tribute from conquered peoples. The principle military advantage they had was their highly mobile cavalry, but as their empire expanded into settled economies, this advantage was dissipated; the short life span of the empire was inevitable. Their rule over Korea lasted only 80 years and that over China (the Yuan dynasty) not much longer. Despite their reputation as ruthless conquerors, spreading terror before them to demoralize their enemies, with piles of skulls being their version of Rumsfeld's "shock and awe" (Sanders 2013), diplomacy was an important component of their strategy; indeed in the tribal clusters that made up their society, the ability to create bonds and alliances was the prerequisite for Genghis Khan's creation of a Mongol nation. This style of politics was naturally carried forward into the imperialist stage. After the initial military conquest, they sought to consolidate and continue their power through marriages much like the Hapsburgs in Europe, but with less long-term success.

While China was by far the main prize, there was a desire to exact tribute from Korea and then Japan, which was (falsely) reputed to have gold in measureless quantities, though this might not have been an important consideration. It may have been that the Mongol empire once born was, rather like the American, driven not so much by immediate economic gain but by the need for permanent war, hence unending conquests; like a bicycle without forward motion, it would fall over. The Korean Peninsula has been described as a dagger pointing to the heart of Japan, and although the expression dates from the nineteenth century when the dagger was pointing the other way and it was really only a pretext for Japanese seizure of Korea in the fourteenth century, it had validity (Jun 2013). Korean-built ships, sailors, and soldiers were an important component of the forces assembled by the Mongols, now under Kublai Khan, who was by then the emperor of Yuan China, in two attempts to invade Japan. Both ended in catastrophe caused by a combination of Japanese resistance and storms which wrecked the invasion fleets, a fate shared by the Spanish Armada. The exercise was an ill-conceived product of imperialistic hubris. The war-machine which had proved so devastating of the steppes of Eurasia was ill-suited for a hugely ambitious amphibious campaign in which the ships would be vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather. The Mongol failure had important ideational consequences for Japan's subsequent interaction with the outside world. This first encounter with invading foreigners produced a sense of Japaneseness that had not existed before. The typhoons which had wreaked the Mongol fleets were labelled *kamikaze* – divine winds – and this led to the myth of divine intervention which would also provide security against invasion in the future (Conlan 2001). It was an unfortunate illusion, as illustrated by the futility of the suicide bombers, called *kamikaze*, to invoke the past, on the eve of Japan's defeat in 1945. In the meantime it gave a confidence to Japanese imperialism that it might otherwise have lacked. One imperialism begets another and just as Western imperialism in the nineteenth century generated modern Japanese imperialism, so perhaps did Mongol imperialism stimulate Hideyoshi's dreams of conquest in Korea and beyond.

Mongol success had another very important, and broader, ideational consequence. The peace that the empire brought to Eurasia meant that for the first time in history, merchants could travel under a uniform regime between Europe and East Asia. Marco Polo was one such, and his fantastical tales of the riches of Cathay were profoundly influential in stimulating exploration, such as that by Columbus and the Western Expansion. Trans-Eurasia had long existed, as the Silk Road attests, and late-medieval Europeans were not alone in exploring the world; the Moroccan Ibn Battuta traveled more widely through Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and China. Columbus only got as far as the Americas, and there are doubts that Marco Polo actually got to China (Wood 1996). But it is the thought that counts, and whatever its provenance, the idea of an Orient of untold wealth, and hence a subject of imperialist desires, received a substantial boost from the Mongols.

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The Japanese did not require a Marco Polo to tell them about China, or Korea, but the abortive Mongol attempts did perhaps seed the idea of invasion of the Asian mainland, along with the perceived security of the *kamikaze*. The prerequisite was the unification of Japan and that was achieved by Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598), with the process being consolidated by Tokugawa Ieyasu, who established the Tokugawa shogunate which lasted until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Hideyoshi launched two invasions of Korea, in1592 and 1597 (with China as the larger objective), and both ended in failure, and the attempt was finally brought to an end with the death of Hideyoshi. The invasion of Asia was militarily as ill-conceived, though for different reasons, as the Mongol invasions of Japan but it may be that, as so often with imperialism, they proceeded from domestic considerations more than a rational assessment of success. Hideyoshi needed foreign success to bolster his legitimacy at home, and he also needed to provide an outlet for the military now made redundant by the peace imposed by his conquests. The unemployment threatened by demobilization and the potential economic slump caused by demilitarization lay behind the creation of the permanent war economy in the USA in the late 1940s (Melman 1974), and the Cold War, in which the Korean War played a significant role; so too in its own specific way did sixteenth century Japan attempt to cope with similar problems.

While the Japanese do not seem to have had the problems with the weather as the Mongols did, they faced considerable opposition from the Chosun navy. However the big difference was Chinese intervention. Ming China sent forces to support the Koreans against the Japanese, as did Qing China in the nineteenth century. Neither wanted to see a hostile power occupying Korea as a prelude to attacking China, and this was also behind the Chinese intervention in 1950. And indeed China would surely intervene again if the USA did invade North Korea (Editorial 2017).

There are other parallels between Hideyoshi's campaigns and the Korean War. The Japanese were harassed by guerillas, as were the Americans in the fluid period of the war between the Inchon landing and the Chinese intervention, and it ended with a military stalemate where neither side was strong enough to subjugate the other and drive it from the peninsula. In the sixteenth century, the impasse was essentially resolved by Hideyoshi's death; the armistice of 1953 remains an unfinished business with the formal peace it promised still rejected by the USA despite the Panmunjom Declaration of the two Koreas and Chinese advocacy (Lim 2018; Seong 2018).

Although this early Japanese attempt to invade China via Korea failed, it remained a dream that readily resurfaced in more propitious circumstances toward the end of the nineteenth century.

The Manchus also launched two invasions against Korea, in 1627 and in 1636. As with the Japanese in preceding invasion in the sixteenth century and the later annexation of Korea in the twentieth, this was part, albeit an important one, of a larger design against China. Unlike the Japanese, the Manchus were successful on both counts. This was symbolized in 1636 when the Korean King Injo surrendered and transferred his tributary status from the Ming to the newly established Qing dynasty of the Manchus. The Qing took the Ming capital of Beijing in 1664 but did not overcome Ming resistance until the capture of Taiwan in 1683.

The Qing dynasty has left an important legacy for contemporary imperialism; it expanded westward, establishing control over Tibet and Xinjiang and northward into Mongolia. However it did not absorb Korea but continued the tributary status of previous dynasties. As the Qing declined in power from the nineteenth century, foreign imperialists imposed unequal treaties and carved out spheres of influence. The British seized the island of Hong Kong in 1842 and tried to detach Tibet at the beginning of the twentieth century, hoping to attach it to the British Raj. However in general the foreign powers recognized the territorial integrity of the Qing Empire, legally if not in practice. The USA, in particular, firmly supported the territorial integrity of China, arguably because it confidently expected one day to hold commercial and political sway over all of it (Kennan 1948). The Qing therefore established the boundaries of

the modern state and both the Republic of China (ROC), established in 1911, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949, regard themselves as the legal successor to the Qing territory. The only major difference between the two relates to Outer Mongolia which declared independence in 1924; this was accepted by the Communists (i.e., PRC) but not by the nationalists (ROC).

In 1945 the victorious allies, which means basically the USA, insisted that Japan return the territory it had seized on the Chinese mainland (Manchuria and the eastern seaboard), Taiwan, and the islands of the South China Sea. The South China Sea has become a hot point in recent years because it is a major chokepoint for China's seaborne trade in case of war, and, with historical amnesia, the USA has objected to Chinese control of the islands and their defensive militarization (Beal 2016d).

Taiwan became an issue and continues to be one, because the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Party (KMT) retreated there in 1949 and, protected by the USA, established the Republic of China on Taiwan, still claiming legal inheritance of the Qing territory and dreaming, for a while, of a return to the mainland. With the USA switching diplomatic recognition to the PRC in the 1970s, the KMT legitimacy was eroded, and indigenous Taiwan secessionism grew in strength. This has presented the USA with challenges. The One China Policy – claiming the legal territorial integrity of the Qing inheritance while being pragmatic on matters of actual control – is the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy, which the USA and most other countries have accepted. On the other hand, fragmentation of adversaries (*divide and rule*) is a standard strategy of imperialism, and Taiwan is a prime target, though Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang are also candidates (Xinjiang is problematic because of the connection with Islamism (Lin 2016)). These ongoing issues in US relations with China have obvious, if often indirect, implications for Korea.

The other legacy of the Qing of relevance here is the intriguing historical conundrum that if Korea had been formally a part of China that had, like Taiwan, been seized by Japanese imperialism, would it, like Taiwan, have been returned to Chiang Kai-shek's China in 1945? In which case whatever would have happened, it would surely have been very different from what did happen: no division of Korea and no Korean War to start with.

The Japanese Annexation of Korea

Apart from resistance, and some support, from the Koreans themselves, Japan had to deal with four other imperialist powers in its annexation of Korea – China, Russia, Britain, and the USA. They each of course presented specific challenges and opportunities, but more crucially they fitted into Japan's plans for the future in different ways. China especially and to a lesser extent Russia had a territory which Japan desired and which were a major reason for the seizure of Korea in the first place; Korea was the gateway to the Eurasian continent. Britain and America, though they had desirable colonies, some of which Japan snapped up temporarily during the Pacific War, were a different matter. Because of power and geography, they were invulnerable, so the prime object was not conquest per se, but their neutralization and perhaps even support for the Eurasian expansion.

China and Russia were dealt with by war around the turn of the twentieth century. The First Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895, and the resounding Japanese victory, demolished Qing pretensions to be a suzerain and protector of Korea, losing the province of Taiwan in the process. Even happy events can have unfortunate consequences, and the humiliation of the Qing hastened the demise of the dynasty and gave rise to revolutionary movements, some of which were inspired by Japan, but which led to the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the end of Japan's leading role in Asia for the foreseeable future. Besides being an American client because of its defeat, the resurgence of China was to return East Asia to its natural state where China was predominant economically, militarily, and politically. Japan was never to achieve Ezra Vogel's 1979 prediction of becoming "number one" (Vogel 1979).

Much of this was replicated with Russia. Japan had again a resounding victory which started with

a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur (now Lushun) in a stratagem was repeated at Pearl Harbor, though without attracting, in the West, the opprobrium of "infamy." Japan's military success removed Russian influence and protection for Korea and opened the way into Manchuria. As with China the defeat had revolutionary and transformation effects which eventually blocked Japan's expansion into Siberia.

Britain war, at this stage, was not necessary. Because of fears of Russian expansion in Central Asia (the so-called Great Game), Britain looked to Japan as a counterbalance, a potential second front on Russia's furthest flank, rather like the USA automatically looks to India today in its containment of China (Kolko 2012). The relationship was formalized with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 which recognized Japan's "interests" in Korea and condoned any action Japan might take to protect them from a foreign power (i.e., Russia) or the Koreans themselves. British interests in China were similarly recognized, and this was subsequently extended to India.

The USA was different again. It was a rising imperialist power whose appetites were clear – after all it was America that "opened up" Japan and imposed the first of the unequal treaties. It was likely that it would become a rival for the domination of China, far more of a challenge than either Britain or Tsarist Russia. Resolution of the issue was achieved, for a couple of decades, by the Taft-Katsura understanding of 1905. Although not formalized as an agreement or treaty (Congress at that time was loathe to do such things), it was clearly a realpolitik deal whereby Japan would not object to the US conquest of the Philippines in return for free rein in Korea (Larson et al. 2004; "The Taft-Katsura Agreed Memorandum" 1905). This betrayal of Korea rankles today both North and South (Larsen and Seeley 2014; Lovmo 2014; Park 2014).

Japan's colonization of Korea proceeded in three stages. The Korea-Japan Treaty of 1876 (to which the Japanese, but not the Koreans, attached the word "amity") was a variant of the unequal treaties which the Europeans and America had imposed on China and Japan and was brought about, as was its predecessors, by "gunboat diplomacy." Sea power, in the nineteenth century, was where the military superiority of imperialism was most marked. It was joined in the twentieth century by airpower whereby recalcitrant natives could be pummeled with virtual impunity, though as John McCain found out when shot down over Vietnam in 1967 that immunity was never quite absolute. Although imperialist states tend to have overwhelming military superiority, as casualty figures attest, there is always the danger in a land war of quagmire as the Japanese discovered in China in the 1930s and the USA in Vietnam and in the Middle East.

Casualties are difficult to pin down with any accuracy. The imperial power keeps good records of its losses, but pays scant attention to those of its victims and often of its "allies" and civilians (Davies 2018a, b, c; Sherlock et al. 2018). In the Korean War, there are presumably accurate data for the USA (36,574 dead of which 33,686 were battlefield) and US expeditionary allies such as Britain (1109). Chinese figures are perhaps less dependable because of conditions obtaining at the time; Wikipedia gives 183,108; a Xinhua article quotes 197,653; however this may be to a matter of definition; one may be battlefield deaths and the other includes subsequent deaths from wounds ("Burial ceremony held for remains of Korean War soldiers in NE China" 2018). Data for the Koreans, North and South, is uncertain; Wikipedia gives 137,899 for the South, which seems spuriously precise, and 215,000–350,000 for the North ("Korean War" 2018). On a rough calculation for every soldier, the USA and its expeditionary allies lost; the North Korean/Chinese lost 12. Imperialism, especially that of the last two centuries or so, depends heavily on technological superiority. The Romans might have had superior training, discipline, and tactics, but their weapons, though benefitting from higher-quality metals, were in general at a par with those of their enemies. The USA may be confronting challenges to its superiority in military technology from the Russians and Chinese, but Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya were conquered (if not pacified) with impunity (Farley 2018). North Korea might be different, and it does have a nuclear deterrent (Cooper et al. 2018; Rogin 2018).

Japanese military superiority over the Koreans was never put to the test, but since it had been demonstrated against China (1895) and then Russia (1905), further proof was not needed.

The Japanese were not alone in wanting to batter down the doors of what Westerners called the "hermit kingdom." The French made an attempt in 1866 and the Americans in 1871 following the destruction of the armed merchant ship General Sherman in 1866; visitors to Pyongyang today are taken to the spot on the Taedong River where the ship was destroyed.

The Japanese were not satisfied with opening up Chosun Korea to trade. Korea was too important for that. It was the nearest country to Japan, and culturally similar, it possessed resources and labor which cultural affinity made utilizable, and it was a bridge to the Eurasian continent, which meant primarily China but then Russia and then perhaps India. Japan's future in a world of contesting empires seemed to depend on its carving out one for itself, and Korea was an obvious choice (Taiwan had been merely a collateral benefit of the Sino-Japanese war). Moreover if Japan did not control Korea, others, perhaps the French but more likely the Americans, would probably do so. Japan had been moved in 1879 to annex the Ryukyu islands, which became the Okinawa Prefecture for fear that Commodore Perry would take it for the USA (Tinello 2018). Following the Treaty of 1876, Japan moved on to more intrusive measures. The treaty of 1905, following the defeat of Russia, established a protectorate over what was now ironically called the Korean Empire. This was followed by outright annexation in 1910. Japan was now truly an empire and Korea was the jewel in the crown.

The Japanese seizure of its neighbor marked a new stage in the history of imperialism and Korea. Past imperialisms were concerned with rent and tribute, with retaining the momentum of imperial expansion, or in the case of China protection against foreign incursions. Japan was different, a modern imperialism with modern concerns – mines and mineral, railways and ports, rice for the factory workers at home, labor for factories at home and abroad, and settlers for the conquered territories of Manchuria. Again Korea was part of

a wider canvas, and here again history had produced a different imperialist framework, closer to that of today and more complex than in the past.

This framework had its own dynamic because Japanese expansion happened not merely at the expense of conquered people but also of the interests of competing powers. The Japanese empire at its height encompassed Southeast Asia reaching to the borders of India, then the British Raj, down the South Pacific through the then Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) to New Guinea. It took in Manchuria (through the puppet state of Manchukuo) and most of the eastern seaboard of China extending into central China as far as Changsha and Wuhan. Crucially the advance to the north into Siberia had been stopped by the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol on the Manchukuo/Mongolian border in 1939. This dashed Japanese hopes of expansion in that direction and focused attention south, especially on the oil, rubber, and other strategic resources of the Dutch East Indies, and contributed to the attack on the Americans at Pearl Harbor. In the aftermath Japan and the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact, a move of obvious, if temporary, benefit to both, avoiding a war on two fronts. In 1945, for reasons which are unclear given the inevitability of Japanese defeat and surrender and progress in developing nuclear weapons, Roosevelt was anxious to bring the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, and at Yalta in February 1945, Stalin agreed that within 3 months after the end of the German War, the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War (Deparle 1989; Mankoff 2015). If Roosevelt had not insisted on Soviet intervention, the USA would have had an easier task dominating East Asia and would not have needed to share Korea.

These issues were in the future as Japan began its process of assimilating and transforming Korea after 1910.

Economic and Social Transformation: The Destructive Creation

The traditional Korean economy was a familiar one, seen throughout the world in pre-modern times, except in proto-capitalist economies such as Athens. The family and village were the basic units, production was focused on agriculture with

handicrafts as an accompaniment, and wealth was measured in terms of land. The coming of the Japanese transformed that, and there was considerable modernization and development of the Korean economy. Some have argued that this enabled the country to escape the Malthusian trap, where the stagnant economy of the Choson period inevitably led to destitution and capped population growth (Cha 2010); that, of course, begs the question of what would have happened with modernization without Japanese colonialism even if that had been slower without the imposed forced march.

The Library of Congress country study on South Korea skips all too quickly over the subject of the Japanese colonial development of Korea – 1 page out of 472 – perhaps partly because the successful "top-down government management of the economy" which was taken up again by Park Chung-hee in the 1960s contravened economic orthodoxy (Metraux 1992). The Japanese colonial government developed the infrastructure of a modern economy, with railways, roads, ports and shipping, mining, electricity generation and light, and chemical and heavy industries.

Railways, which were important not merely for economic reasons, but also for military ones providing a facility for moving troops and materiel into Manchuria and further afield, increased to 6362 km by 1945. Similarly the road network was expanded to 20,000 miles by that year. Ports were built and shipping reached 230,000 tons. Manufacturing's share of industrial output rose from 11% in 1911 to 40% in 1943, and between 1936 and 1943, the number of employees in manufacturing jumped from 188,250 to 549,751. Stimulated by the war, heavy industry's share of industrial output rose from 38% in 1930 to 73% in 1942 (King 1975).

And so the statistics roll in. Two sets capture some of the complexity and consequences of forced imperialist development.

Firstly there was established "a well-developed network of post offices, almost all equipped to transmit telegrams, 7,100 telephone lines, 5,600 miles of telegraph lines, 15 radio stations, 440,000 radio receivers, 72 theaters and 51 cinemas" (King 1975) quoting (Henderson 1968).

We have the makings here of a modern society with communications (second in Asia only to Japan) with social implications as well as the obvious commercial and military ones and radio and cinema facilities which seem to have penetrated quite deeply into the Korean populace, excluding the destitute which constituted about a quarter of the population in1929 (King 1975). This provided entertainment but also social control and indoctrination, perhaps not up to Hollywood standards, but serving the same function.

Secondly, after the rice riots in Japan in 1918, the government made determined efforts to spread the use of the high-yielded varieties that had been developed in Japan to Korea and Taiwan, along with the necessary investment in infrastructure and irrigation, and by the late 1930s, yields in these two colonies were much higher than elsewhere in Asia (Booth 2007). But although rice production went up 50% in the period between 1915/1919 and 1935/1939, exports, mainly to Japan, rose 279%, so that Korean consumption actually fell. Some of the shortfall was made up by the import of sorghum (a grain traditionally used by the rich as animal feed and by the poor as sustenance), but even so the per capita consumption of grain fell during the colonial period (King 1975).

Thus there was considerable economic growth, but the development was structured principally to serve Japan as a component of the Japanese empire, and Koreans were to a large degree excluded from the management of the modernization process; "in manufacturing, the Japanese occupied the high-paying technical jobs and Koreans performed the low-paying manual labor" (Chung 2010). Only in Manchuria, "a land of opportunity not only for Japanese but also for Koreans," did there seem to be some access to higher positions (Han 2008).

This entailed a commensurate transformation of the social structure. The traditional Confucian hierarchy in which the *yangban* elite dominated government and military positions had been abolished in 1894, formally if not in actuality, and the Japanese took this further and then displaced Koreans from positions of power replacing them with Japanese. Some *yangban*

managed to hang on to wealth and power through collaborating with the Japanese, and the *yangban* in South Korea experienced a certain restoration in the late 1940s under Syngman Rhee. Abolition of the traditional strictures would normally have had a progressive and liberating effect, but this was muted by the constraints of Japanese control of Korean society.

This control was welcomed by some, accepted by most, yet resisted in various complex ways, with all of this changing over time as the grip of Japan tightened and the exigencies of the expansion into China and then the Pacific War with the USA generated new economic imperatives.

The Japanese Legacy

There has been a considerable academic debate over the years, especially in the USA (and Britain), South Korea, and Japan, on the impact of Japanese imperialism on the economic development of Korea after liberation (Booth 2007; Haggard et al. 1997; Kohli 1994, 1997). Given the provenance of the academics and the imperial mindset, this has tended to focus exclusively on South Korea, ignoring North Korea. This exclusion is unfortunate since Korea was one entity under the Japanese and a comparison of the two halves would have helped to disentangle the Japanese legacy from the subsequent impact of US imperialism. The USA has impoverished North Korea through physical war, 1950–1953, and continued military threat and economic warfare ever since, and because of the North's very existence, the USA has privileged the South with economic aid, military spending, and access to Western markets and technology. If US imperialism had not faced the challenge of China, Vietnam, and North Korea, then the four "little dragons/tigers" – Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea – would not have had the rapid growth they had. Overlooking this fundamental reality has tended to vitiate the debate.

There is a need to distinguish between the "Japanese model" of economic development when utilised as part of Japanese imperialism, and so serving Japan at the expense of its colonies, and that same model when applied to a particular country, such as South Korea under Park Chung-

hee. It can be argued that Park was very successful (Pearlstine 2018) but this success was largely due to it being focused on developing South Korea as such rather than Korea as part of the Japanese empire. The role of the new imperial framework must be taken into account. The USA poured in huge amounts of civilian aid to bolster the competition against North Korea. It also incurred large military expenditure in South Korea as part of its strategy of containing China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea itself. Moreover South Korea benefitted, as did many others especially on the arc from Korea through Japan around to Thailand from American expenditures in its war in Indochina.

The Japanese period produced huge changes. A forced economic and social development that Bruce Cumings has aptly described as a "pressure cooker" (Sheng 2000; Cumings 1997). There was a massive disruption of Korean society in terms of class structure, occupation (from farm to factory or army), and physical location. Large numbers of Japanese moved into Korea and on to Manchuria; an even greater number of Koreans was forced into Manchuria and further into Asia and to Japan – some 700,000 labor conscripts among them (Underwood 2007). Clearly in the long term, there were many positive outcomes, and that is true of the impact of imperialism in general. We cannot undo the past, but then again now that is over and the price has been paid, perhaps we do not want to either. At the same time, it goes without saying that progress could have been made without the accompanying brutality.

NBC sports commentator Joshua Cooper Ramo ignited a furor in Korea during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics when he said "But every Korean will tell you that Japan is a cultural, and technological, and economic example, [that] has been so important to their own transformation" (Essertier 2018b; "NBC apologizes after praise for Japan's 'example' angers Koreans" 2018; Pearlstine 2018; Selk 2018).

If appraisal is so contested after 70 years, it must have been even more difficult for those living through the Japanese occupation who had to cope with reality on a daily basis. Some fled to Manchuria, the Soviet Union, or China and took

part in the armed struggle; most did not but had to find other ways to resist, accept, or embrace the colonial experience.

Collaboration, Acceptance, and Resistance

Conservative Japanese see their rule over Korea as benign and disinterested, producing great economic and social benefit and indeed requested by the Koreans themselves – an attitude which is widely mirrored in other imperialist countries and similar, for instance, to textbook portrayals of America's colonization of the Philippines (Caprio 2010). That might be expected but what is intriguing, though unfathomable, is how many Koreans privately, if not publically, shared and still share that opinion to some degree (Editorial 2014). Looking back at the Japan period before 1945, we must also bear in mind the American period after 1945. Most Americans would see their country's role in Korea as similarly benign, disinterested, and welcome, and many (South) Koreans would agree; how many, for what reasons and how inculcated, and how that has varied over time are a complex matter. Complicating matters further, there is the question of empire-resident diaspora, those Koreans who for various reasons – forced labor, migration, or birth – ended up in Japan or America and, again for a variety of reasons, remained there. In 2016 it was estimated that there were some 330,000 Koreans in Japan (Ishibashi et al. 2017) and the US census for that year gives 1.8 m ethnic Koreans ("Asian alone or in any combination by selected groups" 2016). Imperialism, in association with globalization, the two being often intertwined, shifts incredible numbers of people from their traditional homelands and renders fixed concepts of nationality (and culture) problematic.

History is not only written by the victor; it is, by definition, written with hindsight. The historian knows what is to come but the historical actor does not. The empire, whether it be Roman, British, Japanese, or American, might well seem permanent to colonial subjects, a natural state of affairs to which man must adapt and get on with life. Resistance is often invented after the empire has fallen. Few Koreans today would freely admit that their parents and grandparents collaborated

actively with the Japanese, although many obviously did, and not merely out of self-interest (Han 2008; Park 2004a, 2016). From the late nineteenth century onward, for many Asians Japan was the wave of the future.

However there was also considerable resistance to Japanese rule, covert and overt, and two specific events among many others require special note. Firstly there were the demonstrations which started on March 1, 1919, and which became known as the March 1st Movement. This was not merely a movement demanding democracy and national sovereignty but also an expression of the disappointment that the USA and the other (victorious) imperialist powers had so soon betrayed Woodrow Wilson's lofty rhetoric of "self-determination" first outlined to Congress in 1918 and proclaimed at the Versailles Peace Conference in January 1919. The Korean protests were mirrored elsewhere, notably by the May 4 Movement in China that year.

It is perhaps in the nature of rising imperialism to promise liberation to colonies and then to forget that promise when the former imperial power is displaced; this is very much the story of imperial Japan in Asia. However talk of self-determination and freedom holds a special place in US imperial rhetoric even as that rhetoric is contradicted by reality; Richard Nixon's 1972 report of US foreign policy, as the battle to subjugate Indochina was reaching its inglorious end, "was filled with encomiums to American support for self-determination as a principle of U.S. policy" (Simpson 2012).

The March 1st Movement (called in the North "March First People's Uprising" ("The March 1st Movement in 'Korea's Fight for Freedom'" 2017)) did mark the beginnings of resistance, initially non-violent protest but subsequently armed struggle against Japanese colonialism. After its suppression there was some temporary softening of Japanese rule. But the main result was that it became the symbol of Korean desire for independence which resonates today. It is significant that Moon Jae-in has claimed that March 1, 1919, marks the beginnings of the "Republic of Korea." This can be seen as an attempt to appropriate historical legitimacy, though the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea has of course an equal claim, but it also sidelines the US establishment of the Republic of Korea under Syngman Rhee in 1948 which did, in many eyes, lack legitimacy. This was how it was seen in an attack by the conservative *Chosun Ilbo* which charged President Moon with refusing "to acknowledge Syngman Rhee as the country's first president..[with] its national security firmly anchored in its steadfast alliance with the United States" (Jong 2018).

The other main event was the establishment of a Korean government in exile in Shanghai on April 11, 1919. This again was mainly of symbolic importance since its military arm, which became the Korean Liberation Army in 1940, never achieved substantial size or effectiveness and was, in any case, under Chinese (nationalist) control although toward the end of the Pacific War, there was cooperation with the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the CIA. The OSS cooperated with various liberation movements during the war, including the Viet Minh of Ho Chi Minh (Bergin 2018), but not it appears with Kim Il-sung. In any case US relations with wartime allies – Ho, Tito, and of course the Soviet Union itself – quickly soured after victory as their interests diverged.

That the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (or KPG) was established in China was significant. There were strong parallels between the Chinese and Korean experiences of the Japanese incursion and the failure of the West, despite the rhetoric, to support self-determination, until of course Japan became an enemy after Pearl Harbor. The USA never recognized the KPG although it did make use of its standing in Korean eyes by taking Syngman Rhee, who had been its first president for a short period, and installing him as the first President of the Republic of Korea in 1948.

If we had to take three individuals to exemplify different Korean responses to imperialism, it would be Syngman Rhee, Kim Il-sung, and Park Chung-hee. Only Japan and the USA can be truly classified as imperialist but China, both before and after 1949, and the Soviet Union/Russia being great powers necessarily exhibit some of the characteristics of imperialism. Koreans often compare

their country to a shrimp among whales, and although it would be simplistic to consider that all whales are the same, it has to be recognized that they are all large, potentially dangerous, and self-centered.

These three Koreans, for all their differences, were contemporaries, straddling the Japanese and American periods.

Syngman Rhee took a political stand against the Japanese, but his main activity was ingratiating himself with the Americans, seeking their support for an independent Korea, under his leadership. He collaborated with the Americans and manipulated them for his own and national ends. He was no mere obsequious puppet but a calculating and ruthless operator. The conservative American historian Robert Dallek suggests that he precipitated the Korean War:

> In 1949 Rhee's government had initiated a series of attacks upon the North Korean forces stationed along the 38th parallel. Because he lacked sufficient troops and equipment to launch a serious push north, Rhee provoked the fighting not only to command Washington's attention and stimulate an outpouring of military and financial aid but also to provide a pretext for cracking down on leftist opponents. (Dallek 2010)

He opposed the armistice, wanting the Americans to keep on fighting, and at one stage there were high-level deliberations going up as far as President Eisenhower on removing his from power (Gwertzman 1975). In the event the Americans decided against his arrest, but in 1960 Rhee was toppled by student riots and flown, by the CIA, back to the USA, taking, in is alleged, $20 million with him (Lee 2000).

Park served in the Japanese puppet Manchukuo army after submitting a letter pledging loyalty to the Japanese emperor signed with his own blood ("Evidence of Park Chung-hee's military allegiance to Japan surfaces" 2009). During the American period, he carved out a degree of autonomy and developed the South Korea economy, at the expense of the people certainly but also by defying American "advice," following the Japanese model of state-guided development, with a focus on heavy and chemical industries aiming to build a comprehensive economy, rather than one which just serviced the American (Kamiya 1980).

In this he was following somewhat the same road as Kim Il-sung in the North, who refused to join COMECON (the Soviet-led common market) because it would have trapped the DPRK in a position of economic and technological dependency (Person 2013). The history of Park's collaboration with the Japanese was largely suppressed during the period of the military dictatorships only being publically revealed during the progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (Choe 2008). The conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park's daughter Park Geun-hye tried to restore amnesia, partly by diverting attention, as Park Chung-hee had done, by waving the nationalist flag and criticizing Japan (Han 2014; McGill 2014). As late as 2012, there were reports of South Koreans being surprised to learn of Park Chung-hee's collaboration (Lee and Shin 2012).

Kim Il-sung, the most famous leader of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement, was in a very different position to Rhee and Park, though there were obvious challenges in common. He was independent of Japanese and American imperialism, but he did have to cope with the Soviet Union and with China who necessarily had their own agendas and priorities. Since the Soviet Union was the occupying power in the North after the Japanese surrender, it clearly was in a position to determine, within limits, the successor regime. According to the *Washington Post*, he was not the "first choice" but "...they turned to Kim, who had a reputation in Korea as a heroic fighter in Manchuria against the Japanese" (Fifield 2017). Over the years he became adept at playing the Chinese off against the Soviets with the aim of developing a state which was independent politically, militarily, and economically (Beal 2005). Having two competing patrons was an advantage denied to his Southern counterparts. Unlike Rhee he was genuinely popular – there is only so much a "personality cult" can achieve – and his enduring reputation is indicated by American annoyance in 2012 that the new leader, Kim Jong-un, was utilizing memories of his "revered grandfather" to establish his position (Associated Press 2012; Choe 2012). Of course the Soviet Union was anxious to establish a friendly regime in post-liberation North Korea but neither they nor Kim Il-sung and his colleagues were burdened with the corpse of Japanese imperialism the way the USA was. The Soviet footprint in North Korea was very much lighter than the American one in the South. The Soviet occupation ended in 1948, and while Soviet pilots – flying MiG-15s to great effect according to Russian reports (Malishevski 2015) – were sent to the war, the involvement was negligible compared to that of the Americans. The USA reassumed operational control (OPCON) of the South Korea military during the war and still holds that today along a substantial military presence.

Korea, being a small country, was unable to gain its own liberation from Japanese rule; that came about through the intervention of the major powers, principally the USA and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union. Whether it will be able to wrest full independence from the USA is as yet unknown; it is an unfinished story. This has meant that Koreans have had to work with more powerful foreign countries in a varying mélange of collaboration and manipulation.

In the aftermath of wars, there is an understandable tendency to vilify, persecute, and sometimes execute those charged with collaborating with the defeated occupier. With the passage of time, historians develop a more nuanced appraisal, moving away from a Manichean dichotomy of good resistance fighters and evil collaborators (Brook 2008; Duara 2008; Kwon 2008). While it is valuable to move away from simplicities toward a deeper analysis of a complex phenomenon, most of this is from the perspective of the victorious imperialism, discussing those who collaborated with "them" while ignoring those who collaborate with "us."

Stephen Gowans in his book *Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea's Fight for Freedom* reminds us that the story of modern Korea is a continuing relationship with imperialism that continues to this day (Gowans 2018). While the dichotomy patriot/traitor might be considered too neat, the essential point that acknowledging the role of imperialism is the key to understanding Korea is quite correct (Beal 2018).

Three Decisions that Shaped Contemporary Korean History

1945 marked the beginning a transformative era in East Asia. The old empires were swept away, unleashing dynamic new forces, principally, though by no means exclusively, the resurgence of China, while the USA became the dominant power. The USA had been active in the region for a century, notably with the opening of Japan and the Open Door Policy toward China, but now it was the mighty hegemon. This imperialism was to face an increasing challenge but in 1945 it was supreme.

In that year the USA took three momentous and decisive actions that were to shape the future of the Korean peninsula, and since by then the USA was becoming a global empire, these actions had worldwide ramifications. These were the atomic bombing of Japan, the division of Korea, and the inauguration of the policy of imperial succession.

The Inauguration of the Nuclear Age

The American decision to use atomic weapons against Japan – the first and only use – has generated considerable controversy. By August 1945 Japan was clearly on the threshold of defeat although it seems that Hirohito had fantasies that he could play off the Soviet Union against the USA to get a better deal (Bix 2014). With the USA having mastery of sea and air, their forces moving inexorably across the Pacific and the Soviet Union poised to launch a huge ground offensive from the west, it is often claimed that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary and so was a dreadful crime. That is no doubt true but imperialism moves to the tune of other calculations.

Firstly, and mundanely, the new weapons had to be tested and calibrated in a real-world situation. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among a handful of other Japanese cities, had been spared conventional bombing so that they would provide a virgin target. Secondly this enabled the power of nuclear weapons to be demonstrated, to the world and specifically to the Soviet Union. By that reckoning Japan was merely collateral

damage and the real target was the Soviet Union. It is likely that Truman prolonged the war against Japan in order that the new weapon could be tested in the USA and then be employed against Japan. While the atomic bomb was untested, Truman followed Roosevelt's strategy of urging Stalin to join the war against Japan; once it had been successfully tested, Russian participation became unwelcome. Soviet intervention could not be reversed, but its consequences could be diminished. Thirdly by thus hastening the end of the war with such a coup de grace, the USA was able to exclude the Soviet Union from a share in the disposal of Japan and much of its empire (Alperovitz 1995; Wilson 2013). The atomic bomb greatly strengthened Truman's hand, but dominance was not absolute, and concessions had to be made. The chief of these was the division of the Japanese colony of Korea.

The Japanese emperor had acknowledged in his surrender speech that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" – surely one of the most bizarrely euphemistic phrases in history (Hirohito 1945). Ironically it so happened that nuclear weapons would also turn out not to be in America's advantage as anticipated. Firstly the nuclear monopoly inevitably did not last long. In particular the Soviet Union tested its first device in 1949, China in 1964, and, cruelest off all, North Korea in 2006. Secondly, nuclear weapons are by their nature primarily a deterrent. Paradoxically, because of their huge destructive power, they are not suited for offensive war even against an enemy who cannot retaliate because they destroy the spoils of war. The invasion of oil-rich Iraq in 2003 is a case in point. By contrast nuclear deterrence is primarily of interest to the weak, who may consider it the only defense against the predations of the strong. The USA does not need nuclear weapons to deter a far weaker country such as North Korea, but for North Korea deterrence is the only defense (Beal 2017a). So nuclear weapons which seemed to give the USA unrivalled superiority in 1945 have turned out to be a great leveler. It is North Korea's nuclear deterrent that has brought the USA toward the negotiating table (although not, at the time of writing

sitting down and seriously negotiating), and the concern for Washington is that this example could be followed by others, thus diminishing imperial power.

Division of Korea

It is often claimed that Korea was divided in 1945 by the Soviet Union and the USA acting in unison. In reality it was a US initiative on 10 August to which Stalin acquiesced immediately, perhaps unnecessarily and unwisely. Certainly Perry Anderson thought so, calling it "one of Stalin's two great timorous blunders in the last months of the War" (Anderson 2013). Whether that is a fair assessment given the demonstration of American power and ruthlessness at Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August the advantages to the USA of the division are obvious. By capitulating to the American demand, Stalin was in no position to insist on Soviet involvement in the Japanese surrender process. Stalin, admonishes Anderson, agreed:

> ….that US troops occupy the southern half of the country, when none were anywhere near it, and the Red Army could without breaking any agreement have strolled to Pusan. Naturally, Truman did not reciprocate the favour and allowed not so much as a Soviet military band into Japan. (Anderson 2013)

Furthermore the division of the peninsula created a cordon sanitaire between leftist and anti-imperialist Eurasia and the new American possession and gave the USA a beachhead on the continent that might be utilized in the future. Interestingly the beachhead idea, though it does seem fanciful in the context of the dangers of getting involved in a land war in Asia (the USA avoided that in China but not in Vietnam), still holds purchase in US strategic thinking. One of the charges laid against Donald Trump in negotiations with Kim Jong-un in 2018 was that he might not realize that "American strategy in Asia ... necessitates a forward military presence in places like South Korea" (Jackson 2018).

If Korea had not been divided and the Koreans left to their own devices at liberation, it is likely that the People's Republic of Korea, which was proclaimed by the broadly-based Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence in Seoul on 12 September, would have prevailed and Korea would have become some sort of "socialist republic" although not necessarily one in which Kim Il-sung was preeminent.

The conservative journalist and one of Park Geun-hee's unsuccessful nominees for premier, Moon Chang-keuk, had no doubts about that:

> "in retrospect, it was also God's will" for Korea to be divided.... Noting that there were many Communists among Korea's elite at the time, Mr. Moon said, "Given the way we were then, had Korea been liberated as a whole, it would have been Communized." (Choe 2014)

In reality as events elsewhere have shown (Vietnam comes to mind), such a regime would over time temper both its socialism and its independence making what it considered to be the necessary compromises to adapt to the realities of a world dominated by the USA. But this is not how the USA saw things in the 1940s or today for that matter. In those days and for decades after that, Washington policy makers viewed local struggles for independence and social change, what might conveniently be labelled anti-imperialism, as being orchestrated and controlled by Moscow, or later by Beijing, or both. Soviet expansion is the key phrase which colored all thinking.

The mindset is well illustrated by a memorandum from George F. Kennan, the "architect of the Cold War", to Secretary of State George Marshall (he of the Marshall Plan that did so much to preserve the US position in Western Europe) in November 1947 on the world situation:

> As to Korea, there is no longer any real hope of a genuinely peaceful and free democratic development in that country. Its political life in the coming period is bound to be dominated by political immaturity, intolerance and violence. Where such conditions prevail, the communists are in their element. Therefore, we cannot count on native Korean forces to help us hold the line against Soviet expansion. Since the territory is not of decisive strategic importance to us, our main task is to extricate ourselves without too great a loss of prestige. In doing so, however, we should remember that it makes no sense to yield in Korea and then to try to insist on the elimination of Soviet influence behind Korea, in northern Manchuria. (Kennan 1947)

By 1950 the USA decided that Korea was after all of decisive strategic importance, probably

because of the Communist's victory in the Chinese Civil War. Back in 1945 that was not a forgone conclusion.

In the event the People's Republic of Korea was banned in the American zone in December and in the north became absorbed into the Soviet administration which favored Kim Il-sung and was a component of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) established in 1948 and which survives today.

The idea of "Soviet expansion" was in fact a self-serving myth which served to obfuscate US imperial expansion. The American historian William Stueck contrasts the Soviet and US objectives as played out in Korea. For Moscow its acceptance of the American proposal to divide Korea was a manifestation of "the determination of the Soviet Union to protect its eastern frontier." In other words it was defensive, rather than offensive. This is consistent with its policy in Eastern Europe where it wanted to create a cordon sanitaire to protect itself from the USA and from German revanchism. The USA, on the other hand, had rather more ambitious objectives. It wanted "to create a stable world order" (Stueck 1995). This bland description was rephrased a bit more forcefully by the (South) Korean historian Lee Won Sul who regarded the division of Koreas as "part of a grand scheme to put the whole Pacific basin under American influence" (Lee 1982). In fact the division was an expression of, and a temporary pause in, the course of America's Manifest Destiny. The dreams had come true, and the USA was now hegemon, primarily maritime, of the Pacific Basin and of course further afield (Clark 1932). In the Pacific it was to "lose China" in 1949 (Kifner 1999) and Vietnam in 1975, but the line it drew across Korea still holds. And dreams of continuing Manifest Destiny and of North Korea collapsing and China collapsing extending American dominance into the heart of Eurasia persist (Chang 2011; Mattis 2018b).

The American division of the Korean Peninsula was to have momentous and long-lasting consequences. It led to the Korean War, still not formally over and the concomitant confrontation with the DPRK. Korea is still divided.

The Western press sometimes indulges itself in describing the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as "freedom's frontier," especially when an American president makes an inspection tour (McCurry 2012). Freedom can have various connotations; one could stand at the DMZ and looking east see the American military, currently some 25,000 troops and under its control the South Korean military, then to Japan the headquarters of the US military presence in East Asia and home to some 50,000 US troops, then across with Pacific with its innumerable American islands, the fruit of an earlier stage of Manifest Destiny, and the bases that constitute such a large part of their economies, to the shores of continental America itself. Turning around and looking in the other direction the landscape is different: no American bases (or of any foreign power for that matter) in North Korea or China or the Russian Federation. The DMZ can thus be considered as the western boundary of the American empire.

In 1945 Korea in itself was of slight importance to the USA. It was primarily the place where the line was drawn between the USA and the Soviet Union, the line that marked a temporary boundary between the empire and the land beyond. It was a pragmatic consolidation in much the same way as the Romans would create a frontier on the Rhine. Since then there have been four major developments. China has replaced the Soviet Union/Russia as the main challenge. The myth of "monolithic Communism" has faded, and no serious observer thinks that North Korea is anyone's puppet. The Korean War was the first that the USA did not win and North Korea's independence and resistance since then have infuriated generations of American policy makers so that an animus against Pyongyang has become hardwired in the system. South Korea has become a major economy. Nevertheless the reasons for the original division of Korea still obtain, albeit in a form modified by these developments. In other words, any analysis of US policy toward North Korea must be situated within this geopolitical context, the main component of which is at the moment the challenge from China (Beal 2016b; Kim 2015; Petras 2017).

K

Imperial Succession

1945 marked a major turning point in US imperi-
alism. Germany and Japan were both defeated
with the USA in de facto control of Western
Germany and complete control of Japan – neither
the Soviet Union nor the European powers were
permitted to play any significant role there. The
USA was the global hegemon – the "American
Century" was at hand (Hunt 1999; Luce 1941) –
and in Asia moved inexorably to take over the
French and Dutch possessions, though in Indo-
china that did not go well. The Soviet Union,
despite the brouhaha about Soviet expansion,
was exhausted by the war and, despite the histor-
ical links with Socialist, Communist, and anti-
colonialist movements, was basically on the
defensive.

Empires, once established, then have to be
governed. In Japan plans to abolish the "emperor
system," remove the Showa emperor Hirohito,
and prosecute him for war crimes and thoroughly
"democratize" the country were abandoned. In an
act of astute imperial statecraft though one
scarcely consistent with "American values," Hiro-
hito was left on the throne, to reign if not to rule,
and apart from a few token executions and impris-
onments, the Japanese elite was essentially allo-
wed to continue in power under American
supervision. There was no Japanese equivalent
of "denazification"; Kishi Nobusuke, for instance,
one of the signatories of the Pearl Harbor declara-
tion, was released from jail and subsequently
made Prime Minister (Schaller 1995). His grand-
son, Abe Shinzo, has followed in his footsteps as
Prime Minister, even being award the accolade of
"Trump's loyal sidekick" (Nakamura 2017). This
failure to exorcise the past still enrages East Asia
today, as is exemplified by the "comfort women"
issue (Nozaki and Selden 2009).

This change of policy was incredibly success-
ful, and although there have been protests and
demonstrations over the years, especially in Oki-
nawa where the bulk of the American military are
stationed, and despite earlier fears of a bloodbath
(which is why Roosevelt and Truman begged
Stalin to enter the war), the occupation was
unopposed. Hirohito had said "we must endure
the unendurable," and so they did. Korea was

different. American officials noted that while
there was "relative order and docility" in Japan,
there was turmoil in Korea. "Southern Korean can
best be described as a powder keg ready to
explode at the application of a spark" wrote H
Merrill Benninghoff State Dept political advisor
on Korea 6 September 1945 (Stueck 1995).

Here again the Japanese imperial system came
to the rescue. The solution was to utilize the
remnant Japanese colonial administration and
the police and security apparatus they had set up.
In the north there was revolutionary transforma-
tion, with land reform producing dispossession of
the landlords and retribution against Japanese col-
laborators. This violent turmoil sent landlords and
collaborators fleeing to the south, along with
many Christians who were perhaps neither but
who feared living under an atheistic regime.
Some 400,000 people went south. As a result the
north lost a lot of human capital. The fleeing
collaborators who had acquired skills serving in
the Japanese military or civilian, "with few excep-
tions, [] passed smoothly into the higher echelons
of the new US-controlled South Korea" (Han
2008). Japanese colonialism continued, under
new management and staff changes, "Japanese
colonialism without the Japanese" as Stephen
Gowans expressed it (Gowans 2007).

Japanese colonialism had been deeply hated in
Korea, and there was widespread and enthusiastic
desire for freedom and independence and a
mélange of other aspirations such as democracy
and socialism. The Soviet-backed administration
in the north, though economically straightened
(there was a desperate need for rice from the
south, for instance), was politically well equipped
to ride the tide of change. The Americans, for all
their wealth and resources, were not. As Kennan
had put it, "[Korea's] political life in the coming
period is bound to be dominated by political
immaturity, intolerance and violence" (Kennan
1947). Because of this "political immaturity," the
USA imposed a Military Government (USMGIK)
which ruled South Korea until 1948 when the
Republic of Korea was established with Syngman
Rhee as president.

Hugh Deane, an American journalist who cov-
ered South Korea in the late 1940s and into the

Korean War, quotes with approval the aphorism of historian Bruce Cumings that "For Americans, the war began with a thunderclap in 1950". For Koreans, it began in 1945 to support the title of his book *The Korean War, 1945–1953* (Deane 1999). Cumings in 2010 suggested that the USA had "inherited a Japanese-Korean enmity that broke into a decade of warfare in Manchuria in the 1930s, and in that sense is almost eighty years old—and no one can say when it will finally end" (Cumings 2010). However the Americans not merely inherited and fostered this enmity; they elevated it to a higher stage as part of a global struggle for hegemony.

Deane describes the repression, executions, beating, and massacres in South Korea that preceded the outbreak of hostility in 1950. The horrors were amplified during the actual war itself and then continued into the postwar period (Ahn 2009). Rhee was toppled in a popular uprising in 1960, ferried by the CIA back to the USA but replaced before too long by General Park Chung-hee, who inaugurated what might be called the "Manchurian period" when South Korea was largely run by a clique of fellow Koreans who had served under the Japanese in Manchuria (Han 2008). Thus Japanese imperialism continued after 1945, and to some respects up to today, a vampire enclosed within, feeding upon American imperialism (Park 2016).

The Road from 1945 to an Uncertain Future

It is now nearly three-quarters of a century since 1945, and naturally there is an immensely rich and complex history that could be explored. This could take many directions. A political perspective would focus on the domestic politics in each of the two Koreas and their interrelationship and their relationships with the outside world, mainly China, Soviet Union, Japan, and, above all, the USA. During this period there has been staggering economic growth and social transformation in differing ways in both Koreas. This of course has been happening in many other parts of the world, but the Korean case has its own special characteristics emanating from the bedrock of Korean culture and geography, the Japanese inheritance, and American ascendancy. Here we

briefly take five themes to illustrate aspects of this history within the overarching perspective of the role of imperialism.

The Korean War

Although the Korean War has been labelled "the forgotten war" (Blair 1987), it is surely the one thing, apart from the well-publicized malevolent belligerence of North Korea, that most people outside the peninsula know about Korea. Both the standard description of this war being an unprovoked invasion of South Korea by North Korea and the more nuanced and plausible analysis that North Korea reacted at an opportune time, when the large contingent of Koreans fighting on the side of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War returned home, is somewhat irrelevant (Hart-Landsberg 2000). Just as civil wars erupted in other places and times – the USA in the 1860s, China in the 1940s – because of the buildup of irreconcilable forces, so too the Korean Civil War had the markings of inevitability given US policy in Korea since 1945. The war caused immense death and destruction of the peninsula, and casualties among the participants, although as the way with imperialism, the USA which bears the greatest responsibility came off by far the lightest. In fact, apart from its casualties on the battlefield – 33,686 out of 1.3 million (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), with millions of Korean civilians – in many ways it and the empire did well from the carnage. The Korean War rescued the Japanese economy from the doldrums and set in on the path to high-speed growth. More importantly, at the imperial center, Korea was the Hot War that bedded the Cold War into the American political system along with the permanent war economy and the military-industrial complex (Melman 1974, 2003; Eisenhower 1961).

Park Chung-hee, Vietnam, and the Imperial Framework

Park Chung-hee, who had served the Japanese in Manchuria, as an officer in the puppet Manchukuo army, also served the Americans, both at home and abroad, principally in Vietnam. The rightwing *Chosun Ilbo* encapsulated the imperial service and its benefits:

A total of 312,853 Korean troops were sent to Vietnam until March 1973, when all Korean soldiers were pulled out. In the intervening years, they had carried out 1,170 large-scale operations and 556,000 smaller-scale operations, killing about 41,000 Vietcong.

The dispatch brought enormous economic benefits to Korea. Exports to South Vietnam rapidly increased as materials and services necessary for soldiers were produced here. The country earned more than US$1 billion in total from the wages for soldiers and workers and the profits of companies operating in South Vietnam.

The dollars earned in Vietnam were used as a key financial source for the government's second and third five-year economic development plans. The term "Vietnam" became a buzzword of the times. ("60 Years of the Republic: Troop Dispatch to Vietnam" 2008)

The word "Vietcong" is used here in the usual fashion to refer to foreign dead, even babes in arms. The South Korean troops were particularly notorious for their brutality, which can be seen as a natural consequence of the history of serving imperial Japan and implementing Syngman Rhee's bloody rule. In recent years there has been a growing awareness and shame in South Korea over the atrocities committed by their troops in the "pacification" of South Vietnam (Armstrong 2001; Cho 2018). In 2017, on a visit to Vietnam, President Moon Jae-in attempted to apologize for the past but was ignored by Vietnamese media (Choi 2017a).

By contrast Kim Il-sung sent support to the Vietnamese and also to the various anti-colonialist struggles around the world, including Africa. Although American pressure has recently compelled various Africa countries to curtail or sever ties with the DPRK, there is still gratitude for past solidarity and resistance to US demands (Harris 2017a).

Park's policy was certainly more profitable than Kim's, and the growth of the South Korean economy owes much to the blood money earned in Vietnam. In fact, much of the success of the Four Asian Tigers (or Dragons) – South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore – was due to US imperial expenditure in Vietnam and elsewhere in the region.

However, with the USA facing defeat in Vietnam in the early 1970s, and the opening to China,

Park Chung-hee became very worried that the USA might cut and run in Korea and that he would be the victim of "strategic abandonment" (Sneider 2008). The domestic response was the Yushin Constitution which increased the repressive power of the presidency. Whatever popularity Park had garnered during the high growth of the 1960s, following from the disaster of the Syngman Rhee period, began to evaporate, and "dissidence became an enduring feature of student life at that time" (Avery 2012). North Korea was still stronger than the South – economically, militarily, and politically – and with US support uncertain, Park made the decision to develop nuclear weapons. The North would make the same decision later and for similar reasons, not so much for fear of the South but because of the overwhelming military superiority of the USA. For those that could achieve it, a nuclear deterrent became the obvious choice when faced with a much more powerful adversary.

Park, in fact, could not achieve it because the Americans found out and forced him to abandon the program (though there are indications that aspects of it continued even more clandestinely than before) (Eum and Ser 2004; Hayes and Moon 2011).

Park's increasingly unpopularity with the people, and sections of the elite, led to his assassination in 1979 by the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Breen 2010). Park's defiance of the USA over economic policy, and his attempt at developing nuclear weapons, gave him a cachet in nationalist thinking, and there was a very popular novel published in 1999 which ascribed his assassination to the USA (Moon 2009). At his funeral procession, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke cruelly observed "There wasn't a wet eye in Seoul" (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2001).

Park Chung hee is survived by a daughter, Park Geun-hee who, inheriting her father's standing among conservatives and a wider public approval of her father's role in South Korea's economic development, became president in 2013 until she was toppled by popular protests – the Candlelight Revolution – and is now in jail on corruption charges (Fifield 2018). Exile,

assassination, or disgrace is the norm for South Korean leaders (Lee 2016).

By contrast, north of the imperial divide, both Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il died peacefully, to great popular distress (the father more than the son), and the third in line, Kim Jong-un, is in power, unchallenged it would seem and with popular support (Ryall and Irvine 2015; Kong 2018).

Jeju: From Massacre Island to US Naval Base to Encircle China

Jeju (formerly usually spelt Cheju) is the Korean peninsula's largest island, and its subtropical climate makes it a popular tourist destination. It also has Hallasan, South Korea's highest mountain and symbolic twin to Paektusan in the north, considered to be the spiritual home of the Korean people, and where it is claimed Kim Jong-il was born.

Jeju was the site of the most infamous massacre of the Syngman Rhee period. On March 1, 1947, a rally was held commemorating the March 1st Movement against Japanese colonialism and protesting against the forthcoming election to be held by the US Military Government in Korea (USMGIK) in 1948 that would finalize the division of the peninsula and install Syngman Rhee as president. Police fired upon the meeting killing six people and injuring eight. This led over the next year to strikes and various protests which cumulated in the Jeju Uprising of April 3, 1948. The authorities reacted with a scorched earth policy, and by the time the island was finally pacified, 7 years later in 1954, at least 30,000 people – 10% of the population – had been killed (Heo 2018a; "Remembering the April 3 Jeju Uprising" 2018; Song 2010; Yetter 2011). The massacre was kept under wraps, with severe penalties against anyone who publicized it until 2000 when the Kim Dae-jung administration allowed an investigation. In 2003 his successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, apologized on behalf of the national government: "Due to wrongful decisions of the government, many innocent people of Jeju suffered many casualties and destruction of their homes" (Song 2010). The phrasing was significant. Not only was there no mention of the scale of the massacre, which was merely attributed to "wrongful decisions" (would the Holocaust be so described?),

but the use of the word "innocent" implies that others – those who took up arms for Korean sovereignty and against repression and perhaps even those who merely protested – were guilty. The description reveals the dilemma that South Korea "progressives" such as Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and now Moon Jae-in face. They wish to exorcise the crimes of the past and build a peaceful and just Korea but are unable to confront the reality of the domination by US imperialism. Sovereignty always remains beyond their grasp (Elich 2018). However the ghosts of Jeju refuse to go quietly away and in 2018, on the 70th anniversary of the uprising there have been a number of articles in the South Korea press on the subject, with rallies and demonstrations outside the US embassy and a petition with over 100,000 signatures called on the US Government to apologize for its role in the massacre (Huh 2018; "Special features on the 70th anniversary of the Jeju April 3rd Incident" 2018).

The subservience of South Korean progressives (also termed liberals in contradistinction to conservatives) is manifest in the issue to the Jeju naval bases. Back in the late 1940s, there were rumors that the US Navy was planning to establish a base on the island which had been used by the Japanese to bomb China during the war. That might have had some attraction being halfway between its two major possessions in Northeast Asia, but at the time the USA still "owned China" (then under Chiang Kai-shek) and the issue was clearly not pressing and nothing seems to have come of it (Heo 2018b). Subsequently America "lost China" which by the twenty-first century became the major challenge to US power, especially in Asia, and the desirability of a base on Jeju took on a new lease of life. However an explicit US naval base would cause political problems, certainly within South Korea and in a different way with China. In addition, naval bases are expensive to construct, and little of the expenditure would come to US corporations. Better to have the locals pay the bills and be the front man. The South Korean government, then under Roh Moo-hyun, came to the rescue ("West Sea Becomes New Arena for Big-Power Rivalry" 2012). The base would be South Korean, not

American though of course "The United States, according to its Status of Forces Agreement and its Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea, can use at whim and at will any South Korean base" (Kang and Hong (Interviewer) 2012). Moreover it was not really a naval base but a "Civilian-Military Port" (Kim and Kang 2013). One problem with this ploy was that no doubt the Chinese were not taken in nor were South Korean activists and there have been continuing protests over the years, even attracting the attention of US film-maker Oliver Stone (Gwon 2011; Huh 2013). The current president, Moon Jae-in, rather gave the game away with the International Fleet (or Naval) Review of October 2018.

The Review, the third in a series, was held to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea (Oh 2018). That it was held in a place where, at their birth, those same Armed Forces had massacred 10% of the population is significant (Kim 2018). It might be an expression of the sense of impunity of the Korean military for past crimes and their power over the civilian presidency. Clearly any ROK president that wants to claw back sovereignty from the US, and make peace with the North, has to reckon with the possibility of a military coup.

Although it was ostensibly a South Korean affair, the Review was also an expression of enthusiastic fealty to the USA. It brought together a motley collection of US "allies" – although the Japanese dropped out over a furor over Korean protests over the flying of the Imperial Japanese Navy ensign (Hurst 2018). The Jeju base and activities connected with it such as the review are clearly aimed at China. At the review ceremony, President Moon declared, "I will further strengthen the Republic of Korea Navy so it may go beyond the Korean Peninsula and contribute to peace in Northeast Asia and the entire world." This may have been no more than boilerplate rhetoric that politicians indulge in but it may have been a commitment to something more. Not only are the South Korean military under the wartime command of the USA, but modern weapons systems are merely a component of an integrated whole and cannot really function on

their own; this is termed "interoperability." Large countries, especially the USA, have a comprehensive capability, but small ones can only operate as subordinate units within this wider framework. In the 2011 invasion of Libya, for instance, the British and French air forces did not have the signals intelligence to operate on their own but had to depend on US leadership, a fact that has not been lost on Korean analysts (Song 2012).

A preventive war precipitated by the USA to impede the "peaceful rise" of China is the main danger facing the Asia-Pacific, and perhaps the world, today. Whether to support US belligerence toward China or to seek ways to avoid being embroiled is the major question facing countries in the region; Australia for one is a source of some forceful debate (Menadue 2018).

Why then does Moon Jae-in endorse a strategy fraught with danger? The controversy over the US deployment of THAAD – a component of the US missile defense system whose radar can be used for surveillance of Chinese missile sites and which is seen as an important part of an American first strike capability – demonstrated Chinese sensitivities and resolve (Beal 2016a). THAAD not merely makes South Korea a prime Chinese target in case of war but led to substantial and continuing economic costs (Yonhap 2017, 2018b). It may be that Moon calculates that by displaying such enthusiasm for the military and its supporting role in maintaining the US containment of China, he will be allowed some leeway on North policy. If so, it is surely a miscalculation.

OPCON and the Military Presence

When the Republic of Korea was formally established in 1948, USAMGIK was dissolved, and control of the armed forces passed in theory to the new republic, though US advisers continued to be influential and allegedly complicit in the massacres, such as in Jeju, leading up to the Korean War (Heo 2018b). The ROK Army (ROKA) was an ineffectual force certainly in in the early fluid stages of the Korean War despite American advisors (Ramsey 2006). This was not surprising as the first officers trained by the USA from 1945 were selected from those who had served under

the Japanese in pacification operations in Manchuria and China, and this is what they continued to do in Korea after 1945. They were not experienced in fighting another army. The Korean People's Army (KPA) formed in the north was very different. The first cohorts were formed from those who had fought against the Japanese, mainly in conjunction with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria but also with the Soviets in Korea. The Americans claim that it was well equipped compared to the ROKA. In 1949 the KPA was greatly supplemented by thousands of Korean who had fought in the Chinese Civil War. When full-scale war broke out in 1950, the ROKA crumbled, and had it not been for American intervention, the war would have soon been over (Scobell and Sanford 2007).The American response to the debacle was twofold.

The US intervened massively, not merely with its own troops but troops from 15 other countries; this was perhaps the zenith of American authority. By comparison only seven countries sent supporting troops to the Vietnam War, and a mere three countries participated in the coalition of the willing in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Because of the Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council over the refusal to transfer the China seat to the new government in Beijing, the USA was able to dragoon the UN into endorsing American intervention, which came under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC). Despite its name the UNC is not controlled by the United Nations but exclusively by the USA (Norton 1997).

The USA also reasserted Operational Control (OPCON) over the South Korean military which it holds to this day. Initially this was done via the UNC, but in the 1970s the UN General Assembly passed a motion declaring that the UNC should be abolished. The USA seems to have ignored that, but it did transfer OPCON directly to the Combined Forces Command (CFC). This is the unified command over the ROK military and US Forces in Korea (USFK), which might suggest some joint ownership. In fact the Commander of the CFC is the Commander of USFK. It is, in other words, a front organization. That is under discussion and may conceivably change, though that is unlikely.

OPCON has changed slightly over time. Park Chung-hee tried to get it back in the late 1960s but the Americans refused. General Roh Tae-woo raised it again in the later 1980s when running for president, and on 1 December 1994, during the Kim Young-sam administration, the USA handed back peacetime control, retaining control in wartime, when of course it really mattered ("Experts address misconceptions about OPCON transfer" 2010). Peacetime control did have some significance because it meant, for instance, that General Chun Doo-hwan needed US permission in 1980 to move troops from the DMZ to Kwangju in the south to repress demonstrations (Shorrock 2015). Protests in Kwangju were part of a democratic upsurge following the assassination of Park Chung-hee. US complicity in the massacre in Kwangju, which may have left over 600 dead, was well-established, and US peacetime control was part of the evidence (Kim 2017a) (Shorrock 2017). Why the USA insisted on hanging onto what was a minor part of OPCON is a mystery. Or alternatively, since they had the power, why did they not use it more wisely; massacres that passed unnoticed in the 1940s were less easily covered up in the 1980s. Moreover, from the US point of view, there was little point to Kwangju. The generals had done their job, and by then democracy did not pose the challenge to US control in Korea as it had in the aftermath of liberation from the Japanese.

US control over South Korea was also eased, although temporarily, in respect of the massive joint military exercises it holds with the ROK military. The USA had handed over management of the exercises to the ROKA in 2007/2008 but reasserted control in 2010 following the Cheonan incident (Jung 2010; Kim and Ser 2010). The Cheonan was a ROK Navy ship which sank, probably in an accident with South Korean mines off the coast of North Korea. The inquiry held by the ROK Ministry of Defense predictably pinned the blame on North Korea (Elich 2010; "Russia's Cheonan investigation suspects that the sinking Cheonan ship was caused by a mine in water" 2010; Gregg 2010). What the real reason for the US resuming control of the exercises is unknown.

K

Full transfer of OPCON, namely, wartime control, has been postponed numerous times. It is rumored that Moon Jae-in had wanted it to happen during his term in office but has instead called for "early transfer," whatever that might mean (Park and Lee 2017). He has expressed frustration that despite having a GDP claimed to be 45 times that of the North and massive military spending, "our troops can't handle the North Korean military on their own" ("Moon vows to push for early takeover of wartime troop control, enhance deterrence against North" 2017; Park et al. 2017). He might also have mentioned that the South has far better military equipment (it jostles with Saudi Arabia for being the biggest purchaser of American weapons) and could field twice as many troops (Kim 2017b). And moreover, because of the US-ROK alliance, war would automatically bring in the USA in support irrespective of OPCON. It is hard to imagine any country less in need of foreign control of its military, something which has been described by a former commander of USFK no less as being the "most remarkable concession of sovereignty in the entire world" (Son 2014).

Both the US and ROK governments claim that the postponement of OPCON transfer is consensual and the conservative press in the past has suggested that delays were at Seoul's request ("Korea Asks U.S. to Delay Troop Control Handover Again" 2013). However, even though the ROK military establishment might have its own secret reasons to approve of the postponement it seems that the real reason for the delay is American reluctance to lose control over what is one of the most powerful militaries in the world, at probably the most strategic location in the world. The ostensible reason for the delay is that conditions are not ripe, and since it is really the USA that decides, there is potential for indefinite postponement (Salmon 2018). The "conditions" usually refer to North Korea's nuclear deterrent, and since that will not be laid aside without some sort of security guarantee from the USA, which Washington is unwilling to provide, there again matters are in American hands.

Nevertheless negotiations on OPCON transfer must continue and a framework for a superficially new, if essentially unchanged command structure agreed upon.

There are four major components in the existing structure – the South Korean armed forces (ROKA for convenience), the US forces in Korea (USFK), the United Nations Command (UNC), and the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CFC has overall wartime command of ROKA and USFK, and the Commander of USFK is also Commander of CFC, under OPCON. The same American general also heads UNC. A number of different entities within the military command structure but all controlled by Washington.

United Nations Command

The UNC does not appear to have any warfighting function, but apart from providing a fig leaf of respectability for the US military presence in South Korea, it does control the southern side of the DMZ. When the USA wanted to block attempts to rejoin the North-South railway network in August 2018, and important part of the détente process, the US commander spoke as head of UNC ("Korean rapprochement efforts stymied by UN rail block" 2018). That the United Nations was being used to prevent peace rather than promote it went largely unnoticed.

However the UNC has an uncertain future. If there were a Peace Declaration ending the Korean war, as advocated by the two Koreas (supported by China and Russia), then UNC would lose its raison d'etre (Park 2018a). This would not necessarily be an insuperable barrier to American utilization of the UN flag in Korea. When a raison d'etre is a pretext, its disappearance can lead to other justifications. NATO was ostensibly founded to "deter Soviet aggression," but when the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO not merely continued in existence but expanded both its membership (into Eastern Europe) and its role (Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Libya) (Chomsky 2014; Daalder 1999; Rice 2016). It is no surprise then that thought is being given to how to continue UNC if the Korean War is declared over (Shorrock 2018a; Yoo 2018).

Combined Forces Command

The CFS oversees USFK and ROKA and so OPCON transfer is focused on it. The transfer and the post-OPCON structure have been

discussed for many years, but it has now become established that the envisaged new structure would, on the face of it, be quite revolutionary. Up until now the commander of CFC has been the American general commanding the USFK, with a Korean general as his deputy. Under the new arrangements, the roles would be reversed. This was confirmed in a meeting held in Washington on 31 October 2018 between US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo which stated that:

> The Secretary and the Minister decided to maintain the current CFC structure and reaffirmed the mutual commitment that the future CFC is to have an ROK four-star general as the Commander and a U.S. four-star general as the Deputy Commander. ("Guiding Principles Following the Transition of Wartime Operational Control" 2018; Mattis and Jeong 2018)

Earlier Andrew Salmon in *Asia Times* had noted that having a Korean in overall command "might prove politically impossible in Washington" (Salmon 2018). That seems a reasonable assumption and yet Mattis agreed to it. There has been curiously little coverage in the US media on this. Clint Work, perhaps the leading American expert on OPCON, writing in the *Washington Post* a month before the agreement, makes no mention of Korean control (Work 2018b), though in the specialist magazine *The Diplomat* in 2017, he had commented:

> The obvious obstacle to this option is that it would require the U.S. president, Congress, and public accept putting U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander. Considering the current political climate and Trump's brand of politics, such a shift would require thorough public explication. (Work 2017)

Defense News, in an article a few days after the Mattis-Jeong agreement, did mention the CFC transfer to South Korea but buried it a long way from the headline which merely mentioned the control of Korean troops – "South Korea could soon take control of its own wartime operations from the US" (Jeong 2018a).

It was as if they did not want Trump (or the general public) to find out that US troops were being put under foreign command. The reticence of the US media is curious since the story is so obviously newsworthy, a case of man biting dog rather than dog biting man as the old adage has it. Yoo Kang-moon, writing in the *Hankyoreh*, pointed out that:

> The case has been mentioned as the only exception to the so-called "Pershing rule," which holds that the US military does not assign command authority to a member of another country's armed forces. (Yoo 2018)

Pershing was the commander of US troops in Europe in World War I, and he later criticized the deployment of American troops under foreign command. He did not trust the British, or the French, and since he was famous in the aftermath of the war – he was the only general to be awarded six stars – his opinions were influential and have passed into conventional wisdom (Maurice 1931). For instance, Karl Rove, election strategist to George W. Bush, claimed on Fox News in 2011 that "American troops have never been under the formal control of another nation. Why should we start now?" (Jacobson 2011). Rove was factually incorrect when it came to details but political, and essentially he was right (Bruner and Serafino 2001; Schuler 2006). Since Pershing's day various US units have been under foreign command, but the importance of those cases has decreased and in recent years has been confined to US peacekeeping operations of no substantial military consequence and where, in reality, the USA is in overall strategic control. Why, in Korea of all places, start now?

It is unclear how the idea of relinquishing CFC control to a Korean initially got traction, but it did and is now the subject of a formal agreement. It may be that the transfer will not happen until it no longer matters. There is no fixed date – the latest prediction is 2023 – and it is contingent of conditions and capabilities, so the opportunity for postponement is always there (Jun 2018a). But if it does take place and there is a formal transfer of command, what then?

The world has been distracted by Trump's strident calls to put "America First," foolishly dismantling America's soft power strengths (Beal 2017d). In the meantime the bureaucracy and here the Pentagon have been working away at more sophisticated ways to run the empire in a time of decline where brute force is increasingly ineffective.

One technique is embedment where senior officers of "friendly and responsible allies" – usually from English-speaking countries and certainly from subservient one – are embedded into high-ranking positions in the global US military structure (Williams 2018). Thus, for instance, we have Harry Harris, in a speech in Australia, claiming that the present international framework has:

> ... been made possible by a security order under-written by seven decades of robust and persistent U. S. military presence, alongside a robust network of allies and security cooperation partnerships – alliances like the one we've shared with Australia for the greater part of a century.
>
> Our alliance is so important that Australian Army Major General Roger Noble is the Deputy Commanding General for Operations at U.S. Army Pacific – he followed Greg Bilton. That's right; an Aussie General Officer is a fully integrated partner at the top of one of my service component commands.
>
> Leading U.S. troops is a responsibility that I take very seriously and isn't something we just give away. In fact, the first offensive action by American Expeditionary Forces serving under non-American command was during World War I in the Battle of Hamel under the overall command of the Australian commander Lt. Gen. Sir John Monash. ... At the end of the day, friends help friends... and it's an honor and privilege to have our Australian friends working alongside us every day. (Harris 2017b)

Alliances are very much stuff of empires and how to co-opt elites into the imperial structure, without abandoning control is a continuing challenge. Harry Harris was then the Commander of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), since May 2008 United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). He was subsequently Ambassador-designate to Australia before being transferred to Seoul after Victor Cha, for unspecified reasons, was not appointed ambassador. Harris, incidentally, is an embodiment of modern US imperialism; his father was a US naval officer and his mother Japanese. Unlike his nineteenth-century predecessor Lieutenant Pinkerton, who abandoned Madama Butterfly for an American woman, Harris senior moved his Japanese wife and family to Tennessee.

Embedment might be seen as the human resources equivalent of interoperability, whereby weapon systems are integrated into the imperial military architecture making independent action by subordinate alliance members difficult if not impossible. A key component of interoperability is Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capability (Elich 2012; Song 2012). We might see ISR as the brains of the military machine which directs the various tools – fighter, bombers, missiles, aircraft carrier, and troops in the field – to carry out appropriate functions. He who controls ISR controls the army, irrespective of the formal chain of command. It is no accident that the air force – the battlefield kingpin to ISR – is to be kept under separate US control (Yoo 2018).

This might be seen – in a nod to Barack Obama's policy of "leading from behind" – to be one of "leading from below" (Lizza 2011). Indirect rule is an old imperial technique, employed, for instance, by the British in the Princely States of the Raj and by the Japanese in Manchukuo. Indirect rule, as Dirks has pointed out, is generally more advantageous to the imperial power than direct rule:

> .... providing ultimate sovereignty could be reserved for the colonial power, and it was frequently the case that indirect rule was both cheaper and easier than ruling by direct means. It was not only more efficient to conquer territory when rulers were allowed to maintain local control, it was also less likely to provoke serious resistance down the line. And yet, in early years of British expansion, the siren of full and direct control was hard to resist; it was only after years of learning the difficulties of imperial rule that Britain began to devise new strategies of indirect rule. (Dirks 2004)

Both the British and the Japanese used a mix of direct and indirect rule in their empire. American control in South Korea at the governance level was direct up to 1948, under the Military Government, and then indirect after that through the Republic of Korea. At the military level, it was direct until 1948, indirect until the USA took over Operational Control 1950, and then direct after that especially in respect of wartime control. However, even during the Korean War, American military "advisors frequently found themselves working with a counterpart two to three ranks above their rank and advising units larger than the ones they had served in, much less commanded," a classic indirect rule function (Ramsey 2006).

Indirect rule incurs a certain loss of control, but it is usually advantageous, and sometimes for historical reasons becomes inevitable. If OPCON is finally transferred to the South Koreans, it may really have little effect on American power in Northeast Asia.

US-NK Negotiations and the Sad Failure of Moon Jae-in

The USA and North Korea have been in negotiations of various sorts since 1945, but they entered a new stage in the 1990s and since then have seldom been out of the news. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea was militarily secure, and the economic relationship provided a reasonable environment for development. The Soviet Union was much poorer than the USA, and costs of trade over the trans-Siberian railway were much higher than those which South Korea experienced with seaborne trade to the USA and the world capitalist economy. The USA gave South Korea access to its market – the largest and richest in the world – and to its technology and education. American military spending, especially but not exclusively with the Vietnam War, was another bonanza. Despite these advantages the North did better than the South for some decades; according to a South Korean authority, the South did not overtake the North in terms of per capita GDP until 1986 (Hwang 1993). When the head of the BBC World Service China section visited North Korea in the mid-1980s, he found it wealthier than China (Hoare 2016).

The collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the reintroduction of capitalism in China, changed all that. Agriculture had been industrialized to circumvent the geographically unfavorable environment caused by the lack of arable land and the short growing season (the warmer south had traditionally been the main agricultural area of the peninsula). This policy had been successful but was dependent on industrial inputs such as oil and fertilizer from the Soviet Union and agriculture went into a tailspin when they dried up. During the "Arduous March," perhaps hundreds of thousands of people died prematurely because of malnutrition and other consequence of the economic breakdown.

On top of this catastrophic domestic situation, North Korea was faced with two overriding international challenges. One was to gain security from the ever-powerful but now triumphalist USA which, freed of restraint from the Soviet Union, was embarking on new crusades, such as the destruction of Yugoslavia. The obvious solution to that was to attempt to develop a nuclear deterrent.

The other challenge was to come to some sort of rapprochement with the USA and to get it to accept peaceful coexistence. Here again perhaps a nuclear deterrent was the solution.

The challenges for the USA were different and of course far less pressing and only a small part of global concerns, even if greatly overblown by government for domestic reasons and the media for commercial ones. Again two are preeminent-nuclear weapons and East Asia strategy.

Military and Political Dimensions of the Nuclear Weapons Challenge

North Korea's small and uncertain nuclear capability is regularly touted as the greatest threat to the USA and an existential one (Graham 2017; Landler 2016; Reich 2016). This narrative goes back to at least 1991, 15 years before North Korea even conducted a nuclear test, let alone had anything approaching a credible capability (Gelb 1991). The American public certainly seems to believe this (Choi 2017b; Yoon and Cho 2016). This is a striking demonstration of the fact that people will usually believe something, however, untrue and indeed preposterous, if it is repeated constantly and not contradicted. Adolf Hitler, who considered that English propaganda was so much better than the German during World War I, concluded that the trick was simplicity and repetition:

> But the most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly and with unflagging attention. It must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over. Here, as so often in this world, persistence is the first and most important requirement for success. (Hitler 2002)

The idea of North Korea being a great, perhaps the greatest, threat to the USA is certainly frequently repeated and often by what most Americans would reasonably, if naively, think of as

authoritative and dependable voices, such as James Clapper then Director of National Intelligence (Landler 2016). It is very seldom challenged, and on the rare occasions when it is, it is inserted into a propaganda envelope which obscures the real relationship between the USA and Korea (Fish 2018).

And yet on examination, the idea is preposterous. Even if North Korea had a handful of ICBMs capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the USA, there is no likelihood of an aggressive attack. What would be the point? There would be nothing to be gained. No country could conquer the USA let alone a small one like North Korea. Nothing would be achieved except retaliation that would destroy their country. This obvious and incontrovertible reality is, to be fair, occasionally admitted by experts:

> Some US officials and pundits are fond of talking about the "threat" from North Korea. But what are the chances that its leader Kim Jong-un would initiate some kind of conflict or attack on the United States?
>
> The suggestion prompts snorts of amusement from some Korea experts.
>
> "The likelihood of a sneak attack by North Korea," says Frank Jannuzi, "especially one with nuclear weapons, to me, is infinitesimally small."
>
> Jannuzi was the policy director of East Asian and Pacific affairs for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1997 to 2012. He's now head of the Mansfield Foundation, a think tank in Washington, DC.
>
> Sung-Yoon Lee, of Tufts University's Fletcher School, agrees. "In the short term, the threat level is low and manageable," he says. "North Korea is not suicidal, so it would not initiate a conflict." (Woolf 2017)

Unfortunately these experts, and the journalists who interview them, seldom get round to analyzing the real situation. If North Korea is not the threat that James Clapper et al. claim it to be, what is it all about? What is the role of North Korea's nuclear capability?

Nuclear weapons, as mentioned earlier, function primarily as a deterrent, and that is the case here. North Korea cannot attack the USA, though many Koreans would no doubt like to follow the example of George Washington and expel foreign power from the peninsula. That is not feasible and there is no reason to suppose that anyone in Pyongyang

thinks it is. North Korea cannot effectively defend itself from an American attack; it might perhaps do better than Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya, but the real danger to Americans comes when they put boots on the ground. There would be no stopping US missiles and bombers. If attack is out of the question and defense is ineffective, that leaves deterrence.

Deterrence is an amorphous concept revolving around bluff, credibility, and acceptable risk and a deterrent that is used is a deterrent that has failed (Beal 2017a). From the point of view of America, North Korea is a high-risk, low-value target. For North Korea it is what Seymour Hersh called, in respect of Israel, the "Samson Option" in that its use would entail destruction (Hersh 1991). There being no other military way to counter possible American aggression, North Korea is left with the nuclear deterrent, not a good option but unfortunately the best.

If North Korea's nuclear capability is not a threat to the USA but rather an ability to retaliate if attacked, what is the fuss about? If there is no attack, there can be no retaliation. Besides, Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal is by far the smallest of all the nuclear powers and of course dwarfed by that of the USA.

The answer lies with imperialism. It makes an attack on North Korea unpalatably dangerous and strikes at the heart of imperial power. The USA may, or may not, attack a particular country, but it wants the option to be able to. What is the point of military power if it cannot be used to subjugate those who resist? The very smallness of North Korea and its deterrent and the historical circumstances in which it was developed make it especially challenging for US imperialism. Even the strongest of empires – and the USA is the most powerful in history – recognize that large countries cannot be attacked with impunity. Small countries should be different. It is frequently observed that if Iraq or Libya had possessed a meaningful nuclear deterrent, they would not have been attacked (Frolov 2010; Sanati 2011; Taylor 2017). North Korea thus poses a strategic challenge to US imperialism rather than a direct military threat. There is always the danger that the Korean example might be contagious spreading to Iran and further afield.

US-East Asia Strategy and Its Contradictions

US difficulties are compounded by the contradiction inherent in its East Asia strategy. On the one hand, there is the long-standing desire to destroy the North Korean state, thus extirpating the shame of the failure to achieve victory in the Korean War and extending American power to the very borders on China. This might take place through direct military action (Read 2017; Thompson 2016). Alternatively and very attractively, there is the fantasy that North Korea will "collapse" and that all the USA will need to do is to "manage" that collapse, utilizing the South Korea military (Foster-Carter 1998; Glaser and Snyder 2010; O 2016; Olson 2016). Obama seemed to believe this, hence his policy of "strategic patience" (Foster-Carter 2015; "Obama: North Korea is bound to collapse" 2015). There are myriad problems involved in all this for the USA. These include North Korean retaliation, nuclear or conventional, and resistance – one authoritative study estimated that up to 400,000 troops would be required for pacification even if there was no significant military resistance (Bennett 2010; Bennett and Lind 2011). On top of these dangers Chinese intervention is almost certain ("Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018" 2018).

Leaving all this aside and assuming that the USA now has another scalp on its belt without being locked in a war with China, there is the problem of justifying the huge US military presence in the region (Holmes 2017). USFK has no plans to leave whatever happens, and President Moon has agreed that the presence will continue even if peace is declared (Cho and Kim 2018; Kim 2018a). Nevertheless it is clear that pressure will mount.

The presence has two components – one is the actual physical deployment of troops and assets such as THAAD in South Korea and elsewhere in maritime East Asia such as in Japan and Guam – the "military presence." The other is the alliance structure that locks South Korea, as well as Japan and Taiwan, into the encirclement of China. Some analysts have realized that the latter is the important one and have been prepared to consider a slimming down of the physical presence (Sokolsky and DePetris 2018). Others, including Congress, have been loath to see any withdrawal of US troops from the front line, even though that might be strategically a wise decision (Yonhap 2018c).

The Military Presence and Its Complications

The North Korean position on the military presence is interesting and shrouded in some fantasizing. Ever since the 2000 summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il Seoul has been claiming that Pyongyang has accepted that the US military presence should continue: "Kim Jong-il clearly agreed with President Kim Dae-jung that United States forces in Korea (USFK) should remain in Korea even after unification for peace keeping and maintaining the balance of power" ("NK Backs Continued USFK Presence" 2000). This assertion has been continued in 2018 regarding meetings between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un (Yi 2018b). It is obvious why South Korea should claim this because it allows them to talk détente with the North without challenging US dominance, but the South Korean claims, as presented, appear preposterous. It seems like that neither Kim Jong-il nor Kim Jong Un, realizing the South Korea presidents' predicament, made the US presence a confrontational issue for strategic reasons. The small US contingent (roughly 23,000 at the moment) is of no great military significance in itself and would probably mainly serve to facilitate the bringing in of an expeditionary force in the event of war (Elich 2012; "Joint Press Conference with Secretary Panetta and Defense Minister Kim in the Pentagon Briefing Room" 2012).

Moreover USFK might well be a hostage against attack. Over the last 15 years, US forces have been drawn back from Seoul to Pyeongtaek some 60 km to the south to take them out of range of North Korean artillery ("N Korea angry at US army plans" 2003). This would have made the USA more likely to launch an attack on the North, with its bases being safe, but would leave Seoul vulnerable to retaliation. One might have been thought that the South Korean government would have objected and attempted to block the

K

move. Though there have been long-running protests by the inhabitants of Pyeongtaek, the South Korean government seems to have remained silent (Choe 2006). As with the deployment of THAAD and the naval base on Jeju, South Korean interests were sacrificed on the altar of American strategic objectives, yet another manifestation of the imperial-client relationship.

However the US sense of security may be misplaced. The KPA has claimed that its long-range artillery can now reach Pyeongtaek and even Pusan ("U.S. Troops in S. Korea Can Never Escape Strikes by KPA's Long-range Artillery: Panmunjom Mission" 2017). That may be an exaggeration, but in any case the US bases are vulnerable to missile attack (Oh 2017). This makes Korea a special case, though the Iranians now claim that they can retaliate against US bases in the region if attacked (Sharafedin 2018). Pearl Harbor is the only instance of a US base outside the theatre of operations ever having been attacked; US wars – Korea, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, to name a few – have always been prosecuted from bases at a sufficient distance to be invulnerable to counterattack.

Moreover the US bases at Pyeongtaek – Osan Airforce Base and especially United States Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, where USFK is now headquartered – is home not merely to troops but also an increasing number of dependents. It is now US policy to encourage dependents to live on base in order to discourage the sorts of things that soldiers on their own get up to, such as drunkenness and the occasional rape. If the USA were to launch an attack on North Korea, it would almost certainly have to evacuate the dependents first, thus giving warning to Pyongyang and antagonizing the South Korean people aware of the implications for their own safety (Lamothe 2017). The evacuation problem in fact extends far beyond the military presence issue since there are also hundreds of thousands of other civilians – Americans and citizens of core allies such as Australia and Britain – who would also have to be evacuated (Hayes 2018; Jun 2018b). Nuclear retaliation aside, the reported confidence of President Trump and Senator Lindsey Graham that in the

event of a war with North Korea "it will be over there. If thousands die, they're going to die over there. They're not going to die here" leaves out this inconvenient fact (Ortiz and Yamamoto 2017).

Another drawback in the US military presence is that it reminds Beijing of the US containment of China and the role of the Korean Peninsula in that. USAG Humphreys is not merely the largest overseas US base (and mainly paid for by the South Korean taxpayer), but it is also the one closest to Beijing (Hincks 2018; Lee and Jung 2012; Letman 2017).

The US military presence in South Korea is an affront to Korean sovereignty but whatever opprobrium that would attract from South Korean citizens would fall on the government in Seoul which endorses it rather than that in Pyongyang which condemns it.

North Korea policy toward the USA is therefore not straightforward. Being so much weaker, it must attempt to be flexible and pragmatic, sometimes being conciliatory and at other times defiant. Nevertheless its very weakness and vulnerability mean that peace and security, coupled with economic development, are the overriding and simplifying objectives. The *Byungjin* policy which attempts to use the relative cheapness of a nuclear deterrent compared to conventional defense to allow space for economic development despite US economic warfare is the expression of this (Beal 2014; Feron 2017; Toloraya 2016).

The USA is in a very different position. It has security and no need for peace – indeed peace is anathema to what is termed too simply the military-industrial complex. It has innumerable options. They may come with costs as well as benefits, but there are still many choices to be made. Often that is an uncomfortable place to be in, and the solution is to defer difficult choices and opt for the status quo.

Pushback and the Attraction of the Status Quo

The USA has constantly considered and frequently threatened war against North Korea since the armistice of 1953 and yet has never taken the decisive step even though it has engaged in military action around the world, overt and

covert many times over that period (Blum 2018). A large part of the reason is clearly the military dangers of retaliation, resistance, and Chinese intervention. There are those who engage in wishful thinking, arguing that resistance would be minimal, that China could be persuaded to approve of an American-led invasion, and that only South Koreans would suffer the costs of retaliation (Luttwak 2018). However wiser or more cautious counsel has so far prevailed, and it is noticeable that when politicians ramp up the threats, as Trump did before Kim Jong-un's peace overture in 2018, the military and their affiliates in the media have been careful to cool matters down warning of "catastrophic consequences" (Marx 2018; Shankar 2017).

On the other hand, the military wants to preserve its military presence in South Korea and its forward strategic position in Asia, and tension on the Korean Peninsula is seen as a necessary justification for that. President Jimmy Carter tried to scale down the US military presence on assuming office in 1977 and to withdraw the 700 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. He was outmaneuvered by US intelligence which exaggerated the strength of the KPA and ascribed, without evidence, an intention to invade on the part of Pyongyang if Carter's plan was put into effect (Gady 2018; Whyte 2015). Carter gave in and the military presence continues to this day, at a slightly lower troop level and, in theory, without land-based nuclear weapons since 1991, though this is disputed (Staines 2004). However, since the focus of US-Asia strategy is China, with Korea being merely a part, albeit an important part of that, then even a successful invasion of North Korea would be counterproductive.

However if war in Korea presents dangers for the United States peace perhaps poses greater challenges. It is just conceivable that a domestically strong and deeply strategic US administration might be able to construct a deal with North Korea that would not greatly undermine the global position of the USA in respect of proliferation (the "North Korean example"). If North Korea could be quickly integrated into the global capitalist system, the deal might even be passed off as a

victory. If the USA could tolerate an independent North Korea and an autonomous South Korea in some sort of pre-unification confederal system, then it is possible that the old dream of harnessing the Korean Peninsula to the anti-China alliance, as is attempted with countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and India, could be pursued (Carlin and Lewis 2007; Cumings 2008; Richardson 2007). None of this is likely to come to pass. The Trump administration is extremely weak with its hold on domestic political power quite tenuous. The foreign policy establishment despises it for incompetence and has been trying through various devices – Russiagate and Mueller – to remove Trump from office. In addition the Democrats have taken the House of Representatives in the November 2018 midterm elections, and many Republications in Congress have a profound hatred for Trump's foreign policy, the late John McCain being an obvious example. Strategically the administration is incoherent and disheveled. Although Donald Trump might hanker after a Nobel Peace Prize and the legacy of being the American president who "solved the North Korea crisis," he has so little understanding of the issues that he allows his North Korea policy to incorporate elements, such as "maximum pressure" of sanctions and a refusal to negotiate meaningful security guarantees that ensure there will be no deal. The process of derailment of negotiations is especially facilitated by his very own Rasputin, John Bolton (Jeong 2018)

Moreover these machinations within the bureaucracy are complemented by obstruction from the Democratic Party (Hwang 2018a; Manchester 2018) and by the media. An important example of the media serving as a megaphone for those in the establishment wishing to derail any progress toward a peaceful settlement was the article by David Sanger and William Broad in the *New York Times* on 12 November 2018 with the tendentious heading "In North Korea, Missile Bases Suggest a Great Deception" (Sanger and Broad 2018). The thrust of the article was that North Korea was "cheating" on commitments made at the Singapore Summit in June. This was untrue and easily debunked by commentators

(Essertier 2018a; Shorrock 2018b; Sigal 2018a). The South Korean government was dismissive:

> Blue House spokesperson Kim Eui-kyum stressed that Pyongyang "never promised to dismantle its missile bases, nor did it sign any agreement obliging it to dismantle its missile bases."
>
> "It seems inappropriate to refer to that as 'deception,'" Kim suggested. (Noh 2018b)

Interestingly the article was also derided by some fellow mainstream journalists such as the *Washington Post's* Adam Taylor and *CCN's* Will Ripley (Ripley 2018; Taylor 2018). The lead author of the NYT article, David Sanger, has a nickname going back at least to the 1990s of "Scoop Sanger" from his success in publishing journalist scoops deriving from his role as a mouthpiece for elements in the intelligence community who wanted to influence government policy (Cumings 2003; Lewis 2005, 2015). The mainstream media is of course part of the state propaganda system, but presumably Taylor and Ripley thought that Sanger was being rather too blatant. The obvious inaccuracies in the article, and its agenda, were so egregious that the Executive Editor of the *Hankyoreh*, South Korea's leading liberal newspaper, wrote a personal open letter to his counterpart on the Times protesting (Kim 2018e).

However it would be a mistake to lay too much stress on the foibles and foolishness of the Trump administration. American presidents find it very easy to make war and, even when they do try, very difficult to make peace. It is a systemic issue which transcends individuals though specificities are important.

Empires are by their nature, warlike animals and although they may impose peace within their domain – as euphemized by the phrases *Pax Romana* and *Pax Britannica* – they are created and continue through force. Traditional empires may have wanted stability on their borders which were far away in terms of time and control, and what was on the other side might not have merited further conquest. Competitor empires also imposed constraints. The US empire is different. Globalization means there are no limits and technology has largely abolished the former constraints of time and control. The military has always been a powerful force in previous empires, but the modern American military-industrial complex – encompassing all those who make their living from not so much from war itself but from the possibility of war, from generals and arms manufactures to journalists and politicians – has grown mightily in influence. The military-industrial complex, it should be noted, does not necessarily want war itself so much as the prospect and likelihood of war. Nothing is more threatening to the permanent war economy than the prospect of peace. This does not mean that militarism is not a force in target countries such as North Korea. Having been under existential threat from the world's hyperpower for all of its existence, it would be strange if the North Korean military was not a powerful political force. But it is constrained by the overwhelming necessity of peace and security. The USA is different. For all the talk of the "National Security State," the national security of the USA has not really been under threat since the ebbing of British power at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Fordham 1999; Hendrickson 1998; Hogan 1998). The USA is indeed exceptional; all other countries to varying degrees have to be concerned for national security. The US, for reasons of geography, size, and power, has little need for such concerns. Rather it is a matter of projecting power with relative impunity. The "National Security State" is really a euphemism describing a new, globalist stage in US imperialism.

This power and impunity means that the USA can conduct its foreign affairs in ways which would be fatal for other countries. An aspect which is of special relevance here is the two-party adversarial system. The USA has developed a political framework in which there are effectively only two political parties (though the maverick Trump has dented that somewhat). The parties are very similar ideologically, and in fact their foreign policy positions are easily switched. They differentiate themselves for the voters not so much by policies as by being adversarial, opposing what the other party is doing. This gives the voters the illusion of choice without the reality. It has an important consequence in terms of foreign policy because it automatically engenders discontinuity and incoherence of which

there are many instances. George W. Bush was famous for his ABC foreign policy – Anything But Clinton (Delury 2008; Sigal 2005). One result was that he tore up the Agreed Framework that Bill Clinton had signed with the DPRK in 1994 on spurious grounds (Cumings 2003). Trump has torn up Obama's deal with Iran, and in turn the Democratic Party is attempting to sabotage his negotiations with North Korea (Hwang 2018a, b; Kristof 2018; Manchester 2018). Since political principles are not a major factor, there is a tendency for American politicians to compete with the opposition by waving the flag of "patriotism" every more vigorously, even when it is strategically counterproductive. Dropping bombs on foreigners, or at least those with no air defenses, is a sure way of upstaging the competition and winning praise; after Trump launched a missile attack on Syria in 2017, prominent foreign policy analyst Fareed Zakaria proclaimed on CNN that by doing so, "I think Donald Trump became president of the United States" (Chasmar 2017; Naureckas 2017).

Apart from the structural forces underlying the reluctance of the USA to accept peace in general in the case of the Korean peninsula, there is also the overriding need to contain China (Fullilove and Lemahieu 2018). From the division of the peninsula in 1945 up until today, Korea has essentially been a subset of wider geopolitical concerns – first the Soviet Union and subsequently China.

If a hostile North Korea disappears whether through war or through peace, the USA faces a challenge of justifying its military presence in East Asia and specifically in South Korea. With war too dangerous, peace unpalatable, and an incapacity of both the current administration and the foreign policy establishment to surmount these challenges, the USA necessarily prefers the status quo. Whatever Trump's hankering for a Nobel Peace Prize today or a yearning to be a great war president tomorrow, it is likely that his attempts in either direction will be frustrated.

The Dilemmas and Impotence of Moon Jae-in and the South Korean Elite

If the USA is an imperialist state and North Korea an independent, resistant state, then South Korea can perhaps best be characterized as a "swing state." Both the USA and North Korea have fixed positions which are unlikely to change. North Korea may be fluid in negotiations, but there is no reason to suppose it will succumb to US pressure and surrender. The USA may make various peaceful pronouncements, but its essential thrust for domination will remain, and it will not, in Mao Zedong's phrase, lay down its butcher's knife and become a Buddha. South Korea is different. Created by the USA from the detritus of the Japanese empire as a client state, it has wrestled ever since with the conflicting demands of subservience and wresting a degree of autonomy. Japan itself became a client state at the same time, and the parallels are intriguing (McCormack 2018). The OPCON issue is a formal expression of its client status, but American domination is more extensive and invidious than that, extending throughout society both at popular and elite levels. South Korea has the potential to swing toward independence; it is a major economy, with a stable society and a powerful military. Its military budget is far greater than that of the North; in 2013 it was claimed in the National Assembly that it was 33/34 times greater (Kim 2013). In its first decades, it needed the USA to protect it from domestic rebellion and the threat from North Korea. But ruthless repression, economic growth, American support, and indoctrination have produced great changes; even today challenging the official government line can lead to prosecution under the National Security Act (NSA or more commonly NSL) (Shim 2018). The North has been greatly weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by unrelenting pressure from the USA. South Korea now has the potential to make its own way and to escape from American domination. It also has the necessity to do so, for as long as it remains a client state, it will be used by the USA as a pawn against China. If the USA goes go to war against China – something which is frequently discussed (Berg 2018; Heath 2018; Kagan 2018) – then South Korea will be on the front line and will face devastation.

However the structural forces of potential and necessity do not necessarily translate into action, as is brought home by the presidency of Moon Jae-in.

Paik Nak-chung has argued that the "Candle-light Revolution" of 2017 which led to the downfall of Park Geun-hye, and opened the way for the election of Moon Jae-in, was a "real revolution" (Paik 2018). It may well have been real in aspiration, but the Moon administration has not fulfilled that desire and promise. "Revolution" does imply an overturning of domestic social relations and international relationships, the two being intertwined, certainly in the Korean context. Moon's popularity has plummeted, mainly so far because of inherited economic problems and his failure to address them (Park 2018b; Rhyu 2018). More important here is his failure to stand up to the USA which will dash prospects for detente and peace. Paik claims that the Candlelight Revolution produced a new government able to respond the Kim Jong-un's peace overtures of 2018 (Paik 2018). That is true but the response is constrained and vitiated by domestic forces, particularly the military and the conservatives, and subordinated to the policies of the United States. Since the USA does not want peace, South Korea will not attain it unless it defies America, and Moon shows no signs of doing that. This was apparent months after he took office in 2017 and has been continually reconfirmed since then (Beal 2017b, c). Moon clearly faces formidable obstacles. He has limited formal political power, and, more substantially, there is always the danger of some sort of coup, either political (Roh Moo-hyun narrowly escaped impeachment in 2004) or military. The USA can apply immense pressure to achieve its aims, even instigated a coup if necessary. So the challenge for Moon is to nudge the USA into a meaningful peace dialogue with Pyongyang without inciting a counteroffensive from the conservatives and military in South Korea. There are various aspects to that, with sanctions having high visibility, but the fundamental one is persuading the USA to accept peaceful coexistence with an independent North Korea which retains the right and ability for self-defense a compromise which could be called "capping" (Dalton and Levite 2018; Miller and Sokolsky 2018; Sigal 2018b; Work 2018a). It is unlikely that any such persuasion would be successful since the USA, for reasons discussed above, is not able to make

the geostrategic adjustments necessary and will opt for the status quo. Nevertheless, if Moon is to help remove the specter of devastation from the Korean peninsula, he must try. North Korea has developed a nuclear deterrent because of the threat from the USA, so Pyongyang will not move toward denuclearization unless that threat is addressed. However, despite pretensions, South Korea has no direct role to play in the negotiations between the USA and the DPRK on the nuclear issue. What it can do is, on the one hand, improve bilateral relations with the North – the détente process – and on the other address the issue of sanctions.

While a number of useful and productive moves have been made during 2018 to promote détente with the North, there is a limit to what can be achieved at the bilateral level. Enthusiasts abroad, often Korean Americans, were carried away with the thought that, at last, Koreans were able to take their destiny in their own hands and forge peace (Feffer 2018; Freeman-Woolpert 2018; Lindorff 2018; Shorrock 2018c). In South Korea the government, naturally, and the liberal media echoed this fantasy (Editorial 2018; Lee 2018b; Noh 2018a; Yi 2018; Yu 2018). In reality there was very little of substance that South Korea could do with the North that did not require US approval (Jeong et al. 2018; Kim 2018b, c; "Korean rapprochement efforts stymied by UN rail block" 2018; Lee 2018a; Shin 2018; Yonhap 2018a).

Much of the constraint that the USA is able to impose on the detente process is exercised through its dominance of the United Nations (and the UNC) and is manifested through sanctions. It is well established that sanctions are usually ineffective in compelling governments to succumb to US demands and that their main function is a domestic one, to "satisfy the need to appear to be acting while avoiding the risks of action" (Friedman 2018). In respect of small countries such as North Korea, they are a particularly cowardly weapon, costing little and posing no danger while inflicting great pain on the target population, especially the most vulnerable, that is, the elderly and children. They produce disease, ill-health, malnutrition, and sometimes starvation.

Currently the UN estimates that 40% of the population of North Korea "require humanitarian assistance" ("UN Humanitarian Chief to visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 9–12 July 2018" 2018). Maternal mortality is eight times higher in North Korea than in the South (Kim 2018d). Sanctions are fanning a TB epidemic in North Korea, and Seoul has fears it may spread south (Talmadge 2018). The US attitude toward sanctions was famously summed up by the US Ambassador to the UN Madelaine Albright who when asked on CCN in 1996 about reports that sanctions had killed half a million Iraqi children replied ". . .we think the price is worth it" (Stahl 2007).

In the present context, sanctions have an added dimension, with two aspects. As long as Washington thinks that it can achieve the unilateral surrender of North Korea with sanctions, it will not find it necessary to negotiate on the security issue. That is wishful thinking and we may suppose that more astute minds see sanctions as a convenient device with which to scuttle negotiations. North Korea is not going to believe any US professions of peaceful intent while it is carrying out economic aggression.

Sanctions therefore have become a key element in current negotiations. Unless there is movement on sanctions, there will be no progress. If Moon Jae-in is to have any effect on US-DPRK negotiations then sanctions alleviation is the button to push. He has made some noises, but as soon as he has encountered opposition from the US, or its subordinate allies, he has backed down. On his trip to Western Europe in October 2018, he raised the issue (how strongly we don't know) with Macron and May and was rebuffed by both (Jeong 2018b; Ryall 2018; Yi 2018a; Yoon and Norman 2018). He went to New Zealand, and the message was the same: Prime Minister Ardern "said New Zealand would not be receptive to any calls to ease sanctions" and "sanctions would continue to be essential until Pyongyang completely abandons its nuclear program" (Beal and Wilson 2018; Kim 2018c). Moon capitulated to this pressure from the imperial periphery and from the center and reiterated his subservience to US sanctions policy (Kim 2018d; "Seoul to

Maintain N. Korea Sanctions until Complete Denuclearization" 2018).

Moon could have attempted to stand up to the USA over sanctions. There is a moral opprobrium; sanctions are variously described as "war crimes" (Cockburn 2018; Pilger 2014; "Rule 53. Starvation as a Method of Warfare" 2017) or "economic terrorism" ("Iran's Rouhani denounces US sanctions as 'economic terrorism'" 2018). This opprobrium is latent because the facts are usually suppressed or glossed over – blaming the victim is a common technique – but could be activated. Moreover the key sanctions are those emanating from the United Nations Security Council, and since they are ostensibly largely to protect South Korea, then an appeal to the UNSC by President Moon would have traction. The actions would not be without danger to Moon or his administration, but if sanctions continue, then the possibility of war with the North, and with China, will continue.

It may be that the current measures between South and North to develop détente will create sufficient momentum and become unstoppable, but this is unlikely since at any time the USA can put its foot down and bring things to a halt.

The failure of Moon Jae-in to stand up to the USA over sanctions is but one instance, albeit a crucial one, of a wider incapacity of the South Korean élite, over generations, to wrest autonomy from the USA. While it is subservient, it will continue to be used as a pawn by US imperialism in its broader struggle to maintain hegemony, especially in respect of the Chinese challenge. For the moment the best strategy for the USA is to preserve the status quo in respect of the Korean peninsula. Both war and peace would be less preferable to the present situation where a constructed fear of the "North Korean threat" produces sufficient tension to justify the US military presence in Northeast Asia, along with missile defense and other components of the permanent war economy. Moreover it comes with little cost or danger. Much of the forward military presence is funded by the host countries (Elich 2016; Lim et al. 2017; Park 2018b). Sanctions may cause huge damage to North Korea – $65trillion according to one estimate ("KCNA on Tremendous Damage

Done to DPRK by US" 2010) – and danger to South Korea, but have no meaningful effect on the American economy. And since the "North Korean threat" is essentially bogus, the risks are quite manageable.

Themes and Issues

If an analysis of the role of imperialism is essential for an understanding of the Korean peninsula, and its history, then Korea, being a principal site of contestation, throws much light on imperialism, in particular on contemporary US imperialism. The Trump presidency adds another dimension because of its disjunction with standard imperialist practice and thinking. Trump, as president, is charged with running an empire but, to the dismay of the establishment, does not comprehend the task. This opens up fissures – counter challenges of "fake news" – that scarcely surfaced in the past. The screams of outrage are a useful indication of just how important the empire is perceived to be and what are its most valuable assets. However since Trump is not anti-imperialist, merely incompetent, these protests from the establishment are not a comprehensive guide.

Trump, the roche moutonnée, and the Unravelling of the Imperial Idea

An empire, at one level, can be considered a conglomeration of states. It is hierarchal with the imperial state at the center surrounded by others at various levels of influence and subordination. Traditionally empires have boundaries, either geographical or with contestant states, and these are marked by a band of liminal states in between which may move either way to one empire or the other. And then there are states which are similar to a roche moutonnée, or *sheep rock,* hard outcrops over which glaciers pass and surround but do not destroy and sweep away. North Korea is such a roche moutonnée. The major crime in the eyes of an empire is rebellion from existing subordinates and resistance from states at the periphery. Independence is not easily tolerated, and naturally the smaller the defiant state, the greater the frustration, hence the animus towards North

Korea, so much smaller than the US. Historically empires have tended to recognize the idea of limits, though with internal quarrelling over where those limits should be, and strategists and historians often warned of imperial overreach. Though there have been very large empires before and the later European empires straddled the globe – the British had an empire on which the sun never set – it is only with the USA that we have an empire with a truly global, all-encompassing appetite which sees no limit to its domain. Hence the frequent talk of war with Russia, or China, or sometimes both together (Farley 2017). There are those that warn of overreach, and urge restraint, but the prevailing trend is aggressive, leading to the eastward expansion of NATO and shenanigans in the South China Sea (Buruma 2011; Fraser 2014; White 2017).

Empires are of course dynamic, expanding, declining, collapsing, rising, and falling. Within the empire the hierarchy is in a state of flux with the subordinate states rising or declining in power and consequently in influence, although size and inherent power is an important factor. South Koreans are often aggrieved when it becomes clear that Washington considers Tokyo more important than Seoul (Cumings and Park (Interviewer) 2015; Kang 2014; Nakamura 2017). The process is historical with strong cultural factors. Britain, for instance, has claimed and has been granted a "special relationship" with the USA since it handed over the baton of hegemony in the twentieth century. This may decline if Britain leaves the EU and so loses its position as the USA's "best friend in Europe" but will retain something as long as American leaders remain monolingual, judging foreigners on their ability to speak English (Birnbaum 2018).

The preferred American term for empire, in polite mainstream circles, is *alliance* over which the US exercises *leadership*. From this it follows that the major foreign duty of the US president is management of the alliance, to keep the subordinate states compliant and unified against any competitors. It might be termed Imperial Management 101. Although Trump's sudden decision to withdraw (in theory) from Syria might have been the trigger which led to the resignation of Secretary of

Defense James Mattis in December 2018, his resignation letter does not mention Syria but focuses exclusively on the importance of the alliance structure for the USA (Mattis 2018a). Trump's incompetence in managing alliances is his besetting sin, in the eyes of the US establishment, one that leads to the various measures, principally Russiagate, by which they hope to pull him down (Sullivan 2019; Tharoor 2018). The basic reason for Trump's failure, more important than any personal inadequacies, is that he does not understand that he is supposed to be running an empire. Niall Ferguson once commented that Americans were imperialists in denial – they had an empire but would not admit to it (Ferguson 2003). The American elite has tended, except in unguarded moments, to perform this charade, but subconsciously they were not taken in. Words might go in one direction, but actions in another. The curious thing about Trump, due perhaps to his famous incuriosity and his lack of political experience, is that he does believe the denial myth.

The curiosity does not stop there. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2017, he outlined his view of the world as being composed of "sovereign nations" – he used the word "sovereignty 21 times – which "with different values, different cultures and different dreams not just coexist but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect" (Jaffe and DeYoung 2017). This, in fact, is the vision of the world enshrined in the UN Charter and one espoused by North Korea, among others, "Sovereignty is the life and soul of the Korean people" ("Rodong Sinmun on DPRK's Bolstered War Deterrent Force" 2008).

Trump was as usual inconsistent, and he singled out North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela whose sovereignty did not merit respect, so it was not quite all the way with the UN Charter. Nevertheless his worldview is strikingly different from the global system that the USA has been at such pains to construct since World War II and with considerable success. For an American president, putting America first among the world's sovereign nations is a very different concept from exercising leadership over the international community and harnessing its alliances to preserve the Liberal International Order (Haass 2018; Ignatius 2017; Mathews 2017; "Petition: Preserving Alliances" 2018).

Alliances are the keystone of this imperial order. Trump sees them as an encumbrance by which allies "are ripping us off" (Sherlock 2016; Zeynalov 2018). Leaving aside things such as host countries paying much of the cost of US troops stationed there and the purchase of US military equipment (which enriches the manufactures, keeps costs down for the Pentagon and, through interoperability, locks foreign forces into the US military machine), a quick look at statistics for military expenditure indicates why the establishment is so horrified by Trump's ignorance of the benefits of alliances for US military power.

According to the annual *Military Balance 2017* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a standard source, the official military budget of the USA in 2016 was $604 billion. The total for the main allies – Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, etc. – together came to $450 billion bringing the grand total to $1054 billion. In other words, to the degree that the USA could utilize the military of its subordinates, it augmented its military budget by 75%. This is merely a rough, indicative measure for obvious reasons, but it does quantify the military value of its empire to the USA ("Military Balance 2017" 2017). It is not surprising then when analysts write of US military power, they often mention the "globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order" (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). The total military budget of the empire is also the metric to be used when comparing US power with that of its adversaries. That $1054 billion was, using the same source, 7 times that of China, 22 times that of Russia, and 64 times that of Iran. The *Military Balance* does not give data for North Korea, but using estimates from other sources, the imbalance in military spending ranges from about 300 times to a thousand ("World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2016" 2016; Kim 2013). Trump has frequently claimed that US "allies" are freeloading and should pay more for the US forward presence in their countries (Cloud 2016; Yoon 2018). He has it the wrong way round; it is

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the allies who subsidize the USA. The US presence is primarily to serve Washington's geopolitical strategy with the claim that it is providing protection a pretext. A war on China to protect its hegemony might make sense for Washington, but it is difficult to conceive how it could benefit South Korea in any way.

However the alliance structure has value extending far beyond the military aspect. It allows the USA to claim that it speaks for the "international community." That supposed community may leave out most of the world's population – in China, Russia, India, and much of the rest of the world – but it does include, from an American perspective, the countries that count or at least their governments. It endows the USA with huge diplomatic power which is evidenced most significantly in international bodies such as the United Nations.

For historical reasons the USA has an automatic majority in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It "owns" three of the five permanent members – itself, the UK, and France – and inevitably most of the nonpermanent members. The Soviet Union used to use its veto with some vigor, China less so, and currently the veto is used sparingly with Russia and China attempting to horse trade on unwelcome resolutions then, if pushed through, implementing them with reluctance. UNSC resolutions, and the ensuing sanctions, have been an important weapon of the USA against North Korea. To most people they appear legitimate because they bear the imprimatur of the UN even when they violate the Charter of the UN and the norms of international law (Weeden 2012). However the UNSC is a political construction within which power is very unevenly distributed. In general its resolutions privilege the USA even when they are clearly illegal (McCormack 2017; "UN Security Council exceeds its authority" 2017; Xavier do Monte 2016). North Korea has been condemned by the UNSC for, of all things, attempting to launch an artificial satellite. This was done on the spurious grounds that it employed "ballistic missile technology"; however, all satellites are launched by ballistic rockets. Such rockets are only missiles if they have a warhead (Beal 2016c). Moreover ballistic

missiles themselves are not illegal or uncommon, and of course the USA has thousands of them.

The problem with the UNSC exceeds far beyond the North Korea issue. Not merely do its resolutions often punish the innocent but it often fails to condemn, let alone punish, infringements of international law by the USA or its allies. For instance, in April 2018 it rejected a Russian-sponsored resolution condemning US airstrikes against Syria (Chan 2018). Indeed it appears that the USA has never been condemned for its flagrant violations international law such as the invasion of Iraq. It does not have to use its veto because its alliance system gives it a virtually guaranteed majority whatever the composition of the nonpermanent members. The UNSC is a place of political power, not the disinterested dispensation of international law.

US influence penetrates far deeper into international institutions such as the United Nations than formal resolutions. The CIA has long been thought to have been involved in the death of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in 1961 (Cowell and Gladstone 2017; Lynch 2016). More prosaically the USA can make or break careers. Presumably both Russia and China have an informal veto over senior appointments, but the balance of power means that only US-supported people get the jobs. Nevertheless the USA has fallen out with the chosen ones when they have not lived up to expectations of deference and they are forced out of office and did not have their appointments renewed or left under a cloud. Notable examples include UN Secretary Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General José Bustani (Urquhart 2004; Meisler 2018; Linzer 2004). Bustani had the particular pleasure of reportedly being threatened by John Bolton: "We know where your kids live" (Hasan 2018).

US influence extends far below the highest levels of the international bureaucracy. Even modest positions in international agencies are well paid and have prestige. It is unlikely that in general any person who is considered anti-American

could expect a good career in this milieu. At the same time, pressure to conform to US policy must be immense and would not require a Boltonesque threat but would just be internalized through the ordinary course of administration. Moreover these people are not merely individuals but also citizens of a country whose government may well be subject to US influence, so in sensitive areas the pressure comes from two directions. One instance of this, unfortunately under-researched, is the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on the DPRK chaired by Michael Kirby assisted by Sonja Biserko and Marzuki Darusman. Marzuki had been a henchman of General Suharto, largely responsible, with the help of the CIA of one of the biggest massacres of the postwar period, perhaps half a million Indonesians, so he knew something about human rights, and how to ingratiate with the powerful (McBeth 2012; Scott 2017).

The statement by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights announcing the appointment of the CIO is telling (emphasis added):

> The President of the Human Rights Council, Ambassador Remigiusz A. Henczel (Poland), announced today the appointment of Michael Donald Kirby of Australia and Sonja Biserko of Serbia who will join Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to serve as the members of the commission of inquiry **to investigate human rights violations** in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, mandated by the Council at its last session. Mr. Kirby will serve as Chair of the three-person commission.
>
> The Council decided to establish, for a period of one year, the commission of inquiry at its twenty-second session on 22 March 2013 **to investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights** in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations which may amount to crimes against humanity. ("Council President appoints Members of Commission of Inquiry on the Democratic People's Republic in Korea" 2013)

It will be noted that the word "allegation" does not appear. The task of the COI was not, as would be the case in any normal court trial or inquiry to assess the veracity of allegations but merely to confirm the guilt of the accused. In other words a show trial with a pre-determined verdict and the confirmation of guilt duly provided. The investigation contented itself with hearing testimony from what the South Korean government calls "defectors" – North Koreans who for whatever reason had left their homeland to live in South Korea or elsewhere. The general motive for this appears to have been economic; a South Korean Ministry of Unification survey in 2004 found that only 9% cited "political dissatisfaction" (Park 2004b). This is not what the COI wanted to hear. Defectors or people in similar situations are notoriously unreliable. Being desperate they tend to say what they think their interrogators want to hear, which is why countries which do not want them – such as EU countries faced with a flood of asylum seekers – use overly rigorous screening techniques to give themselves an excuse for refusal (Souter 2016). The same method applies for Britain barring unwanted North Koreans or South Korea refusing asylum to Yemenis (Bell 2018; Park 2018b). There are many instances of defectors in South Korea fabricating stories (Fifield 2015; Jolley 2014; Song 2015). Moreover there is an incentive to make fabrications as lurid as they can (Yun 2018).

It appears that the CIO heard the testimony of defectors, selected presumably by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in South Korea and its equivalents elsewhere, and without demur or scrutiny predictably concluded that:

> Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the commission constitute crimes against humanity. These are not mere excesses of the State; they are essential components of a political system that has moved far from the ideals on which it claims to be founded. ("Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (main findings and recommendations)" 2014)

The assertion that these "systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations" were an "essential components of a political system" had the useful implication that any action taken by the USA to destroy this political system would be both justified and virtuous.

It is clear what is going on here. Demonization of the enemy is a standard tactic and particularly important for a democratic imperialism. The French with their *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission) or the Spanish and Portuguese spreading Christianity had their own justifications; the USA dwells a lot on human rights and democracy which it claims it embodies (Walt 2011). In American eyes the most potent form of delegitimization of a foreign government, thus providing justification for its overthrow, usually euphemistically described as "regime change," is the accusation of the violation of human rights and deprivation of democracy. A "dictator" who "starves his own people" ticks all the boxes (Von Drehle 2018). Since all governments, not least the American, fall short on human rights and democracy, albeit in different ways, there is always plenty of ammunition around, so all it needs is a powerful propaganda machine to amplify, decontextualize, and distort then spew it out.

Akin to demonization ("they are evil"), although rather different, is dehumanization. This is used in the sense of portraying the adversary as so different from us that the ordinary rules of human behavior do not apply, and we can believe narratives about them which we would not entertain about ourselves or fellow humans. Thus we have the idea that North Korea deliberately and with malice "starves its own people" or the opinion of General Westmoreland, US commander in Vietnam, that "The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. Life is plentiful. Life is cheap in the Orient" (Jackson 2005). Of course Vietnamese don't like dying any more than anyone else, and of course the North Korean government does not starve its people – what would happen to the army, who would work in the factories and fields? Of course it was General Westmoreland who thought that Vietnamese life was cheap, not the Vietnamese, and of course it is the US government not the North Korean that inflicts starvation – that is one of the functions of sanctions after all. Why is it that US imperialism is so often successful in getting people to overlook the obvious and to accept self-serving falsehoods?

Despite the ineptness of Donald Trump, the growing power of China, the resurgence of

Russia, and the resistance of the roches moutonnées such as North Korea, Syria, and Iran, US imperialism is still incredibly strong. It has unparalleled hard power – carriers, missiles, bombers, submarines, and an array of other instruments, including the chemical weapons we are not supposed to notice (Higgins 2017). However it is in soft power spectrum that US strength is most manifest. The alliances greatly magnify its military power and enable it to use international bodies such as the United Nations to further its objectives. Trump may have eroded the alliance system, but it was still able to get Canada, at great cost and danger and to no benefit – to arrest Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou (Karabell 2018; Landler et al. 2018; Sachs 2018). Although the dollar's role as the world's trade and reserve currency is under threat, the USA still has considerable influence over the international banking system; it can, for instance, force Chinese banks to stop dealing with North Korea (Kim 2017c). It still dominates the Internet and on global telecommunications, hence the attack on Huawei (Fifield 2016; McCarthy 2018; Zhong et al. 2018). It has huge resources to corrupt a bribe – General David Petraeus even wrote a manual for the army on how to use money as a weapons system (*Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System* 2009; Thompson 2013). The armory of US imperialism is extensive and varied, but perhaps its most effective weapon is propaganda.

The USA dominates the global intellectual space. It controls perceptions through an extensive array of instruments – universities, thinks tanks, popular culture, literature, news agencies, media, and so forth. Its influence permeates the world. Even in adversarial countries such as Russia and China, the media tends to follow the American narrative unless national interests are at stake.

Harold Pinter, in his Nobel Prize lecture, expressed it well:

> Hundreds of thousands of deaths took place throughout these countries. Did they take place? And are they in all cases attributable to US foreign policy? The answer is yes they did take place and they are attributable to American foreign policy. But you wouldn't know it.
>
> It never happened. Nothing ever happened. Even while it was happening it wasn't happening.

It didn't matter. It was of no interest. The crimes of the United States have been systematic, constant, vicious, remorseless, but very few people have actually talked about them. You have to hand it to America. It has exercised a quite clinical manipulation of power worldwide while masquerading as a force for universal good. It's a brilliant, even witty, highly successful act of hypnosis.

I put to you that the United States is without doubt the greatest show on the road. Brutal, indifferent, scornful and ruthless it may be but it is also very clever. As a salesman it is out on its own and its most saleable commodity is self love. It's a winner. Listen to all American Presidents on television say the words, "the American people," as in the sentence, "I say to the American people it is time to pray and to defend the rights of the American people and I ask the American people to trust their President in the action he is about to take on behalf of the American people." (Pinter 2005)

It is this awesome act of hypnosis that enables the USA to condemn North Korea for having a handful of nuclear warheads when it has thousands itself, for having conducted six nuclear tests when it has conducted over a thousand and for being belligerent and aggressive and a threat to the region and the world, even though North Korean troops have scarcely ventured beyond the peninsula and then only by invitation while the USA is a country in a state of permanent war. The list of such instances of hypocrisy and inversion of reality is extensive and is, of course, not confined to Korea. However the USA has conducted an unremitting propaganda campaign against Korean independence for over 70 years, so it probably provides the best example of the awesome power of sustained propaganda to distort the perceptions of people, not merely Americans, about imperialism and its criminal ways.

Korea has long drawn the attention of imperialism and because of its location that will surely continue. The Mongols and the Japanese were attracted by Korean resources, both natural and human, but for both the peninsula was primarily the route to a larger prize. For the Mongols, that was Japan, and for the Japanese, that was China and Eurasia. The Americans saw Korea as a place to erect a barrier to protect its recently acquired war booty, Japan, from the influence of the Soviet Union. It also provided a beachhead on the Eurasian mainland. China has replaced the Soviet Union as the main challenge, but the desire to maintain US hegemony remains the primary underlying driver of US policy toward Korea. However imperialism is also a complex historical process and in the course of that an obsession with North Korea has assumed a distinctive importance. Moreover the development of the Permanent War Economy also fuels US imperialism, complementing and reinforcing geopolitical considerations. It used to be said that the business of America was business but with American decline and loss of civilian competitiveness war, and the profitable preparation for it is becoming the core business.

Underlying momentous historical forces intersect with the quotidian. Donald Trump is a symptom of American decline and the alienation and disenchantment which is it producing. He is accelerating the decline but doing it in erratic ways. One day he threatens war against North Korea, the next he is talking peace. Even if he is not removed from power by the establishment, he is unlikely to bring about either peace or war.

Whatever happens it is certain that the Korean Peninsula will continue to be a focal point for imperialism and the resistance to it.

A Note on Spelling

Korean, and other non-Latin scripts, can be transliterated (a process usually called Romanization) in a variety of ways. The forms most familiar to Western readers are usually constructs by the nineteenth-century missionaries and scholars, who often disagreed among themselves. With decolonization and reassertion of national identity, governments have engaged in script reform; thus *Tokio* became *Tokyo*, and the PRC developed the *pinyin* system in the 1950s, with *Nanking* becoming *Nanjing*. For transliterating Korean the American McCune–Reischauer system, dating from the 1930s, is the most commonly used, but in 2000 the South Korean government introduced a revision so that, for example, *Pusan* becomes *Busan* and *Chosun* becomes *Joseon*. North Korea continues to use what is essentially the McCune–Reischauer system, so *Pusan* remains *Pusan* although the correct P'yŏngyang

usually appears simply as Pyongyang. However, even in South Korea, there is no thorough consistency; the *Chosun Ilbo* has not revised its title to *Joseon Ilbo*, but it does use *Busan* for the name of the city while retaining the original in titles such as *Pusan* National University. The reader must be prepared for inconsistency.

This chapter tends to use the McCune–Reischauer to preserve continuity with the past and most foreign writing on Korea, as well as providing a link to North Korean usage. There has been a talk in the past of a joint North-South revision, but that has not yet come about.

Korean names, like those in China and Japan, place the surname first, and while the Japanese often Americanize their names, with *Abe Shinzo* becoming *Shinzo Abe*, both Korea and China keep to the original order. However in South Korea the given names are hyphenated, thus Moon Jae-in, while in the North they are written separately and capitalized, thus Kim Jong-un. Here we follow the usage of the country of origin.

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Kurds

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▶ Labour and Decolonisation, Anti-imperialist Struggles (Australia/South-East Asia)

Labour and Decolonisation, Anti-imperialist Struggles (Australia/South-East Asia)

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Australia; Bandung conference; Decolonization; Foreign labour; Labour; Southeast Asia

Definition/Description

This chapter examines labour unrest and strikes against Dutch efforts to reclaim Indonesia as an imperial colony in Australia during the Second World War as a precursor to the decolonization project in Southeast Asia. The chapter reveals that a coalition of workers emerged who strove to end colonialism in China, India, and Indonesia which was instrumental in expanding the movement to decolonize the Southeast Asian and South Asian regions. As the colonial systems were eroded by the Japanese imperial invasion new systems would emerge to initiate the construction of new states.

Introduction

Labour constituted a significant site of struggle in favour of decolonisation and against the reimposition of the imperial order in the period immediately following the Second World War. In Australia, this struggle against the return to the pre-war regime in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI)/Indonesia flared up within months of the surrender of Japan and became a long-running dispute on the waterfront that lasted until the formal handover of sovereignty to the Indonesian nationalists. The actions involved the unions 'black banning' Dutch and British ships that were intended to support the Dutch military in the Indies. Similar bans and strikes were seen globally, with actions in the US, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom all contributing to popularising the anti-imperial cause and aiding in the backing-down of the

Netherlands. More than 500 ships were declared black and the delays caused by the black bans allowed the Indonesian Republic to secure itself and push for a negotiated peace, where otherwise it might have been swept away (Lockwood 1987: 4–6).

While earlier historical accounts of this event lionized the role of Australia's white workers in taking a strong stand against renewed conflict and imperialism, recent studies have revised this narrative significantly. Instead, the emphasis has turned to the role of 'foreign workers' in Australia at the end of the war – the Chinese, Indonesian and Indian seafarers who maintained the maritime arteries of Asia – and placed these workers in their rightful position as highly conscious, well organised anti-imperialist members of a transnational coalition determined to ensure independence not just for Indonesia, but for all victims of colonialism.

The Wartime Situation for Labour in Australia

The war in the Pacific, which had begun with the Japanese assault on China in 1937, saw the imperial Japanese forces cut a wide swathe through the colonial regimes of South-East Asia, sweeping British and Dutch forces from their colonies in Malaya and the Indies, and gaining de facto control of Cochin China from collaborationist France. The speed with which the Japanese had been able to clear these forces from their positions was staggering, and caused a large number of Dutch and British vessels that were manned by sailors from China, India, and Indonesia to find themselves in Australian waters, with thousands of stateless workers (Cottle and Keys 2008: 2–3). The NEI elite also retreated south, establishing themselves in Australia as a government in exile and bringing with them a retinue of up to 10,000 Indonesians including sailors, soldiers, and their most dangerous political prisoners from the Tanah Merah concentration camp (Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981: 168).

Formally excluded from Australia's existing unions, and seen as naturally subservient and unfit for unionism by the ideology of 'White Australia' dominant in the labour movement, Asian seafarers had taken steps to organise themselves during the war. Chinese sailors who found themselves stranded in Australia on vessels commandeered for wartime service took strike action for wages owed to them in Fremantle in 1942, where two of their own died at the hands of police violently dispersing their picket. The Seamen's Union of Australia (SUA) negotiated with the Chinese sailors to join the Australian Army and provide other assistance to the war effort, while at the same time an independent branch of the Chinese Seamen's Union (CSU) – technically an affiliate of the Kuomintang that had existed since 1913 – was established in Australia under militant leadership and with the endorsement of the SUA. By the end of the war, the CSU could claim a well-organised membership in the hundreds (Cottle 2003: 138).

Indonesian seamen likewise took action with the support of the SUA for better wages and conditions on board ships during the war, and by the end of the war had seen their monthly wages increase twentyfold (Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981: 171). Indian sailors had also been organising, with a major strike in 1939 securing better wages and conditions throughout the Commonwealth, although they were still largely an unknown factor in industrial struggles and, unlike the Indonesians or Chinese, had no significant communal bonds in Australia (Balachandran 2008: 65).

Within this context, one of the most significant issues facing the Allied powers as the end of the war drew closer was the issue of decolonisation – an issue that was most pressing in the Asia Pacific region, where the retreating forces of imperial Japan had acceded to the demands of nationalist movements and granted independence to former European colonies. The war-shattered European powers were keen to resume exploiting the resources of their lost colonial possessions, and Australia, which had become the home of the displaced colonial apparatus of the NEI, was expected to be the rallying point of the push to restore the status quo ante (see Dorling 1994: x).

Initial Strikes of 1945–46

News of the Indonesian declaration of independence was broadcast by shortwave radio to Australia, and within 2 days desertions from the Dutch government in exile were occurring. Australia was home to an active network of Indonesian nationalists thanks to the release in 1943 (under Australian pressure) of the prisoners transported from the Tanah Merah concentration camp. These ex-prisoners had put their release to good work, and had established Indonesian Independence Committees in major ports that actively propagandised to the Indonesian sailors (Lockwood 1982: 33–35).

Within a week of the declaration of independence, the Dutch ships in Australia were preparing to sail back to the archipelago – with Indonesian sailors manning them – to re-establish 'order'.

The Indonesian Seamen's Union had been monitoring radio from the Indies when the Republic was declared, and with the support of Australia's maritime unions had resolved to mutiny. By early September 1945, several thousand Indonesian sailors were refusing to man their ships, and the Indonesian Seamen's Union was working with the Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF) and the SUA to place a ban on any shipments to aid the Dutch and their allies in their struggle with the Indonesian Republican forces (Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981: 171). The CSU organised food and supplies for Indonesian sailors left stranded in Australia – including for more than 60 patients who had been expelled from a Dutch-run tuberculosis clinic (Cottle 2003: 146).

On 23 September, the WWF and SUA declared all Dutch ships destined for the Indies 'black'. Dutch forces began using coercion to attempt to get their employees back to work, but to no avail. Nevertheless, there was still a lack of co-ordination on the part of workers, and Indian mariners had continued working Dutch ships, to the confusion and anger of some strikers. Indian sailors had quietly alerted waterside workers to the fact that they were being compelled to load munitions and other military supplies onto ships bound for Java. The Indian Seamens' Union in Australia organised for a mass liberation of workers being coerced on ships in Sydney Harbour, with a flotilla of small boats ferrying Indian soldiers to land from the *Patras*, where they had been held at gunpoint. In other instances, Indian sailors agreed to work ships, only to withdraw their labour at the critical moment that a ship was to leave port, causing maximum disruption. When British forces, concerned by the problems the Dutch were having in re-establishing order, flew Indian sailors by military transport to Australia to scab on the ban, they were met by Indian union organisers asking them to join the strike. The overwhelming majority of these workers did so. Indian organisers also went ship to ship, eventually organising more than a thousand Indian sailors (Goodall 2008: 53–59; Lockwood 1982: 149–155).

The leader of the Country Party, the third largest political party, denounced the strikers as 'busy running rickshaws through White Australia' (quoted in Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981: 171). The Dutch ships, unable to get the necessary coal from the waterside workers or the necessary manpower, remained idle in Australian ports.

The demands of troublesome foreign workers from Indonesia, China, and India to be repatriated were acceded to from late 1945 through 1947, but the white maritime unionists in Australia were committed to the strike and continued the bans. Attempts by the Dutch to bypass the bans by manning ships with army personnel or fuel ships with firewood failed. Some 31 unions joined the strike, and the bans were retrospectively endorsed by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the peak organisation for unions (Lockwood 1982: 189).

In desperation, the commander of South-East Asia Command, Lord Mountbatten, flew to Australia in March 1946 to negotiate directly with the union movement and Australian government to lift the ban. The leader of the SUA informed Mountbatten that no Dutch ships would leave Australian waters unless expressly approved by the Indonesian Republic. Mountbatten was unable to secure this approval from the Indonesian prime minister, Sjahrir (Fitzpatrick and Cahill 1981: 175).

The conservative press campaigned against the ban, declaring that Australian unionists were holding up 'mercy ships' filled with medical supplies for war-ravaged Asia, despite evidence provided by maritime workers that every single 'mercy' ship was carrying weapons and war supplies. Pressure from the Federal Government led to the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council and the ACTU rescinding its support of the boycott. Only the WWF and SUA pledged to continue the boycott until asked to lift it by the Indonesian government. A small union of coal lumpers (comprising around 30 members) was induced to break the ban in mid- 1946, and most Dutch ships were able to limp out of Australian ports crewed by ex-internees and military personnel. It was 11 months after the declaration of independence that the last Dutch military ship was able to leave Australia, and the ban – though still in place theoretically – became a dead letter as the Dutch military steered clear of Australia or were able to avoid engaging Australian workers for work covered by WWF and the SUA (Lockwood 1982: 211–214).

The Bans Return (1947)

The Dutch were still hopeful of being able to rescue military supplies still in Australia and, in July 1947, WWF Secretary Jim Healy publicly threatened reprisals after a Dutch ship in Melbourne began loading army vehicles (Lockwood 1982: 215). The isolation of the maritime unions still engaging in a boycott was short-lived. In July 1947, the Dutch launched attacks on Republican forces across Indonesia, in breach of undertakings they had given the Indonesian nationalists and the international community to negotiate a peaceful settlement. This was the first 'Police Action' – a phrase concocted to sidestep potential breaches of the new United Nations charter.

The effect in Australia was immediate, with a spontaneous reimposition of bans on Dutch ships by workers covered by the Building Workers' and the Amalgamated Engineers' unions. There was also a significant shift in official policy with the

government's Stevedoring Industry Commission instructing its Brisbane Port affiliate to refuse requests from Dutch ships to refuel and repair (Lockwood 1982: 215–217). The Australian government also referred the actions to the United Nations as a breach of the peace – the first such instance for the new international body (Dorling 1994: vii). An August 1947 meeting of the ACTU, which had been active in breaking the previous ban, passed a motion calling on all Australian trade unionists to refuse to handle any Dutch goods until the ACTU had received advice from the United Nations and the Indonesian trade union movement (Lockwood 1982: 218).

This opposition continued through to the second 'Police Action' of 1948, which was met with similar levels of resistance and provoked significant opposition across class divides. Though only two Dutch ships were in Australian waters, they were denied tugs and were unable to have cargo loaded or unloaded. More importantly, Australians took to the streets to voice their support for Indonesian independence and the new international order. Hundreds of students joined maritime workers in protests, and the first student 'riot' in Australian history led to the arrest of several students of the University of Sydney. The bans continued in place until the formal transfer of sovereignty negotiated by the Dutch and Indonesian nationalists (Barcan 2002: 196–198).

Towards a World Boycott

The strikes against Dutch shipping were not isolated to Australia, although Australia's proximity to the contested islands magnified the significance of strikes there. The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union of America under Harry Bridges, the dock-workers of London and New Zealand all at some point during Indonesia's struggle for independence withheld labour on Dutch ships or goods in support of Indonesia's claims, as did the dockworkers of Ceylon, Singapore, the Philippines, and China in a truly international boycott aimed at isolating the intransigent Dutch (Lockwood 1982: 228–230).

Motivation of Workers Participating in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle

There were naturally different motivations for labour organisations to take part in the bans. The first distinction that must be made is between the two types of union which simultaneously engaged in strike action against Dutch interests: the formal, almost exclusively white Australian trade unions, and the semi-legal 'foreign worker' unions that had been formed by colonial subjects who found themselves in Australia during the war. The CSU and the Indian Seamen's Union both looked to the nationalist movements in their homelands for political direction; the Indonesian Seamen's' Union in Australia was formed solely within Australia with political guidance from the Tanah Merah network of former political prisoners.

The motives of these foreign-worker unions are clear: as a social group, all were victims of colonisation, and as workers in the dangerous and extremely stratified seafaring industry, the workers shared a common bond of racial and class oppression. The 'foreign-worker' unions in Australia were already notoriously restive, all three having taken action at various times for improved conditions and Australian rates of pay. The war had thrown the imperial division of the world into chaos, and a sense of solidarity was strong enough to transcend ethnic divisions and the usual 'divide and rule' tactics of colonial authorities. These workers were united not just by their exclusion from the white workforce: the CSU and Indonesian Seamen's Unions both had members from the Chinese diaspora community of Java, and many Indian and Indonesian seamen shared a common Islamic faith. Despite this, anti-colonialism was the key to their coalition. At one banquet organised by Indian sailors to thank their supporters, strike leader Mohamed T. Hussain gave a speech in which he declared:

> There can be no new world while there are any people who are slaves of others … The winning of freedom in Indonesia will surely be followed by the freedom of India. For that reason we must do everything possible to see that the Dutch are driven out of Indonesia. (Quoted in Goodall 2008: 55)

The motives of the 'white' unions are more complex. On the one hand, it is clear that sections of the union movement and the communist leadership of the maritime unions in particular were sympathetic to the cause of decolonisation and autonomous unionising amongst Asian sailors. Jim Healy and Elliot V. Elliot, the leaders of the WWF and SUA respectively, were doctrinaire Stalinists who would have been fully aware and supportive of the post-war Popular Front policies of the communist movement which included a renewed emphasis on peace, internationalism, and national liberation for imperial subjects.

Preventing another war into which Australia would be dragged, this time against the nationalists of Indonesia, also loomed large in the rationale of senior union leaders for their support for the ban. This reasoning has spurred much of the mythologising of the black ban, with Jim Healy's biography including the (most likely) apocryphal story of his first public declaration on the Indonesian independence campaign:

> Indonesia is calling, calling for our help, for a black ban on all ships. They call on us to stall the armada with which they would start a new war in the Pacific. Haven't we had enough of war? (Williams 1975: 60)

While it is true that support for decolonisation and war weariness were important factors for the unions in taking a principled stand for Indonesian independence, the WWF – which went the farthest of any union in preventing Dutch forces access to Australian ports – also had its own motives for flexing its industrial muscle, and the Indonesian Revolution can be seen in many ways as the first opportunity that presented itself.

The WWF had been forced to back down over the so-called 'pig iron' dispute of 1937–38, and the Dutch bans were an opportunity to prosecute again the case of conscientious objection. In 1937, workers in some Australian ports – inspired by Popular Front anti-fascism and egged on by communist agitators – refused to load scrap iron on to ships bound for Japan, citing their right to conscientious objection. Workers argued that Australian scrap iron was contributing to Japan's war machine and that it wouldn't be long before

Australia 'got it back in bullets'. The Lyons Government, which had previously expressed guarded sympathy for fascism, quickly moved to stop the dispute escalating into a national ban and to get the 'whar-fies' back to work. Threatened by invocation of the punitive measures in the Transport Workers Act (which had previously been used to 'break' the union on the Melbourne docks), the disorganised union was unable to expand or sustain the strike and was forced into an embarrassing retreat by its own membership without, however, surrendering the principle of conscientious objection to certain jobs (Lockwood 1987: 208).

The war, which in many ways proved the anti-fascist dockworkers right, greatly strengthened the position of the union as it performed the vital role of organising the waterfront for Australia's war effort. At the same time, the exact strength of the union could not be tested as the war placed a dampener on strikes and political activities in the name of the fight against fascism. The union leadership was co-opted onto the Stevedoring Industrial Commission, and worked hand in hand with the Labour Government to improve productivity in exchange for concessions that secured the WWF position on the docks and brought some stability to workers. The end of the war meant that the union leadership could use these concessions and its position of power to fulfil the union's political policy (Beasley 1996: 115–118).

Importance of the Strike to History of Decolonisation of South-East Asia

The strikes and bans that struck Dutch shipping in Australia reveal some important aspects of decolonisation in the aftermath of the Second World War. Firstly, they demonstrate that a transnational anti-imperialist coalition could be formed on the ground, and that support for this coalition was secure enough for people to risk significant punishment to support its anti-colonial actions. No group represented this more than the sailors from India, who walked off their ships or flatly refused orders from their bosses in opposition to the Dutch attempts to reclaim Indonesia. These men suffered great personal punishment for their

stand. Each was labelled a deserter on their discharge papers, effectively barring them from working for any of the large international shipping lines. That the workers of China, India, and Indonesia were striving and suffering for their common goal of ending colonialism a full decade before the Bandung Conference of 1955 shows that there was a heightened consciousness amongst the masses of the links between groups exploited by colonial and imperial structures of domination, not just amongst the educated elite.

Secondly, the strikes provide evidence of the ways that the war had seriously weakened the imperial project in the Pacific. The old colonial apparatus had been swept away by the Japanese, who supported certain nationalist groups with the aim of developing a 'Co-prosperity Sphere' in Asia free from Western imperialism. It would have taken more bloodshed and war to re-establish the colonial states in Asia that the West's elite wanted. But Allied victory in the war had been predicated on class collaboration and the full strength of the working class being integrated into the war effort. When this was withdrawn after the war (due to unhappiness with the self-denial inherent in wartime labour conditions and war weariness), the balance of forces in Western society was ultimately for peace and against intervention in imperial ventures, at least until the Cold War hardened political thinking and isolated pacifism from the political mainstream. (See Hobsbawm (1994: 45–49) for a broad view of what twentieth-century 'total war' meant. Zinn (2005: 407–442) challenged the idea of the Second World War as a 'people's war'.)

Another important element of this struggle is the way that the participants used the language and symbolism of supporting the Atlantic Charter and United Nations in defending their actions. A new language and symbolism had been introduced into the global discourse on colonialism and imperialism. Opponents of the Dutch – be they far-left communists or centre-right anti-intervention liberals, white Australians, or Indian seafarers – couched their demands in the language of support for the principles of the Atlantic Charter. This Charter and its promises of non-intervention, equality, and world peace became

more than an agreement between nations, but also a challenge to national elites from their own citizens to refrain from imperial and colonial enterprises that violated these aspirations. Future actions, such as the anti-apartheid movement and the promotion of human rights, followed this pattern of appeals to a universal standard.

Cross-References

▶ British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia
▶ Maoism, Nationalism, and Anti-colonialism
▶ Nationalisation
▶ Pan-Asianism
▶ Philippines and Imperialism

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Labour Aristocracy

▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation

Labour Force Exploitation

▶ Political Economy of the European Periphery

Labour Imperialism

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Definition

Labour imperialism is the concept that has been developed to describe one labour movement dominating or seeking to dominate the labour movement of another political community, and is overwhelmingly based on analyses of the international activities of the American Federation of Labor, both before and after its 1955 merger with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, creating the AFL-CIO (hereafter styled Labour). Although sometimes used interchangeably with 'trade union

imperialism' (e.g., Thomson and Larson 1978), 'labour imperialism' is the more encompassing term as it includes working with militaries and other right-wing forces, including right-wing labour organisations, while 'trade union imperialism' limits itself to dominating unions.

Introduction

This essay explains the concept of labour imperialism. It begins with a theoretical discussion and then focuses on findings from empirical research. It next discusses three periods of research findings to illuminate the processes by which this conceptualisation has developed, and then presents Kim Scipes's argument about the role of American Nationalism in the development of US labour imperialism. It discusses the work of the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center with the US Government's National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Finally, it discusses efforts within the American labour movement to challenge this labour imperialism of the AFL-CIO.

Theoretical Discussion

Building on the work of Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1989), Kim Scipes (2010b) discusses the former's conceptualisation of imperialism, and extends it to certain acts by labour, which Nederveen Pieterse does not. Importantly, Nederveen Pieterse's conceptualisation goes *beyond* that of the Marxists, and he argues that, 'imperialism is *domination extended* across *political community borders*' (Scipes 2010b, p. 467). Scipes explains:

A political community usually refers to a nation-state; however, while including nation-states in this category, Nederveen Pieterse's understanding of imperialism extends beyond the nation-state level. He recognizes that because of external domination during past history, groups who share common culture, traditions, languages, and political organization (i.e., 'political communities') may have been incorporated within the boundaries of other political communities. Examples of this include Native American nations being incorporated into the U.S., the Palestinians into Israel, the Kurds into Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, and certainly this is

also true of the indigenous people around the world. Thus, instead of ignoring these peoples or making them irrelevant by confining the understanding of imperialism to only nation-states, Nederveen Pieterse broadens the conceptualization of imperialism to include the domination of one political community over another, and this can exist within the current boundaries of a nation-state; these cross-political community border relationships are based on unequal power relations, with the stronger dominating the weaker.

Nederveen Pieterse also sees different levels of domination. Instead of just confining the concept to political communities, however, he recognises different levels of domination, which can be at a super-state level and a substate level.

In other words, Nederveen Pieterse not only expands the concept of imperialism on a horizontal axis through broadening it to include domination across political community borders, but he also extends it vertically by including different levels of domination. It is in recognizing that domination can take place at a level *below* nation-state domination that allows Labour's across-political-community-borders domination to be included within the concept of imperialism. (468)

And finally, Nederveen Pieterse's conceptualisation is not economistic. In addition to the Marxist claim that imperialism can be for economic gain (i.e. profit), he 'recognizes that imperial domination also can be implemented to achieve political power in the global realm, such as through geostrategic positioning, and through mobilizing and/or controlling social forces in other countries for the benefit of the imperialist force'. These, however, are often in combination, so 'the issue is not a dichotomous categorisation and choice between economics or politics, but rather is a search for primacy at any one time and/or situation: in other words, economic motivations may be primary with political ones secondary, and in others, political control may be primary, and economic ones secondary' (468).

Empirical Findings

Scipes has applied this conceptualisation to theoretically understand the five sets of interrelated empirical findings on the AFL-CIO's foreign

policy programme. This has shown that Labour has actively sought to dominate foreign labour movements since the early years of the twentieth century under Samuel Gompers, and that it continues to do so today despite changes suggested in the early years of the [John] Sweeney Administration:

- Labour's foreign-policy leaders have worked to help overthrow democratically elected governments, have collaborated with reactionary, pro-dictator labour movements against progressive labour movements, and have supported reactionary labour movements against progressive governments (Scipes 2000, p. 12; see among others Andrews 1991; Armstrong et al. 1988; Barry and Preusch 1986; Bronstein and Johnston 1985; Buhle 1999; Cantor and Schor 1987; Carew 1998; Filipelli 1989; Hirsch 1974, n.d. [1975]; Hirsch and Muir 1987; Morris 1967; Nack 1999; Radosh 1969; Schmidt 1978; Scipes 1986, 1990, 1996, pp. 116–125; Scott 1978; Shorrock and Selvaggio 1986; Sims 1992; Snow 1964; Spalding 1984; Weinrub and Bollinger 1987; see also Barker 2011; Bass 2012; Cox and Bass 2012; Rahman and Langford 2014; Scipes 2004a, 2005b, c, 2007a, b, 2010a, b; Sustar 2005).

- This dominative project is a product of forces *within* the labour movement, and not of *external* forces such as the US government, White House and/or the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Scipes 1989; see also Andrews 1991; Briogi 2013; Carew 1998; Chenoweth 2013; Dower 2013; Filipelli 1989; Hughes 2011, 2013; Nack 1999; Scipes 2010a, b; Stoner 2013; Von Bülow 2013.)

- Labour's foreign-policy leaders have voluntarily chosen to be conscious actors in major initiatives by the US State (Carew 1998; Chenoweth 2013; Correa 2013; Dower 2013; Filipelli 1989; Hughes 2011, 2013; Scipes 1989, 2000, 2005a, b, c, 2007b, 2010a, pp. 83–112; 2010b; Sustar 2005; Van Goethem 2013; Vergara 2013; Wehrle 2013).

- Labour imperialism has been carried out in union members' 'name' yet behind union members' backs, and Labour's foreign-policy leaders have refused to 'come clean' about past operations even when union members have advanced their request for information through established labour-movement processes and procedures (Hirsch 1974, 2004; Scipes 2004b, 2005d, 2010a;

- Labour activists have fought over the years in opposition to this domination (Battista 2002; Hirsch 1974, n.d. [1975], 2004; Hirsch and Muir 1987; Nack 1999; Scipes 1989, 2004b, 2010a, pp. 69–82; Scipes 2012, 2014b; Shorrock 1999, 2002, 2003; Zweig 2005, 2014).

'In short, the range of operations in this effort to dominate labour globally has been extremely well-established, and has generally been referred to as "Labour imperialism"' (Scipes 2010b, pp. 466–467).

Accordingly, the key word that we get from understanding 'labour imperialism' is domination.

Literature Review

Although the subject is not generally well known, there have actually been a considerable number of studies published on Labour's foreign policy over the years (this section is heavily based on Scipes 2010a, pp. xxi–xxiv). The literature critically examining Labour's foreign policy (critical labour foreign-policy studies) has gone through three stages. These have included both exposés and analysis of Labour operations around the world, variously seeing factors internal to or external from the labour movement as being responsible for these operations.

The first stage, which began in the mid-to-late 1960s and continued into the late 1970s, began with a series of exposés. This period ended with George Schmidt's (1978) exposé of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) involvement in Labour's foreign operations, and Jack Scott's 1978 study of US Labour's operations in Latin America. Most important in this period, however, was Ronald Radosh's 1969 book *Labor and*

United States Foreign Policy, which tried to explain why Labour had such a terrible foreign policy. Radosh's claim was that Labour was acting as an agent of the US government, and that external forces were driving this reactionary foreign policy. Radosh's claim had a long-standing influence on the field of critical labour foreign-policy studies, in which for many years his claim of external forces operating in some form or another was accepted.

Critical labour foreign-policy studies entered a resurgent second stage in the mid-to-late 1980s, and this extended into the early 1990s. Stimulated by US government efforts to overthrow the revolution in Nicaragua, and to counter-act revolutionary processes in Guatemala and especially El Salvador, there was an explosion of interest in and publication of studies about Labour's foreign policy, especially in Latin America but elsewhere as well. This work paid off during the mid-1980s as the National Labor Committee was able to prevent the AFL-CIO leadership from endorsing President Reagan's apparent plan to invade the region (Battista 2002).

This second period was largely a period of exposé, and understanding of Labour's efforts greatly expanded. Like the first period, this one had a summarising book: Beth Sims's 1992 *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in US Foreign Policy*, which tried to explain why these efforts took place, and why Labour's foreign policy had been so bad. She too focused on external forces, but with a more sophisticated effort. Sims focused on actors within Labour's foreign-policy 'establishment' and their ties with right-wing political networks, basically suggesting that Labour had been infiltrated and, because of the success of these efforts, had acted against its own efforts (see Scipes 1993 for a review of this important book.)

The third period, which continues today but which overlaps the end of the second one, begins with the publication of an article by this author on the origins of Labour's foreign policy (Scipes 1989). This author rejected the argument that external factors were responsible for Labour's foreign policy, and through a careful examination of the development of business unionism under

Samuel Gompers, not only focused on internal factors but argued that Labour's adoption of business unionism in an imperialist country led to at least passive and, later, active support for US imperialism (this article was updated in Scipes 2010a, pp. 1–25).

Writing independently, four other authors subsequently came to the conclusion that internal factors were responsible for Labour's foreign policy: Ronald L. Filipelli (1989) studied US Labour's activities in Italy between 1943 and 1953; Gregg Andrews (1991) studied the role of the AFL in the Mexican Revolution; Anthony Carew (1998) studied the interjection of CIA funding in post-Second World War Labour operations in Europe; and David Nack (1999) focused on the role of internal conflict within the AFL between progressives and reactionaries around events in Russia beginning with the 1905 Revolution, and demonstrated how the reactionaries' victory then became a force in determining US foreign policy in response to the Soviet Revolution of October 1917. These four works, along with Scipes's 1989 piece, have conclusively established that Labour's foreign policy and operations are determined internally and not externally.

The third period has seen the emergence of a new twist in critical labour foreign-policy studies. Following John Sweeney's election as President of the AFL-CIO in October 1995, there was the hope that Labour would play a positive role internationally. Instead of just criticising what Labour has done, there were several articles published by people in or close to the AFL-CIO who argued for the need for international labour solidarity with workers around the world: see Banks 1998; Blackwell 1998; Figueroa 1998; Mantsios 1998; Shailor 1998; Shailor and Kourpias 1998.

There has also been exposés of Labour's foreign operations in this third period, some historical and some contemporary. This author wrote about the affects of AFL-CIO operations in the Philippines during the 1980s (Scipes 1986, 1990, 1996), and in Chile in the early 1970s (Scipes 2000). Anthony Carew (1998) wrote about AFL efforts in Western Europe in the early post-Second World War years. Paul Buhle (1999) had some

interesting insights into the historical development of Labour's foreign policy. James Ciment and Immanuel Ness (1999) wrote about the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and its role in funding current Labour operations. Douglas Valentine (1999) wrote about the role of drug trafficking in funding at least some of Irving Brown's work for the AFL in Europe during the late 1940s. And Peter Rachleff (2000) wrote about Labour's efforts in Mexico during the late 1990s to undercut organising among railroad workers against privatisation.

However, the third period has also seen the intensification of efforts within the labour movement itself to challenge AFL-CIO foreign policy and operations. Scipes's 2000 piece – which revolved around a detailed account of Labour's operations in destabilising the democratically elected Allende Government in Chile in the early 1970s –was actually questioning whether Labour wanted to expand on John Sweeney's then more progressive approach to foreign policy, or revert back to the reactionary policies under George Meany and Lane Kirkland (Scipes 2000). Judy Ancel's (2000) response to this article supported Scipes's approach, and argued that we had to recognise that much of Labour's foreign policy was a result of trying to globalise business unionism.

However, Scipes has subsequently repudiated this idea of 'trying to globalize business unionism' as the motivating factor for Labour's imperialism:

> What holds all of this together, what explains Labor's well-established history and contemporary activities described by the concept of 'labor imperialism'? It is argued here that the acceptance and propagation of Labor imperialism is an ideological construct. ... what has guided the Labour movement's foreign policy has been American Nationalism, the idea that the US is unequivocally *the* best country in the world, and that it *should* run the world.

... Labor imperialism flows from the belief in American Nationalism – which is based on race, empire and capitalism (Nederveen Pieterse 1989), *and* the superiority of the 'American' version of each. This is joined with Labor's conscious unwillingness to challenge the efforts of the US Government around the world. At the same time, Labor's foreign policy leaders attempt to impose American 'union beliefs' (as developed by a few key people) and business unionism on workers in other countries for the further wellbeing of the US Empire from US Labor's perspective.

> In other words, Labor imperialism accepts capitalism, and has traditionally accepted race and empire. However, the [2004] actions of the California AFL-CIO have shown that business unionism can accept or reject race and empire; it does not automatically include race and empire. Therefore, the decision whether to accept race and empire is a conscious choice. The argument is that AFL/AFL-CIO Presidents Gompers, Meany, Kirkland, and Sweeney [and Trumka], and their foreign policy teams, have each accepted race and empire, usually at the expense of the US Labor movement [and workers throughout the developing world]. (Scipes 2010b, p. 473, emphasis in the original).

Where this can be most clearly seen is in the Solidarity Center's key participation in the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

National Endowment for Democracy

Although the decision to work with the US government in its foreign-policy efforts was made and continuously reaffirmed by top leaders of the AFL-CIO – without ever telling most of its leaders or the rank-and-file members – it is notable that US trade unions have chosen to work with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (see Robinson 1996; Scipes 2010a, pp. 96–105).

Before going into details, it is important to note what NED is and is not. First of all, it has *nothing* to do with the democracy we are taught in civics classes, concerning one person-one-vote with everyone affected having a say in the decision, etc. (This is commonly known as 'popular' or grassroots democracy.) The NED opposes this kind of democracy. The NED promotes top-down, elite, constrained (or 'polyarchal') democracy. This is the democracy where the elites get to decide the candidates or questions suitable to go before the people – and always limits the choices to what the elites are comfortable with. Once the elites have made their decision, *then* the people are presented with the 'choice' of which the elites

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approve. And then NED prattles on with its nonsense about how it is 'promoting democracy around the world.'

The other thing to note about NED is that it is *not* independent despite what it claims *ad nauseam.* Operating from funds provided annually by the US government, it was created by the US Congress and signed into US law in 1983 by President Ronald Reagan (that staunch defender of democracy). Additionally, its Board of Directors is drawn from among the elites in the US government's foreign-policy-making realm. Past Board members have included Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, General Wesley K. Clark, and Paul Wolfowitz. Perhaps most notable among today's board members is Elliot Abrams of Reagan Administration fame.

In reality, NED is part of the US Empire's tools, and is 'independent' only in the sense that no elected presidential administration can directly alter its composition or activities, even if it wants to. Its initial project director, Professor Allen Weinstein of Georgetown University admitted in the *Washington Post* of 22 September 1991 that 'a lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA'. In other words, according to Professor William Robinson in his book *Promoting Polyarchy,* NED is a product of a US government foreign-policy shift from 'earlier strategies to contain social and political mobilisation through a focus on control of the state and governmental apparatus' to a process of 'democracy promotion' whereby 'the United States and local elites thoroughly penetrate civil society, and from therein, assure control over popular mobilization and mass movements' (Robinson 1996, p. 69). What this means, as I note in my 2010 book *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?* is that 'instead of waiting for a client government to be threatened by its people and then responding, US foreign policy shifted to intervening in the civil society of a country "of interest" (as defined by US foreign policy goals) before popular mobilization could become significant, and by supporting certain groups and certain politicians, then channel any potential

mobilization in the direction desired by the US Government' (Scipes 2010a, p. 96).

Obviously, this also means that these 'civil society' organisations can be used offensively as well, against any government the US opposes. NED funding, for example, was used in all of the 'color revolutions' in Eastern Europe, is currently a factor in Ukraine as well as elsewhere, and continues to be used in Venezuela (Golinger 2014; Scipes 2014a).

How do they operate? The NED has four 'institutes' through which they work: the International Republican Institute (currently headed by US senator John McCain), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (currently headed by former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright), the Center for International Private Enterprise (the international wing of the US Chamber of Commerce), and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), also known as the Solidarity Center. The latter is the foreign-policy operation of the AFL-CIO, with Richard Trumka the head of its board of directors. The NED gives grants (allocated by the US Congress) to each of these organisations, both to fund their activities and for them to pass on to 'affiliated' organisations. Approximately 90% of the Solidarity Center's budget each year is provided by the NED or other US government departments or agencies (Scipes 2010a).

As documented, ACILS was indirectly involved in the 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela by participating in meetings beforehand with leaders later involved in the coup, and then denying afterwards the involvement of the leaders of the right-wing labour organisation (CTV) in the coup, leaders of an organisation long affiliated with the AFL-CIO. The NED overall had been active in Venezuela since 1997 (Scipes 2010a, pp. 56–66).

The NED and its institutes continue to actively fund projects in Venezuela today (this section is heavily based on Scipes 2014a). From the 2012 NED Annual Report, we see they had provided $1,338,331 to organisations and projects in Venezuela that year alone: $120,125 on projects for 'accountability'; $470,870 on 'civic education'; $96,400 on 'democratic ideas and values';

$105,000 on 'freedom of information'; $92,265 on 'human rights'; $216,063 on 'political processes'; $34,962 on 'rule of law'; $45,000 on 'strengthening political institutions'; and $153,646 on the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).

Additionally, however, as found on the NED 'Latin American and Caribbean' regional page, NED has granted $465,000 to ACILS to advance NED objectives of 'freedom of association' in the region, with another $380,000 destined for Venezuela and Colombia. This is in addition to another $645,000 to the International Republican Institute, and $750,000 to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

The irony of these pious claims for 'freedom of association' and so forth is that Venezuela has developed public participation to one of the highest levels in the world, and has one of the most free media in the world. Even with massive private TV media involvement in the 2002 coup, the government did not take away their right to broadcast afterwards.

In other words, NED and its institutes – specifically including the Solidarity Center – are not active in Venezuela to help promote democracy, as they claim, but in fact, to act against popular democracy in an effort to restore the rule of the elite top-down democracy. They want to take popular democracy away from those nasty Chavistas, and show who is boss in the US Empire.

Discussion

> This labour imperialism has not gone unchallenged within US Labour. Activists challenging the AFL-CIO foreign-policy programme have met with significant success, most notably in California. The 25th Biennial California State AFL-CIO Convention in July handed a stunning rebuke to national-level foreign policy leaders of the AFL-CIO at their state convention in San Diego.' Over 400 representatives of the state's almost 2.5 million organized workers, about one-sixth of the labour federation's membership, adopted the 'Build Unity and Trust Among Workers Worldwide' resolution. (Scipes 2004b)

However, when taken to the 2005 national convention of the AFL-CIO, this resolution was not even allowed to be discussed on the floor, much less voted upon (Scipes 2005d). This challenge has not risen since to this level of direct contestation.

While he admits that activists have been unable to win the AFL-CIO Executive Council to this position, Scipes argues that, nonetheless, the dominant narrative has been so challenged that the cultural groundwork has been laid for an 'alternative globalization movement [to emerge] in labor', although whether it will do so remains to be seen (Scipes 2012).

Interestingly, within Labour, the work of USLAW (US Labor Against the War) has developed on the ground somewhat in parallel to the efforts of those challenging labour imperialism as a whole, which have been organised by the Worker to Worker Solidarity Committee (WWSC). However, USLAW has developed far beyond the WWSC, and been considerably more successful (Scipes 2012; see Zweig 2005, 2014).

As a result of labour activists' growing opposition to the AFL-CIO's foreign policy program, what appears to be the result of internal differences *within* the AFL-CIO and especially among staff members within the International Affairs Department, and efforts such as US Labor Against War, the Solidarity Center *has* carried out some progressive projects, perhaps most notably in Central America and in the Dominican Republic, as well as in Iraq and Bangladesh (see Scipes 2010a, pp. 73, 218, endnotes 12 & 13; and Armbruster-Sandoval 2013; see also Kumar and Mahoney 2014; Rahman and Langford 2014; Zweig 2014).

However, while unable to yet confirm, it appears to this writer that the Solidarity Center has made some internal decisions regarding its projects around the world, perhaps classifying them into areas strategic and non-strategic to the US Empire, and allowing progressive projects to take place in the nonstrategic areas or strategic areas (such as Iraq) where considerable pressure from within the labour movement to do good things has been developed. As far as this author knows, there have been no detailed published reports by the Solidarity Center of their operations in the former Communist-led states in Eastern

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Europe or Russia, nor in oil-producing countries around the world, especially in the Middle East, nor have there been any reports by independent researchers about their efforts in many parts of the world.

Thus, while I am glad to know they are doing some things in some places that are progressive or at least not totally detrimental, as long as the Solidarity Center is integrally tied to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – see Scipes 2010a, pp. 96–105 – then the charge of engaging in labour imperialism, regarding the overall program, remains. See also Barker 2011. For an indepth study of the Solidarity Center's operations from 2002–09, see Bass 2012. See also Scipes 2014a.

Nonetheless, a collection published in 2013 (Waters and van Goethem 2013) appears to be a political challenge to the 'labor imperialism' school. Focusing on AFL and AFL-CIO efforts during the Cold War, they suggest a more nuanced analysis of AFL-CIO operations. However, while contributing some additional empirical research, close examination shows that they affirm the point made by writers within the labour imperialism school since 1989: that this labour imperialist foreign policy has emerged from within the labour movement. Their enhanced nuance is really over a 'straw person' argument: they argue workers have resisted AFL-CIO domination, yet no-one, to this author's recollection, has argued otherwise. Ironically, while trying to weaken the 'labour imperialism' school, this collection actually strengthens its claims (Scipes 2014c).

Conclusion

This essay has established theoretically and empirically the concept of labour imperialism. It has placed AFL-CIO operations under the auspices of the National Endowment for Democracy. Further, it has discussed some of the impact that challenges to this labour imperialism have had upon the AFL-CIO leadership, including some efforts by the AFL-CIO to support workers overseas, especially in areas non-strategic to the US Empire or in strategic areas where significant

Labour support has been built by activists, as USLAW has done with Iraqi labour activists.

The AFL-CIO leadership has painted itself into a corner. They have shown so little leadership at home in the US that the labour movement today represents only about 11% of all workers – in the private sector, it is below 7% (lower than in 1900). As shown at the 2013 National Convention, they are (desperately) seeking outside allies to bolster their power and impact. The problem they face is that activists in other movements know about their foreign operations, and many are reluctant to join in what is euphemistically referred to as the 'AFL-CIA'. The choice the leadership will have to confront – probably sooner than later – is this: Do they continue to support the US Empire (whose leaders are actively trying to disembowel Labour's power at home), or do they reject the US Empire so they can join other social and political movements here and abroad, and offer a real option to working people? Stay tuned.

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Labour Party

▶ British Left and Imperialism: The Fainthearted Internationalists

Labour Segmentation

▶ Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International

Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation

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Definition

This essay begins by outlining several influential theories of economic imperialism and examines how these relate to the segmentation and stratification of the working class. It then looks at the new international division of labour to understand the growth and enlargement of unequal exchange and capital export imperialism, providing empirical estimates of international value transfer. The conclusion highlights some of the most salient political effects of imperialist class structuration and considers the prospects for anti-imperialist trends at the global level. The essay aims to demonstrate that imperialism is not a matter of history, but a primary factor influencing the course of events in today's world.

Synonyms

Class; Embourgeoisement; Imperialism; Labour aristocracy

Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation

> I was in the East End of London (a working-class quarter) yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread! bread!' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism . . .. My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists. (Cecil Rhodes, 1895, quoted in Lenin 1960/1916, 694)

This essay begins by introducing several influential theories of imperialism and examining how these relate to the segmentation and stratification of the working class. The second section looks at the new international division of labour to understand the growth and enlargement of unequal exchange and capital export imperialism. The third section provides empirical estimates of international value transfer. The conclusion of the essay highlights some of the most salient political effects of imperialist class structuration and considers the prospects for anti-imperialist trends at the global level. The essay aims to demonstrate that imperialism is not a matter of history, but a primary factor influencing the course of events in today's world.

Classical Theories of Imperialism and the Labour Aristocracy

The following section introduces the theory of imperialism and its relationship to the concept of the labour aristocracy, that section of the working class which benefits materially from imperialism and the super-exploitation of oppressed-nation workers (Cope 2012: 122). In particular, we outline the views of some of the most important writers on the subject, namely, Hobson, Lenin, Amin, and Emmanuel.

Hobson

Hobson was a British economist whose foundational experience was the Great Depression of the late 1800s. Proposing an explanation for the same, Hobson developed a theory of under-consumption which argued that as capitalism developed there would be insufficient demand for its manufactures. Hobson's views on under-consumption were first set out in his *Physiology of Industry*. The second key experience in his career was the time he spent in South Africa as a correspondent during the Boer War. Hobson properly viewed that war as resulting from a tension between the mining interests of supporters of imperialism (like Cecil Rhodes) and the farming interests of Boer settlers (Hobson 1900: 197).

In light of these experiences, Hobson suggested that British capital (personified by Rhodes himself) was behind the drive for expansion of the British Empire. He concluded that imperialism was a characteristic of late capitalist development where capital was more productively invested outside of Britain:

> It is open to imperialists to argue thus: 'We must have markets for our growing manufactures, we must have new outlets for the investment of our surplus capital and for the energies of the adventurous surplus of our population: such expansion is a necessity of life to a nation with our great and growing powers of production. An ever larger share of our population is devoted to the manufactures and commerce of towns, and is thus dependent for life and work upon food and raw materials from foreign lands. In order to buy and pay for these things we must sell our goods abroad'. (Hobson 2005: 70–71)

Rivalry with other imperial powers was one of the key economic facts that helped bring about this situation. For Hobson, the erosion of British industrial supremacy resulting from competition with Germany, the US and Belgium made it difficult to 'dispose of the full surplus of our manufactures at a profit' (71). In Hobson's view, a specific type of capitalist, investors, was behind the drive to imperialism. Hobson noted that social inequality ensures that '[large] savings are made which cannot find any profitable investment in this country; they must find employment elsewhere, and it is to the advantage of the nation that they should be employed as largely as possible in lands where they can be utilized in opening up markets for British trade and employment for British enterprise' (73).

Hobson believed that imperialism would result in a situation whereby entire regions of the world would become parasitic upon the labour and resources of colonial territories. Discussing the economic prospects liable to result from the imperialist partitioning of China, Hobson writes:

> The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of England, in the Riviera and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a larger body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa . . . . (314)

Lenin

The principal motivation for Lenin to develop his analysis of imperialism was the outbreak of the First World War and the associated breakdown of international socialist solidarity.

In Lenin's theory there are five key components:

> (1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation on the basis of this 'finance capital', of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves; and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. (Lenin 1960/1916, 700)

Lenin's theory of imperialism develops the idea of parasitism, denoting a situation whereby the imperialist countries are transformed into rentier states:

> The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies. (ibid.)

For Lenin, investors export capital to obtain 'superprofits', higher profits than are available within their own countries due to lower wages, cheap raw materials, and the ability to secure a monopoly.

Lenin argued that the source of imperialism was investment rather than trade. Citing Hobson, Lenin noted that '[the] income of the rentiers is five times greater than the income obtained from the foreign trade of the biggest "trading" country in the world! This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism' (ibid.). In its original form, Lenin's investment-focused theory of imperialism can be seen as being in tension with later theories of unequal exchange emphasising the role of trade.

In Lenin's theory, one of the most important consequences of imperialism was its impact on the class structure of the imperialist countries. Lenin argued that the benefits of imperialism would not be restricted to capitalists, but would instead be spread to other classes in imperialist societies, including the working class. There is contention within Marxist theory and ambiguity within Lenin's writings about the extent to which the working class are 'bribed', both in terms of the percentage of the working class thus endowed, and the sum of the subvention. However, Lenin settled upon a broad conception of the labour aristocracy as encompassing much of the working class of the imperialist countries:

> Why does England's monopoly [industrial and colonial] explain the (temporary) victory of opportunism in England? Because monopoly yields superprofits [the] capitalists can devote a part (and not a small one, at that!) of these superprofits to bribe their own workers, to create something like an alliance between the workers of the given nation and their capitalists against the other countries. (ibid.)

Lenin's thinking on imperialism and the labour aristocracy rests on several pillars. First, he emphasises the role of monopoly capitalism, a theme that would later be carried forward by theorists such as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy in the US. Secondly, he focuses on capital export as the principal means to secure super-profits. Finally, Lenin argues, imperialist states attempt to buy off the domestic workforce to avoid the possibility of revolutionary change. As will be seen in the

subsequent discussion of unequal exchange, there are theories of imperialism that presume neither the existence of monopoly capital, the export of capital, nor any conscious decision by capitalists to bribe the working class on their home soil.

Amin

The majority of Amin's work was concerned with imperialism, unequal exchange, and what he called the law of worldwide value. Amin's position is influenced by the tradition of Baran, Sweezy, and Magdoff in that the motive forces driving imperialism are monopolies (Brolin 2007: 243). It therefore contrasts with Emmanuel's perspective, which places the wages and living standards of imperialist-country workers front and centre of his theory of unequal exchange.

Amin's concept of imperialist rent – profits realised through imperialism – is central to understanding the ways wealthy countries transfer value from the Third World. For Amin, the appropriation of imperialist rent defines capitalism from the moment of its inception (84). Capitalism has not homogenised the world's economic conditions over time, but has instead hardened and deepened the asymmetries between imperialist countries and 'peripheral' economies.

In the most recent edition of his *The Law of Worldwide Value,* Amin was more open about the role of imperialist-country workers as beneficiaries of imperialism and the impact this has had on workers' internationalism (Amin 2010: 91–93). While not using the term 'labour aristocracy', he is clear that the exploitation of the peripheries is the material basis upon which the consensus between imperialist capital and imperialist-country workers rests. For Amin, however, '[the] Southern nations by their victories would create conditions in the North that would once again challenge the consensus founded on profits deriving from imperialist rent. The advance posts of the Northern peoples are dependent on defeat of the imperialist states in their confrontation with the Southern nations' (111).

By contrast with Emmanuel, who was more forthright than most Marxists about class antagonism between imperialist-country workers and workers in the Third World, Amin has typically been softer on this question. Brolin, for instance, suggests that '[the] popularity of Samir Amin ... is largely explained not only by his attempting to place unequal exchange in a perspective where productivity differences matter more, but also ... by the theoretical vagueness on this point, and by his drawing the politically correct conclusion' (Brolin 2007: 243).

Emmanuel

Emmanuel's theory places trade at the centre of imperialism. The basic premise of Emmanuel's *Unequal Exchange* (1972) is that the relative mobility of capital and the relative immobility of labour are fundamental features of the world economy. As a result, the international rate of profit has a tendency to become equal, whereas wage levels in different countries remain unequal. For Emmanuel, differences in wages explain differences in commodity prices. With immobility of labour undergirding international wage and, therefore, price differentials, Emmanuel explains national wage levels as the product of a number of factors which are primarily institutional.

Emmanuel, following Marx, considered that the value of labour power goes beyond the minimum costs of sustaining and reproducing the physiological capacity to work. Historically determined moral and cultural factors (most importantly, the power relationship between labour and capital as manifested, in particular, by the success of the trade union movement in securing gains for workers) establish national wage levels (116–123).

For Emmanuel, unequal exchange occurs through trade between high-wage countries and low-wage countries. As high wages are built into commodity prices in high-wage countries, the goods produced therein command a significantly higher number of goods from low-wage countries. Thus, high wage countries develop quickly and low-wage countries slowly. Wages, then, are the cause, rather than the effect, of economic development. Emmanuel's theory implies that

solidarity between workers of high- and low-wage countries is unlikely with the material interests of each group of workers being diametrically opposed.

Changes in Global Production and the Global Division of Labour

Common to all of the above theories is their formulation in a world where the imperialist countries were the centres of world industry. The international division of labour prior to decolonisation largely involved the production of raw materials in the periphery and the production of manufactured goods in the metropolitan countries. This no longer holds true in the twenty-first century. The well-documented decline of First-World manufacturing beginning in the 1980s has led to a situation today where most primary commodity production *and manufacturing* is done in the Third World. Most First-World workers are employed in 'services', primarily jobs in retail, hospitality, administration, and finance. Thus, the OECD (2011b: 168) reports that, 'on average, services now account for about 70% of OECD GDP'.

Both the unequal exchange (UE) and the capital export imperialism (CEI) paradigms can shed light on this new international division of labour. Complementing these are the theories of imperialist rent and producer/consumer states.

Contemporary Theories of Imperialism

A recent attempt to apply UE in a way that accounts for the post-industrial nature of First-World capitalism is in combination with the global commodity chain perspective (Heintz 2003). A simple summary of global commodity chains is that they 'explicate the interorganisational dynamics of global industries in order to understand where, how, and by whom value is created and distributed' (Appelbaum and Gereffi 1994: 42). Commodity chain analysis was developed by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 159) as a means of explaining transfers of value between countries.

Heintz's (2003) main contribution is to use global commodity chain analysis as a way of bringing UE theory into line with contemporary conditions. In doing so, his analysis reconciles the Leninist approaches to imperialism based on investment by monopoly capital and the Emmanuelist approach based on a competitive global market generating unequal exchange. Thus, Heintz notes that 'one of the key features of global commodity chains is the differences in market power that are evident as we move along the chain. Subcontractors and direct producers face highly competitive conditions while brand name multinationals and large retailers enjoy a much higher degree of monopolistic influence' (11).

Following Amin, a number of theorists have attempted to advance the concept of imperialist rent and explore questions of international worker solidarity under conditions of 'globalisation'. Higginbottom (2013), for example, has applied the concept of imperialist rent to describe the way British firms extract value from South Africa through mining corporations and the importance this has in bolstering the British economy. Like Emmanuel and Amin, he continues a tradition of theorists who see problems for international workers' solidarity in light of this global division.

The most significant work in recent times on the issue of the labour aristocracy, however, has been Cope's *Divided World, Divided Class (DWDC)*. The central argument in *DWDC* is that the ubiquitous white nationalism and cultural elitism of societies in the global North is not the result of false consciousness, misinformation, indoctrination, or ignorance to the extent assumed by much of the political left. Rather, these are ideological expressions of the shared economic interest of a variety of social strata in the First World in maintaining imperialism (Cope 2012: 11).

Critical to *DWDC* is the evidence base around unequal exchange and capital export imperialism. Specifically, Cope measures parasitism effected through the transfer of surplus labour internationally by means of analysing and correlating such economic and demographic variables as income distribution, wage levels, profit flows, trade and investment patterns, growth rates, price levels,

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industrial output, productivity, unit labour costs, working hours, the composition of imports and exports, occupational structure, and labour supply at national, regional, international, and global levels. Cope follows classical Marxist thinking in positing a clear distinction between prices, profits, and surplus value. For Cope, 'super-profits' are not the result of higher profit rates in the Third World but, rather, of monopoly capitalist accumulation based upon higher rates of exploitation there.

Producer and Consumer States

The concepts of producer and consumer states were developed by Kerswell in order to explain a situation where a country's workforce moves from being a net producer of surplus value to being a net consumer of surplus value. States where the majority of workers are employed in productive labour (within capitalist national accounting this is typically agriculture or industry, but some services may also be considered productive) are known as producer states. By contrast, those economies where the majority of the labour force is not employed in productive labour are consumer states. The definition of 'productive' becomes critical in determining the existence of parasitism in the contemporary global division of labour.

Following Marx, Shaikh and Tonak (1994: 20–21) conceived four forms of activity which every society must carry out, namely, production, circulation, distribution and reproduction of the social order. Shaikh (1980) developed a fifth concept of 'social and personal consumption' to distinguish between consumption that occurs in the course of production and consumption in general. Savran and Tonak (1999: 121–127) demonstrated that in a Marxist sense (where production is an activity which produces use values through the transformation of nature for the purpose of expanding capital), activities concerned with circulation, distribution, and reproduction of the social order and consumption are not productive activities. As such, they subtract from rather than add to the total social product.

Capitalist societies where most workers are not engaged in productive work can exist in one of two ways. First, unit labour costs in the domestic productive sector may be so low as to compensate for the unproductive work done in the rest of the economy (Kerswell 2012: 342). This may be due to the super-exploitation of a group of people *within* the same state; for example, slaves or those facing national oppression, racism, and/or discrimination because of their status as undocumented migrants (342–343). The second case is where an exploitative economic relationship exists *between* states leading to the transfer of value from producer states to consumer states. Under this model, the material basis of consumer states is value imported by means of imperialist rent or unequal exchange. Such states may also be conceptualised as rentier states (Beblawi 1990: 87–88). The main thrust of Kerswell's argument is to recognise the producers of the peripheries as the primary creators of worldwide value (Kerswell 2012: 345).

Empirical Estimates of Global Value Transfer

We propose herein to measure international value transfer resulting from CEI *and* UE. Both of these theories are fundamentally based upon the labour theory of value and we do not consider them contradictory. However, rather than combine our respective estimates of surplus value transfer (1) by means of CEI (surplus value exported from capital-importing countries through the exploitation of their low-wage labour) and (2) by means of UE (surplus value transferred via the under-valuation of non-OECD goods and the overvaluation of OECD goods vis-à-vis average socially necessary labour), and thereby risk double-counting, we shall attempt to distinguish super-profits thus obtained. We propose to do so by weighting our estimates of super-profits obtained through capital export (whether through investment or loans) by the ratio between the nominal value of non-OECD production (industry and agriculture) and that of non-OECD merchandise exports. This should allow for a rough estimate of value generated by

internal non-OECD sales and, hence, the sum of value entering OECD countries represented as money capital as opposed to that portion imported by means of undervalued commodities. We will then add both estimates of surplus value transfer and compare the combined dollar value with the sum of non-OECD labour hours required to produce it, comparing this total with total production labour hours in the OECD. We thereby demonstrate the reliance of the capitalist nations of the global North upon the uncompensated labour of the capitalist nations of the global South.

Estimates of global value transfer necessarily rely on data that measure the results of transactions in marketplaces, not value-generation in production processes. Specifically, GDP or value-added figures represent not the value that a particular firm, nation, or world region has added, but their share of the total value created by all firms competing within the global economy as a whole. For Smith (2012: 86), reliance on GDP as a measure of value creation results in 'a systematic under-estimation of the real contribution of low--wage workers in the global South to global wealth, and a corresponding exaggerated measure of the domestic product of the US and other imperialist countries' and the 'misrepresentation of value captured as value added'. As an economic measure, 'value added' is extraneous to the amount of actual 'domestic' production it purports to quantify. If GDP were an accurate measure of a nation's product, employees in Bermuda, an offshore tax haven boasting the world's highest per capita GDP and producing virtually nothing, are amongst the most productive workers in the world. Unlike much left political economy, which is content to repeat only those conclusions provided for in capitalist accounting terms, we aim to present economic processes within the context of international class relations.

The much-vaunted superior 'productivity' of First World workers (value added per unit of labour, especially as measured in time as opposed to unit cost) is regularly used to justify the prevailing unequal global wage dispensation. For both liberals and Eurocentric Marxists, global wage differentials are the mechanical effect of productivity differentials resulting from

differences in the level of countries' productive forces (these conceived as ineluctably national in origin). By contrast, we argue that although the uneven and dependent development of the productive forces in Third-World countries conditions the value of labour-power (Amin 1977: 194), as Marx (1977/1867: 53) argued, an hour of average socially necessary labour always yields an equal amount of value independently of variations in physical productivity, hence the tendency for labour-saving technological change to depress the rate of profit. Although increased productivity results in the creation of more use values per unit of time, only the intensified consumption of labour power can generate added (exchange) value. Since wages are not the price for the result of labour but the price for labour power, higher wages are not the consequence of (short-term) productivity gains accruing to capital. Rather, in a capitalist society, the product of machinery belongs to the capitalist and not the worker, just as in a feudal or tributary society part of the product of the soil belongs to the landlord, not the peasant (Engels 1995/1884). Nor is the difference between simple and compound (skilled and unskilled) labour at the root of global wage differentials. It is normal today for a completely unskilled and/or unproductive worker to be paid significantly more than a highly skilled and/or productive worker, or for a highly skilled worker in one sector to be paid significantly more than another in the same sector.

As Jedlicki (2007) argues, value-added figures already incorporate those wage and capital differentials which Western socialists justify in the name of superior First-World productivity. In doing so, 'a demonstration is carried out by using as proof what constitutes, precisely, the object of demonstration' (ibid.). The present essay, by contrast, considers that the value of labour-power is a product of global market forces:

> Wage goods which represent the real counterparts of the value of labour power are in fact also international goods with international value. If the labour-day is the same in countries A and B (eight hours, for example) and the real wage of the proletariat is 10 times higher in B (real wage in B equivalent to 10 kilograms of wheat per day as against only one kilogram in A), and world output of wheat

(where wheat productivity is highest) is 10 kilograms in four hours, the rate of surplus value in B will be 100 percent (four hours of necessary labour and four hours of surplus labour) while it will be 1900 percent in A (twenty-four minutes of necessary labour and seven hours and thirty-six minutes of surplus labour). This reasoning does not call for a comparison between the productivities of the two capitalist productions in which A and B specialise; it is meaningless to do so. (Amin 1977: 187–188)

It is incorrect to say, as Emmanuel does, that the products exported by the periphery are specifically produced by the periphery. Rather, as Amin (1977: 209) notes: 'most of the Third World exports are raw materials produced both at the centre and at the periphery: crude oil is produced by the United States and the Arab countries, cotton in the United States and India, iron ore in Europe and Africa. Many of these raw materials are close substitutes for one another: tropical oilseeds and those from the temperate zones, natural fibres and rubber and their synthetic substitutes, tropical fruits and those of Europe'. Moreover, the techniques used to produce most of the exports from the Third World are the same as those used at the centre, in the same branches, particularly those dominated by the monopoly capital that controls the modern export industries of the Third World, including those producing for local markets. However, real wages are much lower in the periphery (211). Thus, Amin defines unequal exchange as 'the exchange of products whose production involves wage differentials greater than those of productivity' (ibid.).

Bracketing the difficulties involved in using value-added figures on productivity to measure rates of exploitation and global surplus value transfer, however, we will placate social chauvinist apologies for global wage differentials and assume *ad arguendum* that productivity may be defined in purely price-based terms. Thus correcting for divergences in productivity, we find that divergences in wages exceed these such that there is a huge transfer of uncompensated value from the neo-colonial periphery to the imperialist centre of the world economy. Our intention throughout the following calculations is to reasonably correlate value-transfer estimates with estimates of the abstract universal labour

(average socially necessary labour time) involved in production.

First, we obtained the total full-time equivalent global workforce in industry and agriculture by multiplying the economically active population (EAP) in each of 184 countries by the rate of full employment for its corresponding global income quintile and then by multiplying this total by the percentage of each country's workforce in industry and agriculture. The figure thus obtained was, finally, multiplied by 133%, since we have defined 'under-employment' as being employed for only one-third of the hours of a full-time worker (CIA World Factbook 2012; ILO LABORSTA Database; Köhler 2005).

In 2010, the OECD accounted for 16.5% of the total full-time equivalent global workforce in industry and agriculture of approximately 1.15 billion, or 190 million workers, whilst the full-time equivalent non-OECD workforce in industry and agriculture accounted for 83.5% of the total, or 960 million workers. Merchandise exports from the non-OECD to the OECD were nominally worth US\$5.2 rillion and merchandise exports from the OECD to the non-OECD were worth US\$2.5 trillion (see Fig. 4). The "import content of exports" measure provides an estimate of the value of imported intermediate goods and services subsequently embodied in exports. Changes in the same can reveal the evolution of domestic value added due to exporting activities. In 2005, the average import content of OECD exports was 33% and the average import content of non-OECD exports was 17% (see Fig. 1). Weighing the nominal value of goods exports by that portion that was added domestically, we can say that OECD to non- OECD goods exports were worth (US\$2.5 trillion * 0.67) US\$1.68 trillion; and non-OECD to OECD goods exports were worth (US\$5.2 trillion * 0.83) US\$4.32 trillion, or 13.1% and 60.8% of total value added in industry and agriculture of the OECD (US\$12.8 trillion) and non-OECD (US7.1 rillion), respectively. Therefore, we can say that the domestic value-added export-weighted workforce of the non-OECD to OECD goods sector is (960 million * 0.61) 585,600,000 workers, and the domestic value-added export-weighted workforce of the

Fig. 1 Import Content of Exports (%), 2005. (Source: OECD 2011b)

Country	%
Non-OECD Average	17
OECD Average	33
Russian Federation	11
New Zealand	18
United States	12
Australia	14
Brazil	14
South Africa	15
Japan	15
Norway	16
Indonesia	18
India	19
United Kingdom	19
Turkey	22
Greece	26
France	27
Germany	27
China	27
Canada	27
Italy	29
Poland	31
Sweden	33
Spain	34
Austria	35
Netherlands	35
Denmark	35
Mexico	37
Israel	38
Finland	38
Korea	39
Portugal	39
Belgium	43
Slovenia	46
Czech Republic	48
Slovak Republic	49
Ireland	51
Estonia	51
Hungary	56
Luxembourg	60

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OECD to non-OECD goods sector is (190 million ∗ 0.13) 24,700,000 workers. Each non-OECD worker in the goods exports to the OECD sector generated domestic value-added worth (US$4.32 trillion/585.6 million) US$7,377; and each OECD worker in the goods exports to the non-OECD sector generated domestic value-added worth (US$1.68 trillion/24.7 million) US$68,016. The productivity ratio between the OECD and

non-OECD is, by this measure, (US$68,016/US$7,377) 9.2 (Fig. 2).

Meanwhile, OECD manufacturing workers were paid approximately 11 times more than their non-OECD counterparts in 2012 (see Fig. 3). Thus, wage differentials exceeded productivity differentials by an approximate factor of 1.2 (11/9.2). Adjusted by this figure, which represents a coefficient for the real value of goods exports to

	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Total
OECD	0.4	12.4	31.7	44.5
Non-OECD	2.1	5	10.6	17.7
World	2.5	17.4	42.3	62.2

Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation, Fig. 2 Value Added by Activity in 2010 (US$ Trillions)[a]. (Source: The Economist 2010: 110–242. [a]For Regional GDP data based on United Nations estimates, (see http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnltransfer.asp?fID=2). Approximate sectoral GDP estimates calculated from a sample of 62 countries' value added by activity as percentage of national GDP (The Economist 2010, pp. 110–242). The countries sampled were: (OECD) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States; (non-OECD) Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Agriculture includes farming, fishing, and forestry. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, energy production, and construction. Services cover government activities, communications, transportation, finance, and all other private economic activities that do not produce material goods.)

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Fig. 3 Inflation-Adjusted Average Hourly Manufacturing Wages, 2012[a]. (Source: International Labour Organisation (ILO) LABORSTA Database [a]Hourly wage rates in national currencies for both OECD and non-OECD countries were divided by each region's average working hours in manufacturing; i.e. 39.7 and 42.2 h per week, respectively. National currencies were converted into US dollars using www.google.com, www.coinmill.com, and http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter/. Having converted the latest available wage data for each country into US dollars, these were then adjusted for inflation using The Inflation Calculator http://www.westegg.com/inflation/. This calculation does not account for changes in the value of a country's currency relative to the US dollar from the latest year for which data is available to 2012, nor the possibility of a country's wages having since increased more than inflation.)

the OECD from the non-OECD countries under conditions of equal exchange (equal international distribution of value added according to equivalent productivity) and where the overall price stays the same, non-OECD goods exports should have been worth approximately US$6.24 trillion. Since only US$5.2 trillion was paid for these goods, unrequited value worth over US$1 trillion was transferred from the non-OECD goods exports sector by the OECD in 2012. If OECD

goods exports to the non-OECD were overvalued by the same proportion, then OECD merchandise exports to the non-OECD should only have been worth around (US$2.5 trillion/1.2) US$2 trillion. Since US$2.5 trillion was actually paid for these goods, unrequited value worth US$500 billion was transferred from the non-OECD goods export sector by the OECD in 2012. In total, our very conservative estimate is that around US$1.5 trillion of value was transferred from the non-OECD by means of unequal exchange in 2012.

In 2002, the outward FDI stocks of OECD countries were valued at around 22% of OECD GDP (Economic and Social Research Institute Japan 2006). Assuming rates of FDI have remained constant since then, OECD FDI stock was worth approximately US$9.8 trillion in 2010. FDI in non-OECD countries by OECD countries was around 25% of total outward FDI stock in 2002, and therefore worth approximately US$2.45 trillion in 2010 (ibid). Using US Bureau of Economic Affairs data, Norwood (2011) has calculated that the average rate of return on US direct investments in Central and South America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific was 12.5% (compared to around 9.1% for Europe) in 2009. (The rate of return is measured by dividing income in that year by the average of that year's and the previous year's stock of investment (historical cost basis.) Therefore, repatriated profits from the exploitation of Third-World workers amounted to approximately US$300 billion in 2010.

The difference between the nominal value of OECD profit repatriation and its value were the non-OECD workforce paid according to the median average value of labour-power between the two zones (the median wage pertaining between the average manufacturing wage in the OECD and that in the non-OECD) represents super-profits. In 2012, OECD hourly wages in manufacturing were a mean average US$29.07 per hour, and non-OECD wages in manufacturing were a mean average US$2.66 per hour. OECD manufacturing wages were approximately 11 times those in non-OECD manufacturing, with the median wage pertaining between the two regions being US$15.87, six times the

average value of non-OECD wages and 55% of the value of OECD wages (see Fig. 3). Multiplying the US$300 billion in repatriated profits accruing to the OECD from the non-OECD in 2010 by the average wage factor thus calculated, we can estimate that (US$300 billion * 6 – US$300 billion) US$1.5 trillion of uncompensated value was transferred from the non-OECD to the OECD in 2010. However, in order to distinguish uncompensated value transfer from returns on imperialist capital export alone from that portion resulting from unequal exchange of commodities at equivalent productivity, we will weigh our estimate of super-profits from capital export imperialism by the share of total non-OECD value added in agriculture and industry (US$7.1 trillion) that is greater than the value of non-OECD commodities exports to the OECD (US$5.2 trillion), namely, 27%. Accordingly, we estimate that approximately (US$1.5 trillion * 0.27) US$405 billion of uncompensated value was transferred from the non-OECD to the OECD by means of capital export imperialism in 2012.

Combining these estimates of global value transfer due to unequal exchange and capital export imperialism, and ignoring value transferred by means of transfer pricing, royalties from intellectual property rights, and interest on loans (Babones et al. 2012: pp. 199–200), we can say that approximately US$1.9 trillion worth of value was transferred from the non-OECD to the OECD sui *gratia* in 2012. Weighing this total against the number of full-time equivalent non-OECD workers in agriculture and industry required to produce it, we may estimate the total amount of value (as measured in average socially necessary labour time) that the OECD extracts from the non-OECD and, hence, the rate of surplus value pertaining in the OECD itself. Thus, 960 million full-time equivalent non-OECD workers in industry and agriculture created a nominal value added of US$7.1 trillion in 2010. As such, we can say that if the uncompensated value transferred from the non-OECD to the OECD in 2012 amounted to 26.8% of the total value of non-OECD industry and agriculture, then this represents the surplus labour of (960 million * 0.27) 259,200,000 workers. That means that for

every one fulltime equivalent worker employed in OECD industry and agriculture (190 million), there are 1.4 non-OECD workers in industry and agriculture working for free alongside her. By this estimate, the rate of surplus value or of exploitation (i.e., the ratio of surplus labour to necessary labour) is negative for the OECD countries (Fig. 4).

This analysis is corroborated by a more straightforward comparison between the share in global consumption and the contribution to global production of each of the world's income deciles.

In Fig. 5 below, the EAP is defined as all persons who furnish the supply of labour for the production of goods and services. As such, the EAP includes hundreds of millions of persons engaged in private, so-called subsistence farming in the Third World. We have favoured Eurocentric assumptions that subsistence farmers contribute nothing to global production (even though most contribute money rent to capitalist landlords and supply goods for sale on the market), and have assumed that only wage-labour capable of generating surplus value is productive. Total global

Non-OECD   **OECD**

Category	Non-OECD	OECD
Non-OECD to OECD Merchandise Exports Weighted by Domestic Value-Added (US$ trillions)	4.32	
OECD to Non-OECD Merchandise Exports Weighted by Domestic Value-Added (US$ trillions)		1.68
Total Merchandise Exports (US$ trillions)	9.0	9.3
Total Merchandise Exports to Non-OECD (US$ trillions)	3.8	2.5
Total Merchandise Exports to OECD (US$ trillions)	5.2	6.8
Fuels and Mining Exports to Non-OECD (US$ trillions)	2.0	0.4
Fuels and Mining Exports to OECD (US$ trillions)	2.8	0.9
Agricultural Exports to Non-OECD (US$ trillions)	0.4	0.3
Agricultural Exports to OECD (US$ trillions)	0.5	0.7
Manufactures Exports to Non-OECD (US$ trillions)	1.4	1.9
Manufactures Exports to OECD (US$ trillions)	1.9	5.2

Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation, Fig. 4 Value of World Merchandise Trade, 20i2[a]. (Source: OECD 2011a; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2013; World Trade Organisation 2007, 2011. [a]Figures for merchandise trade shares are approximate, based on 34.3% of North American merchandise exports and 20.4% of European merchandise exports going to South and Central America, the CIS countries (Commonwealth of Independent States, the former Soviet Union), Africa, the Middle East and Asia, respectively, and 42.6% of South and Central American, 58% of CIS, 52.9% of African, 20.9% of Middle Eastern and 34.3% of Asian merchandise exports going to North America and Europe, respectively.)

Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation, Fig. 5 Global Exploitation Index, Production/Consumption Ratio for World Income Deciles. (Sources: CIA World Factbook 2012; ILO LABORSTA Database; Köhler (2005); Piketty and Saez (2004); United Nations Statistics Division n.d.)

production is defined as the working hours of full-time equivalent production-sector wage-employment in all countries. As above, the total production workforce was obtained by multiplying the EAP in each country by the rate of full employment for its corresponding global income quintile and then by multiplying this total by the percentage of each country's workforce in industry and agriculture. The figure thus obtained was then multiplied by 133%. To calculate capitalists' share of household income expenditure, Piketty and Saez's (2004) measure of the income share of the top echelons of the US income distribution (42%) has been used as a global benchmark. Subtracting the share of wealth of the top 10% of the population from total household consumption expenditure figures for each country allows a focused comparison of relations between the world's working and middle classes (i.e. the bottom 90% of the population).

In Fig. 5, each of the world's working- and middle-class income decile's contribution to global production is divided by its share in global consumption to arrive at a rate of exploitation, a level beyond which households consume more than they produce. The illustration shows that the top 20% of the world's population consumes an average 4.6 times more than it produces. Those countries where the bottom 90% of the population consumes more than double their share in global

production are, in descending order of magnitude: Hong Kong, Luxembourg, US, The Bahamas, Norway, Kuwait, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Israel, Canada, Netherlands, Kyrgyzstan, Belgium, France, Germany, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Italy, Singapore, Sweden, Austria, New Zealand, Finland, Iceland, Spain, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Barbados, and the Republic of Korea. For a better understanding of national disparities between consumption and production it is, of course, necessary to determine the degree of inequality within the bottom 90% of the population. Nonetheless, these figures make it clear that those working- and middle-class populations inhabiting countries in the top 30–20% of the world by income are consuming almost exactly what they produce. The majority of the world's working class and middle class, in countries whose combined populations are at least 70% of the world total, meanwhile, is consuming significantly less than it produces, by an average factor of 4.8.

The Political Results and Prospects of Mass Embourgeoisement

The 'imperial endowment' (Alexander 1996: 59) enjoyed by the Western European world has provided it with inconceivably large subsidies for its

nascent industry and subsequent productivity in the form of:

- The addition of nearly 10 million square miles to Western Europe's 2 million square miles of territory by 1900, and the ongoing occupation of a quarter of the earth's most productive land;
- The theft of up to 20 million Africans and their subsequent enslavement;
- The indentured servitude of millions of Asian workers;
- The onerous taxation of millions of colonial peasants;
- The plunder of hundreds of tons of gold and thousands of tons of silver from Latin America alone, without which Western capital markets would have been impossible;
- The import of underpriced colonial foods, industrial materials, and medicines including cotton, maize, wheat, rice, potatoes, rubber, tea, tomatoes, turkeys and countless other products;
- The deliberate destruction of colonial industries and the capture of guaranteed markets for Western manufactures;
- The wholesale restructuration of colonial markets to serve Western interests;
- The unrestrained use of land and natural resources as dumps for toxic waste and other noxious by-products of industry; and
- The unequal trade and tariff regulations that negatively impact the profit margins of Third-World exporters (Alexander 1996: 59–70).

Propaganda by the corporate media and governments of the *haute bourgeoisie* augments and provides popular justification for the national, ethnic, and racial hierarchies established through job discrimination, segregation, and imperialism. In contemporary Western culture, reflex racist tropes concerning the 'cultures' of Third-World peoples prevail. The more backward aspects of social and political life in the global South have become magnified, hypostatised, and detached in people's minds from the historical legacies and current realities of economic dependence, exploitation by imperialist capital and its local clients, and violent oppression maintained by the

principal institutions of the former colonial powers and their successors. Yet those forces of democracy championing the rights and interests of workers, women, ethnic minorities, and oppressed nationalities remain the principal enemies of the imperialists and their domestic supports. Insofar as imperialism is able to maintain conservative structures of class rule, so must all the forces of progress be set on the back foot especially, but certainly not exclusively, in the poorer nations.

Whilst it is scarcely conceivable that a bourgeois working-class or labour aristocracy such as is described here should have the organisational wherewithal, the strategic vision, or the material interest to identify its short-term welfare with that of the majority working class in the global South, ultimately, no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations (Engels). The industrialisation of the Third World, especially following the restoration of capitalism in China, led to an explosion of foreign investment and the exponential growth of world trade. Under neo-liberalism, global labour arbitrage (Roach 2003) created the conditions for the commercialisation and financialisation of the imperialist economies, with all of the known consequences. In the wake of the Great Recession begun in 2008, the core imperialist powers are increasingly involved in a deadly military effort to shore up their hegemony. This has taken the form of: (1) the subjugation of hitherto sovereign Third-World states, particularly those with insufficiently 'open' economies and too independent leaderships; and (2) heightened tensions with emergent imperialist rivals, principally Russia and China, in order to exclude them from strategic markets, particularly in arms and energy.

In the Third World, the demand for national self-determination is again coming to the fore as imperialism and capitalism have merged symbiotically. The rise of revolutionary national liberation movements and post-colonial states, changes and developments in the productive forces (information, communication, and transport technology) and monopoly capital's drive for new ways to sustain profit rates after the oil crisis of the 1970s are coterminous with the semi-industrialisation of the Third World. Under the

new globalised capitalism, producer and con-
sumer states are bound together through the mech-
anisms of unequal exchange and finance
imperialism. More than ever, for the exploited
working classes of the global South, the struggle
for national sovereignty and the reclamation of the
land to meet popular needs is indissolubly linked
with the struggle against capitalism.

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  1871–1933
▶ 'Global Labour Arbitrage' and the New
  Imperialism
▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism

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Land

▶ Class and Race Complexities in Understanding Large-Scale Land Deals as New Forms of Imperialism in Zimbabwe

Land Disputes

▶ Settler Colonialism: Regional Development and the Dispossession of the Negev Bedouin

Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa

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Definition

The capture of African indigenous land was one of the first acts of imperialism, leading Africans to found movements such as the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society. While coercion was the usual approach adopted by international forces and their comprador local allies, the claim that such land capture would ultimately ensure to the benefit of locals has remained a core logic, as has the international character of the process now regarded as 'land grab.'

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Introduction

The capture of African indigenous land was one of the first acts of imperialism, leading Africans to found movements such as the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society. While coercion was the usual approach adopted by international forces and their comprador local allies, the claim that such land capture would ultimately ensure to the benefit of locals has remained a core logic, as has the international character of the process now regarded as 'land grab'. It is a phenomenon for which mainstream economics is poorly equipped to analyse. A Marxian framework is a better alternative, even if that too requires modification (Obeng-Odoom 2015).

The aim of this essay is, therefore, to adapt a Marxian framework in placing the land-grab discourse within global capitalist dynamics and imperial networks. It conceptualises land grab around the imperialist notion of primitive accumulation and expanded reproduction. While the debate around this subject has been cast into a simplistic binary of whether or not land grab is

tantamount to imperialism and over-emphasis on the newness of land grabbing as argued in international relations scholarship (see Margulis 2012), a synthesis of the current state of knowledge undertaken from a historical materialist perspective clearly shows that there are several similarities between old enclosures and current land grabs; for example in terms of displacement and hence changes in property relations, but also several points of dissimilarity. Indeed, there are new actors, motives, and processes that do not, for example, generate jobs in the industrial sector as old enclosures did. The land grab–imperialism nexus in Africa is therefore better framed as a 'variety of imperialism'.

Thus, rather than restrict our analysis to 'enclosures', based on the assumption that contemporary processes are simply a progression from and modern manifestation of primitive accumulation in Britain which is being extended to partially capitalist spaces of the world, or confine our discussion to the 'newness' of the phenomenon, this essay frames land grabbing as part of the dynamic dialectic processes of accumulation by dispossession and expanded reproduction that are fundamental to the working of capitalism but in ways that sometimes mimic former enclosures but do not exactly follow the paths of the past.

The essay begins with a conceptual discussion of imperialism and anti-imperialism. This background provides a framework through which it discusses empirical examples. The illustration is not exhaustive. It is, instead, limited to land grabbing and imperialism in Africa, where the phenomenon is most advanced and most pervasive. However, the analyses developed are relevant to other regions, especially Latin America where recent research has also revealed growing number of cases of land grabs (Alonso-Fradejas 2012; Berlanga 2012; Borras et al. 2012; Galeano 2012; Urioste 2012; Wilkinson et al. 2012).

Imperialism and Anti-imperialism

As other essays in this work show, imperialism is a slippery concept. The old notions of imperialism offered by thinkers such as Lenin were organically linked to colonialism and the thirst for continuing profit. Later conceptions, such as those offered by Rosa Luxemburg, suggesting that without external markets capitalism would falter, were notably criticised by the African Marxist political economist Amin Samir as too simplistic and not very attentive to imperialism itself. To Samir (1977: 108–109), imperialism means more than the expansion of capitalism, and it is distinctive for intensifying uneven development. It generates a labour aristocracy in the centre and leads to the erosion of backward areas at the periphery constituted by small and medium-scale economic activities that are not competitive. It is typified by the ascent of monopoly capital in the core areas of the world system and the suppression of weaker classes at the periphery. This classical definition is offered by other Marxists, too. They are tied to notions of globalisation and internationalisation. Two commentators writing for the *Review of African Political Economy* put it succinctly as that 'bring imperialism back into the globalisation debate' (Bush and Szeftel 1999). So, there is a strong connection with global expansion of capitalism. But imperialism is not just about capitalism expanding on a global scale. It is, instead, about domination of foreign control. The 'foreign' in the hegemonic process can be by the state or other supranational bodies. There are those who contend that the state has withered due to globalisation and hence imperialism is mainly by other political economic actors such as transnational corporations. A second view positions US power as imperialist and focuses greatly on American expansionism and Zionism. A third holds that imperialism remains mainly in the domain of interstate conflict and rivalry (Dunn 2009: 306–317). This third view is currently the most dominant and is styled as the new imperialism literature (Robinson 2007). David Harvey is a chief advocate of it, emphasising in his book *The New Imperialism* (Harvey 2003) interstate rivalry and how this leads to domination. It has a ring of the classical core–periphery analysis to it and it powerfully shows change and continuity in imperialist processes by highlighting the continuity of 'primitive accumulation' in 'accumulation by dispossession'. Yet its artificial separation

of politics from economics and the placing of one sphere as economic and the other as political have drawn sharp criticism (Brenner 2006; Dunn 2009; Robinson 2007).

To Robinson (2007), contemporary imperialism is broader and multipronged. It is certainly capitalism on a world scale, but the domination is by multiple actors within different class fractions within and without the territory of domination. Power here is diffused rather than wielded mainly by the nation state or the transnational corporation. Similarly, the boundaries, if any, between the economy and the polity are blurred. There is a co-dependence and each sphere has elements of the other while the two are also fused together. But, the hallmarks of imperialism remain ever evident despite the substantial changes in the form or the process. These are empire building, territorial expansion, the alloy of faraway markets previously unarticulated to centres of power, and domination of the weak by the strong classes within an expanding but highly exploitative world system which is frequently portrayed as good for the exploited. Messianic features often imbue the imperialist self-belief in being on a form of holy mission for the good of all (Dunn 2009: 121–127; Stilwell 2012: xviii), although the source of the right to embark on such a pilgrimage of honour is not made explicit. This epoch of imperialism in Africa is a third type, rather different from the two earlier versions recently analysed by Zack-Williams (2013) for the *Review of African Political Economy*. According to Zack-Williams, the first epoch (1875–1945) covered the period of colonialism and fits of independence, and the second epoch was typified by imperialism without by a formal coloniser (1940s and 1950s–1990s). The present imperial process (2000–) is therefore distinct from the old forms of imperialism.

However, like earlier forms of imperialism, the contemporary iteration is organically linked to resistance of various kinds which can be called anti-imperialism, as other essays in this book show. But unlike past forms of anti-imperialism, which emphasised only a workers' revolution, the present struggles are multifaceted, taking the form of various acts of discontent (Moyo and Yeros

2005), not all of which are in the nature of social movements.

Regarding land grabs within an imperialism–anti-imperialism framework is long overdue. However, the question to ask is what forms they take, and of which variety of imperialism and anti-imperialsim they may be. These are empirical questions and so necessarily require that we examine examples on the African continent where the process has been most evident. Besides, dialectical materialism, the approach most widely used to inform analysis of imperialism of whichever variety, is historically specific and places emphasis on praxis (Marx 1990: 17–25). This essay loosely follows that orientation, and will therefore entail concrete examination of material experiences.

Land Grabs: Scale, Uses, Processes

The control of land has a long history going back to the days of the land enclosures in Great Britain. Yet the fencing and control of common land continued in the nineteenth-century colonial era with attempts to declare most indigenous land *terra nullius*, with varying consequences which included displacements and the formation of protest movements such as the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society of Ghana. The postcolonial era saw a continuation of colonial land policies and later so-called 'land reforms' sometimes related to structural adjustment programmes, especially in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where the reaches of the market were extended to widen property relations in land. Such neo-liberal land reforms, which are essentially neo-colonial law making because they are inherited forms of previous policies, have continued to commodify land tenure in the global South (Alden Wily 2013; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Njoh 2013).

Since 2007–08, large tracts of land have been leased to foreign and local interests for periods sometimes as long as 99 years. When GRAIN, the global NGO, first reported this surge in large-scale land acquisition in 2008 (Alden Wily 2012; Borras and Franco 2012), the initial estimates given were 2.5 million ha of land.

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Subsequently, the World Bank updated the figure to 56 million ha around 2010. Now the figure seems to be around 71 million ha (International Land Coalition 2012).

These figures are likely to be conservative and of indicative value only because a substantial number of land deals go unreported, are shrouded in secrecy, and do not make it as far as collation by any central body. Furthermore, some of the countries offering deals have done no proper scientific mapping from which any categorical claims can be made. In the case of South Sudan, for example, one deal was said to be for 600,000 acres in Lainya, but cross-checking shows that the county of Lainya is itself only 340,000 ha in extent (Pearce 2012: 45). More fundamentally, to date, a definition of land grab has remained elusive. The Food and Agriculture Organisation attempted a three-criterion definition in which land grab is said to have occurred only if a transaction in land covers over 1,000 ha, involves foreign governments, and leads to food insecurity. However, this definition has been rejected as parochial and misleading, as it says nothing about the amount of capital that is used in tilling the land and restricts the consequences of land grab to food insecurity (Borras et al. 2012).

While some of the leased land has been put to the development of recreation complexes and other parts to the development of nature reserves, most land-use change has been of four kinds: from food cultivation for local consumption to food cultivation for export; from food to biofuel production; from nonfood to food cultivation; and from non-food to biofuel production (Borras and Franco 2012). These changes are not always clear-cut. In Agogo, Ghana, for example, one transnational land lease entered into by ScanFarm started as jatropha land lease, but the lessees changed the originally agreed use to food production. Sometimes, farms also have different land uses simultaneously (Wisborg 2012). According to International Land Coalition (2012: 4), 78% of land leases are used for agricultural production, with biofuel production taking about 75% of the agricultural category. The rest are for mineral extraction, forest conservation, and tourism.

In addition to 'physical land', water has also been grabbed for the purpose of irrigating the land. In Senegal, a 400,000-acre deal with Saudi Arabia is close to River Senegal which will be the source of irrigation (Pearce 2012: 33). In South Sudan, the new government seems to be negotiating a deal to send water to Egypt by preparing to allow Egypt to construct a canal to channel water from the Nile around the giant Sudd Swamp, which is the second largest swamp in the world and the site of great wildlife diversity and pasture. The canal will enable the Nile to deliver more water to Egypt, much of which currently evaporates from the swamp during its year-long journey (Pearce 2012: 49). Under international law, host countries must generally undertake to provide water to investors as without water the investors cannot fully benefit from their investment. In turn, governments may be sued if, say, in the process of supplying water to their citizens, they are unable to satisfy international private interests (Pearce 2012:102–103).

The identity and methods of the land grabbers vary greatly. Countries, state corporations, private interests, missionaries, NGOs, and universities are all involved. International interests dominate, although there are local actors involved in land deals, too. Unlike pre-2007/8 land leases, the current lessees come from within and without the West, including from countries such as South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and India which have been prominent in land purchases. 'Traditional' land grabbers such as the UK have remained active, too. Three main methods have been used to obtain land leases, namely negotiations with: central government without consulting local government and local chiefs; local chiefs without consulting central and local government and local communitie;, central and local government and local elites, including chiefs, but without consulting other elders in the communities. The triggers or factors influencing success and failure of negotiations are mainly religious affinity, whether indigenous title is recognised, national governments' business policies, and level of development (Maconachie and Fortin 2013; Pearce 2012; Schoneveld et al. 2011). Also, rich governments improve their chances of

seeking land deals by investing in the dilapidated infrastructure of poorer countries in return for land. That is evidently what for a while was going to happen in Kenya where the government of Qatar was to build a billion-dollar port facility in exchange for 100,000 acres of irrigated land on Lamu Island (Pearce 2012: 36).

The role of the global financial institutions, such as the World Bank, has been shadowy, consigned to carrying out studies to identify vacant land such as *Rising Global Interest in Farmland. Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?* (World Bank 2010). Also, they have favoured the registration of titles to make it easier to trade in land. On the part of investors, the financial power houses have offered huge loans, others have directly invested, and many more have offered guarantee and investment advice. Glossy magazines have been produced as has an aggressive campaign to encourage people to invest.

The Many Posited Motives, But Common 'Improvement' Logic

Since the actors vary, specific reasons for obtaining large tracts of land vary too. For some, it is investment; for others, it is food security or sustainable energy development. These reasons are not unconnected. For example, for those who look at investment, they are doing so mainly because the food and energy issues make demand for certain crops higher and hence investment in land is promising. Thus, it is possible to be 'ethical' and rich at the same time, so the argument goes. There are those who stress green growth and for them buying out indigenous owners who destroy the natural environment is a way to attain sustainable development. Neo-liberals have used a discourse of 'economic development' to support the varied motives of land grab. That is, land grab, from the perspective of neo-liberals, is a win-win situation where poor people can be helped while investors help themselves. Land grab, advocates claim, will lead to agricultural modernisation, mechanisation, and hence development in Africa. For neo-liberals, it is a win-win situation where

more food will be produced, more jobs will be created, more investment will flow, and more mechanisation will take place (Collier 2009).

This line of reasoning is familiar. Colonisation was even posited as good for the colonies. As one commentator at a banquet to end slavery observed:

> Men's destiny lies in the South ...To fashion a new Africa, to make the old Africa amenable to civilization – that is the problem. And Europe will solve it. Go forward, the nations! Grasp this land! Take it! ... Change your proletarians into property-owners! Go on, do it! Make roads, make ports, make towns! Grow, cultivate, colonize, multiply! (quoted in Rist 2008: 51, exclamation marks in original)

The ardent supporter of colonialism Cecil Rhodes once noted that 'we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must be imperialist' (quoted in Uzondu 2010: 1).

However, it is not entirely correct to say, as some activists have suggested (Alden Wily 2011), that land grab is the same as colonialism and imperialism. Unlike the experiences in the colonial era, where North–South imperial land relations dominated, as we have seen, the current land grab phenomenon includes South–South deals too. Also, the modus operandi is not always the same. Now obtaining land is mainly through markets; in the past it was mainly through force or *faux* negotiations. To Peluso and Lund (2011: 668), what is new about recent dynamics is the tilling of land for 'new crops with new labour processes and objectives for the growers, new actors and subjects, and new legal and practical instruments for possessing, expropriating, or challenging previous land controls'. To these, as we have seen, it may be added that these recent changes are accompanied by tensions to do with acquiring bodies of water and natural reserves in ways previously unknown – a twist respectively referred to as 'water and green grabs' (see e.g. Fairhead et al. 2012). So, rather than simply positing a new colonialism, it can be argued that

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there are historical continuities and discontinuities. However, on the basis of an analysis of the posited benefits, losses, and resulting questions, we shall argue that contemporary land grabs are best understood as a particular variety of imperialism.

Posited Benefits, Losses, and Hard Questions

In some cases, land grabs have created employment, increased food production, introduced modern equipment in agricultural processes, and increased the circulation of foreign currency in local and national economies. But, to a greater extent, they have displaced large households and populations, created inequality and food insecurity, and dispossessed large sections of the indigenous population of their land (Mwakaje 2012). However, these benefits and costs are not equally borne by different classes.

How to analyse costs and benefits can be done in many ways. One method is to compare the aims and claims of the projects. Another approach is to use the concept of opportunity cost; that is, the cost of the alternative forgone in order to experience land-use change.

Using these methods to analyse the existing evidence, examples abound of projects which have given fewer than the claimed benefits. For instance, jatropha companies in the Pru district in Ghana provide 120 low-income jobs (US$50/ month) for 780 ha of land leased out. While employees like their jobs for the security of income flow, they see that it is better as a complement rather than as a substitute (Schoneveld et al. 2011). In Ethiopia, the Daudi Star Agri has employed only about 12% of the number it promised to do. Where some benefits have accrued, in opportunity cost terms, these have been fewerd benefits accruing to the people who have lost their land. In Togo, for a lease of 2,700 ha of land for 99 years, Global Greenleaf Plc (Greenleaf Togo) has created only 600 jobs (*Stadia Trustees* 2011: 2), and '[a]t the plantation site villages . . . their inhabitants are being helped to relocate to the edges of the plantation or to areas set aside for

the locals' (*Stadia Trustees* 2011: 4). Here, even where jobs have been created, as in Ghana, the people have lost control of their labour. That is, they have shifted from being self-employed to being employees.

Further, there is a creeping tendency to squeeze the control of seeds out of the hands of local farmers and hence make them further dependent on agro business capital. According to Greenleaf Global Plc, in Ghana, early maturing breeds of maize (maturing in 110 days) produced by scientists were going to be used by Greenleaf Global, and for the jatropha plantation in Togo, jatropha seeds were sent from Ghana, (Greenleaf Global Plc 2011). The role of Togolese farmers as seedlings cultivators was thus done away with. While the use of genetically modified seeds and imported varieties may be economically efficient, the gradual disempowerment of farmers by making their skills redundant raises important political-economic concerns.

Evidence also abounds of poor labour conditions on the new farms arising from land use change and dwindling job prospects. In the case of Ghana, for instance, people in the Pru district have got jobs but have failed to obtain leave to enable them to do community work. In Kenya, the agro-missionary entity, Dominion, has failed to give proper medical treatment to workers injured while working (Pearce 2012). The jobs created on the new farms, especially those for the locals with little education, have a tendency to dwindle in number with time when the jobs for which they are qualified are no longer available, as is openly admitted by agribusinesses in Ghana (Schoneveld et al. 2011). There are already signs that engineers, scientists, and other high-profile agri-professionals are preferable to common labourers. Most agribusinesses tout the impressive array of professionals in their teams, and local expertise is hardly valued or it is valued up to the point that it no longer yields sufficient business (Pearce 2012). Related to this is the lack of expertise in host regions and the imported labour from Egypt, especially, but also elsewhere. In one case, a Dubai-based finance group is paying $100 million for one farmer from the US to develop similar American-type farming in Tanzania (Pearce 2012: 36).

The claims that land-use change brings modernisation and food security are equally problematic. Most produce is sent out of the host countries unprocessed. In the few cases of mechanisation, this has come at a cost to the environment as large amounts of natural reserves are destroyed, as found by Schoneveld et al. (2011) in Ghana and Mwakaje (2012) in Tanzania. Also, most food grown locally is exported. For instance, Greenleaf Global PLC planned exporting 70% of the maize it produced locally (Greenleaf Global PLC 2011).

It is not that investment in land has created no benefits; rather that these have been unevenly distributed. Chiefs in countries where customary law is recognised often directly benefit from land deals. In Ghana, chiefs typically compare the benefits from land deals with how much donation they get from settler farmers. Government officials too benefit, and in some cases government officials are used as consultants by some agribusinesses (Schoneveld et al. 2011). In the Bombali and Tonkolili districts of Sierra Leone, the Swiss firm Bovid Agroenergy has invested in a 50-year lease of a large lot of 57,000 ha and changed its use from food production to an export-oriented biofuel project. In so doing, it has expedited de-agrarianisation forces that have put most small-scale farmers out of work and spat them into agribusiness apparatus making them wage labour. While land grab for biofuel production has given some jobs to some individuals, most are only casual labour whose wages are much lower than they were made to believe and a lot more have been rendered jobless (Maconachie and Fortin 2013).

Companies and investors obviously earn a lot more profit, which explains their growing interest. According to Agri Capital Ltd. (2012), a London-based firm investing in Sierra Leone, there was a 16.2% return on investment in its first year of harvest in January 2011, and a promised 7% increase in land value. Most companies pay little or no taxes. Most of these companies get tax waivers, so governments hardly benefit from tax revenues. Indeed, it seems the government of Ghana exempted Greenleaf Plc from corporate taxes for 10 years (Greenleaf Global 2011).

Also, because most of the investors are from countries outside the land-grab area, most of the returns are repatriated to foreign lands. Indeed, in most of the land deals, there are no restrictions on capital flight. In turn, the countries from which the investors originate benefit, while the host countries remain primary producers.

Investors do not benefit equally, of course. Some investors are swindled and obtain little or no rewards for the risks they take. An example is the case of Greenleaf Global Plc which was operating in Ghana and Togo. Investors sunk £8.2 million into land deals with the promise that they would receive a return of about 20% within 12 months when, in fact, no careful prior analysis had been made. Also, the company had claimed it had had a bountiful harvest in 2010 and paid huge returns to investors when, in fact, no such thing had ever happened. In the end, the company was rendered insolvent (Insolvency Service 2012).

The distribution of losses is also uneven. Settler farmers have missed out more than native farmers. For instance, in Ghana, settler farmers are the first targets to lose land. Also, ethnic minorities are left worse off. In Ethiopia, people from the lowlands, historically opposed to the government, lose more of their land than those on the highlands (Makki 2012). Furthermore, the distribution of losses is gendered. Women in Ghana experience the losses differently to men because land often regarded by men as fallow is used by women to grow some vegetables, so when these fallow lands are grabbed women lose out. Given that women do most of the water fetching, outsiders grabbing water lengthens the journey time for them. Similarly, the journey time for looking for firewood seems to have lengthened. While, private agribusinesses claim that such lengthening was already happening after years of destroying their own environment (Schoneveld et al. 2011; Wisborg 2012), evidence from Tanzania disputes such claims (Mwakaje 2012). Curiously, these differential impacts are not creating major conflicts, resistance, or riots, as some Marxist analyses might lead us to expect. Part of the reason is the influence of chiefs. Chiefs are seen as 'owners' or all-knowing in most African countries where the chieftaincy institution remains. Another

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reason is the feeling by settler farmers that they have no rights anyway. A third reason is a feeling that the benefits will come in the future. A fourth is that people feel land deals involving the government must be good. Heavy policing is yet another reason, and the divide-and-rule tactics used by governments create cracks within the ranks of people who have missed out on the so-called benefits of land grabs. Also, international law, sometimes called international investment agreements, supports private expatriate interests over and above local and national interests when the two conflict (Pearce 2012: 102–103; Schoneveld et al. 2011; Wisborg 2012). The most important reason, however, is that there is a general feeling that 'development is coming' and endurance rather than resistance is needed. In one case, in Ghana, a regional director of the Environmental Protection Agency would not insist that companies do the right thing because he did not want to obstruct development (Schoneveld et al. 2011).

Meanwhile, land grab is widening income and social inequality. By the very nature of the distribution of benefits and losses, people who have are getting more, while the rest are struggling. According to Pearce (2012: 78), there is now an 'enclave economy' in which land grabbers and their cronies live in great prosperity, while the others struggle to make ends meet. Social inequality has been linked to poor health, poor food security, crime, grime, and unhappiness. Poverty eventually worsens when these worsen. Indeed, the massive displacement illustrates the growing inequality. In Gambella, Ethiopia, the government has launched the villagisation project in which some 180,000 people will be resettled in areas where, according to the government, social amenities are available. Yet even people with such amenities are being moved, an experience which exposes the overt mission of the project. Not surprisingly, the place of the resettled people is being taken by agroindustries. For the resettled locals, their new locations have worse livelihood conditions than their original homes (Pearce 2012: 11). Thus, starting from a perspective of coming out to 'help' the poor or the world, to get energy or food, land grab seems to be the cause rather than the cure for this canker.

These empirical examples dispute both populist and ideological representations of land grabs. It is misleading to contend that land grabs have brought no benefits to local populations, but also misleading is the claim that the processes and phenomena of land grab are win-win. What the examples reveal is a clear case of accumulation by both dislocation and dispossession. Exploitation and expropriation are commonplace and the so-called benefits are concentrated rather than spread. Actors in a stronger class position have appropriated greater gains, with the majority of people having to leave with secondary and transitional land rights, and insecurity. Even within the marginalised classes, there is great social differentiation along ethnic and tribal lines as global capital takes advantage of non-capitalist or partially capitalist systems transformed by colonial and neo-colonial forces to accumulate and dissipate. These differential scales of benefits and losses at the local, national, regional, and global levels reveal land grab as a particular type of imperialism that is not only different but also differentiated from 'classical imperialism'. However, as with classical imperialism, land grab has evoked counter-imperialist responses.

Anti-imperialism: Alternative Agriculture as Protest, Conflict, and Resistance

Anti-imperialism may come in the form of alternative forms of agriculture that part company with the capitalist logic. It may also take the form of overt protest against the advancement of the reaches of capitalism. A hybrid of both can also take place; that is, resistance to agricapitalist forms of land use and the use of land for non-capitalist farming.

Regarding organising agriculture in an anti-imperialist way, smallholder farming has gained great popularity in recent times. In this agricultural form, farmers decide what to produce and for whom – a system widely regarded as eco-friendly. In Africa, there is a collection of examples about how smallholder farming in urban areas generates decent income and food to support large numbers

of families with small plots (Obeng-Odoom 2013). This is not just an African practice. In Asia and Latin America such evidence abounds too. However, the most popular of such farming types is organised by the global peasant movement La Vía Campesina, formed in 1993. According to eminent sociologist Walden Bello, 'La Via Campesina is probably the most effective of these movements of people ...' (Bello 2007: 4). Its central vision is fighting for 'food sovereignty' – a broader concept than food security – that entails looking at food as a human right, not just as an aspiration, discouraging fast and junk food, and encouraging a return to common land in which people have use rights in the commons rather than owning them as 'property'. The project challenges individualism and seeks to speak truth to power by advocating humanism and communalism (Desmarais 2007; Riddell 2009). La Via Campesina embodies a transnational peasant struggle. Indeed, the name in Spanish means 'Peasant way' or 'Peasant Road' (Desmarais 2007: 8).

Other forms of anti-capitalist struggles exist in the form of overt protests or local attempts to use violence to protect land. At present, conflict has been reported between natives and settler communities. In the Pru district in Ghana, minor confrontation between settlers and natives have been reported. Violence also in the Greenleaf area in Juapong, Ghana, where one labourer was shot dead on 3 April 3 for trying to clear land for jatropha cultivation when that land was the subject of a long dispute between the chief and another person (Thornycroft 2012). In South Sudan, there was a public meeting at which residents in the sub-county of Mukaya decided to reject one lease made by so-called 'influential people' who had acted without addressing community concerns (Pearce 2012: 46). In Juba, in the same country, the mobilisation of indigenous land rights claims continues to be used as a shield to parry attempts at appropriating land for 'development' (Badiey 2013).

Elsewhere, there are talks of preparing the youth for armed attack in Gambella, Ethiopia. Conflicts have been reported between the Anuak and the more privileged highlanders, the Anuak and the government, and between the government, the highlanders, and the Anuak over struggles concerning land. In one case, some 420 people were killed (Pearce 2012: 9–16). In another case in Agogo in Ghana, local residents have expressed much concern about the nature of the land transactions, including the lack of consultations, and the like. In April 2010, a demonstration by the residents became slightly violent, and when police were called in there was shooting in which 14 people were wounded. Another demonstration was started in 2011 to protest against the dispossession of land (Wisborg 2012). In Dipale in Ghana, the natives have resisted by abstaining from sharing local knowledge about how to prevent fires. or by not helping to quench fires when they start in a region which is very prone to such problems (Yaro and Tsikata 2013).

There has been an innovative anti-capitalist twist towards constitutional political economy. A university academic in the Knutsford University College has filed a constitutional case at the Supreme Court of Ghana seeking that the court should compel the Ghanaian state to prevent takeover of Ghanaian lands, and obliging it to fund institutions mandated to protect Ghanaian lands from foreign takeover. The plaintiff is said to have noted: 'It appears the Government of Ghana is not sufficiently prepared to deal with the challenges that such rapid and massive exposure to foreigners pose to Ghana's national welfare' (Issah 2013), prompting him to file the case on 9 April 2013. The case has yet to be decided, but the route taken complements the existing avalanche of anti-imperialist struggles.

These anti-imperialist responses, to be sure, are not only local or localised. Instead, they are getting increasingly regionalised. In 2010 there was the Kolongo Appeal made by peasant groups in Mali who organised local resistance to land grabs. Subsequently, there was the Dakar Appeal which led to a global conference of peasants in Mali in 2011 that ended with a 'commitment to resist landgrabbing by all means possible, to support all those who fight land-grabs, and to put pressure on national governments and international institutions to fulfill their obligations to ensure and uphold the rights of peoples' (Nyeleni Declaration 2011: 2).

Developmentalist transnational bodies such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Bank advocate regulations, including the so-called 'Responsible Agricultural Investment Principles' and other voluntary charters such as The Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO 2012). These endorse business as usual, but address socially sensitive or welfarian concerns. However, anti-imperialist movements or protests have called for small-scale farming, and there is proof that such alternative land uses and forms are viable and sustainable. Most of Africa's cities are fed by small-scale urban farmers (Schmidt 2012). Indeed, in both Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, respectively the first and second largest producers of cocoa in the world, smallholders are the centrepiece of production (Ryan 2011). There is proof that a combination of community land titling, community-made rules, and conflict resolution improves security of tenure, as it did in the cases of Uganda and Liberia (Knight et al. 2012). Of course, these have their problems too, but they ought to be studied in their own terms and improved based on consultation, mutual respect, and inclusive ideology.

Conclusion

The imperialist processes of land grabbing justified on grounds of 'improvement' and 'progress', 'employment', and 'food security' have produced cataclysmic outcomes for the majority poor and weaker classes and gender. De-peasantisation, landlessness, loss of sovereignty, employment, and livelihoods are but a few of the outcomes of this particular type of capitalist development. It follows that the benign motives mask detrimental ethnicised, gendered, and class outcomes that advantage powerful groups within and without the nation states of Africa.

As with historical processes of enclosure in days past, the dispossession and loss of control of labour from the product of their exertion has been naturalised as the only path to human development. However, this imperialist model is being contested on multiple fronts: through demonstration, constitutionalism, lack of co-operation, and a small amount of armed struggle. Unfortunately, these antiimperialist responses are not yet co-ordinated and the demands of the various groups vary greatly. There is no common rallying point such as food sovereignty nor a common voice such as La Via Campesina. Even worse, the comprador states and their spokespersons are extremely determined to bring about greater modernisation and industrialisation, and give the false impression of consensus when, in most cases, local farmers and indigenous usufructs have not been consulted. Nevertheless, the existence of discontent itself and the modest but important achievements it has chalked up give much hope for the future of anti-imperialist struggles.

This epoch of imperialism though has important distinctive features relative to old forms of imperialism. It is not simply statecentric and is not sharply divided between the 'economy' and 'politics'. This imperialism has diverse loci and actors which do not neatly fit within a core–periphery framework although core–periphery processes are at play. It is, to this extent, a new variety of imperialism, albeit one with similarly destructive outcomes for the majority in the weaker classes and monopolised benefits for a few.

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Land Reform

Land Settlement Policy

Language Imperialism

Language, Translation, and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Cultural imperialism; Inequality; Language imperialism; Linguistics

Definition

This essay explores the question of whether linguistics can help to foster equality, social justice, and international solidarity. This widely unexplored question helps to remind us of ways in which the institutional sanctification of academic discourse prevents linguists from effectively agitating for positive social change. This essay attempts to clearly relate linguistic inquiry to questions of inequality, hegemony, and domination at the international level.

Introduction: The Linguist in the Shell

> The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it. (Marx 1845)

Karl Marx's ultimate 'philosophical mission' was, indeed, to help reduce inequality and suffering caused by large-scale transformations in economic production in the wake of the industrial and scientific revolutions of the long nineteenth century. To replace 'philosophers' by 'linguists' within Marx's apposite statement provides a pretty accurate assessment of the current state-of-the-art in thinking about questions of language. But can linguists help to change the world? Is there any currency in the idea of a 'linguistic mission' to foster equality and social justice? It is telling about the state of the world (academic or otherwise) that linguists – just as nineteenth-century philosophers (and those of the 20th and 21st centuries) – suffer heavily from anti-social tendencies. This widely unexplored question, although not the purpose of this essay, nonetheless helps remind us of ways in which the institutional sanctification of academic discourse prevents linguists from effectively agitating for positive social change.

Post-Marxian critical theorist Herbert Marcuse (1964) famously attributed revolutionary potential only to the marginalised and downtrodden. Therefore, it would seem that writing anything about imperialism and language – with most of us well-established and well-adjusted, or simply too indifferent to care about the fate of the world – is pointless. Besides, modern academia is so fragmented into thousands of knowledge tribes

(cf. Becher and Trowler 2001) that this fact alone plays into the hand of the powerful few who rule the world by dint of military, economic, and financial might. Ways to circumvent this quandary might be to call for intellectual class warfare: (*Linguists of the world unite!*) or to succumb to a quasi-taoist social-democratic reflex: *Let's meditate and then perhaps discuss the options!* There might be, however, a tiny glimmer of hope in preventing our linguists from constantly retreating into their shells. And this glimmer would attempt to firmly relate linguistic inquiry to questions of inequality, hegemony, and domination.

Discourse in the World

Language is much more than a simple tool of communication. Only a small minority of linguists *presuppose* an ontological connection between 'language use and unequal relations of power' (Fairclough 1989, p. 1). Most linguists like to divorce language from its historical, socio-cultural and above all political-economic roots. The generic term 'language' itself already constitutes part of the problem, for language cannot speak by itself. It is *put to use* by speakers who are caught up in historically situated and largely unequal relations of power. People rarely use language consciously, nor are they able to speak with their own 'unique' voice. Language never fully 'belongs', it is populated with the 'voices' of other speakers; in other words, it is shot through with direct or indirect references to what others have uttered before (Kristeva 1986). But speakers do not only use language by means of intertextual reference. Language is a site of ideological struggle, for 'the ideological becoming of a human being' constitutes 'the process of selectively assimilating the words of others' (Bakhthin 1981, p. 134). Language is *in* the world. It is there for us to be *appropriated* in order to pursue our – often unconsciously held – ideological interests.

The onset of institutionalised positivist science from the nineteenth century onwards, in addition to the ever-increasing fragmentation of scholarship, has not been conducive to a self-reflective and critical engagement with the ways in which imperialism as a manifestation of dominant power relations shapes language and vice versa. For the linguists in the shell, language is not a predominantly social activity. They shield it away from the world; they clip its wings and incarcerate it within a prison of rhetorical and grammatical rules. They conform to the dogma of objective rationality and, in their quest for sanitised scientific knowledge, they overlook language as a force of imperial power. Generations of linguists – sociolinguists, semanticists, and so forth – have consciously ignored this communicative force. After all, who wants to bite the hand of the institutional master that feeds them? In the late nineteenth century, modern linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1983/1916) theorised language as a decontextualised and abstract system of interrelated signs; whilst in the mid-twentieth century, Noam Chomsky (1957) theorised language as the interplay of speakers' knowledge of grammatical rules (competence) in relation to their linguistic output in real-life situations (performance). Chomsky's cognitive essentialism strictly separates language and society and thus still has a detrimental effect on attempts to construct a critical theory of language (but for a counterexample, see Lecercle 2006).

The preconditions of semantic essentialism – a decontextualised theory of meaning and language – can be sought in the Western imperial project of modernity. In its zealous strife for popularised enlightened reason and disciplinary conformism, modernity ultimately aims to triumph over the anarchic outgrowth of localised and thus alternative modes of knowing, speaking, and writing. Today, a totalitarian vision of cultural, economic, and technological mastery over linguistic resources lies at the heart of the prevalent neo-liberal orthodoxy of governance. In one of the most cited passages of contemporary scholarship, Foucault (1981, p. 52) laid the ground for what has by now become a truly hegemonic notion in thinking on language in the world, by suggesting that:

> in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.

Foucault's conception of language as a form of discourse is a tacit dig at the linguist in the shell, who insists on a positivist separation of grammatical competence and real-life linguistic performance. The ambiguous term 'discourse' nonetheless allows for a more holistic view on language as a socially grounded activity, and its etymological origins – from the Latin *discurrere* – connote a semblance of fuzziness and diffusion rather than clarity and convergence. Discourse as a mode of speaking and writing is indeed a precarious notion. It suggests movement *and* stillness, knowing *and* ignorance, sound *and* silence, language *and* its absence. Whether discourse is seen as a discontinuous set of material and linguistic practices à la Foucault, or as a more or less continuous 'flow of knowledge through time' (Jäger 2001), discourse structures knowledge and is structured by it. Yet most importantly, both conceptions of discourse epitomise its central role in the historical struggle over human destiny, authority, and material resources. Discourse is truly *anarchic* and thus, since time immemorial, has been a crucial instrument of social control and by extension of the construction and maintenance of empires.

Language and translation are manifestations of discourse. Most work in mainstream linguistics simply ignores the perseverance of inequality, hegemony, and domination. Linguistic and social-theoretical research indeed tends to eschew a rigid interrogation of the inter-dependency of imperialism, knowledge, and discourse, given that such questioning inevitably promotes value judgments on entrenched social hierarchies. A further weakness in the study of discourse constitutes the conscious avoidance of political-ideological bias by a persistent emphasis on blurry concepts such as modernity and its role in the construction of empire. Perhaps closest to an engaged study of discourse are the efforts by scholars working in the field of critical discourse analysis (e.g., van Dijk 2011), an academic movement which emerged during the 1980s with the aim to uncover underlying relations of power and ideology in language use. Critical discourse analysis largely draws on continental social theory (e.g., Bourdieu 1991) and contextualised

interpretations of grammar (e.g., Halliday 1994). Unfortunately, however, these intellectual efforts serve no other additional purpose than to raise awareness of unequal power relations among a small educated elite. In view of such epistemological shortcomings, the entanglement of imperialism *with/in* discourse will now be illuminated through a brief account of language and translation, which can then be fruitfully merged with an account of reified and post-imperialist discourse.

Imperialism *in* Language and Translation

Imperialism manifests itself through processes of communication. Imperialism enforces and naturalises relations of dominance and hegemony. Hegemonic relationships tend to firmly remain in place even after their power base has been removed. Most languages of colonised cultures, for instance, apart from having been installed as languages of government *after* colonisation, have never fully recovered from a stigma of being 'deficient' in terms of their powers of expression in order to face the challenges of the (post-) modern world. Nineteenth-century linguists, sub-consciously enthralled by Western hegemonic intellectualism, gladly classified African languages as exhibiting 'feminine' characteristics in contrast to the 'male' and hence, as they thought, superior Western languages such as German, English, or French (Irvine 2001). Standard languages, to be sure, have 'high symbolic value' simply by dint of their connection to cultural and political elites (Foley 1997, p. 409). Imperialism *in* discourse is indeed to a large extent a 'gendered' phenomenon where cultures and nationalities are highly sexualised (MacDonald 1994). By 'othering' the unknown, these linguists perpetuated the myth of ideological and, not least, racial superiority between the West and the rest. Against this background it becomes clear that research on imperialism in discourse cannot merely trace origins, contextualise geopolitical developments, or pinpoint ideological battles.

Research on imperialism in language and translation needs to map dominant modes of

knowledge pertinent to specific groups across time and space. Accounting for the dominance of English and some other languages, for instance, necessitates the tracing of discourses that sustain this dominance. In line with the evolution of scientific thought and methods, certain discourses on madness and social deviance, especially from the sixteenth century onwards, have increasingly stigmatised marginal groups (Foucault 1988). Likewise, intellectual discourses on language and communication, especially the ominous equation of language and national character by the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1966/1787), have cultivated an exclusionary ideology of language as the property of privileged, mostly nationally defined, social classes. Just as *any* language carries social, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital (Bourdieu 1991), so language can be (mis)used as an instrument of exclusion and inclusion, of persuasion and dissuasion, or of clarification and deceit. The fact that every language is closely tied to individual and collective identities renders it of utmost importance to political and corporate decisionmakers in the (post-)modern world. Linguistic domination is strongly tied to cultural hegemony, an aspect often overlooked in imperialism research. Educational efforts to spread the English language are often underpinned by short-term political-economic and long-term ideological objectives. In the 1980s, for instance, the head of the British Council, the UK's central promoter of English as a foreign language, maintained that 'Britain's real black gold is not North Sea Oil but the English language' (quoted in Phillipson 1992, pp. 48–49). Anglo-American linguistic imperialists – even if they might not always be conscious of their own imperial mindset – will do everything to spread the value of possibly its most crucial tool of imperial domination: the English language.

Studying English as a language of empire has a long intellectual tradition. Many leading linguists, however, play down the threat of English language imperialism (e.g., Crystal 2004; Graddol 2006). It is fair to say that much of what has been said in recent years about power and discourse has been blighted by a conformist reflex to provide an either 'post-modern' and thus relativistic image of cultural domination (e.g., Derrida 1976), and simultaneously a culture-theoretical impulse which has nothing to say about the real suffering linguistic imperialism has caused (e.g., Tomlinson 1991). After all, it does not need a sophisticated analysis to realise that the neglect of indigenous and minority languages in materially deprived parts of the world can be clearly traced back to economic interests (cf. Ngugi 1986). However, some useful suggestions are made to undercut the dominance of only few major languages. Phillipson (1992, 2009) has embarked on an influential and long-term research programme to combat the 'linguistic imperialism' of English. Furthermore, ecolinguistics (Mühlhäusler 1995) is a growing subdiscipline with the aim to defend languages from 'linguicide' (Ngugi 2009). Many sociolinguists explore issues of language planning and language politics, practices that are prime examples for the appropriation of discourse for political-ideological ends. An even more obvious example in this regard is the study of historical discourse in totalitarian regimes such as Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany where the 'correct' use of language is prescribed and rigorously enforced through cultural and literary censorship (Hutton 1999), a phenomenon which also applies to contemporary extremist politics (Wodak and Richardson 2012). It is telling that totalitarian control places particular emphasis on cultural and literary contact with the outside world, and this contact is mainly maintained through the sociocultural act of translation (Baumgarten 2009).

Translation as a mediating phenomenon is an act of linguistic and cross-cultural communication. Translation has been theorised as inhabiting an 'in-between space' of linguistic contact with its own characteristics, as it is always caught in the tension between a so-called 'source' and 'target' cultural pole (Bhabha 1994). The source/target dichotomy has come under much scrutiny in the wake of post-structural theory, however, as upon closer inspection it is far from clear how to precisely define *a* specific culture, *a* language, or a supposedly *faithful* relationship between a 'source' and its 'target text'. It is most crucial to conceive of translation as an act which by

definition occurs within asymmetrical relations of power. Such relations are sustained through social hierarchies and different types of Bourdieusian capital, resources which are partly predetermined and partly battled out between the actors involved in any act of translation. Mainstream Anglo-American publishers, for example, have accrued such a massive amount of sociocultural prestige and economic capital, based largely on the communicative hegemony of English, that this provides them with almost monopolistic powers to control the flow of translations in the global book market (cf. Apter 2001). Yet the people involved at the heart of the process, the translators themselves, largely remain 'invisible' agents of cross-cultural exchange (Venuti 1995). In addition, naked statistics on translations between English-language literature and other languages are indicative of unequal cultural relations, given that 50% of all books worldwide are apparently translated from English and only 6% into English (Grossman 2010, p. 50).

Linguistic domination leaps over into linguistic hegemony when people internalise the power and ideology of a prevailing discourse to such an extent that they forget their own subjection to its manipulative force. Many Portuguese academics, to give an example, when translating their own work into English, tend to self-censor their efforts by subconsciously adapting their work to entrenched hegemonic norms of English academic discourse. In this way, a more flowery and digressive discourse style, traditionally rooted in Portuguese-language humanities research, is eradicated through the process of translation, whilst the translations themselves become absorbed into the global hegemony of English-language academic discourse. Whilst this surely happens to the majority of academic self-translation into English, this discursive phenomenon constitutes a constant danger of 'epistemicide' through translation (Bennett 2007). It appears in fact more important to scrutinise such communicative undercurrents, in true analogy to Gramsci's theory of hegemony, than more obvious examples of linguistic 'manipulation'. After all, the underlying processes of knowledge exchange, rather than their linguistic surface materialisations, help to sustain or subvert existing relations of power. Moreover, Foucault's insight on the suppression of the anarchic proliferation of voices in the world proves nothing less than the inherent – and most often subconscious – conformism of discourse participants.

Discursive Reification and Post-Imperialist Discourse

Discourse is perhaps the most decisive tool in processes of capitalist globalisation and in turn of reification. The capitalist revolution since around the late eighteenth century has furthered an ongoing reification, or commodification, of human and material relations. In line with the positivistic evolution of science and its technological offshoots, this commodification of social relations bears decisive consequences for the way patterns of language and communication develop. The English language has become the world's 'lingua franca', having replaced French during the ascent of the British Empire in the nineteenth century and especially the evolving US-American Empire during the twentieth century. In the context of social change, Fairclough (1992, pp. 200–224) speaks of the (pseudo-)democratisation, commodification, and technologisation of discourse. And there seems no way out of this quandary. Discourse is produced and reproduced in what Bourdieu (1991) calls the 'linguistic market', and the struggle over resources and interests is decided by the forms of capital – most evidently economic ones – at the disposal of discourse participants.

Since discourse research largely relies on a post-modern ethics which first and foremost rejects conceptual binarisms and politically engaged research, the crucial problematics of imperialism have largely been sidelined. This is all the more deplorable as imperialism, one of the prime forces of domination, is a strong transformative force which shapes historical destinies and identities. In this context, popular imperialism is at its strongest in education, owing to its authority to captivate the imagination of the youngest and ideologically most vulnerable subjects in society.

A popular poem entitled *Foreign Children* from the high times of the British Empire begins as follows (Stevenson 1907, quoted in MacDonald 1994, p. 9):

> Little Indian, Sioux or Crow,
> Little frosty Eskimo,
> Little Turk or Japanese,
> Oh, don't you wish that you were me?

This is possibly the strongest subconscious internalisation of empire's authority that can be achieved through the medium of discourse. However, such a 'language of power' not only 'hails' its receivers through immediate ideological impact, but through a persistent spinning of dominant networks of perception and understanding by means of repetition and re-publication. Such a discourse congeals into hegemonic forms of Bourdieusian capital which are for the most part not consciously reflected by those subject to their powers. In other words, ideological supremacism can be seen as one of the prime communicative modes of English language imperialism. Even apparently critical voices during the high times of British imperialism, such as Mary Kingsley (1898), whose travel writing communicated scepticism towards the empire, nonetheless abound in references to an unspoken white master race.

On the whole, the history of linguistic imperialism should not be separated from the economic contexts of its inception. Modern technology is increasingly setting the agenda for how we communicate. Communication is increasingly morphing from traditional 'face-to-face' interactions into one-to-many or many-to-many communication platforms (Jin 2013). Anti-imperialist discourse can criticise and resist the homogenising practices of English language education. And it is also in education and in the social margins of the lower classes where resistance can flourish. It is in education where dominant cultural, symbolic, and above all economic interests are perpetuated. Anti-imperialist discourse as an effective site of resistance to domination and hegemony is unlikely to originate from the powerful. At the same time, however, large parts of dominated groups and populations tend not to be conscious of their domination, as they are entrapped, so to speak, within the dominant

logic of discourse. Suggestions for a 'discourse ethics' whereby, within an 'ideal speech situation', only the better justified argument shall win, have already been put forward in the 1980s (Habermas 1985), yet without any consequences for 'discourse in the world'.

Conclusion

It is clear that 'imperial globalisation' (Phillipson 2009, p. 15) intends to create a one-language-fits-all world. What is crucial is to see that modern imperialism is capitalist and that it is driven by a dual strategy of political control and wealth accumulation (Harvey 2005, p. 132). These ideological activities, nourished further by the neo-liberal forces of 'techno-science', are the key determinations of modern imperialist discourse (Pellizoni and Yllönen 2012). The linguists in the shell, if they want to recognise these phenomena at all, would do better to change dominant perceptions rather than only attempt to interpret them.

Cross-References

▶ British Museum, Imperialism and Empire

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Latin America

Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Core-periphery relations; Empire-building; International economic relations; Mining; Oil drilling; Petroleum exploration; The Global South

Definition

The relation between capitalism and imperialism in the current context of capitalist development unfolding in both the center and the periphery of the world system exists as a a class struggle for land and labor. The agents and agencies of this resistance in the countryside were the social movements formed by the "rural poor" composed of peasants dispossessed as the result of the capitalist development of agriculture. It is not of a class struggle but a socio-territorial struggle for improved access to the global commons, as well as protesting the destructive impacts of extractive capital on their livelihoods and habitats.

Although imperialism preceded the evolution of capitalism, they are intimately connected and have been since the origins of both capitalism and the modern nation state. The aim of this short essay is to clarify the relation between capitalism and imperialism in the current context of capitalist development unfolding in both the center and the periphery of the world system. The relationship of imperialism to capitalism has created considerable confusion, with some scholars drawing a clear distinction between them and disconnecting their respective dynamics while others conflate the two. As I see it, both views are wrong and need to be corrected. We will attempt to do so, with a focus on the contemporary dynamics of what might be described as "US imperialism," i.e., imperialism as it unfolded in the wake of the Second World War when the idea of "development" and the project of international cooperation (or foreign aid) were "invented" – to cite the argument advanced by Wolfgang Sachs and his associates in post-development theory (Sachs 1992). Because each advance of capital in the development process and each stage in the evolution of capitalism generate new forces and different forms of resistance to both capitalism and imperialism, we also review some of the contemporary dynamics of anti-imperialist resistance, or anti-imperialism.

The Marxist *Debate on Imperialism*

The aim of this brief review of the role of imperialism and the anti-imperialist resistance in the development process is to contribute to the debate as well as settle some confusion that surrounds the concept of imperialism. On this point, it is commonplace in the liberal political science tradition of imperialist theory to view imperialism as a purely political dynamic that is entirely disconnected from capitalism and its economic dynamics; this political dynamic is seen as arising out of a lust for power or purely geopolitical considerations by the guardians of the "national interest" in the most powerful countries. In contrast to this politically reductionist view of imperialism, Marxists generally take the view that the state is a major agency of capitalist development and hegemonic power, that capital and capitalism cannot advance without the active support and agency of the state, and that in the projection of state power to secure this advance and establish hegemony over the system, the state tends to equate the economic interests of the dominant capitalist class or the ruling political class with the "national interest" – advancing the former with the aim of protecting the latter. This view is in stark opposition to the liberal political science tradition of imperialist theory.

But this view is also in opposition to the theory of the "new imperialism" advanced by some Marxists in recent years (exponents of world systems theory) (The originator of this theory, a mutant or revised form of Latin American "dependency theory," is Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), but it has evolved into a school of Marxist thought associated with the journal *Globalizations* as well the Fraudel Braudel Institute's *Review.*), namely, that the process of economic globalization has both weakened the power of the peripheral capitalist state to make public policy and the imperial state to take action in the defense of capitalism (to facilitate the advance of capital and exert hegemonic power over the whole system). The theory (see Amin 2001; Arrighi 2005a, b; Panitch and Leys 2004; Robinson 2007) is that the powers of the state have been supplanted by the economic power of multinational corporations, which, as the operating agents of the world capitalist system, no longer need or are beholden to the imperial state – resulting in what might be described as an "empire without imperialism" (Hard and Negri 2000).

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Without going into details, it is evident that the exponents of the "new imperialism" deviate from Marxist thought on imperialism in the opposite direction to theorists in the liberal tradition – by ignoring the institutional specificity of the state as an instrument of class power, reducing imperialism to a purely economic dynamic, and essentially confusing imperialism with capitalism (On this see Veltmeyer (2005). Contemporary theorizing about imperialism, it must be said, tends to ignore the sociopolitical and ideological power configurations of imperial policy, as well as the role of international financial institutions such as the World Bank in shaping the institutional and policy framework of the New World Order, which not only provides a system of global governance but the rules of engagement for the class war launched by the global capitalist class against labor in its different redoubts of organized resistance.). In opposition to both views, we hold (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005b) that the imperial state is an essential agency for ensuring the advance of capitalism and the dominion of capital and this is so both in the past and in the current conjuncture of capitalist development.

Capitalism and Imperialism: The Dynamics of an Intimate Relationship

Michael Parenti (1995) in his illuminating primer *Against Imperialism* defines imperialism as a system so organized as to permit economically dominant groups and the ruling class of powerful nations to advance their political and economic interests by expropriating the land, appropriating a society's natural resource wealth, and dominating the markets of subjugated nations for their own enrichment. More generally imperialism is commonly understood as a policy or practice by which the government of a country increases its power by gaining control over other areas of the world, either by direct territorial acquisitions or, more commonly in the post-Second World War era of US imperialism, by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other countries in order to advance the economic interests of the ruling classes in the advanced capitalist countries.

So understood, imperialism has been a powerful force in world history over the last four or five centuries, in which powerful states with an imperialist agenda carved up entire continents, looting and pillaging countries on the periphery of the world capitalist system of their wealth and natural resources, while oppressing the indigenous people and nations and obliterating entire civilizations in the process.

Yet, despite the momentous importance and devastating impact of capitalism and imperialism over the years, imperialism is seldom accorded any serious attention by academics, media commentators, and political leaders, or it is viewed as a left-wing ideology without any basis in reality or as the political practice of non-Western, non-democratic nations governed by authoritarian regimes. In actual fact imperialism in its diverse forms over the past four or five centuries – and especially over the past seven decades of the American empire – is intimately connected to capitalism, a means of advancing the interests of capitalists and the ruling class of the capitalist Western democracies where the economic and political interests of the capitalist class are equated with the "national interest." In these cases, rather than being directly colonized by the imperial power, the weaker countries subordinated to this power have been granted the trappings of sovereignty and freedom (liberal multiparty democracy) – while the owners of finance capital retain control of the lion's share of their profitable resources. This relationship has gone under various names: "informal empire," "colonialism without colonies" or "neocolonialism," and "the new imperialism."

Lenin (1916 [1963]) had famously described imperialism as the "highest stage of capitalism." His reference point here was the global expansion of capital at the turn into the twentieth century, which entailed the export of capital in search of more profitable investments; the colonization of societies on the periphery of the system (Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean) and the settlement of North America, a dominion of the British Empire; and the imposition by the imperial state of a trading system that would provide a market for goods manufactured in the Center in

exchange for natural resources and other inputs needed for the capitalist development of industry. However, what Lenin failed to appreciate or take into account was that imperialism so understood, as a handmaiden of and an agency of capitalist development, was not specific to this particular phase in the evolution of capitalism as a world system but that it is a feature of capitalism at all phases of its development, from the mercantilist era of colonial rule and state-sponsored/sanctioned merchant's capital to the current neoliberal era.

As noted by Parenti, the preponderant thrust of European and North American imperial power over the years from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century was the subjugation, exploitation, and colonization of societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America on the periphery of the world capitalist system. By the end of the nineteenth century, investors and capitalists saw Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean as not only a source of valuable or strategic raw materials, a source of wealth and slave labor, but also as a market for good manufactured at the center of the system. In the twentieth century, the Western industrial nations were exporting not only goods but capital, in the form of machinery, technology, investments, and loans. But to say that the world entered the "most advanced stage of capitalism," namely, imperialism (a particular stage of capital export and investment, and the territorial division of the world), is not to imply that imperialist exploitation and the plunder of natural resources ceased. As argued by Petras and Veltmeyer (2014), the exploitation and pillage of the natural and human "resources" of the weaker, poorer countries on the periphery of the world capitalist system – what we describe as "extractive imperialism" – and the despoliation of the environment greatly accelerated in the neoliberal era of free market capitalism, i.e., over the past three decades of US imperialism.

Capitalism and imperialism are closely related, but imperialism is a lot older than capitalism. The Persian, Macedonian, Roman, and Mongol empires all existed centuries before the British and American empires of the twentieth century. Emperors and conquistadors were interested mostly in plunder and tribute, gold, and glory. But the imperialism of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries – capitalist imperialism – differs from these earlier forms in the way it systematically accumulates capital through the organized exploitation and the penetration of overseas markets. Capitalist imperialism invests in other countries, transforming and dominating their economies, cultures, and political life and integrating their financial and productive structures into an international system of capital accumulation.

Sometimes imperial domination is explained as arising from an innate desire for domination and expansion, a "territorial imperative" or a "lust for power." But of the various notions about imperialism circulating today in the United States and Canada, and Europe, the dominant view is that it does not exist. Imperialism is not recognized as a legitimate concept, certainly not in regard to the United States or Canada. One may speak or write of "Soviet imperialism" or "nineteenth-century British imperialism" but not "US imperialism". As Parenti observes graduate students in political science at most American universities (and the same is true for Canadian universities) would not be granted the opportunity to research US imperialism on the grounds that such an undertaking would not be scholarly. While many people throughout the world charge the United States with being an imperialist power – and Canada has now acquired this status in Latin America thanks to the destructive operations of Canadian mining companies (on this see Engler 2012; Gordon 2010) – those who talk or write of US imperialism are usually judged to be "mouthing ideological blather," as Parenti puts it.

Contemporary Dynamics of US Imperialism: Three Cycles of Development and Resistance

The end of the Second World War saw the transition from Pax Britannica and European imperialism to Pax Americana and what some neocon theorists conceived of as the "the US Century" – a century dominated by the power of the US state

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to advance its "national interests" (equated with the interests of US-based multinational corporations) and establish its hegemony over the system as a whole. At that time the United States commanded a predominant share of both industrial capacity and the financial resources to invest in the capitalist development of both the economy and others whose "development" was of strategic interest to the United States. However, the United States also faced the growing industrial power and competitive opposition of the USSR, which constituted a fundamental threat to US power and economic interests, particularly as regards the states on the periphery of the system that were seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism.

In fact, both the idea of development and the project of international cooperation were invented and constructed to the purpose of ensuring that these postcolonial states would pursue a capitalist and not a socialist path toward development (Hayter 1971; Veltmeyer 2005). In 1960, in the Latin American context in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the development idea was transmuted in the form of agrarian reform and integrated rural development to dampen the revolutionary ferment in the countryside and provide the "rural poor" – i. e., the peasants who were dispossessed from the land and their means of production by the advance of capital – a nonconfrontational option to the revolutionary social movements that had formed in the resistance to the advance of capital, which, as always and everywhere, was accompanied by a process of productive and social transformation of a traditional agrarian society with a traditional culture and precapitalistic relations of production into a modern industrial capitalist nation, and the transformation of the peasantry into an industrial proletariat, providing industrial capitalists an "unlimited supply of surplus labor" (Arthur Lewis) or an "industrial reserve Army" (Marx).

In this development cycle, from around 1948 to 1982, the resistance to the expansion of capital – the capitalist development of the forces of production – was led by organized and unionized wage workers (the labor movement) in the cities and by social movements formed by the landless or near-landless peasants or "landless rural workers" as they are called in Brazil. Like the Zapatistas in their insurrection on January 1, 1994, the day on which NAFTA took effect, the movements in the land struggle took the form of "armies of national liberation." Since Latin America, unlike the colonized states in Africa and Asia, had achieved their national independence in the nineteenth century, the reference to "national liberation" was to US imperialism – to actions taken by the state to advance the economic interests of US capital, the multinational corporations in the advance of this capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI).

The resistance to the advance of capitalism and US imperialism was engaged by the forces of capitalist development, including the Latin American states that served as proxies for US imperialism, by means of a two-pronged strategy: (i) to offer the rural poor an alternative to the confrontational politics of the movements that were demanding not only "national liberation" but revolutionary social change – to turn the rural poor (the dispossessed peasantry) away from these movements – in the form of "development" (a program of technical and financial assistance, as well as a state-led land reform program) and (ii), when or if the poor did not receive the message or take the bait, deployment of the repressive apparatus of the state. We might term this strategy as the velvet glove of US imperialism (development) and its iron fist (repression), deployed if and where necessary. In any case, by the end of the 1970s, the forces of resistance in the land struggle had been defeated and their capacity to resist destroyed.

The Neoliberal Era: A Second Development-Resistance Cycle

With the advent of what David Harvey and others have dubbed the "neoliberal era" – based on the installation of a New World Order based on the Washington Consensus and a belief in the virtues of free market capitalism – the 1980s saw the unfolding of a second development-resistance cycle. The driving force of change and development in this cycle was the expansion of capital in the form of FDI, an expansion that was facilitated by the US imperial state (via the agencies of the

World Bank and the IMF, both agencies and extensions of US state power). The anticipated outcome and promise of the bold structural reform in macroeconomic policy mandated by the Washington Consensus and imposed on governments by the Bank and the IMF were the activation of the accumulation impulse and economic growth process, leading to "general prosperity."

The actual outcomes were rather different. They included (i) a decade lost to development; (ii) the destruction of forces of production built up in both agriculture and industry (this beyond the protectionist wall of an endogenous industrial policy); (iii) a massive inflow of unproductive and productive capital in the form of FDI in search of natural resources (to meet the growing demand for these resources on the world market), markets, and economic opportunity (to profit and make money); (iv) a rural exodus of poor dispossessed peasant farmers, many of whom took the "development pathway out of rural poverty," namely, immigration and labor (World bank 2008); and (v) destruction of a nascent industrial proletariat and the formation of what might be described as a rural-urban semiproletariat, with one foot in the urban economy (in the informal sector, on the margins of the capitalist system and 'modern society' where they had to work on their own account) and another in agriculture and the rural communities, which served as a sort of a reservation, a reserve of surplus rural labor available to capital should it require another infusion of cheap labor.

To cut short a complicated story, "development" in this form, advanced by forces of change released in the capitalist development process, as might be expected, also generated powerful forces of resistance, this time in the form of peasant social movements that challenged and directly confronted the governments and their neoliberal policies. These movements were relatively powerful – relative to other parts of the world system – basically because the neoliberal reform agenda was more fully implemented and with greater devastating destructive force than in any other macro-region of the world system. By the end of the 1990s, the activism of these movements was sufficient to delegitimate the neoliberal policy agenda and put it everywhere on the defensive –

if not halting its advance, as in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, where the neoliberal agenda was effectively brought to an end. This activism, as it turned out, was also an essential ingredient and condition of a transition into a third development-resistance cycle in the new millennium.

Imperialism and Anti-imperialism on the Frontier of Extractive Capital

The new millennium opened with a major reconfiguration of economic power in the global economy, leading to the ascension of China as a major economic power and the emergence of "emerging markets" in a number of countries, particularly in the bloc of countries that makes up BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). In these countries the capitalist development process had resulted in the formation of a growing middle class, whose consumption capacity and demand for agro-food products and precious metals (gold and silver) provided a further impetus to the advance of resource-seeking extractive capital – in addition to the expanding industries and associated development process, which required and demanded not only access to a supply of labor (accessed from the global labor force constructed on the periphery by means of the mechanism of international migration) but large volumes of natural resources in the form of energy (oil and gas), industrial minerals and metals, and agro-food and biofuel products.

The 1990s saw a considerable expansion of inflow of capital in the form of FDI, particularly in the extractive sector, where the weight of extractive capital in total investments increased from some 20% in 1990 to 40% by 2012. The inflow of resource-seeking capital (investment in the acquisition of land and natural resource wealth) over the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium was more or less double the inflow of total investments, exhibiting a clear sectoral trend in favor of resource-seeking extractive capital. This "development" – the new geo-economics of capital – had a major impact on the economic model for economic development used

by governments in Latin America, particularly in South America, the major destination point of this capital, and also the center of a new "progressive cycle" in Latin American politics that paralleled almost precisely the "primary commodities boom" on the world market (2002–2012).

The "progressive" governments that formed in South America in the wake of a "red" or "pink" tide of regime change in the first decade of the new millennium constructed as a guide to their national development policy an economic model that some describe as "neodevelopmentalism." The reference here is to the aim of achieving a more "inclusive" form of development. Others, including the author (see Veltmeyer 2013; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014), describe instead as "neoextractivist," with reference to its dependence on FDI for the extraction of natural resources and the export of these resources in primary commodity form. In either case, the model has two foundations: (i) extractivism and "inclusive state activism" – using the fiscal resources derived from the export of natural resources (resource rent in the form of royalties and export taxes) to finance their program of poverty reduction, the central component of their "progressive" post neoliberal policy agenda (Veltmeyer 2013).

In terms of the development process it implicates and combines the agency and complex dynamics of three types of capital(ism) – industrial (based on the exploitation of labor), extractive (based on the exploitation of nature's resource wealth), and human capital (based on investment in education and applied scientific knowledge related to production). As mentioned, in the current context, this synergetic mix of these three forms of capital includes a pronounced preference for resource-seeking extractive capital – to expand and deepen extractive operations (mining, drilling, fracking, harvesting, etc.) with the agency of multinational corporations in the extractive sector and with the active support and agency of the imperial state (the United States and Canada, the dominant investor and player in the extractive sector, particular as regards gold and silver mining) (Engler 2010; Gordon and Webber 2016).

With the collapse of the primary commodities boom in 2012, the capacity of the states in the region to pursue their progressive policy agenda (to bring about a more inclusive form of development based on poverty reduction) has been drastically curtailed, leading to a swing in the pendulum of electoral politics toward the Right – toward the formation or restoration of right-wing authoritarian national populist regimes oriented toward a restoration of the neoliberal policy agenda. This agenda is very much supported by the US imperial state in opposition to progressive regimes such as Bolivia, Ecuador (under the Presidency of Rafael Correa), and Venezuela that have been leading the post-neoliberal and anti-imperialist coalition in the region. In any case, because of the dependence of the progressive center-left regimes – in power until recently, and still in power in Bolivia and Venezuela – on FDI and extractive capital, many of these states – even those like Ecuador and Bolivia that are part of the anti-imperialist coalition in the region – in the conflict between the companies in the extractive sector and the communities contiguous to the sites of extraction in the countryside the progressive governments more often than not have taken the side of the companies, branding activists in the struggle against extractivism and imperialism as "environmental terrorists."

As for the cycle of resistance generated by this development process it has taken a different form from the resistance in the first development-resistance cycle (a class struggle over land and labor) or the second cycle (social movements protesting the neoliberal policy agenda). On the frontier of extractive capital in the Latin American countryside resistance has taken – and is taking – the form of (i) a socio-environmental movement that has mobilized the forces of resistance against the destructive impacts of extractive capital and (ii) communities reclaiming their territorial rights of access to the global commons of land, water, and other resources for production and subsistence, as well as a space for mobilizing the resistance. More broadly, the resistance to the advance of both capital and imperialist intrusion has taken the form of (i) the search for alternative and more inclusive forms of development and (ii) the construction "from below" of social and solidarity economies based on worker's self-management

(in the case of Argentina), cooperatives (region-wide), and local development (Azzellini 2016; Veltmeyer 2018) . In other words, while the political landscape throughout the world in the twentieth century was dominated by a class struggle over land and labor, the class struggle has been transformed into a socio-territorial struggle and the active search for more sustainable forms of development.

Conclusion

Imperialism has had a long inglorious history that has spawned diverse forms of struggle and forces of resistance. This history extends well back into what historians describe as "ancient history," but as of the origins of capitalism in the sixteenth century, and particularly with the turn into the twentieth century, imperialism has been intimately connected with the globalizing dynamics of capitalism, serving as both a facilitating condition and a fundamental agency of capitalist development.

The history of capitalism can be traced out in the form of a process of productive transformation that always accompanies capitalist development. Each advance of capital in the development process also generates new forces of resistance, allowing us to trace out the dynamics of different cycles of development and resistance in the post-Second World War period, which includes three decades under the aegis of the development state, and three within the institutional policy framework of the neoliberal policy agenda.

In the first cycle, the resistance to the advance of capital and the actions taken by the imperial state to facilitate this advance in the form of a class struggle for land and labor, the agents and agencies of this resistance in the countryside were the social movements formed by the "rural poor" composed of dispossessed peasants – dispossessed as the result of the capitalist development of agriculture. These movements took the form of "armies of national liberation" that demanded liberation from imperialist intervention and revolutionary change.

In the second cycle dominated by the imperialist imposition of a policy agenda of free market capitalism and the expansion of capital in the form of FDI, the forces of resistance were mobilized by peasant movements against the neoliberal policies of the governments that were aligned with both the neoliberal policy agenda and US imperialism. Each advance of capital was characterized by specific dynamics of development and resistance that correspond to cycles in the neoliberal era and, in the current conjuncture, the advance of resource-seeking extractive capital, which is based on the exploitation of the endowment of natural resources of each country. By the end of the 1990s, the activism of these movements led to widespread disenchantment and rejection of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine and policy agenda, placing the imperial state on the defensive and creating conditions for a new development-resistance cycle. The popular resistance in this conjuncture has taken the form not of a class struggle but a socio-territorial struggle for improved access to the global commons, as well as protesting the destructive impacts of extractive capital on their livelihoods and habitats. As for the anti-imperialist political front of the resistance movement, it is directed against both the imperial policy agenda of neoliberal reform and the changing and new forms of imperialist intervention in both the political and development process.

Cross-References

▶ Imperialism and Environment
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America
▶ U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

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Latin American Solidarity: Human Rights and the Politics of the US Left

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Cross-border alliances; Internationalism

Definition

A broad range of US actors have engaged in solidarity with Latin Americans from the Haitian Revolution in the early 1800s until the present day. Most of these efforts have not been centralized or coordinated by large or prominent organizations, and a defining feature of Latin American solidarity has been its ideological differentiation, lack of institutional continuity, and inconsistent presence. It is hard to pin down. Nevertheless, during the long period from the 1800s until the onset of the Cold War, Latin American solidarity was channeled primarily through an anti-imperialism that was at times inflected by pacifism, black internationalism, and radical labor solidarity. Although anti-imperialism was part of mainstream debate during this period, revolutionary currents rooted in more radical understandings of empire also emerged – first around the Haitian Revolution, then persisting unevenly through the 1800s around the global struggle against slavery and the Cuban fight for independence, and then intensifying during the early twentieth century around the Mexican Revolution and US military occupations in the Caribbean. World War II and the Cold War, however, deeply disrupted this uneven development of international solidarity, in large part because left internationalism within the United States was largely destroyed by the force of anti-communism in the decades following the war. Any yet, with violence sweeping Latin America, US actors recognized the need for international solidarity and adopted human rights as a way of framing, imagining, and mobilising solidarity during the 1970s and 1980s. This shift shaped the trajectory of Latin American solidarity through the present.

Introduction

Modern US–Latin American solidarity came of age during the Cold War through the human rights and peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s. US-based solidarity tentatively emerged around the Dominican Republic and Brazil in the 1960s following US interventions, gathered steam during the 1970s in response to US support for South

American dictatorships, and reached its apogee during the 1980s when Ronald Reagan's aggressive backing of military regimes in Central America drew tens of thousands of people into the peace movement.

The following essay situates this Cold War solidarity boom within a longer history of international solidarity, and asks a straightforward, but complex, question: Why human rights? Why did activists turn to human rights in the 1970s and 1980s as a way of framing, confronting, imagining, and mobilising solidarity? Why were human rights, as opposed to other currents of internationalism, the vehicle through which US–Latin American solidarity emerged as an identifiable political project? And, perhaps most importantly, what did it matter that US-based solidarity developed (primarily) through a particular form of internationalism? What is the legacy of human rights for the US left?

In retrospect, the close association between international solidarity and human rights appears almost inevitable. By the 1980s, the two were increasingly synonymous as many activists simply saw human rights as *the* way to engage in progressive internationalism. Yet, as late as 1970, the capture of internationalism by human rights was far from assured. Human rights were barely on the map and not part of mainstream discourse. More than this, there were other, more prominent and longstanding internationalisms from which people could (and did) draw upon in order to understand and organise solidarity in the Americas, including most notably socialism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, labour solidarity, and pan-Africanism. What needed to happen, in a sense, was that human rights had to replace other better travelled internationalisms in the marketplace of ideas. Human rights had to become established, in relation to already existing projects, as a compelling and useful vision, cause, and form of advocacy and engagement.

Human rights would do this, and in the process (as human rights and peace gained prominence during the 1970s and 1980s) other internationalisms faded, becoming further marginalised even as they continued to inform and challenge their more visible counterparts. The following, then, traces the interrelated histories of two broad (and internally differentiated) currents within US-based international solidarity, one defined by human rights and the other by left internationalism, arguing that the dramatic ascent of human rights not only profoundly shaped US–Latin American solidarity during its formative period, but assumed and facilitated the marginalisation of other forms of internationalism. Human rights became the dominant way to think about and practise internationalism, a process that drew unprecedented human and financial resources to international activism, while at the same time largely detaching such solidarity from an identifiably left politics. Nor was this uneven process without long-term consequences. Subsequent generations of international solidarity activists not only inherited a narrowed political vision from the human rights movement, but acquired an organisational infrastructure and analysis that has been ill-equipped to deal with the central concern of solidarity since the 1990s: neo-liberal capitalism.

The Emergence of Solidarity

US–Latin American solidarity first emerged around the Haitian Revolution during the early 1800s. At its core, Haiti was a struggle by blacks to overthrow both colonialism and slavery, in effect claiming full citizenship before a world audience. It was an early precursor to post-Second World War anticolonial movements that took revolutionary nationalism in internationalist directions. The quest to achieve the nation state, to become citizens, required dealing a blow to empire. In its time, Haiti became a radical inspiration for freed and enslaved blacks and a promoter of revolution within the Americas. US-based efforts at solidarity were limited, but small groups actively supported the Haitian revolution.

Subsequent solidarity tended to follow US aggression. The US war against Mexico in the mid-1800s generated considerable dissent from mainstream politicians, peace groups, anti-imperialists, abolitionists, immigrants, and even some of the soldiers charged with carrying out the war. Such opposition, however, involved little

active solidarity with Latin Americans, and virtually evaporated once the war was in full swing. Similarly, when the US flirted with becoming an overseas colonial power in the late 1800s, the American Anti-Imperialist League was formed (1898) to oppose US annexations of the Philippines, Cuba, and other territories after the Spanish-American War. Although it put limits on US imperial designs, its perspective was more isolationist than internationalist and offered little in the way of cross-border solidarity.

The deepest example of international solidarity during the pre-Second World War era occurred around the Mexican Revolution in the 1910s. US-based actors participated in the first truly trans-border solidarity with Mexican rebels who rose against the US-supported dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Drawing on the left internationalism of the period, this was a radical and working-class solidarity that went beyond anti-imperialism. The newness and permeability of the border itself, the fluidity of Mexican-American identities in the region, and the common experience of an integrated and highly exploitative borderlands economy allowed for a uniquely rooted and revolutionary form of international solidarity to emerge (Foner 1988; MacLachlan 1991).

Finally, when the US occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua during the 1910s and 1920s, a vibrant anti-imperialism re-emerged. When Dominicans launched a campaign in the US to get its military out of their country, they were able to build on a growing internationalism that facilitated connections with allies in the US who worked with them to shift public opinion and pressure the US government. By the end of a very effective campaign, the US was internationally embarrassed and effectively forced from the country (Calder 1984; Juarez 1962: 182).

The US occupations of Haiti and Nicaragua lasted longer. African-Americans took up the cause of Haiti, with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, black press, and black churches, along with small groups of white allies, exposing the brutal nature of the US occupation while supporting the Haitian struggle for independence. The US would eventually be

forced out, but it would take two decades (Pamphile 1986; Plummer 1982: 130–131; Renda 2001; Suggs 1988). The US occupation of Nicaragua, which effectively lasted from 1912–33, generated very little opposition until 1926 when Augusto Sandino began a seven-year guerrilla war to oust the US Marines. Sandino would capture the imagination of a portion of Americans. Some campaigned against the US occupation while others even actively supported Sandino in his rebellion (Gosse 1993; Grossman 2009).

The point here is not that pre-war solidarity was deep or wide, evolving in any particular direction, or somehow more ideologically pure or radical than what came later. In all these cases, we are talking about very few people in the US, acting for brief moments, sometimes for quite reactionary motives, and rarely in active/direct solidarity with Latin Americans themselves. Yet, not only did these efforts draw and develop from a wide range of existing internationalisms (not just peace/pacifism but pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, and labour) but they all contained and promoted political projects, visions, and agendas. Such projects were, to be sure, incomplete, inconsistent, and muddled on a number of levels, but they nonetheless assumed that the world should be ordered in fundamentally different ways. They were political not simply in the sense of being partisan, or in the recognition that power and wealth were unequally distributed, but in that they were implicitly or explicitly grounded in collective notions of liberation that would usher in a fundamentally different world.

Solidarity and the Cold War

The Second World War and the Cold War deeply disrupted this uneven development of international solidarity by bringing about the near complete destruction of all forms of US-based left internationalism. This, in turn, created space for alternative internationalisms such as human rights to emerge.

During the Second World War, much of the US, and especially the liberal left, set aside

concerns about US empire and participated in the anti-fascist struggle. This was reasonable enough given the importance of the fight and the fact that the US government itself was preoccupied with Europe, and hence not intervening as aggressively in Latin America (i.e. FDR's Good Neighbor Policy). In a world threatened by global fascism, the political projects of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and pan-Africanism seemed like secondary concerns, and labour internationalism and pacifism started to feel like quaint anachronisms of the nineteenth century.

Moreover, because anti-fascism quickly gave way to anti-communism following the war, left internationalism within the US was slow to rebound. The US emerged a superpower, its imperialism turbo-charged by anti-communism, and there was very little in the way of domestic opposition to empire. Opponents either acquiesced to, or were silenced by, imperial power. Some within the liberal left joined the fight against communism, seeing it as part of a broader struggle against 'totalitarianism', while others stayed the course and found themselves under attack (Gosse 2005: 10–15).

The real impetus and energy for internationalism during this period ultimately came not from the US and Europe, but from Asia and Africa where anti-colonial movements defined the two decades following the Second World War. More than 40 countries threw off colonial rule and became independent nation states during this period (Wu 2013: 29–30), reducing the number of people living under colonialism from some 750 million to less than 40 million (Moyn 2010: 95). In this global pursuit for self-determination and the nation state, anti-colonialists drew from a range of leftish projects that were both nationalist and internationalist in scope, including most notably communism, but also from a variety of panisms (pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, etc.). This collective struggle against empire rarely drew on human rights for inspiration, and when it did it conceptualised them not in terms of individual protection against the state, but as part of a collective struggle for self-determination against imperial rule (Keys 2014; Moyn 2010).

More importantly for our story, although the anti-colonial nationalism of Third-World revolutionaries had a significant (and complex) impact on US radicalism during the 1950s and 1960s, its ability to become a central way of framing, inspiring, and organising solidarity was limited by a number of factors. Not only was it centred in other parts of the world, but anti-colonialism's close association with communism put it at a considerable disadvantage within the ideological marketplace of the Cold War US. This was especially true as the romance of Third World revolutionaries, which appealed to young Americans during the 1960s, started to wane in the 1970s. The effective end of formal colonialism, marked by Portugal's withdrawal from its colonies in the mid-1970s, only added to this tendency. Anti-colonialism not only seemed less urgent, even outdated, once self-determination been achieved, but it became less attractive to many Americans as revolutionaries began to govern new nations beset by poverty and violence (Moyn 2010).

The fragility of left internationalism, including the uneven appearance of anti-colonialism within US radicalism, was both reflected in and shaped the primary instance of solidarity from the period. Solidarity with Cuba in the early 1960s occurred at a time when open support for the revolution was becoming virtually impossible within the US. It came from two sources: African Americans and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a solidarity organisation that 'brought together the broadest array of constituencies of the early New Left, from old-fashioned liberals to early Black Nationalists' (Gosse 2005: 59). Both groups mobilised support for Cuba just as mainstream opinion turned against the revolution. Collectively, they prefigured and stimulated a multi-racial, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial strand of solidarity that would expand within the US during the Vietnam War (and then largely evaporate as a political force).

These efforts, which were severely restricted by the conservative milieu of the early 1960s and then actively crushed by the US government, were then followed by the Venceremos Brigades of the late 1960s. An outgrowth of Students for a Democratic Society, the Brigades brought hundreds of US citizens to Cuba to support the revolution at a

time when anti-imperialism/colonialism, which had been on life support, was once again informing a greatly expanded and diversified US radicalism. During a period when activists were frustrated by the inability to end the Vietnam War, trips to Cuba offered people an opportunity to practise hands-on solidarity. This did not last long, however, as solidarity with Cuba effectively ceased when the US government made travel to the island impossible (Lekus 2004: 63–64).

What this ultimately suggests is that when US-backed Cold War violence swept over Latin America, the very forms of left internationalism that might have been expected to offer a challenge were either absent or severely debilitated. Few within the US paid much attention to Bolivia during the 1950s, the violence surrounding Stroessner's Paraguay in 1954, the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in the same year, military rule in Brazil during the mid-1960s, or the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. More to the point, when Latin Americans sought foreign allies they had few places to turn. Human rights networks had not yet developed, leaving Latin Americans to appeal for solidarity through the most familiar of internationalisms, as socialists reaching out to fellow socialists. Their calls were not completely ignored, especially in the Soviet Union and Europe, but there was not much to connect to in the US.

And yet, in many ways the origins of modern US solidarity with Latin America are found during this relatively bleak period in the thousands of US Church people who began travelling and working in the region in the 1950s and early 1960s. Their first-hand experience of US-sponsored repression in Latin America (at a time when Americans were starting to question foreign policy more broadly) coincided with a deeper and often politicising engagement with Latin Americans (Gosse 1988: 16–21; 1995: 24–25). Together with an increased emphasis on social commitment within religious communities, in effect institutionalised through the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) and the Medellin Conference (1968), this lived experience of US foreign policy, and its often devastating impact on Latin American friends, provided the basis for a growing collective awareness within faith-based communities about the role of the US and the presence of social movements in the region.

In this respect, President Johnson's 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic was particularly important and 'had a profound impact on a cluster of radicalised missionaries and former volunteers who had served' (Green 2003: 92) in the country and returned to the US 'committed to turning their own religious institutions away from complicity in dominating the hemisphere' (Gosse 1988: 17). Although their efforts, combined with those from small groups of academics and activists, would only produce a minor public backlash (Calandra 2010: 22), the phenomenon of religious actors returning from Latin America and energising the movement would become a recurring theme. More than this, the 1965 invasion itself would become one of the foundational events that over time formed part of a shared knowledge and consciousness among growing numbers of progressives. Solidarity's most important research centre, the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA, founded in 1966), and its oldest activist group, the Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communication and Action (EPICA, founded in 1968), were both by-products of the Dominican experience (Gosse 1988: 16–17).

The occupation of the Dominican Republic, then, along with the unravelling of Vietnam, the US presence in Latin America more broadly, the emergence of democratic socialism in Chile, as well as the civil rights movement, liberation theology, and the rise of the New Left, were all part of a leftward shift that led faith-based groups to view US foreign policy more critically at the exact moment when they were developing sustained connections with Latin Americans. To be sure, the longterm consequences of this process were far from clear in the mid to late 1960s. It would take years to attract significant numbers to the embryonic movement, build institutions, and develop visions and strategies. But it was this diverse faith-based community that would, in the 1970s and 1980s, provide the human, financial, and organisational core of the broader solidarity movement. In its early small-scale manifestations in relation to events in the Dominican Republic,

Brazil, and Central America during the 1960s, this solidarity, much like its secular counterpart, was part and parcel of the broader left.

There is probably no clearer evidence of both the poverty of US-based internationalism during this period, as well as the energy, promise, and tensions embodied in early solidarity efforts, than in the case of Brazil during the mid-1960s. When the Brazilian military, with the full blessing of the US government, staged a coup in 1964 with the goal of restoring the domestic political order by eliminating all forms of dissent, there was little in the way of opposition from groups within the US. Vietnam had not sufficiently unravelled to allow for the broader questioning of US foreign policy, and few Americans were interested in, let alone challenged, US policies toward Latin America.

However, as James Green charts, by 1968 when the Brazilian military regime renewed its commitment to violence, the political winds had shifted sufficiently to produce a small, but energetic, solidarity campaign between Brazilians, made up largely of exiles, and Americans, made up largely of academics, clergy, and other progressives with experience and expertise in Brazil. The campaign, which would eventually expand to include leaders within the World Council of Churches and the Catholic Church, a wide range of academics, prominent civil rights activists such as Ralph Abernathy and Andrew Young, and Amnesty International (which launched one of its first widely publicised campaigns regarding torture) succeeded in shaming the Brazilian regime internationally (Green 2003, 2010).

Its emergence, moreover, was due in part to the fact that activists began to unevenly and tentatively frame the Brazilian cause in the language and practices of human rights. In what would become routine within a decade, Latin Americans asked international allies to publicise the crimes of the Brazilian military government. Human rights would prove to be a particularly effective way of doing this, in part by separating the violence itself from the messiness of political agendas, and doing so in a way that the 'international community' could understand, connect with, and rally around. Although this shaming strategy would not prove

particularly effective in lessening the repression or removing Brazil's military government, the campaign did succeed in turning the Brazilian government into an international pariah defined by human rights violations. This 'success' ensured that the tactic of shaming military governments by exposing human rights abuses would become a central part of the solidarity toolkit.

It is important to note, however, that the small number of activists who were most actively involved in the initial efforts, including both Brazilians and their US allies, tried to articulate and use a (left) version of human rights that made connections between repression and the broader political projects of both the military regime and its opposition. It was by no means common sense during this period to understand repression as 'human rights violations', or to disconnect such violations from a larger politics of oppression or emancipation. As James Green highlights, activists worked to help people make connections between, on the one hand, the horror of human rights abuses and, on the other, the military's war on the poor; on US backing for repressive regimes in Latin America, support for similar governments in other parts of the world, and regressive economic policies; on the relationship between repression and the Brazilian government's treatment of indigenous people in the Amazon. These efforts at education, at making connections, met with some success as the mainstream media in the US caught on to some of these themes and issues, especially as they resonated with the war in Vietnam. Yet, torture and brutal prison conditions, particularly when disconnected from politics, were always an easier sell than economic inequality, especially in a climate where such discussions could quickly be labelled communist (Green 2003, 2010).

Moreover, the broader effort to link the 'human rights' cause to leftist programmes for social change, to understand and support the political projects of those being targeted by state violence, did not find much traction in the US. Not only was there not much to connect to in the US, but what there was tended to focus narrowly on torture, leaving aside the question of broader collective political projects and solidarity. James Green

captures the complexity of this early campaign, including not only its inability to produce a fundamental shift in the policies and practices of the Brazilian dictatorship, but also the ambiguous nature of 'solidarity' itself.

> The campaigns against torture won international support and linked the Brazilian government to repressive actions but did not seem to have a palpable effect on the military's policies. The regime was not about to introduce political liberalization, and the opposition was still reeling from aftershocks of the previous four years. In the United States, torture in Brazil had been denounced, and then men and women of good will had moved on. Even the phrase *Brazilian solidarity group,* has a clumsy, inauthentic ring to it, because many signatories of petitions against Brazilian torture and repression were reacting against an inhumane situation and not necessarily in favor of a program or political current in Brazil. (Green 2010: 3)

Brazil provided a hint of solidarity's future, but both international solidarity and human rights in the Americas were in their infancy in the late 1960s. Latin Americans were much more comfortable with other internationalisms, particularly socialism, and were often sceptical or simply unclear about human rights as a concept or tool. On the US side, both Cuba and Brazil demonstrated the political limits of US-based internationalism, and although activists found human rights to be useful in the case of Brazil, the campaign remained quite small and the concept itself had limited traction.

Even as late as the 1973 coup in Uruguay, where intense repression seemed ideally suited for a human rights framing, Uruguayan activists were slow and reluctant to adopt the language, instead understanding 'torture and death as part of the risks of leading a proper revolutionary life. In the years immediately before the coup, denunciations of abuses by the police, the military, and paramilitary forces adopted a revolutionary language in which local ruling elites and US imperialism were to blame' (Markarian 2005: 99). This was no doubt common sense to many Latin American leftists who had long struggled with how to combat state violence while simultaneously fighting for socialism. Many activists assumed that occasional arrests, brief stays in prison, periodic exile, and certain levels of state violence were fundamental features of being active in the left.

The primary question was how to 'advance the popular cause' by overcoming repression and persecution (ibid.).

Even with respect to political prisoners (the very issue that would animate the human rights movement for the rest of the decade), Uruguayan leftists felt the problem 'should be confronted politically, positioned in terms of class struggle' (ibid.). Such a framing by no means precluded international solidarity, and Uruguayans found some like-minded allies in Europe, but it was not intended to (nor could) attract an emerging human rights movement, much less appeal to US policymakers. The potential audience for a revolutionary framing of repression remained small and weak in the US.

Nevertheless, if Latin Americans were sceptical/unclear about human rights as a form of engagement, by the early to mid-1970s the emerging international movement was difficult to ignore. The level of repression in many countries had intensified so dramatically that it made it increasingly difficult to even be a leftist. The struggle for socialism, many reasoned, could not be advanced without first securing basic civil and political rights. More than this, initial indications suggested that human rights possessed the potential for attracting a wider range of allies both at home and abroad, in part because even people who agreed on little, who shared no political project, could agree that governments should not falsely imprison and torture their citizens. Human rights were also difficult for Latin Americans to ignore because other internationalisms were bringing relatively few allies (especially from the US) to the table at a time when they were so desperately needed. And, as the growing presence of organisations like Amnesty suggested, the international human rights movement seemed poised to provide support from around the world at a time when allies were scarce. It was a potentially useful tool.

Amnesty International and the Rise of Human Rights

The rise of Amnesty International captures most clearly the sudden and powerful emergence of

human rights during the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as the long-term impact of its brand of solidarity. Founded in 1961, Amnesty barely survived the 1960s. It almost collapsed in 1967 due to internal disputes, and the US section (AIUSA), which emerged in 1965, nearly folded under financial pressure in 1970 (Cmiel 1999: 1234). The organisation's fortunes then changed dramatically in the 1970s:

> Between 1970 and 1976, the number of dues-paying members in the US went from 6,000 to 35,000. AIUSA had one paid, half-time staff member in 1970. The organization, such as it was, was run by a volunteer board of directors. A decade later, however, there were fourteen paid staffers with offices in New York City, San Francisco, California, Chicago, Illinois, Colorado, and Washington, D.C. The international organization grew similarly in those years. In 1977, it was awarded the Nobel peace prize. (1235)

Within a decade, then, AI went from near collapse to become the world's foremost human rights organisation.

Timing was clearly part of its success. Human rights activism exploded during the 1970s. Organisations formed, governments took note, and the term itself became part of mainstream public discourse. By the end the decade there were more than 200 groups working on human rights in the US. The Ford Foundation and other funding agencies made human rights a focus, channelling millions of dollars toward the cause. The US Congress held hearings, eventually tying foreign aid to a country's human rights record. And President Carter made it a cornerstone of US foreign policy. Human rights had arrived. It had become respectable. (1234–1238)

Amnesty's success was due to more than good timing, however. It did not simply benefit from the human rights boom. It propelled it, an achievement that was due in part to strategic decisions by the organisation's staff. In 1970, AIUSA committed resources to organising local branches around the country, a tactic that worked remarkably well in expanding its base, and helped bring human rights out of the hallways and offices of the United Nations and into the public arena. This emphasis on building at the grass roots, especially on college campuses, was a by-product of the political milieu; 'nearly all of the 1970s AIUSA staff had

done antiwar and civil rights work', and assumed mass mobilisation was a fundamental feature of progressive politics and social change (1240).

With AI, however, the tactic was not about mass mobilisation in the sense of taking to the streets, but mass membership to support well-orchestrated letter-writing campaigns. This was AI's central tactic during the early years. Each AI affiliate, or adoption group, was assigned a political prisoner. Members then wrote letters to offending governments, journalists, politicians, and international organisations. Done with increasing sophistication, and in large enough numbers, this tactic proved relatively effective in securing the release of prisoners (1240–1241). What this also meant, however, was that AI had to devote more and more resources to identifying worthy prisoners in order to satisfy the demand of growing numbers of local affiliates.

As a result, AI leaders discovered fairly quickly that not only did the organisation not need the masses for street mobilisations, but they did not need a membership to adopt prisoners and write letters. Professional human rights organisations could do the work themselves, saving prisoners in Latin America by lobbying politicians in Washington. Gathering information ceased to be a means to an end, a way of building a mass base. It became the end in itself. AI became a professional organisation that gathered facts and then directly lobbied journalists and politicians in an effort to put pressure on human rights violators (1240–1241). In short, it became a modern human rights organisation. Whatever its virtues, this was a different type of politics, one that relied on insider access to political elites and a mass membership whose central purpose was not taking to the streets or writing letters, but writing a cheque to support Amnesty's efforts.

As Kenneth Cmiel outlines, the question as to what path of political engagement to pursue, of whether to be a grass-roots type organisation or a professional lobby (or a bit of both), was one that AI leadership debated quite intensely during the 1970s (1240–1245). The leaders had, after all, come from a tradition of grass-roots organising. However, for other human rights organisations (which were emerging almost on a daily basis during the 1970s, and in many ways became the

path within US–Latin American solidarity), the question itself was increasingly off the radar. A new political formula, supported in part by the innovation of direct-mail fundraising and the largesse of philanthropic foundations, had emerged. If a network of professional activists, lawyers, and academics could influence elites, get results, and be financially sustainable through grant writing and fundraising, why bother building a mass base? And Amnesty was hardly alone. Its rival, Human Rights Watch, was a product of Ford Foundation funding and created as an 'independent' human rights monitor focusing on abuses in the Soviet Union (Keys 2014: 265–266).

This was a form of politics that increasingly required being divorced from (traditional) politics altogether. As the central task of human rights organisations became the professional gathering and public dissemination of accurate information about human rights violations, the legitimacy of human rights organisations within the eyes of governments, the United Nations, and the broader public became crucial. Human rights organisations came to deal in information, and that information had to be reliable. This legitimacy rested, at least partially, on ensuring that human rights organisations were themselves not only professionally run, but were neutral and nonpartisan, that their activities were independent of politics, particularly the (transformative) political projects of human rights victims, violators, and their supporters. Like most human rights organisations of the period, AI not only 'traded on its claim to be above and beyond politics', but 'defined itself against the left', even when it targeted the victims of right-wing dictatorships (Moyn 2010: 132). As it developed, then, the heart of human rights activism did not simply forget or postpone a larger political vision. It actively separated itself from broader political agendas.

In this sense, the meteoric rise of this brand of human rights did not simply serve to further marginalise a range of left internationalisms, to replace one internationalism with another. Its rise altered the very nature of internationalism itself, of solidarity, by displacing a range of internationalisms that assumed a collective politics of liberation with a form of internationalism that was openly antithetical to political projects or visions rooted in notions of collective emancipation. This was solidarity without politics as the left had traditionally understood it, whereby politics assumes collectively struggling for an alternative way of ordering the world. The emerging human rights movement, by contrast, treated 'political problems as moral ones, thereby eliding the deeper political changes that social justice often required', a tendency that would gather steam during the peace movement of the 1980s (Keys 2014: 201).

Many activists recognised this tension, with some reasoning that in order for the human rights movement to be effective its organisations had to be seen as legitimate, and this required a strict separation from partisan politics. This was a strategic decision. The torture had to be stopped, and required a pragmatic, whatever-works, act-now-think-later approach. Some adopted the nonpartisan practice and language of human rights quite consciously as a way to attract larger numbers of people into political activism, and as a tool for gaining access to policymakers and the mainstream media (even as they tried to tie human rights work to a larger politics by maintaining relationships with movements in Latin America). For many, then, human rights remained contested terrain, particularly with respect to whether it should or should not be openly connected to a larger politics. Regardless, however, when the left in both Latin America and the US began to resist and frame their opposition to repression through human rights, they not only helped elevate human rights – a remarkably vague and elastic concept – to new heights. They also embraced a concept and set of practices whose broad contours and uses the left would ultimately not control. This was a 'decision' that in turn generated a range of short and long-term consequences that were not immediately transparent at the time.

What is perhaps even more important than the open tensions within solidarity circles is the fact that this distinction itself, between human rights and various forms of left internationalism, became increasingly invisible to a generation that came of age during the 1980s and 1990s. For many activists who had limited connection with left

internationalism and took it for granted that socialism was dead, or who simply 'became political' when human rights overshadowed other forms of solidarity, human rights was simply a 'progressive' way of engaging the world in a meaningful way. Human rights became the beginning and end of political work. The goal was to end human rights abuses, a supremely worthy cause, and other projects were deemed too complicated, impractical, or (more often) simply not part of a narrowed political imagination.

To be sure, there was always a portion of activists for whom human rights served as a gateway towards a more radical politics. Currents of left internationalism persisted, pushing the human rights movement and attracting activists who were inspired by the urgency of human rights, but ultimately frustrated by its limited political project. Yet, over time, especially as the 1970s slipped into the 1980s and 1990s, the political avenues of left internationalism faded from public view and became increasingly hard to find for new generations of progressives. There were fewer places to pursue a more militant politics even for those who became radicalised. More importantly, this broader shift towards a solidarity divorced from politics was stimulated by, and brought with it, a very different method of political engagement, one that relied much more heavily on professional staff, lobbying, insider access to political and media elites, etc. This NGO-isation of solidarity work, which emerged very unevenly during the coming decades, would never become completely hegemonic, but nevertheless became a defining form for much of international solidarity in the coming decades, regardless of one's 'politics'.

Chile

Chile made human rights and human rights made Chile. Chile, including the 1973 overthrow of Allende, the intense repression that followed, and the global debate that emerged, was central to the development of the broader human rights movement. Human rights came of age in part through Chile, a process that not only

encompassed the left, liberals, religious communities, the media, policymakers, and broad swathes of the US population, but also ensured that human rights would be a dominant political current within US solidarity from the 1970s onward. At the same time, the growing presence of human rights during this period also made Chile a subject of global interest and a site for political engagement through the 1970s. Chile would not have garnered so much interest, especially in the US, had it not emerged through a blossoming human rights movement.

At the time of the coup, however, it was far from clear that human rights would become a vehicle through which the coup was understood and political activity channelled. Chile itself was home to a powerful left that, although caught off guard by the level of repression following the coup, understood Pinochet's assault as part of a broader class war. Intense debates and divisions emerged within the Chilean left over how and when to respond to the coup, but the broader goal was to forge a political opposition that could regain political power and build a better future.

On a global level, there was very little certainty that human rights would become the primary way through which international actors would understand Chile. The million-plus people throughout Latin America, Europe, and to a lesser extent the US who took to the streets after the coup did so not because Chile was understood as a human rights cause, but because it inspired as a socialist democracy (Power 2009: 52). Within the US, despite some inroads made by Amnesty, 'human rights' was a largely unfamiliar term that was most commonly understood as a rough equivalent to civil rights, and thus associated with domestic issues. For the broader public, the term '*international human rights*' was largely connected with conservatives who adopted the concept to re-energise the Cold War fight against communism. It was not something that mainstream liberals had yet captured in order to confront right-wing military dictatorships supported by the US (Keys 2014). More than this, Chile itself was not of great interest to the US mainstream. On the eve of the coup, Chile was the province of the left, and understood

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primarily in terms of an anti-interventionism that was seen through the lens of anti-imperialism.

In this sense, given that the left had such a head start and there was no human rights movement at the time of the coup, how and why did human rights become so central, so quickly, to understanding and engaging with Chile? And how did the rise of human rights shape the potential of other internationalisms to frame Chile and solidarity efforts in general? The short answer to this latter question is that as the left lost hold of how solidarity with Chile would be framed it was also losing hold of how international solidarity would be understood and practised.

Events in Chile played a decisive role in elevating human rights. The repression on and after 11 September was so intense that it essentially wiped out pre-existing political actors on the left. Virtually all forms of political activity were curtailed and Churches quickly emerged as among the few actors which still possessed a relatively intact organisational infrastructure (Cleary 1997; Frühling 1992; Hawkins 2002). Chileans who wanted to remain politically active flocked to the relative protection of Church-led organisations. The turn to human rights also happened very quickly in large part because other political avenues were cut off. The international spotlight gave Churches limited room to manoeuvre, but they could not criticise the regime on most matters or be seen as taking a 'political' stance (Frühling 1989; Hawkins 2002; Power 2009). Yet, as a moral authority, religious institutions could cautiously criticise the regime for actions that were simply 'beyond the pale'. Human rights provided both the language and practice for such an intervention. It became the preferred path for political activity in part because it was one of the only ones that remained.

Within three weeks of the takeover, Chilean religious leaders founded the Comité de Cooperación para la Paz en Chile (COPACHI). COPACHI was not actively or formerly opposed to the military regime, and initially saw itself as an apolitical human rights office, but it quickly developed an expansive social agenda (Frühling 1992: 121–141). COPACHI's human rights reports, documenting hundreds of cases, became the raw material for groups like Amnesty, the Red Cross, Americas' Watch, and the United Nations (Hawkins 2002: 57). COPACHI's successor, the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, would also stress that it was a humanitarian (and not political) organisation, both for safety reasons and to win more conservative supporters within and outside the Church, but the lines between economic aid, charity, and more political work were inevitably blurred (Cleary 1997: 10–11; Frühling 1992; Hawkins 2002).

Even still, within the US, it was far from clear that Chile would be framed through human rights. What interest and solidarity there was prior to the coup came from small groups of academics, independent journalists, religious actors, radicals, and others who were broadly influenced by or actively part of the New Left, and in some cases had lived in Chile. They understood Chile primarily in terms of an anti-interventionism coloured by anti-imperialism, and in many cases saw their work as supporting the Allende Government and Chilean opposition to the coup. Consequently, much of the work focused on educating Americans about the truth regarding Allende, the military regime, and US government/corporate intervention. Most of the pre-coup efforts did not reach mainstream audiences, but journalist Jack Anderson's 1972 report, followed by Senator Frank Church's (March 1973) investigation into International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) represented high-water marks that both energised solidarity and led sectors of the media and political establishment to view events in Chile more critically (Gosse 2003: 102–104).

Anti-interventionist solidarity expanded dramatically following Allende's overthrow. Significant numbers of prominent academics and other professionals quickly 'labeled the coup as beyond the pale'. Such a consistent and immediate reaction from respectable members of the intelligentsia proved decisive in forcing media outlets to provide more critical coverage of the coup and US involvement. Academics also led the first national protests after the coup (Gosse 2003).

Solidarity subsequently went in a variety of directions, reflecting the diversity of the left. US communists took something of a leadership role,

establishing local solidarity organisations throughout the country while establishing the National Coordinating Center in Solidarity with Chile. Antiimperialists cohered in the form of Non-Intervention in Chile, were committed to a fairly militant style of protest, and stressed connections between US corporate capitalism at home and abroad. The National Chile Center took a more moderate stance and stressed a pragmatic emphasis on legislation and working with liberals (Gosse 2003: 103–106; Calandra 2010). There were eventually somewhere between 50 and 100 solidarity groups working throughout the country in large cities and college towns, holding events, distributing newsletters, and otherwise trying to get the message out. Cultural icons of the liberal-left, such as Joan Baez and Pete Seeger, also lent support (Goff 2007: 101–105).

Chile also represented perhaps the earliest example of dissension within the labour movement over the staunch support of the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) for Washington's Cold War anti-communism (a break that would widen around Central America during the 1980s). Numerous unions, such as the United Farm Workers, United Automobile Workers, and others, quickly passed resolutions against the coup, and for a moment it even looked as though the AFL-CIO was going to take a strong stance against continued aid and trade with Chile. In the end, after Pinochet offered up a few labour concessions, the AFL-CIO returned to form, but the presence of labour within the broader opposition served to tie economic issues (particularly aid, trade, and international lending) to human rights abuses (Tinsman 2014: 178–195).

The left's (albeit limited) success in promoting and framing Chile was made possible not only by the fact that they were the only ones paying attention prior to the coup, but by the strong anti-interventionist current running through American society following Vietnam. Opposition to US foreign policy was now mainstream, producing a liberal-left bloc that rejected the basic premises of the Cold War and was willing to contest US efforts to contain popular movements overseas

(Gosse 2003: 100–102). As a minority partner, the left's challenge was to take this anti-interventionism in an anti-imperialist direction, in effect making the case that US intervention was not apolitical or well intentioned, but supported repressive regimes that undermined democratic movements and sustained wealthy interests at home and abroad.

This would have been an uphill battle under any circumstances, but human rights complicated the terrain. The success of human rights was tied to the fact that it would effectively capture anti-interventionism, disconnecting it from a left politics while taking it in a depoliticised direction. Liberal versions of human rights offered an anti-interventionism that was politically neutral (and neutered), one whose central requirement was that the US government should not support military regimes that committed the grossest of human rights violations (no doubt, a worthy goal). The politics and policies of these regimes, as well as the politics of their opponents, were essentially irrelevant, as were the deeper motivations and practices of the US government and corporations in other parts of the world. This is an anti-interventionism that moves beyond the politics of the Cold War by ignoring it, in effect declaring traditional politics irrelevant and left solidarity obsolete, undesirable, or anachronistic.

This soft anti-interventionism was also central to the success of human rights as a movement. The human rights movement allowed for a diverse range of anti-interventionists to work under its broad umbrella, to oppose US policy, in part because the vagueness of the human rights concept allowed people to work together who had quite different understandings of what 'it' meant. The net result was that as human rights experienced a meteoric rise in the second half of the 1970s, what passed as anti-interventionism was increasingly disconnected from a left politics. Human rights did not simply marginalise other internationalisms, but also coopted them while defining the outer limits of opposition to US foreign policy in politically neutral terms. Nevertheless, it was by no means given that human rights would capture and energise Chilean solidarity. It had been effectively captured by conservatives in

order to reinvigorate anti-communism through a focus on Soviet repression. Most of what Americans would come to associate with international human rights, including its affiliation with liberals, its principle institutions, and its tight focus on torture and political prisoners, either did not exist or was barely off the ground in 1973. The US section of Amnesty International had a total of 3,000 members in 1974, and struggled to find meeting space in Washington DC. Human Rights Watch did not exist, nor did the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Human Rights Law Group, nor the hundreds of other rights groups that would emerge in the second half of the 1970s. There was one international human rights organisation headquartered in the US at the time (Keys 2014; Moyn 2010).

And yet, between religious groups, secular non-governmental organisations, and sympathetic policymakers (the three core constituencies of what would eventually become the human rights movement) there was a sufficient presence to respond to calls for solidarity from Chile. Of the three groups, religious actors were in the best position to respond to a call for human rights solidarity at the time of the coup. From the end of the Second World War until the late 1960s, the most consistent source of human rights discourse emanated from small groups of religious actors and international lawyers. They toiled away in relatively obscurity, often working with largely unknown and impotent sections of the United Nations (Keys 2014; Quigley 2002). The relative readiness of church groups was heightened by the growing emphasis on social commitment within religious circles, along with increasing distrust of US foreign policy, two trends brought about by a decade of civil rights organising, the rise of liberation theology, and the broader disenchantment surrounding Vietnam. A growing sector of the religious community was, in a sense, ready for Chile.

The religious response to Chile was immediate, global, included a wide range of denominations, and had support from the highest levels of Church hierarchy. Pope Paul IV immediately expressed concern, as did Church leaders from around the world. Calls for restraint quickly turned to concrete action, including direct support

for Chilean human rights organisations, the development of a sophisticated lobbying campaign in the US, and active aid to refugees/exiles. The World Council of Churches (WCC) immediately established the Emergency Task Force on the Chilean Situation, promising to commit over $500,000 to the cause, a fundraising goal that was immediately surpassed. The WCC, along with Catholic, Presbyterian, and Lutheran Churches, helped COPACHI get off the ground, and foreign sources would provide the organisation with almost all of its budget. Between 1974 and 1979, international actors, with Churches taking the lead, would funnel more than $100 million to Chilean Churches and their human rights organisations (Hawkins 2002: 57–79).

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) was quickly formed by the Latin American Strategy Committee, an ecumenical collection of North American Church groups that had coalesced in connection to Brazil in 1968 (Calandra 2010: 25; Quigley 2002). WOLA would become a significant force on Capitol Hill with respect to Latin American policy. Efforts steamrolled, and by the mid-1970s, groups like WOLA, the US Catholic Conference, and the (Quaker) American Friends Service Committee had established what came to be known as 'the religious lobby', a relatively small number of faith-based activists, numbering probably less than 150 people at the end of the decade, who were well resourced, well informed, and had strong connections with sympathetic policymakers. With close ties to human right organisations in Chile, they became an important information source for the media, decisionmakers, and the broader public (Calandra 2010: 22–26; Quigley 2002; Schoultz 1981: 77–80). They were also, by and large, quite sophisticated in their analysis of repression in Latin America, including the role of the US (Schoultz 1981: 77–97), and very committed to the region in a way that emphasised building pragmatic, strategic, non-sectarian alliances aimed at addressing an urgent situation.

The collective efforts of this very diverse religious community were predicated on and stimulated by the broader rise of secular-liberal human rights within the US. Within a very short period of

time, it was liberals, both within the US government and outside in organisations such as Amnesty, who would take the lead, defining the broad contours and orientation of the movement. The liberal turn to human rights happened slowly and unevenly during the late 1960s and early 1970s, shaped by events in Greece and Brazil, as well as growing awareness about the Holocaust and political prisoners in South Vietnam. International human rights attracted liberals in part because its limited aspirations were such a good fit at a moment when there was little appetite for a more ambitious US foreign policy; in part because dictatorships were a very real problem; in part because human rights allowed the US to reclaim the moral high ground without investing much at all; and in part because human rights proved effective at garnering public attention (Hawkins 2002; Keys 2014: Chap. 7). The increasingly sharp focus on torture and prisoners propelled this process by defining human rights and foreign policy aspirations in narrow terms while framing the issue in a way that captured the public's attention and confirmed the US's moral superiority.

The liberal embrace of human rights could not gain full momentum until after the Vietnam War finally ended in January of 1973, in part because it was difficult to lecture the rest of the world about human rights abuses when the US government was committing massive atrocities in Asia. In this respect, the September coup in Chile was timely, and was 'the watershed event that would grab headlines and bring liberal human rights concerns – political imprisonment and torture above all – into mainstream public consciousness' (Keys 2014: 148). Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists responded immediately after the coup, cabling the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to insist that refugees be allowed to leave the country and that the new government respect human rights (Hawkins 2002: 55–56). Within the next two years, virtually every major human rights organisation would send delegations to Chile and/or issue reports. Sectors within the UN did all they could to keep up.

It took a bit longer to establish a critical mass in the US Congress, and the process was the product of both politics in the US and genuine concern about human rights abuses in Chile. Human rights activists pushed policymakers with increasing intensity and sophistication, providing information, talking points, and even wholesale legislation. More than this, human rights and Chile provided liberal Congresspersons with a compelling avenue for challenging the Nixon Administration. Kissinger's intransigence and hostility, his initial unwillingness to give an inch on Congressional human rights proposals, created an energetic backlash at a time when the Nixon Administration was vulnerable and increasingly seen as morally bankrupt. Subsequent revelations that the US, under Kissinger's direction, had actively undermined the democratically elected government of Allende provided Congressional opposition with powerful ammunition and elevated Chile to a cause célèbre. Supported by human rights organisations, leading liberal Congressional Democrats such as Donald Fraser, Edward Kennedy, and Tom Harkin adopted human rights as a liberal tool for pursuing a foreign policy project that was at once remarkably limited and profoundly important: to make sure the US government did not aid dictators who torture and imprison their own citizens. On the one hand, ceasing to pay for dictatorship did not require even modest change to a country's political or economic system, or necessarily imply a more democratic vision for the future. It could simply be 'an outlet for moral indignation and a program for virtue without cost' (Keys 2014: 156). On the other hand, the withdrawal of military aid could (in certain countries at particular moments) have profound consequences for Third-World social movements. This possibility would be a central concern as solidarity activists turned their attention to Central America from the late 1970s onward, a region that contained not only repressive military dictatorships backed by the US, but armed revolutionary movements pursuing radical political agendas.

Human Rights and the US Left

By the late 1970s, the broad contours of US–Latin American solidarity were set on a shifting ground defined by two differentiated and intertwined

currents, left internationalism and liberal human rights, with the latter coming to occupy a dominant place within the movement as a whole. Both strands would blossom and expand in the 1980s on a scale that was unimaginable during South American solidarity efforts of the 1970s. Left internationalism, which occupied a key place within Chilean solidarity even as human rights became ascendant, would experience a revival during the Central American peace movement. This resurgence was, somewhat ironically, tied to the broader rise of the right and decline of the left.

When Carter embraced human rights in the late 1970s, it seemed quite plausible that human rights would thoroughly capture, and in effect become, progressive internationalism in the US. With Reagan in office, however, conservatives would try with renewed vigour (and considerable success) to claim human rights in the fight against communism. And yet, Reagan's obsession with communism, combined with the fact that his foreign policy had horrific consequences in Central America and lacked support in the US, ensured that not only would an important current of human rights remain under the jurisdiction of liberals, but that the left was handed a cause at a time when domestic issues failed to inspire. As the remnants of a broader US left based in the civil rights, labour, and anti-war movements evaporated in the late 1970s and 1980s, activists turned their attention to Reagan's foreign policy with such energy that the progressive wing of the peace movement essentially became the left in the US. They were, however, increasingly isolated.

This 1980s surge of internationalism was, to be sure, a testament to the unpopular nature of Reagan's foreign policy and the hard work of activists, but it also signalled the broader decline of the left in the US. The Central American peace movement did not represent the reinvigoration of the US left as much as it marked one in a long series of last gasps. The rapid decline of the broader left not only placed real limits on what a politically isolated peace movement could accomplish in an increasingly conservative climate. It also pushed internationalists to focus narrowly on Central America and US foreign policy while

largely avoiding connections to domestic issues altogether. Central America was attractive to many US leftists precisely because Central Americans were advancing political projects that were completely off the table in the US.

Nevertheless, this left internationalism was quite real, significant, genuinely radical, and had both secular and religious elements. US-based solidarity with Nicaragua during the 1980s was defined not only by an anti-interventionism deeply soaked in antiimperialism, but more often than not sought to support socialist revolution. Solidarity with El Salvador, which would ultimately be the primary focus of the broader peace movement, was also shaped by a left (primarily through the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador [CISPES]) that was fighting imperialism to advance socialism in Central America. In the hands of the left, human rights often served as a tool (alongside anti-interventionism, self-determination, anti-imperialism, and socialism) that could be disconnected or connected to a larger politics depending on the strategic needs of the moment.

This was not, to be sure, a struggle to build a US left that would advance a domestic political agenda, or one that was particularly interested in connecting working-class struggles across borders. Such a project was not offered, in part because it seemed impossible given the US political climate, in part because the movement prioritised the needs of Central Americans, and in large part because Central American revolutionaries saw their US allies as a 'North American Front.' US actors were to advance the Central American cause by confronting Reagan while providing physical protection, emotional support, and material aid (Gosse 1988). On this, the solidarity left, working within and outside human rights, had considerable success, even if in the end the results may have been less than had been hoped for. This history is important to remember.

And yet, the broad parameters of US–Latin American solidarity that had been established in the 1970s would hold through the 1980s. That is, as dynamic as left internationalism was during this period, the dominant current of international solidarity was a human rights/peace movement

based in Church groups, liberal human rights organisations, and Washington DC-based policymakers. It was also a movement that inherited and deepened a contradiction from 1970s' solidarity efforts in South America.

On the one hand, the movement as a whole cohered around a fairly narrow, but important, political project, namely opposition to human rights abuses and US support for military regimes in Central America. To be sure, a significant and important minority saw solidarity in terms of radical transformation, and worked directly with revolutionary movements to advance socialism in Central America. Yet, the core of a heavily faith-based movement, supported by liberal human rights organisations and sympathetic policymakers, saw solidarity not in terms of a longterm struggle to build a new world, but as an urgent call for help to end human rights atrocities and military repression (or to protect its victims). The gravitation towards this limited political project came from a now familiar set of sources. Many Church people shied away from taking sides in the civil wars, either because they did not support the revolutionary movements themselves, did not see it as their place to intervene, or simply felt that being 'political' would empower anticommunist rhetoric and otherwise undermine a fragile movement that was struggling against a popular president in an increasingly conservative climate. The tendency to cohere around a soft anti-interventionism that avoided connections with broader political projects was also embraced because it was a useful way for communicating with politicalmedia elites and attracting larger numbers to the movement. Regardless of whether one supported the FMLN or simply wanted to end/lessen the repression, everyone could agree (or at least enter into a discussion) about US military aid being stopped. More than this, the struggle to stop military aid (pushed by Central Americans themselves) had potentially radical implications in that it could undermine dictatorships and allow revolutionary movements to succeed.

On the other hand, and here lies something of a paradox, although the fact that the movement coalesced around a fairly limited project may explain why it was able to bring thousands of people under its broad umbrella, this narrowed political vision did little to facilitate the movement's own coherence. It never possessed anything resembling an organisational centre. As Gosse aptly noted about the movement, 'everyone knew it was there, but few, even among its supporters, knew where it came from or how it operated' (Gosse 1995: 23). Activism came in a variety of forms, from candlelight vigils, street marches, and travelling to Central American war zones to illegally housing refugees, committing civil disobedience, and pressuring political representatives. National-level entities such as Sanctuary, Witness for Peace, Pledge of Resistance, Neighbor to Neighbor, and CISPES gave the movement a certain coherence, but in many ways 'the movement' was characterised by the proliferation of local solidarity organisations, most of which were sharply focused in one way or another, working on a particular country/city, organised by or around a particular group (i.e. nuns, students, etc.), or limited to a particular type of solidarity (e.g. lobbying). This was no doubt a strength, lessening sectarianism, inviting broad participation, and making a relatively small and isolated movement appear as though it was everywhere at all times (Gosse 1995: 23).

Yet, it also produced a movement that was, despite some significant national-level organising efforts, rooted in hundreds of relatively small, autonomous, and semi-isolated organisations that had few resources. They were increasingly sophisticated at political lobbying, fundraising, accessing media attention, and aiding individual victims from Latin America; but they were largely incapable of, or simply unconcerned about, building a political base with the level of coherence required to achieve even short-term goals, let alone to advance a larger political project. That such a description captures today's solidarity landscape is not entirely a coincidence.

In this sense, it was not simply that the broader shift to the right in the US, and the corresponding decline of the left, put serious limits on international solidarity. As Latin Americans pointed out over and over again, the type of international solidarity they needed most was one that would

'change things in the US', something that in the long term required precisely what the peace movement could not deliver: a meaningful left that would not only stop military aid but transform the fundamentals of US engagement with the region. More than this, the peace movement, due both to the urgency of its cause, directives from Central Americans, and its increasing political isolation within Reagan's US, was not simply unconcerned with domestic politics, but settled on a mode of politics that resisted cohesion and undermined the possibility of forging a viable left.

The movement's limited political project, combined with its embrace of organisational fragmentation, signalled a form of internationalism that was never designed to outlive its short-term goal of stopping human rights atrocities and the US policies that supported them. It was not simply that a portion of the movement lacked a larger political vision, that activists failed to make connections between human rights abuses and the regressive economic policies being implemented by Central American regimes; or between repression and the political projects being pursued by 'human rights victims'. It was that much of the peace movement pursued a form of internationalism that actively dissociated itself from politics altogether, offering up instead a form of solidarity whose noble aspiration worked to obscure a limited goal that was to be pursued through an organisational infrastructure that was not built for sustained international solidarity.

Nor was this without long-term consequences for US-based internationalism. At a time when domestic issues were failing to inspire a rapidly disintegrating US left, human rights and the peace movement appeared as a progressive bright spot. It was how increasing numbers of would-be activists came to 'progressive' politics in the first place. The urgency of the human rights cause, the limited nature of its political project, and its active separation from left internationalism, brought large numbers of people into internationalism relatively quickly. People who shared little in common ideologically, or found the Cold War politically paralysing, could agree that state violence against its own citizens had to be stopped immediately. The fact that such violence appeared to be on the upswing, was being meted out by both right and left-wing regimes, and engendered deep resistance from Central Americans themselves, made the human rights movement both compelling and attractive to those who wanted to engage in 'progressive' politics. People were drawn to a movement that had avenues for political participation and that was addressing an urgent social issue. And they made an important difference.

Yet, ultimately, in part because human rights were not a long-term project rooted in a collective politics of liberation, many international activists considered their work to be 'done' once state-led violence was reduced and political prisoners freed. What this meant in practical terms was that once the Cold War was over, and democracies slowly replaced military regimes throughout Latin America, the number of US-based actors engaged 'in solidarity' declined dramatically. Perhaps more importantly, those who remained or became active in the 1990s inherited a solidarity infrastructure, complete with established practices, tactics, strategies, and institutions, that had been built through human rights/peace and was often poorly equipped to analyse, let alone effectively challenge, neo-liberal capitalism, the central concern of US-based solidarity since the 1980s.

What remained, to oversimplify more than a bit, was a solidarity left that possesses a narrowed political vision, agenda, and imagination, in part because so many activists came of age at a time when left internationalism was all but disappearing from public space and 'progressive' international solidarity came to be defined by the very limited politics of human rights. This narrowed vision was accompanied by an understanding of solidarity that is defined more in terms of responding to calls for help than linking struggles, is often disconnected from US political currents, and inhabits an organisational infrastructure that is rooted in the proliferation of non-governmental organisations that have few resources, are not designed to advance political mobilisation, and are overly focused on witnessing, exposing, and establishing (largely disconnected) 'campaigns' against the most extreme and high profile of abuses.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ British Left and Imperialism: The Fainthearted Internationalists
▶ Cold War Imperialism and Anti-imperialist Protests at the End of the Cold War
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America
▶ Labour Imperialism
▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation
▶ Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa
▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western imperialism
▶ Mexican Revolution and Anti-imperialism
▶ Resistance to Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1856–1983
▶ Third Worldism and Marxism

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Law

League Against Imperialism

League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

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Synonyms

Anti-colonial conferences; Anti-colonial movement; Independence; League against imperialism; League of nations; Sovereignty; W. E. B. Du Bois

Definition/Description

This chapter examines the anti-colonial conferences and organisations that formed and were held in the 1920s as crucial to the development of independence movements in the era between the First and Second World Wars. These movements and forums developed solidarity among opponents of the continuation of colonialism in Asian and African territories which were to gain independence after the Second World War and formed the basis for the development of independent states and the ineluctable development of nominal independence throughout the world.

League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

Demonstrations opposing colonialism have always gone hand in hand with colonialism itself (see Mishra 2013; Stuchtey 2010; Young 2009), but during the years between the two World Wars there was an increase in the dynamics of anti-colonialism partly due to the fact that protests had now become globalised. At a time when European expansion had achieved its 'universal historical maximum' (Osterhammel 2009: 42), the willingness of anti-colonialists to co-operate with one another was concomitantly on the rise. Disenchanted with the League of Nations, political leaders in Latin America, Africa, and Asia strove to link and co-ordinate their diverse anti-colonial movements while continuing their activities within the League's frame of reference and modelling their joint efforts on those of European colonial powers within the League. Their starting point was a shared but unspecified criticism levelled at colonial and imperialistic forms of government by both anti-colonialists and anti-imperialists, the policies of the League of Nations and the US for their failure to champion universal enforcement of the right to selfdetermination, and the desire to have their demands publicly recognised (see Bao 2008; Manela 2007; Prashad 2007).

It was no accident that numerous anti-colonial conferences took place during the 1920s. Based on his assumptions about cultural and geographical

commonalities, W.E.B. Du Bois organised pan-African conventions in Brussels, Paris, London, Lisbon, and New York between 1919 and 1927, attended by between 50 and 200 participants respectively. These in turn were part of a larger pan-African movement that made use of diverse methods and goals to promote the emancipation of black peoples (see Esedebe 1994; Legum 1962). The two pan-Asian conferences that were held at Nagasaki (1926) and Shanghai (1927), with 39 and 11 participants respectively, served the same purpose. The intellectuals gathered there criticised the policies of the League of Nations, demanded the end of European colonial rule, and declared the creation of a united and independent Asia as their common goal. These conferences too formed part of a broader discourse about Asia and its position in the world (see Aydin 2007; Saaler and Koschmann 2007). Nevertheless, the geographical focus of activities critical of colonialism was still to be found in Europe, where anti-colonialists established numerous new organisations during the inter-bellum period (see Derrick 2008).

This anti-colonial movement in Europe also enjoyed the support of communist organisations. Agents sent by the Communist International (Comintern) moved into the vacuum left by the US's withdrawal from European politics and attempted to present themselves as allies of the anti-colonial movement. On the one hand they thus hoped to improve their contacts with non-communist actors whom they desired to convert to their ideology; on the other, the Soviet government itself, which had by no means achieved stability at that time, was hoping to find allies among international political players. Within this context, the government in Moscow organised the Congress of Oriental Peoples at Baku in 1920, with about 2,000 participants. At the same time the Communist Party in England sought to organise an Oriental Congress in 1925, but without success (see Petersson 2013; Weiss 2013; Young 2009: 134–139).

In contrast, anti-colonialists were more fortunate in Germany, which had lost all its colonies after the First World War. On 10 February 1926, the Liga gegen Kolonialgreuel und Unterdrückung (League Against Colonial Atrocities and Oppression) was founded during the course of a rally championing anticolonial movements in Morocco and Syria, which took place under the leadership of Fritz Danzinger. Here all the most important anticolonial activists of the inter-war years came together: communists, socialists, committed German anti-colonialists, as well as representatives of similar movements in the colonies. In the spring of 1926, the League set up an organising committee for the purpose of planning a meeting of anti-colonial groups under the chairmanship of the communist Willi Münzenberg, the Indian nationalist Virendranath Chattopadhyaya (Chatto), and the Hungarian Comintern agent Luis Otto Gibarti (see Barooah 2004; McMeekin 2003). Unlike the pan-Asian and pan-African congresses, these organisers envisaged a global forum that would unite anti-colonial activists from all parts of the world and all ideological camps. After a good year of preparation, it took place at the Palais Egmont in Brussels from 10–15 February 1927.

Some 174 delegates from around the globe, representing 134 organisations and movements, attended the First Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism. In addition, numerous prominent personalities such as Albert Einstein, Henry Barbusse, and the wife of Sun Yat-Sen endorsed the gathering (see LAI 1927: 241). Finally, the organisers succeeded in persuading politicians, intellectuals, and members of the three most important anti-colonial movements of the inter-war period to take part in the Brussels conference: the socialists/communists, the liberal humanitarians, and the representatives of colonial independence movements.

Communists such as Willi Münzenberg and members of the Comintern viewed these movements for colonial independence as an opportunity to gain potential allies in their struggle against capitalistic colonial powers, and attempted to win them over to their own objectives. Leftist social democrats like George Lansbury (vice-chairman of the British Labour Party), Edo Fimmen, and Fenner Brockway opposed colonial rule as well and vied with the communists for influence within the colonies. They did not want the notion that only communists were committed to its goals and interests to gain currency in the anti-colonial

movement, and soon initiated attempts to influence members of this fast-growing faction by promoting social-democratic ideas. Intellectuals who, like the French Nobel Prize winner Romain Rolland, opposed colonial rule for liberal and humanitarian reasons supported the congress. Finally, numerous delegates from opposition movements within the colonies also attended. Among the relatively few representatives from South Africa, African National Congress (ANC) representative Josiah Tshangana Gumede, the South African trade unionist Daniel Colraine, the communist James La Guma and a few more made the journey. Others who came included: the Argentinian author Manuel Ugarte; Richard B. Moore as spokesperson of the Universal Negro Improvement Association; Messali Hadj-Ahmed, co-founder of the Algerian Étoile Nord-Africaine; and Lamine Senghor and Mohammed Hafiz Bey as delegates of the Egyptian National Party. Close to 30 Chinese exiles represented Chinese organisations. Jawaharlal Nehru was one of seven Indians and spoke for the Indian National Congress (INC) that was participating in a convention outside India for the first time. Mohammad Hatta, later vice-president and foreign minister of Indonesia, spoke in the name of the Indonesian nationalist movement Perhimpunan Indonesia. (LAI 1927: 228; 229–242).

They all wanted to make their political demands known to a larger public; they wanted to gain new allies for their political goals and to create a counter-weight to the League of Nations and the colonial powers (see Dinkel 2012). Lacking real military, political, and economic strength, the participants in the Brussels congress put their hopes in co-ordinated public relations work as well as the creation and expansion of an anti-colonial network. As a short-term goal they agreed to collect, publicise and disseminate arguments condemning colonialism via publications, conferences, and exhibits; they planned to establish and maintain contacts among individual anti-colonial activists, and improve the organisational structure of the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Rule and For National Independence, which later was known only as the League

Against Imperialism and for National Independence, or League Against Imperialism, LAI for short. In the longer term, the LAI was envisaged as becoming an effective organisation carrying greater political weight, in which anti-colonialists from all parts of the world and from all political camps would join together (LAI 1927: 228, 243–250).

Following the Brussels congress, the participants at first succeeded in making their political demands generally known. The international media were overwhelmingly positive in their reporting about the anticolonial bent of the congress. Some sympathisers, such as Nehru, travelled through Europe and later returned to their homelands, where they promulgated the LAI's cause in lectures, rallies, and sympathetic newspapers. Furthermore, in 1927, the LAI had its conference proceedings published in book form by Münzenberg's communistic Neuer Deutscher Verlag (New German Press), and in July of 1928 issued the first edition of *The Anti-Imperialist Review*, a magazine expressly founded for the purpose of making their aims known. And indeed this soliciting of new members frequently proved successful. Thus, Carl Lindhagen, lord mayor of Stockholm, joined the LAI as early as 4 March 1927 and was chosen as honorary chairman of its second congress in 1929. Several ethnic minorities within Europe also appealed to the LAI for support in their struggles for independence and were eager to gain membership. However, their initial efforts were in vain, since the LAI was primarily focused on coordination and co-operation with its non-European members (see Dinkel 2012).

The LAI also succeeded in channelling the euphoria generated by the congress into consistent, well-organised co-operation among its associates. On 29/30 March 1927, the heads of the LAI had an initial meeting in Amsterdam at which they confirmed the work of their international secretariat that was based in Berlin. Both institutions – the executive conference that, until 1929, met at least once annually at varying European venues, and the permanent international secretariat in Berlin, headed by Willi Münzenberg and Luis Gibarti – functioned as LAI co-ordination centres for the

purpose of enabling and encouraging other anti-colonial groups to turn to them for support. This, according to several official reports, actually happened. Thus, by April of 1927, about 30 organisations from Latin America, the US, Africa and South-East Asia were associated with the LAI. The most prominent among them were: Algeria's Étoile Nord-Africaine, co-founded by Ahmed Ben Messali Hadj; the Indonesian Perhimpunan Indonesia; the African National Congress (ANC), represented in Brussels by J.T. Gumende; and from December 1927 the Indian National Congress (INC). In addition to encouraging their members to form alliances with organisations already in existence, the international secretariat urged them to establish their own local branches of the LAI. At the end of 1927, LAI affiliates existed in 22 individual countries and colonies (see ibid.).

Yet concurrently with the successes of the LAI came a change in the political environment. The colonial powers crushed uprisings in Morocco, Syria, and Indonesia, thus destroying the hopes of the Brussels congress, which had seen these revolts as harbingers of a new era. On top of that, the Netherlands and France promptly reacted to the Brussels meeting by arresting individual members of the LAI such as Mohammed Hatta and Lamine Senghore. At the same time they banned magazines sympathetic to the LAI and thus restricted its ability to disseminate information (see ibid.).

Despite this, most of the problems besetting the LAI after its founding were internal in nature, for the euphoria surrounding the convention had aroused hopes about the LAI's potential to influence events that it proved unable to fulfil. Technical and financial difficulties robbed both conferences and League of a good part of their effectiveness. The decisive factor leading to the dissolution of this much publicised anti-colonial solidarity group were power struggles among its three leading allies: the social democrats, the communists and the representatives from the colonies. These had already been completely at loggerheads about the future course of the LAI by the end of 1927, and thus rendered the League almost totally incapable of acting. Their common opposition to

the League of Nations and to a woolly concept of imperialism was no longer enough to bridge differences among the members, since each faction strove to exploit the League's network and its other members to further its own interests.

Two years later the National Socialists outlawed the League, and the international secretariat in Berlin was shut down. Equally ominous was the fact that Willi Münzenberg, the long-time organiser of the secretariat, resigned from the League in 1933. The remaining members fled to London via Paris, where they handed its leadership over to Reginald Bridgeman in the autumn of 1933. At the beginning of 1935, Bridgeman noted that no actions had been taken internationally since the secretariat had fled Berlin, and that the League was now leading little more than a pro forma existence on paper. His attempts at rebuilding the organisation were unsuccessful. With the exception of a few brochures that came to publication, little is known about the activities of this English branch that survived until its official dissolution on 11 May 1937, when it turned over whatever material it possessed to the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (see Jones 1996: 29, 32).

The LAI and its conferences exemplified an experimental field in which anti-colonialists were able to test various forms of organisation and co-operation with diverse anti-colonial actors from all over the world. When all is said and done, however, the conferences and activities organised by the League were ultimately mere moments in time when viewed from a historical perspective. The meetings and activities of the LAI had next to no influence on the policies of the colonial powers, nor is there any evidence that they triggered any broader debates about the legitimacy of colonial rule. Even so, the LAI conferences had enormous significance for the anticolonial movement per se. They proved to its members that it was possible to hold such conventions in spite of manifold difficulties and regardless of the political and cultural differences that existed among participants; and for a brief time they had been able to make a broader public aware of their political demands. These meetings were products of an era during which the importance of publicity for the policies of anti-colonial movements and post-

colonial rule was on the rise, and at the same time they themselves served to accelerate these developments. They also offered delegates the opportunity to meet anti-colonialists from other regions, and this facilitated the establishment of personal contacts and networks that often endured beyond the timeframes of the conferences themselves.

As far as the history of ideas is concerned, these meetings left a hodgepodge of anticolonial and anti-Western stereotypes in their wake as well as spawning vague political utopias such as visions of a united Asia and Africa and a world free of colonial rule, beliefs that persisted even after anti-colonialists' attempts at co-operation dwindled towards the end of the 1920s and despite the dreadful experiences of the Second World War. As ever more time elapsed, the anti-colonial conferences and organisations of the inter-war period, particularly the League Against Imperialism, appeared as moments during which all the anti-colonial actors manifested their solidarity without regard to national frontiers. Many governments of African and Asian states striving for independence saw the League as a model for a new solidarity group waiting to be organised and created within a completely altered international environment, although the conferences that were held between the two wars specified neither the time, the membership structure, nor even the organisational forms later congresses were to have. Instead of heeding this fact, various actors resorted to the congress 'legacy' of a diplomacy based on anti-colonialism. During the Second World War, Japan invoked anticolonial and pan-Asian notions in its war against the Allied powers as a way of legitimising its own expansion; in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru partly justified the pan-Asiatic organisation Asian Relations Conference on the basis of his positive experiences at the Brussels conference of 1927; and the Indonesian president Sukarno opened the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 with a similar reference. By so doing, he first placed the Bandung Conference squarely within the anticolonial tradition, thus stressing the common experience of the participants, and then he spelled out the political changes that had occurred since that time as well as the new challenges that arrived in their train:

'I recall in this connection the Conference of the "League Against Imperialism and Colonialism", which was held in Brussels almost thirty years ago. At that Conference many distinguished Delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence. But that was a meeting place thousands of miles away, amidst foreign people, in a foreign country, in a foreign continent. It was not assembled there by choice, but by necessity. Today the contrast is great. Our nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to go to other continents to confer. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia 1955: 19ff.)

The anti-colonial conferences and organisations that had been formed during the period between the two wars, particularly the LAI, were not forgotten in the wake of the Second World War. With the passing of time, they seemed like snapshots in which the boundless solidarity of all the opponents of colonialism was displayed, and for this reason the governments of many Asian and African countries striving towards independence took them as blueprints for the creation of a new regional or international organisation of postcolonial states within a completely transformed global environment.

Cross-References

▶ British Socialist Theories of Imperialism in the Interwar Period
▶ Eurocentricity
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933
▶ Pan-Asianism
▶ Settler Colonialism

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League of Nations

▶ League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism

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Keywords

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Synonyms

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Definition

This essay focuses on Vladimir I. Lenin's theory of imperialism, as he developed it in his *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). Examining the rise of capitalism on a global scale at the beginning of the twentieth century, Lenin provides an analysis of the development and expansion of capital from the local, to the national, and finally to the global level and shows how domination of the global economy by a handful of capitalist monopolies and trusts leads to the domination of capital in other spheres. Above all, he argues that the real power and significance of modern capitalist monopolies could not be fully understood unless one takes into consideration the part played by the banks, i.e., finance capital. Together, they perform the

basis of the expansion of capitalism on a global scale and come to represent the highest and most advanced stage of capitalism, i.e., imperialism. Finally, the extent and intensity of capitalist expansion on a world scale that involves the exploitation of wage-labor throughout the world leads Lenin to conclude: "Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat on a worldwide scale" – one that has resonated throughout the world during the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first century.

Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1870–1924) was the greatest Marxist revolutionary and successful leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917. A great strategist and tactician of the first proletarian revolution of the twentieth century, Lenin was a true anti-imperialist who waged an unrelenting revolutionary struggle against the global capitalist-imperialist system by first overthrowing the despotic Russian Empire and its semi-feudal/semi-capitalist system, and subsequently fought the internal and external reactionary enemies propped up by Western imperialism that attempted to dislodge the young proletarian state that had brought the working class to state power.

Writing on the eve of the Socialist Revolution in Russia, Lenin produced two important works that have become Marxist classics: *The State and Revolution* (1917) and *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). Always understanding the political implications of his analyses of the capitalist state and the political economy of the highest stage of capitalism from the point of view of the working class, the class struggle, and the necessity of the overthrow of the global capitalist system, Lenin developed a keen interest in understanding the underlying class contradictions of capitalist expansion on a world scale that served as the basis for the rise of the working class against capital and the capitalist state on a worldwide basis. To understand the economic roots and political manifestations of the development and expansion of capitalist imperialism across the globe, Lenin studied both bourgeois and Marxist analyses of the highest stage of global capitalist expansion to understand its various dimensions and develop an appropriate strategy and tactics for a protracted class struggle against it. Thus,

more than developing a scientific understanding of the inner workings of the capitalist-imperialist system, Lenin was interested in untangling these contradictions to develop the response necessary in the struggle against imperialism.

Clearly, acutely aware of the class contradictions of global capitalist expansion and of imperialism in general, Lenin was interested in understanding the inner logic and dynamics of the capitalist-imperialist system to generate the ultimate response to it that only the working class could provide through revolutionary class action. In fact, the global expansion of capital in spreading capitalist relations of production across the world was the catalyst that – through the exploitation of labor on a world scale – was preparing the material conditions for the rise of the working class on a worldwide scale. It is in this political context of the struggle against imperialism that Lenin took up the pen to write about the economic underpinnings and social-political implications of the global capitalist system in the age of imperialism.

Lenin's theory of imperialism is based on the Marxist analysis of the development and expansion of capitalism on a global scale from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. Benefiting from two other important works which he studied – John A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (1905) and Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development* (1910) – Lenin provided us with a concise analysis of the highest stage of capitalist development on a world scale.

Lenin's theory of imperialism centres essentially around the five fundamental features of capitalism at the turn of the twentieth century:

1. The concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies that play a decisive role in economic life.
2. Bank capital has merged with industrial capital and created, on the basis of this, 'finance capital', a financial oligarchy.
3. The export of commodities acquires exceptional importance.
4. International monopolist capitalist combines form and share the world among themselves.

5. The territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed.

The beginning point of Lenin's analysis of imperialism is his conception of the dynamics of modern capitalism: the concentration and monopolisation of production: 'The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid concentration of production in ever larger enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism . . . . [A]t a certain stage of its development, concentration itself, as it were, leads straight to monopoly, for a score or so of giant enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement' to monopolise the market ([1917] 1975, 642, 643). He argued that 'This transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most important – if not the most important – phenomena of modern capitalist economy' (643). Referring to Marx's *Capital* (1967/1867), Lenin pointed out that 'by a theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism [Marx] proved that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly' (645). 'Today', he added, 'monopoly has become a fact . . . and that the rise of monopolies, as a result of the concentration of production is a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism' (645). In outlining the dynamics of competitive capitalism developing into its special, monopoly stage (i.e., imperialism), Lenin noted that:

the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: (1) 1860–70, the highest stage, the apex of development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage; (2) After the crisis of 1873, a lengthy period of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon; (3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900–03. Cartels became one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism. (646–647)

He observed that:

Cartels come to an agreement on the terms of sale, dates of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods

to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc. . . . In order to prevent competition . . . the monopolists even resort to various stratagems: they spread false rumors about the bad situation in their industry; anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers; lastly, they buy up 'outsiders' (those outside the syndicates) and pay them 'compensation'. (647, 651–652)

For Lenin, 'the real power and significance of modern monopolies' could not be understood unless one took 'into consideration the part played by the banks' ([1917] 1975, 653).

The principal and primary functions of banks is to serve as middlemen in the making of payments. . . .

As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks grow from modest middlemen into powerful monopolies. . This transformation of numerous modest middlemen into a handful of monopolists is one of the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalism into capitalist imperialism. (653)

After examining an enormous quantity of data, Lenin came to the following conclusions on the concentration of banking, especially in Germany, and the extent to which banks control the market and the significance of that control:

The small banks are being squeezed out by the big banks, of which only nine concentrate in their hands almost half the total deposits. . . . The big enterprises, and the banks in particular, not only completely absorb the small ones, but also 'annex' them, subordinate them, bring them into their 'own' group or 'concern' (to use the technical term) by acquiring 'holdings' in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by a system of credits, etc., etc. . . .

We see the rapid expansion of a close network of channels which cover the whole country, centralizing all capital and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy. . . .

[T]he concentration of capital and the growth of bank turnover are radically changing the significance of the banks. Scattered capitalists are transformed into a single collective capitalist. When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, a bank, as it were, transacts a purely technical and exclusively auxiliary operation. When, however, this operation grows to enormous dimensions we find that a handful of monopolists subordinate to their will all the operations, both commercial and industrial, of the whole of capitalist society; for they

are enabled – by means of their banking connections, their current accounts and other financial operations – first, to *ascertain exactly* the financial position of the various capitalists, then to *control* them, to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering credits, and finally *entirely determine* their fate. . . .

Among the few banks which remain at the head of all capitalist economy as a result of the process of concentration, there is naturally to be observed an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements, towards a *bank trust*. . . .

Again and again the final work in the development of banking is monopoly. ([1917] 1975, 654–662)

Lenin's detailed study of the process of concentration and monopolisation of banking in the major capitalist countries at the turn of the twentieth century convinced him to conclude that 'at all events, in all capitalist countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies' ([1917] 1975, 658). Lenin then explained the 'close connection between the banks and industry'. The monopolistic relationship between the banks and industrial capitalists is such that 'the industrial capitalist becomes more completely dependent on the bank' (662). To stress the existence of this mutual relationship and to outline the specific mechanisms through which such a relationship is established, Lenin pointed out that 'a personal union, so to speak, is established between the banks and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, the merging of one with another through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of bank directors to the Supervisory Boards (or Boards of Directors) of industrial and commercial enterprises, and vice versa' (662).

All of these, then, signified to Lenin: (a) 'the ever-growing merger of bank and industrial capital'; and (b) 'the growth of the banks into institutions of a truly 'universal character' ([1917] 1975, 664). 'Thus, the twentieth century marks the turning point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital' (666).

In his chapter on finance capital and the financial oligarchy, Lenin, by way of quoting

Hilferding, clarified the underlying dynamics of 'finance capital'. According to Hilferding, 'bank capital, i.e., capital in money form, which is . . . transformed into industrial capital' can be called 'finance capital'. In other words, 'finance capital is capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists' (Hilferding, as quoted in Lenin [1917] 1975, 667). But, to Lenin, 'this definition is incomplete insofar as it is silent on one extremely important fact': '[T]he increase of concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that concentration is leading, and has led, to monopoly. . . . The concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry – such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of that concept' (667).

Lenin then described 'how, under the general conditions of commodity production and private property, the 'business operations' of capitalist monopolies inevitably lead to the domination of a financial oligarchy' (667). And the 'cornerstone' of that domination is the 'holding system.' (As an example of this, Lenin mentioned the Deutsche Bank 'group' as 'one of the biggest, if not the biggest, of the big banking groups.') Quoting from the work of the German economist Hans Gidion Heymann, Lenin developed the following observations of the nature and structure of the 'holding system':

The head of the concern controls the principal company [literally: the 'mother company']; the latter reigns over the subsidiary companies ['daughter companies'] which in their turn control still other subsidiaries ['grandchild companies'], etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of production. Indeed, if holding 50 percent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the head of the concern needs only one million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And if this 'interlocking' is extended, it is possible with one million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million, etc. (Heyman, as quoted in Lenin [1917] 1975, 668

Basing his facts on bourgeois sources, such as Professor Liefman (an 'apologist of imperialism and of finance capital'), Lenin argued that 'it is sufficient to own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order to direct its affairs' (668). The 'holding system', he added, 'not only

serves enormously to increase the power of the monopolists; it also enables them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to cheat the public, for the directors of the 'mother company' are not legally responsible for the 'daughter company', which is supposed to be 'independent', and *through the medium* of which they can 'pull off' *anything* (669). And to illustrate his point, Lenin cites several examples from the publications of finance capital itself (e.g. *Die Bank*).

In short, finance capital:

> concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., strengthens the domination of the financial oligarchy and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of monopolists. . . . The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means that a small number of financially 'powerful' states stand out among all the rest. (Lenin [1917] 1975, 672, 677)

And these states, made up of 'the richest capitalist countries' (Great Britain, the US, France, and Germany), together 'own 479,000,000,000 francs, that is, nearly 80 per cent of the world's finance capital' (678). 'In one way or another', Lenin added, 'nearly the whole of the rest of the world is more or less the debtor to and tributary of these international banker countries, these four 'pillars' of world finance capital' (678).

The obvious international implications of world finance capital led Lenin to examine next the part which the export of capital plays in creating the international network of dependence and connections of finance capital. He argued that, unlike under conditions of competition when the principal characteristic of capitalism is the export of *goods*, under the rule of monopolies, it is the export of *capital*:

> On the threshold of the twentieth century we see the formation of a new type of monopoly: firstly, monopolist associations of capitalists in all capitalistically developed countries; secondly, the monopolist position of a few very rich countries, in which the accumulation of capital has reached gigantic proportions. An enormous 'surplus of capital' has arisen in the advanced countries.

> As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline of profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries having already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been or are being built in those countries, elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The need to export capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become 'overripe' and (owing to the backward state of agriculture and the poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for 'profitable' investment. . . .

> The export of capital influences and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capitalexporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world. ([1917] 1975, 679, 681)

An important channel through which capital is exported to the peripheral countries is international loans. Quoting from an article in *Die Bank*, Lenin pointed out that, in making these loans, the capital-exporting countries are nearly always able to obtain 'advantages': 'In these international transactions the creditor nearly always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favorable clause in a commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract, a harbor, a fat concession, or an order for guns' ([1917] 1975, 681). '"The most usual thing" in this financial transaction is to stipulate that part of the loan that is granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country, particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. . . . The export of capital thus becomes a means for encouraging the export of commodities' (681). All these observations led Lenin to conclude that 'the capital-exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But finance capital has led to the *actual* division of the world' (683).

Lenin argued that the economic division of the world among capitalist combines is the inherent

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outcome of the development of capitalism into its highest stage: monopoly capital.

> Monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts first divided the home market among themselves and obtained more or less complete possession of the industry of their own country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial connections and 'spheres of influence' of the big monopolist combines expanded in all ways, things 'naturally' gravitated towards an international agreement among these combines, and towards the formation of international cartels.
>
> This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding stages. ([1917] 1975, 683)

To illustrate how this 'supermonopoly' develops, Lenin examined the electric industry, which, he said, is 'highly typical of the latest technical achievements and is most typical of capitalism at the *end* of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries' ([1917] 1975, 683). Drawing attention to the monopolisation of this sector of global industrial capital, he noted that 'this industry has developed most in the two leaders of the new capitalist countries, the United States and Germany' (683). After examining the process of a series of mergers in the global electrical industry from 1900–12, '*two* electrical "great powers" were formed':

> [I]n 1907, the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world between them. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company (G.E.C.) 'got' the United States and Canada. The German General Electric Company (A.E.G.) 'got' Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the penetration of 'daughter companies' into new branches of industry, into 'new' countries formally not yet allotted. The two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments. (685)

But for Lenin, such agreements to divide the world are only temporary and do not 'preclude *redivision* if the relation of forces changes as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.' ([1917] 1975, 685). And to support his argument, he cited the fierce struggle for redivision

then taking place in the international oil industry: a struggle between John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company, and the big German banks, headed by the giant Deutsche Bank, for the controlling interests of the oil industry in Romania. 'On the one hand, the Rockefeller "oil trust" wanted to lay its hands on *everything*; it formed a "daughter company" *right* in Holland, and bought up oil fields in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other hand, the Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at "retaining" Romania "for themselves" and at uniting her with Russia against Rockefeller' (686).

The conclusion Lenin reached was thus inescapable: the division and redivision of the world is the result of a permanent struggle between two or more major capitalist powers, for this is the essence of the contradiction within international monopoly capital (interimperialist rivalry):

> The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it 'in proportion to capital', 'in proportion to strength,' ... But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength. ([1917] 1975, 689)

Moreover, 'the epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist combines grow up, *based* on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for spheres of influence"' (689–690).

Thus, the characteristic feature of the epoch of the international expansion of monopoly capital, Lenin argued, is the final and definitive partition of the world – final, in the sense that repartition in the future is possible only in the form of transferring territories from one 'owner' to another. This is so because 'the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has *completed* the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up' ([1917] 1975,

690). Related to this territorial division of the world, Lenin hinted at the existence of yet another motive force behind imperialism. He argued that as capitalism develops, the need for raw materials (essential for the continued reproduction of capital) increases, and this intensifies the competition between rival imperialist powers to acquire the sources of these raw materials throughout the world. This international rivalry in turn leads the imperialist countries to pursue imperial policies. This is summarised by Lenin in an important passage in *Imperialism:* 'The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate the struggle for the acquisition of colonies' (695).

Thus, as the principal feature of imperialism is domination by giant monopolies of advanced capitalist countries, 'these monopolies are most firmly established,' argued Lenin, 'when *all* the sources of raw materials are captured by one group. ... Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle against competitors' ([1917] 1975, 695).

Finally, with regard to colonial policy 'in the epoch of capitalist imperialism', Lenin observed that 'finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of *transitional* forms of state dependence' ([1917] 1975, 697). Typical of this epoch is not only the group of countries that own colonies, and the colonies themselves, 'but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which politically are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence' (697). These relations of dependence between the dominant and dependent states 'in the epoch of capitalist imperialism become a general system ... become links in the chain of operations of world finance capital' (698).

There are two other important points that Lenin raised: the parasitism of imperialism and, its consequence, the bourgeoisification of certain segments among the workers in the imperialist countries. Lenin maintained that the 'superexploitation' of

the colonies by the advanced capitalist countries has resulted in the latter turning from 'productive' to 'parasitic' states:

> Imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries. ... Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a stratum of rentiers, i.e., people who live by 'clipping coupons,' who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies. ...

> Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination, ... the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations – all these have given birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. ([1917] 1975, 709–710)

Furthermore, the receipt of enormous monopoly profits by the imperialist bourgeoisie 'makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers ... and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given nation against all the others' (728).

The underlying argument of Lenin's analysis of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism is that imperialism is the *necessary* outcome of the development of capitalism:

> Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development.... Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. ... Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.

> If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. (699–700)

Thus, in summarising the fundamental features of imperialism, Lenin concluded, 'Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the

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division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed' ([1917] 1975, 700).

As we have seen from his analysis of the nature and contradictions of modern capitalist imperialism, Lenin concluded that imperialism today is a manifestation of the interests of the dominant capitalist class in a handful of advanced capitalist countries, and that it is especially beneficial to a section of the capitalist class engaged in overseas investment and finance, as well as to other sections of the bourgeoisie that are linked to it. He argued that economic gain, derived from the global operations of the big bourgeoisie (and the safeguarding of such operations on a world scale), constitutes the motive force of modern imperialism. Thus, the accumulation of capital and its appropriation by the capitalist class at the global level (through the mechanisms of the capitalist state, which this class controls) lies at the heart of the process of global capitalist expansion, hence of capitalist imperialism.

Examining the development of capitalism and its impact on countries around the world, Lenin stressed the domination of the export of capital over the export of goods in this period. His emphasis on the importance of the export of capital is crucial from the angle of its implications concerning the transformation of the relations of production in the periphery; that is, in the precapitalist and semi-capitalist regions of the world. With the export of capital, and the employment of wage-labour that this capital requires in the periphery, Lenin saw capitalism to have reached its highest and final stage when the inevitable conflict between exploiters (capitalists) and exploited (wage-labour) would result in a proletarian revolution by workers throughout the world as they rise up in arms against it (i.e. the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism by the politically organised international proletariat), a conclusion he reached in his book when he wrote, 'Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat ... on a worldwide scale' ([1917]

1975, 640). Thus, in the end, it is this political outcome that is the result of the global capitalist expansion that Lenin saw as the inevitable outcome of the contradictions of capitalist imperialism – an outcome effected by the working class on a global scale.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ Finance, Finance Capital, Financialization
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ Hobson's Research on Imperialism and Its Legacy
▶ Industrialisation and Imperialism
▶ J. A. Hobson and Economic Imperialism
▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism

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Lenin's Theory of Imperialism

Leninism

Leonard Woolf

Liberalisation

Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism

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Synonyms

Human rights: Natural rights; Civil-political rights; Socioeconomic and cultural rights; Unalienable rights
Liberalism: Emphasis on the individual freedom; Political and civil rights; Proponent of progress and equality
Western imperialism: Western militarism; Domination; Occupation; Aggression on non-western cultures

Definitions

Liberalism is a political theory/philosophy focusing on the rights and freedom of the individual and the inherent equality of persons and peoples.

Western imperialism is the occupation, domination, and exploitation of the rest of the world by the West.

Human rights are inherent and unalienable rights/claims/entitlements that an individual possesses by the virtue of being a social human being living in a socioeconomically and politically organized society.

Introduction

Combining these three concepts – liberalism, human rights, and Western imperialism – under the same title is unfair to all of them, since each has been the object of extensive study. Yet, taking them up together raises the question of their mutual and reciprocal relationship. In that regard, since the option of exploring each of them is impossible in one essay, the present work will explore the latter, focusing mostly on the commonplace claim that human rights are a new form of Western liberal imperialism.

Western imperialism, for sure, has been widely documented, and imperialism as such is not a new reality in world politics. On the contrary, it was even the rule in ancient times and in almost every corner of the earth. Don't we talk about Persian, Inca, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Monomotapa, Japanese, and Ottoman empires, to mention just a few! (Lal 2004; Münkler 2007; Schumpeter 1971; Aldrich 2007). Why then has imperialism become a political evil to be fought by all means?

While relatively recently coined in English – it is a creation of nineteenth century (Pitts 2010: 214) – normatively speaking, imperialism is made through domination. From a political point of view, imperialism presupposes the occupation and domination of one people by another, politically, economically, socially, and culturally (Robinson 1972: 118–119; Laurens 2009: 14). As

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such, it goes against certain norms and values, such as freedom, consent, self-determination, and autonomy, which constitute today's political discourse. Thus, a people fighting for freedom equals it with fighting against imperialism and domination. However, these very same norms and values are usually linked to liberalism, and this brings up the first problem with combining these terms. How can liberalism be connected with imperialism while it carries in itself anti-imperialist norms and values?

A similar question arises when imperialism is associated with human rights. The latter are believed to have become not only the *lingua franca* of international politics and discourse (Hogan 2015), but also they are presented as a powerful tool to fight against injustice and domination. For instance, studies show that human rights discourse was important in the struggle against colonization – which was the apex of Western imperialism (Klose 2013; Burke 2010). (Samuel Moyn (2012) seems to argue the contrary concerning the role of human rights in the anti-colonial movement.) That being the case, how can such a powerful instrument as human rights be assimilated to its fierce enemy?

These questions are just mentioned to underline the complexity of the relationship between these three concepts. Hence this essay is organized around four points to be developed in four sections. The first point will show how the Western imperialism crystallized around the racial ideology of the civilizing mission – *mission civilisatrice* – in order to justify the conquest of the rest of the world by the West with the goal of solving its internal problems. In the second section, I will analyze whether liberalism is intrinsically imperialistic, and I will also look at its relationship between liberalism and Western imperialism, since many liberals were hard advocates of imperialism, although some other liberals were against it. In this second moment, therefore, I examine the core norms and values of liberalism to see whether they are congenital to imperialism and their role in supporting Western imperialism. The third point elaborates the claim that human rights discourse is actually the new ideology of Western

imperialism, going through some of the different arguments presented by the critics of human rights, such as that human rights are essentially liberal and are used by Western states in order to expand the liberal imperialism even through military intervention, if necessary. Finally, in the last section, I sketch a response to that claim elaborated in the third point showing that, while human rights can be imperialistically defended and used, they (re)present not only a powerful tool against imperialism but also are a means of resistance against local injustices and discrimination. Such a sketch requires a new conception of human rights drawn from local practices of human rights, a conception that takes the whole practice of human right beyond the Western focus.

On Western Imperialism

As already alluded to in the introduction, imperialism entails the domination of one people over another, politically, culturally, economically, and socially. Furthermore, it has been highlighted that imperialism as a political practice is not new. Hence, talking about Western imperialism implies a normative shift in the understanding of the new political practice. It corresponds to a certain historical period during which the Western powers made it their purpose to dominate the rest of the world (Getz and Street-Salter 2011: 213). Independently of the different theories about imperialism (Mommsen 1980), or different schools that define it – for Lenin (1975) it is the highest stage of capitalism, while Schumpeter (1971) defends capitalism from being imperialist – Western imperialism corresponds to what scholars generally call "formal imperialism" (Getz and Street-Salter 2011), or "the true imperialism" (Laurens 2009: 74), or again "high imperialism" (Mommsen 1986: 339). It is agreed that this period extends from the 1870s to 1914. (Jonathan Hart (2008) dates high imperialism from 1830 to 1914 (see Chapter 5)). In relation to Africa, its climax is the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885, when the European powers divided the whole continent among themselves. It is the period when Western powers dominated and exploited the rest of world for their own interests.

During this time, the West was experiencing rapid economic growth due to the industrial revolution and the technological progress, which affected positively the demographic increase. Consequently, European industry needed both raw materials and the market to sell what was manufactured. Furthermore, the growth in industry and demography created the need for physical space for this demographic surplus and places in which to invest the capital surplus. That is why, while the economic factor is the most cited as the cause of Western imperialism, one has to agree with Johan Galtung et al. that Western imperialism had "a multicentered structure" (1980: 141).

As usual, if those economic and demographic problems were not resolved, they threatened political stability because they would have caused social upheaval. Hence Western powers needed the imperialist expansion in order to respond to their own economic, social, and political problems. Statements from political figures of the time attest to that. For Leopold II, then the King of Belgium, there is no possibility of greatness without colonies (Austen 1969: 60); and for the French prime minister, July Ferry, the French needed export markets for its products (Austen 1969: 71).

Hannah Arendt has well captured the imbrication of all these factors, showing that, indeed, Western imperialism was seen as a solution to the evils that were pushing the Western societies to the brink of disintegration. She observes:

> Older than the superfluous wealth was another by-product of capitalist production: the human debris that every crisis, following invariably upon each period of industrial growth, eliminated permanently from producing society. Men who had become permanently idle were as superfluous to the community as the owners of superfluous wealth. That they were an actual menace to society had been recognized throughout the nineteenth century and their export had helped to populate the dominions of Canada and Australia as well as the United States. The new fact in the imperialist era is that these two superfluous forces, superfluous capital and superfluous working power, joined hands and left the country together. The concept of expansion, the export of government power and annexation of every territory in which nationals had invested either their wealth or their work, seemed the only alternative to increasing losses in wealth and population.

> Imperialism and its idea of unlimited expansion seemed to offer a permanent remedy to a permanent evil. (Arendt 1958: 150)

The merit of Arendt's analysis is how she ties together the three factors at the origin of imperialist expansion. It was not an accident but a solution to internal problems created by conditions internal to Western societies. Imperialism helped to manage the wealth and demographic surpluses which hung over the sociopolitical order. Hence, the expansion was "to offer a permanent remedy to a permanent evil." Boris Kagarlitsky also notes that imperialism was used to solve social problems. Quoting Cecil Rhodes, the colonialist of the Southern part of Africa, he observes that for Rhodes, "Britain needed to 'acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines'." He continues, "this was not merely 'a solution for the social problem', but the only way to avoid 'a bloody civil war'. In other words... 'if you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists'" (Kagarlitsky 2014: 281).

The interesting question for today is whether the same idea of imperialism as a solution to internal problems of the developed countries is not still at work in the international relations between the Western world and the developing world and, as such, has become a settled model in international cooperation. For indeed, if the conviction was that to avoid civil upheaval Western countries had to become imperialist, that is, to strive for "unlimited expansion," what could have replaced it in today's world order? This question is particularly relevant for the African case where a new version of "scramble for Africa" is at work, with the only difference that today there are also Asian powers – such as China (French 2014), looking for space and place for their demographic and capital surpluses.

Although these are the factors that led to Western imperialism, they could not be spelled out crudely without offending the public opinion; "civilized nations" could not just state that they were expanding their colonies to solve their own problems. Even a perspicacious analyst such as Hobson (1902) argues that imperialism was not

economically beneficial. There had to be a clean discourse to justify why people and capital were being exported into heathen lands; otherwise it could have been morally unbearable to these souls bathed into Christian traditions. Clearly, there was a need for a morally acceptable justification of the imperialist domination, and this justification came under the civilizing mission – *mission civilisatrice* – ideology. According to this ideology, Western powers were not going out to hunt for gold and other precious metals, nor were they exporting their surpluses to prevent social unrest. Rather, they were on a mission of higher order: civilizing the backward societies and communities. Such an enterprise was assured to gain even Christian endorsement, with missionaries playing, at times, the role of intermediaries between tradition and change (Lawrence 2014: 145; Scally 1975: 29), or simply being the precursors to imperialist occupation (Robinson 1972: 123).

Civilizing mission was also politically correct and was recommended by a moral duty emanating from a "political metaphysics," to quote Jules Ferry, the French Prime minister. For him, the imperialist expansion was needed for humanitarian and civilizational purposes, and this responsibility relied on superior races. He asserts, "it must be stated openly that, in effect, superior races have rights over inferior races. . .superior races have a right, because they have the duty to civilize other races" (Austen 1969: 71–72). From these observations, it is obvious that the civilizing mission was wrapped in a racist theory, categorizing some races as superior others inferior, with a moral duty to elevate the latter by the former to the level of civilization. With civilizing mission, the real imperial motives were forgotten to the benefit of this humanitarian endeavor of superior races vis-à-vis the lower ones. Imperialism was no longer a self-interested enterprise but rather a response to a moral call for the superior races to civilize lower ones; and the latter had to receive it as a benevolence.

Needless to say that the superior races are the white/Caucasian, while at the bottom of humanity are the dark ones/Negro, and in middle are the Mongolian/yellow. Science, arts, and cultures are bestowed on the superior races; that is the reason why they have the metaphysical duty to bring them to lower ones (Curtin 1972: 8–9). As A.P. Thornton rightly observes, the civilizing mission was so well crafted that "intelligent people everywhere believed they were the masters of progress and the servants of a civilizing mission" (Thornton 1977: 32). The civilized people had to civilize the uncivilized. The pair *civilized-uncivilized* is the foundation of the civilizing mission ideology.

Nevertheless, the moral discourse acceptable to sensitive souls for its justification was not enough for imperialism; it also needed a legal framework. Hence the coincidence between the birth of positive international law and the high imperialism period was not an accident. Some of the international lawyers of the time developed categories based on both a racist theory and the pair civilized-uncivilized, in order to supply the recognition or denial of sovereignty. As Martin Koskenniemi underlines, most of them were committed to the civilizing mission and wholeheartedly believed in the civilizational progress (Koskenniemi 2011: 3).

This is not, however, particular to this period. Reading Francesco de Vittoria – who is considered to be the father of modern international law – Anthony Anghie (2006) argues that imperialism is actually the origin of international law. For him, international law was developed when Western societies encountered the non-Western world, in order to facilitate colonization. "The fact of cultural difference" between Western and non-Western societies is the key concept to the construction of international law. This is illustrated by authors such as James Lorimer (1883), Pascal Fiore (1911), and John Westlake (1894) who, in way or another, constructed their theories on the civilized-uncivilized pair. They gave power and authority to European nations to colonize non-European people, denying the latter political recognition. The agency in the recognition process was granted to the civilized European nations, while other peoples, because they were qualified uncivilized, could not have a space in international law.

The contradiction (Ingiyimbere 2017: 37–38), however, is that the same international law that denied recognition to non-European nations as

full members of international order allowed the latter to enter into agreements through treaties so that European powers could occupy their lands and exploit their peoples and their wealth. If non-European peoples were not deemed worthy of recognition on the civilizational checkerboard, how could they be allowed to enter into agreement through a treaty with European nations? The question does not call for an answer since positive international law was meant to further the cause of imperialism, by providing a legal framework that could supplement the moral discourse of the civilizing mission ideology. From this perspective, Emmanuelle Jouannet is right when she remarks that "if we understand imperialism to mean domination and the imposition on others of one's own legal and economic systems, it cannot be denied that classical, Eurocentric international law both accompanied and legitimated this imperialism" (Jouannet 2007: 382).

The begging question here is whether international law has changed its course and mission. A law that was conceived through and for the cause of imperialism has it fundamentally changed in order to serve the interests of non-European nations, or is it still the instrument of imperialist domination? Again, this question is raised to underscore the different pockets that imperialism can hide and which anti-imperialism has to uncover.

To conclude this first section, we gather that Western imperialism is taken to mean high imperialism, that is, the period from the 1870s to 1914 during which, Western powers occupied and exploited most of the rest of the world, in order to respond to their economic, social, and political needs. They did so through the disguise of the civilizing mission ideology as a justificatory discourse, embedded into the nascent international law as its legal scheme. Now that we have delineated its contours, we can examine its relationship with liberalism.

Liberalism and Western Imperialism

Historically speaking, it is almost impossible to dissociate liberalism from Western imperialism as the latter developed during the spread of liberal ideas (Hausser et al. 1952). However, it is not just a historical coincidence. Some scholars contend that liberalism is intrinsically imperialist. For Uday Mehta (1999), the link between liberalism and colonialism is not accidental; they are congenital to each other because of the liberal belief in progress. It is the same view of Alan Ryan who argues that "liberalism is intrinsically imperialist" and even suggests that "we should understand the attractions of liberal imperialism and not flinch" (Ryan 2012: 107). In other words, there are solid grounds to examine what liberal imperialism entails.

According to Ryan, liberal imperialism is equivalent to liberal interventionism and is understood as "the doctrine that a state with the capacity to force liberal political institutions and social aspirations upon nonliberal states and societies is justified in so doing" (Ryan 2012: 107). Dan Cox follows the same line, defining liberal imperialism as "the aggressive foreign policy of forcing, through direct military action and soft-power coercion, democracy and a respect of Western notions of civil and political rights on the world" (Cox 2013: 634). These definitions share the identification of imperialist seeds inside liberalism itself, which are the liberal beliefs in internationalization of liberal norms developed in the Western world, without paying regard to local cultures and practices. Liberalism then embodies imperialism through its universalist orientation. Nevertheless, it is one thing to be universalist and another to impose universal ideas on others. Liberalism becomes imperialist when it presupposes that its normative ideals and sociopolitical institutions are the best and consequently should be imposed by all means on nonliberal societies. Pitts captures it when she observes that "liberalism arguably remains marked by features that rendered it often supportive of imperial domination, including commitment to progress and a teleological view of history, a suspicion of certain kinds of cultural or ethical particularism, and a hospitable stance toward capitalism and the economic exploitation of nature" (Pitts 2010: 216). This means that the core components of liberalism are at the origin of its connection with imperialist domination.

It has already been underlined that Western imperialism was the domination of nonwestern

societies in all their vital sectors by the West between the 1870s and 1914. During this period, many liberals supported empire and imperialism under the same ideological justification of civilizing mission, and liberal imperialism was tied to the civilizing mission (Mantena 2010: 45). They believed that uncivilized societies would benefit from the imperialist project in freedom and progress. Understandably, such a belief had to be founded on the racist distinction between the civilized and uncivilized, between superior and lower races, from which arose the "metaphysical" duty of superior races to civilize the lower ones; they had to believe in this universal vocation of some races over others. Thus, it is once more difficult to dissociate liberal thought from the rise of Western imperialism. As Pitts once again rightly notes, "whether we apply the term liberalism strictly to theories developed after 1810s, when 'liberal' became a political category, or more broadly but conventionally to the languages of subjective rights and self-government stemming back to the early-modern period, the evolution of liberal thought coincided and deeply intersected with the rise of European empire" (Pitts 2010: 216).

The enmeshing between liberalism and Western imperialism is not only because of the moral support of the civilizing mission ideology; it is also found in the development of positive international law. Started in Brussels under the *Association internationale pour le progrès des sciences sociales*, the founders had the goal of furthering liberal ideas. In Koskenniemi's words, "the *Association internationale* advocated liberal ideas, religious tolerance, freedom of opinion and free trade, as well as the development of contacts between peoples" (Koskenniemi 2011: 12). In addition to this pronounced liberal leaning of the positive international law, they saw themselves as the juridical conscience of the civilized world (Koskenniemi 2011: 41). This is a clear indication that they bought into the dichotomy civilized-uncivilized, and they sided with what was considered to be the civilized world. In other words, the imperialist dimension of liberalism was ingrained in the positive international law.

This point is made evident by reading some representative of liberalism at the age of high imperialism. (Jennifer Pitts (2005) studies the attitude of many liberal figures both in Britain and France toward imperialism, and their views are quite different. Uday Mehta (1999) is also a good source for some British liberals.) James Mill talks of non-European societies "from the South Sea island nomads to the peoples of the Chinese empire [as] rude and barbarous" (Pitts 2005: 131). Under such circumstances, they do not deserve self-rule; rather, as in the case of India, British rule has to be imported and implemented through colonialism in order to help them grow from "social childhood to social maturity" (McCarthy 2009: 168). His son John S. Mill pushed even further in justifying the need and benefit of imperialism, also distinguishing "rude," "savage," and "uncivilized" peoples from the civilized ones. Once more, the dichotomy between civilized-uncivilized was the operative concept. Not only did it denote a categorization of peoples – which entails hierarchy between them – that operative concept also presupposed that those using it believed in the ideological justification of the Western imperialism; they adhered to Jules Ferry's "political metaphysics," which gives superior races the duty to civilize the lower ones.

For J. S. Mill, the classification of peoples into those two categories determined the nature of political institutions corresponding to each, providing consequently the *raison d'être* of imperialism. According to him, the savages could not bear the weight of free institutions; therefore, only a despotic government was the best option for them. In his own words, "a people in a state of savage independence, in which every one lives for himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any external control, is practically incapable of making any progress in civilization until it has learnt to obey." Hence, "to enable to do this, the constitution of the government must be nearly, or quite, despotic" (Mill 1998: 232).

Before even highlighting the imperialist tone of this statement, it is a contradiction to say that there is a people if everyone lives by him/herself; if it is a people, the assumption should be that there has to be a certain social organization – however basic it might be! – to facilitate social cooperation. Not acknowledging this is already a

bias against nonwestern societies and a basis for justifying invasion, since it is believed that one is not entering a constituted political entity. Second, there is the belief in "progress in civilization." This is not offered as a choice; it is presented as a must for the so-called savage people. Therefore, as it has to happen, the only form of government that can lead them to it is a despotic one. It should be underlined that for John S. Mill, despotism is not an end in itself; it is a means to reaching civilization, which comes through obedience. He writes, "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be of their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end" (1971: 263).

Mill connects the liberal belief in progress with the teleological view of history, as Pitts notes (2010: 216), and he represents a common view for the educated Europeans of his time. According to Koskenniemi, "by the 1870s the assumption of human development proceeding by stages from the primitive to the civilized had come to form the bedrock of social anthropology and evolutionary sociology that provided much of the conceptual background for cultivated European reflection" (Koskenniemi 2002: 102). Nevertheless, Mill's argument would not have promoted imperialism had it stopped there. But he went further. Not only did the savage people not deserve self-representative government, but they could not even produce a good despotic ruler to teach them how to obey. Hence, they had to get the despot from outside.

With these views, imperialism was normatively justified. If there had to be progress in the civilization of "barbarous" peoples, and the latter could not afford the means to that end, then those with the means had a moral duty to provide them. Translated into imperialist terms, the civilized nations had to provide despots for civilizing the barbarians; the latter had to be "governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it. . .[and] when the domination they are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to supply it constantly" (Mill 1998: 454). Once more, the civilized people were required by a moral duty to civilize the uncivilized people, and it was presented as benevolence.

With such arguments, it becomes difficult to defend the view that classical liberalism was not imperialist in its core and that it was not in connivance with the Western imperialism. Even Eileen Sullivan who thinks that most of English liberals were anti-imperialists concedes that "with his entire theory, Mill has been the most important intellectual figure in transforming English liberalism from a dominantly anti-imperialist theory to a very sophisticated defense of an expanding British empire" (Sullivan 1983: 617). As the above development shows, Mill's argument is not only for the British empire; it is rather a liberal normative theory of imperialism, because it is built on liberal norms to justify why one people can rule over another.

Following Ryan's and Cox's definitions of liberal imperialism, there is no need to ask whether liberal imperialism disappeared with the physical end of Western expansion – technically marked by the decolonization movement, although the latter has been labeled or taken to lead to a neocolonialism (Fanon 1996). On the contrary, it is a commonplace claim that Western imperialism has continued under liberal imperialism which pervades international politics and economic systems, by instituting the liberal international order (LIO) before which all countries have to bow. Established after the World War II under the hegemonic leadership of the United States of America in connection with its European Allies (Ikenberry 2010), a few years ago (2010), Ikenberry was convinced that LIO is here to stay and that it would maybe change its leadership and not really its foundational norms. Today with the arrival of Trump in the US politics and the increase of nationalism, protectionism, and populism in the Western world, he (2018) wonders whether it is not the end of the liberal order. LIO gained monopoly after the Cold War, celebrated in the now famous Francis Fukuyama's *End of History*. While for many the establishment of LIO represented the dreamt democratic peace through free trade and international cooperation based on international norms, others consider it as the continuation of the imperialistic project that started with Western expansion during the formal imperialism. For Inderjeet Parmar, "LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony – strongly imbued with

explicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions – in both US domestic and foreign relations" (Parmar 2018: 152). This system applies different standards "internally and externally" (Parmar 2018: 157), that is, it is favorable to Western societies while constraining non-Western societies, sometimes even through military interventions. In its many policies on liberal norms of democracy and human rights (Hinnebusch 2012) and neoliberal economic measures that mostly affect nonwestern societies, there is an outcry that LIO constitutes "a new age of liberal imperialism" (Rieff 1999), enforced through humanitarian intervention.

However accurate all these criticisms against liberalism are though, it remains to be underlined that resistance and contestation against imperialism were/are also rooted in liberal tradition. Sullivan contends that John S. Mill had actually inherited a liberal tradition that was anti-imperialist (Sullivan 1983: 599) and Andrew Fitzmaurice corroborates that opinion saying that there were both a critique and a justification of imperialism at the heart of liberalism. (Fitzmaurice 2012: 124). Thomas McCarthy (2009) also shows that there were many liberals who opposed imperialism. Even Mehta, who rather contends that liberalism is intrinsically imperialist, acknowledges Burke as a liberal who challenged the British empire. And Parmar who argues that LIO is imperialistic also recognizes that it was first conceived as anti-imperialist and anticolonial (2018: 160).

Under such conditions, while not completely agreeing with him, McCarthy is right to observe that:

> given this diversity of views, it seems to me an oversimplification to argue…that imperialism is constitutive for liberalism as such, especially since the critiques advanced by anticolonial liberals have typically appealed to liberal values. On the other hand, it is undeniable that mainstream of liberal thought, running from Locke through Mill to contemporary neoliberalism, has continually flowed into and out of European-American imperialism, and that ideas of sociocultural development have been integral to that connection. (McCarthy 2009: 169)

I do not completely agree with McCarthy that imperialism cannot be attributed to liberalism as

such, because it has been shown that the support of imperialism was constructed based on core norms of liberalism. However, he has a point to underscore that anti-imperialism also drew from liberal norms. Therefore, one can conclude with Fitzmaurice that "liberalism has been characterized by conflict over empire" (Fitzmaurice 2012: 124), because it is hard to dissociate liberalism from Western imperialism. In fact, some liberals thought imperialism would be good for the protection of natives. For instance, as once more Koskenniemi writes, the founders of international law "were liberals who supported the turn to formal empire in order to protect the natives from the greed of companies and ensure the orderly progress of civilizing mission." He adds, "they were imperialist not irrespective of their liberalism but as a consequence of it" (Koskenniemi 2011: 3). With such evidence, it would be hard to completely absolve liberalism as such from its involvement with imperialism.

Now, today, there is a claim that Western imperialism has changed its face and girded itself with the new fashion of human rights. The next section looks closely at that.

Western Imperialism Under the Cover of Human Rights

Many Third World and postcolonial scholars have been decrying human rights as the new ideology invented to cover Western imperialism. Indeed, having been formally interrupted by the decolonization movement, the unlimited expansion that was characteristic of high imperialism could not continue openly without hurting the moral sentiments of "civilized nations." Thus, forced to leave the newly acquired colonies, the West had to find another way to stay there, and it did so by leaving in place local bourgeoisie installed to protect Western interests (Fanon 1996). But that being the covert fact, the West once more could not state crudely and assume it openly. Thus, there is a need of another moral discourse to conceal this new stage of imperialism and that is, these scholars claim, the role of human rights.

It is worth recalling that Western imperialism was meant to solve political, economic, and social problems of the Western nations but had to be

justified in a morally acceptable discourse of the civilizing mission. That is how it could garner the support of intellectuals and galvanize missionaries for such a noble cause, hence the support of some liberals who conjured up a robust normative argument and put in place a legal framework in order to attain that end. The claim then is that the human rights corpus has embodied the same role of an ideology for advancing Western domination over the rest of the world, and it has also taken on a legal form in order to be effective in pushing forward the Western imperialist goal. For David Holloway, "the idea of 'human rights' substitutes for, and becomes indistinguishable from, older terms such as 'progress' or 'civilization,' and the gamut of racialized ideologies depicting white Anglo-Americanism as the engine of these values that first became part of the dominant US culture's explanations for its own domestic hegemony during the nineteenth century" (Holloway 2009: 32). Normatively speaking, the claim amounts to saying that human rights idea itself is imbued with the same characteristics of Western imperialism: the racial hierarchy and the civilizing mission entrusted to superior races toward the lower ones.

Makau wa Mutua captures the whole critique through a metaphor of savage-victim-savior (SVS) (Mutua 2002; Ingiyimbere 2017: 39–52). For him, human rights have become the ideological tool that the West, under the United States of America's leadership, has found to perpetuate Western imperialism. It should be underscored that here Western imperialism is understood as the imposition of liberal values and norms on nonwestern societies. Thus, for the critics, when British and French leaderships waned, the United States took over; and while the former hailed civilizing mission ideology as the reason for the expansion, today human rights discourse provides the moral discourse for the Western world to continue the salvific mission of the "burden of white man." According to Mutua, the human rights corpus depicts nonwestern societies as savages, which still need civilization by becoming liberal; it demonizes nonwestern states and officials as savages who violate human rights, and yet it remains silent when the same rights are trampled by Western states. It institutes double standards in

evaluating human rights, because it is designed to advance the Western interests by targeting nonwestern cultures. That is why, for Mutua, human rights corpus is rather Eurocentric; it is constituted with Western values of democracy and human rights, and it aims at imposing them on other cultures without taking into account their normative systems.

The whole point of this first metaphor of *savage* in relation to today's Western liberal imperialism is that, like the formal imperialism then needed to portray the new societies they were conquering as savages, barbarous, and uncivilized in order to justify itself, so too does the current liberal imperialism need to depict nonwestern societies as savage so that the West can perpetuate its domination. In that sense, although human rights discourse is heralded to protect victims and improve sociopolitical structures, it is a sham because it is used to hide the Western liberal domination over the rest of the world. That is why human rights discourse is labeled an ideology.

The anchor of this new imperialism, however, is the *victim*, and this is the second term of the metaphor SVS, and it is also a metaphor on its own. Presented as impoverished, weak, and helpless, the victim epitomizes the savagery of the nonwestern cultures, which the civilized world cannot tolerate. This victim is always from the nonwestern societies, displayed to the Western public in order not only to justify once more why the West cannot sit back and watch, but also to gain public moral support. Images of victims of human rights violations in the West or by the West are rarely presented to the public, and not even talked about, because this would affect the purpose of the whole enterprise, as it would reveal the West's own vulnerability. Furthermore, having presented the victim as helpless facing the ferocity and savagery of nonwestern states, there is only one moral option: to help her.

These kinds of images and discourses were the same used during the formal imperialism to arouse moral sentiment toward the "poor natives" and the need to protect them, without asking what the protector would gain in return. They portrayed the indigenous rulers as cruel and savage on the one hand and, on the other, the helpless local

populations as victims of these heartless rulers. Thus, the civilized public could not fail to support imperialism thus presented and seen as a salvific mission toward those poor souls. Mutua argues that it is the same dialectic operating with/in human rights discourse.

The third metaphor is that of *savior* which, as it sounds at the outset, has a religious flavor; it combines "Eurocentric universalism and Christianity's missionary zeal" (Mutua 2002: 30). The West feels that its natural duty is to come to rescue, as a salvific act, those helpless and poor victims of the savagery of nonwestern cultures. Those cultures need to be fixed – saved – once and for all, by bringing them the values and norms that lead to civilization: the Western liberal values and norms of human rights. The West needs human rights discourse to justify its return to nonwestern societies; otherwise it could be accused of recolonizing the nonwestern world. Furthermore, for carrying out that salvific mission, the Western world needs proselytizers who are ready to go on the new expeditionary missionary work, as they did during the time of high imperialism. Hence, for Mutua, the new instruments of the contemporary civilizing mission of human rights are:

(i) The UN institutions – which are sent to monitor nonwestern states in their human rights performance

(ii) The international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) – which are mostly from the Western world and are concerned only with the records of liberal human rights outside the Western world, ignoring the status of human rights in their own respective countries.

(iii) The Western states that condition their cooperation with nonwestern states by their respect for human rights and liberal democracy in a unilateral way, since nonwestern states do not have any power to impose conditionalities for their cooperation with the West.

This process is reminiscent of the tutelage that undergirded the formal imperialism of the past, believed to help the nonwestern societies to progress toward civilization but without granting them political recognition and equality in bilateral or multilateral cooperation.

Thus, the SVS (savior-victim-savior) metaphor – whose terms are themselves metaphors – exemplifies the ideological dimension of human rights discourse at the service of the continuation of Western liberal imperialism. Indeed, while the human rights corpus itself is made of many generations of human rights, such as socioeconomic and cultural rights, as well as the right to development, the Western world is only concerned with the liberal rights, that is, the civil and political rights. It does not consider other rights, such as economic and sociocultural rights, as real rights because, it is said, they are not easily enforceable. This is another reason why, for some scholars, human rights discourse has become an ideology to advance the liberal culture over the nonliberal societies, for if it were a genuine fight for human rights, there would be no discrimination against nonliberal rights. Thus, the real content of human rights as ideology in the hands of the West is not the actual known Bill of Rights as enshrined in the international instrument – *Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*. Rather, when the West invokes human rights, it is referring to liberal values and norms where "liberal" means "human rights and the rule of law, representative democracy in governance, economic liberalism and free markets open to international trade and foreign investments, religious and cultural pluralism and the efficacy of science and technology" (Bowden 2009: 186). These norms have been set as the standards for nonwestern states in order to be accepted as a worthy member of the society of nations, namely, the civilized nations of the West. To attain civilization is to conform to these standards, and a failure in fulfilling them qualifies states as "rogue" and gives rise to Western intervention in the name of the protection of these rights.

Now, just as the civilizing mission ideology found a "juridical conscience" in the nascent positive international law, human rights discourse also has been incorporated into international

human rights law that Western states can activate when they want to invade a nonwestern one, not only as a moral justification but also as a legal argument. As Anghie puts it, "human rights is deployed as both argument for invasion and then, the invasion having been completed, as an argument for transformation, in which international human rights law…stands for the norm that must be achieved in order to bring about a 'civil state' thus, supposedly, bringing about international stability." He adds, "it is in this way, through the invocation of human rights, that what might be seen as an illegal project of conquest is transformed into a legal project of salvation and redemption" (Anghie 2005: 303). This again is a further reason to consider the contemporary human rights regime as an ideological instrument for the West to dominate the rest of the world.

However, although all these points highlight the ideological dimension of human right discourse, there is no area where the intersection between human rights and Western imperialism is more clearly demonstrated than the so-called humanitarian intervention, that is, the military intervention for protecting human rights. For some authors, humanitarian intervention in the name of human rights is simply another form of neocolonialism. For instance, for Jean Bricmont (2006) through humanitarian intervention, the West uses "human rights in order to sell war." For while there can certainly be a moral case for human intervention in certain circumstances of gross human rights violation – what Michael Walzer calls situations that "shock the moral conscience of human kind" (2006: 107) – those who oppose it show how selectively it is conducted (Ayoob 2004) and how it is always directed against nonwestern states by the Western ones. Crimes committed by Western states or their allies are overlooked, whereas when it comes to nonliberal states, international institutions and Western states under the pressures of Western international nongovernmental organization (INGO) appeal to human rights in order to invade those states with a declared goal of transforming them into liberal states (Fearon and Laitin 2004).

This obsession with installing liberal institutions in the whole world as a condition of international stability is inspired by the myth of "the democratic peace" according to which – following Immanuel Kant's idea of perpetual peace – democratic countries do not fight each other (Rawls 1999). Hence, only liberal democracies should enjoy the nonintervention from external forces, whereas they have a moral duty to export and defend civil and political rights where they are not yet established or are being threatened. In that way, they can bring a bit of civilization to other parts of the world which are still barbarous. (Téson 1988, 2005).

The way authors such as Téson justify humanitarian intervention confirms the suspicion of its opponents as being a neocolonialism, serving the liberal domination of the world. Indeed, the parallelism between imperialism and humanitarian intervention is appalling.

- First, only the West is given the responsibility to carry out humanitarian intervention, in almost the same terms the international lawyers were using to justify high imperialism.
- Second, only Western political institutions are recognized as truly sovereign, and, therefore, they are the standard for sovereignty. Any different political model which is not based on the liberal one is "not civilized". Therefore, it is a candidate for a civilizational lesson. Needless to say that such a practice violates the cornerstone of today's international order built on state sovereignty.
- Finally, humanitarian intervention is not really conducted for the benefit of the nonwestern society but rather for the expansion of liberal domination, and this justifies another reason given by the critics of humanitarian intervention.

For some of these scholars, victims, who are supposed to be the reason for humanitarian intervention, are just proxy and never the real motives. Victims are used as an acceptable reason for invasion, and this affects the purpose of human rights themselves, because they are meant to empower people (Orford 2003), and yet humanitarian

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intervention is based on the image of a victim who is helpless and completely passive (Mégret 2009), without any agency in what is happening in his/her name. Hence, for Mahmood Mamdani, humanitarian intervention claims to protect political and civil rights, but it is actually a lie, since "rather than rights-bearing citizens, beneficiaries of humanitarian order are akin to recipients of charity. Humanitarianism does not claim to reinforce agency, only to sustain bare life" (Mamdani 2010: 54–55).

Once more, the practice of using a victim as proxy is not new because it was also used to justify formal imperialism as a way of saving natives from their savage rulers. The result was the occupation and exploitation of the occupied lands, under the pretext of protecting victims. Mamdani notes that "when it came to lands not yet colonized, such as South Asia and a large part of Africa, they highlighted local atrocities and pledged to protect victims against rulers" (Mamdani 2009: 276). The parallelism with humanitarian intervention is not difficult to draw as it invokes the victim as the reason for intervention, but the Western powers end up occupying the country with the goal of implanting liberal institutions for Western liberal interests. In recent years, examples are abundant, from Iraq to Libya through Afghanistan. Fearon and Laitin observe, "as with classical imperialism, we increasingly see the strongest states taking over, in part or in whole, the governance of territories where Western-style politics, economics, and administration are underdeveloped" (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 12). In other words, there are solid reasons to claim that human rights are being used by the West for liberal imperialist ends.

These criticisms of human rights as ideology implemented through humanitarian intervention are even supported by some defenders of human rights and humanitarian intervention, because they see human rights as an efficient means at the disposal of the West to increase its influence over the rest of the world. Jack Donnelly, who is a leading proponent of international human rights, does not flinch at finding the same legitimacy for human rights as that of the civilizing mission. According to him, "despite the fatal tainting of

the language of 'civilization' by abuses carried out under (and by the exponents of) the classical standard of civilization, internationally recognized human rights share a similar legitimating logic" (Donnelly 1998: 15). He commends the missionary zeal manifested by Western states in their foreign policy to use human rights in 1980s and 1990s, in order "to spread the benefits of (universal) values enjoyed at home." Moreover, the imperialist negative consequences "should not immobilize us in the face of abuses of power by murderous dictators hiding behind legal norm of sovereignty or a claim to radical cultural difference." Rather, "something like a standard of civilization is needed to save us from the barbarism of a pristine sovereignty that would consign countless millions of individuals and entire peoples to international neglect" (Donnelly 1998: 15–16).

Donnelly's views do not need comment, as their similarity with the imperialist ideology is clearly asserted, especially that he himself affirms that they share the same "legitimating logic." The West sets standards that everyone else has to conform to, and it has the obligation to spread them outside the West. "Others" and the nonwestern values and cultures are judged barbarous and murderous, while "Us", Westerners, enjoy "universal values"; the standards of civilization.

Clifford Orwin, on his part, illustrates how humanitarian intervention serves Western interests and the protection and expansion of Western "civilization." As he puts it, "with rare exception, humanitarian intervention is an encounter between Western or Westernized nations and non-Western ones, between lands where liberal democracy and technology have triumphed and land where they have not. It is... 'an encounter between two kinds of societies' of which the one characteristically shrinks from violence while the other takes its dominion for granted" (Orwin 2006: 203). Clearly, humanitarian intervention is a civilizational struggle, through which the Western world is extending its liberal influence and domination. It is the Western imperialism continued under more neutral means; "it is the white man's burden purged of its inconvenient whiteness. Precisely because it passes for nonpolitical, the relief of suffering affords a uniquely

uncontroversial ground for political action" (Orwin 2006: 16). Put otherwise, humanitarian intervention is the political action of the Western powers continuing to conquer the rest of the world.

These views are also confirmed by Western political figures who are honest enough to acknowledge that humanitarian intervention is meant to defend Western interests and spread Western values. For instance, Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, once said that "our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge" (Blair 1999). Indeed, values and interests merge because from the receiving end they are the same; they are all liberal interests. As for Bill Clinton, the former US president, "global interdependence requires global values commonly or evenly applied. But sometimes, force is necessary to get the space for values to be applied" (Jamison 2011: 365). In other words, humanitarian intervention is used to spread and defend the Western liberal interests in states and cultural spaces that resist them.

Following all these factors, it would be difficult to deny that human rights discourse has become the new way to continue liberal Western imperialism, making the three terms of the title – liberalism, human rights, and Western imperialism – quite fitting together. However, in the next section, despite this ideological use, I argue that human rights actually offer a means of resistance against both the Western imperialism and local oppression and injustice. But to do so, they need to be reconceived. Such a reconception is the goal of the following section.

Human Rights as an Anti-imperialist Tool

As the previous section substantiates, human rights discourse can be and has been used for imperialistic goals through humanitarian intervention. At the same time though, the same human rights discourse has been instrumental in fighting imperialism, such as colonialism. This claim, however, is not enough for demonstrating and defending that the contemporary paradigm of human rights embodies in itself an emancipatory

power. Rather, the latter has to be shown as belonging to the human rights corpus per se. To do so, it is first important to distinguish the contemporary paradigm from the modern paradigm of human rights, following the authoritative work of Upendra Baxi (2006).

By modern paradigm, Baxi means the development of human rights during the enlightenment through different declarations of rights, which sprang up in the Western world – for instance, the American Declaration of Independence or the French Declaration *des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*. Sure enough, rights contained in these declarations were of liberal inspiration, and they constituted what is today known as the first generation of human rights (Ishay 2004). Most importantly, however, although they came about as means of resistance against oppression and injustices, they incarnated exclusion as they were mostly concerned primarily with white middle class property owning men, following the liberal political theory of John Locke. That is the reason why they could be used to justify and further imperialism and colonialism. As Baxi remarks, "the foremost role performed by these was to accomplish the *justification of the unjustifiable*: namely *colonialism and imperialism*" (Baxi 2006: 44). Furthermore, the rights contained in those declarations did not have the pretention to a universal applicability, for they were framed for particular political societies. For instance, the French Declaration was never thought to be valid beyond the French kingdom, neither was the American Declaration meant to oblige every human being. In this regard, the validity of the modern paradigm of rights was limited in its outreach.

Contrary to the modern paradigm, the contemporary human rights paradigm was developed after World War II, and is more complex and richer, and includes more than just liberal rights. In addition to the latter, the actual human rights corpus also comprises socioeconomic and cultural rights, which originated from other ideological backgrounds, such as communism and socialism. It also contains rights formulated with the emergence of decolonization and the Third World, which are concerned with rights of peoples and right to development. Thus, the contemporary

paradigm embraces all the human rights instruments that constitute the current human rights practice.

Thus, although the contemporary paradigm of human rights shares the same emancipatory goal with the modern one, it is already clear that the two paradigms differ in their operating logic. While the modern paradigm was a tool of resistance for the white, middle-class men only – excluding women, children, and nonwhite peoples! – the contemporary paradigm is intrinsically inclusive and is meant to reach out to every human being, and it is formulated with inputs from different backgrounds. Once again, Baxi is on target when he notes that "the processes of formulation of contemporary human rights are increasingly inclusive and often marked by intense negotiation between the practitioners of human rights activism and of human rights repression" (Baxi 2006: 47). This observation by Baxi on the formulation of the contemporary human rights corpus is especially accurate when one looks at the commission that elaborated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Morinsik 1999; Glendon 2001). It was composed of members from different countries with different cultural backgrounds, although an objection can still be made that most of them had been educated in the West. Although valid, the objection would not deny the effort of inclusiveness displayed by the diversity of the commissioners. Despite this, critics contend that this contemporary paradigm of human rights is an ideology, which purports the Western liberal imperialism.

Thus, two things can be acknowledged as a way of responding to this claim.

(i) Firstly, the contemporary human rights corpus cannot be normatively rejected as simply being liberal, because it comprises different generations of rights that originated from different ideological backgrounds and it was motivated by diverse political and socioeconomic conditions.

(ii) Secondly, it cannot be rejected on the account that these rights were formulated by Westerners only for non-Westerners, because their formulation involved more than just Westerners, as shown by the members of UDHR's commission.

Nevertheless, the critics can still push further their charge, showing that, although the commission was diverse, Western members were the majority and the non-Western members had received their formal education in the West. Furthermore, they could continue underlying that the whole idea of International Bill of Human Rights originated in the atrocities happening in the West – especially the Holocaust – and not in the political and social conditions of nonwestern societies. In that sense, critics might claim, as it stands today, it cannot be disputed that the contemporary corpus of human rights has a Western imprint. And when one recalls the Western imperialistic use of these human rights – as it has been already shown! – there remains a good reason to suspect that the contemporary human rights corpus is a tool for extending and maintaining Western liberal imperialism.

This claim is valid and is grounded on solid facts because none can deny the Western historical origin of contemporary human rights regime. However, to limit its practice to the Western imperialistic use of human rights against the nonliberal world would be unfair. For human rights are also invoked in other contexts outside the West, and most of the time not for imperialistic motives, but rather as means of resistance against imperialism and local injustices and domination. My thesis, therefore, is that, in order to do justice to the practice of contemporary human rights, one has to study how they are being used in different contexts throughout the world. Such a study allows one to retrieve the emancipatory power of human rights because it disentangles them from the Western prism and leads to understanding them afresh. As Mark Goodale notes, "to study what human rights do is to study what human rights are" (Goodale 2006: 4). Once a new conception is achieved, it can then be tested whether it offers a satisfactory response to the arguments developed by the critics to demonstrate that contemporary human rights is an ideology serving to cover up Western liberal imperialism.

Now, since the goal is to reconceive human rights from what they do, the question is: What do human rights do? Though simple, the question is rather complex, because what human rights do can only be grasped through the actors who call upon them. And since the main actor of international politics is the state, most scholars have found that there is good reason to first focus on what human rights do *to* the state and what state does *with* human rights.

Concerning what human rights do *to* the state, they have noted that the contemporary human rights paradigm has, at least in theory, challenged state sovereignty as the individual has become a concern for the international community (Beitz 2009). Today, the individual has instances beyond a particular state to vindicate his/her rights when they are trampled upon and when the state is unwilling or unable to protect them. State sovereignty is normatively judged according to its human rights performance. It can no longer shield itself under its sovereignty when individuals' rights are violated inside its borders. In other words, human rights have become the warrant of state sovereignty, and from this perspective, we are led to the question: What does state *do* with human rights? The state uses human rights for protecting and enhancing human dignity, by respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the individual's human rights and/or peoples' rights (Lafont 2013). By doing so, the state enhances its sovereignty and comforts its international stature, because today the respect of human rights is part of international obligations. It is needless to recall that this is a normative argument.

However, this central role of state underlies the paradox of human rights practice, a paradox that necessitates the need to reconstruct the whole practice differently. Indeed, the history of human rights is a story of resistance to oppression and injustice mostly orchestrated by the state. Yet, the international order, which is supposed to be concerned with the fate of individuals, is founded on states, and it protects their sovereignty, whereas states are the main and dangerous violators of human rights. As Micheline Ishay rightly captures it, "we find ourselves pondering the role of the state as both the guardian of basic rights and as the behemoth against which one's rights need to be defended" (Ishay 2004: 8). That is why a state-centered analysis of the practice of human rights runs into a wall because, as Rawls (1999) has shown, most of the time, states are more concerned with power, prestige, and interest than the moral reasonable means to maintain international order. That is why some states can easily use human rights for their imperialistic goals, while others pay lips tribute to them, enforcing those which advantage them and rejecting or neglecting those which do not foster their rational interests.

Consequently, the problem with such a state-centered analysis is that it cannot uncover the emancipatory potential of human rights, because it only reveals how states manipulate them. Therefore, there is a need of a new model which decentralizes the analysis from the state, without excluding it. Such an analysis has to identify the other main actors involved in the actual practice of human rights and unveil the reasons beyond the state of those who appeal to human rights. Another reason for not focusing the human rights practice exclusively on the state is that the Westphalian model of nation-state is waning and regional blocks are emerging with more and more decision-making power over the classical nation-state. Furthermore, state is no longer the only entity threating human rights; some transnational and transborder entities – for instance, companies, industries, or terrorist groups – can be detrimental to the respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights. For all these reasons, I suggest that we look at local practices of human rights in order to reconceive human rights in their emancipatory power. From there, it can be shown how they become a means of resistance against every sort of imperialism and oppression and how the new conception offers a better response to the critics who consider human rights as an imperialist ideology. (For a long development on this point, see Ingiyimbere (2017: 229–86).)

Thus, in addition to the state – which is the main actor in the world order! – the first observation that one makes when analyzing human rights practice outside the official space of the state is the tremendous role played by human rights activists.

They are the ones who lobby and even draft the major human rights documents, and without their work, few states would sign human rights treaties or take initiatives to plead the cause of human rights. Once the texts are adopted, human rights activists put pressure on states to ratify and implement them (Smith-Cannoy 2012; Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). They also translate the international texts into the local (in general terms, by local I mean the space below official space occupied by the state) languages and cultures, so that these international norms become relevant to those who need them in their fight against oppression and injustices in their particular contexts. Sally Merry calls these activists the people of the middle (2006). They are the ones who popularize human rights, put pressure on states, and educate local communities about them. They can work as independent individuals or be organized in nongovernmental organizations, and they are engaged in all areas of human rights. This diversity allows human rights practice to be multi-sectorial.

Hence, human rights activists constitute the cornerstone category in the decentralized practice, and they are subdivided into two groups. On the one hand, there are local non-state actors (LNSA), who work in local contexts, and on the other hand, there are international non-state actors (INSA) who work in regional and international organizations. As a reminder, these actors play a leading role in the drafting, adoption, ratification, and implementation of human rights instruments.

At the second level, once people learn about human rights – thanks to human rights activists – they use them in their struggle for justice and against oppression. Some people call upon them to challenge cultural norms which are oppressive – for instance, women who fight against gender violence and injustices against women (Merry 2005). Others appeal to human rights for gaining or protecting their cultural heritage, as in the case of indigenous groups (Goodale 2007). Not only are human rights used to challenge and change political culture and institutions, but they are also invoked to push for socioeconomic improvement (Young 2012). They are even summoned to fight the violation of human rights by the multinational companies which, with the complicity of the ruling elite, conduct activities that harm local communities. The people or groups of people who appeal to human rights discourse in their different and diverse fights do not do so because human rights are Western or because they want to become westernized. Rather, they resort to human rights because of the discursive power of human rights and their mobilizing capacity for political action (Beitz 2009). They find in human rights discourse a source of empowerment, which is not available in their cultural or political normative systems. That is why and how every group of people chooses the kind of rights that are relevant to its situation, without rejecting the other categories of rights. This fact underscores the vital role of the human rights activists who, through their network and pressure activities (Keck and Sikkink 1998), make sure that human rights instruments are legally ascertained, so that they can provide a solid moral and legal discursive source for political action, for people who need it in their different local situations.

This is not peculiar to the nonwestern world. Rather, it applies everywhere because political oppression and socioeconomic injustices can be found everywhere. As Jack Mahoney puts it, "all human cultures without exception are subject to constant scrutiny, evaluation and challenge by a doctrine of human rights, and none is ethically sacrosanct or immune from such critique" (Mahoney 2007: 110–111). This critical and discursive power of human rights that enables political action is beyond what can be politically manipulated by states in their pursuit of self-interests, because it is exactly meant to resist such state's behavior.

At a third level, the state-decentralized practice of human rights also shows the increasing role of regional blocs in the practice of human rights (Davies 2015). While not always obvious, today individuals can bring to court and, sometimes, win against state's policies that violate their basic human rights. Although European Union is a good example in this regard (Kanstroom 2012), cases can be found everywhere today, because many regional blocks have included the respect of human rights in their constituting acts and have even created institutions to that effect – although

the effectiveness of some of them might be wanting. These regional blocs, thanks to the network of human rights activists, can put pressure to the source of violation of human rights, be it from an individual state or a regional threat, and bring about improvement.

Once more, human rights discourse proves itself to be a means of resistance that empowers peoples who, otherwise, would not have found how to deal with their situations. In such cases, human rights are not seen as imperialist instruments at the disposal of the Western states in order to perpetuate Western imperialism. Rather, they offer a new tool to people to resist some of the Western negative impacts on their lives and their communities or to challenge local injustices and oppressive normative systems, and this is done in diverse contexts.

Once these other actors – human rights activists, peoples in local contexts, regional blocs, and other international institutions – are included in the human rights practice, human rights are not seen as instruments for states only; they are not even mainly meant for states. Rather, they reveal themselves to be an empowering source for those fighting for human dignity in every form. That is why they can be conceived as "standards empowering individuals or groups of individuals…in order to resist, through different levels of influence, any source of threat endangering their basic interests" (Ingiyimbere 2017: 250).

This conception of human rights as means of resistance allows, I would submit, to defend the contemporary human rights regime against the claim that it is an ideology meant for covering up the Western liberal imperialism.

(i) To start with, those who appeal to human rights do not do so because they necessarily like liberal culture or because human rights are Western. Rather, people appeal to human rights because of their discursive power and political effectiveness vis-à-vis their concrete situation. In other words, those using human rights discourse have their own justification of human rights, which is not necessarily the liberal origin or liberal inspiration of human rights. In addition, it has been

demonstrated that the human rights corpus is more than just liberal rights. Therefore, it is reductive vis-à-vis the contemporary paradigm of human rights per se to claim that it is only liberal.

(ii) Second, thanks to their critical power, human rights can be used to challenge Western imperialist ambitions over the rest of the world. That is how and why movements against neoliberal policies such as anti-globalist movements or Wall Street movements can be organized using human rights discourse in its complexity (Rajagopal 2003, 2006). In other words, human rights reveal themselves not to be only for nonwestern societies.

(iii) Third, while the imperialist ideology of civilizing mission considered victims as proxy for imperialist expansion, this analysis has revealed that in the contemporary practice of human rights, victims are the subjects of their own fights, instead of being passive receptors. They are the ones who lead the fight, and the external help comes in as a solidarity gesture around a common cause.

These were the main arguments put forward by critics to justify why human rights corpus is an imperialist ideology.

Concerning humanitarian intervention, if the decentralized practice is applied, it would be no longer the Western powers which decide when and where to intervene but rather the regional organizations which are close to the case. While international institutions and Western states could contribute financially and logistically, they should not be the ones to lead the intervention, except when the local means and mechanisms have been exhausted and failed. The responsibility of these regional organizations in carrying out humanitarian intervention would allow to avoid neocolonial invasions and belie the neocolonialist rhetoric. For some nonwestern ruling elites resort to neocolonial discourse in order to hide the crimes they are committing against their own people. If the humanitarian intervention is conducted by neighboring countries, the claim no longer stands because most of the countries involved share the same colonial history.

Furthermore, such intervention excludes the meddling of Western powers for their imperialistic goals. And if they do, human rights discourse still avails to activists and those opposing it as a tool for contestation and resistance. As to the fears of selectivity in implementing humanitarian intervention, they would also be reduced because the countries that are members of the regional blocs have common interests to protect for their common benefit. In other words, the new conception of human rights proposes a new model of conducting a humanitarian intervention that would curb the Western imperialist ambitions hidden in their interventions but also debunk the neocolonialist rhetoric usually advanced by local elites to cover their crimes against their peoples.

These regional developments and the critical power of human rights also help see the ways in which international law and the LIO – which we saw are in connivance with Western imperialism – can be challenged. Indeed, once many conflictual cases are resolved at the regional level and new economic powers arise from the nonwestern parts of the world, new practices different from the Western model will arise, and voices of change and reform of international order will appear. And here again human rights discourse provides a powerful tool in that struggle. Indeed, since human rights are recognized by many Western states, framing the claims into the human rights language will offer a common basis for discussion and help bring back home what a Western imperialist mind could have thought to be for non-Westerners only. Nonwestern societies will use human rights language to raise claims against Western violations of human rights outside. Just as the human rights discourse contributed to the anticolonial discourse (Burke 2010; Klose 2013) – which was certainly unintended by the imperialist countries at the time – the same human rights discourse offers a very effective means to resist today's Western imperialism in all its forms, be it political, economic, or cultural.

In fine, the claim that human rights have become an ideology for Western liberal imperialism is derived from looking exclusively at the human rights practice of some Western states, and this is a fair observation because, once more,

states are most of the time concerned with their interests, power, and prestige. In that regard, they can easily manipulate even human rights in order to achieve their goals. However, an analysis and a conception of human rights drawn from the larger picture of human rights practice ushered in by the contemporary paradigm show that the latter is essentially a means of resistance against any form domination and injustices. How effective this means is and whether it is the best among other means of resistance are different questions beyond the present essay.

From this point of view, then, the combination of liberalism, Western imperialism, and human rights which, at the first look, seemed to be for the benefit of the spread of Western imperialism, turns out to contain its own anti-imperialist antidote under the contemporary paradigm of human rights, provided it is understood from local practices and captured in its emancipatory power.

Conclusion

The aim of this essay has been to explore the relationship between liberalism, human rights, and Western imperialism. The three having been objects of extensive scholarship, I took the option of looking at their relationship through the claim that human rights have become a new ideology to perpetuate Western liberal imperialism. Hence my first point looked at the meaning of Western imperialism, which was carried out through the imperialist ideology of the civilizing mission. Racially embedded, it was built on the antithesis binary civilized-uncivilized, standing for the relationship between superior race and low races. The former was thought to have a moral duty to civilize the latter. The civilizing mission was an ideology because it concealed the reality that Europe needed empire to solve its internal problems. That ideology was helped by positive international law which provided a legal framework to the imperialist conquest.

The second point explored whether liberalism is imperialist in its core norms and values, given that the birth of this imperialist international law was inspired by liberal ideas. The section

established that it was not accidental that liberals supported imperialism and that liberalism became an imperialism on its own. It flowed from the liberal belief in progress, the teleological view of history, and the necessity of civilization. Hence liberalism could not and cannot resist to internationalize itself by all means – even through imposition if need be! – disrespecting other cultural normative systems, instead of choosing restraint as Georg Sørensen (2011) would suggest. On the other hand, though, liberalism also contained seeds of resistance, and many liberals were anti-imperialists, causing a conflict within liberalism itself about empire. However, with the liberal international order and its neoliberal economic institutions, the liberal imperialist dimension is difficult to hide. Critics, therefore, use these facts to claim that human rights have become an ideology of the West to pursue its perennial ambition of making the whole world in its own liberal image.

My third point, therefore, elaborated this claim, showing that there are indeed good reasons to suspect human rights as helping the West to maintain its imperial domination. Although composed of different generations, human rights originated from Western contexts, and some politicians in the West do not hide that they are using human rights to advance their own interests. Furthermore, some proponents of human rights justify them as new standards of civilization that the West has to use to bring civilization to barbarous lands. To apply the imperialist categories to human rights discourse demonstrates what some scholars are claiming that human rights are indeed an imperialist ideology. This is increasingly obvious in the so-called humanitarian intervention, which target non-Western states, while shielding Western states and their allies. Furthermore, most of the time, the invading countries claim to be protecting the human rights of the victims while they are actually pursuing their own economic and diplomatic interests. That is why victims are simply wrapped into the human rights discourse in order to justify a military intervention ordered to protect Western interests.

In face of these arguments which cannot be easily dismissed, I suggested, in the fourth and last section, a new conception of human rights that helps retrieve their emancipatory power and show that human rights can also become an anti-imperialist instrument. The new conception is decentralized from the state and looks at the practice of human rights from local contexts. It reveals a constellation of many actors working in synergy, with human rights activists as the engine of the whole practice. This practice shows that human rights embodies a very powerful critical and discursive capacity that is capable of animating political action to resist any kind of threat to individual' and people's basic interests, be it from the imperialist side or from local authorities. I hope to have exhibited the emancipatory power that is contained in the contemporary paradigm of human rights discourse which can be used against imperialism.

So far, however, I have been insisting on the power of human rights discourse as a tool or means. This is to say that human rights do not work magically. Human rights discourse, just like any tool, needs a subject who knows how to handle it in order to be effective to the maximum of its potentiality. For it to deliver its emancipatory power, current human rights regime needs people who believe in the power of that critical discourse and who have the capacity to guide political action and use that power accordingly. It is only under such conditions that human rights will become the powerful means to resist Western liberal imperialism. Moreover, human rights critical capacity is also internal to the human rights discourse itself, in order to become more effective in its empowering role. That is why new ideas and new mechanisms are created, and new initiatives started. But without people committed to the anti-imperialist struggle through human rights discourse, Western powers and other powers might continue to manipulate them in order to maintain the domination of the world and protect their imperialist interests.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism

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Liberation

Liberia

Liberia, the Struggle for Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty, and Democracy

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Synonyms

Africa; African-Americans; Emigration; Imperialism; Liberia; Nation-building; Slavery

Definition

The conventional historical and political literature commonly associates imperialistic designs and anti-imperialistic resistance with European colonies in Africa and other colonised peoples around the world. Because Liberia was not formally colonised under the 1884–85 Berlin Conference regime, it is usually left out of the discourse. However, this chapter argues that Liberia was born and built out of the interplay of imperialistic and anti-imperialistic forces external and, ironically, internal to the country. Liberia emerged out of the cross-currents of the Atlantic World: the slavery brought on by capitalist imperialism, anti-slavery movements, emigration, and the transplantation of African-Americans along the Atlantic corridor. The confluence of these three tributaries streamed into the founding of the Liberian state and the subsequent struggles, since the nineteenth century, to broaden its statehood and democratic space. Therefore, this essay focuses primarily on three interconnected phases of the shaping of Liberia, based on the dynamics of contending external and internal forces: (1) the historical roots and tension in the founding of the Liberian state in the American and the West African environments; (2) territorial sovereignty and security vs British and French imperialism on boundary issues; and (3) internal imperialism by the Liberian state itself vs the indigenous populations on the issues of slavery, effective occupation, and the politics of exclusion/

inclusion. Discussion of these central themes reveals the critical role of imperialist and anti-imperialist struggles in the formation and building of the Liberian nation state.

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Historical Background: The Journey from Enslavement to Statehood

Although the conventional historical narrative does not explicitly indicate this fact, the origins of the Liberian colony and state began in reality with the uprooting and enslavement of Africans in the 1400s. Then 400 years later, the return of descendants of former slaves to the Grain Coast (West Africa) through the policy of 'expedient deportation' of African-American and manumitted slaves began in 1820. Because African slaves were taken from the various regions of Africa, even if mostly from West Africa (Senegambia to Angola), it is reasonable to say that the African-American emigrants of the period represent Africa in microcosm. Comparative narratives reveal the experiences of the Black Loyalists from the Americas to England, then to Freetown, Sierra Leone in 1784; they are known as the Creoles. Some settled in Liberia as well. Afro-Brazilians returned to other countries in West Africa i.e. Dahomey, now Benin, Nigeria, Togo, etc. (Schick 1980, p. 4). Interestingly, the events of history are ever evolving, as protracted civil wars in Africa have brought descendants of emigrants, as exiles, to Europe and the Americas.

As kith and kin, the encounters between emigrants and indigenous Africans in Liberia and other countries are stories worth the telling and further research. Consequently, how to build a nation out of diverse emigrant and indigenous populations, estranged by 400 years of separation and radically different customs and physical environments, has remained the perennial task in Liberia's historical development. These communities are not monolithic. Although the American Colonization Society (ACS) was the premier national organisation, the emigrants were motivated by different reasons or attitudes and sponsored by various state colonisation societies (Sigler 1969; Clegg III 2004). Being the minority population, they forged unity out of necessity in the strange physical and human environments. In the case of the indigenous majority, comprising 16 different ethnic groups, then and now, it appeared united in the face of strangers on their soil who treated them as uncivilised or inferior and so excluded them from the body politic. However, the fact is that there existed intra-emigrant class struggles for power, the politics of colourism, and differences in settlement location (1820s–1980, the year of a coup d'état) vs the inter-ethnic clashes in the past, both after the coup and during the uncivil war (1989–2003).

These realities exposed how tenuous the presumed unity in both communities was. Also, both communities read historical events differently. Further, both manipulated or were manipulated by internal and external forces, for better or worse, in the nation-building process. The originally forced displacement out of Africa, then the encountering, and the singular task of nation building reveal the struggles and outcomes of contending forces and players of imperialism and anti-imperialism in Liberia.

Effectively, capitalist imperialism started the historical process of Liberia. Gleaning and summarising succinctly imperialism and anti-imperialism from the literature, a working definition is in order. Driven by the need for economic and non-economic advantage, imperialism is the ideology and policy of exercising asymmetrical power to attain such basic goals: the appropriation of foreign territory, labour/materials, and markets (colonialism), the export or transfer of social problems to foreign places (this is left out of the discourse), and cultural subversion and transformation (Bowman et al. 2007). Forces antithetical to imperialism/colonialism have taken different forms of violent and non-violent resistance throughout history, and the Liberian Experiment is no exception.

As a result of capitalist imperialism, an earlier form of globalisation, the four continents along the Atlantic corridor (Africa, Europe, and North and South America) have remained connected by the movement of people, materials, and ideas. First, most prominently, it was the legitimate trade in goods and services (up to 1400) and then the illegitimate slave trade (1400s–1800s). The largest and most ignominious of the 'Middle Passages' was the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. Though the Atlantic Slave Trade is most often referenced, this essay recognises slavery across other land and oceanic 'middle passages' around the world. Discourse on slavery must include the evils of Arab-imperialism since Islamic hegemony in North Africa in the seventh century and the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade subsequently. This policy culminated in the horrific and terroristic pillaging of Eastern and Central Africa by Arabs in the Trans-Red Sea/Indian Ocean Slave Trade at its height in the second half of the nineteenth century. Hamed bin Muhammed (known infamously as 'Tippu Tip') and his African collaborators were perpetrators of Arab imperialism. Arabs and Europeans enslaved Africans, respectively from the East and West. This trade transplanted millions of African slaves, first in the Caribbean islands, South America, and then the US to meet the great demand for labour.

African slaves provided the critical labour that sustained plantations, mines, and other industries that fuelled the economic development of Europe and the Americas. Accounting the devastation of the slave trade, followed by European imperialism and colonialism, Rodney would provide the conclusive assessment of Africa's general condition within the Trans-Atlantic capitalist system. Succinctly, it is that the earlier enslavement and the cheap labour and exploitation of natural resources contributed to capital accumulation abroad. Consequently, the development of Europe and America left Africa in a state of underdevelopment (Rodney 1982).

Africa's loss through the slave trade was America's gain, regardless of the smaller number of slaves on the mainland in comparison to South America and the Caribbean. Ironically, slave codes were first enacted in the New England colonies, the cradle of American liberty. Beginning with the slave codes in Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 1630s, slavery spread across the region and then South, where Virginia established the slave plantation model in the 1660s and slavocracy became commonplace.

In the crucible of America's Peculiar Institution (Stamp 1989), African slaves were burned in the fire and flames of dehumanisation and degradation, but they were unrelenting overcomers. They were battered and bruised by hard labour in the field from dawn until dusk as the field hands. Contrast is often made with the other group, the house slaves, enslaved to what is considered to be soft labour. So much has already been written about American slavery and belabouring is unnecessary. The sum of it all is the looming, grotesque contradiction of human bondage that co-existed with religious freedom and political liberty. African-Americans saw the

antithesis of that contradiction and fought in the American Revolutionary War. Like the colonies seizing their freedom from British tyranny, they too were aroused by the stirrings of the tones of the Liberty Bell. Consequently, they claimed the freedoms associated with the self-evident truths of equality and the inalienable rights to pursue life, liberty, and happiness.

Out of that contradiction, relentless struggles were waged. Like a mighty river, resistance flowed first from source (wars, captures, holding barracoons, and castle cells) in Africa through other forms of resistance (mutiny, suicides, non-co-operation, etc.) along the horrific Middle Passage. Then the waves of resistance onto the mainland as slaves on plantations continued to rebel through various tactics. As one historian would say, the slave plantation was a battlefield, contrary to elitist and revisionist interpretations about the financial costs of slave upkeep and the positive impact of slavery (Blassingame 1979).

The indomitable human spirit, like the buoy, could not be submerged indefinitely. Open resistance was commonplace. In reality, slave resisters and Founding Fathers alike knew that true freedom is natural and spiritual. As such, it is neither derived from corruptible papers called constitutions nor guaranteed by political systems guided and guarded by fallen beings.

As the historical outcome reveals, the evil of slavery contained the seeds or antithesis of its own destruction. In fact, the negro spirituals carry the timeless message of the indefatigable human spirit to be free. For example, though actually physically bound in chains and wearing the social stigma of degradation, it was in the liberationist spirit of the slave to sing and live in freedom (Carawan and Candie 2007, p. 66).

> Oh Freedom, Oh Freedom
> Over me, Over me
> And before I be a slave
> I be buried in my grave
> And go home to my Lord
> And be free.

The slave in mind and spirit never accepted his/her status as officially defined. The physically 'caged birds' could still sing and appropriate to themselves their inalienable rights of freedom.

How profound and confounding the unwavering spirit of slaves must have been to the enslavers who claimed to be the bearers of civilisation and Christianity. Fundamentally, slaves knew in their humanity that they belonged to no-one but 'to their Lord'. They were God's Property, not the property of man. Consequently, they were daring and unrelenting in destabilising the slave system long before national declarations and movements formally abolished it.

Resistance to slavery was indeed an enduring strain. The struggles overflowed beyond the plantations in waves: slave networks, conventions, abolitionist movements, and (most of all) the presence of free blacks in the cities (Huggins et al. 1971; Meier and Rudwick 1996; Foner and Walker 1979). Also, as news travelled along the mysterious grapevine, the slaves heard the echoes of the successful slave revolt of the Haitian Revolution (beginning in the 1790s). Defeating the French imperialists and enslavers, Haitians gained their independence on 1 January 1804.

Having knowledge of such a decisive victory, the slaves must have been encouraged and aroused by the hope of a similar revolt and freedom. Meanwhile, slavocracy was shaken by that possibility of the demonstration effects of the Haitian and other foreign revolutions. There was good reason for the tensions and fears, because major slave revolts on the mainland soon occurred: Gabriel Prosser (1800), German Coast Uprising (1811), Denmark Vesey (1822), and Nat Turner (1834). Despite the vigilance of local, state, and federal patrols, slavocracy was not absolutely secure in the face of unyielding slave resistance. In effect, these social upheavals demonstrate that slaves always created spaces of freedom by individual and collective acts. Slavocracy would not go unchallenged. Simply put, the slaves would not just let the slave system 'rest on flowery bed of ease' while they laboured in blood, sweat, and tears.

As the resistance spread and widened, abolitionist movements and the black conventions took to the cause. As could have been expected, there was convergence and disharmony of interests, strategies, and visions. The abolitionist movements sought primarily to challenge the evil of

slavery and then to expose what they saw as the surreptitious scheme to maintain slavery by supporting the emigration of free blacks. The abolitionists regarded such an insidious plan as a way of undermining black solidarity (free enlightened blacks leading slaves against slavery). On moral and political grounds the abolitionists challenged the evil of slavery. In the tradition of earlier religious groups like the Quakers of Germantown (1688), the abolitionists denounced vociferously the ugly contradiction in a land founded on freedom from religious and political persecution in Europe. Joining the outcry were public officials and private citizens and their publications articulated their opposition to slavery. Some of the notables and publications of that era included the following: William Lloyd Garrison's *Liberator,* David Walker's *Walker's Appeal,* Samuel Cornish's and John B. Russwurm's *Freedom Journal*, and vocal critics like Frederick Douglass, James Forten, Lydia Marie Child, and Robert Purvis etc.

Concerning the conventions, one may say that they served domestic and foreign agendas. Domestically, the conventions aimed at securing the freedoms of free blacks and uplifting other blacks from their plight (Foner and Walker 1979; Pease and Pease 1971, pp. 191–205). Notably, even before the conventions, Garrison was highly critical of the ACS. He wrote a treatise against the expatriation of blacks. In his Thoughts of African Colonization, Garrison (1832) sought to expose the 'doctrines, principles, and purposes' of the ACS that he considered to be fundamentally duplicitous, hypocritical, and harmful towards blacks. With respect to foreign interests, the conventions debated the issue of emigration. Prominent abolitionists previously mentioned were against slavery but not in support of emigration. However, some were disillusioned with the issue of equality in America, and shifted their stance to become ardent (colonialists) like John B. Russwurm, who became governor of Maryland in Africa, now the county of Maryland in the Republic of Liberia.

Prominent emigrationists, like Martin Delany and Highland Garnet, supported colonisation, whether in Canada, Central America, Haiti, or West Africa, in order to establish a black state.

Emigrationists felt that a state would prove that blacks could govern themselves and gain the respect of whites. Various colonisation schemes were undertaken subsequently, with varying degrees of success. While the colony at Haiti failed, Liberia stands conspicuously as the enduring black state that emerged out of that era.

Lastly, and most significantly, the presence of the growing number of free blacks was perceived as a creeping menace or perpetual social problem to white American society. The main concern was about miscegenation or 'mongrelisation' of white society (Schick 1980, p. 4). Also, free blacks were seen as troublemakers who would foment and encourage slave insurrections. Their presence in effect would destabilise slavocracy. Consequently, this social menace or social problem had to be excised and exported out of America. That led to the planting of the Liberian colony.

Emigration lingered as an issue, initially through private initiative. Notable was a prosperous free black of Bedford, Massachusetts: Paul Cuffe. He had actually transported 38 free blacks to Sierra Leone in 1815 at his own expense (Barnes 1980, p. 4). That bold initiative demonstrated the practicality of colonisation and inspired emigration ventures in the 1820s and thereafter.

After the Cuffe initiative, the issue resurfaced in churches, state legislatures, and on to the national scene. What was to be done with free blacks and manumitted slaves? Sermons extolled the virtue of sending blacks to Africa. They would be like missionaries to spread the light of Christianity and civilisation among their 'kith and kin' who were still dropping in the 'darkness' of slavery and non-progressive traditions. State colonisation societies were formed. All of these efforts culminated in a national meeting in Washington, DC in December 1816. The participants included religious leaders, state and federal legislators, slave owners, anti-slavery representatives, etc. This meeting established the American Society for Colonizing Free People of Color in the United States, abbreviated as the American Colonization Society (ACS).

In simplest terms, the idea and political project of Liberia emerged out of the long historical

Liberia, the Struggle for Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty, and Democracy, Table 1 Liberia vs imperialists: Conflicts and encroachments

Conflict/issue	Year	With whom
Dispute/slave trade vessel	1839	British
Dispute/sovereignty	1839	British
Preying on Liberia territory	1841–45	British and French
Dispute/vessel seizure	1845	British
Dispute/boundary	1852	French
Refusal to pay custom duties	1860	Trader John Harris with British support
Refusal to pay custom duties	1862	Trader John Harris with British support
Gunboat violates Liberian sovereignty	1860	Trader John Harris with British support
Attempt to declare Liberia a protectorate	1879	French
Dispute/boundary	1880	British
Dispute/boundary	1882	British
Dispute/land grab on SW border	1883	British
Dispute/land grab	1885	British
Dispute/land grab SE border	1891	French
Claim on mineral-rich N border	1899–1910	French
Annexation of NW border	1903	British
Financial adm./custom receivership	1912–1914	American advisor, British, French
Forced labour/slavery charges	1920s–30s	British, French, German-led League of Nations

struggle of people and ideas. It is an historical journey from enslavement through emigration and colonisation into statehood. Effectively, the ACS was the principal private agency that implemented US public policy on race by the expedient deportation or resettlement of free blacks and manumitted slaves. Thus African-American emigrants left in the 1820s and subsequently on their 'journey of hope' sought a place of asylum, to be free from the 'deep degradation' in America. They were hopeful for a place of their own (Barnes 1980). They sought to attain freedom, equality, and the full stature of manhood and womanhood. That place on the Grain Coast, West Africa, would be called Liberia, from the Latin *liber*, meaning 'to be free'.

Imperialist Encroachments on Liberia's Sovereignty and Territory

Driven by the love of liberty, the emigrants began their torturous rebound down the Atlantic passage on 21 January 1820 aboard the *Elizabeth* from New York. This first voyage and transplantation was at Sherbro Island, near the colony of Sierra Leone (1787), the territory of repatriated Black Loyalists and other emigrants. The voyage was nearly abortive, as almost all the colonists died from malaria (Barnes 1980, p. 4). It was a fatal beginning. For further details on the conflicts and encroachments imperialists would impose on Liberia, see Table 1, constructed from events stated by Richardson (1959) and in Blyden's letters (Lynch 1979).

Imperialist Encroachments on Liberian Sovereignty and Territory

Although Liberia was established as a free and independent state on 26 July 1847, it was not immune to the flagrant violations of imperialist encroachments by the British and French (Akpan 1973). The grotesque irony is that these first recognisers of Liberia's independence later became Liberia's worst encroachers. Britain recognised Liberia (1848) and France did as well (1852). Despite the magnanimity of being the first two to welcome Liberia into the family of nations, that loftiness of international spirit was soon to be seriously debased by the malevolence of

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imperialist encroachments upon Africa's first fledgling republic.

Even before the Berlin regime of 1884–1885, the British on the western frontier and the French to the north and east boundaries were lurking and making inroads into Liberian territory. As for the coastal areas, independent traders (British, Cuban, and French) were violating Liberia's territorial waters and sovereignty by evading the payment of custom duties. Further, in the process of their illegitimate trading, they fomented and encouraged conflicts between the Liberian state and the indigenous groups. Meanwhile, these traders had the unfailing support of their colonial governments. As events unfolded, the poor and weak Liberian state was caught in the strait of rocks (colonial imperial power) and the thorns of brazen traders who smuggled, harassed, and hassled the very limited capability of the infant republic.

The violations by these independent traders and the colonial governments that constantly supported them significantly reduced the size of Liberian territory. Edward Wilmot Blyden provides a description of Liberian territory. Blyden is most eminently qualified on the boundary issues because he was intimately and tirelessly involved. He was Liberia's secretary of state (1862–70) and ambassador to Britain and France (1877–79). He also served as president of Liberian College (1880–84). Blyden was itinerant in Liberia's interior and West Africa (Sierra Leone and Nigeria). Meanwhile, he was a Presbyterian minister and educator. In his 4 August 1860 letter to the Rev. John L. Wilson, corresponding secretary of the Board of Foreign Mission, Presbyterian Church of America, Blyden wrote, 'The Liberian territory now embraces 500 miles of coast with an interior of 200 miles, forming an area of 100,000 square miles, with a population of 2,000,000' (Lynch 1978, p. 40). Today, Liberia is the significantly truncated size of 43,000 square miles, far less than half its original size.

This large land area was the result of land purchased or ceded by various ethnic groups, from the Sherbro Island/Gallinhas area at the western end, to the San Pedro at the eastern. Regarding the Gallinhas area, the territory was purchased with money provided and raised by

the British philanthropist Lord Ashley, the Earl of Shaftesbury (Johnston 1969). He was founder of the British Anti-Slavery Society and supported the infant republic's fight against the slave trade on the coast. Further, Lord Ashley and other friends of Liberia were interested in the spread of Christianity and civilisation in Liberia. Liberians felt it their mission to do so. With the financial support, the Liberia state enlarged its territory.

Between 1850 and 1856, the size of Liberian territorial limits had settled and was never contested by Britain, France or any other group. Consistent with Blyden's claim, the map below illustrates this larger size, which existed until areas were seized by the 'gangster tactics and subterfuge' of the British and French (Anderson 1952, pp. 86, 88). If historical images and metaphors might be used to depict the nature of Liberia's struggle, the British ('the Lion') and the French ('the Cock') lurked along the coast and interior of Liberia, tearing and plucking away at Liberia ('The Pepper Bird'). The fact that this little, severely (defeathered) bird survived at all is providential and due to the relentless ingenuity and tenacity of Liberian statesmen's brinkmanship. What then explains the significant reduction of the size of the Liberian territory? Several factors apply: imperialist adventurism/expansionism, the role of independent European traders, and the Liberian state's weakness and lack of vision.

While it is true that the French and (especially) the British were not committed initially to expansion before the Berlin regime of 1884–85, they were interested in any opportunity that increased their chances of exploration and economic gain. In the case of Britain, having the Sierra Leone colony adjacent to Liberia motivated her curiosity and involvement in the internal affairs of the other little colony and young republic next door. For example, Elizah Johnson, one of the colonists on the first voyage on the *Elizabeth*, is supposed to have responded remarkably to the British captain who offered help to the emigrants in their struggle against the various indigenous groups: 'We want no flagstaff put up here that will cost us more to pull down than it would to flog the natives' (Richardson 1959, p. 302).

Meanwhile, the French were exploring and marking the interior (particularly the Nimba Mountain area with its rich iron ore deposits and other minerals) with the intent of expropriating it to their future territories (Guinea in the north and Côte d'Ivoire in the east). As it later turned out, the French would imitate the British by seizing territory under the guise of linguistic misinterpretation by the Liberian envoy (English-speaking) about riparian rights beyond the Cavalla River. Unequivocally refusing British help, emigrants contended with the indigenous groups over the issues of land and trade. The memory of American imperialism still fresh among the latter, Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton, USS *Alligator*, obtained the land sale for the emigrants through threat or coercion. The British knew of these ongoing conflicts and responded with ambivalence.

With respect to the European traders who operated independently initially, there was a convergence of interests between the colonial powers and the independent traders along the Liberian coast. After the formal abolition of international slave trade by the former enslaving nations, individuals pursued alternative business ventures. Those mentioned in Liberian history are Pedro Blanco (Cuban), Theodore Canot (French), and John Myer Harris (British). They were engaged in legitimate trade which also was a cover for slave trading.

Of the three, the role of Harris was the most detrimental and lasting upon Liberia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. With good financial means and schooners, he positioned himself strategically on the Liberian coast by 1860. Through various intentional acts, he settled in the Gallinhas territory, the area bought and ceded by the chiefs. Next, he intermarried into the families of powerful chiefs, like the Massaquois, and was then influential enough (through money, gifts, and rum) to be admitted into the men's secret society, the Poro, the cultural sanctum sanctorum of African/Liberian life. He therefore became very knowledgeable about the area and its customs, and was considered one of the prominent locals. Harris acted like a chief, an intermediary between the colonial representatives, missionaries, and the local people. Though he at times was the source of their conflicts, he even served as arbitrator among conflicting ethnic groups. Because of his means and big house on the idyllic oceanfront, it is said that Harris even hosted meetings that dealt with the boundary issues (Smyke 2004).

Through calculating methods, Harris took advantage of the schisms and conflicts between the emigrants and the ethnic groups of the area. Further, because of his means and assimilation into the area, he exploited the divide by flagrantly violating laws regarding point of entry. He would trade in what he regarded as 'no man's land', between southwestern Liberia and southeastern Sierra Leone (the Gallinhas territory). In regular violation, the Liberian state seized his schooners. He appealed directly to British colonial governors from time to time, and got support without fail. Harris was therefore emboldened to even claim indemnity for losses to his 'business'. In response, the British colonial governors of Sierra Leone disregarded Liberian sovereignty by sailing to Monrovia, the capital, and seizing Harris's schooners and demanding payments. Liberia was coerced to pay, though a renegotiated lesser amount.

Perhaps even more critical, and having a more lasting effect than the encroachments, is the fact that Harris contested the claim by British officials and philanthropists which asserted that the Gallinhas was legitimate territory of Liberia. Ignoring this claim, he again appealed to the colonial governors to interfere and they did. They did so by discouraging Liberia's claim to the area. Boundary commissions were then set up, but the findings were repeatedly contested, and settlements were delayed and never conclusive. Meanwhile, the US observed from a distance, but only occasionally showed peculiar interest, when its naval vessel appeared in the contested area. Though the officer served as arbitrator, he was not authorised by the US to seek conclusive settlements. The British thus handled the boundary issue that they had encroached upon.

Despite Liberia's appeals and representations to these imperialist governments, as well as the intervention of prominent British individuals (former officials and private citizens) in support of her cause, the status quo on the colonial front

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was maintained. British and French governments eventually sanctioned the positions of their colonial agents. As the words of wisdom forewarn, 'The poor useth intreaties; but the rich answereth roughly' (Proverbs 18:23). Liberia was poor, needy, and weak (financially and militarily), and the British and French took advantage of this in order to violate her laws, invade her territorial waters to seize vessels lawfully impounded vessels for illegal trading, and encroach wantonly upon her borders. Meanwhile, the country was suffering from constant tensions and conflicts between the Liberian state and the indigenous population.

As a result of Harris's behaviour and the support of the colonial governors, Liberia remained 'threatened, perplexed, and anxious' about the security of its territory and sovereignty (Lynch 1978, pp. 54–81, 249–281). As secretary of state and Liberian ambassador to Britain, this was a recurring theme in Blyden's correspondence to the British government, the ACS and friends of Liberia who supported the establishment of the only Christian negro republic in Africa. The British and French charged that Liberia had mistreated the indigenous people by treating them as second-class and did not promote their well-being. Even more critically, they said that Liberia lacked the capability of effective occupation of the territories that it laid claim to. Meanwhile, when the Liberian state intervened against the independent traders, such as Harris, who were smuggling and not paying revenues, the colonial governors responded by force to protect their citizens.

Ironically, Liberia had to turn to British capitalists for its very first loan, which resulted in the infamous 1870 loan debacle. The £100,000 loan was negotiated by President Edward James Roye. Overall, the consequences were disastrous for Liberia because of the exorbitant interest rate, the terms of collection, and the political turmoil it caused that led to the resignation and death of President Roye (Anderson 1952, p. 85; Johnson 1987, pp. 92–93; Johnston 1969, pp. 258–276). If that were not humiliating enough, the Liberian government accepted the British offer to set up a frontier force. That too was a huge mistake, because the Liberian government found out that the insidious British designed it to destabilise the fledgling state. To correct this ill-advised collaboration, the government quickly turned to the US government to send a military training officer. The response was tangled and an African-American was sent to assist Liberia.

Struggle for Full Citizenship and Widening the Democratic Space

Liberia is the reality of the journey between hope and the realisation of the envisioned 'Glorious Land of Liberty'. The beginnings were very challenging between two peoples, the emigrants and the indigenous population. Though 'kith and kin', their relations were marked by sharp disharmony of interests. Table 2 sheds light on the issues (see also Richardson 1959).

In response, Elizah Johnson's infamous remarks towards the natives in 1820, about 'flogging' them, reflected the quintessential attitude of the young republic. It reflected paternalism and a lack of vision that would guide the dual policy of the Liberian state from the 1820s to 1964: 'Liberians vs the Natives', 'Class vs Tribe', 'Coastal vs Interior or Hinterland', and 'Civilised vs Country People'. This dualism was the defining feature of national policy for almost 150 years (Johnson 1987; Liebenow 1969; Fraenkel 1964).

In order to deal with the harsh physical environment and testy human conflicts, the Liberian colony and state became imperialistic and colonialist toward the indigenous population (Akpan 1973). Due to its non-progressive policies, essentially the policies of exclusion and privilege, the Liberian regime has been characterised variously as 'slavocracy', transplanted from America, 'oligarchy and the evolution of privilege dominated' by Americo-Liberians, 'kleptocracy' and 'rampant corruption', and 'autocracy' of one-party domination and circulation of elites from the True Whig Party since the 1870s to the 1980 coup d'état (Woodson 1990; Liebenow 1969; Cole 1968; Sawyer 1992).

Liberia, the Struggle for Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty, and Democracy, Table 2 Conflicts in environment, nineteenth-century Liberia: Americo-Liberians vs Indigenous People

Conflict/issue	Year	With whom
Battle of Crown Hill/land	1822	Deys, Mamba Bassa, Vai
War/land issue	1824	Bassa
War/land	1825	Bassa
War/slave trading	1826	Bassa
War/land and Trade	1832	Gola
War/land and trade	1835	Bassa
War/land and trade	1838	Deys, Gola
Assassination of Finley	1838	Kru, Slave Trader Canot
War/land and trade	1839	Gola
Dispute/slave trade vessel	1839	British
Dispute/sovereignty	1839	British
War/land and trade	1840	Deys, Gola
War/Land and trade	1842	Kru
War/land and trade	1843	Golas
War/land and trade	1851	Bassa
War/land and trade	1851	Gola
War/land and trade	1852	Kru
War/slave trading	1853	Bassa
War/land and trade	1855	Kru
War/land and trade	1856	Kru
War/land and trade	1857	Grebo
War/slave trading	1871	Vai
War/land and trade	1875	Grebo
War/land and trade	1876	Grebo
War/land and trade	1894	Kru

Liberia has transitioned through three republics: 1840s–1980, 1980–90, 1990s–2005. Now into the fourth, the post-uncivil war republic marks a critical junction in the election of Liberia's and Africa's first female head of state, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005. Since 1964, when the historic divide was officially declared nullified through the national policy of unification and integration, the full implementation and realisation is still weighed in the balance.

The fact that counties were constructed out of Liberia's interior, the formally neglected 'hinterland', and indigenous communities on the coast, was not enough. Even the election of representatives and senators or the appointing of their superintendents (county executives) still left more to be done. After all, policy impacts go beyond politics. Policy declarations and implementation have unintended consequences that politicians cannot imagine. The facts of the coup d'état (1980) and horrific uncivil war (1989–2003) suggest that the belated unification and integration policy was not sufficient to avert the national tragedies.

Now, the fourth republic is faced with the onerous and momentous task of repentance, reconciliation, and reconstruction. It is expected that the process will not be an 'evolution of privilege' but widely inclusive so that all Liberians will belong symbolically and materially. This is also the beginning of the period for unprecedented transparency so that leaders, groups, organisations, and citizens can be held accountable. As visionary and committed leadership and people are being transformed and engaged daily, the journey of hope can continue into the earthly 'Glorious Land of Liberty by God's Command'.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ British Slavery and Australian Colonization
▶ Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism
▶ European Imperialism in West Africa
▶ Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa
▶ Pan-Africanism
▶ US Military Presence in Africa

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Libya

▶ AFRICOM, NATO and the 2011 War on Libya

Linguistics

▶ Language, Translation, and Imperialism

Liquidation

▶ Genocide and Imperialism

Louverture, Toussaint (c.1743–1803)

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Synonyms

Abolition; Colonialism; Enlightenment; Francophone Caribbean; French revolution; Haiti; Haitian revolution; Slavery

Definition

This entry explores the life of Toussaint Louverture (c.1743–1803), the heroic leading figure in the Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804, the only successful slave revolution in recorded history. Louverture remains an international inspiration and is seen by many to be one of the greatest anti-imperialist fighters who ever lived.

François Dominique Toussaint Louverture (c.1743–1803) was the heroic leading figure in the Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804, the only successful slave revolution in recorded history, and he remains an international inspiration, seen by many to be one of the greatest anti-imperialist fighters who ever lived. Toussaint was a military genius who led an army composed overwhelmingly of former enslaved Africans and people of African descent to victory after victory under the banner 'Liberty or Death' over the professional armies of France, Spain, and Britain, before paying the ultimate price himself for refusing to compromise with imperial power at the expense of the maintenance of liberty for all. His imprisonment in a freezing cold cell in the Jura mountains inspired a sonnet by William Wordsworth in 1803 paying tribute to Toussaint as an immortal symbol of 'man's unconquerable mind', meaning that 'there's not a breathing of the common wind that will forget thee' (Bell 2008: 3, 294; For recent

work on the Haitian Revolution see Dubois 2005 and Girard 2013a).

The diminutive black West Indian general certainly remains one of the African diaspora's few globally recognisable revolutionary icons, arguably comparable in impact and influence to Malcolm X (1925–65). Building up and organising a disciplined rebel black slave army in the midst of a general uprising among the half a million African slaves in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue, Toussaint was the critical figure who helped ensure that amid the French Revolution, the ideals of the Enlightenment, *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité*, would be translated from rhetoric to become a material force without equal in the Atlantic world. Playing a critical role in the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean's wealthiest colony and the founding of Haiti, the first independent black republic outside Africa and the second independent state in the Americas, Toussaint not only outwitted numerous generals of European imperial armies but was also one of the first to anticipate the threat of neocolonialism in the context of post-colonial independence, as is evident in his constitutional and political tactics as well as his military manoeuvres.

'I was born a slave, but nature gave me the soul of a free man', Toussaint wrote in 1797 (Parkinson 1978: 37). It seems that Toussaint was born in the northern region of the French colony of Saint-Domingue around 1743, the eldest son of West Africans who had been captured and sold to European slave traders. Toussaint's father, who took the name Hippolyte in Saint-Domingue, was the son of Gaou Guinou, a powerful local official of the Alladas in present-day Benin, and the respect other slaves had for him apparently meant that he received favourable treatment from the plantation owner of the Bréda sugar plantation at Haut-du-Cap (Girard and Donnadieu 2013: 44–47). Toussaint himself was spared the often brutally short existence awaiting those who laboured in the sugar cane fields in one of the most intensive zones of capital accumulation in the Western world. Instead, picking up herbalist knowledge from his father, he worked

as a house slave with livestock as a stable-lad, developing skills as a horse doctor.

Toussaint could speak his parents' Aja-Fon language alongside the customary French Creole, and unusually learned to read from his slave godfather. He was born early enough to be exposed to Jesuit missionaries, who introduced him to Catholicism and from who he picked up some Latin phrases, and he soon developed a basic command of French from his contacts with white society. At some time in his mid- to late 20s, between 1769 and 1772, he managed to move from slavery into the small free black community, the very lowest stratum of the free people of colour on Saint-Domingue, and became a small landowner – indeed briefly also a slave owner himself. Yet Toussaint Bréda, as he was then known, continued to live and work as a coachman for the Bréda estate's French manager Bayon de Libertat. Though in his additional role as a *commandeur* Toussaint was involved in directing the work of slaves on the plantation, his own family remained enslaved (Geggus 2007: 116–117, 132).

Toussaint's literacy, his Christianity, and the nature of his professional work appear to have ensured him a degree of social mobility across colonial Saint-Domingue, and a degree of trust among white society. He developed a liking for European culture, reading some ancient history (including Julius Caesar's *Commentaries*) and political philosophy (including the former slave-turned-Stoic Epictetus, Machiavelli, and the Enlightenment *philosophe* Abbé Raynal) (Bell 2008: 61; see also James 2001). The American Revolution – which saw the transition of a former colony to independence while keeping the institution of slavery intact – inspired many of the white master planter class of Saint-Domingue, and doubtless its impact would have also registered with Toussaint.

The outbreak of the French Revolution in Paris in 1789 threw white society in Saint-Domingue into chaos and civil war between royalists and republicans, and saw the island's free people of colour make their own bid for equality. Toussaint himself seems to have watched the fray from the wings, though it seems he was at the Bois Caïman

ceremony in August 1791, which was the catalyst for a hundred thousand of the island's half a million or so black slaves to launch their own insurrection and so join the wider revolt. By late 1791 Toussaint had joined a band of rebel slaves, becoming a doctor, a secretary, and then an influential advisor to the second most important slave leader, the *former commandeur* Georges Biassou (Bell 2008: 23–24, 33).

Toussaint's background as a free black and his relationship with at least some of the white colonial elite perhaps help us to understand why he was initially willing to act in late 1791 and early 1792 to try and help secure a negotiated settlement between the leaders of the slave rebellion and the white planter class. However, the rebels' proposed offer, which guaranteed peace in return for an amnesty for a tiny minority of rebel leaders, the abolition of the whip, and one extra free day per week for the slaves on the plantations – was bluntly rebuffed by the white planters. Yet despite not agitating and taking a stand for 'general liberty' and the full abolition of slavery straight away, Toussaint personally rejected the opportunity to take up the offer that was made by the colonial authorities for an amnesty for free people of colour after the National Assembly in France voted to abolish racial discrimination in April 1792. Rather than defect to the white planters and play his part in the counter-insurgency operations then under way, Toussaint steadily now emerged as a critically important military leader of the black rebel slave army, itself now in alliance with the Spanish Empire, training up his own group of disciplined followers in the art of war – particularly guerrilla war (Geggus 2007: 119–121). From around mid- 1792, Toussaint seems to have moved to a position of support for 'general liberty' based on the principle of natural human rights (Bell 2008: 43).

On 29 August 1793, Léger Félicité Sonthonax, the French commissioner in Saint-Domingue, recognising the de facto reality of abolition at the hands of the black slave army, formerly proclaimed the end of the slavery in the colony, hoping to win the black slave armies and its leaders like Toussaint away from the slave-owning Spanish Empire. The response of

Toussaint – now casting off his old name and adopting the new name 'Louverture', meaning 'the opening' – was to openly declare his complete commitment to abolition of slavery in a proclamation made the same day: 'I am Toussaint Louverture . . . I want Liberty and Equality to reign in Saint Domingue' (Bell 2008; Geggus 2007: 121). This statement – and others from around this time discussing the need for general emancipation – challenged Sonthonax's claim to be the true apostle of liberty locally, and also distinguished Toussaint from other slave leaders such as Jean-François and Biassou, who had begun rounding up slaves for sale to the Spanish for their own personal ends.

On 4 February 1794, the Convention in revolutionary France – under the control of the Jacobins and with public detestation of racism, dubbed 'the aristocracy of the skin', rising in crescendo in France itself – voted not simply to ratify Sonthonax's emancipation proclamation but to abolish slavery throughout the French Empire (James 2001: 113–114). In May 1794, as news of this historic decree began to filter into Saint-Domingue, Toussaint made his famous yet still contested *volte-face* as he defected from the Spanish to join the French. Toussaint chose his moment well to enable his own troops to cause the maximum amount of damage to the Spanish and now also to a British invasion force, sent in 1793 to try and capture Port-au-Prince and other places in the south of the island. The British had the support of local white counter-revolutionary forces and the intention of ultimately claiming Saint-Domingue, the 'Pearl of the Antilles', for the British Empire and restoring the highly profitable business of slavery on the island. Toussaint's dramatic radical political shift from royalism to republicanism may have had ulterior and less noble motives, but as David Geggus notes, it was 'a decisive turning point in the Haitian Revolution . . . Black militancy and the libertarian ideology of the French Revolution were now melded, and the cause of slave emancipation had found a leader of genius' (Geggus 2007: 123–124; see also Geggus 1982, 2002).

In his classic 1938 work *The Black Jacobins*, the Trinidadian Marxist historian C.L.R. James

situated the Haitian Revolution within the wider age of bourgeois-democratic revolutions and showed how Toussaint's extraordinary career rose and fell with the wider revolutionary process in France during the 1790s. 'The great [French] revolution had propelled him out of his humble joys and obscure destiny, and the trumpets of its heroic period rang ever in his ears. In him, born a slave and the leader of slaves, the concrete realization of liberty, equality and fraternity was the womb of ideas and springs of power, which overflowed their narrow environment and embraced the whole of the world' (James 2001: 215). As not only the quintessential 'black Jacobin', but also a French general, Toussaint over the next 4 years now inspired and led the black rebel slave army to stunning victories over first Spanish and then British imperial armies. As James noted, 'Toussaint had the advantage of liberty and equality, the slogans of the revolution. They were great weapons in an age of slaves, but weapons must be used, and he used them with a fencer's finesse and skill' (James 2001: 120).

In recognition of his outstanding achievements on the battlefield and his apparent unceasing loyalty to the appointed representatives of Revolutionary France in the colony, above all the aristocratic Governor Laveaux, Toussaint steadily rose in prominence from proconsul of the western province to deputy governor in 1796, and then the colony's commander-in-chief in 1797. Toussaint not only defeated European generals on the battlefield but also effectively sidelined a number of rival political figures in Saint-Domingue. After putting down attempts to overthrow Laveaux's authority, Toussaint cunningly removed Laveaux himself from the scene by suggesting his return to France in order to counter the growing pro-slavery lobby in Paris in 1796. He then successfully forced out Sonthonax, and when the French Directory sent General Hédouville in 1798 to try and limit Toussaint's growing power, Toussaint outmanoeuvred him as well, sending him back to France within 6 months (Geggus 2007: 125–126).

As Toussaint, more confident than ever, now boasted, 'remember that there is only one Toussaint L'Ouverture in San Domingo and that at his name everybody must tremble' (James

2001: 180). When the Haitian free coloured leader André Rigaud, whose armies occupied lands in the south, refused to tremble before Toussaint's power in the north and west, Toussaint waged a brutal war from 1799 to 1800 to ensure his hegemony, forcing Rigaud and his followers to flee to France. By mid-1800, Toussaint was unquestionably the dominating political figure in Saint-Domingue, recognised as its governor and indeed the self-declared 'first man in the Archipelago of the Antilles' (James 2001: 28). As an established statesman and diplomat, Toussaint undertook a daringly independent foreign policy, for example making a trade and non-aggression treaty with Britain and America in 1798–99, and annexing Santo Domingo – then French territory – in January 1801, in order to deprive any future invading French army use of Santo Domingo's harbours (Geggus 2007: 129). Toussaint's antagonising of the French government in order to keep trading links with the slave-owning America and Britain, something which enabled him to stockpile munitions, would soon have costly consequences.

In terms of his domestic policies, following the defeat of the British, Toussaint attempted to rebuild towns and schools and develop a new anti-racist culture on Saint-Domingue. More controversially, he outlawed Vodou (though he himself may have personally continued to practise it secretly) and supported the re-introduction of the slave trade to guarantee a supply of labour. He also continued Sonthonax's scheme of imposed forced labour in order to try and revive the island's decimated plantation economy to its former prosperity. Toussaint needed a strong economy to support his standing army, which was essential to ensure adequate defence against the clear and ever-present danger of external intervention. However, his army was also used internally to force former slaves to work on plantations when they wished to found smallholdings of their own. The unpopularity of such a measure – and Toussaint's encouragement of white plantation owners to return to and reinvest in their former estates – led to resistance among black labourers, many of them women. In November 1801 a popular revolt from below in the north was blamed by

Toussaint on his adopted nephew, the popular General Moïse, who had opposed the militarisation of agriculture. The revolt was bloodily repressed, and Moïse shot. To many former slaves, Toussaint seemed ever more remote, even a figurehead of a new emerging black landholding class of army officers. In 1801, Toussaint promulgated a bold constitution that concentrated all power in his hands and made him governor for life, with the right to choose his successor. While he ruled out formal independence from the French Empire, he attempted to move the colony towards greater autonomy from France through statehood as a sister republic within a wider 'commonwealth' (Geggus 2007: 127–129; see also Fick 2009: 186–188).

Such audacity on the part of a former slave would soon lead to Toussaint's downfall, given the steady rise of counter-revolutionary forces in France itself around another military strongman, Napoleon Bonaparte. In February 1802, the French invaded Saint-Domingue with ten thousand troops commanded by Bonaparte's brother-in-law General Leclerc. Toussaint, and some of his loyal generals like Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henri Christophe, retreated to the mountains to conduct heroic and desperate bloody guerrilla warfare. 'In the midst of so many disasters and acts of violence I must not forget that I wear a sword', Toussaint declared amid this War of Independence (James 2001: 246). However, despite the fact that the black resistance was beginning to gain the upper hand over the elite professional French military troops, first Christophe in April 1802 and then Toussaint himself in May 1802 made peace, perhaps half believing Napoleonic propaganda about their claimed commitment to the principle of 'general liberty' and perhaps half fearing an unstoppable steady stream of French reinforcements, given the Peace of Amiens which France had recently concluded with Britain.

As the French army at their moment of victory began to be withered away by disease, Leclerc secured the agreement of both Dessalines – who had developed his own vision of full independence for Saint-Domingue which went beyond that of Toussaint – and Christophe that they would

not launch a new uprising if the French now arrested Toussaint on the pretext that he was himself plotting a new rebellion. Toussaint – not realising he had been betrayed – agreed to meet with the French general Brunet in good faith in early June 1802, only to be arrested, kidnapped, and deported to France (Bell 2008: 258, 263–264). As Toussaint boarded the fateful ship to leave his homeland, he delivered a prescient warning to his French captors. 'In overthrowing me, you have cut down in San Domingo only the trunk of the tree of liberty. It will spring up again by the roots for they are numerous and deep' (James 2001: 271). Toussaint was right, for once it became clear that the French intended to restore slavery and the old racial order, many of their former collaborators deserted them and the War of Independence erupted once more with a vengeance. In the freezing cold prison at the Fort de Joux in the French Alps, Toussaint wrote his 'memoir', addressed to Napoleon, to justify his public record as governor of Saint-Domingue and his plea for a court-martial so as to allow him the opportunity – like that given to any white French general – to defend himself. However, in April 1803, with Napoleon's silence ever more deafening, Toussaint died, never living to hear that his life work would be vindicated in January 1804, when the violent struggle for Haitian independence would triumph at last, under the leadership of Dessalines and Christophe and in alliance with the formerly free people of colour (see also Girard 2013b; Nesbitt 2008).

Following James's understanding of 'black Jacobinism', some parallels between Toussaint Louverture and Maximilien Robespierre (1758–1794) may be noted by way of conclusion. Like Robespierre, Toussaint was said to be personally 'incorruptible' and had a keen sharp intellect which marked him out from his contemporaries. Both were also autocratic figures, content to remain somewhat aloof from the revolutionary masses – and even turn and crush the left wings of their respective revolutionary movements, actions which ultimately contributed to their downfall. Yet if Toussaint might be remembered as 'the black Robespierre', his 'blackness' should not be forgotten, for the Haitian Revolution was in many senses an African revolution in a Caribbean setting. Toussaint was a 'creolised' figure, drawing strategically on the various traditions by which he was influenced – including Vodou – to shape and deliver his revolutionary project.

'Men who serve their country well . . . have powerful enemies . . . I know I shall perish a victim of calumny', Toussaint once noted (James 2001: 208). Despite a recent powerful portrayal of Toussaint's life in the outstanding trilogy of novels by Madison Smartt Bell, what the late Haitian scholar Michel-Rolph Trouillot called the 'silencing' of Haiti's 'unthinkable' rich revolutionary history in the discourse of Western imperial countries reminds us that there are some historic figures about whom those in power have found it best not to let people find out too much (Trouillot 1995: 73, 97). It is telling, for example, that there has been no Hollywood film directly about either Toussaint or the Haitian Revolution for over 60 years (since *Lydia Bailey,* 1952).

This said, Toussaint's political legacy in Haiti and internationally across the black diaspora was nonetheless to be profound, and is testified to by, for example, the fact that during the American Civil War, the company nickname of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment, one of the first official units of African Americans, about a quarter of whom had been formerly enslaved, was 'the Toussaint Guards' (Clavin 2007: 91). In later periods – for instance the inter-war period amid the Harlem Renaissance, the US occupation of Haiti, and continuing European imperialist domination over Africa and the Caribbean – Toussaint once again became an inspiring symbol of revolutionary anti-imperialism and 'Black Power', invoked by figures as diverse as Marcus Garvey, C.L.R. James, Langston Hughes, Jacob Lawrence, Aimé Césaire, Pablo Neruda, and Sergei Eisenstein (for a useful survey of some of these representations see Forsdick 2006). Toussaint's refusal to see freedom as a 'gift', but rather as something that has to be taken and won through struggle, gives his political thought continuing resonance amid the revolutionary processes unfolding in recent years across the Middle East and North Africa.

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▶ France and Imperialism

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Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Assassination; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Imperialism; Pan-Africanism; Patrice Lumumba

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of anti-colonial and pan-Africanist Congolese politician, independence leader, and first Prime Minister of the independent Democratic Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba (1925–1961).

In Congo's southernmost province of Katanga, the first prime minster of an independent Congo, Patrice Lumumba, along with two of his comrades, was shot on 17 January 1961. Their assassination followed hours of horrific torture. A Belgian officer organised the firing squad; the three bodies were quickly buried, meters from where they had fallen. The following day, another Belgian officer dug up the bodies, cut them into pieces, and dissolved them in acid.

Lumumba was a self-educated nationalist leader. Born in 1925 in Congo's Kasai province, he was expelled from school and ran away to the regional capital of Stanleyville (Kisangani). By the time of his arrival in Stanleyville, a new colony was being promised. Industry was being developed and new mining communities were established across the country. Copper was at the centre of the boom, being produced in huge quantities in the South and mined by the public-private giant Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK). The Belgian Congo was the source of vast profits for the colonial state and private businesses.

Arriving in Stanleyville in 1944, Lumumba quickly became a leading member of the *évolués* (literally meaning 'the evolved') in the city. This was a group of educated Congolese men who were trained to take part in the civilising mission of the Belgian state. They were given low-ranking jobs in the administration and groomed to regard themselves at champions of the 'Belgian Congo' community. Lumumba became a clerk in the Stanleyville post office.

For much of the 1950s, Lumumba's ideas did not stray from those held by the majority of the évolués. He was, effectively, an advocate of the colonial project. In June 1956 this began to change. Arrested and imprisoned unjustly for alleged embezzlement in his postal job, Lumumba started to criticise the 'motherland'. Released in September 1957, he decided to make his new life in the capital Leopoldville (today's Kinshasa). The city was a modern metropolis but still deeply segregated. Leopoldville became infected by the ideas of independence and political liberation.

By November 1958, Lumumba was elected to lead what became the principal party of national liberation, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). But Belgium was desperate to control the pace of radicalisation and sought to manipulate and divide the country's emerging political parties.

Other Western states were also eager to ensure that Congo's independence did not threaten their economic investments in the country. The US had been heavily involved in the region since the start of the twentieth century. Ryan and Guggenheim, the US mining groups, had interests in the region. The US also had investments in the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (Mining Union of Upper Katanga, UMHK).

End of Conciliation

Two events signalled the end of Lumumba's conciliatory politics. He was inspired by the independence of Ghana in 1957. The most prominent black leader on the continent was Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah took a personal interest in the struggle of the MNC and became a comrade and confidante to Lumumba. The second was more important. On 4 January 1959, Leopoldville erupted in violence. A demonstration was crushed by the notoriously brutal Force Publique, the colonial army. Hundreds were killed. The belief that a long transition and common understanding could pave the way to Congolese independence was over.

Congolese society was transformed, and Lumumba threw himself into the tumult. By March 1959, the MNC had 58,000 members. Lumumba's militancy rose with the gathering radicalisation. Now he demanded independence without delay. But other members of the évolués saw their future in an alliance with the colonial power and later with the US.

> The secret to Lumumba's leadership of the struggle for independence was his ability to respond to the radicalisation in Congolese society. This contrasted with other, more cautious, members of the Congolese évolués, who were prepared to accept the continuity, in new forms, of European influence. In April 1959, while in Belgium, Lumumba responded to a question about support for the party he now led among the Congolese masses – the process was inherently dialectical: 'the masses are a lot more revolutionary than us ... They do not always dare to express themselves in front of a police officer, or make their demands in front of an administrator but when we are with them it is the masses who push us, and who want to move more rapidly than us'. (Van Lierde 1972: 45)

Arrested, beaten, and imprisoned at the end of 1959, Lumumba was only released when negotiations were launched in Brussels in January 1960. In the negotiations he refused to allow the Congolese state to be divided up (with the country's wealth controlled by the provinces) as the Belgian rulers had hoped. Nor would the MNC accept the Belgian king as the head of state in an independent Congo. By the end of negotiations, a date had been set for independence: 30 June 1960. But Lumumba's radicalism had earned him the hatred of the Belgian elite. They decided to undermine the MNC's efforts to win the May 1960 general election.

L

Independence

However, the MNC emerged victorious in the election in May. Lumumba was now the undoubted leader of Congo's future. On the day of independence he reminded his audience of the struggle for freedom: 'For this independence of the Congo, even as it is celebrated today with Belgium, a friendly country with whom we deal as equal to equal, no Congolese worthy of the name will ever be able to forget that it was by fighting that it has been won'. Celebrations were quickly extinguished. In July, Belgium promoted the secession of the mineral-rich provinces Katanga and Kasai. These new 'states' were immediately recognised, armed, and supported by the old colonial power. Some évolués – using the language of ethnic divide and rule – helped provide an African veneer to these artificial breakaway provinces.

Lumumba attempted to mobilise his supporters. As the power he had just acquired began to slip away, he turned to the ranks of the MNC. But the forces against him were too great. Leading militants of the nationalist movement fell to bribes and co-option. Joseph Mobutu (the future dictator of the country, until then an ally and friend of Lumumba) was openly bribed by the US and persuaded to organise a coup d'état in September.

By October 1960 there were four operations underway to assassinate Lumumba. Western states openly called for his government to be removed. Lumumba fled the capital in November to reach his supporters in Stanleyville. Arrested days later, he knew that this probably meant death. Writing in prison to his wife, he said, 'History will one day have its say, but it will not be the history that Brussels, Paris, Washington, or the United Nations will teach, but that which they will teach in the countries emancipated from colonialism and its puppets' (cited in Zeilig 2008: 123).

Books and Debates

There has been little debate about responsibility for Lumumba's assassination since the publication of Ludo de Witte's *The Assassination of Lumumba*, which caused a parliamentary scandal in Belgium and an enquiry. De Witte's book is a superb exposé of the role of the Belgian state in Lumumba's murder. Major studies include biographies written in the 1960s and 1970s; unfortunately, most are out of print and in French. This means that there is very little available on Lumumba's entire life for an English-speaking audience. Robin McKown's *Lumumba, a Biography* was notable at the time (it was published in 1969) for being a very sympathetic portrayal of Lumumba. Another much cited biography is Pierre de Vos's *Vie et mort de Lumumba,* published in 1961.

By far the best source of Lumumba's own writing is *Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba 1958–1961*, edited by his collaborator and comrade Jean Van Lierde. This collection is a translation from the French edition that appeared in 1963. It is a superb collection of Lumumba's speeches and an interview published with a critical introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre. Lumumba's only book came out in the year that he was assassinated under contentious circumstances. It was published in English in 1962 under the title Congo, My *Country.* This is a fascinating insight into Lumumba's ideas in 1956.

Biographies

Robin McKown's *Lumumba, a Biography* (1969) is long out of print but can be bought on the Internet. Panaf Books's *Patrice Lumumba* (1973) was reprinted in 2002. These are valuable sources, but both are dated. McKown's book has a slightly patronising tone towards the Congolese, and the Panaf book is overloaded with occasionally tiresome political rhetoric.

Novels and Films

There are a number of novels that have fictionalised the period of Lumumba's assassination. Two of the most interesting are Barbara Kingsolver's *The Poisonwood Bible* (1998).

Although Lumumba only makes a short appearance in the book, it provides a powerful account of the hopes of the early nationalist movement in the Congo. Ronan Bennett's celebrated novel *The Catastrophist* (1999) takes the Congo crisis as the backdrop to an unusual love affair. The book is a powerful and largely sympathetic account of the crisis, but it makes the unfortunate error of asserting that Lumumba received money from an American agent. The novel reproduces Lumumba's final letter to his wife. Raoul Peck's film *Lumumba* was released to critical acclaim in 2000 and has received numerous awards. It is a moving and historically accurate account of Lumumba's life from his time in Leopoldville to his assassination in 1961.

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Luxemburg, Rosa (1871–1919)

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Definition

Rosa Luxemburg was a Polish-Jewish socialist and anti-militarist. She had the unique ability to combine her theoretical engagement with fervent political practice. Her political work against the First World War, and her writings on imperialism, war, and militarism remain a testimony to her dedication to the socialist and internationalist cause.

Rosa Luxemburg was a Polish-Jewish socialist and anti-militarist. She had the unique ability to combine her theoretical engagement with fervent political practice. At the age of 15 she joined the Polish Proletariat Party. As a naturalised German she would later on in life become an educator and foremost representative of the left wing within the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD). Her political work against the First World War, and her writings on imperialism, war, and militarism remain a testimony to her dedication to the socialist and internationalist cause.

During her short life, not a year passed without military conflict. Her childhood in the 1880s took place against the backdrop of the new imperialism and the scramble for Africa. The Berlin Conference (also known as the Congo C/onference) of 1884–85 heralded a new era for the German Empire as it emerged as an imperial power. Intense inter-state rivalry would follow shortly after. The Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the Spanish-US War in 1898 would be followed by the British Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902) and the campaign of the European powers in China (1900). These wars aimed to consolidate European influence across the world. In the meantime, an ascendant working class was to pay the price for these military excursions. In response to the Russo-Japanese War

(1904–07), Russian sailors mutinied; workers rebelled and set up what would come to be known as the first *soviets* (workers' councils) in one of the most 'under-developed' countries at the time. In the years to follow, tsarist Russia would invade Persia (1908) and France invade Morocco (1911). Meanwhile, the German Empire had fought the Herero Wars in South-West Africa; what is Namibia today. German troops repressed the revolt by selling prisoners to German businesses. To make matters worse, they set up concentration camps. One of these camps, Shark Island, would prefigure the Nazi concentration camps used to exterminate more than 10 million human beings.

In less than 30 years, the geo-political situation had been fundamentally transformed. Thus, it is no surprise that the colonial question was a high-priority item at the 1907 Socialist International Congress in Stuttgart. Speaking there, Rosa Luxemburg would argue that 'European antagonisms themselves no longer play their role simply on the European continent but in every corner of the world and on all oceans' (Luxemburg 1911a). She was to be proven right when the shooting of Franz Ferdinand of Austria triggered European inter-state rivalries that culminated in the First World War.

A few days into the war in 1914, the SPD, the largest Social-Democratic party in Europe, would vote for war credits. Luxemburg and her allies such as Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, Leo Jogiches, and others broke from the SPD to found the Spartakusbund (Sparticist League). They agitated and called demonstrations against the war. In Frankfurt, Luxemburg called on thousands of conscript soldiers to conscientiously object and refuse orders. In 1915 she would be imprisoned for incitement against the German Empire; a continuous and regular occurrence but one that would not lessen her determination.

The Spartakusbund operated within the Independent Social-Democrats (USPD) until Luxemburg, her collaborators, and many radicalised workers founded the German Communist Party (KPD) in December 1918. At that time the German Empire was on the brink of revolution. Soldiers and workers' councils had

taken hold all over the country and forced Kaiser Wilhelm II to step down.

The insurrection, known as the Spartacist Uprising, launched by workers in Berlin, would have devastating consequences and take the young Communist Party by surprise. On 15 January 1919, SPD chancellor Friedrich Ebert ordered the Freikorps militia to murder Rosa Luxemburg and her comrade Karl Liebknecht. Luxemburg was thrown into the Landwehrkanal where a memorial recalls her today.

Rosa Luxemburg's contribution to peace, democracy, and socialism amounts to no more than a memorial. Today more than ever her work informs those seeking to understand the faultlines of global capitalism. With her polemic against the revisionism of Eduard Bernstein *Reform and Revolution* (1900) she enhanced a rich Marxist tradition. *The Mass Strike* (1906), a treatise on the dynamics of the 1905 revolution in Russia, influences social-movement scholars, political scientists, and historians amongst others. In her famous essay 'Peace Utopias' (1911a) she argued that the SPD ought to make the 'question of militarism' the focus of its electoral campaigning and agitational work. In the article she condemns her internal party opponents Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky for being utopians. While the former believed that peace was attainable through more integration of the world markets, the latter contended that it was not in capitalists' interest to go to war. In other words, war is merely a policy error. For Luxemburg the issue is clear-cut: imperialism and war are inherent to capitalism. The 'proletarian revolution [is] the first and only step toward world peace' (Luxemburg 1911a). This set her at odds with most peace campaigners in her day as well as the majority of the SPD leadership. Only a few months later she began her article on the French invasion of Morocco with these poetic yet frightening words: 'A dark imperialist cloud is hanging over the capitalist world' (Luxemburg 1911b). In the article she achieves two things. Firstly, she links the revolutionary upheavals in Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, and Persia to the imperialist dynamic emanating from the centre of the capitalist world by arguing that their integration into the world market as a resource of cheap

labour power and unregulated markets creates the conditions for spontaneous uprisings against the tumultuous shift in the regime of accumulation. Her continued relevance can be seen in the political revolutions in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia in 2011; countries in bondage to international loans and foreign direct investments.

Secondly, but no less importantly, she foreshadows the central tenet in her theory of imperialism by arguing that the driving force of imperialism was capitalism's need for third parties (colonies) outside of capitalist society (cf. Day and Gaido 2013, p. 459). In other words, imperialism is economically rooted in capital's need to continuously expand. As workers' consumption lags behind the production of goods and commodities in the capitalist centre, so third countries provide a new market for the excess capacity of goods and commodities. By integrating these countries into the world market, the capitalist centre could avoid the trap of a crisis of reproduction. Whereas Luxemburg suggests an underconsumptionist reading of such a crisis of reproduction, other Marxist writers of the Second and Third International emphasised the capacity for over-production.

Her most important anti-war pamphlet *The Crisis of Social Democracy or Junius Brochure* (her pseudonym being Junius) would contain her most famous words: 'Socialism or Barbarism'.

In the meantime, Luxemburg the trained economist had written *The Accumulation of Capital* (2013/1913). The book's subtitle *Contribution to the Economic Explanation of Imperialism* provides the answer to what it dealt with. She attempted to understand how surplus value is realised in capitalist society and why capitalist economies expand territorially, spatially as well as enclosing new markets internally. The book aroused much debate following its publication. Neither the reformists nor the revolutionaries in the International Socialist movement were satisfied. Otto Bauer criticised it at length. The Bolshevik leader Nikolai Bukharin called it a 'daring theoretical attempt' (Bukharin 1917/ 1915, Chap. 5), but also dedicated an entire book against it. Published at a time when Lenin's and Luxemburg's relationship was at an all-time low,

Lenin remarked: 'She has got into a shocking muddle. She has distorted Marx' (Lenin quoted in LeBlanc 2013). Even today there are ongoing debates within political economy and Marxism regarding her reading of *Capital* (vol. 2) (Dunayevskaya 1946; LeBlanc 2013). At the same time, there is renewed interest in its lessons on imperialism and the dynamics of capitalist dynamics (Bellofiore 2009; Bieler et al. 2013; Schmidt 2013). Bellofiore argues that the export of goods to the periphery necessarily facilitates an international loans system which creates a vicious cycle in the form of overindebtedness, interest payments, and repayments (2009). On the other hand, Bieler et al. (2013) emphasise the political nature of Luxemburg's explanation of imperialism by drawing on the following quotation which states that 'imperialism is the political expression of the accumulation of capital' (Luxemburg 2003/1913, p. 426). In other words, imperialism also takes on non-military forms.

What was Luxemburg's theory of imperialism? Her starting point was Marx's defining characterisation of capitalist social relations: the antagonism between capitalists and workers. Under capitalism, workers sell their labour-power below the value of what they produce. In turn, the earned wage of the labourer is used to buy food, clothes, and shelter in order to reproduce oneself and other commodities available through the generalised system of commodity production. Luxemburg observes that (unlike feudal landlords, ancient slaveholders, or other ruling classes) the capitalist reinvests rather than consumes the surplus made from exploiting labourers. Thus, there are fewer commodities consumed than produced. In classical economic terms, demand is lower than supply. This divergence means that an economy will stagnate and ultimately grind to a halt unless capital discovers new ways to sell the excess products. According to Luxemburg, the imperialist dynamic begins at the nexus when capitalists are compelled to expand into non-capitalist areas which Luxemburg labels 'the peasant economy' or 'natural economy'. Markets, raw materials, and labour are sought in this economic sphere. She writes that the 'non-capitalist

social environment … absorbs the products of capitalism and supplies producer goods and labour power for capitalist production' (Luxemburg 2013/1913: 347). Elsewhere she wrote: 'Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organisations makes accumulation of capital possible' (416, 417). The childhood experience of Polish industrialisation, on the one hand, and the scramble for Africa outlined above, on the other hand, would have confirmed her thesis. Was she correct to criticise Marx for supposing capitalism's universal character in her *The Accumulation of Capital* (328)?

For Luxemburg, imperialism was not a phenomenon of the 'highest' stage of capitalism, as Lenin had argued in 1917, but occurred at what Marx called the stage of *primitive capitalist accumulation.* In reaching this conclusion, she transcended a *stage-ism* by which capitalism only develops internally within states and then moves outwards and extends its influence once internal markets have matured. It manifests itself, for example, through land robbing or the enclosure of common land – phenomena common to neo-liberalism. As domestic markets age and capitalism matures, it is in these spheres that value is realised. Inspired by Luxemburg's model, the Marxist geographer David Harvey calls this process 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2003, p. 145). According to Harvey, 'accumulation by dispossession' manifests itself through the following practices and policies: privatisation, financialisation, state redistributions to the private sector, and the management and manipulation of crises. In particular, the capitalist centre has imposed privatisation packages through structural adjustment programmes on countries in the global South. The same holds true for the management of crisis through the use of flexible interest rates exacerbating the dependency of the global South. In recent years, Harvey has used the same methodological framework to analyse this dynamic within the capitalist centre itself. Here, non-capital zones such as government-owned housing estates, public spaces, people on benefits, or even workers have been integrated into new forms of value extraction through the privatisation of publicly owned homes and spaces as well

as their integration into the finance and credit system (Harvey 2012). These constitute new antagonisms vis-à-vis contradiction in the capitalist world-system. However, it is questionable whether these forms of exploitation have replaced capital–labour antagonism as the central contradiction within capitalism and whether this reconfigures the imperialist dynamic between countries of the global North and South which was at the heart of Luxemburg's analysis.

Regardless of which position one adopts regarding her model of capitalist accumulation and imperialism, Luxemburg remains highly relevant to those studying the world economy and its processes of commodification and privatisation today. Spheres of life such as health, education, and our environment (formerly outside the control of the market) are now subject to the paradigms of profit and capitalist growth, displaying that the means of subordination and domination used on the peoples of the global South are in turn being used to dominate the centre's own populations. In doing so, 'Luxemburg does not confine capitalism's "outside" to a territorial phenomenon' (Bieler et al. 2013, p. 3) but includes new layers of the local populations which have been outside of this logic until recently. For example, the state employs this logic by dividing the poor into 'deserving' and 'undeserving', creating the need to enter the market in order to receive benefits such as food stamps, means testing etc. Yet, it can also explain geo-political developments. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, noncapitalist areas outside Europe and North America such as China have, and continue to be, integrated into the world market. Ingo Schmidt uses Rosa Luxemburg's framework to analyse US hegemony (Schmidt 2010). The Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq War (2003), Libya (2011), and Mali (2012) can be regarded as events where new territories are integrated into the process of capital accumulation.

Furthermore she observes how capital investments by countries of the centre create dependency on exports and loans. In *The Accumulation of Capital* Luxemburg describes how the British took over Egypt. Once it was unable to repay its outstanding debts on loans it

was conquered and subjected to colonial rule. In many ways, this foreshadows the practices of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank today. The use of structural adjustment programmes, international loans, bailouts and credits has created new markets to realise value. Further examples include free trade and exportprocessing zones in the global South. Internally, this happened through the expansion of consumption through loans to people who previously could not afford to buy a house. The fire sale of Greek or Portuguese state assets to French and German businesses to raise money to repay loans, or the currency speculation which facilitated the East-Asian economic crisis of 1997/1998, both highlight the use of policy tools to maintain financial and economic dominance and extract value from the oppressed classes in peripheral countries while the profits are amassed in the capitalist centres. Exemplified here is how privatisation is a tool of imperialist policy. All in all, Luxemburg's model is a useful means to understand the way in which capitalism, at all times, depends on 'non-capitalist social environments' (Luxemburg 2013/1913: 347).

She also deciphers the underlying imperialist logic inherent in infrastructure programmes such as railways (408). Whether it be the Berlin–Baghdad railway or the expansion of US tracks westwards, railway lines are synonymous with capitalist expansion. Today, infrastructure programmes such as football stadiums for FIFA World Cups in South Africa, Brazil, or Qatar mean the displacement of hundreds of thousands of shantytown dwellers and destruction of *favelas*. In Qatar, the use of migrant labour from Nepal is another example of how labour from non-capitalised zones is integrated into the world market, production, and circulation of capital; and serves as a resource of cheap labour in centres of accumulation. The now infamous Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey, was to be bulldozed and replaced with a shopping mall. There are countless other examples which underline the applicability of Luxemburg's theory.

Yet many Marxists attacked Rosa Luxemburg for this theory. Critics included the reformist Otto Bauer and the Bolshevik Nikolai Bukharin

amongst others. Bauer argued that the reproduction schema did not lead to the kind of imbalances that Luxemburg based her theory on (Pannekoek 1934). On the other hand, Bukharin argued that capitalism did not necessarily have to expand to non-capitalised zones. Under no circumstances was capitalism dependent on integrating peasants or craftsmen into the general system of commodity production. Furthermore, his account of imperialism differs from Luxemburg's insofar as war and imperialism are a by-product of the centralisation of capital (Bukharin 1915/ 1917). Like Rudolf Hilferding, he emphasised the increased inter-relatedness of finance and industrial capital. Raya Duneveskaya writes: 'Methodically, however she did depart from Marxism in the analysis of the question of capital, and it was inevitable, therefore, that she arrives at false conclusions' (Dunayevskaya 1946). Others have criticised her for being an economic determinist; a label which many Marxists have been branded with. Ernest Mandel (1966) wrote: 'The fundamental weakness of Rosa Luxemburg's theory is that it is based simply on the capitalist class's need for markets to realise surplus value, and ignores the basic changes which have taken place in capitalist property and production'. But it was not only those Marxists from the Trotskyist tradition who were critical of Luxemburg's reproduction schemes and her analysis of imperialism.

In many ways the argument she advances in her reproduction scheme asserts underconsumption within capitalism as opposed to over-production. For example, her theoretical framework cannot account for the long boom of capitalism in the 1960s and the expansion of the welfare state which entailed large-scale decommodification. While she does concentrate on the lack of effective demand within capitalism and subsequent capitalist breakdown, Paul LeBlanc argues that she displays an 'anthropological sensitivity' like no other Marxist theoretician at that time. She acknowledges the fact that there are different cultures, types of society, and forms of social and economic organisation (cf. LeBlanc 2010, p. 163). Her sensitivity to the commodification of labour vis-à-vis the proletarianisation,

the genocides, famines, and slave-trading stands out in her account, as the quotation below displays:

> In Africa and in Asia, from the most northern regions to the southernmost point of South America and the South Seas, the remnants of old communistic social groups, of feudal society, of patriarchal systems, and of ancient handicraft production are destroyed and stamped out by capitalism. Whole peoples are destroyed, ancient civilizations are levelled to the ground, and in their place profiteering in its most modern forms is being established. (quoted in LeBlanc 2010; Luxemburg 2013/1913: 325)

These descriptions display her sensitivity to the plight of the oppressed peoples of the global South, and the way that capitalism would uproot their livelihoods and dissolve the social bonds which had kept these societies intact for centuries. Yet Lenin would simply criticise these as 'non-Marxist' (Lenin in LeBlanc 2010). For Luxemburg, imperialism was the 'deadly enemy of the workers of all countries …. The struggle against imperialism is at the same time the struggle of the proletariat for political power' (Cliff 1959). It is this message that makes Luxemburg's theory of imperialism as relevant as ever.

Luxemburg was not free from flaws. Having personally experienced the regressive nature of Polish nationalism and the militaristic nature of German nationalism, she believed that all nationalisms were equally bad and harmful for the socialist and workers' movement. Rather than understanding the contested nature of 'nation' in those oppressed countries, peripheral nations, and countries of the global South, she equated them with the nationalism of the oppressor (Luxemburg 1909). History has shown us that during progressive anti-colonial movements such as the Arab and Irish ones, nationalism successfully challenged imperial domination and colonialism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Luxemburg's anti-imperialist message is as prescient now as it was when she first wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century. Drawing on her first-hand experience of war and the tumultuous changes taking place at the time, her work remains a benchmark in the study of imperialism and anti-imperialist strategies. The War on Terror, structural adjustment programmes in the global South, and the increased importance of the exploitation of foreign labour for capital accumulation highlight the need to deal with her ideas anew.

Her understanding of the relationship between the capitalist centre and the peripheral countries remains limited by her interpretation of Marx's reproduction schemes in *Capital* (vol. 2) and her emphasis on under-consumption. However, this allows her to see how these countries become testing grounds for policies later to be employed on the metropoles' populations. The criticisms levied against her from within the Marxist tradition raise valid concerns about some of her conclusions. Yet her work forms part of a rich Marxist tradition of anti-imperialist thought which cannot be dismissed but needs to be built on.

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Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Accumulation of capital; First World War; German Communist Party (KPD); German Empire; German Revolution; German Social-Democratic Party (SPD); International loans; Marxism; Nationalism; Primitive accumulation; Russian Revolution; Spartakusbund (Sparticist League); Under-consumption

Definition

This chapters analyses Rosa Luxemburg's political work against the German Empire and the First World War. As a member of the German Social-Democratic Party and later the founder of the Spartakusbund (Sparticist League) and German Communist Party (KPD), she was committed to Marxism. Her writings on primitive accumulation, imperialism such as her book the Accumulation of Capital, war, and militarism remain reference points for the study of imperialism and anti-imperialist thought today. She was murdered on the eve of the German Revolution in 1918.

For Rosa Luxemburg, imperialism was a necessary outcome of capitalism. In the years leading up to the First World War, the Polish/German communist theorist and activist worked tirelessly to convince her fellow European socialists and trade union activists that war would only benefit the bourgeoisie and that only international labour solidarity could counter the imperial mission. As an economist she engaged with orthodox Marxian theory of capital accumulation to make an argument that seemed counter to the general Marxist project. Traditional Marxian narrative would argue that capitalism proceeds by exploiting the working class. Luxemburg argued that, though

this is true, it also proceeds via intra-class conflict between rich capitalist countries in Europe and non-capitalist countries still emerging. As an activist, she was a prolific writer and speaker, and her international outlook set her apart from other, more nationalist, leftists.

Much of her economics argument related to a crisis of under-consumption, but she also believed that populations that live outside or on the margins of capitalism ought to be viewed as part of a global reserve army of labour. Some of her critics have suggested that: (a) under-consumption is not the inevitable cause of crisis, or, even if it were, then (b) imperialism would not be the only countervailing force. Despite these criticisms, she is well appreciated for putting the tendencies of capitalism in the context of 'noncapitalist strata and countries' (Luxemburg 1968, p. 348). Up to this point, Marxist theory had tended to ignore the countries of the Third World, most of which had or continue to have experience of colonial binds and severe poverty. For her, it was of the utmost importance to emphasise the historical reality that primitive accumulation was an ongoing characteristic of capitalism, and not a one-time historical event roughly spanning the seventeenth century. Rather, the very viability of capitalism depends on internal and external pockets of available demand, therefore the imperialist nature of the capitalist countries is not a bourgeois vice but rather an historical necessity. The case for under-consumption depends on an interpretation of capitalist accumulation. Traditional Marxian analysis suggests that capitalism is an ongoing process of capital accumulation that creates more and more surplus value. Surplus value is created when labour is exploited into producing goods that have more value than what they are paid in wages. Interestingly, Marx essentially assumed that workers were paid what was necessary to reproduce themselves as workers i.e. a liveable wage. Put differently, workers are exploited into working more hours (surplus labour) than would be necessary to nurture themselves, and capitalists appropriate the exchange value of what is produced with that surplus labour. That value that is appropriated is surplus value. It is important that the surplus value be realised through sales so as to create the liquidity for more capital for the next

cycle. In *Capital*, Marx (1967b/1885, vol. 2) lays out a relatively formal model of expanded reproduction whereby an initial outlay of capital is transformed into an ever larger amount of capital.

According to one school of thought, Marx's model does leave room for a paradox whereby the value of the production would exceed the effective demand, and hence leave some amount of surplus value unrealised (Foley 1986). In order for all the surplus value to be realised, the production must be sold and the difference between the total revenue and what is paid out in wages must be spent. For expanded reproduction, some level of the realised surplus value would be converted into new capital and the cycle would start again, on an expanded scale. In order, though, for all the production to be consumed (by either the workers or the capitalists) there must be enough new money to do so. In addition, there must be a match in the types of goods that are produced and those goods that people want to buy.

A basic form of the under-consumption argument suggests that because workers are paid less than the value of their production they necessarily cannot buy all the output. However, capitalists themselves also consume; they use some of their surplus value to purchase new means of production and some of it for their own consumption. The question still remains, though: If there was a certain amount of money to begin with, even though new products have been created, where will the new money to buy them come from? This interpretation concludes that there will always be a gap between that which is produced and that which is bought, which would leave inventories waiting. In this way, surplus value is created, but not realised because the production is not actually sold for money.

According to under-consumptionist theorists like Rosa Luxemburg, capitalists are relying on an ever-increasing market to buy up the ever-increasing production, but they do not have control over effective demand from the worker-consumer. Luxemburg suggests that capitalists work against this type of crisis by incorporating non-capitalist spheres into the accumulation process. Her idea was that primitive accumulation, the transformation of non-capitalist systems and communities into market-oriented institutions,

was a regular and ongoing part of capitalism. Luxemburg's thesis was that the surplus value of the dynamic capitalist economy could only be realised by the interplay with non-capitalist spheres. Non-capitalist spheres were needed, she argued, to purchase the increased output of consumption and investment goods that become available as capital accumulation proceeds. It is here that she deviates from the traditional Marxian framework. Marx's mode of expanded reproduction assumed that capitalism was a complete mode of production across the globe. For the purposes of detailing the social relations of production between workers and capitalists, such a level of abstraction would be sufficient, she argued. Further, Marx analysed the process of primitive accumulation with the aim of explaining the historical events in Europe that marked the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The problem comes because '[a]s soon as he comes to analyze capitalism [as a] process of production and circulation he reaffirms the universal and exclusive domination of capitalist production' (Luxemburg 1968, p. 366).

According to Luxemburg, this level of abstraction ignored the concrete historical reality that capitalism had never been in a position of complete world dominance. Writing in the early twentieth century, she certainly had plenty of evidence of non-market communities nestled in Europe and the US. In addition, of course, was the plethora of countries whose existence was wrapped up in various European colonial projects as well as indigenous communities in Latin and Central America, Asia, and Africa. It was (and still is) clear that frontiers to capitalism exist. In addition to geographical boundaries, there are more nuanced spheres that are outside or on the margins of the logic of capitalism. For example, even in market-economies, markets do not usually pervade cultural and gender-based systems that reproduce labour power within households. Also, subsistence agriculture occupied (and occupies) the time and effort of most of the world's farmers, many of whom live in countries outside the global agricultural industrial complex headquartered in the US and the European Union. Luxemburg firmly held that the relationships between the capitalist and the non-capitalist

spheres played a necessary part in the capitalist production process, and she believed this was a form of ongoing primitive accumulation.

George Lee (1971) summarises Luxemburg's understanding of the imperialist strategy by which the capitalist countries assimilate the natural economy of the non-capitalist sectors. The overall plan has four stages: the appropriation of natural wealth; the coercion of the labour force into service; the introduction of a simple commodity economy where the majority of output is traded and not consumed; and the elimination of the rural industries which previously provided for the inhabitants. While this essentially describes traditional notions of 'primitive accumulation', for Luxemburg this is an ongoing phenomenon that characterises the relationship between capitalist and non-capitalist spheres, and imperialism itself.

Through this destabilising and often violent process, the capitalist nation states create new pockets of consumers for their output. They do this by the destruction of the existing economies, usually agrarian, thereby creating the need for consumer markets.

> Capitalist production supplies consumer goods over and above its own requirements, the demand of its workers and capitalists, which are bought by non-capitalist strata and countries. The English cotton industry, for instance, during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century . . . [supplied] cotton textiles to the peasants and petty bourgeois townspeople of the European continent, and to the peasants of India, America, Africa and so on. (Luxemburg 1968, p. 352)

In addition to consumer goods, this process also creates markets for industrial goods designed and produced in the capitalist countries.

> [C]apitalist production supplies means of production in excess of its own demand and finds buyers in non-capitalist countries. English industry, for instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century supplied materials for the construction of railroads in the American and Australian states [locations where capitalism was in its infancy]. Another example would be the German chemical industry which supplies means of production such as dyes in great quantities to Asiatic, African and other countries whose own production is non-capitalistic. (p. 353)

In addition to appealing to a crisis in under-consumption, Luxemburg also argued that

the lack of co-ordination in capitalism suggested that demand will usually not equal supply, and that supply-chain interruptions will break down the cycle. In non-capitalist systems, the co-ordination of the actual production and distribution of the goods is achieved either by domination (slavery, military dictatorship, etc.) or by some form of communal decision-making process (such as in egalitarian households or socialist democracies). Such co-ordination mechanisms for capitalist societies are non-existent. The invisible hand is guided by profits and prices, and firms and consumers are guided by these signals in a very decentralized way. By appealing to imperialism, it is possible to manufacture demand or supply to fill in where needed by compelling agreement with a non-capitalist country. This can be accomplished via militarism, indebtedness, or an appeal to colonial (or post-colonial) relations.

> The process of accumulation, elastic and spasmodic, as it is, requires inevitably free access to raw materials in case of need . ...When the War of Seccession interfered with the import of American cotton, causing the notorious 'cotton famine' [in England] new and immense cotton plantations sprang up in Egypt almost at once, as if by magic. Here it was Oriental despotism, combined with an ancient system of bondage, which had created a sphere of activity for European capital. Only capital with its technical resources can effect such a miraculous change in so short a time – but only on the pre-capitalist soil of more primitive social conditions can it develop the ascendance necessary to achieve such miracles. (p. 358)

Critics of Luxemburg's view of imperialism as a vent for under-consumption either dismiss under-consumption from the beginning or they identify other pathways to vent the crisis. A key example of the former is Brewer (1982), who argued that under-consumption is not a problem. He suggests that if productivity, the real wage, and the profit rates increase at the same level and time, consumption will be sufficient as 'the whole system expands together' (p. 66). In addition, he argues that it is likely that at any given time some capitalists will have temporarily stored levels of capital that will initiate the next level of capital accumulation even while the goods from the previous period are being bought.

Alternatively, Foley (1986) acknowledges that the crisis might prevail but that it is rather instantaneously resolved via credit markets. That is, while inventories accumulate, firms need to borrow money to finance the next level of capital accumulation, and this will eventually ease the purchase of the goods produced in the previous cycle. Indeed, Luxemburg herself recognised that the main way the non-capitalist spheres are able to play the role of global consumer of last resort is to indebt themselves to the capitalist sphere. Therefore, debt and financialisation are the key response to under-consumption, which may or may not include the global South.

Luxemburg also argues that militarism itself is a response to the under-consumption crisis, though she believes that capitalism leads to military action and industry for other reasons as well (1968, pp. 454–467). She argued that the state, as consumer of military equipment, would contribute to solving the surplus value realisation problem in the same way that 'non-capitalist strata' might, this time be funded by taxpayers. In addition, she suggests that because multiple capitalist countries need access to the same set of non-capitalist countries, they will engage in militaristic competition to acquire the natural and labour resources, and new markets. Hence, she believes that war, as a necessary arm of imperialism, is a logical extension of capitalism.

In addition to viewing the imperial process as an inevitable outgrowth of the crisis of under-consumption, Luxemburg also employed Marx's concept of the reserve army of labour. In *Capital*, Marx (1967a/1867, vol. 1) described the effect that the cycle of capitalist accumulation had on the labour force. During times of enhanced technological growth, labour was often made redundant while being replaced by constant capital; this would actually lead to a decrease in surplus value as a capitalist cannot exploit his means of production. In addition, there are people who live on the margins of the labour market due to social, cultural, or legal barriers to employment. Together, these workers comprise the reserve army of labour; a necessary body that swells and shrinks directly with the needs of capital. Luxemburg considers the population in non-

capitalist countries to be key members of this reserve army. As technology changes, as profit rates fall, as methods of exploitation go out of fashion, it is necessary to have access to a pool of labour that can be easily enveloped into the labour market. Imperialism will ensure that the global reserve army will be available as capital's needs change.

In focusing her attention on the imperialist relationships between capitalist and non-capitlist spheres of influence, Luxemburg changed the basis of the accumulation process from one that drew its power from exploitation of the working class, to a system that drew its power from dominating the global South. Given this, the proletariat of the capitalist countries becomes complicit in the imperial project, which is a qualitatively different interpretation to the more orthodox Marxian vision. One of the implications of this deviation is that there would be no natural tendency toward (global) proletariat solidarity; southern workers were not allies in the working-class struggle for European workers, thus increasing the possibility for intra-class conflict.

Luxemburg's activism was oriented precisely around the point of fostering international solidarity amongst workers and sympathy for those in countries subject to Europe's imperial project. She was personally distraught at the onset of the First World War. She, and many others, had worked tirelessly to mobilise socialists across Europe to agitate against war and she wanted them to live up to their calls for cross-border solidarity. Believing that war would only serve the bourgeois state in the ongoing rush of capital accumulation, they also knew that it would be the working class that would pay the dearest price. However, when the time came, socialist parties in Germany, France, and England joined in the call for war, and hopes of international labour solidarity were crushed. Luxemburg was jailed for most of the war by the German state, though she continued to write and publish.

> In the prosaic atmosphere of pale day there sounds a different chorus – the hoarse cries of the vulture and the hyenas of the battlefield. Ten thousand tarpaulins guaranteed up to regulations! A hundred thousand kilos of bacon, cocoa powder, coffee-substitute – c.o.d., immediate delivery! Hand grenades, lathes, cartridge pouches, marriage bureaus for widows of the fallen, leather belts, jobbers for war orders – serious offers only! The cannon fodder loaded onto trains in August and September is moldering in the killing fields of Belgium, the Vosges, and Masurian Lakes where the profits are springing up like weeds. It's a question of getting the harvest into the barn quickly. Across the ocean stretch thousands of greedy hands to snatch it up. (Luxemburg 1915)

In November 1918 the war ended and Rosa Luxemburg was released from jail. She immediately headed for Berlin where she got back to work. By the end of December she and her long-time colleague in the Sparticist League Karl Leibnecht became part of the leadership of the new German Communist Party. A merger of several German socialist organisations, this group went on to become a major political force until the mid-1930s. In early January of 1919, the mis-named Sparticist Uprising (mis-named because the uprising was not initiated by Luxemburg and colleagues) swept Berlin. Upwards of 500,000 workers participated in a citywide strike. Eventually the social democratic government put this down with the help of the Freikorps, a paramilitary group made up of right-wing German war veterans. In the days after the uprising was suppressed, Luxemburg was captured by the Freikorps, tortured, and executed. Her body was found in a canal a few days later.

In the early 1950s, *The Accumulation of Capital* was translated into English and published by the *Monthly Review*. This book was Luxemburg's primary attempt to lay out a theoretical explanation of her theory of imperialism. Joan Robinson, one of the most respected economists of the twentieth century and a founding intellectual in the post-Keynesian tradition, has suggested that Marxists and non-Marxists unfairly neglected Luxemburg for her deviations from orthodoxy and her commitment to under-consumption. Robinson, with a warm touch, acknowledges the 'rich confusion in which the central core of the analysis is imbedded', referencing the difficult prose. But she concludes with utmost praise:

> The argument streams along bearing a welter of historical examples in its flood, and ideas emerge

and disappear again bewilderingly ... but something like [what Luxemburg intends to say] is now widely accepted as being true ... Few would deny that the extension of capitalism into new territories was the mainspring of what an academic economist has called the 'vast secular boom' of the last two hundred years and many academic economists account for the uneasy condition of capitalism in the twentieth century largely by the closing of the frontier all over the world. But the academic economists are being wise after the event. For all its confusions and exaggerations [Luxemburg] shows more prescience than any orthodox contemporary could claim. (Robinson 1968, p. 28)

Cross-References

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism
▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ Finance, Finance Capital, Financialization
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ German Imperialism and Social Imperialism, 1871–1933
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism

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Magubane, Bernard Makhosezwe (1930–2013)

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Synonyms

African liberation; African National Congress; Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane; Biography; South Africa

Definition

Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane was born on 26 August 1930 close to Colenso, in Natal, South Africa. His life story, as a black South African and one of the country's leading scholar activists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including during his years of exile, is an instructive and inspiring example. Magubane wrote some of the most powerful works of scholarship analysing the relationship between imperialism, white-settler colonialism, and race and class in South Africa and the global system. This included overseeing a massive ten-volume work on the history of the black liberation struggle upon his return to South Africa under the country's majority rule and multiracial democracy inaugurated in the 1990s with the election of President Nelson Mandela, the head of the African National

Congress (ANC), after his release from prison. This essay provides an overview of Magubane's life and work.

Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane was born on 26 August 1930 close to Colenso, in Natal, South Africa. His life story, as a black South African and one of the country's leading scholar activists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including during his years of exile, is an instructive and inspiring example. Magubane wrote some of the most powerful works of scholarship analysing the relationship between imperialism, white-settler colonialism, and race and class in South Africa and the global system. This included overseeing a massive ten-volume work on the history of the black liberation struggle upon his return to South Africa under the country's majority rule and multiracial democracy inaugurated in the 1990s with the election of President Nelson Mandela, the head of the African National Congress (ANC), after his release from prison.

While a child, as recounted in *My Life and Times* (2010), Magubane's grandparents related stories to him of the Zulu War of 1879 and the Bambatha Rebellion of 1906, named after the Zulu minority ruler, and these made an indelible impression. Magubane's grandparents had seen the defeat of the Zulu Kingdom and its incorporation into Natal and the British Empire in 1897, soon followed by the Anglo-Boer War, which helped bring the word 'imperialism' into the English language, the formation of the Union of South Africa, which became a dominion of the

British Empire, and the passage of the 1913 Natives Land Act which dispossessed the African majority while concentrating them in some 7–13 per cent of the land, leaving 87% to the white invaders.

At around this same time, in 1912, the South African Native National Congress was founded by Zulus who had been educated in the US. Renamed the African National Congress in 1923, this was 'the country's first pan-tribal political organization' (3). Its aims were known to Magubane's father and friends by heart and they often recite them from memory: 'To encourage mutual understanding and to bring together into common action as one political people all the tribes and clans of various tribes or races and by means of combined effort and united political organization to defend their freedom, rights and privileges' (ibid.). The Land Act forced Magubane's family to become squatters and made Africans foreigners in their own land, replete with Pass law regulations that became infamous under apartheid. After his father, a farm worker, clashed with the owner of the farm, the Magubanes abruptly moved to the famous port city of Durban, where they were influenced by the Pass-burning campaign of 1919.

Magubane's political awareness was heightened in 1948 with the victory of the Nationalist Party and the full institutionalisation of apartheid, Bantu education (designed to limit Black African advancement), and the ANC's Programme of Action, as well as the adoption of the Freedom Charter and the Defiance campaign, anti-Pass law activities and related protests. At the University of Natal, Magubane earned his BA and MA in Sociology, and was introduced to the concepts of social pluralism and then as a postgraduate Marxist critiques of this, criticisms on which his subsequent scholarly career were initially built. With the banning of the ANC and at risk of his own arrest, Magubane went to study Sociology at UCLA in 1962, involving himself in the anti-apartheid movement in the city, this around the time of the Watts uprising, earning another MA and his PhD in Sociology there, before returning to Africa to teach at the University of Zambia from 1967–70.

In Zambia, Magubane became close to the vice-president and then president of the ANC (while Nelson Mandela was in jail) Oliver Tamboo, who began using his study to work and eventually moved in with the family. Magubane also befriended other Executive Committee members of the national liberation organisation, on whose behalf he attended various conferences as a delegate, meeting future leaders of South Africa such as one-time president Thabo Mbeki. It was in Zambia, in a fertile environment with many South African radicals and ANC leaders in exile, including Jack and Ray Simons, authors of *Colour and Class in South Africa* (1968), that Magubane's teaching and scholarship began to mature. At this time he published some of his earliest writings critiquing the Manchester School of Anthropology, with its master concept of the tribe as the supposed key to unlocking African society. This work included his 1968 'Crisis in African Sociology' in the *East African Journal* (reprinted in Magubane 1999: 1–26), followed by subsequent work on the political economy of migrant labour. Returning to UCLA in 1970, he eventually secured a position at the University of Connecticut and was for a time a visiting professor in the Department of Sociology at SUNY Binghamton, which had become the centre for world-systems analysis (formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein, Terence Hopkins, and Giovanni Arrighi) and was home of the Fernand Braudel Center. Throughout his time in the US, Magubane was active in the antiapartheid movement and with the ANC.

In 1979 Magubane published *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*, begun before he left Zambia in early 1970 (followed in 1989 by *South Africa: From Soweto to Uitenhage, The Political Economy of the South African Revolution*). Magubane's first chapter, 'The Problem and Its Matrix: Theoretical and Methodological Issues', starts off with an approving quotation from the famous African scholar who helped pioneer what would later become known as world-systems analysis, Oliver Cox, while also drawing on another of its forerunners W.E.B. Du Bois, notably from his towering work *Black Reconstruction*:

Our hypothesis is that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism, and that because of the worldwide ramifications of capitalism, all racial antagonisms can be traced back to the policies and attitudes of the leading capitalist people, the white people of North America and Europe. (1990: 1)

The book is a tour de force and was part of the long-term project of Magubane, chronicling as it did the story of how a white minority came to rule over the black South African majority. Especially significant about this work is that it is a deeply theoretically informed account, written from a black Marxist perspective, of the South African experience from the standpoint of its victims and protagonists in the liberation struggle. As Magubane relates:

The plight of black people in South Africa is intimately bound up with the history of white settlement in their lands, and the South African social formation itself represents a stage in the evolution of the world capitalist system . . . although there are many ways to define and study racial inequality, in this book we shall conceptualize it as an aspect of imperialism and colonialism, concepts that will be used to refer to roughly the same phenomena: the economic, political, and cultural domination of the African people by the white settlers. We will use the term imperialism to refer to the specific relation between a subjugated society and its alien rules, and colonialism to refer to the social structures created within a colonized society by imperialist relationships. (1–3)

The book then devotes itself to an historical sociological analysis of the pyramid of white wealth and power build upon the backs of black African labour, land, and resources, as part and parcel of processes of imperialism. Especially crucial is the way in which the so-called policy of apartheid, or separation, is shown to be a lie, with the exploitation of black Africans, rather than separation, the basis of the white-settler state. South Africa's system of racial stratification, which developed its own relatively unique aspects of course, is moreover related to the larger structure of global power whereby the imperialist countries assure the subordination and under-development of other states in the global capitalist system. Of particular importance is Magubane's emphasis on the central role of British imperialism during the era of British

hegemony in adumbrating the foundations of what would become South Africa's apartheid state, both before and most especially after the discovery of gold and diamonds in the region. Particularly important here was the special role of gold in the international monetary system and the historic control of the gold and the diamond mines in South Africa by British capital, in alliance with the US.

Subsequently, in his massive study *The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa*, *1875–1910,* Magubane (1996) turned to the question: How did the Union of South Africa come to be dominated for almost a 100 years by a white minority? Here, Magubane returned especially to the neglected theme of the central role of British imperialism in the emergence of white supremacy in South Africa. Analysed here is Britain's astonishing period of aggression and imperial advance in South Africa. Coming into particular focus is the legendary imperialist Cecil Rhodes (after whom Rhodesia, today's Zimbabwe and Zambia, was originally named), something curiously neglected in South African historiography and scholarship. As always, Magubane's quest for understanding has profound political implications, as he recognised:

As I write this preface the elections have just taken place which made Mr. Mandela the first democratically elected president of South Africa . . . The end of white minority rule and the beginning of the process of black emancipation are momentous events. Yet South African scholarship – which to this day is predominated by white scholars – has hardly prepared the people of South Africa to understand the meaning of this change . . . Indeed, the various schools of South African historiography and sociology have never confronted what it meant to the Africans to be deprived of the franchise and the claim that South Africa was a *white man's country.*

Reviewing the twists and turns of racist scholarship on South Africa, including efforts to let British liberalism and global capitalism off the hook for the structures of racial domination in South Africa, Magubane here illustrates the structures of knowledge and ignorance in the modern world-system, particularly Bonaventura de Souza Santos's argument that social injustice is always

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accompanied by cognitive injustice. Yet this book is no mere study of the origins of the South African state, in and of itself. Instead, it is a larger study of centrality of race and class in the making of South African and global capitalism. Magubane draws on writings of the architects of imperialism to document their white supremacist views, from Ireland to Africa, squarely underscoring the role of British imperialism, most especially followers of Cecil Rhodes such as Alfred Milner, the one-time proconsul of South Africa, and his kindergarten – largely from Oxford – and the related Round Table Movement in forming the Union of South Africa and laying the material foundations of the South African political economy more generally, upheld as it was by cheap black labour. At the same time, Magubane draws on masters of race and class analysis and related structures of colonial domination such as Du Bois and Fanon, underscoring the spread of white-settler states across the globe, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, those lands that Alfred Crosby (2004), in his *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900*, named the neo-Europes, or what is sometimes referred to as the Anglo-sphere.

Indeed, in an important seminar paper, *The Round Table Movement: Its Influence in the Historiography of Imperialism* (1994), subsequently republished in his collected essays, *African Sociology – Towards a Critical Perspective* (1999), Magubane focuses more on the role of the Round Table movement, with chapters in each of the white dominions, assisted by the largesse of the Rhodes Trust, as a vehicle for British imperialism, replete with their quarterly journal of the same name. The Round Table movement also went on to form the Royal Institute of International Affairs, also called Chatham House, the British counterpart to the Council on Foreign Relations in the US. Participants in the Round Table movement read like a *Who's Who* of the British ruling class. Moreover, to a large extent, through the Round Table's special relationship with Oxford, notably All Souls College, the heart of the British Establishment, they largely controlled the historiography of the British Empire, including through contributions to Oxford's *Dictionary of National*

Biography. In this essay, Magubane's humility, with important lessons for scholar activists today, is made plain:

> Let me, at once make a confession. When I was writing my first book, *The Political Economy of Race & Class in South Africa,* I was embarrassed by how ignorant I was, not only about the history of our people but even more about the history of our conquest and colonization. My education had failed me completely. In order to educate myself, I decided to spend many hours in the library paging through whatever book I could find dealing with the so-called discovery of diamonds and gold and the impact of these events on the life of our people. My interest in the gold and diamond industry was the result of stories that my grandmother used to tell about my grandfather (who had died before I was born) as a result of working in the Kimberley mines and later in the Witwatersrand gold mines. She has told us about how my grandfather, in order to earn money to pay the poll tax, would divide his time between the Kimberley mines and working for a Boer farmer on whose 'land' we were squatters. (1994: 3)

Magubane goes on to relate being taught about Cecil Rhodes in South Africa and his supposed belief in equality for civilised men, seen as concomitant with English liberalism. Subsequently, Magubane uncovered the truth about perhaps the greatest imperialist the world had ever seen, reading his *Confession of Faith*, epitomising as it did the philosophy of white supremacy and imperialism. From this vantage point, Magubane underscores the extent to which the Union of South Africa, was not, as liberal British historians would have it, a concession to the Boers and their white supremacist views but in fact at one with British imperial policy as a whole. The structures of white supremacy that were integral parts of the British Empire and its white colonial settler domains were institutionalised to varying degrees in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, not to mention Ireland and the US. Indeed, the origins of apartheid can be traced back to British imperialism, including Rhodes and leading members of the Round Table movement. Though there is by now a substantial literature on the Round Table movement, including Carol Quigley's (1981) *The Anglo-American Establishment*, much of it is difficult to obtain. Hence, the movement is largely unknown, despite its origins and evolution, going back to Cecil Rhodes and Alfred

Milner in the late nineteenth century, being arguably central for understanding British imperial policy from this time on. Magubane continued his work on related questions of global race and class with the publication of *Race and the Construction of the Dispensable Other* (2007).

Magubane's work represents a tremendous contribution to our understanding of capitalist imperialism and white supremacy in South Africa and the global system. But in retrospect, his most significant achievement may be his editorial leadership of the monumental multivolume *The Road to Democracy in South Africa* (various years). While formally chronicling the period largely from 1960 on, various parts of this project explore the earlier origins of South Africa, with the first volume beginning with an introduction by the then South African president Thabo Mbeki.

In Volume I, while underscoring the extent to which the roots of race-class oppression and exploitation go back to the origins of colonial and imperial settlement, Magubane again chronicles the discovery of gold and diamonds in the dispossession of the African peasantry and the creation of a system of labour reserves for the mines. Subsequent chapters by a host of different scholars chronicle armed and peasant struggles, various types of rural resistance, state repression (including South Africa's State of Emergency), the activities of the various national liberation and related organisations, from the Pan African Congress to the African People's Democratic Union, the South African Communist Party, and the African National Congress itself, including its turn to the armed struggle, its leaders in exile, its worldwide efforts, and of course those imprisoned at the infamous Robben Island.

volume 2 begins with two chapters by Magubane dealing with the social and political context and the rise of the garrison state from 1970–80. Coming into view here is the sustained period of mass upsurge, including the activities and repression of the Soweto students in 1976, the collapse of Portugal's fascist regime, Steven Bantu Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement and Biko's death in police custody in 1977. The mass upsurge during this period presaged the increased militarisation of South Africa. Deftly dealing with the changing composition of South African capital and the ruling hegemonic bloc as a whole, Magubane chronicles the evolution of the regimes Bantustan policy in the context of the increasing importance of the Black South African proletariat to South Africa's economy. The Nixon and Kissinger strategy of support for South Africa and the white minority regimes in the region, as expressed in National Security Strategy Memorandum 39 and South Africa's failed attempt to turn back the Angolan revolution as Cuban troops beat back the South African regime and the CIA, are also discussed here. These issues have also been discussed expertly by Piero Gleijeses (2013) in his *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for South Africa, 1976–1991 and his* (2002) *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976.* Recent newly released documents now show that then US Secretary of State, Kissinger, thought of attacking or possibly blockading Cuba over this issue.

Subsequent chapters detail the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement, the labour movement, Soweto, the ANC underground, the activities of the ANC and PAC and resistance and repression in the Bantustans. Other chapters deal with the rise of the Black Consciousness movement with Steve Biko in response to the segregation of university students, along with related articles on culture and representation, the revival of the labour movement, as well as the Soweto student uprising and its deadly repression in 1976. Two other chapters, co-written with Magubane, chronicle the ANC political underground, and the ANC armed struggle, respectively, in the 1970s.

volume 3, Parts I and II, take up the critical importance of international solidarity and the anti-apartheid movement. volume 4, Parts I and II, deal with the crisis of South Africa's garrison state and the collapse of its total war strategy, this at a time of renewed mass upsurge, with the rise of organisations such as the United Democratic Front. Subsequent chapters deal with the ANC and the beginning of negotiations between the national liberation organization and the white minority regime. Other chapters deal with both underground activity by the ANC and aboveground mass organising by the UDF and the emergence and development of the South African Congress of Trade Unions

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(SACTU) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Azanian People's Organisation. Still other chapters deal with the role of civic and religious organisations, with Zine Magubane contributing a chapter on the role of women in the ANC and the question of feminism while her father contributed final chapters on the collapse of the US policy of 'constructive engagement' and the garrison state.

volume 5, Parts I and II, deals with African solidarity. volume 6, Parts I and II, deals with the dismantling of the apartheid state, with an introductory and closing chapter by Magubane. There is a wide array of chapters, including detailed accounts of the National Party, the re-establishment of the ANC inside South Africa during the years leading up to the inauguration of its multiracial democracy, the Black Consciousness Movement in the 1990s, and the role of women and efforts for gender inclusivity during the transition. Finally, there is also another volume entitled *South Africans Telling Their Stories, 1950–1970.*

Magubane's journey, as a black South African, from poverty in Durban, to exile in the US and then back to South Africa, and his legendary work as a scholar activist for South African, African, Black liberation and human emancipation as a whole, presents a compelling tale for those interested in the history of imperialism and anti-imperialism. Moreover, as Magubane wrote in a review of Mandela's legacy:

> Until the economy is democratized, South Africa's newly born freedoms will remain a chimera. This central truth has been obfuscated in South Africa in particular and in capitalist countries in general … Indeed, current globalization with its challenge to the nation state highlights that *under capitalism democracy has always been restricted to the political domain, while economic management has been held hostage by non-democratic private ownership of the means of production.* Such a democracy is incomplete, even by Western standards. (2001: 36)

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Mandela, Nelson (1918–2013)

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Malcolm X (1925–1965)

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Definition

Malcolm X was one of the most charismatic, controversial, and iconic figures of the US civil

rights and black power struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. His legacy has had a lasting influence on successive generations of political activists and intellectuals in the US and throughout the world. He spent the majority of his active adult life building the Nation of Islam.

Malcolm X was one of the most charismatic, controversial, and iconic figures of the US civil rights and black power struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. His legacy has had a lasting influence on successive generations of political activists and intellectuals in the US and throughout the world. Though he was a contemporary of Dr Martin Luther King (1929–68), Malcolm met the de facto leader of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) just once, on Capitol Hill, Washington, on 26 March 1964, during the passage of the Civil Rights Bill. The primary reason for this was that he spent the majority of his active adult life building the Nation of Islam, an organisation which explicitly denounced and abstained from the civil rights struggles.

Malcolm X was neither the name that he was given at birth nor the one that he used when he died. He was born Malcolm Little in Omaha, Nebraska, on 19 May 1925 and died El Hajj Malik El Shabbaz in Harlem, New York, on 21 February 1965. This changing identity is indicative of what Manning Marable, the author of a major biography (2011), characterises in his title as a 'life of reinvention'.

Early Years and Influences

Malcolm was the son of Rev. Earl and Louise Little, who were politically active as supporters of Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which sought to build its support in towns where racism was deeply entrenched. It is worth pointing out that the UNIA was the single largest black or New Afrikan organisation in US history. Malcolm's earliest memories were of travelling to meetings organised by his father to rally black people and encourage a sense of black pride. When Malcolm was aged just four, the family home was burned to the ground by members of the violently racist Ku

Klux Klan. The family survived this attack but Malcolm's father lived for only two more years. Officially his death on 8 September 1931 was a tragic accident in which he slipped and fell under a moving street car, but it is almost certain that he was murdered by racists. Louise Little was therefore left to raise a family on her own. She struggled valiantly for almost eight years but was eventually incarcerated at the Kalamazoo State Hospital, where she remained for 24 years.

These experiences had a profound and lasting effect upon Malcolm. Though he was a bright and popular pupil, Malcolm became increasingly disillusioned by an education system that refused to recognise him as anything other than a 'nigger' who should abandon any aspirations to be a lawyer and should instead 'plan on carpentry' because he was good with his hands (Malcolm X 1965: 118). Angry at the violent brutality of organised gangs and the institutional racism of the education system, he left school and sought refuge in the bright lights of the north, in Boston, New York, and Detroit. It was during this period of his life that he transformed himself from a country hick into a slick and streetwise hustler.

The racism of US society meant that it was almost impossible for black people to secure prestigious and well-paid work. Having initially struggled to survive as a sandwich vendor and shoeshine boy, Malcolm turned to the more precarious pastimes of drug running, pimping, and burglary. He enjoyed a certain amount of notoriety, glamour, and wealth as he mixed with famous artists such as the jazz singer Billie Holliday, but eventually his luck ran out. He was caught, charged, convicted, and sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment. He was just 20 years of age.

The Nation of Islam

It was while he was in prison that Malcolm underwent his next reinvention. Following an introduction by his brother Philbert, he abandoned his 'Detroit Red' hustler image and became an abstemious and devout member of the Nation of Islam ('the Nation'), a controversial and marginal organisation which was shunned by Islam. At the

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heart of the organisation was a philosophy centred on a belief that white people were created in an experiment by a mad scientist called Yacub. These 'devils' had somehow managed to trick the world's original black inhabitants and seize control of society. The Nation's aim was to re-awaken the consciousness of Original Man and encourage black people to 'wake up, clean up' and reassert their authority. In the interim, it preached complete separation from white society and both encouraged and developed its own form of black capitalism. This philosophy culminated in the establishment of a major economic programme in which supporters were encouraged to contribute $10 towards the purchase of a 4500-acre farm in Georgia. Later the Nation was able to establish its own shops and restaurants. In a society in which racism was deeply entrenched and in the southern states legally enshrined, the appeal of this philosophy cannot be underestimated.

It was not surprising that the Nation's promotion of black pride was so attractive to someone who had heard a similar message being preached in his formative years. Malcolm threw himself into the Nation, and after leaving prison in 1953 he was to become its most charismatic figure. Following a meeting at which he received the approval of the Nation's leader, Elijah Muhammad, he abandoned his 'slavemaster's' surname and became Malcolm X. In 1954 he was appointed the minister for Temple No. 7 in Harlem, the de facto capital of black America. Later he founded and edited the monthly newspaper *Muhammad Speaks*.

The Nation's rhetoric was tough and uncompromising, and the appearance of its male members, clad in black suits and with short, neat haircuts, was equally imposing. Malcolm's role in promoting its appeal was pivotal. For example, he played a key role in recruiting the charismatic heavyweight boxing champion Cassius Clay (later Muhammad Ali). As the general tide of struggle and black political engagement increased, however, Malcolm became frustrated at the dictatorial leadership of Elijah Muhammad, his alleged sexual infidelities, and, in particular, his sectarian refusal to sanction the Nation's involvement in the wider movement.

Estrangement, Departure, and New Beginnings

Malcolm's increasingly strained relationship with Elijah Muhammad eventually came to a head in late 1963. Muhammad had instructed his followers not to attend the March on Washington which Dr King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference and several other civil rights organisations had called for 28 August. Officially Malcolm followed the line, decrying it in the days before as the 'Farce on Washington'. The demonstration attracted an estimated 250,000 black and white people but it was denounced by him. In one of his most famous speeches, 'A Message to the Grassroots' delivered in November 1963, he dismissed the event as 'a circus' and observed that instead of transforming the event into the 'black revolution . . . those Toms were out of town by sundown' (Breitman 1989: 3–18).

Privately, however, Malcolm disagreed with Muhammad's diktat. Not only was he present in Washington, but the night before the event he spoke to the actor and activist Ossie Davis and indicated that he was there to provide 'discreet' help if needed (Younge 2013: 113). The simple truth was that despite his political differences with Dr King, Malcolm admired the CRM's ability to motivate and mobilise people. The activist in Malcolm could not help but be impressed by an event that captured the world's attention and shone a light on racial injustice.

Within months Malcolm's relationship with Muhammad and the Nation was stretched to breaking point. The catalyst for his departure was his response to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on 22 November 1963. As militant opponents of white American power, the Nation might have been expected to comment on the death of the world's most powerful imperialist political leader. Instead, Muhammad instructed his members to stay silent for fear of provoking outrage, and he himself issued a statement expressing shock 'over the loss of our president' (Marable 2011: 269).

Malcolm kept his counsel for over a week, but on 1 December he delivered an address on 'God's Judgment of White America' at a public rally in

Manhattan. Following the speech he responded to a journalist's invitation to comment on Kennedy's death by suggesting that it was an example of the 'chickens coming home to roost'. Emboldened by the enthusiastic reaction of the crowd, he continued by declaring that 'Being an old farm boy myself, chickens coming home to roost never did make me sad; they've always made me glad' (Marable 2011: 272–273). This act of insubordination provoked his leader's wrath, and Malcolm was immediately suspended from the Nation. He was never to return. Instead when it became clear that his rift with Muhammad would never be healed, Malcolm set up a new organisation, the Muslim Mosque Inc. (MMI), in March 1964, which was aimed at drawing black people away from the Nation and into a new spiritual home.

Despite his admiration for the CRM's mobilising capacity, he continued to define himself as a black nationalist. He renounced the idea that black people were American, declaring boldly instead that they were Africans oppressed by colonial rule. He argued that the oppressed nations of Africa had shaken off imperial control through nationalism, not by 'sitting in . . . waiting in' and 'singing we shall overcome'. Instead of abstaining from the struggle, however, he urged his supporters to join with their fellow Negroes in order to 'show him how to bring about a real revolution' (29 March 1964, in Breitman 1989: 23–45).

Sharp Move to the Left: The Final Year and the Final Reinvention

What proved to be his final year was arguably the most fascinating of Malcolm's life. It was in this period that he underwent what Marable (2011) characterises as his last reinvention. This was both a religious and political transformation, but at the time of his death it was by no means complete. Malcolm converted to Sunni Islam, changed his name, and embarked on a journey to Mecca.

The pilgrimage had a profound effect upon him. In a letter to his followers in the MMI he declared:

> Never have I witnessed such sincere hospitality and the overwhelming spirit of true brotherhood as is practised by people of all colors and races here in

this ancient Holy Land . . . For the past week, I have been utterly speechless and spellbound by the graciousness displayed all around me by people of all colors. (Malcolm X 1965: 454)

This was a radical break from the avowedly separatist rhetoric that he had previously preached. Malcolm did not completely break from black nationalism, however. Although he came to acknowledge the need to sit down and talk to white people, he continued to argue that black people needed to set up their own businesses, manage their own affairs, and control their own communities. In order to campaign for this he set up a parallel, nonreligious, and supposedly non-sectarian body called the Organisation of Afro American Unity (OAAU).

The inspiration for the OAAU was the Organisation of African Unity, which had been set up as an anti-colonial body by a collection of African governments in May 1963. Much of Malcolm's time in that final period was spent travelling to Africa and meeting the leaders of these newly independent states in an effort to learn lessons from their national liberation struggles. The establishment of the MMI and OAAU is therefore indicative of the fact that Malcolm retained a significant core of his old beliefs. In essence, he still did not believe that whites could be equal participants in the fight for black liberation, but in the wake of his pilgrimage, he did begin to accept that the 'sincere whites' could become involved in his organisations and play a supportive role in the struggle.

What is also true is that in his final year Malcolm's politics were moving sharply to the left. As part of this, he began to develop a more sophisticated critique of the economic system. Commenting on the increasingly successful struggle against colonialism in Africa, he observed of the newly independent states: 'None of them are adopting the capitalistic system because they realise they can't. You can't operate a capitalistic system unless you are vulturistic; you have to have someone else's blood to suck to be a capitalist. You show me a capitalist and I'll show you a bloodsucker' (Breitman 1989: 115–137). Arguably Malcolm's assessment that these states were developing 'socialistic systems to solve their

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problems' ('At the Audubon', in Breitman 1989: 121) was mistaken, but the speech is nevertheless an indication of his attempt to grapple with and embrace new ideas.

In addition his writings began to appear frequently in the publications of left groupings, including the American Socialist Workers Party (SWP). This was partly because the SWP was one of the few organisations in the US willing to provide him with a platform, but it was also indicative of the political journey that Malcolm was embarking upon. Speaking at an event organised by the Militant Labour Forum in May 1964, he made a similar point about post-colonial Africa, suggesting that '. . . all of the countries that are emerging today from under colonialism are turning toward socialism. I don't think it's an accident.' He also explicitly remarked upon the link between capitalism and racism: 'It's impossible for a white person to believe in capitalism and not believe in racism.' He commented on the strong personal commitment to racial equality shown by socialists and noted the role that socialists had played in supporting and participating in anti-colonial struggles (Marable 2011: 336).

Malcolm's assassination on 21 March 1965 saw his final reinvention brought to an abrupt and violent end and the liberation movement lose one of its greatest figures just as it was entering a new phase. While the assassination was attributed to the Nation of Islam, it emerged following examination of the documentary evidence that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation had deliberately infiltrated the Nation of Islam as part of its COINTELPRO programme and had worked to increase acrimony and bitterness between it and the followers of Malcolm X.

Malcolm X's Legacy

Malcolm had realised that American society was about to explode and predicted that 1964 might be the year of 'the ballot or the bullet' ('The Ballot or the Bullet', in Breitman 1989: 23–45). That very year riots against police racism erupted in Harlem, and over the summer there were further rebellions in Rochester, Patterson, Jersey City, Elizabeth, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Within months of

Malcolm's death, there was another upsurge. In August 1965 an uprising in the Watts district of Los Angeles lasted several days and proved to be the biggest urban disturbance since 1943. Thirty-four people were killed and 4000 arrested, and $35 million worth of damage was caused. In 1967 there were eruptions on an even greater scale in Newark (New Jersey) and Detroit.

By this time it was becoming increasingly clear that racism would not be eradicated through legislative action alone. The CRM had succeeded in forcing the Federal Government to pass equal rights laws with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, but it had failed to transform the material conditions of black people in either the southern or the northern states. While Dr King remained a popular figure, the movement he was part of was increasingly being challenged by those who demanded a more militant strategy. Malcolm recognised this, and after his break with the Nation he threw himself into the task of articulating that anger and giving it organisational expression.

In the years that followed Malcolm's death the struggle for civil rights was transformed into a fight for black power, a demand for economic opportunities. Dr King himself realised this and sought to intervene in wider struggles, opposing the Vietnam War and campaigning for workers' rights. As these struggles progressed new organisations were established to try and take the movement forward. By far the most significant and influential of these was the Black Panther Party of Self Defense (BPP), founded in Oakland, California, in October 1966. Its leaders Huey P Newton and Bobby Seale openly acknowledged that the organisation was set up as 'a living testament to (Malcolm's) work' (Newton 1995: 113). They shunned the nonviolent approach of the CRM and instead encouraged their supporters to exercise their constitutional right to bear arms and challenge the oppressive, racist policing of their communities. In addition, they established a series of community-based projects which focused on black self-help and organisation. The BPP's '10 Point Program' represented a manifesto for political change which built upon and developed Malcolm's black nationalist philosophy. Like the latter-day Malcolm, however, they were prepared

to work with so called 'progressive whites' and left wing political movements.

Malcolm was denounced as a figure of violence and hate when he died, and for many years he was considered a divisive figure whose influence had been negligible. Latterly, however, he has enjoyed a huge resurgence in popularity, not least because of Spike Lee's 1993 film X. He subsequently received the official seal of approval with the unveiling of a 33 cent commemorative stamp by the US Postal Service as part of its 'Black Heritage' series in January 1999. For many young black Americans, the marginalised, excluded, and angry 'hip hop generation', and anti-racists across the world, however, Malcolm X remains an uncompromising icon who never betrayed his cause and fought injustice.

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Mandate

▶ Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law

Mandela, Nelson (1918–2013)

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Definition

Rolihlahla Nelson Mandela was an anti-apartheid activist, political prisoner, and president of

South Africa from 1994 to 99. He was born on 18 July 1918 in the rural Xhosa village of Mvezo in the Transkei (Eastern Cape, South Africa).

Introduction

Rolihlahla Nelson Mandela was an anti-apartheid activist, political prisoner, and president of South Africa from 1994 to 99. He was born on 18 July 1918 in the rural Xhosa village of Mvezo in the Transkei (Eastern Cape, South Africa). The name Nelson was given to him by a teacher at his primary school near the village of Qunu, where he later returned to establish his family home. His formative years were spent within a traditional African tribal context with its firmly established societal structures, including respect for the elders of the village. After his father's death in 1927, he moved to The Great Place (in nearby Mqhekezweni), where he was cared for by Chief Jongintaba Dalindyebo with an equally traditional upbringing. This included initiation through a Xhosa circumcision ritual which young boys of 16 customarily underwent. His school education included 6 years at the Clarkebury Boarding Institute (in nearby Engcobo) and at the Wesleyan College, Healdtown in Fort Beaufort. In 1939 he started a degree at the only black university in South Africa, University College Fort Hare, where he met his lifelong friend and fellow political activist Oliver Tambo (1917–93). Politics formed an instrumental part of Mandela's life from early adulthood onwards, with his tertiary education prematurely cut short after a year when he was expelled for his involvement in protest action.

Mandela's arrival in the sprawling urban city of Johannesburg in 1941 – after escaping from the prospect of an arranged marriage – would significantly alter the course of his life. With his solid understanding of the structures of traditional African society and a growing awareness of the racial injustices prevalent in South Africa, he became increasingly politically active in attempting to liberate the oppressed, majority, non-white population. In Johannesburg he worked on the mines as a security officer

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(providing insights into the inhospitable working and living conditions of miners) and as an estate agent before meeting another lifelong friend and political collaborator Walter Sisulu. Sisulu introduced him to Lazar Sidelsky who employed Mandela as an articled clerk in the law firm Witkin, Sidelsky and Eidelman. He continued with his degree studies through the University of South Africa (UNISA) whilst working at the law firm, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1942, the year in which he began attending African National Congress (ANC) meetings. Although nonwhite South Africans had, over the years, challenged the repressive colonial regime (in existence since the early 1900s) with numerous uprisings and protests, it was the formation of the ANC in 1923 (originally the South African Native National Congress from 1912) that would serve to strengthen the liberation struggle. Initially, membership was only open to black South Africans, but by 1969 the anti-apartheid movement recognised that true liberation would need to include representation from all racial and ethnic groups.

Mandela's first marriage to Evelyn Ntoko Mase took place in 1944 in the same year that he co-founded the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The marriage produced four children: Thembekile (1945–69), Makaziwe, who died as an infant (1947), Makgatho (1950–2005), and Makaziwe (1954). The co-founding of the ANCYL was essential as the younger activists recognised that more hard-line approaches were necessary to challenge the oppressive discriminatory regime, impacting on the lives of all non-white South Africans. Mandela was elected as secretary of the ANCYL in 1948 and became its president in 1951. His positions as political activist and lawyer were complemented by his understanding of the complex systems of Western capitalist ideologies. These would inform his approaches to socialist and communist ideologies which dominated the liberation movement and which would come to play an important role in recognising the necessity of maintaining a strong economic power base during the transitional stages of reform when the apartheid administration was being dismantled in the early 1990s.

By 1948, when apartheid was legally implemented, South Africa had already been ruled by successive, racially discriminating governments. These took their cue from the colonial and imperialist policies of white domination over native inhabitants. Legislation such as the Natives Land Act (1913), banning black Africans from owning land and effectively giving 13% of the land to 87% of the non-white population, had already been implemented early on in the century. From 1948, however, when the right-wing National Party (NP, established in 1913) came to power with D.F. Malan as prime minister, the implementation of apartheid policies was made in earnest. Between 1948 and the formation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961, more than 800 laws were passed, systematically infringing the rights of South Africa's majority non-white population. These included: the Population Registration Act (1950), the Immorality Amendment Act (1951), the Suppression of Communism Act (1951), the South African Censorship Board (1951), the pass laws (1952), the Bantu Education Act (1953), and Separate Amenities Act (1953). The increasing suppression of political activity, oppression of the non-white peoples of South Africa, and the uncompromising stance taken by the National Party government (who retaliated against any political uprisings with brutal force) only served to consolidate the anti-apartheid movement, which also increasingly gained international support from the rest of Africa the Soviet Union and Europe.

In 1949, the ANC, recognising that the ruling National Party signalled further oppression of non-white peoples, took on board the ANCYL's Programme of Action, calling for increased protest action in the form of strikes and organised acts of civil disobedience. In 1952, when Mandela was head of the ANC's Transvaal region, he set up the first black legal practice in South Africa with Oliver Tambo. From June 1952 the ANC and the Communist Party led a Defiance Campaign, taking the path of passive resistance inspired by the *satyagrha* philosophies of Mahatma Ghandi. (Ghandi spent 21 years in South Africa [1893–1914], initially visiting as a legal representative for an Indian Company, and became

disillusioned with the colonial regime after being thrown off a 1st-class 'whites only' train carriage.) The Defiance Campaign included the burning of passbooks (compulsory identification documents which black South Africans were obliged to carry), the illegal occupation of areas reserved for 'whites only', and mass marches. Despite the generally peaceful nature of the Campaign, about 8,000 activists were detained, with Mandela and 19 other leaders convicted under the Suppression of Communism Act and sentenced to 9 months' hard labour. Despite the disappointing failure to generate any positive legislative changes and the government's banning of the Defiance Campaign, ANC membership increased and international awareness of the anti-apartheid struggle was also intensified. The results of the crackdown after the Defiance Campaign led Mandela to devise the M-plan for operations in 1953, which meant that the ANC was broken down into smaller cells of activity, enabling easier operations for operating underground.

The Congress Alliance, created in 1955, served as an umbrella operation encompassing all left-wing organisations, including the ANC, the Congress of Democrats, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, the South African Indian Congress, and the Coloured People's Congress. It was supported by the United Nations as they acknowledged the human rights violations being committed by the apartheid regime. In June 1955, Mandela (despite being under banning orders) drove to Kliptown for a 3,000-strong meeting to witness the adoption of the Freedom Charter by the Congress of People. The Charter outlined the principles of a free South Africa for all races, yet it would be another 40 years before the possibility of equality would become a reality.

The Freedom Charter and the continued actions of the Defiance Campaign were met with ever firmer governmental counter-measures to quash any political action against the policies of apartheid. These included Mandela's arrest, alongside 156 other Congress leaders and political activists, in December 1956. The activists were charged with high treason and with breaking the Suppression of Communism Act (1950). Interestingly, while imprisonment was not an

ideal situation, access to newspapers and detention in two large prison cells provided uncharacteristically welcome opportunities for interaction, as Mandela outlined:

> Our communal cell became a kind of convention for far-flung freedom fighters. Many of us had been living under severe restrictions, making it illegal for us to meet and talk. Now, our enemy had gathered us all under one roof for what became the largest and longest unbanned meeting of the Congress Alliance in years. Younger leaders met older leaders they had only read about. Men from Natal mingled with leaders from the Transvaal. We revelled in the opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences for two weeks while we awaited trial. (Mandela 1994: 233)

The Treason Trial would be dragged out for over 4 years, with Mandela being one of the last to be acquitted in 1961 through lack of evidence.

In his personal life, the pressures from political commitments finally resulted in the breakdown of his first marriage, with his divorce from Evelyn Ntoko Mase taking place in 1958. He had by this time met fellow political activist (and co-accused in the treason trial arrests) Nomzamo Winifred Madikizela, whom he married in 1958. They had two daughters Zenani (1959) and Zindziswa (1960), with 'Winnie' Mandela also continuing her role as a key anti-apartheid activist in her own right, and assisting the underground struggle for liberation while Mandela was imprisoned.

The Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960 brought further international attention to the brutality of the apartheid regime, particularly when police forces mounted an armed attack against protesters, leaving numerous dead and wounded. The Massacre was in many ways a turning point for the ANC as the slaughter of 69 unarmed protestors (and scores more wounded) left the ANC with no option but to resort to violence. The NP Government declared a national state of emergency, the banning of the ANC, and Mandela's detention under the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960. Key political events continued to unfold when South Africa was declared a republic after a whites-only referendum in May 1960. This signalled a withdrawal from the Commonwealth, severing trade and economic links and in effect sanctioning the Afrikaner NP's

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implementation of further discriminatory laws as it severed its ties with 200 years of imperial rule.

In December 1961, Albert Luthuli (ANC president-general 1952–67) received international recognition with the Nobel Peace Prize in honour of his role in the anti-apartheid movement. Yet despite this, and repeated attempts by the ANC to enter negotiations with the NP Government, their efforts went unheeded. Non-violent strike actions and attempts to generate some form of reaction through passive resistance were instead met with hostile and violent counter-resistance as the government attempted to quell the building opposition.

The events of the previous few years clearly demonstrated that passive resistance was not a workable strategy to overturn the oppressive apartheid regime or even to negotiate with the NP Government. The formation of the military wing of the ANC 'Umkhonto we Sizwe' (Spear of the Nation, or MK) was therefore launched on 16 December 1961, with Mandela as commander-in-chief. MK importantly operated as a separate military arm of the ANC so as not to confuse the ANC's main objectives in the liberation struggle. Although violence was the necessary action to take at this juncture, MK at all times sought to undermine government control with minimum harm to civilians. This was done through sabotage and the destruction of government property outside of the main working hours in the hope of accomplishing maximum damage to essential government resources. Strike actions were also called to destabilise government operations and a number of safe houses provided meeting places and shelter for the underground resistance movement. As soon as the government became aware of the emerging underground movement, further crackdowns were implemented, with anti-apartheid cells infiltrated by security police and leaders arrested where possible.

By this point, Mandela was also operating underground. He secretly left South Africa in January 1962 to travel through Africa to undergo military training, to seek support for the anti-apartheid movement further afield, and to visit Oliver Tambo in London for 2 weeks at the end of his trip. On his return to South Africa he was immediately arrested in the Eastern Transvaal (August 1962) and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for travelling without valid papers and inciting political strike action. After his arrest he was briefly interned at Robben Island before being returned to prison in Pretoria. At his trial he stated that the continued oppression of the majority non-white population and the events of 1960 had compelled the ANC to commit to armed struggle. MK continued with acts of sabotage by bombing or burning government resources, with an extensive underground networks developing which included cells set up across Africa and as far-afield as Moscow and Europe.

By this stage in the early 1960s, the police had increasingly been gathering information about the MK headquarters based at Liliesleaf Farm in a semi-rural area 40 km outside Johannesburg. The farm had been bought in 1961 for the South African Communist Party and fronted by a white family, the Goldreich's, who were not yet on the government's list of banned people. While the farm appeared to be an ordinary family home, it was here that regular meetings took place of MK's High Command, with their intentions to overthrow the increasingly oppressive government regime. On 11 July 1963, an undercover police raid took place, resulting in the arrest of almost all of the MK High Command. While Mandela had lived at Liliesleaf for the best part of 18 months (posing as farmhand David Motsamayi), he had at this point already been arrested so was not present on the day of the raid. Liliesleaf was significant as it was here that the important Operation Muyibuye was drawn up: a plan of sabotage action to bring down the South African government. The Rivonia Trial in June 1964 included Mandela and eight other activists ('Rusty' Bernstein, Dennis Goldberg, Ahmed Kathrada, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Andrew Mlangemi, Elias Motsoaledi, and Walter Sisulu), all of whom were tried for sabotage. Mandela's now legendary statement from the dock, which he used not only to defend himself but also as a voice of reason outlining the motives and actions of the antiapartheid movement, is encapsulated in the final sentences:

> During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. (438)

All, with the exception of Bernstein and Goldberg, were sentenced to life imprisonment, and Mandela began his historic 26-year sentence, most of which was spent on Robben Island in a punishing regime breaking rocks at a lime quarry.

The intervening years between imprisonment and release saw Mandela become an international figurehead for the struggle against apartheid. Although he was periodically kept in solitary confinement or had limited access to other political prisoners, he managed to keep abreast of national and international activities taking place underground and within the growing international anti-apartheid movement. He secretly began writing his autobiography in 1975, smuggling it out through fellow-prisoner Mac Maharaj in 1976, but it would be another 18 years before the publication of *Long Walk to Freedom* (1994). Despite imprisonment, Mandela's political commitments never wavered and he continued, as much as it was possible for an interned person, to fight for freedom and justice for the majority non-white population of South Africa. He became an international symbol of resistance against the apartheid government, yet despite international pressures it would be almost three decades before apartheid was judicially dismantled and a new constitution brought into existence, adopting the principles of the 1955 Freedom Charter.

Mandela spent 18 years on Robben Island before being moved to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982, where he shared a communal cell with fellow political prisoners Ahmed Kathrada, Raymond Mhlaba, Andrew Mlangeni, and Walter Sisulu. The last few years of his internment were in Viktor Verster Prison (Paarl), where he stayed until his release in 1990. Mandela twice rejected an early release from prison, with the first offered in 1984 when his nephew Andrew Mlangeni, president of an 'independent' Bantustan (state),

offered sanctuary in the Transkei. A year later, when President P.W. Botha offered a conditional release (if he renounced the use of violence for political ends), Mandela again refused. Although these offers of release were rejected, Mandela entered into talks with the NP Government in which they explored viable conditions for future negotiation with the banned ANC. His house at Viktor Verster prison thus became an unlikely meeting ground for individuals from both sides of the political divide, as attempts were made to bridge the gaps between political ideologies and find a way towards reconciliation and peaceful resolution. During Mandela's extensive prison stay, he utilised the time available and continued studying for his law degree, finally graduating with an LLB in 1989 through the University of South Africa, shortly before his release.

In the intervening years, while Mandela was imprisoned, the NP had desperately attempted to maintain tight controls and hang onto power, countering any political unrest with increasingly violent crackdowns. Despite international economic sanctions, sports and cultural embargoes, and steady pressure from the international community, the ruling regime only conceded defeat in 1990 with the unbanning of all political organisations and finally the release of the figurehead of the anti-apartheid movement Nelson Mandela.

President F.W. de Klerk's role in the final years before Mandela's release would also be important in forging a path – alongside Mandela – for the transition to democracy and the future prosperity of South Africa. De Klerk surprised the nation with a speech delivered to Parliament on 2 February 1990. In this he announced the immediate unbanning of all political organisations (including MK) and Mandela's release a week later. Both Mandela and de Klerk were intent on overseeing a peaceful resolution, needing to include the white minority who formed the stronghold of the economic base in South Africa. They also recognised the need for economic stability to facilitate the emerging black middle class, as this would be central in the transition to a free and democratic society for all races in South Africa. While de Klerk was almost certainly committed to change there is no doubt that the governing

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apartheid regime must have seen that there was no option but to start on the process of dismantling apartheid and moving towards a free South Africa for all its inhabitants.

Soon after the unbanning of all political parties, Mandela's long-awaited release took place on 11 February 1990, with a speech to the nation delivered to a jubilant crowd in Cape Town. Political exiles returned and additional political prisoners were released, including ANC (and MK) activists who were guaranteed protection from prosecution. The ANC president, Oliver Tambo, returned in December 1990 from his 30-year exile for the first ANC meeting on home ground in 31 years. In December 1991, de Klerk announced that key laws enforcing apartheid control such as the Land Act (1913), Group Areas Act (1950), and Population Registration Act (1950) would be revoked, thus in effect ceasing the legislative control of non-white peoples. These were historic shifts for a nation where the majority of the population had had to endure extreme infringements of their human rights.

Although the next 3 years entailed increasing violence, from right-wing white activists the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and Inkatha activists led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, attempts were made to keep the transition process as smooth as possible. The first free general elections took place in April 1994 with almost 20 million queuing to vote over a 3-day period. As the ANC did not win with an absolute majority, a Government of National Unity was formed with the NP and the Inkhata Freedom Party. (COSATU and the Communist Party had aligned with the ANC for the elections.) Mandela was elected as president with F.W. de Klerk as vice-president. On a personal level, the hardships of being separated during his internment and Winnie Mandela's controversial political involvements (with alleged involvement in the death of Stompie Moeketsi in 1989) placed great strain on their marriage. Despite attempting to reconcile their differences, they divorced in 1996 and on Mandela's 80th birthday, 2 years later, he married Graça Machel, a humanitarian and politician (and widow of Mozambican president Samora Machel).

With South Africa's blemished past under apartheid and enormous changes undergone in the transition to freedom, it was hoped that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), set up in 1995 and overseen by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, would enable a sense of forgiveness to prevail in the reconstruction of the new 'Rainbow Nation', as Tutu christened it. As traumatic as it often was for participants, the TRC was an important process to allow for the atrocities committed under apartheid to be brought into the public domain. While it also, to some extent, assisted the country in coming to terms with the oppressive apartheid regime, the mindset which apartheid had inculcated would take many more years to change. It would take at least one new generation of individuals to be educated side-by-side before there could be substantial progress to a more equitable and egalitarian society.

Mandela's roles as political activist, symbolic figurehead of the liberation movement whilst free and in prison, president, and also as icon of a free South Africa were instrumental in maintaining clarity of purpose in striving for justice and equality for all. The difficult yet miraculously smooth (on many accounts) transition to a free South Africa was to a large extent attributable to Mandela's unwavering perseverance, openness in finding a way forward with his oppressors, and his fairness and generosity as a human being. His death on 5 December 2013 was mourned internationally, and he will be remembered alongside other great leaders such as Mahatma Ghandi as one of the great historical figures of change in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

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Manifest Destiny

▶ United States Imperialism, 19th Century

Manufacturing

▶ Enslaved African Labour: Violent Racial Capitalism

Mao Zedong

▶ Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)

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Synonyms

Chinese history; Imperialism; Mao Zedong; Maoism; Marxism; Socialism

Definition

This essay focuses on three thematic arguments. The first is that in the post-Mao narrative, both in and outside China, the first three decades of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have either disappeared from history or have been largely distorted by the necessity of imperialist and capitalist logic. The second thematic argument is that Mao Zedong contributed greatly to anti-imperialism internationally and made huge efforts to build socialism at home. Finally the third thematic argument is that the Cultural Revolution was Mao Zedong's last effort to combat capitalism.

Introduction

In this essay I will not spend time on a descriptive presentation of Mao's biographical details since that kind of information is easily available on the Internet or in numerous other sources, for instance Snow (2008/1937–44), and Karl (2010). The Chang and Halliday book *Mao the Untold Story* of course has to be mentioned. Anyone who wants to have his or her anti-communist prejudices confirmed or who wants to enjoy ideological fantasies can read this book with relish, like former US president George W. Bush, jnr and the last colonial governor of Hong Kong Chris Patten.

Instead I will focus on three thematic arguments. The first is that in the post-Mao narrative, both in and outside China, the first three decades of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have either disappeared from history or have been largely distorted by the necessity of imperialist and capitalist logic. The second thematic argument is that Mao Zedong contributed greatly to anti-imperialism internationally and made huge efforts to build socialism at home. Finally the third thematic argument is that the Cultural Revolution was Mao Zedong's last effort to combat capitalism.

Why have the First Three Decades of the PRC Disappeared in History?

Post-Mao mainstream media in the West, especially Anglo-American media, and even some

mainstream scholarship, be it at universities or in think tanks, tends to portray contemporary China in terms of the so-called 'open up and reform' in the post-Mao period. They talk about the Chinese 'economic miracle' that was made possible by Deng Xiaoping's statement that 'getting rich is glorious', (a statement that has been repeated thousands of times orally and in print without any citation, and is most likely another little myth regarding China); about the double-digit growth of GDP for more than 20 years; about lifting 100 million people out of absolute poverty in three decades; about how Shenzhen, a fishing village, has turned into a modern cosmopolitan city; how rice paddies on the east side of the Huangpu River, Pudong of Shanghai, were turned into one of the main financial centres in Asia and how China has suddenly become a superpower threatening the world. The distinguished Harvard scholar and one-time US government Intelligence officer Vogel, in his monumental biography of Deng Xiaoping, spends only 30 pages on Deng up to the year 1979. In the section of biographies of key people of the PRC, Mao is not even included. From Vogel's point of view, the transformation of China did not happen until Deng became the paramount leader after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 1978.

According to this convenient historiography, the Mao Zedong period had achieved nothing in bringing China to modernity. If anything, it is the opposite: Mao had delayed China's trajectory to modernity, with his initiation of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) programme that led to starvation and the Cultural Revolution that brought chaos. For some people, Mao is responsible for worse than the delay of China's modernity. They portray him as having been a mass murderer, the worst possible mass murderer in human history. It is such a saleable condemnation that the English historian Frank Dikötter's book *Mao's Great Famine* was reported to have sold 100,000 copies. Many claimed it to be a definitive history of Mao in relation to the GLF, and Professor Dikötter's book won the 2011 Samuel Johnson non-fiction prize. It does not matter that the cover photo of the book of a hungry boy was a photo of the 1942

famine in China. It does not matter that Professor Dikötter not only has great problems with his research methodology, as reviewed by Anthony Garnaut (2013) of Oxford University, but also has deliberately distorted documentary evidence as pointed out by Sun (Sun 孙万国 2013) at the Australian National University.

In fact nothing matters so long as you can find evidence or argument against the Mao era. The 1949 Chinese Revolution has to be denigrated, Mao's anti-capitalist and antiimperialist legacy has to be dumped, and the 30 years of the Mao era have to be wiped from history.

This process of erasing 30 years from PRC history in fact started in China and was initiated by the Chinese themselves. This has mostly to do with the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution the political and intellectual elite were supposed to be the target of a cultural revolution aimed at remoulding their world outlook so as to prevent them from being agents turning China into a capitalist country. The method of this revolution (mobilizing the masses to rebel against their leaders) meant that a lot of the Chinese political and intellectual elite did suffer emotionally and some of them physically, and most of them were temporarily stripped of power. But, only about a month after the death of Mao in 1976, his widow Jiang Qing was arrested together with her closest colleagues in the name of the Gang of Four. Deng Xiaoping and his like were brought back to power.

As a backlash against the Cultural Revolution, the ten years from 1966–76 were denounced by the post-Mao authorities as 'ten years of holocaust' or 'ten years of calamities' (the Chinese term is shi nian haojie''', when 'haojie''' can either rendered as holocaust or disaster). Of course there were many Chinese at that time and even now today, especially among the non-elite sectors of Chinese society, who would not agree with this description.

Deng Xiaoping and his followers achieved their aim of denouncing the 1966–1976 decade by using two strategies. The first was either to execute or jail the followers of Mao, rebels or those who were active during the Cultural Revolution. The victims of this greatest purge in the history of the CCP and PRC, a history that is

hardly recorded, were called san *zhong ren* (three kinds of people). One example of the so-called san *zhong ren* is Lin Qinglin, a school teacher who during the mid-1970s wrote a letter to Mao, complaining about the hard life of the 'educated youth' who were sent down to the countryside. It was Mao's sympathetic response to that letter that led to great improvement of the life of the youth who had left their homes in cities and towns. But because Li was promoted to a leadership position as a result of his letter, he became victim of the post-Mao purge and was put in jail for many years (Gao 1999).

Another example typically illustrates the ups and downs of the political elite and the post-Mao purge. Wu Zhipu, party secretary of Anhui Province, initiated some of the most radical measures during the GLF which led to most of the damage during the famine. He admitted to his role and was held responsible for the large number of deaths in Xinyang County. He was so hated by the people who had suffered under his leadership that during the Cultural Revolution he was captured by the rebels and subsequently died as a result of torture. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping, a good friend of Wu, chaired a make-up memorial service for him in which his pre-GLF reputation was restored. On the other hand, Wu's rival Zhang Qinli was purged and jailed for 13 years after the Cultural Revolution. But Zhang was the very person who had criticised Wu's damaging policies and written a letter to Zhou Enlai about the serious consequences of his policies (Changkong Yihe 长空一鹤 2012) Just as Li Qinglin's letter had drawn attention to the problems of the educated youth policy, Zhang Qinli's intervention drew attention to the GLF problems in Anhui. Both men were promoted despite their criticism of Mao's policies because they had addressed real problems. And yet they were purged by the post-Mao regime in the name of correcting Mao's mistakes.

The other strategy that Deng used was a decree that the debate on the Cultural Revolution should cease altogether and that energy should instead be focused on economic development. This was a convenient as well as useful strategy for reducing dissent on the one hand and meeting the demand of material consumerism on the other. With the two strategies in place, any discussion of the Cultural Revolution has been out of the agenda or even taboo. Consequently, one decade of the PRC has disappeared from history.

The Chinese authorities under Deng Xiaoping wanted to sweep under the carpet two other important events in the history of the PRC: the GLF years of 1958–60 and the so-called three years of famine; and the anti-Rightist movement of 1957. There is no doubt that there was a famine during the period, but there are debates about whether its origin, cause, and effect owed anything to the GLF policies. It is generally accepted that there was a demographic change as a result of the famine. In other words, many people would have lived longer without the famine and many would have been born without the famine. However, in what way and to what extent China's population growth was affected by the Great Leap Forward is hotly debated even today. China's official population census in the early 1980s seems to show that there was a population decline in that period, instead of growth on the basis of normal death and birth rates, in the range of several to tens of millions of people.

But the Chinese official census statistics are based on data collected on household registration. There can be errors and fraud in household registration during that period for two important reasons. First, the data could not be complete because the household registration was in the process of being established at the time. Second, the Great Lead Forward policies involved huge internal migration first from rural to urban areas as industrialisation was expanding and then from urban to rural areas as industrialisation was contacting in the face of shortage of grain and the failure of some foolish policies such as backyard iron and steel manufacturing (Yang 杨松林 2013). During these years, households might fail to de-register when they left during the Great Leap Forward and then register when they moved back to rural areas. Because the population base of China was and is so huge, a tiny percentage of error or miscalculation leads to large differences in absolute numbers. Since members of the post-Mao political elite, such as Deng Xiaoping, were actually involved in the GLF and therefore any

evidence-based analysis would have implicated them, it was thought better to keep these years out of sight as well. In addition to the matter of famine estimates during the Great Leap Forward being based on dubious demographic data, it is important to note that they are crudely extrapolated from birth rates and mortality rates established in the decade before, these having improved massively from the pre-PRC era (Patnaik 2002). Moreover, even assuming the worst, the increase in mortality during the GLF was still no worse than that in many countries, including India's, during the same period. Even accepting the very dubious figure of 15–30 million excess deaths during the GLF, it must be admitted that the dramatic and unprecedented decline in infant mortality and rise in life expectancy achieved in the Mao era saved many more Chinese lives.

As for the anti-Rightist movement in 1957, though the CCP government represented by Deng Xiaoping acknowledged the wrongness and 'mistakes' of the movement and therefore rehabilitated almost all of those who were labelled the Rightists, scores of very well-known intellectuals were made to keep the label even so. This seemingly contradictory resolution has been maintained precisely because of the role that Deng Xiaoping played in the movement. Deng was the general secretary of the CCP and ran not only the day-today activities of the CCP at that time but also was responsible for putting abstract ideas and paper policies into practice. In other words, to condemn both the GLF and the Anti-Rightists movement fully and completely would have involved condemning of not just other leaders like Liu Shaoqi but also Deng Xiaoping himself. It was therefore convenient for the post-Mao power holders that these years should not be talked about either.

Furthermore, to justify the capitalist direction that has been taken since the death of Mao, the very revolutionary discourse of socialism and anti-imperialism had to be submerged if not abandoned altogether. On the one hand, the policies undertaken by the post-Mao government have been moved more and more to the opposite of the 1949 Revolution. On the other hand, the very

legitimacy of the CCP's rule rests on the 1949 Revolution. So symbolically, the portrait of Mao still hangs on the wall of the Tiananmen Rostrum, but almost nothing positive has been said officially about the Mao era since his death, while condemnation of him has been allowed here and there either in utterances by some members of the political and intellectual elite (e.g. the publication of *Yanhuang Chunqiu*), or outside of mainland China, as in Hong Kong. So basically the three decades of the Mao era have disappeared from the mainstream history of the PRC, except for condemnation.

Mao Zedong's Contribution to Anti-imperialism and Socialism

Mao's contribution to anti-imperialism and socialism has to be examined in the big picture of world capitalism dominated by the Anglo-sphere powers. Mao's contribution can be characterised domestically and internationally. Domestically, he tried to build a socialist system, with various degrees of success and failure. Internationally, Mao called for a united front to resist the force of US imperialism. In this section of the essay, I will start with Mao's efforts at building socialism in China and then I will follow by studying his international exertions. With regard to the latter, I will briefly discuss the issue of the Sino-Soviet relationship and the split between the CCP and Soviet leadership.

Socialism in the Mao Era

There have been disagreements and debates among scholars and thinkers of a left-wing persuasion about whether China in the Mao era was socialist. It has been argued that China in the Mao era was at best stood halfway between capitalism and socialism and, at worst, amounted to state capitalism. There are socio-economic and even political features in the Mao era that can be justifiably described as capitalist, such as exploitation of the rural sector to accumulate capital for industrialisation, the rigid household registration

system (*hukou*) that virtually held the rural population down as second-class citizens or even non-citizens, the eight scales of the wage system, and the privileges such as the provision of drivers, bodyguards, cooks and domestic servants enjoyed by high-ranking party officials and army officers.

However, there are two important points that are relevant to this line of reasoning. The first is whether any state, however socialist it wants to be, can afford not to industrialise. Given the fact that the PRC was born during the Cold War, with not only the West's economic and technological sanctions against it but also with real hot wars (the Korean War and the Vietnam War) threatening its very existence. Furthermore, it may be argued that, given the fact that China was in ruins after eight years of fighting brutal Japanese aggression and occupation and three years of civil war involving millions of troops, what could the PRC do but industrialise rapidly in a hostile environment? Surely, it had no choice but to exploit the rural sector as a way to accumulate capital for industrialisation? This strategy of survival was successful: by the late 1970s, China stood up as a nuclear power, a country that had satellite technology and had become the sixth largest industrial power in the world whereas in 1949, when the PRC was established, China's industrial capacity had only been that of little Belgium (Meisner 1999).

The second point is about the nature of the state in the Mao era: the means of production were all publicly or collectively owned. There were no individual capitalists. The arrogant party officials or army officers might have behaved like masters within their own organisations, but they could never claim to be owners of any means of production. Even at the height of collectivisation (i.e., in the rural commune system established after the GLF), land had been collectively owned by all the villagers of any particular village. People were constantly reminded of the possibility that there might be 'masters' in Mao's mass campaigns, and the Cultural Revolution, as will be discussed later in this essay, was Mao's last but most brutal reassertion that leaders should be the servants of the people.

Despite some capitalist features existing in the Mao era, there were many features that could only be characterised as socialist: the striving for gender equality; eight-hour working days; almost full employment; widespread availability of free housing; free education; free medical care for all urban people; retirement pension for the working class; and some subsidies for the widowed, old and childless rural residents.

It was during the Mao era that the average Chinese life expectancy rose from 38 in 1949 to 68 in the 1970s. The literacy rate increased so dramatically that it prepared millions and millions of skilled workers in the post-Mao period for economic expansion. Despite all the false and misleading claims to the contrary, China's GNP grew at an average annual rate of 6.2% between 1952 and 1978. Indeed, as Lin (2006) points out, the industrial sector outperformed most other developing economies. Although rural development was seriously impeded by the industrialisation strategy that was biased in favour of the urban sector, the quality of life by the 1970s had improved and was on the edge of being transformed throughout county towns and villages. Though China was decades behind the economically developed world, it was already 'on a par with middle-income countries' in human and social development (Bramall 1993: 335). Measured by social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and educational attainment, China (especially urban China) in the Mao era had already forged way ahead of most market economies at similar income levels and surpassed a number of countries with per capita incomes many times greater.

Throughout China's long history of civilisation, the Chinese have been plagued by hunger and starvation. As witnessed by foreign correspondents, missionaries, and travellers, China before the establishment of the PRC was constantly devastated by natural disasters and starvation on a large scale, some of which claimed millions of lives at one go. The GLF period of failure from 1959–61 could be considered the blackest spot in the history of the PRC, but this famine was the first one, the last and the only one in the whole history of the Mao era and of the

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PRC. This is not a result of luck or accident, but of decades' hard work to buid a solid infrastructure of irrigation and management of rivers and lakes. It has entailed the mobilisation of massive manpower as part of Mao's campaign.

As I have personally witnessed in the village of Gao, life in rural China during the Mao era was poor and spartan. Even in the urban sector, life was very basic and most of the daily necessities such as oil, even soap, were rationed. Life here was not affluent but adequate and decent. Life in the rural sector was poor and hard but stable and improving. Some, especially those who are anti-communist, or anti-Mao, tend to take phenomenal features as evidence of linear causes and effects. This is not necessarily logical. They would compare the phenomenon of poverty in rural China and the rationed material scarcity in urban China in the Mao era with the material abundance in the post-Mao era to make the linear cause-and-effect argument that socialism failed because it is anti-human nature whereas capitalism succeeds because it motivates people to work hard. However, this kind of economic rationalist argument sounds logical only on paper. If one gets down to empirical data it does not accord with reality. As a case study of empirical work in the village of Gao shows, its inhabitants in the Mao era did work hard. On a national scale, China's GNP grew at more than 6%. The logical argument is that there is no economic miracle, and any rational economist should know there is no miracle in economic development in human history. The logic is that the hard work in the Mao era paved the way and laid a sound foundation for later take-off.

Let me take grain output as an example. Clearly, grain output in the Mao era was not as high as in the post-Mao era, and clearly most Chinese were hungry then but they are not hungry now. We know the staple grain in the Chinese diet is rice. There are two important factors that boost rice output. One is improved seeding and the other is chemicals for fertilising and for insecticide. We know the hybrid seeding developed by scientists like Yuan Longping has made a great difference in rice output. But very few bother to point out that the development of hybrid seeding takes many years to achieve and scientists like Yuan Longping started working on this kind of project in the Mao era and their results were implemented only during the post-Mao era. Likewise, it took some years for China to accumulate enough capital and technology to build up chemical factories to produce enough fertilisers; that stage of development again corresponds to the transition from the Mao era to the post-Mao era. When I was in the village of Gao in the 1960s and early 1970s, there was very little chemical fertiliser available and we had to use organic material such as pig manure. This kind of manure was good for the land but of slow and very limited quantity output. Nowadays, Gao villagers just spread large quantities of chemical fertiliser onto the land. The consequent output is high but the effect is hugely damaging to the environment, an issue yet to be addressed.

International Anti-imperialism

Mao made a great contribution to anti-imperialism, and China under his leadership supported weak and oppressed nations across the globe. For this very reason, Mao was accused of being a warmonger and communist threat to the world. This can be examined in a number of cases below.

Korean War

US imperialists and Western Cold Warriors justified their fighting in Korea on two grounds. The first was that the North Korean communists had fired the first shot and invaded South Korea. The second pointed to their moral high ground in needing to stop the domino effect of the communist threat. As the end of the Vietnam War has shown, there was no such domino effect. The so-called communists in both Korea and Vietnam were nationalists, and their primary goals were to get rid of Western colonialism, gain national independence, and possess their own sovereignty. Their struggle for independence was entirely legitimate and justified. The same goes for the point concerning North Korea's invasion. Both

sides wanted to overcome the other to unify Korea. It was none of the business of the Western powers if and when the Koreans wanted to fight for their own destiny, and it was their internal affair to choose to fight for any political system they wanted. As we know, the US imperialists and their allies not only beat back the North Koreans but also attempted to overtake North Korea and threaten the very existence of the new PRC that had been established barely a year before. It is not surprising that Chinese wanted to stop them, and China under Mao did so.

Vietnam War

The same was the case with the Vietnam War. In fact if there had been an election held in Vietnam at that time it would have been highly likely that the Communists, headed by Ho Chi-min, would have won the whole country. But imperialists would never allow that to happen. Not only did they want to stop a Vietcong victory, they also wanted to overrun North Vietnam. China under Mao gave US imperialism a timely warning: if the war extended to North Vietnam, China would intervene. On 24 June 1964, Mao declared that if the US invaded North Vietnam China would send volunteers to participate in the Vietnam War, just as China had done in the Korean War. Mindful of history, this time the US militaryindustrial complex listened.

However, the US imperialists could not stay clear altogether, and they started to bomb North Vietnam. It was in response to these circumstances that China began sending troops to support the North Vietnamese defending their own country. From June 1965 to August 1973, China despatched more than 300,000 air-defence personnel and road-construction workers to North Vietnam to help in the struggle. At the height of the war in 1967, there were 170,000 Chinese troops in Vietnam. Furthermore, China maintained a supply-chain of food, weapons and daily necessities to the North Vietnamese, some originating in the Soviet Union, some in China itself. Attempting to stop this supply chain, the US imperialists even started bombing countries such as Laos and Cambodia, aggression that had unfortunate consequences in the latter.

Supporting the People of Africa and Asia

China under Mao also supported other African and Asian countries in their struggles against Western colonialism and efforts to achieve national independence. For example, on 20 May 1970, China published Mao's declaration 'People of the World, Unite to Defeat the US Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!' (全世界人民团结起来, 打败美国侵 略者及其一切走狗!) to support the antiimperialist struggles of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In 1956, China declared its support for Egypt in reclaiming its rights over the Suez Canal. China also supported Algeria's struggle for independence, for example by supplying weapons and material goods. China supported Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia in their struggles against colonialism and imperialism by providing training courses and materials and supplying weapons.. According to the Organisation of African Unity, from 1971–72, some 75% of weapons supplied from outside Africa originated in China and most of them were supplied free of charge. On the 12 January 1964, Mao declared his support for the people of Panama people in their claim over the Panama Canal (中国人民坚决支持　　巴拿马人民的爱国正义斗争).

As an example of its support of weak and oppressed countries, consider China's use of the best technology and construction materials then available to help build the Tan-Zan Railway, a 1,860 km line from Tanzania to Zambia costing $500 m. According to a Chinese source on the Internet, China offered interest-free loans of nearly CN¥1b and sent more than 55,000 workers and technological personnel, 66 of whom lost their lives in the construction project (坦赞 铁路 http://baike.baidu.com/view/75336.htm233, accessed on the 4th January 2014). This was carried out at a time when China urgently needed capital and technology for its own construction.

In October 1954, China hosted a visit of the India premier Nehru, and in April 1955, China and Indonesia signed a contract on the issue of dual nationality, so that the ethnic Chinese who had Indonesian nationality automatically lost their Chinese nationality (中华人民共和 国和印度尼

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西亚共和关于双重国籍问题的条约). From 1963–64, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and foreign minister Chen Yi visited 14 Asian and African counties including Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Albania. Finally, but more importantly, Mao developed the idea of three worlds and held that Asia (except Japan) and all the African and Latin American countries were Third-World countries. China was on their side.

Mao Zedong's Last Efforts in Combating Capitalism

According to the current official historiography, if anything proves to be wrong or bad in the history of the PRC, Mao should be held responsible; and if anything proves to have been useful and good, it must have been done by those who did not follow Mao or who acted against him.

However, it should be possible, at least for some notable policy developments in the history of the PRC, to envisage events the other way around. According to this alternative narrative, Mao was the person who actually wanted to be moderate but those under him went further than what he wished. There is certainly evidence that Mao wanted the CCP to be criticised in 1957 and therefore launched what was called the 'Two Hundreds' (let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thoughts contend). It was his colleagues in the CCP who resisted Mao's ideas first and then wanted a harsh crackdown as soon as possible when the very existence of the Party was under threat. There is also evidence that Mao was one of the first who saw the problems caused by radicalism during the GLF. For instance, Bo Yibo was the one who made a report to Mao that China could catch up with the UK in steel production in two years. Liu Shaoqi was the one who encouraged communal canteens for he thought that would liberate women from kitchens and so be one way to eliminate gender difference. Zhou Enlai was the one who invented the term 'Great Leap'; Chen Yi and Tao Zhu were the ones who believed and advocated unrealistic agricultural output. If one reads Mao's rambling talk in the 1958 Wuchang and Nanning Conferences and the 1959 Shanghai Conference, one can see that he was the person who wanted to slow down.

We have to realise that the choice of what has been allowed to be published (e.g. Mao's speeches, and speeches by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in their so-called collected works) has been very political. One might notice that in their selected works the speeches of Deng and Liu during the GLF years are not included. The politics is obvious: putting aside personal vengeance (as Vogel (2011) records, Deng Xiaoping was very passionately bitter about the Cultural Revolution because one of his sons was crippled during the movement), to justify a dramatic change of politics, the post-Mao leadership had to declare that it had been correct all the time and that it was Mao who was to blame for the past problems. For the Western audience, it is satisfying to nail down a villain: Mao the monster of evil communism.

By pointing out these issues, I am not suggesting that Mao was not responsible for bad outcomes. All I am trying to say is that he was not a god and therefore could not have been involved in all (bad or good) that had happened under his leadership. It was humanly and organisationally impossible for him to have been involved in all the policy making let alone policy implementation in such a large and war-torn country facing so many daunting tasks of reconstruction in the 1950s. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that many of the initial policies and their implementation were the responsibility of Mao's colleagues, and may even have been undertaken without his knowledge (Li Yi 李 毅 2005) thinks that Mao would probably not have known the exact details of Gaokao (the tertiary education entrance examination) that was introduced in 1955. According to Li Yi, once the system was established, it favoured educated families and disadvantaged poor ones. For instance in 1957, 80% of the enrolled university students were from landlord, rich peasant and capitalist family backgrounds. Mao of course was not happy with this, but did not have the chance to address this until the Cultural Revolution when the university operation stopped altogether. He then started an experiment of recruiting students from among the workers, peasants and soldiers directly via mass recommendation. According to

Li, the hierarchical scale of salary and the household registration that classified Chinese into virtually two different countries were also policies designed by Liu and his colleagues, which Mao was not very happy about. The Cultural Revolution's radical policies of abolishing army ranks and sending urban youth up into the mountains and down to the countryside were a reflection of Mao's ideology, one that was very different to that of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

Mao was very aware that China could easily be swept along with the dominant capitalist system in the world. I would argue that the Cultural Revolution was his last, bold, and desperate attempt to steer China towards what he perceived to be socialism and to prevent the country from moving into the trajectory of capitalism. Mao is reported to have declared that he had only achieved two things in his life: to have driven Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the leader of the Chinese Nationalist government, to the island of Taiwan; and to have launched the Cultural Revolution. It is therefore fascinating to read in Vogel's account of how Mao in his dying days urged Deng Xiaoping to acknowledge in writing (or before colleagues) that he supported the Cultural Revolution, even if not totally then at least 70% of it. According to Vogel (2011), Deng was very resistant on this although in writing he did pledge to Mao that he would never reverse the verdict of the Cultural Revolution. But history proves that Deng did reverse the verdict, as Mao said with a sigh of despair, referring to Deng Xiaoping: 'capitalist roader is still walking along the capitalist road. [He] says never reverse the verdict! Not reliable'. Deng did restore capitalism in China, and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' steered by him was more blatantly capitalist than systems in many developed capitalist countries.

The Cultural Revolution has been constantly narrated as Mao's personal power struggle against his designated successor Liu Shaoqi, even though all the documentary evidence suggests otherwise. Mao's authority in the CCP and PRC was and could never be challenged by anyone after the establishment of the PRC. Mao knew it and everyone else knew it. He could easily have got rid of Liu without mobilising a mass movement like the

Cultural Revolution that was supposed to have lasted ten years from 1966–76. In fact, as early as August 1966 during the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress held in Beijing, Liu had already been demoted from the number-two position in the party ranking to number eight. All Mao had to do to achieve this was write a few lines on a piece of scrap paper called the 'big poster'. Many years later, Liu's widow, the intelligent Wang Guangmei, who also suffered terribly during the Cultural Revolution, admitted that Mao and Liu had policy differences and that Mao had not initially intended to get rid of Liu politically. Liu's political and even personal fate went downhill only after Mao was presented with 'solid evidence' that Liu was once a traitor during his days as an underground communist activist. How this could have happened is still a top secret in China, possibly because it at least partly involved the still beloved premier Zhou Enlai.

Why did Mao launch the Cultural Revolution then? For Mao it was to decide China's road ahead: to guarantee that China moved towards socialism rather than slipped into capitalism. In 1965, barely a year before the Cultural Revolution, Mao made a trip to Jinggangshan, where he had first started a base for guerrilla warfare, then continued to the establishment revolutionary base area in Jiangxi, where eventually most of the top CCP leaders gathered before the now famous Long March. Mao's symbolic visit to Jinggangshan was apparently to contemplate another new starting point for China. In some rare occasions during the visit there, Mao talked to those around him about why he did not like idea of contracting land to households, and why he thought collectivisation was crucial to Chinese socialism (Ma Shexiang 马社香 2006). This was a point about which Mao disagreed with Liu Shaoqi. It is worth pointing out that dismantling the commune system in rural China was the starting point at which the post-Mao leadership launched its so-called reform.

Mao knew such a task was difficult because it required the remoulding of mentality and world outlook. That was why the revolution for the elite to go through was called 'the *Cultural* Revolution'. In May 1966, when the launch of the Cultural Revolution was in full swing, Mao

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called the inner-circle thinkers of the party (figures such as Chen Boda, Qi Benyu and also Lin Biao's hand-picked general Yang Chengwu) to Shanghai to listen to what he thought was a concrete way to change people's minds lifestyles. This was later called the 7 May Directive, after a letter written by Mao on that date praising a People's Liberation Army report which talked about how the soldiers were participating in not only military training but also cultural studies and agricultural production. The directive basically says that one should not work to live, to earn money, but one should live to work. Although division of labour cannot be abolished, a worker should do some farm work and a farmer should do some industrial work, a soldier should engage in production as well as military training. A student should do all kinds of physical labour as well social activities. Party official should sometimes live with those they lead, engage in production work with them and so on (Qi Benyu 戚本禹 2013).

Mao's idea of the Cultural Revolution as written into the Sixteen Articles document that launched the movement was for a three- stage movement: struggle; criticism; reform (*dou pi gai*). All Chinese should engage in struggling against established ideas and habits, especially these who are in leading or authoritative positions. After that, all Chinese should engage in criticism of others and of themselves. Finally, all the institutions should be reformed according to new ideas and consensus reached out of the struggle and criticism stages. As it happened, the Cultural Revolution did not develop the way Mao had envisaged.

Conclusion

Mao was and remains a controversial figure. For a long time after his death, the Chinese authorities, while not allowing a straightforward denunciation of Mao like Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, have encouraged or at least allowed implicit or explicit criticisms of him in many concrete areas of policy, like the Cultural Revolution. Thus, condemnation and damming of Mao, some elements of which are obviously false and fraudulent, by prominent economist Mao Yushi (not personally

related to Mao), school teacher Yuan Tengfei, party historian Xin Zilin and former journalist Yang Jisheng, have been allowed. On the other hand, any positive assessment of Mao, especially concerning the Cultural Revolution, has not been allowed. Especially poignant is that grass-roots activities to commemorate or celebrate Mao are very often banned or harassed. Websites that celebrate Mao and his ideas, *like wuyou zhixiang* (the Utopia), have been shut down several times.

This in a sense is understandable. Mao's theory of class struggle, which was used skilfully by the party power holders at various levels against the classic class enemies, when applied to themselves as a new class of enemies who wanted to turn China into a capitalist country, really caused much consternation. Not to utterly condemn Mao, ideologically and personally, was already a huge concession on the part the Chinese political and intellectual elite of that generation. For the broad sectors of the masses, however, it is a totally different story. According to a recent survey carried out in December 2013, 1,045 people above the age of 18 from Beijing, Shanghai Guangzhou, Chengdu, Xi'an, Changsha and Shenyang were asked whether they would agree that Mao had more merits than demerits. Some 78.3% agreed and 6.8% strongly agreed (*Global Times* 环球时报 2013). Some may doubt the validity of such a survey since it was carried out by the official Chinese media *Global Times*. But my research (Gao 2008) has convinced me that this percentage does indeed reflect the reality in China today. Another response, which is as predictable as the sun rising tomorrow, is that the Chinese have been brainwashed and they have not been told the truth. This kind of patronising response not only betrays the Cold War mentality with very little understanding of what China is like now, but also an astonishing arrogance; as if nobody else holds the key to the truth, as if the broad masses of the Chinese are so unthinking that they can be easily manipulated by a god-like hand. In fact the survey also asked what they thought Mao's biggest mistakes had been. The majority answer to that question was the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. This shows that a positive evaluation of Mao was not based on blind and ignorant worship of a great leader but balanced by the

knowledge of what Mao was perceived to have done wrong.

There are signs that even the official Chinese evaluation of Mao by the present generation of leaders is going to be different from that of Deng's generation. Xi Jinping, chairman of the CCP and president of the PRC, recently made it clear that both the Mao era and the post-Mao period are an integral part of the history of the CCP and the PRC. One should not use the second 30 years to denigrate the first 30 years or versa versus. There are achievements and failures in both periods, Xin states. With this kind of less political attitude, let us hope a more relaxed and balanced evaluation of Mao is in the process of developing.

Cross-References

► China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
► China's National Question Since 1949
► Semi-colonialism in China

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Maoism

► Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism
► Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)
► Maoism, Nationalism, and Anti-colonialism
► Nepal, Imperialism and Anti-imperialism
► Sendero Luminoso
► Turkish Left and Anti-imperialism in the 1970s

Maoism, Nationalism, and Anti-colonialism

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Bandung conference; Colonialism; Maoism; Nationalism; Proletarian internationalism; Three worlds theory

Definition

This essay explores the interrelation between nationalism, anti-colonialism, and Maoism. Its aim is not to elaborate on the relation between anti-colonialism and nationalism in general, but to focus on the period in which the two concepts interacted with the communist movement, and specifically with Chinese communism, or Maoism. We focus here on the period beginning with the revolutionary taking of state power by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 and ending with the death of Mao Zedong in the mid-1970s, which led to an overall shift in Chinese politics. The essay examines the connection between nationalism and anti-colonialism in relation to the evolving Chinese foreign policy of the period.

Introduction

The national liberation and anti-colonial struggles of the post-Second World War period are often represented as if they were a unified global movement carried out under the banner of decolonisation. Despite a common primary aim (i.e. that of decolonisation), reality proves that there were diverse of political and ideological viewpoints and principles within these struggles and movements.

The subject of this essay is the interrelation between nationalism, anti-colonialism, and Maoism. Its aim is not to elaborate on the relation between anti-colonialism and nationalism in general, but to focus on the period in which the two concepts interacted with the communist movement, and specifically with Chinese communism, or Maoism. We are interested in the period beginning with the revolutionary taking of state power in 1949 and ending with the death of Mao Zedong in the mid-1970s, which led to an overall shift in Chinese politics. Before we examine the period under consideration, we must first clarify what we mean by the term 'Maoism'.

Clarifying Terminology: Maoism, Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism

Despite the fact that 'Maoism' has been a widely used term since the 1960s, it is neither well defined nor used in a single context. 'Maoism' was equally used to refer to the ideology of China and to designate that of supporters of Mao in the rest of the world from the mid-1960s onwards. It also came to be used by an ideological trend that emerged during the 1960s which upheld the ideological and political views of Mao and Chinese politics in general, yet at the same time rejected Stalin's views and rule of the Soviet Union.

In terms of terminology, groups that did not follow the "Marxist-Leninist" tradition that saw a continuity between the pro-1956 USSR and Mao's China, and thus, preferred the term Maoism instead of Marxism-Leninism or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. Such groups could be found in France, where they constituted of a particular ideological and political trend, that of Mao Spontex. (See: Lévy 1971).

In terms of ideology, Maoism has at its core the centrality of the peasants in a revolution in countries that it characterised as semi-colonial and semi-feudal—a characterisation that can easily be made to apply to the so-called Third World countries as a whole. Maoism also claimed that the path to seizing power passed through the creation of rural base areas that would eventually lead to encircling the cities in the course of a protracted people's war. This was a theoretical framework to which anticolonialists in the Third World could relate and for whom it served as a source of inspiration.

Apart from Mao's own views on anti-colonialism and nationalism, as well as their impact on anti-colonial struggles, a very important – if not the most significant – aspect of the question under consideration concerns Chinese foreign policy, regardless of whether it was dictated by Mao and his principles or not. Although 'Maoism' can be captured by a single definition, 'Maoist' China functioned at three distinct levels:

- An ideological and political framework related to anti-colonialism, as has been documented in the works of Mao and other Chinese communists
- The relation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and parties, organisations, and groups that conducted, or were part of, anti-colonial struggles
- The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) towards anti-colonialism and newly founded states.

Thus, we must examine the relationship between nationalism and anti-colonialism in their relation to Chinese foreign policy rather than in their relation to the Maoist ideology – in any of its definitions – per se. In addition to the vagueness of the definition of 'Maoism', the complexity of anti-colonialism and the decolonisation struggle in general makes it possible to describe the relationship between the three terms as if they might be grasped in linear fashion. Anti-colonialist forces, and therefore the decolonisation process, ranged from those who dreamed of a new socialist or communist homeland to those who would settle for the declaration of independence of their country.

That being said, nationalism and – to a greater extent, anti-colonialism—are terms that have also been subjected to multiple interpretations. Michel Caher (2012) elaborates on the issue of nationalism in relation to Marxism, colonisation, nations, states, and nation states. According to Caher, it would be rather difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to interpret the transformation process of decolonisation in a univocal manner, and by the same token anti-colonialism in terms of the path taken in order to fulfil the goal of decolonisation, nationalism in terms of the ideology of (part) of the anti-colonial forces, and Maoism as a concrete policy towards the former two issues.

Nationalism relates to anti-colonialism on two different levels. The first is the function of nationalism in relation to anti-colonial struggles as such, and the second is the relation between nationalism and communism within an anti-colonial struggle, front, or alliance. Both levels have ideological and political projections, but to view these issues in such a manner alone would be incomplete, since anti-colonialism is not merely a scholarly issue but a political orientation that is based in a material and practical situation. On the other hand, trying to analyse these matters by viewing the facts isolated by ideological doctrines and their respective political lines can easily lead one to draw hasty conclusions. Despite the fact that proletariat internationalism had been a fundamental task for every or any communist party, defending the PRC and its rights was also a basic commitment of the CPC, and maintaining an equilibrium between defending the state and upholding internationalism has not always been possible, despite the best efforts of the CPC.

The Three Phases of the Chinese Foreign Policy throughout the Maoist Era

Assisting (mainly South-East Asian) national liberation and anti-colonial movements during the 1960s in fact served both tasks, by ensuring that the US would not be anywhere near China's backyard and by fulfilling the commitment of the PRC and CPC to proletarian internationalism (Karl 2010: 113–115). As with any political formation, the CPC was not uniform, and serious opposition was raised against various political decisions or positions it took (Pillsbury 1975: 2). Such opposition was reflected in international relations and foreign policies. But prior to the 1960s, it is necessary to refer to a very important incident in the history of Chinese foreign policy, as well as a milestone of the decolonisation process: the Bandung Conference that took place in Indonesia in April 1955. The particularity of Bandung included the fact that it was a meeting of nation states representing different ideological and political positions (Herrera 2005: 546); that some of China's counterparts in the conference were countries with strong communist movements – such as India and Indonesia; and that it was the first time that both *non-alignment* and the *Third World* were

so central in the agenda of a significant number of countries. The Bandung Conference approach to China's international relations was gradually reinstated in the 1970s and especially after Mao Zedong's death in 1976.

The Bandung Conference

The Bandung Conference was where nationalism, anti-colonialism and Maoism intersected. The conference mainly served the interests of the Chinese state in ensuring that the surrounding states would be neutral in case of a possible intensification of the relations between China and the US. This would be achieved by declarations of non-alignment by these states in any possible theatre of war between the Great Powers (Betts 2004: 44). Even if this was a tactical alignment of the PRC in order to secure its borders, it had a major impact on the various communist parties of the region regarding their attitude towards nationalist forces in their countries. Headed by Premier Zhou Enlai, the Chinese delegation attended the Bandung Conference not as 'a communist nation but as a third world country' (Karl 2010: 89). Townsend (1980: 328–329) also refers to the foreign policy of PRC during that period as Zhou Enlai's 'peaceful coexistence' policy that was at the core of this conference's decisions, and according to Townsend a foreign affairs policy during the mid-1950s. Eight years later, in the Sino-Soviet exchange of letters that made the split of the Communist camp official, one may read the position of the Chinese on this very issue and especially in relation to those countries they refer to as nationalist ones:

> We differentiate between the nationalist countries which have newly attained political independence and the imperialist countries.
>
> Although fundamentally different from the socialist countries in their social and political systems, the nationalist countries stand in profound contradiction to imperialism. They have common interests with the socialist countries – opposition to imperialism, the safeguarding of national independence and the defence of world peace. Therefore, it is quite possible and feasible for the socialist countries to establish relations of peaceful coexistence and friendly co-operation with these countries. The

establishment of such relations is of great significance for the strengthening of the unity of the anti-imperialist forces and for the advancement of the common struggle of the peoples against imperialism. (Communist Party of China 1965a: 273)

This can be interpreted as a change of direction in Chinese foreign policy, away from a focus on the USSR and the Eastern bloc (Jian 2008a: 132; Townsend 1980: 328) and towards what was called 'The Third World'. According to Mao (1974) 'We are the Third World. ... All Asian countries, except Japan, belong to the Third World. All of Africa and also Latin America belong to the Third World.' Until then, China's attitude towards countries of the so-called Third World under nationalist rule was a combination of 'harsh criticism with tactics and actions designed to neutralize them in the Cold War confrontation' (Jian 2008b: 207). Thus it can be argued that after the first 5 years of the establishment of the PRC, the international affairs policy shifted from criticising 'non-Western, nationalist countries' (Jian 2008b: 207) to embracing them. Jian (2008b: 208–209) argues that Bandung – as well as the Geneva talks that took place 1 year earlier, in 1954, in order to resolve the issues concerning Korea, Vietnam, and Indochina in general, with the PRC represented by Zhou Enlai – should not be seen as change of course in Chinese foreign relations. For Jian, Bandung and Geneva should be viewed as part of the same revolutionary foreign policy that had been adopted since the very beginning of the PRC. Although Jian provides some very interesting arguments, there are a few indications that the PRC's foreign policy did not follow a single revolutionary policy, but that there were deviations from Mao's own views on foreign policy. Teiwes and Sun (2007: 85) also argue that there were no substantive divisions, at least for the period 1972–76, but throughout their work are several references to conflicts and disputes regarding foreign policies or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even during the period 1972–76, where the authors see no major differentiations regarding foreign policy between the two major actors; that is, Mao and Zhou Enlai (2007: 30, 54–64, 85–93, 114–115, 124–146, 158–164, 427–434, 515–521).

The essence of the Bandung Conference was nothing more than the 'Five principles of peaceful cooperation': 'mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in other country's internal affairs, equal and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence' (Jian 2008b). But can we assume that this five-point agreement is in reality an agreement of noninterference in countries, some of which had strong communist movements, an agreement that would benefit the nationalist blocs that ruled them? Just 2 years before, China had intervened in Korea and was aligned with the Korean communists. Can this be viewed as a continuum?

It is true that, as Jian notes (2008b: 209–211), Chinese communists gave attention to the national aspect in revolution. But Maoism, here understood in terms of the doctrine formulated by the works of Mao, clearly stated that communists must act in an independent manner within a national front, take initiatives, and also work outside the front (Zedong 1967/1938: 213–217). In the aftermath of the Bandung Conference, the strategy and tactics of communists became both diverse and vague. In retrospect – and judging by the turnout in Indonesia alone – the results for China in terms of their task of promoting the revolution were unsuccessful, if not devastating. Zhou Enlai himself was forced to undertake self-criticism in 1957 regarding his work in the foreign affairs of PRC. More specifically:

> Zhou devoted a large portion of his selfcriticism to his 'conservative and rightist tendency' in handling the PRC's foreign relations. He admitted that the Foreign Ministry's work under his direction had neglected the necessary struggle in dealing with nationalist countries, had maintained a kind of wishful thinking concerning imperialism (especially toward Japan and the United States), and had failed to conduct necessary criticism of the revisionist policies of other socialist countries. He particularly mentioned that while it was reasonable to learn from the experience of the Soviet Union, it was a mistake to copy it completely. (Jian 2001: 73)

The case of Indonesian communists was a striking example of this situation. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) left the initiative to President Sukarno. This was admitted in a document that was published after the Suharto coup took place in 1965 – when the PKI was destroyed and the vast majority of its members and sympathisers were slaughtered – that re-evaluated the politics of PKI during the period preceding the coup (PKI 1968: 25–56). Despite the fact that the outcome of the Bandung Conference is referenced as having had a causal effect on the PKI's politics, it is not so difficult to relate the two. The 6th Congress of the PKI, which took place in 1959, was addressed by Sukarno, who praised the party for its cooperation in the struggle for national unity. One year later, the PKI prioritised national struggle over class struggle (Mortimer 2006: 84–85). But can the subordination of a communist party to nationalist forces be regarded as a Maoist strategy? If we understand by 'Maoism' the doctrine based on the writings of Mao Zedong, the answer would be negative. However, if we understand by 'Maoism' the policies promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the PRC, including those that came out of the Bandung Conference, the answer would be positive.

A very interesting comment on the nature of PKI, which to some extent can be generalised to refer to other parties as well, has been made by G.P. Deshpande (2010: 474). According to Deshpande, the PKI had been a pro-Chinese party without for all that being Maoist, in terms of sharing the same ideological and political views; and this regardless of the PKI's strategy and how it related itself to the policies of the PRC. This valid assessment on the PKI's identity can be generalised. The history of the Maoist movement shows that the case of the PKI was very common, in terms of both parties and organisations that were aligned with the CPC during the Sino-Soviet split, and those that were created due to the split and adopted the CPC's positions.

The Sino-Soviet Split and the Abandonment of the Bandung Conference Line

During the Sino-Soviet split in the mid-1960s, the CPC redirected their international policy towards supporting revolutionary movements and parties, making a distinction between progressive and

reactionary nationalism and reaffirming the pre-condition of communist leadership within a national front. The CPC criticised the Soviet Union for aligning itself with reactionary nationalists such as Nehru (RCPC 1978: 21) who, along with Zhou Enlai, was one of the two keynote speakers of the Bandung Conference.

In 1963, the Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) and *Hongqi* (Red Flag) published the 'Fourth comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU' that was entitled 'Apologists of Neo-colonialism' and, later on, was published in 1965 as part of the collection *Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement,* by Peking Foreign Languages Press. This document, although seemingly nothing more than a criticism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's political views, was in reality a political manifesto of the CPC. In this document, the CPC explicitly stated that although it did not oppose 'peaceful coexistence', this could not replace revolution (Communist Party of China 1965b: 194). Furthermore, while Bandung unified former colonies through the notion of the 'Third World,' the CPC introduced the new term 'neo-colonialism' to its vocabulary:

> Consider, first, the situation in Asia and Africa. There a whole group of countries have declared their independence. But many of these countries have not completely shaken off imperialist and colonial control and enslavement and remain objects of imperialist plunder and aggression as well as arenas of contention between the old and new colonialists. In some, the old colonialists have changed into neo-colonialists and retain their colonial rule through their trained agents. In others, the wolf has left by the front door, but the tiger has entered through the back door, the old colonialism being replaced by the new, more powerful and more dangerous U.S. colonialism. The peoples of Asia and Africa are seriously menaced by the tentacles of neo-colonialism, represented by U.S. Imperialism. (Communist Party of China 1965b: 189)

In addition, the CPC's position on dealing with neo-colonialism is quite clear:

> The national liberation movement has entered a new stage. . . . In the new stage, the level of political consciousness of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples has risen higher than ever and the revolutionary movement is surging forward with unprecedented intensity. They urgently demand the thorough elimination of the forces of imperialism and its lackeys in their own countries and strive for complete political and economic independence. The primary and most urgent task facing these countries is still the further development of the struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and their lackeys. This struggle is still being waged fiercely in the political, economic, military, cultural, ideological and other spheres. And the struggles in all these spheres still find their most concentrated expression in political struggle, which often unavoidably develops into armed struggle when the imperialists resort to direct or indirect armed suppression. It is important for the newly independent countries to develop their independent economy. But this task must never be separated from the struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and their lackeys. (Communist Party of China 1965b: 191–192).

In achieving this, the CPC still holds the position that in each of these countries, the formation of a broad anti-imperialist united front in the national liberation movement under the leadership of the proletariat (i.e. the Communist Party) should take place (Communist Party of China 1965b: 204–205). But where does the PRC fit in all this?

> According to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, every socialist country which has achieved victory in its revolution must actively support and assist the liberation struggles of the oppressed nations. The socialist countries must become base areas for supporting and developing the revolution of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world, form the closest alliance with them and carry the proletarian world revolution through to completion. (Communist Party of China 1965b: 207).

The CPC even accuses the Soviet Union of abandoning proletarian internationalism, since, from their perspective, the latter wanted 'to subordinate the national liberation revolution to their general line of peaceful coexistence and to the national interests of their own country' (Communist Party of China 1965b: 207). If one reviews Bandung, which took place about a decade before the polemics directed at the CPSU by the CPC, it can be said that it promoted a general line of peaceful coexistence and tried to harness national liberation movements in terms of the national interests of the PRC. In this respect, it

is very similar to the political line of the CPSU that is now being criticised. Thus, the polemics of the split period can be perceived as an indication of a shift back to the pre-Geneva/Bandung foreign policy of the PRC, or to a more orthodox communist/Maoist orientation in foreign affairs.

This shift in the PRC's international relations, from the moderate stance of the 1950s towards an open support of revolutionary movements worldwide during the 1960s, is also visible in terms of Chinese propaganda. In 1960, Radio Peking initiated a radio broadcast – in its French Language section – called 'Irresistible Tide' that referred to the rising independence movements in Africa. Two years before, it had launched a programme against the 'Western intrusion' in the Middle East. In the early 1960s, there was an expansion of the language sectors of Radio Peking. Most broadcasts aimed at Third-World countries either directly (in native languages, such as Arabic, Swahili, Hausa, Malay, Burmese, Thai, Filipino, Urdu) or indirectly (in the languages of colonialists, like Portuguese and French). Propaganda was also manifest in the launch of magazines such as *Peking Review, Pekin Information, China Reconstructs* – published in Arabic as well, from 1964 onwards – and an intensification of Foreign Language Press production both in terms of titles and in translations intended to promote Chinese politics worldwide. (Ungor 2009: 154–158, 258).

Back to Bandung

In 1974, Deng Xiaoping reintroduced the spirit of Bandung in the speech he delivered at the United Nations (1974). Two years later, shortly after Mao Zedong's death, Remin Rinbao published an article titled 'Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism'. This article offered a deeper analysis of Deng's aforementioned speech, and both texts took the spirit of Bandung to the next level by identifying the so-called Second World as a potential ally of the Third World against the two superpowers, namely the USA and the Soviet Union. This article produced a major split in the Maoist camp, with most

of the Maoist parties denouncing the article as having been fabricated, and the Three World Theory as not being part of Mao's work. Whatever the case, it illustrates the complexity not only of Chinese foreign policy, but also of ideological and political shifts in the CPC that tracked changes in the balance of forces between the different factions of the party.

Conclusions

It is now evident that there cannot be a general assessment of Maoism in relation to nationalism and anti-colonialism, for the simple reason that there has not been a unitary approach of Maoism towards these two notions.

Chinese foreign policy shifted several times during the 1949–1976 period. In brief:

- 1949–1954: orientation towards the USSR and the socialist camp, with the Korean War being the key event.
- 1954–late 1950s: establishment of relations with former colonies that are mainly ruled by nationalist political forces.
- 1960s: promotion of revolution throughout the world.
- 1970s: shift towards a coalition with Third-World countries (similar to 1954–late 1950s) and an opening to the West.

Each of these shifts in the foreign policy of the PRC reflected a turn towards nationalism or anti-colonialism and altered relations between the two orientations. The 1960s had been the most favourable period for anticolonialism, while in the 1950s, and again in the 1970s, anti-colonialism was set aside in favour of nationalism.

In terms of the theoretical approach of Maoism towards anti-colonialism and nationalism, Mao regarded anti-colonial struggles as anti-imperialist. For Mao, anti-colonial armed struggle should be undertaken by an anti-imperialist united front that would constitute the national liberation movement. These fronts or movements should, on the one hand, include nationalist forces that could unite with the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist

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goals, but, on the other, should be under the guidance and leadership of the communist forces.

Cross-References

▶ Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)
▶ Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)
▶ Third Worldism and Marxism

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Maralinga

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)

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Marxism had already reached Latin America's shores prior to his ascendancy as a leading revolutionary theorist. Yet José Carlos Mariátegui is considered to be the founder of Marxism in the region on the grounds that he was the first to adapt it to local conditions. He famously stated that "we certainly do not want socialism in Latin America to be a copy or imitation. It should be a heroic creation. We have to give life to Indo-American

socialism with our own reality, in our own language" (Vanden and Becker 2011: 37). His pioneering contribution to Latin American Marxism has not only influenced political life in his native Peru but also revolutionary leaders and movements across the region, such as in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Mariátegui's historical analysis of Latin America continues to be foundational material in academic institutions and circles, as well as inspiration for revolutionary activists and workers. The Communist Party of Peru, known as the *Shining Path* after one of Mariátegui's famous phrases ("Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution" Jose Carlos Mariategui), has based much of their political ideology and analysis on his writings, complementing it with their Maoist ideology. Recently, the Communist Party of the Latin American Diaspora, also known as ANTI-CONQUISTA, made up of first- and second-generation Latin American immigrants in the United States and the United Kingdom, has adopted Mariátegui's ideas in an attempt to understand ongoing oppression of their communities (ANTICONQUSITA 2017).

Furthermore, his work has also helped to radicalize and inspire the region's middle and upper classes as was the case with Dr. Hugo Pesce, Mariátegui's confidant and one of the first members of the Peruvian Communist Party, founded by Mariategui in 1928. It was in Pesce's leper colony in Peru's Amazon that Ernesto "Che" Guevara was first introduced to Marxism and Mariategui's writing during his famous travels across the continent. According to Guevara himself, Pesce's influence inspired him to channel his enthusiasm for adventure "towards goals that are more harmonious to the needs of the Americas" (Krauze 2011: 335–337). Mariátegui's seminal book, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, was republished by Cuba's national press at Guevara's request following their victorious revolution against the Batista dictatorship (Hodges 1986: 179).

His influence on Cuban revolutionaries, however, was not just Guevara's doing. Early Cuban Marxist thinkers were profoundly influenced by Mariátegui's revolutionary magazine *Amauta*, helping them develop a revolutionary theory that spoke to the particular conditions of Cuban workers (Becker 1993). In Nicaragua, this same magazine was a staple for revolutionary thought directly influencing Augusto Sandino who was a subscriber and contributor (Hodges 1986, 264). On the 50th anniversary of Mariátegui's death in 1980, Nicaragua's Sandinista press acknowledged him as "having launched the revolution in Latin American thought" and as the "first to investigate the origins, effects and functions, development... and role of diverse social phenomena including ideologies" (Ibid, 179–180).

The sharpness of Mariategui's revolutionary theory evidently cuts across class lines and epochs, bringing revolutionaries of different social strata and from distinct generations together in the task of building a socialist society on top of the ashes of capitalism. Today, as Eurocentric Marxism becomes ever more isolated and exposed, Mariategui's work becomes ever more relevant, not just for Latin Americans but for the world.

Inside the Life of José Carlos Mariátegui

José Carlos Mariátegui was born on June 14, 1894, in the small Peruvian mining town of Moquegua. His father, Francisco Javier Mariátegui, was descended from an upper-class and prominent family that had played a part in the country's independence. Conversely, his mother, María Amalia Lachira, was a mestiza and daughter of poor campesinos. Mariátegui's father, a government worker, abandoned his young family and left for the north of the country not long after his birth, leaving his mother to raise the three children on her own and in dire poverty.

A decade prior to his birth, Peru and Chile signed the peace Treaty of Ancón that put an end to the War of the Pacific. The war had resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the ceding of extensive territory to Chile by both Peru and Bolivia, leaving the latter landlocked up until the present day. The cause of the war was to do with the control of territories that were rich in

saltpeter and guano, primary resources that were heavily sought after by the United States and Britain for the development of transport technology and agricultural science (Travis 2015: 8–9). The Peru that Mariátegui was born in, then, was still only recovering from a devastating war with not only an immense loss of human life but that also left the country economically crippled.

It is in this context that his mother decided to move to Huacho, her native town, to be near relatives and began work as a seamstress, the most common subsistence job for a single mother in that period. Despite the economic difficulties, she put Mariátegui through primary school and at age 15, unable to continue supporting his education, secures an apprenticeship for him in the *La Prensa* newspaper as an office boy. Gradually, the young Mariátegui was able to make a name for himself at the newspaper, despite the fact that he had lost a leg as a young child due to an injury that was not treated in time. At *La Prensa*, he is eventually promoted to reporter of local events in 1912, aged just 16 years. Two years later he begins to write cultural critiques under the pen name Juan Croniqueur, catapulting him to national recognition. Although Mariátegui would later refer to this period in his life as his "stone age" due to the noticeable lack of political analysis, it was through writing these critiques that he honed his skill as a critical writer, eventually using it to expose the appalling conditions caused by capitalism and imperialism across the world, but especially in his native Peru. Mariátegui (2014) would later explain that Peru's economic development was impeded by a national economic structure that was designed to serve the interests of British and North American markets, with the help of local intermediaries.

Disenchanted with the elitist world of journalism and the pompous lifestyle of its circles in Lima, Mariátegui and a handful of colleagues begin to flirt with the idea of creating a publication that challenged the status quo, at least on a social and cultural level. The first attempt at a dissident newspaper appeared in 1916 under the name *Colónidad* but was discontinued after just four issues. That same year he left *La Prensa* to join the newly founded *El Tiempo* whose inclination was more left-leaning and allowed him to print articles that were somewhat critical of President José Pardo and his government.

By 1918 Mariátegui was producing over 200 articles a year for *El Tiempo* and other publications in Lima, also finding time to launch another of his dissident newspapers: *Nuestra Epoca*. In sharp contrast to the mainstream papers he had worked for, *Nuestra Epoca* was "destined for the masses" and not for a literary elite, as Mariátegui himself put it (Moretic 1970: 69–70). After printing just two issues, the paper had to be shut down due to lack of funding but not before provoking a national commotion with an article criticizing the excessive funding of the military. Funding that, according to Mariátegui, could have been going toward economic development and education instead. As a result, he was beaten up by soldiers and challenged to a dual (which he accepted without any firearms experience), all which led to the resignation of the minister of war (Paris 1973: 51).

This period marks the shedding of Mariátegui's title as a mere journalist and the commencement of his life as a political theorist and activist that was not content with simply informing his readers but in committing himself and his work to the transformation of society. As early as 1918, outside of his publications, Mariátegui and his *El Tiempo* colleague, Cesar Falcón, were deliberating the idea of creating a socialist party, meeting labor leaders multiple times to discuss their proposal. In the end, they decided that the conditions were not yet ripe for such an organization and instead formed the Committee of Socialist Propaganda and Organisation with the view of preparing the ground for a future party (Moretic 1970: 71).

The following year Mariátegui and Falcón leave their posts at *El Tiempo* to start yet another publication, this time called *La Razón*. The new paper immediately gains popularity as it is the only publication to champion the rights of workers and students in Lima. Such was the impact of *La Razón* on the labor movement that on the same day that labor leaders were released from prison after a major strike, marches were organized to meet at the offices where the paper was based as a gesture of gratitude for its

coverage. Addressing the huge crowd of workers that had gathered that day, Mariátegui reaffirmed the paper's loyalty to the movement by declaring that *La Razón* was "a newspaper of the people and for the people" and that it was inspired by a "profound love for justice" (Illán 1974: 56). During the same period, the paper would also champion the struggle of university students who were calling for reforms, prompting praise from student leaders and committees.

Notwithstanding the huge popular support and praise, *La Razón* suffered the same ill-fate as all of Mariátegui's previous publication projects, this time due to political persecution. Just 3 months after the first issue, the paper's printing operations were first shut down by Lima's conservative and right-wing archbishop, who owned the printing workshop, and then banned altogether by the incoming dictator Augusto B. Leguía who took power on July 4, 1919. It was not in his interest to enrage the public further by using force to eliminate his opponents and critics so Leguía effectively silenced Mariátegui and others, at least temporarily, by exiling them using foreign-based journalist roles in Europe as a guise (Baptista 2006: 89). Toward the end of 1919, Mariátegui and his colleague, Falcón, embarked for Europe with the former assigned to be based in Italy and the latter in Spain.

Mariátegui witnessed a postwar Europe that was struggling to reconstruct itself from the ashes of destruction, observing how radical European intellectuals made convincing arguments that singled out capitalism as the main culprit. A 2-month stint in France personally acquainted him with Henri Barbusse, Romain Rolland, and their *Clarté* movement which are said to have had a huge impact on his ideological development (Becker 1993: 30). Specifically, it was the *Clarté* movement's combination of both a radical internationalism based on worker's unity and the role of intellectuals in this struggle that really affected the Peruvian exile. The harsh weather in France, however, was too much for Mariátegui who was prone to illness, and so decided to move on to Italy where he settled for 3 years. Mariátegui wasted no time in acquainting himself with the worker mobilizations and radical anti-capitalist intellectuals

that developed out of turbulent postwar conditions.

He gravitated toward a number of radical Italian intellectuals of the time but especially to Benedetto Croce whom he would later reference abundantly in his work. Perhaps the most influential event of his European stay, however, was his presence at the socialist Congress of Livorno in January 1921 where the communists split from the social-democrats, effectively creating the Communist Party of Italy (Marchena 1987: 52). During a trip to Florence at around this time, Mariátegui met his Italian wife, Anna Chiappe, with whom he settled briefly in the idyllic little town of Frascati. He later wrote that it was during their time in Frascati as a newly married couple that Mariátegui was finally able to grasp the "confusing, heavy and cold" Marxist theory (Illán 1974: 68). Shortly after and as a consequence of what he had witnessed at the Congress, Mariátegui together with Falcón and two other compatriots are inspired to create the first cell of Peruvian communists. The cell, however, was short-lived as they were forced to leave Italy on the back of the rise of fascist violence. Together with their newborn son, Sandro, Mariátegui and Chiappe traveled to Germany, France, Austria, and Hungary further investigating the postwar conditions in Europe and writing journalistic reports on the catastrophe that those countries were suffering at that time. Although he yearned to visit the Soviet Union, the couple decided against the difficult trip that would have been too strenuous for Sandro.

Mariátegui and his young family headed to Peru in 1923 where he quickly got reacquainted with activist and political circles that were fighting back against Leguía's dictatorship. Shortly after his arrival in March, he was invited by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who was spearheading the student movement, to give a series of lectures titled *The World Crisis and Revolution* based on his travels in Europe at the Gonzalez Prada Popular University in Lima. The lectures, held in July through to January, argued that Peru's proletariat and their struggles were to be properly understood only when considered as part of the broader problem of global capitalism. Among a wide variety of

themes, Mariátegui expanded on the devastating conditions that Europe was living, the disunity of the European left, particularly the division between reformist social democrats and revolutionary communists (Marchena 1987: 57). Mariátegui would later cut ties with Haya due to their irreconcilable positions that were based along those same lines.

Before their fallout, however, Haya and Mariátegui worked closely together. When Haya was arrested on October 2, 1923, by the Leguía dictatorship for his role as rector of the Popular University, Mariátegui and others at the university were also arrested for meeting up to discuss a plan of action to free him. Mariátegui and his comrades were set free a few days later but Haya was deported to Panama. His competency as a lecturer and his popularity among students in Lima led to him being proposed for a professorship at the University of San Marcos, but the institution refused on the grounds that he did not have any formal qualifications. Instead, Mariátegui accepts Haya's offer to become the director of *Claridad*, a socialist-oriented magazine, in the latter's absence.

Simultaneously, Mariátegui became a contributor for *Variedades*, a weekly newspaper that had ties to the dictatorship. While it may appear strange that he would collaborate with such an institution, he used his column to inform his readers about world events and the development of socialism in Europe, namely, in the Soviet Union. At the same time that he used *Variedades* to inform the public about external events, *Claridad* continued to directly challenge Leguía's dictatorship prompting Mariátegui's second arrest in January 1924. Upon his release, he became even more involved with the labor movement and begins to call for a united front of the proletariat, as per the directives of the Third International (Illán 1974: 75–76). These efforts were interrupted toward the end of May when he is diagnosed with a tumor in his right leg, his only leg, leading to its amputation.

His journalist friends asked the public that rather than pity him that they should offer economic assistance for which they held a cultural and literary event, giving the proceeds to his wife (Illán 1974: 77). Although wheelchair bound and

distraught about his new physical condition, Mariátegui takes just a couple of months to recover before he is back leading *Claridad*, contributing articles to newspapers, and meeting with labor movements. In 1925, having realized that he was not going to get any institutional support, he founded the independent publishing house, *Editorial Minerva*, and launched his first book *La escena contemporánea* based on the articles that he had written since his arrival from Europe. It is also at this point that he became increasingly interested in including the indigenous question in his analysis of the political and economic situation of Peru. Importantly, Mariátegui centers indigenous people as the main actors of economic and political struggle in Peru, not as communities to be saved by benevolent mestizos as was the common view for many of his intellectual contemporaries but rather as the main actors because of their condition as the majority population in the country and the most affected by capitalist-imperialism (Cruz Mosquera 2018).

In September 1926, with the help of a cohort of intellectuals and artists, Mariátegui launches *Amauta*, a magazine whose intention was to attract and help develop a progressive intellectual movement that would serve as the ideological vanguard of the class struggle in Peru. The term *Amauta* in Quechua means "wise one" and was used as a title for professional teachers by the Inca. The magazine's logo, too, was of an artist's sketch of an Inca *Amauta*, and its pages were decorated with ancient Indigenous art and symbols. This indigenous aesthetic was a recurrent theme throughout its issues, demonstrating Mariátegui's deepening concern with the indigenous problem, a problem that would become central to his original Marxist approach.

Unlike Mariátegui's previous publications, *Amauta* was a huge success both in terms of impact and longevity, although it did survive several financial struggles over the years, thanks to contributions from "friends and sympathisers" (Marchena 1987: 71). In Peru, Amauta's stated objective to influence intellectuals and workers over to a socialist analysis of society was hugely successful, soon becoming a dangerous threat to the Leguía dictatorship who arrested and harassed

Mariátegui and attempted to shut down the magazine's printing operations without success.

The impact of the magazine was also felt across Latin America where in Cuba, for example, copies of *Amauta* circulated among the early Marxist vanguard, Mariátegui's ideas becoming evidently present in their own theoretical expressions and actions (Becker 1993: 63). Juan Marinello, one of these early Cuban Marxists, played an important role in bridging "the gap between the generation of Mella and Mariátegui and that of Castro and Guevara" (Ibid: 71). Nicaragua's Augusto César Sandino, too, is said to have kept copies of Amauta on his person and would go on to correspond with Mariátegui who published some of his anti-imperialist letters in the magazine (Hodges 1986: 264).

When Amauta was temporarily shut down and banned by the dictatorship in 1927, Mariátegui and his colleagues reacted by publishing a new magazine called *Labor*, which was less theoretical and aimed at informing workers about current events and labor actions. Through the connections that were made with the labor movement, in large part thanks to *Labor*, Mariátegui suggested the creation of the Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, the country's most affiliated national trade union center up until the present.

In 1928 Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre collided ideologically creating a rift not just between themselves but throughout the whole leftist movement in Peru and the whole of Latin America. Haya argued for a united front between the workers and the progressive bourgeoisie against North American imperialism, using the Kuomintang in China as an exemplar for his united front turned political party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), even after the former had betrayed the communists. Mariátegui, on the other hand, argued that the most fitting way to combat imperialism was for a communist worker's party to take power. Their ideological differences can be deduced from a back and forth they had in which Haya stated: "we are leftists because we are anti-imperialists" to which Mariátegui responded "we are anti-imperialists and leftists because we are

socialists" (Illán 1974: 164). Haya accused Mariátegui of being Europeanized in his position and suggested that he needed to analyze the situation in the Americas according to its own reality and not through what was dictated by the left in Europe. This accusation prompted Mariátegui's now famous phrase on socialism in Latin America having to be an original creation based on the region's own reality.

Following this exchange, Mariátegui is inspired to finally establish the Peruvian Socialist Party in September 1928 affiliated to the Third International, which changed its name to the Peruvian Communist Party in 1930. In this same period, he also publishes his second book *Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality*, where he elaborates a socialist account of Peru's history. Even the most aggressive critics of the ideas expressed in the *Seven Essays* conceded that it was convincingly written and forecasted that it would have a great impact. It was only after his death, however, that the book really began to gain popularity, eventually praised as one of the most original pieces of work by a Latin American writer.

By September 1929 Mariátegui was, more than ever, attempting to integrate socialist ideas into the direction of the labor movement using his newly established party as the vehicle of influence. Leading members of Haya's APRA, especially in the diaspora, dissolved their branches and joined Mariátegui's Socialist Party and postulated him as their representative at forums such as the Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress of the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence. Leguía's dictatorship, however, did not stand by while his influence within the labor movement grew. Once again, using the accusation of a "communist conspiracy" against the government, officers were sent to shut down *Labor*'s printing operations as well as to search Mariátegui's home. In reality, Leguía was anxious about Mariátegui's anti-imperialist influence on the public as his government was increasingly dependent on trading relations with the United States who sought access to Peru's abundant primary resources such as rubber, cotton, sugar, silver, copper, and so on.

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On the back of this renewed and intensified persecution, Mariátegui, toward the end of 1929, arranges to move with his family to Buenos Aires where he planned to continue to publish *Amauta* and advance his revolutionary projects. Ready to depart, Mariátegui's health rapidly deteriorates and is admitted into a hospital. Sensing the severeness of his condition, Mariátegui renounces his positions in the Party and Amauta, handing over the leadership to trusted comrades. On the morning of April 16, 1930, Mariátegui passes away at the age of 35. The next day, laborers from the Confederación General de Trabajadores led the funeral procession waiving a single red flag followed by tens of thousands of workers and supporters in what has been described as the largest funeral procession ever seen in Lima. Just prior to his death, Mariátegui had completed two manuscripts of books that were to be published in Spain by his long-time friend and comrade, César Falcón, but these were lost during shipping.

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Maritime History

▶ Braithwaite, Chris (1885–1944)

Market Integration

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism

Martí, José (1853–1895)

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Definition

José Martí, a deported Cuban who resided in New York City between 1880 and his death fighting for Cuban independence in 1895, observed with alarm the emergence of US imperialism during the transformative decades leading up to US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence and its resolution in 1902, through which the US annexed Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other islands, and set up a tutelary relationship to Cuba.

Introduction

José Martí, a deported Cuban who resided in New York City between 1880 and his death fighting for Cuban independence in 1895, observed with alarm the emergence of US imperialism during the transformative decades leading up to US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence and its resolution in 1902, through which the US

annexed Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other islands, and set up a tutelary relationship to Cuba. His extended residence 'in the monster's entrails', as Martí described his life in New York to his dear friend and Mexican editor Manuel Mercado, provided him with insights about his host country's imperialist vision with respect to Latin America and the Caribbean. Viewing with greater prescience than most of his North and South American contemporaries, Martí developed a critique of the US's double dealings with Native Americans, of Westward expansion into the states that once were Mexican, of attacks on Chinese and European immigrants, of the miserable conditions of working people, and of lynching as a common method of administering justice.

Above and beyond his keen interest in Cuba's national independence from Spain, he devoted thousands of pages as a translator of US literature and society, its popular culture and politics, its prominent literary figures, and influential late nineteenth-century ideas such as the definition of what is the 'modern', as I argued in 2008. These translations facilitate his Latin American, Caribbean and Latina/o readers' conceptualisation of themselves as a region with common political, cultural, and economic interests, as 'Latins' and not 'Saxons', and as a 'United States of South America', with every bit as much or more potential than the republic north of the Río Bravo to define the future of America (Martí 2002/1894: 330). The key text that has established Martí's reputation as a foundational anti-imperialist in the Latin American and Latina/o tradition, is 'Nuestra América' (1891), but to grasp the ways he theorised race, class, culture, and politics in order to make a case against empire, let us consider the context in which this manifesto emerges.

Born José Julián Martí y Pérez in 1853 in Havana, Cuba, to a Valencian father, Mariano Martí Navarro, and a Canary-Islander mother, Leonor Pérez Cabrera, Martí was the eldest in a family of eight children and the only son. His early education with Rafael María de Mendive introduced Martí to a growing movement in support of Cuban independence dating to the early nineteenth century. Aged 16, as the first war of Cuban independence was unfolding, Martí was convicted of sedition and treason and condemned to 6 years of hard labour because of a letter (which he never sent) that discouraged his classmates from serving as part of the police forces of the Spanish colonial regime. Through the influence of his mother, the sentence was commuted after 6 months; he was released but with the stipulation that he live out his exile in Spain. The marks of the whippings and scars due to chains he wore coloured the rest of his life. In Spain, Martí pursued Law, Philosophy, and Literature; for political and financial reasons, he did not formally receive the degrees for which he completed courses of study during his lifetime. (In 1995, the University of Zaragoza granted the degrees posthumously.) Martí returned first to Mexico for 2 years. After a brief sojourn in Cuba in 1877, he moved to Guatemala and worked as a professor of literature where he became renowned for his fiery oratorical style. He resigned from his post after 1 year in protest at the firing of a fellow Cuban. Martí and his new wife Carmen Zayas Bazán returned to Cuba, but his political views led to him being deported a second time to Spain. As quickly as possible, he made his way to New York to join the efforts on behalf of Cuban independence.

While living in New York, Martí worked long hours and organised the growing Cuban and Puerto Rican émigré community at night. Having become bored by his work as a Wall Street office worker, Martí began to make his living by writing for major Latin American newspapers as a foreign correspondent, and by contributing to local Spanish-language newspapers and magazines. In the later 1880s, he also held posts as a consular officer for Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay. In his work as journalist and cultural critic, Martí engaged in translation of the events, the culture, and the politics of the US and Europe for readers in Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and in the Spanish-speaking United States. The novelty of the scenes he described pushed him to forge a new genre, the *crónica* (short, very literary, prose essays), that convey non-fiction in highly metaphorical and rhetorically rich figurative language which Rubén Darío described as unforgettable. In these pages

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of journalism, Latin American readers encountered for the first time and through Martí's critical eye the aesthetics and politics of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, Oscar Wilde, Helen Hunt Jackson, Mark Twain, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, George Bancroft, and Frank Blackmar among many others. He returned to teaching, but of Spanish as a second language at night. While immersing himself in this study and representation of the US, Latin America, and Europe, Martí also wrote several volumes of poetry, travel sketches, edited a newspaper, wrote a magazine for children and his own short novel, diaries, personal notebooks, and an extensive epistolary. Scholars such as Julio Ramos, Ivan Schulman, Evelyn Picón Garfield and Susana Rotker have attributed to Martí an inaugural role in defining a modernist sensibility in these texts, marked in large part by his attempt to depict the intense changes that accompanied industrialisation, immigration, urbanisation and imperial expansion and through his influence on subsequent writers. He sketched outlines for 50 book projects in his short lifetime, but lamented that his radical political commitments would require him to go to the grave with many books unwritten.

In New York, Martí expanded his nationalist vision to include a Latin Americanist regional consciousness. Simultaneously, he developed a critique of the US's betrayal of its own revolutionary tradition, insofar as it increasingly assumed the mantle of European-style empire. A series of historical events, often neglected in narratives of US history, contributed to Martí's anti-imperialist turn. These events proved crucial for shaping his profound alarm at the possibility that the US would simply 'take' his island and make it a protectorate. First, the annexation of the northern half of Mexico in 1848 haunted him as a possible future for Cuba: he depicted the maddening effects of annexation for the original Californianos in his translation of Helen Hunt Jackson's *Ramona*. Second, the 1879–83 War of the Pacific, in which US suppliers provisioned both Chile and Peru with arms, introduced Martí to the tactics by which the US sought to compete

with Britain and France for rights to exploit Latin America's resources. Secretary of State James Blaine, the most powerful Republican of the second half of the nineteenth century, blocked European attempts to mediate between Bolivia and Chile, invoking the Monroe Doctrine. After creating expectations that the US would defend Peru militarily, the US abruptly withdrew and left Peru open to the mercies of the Chileans. Third, real threats of popular expansionist sentiment horrified him, as when the US came close to invading another row of mineral-rich northern Mexican states in 1886, as a result of the intrigues of the Annexationist League and its leader Augustus K. Cutting, which prompted Martí to write a letter in fierce opposition, recently republished by Rodolfo Sarracino (2003).

The tactics of the Republican Party under Blaine's leadership generated a suspicion of the US's intentions that lasted until the end of Martí's life and informed much of his reporting on the other major historical event that shaped his critical understanding of US attitudes toward his America: the International American Conference of 1889–90, on which Martí reported with passion and vigilance. This Conference, organised by the same secretary of state, James Blaine, now under President Benjamin Harrison, promised to establish procedures for arbitrating military conflicts, common weights and measures, even a common currency to be called the 'Columbus' (in English), all in the name of friendship among the American Republics. The leaders of the 'pueblos latinos de América', as Martí described in his report in 1891, in his capacity as official delegate for Uruguay to the International American Monetary Commission, refused to co-operate with the official and unofficial aims of the conference and the Commission. Precisely during this period, Blaine made arguments about the convenience and wisdom of US annexation of Cuba. To Martí, this proposal was anathema. The culture of the 'Congreso Panamericano', as Martí referred to it, devised by Blaine as a means to secure business deals, concessions for US transportation industries, and to extend US influence in the

region, proved odious to Martí. He transcribed the heady imperial sentiments he found in the headlines reporting on the meeting for his Latin American readers: 'Clay's Dream'; 'The Just Influence'; 'Not Yet'; 'Steamships to South America'; 'Manifest Destiny'; 'The Gulf is Ours!' The proceedings of the conference and the Commission revealed to Martí and to his readers 'the open proposal of new era of domination of the United States over all the peoples of America' (Martí 1963–1975/1889: 52–53).

Simultaneous with Cutting's provocation and the popular call for a second invasion of Mexico, police abuse and corruption of the juridical system and failure to address the root causes of the massive protests of working peoples further confirmed to Martí, as he wrote in his unpublished notebook (no. 18), that 'Cuba must be free–from Spain and from the United States' (Martí 1963–75: vol. 21, 380). Although many Latin Americans had seen the US as a model for their newly independent nations, including Argentine president Domingo F. Sarmiento and perhaps even Martí, his descriptions of the largest demonstrations of workers in the history of the US, where hundreds of thousands demanded an 8-hour workday and an end to child labour, suggest that Martí came to question the appropriateness of the US model for his America. In his reporting on the Haymarket anarchist's trial and the eventual hanging of four men with anarchist political views on charges for which they were posthumously exonerated, Martí voiced the anger and shock of the immigrant workers as they realised that the US would not offer them a 'new' world: 'The police, proud in their wool jacket uniform, proud of their authority, and terrifying to the uneducated, beat and assassinate [the workers]. They are cold and hungry and they live in reeking shacks. America then is the same as Europe!'(1963–75/1888: Vol. 11, 338; *Selected Writings* "Class War in Chicago: A Terrible Drama" 200). In addition to this lack of representation for workers, Martí documented gruesome and xenophobic acts of vigilante violence, including the lynching of 11 Italian immigrants inside a Louisiana jail and of the burning at the stake of an African American, both of which reveal his awareness that structural injustice prevented full exercise of rights for all in the US. Martí's 'Letter to the Director of the *Evening Post*' (2002/1889), also entitled 'Vindication of Cuba' and republished in English and Spanish, denounces racism toward Cubans resident in the US and on the island as part of a founding imperialist discourse that stereotyped Cubans – because of their mixed race or supposedly failed masculinity – as incapable of governing themselves.

Martí meditated in his writings on events from his location within the empire's belly; 'Nuestra América' or 'Our America,' bears the oratorical flourish of its first enunciation as 'Madre América' at an 1890 gathering of same Latin American leaders who had assembled in New York for the International American Conference. The revised version, which we know now as Martí's antiimperialist manifesto, appeared in print in January 1891 simultaneously in New York and in Mexico. 'Our America' called upon its Latin American and Spanish readers inside the US to awaken to the threat that the US posed to the independence and sovereignty of Latin America's nations: 'It is the hour of reckoning and of marching in union, and we must move in lines as compact as the veins of silver that lie at the roots of the Andes' (2002/1891: 289). Although it was the document of a light-skinned creole leader addressed to other creole leaders, he asked his Latin American colleagues to turn their orientation away from European and North American models (the imported books and reheated leftovers of colonial legacies) and instead to embrace and celebrate the knowledge and culture of their own 'hybrid lands', for only an original creation would correspond to the 'enigma' of Latin America (294). He called for his America's schools to teach the native languages of 'our Greece', or the ancient American civilisations in order to decolonise Eurocentric curricula that are the legacy of colonialism and imperialism (291). In an anti-racist bid for unity

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and equality, he declared that in his America 'there is no race hatred, because there are no races' (295). Here Martí differed from the vast majority of white people in the US who actively invested in and advocated for white privileges; but he underestimated the trenchant legacies of white supremacist policies and racial terror in the wake of centuries of colonisation and enslavement.

Within 2 years of the International American Conference, together with Arturo Schomburg and others, he founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party and its newspaper *Patria* in New York; from mid-1892 until his death he worked full time to raise money and support for a third strike for Cuban independence. In the first skirmishes of that war in 1895, Martí was killed by a Spanish soldier. He was quickly immortalised for his self-sacrifice as a martyr of the Cuban nation. In the wake of the 1959 revolution, both Cuban exiles and Fidel Castro himself have defined Martí as intellectual ancestor to their politically antagonistic projects. Philip Foner is clear that Martí was never himself a socialist nor a Marxist, although he knew of and respected Marx's commitment to the oppressed and disenfranchised and conveyed a thorough critique of the social conditions in which workers lived under the capitalism he observed in the US. In 2001, George W. Bush cited Martí in his speech on behalf of economic regionalisation at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec (21 April 2001), but study of Martí's writings suggests that he vehemently opposed such US-led 'pan-American' projects. Although Martí's politics continue to be hotly contested by Cubans on and off the island, his writings reveal growing suspicion and discontent with the US's imperial turn in the late nineteenth century. His writings and first-hand experiences as an economic migrant in New York led him to predict the US's aspirations to global empire in his final 'Letter to the Editor of the *New York Herald*', published in English on the day of his death (Martí 1895). Martí's writings call upon his readers to prevent this imperialist development by fighting for Cuba's independence and for his America's self-determination, which would in turn help the US to return to its founding revolutionary principles.

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Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Control; Domination; Exploitation; Hegemony; Influence

Introduction

"Marx was a man of his time." This is the first sentence that comes to mind when we discuss the topic Karl Marx and imperialism. This is certainly true. But Marx's time was not the "anti-colonialist," "liberal phase" of British capitalism that even Marxists like Karl Kautsky described as "the period of greatest freedom for India" (1907, p. 76). (We can find similar considerations in Lenin's *Imperialism* ([1917] 1996, p. 79).) It was the period of the so-called British free-trade imperialism, a phase of great expansion of British formal and informal empire (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). It is therefore no surprise that Marx reflected at length on these processes both in his writings on colonialism – such as those on Ireland, China, India, Russia, and the American Civil War – and in his notebooks, which are being published for the first time in the *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA^2): the historical-critical edition of Marx's and Engels's complete writings.

The MEGA^2 project only started in the mid-1970s, and it took a long time for Marx's *New York Tribune* articles on colonialism to obtain recognition after their first publication in the 1950s. This is why these articles were not mentioned in the Second International's discussions on colonialism and, when the great debate on imperialism took place before and during World War I, neither Rosa Luxemburg nor Lenin showed any awareness of their existence. It is remarkable however how peripheral Marx's articles and notebooks on colonialism have remained even today.

In this entry I present a reading of Marx's *Capital* in the light of both his articles and writings on colonialism: this is not just a philological endeavor but an investigation into the place of imperialism within the overall process of capitalist accumulation and the class struggle.

My reading contradicts one of the main premises of Marxist debates on imperialism from the Second International until today: the view that the model of *Capital* volume 1 is a model of a "closed national economy" without colonial possessions or imperialist dominations (see, e.g., Brewer 1990, p. 19; Harvey 2005, p. 144; Patnaik and Patnaik 2016; Wood 2006, p. 21). In the next two sections, I argue that, on the contrary, in *Capital* Marx overcame the limits of classical political economy and understood capitalist accumulation as a polarizing process operating on a world scale. He included international investment, migration, and expansionism into his analysis and considered processes of capital centralization that, for Lenin, characterized the imperialist phase of capitalist development. In section "Accumulation and Imperialism," I challenge the view that the part of *Capital* volume 1 on the so-called primitive accumulation offers a description of the prehistory of capital and argue that it also contains a description of the permanent methods of capital reproduction. The violence of the state, for Marx, has a fundamental role in the global process of capital accumulation, which necessarily takes an imperialist form. In this framework, processes of imperialist domination are subsumed under the general laws of development of capitalism, under the law of impoverishment of the working class in particular. In this light, in section "Imperialism and World Revolution," I discuss Marx's evolving assessment of the prospects for international revolution. The final section draws some conclusions on the contemporary relevance of his critique.

Capital: A Globalizing System

In *Capital* Marx examines the capitalist mode of production and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode, using England as their chief illustration. At the time,

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England was the core of an expanding empire and a completely developed instance of the capitalist mode of production. From the specific characteristics of capitalism in England, Marx abstracts the general laws of development of the antagonisms of the capitalist mode of production itself. Marx's *Capital*, therefore, is not limited to the analysis of a specific historical stage, i.e., mid-nineteenth-century English capitalism, but examines the general laws of its development (Marx 1996, p. 9). Volume 1, moreover, does not consider individual capital – as both Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg believe – but examines the production and reproduction of the "total social capital," which is both the individual capital and the sum total of all existing capitals. The concept of total social capital – or, more simply, "capital" – refers to all branches of a "given society," which is not confined by national boundaries. By analyzing one capital, Marx analyzes the totality of them, because plurality and competition are inherent to the essence of capital. The concept of capital reflects the tendency of the capital of the dominant states toward universal dominance. As competition is capital's very essence, however, this *limit* cannot actually be reached. Marx already rejected "ultra-imperialism" scenarios; for him, as we shall discuss, accumulation enhances capital competition, which expresses itself in increasing intercapitalist and interstate antagonisms (Marx 1996, p. 414).

In Chapter, ▶ "Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism," Marx proves that expansionism is an immanent necessity for capital *at every stage of its development*. Chapter 25 "The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation", as we discuss in the next section, then shows that accumulation increases capital's expansive power and tends toward the *extreme limit* of absolute, universal wealth. In examining the "Conversion of Surplus Value into Capital" at the beginning of Chapter 24, in fact, Marx takes "no account of export trade, by means of which a nation can change articles of luxury either into means of production or means of subsistence, and *vice versa*." And he adds, "in order to examine the object of our investigation in its integrity, free from all disturbing subsidiary circumstances, we must treat the whole world as one nation, and assume that capitalist production is everywhere established and has possessed itself of every branch of industry" (Marx 1996, p. 580). According to Lenin ([1899] 1977, p. 54) and Rosa Luxemburg ([1913] 1951, p. 136) and to later interpretations, this abstraction means the isolation of England from the world market: Marx would analyze a "closed national system" and the development of the *domestic* market.

But this interpretation ignores crucial aspects of Marx's argument and, in particular, his critique of the classical economists' theory of reproduction. In Chapter 24, Marx criticizes classical political economy from Adam Smith to Henry Fawcett for failing systematically to analyze the origin of surplus value in the exploitation of labor. As a consequence, he maintains, Smith and Ricardo confused the total product with the newly created value: while the latter comprises variable capital and surplus value, the former includes constant capital in addition. Since they excluded constant capital from the country's total product, the classical economists ended up claiming that accumulation leads to the growth of the national revenue, as if capitalist production were aimed at the consumption of the national population and not at accumulation, which involves the expansion of constant capital and the foreign market.

This model presupposes that factors of production are mobile only within a particular country but never cross its boundaries: an assumption that clashed with the expansion of the "field of action" of British capital in the period of "free-trade imperialism," which included labor migration toward Britain, from Britain to the colonies, and between British colonies. For Marx, Henry Fawcett's *The Economic Position of the British Labourer* (1865) expressed this contradiction at the highest degree. On the one side, Fawcett adhered to the wage-fund theory: a theory built upon the classical economists' theory of reproduction according to which the average money wages received by each laborer corresponds to the amount of one country's "labor-fund" divided by the number of the laboring population within the same country. But on the other side, Fawcett claimed that the bigger portion of wealth annually saved in England was exported to foreign countries

(1865, pp. 121–123). With the additional capital exported, Marx concludes ironically, also part of the labor-fund "invented by God and Bentham" was exported (Marx 1996, pp. 606–607).

Marx's treating "the whole world as one nation," therefore, does not mean that he isolated England from the world market; this abstraction rather allowed him to take structurally into account the international mobility of capital and labor (Marx 1996, pp. 606–607). In the 1872–1875 French edition of volume 1, Marx (1989) makes this even clearer by arguing that in the age of mechanical industry the external market prevails on the internal market, impelling the annexation of new countries and increasing rivalries among the industrial powers (MEGA² II/7: 557). Thus, in Chapter 24 – using Harvey's words (2007, p. 59, 62) – Marx systematically includes geographical expansion as one path of surplus absorption and also as a means of increasing the industrial reserve army of labor: an aspect that has been underestimated in later interpretations of his work (Marx 1996, p. 634). British capital invested abroad is considered to be part of the "total social capital," while British colonies are seen, as economically were, as particular districts of the system of the dominant country providing it with labor-power exploitable in loco or through international migration. The "free" migration of the "industrial era" appeared to Marx as a new form of slave trade allowing capitalists to exploit workers to the utmost (1996, p. 272).

Although globally the overwhelming majority of resources and labor were not exploited in a *capitalist form*, Marx presupposes the universal extension of the capital-wage labor relation. On the one side, this abstraction reflects the fact that capital can *integrate* and *subordinate* forms of exploitation different from the "free" wage relation. As Jairus Banaji states (2010, p. 282), in some countries and particularly in the colonial world, *capitalist relations of exploitation* were nonetheless widespread and dominant. On the other side, the full worldwide establishment of the capital-wage labor relation is the extreme *limit* of capitalist development, which involves a constant process of expropriation and proletarianization of peasants, artisans, and the self-

employed, because of competition from industrial production and direct state intervention.

Accumulation and Imperialism

Marx continued to work on *Capital* Volume 1 long after its first publication in 1867. In revising Volume 1 for the 1872–1875 French edition, Marx put more emphasis on colonialism, imperialism, and precapitalist societies and elaborated on his studies of the corporations in the UK, the USA, and Germany. In this light, Marx distinguished for the first time between concentration and centralization of capital: while the former is a process of concentration of production, the latter denotes the fusion of already existing capital and the formation of joint stock companies and leads to the growth of a financial aristocracy less and less directly involved in production. Nevertheless, for Marx, there is a fundamental unity between "capital 'in' the production process" and "capital-'property', capital 'outside' the production process and yielding interest of itself" (Marx 1998, pp. 372–373). Treating "capital-property" as separate from "capital in production" is for Marx (1998, pp. 396–397) the highest form of fetishism.

This shows that Marx already addressed the growth of "finance capital" that became so central in later debates on imperialism. It is noteworthy that while in Hilferding's account the concentration of capital and the connection between industrial and banking capital play a decisive role in the rise of imperialism, capital concentration was virtually absent from Hobson's account (see Hobson 1902; Callinicos 2009, p. 48). This reflects the fact that the form of internationalization of German capital partially diverged from that of British capital: the former took place after a process of concentration at home and through the connection between industrial and banking capital, while British capital was invested overseas without big head offices at home (Wilkins 1988). Marx's analysis of capital concentration and centralization escapes some of the rigidities of later debates and makes it possible to understand the tendencies underlying different paths of accumulation:

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In any given branch of industry centralization would reach its extreme limit if all the individual capitals invested there were fused into a single capital. In a given society this limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist company. (Marx 1976, p. 779) (This passage is not present in Marx (1996))

Centralization, for Marx, takes place "in any given branch" of industry and between different branches of a given society. It has the effect of abolishing, as far as it can, the demarcations between them and of strengthening the intrinsic characteristics of capital, which ignores sectorial and geographical frontiers. The increased mobility of the most centralized capital thus extends the scale of capital's operations and labor cooperation, enhancing the antagonism between capital and wage labor. All this shows that, for Marx, the processes that for Lenin marked the imperialist phase of development – export of capital, growth of a financial aristocracy, increase in the size of firms, and division of the world between capitalist associations – are part and parcel of the global process of capital accumulation.

What about the role of the state(s)? The point is that for Marx accumulation is not a purely "economic" process: given its antagonistic nature, state intervention is essential to the reproduction of capital. As evident in periods of economic crises, the links between capitals and their national governments have actually strengthened over time. This is why in Part 8 on the so-called primitive accumulation Marx incorporates the *state system* into his analysis. He does not describe "incidental" processes, "illustrating merely the genesis of capital, its first appearance in the world," as Rosa Luxemburg argues (1951, p. 364), but rather presents the state's permanent role both in generating the capitalist relation and in reproducing it. Combining the analysis of Western state- and empire-building, Marx describes both the processes of state-supported dispossession of communities aimed at securing land, resources, and labor-power for capitalist interests at home and the role of colonialism, trade policies, and war in concentrating the wealth then invested in industrial production. For Marx these processes are far from over in the industrial phase: "the

commercial war of the European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield," in his view, was "still going on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China." Even if Britain, France, and the USA cooperated in China with the goal of extending their spheres of influence, their reciprocal rivalries were increasing.

By examining the permanent character of methods of so-called primitive accumulation, Marx makes it possible to conceptualize what Rosa Luxemburg (1951, pp. 452–453) calls the "dual" aspect of capitalist accumulation, namely, the connection between surplus value production in workplaces and "force, fraud, oppression, looting" on an international scale, especially in the relation between capitalist and noncapitalist societies. These two aspects of accumulation were indeed "organically linked" for Marx, and "the historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together" (ibidem). In stressing the fundamental importance of processes of the so-called primitive accumulation in the relation between capitalist and noncapitalist societies, Rosa Luxemburg made explicit some aspects Marx had already developed in his work at a higher level of abstraction, even though she assumed that Marx's *Capital* presupposes the model of a "closed national economy" (see, e.g., Luxemburg 1951, p. 428).

Marx, in my view, took two steps further with respect to Lenin, Luxemburg, and contemporary theorists of imperialism. First, he grounded his analysis of imperialism in his value theory. Following the so-called primitive accumulation, for Marx, it is capital accumulation as such that tends to concentrate higher value-added production in the system's most competitive centers, leading to a forced specialization of dependent countries in lower value-added sectors, to the repatriation of profits extracted in these countries, and to forms of unequal exchange between nations with different productivity levels. These forms of uneven and combined development are reflected in differential forms of labor exploitation in the nations involved. Marx, secondly, understood *evolving* interstate relations against this global backdrop. In his view, economic and military expansionism and the resulting growth of the relative surplus population were powerful factors raising the rate of

exploitation and countervailing the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Marx thus conceptualized the reserve army in truly global terms and identified the permanent role of the state in its expansion.

This allowed him to examine the interaction between the dynamics of the global reserve army and the condition of the working class at the national level. In his eyes, the long-run combined effect of concentration and centralization is an increase in the organic composition of capital and a relative reduction in the demand for labor-power, which coexists with an absolute increase of the number of proletarians. As living labor is the only source of value, however, this causes increasing complications, pushing capital to exploit labor to the utmost, in intensity as well as duration. This explains why, for Marx, the law of impoverishment of the working class is the absolute, general law of capitalist development. Capital accumulation necessarily leads to the impoverishment of the world working class, in spite of and through the different conditions of its national sections. Significantly, at the end of Volume 1 Chapter 25, in order to illustrate this law, Marx also presents the case of Ireland, which he defines as an "agricultural district of England, marked off by a wide channel from the country to which it yields corn, wool, cattle, industrial and military recruits" (Marx 1996, p. 694). In the French edition, he further develops his analysis of the situation of Irish workers and farmers after the "Agricultural Revolution" that followed the Irish Famine and examines the opposite effects of agricultural development and rural migration in industrialized countries like England and colonized countries like Ireland, where emigration provoked depopulation (Marx 1996, pp. 699–700). In his articles on India and China, Marx presents the similar effects of British colonialism in Asia, which he considers to be "organic results" of the industrial system (see Anderson 2010; Pradella 2013 and 2014).

Imperialism and World Revolution

In Marx's *Capital*, the concentrated violence of the state is presented as an *economic force*, which operates according to the laws of accumulation. This makes it possible to understand imperialism as the concrete form of the accumulation of capital on a world scale. But the laws of capital accumulation appear to be natural and necessary only when workers are divided and subordinated under capital. Capitalism, however, develops in a contradictory way: any increase in the productive power of social labor subsumed under capital is due to cooperation, which is the premise of the expansion of capital's "field of action" and has the same universalizing tendency. The development of capital is therefore the development of the world working class and lays the basis for the creation of its historical alternative (Marx 1996, p. 750). As the international context is inherent in the condition of the working class in every nation, workers cannot limit themselves to economic struggles and to demands for a better distribution of the "national" product. As Marx explains in his 1867 address written on behalf of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association to its Lausanne Congress, this kind of approach is impotent against the effects of international restructuring and migration. These processes, for Marx, have rendered national workers' associations powerless.

> A study of the struggle waged by the English working class reveals that, in order to oppose their workers, the employers either bring in workers from abroad or else transfer manufacture to countries where there is a cheap labour force. Given this state of affairs, if the working class wishes to continue its struggle with some chance of success, the national organisations must become international. (Marx and Engels 1985, p. 422)

While Marx's and Engels's internationalism has always been unambiguous with respect to industrialized countries, their conception of the relationship between proletarian and anti-colonial struggles evolved over time. In the *Manifesto* they argued that the proletarian struggle in industrialized countries was national only in its *form*, but not in its *substance*, and its victory could have led to the emancipation of the colonies as well. It was only in his 1850–1853 writings and articles on China and India that Marx recognized the active role of colonized and oppressed people in the revolutionary movement. In 1850, in the *Neue*

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Rheinische Zeitung, Marx and Engels enthusiastically supported the Taiping revolution in China and welcomed the prospect of a social revolution in the country (Marx and Engels 1978, p. 267). In his much contested 1853 articles on India, moreover, Marx identified not only the destructive effects of British expansion in India but also the *material conditions* for a unified anti-colonial uprising of the Indian people. This was for Marx the only way in which the Indian people could get rid of the colonialist joke. Four years later, when the Indian national anti-colonial movement did indeed erupt, Marx *unconditionally* supported it, interpreting it as parts of a general uprising of the "great Asiatic nations" against British colonialism (CW15: 297–8).

These movements could have had a reaction on Europe, accelerating the tendency toward crisis and the possibility of a revolutionary outcome. But if the expansion of the world market laid the basis for the reciprocal reinforcement of the struggles on an international scale, Marx and Engels also recognized that the exploitation of the whole world by Britain was creating a "bourgeois proletariat," rendering this interconnection more difficult (Marx and Engels 1983, p. 342). If the connection between anti-colonial and proletarian struggles did not take place, for Marx, anti-colonial revolutions could be the starting point for the capitalist national development of these countries, as actually happened with the anti-colonial movement and the birth of capitalist nation-states in the Global South in the twentieth century. It is therefore not surprising that Marxism was such an inspiration in the great wave of anti-colonial struggles in the second half of the twentieth century.

Although they did not generate the hoped for revolutionary outcomes, anti-colonial movements throughout Asia represented aggravating factors in the 1857 economic crisis that enveloped the world market. The crisis and the Crimean War gave impulse to a number of social movements, in Russia for the suppression of serfdom and in the USA for the abolition of slavery, while in Europe the workers began to mobilize again through trade unions and politically. For Marx, mobilizing African Americans was the precondition for the

victory of the North in the American Civil War and for emancipation, and this was in turn the premise for any further progress of the labor movement in the USA and beyond. Indeed, in the 1867 preface to *Capital*, Marx wrote that the American Civil War was the harbinger of socialist revolution. In the 1860s, moreover, the Fenian movement gained strength both in Ireland and among Irish immigrants in Britain and the USA. Further revising his view of international revolution, in a letter to Engels of December 10, 1869, Marx states that he had changed his mind on the relationship between Irish question and the emancipation of English proletariat. "The English working class will 'never accomplish anything' before it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland" (Marx and Engels 1988, p. 398). The only means of hastening the social revolution in Britain was to promote the working class's support to the Irish national struggle as the *precondition of its own emancipation* (Marx and Engels 1988, pp. 473–475). (For an excellent analysis of the place of the USA and Ireland in Marx's critique of political economy, see Anderson (2010, pp. 79–153)). Significantly, it was soon after his writings on Ireland and the Paris Commune that Marx revised the French edition of *Capital*, Volume 1.

Marx's writings on Ireland and on the English labor movement played a fundamental role in the elaboration of Lenin's analysis of imperialism and the anti-imperialist program of the first congresses of the Third International. While in the preface to *Imperialism* (1996 [1917]) Lenin argues that in writing the pamphlet in Zurich he "suffered from a shortage of English literature," his *Notebooks on Imperialism* (1968 [1915–16]) documents Lenin's extensive engagement with Marx's political writings and letters, in particular those on the International, Ireland, the English labor movement, and the corruption of its political leaders. These writings were essential for Lenin in order to argue for the centrality of the connection between struggles of the metropolitan workers and those for national liberation of oppressed peoples against imperialism. Thus, even if Lenin presupposed a "national" interpretation of *Capital* Volume 1 and tried to integrate it in order to account for the new phase

of expanded imperialist development, he highlighted the economic and political centrality of processes that were, for Marx, integral components of capital accumulation. By building on Marx's statements and letters on Ireland, moreover, Lenin elaborated a broader political program for world revolution that was then formulated in the statements of the first congresses of the Third International.

Legacies and Consequences

Contemporary Marxist debates on imperialism still start from the assumption that Marx's *Capital* focuses on a self-enclosed national economy in a specific historical phase of accumulation, rather than on the overall tendency of the system as a totality. In analyzing capital reproduction, however, Marx treats "the whole world as one nation," anticipating Rosa Luxemburg's insight that "if the analysis of the reproductive process actually intends not any single capitalist country but the capitalist world market, there can be no foreign trade: all countries are 'home'" (Luxemburg 1951, p. 108). In this way, Marx took structurally into account the international mobility of capital and labor-power. By distinguishing *concentration* and *centralization* of capital, he recognized the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the formation of joint stock companies, and the growth of "finance capital." He rejected the separation between "capital in production" and "capital-property" and firmly situated imperialism within the global dynamics of capitalist accumulation.

Marx thus grounded the analysis of imperialism in that of global class relations, paying attention to the interrelationship between the expansion of the global reserve army and labor exploitation in production: a point that was largely overlooked in the debate on the "new imperialism." Harvey's assumption that Marx's *Capital* examines a closed economy "working under conditions of 'peace, property and equality'" (2005, p. 144), in particular, overlooks the interlinkages between processes of expropriation and exploitation within the overall dynamic of capital accumulation. This helps explain why Harvey

increasingly focused on processes of "accumulation by dispossession" as key to understanding imperialism, up to the point of arguing that forms of surplus value extraction are subsumed under "accumulation by dispossession," rather than vice versa (Harvey 2010, p. 311). As Alex Callinicos argued (2014, pp. 197–198), this approach expresses a wider tendency to denying the centrality of industrial production and wage labor in capital accumulation. It also ignores how different forms of expropriation are shaped by and interact with dominant forms of labor exploitation.

In recent years, this tendency has been countered by a series of works focused on imperialism and production restructuring. John Bellamy Foster et al. (2011), for example, highlight that for Marx "the tendency toward the domination of the economy by bigger and fewer capitals was as much a part of his overall argument on the general law as was the growth of the reserve army itself. The two processes were inextricably bound together." In their view, the emergence of a massive global reserve army of labor in the neoliberal period is one of the main defining features of the new imperialism of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The expansion of the global reserve army is indeed the backdrop against which the process of industrial production outsourcing to low-wage countries has occurred over the last 40 years, whether via foreign direct investment or arm's length relationships. In *Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century*, John Smith (2016) has investigated the vast scale of the shift of industrial production to the Global South and shown that it signifies a greatly expanded exploitation of southern workers by US, European, and Japanese multinational corporations, which appropriate greatly increased flows of value and surplus value from them. As in Marx's own times, these flows of value are based on the super exploitation of workers in the South. In *A Theory of Imperialism*, moreover, Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik (2016) highlight the asymmetrical relationship capitalism rests upon, whereby the periphery continues to be saddled by unemployment, underemployment, and poverty. The existence of massive labor reserves in the periphery plays a crucial role in keeping down real and

money wages in the metropolis and can be used to discipline workers in imperialist countries also through international migration.

In different ways, all these studies point to the fact that in an era of globalized industrial production and accelerated international migration, the dynamic of the global reserve army of labor more directly rebounds on the condition of the working class in imperialist countries. Although they also start from the assumption that the model of Marx's *Capital* is the model of a "closed capitalist economy," Foster et al. (2011) argue that Marx "saw the general law of accumulation as extending eventually to the world level." For Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik (2016), moreover, a deeper Marxist analysis of capitalism needs to go beyond the model of a closed capitalism in *Capital* and highlight the importance, along with processes of relative immiseration, of absolute immiseration in the periphery. However, if Marx's *Capital* does not examine a self-enclosed national economy but the overall tendency of the system as a totality, then the impoverishment and super-exploitation of workers and petty producers in the South appear to be part of a unitary process of impoverishment that increasingly involves also workers in imperialist countries (see Pradella 2010).

Locating the development of class relations nationally within the global dynamic of capital accumulation is crucial to reflecting and elaborating on emancipatory strategies. It shows that the global spread of capitalist relations of production in the neoliberal period has not only weakened organized labor but has also led to the emergence of new working classes and generated new sources of structural power for workers (Alimahomed-Wilson and Ness 2018; Silver 2003). For Marx, relations of imperialist domination and gendered, racial, national, and religious oppression are constitutive dimensions of the class struggle. This is why he put in question his initial faith in the universal emancipatory significance of social revolution in Western Europe and warned against the dangers represented by the spread of nationalism and racism among workers in imperialist countries. If his warning resonates in the context of a rising global far-right, so should also his reflections on

the need to link up labor movements, anti-racist struggles, and anti-imperialist resistance. Marx's *Capital*, in fact, is, above all, a tool of struggle. And it shows us that capitalism is based on labor cooperation and thus continuously generates new sources of structural power for workers and new possibilities for working class and anti-imperialist solidarity.

Cross-References

▶ Emmanuel, Arghiri and "Unequal Exchange"
▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
▶ Industrialisation and Imperialism
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism
▶ Luxemburg, Rosa (1871–1919)
▶ Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)
▶ Marx's Theory of International Price and Money: An Interpretation
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Samir Amin (1931–2018)

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Marx's Theory of International Price and Money: An Interpretation

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Synonyms

Comparative advantage; David Ricardo; International trade; Karl Marx; Marxism; Prices and money; Underdevelopment; Unequal exchange

Definition

This essay seeks to contribute to extend Marx's explanation of prices and money to the international level. It begins with an outline of Marx's general explanation of prices and money, focusing in particular on those aspects of these theories which are fundamental in their extension to the international dimension, and dealing in passing with two alleged problems with Marx's theories of price and money. It then presents the key elements of the extension of Marx's theories of price and money to the international dimension. Lastly, it uses the resulting analysis to critically appraise Ricardo's theory of international price and money in the context of his doctrine of comparative advantage. The major aim of the critical appraisal of Ricardo's work is to further highlight the specificity of the Marxist approach and draw out some of its implications for an understanding of the historical and contemporary problems of the so-called developing countries – implications which are in stark contrast to those emanating from Ricardo's comparative advantage doctrine.

Introduction

As is well known, Marx's expressed intention when drafting his *magnum opus* on the workings of the capitalist system, *Capital,* was to include in

it the functioning of the capitalist system at the level of the world economy. To do so, he planned separate books on international trade and the world market (see Nicolaus 1973; Rosdolsky 1977; Shaikh 1979). However, numerous factors, including failing health, combined to prevent him from realising this and other expressed literary intentions. In fact, as is also well known, Marx lived to see only volume 1 of *Capital* completed to his satisfaction, the other two volumes of *Capital* and his *Theories of Surplus Value* (often referred to as volume 4 of *Capital*) being completed long after his death; volumes 2 and 3 of *Capital* were compiled by Frederick Engels and published in 1885 and 1894, respectively, and *Theories of Surplus Value* was compiled by Karl Kautsky and published in 1905–10. Most importantly, aside from a few isolated passages, Marx left no real indication in these or any other of his published works and correspondence as to how he saw his general explanation of prices and money extended to the world economy level.

Although this gap in Marx's economic analysis has been generally acknowledged (see e.g. Carchedi 1991a, b; Kühne 1979; Lapavitsas 1996; Shaikh 1979), it has failed to attract much attention from even those sympathetic to his work, with the notable exceptions of Shaikh (1979, 1980) and Carchedi (1991a, b), and to a certain extent in various contributions to the debate on unequal exchange initiated by the work of Emmanuel (1972). The reasons for this inattention are not difficult to discern. They stem from perceived intractable problems with Marx's general theories of price and money. As regards Marx's theory of price, the problem is argued to be his so-called transformation procedure: that he did not transform input values into prices of production (see especially Meek 1977 for an extensive account of this alleged problem, and Fine and Saad-Filho 2004: 126–134 for a summarised version of it). And as regards his theory of money, the problem is seen as the impossibility of extending his commodity theory of money to take into account the modern form of money: intrinsically valueless pieces of paper issued by the state (see Germer 2005 and Lavoie 1986 for arguments along these lines).

The present essay seeks to contribute to the development of this much-neglected area – the extension of Marx's explanation of prices and money to the international level. To do so I will begin with an outline of Marx's general explanation of prices and money (mostly drawing on *Capital* and *Theories of Surplus Value*), focusing in particular on those aspects of these theories which I consider to be fundamental in their extension to the international dimension, and dealing in passing with the two alleged problems with Marx's theories of price and money referred to above. I will then present what I consider to be the key elements of the extension of Marx's theories of price and money to the international dimension. And, lastly, I will use the resulting analysis to critically appraise Ricardo's theory of international price and money in the context of his doctrine of comparative advantage. The major aim of the critical appraisal of Ricardo's work will be to further highlight the specificity of the Marxist approach and draw out some of its implications for an understanding of the historic and contemporary problems of the so-called developing countries – implications which are in stark contrast to those emanating from Ricardo's comparative advantage doctrine.

Marx's Theory of Price and Money

The key elements of Marx's theories of price and money that require elaboration with a view to their extension to the international dimension are (a) the formation of prices and emergence of money and (b) the determination of the magnitudes of prices and value of money. I will begin with Marx's view of how prices are formed since it is foundational for understanding his explanation of the emergence of money as well as the determination of the magnitudes of prices and value of money.

Formation of Prices and Emergence of Money

Marx begins his analysis of prices in *Capital* by analysing prices in the context of the simple

reproduction of commodities, that is, abstracting from their existence as capital. This analysis takes up the first three chapters of *Capital,* and is known to have been a major preoccupation of his (see Aumeeruddy and Tortajada 1979). He then uses this as a basis for their subsequent analysis in the context of the circulation of commodities (and money) as capital in the remainder of *Capital.* It would appear that his purpose for doing so was that he saw the essence of the circulation of commodities in capitalism as captured by their simple circulation, and the latter as historically prior to the former (for more details see Fine and Saad-Filho 2004; Nicolaus 1973; Rosdolsky 1977). When analysing the simple circulation of commodities Marx sees prices as coming into existence in general when the production of commodities is organised on the basis of a division of labour and this division of labour is mediated by exchange. That is to say, when commodities are produced regularly for exchange in the context of a division of labour they acquire a form which indicates they have a certain exchangeable worth with other commodities (or things) – the price form. The price form is in the first instance the bodily form of the other commodities that each commodity exchanges for, but gradually becomes the bodily form of the commodities most frequently traded (bags of corn, metal objects), and, eventually, the bodily form of a particular commodity, the money commodity, which is usually a metal because of its homogeneity, divisibility, durability, and transportability. When the exchangeable worth of a commodity acquires the money form, the price form becomes the money price form. The worth of commodities in relation to one another is shown through their relation to one and the same commodity: money. This understanding of the formation of prices leads Marx to see their fundamental purpose as one of facilitating the reproduction of commodities. Prices do this by enabling producers to acquire the necessary inputs and means of sustenance through the sale of their commodities to continue production of them.

When Marx moves to the formation of prices in capitalism, he seeks to show that their formation involves the formation of a profit on the basis of unpaid labour for the representative capitalist firm, and takes place in the context of competition between individual firms within and between sectors. He argues that competition within sectors gives rise to the formation of standard prices for standard products which are produced using standard technologies, and that competition between sectors gives rise to the appropriation of an economy-wide average rate of profit by producers of standard products in all sectors. Marx was at pains to point out, however, that the formation of prices takes place in the context of continuous divergences: divergences between prices for the same generic product; divergences between products of the same generic type; divergences between technologies and methods of production of similar goods; and divergences between rates of profits appropriated by standard producers of a given product in different industries.

Marx's view of the emergence of money is a logical corollary of his view of the formation of prices. Specifically, his view of the formation of prices suggests that money emerges with, and is indispensable to, the formation of prices and the reproduction of commodities which prices facilitate. It performs this role by conferring on commodities homogeneous price magnitudes which permit their owners to acquire the necessary inputs and means of subsistence to reproduce commodities on an expanded scale. That is, it performs this role by reflecting the relative resource costs (labour time) required for reproducing commodities in their prices. It is money's role as a measure of (exchange) value that defines it as money and is the basis for *understanding the determination of its worth as money as opposed to a mere commodity.* The distinction is important when considering the value of money as intrinsically valueless pieces of paper issued by the state.

The Magnitudes of Prices

Naturally, Marx's explanation of the magnitudes of prices follows a similar trajectory to his explanation of the formation of prices. That is, he begins with the explanation of the magnitudes of

prices in the context of the simple reproduction of commodities, and then extends this to take into account the reproduction of commodities in the context of capitalism. It is important to note that he sees the explanation of the former as constituting the essence of the explanation of the latter. When explaining the magnitudes of prices in both settings Marx distinguishes between *relative and money prices,* seeing the explanation of relative price magnitudes as logically prior to the explanation of money price magnitudes and notwithstanding the fact that prices are in the final instance money prices. This is because the explanation of money price magnitudes requires an explanation of the magnitudes of relative prices as well as the magnitudes of the value of money. Although Marx also makes a distinction between *long- and short-run movements* in the magnitudes of prices, he makes this distinction explicit only when explaining (changes in) the magnitudes of prices in capitalism.

Explaining the Magnitudes of Relative Prices

At the heart of Marx's explanation of the magnitudes of relative prices in the context of the simple circulation of commodities is the notion that production on the basis of a division of labour involves the expenditure of social (although not necessarily equivalent) labour time which causes the products produced by this labour to have worth or value in relation to one another, with this worth reflecting the relative social labour time required for their production. When exchange comes to mediate the division of labour, the products of labour acquire the form of exchangeable worth, or the price form, and the labour time expended becomes additionally (in addition to being social) qualitatively equivalent units of simple general (abstract) labour time. It is magnitudes of this simple abstract social labour that fundamentally regulate the exchange ratios between the products of labour or commodities (Marx calls products 'commodities' when they assume the price form). What constitutes basic or simple abstract labour time will vary over time and geographic space, and will ultimately depend on the particular socio-economic setting.

When Marx moves to the explanation of the relative magnitudes of prices in the context of capitalism, he distinguishes between long- and short-run movements in the magnitudes of prices, and focuses in the first instance on the former notwithstanding the fact that he sees short-run movements as having a bearing on long-run trends. Focusing on long-run trends in relative price magnitudes, Marx seeks to show that the fundamental determinant of these trends remains the relative labour time required for the production of the commodity. To do so, he first shows that this labour time comprises the labour time required to produce the (manufactured) inputs into production as well as that expended by workers in the immediate process of production, with the latter equal to the labour required to produce the means of sustenance of the workers as well as a surplus of labour time over and above this (which is equal to that required to produce the goods purchased with the profits). Marx then shows that intrasectoral competition will lead to the prices of the standard products produced in each sector directly reflecting, and being determined by, their values as measured by the average labour time required to produce the bulk of these products in each sector, while inter-sectoral competition will result in the appropriation of an average rate of profit by standard producers in each sector such that the magnitudes of their prices will diverge from the magnitudes of their values. In spite of this divergence values will continue to be the fundamental determinant of the prices. Marx refers to the long-run relative prices which result from competition within sectors as market values and those which result from competition between sectors as prices of production, prices of production being modified market values. Obviously, with inter-sectoral competition it is the prices of production which are seen as deviating from the values of commodities, but still being determined by them.

Before proceeding it is necessary at this juncture to digress a little and pay some attention to one of the two alleged Achilles heels of Marx's analysis noted in the introduction: his so-called transformation procedure linking the values of products to their prices of production. This

procedure has been repeatedly criticised by even those sympathetic to Marx's economic analysis on the grounds that it fails to show the link between values and prices of production of commodities because it does not transform input values into prices of production. However, as I have argued elsewhere (see Nicholas 2011: 39–40), this incorrectly interprets what Marx is trying to do with this procedure. It sees him as trying to *calculate* prices in terms of values, when in fact he is trying to *explain* prices in terms of values. If Marx had transformed input values into prices he would have ended up tautologically explaining price by price in the manner of a number of supposed solutions to his transformation problem (see Nicholas 2011: 80, 86–87).

Although Marx sees long-run relative prices as fundamentally determined by relative labour time, and changes in these by changes in the relative productivity of labour in different sectors, his analysis does not preclude the possibility of other factors having a bearing on these long-run trends, including (a) non-productivity-related cost changes, (b) the appropriation of absolute rents, and (c) short-run movements in relative prices arising from demand and supply imbalances. Examples of non-productivity cost changes include sector-specific changes in taxes and/or subsidies and prices of raw materials. They do not include sector-specific changes in wages except in exceptional circumstances (see Marx 1978: 415–416). The appropriation of absolute rents would typically be associated with the behaviour of owners of key raw material inputs such as oil. And short-run movements in relative prices resulting from demand and supply imbalances can also be seen as having a bearing on long-run price trends if they give rise to changes in average methods of production. For example, if the demand for a product greatly exceeds supply such that relative prices correspond to those of the least efficient producers (and not producers producing the bulk of goods) and the majority of producers in the sector appropriate above economy-wide average rates of profit, the resulting inflow of capital into the sector may have some bearing on the average methods of production used in the production of the standard

commodity by the bulk of producers once demand and supply balance is restored (see Nicholas 2011: 39–40).

The Magnitudes of Money Prices

The magnitudes of the relative worth of commodities translate into their worth in relation to money, or money prices, when money mediates exchanges and the worth of commodities is expressed in terms of money. Although Marx recognises that money can assume many forms, ranging from commodity money to intrinsically valueless pieces of paper issued by the state, for the most part he assumes money to be a commodity, arguing that this is the earliest form which money assumes and understanding this form of money captures its essence as money in the process of reproduction of commodities (see Marx 1978: 192). Crucially, Marx argues that when money is a commodity its value, and therefore the level of aggregate commodity money prices, will be given by its value both as a commodity and as money, with the former exerting a gravitational pull on the latter, but the latter also having some bearing on the former (see Nicholas 2011 for an elaboration of this point). As a commodity the value of money is given by the relative labour time required for its production, while as money its value is given by the average labour time of commodities (including labour power) that it circulates over a given period of time. As long as money is a commodity, changes in the value of money and corresponding changes in the aggregate money price level of commodities will be fundamentally due to changes in the relative productivity of labour in the sector producing the money commodity This means that when money is a commodity inflation will mostly be due to a rise in productivity in the money-producing sector.

As with other commodities, so with the commodity that performs the role of money, its trend value can also be influenced by nonproductivity-related relative cost changes in the sector producing the money commodity, the appropriation of an absolute rent by producers of the money commodity, and short- run movements in it caused by demand and supply imbalances. The demand

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and supply imbalances pertain to aggregate demand for, and supply of, all commodities, including labour power, and are brought about by changes in the desire of producers to hold money (or various financial assets) as opposed to repurchasing the necessary inputs to reproduce the commodity. Such imbalances in the supply of, and demand for, all commodities are mirrored by an excess supply of, and demand for, money. An excess demand for all commodities, implying an excess supply of money, would result in a fall in the exchange value of money below its value as a commodity, with attendant consequences for the latter resulting from capital flows into and out of the money-producing sector. The fall in the exchange value of money below its value is typically facilitated by the substitution of money in the performance of its function as medium of circulation by credit and tokens of itself. As long as money is a commodity, however, the extent of this divergence between the exchange value and value of money, and the corresponding impact of the short-run movements in the exchange value of money on its value, will be limited. Money's value as a commodity will anchor its value as money.

Marx denied, however, that increases in aggregate money prices could be due to an increase in the value of labour power over and above that warranted by labour productivity increases. This is because he saw the value of labour power falling with increases in productivity, and believed that where this was not the case it would result in falls in the general rate of profits. Marx also denied that the value of money could be influenced, let alone fundamentally determined, by an increase in the quantity of money in circulation. This is because pivotal to his explanation of money prices is the notion that money measures the exchange value of commodities and confers this worth on them in the form of certain magnitudes of money prices prior to their, and its own, entry into circulation. This means that for Marx commodities would always enter circulation with given money prices, and money with a given value. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of credit and various substitutes of money facilitating an expanded circulation of

commodities and giving rise to a divergence of the exchange value of money from its value.

The preceding interpretation of Marx's analysis of money as commodity money, and particularly his explanation of its value as money, suggests that there is in principle no problem with extending this analysis to take into account money as intrinsically valueless pieces of paper issued by the state, especially once it is recognised that even when money is a commodity a distinction needs to be drawn between its worth as a commodity and its worth as money, and that the latter does not require money to itself have worth. Indeed, since money's worth as money is given by the average labour time of commodities it circulates, the possession by it of intrinsic worth is unnecessary as long as what functions as money is accepted as having command over goods and services.

The implication of this view of the determination of the magnitude of value of intrinsically valueless paper money is that there will be a tendency for the value of this money to fall over time. This tendency arises from the fact that, on the one hand, there is no longer an anchor for the value of money when it is intrinsically valueless pieces of paper issued by the state and, on the other hand, this sort of money is more readily made available to validate the expansion of tokens of itself and credit than is the case with commodity money. This tendency for the value of money to fall will however be fundamentally conditioned by changes in average labour productivity levels in the production of all commodities. Increases in the growth of average labour productivity levels of all commodities would typically exert a downward pressure on the rate of fall in the value of money and corresponding rate of increase in the aggregate money price level, while falls in average labour productivity levels would ease this downward pressure. As in the case of commodity money, changes in costs and imbalances in supply and demand can also have a bearing on the value of money and the aggregate money price level. In the case of costs what matters is non-productivity-related real costs affecting the production of most commodities. In the case of supply and demand imbalances the important thing to note is that

where these imbalances induce a fall in the value of money – a rise in the money prices of commodities – there is no counterbalance redressing this fall. Indeed, the tendency is for a continuous fall in the value of money, with monetary authorities accommodating the increase in demand for money when it arises.

Extending Marx's Theory of Price and Money to the International Level

When extending Marx's explanation of prices and money to the international level it is again necessary to begin with how these prices are formed and how the money that facilitates the international trade of commodities, that is, world money, emerges. It is this starting point that provides the basis for the explanation of the magnitudes of international prices and changes in these.

International Price Formation and the Emergence of International Money

International prices reflect the relative worth of commodities being exchanged between residents of different countries. They are formed whenever such exchange takes place. As long as this exchange is *ad hoc*, the exchange ratio between the traded commodities will vary over time and space, being determined largely by the relative strength of demand in relation to the availability of the traded items. However, once this trade becomes more regular and more integral to the reproduction of commodities in the different countries, the traded commodities increasingly acquire international values measured by international labour time, with the international exchange ratios between the commodities increasingly reflecting these values. Where the exchange is between capitalist countries, the exchange ratios reflect what can be referred to as international market values, and when capital becomes increasingly mobile between the trading capitalist countries, they reflect what can be referred to as international prices of production.

With the development of exchange between countries money breaks out of its national confines and serves increasingly to measure the international exchangeable worth of commodities. When this happens the international exchange ratios between commodities assume the form of money – world money. As with money within national boundaries so with money flowing between countries: it initially assumes the form of a commodity. With the increasing development of commercial and financial links between countries, this form gives way to the form of the paper issued by the state of the most economically powerful country – that country whose paper currency is seen as backed by the largest amount of goods and services. (Carchedi 1991b: 275 argues that world money is issued by the technologically most advanced country. However, there are a number of obvious problems with such a view, not the least of which is that it is difficult to establish what might constitute technological leadership among advanced countries.)

What this view of the emergence of world money suggests most importantly is that the formation of international value does not require either the international flow of labour or capital between countries, or even that the trading countries are capitalist. All that is required is that the products traded become integral to the reproduction of commodities in the trading countries. It also suggests that the opening up of trade between countries does not lead to their specialisation in the production of particular commodities. Rather, it implies the gradual integration of the producers of the various countries engaged in trade into a more extensive division of labour. Although producers in certain countries may have certain cost advantages in the production of certain goods, these are unlikely to lead to a complete specialisation by each given initial conditions of national self-sustaining reproduction based on national divisions of labour and the requirement of some degree of trade balance between countries in the context of an expansion of trade between them. I will return to this point again in the discussion of Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage and the implications of Marx's analysis for understanding the impoverishment of the present-day

developing countries, but it is perhaps worth noting here that one of the important conclusions that will that emerges in this discussion is that it is not the development of trade *per se* that has led to this impoverishment.

Determination of the Magnitudes of International Prices

In keeping with Marx's explanation of the magnitudes of prices in general, an explanation of their magnitudes in process of international exchange needs to be founded on a distinction between relative and money prices as well as between trends in these prices and short-run deviations from the trends. Again, the starting point has to be an explanation of trends in the magnitudes of relative prices.

Relative International Prices

The international prices whose magnitudes need to be explained in the first instance are those formed in the context of *recurrent* trade between countries. The magnitudes of these prices are explained by the relative international values of the traded commodities, whether or not there is international labour or capital mobility. The international relative value or worth of commodities is measured by the average labour time required to produce the bulk of the commodities traded, allowing for skill and productivity differences. Marx notes that more skilful and/or productive labour counts as labour which is productive of a higher value than less skilful and productive labour because the former produces more commodities and/or commodities of a higher quality in the same time (see Marx 1976: 524–525; Marx notes that more productive labour can imply more skilful or hard-working labour, but will for the most part result from labour working with more advanced technology and possibly better-quality natural resources). A change in the relative national levels of skill and productivity of labour will affect the international value of goods exported by a country only if its producers account for the bulk of trade in these types of goods. If the producers do not account for the

bulk of goods of a certain type exported, increases in productivity will only translate into higher profits for these producers.

Although the logic of Marx's general analysis most certainly suggests that trend movements in the relative prices of internationally traded commodities need to be seen as dominated by relative productivity changes in the sector producing these commodities, whether this production is specific to one country or not, it does not preclude other factors having a bearing on relative international price trends in much the same way, and for the same reasons, as was argued above in respect of the general analysis. Specifically, it does not preclude the influence on these trends of non-productivity-related costs, absolute rents, and demand and supply imbalances. The non-productivity cost changes, absolute rents, and demand and supply imbalances which are of significance for trend movements in international relative prices would be those pertaining to the countries producing the bulk of the traded commodities of any given type. Since in the case of demand and supply imbalances their significance for trend movements in relative prices depends on the consequences which the forces accompanying the short-run movement of international prices have for the standard methods of producing the internationally trade commodity, the extent to which capital and technology is mobile will also have a bearing on this.

The logic of Marx's analysis suggests that trend movements in the values and prices of internationally *traded goods* will also exert an influence on the values and prices of *non-traded goods*, with the extent depending on the importance of non-traded goods in the reproduction of all domestically produced commodities, including labour power. This in turn means that the more open to trade the economy, the greater this influence is likely to be, with obvious implications for fully specialised and internationally integrated economies such as the present-day developing countries (see below).

The Value of World Money and the Aggregate World Money Price Level

The magnitudes of international money prices are determined by the magnitudes of relative

international prices and the international exchange value of money which facilitates the international circulation of commodities. The determinants of the magnitudes of relative international prices have been explained above. What is now required is an explanation of the magnitude of value of money which circulates commodities internationally. When explaining the international exchange value of money which facilitates the international circulation of commodities the point of departure is the exchange value of international or world money and not the international exchange value of national currencies (the determination of the international exchange values of national currencies – their rates of exchange with other currencies – is beyond the scope of the present study, but follows from the logic of the analysis being developed in it). This is because what facilitates trade between countries is something that is itself traded internationally and represents international worth. (Some Marxist commentators, e.g. Carchedi 1991b, have argued that explanation of world money prices requires an explanation of the international exchange values of national currencies, or exchange rates. However, the position taken in this essay is that it is world money and not national monies *per se* that facilitates international trade and confers comparable international exchangeable worth on commodities. Hence, it is the explanation of the value and exchange value of world money and not the values and exchange values of national currencies that is the appropriate point of departure for the analysis of international price formation and the determination of its magnitude.) As noted above, what initially facilitates trade between countries is a metal such as gold, but it eventually becomes the intrinsically valueless paper money issued by the monetary authorities of economically powerful countries. And, as in the case of commodity money so in the case of international paper money, for ease of international commerce the tendency will be for one world money to dominate, although for certain purposes and in certain settings paper monies of other countries can be seen to be acceptable substitutes.

When international money is a commodity its international value is determined by both its value as an internationally traded commodity (the relative international labour time required for its production) and its value as world money (the average amount of labour time it commands in the process of international exchange). There can, and normally will, be a divergence between the two, but as long as world money is a commodity the former exerts a gravitational pull on the latter, notwithstanding the fact that the latter will have a bearing on the former. Taking gold as international money, if its international exchange value as money falls below its relative international value as a commodity, for instance because of its replacement in the process of international circulation by tokens, the value of gold will increasingly correspond to the international value of gold produced by more efficient producers. This in turn will result in some of the more inefficient producers moving out of gold production. The resulting contraction in gold production will eliminate the excess supply of gold and lead to some reversal of the fall in the international exchange value of gold. If faith is shaken in the tokens of gold circulating internationally, the reversal may even result in a rise in the value of gold. In any case, the international exchange value of gold, or rather its international value as money, will have a bearing on its international value as a commodity.

In one of the few passages by Marx on the value of world money he argues that its worth can vary between countries in the sense of commanding more or less international labour time in different countries than the international average (see Marx 1976: 702). He argues that in more productive countries it will command less international labour time (the value of international money will be higher) and more international labour time in less productive countries (the value of international money will be lower). This means that, for Marx, as the relative productivity of a country increases the prices of its commodities in terms of international money will fall in relation to that of other countries, but the divergence will obviously be limited by the tendency of international money to exchange with commodities in the same ratios in different countries – the law of one price.

Although from the perspective of Marx's analysis the fundamental determinant of long-term trends in the aggregate world money price level is the relative productivity of labour in the production of world money, for reasons given above in the discussion of the value of money in general this does not preclude other factors having a bearing on these trends. Of note are, once again, non-productivity-related relative cost changes in the countries producing the bulk of gold, the appropriation of absolute rents by the producers of gold, and global aggregate demand and supply imbalances. Demand and supply imbalances can be conceived of as arising from changes in the propensity of those engaged in international commerce to purchase internationally traded commodities as opposed to holding on to gold (or purchasing financial assets with it). A concomitant of these aggregate demand and supply imbalances is, therefore, imbalances in the supply and demand for gold, and their consequence is deviations of the international exchange value of gold from its value. These deviations are facilitated by international credit and/or the international circulation of tokens of gold (e.g. silver), and can be seen as impacting on the international value of gold in the manner outlined above.

In the references to world money that Marx makes in his published writings he certainly assumes it to be a commodity, and in particular gold. However, in the same way as Marx's general analysis of money does not preclude its extension to intrinsically valueless paper issued by the state, so the analysis of world money as gold should not be seen as precluding an extension of this analysis to world money as the intrinsically worthless paper money issued by the state of a particular country.

When world money is the paper of a particular country its value is determined by both the average international labour time of the commodities that it commands in international trade and the average international labour time of the goods it commands in the domestic circulation of the country issuing the world paper money. In the final instance it is the latter that will dominate movements in the former, although the former can have a bearing on the latter. This means that the fundamental determinant of changes in the value of world paper money and level of world money prices is changes in the relative labour productivity of the country issuing the paper (see also Carchedi 1991b). Taking the US dollar as world money, an increase in the world rate of inflation and fall in the relative worth of the US dollar would mostly result from a slower growth in US labour productivity and, conversely, a fall in world inflation would mostly be due to a relative rise in US labour productivity. Of note in this context is that relative changes in aggregate output are seen as having no bearing on the relative international value of the world paper currency and world inflation rate since, from the perspective of Marx's analysis, the quantity of money in circulation will adjust to the amount and prices of goods in domestic circulation.

As in the case of a world commodity money, so with a world paper money, one can certainly conceive of the exchangeable worth of this money varying between countries, and in particular between the country issuing the world paper money and the rest of the world, along the lines noted above in the context of world commodity money. But again, the extent of the deviation will be limited by the tendency for prices in terms of world money to be equal in different countries (the law of one price).

Other factors affecting the world money price level in the context of a world paper money would be relative unit cost changes and aggregate demand and supply imbalances in the world-money-issuing country (absolute rent has no bearing on the relative worth of world money when it is not a produced commodity). The cost changes that matter are non-productivity-related relative international unit costs of the world-moneyissuing country. In the context of the current global economic system and the dollar as world money, one can imagine that the discovery of shale gas in the US and the prohibition of its export can exert downward pressure on its relative unit costs of production, resulting in upward pressure on the relative international worth of the US dollar and corresponding downward pressure on the world rate of inflation in US dollar terms.

The deviations in the aggregate demand for and supply of commodities that matter pertain to domestic and global imbalances. Since, as noted above, the value of the world currency is more fundamentally given by the international value of the goods it circulates in the world-money-issuing country, of greater significance for the short-run and trend value of this currency would be aggregate demand and supply imbalances in the money-issuing country, with part of the excess demand resulting in trade imbalances. Again, assuming world paper money to be the US dollar, an excess demand for commodities *in the US* would result in a rise in the US money price level and downward pressure on the exchange value of the US dollar pushing it below trend. Both would exert an upward pressure on global prices in dollar terms. These would in turn result in trend upward movements in world money prices only if the accompanying expansions in credit and tokens of money were validated by domestic increases in US dollars. An excess *world demand* for commodities would exert a similar upward pressure on world money prices in dollar terms, but the extent to which this would translate into a rise in trend world US dollar prices would depend on the extent to which the accompanying world demand for US dollars was accommodated through, say, the running of an expanded trade deficit, capital outflows, and US dollar loans (swaps) to other world central banks (interest rate differentials between countries would have a bearing on short-term movements in the world money price level via its impact on the balance between global demand and supply). This is not to say that the value of the US dollar and the level of world prices in US dollar terms is dependent upon the injection of US dollars into the global economic system, since the US monetary authorities cannot simply inject money into the global system irrespective of the demand for this money.

Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage

Ricardo developed his explanation of international prices in the context of expounding his doctrine of comparative advantage. This doctrine endeavours to show that the liberalisation of trade between countries would, or should, lead producers in the trading countries to specialise in the production of goods they have a natural comparative advantage in *vis-à-vis* other countries (see Ricardo 1973: 81). Trade on the basis of such specialization would result in gains for all countries specialising and engaging in trade in the sense that each would save on domestic labour time that needs to be expended in the provision of the same amount of goods consumed domestically. In expounding this theory Ricardo is insistent that, unlike domestic relative prices, the relative prices of internationally traded goods would not depend on relative labour times, that is, they would not depend on international labour times. This is because for him the labour expended in different countries cannot be considered as comparable in the absence capital flows between them (1973: 81–83). There cannot be any such thing as international labour times in the absence of international capital flows. Instead, Ricardo sees the magnitudes of the relative prices of internationally traded commodities as settling somewhere between their autarchic pre-specialisation levels in the trading countries as determined by relative national labour times embodied in the production of the commodities. To illustrate his argument Ricardo uses trade between England and Portugal (see Table 1). He argues that with the opening up of trade between the two countries the relative international prices of cloth and wine will eventually settle somewhere between 1:1.2 and 1:0.9 – the autarchic relative prices of the two commodities in England and Portugal, with the exact ratio being indeterminate. Assuming that trade and specialisation results in England producing cloth and Portugal wine as per their comparative advantages in the production of the two goods, if the international exchange ratio of cloth to wine came to rest at 1:1 (i.e. between the two autarchic price ratios), then trade on the basis of specialisation would see England saving 20 domestic hours of labour time per unit of wine consumed domestically and Portugal saving 10 hours of domestic labour time per unit of cloth consumed domestically.

Both countries would have gained from trade and specialisation.

As a number of commentators have pointed out (e.g. Shaikh 1979), Ricardo certainly recognises that it is not relative but money prices that directly regulate international trade between countries and eventually give rise to the specialisation by each in production. That is to say, he recognises that trade and specialisation are not directly based on *comparative* advantage (reflecting relative national prices) but on *absolute* advantage (reflecting world money prices). However, he argues that comparative advantage translates into absolute advantage through the flow of world money between countries and the requirement for balance in this trade over the long run. For Ricardo it does this via a quantity theory type of mechanism whereby the inflows or outflows of world money cause all world money prices to rise or fall in the trading countries (see Shaikh 1979: 287–289). Hence, in the final instance, it is comparative advantage that determines patterns of trade and specialisation. Table 2 illustrates the results of this quantity mechanism in Ricardo's example when money flows from England to Portugal after the opening up of trade. Since Portugal is seen as having an absolute advantage in the production of both goods at the point of the opening up of trade, it will export both goods to England in the first instance. The resulting trade deficit will be paid for by a flow of gold from England to Portugal. The consequence of this flow is argued by Ricardo to be a rise in gold prices of all commodities produced in Portugal and corresponding fall of all gold prices of commodities produced in England (in this specific example by 10%). Relative prices of cloth and wine in each country will however remain the same. This process will continue until English producers become competitive in the production of cloth and export enough of it for there to be balance in the money value of trade flows between in the two countries.

From the perspective of the Marxist theory of international price and money developed above, Ricardo's theory can be argued to be fundamentally flawed in a number of important respects. Firstly, it suggests that Ricardo mistakenly denies the determination of international prices by international values measured by international labour time in the absence of capital mobility because he appears to have a mistaken view of how prices and values come to be formed. That is to say, it is not the mobility of capital, or even its existence, that explains the formation of prices, but rather production based on a division of labour mediated by exchange. For Marx, as soon as a good becomes integral to *the reproduction of an economic system based on exchange,* the labour expended in its

Marx's Theory of International Price and Money: An Interpretation, Table 1 Ricardo's example of trade between England and Portugal in cloth and wine

Before trade	Cloth (hours labour per unit)	Cloth gold price (oz)	Wine (hours labour per unit)	Wine gold price (oz)	Price ratio
England	100	50	120	60	1:1.2
Portugal	90	45	80	40	1:0.9

Note: 1 oz of gold = 2 hours of labour time in both England and Portugal
Source: Adapted from Shaikh 1979: 287

Marx's Theory of International Price and Money: An Interpretation, Table 2 The consequences of the opening of trade between England and Portugal

After trade	Cloth (hours labour per unit)	Cloth gold price	Wine (hours labour per unit)	Wine gold price	Price ratio
England	100	45	120	54	1:1.2
Portugal	90	49.5	80	44	1:0.9

Note: 1 oz gold = 2.2 hours of labour time in England; 1 oz of gold = 1.8 hours of labour time in Portugal
Source: Adapted from Shaikh 1979: 287

production becomes part of the labour required for the reproduction of the whole system and qualitatively equivalent to all other labour expended in the production of all other goods which are similarly integral to the reproduction of the economic system. The existence of capital is premised on the expenditure of part of the labour in the production of all commodities as surplus labour – labour over and above the labour required to produce the wage goods of labour – and manifest in the magnitude of price containing a profit component. The mobility of capital leads to the profit component being equalised across all sectors – prices becoming prices of production. It does not cause commodities to have either worth or prices. Hence, as soon as trade becomes integral to the reproduction of the economic systems of the trading countries, the goods traded represent international value or worth measured by international labour time and the magnitudes of the (relative) international prices of these goods come to be determined by the magnitudes of their (relative) international values. The fact that the firms exporting products are capitalist means only that the prices of the internationally traded commodities contain a profit component. The fact that capital is internationally mobile means only that this profit component corresponds to a certain international average rate of profit, and the prices of the internationally traded products become international prices of production. All of this means that if Portuguese producers of both cloth and wine produce the bulk of commodities for both the Portuguese and English markets, the values of the goods produced in Portugal will become the international values of these commodities, and it is these values that will determine the relative domestic prices of the traded products in England. That is, after the opening up of trade, and assuming all commodities are traded, the relative prices of cloth and wine in England will be those determined by Portuguese producers of both commodities. The relative prices of cloth to wine in England will move from 1:1.2 to 1:0.9.

Secondly, Ricardo is mistaken to argue that the movement of gold between countries would result in changes in its value in each country and a corresponding proportionate change in the gold

prices of commodities in each. The opening up of international trade between England and Portugal can certainly be expected to give rise to a fall in the gold prices of both cloth and wine in England, but only because these are the prices of the two goods set by Portuguese exporters of these. In fact, the gold price of wine will fall by proportionately more than that of cloth in England, contrary to what one would expect from a quantity theory type of mechanism at work. That is, unit gold prices of cloth in England fall from 50 to 45 ounces of gold while the unit price of wine falls from 60 to 40 ounces of gold. The fall in the gold prices in England has nothing to do with the implied outflow of gold from it since there is also a change in the relative price of both, much as there is no reason to suppose that the corresponding inflow of gold into Portugal would result in a rise in gold prices in it. This is because, once it is accepted that gold, like all internationally traded commodities, has a certain international price (an exchange ratio with all other commodities) determined by its international value, there is no reason to suppose that the flow of gold between England and Portugal would lead to the relative (international) labour time commanded by the gold falling in England and rising in Portugal (from 1 oz gold to 2 hours labour time in each to 1 oz of gold to 2.2 hours in England and 1 oz gold to 1.8 hours in Portugal) as is implied by Ricardo's quantity theory adjustment mechanism. The gold money prices of traded commodities and international value of gold in both England and Portugal will remain the same after the flow of gold between them.

This does not mean that there would be no tendency towards adjustments of the imbalances between England and Portugal, or even that the flow of money has no part to play in any adjustment. Rather, it suggests that the adjustments will come primarily from relative changes in productivity in England and Portugal (especially England as the deficit country) and/or patterns of trade between them. In the case of Ricardo's example this would mean that for England to begin exporting cloth to Portugal it would have to produce and sell cloth at, or below, the prices of Portuguese producers – that is, 45 ounces of gold

per unit. To the extent that the flow of money has an impact on the required adjustments, it would be through their impact on relative productivities – increasing the pressure on English producers to improve their productivity.

Lastly, the Marxist analysis presented above suggests that trade *per se* would not lead to the sort of complete specialisation postulated by Ricardo given initial conditions of self-sufficient national reproduction based on national divisions of labour and the requirement of a certain balance in trade between countries as trade between them develops, and notwithstanding some lending by surplus to deficit countries. Rather, the expansion of trade can be expected to lead to the *gradual* integration of the producers of the trading countries into a more extensive international division of labour in which producers in the different trading countries produce and export commodities in which they have natural or acquired advantages. This can most certainly be expected to have some corrosive effect on self-sufficient national reproduction systems. However, even if the producers of a particular country dominate the international sales of a particular product, the likelihood is that there will be a number of producers of the same product in other countries, some of whom may be using the same technologies and appropriating similar profits, while others will be using inferior technologies and appropriating lower levels of profits (see also Shaikh 1980). Some producers using inferior technologies may also be appropriating the same rate of profit as more efficient producers owing to their proximity to markets and various taxes and surcharges facing importers of these products. Moreover, with the flow of capital and technology between countries in the context of international competition between producers (and support by national states), initial patterns of specialisation are likely to change. Historically, the sort of complete specialisation envisaged by Ricardo has been the result of its imposition on the present-day developing countries by the present-day advanced countries during the early phases of the industrialisation of the latter and in the context of the destruction of the existing self-sufficient systems of reproduction in the former (see, for example, Kemp 1989, 1993). These are patterns of specialisation which the advanced countries

have sought to continue right up to the present through a myriad of economic, financial, and political pressures. They are not the natural outcomes of the development of trade, not even trade in the context of uneven development. (It needs noting that some Marxists appear to agree with the logic of Ricardo's explanation of specialisation, i.e. that it is the natural consequence of the expansion of international trade in the absence of capital and technology mobility, only denying that it gives rise to the sort of complete specialisation envisaged by him; see e.g. Shaikh 1980.)

Of note in this context is that pivotal to Ricardo's argument that countries specialising and trading with one another will gain, or at least not lose, is the implicit assumption that each country can revert to the production of the imported good should the international terms of trade they face be less favourable than the domestic terms of trade that existed prior to trade and specialisation. In terms of Ricardo's example of trade and specialisation between England and Portugal, this would mean that if England is not able to import wine at more than 0.83 units for each unit of cloth it exports it can revert to the production of wine and, similarly, if Portugal is not able to import cloth at more than 0.89 units for each unit of wine it exports it can revert to the domestic production of cloth. The important point is that England and Portugal are assumed to be able to revert to pre-trade and pre-specialisation patterns of production. If either England or Portugal could not revert to the domestic production of the imported good, then the logic of Ricardo's analysis suggests that there is in fact no limit to the movement of relative international prices in one direction or another and, therefore, no reason to suppose that countries will not lose from trade and specialisation. This fact has, of course, particular significance in the context of the above-mentioned imposition of patterns of specialisation on the present-day developing countries. These imposed patterns of specialisation, in the context of the destruction of self-reproducing systems of reproduction, in fact denied the present-day developing countries precisely this possibility (some degree of self-sufficient domestic reproduction) and, as a consequence, allowed the non-specialising countries, the advanced countries, to

exert continuous downward pressure on the international prices and values of commodities exported by the developing countries, and via this to increase the absolute and relative intensification of labour in these countries (see also Kühne 1979). It is the enforced and sustained patterns of specialisation in the developing countries in the context of the destruction of their national systems of reproduction that have been the real sources of their impoverishment and not, for example, their alleged lower levels of productivity as claimed by a number of Marxist writers on the subject (see, for example, Carchedi 1991a; Shaikh 1980; Warren 1973). Indeed, it is an understanding of this fact that has also pointed to two of the important pillars of more successful development strategies adopted by a number of (mostly East Asian) developing countries in recent times: food security and the diversification of their production and export bases. (In an extensive empirical study of development processes in the developing countries, Rodrik 2007 provides considerable evidence to show that economic development requires, among other things, diversification, not specialisation.)

Concluding Remarks

The preceding has sought to contribute to the extension of Marx's theories of price and money to the international level. It was argued that pivotal to this extension is an understanding of Marx's views on how prices are formed and, concomitantly, how money emerges and the role it plays in price formation. Marx's understanding of how prices are formed in general permits an understanding of how, with the development of international trade, international prices come to be formed and their relative magnitudes determined by relative international labour time, without any presumption of capital flows between countries. International capital flows have a bearing only on the magnitudes of relative international prices, not on their existence. Marx's understanding of how money emerges and contributes to price formation in general permits an understanding of the emergence of world money and the determination of its value as well as the world money prices of

commodities, denying most fundamentally any quantity theory mechanism related to world money flows between countries. Neither the value of world money nor world money prices in different countries change as a result of flows of money between countries.

This interpretation of the extension of Marx's theories of price and money to the international level was then used to consider Ricardo's explanation of international prices and money in the context of his theory of comparative advantage. It was argued that from the perspective of Marx's analysis Ricardo's explanation of international prices and money is fundamentally mistaken, as is his view that the opening up of trade between countries should lead to their complete specialisation with gains for all. Ricardo's explanation of relative international price is mistaken in that he sees relative international prices as determined in the final instance by the autarchic prices of the trading countries. He explicitly denies that international relative prices, unlike domestic relative prices, are determined by the (international) labour time required for their production on the basis of the mistaken view that such a determination requires international capital mobility. From the perspective of Marx's analysis what Ricardo fails to see is that once international trade becomes integral to the reproduction of different commodities in different countries the traded commodities acquire international values or relative international worth as measured by the relative international labour time required for their production. Ricardo's explanation of world money and world money prices is mistaken in that he sees, on the one hand, world money as reflecting the national worth of this money and not its international worth, and, on the other hand, this national worth as determined by the quantity of world money in circulation in any country in relation to the goods it circulates. The problem with this view is that it suggests world money can have a different worth in different countries and that this worth can change with flows of money between countries. From the perspective of Marx's analysis what Ricardo fails to see is that world money has basically a single world value which is determined by the international labour time required for its

production when it is a commodity, and the international labour time it commands when it is paper issued by a particular country. Flows of money between countries will not cause this value to change in the different countries. Finally, from the perspective of the extension of Marx's analysis to the international level Ricardo can be argued to be mistaken in seeing the opening up of trade leading to complete specialisation. This is because he fails to see that specialisation in the context of the opening up of trade is limited by the need for some semblance of balance in trade flows between trading countries in the process of the expansion of trade, especially given initial conditions of self-sufficient national reproduction. Indeed, complete specialisation would be found only where the national reproduction systems are ruptured and specialisation imposed, as in the case of present-day developing countries. The consequence of the imposition of specialisation patterns in the context of ruptured systems of reproduction is that the prices and values of the exports from these countries are subject to continuous downward pressure, something which is implicitly denied by Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage on the basis of the tacit assumption that all trading countries can revert to the production of all goods should they not obtain the relative prices they desire.

Cross-References

▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism
▶ Third Worldism and Marxism

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Marxian Political Economy

Marxism

Marxism and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Finance capital; Imperialism; Marxism; Neo-colonialism; New imperialism

Definition

The relationship between Marxism and imperialism has been established since the writings of Marx himself. However, the Marxian study of imperialism since then has developed from a belief that, while some analysis of imperialism was present in the works of Marx, a dedicated analysis of the state and the international sphere had been left at an embryonic stage. The phenomenon of imperialism, while discussed by Marx in a number of instances, was not given the same sustained critical attention as other issues in his work. Imperialism, therefore, to Marxism has always been a 'problem' of some form. Indeed, the 'problem' of imperialism derives from a number of perceived sources: gaps in Marx's own writing; an explanation for why capitalism endures; an account of the phenomenon of globalisation. This essay contends that the ongoing relationship between Marxism and imperialism reveals one of Marxism's main strengths, and its clear weaknesses. It reveals Marxism's capacity to explain new phenomena coupled with a rigorous and critical method; however, it also reveals a reliance on systemic explanations for contingent developments, and a considerable partisanship among radical thinkers. This chapter on the relationship between Marxism and imperialism begins early in the twentieth century with the work of the 'classical' authors of imperialism, building on the work of Marx and critiquing extant understandings of imperialism, particularly John Hobson's. It then charts the origins of this relationship and its various iterations throughout the twentieth century until the present. This relationship has, fundamentally, changed very little, deriving largely from Marx's own work, and the work of the first Marxist theorists of imperialism. Indeed, the relationship is largely iterative rather than developmental, with particular ideas within Marxist theories of imperialism recurring perpetually. The essay is split into three sections according to various 'phases' of Marxist thought on imperialism: first, the 'classical' Marxists, from Hilferding to Lenin; second, the 'neo-colonialist' thinkers; and finally, the theorists of 'new imperialism', assessing the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each critical phase.

The relationship between Marxism and imperialism has been established since the writings of Marx himself. Particularly in *Capital, Volume I*, Marx discusses the international division of labour caused by the expansion of capital in Chapter 15, English capital in Ireland in

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Chapter 25, as well as engaging with a theory of colonialism in Chapter 33 (1992a/1867). Marx's own views on both colonialism and imperialism have been well discussed in critical analysis of both his well- and lesser-known texts, many of which are presented in the compendium text *On Colonialism* (Marx and Engels 2001; see also Nimtz 2002; Pradella 2013). However, the study of imperialism post-Marx grew from a belief that, while some analysis of imperialism was present in the works of Marx, a dedicated analysis of the state and the international sphere had been left at an embryonic stage. This is broadly true, but this view has received criticism based on historiographical analysis of both Marx and the earliest authors on imperialism (Pradella 2013). The phenomenon of imperialism, while still discussed by Marx in a number of instances, was not given the same sustained critical attention as other issues in his work. This is the point at which Marxism's engagement with imperialism becomes more profound and substantial. Imperialism, therefore, to Marxism has always been a 'problem' of some form.

Indeed, the 'problem' of imperialism derives from a number of perceived sources: gaps in Marx's own writing; an explanation for why capitalism endures; an account of the phenomenon of globalisation. It is the contention of this essay, then, that the ongoing relationship between Marxism and imperialism reveals one of Marxism's main strengths, and its clear weaknesses. It reveals Marxism's capacity to explain new phenomena coupled with a rigorous and critical method; however, it also reveals a reliance on systemic explanations for contingent developments, and a considerable partisanship between radical thinkers.

This relationship between Marxism and imperialism therefore begins early in the twentieth century with the work of the 'classical' authors of imperialism, building on the work of Marx and critiquing extant understandings of imperialism, particularly John Hobson's. This chapter charts the origins of this relationship and its various iterations throughout the twentieth century until the present. This relationship has, fundamentally, changed very little, deriving largely from Marx's own work, and the work of the first Marxist theorists of imperialism. Indeed, the relationship is iterative rather than developmental, with particular ideas within Marxist theories of imperialism recurring perpetually. Most notably, the overarching power of Finance, or monopoly capital, within capitalism, and the idea of imperialism as a qualitatively distinct 'stage' of capitalist development are extremely powerful ideas within the tradition of Marxist theories of imperialism.

The essay will be split into three sections according to various 'phases' of Marxist thought on imperialism: first, the 'classical' Marxists, from Hilferding to Lenin; second, the 'neo-colonialist' thinkers; and finally, the 'new' imperialists.

The 'Classical' Marxists

The first Marxist theorists of imperialism, writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, sought to link contemporary international political developments to the nature of capitalism itself. The developing tensions between European states, it was argued, resulted from a need for states to secure control over foreign territories as an outlet for surplus capital (Bukharin 2003/1916; Lenin 2010/1916; Luxemburg 1963/1913). Alongside these systemic pressures, the early field of study was also shaped by the role of particular agency, especially financiers and bankers (Hilferding, 1981/1910). A notable division between those regarding capitalism as leading inevitably to conflict, and those who believed that such tendencies could be tamed by social and political reform, was also apparent with this distinction being most clearly articulated by the dialogue between Kautsky (1914) and Lenin (2010/1916).

From Hilferding onwards, however, there emerges the idea that existing Marxist texts lacked an explanation for the phenomenon of imperialism. Hence, Otto Bauer described Hilferding's *Finanzcapital* as the 'fourth volume' of *Capital,* addressing the international and imperial rivalries (and their origins) in a fashion not present in the three volumes of

Capital itself. The explanation for Hilferding (1981/1910) for the development of this phenomenon lies in the relationship between capital and the state, particularly the overwhelming power of monopoly capital over the state.

While Hilferding's approach laid a foundation for an analysis of imperialism, his approach focuses on the unification of capital within the 'metropolis' rather than on an analysis of relationships between states. It is Bukharin who develops, perhaps, the first 'theory' of imperialism, though his reliance on Hilferding's work is clear. Hilferding's imperialism was inextricably linked to the notion of monopoly: the conglomeration of the fractions of capital into finance capital controlled by bankers. Hilferding's understanding of the development of imperialism springs forth from the inherent tendencies of capitalism itself, as well as the personal direction of specific actors.

> A circle of people emerges who, thanks to their own capital resources or to the concentrated power of outside capital which they represent (in the case of bank directors), become members of the boards of directors of numerous corporations. There develops in this way a kind of personal union, on one side among the various corporations themselves, and on the other, between the corporations and the bank. (119–120)

Hilferding (319) then links the power of monopoly capitalism to the inherently crisis-prone nature of capitalism, and the role of the state in resolving those crises:

> As has always been the case, when capital first encounters conditions which contradict its need for valorization, and could only be overcome much too slowly and gradually by purely economic means, it has recourse to the power of the state and uses it for forcible expropriation in order to create the required free wage proletariat.

Hilferding also maintains that while capitalism, as a social relation, may exist everywhere, it is only when a state associated with an 'export capital' is in control of a territory that the process of surplus value extraction is at its most efficient.

> This explains why all capitalists with interests in foreign countries call for a strong state whose authority will protect their interests even in the most remote corners of the globe, and for showing the national flag everywhere so that the flag of trade can also be planted everywhere. (320)

As with Hilferding, subsequent authors also saw a problem of imperialism for Marxism. Lenin introduces Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy* by emphasising that the study of imperialism is the only means to understand political developments of the day:

> The problem of imperialism is not only a most essential one, but, we may say, it is the most essential problem in that realm of economic science which examines the changing forms of capitalism in recent times. Everyone interested not only in economics but in any sphere of present-day social life must acquaint himself with the facts relating to this problem . . . Needless to say that there can be no concrete historical analysis of the present war if that analysis does not have for its basis a full understanding of the nature of imperialism, both from its economic and political aspects. (Bukharin 2003/1915, p. 8)

Following Hilferding, Bukharin (152) argues that not only is monopoly capital important to understanding imperialism but that, without it, imperialism would not be possible. Indeed, this is a view shared by Lenin (2010/1916, p. 46) also, declaring monopoly capital the 'essence' of imperialism. As with Hilferding, Bukharin clearly links imperialism to the valorisation of capital, in that it 'is nothing more but a process of a continuous reproduction of the contradictions of capitalism on an ever wider scale' (Bukharin 2003/1915, p. 153). This is a view shared by all Marxist theorists of imperialism but it is especially clear in the earlier authors, sketching out the link between Marx and the spread of capitalism across the globe. Indeed, as Luxemburg (1963/1913, p. 365) notes, 'capital needs the means of production and the labour power of the whole globe for untrammelled accumulation; it cannot manage without the natural resources and the labour power of all territories'.

While a number of similarities exist within the works of authors on classical imperialism, it is possible to characterise these authors as using very similar methods to understand how capitalism developed a particular form at the beginning of the twentieth century. These methods are, principally, understanding the state as an instrument of the will of bankers, and presenting imperialism as a specific and predetermined period of capitalism (Sutton 2013). Kautsky (1916, p. 18), while also

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offering an instrumentalist conception of the state, avoids the problem of periodisation by emphasising the contingent nature of extant accounts of imperialism, arguing that it is not a pre-determined period of capitalist development. Indeed, Lenin (2010/1916, p. 142) quotes Kautsky in order to criticise his claims of contingency as mere 'Socialist-chauvinist' claptrap:

> Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultraimperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals?

Lenin rejected Kautsky's view since, he argued, states developed unevenly in capitalism and, therefore, national interests were constantly shifting and there could be no stable 'ultra-imperialist' policy, only the ultimately terminal impulsion to competition and conflict of the imperial stage of capital (ibid.). For Lenin, Kautsky had rejected Marx entirely and joined the ranks of 'bourgeois writers', thus leading Lenin to label Kautsky's idea of 'ultraimperialism' as 'ultra-nonsense' (ibid.: 35).

Lenin's argument is clear that imperialism is both a necessary and the highest stage of capitalist development. McDonough (1995, p. 364) argues that Lenin's work, along with the earliest Marxist authors on imperialism, represents the pivotal moment in resolving the 'first crisis of Marxism' as its introduction of a 'stage theory of capitalism' to Marxist thought helped to explain capitalist recovery instead of revolution. However, the subordination of the contingent developments in global society to a deterministic understanding of capitalist development remained highly problematic for these particular understandings of imperialism, especially given that the historical developments of the twentieth century led not to system-destroying warfare but, rather, to something closer to the 'bourgeois' understanding of imperialism held by Kautsky.

However, also problematic within these accounts is the emphasis placed on the role of Finance. These authors are not simply arguing that the power of banks and their domination of the state is a particular or contingent aspect of the imperial form of capitalism, but that it is inextricably linked to an understanding of capitalist production as teleological. In other words, the arguments offered by these early theorists were ill equipped to explain capitalism that did not follow this particular form.

The 'Neo-Colonialist' Thinkers

The historical developments of the early twentieth century, particularly the global wars of the period, devastated the European system of empires. This triggered the demise of the Eurocentric world order, led to the onset of decolonisation, and facilitated the rise of the US. This historical turn, therefore, undermined the original theorists of imperialism. Apparently, not only had European states withdrawn from their empires but the dominant world power was now a self-declared anti-imperial world power. Therefore, the concept was ostracised from the scholarly mainstream during the post-1945 era.

However, imperialism continued to be theorised and accounted for. The main focus was now no longer centred on themes of rivalry and warfare, but on the changing nature of international capitalism, the qualities of the 'world system', and on questions about economic dependency, underdevelopment, and the relations between core and peripheral states (Amin 1977; Arrighi 1994; Baran and Sweezy 1968; Cohen 1973; Frank 1966, 1978, 1980; Frank and Gills 1993; Galtung 1971; Mandel 1975; Wallerstein 1974, 1975, 1980, 1989). However, the continuities between this 'second wave' of scholars and the earlier scholars are quite remarkable. Rather than a revolution in the theorisation of imperialism, these later scholars were highly dependent on the key concepts developed by earlier authors.

The 'second wave' of theories of imperialism occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and is generally synonymous with Dependency Theory and World System Theory (Brewer 1990, p. 161), and developed from earlier ideas of uneven development, monopoly capital, and a stage theory of capitalism (McDonough 2007, p. 258; Soldatenko 1982, p. 41). Amin (1977, p. 112) accepts the Leninist notion that imperialism is the highest stage of

capitalism since it is the most exploitative stage of capitalism, and therefore the 'highest' stage of capitalism.

The authors of the 'second wave' characterised the world economy according to zones of development: core, semi-periphery, and periphery, with surplus value being channelled from periphery to core states. These theories argued that dependent territories are kept in a perpetual state of underdevelopment in the interests of monopoly capital in the core countries. This allows advanced monopoly capital to continue to exploit these territories without competition from native production, and without a working-class consciousness developing there. Where the earliest authors on imperialism emphasised the competition between states, the authors of the 'second wave' emphasised the importance of changes in international capitalism, particularly the dependency and uneven development between core and periphery states (Kettell and Sutton 2013, p. 4). This development in the literature does, to some degree, approximate Kautsky's notion of 'ultraimperialism', in emphasising a harmonisation of interests between 'core', or imperialist, states.

One further development of this characterisation led not just to a typology of states but also to a typology of class. Amin (1977, p. 115) identifies a core working class, and periphery working class, each with its respective bourgeoisie. They can be considered distinct in that they are divided nationally, holding apparently separate cultural and social values and interests. As such, the periphery bourgeoisie can be anti-imperialist allies to the periphery working class; so too can the core working class be pro-imperialist along with their respective bourgeoisie. However, this is an acceptance of the manner in which imperial relations present themselves in capitalism – not as global capitalist relations but rather as the relations between nationally constituted states.

To some extent, then, these approaches diminished the role of agency, focusing instead on the role of the 'world-system' and its typology of states to account for the persistence of capitalism not just in what Hilferding initially referred to as the 'metropolis', but also in the allegedly independent former colonies. Considering the debt owed

to Lenin by these theories, it is not surprising that the emphasis would be on such a structuralist account. The key development of these theories, building on earlier Marxist authors, was to account for an imperialism that was neither formally territorially bounded nor prone to system-threatening competition between imperial states (Song 2011: 293). However, the same problems resurfaced in 'second-wave' accounts as they had in the 'classical' Marxist accounts; namely, a stage theory of history, the role played by monopoly capital, and, therefore, the presentation of contingent developments as necessary aspects of capitalist social relations Furthermore, new problems emerged from the effort to resolve issues with the first theories, particularly a reliance on an explanation of state behaviour that split class along national lines.

The 'New' Imperialists

During the latter years of the twentieth century, the concept of imperialism remained at the academic margins. The principle means of understanding imperialism was now framed in terms of the debate on 'globalisation', particularly from the mid-1970s, which argued that the role and power of the state were being undermined by a hitherto unseen level of capitalist accumulation (Pozo-Martin 2006). The resurgence of imperialism as a field of study during the early years of the twenty-first century was once again linked to an assertion that this form of imperialism was also both qualitatively distinct and unique. Denoting a figurative as well as a literal shift from 'old' to 'new' imperialism, the view from many quarters was that imperialism was not merely 'back' but more profoundly exploitative than ever. There is both a lack of clarity, and some irony, in the term 'New Imperialism' to describe this development in the literature. In terms of the latter, the phrase 'New Imperialism' has been used since the very first dedicated study of imperialism by Hobson (1968/1902) to emphasise that this new 'phase' of imperialism rested both on conflict and competition between empires, as well as the power of finance over the state. Marxist authors on

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imperialism owe a great deal to Hobson's account. In terms of the former, the use of the term 'New Imperialism' in the literature could potentially refer to either a new theoretical approach to understanding imperialism, or a qualitatively distinct form of imperialism (Harvey 2007, p. 57; Kettell and Sutton 2013, pp. 6–20).

David Harvey's account (2003, p. 116) of the New Imperialism highlights the importance of understanding how capital must valorise the role of the state in resolving blockages to the circuit of capital on a global scale. Harvey however relies on the idea of the neo-liberal state, deriving from an apparent caesura in the 1970s, the shift from Fordism to 'flexible' accumulation, and the ensuing turn from modernity to post-modernity, to substantiate his idea of contemporary imperialism. Harvey (1990, p. 124) lays the foundation for this by declaring, 'the contrasts between present political-economic practices and those of the post-war boom period are sufficiently strong to make the hypothesis of a shift from Fordism to what might be called a 'flexible' regime of accumulation a telling way to characterize history'. To Harvey (171), this movement to a 'flexible regime' is concomitant with the shift to post-modernism, emphasising 'the new, the fleeting, the ephemeral, the fugitive, and the contingent in modern life, rather than the more solid values implanted under Fordism'. In critique of Harvey, Wood (1997, p. 540) characterises his position as follows:

> Postmodernity then corresponds to a phase of capitalism where mass production of standardized goods, and the forms of labour associated with it, have been replaced by flexibility, new forms of production – 'lean production', the 'team concept', 'just-in-time' production, diversification of commodities for niche markets, a 'flexible' labour force, mobile capital and so on, all made possible by new informational technologies.

Harvey's understanding of a change within capitalism from modernity to post-modernity has already been well critiqued as the periodisation of capitalist society, used to explain the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation (Wood 1997).

However, this is also true of Wood (2005, p.134) when she argues that the New Imperialism

rests on a 'Universal Capitalism' – one in which capitalism has already expanded to incorporate the entire globe, requiring a new type of imperialism based on 'economic domination' rather than the rivalry of nation states that characterised 'old imperialism'. Harvey (2007, p. 60) criticises Wood's (2005, p. 100) typologies of both imperialism and capitalism as unable to fully explain the dynamic changes in global capitalism. Harvey (2007, p. 67) acknowledges that neither he nor Wood (2005) did a 'very good job' of theorising the state in their accounts of imperialism, which incites him to exhort, 'Not only do we need a new theory of imperialism to match the conditions of our time but we also need a new theory of the capitalist state'.

For Harvey, 'around 1970 or so' is the beginning of the third stage of the global rule of the bourgeoisie (2003, p. 60). This, he declares, saw 'a different kind of system emerge' that was quintessentially neo-liberal in character, transforming the state itself into a different 'type' of state. (62). Indeed, Harvey is explicit that this shift to a newer imperialism only occurs due to the transition from Fordist to flexible accumulation, leading to an ascendant financial power (64). In fact, Harvey's emphasis upon the power of the 'Wall Street-Treasury-IMF' complex, as financial power over the state, is highly redolent of the earliest theories of imperialism, which rested on the idea of finance capital requiring the state to undertake imperialism.

The focus for Harvey, and the New Imperialism more broadly, has, unlike prior accounts, focused almost solely on the actions of a single state: the US, emphasising both its military dominance and its position as the centre of global financial capital. As the dominant power within the international state system, this is perhaps understandable but not entirely unproblematic, and has received considerable criticism from Marxist authors. Hardt and Negri (2000) term contemporary global society as 'Empire' and criticise the US-centric approach of Harvey. To Hardt and Negri (xii), Empire is a decentralised and deterritorialised global power structure. Empire has four distinct aspects: first, Empire is global;

second, Empire appears eternal; third, Empire pervades every aspect of society; fourth, Empire is exceedingly violent but appears peaceful (xv). Empire therefore seeks to reconcile the apparent deterritorialisation of imperialism with continued exploitation and the inherent violence of capitalism; however, this account becomes, in effect, indistinguishable from an account of capitalism itself and therefore provides nothing other than an abstract understanding of capitalism divorced from the still extant features of the international state system (Kiely 2005, p. 48). This critique is also made by Wood (2002, 2005, p. 6) of Hardt and Negri, whom, she argues, accept the superficial qualities of globalisation and miss something 'truly essential' about both capitalism and imperialism, namely a robust understanding of the state.

This critique has also found substantial purchase elsewhere. Panitch and Gindin (2006) Pozo-Martin (2006, p. 236), and Robinson (2007, p. 8) argue that an under-theorisation of the state is characteristic of most scholarship on the 'New Imperialism', including Callinicos (2005a, 2005b), Gowan (1999), and Harvey (2003). Callinicos's (2010, pp. 82–84) response to this is to invoke a formanalysis understanding of the state. However, Callinicos (ibid.) rejects form-analysis as more problematic than useful, leading him to accept a 'broadly Gramscian approach' to imperialism (99).

The New Imperialism developed following debates over 'globalisation' and the international proliferation of 'neo-liberal' ideology. These authors sought to explain the sudden and massive expansion of credit within the global economy, as well as to account for a perceived 'hollowing out' of the state. However, from this particular historical context derives the literature's fundamental problems, which, again, have not fundamentally resolved the problems of the first Marxist theorists of imperialism. First, the consensus on the New Imperialism is that we are, yet again, in a distinct phase of capitalism. Second, the role of Finance dominates explanations of the behaviour of states, and the nature of this New Imperialism. Last, perhaps distinctively in this new phase of

scholarship on imperialism, this apparent historical shift away from the state has also led to authors themselves neglecting the role of the state in understanding imperialism.

Conclusions

This relationship between Marxism and imperialism has been an illuminating one, highlighting not just the enduring value of Marxist scholarship on imperialism but also its persistent problems. Most notably, these problems derive from a conflation of factors contingent upon and necessary to capitalist social relations, which themselves derive from, perhaps, an emphasis on theory over historical research. Broadly lacking in Marxist theories of imperialism is a sustained engagement with historical scholarship. There is also a neglect of the specific relationships between states and the everyday 'minutiae' of capitalism. Rather, these accounts have generally focused more on 'top-down' systemic theories of imperialism. As such, Marxist theories of imperialism have almost always invoked Finance, or monopoly, capital to explain the phenomenon, which they have also sought to identify as a particular and discrete historical period of capitalism. These theories have changed, of course, depending on their particular historical circumstances. The first theories sought to explain imperial rivalries leading to a system-threatening war; the second wave of theories sought to explain the continued inequality between Western and post-colonial state; while the latest wave of Marxist thought has sought to incorporate globalisation and the apparent retreat of the state.

More recent developments in understandings of imperialism in Marxist scholarship have centred on the debate between so-called neo--Gramscian and open Marxist theories of the state. Most obvious in this debate is the limited engagement either approach has had with the other, leading to highly partisan scholarship by both sets of authors (see e.g., Bieler and Morton 2003 Bieler et al. 2010; Bonefeld 2009; Bruff 2009a, b; Burnham 1991). The main distinction

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between these two groups is that, while open Marxists sought to demystify the nature of capitalism by a return to Marx himself, neo-Gramscian scholarship sought to base an understanding of modern capitalism upon the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. The value offered by both of these approaches, however, is in their desire to theorise the state, offering a rigorous critical lens through which to understand the changing conditions of capitalist social relations. Given the development of Marxist theories of imperialism over the course of the twentieth century, and their problems stemming from a lack of sustained analysis of the origins of state action, this more recent debate, although partisan, offers to inject new vigour into a Marxist understanding of imperialism.

Cross-References

▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism

▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism

▶ Third Worldism and Marxism

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Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Transnational transfer of value; Unequal exchange, globalized production, the smiley curve

Marx's critique of capitalist accumulation is based on an analysis of the commodity. Commodities are the cells in the capitalist system. In the commodity, we find the DNA of capitalism. It contains the contradictions that drive the system from a simple exchange of goods in a medieval town square to today's globalized capitalism. In *Das Kapital*, Marx unfolds the logic of capitalism in increasing complexity. His original plan was to "*examine the system of bourgeois economy in the following order:* capital, landed property, wage-labour, the State, foreign trade, world market" (Marx 1859: 1). However, Marx only got halfway through his analysis. He never properly outlined theories of the state, the world market, international trade, or imperialism for that matter (although he did analyze colonialism and England's exploitation of other nations).

My aim here is to explain how Marx's concept of value unfolds in neoliberal global capitalism, with a focus on how *transnational* transfer of value takes place – in short, imperialism. In order to do this, I find it necessary to convey certain features of the value concept, which are important for the transnational transfer of value. They may seem basic and simple, nevertheless often misunderstood.

Capitalist Accumulation and Value

The driving force in the capitalist mode of production is accumulation. The capitalist invests in order to create more capital. To accomplish this goal, the capitalist seeks to sell as many commodities as possible at the highest price to maximize

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profit. Let us look in more detail at the characteristics of commodities.

A commodity has two forms of value: use value and exchange value. Its *use value* is defined as its ability to satisfy a physical or psychological need, as a raincoat or a Teddy bear. The use value is mainly of interest of the buyer. No matter how different their use value is, commodities have something in common, that is, they are comparable on a certain level of abstraction and in certain quantitative relations. This commonality is what Marx calls value – or more specific exchange value (in connection with use value). Exchange value is defined as the quantitative relation between commodities no matter how different they are. Thus, for instance, 500,000 toothbrushes equal one Mercedes-Benz.

Whether something is a commodity does not depend on certain physical qualities but on the social relationships between seller and buyer. We can neither touch nor see value. We can only touch and see the commodities that have value. Value can be measured in labor time or in quantities of other commodities, but it is not a quality physically embedded in commodities. As Marx put it, "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond" (Marx 1867a: 53).The ultimate test is the market: whatever can be sold is a commodity. It has use value for the buyer, while it is on the market that the exchange value unfolds.

Therefore, what all commodities have in common is that they are produced by human labor for exchange. Both use value and exchange value are reflected in labor. Use value relates to the concrete labor necessary to produce a commodity: sewing, welding, etc. Use value and concrete labor are qualitative in nature and satisfy needs. Exchange value relates to abstract labor, which is quantitative in nature, measuring the time, energy, knowledge, and experience needed to produce. Of particular importance is the socially necessary labor time, which is the time required for the production of a commodity based on the average quality and intensity of labor as well as the technological development available for production.

Therefore, it is human labor in the production process that is the source of value. However, the specific determination of the actual exchange value occurs on the market. (I will return to how this is so.) It is the fact that all commodities are products of human labor, which makes it possible to relate them to one another. Thus, value reconciles the production sphere and the circulation sphere in capitalist accumulation. Both are necessary in the realization of the value.

In the preface to the first volume of *Capital* published in 1867, Marx announced his plans for four volumes: one on capitalist production, one on the circulation of capital, one on "the varied forms assumed by capital in the course of its development," and one on "the history of the theory." In a letter to Engels, dated July 31, 1865, Marx wrote that the volumes were to be considered as an "artistic whole" (Marx 1865: 173). If one only reads the first volume, one's impression might be that production is essential and circulation secondary. However, Marx was very clear about the relationship between production and circulation in the valorization of capital: "Capital cannot . . . arise from circulation, and it is equally impossible for it to arise apart from circulation. It must have its origin both in circulation and not in circulation" (Marx 1867b: 268).

The Value of Labor-Power and Surplus-Value

Labor is the common measure of the value of all commodities. However, the commodity that is purchased in the form of wages is not an ordinary commodity. What the capitalist buys is the labor-*power* of the worker: the strengths, the energy, the knowledge, and the commitment for a specific quantity of time. To keep up this power, the worker needs a certain supply of substance. The value of the labor-power is the amount of labor necessary to produce these substances. However, the two quantities are not equal. The labor time and energy the worker delivers are more than what is needed to produce the substances the worker needs to be able to deliver the labor-power.

Just as with other commodities, the value and use value of labor-power is different. Labor-power's use value for capital is its capacity to produce

an amount of commodities, the exchange value of which is greater than the exchange value of labor-power itself. This difference is what Marx called surplus-value – the source of profit. (Value and surplus-value are of no interest for workers or capitalist. What they are interested in are prices, wage, and profit. These concepts are certainly also of our interest; however in order to understand how these forms of appearance of value are generated and divided, we need to explain the basis for these forms of presentation. I will return to the transformation from value/surplus-value to wage, price, and profit.)

Technically, we can divide the workday into two periods: one, in which the worker reproduces the value of their labor-power, and another in which they create surplus-value (Marx 1867c: 162–164). The rate of surplus-value depends on the extent of the second period. The rate of surplus-value therefore indicates the level of exploitation of labor-power:

Rate of surplus − value = time of surplus − value/
  time required to reproduce the value of labor − power.

Alternatively, in terms of capital (variable capital equals wage):

$$\text{The rate of surplus} - \text{value} = \frac{\text{surplus} - \text{value}}{\text{variable capital}}$$

$$s' = s/v$$

There are basically three ways capital can increase the rate of surplus-value and thereby the potential volume of profit:

- **Increase the *absolute surplus-value*** by an extension of working time and/or the intensification of work, in relation to the required working hours to reproduce the "basket of goods" which forms the value of labor-power.
- **Increase the *relative surplus-value*** by a productivity increase as a result of new technology or more effective management form, which reduces the "necessary working hours" share of the total working hours.

- **Extract *super surplus-value*** by lowering the actual level of reproductive costs and thus the "necessary working time" share of the total working hours.

The concept of "super-exploitation" originates from Ruy Mauro Marini (1932–1997), a Brazilian economist known as one of the creators of Dependency Theory. In his book *Dialéctica de la Dependencia*, he describes how the breakthrough of industrialization in England in the nineteenth century was dependent on imports of cheap food produced through the *super-exploitation* of labor in countries such as Ireland and the countries of Latin America. An export-oriented capitalism in the periphery created a dynamic capitalist development in the center. Marini defines super-exploitation as a combination of all three measures to enlarge the amount of surplus-value:

> The intensification of work, the extension of the working day and the expropriation of part of the necessary labour for the labourer to replace his labour power. . .. (Marini 1974, p. 36, Here quoted from Higginbottom 2014, p. 30)

The "Intensification and extension of the working day" equals Marx's absolute surplus-value. However, it is the last mentioned form, which is of special interest here. By "expropriation of part of the necessary labour for the labourer to replace his labour power," Marini refers to a wage depression in the colonial arrears *under* the value of labor-power, as Marini concludes:

> In capitalist terms, these mechanisms. . . signify that the labour (Power) is paid under its value, and they correspond, therefore, to a super-exploitation of labour. (Marini 1974, p. 42. Here from Higginbottom 2014, p. 31)

Marini furthermore draws the interesting conclusion that the super-exploitation of labor-power in the periphery changes the pattern of extraction of surplus-value in England from being dependent on absolute surplus-value (longer and more intensified labor) to relative surplus-value (greater productivity) due to the dynamic development of industrial capitalism in the second half of the nineteenth century (Marini 1974, p. 13. Here from Higginbottom 2014, p. 32). The development of the productive forces in the center due to

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colonial super-exploitation increased the relative surplus-value considerably. However, the working class in the center managed to get its share of the gains from the increased productivity by raising their level of wages through trade union struggle. There is no necessarily built-in relationship between a raise in productivity and an increase in wages; who gains is a question of class struggle (for a historical account for the development of wage in the late nineteenth century in England, see Lauesen 2018, p. 52–55).

I will return to the importance of super-exploitation as a generator of surplus-value in contemporary global capitalism, as based on low-wage labor arbitrage (Smith 2016). First, however, I will have to return to the relation between the value of labor-power and the development of highly different wage levels.

The Price of Labor-Power

Labor-power is not like other commodities. There is no factory that produces labor-power. Labor-power does not produce labor-power. Labor-power is generated in the private sphere of society – mostly in families. However in this process, the laborers consume a certain "basket" of commodities, produced in the capitalist sphere, and thereby the value of labor-power depends on the value of these commodities.

But what defines this "basket of goods" and how is its price of labor-power – the wage – determined? Marx distinguished between two factors: the bare reproduction costs of labor-power and what he called the "historical and moral element." The bare reproduction costs of labor-power relate to the costs that are necessary to keep the working class alive, fit to work, and able to have children who become new workers. In simple terms, they are the costs necessary for food, clothes, and shelter. When a worker receives a wage that covers only the bare minimum of what is necessary to reproduce the ability to work, it is often called a subsistence wage. However, the "necessary wants" also contain a historical and moral element, which was explained by Marx in the following way:

On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of civilisation of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of free labourers has been formed. In contradistinction therefore to the case of other commodities, there enters into the determination of the value of labour-power a historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a given country, at a given period, the average quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for the labourer is practically known. (Marx 1867d: 121)

In other words, the historical and moral element of the value of labor-power is a product of class struggle – national and international – historical and current. This class struggle and the labor market it creates mediate the realization the value of labor-power into wages, in the same way as class struggle and the market mediate the realization of surplus-value into profit.

The long history of capitalism, the creation of a world divided into a center and periphery by colonialism and imperialism – together with the limited international mobility of labor – helps explain the enormous differences in *wages* globally. The price of labor-power, the *wage*, is relatively stable over time, but it varies significantly globally. That is in contrast with the price for other commodities, which varies significantly over time, but is relatively stable from place to place. The prices for copper and wheat, for example, go up and down almost daily, but they do so across the world. There is a world market price for most commodities with labor-power as a significant exception. The wage is dependent on national and global class relations. It is the result of norms, rules, laws, and not least the result of trade union efforts with regard to working hours, minimum wages, overtime pay, collective bargaining, and so on. Within countries – especially imperialist ones – there is a tendency for wages, for the same kind of work, to balance out. Globally however, the differences remain huge.

The Globalized Value of Labor-Power

When Marx formulated his conception of "the historical and moral element" of the value of

labor-power, capitalism consisted of distinct national economies. In today's neoliberal capitalism, there is a global market for capital and commodities with globalized production chains linking labor-power in the North and South together in the production of the same commodity. Furthermore, with the industrialization of the Global South, in the last decades, the level of technology and management regimes is also becoming increasingly similar on a global level. The value of a commodity is no longer based on varied and isolated national conditions. The value is based on global conditions. Thus labor-power also has a globalized *value*. Samir Amin writes:

> My major contribution concerns the passage from the law of value to the law of globalized value, based on the hierarchical structuring – itself globalized – of the price of labor-power around its value. ….this globalized value constitutes the basis for imperialist rent. (Amin 2010, p. 11)

It is crucial to distinguish between the value and the price (wage) of labor-power. As mentioned, labor-power is not an ordinary commodity produced by capital, but one generated in complex social relationships. Its value is determined by historical development as well as the current class struggle, family structure, and so on. This means that labor-power is reproduced under very different conditions in the South and North, but is nevertheless brought together through global production and consumption. The port worker who loads containers in Shanghai creates as much *value* as the port worker in Rotterdam who unloads them, assuming that the work has the same intensity and uses the same technology. However, the *price* of labor-power – the wage – varies due to the different historical backgrounds, different social relations, political conditions, and the limited mobility of labor, as Amin writes:

> Capitalism is not the United States and Germany, with India and Ethiopia only" halfway" capitalist. Capitalism is the United States and India, Germany and Ethiopia, taken together. This means that labor-power has but a single value, that which is associated with the level of development of the productive forces taken globally (the General Intellect on that scale). In answer to the polemical argument that had been put against him - how can one compare the value of an hour of work in the Congo to that of a labor-hour in the United States? –Arghiri

Emmanuel wrote: just as one compares the value of a hour's work by a New York hairdresser to that of a hour's labor by a worker in Detroit. You have to be consistent. You cannot invoke "inescapable" globalization when it suits you and refuse to consider it when you find it troublesome! However, though there exist but one sole value of labor-power on the scale of globalized capitalism, that labor power is nonetheless recompensed at very different rates. (Amin 2010, p. 84)

The "bare reproduction cost" and the "historical and moral component" of the value of labor-power are not two distinct and different elements. The class struggle may incorporate new elements in the "bare reproduction cost," and repression can pressure the wage below that level. The wage may vary below as well above this global value of labor. The combination of the historical development of highly different wage levels between the Global North and South and the constitution of a global value of labor-power has several consequences. It entails different rates of surplus-value. The combination of globalized value and low wages in the South is the basis of extraction of what Marini calls *super surplus-value,* which generates super-profits for capital and relatively low prices of commodities for a North wage level. Thus, the difference between value and price of labor also causes a transfer of value from South to both capital and labor in the North.

So what is the *global value of labor-power* in hard cash? As Marx explained in the quote above concerning the value of labor-power in a *country*:

> the necessary wants. … are themselves the product of historical development,. ….. depend on the degree of civilization. Nevertheless,. . . at a given period, the average quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for the labourer is practically known. (Marx 1867d: 121)

We can now apply this to the global level, meaning that we can determine the global value of labor-power as the global average wage at a given time period. That means the average wage is calculated according to the number of workers on a certain wage level in the different parts of the world. A given level of wages compared to the global value of labor-power indicates whether you are in the center or periphery of the world system. The difference in wages between the USA and

China is around 10:1 and between Sweden and Bangladesh 50:1. This definition of the global value of labor-power also allows us the possibility to quantify the size of transnational value transfer, and it allows us to measure whether a given wage level generates or consumes value in a global context. I have specified the method in the book, *Unequal Exchange and the Prospects for Socialism in a Divided World* (Manifest-Communist Working Group 1986: 110–113 and 131–140). At that time the average wage for workers in the imperialist countries was $5.50 per hour and $0.36 in the Third World. Hence, the difference was at a factor 15:1 and the average weighted factor was 5.7. Zak Cope in his book, *Divided World Divided Class: Global Political Economy and the Stratification of Labour Under Capitalism* (Cope 2015: 254–6), made the same calculation but with figures from 2008. He reaches a wage factor of 11 for OECD workers and 1 for Non-OECD workers, an average wage factor at 6,5, all summing up to a transfer of $4.9 trillion.

After this examination of the value and price of labor-power, I will turn to the transformation from value to price for commodities and the transformation of surplus-value into profit. The first step is a description of the circulation of capital.

The Circulation of Capital

For the capitalist, the use value of labor-power consists of its producing commodities whose exchange value exceeds the costs of the labor-power required to produce them. In order to exploit labor-power in this way, capitalists must own means of production. They must invest in workshops and factories, machines, raw materials, energy, and so on. This part of capital is called constant capital, because its value remains unaffected during the process of accumulation. The labor-power that the capitalist buys is called variable capital because it is used to create value that exceeds its own (Marx 1867e: 142–149).

The circulation of capital is divided into the sphere of production and the sphere of circulation. In the latter, commodities are bought and sold.

Both spheres are dependent on one another: there is no circulation without production, and there is no point in producing without circulation. The first phase of the circulation of capital consists of capitalists acquiring means of production and buying labor-power. The second phase consists of using the means of production and the labor-power purchased to produce commodities. The third phase of the circulation of capital consists of trading commodities. In this phase, the capitalist collects the surplus-value created in the production process.

The capitalist must be able to sell the commodities that have been produced on the market at a price that includes both the expenses for constant and variable capital plus the surplus-value that can be used to either start the circulation of capital anew (with expanded possibilities) or to consume (Marx 1867f: 400). The total circulation of capital appears as follows:

(Or use the figure in Lauesen 2018, p. 461)

Abbreviations used in tables and formulas:

C Aggregate capital	V Value = c + v + s
c Constant capital	p Profit = P(c + v)
v Variable capital	p′ Rate of profit = s/(c + v)
s Surplus-value	s′ Rate of surplus-value
P′ Average rate of profit = s/(c + v)	
PP Price of production = c + v−e−P′ (c + v)	

Although the price of a commodity can differ from its value, it is determined by value in the final instance. According to neoclassical market economists, prices are determined exclusively by supply and demand on the market. This is, however,

only the final touch. Commodities need to be produced and reproduced to keep the accumulation running. If capitalists do not recover the cost of production plus a profit on the market, they will not produce the commodities again, and accumulation ceases. The price they need is what Howard Nicholas calls "reproduction prices" (Nicholas 2011). But how do we measure costs of production, i.e., the inputs required to make a commodity? Freya Brown formulates the problem nicely:

> We cannot use prices to measure inputs, for prices are what we are trying to explain in the first place! The only thing common between all the inputs of a commodity is labor. Thus, in any economy based on commodity production, the prices of commodities will in the final instance be fundamentally tied to the (socially necessary) labor-time embodied in those commodities. (Brown 2011)

From Surplus-Value to Profit

However, just as the worker is interested in the size of her wage more than the concept of value, the capitalist is interested in profit more than surplus-value. Profit, as we have seen, is dependent on production costs in general or what is called the *cost price* (Marx 1883b). How the cost price is divided between constant capital and variable capital is of no interest to the capitalist either. Marx writes in the third book of *Capital*:

> In its assumed capacity of offspring of the aggregate advanced capital, surplus-value takes the converted form of profit. (Marx 1883b; Ibid.)

The relation between the surplus-value and the total capital used for production defines the profit rate, as shown in the formula:

$$\text{The rate of profit} = \frac{\text{surplus} - \text{value}}{\text{aggregate capital}}$$

$$\text{p}' = \text{s}/\text{C}$$

The profit rate depends both on the rate of surplus-value and on the relation between constant and variable capital. A rise in surplus-value brings a rise in the profit rate. The relation between constant and variable capital is called capital's *organic composition*. It is dependent on the relationship between labor-power and the means of production. This relationship varies from industry to industry. Capital has low organic composition if variable capital makes up a large part of total capital, and high organic composition of constant capital makes up a large part of total capital. An example for an industry with a high organic composition of capital is the petrochemical industry, which relies largely on constant capital. An example of an industry with a low organic composition of capital is the textile industry, which relies largely on variable capital.

The following table illustrates the immediate relation between capital's organic composition and the profit rate. The higher the organic composition, the lower the profit rate; the lower the organic composition, the higher the profit rate (Marx 1883a: 155) (Table 1).

Formation of the Average Rate of Profit

As the table above shows, capitals of the same size but with different organic compositions can, in *theory*, generate very different rates of surplus-

Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism, Table 1 Influence of organic composition on the profit rate

Aggregate capitals	Rate of surplus-value, %	Surplus-value	Value of product	Rate of profit, %
C = c + v	s/v	S	V = c + v + s	p′ = s/C
I	80c + 20v	100	20	120	20
II	70c + 30v	100	30	130	30
III	60c + 40v	100	40	140	40
IV	85c + 15v	100	15	115	15
V	95c + 5v	100	5	105	5

value and, therefore, very different profit rates. This, however, is not what happens in practice. Otherwise, capital would flock to industries with a low organic composition, yet this is not the case. We know that the average, long-term profit rates of different industries are very similar. But why? Capital always drifts toward those industries promising the highest profits. If there is increased demand for the products of a certain industry, their prices will rise and so, in turn, will the profit rate. This attracts capital formerly invested in other industries and leads to a growth of this particular industry. Often the consequence is overproduction and oversupply, falling prices, a lower profit rate, and capital moving elsewhere. Unequal profit rates between different industries cause the constant movement of capital and balance out the industries' average rates of profit. In other words, competing capitals ensure that the average, long-term profit rates of different industries are very similar. This also means that a given amount of capital will, in the long run, create similar profits, no matter what industries it is invested in or how it is divided between constant and variable capital.

This can be explained through the first step of the transformation of value into price. The original value of commodities is converted into a price of production. The price of production of a commodity consists of the cost price (used variable and constant capital) plus the average profit in relation to the total capital used in its production. This can be summarized in the following formula:

$$\text{Price of production} = \text{cost price} \\ \times \text{average rate of profit}$$

Therefore, the price of production of a particular commodity is not the same as its value. The cost price is equivalent to the quantity of labor time that is needed in order to ensure that a specific commodity can be *reproduced* in the context of reproduction of *all* commodities. At first glance, these two categories might seem the same. However, in a capitalist economy, where profit enters the equation, due to the different compositions of variable and constant capital reproduction, prices normally deviate from values. A certain transfer of value takes place via the formation of average profits. However, the combined price of production of all commodities is the same as the combined value of all commodities. In addition, combined profits are the same as the combined surplus-value created in production.

The price of production must not be confused with the market price, to which it is only coincidentally equal. The market price is the price a commodity is actually sold for on the market. Market prices are adjusted by supply and demand, the existence of monopoly, and so on. The goal for each commodity is to reach a market price that consists of its production cost plus the average rate of profit. This allows production, and therefore the accumulation of capital, to continue. Let us see how the average rate of profit affects the numbers in the table above. If we put a total capital at 100 and the rate of surplus-value consistently at 100% and we assume that the whole capital turns over in one circulation, then the new numbers indicate the formation of the average rate of profit (Table 2):

$$(20\% + 30\% + 40\% + 15\% + 5\%)/5 = 22\%.$$

As the table indicates, the amount of labor-power required in different industries and

Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism, Table 2 Creation of average rate of profit

Total capital		Surplus-value	Value	Average profit rate, %	Price of production	
C		S	V	P′	PP	Deviation of PP from value
I	80c + 20v	20	120	22	122	+2
II	70c + 30v	30	130	22	122	−8
III	60c + 40v	40	140	22	122	−18
IV	85c + 15v	15	115	22	122	+7
V	95c + 5v	5	105	22	122	+17

therefore the organic composition of capitals as well as surplus-value differ widely. When profits are distributed, surplus-value is transferred from industries with a low organic composition to industries with a high organic composition. As stated above, this is of no relevance for capitalists. However, for a Marxist analysis of capitalism, it is important to account for this transfer. Some economists have called this transfer "unequal exchange," but this must not be confused with Emmanuel's use of the term (which we will consider below). To speak of unequal exchange in this context can be misleading. The value transfer described above is inherent in the logic of capital. The fact that the profit rate is distributed among all industries, so that capitalists can make profits in each of them, is a key aspect of capitalist production. It allows capitalists to compete on the market and to develop the productive forces. If commodities were priced according to their value, instead of according to the price of production, investments in mechanization would come to a halt. Capitalists would only invest in labor-intensive industries with much variable capital and a low organic composition. The pharmaceutical industry would disappear, and woodcutting would prosper. In a developed capitalist country, labor is mobile enough to guarantee that the rate of surplus-value will be similar across different industries. Market prices of commodities depend on the price of production, not their value or cost price. However, I would like to draw attention to an important deviation from average rate of profit of capitalism cause by the development of monopoly capitalism – super-profit.

Super-Profits

In his writings on imperialism in 1916, Lenin spoke of super-profits, meaning profits substantially over the average profit in a given time period. The basis for this divergence is monopoly capitalism. Monopoly takes different forms. One has to do with the production sphere and monopolistic ownership of a certain technology that produces a commodity more efficiently

than others do. One has to do with the circulation sphere: branding, a certain privileged access to a market or raw material that others do not have. Monopolists get super-profits by selling commodities for more than their prices of production (i.e., prices that equalize the rate of profit) at the expense of lower profits for the other capitalists. Already English capital with its monopoly on industrial production and monopoly on colonial trade in many regions of the world in the second half of the nineteenth century gained super-profits. Lenin observed that:

> Superprofits have not disappeared; they still remain. The exploitation of *all* other countries by one privileged, financially wealthy country remains and has become more intense. A handful of wealthy countries – there are only four of them, if we mean independent, really gigantic, "modern" wealth: England, France, the United States and Germany – have developed monopoly to vast proportions, they obtain *super*profits running into hundreds, if not thousands, of millions, they "ride on the backs" of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people in other countries and fight among themselves for the division of the particularly rich, particularly fat and particularly easy spoils. (Lenin 1916: 105)

In the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1920, Lenin went as far as to state: "Super-profit gained in the colonies is the mainstay of modern capitalism" (Lenin 1920).

Samir Amin speaks of "generalized monopoly capitalism" when referring to capitalism's current phase. When he speak of monopolies, it is not just corporations dominating industries. It means networks that dominate the entire productive system. Small- and medium-sized firms serve as suppliers to the monopolized productions chains, which take a significant share of their profits. This means that the latter make a super-profit. So-called intellectual property rights constitute a new dimension of capitalist monopolization. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is meant to protect the super-profits of the monopolies based in the North.

The entire transformation from value into market price can be summarized in the following figure:

Let us now return to how this all works out at the global level.

Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism, Fig. 1 The transformation from value to price

Unequal Exchange in International Trade

As mentioned above, Marx never properly outlined theories of the world market and international trade. The first theory of the world market in the spirit of *Capital* was formulated 100 years later by Arghiri Emmanuel. Emmanuel referred to value transfer from one country to another as *unequal exchange*. The basis of unequal exchange is the historically constituted different wage levels in the imperialist countries and those of the Third World (Emmanuel 1972).

Let us see what different wage levels mean for Marx's theory of the formation of prices of production, using Tables 3(a) and (b). In Table 3 we have two countries with identical rates of surplus-value, identical profit rates, and identical organic composition of industries. Unequal organic composition can therefore not be the cause for a possible value transfer. Value and price of production are the same. Capital also circulates at the same rate in both countries. In Table 3(a), the rate of surplus-value and the profit rate are equal. Both countries are at the same level of development.

On Table 3(b), however, wages in country A have risen by 50%, which leads to less exploitation and less surplus-value. This has consequences for the exchange of commodities between the two countries. The labor-power used is still the same, as is the value of production, but the price of labor-power has changed. This changes the rate of surplus-value in country A, as well as the prices of production. Where commodities with a value of 300 points each are to be exchanged between the two countries, the wage difference of 50% (which, compared with actual differences in wages, is very modest) leads to unequal exchange. Instead of 300:300, we have $333\frac{1}{3} : 266\frac{2}{3}$. Country B loses $33\frac{1}{3}$ value points, while country A gains them. The exchange puts country A ahead of country B by $66\frac{2}{3}$ value points. The rise in wages by 50% in country A means that the profit rate falls from 50% to $33\frac{1}{3}$ %. In this way, value is transferred from low-wage countries to high-wage countries according to Emmanuel (1972).

The Happy Smiley

Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange was a critique of David Ricardo's classic comparative cost theory of foreign trade. However, the export-oriented industrialization of the Global South and the creation of global chains of production have brought new forms of unequal exchange. These are more intricate than swapping raw materials for industrial products, which characterized unequal exchange until the end of the 1980s and still characterizes relations between the more agrarian countries of the South and the industrialized countries today.

The theory of unequal exchange, as based on the difference in wage levels between the global North and South, is not only a critique of economists who advocate liberal foreign trade but also of those who adhere to the neoliberal theory of price formation.

In neoliberal economic theory, the formation of the market price, for example, of a computer, is described as a chain in which each step adds "value" to the product. The chain typically starts in the North, from where it heads South before

Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism, Table 3 The consequence of unequal exchange on price of production

	Constant capital	Variable capital	Surplus-value	Cost price	Value	Rate of profit, %	Average rate of profit, %	Price of production
	C	v	S	c + v	c + v + s	s/C	P′	(c + v) + P′ x C
(a) **Two countries with the same wage level**								
Country A	100	100	100	200	300	20	50	300
Country B	100	100	100	200	300	50	50	300
					600			600
(b) **Two countries with different wage levels**								
Country A	100	150	50	250	300	20	33.33	333.33
Country B	100	100	100	200	300	50	33.33	266.67
					600			600.00

returning to the North and its consumers. A curve illustrating "value added" along this chain looks like a happy-face smiley (Dedrick et al. 1999: 156). In the beginning, when financing, management, development, and design are handled in the North, there is much "value" added; hence, the curve starts at the high end. Then the chain of production moves to the South, where low-wage labor actually produces the product; hence little "value" is added, and the curve falls. Finally, when the product returns to the North and requires branding and marketing to be sold, there is again much "value added" (Fig. 2).

A characteristic feature of global chains of production is that they pass through very different labor markets. According to the happy smiley curve, the biggest part of the product's "value" is created in the North – but in fact, it is the difference in wages – and not value in a Marxist sense, along the chain of production that shapes the curve.

The Sad Smiley

Even if there are many disagreements among economists of different stripes, they all seem to agree that production costs entail two main elements: raw materials, machines, factories, etc. are what Marx calls *constant capital* and wages called *variable capital*. However, what determines the price of all these elements? Here, economists begin to disagree. As mentioned above neoliberal market theory simply states that the prices of goods and services are determined by what consumers are willing to pay. If a product can be sold for a price that is higher than the production costs, someone makes a profit. For Marxists, on the other hand, it is not the market that determines the price, but the cost of production (also referred to as the *cost price*). This is the first step in the transformation of value into price.

So, what determines cost of production? To simply add up the costs of raw materials, wages, etc. is not an answer, because we want to understand *why* they cost what they cost. As mentioned above, what all the necessary parts in the production process have in common is that they can be traced back to the consumption of labor-power. (I am aware of the so-called transformation problem which consists in the assertion that Marx "failed" in his explanation of prices of production to transform the inputs (c + v) into prices of production. However, I do not think there is a problem. To transform inputs into prices would have been to explain prices in terms of prices. Instead Marx sticks to the concept of *value* (average socially necessary labor time) in the formation of prices of production.) We also explained above that labor-power is a very peculiar commodity; although it has a globalized value, its price – the specific wage – is determined by class struggles, historical and current on both the national and the international level. These struggles cause huge variations in global wage.

Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism, Fig. 2 The smiley curve (Mudambi 2008, P. 707)

If the question of surplus-value is not particularly important to capital, wages and working hours certainly are. Capital understands that long and intensive working hours and low wages are sources of profit. Furthermore, as we noted concerning capital's *organic composition*, what matters to the capitalist are the overall production costs, not the ratio between constant and variable capital and thereby surplus-value. A sweatshop in Bangladesh does not necessarily generate more profit than an automated electronics factory. It is not the raison d'être of capitalism to squeeze surplus-value out of workers. This is, under the given circumstances, simply a consequence of all that really matters to the capitalist, namely, to sell something for more than what it costs to make it. This is where profit comes from in the mind of the capitalist.

From a Marxist perspective, however, price is not the same as value. Some commodities are sold for less than their value and others for more. Price determines the profit rate but also the distribution of value and surplus-value, both between capital and labor (in the form of profits for the former and wages for the latter) and between fractions of

capital with different organic compositions (via the average profit rate). The transformation of value into price is therefore highly dependent on the political relationship between capital and labor as well as between different fractions of capital. The redistribution of value and surplus-value through market prices not only occurs between workers and fractions of capital within a single country but also globally, as a result of transnational movements of capital, trade, and production.

Marx's theory about the transformation of value into price assumed an integrated market for goods, capital, and *labor*. Such markets tend to form a single price for a single commodity, balance out profit rates, and pay the same wage for the same kind of labor. This is what we see in the USA, the EU, and Japan. The global market is different: it is an integrated market with respect to the movement of capital and goods, but not with respect to labor. Therefore, the wages paid for the same kind of labor can differ widely. This also applies to global chains of production. Depending on where labor is carried out, its impact on the price of a product is very different. The surplus-value of labor in one part of the world (the Global South) raises profits

and consumption ability (via cheap prices) in another part of the world (the Global North). The "value added" in the happy-face smiley's curve includes not only the value created by a company in its home country but also the value created elsewhere and usurped by capital via the price for which a commodity is sold on the global market. "Value added" is in reality value captured. In short, the basis for the profits made by companies in the North are created in the South.

In neoliberal economic theory, this fact is not recognized; on the contrary, lower wages mean less "value added." Therefore the "value added" curve in a global production chain running from North to South and back again has the shape of a happy smiley. However it is not a curve of "value added" in Marxist terms but a curve illustrating the formation of prices of production.

If we apply Marx's conception of value, the curve looks different. If you draw a curve for value added during the production of a computer or a pair of sneakers following Marx's theory, it will look like a sad-face smiley, the exact opposite of the curve drawn by neoliberal economists. This does not mean that their curve is "wrong." It simply illustrates the creation of price, while the sad-face smiley illustrates the creation of value. The reason for labor in the Global South being much cheaper than labor in the Global North is not that labor in the South creates less value. The reason is that laborers in the South are more oppressed and exploited (Fig. 3).

The Global Distribution of Value

A theory of value entails a theory of price formation. The transformation of value into price occurs on the market; in other words, in exchange. If we look at value only in the realm of production, we turn value into an essence that flows from the minds and bodies of workers into the commodities they produce. But, as we have seen, value is the result of social relationships. Exploitation occurs throughout the entire circulation of capital, that is, during the production of commodities as much as during their exchange. Surplus-value is created in production, but it is acquired and distributed in exchange.

It is in exchange that human labor appears as the only possible measure of the different commodities, that is, as the basis of value. It is the sphere of circulation – the market – that distributes the value created by human labor between industries, countries, and individuals. Among capitalists, the average rate of profit balances out. Value is transferred from industries with low organic composition to industries with high organic composition. Finance and trade capital can acquire value without being involved in production at all. Between capitalists and workers, the distribution of value follows a simple principle: profit for the capitalists and wages for the workers. Value is moved and allocated because of competition and class struggle national and global.

Value-transfer from the global South to North in the form of profit is common knowledge in Marxist

Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism, Fig. 3 The happy and sad Smiley curve. (Lauesen and Cope 2016, p. 59)

imperialism theory, yet value transfer in the form of consumption of commodities produced by low-wage labor by high-wage labor is controversial as it calls into question the unity and solidarity of the global working proletariat against global capitalism.

However, the fact that you are a wage earner does not necessarily mean that you are exploited when viewed in a global context. Some workers consume more value than they create. Due to the considerable difference in wages between North and South, the transformation of value into price, and the transfer of value through global production chains, it is quite possible for capital to employ labor with a relative high wage and get a profit out of it while, at the same time, this wage earner is able to consume more value than she or he creates. To be specific, the hidden value (in the relative cheap price) of the smartphone, the iPad, the sneakers, the t-shirt, the IKEA furniture, the chocolate bar, the bananas, and the coffee produced in the global South and consumed by workers in the global North may be greater than the value said wage earners in the North create. In a global perspective, the level of exploitation depends on the concrete relationship between the national price of labor-power (wage) and the global value of labor-power (global average wage).

Already in 1857, Marx discussed in *Grundrisse* that workers could draw an advantage from the work of other workers. This happens when the goods some workers produce are sold for less than their value and consumed by other workers who can afford them because of the wages they are paid:

> As regards the other workers, the case is entirely the same; they gain from the depreciated commodity only in relation (1) as they consume it; (2) relative to the size of their wage, which is determined by necessary labour. (Marx 1857)

Therefore, a wage earner can consume more value than she or he produces. Whether someone earns a million dollars or 100,000 dollars a year changes the extent of the value transfer, but not its nature. It is not a matter of principle but calculation. I estimate that the breaking point – the point at which workers above that income threshold cease to be exploited – is between 10,000 and 25,000 dollars per year in income.

The Laws of Capitalism and Class Struggle

After this exercise in political economy, I feel the need to underline the dialectic relation between the economic laws that have to be fulfilled in order to keep accumulation running and class struggle. The capitalist mode of production has its laws; we can even express these laws in algebraic formulas. However, they are not laws of nature. The laws of capitalism are the result of national as well as global political struggles. An enormous political apparatus stand behind these laws, and if necessary, they are secured by military intervention. The capitalist mode of production is made by humans, it consists of human relations, and it can – and will – be altered by humans. Human need can be fulfilled by another mode of production than capitalism.

Cross-References

► Emmanuel, Arghiri and "Unequal Exchange"
► 'Global Labour Arbitrage' and the New Imperialism
► Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
► Samir Amin (1931–2018)
► Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism
► Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International
► Unequal Exchange

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Marxism-Leninism

▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

▶ Grenadian Socialist Anti-colonialism and US Imperialism

Marxist Dependency Theory

▶ Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International

Mass Killing

▶ Genocide and Imperialism

Mass Media and Imperialism

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Description

From World War II to the present day, the USA has been the world's dominant media and cultural superpower. The study of US Empire, cultural and media imperialism, and the cultural industries is important to critical political economists of communication, media studies scholars, and US foreign policy researchers. This entry is a holistic conceptualization of the US Empire and the cultural industries. The first section conceptualizes the "media" dimension of US Empire and cultural imperialism. The second section highlights the global economic dominance of the US cultural industries and the role played by the US State in supporting this dominance. The third section focuses on the global geopolitics of the US cultural industries and their support for US "soft power" or public diplomacy campaigns that attempt to build transnational consent to dominant ideas about America and US foreign policy. The fourth section conceptualizes "the media products" of US Empire. The concluding section identifies some of the consequences the US cultural industries, US State public diplomacy campaigns, and media products may have within non-US countries.

Introduction

In a *Life* magazine article entitled "The American Century," the media magnate Henry Luce (1941) predicted that the United States would achieve world hegemony, and he urged his fellow Americans to "accept wholeheartedly" their "duty" and "opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence." Luce enthused at how "American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common." The source of these "things" was the media and cultural industries or American news companies, publishers, radio and TV broadcasters, film studios,

and advertisers. Throughout the Cold War, the US cultural industries grew, internally, by developing new sub-sectors and, externally, by expanding their operations throughout Western Europe and across the newly independent postcolonial countries. As the cultural industries traveled the globe in search of new investments to make, new cross-border production, distribution and exhibition subsidiaries to acquire, new sources of advertising revenue to extract, new consumer markets to sell to, and new audiences to commodify, they carried ideas and images of the American liberal consumer-capitalist way of life to the world. After the Cold War, the US cultural industries expanded into the Soviet Union's former sphere of influence and across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. At the turn of the millennium, CNN, Walt Disney, and Britney Spears seemed to encompass the entire planet: US media products were ubiquitous.

Nearly eight decades have passed since Luce spoke of America as the most powerful and vital nation in the world, and nowadays, the media products of the US cultural industries are common referents for billions of people. In 2017, the Walt Disney-owned blockbuster *Star Wars: The Last Jedi* was the highest worldwide grossing film: it took $712,358,507 from the global box office and ranked among the top ten highest-grossing films in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. In that same year, Super Bowl LI drew a global TV audience of over 111 million viewers to a competition between the Atlanta Falcons and the New England Patriots for the Vince Lombardi Trophy. US-based TV corporations owned the world's five most popular TV shows (by ratings and social media buzz): *The Walking Dead* (AMC), *Game of Thrones* (HBO), *The Flash* (Warner Bros.), *Pretty Little Liars* (Warner Bros.), and *The Big Bang Theory* (Warner Bros.). In 2017, US interactive entertainment companies created most of the world's best-selling video games: Activision (*Call of Duty Black Ops III* and *Call of Duty WWII*), Electronic Arts (*FIFA 2019* and *Madden NFL 19*), and Take-Two Interactive (*NBA 2K19* and *Grand Theft Auto V*). Currently, billions of people around the world access the Internet with technologies owned by

Apple and Microsoft, shop at Amazon.com, send and receive email messages using Gmail and Outlook, virtually socialize with friends on Facebook, tweet personal opinions on Twitter, search for news and entertainment on Google and Yahoo, post photos to Instagram and Pinterest, let Netflix and YouTube algorithmically customize their media diet, and discuss topics on Reddit.

Throughout the twentieth century, the US drove and utilized developments in the media and cultural industries to build, project, and maintain its economic, geopolitical, and cultural power. In the twenty-first century, the United States is the world's dominant media and cultural superpower, the leading cultural-media imperialist. The study of US Empire, cultural and media imperialism, and the cultural industries is important to critical political economists of communication, media studies scholars, and US foreign policy researchers. The "field of study" of "media imperialism" crisscrosses many disciplines and fields and flags a plurality of approaches (Boyd-Barrett 2015, 2), but "imperialism in general and media imperialism in particular occupy intellectually a vital place in international media studies" (Nordenstreng 2013, 354). In the twenty-first century, theorizations and concrete studies of the nexus of Empire, imperialism, and the media and cultural industries are important because they address the "unequal relations of power" between the global system's dominant imperialist countries and others (Boyd-Barrett 2015, 6). Research in this area take it as axiomatic that all Empires, in territorial or non-territorial forms, rely upon communications technologies and cultural industries to expand and shore up their economic, geopolitical, and cultural influence.

This entry is a holistic conceptualization of the significance of the cultural industries to the US Empire and imperialism. The first section conceptualizes the "media" dimension of US Empire and cultural imperialism. The second section highlights the global economic dominance of the US cultural industries and the role played by the US State in supporting this dominance. The third section focuses on the global geopolitics of the US cultural industries, and their support for US "soft power" or public diplomacy campaigns that attempt to build transnational consent to dominant ideas about America and US foreign policy. The fourth section conceptualizes "the media products" of US Empire. The concluding section identifies some of the consequences of the US cultural industries, US State public diplomacy campaigns, and media products may have within non-US countries.

This entry's holistic overview of the significance of the cultural industries and media products to the US Empire and imperialism builds upon and draws upon the past five decades of cultural and political economy of communications research and writing on the topic (Bah 2008; Beltrán 1979; Boyd-Barret 1977, 1998, 2015; Boyd-Barret and Mirrlees 2019; Comor 1994, 1997; Dorfmann and Mattelart 1971; Fuchs 2010; Golding and Harris 1997; Harvey 2005; Herman and McChesney 1997; Fuchs 2010; Golding and Harris 1997; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Hills 2002, 2007; Innis 1950, 2007; Jin 2005, 2007, 2008, 2015; Mattelart 1976, 1979; McChesney 2006, 2008, 2014; Miller et al. 2005; Mirrlees 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016a, b, 2018; Mosco 1996; Murdock 2006; Nordenstreng and Varis 1974; Nye 2008; Simpson 1994; Tomlinson 1991; Tunstall 1977; Rothkop 1997; Schiller 1969, 1976, 1991, 2000; Sparks 2007, 2012; Tunstall 1977; Winseck and Pike 2007). There is no space in this entry to address all of the perspectives on and debates within political economy of communications research on Empire and cultural-media imperialism; so instead, this entry synthesizes some of the field's most salient insights and themes.

The US Empire and Cultural Imperialism: The US State and the Cultural Industries

For hundreds of years, the global system has been structured to serve the geopolitical, economic, and cultural interests of powerful imperial countries at the expense of less powerful ones. The history of capitalism and the Westphalian interstate system is part and product of the rise and fall of different types of Empires, some colonial, others

postcolonial, but all of which have expanded in pursuit of their interests over land and sea, recently, into air and "outer space," and now, in "cyberspace." Following World War II, the global system's center of gravity shifted from the colonial Empires of old Europe to the United States, and the United States began to distinguish its style of imperial rule from antiquated territorial-colonial forms. While colonialism typically involves one State's direct dispossession of a people's sovereignty and control of territory, the postcolonial US Empire strove to develop territorial nation-States that were integrated with and supportive of its overarching vision of order. Unlike the British Empire, the US Empire did not pursue the direct colonial domination and administration of territories, but rather, using tools of coercion and persuasion, it sought to build a global system of client or proxy states that shared its core features and reproduced its model: the capitalist mode of production, the (neo)liberal State form, and the consumerist way of life.

The motor of the US Empire's expansion is imperialism, and US imperialism involves a structural alliance between US corporations and the diplomatic and military agencies of the US Security State. While the political and economic spheres are formally distinct in capitalist society, and there may be conflicts and contradictions between the interests of particular blocs of US corporations and the various agencies of the US State, US imperialism – and cultural imperialism – entails a mutually beneficial alliance, as opposed to conflict, between US-based corporations and the US State. In this regard, US imperialism represents the US State's facilitation and legitimization of the interests of US-based corporations and, sometimes, non-US corporations, legally, diplomatically, and, sometimes, with military force, across the countries they wish to operate in. In the global system, numerous non-integrated and nonaligned corporations and States exist, and they assert national interests and pursue them in ways that may unsettle Washington. For this reason, the US Empire's economic and geopolitical planners have routinely deployed a combination of coercion and persuasion to achieve their goals in world affairs. Nye's (2009) concept of "smart power,"

for example, advises the US State to balance hard power strategies (making others do what you want by coercing them) with soft power strategies (getting others to want what you want by attracting and co-opting them) in their struggle to "lead" the world. To elaborate, the US State regularly projects its military power beyond its own territorial borders, declaring and waging wars against opponents. And with the help of private media organizations, the US State runs persuasion campaigns to get others to do what it wants and to want what it wants. With tools of force and consent, the US Empire pushes and pulls other States, peoples, and cultures to integrate with the institutions, policies, ideas, values, and practices that uphold its vision of global order.

All of history's Empires have been cultural imperialists, and the US Empire is no exception to this pattern. In general, US cultural imperialism describes the US State and corporate sector's coercive and persuasive means and practices that aim to impose or elicit consent to a "way of life" (i.e., production modes, institutions, political and legal norms, policies, languages, customs, and ideas) that is represented as "America" in other countries, with the goal of influencing their ways and without reciprocation of influence. This conceptualization of "cultural imperialism" emphasizes a nexus of the geopolitical and economic spheres and points to a synergistic intertwining of the US State and US corporate actors that drive, lead, and benefit from US Empire and cultural imperialism. What are the mass media and cultural industries, and why are they significant to the US Empire and the State-corporate project of US cultural imperialism?

The US mass media or the cultural industries are the privately owned US-based corporations that aim to turn a profit by financing, producing, distributing, promoting, and exhibiting new technologies, media services, and cultural goods that convey meanings about the social world. In general, the cultural industries refer to a wide range of sectors and firms that crisscross the publishing industries; the advertising, marketing, and public relations industries; the TV film, music, and video game or "entertainment" industries; the radio and TV broadcasting industries; the news media

industries; the telecommunications and related services industries; and the Internet, Big Data, and social media platform industries. Distinct from the cultural industries, the US Security State refers to the federal governmental departments and agencies – the White House, the Department of State, the Department of Defense (including the National Security Agency), the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency – involved in making and pursuing foreign policy decisions. The cultural industries pursue profit for financiers, CEOs, and shareholders. The State advances national security interests and goals, as authorized by the President (and sometimes US Congress), in the name of the "people" it is supposedly beholden to (but most often, for capital).

The cultural industries and the US Security State are different types of institutions, and the business goals of the cultural industries and the geopolitical interests of the US State do not always align. There may be tensions between sectors and firms of the cultural industries, as well as competitions between the lobbies of these sectors to influence or win favor among the political class of the US State's various departments and agencies. Yet, when the US cultural industries and US State agencies come together in collaborations that aim to influence the internal political and cultural affairs of other countries, the thoughts and behaviors of other citizens, and the "ways of life" associated with other national identities, the US-based globalizing cultural industries and the US State are advancing the "media" front of a cultural imperialist project. As a significant component of cultural imperialism, this "media" dimension of US Empire supports the capitalist dominance of the US cultural industries in other markets and buttresses the US State's geopolitical goal of promoting "America" and winning consent to US foreign policy in other countries.

In sum, US cultural imperialism is a State-corporate project that is frequently supported by the cultural industries, and furthermore, this project is represented through the products of these industries. How, specifically, are the US cultural industries integral to the US Empire's economic and geopolitical expansion?

The Economics of the US Cultural Industries: Supported by the US State in World Markets

The US Empire's cultural industries are significant to the overall growth of the US capitalist economy. According to the 2018 *Fortune 500* list, five of the top ten most profitable companies in the United States today are "in" the cultural industries: Apple ($48,351 million), Verizon ($30,101 million), AT&T ($29,450 million) Comcast ($22,714 million), and Microsoft ($21,204 million). In 2017, Apple's profits alone exceeded the combined profits of the "Big Three" automakers – Ford Motor, General Motors, and Fiat Chrysler. Five of the six most valuable companies in the United States (by market capitalization) are digital media companies including Apple, Alphabet (Google's parent), Amazon, Microsoft, and Facebook. Walt Disney, Time Warner, Twenty-First Century Fox, CBC, and Viacom are the biggest five media conglomerates in the United States by revenue; Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, IBM, and Dell Technologies are the biggest technology companies; and AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, Charter Communications, and CenturyLink are the biggest telecommunication companies. In 2017, Wall Street rallied around Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Alphabet, which accounted for almost half of the gains on the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index. Clearly, the US cultural industries are part of and significant to US capitalism.

The US cultural industries are internationally expansive, and their cross-border reach is unrivalled. In 2018, the United States was the global system's headquarters for *most* of the largest corporations in the cultural industries. The 2018 *Forbes Global 2000* ranks the world's 2000 largest corporations in four metrics (sales, profits, assets, and market value). In 2018, the United States was headquarters to 76 of the 172 world's largest corporations in the cultural industries (44% of the world total). By comparison, China, which is often framed as a rival to the United States, is home to a mere 16 of the world's largest corporations in the cultural industries (9.3% of the world total) (Touryalai et al. 2018). The United States is

home to major global TV broadcasting corporations (Comcast, Walt Disney, Charter Communications, Time Warner, Dish Network, CBS, Viacom, Discovery Communications, and News Corp), advertising firms (Omnicom Group and Interpublic Group), computer hardware firms (Apple, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, and Dell Technologies), computer service firms (Alphabet-Google, IBM, and Facebook), Internet and catalogue retail firms (Amazon.com, Netflix, and eBay), computer software and programming firms (Microsoft, Oracle, Adobe Systems), and telecommunication firms (AT&T, Verizon Communications).

The global capitalist power of the US cultural industries is further cemented by Hollywood's preeminence in the global entertainment market. Between 2000 and 2017, more than 90% of the top ten highest worldwide grossing films released each year were owned by one of the six major Hollywood studios: Warner Bros., Twentieth Century Fox, Paramount Pictures, Universal Pictures, Sony Pictures, and Walt Disney Studios (Box Office Mojo 2018). Furthermore, 11 of the global system's top 20 most visited websites were in 2018 owned by US corporations: Google.com, YouTube.com, Facebook.com, Wikipedia.org, Amazon.com, Yahoo.com, Twitter.com, Live.com, Google.co.in, Reddit.com, and Instagram.com (Alexa 2018). The United States is the globe's leading "platform imperialist" because US corporations own the lion's share of the Internet economy's hardware and software, intellectual property rights, and user data (Jin 2015). Moreover, in 2017, the United States was home to 8 of the world's biggest 15 video game publishers (Sony Interactive Entertainment, Apple, Microsoft Studios, Activision Blizzard, Google, EA, Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment, and Take-Two Interactive) (Geoshen 2018). Strong capitalist and expansionist cultural industries exist in other countries (Nordenstreng and Thussu 2015), but most of the largest global corporations in the cultural industries are based in the United States and owned by a US-based transnational capitalist class (Birkinbine et al. 2016).

The many corporations that constitute the US cultural industries use a variety of savvy strategies to enter non-US countries to conduct their business and integrate nationally situated cultural industries into their networks and commodity chains. But apropos cultural imperialism as a State-corporate project, these US-based globalizing media and cultural corporations are often supported by the US State, which facilitates and legitimizes their worldwide position of economic primacy, privilege, and power. The international expansion of the US-based cultural industries is buttressed by US State agencies such as the US Treasury, the US Congress, the Department of Commerce's US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and International Trade Administration (ITA), the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the White House Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), and the US Department of State. These State agencies formulate policies that claim to serve a general "national interest," but they often support the particular capitalist interests of the cultural industries.

Concretely, the US State supports the cultural industries by protecting and promoting the property rights of its owners. Intellectual property rights (IPR) – copyright specifically – is the legal basis for the cultural industries' mode of capitalist accumulation, its existence and growth, and markets for the exchange of its commodified goods and services. The many media owners of the cultural industries depend on the US State to recognize and legally enforce their copyright, which gives them an exclusive right to enable or prohibit others from using or copying their cultural goods and gives them the right to sell, license, or trade these rights to others in worldwide markets. The US State aggressively protects and promotes the IPR of the US cultural industries with the force of law, at home and abroad. The White House's USTR, for example, monitors copyright infringing activities all over the world and pressures violating States to enforce within their own territories US-derived copyright legislation. Indeed, the USTR secures the copyright of US corporations "domestically and abroad, bilaterally, and in regional groupings" by "building stronger, more streamlined, and more effective systems for the protection and enforcement of

IPR" (USTR 2015, 80). To protect the copyright of its core media and digital technology corporations, the US State leads the world in anti-piracy initiatives. In October 2011, for example, the Office of the USTR established the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) "to strengthen the international legal framework for effectively combating global proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and copyright piracy" (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2011).

The US State also supports the economic power of the cultural industries by allocating public wealth to them in the form of subsidies. From the earliest days of the US Republic, postal subsidies helped underwrite the commercial newspaper and magazine industry; State and party printing contracts subsidized a partisan press; public libraries and schools bought commoditized books and established a national readership for them; federal grants supported the nation's private telecommunications system; State-allocated research and development funds helped build the radio and TV broadcasting industries; and the FCC's allocation of monopoly rights to bits of the electromagnetic spectrum to private broadcasters and cable TV networks helped them grow and prosper (McChesney 1999, 2006, 2008, 2014). In the early twenty-first century, the US State continues to subsidize the various sectors of the cultural industries with income tax credits, property tax abatements, tax exemptions, and more. The US Federal Government and State-level governments, for example, use tax credits to keep TV and film production in the US territory and deter Hollywood studios from "running away" to countries like Canada or New Zealand, where labor costs are lower, subsidies more plentiful, and currency exchange rates a boon to business (Miller et al. 2005). Furthermore, some of the wealthiest Silicon Valley companies have raked in massive State subsidies: since 2000, Google has enjoyed State handouts of $766 million; from 2011 onward, Apple has banked $693 million; Facebook pocketed a total of $549 million; and Amazon built its commodity distribution and customer data centers with help from $613 million in State grants and tax benefits (Baron 2018).

Furthermore, the US State supports the expansion of the US cultural industries around the world and into other countries by promoting a neoliberal foreign policy framework that extols the liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of non-US communication and mass media systems. In 1946, US Assistant Secretary of State William Benton declared: "The State Department plans to do everything within its power along political or diplomatic lines to help break down the artificial barriers to the expansion of private American news agencies, magazines, motion pictures, and other media of communications throughout the world. Freedom of the press—and freedom of exchange of information generally – is an integral part of our foreign policy" (cited in Schiller 1984, 6). During the Cold War, the US State used the free flow of information doctrine to try to break down national protectionist barriers to the cultural industries' expansion and open borders (and markets) to its influence. This doctrine was "an aggressive [free] trade position on behalf of US media interests" that implied US-based and "trans-national media firms and advertisers should be permitted to operate globally, with minimal government intervention" (Herman and McChesney 1997, 17). Throughout the 1990s, the US State tried to universalize the free flow for media free-trade doctrine at the World Trade Organization (WTO) with multilateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Herman and McChesney 1997; Schiller 2000).

In the early 2000s, the US cultural industries faced an impediment to its maximal expansion in UNESCO's *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of the Cultural Expressions* (CPPDCE), which empowered States to exempt "culture" from multilateral free-trade deals and develop strategies for protecting and promoting national cultural industries and cultures. The US State rejected and condemned the CPPDCE and then negotiated bilateral free-trade deals with Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Singapore, the

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Dominican Republic, Australia, Morocco, and South Korea (Jin 2011). Currently, the US State "seeks to ensure the continued expansion of U.S. services trade through rules-based liberalization in the WTO, bilateral free trade agreements, and other regional venues" (USTR 2015). In 2011, the Department of State launched the *International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World* (ISCPSONW) – developed in consultation with Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Yahoo – to reconfigure the Internet as a means of "opening markets to U.S. capital" (McCarthy 2011, 89). Since 2013, the US State has spearheaded new media services free-trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). In sum, from World War II to the present day, the US State has sought to open all countries up to the freedom of the US cultural industries to conduct their business wherever they like, whenever they want to.

In addition to promoting free trade in media and culture, the US State promotes *deregulation* (or the elimination of political constraints on the power of US and non-US media corporations to maximize profits) and *privatization* (or the transfer of State ownership over public telecommunication and broadcasting entities to privately owned and profit-seeking media corporations). From the 1980s, the US State has pushed telecommunication deregulation and privatization and played a role in making capitalist telecommunications systems the global norm (Comor 1994, 1997; Jin 2005). The US State's support for deregulation and privatization enabled US telecommunication firms to globally expand, and between 1983 and 2005, they acquired 1502 foreign telecom companies (Jin 2008). Currently, the United States headquarters some of the world's largest global telecommunications firms (AT&T and Verizon Communications). The US State has also promoted the deregulation and privatization of national public broadcasters. Over the past four decades, public broadcasters have declined and private media companies have grown, and these private media corporations frequently reproduce the capitalist logics of US-based media

conglomerates by pursuing profit maximization, exploiting waged cultural workers, buying and exhibiting copyrighted entertainment (often from the US cultural industries), selling audience attention to advertisers, and modeling their own cultural forms and products on those made popular by US-based firms.

The US State's unwavering support for the cultural industries may be explained with regard to an accommodative relationship between the US State's policy-makers and lobbies for the US cultural industries. Each day, the interests of the cultural industries are represented to and advanced within the US State by a network of lobbies such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the American Association of Publishers (APP), the Recording Association of America (RIAA), the Software Alliance (BSA), the Entertainment Software Association (ESA), the Internet Association (IIA), and the International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA). These lobby groups struggle to influence the US State's communication and media policy and regulatory framework and often succeed in getting their way with political actors and policy-makers which recognize the importance of the cultural industries to the US's overall economic growth and perhaps also reap personal rewards for compliance. There is also a "revolving door" between the cultural industries and the US State; many lobbyists for the cultural industries have worked for the US State, and many policy-makers for the US State have worked for the cultural industries. For example, in 2014, Stan McCoy moved from his State job with the US Trade Representative to the MPAA, and he is now the MPAA's President and Managing Director of the region encompassing Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), responsible for policy, operations, advocacy, and personnel across the territory. Moreover, in 2013–2014, 118 out of 142 Comcast lobbyists were formally employed by the US State, 31 of 34 Time Warner lobbyists that period had previously worked for the US State too, and so did 23 of 28 News Corporation lobbyists and 15 out of 19 Walt Disney lobbyists (Open Secrets 2014).

In sum, the capitalist power and global growth of the US cultural industries have been facilitated and legitimized by the US State, which has protected and promoted US media and communications firms with IP security, subsidies, and a neoliberal policy framework that extols free media-cultural trade and the deregulation and privatization of public telecommunication and broadcasting entities. A convergence of interests – economic and geopolitical – plus a rapidly revolving door between public and private sector personnel primes the US State to support the US cultural industries. Though the owners of some non-US cultural industries push for and prosper as a result of US-derived and enforced neoliberal policy, the biggest beneficiary of this policy framework is the United States, which continues to be home base for the world's most powerful cultural industries.

The Geopolitics of the US Cultural Industries: Supporting the US State in World Affairs

The cultural industries are geopolitically significant to the US Empire's global "soft power" and public diplomacy. In the post-9/11 era, neoliberal "soft power" theorists exalted the global dominance of the US cultural industries and conceptualized US media products as instrumental to US world power. Nye (2004) defined soft power as "the ability [of the US State] to get what it want[s] through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (x) and called upon the US State to join forces with Hollywood, news media corporations, and PR firms to make media products that attract people to American values, identity, and foreign policy. Like Nye, Fraser (2004) asserted that US global leadership depends upon "soft power." "Make no mistake," said Fraser, "America's global domination is based mainly on the superiority of US hard power. But the influence, prestige, and legitimacy of the emerging American Empire will depend on the effectiveness of its soft power" (13). For Fraser (2004, 266), "American soft power (movies, television, pop music, fast food) promotes values and beliefs that, while

contentious, are ultimately good for the world." As such, "America's weapons of mass distraction are not only necessary for global stability, but also should be built up and deployed more assertively throughout the world."

Throughout the twentieth century, the US State built "information" and "media" agencies that partnered with the cultural industries to launch these "weapons of mass distraction" in support of the US Empire's expansion. The US State and private media corporations have routinely collaborated to inform, influence, and change the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics in support of US strategic interests around the world (Cull 2008; Mirrlees 2016a; Snow 2003; Wagenleitner 1994). The Committee on Public Information (CPI) (World War I), the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (the inter-war period), the Office of War Information (OWI) (World War I), the United States Information Agency (USIA) (Cold War, 1945–1991) and the Department of State's Office of Public Diplomacy (post-9/11 Global War on Terror) devised and administered the US Empire's public diplomacy campaigns, forming alliances with the cultural industries to produce and distribute media and informational products that aimed to organize transnational consent to the American Way and to win support for contentious US foreign policy decisions.

The US State's public diplomacy agencies have conducted global polls to gauge and manage public impressions of US foreign policy; hired PR companies to conduct locally customized influence campaigns; dispatched academics and speakers to foreign countries to talk up US cultural mores; operated international news services and sourced private news companies with pre-packaged content; helped globalize the US book and magazine publishing industry and set up city-based reading rooms full of American content; administered international radio broadcasters like the Voice of America and Radio y TV Martí; worked with Hollywood studios to make documentary and war-time propaganda films; operated WORLDNET, a satellite TV agency; and engaged publics via social media platforms to influence them. The US State's public diplomacy agencies mobilize the total means of communications

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media to win transnational consent to US Empire, and the US cultural industries have frequently rallied in support of the State's global persuasion campaigns.

For example, following the Bush Administration's post-9/11 launch of the Global War on Terrorism, a 2002 Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy sponsored by the Council of Foreign Relations released a report entitled "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism" that called for "the establishment of coordinating structure, chaired by a principal adviser to the president, to harmonize the public diplomacy efforts of government agencies, allies and private-sector partners" (Peterson 2002, 74). Described by *BusinessWeek* as the "Queen of Madison Avenue," Charlotte Beers was hired as the State Department's Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy (OPD). She pledged to rebrand America and recruited the US Advertising Council to help her do so. In 2002, Beers' launched a public diplomacy campaign across the so-called Muslim World called "Shared Values" comprised of five TV commercials, a Muslim version of *Sesame Street*, a magazine called *Hi,* ads in Pan-Arab newspapers, a website called "Open Dialogue," and virtual "American Rooms." The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) supported Shared Values with Radio Sawa and soon after Radio Farda. While the OPD's Bureau of International Information Programs (BIIP) and Bureau of Public Affairs (BPA) handled Shared Values' media front, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange (BECA) coordinated cultural exchanges.

In 2018, the US Department of State coordinated its own $1.8 billion a year public diplomacy agency that created and circulated positive images of and messages about "America" around the world. The "mission" of the Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD) was "to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world."

In 2018, the OPD oversaw the bureau of Public Affairs (PA), which "engaged domestic and international media" to further US foreign policy and national security interests as well as broadening understanding of American values." To that end, the PA deployed "Strategic and tactical communications planning"; conducted "press briefings for domestic and foreign press corps"; pursued "media outreach" to enable people "everywhere to hear directly from key Department officials"; mobilized "social media and other modern technologies to engage the public"; ran "six international Regional Media Hubs"; answered questions about US "foreign policy issues by phone, email, letter, or through social media"; arranged foreign policy town halls and "speakers to visit universities, chambers of commerce, and communities"; coordinated "audio-visual products and services in the U.S. and abroad for the public, the press, the Secretary of State, and Department bureaus and offices"; and prepared historical studies on "U.S. diplomacy and foreign affairs" (US Department of State 2018). Also, the OPD's US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) launched a Russian-language TV and digital network called Current Time, and its Voice of America and Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty launched Polygraph and Factograph, English and Russian-language fact-checking websites to counter "disinformation." The OPD also ran the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), which leveraged "digital communications technology to reach across platforms" and took a "strategic, data-driven approach to develop multimedia, digital communications products" with 700 American Spaces in more than 150 countries.

A crucial tool of the US State's "soft power" arsenal, public diplomacy is a process of influence by which the US State and its private partners in the cultural industries impose upon publics in other countries dominant images of and stories about America and US foreign policy with the goal of winning them to or perpetuating their compliance with their integration with the US Empire. In the process, the US State and private sector public diplomacy campaigns sometimes subvert the media and cultural sovereignty of non-US States to protect the societies they govern

from unwanted foreign "meddling" in their internal affairs and foreign influence within their cultures. Public diplomacy uses magazines, newspapers, books, radio programs, TV shows, films, and websites to communicate the virtues of the US societal model to citizens in other countries with the goal of getting them to pressure their respective parties and State elites to adopt policies that the US Empire's planners are comfortable with. And when publics disagree with US public diplomacy, they tend to be constructed as having a flawed or false perception of America that needs to be changed. Yet, public diplomacy aims to change public perceptions of the US Empire without changing the often calamitous foreign policy decisions (including war) that may cause anti-American feelings in the first place. When public diplomacy's words do not reflect the concrete deeds of the US State in world affairs and when image triumphs over substance, its officials will face mass resentment. Though public diplomacy is sometimes framed as fostering dialogue, building mutually beneficial relationships and greater cross-cultural understanding, many US public diplomacy campaigns aim to persuade publics to support the US Empire. For the most part, public diplomacy does not listen to global public opinion so as to responsively change US foreign policy, but aims to know public opinion so as to better manage or control it.

The US Empire's Media Products

The previous two sections highlighted a nexus of the economics of the US cultural industries and the geopolitics of the US Security State and identified the major US corporate and State institutions responsible for producing and coordinating the mass-mediated front of US cultural imperialism. This section looks a little more closely at the media products of US Empire and imperialism.

The US cultural industries' products address millions of different people living the US as members of one nationalist "imagined community" and divide this national community into multicultural lifestyle identity niches. In any case, these media products do not stay put in the United States. At present, news stories, TV shows and films, interactive games, music videos, sports entertainment, advertisements, and digital media are carried by the US cultural industries, and sometimes the State's public diplomacy agencies, to the world. As these media products travel across the countries, continents, and entire hemispheres, they expose billions of people divided by geographies, classes, ethnicities, and languages to a wide range of scripts about and images of the American Way of Life and Way of War. The US Empire's media products turn the world into an audience of America. As mediated stories about and symbols of America and US foreign policy blanket the world, they make the United States akin to a second culture that mashes and mixes with other cultures elsewhere.

Many of the US media products traveling the globe carry nationalist consumer-capitalist and militaristic ideologies, but many also carry a plurality of stories about the social complexities and problems of the United States. At the same time, the US cultural industries are de-Americanizing media products to overcome the "cultural discount" associated with the specifics of national place, people, and culture. For example, Hollywood depends upon the worldwide box office for over half of its annual revenue, and so it designs blockbuster films that address a global as opposed to distinctly American audience. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many of Hollywood's highest-grossing worldwide films were not explicitly about America: *Star Wars: The Force Awakens* (2015), *Avatar* (2009), *Jurassic World* (2015), *The Avengers* (2012), *The Dark Knight* (2008), *Rogue One: A Star Wars Story* (2016), *Beauty and the Beast* (2017), *Finding Dory* (2016), and *Avengers: Age of Ultron* (2015). Moreover, globalizing US TV corporations are sometimes integrating the business strategy of glocalization – or "think globally, act locally" – when designing global reality TV formats such as *Top Model* and youth music video brands such as MTV International.

Though many of the cultural industries' media products do not carry explicit representations of America to the world, they do support an

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ideological environment in which capitalism and consumerism *must be* represented as the ideal, though no longer the exclusively American, way of life. The US cultural industries are in the business of selling media products and selling audience attention to advertisers. But they also play an important role in promoting the ethos of buying on behalf of US and transnational corporate clients such as Apple, McDonald's, and Coca-Cola. In support of the ongoing engineering worldwide consumer demand for US commodities, and on behalf of a global capitalist system that depends for its survival on the expansion of consumerism as a way of life, the US cultural industries support the national and transnational advertising needs of larger corporations by representing shopping as the meaning of life and promoting branded goods as a significant source of identity, community, and happiness.

Though the US cultural industries are globally dominant, the consumer-oriented media products it sells to the world don't always carry imagery of and messages about America that align with the State's public diplomacy campaigns. The autonomy of US media corporations from the US State means that there is no guarantee the cultural industries' media products will textually glorify America and US foreign policy. Interestingly, while neoliberals say the cultural industries are integral to US "soft power" (Fraser 2004), conservatives contend that globalizing media products cause anti-Americanism because they foster a global "false consciousness" about America by representing it as a land of sex, smut and violence, stupid teenagers, vapid consumerism, and political corruption (Defleur and Defleur 2003). Furthermore, Richard Kimball and Joshua Muravchick, of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, say that Hollywood vilifies the United States by pumping out films that convey conspiracy theories of State power (Wellemeyer 2006). For conservatives, it would seem that American media products that do not represent Christian values, happy nuclear-patriarchal families, military veneration, hyper-nationalism, and the sexual chastity of youth are "un-American" and thus responsible for global anti-Americanism.

Yet, this is a simplistic explanation. Worldwide, people may enjoy the US cultural industries' popular TV shows, films, and video games but loathe the US imperial presidency and foreign policy. For example, in 2017, Hollywood made record profits, accumulating $43.4 billion in worldwide revenue (Robb 2018), but in the same year, support for US global leadership fell to an all-time low in almost every part of the world. The cause of waning transnational adoration of the US Empire was not the content of globalizing media products but the Trump presidency. The Pew Research Center's study of global attitudes found that "Donald Trump's presidency has had a major impact on how the world sees the US as it is "broadly unpopular around the globe, and ratings for the U.S. have declined steeply in many nations" (Wike et al. 2017). That said, when US media products glorify the US Empire's wars or attempt to build consent to contentious US foreign policy decisions, anti-Americanism may be exacerbated. As Miller (2005) says, "In the final instance, the links between popular culture and US government aims and policies are key to anti-Americanism, *not the content of popular culture*" itself (27).

In any case, the US cultural industries media products do not reflect "America" or the US State but represent many partial and selective stories about and images of America and the US State. Too often, the "media" of cultural imperialism is a blanket term for each and every media product exported by the US cultural industries to the world. This broad definition unhelpfully bundles together a wide variety of corporate and governmental media sources, different types and genres of media products, and diverse stories and images. This bundling is not unreasonable. At a macrolevel of analysis, it makes sense to classify any media product that is produced and circulated by an Empire's cultural industries, as the media of cultural imperialism. But this position is too general and conflates too much. There is a difference between a Hollywood film such as *Zero Dark Thirty* (2012) that affirms preemptive drone strikes and Robert Greenwald's *Unmanned: America's Drone Wars* (2013), which contemplates the moral dilemmas and human

consequences of drone warfare. Both of these films were directed by US directors and produced and distributed internationally by US film companies, but the former film supports the US Empire's new way of war, while the latter film scrutinizes it. How best to conceptualize the "media" of cultural imperialism?

As discussed previously, US cultural imperialism entails a close alliance between the US State and the cultural industries in competition and conflict with other States and capitals in a global system. The media products of US Empire are those shaped by a nexus of the US State and US cultural industries. To elaborate, the media products of cultural imperialism can be conceptualized in one or all of the four following ways, each which highlights a synergy of the US State and the cultural industries.

The media products of Empire can be conceptualized with regard to the geopolitics of ownership. These products are the intellectual property of a US-based and owned media company whose business operations are supported politically against rivals by the foreign policy policies of the US State. This support might take the form of the US State subsidizing IP owner's operations or protecting them from foreign competition, promoting and protecting the IP rights of the owning company against copyright violators in other countries, or trying to open up other country-specific markets to the free flow of the media product by pushing audiovisual free-trade agreements. Take, for example, the US Department of Commerce's Internet Policy Task Force's attempt to protect and promote Hollywood-enforcing copyright legislation in China or the State Department's brokering of audiovisual free-trade agreements with States around the world on behalf of Hollywood.

The media products of Empire can also be conceptualized with regard to State-corporate co-production dynamics. These products result from a collaborative production relationship between the cultural industries and the Security State, the combined labors of the cultural workers and State public affairs personnel. These media products are not politically innocent. They've been deliberately designed to exert some kind of ideological influence on the way people think about or perceive America and US foreign policy. They intend to have effects, those being, to get people to change the way people perceive the US Empire and potentially think about and behave toward it. Take, for example, the US Department of State's Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs' post-9/11 recruitment of Madison Avenue to re-brand America and sell it to the "Muslim World"; the CIA's Office of Public Affairs' collaboration with Warner Bros. on *Argo* (2012); the Department of Defense's Entertainment liaison office's work with Paramount Pictures' global blockbuster film, *Transformers* (2007); the Navy Seals and Relativity Media's making of *Act of Valor* (2012); or the US Army's recruitment of the video game industry to make *America's Army*. All of these media products result from a collaborative relationship between the publicity agencies of the US Security State and privately owned media corporations.

Additionally, the media products of Empire can be conceptualized with regard to the content these products carry or express (i.e., the stories, images, messages, and themes). These products are not about any part of American culture, but rather, they show and tell stories about the past, present, or future of the US Empire. These products depict the diplomatic, security, and military agencies of the US State pursuing strategic interests, power, and influence in a world of threats and in a world that wants or is compelled to accept US-imposed order. The media products of Empire represent the US Empire in action, its hopes and fears, its victories and defeats, and its aspirations and sorrows. They may affirm, express ambivalence about, or directly oppose Empire, but all say something about the US State and US transnational corporations in conflict with other States, peoples, places, and cultures. In the video game *Battlefield 4* (2013), for example, the US State goes to war against China; *Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3* (2011) is a virtual Third World War between the United States and Russia.

Significantly, the media products of the US Empire tend to play a significant role in shaping American and transnational public opinions about what geopolitical topics and issues are important

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to think about and how to think about them. They may play an "agenda setting" role and tell US and transnational publics what world issues are significant to think about by constructing certain non-US people, places, and countries as objects worthy of public attention (and often, US military intervention). Additionally, these imperial media products tell people *how* they should think about the US role in world affairs. Media products about war, diplomacy, and national security are neither mirrors that reflect reality nor nonpartisan mediators of the power relations between the US Empire and other countries, peoples, and cultures. Far from acting as transparent windows to the world, imperial media products "frame" the world in partial and selective ways, thereby encouraging people to develop certain kinds of understandings of the world and often at the expense of others. In effect, these media products actively intervene in and give meaning to the world by telling people *what* and *how* to think about it, privileging certain topics and issues for focus over others. There is a need for more research on and case studies of the media products of the US Empire that attend to the economic and geopolitical conditions of their ownership, their State-corporate production dynamics, the stories and images they convey, and the agendas they attempt to set and the frames of reality they construct and invite identification with.

Conclusion: The Consequences of the US Empire's Cultural Industries

This entry has presented a holistic overview of the economic, geopolitical, and cultural-ideological significance of the cultural industries to the US Empire and imperialism. Though the US State and the cultural industries are different types of organizations and driven by different interests, there are symbiotic relations between them that support the US Empire and the media of US cultural imperialism. In the twenty-first century, the US cultural industries are the most powerful in the world, and the worldwide capitalist power of the US cultural industries is facilitated and legitimized by the US State. At the same time, the US

State's public diplomacy agencies often link with and mobilize the private cultural industries to produce media products that promote America and US foreign policy to the world. Nonetheless, the cultural industries are privately owned and controlled, and so the media products they produce and sell around the world do not always already align with the US State's public diplomacy goals. They may carry a wide range of stories and images: some may glorify the US Empire, some may scrutinize it, and others may say nothing at all.

One consequence of the extraordinary power of the US cultural industries is an asymmetrical cultural trade relationship between the US and other countries. The US-Canada cultural trade relationship is exemplary of this asymmetry. In 2016, the top ten TV shows watched in English Canada were American hits like *The Big Bang Theory*, *NCIS*, and *Grey's Anatomy*. Hollywood films usually take 94–99% of the Canadian box office each year, and in 2015, Canadian films accounted for a little over 1% of the total box office. The top 15 most visited websites in Canada are American (Alexa 2018). Netflix and Amazon Prime Video rule the video streaming service sector in Canada, and national upstarts like Bell's CraveTV never came close to rivalling the size of their subscriber base or revenues. Canada is probably the only country in the world where most people consume more foreign – American – TV than they do national TV shows. Lots of Canadians watch America on their screens; few Americans watch Canada on theirs. The US Empire leaves a big media footprint in Canada and elsewhere too. The US boasts an audiovisual trade surplus with nearly every country. In 2008, Hollywood films took in 16.4 billion rubles at the Russian box office, five times more than Russian-made films. The People's Republic of China blocks a lot of American entertainment, yet nine out of the top ten 2012 box office hits in China were Hollywood films. Over the past decade, China has tried to create blockbuster global entertainment, but it has not had any success in making entertainment hits in the US market.

Another consequence of the unmatched power of the US cultural industries is a largely

asymmetrical economic power relationship between US cultural industries and those based in other countries. In the early twenty-first century, the US Empire's cultural industries exist in a global system of sovereign nation-States where "national cultures" are frequently constructed by elites through nationally based cultural industries to fulfill strategic economic and political objectives. The State and business elites of many nation-States regularly use media and cultural policy tools to protect national cultural industries (and sometimes, "cultures") from the US cultural industries. At the same, time, they promote the internationalization of these industries and their media products to other countries and markets. While States in countries around the world protect and promote the interests of national cultural industries and media products, not all countries have the same (i.e., equal) ability to finance, produce, distribute, and exhibit media products worldwide. So while non-US cultural industries exist all over the world, none of them currently rival the United States. The corporations that constitute the backbone of the US cultural industries possess disproportionate power to integrate and influence the world's many cultural industries to increase their own returns. As such, the US-based globalizing corporations exert asymmetrical influence over the structure, ownership patterns, distribution and exhibition process, and standards of media product quality of other national cultural industries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by them. That said, the US State and corporate cultural imperialists have never been able to totally "Americanize" national cultural industries nor have they ever achieved "cultural domination."

Nonetheless, the US Empire's cultural industries and their media products often leave a mark within countries and cultures around the world. The outcome of the capitalist cultural relations between the United States and other countries is best conceptualized as "asymmetrical cultural hybridity" or "unequal cultural mixing," not "cultural domination." America is not an ethno-monolith reducible to "blood and soil" but rather a site of contestation: socialist, liberal, and conservative Americans battle over the meaning of "America"

and articulate it to different political projects, left and right. But because the US Empire is home to the most gargantuan cultural industries in the world, it is better able to produce and circulate media messages about and images of the US than non-US peoples are of their own cultures. Some people on the receiving end of the US Empire's media products may perceive them as threats to their cultures, while others may embrace them as a positive alternative to what their national State and cultural industries give (or take away). The "audience" of the US cultural industries may interpret, select, creatively mix, and redeploy the texts of American media products in a range of ways, yet there may still be effects, some barely noticeable, others more pronounced. All Empires leave a cultural mark. Undoubtedly, the US Empire's cultural industries and the media products they sell to the world do as well.

Cross-References

▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
▶ US Militarism and US Hegemonic Power

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Maurice Bishop

▶ Grenadian Socialist Anti-colonialism and US Imperialism

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▶ Senghor, Leopold Sédar (1906–2001)

Media Imperialism

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Introduction

In introducing his book *Media Imperialism*, Boyd-Barrett (2015) argued that it is more productive to regard the concept as referring to a field

of study rather than to a single theory. Many different theories could be credited with advancing our knowledge of the broad range of possible issues, topics, and relationships that integrate an interest in phenomena that are widely recognized as having to do with *empire*, with an interest in phenomena that are widely recognized as having to do with *media*. A great deal of scholarship that contributes to understanding of such relationships does not expressly adopt the term "media imperialism."

Scholars have long debated the relationship between the concepts "media" and human "culture." Some have conflated these two terms as though they were interchangeable. The prevalent view today is that media are an important element of culture but constitute only a fraction of the universe of manifestations of culture even if, at the same time, much of this broader universe is represented, mediated, or socially constructed through media.

Scholarship that expressly adopts the terminology of media imperialism (and much of the relevant scholarship that does not) tends to be interested in some or more of the following questions:

1. Do the information, entertainment, infotainment, and advertising contents of given media work to reinforce, resist, or modify relationships of inequality in power and wealth between and sometimes even within nations?
2. Do media operate autonomously in the determination of such contents or do they collude with centers of political, military, commercial, or other power in this process, to the extent that they might be rightly regarded as constituting components of the apparatus of imperial control?
3. Do media corporations sometimes acquire such degrees of market control domestically, internationally, or in certain sectors of media activity that they can be meaningfully described as media imperialists whose activities significantly shape, constrain, or otherwise shape the activities of smaller media corporations?
4. Is there a point at which the global networks of electronic communications that are built and sustained by media corporations – understood

to incorporate both hardware and software, infrastructure, delivery, and reception platforms – become so fundamental to the day-to-day conduct of big business, global trade, and information and entertainment flows that it is meaningful to talk of media imperialism as a distinct phase in the evolution of the global order?

Cultural and Media Imperialism

The terms cultural imperialism and media imperialism date from the same period and have similar roots. They interrelate theoretically and pragmatically. Relationships between processes understood as "culture" and processes understood as "imperialism" (however these are defined) often implicate one or more of the technologies and modes of communication that are denoted by the term "media." Media are constitutive of and constituted by the cultures from which they emerge.

The domain of culture is generally recognized as more pervasive and constitutive of social structure and process than that of media. Some scholarship broaches the subject of cultural imperialism from a broad perspective that may or may not embrace the media directly but which includes a wealth of other dimensions many of which continue to be relevant to studies of media. These include language, approaches to knowledge and knowing, belief systems, ideologies, cultures of governance, education, economic activity, social structure, interpersonal relationship, technologies, and artifacts. Appadurai's (1996) postulation of five "scapes" for the analysis of culture and globalization – ethnoscape, technoscape, finanscape, mediascape, and ideoscape – is an influential example. Bayly's (2000) examination of the relationship between colonialism, information-gathering, and social communication in India is another. Boyd-Barrett (1977, 2015) explicitly favored the term media imperialism, even though recognizing it as narrower than and encompassed by cultural imperialism, for its benefit of a focused discourse helpful in the specific context of unpacking the complexity of media operations. He located the study of the relationships between

media and imperialism at least as much within the realm of the subdiscipline of political economy as that of cultural studies.

While the terms share some common roots and are sometimes used interchangeably, they also have distinctive histories. In the sociology of mass media, for example, the significance of the term media imperialism in the 1960s and 1970s was based on large measure on its contrast to the "modernization paradigm" that had prevailed in an immediately preceding literature and which framed academic analysis of the contributions of media to processes of social and economic development. Modernization theories postulated an essential, benign role for media in "national development," whereas media imperialism theorists regarded media infrastructure, institutions, and content as part and parcel of western hegemony, working to groom peoples of the South or developing world for willing acceptance of, or consent to, their continued exploitation regardless of whether or not they were politically "autonomous." A broader understanding of the relationship between media and imperialism, however, is not confined to concerns about social and economic development, but may also embrace links between social systems, their distinctive communication processes, and preferred epistemologies.

An often cited exemplary text from earlier literatures that deals with the relationship between communication and empires (as distinct from more recent ideas of cultural or media imperialism) is that of the Canadian economist and communications scholar Innis (1950, 1951) who identified what he proposed were distinctive relationships between the physical properties of communication systems (e.g., stone, papyrus, or paper) and the structure and capabilities of power in ancient civilizations. The work of Innis had a direct influence on fellow Canadian and a scholar of literature and culture, Marshall McLuhan, who developed Innis' ideas about the relationship between prevailing modes of communication and evolving stages of social organization (see, in particular, McLuhan 1962, 1964, 1967). The works of Innis and McLuhan were contributions to a large and ever-evolving literature on causal and other modes of

relationship between writing (manuscripts), printing (newspapers, books), electronic and wireless media (telephone, radio, television), and digital and social media, on the one hand, and society in general or particular aspects of society (such as childhood and, of course, imperialism), on the other.

Extrapolating from Boyd-Barrett (2015), it is important to be sensitive to the historical constancy of interrelationships between imperialism, culture, and media, as well as to the ever-evolving manifestation of each of these. Imperialism, he argues, is always about the exploitation of one community by another, but this can take many forms. Direct control over territory is dispensable. Cultures change upon contact, sometimes evolving hybrid forms whose constituents are unequal. Media evolve most visibly in technological form but also through their relationships to different centers of power, ownership, control, geographical and demographic reach, accessibility, genre, purpose, symbolic constituents, and audiences. Across all of these dimensions, there is the play of power and issues of inequality of power.

A clear distinction needs to be made between actual phenomena of cultural and media imperialism, on the one hand, likely commensurate with humanity itself, and studies that fall under the rubric of "cultural/media imperialism" on the other and which we can date back to the 1960s. The currents of thought that emerged around this time and which intensified through the 1970s can be criticized overall for being insufficiently historical, lacking the nuance of a social anthropology of culture, overly focused on the particular case of the USA, and media-centric. But they are also a product of growing awareness in developing countries (or countries of the "Third World" – sometimes referred to later as "the South," "developing," "postcolonial" societies or "emergent" economies) that the achievement of nominal, political independence from the principal imperial powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (especially Belgium, Britain, France, Netherlands, Japan, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and the USA) in the period after World War II was illusory. The "former" imperial nations, singly or in alliance, continued to shape, mold, or control the

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destinies of "former" colonies and acolytes through military threat, economic ties, intelligence subterfuge, and the continuing reverberations of a not-so-distant imperial culture through ties of language, epistemology (determination of what should count as knowledge), esteemed art and literature, political procedure, and so on.

Korean and Vietnamese wars from the 1940s through to the 1970s exemplified threats of imperial invasion and occupation well after the World War II. Ruthless imperial suppression (gentrified or obscured by mainstream media) of indigenous insurgencies in possessions such as Algeria, Kenya, and Malaysia exposed the deep-seated unwillingness of empires to relinquish their most prized conquests. Civil wars in the wake of independence, as in the Indian subcontinent, Congo, or Nigeria, challenged the vaunted benefits of "freedom." Western-instigated or western-supported destabilization and regime change in countries such as Guatemala (1952), Iran (1953), Congo (1961), Indonesia (1965), Greece (1967), and Chile (1973), to name a few, instructed new nations of the "South" that when "independent" nations chose paths of development (nationalization, industrialization, diversification, import substitution, socialism, and secularism) of which their "former" imperial masters disapproved, they would be subject to brutal subversion and worse. Such punitive impacts typically endured for decades. Throughout, media were increasingly indispensable weapons amidst information and propaganda wars between hegemonic power and resistance to it.

Formulation of theories of cultural and media imperialism is particularly associated with a cluster of Latin American scholars of communication in the 1960s and 1970s. They included the Bolivian journalist and communication scholar Luis Ramiro Beltran (see, e.g., Beltran 1980), the sociologist Armand Mattelart (born in Belgium, but whose career spanned a decade in Chile during which he coauthored a significant 1975 study with Ariel Dorfman), and the Venezuelan scholar of social communication, Antonio Pasquali (see his foundational 1963/1977 publication). Many North American, European, and other scholars embraced the term. With particular relevance for

the foundation of cultural studies, the writings of Stuart Hall (Jamaican-British) have had incomparable influence. One of Hall's works, coauthored with Paddy Whannel in 1964, made the case for the serious study of film as entertainment. Relevant studies included the writings of Herbert Schiller (American; see, e.g., his foundational 1969 work), of whom I shall say more in a moment; Jeremy Tunstall (British; whose classic 1977 work delineated US primacy in media production and distribution worldwide); and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky's 1988 exposition of a "propaganda model" of disinformation in which mainstream media were central players and which served to obfuscate the dynamics of (particularly US) imperialism. The propaganda model's first and principal target was the empire's domestic citizenry and then, courtesy of the broad influence of US media infrastructure and journalism worldwide, a global audience.

Tomlinson (1991) considered that the notion of "cultural imperialism" was too broad to yield an easy or single definition that was not controversial, proposing instead that a definition "must be assembled out of its discourse" (p. 3). A definition offered by Schiller touches on many but not all dimensions common to studies of cultural imperialism and which inform Schiller's own approach to media, namely, "the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating center of the system" which Schiller identified as the US (Schiller 1976, p. 9). This definition is consistent with world systems theory (Wallerstein 1981) and highlights modernity, agency, and inequalities of power and class structure. More controversially, it presumes that the term is appropriate only for the "modern" age, deems that the USA is indisputably the system's dominating center, and concentrates its critical energy on advanced capitalism.

Examining processes of cultural imperialism from the top down, Schiller's consideration of media reception at the levels of community and household was relatively primitive. At the macro-

level, his model compellingly demonstrated systemic interplay of the major components of an imperial system as it operated for much of the second half of the twentieth century: (1) advanced US-based privately owned and for-profit media industries; (2) principally financed by advertising; that (3) promoted consumerism, a cornerstone of US economic strength; (4) while adapting new communications technologies (e.g., satellite, later the Internet) initially developed by state-sponsored military and defense industries that also served goals of military and surveillance primacy; (5) simultaneously facilitating the global dissemination of US media, US-based multinational enterprise, and the US goods promoted through global advertising, all the while subject to (6) a national regulatory system and a US-directed global regulatory system that privileged the private, commercial media model and served US hegemony.

The term "media imperialism," emerging from this scholarship, figured as one component of a broader intellectual framework of "dependency theory" – a critical backlash not just against the "modernization paradigm" that had prevailed in developmental studies but more broadly against the democratic-pluralist model of thinking about media and society in general. The three basic presumptions at work behind the modernization paradigm were that (1) western societies were democratic and pluralistic (i.e., home to diverse sources of power in stable tension through their participation in democratic institutions) and enjoyed media "freedom" and their economies were advanced (all these seen to be interdependent, positive attributes); (2) other parts of the world would benefit if they adopted this model; and (3) because the main components of the model were interdependent, the introduction of one component into a developing society (e.g., "free" media or even just "media") would facilitate the appearance of the others. As the prevailing ideology of its time, one that informed the broad field of media scholarship up until the late 1960s and throughout much of 1970s, democratic pluralism and its corollary of the modernization paradigm contributed to Cold War discourses fashioned through direct and indirect

manipulation of knowledge production by political and intelligence actors. Several of the field's leading scholars had worked for US intelligence in one sense or another during World War II, and their ties to the intelligence establishment often persisted (Mody and Lee 2003). Additionally, the objects of their inquiries – news and entertainment media – were themselves infiltrated and exploited by political and intelligence actors to a degree that was not acknowledged in media scholarship of the period, as in Operation Mockingbird. The findings of at least three congressional committees of inquiry into CIA operations during the 1970s are of great importance (Church Committee Reports 1975–1976; Pike Committee 1976; Rockefeller Commission 1975), exposing CIA buy-out of large numbers of both journalists and academics (Boyd-Barrett 2004). The history of the Congress for Cultural Freedom reveals the extraordinary lengths to which the CIA went in order to shape an intellectual environment that was favorable to the interests of the USA and its allies (Whitney 2016). In recent decades, much more evidence has come to light of routine manipulation of movie and television programming by US defense and intelligence establishments (to be discussed further below).

Dependency theory was influenced by the writings of the Argentine economist Prebisch (1962), the German American economist and sociologist Frank (1979), and the American sociologist Wallerstein (1984). Its major points of consensus were that (1) economic growth in wealthy countries did not necessarily lift the economies of poor countries; (2) this negative outcome was a result of systematic political, economic, and cultural ties between countries whose operation favored the rich and disadvantaged the poor; and (3) relations between them (variously described as dominant/dependent, central/peripheral, or metropolitan/satellite) reinforced and intensified inequality. Frank ascribed this dynamic to capitalism specifically, others more generally to power imbalance.

With respect to media scholarship, dependency theory undermined the argument of "modernization" theorists that aid for media in the "developing world" would, of itself, contribute to development. It suggested that the interests

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actually served by the growth of media in the dependent countries were (1) countries whose media systems were already strongest and engaged in exports of hardware and software; (2) the western-based media owners and suppliers who would most immediately benefit from international expansion of their operations, together with (3) corporations (western-based multinational corporations foremost among them) whose sales were linked to advertising expenditure in media, as well as (4) corporations who built the infrastructures for global communication (cable, wireless, satellite, etc.) as well as the technologies of media production, distribution and reception. All these interests subscribed to a general ideology of power, economic development, and growth (later referred to more generally as "neoliberalism") that stood to benefit from its broader dissemination and exemplification (the so-called demonstration effect) through media worldwide.

Dependency theory called attention to the role of media in facilitating and sustaining forms of imperialism. It demolished the idea that simple concession of "independence" by postimperial to postcolonial countries was an especially meaningful sign of autonomy or an end to actual imperialism. The relevance of dependency theory to media was exemplified within media studies by research that demonstrated the dominance of western and in particular US communications technologies corporations (in telecommunications, satellite, and computing) and content providers (notably in film, television, news agencies, and publishing) on global markets.

Dependency discourses were consistent with several other contemporary intellectual trends:

1. The growing influence of "political economy" approaches to media which acknowledged that how media operated, the contents and services that they provided, were significantly shaped by their underlying business models (of which advertising dependence was the most important), the particular markets they served, their strategies for gaining market advantage, and by the implicit and explicit understandings and relationships between major media and the other major centers of power, above all the power of state agencies – including agencies whose function was to regulate the media either for the benefit of a presumed "public interest" or increasingly for the benefit of corporations. The rise of a political economy view of the media drew from similar currents of thought as those of dependency theory, alongside other sources of inspiration.

2. Revitalization of interest in the critical, dialectical approach of the Frankfurt School, especially as represented by Horkheimer and Adorno (2007) and Marcuse (1970), and its fusion of Marxism and psychoanalysis.

3. Development of Marxist or post-Marxist analysis of the prospects for European social democracy of the struggle for influence between publicly and privately owned media systems and the implications of processes of media concentration, conglomeration, and commercialization for culture and politics, during a period of relative detente in the 1970s when potential convergence between the systems of western social democracy and Russo-Chinese communism seemed less unthinkable than it soon became.

4. Discourses of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) within the context of a series of conferences organized by the United Nations Education Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO), also involving the Non-Aligned Movement, and which culminated in the 1980 publication of UNESCO's Many Voices, One World report of a committee chaired by Sean McBride. The concept of NWICO provided UN endorsement for the view that resolving economic inequalities was not simply an economic but also a cultural challenge. While eschewing talk of imperialism, the language of the report was suffused with premises and concerns recognizable as emerging from ideas of dependency and application of the concept to communication inequalities between nations, the origination of these from within political, economic, and cultural realms, and the identification of appropriate reforms of institutional structures and processes that were both external and internal to nation states.

The Fall and Rise of a Concept

The later demise of dependency theory and, with it, ideas of media imperialism has many roots. I shall identify some of the main ones and then explain why the loss of the critical edge that these ideas represented also gravely weakened the intellectual capacity of media scholarship to critique the ever more egregious evidence of resurgent western imperialistic intent from 1990 onward, and the collusion of mainstream media with imperial power, both within the imperial center(s) and their dependencies.

There were some valid objections to dependency and media imperialism theories (both had several variants). I shall concentrate on those that relate to media. These theories awarded primacy of concern to economic inequalities which they proposed should be remedied at least in part by a strengthening of local media systems – an "import substitution" strategy. However many smaller countries did not have a sufficiently large internal population or a market for media systems that could compete economically against cheap imports of higher production quality even at the expense of diminished cultural relevance. Even when like-minded nations pooled resources in order to create more robust productions, as did the nations of the Non-Aligned Movement when they formed the Non-Aligned News Agency, the resulting market still did not compare – remotely – with the advertising-abundant and media-affluent markets served by leading western news agencies, nor was the news product of sufficient appeal to those wealthier markets. Smaller, less wealthy countries turned to their respective government or state agencies for investment in media and media regulation, sometimes inviting unproductive tensions between creative energy, business entrepreneurship, and political or bureaucratic constraints, in the realm of entertainment media, while opening the door to greater political control over news and information products. State involvement invited the ire of western critics who were generally blind to the limitations and informal but profound de facto censorship exercised by advertising-supported, commercially driven, privately owned media in their own countries.

The dependency notion of "underdevelopment" postulated a vicious spiral of inequality between nations of the center and nations of the periphery. This did not always turn out to be the case in practice, and definitions of "development," once they extend beyond simple statistical aggregates such as gross national product and embrace less tangible, more experiential standards of what constitutes the "good life," became controversial. Applied to media, the term worked unevenly, at best. The past half a century had seen significant media development in many if not most countries of the world, including the quondam "developing economies" – the largest of these, such as Brazil, sporting media conglomerates (e.g., the Globo empire) that rivalled and perhaps surpassed most of those of the USA, while even small countries had taken advantage of falling costs of media production and distribution to invest more in local media production. Yet the "media *were* American" thesis (Tunstall 2007) attributed insufficient attention to the near universal neoliberalization of advertising-supported, hyper-commercial infotainment media as an exported western and capitalist ideology and offered insufficient justice to the new digital world of multimedia Internet service providers, portals, and websites, which is dominated by a small number of countries, the US preeminent among them. At the time of writing, the USA remains the world's single largest center of media power and wealth when all media domains are included: legacy and digital, hardware and software, across publishing, film, telecommunications, computing, and industries (Boyd-Barrett 2015).

Dependency theory prioritized the nation as the major unit of analysis in the study of processes that extended beyond national frontiers. Primacy of the nation state came under increasing fire with the popularization of globalization theory from the 1970s into the 1990s and beyond. Perspectives of globalization theory encouraged analysis of the interlinkages between global, regional, national, intranational, and local levels, without necessarily privileging any one of these, and acknowledged how phenomena at any one of these levels could only be explained with reference to other levels.

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Oftentimes the nation state seemed to disappear as a significant entity even though in practice national states retained important regulatory and legislative influence over media and communications industries and even though most relevant international regulatory bodies were in fact governed by the legal representatives of nation states. De-prioritization of the nation state inspired scholars to consider the role of media not so much with reference to representations of nationhood and national institutions (or, for that matter, of other expressions of place) but to how media constituted the imaginaries of any of these and those of whose interests they served. Globalization added fuel to critical scholarship of self-acclaimed "global media" – that usually turned out, on close inspection, to represent interests associated with particular nations or alliances of elite national interests – and of the corporations that built the technologies and assembled the infrastructures required by market demand for international or global communication facilities.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the East European countries of the former communist bloc, from 1989 onward, brought about the balkanization of a vast swathe of EurAsia whose previous national identities – while never entirely eclipsed during their history as components of the USSR and its Yalta-endorsed zone of influence – were elevated into autonomous status through the lenses of media worldwide even though some retained close links with the Russian Federation and others were coopted by or fled into the fold of the European Union and/or NATO. Equally important was the "capitalist road" adopted under the continuing stewardship of the Chinese Communist Party by Chinese leadership under Chairman Deng Xiaoping, following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, reaching apparent fruition in 2000 under Jiang Zemin when China was accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization.

Up until these events, western media scholarship had focused much of its critical gaze upon the media of the western world and the worldwide influence of (mainly) western media conglomerates. Japan was a "proxy" western partner, an acknowledged leader in many domains including animation and anime and, thanks largely to Sony, consumer electronics, not least in the form of Sony Walkman (until the arrival of Internet music sharing – Napster ran from 1999 to 2001 – and the appearance of the first version of the Apple iPod in 2001) and, later, the Sony PlayStation. Although open to Marxist and post-Marxist trends of thought, scholarship had shown little enthusiasm for and not much interest in the communist model of media production and control which were loosely dismissed as over-bureaucratized systems of state capital. The main media issue thought to be of interest, apart from the unsubtle theme of state censorship and control, was the adaptation of low-technology forms of anti-Communist resistance (Samizdat in Eastern Europe, e.g., or post-Maoist wall posters in China).

The influence of dependency theory had peaked around 1980 with publication of the McBride report. The report's recommendations expressed considerable trust in the regulatory power and responsibility of governments to act in the best interests of the community of nations. That faith was undermined by the Thatcher administration in the UK that took power in 1979 and by the Reagan administration that came to office in the USA in 1981. These administrations adopted the monetarist economics of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics. They had no interest in subordinating their policies to UN bodies in which the influence of the "South" or dependent economies was becoming stronger in the wake of post-colonialism, with the numerical advantage brought by the emergence of many new nations. The USA announced its intention to withdraw from UNESCO in 1983, followed by Britain. This was the era during which the West steadily withdraws from goals of détente with Russia. They adopted globalization policies of "free" trade and free flows of investment that principally favored the already wealthy countries. And they began stalling or reversing policies of social democracy that had funneled aid to the distressed through welfare programs, sickness and unemployment benefits, health care, and the like. They considered that their revisionist policies

were endorsed by the collapse of the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and by China's capitalist road.

For Marxist-inclined media scholars, these developments further undermined their already dwindling confidence that Marxism was still relevant to the modern world and deprived them of even the hope that they might establish academic careers on such a basis. They were also under fire from postmodernist cultural studies which hammered irreverently at the foundations of all such "grand narrative" or mega systems of politics and philosophy. The reformist concept of "public sphere" that had emerged in the wake of the discovery and translation after several decades of the works of the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas provided a substitute language appropriate for media criticism, to a point, yet did relatively little to inspire vigorous appraisal of the rot of corrupt or partisan practices of corporations such as News International that had undermined democracy in Britain for several decades and which supported extreme right-wing interests in the USA. Media scholarship was confused by the apparent contradictions between continuing "legacy" problems of market concentration, corporate conglomeration, and so forth, on the one hand, and the urge to celebrate an overhyped abundance and pluralism of the brave new era of digital media.

By the early 1990s, the principal preoccupations of the field had largely bypassed Marx. The foci of attention were the continuing development of the study of "media effects" (including agenda-setting and uses and gratifications theories, refinements of the concept of "active viewer") and the role of media as constitutive or representative of popular culture. These studies were embedded in theories originating in cultural studies of the polysemic text and in social anthropology of the "interpretative reader" (not autonomous exactly but whose understanding of a text was refracted through the interpretive communities of which s/he was a member) as well as in positivist social psychology study of viewing and reception (see Boyd-Barrett 1996 for a brief overview of this field).

These greatly complicated the already considerable challenge to media scholarship of proving "effects" in the presence of large numbers of intervening variables. The influence of the active/autonomous reader approach to media reception would be modified somewhat by growing influence throughout the 1990s and beyond both of "framing" and "indexing" theories and theories of propaganda and persuasion. These provided a much more sophisticated understanding – in a field whose previous grasp of the techniques for study of media content and of how content "works" were shockingly rudimentary – of the wide variety of ways in which texts are routinely modified to privilege certain meanings, foregrounding particular events, people, information, citations, arguments and allusions, and the backgrounding or "disappearing" of others. They showed how such influence could be compounded by the creation and exploitation of "echo chambers," as when propagandists are successful in delivering the same message without significant challenge through multiple media outlets simultaneously. Where existing audience knowledge of a given topic and their motivations to acquire new knowledge were low, and where journalistic dependence on a limited range of "authoritative" sources was high – all of which frequently applied in the case in foreign affairs reporting, for example – then the scope for effective disinformation or propaganda was maximized.

Postmodernism and ideas of the autonomous reader synchronized well with a shift in thinking about media and development away from top-down models represented both by the original "modernization paradigm" (which, though falling out of favor in academe continued to be quite popular in the policy field) and its nemesis, dependency theory. These both attributed to the state a primacy of responsibility for determining what "development" should mean and how it should be implemented and resourced. Top-down approaches relied heavily on the inputs of external, approved "change agents" whose activities and recommendations presumed that innovation in itself was an unquestionably "good thing." They were often tied to NGO or corporate funding whose agendas were extraneous to those of the communities they ostensibly served. The products and processes they delivered were not always a good fit with conditions and needs on the ground.

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Seemingly more democratic, bottom-up models (as identified among others by Melkote and Steeves 2015, and Jan Servaes) regarded "development" as something that communities at ground level should determine for themselves, perhaps with the technocratic input and resources of sympathetic nongovernment organizations. Ideologically attractive to western progressive intellectuals, this approach was hopelessly idealistic in those parts of the world (i.e., most) where initiatives at local level were considerably impacted by local, regional, and national political and other state and non-state agencies, vulnerable to the play of market forces and subject to distinctly unmodern patriarchal and often racist local elites. Bottom-up models of development have still to satisfactorily integrate with the single largest developmental push experienced since the industrial revolution, namely, the industrialization of communist China and neoliberal India in the 1990s and 2000s. This has resulted from multiple, complex forces operating from global to local levels with the support of the state and has elevated hundreds of millions from subsistence levels to something that more closely resembles "middle-class" status, albeit at the expense of massive environmental degradation.

Development theory has engaged in a fruitless quest to catch up with and provide meaningful input within the context of tectonic political, economic, and cultural shifts – veritable Schumpeterian "gales of creative destruction." These resulted from the collapse of traditional communism, the gathering speed of global economic integration (or globalization), and the increasingly universal application of digital technologies. Starting in the developed world, digital technologies have decimated the print newspaper industry. The recording industry has largely shifted online under the policing of Apple and comparable digital gatekeepers. Theatrical exhibition and DVDs for filmed entertainment and the "network model" of traditional broadcasting are in the process of conceding to electronic streaming. Traditional advertising and marketing conglomerates are threatened by the capacity of electronic platforms and social media to connect advertisers directly to consumers without middlemen (Auletta 2018).

Marxism provided an intellectual backcloth for continuing, critical analysis of media industries. But more than a strain of media, political economy had inched its way toward a less radical, industry-friendly study of media economics. The mass popularity of personal computing in the 1980s and of the Internet in the 1990s promised an infinite potential for mediated communications that would be easily available in the home and the office and, later, with the marriage of telecommunications, computing, and the Internet, in the street and air. For a while, the appearance of infinite communications capacity removed the sting from older concerns about market concentration and conglomeration. The monopolies of national landline communication collapsed before a seeming horde of local and mobile telephony companies offering telephony, television, and Internet services. These variously linked individual households to the Internet, established "portals" for safe or organized access online, and facilitated interaction via advertising-supported search engines.

When the mist had cleared from the scrummage by the late 2000s, it became clear that new, bigger, further-reaching conglomerates had formed, often incorporating older versions, more powerful than anything seen before. There were fewer regulatory boundaries separating telephony from television or from the Internet, or hardware from software, or either hardware or software from delivery system. Attempts to preserve a "level playing field" in the shape of "network neutrality" for the benefit of ordinary users weakened before the bulldozers of telecommunications behemoths demanding the freedom to control whatever they chose to make available, and the speed or convenience at which they delivered it, and to favor their own products or those of their affiliates. Media scholarship was scarcely able to catch its breath let alone make sustained meaning from the rush of these developments.

The speed and pervasiveness of change in the media industries themselves increased pressure on scholarship toward ever more media-centric analysis. Efforts to scale both the complexities of media change and their related transformations in the broader, momentous upheavals of global

politics, economics, and culture were generally underwhelming, often naive and senselessly trusting of mainstream media accounts. Examples included the excitement with which some scholars greeted media-originated narratives of the generally ill-fated 2010–2011 "Arab Spring" events as a "Twitter" revolution or, in 2017 accepted as a serious argument that through abuse of social media, the Russians had won the 2016 US presidential election for Donald Trump – an egregious example of a media-induced moral panic.

Review and Prospect

A striking feature of many attacks against the concept of media imperialism had been their irrelevance and inaccuracy. They universally assumed that the concept referred to a single theory whereas, as Boyd-Barrett had already observed in 1977, a far broader range of phenomena was at issue. They ignored the possibility that even if the concept did not speak usefully to their own time, it might have something of relevance to offer to an understanding of the workings of classic imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the role of communications in processes of imperial domination and resistance to it. In respect to their own time, critics frequently demonstrated surprising neglect of relevant historical evidence and an underestimation of the literature they were critiquing, as in the claim of "lack of evidence" (see Sparks 1991; Thussu 2006). The majority of the concept's critics exhibited little if any insight at all into the historical experience of imperialism and its hundreds of millions of victims.

Schiller (1975) had provided copious evidence of the close interrelationships between US foreign policy, US military interventions, US communications technologies, US media and advertising, and US-supported consumerism and capitalism. Wilson, Herman and Schiller (1989) provided devastating witness to how US mainstream media celebrated those Third World regimes that were its allies (no matter how dictatorial or fragile they were in practice) and denounced those whom the US deemed its enemies (no matter how heroic and how popular they were in practice) but also

showed how US media focused only on the incidentals of military gains and losses in their coverage of the extreme crime of the Vietnam War. Boyd-Barrett (1980) and Tunstall (1977) had shown how the media systems of many ex-colonial territories were established by and shaped and supported by western powers and western media giants and how the western-based international news agencies controlled the information flows around the world to the advantage of the powerful nations and to the disadvantage of newly developing nations.

Other empirical work on movies (Guback 1974) and broadcasting (Varis 1973) had provided strong support for the view that western media content dominated the non-communist nations of the developing world and how even within the developed world the media exports of a few dominated the contents of the many (even if this situation had in many but not in all respects transformed by the twenty-first century). The criticism that the media imperialism approach tended toward a magic bullet theory of media effects for the most part accuses the target literature of not embarking on a line of inquiry that was not then current in the field. Although audience-centered analysis has rightly exercised considerable influence in exploring the nuances between exposure to media and the takings of meanings and pleasures from media, the trajectory of agenda-setting study eventually paved the way to the concepts of framing and indexing, and these in turn have helped reintroduce the legitimacy of the notion of strong media effects, especially where campaigns put together by establishment propaganda apparatuses have secured hegemonic and homogeneous interpretations of events, in league with mainstream media, in support of the interests of major western powers. Major political developments in Washington meanwhile, through the course of at least three congressional hearings in the 1970s, exposed not just the immense corruption of literature, popular magazines, and newspapers resulting from the CIA's so-called Congress of Cultural Freedom and its contribution to the development and normalization of Cold War mythologies but also how Operation Mockingbird bought the complicity of hundreds of US

and foreign journalists, including noted editors and publishers, as well as academics, to fight the information Cold War. This corruption by the state apparatus of "independent journalism" has certainly continued and intensified over time, attested to by many sources.

More recent work, especially from 2000 onward, has reinstated the concept of media imperialism as central to media studies. This has worked in parallel with the growing, direct evidence of a resuscitation by the USA and NATO powers of activities that clearly resemble those of nineteenth century imperial machinations not so much against other great powers (though it has led to that) but, as always, against the weak. Scholarship was for long and in many ways is still rendered impotent, timorous, and orthodox in its reaction to the events of 9/11 despite clear indications of massive fraud perpetrated by the official accounts and supported by mainstream media (not least, but certainly not limited to the leading roles played by the Sunni Arab political and religious interests of Saudi Arabia). On the other hand, the illegal US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, on entirely manufactured pretext, rekindled memories of the deceptions of the First Gulf War (notable among them the propaganda tricks of the "incubator babies" fairytale and the myth of "precision weapons"), and the suspicious complexities of western support for the breakup of Yugoslavia have catalyzed a more critically minded scholarship. Even so, relatively few dared to openly investigate the lies and deceptions of western powers and complicit western media in coverage of the "Arab Spring," particularly as this impacted Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Syria. In place of sophisticated, deep-context analysis, too many scholars jumped aboard a media-created, irrelevant narrative of Twitter and Facebook "liberation," grievously failing to recognize in such shallow interpretations the telltale signs of western regime change operations that had already played out in clear daylight in Gorbachev's Soviet Union, then in Washington's promotion of Yeltsin to the Russian presidency and, later, through various territories of the former Soviet Union and communist world, notable among them Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Ukraine, and Georgia.

This desert of neglect and distraction notwithstanding, empirical scholarship has revealed a treasure trove of evidence clearly tying mainstream western media networks – directly representative and constitutive of corporate power – to the imperial ambitions of their respective states. Boyd-Barrett highlighted this in his 2015 book on media imperialism. This was dedicated to two themes: (1) the integral relationship between strong, globalized but predominantly US media apparatuses for capital accumulation and twenty-first-century manifestations of aggressive US and NATO imperialism in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Iran, while (2) confirming that despite the significant growth of a few non-western power-houses, including China and India, global hardware and software markets continued to be dominated by US-based corporations such as Apple, Cisco, Dell, IBM, and Intel. US-based corporations remained exceptionally strong in computer software and Internet services (including Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Twitter), nurtured as many of these are by the concentration of talent and capital in the US Boyd-Barrett subsequently developed these themes further with reference to US and NATO intervention in Ukraine (Boyd-Barrett 2017) and the "fake news" wars between Washington and (Boyd-Barrett 2019).

Early in the twenty-first century, Toby Miller disclosed how Hollywood, supposedly the supreme manifestation of the partnership between capitalism, immense profit, and globally popular entertainment, depended for its influence on an array of federal and state subsidies. Alford (2010), Alford and Secker (2017), Boyd-Barrett et al. (2011), Jenkins (2016), Mirrlees (2013, 2016), Robb (2004), and Stahl (2010) have unpacked the voluminous ties that link the Pentagon, the CIA, and other state agencies of war to Hollywood's (movies and television) choice of plots, dependence on state subsidy, wording of scripts, and favorable representations of the USA and of US military forces, targeting the industry's most important, most susceptible and possibly most gullible audiences, the young. This influence process apparently does not stop at the assassination of uncooperative screenwriters

(Alford 2016). Moody (2017) has chronicled what he describes as the integral role played by US State Department embassies in boosting and serving American media imperialism around the world and demonstrates a mutually beneficial relationship between the network of global US embassies and global Hollywood, arguing that this connection provides substantial evidence for a continuance of US media imperialism in the twenty-first century. Stahl refers to a long history of DOD supported war films – from Saving Private Ryan (1998) to Act of Valor (2012) – that reinforces what he calls the war-as-soldier-protection frame by depicting rescue operation after rescue operation. He suggests that officially sponsored "militainment" has come to penetrate reality TV, talk shows, sporting events, video games, documentary films, etc. This mirrors the imperial strategy of multiplying granular theaters of war through the world for the benefit of domestic public opinion while playing a vital role in maintaining American empire overseas. Dale Yong Jin has chronicled the rise of a US-centric platform imperialism, using the example of Facebook, the largest social media company in the world. He demonstrates that the USA's global dominance is being helped by digital platforms, with Facebook the world's leading platform imperialist. This perspective is increasingly reinforced by evidence of enhanced integration of leading electronic platform oligopolists and the US security establishment, and their eager participation in efforts to censor public speech in the name of a pseudo establishment war against "fake news," too often information and opinion that is robustly critical of western foreign policy.

Conclusion

While never disappearing, despite triumphal assertions to the contrary from their opponents, media imperialism discourses fell out of favor for a period in the 1990s. They had always been a matter of controversy, particularly divisive within media studies between those on the right, inclined to trust the feigned humility of "former" imperial powers and their snake oil encouragement to post-colonial regimes to feel part of the big boys' club, and those on the left, whose principal lesson from Marxism was to keep focused on the dialectical trajectories of history and the interests of capitalist classes. On the surface, the relative decline of media imperialism discourses appeared as an organic intellectual transition toward seductive but ultimately deceptive discourses of globalization – now better described as neoliberal hegemony and whose actual outcomes at the time of writing are ever more intense capitalist competition, unprecedented capital accumulation in fewer hands, extreme inequality, planetary destruction and war – and cultural globalization (whose similar sirens of seduction suggest colorful, joyful hybridity, and diversity in place of a reality of ever shallower infotainment pabulum at the service of consumerism and capital).

For a brief while, concepts of globalization and cultural globalization seemed to offer more promising explanatory power, friendlier to the corporate world, less aggressively provocative toward the state and state-subsidized intellectual production, and more congenial to academic careerism. They emerged against a backdrop of epochal political change, including the demise of the Soviet Union, that was particularly threatening to the left. Even as the illusions of globalization discourse became harder to disguise, intellectuals were ever ready with euphemisms to temper the worst. The term "soft power," coined by an intimate of US intellectual hegemony, stood in to substitute for the reality of ever more violent assertions of imperial power detached from cultural niceties. In place of the sophistication of Wallestein's center-periphery dependency models of distributed global power, simplistic "BRICS" discourses were forcibly nurtured with little or no heed to the absence of substantial shared interest between different members of the BRICS club, the close affiliations between some of their members and the USA and its allies, the absence of a unified BRICS media platform, and the reality, instead of a multicentered world, of an intensification of the threat of nuclear war between Sino-Russian axis on the one hand, and the US-NATO axis on the other.

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Mexican Revolution and Anti-imperialism

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Definition

The Mexican Revolution (1910–20) was the first great social revolution of the twentieth century. It combined elements of nationalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist struggle with populist demands and support centred on peasants, working people, and the poor, including the convergence of such factors in the context of Mexico's and Latin America's indigenous peoples.

The Mexican Revolution (1910–20) was the first great social revolution of the twentieth century, and a precursor to both the Russian and Chinese revolutions of 1917 and 1949. It also became a key referent for other revolutionary processes later in the Latin American context, including Cuba in 1959 and Nicaragua in 1979, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa in the context of processes of decolonisation.

Like all of these examples, the Mexican Revolution combined elements of nationalist, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist struggle with populist demands and support centred on peasants, working people, and the poor, including the convergence of such factors in the context of Mexico's and Latin America's indigenous peoples. A major focus of US policy during the 1920s and 1930s was to prevent the emergence of another Mexico elsewhere in Latin America, first through intensified intervention (including overlapping interventions and/or Marine occupations in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba), and later through President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy.

The eventual defeat of the most radical currents within the Mexican Revolution led by Francisco Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Ricardo Flores Magón, and those they inspired, culminated in the consolidation of an authoritarian one-party regime (headed between 1929 and 2000 by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] and its previous incarnations). As the Revolution's supposed guardian and successor, the PRI sought to legitimise its monopolisation of the ostensible ruling ideology of revolutionary nationalism and its own power, repressiveness, and corruption. It did so in a similar manner to that of other states that formed bureaucratic leadership structures in the twentieth century.

Protagonists, Activists and Leaders

The Mexican Revolution's key leaders (and martyrs) such as Villa, Zapata, and Flores Magón became symbols of its widespread and continuing influence on equivalent leaders and processes elsewhere in Latin America with similar characteristics in the 1920s and 1930s; such as those led by Augusto César Sandino of Nicaragua, Farabundo Martí of El Salvador, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre of Peru (founder of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana [APRA]

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party, established during Haya de la Torre's exile in Mexico in 1924). Sandino was greatly influenced by the nationalist orientation of the Mexican Revolution and its emphasis on workers' rights as a result of his experiences in exile there as an oil worker in Tampico and Veracruz between 1923 and 1926. Much of this legacy is still evident today in contexts such as Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution and its equivalents in Bolivia and Ecuador, which identify with the framework of twenty-first-century socialism.

The origins of the Mexican Revolution lay in a popular revolt against the longstanding dictatorship (or Porfiriato) of Porfirio Díaz, which began to take shape between 1905 and 1907, and finally caught fire in late 1910, culminating finally in his overthrow in May 1911. Key initial steps which laid the basis for wider opposition later included the founding of the Mexican Liberal Party, in September 1905, in St Louis, Missouri, by political exiles led by Ricardo Flores Magón.

The Magonistas intensified the pressure on the Díaz regime from within, by consolidating a Mexican exile community in the US that continued to be engaged with opposition to Díaz, and by organising several armed incursions along the border with increasing regularity between 1906 and 1910. They also became in effect the founders of a left tradition within communities of Mexican origin in the US which became forerunners of the Mexican-American civil rights, Chicano, and contemporary immigrant rights movements.

Flores Magón was born in 1873, and died as a political soldier in Leavenworth Prison in Kansas in 1922, after his arrest in 1918 pursuant to the same repressive policies that led to the imprisonment of Eugene Debs and many others. Flores Magón lived in exile in the US for 18 years, from 1904–22, and was a fiery independent journalist and anarcho-communist activist of indigenous origin from Oaxaca who focused on the need for agrarian reform together with support for labour rights in key industries dominated by foreign capital (Lomnitz 2014).

Flores Magón's journal *Regeneratión*, eventually based in Los Angeles, played a key role in spreading news of the intensifying efforts within Mexico and from exile against the Díaz regime,

and in connecting these struggles to similar struggles elsewhere in the world from a radical internationalist perspective. This included close collaboration between Flores Magón and his associates with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), key sectors of the US Socialist Party, fellow activists and theorists such as Emma Goldman, and independent journalists such as John Kenneth Turner and John Reed. Goldman and Reed were among those at various different stages between 1905 and 1917 who helped connect contemporaneous and ultimately convergent revolutionary processes underway under analogous conditions in Mexico and Russia; these potential convergences were also explicitly present in the writings of Zapata. Goldman eventually headed the campaign to free Flores Magón after his arrests in 1916 and 1918, prior to her own imprisonment and deportation to Russia along with hundreds of others in November 1919 during the initial stages of the Red Scare.

It was Flores Magón who coined *Tierra y Libertad* (Land and Freedom) as a phrase to summarise the demands of the popular revolution that he believed was necessary to overthrow Díaz, and who exerted great influence on Zapata. This influence included Zapata's adoption of this slogan as the framework for his Plan de Ayala, which in turn became the basis for Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 (one of the Revolution's most concrete achievements), which for the first time recognised and instituted protections for communal and indigenous forms of property.

Foreign Imperial Domination

Diaz's ruling cabal was dominated by advisors with Social Darwinist pretensions known as Científicos (scientists), such as Franco-Mexican financier Yves Limantour (Diaz's finance minister from 1893–1911, who accompanied him in exile to France in May 1911), who were imbued with the positivist ethos of scientific racism promoted by Herbert Spencer that was very influential during the same period in Brazil and Argentina. Limantour played a key role in the alignment of

the Díaz regime with European financial interests at the same time that US investment in Mexico was becoming increasingly predominant (with US control by 1910 of 27% of Mexico's land and 45% of all industrial investment).

Henry Lane Wilson served as US ambassador to Mexico during some of the most conflictive moments in US–Mexican relations and came to epitomise recurrent US intervention in Mexico's internal politics and its worst extremes during the period of the Revolution, which included reiterated armed interventions between 1913 and 1917. As Lane Wilson himself noted in his testimony to the US Congress in 1920:

Practically all of the railways belonged to foreigners; practically all of the mines. Practically all of the banks and all of the factories were owned by the French. A very considerable part of the soil of Mexico, probably over a third, was in the hands of foreign-born elements, and practically all the public utilities were in the hands of the Americans or British. Naturally this foreign ownership excited hostility, which was not lessened by the circumstance that these interests, or whatever they may have been, had been honestly acquired. (Welsome 2006, p. 16)

Inter-imperialist rivalries played a key role during the Mexican Revolution and preceded it in terms of jockeying for position among US and European interests. These manoeuvres were also rooted in broader phenomena, as historian Friedrich Katz has emphasised in his classic book *The Secret War in Mexico* (1984, p. x):

The term secret war . . . refers to a new strategy of alliances and understandings that the great powers and the business interests linked to them developed early in the twentieth century as a response to the wave of revolutions that swept some of what are now called the developing countries. The United States applied this strategy with great success in Cuba in 1898, when it used elements of the Cuban independence movement to obtain the expulsion of Spain's forces from Cuba and to establish American supremacy in their place.

Katz then situates the Mexican Revolution in a broader context:

The new strategy of exploiting social conflicts and anti-colonial struggles was not adopted by European powers until World War I, when each side tried to aid revolutionary movements that were directed at its rivals. The Germans attempted to support revolutionary liberation movements against the British in Ireland and India; and they allowed Lenin to return to Russia through Germany. The British sent Lawrence of Arabia to lead an Arab revolt against Germany's ally, Turkey; and together with the United States, the British supported nationalist movements, above all the Czech nationalist movement led by Thomas Masayrk, against the Austro-Hungarian Empire . . .. (ibid.)

What forms did such stratagems take in the Mexican context?

Direct and indirect military intervention, diplomatic and economic pressures, destabilization, attempts to play off one faction against the other – all these tactics were used by at least one of the great powers in Mexico between 1910 and 1920. (ibid.)

Popular repudiation and resistance against foreign domination during the Díaz regime was exemplified by a strike in the mines of Cananea in the northern border state of Sonora in 1906, followed by massive worker resistance to an owner's lock-out in the textile factories of Rio Blanco (the largest of their kind in Latin America) in Veracruz in 1907; both outbreaks were violently repressed with direct involvement by Díaz, and hundreds of workers detained and massacred. These incidents led in turn to an intensification of repression throughout the country. Associates of Flores Magón played major roles in both of these struggles.

By March 1908 Díaz felt it necessary to signal his supposed acceptance of the need for him to finally leave office. He did this in an interview with US journalist James Creelman in *Pearson's Magazine* by announcing his promise not to seek re-election in the next round of presidential elections, scheduled for June 1910. He eventually reneged on this pledge, but meanwhile exiled civic opposition leader Francisco Madero, a wealthy member of the local landed elite in the border state of Coahuila, who had run against Díaz in 1910 in elections widely recognised for their fraudulent character.

All of this laid the groundwork for Madero's call from his exile in Texas for a national uprising against Díaz on 20 November 1910 (to this day commemorated as a national holiday in Mexico, the Day of the Revolution). Villa and Zapata became key leaders of local rebellions in the

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north and south respectively which, together with initially convergent efforts by the followers of Flores Magón and several others, produced several key military defeats that finally convinced Díaz to leave power and depart for exile in May 1911. The tipping point was Pancho Villa's taking of Ciudad Juárez in support of Madero on 9 May 1911 (Katz 1998). Zapata quickly became disenchanted with Madero's reluctance to undertake any significant measures of land reform, and by his increasing reliance on the hated army inherited from the Díaz regime, whose commander Victoriano Huerta led Madero's attempted extermination of Zapata's forces in Morelos, which had refused to disarm. Huerta eventually overthrew Madero in a bloody military coup in February 1913 which included the murder of Madero and several of his key associates, and which was actively encouraged and supported from the US Embassy by Henry Lane Wilson, in a scenario which foreshadowed that pursued later by Nixon and Kissinger in support of Pinochet against Allende, in Chile, in September 1973.

Huerta's coup outraged Villa and helped spark the crucial alliance between Zapata and Villa and broader Constitutionalist forces during 1913–14 which intensified the popular turn of the Revolution from Madero's vacillating moderation towards much more radical alternatives which both Zapata and Villa came to embody and symbolise between 1913 and 1915. This alliance combined Villa's extraordinary military prowess at the head of the cavalry of his División del Norte (Northern Division, notable for its victories at successive battles during 1914 in Torreón, Gómez Palacio, and Zacatecas) with Zapata's political clarity and deep support among Mexico's poorest indigenous communities. Both Villa and Zapata implemented key social reforms in Chihuahua and Morelos respectively during this period which helped shape and influence those included later in the 1917 Constitution.

US Military Intervention and Resistance

Leading supporters of Villa and Zapata collaborated during the National Convention of the Revolution's most radical forces in Aguascalientes in October 1914. The National Convention (modelled after the body of the same name which played a key role during the French Revolution) in turn led to the high point of their convergence which was their joint taking and occupation of Mexico City in December 1914. This continues to capture and shape the imagination of Mexico's most radical sectors today as a glimmer of their still unfulfilled dreams. Much of this history and imagery was invoked by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during 1994 and thereafter, including their caravan to Mexico City in March 2001.

The vacuum left by Madero as a representative of northern élites opposed to Zapata and Villa's insistence on land reform eventually came to be filled by forces led by Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila (Madero's home state) and Alvaro Obregón of Sonora. Carranza initially became dominant during the period between 1917 and 1920 as a result of his success in exploiting Villa's and Zapata's failures to consolidate unity and co-ordinate military and political initiatives among the most radical sectors. Both Carranza and Obregón even exploited the cultural and political distance between Villa's and Zapata's rural bases of support and sectors of radicalised urban workers whom they successfully co-opted. This included their emphasis on incorporating carefully controlled sectors of organised labour into the PRI's governing corporatist coalition.

The emergence of Carranza and Obregón as more moderate alternatives to the much greater perceived threats to US interests represented by Villa and Zapata was also a consequence of increased US intervention reflected in the overthrow of Madero, and its aftermath. Neither Carranza nor Obregón inspired US confidence, but each time intensified US intervention weakened Villa and Zapata, it at least indirectly strengthened Carranza and Obregón. Diplomatic relations between the US and Mexico were actually severed between 1914 and 1917, during the period of greatest US intervention on the ground in Mexico.

These interventions included US occupation of the port of Veracruz for 7 months between April

and November 1913, which also enabled US support to Carranza, who was based in that region during this period, which helped neutralise the potential strength of the emerging alliance between Villa and Zapata. The de facto alliance between the US and Carranza helped spur Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March 1916, which was the only attack carried out by a foreign foe on the continental US until the events of 9/11 (11 September 2001).

The US response included an invasion of Mexico by between 5,000 and 10,000 troops for 11 months between March 1916 and February 1917 as part of a punitive expedition in pursuit of Villa commanded by US general John Black Jack Pershing, who later became the commander of US forces in Europe following US intervention in the First World War in April 1917. One of his chief adjutants during this campaign was future general George S. Patton. Many of the units, officers, and soldiers involved in Pershing's expedition had combat experience in the War of 1898 and in the so-called Indian Wars. It is not surprising within this context that many Mexican civilians became the victims of US atrocities during this period that were shaped by racist assumptions as to their dangerousness, duplicity, and/or racial inferiority, along the same lines as numerous similar incidents during the US-Mexico war between 1845 and 1848.

Advance detachments penetrated at least 400 miles within Mexican territory, as far as Parral, Chihuahua (Villa's home base). Villa eluded capture repeatedly by employing classic tactics of guerrilla warfare which were later emulated by Fidel Castro in Cuba and by Mexico's EZLN in the 1990s. Villa lured Pershing's troops into several pitched battles with Mexican Army units (such as the Battle of Carrizal in June 1916) which, according to several scholars, might have triggered another full-scale war between the US and Mexico had it not been for the pressing distractions of the First World War. Similar skirmishes continued throughout the border region, especially in the environs of Texas and Arizona, between December 1917 and June 1919. Many of the tactics later employed by US troops in Europe in the First and Second World Wars were first tested in Mexico during this period.

There were also attempts at German intervention into the complex balance of forces during the Mexican Revolution, including the role of the S.S. *Ypringa* (the same German-registered vessel which had taken Díaz into exile) in bringing German arms to Huerta in Veracruz in April 1914, leading to US bombardment and occupation of the port later that same month. It also included the so-called Zimmermann Telegram, sent by the German foreign minister of that name to the German ambassador in Mexico City, which proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico that would have included the return of the Mexican territory annexed by the US as a result of the war between 1845 and 1848.

Neo-colonisation

By 1919, Carranza had succeeded in isolating and killing Zapata, and in neutralising Villa (who was forced to live under virtual house arrest from his surrender in June 1920 until his assassination with Obregón's complicity in July 1923). Carranza himself was ultimately betrayed by Obregón and murdered in May 1920. Obregón in turn became the country's president from 1920–24 and was assassinated following his re-election to the presidency in 1928. Carranza's murder in May 1920 and Villa's surrender to Obregón a month later together are generally recognised as moments which mark the end of the Revolution and the inception of its consolidation as an authoritarian regime under Obregón and Plutarco Eliás Calles, and eventually Lázaro Cárdenas.

The president who best embodied the most classic expression of the revolutionary nationalist phase of the PRI was Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). Cárdenas, a general in Mexico's revolutionary army, became renowned for his extensive land redistribution programme, defence of the rights of the country's (and Latin America's) indigenous peoples, and armed support of the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War and granting of asylum to Leon Trotsky and to thousands of Spanish refugees fleeing the triumph of the fascist regime led by dictator Francisco Franco. This tradition was later reflected in Mexico's

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welcoming of thousands of political exiles fleeing dictatorships and civil conflicts in Latin America throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Sadly much of this has been betrayed recently as the PRI has become the most assiduous defender of US interests, such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in Latin America from 1994–2015, including the so-called drug war and ongoing state terror against migrants in transit heading north to the US from Central America.

Cárdenas is perhaps most remembered for his anti-imperialist defiance epitomised by the nationalisation of US oil interests in 1938. This led to very tense relations between the US (under President Franklin D. Roosevelt) and Mexico, including widespread speculation as to possible US military intervention, which was likely neutralised by Roosevelt's increasing concentration on the imminent Second World War in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The ambiguities of Mexico's PRI are reflected both in Cárdenas's own role in forging the corporatist unity of the PRI between sectors such as the military and official government-backed trade union and peasant federations, and in the fact that in 2013 it is the PRI which promotes opening Mexico's state-owned oil industry (PEMEX, founded by Cárdenas) to foreign investment for the first time since 1938.

There continues to be widespread scholarly debate regarding how to characterise Mexico's evolving regime during the period of its domination between 1929 and 2000, and about the extent to which the country has experienced elements of a still incomplete democratic transition since the PRI's acceptance of its first acknowledged national electoral defeat in July 2000. Unlike other such cases in Latin America (e.g. in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru), Mexico has not taken meaningful steps to dismantle the PRI regime (e.g. a national Truth Commission and prosecution of serious human rights crimes) nor undertaken trials regarding key crimes or former leaders. All of this has been exacerbated by the PRI's return to power under current president Enrique Peña Nieto in a hotly disputed, closely contested election in 2012.

Key forces within Mexico's left continue to dispute the PRI's supposed legitimacy as an heir to the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. This includes some of the country's most radical movements such as the EZLN, based among some of Mexico's poorest Mayan indigenous communities in the jungle and highlands regions of Chiapas, which explicitly invokes the name and ideals of Zapata, and urban groups of slum dwellers in the environs of Mexico City who describe themselves as Villistas – followers of Francisco Pancho Villa. It is difficult to conceive of a revolutionary movement today in Mexico that does not in one way or another position itself in terms of the legacy of the most progressive features of the Mexican Revolution and at the same time in terms of the critique of its most evident errors (e.g. authoritarianism, centralism, corruption, etc.).

The disputed legacy of the Mexican Revolution also includes much more moderate centre-left forces focused on the electoral arena such as the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) which was founded in 1990 as a fusion between nationalist sectors of the ruling PRI and several left parties and currents including the successor to Mexico's Communist Party. Its principal founder was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a major opposition presidential candidate in 1988, 1994, and 2000, and son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40), who was himself the founder of the PRI. The PRD has recently split as the result of the founding of MORENA (the Movement for National Renovation) led by former PRD chair and presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, which has sought to draw on the legacy of Flores Magón by, for example, naming its journal *Regenerción.*

The PRI has taken a sharp neo-liberal turn from a longstanding at least rhetorical loyalty to revolutionary nationalism since its regime accepted the conditions of structural adjustment necessary for its rescue by the IMF and US Treasury following serious economic crises in 1982–83 and 1994–95. Meanwhile thousands of peasant, labour, indigenous, and human rights activists and independent journalists have been killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured, or exiled since the 1950s by the PRI regime and its initial successors from the rightist Partido de Acción Nacional.

Historical Influence of the Mexican Revolution

The Mexican Revolution's key elements included an emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights such as agrarian reform and land redistribution, labour rights, and the expansion of public education, social security, and public health, combined with nationalism and anti-clericalism, which were reflected in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. These elements influenced and preceded similar provisions in the pioneering constitutions of Weimar Germany and of the USSR in 1918. All of this in turn foreshadowed the national-colonial turn promoted among non-Western Communist parties by the Third International after the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East in September 1920, which had great influence on anti-colonial movements confronting similar challenges in contexts such as China, India, and colonial Africa (particularly South Africa, for example), and the emergence of the Comintern-backed League Against Imperialism in 1927, whose international leadership included Mexican revolutionary and painter Diego Rivera.

Many of the key characteristics of the Mexican Revolution are also present to varying degrees in modernising, nationalist, and populist regimes (often classified as corporatist or even fascist-leaning) such as: that of Ataturk (1920–38) in Turkey; the presidencies of Gétulio Vargas in Brazil (1930–45 and 1951–54); that which came to power as the result of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution led by Nasser and was pursued by his followers elsewhere in the Arab World; as well as Mossadegh's nationalist regime in Iran which nationalised the country's oil industry in 1951 and was eventually removed by a US-backed military coup in 1953.

In the Latin American context, Guatemala's Democratic Revolution between 1944 and 1954 and that of Bolivia in 1952 sought to emulate many of the Mexican Revolution's principal characteristics such as democratisation, the promotion of land reform, and defence of workers' rights in the face of US domination. The Mexican Revolution's emphasis on agrarian reform and peasant activism was also reflected in experiences

such as: the populist Gaitanista movement in Colombia between 1929 and 1948 (eventually repressed through that country's period of civil conflict between 1948 and 1962 known as La Violencia); and the Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao in north-east Brazil in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which in turn laid the groundwork for the emergence of contemporary expressions such as Brazil's Movement of Landless Workers (MST).

It is not surprising, given this framework, that Mexico became a key contributor to the International Brigades which fought on the side of the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War, or that it was later the place of political refuge where Fidel Castro met Che Guevara in 1955 and from where their expedition on the retooled yacht known as the *Granma* launched what became the Cuban Revolution in December 1956.

Conclusion

The influence of the Mexican Revolution and its diverse interpretations are also evident in efforts on the left (and beyond) to theorise about the complexity of peasant and indigenous movements in Latin America and elsewhere. We see it in the work of historians such as Eric Hobsbawm (*Primitive Rebels* 1959) and E.P Thompson (in his conceptualisation of the moral economy, 1971), drawing in turn on analyses such as those of Antonio Gramsci regarding the ideological, cultural, and political dimensions of capitalist hegemony.

The impact of the Mexican Revolution and its internationalist implications are reflected in the journalism of John Kenneth Turner (*Barbarous Mexico* 1910) and John Reed (*Insurgent Mexico* 1910), whose books helped position the Revolution as a process with global implications, capable of awakening diverse expressions of solidarity and support in the US and beyond. John Reed's *Insurgent Mexico* focused on his experiences accompanying Villa, served as a precursor to his *Ten Days that Shook the World* (1919) documenting the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution, and together suggest additional

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dimensions of the relationship between the Mexican and Russian Revolutions as historically and politically related phenomena.

John Kenneth Turner's *Barbarous Mexico* (1910), which dramatically conveyed the worst abuses of the Díaz regime, has been compared to *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in terms of its analogous impact on public opinion. It was based on his research in Mexico during two trips in 1908 and 1909, vividly documenting the most repressive aspects of Diaz's dictatorial rule in Mexico. It played a key role in influencing US public opinion against Diaz's regime, and helped prepare progressive sectors in the US for active solidarity with Flores Magón, Madero, Zapata, and Villa during the next decade. Turner himself was co-ordinator of the English language version of *Regeneración,* and he participated directly in raising money and in purchasing and supplying weapons to Flores Magón's Liberal Party which helped make possible their seizure of Tijuana and several other towns in the northern states of Chihuahua and Sonora during 1910–11. This included the establishment of an anarcho-communist commune by Magonistas in Mexicali in Baja California between January and June 1911. Dozens of active US members of the IWW participated in this takeover, including Joe Hill and Frank Little. Emma Goldman lauded this episode as the Mexican equivalent of the Paris Commune.

Initial instalments of Turner's book were published in *The American Magazine* (founded in 1906 by Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell, and others as an offshoot of the renowned *McClure's Magazine,* home of the original muckrakers), between October and December 1909, then throughout 1910 in seven additional instalments in journals such as *The Appeal to Reason* (based in Girard, Kansas; close to the Socialist Party, with a circulation of over 500,000 by 1910, the largest circulation of any socialist periodical in US history), *The International Socialist Review*, and *The Pacific Monthly*. The book was not published in Spanish, in Mexico, until 1955 (Turner 1910, pp. xvi, xxii, xxviii). Turner returned to Mexico several times during the Revolution, which

included his arrest in March 1913 as part of the generalised repression which followed Huerta's US-backed coup against Madero in February of that year. Mexican revolutionary painter and communist activist David Alfaro Siquieros included Turner in his mural honouring of the most important heroes of the Revolution, along with Zapata and Villa (xxviii–ix).

The Mexican Revolution was also, and remains, an extraordinary cultural phenomenon. This includes its presence in chronicles such as *The Eagle and the Serpent* by Martín Luis Guzman; in the novels of Carlos Fuentes; the poetry and essays of Octavio Paz; writings by José Revueltas; in music (as reflected in the specific narrative form known as *corridos*; in the nationalist movement in music projected in the work of Silvestre Revueltas, one of José's brothers); and of course in the country's renowned muralists Diego Rivera, Siquieros, José Clemente Orozco; the surrealist, feminist paintings of Frida Kahlo; and in the photography of Edward Weston and Tina Modotti, among many other possible examples. As in the case of Weston and Modotti, Mexico also became a place of pilgrimage for artists with social sensibilities from across the world, including: the film-maker Luis Buñuel and poet León Felipe (both Spanish exiles), D.H. Lawrence, Antonin Artaud, and André Breton. Such influences transcend the physical boundaries of Mexico through the vital presence of communities of Mexican origin throughout the US, and of murals such as those by Rivera in Detroit and San Francisco.

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Middle East

Middle East Wars

Middle East: Socialism and Anti-imperialism

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In 1902, Alfred Thayer Mahan, American Naval Officer and geopolitics expert, wrote that:

> The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will someday need its Malta, as well as its Gibraltar; it does not follow that either will be in the Persian Gulf. Naval force has the quality of mobility which carries with it the privilege of temporary absences; but it needs to find on every scene of operation established bases of refit, of supply, and in case of disaster, of security. The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force if occasion arise, about Aden, India, and the Persian Gulf. (cited in Adelson 1995, p. 22)

Thus, Mahan provided a new concept and defined a certain part of the geography which had been called as "Orient, The Near East, Turkish Asia" by the West until that day.

As the foreign news editor of *The Times* which was one of the loudest advocates of Britain imperialism, Sir Valentine Chirol wrote 20 articles under the main title of *The Middle Eastern Question* after the Eastern trip they took with Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, in 1903. The book composed of Chirol's articles was published in 1903 by the name of *The Middle East Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defense*. During the trip, Chirol heard several times "less of Russia and more of Germany as the Power whose growing influence threatened to displace our own," and he considered "the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway and its planned extension to the Persian Gulf" as a "part of the Kaiser's [Emperor Willhelm] plan to use Turkey as 'a bridgehead to German world dominion'" (cited in Meyer and Brysac 2009, p. 37). Chirol had cited the concept of *The Middle East* from Mahan. Just as the states and borders to be created within the geography after some time, the concept of *The Middle East* was born as a requisite of

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geostrategic priorities determined by British imperialism during the period in which imperialist struggle for the partition get intensified and progressed to turn into the Great War.

Mandate Governments

The Middle East became a territory that hosted bloody scenes of The First Imperialist War. Britain, France, Germany and Russia had demands and plans over the Middle East conflicting with each other. Demands and plans of Tsarist Russia turned into an affair of history due to the October Revolution. Germany lost both the war and its previous zone of influence. The winners of the War, Britain and France, divided the region within the framework of their own zones of influence through the Sykes-Picot Agreement they signed in 1916. After the war, the first draft sketching out the partition of the region came to light at Versailles Peace Conference. The region had great importance to protect the road from Britain to India and direct access to oil fields. On the basis of the structure of its colonial empire, France had to get a predominant position to safeguard its influence over Mediterranean and North Africa, economic interests in the Levant, and access to oil fields.

The decree to establish mandate governments was formulated by the Supreme Council of Versailles Conference on 30 January 1919 as follows:

> the Ottoman Middle East and the former German colonies, being inhabited by 'peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world', would be administered by 'advanced nations' on the principle 'that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.' (cited in Pedersen 2015, p. 29)

The territories within the scope of mandate government were classified in three, and "A" mandates included the Ottoman Middle East. After having been framed at the Paris Peace Conference and been decided to establish at the San Remo Conference at the end of First Imperialist War, mandate governments were a "fig leaf" to cover colonialist domination, as historian Leonard V. Smith cited in. The statement in the establishment text of the

mandate governments was an ornate expression of the "civilizing mission" (*mission civilisatrice*) that colonialist powers of the Europe had developed since the invasion of America and used to legitimate their colonial expeditions. When Lord Curzon "told the House of Lords, the gift of mandates lay not with the League [of Nations], but 'with the powers who have conquered the territories, which it then falls to them to distribute'" (Mangold 2016, p. 93), he revealed that the essence was the colonial domination provided by bayonets which was also the very thing covered by this ornate expression. Robert D. Caix, France Prime Minister Clemencau's consultant and special envoy, framed the general project agreed by Britain and France to reshape the region as follows:

> the peace of the world would be better served if there were in the Orient a number of small states, with relations under the control of France or England, that would be administered with the fullest domestic autonomy and would not have the aggressive tendencies of the big national unitary states. (cited in Bozarslan 2010, p. 53; also see de Dreuzy 2016, p. 207)

The Great Syria (which once used to include today's Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Jordan and a part of Southern Anatolia) was divided within the frame of British-France consensus; whereas Syria and Lebanon were allocated to French mandate, Britain mandate was established in Palestine. Abdullah from Hashimi family under the total domination of Britain was appointed head of the newly founded Jordan. Establishment of an Iraq state under the British mandate was decided to contain Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad provinces of Ottomans. On November 2, 1917, in the advance of this partition, then Britain Foreign Affairs Minister Arthur Balfour promised to build a "national homeland for Jewish people" in Palestine through a document he sent to Walter Rothschild's house at Piccadily, 148 in London. France, the USA, and Italy expressed their support a short while ago before that declaration.

Iraq
The Balfour Declaration and the partition of the region by the imperialists after the war triggered a

wave of anti-imperialist revolts within the region. "Muslim-Christian Association," the first political party of Palestine, was established after the revelation of the Balfour Declaration. The first anniversary of the declaration was determined as the day of national rage, and thousands of Muslim and Christian Palestinian attended to the protests arm in arm. Inconveniences growing within Iraq against British invasion and the establishment of mandate government turned into a significant revolt in summer 1919. The revolt started with clashes as a result of some attacks to British military officers in Shiite and Kurdish regions and inspired large masses. The response of the occupying British government was fatal air strikes embodied in the document by the name of "On the Power of the Air Force and the Application of That Power to Hold and Police Mesopotamia" (Satia 2006, p. 26). The Royal Air Force carried out massive massacres. Iraqi peoples jointly resisted with participation of Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, and Christians.

In Batatu's (1978, pp. 173–178) words, "the revolt (...), by bringing the Shiites and Sunnis closer together, strengthened national sentiment which, as it grew in intensity and wide masses became seized of it" far from deepening the cleavages between the sects, and "a great deal of fraternizing between Sunnis and Shiites took place in 1919 and 1920 at joint religious-political gatherings in Baghdad's mosques an event without precedent in the annals of Iraq."

The revolt in Iraq directly targeted British imperialism and spread to a large area of the country. Among the feeding supplies of the revolt, an important dimension was the political initiatives developed by the Soviets toward the Peoples of the East after the October Revolution. The most comprehensive form of this political initiative was embodied in "Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions" presented by Lenin to the Second Congress of the Communist International. The first political outcome of this initiative became the Congress of the Peoples of the East held between September 1 and 8, 1920, in Baku. The Congress aimed at developing a perspective for the joint struggle of the peoples under the yoke of imperialism.

Turkey

After the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, the resistance initiated by popular forces in Anatolia against the harsh destruction and invasion of Ottoman Empire by the victorious imperialists became intensified. Mustafa Kemal, a commander of Ottoman Army, gathered resistant groups formed in various regions of Anatolia under his political and military leadership. He made an alliance with the Bolsheviks and, thanks to the support against the imperialism, accomplished successive military victories. The struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal evolved in the establishment of the republic in 1923 which introduced modern Turkey.

Syria and Lebanon

France, which accrued Syria and Lebanon as a result of imperialist partition, initially divided Syria and Lebanon in pursuant to imperial *divide et empera* principle and established mandate governments in 1922 in Syria and in 1921 in Lebanon. After a short while, she divided Syria on the basis of ethnic and religious basis and established "ministates" under the names of Aleppo Administration, Damascus Administration, Druse Administration, and Alawite Administration all of which hinged upon French Viceroy. While French colonial administration carried out such regulations, Arab Alawites, mainly living in Mediterranean coasts of Syria, revolted. Aleppo branch of secret "national defense committees" which were established in all parts of Syria got in touch with this revolt of Alawites. The tendency to jointly resist was adopted rapidly. Armed groups in Aleppo under the leadership of İbrahim Hananu started a joint struggle together with the insurgents in the Alevi region. The principal demand of the insurgents was the abolition of partition and invasion of the country. France sent more troops to the region and initiated a campaign to disable resistant forces.

In an article dated 1932, Yusuf İbrahim Yazbek, historian and among founders of Lebanese Communist Party, indicated that he knew Hananu personally and got some significant information about the relationship between Hananu

and Lenin, i.e., the Soviets, during the revolt. Lenin sent messages to Hananu promising to support Syrian Revolution against French invasion (Ismael 2005, pp. 11–12). As a result of that French campaign inflicted a heavy blow on the resistance, the relationship with the Soviets could not be promoted further. French mandate practices which were the most infuriating for Syrians were directly interrelated with her "civilizing mission." The government's wish was to construct new railways and highways in order to "civilize" Syria and apply compulsory labor policy to execute this will. In addition to compulsory work, new taxes were also levied on in addition to compulsory work. There was an outrage in the country arising from the numerous losses of lives as a result of the blockade that Britain and France applied to Syrian harbors during the Imperialist War. The revolt went on until the end of 1922, and, because of unchained violence of French troops, villages were destroyed, and crops were fired. When the French could not capture insurgents, who had a grasp over the geography, they tortured the local community and massacred to suppress the resistance.

Egypt

Another country in which anti-imperialist resistance in the aftermath of the Imperialist War triggered a great revolt was Egypt that had been under the occupation of the British army since 1882. A committee of seven people who established a political party targeting Egypt's independency in November 1918 wanted to participate in the Paris Conference on behalf of their country. Britain High Commission rejected this request, and the members of Egyptian committee protested this rejection and decided to launch a countrywide political campaign. Saad Zaglul, in the position of the committee leader, and two other members were punished by being exiled in Maltha.

One week after the exile of Zaglul, demonstrations that sprang in Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities extended to Delta region, and enormous strikes followed. Railways were sabotaged at important points; railway and telegraph line from Cairo to the Canal and Upper Egypt was cut off. Egypt rapidly turned into the center of rebellion.

The report by British officials in Egypt stated that the revolt was supported by all groups in the country and influenced by Bolsheviks. The report also drew attention to the fact that Coptic Christians and Muslims, students from religious schools and secular ones, and women and men from upper classes participated demonstrations together (Fromkin 2013, p. 349). The revolt in Egypt was a bourgeois-democratic movement where a young Egyptian bourgeoisie, of which development channels had been clogged by Britain, was backed by all fractions of the people. The labor class that had just started to activate in social and political terms also became influential in this revolt.

The violence applied by British forces was comprehensive in the 1919 Revolution; at least 3000 Egyptian died, many villages were fired, lands were ravaged, railway stations were demolished, and railways were devastated. Upon the fact that the violence did not cause to go back and a new wave of strikes burst, the demand of Zaglul was accepted by British officials. WAFD Members joined to the Egyptian committee to participate in Paris Conference. According to the information provided by Peter Mangold, passivation campaign of British forces in Egypt (1919) was one of the cruelest operations in the colonies after the violence applied against Sepoy revolt in India (1857).

Upon the revolt, Britain accepted to launch a negotiation process over political status of Egypt. When WAFD commission indicated that they were insistent on the demand of independency, Britain pursued a different tactic. In pursuant to this tactic, Britain exiled Zaglul again in 1921 and declared dependency unilaterally and promoted Egypt Khedive to the King from the Governorship through a declaration in 1922.

Communist parties in the Middle East were established under the inspiring influence of Communist International just after the Imperialist War. Communist parties of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Turkey took shape between 1919 and 1925 in the atmosphere generated by the October Revolution and anti-imperialist stream rising in the region. Lebanese and Syrian Communist Parties were established in December

1925 and took a set of decisions on actual political affairs in their establishment meeting: (1) to defend Syrian Revolution, (2) to strengthen the struggle against imperialism, (3) to struggle for democratic rights and national liberation, (4) to struggle for the rights of Syrian and Lebanese workers, and (5) to defend appropriation of landlords' properties who were not for the revolution.

Communist Parties and Resistances

During the days that conference held, Syria was shaken by a recent wave of revolts against Syria French Mandate Government, and that is why the first article of the decisions on actual political affairs was "To defend Syrian Revolution" in Lebanese and Syrian Communist Parties establishment conference. The revolt sprang in Druse region that time. A Druse warrior, Sultan el-Atrash, led the rebellion. The reason of the rebellion in Druse region, which is one of the "ministates" of the French, was the fact that newly appointed French officials enforced compulsory works to the local community for the road and building construction with no wages and brought shifting toward private property policies on the land forward by eliminating deep-rooted common property tradition of Druses. Local leaders of Druse people submitted their complaints through petitions sent to Damascus in June 1925. The high commissioner invited complainants to Damascus; all of them with the exception of Sultan Atrash accepted the invitation and were arrested.

Atrash took action after learning the arrests, and a French plane was shot down by the warriors on July 18, 1925, while flying above Druse Mountain (*Jabal al-Druze*). Four days later, Warriors at Atrash's command carried out an attack to the largest French military base located near Suwayda, the biggest Druse city around. Almost all of French soldiers in the base were killed. The victories of Atrash excited all Syrians for Suwayda was enveloped. Three thousand French soldiers at the command of General Roger Michaud were sent to the region in order to lift the envelopment and terminate the rebellion, but

they were ambushed as soon as they burst on the scene and had to retreat by suffering heavy losses. Atrash's such military successes brought warriors belonging to various national and religious groups from different parts of the country into the fold.

On the date of August 23, 1925, Atrash,

> as the 'Commander of the Syrian Revolutionary Armies', issued a general call to arms. Appealing to all Syrians to 'remember your forefathers, your history, your heroes, your martyrs, and your national honour... remember that civilized nations that are united cannot be destroyed', al-Atrash called for the complete independence of Syria, the institution of free elections, and a popular government, the expulsion of foreign armies from Syria soil, and -an interesting touch- 'the application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man'. (Pedersen 2015, pp. 144–145)

People's Party which was established under the leadership of Abdurrahman Şahbender and adopted secularism and national independency as the main principles was among prominent supporters of the revolt. The party hastened agitation and propaganda in Damascus and some other cities so as to favor the revolt. In October, the forces led by Fevzi Kavukçu, a veteran soldier, attacked the French forces in Hama and surrounded the French base there. French planes launched a bomb attack to the region. Due to the heavy shelling over the settlements in the region, there occurred a civilian massacre. As a result, new rebellious groups occurred in many regions of the country during the autumn. French forces lost the control of Ghouta, in Damascus countryside, and serious attacks were carried out against French forces in Homs.

Anti-rebellious paramilitary brigades composed of Circassians, Kurds, and Armenians by the French initiative started operations together with the colonial French army. These groups were utilized in anti-guerilla operations in rural and urban areas and submitted hundred young men that they arrested in countryside of Ghouta to the Frenches by claiming that they were rebellious. Frenches executed these men in the most centralized square of Damascus and exhibited their corpses for days in order to spread fear.

In the early morning of October 18, 1925, there were attacks by armed groups against French

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troops and demonstrations against the French governing by unarmed crowds at many points of Damascus. Anti-guerilla brigades took action against both armed forces and unarmed crowds in the city together with colonial French soldiers. After the intensification of the conflict, the large part of Damascus was controlled by the rebellious group. Even though French tanks entered in even the narrowest streets and bombed the city, this did not break the resistance. In the evening, rebellions were in front of the magnificent residence of High Commissioner Sarrail, but he was not there. The residence burnt up, while the weather was getting dark. French Mandate Government officials decided to a show of force as a result of their assessments. In the evening of October 18, all French troops and armored vehicles retreated from the central Damascus. The next morning, a heavy shelling by warplanes and artillery batteries simultaneously targeted Damascus. It lasted 2 days and demolished many parts of the city.

The French Mandate Government had to propel 80,000 additional colonial soldiers further from Morocco, Senegal, Algeria, and Madagascar to Syria together with heavy weapons in order to suppress the revolt. "The Great Revolt" was a bourgeois-democratic revolution movement that rose on the basis of struggle against French domination. Class composition of the crowds triggered by the revolt and demands embodied in Atrash's declaration points out a framework fitting the political program of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. "The Great Revolt" was an offspring of the revolutionary wave that started to shake the East by 1919–1920s. That fact was also why Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties listed "To defend Syrian Revolution" first in the political agenda of the establishment meeting. Thousands of people were destroyed in the great attack toward Damascus, and these numerous losses became influential in the slowdown of the struggle. However, the fight of Syrian people continued with ups and downs. In May 1926, French planes were above Al-Midan, an outskirt of Damascus. The region was ravaged once more as a result of heavy bombardment. According to a source referred by McHugo, a thousand people died just in this bombardment. Only 50 of them were in

rebellion, and most of the dead were women and children (McHugo 2001, p. 87). French government dictated that people should not be assisted, when they wanted to shelter in inner cities after leaving the razed Al-Midan with injuries and without water and food. French Mandate Government carried out a passivation campaign in order to break the revolt by employing heavy bombardments, attacks of anti-rebellious paramilitary groups, and regular operations of colonial army. The rebellion went on until the end of 1927.

On the date of July 20, 1925, Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties organized a demonstration in Beirut in order to protest removal of rental control policy, and numerous people marched. Rise of inflation and prices of consumption goods enhanced inconvenience in Lebanon. When protestors were in front of the government building to utter their demands, the police fired on the crowd. The people disbanded in panic, 10 died and 40 got injured, while many of them were arrested. The party issued a declaration in Arabic, French, and Armenian on July 22 condemning the bloody attack and supporting the revolt in Syria. The party also declared the intention to build coordination with international communist movement in order to defend the Great Syrian Revolution.

Palestine

The first political challenge against British Mandate Government in Palestine occurred in 1920 after the conflict arising from provocations against Palestinians by Zionist settler groups having close relationships with British governing. For British troops used force against Palestinians, the conflicts grew and caused great losses for Palestinians. During the conflicts, British government developed relations with a moderate group trying to soothe Palestinians led by Amin al-Husseini, member of an influential family in Jerusalem. British officials granted some privileges and attempted control Palestinians through this group. Zionist movement took significant steps toward its specific targets in close cooperation with British government thanks to

outstanding financial sources as well as well-disciplined and centralized political leadership.

Mandate government allocated 90% of state privileges in Palestine to the Jewish capital. This enabled Zionists to obtain the control of economic infrastructure (road projects, mineral deposits under the Dead Sea, electricity, ports, etc.). Zionists got the control of 872 industrial companies out of 1212 in Palestine till 1935. Industrial import belonging to Zionists was exempt from tax. By means of remarkable external support, Zionist movement could provide money in the amount of that mandate government could do for education. This considerable support enabled them to establish the first university in 1925, and Balfour participated in the opening ceremony as the guest of honor. Strong educational institutions were built in line with Zionist political targets and historical perception and played an important role in imposing Zionist ideology to next-generation settlers. Zionist Executive Board was established in 1921 and developed close relationships with mandate government as the representative of the Zionist movement. Zionist movement simultaneously carried settlers to Palestine while purchasing lands from Arabic dominant groups and driving Arab villagers out of these lands. In this frame, 425,000 decares land in 1914 escalated to 1,250,000 decares in 1930. This was one-third of agricultural lands in Palestine, and this expansion worked to the detriment of local community.

A new wave of protests started in Palestine and spread to Syria, Iraq, and Egypt after Balfour's arrival to Palestine for the opening ceremony. Masses around the Middle East protested British imperialism, Zionism, and Balfour. Histadrut, a Jewish Labor Federation, was among the prominent actors playing a role in colonization of Palestine. By virtue of its activities in accordance with "Hebrew labor" maxim, Histadrut forbade employment of Arabic workers in the projects held by Jews. Meanwhile, Histadrut became the largest Zionist organization in Palestine and get the position of the most effective actor in the establishment of Israel. First secretary general of Histadrut, David Ben-Gurion, was going to make the speech declaring the establishment of Israel and become the first prime minister of it. Even though Histadrut has the

name of labor federation, its field of activity extended from capitalist entrepreneurship, banking, insurance companies, and landowning to social insurance activities, enormous educational institutions, armed organization, and the cooperative operations. In this respect, it was much more like the "embryo of a state" rather than a labor federation. Mandate government divided unitary economic system which had been existing in Palestine through a policy enforced in 1929 in favor of Zionist movement. The practices foretelling this division started in 1928. The tension between Zionist settlers and Palestinians got intensified in Summer 1928 because of disagreements over sacred spaces in Jerusalem. The new practice was enforced during these days and enhanced rage among Palestinians more. Intensification of conflicts in 1929 caused uprising of Palestinians once more against British imperialism. The response was again a high-level violence campaign targeting Palestinians. The revolt was repressed. London Government sent a commission to Palestine to investigate the events and reasons on site. The commission arrived in Palestine in September and prepared a report after completing the investigation. In the report, it was stated that "the main source of tension within the mandate was the creation of a landless class of discontented Arabs and the widespread Arab fear that continued Jewish immigration would result in a Jewish-dominated Palestine" (Cleveland and Bunton 2008, p. 257).

Zionist Movement and the 1930s

Having shaped a strong institutional structure, Zionist movement built a powerful armed body named Haganah which would turn into the army of Israel in future. Such armed body was shaped and strengthened through silent approval of mandate government and drew attention by its aggression against Palestinians. Upon the domination of Zionists, flow of settlers toward Palestine and purchase of lands increasingly went on. Jewish population between 1931 and 1936 in Palestine escalated to 370,000 from 175,000. In the year of 1933, a demonstration with the participation of nearly 7000 people in Jaffa was attacked by

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British forces, and 12 Palestinians were killed, whereas more than 70 were injured. Upon the hearing of this massacre, attacks targeted British entities in many cities. British government activated its abettor, the Arab Higher Committee, to terminate the revolt. In spite of the Arab Higher Committee's attempts to break, the movement spread to Haifa, Nablus, and Jerusalem. Serving a report to Britain, a British official stated that "there was no attack towards the Jews" during the revolt and

> It would be wrong to consider migration and establishment of a Jewish nation-state as the only reason for the revolt. Afterwards, a genuine national sensation developed. Such sensation subsisted in Palestine more than any other things, and it was accompanied by a violent attitude against British government. (Sakar 1991, p. 151)

After 1935, the Arab Higher Committee made a set of interviews in order to provide a consensus with Zionist Jewish Agent officials and a proper agreement between the parties through the guidance of British officials. The negotiations did not come up with result because of strict attitudes of Zionist delegates. In May 1936, Palestinian executives faced an obligation to decide: they had been forced both by Palestinians to achieve something and by British government to make serious concessions. On May 7, the decision not to pay tax to mandate government was taken with the participation of 150 delegates. The Arab Higher Committee went on a general strike in May 1936 thanks to the pressure of people and organized countrywide demonstrations.

While the demonstrations to which upper dominant class members of Palestine also participated spread to many parts of the country, conflicts occurred between Haganah members and Arab committees. A gigantic attack was organized by British forces toward Palestinians in Jaffa on June 18. Most of the dwellings in the city were destroyed by British soldiers by the means of dynamites. Mandate government declared a state of siege on July 30 and harshly started a passivation campaign against Palestinian rioters. British forces occupying Palestine were not only supported by 20,000 additional soldiers to carry out the campaign but also benefited from another

source. It was a local power which collaborate British colonialism and immensely mobilized against the local community: Zionists, which once performed many retaliation operations, would take a greater role hereafter in the environment of a condensed pressure through massive arrests, assassinations, and executions. Zionist militias which were integrated into British army and police forces launched a relentless violence campaign against the Palestinians.

1936 revolt mainly developed against British domination and Zionist project. However, after rapidly getting out of control of its initiator, the Arab Higher Committee, it gained the character of a "peasantry social revolution." There were a significant number of participants from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. The thing combining volunteers from various ideological and political positions was the anti-colonial struggle of Palestine. The revolt went on until 1939 and left behind approximately 5000 Palestinians dead, thousands imprisoned, and nearly 5000 houses destroyed. Some Zionist militias which were integrated in British entities during the revolt were going to take important roles in Israel army and state afterward.

After the Second Imperialist War

Palestinian revolt withered away during the days in which the world was drifted to an oncoming imperialist war. When the Second Imperialist War started, imperialist domination in the Middle East was existing in different ways. With the exception of Turkey, on which imperialists could not have a grip directly, and Saudi Arabia, a quasi-independent state even the name of which was determined in London, all countries were under the domination of Britain and France though various means of control. Second Imperialist War caused destructive results in the Middle East. Cairo was one of the main military bases of Britain during the war. Britain and France imposed a war economy on the Middle East countries for foodstuff and military articles they need to. During the war, Middle Eastern peoples' rage against imperialism and desire to eradicate the imperialist yoke grew much stronger.

After the war and in 1945, Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Affairs Minister, determined that an unprecedented social transformation was taking place in the Middle East. According to Bevin, Britain had taken a side on the wrong hand of the history:

> Britain allied with previous gangs and generals rather than peasantry. Britain must encourage social and political reforms in the region, cooperate with moderate nationalists in order to balance extremists. Britain cannot cling on to the Middle East through bayonets. (Mangold 2016, p. 193)

Actually, the evaluation of Bevin on the basis of protection of his country's interests pointed out his uneasiness about the growing anti-imperialist political and social opposition.

The USA, which was a new hegemonic power within the imperialist camp after the war, was not delayed in gravitating to the region having rich energy resources and a geostrategic urgency. Thanks to an agreement concluded in 1944, it already established its first military base in Saudi Arabia, and American oil companies made important agreements with the country. Britain and the USA established a strong political and economic control over reactionary oil-rich monarchies in the region. Growing anti-imperialist wave of the era revealed that colonialist domination could not be maintained in previous forms anymore. Independency demands in the colonies gained momentum after India achieved its independence in 1947. The USA took action in order to build economic, political, and military mechanisms of the new colonialism in place of weakening British and French colonial empires.

During the 1950s, various movements rose against imperialist domination in the Middle East and were welcomed by large masses. The intersection point of these movements based on different social class force combinations and various ideological orientations was the demands of national independency against political domination of imperialism and termination of imperialist control over the local resources. These common targets consisted meeting point of progressive bourgeoisie-nationalist movements and revolutionary-communist movements of the region.

Nasserism

Communist parties in Arabic countries had responsibility to develop a political struggle framework fitting specific conditions of the countries having typical qualities of a capitalist mode of development belonging to the geographies under the colonialist domination. One of the most prominent experiences occurred in Egypt so as to reflect the hardship of this responsibility and specificities of capitalist mode of development under the colonialist domination. A group of young officers, named themselves "free officers," seized the power under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser on July 23, 1952, and overthrew the British puppet king. This attempt had a determinant influence over the political struggles in the Middle East after the second imperialist war and made a tremendous impact in many Arabic countries. 1952 Egyptian Revolution became the first flare of oncoming anti-imperialist revolution wave in the Middle East.

Upon the decision on nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian government in 1956, Britain, France, and Israel took action. After the invasion of Sinai by Israel, Britain and France launched a bombardment toward Cairo and military operations. As a result, they established a military superiority against Egypt. The Soviet Union took a position on the side of Egypt, and the USA did not support aggressive trio for it winced from the break of regional balances to its detriment and isolation from Arabic geography. Aggressors had to withdraw from Egypt: it had a political victory even though it degraded in military terms. This buoyed up anti-imperialist forces in the region.

Nasser, pioneer of Egyptian Revolution, had always kept the experiences of 1948 Arab-Israeli War, to which he participated as a juvenile officer, on the agenda. Arabic countries like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq declared a war against Israel which was established in 1948 thanks to strong support of imperialist countries, but they were defeated. The main reason of the defeat was economic and military deficiency arising from imperialist domination over Arabic countries and

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the competition between abettor political administrations. Israel went to war with a strong army trained and equipped by imperialist countries. Through the war, Israel not only expanded its borders but also drove 700,000 Palestinians out of their lands by relentlessly terrorizing and seized these areas. So, the Nakba (catastrophe) started for Palestinians.

The war also convinced Nasser that the "near enemy" – the king and the British occupier – had to take priority over the "far enemy," Israel, since fighting the former could ultimately lead to victory over the latter.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took part in the war, wrote that they had trouble mostly for the deficiency of heavy weapons, ammunition, and intelligence and considered Britain, domestic monarchy, and political elites of the country as responsible. After the war, Nasser was convinced that taking action against "'near enemy' – the king and the British occupier – had to take priority over the 'far enemy' – Israel – " (Gerges 2018, p. 171). The movement led by Nasser attracted a great attention in the whole Middle East. The US imperialism was in the effort of building a military alliance in parallel to NATO in the Middle East just before the war. The main constitutive elements of such an alliance were Turkey – which shifted toward Western axis after the war and became a NATO member, Iraq and Jordan, of which Kings were the members of British puppet Hashimi family.

On October 13, 1951, the USA, Britain, France, and Turkey invited Egypt to the studies targeting the establishment of a joint military commandership. Egypt government could not reply in the affirmative due to the intensive public pressure. The same day, Western officials also visited Syria, informed Syrian government about the project, and expressed how the threat of communism was crucial: the demand was the enfranchisement of Syrian port utilization in the case of a potential war against Soviets. After the hearing of visit and the content of the subjects, a great mobility occurred in Syria. Syrian people made demonstration with slogans against the USA and Western imperialism. Discussions on a Middle Eastern NATO and the demand of port usage

rights were met by a great reaction. As a result of the visit that caused a political crisis in Syria, the prime minister had to resign. The magnitude of Syrian people's reaction meant that they were aware of the repercussions of Western colonial domination by considering the previous experiences. The memories were fresh in the minds: Palestinians were driven out of their lands; Zionist Israel state was established through the support of Western imperialism, and abettor Arabic administrations had to declare a war and got defeated. Such heavy weights were added onto other fresh memories of deep-rooted history of colonialism.

At the end of the imperialist war, another Middle Eastern country under the influence of Britain was Iran and had great amount of oil reserves and a long border with Soviet Union. In the country, there was a strong communist party and masses had anti-imperialist sensation. Iranian prime minister Mosaddegh won the political struggle against the Shah of Iran under the influence of Western imperialism after the war. Mosaddegh had massive popular support and had the intention to carry out political and economic reforms. Nationalization of oil was the first name on the list. Upon the failure of military coup organized against Mosaddegh, Shah Reza Pahlavi escaped to Italy. Then, American and British secret services stepped in and overthrew Mosaddegh through a coup d'état. Shah turned back to the country on August 24, 1953, as a "hero" and took his place as a trustworthy abettor of the USA in the region.

National Front Tactic

The increasing interest of Soviet Unions in the 1950s toward the Middle East as well as political, economic, and military relations established with Nasser government expedited political confrontations in the region. Juvenile officers and intellectuals triggered by Egyptian Revolution overthrew British puppet king Hashimi in Iraq through 1958 Revolution. Officers led by General Qasim took a radical decision and withdrew from the Western alliance, nationalized key industrial sectors, enabled landless peasantry to access the lands through land reform, launched an extensive

educational campaign, and made reforms so as to make health services accessible.

Juvenile officers seized power in Syria in 1961 under the influence of the developments in the region. Revolutionary forces caused by the revolutionary wave influencing the region developed economic and military relations with the Soviet Union. Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian Communist Parties were the most effective communist organization around the region. They supported the policies of these new governments within the scope of anti-imperialist "national front" tactic. Communist parties made alliances with the governments within the frame of national-democratic front policy. The main confrontation in the Middle East was composed of this frame: Egypt, Iraq, and Syria axes based on national independency, social and economic progression, and secularism on the one hand and reactionary axis in collaboration with imperialism constituted by Turkey, Iran, and Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel on the other.

Palestine, the constantly bleeding wound of the Middle East, maintained its determinant significance during the process. Imperialism benefited from Israel as a battering ram for its attacks against progressive-democratic forces in the Middle East. As a result of imperialism-backed aggression of Israel, progressive-democratic countries in the Middle East had to constantly live in a warfare atmosphere and allocate an important part of resources to the military field. Thanks to certain reform policies in the countries from anti-imperialist axis, significant transformations occurred in agricultural, industrial, educational, and medical areas in favor of working classes. Women gained a momentum in terms of participating to social and economic life. Egypt and Syria governments supported anti-imperialist and progressive movements from Yemen to Congo and Palestine and built solidarity with revolutionary movements in those countries. Six-Day War in 1967 was an important example of that the US imperialism benefited from Israel in order to downgrade anti-imperialist front in the region. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan got defeated against Israel which was predominantly supported by European and American imperialists in military

and financial terms. At the end of the war, Israel quadrupled its lands by occupying Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and Western Bank.

The 1967 War caused a remarkable loss of prestige for anti-imperialist governments, and that was just what imperialism wants. Such a defeat of these widely supported movements provides a basis for propaganda of conservative Islamic forces which opposes Israel demagogically. Palestine National Council gathered on May 29, 1964, and declared the establishment of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); this was a new page for Palestinian struggle. The organization, which was significantly supported by Egypt and Syria, rapidly grew. PLO formed as an umbrella organization for Palestinian political groups, and the biggest group was Fatah led by Yasser Arafat. Marxist organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) also took part in PLO. After 1967 defeat, a new leap was observed in Palestinian organizations' struggle. To prevent this progression, the USA and Israel employed their abettor Hussein, King of Jordan.

The strong support by Palestinian refugees in Jordan to PLO provided an important operational basis to the organization. Significant attacks toward Israel targets were organized from here. The straight abettor King Hussein gave an attack order toward PLO in September 1970. PLO had to move essential units of the organization to Lebanon because of noteworthy losses during the conflicts, and this relieved Israel in military terms. Nasser died because of a heart attack in September 1970 and was replaced by his vice, Anwar Sadat.

Not long after the move of PLO to Lebanon, the new war between Egypt and Syria and Israel started on October 6, 1973, called Yom Kippur. Israel strengthened its gains provided by previous wars through winning Yom Kippur thanks to comprehensive intelligence and military support by the USA. The most important result of the war was the departure of Egypt from the anti-imperialist axis as the most important country of the axis and approximation to US imperialism under the leadership of Anwar Sadat. The aim of these wars was to strengthen Israel's position in

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the region and weaken anti-imperialist front; the tactic became successful. The most important indication of this success was the Camp David Accords signed in the USA on September 17, 1978, witnessed by President Carter. This was the first time that an Arabic country officially recognized the Israel. The most prominent country in the region yielded to imperialism for its resistance had been broken as a result of nasty blows.

The Role of Political Islam

Another movement that imperialists allied against rising anti-imperialist movements during 1950s was Political Islam which was still powerless then. Saudi Arabia gained a strategical significance thanks to rapidly increasing oil requirement in imperialist metropoles just after the Second Imperialist War. Wahhabi-Islam also provided a unique position to the country as Saudi dynasty employed this ideology to legitimize their power. Muslim Brotherhood had been established in Egypt, 1928, and was the main source of all Political Islamist movements to occur in the region afterward. The organization was supported by British imperialism and its puppet Egyptian King since its establishment in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a political alternative to progressive bourgeois nationalist movement that WAFD party represents. Muslim Brotherhood had close relations with Saudi Arabia. Muslim Brotherhood built organizations at not only national level but also regional level through the strong support provided. The organization attracted supporters among angry young masses in countries in the region as it developed a discourse owning the Palestinian struggle. Muslim Brotherhood militants crusaded on the side of Arabic armies in 1948 War, and the organization attracted attention through a violence campaign in Egypt after the war. The government harshly cracked down on the organization; the conflict intensified; and the organization carried out attacks against government officials, restaurants, bars, and women that they did not dress in compliance with Islamic proceedings allegedly. Al-Banna, leader of the

movement, was killed by an attack supposedly performed by Egyptian secret service; some other leaders were arrested.

Muslim Brotherhood developed certain relations with juvenile officers who took power in Egypt after the 1952 revolution. The new leader of the organization, Hassan al-Hudaybi, visited Nasser with a delegation. The group delivered their demands in the meeting. As Nasser publicly expressed after the meeting, the organization desired implementation of a model based on Sharia law in state and society relations by the new revolutionary government. The government rejected this demand, while Muslim Brotherhood was developing close relations with the USA and Saudi Arabia during the era. The negotiations that new government conducted with Britain resulted in 1954, and Britain accepted to withdraw all armies from Egypt. This was an important success that the government gained. Hence, massive demonstrations and meetings were organized in various cities of the country to celebrate withdrawal of British armies. In Alexandria, a Muslim Brotherhood member performed an armed attack to Nasser while he was making a speech at the meeting. Nasser survived and launched rigid operations against the organization. Significant Muslim Brotherhood leaders were discharged from Egypt by a CIA operation and taken to Saudi Arabia.

The leaders gained important governmental positions in Saudi Arabia; some of them were assigned to management of financial institutions while some others to educational ones. A press information center was established in Riyadh to execute propaganda and organizing activities all around the Middle East. The organization of this activity was closely related to political function that Saudi Arabia attained under the guidance of the USA. Saudi dynasty would propagate and organize "Islamic unity against communism" in Muslim geographies through funds provided by ARAMCO oil company of which majority of managers were composed of Americans. US imperialism took the action to employ Political Islam as a weapon against communism, and Saudi dynasty played a significant role for it presented itself as the protector of holy cities of Islam. As for Muslim

Brotherhood, it was the most proper apparatus for the task with its extensive network-type organization and grown cadres in the region. Egyptian labor movement growing in 1946 and expanding wave of strikes in addition to anti-imperialist student movement encountered Muslim Brotherhood as the most decisive force. Militants performed harsh attacks to striking workers and anti-imperialist students. The organization's counter-revolutionary performance and ability to rapidly adapt the war against communism launched by the USA made it a suitable partner for imperialism. Alignment of Muslim peoples in the axis of "Islamic unity" ideology was an important strategic goal for the war against communism by the USA in a geography from Morocco to Indonesia. The Soviet Union should have been surrounded by a "green belt." Activities conducted on the basis of this strategy caused important political results in the Middle East countries in subsequent years.

Anti-imperialism in Turkey and Iran

Turkey

Turkey and Iran were the Middle Eastern countries in which anti-imperialist and socialist struggle gained momentum during the 1960s. Ruling classes of these countries were among the closest alliances of American imperialism in the region. However, growing dynamics provided basis for a popular socialist movement with the participation of labor class, peasantry, and intellectuals. American and European imperialists launched an intensified campaign in order to strengthen state apparatus in these countries, to link trade unions to abettor international union organizations, and to mobilize conservative political forces during the 1960s. Shah regime in Iran left training and equipment of police and army to the supervision of US counselors. Anti-imperialist and socialist opposition was tried to be oppressed through relentless terror of this apparatus.

Growing anti-imperialist and socialist movement in Turkey was enhanced by the enormous labor revolt on June 15 and 16, 1970, in important industrial cities such as İstanbul and İzmit. Against the revolt, a state of siege was declared,

and a severe passivation campaign started. A progressive military intervention attempted by juvenile officers was repressed on March 12, 1971, and a fascist-military intervention was carried out under the guidance of the USA to oppress socialist and labor movement. The juvenile officers' attempt had relations with representatives of socialist and labor movement; and their demands included exodus from NATO, cancelation of bilateral agreements with the USA, closing US military basis in the country, and nationalization of main industrial sectors and banks. Prominent goal of fascist-military intervention was to destroy leaders of rapidly growing anti-imperialist and socialist movement. Accordingly, revolutionary flag bearers of rising generation – Mahir Çayan, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan, Yusuf Arslan, and Ulaş Bardakçı – were murdered through counterinsurgency operations.

Socialist movement in Turkey had a strong anti-imperialist basis. As a result of anti-imperialist campaigns since 1968 and active participation of rising revolutionary generation to Palestinian struggle on the side of local organizations, imperialist forces focused on Turkey in terms of intelligence and military activities. The fascist movement of Gray Wolves, which was organized by one of the first Turkish officers who took part in NATO – Alparslan Türkeş – was among the most important apparatuses of NATO's secret services. Its activities started with attacks to socialist student leaders and turned into all-out slaughters in the 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s, labor and socialist movement in Turkey met with larger masses, and its development could not be prevented. As a result, armed attacks of Gray Wolves and state terror simultaneously became the issue in order to oppress the movement. However, when the socialist responded to those attacks with a strong self-defense, the result was a precursor of civil war in the country. In the conflicts, 30–40 people died per day, but socialist movement proceeded through expanding its influence in prominent cities of the country. The imperialist and local ruling forces would prepare a plan to ensure a more persistent and bloodier fascist rule. A movement organized in the army's chain of command seized the power on September 12, 1980. Five generals at the top of the army declared that the parliament was closed, the government was overthrown, and "they

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took over the power until the establishment of security and stability." First practices of the fascist rule were declaration of a state of siege, prohibition of strikes, and protests in addition to all revolutionary-democratic institutions, trade unions, and associations. The event in Turkey was conveyed to President Carter by the vice president, while he was in a concert hall, and Carter's response was "Our boys done." The military rule was substantially backed by the USA and European countries. Eight hundred thousand people were detained in several years, and physical and psychological torture was employed as the main method during the custodies apart from executions. The main target was to oppress anti-imperialist socialist movement and cut off its ties with poor people. Fascist rule was very successful in this target; development channels of socialist movement were plugged, and ties with peasantry and working classes got weakened. Moreover, it lost its extensive influence in urban parts of the country.

Iran

In Iran, the first mass reaction against Shah rule driven by imperialism occurred in January 1963. Economic and social program presented by Shah as "reform program" and called as "White Revolution" targeted a higher level of integration with imperialist capital. The voting for "reform program" propounded by Shah enabled alignment of various popular classes, workers, poor peasantry, a part of clergy, and civil servants on the basis of common demands. There were two main ideological orientations to affect rapidly growing demonstrations. Socialists had recently started to become influential in ideological terms, and they made an impact over the masses along with religious Shia leaders through different channels. The remarkable name was Ayatollah Khomeini with his ideological domain. The movement was repressed by the violence applied by the Shah. Socialist movement had to withdraw, and Khomeini was exiled to Iraq.

One of the common traits between Iran and Turkey was the birth of capitalist industrialization centers within the frame of uneven development of capitalist relations and subsequent buildup of working classes in those centers. The rest of capitalist centers was a large rural area composed of a small group of landowners and a crowd of poor landless peasantry. A semi-proletarian unemployed population accumulated in metropoles, and this was the embodiment of continuous discontent. In parallel with constant increase in educational institutions, educated young population coming from poor families constituted the prominent elements of opposition against the Shah regime.

The main channel of the socialist movement in Iran was Soviet-sided TUDEH party. New generations who joined the movement after 1963 were much more open to new elements of international movements, and divisions occurring in international socialist movement had repercussions in Iran as well. The very same tendency was also pertinent in Turkey; Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban experiences constituted basis for the divisions of socialist movement in Iran and Turkey. The difference in Iran was the organization named People's Mujahedin of Iran which was born on a Marxist basis but adopted a religious discourse. The determinant element for Iran left was the strong anti-imperialist basis of the movement. Organizations of Iranian People's Fedaian and People's Mujahedin of Iran emerged as strong leftist movements and took armed struggle as the basis. Shia Islamist movement was based on historical references and had a strong anti-colonial discourse. It was against "Islamist unity" approach developed by the USA and Saudi Arabia. Shiism had always been on the side of opposition during the history and "has a nature convenient to attract oppressed and humiliated communities and highlighting indispensability for believers to oppose illicit rulers, tyranny and injustice through either its message or rituals and practices" (Luizard 2016, p. 52). Thus, Shia religious movement was able to develop proper discourse and practices so as to mobilize lower oppressed classes. Anti-imperialist discourse and messages of the movement for the paupers provided a basis for coming side by side with the socialist movement with a joint struggle perspective against the Shah regime. In the second half of the 1970s, a crowded, though divided, socialist movement and a strong movement iconizing Shiism were hand in hand within the frame of "national front" perspective. CIA-backed police terror against socialist movement was of high

level; nearly 200 leaders of Iran socialist movement were murdered by either torturing or assassination during the 1970s.

The Iranian revolution that exploded in February 1979 rapidly inspired large masses in the country. Albeit divided and disjointed, socialists actively took part in the revolution and organized bold actions, but it was rapidly revealed that they did not have sufficient institutional and political capacity to lead the revolution. Shiite movement developed a strict anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist discourse while lunging toward the leadership of the movement with its cohesive structure and strong mass support. Such discourses and the ability to mobilize working classes caused differentiations among the socialists in terms of the attitude toward Islamist movement. Majority of the movement defended making alliance with Islamist movement. In March 1979, The Islamic Republic was approved, and presidential election was held in January 1980. Parliament elections were organized in March and May. After the 1979 constitutional voting, nationalization of main industrial sectors, banks, and insurance companies along with foreign trade was the step which weakened socialists' opposition and evoked desire to expand the alliance. Actions such as occupying US embassy strengthened anti-imperialist discourse of the government. On the other hand, the new government started to limit political influence of socialist movement thanks to such policies and discourses. Oppression started to increase over socialist movement opposing the government by 1979 August. Conflicts occurred in some cities and some socialist leaders were executed. Tensions between Islamist government and some socialist groups continued during the 1980. Meanwhile, Iraq government declared the cancelation of Algiers Agreement, which had been previously concluded with Iran, on September 16, 1980, and Iraq troops crossed Iran border to occupy.

Iraq and Saddam Hussein

The disagreement between Iran and Iraq dated back to history, and there are several reasons underlying this action of Iraq after the Iranian Revolution. Majority of Iraq population was Shiite and had close relations with Iran. Governing Ba'ath Party had seized the power in 1963 at the end of successive coup d'états following 1958 revolution. Saddam Hussein was the strong man of the rule, but he was able to come into office as the head of state in 1979. Perturbation arising from potential effects of Iranian Revolution over crowded Shiite population and expectation to get financial, military, and political support from imperialism and Gulf kingdoms through a war against Islamic Republic were the main factors that triggered Saddam Hussein. Close economic and military relations established between the Soviets and officers who took power in Iraq after 1958 revolution increased the concerns of the USA toward the country. It is known that the Ba'ath Party was supported by CIA in the change of power in 1963 and Saddam Hussein actively took part in assassinations against the leaders of Iraqi Communist Party then (Ahmad 2011, p. 19). The cadres of the Communist Party who actively struggled against Ba'ath coup of 1963 were murdered at the end of conflicts continuing for days. Prior goal of Ba'ath power in Iraq was to destroy cadres affiliated to the Nasserist project. Saddam Hussein was one of the crucial characters in such operations. Contact between Soviet Union and Iraq Ba'ath ruling in 1973 revived communists again, and the pressure over the movement decreased as well. In 1978, a new wave of oppression under the leadership of Saddam Hussein inflicted the communist a fatal blow; communist cadres were executed.

The war initiated by Saddam Hussein against Iran was supported by American and European imperialists and their vassals in the Gulf. In spite of early successes of Iraq, Iran rapidly recovered and vigorously counterattacked. In the forthcoming years of the war that lasted 8 years, Iran achieved superiority. By 1987, Iran Army built up and was preparing an enormous attack in Basrah. The report, "At the Gates of Basrah", prepared by US Defense Intelligence Agency revealed detailed information about the circumstances at the front and warned that potential Iran attack might have caused the collapse of Iraq army in Spring. Upon the report, US National Security Council decided to convey intelligence by

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Defense Intelligence Agency to Iraq Army about the actions of Iran Army. In this frame, US experts forwarded to tell military targets of Iran. Iraq Army abundantly employed chemical weapons targeting these points (Harris and Aid 2013).

> The Reagan administration handed Saddam Hussein the cutting-edge dual-use military and civilian technology, including chemicals that would be used to make the weapons against the Iranian Basij-e Mostaz'afin, the great mobilization of the oppressed whose human waves were cut down by Iraqi chemical weapons. In 1986, the UN Security Council proposed to censure Iraq for its use of chemical weapons, illegal since the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the United States was alone in its vote against the statement. Reagans National Security Council staffer Geoffrey Kemp recalled the sentiment toward Saddam, the mercenary for the United States and the Gulf Arabs, 'We knew he was an S. O. B., but he was our S. O. B.' (Prashad 2012, p. 84)

The Iran War of Saddam Hussein was welcomed by the imperialist world to that extent. The main aim of the imperialists was to weaken Islamic Republic that they had lost their hope to control. The target was achieved at the expense of lives more than a million and large amount of destructions. Iran was weakened, but neither the regime changed nor Iran government kneeled down. War conditions enabled suitable mechanisms for Islamic government to get a more extensive support from the society. Saddam Hussein claimed that Iran War was on behalf of all Sunni Arabs and the forces for which he fought should have paid the price. Hussein required Kuwait to erase the Iraq's debts borrowed during the war upon the advice of the USA and to grant new loans. There was a border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait dating back to the past, and Kuwait used to drill oil from an area to which Iraq laid claim. Saddam Hussein also argued that Kuwait made over-production of oil violating OPEC oil quotas, and this gave harm to Iraq economy by decreasing oil prices. Saddam met with the US Ambassador, April Glaspie, in the advance of occupying Kuwait and listed his complaints. The Ambassador adopted a neutral position. After Iran War, Washington intended to increase American influence over Iraq through economic and political incentives. However, 1 year before Saddam's order to occupy Kuwait, Berlin Wall fell by declaring an end of an era in international politics and opening a new one. This provided the USA a great extent of global mobility. In this new era, the Middle East was of great importance for the USA to reshape the global scene, and Saddam Hussein serves the "reason" that the USA desperately wants on a silver platter, while he was "claiming his rights."

Destruction of the Capacity to Resist

The occupation of Kuwait was ordered on August 2, 1990. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq enabled Iraq to have a great influence over the Middle Eastern oil reserves, and this was considered as an unwarrantable crime which endangers US policy based on "oil safety" in the Middle East. In the post-cold war era, this invasion attempt was valuable for it would enable the USA to show its power to the region and the world, to settle its army in a crucial region in terms of geostrategy thanks to a "legitimate" reason and to have mobility so as to gain momentum in reshaping the region. Upon US attempt, United Nations Security Council took a decision advising immediate withdrawal of Iraq troops from Kuwait lands with no condition, and the decision would be applied through US military forces in actual fact. The First Gulf War started in this way and caused a great extent of destruction. The determinant power in the war coalition composed of 33 countries was the USA. The USA had the chance to exhibit its military capacity in the operation named Desert Storm, hence, the process of "destroying the capacity to resist" started in the Middle East (Amin 2016. p. 62). The real message of this easy victory of the USA was delivered by Chief Commander Bush in his State of the Union Address, January 1992:

> A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and preeminent superpower: The United States of America. And they regard this with no dread. For the world trusts us with power – and the world is right. They trust us to be fair and restrained; they trust us to be on the side of decency. They trust us to do what's right. (Anderson 2015, p. 105)

The easy victory was the thing that made Bush speak in this way. The USA settled in the region with a strong "legitimacy shield." President Bush also emphasized another important point for them in the words of that "the specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the

Arabian Peninsula." The USA did not march toward Baghdad and overthrow Saddam even though it made air strikes which destroyed vital resources of Iraqis. The reason was the foundation of long-term US strategy. In the radio broadcasts of the USA from the Gulf, Shiites and Kurds were invited to revolt for a long time. However, when they rose, there was no US support. They were left to their fate, while Saddam's chemical bombs were dropping out of the sky. The USA was not in a hurry but has the desire to link the opposition against the dictatorship to itself a little bit more as the first step of the long-term strategy. New massacres of Saddam would strengthen the "legitimacy shield" worn by the USA, and revolt dynamics emerging against the dictatorship would be much more open to US influence. Unfortunately, it worked; Colin Powell, Chief of the Staff, would explain the second step why the USA did not march toward Baghdad and overthrow Saddam: "Our practical intention was to leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to an Iran that remained bitterly hostile to the US" (Meyer and Brysac 2009, p. 387).

Disintegration of the Soviet Union made a great impact over the Middle East. Countries which were previously in the Soviet axis encountered existential crisis. After the military intervention of the Soviets to Afghanistan, militants coming from the Middle Eastern countries to the Jihad conducted by the cooperation of the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan returned to their countries much more self-confident thanks to the victory. Political Islam rapidly filled the gap left by anti-imperialist and socialist movements that got defeated and regressed. Discontents emerging among the peoples who lost their financial and military support after the collapse of the Soviets tended toward this channel. Political Islam became the rising political movement in many countries of the region by means of strong support provided by imperialism.

The thing determining the Middle East after the First Gulf War was political and military activities of the USA to reshape the "Greater Middle East." Iraq was of highest importance in this respect. "Destruction of the capacity to resist" against the imperialism in the Middle East was the main element of the reshaping project. "Iraq Liberation Act" was signed on October 31, 1998, by President Bill Clinton and

became the symbol of launching US aggression. In his article, "Imperial America," in November 2000, Richard Haass, who is still the head of Council on Foreign Relations and was counselor in the US National Security Council during the George W. Bush era, defended that "United States should use the exceptional opportunity that it now enjoyed to reshape the world in order to enhance its global strategic assets" (Foster 2006, p. 146). The neocon group which would become really effective in forthcoming years had stated the following ideas in their manifest written in 1997 Spring:

> America's strategic goal used to be containment of the Soviet Union; today the task is to preserve an international security environment conducive to American interests and ideals. The military's job during the Cold War was to deter Soviet expansionism. Today its task is to secure and expand the 'zones of democratic peace;' to deter the rise of a new great power competitor; defend key regions of Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve American preeminence through the coming transformation of war made possible by new technologies. (cited in Donnelly 2004, p. 49)

9/11 was the justification that ruling neocons needed, and the war of the USA to shape the "Greater Middle East" started then. Neocons needed just a justification because the former US Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, "went public that there had been a memorandum preparing for 'regime change' in Iraq almost from 'day one' of the Bush Administration – and well before the September 11 attacks (...) which O'Neill attended and at which an invasion of Iraq was discussed" (Cook 2008, p. 30). Energy Task Force, a group managed by Vice President Dick Cheney, had started to produce documents regarding oil fields of Iraq since March 2001. One of them was entitled *Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts* and included the discussion on the ways to carve up Iraq's crude reserves between Western oil companies. A senior Israeli commentator, Aluf Benn, hosted prominent military and intelligence officials of Israel on the days before the attack on Baghdad, and the issue was a possible consequence of the imminent attack (Cook 2008, p. 35):

> Senior IDF [Israeli army] officers and those close to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, such as National Security Advisor Ephraim Halevy, paint a rosy

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picture of the wonderful future Israel can expect after the war. They envision a domino effect, with the fall of Saddam Hussein followed by that of Israel's other enemies: [Yasser] Arafat, Hassan Nasrallah [of Hezbollah], [Syria's President] Bashar Assad, the ayatollah in Iran and maybe even Muhammar Gadhafi [of Libya]. Along with these leaders, will disappear terror and weapons of mass destruction.

The picture depicted by Halevy pointed out the main target of "destruction of the capacity to resist." Iraq, for the imperialist ruling apparatus of the USA, was an important threshold to access the absolute domination target around the world. The security of Israel was also among the main factors determining regional policies of the USA, and the thing encoded as "the security of Israel" was to ensure continuity of Israel's military superiority and expansion policy based on occupation.

Occupation of Afghanistan, invasion of Iraq, NATO attack targeting Libya, and all of other attacks toward Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza by imperialism and its regional partners were the parts of a single war conducted for a common aim: the desire to prevent revival of socialist and anti-imperialist forces in the region which notably regressed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, imperialism enhanced its pressure over especially Iran and its regional allies Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Whereas the tendency to resist that emerged as a result of Syrian War prevents determinant results to be taken by imperialism, Hezbollah's gradual advancement toward a regional power contributed the development of resistant dynamics in the geography. In this sense, Syrian resistance became the strongest obstacle against the redesign of the region by US imperialism. Geopolitical consequences and tendency to resist arising from Syrian resistance would provide significant contributions to anti-imperialism and socialism renaissance to be constructed by Middle Eastern peoples.

In Lieu of Conclusion

The region that denominated *the Middle East* has witnessed numerous bloody massacres. While imperialist forces have always attempted to divide the region into their proxies, local forces somehow have founded a way out to resist against such attempts. During the period after the Great War, mandate governments and local abettors in the region became the main channel of imperialists to rule the countries here. In the era after the second imperialist war, Zionist movement gained momentum and suppressed Palestinians' struggle with help of imperialists. Moreover, political Islamist movements were supported by imperialists so as to dissolve bourgeoisie-nationalist and socialist coalescences in the second half of the twentieth century. For the resistant forces – regardless of bourgeoisie-democratic or socialist – existence of other anti-imperialist and socialist countries in the last century became a leg to stand on and became the most prominent contributor of the long-lasting resistances against imperialist aggression. On the other hand, collapse of the Soviet Bloc was followed by the enhancement of this relentless aggression so as to deliver more poverty, suffering, death, and destruction to the peoples in the region. It can be suggested that the resistant dynamics are still inherent in the region and the consolidation of these dynamics may be even the sole way to break the blockade for the peoples surrounded by the imperialist political conservatism.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Arafat, Yasser (Abu Ammar) and the Palestine Liberation Organization
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law
▶ Syria and Imperialist Intervention: Past and Present

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Migration

Militarism

Military Intervention

Military Junta

Military Rule

Military Spending

Military-Entertainment Complex and US Imperialism

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complex (MICC) · Military-industrial-media-entertainment network (MIME-NET) · Media war · Virtuous war · Militainment · News and war · Hollywood and war · Sports and war · Video games and war · Social media and war

Description

The growth of the USA as an empire has been tied to war, and since World War I, the US military has routinely collaborated with the entertainment industries to shape and influence public opinion about war. The relationship between the US State's military propaganda agencies, the entertainment industries, media products, and public opinion is of interest to researchers, and the alliance of the military and the entertainment industries is often conceptualized as a "military-entertainment complex" (MEC). This entry focuses on some relevant concepts for studying the MEC (the military-industrial complex, the military-industrial-communications complex, the military-industrial-media-entertainment network, the media war/virtuous war, and interactive militainment), identifies the political and economic institutions that make up the MEC (the Department of Defense's public affairs office and US media and entertainment corporations), and highlights synergies between the DoD and specific sectors of the entertainment industries that underlie the production of militainment (the DoD-news complex; the DoD-Hollywood complex; the DoD-sports complex; the DoD-digital games complex; and the DoD-social media complex).

Introduction: Militarism and the Military-Entertainment Complex

From 1945 to the present day, the economic, geo-political, and cultural-ideological expansion of the USA as a unique postcolonial empire has relied upon permanent war (Bacevich 2010, 2013; Dower 2017; Johnson 2004; Turse 2012). Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the USA launched a Global War on Terror (GWOT). In 2016, the US Department of Defense's (DoD) operations encompassed 70% of the planet, and its various branches attacked opponents and liquidated threats to US security in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In that same year, US Special Forces deployed to numerous countries for "kill or capture" missions and intelligence gathering and to train allied forces. Recently, the DoD has pivoted to East Asia to try to "contain" China (and its "One Belt, One Road" initiative) and built up its presence in countries bordering Russia. As the DoD globally expanded, so did its budget. In 2018, the DoD's budget was about $700 billion, while the total combined defense budgets of the globe's next top four military spenders – China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and India – was $343 billion (SIPRI 2018; Stein 2018). In that same year, US defense spending was about 190% of what it was prior to 9/11, and it accounted for approximately 37% of the world's total. The DoD's budget for wars are costly to society, but they are a boon to defense corporations such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics, which net billions each year by selling war-servicing weapon commodities to the DoD and US client states. In 2018, the USA was the biggest exporter of arms to the world (Brown 2018). The US empire's global footprint of nearly 1000 military bases spread across an estimated 80 countries was likewise exceptional. In the global system, the USA is the military superpower and without rival.

Given that the American way of life has long been interwoven with a contentious way of war, the state has gone to great lengths to try to get US and transnational publics to think about and perceive war in a specific way; to persuade and push people to accept its wars as necessary, good, and right; and to influence the subjectivities and hearts and minds of millions. The US State's wars abroad always rely upon massive war persuasion campaigns at home, and the production and reproduction of the ideology of militarism in the USA is significant. The ideology of militarism represents the American nation as a unity secured by war as opposed to one divided by class inequality, racism and sexism, and frames "the nation's

strength and well-being" to its subjects "in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals" (Bacevich 2010, 2013). Moreover, the ideology of militarism glorifies the state's use of coercion not diplomacy to achieve American security in a world divided between a righteous American "us" and an evil and threatening "them," presents the DoD and its violence as the solution to every problem that seems to vex America, and reduces patriotism to support for the troops (Bacevich 2010, 2013; Johnson 2004). The ideology of militarism is produced and reproduced by a number of actors across a variety of sites, but one source of it is a nexus of the military propagandists employed by DoD public affairs agencies and the media producers paid by the entertainment industries.

From World War I forward, US State elites (and to some extent, their allies in the cultural industries) recognized the importance of shaping, influencing, and steering public opinion about war, and for war. The important US social scientist and communications theorist Harold Lasswell explained this elite acknowledgment, in a 1927 publication entitled *Propaganda Technique in the World War*:

> During the war-period, it came to be recognized that the mobilization of men and means was not sufficient; there must be a mobilization of opinion. Power over opinion, as over life and property, passed into official hands. Indeed, there is no question but that government management of opinion is the unescapable corollary of large-scale modern war. The only question is the degree to which the government should try to conduct its propaganda secretly (15).

From the formation of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) in World War I to the establishment of the Office of War Information in World War II, to the conduct of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and DoD-supported global psychological operations in the Cold War, and to the post-9/11 rise of military-media information operations and cyberwarfare doctrines, the DoD has tried to influence the way the media and entertainment industries and the products they produce and circulate represent the DoD and the wars it fights, so as to influence how the US

empire's wars are perceived by publics in the USA and around the world. Sometimes, these war propaganda campaigns roll out in secret and are only recognized by the public many years after they happen with help from Freedom of Information Act requests. Other times, they are quite belligerent and obvious, but the structural alliance between the DoD and the entertainment industries that support it are ignored or downplayed by the public. In any case, in all war propaganda campaigns, the US State and media-corporate elites routinely work together to intentionally influence the content of entertainment and cultural productions, and many of the products resulting from this alliance support the goal of manufacturing public consent to empire and war as a way of life.

The relationship between the US State's military propaganda agencies, the media and entertainment industries, media products, and public opinion has long been of interest to researchers, and the structural alliance of the military and the entertainment industries is often conceptualized as a "military-entertainment complex" (MEC) (Alford 2010, 2016; Anderson 2006; Anderson and Mirrlees 2014; Boggs and Pollard 2007; Der Derian 2001; Grondin 2014; Martin and Steuter 2010; Mirrlees 2016; Payne 2016; Alford and Secker 2017; Stahl 2010). In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the MEC rolled out numerous "militainment" products that resulted from a production alliance or partnership between the US military and the US entertainment industries.

This entry focuses on some relevant concepts for studying the MEC, identifies the political and economic institutions that make up the MEC, and highlights synergies between the DoD and specific sectors of the entertainment industries that underlie the production of militainment. The first section reviews some key precursors to and concepts that are useful for studying the MEC: the military-industrial complex (MIC), the military-industrial-communications complex (MICC), the military-industrial-media-entertainment network (MIME-NET), the media war/virtuous war, and interactive militainment. The second section conceptualizes the relationship between the major DoD and corporate actors that constitute the

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contemporary MEC. The third section explores some specific sectors of the MEC: the DoD-news complex, the DoD-Hollywood complex, the DoD-sports complex, the DoD-digital games complex, and the DoD-social media complex.

Key Concepts for Studying the MEC

In his January 17, 1961, "Farewell Address to the Nation," US President Dwight Eisenhower used the term "military-industrial complex" (MIC) to flag how US government agencies, the DoD, and the titans of industry interlinked to make and maintain a nation that was permanently readied for war. Eisenhower described the "immense military establishment and a large arms industry" as "new in the American experience" and described the MIC's "total influence – economic, political, even spiritual" as being "felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government." Eisenhower argued that the MIC was necessary to combat mounting threats to US security in the Cold War, but he encouraged US politicians and "an alert and knowledgeable citizenry" to "guard against" the MIC's "acquisition of unwarranted influence" and to contemplate the dangers its development posed to American "liberties" and "democratic processes."

Currently, the MIC describes a symbiotic relationship between the DoD (which aims to maintain a technological cutting-edge over rival militaries in an antagonistic global system), profit-seeking defense corporations (which produce and sell weapons technologies as commodities to the DoD), the US politicians (which increase defense expenditure to look patriotic and please their constituents, many who are employed as waged workers by the defense industry), and academics (which depend upon DoD subvention to support their facilities and research projects). Each of these actors has a real material interest in maintaining or increasing public expenditure on defense and, to some extent, on war. In the absence of a lasting enemy threat, Congress would be less inclined to annually allocate billions of dollars to the DoD to secure the nation. Permanent peace would cut

into the profit margins of the US defense corporations that produced and sold weapons to the DoD, the civilian firms, and the universities that relied on DoD contracts. Throughout the Cold War, the US empire's MIC expanded to equip the US State and US corporations with new tools of violence for buttressing their power around the globe, and in the twenty-first century, the MIC continued to grow and deepen the links between militarism and capitalism (Ruttan 2006; Turse 2008).

Throughout the 1970s, the significance of the communications and media industries to the MIC was examined by the US political economy of communications scholar, Herbert I. Schiller (1969, 1973, 1976, 1992, 2000). Schiller agreed with Eisenhower that "an alert and knowledgeable citizenry" was essential to the existence of American democracy, but he was skeptical that citizens would be alerted to and be able to become sufficiently knowledgeable about the MIC's threat to democracy because the communication system that was supposed to keep the public informed about the MIC's potentially "disastrous rise of misplaced power" was on the DoD's payroll. Schiller (1992, p. 95) observed how the "same forces that have produced the military-industrial-complex in American society-at-large have accounted for the rise of a powerful sub-sector, but by no means miniature, complex in communications." Thus, more than 40 years ago, Schiller conceptualized "the important role of communication corporations in the military-industrial complex" (McChesney 2001, p. 48), as well as the rise of a "military-industrial-communications complex" (Mosco 2001, p. 27), or an "institutional edifice of communications, electronics, and/or cultural industries" that link and connect the DoD to media-corporate power (Maxwell 2003, p. 32). Generally, the MICC, the structural alliances between and the DoD and communications and media corporations, and points to a symbiotic integration between the DoD's war-making exigencies and the media-corporate sector's profit-maximizing goals. Specifically, the MICC points to the three following sites of DoD-communications-media- convergence.

First, the MICC refers to public-private partnerships between the DoD and communications-media corporations that frequently underwrite and

sometimes instigate the research and development (R&D) of new information and communication technologies (ICTs). For example, Schiller (1992, p. 5) described the DoD's channeling of enormous public funds into the private sector's R&D of new ICTs that supported the growth of capitalist communications, industries, and innovations such as computer electronics, TV satellites, and the Internet (Schiller 2008). Schiller (1998) observed how "Astronomical sums have been allocated by the Pentagon, from the public's tax money, to underwrite technological developments" and noted the "fruits of these outlays" have "contributed incalculably to US ascendancy in information technology" and the "underlying infrastructure" of "'the information age'" (Schiller 1998, p. 20). In the twenty-first century, the Pentagon still supports Silicon Valley. In 2015, the DoD allocated $171 million to a consortium of Silicon Valley high-tech companies (including Apple) to support R&D on wearable technology, as part of its newly launched Flexible Hybrid Electronics Manufacturing Innovation Hub.

Second, the MICC concept draws attention to how the DoD supports the existence and growth of major and minor communications and media corporations by acting as a significant consumer of the commodities they produce and sell. For example, Schiller (1992, p. 95) conceptualized DoD largesse as not only supporting the R&D of the new ICTs by corporations (working on contract to the DoD) but also supporting the consumption of these ICT commodities (via procurement contracts with the DoD). Schiller (1991, p. 106) observed how the DoD was an "enormous guaranteed market" for military-ready goods and services" and how the DoD's huge "appropriations" and "expenditures" "offer[ed] a large and secure outlet to some of the nation's most powerful businesses." Some of the MIC's war-ready ICT innovations were later spun off into the civilian market as commodities and reconfigured for civilian uses; the "main beneficiaries of the new capabilities in information production, transmission, and dissemination" continued to be "transnational companies, the intelligence, military and policing agencies" (Schiller 1998, p. 62). In the twenty-first century, numerous US communications and media companies – Walt

Disney, Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon – are recipients of DoD procurement contracts. As one news headline puts it, "Military Contracts are the Destiny of Every Major Technology Company" (Oberhaus 2018). Indeed, private communications and media companies sell the DoD everything from commercialized video production services to radio and TV equipment to telecommunication networks to antennas to processed film to engineering technologies to facial recognition technology to software to iPhones to central processing units to PR services to video games. US companies have accrued millions individually and billions collectively because of the DoD's choice to procure communications and media goods and services from them.

Third, the MICC represents an intertwining of the DoD and communications-media corporations in the co-production of military and war promoting media and entertainment products. For example, Schiller (1991) noted how the DoD operated its own public relations apparatus and used it "to 'inform' and 'persuade' an American public unaware of the character and origin of the messages that are made available to it" (121). He scrutinized DoD efforts to manage the news media's agenda and framing of war (and public opinion of war) by sourcing news journalists with propaganda briefings at press conferences, organizing spectacular media events, and dispatching spin doctors to the news media for interviews (Schiller 1973). Schiller also noted how the DoD, in addition to running its own PR apparatus, outsourced the labor of creating militaristic propaganda to advertising and marketing corporations, whose waged workers helped the DoD "bestow legitimacy and respectability to the entire military program" (Schiller 1992, pp. 121–122). Schiller highlighted how news media corporations participated in the DoD's 1990 Gulf War propaganda campaign, rolling out militaristic media products whose frame of reference was derived from two official sources: the Pentagon and the White House (Schiller 1992, p. 1). Moreover, with DoD assistance, media corporations created militaristic popular culture that "paraded before" global viewers an "army of invaders and secret operatives who perform, in full special

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effects regalia, dramas that numb the intellect and channel the passions" (Schiller 2000, p. 45). In the twenty-first century, the DoD-popular cultural combines continue to cajole: the US Army alone has appeared in reality TV shows (*American Idol*), on daytime talk shows (*The Oprah Winfrey Show*), in Hollywood blockbusters (*Iron Man* and *Man of Steel*), in popular music videos (Joseph Washington's "We Thank You"), and in video games (EA's *Medal of Honor*) (Mirrlees 2016).

Overall, Schiller's political economy of the MICC continues to be analytically valuable, as it identifies how the DoD supports US communications corporations by contracting the R&D of new ICTs, procuring finished ICT commodities from these corporations, and directly and indirectly collaborating with and sometimes even paying communications and media entertainment corporations to act with or alongside its PR apparatus as surrogate war propagandists. As the MICC grew, political economy of communication research on its structural dimensions was supplemented by new theorizations of how the form and content of its commercial output were transforming the citizen's visual, aesthetic, and cultural experience of war. A few key scholarly concepts that extend Schiller's work on the MICC by exploring and elaborating upon how the MICC's media output is bringing about changes to the civic experience of war are discussed below.

At the turn of the millennium, James Der Derian (2001) contributed to study of the MICC by conceptualizing the "military-industrial-media-entertainment network" (MIME-NET) – a network of US military agencies, the defense industry, news media, and entertainment corporations. Der Derian (2001) described a US-based yet globalizing MIME-NET (xxxii) as leading a "virtual revolution in military and diplomatic affairs" (xiv). According to Der Derian, US warfare is increasingly accompanied by and "based on technological and representational forms of discipline, deterrence, and compulsion" (xv), and US wars are increasingly being "fought in the same matter as they are represented, by military simulations and public dissimulations" (xviii). The MIME-NET "seamlessly merge[s] the production,

representation, and execution of war" (xxxvi) with satellite imagery, computer animations, and real-time broadcasting, and the result is a virtuous war that provides the military personnel controlling computerized weapon systems and the civilian viewers consuming the destruction caused by those weapons with "a vision of bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars" (xxxi). These virtuous wars aim "create a fidelity between the representation and reality of war," but they ultimately fail to do so, as they displace and stand in for the real harm that war inflicts on human bodies and minds. "When compared to the real trauma of war" says Der Derian (2001), "the pseudo-trauma of simulation pales." In effect, MIME-NET's virtuous wars legitimize military violence while deceiving citizens about its consequences.

The unfortunate yet inevitable gap between the media representation of war and that reality it belies was conceptualized in the late 1990s by the British historian of propaganda Philip Taylor (1997, p. 119), who coined the term "media war" (which is rhetorically and analytically similar to Der Derian's notion of "virtuous war"). Taylor (1997, p. 119) argued that when militaries prepare for war and wage it, two kinds of war seem to occur: a "real war" and a "media war." Although the former war requires the latter, they are not identical, as these wars happen in different places, are experienced differently by those partaking in them, and have incommensurable consequences. The real war takes place upon the geographies where the fighting, killing, and dying occur (the territorial battlefield); the media war is what civilians see and hear at a safe distance from embodied risk, threat, and harm (a de-territorialized media battle-space). The "real war is about the sound, sight, smell, touch and taste of the nasty brutish business of people killing people" at the point of the war's execution, while the "media war is literally a mediated event which draws on that reality" at the point of media consumption (Taylor 1997, p. 119). Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, successive developments in communication technologies and media forms shrunk the space between real war and media war rapidly and with greater efficiency, brought distant wars closer to home, and made what's happening "over

there" on deadly battlefields seem audiovisually closer to "here," in safe-mediated battle spaces. In effect, the media war audiovisually represents real wars happening in a different time and place, but it does so in a way that displaces and stands in for the actuality of the real war.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Stahl (2010) made a major contribution to the study of militainment products that constitute the media war. Stahl (2010) notes that "entertainment has been part and parcel of military propaganda from the invention of mass media forward," and so in the most literal sense, "militainment" is nothing new"(10). Nonetheless, Stahl conceptualizes militainment as "state violence translated into an object of pleasurable consumption" (6) and argues that it has effected a significant transformation in the civic experience of war, a shift in the audiovisual relationship between war and the citizen. The US empire's early twentieth-century war propaganda aimed to engineer public consent to war by making a rational case for why the US fights and who it must fight (e.g., the persuasive appeal to the nation made by Frank Capra's World War II *Why We Fight* series). The mid-to-late twentieth century's TV war propaganda aimed to distract viewers from the real embodied horrors of war, so as to sanitize war and make death invisible (e.g., the spectacular coverage of the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War by major TV networks). Stahl contends that since the late 1990s, a new form of interactive militainment has emerged. Instead of trying to persuade rational citizens about the righteousness of war or inviting media consumers to passively lean back and watch a war unfold on a TV screen with pizza and beer, interactive militainment is more akin to a first-person shooter video game because it audiovisually addresses citizens as first-person participants in the media war and lets them experience war from the point of view of the soldier, the barrel of a gun, or the camera of a predator drone's Hellfire missile. Interactive militainment does not try to justify or conceal war's carnage and death (Stahl 2010, p. 43) but invites citizens to take a "sadistic posture" and derive guilt-free pleasure from virtually killing or witnessing the killing of the other; it does not simply glorify the

DoD's arsenal but enables citizens to virtually play with new weapons technology. Moreover, by giving citizen's night vision goggle eye's view, a tank gunner's sight view, and a drone pilot's eye view, it transforms the public eye into an extension of the military machine and "weaponizes the civic gaze" (Stahl 2010, p. 44). Beyond telling citizens to "support the troops," interactive militainment invites citizens to virtually become, enlist as, and deploy and fight alongside the troops. It pulls citizens, audiovisually at least, into the military's apparatus and war's violent execution, all the while pushing citizens away from the point of public deliberation about state violence (Stahl 2010, p. 64).

Having reviewed some important precursors to and concepts that are useful for studying the MEC and its media output, the following section identifies the real state and corporate institutions that constitute the MEC and conceptualizes the relationship between these different but often entangled actors.

The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Entertainment Industries

The DoD is a US Federal Government agency headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and it is headed by a Secretary of Defense, who is a key national security policy advisor to the US President. The DoD controls the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force. It also runs the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and R&D agencies that often partner with corporations and universities such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The DoD also operates services schools including the National Defense University (NDU) and the National War College (NWC). The DoD employs approximately 1.3 million active duty personnel and 742,000 civilian personnel. The DoD's mission "is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country" ("About the Department of Defense"). The DoD spans the planet,

waging war to secure land, air, sea, and space against threats to America and buttressing strategic (and sometimes liberal democratic) interests.

The entertainment industries refer to the privately owned corporations that while mostly headquartered around Los Angeles, California, and New York City, New York, are transnational in their operations. Entertainment corporations are run by chief executive officers (CEOs), who, in conjunction with the presidents of different subsidiary units, exercise decision-making powers over the financing, production, distribution, and exhibition of entertainment products such as TV shows, films, and video games. The mission of an entertainment corporation is generally to produce entertainment commodities for sale in audiovisual markets that provide viewers with some kind of affective or emotionally satisfying experience, all the while turning a profit. Garnering budgets in the hundreds of millions and allocating immense sums of money to the manufacture of globally popular entertainment products, US-based entertainment and media corporations travel the globe, producing, distributing, and exhibiting entertainments and offloading them in numerous commodity forms that intersect with and embed images and stories in and across markets and cultures.

The DoD and entertainment corporations are clearly different types of organizations with different structures and goals. The DoD is part of the political sphere (the US State) and the entertainment industries, the economic one (capitalism). They DoD makes war in world affairs; entertainment companies make experiential commodities for world markets. The DoD serves US national security goals, as authorized by the president and congress; entertainment corporations pursue profit, as expected by financiers and shareholders. Despite these differences, there are many instances and moments, past and present, when these organizations converge and collaborate. The US empire's military-entertainment complex, then, can be defined as a nexus of the border-crossing DoD (seeking to win wars while winning hearts and minds to the wars it wages in many countries) and globalizing US entertainment corporations (seeking to make money by making and selling entertainment commodities in many

markets). This critical concept captures this symbiosis of war making and entertainment making by pointing to the real structural alliances, production partnerships, and mutually beneficial relationships between the DoD and entertainment corporations, two organizations not commonly associated with one another and whose connections are not always apparent. The MEC concept is analytically useful because it encourages studies of how the military and entertainment companies intentionally and routinely work together to make commercial militainments that put the DoD at war in a positive light. This concept also invites researchers to consider how entertainment products ostensibly made just for markets are also made to make the DoD look great in world politics. Furthermore, the concept sheds light on the symbiotic relationships between the DoD and entertainment companies that encourage the production of commodities that affirm the DoD and discourage the making of works that criticize it.

To embed itself in the entertainment industries, the DoD operates a massive Public Affairs Office (PAO) whose mandate is to coordinate "public information, internal information, community relations, information training, and audiovisual matters" for the DoD and produce and provide "defense department information to the public, the Congress and the media." The PAO controls media and cultural production units such as the Defense.gov News and Defense.gov News Photos; the Defense Media Activity; the American Forces Radio and Television Service broadcasters; the American Forces Press Service; the DoD News Channel; the Stars and Stripes news service; and many DoD websites. These units produce and circulate content about the DoD at war across media platforms; source news firms with this prepackaged content in hopes that they will pass it on unfiltered to their readers, viewers, and listeners; and outsource content-generation jobs to media firms with no apparent connections to them, camouflaging their influence. The PAO also runs the DoD's Special Assistant for Entertainment Media (DODSAEM) to support the production of entertainment commodities, such as war-themed news items, TV shows, films, and digital games.

Now that the major political and economic institutions of the MEC have been identified, the next section will examine how the DoD concretely links with specific sectors of the entertainment industries to produce commercial militainment that contributes to the militarization of US society and may maintain public consent to permanent war.

The MEC's Sectors: News, Film, Sports, Video Games, and Social Media

The DoD-News Complex

The US Empire's wars are fought by across distant lands, but these wars are represented to publics by news media products. As an industry, the news is structurally organized to make money for its owners and shareholders by selling subscriptions to readers and viewers and selling audience attention and data to advertisers. But in a democratic society, the news should inform and educate the public about substantive debates surrounding war policy and give expression to the range of clashing positions regarding war. Also, in a democratic society, the news ought to be "watchdog" of the most powerful war decision-making organizations – the state agencies and corporate lobbies that steer the empire's war policy and so often lead the nation into perilous and regrettable wars. The news media should expose war spin, hold the state's decision-makers to account, and support the broadest dialogue about and widest range of dissenting opinions about war in the society. Unfortunately, the DoD's push to manage public opinion about war often combines with the industry's business model to threaten the news media's democracy-nourishing and civically useful role. The DoD attempts to get the public to think about war in a way that aligns with its war policy through the news industry, and news corporations have generally supported the DoD's wartime propaganda. Due to a synergistic relationship between the DoD and the news industry, the news about the US Empire at war often mirrors the US State's official war policy.

From World War I to the present day, the US military has combined persuasion with censorship to try to manage the private news media's coverage of the wars it fights (Andersen 2006; Brewer 2011; Creel 1920; Carruthers 2011; Dimaggio 2009; Fulbright 1970; Hallin 1989, 1997; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Jeffords and Rabinovitz 1994; Knightley 1975, 2003; Mirrlees 2016; Rutherford 2004; Sweeney 2006; Taylor 1997). The lead up to and execution of the US 2003 preemptive invasion and occupation of Iraq was the most recent example of the DoD-news complex's management of public opinion (Dimaggio 2009; Rutherford 2004). The US State's "public justifications for the invasion were nothing but pretexts, and falsified pretexts at that" (Krugman 2015). To lead the American public into war, it manufactured a pretext of lies that framed the framed Saddam Hussein as in cahoots with al-Qaeda's 9/11 terrorist attacks, claimed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and intended to use them against the US and its allies, and depicted Iraqis as wanting Americans to liberate them. The TV news media parroted the state's pretext of lies, telling people what to think about this war and how to think about, legitimizing as opposed to challenging the official story. The lead up to and execution of the "Shock & Awe" campaign were made-for-TV global militainment events, spectacles of mass deception and distraction.

Take the following symbolic manipulations. Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld appeared on TV news networks citing Judith Miller's *New York Times* trumped up story about Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. In the time and space not privileged for ads for soft drinks, automobiles, and other commodities, Fox News Channel's pundits beat the military's war drum against Saddam Hussein and presented support for war as patriotic, increasing ratings and ad revenue. The DoD dispatched retired US military generals and lobbyists for munitions corporations to TV news networks to fatten the case for preemptive war in the guise of neutral "analysts" and "experts." When the bombing of Iraq began, TV gave spectators a "clean war" of bombs falling and exploding on Baghdad with no trace of civilian terror, injury, and death (Stahl 2010, p. 25), invited them to relish in "techno-fetishism" by glorifying the power and efficacy of the DoD's

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weaponry (Stahl 2010, p. 28), and as usual, rallied them to "support the troops" by "equating support for official policy with support for the soldiers" (Stahl 2010, p. 29). When the siege of Baghdad began, hundreds of journalists (carefully vetted according to pro-military political correctness criteria by the Rendon Group, a PR firm) were "embedded" with the troops, living and working with them and covering the war from their point of view. More DoD-serving analysts appeared on TV news networks, talking up the good of the war, the weapons, and the troops and downplaying the war's human consequences. The DoD hired Hollywood to create a soundstage from which military public affairs officers drip fed briefings and videos to reporters. It also censored images taken of dead US soldiers and corpses of Iraqi civilians to prevent them from flowing back to the USA while flacking and sometimes attacking nonaligned media firms like Al-Jazeera. The "Shock & Awe" media spectacle climaxed when a US soldier wrapped the face of a Saddam Hussein statue in the American flag as a few Iraqis gathered in Firdos Square, and attacked and pulled down the statue, with help from US psychological operations personnel. The grand finale? On May 1, 2003, US president George W. Bush, flying in a Lockheed S-3 Viking aircraft with a fighter pilot, landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln. Surrounded by hundreds of sailors, standing and grinning under a star-spangled banner proclaiming "Mission Accomplished," Bush declared: "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended." Hubris followed applause. More hoopla. That was the end of "Shock & Awe," but US forces are still in Iraq.

The DoD-Hollywood Complex

Each year, millions of people all around the world flock to cinemas to take in the spectacles of Hollywood blockbuster films. Hollywood has long been an industry designed to make its owners money by producing and selling films that entertain viewers, and Hollywood is preeminent around the world today. In 2018, Hollywood was behind all but 1 of the 20 highest worldwide grossing films, that being, China's *Operation Red Sea*. While Hollywood's global presence is widely recognized, perhaps less obvious to its consumers is the

confluence of Hollywood's profit-making and the DoD's self-promotion, a long-standing merger of cinematic entertainment with military image-making. Year after year, Hollywood studios produce numerous commercial films that represent the DoD's branches encompassing the globe, warring against and obliterating threats to American security. Many of these are shaped by the DoD, which collaborates with Hollywood to make movies that aim to sell in world markets and support the military's self-image (Alford 2010, 2016; Andersen 2006; Boggs and Pollard 2007; Martin and Steuter 2010; Mirrlees 2013, 2016, 2017a, b; Robb 2004; Alford and Secker 2017; Suid 2002; Valantin 2005).

The formation of the DoD-Hollywood complex stretches back to the early twentieth century. In in the lead up to World War I, David Wark Griffith, a friend of President Woodrow Wilson, started working on the *The Birth of a Nation* (1915) with assistance from the Army's West Point engineers. During World War I, the Committee on Public Information's (CPI) Division of Films worked with Hollywood to make films that supported US war aims as well as American liberal capitalism and carried these works "to every community in the United States and to every corner of the world" (Creel 1920). During World War II, the Office of War Information's (OWI) Bureau of Motion Pictures (BMP) networked with Hollywood, which it regarded as an "Essential War Industry" (Short 1985). "The motion picture," said OWI head Elmer Davis, is "the most powerful instrument of propaganda in the world, whether it tries to be or not" (cited in Koppes and Black 1977, p. 88). Davis continued, "The easiest way to inject a propaganda idea into most people's minds is to let it go through the medium of an entertainment picture when they do not realize that they are being propagandized" (Koppes and Black 1977, p. 88). During World War II, Hollywood made approximately 500 of these pictures, including *Blondie for Victory* and Frank Capra's *Why We Fight*.

During the Cold War, the hitherto exceptional war time cooperative arrangement between the DoD and Hollywood was routinized. In 1948, the DoD's public affairs branch opened the

Motion Picture Production Office (MPPO) and hired Donald Baruch, who worked as the DoD's liaison to Hollywood for the next 40 years, reading, vetting, and co-producing war scripts with Hollywood studios. The MPPO set up film review offices and granted Hollywood filmmakers assistance – access to hardware like tanks, ships or planes, troops, bases, and technical knowledge – so long as they agreed to make films that represented the DoD in a positive way (Suid 2002). Until the mid-1960s, all the major war films produced by Hollywood received technical assistance from the MPPO (Suid 2002, p. xii). The MPPO denied assistance to critically acclaimed Vietnam War films such as *Apocalypse Now* (1979) and *Deer Hunter* (1978), but after brief falling out in the 1970s, the DoD and Hollywood reunited in the 1980s, making films like *Top Gun* (1986). In 1989, Phil Strub replaced Baruch, and throughout the 1990s, Strub helped Hollywood roll out films like *Armageddon* (1998), *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), and *The Siege* (1998) (Robb 2004).

Since 9/11, Strub's DoD Special Assistant for Entertainment Media (DODSAEM) has administered a Hollywood liaison office out of every one of the DoD's branches. DODSAEM oversees the Office of Army Chief of Public Affairs, the Navy Office of Information West, the Air Force's Office of Public Affairs-Entertainment Liaison Office, the Marines' Public Affairs Motion Picture and Television Liaison, and the Coast Guard's Motion Picture and TV Office. Located in Los Angeles, these offices are the go-to place for Hollywood producers looking to get the DoD to assist their war films (Robb 2004). Some of the outcomes include *Pearl Harbor* (2001), *Enemy at the Gates* (2001), *Black Hawk Down* (2001), and *Windtalkers* (2002). The DoD also assisted Marvel comic book films such as *Iron Man* (2008) (Mirrlees 2013), DC superhero flicks such as *Man of Steel* (2013), and science fiction films such as *Transformers* (Mirrlees 2017b). All in all, between 1911 and 2007, the DoD-Hollywood complex shaped 814 war films, and many of these works of "national security cinema" promoted "violent, self-regarding, American-centric solutions to international problems based on twisted readings of history" (Alford and Secker 2017, p. 2).

The DoD-Sports Complex

Sports is a significant form of popular entertainment that millions of people participate in and consume around the world. Sporting events support social bonding, rituals of communal identity formation, escapism from the burdens of waged work, and aspirational identifications with celebrity athletes. Sports is also big business, and in 2018, the US sports industry generated over $70 billion in revenue. The biggest players in this industry are the National Football League (NFL), the Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR), and Mixed Martial Arts (MMA). With its popular resonance and vast audience reach, professional sports have long been a significant venue for and vehicle of military propaganda. The DoD and the sports industry have worked together for decades. The DoD's publicity exigencies and the sports industry's bottom line converge in a DoD-sports complex, and the links between war and sport are numerous.

Over the past decade, the DoD has paid athletes, teams, and entire leagues to promote itself to the public. Between 2012 and 2015, the DoD spent over $10.4 million on advertising contracts with US sports corporations. From 2011 to 2014, the DoD paid out nearly $5.4 million to 14 NFL teams in exchange for the opportunity to publicize athletes saluting the military, "military flyovers, flag unfurlings, emotional color guard ceremonies, enlistment campaigns, and – interestingly enough – national anthem performances". The DoD's "paid patriotism" is a boon to the sports business, which also sells DoD-league and DoD-team branded hats and jerseys to fans. The DoD's militarization of sports aims to maintain public support for the wars it fights and the budgets it increases, and most importantly, attempts to increase the number of recruits to its ranks. Since 2008, the DoD has recruited soldiers at Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) events. Some MMA fighters (and their fans) move from Octagon to the Pentagon; others shift from the battlefields of Iraq to Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC). "The UFC provides a great venue to get the Army name

into the minds of millions of young Americans" said Major Kelly Crigger (cited in Brick 2008).

The DoD-sports complex also links with the military-industrial complex. Bell Helicopter, a US defense corporation that produces and sells helicopters, regularly sponsored the Armed Forces Bowl (AFB) (Butterworth and Moskal 2009). By doing so, Bell Helicopter built up its brand as a patriotic corporation and reminded the DoD procurement officers that its helicopters are on the DoD's team. The DoD's wielding of such commercialized weapons of mass destruction in wars against foreign peoples is often scheduled alongside major global sporting events. The USA started bombing the Taliban in Afghanistan just a half hour before the quarterbacks for the Philadelphia Eagles and Arizona Cardinals began launching "long bombs" in the stadium. The start of the Global War on Terror was blurred into the televised spectacle of football. As an American man watching this big post-9/11 game at a bar commented: "[The Taliban] wanted to play the game, and now the score is tied. It's good. We should [hit them] again" (cited in Stossel 2001).

Chomsky (2002) argues that professional sports teach spectators national chauvinism, irrational competition, and loyalty to power while distracting and steering them away from matters of importance, such as war. Yet, the DoD-sports complex fuses the DoD's war-promotion exigencies with the business logics of the sports industry. This resulting collusion links the field of sports, the players, and the fans to the battlefield of war and the ethos of soldiering. It extols a jingoistic form of militarized patriotism, conceals the human lives destroyed by war, and, as indicated by the State and industry backlash against Colin Kaepernick's choice to kneel during the "The Star-Spangled Banner," suppresses dissent (Astore 2018).

The DoD-Digital Games Complex

Video games are a lot of fun to play, and in the USA, more than half of the population plays video games. Video games are produced by a massive globe-spanning interactive entertainment industry of developers and publishers for a market that in 2018 was worth well over $115 billion. When trying to deflect public criticisms of the real wars

they have embroiled the nation in, US presidents sometimes frame war video games as crass and simple simulations as compared to the real thing. In response to questions about the US State's contentious bombing campaign in Iran, Obama chimed: "These aren't video games that we're playing here." Undoubtedly, real war is not exactly like a war video game, yet, the links between the US DoD's real wars and commercial war game simulations are palatable, thanks in part to the growth of a DoD-digital-games complex.

The DoD-digital games complex refers to the structural alliances and symbiotic relationships between the DoD and US-based digital game firms that produce military shooter games which blur and blend the DoD's war machine with commercial game machines and the labor pains of fighting real wars with the paid for consumer pleasures released when playing interactive simulations of them. A real institutional convergence of the DoD's institutions, policies, and personnel and digital capitalism's developers, publishers, and players, this complex shapes the design, production, promotion, and stories of some commercially available war games (Andersen and Kurti 2011; Halter 2006; Huntemann and Payne 2010; Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009; Lenoir 2000, 2003; Leonard 2004; Mirrlees 2009, 2014; Payne 2016; Stahl 2006, 2010).

The DoD underwrites the R&D of many war simulation games through the Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office (M&S CO). The M&S CO contracts digital game firms to make war simulation games and "procures" the finished war commodities sold by them. Beneath the M&S CO are DoD agencies, each immersed in the business of war simulation R&D. These include the US Army's Project Executive Office Simulation; Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI); the Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT); the US Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM); and the Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulation Institute (MOVES). Also, located at the University of Southern California (USC), the ICT (established in 1999) receives DoD funding and liaisons with the interactive entertainment industry. Founded by the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey,

California, in 2000, MOVES bring together US military personnel, digital game firms, and academics. These linkages between the DoD and digital game industry annually channel millions of public dollars into digital war game R&D.

From allocating public dollars to R&D on simulation technologies for war purposes to consuming war-ready software and hardware from private firms to cultivating consumer demand for and cross-promoting war games by waging wars, the DoD is a boon to the digital games industry. In fact, the market power of the US digital war games industry has long been assisted by DoD subvention. In fact, the DoD supported crucial innovations in the history of digital games: the first video game (*SpaceWar!*); the first head-mounted virtual reality display system, the first first-person shooter video game (*Maze Wars*); the first tank simulator arcade game (Panzer PLATO to Atari's *Battlezone*); the first prototype of an online multiplayer game (*Empire* for the PLATO computer network) and then, SIMnet, or "simulation network"; and the first full-fledged Army recruitment game (*America's Army*, which is freely available to play online).

Digital war games are at the forefront of a hugely popular and profitable interactive militainment industry, and these games immerse civilians into first- and third-person battle spaces and virtual theaters of war-fighting. The DoD sees in its military shooters a number of benefits. Permanent war requires an unending recruitment campaign, and starting in 2002, the DoD has used its own online game, *America's Army*, to attract millions of youthful gamers to real careers in the real Army. To reduce overhead costs and mitigate the risk of soldiers dying while training for battle with live ammunition, the DoD uses war games to teach new and existing personnel how to fight. Shortly after 9/11, the Army fashioned Ubisoft's *Tom Clancy's Rainbow Six: Rogue Spear* into a means of training soldiers how to fight terrorists in urban warfare settings and also oversaw the ICT and Pandemic Studios' development of *Full Spectrum Warrior* to prepare the troops for battles in Baghdad. Seated in front of a computer screen, hands on controller, eyes on a mediatized battlefield, drone operators wage wars

increasingly modeled on game play too. Many troops return home from real wars suffering post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): to prevent them from killing themselves, the DoD provisions virtual therapy to them in form of games like *Virtual Iraq*.

Furthermore, the DoD leans on war video games to elicit consent to or maintain public morale for real wars. In the years following 9/11, *Fugitive Hunger*: *War on Terror* and *Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell* immersed players in the Global War on Terrorism. *Conflict Desert Storm II: Back to Baghdad* was launched in the same year as the 2003 US invasion of Iraq began, and this game enlisted players in a virtual war to invade Iraq and topple Saddam's Ba'thist regime. Normalizing the US State's past decade of non-congressionally approved violence, and glorifying the DoD's reliance on privatized mercenaries to wage dirty wars, the *Call of Duty: Black Ops* franchise is one of the most popular around the world. 2018's best-selling video game was *Call of Duty Black Ops 4*, the latest addition to a franchise that took over $1 billion in sales in 1 month and put millions of players in the virtual boots of black ops soldiers to fight opponents and zombies too.

War incentivizes the making of war games, yet, not all military shooters are spun out of the DoD-digital games complex. Most often, "game studios hire subject matter experts to advise them on proper tactics, protocols, and battlefield behaviors with the aim of engendering 'authentic' military experiences without having to submit their design choices to the scrutiny of the government's exacting review process" (Payne 2015, p. 6). Nonetheless, whether made by or in partnership with the DoD, all commercial digital war games risk desensitizing players to war's embodied horrors and deterring serious public deliberation about war. Digital war games encourage a militarized view of reality, and they prepare players, ideologically and practically, for the US empire's current and speculative wars. Indeed, in *Battlefield 4* (2003), the US goes to war against China; *Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3* (2011) simulates World War III between the USA and Russia; *Call of Duty: Ghosts* (2013) pits a declining US Empire against a coalition of Latin American states.

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The DoD-Social Media Complex

In the early twenty-first century, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are everywhere and used by billions of people for everything from socializing to self-promotion to entertainment. Social media platforms are interwoven with the everyday lives of billions, and they are also paradigmatic of "platform capitalism" (Srnicek 2017), or, "a new business model, capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of data" (6) that user activity produces. Indeed, platform corporations provide the "infrastructure to intermediate between different groups" (Srnicek 2017, p. 48), and they collect, analyze, process, commoditize, and sell people's private data, often to advertisers (Fuchs 2017). In addition to being a tool and a business model, these Internet-based social media platforms have also become a space of war in which the DoD battles its enemies.

The DoD imagines the Internet and World Wide Web as a "battle space" in which many government, corporate, and non-state actors produce and "deliver critical and influential content in order to shape perceptions, influence opinions, and control behavior" (Armistead 2004, p. xvii). The DoD considers the Internet and social media platforms to be a "cyber domain," and as such, it aspires to command and control it, along with land, sea, air, and space. Rand Waltzman (2015), the former program manager for a $50 million dollar DARPA study of "Social Media in Strategic Communication," said "the use of social media and the Internet is rapidly becoming a powerful weapon for information warfare and changing the nature of conflict worldwide." The DoD uses social media platforms to spread information that enhances its image and counters information that puts it in a negative light.

Take the example of the DoD's foray into YouTube, the world's largest online video sharing site. YouTube enables a plurality of combatants to upload and share first-hand videos about the wars the USA is in. As Naim (2006) observed, "YouTube includes videos posted by terrorists, human rights groups, and US soldiers," and some of these "videos reveal truths," while others "spread disinformation, propaganda, and outright lies." The development of YouTube, the diffusion of low-cost digital cameras and laptop computers within the US military, the desire of American soldiers to film, share, and make public their personal experience of war to civilians, and the efforts of citizens to peel back the veneer of the media war and get somewhat closer to the real thing all drive the production, circulation, and consumption of YouTube war videos. Some of the earliest videos uploaded to YouTube by US soldiers depicted the US occupation of Iraq at its worst. Soldier-generated videos ranged from disgusting ("Apache Kills in Iraq" showed a US gunship firing high powered munitions at Iraqis and exploding their bodies) to dehumanizing ("Iraqi Kids Run for Water" depicted thirsty Iraqi children chasing a US armoured truck full of American soldiers who tease the kids by dangling a bottle of water). These soldier-generated YouTube videos countered the "myths of national glory, macho heroism and clinical warfare manufactured by military and media elites" and "offer[ed] the public uncensored insights into the mundane, violent, and even depraved faces of warfare" (Anden-Papadopoulos 2009, p. 25).

To reign in these unofficial uses of YouTube by US military personnel, and to counter YouTube videos made by the US military's opponents, the DoD started coordinating YouTube publicity campaigns. Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, for example, explained the importance of YouTube: "we understand that it is a battle space in which we have not been active, and this is a media we can use to get our story told" (cited in Zavis 2007). To push official war stories via YouTube, the DoD uses a combination of censorship and self-promotion. In May 2007, the DoD started blocking its Iraq-stationed soldiers' access to YouTube and compelling all soldiers to submit their videos to their supervisors for review prior to publishing them on the web. In that same year, the DoD launched its own YouTube channel, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNFIRAQ) (Christensen 2008). Administered by Brent Walker and Erick Barnes (ex-Marines turned military-contracted social media propagandists), MNFIRAQ claimed to "give viewers around the world a 'boots on the ground' perspective of

Operation Iraqi Freedom from those who are fighting it." Yet, a study of 29 of this channel's videos concluded that it represented a sanitized vision of the US occupation of Iraq (Christensen 2008). Many of the videos display gun battles in streets sans death, acts of "surgical warfare" sans terror, and the "good deeds" of US soldiers sans resentment.

The DoD's partnership with YouTube is but one of many examples of the DoD-social media complex in action. DoD public affairs officers also socially network with users via Facebook pages, manage Twitter accounts, and post photos to Pinterest. By spreading itself across the private social platforms that intersect with the daily lives of billions, the DoD bypasses the gatekeeping powers of the news media and turns the manufacture of consent to war into an interactive DoD-to-public affair.

Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the MEC and the various sub-complexes that produce and circulate militainment in support of war. The DoD's pursuit of strategic supremacy and the entertainment industries' pursuit of profit intertwine in significant ways, bringing the business of war and creativity into a strategic alliance. To prepare for, promote, glorify, and sell the wars of the US empire as a way of life to the public, the DoD has weaponized the entertainment industries and a wide range of media products such as news stories, Hollywood films, sporting events, video games, and social media.

That said, the DoD does not own or exert direct control over the entertainment industries; and the many media products that these industries produce and sell do not always already promote and legitimize the DoD at war. Some entertainments may even offer subtle or full-blown criticisms of the DoD. For example, *Redacted* (2007) and *Green Zone* (2010) represent the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a crime with terrible human consequences; and, *Team America* (2004) and *Tropic Thunder* (2008) parody war as a media spectacle. Digital games like *Special Ops: The Line*

(2012) grapple with war's many horrors (Payne 2014). Furthermore, the recent transformation of the overall communications and media environment by the Internet, World Wide Web and social media platforms has given rise to a "ubiquitous media war," a war read about, seen, listened to, watched, played, debated, and interactively "prosumed," participated in by millions around the world through a range of technological mediums (e.g., TV sets, personal computers, game consoles, smartphones and tablets), and fought, almost anytime, anywhere. In this context, it is doubtful that the DoD possesses the power to command and control the total public opinion of war (Gillan et al. 2008; Mirrlees 2018). Yet, if the MEC and militainment were ineffective, we might see widespread popular cultural opposition to the US Empire and war as way of life. The absence or dearth of this resistance might be explained with regard to the MEC's continuing power.

Cross-References

▶ Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law
▶ Media Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ US Militarism and US Hegemonic Power

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Mining

▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism

Mining and Minerals

▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America

Minorities

▶ Racism and Imperialism

Mode of Exploitation

Modernization

Mohammed Abd al-Karim

Moldova: Imperialism and Regime Change

Ari Weinstein
Varna, Bulgaria

Introduction

This entry focuses on what is, arguably, an inadequately studied historico-political phenomenon – the 2009 US-backed regime change in Moldova – and it does so, at least in part, by placing said phenomenon within the broader contexts of Washington's foreign policy record, including its myriad campaigns around the world (successful or otherwise) to overturn foreign governments, its seemingly increasingly tense relations with Moscow during the post-Cold War period in general, and in the East European geopolitical space in particular.

The analysis presented here hinges to a considerable extent on the idea that the pursuit of "regime change" is – whether its executors openly acknowledge this or not – a key element of US foreign policy. Here, I shall demonstrate that,

while certainly less well-known and openly violent than the post-Cold War regime change campaigns that it "successfully" carried out in, say, Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, Washington – in 2009, and certainly to this day still – was and is committed to ensuring that its central economic and geopolitical interests will be well looked after via the installation and stabilization in power of a new government and state apparatus in Chisinau.

In the present study, a reasonably comprehensive working definition of "regime change" will be provided, as will an explanation about why, specifically during 2009, Moldova happened to become the scene of an eventually "successful" campaign by Washington to push through just such a change. Furthermore, parallels will be drawn between the respective "successful" regime change, and others that, with at least some support from Washington, unfolded in Central and Eastern Europe at one point or another during the post-Cold War period. Due to the critical role that Bucharest undeniably played in assisting both Washington and Brussels in the carrying forward of the 2009 regime change in Moldova, I will also devote some space here to describing not only the character of Romanian domestic and foreign policy ever since the fall in late 1989 of the Ceausescu regime, but also the historical roots and modern-day manifestations of far-right ideology in Romania. I will stress in this entry how, since the end of the Cold War, Romania has emerged as an ever more "weighty" regional political actor whose foreign policies, including certainly vis-à-vis Moldova, are rather closely aligned with Washington's regional and, indeed, global political orientation.

This entry, as its title indicates, is primarily concerned with events that took place in 2009 and in the immediately subsequent 2 years or so; in other words, the focus here is on political developments which took place roughly 20 years after the end of the Cold War (which can be defined as having occurred on December 31, 1989) and about eight years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While it is certainly possible to conceptually divide up the conduct and course of US foreign policy following

the conclusion of the Cold War into (at least) two subperiods – one running from January 1, 1990 to September 10, 2001 and the other from September 11, 2001 to present – the notion that this conceptual division isn't, in fact, particularly meaningful is implicit in the arguments that are herein developed. It should also be pointed out that the unfolding, and primarily in 2009, of the historico-political episode that is at the core of this entry, not to mention other post-9/11 gambits, up to and including regime change operations that Washington initiated in Eastern Europe certainly lends support to the notion that the trajectory of geopolitical tensions in said region has been steadily – or perhaps even explosively – ascending for years now with no end in sight and that this state of affairs is attributable to a very significant extent to the activist, not to say openly interventionist, posture that the US government has demonstrably chosen to adopt. Furthermore, the analysis presented here will implicitly provide backing for the argument – articulated with a greater or lesser degree of openness elsewhere – that, in their examination of Washington's conduct of foreign policy, the realist and Marxist schools, paradoxically enough, are broadly in accord. That is, both realist and Marxist analysts of international relations maintain that the pursuit of the "national interest," however defined, is at the core of a given state's, and certainly the US's, process of foreign policy formulation (see, for example, Huntington 1993, 1996; Brzezinski 2000; Gowan 1999). Thus, while the proclaimed selfless motives of overseas human rights and democracy promotion are certainly rejected as false by Marxist analysts, they would also have to be looked upon with some degree of skepticism by many Western realist scholars, despite their general identification with the American state and its role on the international scene.

Another perhaps surprising point of contact between Marxists and at least certain prominent Western adherents of the realist school like, for example, the late Zbigniew Brzezinski that will "come out" in this entry concerns their agreement that US-Russia relations are seemingly inherently (and profoundly) conflictual in nature and that the clearly quite strained relations that exist between

these two states have been in place, with possible modest interruptions, for many years now (see, for example, Brzezinski 2000; Gervasi 1996; North 2016). Thus, in my examination in this entry of both the regime change that took place in Moldova in 2009, as well as its aftermath, I will strive to always maintain some degree of focus on the broader context of rivalrous US-Russia relations.

This broad context will also prove useful in tracing the seemingly sudden zigs and zags which characterized the positions taken by the principal domestic political forces in Moldova during the eight or so years prior to the 2009 regime change which is the main subject of this entry; moreover, reviewing, even if only briefly, said zig and zags can help us better comprehend the relative power and influence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space that since, say, the new millennium, Washington and the EU, on the one hand, and Moscow on the other, have been able to effectively exercise. Evidence will also be presented herein indicating that significant shifts in the foreign policy stances that, at various moments over the course of the period from around 2001 through 2009, were adopted by the heads of the Moldovan state tended to occur around – and thus have, at an absolute minimum, a temporal proximity to – the "successful" unfolding of Washington-backed regime change operations in different states that became independent simultaneous with the collapse of the USSR.

Washington's support for regime changes, as various authors have asserted, can manifest itself in various ways, with open, announced, and bloody regime change campaigns, *a la* Iraq in 2003 not necessarily being the most common (see, for example, Blum 2002, 2003; Kinzer 2007). The provision of behind-the-scenes backing for regime change – coordinating with opposition forces, financing them, and possibly even co-opting members of unfavorably regarded political parties, etc. – has been in evidence in innumerable regime change operations that, for decades and decades, Washington has typically served as the primary wire-puller of (Ibid). Another potentially effective tactic towards the realization of regime change which, for example,

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was utilized in the case of Albania in the mid-1990s revolves around the co-opting of key members of powerful political parties which Washington generally is not favorably disposed towards and which it is largely intent on weakening and/or removing from power (Weinstein 2016).

What Is a "Regime Change," and Why Was Washington Determined to Push One Through in Moldova in 2009?

For the purposes of the present study, it is obviously critical that I advance a useful working definition of the term "regime change," and also explain how this applies to the politico-economic ends that Washington sought to achieve and largely succeeded in achieving in Moldova in 2009 and thereafter. In a discussion of other regime change campaigns that, during the January 1, 1990–September 10, 2001 period, Washington "succeeded" in pushing through, I asserted that: "Regime change, as the term is most frequently understood, is utilized to refer to the replacement, whether by democratic or less-than-wholly democratic means, of a given country's principal political-statal leadership. But it also refers to shifts in institutions, in legal structures, and in economic structures, including [oftentimes in] the ownership of basic resources. . . . the term . . . in this dissertation means a process whereby formal control over a country's central government passes from the hands of one individual or political organization to the hands of others who then implement substantially different economic and geostrategic policies" (Ibid).

There is no question but that such an event did indeed take place in Moldova over the course of a number of months during 2009. In this attempt to further "fill out" my definition, I also emphasized that:

> the term 'regime change' as utilized in this study also signifies that, once carried out, the fundamental revamping of the targeted national government's overarching economic policy orientation and geopolitical posture then will not be, and effectively simply cannot be, 'undone' or reversed in the short or even medium-term. More concretely, once the successor government in a targeted country passed

legislation or took meaningful policy steps towards, for example, significantly more cooperative relations with NATO or the privatization of theretofore collectively-owned assets, said legislation or policy steps would prove to have, whatever the prevailing national political will, an enduring and even quasi-permanent character (Ibid).

Again, a good deal of evidence will be presented here showing that such a change occurred in Moldova in 2009, and that it had (and still has to this day, in fact) significant "staying power." However unpopular various of the (primarily, though not exclusively economic) policies of the successor regime, that regime has – and with the open, obvious, and substantial backing of its Western benefactors – proven to be exceedingly difficult to displace, partial reshufflings of some of its key personnel notwithstanding. Thus, the development whereby in 2009 the theretofore ruling PCRM (in Romanian: "The Party of Communists from the Republic of Moldova") was forced to cede power to a coalition of four more openly neoliberal and pro-EU and pro-NATO parties that together governed as the AIE ("The Alliance for European Integration" in Romanian) served as a clear inflection point in Moldovan political and economic history; this power transfer, which was consciously encouraged, facilitated, and, in general terms, significantly "helped along" by Washington, the EU, and neighboring (and the then relatively newly-inducted) EU member-state Romania should therefore be seen – even if this case is not so widely known – as a "regime change" and as one important example of how Washington continues to actively seek to advance its interests and bolster its influence all around this planet of ours.

To reiterate, a few different analysts, myself included, have studied in some detail, for example, the Washington-backed regime changes that "successfully" unfolded in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania in 1991–1992, and in the FRY in 2000; these studies generally emphasized the fact that, following the "successful" consummation of these regime changes, the successor regimes adopted – alterations in their outward political colorations and leading personnel notwithstanding – a fundamentally pro-neoliberal economic and pro-"Western" geopolitical orientation that,

to this day in fact, has not only not been reversed but has generally grown more and more "rock-solid" (see, for example, Blum 2002, 2003; Elich 2006; Sussman and Krader 2008; Weinstein 2016). Similarly, various analyses, including one that I developed, at least implicitly advanced the argument that, immediately following the over-turning of the Ceausescu regime during the latter half of December of 1989, Romania not only demonstratively and wholeheartedly "leapt" into Washington's geopolitical camp, but also began and then steadily continued to adopt more and more pro-capitalist and eventually increasingly radical "neoliberal" economic policies (see, for example, Pasti 2006; Weinstein 2005; WSWS 2015, 2016a).

Facilitating the occurrence of a regime change in Moldova thus was, as I shall show here, pro-foundly consistent with the overall geopolitical posture that, ever since the end of the Cold War, Washington had maintained; in other words, Washington wasn't particularly interested in the unique features of Moldova's recent history and, rather, has endeavored to ensure to the greatest degree possible that the government in Chisinau would adopt the same basic geostrategic orienta-tion and push through essentially the same eco-nomic policies that its neighbors had in the wake of the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in late 1989.

After becoming formally independent in late 1991, simultaneous with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in which it had previously been a constituent administrative unit (a republic), Moldova, guided by its heads of state, pursued an economic and geostrategic policy course that, in broad terms, was more-or-less identical to that of the above-mentioned Central and Eastern Euro-pean states.

However, one distinguishing feature in Moldova's recent political history that I have already briefly touched on here and that I will explore in slightly greater depth later on in this study concerns the fact that in 2001, it became the first country in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the entire post-Soviet space to elect – and democratically – a party calling itself "commu-nist" (the PCRM). While, as I shall show a bit further on, the PCRM's eight-year period of

governance was marked by significant geostrate-gic (and also economic policy) vacillations, its actual commitment to the pro-capitalist and pro-"Western" convictions that it then sometimes sought to claim that it maintained was generally viewed by Washington, the EU, and Bucharest as being reduced and likely somewhat less sincere in comparison to that of the more openly right-wing Moldovan parties like the PL (Liberal Party), the PLDM (Liberal Democratic Party), the AMN (The Alliance – Our Moldova), the PD (Democratic Party), etc (see, for example, WSWS 2009b, 2010b).

The importance for Washington and its EU and NATO "partners" of carrying out a regime change in Moldova in 2009 should, it will be argued here, also be seen in the light of the partial resurgence that, geostrategically and, arguably to a somewhat lesser extent, economically, Russia mounted after the collapse that it underwent during the 1990s. Coincidentally or otherwise, said resur-gence seems to begin around the December 31, 1999, move whereby Boris Yeltsin vacated the office of the Presidency of Russia and simulta-neously chose Vladimir Putin to succeed him. The eight-plus years during which Yeltsin had served as the President of Russia had a profoundly dichotomous character: while over the course of said period, he had been the recipient of massive Western economic and political support, he was, by the time that he left office, intensely unpopular among the population of Russia itself. Putin, on the other hand, has adopted a more outwardly nationalist posture and during the last 19-plus years (a time during which he has served as pres-ident and prime minister, before once again assumed the office of the Presidency), he has come to be perceived as something of a bête noire – perhaps even the principal one! – in American ruling circles.

As the very title of this entry makes clear, the "successes" that, at different points over the course of the January 1, 1990–September 10, 2001 period, Washington achieved via the shepherding through of at least three regime changes in Eastern and Central Europe would prove to be something else than mere "one-offs" whose unfolding at least partially defined and was

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a product of the special circumstances that were characteristic of said period; indeed, the evidence that indicates that Eastern and Central Europe and the post-Soviet space more generally have, from 1990 to present, been the scene of one Washington-sponsored (successful and unsuccessful) regime change campaign after another is very clear and, frankly, rather uncontroversial.

Later on in this entry, I will provide support for this assertion by discussing not only Washington's sponsorship and "guiding forward" of the 2003–2004 "Rose Revolution" in Georgia and the 2004–2005 "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, but also the ulterior – and not particularly favorable for Washington – evolution of the regimes that resulted from said "revolutions." Finally, I will also draw the reader's attention here to the critical role that Bucharest has played and continues to play in the elaboration of Washington's "grand regional strategy" not only "on the ground" in Moldova but also – and more pivotally still – towards Russia. While, as mentioned above, various scholars, including myself, have demonstrated that, ever since the overturning of Nicolai Ceausescu's regime in 1989, Bucharest has not only pushed through one neoliberal economic measure after another, but has also been an intensely faithful ally of the US government on the international scene, the extent of the changes in those two spheres can be underestimated in analyses which do not (adequately) cover the 10 years (December 20, 2004–December 21, 2014) during which Traian Basescu served as the President of Romania (see, for example, Pasti 2006; RFERL 2005; WSWS 2014b).

The political ascent and subsequent decline of Basescu – a strongly conservative figure whose zealous support for Washington's aspirations for ever-greater global power and influence was only matched by his basically unconcealed antipathy towards Moscow and its regional interests – plausibly constituted another factor which, in early 2009, led the US's then-new Obama administration to "push for a win" in Romania's neighbor, Moldova (see, for example, A1.RO 2011; MID-RU 2011; WSWS 2009b).

In short, – and in correspondence with the central arguments developed by the

aforementioned Zbigniew Brzezinski in his shockingly frank 1997 book "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives" – Washington's actions on the global stage reinforce the view whereby said capital conceives of international politics as a zero-sum game, like Chess or, perhaps, Risk. In other words, attaining de facto control over the basic economic and foreign policy "vectors" of another country – even a relatively small one such as Moldova – is a real and significant desideratum, and probably even more so when such a country happens to be located reasonably close to a state, like Russia, whose interests are regarded by the great majority of the US's foreign policy elites as being essentially diametrically opposed to their own.

Moldova's Far-Right Pan-Romanian Nationalists Prepare for the Elections . . . and for Violence

Strange though it may seem, a rock concert that took place in late March of 2009 in a small club located several hundred meters from the center of Moldova's capital of Chisinau significantly foreshadowed pivotal political events that would begin to unfold in that city and country more-or-less immediately after the polls for the nationwide April 5 Parliamentary elections closed.

What was, for the purposes of this analysis, most significant about this concert were the people in attendance and their generally not terribly well worked-out worldviews; of the maximum 40 or 50 fans who were in attendance, more than one wore a T-shirt which featured the face of the notorious Romanian Nazi from the 1920s and 1930s, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, superimposed on the Celtic Cross symbol that is intimately associated with numerous ultra-right political movements today (see, for example, Ioanid 1990; Sandache 2010; Schmitt 2017). During the show, drunken kids who were generally in their early 20s shouted things in Romanian to the band like "Boys! Do it for Greater Romania!" During a brief intermission in the show, the long-time political provocateur Oleg Brega got up on the

stage and semi-coherently told the crowd that it was important to vote against the PCRM at the then-imminent elections; this Brega, who was at that time the head of one or another small right-wing NGO (alternately called "Hyde Park" and "Curaj") that sought to cover up its broadly unpopular essential political orientation by posing as an advocate for free speech would, along with a brother of his named Ghenadie, proceed to play a significant role in and then during the aftermath of Moldova's 2009 regime change. One of Oleg and Ghenadie Brega's principal political and "literary" activities revolved around the organization of campaigns in which they not only portrayed the Romanian anti-communist writer Paul Goma as a great talent worthy of the highest literary honors that the Moldovan state bestows, but also demanded that he – who was born in the late 1930s in what was then Romanian territory but which is now a part of the Republic of Moldova – be granted Moldovan citizenship and otherwise recognized as an intellectual of the highest order and a great source of national pride. Goma was probably most notorious for authoring the book "Red Week," which effectively argues that the Romanian military's participation in the Holocaust through its commission of genocidal crimes against the Jewish population in eastern Romania and Moldova in 1941 was precipitated – and therefore *justified* – by those Jews' supposed mistreatment of Romanian soldiers in the preceding year (see, for example, *Adevarul* 2013; Goma 2008).

Also in attendance at this concert were the brothers Basarab, Evelin and Marin. The latter – and older – brother Marin would, shortly following the regime change in focus, begin a still ongoing career as a journalist for the vehemently anti-communist and supposedly "center-right" newspaper *Timpul*, which is also accessible online. *Timpul,* which very shortly after the anti-PCRM "liberal" and "democratic" coalition took power in the latter half of 2009, became in de facto terms said coalition's "house paper," has a long history of promoting Russophobia and, perhaps even more worrying, of justifying the Romanian military-fascist dictator Ion Antonescu's move to join with the Nazi regime in invading the Soviet Union in 1941 (see, for example, *Timpul* 2014, 2016).

Arguably even less concerned than his brother by the possibility that he might come to be seen by broader sections of the population as a nationalist zealot single-mindedly focused on pushing through the reestablishment of a "Greater Romania," Evelin would later be photographed on April 7, 2009, standing together with other (largely young) ultra-rightists in Chisinau's central square (sometimes referred to as PMAN for the first letters of the four words that make up its name in Romanian) and holding up large banners which vehemently condemned both the PCRM, as well as the thousands and thousands of people who had voted for it two days prior (*Timpul* 2010).

Significantly, Evelin was also associated with the Brega brothers' campaigns to try to transform Goma's public image into that of a courageous, dissident intellectual and genuine national treasure and to specifically promote his repugnant *Red Week* as *the truth* about political and military history and ethnic and religious relations in the late 1930s and early 1940s in the border region between Romania and Moldova (then part of the Soviet Union).

The preceding brief history is useful insofar as it demonstrates that numerous individuals, nominally independent Moldovan "NGOs" which more-or-less discreetly advanced a far-right, pan-Romanian nationalist worldview worked fairly smoothly not only with one another but also with the largest – and supposedly "liberal" and "democratic" and "pro-European" – newspapers and media concerns and also parties that took part in and ran on an anti-PCRM platform in the two parliamentary elections (April 5 and July 29) that were held in 2009.

In other words, the parties – including their leaders themselves – that portray themselves as the very embodiment of "European values" and that ended up replacing the PCRM at the head of the Moldovan state in the second half of 2009 had "dense" links to a network of individuals and supposedly "non-governmental" organizations that venerate Romanian ultra-rightists from the 1930s and 1940s, including the blood-soaked military dictator of Romania and ally of Hitler, Ion Antonescu.

While sundry events that took place in Chisinau within the last two weeks before the

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holding of the April 5, 2009 Parliamentary elections served to reveal clearly enough that, at least in de facto terms, there had been put together a broad and at least somewhat cohesive anti-PCRM "infrastructure," part of which was under the guidance and control of far-right nationalist elements, it became all the more apparent in the hours after the closing of the polls that night that, regardless of how the voting turned out, various constituent elements in said infrastructure would not peacefully acquiesce to another four years (or more) of continued "communist" control over the Moldovan state.

The "Communists" Win the Elections … and the "Liberals," "Democrats," and Far-Right Attempt a Putsch

Shortly after 10 PM local time on April 5, the public television channel Moldova 1 carried a live broadcast from a Chisinau hotel in which leading representatives of a local polling agency presented the preliminary results – gathered up until 7 PM that evening, while polls closed at 9 PM – of the exit poll that their agency had carried out that day. While these pollsters went out of their way to stress the unofficial and merely orientative character of their poll, the preliminary results – which were immediately met with an audible gasp by the largely well-heeled audience – showed that the PCRM would take approximately 56 out of the 101 seats in the Parliament, while the three major anti-communist parties – the Liberal Party (PL), the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM), and the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) – would together take the balance. The updated version of the exit poll, which was broadcast at slightly after 11 that night and which reflected polls taken until the 9 PM close of voting that day, credited the PCRM with 55 seats compared to the combined total of 46 won by the PL, the PLDM, and the AMN.

The official counting of the votes began at 11 PM and, at least in the early hours, went even more favorably for the PCRM than the exit poll results had indicated. (The rolling vote count could be followed in "real time" on the website alegeri.md.)

Virtually immediately after the first official results began to be released that evening, young (generally in their early to mid-20s) people who were certainly more favorably disposed to the various relatively right-wing opposition parties than they were to the PCRM used Facebook to create and promote an "event" that they indicated would take place the following day. Said event, which was visually represented on Facebook primarily by a small (though certainly clearly visible) banner-style photograph in which at least one hand was holding a lit candle, was being held, the accompanying promotional text read, to "mourn" the supposed "death of democracy" in Moldova (see, for example, GBrega).

The "mourning" for the supposed "death of democracy" was, it was entirely evident, being held because all the evidence – both from the first and then final exit poll as well as from the early stages of the official count of the ballots that had been cast – indicated that the PCRM would once again by itself hold a clear majority in the Parliament.

That the announcement of both these exit poll results and the unfolding of the early stages of the official and easily accessible "rolling" vote count wouldn't be pleasing to the supporters of the various relatively right-wing anti-PCRM parties was, to put it mildly, rather unsurprising.

Little by little, it became clear that something resembling a coup attempt was in the works. Shortly after the final exit poll results were released during the evening of April 5, the right-wing and staunchly anti-communist then Mayor of Chisinau, Dorin Chirtoaca (PL), appeared on the Romanian TV network PROTV; when asked by the host what he thought of the poll results, Chirtoaca indicated that he didn't believe them, but that if they did indeed prove to be "of value," then "the anti-communist resistance will have to continue to be prepared to go all the way to the end" so as to bring about "the *demolition* of Communism in the Republic of Moldova. This is the position of the Liberal Party [PL]" (see Youtube).

By the early hours of the morning of April 6, the results – in broad terms – seemed quite clear: the number of votes that the PCRM received

significantly surpassed the aggregate total of the three relatively right-wing parties (the PLDM, the PL, and AMN) that would also be represented in the next Parliament; in fact, by noon or so that day, the only politically meaningful question about the outcome of the election seemed to be whether the PCRM would receive at least 61 of the 101 Parliamentary seats necessary so that it could, just by relying on its own MPs, elect the next President.

Given the relatively lopsided character of the vote, the fact that the very same PROTV that had discussed the results of the final exit poll the night before had opted not to return to Bucharest, but to stay in Chisinau and to continue broadcasting from PMAN into at least the early afternoon on April 6 seemed – and one might add, still seems even today – a bit suspicious. Not only did PROTV keep its camera in PMAN, but it broadcast an interview during the late morning or early afternoon of April 6 there with a young man who was wearing various items of clothing – in his case, a hat and a shirt – which demonstrated his support for and quite possibly affiliation with the far-right Romanian revanchist-nationalist movement: his hat and shirt not only called Moldova "Basarabia" and named it "Romanian Land" but also featured Moldova as a part of Romanian territory, all of which was red, blue, and yellow (the colors of the Romanian flag).

While at the time there was no one protesting in PMAN or, apparently, anywhere else in Moldova against the results of the election, this young man called for just that, and not only invited to the proposed demonstration supporters of the PLDM, PL, and AMN, but also backers of The European Action Movement (MAE), a far-right coalition which had received 1% of the vote and thus not come close to the 4% threshold necessary for Parliamentary representation. He also suggested – though no such evidence in this regard was ever presented – that the election results may have been manipulated, with the PCRM being the implied culprit and beneficiary.

As implied above, an understanding of why the network's continuing election coverage relatively early in the day on April 6 was based largely on interviewing obscure far-right youth dissatisfied

with the outcome of the vote may be easier to come by if one believes that PROTV was either aware that a radical and violent anti-PCRM campaign would soon begin to unfold or, alternatively, that it was somehow involved in the respective campaign.

In any event, somewhat later on during the afternoon of April 6, anti-PCRM protests did indeed begin; a handful – perhaps eventually rising to 50 or so – of far-right Romanian nationalists or "unionists" wearing the above-described clothing and waving Romanian flags grouped together in the part of PMAN that is near the sidewalk which is located below the governmental building. While they were somewhat noisy and attracted a bit of attention to themselves, their protest was not terribly noteworthy and certainly didn't seem likely to lead, directly or indirectly, to the overturning of the just re-elected government.

By perhaps 5:30 in the evening (well prior to sunset) on April 6, the event that had been organized on Facebook the prior night started around the statue of Stefan The Great, which is adjacent to PMAN (and less than 100 m from where the Romanian revanchists had been protesting, but from where they dispersed fairly quickly). Perhaps 200 people or so eventually gathered in the fairly small circular area where the statue is located in order to "mourn" the supposed "death of democracy in Moldova." A disproportionately large number of these "mourners" were young and, as is indicated by the kinds and styles of clothing that they were wearing, relatively well-off economically. While the "mourners" sought to present themselves as calm and dignified defenders of the undermining of a democratic system, fascistic elements wearing the aforementioned shirt in which Corneliu Codreanu's face is overlain on a "Celtic Cross" were also present and moved among the former freely. At this time, the ultra-nationalists increasingly began to make the evidence-free assertion – and this claim was quickly taken up by the self-described "liberals" and "democrats" who were standing side-by-side with them – that the PCRM had massively rigged the previous day's elections.

The next day, all hell broke loose, as they say. Late in the morning, probably hundreds of

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(again, mainly young) protesters in "messy" column formations slowly made their way to the center of the center; at about the same time, police – who were also organized in comparatively "neat" formations – ran towards the city center in an attempt to forestall what seemed like a possible outbreak of mass disorder and political violence. The character of the April 7 protests as well as of many of those who "demonstrated" that day was evident well before events violently spiraled out of control. For example, prior to the launching of attacks by protesters on the police, the Parliament, and the Presidential building, three clearly intoxicated young men who were probably about 19–23 years of age were seen half-running and half-staggering on the main Stefan Cel Mare Boulevard in front of McDonalds and adjacent to PMAN, shouting "Down with the Communists!" and struggling to lift up a Moldovan flag that was attached to a wooden pole.

The speech given in the mid-afternoon on April 7 by one Vitalia Pavlicenco seems to have served – and almost certainly was intended to have served – as a turning point in the events of that day. Pavlicenco had participated in the April 5 elections as, along with Anatolie Petrenco, one of the two leading candidates of the MAE. Given the party's relatively marginal character, it may seem surprising that such a central political and speaking role was accorded to Pavlicenco in PMAN during the afternoon of April 7; this surprise "melts away" if one understands that the dynamics of the situation made the role of the far-right absolutely pivotal in the campaign to unseat the PCRM.

That the anti-PCRM regime change campaign which developed very quickly (and, indeed, violently) in the immediate aftermath of the closing of the polls on April 5 was headed by profoundly anti-democratic far-right forces was demonstrated – probably despite her own intentions – by the speech that Pavlicenco gave in PMAN on April 7. Shamelessly ignoring the fact that the by-then nearly completed official vote count showed that the PCRM had garnered about 49.5% of all the valid ballots cast, Pavlicenco called for the banning of all "parties of a communist and socialist type." The openness with which she called for the banning of political parties, including what was at that time by far the largest in the country, was matched by the undeniably inflammatory character of her speech as a whole; the effect of her words on a crowd, a significant number of whose members were evidently under the influence of alcohol or some other substances, could only have been – and certainly seemed to have been – expressly designed for just this purpose – to trigger some kind of violent insurrection.

The Geopolitics Underlying the Unholy Alliance Between "the West" and Moldova's "Liberals," "Democrats," and Far-Right "Pan-Romanian" Nationalists

Pavlicenco was, at the time that she gave her speech on April 7, still officially a Member of Parliament (MP), having been elected on AMN's list back in 2005. (From 1998 to 2001, she was an MP representing the Alliance of Democratic Forces or AFD in the original Romanian.)

A quick look over her CV (which she has published on her personal webpage) makes it clear that, from the beginning of her first term in Parliament if not earlier still, she had enjoyed close and positive political ties with high-ranking officials from Washington, Bucharest, and NATO (see Pavlicenco A).

Pavlicenco's membership in nominally democratic Moldovan political organizations and the support that outwardly democratic foreign governments and international institutions have given to her do not somehow make her sympathies for some of the most barbaric, far-right forces from the early-mid twentieth century disappear. More specifically, Pavlicenco has posted numerous articles on her blog which present Marshall Ion Antonescu as either a hero or, alternatively, in a generally positive light.

While this is not the place for exhaustively reviewing the war crimes for which Antonescu was responsible, it is worth mentioning here, if only briefly, that, for example, serious historians of World War II and the Holocaust have conclusively demonstrated that the forces under his

command which joined in the Nazi-led invasion of the Soviet Union murdered close to 300,000 Jews, including in a number of particularly blood-curdling massacres (such as in Iasi, Romania, and in Odessa, Ukraine) (see, for example, Ancel 2010; Kaplan 2016).

In short, there is a wealth of evidence (some of which I've presented in this entry) indicating that Pavlicenco is by no means whatsoever alone in portraying Antonescu as a heroic figure who dedicated his life to the pursuit of the supposedly "noble ideal" of Romanian ethno-national unity; in fact, it would be accurate to say that essentially the entirety of the contemporary "pan-Romanian" nationalist right in both Romania and Moldova is defined by its conviction that if there was anything damnable in Antonescu's life and political-military career, that was surely greatly outweighed by his lifelong commitment to and "selfless" sacrifice in the interests of the Romanian nation (see, for example, Pavlicenco B, C).

There exists a wealth of evidence – certainly far more extensive than can be presented in a paper of this length – which shows that while nominally "liberal," "democratic," "liberal-democratic," and "pro-European" (i.e., pro-European Union or EU) forces and figures did indeed replace the PCRM atop the Moldovan state in the second half of 2009, said forces and figures understood very well that the "success" of their regime change campaign was critically dependent on close collaboration with profoundly reactionary and anti-democratic domestic political movements.

During the height of the regime change campaign and shortly after its eventual completion, the fact that Washington and sundry high-level forces within the EU were serving as the de facto backers of various "liberal" anti-PCRM elements within Moldova became more and more apparent.

Natalia Morari was one such "liberal" who not only played a central role in the anti-PCRM protests-turned-riots of April 7, but who virtually immediately after the removal of the PCRM from power began to work in Moldova both as a journalist for the US government-financed "Radio Europa Libera" multi-media organization, as well

as a prominent political talk-show host; furthermore, in the latter half of January 2010 – that is, less than six months after the consummation of the regime change-process that is here in focus – Morari also met with then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during a conference that was based on enhancing Washington's ability to use social media to advance its global objectives (see, for example, Europa Libera 2010; *Jurnal de Chisinau* 2010; VIP Magazin; WSWS 2010a).

Given the ideological character of many of the leaders of the post-April 5, 2009 anti-PCRM movement, Morari's centrality in said movement would, for at least one pivotal reason, seem to be rather incongruous. Unlike the Brega brothers and their websites and NGOs, unlike Vitalia Pavlicenco, unlike the Basarab brothers and the *Timpul* newspaper that the elder one, Marin, would go to work for as a journalist, etc., Morari cannot fairly be described as a pan-Romanian nationalist; in fact, while she was born in Moldova during the last decade or so of the period when it was part of the Soviet Union, she is not ethnically Romanian or Moldovan, but Russian (see, for example, E-Democracy 2015).

Morari's choice of dress – specifically, the T-shirt that she wore on April 7, 2009 – is, paradoxical though it may seem, highly revealing not only about the ideological foundations but also the geopolitical orientation of what were then Moldova's most active anti-PCRM forces. In short, on April 7, a day during which she, using a megaphone, addressed the protesters in PMAN, Morari sported a T-shirt which read: "I 'heart symbol' Obama" (VIP Magazin).

To people not intimately familiar with the contemporary political spectrum in Moldova and various other Central and Eastern European countries, the picture that I am painting here must seem absolutely inexplicable: after all, I have argued – and brought quite a bit of data to bear in this regard – that ultra-right elements were highly active in the movement to bring down the PCRM government, including in the violence that broke out in the center of Chisinau on April 7. In fact, in the article which constitutes the relevant endnote here, Morari can be seen in the above-mentioned T-shirt addressing a crowd, at

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the very front of which there were people holding up a banner on which the slogan "Better Dead Than Communist!" had been written in Romanian; the photo's utility in this analysis becomes even clearer when it is pointed out that the young man on the left who is holding up a corner of that banner was known to have had genuinely pro-Nazi sympathies (Elldor).

Given that, at least within the spectrum of "official politics" in the United States (i.e., what is currently considered to be the "political mainstream" in that country), Obama was widely regarded as being relatively left, how did it come to pass that a supporter of his spoke in public to and was involved in an obvious de facto political alliance with ultra-right elements?

While considerable internal divisions do indeed exist, the bulk of the Moldovan (and Romanian) far-right not only views "Communism" in its various manifestations negatively but also, certainly, the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, which is by far the largest of the successor states to emerge from it. One of the reasons whereby Moldovan and Romanians on the far-right of the political spectrum regard Moscow negatively comes from the Russian state's perceived (and almost certainly actual) hostility to "union," or to the formal incorporation of Moldova into Romania. Romanian nationalists (and those Moldovans who are politically aligned with them) see Moldovans as being virtually indistinguishable – ethnically, linguistically, and culturally – from Romanians and, given the fact that Moldova is poorer and considerably smaller (both in terms of territory and population) than Romania, they believe that it makes far more sense for the former state to become a part of the latter and not vice versa.

To the extent that Moldovan "liberals" (like the open Obama Administration supporter Natalia Morari) differ ideologically from their de facto allies in the pan-Romanian far-right nationalist milieu, this is not so much a product of significantly contrasting visions about the broad geopolitical and economic trajectory that Moldova should follow and, instead, concerns the issues that they choose to publicly emphasize, and the final end destination of Moldova (i.e., should the country be a nominally independent EU member-

state, or a province of EU and NATO-member Romania).

To understand the de facto cooperation between Natalia Morari and Moldovan "liberals" like her with far-right domestic "unionists," and major Western capitals like Washington, it is useful to briefly describe the nature of the political activity prior to and then shortly after her participation in the anti-PCRM protests/riots of April 2009.

Morari's entrance into "big politics" apparently predates by several years her 2007 receipt of a degree in Sociology from Moscow's Lomsonov University. In 2005, as a result of her acceptance of the offer that was made to her by "Open Russia," which at least at that time was the largest Non-Governmental Organization, or NGO, in all of Russia, Morari become said NGO's "Coordinator of the Project of Public Political Schools" for a large number of the regions within that country. "Open Russia" had been founded by Mikhail Khodorkovsky who, immediately prior to his mid-2005 sentencing by a Moscow court to a nine-year prison term, had been a multi-billionaire and the richest Russian citizen.

In 2006, Morari – again per an invitation that had been made to her – became the Spokesperson for the anti-Putin political coalition that was then called "The Other Russia" (VIP Magazin).

While broad overview pieces in the Western mainstream media usually make the claim that "The Other Russia" was a political umbrella coalition whose ideologically heterogeneous constituent parts were held together only by their shared desire to see Putin pushed from power, such accounts are, a fair review of the key data would suggest, wide of the mark. "The Other Russia" was anti-Putin indeed and there were disparate currents at its head, but these disparate currents (and, consequently, the coalition as a whole) were largely right-wing. It is generally accepted that "The Other Russia's" three most prominent leaders were the former Chess World Champion Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov, who had served as Prime Minister under Putin from 2000 to 2004, and Eduard Limonov; of these three, Kasparov and Kasyanov are known mainly for their strong support both for "free-

market" economics and the geopolitical stances of the US and the EU, while Limonov may fairly be characterized as a fascistic Russian ultra-nationalist.

It is critical to mention that this unholy alliance – which, again, Morari served as the Spokesperson of – was not just supported by but essentially created or at least midwifed at the 2006 G-8 Summit in Moscow by leading Western government officials, including the then UK Ambassador to Russia Anthony Brenton, and Barry Lowenkron and Daniel Fried, both of whom were serving at that time in the US State Department as Assistant Secretaries of State (i.e., quite high-level positions) (see, for example, RFERL 2006; *The New York Times* 2006; WIKILEAKS 2006).

Over the course of the period from 2005–2008, Morari moved in and out of (and generally in) a wide variety of nationalist and pro-free market groups in Russia, all of which were at that time anti-Putin and many of which enjoyed considerable political support from Washington. For example, in a late 2009 interview with a Moldovan publication, Morari reminisced with evident satisfaction about the time that she had spent as a part of the Russian organization called "The Democratic Alternative Movement"; the respective movement, which had been created by the self-described "national democrat" and Western favorite Alexei Navalny, served as the means through which Morari became personally acquainted with, for example, Yeltsin's strongly pro-"free market" Economy Minister, Yevgeny Yasin, as well as Maria Gaidar, who shares the faith that her father, Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar (1992) had in pro-capitalist economic "shock therapy" (see, for example, VIP Magazin).

In penning articles which suggested that corruption was rife among close associates of Putin, Morari ran afoul of the Russian authorities, who in 2008 moved to bar her from reentering the country (which she is not a citizen of); in the above-mentioned interview, Morari says with pride that, in her dispute with the Russian state, she was supported "very much" not only by the EU's European Parliament but also, among other institutions, by "Freedom House," a supposed NGO which, in fact, receives tens of millions of dollars from the US government and whose political

activities in, for example, Ukraine in 2004 were credibly regarded as being marked by clear bias in favor of the pro-Western then Presidential candidate Viktor Yuschenko (Paul 2004; VIP Magazin; WSWS 2014a).

By extending this analysis to a review of protest leader's Natalia Morari's political activities both in Moldova and especially in Russia, the structure and orientation of the anti-PCRM regime change movement in 2009 come more clearly into focus.

Sundry organizations and individuals advocating some mix of "neo-liberal" economics, an anti-Moscow (and thus strongly pro-Brussels and pro-Washington) geopolitical orientation, and pan-Romanian nationalism collaborated together and enjoyed clear support from the just-mentioned Western capitals in the 2009 campaign to remove the PCRM from power. The US and the EU supported precisely the same kinds of forces in Moldova in 2009 as they did in Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" in 2004 and as they've been doing in Russia more or less since Putin consolidated his grip over the state in the early part of the new millennium (Paul 2004; WSWS 2014a).

Had the anti-PCRM regime change campaign not "successfully" achieved its end goal, the above description of the ideological orientation of several of the forces in that campaign and the relations between them and their foreign (overwhelmingly "Western") supporters would have been, perhaps, interesting mainly for curious academics.

However, the "motley crew" alliance of neo-liberals and sundry "pan-Romanian" nationalists did indeed eventually "succeed," the proof of that being the formation of a fractious four party, anti-PCRM parliamentary majority coalition in the late Summer and early Fall of 2009.

Following the Failure of the Violent Putsch, a "Democratic" Regime Change Takes Place

For all the (evidence-free) claims that it had rigged the April 2009 election and that it was, in broad terms, a totalitarian entity, the PCRM all

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throughout the regime change process showed considerable deference to its right-wing political rivals, even after they and their supporters had attacked the police and burned and ransacked sections of both the Parliament and the Presidential building in Chisinau on April 7.

The strongest indication that the claims of electoral fraud that were made by wide sections of the Moldovan right – from young fascists and pan-Romanian nationalists on the street to, for example, Dorin Chirtoaca and then PLDM leader Vlad Filat – were lacking in merit came from the number of seats that the Electoral Commission (CEC) had, certainly by noon of April 7, officially determined that the PCRM would receive. While protesters in PMAN on the morning and early afternoon of April 7 were heard decrying the PCRM's receipt of 61 out of 101 Parliamentary seats – exactly enough to elect the President from within the Parliament, – this information was already then out-of-date or false; several hours before the protests on April 7 degenerated into an orgy of violence, the official vote count had shown that, with 97% or 98% of the ballots having been tabulated, the PCRM would only have 60 seats in the next Parliament.

Over the course of the next two months, the 41 members of Parliament from the PL, PLDM, and the AMN would refuse to grant even one vote to the PCRM's candidate for President, a move which triggered the dissolution of the Parliament and the scheduling of early elections in late July.

The turning point in the 50-day or so campaign for the late July 2009 elections came as soon as that campaign officially got underway; in a development worthy of considerably deeper investigation than is possible in the context of this entry, Marian Lupu, the man whom the PCRM had selected as its candidate for Prime Minister (the Prime Minister is selected by the President after he or she has received at least 61 votes in the Parliament), broke from his party and quickly announced his affiliation with the Democratic Party (PDM), an organization which, in receiving under 4% of the vote on April 5, had failed to enter Parliament.

Lupu quickly became the PDM's leading candidate, with his face being plastered on

large billboards that stated that: "The Political War Must Be Stopped!" (see, for example, Peru-Balan 2010). Despite disingenuously advancing this claim of a political "neutrality" which could not and did not exist and similarly being presented by various anti-PCRM media sources as being a reasonable and responsible man on the "center-left," there was very little question that, in the event that Lupu and his new party entered the Parliament, they would immediately work towards the formation of a government from which the PCRM would be entirely excluded (see, for example, Unimedia 2009).

This, of course, is exactly what occurred; the PCRM's receipt of 44.69% of the vote in the July 29, 2009 election entitled it to 48 out of the 101 seats in the next legislature, while the 51.14% share of the vote that the four anti-PCRM parties (the PL, the PDM, the PLDM, and AMN) together took gave the remaining 53 seats to them.

2001–2009: The PCRM "Zigs" Away from Moscow, and then "Zags" Part of the Way Back

The preceding sections should provide some indication as to why certain sections of Moldovan society as well as Washington and Brussels generally wanted to see – and were intent on taking numerous concrete steps that they regarded as likely to facilitate this goal's realization – the PCRM's back. Why, for the respective Western Powers, this goal arguably acquired a somewhat more imperative character in the lead-up to and then in the immediate aftermath of the April 2009 Parliamentary elections in Moldova than had been the case just a few short years before can, one could rather plausibly argue, be significantly better understood by looking at the broad geostrategic orientation that, ever since the dawn of the millennium, Chisinau had been seeking to chart; thus, the constantly shifting and at-least seemingly ever-more volatile regional and geopolitical context in which the elections in question took place – a context which had been powerfully molded by Washington's role in facilitating the "success" of the 2003–2004 regime change in

Georgia, as well as of the one which unfolded in Ukraine in late 2004 and early 2005 – can explain why, for Washington and Brussels, the opportunity which emerged in the Spring and Summer of 2009 to remove the PCRM from power was not to be missed.

Anti-communism has been, certainly since the Bolshevik Revolution, a corner stone of the ideology not only of Washington and the Western European Powers but also – and, it should be mentioned, in particularly ferocious form – of the Romanian right (see, for example, Ioanid 1990; Sandache 2010; Schmitt 2017). This certainly helps explain why, despite the virtually total absence of genuinely socialist policies during the PCRM's eight years as a governing party, there continued to remain a constituency – certainly among sections of the Moldovan elite – for uncompromising opposition to its rule.

Roughly two months after the PCRM received 50.07% of the vote in the Parliamentary elections in late February of 2001 and consequently was awarded with a super-majority of 71 out of 101 seats in the legislature, the party held its Fourth Congress; it should be mentioned here that long-time – and, actually, still current-day – PCRM leader and Moldova's then newly-installed President Vladimir Voronin gave a speech to those in attendance at this congress, telling them (among other things) that, under his leadership and "[w]ith the help of the progressive forces from the entire world, we [the PCRM as Moldova's governing party] will resist until the end, just as Cuba resists in the middle of the imperialist predators" (*Ziarul de Iași* 2001).

Voronin's occasional radical rhetoric notwithstanding, the PCRM proved, from rather early on in its period in power, to not only be susceptible to pressure from, but also rather willing to align itself to a certain degree with Washington.

The PCRM government's proclaimed anti-imperialist orientation was, at least until late 2003, combined with generally friendly relations with Moscow, relations whose largely amicable and constructive character was manifest in the Chisinau's drafting of – and apparent intent to sign –the so-called Kozak Plan (or Memorandum).

In the main, said plan was at least ostensibly aimed at resolving a conflict which to this day is referred to as "frozen," and which first began to emerge as an existential question for Moldova roughly one year prior to that country's formal declaration of independence in late August of 1991!

The conflict in question mainly concerned the status of Transnistria, a territory which, over the course of the existence of the Soviet Union, was part of that administrative sub-unit known as the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and the overwhelming majority of whose territory still lies today in a strip of land which begins on the eastern banks of the Dniester River. Transnistria accounts for about 11% of the territory of Moldova, and roughly the same portion of its population (or perhaps marginally more), though unlike the rest of the country, the majority of its population considers itself to be either Russian or Ukrainian, with Moldovans constituting then and now a large minority.

In the waning days of the Soviet Union, the perceived increase in influence of pan-Romanian nationalists, including in Moldova's Supreme Soviet, their numerical superiority in that body, and their occasional acts of violence against the far less numerous deputies from the Transnistrian region led the latter to declare Transnistria's independence on September 2, 1990. Skirmishes between forces loyal to Chisinau and those to the separatist authorities in Tiraspol broke out shortly thereafter, occurred intermittently in 1991, and then intensified anew in 1992. In the conflict, the new Moldovan state was backed in at least de facto terms by Bucharest, while the Transnistrian separatists received critical support from Moscow which, by the time of the most intense fighting in 1992, was just the capital of the Russian Federation and not of the by-then defunct USSR.

While existing in de facto terms as a strongly pro-Moscow statelet, Transnistria's "independence" has never been formally recognized by any major international or regional actor, including by Moscow. The Kozak Plan – named after Dmitri Kozak, who then was an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin and who now is Russia's Deputy Prime Minister – would have created a

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federal political structure in which Moldova proper and Transnistria would both have been members (this plan also stipulated that Gagauzia, a part of Moldova proper that ever since 1994 has enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, would have been the third "federal subject").

By all indications, Voronin was on the precipice of signing the plan but, at the last moment – when Putin was apparently en route to Chisinau via plane in order to put his signature on it, as well – he backed out, with the evidence suggesting that his about-face was influenced by opposition to the accord that originated not only from Moldova's pan-Romanian nationalist right and its numerous demonstrations in the street, but also from Washington and the EU (see, for example, Interlic 2008; Mihaes 2008).

Voronin's last-minute rejection of the Kozak Plan was apparently followed in short order by Washington's provision of a 42 million dollar grant (i.e., a financial transfer that did not need to be repaid) to his government (Interlic 2008).

A broader view of the context in which Voronin suddenly decided to reverse course and abandon his acceptance of the Kozak Plan is provided by the fact that, while his and Putin's official signing of the memorandum was scheduled for November 25, 2003, the intensely anti-Russian and Washington-supported "Rose Revolution" in Georgia culminated in the toppling of President Eduard Shevardnadze on November 23. (The "Rose Revolution's" principal leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, officially started his term as the country's President on January 25 of the following year.)

Even more significantly for Moldova (and for the larger balance of power between Washington and the EU, on the one hand, and Moscow, on the other), the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine came to a "successful" conclusion slightly over one year later with the defeat of the relatively pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych, and the accession to the Ukrainian Presidency of the vehemently anti-Moscow and pro-Western candidate Viktor Yuschenko.

Voronin and the PCRM's apparent at-least temporary shift into Washington's camp was further evidenced when, in January of 2005, the then

newly-installed President of Romania, the fervent supporter of all things "Western" and the enemy of "communism" and the Russian government, Traian Basescu, visited Chisinau. While there, Basescu met with Voronin, who gave him 11,000 bottles of Moldovan wine, sending along with them two specialists who were charged with artfully arranging them in the cellars that are located beneath the Romanian Presidential Palace (*Adevărul* 2017).

Basescu's visit to Chisinau preceded by only roughly six weeks the holding of elections on which not only the entire composition of the next Moldovan Parliament, but also – though indirectly – the identity of the country's Prime Minister and President would depend. As opposed to the indisputable "line" of alliance with Russia which was a major part of its campaign in the buildup to its triumph in the 2001 Parliamentary elections, in early 2005, the PCRM positioned itself as a party with a clear – if not excessively single-minded – focus on integration into the EU. In the 2005 elections, the party not only faced opposition from still more fervently and passionately pro-EU and pro-NATO forces in the form of the "Democratic Moldova Bloc" (BMD in Romanian), and the "Christian Democratic People's Party" (PPCD), but also from an openly pro-Russia and relatively left-wing formation, the "Electoral Bloc – Homeland" (BEPR), which criticized it and the two first-mentioned parties for being "pseudo-communists" and "pseudo-democrats," respectively (E-Democracy 2005a).

In any event, the PCRM received 45.98% of the votes in those elections, a result well above the combined total of the only two other electoral formations that passed the threshold for parliamentary representation at that time: while 28.53% of those who cast a ballot gave their backing to the BMD, 9.07% opted to support the PPCD. (While the BEPR's 4.97% vote share was certainly significant, it was also well below the 9% minimum that electoral blocs then needed in order to enter into the Parliament.)

The PCRM's vote share entitled it to 56 out of the 101 seats in Parliament, a number which was, just as was still the case in the wake of the 2009 elections, shy of the 61 that the party needed to

elect the President (and thus the Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet) by itself. Thus, if new elections were to be avoided, some kind of deal between the "communists" and the vehemently anti-communist deputies in the PPCD and the BEM would have to be worked out.

New elections were avoided, and this was due mainly, though not exclusively, to the decision of the PPCD leadership – whose pro-Western and anti-Moscow credentials were, even in comparison with the similarly strongly anti-communist BMD, beyond reproach – to grant the PCRM the votes in Parliament that it needed in order to give Voronin a second term as the country's President (see, for example, Jamestown 2005).

This move, the evidence strongly suggests, went forward in large measure because it not only received the blessing of, but was positively demanded by, the administration of then US President George W. Bush. (Washington's position in this regard was, not even remotely surprisingly, immediately and reflexively adopted by its local partner Basescu.)

Thus, from the early Spring of 2005 until, ultimately, the late Summer of 2009, the PPCD and its leader, the long-time pan-Romanian nationalist and anti-communist agitator Iurie Rosca would end up serving, in exchange for a number of concessions of a secondary importance, as junior partners in what was, for all intents and purposes, a PCRM-run government. (Interestingly enough, by 2018 – that is, long after the 2009 regime change deprived him and his party of their positions within the government and Parliament, – Rosca had started to polemicize aggressively against the Romanian state, portraying it as a stooge for US imperialism's regional designs and anti-Russian agenda (see Geopolitica).)

While probably regarding the essential result of the 2005 elections – the PCRM's success in extending its rule over the country for another four-year term – as less than absolutely ideal, the relevant and available evidence indicates that not just Washington, but also the EU and Bucharest were, at least at the historical moment in question, still on the whole quite satisfied with developments in Moldovan political life. After all, the country's Parliament now consisted of 101

individuals from three different political formations – the PCRM, the BMD, and the PPCD – which were all on the record as favoring Moldova's (at least eventual) integration into the EU (see, for example, E-Democracy 2005b, c).

In fact, when, on April 4, 2005, the Parliament both formally registered and then gave its backing (with 76 votes in favor) to his candidacy for a second term as President, Voronin gave two speeches in which he emphasized that not only should Russia remove its "peacekeeping" troops from Transnistrian territory, but that the assistance of Washington, the EU, Bucharest, and Kiev, as well, would be extremely useful in ensuring a favorable settlement of the Transnistrian problem (Jamestown 2005).

Voronin's seemingly fairly decisive, though also highly conjunctural turn towards the West, however, would not last forever and, as I argue in this entry, had been broadly reversed well in advance of Moldova's 2009 Parliamentary elections.

As soon as it was apparent that the PCRM had indeed won the March of 2005 Parliamentary elections by a substantial margin, Moscow moved to penalize it for its above-described pro-"Western" zig. The first penalties, which came during March and April of 2005, took the form of a total embargo on the import of Moldovan meat, vegetables, and fruit into Russia (*Adevărul* 2014; *Timpul* 2017). Then, on January 1, 2006, the Russian energy giant Gazprom ceased its deliveries of gas to Moldova, demanding as a condition for their resumption a doubling of the price paid per unit volume (Jamestown 2006a). In March of that same year, Russia refused to purchase any more of Moldova's wine, which was then and is now one of the country's principal exports. In every case, the Russian authorities invoked seemingly legitimate reasons for these restrictions – that the wine and food didn't meet the necessary sanitary or quality standards, that the price that Moldova had been paying for its imported gas hadn't been changed in years, and that it had been kept at a much, much lower level than the one in place on the world market and in Western European countries, etc., – but it is more-or-less universally believed that, behind these

restrictive commercial practices, lay broader geo-political considerations (see, for example, *Adevărul* 2014; Jamestown 2006a, b).

The very fact that, as I have argued throughout this entry, Washington, along with the EU, and Bucharest, "successfully" endeavored to push the PCRM from power during the politically decisive year 2009 constitutes fairly strong *prima facie* evidence that said party's pro-Western and anti-Russian "zig" from around the time of its rejection of the Kozak Memorandum in late 2003 certainly did not last forever. There may well be some nuance in precisely dating the PCRM's (at least partial) "zag" back towards Russia, and away from "the West," but it clearly took place prior to the holding of the April 5, 2009 Moldovan Parliamentary elections. Support for the idea that, some time prior to those elections, the PCRM did indeed carry out some kind of "corrective zag" back towards Moscow is provided by the Romanian political analyst Vladimir Socor who, for well over a decade now, has been intimately involved in seeking to impact on high-level political developments in Moldova.

Socor's efforts in this regard have not been, it should be mentioned, limited to penning (rather subjective) analyses about Moldovan and regional political affairs for the vehemently anti-Moscow think-tank the Jamestown Institute; in fact, in one such article, he admits that, in the immediate aftermath of Moldova's 2005 Parliamentary elections, he brought the conservative former Republican Congressman from Arizona, John Conlan, to that country in order to encourage the incoming deputies from the PPCD and the BMD to reward Voronin for his pro-Western "zig" by granting him at least the five "golden votes" that he needed in order to start his second term as President (Hahn 2018; Jamestown 2005; JConlan).

In an article published on the Jamestown Foundation's website on July 30, 2007, Socor argued that, during the preceding 10 days or so, Voronin had broadly rhetorically lashed out twice at all of the significant political formations in Moldova that were criticizing his then-ongoing and less-than-totally transparent negotiations

with Russia over Transnistria and/or were seeking to form coalitions without the PCRM in various localities around the country. Voronin, Socor notes, collectively referred to all such parties besides his own as: "the opposition," "right-wing," and "enemies," and also stated that they were "in the pay" of forces that sought to do harm to Moldova.

The change in tone, Socor suggests, was connected to the PCRM's relatively poor showing in the local and municipal elections that were held in early and mid-June of 2003 (if no candidate in a Mayoral race received an outright majority when the first round of elections was held on June 3, then a second round between the top two finishers was held on June 17); overall, the party received about 34% of the ballots cast in different races in the country, a result which was significantly worse than its approximate 46.8% vote share when local and municipal elections had last been held back in 2003 (Jamestown 2007).

In retrospect, the beginnings of a partial PCRM "zag" away from the more-or-less exclusively pro-"European" vector that, following right on Voronin's sudden rejection of the Kozak Memorandum, it had adhered to can be traced back to the second half of 2007. Whatever the cause or causes – and primarily electoral calculations certainly cannot be summarily ruled out – it seems that Moscow fairly quickly took notice and sought to reward Chisinau for (again, at least partially) "returning to the fold"; central among such "rewards" was the move during November of 2007 whereby Moscow once again decided to "open the doors" for the importation of Moldovan wine into Russia (BBC 2007).

2009: With Its Regional "Golden Boys" in Crisis, Washington Tries to Score a Compensatory Win in Moldova

The regional political context in the buildup to the April 5, 2009 Parliamentary elections in Moldova was significantly different from that which existed four years or so prior, and Voronin (not to mention, for example, Washington) seems to have

been fairly keenly aware of this. While the regional political context that preceded the March 2005 Parliamentary elections in Moldova was largely defined by the rise to the office of the Presidency of (and the consequent assumption of Executive power by) rock-ribbed anti-communists and lovers of all things American – Saakashvili in Georgia in January 2004, Basescu in Romania in December 2004, and Yushchenko in Ukraine in January 2005 – by early 2009, the bloom most definitely had, as is said, come off the rose in the cases of these three individuals (see, for example, Toal 2017). Saakashvili's regime – in a short war that it had initiated – suffered a humiliating defeat on Georgian territory at the hands of Russia in August 2008, while Yushchenko's term as President had been marked by – among other undesirable developments – constant political instability and inter-elite infighting including, prominently between him and his erstwhile "Orange Revolution" partner from 2004 to 2005, Yulia Tymoshenko. So great was the political chaos that characterized Yushchenko's term as President that, during said time, not only did Tymoshenko serve as Prime Minister for two non-consecutive periods, but those two periods were "sandwiched" around the 16+ months when the post of Prime Minister was held by the "Orange Revolution's" old nemesis, the relatively pro-Moscow politician Viktor Yanukovych. By the end of 2008, the economies of all three states were, as a consequence of the outbreak of the global financial crisis, in a state of collapse, a development which certainly had a significantly negative impact on these Presidents' approval ratings.

Voronin was, it is safe to assume, keenly aware of these developments, just as he was regarding the corrosive impact that his "unidirectional," pro-EU stance had, as evidenced by the election results in 2005 and 2007, on his party's significantly Russophile voting base. To Washington's not-insubstantial chagrin (evidenced, again, by an article by its apparently semi-official analyst for Moldovan affairs, Vladimir Socor), Voronin opted to accept an invitation to go to Moscow for meetings on March 18, 2009 that concerned a potential pathway forward for the resolution of

the Transnistrian question. Socor suggests that Voronin saw the meetings – which were hosted by then-Russian President Medvedev, and also attended by Igor Smirnov, who at that time was the President of Transnistria – not only as an attempt to solve the Gordian Knot that was the Transnistrian question, but also as a pre-election photo op (Jamestown 2009).

Socor asserts that Moscow also regarded the meetings as some kind of *quid pro quo* – perhaps not only could they result in making headway towards a potential final settlement of the Transnistria question in a manner consistent with Russian interests, but they might also simultaneously boost Voronin's popularity at home and convince him that his own political future and that of the PCRM as a whole were dependent on a broad alignment with the Kremlin. Socor supports these claims by acknowledging that, however much he may have wished that things were otherwise, the truth was that, at the time of the meetings in question: "It is a measure of Moldova's political underdevelopment that Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin hold the first two places in Moldova's political ratings (ahead of Voronin, who holds a distant first place among local personalities) and that Moldova's Orthodox Church, affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate, enjoys the highest confidence rating among Moldova's institutions" (Ibid).

With its maximally faithful "regional golden boys" Saakashvili, Basescu, and Yushchenko in evident political retreat, and with its erstwhile "man with whom we can do business," Voronin, now again "zagging" away from it to some extent, Washington clearly regarded "a win" in the April 5, 2009 Parliamentary elections in Moldova as being even more imperative than would otherwise normally have been the case. When, in the more-or-less immediate wake of those elections, the opportunity to push the insufficiently "dependable" PCRM from power presented itself, Washington did not hesitate to bring to bear various policy instruments at its disposal towards the end of facilitating a "successful" regime change in Moldova.

M

The Regime Change Is Complete . . . and the Austerity Is Intensified

Several of the economic and political implications of the PCRM's loss of its parliamentary majority and the transfer of power to four anti-communist parties became visible even before that transfer was formalized.

For example, just five days before PLDM leader Vlad Filat formally became Prime Minister on September 20, the anti-PCRM majority on the Chisinau City Council, in alliance with Mayor Chirtoaca (PL), not only increased the price of drinking water for consumers in residences in the city by 80%, but also bus fares by 50%, as well as the cost of trolley tickets by 100% (OMG 2009a, b).

The elimination of price-reducing subsidies for things like drinking water, public transportation, and energy is invariably one of the elements of "bailout" packages that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), operating on strict "neo-liberal" principles, offers to countries which are economically struggling and having difficulties with the payment of their foreign debts.

So it was with Moldova in the more-or-less immediate aftermath of the conclusion of the 2009 anti-PCRM regime change there.

The budget that the Filat government voted for and put into effect on November 18, 2009 contained a wide array of austerity measures whose implementation the IMF demanded in exchange for its granting of a $574 million loan to the state (OMG 2010e). Besides mandating the closure of 60 schools and the "reorganization" of 130 other ones, the respective budget, among its various other austere features, significantly reduced the amount of money which had previously gone to agriculture and also increased taxes on different kinds of fuel, which immediately increased their prices by 7–8%; similarly, funds which under the PCRM had been utilized for the construction of aqueducts in as well as for the "gasification" of rural areas were either totally missing from the new budget or were cut back sharply (OMG 2009c, d, 2010c).

The austerity agenda of the AIE was not only advanced through the regressive tax increases and various spending cuts contained in the budget that was briefly described above; as a condition for the receipt of the IMF loan, the Filat government, in alliance with the Central Bank (the National Bank of Moldova or BNM in Romanian, whose "Governor" Filat and his Cabinet chose shortly after coming to power), facilitated a 13–14% depreciation in the value of the Moldovan Leu over the course of the two-month period from early December of 2009 to early February of 2010 (OMG 2010d).

Austerity – an integral part of "The Washington Consensus" (the IMF is, after all, headquartered there) – was pushed forward rather quickly by the Filat Government via the method of "a thousand cuts." Yet another one of the (social) "cuts" came in the form of the sharp hiking of the prices that final consumers (that is, residents of different parts of Moldova) had to pay for natural gas, and electric, and thermal energy.

On January 14, 2010, The National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE in Romanian) announced that, retroactive to January 1 of that year, the prices that consumers would have to pay for natural gas, electric, and thermal energy would be increased by 16.5%, 21%, and 29%, respectively (OMG 2010b).

The sharp increases in utility prices did not merely reduce living standards for large sections of Moldova's already-suffering population; they were a reflection of how IMF-demanded austerity measures which provoke public opposition often cannot be implemented via democratic means.

Up until right before the pushing through of the above-mentioned utility price hikes, the Chisinau Municipal Council (CMC), in coordination with the Mayor, was responsible for determining, at least within that city, the prices that consumers would pay for thermal energy in their residences. As described by then CMC member Valeriu Klimenco, the CMC's reluctance to jack up thermal energy prices as much as the IMF demanded led the Filat government to transfer the responsibility for their determination from the popularly-elected CMC to ANRE, which is an unelected body (OMG 2010a).

Incredibly, exactly four months after the January 14 session in which it decided to put the just-

mentioned utility price increases in effect, ANRE made another move on May 14 towards "economic liberalization" by not only further hiking consumer prices for natural gas by around 14%, but also for thermal energy by about 17% (OMG 2010f).

The subordination of the new AIE regime to the IMF is made clear by the sequence of events; on September 20, 2009, Filat becomes Prime Minister; on October 28 of that year, he met with Nicolai Gheorgiev, who was then the head of the IMF Mission to Moldova; following that meeting, Filat declared that: "Utility prices need to be brought into accord with their real cost . . . [so that] the companies which produce electric or thermal energy can cover their costs;" almost immediately thereafter, the Filat Cabinet passes responsibility for the determination of utility prices from the (elected) local authorities to ANRE; in mid-late November, the Government passes a budget which hikes various regressive taxes and cuts back a number of kinds of socially-oriented public spending; by no later than early December, the Moldovan Leu begins to sink quickly against the US Dollar, losing 13–14% of its value against it in two months' time; in mid-January 2010 and again in mid-May of that year, ANRE imposes utility price hikes on consumers that amount to around 21% for electric energy, 32.6% for natural gas, and about 51% for thermal energy (OMG 2010a).

It is obvious that the IMF-demanded and AIE-implemented economic measures quickly and powerfully negatively impacted on the living standards of large sections of Moldova's predominantly impoverished population.

Stopping "the Communists" . . . by Pursuing More Authoritarian Forms of Rule

To consolidate its grip on power in conditions in which large portions of the population were sinking even more deeply into poverty, the AIE regime oriented itself, and in several different ways, towards the adoption of more authoritarian forms of rule.

From the beginning, despite the open and obvious support that it enjoyed from Washington and the EU, the AIE regime was mired in crisis; the 53 seats that its constituent parties controlled in the Parliament meant that the AIE's chosen candidate for President, Marian Lupu, would only be elected if at least eight MPs from the PCRM decided to defy their party's leadership and vote for him.

As that didn't occur, the Constitution mandated that the AIE would have to call, certainly no later than the early summer of 2010, early Parliamentary elections. None of the AIE's constituent parties had any interest in that and they all sought, in spite of the seemingly well constitutionally grounded protests from the PCRM, to circumvent what appeared to be their unambiguous legal obligation to organize just such elections.

Finally, the AIE's four leaders came up with a plan; before organizing any such constitutionally mandated Parliamentary elections, they would first organize a national referendum in which the country's adult (18 and over years of age) citizens would be asked if they favored electing the President by means of a popular vote; interestingly enough, the long-time leader of the PCRM, Vladimir Voronin had argued earlier in 2010 that, as long as the Parliament was dissolved and early elections for it called, he would instruct his party to vote for the reinstitution of the popular vote as the means of choosing the country's President (OMG 2010i).

Operating with the evident support of Brussels and Washington, the AIE's four leaders – Filat (PLDM), then Interim-President Ghimpu (PL, just like his nephew, Chisinau Mayor Chirtoaca), Lupu (PDM), and Serafim Urechean (AMN) – ignored the requirement that they organize Parliamentary elections and simply decided to first hold a Referendum on the modality of choosing the President.

Favoring, at least at that point in time, the direct election of the President by popular vote, the leaders of the AIE pushed a law through the Parliament which seemed to make the success of their referendum (at which they called the population to vote "Yes") a virtual inevitability; up to the summer of 2010, the legal-constitutional

changes proposed in a referendum would have been enacted if a simple majority of at least 50% +1 of the eligible voters cast a ballot in favor of them (a "yes" vote). However, the AIE regime pushed a measure through Parliament whereby its referendum on the direct election of the President would have been validated if a simple majority of at least 1/3+1 of the eligible voters turned out to vote "Yes" on it (OMG 2010g, j).

In other words, if 1/6 + 1 (at least 16.67%) of the eligible voters in Moldova voted "Yes" on the AIE's Referendum, which was scheduled for September 5, 2010, the Constitution would be changed, direct Presidential elections would be organized relatively quickly thereafter, and the AIE could put off the holding of parliamentary elections (at which its narrow majority might disappear) for another three or four years (OMG 2010h, j).

Clearly seeing the Referendum as a threat to its interests (former Moldovan President and long-time PCRM leader Vladimir Voronin would not be able to run in Presidential elections as he had already served two terms in that office) and publicly arguing that it merely served to unconstitutionally delay the holding of obligatory Parliamentary elections, the PCRM called on the population to boycott the Referendum (OMG 2010i, j).

The general consensus within the PCRM at this time was not only that it was quite likely that at least 1/3 of the eligible voters would indeed participate in the Referendum, but also that it was a virtual certainty that the overwhelming majority of the participants would vote "Yes." Thus, while not resigned to defeat, various PCRM members consoled themselves with the notion that their party's boycott could be regarded as having achieved a sort of moral victory if turnout fell under the 50% threshold.

In a surprise for all concerned, the turnout on the day of the Referendum was around 30% (of those who participated, something like 87% did indeed vote "Yes") (OMG 2010m). Thus, the AIE was thrown into a significant political crisis which it had not anticipated having to confront; with no other even remotely constitutionally valid options that they could resort to, the AIE's leaders conceded to the PCRM the need to hold, and in relatively short order, Parliamentary elections.

Forced to call the Parliamentary elections which should have taken place not more than seven weeks or so after the December of 2009 development whereby Lupu's candidacy for the Presidency was defeated by the PCRM's refusal in the Parliament to grant him any of the eight extra votes that he needed from it, the AIE regime did everything that it could – including via the adoption of a plainly anti-democratic election law – to effectively guarantee that it would never lose its majority in the legislature to the PCRM.

The law in question radically and utterly undemocratically changed the manner in which parliamentary mandates would be distributed to those parties that did indeed surpass the threshold for representation in the legislature; while previously, the votes received by parties which did not enter the Parliament would be transformed into extra mandates for the parliamentary parties in relation to the number of votes that the latter received, under the measure that the AIE passed roughly 10 days after the failure of its referendum, all the "extra" votes obtained by non-Parliamentary parties would be transformed into mandates, which would then be divided equally among the parties in the legislature, regardless of the number of votes that they had received (OMG 2010n, o).

The blatantly partisan (in this case, anti-PCRM) and grossly anti-democratic character of this law can be better understood if one realizes that, at the time, the PCRM was by far Moldova's largest party and capable of being defeated only by an alliance of multiple parliamentary parties.

A short example will suffice: if the PCRM got 40% of the vote in the November 28, 2010 elections, and the four parties of the AIE once again entered the Parliament with a combined 32% of the vote, the AIE would once again control either 53 or 54 of the 101 seats in Parliament. Such a counter-intuitive and anti-democratic result would be arrived at because the 28% of the vote that went to parties that did not enter the Parliament would be transformed in 29 mandates (again, there are 101 in the Parliament), of which the PCRM would either receive seven or, in "the best case scenario," eight.

Unsurprisingly, the AIE's open trampling on the most fundamental principles and practices of modern representative democracy did not elicit any kind of criticism from ruling circles in either Brussels or Washington; the repudiation of the most basic principles which necessarily must undergird any modern system of representative democracy was, apparently, not worthy of comment or criticism by the Western Powers that, financially and in terms of "political capital," had invested a great deal in the "AIE Project" and that were loath to see their investment in that alliance go to waste after it had only held power for slightly over a year.

The Client Regime's Stability Remains in Doubt . . . and Joe Biden Is Dispatched to Try to Shore It Up

The November 28, 2010 Parliamentary elections in Moldova did not in any way put an end to the political instability that, ever since the chaos and violence of April 7, 2009, the country had been struggling with.

The 39.34% share of the vote that the PCRM received in the November 28, 2010 elections resulted in the party's receipt of 42 seats in the next Parliament – no majority, clearly, but once again enough – if the party so chose and remained united – to block whomever the AIE decided to put forward as its candidate for the Presidency (E-Democracy 2010). Sure enough, the AIE (reduced to just three parties – the PLDM, the PDM, and the PL – after the AMN did not meet the 4% share of the vote for parliamentary representation at the November 28, 2010 elections) would eventually again select Marian Lupu as its candidate for the Presidency of the country though, according to the constitutional and legal provisions that then governed the election of the head of state in Moldova, the next time that the Parliament would vote on his candidacy could not be before late 2011 (see, for example, OLD.OMG; Ziare; OMG 2010p through OMG 2010v).

The fact that, from late December of 2010, just as in November and December of 2009, the AIE (or AIE-2, given the reduction in the number of its constituent parties from four to three) had no real possibility to "deliver" the 61 votes in Parliament necessary to make Lupu the President meant that the country's political-institutional crisis would continue and deepen; there was no end in sight to the situation whereby from mid-September of 2009, the office of the Presidency of the country had effectively remained vacant. (The President of the PL, Mihai Ghimpu, served as the country's Interim President from mid-September of 2009 until December 30, 2010 when that position, with the limited powers that it offered to whoever occupied it, was transferred over to Lupu.)

None of this would deter Western officials from lavishly praising Moldova (actually, its ever-more provisional political leaders from the AIE) as a "success story."

The visit that, in early March of 2011, then US Vice President Joe Biden paid to Moldova and, even more than that, the speech that he gave before an assembled crowd in PMAN showed rather clearly why Washington, along with the EU, was intent on backing the AIE to the hilt.

While "impressively" rife with more-or-less meaningless generalities and profoundly banal stock phrases, Biden's speech was revealing in that he indicated clearly enough through it not only that Washington generally had a favorable view of the AIE regime, but that the respective view was largely based on economic and geostrategic considerations.

While completely devoid of any direct criticisms of the Russian government, the speech that Biden gave in (or right next to) PMAN was notable for its numerous and highly positive references to Eastern European and Caucasus-region governments and political developments that were and are widely perceived as having been significantly and clearly hostile to the Putin regime's strategic position.

For example, Biden stated that: "In Georgia, we support the emergence of a strong democracy and free markets, and the integrity of Georgia's territory" (Obama WH). It is worth stating here that, at the point that Biden gave this speech in Chisinau, the Georgian state had already been run for over seven years in a plainly less-than-fully

democratic manner by then President Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili, who ended up serving as Georgia's President for nearly 10 years (he was in office as the head of state from early 2004 to late 2013), ran a state which, when confronted with large street demonstrations, used the police to brutalize hundreds of protesters and close down independent media outlets (WSWS 2008). While nominally democratic, Saakashvili's regime was, it seems undeniable, far more authoritarian and repressive in practice than, say, the government that Voronin headed in Moldova from 2001 to 2009.

There is little question that the effectively authoritarian regime that Saakashvili led did indeed largely pursue "free-market" economic policies and that, whatever their success or failure in raising the living standards of Georgia's still predominantly quite poor populace, the implementation of such measures was, as Biden stated openly, looked on very favorably by Washington (Ibid.).

Similarly, Biden's reference in his speech to "the integrity of Georgia's territory" can and probably should be understood to mean that Washington will not hesitate to provide backing to countries such as Georgia (and Moldova), should they find themselves locked in conflicts with separatist forces and enclaves that are supported by Moscow (as occurred in the short war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia that started when the latter sought – and ultimately failed – to reconquer its "renegade" territory of South Ossetia). In the context of Moldovan politics, this statement of Biden should be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of the outbreak of a conflict between Chisinau and the Russian-backed separatist administration that is based out of Tiraspol, Washington would definitely come to the aid of the former.

The remarks that Biden made in his speech in Chisinau about Ukraine and Belarus provide further evidence for the argument that Washington crafts its policies towards countries in Central and Eastern Europe (and the Caucasus) to a great extent on the basis of the nature of those countries' relations with Moscow; Washington will support (adopt a more-or-less hostile position towards) those countries whose governments have a basically rivalrous (friendly) stance vis-à-vis Moscow.

In saying in his speech in Chisinau that: "In Ukraine, the world welcomed the Orange Revolution, but there is much hard work remaining to be done to sustain its success," Biden can be "accused," at a minimum, of having a less-than-perfect sense of timing. The so-called Orange Revolution began in late November of 2004 and, after roughly two months, finally came to a "successful" conclusion when the strongly pro-Western and pro-capitalist politicians Viktor Yuschenko and Yulia Tymoshenko took office as President and Prime Minister, respectively (see, for example Hahn 2018; Rudling 2011).

When the first round of Presidential elections were held in Ukraine in mid-January of 2010, the country's then-serving head of state Yuschenko came in fifth place and only received about 5.5% of the vote; when the run-off between the two top finishers was held two weeks later, the "bête noire" of the Orange Revolution, the relatively pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych, edged one of its two main protagonists, Tymoshenko.

While Yanukovych's formal assumption of the office of the Presidency in late February of 2010 would have seemed to have clearly sounded the "death knell" of the Orange Revolution, Biden was still – and rather oddly and, one might add, suspiciously – speaking over a year later of "sustain[ing] its success."

Though Biden almost certainly did not intend for this to be the case, the speech that he gave in Chisinau can indeed serve as an extremely useful source for researchers intent on learning more about the forces that actually drive Washington's (and the EU's) policies towards countries in the "post-Soviet space" and Eastern and Central Europe more generally. Somewhat less politely, Biden's Chisinau speech gave off the distinct stench of rank political hypocrisy.

For example, among all the post-Soviet Republics that Biden mentioned in his speech, Belarus was the only one whose government he subjected to (quite harsh) criticism; more specifically, he stated that: "We have condemned the

government of Belarus for the repression of its own citizens. We've joined the European Union in imposing sanctions against that government, and we call for the immediate release of all political prisoners."

That the government of Belarus (still headed today as it was at the time of Biden's speech by Aleksander Lukashenko) is no Jeffersonian Democracy is obvious enough, but it is not at all clear if it was radically (or really any) more repressive than the Saakashvili regime which, again, Biden said in Chisinau represented "the emergence of a strong democracy."

The most significant contrasts between Lukashenko's regime and that of Saakashvili in Georgia lay, it would seem, not in the sphere of political democracy, but in the latter's clearly much stronger orientation towards both a largely deregulated "neoliberal" economy and Western-dominated multinational organizations like NATO and the EU (see, for example, The Plundering; WSWS 2008, 2011, 2012, 2017).

The speech that Biden gave in Chisinau certainly served as recognition that a regime change had taken place in Moldova in 2009, that it had been, to some extent at least, consolidated, and that Washington was definitely supportive of the new AIE government; however, through this speech, Biden stressed that the AIE still had a lot of work to do in the future to ensure that Moldova would eventually become a stalwart and more-or-less irreversibly pro-Western and economically neoliberal outpost in the former Soviet space.

A clear indication from Biden's speech that, at least at that particular point in time, Washington viewed AIE-governed Moldova as a "star pupil" who hadn't, however, graduated yet came from the frequency with which he stressed how important it was for the country to continue implementing (the never explicitly defined) "economic reforms."

For example, about midway through his speech, Biden said that: "We strongly support your commitment to political and economic reforms and taking on hard issues." What, one may ask, were the "hard issues" that Biden made mention of? As he never defined that term, it is impossible to know.

What Biden meant when he spoke of "political ... reforms" is also hard to determine, as in his speech he didn't mention any concrete policies in the recent history of Moldova or, actually, of any other country which might have served as examples. Perhaps this was for the best as, per the analysis presented above, one of the most significant changes to the country's political-electoral system that the AIE government had made was based on plainly undemocratically manipulating the system of parliamentary mandate-distribution so that it would be virtually impossible for the then PCRM-dominated opposition to ever take power again.

In his speech, Biden did, however, provide some clues about what he saw as the content and likely implications of the "economic reforms" that the AIE government apparently had a "commitment to." The basic contours of the economic (and political) policy path that, in his Chisinau speech, Biden not too terribly subtly indicated that Washington wanted the Moldovan government to follow were outlined in the following passage: "Economic reform can be even harder [than political reform], especially when unemployment is high and prices are rising. People everywhere, including in my own country, America, worry about jobs and prices, as well. But as you reform your economy, more foreign investment will flow into Moldova ..." (Obama WH).

In other words, Biden knew that the IMF-demanded austerity measures that, going back to late 2009, the AIE had first started pushing through had already generated "unemployment ... and [high] prices" in the country, but that mustn't under any circumstances dissuade the heads of the Moldovan government from continuing to "reform your economy"; apparently, in then-Vice President Biden's view, persevering with moves to "reform your economy" is the only way to ensure that "more foreign investment will flow into Moldova."

There is little question that Biden saw the "foreign investment" about which he spoke on that March day in Chisinau as originating primarily from the US and other "Western" countries; given the text of his speech and the entire political and economic history outlined in this article, it seems

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extremely unlikely that he and other leading US and EU policymakers would be pleased if the "foreign investment ... flow into Moldova" increasingly started coming from, say, Russia and China or, for example, Iran.

To be continued . . .

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Monarchy

Money Capital

Monopoly Capitalism

▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex

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Synonyms

Globalization; Neoliberalism; Periphery; Political economy; World economy

Definition/Description

Discussions on the changing forms of imperialism have retained their relevance in the face of stupendous upheavals of the world economy and geopolitics since the 1970s. This article aims to contribute to these discussions from the perspective of the monopoly-capital school. In the first place, I analyse the stagnating nature of US monopoly capitalism since the 1970s using data obtained from primary sources. In the second, I assess the growing importance of NGO-isation for imperialist interventions geared toward advancing the global interests of monopoly capitalism. My findings suggest that monopoly capitalism cannot extricate itself from the trap of stagnation, economic crisis, and inequality despite soaring profit and monopolisation levels under neoliberalism. This situation forces US imperialism to increasingly rely on military aggression, media manipulation, and colonisation of the non-profit sector.

Introduction

Discussions on the changing forms of imperialism have retained their relevance in the face of

stupendous upheavals of the world economy and geopolitics since the 1970s. This article aims to contribute to these discussions from the perspective of the monopoly-capital school. More precisely, its contribution is twofold. In the first place, I analyse the stagnating nature of US monopoly capitalism since the 1970s using data obtained from primary sources. By stagnation, I do not only mean the slowing down of economic growth, but also an amalgamation of declining production levels below the economic potential, significant levels of (long-term) unemployment, and rising inequality (Foster and Magdoff 2009). This is despite soaring corporate profits in the context of financialisation. Stagnation is then associated with escalating imperialist aggression and the intensification of contradictions between US imperialism and the Third World. This helps explain why US imperialism increasingly relies on interventions abroad by means of the non-profit sector as a more cost-effective method than military invasion.

In the second place, I assess the growing importance of NGO-isation for imperialist interventions geared toward advancing the interests of monopoly capitalism. Besides presenting empirical evidence on the global NGO boom since the 1980s, I argue that corporate foundations and the US state apparatus assume a key economic role in the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC) as the agents of monopoly capitalism. I identify three historical moments that underlie the emergence and consolidation of the NPIC. First, the Cold War conjuncture allowed US imperialism to develop new strategies of regime change employing the resources of such actors as the George Soros Foundation (GSF), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Second, the advancement of the neoliberal agenda led dominant international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to prioritise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as an alternative to state-centred welfare regimes. Third, the need to pacify growing social unrest – caused by neo-liberalism's failure to overcome inequality

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and stagnation – was satisfied based on strategies of co-optation and the professionalisation of NGO cadres.

My argument on NGO-isation is inspired by John Bellamy Foster's Kalecki-informed analysis of the triangular structure of contemporary imperialism. According to Michal Kalecki, the imperialist system of the Keynesian era rested on a triangular structure that was composed of: (a) state-financed military production (i.e., the military-corporate complex, often called the 'military-industrial complex'); (b) media propaganda (media-corporate complex); and (c) a putative full-employment/welfare-oriented superstructure (Keynesianism) underpinned by the war machine, serving to justify it (Kalecki 1972). Building on Kalecki's work, Foster provides an updated version of the theory of imperialism of the monopolycapital tradition by laying emphasis on the primary role of the above triangle in the restructuring and preservation of the contemporary imperialist system (Foster 2006, 2008). Expanding on his work, I argue that one of the most significant changes in the triangular structure of contemporary imperialism is in its third pillar, particularly with the abandonment of the welfare-oriented paradigm and the adoption of the neo-liberal globalisation project. In this article, neoliberalism is simply referred to as a set of institutional structures, norms, and unwritten rules that regulate the global political economy of the post-1980 era based on the principles of capital and trade liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation. It is spearheaded by US imperialism and its global network represented by the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organisation, etc.

The article is divided into three parts. The first provides a theoretical and empirical discussion of contemporary imperialism. Not only do I address the stagnating nature of US monopoly capitalism, but I also touch on its aspects related to military and media power. The second section shifts the focus to the NPIC by assessing the global NGO boom with respect to its economic and conjunctural background. The third section examines the co-optative effects of the NPIC on NGO leaders and Third-World countries. In the conclusion, I discuss the importance of popular struggles for the transformation of the non-profit sector into

a popular-democratic domain. I conclude by drawing attention to emerging alternatives to the NPIC in Latin America. This region has become a mainstay for the global anti-imperialist struggle with the rise of leftward social movements and centre-left governments since the 2000s (Gürcan 2013).

The Metamorphosis of Monopoly Capitalism and Restructuring of the Triangular Structure of Imperialism

The neo-liberalisation of the world economy under the US leadership represents a landmark in the history of modern imperialism. As portrayed by John Bellamy Foster, neoliberalism corresponds to 'the most recent manifestation of imperialism: capital (large corporations, both financial and non-financial) using governments, and especially the leadership of the US government, to make it easier to exploit the world's resources and people' (Foster and Magdoff 2009, p. 41). A defining feature of the neo-liberal era is the financialisation of the world capitalist system since the 1970s. For the specific purposes of this article, it is sufficient to illustrate financialisation based on the growing total value of all traded shares in the US stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP. The World Bank data indicate that there has been a value growth of almost 100% between 1988 and 2012 (Fig. 1):

The neo-liberal era has been marked by a general economic tendency toward stagnation as the economy functions below its productive potential, while suffering from significant levels of unemployment and inequality. The data suggest that the US economic growth (taken as GDP per capita growth) has tended to stagnate below 4% in most of the period 1961–2012 (Fig. 2), although corporate profits have seen record uptrends (Fig. 3). This goes hand in hand with declining levels of industrial production (Fig. 4), a rising share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment (Figs. 5 and 6), and growing income inequality (Fig. 7).

The neo-liberal transformation of the imperialist system has not altered the real essence of

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 1 Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP). (Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.GD.ZS)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 2 US GDP per capita growh (annual %). (Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 3 US Corporate Profits (1950–2014, in USD Million). (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis: http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/DownSS2.asp#XLS)

imperialism, which manifests itself in the growth of monopoly capitalism as the dominant form of capital. For the purposes of this chapter, monopoly capitalism can be defined as a capitalist system dominated by giant (i.e., highly bureaucratised, hierarchical, management-controlled and financially independent) corporations and strong imperialist states that further the interests of giant corporations (Sweezy and Baran 1968). Driven by the need to retain control over raw materials

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 4 Industry, value added (% of GDP). (Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 5 US long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment). (Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.LTRM.ZS)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 6 US Unemployment Rate (% of Total Employment). (Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 7 US Gini Index (Increasing Inequality). (Source: OECD)

and labour, and to generate surplus-absorption opportunities in peripheral areas, monopoly capitalist imperialism is characterised by the further polarisation of the world economy into centre and periphery (Foster 2006).

Data on the concentration ratio of US industries can provide a provisional depiction of monopoly capitalism and its inherent drive for monopolisation, albeit at the national level. Given that the US economy is the powerhouse of the global economy, one could assume a symmetry for the monopoly power of US-centred firms at both the national and international levels. According to the US Census data, the four largest firms in national commercial banking and savings have monopolised 55.7% and 41.1% of the total sectorial revenue in their respective areas. The same rates for software publishing, motion picture and sound recording, newspaper and book publishing (nerve centres for the manufacturing of consent) are 38.9%, 34.5%, 29.4% and 33.4%. In the agrifood sector, a vital sector for the reproduction of labour power and continuation of the economy, the four largest companies have monopolised sectorial revenues as follows: animal food processing

(43.9%), grain and oilseed milling (54.2%), flour milling (52.1%), rice milling (55.4), starch and vegetable fats and oils manufacturing (69.3%), fats and oils refining and blending (53.8%), soybean processing (85.4%), breakfast cereal manufacturing (85%), and sugar manufacturing (51.9%) (USEconomicCensus 2007).

As the data on economic growth, inequality and unemployment demonstrate, significant levels of financialisation, monopolisation, and corporate profits could not provide a tangible solution to the stagnation problem of US capitalism. The stagnating state of monopoly capitalism is the underlying reason for imperialist aggression and the intensification of contradictions between US imperialism and the Third World. Relatedly, it is important to stress that imperialist aggression cannot be reduced to the individual policies of certain 'ambitious' states or the personality of policymakers. It is rather a systematic result of the logic of monopoly capitalism as a historical/structural formation (Foster 2006, p. 13).

As mentioned earlier, the defining components of the historical structure of monopoly capitalism include the military- and media-industrial

complexes. As far as the military-industrial complex is concerned, Foster points to the fact that the US remains the world leader in military spending (Foster 2008). The US leadership came to keep its leading position thanks to record levels of budgetary increase. Between 2001 and 2007, US national defence spending soared by 60% in real dollar terms, reaching a level of $553 billion (Foster 2008). It is thus no coincidence that the US Department of Defense has become the world's largest employer by providing work for 3.2 million people (BBC 2012). Figure 8 reveals that US military expenditure has tended to exceed that of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) between 1991 and 2013. Clearly, high levels of military spending are a chief indicator of the extent to which military and industrial sectors are intertwined within the US state and economy (Foster 2008).

The imperialist tendency toward militarisation stimulates the decline of US global hegemony, which in turn further intensifies military escalation (Foster 2006). According to István Mészáros, the military aspects of today's imperialism are one of the most crucial components of monopoly capitalism. Considering the current state of military technology:

> '... We have entered the most dangerous phase of imperialism in all history. For what is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet ... but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means – even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones. This is what the ultimate rationality of globally developed capital requires ...' (Mészáros 2001, p. 37)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 8 Military expenditure (% of GDP). (Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS)

As for the media-industrial complex, US corporate/imperialist media are among the primary beneficiaries of the US-led neo-liberal globalisation, as their revenues outside the US are soaring at a rapid pace and the US government itself is lending support to media monopolies in trade deals and intellectual property agreements (Foster 2006). According to the US Census data, the media, information and arts/entertainment industry provides employment for almost 5.5 million persons (USCensus 2007). The essential role of the media-industrial complex consists of the depoliticisation of the masses as well as the provision of ideological support for the US war machine through all sorts of propaganda and disinformation (Foster 2006). As such, the media-industrial complex expresses itself most clearly in the extensive use of media during such imperialist wars of aggression as NATO's war against Yugoslavia in 1999 (Foerstel 2007). The imperialist media's role was not only revealed in the stigmatisation of the Serbs, but also in the legitimisation of the Wars on Iraq (1990 and 2003), known as the first widely televised wars in history. There is no need for further clarification as to the role of the media-industrial complex in manipulating public opinion on the so-called Arab Spring, Libya, and Syria. Indeed, the same goes for imperialist attempts to stigmatise the so-called 'rogue states' such as Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea.

As Philips remarks, the US media industry is being increasingly centralised and monopolised by fewer than a dozen media corporations that dominate the worldwide flow of news. It is also striking to notice that the board members of the largest 11 media corporations in the US (a total of 155 people) are intertwined with the top echelons of monopoly-finance capital, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other key sectors of the state apparatus (Philips 2007, pp. 59–60). As a result of monopolisation, entertainment and news services are being intertwined to multiply the profits of monopoly capitalists and expand the reach of imperialism. This is perfectly exemplified in the case of Time Warner Inc., one of the world's largest media conglomerates, whose reach includes television and film production, publishing, and cable channel services (Foerstel 2007, p. 10).

The Non-profit Industrial Complex: The NGO Boom and its Origins

The non-profit industrial complex (NPIC) complements the power of the US military and media in the quest for world domination. The NPIC is better conceptualised as a 'set of symbiotic relationships that link together political and financial technologies of state and owning-class proctorship and surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements, since the mid-1970s' (Rodríguez 2007, pp. 21–22). Thanks to the active support of the US and monopoly capitalists themselves, the NPIC grew to be a vehicle for the disintegration of nation states in the Third World.

There are sufficient data to assess the NGO boom under neo-liberal globalisation. In OECD countries, the number of development NGOs rose from 1600 to 2500 between 1980 and 1990. A similar trend was observed in Canada, where the number of development NGOs climbed from 107 in 1980 to 240 in 1990 and to more than 500 in 2005. The Third World was not exempt from this trend. Bolivia registered a rise from 100 NGOs in 1980 to 530 NGOs in 1994. The NGO boom in Tanzania recorded a growth from 41 NGOs in 1990 to more than 10,000 by 2000. Similarly, Kenya witnessed a rise from 511 in 1996 to 2511 in 2003. The worldwide reach of development NGOs during the 1980s was 100 million people, whilst this number grew to around 250 million in the 1990s and more than 600 million in 2007 (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 77–78). Indeed, external funding was crucial for the global NGO boom (Choudry and Kapoor 2013). Figure 9 illustrates the spectacular rise of official US funding to governments and civil society, a great number of which can be assumed to be proxies of US imperialism. In turn, Fig. 10 provides more detailed data as to how the significantly growing US aid contributes to NGO-isation.

Therefore, Barry-Shaw and Jay rightfully argue that NGOs have become a major player in the neo-liberal 'development industry':

> One study showed that by 2002 the NGO sector across 37 countries had an estimated operating expenditure of $1.6 trillion. Other estimates are

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
Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 9 US Official Development Assistance Net Disbursements, in current USD million. (Source: http://stats.oecd.org/)

Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex, Fig. 10 US Disbursements to US, Non-US and International NGOs (in current US Dollars). (Source: https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/explore.cfm)

higher, with some studies showing an overall increase in the flow of funding through NGOs from 4,200 billion in 1970 to $2.6 trillion in 1997... the seven largest NGOs had a combined income of $2.5 billion in 1999. (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 16–17).

Other data reveal that the financial assets of NPICs exceeded $1.59 trillion, whereas their expenditure was more than $822 billion in 2000 (Kivel 2007, p. 138).

The NGO boom did not merely originate from state support. On the contrary, the direct role of monopoly capitalism cannot be underestimated. Corporate foundations are thus an important element of the NPIC as the long arm of monopoly capitalism. It is noteworthy that the net worth of

monopoly-capitalist foundations rose by 400% between 1981 and 1996, to $200 billion in total (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 24–25). As Christine E. Ahn asserts, 'with few exceptions, foundation trustees are extensions of America's banks, brokerage houses, law firms, universities and businesses' (Ahn 2007, p. 66). Ahn also adds that NPIC resources are controlled by a narrow elite of corporate foundation boards and staff. They are mostly composed of white, middle-aged and upper-class individuals, who are prone to undermining the public accountability of foundations. Ahn goes on to refer to research conducted in 1997 involving 12 prominent conservative foundations. The study reveals that these

institutions 'controlled over $1.1 billion in assets and awarded $300 million in grants from 1992 to 1994' (Ahn 2007, p. 68). According to other research (carried out in 1995), 'conservative multiissue policy institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, the Cato Institute, and Citizens for a Sound Economy collectively had a revenue base of over $77 million' (Ahn 2007, pp. 69–70). Ahn highlights the individual example of the Heritage Foundation, which received around $28 million in grants from numerous conservative foundations from 1999–2001. She points out the fact that liberal foundations (such as the Rockefeller, Ford, and Bill and Melinda Gates foundations) are no less innocent of advancing a monopoly-capitalist/imperialist agenda. The role of the Rockefeller Foundation in the capitalist Green Revolution against the spread of communism is exemplary of the ways in which liberal foundations also serve to advance monopoly-capitalist/imperialist interests (Ahn 2007, pp. 70–72).

Three conjunctural factors can be identified to explain the historical emergence of the NPIC with active state and corporate support. A key factor that has led to the rise of the NPIC is the Reagan Administration's efforts to destabilise the former Soviet Union and East European socialist regimes. In his book, MacKinnon gives evidence of how George Soros financially supported Solidarnosc, a key actor which served to weaken the socialist regime in Poland. Similar support was provided for Charter 77, one of the leading actors of the Czechoslovakian Velvet Revolution in 1989. What is also worthy of mention is the efforts of the Soros Foundation to spend millions of dollars to publish non-Marxist textbooks and support Alexander Yakovlev.

Similar methods were also replicated in the overthrow of the Slobodan Milošević Government in Serbia, after which the Soros-funded Otpor! became a global model of mobilisation for pro-US regime change during the Colour Revolutions in the 2000s (MacKinnon 2007, pp. 24–25, 42–45; Vukov 2013). As depicted in Tamara Vukov's interviews with Serbian NGO activists, Western NGO funding came with bags of cash rather than via legitimate bank transfers, with the sole condition of engaging in anti-Milosevic actions. The funding of those who wanted to diversify their actions toward larger issues (including human rights, education, the judiciary, etc.) was cut by the donors. Moreover, project-based funding served to divert the attention of Serbian NGOs from long-term to short-term strategies compatible with capitalist market adaptation (Vukov 2013).

An equally important actor in the development of the NPIC is the NED. The NED was created in 1982 as a non-profit and government-funded organisation aiming to counter the spread of communism in the world. Having started with a budget of $18 million, it reached a budget of $80 million in the 2000s. The NED funds contributed to the strengthening of such organisations as the Andrei Sakharov Institute, the Center for Democracy, Charter 77 and Solidarność, which specialised in mobilising dissidents of socialist regimes. Similarly, the NED funds nowadays serve to support dissidents in 'rogue states' such as Venezuela and Cuba (MacKinnon 2007). The track record of the USAID is no less impressive. The WikiLeaks documents and many other credible sources have revealed how the USAID as a 'civilian foreign aid agency' transferred millions of dollars to Cuban and Venezuelan NGOs for pro-US regime change (Beeton 2014; Bigwood 2014; Mallett-Outtrim 2013).

Whereas the first factor leading to the NGO boom speaks to geopolitics, the second can be linked to the global political economic conjuncture characterised by the advance of neoliberalism (Kamat 2013). Therefore, NGO-isation is greatly indebted to the support of US-dominated international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). According to Barry-Shaw and Jay, these institutions see NGOs as 'ideal vehicles for tackling social costs' of the structural adjustment, which has led to worsened levels of poverty and unemployment. NGOs have become a preferred channel for the provision of welfare services that used to be assumed by the state. They are seen as superior to the public sector in terms of their alleged ability to provide more cost-effective

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and better targeted services, as opposed to inherently 'corrupted' and 'inefficient' state bureaucracies. This helps conceal the fact that a great number of Western-supported NGOs are nothing like 'value-driven' and 'bottom-up' organisations, but they rather rest on bureaucratic, hierarchical and professionally staffed agencies (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, p. 23, 34–35, 40, 68–69). In this sense, the NGO boom can be viewed as an integral component of neo-liberal globalisation (Petras 1997).

A third factor is the need to pacify popular-democratic upheavals that arise out of a conjuncture marked by long-term stagnation, rising inequality, and imperialist aggression. Movements of popular-democratic potential have been a primary target of corporate and foundation funding, which aims to transform these movements into non-antagonistic and reformist agencies of social service (ibid.). The absorption of radical movements is ensured through the establishment of patronage relationships between the state/private capital and social movements. The co-optation of radical movements is further consolidated via ideological repression and institutional subordination thanks to 'a bureaucratised management of fear that mitigates against the radical break with owning-class capital (read: foundation support) and hegemonic common sense (read: law and order)' (Rodríguez 2007. p. 31). Rodríguez states that the active involvement of monopoly capital (namely such actors as the Mellon, Ford, and Soros foundations) in the nonprofit sector serves to assimilate 'political resistance projects into quasi-entrepreneurial, corporate-style ventures' (Rodríguez 2007, pp. 27–28).

NPIC as a Co-Optative Mechanism: Evidence from the Third World

Militants of radical movements are either coopted into the NPIC or replaced by new cadres. The co-optation of militants occurs with the professionalisation and depoliticisation of movement leadership (Choudry and Kapoor 2013):

> The non-profit structure is predicated on a corporate structure and hierarchy that rewards 'bourgeois

credentials' and 'upward mobility'; the non-profit model makes it easier for young economically privileged people just coming out of college to start a non-profit than to engage in long-term established movements; the mode is obsessed with institution-building rather than organizing; and it forces social injustice activists to become more accountable to funders rather than to our communities. (King and Osayande 2007, p. 83)

Nikolas Barry-Shaw and Dru Oja Jay point to the fact that the contemporary development discourse rests on a language of 'empowerment' and 'capacity building' through NGOs. However, in practice, most NGO programmes have ended up disempowering civil society groups insofar as they have been rendered more accountable to donors and less responsive to their constituencies. Whilst genuine social justice movements depend on gaining wider popular support to engage in an empowering practice, a great number of NGOs prefer to depend on external donors. They do not necessarily feel the need to win the support and encourage the active participation of popular masses into their ranks (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 76–78).

The so-called 'empowering' capacity-building practices of mainstream NGOs prioritise the acquirement of 'skills and organizational set-up necessary to meet the punishing bureaucratic demands of the donors'. The aim is to create '(self-)disciplined clients of donor agencies' (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, p. 81). Relatedly, the process of professionalisation of NGO cadres is further accelerated with a flurry of sectorial experts and the opening-up of business schools, the curricula of which are devoted to training high-profile 'managers' in the sector (Gilmore 2007, pp. 45–47). The managerial profile of leaders mostly reflects a technocratic view of development, which reduces global issues such as poverty to a quantitative problem rather than viewing them as a product of unequal social relations. As such, development is considered to be a purely technical matter that is to be isolated from ideology and politics (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 7–8).

The co-optative structure of the NPIC also serves to replace social mobilisation with social service. Social service work has become a distinct

employment sector that generates philanthropic relief at the expense of reproducing previously existing structures of inequality and injustice:

> The existence of these jobs serves to convince people that tremendous inequalities of wealth are natural and inevitable. Institutionalizing soup kitchens leads people to expect that inevitably there will be people without enough to eat; establishing permanent homeless shelters leads people to think that it is normal for there not to be enough affordable housing. (Kivel 2007, pp. 139–40)

Technocratic and social service-centred approaches to the problems of development turn movement leaders into social service workers who are entirely differentiated from their membership base. In turn, the NGO-led social service work is confined to satisfying the daily needs of atomised individuals or communities rather than addressing the root causes of exploitation and violence. Such a narrow focus leads civil society organizations to become the defenders of the status quo (Kivel 2007).

A prime example of the absorption of radical movements by the NPIC is Palestine. According to Andrea Smith, the fact that the vast majority of Palestine NGOs adhere to a 'two-state solution' is not pure coincidence. Such adherence legitimises colonisation and occupation policies, while ensuring full control of Palestinian resources by the Israeli state. Many NGOs operating in Palestine avoid addressing the issue of occupation, and devote their attention to developing joint 'Israeli-Palestinian' projects. In terms of stressing the symbiotic existence of imperialism and the NPIC, it is worth noticing that 80% of the Palestinian infrastructure is funded by international granting agencies that seek to impede anti-capitalist sentiments and establish free-market mechanisms integrated to the world economy (Smith 2007). Similarly, Barry-Shaw and Jay argue that the First Intifada, which erupted in 1987 as a nonviolent popular uprising against the Israeli occupation, was led by a network of grassroots committees and left-wing organisations (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012). The period following the First Intifada saw a far-reaching NGO boom which redirected Western development aid for the co-optation of radical anti-Israeli movements.

Western funding for Palestinian 'civil society' grew exponentially after 1993, and the number of Palestinian NGOs skyrocketed from 444 in 1992 to over 1,400 in 2005. Palestinian NGOs benefiting from the deluge of Western funding became some of 'the largest, and therefore the most significant' organisations in the Occupied Territories. By 2005, the NGO sector employed more than 20,000 people, and NGO service provision covered 60% of all health care services, 80% of all rehabilitation services, and almost 100% of all preschool education. (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, p. 92)

As such, the Second Intifada (which erupted in 2000) was led by Islamist groups left outside the NGO sector. NGO-ised organisations could not provide support to the Intifada movement for fear of losing their Western funding (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012).

The Palestine case is not an exception in the Third World. Haiti, as the poorest country in the Americas, has been one of the biggest victims of neo-liberalism in the continent. The country qualifies as an 'NGO Republic' because it has the world's highest concentration of NGOs per capita, 'with over 900 foreign development NGOs and an estimated 10,000 NGOs overall operating in the small Caribbean nation of 8 million inhabitants' (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 43–44). What are the results of the NGOs presence? 'Nearly 80% of Haiti's basic services (healthcare, education, sanitation etc.) are provided by NGOs.' In 2005, over 74% of all 'help wanted' advertisements were for jobs working for NGOs or other international organisations (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012).

In the case of India, key NGOs – which used to pretend to sympathise with antidisplacement movements such as the Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM) – have easily been coopted by state and corporate actors because they fear being de-registered or blacklisted as 'anti-industrial NGOs'. The co-optation of NGOs resulted in the formation of a prodisplacement forum in favour of the mining industry. The LAM activists also complain about large NGOs that engage in corporate espionage. According to the activists, it is common for companies to hire NGOs to conduct surveys and interact with the local population in order to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of communities for co-optation purposes. Workshops and other

educational activities are used to create favourable opinion regarding capitalist industrialisation, and local people are lured by material incentives such as free health check-ups, clothing, bikes, micro-credit, etc. (Kapoor 2013).

Widely advertised as one of the World Bank and IMF's success stories in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1980s, Ghana suffered from growing popular discontent under structural adjustment programmes. The figures show the extent to which neo-liberal policies eradicated public services: 'Enrolment rates fell and primary school dropout rates climbed to as high as 40%. In 1990, 80.5% of children reached fifth grade, but by 2000 the figure had fallen to 66.3% . . . visits to clinics and hospitals fell by as much as 33%' (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, pp. 25–26). The Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was created in 1987 as a counteraction against growing popular unrest under neo-liberalism. PAMSCAD's social funds, which amounted to $85.7 million, stimulated a countrywide NGO boom. The NGO number increased from 17 in 1987 to 120 by the early 1990s, and to 400 by the second half of the 2000s. Whilst access to public services witnessed a considerable decline, the growth of regime-friendly NGOs started to fill the empty place left by the state, contributing to the silencing and co-optation of the popular opposition in Ghana (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012).

Prior to the 1990s, radical NGOs that fought for land reform were a critical element of Bangladeshi civil society. The transfer of millions of development dollars to NGO-led microcredit programmes helped pacify mobilisations for land reform: 'Today, virtually all of Bangladesh's 2,000 NGOs are "involved in microfinance in one way or another"' (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, p. 108). The microcredit movement propagated the misguided conviction that rural poverty does not emanate from unequal distribution of wealth, but from inadequate access to the credit market and lack of individual responsibility and entrepreneurship. Thanks to massive external funding, NGOs have ultimately become one of the most popular job markets in the country (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012).

In the Philippines, the colonisation of civil society goes back to the 1980s and 1990s, during which international institutions transferred tens of millions of development dollars to create a neo-liberal non-profit sector. As a result, the Philippines today enjoys the presence of over 60,000 NGOs. A World Bank report dating from 2009 reveals that 75% of its loans and 87% of its country assistance strategies involve 'civil society engagement' (Africa 2013). Nowadays, 48% of NGOs are believed to rely on foreign funding, whereas 12% benefit from corporate funds as their core source of funding. Africa Sonny draws attention to how mainstream NGOs are partnered with the military's counter-insurgency programmes, particularly in conflict zones, with the aim of inhibiting genuine grass-roots initiatives and covering up human-rights violations. Rather than mobilise local communities against neo-liberal policies and structural inequalities, mainstream NGOs act as charity intermediaries for cash transfers that are provided by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Africa 2013).

Finally, the Afghani case is a clear example of how NGO-isation ends up generating a new comprador class compatible with the interests of imperialism:

> University educated Afghan people (less than 1% of the population has any university education) working for NGOs and other international agencies were one of the few social groups that strongly supported the occupation forces. While government civil servants were paid $60 per month on average, Afghans working for NGOs earned an average of $1,000 per month. (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012, p. 223)

Barry-Shaw and Jay assert that NGOs have assumed a key role in implementing the Karzai Government's development programmes, particularly the flagship rural programme called the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). It was created in 2003 with Western funds, and launched as a 'participatory grassroots initiative' (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012). An equally striking fact about the Afghani case is how the military uses NGOs as a strategic asset for counterinsurgency and intelligence. The Canadian counter-insurgency manual stresses the central role of NGOs in winning over

hearts and minds. More strikingly, it was revealed that 90% of the coalition forces' intelligence in Afghanistan came from aid organisations on the ground (Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012).

Conclusion: Popular Alternatives to the NPIC

Monopoly capitalism cannot extricate itself from the trap of stagnation, economic crisis, and inequality despite soaring profit and monopolisation levels. This situation forces US imperialism to increasingly rely on military aggression, media manipulation, and colonisation of the non-profit sector. Military aggression is used to control the world's resources and prevent the emergence of potential rivals at the expense of eroding US hegemony. However, the rise of potential rivals cannot be prevented, as witnessed in the case of the emerging economies of the BRIC. Faced with intensifying global competition, US imperialism feels greater need to disintegrate the nation states of the Third World. Meanwhile, media power alone cannot regenerate consent for a US-centred world order. This is where the crucial role of the NPIC comes in. The colonisation of the non-profit sector serves to pacify those who cannot be directly persuaded by the media, and disintegrates the nation states of the Third World in the interests of monopoly capitalism. Similar to the media-industrial complex, the NPIC also provides political and ideological support to militaristic practices.

The cases from Third-World countries expose the imperialist drive to impose regime change, advance the neo-liberal agenda and pacify social unrest via the NPIC. Each of the three motives of the NPIC (geopolitics, global political economy, and co-optation) is also a leading factor in the historical emergence and consolidation of the NPIC. Whereas the Afghani and Philippine cases mainly reflect the geopolitical factors with regard to military-NGO co-operation, the Haitian case invokes the role of neo-liberalism in dismantling the welfare apparatus and turning Third-World countries into 'NGO republics'. The Bangladeshi, Indian, Ghanaian, and Palestine cases lend evidential support to the imperialist drive to co-opt radical

movements with respect to land reform and social mobilisation.

Despite the strength of the global nonprofit sector, the antidote for the decolonisation of the popular sector is already available. We have the guiding example of the global peasants' movement, which is highly instructive concerning the way civil society can be liberated from the yoke of the non-profit sector. La Vía Campesina is the world's largest global social movement, connecting more than 150 peasants' organisations in over 70 countries. This movement is known for its refusal of NGO-isation as well as its bottom-up decision-making model based on the principles of inclusion and consensus. According to La Vía Campesina, mainstream NGOs tend to manipulate and dominate the discussions on behalf of the peasants with their technocratic and top-down approach (Desmarais 2007).

What are the specifics of the alternative represented by La Vía Campesina? What clues can it provide about the peoples' liberation from the non-profit sector? A number of insightful pointers can be drawn from the case of the Movimiento Nacional Campesino Indígena (National Peasant and Indigenous Movement, MNCI), a member organisation of La Vía Campesina, with which I have worked during my fieldwork in 2014. The MNCI is Argentina's largest peasant movement with more than 20,000 member families. Rather than integrate itself in the NGO/charity sector, the MNCI prefers to organise rural communities as a class organisation in a constant state of mobilisation. This is sustained by bottom-up decision-making processes, which start at the community level and spread to the provincial and national levels. No hierarchical leadership practices are encouraged, as the membership base relies on 'peasant militancy' rather than narrow and educated NGO cadres and 'activists'. The strength of the movement also emanates from strong class alliances that link different sectors of the Argentine working classes. While recognising the potential contributions of state-sponsored cash transfers and microcredit that are free of the World Bank's yoke, the MNCI struggles for a radical agrarian reform by relying on a broader alliance with the urban informal

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proletariat of shanty towns, particularly with the Confederación de Trabajadores de la Economía Popular (CTEP, Confederation of the Workers of the Popular Economy). Agrarian reform is seen as the only way to address the structural roots of inequality. In other words, unlike the NGO model of charity for atomised communities, the MNCI relies on class action that not only unites peasant communities at the national and global levels, but also connects with the other subordinate segments of Argentine working classes in urban areas.

The MNCI movement is extremely cautious in establishing relationships with NGOs, other international institutions, and state actors. A few militants come from a social service or university background, but most of them share the same living conditions as the rest of the militants with no privileged position. The movement insists on self-management and bottom-up decision making, although it benefits from the technical expertise and resources of a limited number of international organisations and state actors. Thanks to its emphasis on organisational autonomy, the MNCI has led countless land occupations and national-level protests, and come to establish its own officially recognised elementary schools and university with its own teaching staff and curriculum. The case of the MNCI alone demonstrates that working classes are capable of liberating themselves and bringing about social change by reversing the relations of power. Indeed, these achievements have been made possible without the 'prescriptions' of the World Bank and the 'professional help' of NGO technocrats. They lie rather in preventing externally funded projects from becoming a core resource of organisation and in prioritising social mobilisation as a means to subordinate state power.

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Moon Jae-in

▶ Korea and Imperialism

Moulay Muḥend

▶ Abd-el-Krim al-Khattabi (1882–1963)

Mozambique, Imperialism and

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Mozambique has been exploited for slaves and ivory in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: sugar, labor for the South African mines, and land in the twentieth century and energy and minerals in the twenty-first century. Independence in 1975 brought a brief window of local control, but imperialism fought a decade-long war in 1982–1992 which killed one million Mozambicans and regained control. This new control is managed through a comprador elite which has become the new wealthy oligarchs, while Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

Mozambique in Southeast Africa has always been shaped by its 2470 km coastline. There were Arab traders and coastal settlements from the tenth century followed by Persian and Indian traders. Chinese explorers arrived in the fifteenth

century and the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. This generated an important Mozambican trade between the coast and the interior and linked commercial farming. Portugal became dominant but did not have territorial control. Instead it increasingly traded in slaves and ivory. In 1807, Britain abolished the Atlantic slave trade, but it continued in Mozambique for another century. Between 1800 and 1850, Brazil imported 2,460,000 slaves, most of whom passed through Mozambican ports (Newitt 2017). The ivory trade in this period was over 100 tonnes per year.

At the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, the imperial powers divided up Africa between them. Portugal was given Mozambique and Angola, as well as the connecting territory. But the conference also agreed the "Principle of Effective Occupation" which required the colonizing power to exercise strong and effective control of its colonies. Portugal was always the weakest of the imperial powers and did even not effectively occupy Mozambique. Britain soon claimed the interior areas – now Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia – leaving Portugal with just coastal Mozambique and Angola. Portugal then leased vast tracts of land to British concession and sugar companies as a way of bringing it under occupation. Although the Berlin conference gave Britain the best land, it also left its colonies land-locked, and it was the British capital that developed colonial Mozambique's ports and railways. Thus Mozambique was effectively a colony of two imperial powers, Britain and Portugal.

Portugal was never rich enough to develop Mozambique, so its colonization was built on people. Up to 500,000 Mozambicans worked as migrant labor on South African and Rhodesian mines and farms. Inside the country, Mozambicans had to produce cash crops or do forced labor on plantations or on construction projects. Fascist Portugal refused to do a land reform and could not create enough jobs, and instead between 1943 and 1975, Portugal sent 164,000 people to Mozambique to become peasant farmers or to take the lower-level jobs still reserved for Portuguese. Most returned "home" to Portugal at independence.

Portugal may have been poor and marginal, but in World War II, it became important by remaining neutral, in contrast to its neighboring fascist state Spain which joined the German-Italian "axis." In 1942, the United States agreed "to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies" which was confirmed to gain Portugal's 1949 agreement to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to allow the Azores in the mid-Atlantic to be used as a stopping and refuelling place during the 1948–1949 airlift to Berlin, a key event in the early Cold War. Thus the United States agreed not to push for decolonization of Portugal's African colonies, which included Mozambique. Independence and majority rule came to most of Africa, but white rule continued in Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, and Namibia. By the early 1960s, the liberation movements in all five countries were receiving support from the then communist countries, as well as clandestine support from the Nordic states. Portuguese soldiers refused to continue to die in the colonial wars and overthrew the Portuguese government in the 1974 "Carnation Revolution."

Independence

Mozambique came to independence in 1975 under the single liberation movement Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) and President Samora Machel. Most Portuguese fled, frightened by Portuguese anti-communist propaganda. Businesses were abandoned overnight and sometimes smashed up before the owner departed. Key administrative posts as well as middle-level positions such as railway ticket collectors had all been reserved for Portuguese, and most Mozambicans had been limited to 4 years of primary school, although in response to the liberation war, Portugal had made major changes including ending forced labor and allowing secondary and university education for Mozambicans. Nonetheless, there were not enough educated Mozambicans to fill all the gaps; however workers took over factories, and newly named teachers took over the schools.

The new Mozambique was nominally socialist, but its image of socialism was Nordic social democracy. Frelimo tried not to interfere in economic sectors, and few companies were nationalized; old colonial companies such as Entreposto and João Ferreira dos Santos continued to operate and still do. Machel even promoted a new factory by the US company General Tire (Hanlon 2017b).

Mozambique's neighbors were hostile. South Africa was a white-ruled "apartheid" state; the white government of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) had declared independence, and Malawi although independent was allied to the white states. Although the Cold War was still on, the United States was chastened by its defeat in Vietnam in 1975, and US Presidents Gerald Ford (1974–1977) and Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) did not take strong international positions. Although South Africa invaded Angola with US support (under Ford) after its independence in 1975, neither took military action against Mozambique. However, Carter refused to continue the past practice of overlooking the human rights abuses of US allies and put pressure on South Africa and Rhodesia – which did provide a partial check on South Africa and promote the settlement of the war and then independence in Rhodesia. The nonaligned movement and the Brandt Commission were both influential, and a real change in North-South relations seemed possible in the late 1970s.

In Rhodesia the liberation war was increasing, and Mozambique imposed United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia and allowed the liberation movement ZANU to have bases in Mozambique. Rhodesia responded by some attacks into Mozambique and by creating an opposition guerrilla force, the Mozambique Resistance or Renamo. This caused some problems in the center of the country, but was not serious.

Thus independent Mozambique had a 6-year window (1975–1981) without major imperial pressure. Actions were taken to keep the economy running, to make some changes, and to look ahead to development and industrialization. The only university was closed for a year, and university students were sent into rural areas to do literacy training. Internationally, sympathetic governments and solidarity movements sent technicians to be employed by the state, not aid agencies, to support the new managers. The economy declined until 1978, but as the new managers and bureaucrats began to learn their jobs from experience, the economy picked up and by 1981 had returned to pre-independence levels.

By the end of this period, it was becoming clear that the initial emergency measures were no longer needed. Hundreds of small businesses had been abandoned at independence with workers not knowing how to run them, so state officials took over. By 1979, long before privatization was pushed by the IMF, Samora Machel said "the state does not sell needles" and handed state-run shops and small businesses to local private businesspeople – either workers who now had the skills and confidence to run their own business, or small businesspeople who now had enough trust in Frelimo and its mixed economy to take over these businesses, despite price and market controls.

Zimbabwe's independence at the beginning of 1980 brought peace and optimism. For a year, Mozambique had a chance to dream and plan a future.

Mozambique had become a serious challenge to apartheid South Africa. It was a multiracial country with a mixed government, with a rapid spread of public health and education services, and with a growing economy. Of course, not without problems. But Frelimo and the government were popular and trusted as shown by the currency change in June 1980. Changing the currency was never a priority, and Mozambique continued to use the colonial Mozambican escudo. Then suddenly Samora Machel went onto the radio to announce a new currency, the metical, with money converted one for one over the next 3 days. Banks would be open 11 h, and government officials have been sent to the most remote areas with new banknotes. Thousands of people knew; hundreds of people were unexpectedly sent on trips to rural areas, but no one was worried, and it never leaked. At workplaces, people were told to hand in all their money to the office on Monday. A junior official then queued all day Tuesday to change everyone's money, took all the money home, and then handed it out on

Wednesday when the new currency could be used in shops. There were no reports of thefts, despite millions of dollars in banknotes moving around the streets and remote rural areas. And there was no panic – Frelimo was trusted to be doing the right thing (Hanlon 1996).

But popular, non-corrupt, multiracial socialism with health and education for all and a growing economy challenged the apartheid and imperial agendas. And in the background, change was already happening. In the newly independent Zimbabwe in early 1980, the British governor's staff did not disband Renamo but instead allowed 1000 trained insurgents to be transferred from the Odzi base in Zimbabwe to the South African Department of Military Intelligence base at Phalaborwa (Hall and Young 1997).

Imperialism Comes Back from Its Holiday

Under President Richard Nixon (1969–1974), the United States had pushed the imperial project, backing the coup in Chile on 11 September 1973 (the first "9/11"). And it became the model for neoliberal economics. From the 1950s, the US State Department Chile Project had included training Chilean economists at the ultra-conservative University of Chicago school of economics, which promoted the neoliberal package of deregulation, privatization, and extreme free market of what were called the "Chicago boys" in charge of the economy, and Chile became the test bed for these policies.

The 1973–1975 defeat in Vietnam temporarily curbed imperial ambitions. But free elections and independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 were the end of that hiatus. The 1970s ended with a new conservative and imperial agenda, built around neoliberalism and intensifying the cold war. Margaret Thatcher was elected prime minister of the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald Reagan president of the United States in late 1980.

When Ronald Reagan took office as US president in January 1981, he escalated the Cold War and began a massive military buildup to confront the Soviet Union. This had a dramatic impact in Southern Africa. Under a policy of "constructive engagement," white apartheid South Africa was seen as the bulwark against "communist"

governments in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Angola. A Cold War proxy war was launched in Mozambique with apartheid South Africa permitted to back Renamo. Other proxy wars were being waged in Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Angola.

Just 10 days after the Reagan inauguration, lorryloads of South African commandos came over the border and raided Matola, a suburb of Maputo. They killed 13 members of the African National Congress and a Portuguese electricity technician and left behind one of their own, a dead British mercenary whose helmet was painted with swastikas and the words "sieg heil." It was clearly a very public test of US government response, and the United States did nothing to discourage similar actions. Other major commando raids included destruction of bridges carrying the main road, railway, and oil pipeline from Beira port to Zimbabwe as well as cutting the main railway bridge across the Zambezi River and destroying the oil tank farm in Beira (Hanlon 1991).

The fighting on the ground was done by Renamo, a proxy force of Mozambicans trained, supplied, and controlled by South Africa. In early 1981 the Renamo guerrillas who had been delivered to South Africa were flown by helicopter to a new base at Garagua inside Mozambique (Hall and Young 1997). By late 1981, South Africa had established Renamo bases in Manica and Sofala provinces in the center of the country. There were regular supply flights to the interior as well as seaborne landings, including by submarines. By 1982 Malawi has been pressured by South Africa to allow Renamo bases, which made cross border raids into Tete and Zambézia provinces. There were two initial goals. First, Frelimo had won popularity by a major expansion of health and education, so the first target of Renamo was to destroy schools and health posts. Second, Renamo wanted to stop transport, and this was done by making people afraid to travel. For example, buses would be stopped, and the passengers burned alive inside the bus – but a few survivors were allowed to leave first, to tell the story. The railways were attacked with rocket launchers, and lorries were ambushed. Renamo also attacked any

private business, burning shops and farm machinery (Hanlon 1991, 1996).

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought dramatic change in Southern Africa. In Mozambique, Malawi, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, parties backed by the United States lost elections. Mozambique's war ended with a peace accord in 1992. But the price of the US's proxy war was very high: one million Mozambicans died in the 1981–1992 war (8% of the population), and damage exceeded US$20 billion. And the proxy war had been effective. At the end of the war, the United Nations estimated that Renamo controlled 23% of the land, but only 6% of the population. But transport had been made almost impossible, and the economy was devastated; 3000 rural shops were closed or destroyed. And Renamo was successful in destroying social fabric: of 1200 health posts in the country, 500 were closed or destroyed (Hanlon 1996).

During the entire decade-long war, the US government was divided. The conservative Heritage Foundation wanted the United States to openly back Renamo and gained supporters in congress. The Defense Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) wanted to back Renamo and thought it could win the war. The Central Intelligence Agency opposed Renamo and thought it could not win. The White House and State Department were divided and for the most part did not want to openly back Renamo. A State Department report by Robert Gersony in 1988 said "the level of violence reported to be conducted by Renamo against civilians is extraordinarily high." Also in 1988 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Roy Stacey, said Renamo was carrying out "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II" (Hanlon 1991).

The Economic Component

There was an economic component to this. In 1971 Richard Nixon ended the convertibility of the US dollar to the gold, which had the effect of making the dollar the international reserve instead of gold. That meant countries all over the world

had to hold billions of dollars – these were dollars which were not being used to purchase US good and were, in effect, giant loans to the United States and thus major transfers of wealth to the United States – in part to help pay the huge cost of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, interest rates for developing countries were negative – that is, less than the rate of inflation – and developing countries were receiving $25 bn per year in new loan money for development. Reagan pushed up US and global interest rates, and real interest rates reached 12% in 1984. Developing countries could not pay, so interest payments were simply added to the debt. In the years 1984–1993, developing countries transferred $81 billion to the rich countries, yet their long-term debt increased by $675 billion (Hanlon 2017a).

In Mozambique the war was causing major economic damage by 1982. In 1984, Mozambique defaulted on its debts – higher interest rates combined with a war damaged economy meant Mozambique could not pay. President Samora Machel toured Europe trying to obtain money, only to be told that Mozambique first had to join the IMF and World Bank – the main enforcers of the new neoliberalism. It joined in 1984. Drought combined with the war and refugees to the cities to cause food shortages, which were largely filled with aid. But to put pressure on Mozambique to "turn to the west," food aid was withheld in 1983 and again in 1986 (Hanlon 2004).

The United States imposed an interesting additional condition – the acceptance of US NGOs. In the late 1970s, Mozambique had thousands of foreign technicians, sent by solidarity groups in Europe as well as fraternal governments like Cuba. But all worked directly for the government and reported to Mozambican department heads. Nongovernment organizations, who sent technicians that reported to the NGO and not the government, were banned. This reflected both the fear that US NGOs were linked to the security services and unwillingness to allow foreign agencies to take control of development policy. But the United States demanded that two of its NGOs, Care and World Vision, be allowed to work in Mozambique, which was allowed in 1983 and 1986.

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"Shock therapy," the sudden and dramatic change in national economic policy to turn a state-controlled economy into a free-market one, built on privatization and ending financial controls, was already being tried in Chile after the US-backed coup and was being discussed for the post-socialist countries. China's slower and more considered reforms have already started but were not recognized in the West. So Mozambique became the first test of shock therapy in a socialist country. Through 1985–1987, while the war continued, the IMF and World Bank pushed shock therapy, while Mozambique recognized that the war-battered economy needed change but wanted to move cautiously. In late 1986, both Bank and Fund demanded major policy changes. Finally in January 1987, without consulting the Bank and Fund, the government announced its own Economic Reform Programme (PRE) which included devaluation, a freer market, reduced subsidies, and higher wages – but not at levels demanded by Bank and Fund. However, they accepted. Mozambique became the first country in the world to impose structural adjustment in time of war.

It was not enough. In 1990, with the war going on, the IMF imposed stabilization in order to cut inflation and money supply. Most important were sharp cuts to government wages. In January 1991 the civil service wage range was $31–$500 per month. Five years later it was $20–$150. A 1995 UNDP/Unicef report "Pay, Productivity and Public Service: Priorities for Recovery in SubSaharan Africa" estimated the "absolute minimum wage" for Mozambique to be $75 per month (two-thirds of civil servants were below that) and the "abject poverty line" of $50 per month, with half of civil servants including nurses and teachers below that. The result was many civil servants taking time off work to do other jobs or grow food or taking bribes. The report called for the hiring of more civil servants and paying them more in Mozambique (Hanlon 1996). The report was published, but then suppressed under pressure from the IMF, and has never appeared on the web.

With the end of the war with the 1992 cease fire, the IMF stepped up its demands and began to impose shock therapy. It wanted much higher tax payments and a sharp cut in government investment. In particular, it opposed repairs of the massive war damage because they would be inflationary. Such repairs were being paid for by aid, so it imposed an unprecedented cap on aid, actually demanding a reduction in aid (Hanlon 1996).

Creating Capitalists and Oligarchs

Agreement to accept structural adjustment during war led to a more than doubling of aid and a crash course in capitalism for Mozambicans who had run businesses, ministries, and the military but had never been capitalists. And the lesson was that capitalism is not about profit but about patronage – state assets are "privatized," and people are given "loans" that need never be repaid entirely based on who you know and donor whim.

The first priority was privatization, and in the years 1989–1998, over 800 of the 1250 public companies were sold. Haste was the first rule. The second was that big companies such as cement, beer, and food processing be sold to foreign companies. The third was the companies should go to the *nomenklatura* – the Frelimo elite and their friends and family. This continued through the 1990s, with the family and close associates of President Joaquim Chissano becoming shareholders in a range of businesses. As late as 1999, the World Bank promoted a less than transparent part-privatization of part of Maputo port to a consortium involving a senior politician.

Second was providing money to the new capitalists. In 1988 the Agricultural and Rural Development Fund was set up using donor funds to give "loans" to military men and party officials, with no intention that the loans would be repaid. Donors accepted that the money was being used to buy out military people and Frelimo party officials opposed to ending the war and abandoning socialism. The World Bank's 1989 Small and Medium Enterprise Development Project was intended to help the new owners of privatized businesses. Nearly $33 million was lent, and the World Bank's 1998 evaluation admitted that 90% of the loans would never be repaid. The bank

admitted it put "substantial pressure" on honest Mozambican bankers to bend the rules to give loans they knew could not be repaid.

This was the start of the creation of the oligarchs.

Meanwhile in early 1990s, banking was being liberalized. The governor of the Bank of Mozambique, Adriano Maleiane, was trying to clean up the two state-owned commercial banks to privatize them, preferably to foreign banks. In 1995–1996 the IMF and World Bank forced the privatization of both banks, even though Maleiane knew they were not ready. Only corrupt groups including part of the Frelimo elite would take them. They were looted for $400 mn and collapsed and handed back to the state in 2000. Four people revealing details of the corruption were murdered: a bank managing director, José Alberto de Lima Félix; a branch manager, Passarinho Fumo; António Siba-Siba Macuácua, Bank of Mozambique director of banking supervision who had been named president of one of the banks to clean up the mess; and Mozambique's most important journalist, Carlos Cardoso. Only Cardoso's killers were tried and killed; the others were protected.

The donor Consultative Group (CG) met in Maputo 25–26 October 2001 just 2 months after the murder of Siba-Siba Macuácua; no investigation was underway, and his efforts to collect bad debts had been stopped. Mozambique asked for $600 million in aid and was given $722 million – the extra money was enough to plug the hole in the banking system. After this, former security minister Sergio Vieira wrote that the donors recognize "the good performance of the government" and this "overrides the bank scandal and the assassinations of Siba-Siba Macuacua and Carlos Cardoso." Not only could the new oligarchs steal, they could get away with murder.

Speaking at a Maputo press conference on 11 July 2003, IMF managing director Horst Kohler said "it is our conviction that the government, under the leadership of President Joaquim Chissano, has done a fine job in defining and implementing the fundamentals for growth and for reducing poverty." Nothing was said about corruption and the failure to investigate the Siba-Siba murder, even after journalists raised the issue; instead Kohler called only for "deeper reform" in the financial sector.

Becoming a Mineral-Energy Exporter

At independence Mozambique was not seen as an important natural resource producer, with only limited mining. The Portuguese built the giant Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River to supply cheap electricity to apartheid South Africa, but it only began operating at the time of independence in 1975. After the end of the war in 1992, the Mozal aluminum smelter opened near the capital, Maputo, in 2000. It was promoted by the IMF which said the foreign owners had been given a good deal to prove that Mozambique was open to foreign companies at the end of the socialist era. Production of a small gas field in Inhambane province began in 2004, and the gas was shipped by pipe to Sasol in South Africa. All three projects were for foreign benefit, and Mozambique gained little.

The picture changed when large amounts of coal, including high-quality coking coal, were found in Tete province around 2000. Brazilian, Australian, and Indian companies invested and coal exports began in 2012. Meanwhile gas explorations off the coast of Cabo Delgado in the north of Mozambique began in 2006, and by 2012, US-based Anadarko and Italian-based Eni announced huge discoveries which will make Mozambique one of the largest gas producers in Africa. Production and gas liquefaction investment will exceed $100 bn with production due to start in 2025. This transforms Mozambique into a major natural resource country.

As well as coal and gas, mining has also developed for rubies, graphite, titanium, and other minerals.

In contrast to Russia, natural resources in Mozambique are largely controlled by foreign companies, not domestic oligarchs. Even the elite is subject to the demands of imperialism as enforced by the World Bank and IMF. Local oligarchs do have interests in some mining, notably rubies, and have some shares in foreign-

owned companies, but their main involvement has been in contracts to service the mineral-energy sector.

Teaching Subservience

A major increase in bilateral and multilateral aid and the opening of international non-governmental organization (INGO) offices in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought a massive change. Previously technicians and officials, including the "cooperantes" from foreign countries, worked for the government with the same wages and conditions as local staff. Now each agency and INGO had its own programs and large office and paid much higher salaries just at a time that the IMF was suppressing government salaries to below the poverty line. The impact of lack of education in the Portuguese era was still felt, and there was a shortage of skilled people. Senior Mozambicans officials became secretaries in aid agencies to earn higher salaries in dollars. Health and agricultural workers moved from government to aid projects.

The World Bank and other agencies began to notice that key ministries were being stripped of skilled staff, which made it increasingly difficult to get projects implemented. So it was decided to try to keep key people in ministries with "top-ups" – extra salary payments. All of the donors and INGOs began running seminars on their pet projects and paid per diems for those who attended. Consultancies were commissioned, usually from government staff, who often wrote the report in work time.

Not everyone could obtain these jobs, top-ups and consultancies. It required agreement with the new agenda, of transferring power away from government to the private sector and international agencies and INGOs. And it was those who seemed the most committed to the imperial agenda who were sent to Europe and the United States for conferences and training, who were promoted, and who won university scholarships. International agencies and INGOs also watched the staff they sent to Mozambique; those who were seen to support the government were

accused of "going native" and recalled or did not have their contracts renewed.

The World Bank became powerful in several areas and imposed policies and projects over strong initial domestic opposition. A deputy minister and a national director were forced to be dismissed because they opposed a World Bank policy. Resistance withered.

In the 1990s, donors introduced a new form of aid, "budget support," in which money was given directly to the government for its budget. That became between one-quarter and one-third of non-emergency aid. In exchange, the donors had "advisors" inside ministries, involved in setting and implementing policies. In some cases, these "advisors" had to be included on internal e-mail lists. At the Ministry of Planning, internal meetings were held at the nearby Café Nautilus so that discussions could be held out of hearing of the "advisors." There was a donor budget support group which increasingly set policy. Of course, the donors had to approve the national budget before it was sent to parliament (which was not allowed changes – donor interest overrode democracy). After an incident in 2005 when the government sneaked into the budget a rural development fund opposed by donors, the budget support group added to its conditions that the group not just see and approve the budget before it went to parliament but must each draft of the national budget.

Mozambique did have a nascent domestic NGO sector – a national peasants association and a national cooperative association linked to peri-urban food producers, and a vibrant women's association linked to the ruling party Frelimo. But the northern donors and INGOs wanted to create domestic NGOs that would be explicitly apart from government and perhaps hostile to government and would carry out northern imposed programs – on environment, HIV/AIDS, governance, gender, etc. Dozens of domestic NGOs were created and were and are dependent on foreign funding for their survival. Funding is sometimes withdrawn from domestic NGOs that become too outspoken. And the salaries are high – staff in donor-funded Mozambican NGOs earn more in dollars than would be paid for similar posts in Europe.

The broad outlines of neoliberalism are still sometimes criticized, but it is very difficult to criticize the policies of the IMF, World Bank, bilateral donors, or INGOs for fear of losing funding, perks, and protection.

Over 20 years, this created a climate of subservience. At top level the government was constantly praised for being the "best pupil," parroting the neo-liberal rhetoric and officially introducing neo-liberal policies. In private, the real praise was for allowing the World Bank, bilateral donors, and INGOs to carry out whatever programs and projects they wanted. Health, for example, for the first 20 years was an integrated national health service. But by the 2000s, it had become a fragmented set of vertical programs run by foreign foundations and agencies.

The period since the 1992 peace agreement has slowly molded a new elite and a growing middle class whose status depends on being subservient to foreign, imperial interests. This is a comprador elite. But it is more complex, because built into this new structure is also subservience to Frelimo and deepening corruption.

Corruption and the Power of a Comprador Ruling Party

The new elite's growth was based on corruption. The baby oligarchs were growing up based on government contracts and loans and land and mining exploration licenses – which naturally required payments to the ruling party, Frelimo. There was a tacit agreement that as long as the government said the right things and adopted the right policies, corruption would not be challenged. Indeed, in 2002, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and Norway all had policies **not** to challenge corruption. World Bank policy said: "It is not the Bank's role to identify and prosecute individual offenders, but rather to address the various aspects of policy and institutional reform that are likely to be critical in reducing corruption" (Hanlon 2004). The message is clear – the new oligarchs can steal and even kill, as long as Frelimo is seen to adopt the correct policies and reforms, even if they are never implemented.

For the elections in 1994 and subsequently, many NGOs and other agencies ran competing seminars for journalists, paying up to $100 per day. Similar competing seminars were held on gender, HIV/AIDS, and other fashionable subjects, and government staff and journalists attended just to collect the per diems. It became quite brazen with people just arriving to sign in and staying long enough to collect their envelope and, not caring to hear the same thing again, simply leaving. The agencies did not care – they also only wanted the attendance sheets to present to headquarters. Thus comprador corruption extended to the new middle class in the donor-dependent NGOs and ministries who skipped work for the day and to Mozambican and foreign staff who only wanted to tick the boxes in report to their headquarters in the United States or Europe.

And the corruption extends to projects. Relatives, friends, and lovers of NGO and donor staff are given jobs on the projects that the donors and NGOs have funded. Consultancy and evaluation contracts are only given to those Mozambicans who say that the project was good.

This develops into a dense network of patron-client relations, at all levels. The ultimate imperial patrons sit in the headquarters of international agencies such as the World Bank, IMF, and European Union, as well as those in the headquarters of bilateral government donors and INGOs. Their clients are lower-level staff, including in Mozambique, and increasingly intermediate contractors who have taken over the implementation of aid. Below them are a set of Mozambican subcontractors and facilitators – in ministries, in NGOs, or in some cases with tiny one-person "briefcase" NGOs. At each level, they are clients of those above and patrons of those below. But as with capitalism and business itself, complexity leads to less rigor and more personal intervention. And the clients become more subservient and the patrons more powerful.

The final piece of the subservience jigsaw is Frelimo, the ruling party, itself. In exchange for subservience in key places, Frelimo has been allowed to build its own patron-client relations. Contracts and jobs are dependent on having Frelimo

patrons. Sometimes it is quite simple – teachers cannot stand for or work for opposition parties in elections; if they do, they are transferred to a school far away. But if they properly support the party, they are allowed to ask bribes for school places and to pass courses.

The demands of imperialism change over time. Just after the war in the 1990s, it was to covert the socialists to capitalists and create a comprador elite, as well as accepting the basic rules of neoliberalism. A decade later, Mozambique suddenly became important as a mineral-energy producer, and the demand was to give free access to transnational capital.

Mozambique's new oligarchs often sit on Frelimo's Political Commission, the ruling body, or the Central Committee – or they are close to those who hold those seats. They know they will be supported to build their businesses if they use their political role to allow imperial dominance. Thus they are "comprador oligarchs" – both clients and patrons. And Mozambican society is being shaped in their image, at all levels.

Mozambique is unusual in being treated both as a post-Socialist country needing "shock therapy" like Russia and Eastern Europe and also as an African developing country. The result has been the creation of what might be called "comprador oligarchs." Their wealth comes partly from control of state assets and contracts, but, unlike Russia, not from control of the mineral-energy resources, which are instead controlled by international capital. History, a proxy war, and the aid industry have ensured that the end of colonialism did not mean the end of imperialism in Mozambique.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Debt Crisis in Africa and Imperialism
▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Social Costs of US Imperialism

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▶ AFRICOM, NATO and the 2011 War on Libya

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Multinational Corporations

▶ U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

Music

▶ Jazz: *Come On and Let's Get Free*

Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

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Synonyms

Blues; Country; Electronica; Evangelical; Folk; Hip hop; Hymnody; Indian classical; Jazz; National anthems; Reggae blues, national anthems

Definition/Description

This chapter examines musical forms from the 18th to 21st centuries. In each zone, the chapter asserts an imperial force is designated from Britain, the United States, and other heartlands of imeperialism in opposition to musical forms from dissenting peoples resisting imperial exploitation across the world.

Introduction

This essay explores the opposing uses to which musical forms are put within three key historic and contemporary zones which span the 18th and 21st centuries.

These zones designate imperial force, as it is embodied by Britain and America, as well as the oppressed communities of the heartlands of imperialism, in African America, and dissenting and dissident Britain; imperial agency, such as Chile and Israel, as well as the interior, subaltern, and exterior zones of exile, through which resistance takes place, particularly in the instance of Palestine, and the zones of imperial exploitation and resistance, in Kenya, Venezuela, Palestine, Vietnam, and India.

This exploration takes place through the interweaving of thematic concerns, exemplary musicians, musical forms, and modes of practice, inclusive of.

Through this approach, the essay describes the complex and contradictory uses to which music is put in the formation of the British and American empires, and the struggles of groups such as the Mau Mau, the Black Panthers, the peoples of the Occupied Territories of Palestine, the revolution of Venezuela, and the cultural project of the Communist Party of India.

Isaac Watts: Hymnody, Empire, and Voices of Dissent

The publication in 1707 of English hymnodist Isaac Watts's songbook *The Psalms & Hymns of Isaac Watts (aka Isaac Watts' Hymns & Spiritual Songs)* (Watts 2004/1707a) and the publication the same year of the *Union with England Act* (Estates of Parliament 2004/1707), through which the kingdom of Great Britain was established, mark a founding intersection of music in the service of imperialism.

This intersection is grounded by an emphasis on the idea, present in the Acts of Union's synonym of divine and temporal rule, symbolised in its adoption of the crosses of Saints George and Andrew as the official emblem 'in all Flags, Banners, Standards, and Ensigns both at Sea and Land' (2004/1707: xxv), and noted in Watts in *The Psalms of David, Imitated in the Language of the New Testament and Apply'd to the Christian State and Worship* (1717), of Britain as a divine elect. Watts's centrality in the formation of this intersection of music, scripture, and imperialism is documented in Hull (2008).

This intersection is characterised, through Watts, by a break with the idea present in hymnody since the publication in 1562 of Thomas Sternhold and John Hopkins's *The Whole Book of Psalms Collected into English Metre* (1812), that hymnody was the sole practice of the clergy and that its songs comprised the setting to music of Biblical texts: in his *Psalms and Bibles* (2009/1707) Watts presented hymnody as a secular writing practice that was inclusive of the use of subjectivity.

It is, however, unlikely that the subjectivities Watts had in mind were those of the African slaves

upon which the expansion of the British Empire was dependent: Watts's rationale for their location 'in the confines of hell' was 'because it pleased thee, whose counsels are unsearchable' (Watts 1812/1723: 173).

Nevertheless, the adoption of Watts's ideas on hymnody by African slaves in the British Empire's North American colonies and in the subsequent 'nascent' (Washington 1786), 'infant' (Washington 1788) American Empire gave Watts's idea historic force: Boyer (2000/1995: 6,7) traces documentation of slaves' independent use of Watts's hymns to 1755. The violence of slavery and segregation ensured that subsequent expressions of dissent, in the negro spiritual of the nineteenth century and the gospel forms of the twentieth century, were governed by song writing and performance strategies cohered by what Brown (1953) describes as 'oblique' forms of musical expression.

This allusive, figurative use of language, particularly in its deployment for the founding of black pedagogic institutions, such as the Fisk University by the Fisk Jubilee Singers in, for example, *Great Camp Meeting (aka There's a Great Camp Meeting in the Promised Land)* (1997/1909), and its deployment for a global working-class solidarity in the performance of the form by Paul Robeson, in *There's No Hiding Place* (2008/1937) serves as evidence of the subversive use of a musical form compelled by an imperialist intent.

William Blake: *Jerusalem* and England Upside Down

Music is the medium through whose forms imperialist and anti-imperialist alike articulate their mutual antagonisms of interest, sometimes through the same song. Consider the case of William Blake's poem *Jerusalem* (Blake 1998/1810).

Blake relocates Jerusalem in England. This relocation designates a scriptural, biblical Jerusalem of the world before its destruction and reconstruction, described by John of Patmos, and presided over by a Satanic presence (Rev. 21: 7,8), which is present in Blake's anti-war poetry

in, for example, *Milton: Book the First* (Blake 2008/1804) as the 'dark satanic death' instituted through military and religious conflict (119) and the 'dark satanic mills' of *Jerusalem* (Blake 2008/1810: 95), which Blake historian Erdman describes as figurative of a critique of militarism (Erdman 1991: 396).

Jerusalem, in its orchestral version by Hubert Parry (1916) and Edward Elgar (1922) nonetheless found an advocate in King George V (Dent and Whittaker 2002: 89): *Jerusalem*'s subsequent use in the BBC's second *Empire* Day Royal Command Concert broadcast in 1938 (Richards 2001: 172) and its presence as a regular feature of the BBC's *Last Night of the Proms* comprise the most resonant examples of what Crocco describes as an erroneous perception of Blake's work as that of an imperialist in the service of the British Empire (Crocco 2014: 184, 185).

On the other hand, Mark Stewart's version of *Jerusalem* (Stewart and MAFFIA 1983) uses post-colonial, Jamaican dub process, and English post-punk performance technique to fracture and distort a recording of Elgar's orchestration of *Jerusalem,* through which Stewart disempowers the affirmation of empire present in Elgar's composition. Stewart's fragmented, reversed reading of the stanzas of Blake's poem creates a shattered figuration of a broken, post-imperial Britain, a sense of 'England's green and pleasant lands turned upside down' (Whitson and Whittaker 2013: 86). Stewart's version of *Jerusalem* thus uses an imperialist rendition of Blake's poem to restore Blake's intent to its context of anti-imperial dissent.

Silence I: Salim Joubran, *Hatikvah,* Israel, America

The function of music in the affirmation of empire is twofold: to sonify the aspirations and presence of imperialism, and to silence, if not subsume into its sonic presence, the dissenting sonic voices of the conquered. However, in the context of the mutuality of support between Israel and the post-Second World War realisation of George Washington's nascent, infant American imperialism, *Hatikvah*

(Imber 1878), the national anthem of Israel, performs the silencing function of imperialist music, against which the performance of silence can sometimes function as an articulation of dissent.

Such was the case in the refusal of the Israel Supreme Court's sole Arab judge, Salim Joubran, to sing *Hatikvah* with his colleagues in a public event marking the retirement of Supreme Court chief justice Dorit Beinisch. Joubran's silence signalled a reversal of the relation of the song to silence.

Hatikvah had, in its performance in 1945 by survivors of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp on the day of the Allied liberation (BBC 1945) rendered, through sound, the failure of the Nazis to force an absolute silence on Jewish presence: *Hatikvah*, in this context, functioned in opposition to silence.

In 2004 *Hatikvah* was made the national anthem of the State of Israel. In this new context the song exists both as that which historically functioned against silence, and as that which also performs an advocacy of silence, that of a vocal Arab subjectivity in the expression of Israeli national presence. Here is the 'essential access' (Fein 2012) prohibited by the song's lyrics: 'As long as Jewish spirit/Yearns deep in the heart/With eyes turned East/Looking towards Zion/Our hope is not yet lost/The hope of two millennia/To be a free people in our land/The land of Zion and Jerusalem' (Imber 1787).

By making present a Palestinian silence in the song's performance, and thus performing a silence in the song which makes of the song a song of silence, a silent *Hatikvah*, Joubran extended *Hatikvah*'s historical opposition to silence to the very Palestinians whom the song, in its function as a national anthem, renders silent. By means of silence, Joubral's performance thus extends into the twenty-first century the intent of the 1945 Belsen survivors' performance: to affirm the presence of a people against attempts at their annihilation.

But Joubran's silence also serves as a counterpoint to a second historical silence, one which brings us back to the question of silence and its role in imperialism. Chomsky (1989; 1999/1983) identifies a silence in US political and media culture toward Israel's territorial expansion and the corresponding conduct of the Israeli military toward Palestinians. This silence, Chomsky writes, comprises 'an apologetics about the crimes of one's own state and its clients' (Chomsky 1989: 282). Its effect, in Israel, is to make possible further violence. In the US this silence serves to obscure from the American public, whose taxes ensure the continuity of this violence, both its scale and its cost (Chomsky 1989: 293; 1999/1983: 49).

Silence II: Victor Jara: Pinochet, Memory, Oblivion

In the case of Chilean music against the agencies of US imperialism, the secrecy with which the latter secured its interests in Chile, inclusive of its facilitating the overthrow of the democratically elected Allende Government, documented in Kornbuh (2004) and Dinges (2004), functioned as the modality through which the Chilean military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet exerted its powers of silence.

In the Pinochet regime's murder of musician and theatre director Victor Jara, and its imprisonment and enforced exile of musicians and poets (e.g. Inti Illimani, Angel Parras, Patricio Manns, and Quilapayún, whose work comprised both univocal support for Allende and the Pan-Latin Americanism of the Nueva Cancion movement), there was an investment in secrecy which was concomitant with that of the White House.

However, whereas the White House articulated this investment through the labyrinthine paper trail of transmissions documented in *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (Kornbuh 2004), Pinochet expressed his investment through his antipathy to and subsequent censure of Nueva Cancion artists. This investment was characterised by Pinochet's attempts at secreting the sound of the Nueva Cancion's opposition in the noise of torture and the silence of death. The legacy of the relation between the Chilean expression of US imperialism and dissenting Chilean music is thus a microcosm of the broader legacy of American imperialism in Chile.

This legacy is one of silence, identified as such by exiled musician Horacio Salinas, one of the founders of Inti Illimani. Salinas (in Manz 1999: 4) located this silence in the collective memory of the half-a-million Chileans who experienced torture by the Pinochet regime. For Salinas, the memory of this mass trauma had yet to undergo catharsis, and was present only in the silence of memory. The problem for musicians in post-fascist Chile was thus one of speaking to and allowing for the expression of this trauma, which remained as silence precisely because it was too painful to exist as sound (ibid.).

With no small irony, Salinas noted that these reflections occurred to him during a 1999 performance by Inti Illimani at the National Stadium of Chile on the group's return from exile. Pinochet had used the stadium as a mass detention centre after his military coup. Jose Paredes Marquez, the first soldier to be charged with Jara's assassination, confirmed in 2009 that the stadium was the site of Jara's murder.

Paredes's confession to his role in Jara's death in 2009 (Morales 2009) marked the beginning of the end of Chilean military secrecy surrounding Jara's death. The indictment in 2012 of a further eight soldiers might be viewed as the beginning of the catharsis Salinas had hoped for ten years earlier, if not the restoration to justice of sound, that of the music and ideals of Jara and the Nueva Cancion movement.

These indictments certainly mark the triumph of memory, that of music over forgetting, in the rescue of Jara and the Nueva Cancion from what journalist Ramona Wadi called Pinochet's 'hope for oblivion' (Wadi 2013: 4), a term which might also describe the implementation of forgetting through the silencing of musicians.

Pham Tuyên: Borderless Music

Music against imperialism crosses national borders designated by imperialism and articulates an affinity of struggle against oppression. The anti-imperialist song functions as a space of connection and solidarity via the valorisation of a people through their political leaders. For example, Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet Minh independence movement and architect of the victory of the North Vietnamese against both France and the US, was the figure through whom a unity of political identification was established between Chile and Vietnam, in Victor Jara's *The Right to Live in Peace – a Song of Comrade Ho Chi Minh* (1971).

The Plastic Ono Band's *Give Peace a Chance* (1969) functioned as a catalyst between American folk music and Vietnamese liberation music. Pham Tuyên, founder of the Vietnam National Academy of Music and one of Vietnam's preeminent composers, many of whose 600-plus songs voiced Vietnam's aspirations for independence during the country's defence against French and US incursions, recalled seeing American folk singer Pete Seeger lead a massed audience through a rendition of *Give Peace a Chance* on a television broadcast of the momentous anti-war event 'Moratorium to End the War' in Washington DC. In a 2008 interview, Tuyên described being so affected by the song and Seeger's performance that he wrote *Play Music for Our Dear American Friends!* (1972), and dedicated the song to Seeger (Norton and Kutschke 2013: 105).

This was no small compliment. Tuyên's songs made an indelible imprint on Vietnamese consciousness. His composition *Hanoi Dien Bien Phu in the Air* (1972) served as an aid to morale in the face of Hanoi's bombing by the US in December 1972.

The bombing, a protracted 12-day attempt aimed at making the Vietnamese submit, deepened their resolve. In a 2012 interview, Tuyên said the song was 'strong and resolute to remind people that the Vietnamese people were determined to win. …. The song echoed throughout the city despite the tense situation. Our people in the south said that Hanoi sang while fighting and the U.S would be defeated. And yes, the U.S had to retreat the following day' (Lan 2012: 2).

Tuyên's composition *If Only Uncle Ho was Here on the Day of Victory* (written, recorded, and broadcast on 28 April 1975 on a Voice of Vietnam newscast), marked the defeat of the US's South Vietnamese allies and the official cessation of the Vietnam War.

Burning Spear: Citation, *Slavery Days*

In music against imperialism citation functions as an aid against imperialism's annihilating forces of forgetting by which histories of resistance are erased from popular memory. Through citation, a song, a line in a song, becomes present in another song, in the voice of another singer, in the absence of its author; and the memory of resistance carried by music against imperialism thereby crosses the spatio-temporal borders of imperial demarcation.

For example, Jones (2005/1941: 41) recounts that former African-American slave Lucy Adams, 104 years old 'and unable to control her memory', would sing fragments of songs: 'Her favourite was one she said her grandfather had sung: '... Keep your lamp trimmed and burning, for your work is almost done'. By 1941, when Jones interviewed Adams, this fragment had comprised a popular gospel song, *Keep your Lamp Trimmed and Burning,* recorded by African-American evangelist William 'Blind Willie' Johnson (1929). Johnson's song and an earlier version, *Let Every Lamp be Burning Bright*, written by Euro-American hymnodist Franklin E. Belden and published in the songbook *The Seventh Day Adventist Hymn and Tune Book for use in Divine Worship*, in 1886, when Adams was in her 30s, may have been the song Adams recalled her grandfather singing.

Johnson's refrain, 'the work is almost done' (Johnson 1929), is given apocalyptic expression in a 1956 version of the song by Reverend Gary Davis. That Davis sings 'this whole world is almost done' serves as an example of the oblique song-writing strategy referenced in Brown (1953), by which the desire for the absolute end of the work of slaves and their descendants in Johnson's recording and the world of slavery and segregation in Davis's version are rendered implicitly.

On the other hand, the repetition and difference of Johnson's line in Jamaican vocal group (latterly a solo artist) Burning Spear's *Zion Higher* (1971) relocates 'heaven's journey', the metaphysical trajectory of Johnson's song, to the terrestrial planes of Africa:

> Awake, Zion I, awake
>> Awake and trim your lamp
>> for I want to go
>> to the land
>> where the milk and honey flow. (Burning Spear 1971)

Zion, in Spear's subsequent songs (e.g. *Red, Green and Gold* [1975]) functions as the interchangeable name of Africa. Spear's citation of Johnson's line, in *Zion Higher,* thus grounds the space of post-imperialism in the nonmetaphysical, historical-material world.

Burning Spear's oeuvre also designates the beginning, in African diasporic music against imperialism, of an explicit reference to slavery as a question of historical memory. Spear begins his song *Slavery Days* (1975b) with a question: 'Do you remember the days of slavery?' The plea (to the listener as much to himself) with which Spear ends, 'Try and remember, please remember', makes the song an injunction against forgetting the transatlantic trade on which British imperialism was founded and through which the US 'infant empire' was realised.

Burning Spear's sustained engagement with the legacies of imperialism (including his name, which is the English translation of Jomo, the Kikuyu forename of Mau Mau leader and first president of independent Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta) and present in his earliest recording, *Door Peeper* (1969), prefigures that of The Wailers' *Soul Rebels* (1970), Fela Kuti and the Africa 70 with Ginger Baker's *Why Black Man Dey Suffer* (1971), and Sonny Okosun's *Fire in Soweto* (1978). Okuseinde and Olubomehin (2011) suggest that the lingering euphoria of independence may have been a contributory factor in Kuti and Okuson's late, but nonetheless vital, engagement with imperialism's reverberations.

However, Burning Spear's citational namesake Jomo Kenyatta was instrumental in suppressing the legacy of the Mau Mau and its heroes (see Durrani 2006: 15), and this was a major contributory factor in the deferral of Kenya's engagement with its own role in the defeat of British imperialism. In comparison to the wealth of songs composed during the Mau Mau rebellion waged against the British between 1922 and 1963 (documented in Clough

M

[1998]; Durrani [2006]; Kinyatti [2009/2001]; Njogu and Maupeu [2007]; Pugliese [2007]), the number of similarly themed recordings made since colonialism is relatively low. Two examples are Wanjau with the University Orchestra's *The Late (Marehemu) J.M Kariuku Pt.1* (1975) and Jabali Afrika's *Dedan Kimathi* (2013).

The simultaneity of memory and its suppression contained in the name 'Burning Spear' thus suggests that the relation of music to imperialism may be one of contradiction, in which is present the co-existence of opposing, yet nonetheless productive, meanings.

The 1857 Revolt and the Indian People's Theatre Association: The Archive and the Preservation of Memory

The Indian Revolt of 1857 is regarded in Marx, Engels, and Joshi, as India's first national armed insurrection against British colonial rule. Despite its defeat by the British, it succeeded in creating a unity of purpose across India's ethnic, linguistic, and religious divides, and in developing affiliations in the international anti-imperialist struggle (Engels [1858]; Joshi [1994; 2014/1954; 2014/1957]; Marx [1857a, b, c, d]).

Joshi observes that while British documentation of the revolt is plentiful, there is no corresponding Indian record (Joshi 1994: ix). Joshi's anthology *1857 in Folk Songs* serves as a counter-historical document in whose songs the British imperial presence is named Farangi, 'the foreign usurper', and is the subject of an incendiary 'burning hatred' (xvi).

The book commemorates the revolt through songs from the key locations in which the revolt took place (Delhi and its neighbouring vicinity, Oudh, and Rajasthan), and through songs that honour key leaders of the revolt such as Laxmi Bai, the Rani of Jhansen, and Kunwar Singh. The nature of the imperial violence that characterised the revolt is also recalled in these songs. The following untitled passage on Bai documents the British lynching of Indians:

Fell the trees,
    Commanded the Rani of Jhansi
    Lest the Farangi hang

Our soldiers on them
[…]
So that, in the hot sun
They may have no shade. (quoted in Joshi 1994: 61)

The following verse, from *The Battle Of Gangi,* documents Singh's first insurgency and also the finality of Indian hostility toward British rule.

Fire no more shots, oh Baba Kunwar Singh
    The Farngis are routed
    Oh Rama
    The Firanji's are finished
    Oh Baba Kunwar Singh
    Fire no more shots! (quoted in Joshi 1994: 84)

The book thus functions as an archive of the revolt, comprising Indian, anti-imperialist expressions of the beginning of a new 'tradition' (Joshi 2014/1957: viii) of insurgency, of national, armed insurrection. That these antiimperialist expressions take place through songs and are restored to public memory as songs suggests that the book also functions as an archive of expressions of a tradition of Indian anti-imperialist music.

The songs can also be regarded as an archive of the memory of defeat, through which the memory of imperial violence can constitute a galvanising force. Joshi writes, 'when the modern nationalist movement emerged and began rallying the mass of the people during the 1920s, the memory of the 1857 terror was recalled to warn the Indian people to get ready to face the worst' (212).

There is an autobiographical resonance to Joshi's claim. In 1929 he joined the Communist Party of India, and in 1935 became its leader. Formed in 1925, the Party, and Joshi, were part of the nationalist movement he describes. The memory of the 1857 rebellion was thus borne by Joshi. The commemorative work of *1857 in Folk Songs* thus includes its author's political formation within the broad context of the emergence of India's anti-imperialist movement.

On the other hand, the book was intended to be part of an archive, initiated by Joshi, of the history of communism in India (Panikkar 1994: v). The archive has remained unfinished since Joshi's death in 1980. The role of culture within India's anti-imperialist struggle and its broad socialist project would have been an essential concern of such an archive. This role would have been

embodied by the culturally diverse work of the Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA).

Richmond locates IPTA's beginning as 'a low key affiliate of the Anti Fascist Artists and Writers' Association of Calcutta' (Richmond 1973: 323). Chowdhury cites the Bengal cultural Renaissance movement of the nineteenth century as a predecessor (Chowdhury in Biswas 1978: 1). IPTA National Congress (2015: 1) places its development in the context of Indian anti-colonial cultural activism: the first Progressive Writer's Association Conference (1936), the formation of the Youth Cultural Institute in Calcutta (1940), and the People's Theatre in Bangalore (1941). Chowdhury describes IPTA's aim, before and after India's independence, as 'Socialist revolution. And to awaken the people, to make them aware for it' (Chowdhury in Biswas 1978: 5).

The founding of IPTA in 1943 as a response to the Bengal famine of that year is documented in Chakravortty (2014). IPTA grew from the work of the Bengal Cultural Squad, a mobile theatre organised by Binoy Roy (IPTA National Congress 2015: 1). The Bengal Cultural Squad toured India performing, feeding, and raising money for the famine victims, and drawing national attention to the famine. Significantly, the Squad also inspired the formation of similar mobile theatre and musical units (Chakravortty 2014: 30–31; IPTA National Congress 2015: 1).

The theatrical work that comprised the main aspect of IPTA's output is documented in Bathia (2004), Gupta (2010/2008), and Richmond (1973). Damodaran notes that the musical aspect of IPTA's work 'remains largely undocumented in any systematic manner' (Damodaran 2008: 1). Dewri's text on IPTA's musical work in Assam (Dewri 2012) corrects this state of affairs, as do the downloads of revolutionary Indian songs stored in Soumya Chattopadhyay's *Ganasangeet Archive* (2011), and Damodaran's text, 'Protest Through Music' (2008), in which the author identifies four genres and forms of practice descriptive of a definitive IPTA musical tradition:

1. The folk genre, in which folk tunes provide the basis for new compositions. Damodaran cites Hemanga Biswas and Nirmalendu Chowdhury,

Nibaran Pandit and Gurudas Pal as writers and performers whose work illustrates this genre (Damodaran 2008: 1).

2. The classical music-based genre, which emerged in Bombay and Hindustani, and in which Hindustani classical musical was used as the basis for protest songs. Damodaran cites Pandit Ravi Shankar and Jyotirindra Moitra as exemplars of this genre (ibid.). Shankar was also involved with IPTA's theatrical and cinematic productions; he composed music for IPTA's ballet Amar Bharat [Immortal India] (1946) (Lavezzoli 1996; Ray 2012), was the musical director for filmmaker Chetan Anand's Neecha Nagar (1945), and K.K Abass's film on the Bengal famine Dharti Ke Lal (1946) (Gupta 2010/2008).

3. The nationalist genre, whose songs Damodaran describes as exhortations to colonial revolt, was also rooted in the Indian classical tradition, and characterised by 'uplifting tunes, sung at high scales and tempos to the accompaniment of large orchestras using instruments like the sitar, veena, violin, tabla and the bugle' (Damodaran 2008: 3).

4. The trans-generic activity of translating and adapting songs composed within the Western harmonic tradition, and drawn from the international communist and anti-fascist movements, as a way of identifying with the international protest music culture and its exponents, such as Bertolt Brecht and Paul Robeson.

Damodaran writes of 'the direct use of Western tunes such as from Paul Robeson, the writing of anti-fascist ballads in Malayalam and Bengali on the lines of Brechtian war ballads', and also notes that 'Hemanga Biswas wrote songs about Paul Robeson and the Chinese Revolution which had western tunes; Bhupen Hazarika adapted Paul Robeson's Mississippi to talk about the Ganga' (3–4).

Regarding the composition of protest songs within the Western harmonic tradition, Damodaran credits composer Salil Chowdhury with transforming the prevailing style of composition and vocal performance in Indian music during the 1940s (3). Chowdhury's oeuvre is the subject of

The World of Salil Chowdhury, an archival website by Gautam Choudhury (1998), which features interviews, overviews, and an extensive discography of phonographic singles recorded by Chowdhury for the Megaphone record label between 1944/45 and 1991.

The dispersal of Chowdhury's songs followed the same route as IPTA's theatrical productions. Choudhury writes that 'with IPTA comrades [Salil] took his songs to the masses. They traveled through the villages and the cities and his songs became the voice of the masses' (Choudhury 1998: n.p.).

Evidence of the claim by Chowdhury (in Biswas 1978) and Choudhury (cited in Mujumdar 2012) that many of the songs composed by Chowdhury during the struggle for independence remain popular in peasant communities can be found in *Chetonaar Gaan* [Songs of Consciousness], an album, produced by Choudhury (Chowdhury 2011).

Mujumdar (2012: 1) describes the making of the album: Choudhury used his extensive knowledge of Chowdhury's music as the basis of a 12-year search for the composer's songs in villages where Chowdhury's former comrades still resided. At his request, the villagers sang the songs: Choudhury recorded their performances and used them as the basis of re-recordings by IPTA singers. These were collected on the album.

As with *1857 in Songs, The World of Salil Chowdhury* was compelled by a concern that a significant cultural contribution to India's anti-imperial struggle would be lost to memory because of the absence in India of a culture of preservation (Choudhury in Mujumdar 2012: 1). Through Choudhury's archival work, Chowdhury's music is restored to Indian public culture, and the project of restoring India's anti-imperialist songs to memory, initiated by Joshi, is given a new expression in the twenty-first century.

Max Roach: Drum Culture

The anti-imperialist musician finds political fellowship and continuity through a listening informed by musical practice. This is the case with African-American jazz drummer, bandleader, and pedagogue Max Roach (1924–2007). With

trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie, saxophonist Charlie Parker, pianists Bud Powell and Thelonius Monk, and fellow percussionist Kenny Clarke, Roach was a pioneer of be bop, and thus an inventor of modern jazz.

Roach's commitment to anti-imperialism is embodied in percussion. His collaboration with vocalist and anti-imperialist collaborator Abbey Lincoln, *We Insist! Max Roach and Oscar Brown, Jr.'s Freedom Now Suite* (1960) expressed Roach's opposition to segregation in the US and South Africa. The album's artwork, comprising a photograph of African-Americans desegregating an American cafeteria, and the album's compositions (notably *Tears for Johannesburg, and Driva' Man*) offered its listeners parallels between apartheid and US segregation. Roach further developed these themes in *Percussion Bitter Suite* (1961).

Roach's explicit opposition to domestic and global expressions of US imperialism preceded subsequent work by jazz musicians. A key example is the quartet of albums composers Charlie Haden and Carla Bley collaboratively created as the Liberation Music Orchestra (Haden and Liberation Music Orchestra 1990, 2005; Liberation Music Orchestra 1969). The Orchestra's first and eponymously titled album was recorded in opposition to the Vietnam War (Haden in Goodman 2006: 4–5), commemorated the anti-Fascist Spanish Civil War, Che Guevara (*Song for Che*) (1969), and was dedicated to the anti-colonial movements of Mozambique and Angola (Goodman 2006: 8).

A second example is the work of Archie Shepp. Shepp's composition *Malcolm, Malcolm, Semper Malcolm* (1965) eulogised the slain Muslim internationalist; *Attica Blues* (1972) honoured George Jackson of the socialist organisation the Black Panther Party, who was slain in Attica prison in 1971. Roach's collaboration with Shepp, *Force: Sweet Mao-Suid Africa '76* (1976) was a product of a touring invitation by the Italian Communist Party, and commemorated the death of Mao Zedong, founder of the People's Republic of China, and the protests by the youth of Soweto against apartheid (Ho 2009: 124).

An anti-imperialist sensibility informed Roach's thinking about the political meaning of jazz: he considered it 'a democratic form … it means to listen, to respect, and harmonize together'

(Roach in Chénard 1978: 2). For Roach, jazz, understood as a dynamic, intergenerational musical process, was also antithetical to imperialism: 'Jazz is not an imperialistic way [of making music] where a conductor tells [you] that you are not doing it right. That is classical music. Jazz is fluid, and every generation has the opportunity to contribute something new (2).

The anti-imperialist thinking and practice of Roach, Shepp (in Kofsky 1983/1970: 20), and Haden (in Goodman 2006) runs counter to the use of jazz by the United States Information Service (USIA) and the Voice of America (VOA) during the Cold War. Willis Conover, the VOA's music consultant, describes this use: 'our music helps maintain contact with people already inclined to sympathise with the United States' (Conover in Kofsky [1983/1970: 109]. Kofsky describes the function of the USIA as supervising 'the dissemination of pro-U.S. and anti-socialist propaganda throughout the world' (110). Zolov (1999: 236–239) elaborates on this function.

When Roach listened to hip hop in 1985, two years prior to the emergence of Public Enemy, the genre's most politically confrontational and sonically dissonant group, he discerned in its sound a continuity with jazz, a radical capacity for invention from conditions of social and political disenfranchisement, for 'making something out of nothing ... which affected the whole world' (Roach in Owen 1988b: 60).

In the relentless percussive force of L.L. Cool J's album *Radio* (1985), Roach heard a martial sensibility which he associated with the transformative momentum of the civil rights movement: 'the sound was very militant to me because it was like marching, an army on the move. We lost Malcolm, we lost King and they thought they had blotted out everybody. But all of a sudden this new art form arises and the militancy is still there in the music' (72).

Bob Dylan, Public Enemy, Tupac Shakur, and the Black Panthers: Revolution and Reciprocity

An affective reciprocity between anti-imperial activism and popular music, which begins in the music of Bob Dylan and returns in hip hop through the music of Public Enemy and Tupac Shakur, illustrates an intertwining of personal and political experience in the relation between music and anti-imperialism.

Seale writes of members of the Black Panther Party (BPP) listening to Dylan's music over the course of three days while preparing their newspaper (Seale 1991/1971: 183). In a photograph by Steven Shames taken in the home of Black Panther co-founder Huey P Newton, Newton is about to play, or has already played, the album whose sleeve he casually brandishes as display and protection, between his body and the world: Bob Dylan's *Highway 61 Revisited* (1965) (Miss Rosen 2010: 3; Shames 1967).

Shames's photograph shows Dylan's music formed a part of the domestic space of the Panthers' political project, in the intimacy of which a consonance of his music with their view of the world took place. Seale describes Newton's detailed listening to one of the songs: *Ballad of a Thin Man* (Dylan 1965). In the song's narrative of voyeurism and horror, power and abjection, Newton found an intimate description of the relations between America's black working poor and its white middles classes (Seale 1991 [1970]: 183–184).

The Panthers' project of politicising the black poor, including the incarcerated, gave the organisation common ground with the work of prison activist George Jackson. A self-educated Marxist theoretician of imperialism's global, domestic, penal expressions, Jackson was serving a life sentence for stealing $60 while a teenager.

Jackson shared the Panthers' view of the US as a colonising country whose colonised subjects were African Americans, one of whose tasks was nonetheless to create an international anti-imperialist network through which revolution could take place (Jackson 1994/1970: 264). Newton (2009/1973) had offered to send Black Panther members to join the North Vietnamese in their war against the US; BPP co-founder Elaine Brown outlines the Panthers' affiliations with anti-colonial movements in Palestine, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and China (Brown 1990: xvii–xix).

In 1970 Newton invited Jackson to join the Black Panthers and integrate his prison activism

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with theirs (Jackson in Wald 1993/1971: 7). The Panthers were by 1970 regarded as 'the most active and dangerous black extremist group in the United States' (FBI in Wolf 2001: 2). Their destruction is identified in Wolf (2001) as the chief objective of the FBI between 1968 and 1971: the Party was infiltrated; key members were hounded, harassed, and killed in a succession of attacks by the police. In August Jackson was shot and killed by guards during a riot at San Quentin prison.

In *George Jackson*, recorded in August that year, Dylan recounts Jackson's life, his death. Jackson was feared, Dylan tells us, because he was indomitable:

> He wouldn't take shit from no one
> He wouldn't bow down or kneel
> [...]
> They [the prison authorities] were frightened of his power
> They were scared of his love. (Dylan 1971)

Jackson had his own thoughts about music and death. He wrote, in a letter to attorney at law Fay Spender, on 17 April 1970, that he did not 'want to die and leave a few sad songs as [his] only monument' (Jackson 1994/1970: 266). The folk lineages of dissenting music through which Dylan voiced his empathy with Jackson and, earlier, the Civil Rights movement (Dylan 1963, 1964), and the lineages of politicised rap most forcefully defined within the genre by Public Enemy (1987, 1988, 1990a, b) can be figuratively regarded as guarantors of Jackson's wish.

So too can *The 2006 George Jackson Tribute Mixtape* (Ball 2006), compiled by Jared Ball, in which tracks by US MCs Dead Prez, Mos Def, RZA, Ghostface Killa, and Immortal Technique are interspersed with readings from Jackson's *Blood in My Eye* (1990/1972) and *Soledad Brother* (1994/1970). The MCs on Ball's mixtape are representative of a strand of politicised rap developed by Public Enemy, who are also featured. In the example of *The 2006 George Jackson Tribute Mixtape* the writing of Jackson the anti-imperialist functions as a discontinuous audio narrative whose vocal performance, assemblage, and inter-cutting renders Jackson's writing a component part of a musical process, to be consumed within the experience of listening to music. Jackson's writing thus functions as a musical guarantor of its writer's wish.

However, Dylan's, Public Enemy's, and Tupac Shakur's lineages of political dissent converge not in Jackson, but in Shames' image of Newton, in whose hands and hearing Dylan is present as phonographic music (in Seale 1991/1970) and photographic image (in Shames 1967), and whose body is recalled to music in the moment of his murder in 1989, 'from the hand of a nigger that pulled the trigger' (Public Enemy 1990b), in Public Enemy's *Welcome to the Terrordome* (1990b), and recalled again in Tupac Shakur's posthumously released *Changes* (1998):

> It's time to fight back
> That's what Huey said
> Two shots in the dark
> Now Huey's dead.

Public Enemy vocalist Chuck D, in Reynolds described liaising with the Panthers in order to 'spark a revival' (Reynolds 1987: 14), and in *Party For Your Right To Fight*, called for the Panther's return. Shakur, in *Changes,* represented a calling forth into the present, through 'two shots in the dark', the violent passing of the time in which the time for fighting back had been announced, and the end of the possibility of the presence in the present of the past in which the object of such retaliation was international socialist transformation, in Seale (1991/1970), Jackson (1990/1972, 1994/1970), Newton (2009/1973):

> That's just the way it is
> Things'll never be the same
> *That's just the way it is*. (Shakur 1998)

In the absence of the revolution advocated by the Panthers, the possibilities for social transformation Shakur suggests in *Changes* mark a shift from macropolitical to micropolitical change which nonetheless reflects the politicising of caring embodied in the Panthers' 1968 'Serve the People' activities, a key example of which was their national free breakfast project for the children of welfare recipients:

> Let's change the way we eat
> Let's change the way we live
> And let's change the way we treat each other.
> (Shakur 1998)

On the other hand, in *Wordz of Wisdom* (1991), Shakur uses the phrase, 'America's nightmare' to locate the past of the Panthers in the unconscious of the Euro-American imagination in its dreaming and waking states. Shakur achieves this by personifying a murderous, mnemonic dream figure, a 'nightmare' of the memory of slavery through which the rapper declares to the US that 'Just as you rose you will fall/By my hands'.

Shakur repeats the phrase to name and cohere a continuum of politicised MCs who are his contemporaries:

> Ice Cube and Da Lench Mob ... America's Nightmare
>> Above The Law ... America's Nightmare,
>> Paris ... America's Nightmare,
>> Public Enemy ... America's Nightmare,
>> KRS-*One* ... *America's Nightmare*

and political activists who are among the last physical embodiments of the Black Panthers, are bearers of the punitive force of the US government, and are also members of Shakur's family.

Shakur's godfather, Elmer 'Geronimo ji Jaga' Pratt, the Panthers' minister of defence, was sentenced to 27 years for murder under the FBI's illegal COunter INTELligence PROgramme (COINTELPRO) (Kleffner 1993; Wolf 2001). Pratt's conviction was overturned in 1997. Shakur's stepfather, Mutulu Shakur, was sentenced to 60 years for bank robbery and aiding the escape of Tupac's aunt, Assata Shakur.

Assata Shakur was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a state trooper. Shakur escaped in 1979 and was granted asylum in Cuba. In 2013 she was placed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List. A \$2 m reward was issued for information leading to her capture (Walker 2013). Lawyer Ron Kuby suggested a context for Shakur's indictment that could also be applied to Mutulu Shakur and Elmer Pratt: 'Assata Shakur was the embodiment of the Black Panther Party ... at a time when there was a low intensity war between black radicals and the U.S.' (Kuby in Jones 2013: 1).

In his later work, the autobiographical component of Shakur's nightmare continuum grew to include his father, Billy Garland, in *Papaz Song* (1993), and his mother, Afeni Shakur, in *Dear Mama* (1995). Garland and Shakur were both Panthers: Shakur was incarcerated while pregnant with Tupac (Garland in George 1998; Shakur in Shakur 1995).

Shakur thus uses autobiographical writing to create an intimacy between politicised hip hop and the outlawed embodiments of the Panthers' project. Hip hop, through Shakur's early work, extends across genre and time the reciprocal relation between popular music and anti-imperialist activism articulated between Newton, Seale, Dylan, and Jackson, while also foregrounding the role of a lived experience within that reciprocity.

Hip Hop Revolución: Organisation, Pedagogy, and Practice

Music against imperialism comprises a multifaceted cultural activity that counters the prevailing forms imperialism's presence might assume in the absence of direct of indirect imperial domination. The practice, organisational and pedagogical work of Venezuela's socialist collective Hip Hop Revolución embodies this description.

US attempts to overthrow Venezuela's United Socialist Party, since its election in 1999, and its failure to achieve its intent are documented in Golinger (2007/2006) and Petras (2013). In Golinger (2010), US State Department documents declassified under the Freedom of Information Act show that between 2005 and 2007 the US State Department invested \$40 m in three American agencies, the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), Freedom House, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (1).

The strategy of the funding was to target Venezuela's 18–25-year olds: its students, particularly students of journalism, and users of online and community media. The strategy would thus have sought to solicit the support of young Venezuelans of the age of Jorney Madriz, the rapper also known as Master. Madriz was 15 when Chavez was elected. He lived in low-income housing in one of Caracas' most deprived areas. 'I didn't care that he had won. Why? Venezuelan youth, myself included, lived in total

political apathy' (Madriz in Navarette 2015: 1) 'But I did pay attention when he was overthrown in 2002'. (Madriz in Terra 2012: 1).

Madriz was one of a generation politicised through its role in the popular revolt by which the US-backed opposition's attempted coup against Chavez was thwarted and Chavez returned to office, albeit not to the effect the US government's $40 million investment in coercing the hearts and mind of Venezuela's youth had been intended, particularly considering Madriz was a fan of America's biggest popular cultural export, hip hop. On the contrary, Madriz founded the collective Hip Hop Revolución in 2003 with Gustavo Borges.

In August 2005 the collective organised the First International Hip Hop Summit in support of Chavez, with three open-air concerts featuring over 100 hip-hop artists as part of the 16th World Youth Festival in Caracas. The size of the event suggests that the State Department's $40 million had missed a significant sector of its demographic: 17,000 participants from 144 countries attended the festival. The size and scale of the Hip Hop Summit suggests that Hip Hop Revolución's affirmation of socialism possessed an international appeal, as well as evidencing hip hop as a popular genre through which the ideas of a socialist revolution could be voiced and disseminated within and across national borders.

In January 2010, Hip Hop Revolución organised the first national conference of activists from the Venezuelan hip hop movement. The conference included political education, music production workshops, film screenings, and discussions for the founding of a national curriculum of urban art schools, Popular Schools for the Arts and Urban Traditions (EPATU), a joint project of Hip Hop Revolución and Venezuela's Ministry of Communes (Hip Hop Revolución 2010).

By 2011 there were 31 EPATU schools located across the most deprived areas of Venezuela. EPATU's curriculum comprises musical and political education; workshops and discussions include subjects such as racism, consumerism, and cultural imperialism, as well as the four disciplines of hip hop: breakdancing, rapping, graffiti, and DJing (Cassell 2011: para 15). Graduates are encouraged

to become teachers to the next group of students (McIntyre and Navarette 2012).

In this regard, Hip Hop Revolución's EPATU project constitutes a contemporary Latin American expression of an African-American cultural continuum of the intergenerational pedagogy Roach (in Owen 1988b) associates with the democratic aspect of jazz practice. This is one way in which the collective's work offers an example of antiimperialist music practice which forms a continuum extending across time and space through black musical genres, and which is both cultural and political.

Hip Hop Revolución's identification with Hugo Chavez and the broad project of socialism in Latin America (Navarette 2012) can, for example, be said to locate the collective in a Venezuelan political continuum of anti-imperialist activism whose forms, in Petras (2010) include the popular mass movements, guerrilla organisations, and trade unions of the 1960s.

These national expressions of dissent cohere with their contemporaneous African-American expressions through the collective's identification with the work of the BPP and Malcolm X: 'Hip Hop Nacido del seno de movimiento como Malcolm X y Panteras Negras' (Hip Hop Revolución 2010): the BPP's opposition to imperialism is documented in the writing of two of its key figures: George Jackson, in *Soledad Brother – the Prison Letters of George Jackson* (1994/1970), and Bobby Seale, BPP founder and national organiser, in *Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton* (1991/1970).

Through their identification with the Black Panthers, Hip Hop Revolución's musical, pedagogic, and organisational activities can be viewed as a project in which two aspects of the politically engaged anti-imperialist sensibility present in Roach, Shepp, Haden, and Bley is condensed. Firstly, the militancy Roach accorded those killed or 'blotted out' during the African-American political struggle of the 1960s ('King . . . *Malcolm X* . . . [and] *everybody'* [Roach in Owen 1988b: 73]). Secondly, the return of this militancy, present as composition and its performance, within hip hop ('the militancy is still there *in* the music' [Roach in Owen 1988: 73]; my italics).

Through the figuration of militancy that conjoins Roach and Hip Hop Revolución, the ambitions of the dead can be said to return as an enervating musical force, albeit with the critical caveat that this reanimated presence of the dead as music is also a reanimation of failure: Hip Hop Revolución's work is directed at consolidating a socialist revolution, which unlike the Black Panthers, had won a substantial victory against US imperialism.

Consequently, the sense of loss that followed the murders of King, Malcolm X, and members of the Black Panthers, and which informed the recordings by Shepp, Haden, and Bley, and the subsequent sense of loss articulated in the enraged, retrospective evocation of these figures in African-American music, has yet to take place in Venezuela's revolution, and may not take place, should the Venezuelan revolution prevail.

This sense of loss is thus absent from the following examples of Venezuelan revolutionary rap: *Revolution* (Desde Guaraira 2009), *EPATU (1 Tema)* (Master, MC Arcades 2010), *Hijo de Lobo Caza* (Arte y Esencia 2012), *Patriotas (Agents of Change Remix) (Área 23 2012), Hip Hop Revolución: The Mixtape Volume One* (Various 2014), *Planetario el himno de la Revolución* (Muchocumo Official 2015).

However, the multivalent nature of America's ongoing attempts to destroy Venezuela's government, through external agencies and internal tensions (Ciccariello-Maher 2012), which Robinson, in Polychroniou (2010), describes as a 'war of attrition', suggests that it is precisely the potential presence of such a loss that informs the force with which these recordings affirm Venezuela's revolution.

USAID's covert deployment of Venezuelan youth to foment opposition toward the Cuban government suggests that the US views Hip Hop Revolución's indigenous audience as a possible agency of this loss. USAID's deployment began in 2008 but was not made public until 2014 (Bercovitch 2014): USAID also attempted to train anti-Castro rappers Los Aldeanos to become leaders of a movement for the overthrow of the Cuban government (Weaver 2014).

A Musical Intifada: Palestine in Electronica and Hip Hop

The support of musicians within the electronic and hip hop genres for the people of Palestine can be understood as an opposition to what Bashir (2007) describes as a geometrical relation of violence between US imperial interests and Israeli colonial interests which functions to sustain the economic interests of the former, and the territorial interests of the latter:

> U.S. support reinforces Israeli colonialism and occupation, which bolsters Israeli militarization of state and society, which generates new ideological and political justifications and breeds new religious fanaticisms, leading to further indigenous resistance and to more U.S. interventions in the region. A cycle of violence if ever there was one, ultimately determined by U.S. imperialism. (1)

Imperial America's determining role in the maintenance of Israeli colonialism includes the use within Israel of hip hop. One example, in Billet (2013), is a collaboration between Taglit Birthright, an organisation which sponsors heritage trips to Israel for young Jews in the US, and Artists 4 Israel, the aim of which is to arrange 'hip hop tours of Israel' for Israeli Zionist fans of hip hop (1). For Billet, the entrenchment of two kinds of colonialism is at work in this collaboration, that of Palestine and hip hop.

Billet also notes a contradiction in this use of hip hop, '[a] music and style that gestated in reaction to the wilful neglect and apartheid treatment of African-Americs and people of colour' to make popular 'the image of an apartheid regime among young people'. Importantly, Billet also observes that Taglit-Birthright and Artists 4 Israel's hip hop tours serve to overshadow Israel's indigenous Palestinian hip hop culture (1).

A second example is the placing of Israeli hip hop in the service of Zionism: Mumford cites the mobilising of homicidal anti-Palestinian sentiment in Tel Aviv by Israeli Zionist rapper Shadow, and the holocaustic demand by rapper Subliminal to '"burn the prisons" housing Palestinians and "destroy [the Palestinian city of] Jenin"' in the aftermath of the killing of an Israeli soldier by a

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Palestinian man (Subliminal in Mumford 2014: 1). This service also includes the use of hip hop as a vehicle for the dissemination of Zionism: British Jewish rapper Antithesis dedicates his first video single *I'm a Zionist* (2010) to Theodore Herzl, the founder of Jewish Zionism's colonial project (Herzl 1988/1896).

Rap that voices support for Palestinian selfdetermination can be understood as an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial musical force which seeks to break the circular relation of violence kept in place through the interdependency of colonial Israel and imperial America.

However, while Palestinian hip hop in particular has an indigenous, Arab tradition of dissenting music, the history of which is documented in Kanaaneh et al.'s *Palestinian Music and Song: Expression and Resistance since 1900* (2014), and whose proponents, in Flow Motion's *promised lands* (2008–2010) include Mahmoud Salim al-Hout, Fairuz, Said Al Muzayin, Said Darwish, and Marcel Khalife. The identification with Palestine expressed by the broader rap community has a precedent in the recordings of British electronic musician Muslimgauze.

Within the many genres that comprise Euro-American and African-American electronic popular music, Muslimgauze's oeuvre is singular because it coheres around a single theme, that of Palestine and its liberation, through which he integrates an empathy with Middle Eastern politics and Arab history and culture.

Muslimgauze's music is instrumental. He communicated these themes through his album artwork, and elaborated on them through his album and composition titles. These include: 'Shadow of the West', in *The Rape of Palestine* (1988), 'Muslims of China', in *United States of Islam* (1991), 'Zion Poison', in *Vote Hezbollah* (1993), 'Yasser Arafat's Radio', in *Hamas Arc* (1993), 'Anti Arab Media Censor', in *Fatah Guerilla* (1996), 'Thuggee', in *Return of Black September* (1996), 'Strap Sticks of Dynamite Around Her Body', in *Vampire of Tehran* (1998), 'Every Grain of Palestinian Sand', in *Mullah Said* (1998), 'Zion Under Izlamic Law', in *Baghdad* (2000), 'Veiled Sisters Remix', in *Veiled Sisters Remix* (2002),' Refugee', in *No Human Rights for Arabs in Israel*

(2004), 'Hamas Internet, Gaza', in *Ingaza* (2006), 'Find Yugoslav Butcher of Muslims', in *Beirut Transfer* (2011), and 'All I Have is Sand', in *Al Jar Zia Audio* (2013).

Political solidarity is the driving force of his music: 'Without the politics, the music would not exist. The political fact is the starting point, from this I am pushed into a musical idea' (Muslimgauze in Malonee 1998: 1), Muslimgauze located the beginning of his solidarity with Palestine in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Musilmgauze in Schefel 1998: 2). He thereafter refused to perform in Israel, telling an interviewer in 1998: 'I would never visit any occupied land, when Palestine is free, I would like to visit then' (1). Muslimgauze viewed his boycott of Israel in a prescriptive light, feeling that 'Others shouldn't [visit Israel]' (Muslimgauze in Urselli-Scarerer n.d.: 2). An early stirring of the imperatives of the Boycott, Disinvestment, and Sanctions movement can thus be detected in the thinking that informed Muslimgauze's music.

Muslimgauze's identification with Palestine offers a precedent for musicians who have worked within the genres that comprise electronic popular music and have affirmed the necessity of the Palestinian struggle. Brian Eno, rock music producer and founding figure of ambient electronic music, is a significant example. In a 2014 editorial titled 'Gaza and the Loss of Civilisation', published on the website of musician David Byrne, Eno expressed his outrage and confusion at what he described as a 'horrible one-sided colonialist war' (Eno 2014a: 1). That year Eno also condemned the BBC for what he viewed as partiality toward Israelis in its news reporting on Israel, against which 'Palestinian lives [are regarded] as less valuable, less newsworthy [than the lives of Israelis]' (Eno 2014b:1).

Eno was also one of a number of public figures who participated in # *Gazanames,* an online video produced by Freedom 4 Palestine and Jewish Voices for Peace (2014). Rebecca Vilkomerson, executive director of Jewish Voice for Peace, stated that the aim of the video was to convey the idea that 'securing freedom and justice for Palestinians is the only pathway to a lasting peace' (Vilkomerson in Surasky 2014: 1).

Released in July 2014, the political backdrop to *# Gazanames* was Israel's 'Operation Protective Edge', a military offensive instigated by the Israeli government against the people of Gaza. *Al Jazeera* reported that, by August that year, the mortality rate had reached 1,951 (Al Jazeera 2014).

 # Gazanames is significant for a consideration of hip hop as a vehicle for Palestinian liberation because it features two of the genre's most influential protagonists: Chuck D, lead vocalist of Public Enemy; and DAM, who are widely regarded as Palestine's first politically outspoken rap group.

In the documentary *film Slingshot Hip Hop* (Salloum 2008), DAM lyricist Suhell Nafar cites Public Enemy's *Fear of a Black Planet* as a conceptual influence in a personal continuum that includes Edward Said, Mahmoud Darwish, Tupac Shakur, Nawal el-Sadawi, and Malcolm X, among others. Tamer Nafar remarks that 'In this country [Israel], there's a fear of an Arabic nation'. (Nafar in Saloum 2008). A biographical synopsis of the Palestinian rap quintet Katibe 5, featured on the website *Cultures of Resistance Network*, states that the group 'see their music as a continuation of Public Enemy's legacy'. In an extract from the documentary, *Cultures of Resistance* (Lee 2010b), Katibe 5 describe their music as rap for people who do not listen to rap: 'Rap is not the main goal; the main goal is the cause for which we are singing' (Katibe 5 in Lee 2015). British-born Palestinian MC Shadia Mansour names Public Enemy as a source of conceptual 'discipline [. . .] their form of resistance was intellectual, and they managed to speak in a universal language. Hip-hop was a shelter that became a community' (Mansour 2011b: 1).

The community Mansour describes includes: socialist Palestinian/Jordanian group Torabyeh's *Ghorbah* (2012a), and their album *Mixtape Volume One* (2012b); Katibe 5's album *Ahla fik bil moukhayamat (Welcome to the Camps)* (2008); Ramallah Underground's MP3 releases, *From the Cave* (2007a), *Nateejeh bala shughol* (2007b), *Qararat* (2008), *Sijen ib Sijen (Prison Within a Prison)* (2011), their collaborations with DJ Lethal Skillz, Qararat (2008), and Kronos Quartet *Tashweesh (Interference)* (Kronos Quartet and Ramallah Underground 2009), group

cofounder Boikutt's *Letter From Boikutt* (2007) and *Hayawan Nateq* (2013), the E.P. of fellow co-founder Asifeh, a.k.a. Stormtrap, *Iradeh (Will)* (2012), and Asifeh Stormtrap's *Fi Hadal Habs* (2012).

Politicised indigenous Palestinian hip hop is nonetheless exemplified by DAM. Essential moments in the group's discography include DAM's first politically themed single *Posheem Hapim me Peshaa* (*Innocent Criminals*) (2008b). The track was compelled by the Israeli response to the second Intifada, in which the Israeli Defence Force killed over 1,000 Palestinians.

Also essential are DAM's: collaborations with Shadia Mansour *I Want Peace* (Jreiri and Mansour 2008/2007) and *They All Have Tanks* (2008); DAM's albums, *Ihdaa' – Dedication* (2006b) and *Dabke on the Moon* (2012); as well as their six tracks which, in addition to contributions from We7, PR, Mahmoud Shalabi, Arapayat, Abeer Alzinati, Shadia Mansour, and Sameh 'SAZ' Zakout, comprise the soundtrack album *Music from the Documentary Film Slingshot Hip Hop,* and include 'Born Here', 'Who is the Terrorist?' (2008a) and 'Freedom For My Sisters' (2008b).

Palestinian hip hop thus sonifies a politically informed cultural riposte to the multivalent privations and the forms of discrimination and militarised violence through which the State of Israel seeks to render its Arab population politically, economically, spatially, and culturally void of presence. In *Cultures of Resistance*, Mansour states that she regards Arab hip hop as a sonic intifada, 'an uprising in music' (Mansour in Lee 2010a).

Essential moments in Mansour's discography include *Assalamu Alaikum (Peace Be Unto You)* (2011a) and *Sho Eli Saar* (2013). The collaborative nature of Mansour's music's suggests that her musical intifada might also constitute a dissemination, a movement of an Arabic diaspora, determined as much by an immersion in hip hop as by migrant histories of exile and displacement. In Mansour's work there are collaborations with: Chilean Palestinian MC Ana Tijoux (*Somos Sur* [2014]); Iraqi-Canadian MC The Narcicyst (*Hamdulilah [Praise God]* and *Gaza Remix* (2009a; 2009b), M1 of U.S rap duo Dead Prez

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(Al Lufiyyeh Arabeyyeh [*The Kufiyeh is Arab*] [2010]); Lebanese producer DJ Lethal Skillz (*Language of Peace*) (DJ Lethal Skillz and Mansour 2013); and Syrian-American MC Omar Effendum (*We Have to Change* [2013]).

Mansour's musical activity has a pedagogic and fundraising function which strikes a political contrast to Artists 4 Israel and aglit-Birthright's deployment of hip hop to further Israeli apartheid, as Billet (2013) observes. Mansour's pedagogic activism takes place through her work with Existence is Resistance, an organisation that organises hip hop tours in Occupied Palestinian Territories to enlighten hip hop fans about Palestine and the conditions against which the emergence of Palestinian hip hop has taken place.

British-Iraqi Lowkey, with whom Mansour collaborates, is also an exponent of Existence is Resistance's work. For Lowkey, hip hop is a means of establishing Palestinian presence against Israeli attempts at diminishment: hip hop, Lowkey says, is '[a] way of saying "I am here and I demand to be recognised"' (Lowkey in Lee 2010a).

Mansour and DAM collaborated with Lowkey on the two-part single 'Long Live Palestine Part 1' (Lowkey 2009) and 'Long Live Palestine Part 2' (Lowkey et al. 2009). The former is a Lowkey composition; the latter features Mansour, Lebanese-Syrian MC Eslam Jawwad, Iranian MC Hichkas, DAM's Mahmoud Jreiri and Tamer Naffar, British-Iranian MC Reveal, The Narcicyst, and African-Caucasian Muslim MC Hasan Salaam, a fragment of whose verse reads:

> There's no such thing as the Middle East
>   Brother they deceiving you
>   No matter where you stand there's always
>   something to the east of you
>   So whether it's Mossad or the FBI policing
>   you
>   It's all one struggle 'til the final breath is
>   leavin' you. (Salaam in Lowkey et al. 2009)

Salaam's verse illustrates what O'Keefe (2014) describes as a salutary effect of Arab hip hop's diasporic dissemination within the global hip hop community: 'Revolutionary rappers throughout the Middle East and the world . . . are associating their fights against their own societies' social

injustices with the Palestinian cause – a process that Palestinian hip-hop artists encourage and amplify'.

However, read with O'Keefe in mind, two lines from Tamer Naffar's verse reverse O'Keefe's observation, and show the DAM MC offering the listener a suggestion of comparisons between the struggles of Palestine and those of other displaced indigenes, and thereby articulating the interconnectedness and deathless significance of anti-imperialist struggle:

> They took my land from under my feet
>   And gave me only suffering. (Naffar in Lowkey et al. 2009)

Conclusion

This essay has elaborated on the role of musical forms and practices in the service of imperialism and the role of music in struggles against imperialism. It has displayed the interrelation between musical forms in forging unities of anti-imperialist struggle across place and time, and has also presented key examples of the contradictory nature of the relation between music and imperialism.

This elaboration has taken place through the interweaving of musical genres from the 18th to the twentieth century with themes of contradiction, dissent silence, the border, memory, citationality, listening, reciprocity, pedagogy, and uprising. It has conveyed, on the one hand, the uses of music as a subversive vehicle for the affirmation of presence within liberation movements and through individual agents of anti-imperialist transformation; and on the other, the use of music in the affirmation of imperial expansion.

Through this interweaving of themes and forms, historical agents, and moments, the essay has demonstrated music's subversive potential for functioning as a conveyor of opposing interests, and thus as a volatile cultural medium through which struggles for liberation can be articulated. However, it has also shown that music is a medium whose cultural and political use is as much the subject of contestation as the view of the world presented by music.

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Muslim Brotherhood

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

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Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Abdalla F. Hassan
Cairo, Egypt

Synonyms

Anti-colonial; Arab nationalism; Arab socialism; Aswan high dam; Baghdad pact; Black September; Censorship; Cold War politics; Free Officers; Hydroelectric power; Intelligence and Security Agencies; Islamism; Israel; Military junta; Monarchy; Muslim Brotherhood; Nasserism; Nationalisation; Non-Aligned Movement; Palestine; Pan-Arabism; Police state; Propaganda; Saudi Arabia; Six-Day War (1967); Soviet Union; Suez Canal; Syria; Tripartite Aggression (1956); United Arab Republic; United Nations; United States; War of Attrition; Yemen

Definition/Description

A conspiratorial group of military officers called the Free Officers, led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser, extended throughout the Egyptian military. In the evening of July 22, 1952, they effortlessly occupied key centres of power in Cairo and Alexandria, staging a quick and bloodless coup. Consolidating his rule, Nasser closed the opposition press and suppressing all forms of ideological dissent. He alone increasingly held the reigns of power through control of government ministries, the military, and security services.

Nasser's rhetoric promoted national independence and sovereignty for all Arab states. He sought to establish Egypt as the leader of the Arab nationalist movement. Immensely confident and charismatic, he spoke to the masses in other countries via the medium of radio, often over the heads of their leaders.

Nasser's crowning vision was the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which would vastly increase agricultural productivity and generate vast amounts of electricity that would power Egypt's industrial zenith. The High Dam was the highlight of Nasser's reign, shaping present-day Egypt.

Nasser tightened his grip on the Egyptian economy through sweeping changes: taking over industries and imposing state control over the whole of economic life. Nasser undertook measures to transform the economy and accelerated the pace of his socialist programs: education and health care were expanded; housing units for low-income families were built. Nonetheless, Nasser's social initiatives often faced problems in funding, staffing, and implementation. Security and intelligence services were dramatically expanded under Nasser's rule, pervasively used to keep tabs and silence dissent among factions of society. Having been a conspirator himself, Nasser was obsessed with preserving control.

Nasser adopted increasingly strident rhetoric toward Israel and its colonial designs, and called

for the liberation of Palestine. Egypt was taken by surprise when Israel struck in June 1967, disseminating in a coordinated air offensive the Egyptian air force on the ground within the first hours of the war. In 6 days, the Jewish state seized the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Syria's Golan Heights. The outcome of the war was not only a military failure; it was a failure of the established political and social order.

The 1967 Six-Day War became a watershed as Nasser's Pan-Arabism began losing currency, seen as an illusion of the Egyptian leader's power or a ploy to seduce the masses. Islamism in its various forms would become a dominant force against occupation and authoritarianism in the Middle East for decades to come.

A conspiratorial group of young military officers called the Free Officers, led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser (Gamal Abdel Nasser), a young army officer born in 1918 in the coastal city of Alexandria and the son of a postal clerk, coalesced in the aftermath of the 1948 war that witnessed the creation and expansion of the state of Israel. The network of Free Officers' cells extended throughout the military services and excelled in planning, organisation, and timing. In the evening of 22 July 1952 they effortlessly occupied key centres of power in Cairo and Alexandria, beginning with the army headquarters and broadcast outlets, thereby staging a quick and bloodless coup. By the next morning, the Free Officers were in charge. The seeds of social change had been in the making. A huge polarisation of wealth existed. Many Egyptians lived in poverty as wealthy landlords controlled huge plots of arable land. Power was shared between the British occupiers, the monarch, and the Egyptian elite. Economic industrialisation progressed at a painfully slow pace, and dissatisfaction with an inept monarchy was growing. On 26 July King Farouk was exiled, sailing from Alexandria aboard a royal yacht.

A cascade of events followed the Free Officers' seizure of power in 23 July 1952. The military junta chose not to share power with former allies and had negligible regard for democratic principles, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. In October 1952, strict censorship was imposed. In December, the constitution was abolished. In January 1953, all existing political parties were banned and their publications ceased to exist. A year later, in January 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood, a potent, anti-colonial religious, social, and political movement formed in 1928, was outlawed.

Like any army force that suddenly finds itself in power, the Revolutionary Command Council, the central committee of the Free Officers, had no coherent agenda for governing Egypt. On the domestic front, it moved quickly to implement land reform in 1952, limiting the size of family holdings to 300 feddans. The army's stated goal was to retain power for three years, during which time a constitutional government would be established. Promises to restore an elective government were soon abandoned since society first needed to be reorganised according to revolutionary principles, the Free Officers argued. The revolutionary vanguard believed they had earned the right to rule; they were in charge of directing, controlling, and organising the masses.

Domestic and International Politics

Following the king's abdication, Muhammad Naguib, a highly regarded general, became president and prime minister. Nasser held the posts of deputy prime minister and minister of the interior. Quickly becoming popular among Egyptians, Naguib favoured a parliamentary democracy. Nasser evidently did not. Nasser began working behind the scenes to undermine Naguib's supporters within the army and police. The Revolutionary Command Council announced in March 1954 that elections would not be held and that it would remain in power. Naguib was deprived of the presidency a few months later and placed under house arrest. Nasser assumed executive powers, and the presidency would soon become his.

The Muslim Brotherhood's confrontation with the Free Officers' regime culminated in an assassination attempt by a Brotherhood member on 26 October 1954 against Prime Minister Gamal Abd al-Nasser as he delivered a speech in Alexandria. The eight shots fired – all of which

missed their target – were heard via radio across the Arab world, an incident that Nasser seized on to rally the Arab people. In an intense crackdown on the movement that followed, thousands of Brotherhood members were summarily rounded up and detained, critically shaping the development of Islamist groups for decades to come. Silencing dissent and consolidating his rule, Nasser went further by closing the opposition press and suppressing all forms of ideological dissent. He alone increasingly held the reins of power through control of government ministries, the military, and security services.

British troops finally left Egyptian soil in June 1956, and on 26 July 1956, the fourth anniversary of the last king's exodus from Egypt, Nasser challenged the French and British by nationalising the Suez Canal in a speech that he delivered in Alexandria and broadcast on live radio at 7.00 pm. It came as a response to the West's withdrawal of support for the Aswan High Dam, the mega-infrastructure project of the time that promised to modernise Egypt by harnessing the waters of the Nile to generate hydroelectric power. A code word in his speech – 'de Lesseps' (the name of the French developer of the canal) – was the signal for the Egyptian takeover of the Suez Canal Company, nominally an Egyptian shareholding consortium that had constructed and operated the canal but was in the overall control of the British and French. As Middle Eastern oil passed through the canal en route to industrialised Western economies, the value of the canal increased, with annual revenues reaching £36 million.

Colluding with Israel and France, the British invaded Egypt in November with the aim of seizing the Suez Canal and toppling Nasser. Traffic of oil tankers through the channel came to a standstill. The United Nations, the US, and international public opinion were overwhelmingly against the invasion. In the midst of the invasion, the Egyptians sunk 50 or so ships in the canal, and it took five months before they were cleared, by which time international quarters were in agreement on which country controlled the vital waterway. The incident accelerated the demise of traditional colonial power in the Middle East. British and French property was sequestered. Later, foreign business interests were nationalised, and new residency and citizenship requirements forced the expulsion of foreigners and Egyptian Jews.

Nasser's defiant resistance to the Tripartite Aggression of 1956 made him a hero in the developing world where anti-imperialism was on the march. His rhetoric promoted national independence and sovereignty for all Arab states, and he sought to establish Egypt as the leader of the Arab nationalist movement. But he was first and foremost an Egyptian nationalist who pursued policies guided by what he saw to be Egypt's interests. Nasser's relationship with the Soviet bloc grew as he sought to modernise the Egyptian army through arms purchases, although he would have preferred to buy them from the West had it not been for the foot-dragging and restrictive conditions they placed on weapons sales. A Soviet arms deal via Czechoslovakia in 1955 provided Egypt with 150 aeroplanes, 300 tanks, and a wide range of guns and rocket launchers.

Nasser's crowning vision was the construction of the Aswan High Dam, which would vastly increase agricultural productivity and generate vast amounts of electricity to power Egypt's industrial zenith. Nasser negotiated funding for the US$1-billion dam through the World Bank, with the US bankrolling most of the deal. At first the US signed on to the project, seeing it as a way to counterbalance growing Soviet influence in Egypt. Still, the US imposed a litany of conditions, which Nasser reluctantly accepted, only to be told that the US was pulling out of the arrangement, believing that Egypt lacked the means to repay the credit.

Revenue from the canal, when it reopened in 1957, was insufficient to build the Aswan High Dam, and Egypt lacked the technical expertise for its construction. The Soviet Union stepped in, providing funding and engineering, with the motive of extending its influence in Egypt and the Middle East. Construction began in 1960 and was completed a decade later, generating 10 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, or half of the country's electricity requirement at the time. The dam was the highlight of Nasser's reign, shaping present-day Egypt.

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In 1956, when a new constitution was finally drafted, it allowed for a representative assembly that served a consultative, not legislative, function. Political parties remained banned, save for the state-controlled National Unity Party. Unopposed, Nasser won with 99.9% of the vote in a plebiscite in the year the new constitution was adopted. With power firmly in his hands, Nasser undertook measures to transform the economy and accelerated the pace of his socialist programmes: education and health care were expanded, and housing units for low-income families were built. Nonetheless, Nasser's social initiatives often faced problems in funding, staffing, and implementation. His policies of socioeconomic levelling drew students to the fold of Nasserist-socialist principles. But he also reorganised universities, banned independent student movements, purged faculty members and administration, and placed the institutions of religion, including al-Azhar, the centuries-old seat of Sunni Islamic learning, firmly under state control.

Nasser's Cult of Personality

Gamal Abd al-Nasser emerged on the world stage leading a nationalist struggle and possessing the dream of Arab nationalism. He looked beyond Egypt's national borders. Either loved or despised, Nasser was a phenomenon unto himself. With Nasser's rise to power, Cairo became the fulcrum of Pan-Arab nationalism. Nasser's rhetoric promoted national independence and sovereignty for all Arab states. Beyond Egypt's national borders, Nasser was seen as leading a nationalist struggle and embodying the promise of Arab unity. Egypt's cinema, publishing, and broadcasting were outlets to spread his message. He captured hearts and minds, across generations, through hopes for greatness.

Once Nasser was firmly in power, his personality cult grew, with the state apparatus serving to underscore the leader's destiny, wisdom, and vision as a national icon. Immensely confident and charismatic, he spoke to the masses in other countries via the medium of radio, often over the heads of their leaders, seizing on a nostalgic longing among Arabs for a mythic hero, a modern-day Saladin. Sawt al-'Arab (Voice of the Arabs) carried his speeches of Pan-Arab nationalism to all corners of the Arab world. The Algerian novelist Ahlam Mosteghanemi writes in *Chaos of the Senses*:

> At the time, we could listen some evenings to Voice of the Arabs from Cairo, broadcasting Abd al-Nasser's speeches and inflamed anthem. I still remembered some of them, the way that children at that age memorized nursery rhymes – they were forever inscribed in my brain. Then we would go to sleep happily, with no need for a television, which we have never seen in our lives. (2004, p. 132)

Nasser showed concern for workers and farmers in a way the old political order had not done. Swept up by a vibrant sense of nationalism and enamoured of the first native son to rule Egypt in two millennia, singers and writers embraced the Arab nationalist cause. Umm Kalthoum, the superstar of Arabic song hailed as the 'pearl of the Orient', was closely tied to Nasser's Pan-Arabism, as was the singer, actor, and heartthrob Abd al- Halim Hafez, who crooned in praise of the Aswan High Dam. The acclaimed poet and lyricist Salah Jaheen was a devotee of Nasser's vision and penned the words of the national anthem.

Egypt's Union with Syria

Nasser spurned Western designs in the Middle East, and refused to sign up to the 1955 Baghdad Pact, a collective defence organisation which aimed to prevent Soviet encroachment in the region. He did not see the need for regional defence requiring the patronage of a superpower and felt that it carved up alliances that divided Arab states. Considering Israeli expansionism and imperialist powers the main threat, in 1961 Nasser instead cofounded the Non-Aligned Movement, which promoted a somewhat independent approach in Cold War politics. In his dealings, Nasser played one power off against another, but it was the Soviet pole that proved more beneficial, and Egypt under Nasser was seen as falling under the Soviet sphere of influence.

In a step towards Nasser's Arab nationalist vision, a short-lived union between Syria and

Egypt was declared in February 1958. In a plebiscite, Nasser was overwhelmingly chosen as the union's head of state, in a country he had never before set foot in. It seemed likely to some that Nasserism might sweep the Middle East, especially following a coup in Iraq inspired by Egypt's Free Officers revolution and dubbed the 14 July revolution, which ended a monarchy and removed Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. As president, Nasser remained firmly in charge of the newly created United Arab Republic, whose slogan was 'Freedom, socialism, unity'. It was the first test of Pan-Arabism and a harbinger of the future of Nasserism. Threatened by the union and Nasser's popularity in the region, King Saud of Saudi Arabia paid Syria's chief of military intelligence to place a bomb on Nasser's plane. But after the payments were cashed, the incident was made public.

Syria and Egypt formed a national assembly, yet Egypt retained the upper hand, including control of major ministerial posts. Syria's political parties were abolished and Egypt dominated the military, often imposing its will and bureaucracy on Syria's institutions. By 1961, the union was unravelling as sectors within Syria were disappointed with the progress of the United Arab Republic and resistant to socialist reforms decreed by Nasser. An army coup in Syria in September brought the union to an end. And by doling out generous payments to military leaders, King Saud helped to instigate the coup in Syria that dissolved the union with Egypt. (He was later forced to abdicate in favour of his brother Faisal and sought political asylum in Egypt.) Nasser decided against preserving the union through armed intervention; that would be the only occasion Nasser's brand of Pan-Arabism would see tangible fruits.

Economic Revolution

Nasser tightened his grip on the Egyptian economy through sweeping changes: taking over industries and imposing state control over the whole of economic life. Beginning in 1961, he nationalised businesses, banks, hotels, media outlets, and other economic sectors, and instituted heavy regulation on companies that were not nationalised. Properties of wealthy families were sequestered and further land reform was initiated. Even with the move towards socialism, inequalities remained, and with any change in social order, one ruling class was replaced with another. During the time of the monarchy, Egypt's elites were the landed gentry. Nasser's land reforms stripped them of their source of wealth, only to replace them with another elite: the officer class. Army officers, for example, were chosen to head nationalised companies. The military became the new route to social mobility and personal enrichment through graft.

While bringing businesses and major economic sectors under state control, Nasser's expansive economic reorganisation paid few long-term dividends. Instead, the state became the economy's prime mover. In the short term, the regime had new sources of revenue, but over time many government-owned businesses failed to turn a profit or had to be heavily subsidised; they were generally overstaffed under Nasser's policy of guaranteeing jobs to university graduates, and with no formidable competition there was no incentive for state-owned enterprises to upgrade products, services, or management practices.

Adding to the state's bureaucratic tentacles, a police state was created. Security and intelligence services were dramatically expanded under Nasser's rule. Their main function was to keep track of any subversive plotting against the regime within the military but they were also pervasively used to keep tabs and silence dissent among factions of society. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment were common. Having been a conspirator himself, Nasser was obsessed with preserving control. Egypt's 1964 constitution added little by way of democracy; power remained with the presidency, and in a plebiscite Nasser again commanded 99.9% of the vote.

Media, the Arts, and Religion

In 1955 Nasser decreed a censorship law, which set the legal parameters for the arts. Filmmakers were co-opted to support Nasser's brand of socialism. Censorship was extended to cover broader

areas of artistic expression. Nasser nationalised the private press in 1960, bringing it under the control of the Arab Socialist Union, the sole political organisation, and branding it the 'media of mobilisation'. The move was justified within the socialist vein of being anti-capitalist. The press had lost touch, Nasser said, and was much too concerned with tantalising society gossip and Cairo nightlife instead of serving its public function by representing the ordinary struggles of rural Egypt.

The state media wholeheartedly embraced socialism and Pan-Arabism, becoming a filter of information and propaganda, instead of being transformed into an institution that would supposedly guide the public and build society. Critical voices were muted, the military junta was sacrosanct, and Nasser was fortified as a national hero. The failings of the regime were not attributed to the president, but to the reactionary and destructive forces of capitalism and feudalism.

The nationalisation of the film industry followed in 1961, and that of publishing houses from 1961 to 1965, even when books already required the approval of security agents before printing. Army officers were placed in charge of these nationalised businesses, which were also increasingly imbued with propaganda about Arab socialism. The monopoly that the state held on print media, books, television, and film served a more direct form of control than state rules of censorship. As in the times of the pharaohs millennia before, the function of art was to exalt the ruler's power, idealise his perfect administration, and serve the state. Self-censorship was already becoming engrained. A network of security and intelligence agencies made the domination of the media airtight, and a climate of fear was fortified.

The revered religious institution of al-Azhar was made an appendage of the state by Gamal Abd al-Nasser in June 1961. The head of al-Azhar was then appointed by the president, not internally as had been the practice for centuries. The 'ulama (religious scholars) were expected to give their unconditional support to the regime, with the understanding that they were given dominance in questions pertaining to religion and jurisprudence.

The 1961 law established the Islamic Research Academy at al-Azhar, comprising scholars who held sway on censorship matters when it came to Islamic texts, but that role was broadened at times to compete with other official censorship bodies. A civil court decided on matters of confiscation. The censorship authority and the secret police in Nasser's Egypt remained the major force behind the censorship of works of fiction and science that they found blasphemous or politically objectionable.

War and Intervention

In a failure of Pan-Arab nationalism, Nasser embroiled himself in a military quagmire in Yemen to prop up a regime that came to power through a violent military coup staged by General Abdallah al-Sallal, the commander of the royal guard, in 1962. King Muhammad al-Badr (who reigned for just over a week following his father's death) and loyal tribesmen continued to fight on. Fearful of the spread of Nasserism, Saudi Arabia and Jordan lent assistance to the royalists. By 1964, seventy thousand Egyptian troops were stationed in the harsh desert terrain of Yemen to maintain a floundering regime. Fearful of ruining his Pan-Arabist image, Nasser remained committed to a prolonged and hopeless struggle where the Egyptian army, under the command of his defence minister, vice president, and incompetent political ally Abd al-Hakim Amir, fought a five-year battle against a foe that had mastered guerilla tactics. The military confrontation was costly. Ten thousand Egyptian troops were wounded, captured, or killed before Egypt pulled out in 1968, after the humiliating defeat against Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War.

Arab opposition to Israel increased as the Palestinian refugee crisis festered. As the self-crowned Arab patriarch, Nasser linked a solution to the Palestine question with Arab honour. Nasser adopted increasingly strident rhetoric towards Israel and its colonial designs, and called for the liberation of Palestine. He contended that Arab puppet regimes and the division of the Arabs contributed to the Palestine defeat. Israel, as an

imperialist power, he thundered during speeches, represented a threat to the entire Arab world. Hostility to Israel centred on its displacement of the Palestinians from their homeland.

Nasser's bellicose posturing was confined to rhetoric; he was in no way prepared for a confrontation with Israel. Yet war seemed inevitable, as the Arabs believed they could change the balance of power to their favour. Nasser's military command assured him that they could match anything Israel's military forces could muster. Soviet intelligence falsely informed Nasser that an attack on Syria was imminent, claiming that Israel was concentrating troops on the Syrian border in response to attacks by Palestinian fighters. On 16 May 1967 the Egyptian leader demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force stationed on its border with Israel. Egypt's alliance with Syria, which was sponsoring Palestinian raids into Israel, pulled Nasser to impose a naval blockade of the Straits of Tiran on 22 May as Egyptian diplomats were seeking United Nations intervention to get around the impasse.

Egypt was taken by surprise when Israel struck in June 1967, disseminating in a coordinated air offensive the Egyptian air force on the ground within the first hours of the war, then burrowing across the Sinai Peninsula. In six days the Jewish state seized all of Sinai, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Syria's Golan Heights. The brief and humbling war for Arab armies claimed the lives of some twelve thousand Egyptian troops, with another five thousand captured or missing; 80% of all military equipment was lost. During the conflict, as the Egyptian army, under Abd al-Hakim Amer's command, was wildly retreating from Sinai, broadcast outlets aired invented reports of fabulous victories against the Zionist foe. At no other moment did the state media prove so woefully deficient, contributing to a deep sense of public betrayal.

The defeat was an unforgivable embarrassment for Nasser, who on 9 June 1967, a day before the war came to an official end, took responsibility and told the Egyptian people that he was resigning from the presidency. 'My brothers, we are accustomed, in times of victory and in times of adversity, in sweet hours and in bitter hours, to sitting together and talking with open hearts, honestly stating the facts, believing that we are on the same path, always succeeding to find the true way, no matter how difficult the circumstances and no matter how faint the light', began a remorseful Nasser in a live radio and television broadcast at 6.30 pm. 'We cannot hide from ourselves that we've faced a devastating setback during the past few days', he continued. 'I have decided to step down completely and forever from any official position and any political role, and to return to the ranks of the masses to fulfill my duties as any other citizen.' The speech by Nasser in June 1967 was written for him by the prominent journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Nasser's personal confidant, editor-in-chief of the flagship daily *al-Ahram,* and chairman of the board of state-owned media and publishing houses.

It was a moment that served to shore up his support. Egyptians took to the streets demanding that their leader stay in power. Thousands of protesters surrounded the National Assembly. The Egyptian parliament demanded that Nasser withdraw his resignation, refusing to leave the building until he did so. It is difficult to say how populist and genuine the appeal was and how much of the public display of support for Nasser was the behind-the-scenes political machinations of the regime. While Nasser did stay in power, it was only later that Egyptians could comprehend the true extent of the defeat (especially in light of the propaganda on state-controlled media) and the institutional failures that placed the whole of Sinai under Israeli occupation. Believing that the US had colluded with Israel, Nasser ordered all Americans to be expelled from Egypt.

The outcome of the war was not only a military failure; it was a failure of the established political and social order. Waves of student protests erupted on college campuses in the war's aftermath. Nasser became the object of direct, public criticism. A campaign against student unrest was waged in the state-owned media, which labelled the activists as provocateurs and counter-revolutionaries goaded by foreign elements. Nasser found a way to crack down hard

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on his opponents. Student unrest on university campuses was firmly suppressed. Clamouring for the rule of law and the adoption of liberal principles, judges blamed the defeat on the lack of political liberalisation. Dissenting judges were summarily dismissed or transferred to administrative posts.

The setback of 1967 reinforced a general distrust of reports on state-owned media, compelling Egyptians to tune to the shortwave transmission of the BBC World Service and French Monte Carlo to find out what was not being reported in the official press. Faced with the limited means of expression in the printed press, literature and film evolved into an abstract channel for social and political commentary. Accustomed to political censorship, film audiences have become attuned to uncovering subtle and hidden messages.

The decisiveness of the June 1967 war dramatically and irreversibly changed the balance of power in the region, fortifying Israel as a stalwart US ally in the strategic, oil-rich Middle East. Egypt became more reliant on the Soviet Union to rebuild its army and provide economic assistance. In contrast to the situation after the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, Nasser could not claim victory in defeat. The Suez Canal was closed, depriving the country of much-needed hard currency, tourist revenue ground to a halt, and Israel now occupied a sizeable chunk of Egypt's oil reserves. Nasser launched the War of Attrition in March 1969, which only served to increase the devastation. Reprisal raids intensified. For the sinking of one of their ships, Israel bombed canal cities and oil installations in Suez.

Nasser accepted the US-brokered Rogers Peace Plan in July 1970, effectively ending the War of Attrition and implementing a cease-fire. The Palestinians viewed Nasser's acceptance of the plan as turning his back on the Palestinian cause. Militant Palestinians increasingly used Jordan as a base of operations to launch attacks, and King Hussein of Jordan launched a full-scale attack against the Palestinians, an event that came to be known as Black September. Syria was set to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians,

which would have escalated the crises, pulling in other Arab states and making a mockery of any sense of Pan-Arabism. In his last foreign policy accomplishment, Nasser convened an Arab summit in Cairo that mediated between the parties and brought the simmering conflict to an end, his final move as the Pan-Arab leader. Nasser suffered a heart attack that ended his life just after the summit was concluded on 28 September 1970. He was 52.

The Legacy of Nasserism

Gamal Abd al-Nasser had an uncanny ability to communicate with the Arab public, yet his influence was in large measure due to complete state domination of the press and airwaves, leaving little room for dissent. Autocratic power was concentrated in the hands of the president. Nasser's control of the media buttressed this imagined dream state. In his novel *Before the Throne*, the Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz has Egypt's rulers critique one another: 'Unfortunately, you wasted an opportunity that had never appeared to the country before', went one rebuke of Nasser. 'For the first time, a native son ruled the land, without contention from king or colonizer. Yet rather than curing the disease-ridden citizen, he drove him into a competition for the world championship when he was hobbled by illness. The outcome was that the citizen lost the race, and himself, as well' (2009, p. 37).

The 1967 war became a watershed as Nasser's Pan-Arabism began to lose currency and to be seen as an illusion of the Egyptian leader's power or a ploy to seduce the masses. Defeat brought with it new realities – a wake-up call of sorts. The new force of Islamism began its evolution. A growing number of Muslims across the Arab world began holding the opinion that a humiliating defeat was possible because Muslims had strayed from their faith, embracing Nasser's secular nationalism over Pan-Islamism. Islamism in its various forms would become a dominant force against occupation and authoritarianism in the Middle East for decades to come.

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National Movement

► Decolonization in South Asia

Nationalisation

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Synonyms

Compensation; Decolonization; Denationalisation; Expropriation; International law; October Revolution; Planning; Private property; Privatisation; Public interest; Renationalisation; Socialisation; Sovereignty; Transition to socialism

Definition

This entry explains nationalisation, the act of seizing private property by public authorities, in its theoretical and historical dimensions. The justification of seizure has developed historically reflecting the changes in the public-private interest dichotomy since Ancient Rome. Class struggle and its political repercussions in the era of capitalism have impacted the methods and practices of nationalisation, especially in its imperialist stage. The entry first summarizes the theoretical approach of Marxism-Leninism towards the political act of seizure. Nationalisation is correlated with concepts such as socialisation, collectivisation, expropriation, confiscation, which may overlap or differentiate according to the type and objective of seizure. Nationalisation is also discussed in the context of international law, particularly in terms of compensation, and in the context of economic planning versus market policies. The entry demarcates the history of nationalisation into two periods, 1917–1950 and 1950–2000. While the 1917 October Revolution and the transition to socialism characterises the first; decolonisation and sovereignty rights characterises the latter. Individual country experiences throughout the twentieth century are summarized including prominent nationalisation cases in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Finally, the entry elaborates the current discussions on denationalisation (or privatisation) under the influence of neo-liberalism and renationalisation under the influence of the crisis of capitalism, at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Introduction

Nationalisation is the seizure of private property by public authorities. The political, economic, administrative and judicial character of a seizure can vary. The reason, aim, agent, and method of seizure determine whether it is a confiscation, socialisation, collectivisation, etatisation, or municipalisation. Technically, confiscation is seizure of a particular private property; collectivisation and socialisation diffuse ownership to certain sectors of society; etatisation and municipalisation reflect the central or decentralised character of the public authority; nationalisation indicates on whose behalf the seizure takes place.

The general judicial concept for seizures is expropriation. Literally, expropriation has transitivity with nationalisation and the two terms are used interchangeably in the broad meaning of seizure. The narrower terminology corresponding to expropriation is eminent domain, compulsory purchase, and acquisition; all of which involve delegation of this authority to third parties for specific public purposes. The justification for seizure is 'public interest', which represents the interests of a population specified in terms of social classes, administrative scales, or economic sectors. The seizure may produce permanent or temporary hybrid forms of ownership other than state ownership, such as co-operatives, quasi-public corporations, and autonomous institutions.

Expropriation is mainly theorised by Marxist political economy, which proposes the seizure of the means of production for the socialisation of private property. As a widespread political practice in the twentieth

century, nationalisation has been a process in decolonisation involving the seizure of foreign-owned property as a legitimate measure to consolidate national sovereignty. Current scholarly discussion focuses on the degree of compensation to be paid in nationalisations, determined by the conceptualisation of public interest and sovereignty.

Historical and Theoretical Background

The main premise of nationalisation is the nation state. The nation state is the modern form of state based on citizenship instead of kinship. Citizenship developed in the burgs of Europe under feudalism but its embryonic form was seen in Ancient Rome. Citizenship, which was not based on nations at this stage, conferred individual freedom and the right to ownership. Roman law restricted individual rights on behalf of common interest. The state's exceptional authority to seize private property (*imperium*) was based on sovereignty over the communities, whose members had the right to own property (*dominium*). The duality of *dominium–imperium* later transformed into the modern private–public dichotomy.

After the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the emerging feudal regimes in Europe did not distinguish between public and private interests in the modern sense. As the bourgeoisie ascended to the ruling position in the modern era, the 'private' came to correspond to the sphere of individual capitalist economic activities, and the 'public' to the common interests of society. Expropriation of private property by the nation state (i.e. nationalisation) became an exceptional procedure justified by public interest that was assumed to be above class interests.

In the building of nation states, the act of seizure functioned as a means of primitive accumulation and secularisation. The enclosure movement in England (which accelerated in the seventeenth century) expropriated small peasants' lands, while it played a secularising role during nationalisation of Church property during the French Revolution (1789). The same year, the Bill of Rights adopted by the US Congress approved the notion of 'eminent domain', restricting seizure of private land to the condition of public use and the payment of compensation. During decolonisation, nationalisation was utilised to seize foreign-owned property and in order to consolidate the emerging national bourgeoisie.

Marx (1978/1867) asserted that production was socialised as the development of capitalism centralised and concentrated production and at the same time private property. The centralisation and concentration of capital paved the way to mass production on an ever greater scale. Proletarian revolutions would 'expropriate the expropriators', thus completing the process of integration of production. Marx used the term 'socialisation' for the total transformation process. He anticipated that the first harsh phase of socialisation ('accumulation of capital') would inevitably lead to the second phase of socialisation ('expropriation of expropriators'), which would be easier, merely involving a transfer of ownership.

On the eve of the twentieth century, Hilferding (1910) explained the vertical and horizontal integration of industry under the dominance of financial capital. According to his terminology, 'socialisation' of banks through concentration of capital would lead to centralised control of large-scale production while the liquidation of small-scale production through competition would socialise the assets of such producers. Socialisation of production necessitated integration of individual production units. However, it is known that capitalist monopolisation does not carry integration through to fruition.

Lenin's (1964/1917) contribution to the discussion elucidated the economic and administrative organisation under working-class power. He asserted that Soviet power would disintegrate the capitalists' bureaucratic control over capital through workers and peasants' seizures, and reorganise production through planning. Indeed Marx (1966/1871) had also attributed the failure of the Paris Commune to not having organised co-operative production under a general plan.

Two approaches to nationalisation emerged in revolutionary movements. Syndicalism emphasised self-management of enterprises after being seized by workers as the breaking point from capitalism. This approach, inspired by the ideas of anarchism, opposed the centralisation of the control over production. In contrast, Bolshevism considered nationalisations a critical phase in the socialisation process, freeing the productive forces from the constraints of old production relations. According to orthodox Marxism, productive forces are expected to mature as they are integrated through planning, eventually closing the gap between ownership and management. Basically, the dispute was about who should lead nationalisations and organise nationalised enterprises: the workers of the enterprises or the political power.

The implications of these ideas have been challenged in two sets of nationalisation experiences throughout the twentieth century. The first comprises those in Europe that arose as a response to the consequences of the First World War and the ideological polarisation in the aftermath of the Second World War. The second comprises the rise of nationalisation in the decolonisation period and its retreat with the restoration of imperialist relations. The practice of nationalisation will be discussed in these two phases. Their residue is assessed in current discussions on the past and future of nationalisations in the early twenty-first century.

First Phase (1917–50)

In the run-up to the First World War and during the years after it nationalisations were carried out under different agendas. The Mexican Revolution established the 1917 Constitution, which gave the government an inalienable right to all underground resources, aimed at preventing oil exploitation by foreigners. Simultaneously, the nationalisation practices after the October Revolution in Russia laid the ground for the Soviet socialist state. On the other hand, partial nationalisations implemented in Germany after the First World War were influenced by the demand of unions to involve workers in enterprise management to promote the 'socialisation' of enterprises as autonomous units.

Systematic nationalisations were carried out by etatist and socialist regimes after 1929, particularly in countries devastated by the war and the Great Depression. Some of the nationalisations were aimed at saving bankrupt private enterprises by the injection of public funds, with the intention of eventually returning them to private ownership. However, these nationalisations to bail out firms were applied selectively. As relations between imperialist powers deteriorated, in fascist Italy and Germany, nationalised enterprises were integrated into the state-owned military industry and not reprivatised.

The rise in resort to protectionist measures during the Great Depression led to the fragmentation of the capitalist world economy, resulting in a loss of faith in liberal economic theories. Keynes (1936) pointed out that state regulation of aggregate expenditures could maintain high levels of employment and investment, thereby forestalling the pressure for nationalisation. In the aftermath of the Second World War, economic planning was introduced to avoid nationalisations in the reconstruction of war-ravaged capitalist economies.

The bureaucratisation theories posited by Rizzi (1985/1939) in the inter-war years, which connected the formation of a new management class to nationalisations, became more relevant in the post-war period as public enterprises flourished. Another analysis of nationalisation qualified it as a temporary measure serving capitalists' interests. Dobb (1958) pointed out that the function of the nationalised sector in capitalist economies was to purchase the outputs of, and to supply inputs to, the private sector. According to Dobb, enterprises nationalised because of bankruptcy could be expected to be reprivatised after their financial recovery under public management.

The nationalisation experiences in the wake of the Second World War developed in two grounds. In Western Europe where capitalism reigned, selective nationalisations were implemented

and commissions for selfmanagement were established along trade union demands. In Eastern Europe where the People's Democracies were founded, widespread nationalisations were reinforced with land reform and economic planning. The People's Republic of China (PRC), on the other hand, brought private enterprises into joint state-private management as a step towards nationalisation and delivered collectivised land to the communes.

Both in the capitalist and socialist countries, nationalisations had a confiscatory nature as a sanction for past national and public offences during fascist occupation. This opened a debate on the legitimacy of seizure and the liability of compensation. The peaceful co-existence policy in Europe resulted in attempts to merge communist principles with capitalist logic in international law.

Katzarov (1959) distinguished between nationalisation and expropriation, relating the former to a justified public issue and attributing a penal character to the latter. Bystricky (1957) on the other hand advocated the universal legitimacy of nationalisation without indemnity as a human right. In contrast, Seidl-Hohenveldern (1958) argued that both nationalisation and expropriation necessitated full compensation. Shao-chi (1956) theorised the redemption of the national bourgeoisie as a peaceful means of transition to socialism through state-capitalism. These diverse ideas had implications in the decolonisation process.

Second Phase (1950–2000)

International law specified 'prompt, adequate and effective compensation' (the Hull standard) as a condition for nationalisation in the wake of Mexico's nationalisation of US assets in 1936. In the post-war period, the United Nations (UN) recognised the right to nationalise in 1952 with Resolution No. 626 (VII) as part of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A decade later, with Resolution No. 1803 (XVII), the justified grounds for nationalisation were stipulated as public purposes, security, or national interests,

and appropriate compensation was set as a condition. In 1974 the UN adopted the Calvo doctrine that recognised the validity of the legislation of the home country in cases of legal disputes, against the opposition of France, Germany, Britain, Japan, and the US.

In the implementation of nationalisation, the countries that gained independence from colonial rule were influenced by the development strategy propagated and exemplified by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Soviet industrialisation experience (the First Five Year Plan taking place between 1928 and 1932) was a development model based on planning in a nationalised economy. By contrast, the Tennessee Valley Authority (nationalising the Tennessee Electric Power Company in 1939) implemented during the New Deal was used by the US to show that capitalism could also use planning and public entrepreneurship for development.

The states that joined the Non-Aligned Movement (initiated in 1961) were attracted to the Soviet model in varying degrees, some using nationalisation as a political tool against imperialism and others as an economic tool for bargaining with foreign capital. The organisation of nationalised resources determined the orientation of the country towards the socialisation of the economy or towards reintegration into the world economy. In some countries the infusion of imperialist capital in the form of development funds from international financial institutions contributed to the rearticulation of capitalist relations.

Diverse experiences inspired controversial ideas on the role of nationalisations. Poulantzas (2000/1978) maintained that nationalisations in a capitalist context have to be distinguished from nationalisations for socialisation. When it came to the process of socialisation, Bettelheim (1975/1968) used the term 'chronological gap' for the historical delay in the development of socialist property relations from legal form to social reality. Guevara (1964) held that moral incentives in the planning process would close this time gap by accelerating the development of productive forces, mitigating the need for material incentives.

The discussion stemmed from the quest to follow a self-sufficient path of independent

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development. The uneven development between economic and political structures in post-colonial countries necessitated revolutionary voluntarism to overcome economic deficiencies. This opened a theoretical polemic between the advocates of gradual economic development towards socialism through a transitional moment of private ownership accompanied by market relations, and the advocates of political acceleration of development transcending through social mobilisation the economic phases assumed to be historically imperative. The first approach led to the Liberman reforms in the USSR while the second approach was implemented in the Great Leap Forward in the People's Republic of China.

Among the 'Third-World' countries, the pragmatic-temporary implementation of nationalisation (namely selective expropriation) instead of its programmatic-institutional implementation (pursuit of socialisation) determined the persistence of the policy. In due course the former predisposition resulted in the competition among developing countries to attract foreign capital which they had previously considered an obstacle to independent development. After 1980 two important trends of neo-liberalism, namely globalisation and administrative decentralisation, advanced as the prospect of defending national public interests against the collaboration of international and local private interests waned.

The dissolution of socialism in the 1990s accelerated these trends. Commitments made to refrain from expropriations in bilateral and regional free-trade agreements invalidated the political legitimacy of nationalisations carried out in the past. The term 'seizure' now came to denote moderate measures against foreign investments ('creeping expropriations') with full compensation implied. According to UNCTAD (2012), foreign investments that were nationalised in the 1970s were subjected to indirect expropriations. The new grounds for nationalisations accepted as justified are motivated by environmental, public health, and welfare concerns.

The terminology of international law in the new millennium categorises seizures as direct expropriations and indirect expropriations which are defined variously in bilateral investment treaties, generally enlarging the scope of compensation. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established to arbitrate disputes between home countries and investor firms, focuses on claims of indirect expropriation and discriminatory measures. The awards are especially biased against expropriations related to political reactions (Libya–BP, 1973), popular protests (Argentina–Vivendi, 2009), and protectionist policies (Hungary–ANC, 2006).

Individual Country Experiences

In the colonial period, the colonisers had used land seizures for primitive accumulation, such as the confiscation of land belonging to blacks by the British in South Africa (1870–85). As a reaction, anti-colonial movements took over property of foreign settlers, like those of the Europeans in Algeria (1962). In the age of imperialism, seizures became a means of maintaining national sovereignty, the foremost example being the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in Egypt (1956).

The legitimacy of nationalisation was manipulated in the confiscation of property of social minorities, perceived as exploiters and usurpers of national resources. An example of nationalisation of assets of economically dominated groups is the transfer of the Chinese-dominated financial sector to the indigenous privileged classes in Indonesia (1960s). By contrast, in the nationalisation of land belonging to Palestinians by Israel (1949), the expropriators were the economically dominant groups.

In Latin American countries, various national movements united against comprador political elites and limited the economic power of foreign investors over domestic resources. Land redistribution and nationalisations of natural resources were carried out by corporatist political leaders such as Peron in Argentina (presidency 1946–55, 1973–74), Cardenas in Mexico (presidency 1934–40), and Vargas in Brazil (presidency 1930–45, 1953–54).

Nationalisations implemented in revolutionary processes were carried out not only through administrative and legislative measures but also through organised mass movements. The seizure of colonisers' lands by Vietnamese peasants was organised during the 1930s by the Indochinese Communist Party; the Cominform decision in 1947 to implement further nationalisations was realised with the seizure of small-scale enterprises by the Communist government in Bulgaria. A singular example was seen in Ethiopia in 1974 where nationalisations were combined with the mobilisation for education.

In some developing countries, nationalist governments tried to create an economic model distinct from socialism. These were indigenous variations of the so-called 'third way' espoused by the Non-Aligned Movement established in 1961. Governments that implemented nationalisations without the aim of 'expropriating the expropriators' gave names to their regimes to indicate the singularity of their development models; such as Estato Novo (New State) in Brazil (1937–45), Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) in Indonesia (1957–66) and Ba'ath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) in several countries in the Middle East. In some countries, communist movements that pressed the moderate governments to continue nationalisation were either pacified (Portugal, 1974–75) or eliminated (Indonesia, 1965–66).

Religious institutions in some Christian and Muslim countries inhibited or even reversed nationalisations. Nationalisations were prohibited by the conception of Islamic finance in Sudan (1970s), and prevented by Islamic principles in Iran (1982). Catholicism was among the important factors in the restoration of previously nationalised private property under Falangism in Spain (1939) and after the dissolution of the People's Republic in Poland (1989).

In certain cases, public institutions created through nationalisations merged with traditional social structures, with varying results. The attempt in Iraq (1958) and Libya (1969, 1977) to liquidate feudal dominance while preserving the rural social structure to which egalitarian relations were attributed proved unsuccessful. In Hungary and Romania between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1980s, on the other hand, the collectivisation in land promoted the social position of women. However, in the socialist countries, the subsequent reintroduction of market relations in the 1980s generated pressure for the restoration of conservative social order.

The planning organisations that had consolidated the nationalised enterprises were later used in the restoration of private property. In Yugoslavia (1953) and Algeria (1988) decentralised planning that accompanied self-management of nationalised enterprises resulted in the revival of competitive relations. Granting autonomy to public enterprises was theorised as 'market socialism' in the People's Republics, where the endorsement of the profit maximisation principle ended the socialisation process.

The leaders of some national liberation movements that had achieved nationalisations in their countries later endorsed privatisations under the influence of neo-liberal thinking. As globalisation became the watchword, the pursuit of public interests and the concern for independence were degraded, paving the way for denationalisations. Exemplified by the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, Ba'ath in Syria and the African National Congress in the Union of South Africa, they abandoned the non-capitalist development strategy in the wake of the dissolution of the actually existing socialist alternative (1990s).

Apart from the countries where counter-revolutionary governments eventually relinked them to the global capitalist system by forced marketisation 'reforms' such as Chile (1975), the main argument of the majority of post-colonial states for deregulating their economies was the need for capital investment. However, in order to attract foreign capital, it had to be indemnified from nationalisation. This necessitated acceptance of seizures as 'expropriations' that required prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Consequently, some countries (such as Bolivia and Ecuador in the early 2000s) rejected demands for compensation payment in seizures that they considered as a right of sovereignty.

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Nationalisation as a makeshift towards reprivatisation was also applied in crisis-stricken peripheral countries as some post-colonial states sought financial aid from international financial institutions, thus renewing dependence on imperialist capital. However, economic crises triggered by foreign debt reintroduced nationalisation to bail out bankrupt private financial institutions through the injection of public funds. Banks in Mexico (1982) and Peru (1987) were nationalised, burdening the public sector with liabilities.

The privatisation of nationalised assets in various countries in the neo-liberal period was hindered by various factors. Argentina cancelled planned privatisations after the decision to renationalise the postal service (2003) following its refusal to go along with International Monetary Fund demands. Nationalist feelings against the Chinese minority in Indonesia and in the Philippines also slowed down the privatisation process when it was introduced in the 1980s. In some countries, some of the public enterprises whose seizure had been vital in the nationalisation process were protected against privatisation, as they were still qualified as 'strategic sectors'.

Current Discussions

The frequency of nationalisations throughout the twentieth century has been studied by many scholars. Minor (1994) carried on Kobrin's (1984) research, which covered the 1960–79 period, to the year of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hajzler (2010) updated the research while Tomz and Wright (2010) extended it back to the beginning of the twentieth century. These studies subsume all seizures under the concept of expropriation. They thus reflect a shift in the scholarly perception of nationalisation policies and practices towards a framework that ignores the political antagonism between imperialism and anti-imperialism.

Kobrin uses the term 'expropriation' interchangeably with 'nationalisation'. He distinguishes between selective and massive expropriations, attributing an ideological character to the

latter. As developing countries find more effective ways to cope with foreign firms, nationalisations become less frequent. Reaching a peak during the mid- 1970s in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the option of nationalisation was mostly used as a bargaining chip against core countries rather than being implemented for a political objective. This pragmatism was reflected in the levying of taxes on and the regulation of direct foreign investments in the 1980s. Kobrin points out that this tendency is the result of backsliding from the anti-imperialist stance that was the basis of most nationalisation.

Minor provides information on the privatisations in the 1980s of previously nationalised assets. Some selective expropriations were observed during this period. States which had previously conducted nationalisations on a broad scale (such as Egypt, Vietnam and China) enacted legislation prohibiting nationalisation of foreign investment. Minor anticipates that the results of privatisations may engender a new wave of nationalisations in the future.

Kobrin and Minor's framework, which had taken into consideration social movements politically inclined to anti-imperialism, underwent a change in the literature of the 2000s. The studies of nationalisation took a technical form, focusing on economics and management. This shift is peculiar because of its incongruity with new trends. On the one hand, many states are resorting to regulative measures in crises caused by neo-liberal policies. On the other hand, a new anti-imperialist political trend has emerged in Latin America where a resurgence of nationalisation measures has taken place. Although a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was established to promote foreign investment in developing countries and press for protection from nationalisations, it seems not to have influenced the policies of some Latin American states.

Duncan (2006) argues that nationalisations are not prompted by political and economic crises but rather by fluctuations in the prices of raw materials. Against Kobrin's emphasis on the ideological aims of the nationalising state, he points out that the appeal of nationalisation is that

it can be used to satisfy popular expectations. According to Duncan, 'revolution' and 'sovereignty' are used only as pretexts to legitimise state intervention in the economy. Hence, in developing countries, nationalisation is not implemented to realise an anti-imperialist political strategy; rather it is utilised as a makeshift expedient.

Chang et al. (2009) conceptualise nationalisation in the same pragmatic framework. The swings between economic crises and institutional reform reflect the trade-off between 'efficiency' and 'equity'. The demand for equity motivates nationalisation, but efficiency necessitates privatisation; hence nationalization–privatisation cycles are generated. Chang et al. maintain that the nationalisations in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Zambia have been induced by fluctuations in raw material prices; therefore, these states may be expected to reverse this policy depending on market conditions.

Hajzler explains nationalisation policies from a technology angle: the preponderance of natural resources and public services subjected to nationalisation arises from their technology-intensiveness. It is the increasing profitability of certain economic sectors in private hands that generally induces nationalisations in developing countries. Tomz and Wright hold that nationalisation is 'sovereign theft', an act of expropriation that should be compensated. They ignore that those countries implementing nationalisations during the last century have been subject to colonisation and to unequal trade treaties under military threat. Therefore, the legacy of imperialism vanishes in this assessment of nationalisations.

Harvey (2007) explains the flux between nationalisation and privatisation as opportunities for the adjustment to changing imperialist hegemony and capital accumulation strategy. As an example he refers to the aftermath of the nationalisation of oil in Iran by the Mosaddegh Government (1951). A coup toppled the government and denationalisation transferred the oil assets to a US company instead of the previous British proprietor company, a change reflecting the new imperialist hierarchy. Likewise in Chile, General Augusto Pinochet reversed nationalisations carried out by Salvador Allende (1970–73) only after his rival (General Gustavo Leigh, a Keynesian) was sidelined in 1975 and export-led growth was favoured over import substitution.

Ha-Joon Chang (2007) analyses the utilisation of nationalisation by governments on behalf of capital when faced with national or sectoral crises. Interestingly, he uses arguments against state ownership put forth by market-oriented thinkers against policies of liberal governments. He suggests that Kornai's criticism of soft budget constraints in state enterprises in former socialist countries could be applied to the bailing-out of banks through nationalisation, which he describes as the privatisation of gains and socialisation of losses.

There appears to be an increasing mainstream concern to mitigate the pressures that make for the nationalization–privatisation cycle. This may reflect uneasiness over the discontent arising from the results of the deregulation policies advocated by the Washington Consensus. Chua (1995) proposes re-regulation, accompanied by 'institutional reforms' against the resurgence of protectionism and the rising awareness of 'ecological colonialism', in order to consolidate privatisations.

About two decades after the implementation of the Washington Consensus, the concern to sustain neo-liberalism in the face of a global economic crisis has again put nationalisation on the neo-liberal agenda under the premises of the post-Washington Consensus. Stiglitz advocates the nationalisation of banks subsidised by government in the US (2009) and also nationalisation of natural resources subject to inequitable contracts in Latin America (2006), in order to protect foreign investment on a broader scale (i.e. capital exports, the basic form of imperialism).

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa
▶ Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)

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Nationalism

Nation-Building

Nation-State

NATO

NATO Expansion

Natural Resources

Natural Rights

Naxalite Movement: An Anti-imperialist Perspective

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Definition

Maoists of the 1960s and 1970s in India came to be known as 'Naxalites' after the uprising in Naxalbari. While the Naxalite movement was centring on the peasants and was indeed basically an anti-feudal movement, this essay attempts to highlight and analyse the anti-imperialist perspective of the Naxalite movement.

The Indian Communist movement, formed around the 1920s, is now fragmented. The undivided Communist Party of India (CPI) split after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, which was simultaneous with the international communist schism of 1963–64; and a second party, the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), was born in 1964. Both are non-Maoist parties. As regards Maoist organisations, there are now:

(a) various Naxalite groups of the now disintegrated CPI (Marxist-Leninist) or CPI-ML led by Charu Mazumdar, which was created in 1969 after the Naxalbari peasant uprising in 1967; (b) one major Maoist party, the CPI (Maoist), which was founded in 2004 through the merger of the CPI-ML People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). Maoists of the 1960s and 1970s came to be known as 'Naxalites' after the uprising in Naxalbari, and the CPI-ML was the predecessor of today's CPI (Maoist). While the Naxalite movement was centring on the peasants and was indeed basically an anti-feudal movement, this essay attempts to highlight and analyse the anti-imperialist perspective of the Naxalite movement.

Both the CPI and the CPI-M advocate a peaceful parliamentary path and have been totally involved in the parliamentary system. Contradictions between these two parties are non-antagonistic. Meanwhile, contradictions within the Maoist movement are also non-antagonistic insofar as all reject the parliamentary path and agree on a Maoist model of revolution.

Initially, the CPI had a confused understanding of the role of imperialism and India's independence in 1947. Adopting the 'Tito-ite' analysis, it concluded that India was already a fully capitalist country (rather than semi-feudal and semi-colonial) and therefore linked the two stages of the revolution (democratic and socialist) into a single stage through an attack on the whole Indian bourgeoisie.

This view was repudiated by the Andhra Communists, who had been conducting a peasant partisan war in Telengana since 1946. The Andhra Communists invoked Mao Zedong's 'New Democracy' and 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' to justify their strategy for a two-stage revolution in 'semi-feudal semi-colonial' India, involving a four-class alliance for agrarian revolution. It refers to an alliance led by the proletariat, with the peasants as their main allies, the petty bourgeoisie as allies to be won over through careful organisational work, and the non-monopoly bourgeoisie as potential but less reliable allies.

In 1950 the Cominform persuaded the CPI towards a two-stage revolution based on a four-class alliance. This was a vindication of the Andhra line, as opposed to the CPI central leadership's anti-capitalist struggle, based on urban insurrection and general strike. Soon, however, Soviet foreign-policy interests required that the CPI discard armed struggle in favour of peaceful constitutionalism since the USSR wanted to placate Nehru as a non-aligned ally in the peace front against imperialism. In 1951 the Cominform intervened and forced the CPI to abandon armed struggle. The CPI therefore participated in the country's first general elections in 1952.

The CPI and the CPI-M differed over their assessment with respect to the role of imperialist foreign finance capital in India's economy and polity. The CPI maintained that the Indian state is the organ of the national bourgeoisie as a whole, in which, however, the big bourgeoisie is powerful and has links with the landlords. In contrast, in the opinion of the CPI-M, the state is in the hands of both the bourgeoisie and the landlords, but it is actually led by the big bourgeoisie, which increasingly collaborates with foreign finance capital in pursuit of the capitalist path of development. According to the CPI, in order to go ahead on the socialist road, India must complete its present anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and national democratic stage of revolution. The CPI programme, therefore, proposed an intermediate stage, the 'non-capitalist path of development', as distinct from the capitalist path pursued by the Indian ruling classes. This stage is to be attained through a national democratic front composed of the working class, the peasantry, the rising classes of urban and rural intelligentsia, and the national bourgeoisie (excluding the monopoly bourgeoisie). The leadership of the front will be shared by the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The CPI-M, however, advocated a narrower, people's democratic front. It believed that India must go for a people's democratic revolution in order to accomplish radical agrarian reforms and oust foreign capital from the country. Agrarian revolution is the axis of the revolution. The front will be led by the party, and comprise the working class and the peasantry. It will have agricultural labour and

poor peasantry. Attempts would later be made to include middle peasants to the front and the party even considered that rich peasants could be won over through suitable tactics. The urban and other middle classes are also to be recruited and attempts made to win over the non-monopoly section of the bourgeoisie. The character of the revolution is the same for both parties (anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, antimonopoly, and democratic), but they differ over the class composition of the front.

'Eight Documents' on Imperialism

After the brief Maoist interlude in the late 1940s in Telengana, the Maoist perspective began to develop in the 'Eight Documents' written by Charu Mazumdar during 1965–67, even before the Naxalbari uprising. As early as 1965, Charu Mazumdar in his famous 'Eight Documents' referred to the role of US imperialism behind the India-Pakistan war of 1965. He said: 'So it is in the interest of the reactionary bourgeoisie of India that India has attacked Pakistan. The US imperialist plan of the world war is also operating behind this war' ('What Possibility the Year 1965 is Indicating?' Document no. 5, secretly circulated during August–September 1965).

Regarding the true nature of Soviet aid, Charu Mazumdar referred to the collusion of US imperialism and the USSR. He said:

> If support is given to the government of India which is following the path of co-operation with imperialism, and feudalism, it is the reactionary class which is strengthened. So Soviet aid is not strengthening the democratic movement of India, but is increasing the strength of the reactionary forces in co-operation with US-led imperialism and the Soviets. It is the Soviet–US co-operation of modern revisionism that we are observing in India …. ('Carry on the Struggle Against Modern Revisionism', Document no. 4, secretly circulated during the middle of 1965)

Mazumdar further exposed the designs of imperialism behind bourgeois nationalism. He said:

> As the Indian Government is carrying on compromising with imperialism, that sense of unity is being struck at its root. … The consciousness of a new unity will come in the course of the

very struggle against this government of India of imperialism, feudalism and big monopolists …. (ibid.)

Mazumdar explained how Soviet revisionism presented new hopes for the neo-colonial forces and also how the Indian Government opened up India to imperialist exploitation:

> … no imperialism could wipe off the Chinese Revolution …. Decadent imperialism also realized that it was not possible to carry on in the old method. So it took a new form, introduced a new method of exploitation by giving dollars as gift. Neo-colonialism began. When imperialism and all the reactionaries of the world were groping for a way out, to save themselves, the revisionist policy of the traitor Khrushchev in 1956 made its appearance before them with a light of new hope. The reactionary government of India found a way to create illusions about Khrushchev's independent capitalist path. … The reactionary government of India's bourgeoisie entered into a secret pact with the US imperialism in 1958 …. This traitorous government … turned India into a playground of imperialist exploitation. It has converted the entire Indian people into a nation of beggars to the foreigners. ('What is the Source of the Spontaneous Revolutionary Outburst in India?' Document no. 3, 9 April 1965)

Mazumdar believed that the main aim of US imperialism was to establish India as the reactionary base in South-East Asia. He wrote:

> The Indian government has gradually become the chief political partner in the expansion of American imperialism's hegemony of the world. The main aim of American imperialism is to establish India as the chief reactionary base in South-East Asia. ('Our Tasks in the Present Situation', Document no. 1, 28 January 1965)

In the same document, Mazumdar further maintained that the Indian government was becoming more and more dependent on imperialism, hence the arrest of the communists under its instruction. He said:

> … there is no other way for the Indian bourgeoisie to come out from this crisis excepting importing more and more Anglo-American imperialist capital. As a result of this dependence on imperialism, the internal crisis of capitalism is bound to increase day by day. The Indian bourgeoisie has not been able to find out any other way except killing democracy, faced with the instructions of American imperialism and its own internal crisis. There were imperialist instructions behind these arrests, since the

American police chief 'Macbright' was in Delhi during the arrest of the communists, and the widespread arrests took place only after discussions with him. ... The more the Government will be dependent on imperialism, the more it will fail to solve its internal crisis. ... Imperialist capital demands the arrest of communists as a precondition before investing; ... American imperialism is writhing in death pangs, in keeping its commitment to those countries of the world which it has assured of giving aid. Meanwhile, an industrial crisis has developed in America. It can be seen from President Johnson's utterance itself that the number of unemployed is increasing in the country. According to the official statement, four million people are absolutely unemployed; 35 million people are semi-unemployed and in factories also semi-unemployment is continuing' (ibid.).

Charu Mazumdar also drew attention to how Soviet revisionism was colluding with US imperialism and how the revisionist party leaderships of the CPI and the CPI-M were concealing this fact. It should be noted that at this point he had not yet used the term 'Soviet Social Imperialism' as he would do later. Mazumdar now said:

> Soviet revisionist leadership in collaboration with the US imperialism is today trying for world hegemony. ... They are trying to establish the revisionist leadership by splitting the revolutionary parties and are shamelessly acing as agents of the US imperialism. ... So no struggles against American imperialism can be made without carrying out an open struggle against this Soviet revisionist leadership. ... The party leadership ... are trying to conceal in a cunning manner the fact that the Soviet leadership is transforming the Soviet Socialist State into a capitalist state gradually and that the Soviet-American collaboration itself is because of that. So, in the political and organizational analysis of India during the last two years [made by the party leadership], there has been no mention of imperialist, particularly American imperialist interference, although from Johnson to Humphrey, all the representatives of US imperialism have repeatedly declared that they will use India as a base against China ... in the political and organizational resolution [of the party leadership], no word of caution has been uttered for party members against the imperialist counter-offensive. ... In no part of their resolution it was mentioned that this election was being held to hide the exploitation and indirect rule by imperialism. The reactionary government of India ... under imperialist instructions wants to build up our country as a counterrevolutionary base of South East Asia .... The experience of Indonesia has taught us how violent today dying imperialism

can become. ('The Main Task Today is the Struggle to Build Up the True Revolutionary Party Through Uncompromising Struggle Against Revisionism', Document no. 6, 30 August 1966; circulated in a clandestine manner and published in the name of 'Maoist Center' of the CPI)

Charu Mazumdar's Later Writings on Imperialism

Apart from the 'Eight Documents', Charu Mazumdar wrote several other important documents before his death in police custody in 1972, after which the Naxalite movement of the first phase gradually subsided. In one such document written after the Naxalbari peasant uprising, he analysed how the Central Committee of the CPI-M proved to be an ally of US imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Indian government. In his words:

> The ulterior motive of the ... C.C. Resolution (of the CPI-M) is ... to act secretly as a stooge in the interests of US imperialism, Soviet revisionism and Indian reactionary forces .... It has not explained the real character of the joint nuclear monopoly by America and Russia, but has only aired a semblance of criticism in this vein .... The collaboration between America and Russia turns out in fact to be a collaboration for world domination. ... The C.C. has ignored an event like exchange of nuclear secrets between America and Russia .... Even when American imperialism and Soviet revisionism in spite of their giving all possible help are failing to revive people's confidence in the government, the C.C. like a faithful lackey comes forward in defence of this reactionary government. The C.C. has thus proved to be an ally and friend of American imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Indian reactionary government .... This vast country of fifty crore-strong population happens to be a strong base of the imperialist powers and the mainstay of Soviet revisionism. So with the victorious completion of the revolution in India the doomsday of imperialism as well as of Soviet revisionism would fast draw near. ... All the might of the imperialists and revisionists will fail to stop the tide of revolution in this country. ('It is Time to Build up a Revolutionary Party', Liberation, November 1967).

Mazumdar was very optimistic about the victory of revolution in India and the subsequent collapse of imperialism. He asserted:

The victory of the People's Democratic Revolution in this country of 500 million people will lead to the inevitable collapse of world imperialism and revisionism. The People's Democratic Revolution in this country can be led to a victorious end only in opposition to all the imperialist powers of the world. Particularly, we shall have to reckon with U.S. imperialism, the leader of world imperialism. U.S. imperialism has not only adopted all the aggressive features of pre-war Germany, Italy and Japan, but has further developed them to a great extent. It has extended its aggressive activities to all corners of the globe and has enmeshed India in its neocolonialist bondage. . . . The victorious Indian revolution will destroy this imperialist monster ('The Indian People's Democratic Revolution', *Liberation,* June 1968).

Mazumdar further explained at greater length how Soviet revisionism colaborated with US imperialism and how the leadership of the CPI and the CPI-M helped them. He said:

The People's Democratic Revolution in this country will have to be carried through to a victorious end by actively opposing the Soviet Union . . .. This is because the present leaders of the Soviet state, party and army have adopted a revisionist line and set up a bourgeois dictatorship in their country. In collusion with the U.S. imperialists, they have extended their exploitation and established their domination over various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In India, the Soviet leaders have become the chief peddler of U.S. imperialism . . .. With the help of their stooges (the Dange clique [of the CPI] and the neo-revisionist clique [of the (CPI-M)]), nurtured by themselves, the Soviet leaders are turning India into a field for their unrestricted exploitation and are deceiving the fighting masses, thus proving themselves to be the running dogs of U.S. imperialism and friends of the Indian reactionaries. . . . Today, all the political parties of India have turned into active accomplices of US imperialism, Soviet revisionism and Indian reactionaries . . .. People engaged themselves in a heated controversy at Burdwan [Plenum of the CPI-M] over the extent of restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. To engage oneself in a controversy over the restoration of capitalism in a country where the proletarian dictatorship has already been abolished . . . is . . . to blunt the edge of struggle . . .. All the reactionaries of the world . . . are trying to use India as their base for supplying cannon-fodder for their aggression against the great Chinese people. It was precisely this that the renegade Kosygin, Tito and Chester Bowles conspired about with Indira Gandhi in New Delhi recently . . .'. ('The Indian People's Democratic Revolution', *Liberation,* June 1968)

In another article written after one year of the Naxalbari movement, Mazumdar mentioned the international significance of the Naxalbari struggle: 'India has been turned into a base of imperialism and revisionism . . .. That is why the Naxalbari struggle is not merely a national struggle; it is also an international struggle' ('One Year of Naxalbari Struggle', *Liberation,* June 1968).

Mazumdar vehemently criticised the Burdwan Plenum of the CPI-M and said:

They [the CPI-M] are merely the running dogs of foreign and Indian reaction and of the Soviet revisionists. It was on behalf of Indian and foreign reaction that Dinesh Singh came and warned Jyoti Basu not to expose their reactionary character too much at the Burdwan Plenum [of the CPI-M]. In this way the conspiracy of international revisionism was successful at the Burdwan Plenum, . . . even if temporarily, . . . to deceive the revolutionary masses of India'. ('The United Front and the Revolutionary Party', *Liberation,* July 1968).

Mazumdar branded the leaders of the CPI and the CPI-M as lackeys of the Soviet Union. He wrote:

US imperialism and Soviet revisionism are intensifying their oppression and exploitation in India . . . The Dangeite traitorous clique [of the CPI] and the neo-revisionist clique [of the CPI-M] are . . . trying to confuse the masses by . . . indulging in all sorts of pseudo-revolutionary talks. But the Soviet revisionists' fascist aggression against Czechoslovakia has torn off their mask and with each passing day they will be clearly shown up as mere lackeys of the Soviet Union, which is today a pedlar of neo-colonialism and one of the aggressive powers of the world. ('Develop Peasants' Class Struggle through Class Analysis, Investigation and Study', Liberation, November 1968).

In another essay written at the end of 1968, Charu Mazumdar repeated at length his assertion about the collusion of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. He said:

The victory of the great Chinese revolution . . . stirred up . . . armed struggle . . . in every colony in Southeast Asia. . . . As world imperialism neared its final collapse, the revisionist leadership of the Communist Parties of the world began to betray the people's struggles. After the death of Stalin the Soviet revisionist renegade clique usurped the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the world's revisionist renegade cliques began to work jointly with a view to saving world

imperialism from its destruction. The renegade traitors in India . . . withdrew unconditionally from the Telengana struggle and took to the path of parliamentarism. After the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, in collusion with US imperialism, spread disruption and confusion among the people of the colonies and semicolonies wherever they were waging armed struggle. Chairman Mao has said that world imperialism today is like a house which rests on a solitary pillar: US imperialism. And so, the destruction of US imperialism will completely smash world imperialism. This is why the traitorous Khrushchev clique extended its hand of cooperation to US imperialism. . . . In the present era when imperialism is heading towards total collapse, revolutionary struggle in every country has taken the form of armed struggle; Soviet revisionism, unable to retain its mask of socialism, has been forced to adopt imperialist tactics . . . . ('"Boycott Elections!" International Significance of the Slogan', Liberation, December 1968).

In December 1968 Mazumdar repeated his views about US imperialism and Soviet revisionism but put forward a new term for the first time, namely that India had become a 'US-Soviet neo-colony'. He wrote:

> Without such a [revolutionary] party it is impossible to lead the . . . struggle against imperialism and its lackeys . . . . Chairman Mao has taught us that in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country . . . the peasantry is exploited and ruled by three mountains, namely, imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. . . . .The Vietnamese people's struggle against the US imperialist aggressors has filled the minds of the oppressed people with a new hope. . . . Comrades, the events in Czechoslovakia have fully exposed the naked fascist nature of Soviet revisionism. These events have also clearly revealed the fact that the traitorous Dangeite clique [of the CPI] and the neo-revisionist clique [of the CPI-M] are obedient tools of the Soviet revisionists. . . . India has today become a US-Soviet neo-colony. With the help of the Indian reactionaries they have turned India into a base of counter-revolution in Southeast Asia. ('Undertake the Work of Building a Revolutionary Party', Liberation, December 1968)

In another article, Mazumdar repeated his view about India being a 'US-Soviet neocolony'. He said, 'Every Indian has the inalienable right to rise in revolt against the reactionary Indian government – a government that has again turned India into a colony, this time a neo-colony of US

imperialism and the Soviet revisionists . . .' ('We Salute the Peasant Revolutionaries of Kerala!', Liberation, December 1968).

On the eve of the installation of the CPI-ML, Mazumdar, while underscoring the need for formation of the new party, emphasised the importance of a successful Indian revolution against imperialism:

> All the imperialist powers of the world, whether the US imperialists or the Soviet social-fascists, are trying to win a fresh lease of life by exploiting the five hundred million people of India. They . . . are trying to use the 500 million people of India as cannon-fodder in a war to destroy the great Chinese Republic, the base of the world revolution . . . . By making the revolution we shall be able . . . to deal a staggering blow to world imperialism and revisionism . . . . ('Why Must We Form the Party Now?' Liberation, March 1969)

During the formation of the new party (the CPI-ML) in April 1969, Mazumdar reiterated his assessment of the collusion of US imperialism, the Soviet revisionists, and the leaders of the CPI and the CPI-M thus:

> After the death of . . . Stalin, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique usurped the leadership of the state, party and the army and established a bourgeois dictatorship in the Soviet Union . . . . They have become the No. 1 accomplice of the imperialists; particularly, they have advanced far along the road of collaboration with the US imperialists. This is because US imperialism is today the leader of the imperialist camp, and is pursuing even more fiercely and widely the aggressive policies of the German, Italian and Japanese imperialists. The traitorous leaders of the Soviet Union are supporting these aggressive activities and . . . carrying on colonial exploitation with various imperialist powers and, in particular, with US imperialism. . . . In India also they are acting as No. 1 accomplice of US imperialism and are directing the state power . . . . That is why India's liberation struggle can win victory only by fighting against the guns of the Soviet revisionists and . . . the Soviet revisionists' state power. This explains why the Dange clique [of the CPI] and the neo-revisionist leadership [of the CPI-M] have, by their actions, joined the Indian reactionary clique . . . . They . . . support the bourgeois and imperialist propaganda . . . (while) the thought of Chairman Mao can be called Marxism of the era of the total collapse of imperialism . . . . ('To the Youth and the Students', Liberation, April 1969).

After the formation of the CPI-ML, Mazumdar criticised Parimal Dasgupta, another Maoist radical, and for the first time asserted that the USSR was a social-imperialist country:

> ... Parimal Dasgupta ... has placed the recent happenings in Czechoslovakia on the same footing as the Hungarian event of 1956. ... [But] to place these two events on the same footing means denying the fact that the Soviet Union has degenerated into a social-imperialist country, and endorsing the Soviet imperialist aggression against Czechoslovakia as a correct action .... The fact that the Soviet aggression took place with the knowledge of Johnson has little importance for him. This is because he either rejects or fails to understand the fact that Soviet social-imperialism, in collaboration with US imperialism, is striving to dominate the world. This leads to one thing: to deny in effect the fact that the Soviet Union is a social-imperialist country. ('On Some Current Political and Organizational Problems', Liberation, July 1969).

During the First Congress of the CPI-ML held in May 1970, Mazumdar found a similarity between the international and the Indian situations. He said:

> On the one hand, there is US imperialism's naked aggression against Cambodia. ... On the other hand the revolutionary united front of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, under the leadership of China, has been built up to fight the US aggressors .... The same kind of phenomenon exists in India also. India's reactionary ruling classes are making frenzied preparations to suit the global strategy of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. They are hatching criminal war plans against China. But the emergence of the C.P.I. (M-L) has changed the internal situation in India. ('Hate, Stamp and Smash Centrism', May 1970)

Although the Andhra Maoists had already alleged that Charu Mazumdar was not vocal about British imperialism, here we find that Mazumdar clearly repudiated British imperialism:

> ... the Soviet State is today collaborating with British-American imperialists .... With the help of the native bourgeoisie the Soviet Union is also trying to invest capital in our country. In the sphere of trade and commerce with our country it has come to enjoy special facilities. ... That is why, as a collaborator of Britain and the U.S.A., the Soviet State also is our enemy'. ('Long Live the Heroic Peasants in Naxalbari!', Liberation, July 1971–January 1972)

Organisational Views on Imperialism

Like Charu Mazumdar's individual writings, the Maoists' organisations also expressed their deepest concern about imperialism in their various documents. In the 1967 general elections, the Congress Party lost its electoral monopoly. In Kerala and West Bengal, the CPI-M was the leading partner in coalition ministries, which also included the CPI. The peasant upheaval in Naxalbari, led by radicals still belonging to the CPI-M in West Bengal, put the CPI-M in a dilemma: if their ministry did not suppress the uprising, it would attract dismissal by the central government for failing to maintain law and order; but if it trampled the insurgency, the party would invoke the allegation that it was subordinating class struggle to the bourgeois parliamentary system and prioritising the maintenance of the governmental seat of power in the bourgeois state machine. The West Bengal government, led by the CPI-M, opted to suppress the rebellion.

The Communist Party of China (the CPC), endorsed the Naxalbari uprising and called upon the CPI-M cadres to oppose its leadership. The CPC held that India is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial, only nominally independent country; the Indian bourgeoisie have turned comprador. It further maintained that the objective conditions for a revolution existed in India.

Charu Mazumdar's theoretical leadership, Kanu Sanyal's mass leadership, inner-party ideological struggle of various Maoist radicals inside the CPI-M in West Bengal (namely, Asit Sen, Parimal Dasgupta, Souren Basu, Sushital Roy Choudhuri, Saroj Datta, Suniti Kumar Ghosh etc.), the consequent Naxalbari uprising in 1967 and a revolt by the Andhra Pradesh state unit of the CPI-M led by T. Nagi Reddy, D.V. Rao, Chandra Pulla Reddy etc. in 1968 all finally induced a powerful Maoist movement in different parts of India.

Shortly after the Naxalbari uprising, an All India Co-ordination Committee of Revolutionaries (AICCR) of the CPI-M was formed within the CPI-M to accelerate the struggle against revisionism and to launch mass struggles. Centring

around the Naxalbari revolt, most of the dissident radicals assembled together under this new committee, which was formed on 13 November 1967 in Calcutta. The AICCR issued a 'Declaration of the Revolutionaries of the CPI (M)' in which, inter alia, the neo-colonial nature of India was stated. It said:

> By disowning, in the name of independent analysis, the neo-colonial nature of our country and its semi-feudal, semi-colonial character . . . they [the neo-revisionist leadership of the CPI-M] indirectly indicated that what was being built up in India was an independent capitalist economy and that the Indian big bourgeoisie had not exhausted its anti-imperialist role . . . . ('Declaration of the Revolutionaries of the CPI (M)', AICCR, 13 November 1967, Liberation, vol. 1, no. 2, December 1967).

The Burdwan Plenum of the CPI-M was held in April 1968 and the breach was final. After leaving the CPI-M, on 14 May 1968, the AICCR expanded itself into the All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar. Soon the Maoist dissidents centring around the AICCCR wanted to build up a new Maoist party through spreading Naxalbari-type peasant struggles all over the country. The emergence of a strong Maoist perspective during the Naxalbari uprising in 1967 resulted in the formation of the AICCCR comprising a large number of Maoists who either left the CPI-M or were expelled from it. The AICCCR, however, expelled its Andhra unit before converting itself into the CPI-ML. This soon led to a split within the CPI-M itself in 1969, but not all Maoist groups and individuals joined the CPI-ML (e.g. the Andhra Maoists).

The AICCCR issued the 'Second Declaration' on 14 May 1968. Along the lines of argument put forward by Charu Mazumdar, the document provided a detailed analysis of how the semi-colonial and semifeudal India has been turned into a neo-colony of some imperialist powers, the principal of them being the US and the Soviet Union. The document said:

> . . . the heroic peasants of Naxalbari rose in revolt . . . this event has caused panic in the minds of US imperialists, Soviet revisionists, the Indian big land-lord class, comprador-bureaucrat bourgeois class

. . . . A little over twenty years ago India was a colony of Britain; today India has been turned into a neo-colony of some imperialist powers, the principal of them being the United States and the Soviet Union. The US imperialists . . . are also the worst enemies of the Indian people. Their neo-colonial grip over India is now complete. The traitorous Soviet ruling clique . . . are today actively collaborating with the US imperialists and they have turned India into a neo-colony of both the United States and the Soviet Union. India is a perfect example of the entente into which the US imperialists and Soviet neo-colonialists have entered to jointly establish hegemony over the world . . . . In the semi-colonial and semi-feudal India, the contradiction between imperialist and neo-colonial powers and the people, the contradiction between feudal classes and the peasantry and the contradiction between comprador-bureaucratic capital and the working class have assumed the most acute form. Today, US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, the big landlord class and the comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie of India are the principal enemies of the Indian people – these are like four mountains . . . . Today India has a position of vital importance in the counter-revolutionary world strategy of US imperialists and Soviet neo-colonialists. They have reduced India to a powerful bastion of reaction . . . the Soviet betrayers, hand in gloves with the US imperialists, have increased their supply of military hardwares to the Indian reactionaries. Supersonic jet bombers and submarines are among those hardwares. They have set up MIG-factory and missile bases on the soil of India and have been trying to secure marine bases for their warships in the Andamans and Nicobar islands. (Sen Samar et al. 1978, pp. 196–201).

In his famous 'Terai Report', Kanu Sanyal, the mass leader of the Naxalbari uprising and a follower of Charu Mazumdar, explained how the armed revolt of the peasants in the Terai region centring around Naxalbari not only attacked feudalism but also imperialism. He said:

> The comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie, the land-lords and the jotedars have been carrying on their rule and exploitation through their political organization, the Congress party, by protecting fully and developing imperialist interests and by covering up the basis of feudalism with legal coatings . . . .The peasants of Terai not only dealt a fierce blow at feudalism, they also expressed their intense hatred for the imperialist exploitation of India, specially the exploitation by US imperialism . . . . It is never possible to overthrow the rule of the comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie and the landlords, who have come to terms with imperialism, without arming the peasants . . . because . . . the feudal landlord class is

the main social base of the imperialist and comprador-bureaucrat bourgeois exploitation …. At the present time, every antifeudal armed struggle is certain to be opposed by imperialism …. In the propaganda being carried on by the bourgeois papers, representing different imperialist interests, by the Voice of America and by the BBC, we are witnessing this opposition in an embryonic form … as soon as the antifeudal struggle of the workers and peasants of Terai grows more intense, it will have to face direct opposition from imperialism. ('Report on the Peasant Movement in the Terai Region', Kanu Sanyal, September 1968, Liberation, November 1968)

It should be noted that, meanwhile and throughout the first phase of the Naxalite movement, many scattered and small-scale agitations and protests especially of the students and youth were being organised by the Naxalites and more specifically the AICCCR against imperialism (apart from feudalism) in different corners of India. One massive demonstration took place in Kolkata in 1968 in order to protest against the visit of the World Bank President Robert McNamara.

CPI-ML on Imperialism

The new CPI-ML was created in April 1969. It excluded however the Andhra Maoists and some other Maoist radicals who considered its formation premature. The CPC, however, recognised the new party.

The CPI-ML, which followed the Chinese view, differed from the CPI-M. The CPI-ML held that India is a semi-feudal and neo-colonial country; its outdated semi-feudal system serves as a base for US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. The big comprador-bureaucrat capitalists, the pawns of imperialism, are in state power. The basic task of the revolution is the elimination of feudalism, comprador-bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism. Of the major contradictions, that between feudalism and the broad masses is principal. Thus, the present stage of the revolution is democratic, the essence of which is agrarian revolution. The peasantry is the main force of revolution, led by the working class through the CPI-ML. The working class must rely on landless and poor peasants, unite with middle peasants and

win a section of the rich peasants while neutralising the rest. Urban petty-bourgeoisie and revolutionary intellectuals will be reliable allies, while the small and middle bourgeoisie, the independent businessmen, and the bourgeois intellectuals will be vacillating allies. The CPI-ML sought to build a democratic front through worker-peasant unity, through the process of armed struggle and after red power has been established in some areas. The path is people's war, through creating bases of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare. This will remain the basic form of struggle throughout the democratic revolution.

Mohan Ram, however, pointed out the differences between the CPI-ML and the Andhra Maoists on the question of imperialism. In 1973 Mohan Ram commented:

The CPI-ML assertion that the principal contradiction is between feudalism and the broad masses of the people leaves unclear the anti-imperialist task of the democratic revolution …. It lays lopsided emphasis on the anti-feudal task. By contrast, Maoists of the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee, who are outside the CPI-ML, hold that the main contradiction is between the Indian people and imperialism (including social imperialism) in alliance with feudalism. They see imperialism and comprador-bureaucrat capitalism as the props of feudalism. The CPI-ML does not regard the national bourgeoisie as an ally of the revolution, either firm or vacillating. But the Andhra Maoists want the national bourgeoisie in the front along with the workers, the poor peasantry, and the middle classes. Further, the CPI-ML is silent on the need to fight British imperialism; its references are limited to United States imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. The Andhra Maoists are more specific on this point. (Ram 1973, p. 348).

Visibly influenced by the formulations made by the CPC and its endorsement by Charu Mazumdar, the 'Political Resolution' of the new CPI-ML, adopted on 22 April 1969, described in detail the 'four mountains' weighing upon the Indian people, namely, US imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism, feudalism, and comprador-bureaucrat capitalism. It said:

… (Indian) government is a lackey of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. The abject dependence of Indian economy on 'aid' from imperialist countries, chiefly from US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, the thousands of

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collaboration agreements, the imperialist plunder of our country through unequal trade and 'aid', the utter dependence for food on P.L. 480 etc, go to prove the semi-colonial character of our country . . .. The fleecing of the Indian people by extracting the highest rate of profit, the concentration of much of India's wealth . . ., the utilization of the state sector in the interest of the foreign monopolies and domestic big business . . . all . . . prove that it is the big landlords and comprador-bureaucrat capitalists who run the state . . .. The political, economic, cultural and military grip of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism on the Indian State, the dovetailing of its foreign policy with the US-Soviet global strategy of encircling Socialist China and suppressing the national liberation struggle, the recent tours of Latin America and South East Asia by the Indian Prime Minister to further the interests of this counter-revolutionary strategy, the total support given by the Indian Govt. for the Soviet armed provocation against China, the fascist approval of Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia and the active collaboration with the US imperialists against the national liberation struggle of Vietnam clearly show that the Indian Govt. is a lackey of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism . . .. To destroy feudalism, one of the two main props (comprador-bureaucrat capital being the other) of imperialism in our country, the Indian people will have to wage a bitter, protracted struggle against US and Soviet social-imperialism too. By liberating themselves from the yoke of feudalism, the Indian people will also liberate themselves from the yoke of imperialism and comprador-bureaucrat capital, because the struggle against feudalism is also a struggle against the other two enemies . . . the four mountains . . . are US Imperialism, Soviet Social-Imperialism, Feudalism, and Comprador-Bureaucrat Capitalism. (Liberation, vol. 2, no. 7, 20 May 1969)

The 'Programme' of the CPI-ML adopted at the First Party Congress held in May 1970 contained a more detailed analysis of India's situation vis-à-vis imperialism. It said:

10. During these years of sham independence the big comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie and big landlord ruling classes have been serving their imperialist masters quite faithfully. These lackeys of imperialism, while preserving the old British imperialist exploitation, have also brought US imperialist and Soviet social-imperialist exploiters to fleece our country. 11. They have mortgaged our country to the imperialist powers, mainly to the US imperialists and Soviet social-imperialists. With the weakening of the power of British imperialism the world over, the Indian ruling classes have now hired themselves out to US imperialism and Soviet

social-imperialism. ('Programme of the CPI-ML', Sen Samar et al. 1978, pp. 275–284)

Further, the connection among the 'four mountains' was discussed: 'Thus, . . . the Indian people are now weighed down under the four huge mountains, namely, imperialism headed by US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, feudalism and comprador-bureaucrat capital. Thus India has turned into a neo-colony of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism . . . ' (ibid.).

It further analysed the various contradictions in India, and detected that between feudalism and the broad masses as the principal one in the present phase. It said:

16. In brief, out of all the major contradictions in our country, that is, the contradiction between imperialism and social-imperialism on the one hand and our people on the other, the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses of the people, the contradiction between capital and labour and the contradiction within the ruling classes, the one between the landlords and the peasantry, i.e., the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses of the Indian people is the principal contradiction in the present phase. 17. The resolution of this contradiction will lead to the resolution of all other contradictions too. (ibid.)

The programme of the new party provided a detailed analysis of the economic aspects of the exploitation by imperialism thus:

18. While preserving and perpetuating the semi-feudal set-up, the big comprador-bureaucrat bourgeoisie and big landlord ruling classes have become pawns in the hands of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. 19. The phenomenal increase in the total quantum of foreign capital, the heavy remittances of profits abroad, thousands of collaborationist enterprises, total dependence on imperialist 'aid, grants and loans' for capital goods, technical knowhow, military supplies and armament industries for building military bases and even for markets, unequal trade and P.L. 480 agreements have made US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism the overlords of our country. 20. US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism have brought the vital sectors of the economy of our country under their control. US imperialism collaborates mainly with private capital and is now penetrating into the industries in the state sector, while Soviet social-imperialism has brought under its control mainly the industries in the state sector and is at the same time trying to enter into collaboration with private capital. 21. US imperialism and Soviet

social-imperialism do everything possible to foster the growth of comprador-bureaucrat capitalism for continuing their unbridled exploitation of the Indian people. 22. The much-trumpeted 'public sector' is being built up by many imperialist exploiters for employing their capital and for exploiting the cheap labor power and raw materials of our country. The public sector is nothing but a clever device to hoodwink the Indian people and continue their plunder. It is state monopoly capitalism i.e., bureaucrat capitalism. 23. With their octopus-like grip on India's economy, the US imperialists and the Soviet social-imperialists control the political, cultural and military spheres of the life of our country. (ibid.)

It also furnished a separate discussion of imperialism's penetration in India's foreign policy. It said:

24. At the dictates of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, India's reactionary ruling classes pursue a foreign policy that serves the interests of imperialism, social-imperialism and reaction. It has been tailored to the needs of the global strategy of the US imperialists and Soviet social-imperialists to encircle Socialist China and suppress the national liberation struggle raging in various parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, of which Vietnam has become the spearhead. India's aggression against Socialist China in 1962 and her continual provocation against China since then at the instance of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, her support to the Soviet attack on China, her tacit approval of Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia, her dirty role in supporting US imperialism against the Vietnamese people prove beyond a shadow of doubt that India's ruling classes are faithful stooges of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. 25. These hard facts irrefutably prove the semi-colonial character of our society, besides its semifeudal character. 26. As the obsolete semifeudal society acts as the social base of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism and as it facilitates also the plunder of our people by comprador-bureaucrat capital, the problem of the peasantry becomes the basic problem of the Indian revolution. 27. Therefore, the basic task of the Indian revolution is to overthrow the rule of feudalism, comprador-bureaucrat capitalism, imperialism and social-imperialism. This determines the stage of our revolution. It is the stage of democratic revolution, the essence of which is agrarian revolution. (ibid.)

Among other things, the CPI-ML propagated the politics of attack against foreign capital and imperialism. Point 38 of the 40-point 'Programme' adopted by the CPI-ML Party Congress of May 1970 indicated that the People's

Democratic State in post-revolutionary India in future would carry out, inter alia, the following major tasks: (a) confiscation of all the banks and enterprises of foreign capital and liquidation of all imperialist debt; (b) confiscation of all enterprises of comprador-bureaucrat capital; (c) development of a new democratic culture in place of colonial and feudal culture.

Conclusion

In this essay, we have tried to show that although the Naxalite movement was basically a peasant movement against feudal oppression, its anti-imperialist orientation was also quite pronounced. After its rise in the 1960s and subsequent fall in the 1970s, the Naxalite movement had undergone a series of fragmentations. At present there is a resurgence of the 'Maoist' movement (as it is commonly called to distinguish it from the old Naxalite movement). There is a lot of controversy about the similarities and differences between the old Naxalite movement and the present Maoist movement, and also about whether the current Maoist movement is a continuation of the old Naxalite movement or not. However, the new Maoist movement is, like the old Naxalite movement, both anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. But that is a separate story.

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Nazi Empire

▶ Racism and Imperialism

Négritude

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> *We have used Surrealism like Surrealism has used the nègre.*
> *(Damas, quoted in* Racine 1983, p. 202)

Definition

A poetic, literary, political movement, Négritude remains one of the most emblematic discourses of African and Black Atlantic, anti-colonial, cultural politics.

Introduction

A poetic, literary, political movement, Négritude remains one of the most emblematic discourses of African and Black Atlantic, anti-colonial, cultural politics. Although formulated in the specific context of late French colonialism and its assimilationist politics, its singular aesthetics and the depth of critiques travelled far beyond Francophone countries. Born out of the intellectual revolt of three friends – the Guyanese Léon-Gontran Damas, the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor, and the Martinican Aimé Césaire – the concept of Négritude emerged in the inter-war period from their search for poetics able to capture their specific experience as colonised black subjects. 'Négritude' comes from 'nègre', a derogatory term historically used to designate African slaves, generalised to black African people in the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was used both as a racial term and as a slur, situated in US English of the 1920s somewhere between 'nigger' and 'black' (Edwards 2003, pp. 34–35). Damas, Senghor and Césaire were not the first to subvert and appropriate 'nègre', a distinction claimed by anti-racist activists such as Lamine Senghor and Tiemoko Garan Kouyaté from the 1920s onwards (Edwards 2003; Miller 1998). Against the racial hierarchy prevailing in the French Empire, which distinguished Antillean 'évolués' (evolved), civilised mixed-race people and backward 'nègres', the latter came to be a symbol of the struggle and solidarity against colonial oppression. Négritude thinkers grounded their literary movement in this founding gesture, turning the vocable into an existential condition, an aesthetic style, and a pan-African form of identity. From an array of creative and political practices of the Paris-based black diaspora, 'négritude' only emerged as a self-conscious movement after the Second World War II, and continued to be reconfigured in light of the evolution of Third-World nationalisms, decolonisation, and the advent of post-colonial states. Thus, the challenge is to understand it in the complexity of its historical transformations as Négritude progressively incoporated new dimensions: from a literary movement emerging in student politics, through reformism, it was retrospectively reconfigured as a a precursor of radical anti-colonialism and Third-Worldism. In addition, some of its central theoretical concepts (race, culture, civilisation, racism) underwent dramatic changes in the same period.

Colonial Elites

[...]
Bleached
My hatred grows on the fringe
Of their wickedness
On the fringe
Of gun blows
On the fringe
Of wave blows
Of slave merchants
Of the foul freight of their cruel trade
Bleached
My hatred grows on the fringe
Of culture
On the fringe
Of theories
On the fringe of the chatters
That were deemed fit to be stuffed into me from
the crib
While everything in me only aspires to be nègre
Like my Africa that they plundered

(Damas 1972, p. 60)

Césaire and Senghor met in the lycée Louis-le-Grand, where they had both come to attend preparatory classes for the entrance at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, one of the most prestigious higher-education institutions in France. While the aim of colonial schools was to form native élites, intermediary between French administrative functions and local populations, the French meritocratic system also helped a few native students to partake in the entry competition for some of the most prestigious schools of the capital with bursaries. In command of flawless French language, these deserving students were held up as examples of 'assimilated' subjects, but these living exemplars of an impossible 'success' only revealed the contradictory nature of the French assimilation politics. As Damas would summarise: 'he who will be assimilated expects from assimilation the equal treatment that the metropole will never grant him, and on the other hand, they will ask him to pay a price that the other cannot pay: they both agree to try to whiten the nègre, but that cannot happen' (Wilder 2005, p. 223).

Senghor, born into a rich Serer family of the small town of Joal, had received his secondary education at a missionary boarding school, and after attending lycée in Dakar he obtained half a scholarship to study Letters in Paris (Vaillant

1990). Aimé Césaire, coming from a modest family in Basse-Pointe, Martinique, had moved to Fort-de-France at the age of 11 to study at the lycée Victor Schoelscher, where he met Léon-Gontran Damas. The latter, originally from French Guyana, had moved to France in 1928, and to Paris in 1930 where he had encountered Senghor through an acquaintance (Racine 1983, p. 27). Senghor, who immediately befriended Césaire, was the first African person Césaire had ever known. Together with Damas, they read the same books, shared poetry, and discussed Africa, the Antilleans and the US. All three had experienced forms of racism; they were concerned with defining who they were vis-à-vis French culture, and revolted against the exclusionary character of French society and its paternalistic discourse. Their 'lived experience' as black, as Fanon would later theorise in *Black Skin White Masks*, and their ungraspable feeling of uprooting, called for words they had to invent. With their modest bursaries, Césaire and Senghor were living in extremely poor conditions, often on the verge of depression. But Damas, unlike them, had no scholarship at all. He was studying Law, Languages and Ethnology, at the same time as working in various small jobs at Les Halles, Paris's main wholesale market, for survival. In these distressing and consuming life conditions, Damas, who was the most 'tormented soul' of the three, was also considered the most *engagé* (Racine 1983, p. 9), and in many ways their inspiration.

Négritude's Genesis: Black Internationalism and Translation in Inter-War Paris

Much of the ideas of the young Senghor, Damas, and Césaire was formed through their encounter with previous journals and other collectives created amongst the black communities of the French capital. These earlier organisations ranged from the Garveyist internationalist journal *les Continents* (1924) to the Republican-reformist journal *La Dépêche africaine* (1928–32), through the Marxist-anti-colonial *Comité de Défense de la*

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Race Nègre (1926–27) as well as the short Marxist-Surrealist experience of *Légitime Défense* (1932), in which Damas got involved. After their arrival in Paris, these three students took part in what Gary Wilder proposed to call a 'black public sphere' composed of students, activists, and militants, Antillean, African, and African-American writers, artists and workers. Latin Quarter cafés, the Cabane Cubaine in Montmartre, apartments and student dormitories provided spaces for lively debates between pan-Africanists, anti-fascists, communists, artists, and writers (Wilder 2005). For Césaire, Senghor, and Damas, this cosmopolitan network of associations was epitomised by the intellectual milieu surrounding the Nardal sisters' salon, held every Sunday to discuss the 'Negro race' and its future, and to promote 'the solidarity between different Negro groups spread around the world' (171). In relation to these gatherings, a bilingual journal, *La Revue du Monde noir* (hereafter, '*La Revue*'), was launched in 1931 (and lasted about a year). It published articles and poems by Antillean writers such as Etienne Léro, René Maran, Gilbert Gratiant, and René Ménil (Vaillant 1990, p. 125), as well as ethnographic research by Delafosse and Frobenius. As Louis T. Achilles would later recall, this movement was 'no longer political like the Pan-Negro movements that preceded it, but cultural and sociological' (quoted in Wilder 2005, p. 174). Yet, colonial politics was at the centre of their preoccupations.

For Damas, Senghor, and Césaire *La Revue* not only connected them to 'wider sociocultural networks of the imperial metropolis' (173) and older generations of colonial migrants, it also made them discover a number of important writers. Claude McKay's *Banjo* (1928), Alan Locke's *New Negro* (1925) and Langston Hughes's poetry were crucial references, along with recent anthropological studies on Africa. Along with the Achilles and the Nardal sisters, the Guianese René Maran, internationally famous for winning the literary Goncourt prize, was, in Mercer Cook's words, a 'focal point for transatlantic contacts' (166) and had been the first to publish translations of Harlem poetry in *Les Continents*. In their flats, one could regularly meet writers and political figures such as Claude MacKay, Mercer Cook,

Carter G. Woodson, Alain Locke, Countee Cullen, and Hale Woodruff (Edwards 2003, p. 120). Césaire would later explain that the importance of the Harlem Renaissance was to 'encounter another modern black civilization, Blacks and their pride, their consciousness to belong to a culture' (Césaire 2005, pp. 25–26). Like the Harlemite writers, they were seeking to express, in Langston Hughes's formulation, their 'individual dark-skinned selves' (Wilder 2005, p. 176), but also to foster and herald the renaissance of African civilisation. As Brent Hayes Edwards (2003) has admirably shown, Négritude, like other cultures of black internationalism, arose from translation practices. An internationalist black consciousness could only emerge across, and from articulation of, linguistic and historical differences.

In 1935, Césaire, Senghor, and Damas, who were active in student politics, got involved in the writing of the newly renamed journal of the Association of Martinican students, *L'Etudiant noir*. The first and only issue that has survived contained articles by Paulette Nardal, Gilbert Gratient, Léonard Sainville, and Henri Eboué, and addressed similar themes as the *Revue du monde noir,* mostly focused on assimilation and black humanism. Damas, in his role of editorial secretary, described the journal's ambition as that of ending the Quartier Latin student 'tribalism', so that they 'cease being essentially Martinican, Guadeloupean, Guianese, African, and Malagasy students to become one single and same étudiant noir' (Wilder 2005, p. 187) Yet, as Senghor was one of their only non-Antillean contributors, this was more a wish than a fact. Far from being a Négritude manifesto the journal was principally a platform for Césaire and Senghor to begin writing publically in a non-academic context. By 1934, Damas had already published some poems in the famous personalist review Esprit. Damas, who 'hung out in the most diverse neighbourhoods and milieux' (Senghor quoted in Wilder: 206) was the first to step outside the purely academic system of recognition in which they were entangled. For Césaire, Damas was 'the first to liberate him-self', to become, in a truly bohemian spirit, a 'cursed poet' (*poète maudit*) (Césaire, quoted in Wilder: 280). In the poems of

his small, 1937, self-financed volume titled Pigments the questions of assimilation and the complicity of black élites with the French colonial system figure prominently. They are expressed in a vehement, sometimes threatening voice, as in 'Bleached' (quoted above). While they circulate through revolt, racial authenticity, and Afro-centric identifications, Damas's poetic forms are much indebted to the Harlem Renaissance, displaying a strong engagement with spirituals, blues, and jazz, through rhythm and anaphoric repetitions.

Notebook of a Return to the Native Land

The first occurrence of the word 'négritude' appeared in the middle of Césaire's long poem *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal* (Notebook of a return to the native land; 2000), which became a classic of French and Antillean literatures and overshadowed *Pigments* as the seminal text of the movement. Césaire started writing the poem during a stay in Croatia, where he had been invited by his friend, in 1936, and published it for the first time in 1937, at the age of 25. Against the élitist alexandrines of Martinican poets, the *Cahier* stages the epic journey of an experience of self-recovery in an insurrectional prose. By titling it as he did, Césaire announces a return to Martinique, and a return to his fundamental self. Framing this search in a 'notebook' locates it halfway between the schoolboy *cahier* and the personal diary, and evokes it as a learning process. The path of learning is that of Négritude, which constitutes the overcoming of racial and colonial normativity at the same time as being an affirmative endorsement of black people's historical condition. Négritude constantly circulates through historical subjects, realising itself through multiple voices: 'I have worn parrot feathers and / musk-car skins / I have worn down the patience of missionaries / I have insulted the benefactors of humanity' (Césaire 1969, p. 57). The nihilistic description of the filthy, poor, and motionless Basse-Pointe and the 'crumbled island' of Martinique, with which the poem begins, averts any exotic praise. Leaving for Europe does not mark a narrative progression but the discovery of the disguised racism of the metropole: that is, in the 'vogue

nègre', the belittling admiration for the 'good nègre' and the denigrating praise for the Lindy-hop dancer. A first escape would be to embrace these clichés and to cling to the meagre and disparaging recognition it discharges. 'As a result of an unforeseen happy conversion I now respect my repellent ugliness' (65). But this victory is a complacent lie. 'I refuse to pass my swellings off for authentic glories / And I laugh at my old childish imaginings' (66). The return begins with the end of these mystifications; by embracing the real and ghostly presence of (black) suffering. 'How much blood there is in my memory! In my memory are lagoons . . . . / My memory is surrounded by blood. My memory has its belt of corpses!' (63–64) Négritude's movement of reversal draws a trajectory from inertia to life, from shameful wounds to full acceptance. 'I accept . . . . I accept . . . completely, with no reservation . . . / . . . My race gnawed with blemishes' (80). Towards the end of the poem the poet's call for Négritude as a vital force, a virile and incarnated life against the machinistic Europe becomes the herald of hope. The prose becomes increasingly incantatory, inflated by future promises:

> In their spilt blood
>   the niggers smelling of fried onion
>   find the bitter taste of freedom
>   and they are on their feet the niggers
>   the sitting-down niggers
>   unexpectedly on their feet
>   on their feet in the hold
>   on their feet in the cabins
>   on their feet on deck
>   on their feet in the wind
>   on their feet beneath the sun
>   on their feet in blood
>   on their feet
>   and
>   free
>   on their feet and in no way distraught
>   free at sea and owning nothing
>   veering and utterly adrift
>   surprisingly
>   on their feet
>   on their feet in the rigging
>   on their feet at the helm
>   on their feet at the compass
>   on their feet before the map
>   on their feet beneath the stars
>   on their feet
>   and
>   free
>   (89)

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From the comical 'nègrerie' of *l'Etudiant Noir*, through the derogatory 'négraille', 'Négritude' is not the only neologism created by Césaire with the prefix 'nègre', but it is the only one that could sustain the radical inversion they called forth, turning an epidermic slur into an existential condition. Although one easily recognises a progressive linearity in the poem, signalling the temporality of 'return', the text is a collage of leaps back and forward; its objects are plunged into a confounding night. Whilst consciously appealing to a certain 'cannibalistic violence' (Wilder 2005, p. 280) in order to explode formal references, it simultaneously draws on a dense network of historical and geographical references. The poem, which incarnates the pilgrimage of a (singular collective) self in relation to a specific historical context, is affirmative but has not much to do with the notion of *'cultural* affirmation', by which one often characterises Négritude.

Rather than ascribing *culture* to black people, as Senghor does, Césaire opposes Western civilisation for its intrinsic barbarism. Civilisation, with its 'machinistic' overtones, is the decaying antithesis of the self's vitalism, and its structural racism is the backdrop for revolt. The pitfalls of recognition are central to the poem; it is Nietzsche's influence that 'emboldened Césaire to rise above the need for confirmation, which can only imply conformation' (Jones 2010, p. 168). In Gary Wilder's analysis (2005, p. 278), the *Cahier* is to be considered as the 'crowning achievement of interwar Négritude, its summit and synthesis. But it must also be read as an autocritique of Négritude itself, a text in which the self reflexive doubt about cultural nationalism that momentarily surfaced in the work of Gratient, Sainville, Ousmane Socé Diop, Damas, and Senghor is pursued deeply and directly'.

Négritude as Ontology

In contrast to Césaire, Senghor's early concept of négritude was an attempt at revalorising African cultures in a positive way, as ontology and an ethical way of life. In the case of Césaire, Négritude's vitalism is expressed in a poetic idiom, staging the revolt against colonialism as an inward and organic violence. In Senghor's case, though, vitalism was a *theoretical* frame to think what négritude was. By 1939, Senghor had already reached a complex theory of African Art as philosophy, which, combined with that of civilisational *métissage* (hybridity) laid out the ground for his subsequent writings on Négritude:

> The service provided by the Nègre will have been to contribute along with other peoples to re-creating the unity of man and the World: to link flesh with spirit, man with his fellow men, a stone with God. In other words, the real with the spiritual surreal – through man, not as the center, but the hinge, the navel of the World. (Senghor, quoted in Wilder 2005, p. 249)

African art, for Senghor, was defined by this very connection with this sub-reality of vital forces (Bachir Diagne 2011) beneath the level of the visible. Influenced by the study of Guillaume and Thomas Munro on primitive negro sculpture, Senghor developed an understanding of African art form as a 'unity of rhythmic series' (81). Through this move to ontology, Senghor was able to transcend the available concepts of 'culture', trans-valuating the civilisational yardstick of development into the language of humanist *values.* As he would repeat throughout his life, 'Négritude is the set of values of the black world civilization, which is to say a certain active presence to the world: to the universe' (Senghor 1977, p. 69). Understanding these values as a 'presence' becomes meaningful once situated in Souleymane Bachir Diagne's proposition that Négritude is Senghor's way to think 'African art as philosophy'. Indeed, as Jones recently argued, 'there was nothing inherently reactionary about this part of their program insofar as it attempted to open up cognitive possibility rather than essentialize African perception as the simple other of a caricatured West' (Jones 2010, p. 144) But Senghor's Négritude was also closely connected to his conception of humanism. Drawing on Teilhard de Chardin, who professed a form of evolutionism of human consciousness at a global scale, Senghor called for an encounter and *métissage* between civilisations from above, a humanisation through the 'best' contributions of each. True humanism would be 'totally human

because formed of all contributions of all peoples of the earth' (Senghor 1977, p. 91). Grounded in a concept of 'culture' relying on a preconceived notion of alterity, his humanist vision of world civilisation could only restrict the disruptive potential of his 'Negro-African ontology'.

Césaire, for his part, remained faithful to the historical perspective of the *Cahier,* and continued to ground Négritude in past and present oppression and in the movement of historical remembrance. In a 1987 discourse on Négritude, he unmistakably asserted 'Négritude, in my eyes, is not a philosophy. Négritude is not a metaphysics. Négritude is not a pretentious concept of the universe. It is a way of living history within history ... ' (Bachir Diagne 2011, p. 34). To the analytic stylisation of black heritage through Western ontological concepts, Césaire opposes an incommensurable 'heritage' of suffering. As the friendship between the two men always prevailed over their theoretical and political disagreements, these two faces of Négritude's legacy remained, in a way, dialogically linked. Damas, their self-proclaimed 'holy spirit' (Racine 1983, p. 193), was less determined to theorise Négritude than to situate it in the historical movement of ideas. Faithful to their initial quest, he considered Négritude to be a search for identity through the rehabilitation of African culture (189).

Négritude and Politics

Proponents of civilisations' dialogue and of cultural *métissage,* Négritude's protagonists at no point advocated a total break between metropolitan and native cultures. Nor did they advocate an absolute political break. The politics of Négritude is riddled with problems of interpretation, as the violent anti-colonial stance against colonialism surfacing in their poetry does not find direct translation into their political discourse and decisions. While much of the early scholarship on Négritude was concerned with describing its clear identification with either radical anti-colonialism or cultural reformism (Wilder 2005, p. 202), Gary Wilder's important study has shown how Négritude responded to the specific conditions and

contradictions of the inter-war 'French imperial Nation-state', which was characterised by a greater level of integration between metropolitan and colonial societies, and by new methods of colonial administration. The post-war need to improve colonial productivity led to a form of government that was based on the simultaneous transformation and preservation of indigenous societies, at the same time rationalising national belonging and racialising citizenship, or ethnicising development (4–5). In this context Négritude can be read as a response to this contradictory situation, working within French Republican politics and against colonial racial hierarchy. It expresses itself in Négritude's simultaneous demand of citizenship and rejection of assimilation, a project that could 'accommodate both republican and Panafrican identifications' (256). Resituating Négritude in the context of Greater France helps one to understand why their critique did not lead to a project of complete separation, such as Fanon's call to 'leave Europe'. It explains why Négritude remained in the register of immanent critique, taking its clue from radical counterpoints to European modernity and rationality, such as philosophical vitalism, surrealist aesthetics, or ethnology (257).

Historical Watershed, 1945

The immediate aftermath of the Second World War constitutes a break within the history of the Négritude movement. Whilst Césaire moved back to Martinique with his wife Suzanne and created a literary review called *Tropiques,* Senghor and Damas were both mobilised in French army battalions. Senghor was held captive for 2 years in German labour camps and Damas worked for the Resistance. In the 1930s, Senghor, Césaire, and Damas were notorious among small communities of Antillean and African students in Paris; they elaborated their own discourse in the margins of mainstream politics. After 1945, however, all three took up political roles within the French Empire as deputies and sat at the National Assembly in Paris. Only then did Négritude become a self-conscious movement, signalled by the

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creation of the journal *Présence Africaine*, by Alioune Diop, their friend and ally. The journal proposed to edit black writers and studies on Africa, with a particular emphasis on African literature. Moreover, the publications of two anthologies – *Poètes Noirs d'Expression française, 1900–1945* by Damas in 1947 and Senghor's *Anthologie de poésie nègre et malgache* in 1948 – were key in publicising Négritude on a wider scale. Jean-Paul Sartre's long preface to Senghor's anthology, 'Black Orpheus', became Négritude's political manifesto, propelling the movement onto the world stage of revolutionary politics. His intervention signals the entry of French anti-colonial thought into a new era, where readings of Sartre, Hegel, Kojève, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis prevail over those of Nietzsche, Bergson, and anthropology (Frobenius, Delafosse, Delavignette). In the course of the 1950s, reflections on life and civilisation were thus replaced by existential phenomenology, Marxism and development discourse.

Sartre's preface redefined Négritude in connection to post-war revolutionary politics, at the convergence of existentialism, Marxism, and his own theory of literature. For Sartre, Négritude designates the black man's *taking consciousness* of himself (Sartre 1972, p. 11) in the nexus of capitalist relations of forces. 'And since he is oppressed *in his race* and because of it, it is *first* of his race that it is necessary for him to take conscience' (15, emphasis added). The paradoxical framing gesture of Sartre was to celebrate Négritude poets as 'authentic revolutionaries' while negating the autonomy of their political demands, reducing it to the 'weak stage of a dialectical progression' (60). Since Négritude, through Césaire's voice, lays claim to the universal struggle against oppression, Sartre deduces that Négritude's voice is *ultimately* reducible to a main, overarching historical subject: the proletariat (59). Sartre's analysis, by prioritising a historical definition of Négritude over its anthropological or cultural facets, foreshadowed the subsequent problems and debates surrounding it, simultaneously ontological definition, cultural inventory, *and* emerging from struggle – positing race and undoing it.

Négritude: Between Culture and Politics

The heterogeneity of positions and political tensions surrounding Négritude was never so glaring as during the First Congress of Black Writers and Artists, organised by Présence Africaine in September 1956. Gathering over 60 'delegates', the aim of this three-day congress was to engage a 'dialogue' between black 'men of culture' from Africa, the Caribbean, and the US, re-enacting in an official way the trans-continental groups of interwar Paris. Senghor, Césaire, Achilles, Alexis, Fanon, Hampaté-Bâ, Cook, Wright, amongst others, gave papers and participated in heated debates. But behind its constant invocation, the polymorphous notion of 'culture' proved to be a very unsteady ground for the reunion. The Congress was structured around the idea of an authentic 'African heritage', which was to be unearthed, inventoried, and modernised. But by the time this 'dialogue of civilizations' could finally take place, several delegates and a large part of the public were expecting the speaker to endorse radical anti-colonial positions. The word 'nègre' and its correlate 'négritude' were hardly pronounced during the conference. Senghor, who at the time represented Négritude's canon, presented a paper titled 'The Laws of Negro-African Culture', in which he defined the negro-African civilisation by a set of integrated characters, insisting on its complementarity with European civilisation:

> The negro (nègre) reason does not exhaust things, it does not mould them in rigid schemes, eliminating the juices and the saps; it sticks itself within the arteries of things, it adheres to their rims to dive into the living heart of the real. The white reason is analytical by utilization, the negro reason, intuitive by participation. (Présence Africaine 1956, p. 52)

Several delegates criticised this idealised image of the African civilisation, entirely disconnected from the colonial problem. Césaire's important intervention, 'Culture and Colonisation', constituted a stark opposition to the latter, arguing that the question of black culture was completely unintelligible without reference to colonisation. For Césaire, the issue was not to address colonised people as an *audience* anymore, but as agents and creators. The time to 'illustrate

the presence of black men of culture', as *Présence Africaine* claimed to do, was over. More generally, these proceedings reveal the growing importance of psychology and existential phenomenology, in the mid-1950s, as ways of understanding racism and colonisation. Frantz Fanon's notorious speech – 'Racism and Culture' –contained an implicit critique of Négritude's lack of reflection on their psychological mechanisms as colonial élites. Recalling the themes of the *Cahier,* Fanon's 'Racism and Culture' referred to an *interior struggle* of the colonised with himself, evoking a bloody and painful 'corps-à-corps' between the colonised and his culture, a struggle at the level of his 'being'. In 1956, Fanon had abandoned the upbeat dynamic of 'cultural choices' and situated liberation in both psychic and physical violence, within the concrete experience of liberation struggles.

Négritude After Decolonisation

With Senghor's presidency in Senegal (1960–80), Négritude accessed the status of state discourse, and met its most virulent critiques from among the Antilleans and the newly independent African states. At the 1969 Pan-African Cultural Festival held in Algiers, the Dahomeyan (now Benin) Stanislas Adotévi asserted: 'Négritude is a vague and ineffective ideology. There is no place in Africa for a literature that lies outside of revolutionary combat. Négritude is dead' (Jules-Rosette 2007, p. 276). Similarly, the Haitian communist René Depestre characterised the movement as the 'epidermisation of his [the black's] miserable historical situation' (Depestre 1980, p. 50), and made the brutal claim: 'All these chatters around the concept of négritude are actually defining an inacceptable black Zionism, which means an ideology that, far from articulating itself to a desalinating and decolonization enterprise, is incapable of dissimulating that it is one of the columns supporting the tricks, the traps and the actions of neo-colonialism' (53).

A few years later, the Benin-based philosopher Paulin J. Hountondj developed a criticism of Négritude specifically targeted at its philosophical aspects, which he called 'ethnophilosopy'. To reclaim, he argued, an African way of life as philosophy can only be an external point of view, *about* them and not *by* them, which can only generate an alienated African philosophical literature. Négritude, he wrote, 'has lost its critical charge, its truth. Yesterday it was the language of the oppressed, today it is a discourse of power' (Hountondji 1983, p. 170).

In the wake of these polemics, Négritude scholarship has focused intently on the thorny questions of its lack of political radicalism and on its cultural 'essentialism', seemingly at odds with 1990s paradigms of identity (creolness, hybridity). More recently, the tendency has been to resituate these questions in their historically specific contexts, addressing Négritude's archive as a multidisciplinary resource of study. The crucial role of Jane and Paulette Nardal in launching and inspiring the movement through their use of transnational networks has represented an important step towards reconfiguring Négritude from the point of view of gender critique (Sharpley-Whiting 2002; Edwards 2003). But Négritude has also been increasingly analysed at the level of its philosophical discourse, emphasising its relation to the Western canon (Jones 2010; Bachir Diagne 2011). Emphasising Négritude's historical depth does not mean, however, that it only retains a documentary value. Today, Négritude's truth resides not only in the complex sum of its influences; it has also become, over the years, one of the main foundations of the black radical tradition.

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▶ Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)

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Neocolonialism

Neo-colonialism

Neocolonialism and Transnational Corporations

Neo-extractivism

Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology

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Synonyms

Critique of development economics; Neocolonialism and transnational corporations; Theories of economic development; Washington consensus

This entry explores the ways in which the apologists of imperialism seek to camouflage the true causes of the unequal position occupied by a vast number of developing countries within the system of international capitalist relations. It will be shown that this goal has been achieved through the adoption of a more veiled but equally reactionary theoretical platform that tries to shift the blame for the misfortunes of millions of people in backward countries onto these very same people. Methodologically speaking, the goal of exonerating imperialistic relationships from any responsibility for the backwardness of the former colonies is served by thrusting into the foreground the psychological propensities of people

in developing countries and the institutional failures allegedly arising from their incapacity to conform to market norms. However, the task of providing a "scientific" substantiation of the "irrationality" of people in backward countries and of their "inability" for managing and developing their economies is complemented by the absence of any systematic consideration of the structural processes that have produced the underdevelopment of such countries.

The Essence of Imperialist Ideology and its Reproduction in Mainstream Economics

Imperialist ideology refers to a set of ideas intentionally designed in order to justify, preserve, or strengthen the dominant position of the international monopolies based predominantly in Western Europe, North America, and Japan in many of the economically underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In a bid to conceal that it is the very nature of the penetration of international capital into developing countries that produces new forms of dependency, the ideologues of imperialism exert a great deal of effort to persuade the public that the export of state and private capital, respectively, by imperialist states and their giant monopolies, operates as a type of integrating factor whose historical mission is to accelerate the transfer of equipment, technology, technological experience, and managerial skills. In the apologist narrative of imperialist ideology, this is presumed to narrow the technological and economic gap between advanced capitalist countries and developing ones and to lead to the elimination of the pronounced differences in the rate of economic development and welfare around the world.

The arsenal of modern imperialist ideology which encourages the South's opening up to foreign capital investments is loaded with the weapon of neoliberal economics (monetarist, supply-side, neoclassical policies, neo-institutional theories, etc.). In accordance with Adam Smith's concept of the invisible hand of the market, the advocates of economic neoliberalism believe that, under conditions of free competition, the private

enterprise system guided by the profit incentive automatically directs toward the maximization of the total product and the most effective use of society's productive resources. The absolutization of the potentialities of the free play of market forces for promoting development ultimately serves the goals of the international monopolies, which is that of moving their capital across the globe and placing it in countries with a more favorable business climate. Neoliberal economics is a tool to legitimize imperialist policies designed to intensify the integration of the former colonial periphery into the world capitalist economy with the aim of perpetuating developing countries as profitable spheres for investment. On the one hand, the purpose of neoliberal economists is to remove hesitation on the part of the ruling circles of backward countries who are concerned with the foreign monopolies' penetration into their economies, by fostering the illusion that an "open door" policy is the only means through which to achieve rapid economic growth and raise the living standard of their populations. On the other hand, the goal of the defenders of the imperialist system is to convince the local ruling circles to create a favorable sociopolitical and economical "climate" for large-scale private foreign investments by means of enforcing the polices which preserve the free market system in liberated and emerging countries. Overall, the promotion of the private sector is intended to encourage the creation of a wide network of participation in foreign activities by international monopolies. This entry is structured as follows. The next section of this paper retraces the key historical events that supported the global offensive of the neoliberal ideology which has been disseminated worldwide by US-backed imperialist institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. By starting from the assumption that economic theories are the product of their social, political, and economic settings and the conflictual circumstances in which they are conceived, the section pinpoints the causal nexus between the numerous failure of government-led import substitution industrialization (ISI) growth programs based on Keynesian principles and the ascendency of conservative policy and ideology within leading imperialist countries (what came to

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be known as the "Washington Consensus"), which became the hegemonic model of international development starting in the early 1980s. Neoliberal economics and the apologetic conception of free market presents illustrations of the way in which the theoretical core informing the so-called structural adjustment programs imposed on the former colonies and dependent countries of the Global South by leading international financing institutions since 1980 is derived from basic principles of neoliberal economics. The purpose here is to scrutinize the theoretical foundations underpinning the typical neoliberal arguments regarding the need for a strengthening of the role of the market mechanism at both the national and international levels. Development economics and the ideological defense of imperialism discusses the specific forms of colonization of development economics by neoliberal economic theory. In doing so, it will be argued that the adoption of neoliberal dogmas by development economists fulfils a certain ideological function: it reflects the search by imperialist ideologues for the most effective theories capable of throwing a smoke screen around the true nature of the impact of the privatization of national assets privatization and the extensive inflow of foreign capital into developing countries. The final section concludes with an attempt to pierce the veil of imperialist ideology backed by neoliberal economics.

The Crisis of US-Led Imperialism and the Restructuring of International Economic Relations

The evolution of the explanations provided by economists and the ideologies they are based upon are shaped by the emergence of new practical problems "that are thrown up from a particular social context" (Dobb 1973: 16). In view of this, one can interpret the substantial shifts in Western economic thought away from the orthodox Keynesian doctrine of government economic regulation and toward laissez-faire neoliberalism as a reflection of the aggravation of the crisis in US capitalism and the subsequent changes in international economic relations during the 1970s. The disintegration of the global institutional configuration under which the newly independent countries successfully resisted the diktats of US

imperialism throughout the 1960s until the late 1970s can be traced back to the serious crisis of confidence in the US dollar as the global reserve currency. Such crisis reflected the decline of US global hegemony mainly due to the following factors: the rise of international competitors such as Germany and Japan, the fall of profitability of US firms' investments, the growth of state debt, and the intensification of chronic inflation caused by the actions undertaken by the US government, which continued to print dollars to sustain growth internally and mainly to fund both the war in Vietnam during the late 1960s and the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

In the meanwhile, it became apparent that the practice of state regulation oriented toward the closed economy not only ceased to correspond to the practical task of strengthening the position of American monopolies on both domestic and foreign markets, but was even an obstacle to its execution. It was in this context that the US political and economic leadership under President Carter and the Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, respectively, in a desperate effort to reverse the slide in US power, decided to throw off the shackles of bankrupt Keynesian methods of government regulation in favor of previously discredited monetarist strategies proposed by neoliberal theorists. This process started at the end of the 1970s with a drastic contraction in the money supply and the sharp rise in interest rates, which reached 14–16% in the early 1980s. The monetarist shift in the Federal Reserve's economic policy to stabilize the dollar set up the conditions for an outbreak of the debt crisis in developing countries, to the extent that they found themselves unable to bear the burden of debt repayments, which were issued in US dollars (Brenner 2006: 187–236; Parboni 1981).

This fundamentally restructured the relationship of the United States to the global economy. On the one hand, in the 1980s, US financial institutions re-established their financial power over the world economy, as the "Third-World debt crisis" led to a reversal of private capital flows, which began flowing back to the United States once the IMF stepped in to resolve such crisis in favor of the US international banking monopolies. The lowering of the limit for gaining access to its

resources and the toughening of the terms of credit by the IMF led to a substantial inflow of funds into the US economy (Arrighi 2002: 20; Duménil and Lévy 2004: 90; Vasudevan 2009). The other side of the coin is that underdeveloped countries were left with extremely meager funds to promote their economic growth. By absorbing the developing countries' savings, the developed countries – first and foremost the United States – did not allow poor countries to amass sufficient resources to finance large-scale economic programs that would diversify their economies, thereby setting backward nations on an upward path, taking them from poverty to development. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that, as Western developed capitalist states started to adopt strong "deflationary" and protectionist measures, the demand for raw materials mainly exported by developing countries slowed down in the early 1980s. The response adopted by these countries was to expand their exports all at once, causing a further collapse in the price of their traditional primary materials. As a result, the less-developed countries found themselves in a disastrous situation, as the falling export earnings were eaten by interest payments and the redemption of credits. Many of the Asian, African, and Latin American developing nations could do nothing but contract more and more credits to pay the interest on their debt or repay the existing debt to the international bankers, which caught them in a debt trap that ended up in an inevitable spiral (Nakatani and Herrera 2007). The growing external indebtedness of these countries contributed to a shift in the global balance of power in favor of the United States, as it marked the failure of ISI-based developmental strategies in most backward countries – based on protection, regulation, and state subsidies. The outcome of this process was that "the entire program of action for a new world economic (NIEO) order came up against serious difficulties in the 1980s" (Buzuev 1990: 263).

Imperial Policies and the Rise of Neoliberal Ideology

It is in this context that the global offensive of neoliberalism in practice and of neoliberal ideology in economic theory must be understood. At the Cancun Summit on International Development in 1981, both Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan "killed" the South-backed NIEO idea, calling for a greater reliance on the free market as the vehicle for promoting economic development and fighting poverty (Cypher 2014: 237). Afterward, the United States simply refused to engage in global negotiations, forcing the North-South dialogue to stall. Such actions were applauded by Margaret Thatcher, who suggested that one of the valuable outcomes of Cancun was that it "was the last of such gatherings" (Taylor 2003: 410). Henceforth, she noted, "the intractable problems of Third World poverty, hunger and debt would not be solved by misdirected international intervention, but rather by liberating enterprise, promoting trade – and defeating socialism in all its forms" (Thatcher 1993: 170).

This pro-market philosophy soon became commonly accepted in the influential circles of big Washington-based developmental agencies. According to the new development policy that became codified in what was called the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1993; Babb and Kentikelenis 2017), the reasons behind the developing nation's troubles and the resulting growth in global inequality relied neither on the questionable neoliberal policies of the United States and its allies nor on the prolonged colonial rule imposed by the developed capitalist powers. On the contrary, neoliberal economists and orthodox policy makers sought to shift any responsibility for the disastrous situation fully upon the developing countries themselves and the government-led ISI strategies which they had adopted during the 1970s. These strategies, it was argued, lay at the root of many of the problems of developing economies, including the rent-seeking character of government and government officials, pervasive inefficiencies, misallocation of resources, endemic inflation, decline of primary sector output and exports, high levels of unemployment and informality, unequal distribution of incomes, high poverty rates, and systemic corruption (Moreno Brid and Pérez Caldentey 2010: 404–405).

From this perspective, the solution to the most pressing social, economic, and political problems was to be found in the institutionalization of market relations and, conversely, on a significant cutback of the role of government. Rather than resources,

what developing nations really needed was better organization. The latter was something of a code word that meant, primarily, shifting resources away from the state sector into areas assumed to be of much higher value in the private sector. What poor nations essentially needed was not more capital or infrastructure. Developing nations were advised to not waste their time and resources on creating national, domestic technologies because they could easily obtain them from the West through international trade. Indeed, the "privatization agenda" was complemented by the promotion of "free trade" as the most effective vehicle for forcing Third-World countries to open their markets to foreign goods and foreign direct investment by US multinational corporations.

Under the banner of "free trade," poor countries were urged to dismantle protectionism, minimize domestic restrictions on foreign ownership, and liberalize domestic markets so that state-owned assets (such as mines, manufacturing, electricity generation plants, public transport, and most infrastructures) could be available to foreign capital. These measures would facilitate the attraction of foreign investments by transnational corporations. By providing for an "interdependent" market-economic linkage between developed and underdeveloped countries, foreign investments allegedly constituted the major factor in developing the world economy, insofar as they transfer the most advanced equipment and technology which can be easily assimilated by the local producers.

The standard package of supply-side macroeconomic policies to promote economic growth embodied in the Washington Consensus was actively supported by the internationally competitive economic powers through the two main multilateral agencies – the IMF and the World Bank. The former has for decades imposed neoliberal policies on the vast majority of less-developed economies in the form of so-called structural adjustment programs, consisting primarily of a series of conditions or actions to which the borrowing government must agree before receiving a loan. Such programs were nothing but a punctilious application of the Washington Consensus-type economic policies that were imposed upon 70 developing debtor countries after the change of

the global political climate in the early 1980s. Basically, these programs were the global disciplinarians that would ensure a long-term strategy for commercial banks getting their money back (Bracking 2009: 20), as the conditions attached to IMF loans are usually associated with the demand for developing countries to implement processes of market liberalization, which typically implies the retrenchment of public subsidies on essential needs such as food, water, and other staple products, education, transportation, healthcare, housing, and the like. As the establishment of market pricing usually led to increased prices for basic necessities, these were roundabout ways of taxing the working people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to pay the powerful creditors in the West (Vasudevan 2009: 297; Hossein-Zadeh 2010).

The fund's rescue schemes imposed on dozens of poor Third-World nations also included the currency devaluation to generate trade export, the privatization of national industries, and the liberalization of external trade and capital movements. Overall, these measures had the effect of allowing greater access to domestic markets for the industrialized nations, their banks, and transnational corporations. In this way, productive and financial institutions of the leading countries could buy up the peripheral countries' domestic assets at a very low price. This form of acquisition, other than constituting a kind of repayment for the existing external debt obligations, represented a new way of gaining access to newly created markets in emergent countries while, at the same time, allowing leading international monopolies to maintain controlling positions in the production and exchange of commodities.

The World Bank occupied a hegemonic position in setting the developmental agenda throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s (Fine 2002: 2065). Indeed, the World Bank became the key "maintainer and projector of the neoliberal economic paradigm...and that centers on deregulation, privatization, and financial and trade liberalization" (Broad 2006: 388). With the advent of neoliberalism, the diversity of the World Bank's points of view on the role of the

state in economic development narrowed. Between the late 1970s and the 1980s, about 800 orthodox macroeconomists were hired to replace budding development economists hired during the 1960s and the 1970s. This is considered by one World Bank official to be a type of "economic genocide" for older economists who had been learning about development during the McNamara era (Goldman 2005: 92).

Having virtually silenced all dissent within its ranks, the World Bank cemented a core community of development economists ideologically committed to defending neoliberal orthodoxy. They argued that markets are uniquely suited to allocate resources efficiently and that the best way for individuals to allocate such resources is to expand the sphere of the market. In their view, markets are desirable because they are superior to other social forms of economic and social organization. As such, they made a serious effort to convince the public that there is no alternative to development other than to laissez-faire economic policies. As a consequence, any idea of development outside of the free market economy seems to be prohibited or marginalized at best (Angresano 2007: 41–42).

Neoliberal Economics and the Apologetic Conception of Free Markets

Since the early 1980s, the neoliberal revolution promoted by the global governance institutions in tandem with the governments in the United States and the United Kingdom has been inseparable from neoliberal domination in the field of economics. The neoliberal idea that free markets are the most efficient method of organizing a society is founded upon some theoretical and methodological premises, which can be identified along the following four dimensions of neoliberal economics.

First, the key point of entry of neoliberal economics is the decisions made by people in terms of the theory of *rational choice*, which assumes that everyone is equipped with an inborn and ahistorical rationality which helps him/her to maximize his/her own well-being. He/she is presumed to be a sort of rational computer which mechanically processes "the information

available to weigh the costs and benefits of every action and undertake those that are the most beneficial" (Chernomas and Hudson 2016: 6), irrespective of the socioeconomic organization of society in which he or she is embedded. It is worth noting that the homo economicus is a simple apologia of the capitalist system, as he/she reflects the subjective goals of a capitalist who interacts within a primordial system of pure markets insofar as his/her only goal is to extract the greatest amount of utility (profit) for himself/herself, without regard to the methods employed in the process.

Second, from the individual and his/her rational behavior, neoliberal economic theory defines the meaning of all the social and economic phenomena that it seeks to understand. Neoliberal economics moves from its basic unit of the atomistic, hyper-rational individual to draw inferences on society as a whole by assuming that the whole is the sum of the individual isolated parts. The essential proposition of the theory is that the isolated individual represents the whole of society (in the words of Margaret Thatcher, there is no such thing as society – just individuals). This typifies *methodological individualism*, according to which the explanatory movement is from individuals to society, taking the maximizing behavior of atomistic individuals as given. Accordingly, the behavior of all individuals does not depend on the context in which they operate.

Third, the mechanistic concept of the nature of human beings lies at the heart of the ideology of neoclassical economic theory: when all rational buyers and sellers in the marketplace exchange their resources with the aim of maximizing their individual self-interest, "competition will produce a unique set of prices and quantities that will create a perfect match between the supply and demand" (Herrera 2006). At this point, the economy reaches an inherently harmonious and stable *equilibrium*, which supposedly fully satisfy the needs of all members of society. It follows that deviations from market-based equilibrium are associated with disorder and irrationality (Carchedi 1995: 172; Perelman 2002: 22). Note that the stability of equilibrium crucially depends on the existence of a well-defined system of

property rights. These are mainly defined as the right to use, derive an income from, and sell a resource (an asset). These resources, in turn, are assumed to be scarce. Scarcity of all resources affects individuals' behavior, in the specific sense that it is because resources are scarce that individuals have the incentive to use them more efficiently. The implication is that open access to resources – or more precisely, the absence of markets where property rights are bought and sold – leads to inefficiency and waste of resources. A single-minded advocacy of eroding the system of public ownership and "protecting" the use of resources by means of their privatization is among recent policy reflections of this view. Actually, the assumption in neoliberal economics against state ownership of national assets is that public interference carries the danger of economic inefficiency and stagnation, since it frustrates the spontaneous tendency of the market to reach the equilibrium. As ultraliberal economist Harold Demsetz (1967) argued, the stronger the protection of private ownership, the higher the incentive for individuals to mobilize their resources efficiently to the extent that private property allows individuals to realize the rewards of their investments.

Finally, the concept of equilibrium involves a basic assumption: "all individuals express freely their preferences, without any form of coercion or *power* relation" (Palermo 2016: 83). By completely omitting from the analysis the asymmetrical distribution of property among various classes of society, the competitive market is regarded as an impersonal arena through which buyers and sellers are free to buy and sell whatever they like. As the prices emerge from the "free" interaction of demand and supply, the market price system is therefore elevated to the role of the most equitable allocation system possible, where all individuals can extract equal benefits from the system. It is important to note that the introduction of market imperfections by post-Walrasian economics does not fundamentally challenge the power-free nature of competitive capitalism argued by traditional neoliberal economic models. They all agree that within a perfectly competitive arena, there is no power

relation. In both benchmarks, thus, the true cause of power relations, coercion, non-clearing markets, and allocative inefficiencies is to be found in imperfections (asymmetric information, bounded rationality, uncertainty, historical time, etc.) in the decision-making context that make perfect competition impossible. "Eliminate them, these authors maintain – either implicitly or explicitly – and power relations disappear" (Palermo 2014: 132).

It goes without saying that this is perfectly suited to the neoliberal utopia of market freedom: "if we assume that production is conducted by atomistic agents maximizing their utilities in perfect competition, then market competition controls their behavior and the need for formal social control is minimized" (Dugger 1992: 88). This contributes to impose the view of unregulated capitalism as the only neutral way of regulating social relations on the whole society. Indeed, this core principle forms the basis of the mainstream, neoliberal economist's instinctive position that if a problem arises, then some "anti-market" and/or "monopolistic" forces, typically the trade unions or government, are to blame: the imposition of high corporate taxes kills the capitalist incentive to make new investments; the imposition of high tariffs, quotas, and other forms of barriers aimed at protecting indigenous industries against foreign competition creates costly distortions that end up penalizing exports and weakening the national economy; state support to employment, wages, and social needs creates a free-ride mentality that encourages workers to prefer voluntary unemployment and state assistance rather than to look for work. To put it bluntly, by shifting onto the regulatory activity of the state and other extra-market institutions all the responsibility for unemployment, inflation, and stagnant economic growth, neoliberal economists argue the necessity of dismantling the system of state regulation, curbing social spending, and opening up the economies to foreign investment. To the extent to which the state maintains an economic function, this is reduced to providing the most favorable environment for the functioning of the market system and to increasing the effectiveness of private capital investments.

Development Economics and the Ideological Defense of Imperialism

The previous section has provided a brief account of the core of neoliberal economics, which traditionally deals with an advanced capitalist world of power-free, voluntary, market transactions. This is because advanced countries are presumed to be populated by rational economic agents who exchange private property rights over their resources on the basis of purely individualistic, self-interested considerations and utility calculations. It will not come as a surprise that neoliberal economists have paid particular attention to advanced countries, which are allegedly characterized by automatic price adjustments "and equilibrium outcomes in all product and resource markets" (Todaro and Smith 2011: 7).

One of the most effective instruments in the hand of imperialist ideologues that help them propagate free-market principles and related policy prescriptions to underdeveloped countries is "development economics." Generally speaking, the task of development economics is to clarify:

(a) The reasons behind the lower incomes and living standards in developing countries
(b) The origin of and the machinery perpetuating the sharp economic inequality of different groups of nations in the world
(c) Ways and means of solving the problem of economic backwardness and, as a result, eradicating the economic inequality of states

Since the early 1980s, the analytical tools of neoliberal economic theory discussed above have been amply applied to the field of development, so much so that the theoretical core of neoliberal economics has come to define the core of mainstream development economics. As Todaro and Smith (2011: 25) candidly admit "Development economics is a distinct yet very important extension of...traditional economics," or, as Kanbur (2002: 477) put it, "mainstream development economics today is mainstream economics applied to poor countries." In what follows, it will be examined how the adoption of neoliberal economic tools by development economics has reshaped the way in which academics, policy makers, and leading development institutions understand problems related to development. Development economists take the core tenets of neoliberal economic theory and try to apply them in analyzing the economy of poor countries as well as in devising development and growth strategies.

Firstly, the focus will be on the first two assumptions which have been discussed in the previous section: methodological individualism and rational choice theory. To begin with, once it is recognized that the whole of society must be analyzed largely in terms of isolated individuals and their properties, it follows that the global dynamic of capitalist development is seen as merely the aggregation of national dynamics. The elevation of individualism to the level of the most important methodological principle imposes narrow limits on the subject matter of neoliberal development economics, which is essentially reduced to the identification of internal features of the economically backward countries supposedly underlying their backwardness and economic inequality in the world. For example, Ray (1998: 4) states in his widely adopted textbook, *Development Economics*: "I move away from a long-held view that the problems of all developing countries can be understood best with reference to the international environment of which they are a part." According to this view, "the problems of underdevelopment must first and foremost be seen in a global context. ...but I wish to emphasize equally fundamental issues that are internal to the structure of developing countries." Through this methodological lens, the persistent poverty of developing countries cannot be ascribed to the specific features of economically backward countries themselves, such as incompetent economic policy. This position, therefore, determines the normative function of mainstream development economics, namely, the design of appropriate domestic policies. As succinctly stated by Akbulut et al. (2015: 751), development economics within the contemporary mainstream is reduced to "a mere technical issue that can be resolved through the implementation of the right mechanism."

On the other hand, this individualistic approach, which automatically opens up the

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possibility of resolving problems by purely administrative methods, sanitizes the question of development as this is discursively detached from the system of states in which the world market is embedded, the interdependent but often antagonistic international relations and reproducing mechanisms that shape, constrain, or condition agents' behavior. Poor countries remain poor not because others are rich, but because they have not "done as well." The overlooking of the dynamics of global exploitation, extraction, and dispossession and the relegation of the asymmetrical distribution of property (power) between developed and underdeveloped countries to the periphery of its analytical field is an ideological device used (consciously or not) by neoliberal development economics to propagate the belief that, overall, the capitalist system is an inherently harmonious and egalitarian system. In this framework, all underdeveloped countries need to do is choose the "right" path of capitalist development.

Secondly, the field of development economics has been dominated by the rational-actor model for the past quarter-century. "Despite the abandonment of some of the unrealistic assumptions of the standard neoclassical framework...mainstream development economics unmistakably retains the assumption of homo economicus" (Akbulut et al. 2015: 746). The micro-focus is reduced to the (ir)rational (opportunistic or rent-seeking) choices adopted by the representative individual or individual state, which, however, is also treated as an optimizing individual. Since the theories of development are based on the psychological propensities of individuals or groups of individuals, the engine economic growth and development for all nations must be powered by economically rational subjects. As an important corollary of this, one must note that underdevelopment is reducible to the consequences of the irrational (wrong) decisions undertaken by policy makers and individuals. The issue, in fact, is that "in comparison with the more developed countries, in most less-developed countries, prices often do not equate supply and demand" because at "the individual level, family, clan, religious or tribal considerations may take precedence over private, self-interested utility or profit-maximizing calculations" (Todaro and Smith 2011: 9).

The main argument in such assertion is that the main obstacle to economic development of some countries is the lack of economic rationality, which neoliberal development economics alleges to be innate in the common people of the economically backward countries. Since psychological barriers, conservative habits, religious prejudices, fear of change, and so forth prevent people from behaving in a hyper-rational manner, the spread of the market mechanism over economically backward nations, it is asserted, will overcome the ancient culture of these peoples and, together with this, will induce an entrepreneurial spirit and economic development. Such concerns were exported to adjacent fields such as poverty alleviation and human well-being literature epitomized by the work of Banerjee and Duflo (2005, 2007). The starting point of their analysis is that poor people are poor because they often make poor decisions with harmful consequences. The poor are poor, they say, because "they are reluctant to commit themselves psychologically to a project of making more money" (Banerjee and Duflo 2007: 165). With such theoretical view, Banerjee and Duflo deride poor people on the account that they supposedly undermine their own interests with very high discount rates, that is, the tendency for people to overweight present costs relative to future benefits. Since poor people cannot resist immediate temptation to squander their money on immediate gratification, making the decision to save is put off day after day, and so it is never done. This misbehavior discourages the accumulation of personal savings which, by decreasing the inducement to invest in subsequent periods, inevitably results in depression, unemployment, and poverty. In general, this speculation about poor people's tendency to deter sacrifices creates the impression that, left to their own devices, the poor are victims of their own irrationality, which makes them incapable of planning for the future.

The main conclusion of Banerjee and Duflo's work is that had they properly adopted a profit-maximizing behavior, poor people might have been able to undertake the most forward-looking investments, which could have allowed them to make some progress. As poor decisions make poor people, then neoliberal development

economists' recommendation on this issue boils down to changing people's behavior to bring it into line in every way a with profit-maximizing behavior through the implementation of market system of incentives. Within capitalism, such incentives are generally provided by the liberalization of the labor market and the reduction of unemployment benefits and financial and other forms of assistance from the state after retirement – these being indispensable conditions for motivating individuals to curtail their present consumption relative to planned future consumption.

The proposition that the existence of an explicit system of private property rights is a highly important factor in promoting growth represents the third instance of direct, and effective, invasion of neoliberal economics into the domain of development. Typically, mainstream development economists hold the view that underdevelopment is the inevitable result of the lack of a system of legal sanctions and/or the assurance of legality for the protection of private ownership. Due to the uncertainty in the area of property rights, "in most less developed countries, commodity and resource markets are typically highly imperfect, consumers and producers have limited information, and disequilibrium situations often prevail (prices do not equate supply and demand, emphasis added)" (Todaro and Smith 2011: 8). It is then argued that the state of persistent disequilibrium due to a lack of an explicitly defined system of private property rights makes it difficult for developing countries to make good (efficient) use of the existing scarce productive resources, which prevents their markets from freely spreading or working properly. Following this line of thought, orthodox development economists like Debraj Ray claim that "the irregular, uncertain, and unpredictable nature of land expropriation and transfers, together with the free-rider problems caused by the formation of cooperatives with ill-defined property rights, surely undermined the productivity of Mexican agriculture and caused it to stagnate over a very long period" (Ray 1998: 461).

A similar view is held by leading economists working in the new institutional economics tradition, namely, Acemoglu and Robinson (2010, 2012). In tackling the link between macro-level institutions and national income growth, they argue that poor economic performance throughout the developing world is primarily caused by too much government interference into the functioning of the market. This arbitrary concentration of power in the hands of the government, in turn, leads to the persistence of institutions that are unfit (defined as those that threaten private property), thereby undermining market exchange and posing serious impediments to long-term technological investment and economic growth. For instance, in their discussion concerning the roots of African poverty, Acemoglu and Robinson (2010: 22) point out that "property rights are insecure and very inefficiently organized, markets do not function well, states are weak and political systems do not provide public goods." Then, they go on to say that the greatest threat to property rights and markets is a predatory state in which the government levies high taxes or expropriates land and property. This uncertainty is viewed as one of the basic obstacles to investment and innovation and is the root cause of low productivity and growth.

To sum up, the main argument of neoliberal development economics is that poverty results from the failure to support the development of necessary "market prerequisites," namely, a strong system of property rights and legal regulations. This deprives firms of the opportunity to mobilize the necessary capital, which leads to the paralysis of investment activity and hence underdevelopment. The ultimate cause of such failure relies on oppressive, activist governments that reduce market efficiency and impede economic growth. This view is fully consistent with the neoliberal focus on privatization which originates from the idea that any regime based on strong intervention of the state in the economy is almost universally prone to failure due to its inherent wasteful, inefficient, and costly character (Stewart 2005).

The fourth essential feature of mainstream development economics is its reliance on the neoliberal belief that unfettered markets are necessarily power-free, that is, that there is no inherent asymmetry of power and authority between market agents – be they individuals, firms, or states.

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This premise determines the interpretation given to development issues: economic development is being held back because of enduring power relations that arise from imperfections in the working of market competition. Such imperfections, which are always related to the subjective nature of individuals (their irrational economic behavior), are conducive to numerous market failures that hinder the full deployment of factors of production in developing countries. Since market transactions in underdeveloped countries are inefficient due to various types of failures and imperfections, development economics must therefore focus on the specific conditions which will re-establish market efficiency. As Ray (1998: 4) points out, "the point is to understand the conditions under which they (markets in developing countries, emphasis added) fail or function at an inefficient level and to determine if appropriate policies grounded in an understanding of these conditions can fix such inefficiencies...Few people would disagree that these considerations lie at the heart of many observed phenomena." In a similar vein, Todaro and Smith (2011: 8) suggest that development economics "must be concerned with the economic, cultural, and political requirements for effecting rapid structural and institutional transformations of entire societies in a manner that will most efficiently (that is, at the lowest cost and highest profit, emphasis added) bring the fruits of economic progress to the broadest segments of their populations." The passages quoted above are enough to show that the contemporary mainstream in development economics is about "getting policy right," that is, fixing market imperfections which, in turn, will speed the creation of those "market-friendly" institutional environments most favorable to capital accumulation. A concrete example of this approach can be found in orthodox development economists' treatments of "globalization," which is presented in the most favorable light with the intention to convince relatively underdeveloped countries that they should dismantle protectionist barriers to make foreign monopoly capital welcome in every possible way.

Within mainstream development economics itself, the idea of market inefficiency caused by various forms of market failures has recently been used to justify discretionary state intervention in the economy. In this framework, the state is conceptualized as one that intervenes, often extensively, to resolve problems that the spontaneous market itself endangers but is unable to resolve. It is worth noting that the reinvention of the nature of the state in efficiency terms and the search for the best ways to deal with market imperfections went hand in hand with the transition from the Washington to the post-Washington Consensus spearheaded by Joseph Stiglitz after his appointment as chief economist at the World Bank in the late 1990s. At least in principle, this is more state-friendly and less pro-market than the previous neoliberal Washington Consensus, "as it emphasizes the significance of market and institutional failings and their correction through state intervention as the key to developmental success" (Ashman et al. 2010: 28). Nevertheless, this definition of the problem provides a narrow perspective on the concept of the state. In fact, by using the Pareto efficiency principle as a driving factor in governance decisions, the state is reduced to an alternative, nonmarket institution that intervenes every time the market fails to allocate resources efficiently with the aim of improving economic efficiency by correcting such market failures.

This approach is a methodological device used by neoliberal development economists to launch their own version of state regulation of the development process. Here, the regulatory activity of the state is restricted to "intervention on behalf of capital" (Saad-Filho 2003: 9), for example, to the opening up of the national economy to international trade and foreign investment by international private corporations. Other forms of state intervention to stimulate private capital accumulation are the limitation of trade unions' rights, which gives private capital unlimited freedom of action in the labor market, and the assumption by the state of the burden of insuring international capital against the commercial and political risks connected with possible revolutionary perturbations and/or the upsurge of anti-imperialist movement in emerging countries. In brief, such an understanding of the economic role of the state provides an ideological cover for the promotion

and strengthening of capitalist relations within developing countries' borders. This ultimately reflects the interests of international capital, insofar as it improves the conditions for extracting the greatest possible profit for minimal initial investment by foreign corporations.

Critique and Conclusion

A major trait of neoliberal economics, especially that branch which studies the problem of the development of economically underdeveloped countries, concerns its attempt to arm the supporters of imperialism with new tools for applying various forms of pressure within developing countries. Under the flag of the "free market system," neoliberal economists have, in fact, launched an offensive on an unprecedented scale aimed at extending the freedom of entrepreneurial activity throughout the world and discrediting the idea of public ownership of the means of production (and/or central planning) as the basis of economic development. The typical neoliberal argument regarding the need for the dismantlement of the system of state regulation and the privatization of public assets is nothing more than an ideological cover for weakening the economic and political position of developing countries. This primarily serves the multinational corporations' aim of extending the ability to relocate investments at the level of the entire world capitalist economy. This point is attested to by the active use of free market policy principles addressed primarily to developing countries and designed to clear the way for the relaxation of trade and foreign direct investment restrictions and the opening of capital markets.

The approach taken by neoliberal development economists in analyzing factors determining economic development, and the laws and categories expressing these factors, is an extremely important criterion in penetrating the significant influence of imperialist ideology on backward economies. To a decisive extent, the adoption of abstract models claimed to be applicable both in developed and underdeveloped countries forms the principal characteristic of the methodology of neoliberal economic theories of the economic development of backward countries. The predominant use of an individualistic methodology must be seen as a form of ideological practice, whose precise function is to mask the economic essence of contemporary imperialism, namely, the maintenance of a dominant position by international private capital over all modern industrial sectors of developing countries, where conditions for extracting monopolistically high profits are favorable. In an attempt to hide the exploitative nature of imperialism, neoliberal development economists who dominate major academic institutions and intergovernmental organizations claim that underdevelopment is a result of a diversity of internal, accidental causes which supposedly could be eliminated by the expansion of the scope of the market and the simultaneous retrenchment of government intervention in economic matters.

The bankruptcy of neoliberal theories of economic development is confirmed by the historical experience of all countries where these have been applied. First, the neoliberal dogma that economic development can only be achieved on the basis of the private ownership of the means of production and market competition in the pursuit of individual profits is dangerously disconnected from reality. As a matter of fact, the historical paths of currently developed countries support the evidence that the governments of these nations played a major role in all aspects of their development – ranging from public health, education, and other social measures to the creation of the most important inventions (Chang 2002; Mazzucato 2013). This suggests that the very specifics of the problem of overcoming economic backwardness and of winning economic independence compel the governments of developing countries to invest large sums in those branches of the national economy in which the criterion of current profitability does not play a substantial role in guiding individual behavior: public health, universal education, housing, transport, working environment, social security, and so forth. The social results achieved on the basis of these "unproductive" investments create material conditions for securing the growth of people's

creative potential and physical powers which, in turn, "serve as the prerequisites for the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and the growth of productivity of social labor and national income" (Vainshtein 1974: 8).

Directly related to this point is the need to channel public funds to new branches of production which demand more sophisticated technology. As a matter of fact, government funding normally contributes to foster innovation due to the fact that private business is extremely reluctant to finance new investment projects because of the lack of a clearly defined relationship between these expenditures and companies' profitability. This implies the need to make large-scale state-led investment in R&D which encompasses massive outlays on powerful new equipment and costly structures such as laboratory buildings, experimental plants, testing grounds, and computational centers equipped with computers – along with public investment in new scientific institutions and in the formation and training of scientists and highly qualified specialists. As before, the scale of these expenditures requires a departure from the criterion of current profitability, insofar as "it can be determined only on the basis of a general consideration of prospects for the development of the national economy as a whole" (Kollontai 1970: 11). In other words, objective circumstances frequently demonstrate the inadequacy of market competition and profit-driven entrepreneurship as a method of stimulating innovation and development.

Second, the "theoretical" arguments advanced by neoliberal economics to present free trade as the most important vehicle for closing the gap in living standards between advanced economies and the rest of the world are neither supported by historical facts nor take into account the question of real economic power which is closely connected to the ownership problem. On the one hand, the widespread adoption of neoliberal economic programs during the 1980s and 1990s, which were meant to ensure the liberalization of trade and capital movement (along with fiscal austerity and privatization), to a large extent failed to support the convergence of the global income gap between developed and developing countries

(Chossudovsky 1997; Milanovic 2016). Since the start of the wave of market liberalization in the mid-1980s until 2005, the less-developed economies' share of total world income stagnated at 22% even as its share of world population has grown. As a consequence, the income per capita received by three-quarters of humanity fell over that period. In US dollars, while income per person in advanced countries rose from 18,088 to 26,201, in the rest of the world, it fell by around 30% – from its 1980 peak of 1690 to its 2000 trough of 1160 (Freeman 2004: 47), leaving a surplus of people living in extreme poverty.

On the other hand, the failure of neoliberal economics (and the free-trade policies promoted under this banner) to adequately address the fundamental question of development is not accidental but is the inevitable manifestation of its methodology, which ignores the asymmetrical distribution of power in society, which is determined by the asymmetrical distribution of the property of the means of scientific and technological production. Casting aside property relations, neoliberal economic science provides an apologetic treatment of the economic operations of transnational corporations, where their foreign investments are understood as a neutral channel that freely transfers technology from economically advanced to poor countries, thereby raising the technical level of their production and contributing to technological convergence.

This view entirely neglects or glosses over the fact that the dominant relations of ownership of the means of scientific production and abundant supply of skilled labor in imperialist countries give transnational corporations the opportunity to distort the mechanism of global competition to serve their own ends. Although the "the results of scientific labor (new technologies, emphasis added) are potentially accessible to all countries, individuals and groups of people [. . .], under capitalism, monopoly of scientific knowledge emerges" (Anchishkin 1987: 204). The massive availability of financial resources, in fact, allows transnational corporations to concentrate scientific and research work and centralize the most qualified labor power in their headquarters. The results of scientific work performed by such

skilled and technical personnel are manifested in the development and introduction of more sophisticated technology, which becomes the source of higher labor productivity. By lowering the unit production cost, labor productivity gains create mounting opportunities for increasing investment in new technology to be incorporated in new means of production, thereby further strengthening the monopoly power of transnational corporations vis-à-vis technological laggards.

Developing countries' position on the technological marketplace is far more complex. As a direct legacy of the recent colonial past, these countries are extremely limited not so much in the availability of material resources, as in the supply of creators of scientific ideas, engineering specialists with higher qualifications, and networks of scientific research institutions (Skorov 1970; Wood 1995; Lall 2001; Gürak 2015). The acute shortage of educated and skilled human resources armed with modern scientific knowledge, experience, and professional skills makes developing countries even more dependent from an economic point of view. In fact, the formation of numerous science and technology gaps implies the uneven use of the economic effect of science, meaning that not only science-intensive products and scientific up-to-date equipment but also scientific and technological patents, technical know-how, and so on have to be imported on an ever-large scale by less-developed countries. This allows industrially developed countries to remain the main source of obtaining technology to such an extent that they have the power of making more rigid the condition of technology acquisition by developing countries.

Besides selling technology to the developing countries selectively (e.g., blocking access to latest technology) and with many restrictions, this also offers international monopolies the opportunity to make local producers frequently pay for the technology in excess of its actual cost. This has varying effect. On the one side, this technological rent is used by giant monopolies in imperialist countries to buttress their position. The other side of the coin is that the payment of new technology imported on unfavorable terms means a colossal squandering of developing countries'

financial resources that could instead be used to support a country-wide scientific and technological policy for the sake of national interests. In any event, it must be noted that, even if the dissemination of scientific information through a complete liberalization of intellectual property rights was possible, there is another and perhaps more crucial factor that constrains the free flow of technology and knowledge. This is represented by the relative territorial stability of the labor force and/or the imposition of restrictions over people's ability to move across borders. The relative immobility of labor (often enforced through various forms of political coercion) "leads to stable differences in the scientific and technical levels of individual branches of production, regions and entire countries" (Anchishkin 1987: 35). In a nutshell, the ability to compete of technologically latecomers in the developing world is structurally constrained by the asymmetric distribution of material resources, differences in the availability of skilled labor within the international capitalist system, and restrictions over the form of the its mobility.

International monopolies take maximum advantage of their monopoly power over the most advanced technology to penetrate new markets and sectors and participate in the capital of developing countries' private firms to acquire control over them. Due to their financial and technological inferiority, domestic firms are confined to low value-added activities which are typically of a dependent nature such as export-oriented subsidiaries. These supply-oriented enterprises, which widely employ low-paid female labor as well as the labor of teenagers and children, are chiefly engaged in the production of component parts for Western and Japanese multinational corporations that are not able to yield a maximum rate of return on domestic investments. That is to say that, given the dominant capitalist relationships and the asymmetrical levels of technological development in the world today, the imposition of economic policies based upon the principles of laissez-faire provides international monopolies hidden opportunities for preventing the most up-to-date branches of their economies from emerging and effectively competing on both the internal and world market (Chufrin 1982).

To conclude, the transfer of technology is more than merely a material process influencing production. It is a process that also influences the development of social relations, to the extent that foreign monopolies, which have control over global scientific and technical potential and financial flows, stimulate the local development of dependent forms of capitalism by adapting the industrialization of newly free nations to their own interests. The current practice of imperialist relations impedes the worldwide spread of scientific and technological progress, which in turn inhibits the full development of emergent states' productive forces. It is precisely this form of dependence in science and technology (and the unequal international division of labor that follows) which prevents emergent states from building truly independent national economies and liberating themselves from the financial bondage of imperialism.

Cross-References

▶ Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law

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Neoliberalism and Education in the Global South: A New Form of Imperialism

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Neoliberalism · Imperialism · Global South · Chile · Brazil · South Africa

Introduction

In the last decade of the twentieth century, many authors commented on the new economic, cultural, and political system being implemented worldwide, which emerged after the crises and fall of socialism: that is to say, neoliberalism. According to Connell (2013, p. 100), this system has an economic and social agenda to be implemented in every society, to be achieved under the auspices of a free market. This agenda turns neoliberalism into not merely a simple set of economic policies; rather, as Miraftab (2009, p. 34) notes, it should be understood as a *network of policies, ideologies, values and rationalities*, and certainly some of these are disarticulated and contradictory – however, it aims to encompass all peoples, institutions, and culture itself. This means that educational policies are an important part of this system, and it is one of the areas that policy-makers are keen to implement changes (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001). In this light, we understand that this question must be answered: *What is the impact of changes in education being implemented by neoliberal policies in the Global South?*

The Rise of Neoliberalism as a New Form of Imperialism

Characterized by cutting taxes, curbing public budgets, privatization of the public assets, commodification of relationships, banking system deregulation, and flexibilization of labor laws, neoliberal policies started to be implemented with vigor in the 1980s by Margareth Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States. However, some authors maintain that the very first experience with this kind of social-political-economic model was implemented in Chile under General Augusto Pinochet, who through a coup d'état, took power by force, murdering President Salvador Allende on the 11th of September 1973 (Stiglitz 2006; Klein 2007; Carvajal Diaz 2017; Vásquez and Olavarría 2014). During Pinochet's government, some Chilean economists who had studied at the University of Chicago started to define economic policies for the country. These economists were known as the "Chicago Boys" and were responsible for that which Milton Friedman called "The miracle of Chile" (Friedman 1994).

Milton Friedman and Friedman Friedrich Von Hayek are the two most important thinkers of neoliberal ideology, and their works during the 1980s–1990s became a showcase to the New World Order. It could be said that this was an orchestrated reaction from the right, against the continuous failures of left-wing governments in managing the economy successfully and which ultimately led to a backlash against workers', women's, children's, and minority groups' entitlements and rights. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, the United Kingdom was often called the "sick man of Europe" due to its poor economic performance when compared to its peers (e.g., in 1967, the pound was devalued; 1973/1974, the period of the Three-Day Week; 1976, the IMF has to bail out the country; and 1978/1979, the Winter of Discontent). So the failures of the left provided fertile ground for the right to implement its new agenda.

It is arguable that the great beneficiaries of these changes are business owners that take advantage and profit from the situation because governments, worldwide, refrain from stablishing more rules, constraints, and overview procedures, on the production, distribution, access, and consumption of goods and services (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001, p. 273) – and we would add that some governments have in fact done

away with these. Under the discourse of "less government," private capital takes over services that before were considered functions and part and parcel of the state, such as electricity, communication, transportation, healthcare, and education. Thus, while in classical liberalism it is understood that the state must stay out of market relationships, but ensuring security and the basis for free enterprise, in neoliberalism the state becomes a servant of the private sector. This is so because under neoliberalism, the state must open all sectors to the free market, should deregulate through legislation the use of natural resources, must flexibilize labor laws, and needs to build infrastructure, or be open for companies to do it, so to support private enterprise (McMurtry 1999, p. 58; p. 6). On the servitude of the state to the market, Olssen and Peters (2005, p. 314) affirm that this relationship is, from the dominant part's point of view, *a positive conception of state's role in creating the appropriate market by providing the conditions, laws and institutions necessary for its operation*. And McLaren and Farahmandpur (2001, p. 285) corroborate this thesis, maintaining *that whereas state power can be used in the interests of the large multinational corporations, it cannot be employed in the interest of the working-class*. Accordingly, those who defend neoliberalism become willing servants of the market, understanding that the state should be free of ideologies and that this will make the nation more democratic.

Henceforth, within the neoliberal system, some forms of citizen's participation are stimulated, while others are criminalized. The World Bank's document *Social Capital: The Missing Link?*, published on April 1998, endorsed actions that help the poor to live with inequalities, but the same publication manifested its disagreement with any kind of movements that fights against these inequalities (World Bank 1998). By taking this position, this institution, one of the most influential in the organization and definition of public policies worldwide, empties the political and democratic dimension of social relationships under the discourse of free enterprise, personal merit, and naturalization of inequalities. According to Miraftab (2009, p. 39), the neoliberal system accepts some types of public action

and citizen's participation, but just those that do not challenge the system; he says: "They celebrate grassroots and their collective actions selectively, applauding those that help the poor cope with inequality, while criminalizing the others. Planning practices that celebrate inclusive planning through citizens' participation yet remain uncritical of the complexities of inclusion and resistance in the contemporary neoliberal era are complicit in the binary misconception of civil society and public action." Thus, questioning the neoliberal system, its understanding of human freedom and of democracy, becomes difficult (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001, p. 273), especially for those from disadvantaged backgrounds who are prevented from conceiving of a life beyond the limits set by the "free market."

However, it is important to note that these policies are implemented differently in parts of the world. As Connell (2013, p. 101) notes, in the Global North, neoliberalism dismantled the welfare state, the system based on a state-regulated capitalism, and basic services that were stablished after World War II, and in the Global South, neoliberalism *dismantled the strategy of autonomous economic development, and broke up the social alliances around it*. It puts pressure on developing economies through multinational companies, financial help, trade agreements, and so forth, stablishing an international relationship based in dichotomy between the center (i.e., developed countries) and its periphery (i.e., developing countries).

Neoliberalism, thus, is a new manifestation of imperialism (Kaščák and Pupala 2011, p. 148) that amplifies the concentration of wealth among people and countries. It is a form of imperialism because it seeks to affirm its own truth as the unique truth, not only in the economic sphere but also in all spheres of life, individual, and social. According to Grenier and Orléan (2007), in 1979, Foucault affirmed that this new kind of liberalism, which was beginning at the time, was not just economic and political choice but was also a way of being and thinking. Indeed, it is possible to find in Foucault's writings the following sentence on (neo)liberalism: "It is also a method of thought... It is up to us to create liberal utopias, to think in a liberal mode... Liberalism

must be a general style of thought, analysis, and imagination" (Foucault 2008, pp. 218–219). In this way, neoliberalism is a new kind of meta-narrative (i.e., it creates all the dispositive for the narrative to be realized, fulfilled), and it is perhaps one of the most influential we have seen in our time. The success of neoliberalism as a dominant approach in almost all areas, trade, finance, work, and culture is because, on the one hand, the twentieth century experienced a number of ideological crises that compromised some utopic understandings of reality and their metanarratives and, on the other hand, because neoliberalism does not portray itself as a utopia to be realized in the future but as the truth. As such, it depoliticizes relationships, between individuals and countries, portraying them as mere market relationships, in which everything is exchanged as a commodity. Kaščák and Pupala (2011, pp.149–150) comment:

> The neoliberal metanarrative thus represents a totality of a variety of discursive and non-discursive practices, which often operate disparately, subliminally and diversely. It is not a homogenous ideology, but rather a number of heterogeneous discourses and measures, which ultimately converge and strengthen one another.

It is for this reason that neoliberalism is today that which Foucault called "episteme," a way of thought that shapes the foundations of social reality. This "new episteme" seeks to convince individuals in all possible ways that any opposition to it is a waste of time, a feeble and irrelevant attempt in the face of the social-political and economic processes.

This can be clearly seen in the neoliberal takeover of international financial institutions, such as International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the 1980s, when developing countries in need of aid were put under the Structural Adjustment Programs that aimed to stablish deregulated markets, guaranteeing advantages to companies (e.g., low-wage regimes, loose environmental legislation, consumer market, and so forth). However, it is also undeniable that neoliberal policies have had an impact in developed countries too, generating not merely new forms of dynamics within the metropole but "in the relation between metropole and periphery" (Connell 2013, p. 100), between Global North and Global South.

According to McLaren and Farahmandpur (2001, p. 281), the process leading to the disappearance of the working class in developed countries needs to be understood alongside the reappearance of assembly lines in China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, and elsewhere, where there are fewer restrictions to profit-making. In addition, under the discourse of "minimum state," which gained further support after financial and budget crisis, countries have been forced to implement austerity policies, opening more space to private enterprise. It is arguable that the result of these austerity policies in the Global South was the collapse of economic security and public services, currently experienced by Argentina and Turkey but also to a lesser extent by Brazil and South Africa – in the Global North this was perhaps less acute. These policies are always implemented through a discourse advocating the good use of public money. Further, it is possible to add that, by and large, devalued jobs in developed countries are currently being done by immigrants and are not desired by unemployed citizens born in these countries – in turn, this seems to have led to an increase of xenophobia and the rise of the far-right. Thus, the outcome of Structural Adjustment Programs, imposed by the financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank on developing countries seeking aid, as well as the self-imposed restrictions implemented by other emerging economies, has caused the public sector to shrink, wages to be frozen in the public sector, deregulation of economic and work relationships, cutting taxes or taxes breaks, and dependence on international capital linked to a requirement of strict inflation controls and national debt servicing as the top priority (Connell 2013, p. 101). Yet according to Connell (2013, p. 101):

> The commodification of services and the privatization of public sector agencies demands institutional and cultural change. The profit-seeking corporation is promoted as the admired model for the public sector, and for much of civil society too. Schemes of organization and control are imported from business to public institutions. In an 'audit society', public institutions have to make themselves auditable, on a model imported from business accountancy.

As a way of thought, neoliberalism needs to control the educational discourse to inculcate its

values in children and young people, particularly with regard to individual success (self-determination) and freedom of choice in the marketed relations between the individual and others. Pongratz (2006, p. 474) corroborates this when stating that *schooling and further education, educational institutions and social work are gathered together in a strategic complex which aims to recode relations of power on the basis of a new neo-liberal topography of the social*. Within this thinking, failure and poverty are blamed on the individuals because "they are too lazy, ignorant, unskilled" (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001, p. 276). It is a perfect strategy because the system has conveniently taken no responsibility toward an individual's living conditions while advocating that it is possible to overcome hard conditions, and this is only achieved by those that are obedient to the market and are enterprising. As neoliberalism seeks to stablish itself as the truth, the educational field becomes one of the most important ones within this project: it is necessary to prepare people to conform to a New World Order, an order under the government of free market.

The Neoliberal Concept of Education

As is the case in the economic and social fields, neoliberal actions in the educational field can be rather fluid. Generally speaking, in the economic and social spheres, it is possible to affirm that the fragmentary characteristic of neoliberal policies is a very convenient strategy that allows the system to adapt itself in the face of resistance and crisis. According to Pongratz (2006, p. 475), with a fragmentary discourse and partial reforms, neoliberalism managed, step by step, to stablish a centralized control of education, a new metanarrative that is a new way of governance of the school sector. Pongratz (2006, p. 477) refers to Foucault and affirms that the strategy of "soft power" by competition, rankings, and disputes for status stablishes a form of control based on self-control that is allied to the idea of personal responsibility for success or failure. This is connected to the discourse of democratization and improvement of academic standards, as well as an attempt to disguise non-egalitarian relationships between

those within educational processes. The ideal citizen in the neoliberal era is the one who accepts the system and internalizes the self-responsibility and self-control ideals.

With a veneer of freedom and democracy, the kind of education supported by neoliberalism is a deeper manifestation of normalizing education. Gur-Ze'ev (2001, p. 332) commented on this and stated that "normalizing education is founded on such an unchallenged consensus and is committed to security its self-evidence." Normalizing education does not just introduce a set of values, but it also establishes and naturalizes what it considers to be relevant and valid and, consequently, what is irrelevant and non-valid; that is, those concepts that reinforce the normalizing ideology are considered as being true, and those concepts that question the normalizing ideology are considered as untrue (Gur-Ze'ev 2007, p. 164). Through a series of standardized tests and rankings, among which the most important for basic education is the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), normalizing education, as set by the neoliberal project, establishes what should be taught in schools and communicates the results of evaluation processes so to praise or shame schools and educational systems. In this way, it pressures schools and educational systems to organize the curriculum, practices, teacher education, and so forth, in accordance with its own initiatives, such as PISA, heralded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) for its member countries or for any other country that wishes to join the organization. According to Pongratz (2006, p. 472), the OECD included PISA in their framework for global politics and economic agenda since 2000; and in general terms, PISA's aims for education are very neoliberal in nature, since they aim at the "implementation of private sector management principles in the public sector, restructuring of education and research institutions according to business principles, introduction of market and management elements to all process levels" (Pongratz 2006, p. 472).

Thus, in education, the normalizing characteristics of neoliberal policies mean that we must direct efforts toward human capital development.

In order to achieve this, it is common to use the values and practices of humanist traditions and, even, from critical pedagogy but certainly without an effective critical perspective and disregarding its transformative social drive; that is, these are emptied of their original meanings. Further, active learning and collaborative environment – something borrowed from constructivist psychology – are some of the most cherished concepts used by the neoliberal pedagogical perspective to attenuate the emphasis on competition and individual success (Carter and Dediwalage 2010). According to Kaščák and Pupala (2011, p. 150), neoliberalism is very ingenious in trying to connect various strands, which normally is to be seen as being at odds with it, which are used for human capital development and the normalization of individuals. Pongratz (2006, p. 473) corroborates this:

> Seen in this way, PISA can be seen as a nodal point in a disciplinary network, using an extensive arsenal of partly familiar, partly innovative modes of intervention. This apparatus extends from new modes of administration through budgeting, sponsoring and privatisation to certification, centralised performance control, creditpoint systems, Total Quality Management, and not least, PISA. In a certain sense it remains irrelevant whether one supports the new reforms (more selection, more encouragement of elites, more performance, more competition, more control) or their philanthropic opponents (more self-organisation, more individual profiles, more (school) autonomy, more (self) responsibility, more democratic participation). In each case one can see a disciplinary strategy at work in the wake of the current educational reforms.

This means that the individual is, at the same time, a victim and an enthusiastic supporter of this kind of education because, in principle, anyone can be successful and anyone can become rich, and this only depends on the individual's performance and efforts; that is to say, it is the individual's responsibility. As Connell (2013, p. 109) points out, the internal base of values and technical knowledge promotes a sense of satisfaction that hampers any criticism of the system. There is a complex combination between external- and self-subjection and external- and self-control characterizing the neoliberal restructuring of educational systems (cf. Pongratz 2006, p. 479). As Olssen and Peters (2005, p. 314) affirm, while in the classical

liberalism the individual is characterized as practicing freedom, in neoliberalism, as a faithful and obedient servant of the system, the individual seeks to create a competitive entrepreneur. Thus, the individual's interests in a world of a free market, of free enterprise, and of competition are understood as the only possible option. In this context, the instrumentalization of knowledge is favored, and, very often, some disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, and art are understood to be irrelevant, being gradually withdrawn from the curriculum because they are conceived as being of no importance in a competitive world. According to Peters (2001, p. 66), "The curriculum must also be redesigned to reflect the new realities and the need for the highly skilled flexible worker who possesses requisite skills in management, information handling, communication, problem solving, and decision making. As the metanarrative has grown it has also been transformed to encompass a new emphasis on regional educational standards." Similarly, as Connell (2013, p. 109) says, "Corporate interests globally have mounted a fierce and well-funded attack on science when scientific findings challenge profit-making."

Without opposition, educational institutions tend to become themselves a market-orientated service (Pongratz 2006, p. 479), and with all concerns directed at it, education becomes, in theory and practice, a product, a good, or, better, a commodity. Connell (2013, p. 109) notes that this leads to the development of a "corporate identity," a "corporate behavior," and a "corporate design" within a "permanent quality tribunal" that stablishes and intensifies competition among teachers, students, schools, and universities. The university is no more an institution for producing and sharing knowledge but instead becomes an institution for profit-making. As a commodity, the neoliberal conception supports a ranking system between schools so to establish a criterion for parents to choose which schools their children should attend. This system shows parents the right place for their children (Campbell and Sherington 2006). In perfect accordance with the market perspective, within this discourse the school becomes a service provider and parents become costumers. In some countries, it also favors private schools

within this "educational market" through a voucher system; that is, the government pays for places in private schools and universities instead of investing in improving and expanding the public sector. This means that families from disadvantaged backgrounds, largely unable to compete for places in elite schools, must place their children in public schools, which normally direct their curriculum toward technical training aimed at occupying less prestigious posts in the labor market. The exception to this are some of the more prestigious public schools that establish a rigorous selection system that in fact hinders the enrolment of students from a disadvantaged background, who do not achieve good results in the selective processes (Connell 2013, p. 103). Thus, education becomes a privilege.

The Imperialist Neoliberal Reforms in the Global South's Education

The term Global South refers to those countries primarily located in subtropical or tropical ecosystems (Karlsson 2002, p. 54) and that were, in the past, colonized by European countries or indirectly by the United States. This might be an oversimplification, as there is great diversity among these countries and in the kind and level of neoliberal policies implemented by them. However, it can be clearly perceived that, in general terms, under a discourse of modernization, in the Global South, "an entitlement to political and social rights does not necessarily guarantee substantive rights to livelihood" (Miraftab 2009, p. 40). Miraftab (2009, pp. 40–41) comments:

> that in this neoliberal moment the hypocrisy of modern citizenship can be most clearly observed in the global South. In the liberal democracies of the global North, citizens experience the pretence of neoliberal capitalism through the shrinking of the public sphere and some infringement on civil liberties. In the global South, however, for example in Brazil and South Africa, new found universal citizenship rights are starkly contradicted by the material inroads on citizens' lives made by neoliberal capitalism. Their political citizenship and abstract formal rights have expanded, yet simultaneously their economic exploitation and the abdication of public responsibility for basic services continue, and their livelihood erodes. In societies that have emerged from a colonized legacy, 'citizens have gained rights they cannot eat!'. (Mifaftab 2009, pp. 40–41)

In the light of our argument thus far, let us look at some concrete examples in the Global South: Chile, Brazil, and South Africa. As already mentioned, Chile was the first country to experience "neoliberal reforms," which happened in the 1970s. Other developing countries in the Global South followed suit and liberalized their trading and external capital regime under guidelines, or determinations, of IMF and World Bank, especially during the 1990s. Even countries governed by left-wing parties implemented a reduction of taxes and conducted the privatization of public companies, which is something in accordance with the Washington Consensus (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001, p. 280) and the logic of the market (Connell 2013, p. 102). (The Washington Consensus is a term coined in 1989 by John Williamson, a British economist working at the Institute for International Economics, a think tank based in Washington, D.C., and it is a set of ten points that should be implemented by countries facing economic and financial crises (cf. Williamson 1989). Thus, Chile served as an "experiment" and a "showcase" for other countries in the Global South.

In 1973, after a coup d'état, Augusto Pinochet established a right-wring dictatorship in Chile and under the guidance of the Chicago Boys opened the country to the world market, privatized public assets, and implemented changes in the educational system as public universities started charging tuition fees (González and Espinoza 2011, p. 95). According to Assaél Budnik et al. (2011, p. 306), Esquivel Larrondo (2007, p. 42), and Redondo (2005, p. 103), it is very common to refer to this educational reform in Chile as "the educative market experiment" because it was done during the dictatorship period, without dialogue and without any empirical evidence; it was based on the dictums of Friedman's and Hayek's theories.

In this connection, it is important to note that until the beginning of the 1980s, there was a public educational system which served about 90% of enrolments in basic education (Assaél Budnik et al. 2011, p. 307); however, around this time, Pinochet started an educational reform based on four pillars: (1) a new regulation system

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for education, (2) the creation of a management model for formal education that introduced new agents as stakeholders, (3) a new way for school funding through vouchers or portable subsidies to students, and (4) the restructuring and privatization of higher education. These pillars are still in place, even after almost 40 years (Assaél Budnik et al. 2011, pp. 307–308; Falabella 2015, p. 703; Inzunza et al. 2011).

Further, under the discourse of the failure of the state as an education provider, Chile adopted the discourse that education is the responsibility of the family, and as a consequence of this, education stopped being understood as a social right (Ruiz 2010; Falabella 2015, p. 704). Primary and secondary educations are still mandatory and funded through a system of vouchers that covers about 92% of students, who attend public schools. According to González and Espinoza (2011, p. 96), the cost of private education is very high, approximately 5000 dollars per year, and because of this, only 8% of young people are able to attend private institutions. The national curriculum was revised, and as Falabella (2015, p. 705) affirms, there was an alliance between neoliberals and conservatives; that is, between a Christian view of the world and the market logic, which established a "minimum curriculum," with a "humanistic and Christian" character, to form, as the dictator Pinochet wrote, "good works, good citizens and good patriots" (*our translation*; cited in Falabella 2015, p. 705) Thirty years have passed since the end of the dictatorship period, and no changes to these structural pillars have been made by democratic governments (Assaél Budnik et al. 2011, p. 308; Falabella 2015, p. 707; Carrasco et al. 2013; Garcia Huidobro et al. 2014; Herrera et al. 2015).

The government is responsible for the assessment and publication of rankings so that families are able to choose schools for their children. This assessment is done by standardized tests, such as PISA, which is done under the National System for the Measurement of the Quality of Education. This system seeks to introduce competition between schools, because the best ranking schools become the most sought after by parents, and, therefore, they are those who receive most money, either from the families themselves or

from the state through the voucher system (Assaél Budnik et al. 2011, p. 310). According to Garcia Huidobro et al. (2014) and Herrera et al. (2015), underlying the discourse of educational reform is the implementation of traditional pedagogical practices seeking to improve human capital, capable of working in an open and competitive economy. In this context, the state is very important, not as a provider but as a supporter and a regulator which rewards the best and encourages those who are not doing so well to improve their competitiveness – the state becomes a servant to market interests. The Ministry of Education of Chile (MINEDUC 2014) acknowledges that there is a great issue in this system that must be resolved: the subsidized private sector gets advantages over the public sector because there is no regulation for the criteria of selection and expulsion of students, and thus, the private school can choose the least expensive and best students, who usually come from middle or upper classes. In 2006, the Preferential School Grant Law was implemented trying to resolve this problem, but this was to no avail because of the complexities involved according to Assaél Budnik et al. (2011, pp. 312–313).

Despite all these issues, Chile has managed to improve its results in standardized international tests. Budnick et al. (2011, p. 316) affirm that this has occurred not in general and widespread terms; rather, students that come from the most favorable classes have improved their performance, while those that come from the less favored classes continue to score low in tests. This is used as evidence for the argument that public schools do not function properly and that the private schools are a better alternative – this discourse is normally done without any consideration of important differences in living conditions. With the aim of improving positions in the rankings, the standardized test becomes the motor for changes in education, from management solutions to school results (Assaél Budnik et al. 2011, p. 316; Falabella 2015, p. 713). All this means that the effects of the 1980s neoliberal educational reform gave rise in Chile to an educational apartheid, where students only study with people from their own social class and who share the same values.

Let us look at the case of Brazil. In Brazil, neoliberal ideas started to be implemented with the National Plan for Privatization under Fernando Collor de Mello's government (1990–1992), but it was under Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government (1995–2002) that an effective set of neoliberal reforms was developed in the country. According to Frigotto and Ciavatta (2003, p. 95), during the 1990s, by and large, public policies were based around concepts such as globalization, minimum state, productive restructuring, information society, total quality, employability, and so forth (cf. Leher 2001, p. 162). Reforms were in three areas: deregulation, decentralization, and privatization. Deregulation meant revoking old laws or passing new ones that favored the laws of the market. Decentralization meant the transfer of the operations and management of public services to states and municipalities, with less interference from the federal government. Privatization meant allowing private companies to profitably exploit the provision of public services and offer complementary or parallel services.

Thus, under the three pillars (deregulation, decentralization, and autonomy-privatization), Cardoso's government implemented the Law of Guidelines and Bases of National Education (LDB) (Saviani 1997, p. 200; Dourado 2002, p. 241; Frigotto and Ciavatta 2003, p. 110) which is still in force, and consequently neoliberal elements entered all subsequent National Plans of Education and its derivative laws. In addition to this, the adequate level of investment was never reached by the state, which means that the system is not functioning properly, and the middle and upper classes have either migrated to or kept their children in private education. Recently, further changes have been implemented. Under the discourse of modernizing secondary education, one of the first decisions of Michel Temer's government (2016–2018) was to reform the system, reducing the timetable for history, geography, biology, physics, and chemistry and prioritizing maths and Portuguese language; further, this reform extinguished philosophy, sociology, art, and physical education as compulsory subjects. The focus on maths and Portuguese language is largely regarded as a demand from the labor market while the exclusion of disciplines such as philosophy and sociology as an attempt to hinder critical thinking. With regard to these reforms, Lima and Maciel (2018, p. 21) write that "[t]he adaptability of the curriculum results in the erosion of the right to basic and professional education, whose root lies in meeting the demands of the capitalist crisis, which, by choosing to stifle the State's social 'expenditure', intends to appropriate the public fund in order to serve the interests of the rentier capital, represented by neoliberal and neoconservative sectors in Brazilian politics."

Changes in the higher education system were also implemented, which at the same time affirm the autonomy, decentralization, and flexibility to institutions, but also implement controls through a standardized process of assessment. According to Dourado (2002, p. 242), key points of this policy were to provide incentives for the creation of for-profit institutions in the educational sector, to expand educational credit finance through state and private resources, and to encourage distance learning and the creation of a system of measurement in favor of teaching activities rather than research activities (cf. also Dias Sobrinho 2002). Through the standardized evaluation process, the federal government can provoke changes in management processes and on the institutional culture of higher education institutions, especially universities, which are now ranked by the National Examination of Courses and the General Index of Courses (Dourado 2002, p. 244).

Interestingly, and to attend to the demands of students from less wealthy backgrounds, in 1999, the federal government created the Student Financing Fund for Higher Education (FIES), and in 2005, it created another financing device called University for All Program (ProUni), which provides full or partial grants to students from less wealthy backgrounds to study at private institutions – in practice, these are voucher systems, by which the state pays for places at private universities. Thus, it is possible to affirm here that if there is still a great presence of the state in the provision of basic education – although the curriculum is being influenced by market interests – it is possible also to affirm that higher education,

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especially at undergraduate level, is highly dominated by market forces and players. According to Sguissardi (2015, p. 869), there is a certain neoliberal control of higher education in Brazil, dividing the system in two: (i) higher education institutions providing high-quality education and research focused, encompassing public and some private universities, and (ii) higher education for-profit institutions providing mass education and of low quality. In the last 20 years, access to higher education has been treated as a commodity, which has led to a large expansion of the sector, but with a considerable impact on the quality of provision. The last significant event occurred in 2017 when a law was passed by the federal government prohibiting the expansion of public investments above inflation and the growth of gross domestic product in several sectors, including education and health, for the next 20 years, and this leaves it open for a considerable expansion of for-profit companies and organizations (Amaral 2017).

The last case we wish to look at is South Africa. The regime of apartheid was officially institutionalized in 1948 and only ended in 1994. During this period, the movement against apartheid in South Africa had as one of its most important demands equality in the field of education, rejecting the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which enforced segregation in educational institutions (Christie 2016, p. 435). It is often claimed that this policy aimed at directing black and nonwhite youth to blue-collar and unskilled jobs; however, Kiyaam Govind, Minister of the Native Affairs at the time, denied this claim and affirmed that the policy aimed at solving South Africa's ethnic problems by creating a system for each ethnic group (cf, Byrnes 1996). After the end of the apartheid regime, the aspiration of "Education of equal quality for all" encountered problems in the government's national unity formation and was laid aside in part because new challenges emerged. In 1996, the South African Schools Act restructured school governance, introducing a system of parental fees to school and a system (i.e., equitable share formula) that distributed part of the educational budget differently among schools classified by a poverty scale (Christie 2016, p. 439). This represented a great opportunity for neoliberals to occupy the educational field, through the creation of "affordable private schools" which targets students from a disadvantaged background (Tooley and Dixon 2005). According to Languille (2016, p. 1), the supporters of low-fee private schools affirmed that this would aid the state to offer access to education with good quality and conditions. More than 20 years since the end of apartheid regime, educational access has improved, but the performance is still poor, with great differences between schools attended by a majority of white children and those attended by black youth (Languille 2016, p. 1; cf. also Motala and Dieltiens 2008; Nordstrum 2012; Motshekga 2015; Phadi and Ceruti 2011)). This is so because "access to quality education is unequally distributed, along social class, racial, and spatial lines" (Chisholm 2005). According to Christie (2016, p. 435), in the "Rainbow Nation":

> Despite some shifts in apartheid's race/class configuration, the burden of poverty and poor education are still shouldered disproportionately by black people. The imaginary of liberation has scarcely been touched – let alone achieved – despite the formalities of a modern state being put in place. The practices of everyday life (including education) follow the rhythms of a fundamentality unequal neoliberal political economy.

The case of "affordable private schools" is significant, because according to Mcloughlin (2013, p. 15) and Languille (2016, p. 2), these schools do not cater for individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds; rather, it caters for the emerging, predominantly black, middle classes seeking to use education as a way to further improve their lives. These developments in South Africa are similar to a neoliberal trend experienced worldwide. During the transition period, the democratic government discarded the option of free compulsory basic education (so even public schools are allowed to charge tuition fees) while, at the same time, established education as a right. This seems to be a paradoxical situation.

After the end of the apartheid system, the majority of South African universities subscribed to international metrics of success, joined cross-country rankings, and adopted systems of management, very similar to for-profit companies (Muller 2017, p. 58). If in the beginning it was

possible to affirm that these changes were directed at overcoming isolation and to improve quality, nowadays it is the reason for a series of problems. Muller (2017, p. 63) notes that the majority of South African universities are public institutions and that, even if this is the case, they must engage in a competitive system for funding. The author affirms that there are three popular and influential themes in the current higher education system's thinking in the country: (i) an emphasis on "indigenous knowledge," that is, aims to develop local know-how; (ii) the importance of "internationalization," that is, to gain a certain status among institutions abroad; and (iii) a focus on the university's role in the "knowledge economy," that is, to add value and potential for raising funds for academic research and production. The author continues:

> The most notable problem with the system is that it encourages publication in lower quality (local or international) accredited journals. This is simply because the reward for publication is the same across all accredited publications, but the preparation, submission and revision costs – in terms of actual time and ability required – are lower and the probability of acceptance is higher for lower quality journals. In some instances these incentives may even induce individual academics, or academic institutions, to engage in fraudulent – or ethically questionable – publication practices. (Muller 2017, p. 63)

Shrivastava and Shrivastava (2014, p. 7) remind us that in 1996, the higher education reform in South Africa was implemented under the framework of "Growth, Equity and Redistribution"; however, this was adopted only in discourse because in practice a very competitive system was implemented. In addition, public resources for higher education fell since from 4% in 1999 to 2.5% in 2007 of the national budget. This forced universities to raise tuition fees sharply, and, "as a consequence, as student numbers grew steadily due to urbanization and increasing population density, faculty numbers at universities remained static, further contributing to the disturbing 45% dropout rate among higher education students in South Africa" (Shrivastava and Shrivastava 2014, p. 7).As a way of trying to solve this situation without state support, most universities formed increasingly larger classes, some of them

with more than 200 students, and started to use ICTs, distance learning, and MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) to support their students (Shrivastava and Shrivastava 2014, p. 9).

Conclusion

It can be argued here that under neoliberal ideology schools and universities are in danger of not encouraging true education but instead promote normalizing education. For this ideology, the role of these institutions is to prepare individuals through competitive training to compete for privileges (Connell 2013, p. 110). However, this does not occur without opposition. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century in Chile, Brazil, and South Africa, student protests have questioned and opposed the system – such as in 2006, 2011, and 2012 in Chile, in 2016 in Brazil, and in 2015 in South Africa. While these movements must be understood in their own complexities and historical contexts (Miraftab 2009, p. 43), it is possible to affirm their claim that education is a human right not a commodity and true education should not normalize people. Thus, the following question posed by McLaren and Farahmandpur (2001, p. 279) is still very significant: "Why try to help young people adapt to a system that is designed to exclude them?". This question does not exclude the importance of posing questions about education, but it refuses to accept the neoliberal normalizing education as the essence of schools and universities.

If, according to Foucault (2008, pp. 218–219), there is a utopic dimension to neoliberalism insofar as it tries to establish a "general style of thought, analysis and imagination," then education, not normalizing education, must become a form of resistance against this utopia that seeks to turn people into uncritical defenders of the system. As Biesta (2018, p. 26) affirms:

> This does not mean, of course, that the economy does not matter, but the challenge is to 'do' economy differently, in ways that are more sustainable, more caring and more democratic. It also suggests that we should question the focus on competition – which is fine as long as one is part of the winning 'team,' but becomes nastier when the table turns – and ask how co-operation and collaboration can

become more central in how we conduct our lives together. And it means – and this is perhaps the most important issue in face of the half-truths that seem to govern global education – that we need to make a shift away from sheer survival towards an orientation on life. After all, survival entails an orientation on the question how we can adapt and adjust to ever changing circumstances, whereas the question of life asks us that we first explore whether the circumstances we find ourselves in are worth adapting to, or whether the first task is actually to try to create better circumstances.

Certainly, there is no guarantee that true education will succeed. However, in the neoliberal era, true education must resist social imaginary and market logic and affirm that education is the opportunity to try and create possibilities for life and to face risks (Biesta 2018, p. 28). To create possibilities for life and to face risks means having the opportunity to conceive an anti-imperialist view of the world. According to Miraftab (2009, p. 45) and Biesta (2018, p. 28), to resist neoliberal thought implies resisting half-truths and openly facing the complexities of reality, in which the other exists, rejoices, and suffers, and acknowledging that the market-stimulated competition can greatly amplify this suffering.

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Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

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Synonyms

Democracy; Democracy assistance; Democratization; Europe; External governance; Neoliberal Hegemony; Neoliberalization; Political transformation

Definition/Description

This entry probes whether neoliberalism is hegemonic in European democracy promotion. It analyzes the models of democracy and strategies of democratization of two democracy promoters in Europe, the European Union and the USA, both of whom are key to understanding the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy promotion. This entry sheds light on the way in which democracy promotion and democratization processes can be a component of the extension of neoliberalism in Europe. Second, it aims at a better understanding of the conceptual and practical implications of neoliberal thinking for democracy. Carving out neoliberalism's influence on democracy helps to grasp better why there is often a gap between the democratic rhetoric of and its implementation by democracy promoters. It is argued that neoliberalism is in fact hegemonic in European democracy promotion. The USA and the EU, both in their own way, pushed for neoliberal

economic transformations and advanced neoliberal principles in democracy promotion. Nevertheless, democracy promotion policies neither consistently nor exclusively advocate neoliberalism. Rather, the policies draw from a variety of political traditions. Liberal and social democratic elements are promoted alongside neoliberal principles, which often result in inconsistencies and competing priorities.

Introduction

Neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization processes have become buzzwords for scholars and commentators today. Whereas the proponents of neoliberalism – often without referring to the term itself – hold that unhindered market transactions will maximize the social good, its critics argue that neoliberalism has resulted in economic destitution in many countries in the Global South as well as many industrial regions of the Global North, environmental destruction on an unprecedented scale, and the hollowing out of national representative democracies.

The theoretical basis of neoliberalism dates back to the 1920s, but its large-scale implementation in economics and politics proliferated about 50 years later in the 1970s (Harvey 2005). Spearheaded by Thatcher in the UK and the Reagan administration in the USA, neoliberalism advanced from a niche economic theory to the elite's preferred development model in the world. Despite a complex and uneven diffusion as well as conceptual shifts, neoliberalism has become hegemonic today to a degree that globalization is often used as a synonym for neoliberalization. The aim of this article is to discuss whether neoliberalism has become dominant in European democracy promotion as well.

I use the term European democracy promotion not as a rigid research category but as a regional and thematic focus to narrow the scope of this article. The analysis centers on the policies of democracy promoters since the 1990s that are directed at Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Caucasus, and the Middle Eastern and North African region (MENA), which I include here due

to its proximity to Europe. These regions were subject to varied democracy promotion efforts and underwent regime changes in the past (the "velvet revolutions" in CEE, the "colored revolutions" in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and the "Arab Spring" in the MENA region).

This article does not seek to identify the variables of successful democratization. Furthermore, no contribution to the debate about the relationship between external and internal dimensions of democratization is intended. Instead, it sheds light on the democracy promoters. It analyzes their models of democracy and strategies of democratization. The view is restricted to two democracy promoters – the USA and the European Union (EU) – both of whom are key to understanding the relationship between neoliberalism and democracy promotion.

This article addresses two research gaps. International political economists, whose work draws on Marxian or neo-Gramscian perspectives, tend to focus on the spread of neoliberalism as a dominant development paradigm through the work of governments' national policies and the way national governments have supported international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that have enforced international trade rules that benefit multinational corporations and global creditors. One of the findings of international political economists is that the globalization of capital results in a hollowing out of representative democracy (e.g., Hirsch 1997). Democracy's scope and the people's political efficacy need to be restricted for neoliberalism to thrive. Democracy and neoliberalism almost appear antithetical in the literature on neoliberalism (e.g., Bonefeld 2017; Bruff 2014). While this research is no doubt important, it overlooks the way in which democracy promotion and democratization can be a building block in the spread of neoliberalism.

Second, as International Relations scholars and political scientists, mostly from a rational institutionalist, intergovernmentalist, or neo-functionalist perspective, seek to understand the political and economic variables that determine the success of democratization, they assess the coherence of democracy promoters' agenda, etc. Often, studies point out a gap between the rhetoric and practice in democracy promotion. Research suggests that in many cases, economic and security interests override the ambition to democratization. A reference to neoliberalism (or "free market" paradigm) is sometimes made. However, it seems that in many cases the very concept of democracy is presented as remaining untainted by neoliberalism. What is needed is a better understanding of the conceptual and practical implications of neoliberal thinking for democracy (promotion) (see Kurki 2013). Eventually, this can yield a better understanding of the gaps between rhetoric and practice of democracy promoters.

These two research gaps can be bridged by addressing whether or not neoliberalism is the dominant paradigm in US and EU democracy promotion. In addition, this chapter sheds light on the following questions: Is democracy promotion a building block for extending the reach of neoliberalism and securing its hegemony in the world? Is democracy promotion part of a neoliberal form of imperialism? What are the effects of neoliberal hegemony and strategies of democratization by the actors that are promoting democracy? Are there contradictions and tensions between neoliberal ideas about democracy and other political traditions (classical liberal, social, or participatory democratic ones) in the policy documents?

I will argue that neoliberalism is indeed hegemonic in European democracy promotion. However, that does not mean that it is dominant in every case. Neoliberalism can be both hegemonic and flexible. It is adaptable to different political and historical conditions. That way we cannot expect to find a 'one size fits all model' of neoliberalism in democracy promotion or in the democracy aid-recipient countries. Furthermore, security and geopolitical interests can override economic and political reform ambitions. Finally, neoliberalism cannot always be easily identified as the hegemonic concept in policies because democracy promoters draw from a variety of political traditions.

I will use the term democracy promotion throughout this text as an umbrella term despite the fact that researchers and policy makers use

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partly different wordings with different connotations. A short clarification on terms and wordings will follow. Schmitter and Brouwer (1999, p. 14) have defined democracy promotion in the following way:

> Democracy *Promotion* consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries.

Toppling an autocratic regime by the use of military force is one possible way of political liberalization. Today, the term democracy promotion is widely associated with the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many democracy promoters refrain from military actions to pursue their goals. The bulk of the activity of democracy promoters is better labeled as democracy *assistance*, which is limited to measures that serve the consolidation of democratization processes in newly established democracies or semi-democratic countries (Bicchi 2009; Huber 2008). In order to set their work apart from US democracy *promotion*, EU officials turned to the wording democracy *support*. Another term that is sometimes used is democracy *aid*, which signifies that democracy promotion is often a subsection of development aid. In order to avoid terminological confusion, I will use the term democracy promotion consistently in the text and as an umbrella term that comprises all measures to promote, assist, stabilize, and support democracy.

In the next section, I will introduce into some key conceptual foundations of neoliberalism. I will outline the role of the political system (the state and democratic institutions) in neoliberalism and how neoliberal theory conceptualizes the state-citizen relationship. This section will provide the basis for assessing the neoliberal character of the particular democracy promotion agendas.

In the section "The USA: Disparities in Discourse and Practice," I provide an overview on the shifts in US democracy promotion and the US engagement in Europe. The USA used the political transformation processes in Europe as an opportunity to promote the American model of democracy and the free market doctrine. But US democracy promotion is not ideologically confined to neoliberalism and draws from a range of liberal ideas.

The section "The European Union: Coupling Neoliberalization and Democratization" focuses on EU democracy promotion. It analyzes the enlargement process from the 1990s to the early 2000s and the European Neighbourhood Policy. I will argue that neoliberalism is hegemonic in EU democracy promotion, first, as the EU itself can be said to be neoliberal, and, second, as neoliberal principles or neoliberal conforming practices are promoted in the subtleties of funding regulations and program priorities, as well as in the European Commission's mode of cooperation in its external relations.

Neoliberalism and Democracy

Neoliberalism was put forward – most prominently by the economists Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman – as a counter-hegemonic proposal directed against state planning and the regulation of capital, which its proponents perceived as becoming hegemonic in their times. The spread of communism in the early twentieth century and onward, government spending and state-directed modernization projects in many liberal democracies, as well as the class compromise that was established in many countries after World War II were perceived by neoliberalists as a hegemonic configuration that threatened entrepreneurial freedom. As Harvey (2005) describes in his critical history of neoliberalism, in a several decade long process, neoliberalism has become hegemonic in economics, politics, and lifestyle in many countries as well as in international financial institutions and other international organizations.

The history of neoliberalism is characterized by an uneven development, tensions, conceptual and practical contradictions, and recurrent economic crises that resulted from the neoliberalization of economies. A broad consensus among scholars about the conceptual foundations (the paradigm of entrepreneurial freedom and

individualism), its historical trajectory (the Reagan and Thatcher administrations as key promoters), and the economic consequences (increasing inequality in the world but also an alleviation of poverty to some extent) seems to exist. However, given the recurring economic crises such as the Asian crisis of 1997–1998 or the global financial meltdown in 2008, scholars debate how neoliberalism maintains and reproduces its hegemony (see, e.g., Konings 2017; Rodrigues 2018). Furthermore, the uneven development of neoliberal hegemony resulted in regionally and locally specific variations of neoliberalism. In this section, some of neoliberalism's key conceptual foundations and its relationship to democracy will be discussed. The aim is not only to introduce into neoliberal thinking but also to provide some theoretical linkages between democracy promotion and neoliberal hegemony.

In his critique of neoliberalism, David Harvey (2005, p. 2) defines it as "a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade." According to neoliberal theory, the role of the state is to "favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade" (ibid., p. 64). The deregulation of industries and privatization of social and other state-provided services should be the prime tasks of neoliberal governments. Against the standpoint of an active intervention by the state into the market, a legal framework that secures free and fair competition is all that is deemed necessary to further the public good.

However, the implementation of neoliberalism itself is exempt from the noninterventionist standpoint. The state can and should take an active role in producing and reproducing the conditions and institutional framework for neoliberalism. Despite the public rhetoric of many neoliberalists, neoliberal theory does not consider the free market as a natural order. The neoliberal market is contingent on a framework that it cannot (re)produce itself. Neoliberalism's proneness to crises exemplifies

this. The global financial crisis of 2008, for example, posed a threat to the free market principle and the ongoing process of financialization. For neoliberalism to maintain its hegemony, it required a "mob-up after strategy" or "failure containment" of an active state that managed the economic and social consequences of crises and adjusted the conditions for the neoliberal economy (see Konings 2017, p. 66; Panitch and Gindin 2013, p. 266).

The neoliberal state promotes actively neoliberal principles in its activities and through its structures (see Harvey 2005, Chapter 3). From this perspective, state capacity building in development aid programs can be compatible with the neoliberal paradigms of a minimalist and noninterventionist state. The state has to have the capacity to provide a favorable environment for business activities to thrive. Furthermore, the state has to be equipped with the capacity to handle economic crises and global economic transformations, for example, by removing economic decision-making capacities from democratic control to independent central banks or by creating the institutional framework for the flexibilization of a country's workforce by eliminating labor laws and curtailing unions.

The promotion of a neoliberal state can be seen as part of a greater effort to embed neoliberalism, which is defined as "the realities of an elite-driven intellectual and political constructivist effort to strengthen market forces and corporate power" (Rodrigues 2018, p. 129). Embedding neoliberalism is as much as about controlling and reconfiguring the state as it is about "cultivating the appropriate moral climate among the populace so that commodification is deliberately pushed forward and accepted" (ibid.). This includes activities to educate citizens to be good market actors and to foster a neoliberal subjectivity.

In the neoliberal framework of thinking, each individual is considered responsible for his or her well-being. Hence, welfare, education, health care, and other social services are individual responsibilities and should be acquired on the market. The privatization of social services opens up opportunities for financialization and "accumulation by dispossession" (see Harvey

2003, Chapter 4). However, privatization is not only a means to open up new markets and to increase profit margins. It is also a way to replace solidarity among citizens with a consumerist attitude, the value of individual entrepreneurship, and competitive behavior. Citizens should, first and foremost, think of themselves as consumers and entrepreneurs and not as members of a community. Neoliberal citizens (and state officials with a professional attitude of being service providers to these citizens) are a necessary component to secure neoliberalism's hegemony.

The concept of the neoliberal citizen is relevant for the topic of this article because democracy promotion programs may help fostering a neoliberal subjectivity in recipient countries. Democracy promotion is often not restricted to core democratic institutions (e.g., the electoral process, parliamentary reforms, accountable governments). Many activities target the relationship between the citizen and the state more generally. For example, a rights-based approach in citizen training may result in an increase of people voicing their complaints against the government on the basis of human, i.e., mainly individual and Western-coined, rights instead of locally specific customs. As part of so-called Twinning projects, local government officials are trained in or become accustomed with "modern" administration processes. These projects can have multiple effects: they may increase democratic accountability, may support the transition toward a neoliberal management approach in the bureaucracy, and may help local officials to adopt business-friendly behavioral attitudes (cf. İşleyen 2015). Some research – mostly from a Foucauldian perspective – exists, but comparatively little is known yet about the promotion and the effects of neoliberal governmentality in aid-recipient countries (see, e.g., İşleyen 2015; Kurki 2011; Muehlenhoff 2018; Tagma et al. 2013).

This aspect of neoliberalization and democracy promotion should not be taken as a simple form of social engineering. Instead, it should be analyzed in the context of quite complex social processes and addressing why neoliberalism is appealing to the population in target countries. A society may be receptive to a neoliberal lifestyle because of a desire for autonomy from disciplinary forces of the state or the intrusion of the state in private and public life. Mitchell Dean's (2018) discussion of Foucault's ambivalent stance on neoliberalism is exemplary to understand processes of superficial or actual alignment with neoliberal ideas such as greater autonomy from the state and self-management.

Given neoliberal theory's skepticism against collectivisms, one might suspect a hostility against civil society organizations (CSOs). But this is not necessarily the case: To ease the transition to privatization and a competitive consumer society, and to stifle social upheaval, voluntary associations can step in to provide basic social services to those who cannot afford them. This is a market conform solution since it is based on a market regulated philanthropy dominated by successful entrepreneurs and competitive charity organizations.

From this perspective, the growth of CSO activity in the second half of the twentieth century is not a contradictory trend to the rise of neoliberalism. Some analysts even see CSOs complicit in advancing neoliberalization. Wallace (2004) asks whether NGOs (or CSOs, in my terminology) are Trojan horses of neoliberalism because they provide services that were formerly responsibilities of the state. By providing social services, CSOs may contribute to more privatization and may encourage the state to retreat even further. Petras (1999), who perceives CSOs as part of an imperialist strategy of economic and cultural colonization, argues similarly: CSOs in the development sector are complicit with a neoliberal agenda because they stand for a privatization "from below" and their activities may lead to a demobilization of social movements. Although this standpoint cannot be generalized and applied to all CSOs in democracy promotion, CSOs may indeed foster neoliberalization and a neoliberal conforming democracy due to their working style and function in society or by implementing their donor's neoliberal principles.

In sum, neoliberal theory privileges the individual over the community and subordinates all activities of social and political life to the market principle. Even the political and civic engagement of citizens is subject to market rationalities.

Harvey (2005, p. 66) offers a view on how democracy figures in neoliberal theory: "Democracy is viewed as a luxury, only possible under conditions of relative affluence coupled with a strong middle-class presence to guarantee political stability. Neoliberals therefore favour governance by experts and elites. A strong preference exists for government by executive order and by judicial decision rather than democratic and parliamentary decision-making." Neoliberals see majority rule – one of the core principles of representative democracy – as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties.

Neoliberal theory is not necessarily anti-democratic in principle, but it favors a minimalist conception which is best described with Schumpeter's pluralist-elitist model of democracy. Schumpeter (1994) applied a market model to democracy in which citizens are perceived as consumers of political goods that are offered by competing political parties. Citizens play a rather passive and restricted role in politics: They vote for a candidate or political platform in general elections, which they are supposed to choose according to their individual interests. But citizens are not meant to engage in the process of political will formation, which is reserved for the political elites. Likewise, the formation of (political) collectives such as trade unions or political parties is seen with skepticism. Strong collective institutions may force the state to intervene in markets and, hence, may result in an infringement of property rights and entrepreneurial freedom.

As a potent check against the democratic threat of the majority rule, neoliberals favor constitutionalism and the rule of law with a twofold purpose. First, neoliberals seek to locking in neoliberal principles in constitutions because they are hard to change democratically. The failed constitutional process of the EU is a case in point. European social movements were opposing the EU constitutional treaty exactly because it would have constitutionalized the principle of market competition for the future development of the EU (see della Porta and Giugni 2009, pp. 90–91). This would have minimized the national governments' leverage to divert from a neoliberal course. In the cases where liberal values such as entrepreneurial and individual freedoms are already constitutionally codified, judges, who interpret these values in a neoliberal way, can act as key promoters of neoliberalism. In such cases, democratically passed laws that are backed by a majority in the population but that run counter to neoliberalism can be challenged and defeated in the courts. In a neoliberal system, constitutionalism and the rule of law trump democracy.

International treaties and the integration of nation states in a global (neoliberal) community are another way to embedding neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is "institutionalized at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal structuring of state and international political forms," which Gill (2008, p. 139) has coined the "new constitutionalism." The policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the content of free trade agreements, and the EU's legal framework have, among others, redefined the public sphere in a more privatized and commodified way (ibid.). International treaties are usually drafted by experts and negotiated in backroom talks removed from public access. Global governance is practically void of democratic accountability and stands for the possibility of implementing neoliberalism without popular consent.

The second reason why neoliberal theory privileges the rule of law is its proponents' suspicion against collective bargaining and collective interest representation. In parliamentary democracy, for example, the parliament is the principle institution of conflict resolution and mediation. The parliament is the place, in which different parties seek to push through the interests of their constituencies or seek a compromise or consensus with other parties for the public good. The basic working principles are the representation of aggregated interests and collectivized bargaining. In neoliberal theory, on the contrary, the court is the principle institution of conflict resolution and mediation. The court resolves conflicts on the basis of individual rights and mediates between – mostly – singular parties (businesses and citizens).

To sum up, neoliberal thinking privileges a minimal form of the state with a strong judicial regime that protects individual rights and entrepreneurial freedoms. The neoliberal citizen does

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not seek to receive services from the state but acquires them on the market. Conflicts are resolved individually in courts instead of collectively through political association. Democracy is kept to a minimum and in the hands of political elites.

Such an ideal-type (but, nevertheless, incomplete) characterization of neoliberalism is seldom found in reality. Different forms of neoliberalism with different degrees of realization exist around the world. Furthermore, analysts have pointed out contradictions in neoliberal theory that result in a contingent implementation (see, e.g., Harvey 2005, pp. 67–81). In addition, neoliberalism is fused with other political traditions, for example, neoconservatism (e.g., Harvey 2005, p. 81) or European-specific types of social democracy and neo-mercantilism (van Apeldoorn et al. 2009). The following sections on democracy promotion account for excellent examples of neoliberalism's fuzziness.

The USA: Disparities in Discourse and Practice

Introduction

The United States (USA) are the most active and versatile democracy promoter in the twentieth century and today. Likewise, it is known to be the most vigorous advocate over the last 40 years of a free market doctrine and the primacy of individual liberties. An assessment of neoliberalism and European democracy promotion can hardly ignore the US agenda and its consequences in Europe and beyond. In numerous cases, the USA have influenced democratization processes by open assistance or in covert operations. Depending on their security and economic interests, the USA have supported pro-democracy movements, but they have also destabilized elected governments and stabilized authoritarian regimes.

The history of democratization and regime change in Latin America accounts for the most prominent example of how democratization is inconsistently promoted over time. Building on Robinson's (1996) classical study, Burron (2012) has shown from a neo-Gramscian International

Political Economy perspective how democracy promotion is put to use for the promotion of the neoliberal state. He (2012, p. 143) concludes that "[w]hile the institutionalization of a liberal-democratic order in the hemisphere [the Americas, MF] is not to be dismissed, democracy promotion itself has often served as a hegemonic practice reducing the scope of democracy to the requirements of neoliberal accumulation."

The US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are further cases in point to characterize US democracy promotion. Both interventions were at least partly justified with bringing freedom and democracy to the Afghan and Iraqi populations – despite the blatant dominance of security and economic interests. The transition period in Iraq, for example, has been used to lock in a neoliberal framework for the future development of the country. As Harvey (2005, p. 6) notes, before handing over power to the Iraqi interim government, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, ordered the full privatization of public enterprises, the elimination of almost all trade barriers, and other neoliberal policy directives. Harvey (ibid., p. 7) concludes that the "US evidently sought to impose by main force on Iraq [. . .] a state apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital."

In Europe, US democracy promotion started with the success story of the democratization of West Germany after World War II. The USA can refer to the stable German democracy and thriving market economy that external democracy promotion and the transition to a free market economy work even in a society that had been deeply indoctrinated by fascist ideology and whose economy became extremely centralized during the war. However, the German case is less interesting here because the USA did not promote a neoliberal model of democracy. In the opposite, "[d]emocratic liberalism was balanced by concern with economic equality, stability and well-being and hence democratic regulation of the economy of the state" (Bridoux and Kurki 2013, p. 123). In short, the postwar era was not a time of neoliberal hegemony.

Neoliberalization Through Shock Therapy

By the time of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989–1991, the Reagan administration had started implementing neoliberal ideas in its policies at home. It had also developed a Hayekian-inspired democracy promotion agenda with individual liberty, economic freedom, and anti-communitarianism at its core and procedural democratization as a target activity (ibid., p. 124). However, Bridoux and Kurki (ibid., pp. 124–125) point out that despite Reagan's discursive turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s, the actual practice of democracy promotion that followed in the 1990s was rather a mix of neoliberal and classical liberal approaches.

More important for advancing neoliberalism in Central and Eastern Europe than any democracy promotion program of the USA was the West's insistence on a particular strategy of economic liberalization. Western diplomats, international financial institutions, and Western economists (most prominently Jeffrey Sachs (1990)) pressured the post-socialist governments to adopt a development model that came to known as the Shock Therapy. It was geared toward a rapid transition to market economies, the opening for foreign direct investment, and the integration into the Western market (Gowan 1995). Even though some governments in the post-socialist countries resisted the Western development model to some extent, Drahokoupil (2008, p. 1) shows for the countries of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland that at the turn of the new millennium "[t]he dominant state strategies aim to promote competitiveness by attracting foreign direct investment. The states are thus increasingly internationalized, forging economic globalization by facilitating capital accumulation for transnational investors." A decade after socialism, Central and Eastern Europe adopted a diverse but by and large neoliberal economic agenda.

In Gowan's reading of Sachs' economic transition theory, democracy and freedom are the primary discursive goals of the Shock Therapy (Gowan 1995, p. 47). However, in order to realize it and, subsequently, the desired forms of democracy and freedom, it seemed necessary "to subordinate the will of the electorates and parliaments to the overriding priority of rapid systemic transformation to capitalism, downgrading constitutional development, social and political consensus-building, and respect for minimal economic and social solidarity" (ibid., p. 48). Gowan (ibid., pp. 50–53) proves this point with the West's support of Yeltsin's unconstitutional and non-democratic implementation of Shock Therapy in Russia. The argument that neoliberalism prefers elite rule and rule by experts over democratic accountability finds some empirical grounds in the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (see section "The European Union: Coupling Neoliberalization and Democratization"). Furthermore, the external influence on the transformation process shows neoliberals' strategy to take advantage of political and economic crises for advancing their agenda.

The US strategy of economic liberalization in Europe, which is mostly implemented via international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, is neoliberal and seems to be antithetical to popular democratic participation. However, the US democracy promotion programs do in fact provide support for free and fair elections, democratic state-building, and distribute funds to civil society. Furthermore, as indicated above, US democracy promotion is not unequivocally neoliberal. The analysis so far has not shown whether US democracy promotion is part of or at least compatible with a neoliberal agenda or whether it contradicts the economic dimension of US foreign policy. Hence, it is worth pointing out some strategy changes in the discourse and practice to acquire a better understanding to which extent neoliberalism is hegemonic in US democracy promotion.

Strategy Change 1: Neoliberal Discourse but Classical Liberal Democracy

According to Bridoux and Kurki (2013), recurring disparities between rhetoric and practice can be observed: A neoliberal rhetoric entered the discourse in the 1980s with the Reagan administration. However, the US democracy promotion institutions did not implement the policy shift immediately but predominantly promoted a classical liberal model of democracy (ibid., pp. 124–125). The authors

(ibid., p. 124) argue that the actual implementers of Reagan's agenda conceived a classical liberal model "more palatable to many recipients of democracy aid." During the 1990s the "[c]lassical and neoliberal agendas in a sense merged." This approach continued throughout the presidencies of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. In its response to 9/11, the latter's administration "made strong rhetorical commitments to democracy promotion" (ibid., pp. 125–126). The authors argue that this did not account for a paradigmatic shift "but a more intense continuation of Reagan's and Clinton's commitments to promote a combination of classical liberal and neoliberal ideals of democracy globally" (ibid.).

Hassan's work on the MENA region provides some further insights. He argues that George W. Bush turned to the one size fits all approach of the Washington Consensus after initially pursuing a more conservative approach, which allowed the elites of authoritarian states to safeguard their socioeconomic privileges and power. "Promotion of democracy came to mean pushing for elections, opening markets following the prescription of neoliberal economics [. . .] in the hope of generating gradual and stable transformation into so-called 'market democracies'" (Hassan 2012, p. 131). However, the pressure to hold democratic elections was lowered after electoral victories and gains of anti-American and Islamic groups in the region. Watering down democratization efforts in the hope for regime stability, political liberalization did not necessarily become to mean a greater degree of political participation by the population but any reform that enhanced individual freedom (ibid., p. 133). In sum, Bush's agenda was characterized by "an incoherent set of policies held together by a neoliberal core; economic reform was the order of the day, not necessitating serious political reform from partners and the allies in the region" (ibid., p. 132).

The situation in Europe during Bush junior's presidency was not less complicated. The so-called "colored revolutions" brought pro-Western governments in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) into power. However, the diplomatic support for the opposition in the run-up of the regime changes or for the newly elected leaders varied, and there is

controversy about whether the USA had a significant influence on the events (Mitchell 2012). Beyond dispute is that US agencies deployed millions of aid to CSOs, which increased mainly opposition groups' capacity of campaigning and electoral observation. US democracy promotion also facilitated the unification of opposition groups, which made electoral success of pro-Western candidates more likely (MacKinnon 2008).

Neoliberal Democracy?

Unfortunately, we do not learn much about neoliberalism in the debates about the "colored revolutions." Analysts do not pose the question in how far neoliberal ideas were promoted in the democracy promotion programs. Although economic interests such as pipeline projects in Ukraine and Georgia are common references and the new leaders were known to be pro-American, more research is necessary if one wants to make the case that the democracy promotion efforts bore a neoliberal mark. It remains largely unstudied in how far US-funded projects in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus promoted neoliberal characteristics of the state, democracy, and state-citizen relationship as outlined in the section "Neoliberalism and Democracy."

Sussman provides some hints and starting points in this respect. He argues that former socialist states have to comply with neoliberal regulations if they seek to receive democracy assistance. Referring to a USAID website, the expectations include the "'dismantlement of all wage and price controls,' supply-side tax policies, [. . .] a functioning investment system of stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments" (Sussman 2010, p. 54). Pointing out the training of lawyers and judges in the American jurisprudence "with regard to constitutional law, business law, and 'election reform'" (ibid., p. 58), he provides another possible object of inquiry. This training can be seen as a rather technical aid to countries in transition. However, a specific type of rule of law which focuses on individual liberties and conflict resolution in the courts is conducive for implementing neoliberalism. Skills transfer accounts for one strategy to foster the adoption

of American-type institutions and may have helped to introduce neoliberalism in the region.

Based on the existing research, one can conclude that the US efforts in promoting democracy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are part of the USA's sustained effort to bring the regions closer to the West. One can hypothesize that a neoliberal economic agenda is pursued and that democracy promotion programs carry neoliberal contents to some extent. Some support for this hypothesis can be garnered by proceeding with the paradigm shifts in the US administration on democracy assistance.

Strategy Change 2: Neoliberal Practice Despite Discursive Changes

A partial shift in discourse has been undertaken by the Obama administration (Bridoux and Kurki 2013, pp. 127–130; Hassan 2012, p. 134). In the light of Bush's military interventions, which delegitimized democracy promotion in many eyes, it seemed that the Obama administration neglected democracy promotion. In addition, the Obama administration had to cope with the consequences of the global financial crisis, which threatened the hegemony of the neoliberal model to some extent. In domestic politics, Obama undertook a discursive shift toward questioning the "assumptions that the market will naturally regulate the economy and that more deregulation and less taxes are synonymous with economic growth" (Bridoux and Kurki 2013, p. 128).

Obama's global development policy continues to prioritize economic growth. Democratic governance holds a supportive role in consolidating economic development. However, "Obama argues that the values of liberty, equality, and social justice are intrinsic to democracy and should be present when democracy and human rights are promoted abroad" (ibid., p. 130). Bridoux and Kurki (ibid.) see in Obama's "simultaneous concern for social and economic equality through greater state interventionism in economic affairs and political democratisation" an incipient shift away from the classical and neoliberal models of democracy in US democracy promotion.

Hassan (2012, pp. 133–134) too observes Obama's distancing from his predecessor's policies. However, he argues that after 2011 Obama's approach moved closer to Bush's agenda by stressing financial stability, promoting reform, and integrating competitive markets in the global economy as the backbone of American democracy promotion in the transition process of the MENA region (ibid., p. 135). Instead of supporting the protesters call for social justice and human rights, the Obama administration used the aftermath of the Arab Spring to support free trade and free markets. As Hassan's assessment shows, Obama's recipe for stabilization and economic transformation very much resembles the US approach in postsocialist Europe.

This does not necessarily contradict Bridoux and Kurki's argument of discursive shifts: despite the discursive shift in the Obama administration, the latter see little concrete transitions in the discourses of the US State Department, who did not call for a greater regulation of economic forces, and the funding practice of USAID (Bridoux and Kurki 2013, p. 131). In particular the funding priorities and regulations, which cannot be presented here in its entire complexity, are a way to understand in how far a neoliberal state and neoliberal conform democracy is promoted by the USA.

Bridoux and Kurki identify two important shifts in the USAID programming. The regulations of 1998 carried a classical and neoliberal view of democracy with the respect for the rule of law and a well-developed justice system, which are seen key not only for democracy but also for a modern economy (ibid., p. 132). Neoliberal aspects such as private property ownership and minimum state intervention are promoted with classical liberal elements such as the call for free and fair elections, multiparty systems, minority rights, and free association of citizens. Even a vital labor sector is seen as important for the political and economic liberalization of a country (ibid., p. 133). The guidelines in 1998 "laud the classical liberal political system together with a free-market economy, deregulation and minimum state intervention as organising principles of the economy in developing countries" (ibid.).

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In 2010, the regulations read differently. The "free market economy is conspicuously absent as a definitional component of democracy" and "broad-based, equitable economic growth" becomes an aim of development aid (ibid.). This shift seems to be in alignment with Obama's call for a greater regulation of the economy. However, Bridoux and Kurki (ibid.) doubt that this counts for an actual shift because the new priorities contribute "to social stability and effective functioning of open-market societal institutions. They can be compatible with (neo)liberal policies, and be reflective of a more 'embedded' stability-oriented neoliberal model."

To sum up, this section has discussed neoliberalism in US democracy promotion. Security and geopolitical interests were largely left aside to retain the focus on the question whether neoliberal ideas are hegemonic in US democracy promotion. Transition processes such as the transformation of post-socialist countries provided the USA with the opportunity to promote both an American model of democracy and a free market doctrine. Most of the pressure on economic liberalization was exerted through conditional loans of international financial institutions. The democracy promotion programs were implemented by a range of development aid agencies and backed with diplomatic efforts.

To which extent these programs can be called neoliberal and whether they contributed to a neoliberalization of the target countries is only partly answered in the literature on democracy promotion. The support of pro-Western forces seemed to be the priority in Europe. For that purpose, democracy promoters drew from a range of liberal ideas about democratization and were not ideologically confined to neoliberalism. The regulations and funding guidelines in the democracy promotion bureaucracy shifted toward a neoliberal content though. Bridoux and Kurki (2013, p. 145) conclude that despite the variety in the discourse about liberal democracy and state-economy relations in US politics, "these developments are contradicted by continued, and often 'technically' or 'implicitly'-justified, promotion of classical and neoliberal ideas" by the implementers of democracy promotion.

The European Union: Coupling Neoliberalization and Democratization

Introduction

Whereas some EU member states have a long-standing history in democracy promotion, the EU itself is a latecomer in the field. During the Cold War, action in this field was either unrealistic as in the case of Central and Eastern Europe or – with some exceptions – it was seen as "too intrusive" in regard to developing countries (Smith 2014, p. 126). Furthermore, the member states only reluctantly transferred foreign policy competences to the community level because they are seen as one of the core elements of national sovereignty. International trade is an exception to this rule: The European Commission has the authority to negotiate trading partnerships with non-EU countries. In these negotiations, the European Commission is known to push for neoliberal principles such as free markets, free flow of capital, and privatization of social services. Since the 1990s, the EU has acquired some substantial competences in managing the external affairs of its member states in general and in democracy promotion in particular (see Smith 2014). Does this mean that neoliberalism, which coins the EU's trading policy, is hegemonic in EU democracy promotion as well?

Important to note is that throughout the 1990s and 2000s, EU policies lacked a particular label for or a rigid definition of democracy. In a strategy paper from 2006, the EU recognized that "democracy is a multi-faceted and contested idea" (Kurki 2013, p. 153). A catalog of basic democratic rights and the idea of popular sovereignty served as guidelines for democratic reforms, which very much resembles the existing liberal democracies in the EU member states (Fiedlschuster 2018, p. 81). In 2011, however, the revision of the ENP included a definition and label of democracy (deep and sustainable democracy (European Commission 2011)), which very much resembles liberal representative democracy. The introduction of a specific definition was controversial because, as an EU official put it, democracy would be a fuzzy thing and that promoting a specific label of democracy has no advantage for

the implementation of democracy assistance (Fiedlschuster 2018, pp. 84–85).

Recent research has shown that EU democracy promotion is characterized by a plurality of political traditions (e.g., political liberalism and social democracy) (see Fiedlschuster 2018; Kurki 2013). However, as indicated above, a Western liberal representative type of democracy can be identified as the basis of the plurality (see Fiedlschuster 2018, pp. 81–82, 103). Free and fair elections, a representative parliamentary system, the rule of law, and the respect for fundamental freedom of rights are the basic ingredients of this type of democracy. But the content of EU democracy promotion also includes (neoliberally coined) good governance principles, social democratic ideas, and even a particular kind of participatory democracy. Furthermore, neoliberal characteristics can be identified in the funding regulations and the conceptualizations of the role of civil society organizations and local authorities in democratization and development.

I will show that, to some extent, the neoliberal characteristics outlined in the section "Neoliberalism and Democracy" are embedded in the policies and practices of EU democracy promotion. I will argue that neoliberalism is hegemonic in EU democracy promotion, first, as the EU itself can be said to be neoliberal, and, second, as neoliberal principles or neoliberal conforming practices are promoted in the subtleties of funding regulations and program priorities, as well as in the European Commission's mode of cooperation in its external relations.

I will support my argument, first, by analyzing the EU enlargement process. The latter is an example of a form of democratization and neoliberalization accomplished by including new members, who have to accept the existing EU regulations. Second, I will discuss the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which provides incentives for the governments of the EU's neighborhood regions to conform with EU standards and to democratize their countries. Both cases, the enlargement and the ENP, subject the countries in question to a considerable extent to the monitoring of the European Commission.

Democratization and Neoliberalization Through Enlargement: EU-Europeanization of Membership Candidates

The enlargement process is arguably the most effective way of the EU to extend its values and norms to other regions. The accession countries need to conform with the established political and economic standards in the EU. More precisely, they are required to accept and implement the EU *acquis* before they join the union. The EU's *acquis* is the body of common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU Members. Only in exceptional circumstances are derogations from the EU *acquis* allowed. This requirement is part of the Copenhagen criteria for accession candidates, which were formulated in 1993 and applied to all candidates after Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined the EU in 1995. Further requirements are "stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union" (European Commission 2016). This quote exemplifies that the conditionality of democracy goes hand in hand with the requirements of a market economy and international competition, which often fostered a neoliberal restructuring of accession countries.

Subject to the accession criteria were mostly young democracies of the former socialist countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus, who joined in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania (2007); and Croatia (2013). Most of these countries were also subject to the economic Shock Therapy in the 1990s (see the previous section). Processes of democratization and neoliberalization were – in varying degrees – already underway in these countries, but the prospect of EU membership was an important incentive for democratic and economic reforms. On the side of the EU, the enlargement was a deliberative step to stabilize the new states, to support the transition to market economies, as well as to bind the countries

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politically and economically closer to the EU. As I will show below, it also served the consolidation and expansion of a European neoliberal project.

The legal framework of the accession process gave the EU the leverage to demand political and economic reforms. As Sedelmeier (2011, pp. 5–6) puts it, the EU "became engaged to an unprecedented extent in a regular monitoring and assessment of the adjustment efforts of the candidate countries. Moreover, the EU used its attractiveness for the candidates to pursue "a broad range of political and economic criteria, covering many rules for which EU institutions have no legal competences vis-à-vis full member states (such as democracy and minority rights)" (ibid.).

Böröcz and Sarkar (2005, pp. 158–159) have criticized the EU's competences from a post-colonial perspective: "Such structural conditions of dependence on a foreign authority for laws and regulations make the situation of East European applicant states somewhat similar to that of 'dependencies', 'protectorates' and a form of externally supervised government reminiscent of the history of colonial empires' 'indirect rule.'" Also Sedelmeier (2011, p. 6), representing a more mainstream International Relations perspective, concedes that "as non-member states, the candidates had no voice in the making of the rules that they must adopt, and the power asymmetry vis-à-vis the incumbents has led to a top-down process of rule transfer, with no scope for 'uploading' their own preferences to the EU level." This sheds a negative light on the enlargement process because the populations – and even the political elites – had little democratic leverage in the process.

Without doubt the EU enlargement process has changed the accession countries considerably in many respects (cf. Böröcz and Kovács 2001; Zielonka 2007; see also Sedelmeier 2011). However, there are also studies pointing out the EU's limited influence on the patterns of democratization and the role of domestic factors that affected the efficacy of EU-Europeanization (see Sedelmeier 2011, p. 18).

Despite the EU's competences to interfere in the accession candidates, Sedelmeier argues that its impact on the polities has been low compared to its policy impact (ibid., p. 17). Either the EU did

not need to make substantial use of democratic conditionality because liberal democratic governments were already in place or its influence proved to be insignificant in the cases of nationalist or illiberal governments because they saw no benefits in democratization on the terms of the EU. The EU's influence on political change was rather indirect. It supported liberal reformers "by informing electorates about the implication of their choices for the country's accession prospects and facilitating cooperation and moderation of opposition forces" (ibid., p.18). The EU had perhaps greater influence on the pro-EU political elites that came into power and were willing to EU-Europeanize their countries (see Vachudová 2005).

Apart from the domestic factors, the limited influence of the EU on the design of democratic institutions can be explained with the lack of a clear definition of democracy and the European Council's viewpoint that there are many variations of democracy (see above). Furthermore, the European Commission was in charge of the enlargement process. As Pridham (2006, p. 381) points out, "its approach to democratic conditionality was bureaucratic rather than straightforwardly political." It focused on state capacity building with operative principles such as transparency, effectiveness, and accountability (ibid., p. 382). As I will show in more detail below, such a managerial and technocratic approach has ambivalent or negative effects on democracy.

The EU enlargement process contributes to the neoliberal restructuring of Europe by binding these countries to the neoliberal trajectory of the EU. Therefore, it is worth summarizing the neoliberal character of the EU. Neo-Gramscian international political economists have characterized EU integration as a threefold project (see, e.g., van Apeldoorn 2009). As Bieler (2006, p. 80) summarizes this perspective, there is, first, a neoliberal attempt of integration favored by mainly globally operating transnational corporations that emphasized a "market-led, negative integration and close connection with globalization through the opening of the EU to the global economy. It was argued that the loss of competitiveness of European production was due to expansive welfare

systems and labour market rigidity. [. . .] Secondly, there was a neo-mercantilist project supported mainly by transnational European firms, which predominantly produced for the European market, but were still not fully global players. [T]hese companies regarded the fragmentation of the European market as the main cause of their lack of competitiveness [vis-a-vis the US and Japanese companies, MF]. Finally, there was a social democratic project, especially supported by Jacques Delors, social democrats and a whole range of trade unions. For social democrats, the European level offered the possibility of re-regulation of the market at a higher level and thus the opportunity to regain some control over capital lost at the national level." Bieler argues that the neoliberal project came to dominate the integration process (ibid., pp. 82–83). Van Apeldoorn (2009) labeled the result "embedded neoliberalism," which is "predominantly neo-liberal in content, but also includes some mercantilist and social policy side aspects to widen the social basis of support" (Bieler 2006, p. 83).

Analyzing the EU enlargement, Bieler points out the context of domestic factors in the new member countries. Starting with Sweden and Austria (accession in 1995), Bieler (ibid., p. 85) asks why these more social democratic-oriented countries sought to become members of a predominantly neoliberal EU. "Partly due to structural pressure, especially exemplified in Sweden through the relocation of production units and investment by Swedish TNCs to locations in the EU, and partly due to a change in hegemonic ideas away from a Keynesian towards a neo-liberal understanding of the economy, the neo-liberal drive underlying the revival of European integration became suddenly an attractive option in times of severe domestic economic recession in the late 1980s, early 1990s" (ibid.).

In regard to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Bieler (ibid., pp. 85–86) argues that "[s]tructural change was not driven by domestic coalitions of social forces, but through the incorporation of international ideas and foreign production methods in tandem with an internalization of transnational social forces in the national CEE forms of states." He adds that transnationalization,

nevertheless, was not enforced from outside but took place through the state elites cooperation in the transnationalization of production structures via foreign direct investment (ibid., p.86).

Holman (2001, p.178) shows that the Copenhagen criteria pushed the accession candidates to adopt the neoliberal model of the EU. He concludes that "the Commission's pre-accession strategy is basically about disciplining the candidate members in terms of free market integration" (ibid., pp. 180–181). Bohle (2006, p. 78) claims that the EU "has exported a more market-radical variant of neoliberalism to its new member states." She claims that only the EU's deregulatory program and not the redistributive acquis was exported. Furthermore, Bohle (2006, p. 77) observes that the labor movement "weakened tremendously during the 1990s. Unionisation levels have fallen dramatically, and the mobilisation capacities both at the national and the workplace level have been seriously undermined." In addition, labor mobility from the old to the new member states had been considerably blocked for several years.

As Bieler (2006, p. 88) sums up, "EU enlargement with the social purpose of securing and intensifying neo-liberal restructuring in CEE fulfiled the objectives of both CEE state elites, who want to secure restructuring externally, and of the EU and European transnational capital, who want to expand capitalist accumulation to CEE." Van Apeldoorn's concept of embedded neoliberalism and Bieler's application of the concept to the enlargement process are crucial for understanding the neoliberal character of the EU and the expansion of the neoliberal project in Europe. However, we do not learn much from these political economists about the effects on democracy. I will provide two examples that exemplify the ambivalent effects of the enlargement process for democracy.

First, although the EU is said to have had no major transforming effect on the polity of the accession countries, the enlargement process affected the efficacy of parliamentary democracy. The governments had to integrate about 80,000 pages of EU *acquis* into national law. The EU *acquis* "had to be implemented under great pressure with insufficient time or effort to consult

where necessary. Accession certainly favoured the executive institutions over the parliamentary ones; while administrative values were sometimes given a priority over democratic (i.e., participatory) values" (Pridham 2006, p. 396). Sadurski (cited in Sedelmeier 2011, p. 21) confirms this point: "Enactment of EU-related laws was often fast-tracked, with little or no serious parliamentary discussions, and with the executive controlling the process throughout. [. . .] [I]t strengthened the executive bodies over their parliamentary equivalents, a secretive procedure over fully transparent ones, and the quick-fix pace of decision-making over comprehensive deliberation. [The goal of accession] gave the executive more power to by-pass parliament and to justify the centralisation of decision-making by the emergency-like circumstances." Furthermore, governments often prioritized the demands of the European Commission, which is in charge of managing and monitoring the enlargement process, over the parliament.

Even though the hollowing out of parliamentary democracy may not be an intentional effect of EU enlargement and Pridham or Sadurski does not frame it that way, the bypassing of parliaments conforms with neoliberalism's preferences for governance by experts and elites. For many newly established democracies, the decision to join the EU meant that their democratic decision-making capacity became limited and that governments exhibited a neoliberal or neoliberal conforming attitude.

Second, the European Commission fostered the establishment or the strengthening of democratically elected regional governments. Through decentralization, the EU aimed at stabilizing the new democracies, increasing cohesion in the EU, and securing the effective management of EU structural funds (Sadurski 2004, p. 395). For the latter, an appropriate administrative capacity at the regional and local level was needed. As Sadurski (ibid.) notes, "[t]he Commission's Regular Reports made remarks on the extent of administrative reforms in the relevant states, though there is a very clear emphasis on the administrative capacity for the management of structural and cohesion funds, and on effective monitoring, financial management, and control

at regional level rather than on democratic self-government and autonomy." This is an example of the often-stated gap between the rhetoric of democracy in the policy documents and the actual priorities of the European Commission, which tends to pursue a technocratic and managerial approach. Although the European Commission's activity might not have been intentionally anti-democratic, its emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness has had de-democratizing effects to the extent that it has fostered the rule by experts and restricted democratic deliberation.

The prospect of EU membership and economic prosperity through the integration in a (neoliberal) European economy highly motivated (the pro-European) political elites in CEE to accept a substantial outside interference by the European Commission and the – not formally but factual – restriction of their newly established democratic institutions. Although the EU imposed democratic conditionality, it did not seem to be an effective or ambitious democratizer. In contrast, the European Commission's managerial and technocratic approach and its emphasis on effective and efficient administration of EU funds can be said to have had de-democratizing effects and fostered a neoliberal conforming style of politics in the accession countries.

In addition, the accession process made a substantial contribution to extending neoliberal hegemony to the CEE countries. Most of the accession countries adopted a neoliberal economic model. The reforms toward a market economy and the restructuring of the economy to increase regional and international competitiveness resulted in privatization, deregulation, and the decline of labor rights. The new membership countries had to open their economy for EU investment. However, the EU set restrictions on the access to labor markets of the old member states. As Böröcz and Sarkar (2005, p. 158) point out, the enlargement process asymmetrically benefited the EU in economic and geopolitical terms.

Democracy and Neoliberalization in the European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP offers those 16 countries in the Eastern and Southern neighborhood who have no membership perspective a closer cooperation with the

EU: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. The policy was launched in 2003 after a speech of Romano Prodi (2002, p. 5) set out the goal "to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union." The policy was revised in 2011 in light of the Arab Spring and reluctant reformers in Eastern Europe (European Commission 2011). The ENP is connected to further EU cooperation instruments, programs, and policies such as the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility, and the program Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities, which I will only mention in the passing. The ENP is a means to increase the EU's influence in its neighborhood regions by binding them economically and politically closer to the EU. The regions offer export markets, investment opportunities, a cheap labor force, etc. Also, cooperation is crucial for the EU in terms of political stabilization and conflict resolution (e.g., in Caucasia, North Africa, or the Middle East). The non-EU partner countries seek financial assistance, access to the EU's internal market, and, last but not least, visa liberalization. The EU casts the ENP as mutually benefiting all partners and acknowledges that the level of cooperation will differ. Unlike the enlargement process, the ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country.

The original policy document was imprecise about democracy. The revision in 2011 included a definition of "deep democracy," which is "the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service" (European Commission 2011, p. 2). This definition strongly resembles a liberal idea of democracy, and the EU is positive that "[r]eform based on these elements [of deep democracy, MF] will not only strengthen democracy but help to create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth, stimulating trade and investment" (ibid., p. 4). A certain indeterminacy about the content of

democracy remains because the policy affirms that "[t]here is no set model or a ready-made recipe for political reform" (ibid., p. 3). Furthermore, the EU shies away from imposing sanctions on partner countries that do not sufficiently democratize; this questions the EU's claims as a democracy promoter.

Democracy promotion is only one component of the ENP. The cooperation is often driven by security interests and migration control. These interests take precedence over the EU's normative value of democracy, which shows a gap between democratic rhetoric and political practice (see, e. g., Jünemann and Maggi 2010, pp. 119–120; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011, p. 899). Moreover, the EU's mode of cooperation with authoritarian regimes had some stabilizing effects on the latter and might prevent substantial democratization (see Van Hüllen 2015). The slow progress in democratization in some countries and the conflicting goals of pursuing political change while favoring stability renders the ENP in many eyes an ineffective instrument for democracy promotion (cf. Börzel and van Hüllen 2014).

Another important component of the ENP is the regulation of the economic integration into the EU internal market. Here we would expect that the policy's neoliberal character is exposed. The document promotes free trade negotiations, which are tailored to the EU's needs and requires a WTO membership. The free trade agreements gradually remove trade barriers and "aim for regulatory convergence in areas that have an impact on trade [. . .]. They [regulations, MF] are designed to be dynamic in order to keep pace with regulatory developments in the EU's Internal Market" (European Commission 2011, p. 8). In the end, this means that the partner countries have to continuously adopt EU regulations without enjoying EU membership rights.

The provisions on the support for sustainable economic and social development focus on fostering "stronger and more inclusive growth," which "includes support for efforts to improve the business environment such as simplifying procedures and catering to small and medium-sized businesses and to promote employability" (ibid., p. 7). Strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption are said to increase foreign

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direct investment. Another aspect of the policy is "macro-economic governance and budgetary sustainability" (ibid., p. 8). Due to the labor shortage in some areas of the EU economy, the regulation of labor mobility is promoted as well.

Whether budgetary sustainability translates in practice into austerity measures and employability will result in a flexibilization of the workforce – both characteristics of neoliberalism – cannot be judged analyzing the policy document alone. The policy, furthermore, uses vocabulary that resonates with liberal and social democratic ideas: inclusive growth, job creation, improving social protection, as well as strong administrative and democratic institutions. Also the characterization of CSOs seems to bear a progressive meaning: CSOs help to ensure that economic growth becomes more inclusive and they can contribute to greater social justice (ibid., p. 5). In sum, the ENP reflects the ambiguity in EU democracy promotion, which is simultaneously influenced by liberal, neoliberal, and social democratic traditions.

While the ENP has certain progressive elements that support democratization, its implementation exposes a clear neoliberal agenda. Kurki (2013, p. 164) has shown on the basis of the first ENP policy document that reform priorities in the cooperation with Ukraine were neoliberal in nature. İşleyen (2015, p. 679) argues that projects about vocational training and employability in Tunisia and Egypt "are indicative of neoliberal governmentality as they focus on the optimisation of capacities and individual connections for the benefit of market processes." Furthermore, Kurki holds that the EU's recent increased focus on socioeconomic issues in democracy promotion is not a turn toward the promotion of social democracy, but it addresses the socioeconomic effects of the global economic crisis of 2008: "[T]he EU seeks to make democracy promotion more attuned to challenges which economic inequalities can raise to achievement of liberties in communities" (Kurki 2013, p. 154). Her view finds some support in the 2011 version of the ENP, which sees the need for economic and social reforms partly because "[m]ost partner countries have weak and poorly diversified economies that remain vulnerable to external economic shocks" (European Commission 2011, p. 7).

What are the possible consequences of the neoliberal aspects of the ENP for democracy and democratization in the partner countries? In which way can one claim that neoliberalism is hegemonic in this case? First of all, the partner countries "commit themselves to approximate their domestic policies and legislation to the EU *acquis*" (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011, p. 896). Democratization is promoted through the adoption of principles of democratic governance (accountability, transparency, and participation) that are the underpinnings of EU policies. Furthermore, the export of EU policies, which were originally designed for liberal democracies, may foster reforms of the political system in the partner country (ibid.). However, the scope and character of democratization are restricted at the same time because the partner countries are assumed to converge with the EU *acquis*. This EU-type Europeanization and the EU's neoliberal characteristics as outlined in the previous section set limits for any genuine "home-grown" or "bottom-up" process of democratization.

Second, neoliberal practices can be transferred to partner countries through the EU's Twinning instrument, which is part of the ENP framework and has been launched in 1998 in the context of the enlargement process. İşleyen (2015, p. 673) characterizes Twinning "as a tool for project-based institution-building cooperation between relevant public bodies of EU member states and their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia [İşleyen's empirical focus, MF] so that the latter foster their technical, administrative and judicial capacities to implement European Neighbourhood Policy objectives." She contends that "Twinning practices are illustrative of a neoliberal governmentality agenda with which the EU aspires to circulate market principles and logics into the minds, choices, habits and actions of individuals and public institutions across a broad array of issues" (ibid.). Twinning contributes to depoliticizing the citizen as a subject entitled to rights and social welfare and "promotes neoliberal subjects defined by the idea of competition and enterprise- and risk-oriented action" (ibid., p. 684). Twinning can be seen as fostering the moral climate that is necessary to embed neoliberalism (see Rodrigues 2018, p. 129).

Arguably, Twinning may have democratizing effects to the extent that it is meant to increase the accountability of authoritarian, nonresponsive authorities. In the long run, however, it might be an obstacle toward substantive democratization because it remains unclear if there is room for substantive democratic participation of ordinary citizens.

Third, Tagma and his colleagues see the EU's support for CSOs as another form of promoting neoliberal subjects through democracy promotion. They argue that the EU's view on civil society is "a neoliberal one that is characterized by the economic rationalities of competitiveness and entrepreneurship" (2013, p. 382). They claim that "democracy promotion is limited to 'institutional-technical' areas and leaves very little room for substantive democratic debate. Instead, one could well be left with a political sphere that is monitored by entrepreneurial and effective civil society actors that report to the EU vis-a-vis democratic deliverables with neo-liberal benchmarks" (ibid., p. 387). The concern here is that the EU funding regulations and rules of cooperation have a neoliberal effect on civil society because CSOs have to conform to EU expectations in order to receive resources.

Kurki's analysis of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is the EU's main tool to support civil society-driven democratization, is a case in point. Although the EIDHR promotes a pluralistic view on democracy, it collaborates with CSOs in a neoliberal managerial way (Kurki 2011, 2013, pp. 159–162). She argues that "actors in civil society are expected to adopt for themselves a liberal democratic and liberal market attitude" (Kurki 2013, p. 161). CSOs are conceived as "the defenders of individual rights against the state" and as "self-standing, autonomous, but at the same time entrepreneurial actors in defence of a limited individual-protecting state" (ibid., p. 160). Left-leaning organizations certainly can apply, but they have to adjust their applications to the rhetoric of the EIDHR. Furthermore, the EIDHR's calls-for-proposal system "enforces competitive applications from civil society actors" (ibid., 159), which is "far from creating civil society solidarity (one of the key constituents

of social democratic and participatory understandings of democracy)" (ibid., p. 161).

It can be added here that the ENP outlines that CSOs should apply good governance principles within their own organizational structure (European Commission 2011, p. 6). Lacking the means to enforces it, the EU requests CSOs to voluntarily neoliberalize their working style.

It is important to explain that the EU's position toward CSOs has become multifaceted in recent years. Civil society obtained a central role in bringing forward reforms: "Civil society plays a pivotal role in advancing women's rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities [. . .]. The EU will support this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes" (European Commission 2011, p. 4).

Another document even goes further by stipulating that CSOs are an important feature of democracy: "An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system" (European Commission 2012, p. 3). In the document, CSOs contribute to participatory democracy and inclusive and effective policies; they articulate citizens' concerns, stand for a demand for transparent and accountable governance, and bear further democratic features. In comparison to past EU documents, this is a relatively progressive view on CSOs because it acknowledges that CSOs can be political actors (see Fiedlschuster 2018, pp. 80–81). The document demonstrates the influence of manifold European political traditions in EU democracy promotion.

Nonetheless, the cited documents exhibit neoliberal characteristics. A reference to CSO's contribution to inclusive and effective policies as well as CSOs' role in implementing and evaluating EU programs mixes a participatory ideal with the idea of good governance, in which CSOs provide expertise in a policy-making process dominated by state actors (Fiedlschuster 2018, pp. 90–94; see also 2016). The political role of CSOs is often limited in practice.

The political character of CSOs is limited in another way: The EU conceptualizes democratization predominantly as a collaborative venture of

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governments and CSOs (see ibid., p. 99). This clouds the often adversarial relationship between civil society actors and the state. Although the EU has increased its means to support oppositional CSOs by establishing the European Endowment for Democracy, social change is predominantly conceptualized in a reformist and consensual way. Democratization takes the form of a technical problem and not a political process in which adversaries struggle over the trajectory of their country. From this perspective, CSOs are not contenders of power but contributors to effective problem-solving (ibid., p. 100).

To sum up, EU democracy promotion ambivalently conceptualizes CSOs. Liberal ideas about civil society and neoliberal characteristics of good governance are fused with a progressive stance about the role of CSOs in democracy. In practice, this can have the effect that CSOs, who cooperate with the EU, may become Trojan horses that embed neoliberalism through their activity and self-understanding.

Fourth, a final dimension of interest is the ENP's empowerment of the local level. Although the EU still focuses in democratization on state capacity building and the political elites at the national level, greater weight is given to local authorities (and, as outlined above, to CSOs) in social, economic, and political development. In the previous section, I have outlined the EU's interest in decentralization in the enlargement process. The European Commission approached decentralization in a way that is problematic in democratic terms because it privileged the rule by experts. The ENP and related documents will serve as another example to characterize the ambivalent neoliberal character of EU democracy promotion.

Local authorities and local CSOs, which in the EU's view include business associations, are seen as key implementers of policies, and they are considered important sources of input for policies that meet peoples' needs. This position is underlined with the program "CSOs and Local Authorities" (see Fiedlschuster 2018, pp. 67–68). The European Commission (2014, p. 3) has stated that local authorities and CSOs are "essential in building the foundations for broad-based

democratic ownership of development policies." The EC has recognized the "CSOs 'right of initiative' to identify and respond to emerging needs, to put forward visions and ideas; to initiate and propose initiatives and new approaches" (ibid., 11). Such a description could be taken as a progressive approach that puts citizens first.

However, a greater focus on civil society and the local level is not necessarily a step toward substantive democracy; in fact, such a focus can actually signify a neoliberal position which emphasizes a lean state and a management approach to politics (Mohan and Stokke 2008, p. 552). Seen from the perspective of neoliberalism, local authorities and CSOs form a counterweight to the centralized nation state, which is a bureaucratically overburdened and inefficient service provider (ibid., 550).

Mohan and Stokke (ibid., 546) argue that the Western development agencies "construct 'the local' in ways that create certain opportunities for local participation but also render development as a technocratic and depoliticized process." In a similar way, this seems to be true for EU democracy promotion as well. The EU deploys a democratic rhetoric about broad-based democratic ownership of policies, which may indeed create opportunities for citizens; but, and perhaps more importantly, it brings together this democratic rhetoric with a neoliberal view on politics, which in turn restricts the scope of citizen participation. This contradictory tendency is significant because it is key to understand the connection between EU democracy promotion and neoliberalism.

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to discuss whether neoliberalism has become hegemonic in European democracy promotion. Using the US and EU democracy promotion as case studies, I analyzed models of democracy and strategies of democratization. Drawing on the research of international political economists, who analyze the spread of neoliberalism, on the one hand, and on the research on democracy promotion conducted by (mainly) International Relations scholars on

the other, I sought to, first, shed light on the way in which democracy promotion and democratization processes can be a component of the extension of neoliberalism in Europe. Second, I aimed at developing a better understanding of the conceptual and practical implications of neoliberal thinking for democracy. Carving out neoliberalism's influence on democracy helps to better grasp why there is often a gap between the democratic rhetoric of and its implementation by democracy promoters.

I argued that neoliberalism is in fact dominant in European democracy promotion. The USA and the EU, both in their own way, have pushed for neoliberal economic transformations and promoted political principles that are, at least, not detrimental to the spread of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, democracy promotion policies neither consistently nor exclusively advocate neoliberalism. The policies draw from a variety of political traditions. Liberal and social democratic elements are promoted alongside neoliberal principles, which often results in inconsistencies and competing priorities.

One of the central findings on US democracy promotion is that there has been a disparity between high-level political rhetoric and the implementation on the administrative level. In the 1980s, where we would have expected a strong neoliberal stance, researchers observed a classical liberal position in US democracy promotion. In comparison, President Obama's change toward a (partly) anti-neoliberal rhetoric after 2008 did not seem to translate into a different practice of democracy-promoting agencies. Furthermore, there are different and changing priorities in the actual cases of democratization. This means that researchers should take at least three aspects into account: the changes in political discourse, the degree of implementation in the bureaucracy and the agencies distributing aid, and the actual priorities and effects in the recipient countries.

In conclusion, it can be said that the USA took the political transformation processes in Europe as an opportunity to advance the free market doctrine and the American model of democracy. Although neoliberalism is currently hegemonic in US democracy promotion, the latter is not ideologically confined to it and draws from a range of liberal ideas.

A research gap seems to exist in how far the US engagement in Europe actually promoted neoliberal characteristics of the state, democracy, and the state-citizenship relationship as outlined in the section "Neoliberalism and Democracy." A more comprehensive view on this matter is needed to understand, for example, in which way the training of state officials like judges fostered the adoption of American-type institutions, which in turn may have helped to spread neoliberalism to the region.

One of the findings on the EU is that the EU's efforts to promote liberal representative democracy, democratic elections, and a parliamentary system are quite diverse and not dominated by neoliberalism (see Kurki 2013, pp. 156–159). However, the incorporation of countries in the EU's neoliberal framework through the EU enlargement or by the European Neighbourhood Policy extends the hegemony of neoliberalism in Europe – with a varying degree due to the individual trajectories of each country. Neoliberalism is hegemonic in another sense: the European Commission tends to apply a managerial and technocratic mode of cooperation, which fosters a neoliberal conforming conduct of aid-recipient governments and the governance by experts and elites. This often has negative effects on the efficacy of democratic institutions such as parliaments.

Another finding concerning EU democracy promotion is that an increased focus on CSOs and local authorities is in fact ambiguous because it can be seen as a way to foster both the democratization of a country from the "bottom-up" and a neoliberal entrepreneurial culture among citizens and authorities. A turn toward civil society in democracy promotion does not primarily signify a shift toward progressive concepts of democracy (such as participatory democracy) but fosters a neoliberally coined state-citizen relationship. Furthermore, it is a way to sidestep national governments, which are not always willing to reform their countries toward EU-type democracies.

Many more democracy promoters than the USA and the EU could have been included in

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the analysis. For example, some of the newly established democracies – in particular Poland and the Czech Republic – have developed a distinct democracy promotion agenda based on their own history of democratization. As Petrova (2014) shows, these actors played a significant role in the Balkans and Georgia (see also Mitchell 2012 on the linkages of the "colored revolutions"). Arguably, they have become proxy democracy promoters by other European states and the USA with a distinct twist. Research could analyze whether or not they promote neoliberalism as well.

International organizations such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), who refer to democratic principles in their statutes, could be included in the analysis as well (see, e.g., Gawrich 2017). They were not central for my argument because both organizations are less rigorous democracy promoters: the CoE's approach is based "on post-membership socialization into western democratic practices," and the OSCE focuses on monitoring (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004, p. 99). Nonetheless, it would be interesting to know whether these long-established organizations remained untainted with neoliberal thinking.

Neoliberalism targets a transformation of all spheres of social and political life. Therefore, the work of the international court system to which individuals can appeal about human rights violations, lobby organizations that seek a stable and profitable investment environment, biographies of charismatic political leaders and their entanglement with Western think tanks and business organizations, profiles of educational institutions, and media campaigns account for further potential objects of analysis to prove in how far neoliberalism is hegemonic in politics, economics, and society.

Democracy promotion is a complex (research) field, which cannot be treated exhaustively in one article. Democratization is in most cases a collaborative project of many internal and external actors (with the common aim to democratize a country and the minimal consensus on fostering democracy and human rights) but also a competitive field in which everyone pursues their particular economic or political interests and pushes for different social policies. Hence, plenty opportunities for future research from multiple and interdisciplinary perspectives are abound.

Cross-References

▶ Eurocentricity
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ Finance, Finance Capital, Financialization
▶ Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
▶ Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law
▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Neo-Liberalism and Financialization
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Non-governmental Organisations (NGOS)

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Neo-liberalism and Financialization

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Synonyms

Capitalism; Finance; Financialisation; Free trade; Neoliberalism

Definition

This essay examines neoliberalism as a theoretical, economic, and political project. In particular, it describes how neoliberalism promotes the deregulation of domestic and international trade and capital movement, and how this relates to the phenomenon of financialisation of the global economy.

Neo-liberalism

According to David Harvey (2005, p. 2) neoliberalism 'proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade'. Neo-liberals therefore believe that free markets need to be unshackled from the demand management of the economy and society so that individuals can then follow their self-interests.

It was after the Second World War that demand management of national economies took centre stage when many governments sought to impose Keynesian policies, such as national bargaining with trade unions over wage levels in order to forecast wage costs and consumer demands. Neo-liberals, however, jumped on the inflationary tendencies of Keynesianism in order to push forward their own agendas. For example, during the 1970s higher wage demands from organised labour in the US and Western Europe led to

increased prices, which were then tackled by cuts in public expenditure. But this ran into other problems, not least the spectre of industrial action by trade unions to maintain living standards (Crouch 2011, p. 14). To counter these inflationary tendencies neo-liberals broadly argued, and indeed still argue, that individuals should be encouraged to interact with one another through their ego and self-interest in free markets rather than rely on a state to make economic calculations for them. Spontaneous order throughout society will as a consequence emerge (Birch and Mykhnenko 2010, p. 3). Social policy cannot, then, be used to ameliorate social inequalities thrown up by free-market economic processes and practices. Instead, neo-liberals take it for granted that 'the economic game, along with the unequal effects it entails, is a kind of general regulator of society that clearly everyone has to accept and abide by' (Foucault 2008, p. 143).

None of this implies that neo-liberals are entirely anti-state as such. Indeed, Harvey's definition also usefully draws attention to the fact that for neo-liberals free markets require an 'institutional framework' if free markets are to prosper. This is an extremely important point if for no other reason than the fact that neo-liberalism is often thought to only promote free markets in society. But this is not true. While supporting free markets neo-liberals have also been keen supporters of the need to ensure that a strong interventionist state is evident in society in certain areas. Early neo-liberal ideas say as much. Emerging in Germany during the late 1920s, and comprising thinkers such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alfred Müller-Armack, the Freiburg School explicitly thought that 'entrepreneurship is not something that is "naturally given", akin to [Adam] Smith's idea of the natural human propensity to truck and barter. Instead it has to be fought for and actively constructed' (Bonefeld 2012, p. 636). These 'ordoliberals' held strongly on to the belief that the pursuit of private property, selfinterests, entrepreneurial determination, and so on also had to be socially ordered through the state. After 1945 this brand of new liberal thinking was complemented by other luminaries in the

economic world. Most notable of these economists was Milton Friedman, whose work at the University of Chicago with liked-minded colleagues criticised Keynesian demand management of the economy in favour of deregulation and monetarism. Unlike ordoliberalism, the neo-liberalism of Friedman et al. was more anti-state and advocated a larger degree of pro-market strategies in policy-making (Peck 2010).

Even so, those following Friedman's brand of free-market ideology were also adept at using state power for their own ends. For instance, one of the first experiments in implementing neo-liberal policies in fact arrived in an authoritarian state system in Chile when in 1973 Augusto Pinochet staged a *coup d'état* against the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. As well as rounding up, imprisoning, and killing many in the opposition, Pinochet also called on the help of neo-liberal economists to apply their brand of free-market economics (Crouch 2011, p. 15). The next notable large-scale neoliberal offensive came in 1979 with the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government in the UK. Privatising nationalised industries and passing legislation to strengthen the forces of law and order were just two broad policies that demonstrated Thatcher's commitment to a free economy and strong state (Gamble 1988). Antiinflationary policies were also pursued to avoid wage-price instabilities and overloaded governments, while rising levels of unemployment and poverty were deemed acceptable because they helped to loosen labour markets (Cerny 2008, pp. 18–20; O'Connor 2010, p. 698). Under the presidency of Ronald Reagan the US pursued similar policies, while neo-liberal ideology more generally spread throughout the global world during the 1980s.

Despite these real effects of neo-liberal policies some critics nevertheless argue that many theories of neo-liberalism establish ideal-typical models which fail to take account of the complexities of societies. Wacquant (2012) in particular finds fault with what he considers to be one-sided views of neo-liberalism. Marxists for example regard neo-liberalism as a strictly economic macro project best encapsulated through the

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beliefs that neo-classical economics, privatisation, and 'small states' work best to safeguard capitalist interests and power. Foucauldians on the other hand regard neo-liberalism as a more concrete and contingent social project comprising a 'conglomeration of calculative notions, strategies and technologies aimed at fashioning populations and people' (Wacquant 2012, p. 69; see also Barnett et al. 2008). In contrast to these two approaches, Wacquant prefers to analyse neo-liberalism as neither a strictly economic project nor a series of concrete governing techniques. For Wacquant neo-liberalism is therefore best viewed as a state project that includes fiscal constraints over welfare policy alongside an increase in penal policies aiming to curb disorders generated by welfare reform.

Jessop (2013), however, also reminds us that neo-liberalism has assumed different guises during specific periods in time and in specific countries. In other words, neoliberalism has not remained an unchanging and static phenomenon as is perhaps suggested by Wacquant's definition. In the United Kingdom alone neo-liberalism has altered its form under successive Conservative and Labour governments from the 1980s through to the 2000s (Kiely 2005, pp. 32–33). Moreover, neo-liberal policies have been adapted to suit different contexts, from the neo-liberal shock therapy in Russia during the collapse of the Soviet Union to Atlantic neo-liberalism in the United Kingdom and US, to neo-liberalism in developing countries, and finally to Nordic neo-liberalism (Jessop 2010, pp. 172–174). It is for this reason, as Peck (2010, p. 20) recognises, that neo-liberalism does not have fixed coordinates of explanation as such, but rather represents a 'problem space' that resides within and at the boundaries of the state but also seeks to socialise institutions residing in civil society to take on a free-market ethos. Neo-liberals have therefore recognised the need to develop their ideas in order to suit the times they find themselves in and to convince sections of the public and policy-makers that the future resides in perpetuating the neo-liberalisation of society.

Neo-liberalism also shares a relationship with what has become known as financialisation. In actual fact, the two often work off from one another. Neo-liberal projects across the world have for example privatised the public sector, thus preparing the way for private investors to take over the running of particular social services and repackage them for financial markets and investors. Neo-liberalism promotes deregulation throughout society, including the financial sphere. For example, it 'imposed strong macro stability, and the opening of trade and capital frontiers' for finance (Duménil and Lévy 2011, p. 18). But what exactly is financialisation? It is to this question that we now turn.

Financialisation

In one sense financialisation simply points towards 'the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies' (Epstein 2005, p. 3). However, different approaches to financialisation can be identified. One influential approach in the social sciences and humanities highlights how financial networks are created through financial categories and financial models themselves, which not only 'describe economies . . . but are intrinsic to the constitution of that which they purport to describe' (Langley 2008, p. 25). In this respect finance can be analysed as being 'performative' insofar as financial models and other financial devices and objects create a certain calculative logic among agents and objects and this in turn helps to shape the economy. In this definition, then, performativity designates the point at which an object is brought into being at the moment it is performed in concrete events.

One illustration of this type of performativity would be a financial model for prices which brings into being a set of prices, and thus changes actual existing prices, the moment it is performed in certain economic markets. For instance, options are a type of financial derivative based on the idea that one trader has the right to either buy an option at a stated time for a fixed price, for example to give $5 to another trader for the option to buy crude oil at $75 in 6 months, or sell an option at

a point in time for a fixed price (Scott 2013, p. 68). One problem with options, though, has been how to decide when it is indeed the best time to buy them in the first place. This problem was 'solved' in 1973 by the Black–Scholes model in which stipulated that 'it was possible to construct a portfolio of an option and a continuously adjusted position in the underlying asset and lending/borrowing of cash that was riskless' (MacKenzie 2007, p. 58). According to MacKenzie, the influence of the Black–Scholes model went beyond simply presenting a 'correct' solution to a particular economic conundrum. Instead it started to change the behaviour of option traders. After all, the model was soon highly regarded in academic circles, it was simplistic enough for traders to understand its basic principles, and it was publicly available through newly established personal computers. It is in this sense that the model helped to socially construct, or 'perform', economic reality in accordance with its own principles and thereby opened up a space for derivative traders to make seemingly 'rational' calculations about the buying and selling of options (compare Callon 2007).

For Arvidsson and Colleoni, such illustrations imply that financial markets are directed by 'calculative frames' of 'convention' that enable a 'rational analysis' of financial markets to come into being among financial actors. These calculations and social conventions in turn guide interpretations of financial data and lead to financial evaluations of companies and goods among different financial communities. Knowledge about the reputation of a company, say, Facebook, thereby circulates through these communities and can help encourage investments in the company in question (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012, p. 142). Financial models and modes of calculation are also attached to other means of communication. One obvious illustration in this respect is the huge growth of information about finance in popular media (see also Thrift 2005).

However, if one argues that capitalism works within 'rational' calculative frames of convention then, as Engelen et al. (2012, p. 367) observe, this further implies that financial practices are to some degree predictable because certain rules of 'convention' are followed by financial actors. Engelen et al. suggest this gives a misleading picture of global finance, primarily because far from being predictable, global finance in fact operates in highly unpredictable circumstances. Financial strategies do not follow a set pattern or logic but more often evolve from a set of volatile circumstances which prove impossible to foresee. And such unpredictability is deeply embedded in the global financial architecture (Engelen et al. 2012, p. 367).

This is an important point because it suggests that the manner in which capitalism operates is not only found at a concrete level of calculations and conventions, but also operates at a deeper structural level where contradictions and dilemmas are evident. Starting from the standpoint of critical political economy, this alternative viewpoint attempts to understand how financialisation has become entrenched in the daily economic decision-making of major actors and corporations in the global capitalist economy. While not denying the importance of cultural conventions, critical political economy also explores how finance has become a growing source of profits throughout the global economy (Krippner 2011, p. 27).

To give just one illustration of what this mean in real terms, major corporations are today able to fund many of their investments without the help of banks. They draw revenues instead by going to open financial markets, where they trade in bonds and equities (Lapavitsas 2013, p. 38). Again, many of these developments are related to the rise of neo-liberalism pursued by dominant states. As McNally (2006, p. 40) observes, those politicians who championed a move away from 'closed' national economies in the late 1970s to a competitive global economy actually advocated not the freeing up of trade as such but the liberalisation of capital. This then helped to pave the way for various forms of financialisation to take on highly complex appearances like derivatives and hedge funds (for a good discussion of these financial devices see Blackburn 2006).

At the same time, there has been a rise in the number of 'financial intermediaries' (corporate lawyers, hedge fund managers, stock market analysts, pension fund advisors, financial traders, and

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so on) willing to articulate financial imperatives to society. Banks are a case in point in that they too now gain profits by operating in financial markets to gain commissions and fees (Lapavitsas 2013, p. 38). With other financial organisations, banks also encourage individual households to increasingly take on financial burdens. So, for instance, during the 1990s financial intermediaries in the United Kingdom, with the help of government, made it easier for households to divert their savings into financial mechanisms like securities which then ended up in secondary financial markets. The coupons created by these markets could subsequently 'be held directly by households or indirectly by pension funds and insurance companies pooling household savings' (Froud et al. 2002, p. 127). Profits were thereby generated in part through these emerging markets. Financialisation has therefore penetrated everyday life, placing a pressure on ordinary working people to pursue financial avenues and knowledge in their day-to-day activities and lives, with private pension schemes being an obvious illustration (Martin 2002, p. 78).

Among radical political economists, however, there is some disagreement about the form, function, and consequences of financialisation on the global economy. Post-Keynesians follow Keynes's belief that a financial rentier class grows in maturity when capital is depressed. The rentier class is therefore like a parasite, feeding off the 'real' productive sections of the economy through forms like interest on loans (Lapavitsas 2013, p. 30). For this reason the rentier class is a 'functionless investor' who gains profits from financial market activity through their ownership of financial firms and financial assets (Epstein and Jayadev 2005, pp. 48–49). According to post-Keynesians, then, financialisation is closely tied to an increase in the increased action and influence of the rentier class. Epstein and Jayadev (2005, p. 50), for example, estimate that the income share of the rentier class in the United Kingdom went up from 11.48% to 24.5% between the 1970s and 1990s.

An alternative perspective of financialisation to post-Keynesians is that of Marxism. Without doubt, both Marxists and Keynesians share some

similar assumptions such as their critical remarks on the rentier class. Yet Marxists argue that financialisation is the result of deeply rooted contradictions within the heart of capitalist production which can never be eradicated, while post-Keynesians see the problems of financialisation as being based on poor decisions by politicians and policy-makers that can in principle be rectified by better management. However, there are different Marxist perspectives on the rise of financialisation. One school of thought sees finacialisation as the outcome of stagnation. By the 1970s, according to Foster and McChesney (2012), capitalism was dominated by large monopolies that had generated large surpluses but could not invest these in normal productive spheres such as infrastructure projects (railways, roads, and so on) for the government. Most infrastructure projects had already been exploited by previous capitalists. Therefore the financial sphere was seen as a way to avoid stagnation. Investments in speculative and debt-driven finance thus became attractive because of the huge profits that could potentially be made. Speculative finance soon took on a life of its own, which is especially noticeable in relation to the use of debt to bankroll speculation. In the 1970s total outstanding debt in the US was around one and half times gross domestic product (GDP). By 2005 it had shot up to three and half times GDP (Foster and McChesney 2012, p. 60; see also Magdoff and Sweezy 1987).

A different Marxist perspective draws on Marx's argument that capitalism exhibits a propensity for the general rate of profit to fall over time. One of the most well-known proponents in this respect is that associated with Robert Brenner. He argues that capitalists have failed to invest in new productive capital. Specifically, Brenner (2002, p. 18) claims that intensified intra-capitalist competition from the 1960s onwards has led to 'manufacturing over-capacity and over-production in forcing down profit rates, both in the US and in leading capitalist economies more generally'. To compensate for a declining profit rate capitalists can temporarily seek out other ways to make money. During the 1990s, for example, Brenner (2002, p. 224) notes that venture capital and financial speculation hyped up an

emerging belief that a new economy was coming into being based in part on high-tech industries, jobs, and services. But he argues that the new economy owes much of its existence to the predatory and speculative nature of the (over-) accumulation of capital in its financial form. Many investments in the high-tech sector were and are based on financial speculation rather than the production of goods with a foreseeable real profit gain (Brenner 2002, p. 229; for a similar Marxist perspective see Callinicos 2010).

Other Marxists dispute this and claim instead that financialisation represents the power of US economic global hegemony. Dominant capitalist nations have been willing to engage in financial investment in the US economy on the assumption that they will benefit in some way from the US's continual economic dominance in the world (Panitch and Gindin 2005). Panitch and Gindin (2012, p. 135) therefore argue that the American state has been enormously influential in maintaining the hegemony of the US dollar. Indeed, the Federal Reserve has managed to push liquidity into the economic system when required to try to off-set and manage economic crises. For Panitch and Gindin, then, the liberalisation of capital during the 1970s and greater global competition was underpinned by the determination of the US Treasury to maintain a common purpose among the core advanced capitalist nations and global institutions, which meant spreading financialisation across the world. The result was to bring new advantages to American industry. As Panitch and Gindin go on to note (2005, p. 114), from 1984 to 2004 the US economy (GDP) grew by 3.4%, greater increase than those of other Group of 7 (G7) countries during this period, while its volume of exports averaged 6.8% between 1987 and 2004 compared with an average of 4.5–5.8% for the other G7 countries.

One useful conclusion that one can draw from Marxism is the idea that neo-liberalism and financialisation do not represent relatively stable socio-economic projects. Despite their differences, Marxists all agree that it is truer to say that both exhibit highly contradictory tendencies. The 2008 global economic crash is testimony to the deep-seated irrational nature of the

relationship between the two, but evidence also suggests that more a country goes down the path of neo-liberalism and excessive financialisation, the more social inequalities it will generate and the less income and wealth will flow to its population (Lansley 2012). Moreover, neo-liberalism has made meagre gains for many in the developing world in terms of economic growth, notwithstanding the claims of the World Bank and other apologists to the contrary (see Hart-Landsberg 2013, pp. 80–82). More positively, the contradictory nature of neo-liberalism and financialisation creates cracks, fissures, and gaps in its own structures that then open up opportunities for those with progressive agendas to put forward alternative social and political programmes to those who celebrate free markets.

Cross-References

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Neoliberalism and Education in the Global South: A New Form of Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism

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Neoliberalism and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Capitalism; Colonialism; Imperialism; Neoliberalism; Primitive accumulation; Resistance

Definition

This essay explores the continuities and ruptures between older forms of colonialism and contemporary forms of imperialism centred on neoliberalism as ideology and as economic program. Specifically neoliberal imperialism has led to unprecedented levels of inequality, fed by finance, media control, and corruption. It has also irreversibly damaged the environment. While neoliberalism has not yet been defeated, it has faced stiff resistance, not only in Latin America but also in numerous regions of the world, in the form of workers' movements, women's movements, and movements to protect the environment.

Introduction

Let us start with some rough definitions and distinctions. First, we are concerned with modern imperialism and neo-liberalism, which are intimately

connected with capitalism. A developed capitalist economy is one in which capitalists or the bourgeoisie own the means of production and the rest of the people, designated as workers or proletarians, own only their labour power (Dobb 1946: 7; Marx and Engels 1969 [1848]). But the proletarians are free in a legal sense: no private person (including corporations) can compel them to do anything legally without paying them a wage. No country has fully fitted this model of the capitalist mode of production.

There is a second aspect associated with capitalism. Capitalists not only make their profit by utilising the labour power of their workers, they have also to compete with one another by using whatever means they have at their disposal, for fear that if they cannot win they will lose all their capital, or their businesses will be taken over by other capitalists. One of the first things they have to do is to save as much of their profit as possible and invest it in such a way as to increase their profits further. As Marx (1957 [1867]: 595) wrote: 'Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!' As investment grows in size, various kinds of manufacturing production display economies of scale. Long before William Petty in the late seventeenth century, and Adam Smith in the second half of the eighteenth century, an Italian monk called Antonio Serra (2011 [1613]; Bagchi 2014a) had theorised that manufacturing displays economies of scale. This contrasts with agriculture, where the output is limited by the size and fertility of the land and increasing applications of inputs yield, after a time, diminishing amounts of output. Hence, he concluded, promotion of manufacture was the means of increasing the prosperity of a kingdom or region.

There is a third basic aspect of capitalism which is often overlooked. Workers have to compete with one another in order to survive. As Marx and Engels (1976 [1845–46]: 83) wrote:

> Competition separates the individuals from one another, not only the bourgeois but still more the workers, in spite of the fact that it brings them together. Hence it is a long time before these individuals can unite . . .

Capitalism can develop only in societies in which the kind of non-market power exercised by feudal lords has been abolished or greatly moderated, and in which the capitalists or landlords turned

capitalists control state power. This happened in several communes of northern Italy and in Flanders by the 11th–13th centuries (Abulafia 1977; Braudel 1984). These capitalists often make their first piles of wealth in foreign trade: 'Intercourse with foreign nations was the historical premise for the first flourishing of manufactures, in Italy and later in Flanders' (Marx and Engels 1976 [1845–46]: 76).

Referring back to the second characteristic of capitalism, we can again use a citation from Marx and Engels (77):

> With the advent of manufacture the various nations entered into competitive relations, a competitive struggle, which was fought out in wars, protective duties and prohibitions, whereas earlier the nations, insofar as they were connected at all, had carried out an inoffensive exchange with one another.

Most of the historical evidence supports both parts of the above citation. The flows of trade within Asia were far more extensive than within Europe and between Europe and Asia before the rise of European powers, and by and large these trades were conducted peacefully (Abu-Lughod 1989). China and India, the two most populous countries of the world, had extensive internal and external trade, and big merchants conducting such trades from centuries BCE. However, these merchants acted under the regulations of states over which they had no control, and could not dispose of their property as they pleased, nor did they dare to engage in war to increase their profits (Bagchi 2005: Chaps. 9–10).

Between the 10th and 12th centuries, communes of Italy emerged as capitalist states, Communes were regions ruled by the citizenry of a town. Many of them remained subject to the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor or a prince or the Pope. But communes in Central Italy (Lombardy), organising themselves in the Lombard League, threw off the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Emperor by the twelfth century. Merchants of some of the Italian towns, many of which were ports connected by trade with the Byzantine Empire, Egypt and the Levant, grew wealthy and powerful through trade and then subjugated the countryside and compelled the surviving feudal lords to give up their privileges and

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submit to the rule of the magistracy of the town council. For the history of the emergence and consolidation of the Communes, see Procacci (1973): Chaps 1 and 2 and Epstein 1999. They developed or revived the Roman laws relating to private property (Marx and Engels 1976 [1845–46]: 99–100). One of the earliest such examples was Amalfi in southern Italy (ibid; Braudel 1984: 106–108). 'Amalfi was penetrated by a monetary economy: notarial documents show that her merchants were using gold coin to buy land as early as the ninth century. Between the eleventh and the thirteenth century, the landscape of the *valle* of Amalfi was thereby transformed: chestnut trees, vines, olive-groves, citrus fruits and mills appeared everywhere. The Amalfi Tables (*Tavole Amalfitane*) became one of the great maritime codes of Christian shipping in the Mediterranean' (1984: 107). Then two things happened to the city: in 1100, it was conquered by the Normans who proceeded to establish a feudal order on the whole of southern Italy and the island of Sicily. And in 1135 and 1137, Amalfi was sacked by the city-state of Pisa, its rival in trade. Those events sealed the fate of Amalfi as a city-state and trading power.

But the aggression against Amalfi by the city-state of Pisa is only one in an almost unending series of wars by Italian city-states against each another, against the North African Arab sultanates or viceroyalties of the Ottoman Empire, and the rapidly declining Byzantine Empire. I shall cite only a few examples of such continuous competition for profit and power using violent and diplomatic means. In 1284, at the Battle of Melora in the Ligurian Sea, the Genoese defeated and destroyed the entire shipping of Pisa, and the latter then paled into insignificance as a maritime power (Caferro 2003). Ironically enough, exactly 400 years later, a French fleet of 160 ships bombarded the city of Genoa for three days and destroyed its shipping. Genoa had already declined to a tiny power, and its decline was hastened further by this. The French bombarded Genoa in order to eliminate it as a competitor in the salt trade and because it had refused to join the war against Spain with which the city had close commercial and financial relations (Reinert 2009:

260). Such events became a regular feature in wars between rival capitalist powers. For example, in 1801, a British fleet commanded by Horatio Nelson, the most famous British naval commander of all time, bombarded Copenhagen because Denmark-Norway had joined an Alliance of Armed Neutrality, and as a neutral power, would not cease trading with France (Fremont-Barnes 2012: 84; Pocock 1987: 229). This feat was repeated in September 1807 by another British naval commander, and much of Copenhagen was burnt to cinders. So the infamous Japanese attack, against the US-occupied Pearl Harbor in December 1941, had many precedents in intra-European rivalries.

The destruction of Amalfi as a city-state and the establishment of a feudal order had an effect on the economic and social structure of southern Italy that lasted for the next seven centuries, if not longer. Until the eleventh century or so, northern Italian city-states had to pay for the goods imported from Naples and Sicily with bullion, gold, or silver. Increasingly, however, the northern Italian merchants brought cloth and other manufactures to the region and used these in part to pay for the primary products they took from it. They found it increasingly in their interest to deepen the dependence of southern Italy on northern cloth (Abulafia 1977: 284). So the problem of dependency which has plagued the non-European colonies conquered by the European powers and the USA could occur even before centre–periphery division had emerged in the *global economy.*

Imperialism Straddles the World

Among the Italian city-states, Venice had emerged as a great power by defeating its arch rival Genoa. It fought four wars with Genoa between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and emerged triumphant in the fourth war fought between 1378 and 1381 (Lane 1973: Chaps 13–14; McNeill 1974: Chaps 1–2). Even before that victory, Venice had been acting as a great power in the eastern Mediterranean, siding with one power or another as suited its interests. It continued in that role until it was thoroughly trounced in a series of

engagements with the Ottoman Empire, which had captured Constantinople, the seat of the Byzantine Empire, in 1453. However, Venice consolidated its position on the mainland of Italy, extending its territorial possessions on terra firma. This situation ended when Francis VII of France invaded Italy and the rivalry between European states was fought out among the much bigger states of Spain, France, and England, and with the newly independent Republic of Netherlands, erstwhile part of the Spanish Netherlands, as a player (ibid: 123).

From the sixteenth century, several European powers – including England, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Sweden and Prussia – strove for dominance in global trade and territorial power (Bagchi 2005: Chap. 4). Eventually, between the 1690s and the final defeat of Napoleon in the Anglo-French wars (1815), freshly sparked by the French Revolution and its successful defence by the nationalist army put together by the revolutionaries (Fremont Barnes 2012), France and Britain became the two major European powers vying for global dominance. The consolidation of British hegemony over the global economy and trade lasted till the creation of the nation state of Italy in 1861, and the German Reich after the defeat of Napoleon III by Prussia in the Battle of Sedan in 1871 (Hobsbawm 1987: Chap. 6). With the Ottoman Empire visibly declining after its defeat in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78, a Congress of the European Great Powers, including Ottoman Turkey, was convened in Berlin, with Bismarck the reich chancellor playing host. Under the Treaty of Berlin, Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia were created as independent principalities by detaching them from the Ottoman Empire, and the process was started of creating a new nation state of Bulgaria, taking it out of the Ottoman Empire (Motta 2013: Sect. I, Chap. 1). This arrangement settled little of which power was to get what share of the global resources, markets, and fields of investment. Most of Asia – including India and China – had already been subjugated, the coastal areas of West, South and East Africa were already in the possession of one European power or another, and they were now competing for the acquisition of all the interior of Africa. One

of the claimants of the huge territory of the Congo was King Leopold II of Belgium, who used Henry Morton Stanley to explore and stake out a claim for him. In 1884, at the Berlin conference of the major European powers, again hosted by Bismarck, Leopold's claim was recognised and the whole of Africa was divided into spheres of control among the European powers. Leopold had already managed, through his agents, to secure US recognition of his claim (Hochschild 1999: Chaps 3–5). 'The scramble for Africa' received its official sanction.

Imperialism and Theories

Eric Hobsbawm (1987) called the period from 1875 to 1914 'the age of empire'. This designation is justified only to the extent that this was the period during which all the major capitalist powers were trying to grab whatever colonies were still left un-usurped by the others, and began also planning to take away other powers' colonies wherever they could. The developments that took place during this period gave rise to the Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism (Hobson 1902; Lenin 1957 [1916]), and also to parallel studies by liberals such as H.N. Brailsford and Marxists such as Rudolf Hilferding (1981 [1910]), Rosa Luxemburg (1951 [1913]), and Nikolai Bukharin (1972 [1915]). Of these theories, the Hobson-Lenin theory has proved most influential. The subtitle of Lenin's pamphlet has led to a deluge of unnecessary controversy. Hobsbawm (1987: 11–12) has pointed out that Lenin never claimed that imperialism was 'the highest stage of capitalism'. He had called it the 'latest' stage of capitalism, and the subtitle was changed after his death.

Among these theorists, Rosa Luxemburg used colonial conquests as the centrepiece of her analysis. She argued that since capitalists are always taking away a large share of the surplus value created by labour, the latter would not have enough purchasing power to buy the consumer goods produced by them. Therefore, the capitalists needed to break down what she (and many other Marxist authors) called the 'natural

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economy' of non-capitalist countries and convert the erstwhile producers of those economies into buyers of the commodities to be sold by the capitalists. It was also necessary to dispossess the producers in order to increase the supply of labour to an ever expanding capitalist system (Luxemburg 1951 [1913]: especially Sect. 3, 'The historical conditions of accumulation').

From Bukharin (1972 [1915]) to Kalecki (1971 [1967]), many Marxists and others have criticised Luxemburg for her theoretical mistake about the solution of what the Marxists called the realisation problem and is now known as the problem of effective demand (after Keynes). Theoretically, it is possible, as was argued by Tugan-Baranovski, that capitalists can invest greater and greater amounts as their total profits and even their share of profits go up. But as the capitalists invest larger and larger amounts, in the general case, their profits will fall. They will then retrench their investment and the realisation crisis will affect the economy. One solution to the problem is competition among capitalists: in order to survive and preserve themselves from being taken over by another firm, they have to invest even when the profitability of their operations is declining. But there is again a limit to the decline in profitability and they have to retrench their expenditure, and the realisation crisis is triggered once more. Thus, Luxemburg's problem cannot be wished away just by showing the incompleteness of her theoretical model.

In the last chapter of her book ('Militarism as a province of accumulation'), Luxemburg pointed to another factor that has become increasingly important in the current neo-liberal phase of imperialism, both as an instrument of domination and control, and as a means of generating higher effective demand and profits, without empowering the working class through an improvement in its real earnings or working conditions. Military expenditures, arms sales, and military bases of Western powers, especially the US, have played a major role in enforcing the global imperial order (Grimmett and Kerr 2012; Shah 2013). While the US, in spite of the recession, continues to be by far the biggest military spender in the world, and also remains the biggest seller of arms (with

Russia ranking second), it is ironic that, developing nations (especially client states of the Western bloc) are the biggest buyers of arms.

Hilferding's theory of finance capital (1981 [1910]) was a generalisation based mainly on the Continental European countries (including Tsarist Russia) trying to catch up with Britain. Banks had played a critical role in many of those countries by giving cheap credit to the industrial firms. Hilferding saw this as an amalgam of finance and industrial capital. The role of finance in the contemporary imperial order is very different (Patnaik 2011). Finance has emerged as a separate power on its own. It directs the global, interstate financial organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the European Central Bank, and so on to act according to the interests of the biggest hedge funds, private equity funds, and other private financial giants. It also buys up politicians and political parties by giving them campaign funds in all kinds of ways, and holding them hostage, as the careers of US presidents from Reagan to Obama and the rise to power in India of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Narendra Modi in 2014 vividly illustrate. Modi's campaign for the post of prime minister cost, at a conservative estimate, INR50 billion or about US$850 million (Ghosh 2014). In actual fact, it cost several times more, because much of the expenditure by the local campaign agents was made without any receipt, in order to avoid restrictions on expenditure made by the Indian Election Commission, a statutory body.

The aggrandisement of the finance companies has proceeded apace even after the financial and economic crisis officially signalled by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. This has been helped by the bail-outs of banks by all concerned governments. No CEOs of finance houses have been prosecuted, even when they had resorted to fraudulent behaviour (Rakoff 2014). The weaker economies of the Eurozone – generally with a history of belonging to the periphery of the zone, such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS) – have been the worst sufferers of the financial crisis starting in 2007–08, and some of them have been led up the garden path for

slaughter by the big finance companies (Dunbar and Martinuzzi 2012). But those companies have great influence with the governments of the US, UK, Germany, and France. So ordinary people in the PIIGS are made to suffer under a draconian austerity policy (Blyth 2013).

Side by side with these developments, millions of poor citizens – including small businessmen – in advanced capitalist as well as developing economies have been excluded from formal credit networks. They have to pay usurious interest rates to local moneylenders or intermediaries of big finance houses and often lose their land or other means of livelihood when they default on their loans. Hundreds and thousands of them, such as farmers in India and Mali, have committed suicide as a result (Bagchi and Dymski 2007).

Some resistance to the dominance of the IMF and the US-EU finance companies is being built up through the agreement signed in September 2009 by the leaders of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia to establish the Bank of the South with a capital of $20 billion (MercoPress 2009), and by the May 2014 agreement to establish the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) development bank, along with a currency reserve pool. But whether they can rival the IMF or World Bank depends on how much capital they can mobilise. In 2013–14 the World Bank and China Development Bank each lent around $32 billion to developing countries (Williams 2014). On the other hand, while the late Hugo Chávez was president of Venezuela, his country lent, or granted, a larger amount to the peoples of America than the US administration. In 2007, for example, Venezuela spent more than $8.8 billion in grants, loans, and energy aid as against $3 billion spent by the Bush Administration (Lamrani 2013).

Free Trade Imperialism and Neo-liberalism

Although Adam Smith and David Hume preached free trade, their homeland did not adopt it during their lifetime. Britain adopted free trade for its own external commerce only in the 1840s when the Corn Laws protecting British agriculture were abolished. It should be emphasised that free trade and laissez faire are not synonymous. Britain adopted free trade policies but from 1833 began adopting laws restricting child labour, women's labour, and hours of work in mines and factories. Britain could do all this because by then it had become the leading industrial and economic power in the world. In the eighteenth century, Josiah Tucker had laid the foundation of the theory of free trade imperialism (Bagchi 2014a; Semmel 1970). His analytical model used what would later be known as the theory of cumulative causation. Both Adam Smith and Tucker were opposed to colonies established by monopoly companies that had been established by means of charters granted by their governments. They were also opposed to the special privileges granted to producers in the home governments that impaired the economic development of colonies. They opposed the British government's attempt to quell the revolt of the 13 American colonies. But Smith had little to say about the general attempt of the Europeans to conquer non-European peoples.

Tucker's opposition to colonialism was in some ways more fundamental, based as it was on what could be called the Hume-Tucker theory of economic development (Bagchi 1996).

According to Tucker, writes Bagchi (2014a: 552):

> Hume's essays on money and the balance of trade . . . were being read as implying that a rich country, through free trade, would necessarily be brought down to the same level of income as a poor country. This reading suggested that when a rich country trades with a poorer country, it will gain gold or silver (virtually the only international currencies of the time) for the goods it sells to the poorer. The access to that bullion, coined or uncoined, would raise prices all round in the richer country and eventually make its exports uncompetitive, so that bullion will flow out of the richer country until the prices and, by implication, incomes were equalised in the two countries.

> Tucker countered this view by working out the rationale of cumulative causation keeping the richer country ahead . . . According to him, the richer country would be able to stay ahead of the poorer because: (a) the richer country, with better implements, infrastructure, a more extended trading

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network and more productive agriculture, would be more productive overall; (b) it would be able to spend more on further improvements; and (c) the larger markets of the richer country would provide scope for greater division of labour and greater variety of products. Tucker also pointed to the advantages a richer country would enjoy in terms of human resources and the generation of knowledge: (a) it would attract the abler and more knowledgeable people because of higher incomes and opportunities; (b) it would be better endowed with information and capacity for producing new knowledge; and (c) a greater degree of competitiveness gained through higher endowments of capital, knowledge, ability to acquire more knowledge and capital and the energy of people with more capital and ability to generate more capital and knowledge in the richer country would make products cheaper. Finally, the larger capital resources of the richer country would lower interest rates and render investable funds cheaper.

Gallagher and Robinson (1953) coined the phrase, 'imperialism of free trade', and argued that in the nineteenth century Britain primarily concentrated on the policy of forcing colonies – formal and informal – and defeated powers to abolish restrictions on foreign trade, rather than always wanting to acquire new territories as colonies. Thus, for example, when Spanish and Portuguese America threw off the rule of Spain and Portugal, the UK recognised their independence on condition that they allowed the free import of British manufactures. This policy more or less ensured that few large-scale industries grew up in Latin America in the nineteenth century. Of course, the 'imperialism of free trade' required to be backed up by military action from time to time (Semmel 1970). The two wars the UK fought in the interest of forcing China to allow the free import of opium – a drug which was produced by Indian peasants but from which the British Indian government derived a large revenue – are perhaps the most notorious examples of this policy.

But British liberalism did not mutate into neoliberalism during the heyday of the British Empire. While one principal feature of liberalism was the centralisation of decision making into a few hands (Wallerstein 2011), its market-friendly policies, and the freedom of contract it wanted to universalise, were constrained by the workers' struggles in the core countries and the need of the factory-owners to have a healthier workforce and the rulers to have more fighting-fit armed

force (Atiyah 1979; Bagchi 2005: Chap. 7; Clark 1995). The largest formal colonial empire ruled by Britain and the mass migration of the poorer sections of the population to the US, Canada, and other lands taken over by Europeans also obviated the need for the creation of a neoliberal global order.

It was after the end of the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism (Marglin and Schor 1990) – from say 1945 to 1970 – that we witness the full unfolding of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is a symptom of capitalism in extremis, of the involution of the system, when it regurgitates resources it has already captured to try and draw nourishment from them. In practice, neo-liberalism is a virus that penetrates every pore of the social body and every atom of the surrounding earth and its stratosphere. It attacks the family and seeks to reduce it to a relationship among self-centred individuals; it commercialises love and makes potential lovers into consumers through the celebration of St Valentine's Day; it commercialises and corrupts sport, reducing it to a consumer item and a means of advertising the prowess of the country or the city. In nature, it spoils the soil, pollutes and makes scarce clean drinking water, clean air, and sanitary living quarters. It attacks the innards of the earth's surface under land, rivers, along coastlines, and under the deep ocean floor. It has evolved the ideology of austerity for defrauding the poor of whatever control they may have over their lives (Blyth 2013). In the following, the many facets and effects of neo-liberalism will be analysed, with illustrations from all regions of the world (for brief accounts of the rise of neo-liberalism, see Bagchi 2005: Chaps 22–25; Harvey 2007).

Independent countries following Britain rejected both the practice of freedom of external commerce, and from the late nineteenth century, laissez faire doctrines as well. Alexander Hamilton in his *Report on Manufactures* (1791) argued that the new republic of the United States of America should impose duties and other restrictions on imports of British manufactures in order to safeguard and promote domestic industrial production. In 1841, Friedrich List argued that the British had become industrially the most advanced country in the world by adopting

policies of import restriction and state patronage for domestic production and shipping during the preceding centuries (List 1909 [1841]). Countries wanting to prosper industrially and economically should study British practice and ignore the British propaganda in favour of free trade. Neoliberalism can be seen as the adoption of both free trade imperialism abroad and laissez faire for the domestic polity by the principal capitalist powers, and enforcement of such policies in all countries that are subjugated by them.

Neo-liberalism, Media, and Corporate Power

Ruling classes rule by using coercion, encoded in law, and by persuading the ruled to believe in the right to rule of the former. This ideological hegemony is exercised through educational systems, through nurturing in the family, and through propaganda. This propaganda can often take the form of feeding false information to the public and suppressing the correct information. The propaganda war by the US-led coalition of Western powers reached new heights from the Thatcher-Reagan era of neo-liberalism onwards (Herman and Chomsky 2002).

The basic characteristics of their 'propaganda model' as set out by Herman and Chomsky (2002: 2), in which the inequality of wealth and power plays the crucial part, can be understood by combining three of the basic ideas adumbrated by Marx, and the Marxists and other radical writers (including, of course, Chomsky and Herman in their other writings). The first idea is that under capitalism two laws operate, unless they are countered by resistance of the workers or liberal defenders of free competition as against oligopolies. These two laws are those of concentration and centralisation of economic power. In most areas of commodity production, economies of scale in production, finance, marketing, and advertising will enable a large firm to cut the cost of production, raise finance on more favourable terms and reach the buyers on a wider front than a small firm. Economies of scale in production are best exemplified by the three-fifths law in process (ore refining and

chemical industries); namely, that as the volume of a vessel doubles the surface area increases only by approximately three-fifths, thus conferring a cost advantage to the owner of the larger container. This plus the advantage in raising finance that a larger firm generally enjoys will allow it to take over smaller firms and thus economic power will be centralised in fewer hands. The process of centralisation was accelerated as a market for firms developed in the 1960s (Manne 1965; Shleifer 2000). The second proposition is that the dominating ideas in a society are the ideas of the ruling class. The third strand of the argument is that despite advances made by some ex-colonial countries in economic and human development, the world is dominated by the imperial countries led by the US. The fourth, relatively recent strand of the argument is that the ideas of neo-liberal liberalisation have gripped the ruling classes of the subordinate countries and the latter have done their best to inculcate them among the labouring population. Herman and Chomsky applied their propaganda model to the US ruling class, but it can be applied to the relation between media, corporate power, and the state in every market economy. Moreover, the suppression or exclusion of relevant information, the deliberate channelling of disinformation, and the concentration of media and corporate power have been taken much further in the twenty-first century.

There is a reciprocal relationship between the media and the government. In Britain, successive prime ministers from Tony Blair to David Cameron, and leaders of the Opposition (would-be prime ministers) have taken care to cultivate Rupert Murdoch, chairman of News Corporation and arguably the most powerful media magnate in the world (Allen 2012). The kind of deception and false propaganda on the basis of which Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had conducted wars in Nicaragua, a proxy war in Iran, and the first war against Iraq reached their apogee in the Second Gulf War against Iraq in 2003. As Bagchi (2005: 334) writes:

> ... neoliberalism has increasingly resorted to divesting the state of functions that Adam Smith thought could never be in the private domain. These include military and security operations both at home and abroad. Prison services are privatized and private firms profit from them. Military

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functions are contracted out to private firms, and in the name of security and war against terrorism, the executive branch of the government removes their own accountability and the accountability of the firms to the legislature or the electorate (Johnson 2004; Pieterse 2004). The deception and the disinformation about the weapons of mass destruction in the possession of Saddam Hussein (Economist 2003a, b) are all of a piece with this attempt on the part of White House and Whitehall to put themselves above not only international law but the laws of their own nations.

After the 9/11 events of 2001, the US Surveillance Court allowed the official spy agencies to breach all earlier standards of protection of privacy through accessing trillions and trillions of personal information of its citizens and non-citizens all across the world (Savage and Poitras 2014). As the scale of surveillance increased, courageous whistleblowers such as Daniel Ellsberg (who leaked the lies spread by the Pentagon during the US–Vietnam War), Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, and their associates such as Laura Poitras revealed the escalation of the reach of surveillance and its iniquity. Secrets were sold to dictators, people were killed, arrested, and kept in secret prisons without the benefit of any legal defence (Big News Network 2013; Campbell 2014; WikiLeaks 2014). The spy agencies of the USA and some European countries spied on friendly governments as well as on governments of what they considered to be hostile countries, and on businesses of other countries whose secrets the US corporate houses wanted to know.

In the meantime, Israel, the longestoffending rogue state since 1948, continued with impunity its murderous campaign of ethnic cleansing directed at the Palestinians, that land's original inhabitants; not content with driving out the Arabs from the legal territory of Israel, it has continued to try and destroy Palestinian homes and villages. (Rachel Corrie, a 23-year-old US student was killed by an Israeli bulldozer razing a Palestinian home in 2003.) Courageous Israeli citizens such as Ilan Pappé (2007, 2014) and Mordechai Vanunu who disclosed Israel's nuclear programme remain in exile (Pappé) or a prisoner of conscience (Vanunu). Vanunu's case illustrates the length to which a neo-liberal, racist regime can

go to punish a protester: 'in 1986, Vanunu went to Britain to tell the *Sunday Times* the story of the then secret nuclear weapons facility at Dimona in Israel. He was lured by a woman from Mossad [the Israeli spy agency] to Italy. There, he was kidnapped, drugged and smuggled out of the country to Israel, where he was convicted of espionage' (Campbell 2014). Since then, he has been kept many years in solitary confinement, his passport has been taken away, and when out of prison, he is not allowed to make any public statement; and he was not allowed out of the country even though a group of 54 British MPs had invited him.

The strongest supporters of Israel are the hardcore European and US Zionists and the neoconservatives such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. In fact, neo-conservatives have been accused of putting the interest of Zionists in Israel even above those of the US (Heilbrunn 2004; Lieven 2004a, 2004b). But in fact, Israel serves a vital role by terrorising the Arab countries with its military might, continually replenished with US help (Chomsky 2012). It is now a moot issue as to how useful Israel will remain as an ally, when fundamentalist Islam and desperate resistance have spread all over West Asia and North America, often unwittingly helped by the US intelligence agencies. But Israel's determination to take away the lands of the Palestinians by killing or driving them off remains unabated, with scant regard for world opinion as its genocidal assault against the Gaza Strip in July 2014 demonstrated.

In India, all the neo-liberal regimes have used media to sustain their power. They also evolved the phenomenon of 'paid news'; that is, advertisements for particular politicians and parties which appeared as news, without the newspaper signalling them as such. The Press Council of India, supposedly the watchdog for media, condemned the practice (Guha Thakurta 2011; Press Council of India 2010), but it continues in some form or another. In any case, with corporate control of the media, only news that can benefit the corporates commercially or politically finds a place in big newspapers or major TV channels, although smaller papers and electronic media try to keep up a tradition of investigative journalism (Sainath 2011).

Neo-liberalism, Creative Adaptation and Resistance

Several countries or regions of East Asia (including Singapore in South-East Asia) have creatively adapted to neo-liberalism and boosted their economic growth and human development, although virtually all of them have paid a price in increased inequality and constraints on human freedom. They include Taiwan, South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK for short), Singapore, People's Republic of China (PRC, or China), and more recently Vietnam. On the other side of the world, major Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Ecuador have resisted the worst aspects of neo-liberalism and US domination from the late 1990s or the first decade of the twenty-first century. But the history of such resistance goes back to that of Guatemala's President Juan José Arévalo, under whose leadership the dictator Ubico was overthrown in 1944, and his successor Jacopo Arbenz. Because of the pro-worker and pro-peasant policies of the two democratically elected presidents, which hurt the interests of the United Fruit Company, at that time the US-based biggest producer and seller of bananas in the world, the CIA organised a coup against Arbenz and overthrew him (Cullather 1999). Guatemala, along with most of the Central American republics, moved into a long night of rule by mass-murdering dictators, helped by the US. Resistance against US-backed dictators erupted in Cuba, where, from 1953 to 58, rebel forces led by Fidel Castro fought against and eventually overthrew the dictator Fulgencio Batista and established a socialist regime from 1959 (Wright 2001). That regime has served as a beacon of the left in Latin America and the Caribbean (and for other socialist activists across the world); and it has naturally attracted the concentrated enmity of the US ruling classes and their collaborators throughout the region. In 1973, on 11 September 1973 (the 9/11 of Latin America), Salvador Allende, the democratically elected socialist president of Chile, was overthrown and killed by the armed forces of the country, aided and abetted by the US government, and the vicious dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was installed. During the 1980s, the US conducted a wholly illegal and vicious war through its surrogate collaborators in Nicaragua against socialist Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN), which was fighting to liberate the country from the grip of the dictator Anastasio Somoza.

Despite the continuous opposition and machinations of the US, by 2009, battered by US-inspired neo-liberal policies, 13 countries of Latin America had elected leftist presidents, including Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, who had been the leader of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua (Lupu 2009). Apart from Fidel Castro, another charismatic leader, Hugo Chávez emerged in Latin America to challenge the neo-liberal and US dominance in the region. After being democratically elected in 1998, Chávez survived a coup organised by the elite of Venezuela, and – despite continuous disinformation spread by the Venezuelan elite and mainstream US media – won every election till his death in 2013. He left a legacy of land reforms, public education, health care for the poor, and a high degree of participation by the ordinary people in decisions of the state (Harnecker 2013). There have been some setbacks, and some regimes have been seduced by promises of US or World Bank aid, but on the whole the left turn continues in the region. The latest victories have been those of Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party in Chile in March 2014 and of the ex-guerrilla leader Salvador Sanchez Ceren as the president of El Salvador in the same month (Wilkinson 2014).

Virtually the only developing countries or regions that have been able to industrialise in a proper sense – that is, where both employment and income generated by industry contribute a much larger fraction to the national or regional employment and income – are Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Of these regions, Taiwan and South Korea had been colonies of Japan. For various historical reasons, both South Korea and Taiwan underwent thoroughgoing pro-peasant land reforms in the 1950s. In Singapore, the government owned 70% of the land, and used that as a lever for both raising

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revenues from the government-owned housing board and for relocating industries when structural change so demanded. In Hong Kong, all the land is now owned by the PRC. Before 1997 as well, most of the land was owned by the government. In the PRC and Vietnam, the communist regimes had got rid of landlords. The abolition of landlordism had thus created the basic condition for the development of capitalism in the private enterprise economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and pre-1997 Hong Kong, and a base for building basic forms of socialism in PRC and Vietnam such as publicly funded education and health care and a guarantee of a minimum standard of nutrition.

However, the private enterprise economies of Taiwan and ROK learned from Japan, the pioneer of East Asian industrialisation. (For a brief history of the Japanese experience of competing with Western capitalist countries and moving towards industrialisation, see Bagchi 2005: Chap. 12.) First, while these economies obtained loans and aid from the Western countries trying to build a bulwark of resistance against communism, they tried to become free of dependence on those loans as soon as possible. Otherwise they might have become dependent perennially on Western countries. Second, even when they had been receiving Western loans and aid and had privileged access to Western markets, they did not allow any foreign enterprise to acquire a foothold in any important sector of the economy. Until 1993, ROK – and until very recently, Taiwan – strictly controlled foreign direct and portfolio investment. Third, they all adopted policies that induced or compelled their firms to absorb any foreign technology they bought or borrowed and upgrade it to suit their own requirements as quickly as possible.

Until 1978, China operated a command economy. When it wanted to bring in reforms, it did so under its own compulsion, not under the pressure of the IMF, World Bank or USAID. Before the start of reforms, China had already built up a network of roads and other infrastructural facilities by utilising its enormous manpower resources. It also constructed a large industrial sector, although often only with 1950s Soviet-era technology. It was still a very poor country. It suffered a food crisis in the early 1980s and had to

avail itself of UN food aid. Bu the reforms it had introduced in agriculture, in industry and decision-making processes began yielding results soon. PRC had nationalised all land, and, until 1978, the land was cultivated collectively by the village or cluster of villages and towns under the commune system. Land is still state-owned in China, but the local or provincial government can lease it out to users for specific purposes. In agriculture, PRC introduced the Household Responsibility System under which a household was given a plot of land to cultivate under its own responsibility, with specific payments to be made to the state (such as, for example, an amount of grain delivered, later generally changed to cash payments). The prices of agricultural products were raised in order to increase the incomes of the peasants. Other steps taken by the government included: (a) decentralisation of powers of raising revenues and spending them (with the central government making transfer payments to correct imbalances between surplus and deficit provinces); (b) greater autonomy of state enterprises to retain profits and invest them; and (c) introducing a credit system to finance investments and monitor them (ESCAP 2014: Chap. 7). The state continued to change the reform measures as conditions changed. It took quick measures to control balance-of-payments deficits, so as to avoid dependence on foreign loans. It also continually changed policies with regard to state enterprises and research institutions, sometimes merging them, sometimes directing a research institution to float commercial firms, and so on (Gu 1999; Oi and Walder 1999). When it began foreign direct investment, it offered many concessions to the investors, first creating special economic zones for them and then allowing them also to operate in other regions, especially in the economically backward western provinces of the country. These concessions often resulted in an extreme degree of exploitation of labour. But on the other hand, the conditions imposed on foreign investment generally led to a surplus of foreign exchange inflows over outflows. PRC also never allowed free flow of portfolio investment into its stock markets by the residents. Similar restrictions were also operative in Taiwan. This is one of the

reasons why neither of the two economies were affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. China has now emerged as the second largest economy in the world, with a still relatively low per capita income but reasonably high levels of human development, and an enormous increase in inequality.

Vietnam was utterly devastated by the 30-year war with Western powers: France to start with and the US after the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In 1979, almost simultaneously with the Chinese reforms, the government of Vietnam began dismantling the 'bureaucratic centralism and subsidy system' because of the urgent need to improve the living standards of the peasants and equip them with the resources and incentives for improving productivity. An American trade (and investment) embargo on Vietnam was lifted in 1994. In 1995 Vietnam joined ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations.

Vietnam's advance was built on some earlier foundations. It had a long record of investment in human capital, both in education and in health provision. In 1990, the adult literacy rate for men here was already 94%, and 87% for women. Beyond this, Vietnam had invested substantially in higher education, and there was a cohort of officials well trained, for example, in agricultural techniques and engineering, generating a receptivity to technical change (Beresford 1993).

The core of Vietnam's economic strategy since the early 1990s has been a rapid integration into the world economy: the development of a diversified portfolio of oil, manufactured and agricultural exports, and the attraction of direct foreign investment. This has been combined with successful domestic agricultural growth and a continued role for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while encouraging growth of the private sector. Gross capital formation, largely from domestic sources – despite substantial inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) – rose from just over a quarter of GDP in the mid-1990s to over a third of GDP in the early 2000s.

Unlike Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, Vietnam remained unaffected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, and it emerged as the fastest growing economy of South-East Asia.

Like China, it retained autonomy of economic and social policy and depended – despite the large inflows of FDI – mainly on domestic sources of growth in demand (ESCAP 2014: Chap. 6). But as in China, this achievement was bought at the cost of increases in inequality between town and country and among persons.

Neo-liberalism and Corruption

Corruption, in the sense of people making money by using political connections, has been endemic to capitalism and especially to capitalist colonialism. Businessmen from metropolitan countries enjoyed enormous patronage from the colonial authorities in the allocation of land and construction of plantations, railways, ports, and purchase of commodities by the government. With the rise and growth of the stock exchange, the corruption reached new heights, for example, in eighteenth–century Britain (Dirks 2006) and France under Louis Napoleon (aka Napoleon III) (Plessis 1987). Since the late nineteenth century, there has been no period in which 'crony capitalism' – that is, the enrichment of the capitalists in association with politicians and bureaucrats – has ceased to operate. This has been especially true of the arms industry, including the making of ships of naval forces, and increasingly of aircraft, both civilian and military. The US administration has, for example, lobbied repeatedly for the purchase of Boeing or Douglas McDonnell aeroplanes as against the products of the European company Airbus SAS (formerly Airbus Industrie).

But the advent of neo-liberalism worldwide since the 1970s has escalated both the scale and spread of corruption. In the US, much of the corruption has been legalised by allowing many industries such as gun making, finance and health care to have recognised lobbyists who try and influence Congressmen. The latter two have been particularly active in the 1990s and in the twenty-first century. Moreover, politicians raise campaign funds by various means. Recently, the US Supreme Court has legalised donations by corporations to politicians and parties (Liptak 2014).

Beyond the borders of the state, the US state permits any illegality committed by its corporations and citizens, so long as it does not infringe any sacred tenet of US foreign policy, such as the real or imagined security of Israel. Another sacred tenet was earlier not to allow anybody to give any assistance to communist countries through trade, aid, or sensitive technology. That prohibition still continues in the case of Cuba, on which the USA tries to enforce its completely illegal embargo of trade. But the focus has shifted to the so-called war on terror (of a specifically Islamic variety), started by the Republican Administration of President Bush and continued diligently by the Democratic one of President Obama. Behind such wars there also are many links to crony capitalism, such as Dick Cheney and Halliburton Corporation profiting from the Iraq War, or the family of George Bush continuing to benefit from its cosy relationship with the Saudi monarchy, a throwback to the most benighted realms of the past (Bronson 2006; Unger 2007; Woodward 2004).

Corruption was rife in the dictatorships in the Third World either promoted directly or supported by the US and its allies. Indonesia under the control of Suharto's military regime was one of the stellar examples of such corruption. According to an investigation by *Time* magazine, after his fall from power in 1998, Suharto was busy protecting his family's wealth: '$9 billion of Suharto money was transferred from Switzerland to a nominee bank account in Austria. Not bad for a man whose presidential salary was $1,764 a month when he left office' (Colmey and Liebhold 1999). Altogether, 'Suharto and his six children still have a conservatively estimated $15 billion in cash, shares, corporate assets, real estate, jewelry and fine art – including works by Indonesian masters' (1999). Suharto's regime left a legacy of corruption which affects the lives of millions of Indonesians and damages the environment very seriously. For example, in East Indonesia, when construction contractors were asked to give competitive bids, it was found that several of them had done so in identical writing and some did not bother to go through the actual bidding process (Tidey 2012). This kind of collusive behaviour is almost routine in many

developing countries, including India. Under the Suharto regime, the major source of revenues had been exploitation of natural resources, including oil and other minerals and the forests of other islands. These resources were generally extracted by big foreign companies, often in association with the Suharto family or military top brass. They had often simply burned the forests as a cheap way of clearing them for creating plantations or extracting minerals. This practice continued after the change to a formally democratic regime. In 2006, Indonesian forest fires created a haze that covered neighbouring states including Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines (Ghosh 2006).

The only two indexes of success recognised by the World Bank are the rate of economic growth, as conventionally measured, and the extent of poverty reduction, as measured by the crudest and minimalist criteria, such as the percentage of people falling below an income of US$1 ($1.25) or $2 per day. (For a critique of the conventional poverty measures, see UNDESA 2009: Chap. 2.) Indonesia under Suharto is supposed to have done well by these criteria, although the reduction of poverty was exaggerated, and the labour department and the statistics departments contradicted each other (Bagchi 1998). (Under the military regime, many data were unavailable to outsiders.) Among the major Asian countries, Indonesia suffered the most in the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The officially measured proportion of people under the poverty line jumped from 18 to 24% between 1997 and 1228, but there was a huge clustering of people above the poverty line, so that a small change in cost of living or earnings can push large numbers of people below that measure. Moreover, there were huge differences in the incidence of poverty between outer regions and Java, and even within Java, between villages and cities (Breman 2001; UNDP 2001: 7–9).

The globalisation of corruption under neoliberalism produced startling and costly results for the Indian public with the entry of Enron into the electricity generation sector in India. When Kenneth Lay took over as the CEO of Enron in 1979, the company specialised in the production and transmission of natural gas and pipelines and

in production of plastics. It soon expanded its business to the generation and sale of electricity. It built political links with the Bush family and the Republicans:

> Since 1993, Lay and top Enron executives donated nearly $2 million to Bush. Lay also personally donated $326,000 in soft money to the Republican Party in the three years prior to Bush's presidential bid, and he was one of the Republican 'pioneers' who raised $100,000 in smaller contributions for Bush. Lay's wife donated $100,000 for inauguration festivities. (Scheer 2001)

Attracted by the enormous amounts of income that the Enron executives –including the CEO Lay – could earn from trading in derivatives and stock options and bonuses from rising values of shares in the stock market, Enron resorted to creating derivatives in energy supplies, offshore entities to hide the liabilities it assumed, and creative accounting in collusion with Arthur Andersen, the world's biggest accounting firm, before its dissolution. When ultimately, Enron could no longer deceive its creditors, it filed for protection under US bankruptcy law in December 2001. It is interesting that it enjoyed a high credit rating from the global credit agencies even up to the middle of 2001. The complex web of deception Enron built can be gauged from the fact that after it filed for bankruptcy it was found that it had created 2800 offshore units and that 54 pages were required to list people and companies owed money by it (Cornford 2006: 20). On the way to bankruptcy, it had totally pauperised its workers by locking all their pensions into the stocks of the firm. The value of those shares fell to nothing after Enron crashed. Enron also defrauded the US and Canadian publics in other ways. After deregulation of electricity supplies in the US and to a smaller extent in Canada, Enron had got into the business of supplying electricity to the US state of California and to Canada. The result was the following development:

> In the midst of the California energy troubles in early 2001, when power plants were under a federal order to deliver a full output of electricity, the Enron Corporation arranged to take a plant off-line on the same day that California was hit by rolling blackouts, according to audiotapes of company traders released here on Thursday . . . . Enron, as early as 1998, was creating artificial energy shortages and running up prices in Canada in advance of California's larger experiment with deregulation . . . . [T]he California energy crisis . . . produced blackouts and billions of dollars of surcharges to homes and businesses on the West Coast in 2000 and 2001. (Egan 2005)

Enron got into India soon after the Indian central government introduced neo-liberal reforms in 1991. On the assumption that India needed enormous amounts of private foreign funds in order to create large capacities for electricity generation, in 1992 the government amended the 1948 Electricity Act that reserved electricity generation and strictly regulated the pricing of electricity. The amendment allowed the entry of private companies into the business of generation and transmission of electricity, and, what is more, guaranteed a return of 16% on the capital invested to foreign investors (Victor and Heller 2007: chapter on "India" by Rahul Tangia). It may be mentioned that even the colonial British Indian government had only guaranteed a return of 5% to British companies constructing railroads in India. Indian officials visited the US scouting for investors, and Enron seized the opportunity. In 1992, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of India for building a series of gas-based power plants with a generating capacity of 2000 MW.

A confidential World Bank report of 1993 argued that the project was economically unviable and therefore it did not receive the bank's funding. Nonetheless, in the same year, the electricity board of the state of Maharshtra, in which the plant would be located, concluded a 20-year agreement for building the plant at Dabhol. But when the opposition party, the Hindu-chauvinist Shiv Sena, came to power here in 1995, it filed a law-suit to cancel the agreement. But after a meeting between an Enron executive Rebecca Mark and Bal Thackeray, the unelected and non-accountable supremo of Shiv Sena, the Mahrashtra government agreed to renegotiate the agreement. (Enron later showed an expenditure of $20 million for 'educating' the public in India.) After a review by the neo-liberal energy, Kirit Parikh, the government went ahead with the project on the basis of slightly altered terms. Dabhol's

first phase, begun in 1999, proved to be too expensive and too burdensome because the Maharashtra State Electricity Board had to pay for the cost of utilising the plant's full capacity, even if it could use only a fraction of that capacity. The Maharashtra government then set up an inquiry committee under the chairmanship of Madhav Godobole, a senior and widely respected bureaucrat, and the report condemned the whole project in no uncertain terms. The already built Dabhol plant was shut down. Meanwhile, Enron filed for bankruptcy. Most experts (Godbole and Sarma 2006; Prayas Energy Group 2001, 2005) were against trying to restart the plant because there were legal complications arising from the Enron crash and, technologically, the plant had become obsolete owing to the shutdown. However, Parikh argued for restarting the plant, and the views of the neoliberal experts prevailed. The state-owned National Thermal Power Corporation and Gas Authority of India Limited were persuaded to float a joint venture and take over the plant in 2005, and, after technical glitches suffered by equipment supplied by General Electric had been overcome, the plant started operating in 2010.

The Indian Enron story shows that while the neo-liberal policy of generating private profit at public cost was being pursued, there was stiff opposition against it, from conscientious bureaucrats to scientists (e.g. the Delhi Science Forum and Prayas Energy Group) and the general public. The victory of the neoliberals in their programmes was made possible because they ran a democracy that money could buy. It is necessary to pay some attention to the theory and practice of democracies that benefit plutocrats all over the world.

Neo-liberalism and Democracy

Under capitalism, formal democracy has always been weighted in favour of the propertied classes. But for a brief period, first in the major Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, and in most West European countries between around 1945 and 1970, working classes found a voice and a welfare or social democratic state operated. One principal contribution of neoliberalism has been to destroy the workers' resistance in those countries and install democracies that money can buy. In India, the most populous formal democracy in the world, the same tendency prevailed under neo-liberalism – in the central government and in most of the constituent states. The climax was reached in the parliamentary elections of 2014, when the Hindu nationalist BJP, led by Narendra Modi, obtained an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the central legislature) by mounting a lavishly funded campaign. Because of the majority rule of representation in every constituency, the BJP obtained that legislative majority with only 31% of the votes polled. In the US, lobbying for particular interests and corporations has been legal for a long time. Between 1998 and 2013, lobbyists contributed a total of $60.38 billion to the two major parties, the Republicans and the Democrats. Among the top-contributing sectors were finance (insurance, banking, hedge funds), private health care, and defence suppliers. Among corporations, top contributors included Boeing, General Electric (GE), Google, by now the biggest internet company in the world, and Pfizer, the biggest drugs and pharmaceuticals company globally, which conspired to create the entity called the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Center for Responsive Politics 2014a, 2014b). Besides contributions by lobbyists, individual politicians also receive campaign funding from corporations. For his 2008 campaign, for example, the presidential candidate Barack Obama received funds from Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Microsoft and Google, among others. Altogether he was able to raise $417.5 million in direct campaign funding (Center for Responsive Politics 2004b, 2014a). It is not surprising then that Obama would pursue policies that would benefit these corporations or that he should appoint as treasury secretary Tim Geithner, who has had a close relationship with both the foreign policy establishment and Wall Street all his life. Nor is it surprising that the policies Obama followed during both his terms should be those of George Bush and Bill Clinton. The US Supreme Court has now lifted all limits on

campaign funding, so big corporations can simply buy the legislators who will back them (Liptak 2014).

In India, corporations used to finance both the Congress Party, which has been the longest-ruling centre party and the BJP, which had ruled in several major constituent states since 1990 and been at the centre in the early twenty-first century. Between 2004 and 2012, corporate houses made 87% of the total contributions to political parties, most of them to the aforementioned parties (Association for Democratic Reforms 2014). Of the total amount of INR3,789 million, the BJP received INR1,925 million and the Congress received INR1,723 million. These are only legally disclosed amounts.

Imperialism, Neo-liberalism, Inequality, and Resistance

As should be clear from the earlier analysis, imperialism has led to unprecedented levels of inequality, fed by finance, media control, and corruption. It has also irreversibly damaged the environment. While neo-liberalism has not yet been defeated, it has faced stiff resistance, not only in Latin America but also in numerous regions of the world, in the form of workers' movements, women's movements, and movements to protect the environment.

> The beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed a collapse of the growth of employment worldwide, except in most countries of East Asia, and not only in the formal sectors but even in low-paid informal sectors (ILO 2003, 2004). This is especially true of the youth (that is, persons between the ages of 15 and 24 according to the UN definition) who constitute 25 per cent of the working age population but account for 47 per cent of the unemployed. Worldwide, there were 88 million unemployed youth in 2003 (ILO 2004). Moreover, women have been the first victims of spreading unemployment in many countries. In particular, in some Asian countries which had specialized in using female labour for export production, there has taken place a 'de-feminization of labour' as machines operated by men have displaced women . . . Rates of unemployment have soared perhaps to levels as high as 36 per cent in the Caribbean and Middle East and North Africa among young people between the ages of 15 and 25 years' (Bagchi 2005: 328–329).

Such trends are likely to continue in most countries, especially since many developing ones, including India, have concluded what are called WTO-plus free trade agreements, under which the highly subsidised agriculture of the US and EU is competing with very poor farmers of the Third World. Such struggles for existence of already impoverished farmers and women in subsistence agriculture will also cause more environmental damage through over-grazing, deforestation and failure to put back organic soil nutrients (Singh and Sengupta 2009).

During the last few decades, there has been a steep increase in the shares of the top 1–5% of income earners in many advanced capitalist countries, and especially the US and the UK (Atkinson et al. 2011). Piketty (2014: parts 1, 3) has demonstrated that over the last three decades 60% of the increase in US national income went to just the top 1% of earners; the incomes of the top 0.01% and the top.001% increased even more steeply. Enormous increases in salaries and other incomes of the top layer of executives even during the period of global recession, and capital gains accruing from operations of deregulated stock markets, have contributed greatly to this historic increase in inequality in these countries.

Global income inequality has also increased over this period (Milanovic 2011). One reason for this global inequality is that in most of the developing economies, except for the East Asian industrialised or industrialising ones, landlordism still prevails. As in earlier centuries, imperialism has utilised the use of non-market power for its own ends. However, we have already noted how in Latin America many leftist regimes are challenging the imperialist world order. They are also, as in Bolivia and Ecuador, empowering the majority Amerindian communities and throwing out the criollo elite that is complicit with imperialism.

All over the world, including the US, Mexico, and other countries, workers organised in formal trade unions and unorganised workers – many of them immigrants – are fighting for their rights (Bagchi 2014b; Lynd and Gross 2007; Weinberg 2007). In Porto Allegre in Brazil and Oaxaca province in Mexico, such groups were able to take control of municipalities and implement a

variety of participatory democracy. One problem with workers' international solidarity is that colonialism created an enormous gap between the wages of workers in imperial centres and those in the colonial lands. Under the neoliberal dispensation, capital is fully mobile across international borders but workers' mobility across those borders has been kept very restricted. One consequence is that the aforementioned wage gap that continues in spite of the slow rise or stagnation of wages for the majority of workers in the US and EU (Bagchi 2014b; Cope 2012).

Even under those constraints, successful experiments in participatory democracy have occurred; for example, in the state of Kerala in India, in the city of Porto Alegre in Brazil, and in Venezuela under Chavez (Thomas Isaac and Franke 2000; Harnecker 2013; Kingsley 2012;). That kind of democracy necessarily challenges the basic tenets of neo-liberalism.

All over the world, women have been actively defending their rights and the democratic principles under which they can defend them (see e.g. El Saadawi 2012; Patel 2010). They are fighting for universal literacy, universal health care, an end to human trafficking (of which women are the most numerous victims), equal pay for equal work, and a decent livelihood for the nurturing care which they bestow on their children and other members of their communities. This is also a fight against neo-liberalism, because under that extremely inegalitarian order, both the demand for food grains – of which the poor are the main consumers – and investment in agriculture (which has again been of a labour-displacing nature) have suffered badly, and led to the displacement of several hundred million women from agricultural work, forcing them into very-low-wage work in cities where they live under subhuman conditions.

Finally, scientists have long campaigned for human beings to respect Nature's boundaries. Apart from the International Panel on Climate Change, which has documented the irreversible nature of climate change and has been campaigning for limiting the emission of greenhouse gases by using more renewable sources of energy, a group of 18 scientists has identified what they call planetary boundaries which human

beings cross at their peril and at the peril of life on earth (Rockström et al. 2009). These boundaries are determined by the following factors, and some of them have already been crossed: climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric depletion, interference with the global phosphorus and nitrogen cycle (through intensive use of artificial fertilisers), an alarming rate of biodiversity loss, interfering with natural ecological balance, excessive use of freshwater globally, drastic change in land use patterns, and excessive loading of aerosols such as particulate matters through a tremendous rise in the production and use of internal combustion engines in automobiles of all kinds, and finally chemical pollution of water and food.

A system that is driven by competition for profit and power, which is the fundamental prime mover of the neo-liberal imperial order, cannot respect the planetary boundaries as the repeated failures of the Copenhagen intergovernmental conferences on climate change have demonstrated.

In spite of the spread of resistance against neoliberalism and imperialism in the form of jihadist movements in the Islamic world and peasant wars in Latin America,, rejection of the Washington consensus (namely, that you should leave all economic activities up to the market and the private sector) in most countries of Latin America, and the rise of China as the world's second largest economy, imperialism and neo-liberalism with corporates as the core commanders continue to rule most of the world, and military expenditures remain massive. 'World military expenditure in 2012 is estimated to have reached $1.756 trillion. This corresponds to 2.5 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP), or approximately $249 for each person in the world' (Shah 2013). That per capita expenditure is higher than the income of the working poor in the poorer nations of the world. However, while the US remains the dominant military power accounting for 39% of the global military expenditure and with hundreds of military bases across the globe, it is being challenged by Russia in Syria, Ukraine, and even in Latin America. The Russian president Vladimir Putin met Fidel Castro in Cuba, and offered help for offshore exploration of oil (Anishchuk and

Trotta 2014). On the other side of the Caribbean, the government of Nicaragua has signed an agreement with a Hong Kong Chinese company for construction of a canal that will link the Caribbean (and the Atlantic) with the Pacific Ocean, and thus provide an alternative to the Panama Canal (Westcott 2014). Thus, the US and its allies are being challenged internationally by two powerful nations and by a host of countries revolting against neo-liberalism or military domination by the US. But humankind is still waiting for a world of knowledge economies, where the search for new ways of using nature without causing irreversible damage and improving health, education, and creativity will be the driving force rather than the exploitation of wo(man) by wo(man) and profit-motivated extraction of non-renewable natural resources.

Cross-References

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Neoliberalism and Education in the Global South: A New Form of Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion
▶ Neo-Liberalism and Financialization
▶ Women's Movements, Indian Anti-colonial Struggle

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Neoliberalization

▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

Nepal

▶ Nepal, Imperialism and Anti-imperialism

Nepal, Imperialism and Anti-imperialism

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Imperialism; Inter-imperialist rivalry; Maoism; Monarchy; Nepal; People's War

Definition

Resting on a fault line between the two emerging global powers of China and India, Nepal aspires to geopolitical neutrality. In reality it is subject to imperialist interests. This essay shows that although modern Nepal was never officially colonised, its economic and political dependence on imperial powers reveals a history that has been shaped by imperialism. The caste, ethnic, and regional discrimination that exists in Nepal today is a legacy of Gorkhali imperialism, which was accompanied by a unification process based on classifying social and cultural diversity along lines of caste hierarchy under the rule of the Shah monarchs. Challenges to this discrimination were revitalised as a result of the Maoists' People's War initiated in 1996, and were brought to the forefront of national politics following the 2006 revolution, the end of the 240-year-old Shah dynasty in 2008, and subsequent constitutional debates. But internal domination by an upper-caste hill elite has not been overcome and, at the same time, Nepal continues to endure external interference in its political and economic affairs by the great imperialist powers. India remains the most interventionist power in the region and has a particularly charged relationship with Nepal, facilitated by the open border. Thus, the balance of forces between imperialism and anti-imperialism in Nepal must inevitably encompass India's role, its security and economic interests – and resistance to these interests – but also the complex interplay of imperial forces including

the US, Britain, and China in maintaining and profiting from the status quo in Nepal.

Resting on a fault line between the two emerging global powers of China and India, Nepal aspires to geopolitical neutrality. In reality it is subject to imperial interests. Modern Nepal was never officially colonised, but its economic and political dependence on imperial powers reveals a history that has been shaped by imperialism. The caste, ethnic, and regional discrimination that exists in Nepal today is a legacy of Gorkhali imperialism, which was accompanied by a unification process based on classifying social and cultural diversity along lines of caste hierarchy under the rule of the Shah monarchs. Challenges to this discrimination were revitalised as a result of the Maoists' People's War initiated in 1996, and were brought to the forefront of national politics following the 2006 revolution, the end of the 240-year-old Shah dynasty in 2008, and subsequent constitutional debates. But internal domination by an upper-caste hill elite has not been overcome and, at the same time, Nepal continues to endure external interference in political and economic affairs by the great imperialist powers. India remains the most interventionist power in the region and has a particularly charged relationship with Nepal, facilitated by the open border. Thus, the balance of forces between imperialism and anti-imperialism in Nepal must inevitably encompass India's role, its security and economic interests – and resistance to these interests – but also the complex interplay of imperial forces including the US, Britain, and China in maintaining and profiting from the status quo in Nepal.

The history of the Nepali nation state is itself one of imperial conquest. Prior to the unification of Nepal by Prithvi Narayan Shah, who ruled the small kingdom of Gorkha in what is now central Nepal, and who eventually became Nepal's first king, the region was dominated by an assortment of petty kingdoms. Following the capture of Nuwakot, a strategic town lying between Gorkha and the Kathmandu Valley, Prithvi Narayan's army was able to assert control over the profitable trade route between Tibet and Kathmandu and other strategic points in the area, before declaring

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Kathmandu the capital of Nepal in 1768. Gorkhali expansion included the annexation of the Terai (the southern plains bordering India), which was one of 'the most valuable among the territorial acquisitions of the Gorkhali government' (Regmi 1999: 15) in the early 1770s. Prithvi Narayan continued to expand the Gorkhali Empire as far as Sikkim in the east and Himachal Pradesh in the west, until his death in 1775. The Gorkhalis had also challenged Chinese suzerainty in Tibet between 1788 and 1792, without success (Joshi and Rose 2004/1966: 3), before engaging in a border war with Britain's East India Company from 1814.

British Imperialism in Nepal

The growing power of the East India Company was the harbinger of deepening British control of South Asia, shaping Nepal's fortunes until Indian independence. The British never occupied Nepal, but it was vital to their imperial calculations. Bhimsen Thapa, who had seized power in Nepal in 1806, the son of a loyal soldier of Prithvi Narayan, had provoked the war with the British. While the Gorkhalis had 'better knowledge of the ground and inflicted several reverses on the East India Company's forces' (Whelpton 2005: 42), and the British found it difficult to break them despite the Gorkhalis' inferior weaponry, the Gorkhalis eventually capitulated, negotiating an end to the war in 1816 with the signing of the Sugauli Treaty. Viewing the Gorkhalis as encroaching on British territory by continually shifting the frontier line, at the end of the war the East India Company demanded that the border dividing Nepal and British India be carefully demarcated by stone pillars (Burghart 1984: 114), which remain in place today. The signing of the treaty had several advantages for the British: territory along the western, southern and eastern borders of Nepal was annexed, preventing direct contact with the princely states of Lahore and Sikkim, which Nepal had ambitions to conquer; raw materials such as iron, copper, and lead mines, forests and hemp; and a trade route through to Tibet (Sever 1996: 87). These gains reinforced Britain's imperial role in the region.

The Anglo-Nepalese War resulted in the loss of one-third of Nepal's territory (Mojumdar 1973: 5), and although the British later returned part of the Terai, the current boundaries of Nepal are more restricted 'than at the apex of Gorkha imperial expansion' (Joshi and Rose 2004/1966: 3). The British returned territory that was deemed 'unimportant' (Mojumdar 1973: 83) after the Indian Mutiny in 1857, out of gratitude for the offer of military assistance, despite initial reluctance to accept it. The Sugauli Treaty not only put an end to Nepali territorial expansion but also to the economic development of the Terai, on which the future of Nepal's economic development depended (Stiller 1976: 50). The aim of the British was not to absorb Nepal but to make it smaller and weaker (Brown 1996: 3), providing a reasonable buffer with China. Moreover, as long as Britain's influence over Nepal was 'sufficient to exclude that of rival powers, a boundary on the plains was satisfactory; approaches to India could be guarded by obedient feudatories as securely as by British power itself, and far more cheaply' (Maxwell 1972/1970: 24). The terms of the Sugauli Treaty, including the presence of a permanent British resident, helped strengthen British hegemony in the country. The British resident 'was dreaded as an instrument of British imperialism and as a sinister agent of intrigue' (Mojumdar 1973: 6), intent on compromising Nepal's integrity. Following the war, the British began recruiting Gorkha soldiers into the British Indian Army (the word 'Gurkha' came to be accepted in English, but is a corruption of Gorkha). The Gurkhas helped crush the Indian Mutiny (78), fought in the two world wars, and continue to serve in the British and Indian armies today. Nepal had lost the war of 1814–16 and, while it retained formal independence, its economic and political dependence intensified in the following decades.

Rivalry between various powerful families culminated in a palace massacre in 1846, known as the Kot Massacre, which displaced the Shah monarchs and brought to power the Ranas, whose rule was to last for over a century. There are few legacies the Ranas are remembered for other than inflicting misery on the vast majority of the population. But the internal stability of the

Rana regime also depended on managing political and military relations with British India. The British needed Nepal to serve as a frontier to counter Chinese influence and subversion in the region, but it also needed the Gurkhas' military skill and influence in dealing with seditious forces in India, for example, during the Indian Mutiny. The mutiny was perhaps the greatest crisis the British faced in India. That Jang Bahadur Rana, one of the founders and first ruler of the Rana dynasty, refrained from exploiting the opportunity to challenge the British, is testament to the 'effective alliance of interests between the ruling class of Nepal and British imperialism in India' (Blaikie et al. 2001/1980: 38). Nepal, on the other hand, needed British recognition of its independence to keep Indian and Chinese intervention at bay, and to quell any internal challenges to the Rana regime. These mutual interests were recognised in the Treaty of Friendship, which Nepal and Britain signed in 1923, and which explicitly declared Nepal's independence. Ultimately, however, relations were not on equal terms: 'Nepal was, in fact, an Indian political and military outpost, serving the purpose of an outer strategical frontier; Nepal's internal autonomy was guaranteed by the British, but her external relations were subordinated to the considerations of British interests' (Mojumdar 1973: 12).

The treaty also discouraged the establishment of new industries because it allowed almost unrestricted imports of British goods into Nepal (Lohani 1973: 205), facilitating the growth of the British economy at the expense of Nepal's (Tamang 2012: 271).

Several factors account for the fall of the Ranas in the 1950–51 revolution: divisions within the regime itself; the role of the king in emboldening the political parties exiled in India; the insurrectionary activities of the Nepali Congress; mass demonstrations in the capital; and the British withdrawal from India in 1947. But two further factors stand out, both of which stoked anti-imperialist sentiments towards the British. First, over 100,000 Nepalis fought in the First World War for the British, with at least 10,000 killed and another 14,000 wounded or missing (Whelpton 2005: 64). Hundreds of thousands also fought in

the Second World War in Africa and Europe, again for the British (Joshi and Rose 2004/1966: 57). This exposed them to new ideas, and a small but significant number of Gurkhas became fiercely anti-Rana. Attempting to prevent veterans from spreading these ideas in the villages, the Ranas requested the British not to promote Gurkha recruits beyond the rank of sergeant, and enforced caste purification rituals on the Gurkhas when they returned from fighting (52). Many Gurkhas refused to be repatriated to Nepal, preferring instead to settle in India. A number of them joined the movement against both British imperialism and Rana rule.

Second, the Quit India Movement initiated in 1942 had a powerful impact on Nepali activists and intellectuals. The participation of Nepalis in the Indian movement created an anti-Rana movement within Nepal, however limited, that could not be ignored by the Ranas. The survival of the Ranas 'had depended on the submission of the subjects to medieval methods of oppression. But once the idea of defiance entered the public mind, the Rana system collapsed like a house of cards' (Gupta 1964: 49). Exposure to the Indian nationalist movement led many Nepalis to believe that the fall of the Rana regime could only be accomplished with the elimination of British rule in India, since the British had become a bulwark for Rana power (Joshi and Rose 2004/1966: 50). Nepalis began to participate in the *satyagraha* movements of the 1920s and 1930s in India, and to train in the methods of mass movements (ibid.). The eventual success of the civil disobedience movement in India instilled fear in the Ranas, and it was becoming increasingly clear that the strength of political opposition to imperialism in India was intimately bound up with the prospects for a resistance movement in Nepal.

The Ranas were surrounded: the post-1947 government in India – the powerful Indian National Congress – detested the Ranas because they had supported British imperialism; the Nepali monarchy, which had been deposed by the Ranas, also wanted the dissolution of the regime; the international community was becoming impatient with Nepal's trade barriers and concerned about potential communist influence

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from China; and various Nepali political parties, with a growing base of support, were being founded calling for democratic reforms. The Ranas finally conceded when sections of the army surrendered to the Nepali Congress's liberation army, the Mukti Sena, and when India, Britain, and the US refused to recognise four-year-old Gyanendra, one of King Tribhuvan's grandsons, as the new monarch; the Ranas had crowned Gyanendra in the absence of King Tribhuvan, who had fled to India for safety in the midst of the crisis.

India's Sub-imperialism

Nepal's relationship with India has been more complicated and challenging for the Nepali ruling class than it was with the British (Rose and Dial 1969: 91). India's overwhelming security, economic and political interests, as well as its cultural and religious affinities with Nepal, have constantly raised the spectre of Nepal's potential absorption within it. When India gained independence, it continued with imperial pretensions in Nepal, inheriting Britain's strategic and political dominance in the region. In 1950, eager for continued recognition of Rana rule, Mohan Shamsher Rana signed the India-Nepal Treaty, a bilateral agreement formally known as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, replacing the 1923 Treaty of Friendship. The India-Nepal Treaty sanctions the free movement of people and goods over the border and outlines strategic questions of defence and foreign affairs, restricting the development of a diversified economy and an independent polity. The treaty remains in effect and while it officially acknowledges the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of each nation, it is widely perceived to favour Indian interests, particularly as Nepal continues to be aligned to India in foreign affairs (92).

But following independence India could no longer support Rana rule; popular disaffection with the Ranas was growing, and India did not want to encourage the potential for revolution. The government in India thus favoured Shah rule, believing it to be more stable, and believing

also that there was a role for the Nepali Congress in providing the regime with democratic credentials. What became known as the Delhi Compromise involved an agreement between the Indian government, the Ranas, and King Tribhuvan. It was aimed at a smooth transfer of power from the Ranas back to the monarchy. A power-sharing government was formed in 1951 between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress, until the Congress decided to force the Ranas out of the cabinet (Joshi and Rose 2004/1966: 89), prompting King Tribhuvan to invite the Congress to form the government. The Ranas had to accept the compromise, partly to protect extensive investments in India (Rose 1971: 285), and partly to avoid total humiliation. The situation suited the Indians because it meant the king was indebted to India for having restored the monarchy. India could also extend support to the Mukti Sena in order to put pressure on the regime when Indian interests were threatened. India cultivated this relationship with the monarchy over the following decades, and in the post-1990 context the constitutional monarchy formed one pillar of India's 'twin-pillar' policy towards Nepal, together with multiparty democracy.

After his death in 1955, King Tribhuvan was succeeded by his eldest son, Mahendra. In 1960 King Mahendra used his emergency powers to dissolve parliament, suspend the constitution, and ban the political parties, ushering in the panchayat system. The royal coup marked the restoration of direct rule by the king (Rose 1963: 16), more akin to the Rana autocracy that was overthrown in 1951 than the constitutional monarchy of the preceding decade. Initial misgivings on the part of India following the imprisonment of Nepali Congress prime minister B.P. Koirala, ending a decade of democracy and the 18-month stint of the country's first popularly elected government in 1959, were displaced by greater security concerns over China. India continued to provide economic assistance to Nepal to boost closer communication and transport links across the border in order to restrict Chinese influence there, revealing India's privileging of national security interests over questions of democracy. In any case, the 1962 Sino-Indian War necessitated a rethinking of

relations with Nepal, particularly when Nepal was making overtures to China (Tamang 2012: 277) and Chinese authority in the region was reinforced by its victory in the war.

The panchayat government of the post-Rana era ostensibly viewed economic development as one of its top priorities. Nepal requested aid from India, which responded with technical and economic assistance in 1952, building roads, airfields, and communications networks (Khadka 1997: 1047). India became Nepal's largest donor from the mid-1960s until the 1970s, when Japan assumed the role (1048). Meanwhile, China offered aid to Nepal in the wake of King Mahendra's coup in order to reduce Nepal's economic dependence on India; in general during the 1960s and 1970s, when Indian aid increased, aid from China and the Soviet Union also increased (1053). This economic integration and associated dependence continues. Landlocked and without easy access to ports, accessing the markets of the rest of the world other than through India is time-consuming and expensive for Nepal (Karmacharya 2001: 89). Sole reliance on India for trade and transit has inhibited Nepal's ability to develop commercial relations with other countries. While the long open border with India has enabled Nepalis to work in India, it has also created problems; India's superior infrastructure, technology, and skills, the unofficial and unrecorded movement of goods across the border (ibid.), and the economies of scale provided by its large domestic market have acted as disincentives to the development of industry in Nepal. Following the liberalisation of trade, imports from India have rapidly increased, creating a trade deficit for Nepal.

Nepal's integration into the global economy has been largely dictated by its dependence and integration into the Indian economy (Blaikie et al. 2001/1980: 49; Tamang 2012: 271). The importance of foreign intervention in the development of Nepali capitalism, which has 'taken the form of assertion of monopoly control by ruling families in alliance with transnational interests – a position analogous to that of the Birlas, Tatas, and other large houses of post-independence India' (Mikesell 1999: 186), cannot be overstated. This

integration has reduced Nepal to a virtual colony of India, but with none of the benefits of infrastructural development that some other colonies experienced, and all the disadvantages of being subject to the demands of a sub-imperial power. The resulting diversion of labour across the 1580 km long open border between Nepal and India continues. The poorest Nepalis travel to India to work in the informal economy, primarily as security guards, porters, miners, and domestic workers, not having been able to afford to travel to the Gulf countries or Malaysia (Sharma and Thapa 2013: 10). Estimates range from a few hundred thousand to a few million, though millions of Nepalis are now also migrating elsewhere. While seasonal migration is necessary for many agricultural labourers in order to survive, it has at times weakened the economy of Nepal by reinforcing economic ties to India. Indian aid and investment, particularly early road projects, were geared towards expanding India's business interests and fortifying its strategic defence capabilities. India has long been the primary supplier of military aid and training to the Nepal Army (Adams 2005: 129). The supply continued throughout the Maoists' People's War and although it was suspended following King Gyanendra's takeover of absolute power in February 2005, it has now resumed (see http://goo.gl/riN5Rh – last accessed on 29 January 2015). Notably, the India-Nepal Treaty also specifies Indian control of Nepali arms acquisition, serving as 'a definite mark of New Delhi's strategy of seeking a preeminent position in Nepal' (Dabhade and Pant 2004: 163). When King Birendra negotiated a special arms deal with China in 1988, India imposed the now infamous trade embargo in 1989, preventing fuel and kerosene from entering Nepal (Mishra 2004: 633), damaging the Nepali economy and setting off the 1990 revolution. India argued that under the India-Nepal Treaty, Nepal must consult India before purchasing arms; Nepal argued that this provision was not applicable if the arms were not transiting through India (ibid.). India was not convinced. Post-9/11, India has supported an increased role for the US in providing arms and economic aid to Nepal, ostensibly 'to counter the

menace of terrorism' (Dabhade and Pant 2004: 165) and curb Chinese influence. All of these factors have consolidated Nepal's dependence on India. While Indian aid has at times converged with the interests of the Nepali elite, it has not been provided on the basis of the interests of Nepal's population; rather it has served to strengthen India's hand in the Nepali economy.

Chinese Interests in Nepal

Nepal has always attempted to pursue a balanced foreign policy between China and India. While this policy of neutrality has been encouraged by China, and Nepal has often needed to use China to manage relations with India, India has unremittingly sought to reinforce its authority in Nepal, including countering Chinese influence. Thus, in practice, a balanced policy between China and India is impossible given the economic, cultural, and religious ties between Nepal and India and the geographical barrier with China created by the Himalayas. Since China's invasion and occupation of Tibet in 1950–51, Chinese interests in Nepal have been fixated on repressing the organisation of anti-China activities from Nepal; indeed Nepali soil had been used to launch the Tibetan uprising in 1959. Regardless of the government in power, China's top priority has been to stifle protests challenging Chinese authority in Tibet, particularly since Nepal hosts a growing presence of Tibetan refugees. China has also been involved in aid politics in Nepal since the 1950s, building large infrastructural and road projects. These have been used to leverage security and foreign-policy interests, including countering US influence, and reducing economic dependence on India (Khadka 1997: 1047–1048). These goals have remained unchanged in recent years, and since the Maoists' entry into mainstream politics in 2006, China has stepped up aid and offered military training. In 2009, for example, China provided Nepal with US$3 million in military aid, including training for the Nepal Army (see http://goo.gl/27yusT – last accessed on 2 February 2015). In 2014 China announced that it was increasing its overall aid budget by five times,

and while its ambitions in Nepal are limited, it seeks to exert its interests in increasingly strident ways (see http://goo.gl/e5OQhb – last accessed on 29 January 2015). Apart from security concerns surrounding Tibet, China has also become preoccupied with expanding business and commercial interests in Nepal, seeking markets for manufactured goods and using investment to leverage influence. In this respect, China has now become a major player in Nepali political affairs.

US Foreign Aid and Imperialism

US interests in Nepal have been driven largely by geopolitical concerns. The overthrow of the Rana regime in 1950–51 combined with the perceived threat of communism following the Chinese Revolution led the US to establish a presence in Nepal, even before Russia, India, or China. Using its aid programme in a systematic and strategic way in order to achieve its foreign-policy objectives, the US was Nepal's first bilateral donor (Skerry et al. 1992: 1). Until 1965 it was also Nepal's largest donor (Khadka 2000: 83). US aid started to decline as Nepal's relations with China began to normalise in the 1960s and the US became preoccupied with Vietnam; the relative decline of aid from the Soviet Union and the involvement of Western European donors, in addition to the Bretton Woods institutions, which could help counter any communist uprising, were also factors in the decline of US aid (84). There were two primary reasons for the US initiating its aid programme: the growing popularity of communist parties in South Asia in general and Nepal in particular, and the grinding poverty found across Nepal (77). But the question of poverty, arguably stemming from a century of neglect by the Rana dictatorship and weak governance following the rise to power of the nascent political parties, was also linked to the US's overall anti-communist offensive. Creating the economic conditions that could prevent the spread of communism, particularly the 'vulnerability of the peasantry' (Mihaly 2002/1965: 31) to communism was a major pillar of the US's aid

programme. US officials were aware of the increased political consciousness of Nepalis, who appeared to be turning to communism and were becoming increasingly anti-Indian (Tewari 2001: 104). They reasoned that if aid could help Nepal achieve rapid economic growth, it would be able to repel any communist influence from either China or the various communist groups in India, and even the Soviet Union (Khadka 2000: 77). On a diplomatic level, having an aid programme that allowed US officials to travel throughout Nepal and assess socio-economic conditions first-hand was an important source of information for analysing the threat of external aggression and the level of ideological penetration by communist China or Russia. During the Maoists' People's War, the presence of numerous US-funded NGOs, including international and national NGOs working on development, human rights, democracy, and peace, often took on this role in an effort to mitigate the impact of the Maoists' ideas on wider Nepali society.

Driven by Cold War priorities, the US thus supported King Mahendra's coup in 1960, believing the monarchy to be a more stable force than the political parties, just as India did. King Mahendra's pragmatic foreign policy (i.e. professed neutrality between the regional powers) also coincided with US interests. But it is arguable that the US failed in its stated objective of fostering democracy. This is because while it had always emphasised 'democracy, human rights and freedom whenever aid was questioned' (91), it lent indirect support to the absolute rule of the monarchy by financing its plans and maintaining close contacts with palace officials. During the panchayat era, the US position was that the regime was a form of democracy, 'a stepping stone to full democracy for which the Nepali people were said to be not quite ready' (ibid.). In 1990, the US supported the people's movement, but advised the Nepali Congress to co-operate with the monarchy in order to counter the expansion of communism (ibid.). During the People's War it took strong measures to communicate its displeasure about the political situation, including putting the Maoists on the second tier of the US terrorist list in 2003, despite ongoing negotiations between the government and the Maoists and a ceasefire in place. The Maoists had always opposed the terrorist label, arguing that they were a serious political force, not a terrorist group (see http://goo.gl/I492Bs – last accessed on 25 January 2015). The US also pursued a strategy that aimed to give the Maoists a 'bloody nose' by ensuring a steady flow of weaponry to the army; this would force the Maoists to negotiate from a position of weakness. Later, as it was becoming clear that neither side was making decisive military gains, the US's strategy changed. Although on one level it continued to maintain a hard line towards the Maoists, in 2005 when King Gyanendra staged his coup, taking power as dramatically as his father had done in 1960, the US began working with India to bring the Maoists into the mainstream. Between 2001 and 2005 the US also donated US$29 million in military aid (Adams 2005: 130), and it continues to conduct training for the Nepal Army. The policy of containment remains the core of US interests in Nepal.

The Growth of Anti-imperialism in Nepal

The two most significant political events that influenced the development of the communist movement in Nepal, including the spread of anti-imperialist ideas, were the independence movement in India and the Chinese revolution of 1949 (Rawal 2007: 30; Tewari 2001: 48). While the revolutionary upheaval in China was relatively far-removed from the communists in Nepal, the Indian experience had a more direct impact. With the growth of educational institutions in northern India in the early twentieth century, many young Nepali students began to study in India, particularly from the 1930s onwards. They quickly became influenced by the ideas of the Indian communists, who were operating in a relatively open political environment compared to Nepal. Based in Calcutta, Darjeeling, Varanasi, and elsewhere, they began to participate in various groups and study circles that explicitly professed socialist and anti-imperialist ideas. Following the participation of Man Mohan Adhikari, Pushpa Lal Shrestha, and others in the Biratnagar Jute Mill

strike in 1947, they returned to Nepal as young leaders looking for an opportunity to form an organisation that could provide the basis for launching a struggle against the Rana regime (Upreti 2009: 15). The Biratnagar Jute Mill strike was a momentous event in Nepali history because it brought both Congress and communist activists together in joint struggle. But it was also the beginning of wider resistance to Rana rule. The strike began as 'an economic struggle of the working class projected from India' (Tewari 2001: 70), since the Indian left had helped to initiate it and most employees at the mill were Indian; when the Ranas repressed the strike with police violence and mass arrests, it had repercussions across Nepal (Chatterji 1967: 39). The strike moved beyond the confines of trade unionism and joined the mainstream of the democratic struggle. The leaders associated with the strike and others decided that a party separate from the Nepali Congress should be formed. The CPN was established in September 1949 in Calcutta with the advice and financial support of the Communist Party of India (CPI). The main objective of the party was to participate in the popular movement against the Rana dictatorship, together with the Nepali Congress.

The CPN was active in the movement against the Rana regime since its formation. Following the tactical line of the CPI, the CPN had recognised that the national leadership in India had a 'collaborationist character' (Gupta 1964: 200) that was susceptible to being influenced by imperialist forces and, as such, could not be trusted; it began to organise amongst peasants and workers, and held that peace in Nepal would require more than the overthrow of the Ranas (ibid.). The CPN was also conscious of the fact that the Delhi Compromise had been engineered to diffuse the anti-Rana movement and prevent the growth of the communist movement in Nepal (Rawal 2007: 39). It publicly criticised the pact and declared that the Nepali Congress had betrayed the revolution. One of the main policy aims of the CPN was to minimise Indian influence and strengthen relations with China (Khadka 1995: 57); to that end it called for the defeat of national feudal lords, Indian capitalists, and

imperialist forces (Gupta 1964: 63). But the CPN also suffered from a lack of ideological clarity. Following a revolt in 1952 in which parliament was stormed in order to secure the release of K.I. Singh, one of the leaders of the Mukti Sena who had been arrested for being involved in disturbances in eastern Nepal, King Tribhuvan called a state of emergency and banned the CPN for its involvement. The CPN was forced to organise underground, where it continued its activities by infiltrating other organisations and intensifying its work among agricultural labourers (202). The ban was only lifted in 1956 by the Nepali Congress government headed by prime minister Tanka Prasad Acharya on the condition that the communists accept the principle of constitutional monarchy.

The Maoists and Anti-imperialism

The 1990 revolution that brought about multiparty democracy in Nepal was a turning point in Nepali political history. If the 1950–51 revolution marked the end of a dictatorship, ushering in not an entirely new order, but a 40-year transition that steadily weakened the old structures of power, then the 1990 revolution, in contrast, set Nepal on a trajectory where everything could be challenged: the monarchy, upper-caste rule, ethnic disparities and the stark class divisions that had characterised Nepali society for centuries. It was the beginning of a new kind of revolutionary process – the birth of Nepal's democratic revolution. The Maoists were crucial agents in this process because they pursued and advanced it from 1990 until the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, but then held it back and ultimately contained it. It was the Maoists, however, more than any other political force, who had recognised the objective possibility of fundamental social change in Nepal following the 1990 revolution. With the movement having forced the king to make major political concessions, the Maoists sensed there was an urgency (amongst women, ethnic minorities, and the poor in the countryside) to take the movement further; for this they saw no other alternative to armed struggle (Mikesell 2001: 17). Whether this

would democratise the economic sphere, in addition to the political one, was another question, but the rationale included an anti-imperialist element from the start.

Several days prior to launching the People's War in 1996, the Maoists had issued a 40-point demand containing a number of radical proposals under the labels nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. These included: the abrogation of the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty; the cessation of the work of NGOs and INGOs as agents of imperialism; the closure of Gurkha recruitment centres; an end to all racial and regional discrimination; and secularism (Thapa 2003: 189–94). In the letter accompanying the 40-point demand, the Maoists criticised the parliamentary parties for blindly adopting policies of privatisation and liberalisation, serving the interests of imperialism over the interests of Nepal. In developing the theoretical premises for the People's War, the Maoists concluded that challenging state power by uniting the antiimperialist masses (i.e. workers and poor peasants) under the leadership of the Maoists was the principal goal (UCPN 2004: 25).

They also argued that Nepal essentially suffers from two forms of oppression. The first is its semi-colonial domination by India, manifested in unequal treaties such as the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty; Indian interference in Nepal's political affairs; Indian control of the vast majority of trade and industry in Nepal, including the exploitation of its water and other resources; and the promotion of Hindu nationalism in Nepal (Yami 2006/1996: 132–133). Other imperialist powers such as Britain (through the recruitment of Gurkhas) and the US (through its domination of the World Bank and IMF) exert 'neo-colonial' domination over Nepal. The second form of oppression was the subjection of weaker nationalities by the dominant nationality within Nepal, whose language, dress, and religion enjoys state patronage. These inequalities were systematised under the Ranas with the promulgation of the legal code of 1854, the Muluki Ain. The Maoists' defence of ethnic interests in particular, along with questions of class, were recognised as 'inevitable components of the democratic revolution' (128). Questions of strategy were crucial to responding to both widespread poverty and inequality.

By the end of the war in 2006, not only had the Maoists achieved the military stalemate they wanted, but they had also succeeded in shifting the majority of public opinion in favour of a Constituent Assembly (CA) and a federal republic. If the Maoists did not lead a direct confrontation with the capitalist system as such, the People's War was effective in undermining the legal and ideological framework that was holding it together in Nepal. During the 2006 revolution, which emerged in response to the royal coup the previous year, the Maoists enjoyed mass support, the monarchy lacked authority, and the army ultimately refused to fight. The military stalemate forced the establishment to calculate that a political solution was unavoidable. But without a strategy for taking the revolutionary process beyond the parliamentary road, the Maoists' alliance with the mainstream parties became a way for the ruling elite to demobilise the movement. The consolidation of the alliance took the form of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), signed in November 2006 between the Maoists and a grouping of political parties, prepared in Delhi and facilitated by the Indian government. Although it spelled the end of the monarchy, it also marked the official end of the People's War. The Maoists agreed to dismantle their parallel infrastructure outside Kathmandu, including people's courts and people's governments, return property confiscated from landlords, and confine Maoist fighters to cantonments under UN supervision. Since the CPA and their triumph in the CA elections in 2008, in which they emerged as the largest party, the Maoists' trajectory has been one of accommodation.

Whereas once the Maoists' agenda was pulling mainstream politics to the left, and divisions in society cut along class lines, following the end of the war the central divisions cut along ethnic lines. The mass protests in the Terai organised by Madhesi parties in early 2007, although they quickly turned violent and raised tensions between Madhesis and hill migrants, were successful in pushing for guarantees for federalism. The raised level of ethnic consciousness in Nepal is irrefutably progressive to the extent that it destabilises imperialist influence. In recent years,

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however, the imperial powers have sought to use questions of nationality and ethnicity to support fragmentation along ethnic lines and divert energy away from challenging imperialism. Whether the Maoists facilitated a shift from class struggle to identity politics can only be judged by assessing their political trajectory in practice: they suspended the People's War through a negotiated settlement facilitated by India, and were at the helm of a coalition government with mainstream parties, which have a considerable record of neglecting the aspirations of the majority. After signing the CPA, the Maoists became central to rehabilitating capitalism, and national debates became focused on the nature of identity-based federalism as the starting point for restructuring the state. The ethnic movement, predominantly aided by NGOs and donors, now has a political course that is largely independent, and perhaps even contrary to, class struggle. In an international context where indigenous rights have been incentivised by the neo-liberal state, the anti-imperialist potential of these rights-based movements remains limited.

Although the Maoists managed to reorient the country towards a radical departure from the status quo (a secular, federal republic that replaced a conservative Hindu monarchy) and for a time gain immense popularity as communists, they were predisposed towards a peace process that would leave much of the Nepali elite in place because of their conviction that a new, more equitable society was impossible at the present stage of historical development. Participation in the peace process has had profound consequences: the Maoists have accepted the main tenets of capitalist development, entrenched themselves into the mainstream of politics in Nepal, and distanced themselves from strategies involving popular struggle. These consequences have been eloquently elaborated elsewhere (see http://goo.gl/34gLqt – last accessed on 2 February 2015). Moreover, the adoption of a parliamentary perspective alone has meant the abandonment of the struggle to transform wider structures in Nepali society and, with it, the acceptance of a framework of consensual, neo-liberal policies. In the process, it has meant accepting (and even embracing) the involvement of imperialist forces in Nepal's internal political affairs.

Imperialist Powers' Response to the Maoists

Imperialist powers have responded to the Maoist challenge with both military force and a soft-power approach. While the purpose of early police operations was to crush the movement by sheer physical force, predictably, this had the effect of strengthening the Maoists' cause as family members and others sought revenge against the brutality of the police. The project of containing the Maoists needed to be extended to countering the Maoists' ideology. For much of the international community, particularly the US and Britain, this has taken the form of strengthening the role of NGOs and 'civil society' in development and conflict resolution, and in implementing the terms of the CPA. Alongside NGOs, military force was crucial in neutralising the Maoists. India, China, Britain, and the US, as well as Belgium and others, have all supported the Nepal Army with arms and other military equipment and have tolerated widespread human rights abuses committed by the army throughout the People's War. Only towards the end of the war, after King Gyanendra's seizure of power and when the army was losing popular legitimacy, was there a focus on human rights, which was made a condition for further military aid. This was a step forward for human rights defenders. One drawback of this focus by the US, British, and Indian armies, however, was that it suggested an equivalence between the Maoists and the Nepal Army and, moreover, has been used to argue for more monitoring and training by foreign militaries in general. Yet there is no evidence that engagement with foreign militaries improves human rights records (Adams 2005: 134). Military aid, particularly by India and China, has escalated in recent years. On a political level, India attempted to prevent the ascendance of the Nepali Maoists because this lent legitimacy to the Indian Maoists. Failing to prevent the Maoists' influence, they chose to pacify them, and succeeded in facilitating

their entry into the mainstream. This has had two major benefits for India: the Nepali Maoists have served as an example to the Indian Maoists and extremist groups the world over; and, secondly, India has been able to increase business investment in Nepal, further reinforcing Nepal's economic dependence.

Dependence on foreign aid has also unquestionably made Nepal more vulnerable to coercion by the imperialist powers. Donors have been able to impose conditions, 'some of which could be interpreted as direct interference in recipients' internal affairs' (Khadka 1997: 1058). These include pressures to liberalise the economy, accept trade and transit restrictions, obtain arms and military training, and calibrate foreign-policy objectives according to imperialist interests. The neo-liberal reforms that Nepal has pursued since the mid-1980s, as a condition for loans from the World Bank and IMF, have created political and social costs (1057). From the late 1980s Nepal became even more reliant on external loans, leading to greater debt, which ultimately led to 'more stringent aid conditions to correct structural imbalances caused by the debt itself' (1056). Privatisation of state-owned enterprises and deregulation have been particularly severe, resulting in cuts in subsidies and social expenditure and an increase in the price of public services. In recent years Nepal was deemed the most unequal country in South Asia (Wagle 2010: 577), where reforms have created an 'overall policy environment providing a powerful impetus to create and sustain inequality' (573). Furthermore, increasing inequality coincided with the liberalisation policies of the 1990s, 'further intensifying integration of the national economy into the regional and global markets' (574). While foreign aid contributed significantly to a number of advances in development indicators over several decades, the experience of development in Nepal remains uneven and incomplete. One of the sources of stagnation can be directly attributed to the deepening of neo-liberal reforms, inextricably linked with the ability of imperialist powers to exert their interests in Nepal.

The response to the devastating earthquake that struck Nepal in 2015, in which thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced, mainly consisted of an outpouring of funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation from donors, NGOs, and members of the public all around the world. The extent of the damage caused by the earthquake, however, must be traced back to the history of underdevelopment in Nepal by both national elites and international donors (see https://goo.gl/7x0ixt – last accessed on 5 June 2015). For the imperialist powers in particular, development has always been secondary; since the 1950s efforts primarily went into preventing the spread and influence of communism and promoting free-market ideas. Much of the infrastructure, which is particularly badly built in the rural areas that were hardest hit, was unable to withstand the force of the 7.8 magnitude earthquake and aftershocks, even though it had been anticipated for decades. While hundreds of thousands of people were still waiting for food, shelter, and medicines months after the tragedy, there were reports of massive corruption of funds and supplies, and distribution favoured certain groups over others. The progress made in distributing relief was largely done by Nepalis themselves. At the national level, the government ceded control of immediate relief efforts to the army and, again, while progress was made in pulling out survivors and concentrating relief near the epicentre, concerns were raised over the lack of civilian oversight of the army, and whether the army should be commanding the long-term reconstruction process. The earthquake did seem to create the conditions for limited agreement amongst the political parties over the constitution and restructuring the state, which had been postponed for over five years. But without ensuring that reconstruction favours those who are most vulnerable, poverty and inequality in Nepal will be compounded. There is also the risk that the disaster will be used to impose a regressive constitution and shock therapy economics, and it remains to be seen to what extent anti-imperialist and other progressive forces can resist the reinforcement of imperialist powers in the country.

The Maoists, unable to mobilise, remained relatively silent following the earthquake, making it clear that a new anti-imperialist alliance has yet to

emerge. That the various anti-Maoist forces did reassert themselves in Nepal through the peace process, managing to violently (and non-violently) counter the Maoists' own use of violence during the People's War, does not negate the Maoists' case. Anti-imperialist struggle in Nepal has reached an impasse for the time being, but having overthrown two regimes and built an anti-imperialist tradition in the country, Nepal's experience remains a beacon for anti-imperialist struggles in the region and beyond.

Cross-References

▶ Maoism, Nationalism, and Anti-colonialism
▶ Naxalite Movement: An Anti-imperialist Perspective
▶ Sendero Luminoso

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Net Export of Ecological Footprint

▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange

Net Transfer of "Negative Entropy"

▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange

Netherlands Antilles

▶ Dutch Imperialism, Caribbean

New Colonialism

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities

New Imperialism

▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity

New Jewel Movement

▶ Grenadian Socialist Anti-colonialism and US Imperialism

New World Order Neocolonialism

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities

Newton, Huey P. (1942–1989)

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Definition

Huey P. Newton was the co-founder of the Black Panther Party ('Party'), and its leader, chief theoretician, and ideologue.

Huey P. Newton was the co-founder of the Black Panther Party ('Party'), and its leader, chief theoretician, and ideologue. When the Party was founded by Huey and Bobby Seale in 1966, Huey was 24 years old.

Born on 17 February 1942, in Monroe, Louisiana, Huey was the seventh and last child of Walter and Armelia Newton. In 1945, the family migrated to Oakland, California.

With some difficulty, primarily in reading and on account of conflicts with teachers, Huey finished high school, and, in 1959, enrolled in Oakland City College, a community college. There, he joined the Afro-American Association, and immersed himself in its agenda to read and study books by and about black people. He and other Association members would then take their newly found knowledge out onto the streets of Oakland and nearby Berkeley to proselytise people about the wrongs of racism in America. Ultimately deeming the Association too 'bourgeois', as unwilling to take action against the racism they denounced, he soon left it.

Disillusioned with the religious tenets embraced by his family and with the actions of the emerging black movements, Huey became reclusive, studying the works of great thinkers and philosophers, and supporting himself by street

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hustling. Swayed by the ideas of Kierkegaard, Huey considered himself an existentialist. Later, after attending meetings of the Progressive Labor Party, he began to transform himself into a socialist, determining that the problem of racism in the US was the problem of capitalism. He became further influenced by the positions set forth by Malcolm X in his many speeches, one of which Huey heard in person at McClymonds High School in West Oakland. All of this led to his interaction with what became the West Coast branch of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM). He joined RAM's student affiliate, the Soul Students Advisory Council. Deemed by some to be the paramilitary wing of Malcolm X's Organization of Afro-American Unity (formed in 1964 after Malcolm's expulsion from the Nation of Islam), RAM articulated a revolutionary programme for blacks that fused Black Nationalism with Marxism-Leninism.

During this time, Huey enrolled in criminal law classes at Merritt College, primarily, as he stated in his autobiography *Revolutionary Suicide*, to 'become a better burglar'. Though the money he gained on the streets allowed him a lot of time to read and study and contemplate the social and philosophical questions that beleaguered him, this activity resulted in numerous brushes with the law. He was never convicted of any of these crimes. In 1964, however, he was charged and found guilty of assault, for stabbing a man in a knife fight. For this felony, he was sentenced to prison.

While in prison, in 1964, he endured living in an extreme isolation cell, where he felt he developed a clearer consciousness about the social construct of the US. Once released from incarceration, in 1965, he reconnected with his college comrade Bobby Seale. Huey describes their relationship before this as one in which they were not always on the same side politically. He cites the time when, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Bobby aligned himself with the position of the NAACP to support President John F. Kennedy and the US government, which Huey denounced, arguing in favour of Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro. Both had actively tried to change the status quo in America,

however, and they joined forces in exploring the burgeoning movements and organisations forming to address black rights and black liberation. They returned to the Soul Students Advisory Committee, by then embroiled in a struggle to create an Afro-American history class at Oakland City College. Huey urged that, to be effective, students should carry guns at their proposed rally to demand institution of this class. As this idea was totally rejected, Huey and Bobby began to consider the need for a new organisation, one that involved working blacks and unemployed blacks surviving on the streets by any means necessary.

Formation of the Black Panther Party

Huey began studying the works of Frantz Fanon, who promoted engaging the lumpenproletariat of the oppressed class in the revolutionary struggle as a critical element to success, which was antithetical to traditional Marxism that defined the lumpenproletariat, the non-working class, as scum that had no place in the workers' struggle to overcome capitalism. While adhering to the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism, Huey favoured the ideas of Mao Zedong, particularly relating to the necessity of armed struggle as the resolution to the contradictions that existed between the oppressed and oppressor, summarised in Mao's statement that would become a Party motto: 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'. Finally, Huey focused on the Leninist concept that a necessary step in preparing the oppressed people for revolution was the creation of a vanguard party. As importantly, Huey idealised and would come to embody Ernesto Che Guevara's concept that the revolutionary guerrilla was at once military commander and political theoretician.

Armed with these ideals, Huey and Bobby launched the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, and wrote out its 10-Point *Platform and Program,* articulating the basic social and economic contradictions that had to be resolved for blacks to be free in the US. The first point stated: 'We want freedom'. Huey became the minister of defense, the highest rank in the Party,

which came to be organised around a paramilitary structure. Early on, Huey commanded that the Party was a vanguard party for black liberation, that it was guided by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the philosophy of dialectical materialism, that the black lumpenproletariat were the guiding force of the vanguard party, and the goal of the Party was to create the conditions for revolution by instigating war against the 'two evils' of capitalism and racism toward the liberation of black people in the US.

Focusing first on the *Platform and Program's* seventh point, calling for an 'immediate end to police brutality and murder of Black people', and for blacks to be 'armed for self-defense', Huey began to organise the members recruited into the Party in the early days to carry arms and patrol the streets of Oakland, Richmond, and other nearby cities in Northern California to educate the people in these ghetto communities as well as the police that the people had a right to defend themselves against the rampant brutalities regularly carried out by the police against blacks. Over that first year, more and more young blacks became attracted by this stance and joined the Party.

In October of 1967, Huey became involved in a direct confrontation with the Oakland police. During this clash, Huey was shot and severely wounded, one of the policemen was shot and wounded, and one was shot and killed. Huey was arrested for murder and related charges, which arrest spawned the 'Free Huey Movement', in turn triggering the explosion of the Party over the next year from a small, Oakland-based group into a nationwide organisation with chapters in 48 states. The rallying cry 'Free Huey' became a clarion call that galvanised blacks around the country into a single voice that shouted 'The revolution has come. It's time to pick up the gun'.

Even though he was incarcerated, awaiting trial, Huey began to shape the theories and practice of this growing organisation. From jail, in 1967, he issued 'Executive Mandate No. 1', calling for 'Black people to arm themselves', arguing that, 'As the aggression of the racist American Government escalates in Vietnam, the police agencies of America escalate the repression of Black people throughout the ghettos of America'.

In 1968, he issued 'Executive Mandate No. 3', commanding that 'all members of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense … acquire the technical equipment to defend their homes and their dependents and shall do so. Any member … who fails to defend his threshold shall be expelled from the Party for Life'.

Liberation Struggles

Newton led the Party to form coalitions, and he encouraged the formation of various revolutionary organisations that represented the interests of other oppressed groups inside the United States, including: the American Indian Movement (AIM); the Brown Berets, a Chicano organisation; the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican organisation; the Young Patriots, an organisation of poor whites; the Red Guard, Chinese. All of these organisations recognised the Party as 'the vanguard party', and used it as the model for their agendas and ideology. At the same time, in 1970, just after being released from 3 years in prison on account of the success of a new-trial motion following conviction on lesser charges in connection with the killing of the Oakland policeman, Huey issued a statement that the Party not only called for an end to the then raging Vietnam War but also that: 'In the spirit of international revolutionary solidarity, the Black Panther Party hereby offers to the National Liberation Front and Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam an undetermined number of troops to assist you in your fight against American imperialism'. This position was in line with the Party's agenda to develop coalitions with socialist organisations around the world.

Pronouncing that the liberation struggle of black people in the US was tied to the struggle of others around the world fighting for freedom against the US and its allies, Huey outlined the Party's position on developing international coalitions in his letter of 29 August 1970 to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (as referenced above): 'There is not one fascist or reactionary government in the world today that could stand without the support of United States

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imperialism. Therefore, our problem is international, and [we recognise] the necessity for international alliances to deal with this problem'. Soon, the Party had developed alliances not only with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ('North' Vietnam) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam but also, among others, with: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO); the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC); the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin; the Tupamaros of Uruguay; the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. In addition, the Party developed close ties with the Republic of Cuba and the People's Republic of China, to which it sent several official delegations over the next years, one of which was led by Huey himself (1971).

By this time, Huey had been identified by the US government, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as an enemy of the state, and the Party had been deemed by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as 'the greatest threat to the internal security of the United States'. Under its COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) operations, the FBI orchestrated assaults on Party offices and murders of Party members, and used other tactics to 'discredit, disrupt or destroy' the Party, on account of which Huey entitled his second book *To Die for the People.*

In furtherance of the necessity to build revolutionary coalitions, Huey led the Party to form partnerships with other marginalised groups seeking liberation within the US, launched by his seminal statement in 1970 articulating the Party's position on Women's Liberation and Gay Liberation: '[T]he women's liberation front and gay liberation front are our friends . . . We should try to form a working coalition with the gay liberation and women's liberation groups'. No other black or progressive or radical organisation of the time had taken this revolutionary position. As a result, the Party engaged in joint activities not only with radical women's groups and gay

organisations but also developed coalitions with labour unions, particularly the United Farm Workers; with older people struggling for human rights, launching the Gray Panthers; with the disabled independence movement, coalescing with the Center for Independent Living; and with environmental activists, creating a programme of developing 'gardens in the ghetto' with the Trust for Public Land.

Survival Programmes

At the same time, Huey promoted strengthening of what he named the Party's Survival Programs, stating:

> We recognized that in order to bring the people to the level of consciousness where they would seize the time, it would be necessary to serve their interests in survival by developing programs which would help them to meet their daily needs
>
> . . . All these programs satisfy the deep needs of the community but they are not solutions to our problems. That is why we call them survival programs, meaning survival pending revolution. (Newton 2002: 229–230)

Starting with the Free Breakfast for Children Program, the Party established a number of Survival Programs throughout the US, including: Free Clinics and Ambulance Programs; Free Food and Grocery Programs; Free Clothing and Shoe Programs; Free Legal Aid and Bussing to Prison Programs; Free Plumbing and Maintenance Programs; and Free Pest Control Programs. In this vein, the Party also launched the Oakland Community School in East Oakland and, in 1973, the People's Cooperative Housing Program. The latter was organised through the Oakland Community Housing non-profit corporation, which developed a $12 million co-operative housing complex of 300 affordable homes in West Oakland, with rents not exceeding 25% of monthly income.

In 1972, Huey reorganised the entire Party, closing down all chapters and ordering all members to move to Oakland, the base of the Party and what he deemed could become the base of revolution in the US. With all forces consolidated, Huey ordered Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown to

run for public office, launching the Party's electoral campaigns.

All theories and activities of the Party were published in its newspaper, instituted by Huey in the early days. Ultimately entitled *The Black Panther Intercommunal News Service*, the newspaper was published by the Party and distributed around the world for 13 years.

Conclusion

Huey Newton was not only the leader of the Black Panther Party for all the years of its existence, from 1966 to 1981, but he was the Party's chief theoretician. In that capacity, he set forth his theory of Intercommunalism, fully articulated in a speech republished in *To Die for the People*. Huey postulated that, as industrialisation had heightened the contradictions of capitalism around which Marx and Lenin et al. had advanced the ideal of socialist revolution, technological advances had so shifted the construct of the world's societies that the nation state had disappeared and the question of socialist revolution had been rendered irrelevant.

Technology, Huey argued, had allowed US capitalists to consolidate their interests around the world, which had so transformed the planet by the end of the twentieth century that the US had been able to reduce the rest of the world to a collection of communities over which it had economic, social, and political dominion. He pointed out, however, that with the success of global capitalism, as Lenin had predicted, conditions were ripe for a global revolution. Technological production and 'outsourcing' of labour by US capitalists had rendered or would soon render the majority of US workers as unemployables replaced by workers of the world. This Huey identified as a state of Reactionary Intercommunalism, whereby local and national economies had disappeared in a world where, for example, Coca-Cola was the largest private employer on the continent of Africa; a world in which European countries had to surrender their national identities, as reflected in the merging of Franc, Deutsche Mark and other currencies into the Euro in order to stay afloat in a global economy defined by the US dollar; a world in which only the US and its designated satellites (e.g., Israel) held nuclear weapons.

With the disappearance of national sovereignty and independent economies came the prospect of the unity of the world's communities under the banner of Revolutionary Intercommunalism, whereby the people of the former nation states, which had withered away, could, without going through the Marxist stage of socialism, organise global revolution, overthrow the US empire and create the communist world ideal.

In August 1989, Huey was murdered in Oakland, California. He was survived by his siblings and second wife, Fredrika Slaughter Newton. He had no children. More than 10,000 people attended his funeral.

As founder and leader of the Party and author of numerous treatises and articles, poems (published in *Insights and Poems* with Ericka Huggins), and several books (including those noted above as well as In *Search of Common Ground* with Erik Erikson), and his PhD dissertation 'War Against the Panthers, A Study of Repression in America', Huey P. Newton stands in the pantheon of revolutionary leaders and thinkers.

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Nicaragua and Contemporary American Imperialism

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Synonyms

Central America; Contra war; Dollar diplomacy; Regime change

Definition

Nicaragua is perhaps among the clearest cases of rampant US imperialism producing sustained anti-imperialist movements, in a pattern that has repeated itself since the US mercenary William Walker invaded that country and declared himself president in 1856. The United States' financial and industrial interests, backed by US military forces, have sought to maintain control over key Nicaraguan resources, infrastructure, and a potential interoceanic canal route. US corporations and the US government maintained an aggressive posture toward Nicaragua throughout the twentieth century and have continued to utilize diverse imperialist strategies to coerce Nicaragua in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.

Introduction

Beginning with the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States increasingly asserted itself as the sole imperial power over the Caribbean Basin, claiming Puerto Rico as war bounty and exerting economic dominance over Cuba, Hispaniola, and all of Central America – going so far as to create the nation of Panama in order to build an interoceanic canal (Bermann 1986). Nicaragua was highly important in this neocolonial endeavor, due to its arable land, fresh water, and mining resources, but above all, its geography as a likely canal route.

Methods used by the imperialist system in Nicaragua have included direct counterinsurgent war (1927–1933), support for despotic pro-US regimes (1934–1979), proxy mercenary warfare (1980–1988), financing of opposition groups (1909, 1980–1990, and 2007–present), the use of the Organization of American States to pressure Nicaragua (1980–1989 and 2016–present), military bases and exercises with the Honduran government near the Nicaraguan border (2010–present), declarations of Nicaragua as an extraordinary threat to US national security (1985 and 2018), financing of opposition media (2007–present), training of "civic groups" in cyber-politics (2013–present), planning and execution of a "color revolution" or "soft coup" attempt (2018), sanctions to prevent Nicaragua's access to credit (2018), personal economic sanctions against Nicaraguan officials (2018), and the use of US rating corporations to downgrade perceptions of Nicaraguan financial stability (2018).

This continuous trajectory of intervention shows a transition from more overt, military, or "push" forms of politics to more subtle tactics involving media-based "pull" politics premised on capitalizing on the rules of globalized economies, liberal democracies, and political legitimacy to discredit and disarm anti-imperialist forces in Nicaragua, in order to restore a docile neoliberal regime. Throughout this history, US imperialism has found strange bedfellows. Historian Michel Gobat has argued that William Walker's support came not only from the Southern US slaveholding interests that donated to his campaigns to build

slave states in Central America but also from more liberal, Northern US industrial and military figures, and, indeed, from the liberal party of Nicaragua. Likewise, during the two decades of US military occupation of Nicaragua in the early twentieth century, most of the Nicaraguan elite and its press maintained a reverential glow in editorials and reports about US forces. This was true of both the opposing Liberal and Conservative parties, although US policy after ousting Liberal president Zelaya in 1909 maintained a strong pro-Conservative focus until 1928. Only when a patriot general, Augusto César Sandino, refused to recognize US legitimacy of any kind in Nicaragua did there begin to emerge a consistently anti-imperialist political tendency. However, there has always been a sizable part of the Nicaraguan political class that favors and appreciates US intervention, reflecting a sense that the legitimacy of the State in Nicaragua begins with US approval.

In 2018, US President Donald Trump declared Nicaragua to be an "extraordinary threat" to national security, and US National Security Advisor John Bolton described Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela as a "Troika of Tyranny" that would soon fall with support from the Trump administration, and at the same time he has lauded the election of "likeminded leaders" Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Ivan Duque in Colombia. The Nicaragua Investment Conditionality Act (NICA Act), the brain-child of Cuban-American Republican Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, which prevents the Nicaraguan government from accessing international loans, limiting its capacity to develop its healthcare, education, transport, and commerce capabilities, was passed by Congress in November 2018.

Historical Background

A century-long feud between the Liberal and Conservative parties marked Nicaraguan history even before US imperialism became a factor in national politics. The traditional landed oligarchy and the Catholic Church imposed their will through the Conservative party, which was based in Granada.

The Liberal party, based in Leon, was made up of an urban merchant and professional class, with important spaces of participation by workers and peasants. However, the Liberal party was thoroughly discredited through its shameful participation in the United States' first regime change operation in Nicaragua, carried out through filibuster William Walker in 1856–1857. As a result, the Conservatives controlled the Nicaraguan government for three and a half decades, until 1893, when Liberal strongman José Santos Zelaya assumed the presidency after the "July Revolution." The US government, led at the time by Theodore Roosevelt, was embarking on its "big stick" policy, which would soon be complemented by what he coined "dollar diplomacy," through which US banks would purchase the sovereign debts of Caribbean and Central American countries, exercising full control over formerly national banks, railroads, and shipping channels and forcing Caribbean and Central American countries to take on debts (Munro 1964).

Zelaya and the Regime Change Operation

The Zelaya government created a new constitution that replaced Nicaragua's electoral congress with obligatory and direct voting and a secret ballot, as well as separating the Church from the State (Esgueva Gomez 2005). Public education and transportation infrastructure increased, as shipping routes and railroads were built, largely with US capital. However, labor exploitation and labor strife increased during Zelaya's presidency, as he focused on modernization, particularly with regard to commerce and agrobusiness development, leading to countless land grabs and the widespread displacement of indigenous peoples from what would become coffee plantations and shipping routes. Initially enthusiastic with the expansion of commodity flows, US support for Zelaya waned after he appeared to take Nicaraguan sovereignty too seriously. US policy consistently demanded that Central American constitutions prohibit re-elections, yet Zelaya was re-elected twice, in 1902 and 1906.

After Zelaya intervened in Honduras and El Salvador in 1907, with interest in creating a Liberal-dominated federation of Central American states, the Taft administration assumed the US presidency in 1909, and the United States changed positions dramatically on Zelaya, now considering him a danger to US interests and "regional stability." Perhaps most significantly, Zelaya was reported to be initiating negotiations with the German and Japanese governments to build an interoceanic canal, challenging the monopoly of the US-controlled Panama Canal, under construction at the time (Gobat 2005).

Given the geographic importance of Nicaragua, US imperialism made a priority of Conservative restoration and the return to a subservient national government. After receiving covert support from the United States, politician Juan José Estrada proclaimed himself interim president of Nicaragua on October 10, 1909. Estrada represented one of several factions of Liberals unhappy with Zelaya, yet he was nonetheless utilized by the United States as a means by which to maneuver the unpopular Conservative party back into power. Within months, Estrada's military force on the ground was made up of Conservative generals, such as Emiliano Chamorro, using hired troops and weapons supplied by US companies through intermediaries such as Adolfo Díaz. When a counteroffensive by Zelaya led to the arrest and execution of two US nationals, soldiers of fortune hired by the Estrada insurgency, the US Secretary of State, Philander Knox, wrote the notorious "Knox Note" to the Nicaraguan Chargé d'Affaires in Washington on December 1, 1909, cutting off diplomatic relations with the Nicaraguan government. In late December, Zelaya resigned and left for Mexico via ship from the northwestern port of Corinto, surrounded by US warships (Kerevel 2006).

The Conservative Restoration

During his 10 months in office, Zelaya's successor, Liberal José Madriz Rodríguez, worked tirelessly to negotiate peace with the Estrada rebellion and to restore relations with the United States, but Knox refused to accept Madriz's government. US marines were deployed in Bluefields in order to prevent the final defeat of the failing rebellion, and a United Fruit Company subsidiary loaned Estrada money for arms and soldiers. Eventually, the US navy provided Conservative general Emiliano Chamorro with a large shipment of weapons to support the rebellion, at the same time as it blocked the arrival of arms purchased by the Madriz government (Kerevel 2006). Despite anti-imperialist protests across Nicaragua and in San Salvador, capital of El Salvador, the US presence gradually changed the balance of forces, and the Madriz government fell on August 19, 1910. One week later, Juan José Estrada assumed the presidency.

In the chaotic aftermath of war, as pro-Madriz, anti-imperialist armed groups still roamed the streets of Managua, the United States lost no time in restructuring the Nicaraguan economy, forcing Nicaragua in the "Dawson Agreements" to take out a $20 million US loan, to be paid for by Nicaraguan custom receipts. Liberals were rounded up, and the Conservation restoration was consolidated, as even the leader of the rebellion, Juan José Estrada, was ousted by the Conservative-dominated Constitutional Assembly in 1911 in favor of Adolfo Díaz.

In 1912, Conservative president Adolfo Diaz, formally a mining executive for a US company, transferred control over the Nicaraguan National Bank to the US Brown Brothers Commercial Bank. In response, the National Assembly, with Luis Mena Vado's leadership as Minister of War, passed a resolution censoring Díaz, who promptly fired General Mena and called on the United States for support. Mena and Liberal General Benjamín Zeledón rebelled against Díaz, who in turn appealed to the United States to intervene. Mena's forces, headquartered in Granada, succumbed under the combined thrust of US marines and recruits of the Conservative government. Taken alive, Mena was exiled. Zeledón, based in Masaya, stood up to US marines and was killed in battle. Zeledón's heroic statements and death in battle are considered one of the first major explicitly anti-imperialist endeavors in

Nicaragua. In response to Colonel Joseph Pendleton's letter asking him to surrender, Zeledón wrote, in part:

> I confess to you that I have read your note that I allude to and I have resisted believing that it could be signed by an educated soldier [...] and serving under the banner of the great (North) American Nation that prides itself on being the teacher of the Democratic Republics of the American Continent; and my sense of disbelief grows sharply when I consider that it is impossible for the Government of the United States of America and, above all, the Senate of the homeland of Washington and Lincoln, to have authorized their servants to come and intervene with armed force in the internal affairs that we Nicaraguans discuss in this land that is ours, and which was bequeathed to us freely, sovereignly and independently by our parents.
>
> [...] I do not even remotely see the reason you or your superiors could have for demanding the surrender of my positions or the disarmament of my army; consequently, I dare to think that you will withdraw his threats in view of the justice that accompanies me. But if, unfortunately for the honor of the United States of America, you and your bosses disregard the well-founded reasons that I invoke and carry out your pretensions of attack [...] I will do with mine the resistance that the case demands and that the dignity of Nicaragua demands, which we represent, and then, let it fall upon you, your bosses and the very strong Nation to which you belong, the tremendous responsibilities that History will attribute to you, and the eternal burden of having used your weapons against the weak who have been struggling to conquer the sacred rights of the Homeland. (in Selser 1984)

With the defeat of the nationalist rebellion, the Conservative government signed the onerous Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in Washington, DC, in 1914. The treaty, named for William Jennings Bryan, US Secretary of State and Nicaraguan General Emiliano Chamorro, gave the United States exclusive rights to build any canal in Nicaragua in perpetuity, as well as a renewable 99-year option to create a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca and a renewable 99-year lease on the Big and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean, in exchange for $3 million used by Nicaragua to pay debts to US creditors. US President Woodrow Wilson insisted on a clause that gave the United States a priori rights to military intervention, but the US Senate balked and the clause was removed before the treaty was ratified.

Sandino's Anti-imperialism

During the US military occupation of Nicaragua from 1912 to 1926, nonmilitary elements of imperialism developed. For example, the Rockefeller Center, funded through the Standard Oil monopoly, began sanitation drives that accompanied US military activities with rural census taking, hiring of local volunteers, and public meetings on hookworm control and prevention (Peña Torres and Palmer 2008). This is one of the first examples of a nongovernmental organization riding on the coattails of the US military. Meanwhile, the United Fruit Company (UFC) was the largest landowner between Colombia and Mexico.

In the countries that United Fruit dominated – referred to as "banana republics" – it controlled the ports, ran the postal service, and even created the first network of radio stations across Central America, effectively developing the first mass media (and media monopoly) that reached millions of people. The company vigorously resisted all worker efforts to organize unions, going as far as tearing down all houses and schools as it abandoned whole areas where union organizing was taking place. Although it paid no taxes, United Fruit gave governments money and weapons to repress the many rebellions taking place among the hundreds of thousands of highly exploited banana workers in the region, leading, for example, to the Banana Massacre of several hundred striking workers in Colombia. Politicians needed support from UFC's radio network, and so were scared of creating any tension with the conglomerate.

The geopolitical hegemony of the United Fruit Company was reinforced by the US Marines, which were deployed in Central America and the Caribbean to defend the interests of the corporation dozens of times between 1901 and 1934. The "Banana Wars", as these were called, produced such a trove of experiences in capitalist combat against impoverished rebels that the Marines systematized their learning in the *Small Wars Manual*, published in 1940.

In Nicaragua, banana interests were slowed by the need for a railroad system (Schoonover and Langley 1995). The US commercial bank Brown

Brothers financed the railway system and came to control the Nicaraguan National Bank. Bundy Cole, a manager of one of Brown Brother's subsidiaries in Nicaragua, famously said in the 1920s, "I do not think any Indian or any negro is capable of self-government." After a Liberal uprising against a US-supported Conservative government led to civil war in 1926, the United States intervened to prevent a Liberal victory, forcing all parties to agree to a power-sharing government that would preserve US interests.

Liberal general Augusto César Sandino refused the terms of the US plan and with 29 men embarked on a guerilla war against the US occupation of Nicaragua. Sandino's first armed action was the occupation of the San Andrés Mine in Nueva Segovia, where he drove off the US managers and turned over the mine to the workers to run collectively. Sandino was declared an outlaw, and US marines were sent to Ocotal to initiate a counterinsurgency campaign. Internationally, Sandino became a symbol of resistance to the US empire, and grassroots anti-imperialist leagues and Communist parties across the Americas debated whether his guerrilla tactics were acceptable or represented a threat to the dominant parliamentary political methods promoted internationally by the Soviet Union.

The first use of airplanes to support US ground troops occurred in Nicaragua, as US Marines leveled the countryside and forcibly displaced peasants from small towns of the Segovia region in repeated attempts to eliminate Sandino's forces (Macaulay 1985). The use of mercenary troops to hunt Sandino eventually became a concerted US effort to build a National Guard in Nicaragua, which US planners assumed would strengthen democratic institutions. Meanwhile, Sandino's writings took on class dimensions, as he insisted that the difficulty of prolonged anti-imperialist struggle would necessitate the unique qualities of workers and peasants.

By 1933, the US government withdrew troops from Nicaragua and announced the Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America. Sandino signed peace agreements with Nicaragua's new Liberal president, Juan Baustista Sacasa, and created an agricultural cooperative with his troops in Wiwilí. However, in 1934, as Sandino and his father left a dinner party with President Sacasa, the leader of Nicaragua's recently formed National Guard, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, ordered Sandino's detention and assasination, and disappeared his body. The following day, the National Guard carried out a massacre of Sandino's disarmed troops at the Wiwilí cooperative. Within 2 years, Somoza Garcia had staged a coup d'etat and installed himself as Nicaragua's strongman, with US support. Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously referred to Somoza by saying "he's a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch" (Black 1988). The Somoza family ruled as a US-supported dictatorship from 1934 to 1979.

The Sandinista Popular Revolution and the Contra War

During the early 1960s, inspired by the success of the Cuban Revolution, radical Nicaraguans led by student activist Carlos Fonseca created the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Known as FSLN for its Spanish initials, this Sandinista Front created an "historic" program to break free from US tutelage and the agro-export model. After nearly 20 years of sustained clandestine activities, the FSLN managed to lead a massive people's insurrection that ousted Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the first Somoza's son, in 1979, after his regime inflicted tens of thousands of casualties on the civilian population in a US-supported counter insurgency.

The Sandinista revolutionary movement scored a surprise victory as a generalized disgust with the Somoza dictatorship transformed into an insurrection in 1978 and 1979, and Somoza met the growing uprising with air bombings of poor neighborhoods of Managua, Estelí, and León. When the dictator left Nicaragua on a flight to Miami, he took along with him the cremated remains of his father and brother. The new governing junta, which seized power in 1979, immediately began to enact social change through initiatives such as Fernando Cardenal's world-renowned literacy crusade, which reduced illiteracy over 40% to 8%. The agrarian reform process

eventually reached three million hectares of the country's five million hectares of farmland (Núñez-Soto 2015). Additionally, Nicaragua's contemporary healthcare infrastructure, including the system of public hospitals and clinics, essentially dates back to the revolutionary period of the 1980s. The Sandinista Revolution (1979–1990) was a period of profound social transformation in Nicaragua, including agrarian reform, literacy and cultural campaigns, nationalizations of key industries, and community development and health programs.

Many of the acheivements of the Revolution, however, were eclipsed by the scale and horrors of the war that began in 1980. The counterrevolutionaries, or Contras, were armies recruited, trained, armed, and financed by US intelligence, along with involvement by the governments of Argentina and Israel. US President Ronald Reagan (1980–1988) was the major backer of the Contras, whom he referred to as "freedom fighters" struggling against the "Communist beachhead in Central America."

As Brian Willson (2019) documented:

> In March 1981, during President Ronald Reagan's second month in office, he issued a Presidential Finding authorizing the CIA to undertake covert activities directed against Nicaragua and its new Sandinista revolutionary government, the Frente Sandinista Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). An initial $19 million was allocated for the purpose of destroying the Sandinistas, beginning with a 500-man "action team" to engage in paramilitary and political operations. By summer 1981, Reagan's State Department aide Robert McFarland prepared a report, "Taking the War to Nicaragua"2, and by December 1981, Nicaraguan exile groups, or Contras, began combat training at a site west of Miami, and subsequently at training camps in California, New Jersey, and in Florida's Panhandle. Also in December 1981, the Red Christmas CIA Operation occurred in Miskito territory in Northeastern Nicaragua along the Honduran border where Indigenous communities were forcefully relocated to create a beachhead inside Nicaraguan territory before the Sandinista government forces could establish control of the area. The hope was to create a breakaway state that could ask for US military support. In January 1982, Reagan requested and received, $5.1 million in US Agency for International Development (AID) funds to provoke dissent among Somocistas, and among Catholic Church hierarchy, against the new Nicaraguan government.

These armies' purpose was to reverse the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution, and their strategy was to terrorize the civilian population of Nicaragua. Over 10,000 separate acts of terrorism were committed by the Contras during the 10 years of war that coincided with the Sandinista Revolution, often coinciding with the practices recommended in the CIA-produced 1983 "murder manual" for Contras, *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*. During the Reagan administration, the US Government illegally sold weapons to Iran and smuggled cocaine into the United States, fueling the crack epidemic in African-American communities, in order to finance the Contras (Webb 1998). The International Court of Justice found that the United States had violated international law by creating the Contra war against Nicaragua. In November 1983, the US Congress created the "National Endowment for Democracy" (NED), to openly perform some of the tasks that the CIA had secretly been carrying out for decades. NED immediately began funding printing supplies and salaries for the right-wing Chamorro-owned daily newspaper *La Prensa* to promote the cause and image of the Contras as pro-democracy forces. After the Nicaraguan government forced *La Prensa* to close for 1 year due to its connection with the armed Contra armies, the newspaper reinitiated with 250,000 of NED funds. The scale of the Contra operation was staggering, even by US standards. In March 1983, the CIA established a 50 million intelligence network in Central America, under the direction of figures such as Elliot Abrams and John Negroponte. Actions included infiltrating agents into Nicaragua and carrying out missions with low-altitude spy planes. Between 1983 and 1984, Contra armies sabotaged Nicaragua's airport in Managua, the Corinto port facilities, and an oil pipeline in the western coastal town of Puerto Sandino, and CIA assets mined Nicaragua's harbors. NED and CIA funds went into the manipulation of public opinion, as fotogenic events were staged in order to create false news stories and narratives that could erode public support for the Sandinista Revolution. The CIA created clandestine radio stations in Honduras, Costa Rica and on the Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua. A 16-page

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comic book written by the CIA, *Freedom Fighter's Manual*, was air-dropped across northern Nicaragua. The manual called for physically breaking windows and light bulbs, spreading rumors, making false reports of crimes and fires, stopping up toilets, putting dirt in gas tanks, and firebombing police stations, among other tactics. In 1985, Col. Oliver North of the US National Security Council released the "US Political/Military Strategy for Nicaragua," which directed the Contras to repeatedly "disrupt the economic infrastructure of Nicaragua with priority given to the electrical grid, water, transportation and communication systems," as a "show of force action with maximum psychological benefit."

The Neoliberal Period

In the context of end of the Cold War, the Nicaraguan government agreed in negotiations with the United States to hold early elections in 1990. In an election in which the United States spent more per Nicaraguan voter than Bush and Dukakis had spent combined 2 years earlier, the US-backed Unidad Nacional Opositora (National Unity Opposition – UNO) presidential candidate, Violeta Chamorro, won the election handily against the FSLN's candidate, Daniel Ortega. Noam Chomsky commented that the Nicaraguan people were voting "with a gun to their heads," as the UNO promised an end to the war if it won the elections. The 1990 turnover of power from the FSLN to the UNO is the only known case in the world of a government that took power through armed struggle peacefully turning over that power through electoral means. After the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, former landowners returned to Nicaragua from the United States. They began to take back their former estates through legal and less than legal maneuvering, driving many rural people off the land they had been cultivating. This "agrarian counter-reform," as it became known, left many hundreds of people landless in its wake during the 1990s and early 2000s.

During the three presidential periods from 1990 to 2006, the Nicaraguan government privatized healthcare and introduced educational "autonomy," which made each public school responsible for paying teachers' and administrators' salaries, essentially passing the cost of education to parents. By 1996, 34% of the population was considered illiterate, while half a million children and teenagers were outside of the school system, in a country with a total population of 6 million people (Hanemann 2006; UNDP 1998). Nicaragua became the second poorest country of the western hemisphere, after Haiti, as international aid and remittances from Nicaraguan citizens living abroad became the pillars of the economy (Bonino 2016).

The 2006 Central American Free Trade Agreement, signed by Central American countries as well as the United States, opened the door to "free trade zones" or enclaves for foreign-owned textile factories to take advantage of Nicaragua's cheap labor while avoiding paying taxes. However, the "lost decade" of the 1990s and early 2000s was not simply an uncontested, top-down process; on the contrary, student movements shut down Managua for several months protesting against budget cuts, and rural workers virtually occupied state farms on the cusp of being privatized, creating cooperatives and a bottom-up process of land reform (Wilson 2013).

The Second Phase of the Sandinista Revolution

After coming in second in three consecutive presidential elections, Daniel Ortega beat all other candidates with 38 percent of the vote in 2006 and returned to the presidency in 2007 after 17 years. The incoming Sandinista-led coalition created a National Unity and Reconciliation (NUR) government, with slogans such as "Christian values, socialist ethics, and actions of solidarity." Within its development plans, the "recuperation of rights" plays a major role, guiding diverse policies, including the renewed literacy campaigns and the reconstruction of public education and public healthcare, among other key areas (PNDH 2012).

Social infrastructure, including roads, parks, farmers' markets, child care centers, and

maternity homes in each municipality of the country, has been the hallmark of the NUR government. One of the first laws related to the food sector to be enacted by the returning Sandinista government was Law 693, the law of Food and Nutritional Sovereignty and Security of 2009. This law, the goal of several years of social movement articulation and lobbying, declared food sovereignty and security to be the responsibility of the State, to be carried out in collaboration with territorial and social actors (Araujo and Godek 2014).

Aside from Law 693, there are several recent laws that contribute to the argument that food sovereignty is a legitimate analytical lens for understanding Nicaraguan food and agricultural social processes. Law 717 mandates the creation of a fund for purchasing land for distribution to women peasants. Law 765, the Law to Foment Agroecological and Organic Production, establishes norms for agroecological production and the capacity for municipalities to create local ordinances to foment agroecology. New state entities, such as the Ministry of the Family, Community, Cooperative, and Associative Economy, have become spaces for promoting small-scale farmers and food producers through fairs, farmers' markets, micro-loans, and training (Núñez Soto 2015).

These policies have contributed to Nicaragua having among the highest rates of economic growth in Latin America between 2007 and 2018. By 2018, Nicaragua was food self-sufficient in beans, corn, eggs, milk, fruits, onions, peppers, tomatoes, and beef. Nicaragua has the highest human development index score in Latin America and has been considered the country with the greatest level of gender equality in the region. In 2007, Nicaragua became part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), a group of nations seeking a regional integration based on principles of complementarity and respect for socioeconomic models that seek alternatives to capitalist development. For nearly a decade, Venezuela contributed petroleum and loans to Nicaragua, providing a crucial initial investment for the economy of small-scale producers, while Cuban doctors provided diverse health services.

There is no doubt that the US Government has long been hostile to the ALBA alliance, with particularly violent postures toward Cuba and Venezuela. Until 2016, the official US stance on Nicaragua was not as aggressive, and the Nicaraguan government avoided the kinds of public clashes with US imperialism that Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Ecuador's Rafael Correa, and Bolivia's Evo Morales took on as part of their political strategy. On the part of the Nicaraguan Sandinista government, it is clear that avoiding conflict with the United States is a basic need for governing the country, as evidenced by nearly 200 years of history. Additionally, the unhealed wounds of the Contra war require a permanent emphasis on peace and reconciliation on its part, which would be incompatible with heightened anti-US discourse. Wikileaks documents reveal the hostility of the US State Department's stance on the Nicaraguan government, and cables name goals including "the acheivement in the immediate future of a government akin to the interest of the US government," to "alienate the ALBA movement from Nicaragua," and the "creation of conditions for regime change." A 2013 memorandum of the National Democratic Institute, one of the four core entities of the NED, identified four elements of a destabilization strategy: (1) training young political leaders; (2) a media offensive; (3) the unification of the opposition; and (4) the strengthening of civil society organizations. However, it is not immediately clear why the United States did not act more decisively against the FSLN government until 2018, although it is likely that the continental geopolitical situation had deteriorated for leftist governments since the 2013 death of Hugo Chávez and, with that decline, the opportunity finally opened up for US imperialism.

The 2018 Coup Attempt Against Nicaragua

The Sandinista-led coalition government won elections by increasing margins in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2016, and 2017. Despite polling at around 80% approval, Daniel Ortega had his share of enemies. The fiercest of all of these were the

former Sandinistas, who after leaving the party, had shifted to the political right. Indeed, the president of the Movement for the Renovation of Sandinismo (MRS) in 2017 went so far as to meet with far-right Cuban-American Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and join her call for US sanctions against Nicaragua. In Miami and Washington, the Nicaragua Investment Conditionality Act (NICA Act) was written, which forces Washington to veto all international loans to Nicaragua until the United States approves of Nicaraguan election procedures.

Since the return of Daniel Ortega to the presidency in 2007, the NED has funded opposition nongovernmental organizations. Through the International Republican Institute, International Democratic Institute, and other US organizations, NED funded the training of over 2000 young people in social media skills for "democracy promotion" in the years leading up to 2018. Most of these trainings were carried out through MRS-affiliated nongovernmental organizations. As a NED-funded publication, Global Americans (2018) boasts on its website:

> In 2017, for example, the NED provided an anonymous organization with $86,000 to foster "a new generation of democratic youth leaders." According to the project description, the funds were intended,
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> "To promote democratic values and participation among youth in Nicaragua. Forums in schools and universities will educate students about democratic values and human rights. A network of youth leaders will foster a more active role of youth in defending democracy. Additionally, a magazine and social media will facilitate discussion on youth issues and democratic activism."
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> In the same year, the NED funded a project titled, "Strengthening the Strategic Capacity of Civil Society to Defend Democracy." Again, the NED's website does not report the name of the organization that received the grant. However, per the project description, the funds were used to,
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> "To strengthen the capacity of Nicaraguan pro-democracy activists to forge a common civil society strategy to defend democracy. Periodic publications will cover the state of democracy and the situation of human rights in Nicaragua. A group of civil society organizations and social movements will convene a series of forums to discuss their content and identify advocacy opportunities."

NED has placed particular emphasis on funding fiercely anti-government media, human rights,

youth, environmental, and feminist organizations associated with the MRS political party. Among the main recipients of NED funds is the Institute for Economic and Public Policy Research, whose director, Felix Maradiaga, has been groomed and maintained by fellowships and grants from the US foreign policy establishment for over a decade. Another major recipient is Hagamos Democracy, which in turn funds other anti-Sandinista organizations. These organizations have been seen as largely ineffective in transforming their funding into any sort of broad-based opposition to the Sandinista government, until April 2018.

As Tom Ricker (2018) reported early in the crisis that in Nicaragua, rather than fund discredited political parties, the US government was more interested in creating a network of NGOs, particularly those that work with media, with the capacity to repeat each other loud enough and often enough to create an alternative version of events in social media:

> The problem with the words "developing a joint civil society strategy," and similar formulations of this idea, is what they obscure, which is the control of media representation through a well-coordinated strategy that excludes facts that might disrupt the story of a corrupt dictatorship with no popular support. The result of this consistent building and funding of opposition resources has been to create an echo chamber that is amplified by commentators in the international media – most of whom have no presence in Nicaragua and rely on these secondary sources. During and immediately after the INSS protests, the NED-funded opposition lost no time in using overblown rhetoric to frame a complex situation in simplistic terms, focusing solely on government misdeeds.

Carlos Fernando Chamorro, former editor of the 1980s era Sandinista newspaper and son of neo-liberal president Violeta Chamorro, created a media organization that served as the conduit for the National Endowment for Democracy to fund several anti-Sandinista media outlets in Nicaragua. He also runs one of them, called *Confidencial*, and has a television program. His cousin, Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro, is a publisher of *La Prensa*, a fiercely anti-Sandinista daily, and the same family controls *El Nuevo Diario*, the only other major daily newspaper in Nicaragua. These news outlets had regularly accused Daniel

Ortega of being an "unconstitutional president," a "dictator," and a "murderer" for nearly a decade.

The broader context for the soft coup attempt in Nicaragua was the deteriorating economic situation in Venezuela and the reemergence of a strong far-right political force in Latin America, particularly involving Colombia, Honduras, Argentina, and Brazil. In March 2018, Venezuela stopped purchasing Nicaraguan beef and cattle exports, negatively affecting the landholding oligarchy of Nicaragua (Suárez 2018).

The more specific context was a fiscal crisis in the social security system. In April, talks broke down between the business sector, labor unions, and the government over a new law to reform the social security system, or INSS. The number of insured people had mushroomed over the last decade, as the government encouraged individuals working in free-trade zones and informal popular markets to sign up for pension and healthcare. The government was running an $80 million annual loss between contributions and services delivered to the population. In 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had published recommendations that Nicaragua overhaul its social security system. The IMF proposal was to raise the retirement age and nearly triple the number of weeks, or paychecks, required for people to qualify for pension benefits. The business lobby, known as the Superior Council of Private Companies or COSEP, aggressively stuck by the IMF proposal, while labor unions demanded that the reform target businesses more than workers. When COSEP walked away from negotiations in April, the government quickly made an agreement with labor unions and published the reform law in the official Gaceta in April 17.

The business lobby called for protests the same day, and the two major newspapers dedicated front-page stories to the "antibusiness" social security reform. More importantly in the Nicaraguan context, virtually all Facebook accounts in the country were drowned in paid advertisements calling on people to protest against unjust reforms that would hurt elders. A dramatic image of crying older women reached nearly all Nicaraguans with a smartphone, along with a caption saying, "The war took my son. All I have to live on in is my pension. Now they are leaving me destitute!" The #SOSINSS hashtag was created on Facebook and Twitter. Although only about 5% of Nicaraguans have the Internet at home, the parks in nearly every neighborhood have free Wi-Fi, so the messaging was extremely successful in generating the perception that the INSS reform was regressive, particularly among young people.

The following day, April 18, in response to the COSEP call for protests, the Sandinista Front called for marches in favor of the INSS reforms across the country. In the largest anti-reform protest in the country, a group of about 200 young people, mostly students of the Jesuit-run, private Central American University (UCA), protested at a point along the highway in one of the wealthier parts of Managua. An equally large group of pro-government counter-protesters from a nearby working-class neighborhood confronted the students, and national camera crews were on the scene as scuffles broke out between young people of distinct class origins. One reporter had his camera stolen by a young man wearing a Sandinista T-shirt. Before the afternoon was finished, former presidents, beauty queens, and the US Ambassador had all made statements blaming the government for repressing protests. Indeed, Piero Coen, the richest man in Nicaragua and owner of national Western Union operations, personally visited the student protesters, who had regrouped at the gates of the UCA, to encourage them and declare his support for their cause. During the evening of April 18, there was a false report of a student protester killed by police that "went viral" in social media, and images of an older woman with a beaten face also reached virtually all Facebook users in Nicaragua (Moderate Rebels 2018). In April 19, large-scale mobilizations in favor and against the INSS reforms took place across the country. Four Nicaraguan human rights organizations, also funded by NED, mobilized protests for freedom of expression.

In several cities, opposing demonstrations came into close contact with one another, as the police attempted to separate them. During the evening of April 19, there were three fatal shootings related to the INSS protests: a worker not involved in the protests and a police officer were

killed near the campus of another Nicaraguan university, UPOLI, and a teenager in Tipitapa was shot that night. The case of the Tipitapa teen is somewhat explanatory of the vague circumstances of the early fatalities. A 16-year-old son of "historic combatants" and members of the Sandinista Front was a member of the Sandinista youth and played in a neighborhood marching band. However, on April 19, he was also one of a group of teens who were hired to attack the INSS building in Tipitapa and given makeshift firearms by a local Liberal party politician. After INSS workers and local police officers fended off the attack on the INSS building, the group of armed teens walked several blocks toward the municipal government buildings. Along the way, the teen misfired a weapon and shot himself, according to witnesses in his group. During his wake, the neighborhood band director, who had been fired from a job in a public high school, placed a Nicaraguan flag upon the coffin and brought bandmates in to videotape themselves promising to avenge his death – videos that reached hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans.

Although none of the three deaths of April 19 were attributable to police overresponse, the media narrative was unequivocal in denouncing "repression." Facebook was overtaken by well-designed images and slogans calling for armed resistance against the "dictatorship." Videos of police beating people surfaced online, although many were later exposed as being from neighboring Honduras, where the police uniform is similar. Newspapers and television channels cited one another in reporting widespread government repression.

On April 20, 21, and 22, large-scale riots took over most cities of Nicaragua. In general, the confrontations were between pro- and anti-government civilians who threw rocks at each other and sometimes fought with sticks, although homemade mortar launchers began to appear as well. In Leon, anti-government rioters burned down the historic building of the Nicaraguan student movement, and a student was burned to death inside – the first death of a university student in the context of the protests. In Bluefields, the news reporter for pubically owned Channel 6, Angel Guhona, was broadcasting live on Facebook Lite

about the damage rioters had done to public infrastructure when he was suddenly shot in the head by a madeshift shotgun. For months, Nicaraguan and international media asserted that Guhona had been killed by the police, although a police officer had been wounded by the same shotgun explosion. In Esteli, two young protesters were shot, one at short range as riots came close to burning down the town hall, and the other as he crossed the town plaza next to the Cathedral. In Managua, riot police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets; in at least two cases, rubber bullet wounds resulted in a loss of an eye. In Masaya, a young man was killed as he defended a supermarket from rioters who had been "spontanously" convoked via anonymous WhatsApp messages. The number of victims became an issue of contention, as the US-funded human rights organizations claimed over 30 deaths and the government reported 10. Over the next week, the number of deaths reported by human rights organizations as occurring from April 19 to 22 mushroomed to 43, then to 65, and then to 84. On Facebook, posts referred to a "genocide." The same week, the "Anonymous" group carried out a massive hack of Nicaraguan government websites and public employees' email accounts.

In Saturday, April 21, President Daniel Ortega called for peace and dialogue. The next day, he rescinded the social security reform, in order to "create a better environment for dialogue." However, the opposition initially rejected dialogue and demanded a new government. As US Vice President Mike Pence called for Ortega to resign, the Twitter and Facebook hashtag became #SOSNicaragua. The FSLN government asked the Catholic Church to mediate the dialogue, and the opposition accepted on the condition that the National Dialogue be televised. During the dialogue, the opposition's newly created "Civic Alliance for Democracy and Justice" presented its proposal: the President, Vice-President, and members of the Supreme Electoral Court should resign, the powers of the National Assembly should be suspended, and an interim governing junta of "upstanding citizens" should take power. The members of the Church hierarchy mediating the dialogue began to bring their congregations to opposition rallies and use church infrastructure

(vehicles, physical installations) to support the opposition road blocks that were set up across the country as the government complied with an agreement to keep the National Police in barracks. The opposition road blocks eventually became the main element of the coup attempt, and for over 2 months Nicaraguans could not travel between cities due to the road blocks operated by masked men armed with pistols and automatic rifles. With police and emergency vehicles unable to respond, countless arsons and kidnappings targeted Sandinista supporters, particularly the well-known "historic" families of participants in Sandinista struggle since the 1970s. The June 16 assassination and public burning of Francisco Aráuz Pineda, son of Amada Pineda, one of the "Women of Cuá" who had been gang-raped by Somoza's National Guard troops, is an example of the symbolism used by the Nicaraguan right-wing during the 3-month-long coup attempt.

The regime change operation in Nicaragua made use of two kinds of internal opposition to the government. One face of the opposition was a well-groomed coalition made up of NGOs that ostensibly represented many sectors of the Nicaraguan society: university students, private commercial interests, agribusiness, peasants, and feminists. This group, known as the Civic Alliance, was coordinated with the Nicaraguan oligarchy, politically led by the Chamorro family, as well as other illustrious clans such as the Montealegre, Belli, and Baltodano families. Included in this opposition were the high-profile students being flown by Freedom House to meetings with rightwing Cuban-American politicians Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Blumenthal 2018). The other face of the opposition was made up of extremely violent street groups that carried out terrorist attacks on public infrastructure and Sandinista supporters. This violence followed the script of the "guarimba" protests in Venezuela during 2014 and 2017, including the widespread use of kidnapping, torture, murder, and public humiliation of Sandinista party members, the destruction and desecration of historical sites associated with the revolutionary struggle, as well as the use of road blocks and no-go zones from where opposition forces could broadcast a narrative to national and international media (Zeese and McCune 2018). In 2019, board members of the Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights accused Executive Director Álvaro Leiva of inflating the death toll from protests as well as stealing nearly half a million dollars in funding provided by the US government's National Endowment for Democracy (McCurdy 2019).

Cross-References

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism
▶ Cold War and Latin America
▶ Dollar Diplomacy
▶ Non-governmental Organisations (NGOS)
▶ U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

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Nigeria

▶ Ifeoma Okoye (1937–)

Nigeria: Modern Economic Imperialism (c. 1980 to Present)

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Introduction

The roots of the modern system of economic imperialism in Nigeria can be traced back to the advent of European merchants along the coastal areas of West Africa as from the seventeenth century (Stone 1988). This early-stage mercantilism signalled the consequent proclamation of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria by the end of the nineteenth century and subsequent integration of the new colonial territory into the world capitalist system (Smith 1979). Colonialism ensured the total peripheral subjugation of geographical territory of Nigeria along with its markets and products (largely raw materials) to the dictates and vagaries of the markets in the metropolis (Lange et al. 2006). In particular, trade and profit making were the ultimate attention of metropolitan markets and local lumpenbourgeoisie at the expense of the pauperized producers in the colony. Forming the early set of the indigenous elite class, the local merchants and middlemen (lumpenbourgeoisie) merged with the educated elite to form the new ruling class at independence in 1960.

The economic policy in the immediate post-colonial period, from 1960 to 1966, was largely modelled after the economic foundation bequeathed by the former colonial masters. Primary emphasis was on the export of agricultural products and other raw materials to international markets, while multinational corporations dominated the nation's economy (Udofia 1984; Turner

1976). The consequent civil war of 1967 to 1970 ensured a war economy, which, of course, favored multinational arm suppliers along with middlemen in the military, political, and economic circles, while the country groaned at the massive loss of human lives and material capital (Nafziger 1972). The postwar attempt of General Gowon's government at participation of Nigerians in the mainstream of economic management through the promulgation of the indigenization decree in 1971 achieved little result (Ogbuagu 1983). The indigenization process was riddled with mistrust. While the Igbo ethnic group which had suffered great loss and economic deprivation due to the Civil War accused the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba dominated Federal Government of deliberate economic annihilation and sideling, many of the indigenized companies were bought over by ill-experienced government contractors and retired powerful and high-ranking public officers (Iwuagwu 2009; Akinsanya 1994; Nwoke 1986). Many of the companies, of course, subsequently collapsed. The failure of the indigenized companies coupled with oil glut and economic depression of the late 1970s made the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) proposal for economic liberalism a rational option with dire economic and political consequences for the nation. The next section discusses austerity measures and structural adjustment, the third section presents post-1996 new economic order, the fourth section examines economic deprivation and militancy, and the last section concludes the chapter.

Austerity Measures and Structural Adjustment, 1980–1996

After a gruesome civil war and 13 long years under military rule, Nigeria was democratized again in October 1979. The civilian regime of Alhaji Shehu Shagari had a depressed economy and a huge debt burden. International financial experts, creditors, and Bretton Woods organizations attributed Nigeria's deplorable economic state to institutional corruption and waste, which could only be addressed through austerity measures (Bienen and Gersovitz 1985). At this stage,

austerity measures largely entailed the removal of subsidies. Shehu Shagari could achieve but a little with his reforms until he was toppled in a military coup in 31 December 1983. The new military regime headed by General Buhari was skeptical about the economic impact of the reforms on Nigeria. It rather sought to reform through a program it termed "War Against Indiscipline" (Stock 1988). For the Buhari regime, indiscipline was the problem with Nigeria. If tackled, Nigeria could improve its socioeconomic indices. Buhari remained in power only until August 1985 when he was toppled in a military coup led by his army chief, General Badamasi Babangida.

An intelligent military officer, Machiavellian, and very deceptive with his transition to civil rule program, euphemistically called the "Maradonna" and "evil genius" because of his dexterity at deft, and yet manipulative political maneuvers, Babangida, who ruled Nigeria for 8 years, introduced an encompassing Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, which has somewhat defined Nigeria's economic policy till date. The SAP entailed the withdrawal of government from the provision of social support, especially in education and health; downsizing of the civil service; devaluation of the nation's currency, the naira; commercialization and privatization of government enterprises; embargo on employment and salary increases; the adoption of liberal trade policies; and prioritization of debt servicing (Geo-JaJa and Magnum 2001; Roy 1993). The SAP resulted in massive inflation (which increased from 5.4% in 1986 to 40% by 1989) and mass pauperization with about 70% of Nigerians living below the poverty line by the year 2000, up from the pre-SAP figure of about 27% in 1980 (Ogwumike 2002; Anyanwu 1992). Student enrolment and hospital attendance drastically declined with some communities recording up to 50% increase in maternal mortality (Lingam 2006) and national child mortality of 191 per 100,000 live births (National Bureau of Statistics 2005). Likewise, there was massive retrenchment of workers in both the public and private sectors even as many industries also collapsed (Okafor 2007; Gbosi 1993).

Notwithstanding the socioeconomic woes of the mass, SAP through the embedded policies of

privatization and trade liberalization benefited a class of lumpenbourgeoisie and international capitalists who took advantage of the new fiscal environment. Here, a clear imperialistic manifestation of international capital alongside its local counterparts could be seen. General Babangida's government promulgated the Privatization and Commercialization Decree of 1988 and instituted the Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC), which was saddled with the responsibility of privatizing 111 public enterprises. By the time the TCPC rounded up its activities in 1993, it had privatized up to 88 public companies (Igbuzor 2003). Whereas, while the Nigerian Telecommunications PLC (NITEL) and National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) were commercialized and retained under government control, the more profiting public enterprises in the banking, insurance, and oil sectors (including oil blocs) were sold and/or leased to government cronies among the economic elites (Olutayo and Omobowale 2011; Ugorji 1995; Lewis 1994). Thus, there emerged new super-rich capitalists, many of whom hitherto had no capitalist and productive pedigree in the Nigerian productive and business sectors. Buyers of the profitable public enterprises are often accused of being agents of the top military officers who may be the "real" owners of the companies.

The SAP's trade liberalization policy emphasizes international trade and open borders as against local production and protection of the local producers. Hence, while numerous local companies collapsed, the service and exploration industries in the financial and petroleum sectors, whose transactions are somewhat connected with multinational corporations abroad, thrived. Nigeria became a dumping ground for goods which had productive expertise in Nigeria. Facing difficulties to survive in the new "competitive" environment that favored foreign companies, local companies collapsed (Iwuagwu 2009; Noorbakhsh and Paloni 1999; Rogers and Til 1997).

It is also important to note that the economic de-empowerment of Nigerians also provided a thriving market for the importation of substandard goods from Asia (popularly called *Chinco*) and secondhand goods from the developed world

(Pang 2008; Omobowale 2012, 2013a). This was (and still is) a sort of "primitive" economic imperialism of Nigeria by Asian countries (particularly China) as well as developed countries who extract surplus capital flight from Nigeria by dumping poor quality goods and used goods, of course, with the connivance of Nigerian officials and businessmen (Omobowale 2013b).

Capital flight is a major consequence of economic imperialism. Jimoh (1991) estimates that aside from money lost to under-invoicing and "fake trading," capital flight from Nigeria between 1960 and 1988 is US$53.8 billion representing an average of US$1.9 billion yearly. Likewise Lawanson (2007) reports that annual average capital flight from Nigeria was US$4.3 billion in the 1980s, reaching a peak of US$10.1 billion in the 1990s, after which it declined US$1.4 billion in 1995 (see also Olugbenga and Alamu 2013; Akinlo 2011; Ngwainmbi 2005). The SAP was officially discontinued in 1996. It has been largely described as a monumental failure with most of the blame attributed to corruption and half-hearted implementation (Iwuagwu 2009; Rogers and Til 1997). It should be noted that the huge amount that Nigeria lost to capital flight during this period due to trade liberalization could have been used for local development. While the majority of Nigerians were pauperized, the country statistically experienced some economic growth that largely benefited the local capitalists and multinational corporations.

Post-1996 New Economic Order in Nigeria

The immediate post-1996 period marked some major milestones in Nigeria. General Abacha who had seized power in a military coup in 1993 was preparing to transform into a civilian president through a fraudulent transition program (Ehwarieme 2011). Abacha, was a military ruler that was very critical of the Western world and he, fraternized with China and North Korea. He was very much unloved both at home and abroad and often described as a pariah. He had constituted a team of political and military cohorts to advance

his plan for civilian presidency (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). Abacha's sudden death in June 1998 somewhat changed the political and economic landscape of Nigeria, with the new regime of General Abubakar opting for a speedy transition to civil rule program. Thus Nigeria adopted liberal democracy with the assumption of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as civilian president on 29 May 1999.

The new liberal democratic dispensation of President Obasanjo favored liberal policies that had supposedly been dispensed with the discontinuation of SAP earlier in 1996. Olusegun Obasanjo's economic policy did not really differ from what obtained during the SAP years. There was strong emphasis on privatization and liberalism. Obasanjo's government keyed into the Washington Consensus by designing the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) policy for Nigeria and influencing the African Union to adopt the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative as African homegrown initiative for economic development (National Planning Commission 2004; Chabal 2002). A close scrutiny of both NEEDS and NEPAD shows they are very connected with neoliberal recommendations of the Breton Woods organizations, which had earlier been implemental through SAP (Olutayo and Omobowale 2005). Simply put, NEEDS and NEPAD were new nomenclature for SAP in the era of liberal democracy. Hence, NEEDS and NEPAD were domestic policies for the continuation of economic imperialism through liberalization and privatization in the post-military era. Nigeria no longer lays emphasis on NEEDS and NEPAD nomenclature following the end of Obasanjo's regime in 2007; nonetheless, government economic policy remains market oriented.

The first major wave of liberalization and privatization under the Obasanjo regime was in the telecommunications sector. The government of Olusegun Obasanjo licensed two multinational GSM companies, MTN and ECONET (an indigenous company, GLOBACOM, was licensed much later), to invest in Nigeria's moribund telecommunications sector. For many Nigerians, this was a welcome development because the Nigerian Telecommunications PLC

(NITEL) had failed to provide nationwide quality service. Even though NITEL had advanced telecommunications equipment, some of which MTN and ECONET had to rely on in the first few years of their operations; NITEL could not compete with these new GSM companies. Subsequent attempts at privatizing NITEL have failed. NITEL's multimillion dollar investments remain abandoned; its staff has been disengaged, while the company remains comatose (Olutayo and Omobowale 2011). A report credited to the Association of Telecoms Companies of Nigeria (ATCON) states that the telecommunications sector is the largest-growing sector in Nigeria, but Nigeria lost 80% of the US$18 billion profit generated between 2001 and 2010 to capital flight (Okonji 2012). The steel and power sectors that are very critical to industrial development have also remained moribund. Attempts at revitalizing the steel sector by selling majority stakes to international companies have failed. In fact the Nigerian government accused a major investor in Nigeria's steel company at Ajaokuta of pilfering critical machinery and equipment while it invested nothing at reviving the company (Jumbo 2011). Also the power sector has virtually failed. Sarcastically described as *Never Expect Power Always* (Olukoju 2004), the power sector has remained inefficient in spite of privatization and huge bills that are charged by the new multinational owners of power transmission companies in Nigeria.

Finally, Nigeria's oil sector remains the most subject to international economic imperialism. The oil sector is the mainstay of Nigeria's economy. It is dominated by multinational oil companies that control exploration and pays royalty to the Federal Government. About 90% of the crude oil produced is exported. Unfortunately, Nigeria's refineries are largely nonfunctional. And so, Nigeria imports about 80% of its local consumption of oil products. Between March 2010 and January 2011, Nigeria spent over $7.6 billion to import about 8.1 million metric tons of petroleum products (Nwachukwu 2011). Still, Nigeria's local content policy is grossly disregarded in the petroleum industry. The industry relies principally on international technical and professional

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manpower while the technology is largely imported. This, of course, translates to huge capital loss for Nigeria.

Again, Nigeria is experiencing a new wave of economic imperialism in the tertiary education sector. Nigeria's universities (which counted as some of the best around the world in the 1960s and up to when SAP was implemented in the early 1980s) are at present lowly ranked globally. According to the Times Higher Education (2019), only the University of Ibadan (public) and Covenant University (private) ranked among the best 601–800 universities globally (out of the over 160 universities in Nigeria, aside from polytechnics, monotechnics, and colleges of education – all considered as tertiary institutions in Nigeria). Faced with continual brain drain, poor infrastructures and equipment, limited student slots, unmotivated faculty, and incessant strike actions, due to SAP-induced strains, Nigerian universities are unable to compete with universities in the Global North. Hence, foreign universities (both in the Global North and Global South) attract candidates from Nigeria in groves. A report credited to Committee of Vice Chancellors (CVC) of Nigeria's Universities claims that Nigerians commit about US$500 million to tertiary education in universities in Europe and North America (The Sun 2012).

Only a few examples from critical sectors of the Nigerian economy have been discussed above. It is important to note that the imperialistic tentacle of the industrialized nations, international financial organizations, and multinational corporations cover every sector of Nigeria's economy. Nigeria's economy remains subservient to the dictates of the imperialist powers that are able to guide the direction of the nation's economic policy and system through the agency of neoliberalism at the pain of international sanctions.

Economic Deprivation and Militancy: Self-Determination Groups, the Niger Delta, and Boko Haram

Since the mid and late 1990s, vicious economic deprivation has contributed to the emergence and expansion of self-determination, militancy, and insurgency in Nigeria. Notable separationist, militancy, and insurgency activities in Nigeria, especially since the current democratization process commenced in 1999, include those of self-determination groups, particularly Oodua People's Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (and other Niger Delta splinter groups such as the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF)), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) among others, while Boko Haram insurgents have repeatedly orchestrated devastating attacks in Nigeria's northeastern geopolitical zone since 2010.

The OPC emerged in the mid-1990s following General Babangida's cancellation of the 1993 presidential election which a Yoruba multimillionaire and politician Bashorun Moshood Kashimawo Abiola was posed to win. The Yoruba largely sentimentally described the cancellation of the election as a deliberate attempt by the Hausa-Fulani-dominated military and political leadership to deny the Yoruba the possibility of ascending the nation's presidency. The OPC was one of the numerous pro-democracy groups that emerged following the cancellation of the presidential election; however, the OPC pronounced a particular agenda to protect the Yoruba from marginalization with an ultimate objective for self-determination by cessation. At its peak, the OPC had 2786 branches and about 3 million members in Southwestern Nigeria (Akinyele 2001). Despite the initial popularized secessionist outlook, the OPC functioned more like a militancy-oriented vigilante group, with its membership drawn more from the proletarian class, largely illegally armed and operating as neighborhood security lords. In fact, the OPC vigilante operatives were readily hired by neighborhoods that view the OPC as more effective than the police in neighborhood security. Unfortunately, the OPC readily transformed into a pro-Yoruba ethnic militia whenever conflicts took on the inter-ethnic dimension (see Nolte 2004, 2008; Ikelegbe 2001, 2005).

Also, in the Niger Delta, the MEND, NDPVF, and NDVF emerged as the dominant Niger Delta

militancy groups with an agenda to sabotage oil investments and other government infrastructures in the Niger Delta, to draw attention to the economic deprivation of the Niger Delta and violently harness funds through bunkering and kidnapping for ransom (Omobowale et al. 2012; Ibaba 2011). The Niger Delta is the main producer of Nigeria's post-independence oil wealth. Nigeria is largely a mono-economy, mainly dependent on oil with 90% of foreign earnings coming from crude oil sales (Occhiali and Falchetta 2018; Elum et al. 2016). In contrast, the Niger Delta, which accommodates the oil and produces the national wealth, is one of the most economically deprived in Nigeria and environmentally polluted by oil spills and gas flaring. Farming and fishing, the main productive lines of the indigenous population, are affected by environmental pollution with more than 70% of the population living below the poverty line (Elum et al. 2016; Gonzalez 2016). Consequently, the militancy spearheaded by the MEND, NDPVF, and NDVF provided ready platforms for restive youths to vent their anger against the Nigerian state. The initial police and military action deployed by the Nigerian state had little or no achievement at redressing insecurity in the Niger Delta due to the difficult terrains of the creeks and the sophisticated weapons the militants possessed. Nigeria, subsequently in 2007, opted for an amnesty program, which entailed a voluntary surrender of arms in exchange for regular cash transfers and skill acquisition and training of militants by the Federal Government of Nigeria (Ogbogu 2016; Udoh 2013). The amnesty program seemed to have reduced militancy in the Niger Delta, but the region is still *weaponized* and restive, and attacks on security personnel, oil bunkering, illegal oil refining, and kidnapping of oil workers for ransom frequently occur in the region.

The MASSOB and IPOB are focused on achieving the state of Biafra. The first attempt at having the state of Biafra was in 1967, following a declaration by the then Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Colonel Ojukwu. Ojukwu's declaration resulted in the Nigeria Civil War, which lasted from 1967 to 1970. An estimated 2 million lives and multimillion dollar worth of investments were lost (Atata and Omobowale 2018; Omobowale 2009). Whereas the government declared a post-war 3R policy of Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation, the pro-Biafra groups claim that the Igbo ethnic group has been economically and politically deprived in Nigeria (Onuoha 2014, 2016). Hence, the MASSOB emerged about the year 2000 to advance Igbo interests in the Nigerian state, with an ultimate aim to achieve a sovereign state of Biafra, while the IPOB subsequently evolved when the MASSOB seemed to have retracted from the objective of a sovereign state. The MASSOB and IPOB have propagated the Biafra objective through violent street protests, sit-at-home protests, and numerous violent exchanges with the police and the military (Atata and Omobowale 2018; Onwuegbuchulam and Mtshali 2017). The activities of the MASSOB and the IPOB and the violent exchanges with the coercive forces of the state are associated with perceived and actual economic deprivation of the Igbo working class from among whom the MASSOB and the IPOB have most of their "foot soldiers."

The most dreaded insurgency group in West Africa as from 2010 is Boko Haram. Boko Haram started as a radical Salafist movement in the year 2002 in Maiduguri, under the leadership of a young Islamic cleric, Mohammed Yusuf (Falode 2016). The group's Arabic name is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), but it is popularly known by its Hausa cum Arabic name, Boko Haram. Boko in Hausa means Western education/civilization and the Arabic word Haram means forbidden. Hence, Boko Haram means Western education/ civilization is forbidden (Agbiboa 2013). Yusuf drew membership especially from among the working class bonded by the Kanuri language from Northwest and Northeast Nigeria as well as the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. As Yusuf's followership significantly grew, his anti-establishment and anti-dominant Sunni Muslim leadership in Northern Nigeria preaching drew the attention of security forces. Following a sectarian crisis supposedly spearheaded by the group in July 2009, the

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group was violently contained by the military, leading to the death of about 1000 members. Yusuf was arrested by the military and handed over to the police, and Yusuf thereafter died in police custody within 24 h.

The leadership of Boko Haram was passed to Abubakar Shekau, who retreated to the background. Empirical reports indicate that during the period of the retreat, surviving Boko Haram leadership and members moved to the Sahel and received training and funding from al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, particularly the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Shabab (Zenn 2017). In July 2010 Shekau declared a Jihad against Nigeria, and in September 2010, Boko Haram launched its first major attack on Bauchi prison where it freed about 250 Boko Haram detainees undergoing prosecution and trial (Zenn 2017; Falode 2016). Between 2010 and 2015, Boko Haram grew to become a monstrous guerrilla group, attacking state apparatuses; seizing territories; kidnapping school girls, women, and children; deploying kidnapped girls as suicide bombers; and imposing a most draconian form of the Sharia law in the territories where it predominates (Weeraratne 2017; Bloom and Matfess 2016). Boko Haram is a major cause of internal displacement in Northeastern Nigeria. At the peak of Boko Haram's onslaught against Nigeria, Falode (2016, p. 44) submitted that: "Boko Haram's arsenal...includes AK-47 rifles, grenades, rocket propelled grenades, automatic rifles, surface-to air- missiles, vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-55 tanks, Panhard ERC-90 'Sagaie' and explosives such as Semtex." The sagacity of the Boko Haram insurgents at gaining territory in Northeastern Nigeria as well as incessant terrorist attacks even in the nation's capital city wrongly marked the military as incapable of containing the insurgency without external support. Hence, former President Jonathan secured the services of mercenaries in the war against Boko Haram (Varin 2018). Boko Haram attacks, underfunding and poor equipment of the military, and the engagement of mercenaries were some of the major highlights of the opposition during the campaigns for the 2015 general elections. Jonathan lost the elections to a former military general and head of state, Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari started with a strategy to militarily vanquish the Boko Haram. The new government ordered the head of the army to move his headquarters to the epicenter of the insurgency in Maiduguri, and the contract of the mercenaries was terminated. Whereas Boko Haram insurgency has been limited to a few locations in Northeastern Nigeria and the government has declared a technical victory, Boko Haram continues to carry out guerrilla attacks, suicide bombing, and kidnappings. In short, though contained, Boko Haram remains a formidable adversary of the Nigerian state.

Conclusion

The integration of Nigeria into the world capitalist system within the last 200 years has subjected the nation to sustained economic imperialism. Nigeria's post-independence economic policy advances the course of economic imperialism such that Nigeria only seems to have political independence; it is very much dependent on the international economic powers and institutions in economic policy formulation and implementation. The limited attempt at economic self-determination in the early 1970s produced no positive result with Nigeria emerging into the 1980s in massive economic depression and policy disorientation. Hence, once again, the liberal policy that the Nigerian government despised in the 1970s was presented as the panacea, in form of austerity measures. Full implementation of the reform program started under General Babangida's government in 1986 with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The SAP advanced liberalism in full course, favoring the withdrawal of government from the provision of social services, currency devaluation and free trade, frugal expenditure, and lean bureaucracy in order to save funds to invest in critical areas of the economy and debt servicing. The social and economic implications of SAP were overwhelmingly devastating for the populace. Many industries

collapsed, while many Nigerians fell below the poverty line. Notwithstanding this, SAP ensured a class of economic elite profited through trade. While local industries collapsed, international trade boomed. The result of this, of course, was classic capital flight through debt servicing, massive imports, contracts to foreign contractors, and illicit siphoning of corrupt funds through international financial corporations. Thus the money saved through SAP ultimately benefited the developed countries in the metropolis who received legally repatriated profit from Nigeria and/or whose banks also received illicit funds stashed in secret bank accounts. In spite of SAP's discontinuation in 1996, it is pertinent to note that the economic policies of Nigeria's post 1996 democratic regimes have followed the liberal lines. Nigerians remain poor and impoverished, but huge capital is expropriated from the economy through unbalanced trade annually. Unfortunately, the pro-liberal and exploitative economic policy frame continues to produce a restive proletarian class, readily available as foot soldiers for militancy and insurgent groups that have worsened the insecurity in Nigeria. As long as Nigeria emphasizes pro-trade liberalism as against local production, processing, and marketing, it would remain a peripheral nation under perpetual yoke of economic imperialism to the overall benefit of the world capitalist system. Nigeria will thus produce wealth that would be appropriated by the capitalist powers under the guise of liberalism and "freedom."

Cross-References

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism
▶ Dollar Hegemony
▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law
▶ Imperialism and Environment
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semi-periphery and Periphery
▶ Taxation, Capital Flight, and Imperialism

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Nigerian Marxism

▶ Ifeoma Okoye (1937–)

Nineteenth Century

▶ United States Imperialism, 19th Century

Nineteenth-Century British Female Emigration Societies

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Introduction

Empire migration was a gendered concept for the British Victorian female emigration societies whose role was to organize essentially unmarried women's emigration to the British colonies. After the 1851 Census officially revealed the extent of Britain's female overpopulation, some philanthropic societies focused on the redistribution of the so-called "surplus" women by relocating them to the colonies, along with British gender norms and economic prospects. Many newspaper editorials, parliamentarians, and key commentators of the day depicted these so-called "surplus" women as burdens because they were unmarried, childless, jobless, and so considered unproductive. At the intersection between the upper working class and the middle classes, "surplus" women were gentlewomen who embodied British traditions and norms. They were expected to show self-restraint, serve men, and be submissive and

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feminine according to Victorian standards. They were educated in socially acceptable, religious, and conservative families and generally behaved on the upper-class model.

Female emigration was a compromise for women's access to work which was generally rendered difficult in androcentric Britain, but available in the colonies which ensured women's financial autonomy. As historian Adele Perry has pointed out, "inserting white women into the rhetoric and geopolitics of Empire proved easier than challenging the British gendered division of labour or even the more modest goal of finding women paid work in London" (Perry 2001). Therefore, the notion of voluntary emigration needs to be questioned in the case of organized "surplus" women's migration: were Victorian single gentlewomen emigrants voluntary migrants? As historian Bernard Porter has demonstrated, the term "voluntary" is inappropriate to qualify migrants who left home to avoid poverty (Porter 2006). Reminiscent of convict transportation, for some commentators of the time such as essayist and statistician William Rathbone Greg (1809–1881), "surplus" women were a problem to be transported elsewhere.

Female imperial migration also benefitted constructive imperialists who promoted a more organized settlement of the colonies. In 1899, historical economist W.A.S. Hewins described constructive imperialism as "the deliberate adoption of the Empire as distinguished from the United Kingdom as the basis of public policy" (quoted in Green 1999). Historians concur that the British Empire represented a political instrument to increase the metropole's revenue and profit, and this political economic approach impacted the populations in Britain as well as in the colonies. The female emigration societies partook in the constructive imperialist project to organize the Empire on economic and defensive. They also consolidated the political economy of the Empire by securing future market partners produced by their female emigrants. They guaranteed the racial unity of the Empire by sending out selected women who would then produce future partners in trade for the metropole and whose loyalty to Britain was expected to exclude external markets.

According to historian James Hammerton, Empire-building was a social engineering experiment: "to control sex ratios and to ensure male settler access to the services – domestic, sexual, and reproductive – of women" (Hammerton 2004). So, the role of the emigration societies was to redistribute the "surplus" women over the British Empire, and in turn these women were expected to guarantee imperial unity by producing British offspring. Yet, this view denies female emigrants' agency in the migration process. Intrinsically linked to the notion of "imperialism" is that of "power," but did the British Empire-building process empower these "surplus" women?

Female emigration societies used the British Empire "as a sphere of opportunity" (Midgley 1998) for gentlewomen emigrants as well as for themselves. Indeed, the female emigration organizers intruded upon a traditionally male sphere by taking a share in the Empire-building process, which turned them into female imperialists. Many emigration societies were founded in the nineteenth century; this chapter focuses on the later period's female emigration societies that organized the imperial migration of "surplus" women: Female Middle Class Emigration Society (1862–1886), the Church Emigration Society's Ladies Committee (CES 1886–1929), and the United British Women's Emigration Association (1884–1901) which was renamed the British Women's Emigration Association (1901–1919) in 1901. The sources used include the female emigration societies' publications in their official journals such as the BWEA's *The Imperial Colonist* and the CES's *The Emigrant* but also the Victorian press, emigrant letters, and colonial archives. The approach mainly dwells on constructionist imperialist theories, structuration theory, and philosopher Michel Foucault's spatial study of the heterotopias.

This chapter tackles the political economy of British Empire between 1860 and 1914 by focusing on selected women's imperial migration at a time when constructive imperialists promoted imperial unity. Indeed, government institutions and private organizations, such as the female emigration societies, examined the role and function

of the Empire in detail in order to appraise the benefits of the Empire for the metropole. I shall therefore investigate the female emigration societies' contribution to the political economy of the British Empire through their participation in the constructive imperialist project. I shall also look into organized female migration as a process of social reproduction and investigate the nature of Victorian female imperialism in the context of organized emigration to the antipodes – Australia and New Zealand.

The Female Emigration Societies' Constructive Imperialism

In 1883, British historian J.R. Seeley famously remarked in *The Expansion of Britain* that "we seem to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind" (Seeley 1883). Seeley meant to attribute Britain's territorial expansion to private rather than state action. Female emigration societies led a private enterprise that was meant to consolidate the Empire without government support, which they were officially denied. Indeed, in 1897 Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914), then at the head of the Colonial Office, clearly indicated that the government would give no funding to the female emigration societies, thus leaving "surplus" women's emigration to private organizations and colonial immigration schemes:

> I am afraid it will be felt that I am disappointing the audience when I say that I cannot offer pecuniary assistance on behalf of the British Government... I think it possible, if not probable, that the authorities of the new colonies, recognising the extreme importance of this work, the immense advantage it would be to them that the emigration of women should be successfully carried out, will find it possible to contribute towards the expense. But after all, in this as in most philanthropic work, it is to private beneficence, private philanthropy, we must look in the first place, and perhaps for our principal support. (UBWEA Report 1897)

The above quote thus coheres with Seeley's arguments concerning privately directed Empire-building as the government did not financially support the organization of "surplus" women's emigration. Yet, the female emigration societies

did not contribute to Empire-building "in a fit of absence of mind": they were rather well organized, visible, and showed obvious signs of imperialism.

The female emigration societies indeed contributed to the national effort turning the Empire into a coherent structure in order to organize the colonies on the British model. For instance, they participated in imperial conferences that examined the relationships between the metropole and its colonies, and the BWEA had its offices at the Imperial Institute in London. The female emigration societies' contribution to constructive imperialism was above all defensive. Indeed, the imperial nation was thought to face external menaces with the risk of exogenous intrusions from other imperial powers and neighboring nations. To counter these threats, the female emigration societies proposed creating a colonial space based on the British model, which would be safeguarded by respectable educated women. Their actions thus symbolically cohered with the defense policy promoted by constructive imperialists, which was essential to secure the economic stability and maintenance of the Empire.

In the new imperialism period (c. 1870–1914), the territorial race between imperialist nations implied a danger of exogenous invasion in the Pacific, which the British expected to imperatively erase in order to safeguard the "almost purely British Colony" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1911). Therefore, the female emigrants' main mission was preventive: they were expected to protect the imperial frontiers by acting as biological shields, ensuring the reproduction and the purity of the British imperial nation. This biological argument was taken up by the female emigration societies: "In what lies the hope of the Empire and the world? For what does the home primarily exist? There is but one answer to these questions: the child" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1914), the BWEA declared in an article promoting colonial motherhood. The female emigration societies were indeed well aware that they acted to defend the Empire against exogenous intrusion, as they declared in *The Imperial Colonist* in 1910: "Closely connected with the question of emigration was that of alien immigration" (*The Imperial*

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Colonist 1910). Australasia, a white settlement colony surrounded by Asian nations, was expected to preserve its frontiers against potential neighboring intrusions. As a way of promoting patriotic emigration from Britain to Australia, references to this pressing issue affecting the Empire's borders were not rare in *The Imperial Colonist*. The following extract from an article entitled "Emigration and Common Sense" thus indicates "there is the grave danger that if Australia cannot acquire enough inhabitants of British stock she may be overrun by Asiatic races" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1913). The British Empire needed to consolidate its frontiers, a task commonly attributed to women as their natural biological and cultural mission. In 1897, BWEA's Vice-President Ellen Joyce described her emigrants as the "wives and mothers of the present and future makers of the history of our colonies" (*Westminster Gazette* 1897). Gentlewomen were thus expected to become the mothers of the British imperial race but also to consolidate the colonial identity by spreading the British norm.

The Political Economic Orthodoxy of Empire-Building

Linked with the political economy of the British Empire, imperial unity was expected to strengthen Britain facing international rivalry and to secure imperial trade. Indeed, the British Empire represented a potential market for Britain's export. As historian E.H.H. Green notes, in 1914 imperial markets were the recipients of 51.7% of British cotton exports, 33.5% of woolens, 45% of nontextile manufactures goods, and 48.2% of pig iron and metal goods. Although British trade outside the Empire was greater, imperial markets represented a future investment which was to be safeguarded through imperial unity (Green 1999). Imperial unity could be best sealed by the controlled settlement of British immigrants, such as the women selected by the female emigration societies.

In the 1860–1914 period, Britain possessed one of the largest Empires in the world, yet it was also a time marked by uncertainties as to its

sustainability and stability. The British female emigration societies participated in imperial consolidation by sending out selected women who would safeguard the British Empire against exogenous intrusion by producing the offspring of the imperial race – "pure" in blood and proud heirs of Britain's cultural heritage. In turn, these colonial settlers were expected to become Britain's customers and partners in trade. The metropole indeed had economic and political interests in the colonies, which the female emigration societies were well aware of. In 1912, the BWEA indicated that it encouraged the consolidation of commercial relations between Britain and its colonies through the migration of future commercial partners from Britain: "those settled under the Flag become at once customers and producers for us" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1912a). Indeed, Australia and New Zealand represented poles of influence and commerce in the Pacific, which the female emigration organizers promoted. The following article from 1912 thus read:

> To Australia, people mean wealth and security. To Great Britain, the filling up of this vast and enormously productive and exclusively British continent with more men and women of her own stock, means an indefinite enlargement of a most valuable market for British trade, as well as a great blood support in time of trouble. (*The Imperial Colonist* 1912a)

The female emigration societies were well aware of the political economic orthodoxy at the heart of the Empire-building process and thus promoted closer links with the Empire which would secure valuable markets for the metropole. Although they focused on organizing female emigrants' departures, their publications – as the above articles show – also reveal that they supported constructive imperialist endeavors and participated in the political economy of the Empire by securing future market partners produced by their female emigrants.

Given material value, female emigrants' human capital represented a British investment in the construction of the Empire and "a potential source of wealth" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1909). By organizing the departure of "surplus" women, the female emigration societies increased the

viability and *profitability of the Empire*, which depended on its reproductive capacity. They participated in the political economy of the Empire thanks to their organization of unmarried women's imperial migration, who would marry colonial settlers and reproduce the imperial race. Britain was thus getting rid of a population that the metropole could no longer maintain – the "surplus" women – and investing these women in the peopling of the colonies, a transaction which seemed beneficiary to both the sending and welcoming communities. Selected female emigrants were thus meant to sustain the growth and maintenance of the Empire by reproducing the race, and their biological contribution to the political economy of the British Empire was often praised, as in *The Imperial Colonist* in 1902: "Englishwomen make home wherever they settle all the world over and are the real builders of Empire" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1902). The female emigration societies thus resorted to the traditional values of the home to account for the emergence of female imperialism.

Women's Nuanced Empowerment and Imperial Unity

In turn, women's contribution to the colonies' domestic economy went along with their increased financial autonomy and nuanced empowerment. Whether they became teachers, school owners, or governesses, they now managed their own lives and budgets on their own terms as emigrant Mary Richardson wrote in her letter to the FMCES in 1863 from Australia: "I have no one to interfere with me in the least." Although not all female emigrants were successful, Miss Barlow's letter from Australia in 1863 is yet another example of women's nuanced empowerment through imperial migration, as new choices and autonomy opened to them: "My school has prospered beyond my expectations though I have had many heavy expenses and my remuneration is very small . . . however it is a much more independent life than that of the Governess and I like it." These women were often

aware of their contribution to the demographic stability of the imperial nation, as Annie Davis indicated in her letter from Australia in 1864: "According to statistics, men greatly outnumber women in this land, yet it seems to me that the women find it nearly as difficult to get their daily bread here in Sydney as in London, many are the sad tales." They also knew that they represented a burden to the metropole's economic stability as Gertrude Gooch acknowledged in a letter from Australia in 1862: "there are enough of us at home" (FMCES Letter Books).

In order to promote migration within the Empire, the female emigration societies refused to assist emigrants willing to settle outside the imperial frontiers. This was made clear by the CES's announcement in 1907 that "the Society does not assist with loans or grants of money those desiring to settle in the United States" (CES Report 1907). They were engaged in the Victorian movement against emigration and actively promoted imperial mobility as a component of the political economy of the British Empire, as the following article from 1912 shows "Among those who do not realise the Empire as an integral part of Britain, but talk of going abroad, there is an outcry against emigration. As if it were a loss and not a transplanting into better soil and sunshine of the human asset" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1912a).

This was meant to increase imperial loyalty and thus guarantee the unity of the Empire through controlled population settlement, in keeping with the constructivist imperialist project of Empire, as advocated by Chamberlain who linked his campaign for imperial preferential tariffs with the theme of racial unity. In 1903, Chamberlain stated that the aim of imperial preference was "to consolidate the British race" (quoted in Green 1999). Hence, constructivist imperialists promoted both a racially unified Empire and imperial economic interests.

In 1895, Chamberlain declared: "I believe that the British race is the greatest of governing races that the world has ever seen" (Chamberlain 1897), thus spelling out the ideology of triumphant Anglo-Saxonism. The female emigration societies were also convinced that Britain was a superior

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nation. They exalted the British nation's exceptional fate, which they expected to become the global world matrix, hence promoting migration within the Empire as a patriotic act. To this end, they often reminded their readers that the power of the nation depended on its population. This was illustrated by *The Imperial Colonist* in 1911:

> Beyond all nations of the world, this Britain of ours had become a mother nation, a proud position. The fighting energy of our soldiers...had planted our race on all the new Continents... Today, after 125 years, we had become one of the mightiest nations of the world, with 90 millions of people, Australia had four millions, South Africa two millions, and New Zealand, one million of people. The future was pregnant with the greatest possibilities for the human race... That was how we had won our Empire. The only way to build the Empire was on homes. If we would reap the advantages we had got we must create homes in those countries, and we could not have homes without women. (*The Imperial Colonist* 1911)

In parallel to the ongoing national and imperial exaltation, the female emigration societies entrusted their emigrants with a monumental mission for Britain, but also for the whole of humankind. They were expected to become the proud representatives of the chosen nation and to act as "augmenters of Empire," as the title of a 1902 article indicated in bombastic terms: "They [women] must slough off the pettiness of the past and rise to the height of Imperial womanhood, remembering that to have had the vision of Greatness is an immense responsibility" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1902).

Although British gentlewomen were sometimes glorified, their role in the British Empire-building process was nevertheless commonly restricted to their basic biological function. They were even described as "human links" between the different parts of the Empire in 1904: "human links of Empire upon whom depend the unification, development, and perfection of that great and glorious country whereof we are sons and daughters, on which the sun never sets" (*The Imperial Colonist* 1904). Their role as unifiers and developers of Empire, here celebrated by Miss Chitty, symbolically turned female emigrants into active agents of Empire.

Although the female emigration societies presented their actions as social acts, in reality, at the beginning of the twentieth century, they acted in favor of the British imperialist ideology, the triumphant Anglo-Saxonist doctrine, and imperial patriotism. They aimed at safeguarding, justifying, and replicating Britain's conservative social classifications in the colonies. The emigrant gentlewomen's influence indeed reinforced the idea that the Anglo-Saxons were a dominant and organically unified race. Yet, this did not prevent the fractioning of the imperial nation. At the end of the nineteenth century, the colonies were emancipating themselves from Britain's domination, and the colonial settlers progressively redefined their identity on account of their location and birth land rather than their allegiance to the Empire. Nevertheless, the female emigration societies never failed promoting the organic unity of the Empire, thus participating in the constructive imperialist project that was grounded on a mixture of racial and economic endeavors.

Female Emigrants' Marketing Value

Female emigration societies offered "surplus" single gentlewomen individualism and a fresh start. They did invest their female emigrants with power and agency unlike the "shovelled out" (Wakefield 1849) pauper emigrants of the first half of the nineteenth century. Along with a developed access to work, these philanthropic societies were opening up a new role for women in the colonies and in gendered Empire history – that of Empire-builders. Quoted in the 1898 UBWEA's report, Sir George Baden Powell acknowledged the empowerment of "women, whom he considered exercised an enormous power in building up the Colonies" (UBWEA 1898).

However, the notion of female empowerment should be further investigated in this case. For philosopher Michel Foucault, some colonies were heterotopias born out of the metropole's need to compensate its failings. They were the same societies as home, but perfected (Foucault 1984). For instance, Tasmania was described as "a

better England" in a UBWEA's report (UBWEA 1891–1892). In the second half of the nineteenth century, Australia and New Zealand were often imagined as absolutely perfect places peopled with perfect British settlers, places where human perfection could be achieved when it had failed in the metropole. In the same vein, historian David Cannadine considers "the British Empire as a mechanism of export, projection and analogization of domestic social structures and social perceptions" (Cannadine 2002).

In the heterotopias that the Pacific colonies represented, British women were to be ideal women, especially when selected by British female emigration societies: "free from mental or bodily defect" (*The Woman's Gazette* 1877). In the economy of symbolic exchange and social construction, women are tools to reproduce men's symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2002) and domination. Single women were indeed generally perceived as national merchandises, as an Australian journalist quoted by the FMCES founder, Maria Rye (1829–1903), indicated: "We may bring the young women here, but what if they do not suit the young men? What shall we do with the articles which don't "move off", and the goods which are found unsaleable?" (Rye 1862).

In the "social engineering" process promoted by female emigration societies, the role attributed to women in Empire-building was to reproduce the British middle-classes' family model: women were to be kept at home under male control, even in the antipodes. This is exemplified by British imperialist writer Charles Dilke's (1843–1911) record in *Greater Britain*, which echoed judge William Blackstone's (1723–1780) 1765 theory on married women's legal status as being incorporated into their husband's and which denied married women's individuation: "Our theory of marriage – which has been tersely explained thus: "the husband and wife are one, and the husband is that one" – rules as absolutely at the antipodes as it does in Yorkshire" (Dilke 1885).

As sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues, women – when considered symbolic goods constitutive of cultural capital – can be circulated and traded (Bourdieu 1994). Single female British emigrants

were thus symbolically traded between the metropole's men who did not need so many women and the colonial settlers in great demand for female partners. For instance, whereas the 1851 Census had revealed that there were about 300,000 "surplus" women in Britain, women only represented between 37% and 49% of the population in the Australasian colonies in 1861 and 1871 (Census 1851, 1861, 1871).

Central to contemporary debates, the use of the Empire for the metropole evolved from distress relief to British Empire consolidation, as it was clearly expressed at the 1889 CES Manchester Meeting: "being abroad should remain at home under the British flag" (CES 1889). It was the female emigration societies' role to ensure that the British colonies would be peopled with respectable young women who would keep up the British race's standards abroad: as the FMCES rules stated it, they concentrated their selection on educated gentlewomen: "The Society confines its assistance entirely to educated women... Every applicant is examined as far as possible, with regard to her knowledge of cooking, baking, washing, needlework, and housework" (FMCES 1862). The emigration societies proposed to turn the metropole's so-called idle "surplus" gentlewomen into useful Empire-builders, perfect keepers of traditional gendered structures. Yet, by making the decision to emigrate, women were empowered with an agency they never had before – the decision over their own fates – thus endangering Victorian gender norms. Women's emancipation symbolically materialized in the passage to the New World – in geographical as well as social terms. As sociologist Karen O'Reilly does, I consider migration "as a structured and a structuring process" (O'Reilly 2012).

If women were empowered with the decision to emigrate, their agency was however still limited by traditional structures – a concept Bourdieu has termed "habitus." Habitus is a combination of acquired dispositions produced by social and historical exposure, which determines individual agency. For Bourdieu, social interaction is set within fields with dominant capital owners and

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agents striving to gain more capital and legitimacy – agency thus being limited by the field's contextual necessities. On the one hand, the British Empire allowed female emigrants to acquire more social capital by giving them access to work and financial opportunities. Yet, on the other hand, within the imperial field, women's role was limited, by gender habitus, to the displacement of their cultural and social capital to other territories.

According to sociologist Anthony Giddens's structuration theory, based upon the structure-action dyad, actors are self-reproducers of the conditions necessary to their activities, and norms are factual social limits (Giddens 2005). The dialectical combination of their developing agency and the gendered structures of power did not allow women to fully emancipate through emigration. Structures, both habilitating and constraining (Giddens 2005), were too constraining by gender habitus in this case. Hence, within the context of the British Empire, the antipodes offered a stage for social reproduction.

Mirroring the women they assisted, female emigration societies' organizers were generally religious, conservative gentlewomen well imbued by class and gender habitus. As such, female emigration leaders contributed to keeping women within the domestic field, the colonial professional opportunities that they advertised being mainly domestic and their selection generally based on domestic criteria. Under the cover of female access to work, emigration societies ensured the reproduction of traditional gendered structures. Recreating a social universe in the colonies, the female philanthropic societies conformed to British gendered traditions which they proposed to transport to the New World.

A constitutive element of Victorian Britain's identity, the Church of England also needed to secure its survival in the new geopolitical and social contexts: the CES was thus founded "to strengthen the hands of the Clergy in the Colonies" (CES 1887b). The Church needed to remain the repository of the salvation capital (Bourdieu 1971), which justified the CES's foundation in 1886. At a time when emigration societies were

proliferating, the Church needed to regain its symbolic capital and to secure its power and legitimacy against those who had taken a share in the salvation enterprise. The main reason for the CES's creation was the threat of the Church of England's followers turning to other religions, once away from the metropole: "emigrants [...] may be kept from settling far apart, as without this aid they usually do, in communities alien to the Church and without their ministrations, there to fall from her" (CES 1888a). Through the CES, the Church of England secured its symbolic and social capital in Victorian England with an obvious expansionist agenda: "for the interests of English colonization all over the world" (CES 1888a).

Educated British women could support the Anglican Church's preeminence and expansionist project. The ideal colonial female profile enhanced morality and healthy child-rearing potential, which model only gentlewomen were considered to correspond to at the time. Women were the most efficient medium to reproduce the Church of England's religious capital in the Empire. So, the Ladies' Committee of the CES was soon founded, led by Miss Denison, and given an office away from the main – the CES's office was located at 9 Victoria Chambers, Westminster, whereas its Ladies' Committee was at 196, Cromwell Road, South Westminster (CES 1887b). Indeed, reminiscent of Victorian gender norms, the emigration of men or families and that of single women were to be dealt with separately.

According to Bourdieu, the Church is anti-feminist, the official reproducer of a pessimistic vision of femininity following the patriarchal precepts according to which women are inferior beings (Bourdieu 2002). Indeed, the CES made sure that women were in charge of female emigrants, while men dealt with "serious" imperialist matters. Whereas legitimate Church authority figures were often quoted in the organization's quarterly *The Emigrant*, very rarely was Miss Denison so: she was not considered a legitimate dominant religious symbolic capital holder while clergymen were. Even though female emigration was publicly defended as an important matter to the Church, there were much fewer articles devoted

to women's than to men's and families' departures. The CES gave legitimacy to the norms imposed on women and thus operated the class-differentiated and gender-focused nature of Empire-building.

Female Imperialism

Empire-building can be analyzed as a strategy to maintain sex inequality, so-called "natural." Yet, the female emigration organizers managed to acquire symbolic capital as they soon turned into expert organizers of female migration: they were listened to by men and participated in official and public debates on migration, which was a way to do politics (Richardson 2013) when the political field excluded women at the time. Selecting and assisting their fellow female emigrants indeed gave legitimacy to their imperialist discourse. Female emigrants were to be kept under the domination of the higher capital owners – men – who delegated the organization of female emigration to female experts. The balance between deliberate action and cultural determinism structured the actions of female emigration promoters and their emigrants in the imperial context. Male domination needed no justification: the androcentric vision imposed itself as a legitimate toxic consensus that led to accepting the categories constructed by the dominants (Bourdieu 2002). This justifies the female emigration organizers' insistence upon keeping female emigrants within the domestic sphere.

Yet, as sociologist Umut Erel has pointed out, "the very act of migration disrupts ideas of linear reproduction of cultural capital" (Erel 2010). On the one hand, in contemporary propaganda, the British Empire was often referred to as a mere extension of Britain. However, on the other hand, female emigration societies provided training for emigrants before departure, such as in the Leaton Training House, which was necessary to model and adapt their female emigrants to the conditions in the colonies. Preparation to a new rougher context was required for gentlewomen emigrants to take up the domestic function they were assigned to. Adaptation thus contradicts cultural capital's linear reproduction.

To avoid failure, middle-class women (mainly lower middle-class) were preferred to working-class women by emigration societies. According to historian Philippa Levine, working-class women were believed to have a greater libido, and their alleged downgrading sexual and moral habits did not make them ideal representatives of the nation (Levine 2007); it was believed that only gentlewomen had the moral qualities required to spread Britishness. A class-differentiated access to the Empire was therefore initiated. To Cannadine, the British Empire was indeed "a class act" (Cannadine 2002). Maria Rye never concealed her class-structured attitude when she selected emigrants: "an elevation of morals being the inevitable result of the mere presence in the colony of a number of high class women" (Rye 1861). For Rye, "high class" women were religious, conservative, and submissive raised in respectable families. Highly moral and educated to become perfect wives and mothers, so were her "high class" women: women that Britain could be proud of and expected to reproduce in the colonies.

As a commentator declared in 1885, a skilled female emigrant was a nation's future mother, the repository of Britishness, responsible for making "the happy home of the future" (M.A.F. 1885). This notion was openly expressed by the FMCES's secretary in 1883: "These women are to be the mothers of the race in this province; shall we do what we may to attract the best of their class to Canterbury (Lewin 1883)?" They were to contribute to the nation's political economy by producing the imperial "race" and would thus no longer be Britain's unproductive "surplus" women. Their ethnic cultural capital was also based on national "character," an exclusive masculine notion of ethnicity modelled on moralistic whiteness. Women's appropriation of "character" was a claim to equality: they thus proclaimed their Britishness, on the same terms as their male counterparts.

Yet, this was to be at the expense of colonized men and women. Recent research has focused on the negative impact of British female imperialists' reforming actions on indigenous women as, for instance, Professor of Indigenous history Aileen

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Moreton-Robinson's *Talkin' Up to the White Woman: Indigenous Women and Feminism*, among other works. Indigenous people, men and women, were neither granted existence nor any kind of recognition by the colonizers, unless as tools for imperial power. Writing from Australia in 1862, Maria Barrow described the Aborigines from an ethnocentric perspective and underlined their perceived weakness, creating a symbolic gap to the advantage of the British race: "They are very ugly and old, the women particularly and I was rather afraid of them. However they appear to be quite harmless" (FMCES Letter Books). This territorial perspective sheds a new light on the subject under analysis, as what was intended as a positive impact on British women sometimes ended up having a negative one on indigenous populations. If imperialist women endeavored to change their status from subjugated beings in the metropole to imperial agents in the colonies, some of them may simultaneously have contributed to the imperialist subjugation of other women and men, in the colonies.

Central to contemporary debates was the fear of exogenous intrusion, and Cruikshank's popular reaction to the British female "emigration mania" (Cruikshank 1851) took the shape of a sharp satire. He called Australia "the land of the wifeless" and debunked the propaganda toward single female emigration: "If the desire for emigration among females is not stopped, England will soon be like a bee-hive, with only one female in it, and that – the Queen. . . . London will be womanless." Besides, he denounced the risk of racial degeneracy and the threat of reverse colonial invasion into Britain, of intermarriages, and foreign influence upon Britishness when he said "Ladies will have to be imported to supply the place of the exported . . . The love-sick bachelor, armed with a "tasting order," will hurry to the docks to try the sweetness of the charming Negresses before taking them out of bond" (Cruikshank 1851). This description of men rushing to the harbor to find wives is reminiscent of the many tales of Australian men rushing at the arrival of vessels full of brides-to-be from Britain – situations mocked at in the metropole, still the dominant figure over its needy colonial offshoots. To female activists

who denounced the transportation of women as an excuse to postpone solutions to be found at home or who complained that the best stock was taken away, the female emigration societies responded that "they made special effort to promote the Emigration of those whose work is least needed and least productive here" (UBWEA 1889–1890), thus justifying their selection limited to the unproductive educated gentlewomen – "surplus" women – who were given a chance to turn productive in the Empire.

From the 1880s on, the emigration societies' rhetoric was overtly imperialistic, hegemonic, and expressed an "imperialism of inevitability" (Porter 1996): the world was to be British. Beyond concerns for endogenous reproduction, women were to spread ideological domination in the form of cultural imperialism which entailed the imposition of universal British standards (Dunch 2002). As feminist historian Leila J. Rupp put it, "women's internationalism in the period before World War II points the way to one form of global identity" (Rupp 1994). Through their Empire-building actions, women became the agents of dissemination of ethnocentric Britishness.

For British men, women were granted the roles of domination tools and foils as was declared in the female periodical *Woman* in 1887: "the Englishwoman abroad" is a glorious institution. [. . .] They say, of course: "If England produces this sort of women, what splendid fellows the men must be! She does more to maintain the prestige of the British Empire, than all our ironclads put together" (*Woman* 1887). The perfect female emigrant was a valuable asset to British male Empire-builders, an item of superiority over the other nations' men, thus reinforcing Britain's cultural and imperial capital. As expressed in an article published in *Macmillan's Magazine* in 1882, British women's physical superiority over the other nations was natural: "Englishwomen are, in general, the most beautiful in the world" (Ross 1882). If femininity is a form of complaisance toward men's symbolic domination (Bourdieu 2002), the emigration societies' careful selection, based on moral and physical grounds, thus served to assert both male domination and Britain's superiority. British superior masculinity over the other

races was to be asserted worldwide, and women were the most efficient tools to spread it. As Empire-builders, they were therefore given a secondary role in the male-centered imperial enterprise, the one of assisting foils.

Beyond cultural imperialism, by exporting their women, the British were trying to achieve identity imperialism. "Superior" British women were identity-keepers and spreading agents involved in what historian Denis Judd calls "imperial Darwinism" (Judd 1996). Traditions, common history, norms, and sense of belonging, which constitute national identity, were expected to be safeguarded by peopling the colonies with "respectable" British subjects. As historian Anna Davin has pointed out, "women would take their place not only as Empire-builders, but above all as Empire-conservers" (Davin 1978). For some French imperialists, imperial domination was best implemented through women and children and an article published in 1896 in *Le Moniteur Universel* described British female emigration societies as a model to be followed worldwide (*Le Moniteur Universel* 1896). This highlights that, to some extent, British female emigration societies succeeded in becoming a symbol envied by other nations, thus perfecting the objective for global cultural standardization, on the British model, endeavored by their fellow male imperialists.

By the end of the nineteenth century, British female emigration organizers managed to turn into imperial agents and assisted male Empire-builders in the construction of a collective global identity. To female imperialists, the Queen was the feminine model to follow: she embodied authority and maternity. The maternal rhetoric that historian Julia Bush defined as "imperious maternity" (Bush 1998) was the major instrument of female imperialist propaganda. Yet, gender habitus was still perceptible in the female emigration societies' discourse. They reproduced the male bombastic imperialist and expansionist rhetoric with a maternal touch:

> [England] is the mother of a large family of colonies scattered over the world. The sun no sooner sets on the parent shores than it rises on the cliffs of one of the colonial children; and, indeed, the empire of

Great Britain has been truly described as one on which 'the sun never sets.' . . . There is . . . plenty of room for more people, and this means plenty of work to be had. (*Work and Leisure* 1885)

Thus, a mixture of maternalism, patriotism, expansionism, and emancipation endeavor is what defined female imperialism in the last quarter of the Victorian era. Their imperialist propaganda was opinionated but ladylike, a new voicing mode for women. In this way, female imperialism endangered gendered norms, but it was a price British men had to pay to secure Britishness against external intrusion.

Conclusion

As introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the female emigration societies' participation in the organization of the Empire contradicts Seeley's analysis that the British Empire was gained "in a fit of absence of mind," at least until the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the organizations participated in the constructive imperialist project. In the New Imperialism period (c. 1870–1914) marked by worldwide expansionist race, the British Empire's stability was at stake, and female emigrants' symbolic capital was a tool to secure a stable colonial nation – on the metropolitan model – and to reinforce racial frontiers against exogenous intrusion. Female emigration organizers' newly acquired agency did not create a new social system but reproduced the traditional one within the imperial context. However, female emigration societies did threaten gender habitus by granting their leaders agency and by endowing their emigrants with decision-making power over their own fates. At the time, there were constraints that female emigration organizers could not overcome and traditional structures were to persist despite spatial mobility, but they – as imperialist women – used their agency as a medium to lead the way to their selected emigrants' nuanced empowerment. In this somewhat convoluted way, female emigration societies' leaders can be described as Empire and history agents.

Women's civilizing power, as well as their biological ability to reproduce the nation,

participated in the constructive imperialist project promoted by Chamberlain. The "surplus" women, who were expected to guarantee "the survival of the fittest" within the Empire, were thus turned into symbolic instruments of constructive imperialism. The philanthropic societies under study were finally going to make way for the state's official handling of selected female emigration in 1919 with the Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women (SOSBW, 1919–1962). In 1962, the SOSBW was finally replaced by the Women's Migration and Overseas Appointments Society (1962–1964). This represented official acknowledgment that private enterprise was no longer deemed able to handle imperial responsibility. As E.H.H. Green puts it, "constructive imperialism was one of the first attempts to design a form of co-partnership of Commonwealth structure of Imperial relations, whose relevance was to become apparent in the inter-war period" (Green 1999). Hence, the female emigration societies' contribution to the British Empire's political economy focused on guaranteeing the racial unity of the Empire by sending out selected women who would then produce future partners in trade for the metropole and whose loyalty to Britain was expected to exclude external markets.

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Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)

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Definition

Kwame Nkrumah was one of the leading figures in the movement for the Gold Coast's (modern-day Ghana) independence from Great Britain as well as one of the most vocal and public campaigners for the African continent's independence from European rule. Politically active from his student days, Nkrumah went on to become Ghana's first prime minister (1957–60) and first president (1960–66). In addition to his political career, Nkrumah was a prolific author, writing on subjects ranging from philosophy to guerrilla warfare.

Introduction

Kwame Nkrumah was one of the leading figures in the movement for the Gold Coast's (modern-day Ghana) independence from Great Britain as well as one of the most vocal and public campaigners for the African continent's independence

from European rule. Politically active from his student days, Nkrumah went on to become Ghana's first prime minister (1957–60) and first president (1960–66). In addition to his political career, Nkrumah was a prolific author, writing on subjects ranging from philosophy to guerrilla warfare. Among the first generation of African heads of state, he was one of the most articulate proponents and theorists of Pan-Africanism. Antiimperialism and antiracism were central to Nkrumah's political thought and policies. A commitment to Pan- Africanist philosophy and politics remained a pivotal aspect of his thought throughout his life. He worked closely with major African- American and Afro-Caribbean intellectuals, including George Padmore, W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, and the Nobel Prize winning economist W. Arthur Lewis. Nkrumah identified as a socialist, but chose not to ally himself with the superpowers during the Cold War. Instead, he worked to forge close ties with other heads of state who resisted joining either the Western or the Soviet bloc. He was an ardent supporter of Pan-African unity, advocating the creation of a federation of African states. While Nkrumah's foreign policy promoted the emancipation of colonised peoples, his national policies became harshly authoritarian, which included making strikes and opposing political parties illegal and empowering the state to detain and arrest suspected subversives. Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup in 1966 and died in exile. He spent his remaining years in Guinea.

Early life and the birth of a Pan-Africanist

Nkrumah was born in the village of Nkroful in the British Gold Coast. From 1925–30, he studied at the Achimota School in Accra, and for the following five years, he worked as a teacher and saved money to travel to the US to continue his education (see Birmingham 1998; Nkrumah 1971). In his autobiography, Nkrumah notes the impact that the writings of the Nigerian nationalist and the future first president of Nigeria Nnamdi Azikiwe

had on his own developing nationalism (Nkrumah 1971, p. 22). At that time, Azikiwe was the editor of the *African Morning Post*, based in Accra. In 1935, Nkrumah travelled to Britain. There, he learned of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, which further fuelled his anti-colonialism. He arrived in the US in October 1935 and began attending Lincoln University – the first historically black university in the US and Azikiwe's alma mater. He received his Bachelor of Arts from Lincoln in 1939. There, Nkrumah developed an interest in European philosophy, a topic he would engage in his philosophical work *Consciencism* (Nkrumah 1964). He pursued his interest in philosophy, receiving a Bachelor of Theology degree from Lincoln in 1942 as well as a Master of Science in education in 1942 and a Master of Philosophy in 1943 from the University of Pennsylvania. During his education, Nkrumah worked as a lecturer and on ships as a member of the National Maritime Union. He also remained active in African politics, contributing to the growth of the African Students' Association of America and Canada. Nkrumah's interest in philosophy and politics drew him to radical thinkers such as the Trinidadian Trotskyist C.L.R. James.

In 1945, Nkrumah returned to London. He had contacted the Trinidadian Marxist George Padmore in advance and, on arrival, began to work closely with him. With Padmore, Nkrumah was one of the principal organisers of the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, which took place from 15–21 October 1945 (for primary sources see Padmore 1947; for critical discussion, see Cooper 2002, pp. 58–59). The gathering was sponsored by the Pan-African Federation, which had been founded the previous year. It was scheduled to coincide with the World Trade Union Conference in Paris. The Congress was timed immediately after the Second World War in order to mobilise for decolonisation, particularly after the defeat of the Axis empires. Over 90 delegates attended from throughout the African diaspora and British Empire. Though the gathering's stated purpose was to condemn all forms of imperialism, and its attendees came from throughout the British Empire, the discussion focused largely on peoples of African descent. Further, despite its

aspiration to represent Africa as a whole, all the African attendees came from British Africa. Each region represented prepared its own set of resolutions. The resolutions passed by the West African delegation were perhaps the most radical in explicitly connecting imperialism to economic exploitation (Padmore 1947, pp. 102–103).

Among the Fifth Congress's notable African attendees were the South African novelist Peter Abrahams, the future president of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta (who also helped to organise the Congress), Malawi's future president Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and Nigeria's Obafemi Awolowo (for list of delegates, see Padmore 1947, pp. 117–120). The Congress's two most distinguished attendees were Amy Jacques Garvey, the widow of Marcus Garvey, and W.E.B. Du Bois, who served as the Congress' honorary president. Du Bois had attended the first Pan-African Conference in 1900 and organised the first Pan-African Congress in 1919. The attendance of Garvey and Du Bois leant credibility to the mostly young African delegates as heirs to the Pan-African movement. This first meeting between Nkrumah and Du Bois would later evolve into a lasting friendship and intellectual collaboration. Unlike the preceding gatherings, the Fifth Congress was distinguished by the increased presence of Africans as well as by the major role played by Africans, such as Nkrumah and Kenyatta, in organising the event, which undoubtedly moulded Nkrumah's thought and politics. He regularly cited the meeting as one of the key events in the anti-colonial movement and, as a statesman, he made Pan-African cooperation the centrepiece of his political work (Nkrumah 1963, 1964, 1971; Padmore 1971, p. 168). For him, the independence of individual African states served as a first step towards the greater goal of Pan-Africanism (Nkrumah 1971: x).

Founding of the Convention People's Party and Ghanaian independence

Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast in 1947 to work for the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) (for more on the UGCC, see Adu

Boahen 2004). Soon thereafter, Nkrumah set to work organising the UGCC by forming a Shadow Cabinet to prepare for independence, recruiting supporters, consolidating the party's branches, and planning demonstrations (Nkrumah 1971). One of the UGCC's first actions was a boycott of European and Syrian merchants. On 28 February 1948, the same day the boycott was ended, a peaceful demonstration by the Ex-Servicemen's Union ended in a clash with the British colonial police. Two ex-servicemen were killed. The shootings led to riots in which Africans targeted the European and Syrian populations. The UGCC was blamed for the riots. Nkrumah was detained and arrested on 12 March 1948, but was released a month later after the UGCC was cleared of responsibility. Nkrumah's arrest, however, helped to solidify his reputation as a leading, young political leader. Young Ghanaians were becoming increasingly frustrated with the UGCC's moderate political strategies and its reluctance to demand immediate self-government. Nkrumah shared these frustrations. He began to tour the country and his skills as an organiser helped win support among groups that were usually fractured under the colonial administration, including urban intellectuals, war veterans, youths who had become disenchanted by their life prospects under colonial rule, women, trade unionists, and rural farmers. In 1949, he united his supporters to form the Convention People's Party (CPP), a central platform of which was the immediate implementation of self-government, and began his campaign of positive action, a form of nonviolent action, to press colonial authorities for self-government.

As leader of the CPP, Nkrumah constructed a People's Assembly that would convey grievances to the colonial authorities. The proposals included the call for universal suffrage and for self-governing status under the 1931 Statute of Westminster. When the colonial government rejected these proposed constitutional amendments, the CPP responded by launching its first major Positive Action campaign. On 1 January 1950, Ghanaians performed non-violent acts of civil disobedience, boycotted European goods, and trade unions went on strike. Nkrumah and other

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members of the CPP were arrested that day. Support for Nkrumah continued to grow as a result. Due to continued unrest, on 1 January 1951, colonial authorities presented a new constitution that allowed for the creation of a Legislative Assembly and universal suffrage. The first elections took place on 5 February. Though still in prison, Nkrumah won a seat and the CPP won a majority in the Assembly. Nkrumah was released on 11 February and invited to form a government. The Gold Coast had not achieved full independence. Rather, Nkrumah's government was expected to co-operate with the British government in facilitating a gradual transition to independence. In 1952, Nkrumah became Ghana's first prime minister after an emendation to the Constitution.

Already in 1951, Nkrumah had began to consolidate his power. The greatest challenges to his nationalist political programmes came from chiefs throughout the Gold Coast and from Asante nationalists (for more on this, see Allman 1993; Rathbone 2000). Chiefs had ruled parts of the Gold Coast for hundreds of years and were seen as legitimate rulers. In particular, the Asantehene, the king of the Asante, could trace his family's rule back to 1707 and had a strong base of support in his kingdom's capital at Kumasi. Nkrumah viewed the chiefs as a threat to his nationalist programme and efforts to centralise power. He was in the precarious position of having to both publicly show reverence for the Asantehene as well as delegitimise him by associating him with feudal tyranny and anti-modernism (this is discussed in Rathbone 2000). The stronger political challenge came from the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which was the organisational body that opposed Nkrumah's nationalism. Beginning in 1954, the NLM began to advocate a federal system of government in Ghana. They opposed Nkrumah's centralisation of power and sought to preserve the culture and traditions of the Asante peoples. The NLM pursued its aims through electoral politics. This severely weakened the movement when, in 1954, the CPP once again won a majority. The CPP worked actively to weaken the movement and by 1958 had managed to completely marginalise it (see Allman 1993).

Independent Ghana

On 3 August 1956, the assembly authorised the government to request independence from Britain as a member of the Commonwealth. On 6 March 1957, Ghana became an independent member of the Commonwealth with Nkrumah staying on as prime minister and Queen Elizabeth II as its monarch. Nkrumah became known as 'Osagyefo' (redeemer). Ghana was the first of the major sub-Saharan African colonies to gain independence. Though the 1957 constitution initially included protections for the rights of chiefs and different regions, these protections were weakened as CPP supporters managed to infiltrate and take control over the country. Constitutional provisions that checked power were slowly abolished. Nkrumah's Government introduced a succession of measures to secure the authority of the CPP. In 1957, political parties founded on ethnic, religious, or regional interests were banned, thus, leading to the decline of the NLM. The NLM, however, merged with the United Party to form the major opposition party to the CPP. The Deportation Act allowed for the expulsion of non-Ghanaians perceived to be acting against Ghanaian interests, but was later applied to Ghanaians as well. In 1955, Nkrumah had already begun to evince autocratic tendencies after banning strikes in the name of patriotic duty in response to the 1955 Gold Miners' Strike. He strengthened the Trade Union Act in 1958, but also worked to remain on good terms with the powerful Gold Coast Trade Union Congress (TUC). Nkrumah dealt with the TUC leadership by integrating them into the CPP. His base among rank-and-file unionists would suffer further when he refused to support railway workers during their 1961 strike (see Birmingham 1998, pp. 74–76). In 1958, the Preventive Detention Act empowered Nkrumah to detain individuals without trial. Among those detained was his former ally Danquah. Danquah expressed support for the NLM's criticisms of Nkrumah, and would die in prison in 1965.

As Nkrumah instituted increasingly authoritarian policies within Ghana, he worked hard to cultivate an image as an international spokesman for African independence, inviting dignitaries and

travelling abroad frequently. Almost immediately after Ghana's independence, his attention shifted back to his Pan-Africanist vision of continental cooperation. By 15 April 1958, Nkrumah was already welcoming the representatives of the eight existing African states (Ghana, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco) in Accra for the first Conference of Independent African States (Nkrumah 1963, p. 136). On 5 December of that year, he would host another meeting, the first All-African People's Conference, this time inviting delegates from the different African nationalist organisations throughout the continent. In 1960, Ghana left the Commonwealth and became a republic. The following year, Nkrumah brought Ghana into the Non-Aligned Movement, joining a group of four other states that rejected alliances with either of the Cold War superpowers. The Movement's other leaders were Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Sukarno of Indonesia. In 1960, Nkrumah invited his old friend Du Bois to settle in Ghana and begin work on the *Encyclopedia Africana.* Du Bois died in Ghana in 1963 without living to see the *Encyclopedia* completed (for more on Du Bois' later years, see Lewis 2000). Padmore had died in 1959.

In 1963, Nkrumah was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize. That year also proved a decisive one for Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist aspirations. He had continued throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s to campaign for continental unity, particularly as an ever increasing number of African states became independent. On 25 May 1963, the Organisation of African Unity was established in Addis Ababa. In that same year, Nkrumah published *Africa Must Unite.* Echoing many of the Pan-Africanist sentiments of the Fifth Pan-African Congress, he drew on US and Soviet Union examples to argue for a union of African states. Nkrumah's position was supported by Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Mali, and Libya, which received the collective label of the 'Casablanca Bloc'. They were, however, defeated by the 'Monrovian Bloc', led by Léopold Senghor and other African leaders who either favoured

continued close relations with former colonial powers or a slower transition to political union. Nkrumah held out hopes that a union of states would, despite the delay, come eventually (see Manby 2009, p. 157).

Believing that modernisation was an essential component of the ultimate end of Pan-African union, Nkrumah had embarked on a variety of ambitious economic and industrial projects. He was able to harness Ghana's natural resources to bring enormous wealth to the country, which he used to finance further public works projects. This enabled him to introduce free education and health care. However, other major projects, such as the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River, helped to put Ghana into increasing debt. This was coupled with increasing expenditures to modernise the Ghanaian military. He lent military support to Rhodesian rebels battling Ian Smith's white-African government. Throughout this time, Nkrumah struggled to keep Ghana economically self-sufficient and not reliant on either the US, Europe, or the Soviet Union. But his regime was frequently susceptible to charges of corruption made against the beneficiaries of his industrialisation contracts.

Nkrumah was on a state visit to North Vietnam on 24 February 1966 when the National Liberation Council, led by eight high-ranking members of the military and the police force, overthrew his government in a military coup. Nkrumah had lost the support of his base. The Trade Union Act and his reprisals against strikers helped turn trade unionists against him. The Preventive Detention Act had helped nurture growing public disenchantment with Nkrumah's rule and fostered support for his political opponents. Danquah was dead. Yet, another former Nkrumah ally, Joe Appiah, had arisen as a popular critic of Nkrumah's rule. Nkrumah's refusal to take sides in the Cold War had also frustrated foreign powers, particularly the US and Britain. There is little evidence to back claims that the CIA had a direct hand in the coup, but foreign agencies were likely aware that it would take place. Nkrumah settled in exile in Guinea at the invitation of President Ahmed Sékou Touré. Touré and Nkrumah shared many ideological affinities. Both were viewed as

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radicals among the new African leaders. Touré was the only African leader to reject Charles de Gaulle's offer to African states to join the French Community. They had also worked together as members of the Casablanca Bloc. During his exile, Nkrumah continued to support Pan-Africanism. His rhetoric took on an increasingly radical tone. He became more supportive of the notion of armed resistance to imperialism and was fearful of assassination attempts. In August 1971, he flew to Romania in ill-health to seek treatment for prostate cancer. He died on 27 April 1972.

Pan-Africanism and Consciencism

Despite his controversial presidency, Nkrumah has enjoyed a reputation as a significant Pan-African political theorist and philosopher. His Pan-Africanism can be traced back to his days in Britain working with Padmore. Certainly, the idea of a union of African states was one of the most consistent features of his political thought. He supported it throughout his life in various books and pamphlets. It informed his political policies and diplomatic missions. As a pre-independence intellectual, Nkrumah's promotion of Pan-Africanism was largely abstract. As a political organiser, his thought centred on the concept of 'positive action', which advocated non-violent civil disobedience in the vein of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. (explained in Nkrumah 1964). Once in power, his Pan-Africanism took on a more concrete form by way of referring to federal models for a union of states. After his expulsion from office, Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism turned to the critique of neo-colonialism, arguing that the continued European involvement in African affairs constituted a new phase of imperialism (Nkrumah 1966). Nkrumah's analyses proved all the more prescient as African states made greater concessions to Western and corporate interests, which led to debt and economic instability. Following the coup and fearful of a resurgent imperialism, Nkrumah would later argue that Africa had entered a period that necessitated armed revolution, which he discussed in his *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* (1968). Nkrumah's

strengths lay more in his abilities as a polemical pamphleteer than as a systematic theorist.

Nkrumah's most developed theoretical text is his 1964 work, *Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization* (1964). The work is Nkrumah's strongest effort to participate in the philosophical discourses that first fascinated him in his youth. But, it is a clumsy text. Much of the book is mired in a confused and extended discussion of the history of European philosophy. It weakly argues that idealism is inherently reactionary and that materialism is inherently revolutionary. From this lengthy discussion, Nkrumah goes on to make broad and unsupported statements about the egalitarian nature of traditional African societies. These are highly questionable given the complex and diverse shapes of political governance one finds throughout the continent and historical record. The simplistic claims echo views that he had developed in his youth. Already in the West African Resolutions at the Fifth Pan-African Congress, which it is likely Nkrumah had a hand in drafting, one finds statements emphasising that among the West Africans' chief grievances with colonialism was the destruction of traditional African social structures. Nevertheless, the final section of the short book is the most interesting, if only for giving an insight into his thought and the justifications for his politics. Nkrumah argues that there is a natural affinity between the egalitarian aims of socialism and the egalitarianism that he attributes to traditional African society. However, he recognises that the effects of colonialism as well as the necessity of dealing within a global context make an unmediated return to traditional African social structures impossible. Hence, this becomes a justification for the continuation of certain colonial industrialising campaigns.

In the text, Nkrumah identifies positive elements in both Western and Islamic intellectual traditions and the impact both have had on African intellectual life. It therefore becomes necessary to cultivate a new ideological basis for African philosophy and politics, which Nkrumah calls Consciencism. Consciencism retains what he understands to be the fundamental egalitarian principles that underlie pre-colonial African societies, but appropriates ideas from the Western and

Islamic intellectual traditions and especially those socialist principles that would allow Africa to modernise and develop political institutions. Because Nkrumah finds a precedent for socialism in traditional African communalism, he implies that Africa's road to socialism relies more upon reform than violent revolution. With Consciencism serving as the ethical and intellectual foundation for a movement, Nkrumah argues that 'positive action' is that form of activism that serves African's interest in both the struggle against colonialism and the effort to build the individual nations and foment co-operation among the disparate African states. Nkrumah's argues that positive action is best directed by a single-party state run by his CPP, which suggests a certain conception of a vanguard that may or may not be linked to Lenin's thought of which Nkrumah was an admirer. African independence meant much more to Nkrumah than simply ousting a colonial power. In order for Africa to be truly independent, he believed it had to develop a fully functioning industrial and economic infrastructure. Yet, more importantly, independence, for Nkrumah, was about reclaiming Africa's intellectual heritage and synthesising it with other intellectual traditions. Independence requires creating a new intellectual tradition for Africans – Consciencism.

Legacy

The argument of Consciencism is not as philosophically sophisticated as Nkrumah might have hoped. The concept of Consciencism is remarkably vague and Nkrumah makes logical leaps that are unsupported by his argument. Nevertheless, the book does reveal some of the key features of Nkrumah's thought that have a bearing on his politics. Nkrumah may have paid homage to traditional African society, but he was an unapologetic moderniser who ultimately saw traditional society as a barrier to change. As pointed out earlier, he had little tolerance for the traditional culture of the Asante. This often meant resorting to questionable legal manoeuvres at the least and the outright use of force at worst. Nkrumah's

defence of the single-party state, which he would institute as president, is also intimately tied to his philosophy. There are strong affinities between his single-party state and the vanguard revolutionary theory of Lenin, of whom Nkrumah was a great admirer. Despite these authoritarian features, Nkrumah's thought is interesting insofar as it is an attempt, albeit a weak one, to bring Western, Islamic, and African philosophy into dialogue with one another. This enterprise has been taken up with greater success and more sophistication by a younger generation of philosophers. This is not to suggest that Nkrumah was unprecedented, but, in this regard, he was, in spite of his shortcomings as a philosopher, something of a pioneer. It therefore makes sense that Africana philosophers – who have done much to build a canon of Africana philosophy – have embraced Nkrumah the philosopher. He is also undoubtedly an important influence on modern Pan-Africanism. He was an articulate spokesperson for the movement and was the leading African statesman to try to make Pan-Africanism a political reality. This commitment to Pan-Africanism made him, along with Touré, one of the most uncompromising African leaders who sought to pave an independent path for African development. The lasting appeal of these features of Nkrumah's life and work are important and should not be underestimated. At the very least, they have helped to cultivate a mythic persona with strong resonance.

All of this helps to explain Nkrumah's current status as something of a hero among many modern-day Africans. But this is a relatively recent phenomenon. When he fell from power, he was largely unpopular among Ghanaians (for a discussion, see Appiah 1992, pp. 161–3). With the exception of Touré, Nkrumah's ouster elicited little outrage from his fellow African heads of state. Ghanaians better remembered him for his oppressiveness. Any movement that he was unable to incorporate into the programme of CPP was either severely weakened or abolished by his supporters or through his revisions to the constitution. While he publicly and in his writings expressed respect for traditional African culture, he banned parties that were founded on tribal, religious, or ethnic interests. Though trade

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unionists helped bring him into power, Nkrumah's policies turned labour leaders into elites who were indebted to him and ignored the interests of the Ghanaian working class. He punished African workers for striking against inhumane working conditions. Competing political parties were labelled unpatriotic. Nkrumah made ready use of the Deportation Act and the Preventive Detention Act to silence his opponents. His ambitious modernisation programmes ultimately had the opposite effect of placing Ghana in debt and making it more reliant on foreign aid. Nkrumah's reputation began to undergo a cautious revival under the oversight of President Jerry Rawlings following the latter's coup in 1979. This period gave birth to 'Nkrumahism' to refer to Nkrumah's thought as a system of political philosophy (see Assensoh 1998; Martin 2012). But the oppressive elements of his regime linger.

It is difficult to disentangle Kwame Nkrumah the admired Pan-Africanist visionary from Kwame Nkrumah the despised authoritarian. At any given point, one view is privileged over another. They are not, perhaps, mutually exclusive. It is likely that Nkrumah himself saw little inconsistency between his ideas and his policies. The consolidation and abuse of power in the name of nationalism might, in his view, have been seen as a necessary condition for the kind of national unity that could serve as the basis for and make possible the grander goal of African unity. Nkrumah might be better understood less as a Ghanaian nationalist than as a Pan- Africanist for whom Ghanaian nationalism was an instrument (for a version of this claim see Appiah 1992, p. 162). Nevertheless, Nkrumah the one-time dissident did not tolerate dissent. He oversaw a thoroughly antidemocratic government, which regularly bought off or destroyed the opposition instead of negotiating with it. But Nkrumah very much remains the public face of African independence. He was the leader of the first major African state to achieve independence and was a stalwart, if not embattled, campaigner of a grander vision of African independence that extended beyond the end of colonial rule. He condemned ongoing colonial rule and white racism when other African heads of state were reluctant to do so. His lasting significance may best be understood, rightly or wrongly, as a symbol of African independence.

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Non-Aligned Movement

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Non-Aligned Movement (Incorporating Yugoslavia)

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The Non-Aligned Movement is an international association of states that was established to co-ordinate co-operation globally and across regions outside the Cold War blocs of the two Superpowers – the US and the USSR. Its inaugural conference was held from 1 to 6 September 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The leading figures of the foundational meeting were the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz 'Tito', and the President of Egypt and the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Twenty-five states took part in this initial conference including Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kampuchea, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, and Zaire. The organisation grew rapidly to include 117 member states by 1971. Several countries including Cuba, Indonesia, and Ghana also played leading roles in setting the agenda of the association in the 1970s and 1980s. The Non-Aligned Movement formed a permanent committee and a co-ordinating bureau at the headquarters of the United Nations (UN) in New York and held frequent consultative meetings and ministerial conferences, as well as summit conferences approximately every 4 years (in Belgrade in 1961, Cairo 1964, Lusaka 1970, Algiers 1973, Colombo 1976, Havana 1979). The organisation continues to exist and function today in a modified form, even after the end of the Cold War.

As the formerly colonial states and otherwise recently self-determining states became independent after the Second World War, with the formation of the UN they searched for a 'Third Way' alternative to the East–West blocs. These states across the globe encountered difficulties in modernisation, but strove towards an independent course in foreign policy and development.

Third Way politics, in which the Non-Aligned Movement engaged, sought to represent small states and challenge bi-polar divisions by forming a multi-state coalition outside the East–West blocs. Development in the Mediterranean region that was important for the birth of the movement was shaped by the radicalisation of politics in the Cold War in the aftermath of decolonisation and by Superpower interventions across the globe. Choosing a Third Way foreign policy among the recently independent states influenced the construction of sovereignty, nationhood, and the state. The Non-Aligned Movement came to represent this crucial dynamic of international history.

The themes which encompassed the Non-Aligned Movement were international: anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, antimilitarism, communism, dictatorship, and anti-apartheid action. These subjects left no region untouched in the post-Second World War period. The goal of this association of states was never clearly defined, but it worked to promote solidarity among those nations that were less powerful in international relations. It also functioned materially to facilitate large development projects among different member states, such as river water regulation systems and the building of large-scale constructions such as military complexes. In addition it fostered student exchanges.

The Initial Geo-Political Prerogative

The Non-Aligned Movement set the stage for alternative foreign policy strategies outside of the East–West blocs; it made use of transnational politics, an ideological alternative, and the cultural dynamics of the Cold War to advance not one, but several agendas. It is important, however, to understand that the association itself began as a geo-political prerogative. The balance-of-power status quo which emerged between the two Superpowers after the end of the Second World War was problematic for states such as Yugoslavia and Egypt. Yugoslavia had faced an initial split with the USSR in 1948 when it was expelled from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) by

the Soviet leader Josef Stalin. While Tito and Stalin had argued over numerous issues between 1945 and 1948, including the formation of a future Balkan federation, the basic underlying reason for the split was Tito's objection to Stalin's postwar foreign policy. The Yugoslav Communist leadership increasingly felt that Stalin was overly accommodating to the wartime Western allies, ready to grant them their sphere of influence in Western Europe, and that the USSR was not prepared to recognise Yugoslavia's leading role among European Communist parties. Tito's leadership in Belgrade was not willing to compromise its independence from the Soviet Communist Party which it had acquired during the Second World War by fighting and winning a civil war and a war against the Axis across Yugoslavia. It now rejected Soviet foreign policy in the post-Second World War world.

The Nikita Khrushchev-led Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement of 1955 led only to a second conflict in 1956 when the USSR invaded Hungary. Military action to prevent a revolution in Hungary made the geographical and ideological position of Yugoslavia more difficult; Yugoslavia was an independent one-party communist state in Europe outside the Warsaw Pact. The Yugoslav leadership surrounding Tito still did not desire a close connection between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist parties, and Tito himself underlined a need for state sovereignty also in foreign policy.

The second Yugoslav–Soviet split led to a permanent disconnection in the years after 1956. In that same year Egypt experienced a challenge from Great Britain and France in the form of the Suez crises. When Egypt decided to nationalise the Suez Canal, Israeli troops with the support of Great Britain and France invaded the waterway in October. The incident ended when British and French troops were replaced by UN peacekeepers in November 1956 and Israeli troops were withdrawn in March 1957. Nasser in Egypt also came to seek a foreign policy alternative after the invasion of the Suez Canal by stepping away from British and French pressure.

The political leaders of Yugoslavia and Egypt then began, with renewed political will, to look for an association and a geographical centre of gravity by means of which they could enforce their foreign policy agendas and secure the independent futures of their states outside the politics of the USSR (in the case of Yugoslavia) and the Western Allies (in the case of Egypt). Tito and Nasser strove to gather together the elements for the so-called Third Way from among those states which did not officially belong to either the US or the Soviet bloc.

Following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc, the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership had sought refuge, successfully, in building wider international foreign policy connections. The party had increasingly granted to its foreign ministry the resources necessary to establish a broader and more important range of diplomatic relations than those of other Eastern European states. Yugoslavia quickly became a member of the UN, and achieved a term as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council as early as January 1950. It notoriously accused the USSR at the UN General Assembly of having started the Korean conflict. The country's representatives to the UN became very skilled at launching and supporting resolutions and other initiatives within the organisation. Yugoslavia was prepared to support to Egypt at the General Assembly over the Suez crises, securing a special emergency session under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution. It also gave early and vocal support for a UN Emergency Force to intervene days after the Israeli invasion, and this prepared the way for Egyptian collaboration in later years in helping to organise the inaugural conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in September 1961 (see for example UN General Assembly 1956).

For Tito and for Nasser the Non-Aligned Movement served as a foreign policy solution against geo-political dilemmas posed by the USSR and by Britain and France, and it sought legitimacy in foreign policy away from the USSR and the Western Allies. The movement was internationally recognised and became highly visible through the influence of news media, and also helped to justify the domestic policies of 'brotherhood and unity' in Yugoslavia and Arab nationalism in Egypt. Both Tito and Nasser utilised images of the movement politically to convey its

international significance and its global weight. The leaders of the two states, and Tito in particular, dominated the political agenda of the movement in its early period. The first summit conferences of the organisation were held in Belgrade (1961) and Cairo (1964). Yugoslavia had not been engaged in the anti-colonial struggle before the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite the overwhelmingly global themes and anti-colonial context of the movement, Yugoslavia was not an anti-colonial state. Rather, it had established itself via the Non-Aligned Movement as firmly against the domination of its Communist Party and state by the USSR. The roots of Third Way politics through the key influences of Yugoslavia and Egypt were intimately connected to the need to shelter foreign and domestic politics from Superpower influence and the desire and need to build sovereign state structures after the Second World War.

The Role of the Global South and Asia

Many scholars have described the 1955 Asian–African meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, as a significant stage in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Bandung summit did bring together all 29 independent states of Asia and Africa except for Korea and Israel, and it raised many topics and debates of race and geo-politics which in the later decades of the 1970s and 1980s became crucially important to discussions within the Non-Aligned Movement as well (Lee 2010; Tan and Acharya 2008). These issues included, among others, anti-colonialism, the role of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, and military pacts. The Bandung meeting was the first occasion on which a group of former colonial states gathered together without European powers, and it therefore played a significant role in the chronology of the post-colonial era. In 1960, the Indonesian leader Sukarno argued that the inaugural meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement at Belgrade should be planned as a follow-up to Bandung, or as a second Bandung. However, since such a theme would have limited the scope specifically to Afro-Asian states this did not come to pass. The

organisers of the Belgrade meeting, Tito and Nasser, did not accept this approach during the final preparations at the Cairo preparatory meeting of 5–12 June 1961 (Willets 1978). In fact, there is no evidence of an absolute connection between the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian states, despite numerous scholarly references to specific links between the two.

African and Asian states were crucially important to the Non-Aligned Movement in the wider context of the Global Cold War, and gave also crucial impetus to the organisation of its inaugural meeting: in the year preceding it alone, 16 new African states became independent and joined the UN. In 1960 the Algerian guerrilla war of independence against France (1954–62) was still running its cruel course and was a constant security concern across the Mediterranean. In the same year, in his speech to the General Assembly's 15th session, Khrushchev banged on the podium with a shoe that he had brought in his briefcase, in an attempt to inspire and persuade the Third World to support the USSR instead of the United States in the Cold War. In these circumstances of escalating geo-political unrest Tito, Nasser, the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah, and Sukarno met at Yugoslavia's permanent mission to the UN in September 1960 to discuss a way forward for a future initiative. In the following year the continuing Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR involved Berlin as well between June and November 1961, intensifing the bi-polar fight. The ideas for the formation of an association crystallised at the inaugural conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, led by Tito and Nasser.

An important question regarding the birth of the movement concerns the role of India. India had become independent from the United Kingdom in 1947; its leader Nehru was an icon, and it bore legitimacy as an ideological forerunner of one of the large post-colonial states in Asia. India's foreign policy after independence has sometimes been interpreted as one of fundamental nonalignment. This is also because Nehru used this term early on. Egypt too had gained its

independence from the United Kingdom. Despite early important involvement in dialogue over the Bandung conference and the preparations for the Non-Aligned meeting, Nehru's and India's role in the actual Non-Aligned Movement was less central than has sometimes been described or than it could have been expected to be. The initial goals of the Non-Aligned Movement came to be defined as ones closely tied to representing small states outside the Superpowers of the Cold War. India's regional role in Asia and its overall role in the Global Cold War were markedly different from those of small states; India was an important power that sought to assert itself after its independence as one of the important great powers. India and its leader Nehru engaged in much debate about what a moral foreign policy in the tradition of Gandhi would consist of, but Nehru related questions of its geo-political role to the great power China. In 1954 India formulated its five principles of peaceful co-existence in a treaty with China. These included mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. India, from its important geo-political perspective, proposed from the beginning that the Non-Aligned Movement should consist of a large number of states, among which it could have played a significant and dominant role. However, Tito and Nasser insisted on a relatively small group of states and were able to achieve their goal initially as the initiators of the first conference.

Outcomes

After the Second World War economic development remained fundamentally equated with industrialisation and the implementation of modern science within production and consumption processes. The US entered the markets of the postcolonial states in both competition and co-operation with European powers because of the enormous financial and technological capacities it possessed. The USSR entered the postcolonial markets often by default, as an alternative to Western capital and products, often especially providing armaments to post-colonial states. Both Superpowers tried to link economic co-operation to bloc alignment, but these attempts were frequently dismissed by elites of the states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, who believed that recent political independence fundamentally translated to the prerogative to shield the domestic decisionmaking process, and therefore technology, from foreign interventions. This was considered to be best accomplished by centralising and strengthening the institutions of the newly sovereign nation state. Thus pursuing a connection with the Non-Aligned Movement gave the nationalist elites the opportunity to select from both blocs the capital, technology, and educational institutional partnerships which they deemed most suitable for their priorities.

The resources which the Non-Aligned Movement amassed were important, for example, in Algeria, where American and Soviet concepts of modernisation had to compete with those of the Yugoslavia and later Cuba. On gaining independence in July 1962, Algeria became the arena of a multi-lateral contest between the modernisation programmes of France, the US, the USSR, and communist China. The Algerian leadership itself attached great importance to developing the country's own autonomous revolution, and saw their newly independent country as the vanguard for the rest of Africa, if not the entire Third World (Byrne 2009). The Syrian Ba'athist elite in Damascus made similar considerations: although highly wary of the risks involved in the military presence of the two Superpowers in the Mediterranean, the Ba'athists exploited the partnership with the Soviet camp to break the primacy of Western powers in the Syrian economy and foreign policy (Trentin 2010).

Yugoslavia exploited the relationships that it formed through the Non-Aligned Movement to build extensive foreign relations and participate in development and construction projects globally, including the Kemer dam in Turkey in 1954, the water supply in Lebanon in 1957, the Garabuli area dams in Libya in 1974, and the naval academy in Tripoli in 1986. The Non-Alignment Movement legitimated the practice of

differentiation of international relations and thus suited well the pluralism desired in the post-colonial states' economies and societies and by those states whose independence had otherwise been threatened in the post-war scenario.

The Relationship of the Non-Aligned Movement to Neutralism

The terms 'neutralism' and 'non-alignment' are often used interchangeably, but they should not be confused even in the historical and political context of the Cold War. One definition of neutralism is as a political strategy appropriate to the circumstances of the Cold War. The foreign policy of neutralism, as for example in the case of Finland according to the formulation of its presidents Juho K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, meant that the state would establish bilateral relations with the USSR but would remain outside the Western North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as outside other defensive international alignments. The experiences of Finnish–Soviet relations during and after the Second World War led the Finnish post-war political leadership to conclude that in order to avoid invasion, Finland would have to demonstrate a commitment to minimising security risks to the USSR along its European political border and to not interfering in the Soviet domination of domestic politics elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Neutral foreign policy defined by Paasikivi and Kekkonen demanded limiting relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions to economic agreements, refraining from security alliances, limiting co-operation with Western intelligence agencies, and allowing a domestic Communist Party to exist and be active. Finland shared an 800-mile-long border with the USSR, and the outcome of the post-war peace treaty threatened Finnish independence because parts of Finnish territory had been surrendered to the Soviet neighbour; Finland, like Yugoslavia and Egypt, dealt with security threats against its independence after 1945. However, Finland, like several other European states that engaged in neutralist foreign policy was not a post-colonial state.

States such as Finland and Sweden were invited to join the Non-Aligned Movement and asked to take part in its conferences. However, both of these states declined, identifying the movement as anti-colonial and also as leaning towards communist economic models. The attitudes in the 1960s were often ones of a shared interest in the declared goals of the Non-Aligned Movement, but hesitation to make the expected commitment to comment on questions relating to Superpower conflicts. Of the two states, Sweden was even more hesitant towards the movement than Finland on the USSR's border. Elements of geo-political strategy and the intention to reduce military tensions by the Non-Aligned Movement interested the European states that were engaged in a foreign policy of neutralism, but they were unwilling to criticise Western European institutions publicly. It is clear why this was an inescapable barrier for affiliation or cross-over if we consider that Finland, for example, had become an associate member of the European Free Trade Agreement EFTA in 1961, the year in which the Non-Aligned Movement was born. Neutralism foreign policy bears a closer connection to the Euro-Atlantic community through the economic ties of a few European states (Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland) to the West. In today's context it is also important to note that a country cannot be a member of both the Non-Aligned Movement and the European Union at once.

The Lack of a Coherent Agenda

The Non-Aligned Movement was never successful in formulating and putting forth a clear and ultimately effective concept of a global order as an alternative to that proposed by the two Superpowers. The agenda of the association was never crystal-clear, and instead was formulated mostly in terms of summit conference agendas, but at times it produced at a dynamic organisation which could promote several agendas and leaders at once. The organisational structure of this association was too loose, and its dynamics during various decades after its birth tended to favour

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one part of the world and agenda over another. It was not democratic among its member states, and did not inspire solidarity. For this reason it is very difficult to define the ideology of the movement, because that would require assessing the relative importance of the different leaders of the movement and the occasions on which they were able to put forth their agendas.

In the late 1960s Non-Aligned member states struggled to agree on whether to condemn the US over its actions in Vietnam. Many of them then had also shifting partial allegiances and relationships with the USSR. Simultaneously the Arab states underlined the importance of the question of the Palestinian occupation by Israel after the 1967 war. As détente began to emerge across the European continent, there was a fear among the Non-Aligned states that the Cold War proxy conflicts would shift increasingly away from Europe to an even great extent, perhaps to their territories. Within the movement there was a general move away from presenting the limited, more coherent set of geo-political concerns of states like Yugoslavia and Egypt and towards treating anticolonialism as a more important major issue. From the 1970 Lusaka summit conference onwards, anticolonialism was placed as a main item on the agenda, whereas it had previously been listed under matters of peace and security. At the Lusaka summit the US was also directly blamed for escalating the Vietnam War. Issues including racism, apartheid, and imperialism were also raised in the agenda and were defined as forces which worked against peace. In the 1970s the movement highlighted problems of apartheid in South Africa and Portuguese colonialism, and economic issues were given more weight. Nonetheless the Non-Aligned Movement remained relevant because it was able to engage in fundamental questions including economic development. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was given observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement at the 1973 Algiers summit, but it did not agree to vote for the expulsion of Israel from the UN. After preoccupation with questions of race, post-colonialism, the Vietnam War, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and economic development in the 1970s, in the 1980s the focus of the association turned more towards Latin American concerns and priorities.

Relevance Today

As the Cold War came to an end the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole had difficulty in agreeing on a unified position on crucial events such as the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. These issues emerged in debates, for example while setting the agenda for the Havana summit meeting in 1979. In many ways it is surprising that the movement has survived into the post-Cold War era. Its role and capacity have changed, but it continues to exist and claims to represent the interests of smaller states and a great variety of other states in international relations outside the Euro-Atlantic community.

The legacy and memory of the Non-Aligned Movement have also been utilised in current UN politics. In recent times, for example, two states emerging from Yugoslavia, Croatia and Serbia, have both sought out the structures and states of the Non-Aligned Movement to promote their foreign policy agendas. The support of Non-Aligned countries helped to vote Croatia in as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2008–09. Engagement with the legacy of the Non-Aligned Movement and the support of a significant number of African states also helped Serbia's foreign minister Vuk Jeremic to gain favour and to be voted in as the president of the UN General Assembly for 2012–13. Although many formerly communist states have sought to separate themselves from the legacies of their Cold War foreign policies, these formerly Yugoslav states have utilised their Non-Alignment past as an asset.

Bearing in mind the current interest in the Cold War period and important advances in the field of development studies, it is surprising how little we know of the Non-Aligned Movement. Studies are challenged by the lack of any single archive of documents for the association. In addition scholars have had only limited access to comprehensive collections of primary sources in many of the countries which played leading roles in the

organisation including Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, and the former Yugoslavia. Important research has been done on the relationships of individual countries with the Non-Alignment Movement, but more is required in order to further understand the history of this important player in the history of international relations. Once we begin to understand the strategies of the Non-Aligned Movement and the similarities as well as differences between the various member states, we will be better able to discern the historical significance of the association.

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Non-equivalent Ecological Exchange

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Non-governmental Organisations (NGOS)

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Definition

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have become increasingly major players across a range of social, political, economic and environmental terrains. NGOs have been active in the United Nations (UN) from the time it was established in 1945, since when the term has gained broader usage. While their politics, practices, histories and relationships to social movements, the state and capital vary, NGOs are frequently conflated with the concept of 'civil society'.

Many critics – from social movements and academia - contend that the ascendancy of NGOs is a key aspect of new market regimes that seek to replace citizen–state relationships under state

regulation with civil society–stakeholder relationships under market regulation. Further, they argue that most NGOs are key actors in maintaining, advancing and administering imperialism, undermining democracy and entrenching liberalism. Coupled with this, social movement activists often refer to the 'NGOisation' of movements and struggles – that is, their institutionalisation, professionalisation, depoliticisation, and demobilization.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not a new phenomenon. Arguably, we can see their earlier incarnations in the humanitarian assistance and anti-slavery societies of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for example. Indeed, some contemporary NGOs have their roots in nineteenth-century missionary and/or faith-based charitable and philanthropic work (De Waal 1997; Manji and O'Coill 2002). NGOs have been active in the United Nations (UN) from the time it was established in 1945, since when the term has gained general currency. Today, the task of defining an NGO must contend with different descriptions employed by the state or inter-governmental institutions with which many of these organisations interact. The UN system defines an NGO as a legally constituted organisation created by natural or legal persons operating independently from any government. For the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the term 'NGO' 'encompasses any private or nonprofit organization that is formed or organized independently from a national or local government entity' (USAID, n.d.).

On the one hand, whether or not they are active within the circuitry of the UN or other intergovernmental bodies, NGOs can be said to be defined by what they are not. Yet, on the other, the accuracy of this definition can be challenged because so many of them (although not all) depend on government funding and/or compliance with official regulation or registration requirements set by state or inter-governmental agencies. Indeed, Sangeeta Kamat (2013: xi) reminds us that

NGOs do not exist outside of the state, market or society, as some imply. She suggests that they represent 'one more institutional form through which class relations are being contested and reworked'.

The UN created institutional space for NGO participation in international policy forums such as those on population, human rights, the status of women, and the environment. Such participation, mainly of northern-based international organisations, increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, further multiplying after the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Summit), when many more NGOs sought accreditation and access to UN fora. Improved communication technologies and international travel – for those who could afford or access these – and a growing identification of common issues and problems which transcended national borders also contributed to the rise in international NGO activity. In 1995, then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) said:

> Non-governmental organizations fulfil an essential representational role in the contemporary world. Their participation in international organizations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those organizations. Today, on all continents, non-governmental organizations continue to multiply. ... I have had occasion to state on several occasions ... that I hoped that non-governmental organizations would be given an increasingly important place within the United Nations itself. From the standpoint of global democratization, we need the participation of international public opinion and the mobilizing power of non-governmental organizations.

In 1997, the UN General Assembly began to debate the possibility of extending the participation of NGOs to include all areas of UN activity. To obtain UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status, NGOs must show that their activities are relevant to the work of ECOSOC, must have been in existence (officially registered) for at least two years, have a democratic decision-making mechanism; and the major portion of their funds should be derived from contributions from national affiliates, individual members, or other non-governmental components. The ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, comprising 19 UN member states, recommends

general, special or roster status for NGOs on the basis of an applicant's mandate, governance and financials, among other criteria (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.). Current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon claims that the three main areas where NGOs are needed are 'sustainable development', 'disarmament', and 'helping countries in transition' (UN Radio 2011). NGOs have been dominant in the proliferation of numerous national and international coalitions and campaigns in recent years around the environment, food sovereignty, human rights, women, humanitarian intervention, aid, development, health, education and health, among other concerns. Some have played major roles in lobbying for various inter-governmental negotiations and agreements on sustainable development, the regulation of hazardous wastes, the global ban on landmines and the elimination of slavery.

International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank and the African Development Bank have also increasingly involved NGOs (civil society organisations, CSOs) in financed development assistance. For the ADB, 'Civil society refers to groups distinct from the government and the private sector who operate around shared interests, purposes, and values. Civil society organizations (CSOs) encompass a wide range of organizations, including nongovernment organizations (NGOs); community-based organizations (CBOs); and people's organizations, mass organizations, professional associations, labor unions, private research institutes and universities, foundations, and social movements' (Asian Development Bank n.d). CSOs are increasingly involved in World Bank-financed projects in such areas as AIDS prevention, environmental protection, education, and even in macro-economic reform. Active CSO involvement in World Bank operations has risen steadily, from 21% of the total number of projects in 1990 to 82% in 2009 (World Bank, n.d.). Similarly according to the Asian Development Bank website (Asian Development Bank n.d), in 2010, 81% of approved loans, grants, and related technical assistance and 37% of stand-alone technical assistance approved included some form of CSO

participation. In turn, and as with the UN, the policies of these institutions also set parameters for which kinds of organisations will be involved in their programmes, and the terms of dialogue or other forms of engagement with official processes.

'Civil Society', Neo-Liberalism and Geopolitics

NGOs are often complex and difficult to fit into compartmentalised analyses or typologies, although many have tried to do so. Histories and context matter. NGOs operate in so many contexts and roles that it is difficult to generalise about them. Fisher (1997) argues that there is a danger of overessentialising them and a need to unpack micropolitics, complexities, and interconnections between local sites and larger contexts. However, critics urge that we must seriously examine commonly held assumptions that portray NGOs as inherently benign, neutral, and even apolitical actors; and to analyse the roles that they play. Radha D'Souza (2010: 249) holds that the ascendancy of NGOs is a key aspect of 'new market regimes that seek ways of replacing citizen–state relationships under state regulation with civil society–stakeholder relationships under market regulation. The UN Human Development Summit and the Copenhagen Declaration in 1995 forms a watershed moment for social movements in that the neo-liberal transformation of international organisations initiated by "globalisation" and spearheaded by the World Trade Organisation targeted social movements for the regime changes'. Uncompromising in their critique of NGOs, Petras and Veltmeyer (2001: 138) view most NGOs as agents of imperialism.

> Politically the NGOs fit into the new thinking of imperialist strategists. While the IMF [International Monetary Fund], World Bank and TNCs [transnational corporations] work with domestic elites at the top to pillage the economy, the NGOs engage in a complementary activity at the bottom, neutralizing and fragmenting the burgeoning discontent that results from the savaging of the economy.

Alongside their promotion by the UN, several factors account for the growth of aid and development NGOs, and their relationships with

governments and the private sector over the past three decades. The 1990s saw the further spread of NGOs and 'civil society' organisations and rhetoric worldwide. Increasingly, governments, inter-governmental organisations and international financial institutions promoted the policy and practice of 'strengthening civil society' along with 'good governance' and decentralisation. The dominant notion of 'civil society' emphasises the rights of individuals to pursue their self-interest rather than collective rights, and upholds the interests of state and capital. It also facilitates what Kamat (2004) calls the privatisation of the notion of public interest. Wood (1995: 254–256) cautions the following:

> 'Civil society' has given private property and its possessors a command over people and their daily lives, a power enforced by the state but accountable to no one, which many an old tyrannical state would have envied. . . . The rediscovery of liberalism in the revival of civil society thus has two sides. It is admirable in its intention of making the left more sensitive to civil liberties and the dangers of state oppression. But the cult of civil society also tends to reproduce the mystifications of liberalism, disguising the coercions of civil society and obscuring the ways in which the state oppression itself is rooted in the exploitative and coercive relations of civil society.

Given the role of NGOs as key 'civil society' actors, and indeed the conflation of the two concepts, Wood's observation seems highly pertinent.

Fowler (2000) sees a number of factors which account for the growth of NGOs involved in Third-World development, and their increased relationships with governments and the private sector. He sees the rightward shift in northern politics during the Reagan-Thatcher era as key to 'the start of the rise in official finance to, and number of NGOs that continues today' (2). This was due to the move away from government to the market as the engine of growth and progress, and 'meant more responsibility to citizens and their organizations' (ibid.). Although funds used to flow primarily from northern governments or financial institutions to southern governments, Many NGOs have increasingly become channels for, and direct recipients of this 'development assistance' (Biel 2000; Hancock 1989; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Wallace 2003). Priorities

for official development assistance had shifted gears after the end of the Cold War. Increasingly, governments, inter-governmental organisations and international financial institutions promoted the policy and practice of 'strengthening civil society' along with 'good governance' (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001, 2005; Veltmeyer 2007). These are intrinsic pillars of neo-liberal policy, as Kamat (2004) and Petras and Veltmeyer (2005) argue. Northern government and private-sector funding agencies resourced NGOs as part of an economic and foreign-policy strategy to 'democratize' countries through 'civil society' (Mojab 2009; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001, 2005; Veltmeyer 2007) in a unipolar world. With the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the broader focus on geopolitical and security concerns in economic and foreign policy since the attacks of 11 September 2001, came renewed explicit linkages gathering state actors, the private sector, and NGOs in the name of development, humanitarianism, peace, and security (Bebbington et al. 2008; Mojab 2009); what others have referenced as the militarisation of aid or humanitarian imperialism as development and security agendas cohere in the interests of global capitalist governance (Bricmont 2006; Duffield 2001). This entailed support for only a limited restructured state, free-market economic reforms, and an increased role for NGOs and private-sector organisations in providing social services and local development initiatives. For Kamat (2004) and Petras and Veltmeyer (2005), the professionalisation of community-based NGOs and their depoliticisation works well for neo-liberal regimes. Indeed, for Petras and Veltmeyer, this serves to keep 'the existing power structure (vis-à-vis the distribution of society's resources) intact while promoting a degree (and a local form) of change and development' (20). Instead, these organisations merely seek to ameliorate some of the social or environmental impacts through community development and participation-based development projects (on NGOs in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, see Fernando 2011). With the rise of a range of international/community development, advocacy and other NGOs and the enlargement of

NGO-political-space, forms of hegemonic NGO politics emerged, wherein the terms of social change amount to limited gains as opportunities might permit *within* existing structures (Choudry and Shragge 2012). While there are NGOs which openly contest the power of states and capital, these are a minority. For Kamat (2004: 171), rather than 'deepening the gains made on the basis of popular democratic struggles, NGOs are being re-inscribed in the current policy discourse in ways that strengthen liberalism and undermine democracy'.

In many cases, and by no means only in the international development sector, NGOs have grown to fill gaps in providing services and public goods instead of the public sector. In many countries they also provide job opportunities for former civil servants as the public sector is slashed (Burrowes et al. 2007; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001).

Many NGOs are themselves sites of considerable internal struggle over politics, positioning, programme priorities – and power. They represent a multiplicity of agendas, functions, and organisational structures, and reflect a spectrum of histories, values, approaches to practice and ideologies. While the term 'NGO' is usually assumed to signify a nonprofit organisation, some NGOs are little more than businesses (Hancock 1989; Jordan and Maloney 1997; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Reinsborough 2004) and/or corporate structures. Some are volunteer-driven, and/or emerge from popular movements and a claim to have a democratic structure. Others, as Gallin (2000: 27) notes, 'have a self-appointed and co-opted leadership, are not accountable to any constituency other than public opinion and their funders, do not provide public financial information, and have no clear monitoring and evaluation procedures'. In different contexts, a range of NGO-related acronyms are used to further classify NGOs: business-interested NGOs (BINGOs), royal family NGOs/ religious NGOs (RINGOs), government-sponsored NGOs (GONGOs), environmental NGOs (ENGOs), among others.

Some NGOs contract directly with the state to provide services, some receive state and private sector funding, while others rely on charitable donations. Writing about international aid NGOs, De Waal (1997: 66) believes that:

> the expansion of internationalized humanitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s reflects a retreat from accountability, akin to the dominance of neoliberalism. This is no coincidence: the internationalization of social welfare is closely linked to the decline of state authority, which is central to the neo-liberal project. The humanitarian international may be the 'human face' of neo-liberalism, but it is a charitable face with little accountability.

He sees both neo-liberalism and international humanitarianism being used as justifications for foreign institutions to intrude into the domestic politics of Third-World countries. The imposition of neo-liberal policies is entirely consistent with downloading responsibility for service provision and development projects from the state onto NGOs and communities. For Kamat (2004) and Petras and Veltmeyer (2005), the professionalisation of community-based NGOs and their depoliticisation works well for neo-liberal regimes. Petras and Veltmeyer suggest that they keep 'the existing power structure (vis-à-vis the distribution of society's resources) intact while promoting a degree (and a local form) of change and development' (20).

Some NGOs have been set up by business lobby groups and industry think tanks and have been successful in gaining access to international policy forums through accreditation as NGOs or CSOs (Kamat 2004). Some supposedly community organisations, such as 'BINGOs', have been set up by corporations and public-relations consultants in an effort to counter opposition to corporate power and shape public opinion and debate on environmental and social issues As Beder (1997) notes, to cite one example of this trend, the 'Wise Use Movement' which emerged in the US, Canada and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s (which has campaigned against environmentalists, environmental regulation, and for guaranteed access for mining and forestry on public lands) portrayed itself as a 'poorly financed, grassroots movement' (51). But in the US it has been 'stage-managed' by a conservative foundation, the Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise. Many of the groups within the Wise Use Movement have received substantial industry funding and support.

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In other cases, corporations sponsor or form 'partnerships' with existing NGOs in an attempt to improve their image. This phenomenon is well documented in Beder (1997), Dauvergne and LeBaron (2014), Lubbers (2002), and Rowell (1996). John Hilary (2013) notes the partnerships between a number of NGOs with big business and their active involvement in the 'corporate social responsibility'(CSR) programmes of business: 'This collaborationist turn on the part of NGOs – increasingly pronounced in recent years – has contributed to the closing down of critical space, as corporations have been able to point to their partnerships with "respectable" civil society (especially NGOs from the global North) as a means of marginalising more radical opposition to their operations and to the system as a whole' (147–148).

Some NGOs are essentially community-service or advocacy organisations with little focus on broader social, political, or economic issues, and no links to social movements. Others operate at a local and national level and combine policy analysis, lobbying, and mobilisation. 'Development' NGOs, largely but not solely based in the North, still focus mainly on poverty relief overseas, and are increasingly channels for government aid and development budgets. Some of these organisations maintain a very narrow, specialised, single-issue focus, while others have a broader global and local perspective.

In sum, the category 'NGO' is itself open to manipulation and control by states and intergovernmental institutions either through legal means such as NGO registration laws or through funding relations which allow for surveillance and regulation of NGO activities. This includes the power to confer or revoke charitable or tax-exempt status, and funding relationships which shape NGO policies and positions.

NGOisation and NGOism?

US activist and author Patrick Reinsborough writes:

> Just as service oriented NGOs have been tapped to fill the voids left by the state or the market, so have social change NGOs arisen to streamline the chaotic

> business of dissent. Let's call this trend NGOism, the belief – sometimes found among professional 'campaigners' – that social change is a highly specialized profession best left to experienced strategists, negotiators and policy wonks. NGOism is the conceit that intermediary organizations of paid staff, rather than communities, organizing themselves into movements, will be enough to save the world. (2004: 194)

The term 'NGOism' has become common among many in social movements and activist networks, especially those with commitments to decentralised, non-hierarchical modes of organising and mass-based peoples' movements with more radical platforms (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Reinsborough 2004). Many social movement activists also speak of the 'NGOisation' of movements and struggles – that is, their institutionalisation, professionalisation, depoliticisation, and demobilisation (Armstrong and Prashad 2005; Burrowes et al. 2007; Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Kamat 2004; Smith 2007a). Kamat (2004) argues that this process is driven by the neoliberal policy context in which NGOs operate. Organisations must demonstrate managerial and technical capabilities to administer, monitor, and account for project funding. While there are some NGOs which do serve people's movements struggling for more radical social change (see Africa 2013 for examples from the Philippines), mass-based organisations of movements who represent their demands themselves through various forms of political mobilisation have often been in conflict with organisations which claim to represent the poor and marginalised, but in fact have no mass base or popular mandate (Faraclas 2001; McNally 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001, 2003, 2005; Veltmeyer 2007). When they are neither internally democratic nor accountable to a mass base, how are NGO demands for greater democracy and transparency of states or inter-governmental institutions and their legitimacy to speak on behalf of 'the people' to be understood?

NGOs, Policing Dissent, and Gatekeeping

Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) see the vast majority of NGOs as serving to displace, destroy. or neutralise

social movements fighting for economic and social injustice throughout the Third World. Elsewhere, they write that 'the forced professionalization of the community-based NGOs, and their subsequent depoliticization, represent two sides of the same development, producing a common set of effects: to keep the existing power structure (vis-à-vis the distribution of society's resources) intact while promoting a degree (and a local form) of change and development' (2005: 20). For these authors most NGOs are 'intellectual policemen who define "acceptable" research, distribute research funds and filter out topics and perspectives that project a class analysis and struggle perspective' (2001: 137). Some NGOs – especially aid and development agencies with funding relationships with partner organisations in the Third World, as well as some established research and advocacy NGOs in both North and South – position themselves as the gate-keepers between social movements and other organisations. That is, they act as intermediaries, and yet their roles and interests in doing so and the power inherent in acting in this way, are frequently opaque and rarely subject to critical examination (Burrowes et al. 2007; Choudry and Shragge 2012). Townsend and Townsend (2004: 281) note that gatekeeper NGOs 'command the discourse, can write the funding proposals . . . and are "in the information loop"', often creating a sense of powerlessness for those on the outside. Northern NGOs and social movement activists may be unaware of – or unconcerned about – whether Southern organisations and their representatives have a genuine grass-roots base; or, rather, whether they represent a professional class of NGO representatives with access to international networks but no accountability to those they claim to serve.

In many NGO networks, there is much focus on development and development models which often obscure the capitalist relations which underpin them. Critics charge that these organisations often merely seek to ameliorate some of the social or environmental impacts through community development and participation-based development projects. With their praxis and principles usually rooted in liberal notions about society and the state, many NGOs have distanced themselves from, or stigmatised activists and

movements that drew from Marxist traditions as doctrinaire, anachronistic ideologues, excluding them from their events (Petras 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). In some cases there is outright hostility and suspicion towards NGOs from mass movements, especially towards those which receive government and/or foreign funding. Further, some NGOs have been charged with, and exposed as complicit in, counter-insurgency and intelligence-gathering operations for domestic and foreign state powers (see, for example, Williams 2011). Does the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of organisational forms advance or inhibit movements for social change? Do NGOs open up political space or represent a new form of regulation and containment?

Discussing human rights advocacy NGOs, Richard Falk (1999: 98) argues that:

> [t]he main human rights NGOs were very much outgrowths of Western liberal internationalism and looked mainly outward to identify abuses in Communist and Third World countries. In part, this reflected civilizational, as well as partisan and ideologized, orientations. It was expressed by a very selective emphasis by human rights organizations on the abuse of dissenters and political opposition or on the denial of Western-style political liberties . . . . In other words, human rights progress, while definitely subversive of statist pretensions in certain key respects, still remained generally compatible with the maintenance of existing geopolitical structures of authority and wealth in the world and, as such, exerted only a marginal influence.

Funding and other material support can orient NGOs to prioritise institutional survival and maintenance at the expense of mobilisation: NGO actions may be shaped by material incentives. This has implications for the professionalisation of social change (Reinsborough 2004; Smith 2007b) and the spread of forms of marketisation, territorialism, and competition among NGOs. Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) see the vast majority of NGOs as serving to displace, destroy, or neutralise social movements fighting for economic and social injustice throughout the Third World. Williams (2010) suggests that NGO-led processes of human rights intervention are often inherently imperialist and colonial, as opposed to struggles which address the processes of imperialism and colonialism as explicit targets for political action.

He contends that this is made evident in many NGOs' tolerance for and complicity with development/market violence in contexts of displacement and dispossession. Within the context of neo-liberal transformation, development and advocacy NGOs in particular come to contribute to managing and structuring dissent, channelling this into organisational structures and processes that do not threaten underlying power relations. Further, these organisations often act to absorb cuts in services and a reduced role for the state under neo-liberal restructuring and/or as a safety valve or lid on more militant opposition against such policies (Choudry and Shragge 2012).

Greenfield (2001), McNally (2002), and Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) suggest that most NGOs tend to operate in ways which accept capitalist globalisation rather than seeking to transform the system altogether. Instead, many of these organisations have focused on lobbying and trying to influence elites rather than movement building. In doing so, they have often become more driven by notions of polite reformism and self-interest in the maintenance of their organisation and funding relationships – and ultimately serve dominant political and economic interests (McNally 2002; Rojas 2007; Smith 2007a). In some cases, these organisations have become corporate entities in their own right (Blood 2005), part of what Rojas (2007) and Smith (2007b) describe as 'the non-profit industrial complex' (Smith 2007b: 3), modelled after capitalist structures. While some NGOs maintain a focus almost solely on the international arena, and some look for new opportunities for political leverage at a supranational or transnational level, for many NGOs and social movements the state remains both a target and terrain of struggle (Goodman 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Some NGOs co-operate closely with domestic governments at an international level, while others are diametrically opposed to such collaboration. Organisations that frame their demands in liberal social-democratic traditions tend to demand a humanised form of capitalism and a retooled state, although some view incremental gains and reforms as necessary steps in a longer-term transformation of society and social and economic relations.

Goodman (2002: xvii) raises important questions about the legitimacy of international NGOs, predominantly based in the North, becoming vehicles for 'people power' in this international space, and also questions their political leverage and institutional capacity to perform this task. He sees NGOs that operate at this level as broadly reformist, seeking greater institutional accountability and the formulation of goals that address popular priorities rather than elite interests. But this mode of operating is itself elitist and only open to a privileged few with access (albeit limited and contested) to either critique or advise agents of globalisation, and who are willing to operate within the parameters set by those institutions. The ability for these actors to pursue such a mode of action is frequently linked to their relationships with state governments in Northern countries, and the fact that their ideologies and political platforms do not reject the fundamental principles of these institutions.

Yet some NGOs were set up by, and have managed to remain attached and accountable to, people's movements for specific purposes (Burrowes et al. 2007; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001, 2005; Rojas 2007). However, these tend to be exceptions. Such organisations are often hybrid activist/social movement organisations which work at building social movements and community mobilisation, and are also constituted in a way to be recognised in an organisational form which allows them to seek support from philanthropic foundations, or state funding and tax-exempt status where these exist (Burrowes et al. 2007; Smith 2007b). For example, Burrowes et al. (2007: 231) note that Brazil's Movimento dos Trabalhadore Rurais Sem Terra MST; a landless rural workers' movement) has had strategic relationships with NGOs, many of which 'were started at the request of the movements, usually to provide specific skills or resources' but 'ultimately . . . are not essential. If those NGOs collapsed tomorrow, the movements would remain intact'.

Like Petras and Veltmeyer (2001), Fowler sees another factor in the emergence of NGOs as the creation of a safer space for intellectuals and others on the left during periods of heightened

repression, often under authoritarian dictatorships. Meanwhile, sometimes funded by northern NGOs, private foundations, and government development-assistance programmes, some Third-World NGOs have been vehicles for relatively privileged intellectuals to research, or to conduct professionalised lobbying of, governments or international institutions, but have later reached out to social movements as their legitimacy and lack of a grass-roots base have been challenged, for example, in the context of the growth of the global justice movement.

Some NGOs with roots in popular progressive social movements become disconnected from them and institutionalised (Burrowes et al. 2007; Petras and Veltmeyer 2005). Kamat (2004) highlights a shift among community-based NGOs (sometimes referred to as community-based organisations or CBOs) in a number of Third-World contexts 'from broad-based political education and organization of the poor to providing social and economic inputs based on a technical assessment of capacities and needs of the community' (168). This resonates with critical perspectives on trends in community organising in the global North. For Piven and Cloward (1977: xi), for example, writing on poor people's movements in the US, '[o]rganizations endure, in short, by abandoning their oppositional politics'. They hold that the preoccupation with financial survival, and building and maintaining these organisations divert energy and resources away from organising and escalating popular protest movements, and indeed often blunts or curbs them. This trend can be seen at the local, national, and international levels, where many NGOs lose their capacity (assuming that they ever had one) to remain critical or to support popular education and mobilisation programmes. For Biel (2000: 298), NGOs as key actors in a liberal pluralist civil society are central to a 'new political economy of co-opted empowerment' which promotes fragmentation and inhibits 'the gathering-together of the forces of the poor'. Mathew (2005: 193) also notes the 'self-fragmenting' tendency of progressive movements in the US which comes with the institutionalisation of the separation of communities at each and every level possible,

resulting in a rise and proliferation of community-based organisations which each have their own interests (but not necessarily accountability back to the community that they claim to represent). Yet Rucht (1999: 220) notes that the 'shift from radical challenger groups to pragmatically oriented pressure organizations' can lead to a 're-radicalization at the fringes'. Thus, while changed structures and self-interest in organisational survival may often lead to changed, deradicalised ideologies, this process of institutionalisation can drive others to seek different, more contestational forms of politics and models for their movements. In this dynamic and in longer-term social movement struggles arguably lie the most compelling prospects for building intellectual spaces, counter-power, and action for systemic change that go beyond dominant NGO/'civil society' activities and politics.

Cross-References

▶ Conservation as Economic Imperialism

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Nordic Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples

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Definition

Nordic colonialism of the land inhabited by Arctic indigenous peoples, although having earlier precedents in the region, came into full force with the mercantilism of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, and the subsequently confirmed dissolution in 1814 of the Denmark–Norway personal union as a result of their losses in the Napoleonic Wars.

This essay will focus on two of the most prominent examples of Nordic colonialism of indigenous peoples in the Arctic region: the Inuit of Greenland and Sweden–Sámi relations. It will focus largely on the period from the seventeenth century onwards, and place significant emphasis on the recent history of the Sámi and Inuit, since de-colonisation in the region is a relatively late phenomena still in flux (or arguably, yet to begin).

From No Colonialism to Post-colonialism

Nordic colonialism of the land inhabited by Arctic indigenous peoples, although having earlier precedents in the region, came into full force with the mercantilism of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, and the subsequently confirmed dissolution in 1814 of the Denmark–Norway personal union as a result of their losses in the Napoleonic Wars. The colonial powers in the Nordic region from this point onwards were Sweden and Denmark, whose separate colonial policy making was 'often guided by regional competition over the Baltic trade and the control of the Sound' (Naum and Nordin 2013, p. 8). Dominating Arctic indigenous peoples and their land was a

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means to securing control over 'the mining industry and other assets such as fur, game and natural resources' (ibid.). Territories were charted, mapped out, and domesticated; the subordination of the land going 'hand in hand with [the] domestication of its dwellers' (Lindmark 2013, p. 133). There are approximately 400,000 Arctic indigenous people residing in the circumpolar region, divided between eight Arctic countries; Canada, United States, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark. There are over 40 different ethnic groups indigenous to the Arctic, including amongst others the Sámi [also spelled Saami] in circumpolar areas of Finland, Sweden, Norway, and north-west Russia; Nenets, Khanty, Evenk and Chukchi in Russia; Aleut, Yupik, and Inuit (Iñupiat) in Alaska; Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada; and Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland (Arctic Centre of Lapland 2010).

This essay will focus on two of the most prominent examples of Nordic colonialism of indigenous peoples in the Arctic region: the Inuit of Greenland and Sweden–Sámi relations. It will focus largely on the period from the seventeenth century onwards, and place significant emphasis on the recent history of the Sámi and Inuit, since de-colonisation in the region is a relatively late phenomena still in flux (or arguably, yet to begin). Both examples follow the distinctive characteristic of the colonial relationship in that neither of the colonised parties has chosen whom they have been dominated by for the past 500 years (Gad 2009, p. 149).

There are many specificities of the Nordic colonial context that denote its contemporary significance. As the scholar Lars Jensen has identified, what distinguishes 'each and every European imperial power from the others, is the particular culture around imperialism that grew out both of the imperial experiences with the colonised world, and imperialism's relationship to nationalism' (Jensen 2008, p. 59). In the case of Sweden and Denmark, therefore, what is particular is the lack of acknowledgement: a strong element of denial exists in Sweden and Denmark with regards to the ownership of colonial holdings. As the sociologists Stan Cohen and Paul Gilroy have noted, denial in social, historical,

political and psychological terms requires constant reiteration, and thus functions as a major site of repression. Even when the existence of colonies is acknowledged, the majority opinion seems to be that the Danish and Swedish empires were 'smaller, less violent, and made less money than the other empires did from their colonies' (60). For example, it is often noted in the context of the paternalistic relationship between Denmark and Greenland that the Danish administration never resorted to violent actions against the Greenlandic Inuit. It is worth noting that any 'gentleness' (Petersen 1995, p. 18) that may have existed on the side of the Danish and Swedish colonists was not necessarily the result of more liberal or humanistic values, but instead an indicator of their 'small-time agent status, [and failures on] the very tenets of colonialism' (Horning 2013, p. 298). Sweden, for example, never established a profitable Caribbean venture; accepting the near barren island of St Barthelémy, which it gave back to France in 1878 after less than 100 years' rule. This prolific reworking of the past is heavily intertwined with the Nordic countries' modern reputation, known throughout the world, for best demonstrating the practice of 'social democratic principles' (Gilroy 2006) and in the Swedish context also political neutrality and intake of political refugees. This reworking and creation of 'national blind-spot[s]' (Jensen 2008, p. 61) was fabricated in:

> the twentieth-century [as the] Danish perception of its national identity was transformed from a multi-cultural, multiethnic seafarers' nation involved in the worlds' politics into the idea of an agrarian-based and mono-cultural society. ... Twentieth-century Denmark was *deglobalized,* i.e. seemingly detached from the ebbs and flows of colonial and global history. The development in Sweden was rather similar, only here the colonial past and the notion of colonial history played an even smaller part than in Denmark. The Swedish historic narrative is colored by methodological nationalism, meaning that the state, nation and history are three aspects of a common whole – one can hardly be separated from the other. (Naum 2013, p. 4)

The imperialist undertakings of the Danish and Swedish administrations are often described as internal colonialism, within which political and economic inequalities are inbuilt into the

governing apparatus between regions of the nation state. It is significant, however, to bear in mind that such definitions tend to place more emphasis on the role of the colonisers and their vantage point, whereas the following definition from Sukarno of Indonesia explicates the perspective of those colonised: 'a situation in which a people was governed by other people politically, economically, intellectually and physically' (Petersen 1995, p. 119). As such, we must place at the forefront of this entry the following enquiry from Kobena Mercer: '[H]ow is the temporal quality of belated recognition to be understood from the perspective of those, such as the Sámi, who are, in fact, historical survivors of such "internal colonialism"?' (Mercer 2006, p. 2).

Greenlandic Inuit

Danish Constitution Day, 5 June 1953, marked the legal incorporation of Greenland as a county of equal standing into the Kingdom of Denmark, the decision to do so being voted upon by Danes in Denmark, not the Greenlandic people. Please note that the exceptions to this were East Greenland and Thule in northernmost West Greenland, neither of which was integrated until the early 1960s, as noted by Mette Rønsager (2008, p. 71). Alongside the award of two seats to Greenland within the Danish Parliament, this signalled the formal end of Greenland's colonial status and the official integration of its inhabitants as Danish citizens (Gad 2009, p. 136). This was then followed by: the Home Rule Act of 1979; favourable results in a nonbinding referendum on self-governance on 25 November 2008; and the subsequent assumption of, and negotiations towards, self-determination. With self-rule and the possibility of independence advocated by Greenland's two most prominent political parties Forward and Inuit Ataqatigiit, it is planned that the annual subsidies made to Greenland by Denmark will decrementally diminish. These subsidies have served to alleviate any serious 'politics of embarrassment' (Kristensen 2004) that contemporary Denmark may have experienced with regard to its previous colony, but they have also

resulted in a situation whereby it is a commonplace opinion in Denmark that the Greenlander is an 'ungrateful and somehow lacking citizen' (Jensen 2008, p. 59). Such revelations (along with statements such as the Danish prime minister's warning to the Faroe Islands in 2000: 'If you slam the door, I will slam the till' [61]) display the 'post imperial-colonial bind [as it continues] to be acted out today' (61). Greenland differed from Denmark's colonial holdings in the Caribbean, which were undertaken strictly for economic and strategic gains. Greenland was an 'inherited dependency', as the Danish vocabulary attests, to with the word *bilande* (in English: dependencies). This term was used to describe Greenland, while only trading and mission stations were labelled 'colonies' (Petersen 1995, p. 119).

The passing of time has shown the granting of independence from Denmark to Greenland to be a pragmatic decision by the Danish government, made under duress from the United Nations. It also followed the failed 1946 attempt by the US government – pre-Cold War – to buy Greenland from Denmark for a sum thought to have been in the region of $100 million (Miller 2001). The location of Greenland and the US desire for a military base there allowed Denmark to hold a disproportionate amount of influence within NATO and to have discounted membership. The decision not to sell Greenland was also based on Denmark's continued economic interests there, mining especially, and on the fact that by 1946, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands were the only two remaining vestiges of Denmark's colonial empire, Greenland surpassing by 30 times in terms of land mass (Hoydal 2006, p. 1) the territory of Denmark. Prior to 1953, representatives of the Danish government had sought to counter the articulation of Greenlandic and Faroese desire for self-governance by claiming that both nations felt Danish, which the UN rejected (Poddar et al. 2008, p. 74).

The period between 1953 and 1979 has been referred to as the 'Danisation' period of modernisation (Petersen 1995, p. 121), which included: medical campaigns; improvements in housing conditions; and the remodelling of the school system, separating it for the first time from the

(predominantly Lutheran) Church. As Robert Petersen has pointed out, the:

> modernization of Greenland was planned in Copenhagen . . . paid for by the Danish state and realized by imported Danish manpower. [Post-1953] Greenland was in fact more than ever governed politically, economically, intellectually, and physically by another people. (120–121)

Concurrent with this were the arguments that, in fact, the decolonisation process was still very much underway as membership of Greenland and the Faroe Islands within the Commonwealth of the Realm (in Danish, Rigsfællesskabet; in Greenlandic, Naalagaaffeqatigiit) continues to this day. Conversely, others assert that the process of Home Rule since 1953 has been legally void. This challenge has been made by law academics on the basis of 'nonfulfillment of the substantive and procedural prerequisites of exercizing self-determination, as well as partial misinformation provided by the Danish government to the UN' (Rytter 2008, p. 365).

Denmark's colonial ventures began in the early thirteenth century with Estonia (Jónsson 2006, p. 4), then later acquisition of Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and the Northern Isles in the personal union of Denmark-Norway in 1524, following the demise of the 1397 Kalmar Union. Norse settlement in the west of Greenland was initially that of Icelanders and Norwegians from 986 CE (Langgård, quoted in Symonds 2013, p. 313), with these 'independent Norse medieval communities in Greenland [agreeing] to pay taxes to the Norwegian king about AD 1260' (Petersen 1995, p. 119). It was these Norse settlers who gave the nation the name of Greenland (which the Inuit themselves refer to as Kalaallit Nunaat, meaning land of the Kalaallit Inuit), and who 'disparagingly referred to the Inuit as *skraellings*, or 'small weaklings'. Paleo-Eskimo cultures are known to have entered Greenland as early as 2500 BC. Early Dorset culture emerged around 800 BC, and Thule culture (the direct ancestors of the indigenous Greenlandic Inuit population today) began to reach Greenland by 1000 CE. Although the Norse settlements disappeared, when the Danish re-established contact in the 18th century they interpreted the community ownership of land by the Inuit to mean 'no ownership or "crown land"' (120). This contact came in two particular forms: the first being Lutheran and Moravian missionaries, beginning with Hans Egede in 1711. A significant factor in the mental colonisation of the Inuit, it was largely the Church which was responsible for the transformation of the Inuit (oral) language into its written form, as 'both the Danish mission and the Moravian Brethren wrote hymnbooks in Greenlandic' (Poddar et al. 2006, p. 71). The second form of contact was through trade, which the Danish government monopolised in 1726. The Royal Greenlandic Trade Company (known as KGH: Det Kongelinge Grønlandske Handelskompani) was founded in 1776, and 'kept Greenland closed off from the rest of the world [;] even Danish citizens were not allowed to enter Greenland without a permit' (70). As in other colonies around the world, ethnographic material and artefacts were systematically collected in Greenland, particularly in the late nineteenth century, making their way into major public and royal collections in Denmark and the US. Following the Home Rule Act in 1979, 'all matters relating to museums and protection of ancient monuments' (Thorleifsen 2009, p. 26) were transferred to the home-rule government, a process which continues with the current building of the National Gallery of Greenland.

Swedish-Sápmi Relations

In the opening paragraphs of Kobena Mercer's essay 'Art as a Dialogue in Social Space' (produced as part of the exhibition series Re-Thinking Nordic Colonialism), the author stresses the importance of examining 'intra-Nordic territorial struggles [suggesting an analysis of internal colonialism with direct reference to the Sámi] as a First Nations people dealing with a colonial legacy that has not yet been recognized as such' (Mercer 2006, p. 2). Curated by Kuratorisk Aktion for the Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art (NIFCA), the project combined exhibitions with workshops, conferences, hearings, and happenings in the locations of Reykjavik (Iceland), Nuuk (Greenland), Tórshavn

(Faroe Islands), Rovaniemi (Finnish Sápmi), Copenhagen (Denmark), Helsinki (Finland), Oslo (Norway), and Stockholm (Sweden) from 24 March–25 November 2006. As Naum and Nordin point to in their analysis of Swedish expansionism, the 'whitewashed and keenly reproduced picture of minimal or noninvolvement in colonial expansion is [also] a result of adopting a narrow definition of colonialism, which reduces it to the possession of colonies in the far corners of the world' (Naum 2013, p. 4).

Sápmi (the name assigned to Samiland) extends from Idre, Dalarna in northern Norway across to the Kola Penninsula in Russia. Spanning four countries, the area's landmass has changed over time with the implementation of national borders. Following the colonial period, Sápmi measures in total 157,487km^2, with an estimated population of 70,000 indigenous people. This population is divided into: 20,000 living in Sweden; 40,000 in Norway; 6,000 in Finland; and 2,000 in Russia. The definition of what constitutes being Sámi is currently experiencing a major political flux. Sámi are best known for their semi-nomadic livelihood of reindeer herding, with other trades including coastal fishing and fur trapping. An estimated 20,000 of the population speak one of the three main Sámi languages, which are further subdivided into nine dialects, all belonging to the Uralic language family. In 2000, UNESCO declared each of the Sámi languages critically endangered, whereby the youngest speakers are grandparents or older, and who speak the language partially and infrequently (Sami – an indigenous people in Sweden). Formerly referred to as Lapps, Lapland and Lapponia (a term the Sámi consider to be pejorative, instead assigning the official name of Sámi and Sápmi), such terms continue to be used in the region for touristic purposes.

The fifteenth and sixteenh centuries marked the beginning of Swedish colonial activity in Sami ancestral land, following the discovery of silver in Nasafjäll in 1634. Mining ensued in the region and eventually resulted in the Swedish state's determination to further foster mineral riches from the land, resulting in the 1673 Lapland Bill, which officially established colonial settlement in

Sápmi. The perception of the Swedish state's expansion within the country's historiography is conceptualised as a mild intervention in agricultural terms, or at its most severe, internal colonisation. As Lindmark notes, in direct relation to the term *internal colonisation*, 'such framing of this expansion also contains the implicit perception of Sápmi as a purely Swedish region. Choosing to define Sápmi as part of the Swedish realm, one ignores the possibility of placing Swedish policy in Sápmi in a colonial context. Thus, the development of the Swedish Lapland becomes something essentially different from the colonialism practised by European powers on other continents' (Lindmark 2013, p. 132).

As Lindmark suggests, the asymmetrical colonial power relations put into place by the dominant forces of Sweden have been negated, and their actions grossly underrated by the term 'expansion' given to activity at this time. The mines reaped relatively little capital for the Swedish state and so lasted a mere 25 years. However, during this time, Sámi were subjected to indentured labour and forced migration to Norwegian soil ensued. Slavery in Sweden was banned in the early fourteenth century, with the exclusion of any Sámi who had not fully converted to Christianity. The land, rich in other raw materials such as ore and timber, continued to be mapped, measured, and divided. Tax sanctions were placed upon each province, with some Sámi communities being forced to pay taxes to three separate states as a result of imposed borderlines.

Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and ninteenth centuries, the Swedish state conducted 'civilising' missions. Rendering Sámi identity and practices as 'primitive', these programmes were predominantly carried out through education involving young Sámi children being extracted from their families and communities by missionaries. The programme 'was essentially driven by the desire "for a reformed, recognizable other" and [the] creation of a class of interpreters between the colonial elites and the masses they governed, native "in blood and color" but European in "tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect"' (Bhabha, quoted in Lindmark 2013, p. 135). This educational drive forged a divide

within the Sámi communities, and provided the foundations for political dominance followed by capital gain. Concurrent with Sweden's colonial activity in the North, the state developed missions outside of Europe including the colony of New Sweden in North America (1638–55), slave trading in Africa (1649–58), and the slave trade port of Saint-Barthélèmy (1784–1878). Each of these colonial ventures was short-lived and ultimately failed (Ghose 2008, p. 419).

Perhaps informed by the prevalence of the Eugenics movement in Sweden in the ninteenth and twentieth centuries, the Sámi were defined by the state as a separate, primitive racial group, 'which resulted in paternalistic policies circumscribing the Sámi's access to education, housing, choice of profession (they were deemed capable mainly of reindeer herding) and land ownership' (419). The prevalence of racial discrimination continued to make itself apparent in the form of Swedish state papers and reports, the last case of which is an official paper dated 1945, cited as the end of such rhetoric by Lennart Lundmark in his influential text 'Swedish State Sámi Politics in the Era of Racism (ibid.). However, the Swedish state refused to acknowledge its treatment of the Sámi in a colonial context, providing the following reasons in a 1986 governmental report:

> (1) Sápmi is not located at a distance from the national states that established the borders cutting across Sámi lands; (2) the extent and influence of colonization (meaning establishment of non-Sámi settlements) and assimilation policies have been much more radical and successful than, for example the Danish influence on the Inuit of Greenland; and (3) the Nordic states have claimed the area as part of their Kingdoms since the 16th century and have never expressly carried out a colonial program in this region. (Fur 2013, p. 26)

The Swedish state did not officially recognise the Sámi as an indigenous people and national minority until 1977.

Two moments yielding significance for Sámi autonomy include the creation of the Sámi Council in 1956, with the aim of strengthening cross-border solidarity, and the establishment of the Sámi Parliament in 1993, which consists of a publicly held elected body and state authority, with the overall task of achieving a living Sámi

culture (Sami Information Centre n.d.). Whilst the parliament is not a body for self-governance and is ultimately controlled by the Swedish state, its presence marks progression for Sámi self-determination. Land and water rights, reindeer husbandry legislation, logging, military activity, tourism and debates about ever increasing climate change are amongst the challenges faced by Sámi in contemporary society.

Conclusion

There is a distinct absence of scholarship surrounding about Nordic colonialism, with a particular lack of literature available in English. Furthermore, despite the 'remarkable continuity in the [manner] in which Denmark has looked differently at its tropical and Arctic possessions' (Jensen 2008, p. 60), the scholar Lars Jensen notes the difficulty in finding writers willing to elaborate upon these parallels. Challenging the common representations of untainted histories is critical not only for multicultural European societies living within the Nordic region, but also for post-colonial discourse as an academic field. Comparisons must be drawn and engaged with in order to counteract the cultural amnesia regarding Scandinavian imperial projects, crucially in this moment of increased European anxiety surrounding notions of nationalism, purity, and the rise of the right. As the cultural theorist Paul Gilroy asserts in his essay *Colonial Crimes and Convivial Cultures,* the Nordic region is distinctive in that it is very much in the grip of what he calls *the new racism* (Gilroy 2006). Most importantly, as an historiographical project, it is essential to reinscribe indigenous peoples into a pluralised history of the region, and to acknowledge their 'formative influence' (both then and now) upon their colonisers (Jensen 2008, p. 59).

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North Africa

▶ Algeria: From Anti-colonial Struggle to Complicity with Imperialism

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

▶ Global War and the Battle for Afghanistan

North Korea

▶ Kim Il Sung (1912–1994): Partisan from the Edges of Empire
▶ Korea and Imperialism

Nuclear Entanglement

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

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Nuclear Fallout

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Nuclear Imperialism

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Synonyms

Anti-nuclear movement; Australia; Basing and forward force projection; Bikini Atoll; Bioaccumulation; Capitalist imperialism; Chronic and fatal illnesses; Dose-effect models; Dual-use technologies; Finance capitalism; Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster; Global securitization; Human self-destruction; Indigenous autonomy; Indigenous communities; Informal empire; Internal and external exposures; International Atomic Energy Agency; International Commission for Radiological Protection; Japan; Maralinga; Nuclear entanglement; Nuclear fallout; Nuclear latency; Nuclear path dependency; Nuclear testing; Nuclear war planning; Nuclear warfare; Nuclear waste; Postcolonial peripheries; Radiation health and environmental effects; Radiation monitoring; Resource control; Rights of nature; State clientelism; Transnational and corporate militarization; Transnational nuclear industry; Unilateralism; United Kingdom; United States of America

Definition

This entry follows the emergence and development of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons as part of a renewed form of imperialism during and after the Cold War. Through the cases of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Australia, in particular, the entry examines the links between nuclear energy, nuclear testing and security alliances. It then turns to testing by core nations in peripheral regions and the negative impacts on populations in the peripheries and on test workers and indigenous communities. It shows how radiological health regimes support the transnational nuclear industry to continue its activities. It suggests how anti-nuclear movements are necessarily a part of an anti-imperialist movement resisting a renewed form of imperialism.

Imperialism

The twenty-first century began with a profusion of ideas pertaining to empire and imperialism. Provoked by a unilateralist expansion by the US in its launch of the War on Terror in 2002–03, supported by claims of being an unrivalled military superpower and the global hegemon, many scholars have found cause to reconsider the formations of the post-war world order since 1945. Of the myriad forms of empire – political centralisation under an emperor; colonial acquisition in empire building; monopoly capitalist formations; direct military intervention and basing; ideological and material domination and subjugation of one group, nation state or ideology by another – yet another form was to emerge through the development of nuclear weapons and energy technology in the post-war world system.

Unlike the sectioning of the world into colonial assets amid the inter-imperialist rivalries for geopolitical accumulation of capital and power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a new form of imperialism was forged through a Cold War conflict between two distinct spheres. The ensuing proxy and covert wars and bitter ideological conflict that enforced this division only gradually dispersed as one sphere was interpenetrated through an increasingly diversified network of private capital, industrial firms, nation states, financial and political institutions, and media outlets. From 1991, the globalised acceleration of production, circulation, and investment ran in parallel with a spreading chain of US military ('lilypad') bases and installations. In the 'new

imperialism', these military platforms served to pave the way for transnational network operations to flourish, opening and penetrating new markets (Callinicos 2003; Forte 2010: 2–5; Harvey 2003; Johnson 2007).

Certainly, the US military and economic occupations of client states such as Japan, West Germany, Italy, and to an extent the UK, established the architecture of a US-designed Cold War alliance. Having secured the US dollar as the world currency reserve, the Bretton Woods international financial institutions instrumentalised a global capitalist order in which national economies, state leadership and ruling elites at 'the periphery' were penetrated and reorganised into trade and military zones conducive to primarily US and UK banks banks and transnational corporations at 'the centre'. Where this ideological, strategic, and structural reshaping of world order by the 'Western' empire under US leadership was a prerequisite to meet the challenge of the 'Eastern' communist bloc during the Cold War, the concerns for decolonisation and local relations between and within non-aligned states, and for poverty, famine, and disease in Third- and Fourth-World societies complicated the binary struggle between the superpowers and their spheres of influence.

The interstitial operation of US 'liberal' or 'capitalist imperialism' can be traced to at least the Spanish-American war of 1898. A recent reiteration has taken the form of Washington's National Security Council and the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) since the late 1990s. (Arrighi 1994; Harvey 2003: 26–30). In this dynamic penetration of states by a combination of capital accumulation and military threat/protection, as it has been underpinned by an apparently immutable law of globalisation and decorated with exhortations to 'the good', 'freedom', 'justice', 'humanity', 'democracy', perceptions of an 'informal US empire' have been sustained (Panitch and Gindin 2004: 16–19).

There are significant design flaws in the idea of an advanced capitalist 'free' world under US leadership, however. Aside from orchestrated attacks on sovereign states, progressive or otherwise, through covert means and proxies in resource-

rich regions of interest to the US since the 1950s, the long-term structural impact of profitability and over-accumulation produced crisis in the form of recessions, inflation, and monetary instability during the 1970s (peak oil) (Brenner 1998). The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Iran's Islamic revolution, China's reform, and Israel's armistice with Egypt in 1979 reverberated at the very centre of imperial capital. The US responded by funding radical Islamists abroad and, together with the UK, implemented a programwhich became known as 'neoliberalism', organised labour and national protectionism by introducing further privatisation and austerity measures both at home and in developing nations through the G7, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Freeman and Kagarlitsky 2004; Panitch and Gindin, 2004: 50).

With the unifying force of the Cold War divide and contest no longer available by 1991, the expanded transnational economic and geopolitical space put previously allied states and corporations into new alignments. NATO and the EU, backed by the neo-liberal Washington Consensus, sought to extend free-market capitalism into Eastern and Central Europe. Yet, as the US sought to control resource access and distribution, concentrate wealth and financial control in US-UK banks and corporations, and increase dependency on US military protection, with 737 US bases officially recognised in 63 countries as of 2005 and a likely total of roughly 1,000 bases, its ever increasing national debt indicated that the US was experiencing 'imperial overreach' (Johnson 2007: 143; Kolko 1994).

The process of increased economic interdependence may have reduced the likelihood of a twentieth-century-style world war, yet the 'post-war' era saw a proliferation of smaller wars, conflicts, and operations as well as famines and diseases. The legacy of direct, indirect, and pre-emptive US wars and operations from 1947 onward is instability and unquantified destruction in specific regions. While serving to warn other nations who might plan to challenge the US economically or militarily, such (para)military activities have also helped to secure greater control

over surplus extraction and the distribution of 'global resources' upon which potential rivals depend (Harvey 2003: 19). This has been dubbed 'making it safe to do business' in foreign territories.

The unlimited unilateralism of the US posture in the twenty-first century can be seen as the fruit of the past two centuries of liberal rhetoric concerning spreading good in the world, combined with long-nurtured Euro-American anxieties to contain an emergent power on the Eurasian landmass (Mackinder 1969: 89). Somewhat paradoxically, this recent form of imperialist architecture matured when US domestic instability and economic vulnerability have grown more acute. With Chinese and Japanese banks central financing asignificant proportion of US fiscal and trade deficits, the EU and NATO, China, Russia, India and Brazil, among others, and a suite of supranational corporations diversified their networks and establishing independent pacts and agreements (Arrighi 2005: 61–80). In the greater uncertainty of having neither communism nor jihadism as 'lightningrods' against which to unify multiple actors in one order, transnational and corporate militarisation is increasingly entangled within the global accumulation process.

Nuclear

In the formation of the new imperialist order, it is instructive to consider the influence of nuclear technology. Coveted as a means by which to gain access to an ascendant transnational club, it is no surprise that the permanent members of the UN Security Council rapidly developed nuclear weapons capabilities in the 1950s and 1960s. The geostrategic and economic effect on the international hierarchy indicated the importance of nuclear technology.

The US was the first in the world to prepare and conduct an atomic weapon test. Codenamed Trinity, and held in the Alamogordo, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, this was as much a symbol to mark the changing order as it was a scientific test. With the Allied West–Soviet East divide having opened up as early as 1943, informed by relational

dynamics since 1917, in June 1946 the US presented the Baruch plan to the United Nations (UNAEC) which launched the atomic age and its intrinsic dualism: 'between the quick and the dead', between 'world peace or world destruction', the 'new hope for salvation or slavery to fear'. The Soviet leaders rejected this plan as disingenuous, as the US had cast itself as the sole supplier of nuclear material and technology to the UNAEC after all other powerswere expected to reliquish all atomic-related technology and materials. On 1 July 1946 the Americans responded with Operation Crossroads, a series of atomic bomb tests on the Bikini atoll in the Marshall Islands. Eventually, the Soviet Union followed suit with its own successful atomic bomb test in 1949.

If the US could not be the sole possessor of atomic weapons, it would attempt to become the possessor of the most number of warheads while seeking to control and profit from extending a limited supply of nuclear technology to select states, thereby multiplying the threat to the socialist bloc. A nuclear trap had been set. To 'become nuclear', enormous investments were required to overcome technical engineering requirements. With the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) presiding over the nuclear resources, market devices and techno-political instruments, it was perceived that no nation could secure its independence without nuclear power (and protect against nuclear blackmail). Becoming nuclear meant a long-term commitment to development, structural change, and maintenance. The insecurity of the Cold War increased, as having nuclear weapons implied having to use them (as Truman would say), which meant planning for nuclear war.

As part of his 'New Look' strategy, President Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace program with a speech at the United Nations on 8 December 1953 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power. Many nations were already actively sourcing uranium and nuclear resources. As most national elites were aware, nuclear power plants were inherently dual-use and could be used for both military and energy production purposes. Much like the Baruch plan, Eisenhower's rhetoric separated commercial and military aspects so as to

depoliticise nuclear power as a constructive, banal, and peaceful enterprise. The launch of the first US commercial nuclear reactor in July 1955 led to contracts with 37 nations and expressions of interest from 14 others. The US AEC quickly marketed an atomic-powered merchant ship and atomic aeroplane as well (Tanaka and Kuznick 2011).

The US aimed to compete with its communist rivals to supply nuclear technologies to Third-World nations that were seeking to protect their hard-won sovereignty and build their economies. Diffusing the operation of nuclear imperialism through neutral technopolitical devices such as the UN International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), mandated to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power (1957), assisted in recapturing these nascent states by controlling the flow of monopolised uranium processing and nuclear technologies.

Denied access to American nuclear technology, imperialist rivals such as the UK Atomic Energy Authority (1945) launched independent atomic programmes to maintain status and leverage in the post-war system. As a case of the centre exploiting the periphery, the British turned to Commonwealth countries like Australia for the raw uranium necessary for enrichment and bomb preparation in the UK, which would then be used at test sites in Australian territory. British corporations such as Cozinc Rio Tinto (CRA) subsequently claimed the majority share of uranium mining rights, in collaboration with US, Canadian, and Australian corporations. Between 1952 and 1963, tests were held at Monte Bello Island (1952, ×1), Emu Field (1953, ×2), Maralinga (1956–57, ×7), as well as on the Kiritibati and Malden Islands of Kiribati. Dubbed a 'triumph for British scientists and industry', the radioactive fallout was passed off as being 'almost negligible'.

In 1954, when Prince Philip 'left his mark in the South Australian desert' (opening the Maralinga testing range in an area traditionally owned by the Pitjantjatjara, Kokatha, and Tjarutja people and which contained sites dating back to the giant Emu), the British military scientists had already been granted permission to 'shoot anything they liked', as the minister for external affairs, Richard Casey, put it in 1953. Instead of receiving the nuclear reactors, bombs, submarines, and satellites the Menzies Government had anticipated in return for fossicking, mining, infrastructure development, and technical assistance to the imperial alliance, Australians received 100,000km^2 of contaminated land. Ultimately, alongside the exposures to radioactive fallout suffered by indigenous inhabitants and Atomic Veterans from the tests, with the land permanently contaminated, the Maralinga and Pitjantjantjara peoples, have been removed from those particular lands were also dispossessed of their lifeways which had been passed down over millennia and which were inseparable from those lands.

In the mid-1950s, the United States Information Agency (USIA) distributed US AEC packages in countries like Australia which promoted nuclear power and isotopes as the magic elixir to reduce distances, improve crops, power cities, cure the sick, and provide industry jobs. It was further added that nuclear power would rejuvenate the 'lonely and silent outback' as a useful place that hummed with machinery. Philip Baxter (head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission) imagined nuclear power and nuclear weapons as the way toward self-sufficiency, national security ('one man to hold off a hundred') in a region of growing uncertainty, and to ascend to great power status (Reynolds 2000).

The poisonous nuclear rituals conducted in post-colonial peripheries bound national and supranational entities to the imperial centre within the postwar realignment. The client state was rewarded for consenting to the dominant modality with a greater sense of 'security' as it facilitated greater penetration by the hegemonic power. Nuclear protocols magnified the historical relations between the internally colonised, settler colonial society, and imperial power. Just as Marshallese inhabitants of Bikini were misled and dispossessed of their ancestral home to become captive experimental subjects of the US government, indigenous Australians and Australian and British soldier-workers were neglected both prior to and after the tests and they and their progeny

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suffered from fatal and chronic effects from exposures to blast fallout and radioactive waste.

Another client state and one of the first to sign up to the American nuclear model was Japan. Often described as a Faustian bargain, with the aid of US agencies during the Occupation period and after (1945–52), the case for the peaceful uses of nuclear power exploited received ideas about the causes of Imperial Japan's humiliating defeat – energy scarcity and superior American technology. Widely broadcast through national and local outlets including the Asahi, Chugoku, Mainichi, Nihon Keizai and Yomiuri newspapers (Takekawa 2012), for many, atomic energy was the 'third fire' which heralded the Atomic Age as part of a 'second industrial revolution'.

In order to transition Japan into a nuclear client, the US wartime narrative of 'the Japanese' had to be rapidly reversed from fanatical and undivided devotees of Imperial Japan to model students of American democracy. Imbricated with Harry S. Truman's 'Campaign for Truth' offensive against communism in 1950, a precedent of collaborating with high officials in bothImperial Japan and Nazi wartime regimes selected for their potential as intelligence assets (including former secret police, biological and nuclear weapons researchers, mafia leaders) was established putatively 'to contain' the influence of the USSR. Practised by the US Embassy, US Information Service (USIS) and CIA, among others, after 1947, if not earlier, individuals such as Shôriki Matsutarô became ideal collaborators in overcoming Japanese society's so-called 'nuclear allergy' and undermining the political left. Resuming his position as editor in chief of the *Yomiuri shinbun* after a stint at Sugamo prison as a suspected war criminal, Shôriki actively encouraged peaceful nuclear power as an apparently neutral opportunity for Japan to overcome its pariah status and renew itself as the techno-scientific-industrial powerhouse of Asia. His influence expanded when he founded the commercial station Nippon Television in 1953 (with Shibata Hidetoshi as director), which broadcast the first professional all-Japan baseball game. At the urging of a young Nakasone Yasuhirô recently returned from the US, a significant nuclear

research and development budget was passed in 1953 and General Electric reactor blueprints for local manufacturing were acquired in 1954.

At this critical juncture, in March 1954, when the path was laid for a nuclear-powered future, 23 Japanese fishermen on the *Daigo Fukuryūmaru,* among other fishing vessels and fish caught from the area, were exposed to the 15 megaton 'Bravo shot' hydrogen bomb test as part of Operation Castle on Bikini atoll. By the time the ship returned to port in Japan, one fisherman had died and the others had advanced symptoms of acute radiation sickness. Petitions organised by citizens of Tokyo and local governments saw the collection of 32 million signatures nationwide and 600 million worldwide by August 1954. Stout resistance from a nascent anti-nuclear movement led by the political left and trade unions converged in the first World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen bombs in Hiroshima in 1955.

The foundations for a 'plutonium economy' were already underway, however. Known as the '1955 system', in that year the Liberal Democratic Party (Jimintō) was founded, the *Yomiuri* co-sponsored the Atoms for Peace exhibition in November, the US-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement was signed in December, and the Atomic Energy Basic Law was passed to found the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) in January 1956. Shôriki was appointed minister of atomic energy, chair of the JAEC, and head of the Science and Technology Agency. With Kishi Nobusuke, another rehabilitated war criminal, leading the LDP to victory in 1957, a pro-nuclear, pro-American conservative policy platform became the bedrock for extending and projecting US imperial policies throughout 'free Asia', in the name of containing communism. Seeing nuclear weapons as a way to stem the 'human sea' military tactics of communist powers, Kishi stated that it was not unconstitutional to acquire tactical nuclear weapons in the defence of the nation and to (re)gain power in East Asia (Office of Intelligence Research 1957: 2). Along with the bad old days of the Japanese Empire, living memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were converted to support a 'victimhood nationalist' narrative to support the foundations of the new nation state.

While the world was alerted to the dangers of nuclear brinksmanship during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the massive losses of human life from a nuclear exchange had already been factored-in by US and Soviet leaders and their strategic advisors. The decisions of US leaders were informed by reports from nuclear and strategic analysts, who argued that nuclear wars, even small tactical ones, could be won (Kahn 1960; Kissinger 1957). The US had already threatened the People's Republic of China with nuclear weapons several times during the Korean War, and had accumulated a large arsenal of nuclear tipped TM-76 mace missiles stored on Okinawa for this purpose (Komine 2013; Mitchell 2012; Rabson 2013). In addition, the total number of nuclear weapons tests (ground/air, underground, underwater) and ventilations from nuclear power plants since 1945 had already dramatically raised background radiation levels in air, land, and oceans. When the US and Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 it was partially due to official and scientific recognition of the fact that these activities had permanently altered the environmental conditions of the planet.

Nuclear energy and other related technological (dual-use) capabilities mirrored the arms race between the US and USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the US 'nuclear umbrella', states like Japan calibrated their defence postures so as to balance non-nuclear weapons status with a capacity to produce weapons-grade fuel, aeronautical delivery systems, and fuel for satellite systems. Multilateral and regional agreements to control nuclear proliferation, such as nuclear-free zones or UN-led arms control initiatives, have often been ignored or obstructed primarilyby the US, which prefers bilateral security agreements. For nation states with limited options for independence in the new imperialist system, nuclear weapons capabilities have proved to be a useful, if cavalier, bargaining tool to at least avoid total subjugation and collapse. As of 2014, however, undisputed military superiority has not deterred the US from committing to an expensive upgrade of its mlitary systems including nuclear weapons to meet the 'threats' posed by China and Russia.

Health and Environmental Effects

Long before the discovery of uranium fission, it was known that uranium mining produced pulmonary diseases. The consistently of such cases led to the establishment of the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP). Dr Herman Müller's research on the mutagenic and generational effects of X-rays in 1928 (*Drosophila fly*) and physicians' reports on radium exposure, dust particles, and radon gases were made known in the early 1930s. From 1939, scientists employed on the Manhattan Project knew of the intergenerational health and reproductive risks posed by ingested uranium fission materials. Prior to the development of the atomic bomb, they researched the potential of fission products (strontium) for use in environmental weapons which could disperse the materials over enemy territory, and contaminate enemy food and water supplies (Conant et al. 1943; Hamilton 1943; Smyth 1945: 65, 71; Bernstein 1985: 14–17; Langley 2012).

Between the 1940s and 1960s, despite prior knowledge of the radiological warfare tests, the US AEC calculated the risk of fatality from cancer in proportion to the dose received. This was based on studies by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) on acute and short-lived external gamma exposure from a Hiroshima-type bomb within a 2 km blast radius. Averaged for the 30 year-old male, any exposure below 100 milliSv/year was considered negligible to human health. The ICRP adopted this model as the international standard for radiation exposure and safety standards. Disparities of gender, age, physiological variation, period of exposure, diet, or environmental specificity were occluded, as were non-cancer, non-genetic or non-fatal chronic illnesses (auto-immune disease, fertility impairment, or toxic combination with other carcinogens).

This ICRP standard used to dispel public fear during intensive nuclear testing in the 1950s and 1960s masked the fact that ionising radiation particles had been introduced into all levels of life for eternity (on average 100,000 years). Having recognised that even small amounts of radiation can induce some mutations, especially in the

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reproductive cells, which can accumulate in successive generations (e.g. US National Academy of Sciences 1956), conscientious scientists (such as Linus Pauling and Andrei Sakharov) and public intellectuals actively protested against nuclear testing. In 1963, Ernest Sternglass calculated that between 1951 and 1966, fallout from nuclear testing in the US alone had caused increased infant mortality (375,000 additional deaths) and 'countless fetal deaths'. He also found greater frequency of infant asphyxiation and respiratory distress in areas downwind of nuclear reactors. (Freeman 1982: 76–81; Sternglass 1969: 26–28).

In 1971, the ICRP set a universal occupational limit of 50 mSv/y, which was revised down to 20 mSv/y in 1990. Over the past 20 years, in vitro and in vivo studies confirm that uranium products, when ingested in micro-particles, can be genotoxic (damaging DNA), cytotoxic (damaging cells), and mutagenic (mutation inducing) to living beings (US ATSDR 2013).

The geostrategic and capital investment to obtain the most 'competitive' yellowcake by powerful states and corporations has intensified the exploitation of vulnerable resource-rich states and peoples. In their precarious conditions, these states and communities have grown moredependent on the revenue generated from supplying uranium, labour, and sites for nuclear testing. They frequently argue that 'overstringent' safety measures would bring mine closures, thus placing the burden on workers in need who 'choose' to forgo the risk of radiation exposures and tolerate looser monitoring and conditions. While states and corporations have inserted barriers between them and the metropolitan regulator, the ICRP has accommodated their priorities by adopting an ALARA clause (as low as reasonably acceptable). This serves to minimise financial loss through flexible radiation protection standards (whole body testing, ambient dosimetry, whole population averaging, no alpha-beta measurements, defective records, skewed data interpretation) (Hecht 2012: 207).

This process has also been evident in Japan, an advanced capitalist technocracy, in the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station ongoing since 11 March 2011. The responses from the state, corporations,

media outlets, and institutional regulators (WHO, UNSCEAR, IAEA) to waive international standards and to downplay the huge scale of radiation releases demonstrates their entanglement within a 'global nuclear village'. While denying and trivialising the danger, and exploiting uncertainties about ionising radiation (Grover 2013), the Japanese government and the utility have selectively shared information on the reactors, delimited evacuation zones, re-set radiation safety levels, monitored food, water, soil, and air, altered diagnostic and medical registry practices, and curtailed and sought to control media reporting. This has ensured plausible deniability, minimised understanding of risk, and blocked culpability for the inevitable health damages received by a portion of the population, in Japan and elsewhere which will manifest over several decades and generations.

The implications of the unlocated totality of the corium from Reactors 1, 2, and 3 and the evaporation of water from the spent fuel pool of Unit 4, are more serious than has been officially acknowledged. Given the stochastic rather than even dispersal of radioactive contaminants, those who are most exposed are workers at the damaged nuclear reactor sites and areas of waste management and 'disposal', sites, and those who reside in environmental distribution pathways with a greater danger posed to young people and women in particular, and children and infants with their faster metabolisms. Those who were not provided with the requisite information by the government for protection from radiation exposures after 11 March, or who have not evacuated from contaminated areas (for economic reasons or otherwise), are more likely to have consistently consumed food and water that is contaminated with radioactive materials. Those who cannot afford to procure foods from elsewhere, who are ill-informed of the need to do so, or who consume it where nations have agreed to accept food products from contaminated areas as 'economic aid', are also likely to be harmed. Further, those from lower socio-economic strata who cannot afford to take respite trips, take health supplements or specialist medical care, or from nations which are denied access to expensive pharmaceutical products, are more

exposed. In Japan, citizens who are not professional scientists or doctors in Tohoku and Kanto areas are adopting methods of self-monitoring food, water, and radiation distribution in inhabited environs, using dietary mineral supplements, and selectively screening food products.

Conclusion

Since 1945, for the first time in history, human beings have developed a clear capacity to destroy conditions conducive to the continuation of human life on the planet. Ascendant in the post-war world order, the leading proponents of nuclear imperialism have facilitated the invasion, occupation, division, and dispossession of the affected lands indigenous and local peoples own and belong to, and the water, food, and air they require to sustain healthy lives. In even a limited exchange of nuclear weapons, organised human existence would be terminated (Helfland 2013). This could also occur over a longer period of time, through ingestion of on-going releases of 'low-level' radiation into the environment from uranium mines and reprocessing facilities, uranium-related weapons use, nuclear reactors, and waste sites. As the effects of radiation on the unborn and very young are far more critical than on a mature adult, adults may pass on the heritable effects of cellular damage through reproduction even if the harm they receive is ostensibly minimal. Through the intensification of cellular damage from accumulated and magnified radiation exposures, humans could extinguish themselves over subsequent generations of declining fertility.

The long latency periods from the bioaccumulation of radiotoxic materials have made it easier to conceal the effects from the past two centuries of mining, atomic tests, power plants and dumping. As nuclear technology is a pillar of the new imperialism, the global nuclear industry has steadily captured and funnelled enormous human, technical, and financial resources away from local industry and the communities that it supports, such as manufacturing and food, energy and cultural production, toward the centres

of capital. With few incentives for rigorous monitoring and safety programmes at nuclear sites, particularly in poorer economies such as in Namibia or Congo but also in the 'internal colonies' of wealthier economies such as Japan, the US, India, Canada, or Australia, the exposure and replacement of workers (including but not limited to casual, menial, itinerant, non-white, indigenous) provides a bulwark to absorb the violence of capital accumulation and its inherent risks. While disseminated confusion regarding health risks serves to blur causation between exposure, illness and comorbidities, a biopolitical regime shields the experts, bureaucrats, and business people who are invested in prolonging the nuclear regime from liability for the multiple negative impacts of industrial toxicity, at least in the short term. Invocations of stability in the form of economic and political stability and security have served to consolidate the transnational nuclear industry as a pillar in the new imperialism.

As long as the entangled relations of nuclear imperialism continue to remain invisible, it is reasonable to assume that institutional dosimetry models of radiation safety will continue to reflect its interests. It is unlikely that analysts and advisors to political and corporate leaders will have accurately or judiciously calculated the low-scores in social and environmental justice due to the high costs in reproductive capacity and clean and reliable food sources in the biosphere from the nuclear industry and its associated activities.

Some of the most critical proponents of an anti-nuclear movement are those who live on the lands which are designated for nuclear related activities and who are exposed to nuclear and other industrial sites. As witnesses to the near-permanent destruction of their life-worlds, first-nation indigenous representatives have demanded recognition of their prior ownership of lands and restitution for any damage done. Seeking to de-centre the universality of capitalist values in which economic and security evaluation transforms the commons into resources, and men and women into commodified labour, while choosing to 'outsource' any social costs as external liabilities, these voices have maintained more direct forms of surplus distribution to sustain collective

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cultural and material autonomy and to re-include the non-negotiable 'rights of nature' in law (Gibson-Graham 2005: 5–16; Povinelli 1993). Given the alternative of permanent war, accelerated climate change, and near to mid-term extinction, a majority of humans could do worse than to take such demands seriously.

Cross-References

► Australia's Colonisation and Racial Policies
► Cold War Imperialism and Anti-imperialist Protests at the End of the Cold War
► Cold War, The
► Genocide and Imperialism
► Imperialism and Environment
► Indigenous Peoples and Imperialism
► Industrialisation and Imperialism
► Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism
► Neoliberalism and Imperialism
► Settler Imperialism and Indigenous Peoples in Australia
► Structural Violence and Imperialism
► Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice (1930–2019)
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Nuclear Latency

► Nuclear Imperialism

Nuclear Path Dependency

► Nuclear Imperialism

Nuclear Testing

► Nuclear Imperialism

Nuclear War Planning

► Nuclear Imperialism

Nuclear Warfare

► Nuclear Imperialism

Nuclear Waste

► Nuclear Imperialism

Nyerere, Julius Kamparage (1922–1999)

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Defnition

Julius Kamparage Nyerere committed his life to working assiduously against the oppression and marginalisation of his people. He saw colonialism as destroying cherished African and human values. He argued for the revival of those values, which he encapsulated in the term 'Ujamaa'.

Early Life and Education

Julius Kamparage Nyerere was born on 13 April 1922 and died on 14 October 1999. He was born in the village of Butiama on the eastern shores of Lake Victoria in northwestern Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika), the son of Burito Nyerere, a chief in a village of the Zanaki tribe. His mother was Mgaya Wanyang'ombe, the fifth of his father's 22 wives. He was one of 26 children. He died in a London hospital in England where he was being treated for leukaemia. A Tanzanian politician, he became the first president of Tanzania when the country achieved independence in 1961. He committed his life to working assiduously against the oppression and marginalisation of his people. He saw colonialism as destroying cherished African and human values. He argued for the revival of those values, which he encapsulated in the term 'Ujamaa'. It is worth noting that before his career as a politician he was a professional teacher, which is why he was popularly known as Mwalimu, which means teacher in the Kiswahili language.

It was not until the age of 12 that he started primary school. He had to walk a distance of about 26 miles to Musoma to attend. There he completed the 4-year programme in 3 years. In 1937 he started at Tabora Secondary School, a Roman Catholic Mission school. He was baptised as a

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Roman Catholic on 23 December 1943 with the name Julius. While at Secondary School his excellent behaviour and intelligence were recognised by the Catholic priests who taught him, and they were the ones who encouraged and helped him to train to be a teacher at Makerere University, Kampala from 1943–45. After his teacher training and certification, he taught Biology and English for 3 years at St Mary's Secondary School, Tabora. He was then granted a government scholarship with which he was able to study for a Master of Arts degree in History and Economics at the University of Edinburgh. He obtained this degree in 1952, and was the first Taganyikan to study at a British university.

Nyerere's Politics and Views

When he returned to Tanganyika after his studies, Nyerere first taught History, English, and Kiswahili at St Francis College, near Dar es Salaam. It was there that he founded the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). He faced hostility from the colonial authorities, which were afraid of his political activities, and he was forced to make a choice between teaching and political activities. TANU was founded in 1954 and Nyerere was able to reorganise the divided nationalist camps into this union. He was president of the organisation until 1977. In 1958, he entered the Legislative Council, and became chief minister in 1960. His party helped in the struggle for independence, and when Tanzania was granted self-rule in 1961 he was made premier, then president on independence in 1962. In 1964 he negotiated the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as Tanzania. He retired from the presidency in 1985, though he remained party chairman until 1990. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2012) noted that at the time Nyerere entered politics, the old League of Nations' mandate exercised by the British over Tanganyika had been converted into a United Nations trusteeship aiming at independence. And it was due to his uncompromisingly resolute stance in the quest for independence that Tanganyika was eventually to gain independence from the British.

Nyerere was not interested solely in the independence of Tanzania; he was a pan-Africanist to the core and advocated the total independence of Africa. Campbell (2010) has shown that Nyerere was one of the strong individuals who helped form the Pan-African movement for East and Central African (PAFMECA) in 1958, which would later become the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern African (PAFMECSA). This organisation would help in the struggle for African independence and become 'the nucleus of the liberation committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)' (178). When the OAU was formed in May 1963, its Liberation Committee opened its office in Dar es Salaam, testifying to Nyerere's and Tanzania's importance in the independence of Africa. Groups such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress of South Africa, FRELIMO, and many others received his support (Campbell 2010).

Nyerere was a strong voice for the rights and freedom of the African people. And so, for instance, he did not hesitate to oppose the brutal rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. When Amin dared to invade Tanzania in 1978, the Tanzanian army defeated him and restored Uganda's first president, Milton Obote. Nyerere's significant contributions also include having been the chief mediator in the Burundi conflict of 1996.

There were difficult times in his career. No African country at independence was economically self-sufficient. Colonialism had sucked the immense resources of the African soil and transferred them to the homeland of the colonialists. Like other African countries, Tanganyika was a poor country and suffered under the bondage of foreign debts after independence. Nyerere expressed his firm belief in the doctrine of Ujamaa (African socialism) and Tanzania's ability to be self-reliant in the Arusha Declaration (Nyerere 1967). He implemented policies to enhance communal agriculture and there was large-scale nationalisation. The Arusha Declaration stated that Tanzanian society aimed to provide equal rights and opportunities for all to live in peace with their neighbours free from suffering, injustice, and exploitation. All were to live a

satisfactory material life. The villages were to be organised as Ujamaa villages on a co-operative basis, with residents living and working according to the cherished value of family-hood. People all over Tanzania were to live as one family of brothers and sisters, using traditional African values rooted in socialism through sharing food, water, health services, and housing and other essential resources.

Nyerere's political views stemmed from his background and education. Campbell (2010, p. 177) writes that, 'He learned the values of sharing and cooperation that later inspired his philosophical understanding of *Ujamaa* from his local village community and the African environment'. He claims that Nyerere's studies in Scotland exposed him to the Fabian movement and socialists in the United Kingdom, and that it was during this period that his philosophical outlook on socialism and co-operation was further shaped. The Fabian movement also helped him to see a relationship between certain socialist values and African communalism.

In his book *Ujamaa: Essays in Socialism*, Nyerere (1968) argued that socialism is not foreign to traditional African society; rather it is capitalism that is the stranger. Individualism and selfish consumerism has never been part of traditional Africa. African societies lived in harmony. There was a spirit of community and brotherhood. There was a spirit of cordiality and hospitality. People readily came to the aid of those in need. He also made clear that the kind of socialism present in traditional Africa was not Marxist socialism, rooted in class struggle and violence. African society was one of 'family-hood', based on cordial family relationships. He believed that as traditional societies entered into the modern world; the idea of familyhood must be extended to embrace the whole society, the African continent, and the entire human race. Makumba (2007) rightly notes that Nyerere on this point was in consonance with Nkrumah and Kenneth Kaunda, who saw African brotherhood as larger than the tribe and embracing all humanity. It began with the family but did not end there. Love and solidarity must move from the local family to the universal family. This traditional African value

of Ujamaa helped to counter social ills such as individualism, greed, exploitation, embezzlement of public funds, and selfishness. A society that cherished Ujamaa would work towards self-reliance and freedom from freedom from foreign control and influence. Furthermore, the landmark Arusha Declaration (which equally contained TANU's policy on socialism and self-reliance) affirmed fundamental human rights such as: the right to dignity and respect; the right to freedom of expression, of movement, association, and religious belief; the right to a just wage. It also enunciated the right of the state to intervene in the economy and to act as a democratic socialist government, to co-operate with Africans engaged in liberation struggles, and to exercise effective control over the principal means of production and exchange. It is important to quote directly from the Declaration to reveal the crux of Nyerere's thinking. It states:

> Socialism is a way of life, and a socialist society cannot simply come into existence. A socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves practice, the principles of socialism. A committed member of TANU will be a socialist and his fellow socialist – that is, his fellow believers in this political and economic system – are all those in Africa or elsewhere in the world that fight for the rights of peasants and workers. The first duty of TANU members, and especially as a TANU leader, is to accept these socialist principles, and to live one's own life in accordance with them. In particular, a genuine TANU leader will not live off the sweat of another man, nor commit any feudalistic or capitalistic actions.

> The successful implementation of socialist objectives depends very much upon the leaders, because socialism is a belief in a particular system of living, and it is difficult for leaders to promote its growth if they do not themselves accept it. TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; the struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania (and the people of Africa as a whole) from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity. (Nyerere 1967)

Nyerere as an anti-imperialist fighter saw imperialism or colonialism as a form of capitalism, and hence rooted in the exploitation of humans by humans. In capitalism, a few individuals enrich themselves to the detriment of the masses. Many African leaders and nationalists who replaced the

colonisers simply continued the oppression of their people while enjoying abundant privileges. Omoregbe (2010, pp. 140–141), commenting on Nyerere, writes:

> Thus the perpetuation of capitalism in Africa by the colonizers and its acceptance by Africans was mainly because African leaders and nationalists were more concerned about replacing the European colonizers and enjoying the privileges that they were enjoying. All they wanted was the exit of the whites while they themselves would take their places. The people accepted capitalism because they trusted their nationalist leaders, respected them and wanted to co-operate with them.

At the heart of Nyerere's political views were the dignity and well-being of the human being. The people are at the heart of the society; everything must be done to ensure their wellbeing. The goals of socialism should foster an adult education system that makes the people free, inculcates the values of development and freedom, and enhances co-operation and solidarity among them. Nyerere's written works clearly express such values. They include, *Democracy and the Party System* (1963), *Socialism and Rural Development* (1967), *Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches* (1967), *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (1968), *Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and Speeches* (1968), *Freedom and Development* (1974), *Man and Development* (1974), and *Crusade for Development* (l979).

Critique and Conclusion

Nyerere's Tanzania was a one-party state. We cannot gloss over the fact that he handpicked his successor (thus violating the tenets of democracy), and left the country very poor and dependent on foreign aid. He ended up imprisoning political opponents, thus violating human rights. Some scholars may explain this away as necessary for unity in the country. In implementing his socialist vision, people were forcefully displaced and uprooted from their localities into collective farms, and many villages were burned down.

In his thought, he seems to belittle the presence of exploitation and oppression in traditional African societies. There is no gainsaying the fact that in traditional African societies there were some elements of corruption, or that some powerful people such as kings and village elders were oppressive. There were also conflicts and strife in traditional African societies, and inequalities arose as some people were considered outcast because they were children of slaves.

On the other hand, some would argue that nationalisation did not go far enough in Tanzania to allow it to succeed, with many foreign organisations maintaining their stranglehold on industry. Crucially, without workers' ownership of industry, nationalisation tended to facilitate the growth of bureaucratic state capitalism, rather than socialism. The villagisation programmes pursued by the Nyerere Government also ran into difficulties, since there was little articulation between socialist industrialisation (as opposed to the strategy of national industrialisation actually favoured) and rural collectivisation. Rather, villagisation tended to reinforce the colonial *ante,* whereby farmers continued to direct most of their efforts toward export crop production. Moreover, a class of land-owning bureaucrats took advantage of state patronage to further their individual interests at the expense of the poorer peasantry.

Ujamaa is a form of African socialism and so it is proper to evaluate it in the light of socialism. African socialism combines some values from African communal ways of life with some values from Marxist social and economic theories (Makumba 2007); Nkrumah's Consciencism, Kaunda's African Humanism, and Awolowo's Democratic Socialism are other forms. Appadurai (2004, p. 115) sees socialism as concerned with 'collective organisation of the community in the interests of the mass of the people through the common ownership and collective control of the means of production and exchange'. It arose as a protest against the exploitation, oppression, alienation, and other ills of capitalism. Socialists can be broadly divided into revolutionariy/scientific and evolutionary. On this, Appadurai (2004) states that the revolutionary group believes in bringing about socialism through violent change, and that other groups believe in gradual constitutional change.

Nyerere's Ujamaa is unlike the socialism just described, even though he called it Tanzanian socialism. In scientific socialism, socialism is just a stage on the route to a communist society. The socialist society is rooted in central economic planning, and revolutionary violent change. One of the fundamental requirements of a democratic society is that economic decisions and policies should be subjected to the democratic process either through parliament or referendum. Ujamaa did not originate from the grass roots or the people. It was Nyerere's conception of how society should be organised. Thus conceived, it was an imposition, and because of that ran into many of the problems already mentioned. Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003) have suggested that though there was nationalisation, nationalised institutions still partnered foreign firms, thus total control was not exercised by Tanzania. The implementation of Ujamaa even allowed for some private firms to own factories without state control. Indeed, Ujamaa is an aberration from socialism. Colllectivity or communalistic values do not mean a society is in consonance with socialistic values.

Pre-colonial African societies from which Nyerere drew inspiration were patriarchal, monarchical, lacked egalitarianism, and even what was owned in common was often fought over leading to the killing and destruction of peoples and properties. The many inter-tribal and ethnic wars in pre-colonial Africa negated the so-called humanistic values vaunted by Nyerere. State control did not guarantee effective restructuring of the economy and nationalisation often led to bureaucracy, inefficiency, and corruption (ibid.). A core aspect of Ujamaa was the implementation of villagisation aimed at the development of rural places. In the Ujamaa villages, people were meant to focus their lives on a common service centre (not living in separate homesteads) and the land was to be farmed by co-operative groups not individual farmers (ibid.). Many villagers were unwilling to come to the Ujamaa villages as they were afraid their lands would be nationalised. Because of this and other difficulties, the policy was abandoned in 1975 (ibid.).

Ujamaa should be evaluated within the post-independence era of Africa. It was overly optimistic and utopian. Zinhle (2010) says that as African countries were gaining independence they wanted to create a political and economic system rooted in African traditional values in opposition to capitalism, which they saw as foreign to African tradition. Ujamaa or Tanzanian socialism should never be equated with scientific socialism. Ujamaa, like some other forms of African socialism, is not materialist, atheistic, and deterministic as Marxian or scientific socialism is. While scientific socialism is mainly focused on the future of human history and society, Ujamaa looks back to draw lessons from African history. Though this is the case, both share a vision of a society free from exploitation of man by man, oppression, and alienation.

Despite the limitations and failings of Ujamaa, the social and political significance of Nyerere and his thoughts should not be underestimated. He struggled against imperialism. He advocated authentic African and human values. What Campbell (2010) writes about the significance of Nyerere is very helpful as this essay begins to draw to a close. He says of him that he: voluntarily stepped down from power in 1985; saw political power not as a route to personal gain but to the good of the people; inspired the struggle for justice, peace, and liberation; developed the doctrine of Ujamaa (African socialism) as an African contribution to human freedom; acted as a strong moral leader where many were corrupt and embezzled public funds; and practised religious tolerance towards people of other faiths. His sole interest was the restoration of the dignity of the human being. In all, he is considered as among the foremost champions of African liberation and one who struggled against imperialism.

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O

Occupation

▶ Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law
▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism

October Revolution

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Oil

▶ Darfur and the West: The Political Economy of "the World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis"
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Orientalism

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Definition

Orientalism is most usefully understood as the ways in which the West has represented the East to itself, and the ways in which it has behaved towards the East.

If it were not for the work of one man, and the impact of one book in particular, then it is entirely possible that Orientalism would still continue to be what it had previously been: the relatively

lesser-known or under-explored corner of the academic world devoting itself to a study of the Orient. Although Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) was not the first work to offer a critique of Orientalist assumptions and practices, its impact has far outstripped anything written before or since in relation to the field. Indeed, Orientalism's influence has been quite simply transformative in a whole range of academic disciplines, and much of what follows in this essay will therefore (entirely properly, I would argue, given its importance) concern itself with the arguments and implications of Said's book, as well as some of the criticisms levelled against it.

One of Said's crucial first steps (and already a step too far for those with an investment in traditional Orientalism) was to broaden the meaning of the term far beyond its ordinary academic reference. Said's repositioning begins with what he calls 'imaginative geography'. For Said, all cultures divide the world into those who are like us, and those who are not: Us and Them, or, borrowing from philosophy, Self and Other. Ideas are then created about Us and Them, stories are told, myths embroidered, values ascribed; in other words, representations are produced about the two groups. Unsurprisingly, our representations of Us are usually very positive, while those of Them are not infrequently the negative opposites. The difficult final step concerns what We feel licensed to do towards Them (avoidance, aggression, negotiation, incorporation, subjugation) on the basis of the knowledge derived from the representations.

For Said, Orientalism is most usefully understood as the ways in which the West has represented the East to itself, and the ways in which it has behaved towards the East. He sees that process beginning as far back as the ancient Greeks (Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides) which has earned him criticism from those who, quite erroneously, think that he is suggesting an unbroken continuity of attitude and interest spanning two millennia. On the contrary, however, although certain aspects are by and large consistent (the division into East and West; the tendency to regard the West as superior), Said is very clear that different ages and different circumstances produce

different Oriental 'Others' through their systems of representation. Medieval Christian Orientalism, for example, operates with a very different set of concerns and conceptions regarding the East from those which were prevalent in the period of classical Greece. The particular history Said intends to explore focuses on the ways in which Western countries, especially those with colonial ambitions, have, from the eighteenth century onwards, felt licensed to behave towards the Orient on the basis of the knowledge derived from Orientalist representations of that part of the world.

The intimate connection between 'knowledge' (representation) and power is something that Said takes from the work of Michel Foucault. For Foucault, 'savoir/pouvoir' is a relationship of mutual implication and production: knowledge leads to power; power enables the production of knowledge. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, what the West knew about the Orient centred on the range of disciplines (long-established, such as philology and history; or newly emergent, such as ethnography, and encompassing linguistics, theology, economics, geography, literature, archaeology, among others) that concern themselves in different ways with matters Oriental. For Said, this period marks a major shift: 'Taking the late 18th century as a very roughly defined starting point, Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient' (3). Not just Western knowledge, but the deployment of Western power marks Orientalism henceforth, as would-be disinterested knowledge is increasingly made to serve very 'interested' material ends.

Central to Said's argument is the way in which the types of knowledge (widely divergent, at least as far as their sources are concerned) act to inform and legitimate the political, economic, and military power which is unleashed on the Orient. In particular, the supposedly discrete academic disciplines produce astonishingly similar, and mutually reinforcing, 'knowledge' about the Orient as

deviant, dysfunctional, civilisationally stagnant, technologically backward, socially retrogressive, morally deficient, culturally impoverished; in all senses the Other to the West. The mutually reinforcing nature of Orientalist 'knowledge' is, on one level, to be expected, insofar as Said is making use of Foucault's concept of a discourse as a framework within which 'appropriate' knowledge is regulated, produced, and constrained, (though arguably he might have been better served by treating it as an ideological formation, which has different theoretical and political implications). As he says: 'My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period' (ibid.). From 'hard' science to imaginative literature, the Orient is constructed as inferior, in need of Western intervention, and whether the representations aim to be sympathetic or are unrepentantly derogatory, they are recuperated by Orientalism in the production of its sanctioned forms of knowledge. One result of the operations of Orientalism as a discourse is therefore that the representations it produces are much more concerned with internal consistency than with providing the truth about the Orient (though they nevertheless claim to do that also). That focus on internal consistency helps explain the strength of the discourse and the longevity of Orientalist ideas over several centuries, factual contradiction notwithstanding.

The inferiority of the Orient and Orientals is marked by the fact that, in the phrase from Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* which Said uses as one of the epigraphs for the book, 'They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented' (1978, p. xiii). The power, cultural and Other, of the West allows it to represent the Orient as it chooses, but in addition there is the legitimating 'must': since they are incapable of representing themselves, it falls to us to do it for them. This doubles the power of the West, as it speaks not only in its own voice, but also in that of the Other.

A great deal of critical attention has been devoted to the process of Orientalist representation, as well as its object, the Orient. Said, for example, argues that there is no such thing as a true representation, only varying degrees of misrepresentation, and also that there is no such thing as a real Orient to be represented. Without entering unnecessarily into the prolonged theoretical debates (for a representative poststructuralist critique, see Young, 1990), it is important to clarify Said's position. First, a representation cannot provide a perfect copy of the original, and therefore is inevitably to some degree a misrepresentation. Much more important for Said than any question of putative fidelity to the original, however, is what the representation actually does: its power to persuade, to legitimate, to dominate. Second, because the Orient is a Western construct, there is indeed no 'real' Orient for Orientalism to 'truthfully' represent. As Said comments, 'There were – and are – cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West' (1978, p. 5); and they are not the 'Orient'.

The truth of knowledge is another of those apparently uncontroversial topics which somehow become controversial when articulated by Said. As he says, 'the general liberal consensus that "true" knowledge is fundamentally non-political (and conversely that overt political knowledge is not "true" knowledge) obscures the highly if obscurely organised political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced' (10). Scholars in the humanities, and Orientalists above all, were, however, scandalised at the suggestion that their work was not disinterested, above politics as they claimed (and some, like Bernard Lewis, still claim). It is, nevertheless, one of the successes of *Orientalism* that it demonstrates so convincingly that not only is Orientalist knowledge not above politics, but it is precisely and deeply enmeshed in the very worst sort of politics, namely colonial domination and exploitation.

One of the principal objects of Orientalist knowledge has been, at least since the Middle Ages, Islam and the Muslim world more

generally. As Said comments, 'For much of its history, then, Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam ...' (1978, p. 74). More than this, wrote Said, 'I have not been able to discover any period in European or American history since the Middle Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about outside a framework created by passion, prejudice and political interests' (Said 1981, p. 24). He then adds: 'This may not seem a surprising discovery ...'; perhaps not, but its unsurprising assertion is precisely the kind of claim which makes Said a controversial figure.

Even as nineteenth-century European colonial expansion moved the territory of the Orient beyond the confines of the Muslim world, and the terms of representation changed, Islam continued to function negatively in the Orientalist imaginary: 'the "good" Orient was invariably a classical period somewhere in a long-gone India, whereas the "bad" Orient lingered in present-day Asia, parts of North Africa, and Islam everywhere' (1978, p. 99). However, although the geographical location might change, and although the categories of representation might alter, what remained the same was the hierarchical nature of the relationship: 'In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible *positional* superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand' (7).

In the central chapters of *Orientalism,* Said tracks the assumptions, forms, languages, and outcomes of 'this flexible *positional* superiority' through the great age of European, particularly British and French, colonial expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and on into the contemporary world where the US has taken over the role of pre-eminent Orientalist power. In so doing, he analyses the works of a range of representative figures: travellers such as Edward Lane, Richard Burton, Gerard de Nerval, and Chateaubriand; politicians like Balfour and Cromer; novelists including Flaubert and Kipling; scholars of many kinds, including Ernest Renan, Silvestre de Sacy, H.L.R. Gibb and Louis Massignon, as well as ones like Bernard Lewis,

whose Orientalism is so egregious that Said would have difficulty including him among the ranks of the scholarly. This period marks the definitive shift in Orientalism 'from an academic to an *instrumental* attitude' (246), its forms of knowledge ever more useful for, and used by, the institutions of Western power. The categorical flexibility is demonstrated by the shift around one term – 'Semite' – from the European Ernest Renan to modern US-led Orientalism. For Renan, the great philologist, practitioner of the discipline that Said so much admires, 'the Semitic languages are inorganic, arrested, totally ossified, incapable of self-regeneration; in other words, he proves that Semitic is not a live language, and for that matter, neither are Semites live creatures' (145). Here, Semitic covers both Jew and Arab, to the benefit of neither. Later, in the period of American dominance, there is a need to shift and differentiate the representation of Semites: around the time of the 1967 and 1973 wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours, Arabs take on all the negative characteristics ('their sharply hooked noses, the evil moustachioed leer on their faces' [286]) that might previously have been shared by, or indeed have belonged principally to, Jews. 'The transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target was made smoothly, since the figure was essentially the same' (ibid.).

Another significant shift in the period of US dominance is from the figure of the scholar to that of the 'expert', and for Said, this is an altogether negative transformation since 'the experts instruct policy on the basis of such marketable abstractions as political elites, modernisation and stability, most of which are simply the old Orientalist stereotypes dressed up in policy jargon, and most of which have been completely inadequate to describe what took place recently in Lebanon or earlier in Palestinian popular resistance to Israel' (1978, p. 321). Inadequate or not, Orientalist 'expertise' continues to have significant influence on US foreign policy, so much so that 'the accommodation between the intellectual class and the new imperialism might well be accounted one of the special triumphs of Orientalism' (322).

For Said, writing in 1978 in the phase of US Orientalism, the centuries-long persistence of

Orientalist modes of thought and representation was remarkable. Some 25 years later, in the context of the invasion of Iraq, the situation in terms of representing and understanding Muslims was visibly much worse. While this offers little comfort to those who might hope that critique as powerful as Said's could bring the ideology it is attacking to an end, it does nevertheless demonstrate the accuracy of his contention that the knowledge production of Orientalism is intimately linked to the material interests of Western (in this case US) supremacy, and sadly is unlikely to disappear any time soon.

The problem of Orientalist representations is exacerbated by the proliferation of modes for their transmission. In the 1970s, 'One aspect of the electronic, post-modern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media's resources have forced information into more and more standardised moulds' (26). In the twenty-first century, this is even more the case, with the appalling stereotypes circulated by the likes of Fox News and CNN, and the expansion of the domain of popular culture: 'These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camelriding, terroristic, hooknosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilisation' (108). Although commentators would no doubt also point to the way in which proliferating media forms and technologies such as the Internet, smart phones and social media may be able to play an empowering role, as, for example, in the uprisings of the Arab Spring, they are equally available for the circulation of Orientalist stereotypes.

Assessing Orientalism

Some years ago, in the introduction to a collection of critical work on Edward Said, I suggested that 'in general, Said has not been well served by his critics' (Williams 2000, p. xxv). Over a decade later, the situation is, if anything, rather worse, since the period following Said's death has witnessed the emergence of a sub-genre of attacks

(often scurrilous and personalised) claiming to give a more clear-sighted or balanced assessment of this over-rated individual. We will return to these later, but firstly it is important to note the surprisingly widespread inability of critics, even those well-disposed towards Said, to read him with any degree of accuracy. That is all the more surprising when we consider that Said's style is not obscure, nor as theoretically dense as that of many of his contemporaries. It is perhaps a little unfair to highlight any of the well-disposed, but A.L. Macfie may stand as an example. In his introduction to *Orientalism: A Reader,* he says: 'What divides Said from many of his critics is the fact that while Said, in *Orientalism,* tends to view his subject through the prism of modern and postmodern philosophy (in particular the philosophies of Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida and, surprisingly, the Marxist Gramsci), his critics remain, for the most part, firmly wedded to a traditional (realist) approach to the writing of history' (2000, p. 5). This is an unusual sentence. *Orientalism* has nothing whatsoever to do with Derridean deconstruction, particularly not in a formal or philosophical sense. Nietzsche appears a couple of times in the book but could hardly be said to offer an analytical framework for Said. On the other hand, the idea that Said's use of Gramsci is surprising is, well, surprising: although Said never declared himself a Marxist, his engagement with, and interest in, a range of Marxist thinkers (Gramsci, Adorno, Lukacs, C.L.R. James, Fanon, Raymond Williams, and others) forms a long-running thread through his work. Also, the idea that Said is seeing the world through a post-modern prism is not borne out by evidence, either here or elsewhere. Indeed, post-modernism for Said precisely typifies a great many of the problems of contemporary intellectual practice.

Orientalism has been criticised for many things, often in completely contradictory fashion. It has, for example, been accused of being wildly over-theoretical, or of being insufficiently theoretical; of being excessively indebted to Foucault, or of failing to make proper use of the range of insights a Foucauldian perspective offered. It has also been taken to task for not including an examination of the gendered dimensions of

Orientalism, as well as for not including any consideration of the resistance on the part of colonised people to Orientalist and colonialist incursions. The first of these, typified by a book like Meyda Yegenoglu's *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism* (1998), is an example of the slightly better or more accurate criticisms of *Orientalism* (gender was arguably never one of Said's strong points in any of his books), but it hardly constitutes a total omission in the way that is often asserted. The second typifies the way in which Said is criticised for not doing something which he had no intention of doing: *Orientalism* is a study of the forms of power (discursive, textual, and ideological, as well as economic, political, and military) deployed by the West in its relations with non-Western cultures; indigenous resistance is dealt with elsewhere, particularly in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993).

That trope of criticising *Orientalism* for failing to provide something that was never part of the book's project in the first place occurs in some surprising contexts. Daniel Martin Varisco's *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid* (2007) is by far the best of those posthumous reassessments of Said mentioned a little earlier. His is the most thoughtful and scholarly of any of these works. Nevertheless, despite spending several hundred pages carefully and critically dissecting *Orientalism*, he is still able to summarise the book, and Said's intentions, in ways which may be critical, but do not seem particularly careful. 'The notion of a single conceptual essence of Orient is the linchpin in Said's polemical reduction of all Western interpretation of the real or imagined geographical space to a single and latently homogeneous discourse' (290). 'Single conceptual essence ...', 'single and latently homogeneous discourse': arguably, the excessive reductiveness here is Varisco's, since despite Said's highlighting of Orientalism's efforts to create internal consistency out of disciplinary multiplicity, singularity and homogeneity are not the result. As Said says, 'My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence – in which I do not for a moment believe – but that it operates as representations

usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting' (1978, p. 273). Undeterred, Varisco continues: 'What is missing from *Orientalism* is any systematic sense of what that real Orient was and how individuals reacted to the imposing forces that sought to label it and theoretically control it' (2007, p. 291), yet Said had already addressed that point in his introduction to *Orientalism:* 'There were – and are – cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West. About that fact this study of Orientalism has very little to contribute, except to acknowledge it tacitly' (1978, p. 5). Finally, Varisco concludes that 'It is time to read beyond *Orientalism*', since 'The goal of serious scholarship should be to improve understanding of self and other, not to whine endlessly or wallow selfrighteously in continual opposition' (2007, p. 304). However, to suggest that Said, as someone subjected to repeated death threats, the firebombing of his university office, and routine vicious abuse from political opponents, 'whine[d] endlessly' in a position of victim-hood is as straightforwardly preposterous as to claim that his 'continual opposition' to the (continual) brutal treatment of his people by the Israeli state constitutes anything like selfrighteous wallowing.

A different kind of (unsuccessful) undermining of Said occurs in the work of the sociologist Bryan Turner. In *Orientalism, Post-Modernism and Globalism*, for example, Turner says 'the book [*Orientalism*] is now obviously outdated ...' (1994, p. 4) because, among other things, 'It is simply the case that globalisation makes it very difficult to carry on talking about Oriental and Occidental cultures as separate, autonomous or independent cultural regimes' (8). Apart from the fact that Said was at great pains to stress the inter-related and overlapping nature of cultures, the ability to represent the West and the East as indeed separate, if not fundamentally antagonistic, in classic Orientalist fashion, has obviously been one of the defining features of the history of

the world in the last decade, in the context of the 'War on Terror' and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a more recent piece, 'Orientalism, or the politics of the text', Turner criticises Said for errors of which he is arguably not guilty, and concludes that, 'The traditional game of the Orientalist text appears to have come to an end' (2002, p. 30). Part of the reason for this is that in a putatively post-modern world, 'intellectuals are unwilling or unable to defend grand narratives, since academic intellectuals no longer have the authority to pronounce on such matters' (29). If nothing else, however, Said's life and work provide a powerful example (though by no means the only one from the 'postmodern' world) of precisely why Turner is wrong. As the editors of a recent collection of essays on Said point out (Iskander and Rustom 2010), it was the analysis offered by *Orientalism* which was revelatory for them as undergraduates in the mid-1990s (i.e. after Turner had already declared the book was outdated), while at the same time it was Said's unwavering determination to defend grand narratives of enlightenment and liberation that inspired them and their contemporaries.

While it would indeed be wonderful if we lived in a world where the insights and analyses of *Orientalism* were no longer relevant, that is unfortunately not the case. The current spread of Islamophobia marks the return of Islam as the always available supreme ideological Other, while, in the context that was closest to Said's heart, there is the unedifying spectacle of one Semitic people (the Jews, particularly as the State of Israeli) Westernising themselves at the same time as they perversely construct another Semitic people, and their closest neighbours (the Palestinians) as Orientalised Others (cf. Laor 2009; Piterberg 2013; Williams 2013). The final and longest chapter in *Orientalism* is entitled 'Orientalism Now', and the final words in the book are: 'If the knowledge of Orientalism has any meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any time. Now perhaps more than before' (Said 1978, p. 328). Now more than before, indeed.

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O

Origins

▶ Jones, Claudia Vera Cumberbatch (1915–1964)

Orthodox Communism

▶ Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

Othering

▶ Cricket and Imperialism

Ottoman Colonialism

▶ Ottoman Empire and Imperialism

Ottoman Empire

▶ Ottoman Empire and Imperialism
▶ Racism and Imperialism
▶ Turkey and Imperialism (1923–2018)

Ottoman Empire and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Capital exports; Imperialism; Ottoman colonialism; Ottoman Empire; Peripheralization; World-systems theory

Introduction

This essay aims to outline the history of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire by focusing on the period until the beginning of the Great War in 1914. But such an effort unavoidably confronts a terminology problem. Imperialism is a term that is frequently used in different meanings and contexts. This observation holds true particularly for today's Turkey, where leftist, progressive, and radical movements make great use of the term, but imperialism also figures in the political vocabulary of right-wing politics. Conspiracy theories and chauvinist politicians do often speak of imperialism by reference to the intrigues of the Western powers allegedly ruling the world. On the other hand, there is no single definition of imperialism in contemporary academic literature either. The

term may refer to the monopoly stage of capitalism, power struggles in the interstate system, colonialist polices of modern empires, or the imperial mentality of ruling elites. Therefore, the main objective of this essay is to evaluate the history of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire by simultaneously addressing how that term has been conceptualized in historiography. Rather than providing an exhaustive review of the contemporary literature, I refer to the major trends in this respect starting with the classical theories of imperialism and their relevance for the Ottoman history. The second part of the essay deals with the question of imperialism in the context of the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire, pointing out the influence of the dependency/world-systems perspective in Ottoman historiography. The final section focuses on a more recent literature emphasizing the colonialist mindset and imperialist ambitions of the Ottoman statesmen rather than the economic and political dynamics underlying the Ottoman peripheralization process.

Finance Capital

During the early decades of the twentieth century, there was a strong tendency to conceptualize imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism and identify it with the hegemony of finance capital. The liberal journalist John A. Hobson (2016) was among the first to employ the concept in this sense, drawing attention to the rise of economic monopolies across the core capitalist countries in parallel with the increasing centralization and concentration of capital starting in the last third of the nineteenth century. Yet it was the Austro-Marxist economist Rudolf Hilferding (1981) who provided the most systematic analysis of the merge of the financial capital and industrial capital. He observed that joint-stock companies led to economic monopolies, the number of banks was reduced in the process, and a handful of them seized control of industrial firms in the key sectors of the economy. Drawing on Hilferding's concept of finance capital, Lenin (1999) developed the theory of imperialism further. For monopolies, emphasized by Lenin (1999, pp. 70–74), the

export of capital to less-developed areas was an effective way of increasing profit rates. They pushed the governments to pursue aggressive expansionist policies and colonial conquests so as to obtain monopoly profits under military protection. It was the imperialist struggle for the division and re-division of the world that triggered the Great War in 1914.

The early-twentieth-century critiques of imperialism focused mostly on the industrialized metropole countries, where intense developments in the technologies of production, transportation, and communication had emerged, leading to the formation of a single world-economy. Colonies and peripheral areas were discussed to a lesser degree. Nikolai Bukharin (1929, p. 96), for example, called attention to different aspects of the influence of international capital movements for the countries that export capital and those that import. However, he speaks little of the socioeconomic and political results of capital import for such countries as the Ottoman Empire. Both Bukharin (1929, p. 86) and Lenin (1999, pp. 30–31) categorized the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) as a semicolony, along with Persia and China. According to Lenin (1999, pp. 85–86), semicolonial states were transitional forms. Finance capital was capable of subjecting to itself even such states that enjoyed full political independence, although the imperialist powers were able to extract the greatest profits from the countries completely subjugated as colonies.

Of the so-called classical theories of imperialism, Rosa Luxemburg's *The Accumulation of Capital* devotes relatively more consideration to the Ottoman Empire. Luxemburg explains the underlying motive of imperialism by reference to the tendency of capital to expand toward noncapitalist areas. That is because, argues Luxemburg (2003, p. 401), "while realization of surplus value requires only the general spreading of commodity production, its capitalization demands the progressive supersession of simple commodity production by capitalist economy." For Luxemburg, too, the export of capital was one of the identifying features of imperialism: realized surplus value that cannot be capitalized in the industrialized countries was employed to

construct railways and infrastructures in different parts of the world (Luxemburg 2003, p. 407), serving the monopolization of capital and domination of Asia and Africa (p. 402). In the 1850s and 1860s, according to Luxemburg, British capital built the railway lines of parts of Asia Minor, later French capital took part in the business, and German capital appeared on the scene in the late 1880s (pp. 419–422). Luxemburg discusses the complex mechanisms underlying how railway building, and accompanying commodity exchange, led to the exploitation and rapid disintegration of peasant economy in Asia Minor and how, in this process, the Ottoman state was subordinated to European capital economically and politically (pp. 423–425).

Alexander Helpland, known as Parvus Efendi in Ottoman-Turkish historiography, provided one of the earliest analyses of the impact of imperialism specifically on the Ottoman Empire. Parvus was an intriguing figure who lived quite an adventurous life (Scharlau and Zeman 2007). He took part in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and then spent the greater part of his political life in Germany. He ended up living in the Ottoman capital Istanbul between 1910 and 1914, advising the Young Turks on economic policies on the eve of the Great War (Sencer 2005). Parvus was an influential theorist who, along with Trotsky, contributed to the formulation of the theory of permanent revolution and reflected on imperialism. He provided a solid critique of the domination of the Ottoman economy by European financial power, which began colonizing the country through debts and direct investments, turning the Ottoman state into its own instrument through the Public Debt Administration (PDA) (Karaömerlioglu 2004, pp. 152–153).

Parvus was an important link between the European critiques of imperialism and the Young Turks, whom he advised to build up a national economy and industry to free the Empire from the domination of European finance capital. It appears that his ideas had considerable influence over the Young Turk circles. In the course of the Great War, during which the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was in power, some of the Young Turk leaders interpreted the national economy

policy from an anti-liberal and corporatist perspective (Tekeli and İlkin 2003; Tunçay 2009, pp. 266–268). After the war ended and the Allied powers embarked on partitioning the Ottoman Empire, this interpretation became one of the major reference points for some of the radical groups and organizations involved in the Turkish national movement, which was justified as a struggle against European colonialism and imperialism in the peculiar historical context created by the October Revolution of 1917 (Tunçay 2009, pp. 268–315). Next to such radical and anti-imperialist movements originating from the Young Turks, the Turkish communist movement that came into existence in the armistice period subscribed to an anti-imperialist paradigm and labeled the national struggle as a struggle against imperialism (Tunçay 2009, pp. 315–345; Akbulut and Tunçay 2012).

This anti-imperialist framework maintained its political and intellectual importance in the next years. After the Republic was established, quite a few critiques of foreign capital in the Ottoman Empire and interwar Turkey were produced drawing on the basic notions introduced by the classical theories of imperialism (Şanda 1932, 1935; Kıvılcımlı 1989; Blaisdell 1979). Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s, all factions of the socialist left were subscribed to an anti-imperialist paradigm, claiming that the prevailing regime in Turkey was dominated by imperialist forces, particularly the United States (Atılgan 2008, Bora 2017, pp. 652–681). There were mentions of the penetration of imperialism into the Ottoman Empire and the semi-colonization of this polity in the publications of the opposition groups (Yıldırım 2008, p. 243; Çayan 2008, pp. 299–302). This context motivated many radical intellectuals and academics to reflect more systematically and analytically on the implications of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire and its relations with the European colonial powers (Çavdar 1970; Kurmuş 2007; Varlık 1976).

Peripheralization

By then, however, there had been significant changes in the conceptualization of imperialism

(Adas 1993; Brown 1972). As mentioned above, the earlier criticism of imperialism concentrated on the ascendancy of finance capital in the core industrialized countries and the results of that for the interstate system. After the Second World War, the focus of the prevailing analyses shifted toward the Third World countries in the context of the decolonization and national liberation movements that appeared in Asia and Africa. The optimism that marked the modernization and development approaches concerning the possibility of economic and political development for postcolonial countries rapidly faded. What replaced it was an argument that former colonies and developing countries were still subject to imperialist domination. This perspective found one of its strongest expressions in Andre Gunder Frank's remarkable discussion on the development of underdevelopment, which signified the imperialist links of dependence and exploitation between metropolis and satellite (Frank 1970). Different versions of dependency perspective highlighted systemic and global mechanisms underlying the formation of unequal relations between the central and peripheral states of the capitalist world-economy (Amin 2000, pp. 45–102).

In the 1960s and 1970s, dependency theory had a considerable following in Turkey. Many leftwing intellectuals drew on this perspective in their engagements with the questions of imperialism and underdevelopment in Ottoman-Turkish history (Karaömerlioğlu 2001, pp. 86–88). It was in this context that the scholars of Ottoman history developed interest in the world-systems theory (Karaömerlioğlu 2001, pp. 88–96; Ceylan 2003; Emrence 2011, pp. 15–27). The foundations of this interdisciplinary approach had been laid by the leading sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein by the mid-1970s, with the first volume of his *Modern World-System* published in 1974 for the first time (Wallerstein 2011). According to Wallerstein (1979, pp. 37–48), prior to the sixteenth century, redistributive world empires, world economies, and mini-systems coexisted. The baseline of his theory is that the modern world-economy, to be identified with the global predominance of market trade (Wallerstein 1979, p. 6), emerged in Europe during what Fernand Braudel calls the long sixteenth

century, which roughly covers the period 1450–1640. The modern capitalist world-economy born in Europe rested on the division among the core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral states. It expanded till the twentieth century by incorporating the world empires and mini-systems as peripheral or semi-peripheral areas where production processes were restructured in accordance with the necessities of capital accumulation (Wallerstein et al. 2004, p. 88).

The world-system perspective provided the Ottomanists with a solid conceptual framework to analyze the social and economic history of the Ottoman Empire. Consideration has been given to the implications of foreign trade and capital movements for the Ottoman integration into the capitalist world-economy, but the world-system perspective signified a broader research agenda. There has been considerable scholarship dealing with various forms of resistance to European economic penetration, such as labor unrests in those sectors of the economy dominated by European corporations (Quataert 1983). Having been the major outlets of connection between the Ottoman Empire and the world economy, the social, political, and economic history of the Ottoman port cities, like İzmir, Salonika, and Istanbul, has been extensively studied as well (Kasaba et al. 1986; Keyder et al. 1993; Eldem et al. 1999).

Peripheralization has been one of the most critical terms of the world-system perspective in Ottoman studies. In an important article on the subject, Huri Cihan İslamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder (İslamoglu-İnan and Keyder 2004, p. 42) identified the Ottoman peripheralization process as one of the transitions from a world empire dominated by the Asiatic mode of production to a peripheral status within the capitalist world-economy. In the late 1970s and 1980s, an influential group of historians and social scientists, including Wallerstein (1979) himself, set off on exploring research questions such as how and when the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire started. What were the social, economic, financial, and political implications of integration with the capitalist world-economy in Ottoman domains? Addressing such questions required the Ottomanists to revise their research agenda concerning imperialism. Studies based on the

classical understanding of imperialism had called attention to the nineteenth century, especially to the period that followed the signing of a free trade treaty with Britain in 1838. The world-system perspective, on the other hand, signified a broader period of the Ottoman history.

The course of the Ottoman peripheralization was determined by the combination of a set of internal and external factors that gradually disrupted the ancient system of production from the sixteenth century onward (İslamoglu-İnan and Keyder 2004). In addition to the factors such as population increase and price inflation, peripheralization was asserted by the commercialization of agricultural production through the selling of cash crops in European markets for profits. Thereby the Ottoman economy was gradually reduced to a supplier of agricultural produce and raw materials for the expanding European economies where the process of industrialization was underway. Incorporation into the capitalist world-economy occurred in the Ottoman Balkans in the course of the eighteenth century with the rise of commercial estates (çiftliks), and it occurred in Anatolia starting in the 1830s with a large increase in the volume of commercialized production by independent peasant farms (İslamoglu-İnan and Keyder 2004, p. 60). With the growing import of European industrial goods came the decline of the guilds and crafts that had been the centers of Ottoman traditional manufactures (İslamoglu-İnan and Keyder 2004, p. 61; Keyder 1987, pp. 25–48).

It was with the growth of trade for international markets that the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire gained momentum (Kasaba 1988, pp. 11–35). Although commercialization of agriculture and trade with Europe began at different times in different localities, the signing of the Balta Limanı Treaty with Britain in 1838 was a significant turning point (Pamuk 1994, pp. 17–22). This free trade treaty removed most of the restrictions on foreign trade; it expanded the privileges of foreign merchants to reside, navigate, and carry out commercial activities in Ottoman domains, also reducing the state's ability to control tariffs (Kasaba 1993, pp. 215–219). The 1838 treaty sealed the change in the character of capitulations. Since the early modern period, the Ottoman state had

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provided the merchants of certain European powers with economic and commercial privileges to carry out business in Ottoman territories. Capitulations were extended for many different reasons such as improving diplomatic relations with a European power, promoting commerce, and provisioning the Ottoman cities. In theory, if not always in practice, the Porte provided them unilaterally. Yet the 1838 treaty was a bilateral one laying the foundations of a free trade regime. The Porte had had a similar deal with the Russian Empire with the Adrianople Treaty of 1829 (Kasaba 1993, p. 220), and the terms of the Balta Limanı Treaty were extended to the other European powers in the next few years (Elmacı 2005, p. 22).

While the growth of external trade accelerated the Ottoman integration into the capitalist world-economy, the Ottoman peripheralization process also concerned capital exports to the Empire. The Ottoman state borrowed its first foreign loan in 1854 to finance the Crimean War against Russia. On the authorization of Sultan Abdülmecid, three million pounds sterling was received from Dent, Palmer, and Company of London (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 32). To cover the war expenses, five million pounds sterling of additional loan was borrowed, with Britain and France guaranteeing the interest payments. In the next years the Porte kept borrowing new loans and that continued until 1875, when the Ottoman state declared moratorium (Geyikdağı 2011, pp. 32–33). As a result, the Public Debt Administration was founded in 1881 (Birdal 2010; Blaisdell 1979; Sencer 2005). Even after the loan borrowed in 1855, the British and French were authorized to audit the Ottoman treasury (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 32). With the establishment of the PDA, over which the British and French representatives presided, this authority increased to a great degree. Much of the Ottoman economy came under the control of the PDA, whose duty was to make sure that the revenues of the state were well regulated and channeled into the repayment of the Ottoman debts.

The second form of capital export to the Ottoman Empire consisted of direct investments, which started coming to Ottoman domains in increasing amounts from the 1840s onward. The initial concessions were provided to the British and French individuals and companies. Of great importance for the integration of the Ottoman economy with the world market, ports and railways received the highest share of capital investments (Keyder 1987, p. 44; Quataert 1983, pp. 7–9). This was followed by direct investments in mining and agriculture and a corresponding increase in the number of banks and insurance companies (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 54). The PDA's establishment and its control over the economy encouraged direct investments by reducing the political and economic risks of investing in the Ottoman domains (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 55). The inflow of capital investments speeded up in the period of 1888–1896 and continued up until the Great War (Pamuk 1994, p. 72). Although European firms and holding companies channeled some of their investments into different sectors, such as urban utilities, mining, and industrial production, the largest proportion of European capital kept concentrating in railways until the war. In the middle and long run, foreign investors transferred more capital to their headquarters in Europe than what they had brought in the Ottoman Empire through the repayment of debts and profits (Pamuk 1994, pp. 72–77).

The national composition of foreign capital investments significantly changed during this whole process. The participation of British companies significantly fell from 56.2% in 1888 to 14% in 1914 (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 57). Part of the reason was the opening of the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1869 and the occupation of this country by the British in 1882. These developments reduced the strategic importance of the Ottoman Empire for the British political and economic interests in the Middle East and for the safety of the route to India (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 60). Also the economic depression of the 1870s resulted in a relative decline in Britain's economic and political supremacy. In this context, British investments began concentrating in the colonies (Kurmuş 2007, pp. 229–230; Pamuk 1994, pp. 87–89). Compared to the French and German governments, the British government's support for the investments of its subjects in Ottoman lands remained rather weak (Pamuk 1994, p. 89). As a

result, the British began selling their investments, while the French and German investors filled the gap. The rate of French capital in the foreign direct investments in Ottoman lands increased from 31.7% in 1888 to 45.3% in 1914. But the most substantial increase was registered by German capital with 1.1% in 1888 and 34% in 1914 (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 57).

The growth of German investments in the Ottoman Empire was not a coincidence. The German Empire was a latecomer to the imperialist competition for the division of the world. By the 1880s, when it began taking part in the struggle for natural resources and external markets, France and Britain had already dominated the richest parts of Africa and Asia. Furthermore, France had established itself as the most powerful economic and political partner of Russia, which had been significantly industrialized, Iran was divided between the Russian and British spheres of influence, and Japan had become one of the powers dominating China economically and politically (Geyikdağı 2011, pp. 64–65). But the Ottoman Empire was not yet fully dominated by any of the great powers. German investors were able to operate in Ottoman domains, benefit from the same trade advantages as their British and French rivals, and compete with them for concessions (Pamuk 1994, p. 89). Hence German merchants began to show in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, and, in parallel with the rapidly rising volume of trade, German direct investments substantially increased.

German investors greatly benefited from their government's proactive support in their hunt for concessions from the Ottoman state. This was true especially for railway concessions, which provided the capital exporting country with great political, economic, and financial advantages. "The country that obtained such a concession would gain influence in that area, get revenues from the sale of materials, equipment and vehicles used in railway construction and operations, and become a creditor right away" (Geyikdağı 2011, p. 77). Therefore, the European diplomatic missions, including those of Germany, actively took part in the competition for railway concessions by trying to influence the Ottoman

government's decisions in that respect (Ortaylı 2003, pp. 127–170). Railway concessions granted to Germans signified the German *pénétration pacifique* into the Ottoman Empire.

Both German and French investors had the support of their governments in their businesses in the Ottoman Empire. What particularly underlay the German superiority was the role of monopolies, that is, the participation of big German banks and industrial firms in investments throughout the Ottoman Empire (Pamuk 1994, p. 90). This trend displayed most characteristics that the early-twentieth-century critiques of imperialism attributed to monopolies. The German banks, such as the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank, took active roles in the formation of consortiums to finance ambitious and expensive projects, provided credits for investments, helped the failing companies by purchasing their capital shares, and even collected the debts of German investors from the Ottoman state when necessary (Ortaylı 2003, p. 73). In 1888, for example, the Ottoman government granted a concession for the Anatolian railways to a German consortium headed by the Deutsche Bank (Ortaylı 2003, 138). In 1902, the Deutsche Bank and the Anatolian Railway Company received another concession for the construction of the Bagdad Railways, which included many other economic privileges, such as the right to exploit the mines and forests in the vicinity of the railways (Geyikdağı 2011, pp. 95–98; Ortaylı 2003, pp. 145–156). That was a huge and politically prestigious project intended to connect Berlin and the Ottoman city of Bagdad in the Middle East (Özyüksel 2016). By the time the Great War broke out, some 1060 kilometers of railways had been constructed beyond the Ottoman city of Konya (Geyikdaği 2011, p. 98).

As İlber Ortaylı (2003) demonstrates in detail, Germany's economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire went hand in hand with the improvement of their military and political relations. Starting in the reign of Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman statesmen perceived Germany as a potential ally to counterbalance the other imperialist powers of the time, above all Britain and France, which annexed certain parts of the Ottoman Empire as their colonies in the course of the

nineteenth century. In the eyes of the German decision-makers, on the other hand, strong political relations would help German enterprises improve trade with, acquire concessions from, and exploit the natural resources of the Ottoman Empire. This alliance eventually culminated in the Ottomans' participation in the Great War on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary against the Allied Powers.

Ottoman Imperialism?

What has to be highlighted before concluding this paper is that the Ottoman Empire was not simply a passive recipient of capital movements or a battleground for the colonialist struggles of the European powers. From the late eighteenth century onward, the Ottoman elite attempted to implement a set of reforms to reinvigorate the Empire's position in the competitive interstate system dominated by the European colonial empires. With the Tanzimat Edict promulgated in 1839, modernization efforts intensified. In the second half of the century, the reform movement was intended to transform not only the bureaucratic, fiscal, and military institutions of the state but also the Empire's socioeconomic structure and state-society relations as a whole. The government expanded its powers in the process and became capable of exerting authority even in the remote localities thanks to the development of transportation and communication infrastructures. At the same time, the Ottoman imperial center acquired some degree of autonomy in European diplomacy by playing off the rival powers against one another.

Starting in the late 1990s, historians have emphasized the Ottoman Empire's political autonomy rather than its economic dependency. It is no longer viewed simply as a semi-periphery or a prey to European imperialism, but as another imperial polity whose rulers shared a similar colonialist mindset as their counterparts in Europe (Gölbaşı 2011; Türesay 2013). According to Selim Deringil (2003, pp. 311–312), one of the pioneers of this new paradigm, "sometime in the nineteenth century the Ottoman elite adopted

the mindset of their enemies, the arch-imperialists, and came to conceive of its periphery as a colonial setting." Similarly, Ussama Makdisi (2000, p. 7) asserts in his *Culture of Sectarianism* that the character of sectarian politics in Ottoman Lebanon of the mid-nineteenth century depended on "an intermingling of both precolonial (before the age of Ottoman Reform) and postcolonial (during and after the age of reform)." For Deringil (2003, p. 316) "…what is true for religious sectarianism at a local level is also true for the elite's perception that of itself and its peripheral populations, the same 'intermingling' is very much in evidence."

So far quite a number of historical researches have presented the Ottoman reform movement of the nineteenth century as a colonialist design by reference to different but related terms, such as Ottoman orientalism (Makdisi 2002), orientalism *alla turca* (Herzog and Motika 2000), or colonial Ottomanism (Kühn 2007). One of the common themes in this literature is the civilizing mission that the Ottomans assigned to themselves in their engagements with the peripheral and not-yet-Ottomanized communities mostly inhabiting the Empire's Arab provinces. The Ottoman elite emphasized the authenticity of Islam as the marker of Ottoman modernity. Especially under the reign of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), the idea of Ottoman civilization was identified increasingly more with an official version of Sunni Islam based on Hanafi jurisprudence (Deringil 1998). Not only did this representation single out the distinction of Ottoman modernity, but it also created the category of pre-modern designating the Empire's peripheral populations not-yet-assimilated into the official understanding of Islam. It was this latter category that was subject to the civilizing mission of the Ottoman statesmen.

To be sure, this rich literature brings important insights into the cultural and ideological background of the Ottoman reform movement. Nonetheless, as Özgür Türesay (2013, pp. 133–136) mentions in a critical assessment of historiography on the subject, Ottoman colonialism was not based on a genuine distinction between metropole and colony. Indeed, it would be

misleading to view the peripheral provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the same category as the colonies of the European imperialist powers. Colonial states in Asia and Africa were organized as instruments of exercising power and authority in accordance with the economic and political priorities of the European metropoles. They were built on the hierarchically organized categories of race, and that was in sharp contradiction with the universalism of Enlightenment and bureaucratic rationality for which the European civilization supposedly stood (Chatterjee 2002, pp. 35–67). None of this can be observed in the Ottoman Empire's relations with its periphery, which is why Türesay speaks of Ottoman "colonialism without colonies."

Deringil problematizes this difference by employing the term Ottoman *borrowed* colonialism. He relates this term to the concept of "borrowed imperialism" that the historian Dietrich Geyer (1987) employs with respect to the Russian Empire of the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Geyer (1987, p. 186), after a certain level of industrialization and state-led economic expansion, the basic characteristics of modern imperialism came to shape the Russian Empire's relations with its periphery. For Geyer (1987, p. 187), the mentality of Russian statesmen was characterized by the conviction that "...only by becoming a metropolis herself could Russia overcome her historic 'backwardness and her subservient role as a colonial source of exploitable resources for the more developed powers...." Deringil argues that the Ottoman borrowed colonialism, too, was "a survival tactic. It was "a modern way of being," which should have saved the Empire from becoming a colony itself (Deringil 2003, p. 313).

There is no doubt that the Ottomans pursued a defensive strategy against European colonialism, which involved showing imperial attitudes in both peripheral setting and interstate context (Türesay 2013, p. 134). However, a recent scholarship on the subject has established that Ottoman colonialism was not all about survival strategies. Mostafa Minawi's (2016a, b) recent research on the late Ottoman diplomacy demonstrates that the Ottoman government also followed competitive,

dynamic, and expansionist strategies of power in the frontiers of the Empire. Focusing on the period between the 1880s and the initial years of the twentieth century, Minawi shows how the Ottomans participated in the scramble for Africa by seeking to carve a sphere of influence along the Empire's African and Arabian borderlands and competing with the British, French, and Italian imperialist forces toward that goal. Minawi (2016a, p. 3) suggests conceptualizing imperialism as a process, not a category, and asks "how the Ottoman Empire adapted to the new demands of imperialism in the late nineteenth century." This perspective renders possible for him to present Ottoman imperialism in a different way from defensive imperialism or borrowed colonialism – as a new form of imperialism that followed the terms of European colonialism (Minawi 2016b, p. 570).

Minawi makes it clear that the Ottoman government tried to adapt to the challenges of the imperialist struggles taking place along its frontiers. The question of whether the Ottoman state was among the imperialist forces of the late nineteenth century cannot be fully answered within the limits of this essay. What is clear is that the colonialist and imperialist ambitions of the Ottoman ruling elite brought about concrete results. Cemil Aydın, for example, calls attention to an ideological transformation. He discusses how the "civilizationist" stance adopted by the Ottoman elite in the course of the nineteenth century paved the way for the idea of creating the transnational solidarity of all Muslims from the 1870s onward. This transition, argues Aydın, came about in the face of the Western powers' imperialist aggressions and the orientalist attitudes excluding the Ottomans from the Western discourse of civilization. It culminated in the Young Turks' Pan-Islamic imperial policy, supported even by the secular-minded members of the ruling elite as a realistic imperial strategy (Aydın 2007, p. 82). According to Aydın, Pan-Islamism was formulated from an "anti-imperialist" viewpoint aiming at the unity of Muslims and their freedom from the domination of colonial powers.

In November 1914, the Ottoman Empire declared Jihad against the enemies of Islam.

Thereby Pan-Islamism functioned as an important component of the Ottoman imperial ideology in the course of the Great War. In the eyes of the Young Turks, the war provided a unique context in which they could put their imperialist ambitions into practice. They embarked on military adventures based on Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist dreams, but their imperialist agenda was not limited to territorial expansion. The Young Turks desired to consolidate the Ottoman state into a modern imperial power by leading a large spectrum of social, economic, and demographic transformations. This process brought disastrous outcomes and was interrupted only with the Ottoman Empire's ultimate defeat in the Great War.

Cross-References

▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ Middle East: Socialism and Anti-imperialism
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semi-periphery and Periphery
▶ Turkey and Imperialism (1923–2018)
▶ Yemen, Imperialism in

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Pacific Islands

▶ United States Expansionism and the Pacific

Pacification

▶ Peru, Underdevelopment, and Anti-imperialism

Padmore, George (1903–1959)

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Synonyms

Biography; George Padmore; Marxism; Pan-Africanism

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of pan-Africanist, journalist, and author George Padmore (1903–1959).

George Padmore was a radical anti-imperial activist most well-known for his leadership of the Communist International's Negro Bureau in the early 1930s, his key role in organizing the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, and as a political mentor to Kwame Nkrumah, first prime minister of Ghana. Born in the British colony of Trinidad in 1903 under the name Malcolm Nurse, the boy who would become known as George Padmore is usually celebrated as an important leader of the Pan-African movement. His thinking and his activism, however, actually encompassed a much wider and more complex range of traditions that was most sharply focused on a Marxian analysis of capitalism and imperialism. He published ten books and thousands of newspaper articles that focused on the policies and practices of colonialism, as well as the governing ideological tenets of imperialism, especially in relation to Africa.

Tracing George Padmore's life of political activism provides a snapshot of many of the most important trends of thinking about British imperialism and anti-imperialism in the first half of the 20th century. Padmore came of age in the British West Indies at a time of significant political activity characterised by post-war disturbances and the rapid spread of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association. He entered the international communist movement at a moment when it played a particularly prominent role in black politics. Moving to metropolitan London in the 1930s, he was involved in contentious debates among the British left about its position on imperialism and fascism, as well as the

catalytic events of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. His continued criticism of British imperial policy in the 1940s, particularly its new policy of colonial development, reflected the early contingencies of the Cold War and the response of British imperial policymakers to decolonisation and nationalist movements. He became a close adviser to Kwame Nkrumah in the late 1940s and worked with him to negotiate the independence of the first British African territory, Ghana, in 1957. His presence in Ghana from 1957 until his death on 23 September 1959 witnessed the earliest signs of the problems and contradictions new African leaders began to evidence once they attained political power.

George Padmore viewed imperialism as a system of exploitation arising from monopoly capitalism and perpetuated through racism. Padmore also argued, along with others at the time, that all people of colour were subjugated under a system of power relations rooted in imperialism. His 'anti-imperialism' articulated liberation for all peoples of colour, whether living under formal colonial rule or not. Padmore's ideas about imperialism and his anti-imperial activism emerge from three important strands of anti-imperial thinking in the first decades of the 20th century: a West Indian intellectual tradition; radical left anti-imperialism; and the rise of fascism in Europe.

Padmore's anti-imperialism was forged in the early 20th-century Caribbean and, in particular, the West Indian middle class. This world produced an attitude of responsibility that embedded a deep respect for those who committed themselves to causes for which they received a high standing within the community but little financial reward. A tradition of voicing opposition to injustice and exploitation emerged among the West Indian middle class that often used the newspaper as a means of articulating opinion and engaging in dialogue among a highly migratory population. His boyhood friend and future political comrade C.L.R. James has positioned Padmore within a group of 'remarkable West Indian men' including Toussaint L'Ouverture and Henry Sylvester Williams, as well as contemporaries like Aimé Césaire, Marcus Garvey, and Frantz Fanon. Their tradition also often recalled the memories

of slavery and fed into a powerful rhetoric of moral and intellectual opposition to empire. Part of this West Indian intellectual tradition also, however, embodied complex contradictions with regard to elite and popular politics. Padmore came of age among a generation who still struggled with these ambiguities but also aligned more concretely with working-class movements. This generation also began to challenge the idea of imperialism itself rather than simply the morality of its administration (Cudjoe 2003: 16–33; Smith 2002: 33).

At the end of 1924 Padmore moved to the US to train for a profession. This brought him to two prominent African-American universities: Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee and Howard University in Washington, DC. The dynamic space of these increasingly radical 'hybrid diasporic settings' drew him into student politics and, over time, into the Communist Party (Gaines 2006; King 1970). His entry into US communism and to the international communist movement in general occurred in a uniquely fertile period of communist activity regarding the 'Negro Question'. The American Negro Labour Congress (ANLC), which Padmore had joined by 1928, emerged out of the work of Cyril Briggs and the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB), and the political milieu of places like New York and Chicago that were heightened by the ferment of the Harlem Renaissance and the effects of Garveyism (Makalani 2011; Wilson 1976). His move to Moscow at the end of 1929 coincided with the growth of Third Period Comintern policy which engaged more directly than ever before with, in particular, the situation of black peoples (Callahan 1995; McClellan 2007: 61–84). Padmore became one of the foremost black activists for the Comintern through his editorship of the *Negro Worker* and the publication of his book *The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers* (1931). The port of Hamburg, from which he worked from 1932 until his office was raided by Nazi officials two weeks after Hitler came to power in February 1933, had become a convergence point for colonial seamen from all over the world that was utilised as a central depot for dispersing what was deemed in the colonies as 'subversive literature'.

Padmore's rapid rise within the Comintern and equally swift departure by the end of 1933 has come to represent, for historians, the attraction and subsequent disillusionment with European communism by many black radicals. For the Communist International in this period, and its work with Africa and the 'Negro Question', see Adi (2008). To establish his position outside the bounds of the Comintern, Padmore published *How Britain Rules Africa* (1936) – a book that provided a forensic outline of conditions in British African territory and in South Africa, and responded to communist debates about colonial revolution by arguing that the unique conditions of racial prejudice in Africa required different strategies for instigating a socialist revolution that would end imperial rule. Importantly, Padmore remained a committed Marxist after he moved to London in 1935. But his networks widened significantly as he worked from the metropolis to explain imperialism to British workers and to advocate for colonial nationalists. From London he befriended Indian nationalists, engaged with all the various strands of the British left, and built alliances with campaigners of all political stripes who were interested in questioning the British Empire. For example, Pennybacker's study of Padmore and other activists who addressed racial politics draws attention to the wide geography of campaigns which converged in London and usually involved organisations led by socialists and communists. Padmore's politics, Pennybacker highlights, were part of a larger discourse that 'condemn[ed] imperialism and fascism in the same breath' (Louis 2006: 974–989; Pennybacker 2009: 13).

Padmore's life was spent attacking the purported liberalism of empire as a sham. All of his writing utilised government reports and statistics about conditions in the colonies as a means of countering the dominant narrative of imperial historians, which told the history of Empire 'as the unfolding story of liberty'. His work was a response to 'immensely influential' contemporaries like Lord Lugard and Margery Perham, who championed 'indirect rule' and gradual reform in order to stall the advance of radical colonial nationalists. In the 1930s, Padmore

countered their narrative by arguing – perhaps more vehemently than anyone else at the time – that European rule in its colonies was itself fascist. He also argued that the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and the rumoured appeasement of Hitler via the return of former German colonies in Africa, proved that imperialism was the result of the present state of capitalism by which industrialised countries strove to monopolise markets, raw materials, and spheres of investment. His work in this regard displays the greatest influence on Padmore's ideas about imperialism, which came from the British anti-imperial theoretician J.A. Hobson and, most influentially, from V.I. Lenin. Imperialism, in this analysis, provided an outlet for markets and a source of raw materials. Thus, not only were fascist countries aiming to acquire colonies, Padmore argued, but British and French colonial governments were behaving in their colonies in a manner similar to Germany and Italy in their own territory.

Padmore's continued Marxism and persistent encouragement of colonial unity came together in the late 1930s in his support for Caribbean workers who were waging a revolt across the British West Indies. These revolts became a major subject of Padmore's journalism and a key action point for the organisation he had founded with C.L.R. James and other black radicals in London: the International African Service Bureau (IASB). After the Second World War, Padmore transformed the IASB into a much wider alliance in Britain called the Pan-African Federation (PAF). His lead role in organising the Manchester Pan-African Congress was crucial to establishing a much stronger orientation to colonial workers than previous Pan-African Congresses. The Congress also marked an important turn for Pan-Africanism in its approval of, for the first time, the use of force and mass action (Adi and Sherwood 1995).

Padmore's work at the end of the Second World War embodied the sense of both hope and scepticism that many anti-colonial activists articulated in the 'new era' of the United Nations. He believed that new strategies needed to be employed in the post-war period that exploited the changes in the international order and Britain's increasing ambivalence towards colonial policy; but he also

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increasingly argued that colonial independence would only be won through careful negotiation and strategic resistance on the part of colonial peoples. Padmore's *How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire: A Challenge to the Imperialist Powers* examined how the nationalities policy of the USSR contributed to the national liberation of countries formerly contained within the tsarist empire and how socialism was effective in resolving the colonial problem in a progressive manner. When, in one of the first manifestations of Cold War tension, British imperialism became a prime target of the Soviet Union after 1946, Padmore's journalism and his books were at the centre of British official debates about the suppression of anti-colonial movements and their potential communist ties. He continued to counter the narrative of a liberal empire by reporting regularly on the presence of a colour bar in Britain and attacking what he argued was the underlying exploitative intentions of Britain's new colonial policy of 'development' (Lewis 2011). Padmore's strength as a journalist was his ability to link popular and unpopular events across the Empire together. In particular, he relentlessly covered developments in South Africa and the solidification of the apartheid state, arguing that every progressive step in an African or Caribbean colony towards independence challenged the racial supremacy and segregation of apartheid.

Padmore's most frequently cited example of this was Kwame Nkrumah's march towards self-government in the Gold Coast. Although Padmore maintained interest in and contacts with anti-colonial nationalists in South Asia and the Caribbean, he became increasingly focused on Africa and on the Gold Coast as a beacon for other anti-colonial movements. He engaged much more closely with the party political system and harnessed the processes of government to the cause of negotiating independence, arguing that success in one colony would have a catalytic effect on others. Ending imperialism became, in some respects for Padmore, a game of dominos; in which victory in one colony would lead to victory in others, and political independence would be the first stage of combating the social and economic strands of imperialism's many permeations. Indeed, Nkrumah's famous refrain to 'seek ye

first the political kingdom' is a mark of the close thinking these two political allies maintained.

Yet as an end to formal colonial rule became real, Padmore's arguments about the use of violence became ambiguous, and his ideas about mass action and the strategic manipulation of elite party politics began to collide. Contentious questions about how former colonies would be governed, how their economies would be structured, and who would 'belong' in these communities also emerged. The transnational, anti-imperial vision of Padmore which sought to create entirely new societies, clashed with that of some anti-colonial nationalists. Indeed, the encounter between transnational antiimperial thinkers like Padmore with a new generation of anti-colonial nationalists, particularly after the Second World War, provides much fertile ground for future research. The impact of the continued influence of Marxism on many of these thinkers is another, highly relevant area for research.

Ultimately, Padmore's form of Marxism did not wane in the face of a stronger commitment to black unity nor the evolving ideas of 'pan-Africanism' after he left the Communist International in 1934. But his form of Marxism shifted to one in support of a Labourite commitment to 'democratic socialism' or 'libertarian socialism', as he termed it. Padmore denounced communism in his later years as something that was largely formulated according to the interests of the Soviet Union and profoundly opposed to freedom, this even after the Comintern had been disbanded. Padmore seems to have taken non-Marxists like Gandhi and Nehru in India as models.

Instead these ideas were for Padmore central aspects of the same logic that understood racism as a product of imperialism, and imperialism as both a political and economic system of dominance that could not be modified by those bound up in its interests. When the British Labour Party came to power in 1945, he exposed the hypocrisy of their support for empire against their previous promises, and identified resource extraction as the exploitative intention of colonial development policy. Contrasting the peaceful negotiation of independence in the Gold Coast with the brutal suppression of Mau Mau in Kenya, he placed the

blame for violence squarely at the feet of the imperialists and the nature of the system they perpetuated. He held up a mirror to late imperial Britain and expressed what 'outsiders' saw.

Cross-References

▶ Du Bois, W.E.B. (1868–1963)
▶ Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)
▶ Nyerere, Julius Kamparage (1922–1999)
▶ Pan-Africanism
▶ Resistance to Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1856–1983

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Pakistan

Palestine

Pan-Africanism

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Synonyms

Africa; Anti-racism; Capitalism; Colonialism; Racism; Slavery

Definition

This essay xamines how Pan-Africanism evolved as a variety of ideas, activities, organisations, and movements that resisted the exploitation and oppression of all those of African heritage, opposed the ideologies of racism, and celebrated African achievement and being African. It describes the manifold visions and approaches of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Africanists as a belief in the unity, common history, and common purpose of the peoples of Africa and the African diaspora, and the idea that their destinies are interconnected. Such perspectives may be traced back to ancient times, but Pan-Africanist thought and action is principally connected with, and provoked by, the modern dispersal of Africans resulting from the trafficking of captives across the Atlantic to the Americas, as well as elsewhere, from the end of the fifteenth century. This 'forced migration', the largest in history, and the creation of the African diaspora were accompanied by the emergence of global capitalism, European colonial rule, and racism.

Introduction

There has never been one universally accepted definition of exactly what constitutes Pan-Africanism. Some writers on the subject are even reluctant to provide a definition, or suggest that one cannot be found, acknowledging that the vagueness of the term reflects the fact that Pan-Africanism has taken different forms at different historical moments and geographical locations (Ackah 1999, pp. 12–36; Geiss 1974, pp. 3–15; Shepperson 1962). Nevertheless, most writers would agree that the phenomenon has emerged in the modern period and is concerned with the social, economic, cultural, and political emancipation of African peoples, including those of the African diaspora. What underlies the manifold visions and approaches of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Africanists is a belief in the unity, common history, and common purpose of the peoples of Africa and the African diaspora, and the notion

that their destinies are interconnected. In addition, many would highlight the importance of the liberation and advancement of the African continent itself, not just for its inhabitants, but also as the homeland of the entire African diaspora. Such perspectives may be traced back to ancient times, but Pan-Africanist thought and action is principally connected with, and provoked by, the modern dispersal of Africans resulting from the trafficking of captives across the Atlantic to the Americas, as well as elsewhere, from the end of the fifteenth century. This 'forced migration', the largest in history, and the creation of the African diaspora were accompanied by the emergence of global capitalism, European colonial rule, and racism. Pan-Africanism evolved as a variety of ideas, activities, organisations, and movements that, sometimes in concert, resisted the exploitation and oppression of all those of African heritage, opposed the ideologies of racism, and celebrated African achievement and being African.

Forerunners

Before the concepts of Pan-African and Pan-Africanism emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, there were various organised efforts by Africans in the diaspora during the eighteenth century to join together in order to combat racism, to campaign for an end to the kidnapping and trafficking of Africans, or to organise repatriation to the African continent. In Britain, for example, there appear to have been several informal efforts before African abolitionists such as Olaudah Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano formed the Sons of Africa organisation to collectively campaign for an end to Britain's participation in the trans-Atlantic trafficking of enslaved Africans (Adi 2007). In Boston in 1784, the abolitionist Prince Hall organised the first African Masonic lodge in North America as a means of combatting racism and for mutual support and with a clear orientation towards Africa. Three years later, an African Church movement developed in North America out of the Free Africa

Society founded in Philadelphia by Richard Allen and Absalom Jones with similar anti-racist aims (Geiss 1974, p. 34). Such early initiatives were often accompanied by efforts to refute the dominant racist ideology of the day, which argued that Africans were inferior to Europeans, subhuman and only fit for enslavement. The best-selling writing of Equiano and Cugoano, for instance, aimed to undermine the racism that justified slavery, as well as attacking the slave trade and slavery itself. Such writing was sometimes a collective endeavour undertaken in the interests of all Africans and had a wide influence.

Perhaps the most important event to undermine both racism and the slave system during this period was the revolution that broke out in the French Caribbean colony of St Domingue in August 1791. That revolutionary struggle eventually led to the creation of Haiti, the first modern 'black' republic anywhere in the world and only the second independent country in the entire American continent. The revolution elevated Haiti to iconic status amongst all those of African descent, and produced new heroes such as Toussaint L'Ouverture, Dessalines, Christophe, and Pétion. The country's constitution established the principle of equal human rights and established the country as a safe haven for all Africans (for a useful summary, see Popkin 2012). Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, several thousand African Americans migrated to Haiti from Philadelphia and other US cities (Geiss 1974, p. 86). Haiti also acted as a base for future assaults on the ideology of racism by some of Haiti's leading intellectuals and statesmen such as Anténor Firmin and Benito Sylvain.

There were several efforts by Africans in the diaspora to return to the African continent. Thomas Peters, born in Africa, enslaved and then self-liberated during the American War of Independence, led over a thousand 'Black Loyalists' from Nova Scotia in Canada to the new British colony of Sierra Leone, where they continued to agitate for their rights and even self-government (Walker 1992). Other African Americans also organised repatriation to Sierra Leone in the nineteenth century, including the

Bostonian merchant Paul Cuffee. Similar efforts to repatriate to West Africa were also made by Africans and their descendants who had been kidnapped, enslaved, and transported to Brazil and the Caribbean. The West African country of Liberia, which was founded and developed by the American Colonization Society in the early nineteenth century, also became a haven for repatriated African Americans and after its declaration of independence in 1847 was viewed by many as yet another symbol of African achievement, alongside Haiti and the African kingdom of Abyssinia.

The growth of colonies of Western-educated Africans in Sierra Leone, Liberia and elsewhere in West Africa, many of whom were personally connected with the struggle against enslavement and racism, was certainly a factor contributing to the emergence of emancipatory ideas with a broad Pan-African rather than just local character throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed, it could be said that an African intelligentsia (clergymen, doctors, lawyers, and teachers) emerged on all sides of the Atlantic, that is to say in Europe, the Americas and in Africa during this period, whose members influenced and drew inspiration from each other. Several prominent figures emerged such as Martin Delany, from the US and Edward Blyden from the Caribbean. Delany, an abolitionist, writer, and medical practitioner, welcomed the 'common cause' that was developing between 'the blacks and colored races' of the world, travelled to West Africa and advocated the 'regeneration of Africa' by those in the diaspora. He clearly stated his policy: 'Africa for the African race and black men to rule them' (Adi and Sherwood 2003, pp. 34–39). Blyden, a politician, writer, educator, and diplomat, has been seen as one of the key thinkers in the development of Pan-Africanism. He emigrated to Liberia and became a strong advocate of 'racial pride' and repatriation to Africa from the diaspora. His newspaper Negro was specifically aimed at audiences in Africa, the Caribbean, and the US. Blyden believed that Africans had their own unique contribution to make to the world and an equally unique 'African personality'. During his own lifetime he was a very influential figure and his contradictory ideas can be seen as influencing later Pan-Africanists such as Marcus Garvey and even Kwame Nkrumah. However, he was also a firm supporter of British and other forms of colonialism in Africa, a position that he shared with many other Western-educated Africans in the nineteenth century (11–15).

Ethiopianism

At the end of the nineteenth century the strivings of Africans in West Africa and southern Africa against what were perceived as racist practices and attitudes within Christian Churches led to what was commonly referred to as the Ethiopian movement, a movement to establish independent African Churches such as the Ethiopia Church founded in South Africa in 1892 and the Native Baptist Church founded in Nigeria in 1888. In both regions, the movement was sometimes influenced by African American missionaries, and although often expressing itself through religion, it also articulated a range of anti-colonial strivings encapsulated in the slogan 'Africa for the Africans' (Esedebe 1992, pp. 23–24). As a broad cultural and political movement, an early form of Pan-Africanism, it was enhanced by Abyssinia's military victory over Italy at the Battle of Adowa in 1896. Ethiopianism was also seen as being a contributory factor to the Zulu or Bambatha Rebellion in Natal in 1906, a struggle which led to one of the earliest Pan-Africanist texts, Bandele Omoniyi's *A Defence of the Ethiopian Movement* (Adi 1991).

The First Pan-African Conference

The first gathering to be described as 'pan-African' was the Chicago Congress on Africa held in 1894, but the first Pan-African Conference was held in London in July 1900, convened by Henry Sylvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer, and the organisation he founded in 1897, the African Association. The African Association was mainly concerned with various injustices in

Britain's African and Caribbean colonies but it soon consulted leading African Americans such as Booker T. Washington about its aims to hold a conference. This was timed to coincide with the Paris Exhibition in order to assemble 'men and women of African blood, to deliberate solemnly upon the present situation and the outlook for the darker races of mankind', and establish 'a general union amongst the descendants of Ham'. Plans for the conference, which was still mainly aimed at influencing enlightened public opinion in Britain, were also widely reported in the African American press, as well as in Anglophone Africa and the Caribbean. It seems that after Williams met Benito Sylvain in Paris, the scope of the conference was broadened to include 'the treatment of native races under European and American rule. One important aim of the conference was to demonstrate that those of African descent could speak for themselves against all the injustices they faced and contemporary reports stressed that this was the first occasion on which Africans had united for 'the attainment of equality and freedom'. Benito Sylvain, who represented Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia, the African American educator and activist Anna J. Cooper, and W.E.B. Du Bois were amongst the distinguished participants of this international gathering, which concerned itself with many of the key issues and problems facing 'African humanity'. The conference 'Address to the Nations of the World', which condemned racial oppression in the US as well as throughout Africa and demanded self-government for Britain's colonies, was drafted under the chairmanship of Du Bois and included the famous phrase 'the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color-line'. The conference recognised the importance of the 'three sovereign states' and intended to establish branches in Africa, the Caribbean and North America of a new Pan-African Association. Plans were also announced for a second conference in the US in 1902, and Williams was able to launch the first few issues of a magazine the *Pan-African*. However, despite Williams's strenuous efforts and extensive travel, both the Pan-African Association and the *Pan-African* soon collapsed (Sherwood 2011).

Du Bois and the Pan-African Congresses

Following the London conference, several years passed before such a major event was again organised. In 1912, Booker T. Washington convened an 'International Conference on the Negro' at Tuskegee. It is possible that both Washington and the editor Thomas T. Fortune had planned to hold such a gathering even earlier, but it was not designed to develop the overtly political concerns established in 1900. W.E.B. Du Bois had emerged as one of the key figures in London in 1900, and 3 years earlier had elaborated his views on what he referred to as 'Pan-Negroism' and the need for a 'Pan-Negro movement in his well-known essay, published in 1897, 'The Conservation of Races' (Du Bois 2010/1897). It was Du Bois who sought to continue the tradition of major international Pan-African gatherings when he organised the first Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919.

Du Bois had some official support from the French government for the Congress, but faced opposition from the governments of Britain and the US. Nevertheless, 57 participants from Africa, the Caribbean and the US made their way to Paris. Du Bois proposed the creation of new states in Africa based around the confiscation of some of Germany's former colonies, supervised by the other major colonial powers but taking into account the views of the 'civilized Negro world', by which he had in mind mainly African Americans. He also called for a permanent Pan-African secretariat based in Paris and hoped that the Congress would enable the voice of the 'children of Africa' to be heard at the post-war peace conferences held in the city. However, the first Pan-African Congress had little lasting influence, was criticised for its proximity to the French government, and its demand that the rights of Africans and those of African descent should be protected by the League of Nations was ignored (Geiss 1974: 234–258).

Du Bois then took the initiative to organise a second congress, held in 1921 in London, Paris, and Brussels, then a third in London and Lisbon in 1923, and a fourth, originally scheduled to take place in the Caribbean but finally held in New York in 1927. In 1929 he also made plans

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to hold a fifth congress in Tunis in North Africa, but was denied permission by the French government. The four congresses established the idea of Pan-Africanism, consolidated Pan-African networks, and drew activists from the US, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Haiti, as well as those from Africa and the Caribbean resident in Europe. The congresses took a stand against racism and began to raise the demand for self-determination in the colonies. However, few representatives from organisations in the African continent participated, there was little support from African American organisations, and no permanent organisation, organising centre, or publication was established. The congresses were also criticised for the moderate political views expressed and for the exclusion of Marcus Garvey, perhaps the leading Pan-Africanist of the time (ibid.).

Garvey and Garveyism

The Jamaican writer and activist Marcus Garvey first established his Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA) in Jamaica in 1914. It included amongst its aims 'a universal confederacy amongst the race', as well as promoting 'racial pride', education, commercial enterprises, 'conscientious Christian worship', and assisting in 'the civilizing of backward tribes in Africa' (Adi and Sherwood 2003, p. 76). Garvey re-established the UNIA in New York in 1917 where it soon attracted thousands of adherents, first throughout the US and soon after internationally. At its height, the UNIA's membership has been estimated to have been over four million, but no precise figures exist. Undoubtedly it was the largest political movement of Africans during the twentieth century, embracing not just a few intellectuals but the masses both on the African continent and throughout the diaspora. The organisation's newspaper *Negro World* preached an anti-colonial message, 'Africa for the Africans at home and abroad', challenged notions of white supremacy, and extolled the greatness of Africa's history and of Africans. It circulated, often

illegally, throughout colonial Africa and the Caribbean, indeed throughout the diaspora. The UNIA established women's and children's organisations, and promoted commercial ventures of many kinds. The best known of these was the ill-fated Black Star shipping line which aimed to aid commercial ties between West Africa, the Caribbean, and the US.

The UNIA's *Declaration of Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World,* launched in 1920, demanded self-determination, condemned anti-African racism, and defended 'the inherent right of the Negro to possess himself of Africa', and the 'necessity of Negro nationalism, political power and control'. The UNIA also envisaged a 'Negro independent nation on the continent of Africa' to which those in the diaspora could return (78). In the meantime, Garvey attempted to forge links with the government of Liberia and declared himself provisional president of a future independent African republic. Garvey's politics, overtures to the Ku Klux Klan, and links with the masses put him at odds with Du Bois and other African American leaders, while his movement was feared by the major colonial powers and the US government. In 1922 he was arrested in the US on charges of fraud, eventually imprisoned and then in 1927 deported to Jamaica. Garvey remained active in Jamaica, Britain, Canada, and elsewhere until his death in 1940, but the UNIA became divided and Garvey himself sometimes espoused a political orientation that was rejected as too moderate by other Pan-Africanists. Nevertheless his legacy was immense, particularly in Jamaica where, following his death, his ideas exerted a major influence on the Rastafarians and where he was subsequently declared the country's first national hero. His influence was acknowledged by other Pan-Africanists, most notably Kwame Nkrumah. Garveyism too has remained an influential trend of Pan-Africanism, especially in the African diaspora.

Despite the undoubted influence of Garvey and the UNIA, many radical activists were as critical of his politics as they were of Du Bois. The most significant critics and those who developed a different Pan-African vision were those connected with the international communist movement of

the 1920s and 1930s. Although acknowledging that Africans worldwide faced similar problems of racism and various forms of colonial oppression and exploitation, the black communists advocated the need for a united struggle of all Africans in unity with working and oppressed people of all countries, and disseminated their views through a publication, the *Negro Worker,* as well as through communist parties internationally. In 1930 in Hamburg, Germany, the communists even held their own Pan-African gathering, drawing participants from Africa, the Caribbean, the US, and Europe. The politics of the communists did not attract as many adherents as the UNIA but it was significant for its critique of colonialism and imperialism, its insistence on the need for an organised struggle around specific demands which would lead to a socialist future in which all Africans would be empowered. One of the most notable black communists before the mid-1930s was the Trinidadian George Padmore, who acted as the editor of the *Negro*. After he parted company with the communist movement, Padmore became a leading Pan-Africanist. Communism, or various aspects of Marxism, also had a significant influence on other Pan-Africanists including Du Bois, Aimé Césaire and Kwame Nkrumah (Adi 2013).

Négritude

Yet another strand of Pan-Africanism developed amongst African and Caribbean intellectuals living in France between the two wars. Known as Négritude, the movement was principally developed by three students (Aimé Césaire from Martinique, the Senegalese Léopold Senghor, and Léon Damas from Guyana) who had come under a variety of influences including Marxism and the Harlem Renaissance. Négritude propounded a reconciliation between those from the continent and the diaspora, through a rejection of assimilation, colonialism, and Eurocentrism and a common struggle to embrace and celebrate African culture and the uniqueness of being African, at times almost harking back to the notion of 'African personality' espoused by Blyden. Its

impact was greatest in the Francophone world and exemplified in Césaire's poem *Cahiers d'un retour au pays natal* (Kestleloot 1974).

Ethiopia and Radical Pan-Africanism

In the mid-1930s the Pan-African movement was further radicalised by the influence of Marxism, especially in Britain and France and many of the colonies of these two imperialist powers. It was the Communist International that first promoted the idea of a United States of Socialist Africa and provided an uncompromising critique of colonialism, while several activists were impressed by the economic developments in the Soviet Union and that country's attempts to end racism and national oppression. A more radical approach to colonial rule was also the consequence of the dire economic situation during the Depression years, which led to major strikes and rebellions throughout the Caribbean, and by fascist Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, which led to a major international campaign to support Ethiopia that was particularly strong in many parts of Africa and throughout the diaspora. The outbreak of the Second World War only strengthened Pan-African demands for an end to colonial rule; while in Britain, Padmore and the Pan-African Federation made preparations for a new Pan-African congress.

The Manchester Pan-African Congress

The Manchester or Fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Britain in 1945, has been seen as the most important of all the Pan-African conferences. It was dominated by the thinking of Padmore and other British-based Pan-Africanists, including by this time Kwame Nkrumah. The Manchester Congress grew out of the radicalism of the 1930s and the war years, as well as Padmore's experience as a key organiser of the communist-led International Conference of Negro Workers in Hamburg in 1930. One of the main features of the congress was that its participation was restricted to representatives of workers' and

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farmers' organisations: 'the masses' who were considered to be the main force that would end colonial rule by force if necessary. It therefore also broke with previous gatherings that had merely the aim of lobbying the governments of the imperialist powers. The congress expressed its opposition to the 'rule of capital' and the imposition of Eurocentric values and political institutions in the colonies. It also condemned the colonial borders that had been imposed on African states, an issue that would later become controversial in the post-independence period. Although it did not openly refer to the need for socialism, the Congress clearly had this general orientation. Several of the participants had also attended the recent founding conferences of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and proceedings in Manchester reflected an internationalist spirit in the espousal of the slogan 'Workers and oppressed people of all countries unite!' Although Du Bois attended, there was very little emphasis on the US. Participants were mainly from Britain's colonies in Africa and the Caribbean, and there was an increasing emphasis on African liberation (Adi and Sherwood 1995).

Pan-Africanism in Africa

Although the Manchester Congress and the activities of Padmore and others made Britain an important centre of Pan-Africanism, in the period after 1945 the centre of the Pan-African world was already shifting to Africa. In 1947, the WFTU organised two Pan-African trade union conferences. The first was held in Dakar and 4 years later a second, similar conference took place in Bamako, attended by over 140 delegates including the future leader of Guinea and leading Pan-Africanist Sékou Touré. Nkrumah had returned to the Gold Coast in 1947 and his Pan-Africanist activity was initially focused on achieving the independence of that country from British colonial rule, although he had already indicated his aim of a federation of independent states in West Africa, both Anglophone and Francophone, as a step towards the 'United Socialist States of Africa'. With this aim in mind, Nkrumah had made plans on several occasions to hold a conference of nationalist movements in Africa, particularly those in West Africa such as the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, but evidently without success. Finally, as 'leader of government business' in the Gold Coast, he convened the West African Federation Conference, which was held in Kumasi in December 1953. The participants discussed how to establish a West African federation that could create the conditions for the liberation of the entire African continent and the African diaspora.

Nkrumah and the Road to the OAU

Nkrumah played a major role in reinvigorating an African-centred Pan-Africanism even before 1957, but in that year the independence of the Gold Coast from British colonial rule created the conditions for a new stage in the Pan-African struggle to liberate and unite the entire African continent. As the new Ghana celebrated its independence, Nkrumah declared that it was 'meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa', and he began to organise to achieve that liberation and his vision of a United States of Africa. In 1958, with the assistance of George Padmore, he hosted the Conference of Independent African States, (at that time a gathering of Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic). It was the first time in history that such a meeting had taken place. Later the same year, Nkrumah hosted the All-African Peoples Conference, which brought together over 300 representatives of political movements, trade unions, and other organisations from 28 African countries, including those still under colonial rule. Both conferences aimed to encourage a spirit of Pan-African unity amongst the participants and to discuss ways of working jointly to ensure the end of colonial rule throughout the continent. Even at this early stage, Nkrumah urged the African states to consider measures to enhance economic co-operation and to develop a common foreign policy, and both conferences looked forward to a commonwealth of independent African states.

The same year the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) was founded, with Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda playing leading roles, and with the aim of facilitating the independence of colonies in that part of Africa. These initiatives were followed by a series of other conferences in Africa in the years before 1963, and Nkrumah and Sékou Touré also agreed to establish a union between their two independent countries as the basis for a federation of African states and an eventual United States of Africa. However, their initiative was seen as too radical by many other African governments and reflected differing approaches to the question of African unity and whether this meant merely increasing economic cooperation or implied a more immediate political union (Nkrumah 1963). The growing differences between African states, which all claimed to be adhering to the principles of Pan-Africanism, were exacerbated by the continuing interference of the big powers in Africa's affairs, but this did not prevent the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Legum 1962: esp. chs 3–5).

Organisation of African Unity

The founding of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963 has been seen as a compromise between 'radical' and 'moderate' African governments. Its formation was clearly a major victory for Pan-Africanism on the African continent, although it also had a significant influence amongst the African diaspora. It was, however, the Pan-Africanism of African governments not of the peoples of Africa, although there were also attempts to forge that kind of unity, too, most notably through the labour organisation the All-African Trade Union Federation, established in 1961 (Agyeman 2003).

The OAU was established with four main aims:

  To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
  To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

  To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
  To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa. (Organization of African Unity 2004)

However, it was also confronted with what was increasingly being called neocolonialism: the attempts by the major imperialist powers to maintain economic and other forms of control of nominally independent states. The impact of neo-colonialism, the legacy of colonialism, and the effects of the Cold War in Africa all contributed to increasingly undemocratic African governments and an ineffective OAU. Perhaps its greatest achievement was the support given to those struggling to remove the remaining colonial regimes in Africa, in the Portuguese colonies, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, as well as the apartheid regime in South Africa, through the auspices of the OAU's Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (Salim 1996).

Although it had no direct mandate in regard to the African diaspora, the OAU's influence and the manifestation of African unity could still have an influence. It was particularly evident in the work of the African American activist Malcolm X, who established his Organisation of Afro-American Unity in order to address the many problems still faced by those not just in the US but also throughout the diaspora. At the end of his life, Malcolm X spoke for a whole generation when he called not only for those in the diaspora to identify and learn from Africa but also demanded that the OAU take up for solution the problems confronting African Americans. The militant approach of Malcolm X and others ushered in a new era and a demand for what was referred to as Black Power, a new Pan-Africanist trend that exerted its influence not only amongst those in the diaspora from Britain to Brazil, but even in parts of the African continent, most notably in the Black Consciousness Movement led by Steve Biko in South Africa (West and Martin 2009: esp 24–28).

Sixth and Seventh Pan-African Congresses

Attempts to strengthen the links between the diaspora and Africa, between African and Caribbean

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governments and nongovernmental organisations, led to the convening of the 6th Pan-African Congress in Tanzania in 1974. Indeed, Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, played a leading role in convening the congress, although the original initiative and many of the key organisers were based in the US. The Sixth PAC, as it was often known, was often presented as the first such congress to take place on the African continent. Its main aims included:

> Increasing the political unity between African people in the west and African people on the continent . . .
>
> Exploring strategies for increasing our support for the liberation wars in southern Africa . . .
>
> Encouraging a need for self-reliance and self-determination among the masses of African people wherever we may find ourselves. (Hill 1974)

The congress aimed to discuss practical solutions to a range of problems including greater unity amongst Caribbean states and greater economic cooperation and ways to eliminate 'economic dependency and exploitation' (Cox 1974).

However, it represented an uneasy alliance of delegates from 26 African governments (and one from the Caribbean), several southern African national liberation organisations and those from the diaspora communities in the US, Canada, Britain, Brazil, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Nevertheless, it could certainly claim to be the largest and one of the most representative of all the Pan-African congresses. The congress undoubtedly played an important role in consolidating support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa, one of the few issues that united all strands of the Pan-African movement. However, at the same time, there were many who were critical of what they saw as the hijacking of Pan-Africanism by the unrepresentative member governments of the OAU and their staunch defence of colonial boundaries. As the well-known Guyanese historian and activist Walter Rodney put it, 'the OAU does far more to frustrate rather than to realize the concept of African unity'. In his remarks before the Sixth PAC, Rodney also urged that the Pan-African movement should re-establish the revolutionary and socialist orientation it manifested at the time of the Manchester Congress. The Sixth PAC eventually resolved that Pan-Africanism should be a force for liberation 'within the context of the class struggle' (Rodney 1975).

The Sixth PAC reflected the fact that Pan-Africanism had become a broad movement that encompassed governments and NGOs, those who demanded the political union of African states as well as those that defended national boundaries. It was also apparent that the clear political orientation that existed in 1945 was no longer so much in evidence, and the demands for revolution and socialism by some were seen as a threat by others, not least by most African and Caribbean governments. The years that followed did nothing to minimise the differences that existed amongst all those claiming adherence to Pan-Africanism, although there were also many cultural manifestations of Pan-Africanism, especially musical ones, the reggae of the Jamaican Bob Marley and the Afro-Beat of the Nigerian Fela Kuti, for example, that served as unifying factors. Cultural manifestations had long existed and were evident in the two Conferences of Negro Writers and Artists held in Paris and Rome in 1956 and 1959, and the World Festivals of African Arts and Culture held in Senegal and Nigeria in 1966 and 1976, although a diversity of approaches could also be found in these Pan-African events. New ideological currents, such as Afrocentrism, that emerged at the end of the twentieth century only contributed to the diversity of opinions but did not prevent the convening of another Pan-African congress in Uganda in 1994.

The Seventh Pan-African congress brought together over 800 delegates under the theme 'Facing the Future in Unity, Social Progress and Democracy'. The congress was held at a time when the entire African continent had been liberated from colonialism and apartheid had been defeated. It was most notable for the fact that at its conclusion a Pan-African Women's Liberation Organisation was established, and for the decision to establish a permanent Pan-African Secretariat hosted by the government of Uganda (Abdul-Raheem 1996). Unlike the previous congress, the event was dominated by non-

governmental organisations, although some nine governments sent delegations including Libya and Cuba. However, just as during the Sixth PAC, there were major ideological differences during the proceedings, even over the definition of who was an African. Several major issues were debated including the preferred scope and meaning of reparations for Africa and the diaspora and most importantly the role and position of women and youth. A key declaration at the conclusion of the congress was that Africans should resist economic and other forms of recolonisation, oppose the 'New World Order', and 'take action that will rid the world of the curse that has plagued humanity for over five centuries' (Campbell 1998). The congress also resolved to hold an eighth congress in Libya, a meeting that was eventually not convened.

The African Union

Although the eighth Pan-African congress was not held in Libya, that country and its leader began to assume an increasingly important role in Pan-African affairs on the African continent. There had been many criticisms of the OAU from those outside it but there was also a recognition from member states that the organisation required an overhaul if it were to be fit for purpose in the twenty-first century. This became particularly evident after the founding of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1994. The AEC aims to bring about the eventual economic integration of the entire continent leading to an African central bank and single currency. It was the initiative of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to convene an extraordinary summit of OAU heads of state in his hometown Sirte in 1999, and from this summit emerged the Sirte Declaration and a new organisation of African states, the African Union (AU). The AU was an attempt to revitalise the OAU, which had become widely discredited as a 'club of dictators', but also to establish a more robust continental organisation in the era of globalisation. Gaddafi was the most enthusiastic proponent of a United States of Africa and a strong and united continent able to stand up for itself in the

world, and although other leaders were more cautious there was an agreement to speed up the founding of continental institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament. The aims of the AU are much wider than those of the OAU and specifically include accelerating 'the political and socio-economic integration of the continent', promoting 'peace, security and stability', and promoting 'democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance' (African Union 2002). The AU was officially founded in May 2001.

Although the AU also has many critics, one of its most important acts was to recognise the importance of involving the African diaspora in its activities and deliberations. In subsequent years the African diaspora has been more fully incorporated within the structures of the AU as the 'sixth region', although it is clear that these structures and the heterogeneous nature of the diaspora do not allow easy integration. Nevertheless, such steps are more than symbolic and have been extended by Haiti's application to be the first country situated in the Caribbean to become a full associate member of the AU.

In 2013 the AU celebrated the 50th anniversary of the founding of the OAU by promoting the theme 'Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance', although it had been powerless to prevent NATO intervention and the toppling and assassination of one its key architects, Muammar Gaddafi, 2 years earlier. Nevertheless, both inside and outside meetings and conferences held during the anniversary year, Pan-Africanism was celebrated and invoked by its numerous and disparate adherents, some of whom looked forward to an imminent 8th Pan-African Congress. The problems and challenges confronting Africa and its diaspora remain and so too does a sense of common purpose and aspiration, the basis for Pan-Africanism and a Pan-African movement in the twenty-first century.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa

▶ Braithwaite, Chris (1885–1944)

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Pan-Arabism

Pan-Arabism and Iran

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Synonyms

Anti-Iranian Sentiment; Arab Nationalism; Baathism; Nasserism

Definition

Pan-Arabism is the philosophy of unifying all present-day Arab nations and Arab-speaking regions into a singular and unified superstate stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf (Davis 1993: 266). More specifically, Baathist philosophy defines the greater Arab nation as consisting of Arab League countries as well as non-Arab territories such as Alexandretta (Iskenderun) in Turkey and Khuzestan in Iran. Pan-Arabism has also been characterised as inciting prejudice against and downplaying the role of non-Arab Muslim peoples such as Turks and Iranians (Chaudhary and Chaudhary 2009: 172). The relation of Pan-Arabism towards Iran can be described within four broad categories: (1) historical antecedents of twentieth-century Pan-Arabism; (2) the formulisation of anti-Iranism in twentieth-century Pan-Arabism; (3) retroactive Arabisation of history and geography; and (4) the Iran–Iraq War and Pan-Arabism.

Historical Antecedents of Twentieth-Century Pan-Arabism

One defining feature of Pan-Arabism is its negative characterisations of Iranians, a phenomenon existing since at least the Islamic conquest of (predominantly Zoroastrian) Sassanian Iran (637–51). As noted by Ettinghausen (1972: 1), Iran after the Arab-Islamic conquests 'had lost

its independence, though not its cultural identity'. As noted by Zarrin'kub (2002), the Ummayad caliphate (661–750) instituted a number of discriminatory anti-Iranian measures for eliminating the Persian language and wider Iranian culture, a dynamic corroborated by Islamic sources reporting of punitive measures taken against Persian-speakers (Al-Isfahani 2004: vol. 4, 423). The Persian language was banned in Iran for nearly three centuries by the caliphates (Abivardi 2001: 468).

The caliphate's discriminatory practices were not confined to the followers of the Zoroastrian faith but also operated against Iranian converts to Islam. Clawson (2005: 17) writes of the Arabs implementing a system of 'ethnic stratification that discriminated against Iranians', who then 'chafed under Arab rule'. A prominent example is Al-Baladhuri's report of Ummayad Caliph Muawiyah (602–80), who declared in his letter, 'never treat them [Iranians] as equals of the Arabs' (Al-Baladhuri 1916: 417). The caliph's letter to Ziyad Ibn Abih stated (Bahar 2002: 82; Qomi 1982: 254–256) that the caliphate's Iranian Muslim subjects were to be (1) barred from frontier duties safeguarding the caliphate's frontiers; (2) granted lower pensions and jobs; (3) discriminated against in prayers when Arabs were present (i.e. they were not to stand in the first row or lead prayer congregations); (4) forbidden to marry Arab women (Arab men were allowed to marry Iranian women); and (5) forbidden to dress in Arab garb (Goldziher 1889–90: vol. 2, 138–139). Other discriminatory measures against non-Arabs included declarations that only persons of 'pure Arab blood' were worthy to rule in the caliphate (Momtahen 1989: 145). The succeeding Abbasid caliphate (750–1258) failed to adequately address the discriminatory practices against the Iranian population.

Negative views of Iranians are documented centuries later and into the early twentieth century. A clear reference to this is seen in a meeting in 1911 between Ibn Saud (Abdul Aziz bin Abdul-Rahman Ibn Saud, 1876–1953, founder and first king of modern Saudi Arabia) and William Shakespear (a British political agent in Arabia at the time), in which they discussed the possibility

of forming a common front against the Ottomans. It was during this meeting that Ibn Saud told Shakespear, 'we hate the Persians' (Allen 2006: 245). What is significant about the Ibn Saud–Shakespear exchange is the articulation of the Arab cultural dislike of Iranians, despite the mainly anti-Ottoman character of the meeting.

The Formulisation of Anti-Iranism in Twentieth-Century Pan-Arabism

The roots of modern Pan-Arabism have often been attributed to the great Arab revolt in Hijaz during the First World War (1914–18), which was essentially organised and led by the British intelligence officer T.E. Lawrence (1888–1935). As an anti-Ottoman movement, the Hijaz revolt was fought by the Arabs to carve out a singular Arab state in the aftermath of the First World War. This ambition was to be unfulfilled in the wake of the Versailles post-war negotiations in Paris. Despite this failure, the idea of a large Pan-Arab state had taken hold among the Arab intelligentsia of the Middle East.

It was in the newly formed post-Ottoman states of Syria and Iraq that the modern basis of Pan-Arabism was to be formulated. Notable figures in Iraq (which was recognised as an independent country by the League of Nations in 1932) were Rashid Ali (who led the anti-British revolt in 1941) and resident Syrians (especially Jamil Mardam and Shukri al-Quwatli) and the Mufti of Jerusalem (Haj Amin al-Husseini), who were exiled to Iraq for their political activities against the French and British. Prominent Syrian Pan-Arabists were Salah al-Din Bitar and Michel Aflaq (1910–89; a Christian), who were influenced by European-style fascism during the 1930s (Davis 1993: 266). The Pan-Arabist origins of anti-Iranism were mainly constructed in Iraq, especially from 1921 when King Faisal I (1885–1935) bought Satia al-Husri (1882–1968; of Syrian-Turkish descent) to Iraq; he first became the director-general of education and later dean of Iraq's Law College. Al-Husri was soon accompanied to Iraq by a number of Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian Pan-Arabist thinkers to help implement King Faisal's project of establishing Iraq's educational system. Masalha (1991: 690) has noted that Syrian Pan-Arab educators were 'Ummayad in their perspective', which may partly explain the implementation of anti-Iranism by Husri and his team into the Iraqi educational system and mass media in 1921–41 (Adib-Moghaddam 2006: 19).

Makiya (1998: 153–160) outlines Husri's anti-Persian educational policies in Iraqi schools, such as the publication of the monograph *Iranian Teachers who Caused us [Arabs] Big Problems*. This may have contributed to the perception among Pan-Arabist thinkers that the historical decline of the Arabs was due to the Persians (Keddie 1969: 18). Husri is also notable for his discriminatory practices in the Iraqi education system in rejecting the appointment of teachers of Iranian origin.

The advocacy of force for the advancement of Pan-Arabism is traced to Sami (Saib) Shawkat, who became director-general of education in 1938. He is notable for his 1933 speech 'Sina'at al-Mawt' ('Manufacturing of Death') promoting militarism and mass violence, which was printed for mass distribution in Iraqi schools (Makiya 1998: 177; Miller and Mylroie 1990: 73). This provided the ideological foundation for Iraq's manufacture and deployment of chemical weapons decades later, during the Iran–Iraq War. Shawkat became the leader of the Nazi-inspired Nadi al-Muthanna society (active c. 1935–41) (Ghareeb and Dougherty 2004: 167), and in 1939 founded the organisation's youth wing, the Futtuwa, which was patterned after the Nazi Hitler Youth movement (Makiya 1998: 178). Shawkat's fascist organisations are believed to have provided the model for their later counterparts in the Baath regime of Iraq (Kechichian and Von Grunebaum Center 2001: 84).

The Retroactive Arabisation of History and Geography

Pan-Arabist history revisionism involves retroactive Arabisation. This is the process of attributing Arabic origins to non-Arab entities and domains

(e.g. non-Arab scholars, regions, and so on). Retroactive Arabisation revises the legacy of Persia's heritage in Arabic and Islamic civilisations with respect to Persian cultural and scientific achievements and Persian geographical areas (the Persian Gulf and Iran's Khuzestan province). Mojtahed-Zadeh has noted this process in Arab history and geography textbooks which aim to revise history in an anti-Iranian manner (2007: 350). Several Arab states (e.g. Iraq, Egypt, Sharjah, Abu-Dhabi, Saudi Arabia) as well as a select number of Western academic institutions have been involved in retroactive Arabisation. Mcloughlin (2002: 218) and Parsons (1985: 38) have noted significant funding accorded to British Arabist studies by wealthy Persian Gulf Arab states.

The re-naming of historical territories and waterways often leads to irredentist claims on the territorial integrity of the present Iranian state. The attempt to define the Persian Gulf as the 'Arabian Gulf' was first initiated without success by Richard Belgrave. The term was first officially used in a political context by Egypt's Pan-Arabist president Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918–70) from the 1950s onwards (Taheri 2010: 135); prior to this he had referred to the waterway as the Persian Gulf. Support for this name change came soon with Roderick Owen's text *The Golden Bubble of the Arabian Gulf: A Documentary* (1957). The process of re-defining the history of the Persian Gulf as the 'Arabian Gulf' is largely funded by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Examples include Michael Rice's *Archaeology of the Arabian Gulf* (1994), which acknowledges the support of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar (1994: xvii). Daniel Potts's two-volume *The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity* acknowledges the support of Saddam Hussein's Tikriti clan (1990: vol. 1, vii). Primary sources and cartography spanning the Classical, Islamic, and Medieval eras fail to corroborate the thesis that the Persian Gulf has been known as the 'Arabian Gulf' since antiquity (Hansen 1962: 135–138; Mojtahed-Zadeh 2007: 20–21, 64; Sahab et al. 2005). Notably, Arab maps up to the 1960s cite the Persian Gulf by its correct historical name (Abdul-Karim 1965; Hasan 1935; Heikal 1968). The United

Nations has twice recognised the legality of the term 'Persian Gulf' for this body of water (UNAD 311 of 5 March 1971 and UNLA 45.8.2(c) of 10 August 1984; for more on these documents see Abdi 2007: 221, 232).

Pan-Arabism also lays territorial claims to Iran's south-west Khuzestan province (Parsi 2007: 22), called 'Arabistan' by Pan-Arabist thinkers who describe this as an ancient Arab territory (Seliktar 2008: 30) that must be restored to the greater Arab nation (Gieling 1999: 13). Historiography however challenges the Pan-Arab thesis, as Khuzestan was the basis of the ancient Elamite civilisation, which heavily influenced the Achaemenid Persian Empire (559–331 BCE), with Khuzestan being an integral part of Parthian (c. 250 BCE–224 CE) and Sassanian Persia (224–651 CE) (De Graef and Tavernier 2012; Zarrin'kub 2002: 185; see also the Shapur inscription of Sassanian provinces from the early third century CE cited in Wiesehofer 2001: 184). Khuzistan remained politically intertwined with Iran in the post-Islamic era after the Arab conquests (Farrokh 2011: 76–77, 153–158; Kasravi 2005).

Retroactive Arabisation redefines past non-Arab peoples (notably Iranian scientific figures in Islam) and their achievements as Arab (Lewis 1989: 33). This cultural appropriation process may have historical antecedents, such as the aforementioned letter of Muawiyah, which also states, 'Arabs are entitled to inherit their [the Persians'] legacy.' Specifically, persons such as Omar Khayyam, Ibn Sina, Farabi, and so on are retroactively Arabised in Arab educational, political, and media outlets. This process is contradicted by primary Islamic sources such as the *Muqaddimah* of Ibn Khaldun (1332–95), which report the majority of Muslim intellectual-scientific scholars as having been of Iranian descent (Frye 1977: 91; Ibn Khaldun 1967: vol. 3, 271–274, 311–315). Pan-Arab educators, notably Sami Shawkat, have called for the elimination of books such as those of Ibn Khaldun because they discredit Pan-Arab theories that all Muslim sages were Arabs (Makiya 1998: 177). While mainstream scholarship has outlined the extent and significance of Persian contribution to Arabo-Muslim civilisation

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with respect to sciences, medicine, mathematics, grammar, and so on (e.g. Abivardi 2001: 148–149; Elgood 2010: 58–301; Kennedy 1975; Nasr 1975; Saliba 1998; Yarshater 1998), Arabian historiography in general rejects the Persian legacy in Arabo-Muslim civilisation.

Other examples of historical revisionism include attempts by the Iraqi state to link Iraq's Shiite population with the country's pre-Islamic Iranian population, a theory first propagated in two books published in 1927 and 1933 (Dawisha 2003: 90; Masalha 1991: 690). The notion of viewing Iraqi Shiites as an Iranian fifth column inside Iraq was expanded during the Saddam Hussein era (Ajami 2003: 12). This may be explained by the Pan-Arabist dynamic of culturally distancing the Arabian world from Iran; as Shiism is the official state religion of Iran, Iraqi Shiites, though Arab, are retroactively redefined as Persians.

A number of official events in the Western world have engaged in retroactive Arabisation, such as the Centre d'Études Euro-Arabe of Paris, which hosted a conference in November 1992 defining over 80% of Iranian artistic displays as Arab (Matini 1993: 467) and the Saudi Arabian government's exhibitions in London (October 2004) and Washington, DC (August 1989) displaying Persian cultural artifacts as Arabic or Turkish (Matini 1989). Another example is Toronto's 33rd International Congress of Asian and North African Studies, in which the Persian poetry of Jalal-e-Din Rumi was erroneously presented as 'Arabic Literature' (Estelami 1992: 305). More recently (August 2012) the Louvre museum used the term 'Islamic' in reference to its post-Islamic Iranian artifacts. This may have been related to the museum's decision to establish a branch in the United Arab Emirates, an initiative characterised by academics such as Marjolein (2007) as 'a clearly-defined strategy: profit maximization'. The British Broadcasting Corporation reported a total of 400 million Euros being paid by the Emirates to the Louvre for this project (BBC News 2007). Matini asserts that terms such as 'Arab science' or 'Islamic art' are European academic inventions that have been adopted by new Arab nation states such as Bahrain, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait (1992; 1993: 465).

The Iran–Iraq War and Pan-Arabism

Following the overthrow of the Pahlavi order by February 1979, Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party, who were cognisant of Iranian military weakness, hoped to facilitate a rapid Iraqi conquest of Iran's Khuzestan province, which as noted previously was claimed as part of the greater Pan-Arab state. The invasion of Iran was officially known by the Baathist regime as the 'Qadissiya Saddam' in reference to the Arab victory over the Sassanian Empire (224–651 CE) in 637 CE, which led to the conquest of Iran (Adib-Moghaddam 2006: 37–38). Saddam made specific reference to the Iranians as 'the magi' who were to be crushed once again by the Arabs (Mackie 1996: 318).

There have been a myriad of reasons proposed as to the causes of the Iran–Iraq War, such as border disputes traced back to the Ottoman–Iranian wars as well as sectarian (Shia versus Sunni) rivalry (Souresrafil 2006: 27). Baathist philosophy regarded as a primary cause of the war the supposed racialist 'Aryan versus Semite' rivalries dating back thousands of years (Makiya 1998: 264; Pipes 1983). This thesis contradicts the long-term history of cultural and anthropological admixture between the Iranian plateau, Fertile Crescent, Anatolia, Caucasus, and Central Asia. As noted by Halliday, Iraq is the Arab state with the strongest Persian legacy in the Arab world.

Tehran's Pan-Islamic rhetoric of unity between all Muslim (Arab and non-Arab) peoples contradicted Michel Aflaq's Baathist definition of Islam as 'a revolutionary Arab movement whose meaning was the renewal of Arabism' (Makiya 1998: 198). When the war was ignited by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia (ruled 1975–82) supported the annexation of Iran's Khuzestan province by stating that he stood with Saddam Hussein in the 'pan-Arab battle and its conflict with the Persians, the enemies of the Arab nation' (*Guardian* 1980). The Iraqi educational system also produced textbooks promoting conspiracy theories and alleging a collusion between Iranians and Jews against the Arabs that went back thousands of

years to the time of Cyrus the Great (559–530 BCE) (Adib-Moghaddam 2006: 36).

Baathist propaganda participated in the war effort by promoting racism. Propaganda films often equated the Arabic–Islamic conquests of the Sassanian Empire with the contemporary Iran–Iraq War (Mackie 1996: 318). Racist writings were widely distributed to Iraqi government institutions, educational settings, and the military establishment, notably with the republishing in 1981 of the pamphlet *Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies* by Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam Hussein's maternal uncle (Bengio 2011: 133). The publication defined Iranians as 'animals god created in the shape of humans' (Karsh and Rautsi 1991: 15). Official racist discourse in fact involved descriptions of Iranians as animals (mainly insects and donkeys), especially by the high echelons of the Baathist leadership, for example General Maher Abdul Rasheed (Hiro 1991: 108). Racist literature (textbooks, poetry, newspaper articles, etc.) described Iranians as bearing racial characteristics such as cruelty, mercilessness, hatred against Arabs, 'backstabbing', and 'the destructive Persian mentality' (Adib-Moghaddam 2006: 35–36). Nazi-type race laws were instituted against Iraqis of Iranian background, including financial incentives for Iraqis to divorce marriage partners of Iranian ancestry (Aburish 2000: 123), and Iraqis of Iranian ancestry were deported en masse to Iran by Saddam Hussein's regime (Al-Ansari 1991; Al-Zubaidi 2010: 49). The Baathist regime also attempted to destroy Iran's historical identity through 'archeological warfare' by deploying artillery, missiles, and aerial bombardment against ancient Iranian historical sites, including UNESCO World Heritage sites (Hojjat 1993).

Pan-Arab philosophy significantly influenced Baathist military planning in four ways. First was the tendency of Iraqi military planners to underestimate Iranian military capabilities, leading to inadequate war preparations (Woods et al. 2011: 8) and assumptions of a rapid victory over Iran within 10–14 days (Zabih 1988: 169). While many of the Iraqi assumptions of victory rested upon the state of Iranian military disarray following the 1979 revolution (Farrokh 2011: 346–349),

Pan-Arabism appears to have influenced Iraqi assumptions of the Iranian will to resist the invasion. As noted by Jawdat, 'Iraqi strategy bears no evidence of any planning beyond the assumption that the Iranian armed forces would collapse at the first shot' (1983: 91). Even as Iraqi forces were ejected from Khuzestan by late May 1982, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership often relied on Pan-Arabist assumptions of Persian military inferiority by claiming that their ejection from Iranian territory in late May 1982 was due to the 'voluntary' withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iran (Hiro 1991: 56).

The second impact of Pan-Arabism on Iraqi military planning was in the assumption that Iranian Arabs would welcome Iraqi troops as they entered into Khuzestan's provincial cities. This led the Iraqi military brass to conclude that close-quarter urban combat would not take place as they invaded Iran, which may partly explain why they failed to provide adequate infantry forces to support their tank thrusts into Khuzestan. The majority of Iranian Arabs did not support the invasion, with many joining the Iranian military in resisting the Iraqis (Hiro 1991: 43). This resulted in Iraq's failure to capture all major Khuzestani cities, except for Khorramshahr, which fell only after very heavy urban combat over several weeks, another factor preventing the Iraq conquest of Khuzestan in 1980.

The third impact of Pan-Arabism on the Iraqi war effort was in its success in recruiting Arab volunteers from various non-Arab countries to fight against Iran, notably Jordan's Yarmuk Brigade (Rajaee 1997: 15). Dawisha however notes that the majority of the 'volunteers' were non-Iraqi Arab guest workers forcibly recruited by Iraq into the war (2003: 275).

The fourth manner in which Pan-Arabism affected Iraqi military planning was in terms of chemical warfare. The Iraqi media promoted Pan-Arabist propaganda by de-humanising Iranians through violent imagery and language, thus helping to minimise the moral impact of non-conventional weapons. The Iraqi press often produced various de-humanising cartoons portraying Iranians as animals, burning in furnaces, being eaten by fishes, and so on (Bengio 1986: 474). When

General Mahir Abdul Rashid deployed chemical weapons to kill Iranian troops, he officially characterised his dead Iranian victims as 'Majoosi [Zoroastrian Magi] insects' (Bengio 1998: 153), a description announced on Baghdad Radio on 28 February 1984 (Hiro 1991: 278). Iraqi television would support this process by broadcasting images of dead and mutilated Iranians for hours.

Conclusion: Educational Discourse and Cultural Rapprochement

Negative characterisations of Iranians continue to appear at the official level in the Arab world, one prominent example being the Iraqi Sunni politician Adnan Al-Dulaimi, who made the following statements on Saudi Arabia's Safa TV (aired on 17 January 2012): 'When facing the Persian personality you have no choice but to use force, they understand nothing but force ... whenever they are in power, they want you to worship them, but when they are ruled by others who are stronger, they lick their boots ... they become submissive to the point of masochism ... Persian personality is characterised by insolence.'

Educational discourse is recommended as the primary tool of overcoming the anti-Persian element of Pan-Arabist discourse. This process may be put into practice by the organisation of conferences and seminars involving Arabian, Western, and Iranian educational and academic institutions specialising in the Islamic domains. It may be hypothesised that such proceedings should help to overcome Arab perceptions of Iranians with respect to their collective characteristics as well as their legacy in Arab-Islamic civilisation.

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Pan-Asianism

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Synonyms

Asianism; Chinese history; Internationalism; Japanese history; White peril; Yellow peril

Definition

Pan-Asianism (or Asianism) had a strong influence on political discourse and international relations during the first half of the twentieth century, particularly in East Asia. Pan-Asianist conceptions were diverse but usually focused on the assumed common heritage and fate of 'yellow' people vis-à-vis 'Western' civilization. As a political doctrine or principle, it first gained influence during the early 1910s in the context of anti-Asian immigration legislation in the United States and during World War One. As a statement of Asian self-determination ('Asia for the Asians', Asian Monroe Doctrine) and self-affirmation, it criticised negative and Orientalist portrayals of Asia as an exotic and backward place. It also rejected 'Euro-American' imperialism in Asia ('White Peril') and demanded the liberation of Asia from 'Western' imperialist powers. In this anti-imperialist version, Pan-Asianism was supported by many Asians but there was no consensus on its precise policies or implementation. In his speech on 'Greater Asianism' in Japan in 1924, the founder of modern China, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan, 1866–1925), summarized Pan-Asianism as an anti-imperialist and largely anti-Western political and cultural principle.

Many Indian and Chinese used Pan-Asianism to promote national liberation movements and showed little interest in supra-national activities, while Japanese conceptions often overlapped with Japan's imperialist ambitions. The Pan-Asian Conferences in Nagasaki and Shanghai (1926 & 1927), jointly convened by Japanese and Chinese organisations, failed to initiate a political movement (Weber 2017). From the 1930s onwards, the Japanese government and military used Pan-Asianist slogans as propaganda for Japan's own military and economic expansion in East and Southeast Asia (so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'). During the 2000s, Pan-Asianism was rediscovered by East Asian intellectuals and politicians as critiques of a Western-centric, neo-liberal, or neo-imperialist world order. Around the same time, Chinese politicians proposed a neo-Asianist global order, led by China. In scholarship, the influence of the Japanese China scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi has been paramount. Takeuchi alerted to the coexistent *anti-imperialist* aspiration and *imperialist* reality of pan-Asianism by contrasting its 'intention of solidarity' to its function as an 'instrument of invasion'.

Introduction

Pan-Asianism (also referred to as Asianism) is an idea, movement, and ideology based on an assumed cultural and ethnic commonality of Asians. It assumes the existence of common political and economic interests and of a shared destiny which necessitate a union of Asian peoples or countries to realize common aims. Such politicized ideas of Asian commonality and unity probably originated in Japan in the late nineteenth century but quickly became known throughout East Asia, in other parts of Asia, and outside Asia. One major impetus to the spread of Pan-Asianism was the racial exclusion legislation in the US from the 1880s onwards and the accompanying 'Yellow Peril' discourse there and in Europe. Depending on whether one prefers to interpret Pan-Asianism as an idea, as a movement, or as an ideology, the period during which its impact was strongest can be placed at different times between the 1880s and the early 1940s. However, as a political concept, discussed at first only occasionally by a specialist minority and later widely in mainstream public discourse, pan-Asianism has never completely disappeared since its inception and continues to be invoked frequently in social, economic, and political discourse today.

Concept and Conceptions

Pan-Asianism as a concept can be approached by analysing its semantic components: 'pan' (Greek: all) signifies togetherness, completion, or unity, while 'ism' refers to a theory, doctrine, or principle. 'Pan-Asianism' could therefore be translated as 'All Asia Principle' or 'Theory of Asian Unity'. In Japan and China, Pan-Asianism became widespread under the term 'Greater Asianism' (Jap. *Dai Ajiashugi,* Ch. *Da Yazhouzhuyi*) or simply Asianism (Jap. *Ajiashugi,* Ch. *Yazhouzhuyi*); for a discussion of different terminological nuances see Weber (2018). The most ambiguous part of the concept is its regional referent, Asia. Since Asia discourse in the 'West' usually ascribed Asian commonality to the 'yellow races' of East Asia,

and because Pan-Asianism as a self-referential concept had the greatest impact in Japan and China, most discussions of Pan-Asianism centre on the region today comprising Japan, China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, with occasional references to South-East Asia and South Asia and only rare inclusions of Western Asia. Pan-Asianism's Asia therefore by and large refers to the region that was traditionally under the strong influence of Chinese civilisation, including its material culture (diet, chopsticks) and non-material culture (script, Confucianism), as well as its political and social order (tributary and dynastic system, scholar-officials, examination system). While this heritage served as a basic unifying factor in many conceptions of Pan-Asianism, the central focus usually lay on Japan, not China. The main reasons for this are, first, Chinese disinterest in alternative concepts of Asia (other than the hegemonic, but looser, Sinocentric tributary order), second, the Japanese origin of Pan-Asianism as a new political concept which was viewed with suspicion by many in China, and third, the shift in power relations within East Asia from Chinese to Japanese dominance by the late nineteenth century. As a consequence of the latter, most Japanese conceptions of Pan-Asianism included a self-assigned leadership role for Japan as the strongest and most 'modern' or 'advanced' country in East Asia. This position is prominently reflected in the Japanese proposals for the Asian Monroe Doctrine, which was formulated in imitation of the Monroe Doctrine declared by the US president James Monroe in 1826. Just as the original Monroe Doctrine was not a non-hegemonic policy, but aimed rather at securing the national interests of the US in the Americas vis-à-vis the European colonial powers, the Asian Monroe Doctrine proposed a Japan-centred equivalent in opposition to the Western colonial powers in Asia. Asian Monroeism, like its American model, symbolises the ambivalence of Pan-Asianism as a concept that accommodates both imperialist and anti-imperialist views. While, on the one hand, most conceptions of Pan-Asianism argued for the liberation of Asian peoples and territory from Western imperialism, they implied – or explicitly called for – the replacement

of Western hegemony by Japanese leadership. Most Asianist conceptions are therefore both imperialist and anti-imperialist. This co-existence of opposing political agendas made Pan-Asianism a highly contested concept, an extremely disputed political agenda, and an ideal concept for imperialist propaganda in the name of anti-imperialism. The over-use of Pan-Asianism as an instrument of propaganda by the Japanese military and state authorities during the so-called Fifteen Years War (1931–45) in East Asia discredited the concept until the 1960s and may have contributed to the fact that scholars only hesitantly started to study Pan-Asianism in the first post-war decades (on the development of scholarship on Asianism in Japan see Furuya 1996). With few exceptions, scholarship in Western languages on the subject appeared only from the late 1990s onwards; among the first substantial articles dealing with Pan-Asianism in English are Beasley (1987), Hashikawa (1980), and Miwa (1990).

Scholarship and Classifications

The rehabilitation of ideas of Asian commonality in the context of the anti-imperialist Afro-Asian Bandung movement from the mid-1950s onwards encouraged the emergence of the first academic studies of Pan-Asianism in post-war Japan. Shorter articles on the development of Japanese Pan-Asianism by the historians Harada Katsumasa (1959) and Nohara Shirō (1960) formed the analytical basis of a first longer essay by the Japanese China scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–77) on 'The Prospect of Asianism' (*Ajiashugi no tenbō*), published in 1963 (see Weber 2018 and, for a full and annotated translation in German, Uhl 2005). This study has remained the most influential scholarly work on Pan-Asianism up to the present day. Takeuchi defined Asianism as an 'inclination', not an independent school of thought, contrasted Asianism's 'intention of solidarity' to its function as an 'instrument of invasion', and distinguished between 'real' and 'self-professed' Asianism. In addition, Takeuchi established a canon of thought and thinkers that he viewed as representative of

Asianism. This canon included, among others, activists of the left-wing Freedom and People's Rights Movement of the 1880s (Ueki Emori, Tarui Tōkichi, Ōi Kentarō), radical right-wing groups such as the Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) and the Genyōsha (Dark Ocean Society) that supported Japan's imperial expansion on the Asian mainland, the art historian Okakura Tenshin (who established the phrase 'Asia is one': see below), and the Sinophile writer and activist Miyazaki Tōten (supporter of the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen) (for these groups and thinkers see the relevant chapters in Saaler and Szpilman 2011). Takeuchi's main concern was to (re-)establish an understanding of Asianism that emphasised solidarity over invasion and that would, consequently, facilitate a positive Japanese understanding of Asia. In other words, he aimed at the rehabilitation of Asianism without denying the crimes committed in its name. Takeuchi therefore dismissed Asianist political and military propaganda, such as the euphemism 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' which the Japanese government used to disguise its imperialist policy in Asia, as well as apologetic and self-professed conceptions of Asianism as 'pseudo-thought', 'non-intellectual', and eventually non-Asianist.

Since the 1990s, Japanese scholarship has gradually started to shift its focus away from the Takeuchian approach, beginning instead to focus on Pan-Asianism's 'Asia' as a significant element of understanding the concept's meaning and implications. For example, the historians Furuya Tetsuo (1996) and Yamamuro Shin'ichi (2001) have historicised Asia with a focus on functional aspects of Asianism. Yamamuro distinguishes between Asia as a conceived, linked, and projected space. In his view, the Japanese were initially forced to accept Asia as a Western spatial classification, together with its negative civilisational implications. Eventually, however, they managed to utilise the concept for their own purposes. More than any previous studies, Furuya and Yamamuro have explored the historical use and meaning of Asianism and thereby contributed to the diversification of the Asianist canon. In addition, they have integrated Asianism discourse into the wider context of transnational and global

history by emphasising linkages between political reality and discourse in Japan, different parts of East Asia, and the world. One important result of this re-contextualisation is the discussion of Asianism in the (perceived) global hierarchy of West → Japan → rest of Asia that informed the world view of many thinkers and activists in Japan from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.

In twentieth-century China, studies of Asianism usually indiscriminately dismissed Japanese Asianism as blunt imperialism, while praising Li Dazhao's 'anti-imperialist' and Sun Yat-sen's 'patriotic' conceptions of Asianism. Since the early 2000s, however, Chinese scholars have started to revise this orthodox interpretation of Asianism. In 2004, the historian of modern Japan Wang Ping has proposed to evaluate Asianism chronologically, in terms of co-operative Classical Asianism (until 1898), expansive Greater Asianism (until 1928), and the invasive 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' (until 1945) (see Weber 2018). Against the background of China's contemporary rise, partial affirmations of historical Asianism have started to emerge in public discourse too. They imply that neo-Asianism could become a formula for China's new approach to Asia in the twenty-first century but, at the same time, are rather explicit about China's self-appointed leadership role in any such project. If one sees present-day China as a post-modern empire, this conception of new Chinese Asianism could be classified as new imperialist Asianism.

Unlike scholarship in China and Japan, scholarship in English has often focused on Pan-Asianism's 'pan' and the assumed common genealogy of Pan-Asianism and other pan-movements. For example, William G. Beasley distinguished between transnational anti-hegemonic pan-movements (e.g. Balkan Pan-Slavism, Pan-Africanism) as an expression of anti-colonial resistance and interventionist hegemonic pan-movements (e.g. Russian Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism) as instruments of expansion (see Beasley 1987). Beasley concluded that Japanese Pan-Asianism contained both elements of anti-colonialism (stemming from its weakness vis-à-vis the West) and expansionism (stemming from its strength vis-à-vis Asia).

Approximately half a century after scholarship on Asianism began with a simple solidarity-versus-invasion dichotomy, scholars today have returned to contrasting two types of Pan-Asianism: imperialist and anti-imperialist conceptions (Itō 1990). Placing current discussions of regionalism and mechanisms of regionalisation into a historical context, Prasenjit Duara has proposed to discuss Asianism in the framework of a distinction between 'imperial regionalism' and 'anti-imperialist regionalization'. According to Duara, both types can be found in historical Asianism: 'Japanese pan-Asianism at the turn of the century had several different strains, including imperialistic ones, but also egalitarian and compassionate feelings toward fellow Asians who had been exploited and devastated by more aggressive cultures' (Duara 2010: 970). Intentionally or not, Duara's binary typology constitutes a return to the Takeuchian distinction between (imperialist) invasion and (anti-imperialist) solidarity.

A possible conclusion drawn from these different attempts at classifying Pan-Asianism may be that both in thought and practice different conceptions of Pan-Asianism varied greatly in content and intention. During most of its history these conceptions co-existed but differed in influence. When ideas and practices of Asian commonality and solidarity were 'hijacked by Japanese militarism' (Duara 2010: 973) from the 1930s onwards, however, Pan-Asianism became meaningless beyond its function as propaganda.

Pan-Asianism Before the First World War

While 'Pan-Asianism' as a term appears not to have been in use in East Asia before the early 1890s, other concepts implying cultural and ethnic commonality or the common political fate of Asians in opposition to the West had been used in Japan and China from no later than the 1880s onwards. Among them were 'same culture, same race' (Jap. *dōbun dōshu*, Ch. *tongwen tongzhong*) implying cultural and ethnic commonality, 'lips and teeth' (Jap. *shinshi hosha*, Ch. *chunchi fuche*) implying economic and strategic interdependence based on territorial proximity, or the more

practically oriented terms 'revive Asia' (Jap. *Shin-A*, Ch. *Zhen Ya*) and 'raise Asia' (Jap. *Kō-A*, Ch. *Xing Ya*) (on these concepts and their relation to Asianism see Furuya 1996). Some of these concepts served as names of Asianist organisations active before and around the turn of the century, such as the Kō-A Kai (Raise Asia Society, 1880–1900), the Dōbun Kai (Common Culture Society, 1898), or the Tōa Dōbun Kai (East Asia Common Culture Society, 1898–1946) (see Zachmann 2009). The founding of Asianist organisations since the 1880s in Japan must above all be seen in the context of anti-Westernism. This anti-Westernism both directly and indirectly targeted the West, seen as a more or less monolithic bloc representing political, economic, and rhetorical oppression of the non-West. Most immediately this anti-Westernism was directed *internally* at the Japanese Meiji government, which preferred to modernise by adapting models in law, education, economy, politics, military, and other areas from European countries and the US, thereby neglecting Japan's long-standing links with East Asia. In addition, it was also directed *externally* at the West itself; by forming personal alliances with like-minded Chinese, Koreans, and other Asians, Japanese Asianists hoped to prepare for an eventual clash with the West in order to regain freedom from Western oppression. The anti-imperialist element is therefore deeply rooted in the programmes of early Asianist organisations. However, the self-assigned privilege of leadership of Pan-Asia by Japanese Asianists increasingly came under attack from non-Japanese participants as relations between Japan and its Asian neighbours deteriorated, first in the struggle over Korea (since 1875, leading to annexation in 1910), then during the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), and finally during and in the immediate aftermath of the First World War (the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, the anti-Japanese demonstrations in Korea and China in 1919).

The activities of these Pan-Asianist organisations were nevertheless meaningful. In meetings, in publications, and most importantly through educational activities (such as the establishment of language schools, e.g. Tōa Dōbun Shoin in Nanjing/Shanghai) they contributed, in the literal sense, to a growing mutual understanding, to the spread of political and scientific knowledge, and to an awareness of Asian commonality. In the decade following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, which had ended with China's defeat and its partial colonisation by Japan, exchanges between students and teachers from both countries boomed to an unprecedented degree (see Reynolds 1993). During this time, the first proposals emerged that not only suggested assistance and co-operation but went one step further to propose political unions of Japan and other parts of East Asia. The most famous proposal was authored by the liberal activist Tarui Tōkichi (1850–1922), who proposed 'to ally with the friendly nations of the same Asian race'. His *Union of the Great East* (written in 1885, published in 1893) envisaged an alliance of Japan and Korea, later to be joined by China. Such a union, Tarui argued, would be advantageous economically and militarily, particularly in opposition to Russia, and would also strengthen the sense of East Asian racial commonality versus the White race (Neuhaus 2020). Tarui's treatise today is usually interpreted as a counterpart of the more well-known *Leaving Asia Thesis* (Jap. *Datsu-A Ron*, 1885) by the famous Meiji thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901), who had taken a stance completely opposite to Tarui's (for an English translation of this classic text see Lu 1997). After the failed Japanese intervention in Korea in 1885, Fukuzawa had called upon Japan to depart from 'the bad company of Asia' and to join the West in order to be recognised by it as a civilised country that was – despite its shared historic roots and geographical position – fundamentally different from the Asian barbarians. Against this anti-Asianist civilisational argument, Tarui's Asianism focused on a combination of practical and racial arguments. Despite the existence of Asianist organisations and ideas, Fukuzawa's call to depart from Asia is believed to be more representative of the dominant politico-intellectual mood of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Japan.

A second important Asianist writing produced around the turn of the century was *Ideals of the*

East (1903) by Okakura Kakuzō (1862–1913, better known as Tenshin) (see Tankha 2009). This book, written in English for a foreign audience and not published in Japanese before the 1920s, contains the famous line 'Asia is one', which today is often quoted as the politico-cultural epitome of Asianism. Okakura, however, admired the diversity of Asian civilisational traditions and arts, which only appeared as 'one' when compared with the external other, namely the West. This West increasingly came to be negatively portrayed, not only in the parts of Asia that had been colonised by the West, but also in Japan. After Japan's victory over China in 1895, the so-called Triple Intervention by Russia, Germany, and France forbade Japan extensive territorial gains in China. While even Japanese Asianists had been tolerant to some degree of the Western colonial presence in Asia, there was little tolerance in Japan of the Western restriction of Japan's own expansive ambitions within Asia. In this context Japanese politicians and thinkers coined an imperialist version of Asianism which constituted an imitation of a Western policy: the Asian Monroe Doctrine. One of the first proponents of this doctrine was the prominent politician Prince Konoe Atsumaro, who was also the leading figure in the Asianist East Asia Common Culture Society. In 1898, Konoe first proposed the adoption of an Asian Monroe Doctrine to the Chinese reformer Kang Youwei: 'The East is the East of the East. Only the peoples of the East must have the right to decide the matters of the East. The American Monroe Doctrine denotes exactly this. It is the duty of our two peoples [Chinese and Japanese] to implement an Asian Monroe Doctrine in the East' (see Zachmann 2009). While in this formulation the idea appeared to be anti-imperialist and pluralist in character, it lent itself perfectly to the justification of Japanese claims of hegemony and imperialist expansion when China continued to struggle politically, economically, and militarily around the time of the Republican Revolution (1911–12). In fact, Asian Monroeism became a key concept in the justification for Japan's assumed special mission in Asia during the 1910s and was a key argument also in the 1930s when the Japanese government sought

to justify its establishment of Manchukuo as a protectorate in north China (Young 1998).

The anti-Western element in Pan-Asianism was not fuelled solely by Western imperialism in Asia. Another source was the rhetorical denigration of Asians in Western political and popular discourse. Movements in the US to ban Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century were accompanied by an array of racist statements known as 'Yellow Peril' discourse. When Japan, too, became increasingly affected by these policies and discourse from the early twentieth century onwards, Asianist thought and proposals spread rapidly. As the antithesis of Yellow Peril discourse, the term 'White Peril' was coined and interpreted by some as the core meaning of racialist conceptions of Asianism (Kamachi 2005). While various ideas of Asian commonality had been discussed in Japan (and to a much lesser degree in China) since the 1880s, it is important to note that debates on Pan-Asianism were highly unpopular with the Japanese government. This stance was part of its pro-Western and accommodationist orientation, which produced an imperialist-cum-anti-Asianist rather than Asianist position and changed openly only when Japan announced its departure from the League of Nations in 1933.

Pan-Asianism in the Twentieth Century

The greatest impact on the spread of Pan-Asianist ideas in Japan and China may be attributed to the First World War. It not only triggered the birth of a great diversity of Asianist conceptions, adding economic, educational, academic, literary, and other elements to the previous range of mainly political and racialist-culturalist ideas. It also brought discussions about the meaning, significance, and usefulness of Asianism to the mainstream of public debate. Articles discussing Pan-Asianism now started to appear in national newspapers and widely read journals. Despite very obvious imperialist tendencies in Japan's Asia policy during the 1910s (the annexation of Korea in 1910, the Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915, the Siberian Expedition during

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1918–22), this was also the period during which Asianism exerted the strongest appeal throughout Asia, including China and India.

The First World War served as a trigger since it challenged the widespread belief in the superiority of Western civilisation and modernity. More practically, the focus of the Western powers on Europe as the main theatre of war allowed for the planning of more proactive policies by Asians in Asia, including renewed demands for the declaration and implementation of an Asian Monroe Doctrine. In addition, the refusal to accept the Japan-sponsored racial equality clause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 fuelled the growing disillusionment with the West and became a perfect occasion for anti-Western agitation in Japan (Shimazu 1998). The protests against Western racial discrimination reached a peak with the US–American Racial Exclusion Legislation of 1924 and stimulated racialist Asianist thought and activities in Japan to an unprecedented degree (Stalker 2006). This stream of Asianism would remain at the forefront of debate (and later of propaganda) until the end of the Second World War (Dower 1986).

However, the legacy of the war and of Versailles, including Wilson's (and Lenin's) declaration of the self-determination of nations, also inspired different anti-imperialist conceptions of Asianism in the colonised parts of Asia, including West Asia. In fact, after the Japanese victory over Russia (1905) Japan had begun 'to serve as a metaphor for Asian modernity for the Ottomans, Egyptians, and Indians' (Aydin 2007: 78). In particular, many Indians came to study and live in Japan, although their concern with national independence seems to have mostly taken priority over a substantially Pan-Asian cause. This is very obvious in the writings of Rash Bihari Bose (1886–1945), the most famous Indian dissident in Japan. He had fled to Japan in 1915, acquired Japanese citizenship in 1923, founded the Indian Independence League in Tokyo, and used the Pan-Asianist boom in Japan to promote Indian independence (Hotta 2007). Bose's activities in exile illustrate the dilemma of Pan-Asianism at that time. There was no other Asian power to appeal to in the fight for independence but Japan.

However, from 1902 to 1922 Japan had been an ally of India's coloniser, and, even after the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it showed little interest in participating in or even leading anti-colonial national liberation movements because it had itself become an imperial power. Bose's explicit Japanophilism therefore damaged his position within the Indian independence movement. As Bose had to learn, it was difficult to be pro-Japanese and anti-imperialist at the same time. This balancing act became almost impossible after the war when Japan's imperialism triggered anti-Japanese movements and violent suppressions in Korea (the March First Movement, 1919) and China (the May Fourth Movement, 1919, the May Thirtieth Incident, 1925). But criticism of Japanese conceptions of Pan-Asianism did not preclude affirmations of the concept itself. For example, Li Dazhao (1889–1927), a well-known Marxist thinker and co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party who had studied in Japan between 1913 and 1916, harshly criticised Japanese 'Greater Asianism' as a 'different name for Greater Japanism' and as a principle of invasion and Japanese militarism (Matten 2016). Initially, however, Li embraced Asianism as an instrument to overcome rival nationalisms. Yet for Li it was no contradiction to reject *Japanese* nationalism while advancing the revival of *Chinese* nationalism as the core message of Chinese Pan-Asianism. According to Li, Chinese nationalism should first free and unite China, then proceed to unite East Asia, and later unify the world. In this sense, Li's 'New Asianism' was as nationalistic and self-centred as Japanese proposals for an Asian Monroe Doctrine. The important difference, of course, was that the realisation of such China-centred interpretations of Asianism were – at that time, at least – unrealistic given China's internal state and international status, whereas Japan-centred visions had already begun to be implemented as imperialist policies.

Although originating from a very different position – that of a nationalist statesman, not a Marxist activist – the most famous Chinese contribution to Asianism discourse by the 'Father of the Chinese Republic', Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), resembles Li's 'New Asianism'. The basic line for

Sun, too, was anti-colonialism, at least as far as China's emancipation from the colonial powers was concerned. While Sun harshly criticised the West for its racism and imperialism, his stance towards Japan was more ambivalent. On the one hand he portrayed modern Japan as a model for China and other Asian nations, while on the other hand he criticised Japan's lack of commitment to the traditional Asian value of benevolent rule (Jap. Ōdō, Ch. wangdao). Reportedly, Sun ended his famous speech on 'Greater Asianism', delivered in the Japanese port city of Kobe in November 1924, with the following statement: 'The Japanese have already arrived at the Western culture of the Rule of Might. But they retain the substance of the Asian Rule of Right. Will Japan from today onwards for the future of the culture of the world become the hunting dog of the Western Rule of Might or the bulwark of the Eastern Rule of Right? This, my Japanese friends, you must thoroughly consider and make one choice' (Weber 2018: 206). The terms 'Rule of Might' and 'Rule of Right' refer to the Confucian concepts wangdao (lit. Kingly Way: benevolent rule) and badao (lit. Despotic Way: hegemonic rule). Transferred to the political context of the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, they may also be understood as representing anti-imperialism and imperialism, respectively. Sun's final question to Japan addresses the co-existence of imperialist and anti-imperialist conceptions of Asianism. But his conceptual choice and his euphemistic portrayal of China's own previous imperialist-like tributary relations with other parts of Asia leave little doubt about the Sinocentrism inherent in his conception of Asianism (Duara 2001). In other words, for many Asianists, including also Chinese, Asianism's anti-imperialist dimension went only so far as to criticise the imperialism of others while conveniently making use of the concept to disguise one's own hegemonic agenda (e. g. cultural dominance in the region or ethnic hegemony within one country).

The Pan-Asian Conferences held in Nagasaki in 1926 and in Shanghai in 1927 were the last notable efforts 'from below' to divorce Japanese imperialism from Japanese-driven Asianism (see Aydin 2007). Convened by a Chinese and a Japanese Asianist organisation, the conferences brought together Asian-minded activists, including Rash Bihari Bose and the Indian revolutionary Mahendra Pratap (see Stolte 2012). However, Chinese suspicions of Japanese proposals, for example for the building of an Asian railway and the planning of an Asian Development Bank, and the Japanese delegates' hesitant stance towards condemning Japan's imperialist policies, obstructed any fruitful debate. Given the obstructive circumstances, however, the convening of these conferences alone may be regarded as proof of Pan-Asianism's appeal to thinkers and activists in Asia during the mid-1920s.

Any discussions of Pan-Asianist alternatives to imperialism or nationalism became obsolete when the Japanese military and government began to adopt the concept to propagate its policies in its new colonies. Most notoriously, Pan-Asianist notions were instrumentalised when Japan created the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 (Young 1998). According to Japanese propaganda, Manchukuo represented the realisation of a Pan-Asianist ideal state in which different Asian nations could co-exist peacefully and in harmony. The founding of Manchukuo also inspired new Asianist organisations, which often had prominent political or military leaders as patrons. One of the key figures behind the activities of the Greater Asia Association (Dai Ajia Kyōkai, 1933–45; see Weber 2018), for example, was General Matsui Iwane (1878–1948), who was later executed as a class A war criminal for his role in the military campaign in Central China and in the infamous Nanjing Massacre committed by Japanese soldiers in the Chinese capital in 1937–38. The Greater Asia Association used Japan's military advance to set up branches in occupied areas that were instructed to spread Pan-Asianist propaganda to gain local collaboration. In Japan itself reports about and by the Association's Asia network implied that Japan-sponsored Pan-Asianism was the key to Japan's assumed successes and popularity throughout Asia. With the Japanese declaration of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' in 1940 (Yellen 2019) Pan-Asianism completely degenerated into an ideology for empire. In addition, following ever stricter

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censorship regulations and the establishment of a nationwide 'thought police' in Japan in 1928, controversial discussions and anti-government activism had become close to impossible even before the mobilisation for total war from 1941 onwards. The most prominent use of non-Japanese conceptions of Pan-Asianism during that period was the attempt by Wang Jingwei's collaborationist Nanjing regime to link Japanese hegemonism to Sun Yat-sen's pan-Asianism (Weber 2018). Wang's outspoken focus on Sun's Sinocentric Asianism was tolerated by the Japanese to a large degree because the Japanese government itself had started to use Sun as an instrument for the promotion of 'Sino-Japanese friendship' under Japanese guidance.

The Bandung conference of 1955 is often interpreted as an early revival of political Pan-Asianism, although the joint African–Asian dimension may qualify the movement more correctly as an expression of non-regionalist anti-colonialism and a stepping stone towards the Non-Aligned Movement. In its regional, cultural, and ideological heterogeneity it shared little of the elements of Pan-Asianism during the first half of the twentieth century. Pan-Asianist notions, at best, informed one stream of thought within the Bandung movement.

Pan-Asianism in the Twenty-First Century

Towards the end of the twentieth century, with the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc and the economic rise of many Asian countries, new affirmations of Asia emerged that revived some of the themes of historical Pan-Asianism (Jenco 2013). Initially, the main proponents of such ideas were neither Japanese nor Chinese, but included the former prime ministers of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew (1923–2015), and Malaysia, Mohamad Mahathir (born 1925). Both used Pan-Asianist notions to justify the authoritarian and patriarchic rule in their countries, which – in their view – corresponded better to Asian socio-political traditions than Western democracy. Lee in 1994 proposed a cultural Asianism through which East

Asian people were allegedly connected by tradition and fate. According to Lee they shared a belief in the superiority of groupism over individualism and 'core values' such as 'thrift, hard work, filial piety, and loyalty in the extended family' (quoted in Jenco 2013: 250). Similarly, Mahathir (2000) denounced the promotion of human rights and democracy by Western governments as a new quasi-imperialist method to continue their domination over Asia. Instead he encouraged Asians to 'have pride in their values and culture and their ways of managing their countries and their problems. The attempts by the West to force their values and ideologies on Asians must be resisted.'

In the context of regional integration and attempts at historical reconciliation, Pan-Asianist visions also re-emerged in political discourse in China, Japan, and Korea during the 2000s. While in official statements by politicians from these countries Pan-Asianism once again appears to have become a tool for reaffirming or claiming one country's centrality and leadership position in (East) Asia, initiatives from below appeal to notions of commonality for the purpose of fostering exchange, mutual interest and understanding, and historical reconciliation. Many of the intellectuals and activists in such transnational networks, including the Chinese Sun Ge, the Taiwanese Chen Kuan-hsing, and the Korean Baik Yong-seo, take inspiration from Takeuchi Yoshimi's pro-Asianist writings. Their discovery of Takeuchi and their promotion of East Asian reconciliation have triggered a boom in the study of Takeuchi since the early 2000s (Sun 2007; Chen 2010; Baik 2002). Linked to this focus on non-hegemonic visions of Asia is the re-emergence of Asianism as a critique of regionalism that is solely driven by capitalist interests. Against the tendency to conceive of Asia as merely a market obeying neoliberal mechanisms, many Asianist-inclined thinkers and activists have warned of an 'Asia for the rich' (Duara 2010: 983). In opposition to this capitalist vision of Asia the Japanese historian Wada Haruki and the Korean-born scholar Kang Sang-jung, among others, have proposed a people-centred approach to Asia that could lead to the creation of a Common House of North East Asia (Weber 2014). In these ways pro-Asianist civil

society networks and scholarly communities are once again forming a transnational opposition to top-down projects that promote state-centred, neoliberal, or other hegemonic visions of Asia.

Cross-References

► China: Anti-imperialism from the Manchu Empire to the People's Republic
► China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
► First World War and Imperialism
► Korea and Imperialism
► Neoliberalism and Imperialism
► Orientalism
► Pan-Africanism
► Philippines and Imperialism
► Said, Edward W. (1936–2003)
► United States Imperialism, 19th Century

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Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)

▶ Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

Partisan War

▶ Guerrilla Warfare and Imperialism

Partition

▶ British Twentieth Century Imperialism and Anti-imperialism in South Asia
▶ Decolonization in South Asia

Paternalistic Capitalism

▶ Greek Anti-imperialism, Contemporary Era

Patriarchy

▶ Gender and Violence

Patrice Lumumba

▶ Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

Payment for Environmental Services

▶ Conservation as Economic Imperialism

Peace

▶ Zionism's Imperial Roots

Peasants

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism
▶ Food and Imperialism: Food Regimes, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony

People's War

▶ Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)
▶ Nepal, Imperialism and Anti-imperialism

Peripheralization

▶ Ottoman Empire and Imperialism

Periphery

▶ Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex

Peru

▶ Sendero Luminoso

Peru, Underdevelopment, and Anti-imperialism

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Synonyms

Anti-capitalism; Dispossession; Neoliberalism;
Pacification

Definition/Description

The Peruvian state has a long history of using
structural and legal violence as a means to
advance foreign imperial and capitalist interests.
Although the history of anti-imperial (resistance
to cultural domination.) and anti-capitalist (resis-
tance to economic domination.) struggles in Latin
America is vast, the case of Peru is noteworthy
because it often went in opposite direction from its
neighboring countries. Following the sociopoliti-
cal-economic upheaval that began in the 1930s
and peaked during the 1960s, most Latin Ameri-
can countries saw democracy replaced by right-
wing military governments, whereas, in Peru, it
was a socialist military government. Furthermore,
despite anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist move-
ments in most of Latin America opting for non-
military strategies in their struggles during the
1980s, the PCP-SL (Peruvian Communist Party-
Shining Path, a Maoist organization that splin-
tered off the PCP in 1968.) and the MRTA (Rev-
olutionary Movement Túpac Amaru formed
through alliances between the remnants of the
1960s guerrillas inspired by the Cuban revolution
and in particular by the Che Guevara.) opted to
begin an armed insurgency. Finally, whereas the

return to democracy in most Latin American
countries decreased the level of overt political
violence, in Peru the end of the military govern-
ment marked the beginning of a 20-year internal
armed conflict that would cost the lives of over
70,000 people and would pave the way for a right-
wing civilian authoritarian government from 1990
to 2001. This entry examines how the Peruvian
state used the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist
struggles from 1960 to 2001 to reinforce imperial
justifications for neocolonial forms of interven-
tion, strengthen capitalism, and implement drastic
neoliberal policies. As a result, the plundering of
natural resources and the exploitation of labor
benefiting capitalist interests intensified signifi-
cantly; the use of overt violence by the state
became further embedded in parts of the collective
imaginary as necessary and legitimate means to
quell social unrest; state crimes remained essential
to the protection and advancement of capitalism
and imperialism.

Situating the Historical Origins of Economic Exploitation, Cultural Domination, and State Violence in Peru

Colonization of the Americas, Asia, and Africa
paved the way for imperial advancement by pro-
viding European capital unbounded resource
extraction (McNelly 2006). The colonization pro-
cess imposed an economic model geared toward
accumulation by dispossession Harvey (2004).
He argues that the concept "original" or "primi-
tive" accumulation is misleading; it implies that
the predatory practices that gave way to capital
creation and capital accumulation during capital-
ism's early beginnings are no longer relevant
when, in fact, they remain central to capitalism.
"The commodification and privatization of land,
the forceful expulsion of peasant populations, the
commodification of labor power and the suppres-
sion of alternative, indigenous forms of produc-
tion and consumption. . ." (p.74) are few examples
of ongoing practices. The "patenting and licens-
ing of genetic materials, the commodification of
nature in all its forms as well as of cultural pro-
ductions, the depletion of global environmental

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commons and other forms of habitat degradation. . ." (p.75) are new manifestations of the same predatory practices. Harvey (2004) proposes accumulation by dispossession as a more accurate description of these predatory practices that relied on the expropriation of land from the original inhabitants of the newly founded colonies; the pilfering of the natural resources found in those territories; the exploitation of the labor of Indigenous peoples; and the transformation of Indigenous societies into markets for colonial industrial products. Spain deployed diverse forms of overt violence to secure control over the land and its inhabitants as well as to impose a system that would render violence invisible and unrecognizable. Whereas the overt violence of colonizers killed, injured, and maimed Indigenous peoples, the systemic and structural violence debilitated the local population through the endemic injury and exclusion of certain bodies due to the logics of racial capitalism (Puar 2017), produced the slow death of millions of people through a violence that appears as natural and disconnected from the systemic and structural factors that, through a trickling effect, reduce life chances, quality of living, and length of living of certain categories of the population (Nixon 2011), and hindered the possibility of resistance across generations (Nixon 2011; Puar 2017). The ripple effects of visible and invisible colonial violence continue until today (Manrique 2002; Degregori 2010).

Although international law criminalized the seizing of land already occupied by people, Europeans rendered colonization lawful by legally excluding the Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas, Asia, and Africa from the realm of the human (Said 1993; Montaner 2001; Nixon 2011). Hence, Europe's imperialist ideology partly emerged out of the need to legitimize their criminal actions. This ideology limited humanity to Europeans and granted the rest of humankind different degrees of humanness depending on their likeness, adaptability, and willingness to adopt a European way of life. By construing Indigenous peoples of colonized lands as semi-human, child, barbarians, savages, etc., Europeans were able to justify not only the taking

over their lands but their subjugation, domination, and the destruction of their political-social-economic structures (Muiu and Martin 2009). Imperial ideology equated Europeans with whiteness, natural superiority, and civilization, whereas it construed non-Europeans as intrinsically racialized, naturally inferior, perpetually underdeveloped, and needing brute force to comply (Said 1993). Imperial ideology interpreted any use of overt violence to resist their subjugation as further proof of the savagery of the local population and legitimated the violence deployed by the colonizer. As overt violence is never sustainable in the long term, symbolic violence (Bourdieu) and cultural violence (Fanon 1951) were used to ensure the dissemination and assimilation of imperial ideology within the local population. This facilitated the creation of internal casts where European descendants assumed the right to dominate everyone deemed non-European through overt and structural violence (Lumbreras 1985; Manrique 2002). Within non-European societies, claims of whiteness became a strategy to assert power and superiority over others (Arat-Koc 2010). Consequently, the symbolic, structural, and physical violence deployed by the colonial state continued after independence (Galeano 1971).

Latin America originated out of the violence of colonization and remains trapped in it; violence became a normalized response and proof of its existence as a political body (Lora Cam 2001). The use of physical violence by the colonizers and the use of the same violence in order to gain independence laid out the ground for a construction of a collective imagery where violence is a legitimate tool to achieve political goals (Manrique 2002). This collective imagery facilitated the constitution of the military under the model of political armies. Unlike in Europe where the creation of the nation state required military forces to be brought under the control of the state (Foucault 1976), in the global South, the nation state came to be through the waging of a war of independence by a national army (Francisco 2000). Therefore, the birth of the nation state happened at the same time as the emergence of a national army; consequently, the military used

this historical fact to justify its misappropriation of politics as one of its prerogatives (Koonings and Krujit 2003). The armed forces in Latin America choose to abstain from politics until they deem it necessary to intervene.

Political armies deem civilians greedy, incompetent, and corrupt while considering themselves as having the training, values, and expertise to lead the nation. Furthermore, given that they have sacrificed themselves for the nation, they believe they are entitled to shape the essence of the nation and to decide on the future of the nation (Toche 2008). As a result, out of 107 rulers since Peru's independence, approximately 56 have been military men. Furthermore, between 1956 and 2002 (period with the highest level of social unrest), five governments were de facto and six democratic. Yet, whether dictatorship or democracy, Peruvian governments have been incapable of protecting the state from capital influence and imperial intervention (Lora Cam 2001).

Although the political chains that tied it to Spain were broken through the acquisition of political sovereignty, the social and economic order founded in a racist capitalist system and mode of governance remained (Lora Cam 2001; Manrique 2002). Unlike Spain who implemented a formal imperial relationship, the UK and the USA have established an informal imperial relationship built upon economic and cultural dependence; political and military collaboration; and collusion with the national elite (Doyle 1985; Lora Cam 2001). The dominant classes of ex-colonies benefit economically from serving the interests of imperial forces and therefore have actively impeded the implementation of alternative economic systems, have limited their own investment in national industries, have hindered the generation of national capital, and refused to develop other ways of doing politics (Nkrumah 1973). Peru and the rest of Latin America continue to exist in order to serve foreign needs. Oppressor countries get richer in absolute and relative terms because imperial powers force ex-colonies to hand out resources at low prices and labor at low wages. Furthermore, the development of national capital is hindered by imperial forces coercing ex-colonies into mono-agriculture,

dependent industrialization, and a mining economy that responds to the needs of the metropolis (Galeano 1971). Latin America's underdevelopment is therefore the direct consequence of capitalism's international division of labor geared toward the continuous economic growth of the global North (Galeano 1971; McNelly 2006; Gordon and Webber 2016). The global North then uses the South's underdevelopment as proof of ex-colonies' backwardness and to normalize the right of the North to dictate the liberalization of national markets and impose other structural reforms in developing and transitional economies (Abrahamsen 2003; Shore and Haller 2005; Ayissi 2008).

Anti-imperial and Anti-capitalism Struggles

Peru has a long history of movements attempting to challenge capitalism and imperialism. However, these struggles have mostly been issue oriented and identity based (workers, students, peasants, Indigenous peoples) without being successful in reaching out to other groups and involving diverse sectors of the population (Degregori 2010). Between the 1950s and 1970s, the number of movements advocating for social justice and seeking political, cultural, social, and economic transformations grew exponentially and adopted different approaches. Social movements made claims and demanded changes through institutional channels and through public demonstrations without success. As a result, these movements turned to direct action strategies: peasants and Indigenous peoples attempted to repossess land taken away by the state, corporations, or landowners; workers went on strike or seized factories; and students disturbed classes and occupied schools or universities (Béjar 1969). These strategies required a certain use of overt violence directed at people and property, which the state then used to justify the violence and unreasonable force the police and the military deployed to regain control over those spaces. In their reporting of the events, the media exaggerated the violence used by these movements and

denied or minimized the abuses committed by state forces (Degregori 2010). By providing the public with a distorted view of the events, the state succeeded in portraying anti-capitalism and anti-imperial struggles as criminal, dangerous, destructive, and infringing on the rights of law-abiding citizens.

Up to the 1960s, political parties represented the interest of the oligarchy and therefore were located at the center right of the political spectrum. APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre.) and the PCP (Peruvian Communist Party, founded in 1928 under the name Peruvian Socialist Party by José Carlos Mariátegui.) were the only left-wing political parties in existence, performing poorly during elections. Their political platforms challenged imperialism and capitalism and called for economic nationalism or homegrown socialism. Considered at times a threat to social order, the Peruvian government banned them in multiple instances forcing their leaders to live clandestinely or in exile. The convoluted history of APRA and the PCP and the political turmoil of the 1960s resulted in several internal schisms within those two parties that led to an exponential growth of left-wing political parties. These parties called for the eradication of the social inequalities produced by capitalism in urban centers and by the semi-feudal situation in rural areas, where 1% of the population owned 60% of agricultural lands (Béjar 1969), through radical social change (Lora Cam 2001). Although they used their calls for insurrection demagogically, the effect was nonetheless to introduce it into the public's consciousness as a legitimate strategy. Although none of those parties gained significant electoral success and remain marginal in the political scene, their reformist or revolutionary stances became a credible alternative for the urban population dissatisfied with the solutions proposed by traditional political parties (Pásara 1980).

Parallel to the arrival of multiple left-wing political parties to the electoral process, the political scene saw the entrance of political groups created by ex-members of electoral parties who, disaffected with the electoral system, advocated for insurrection as the only viable option to take power and transform society (Béjar 1969). These groups presented violence as necessary evil to the overt and structural violence perpetrated by the state and capital. These groups understood that an insurrection without the support of the masses was unsustainable and therefore embarked on political work with students, workers, and peasants in rural and urban sectors. However, their approach had limited success because they were mostly privileged young middle-class educated white men attempting to *enlighten* those marginalized and exploited by the system without acknowledging that they were partly responsible for the exploitation of those they were trying to *awaken* (de la Cadena 1998).

The 1960s brought around an unprecedented actor within anti-capitalism and anti-imperial struggles. Traditionally, the Catholic Church had supported and legitimated the exploitative, oppressive, and racialized social order. For instance, priest would preach that the landowner in rural areas and the employer in urban areas were representatives of God on earth and therefore their word was equivalent to a divine command (Béjar 1969). In the mid-1960s, an alternative discourse appeared. Liberation theology had a significant impact around the world but particularly in Latin America and Africa because it argued for a Marxist analysis to be at the basis of religious dogma and precepts. Liberation theology preached that every Christian is obligated to denounce any unjust political, economic, and social system and to demand immediate and concrete action in order to transform society (Gutierrez 1972). It is a Christian duty to participate in bringing about "heaven here on earth" by defending the poor, resisting oppression, and partaking in the fight for social justice. Due to the preeminence of the Catholic Church in Peru, around 90% of the population identifies as Catholic, the anti-capital and anti-imperial discourse of liberation theology gave credence and a certain level of legitimacy to similar discourses from different sources.

Despite failing to effect significant and lasting social change, the multiple movements, groups, and parties were successful in normalizing anti-

imperial and anti-capitalist discourses. As a result, by the 1960s, most Peruvians were aware of the inequality, exploitation, discrimination, and oppression experienced by the majority of the population on behalf of a minority whose interests were protected by the state, religion, and other social institutions. When the FIR (Left-wing Revolutionary Front), the MIR (Revolutionary Movement of the Left, founded by ex-members of APRA), and the ELN (National Liberation Army, founded by ex-members of the PCP) took up arms against the state between 1963 and 1965, they targeted capitalist and imperialist infrastructures or members of the armed forces who were protecting an illegitimate order. Despite some limited initial success and support from the population, they failed to galvanize it into a larger political mobilization at the national level (Lora Cam 2001). The Peruvian state took advantage of this and deployed the army who neutralized the guerrillas rapidly; the insurgents were either imprisoned, killed, or murdered (Pireto Celi 2010).

The defeat of the guerrillas did not bring about the end of social turmoil. Political instability continued until 1968 when the military, led by General Velasco, deposed the democratically elected president and put in place a left-wing nationalist military government. Velasco justified the coup d'état by arguing that the country was heading toward utter chaos given that politicians were incapable of making the necessary transformations to ensure social justice and to protect the interests of the majority (Velasco 1973). When Velasco addressed the nation on October 2, 1968, he justified the intervention of the armed forces by blaming the turmoil on the widespread corruption and immorality of politicians who put their interests ahead of those of the nation. He claimed it was the responsibility of the army to take power and ensure the necessary transformations put in place to avoid the collapse of the state (Velasco 1973). Velasco assured the population that social justice and nationalist interest were behind the military's actions and that his government would be independent of capitalist, communist, and imperial influences.

Velasco conducted numerous anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist reforms within agriculture, industry, education, and worker's rights; he also renationalized the exploitation of natural resources and increased regulation over international corporations (Krujit and del Pilar Tello 2003). Although the measures struck at the core of capitalist interest and appeased most of the left, it generated economic instability, pressure from those negatively affected by the reforms, and internal discontent from opposing high-ranking members of the military (Pásara 1980; Escárzaga 2001). As a result, in 1975, General Morales Bermudez replaced Velasco, reversed many of the reforms, and organized free democratic elections in 1980.

The reversal of some of Velasco's reforms placed the political left at a crossroads; it needed to decide whether to give a chance to the electoral process and participate in the election or take up arms against the state (Hinojosa 1998). Although the majority of the political organizations participated in the election, the PCP-SL began its armed insurgency during the elections. Four years into the internal armed conflict, the MRTA became the second insurgent organization to use military strategies as means of seizing power. Aside from attacking infrastructures, symbols, and representatives of the state, both organizations systematically and continually targeted national and international capital as well as imperialist entities, symbols, and representatives. Although early on both organizations garnered significant support from the political left, social movements, popular organizations, as well as the urban and rural poor, by the end of the 1980s, they had lost most of it (Escárzaga 2001).

Support for both organizations declined for different reasons. In the case of the MRTA, their ideological and organizational link to the 1960s guerrillas had contributed to their popularity, but by the end of the 1980s, public support dwindled significantly. Its supporters were disillusioned by the MRTA's purportedly association with drug trafficking and redirection of fundraising activities (such as kidnappings and extorting quotas) from targeting representatives of imperialism and capitalism to targeting regular folk. They saw these changes as veering away from a revolutionary struggle and into ordinary criminal

activity. Furthermore, the state and the media continuously undermined the leadership by providing information that presented them as weak and frivolous, marred with internal fighting over women. This led the MRTA's supporters to question the sincerity, commitment, and determination of the leadership.

The loss of support experienced by the PCP-SL resulted from three distinct yet linked factors. On one hand, the PCP-SL positioned Abimael Guzmán as bearer of historical truth and sole leader of the revolution (Gorriti 1990). Consequently, throughout its history, the PCP-SL attempted to bring under its control any organization, group, or movement advocating for social change and the transformation of society (Degregori 2010). Those who refused the authority of the PCP-SL were deemed reactionary forces hindering the revolution (Burt 1998). Although the PCP-SL attacks on state institutions, capitalist infrastructures, and imperial entities generated a positive response from parts of the population, their purported attacks on anti-imperial and anti-capitalist groups as well as grassroots organizations seen by the public as working toward equality and fighting poverty sapped public support.

The second factor was the PCP-SL use of violence. Although its supporters had accepted that a certain level of violence might be needed to transform social order, the majority of the population repudiated the extent of the violence and the methods used by the PCP-SL. Guzmán (1988) publicly acknowledged killing 80 peasants including children in Lucanamarca in 1983 as a way of sending a message to all reactionary forces. The media frequently reported on the use of violence and the alleged cruelty displayed by members of the PCP-SL during its military actions. The press coverage had a negative effect on public perception and Abimael Guzmán decried the fact that it had resulted in the PCP-SL being perceived as a "demented, messianic, bloodthirsty, Pol Potian, dogmatic, sectarian, narcoterrorist and genocidal movement" (Guzmán 1988). Yet, the PCP-SL actively contributed to this perception through their own interviews, ideological documents, and artistic productions made available to the public. These documents presented violence not only as means to defeat the state (PCP-SL s.d. a; PCP-SL s.d.c; PCP-SL 1982; Gonzales 1986) but also as means of purifying the nation from its reactionary tendencies and its immorality (PCP-SL 1986a, b; Granados 1987). The PCP-SL claimed that "combatants should be ready for a bloodbath" (Hinojosa 1998) given that "a genocide might be necessary" (Guzmán 1988) to create a blank slate on which to build the new state (Guzmán 1982; PCP-SL s.d. b).

A final reason for the dwindling of public support was the lifestyle led by the leadership of the PCP-SL. When the police raided safe houses occupied by its leader, they displayed a series of images showing empty bottles of alcohol and expensive food packaging that seemed to indicate a lavish lifestyle in contradiction to the austere and ascetic life proclaimed by Guzmán and demanded of its members. Furthermore, in a video filmed by members of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmán appears drunk and dancing. The unflattering images although trivial appeared incongruous with the persona Guzmán had crafted since the 1960s. The state used these images to undermine the PCP-SL and attempt to erode its combatants' morale by depicting the leadership as immoral, disreputable, lacking ideological resolve, and living off the sacrifices made by their members.

Although the early 1980s appeared to bode well for the PCP-SL and the MRTA, by the end of the decade, popular support for armed struggle had dropped significantly, as the population increasingly felt the human, social, and economic cost of the internal war. This had a negative ripple effect on other anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movements struggling with limited human and material resources and having to fend off the discursive and physical attacks coming from the state and from both insurgent organizations. Furthermore, the pro-capital reforms imposed by the IMF between 1980 and 1985 that significantly reduced governmental spending and social programs (Crabtree 1992; Roberts 1995) and the anti-capital reforms adopted by García that limited international debt payments to 10% of national exports, increased salaries, controlled prices of

basic products, artificially set the US dollar exchange rate, and, in 1987, announced the nationalization of all banking institutions (Crabtree 1992; Roberts 1995). combined with the internal war resulted in the second worst inflation (7,650%) in Latin America's history (Kenney 2004) that hurt investments and created an environment unconducive to capital's interests. By 1990, international pressure to stabilize the economy reached its highest point and generated lightly disguised threats paralleled with offers of assistance from economic agencies, consultancies from imperial think tanks, and foreign aid from the global North. The table was set for the pacification that occurred in the 1990s. Pacification seeks to produce and maintain a social order amenable to capitalism through a reordering of the social world and the production of responsible, peaceful, and disciplined subjects whose approach to politics and activism is nondisruptive (Jackson 2013; Neocleous 2014). To achieve this, pacification produces a rhetoric of security interconnecting the economy, politics, and society where nothing is out of its purview (Neocleous 2008). Emergency power institutes temporary measures, which swiftly become permanent (Neocleous 2008). These measures tend to include the conditions for the construction of a free market, the means to discipline and indoctrinate the population, as well as the power to surveil and coerce those representing a threat to capital interests (Neocleous 2014). The pro-capital social order must be enshrined in law to alter permanently the social fabric in a legitimate way (Neocleous 2007).

Pacification, Legality, and Crime

The disenchantment with traditional politics and its alternatives accompanied by a rise of populism meant that the 1990 elections took place between two candidates with no previous political experience. Fujimori won the election by quieting people's fear over the economy as well as by presenting himself as hardworking, self-made man and an outsider to the political class who wanted change. Upon coming to power, Fujimori began the first stage of pacification by seeking from Congress the authorization to rule by decree on economic and national security matters. In 1991, Fujimori decreed 120 new laws targeting the economy and national security (Mauceri 1996). He then relied on emergency legislation to enact security, governance, and economic reforms.

Security Reforms

Prior to engaging in pacification, Fujimori changed the rules and regulations of the military, law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence services to bring them under his control (Bowen and Holligan 2003). The restructuring of the security apparatus gave Fujimori control over promotions and placements inside each institution, forcing his adversaries into retirement and putting his supporters in key positions (Kenney 2004). Fujimori made the SIN (National Intelligence Service) an autonomous entity under the direct command of the President, unobstructed by any civilian, judicial, or military authority (Degregori 1994). Fujimori then named Vladimiro Montesinos – an ex-army captain dishonorably discharged for drug trafficking and selling state secrets to the United States who became a lawyer specialized in defending drug traffickers and police officers charged with corruption and human rights violations (Jara 2003) – as the de facto chief of the SIN throughout the duration of the regime. Fujimori also granted the Executive the power to name the General Commander of the Armed Forces and to allow him to remain in place as long as the president deemed it advisable (Degregori 1994). Thus, General Hermoza Ríos remained in an unprecedented 8 years as General Commander of the Armed Forces.

After ensuring control over the military and all security agencies, Fujimori embarked on an all-out war against the PCP-SL and the MRTA. He implemented an array of emergency legislation, antiterrorism laws, and other security decrees between 1991 and 1995 which granted the police and the military extensive powers and prerogatives (such as the right to intervene in universities and prisons); broadened the mandate of the SIN; and expanded the authority of military

commanders in conflict areas (Schulte-Bockholt 2013). Furthermore, the new laws criminalized non-violent activities; restricted freedom of expression; redefined certain crimes as acts of treason judged by military courts; designated harsher sentences for all crimes linked to terrorism or treason; and changed the minimum age of criminal responsibility for terrorist activities from 18 to 15. The new legislation made it legal for armed forces to confiscate property, interfere with journalist, as well as detain civilians and maintain them incommunicado for long periods of time (Mauceri 1996). Finally, judicial reform restricted the rights of those suspected of terrorism or treason; they lost the right to habeas corpus as well as the right to counsel. The reforms created courts with anonymous judges who could try and sentence suspects of terrorism in absentia; authorized military courts to try civilians; and prohibited lawyers from accessing the evidence against their clients, attending their interrogation, or cross-examining witnesses (Americas Watch 1993). The judicial reforms resulted in an unprecedented and outstanding conviction rate of 97% (Mauceri 2006).

Governance Reforms

Almost 2 years into his mandate, Fujimori suspended the constitution and established a civilian dictatorship on April 5, 1992, after declaring that Congress was hampering his ability to pass necessary legislation to win the internal war (Mauceri 2006). Fujimori ordered a complete overhaul of the Judiciary (National Magistrates Council, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, as well as the Attorney General's Office) and shut down the Congress until the approval of a new organic structure of the Legislature (Kenney 2004). During this time, Fujimori reorganized public administration by legalizing mass firings in the public sector (Conaghan 2005); dissolving institutions, boards, and committees; creating new institutions under his direct control such as the Ministry of the Presidency; reducing long-held prerogatives of municipal governments; and personally appointing key positions within the public sector (Mauceri 2006).

In 1993, the newly elected Constitutional Congress wrote a new Constitution that concentrated power in the hands of the Executive by reducing the size of Congress and significantly curtailing its power to control the Executive while making it more vulnerable to the threat of dissolution by the president (Mauceri 2006). It created new oversight mechanisms and institutions that gave the Executive de facto control over the Legislative and Judicial powers; authorized the Executive to implement urgent decrees without authorization from Congress (Between 1993 and 2000, the Executive passed 1003 urgent decrees (Schulte-Bockholt 2013).); and allowed the introduction of new items for immediate congressional deliberation if the majority present voted in favor (Conaghan 2005). Through this mechanism, the Congress was able to pass controversial laws, such as a general amnesty law 26479, at three in the morning.

Economic Reforms

Immediately after coming into office, Fujimori conducted a wide range of economic reforms that brought Peru back into the international financial community (Kenney 2004). Fujimori's regime, following recommendations from international economic agencies and imperial think tanks, successfully implemented a neoliberal ideology that constituted the market as the organizing principle of the economy, the state, and the society as a whole.

Fujimori's economic policy started with renewing payments to the external debt followed by the introduction of two sets of major reforms. The first wave of reforms stabilized the economy by cutting price subsidies, social spending, and employment in the public sector; increasing interest rates and taxes; and unifying exchange rates. The second wave of reforms deregulated financial and labor markets; reduced and unified tariffs; and privatized public enterprises (Roberts 1995). During the second wave, Fujimori privatized almost 90% of over 300 state-owned companies from strategic sectors such as mining, oil, electricity, and telecommunication (Duvillier 2016). The new Constitution contributed to these reforms by: limiting the right to collective negotiation and the right to strike while simultaneously decreasing state's responsibility toward workers (Fernández-Maldonado 2011); giving employers the right to

fire without cause (Duvallier 2016); and expanding the use of temporary contracts and outsourcing (Loayza 2011).

Aside from eliminating many fundamental individual and collective workers' rights, Fujimori signed stability agreements with transnational corporations. These agreements implemented accelerated depreciation; allowed for investments in public infrastructure as well as for the cost of research and mining exploration to be deducted from tax payments; and exonerated tax payments until the initial investment was recuperated or until production was increased more than 10% by reinvesting income already generated (Campodónico Sanchez 1999). The new Constitution prohibited any changes to laws protecting the interests of transnational extractive capital (Lust 2016). Surprisingly, the economic reforms adopted by Fujimori went further than what financial institutions demanded at that time (Vergara and Encinas 2016). Unsurprisingly, these reforms resulted in significant gains for capital, but they did not benefit the majority of the population. Stabilizing the economy sharpens inequalities; devaluation concentrates internal capital to the benefit of the dominant classes and encourages the denationalization of industry at cheap prices (Galeano 1971). Consequently, unemployment levels did not change, and purchasing power levels remained the same to those of the hyperinflation period of 1988–1989 (Fernández-Maldonado 2011).

Institutionalization of Neoliberal Populism

The Peruvian pacification process took place in an international context where the fall of communism gave way to capitalism being heralded as the victorious economic model (Jackson 2013). At the national level, the state used the violence deployed by the MRTA and the PCP-SL to delegitimize all anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist demands. In a context with no apparent credible and viable alternatives to capitalism, Fujimori encountered no actual opposition or significant challenge to his neoliberal ideological push and managed to maintain an unprecedented level of public support throughout his regime (Barr 2003; Carrión 2006). Between 1993 and 1994, at the

height of his controversial reforms, his approval rating was between 60% and 70% (Conaghan 2005).

Pacification in Peru was possible through the articulation of neoliberal ideas and values with authoritarian legacies and populist politics. Fujimori successfully transformed the political, economic, and social landscape of the country. By enshrining authoritarian practices and neoliberal principles in the 1993 Constitution, the current democratic structure has neoliberal and authoritarian values and principles at its core. Consequently, the downfall of Fujimori represented the end of an authoritarian regime but not the end of neoliberal populism. Between 2001 and 2016, the three democratically elected presidents continued to engage in neoliberal populist politics. Toledo promised to follow market economics with a human face (Barr 2003). García was reelected in 2006 using the slogan "you know how I work!" despite the debacle of his previous government. Finally, Humala aligned himself with Morales and Chavez and pledged a neo-developmentalist economic program that would put an end to neoliberal policies (Burron 2011; Vergara and Encinas 2016). Despite having campaigned on promises and platforms that challenged neoliberalism, nothing changed. Toledo continued Fujimori's neoliberal policies while attempting to put in place social programs and increasing social expenditure (Burron 2011; Lust 2016); García became a "born-again neoliberal" and intensified the economic liberalization policies and market reforms put in place by Fujimori (Gordon and Webber 2016); and Humala did an about-face turn and embraced neoliberalism and extractive capital (Lust 2016).

Human Rights Violations

The PCP-SL launched the internal war at a crucial moment. The exiting military government did not want to acknowledge that an insurrection had been brewing during its regime, while the democratic government was afraid that acknowledging the existence of a serious threat to the state would provide the armed forces with a legitimate reason to reclaim power (Gorriti 1990). As a result, both regimes undermined the level of preparation,

extent of resources, and the range of support the PCP-SL had. However, by 1982, the government had to admit the police was ill prepared to confront the insurgency and declared a state of emergency. The government authorized the armed forces to act within the territory without a clear strategic plan and no political control (Desco 1989). Following the advice of Argentinian generals and the strategies taught in the School of the Americas – a military assistance program to train Latin American armed forces in the fight against anti-capitalist insurgency through – the armed forces engaged in human rights violations, crimes against humanity, and genocidal strategies against Indigenous peoples, peasants, and the racialized poor, all presumed to be members of the insurgency because of their social location (Manrique 2002; Toche 2008). Under Fujimori, human rights violations increased and the use of disappearances and extrajudicial executions intensified. According to Congress (2003), there were 586 registered disappearances between July 1990 and April 1993 compared to 283 during the 5 years of García's administration. The flow of the justice systems also improved through systematic torture to gather information and obtain confessions (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación 2003). The state also violated children's rights as minors accused of terrorism served their sentences in the same units as adults in maximum-security prisons (Congreso de la República 2003).) and were tactical, deliberate, premeditated, methodical, and many of them ordered by the regime (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación 2003; Jara 2003; Uceda 2004).

The Peruvian state wielded the force of the law and legal violence to ensure its own survival and to protect capitalism from the political and military danger presented by the MRTA and the PCP-SL. Although the 1980s state's response facilitated the advancement of the MRTA and the PCP-SL, the beginning of the 1990s brought about a significant shift in the internal war that had crucial implications for anti-imperial and anti-capitalist struggles. The Executive used the Judiciary to persecute the opposition and relied on extensive use of imprisonment to deal with political opposition (Comisión de la verdad y

reconciliación 2003). Youngers (2006) reckons that during Fujimori's regime, 22,000 people out of a population estimated at 27 million were unjustly detained or imprisoned for months without charges ever being laid. They were human rights workers, community leaders, journalists, and members of the civilian population with no connection to the PCP-SL or the MRTA (Americas Watch 1993). It also used the Judiciary to pardon crimes and human rights violations from sympathizers or allies (Apoyo 2001). Law decree 26479 of June 14, 1995, absolved from criminal responsibility and from all forms of accountability all military, police, and civilian agents of the state who were accused, investigated, charged, processed, or convicted for common and military crimes caused by the war against terrorism from May 1980 until June 1995 (Conaghan 2005).

During the 10 years of Fujimori's regime, human rights violations were committed in the name of national security and to enact social policies. Between 1990 and 2000, a minimum of 272,028 women and 22,004 men (mostly poor indigenous and living in rural areas) were forcibly sterilized or sterilized without their knowledge as part of a population growth control policy). Human rights violations were also committed in order to ensure the continuation of the regime. Once the regime defeated the PCP-SL and the MRTA, Fujimori maintained and expanded the state of emergency as means of ensuring continued electoral success and political control (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación 2003). In 1991, at the height of the armed conflict, 48.7% of the population lived in areas declared as emergency zones compared to 57% in 1995 when the insurgent groups had been neutralized (Borja 1996). By 1995, the country was under a joint armed forces-Fujimori government, its democratic institutions were precarious, and state power was exercised in a coercive, manipulative, and arbitrary fashion with no organized opposition (Quijano 1995). Aside from detaining those who spoke against the regime, the regime used a wide array of strategies to ensure compliance and cooperation from all sectors of the population. The SIN routinely collected information that

could be used to blackmail or discredit anyone who opposed the regime or who did not follow orders (Conaghan 2005). When the regime was not able to influence or corrupt someone, they would be transferred, blackmailed or threatened, and, in extreme cases, tortured or killed (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación 2003).

The security reforms implemented during the internal war hardened the security apparatus and have since been used to discipline challenges to the neoliberal social order (Gordon and Webber 2016). Although the extent of human right's violations appears to have significantly lessened since the end of Fujimori's regime, they continue to take place as means of controlling social unrest. Continued pacification is necessary because it ensures the secured foundation for practices of capital accumulation but, most importantly, because the neoliberal economic system put in place creates harms through the persistent predatory practices of capital (Harvey 2004; Neocleous 2013). Neoliberal populist policies and practices cause serious harms by expropriating indigenous communities' land (in 2004 13% of indigenous communities' territory was given in concession to gas and petroleum companies, by the end of 2008, it had been increased to 70% (Pinto 2009)); forcing the relocation or displacement of communities and populations; causing environmental pollution and degradation; criminalizing social protest; generating unstable and dangerous working conditions; and facilitating the predatory extraction of natural resources (mining investment went from 200 million in 1993 to 1.5 billion in 200 and 5 billion in 2010 (Gordon and Webber 2016).). The harms and crimes resulting from extractive neoliberalism have given way to social protest and unrest. Whereas Toledo's strategy was to weaken the protestors through mechanisms of concertation that yielded no actual results, García relied on criminalization and repression (on June 5, 2009, during the height of mobilizations against the PTPA which made possible to sell 64% of Peruvian forests to transnational corporations, 33 people were killed (Burron 2011).). Humala continued this approach; in the first 23 months of his government, state agents killed 19 protestors (Lust 2016). The narrow definition of politics and of rightful political action produced by neo-liberal order neutralizes legitimate politics as a source of social change while criminalizing alternative forms of politics (Jackson 2013). In this regard, pacification secures the insecurity caused by capitalist accumulation (Neocleous 2011).

Corruption

Corruption is not an abnormality of the system; fraud and corruption are encouraged by a moral culture present in capitalist societies (Whyte and Wiegratz 2016). In fact, capitalism is by definition a system of corruption that involves violence, fraud, and authoritarian practices essential to domination (Hardt and Negri 2000; Gordon and Webber 2016). Fujimori's regime promoted a culture of corruption where laws and rules were continuously broken (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación 2003). The regime embezzled money from the sale of hundreds of state-owned enterprises. The sale of state-owned enterprises generated 9.221 billion US dollars, but only 6.993 billion entered the public treasury (Schulte-Bockholt 2013). It also swindled money from contracts awarded, from development or aid programs, and from the national budget. Although the level of corruption between 1990 and 2001 was unprecedented, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the economic crimes committed (Escárzaga 2001). Nonetheless, it is estimated that economic crimes and corruption during this time cost the Peruvian economy between 1.5 and 4 billion USD (Quiroz 2008). The money syphoned out was used for personal gain and to ensure the continuity of the regime (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación 2003; Conaghan 2005; Schulte-Bockholt 2013). To this effect, Montesinos put in place a broad and multi-level network of corruption that included government officials, judges, prosecutors, congressmen, businessmen, owners of newspapers, radio and TV, bankers, CEOs of financial institutions, and renowned journalists as well as TV and radio personalities and videotaped his exchanges for leverage (Jochamowitz 2002). Over 3000 videos have been found (Cameron 2006).

The control the Executive had over the Legislative and Judiciary power was so extensive that

even though accusations have begun to appear as early as 1993 against Montesinos and Fujimori for corruption, fraud, embezzlement, racketeering, illegal wiretapping, human rights violations, as well as arms and drug trafficking, no heed was paid. Since then, Montesinos, Fujimori, and General Hermoza have been found guilty of economic crimes and human rights violations. Corruption did not stop with the regime change. The four presidents of Peru since 2001 (Alan García, Alejandro Toledo, Ollanta Humala, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski) are currently under investigation for corruption or are serving time in prison for corruption and human rights violations.

Conclusion

Despite a long history of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism struggles, the 1960s marks a turning point in Peruvian history as social movements become less reformist or issue oriented and attempt instead to gain control over the Peruvian state in order to transform it or reconstitute it. Yet, the alternatives that emerged during that time were incapable of toppling the government due to lack of organization and lack of support but most importantly, due to the Peruvian state's military action, human rights violations, legal strategies and use of mainstream media to delegitimise anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism struggles. Furthermore, the overt violence ensuing from the internal armed conflict between the PCP-SL, the MRTA, and the Peruvian state in the 1980s and 1990s became a source of legitimacy for the latter who used it to delegitimize alternative social and economic orders. The Peruvian state's response to anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism struggles has further entrenched the identification of the interests of the Peruvian state with those of imperial/capitalist forces and has relied on the use of pacification for their advancement. Consequently, any political organization (regardless of ideological affiliation) bestowed with the power of the state has a stake in maintaining the current social and economic order. This explains why, whether from the left, the right, or the center, all governments since the end of the military regime in 1980

have contributed to the ongoing pacification of Peru.

The multiple challenges to imperialism and capitalism created a breaking point in Peruvian history. The civilian dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori, with the backing of imperial powers and its consultants, engaged in a pacification process that render the mechanisms of imperialism and capitalism visible. Fujimori was successful in implementing a neoliberal social order because, aside from providing a quick, effective, and resolute solution to the economic crisis and the internal war, he was effective in articulating neoliberal principles with the *end of politics*, the rise of populism, and an authoritarian tradition. Since 2001, the different governments have attempted to hide the pacification process behind the veil of socially conscious neoliberal democracy in order to render the economic and political system more palatable and legitimate. Notwithstanding, the destructive effects of capitalism and imperialism are still present, but the internal war broke down collective struggles and has replaced them with local and interest-driven struggles which attempt to help specific groups without really challenging the system. Anti-capitalist and anti-imperial movements lost traction and were unable or unwilling to organize and act collectively at the national level. As a result, some grassroots organizations have been able to impose limitations to capital pilfering of natural resources within their respective communities, but they have not been able to challenge the predatory exploitation of natural resources elsewhere. The demonization of anti-imperial anti-capital struggles by the Peruvian state and mainstream media has therefore been successful in strengthening the grip of imperial forces and advancing transnational capital interests.

Cross-References

▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ Imperialism and Environment
▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism
▶ Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology

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Petrodollar Imperialism

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Synonyms

Currency hegemony; Dollar hegemony; Middle East wars; Petrodollar recycling

Definition

Known by a variety of other terms, including 'dollar hegemony', 'dollar dominance', the 'dollar Wall Street regime' and 'exorbitant privilege', petrodollar imperialism is the theory that the US primary position in the world economy is due to the fact that since 1944 oil has been almost exclusively priced in American dollars. This means that every country in the world that imports oil (the vast majority of the world's nations) has to have immense quantities of dollars in reserve. Because they are US dollars, they are invested in US Treasury bills and other dollar interest-bearing securities that can be easily converted to purchase dollar-priced commodities like oil. This is what allows the US to run up trillions of dollars of debt; the rest of the world simply buys up that debt in the form of US interest-bearing securities. This system can only function if oil exporters refuse to accept anything other than American dollars for payment. With few exceptions, oil exporters have done this since the early 1970s, when the US Nixon Administration successfully negotiated with Saudi Arabia, traditionally the world's

dominant producer, to accept only American dollars for its oil. Crucially, most Arab oil exporters since that time have also agreed to invest their surplus oil revenues in US government securities. This recycling of oil revenues is known as 'petrodollars', or petrodollar recycling. In addition to being the exclusive currency for all oil sales, the dollar is also the primary currency for global trade, ensuring that countries need to have dollars at hand not only to pay for oil, but also to facilitate trade. Thus, the US directly benefits from both the importing and exporting of oil, and from global trade activity in general. It is a key underpinning of the US economy, and a benefit not available to other countries. This is what in large part allows the US to be in debt for $17.567 trillion as of April 2014; so much of the world economy gets invested back into the US economy, and indirectly guarantees US debt will always be bought up, allowing the US to carry on printing money to fund tax cuts, increase military spending, and consumer spending on imports without fear of inflation or that these loans will be called in.

> American imperialism, no domain escapes it. It takes all shapes, but the most insidious is that of the dollar. The United States is not capable of balancing its budget. It allows itself to have enormous debts. Since the dollar is the reference currency everywhere, it can use others to suffer the effects of its poor management. (French president Charles de Gaulle, 1963, quoted in Brands 2011: 75)

De Gaulle's quote provides an excellent introduction to petrodollar imperialism. Known by a variety of other terms, including 'dollar hegemony', 'dollar dominance', the 'dollar Wall Street regime' and 'exorbitant privilege', petrodollar imperialism is the theory that the US primary control of the world economy is due to the fact that since 1944 oil has been almost exclusively priced in American dollars.

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trillions of dollars of debt; the rest of the world simply buys up that debt in the form of US interest-bearing securities.

This system can only function if oil exporters refuse to accept anything other than American dollars for payment. With few exceptions, oil exporters have done this since the early 1970s, when the US Nixon Administration successfully negotiated with Saudi Arabia, traditionally the world's dominant producer, to accept only American dollars for its oil. Saudi Arabia then used its influence to get the rest of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to agree as well. Crucially, most Arab oil exporters since that time have also agreed to invest their surplus oil revenues in US government securities. This recycling of oil revenues is known as 'petrodollars', or petrodollar recycling. Between 1973 and 2000, Saudi Arabia recycled as much as $1 trillion of its oil profits, primarily in US Treasury notes and other government interestbearing securities. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates recycled between $200 and $300 billion (Cleveland 2000: 468). While it is difficult to ascertain exact numbers as many countries do not itemise specific holdings, recent estimates are that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar currently hold $2.1 trillion in dollar reserves (Fisk 2009).

In addition to being the exclusive currency for all oil sales, the dollar is also the primary currency for global trade in general. If Mexico wants to purchase manufactured goods from China, it must first convert its pesos to dollars; China in turn accepts dollars and then converts them to yuan. This means that countries need to have dollars at hand not only to pay for oil, but also to facilitate trade in general. Some 80% of all world trade is denominated in dollars and more than two-thirds of foreign held reserves worldwide are also in dollars (Prasad 2014).

Thus, the US directly benefits from both the importing and exporting of oil, and from global trade activity in general. It is a key underpinning of the US economy, and a benefit not available to other countries. This is what in large part allows the US to be in debt for $17,567,647,844,797 ($17.567 trillion) as of April 2014 (US Debt Clock 2014); so much of the world economy gets invested back into the US economy, and indirectly guarantees US debt will always be bought up. According to the US Treasury, foreign investors accounted for about 33% of all US federal government debt. As of February 2014, major oil-importing and dominant manufacturing countries China and Japan held $1.27 and $1.21 trillion in US Treasury Securities (US Treasury 2014).

Author John Perkins helped negotiate one of the first petrodollar recycling agreements with Saudi Arabia. In *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man,* he writes:

> In the final analysis, the [US] global empire depends to a large extent on the fact that the dollar acts as the standard world currency, and that the United States Mint has the right to print those dollars. . . . It means, among other things, that we can continue to make loans that will never be repaid – and that we ourselves can accumulate huge debts. (Perkins 2004: 250–251)

Observer (UK) newspaper business writer Faisal Islam explains that this is what allows the US to:

> carry on printing money – effectively IOUs – to fund tax cuts, increase military spending, and consumer spending on imports without fear of inflation or that these loans will be called in. As keeper of the global currency there is always the last-ditch resort to devaluation, which forces other countries' exporters to pay for US economic distress. It's probably the nearest thing to a 'free lunch' in global economics. (Islam 2003)

Petrodollar imperialism gained more popular credence with the publication of William Clark's 2005 book *Petrodollar Warfare,* which posited that the 2003 US invasion of Iraq had been in large part to prevent the Saddam Hussein regime from pricing its oil in euros instead of dollars. The belief that US imperialism is directly linked to the dollar as the de facto global currency for oil was also strengthened by the 2011 US and NATO intervention in Libya, which followed shortly after Muammar Qaddafi's regime proposed a gold dinar as the currency for all of Africa and the exclusive payment currency for Libyan oil. In February of the same year, International Monetary Fund chief Dominique Strauss- Kahn openly called for a new global reserve currency. Three months later he was forced out in disgrace when a

New York hotel maid accused him of sexual assault. He was replaced by the dollar-embracing Christine Lagarde. Strauss-Kahn has since been cleared of all charges (Katusa 2012).

Proponents of this theory also point to US-led attempts to contain Iran's nuclear power ambitions as a ploy to distract from the real issue of concern, that Iran announced it would stop accepting dollars for its oil in 2007, and that ongoing US tensions with Iranian ally Syria were severely exacerbated when Syria switched to the euro for all international trade in 2006.

History

The international agreement to price oil in dollars was part of the 1944 Bretton Woods agreements for how the post-Second World War global economy would function. Bretton Woods was intended to provide a stable international financial regime which would ensure that the type of economic collapses that had led to the Great Depression, and the subsequent rise of fascism and the carnage of war, did not occur again. This meant establishing a rule-based system that could not be manipulated by more powerful states to their own advantage (Korten 2001: 161–162).

Gold was set as the anchor of the new system. The US dollar was established as the de facto global currency for trade and commerce, but the price of the dollar was pegged directly to actual gold reserves, and gold was set at $35 an ounce. Other countries' currencies were then fixed against the dollar; changes in currency rates could only occur via the International Monetary Fund. The criteria for a change in a country's currency exchange relative to the dollar was if the country needed to address a 'fundamental disequilibrium' in its current account. While the dollar served as the main currency for international trade, its exchange rate was similarly fixed to any other country's currency because it was fixed against gold. The system encouraged states to stay in surplus; they could then demand that their surplus dollars be exchanged for gold.

But by the late 1960s, under the strain of financing the Vietnam War, the US was running out of gold reserves sufficient to exchange other countries' surplus dollars for gold (178–179). The American government had a number of options to address this predicament. These included bringing its own deficit under control by cutting back on the tremendous military costs from the Vietnam War, or by reducing imports, or by devaluing the dollar against gold, which would have meant countries got less gold for their surplus dollars. Instead, in 1971, the Nixon Administration pulled the US out of the gold standard altogether. By removing the need to have enough gold reserves relative to the amount of dollars it printed, the US gained instant and significant leverage over other countries, in particular regarding oil (Gowan 1999: 19).

While assuring the rest of the world that it would not impede moves to a basket of currencies to replace the dollar as the exclusive currency for oil, Nixon and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger were secretly and successfully negotiating with Saudi Arabia to guarantee that international oil sales would continue to be priced exclusively in dollars. The Nixon Administration also negotiated that Saudi Arabia's significantly increased oil profits would be invested in the US economy, primarily in government interest-bearing securities, and that its profits would be directly invested in US and British private banks (Spiro 1999: 121–123). Petrodollar recycling was thus born, and the first billions of what would become trillions began flowing into the US.

Nixon and Kissinger's manoeuvring was part of a long-standing US relationship with the Saud royal family. In 1945, US President Franklin Roosevelt ensured that Saudi Arabian oil would be under US control when he entered into an agreement with Saudi Arabia's King Saud. The US would protect and guarantee the Saudi regime, in return for exclusive access to Saudi oil (Yergin 1991: 413–416).

John Perkins worked as a consultant for a private firm that helped the US government negotiate trade deals. In *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man,* he details how he directly worked on the initial post OPEC oil crisis deal between the US and Saudi Arabia. Perkins writes, 'I understood, of course, that the primary objective here was not the usual – to burden this country with debts it

could never repay – but rather to find ways that would assure that a large portion of petrodollars found their way back to the United States' (Perkins 2004: 97).

Perkins said of the plan he helped to develop:

Under this evolving plan, Washington wanted the Saudis to guarantee to maintain oil supplies and prices at levels that could fluctuate but that would always remain acceptable to the United States and our allies. If other countries such as Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, or Venezuela threatened embargoes, Saudi Arabia, with its vast petroleum supplies, would step in to fill the gap; simply the knowledge that they might do so would, in the long run, discourage other countries from even considering an embargo. In exchange for this guarantee, Washington would offer the House of Saud an amazingly attractive deal; a commitment to provide total and unequivocal US political and – if necessary – military support, thereby ensuring their continued existence as the rulers of their country. . . . The condition was that Saudi Arabia would use its petrodollars to purchase US government securities . . . (102–103)

But the true essence of petrodollar imperialism rests on the next moves pursued by the Nixon Administration: its manipulation of the 1973 OPEC Oil Embargo. On 15 October 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), consisting of its Arab members plus Egypt and Syria, declared they would embargo oil sales to any country that supplied arms to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. As a result of the embargo, the price of oil quadrupled to nearly US$12 per barrel by 1974 (Hammes and Wills 2005: 501–511). The US was embargoed, and the crisis impacted its economy, but less so than it did other countries because America was a domestic producer of oil and therefore less dependent on OPEC and the Middle East.

As detailed in Peter Gowan's *Global Gamble* (1999: 21, 27), Nixon and Kissinger had been pressuring Saudi Arabia to significantly increase global oil prices via OPEC 2 years before the Embargo began. By manipulating the OPEC Oil Crisis, the US was able to guarantee a financial windfall for itself; higher oil prices meant countries purchasing oil had to have more American dollars in reserve to purchase that oil. When the OPEC crisis quadrupled the price of oil, countries suddenly needed four times as many American

dollar reserves to purchase oil supplies. This meant a near immediate 400% increase in foreign investment in the American economy, primarily in short-term US government debt securities. For those poor countries that did not have the available revenues to pay for this, the Saudi Arabian surplus oil revenue was now available from US banks as loans (22).

Which brings us to the final but by no means least significant of the petrodollar imperialism underpinnings orchestrated by Nixon and Kissinger. As well as dismantling the gold standard as the backbone of the international financial and currency regime, the Nixon Administration succeeded in eliminating the previous limitations on private banks as a source of direct capital for international finance. Under Bretton Woods, international finance and loans were under the direct control of government-controlled central banks. Private banks and investment firms were prohibited from moving their funds freely to other countries, although there were some exceptions for financing trade and specific foreign-development investment. The idea was that money would stay in that country and contribute to the country's economic and social development goals, thus contributing to internal financial and, theoretically, social stability, rather than seeking profit opportunities elsewhere (Beder 2006: 48–49).

In 1974, the US simply eliminated its own limits on external and internal capital flows. By dropping the capital constraints previously placed on private financial institutions, the increased and considerable OPEC oil revenue was available to be invested directly into New York banks. US private banks and investment firms then became the dominant international financial force, largely replacing the Bretton Woods government-controlled central banks (Gowan 1999: 21).

Eric Helleiner, who has written extensively on this issue, says 'the basis of American hegemony was being shifted from one of direct power over other states to a more market-based or "structural" form of power' (Helleiner 2005).

Crucial to petrodollar imperialism is the control it gives the US over developing countries via its ability to manipulate their debt. This achieved

firstly by creating or exacerbating existing debt, as evidenced by the US initiation of the OPEC oil crisis and the subsequent quadrupling of the cost of oil. But the US can also manipulate other countries' debt by simply lowering or raising its domestic interest rates via the Federal Reserve, which is then passed on to any and all international loans. A rise in domestic US interest rates means that countries which have taken out loans from US banks or the IMF/World Bank are now faced with a sudden increase in the interest tied to those loans, and hence an almost automatic increase in dollars going back to the US.

This is what happened with the Third- World debt crisis of the early 1980s, when fiscal policy under the Reagan Administration saw US interest rates rise to 21%. This in turn skyrocketed Third-World debt, which had to be repaid in dollars. This debt had grown substantially from 1973 onwards, when oil-importing countries had to borrow funds to cover the 400% sudden increase in global oil prices as a result of the OPEC crisis. The Saudi and Gulf States' petrodollars that had been invested in the US were then available as loans, directly or via the World Bank and IMF, to these countries. The foreign debts of 100 developing countries (excluding oil exporters) increased 150% between 1973 and 1977 to cover the quadrupled cost of oil (International Monetary Fund n.d.)

Many of these same countries then faced even more severe economic crises in the aftermath of the first round of the debt crisis brought on by the significant rise in interest rates. The debt was owed primarily to the World Bank, IMF, and the New York private banks that had been liberated under Nixon from the capital restraints built into the original Bretton Woods structure. Bail-out packages from the World Bank and IMF came with stringent neo-liberal conditions requiring privatisation, deregulation, and cutbacks on government spending. These structural adjustment programmes became the ultimate means of US control over a soon to be neo-liberalised global economy, with significant financial flows to the US and the developed world occurring as a result.

By 2004, this arrangement had seen the world's poorest countries pay an estimated $4.6 trillion in debt repayments to the world's richest countries, a significant portion of which went to the US. In 2011, they paid over $620 billion servicing this debt. As of the end of 2012, the total debt owed by so-called developing countries was $4.8 trillion (Elmers 2014). Many of these countries have paid back their initial loans many times over, but are kept in a state of indebtedness due to interest rises, as highlighted by the 21% US interest rate rise in the early 1980s.

In an unfortunately typical example, in 2005 and 2006, Kenya paid as much in debt repayments as it did for providing critical services to its people like health care, roads, public transport, and provision of clean drinking water *combined.* Between 1970 and 2002, sub Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world, paid $550 billion on loans totalling $540 billion. Yet it still owed an incredible $295 billion due to interest (Jubilee UK 2011).

Thus, the US can run up staggering debts with no significant consequences, while simultaneously benefiting immensely from other countries' debt and guaranteeing that the world's poorest countries will disproportionately support the US economy.

Iraq's Threat to Petrodollar Imperialism

In *Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq, and the Future of the Dollar,* analyst William Clark (2005) put forward his theory that Iraq's switch to the euro, and the threat that other oil-producing countries might follow, was the primary motivation for the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The book was preceded by a widely read and discussed article by Clark just prior to the invasion.

In September 2000, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq would no longer accept the 'currency of its enemy', the US dollar, for its oil and would instead accept only euros. Iraq openly encouraged the rest of OPEC to do the same (Sachs 2000). If every oil-producing nation followed Iraq's lead and accepted euros instead of dollars, it would mean the end of the US empire. Oil-importing countries (most of the world) would have to convert their dollar reserves into euro reserves, and thus would remove the trillions invested in the US economy.

A resurgent and regionally strong post UN sanctions Iraq, supported politically and economically by European rival oil powers involved in rebuilding its oil-producing infrastructure, would then have been in a position to encourage vocal US critics Iran and Venezuela to switch as well from the dollar to the euro.

Writing in 1999 before the euro had been introduced as a currency, Peter Gowan said:

> Directly threatening to U.S. interests in such a scenario would be the impact on the dollar; for Saddam Hussein might have preferred to denominate his capital in marks or yen. As the world's biggest debtor, with its debt denominated in dollars, the U.S. economy would clearly be vulnerable if a significant proportion of Middle East oil revenues were switched to another currency. For the United States to concede such political power to Saddam was unthinkable. (Gowan 1999: 159)

Economic Hit Man author John Perkins wrote:

> A decision by OPEC to substitute the euro for the dollar as its standard currency would shake the empire to its very foundations. If that were to happen, and if one or two creditors were to demand that we repay our debts in euros, the impact would be enormous. (Perkins 2004: 250–251)

Europe itself began to enthusiastically encourage the rest of the world to switch to the euro shortly after Iraq's decision. In June 2001, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on 'the European Union, in dialogue with the OPEC and non OPEC countries, to prepare the way for payment of oil in euros' (European Parliament 2001). A month earlier, there were media reports that 'EU leaders [have] made an audacious bid to lure Russia away from its reliance on the greenback, calling on Moscow to start accepting euros instead of dollars for its exports, dangling the attractive carrot of a boom in investment and trade' (Newbold 2001). Russia is one of the world's largest oil exporters.

Youssef Ibrahim, a member of the US Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN in February 2003 that 'The Saudis are holding the line on oil prices in OPEC and should they, for example, go along with the rest of the OPEC people in demanding that oil be priced in euros, that would deal a very heavy blow to the American economy' (Islam 2003). The next month, the US invaded Iraq.

In June 2003, the US military occupation moved back to accepting only dollars for Iraq's oil, and eliminated the acceptance of euros. It did so despite the fact that the euro was valued 13% higher than the dollar, and thus directly reduced the revenue value of Iraq's oil sales (Hoyos and Morrison 2003).

Inherent in the George W. Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy was that no rival to the US be allowed to rise in the post-Cold War geopolitical world. Russia, one of the few nations with the potential to rival US power, is heavily dependent on its oil-producing revenue. By invading Iraq, the US gained de facto control over Iraq's oil production, and ultimately over the global oil market; a cut in the oil price via Iraq in combination with Saudi Arabia would mean a cut in Russia's own hegemony, and more importantly, a direct impediment to its ability to economically rival the US.

An example of the US utilising its petrodollar imperialism to great geopolitical effect was its Cold War diplomacy with the Soviet Union. Energy analysts Edward Morse and James Richard argue that it was Saudi collusion with the US for geopolitical gain that set the groundwork for the debt-ridden collapse of the Soviet economy. In the mid-1980s, as the Soviet oil industry was attempting to expand, Saudi Arabia used its spare capacity to drive down the global price of oil to $10 a barrel, a drop of over 50%:

> The aforementioned Saudi-engineered price collapse of 1985–86 led to the implosion of the Soviet oil industry – which, in turn, hastened the Soviet Union's demise ... Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons ... It is also the centrepiece of the U.S.–Saudi relationship. The United States relies on that capacity as the cornerstone of its oil policy. (Morse and Richard 2002: 20)

Alternatively, China and Europe are both dependent on oil imports. Raising the price of oil would have similar deleterious impacts on these and/or any other countries dependent on oil imports, which the US did not hesitate to do when Nixon manipulated the OPEC oil crisis. Control of world oil prices via control of the world's currency means in large part control over the economies of Europe, China, Russia, and any other present or future rivals to US hegemony.

As military analyst Stan Goff puts it, 'Oil is not a normal commodity. No other commodity has five U.S. navy battle groups patrolling the sea lanes to secure it' (Goff 2004).

Contemporary Issues

As of 2014, the US faces new challenges to retain its petrodollar imperialism. A key factor to the success of the petrodollar regime has been that much of the world until recently has been dependent on the US for its security. Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe are all in the US post-Second World War security orbit, as are key Arab oil-producing states, most crucially Saudi Arabia and now Iraq. It certainly made, and continues to make, some sense for these countries to adhere to the dollar's primacy as the dominant trade currency in return for US protection.

However, key oil producers Venezuela, Iran, and Russia are most decidedly not US allies. Nor is China, the world's leading manufacturer. And with the rise of the BRICs (Brazil and India joining Russia and China) as powerful international economies, US economic leadership is no longer dominant.

And in response to the global financial crisis, caused by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and housing-market bubble collapse, the Federal Reserve's response has been the controversial policy of Quantitative Easing (QE). QE is the process of expanding the number of dollars in circulation, while keeping interest rates at near zero levels to encourage borrowing and to promote economic growth. This in turn has meant much lower returns for US Treasury bills and other interest-bearing instruments, and subsequently lower returns for other countries' dollar reserves invested in those Treasury bills (Eichengreen 2012: 180). Between the outlays to save the 'too big to fail' banks, profligate military spending on the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the War on Terror, US debt increased by $10 trillion in just 10 years, and went from 36% of GDP in 2001 to 82% in 2011 (Hung 2013).

Relying on the rest of the world to simply buy up the dollars it prints to cover its increased spending would appear to be catching up on the United States. Many are now suggesting that what was unthinkable a few years ago is now inevitable. In 2009, French president Nicolas Sarkozy said 'Today, we have a multipolar world, and the system must be multi-monetary. In the world as it is now, there can't be submission to what a single currency dictates' (Vinocur 2009). A 2011 World Bank report predicted that the dollar would be abandoned as the world's single currency before 2025 (World Bank 2011). The same year, Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin said of Americans: 'They are living like parasites off the global economy and their monopoly of the dollar' (Tsvetkova 2011).

At an international meeting of the BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa openly declared that they want the dollar's dominance to end:

> Recognizing that the international financial crisis has exposed the inadequacies and deficiencies of the existing international monetary and financial system, we support the reform and the improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. (Sanya Declaration 2011)

In October 2009, long-term Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk of Britain's *Independent* newspaper broke the story that Gulf oil-producing countries, along with China, Russia, Japan and France, were in high-level secret discussions to launch a new system to replace the dollar as the de facto currency for global oil sales by 2018. The dollar would be replaced by a basket of different currencies, including a new currency for the Gulf Co-operation Council countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. Other currencies would include the euro, the Chinese yuan, and Japanese yen. Gold would also be included in the mix (Fisk 2009).

China was cited as one of the most enthusiastic participants in the meetings. It has developed a somewhat mutually dependent relationship with the US; China buys American debt in the form of US government securities ($1.27 trillion as of February 2014, according to the US Treasury).

In return, the US consumes an enormous amount of Chinese products. This arrangement has been relatively stable as long as the US economy has continued to buy Chinese goods, and as long as US government securities have provided a decent rate of return.

However, Europe has now surpassed the US as China's principle export market, and thanks to QE, the rate of return on its trillion-dollar holdings is anaemic. However, any sizeable unloading of its dollar holdings would result in a collapse of the dollar's value, and a significant loss of its dollar assets.

China has a multitude of other reasons to be unhappy with the dollar as global currency hegemon. With the increase of dollars in international circulation due to QE and the resulting depreciation of the dollar, Chinese exports have become more expensive. It has also resulted in inflation, as China has had to print more of its own currency to keep up with the increased supply of dollars. While the US has done this for a variety of reasons, at least one of them has been to make US exports cheaper and thus more attractive in order to help end the self-imposed Global Financial Crisis, at least for itself (Eichengreen 2012: 135).

With the Middle East importing a vast amount of goods from China, as does the rest of the world, these dollars are then exchanged for Chinese yuan in order to buy Chinese goods. If China could buy oil in yuan, the Middle East countries could then buy Chinese goods with the yuan they would be holding in reserve from oil sales.

Proponents of petrodollar imperialism point to Iran as another example of the US using its foreign policy and military to protect its dollar dominance. Ostensibly, US-led sanctions against Iran have been to address its nuclear aspirations. But Iran in recent years has also successfully and directly challenged the US dollar as the exclusive global currency for all oil transactions, with the direct assistance of Russia, China, and others.

It began in 2005, when Iran announced it would form its own International Oil Bourse (IOB), the first phase of which opened in 2008. The IOB is an international exchange that allows international oil, gas, and petroleum products to be traded using a basket of currencies other than the US dollar. Then in November 2007, at a major OPEC meeting, Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a 'credible and good currency to take over US dollar's role and to serve oil trades' (China Daily 2007). He also called the dollar 'a worthless piece of paper' (BBC News 2007). The following month, Iran (consistently ranked as either the third or fourth biggest oil producer in the world) announced that it had requested all payments for its oil be made in currencies other than dollars (Reuters 2007).

The latest round of US sanctions target countries that do business with Iran's Central Bank, which, combined with the US and EU oil embargoes, should in theory shut down Iran's ability to export oil and thus force it to abandon its nuclear programme by crippling its economy. But instead, Iran is successfully negotiating oil sales by accepting gold, individual national currencies like China's yuan, and direct bartering involving China, India, and Russia, among others (Doran 2012).

By accepting and encouraging countries to pay for its oil in currencies other than the US dollar, Iran has deliberately taken the same action that, according to *Petrodollar Warfare* (Clark 2005), led directly to the US invasion of Iraq. Like Iraq pre-invasion, Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organisation, has not had any dealings with the IMF since 1984, and does not have any debt with it or the World Bank. Like Iraq before it, the US and its oil companies are cut out of any future oil development in Iran. Like a post-sanctions Iraq, Iran has the potential to be the dominant power in the region and to provide development assistance on a vastly different model to that imposed by the WTO (World Trade Organization), World Bank, and IMF.

For now, the dollar remains dominant as the de facto global currency. However, the ascendancy of the euro and eventual internationalisation of the Chinese yuan, the rise of non traditional allies like China and Russia in the global economy, and the increasingly obvious decrease of America's global economic domination are all factors in predicting the dollar's eventual fall.

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Petrodollar Recycling

▶ Petrodollar Imperialism

Petroleum Exploration

▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism

Philippines and Imperialism

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Definition

The history of Philippines as a colony and neo-colony can be divided into three parts –Spanish domination of the archipelago from 1565 to 1898, the annexation of the islands by the USA following the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its pacification from 1899 to 1935, when it became a Commonweath up to 1941, and the Japanese occupation of major regions of the country from 1942 to 1945. In 1946, the Philippines was granted nominal independence but not full sovereignty, and recent bilateral agreements such as the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) have reconfirmed the status of the Philippines as a neocolony of the USA.

The history of the Philippines as a colony and neo-colony can be divided into three parts. The first designates 300 years of Spanish domination of the archipelago from 1565 to 1898 after the subjugation of tribal resistance in the main island of Luzon. The second includes about four decades involving the annexation of the islands by the USA following the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its pacification from 1899 to 1935, when it became a Commonwealth up to 1941. The ascendancy of US monopoly capital and finance at the beginning of the twentieth century replaced that of Spanish merchant capital and its moribund feudal arrangements (Magdoff 1982).

From 1942 to 1945, the Japanese militarily occupied the major regions of the country but left local governance to a "puppet" regime of elite natives. The return of US forces destroyed the Japanese authority and restored the status quo ante bellum.

In 1946, the Philippines was granted nominal independence but not full sovereignty, given the presence of US military bases and effective control of key political, military, and economic institutions by Washington. With recent bilateral agreements such as the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to buttress military and political dependency, the Philippines's status as a neocolony of the USA has been reconfirmed.

Revisiting Spanish Hegemony

The Philippines came under the formal political authority of Spain in the time of European rivalry over control of trade with Asia and the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Following Ferdinand Magellan's discovery of the islands in Southeast Asia in 1521, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi claimed the archipelago (named the "Philippines," after King Philip II of Spain) for Spain in 1565. Lacking any cohesive unity or common loyalties, the indigenous tribes based on subsistence agriculture fell victim to the Spanish strategy of "divide and rule" and its use of superior weaponry for pillage, plunder, and killing (Veneracion 1987).

Given the distance from Spain, the islands were ruled from Mexico approximately

10,000 miles away. Few lay Spaniards settled in the Philippines. The pagan natives were Christianized by missionaries of the religious orders (this had been the rationale given by the Spanish monarchy to the Pope for taking power) so the Roman Catholic Church virtually ruled territories that yielded foodstuffs, human labor, and timber needed for the galleon trade. This lucrative exchange of Chinese porcelain, Indian textiles, etc., for Mexican gold and silver required the Philippines as a transshipment point between Mexico and China.

The profit gained from the galleon trade offered the main reason for subsidizing the "civilizing mission." The Church's evangelical apparatus of catechism and sermons was mobilized to justify appropriation of land and other natural resources extracted via heavy taxation, enforced labor, and assorted tributes. This missionary salvific discourse portrayed native resistance to Church abuses and government impositions as pagan wickedness, not a legitimate defense against violence (Eadie 2005). Coopting the village chiefs, the missionaries and civil officials reinforced the patron-client system of asymmetrical harmony. Cultural ties of reciprocity and indebtedness to the local leaders were manipulated to ensure the regular centralized routine of the accumulation process.

The lack of adequate civilian personnel to maintain ecclesiastical and bureaucratic discipline compelled the state to develop a local agency, the *principalia* (principal personages), to manage the procedures of taxation, sexual/domestic conduct, civic projects, security, and indoctrination to reproduce the feudal-tributary social relations while producing food, shelter, clothing, and other means of survival. This also explains the theocratic dominance of the friars in mediating between the mercantilist state and the natives in the *cabeseras* (geopolitical town complex) which broke apart the kinship or *datu-sacop* system of the preconquest polity.

Colonial discipline of the native subjects involved coercive and ideological mechanisms to enforce extraction of goods/services for use and for exchange. Precapitalist forms and feudal instrumentalities dovetailed to constitute the political economy of the Spanish possession. Apart from the local chiefs and their extended families and retainers, the natives were thus reduced to serfs or even to virtual slavery. This excluded the Moros or Muslims of the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu who successfully resisted Spanish military and religious incursions from the time the Muslim chiefs Soliman and Lakandula were subdued in 1572–1574.

Despite reformist measures introduced in the mid-nineteenth century, Spain never developed the potential for self-sufficient agriculture and sustainable industries. The archaic state's practice of imposing bonded labor for infrastructure projects, as well as the excesses of the friars, led to over 200 revolts of peasants and workers, from Malong's revolt in Pangasinan (1660–1661) to the numerous revolts during and after the British occupation of Manila in 1762–1764 (Constantino 1975, pp. 112–114).

Crisis of the Mercantilist Dispensation

With the termination of the galleon trade in 1813 and the abolition of government monopolies of tobacco and other export crops, the metropolitan city of Manila was opened to foreign trade in 1835. Liberal ideas entered the islands, a consequence of the exposure of Spain to Enlightenment philosophy before and after the Napoleonic wars (1808–1814) and the South American wars of independence. Conflict between the absolutist monarchy and the forces of liberalism led to the republican interlude (from 1868 onward) and the appointment of Carlos Maria de la Torre, a prominent liberal (Zafra 1967, pp. 157–163). De la Torre exempted the Filipino workers in the Cavite arsenal from tribute and coerced labor. They subsequently mutinied when his successor, the conservative Rafael de Izquierdo, restored the status quo. The Cavite revolt of 1872 and the execution of the three secular priests (Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora) signaled the resurgence of hitherto inchoate dissidence among urban intelligentsia and guilds in the islands.

Meanwhile, capital accumulation via commercial agriculture and export trade passed into the

hands of Anglo-American merchant houses. To these were attached mestizo families, owners of sugar plantations and *hacenderos* (owners of haciendas or land grants from the Crown) of other cash crops (rice, hemp, tobacco, and coconuts). An *ilustrado* (enlightened) stratum of these families emerged in the 1870s and 1880s; foremost were the "propagandists" (Marcelo del Pilar, Graciano Lopez Jaena, Jose Rizal, Isabelo de los Reyes, etc.) who advocated peaceful reforms and representation in the Spanish Cortes (De la Costa 1965). These aspirations were all denied and their advocates punished by death, imprisonment, or exile.

Parallel to that assimilationist movement existed a separatist movement of the peasantry and mutual aid cooperatives of workers and artisans inspired by millenarian agitations and the secularist movement among Filipino priests against the arrogant friars. This was led by Andres Bonifacio and the secret organization, the *Katipunan* (Association of Sons of the People), inspired by freemasonry and the delayed impact of the ideas of the French and American Revolutions. Earlier insurrections, particularly instigated by indigenous cults and seditious anticlerical groups of uprooted tenant-farmers, converged in the 1896 revolution that led to the establishment of the first Philippine Republic after feuds between the collaborationist elite factions and the grassroots radical-democratic peasant-worker revealed basic contradictions among classes. This explosion of emancipatory desire by the disenfranchised rural folk was undeterred by sustained Catholic proselytizing and the terrorist measures of desperate Spanish governor-generals. The decay of Spanish colonial domination could not be reversed by the end of the nineteenth century.

The Nightmare of Spanish Colonization

The Spanish destruction of the self-sufficient barenganic communities by taxation and forced labor (*polos y servicios*) disrupted the village economy of kinship-based clans. Population was reduced, farm lands lay wasted, including

whatever trade and industry flourished. The Spanish historian Antonio de Morga lamented that due to the despotic backward policies, the natives abandoned "their farming, poultry and stock-raising, cotton growing and weaving of blankets" (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1970, p. 104). From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, Spain exploited the natives to support the galleon trade that enriched the friars and local bureaucrats, the Chinese traders, and native mestizo families.

Whatever changes were carried out in the nineteenth century did not significantly improve the conditions of the majority since the specialization in export crops (controlled by Anglo-American agents) prevented the growth of a diversified economy. The nascent capitalist sector benefited only a few propertied families and foreign merchants. In terms of Christianization, very few Filipinos really understood Catholic doctrine, hence, the mixture of miracles, idolatry, veneration of icons and images, superstition, and rudimentary Catholic rituals that constitute the belief-system of ordinary Christian Filipinos today.

In general, the cultural development of the country reflected the bankruptcy of Spanish political and economic policies. It reflected the decay of the metropolitan order in a grotesque caricatured form. Spanish was not made the lingua franca of the colony; hence, a bizarre enthnolinguistic multiplicity continues to distort Filipino efforts at national self-identification. Hispanization survives only in certain customs and habits (fiestas, family rituals, etc.). The historian John Phelan observes that "although partially Hispanized, the Filipinos never lost that Malaysian stratum which to this day remains the foundation of their culture" (1959, p. 26). Spanish colonialism, in short, ruined the indigenous life-forms and the supporting economy it encountered, while enriching a few oligarchic sectors and intensifying its own paralysis and decadence.

The American historian Nicholas Cushner concludes his account with the belief that Spain's "more subtle influence on attitudes and social conventions remains part of the fabric of Philippine society" (1971, p. 229). However, profound Americanization of the collective Filipino psyche from 1899 to the present may have

pronounced the final demise of this influence today despite superficial vestiges now extravagantly commodified for tourist consumption.

The US Conquest

President William McKinley's proclamation of the US "civilizing mission," also known as "Benevolent Assimilation," emerged as part of global interimperialist rivalry in the age of monopoly-finance capitalism. US corporate industries and banks needed a market for finished goods and sources of raw materials as well as business for exporting capital. A guaranteed market for commerce and investments was an imperative for competitive capital accumulation. Maritime supremacy was needed to facilitate trade with China and South America and regulation over the US sphere of influence in those hemispheres.

The Philippine conjuncture then was unique because of the appearance of a nascent Filipino nationality in the stage of world history. When the Spaniards ceded the islands to the USA in 1898, the Filipinos had already defeated the Spaniards everywhere except the fort city of Manila. The army of the first Philippine Republic (proclaimed in June 1899) fought the US invaders from 1899 to July 1902. Apart from guerrilla resistance led by peasant-based leaders, the Moros continued to resist until 1913 (Tan 2002).

Given the advanced mode of industrial production and superior technology and human resources, the USA demolished the revolutionary forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo. It was the first bloody war of imperial subjugation that opened the twentieth century. From positional to mobile tactics to guerrilla warfare, the Filipinos suffered enormous casualties. Frustrated by the popular support for the resisters, the USA engaged in genocidal destruction of villages and killing of civilian noncombatants. Torture, hamletting, mass detention in concentration camps, and other savage reprisals led to the death of 100,000 people in Batangas province in one campaign (Fast 1973, p. 75). General Franklin Bell estimated 600,000 deaths in the island of Luzon

alone. These, added to the other "depopulation" tactics in Samar and Panay where fierce resistance occurred, resulted in over a million deaths (Francisco 1987, p. 19). On the victor's side, over $300 million was spent, 4,234 died, 2,818 were wounded, and hundreds of soldiers returned home to die of service-related malaria, dysentery, venereal disease, etc. (Ocampo 1998, p. 249).

US monopoly capital distinguished itself from Old-style colonialism by its systematic planning, its management of time-space coordinates for limitless capital accumulation. Even before the ferocious pacification campaigns were launched, the USA already drew schemes for long-term exploitation of the islands. Geological explorations and anthropological surveys were conducted in advance to discover sources of raw materials and manpower. Compilations of immense data on history, ethnolinguistic groups, flora and fauna, etc. provided knowledge for the succeeding colonial administrators in establishing a centralized bureaucracy, civil service, and local governments. Unlike Spanish evangelism, the US colonial machinery was geared to using the country for the thorough exploitation of the newly acquired territory, envisaging the eventual expansion of multinational corporations and ultimate global hegemony.

Knowledge Production for Profit

One example of how knowledge production functioned to advance imperial hegemony may be found in the US handling of the "Moro problem." After thorough research and studies of the Moro people's history, customs, and values, the USA negotiated with the Sulu sultan and his datus for acceptance of US sovereignty in exchange for preserving the sultanate's right to collect taxes and sell local products. A monthly salary of Mexican dollars for the sultan was also included in the Bates Treaty signed on 20 August 1899 (Agoncillo and Guerrero (1970, pp. 255–256). This neutralized the effective opposition of some Moro elites. But it did not prevent Generals Wood and Pershing, a few years later, inflicting a scorched-earth retaliation against sporadic

intransigence, resulting in the massacre of thousands of Moro men, women, and children in the Battles of Bud Dajo (9 March 1906) and Bud Bagsak (11 June 1913) (Tan 2010, p. 130).

McKinley's policy of "Benevolent Assimilation," translated into civil governor William Howard Taft's slogan of "the Philippines for Filipinos," legitimized the physical occupation of the islands as a preparation of the colonized for eventual self-rule. While brute force was used to destroy organized resistance by the Philippine Republic's army, the USA deployed three nonviolent instruments of subjugation.

The colonial program was both traditional and innovative. First, by coopting the *ilustrado* mestizo class (the proprietors of commercial land and the compradors), by offering them positions in local municipal boards, the military, and the civil service, the USA drastically divided the leadership of the revolutionary forces. By promising democracy and gradual independence, the USA won the allegiance of this educated minority who had fought Spanish absolutism. Aguinaldo himself swore allegiance to the USA a month after his capture, followed by his capitulationist generals and advisers.

Second, by imposing a large-scale public education program to train lower-echelon personnel for a bureaucracy headed by US administrators, the USA answered the grievances of the peasantry, artisans, and workers against the monopolistic, hierarchical practice of the Spanish-dominated Catholic Church. As a pedagogical tool, the learning of English facilitated wider communication among widely scattered communities, transmitting bourgeois values and serving as the key to obtaining privileges and opportunities in careers and jobs. The massive dissemination of US cultural products (books and magazines, music, films, sports, theatre, etc.) reinforced the colonial mindset of the *indio* masses that continues to this day. It included the *pensionado* system of government-funded scholarships, the forerunner of fellowships funded by Fulbright, the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, and other privately endowed exchanges promoting the positive side of US "compadre" or philanthropic colonialism.

Third, by propagating through schools and mass media the ideals of liberty, brotherhood, and meritocracy, the USA cultivated among the masses the illusion of equal participation in government via elections, social-welfare programs, and token land reform. This synchronized with the democratic ideals expressed by the nationalist propagandists Rizal, Mabini, and others, ideals already embodied in the republican constitution, thus gaining a measure of consent. With the final actualization of these three modes of fashioning the colonial subject of US monopoly capital, the apparatus of the colonial state could now be safely transferred to the mestizo elite and its clientele.

One symptomatic item of evidence for US-style pedagogical strategy during the war is the incidence of soldier-teachers and hundreds of civilian volunteers from the USA who fanned out across the islands. Public schools were opened everywhere. The University of the Philippines (established in 1908) and the Bureau of Education spearheaded the training of "Americanized" natives for the professions and the civil service. By 1907, the USA had established the Philippine Legislature, composed mainly of mestizo elites and token "nationalist" veterans. By 1916, the colonial bureaucracy was in the hands of the comprador and land-owning elite, with the US governor general exercising veto power.

The self-proclaimed nationalist leaders Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena took turns sublimating the nationalist aspirations of the people by leading missions to Washington delivering pleas for immediate independence. This was a shrewd maneuvre to calm down the turbulent peasant insurrections in the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in the Sakdalista insurrections from 1930 to 1935. The Philippine Commonwealth, formed in 1935 with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, marked the advent of US neocolonial retrenchment.

Crafting a Neocolonial Strategy

After the hasty proclamation of the end of the Philippine-American War in 1902, the USA began constructing its hegemony via popular

consensus. Schooling, civil service, and bureaucracy served as ideological apparatuses to accomplish that aim. Since the USA, unlike Spain, did not claim to save the souls of savage pagans, its "civilizing mission" inhered in the tutelage of the natives for a market-centered democratic polity (insuring free trade and free labor) suited to the needs of finance-monopoly capitalism.

Even before armed hostilities ceased, President McKinley formed a civil government to replace the military officials who managed pacification. In July 1902, the US Congress passed the first Philippine Organic Act establishing the Philippine legislature as provided for by the 1916 Jones Law which promised eventual independence. But it was the 1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act that guaranteed its export-oriented agricultural economy even after formal independence in 1946. It tied the client Filipino sugar landlords and compradors, together with their political representatives, to serve US imperial goals. The Act eliminated the tariff on sugar and created a captive market for US products. However, not much foreign investment came in because earlier legislation had limited the size of land holdings, thus preventing US attempts to initiate plantation production of cash crops. This resulted in the conflict between the US sugar beet industry and US investors in Cuban sugar that led to demands for Philippine independence to eliminate US preference for Philippine sugar.

Beginning in 1924, the Filipino oligarchs had to maneuvre and negotiate the terms of independence to insure the preservation of their wealth and privileges. In 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed restricting the free entry of Philippine sugar while providing for the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, an interim formation which served as the blueprint for the postwar neocolony. From 1935 to 1941, the Commonwealth and its American stewards faced growing unrest from a politicized peasantry and impoverished urban workers not fully disciplined by the client-patron pattern of political domination.

Class war resurfaced with the 1935 Sakdalista insurrection on the eve of a general referendum on the ratification of the Philippine Constitution. This was a symptom of the failure of US colonial policies in eradicating the fundamental problem of land ownership and feudal practices. In 1903, 81% of all land holdings were cultivated directly by their owners; by 1938, the figure had declined to 49%, with the polarization increasing in the postwar decade when, by the 1950s, two-thirds of the population was landless, working as sharecroppers (Fast 1973, p. 76). In short, US colonialism thrived on the social and political exploitation of the countryside where the majority of Filipinos lived, thus nourishing the source of antiUS imperialist insurgency from that time to the present (for more data on structural inequality, see Canlas et al. 1988).

Interlude: The Japanese Occupation

Japan easily occupied the Philippines in 1942 after the defeat of General Douglas MacArthur's forces of Americans and Filipinos in Bataan and Corregidor. Historians now agree that MacArthur's incompetence in failing to prepare for the invasion explains the most humiliating defeat for the USA on record (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1970; Rutherford 1971, p. 155). Japan thus became the third imperial power to subjugate the Philippines in less than half a century. But its mode of subjugating the country in three and a half years of occupation demonstrates significant features of the pattern already manifested in the way the USA took over control from the Spanish colonizers.

Since the Second World War was basically a rivalry between two industrial powers, the role of the Philippines continued to be geopolitical (as a military base) and economic (a source of raw materials and manpower). Japan needed vital raw materials such as copper and food for its war effort. Just like the USA, Japan carried out methodical reconnaissance of the cultural and sociopolitical condition of the Philippines many years before Pearl Harbor. In the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese military spies posing as workers worked in the construction of roads and bridges to Baguio City, the summer capital of the US administration. They also carried out social investigation of the

political loyalties of the mestizo elite as well as the mass organizations opposed to US rule. They succeeded in gaining the support of General Artemio Ricarte, a respected official of the Aguinaldo Republic, and of Benigno Ramos, the intellectual leader of the Sakdalista Party, as well as nationalist politicians such as Jose P. Laurel, Claro Recto, and others, who served in the puppet government of the Japanese-sponsored Republic.

Liberating Asians for Japan's Empire

The ideological cover for Japanese occupation was the scheme of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The Philippines would be a member of this grand union of Asian nations all united in emancipating themselves from Western domination, and (in the case of the Philippines) from "the oppression of the United States" (Veneracion 1987, p. 69). Japan echoed Taft's slogan of "Philippines for the Filipinos," and encouraged the use of the vernacular and other indigenous cultural forms of expression.

Although aided by local sympathizers of Spain's fascism (such as the Catholic Church and mestizo compradors), the puppet Republic confronted the underground resistance of the combined forces of the guerrillas of the USAFFE (United States Armed Forces of the Far East) and the far more effective Communist-led Huks (acronym for People's Army Against the Japanese). The Huk guerrilla army emerged from the peasantry's experience of dispossession and recalcitrance during the first three decades of US rule. They opposed the Japanese confiscation of rice harvests, administered local governments which distributed land and food, and punished collaborators. When MacArthur returned in 1944–1945, however, despite their substantial help in crippling the Japanese defense and liberating large areas of the country, the Huks were disarmed, arrested, and even massacred (Pomeroy 1992).

The war was the most horrendous experience for the Filipinos. Aside from Manila being entirely destroyed by US bombing and Japanese atrocities, the country suffered over a million deaths, second to the number of casualties during the Philippine-American War. Some 50% of Filipino prisoners died while the number of civilians killed in the capital city of Manila exceeded those killed by the Japanese in Nanking, China. If the USA had not given priority to the war in Europe, the Philippines would have been freed from the Japanese much earlier. The people were told to wait for US relief, channeling all their hopes in the promise of MacArthur to redeem them from suffering. The brutality experienced by Filipinos from Japanese military reprisals, helped by long years of colonial education and tutelage, allowed the majority to welcome MacArthur as "the liberator." It also tended to glamourize the subordinate position of Filipinos as part of "US–Philippines" special relations. MacArthur immediately promoted the representatives of the prewar oligarchy to crucial positions, endorsing Manuel Roxas, a former collaborator, as president and installing proUS bureaucrats and military personnel in charge of the state apparatuses.

Colonialism Refurbished

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Law which created the Philippine Commonwealth, the war-devastated Philippines was granted formal independence. But certain conditions defined the limits of nominal sovereignty. The first condition required the Philippine Congress to accept the terms of the 1946 Philippine Trade Act, which provided some rehabilitation money to repair the war-damaged economy. More crucially, the Act required an amendment to the Philippine Constitution that gave US citizens equal rights in the exploitation of natural resources and ownership of public utilities and other businesses.

In effect, the colonizers retained their old privileged status. What was more decisive was the revival of the oligarchy's sugar industry via tariff allowances and quotas, the abrogation of control over import tariffs on US goods, prohibition of interference with foreign exchange (pegging the local currency to the dollar), and unlimited remittance of profits for US corporations. Free trade guaranteed the status of the former possession as a market for finished

commodities and investments as well as a source of cheap agricultural products and raw materials. The Act was rammed through Congress by expelling left-wing legislators in line with the CIA-directed military campaign against the Huks (Woddis 1967, pp. 38–40).

The second condition was the approval of the 1947 US-Philippines Treaty of General Relations. This empowered the USA to exercise supreme authority over extensive military bases. It also guaranteed the property rights of US corporations and citizens, thus nullifying the sovereignty of the new republic. This was followed by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, which guaranteed the US occupation of extensive military bases for 99 years. This included two major facilities (Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base), used as strategic springboards for intervention in Asia and the Middle East during the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Iraq Wars. The agreement also prohibited the Philippines from granting extraterritorial rights to any other country and placed no restrictions on the uses to which the bases could be harnessed, nor the types of weapons that could be deployed to them (Labor Research Association 1958).

To reinforce its political and military ascendancy, the USA also imposed the 1947 US-Philippines Military Assistance Pact to provide military assistance. Together with this, a US military advisory group (JUSMAG) was assigned to the Philippine armed forces that would exercise direct control by supervising staff planning, intelligence personnel training, and logistics. All military hardware and financial backing must be cleared through JUSMAG. Meanwhile, the US AID Public Safety Division managed the tutelage of local police agencies. US-supplied weapons, training, and logistics were immediately used in the counter-insurgency campaign against the Huks in the early 1950s, and later on to support the parasitic elite and Marcos's authoritarian regime in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

In a revealing testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969, Lt General Robert Warren clarified the role of the US military in the Philippines: "To provide advice and assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of training material and services as necessary to assure protection of US interests in the Philippines and to promote US foreign policy objectives in the area" (US Senate 1969, p. 242).

In 1954, the terms of free trade that worsened Philippine dependency were modified in the 1954 Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement. This extended parity rights to Americans for all kinds of enterprises. Tariff rules were readjusted, thus shifting US leverage to direct private investments into manufacturing instead of raw material production. Due to import controls imposed by the Philippines, the USA established assembly and packaging plants to produce consumer goods, thus competing with local industries. This was the refinement of the elaborate apparatus of the multinational or transnational corporations that would dominate post-Second World War international trade. Meanwhile, the Philippine economy continued to rely on the USA for selling raw materials and buying more expensive technology. In 1970, the USA controlled 80% of foreign investments in the country, approximately one-third of all the total equity capital of the 900 largest corporations. This represented 60% of US investments in Southeast Asia at that time (Bayani 1976, p. 18).

Crisis of the Neocolonial Order

At the height of the Cold War, with the USA bogged down in the Indochina war, the Philippines underwent severe economic and social blockages that destabilized the Marcos regime, an instrument of US Cold War strategy but an ironic comment on the role of the Philippines as a traditional showcase for democracy and freedom in Asia.

Marcos dispatched 2,000 troops to Vietnam at the request of Washington. But his economic base had been deteriorating since he won the presidency in the 1960s. The intense foreign stranglehold of the economy had led to an unchecked flow of capital, acute inflation, devaluation, and the rise of external debt. Exchange control was lifted in 1962, leading to capital outflow: repatriation of profits exceeded overseas investment. The overdependence on basic exports (lumber, sugar,

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copper, coconuts, and other extracted products) of low value relative to imported finished goods led to a trade deficit of $302 million in 1969 (Fast 1973, p. 89). In addition, the failure of the "Green Revolution" and the alleged "miracle rice" varieties (developed by the Rockefeller-funded International Rice Research Institute) aggravated the chronic shortage of rice as staple food, renewing the specter of famine and unrest.

Meanwhile, the social contradictions between the oligarchic state and the majority of pauperized peasants sharpened. Although the Huks (renamed People's Army of Liberation) were violently suppressed by the CIA-backed Magsaysay regime in the 1950s, they enjoyed popular support in the extremely polarized countryside. Crippled by the arrest of its leaders in 1950, the Huks evolved into the New People's Army (NPA) when the Communist Party was reorganized in 1969 by Maoist partisans who matured during the resurgence of the nationalist, anti-imperialist movement evinced in massive student demonstrations, peasant and worker strikes, and agitation among professionals such as teachers, journalists, lay and religious workers, women, urban poor, and so on.

One of Marcos's justifications for declaring martial law in 1972 was the threat of a communist takeover. In actuality, it was an outgrowth of Cold War geopolitics and a US attempt to reassert its hegemony in Asia after its Vietnam debacle. Increased US military and political support for the Marcos dictatorship was insured when he guaranteed US business 100% profit remittance as well as opportunities to exploit the country's natural resources, and also the right to engage in banking, shipping, domestic fishing, and so on (Javata-De Dios et al. 1988). Later investigations revealed that the bulk of US aid ended up in the foreign bank accounts of the Marcos family and their sycophantic cronies (Bonner 1987).

Total US military aid for the Marcos regime exceeded all that was given to Africa or to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, or Chile. Napalm and fragmentation bombs, among others, were supplied through JUSMAG to be used against NPA and Moro insurgents in Mindanao fighting the dictatorship. US AID officials trained police in advanced techniques of riot control, interrogation,

and torture tactics applied to political prisoners and detained suspects.

US "Special Forces" were also directly involved in counter-insurgency operations disguised as civic action activities, operations which are still maintained under the terms of the VFA, and more recently, under those of EDCA. These two agreements have virtually legitimized the return of US troops despite the dismantling of all US bases in 1992. One can conclude that "US imperialism, with its economic and military stake in the Philippines, is the instigator and mastermind of the Marcos fascist dictatorship" (Bayani 1976, p. 38). The USA continues to mastermind the human-rights violations, extrajudicial killings, and torture of the succeeding administrations, from those of Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos to Joseph Estrada, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and Benigno Aquino III.

Aftermath of the 1986 February Revolution

President Corazon Aquino's regime (1986–1990) was marked by the 1987 massacre of 18 farmers in a peaceful demonstration and by numerous human rights violations through hamletting, "salvaging" (extra-judicial killings), torture, etc. (Maglipon 1987). Both Aquino and her successor General Fidel Ramos had the approval of Washington in maintaining a stable market for business and US geopolitical maneuvres in the Middle East. After Ramos, both President Joseph Estrada and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pursued the "Washington Consensus" of abiding by the structural conditionalities of the World Bank International Monetary Fund in its neoliberal program of deregulation, privatization, and dismantling of any large-scale social-service programs for the impoverished and marginalized majority of citizens (Eadie 2005; San Juan 2008). All land-reform programs initiated since 1946 have failed to resolve the age-old problem of landless farmers and iniquitous semifeudal relations between landlords and rural workers (Putzel 1992).

In 1992, the Philippine Senate voted to dismantle the US military bases but did not touch

the other Agreements that maintained US supervision of the military and police agencies. The end of the Cold War did not witness a decrease in US military intervention. In 2002, after the 9/11 Al Qaida attacks, the US State Department declared the Philippines to be the second front in the war against global terrorism (Tuazon et al. 2002) and so required special supervision and surveillance.

Secretary of State Powell categorized the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA as terrorist organizations (Fletcher 2013). While the major Moro groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were not stigmatized as terrorist, the US singled out the Abu Sayyaf splinter group as a reason for justifying the 1999 VFA and the 2002 Mutual Logistics Support Agreement that allowed the initial troop deployment of 600 Special Operations forces to assist the Philippine military in counter-insurgency operations. The killing of a Filipino transgender in October 2014 by US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton called attention once again to the impunity of US personnel in numerous criminal cases. The VFA gives extraterritorial and extra-judicial rights to visiting US troops, an exceptional condition banned by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Thus, the Philippines could not detain the suspected killer, undermining its national sovereignty and its system of justice (Ayroso 2014).

Meanwhile, the MILF is in the process of negotiating a peace agreement with President Aquino under the auspices of the US Institute of Peace and the Malaysian government, while the MNLF has fragmented into various camps since the 1996 accord with the government, a conclusion to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF and Marcos (Graf et al. 2009). The government's dialogue with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines remains frozen while the Aquino regime is plagued with corruption, disaster relief, energy shortages, and the stalemate with China over the Scarborough Shoal and Spratley Islands confrontation in which the US Navy and Air Force presence figures prominently (Heydarian 2013).

From Cold War to War on Terror

Since 2002, the joint annual military exercises called "Philippine-US Bilateral Exercises" have been held allegedly to give humanitarian assistance during natural disasters to victimized provinces. They also offer weapons, logistics, and other support to government campaigns to secure peace and order in war zones, or in vital metropolitan areas (as in the 2012 exercise around the National Capitol Region). Just like the Civic Action programs refined during the antiHuk drives of the 1950s, these exercises supplement violent repression with psywar and other unconventional techniques to win "hearts and minds," closely following the US *Government Counterinsurgency Guide* of 2009 and its associated field manuals.

President Arroyo's Oplan Bantay Laya and President Benigno Aquino's Oplan Bayanihan are updated versions of the counter-insurgency strategy and tactics applied by the USA in Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. They combine intensive military operations, intelligence, civic action or triad operations, conventional warfare methods, and counter-guerrilla tactics. The USA learned as much from its tutelage of its colonial subjects as Filipinos did through a cross-fertilization of security and espionage practices. The historian Alfred McCoy concludes his inventory of such practices with the remark: "Empire has been a reciprocal process, shaping state formation in Manila and Washington while moving both nations into a mutually implicated postcolonial world" (2009, p. 522).

The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty continues to legitimize US "low intensity warfare," such as the sustained antiNPA drives during President Corazon Aquino's tenure (Bello 1989). During the Arroyo presidency, the USA maintained the official headquarters of the US-Philippine Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTF-P) inside the Camp Navarro of the Armed Forces of the Philippines's Western Mindanao Command in Zamboanga City, where Moro insurgents are active. Drones and other sophisticated equipments are handled by US Special

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Forces against the Abu Sayyaf, now valorized as an Al Qaida offshoot, with linkages to other recent terrorist groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria.

To supplement JUSMAG, a new agency called the Defense Policy Board was created to handle issues of international terrorism, maritime safety, transnational crime, natural disasters, pandemic outbreaks, etc. Other "cooperative security locations" (as these facilities are euphemistically called) are found in Clark, Subic, Mactan International Airport, and in other clandestine areas (Klare 2005). It is in these areas occupied by US advisers and staff where torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings occur. One recent case was that of US health worker Melissa Roxas, who was kidnapped and tortured by military agents in 2009. Documenting the accelerated kidnappings and extrajudicial murders of activists already publicized by Amnesty International and UN rapporteurs such as Philip Alston, the Filipino group KARAPATAN noted the 1,111% increase of military assistance to the Arroyo regime beginning in 2001 when the first Balikatan exercise was held (Lefebvre 2010). This aid continues indiscriminately with horrendous consequences.

Provisional Coda

In March 2007, the Permanent People's Tribunal based in Europe heard witnesses about government abuses and judged Presidents Bush and Arroyo guilty of crimes against humanity (San Juan 2007: Appendix C). The verdict reviews the US imposition of virtual colonial status on the Philippines via numerous military and security agreements that have ensured domination over the economy, state apparatus, and internal security.

Under the guise of the global "War on Terror" against extremists, the USA continues to deploy and station thousands of troops, at any one time, in the Philippines. They participate in combat operations against local insurgents, a gross violation of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Tribunal observed that "because of its strategic location, the Philippines is vital for the US projection of military force in East Asia and as far

away as the Middle East," serving as transit points and refueling stations in its wars of aggression against the people of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the people of the Philippines. President Bush was an accomplice of President Arroyo in the systematic violation of the rights of the Filipino people, which were also crimes against humanity. For these, US imperialism was indicted as an international scourge.

From the sixteenth century to the present, imperialism (whether in the mode of Spanish Old style colonialism, Japanese militarism, or US tutelage in modernization/developmentalism) represents one of the worst manifestations of an oppressive system of exploitation of people that have been outlawed by the United Nations Charter and its Declaration of Human Rights. Nonetheless, it persists today in the Philippines where a people's national-democratic, socialist-oriented revolution, with a long and durable tradition, thrives in a collective project to eradicate this historic legacy (San Juan 2008). The history of the Philippines may be read as one long chronicle of the people's struggle against colonialism and imperialism for the sake of affirming human dignity and universal justice.

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Philosophy and Imperialism

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The present entry offers a very brief introduction into just a few of the numerous, complex relations between imperialism and philosophy. The piece does not seek to resolve the issues presented. Much less does it pretend to comprehensiveness. Two interrelated questions motivate the expositions to follow: In what ways has imperialism impacted or influenced philosophy? And, conversely, how has philosophy influenced, addressed, and/or confronted imperialism? To begin, some central concepts will be fleshed out. The second section then presents a number of episodes in which accordant relations have been obtained between imperialism and philosophy. The next section then explores a number of overtly anti-imperialist philosophies.

Definition

The definitions to follow do not aspire to grasp the essences of things in themselves. They are rather delineations meant to be broad enough not to be unnecessarily exclusionary and narrow enough to

pinpoint real areas of convergence between imperialism and philosophy.

"Imperialism" amounts to the totality of an empire's concrete and abstract orientations toward groups considered to be "other" than the said empire, whereby the continual extraction of value, resources, land, and people through theft or systematically unequal exchange plays a central role in the empire's maintenance and further aggrandizement of power and order. For present purposes, and since they are often used interchangeably in contemporary theory, "imperialism" and "colonialism" will not be rigidly distinguished from one another here. An "empire" is a large, multiethnic or multinational political body with a complex internal division of labor that governs territories or political entities originally outside of its sphere of control via combinations of direct and indirect rule (Howe 2002, pp. 13–15, 30). There are many important differences that distinguish one empire from another. The empires of Maurya in the fourth century (BCE), of the Tawantinsuyu in the fifteenth century, and of the French in the nineteenth century were vastly different from each other. But empires also betray certain constant features or family resemblances, only a few of which will be noted for present purposes. How these and related constants ultimately affect one another and which prove to be most important for explaining the workings of empires are issues that ultimately exceed the scope of this piece.

Despite emerging in varying geographical regions over the course of time, empires have shared a number of family resemblances with one another. For example, they use violence, persuasion, and intrigue for their various ventures. Such plans typically include wars of aggression, territorial expansion, the subjugation of foreign populations, and the establishment of durable forms of economic extraction – whether through tribute, theft, or the creation of new markets. The occasional de facto or de jure anomaly notwithstanding, men hold the highest and vast majority of positions of power and authority over imperial life, i.e., empires are and have been androcratic. One exponent of the existence and affairs of such gendered hierarchies is "imperial ideology."

"Imperial ideology" signifies the idealist obfuscation or inversion of the actual bearing of historical-material processes on the construction of ideas in a way that allows imperial ruling classes to reinforce their own, universal ideas as the sole legitimate ones (Marx 1978, pp. 154, 172–174). The reigning ideology of an empire ensures, motivates, and justifies its day-to-day operations. Ideology makes people march (*fait marcher*), in the multiple senses of making them fall in line, work, and function, as well as in the sense of deluding them (Althusser 2014, pp. 42n27, 180–81). Artwork, stories, ceremonies, grand architectural projects, and official myths constitute but a few of the more common conduits of imperial ideology. To these things which often act as cultural bearers of imperial interests, one can also add "philosophy."

"Philosophy," a term whose ancient Greek roots mean the "love of wisdom," refers to an oriented system of ideas, values, and practices by means of which an individual or group seeks and proposes answers to fundamental questions, such as those concerning reality, logic, beauty, goodness, knowledge, the self, the gods, and the meaning of life – questions whose elusiveness often rivals their perceived, perennial importance. One often associates philosophy with ideas, particularly with *big* ideas. But philosophical ideas, concepts, and theories emerge, transform, and are transmitted through concomitant *practices*. Social and cultural practices comprise a key aspect of really existing philosophy, whether in regard to the adoption of Jain ascetic habits (Laidlaw 1995), the memorization and recitation of syllogistic poems in Medieval European universities (Kneale 1962, p. 232), or the participation in contemporary dissertation rituals. In seeking the best ways to address fundamental questions, philosophers and philosophical traditions prioritize some concerns, methods, forms of life, and styles of presentation over others. In this way, a particular philosophy *orients* itself in one way rather than another. Finally, the ideas, values, and practices that comprise an instance of philosophy relate to and impinge upon one another, such that the elements of a philosophy make up an organized *system* as opposed to a mere cluster or heap.

Philosophies have histories. And even if a good deal of philosophers over time have tried to think that which is pure, eternal, and immutable, nonetheless these endeavors cannot be clearly and distinctly separated from messy, fluctuating, and worldly matters – including imperial states of affairs. Imperialism is also a historical phenomenon. There were times prior to any empires and empires rise and fall. But insofar as the ventures and bureaucratic affairs of an empire involve operative presuppositions about beauty, justice, the gods, the meaning of life, knowledge, and so forth, they too do not exist in isolation from philosophy. So, to begin, one can reasonably propose that *imperialism and philosophy bear upon one another*. Imperialism and philosophy can be thought of as "bearing upon" one another in at least two senses. On the one hand, the phrasal verb "to bear upon" can be understood in the sense of "being relevant to," as new evidence can be said to bear upon a court case. On the other hand, "to bear upon" connotes a stronger sense of "influencing" or "pressing downward on," as when a heavy weight bears upon one's shoulders. The following sections explore cases in which, at the very least, philosophy and imperialism have proven to be relevant to one another and, in a number of instances, do in fact seem to have exerted pressure on and influenced each other.

Imperialism and Philosophy: Accordant Relations

Imperialism and philosophy have maintained certain consonant relations with one another over the course of history. Where philosophy's history begins and what types of thinking one deems worthy of consideration as philosophical are themselves philosophical matters of no little importance. If one prioritizes the meaning of philosophy's etymology over the term's origins, then an examination of the relation of the love of wisdom to imperialism will not only need to extend to places and times long before archaic and classical Greece but must also include empires that emerged independently of any initial Hellenistic influence. Various forms of didactic

and wisdom literature circulated within ancient imperial contexts. Consider, for example, the maxims of Ptah-Hotep, who was reported to have served under King Izezi of the Fifth Dynasty of ancient Egypt (c. 2450 BCE). "The Instruction of Vizier Ptah-Hotep" consists of a collection of wise sayings to be passed down to his son and designated successor. The text provides a glimpse into what would have been considered the best advice for the development of habits needed to assist one in practical, moral, and political matters from an upper-class Egyptian point of view (2011, pp. 343–346). Papyri versions of the text were copied and emended in the Egyptian Empire (New Kingdom) during the Bronze Age, attesting to the perceived salience of the maxims (Simpson 2003, pp. 129–130).

Traditions of the pursuit of wisdom can also be observed within imperial contexts without initial influence from ancient Mediterranean or Near Eastern empires. For instance, in the Aztec Empire (the Triple Alliance) of pre-Colombian Mesoamerica, there arose "a remarkable intellectual tradition, one that like the Greeks began with the questions of lyric poets and then went on to distinct schools of inquiry associated with elite academies" (Mann 2011, p. 131; see also Dussel 1995, pp. 50–57). The philosophers of the Aztec Empire, the *tlamatinime*, were thinkers and teachers whose lives were to set a moral example. They sought and reflected upon the Nahuatl concept *neltilizli tzintlitzli*, which roughly translates as "fundamental truth, true basic principle." While the world was thought to be in a permanent state of flux, truth in the sense of *neltilizli tzintlitzli* was understood to exist beyond transitory finitude. This perceived separation provoked the question of how fundamental truth could relate to constant change. One individual who dwelt upon such questions was Ayocuan Cuetzpaltzin. Cuetzpaltzin, son of the Chichmec Prince Cuetzpaltzin the Elder, was the reported ruler of Tecamachalco (1420–1441 CE), a city-state that would become incorporated as part of the tributary province of Tepeacac by the Aztec Triple Alliance in line with the latter's primary economic strategy (Berdan et al. 1996, pp. 133–135; Berdan and Anawalt 1997, p. 99). Cuetzpaltzin continued

to affiliate with princes after Tepeacac's subsumption (León-Portilla 1966, p. 14), and the economic benefits befalling a man of such status may have provided him with more leisure time to consider philosophical matters. Among other things, the poet-philosopher speculated about whether or not friends would be reunited in the afterlife, "Earth is the region of the fleeting moment. / Is it also thus in the Place/Where in Some Way One Lives?" Although he laments the emptiness and futility of finitude, Cuetzpaltzin also seems to suggest that through artistic creation, one might approach the real, and he calls for the enjoyment of friendship, flowers, and song while alive in the face of existential uncertainties (León-Portilla 1992, pp. 214–221; Mann 2011, pp. 137–139).

If one prefers to understand the etymology of the term "philosophy" more narrowly, designating a new form of thinking that emerges specifically in archaic and classical Greece, here too philosophy's relation to imperialism should not be passed over in silence. By the beginning of the early eighth century BCE, expanding Greek city-states had begun to colonize territories overseas, eventually covering parts of what are today France, Spain, Syria, North Africa, Italy, and Turkey (Cline and Graham 2011, p. 112). And during the next two centuries, slave trade routes would begin to make non-Greek slaves ("barbarians") much more accessible (Cartledge 2002, p. 162). But it was not until the formation of the Delian League in 477 and its successfully organized resistance against the expansionist efforts of the Achaemenid Persian Empire that the Athenian Empire truly rose to power. The Athenians' "lead in resistance to the Persian Empire was a vital ingredient in their own short-lived bid at imperialism...An empire resister became an empire itself" (Cline and Graham 2011, p. 126). By this point, Athens along with its colonies and cleruchies did not only happen to have slaves, but its economy fundamentally depended upon the labor of slaves, the great majority of whom were of foreign origin. Athens was a slave society (Cartledge 2002, p. 159; Hall 1989, p. 2; Kyrtatas 2002, p. 146). Those of the *demos* who were able to exercise democratic power were male, autochthonous (or sometimes naturalized) citizens who

made up about 16% of the population, whereas actual assembly attendance proved closer to about 2.4% of the population (Black 2009, p. 141).

Athenian imperialism's bearing upon Greek philosophy can be found in a variety of different texts. One particularly elucidating example can be found in the work of Alexander the Great's tutor: Aristotle (384–322 BCE). In a foundational section of the *Politics* that foreshadows his subsequent theory of natural slavery, Aristotle writes:

> Now in these matters as elsewhere it is by looking at how things develop naturally from the beginning that one may best study them. First, then, there must of necessity be a conjoining of persons who cannot exist without one another: on the one hand, male and female, for the sake of reproduction (which occurs not from intentional choice but—as is also the case with the other animals and plants—from a natural striving to leave behind another that is like oneself); on the other, the naturally ruling and ruled, on account of preservation. For that which can foresee with the mind is the naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, while that which can do these things with the body is the naturally ruled and slave; hence the same thing is advantageous for the master and slave. Now the female is distinguished by nature from the slave. For nature makes nothing in an economizing spirit, as smiths make the Delphic knife, but one thing with a view to one thing; and each instrument would perform most finely if it served one task rather than many. The barbarians, though, have the same arrangement for female and slave. The reason for this is that they have no naturally ruling element; with them, the community of man and woman is that of female slave and male slave. This is why the poets say "it is fitting for Greeks to rule barbarians"—the assumption being that barbarian and slave are by nature the same thing. (2001b, I.2 1252a24-1252b8)

This passage exemplifies imperial ideology to the extent that it inverts the life processes of Athens: nature is socialized, and social relations are naturalized in a way consonant with the aims of the ruling classes. Greece has often been seen as the birthplace for providing rational and natural explanations of things as opposed to merely theological ones (Cline and Graham 2011, p. 104; Ede and Cormack 2012, pp. 1–27; Marietta Jr. 1998, p. 4; Windleband 1956, pp. 34–36). In the text at hand, no deities or divine rulers are called upon for imperialist ends, as did Naram-Sin with Ishtar in Akkad and Constantine with Jesus in Rome (Cline and Graham 2011, p. 17; Irvin and

Sunquist 2006, pp. 160–65). Nonetheless, no sooner does "nature" in the above quotation displace the imperial gods as legitimate forms of explanation than it becomes socialized in an ambiguously poetic fashion. Aristotle describes nature as having the creative power and foresight of a highly skilled craftsman, an image reminiscent of Plato's demiurge in the *Timaeus*. This craftsman makes types of individuals who have specific purposes in relation to one another (cf. 2001a, *Phys.* II.8 198b18–199b33). Whether or not certain types of individuals organize themselves in accordance with their natural ends does not alter their more primordial relation to the "craftsman" of said interrelated ends. In this way, and however metaphorically, the idea of "nature" acts as a social agent who creates and establishes a normative hierarchy between types of human being.

Aristotle notes three different types of relations of dependency that nature distinguishes and establishes: woman-to-man, slave-to-master, and barbarian-to-Greek. Women, slaves, and barbarians make up those categories of individuals fit to be naturally ruled. The idea of the "body" mediates these groups with the imperial status quo. The reproductive body ensures the continual supply of Athenian citizens, the absolutely instrumentalized body upholds the slave economy, and the ethnically other body contrasts with and delimits the uniqueness of Greek self-identity (cf. Hall 1989). Such a characterization served the interests of and would have found favor with the upper-class men of the Lyceum (Millett 2007, p. 193) as well as those of the Assembly. By describing women, slaves, and barbarians as lacking the full capacity for deliberation (2001b, *Pol.* I.13 1260a9-15), Aristotle – Greek, philosopher, man, and slave owner – positions himself in the best place to convene with the excellent craftsman that is nature. So, the political-philosophical paragraph above serves as little more than an ideological justification for Athenian imperialism.

Ancient philosophy has not only defended existing imperial orders but has also sought to create them. The current of thought referred to as "Legalism" in ancient China serves as a good

example of how philosophical programs have pursued and obtained such objectives. In Hucker's catchy formulation, "If Confucianism is a doctrine of 'ought-ness' and Taoism a doctrine of 'such-ness,' then Legalism is a doctrine of 'must-ness'" (1975, p. 92). The word "Legalism" (*fa jia*) gathers together a set of related currents in ancient Chinese philosophy, although the term can prove misleading if taken too simplistically (Pines 2017, p. 1; Zhao 2015, p. 179). The "*fa*" of "*fa jia*" has multiple senses in addition to that of law, at times connoting a model, standard, method, normative rules, or technique (Schwartz 1985, pp. 321–23). During the Spring and Autumn period in the Zhou realm (770–453 BCE), there ensued widespread political turmoil and disintegration. Chaos and violent warfare fragmented Eastern Zhou, which had become "entangled in a web of debilitating struggles among rival polities, between powerful nobles and the lords within each polity, as well as among aristocratic lineages and among rival branches within major lineages" (Pines 2017, p. 5). Such political factiousness would ascend to even bloodier heights in the Eastern Zhou between 419 and 221 BCE during the Age of Total War, at which point territorial expansion became the central purpose of warfare (Zhao 2015, p. 222). Legalism emerged during the fourth and third centuries in response to the era's political calamitousness. Legalism's overarching goal consisted in creating a "rich state and powerful army" (*fu guo qiang bing*) that would unite "All-under-Heaven" (Pines 2017, pp. 5–6). But the current of thought did not amount to idle speculation detached from everyday affairs of state. Indeed, the overall "synergy between the states' war efforts and the Legalist reforms strengthened state power and defined the Age of Total War" (Zhao 2015, p. 187). While there were many different factors that led to the emergence of the Qin Empire in 221 BCE, such as increased urbanization, new commercial relations, and technological developments, the extent to which Legalist philosophical ideas and practices came to bear upon imperial policy deserves to be foregrounded.

One of the earliest philosophers identified as part of the Legalist tradition was Shang Yang or

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Lord Shang (390–338 BCE). Shang Yang was an incredibly ambitious aristocrat from the small state of Wei, where he studied with Li Kui, the man who orchestrated the Wei Legalist reform. As a political actor, advisor, and major reformer, Shang Yang would later assist in the rise of the Qin Empire (Pines 2017, p. 3; Schwartz 1985, p. 331; Zhao 2015, p. 195). Shang Yang is best remembered for the eponymous *Book of Lord Shang* in which he (and most likely his later disciples) set forth the brutal policies considered necessary for statecraft. A notorious passage reads: "When the people are weak, the state is strong; hence the state that possesses the Way strives to weaken the people" (Pines 2017, p. 9). In contrast to Confucius and Aristotle, Legalist philosophers like Shang Yang were unconcerned with moral character and the cultivation of virtues, and they considered the purported importance of individual and spiritual-moral agency for politics as illusory (Schwartz 1985, pp. 325, 335, & 346). Shang Yang thought of agriculture and warfare as the most important bases of the best state, both of which required the implementation of draconian laws and punishments (even for petty crimes) accompanied by positive incentives.

Shang Yang's views were further developed by Han Fei (d. 233 BCE), "a scion of the ruling family from the state of Hán" (Pines 2017, p. 4). Han Fei emphasized the importance of developing a strong bureaucracy to mediate the absolute powers of the ruler, and he argued that the advancement of individuals within the state bureaucracy should be merit-based. While agreeing with Shang Yang on the state's need for draconian penal laws, he also thought that such laws served the people's best interests in the long run. Even if they did not recognize this, they could eventually come to love the law (Schwartz 1985, p. 323). The philosopher held that the sovereign needed to enshroud himself in mythology, offering the following metaphor: "a flying dragon only looked majestic in the sky against the clouds; without clouds, the flying dragon would resemble a worm" (Zhao 2015, p. 186). Han Fei would eventually gain access to the First Emperor, whom the former considered to be the ideal ruler. However, the Emperor's suspicion of Han Fei would later

lead to the philosopher's execution, possibly because the sovereign followed Han Fei's advice too closely (Feizi 2003, pp. 85–90; Schwartz 1985, p. 345).

Among other early-modern European candidates for investigation (Ince 2018; Jahn 2005; Muthu 2012; Smith 2015), the work of English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) provides another telling example of the ways in which imperialism has borne upon philosophy. Like Shang Yang and Han Fei, Bacon did not pursue philosophy to the exclusion of political life. He served as Lord Chancellor under James I and was an active member of the Commons during the initial emergence of the British Empire (Klein 2016, p. 1). During his lifetime, mercantile capital had begun to generate substantial competition between rival European powers (Wallerstein 2011). Along with the Dutch and the French, England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tried to curb Spanish imperialism through state-sanctioned privateering, smuggling, and raiding in the Americas (Streets-Salter and Getz 2016, pp. 114–117). To these forms of extraction were added the conquest and establishment of overseas settler colonies and plantation systems in the early seventeenth century. The ensuing regular encounters between British forces and indigenous groups resulted in the marginalization and decimation of the latter, most notably in the burgeoning Atlantic slave trade, the first voyage of which set sail from England the year after Bacon's birth (Williams 1994, p. 30). Already by the middle of the seventeenth century, over one million slaves had been imported into Anglo-America (Lange 2009, p. 22).

A number of Bacon's texts exhibit imperialist predilections. For instance, in *Of Plantations* the philosopher speaks of colonies as "heroical works," and he appropriates the Emperor Charles V's expansionist motto *plus ultra* (further yet) for his natural philosophical schemes (Jowitt 2002, pp. 130–133). But such leanings also find expression in Bacon's dreams of uniting empire and science in houses of learning. Both imperial political bodies as well as philosophers have been concerned with the reach and future preservation of their ways of life and thought. Both have,

accordingly, founded institutions where the teaching and learning of said ways of life and thought could take place. A brief allusion to the relation of Aristotle's Lyceum to the imperial economic and ideological forces in classical Athens was already noted. To such an institution, one could also add the large-scale mandatory educational system for every male in the Aztec Triple Alliance or Oxford University in the nineteenth century (Mann 2011, p. 137; Pietsch 2013). Bacon's vision of the ideal natural-philosophical institution, which would later be taken as a model by "mid-century republicans and the monarchist founders of the Royal Society," likewise unites the ends of philosophy with those of empire (Colclough 2002, p. 61).

In his utopian novella, *New Atlantis*, Bacon portrays a ship of Spanish sailors who come across an island (called "Bensalem") west of Peru in 1612. The crew learn from Bensalem's governor that one night the canonical and non-canonical works of the Bible (even those which had not yet been written) came to the island amid a bright pillar of light (1980, p. 48). That is, the ideas considered to be most important on the island literally descended "from heaven to earth" (Marx 1978, p. 154). On the island, there exists the ideal institution of scientific learning, Salomon's House, whose workings reflect Bacon's belief that ideas should be controlled by the elite (Ede and Cormack 2012, p. 131). The House's central purpose of investigating the "Causes, and secret motions of things" operates inseparably from the "enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible" (1980, p. 70). Well on its way to such an ideal, Salomon's House excels in the acquisition and production of unrivaled forms of knowledge, medicine, and technology.

New Atlantis has been read, most convincingly, as Bacon's criticism of James I's underestimation of the importance of using empirical research for England's greater international-political empowerment (Jowitt 2002, pp. 141–143). The elements of patriarchy and racism both inside and outside of Salomon's House suggest that the expansion of the bounds of "Human Empire," even in a utopian setting, would not do away with the hierarchical subordination of some types of human being to

others. Bacon often describes the investigation of nature in gendered and sexualized terms or through analogies involving heterosexual marriage, a motif which continues in *New Atlantis* (Aughterson 2002, p. 156; Godfrey-Smith 2003, pp. 138–139). Bensalem in general and Salomon's House in particular are both governed exclusively by men, and different rituals serve to entrench patriarchal rule. Bacon depicts the greatest achievement attainable by a woman as being the bearer of a long lineage of men, for which she can be seated in a lofted chair during the celebration of the family, but where she must nevertheless remain concealed, able to see through a window but not be seen (1980, pp. 59–61). Negative stereotypes also continue to circulate freely within the philosopher's utopia. For example, mention is made of "a little foul ugly Æthiop," and terms of disparagement are marshalled to distinguish some of Bensalem's policies from those of the Orient: "It is true, the like law against the admission of strangers without licence is an ancient law in the kingdom of China, and yet continued in use. But there it is a poor thing; and hath made them a curious, ignorant, fearful, foolish nation" (1980, pp. 65, 55).

The imperialist moments in Bacon's philosophy pale in comparison to those found in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Nietzsche wrote all of his major works during the era of the German Empire, a period whose social, cultural, and political realities would both influence him and provoke his contrarian ire. His works are marked by an unapologetic frankness, which allows him to pursue dangerous and bold ideas without reserve. Such daring leads Nietzsche to quite a few remarkable ideas, criticisms, and observations. But the bluntness of his approach also results in paroxysms of prejudice that often contradict one another. At times imperialist dimensions of his thought occur somewhat subtly, at other moments becoming more conspicuous. In *Human, All Too Human* (1878), Nietzsche contrasts the old European notions of the wild, nasty tropics with temperate Europe (Blaut 1993, pp. 69–94). In §236, he argues that "cultural eras correspond to various climactic belts," the past giving the impression of a tropical climate:

"Violent contrasts; abrupt alternation of day and night; heat and magnificent colors; reverence for everything sudden, mysterious, frightful; rapid onset of oncoming storms; everywhere the wasteful overflowing of nature's horns of plenty" (1996). He contrasts these stereotypical images of primitive life with "our" culture, in which the climate is light, temperate, and pure. Nietzsche then briefly concedes that perhaps Germany/Europe's cultural progress has not led to advances in art and metaphysics. He then concludes, however, that, "for us, the very *existence* of the temperate cultural zone counts as progress." Here Nietzsche does not advance detailed arguments for the rational superiority of Germans/Europeans over inhabitants of the tropics, as did so many other colonialist thinkers. Instead, he finds that he is able to infer the temporal notion of progress simply from the spatial notion of contrasting geographical zones. The thought that non-European peoples were models of the past of Europeans was a widespread element of modern imperial ideology. Such ideological echoes reverberate in §236 of *Human, All Too Human* not only in terms of content but also insofar as Nietzsche's conclusion is asserted as self-evident, despite rhetorically entertaining hypothetical counterpoints.

Yet while the Nietzsche of *Human, All Too Human* may have considered Europe as comparatively progressive vis-à-vis the tropics, he would eventually come to see the nations of Europe as decadent and in a state of decline. The philosopher lambasts the schemes of Bismarck, whose "volteface in the mid-1880s on the question of Africa had not only furnished Germany with a colonial empire of her own, but also provoked Nietzsche's attacks on the petty ambitions and nationalistic myopia of the Reich" (Conway 2002, p. 175; Nietzsche 2001: §377). But Nietzsche did not criticize the competing nationalisms of Europe for moral or anti-imperialist reasons, but rather because Europe's imperialisms were proving defective precisely insofar as they produced enfeebling divisions among Europeans. In a reflection from 1885, Nietzsche claims that individual nations like England, Holland, and Germany will not, by themselves, be able to maintain their colonies, and he concludes that a

certain European unification proves necessary for the conquest of non-Europeans (Holub 1998, pp. 44–45). The conquests of Napoleon serve as one model for such future unification, while the past glories of the Roman Empire serve as another. If Nietzsche had once found in tropical zones the past of Europe's progress, he now saw "in the Roman Empire the promise of Europe's future" (Conway 2002, pp. 175–176). To overcome its present decadence and pessimism, Europe would need to cultivate new values and individuals. In *The Gay Science* (1882), published 2 years prior to the Berlin Conference, Nietzsche calls for the discovery of such values by means of mercantile metaphors, "[A] new justice is needed! And a new motto! And new philosophers! The moral earth, too, is round! The moral earth, too, has its antipodes! The antipodes, too, have their right to exist! There is another world to discover—and more than one! On to the ships, you philosophers!" (§289). Whereas "Merchants of Light" from the House of Salomon would need to occasionally set sail in order to discover new knowledge that would enlarge the bounds of Human Empire (Bacon 1980, p. 79), "good Europeans" would need to set sail to discover new values to enlarge the bounds of Nietzsche's "comprehensive, integrated program of pan-European acculturation" (Conway 2002, p. 177).

Imperial ideology continues to affect and hold sway over various aspects of contemporary philosophy (Wood 2014a, 2016). However, imperialism does not only bear upon philosophy's textual content. As noted previously, institutions of learning play an important role in bolstering an empire's practices and ideologies. For instance, contemporary universities in the United States in many respects depend upon and reinforce US imperialism. And insofar as philosophy functions as one discipline among others within such universities, it too maintains a variety of complex relations with imperial flows of capital and concepts both nationally and internationally. While the Red Scare played a heavy-handed role in shaping philosophers, textbooks, and philosophy as a discipline in the 1940s and 1950s (McCumber 2001), one can also find overtly imperialist motifs within current day-to-day departmental politics.

Consider, for example, the civil case brought against the Regents of the University of California and world-renowned philosopher John Searle, recipient of the National Humanities Medal awarded by George W. Bush in 2004 (Vattimo and Zabala 2011, p. 11). In March 2017, Searle's teaching and research assistant, Joanna Ong, filed a civil lawsuit against him and the Regents, the vast majority of whom are men. The complaint alleges that the philosopher had repeatedly sexually assaulted her both verbally and physically and that upon refusing his advances, her pay was cut by half, after which she was dismissed without cause. According to Ong's complaint:

> During Ong's employment, Searle continued to make inappropriate comments and engage in lewd conduct around her. While they were engaged in work, Searle would occasionally ask Ong to log into a "Sugar Baby, Sugar Daddy" website for him, which she refused to do. Searle also would speak to Ong in a sexual manner. On one occasion, when Ong brought up the topic of American Imperialism as a discussion topic, Searle responded, "American Imperialism! Oh boy, that sounds great honey! Let's go to bed and do that right now!" ("Complaint for Damages & Demand for Jury Trial", Paragraph 23)

In the case at hand, the constants of imperial ideology noted throughout this section present themselves once again. The civil case involves the alleged abuse of power by a white man in a prestigious US university to emotionally, sexually, and economically exploit an Asian-American woman. As a harbinger of sexual conquest, the euphemism "American Imperialism" here reveals the patriarchal dimension of imperial ideology. At the very least, Ong v. the Regents of the University of California makes clear that really existing philosophy is not immune to conflicts in which imperialism arises as an explicit area of contention across lines of class, race, and gender.

Imperialism and Philosophy: Discordant Relations

The previous section examined cases in which imperialism and philosophy have promoted one another's preservation and advancement. The present section turns to just a few of the cases in which the ideas, values, and practices of a particular philosophy and of a particular empire have not fostered each other's empowerment but rather have been at odds with one another. Before proceeding to these analyses, however, two caveats are in order. First, it should be noted that a number of unique historical and material problems beset anti-imperialist philosophies. If one understands the concepts of imperialism and philosophy broadly, it seems likely that a large number of traditions dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom, some of whose particular ideas, values, and practices were antithetical to imperialism, have not been preserved. Whereas empires have employed scholars and scribes to debate and record ideas, many small-scale societies within and on the edges of empires have lacked the time, resources, and technologies to physically record their ideas and arguments. While thinking philosophically, as Socrates knew, does not require writing, writing down philosophical ideas does allow for the future access to those ideas in a way that usually surpasses the capacities of oral transmission. Such issues of preservation are multiplied to the extent that an empire actively benefits either from ignoring anti-imperialist arguments altogether or from excluding such positions as not being properly philosophical in the first place. For example, it is not insignificant that, although Aristotle treats arguments against the idea of natural slavery in his *Politics* (1253b15-23), the theorists of such ideas nevertheless remain wholly anonymous (cf. Cambiano 1987). Likewise, in modern contexts, anti-imperialist philosophies are effectively kept at the margins when one configures the history of philosophy in accordance with *translatio imperii* models, i.e., when history itself becomes equated with the history of the succession of empires.

The second caveat is that there are cases in which a philosopher's oeuvre cannot be considered simply "for" or "against" imperialism. Imperialism and philosophy have borne upon one another in such a way that on some occasions a thinker seems to be averse to imperialism, while at others said philosopher remains mired in an empire's practical, institutional, and ideological trappings. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant

(1724–1804) serves as an excellent example of this ambivalence.

Taken as a whole, Kant's philosophy exhibits both quintessentially imperialist and resolutely anti-imperialist arguments. Prior to the mid-1790s, his philosophy describes the life of the colonized from a perspective in favor of imperialist ideas, values, and practices (Kleingeld 2014). For example, in his essay "Of National Characters" from 1748, Kant considers "Negroes" as naturally inferior to whites (Muthu 2003, p. 183). Portions of his later Doenhoff Lectures on Physical Geography (1782) sound like a "how-to" guide for aspiring imperialists: "The Mandinka are the very most desirable among all Negroes up to the Gambia river, because they are the most hardworking ones. These are the ones that one prefers to seek for slaves, because these can tolerate labour in the greatest heat that no human being [*Mensch*] can endure." Such anthropological claims provided a foundation for the philosopher's later defense of colonialist and nonwhite slavery in his article from 1788, "On the use of teleological principles in philosophy." In his Dohna Lectures on Physical Geography, Kant would continue to adhere to imperialist notions, stating that "Negroes" were created for the difficult labor of slavery intolerable to others (Kleingeld 2014, pp. 47–51). Like that of Aristotle, Kant's hierarchy of relations of subordination purports to model both a factual and a normative order and does so through the notion of "creation." For Kant, the capacities available to a certain type of individual determine the avenues that said type of individual can and should (be made to) follow. Yet, unlike Aristotle's hierarchy of social relations, Kant's schema is mediated by the distinctively modern notion of race, to which he contributed significant theoretical efforts. The racial hierarchy to appear in his anthropology lectures placed Native Americans on the bottom, "Negroes" above them, and Asians on the rung above them. As the only non-deficient race, whites sat atop Kant's racial pyramid (Kleingeld 2014, p. 47; McCarthy 2009, pp. 50–51).

In his later ethical and political works, however, Kant not only begins to abandon his apology of imperialism but sets forth critical arguments against imperialism. He now begins to see colonialism's self-ordained civilizing mission as "specious" and thinks that European states' application of "all their resources to vain and violent schemes of expansion" in part contributes to Europe's moral immaturity (Muthu 2003, pp. 198, 209). Kant's later work undergoes a number of transformations. First, he begins to challenge common Eurocentric biases. In *Perpetual Peace* (1795), in what could be read as a reversal of the aforementioned position of the governor of Bensalem, Kant argues that China and Japan were morally and politically right to place restrictions of contact and entrance on their European "guests," who had not only proven themselves to be violent, treacherous, and oppressive but also to be economically unstable (1991b, pp. 106–107). Similarly, in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), one finds a criticism of the illegitimacy of Greek xenophobia, in which "they evinced no goodwill towards *extranei* [outsiders], but included them all, rather, *sub voce hostes = barbari* [under the name of enemies, or barbarians]" (Muthu 2003, pp. 153–154). Secondly, against *res nullius* doctrines through which the theft of indigenous peoples' lands was legally sanctioned (Muthu 2003, p. 187), Kant develops a concept of cosmopolitan right. To accomplish this, Kant argues in §62 of *The Metaphysics of Morals* that the definite, spherical nature of the planet, the "*globus terraqueus*" on which all people live, makes all nations original members of a community of the land. All peoples make up a "community of reciprocal action (*commercium*)," in which each has the right to peaceably interact or deny interaction with the others. Kant highlights the function of the ocean in providing an avenue and incentive for international commerce but also notes that attempts at settlement often carry "evil and violence" in their wake. If for Nietzsche the roundness of the earth serves as a perfect image for the world's *lack* of any objective moral and political foundations, for Kant the spherical definiteness of the *globus terraqueus* serves as the historical condition from which one can derive the concept of cosmopolitan right. The moral and political concept of "cosmopolitan right" constitutes an attempt to articulate an international order that

annuls the violent instabilities wrought by imperialists and political revolutionaries alike. Lastly, Kant breaks from other social contract theorists by not placing Amerindians, South Pacific Islanders, or any non-European peoples within the state of nature (Muthu 2003, p. 201).

Kant was by no means the first philosopher to forward arguments of an anti-imperialist nature. The ancient Chinese philosopher Mo Zi and his followers, the Mohists, also held a variety of anti-imperialist views. Mo Zi lived throughout the last three quarters of the fifth century and likely into the fourth century BCE during the Warring States period. Like the later Legalists, he was concerned to influence rulers so that they would implement the correct forms of government. Unlike the Legalists, however, the philosophy collected in *The Book of Master Mo* (or, the *Mozi*) contests traditional imperialist interests and schemes on political, practical, historical, and ethical grounds. For example, the *Mozi* provides multiple arguments against engaging in offensive war and sets out specific, detailed tactics concerning the military defense of a city at least six centuries prior to the composition of Augustine's *City of God*. Insofar as expansionary wars of aggression have made up a central constant of imperial strategy over the course of history, the *Mozi*'s political arguments against offensive warfare are correctly characterized as "essentially anti-imperialist" in nature (Johnston 2013: xviii). The *Mozi*'s first argument against offensive warfare proceeds as follows: One says that stealing a plum or a peach is wrong, because it benefits the thief and harms the one robbed, and the government punishes the thief. To steal hogs, chickens, and pigs is worse still, and stealing a horse is even worse. Likewise, when one kills an innocent man, this action is said to lack *ren* (love, kindness, humaneness, and benevolence) and *yi* (right action, righteousness, duty, justice). So, to kill an innocent man and steal his garments, sword, and spear are worse than the aforementioned actions taken individually. To attack a foreign city involves killing and stealing to an immensely greater degree than all of these cases. And yet, officers and noble men call such courses of action *ren* and *yi*. By doing so, such officials gravely err in thought and action (Mo Zi 2013, pp. 91–92).

The *Mozi* also furnishes practical and historical arguments against offensive warfare. First, offensive warfare proves enormously costly in a number of senses. Troops mobilized in the summer suffer from excessive heat and during the winter from excessive cold. "If they go forth in spring, it disrupts the people's planting and sowing and the cultivation of trees, and if they go forth in autumn, it disrupts the people's reaping and storing" (2013, p. 94). Offensive warfare requires spears, lances, arrows, flags, tents, banners, and food supplies – a large portion of which will be destroyed, broken, or lost. Moreover, many soldiers are often killed, and sometimes entire armies are decimated, especially when attacking cities with thick walls. And ultimately, to waste lives and resources amounts to contradicting "the basic interests of the state" (2013, p. 95). Secondly, even strong, aggressive states inadvertently sow disorder in a way that eventually leads to their own demise. The *Mozi* examines the case of Helü of Wu, who trained his troops for 7 years to wear armor and carry weapons over vast tracts of terrain before needing to rest. Helü's forces successfully took control of Chu, and his son Fu Chai inflicted crushing defeats on the people of Qi. Fu Chai, however, "boasted about his achievements and flaunted his own brilliance but neglected to train [his troops]." As his people labored to construct a large tower, Fu Chai failed to satisfy their disaffection and weariness. Seeing this, the King of Yue assembled his forces to take revenge, and the state of Wu was lost (2013, p. 97). Such a case exemplifies Mo Zi's belief that, whether at the level of individuals or of the state, hatred only breeds more hatred and disorder. And the *Mozi* argues that like the laborers of Wu, "The world is as tired of the prolonged period of attacking and reducing as a young boy who has played at being horse" (2013, p. 105).

Mohist objections to offensive warfare follow from basic Mohist ethical ideas. Put bluntly: "to favour injuring and destroying the ten thousand people of the world. How is this not perverse?" (Mo Zi 2013, p. 102). Since empires must motivate armies to conquer and exploit ethnically and/or nationally diverse populations, imperial ideology entails the denigration of such peoples and the

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promotion of love for imperial in-groups. Insofar as the *Mozi*'s principles concerning universal love seek to do away with such discrimination and partiality, such moral principles count as anti-imperialist in nature. According to the *Mozi*, mutual hatred and lack of mutual love give rise to general disorder, which plagues relations between individuals and states (2013, pp. 73–24, 81). To correct such disharmony, Mo Zi advocates *ren* and *yi*. He also argues that individuals and rulers should implement *jian ai*, which is "an extension of the love one has for oneself or one's parents to a universal loving kindness directed at all mankind without partiality or gradations" (Johnston 2013: xxxvii). Universal love without discrimination constitutes a core element of Mohist morality.

The *Mozi* provides positive ethical arguments and entertains counterarguments. The text notes that "attacking cities, fighting on the battlefield and sacrificing oneself for fame are all things that the ordinary people of the world find difficult." People nevertheless take on these endeavors because the ruler advocates them. Compared to such things, loving another is relatively easy. But because rulers do not advocate for mutual, universal love and prohibit hatred, disorder between individuals and states continues (Mo Zi 2013, p. 78). The *Mozi* also gives voice to prototypical counterarguments of officers and noble men. The latter argue that it would be good if universal love were possible; however, "this is something that cannot be done. It is comparable to lifting up Mount Tai and jumping over the Yellow River and the Qi Waters with it" (2013, p. 79). In reply, the *Mozi* argues, first, that the example relies on a disanalogy. Lifting mountains is physically impossible, whereas loving without partiality can and does occur. A subsequent argument runs as follows: If an officer were to be dispatched to a distant place, his return wholly unknown, would he be likely to entrust the well-being of his house, wife, children, and parents to someone who lived according to mutual, universal love, or to someone who only loved partially (e.g., loving himself or his family more than those left to his care)? The *Mozi* argues that people would choose to leave their house, wife, children, and parents in the care of someone who loves universally and that they would be right to do so. Even were such people to condemn universal, impartial love, their actions would contradict their words (2013, p. 84).

The Legalist *Hanfeizi* contains a claim which describes Mo Zi's arguments as lacking in eloquence because Master Mo did not want literary style to overpower the utility of his sayings (Johnston 2013, xxv). Such an approach contrasts markedly with the explosive rhetoric that characterizes the anti-colonialist work of Frantz Fanon (1925–1961). Fanon was a student of Aimé Cesaire in Martinique and would later receive formal education as a psychiatrist in Lyon, where he would attend the lectures of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, however, Fanon's political thought proffered ruthless critiques of French capitalism and colonialism (Wood 2013). Such criticisms would continue to develop and evolve while Fanon began to work in Blida-Joinville, Algeria, after having finished his training in psychiatry. Algiers had been conquered by the French in 1830, and Algeria remained a French colony while Fanon lived and worked there. By November 1954, after numerous different nationalist parties had failed to gain significant freedoms for the people of Algeria (Horne 2006), the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) initiated Algeria's revolution for independence, which it would gain in 1962. Fanon worked with the FLN, training Algerian soldiers to withstand torture and serving as the FLN's diplomat to Ghana, liberated from Great Britain under the leadership of the philosopher Kwame Nkrumah. The era of African decolonization was now in full swing, during which time the practical and theoretical struggles of African peoples often found support in the anti-imperialist theories of Marx, Lenin, and Mao (see Cabral 2016; Cooley 1965; Friedland et al. 1964; Lenin 1939; Nkrumah 1970; Robinson 1983; Wood 2014b). A turn-of-phrase of Amílcar Cabral, the revolutionary leader for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, perhaps best captures the period's liberatory philosophical vision: "If it is true, as Plato the insuperable sage says, that necessity is the mother of our *engenhos* [inventiveness], no people—above all the Cape Verdean people—has the right

and the duty to find the '*engenhos*' [mills] indispensable for the fulfilment of their necessities" (1988, p. 61).

Fanon makes a number of important advances in anti-imperialist philosophy. Although a psychiatrist by profession, he perceived his own work as tied to philosophy, characterizing the latter as the "the risk that the spirit takes to assume its dignity" (1951, p. 168). His work often deals with existentialist and phenomenological topics, highlighting the way in which colonization brings an entire civilizational complex to bear upon another society. He also uses the language of ontology throughout *Black Skin, White Masks* and describes the analyses in his accepted dissertation as ontological (Renault 2011, p. 67). One area in which Fanon contributes to theorizing and resisting empire can be found in his discussions of truth and knowledge (Wood 2017b). Throughout his intellectual and political career, Fanon found himself confronted with various theories and diagnoses of the human mind in which colonialist biases played a defining role. For example, he addresses Octave Mannoni's theory of the so-called dependency complex of the colonized in *Black Skin, White Masks*. Mannoni takes up and develops the longstanding imperial belief that some people are better fit to be ruled than others (as one finds in Aristotle) and naturalizes this belief with the help of a racial hierarchy in which whites reign supreme (as one finds in Kant). Fanon acknowledges that Mannoni grasps some of colonial-psychological realities to which he attends but argues that Mannoni nevertheless fails to comprehend the social and political causes of such realities. Due to his immersion in imperial ideology, Mannoni's scientific efforts fall short of understanding the specific historical ways in which it is "*the racist who creates the inferiorized*" (Fanon 1952, p. 73). Fanon offers similar criticisms of publications affiliated with the Algiers School of psychiatry, which formed part of a long history of French dominance in the Maghreb (Fanon 2002; Keller 2007). Even medical objectivity, as Fanon argues in "Medicine and Colonialism," becomes vitiated by the general lie of the colonial situation (1965, p. 128).

Fanon also advances the knowledge of how race functions within the colonial world. *Black Skin, White Masks* analyzes the relation of blackness to language, sexuality, dreams, lived experience, psychopathology, and the search for recognition. In each case, Fanon explores the various psychological patterns that arise in contexts determined by antiblack racism. For example, racial hierarchies that structure the colonial world express themselves linguistically. The priest who uses pidgin to speak to a black individual effectively says: "You, stay where you are" (1952, p. 17). The Antillean who wants to speak the French of the metropole, on the other hand, seeks "the subtleties and rarities of the language—a way of proving to himself that he is culturally adequate" (1952, p. 17). From his early work onward, Fanon demonstrates how, in essence and in so many intricate ways, colonialism and the unjustifiable notion of white supremacism overtly and subtly buttress one another.

According to Fanon, the predominance of white supremacism provokes certain regular reactions among the colonized. The regularity of said reactions cannot be explained, however, due to racial differences understood through natural, biological, or vast, transcultural categories. Instead, to understand the different affective complexes peculiar to the colonial situation, corporeal and mental states must be thoroughly contextualized historically, culturally, and politically. A concise example of this method can be found in "West Indians and Africans." In this piece, Fanon examines the relations between West Indians and Africans in Martinique before and after World War II. According to Fanon, before 1939, West Indians in Martinique lived and thought largely in accordance with French imperial ideology, being sure to distinguish themselves from those on the lower rungs of the racial hierarchy (e.g., Africans and Guadeloupeans) while aspiring to the benefits promised to those of the upper echelons (viz., white Parisians). "In 1939 no West Indian in the West Indies proclaimed himself to be a Negro" (1967, pp. 18–21). But Césaire's proclamations about the beauty of blackness, the defeat of France by the Germans, and the subsequent stationing of 10,000 French soldiers in Martinique began to

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effect a change in West Indian (self-)perception. These factors and the need to defend oneself against racism played a role in the development of the notion of Negritude, through which the West Indian began to romanticize, idealize, and seek out "Africa the hard and the beautiful, Africa exploding with anger, tumultuous bustle, splash, Africa land of truth." Here, the stereotypical notion of the wild, pulsating tropics found in Nietzsche's writings reemerges in the West Indies, albeit motivated by and directed toward different ends. Fanon concludes, however, that these metaphysical experiences of the West Indian have only led out of "the great white error" and into "the great black mirage" (1967, pp. 26–27). True liberation and disalienation, for Fanon, will require overcoming both limitations. Fanon's analyses of racialized perceptions, whether those of the average colonized subject or of the colonialist psychiatrist, critically deconstruct the intricate movements of imperial ideology on both sides of the colonizer-colonized divide. In this way, Fanonian theory marks an important moment in the contestation of empire.

Anticolonial struggles are not peculiar to twentieth-century Africa alone. Resistance to imperialism and colonialism has taken on many different forms and has adopted varying strategies throughout the world. But whether and how imperialism or empire still operate in the contemporary world remains an issue with which philosophers and activists continue to wrestle (Castro-Gómez 2010; Harvey 2013; Negri and Hardt 2000; Smith 2016). The work of activist and philosopher Vandana Shiva comprises one of many examples in which colonialism and imperialism are understood to affect and bear upon contemporary international relations. Shiva was originally trained in physics and wrote her dissertation in the philosophy of quantum theory (Shiva 2014). In 1984, at the time of the Bhopal disaster in India, she turned to the investigation of the Green Revolution, the chemical-based agricultural model foisted upon the Global South in the 1960s through pressure from the US government and the World Bank (Shiva 2016b: xv–xvi). For Shiva, the Green Revolution and industrial agriculture in general form but the newest link in the chain connecting three

phases of globalization: classical European colonization, the postcolonial era in which the West has imposed its idea of "development," and the contemporary period of the so-called free trade (Shiva 2016a, pp. 103–104). While they have by no means wholly disappeared, the shapes that imperialism and colonialism now assume have transformed in important ways. Shiva argues that classical-modern jurisprudential notions, such as that of *terra nullius*, through which Europeans justified the acquisition of indigenous peoples' lands, have been replaced by the operative idea of *bio nullius*, through which the interiorities of women, plants, animals, and life itself become targets for conquest and possession. Declarations such as Papal bulls have been replaced by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. And whereas the Catholic hierarchy and monarchs provided institutional and ideological support for colonization in the period of mercantile capitalism, multinational corporations drive contemporary imperialism (2016a). Finally, as with past forms of colonialism, contemporary biocolonialism harms women to a disproportionately greater degree than men. Shiva argues that views of nature continue to be coded in the gendered and normative categories that one finds, for example, in the works of Aristotle and Bacon. Women and the earth are construed as linked by virtue of a putative passivity, being merely reproductive, whereas men are seen and treated as engaged in genuinely intellectual creativity. And just as Bacon's imaginative vision for an ideal institution of scientific learning and production relied upon and reinforced gendered and racial hierarchies, so too, Shiva argues, do contemporary patriarchal assumptions structure many of the social, political, environmental, and economic dimensions of contemporary imperialism.

The *Mozi* criticized the logical inconsistencies of noble men out of concern for present and future agricultural prosperity; so too does the work of Shiva in the twenty-first century. One of the central concepts that Shiva develops to grasp and criticize the imperialist dimensions of the industrial-agricultural complex is that of "biopiracy." Biopiracy amounts to the theft of parts of or types of living beings. Patents and trade-related

intellectual property rights serve as the legal mechanisms through which living beings are now acquired as the property of an individual or corporation, thereby criminalizing the subsequent unauthorized use of these living beings. Patents on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), such as cotton and corn, allow corporations to charge technology fees, sell their own chemical inputs made to accompany their GMOs, and prohibit farmers from engaging in sustainable practices, such as saving seeds. This drive toward monopolization fosters the spread of monocultures, radically undermining the nutritional and safety benefits of living and eating in a world where local farming and biodiversity predominate. Biopiratic relations reproduce and intensify global asymmetries between the North and South and between men and women in ways consonant with the history of imperialist strategies (Mgbeoji 2006; Robinson 2010; Shiva 2016a; Whitt 2009). As one ideological defense mechanism among others, corporations privatize the benefits and socialize the harms of GMOs by means of double standards. For example, when a GMO variety leads to an increase in profits, corporations often consider said variety as safe and as its own, novel creation. But when issues of biosafety are brought to the fore, the same GMO varieties are suddenly considered to be simply "natural" entities (Shiva 2016a, p. 22). For Shiva, such double standards constitute an affront to global environmental justice no less than a breach of the law of noncontradiction.

As a philosopher, Shiva highlights that biopiratic ideas, practices, and values rest upon presuppositions of a philosophical nature. For example, she argues that multinational corporations inadequately understand the concept of "creativity." Scientific creativity includes but does not reduce to the ways in which universities and corporate labs genetically alter living beings. She adds that living organisms are likewise creative (evolving, regenerating, and adapting to new circumstances), as are indigenous communities, who have cultivated and selected for desirable plant varieties over thousands of years (Shiva 2016a, p. 9). Narrowed views concerning the inherent creativity of all living systems mesh well with

certain forms of reductionism in biology. The reduction of all other species to mere instruments to be used by the human species and the reduction of the behavior of all organisms to genes falsely separates humans from the natural world and promotes the colonization of diverse forms of knowledge (Shiva 2016a, pp. 24–25; Wood 2017a). Questions of creativity, like those concerning life, nature, logic, justice, right, and competent authority, are philosophical matters, and Shiva articulates and organizes such concepts toward anti-imperialist ends.

Just as imperialist philosophy comprises not only various ideas but also a number of values and practices, so too does anti-imperialist philosophy. The values and ideas to which Shiva has given voice have led to the cultivation of a variety of institutions and practices resistant to imperialism. For example, in 1987, Shiva started Navdanya, an NGO founded to protect seed diversity and "farmers' rights to save, breed, and exchange seed freely." Navdanya has established more than 100 seed banks that allow farmers to save and share seeds in sustainable ways (Shiva 2016b, pp. 80–81). In 1999, Shiva sued Monsanto, "which accounts for 94 percent of the world's genetically modified organisms" (Shiva 2007, 2014). She has also helped advise governments and draft laws concerning the environment. In the Gandhian tradition of non-violent resistance by means of *satyagraha*, or "truth force," Navdanya has organized a grassroots campaign of Seed Satyagraha with farmers and scientists around the world in resistance to the corporate commodification of seeds. Such political and organizational efforts challenge the dominance of contemporary imperialist practices, values, and ideas.

Conclusion

The present entry has explored a few of the ways in which imperialism and philosophy have borne upon one another. Varying vignettes have been considered to highlight different ways in which accordant and discordant relations have obtained between imperialism and philosophy. Many more

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cases might have been examined. For instance, one might investigate the ways in which stoicism and Roman imperialism impacted one another, the relation of Heidegger's thought to his Nazism, or the diverse history of Marxist anti-imperialist philosophy (Brewer 1990; Mariátegui 2009; Noonan 2017; Robinson 1983; Rose 1995; Young 1997; Smethurst 1953; Wolfson 2018). To the extent that they can be separated conceptually, imperialism and philosophy have proven at least relevant to one another and in some instances have impacted and influenced one another in nontrivial ways.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Empire and Imperialism in Education Since 1945: Secondary School History Textbooks
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ Food and Imperialism
▶ Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
▶ Gender and Violence
▶ Imperialism and Environment
▶ Négritude
▶ Racism and Imperialism
▶ Settler Colonialism

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Physical Trade Balance

▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange
▶ Unequal Exchange

Planning

▶ Nationalisation

Plantations

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism

Poland and the Political Economy of Foreign Intervention (1918 to Present): From White to Red and White Again

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On November 11, 1918, Poland rose as an independent nation, a phoenix from the ashes of occupation and war, 123 years after its Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian imperialist partition. The Allies allowed Germany to retain the eastern Polish territories. During World War I, Josef Pilsudski's Polish Legions had fought alongside Austria-Hungary against Russia. Pilsudski conceived of a federated state comprised of Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians, a throwback to the 1569 Union of Lublin when Poland and Lithuania shared the same monarch. Poland's national liberation allowed it to become enmeshed in the imperialist schemes of Berlin, Washington, London, and Paris that would sacrifice it on the altar of their respective empires. An independent Polish foreign policy was doomed because Poland is flanked by Germany and Russia and remains subordinate to foreign capital thanks to decades of occupation; even though recently, attempts have been made to exercise financial independence.

Josef Pilsudksi: Apostle of Polish Nationalism and Imperialism

When World War I began, Pilsudski, the son of an impoverished nobleman, presented his strategic plan: "The problem of the independence of Poland will be definitely solved only if Russia is beaten by Austria-Hungary and Germany, and Germany vanquished by France, Great Britain and the United States; it is our duty to bring that about." Pilsudski and his successor Colonel Josef Beck never deviated from this course. This unrealistic foreign policy culminated in unmitigated catastrophe for the Polish people during World War II.

When the Czar abdicated on March 15, 1917, ending 300 consecutive years of Romanov family rule, Pilsudski withdrew his support for the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria. In July, Pilsudski ordered his Polish soldiers to stop swearing allegiance to the Central Powers. The Germans imprisoned him and folded his soldiers into the Austro-Hungarian Army.

Vladimir Lenin had arrived in Petrograd on April 17 from Swiss exile in a sealed German train to lead the Bolshevik Revolution that November. It was a revolution that would alter the course of history because Lenin's work inspired Mao Zedong to lead China to communist independence in 1949.

On March 3, 1918, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty ended Russia's participation in World War I, and the two-thirds of all German forces that were directed against Russia could now be redeployed to storm the trenches and conquer France. On November 1, Polish armed resistance challenged the Ukrainian seizure of Lwow with its majority Polish population. On the 1-year anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Lublin established a Polish Republic. Though it lasted only 5 days, its radical program included an 8-h work day, nationalization of the forests, and the secret ballot for all adult men and women to choose a Seym based upon proportional representation.

On November 8, the Germans sensing a potential ally in Pilsudski who feared the spread of Bolshevik fervor released him from prison and sent him in a private train to Warsaw where Pilsudski was greeted as a national hero. The next day, the German monarchy abdicated.

On Armistice Day, the Regency Council, created 2 months earlier by Imperial Germany and Austro-Hungary, appointed Pilsudski Commander in Chief of Polish forces. He was entrusted with the creation of a national

government. It would briefly unite various military units and provisional governments under a predominantly socialist banner that mandated an 8-h day, free education and women's suffrage. He negotiated the removal of almost a half million German troops from Polish soil (Black 2001).

Pilsudski reacted to his appointment with these words: "Comrades, I took the red trolley of socialism to the stop called Independence, and that's where I got off. You may keep on to the final stop if you wish, but from now on let's address each other as 'Mister'." He turned to organizing an army comprised of veterans of the Austrian, German, and Russian armies. On December 16, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPil) and the Polish Socialist Party's (PPS) left wing united to form the Communist Workers Party of Poland (CWPP).

John Dewey Eyes Poland as a Potential US Imperialist Target

To plan for a possible loss of political control of Polish Americans, Bureau of Intelligence (BI) head, General Marlborough Churchill, tapped John Dewey, the philosopher of US public education, to covertly collect information on American Poles. In his secret report, Dewey stressed

the great industrial importance of Polish labor in this country . . . a shortage of labor after the war and . . . already a movement under foot (which should be carefully looked into) to stimulate the return of Poles and others of foreign birth in Southeastern Europe to their native lands. . . . Poles from this time on might be encouraged to join a Polish Army under direct American control. . . [Socialist-minded Poles would] deprive the government of the most active aid which the leaders of this group are capable of giving the Government. . .while this group is a minority of the organized Poles, it possesses the ablest Poles in this country, is stronger with the organized and more skilled Polish workers than the conservative faction . . . large numbers of Poles who are not nominally affiliated with it are sympathetic toward it – namely, those Poles who, without having broken from the church, are opposed to the activity of priests in politics. (Dewey 1918, 2, 28, 74–77)

Dewey proposed creating an American Commission on Polish Affairs comprised of "Poles . . .

really loyal to the cause of America and the Allies . . . relieved of the technical status of enemy aliens. . . . in contact with all organized Polish groups abroad, including Poland, and thereby also make clear the active and directive influence of the United States in the Polish problem, quieting German and Austrian propaganda and keeping the Poles in Poland faithful to the cause of the Allies" (Dewey 1918, 79). He concludes ". . . the United States is the one country therefore which would unqualifiedly win and retain the confidence of the Poles in Europe" (Dewey 1918, 80).

Twenty-one years after Dewey submitted his report to the head of US military intelligence, the United States, Britain, and France did nothing materially to stop Germany from destroying Poland.

Poland Challenges Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia

After World War I in the Prussian-controlled sector that had not been devastated by the war and where agriculture flourished, the Bolshevik Revolution inspired the formation of Polish-German Councils of Workers and Soldiers Delegates. They established a People's Supreme Council to rule the nation. On December 27, 1918, fighting with German troops in Poznan spurred the liberation of the entire Poznan province. The Allies compelled both sides to conclude a cease fire. "The liberated districts retained to some extent a distinction between themselves and the government in Warsaw and even set up a tariff barrier against the Kingdom in order to maintain their higher standard of living, especially in foodstuffs and to safeguard themselves against revolutionary upheavals" (Wereszycki 1968, 641–642).

On the night of January 4, 1919, a capitalist-landlord coup against the 3-month-old socialist-peasant government of Jedrzej Moraczewski failed. Moraczewski was the first prime minister of the Second Polish Republic. Ten days later, Paderewski's bourgeois cabinet took Moraczewski's place. January 26 elections to the Seym held in those parts of Poland under Polish control resulted in the Right and Center each

garnering 35% of the seats, while the Left received 26%. The Communists boycotted the vote.

Unity was enhanced on nationalist principles when 3 days earlier, a 7-day battle erupted between Poland and Czechoslovakia over the area known as Zaolzie near southwestern Poland. Though an International Commission granted the territory to the Czechs, Poland took revenge in 1938 when it annexed Teschen, much to the delight of the Germans who had just annexed the Sudetenland. The next year the Germans violently settled the question of the entire region in their own favor.

On April 21, 1920, the Treaty of Warsaw, an alliance against Bolshevik Russia, was signed between the second Polish Republic, led by Pilsudski, and Symon Petliura, the Ukrainian Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian National Republic. Four days later, Poland attacked Soviet Russia and occupied Zhytomyr. Pyotr Wrangel, the anti-Bolshevik Commander in Chief of the Crimean White Army, launched an offensive coordinated with Petliura whose forces slaughtered tens of thousands of Jews in the short-lived Ukrainian Republic (1918–1921).

On May 7, Polish troops attacked Kiev, then part of the Soviet Ukraine. The Red Army repulsed Pilsudki's forces and sent them to the gates of Warsaw, while the Ukrainian Directorate fled to Western Europe. The ensuing Battle of Warsaw (August 13–August 20) ended with the defeat of General Mikhail Tukhachevsky's Red Army. On November 20, Petliura visited Warsaw to announce that the Ukrainian Directorate would dissolve. On March 18, 1921, Poland, Soviet Russia, and the Soviet Ukraine signed the Treaty of Riga that relocated the new border to east of the Curzon Line along ethnic divides. Four years later, the CWPP became the Communist Party of Poland.

British Imperialism Undermines International Worker Solidarity Through the Promethean League

In 1925, MI6 covertly established the Promethean League whose purpose was to dismember the

Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Roma Smal-Stocky officially headed the league, which created "governments in exile" that claimed to represent minority nationalities in the Soviet Union and weaken the international worker cooperation that Bolshevism inspired (Dorril 2000, 185). The league's template came from the Austro-Japanese Count Coudenhove-Kalergi whose pioneering notion of a United States of Europe demeaned the role of Eastern Europe (Dorril 2000, 186).

Pilsudski's Coup d'etat

In 1926, Pilsudski staged a coup d'etat. Four years later, through his Minister of Internal Security, Felicjan Slawoj Skladkowski, he ordered the summary arrests of opposition party leaders, including the former prime minister Wincenty Witos, Christian Democrat Wojciech Korfanty, and most of the leaders of the Centrolew alliance comprised of the Polish Socialist Party, Polish People's Party "Piast," and Polish People's Party "Wyzwolenie." They were found guilty of plotting an anti-government coup. After their appeals were turned down, the men were given the choice of imprisonment or emigration. Half chose imprisonment for 5 years in the Brest Fortress. Poland was spending more than half of its budget on the military (Fischer 1930, 816).

During the 1930s, Germany contested Poland's claim that the Thyssen-affiliated Consolidated Silesian Steel Corporation (CSSC) that controlled 45% of Poland's steel production pays its back taxes. To squelch this effort, Prescott Bush and Averell Harriman, members of the undergraduate Yale University senior secret society, Skull and Bones, founded through opium trade money, hired John Foster Dulles, partner in the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, to represent them. Once Poland fell, Hitler built the Auschwitz death camp close to Thyssen's steel works. The camp supplied communist, Gypsy, and Jewish slave labor to 30 different companies, including CSSC. Thyssen sold this company to the New York-based Union Banking System (UBC) controlled by the Democrat Harriman and the Republican Bush who ran the slave-labor end of the business. IBM provided logistical

and technical support and implemented the tattoo classification system for German extermination camps built on Polish soil.

On July 25, 1932, the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was signed.

On March 8, 1933, Pilsudski increased Polish military forces to 200 men in Danzig's harbor at the Westerplatte peninsula, a violation of the 1921 League of Nations stipulation that the Polish military presence there could not exceed 88 men. With the promise of French military aid, at noon on March 17, the Poles were to occupy the customs house. France agreed to invade the Ruhr by March 20 if Germany militarily challenged Poland. London and Berlin learned of this provocation on March 15. To stymie the French-Polish plot, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and his Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, strongly protested to France, stating that Britain would not honor the Locarno Treaties if France proceeded. The treaties were reviled in Poland when signed in 1925 because as Great Britain insisted, no firm boundaries on the German-Polish border were established. On the 16th, the French scuttled their planned trip to Warsaw, while MacDonald flew to Rome to confer with Mussolini whom the British had covertly funded during World War I to keep Italy in the war (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 112).

MacDonald's aim was to resuscitate Mussolini's "Four-Power Pact" between Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, as a counter to any Franco-Soviet Pact. Seeing that they had been abandoned by France, Poland re-established diplomatic contact with Germany on May 4 and removed its additional troops from Westerplatte where Germany would begin World War II. On November 15, 1933, Germany and Poland announced the Neurath-Lipski Declaration of Amity, followed by a non-aggression pact signed on January 26, 1934 (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 113).

From the early 1930s, the Polish government and the French secret service financed strife in Belorussia and the Ukraine (Dorril 2000, 186). Though Pilsudski and Beck dreamed of Poland becoming a great power again through the Intermarium Plan, they forgot that had only been possible when Germany was comprised of warring Catholic and Protestant provinces. Once Germany unified through the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, Poland became too small to be a great power and too large to be Czechoslovakia, to paraphrase Yale historian Piotr Wandycz. The Intermarium Plan originated with a former Tsarist general who had proposed a federation of Central and Eastern European states to overthrow the USSR. MI6 biographer Stephen Dorril noted that Intermarium members "shared many of the characteristics and anti-Semitism of the clerical-fascists" (Dorril 2000, 166).

Pilsudski opposed French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou's proposed Eastern Pact that would bring France, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into an anti-German alliance. Poland objected to the participation of Czechoslovakia.

On June 14, 1934, the USSR invited all interested states to participate in the Eastern Pact. Estonia and Latvia insisted that Germany and Poland be included. Britain made its support conditional on Germany's inclusion, consistent with Hitler's master plan outlined in *Mein Kampf*. Nonetheless, France and the Soviet Union acceded to the British demand.

Poland was not interested. The day after Barthou's proposal, German ambassador to Poland Hans-Adolf von Moltke, Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, Pilsudski, and Beck met in Warsaw to plot their oppositional tactics to the Eastern Pact. On July 2 Czechoslovakia, on July 29 Latvia and Estonia, and on August 3 Lithuania declared their support. Finland took no position. Latvia and Estonia added German and Polish adherence as a further stipulation.

On September 11, Hitler's cabinet, followed on September 27 by the Polish government, nixed the Eastern Pact. The coup de grace was administered in Marseille on October 9 when the pro-Nazi Ustase Croatian Vlado Chernozemski assassinated both Barthou and the King of Yugoslavia. The Eastern Pact was dead.

While France no longer seriously tried to oppose Hitler, Poland moved closer to Nazi Germany. In 1936, 300 Polish officers attended a Promethean Congress in Warsaw, while German Military Intelligence developed strong ties with dissident nationalists in Poland (Dorril 2000, 187). On February 29, 1936, the Primate of Poland, Cardinal (1926–1948) August Hlond,

issued a 5600-word pastoral letter in which he intoned, "So long as Jews remain Jews, a Jewish problem will continue to exist … It is a fact that Jews are waging war against the Catholic church, that they are steeped in free-thinking, and constitute the vanguard of atheism, the Bolshevik movement, and revolutionary activity. It is a fact that Jews have a corruptive influence on morals and that their publishing houses are spreading pornography. It is true that Jews are perpetrating fraud, practicing usury, and dealing in prostitution. It is true that, from a religious and ethical point of view, Jewish youth are having a negative influence on the Catholic youth in our schools."

After the war, the Church continued to blame the victims. In response to the Kielce pogrom of July 4, 1946, Hlond, who had fled Poland for France and allied himself with London Poles, excoriated Jewish bureaucrats who served the Communist government. Adam Sapieha, who served in Poland under the German occupation and became a cardinal in 1946, stated that Jews brought the pogrom upon themselves.

From 1935 on, priests had been used to infiltrate the Soviet Union through its eastern border with Poland. They utilized routes created and tested by *Catholic Action* that was created by future pope, Pius XII. "This group maintained outposts on the Polish-Russian border where Jesuits were trained as Greek Orthodox priests and smuggled individually into Russia, mainly into the Ukraine, there to spread religious and counterrevolutionary propaganda" (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 106).

On September 17, 1939, in response to Germany's September 1 invasion of Poland that began with an attack on Westerplatte, the USSR unilaterally abrogated the 1932 Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact treaty so that it could occupy that part of Poland roughly east of the British-drawn Curzon Line as a buffer against any further German incursion eastward.

Germany's Aim Is to Liquidate the Polish Nation with British Acquiescence

Hitler had correctly assessed that Great Britain and France would do nothing more than just "declare" war. On March 15, 1939, when Hitler supported

Hungary's conquest of Ruthenia, London and Paris realized that Germany might move west (Leibovitz and Finkel 1997, 225) before targeting the Soviet Union whose military might in the 1930s had grown astonishingly fast under Stalin's *Five-Year Plans*. The day after Hungary occupied Ruthenia, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain reaffirmed the British policy of nonintervention in Spain where MI6 had supplied the plane that flew Franco out of Tenerife to Tangier and Seville in July 1936 (Dorril 2000, 430).

British high military command confidante, Captain Liddell Hart, wrote after the war, "Since World War II, when the practical absurdity of the Polish guarantee has come to be better appreciated than it was at the time, it is commonly excused, or justified, by the argument that it marked the point at which the British government declared: 'We were blind, but now we see.' I have too many recollections, and records, of discussions during this period to be able to accept the view that this sudden change of policy was due to a sudden awakening to the danger or to moral issues. In Government circles I had long listened to calculated arguments for allowing Germany to expand eastward, for evading our obligations under the League covenant and for having other countries to bear the brunt of an early stand against aggression" (Hart 1965, vol. 2, 221).

Hitler did not want Germany to fight a two-front war as it had done in World War I and so signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact to secure his Western European rear with the 1940 conquest of Western Europe with the obvious exception of Britain, after which he would invade the Soviet Union with more than two-thirds of his armed forces.

The German leader had written in *Mein Kampf* that so long as Germany moved east to conquer Slavic lands, he could count on England's tacit approval (Hitler 1943, 139–140). Their mutual desire to crush Bolshevism made them natural allies on the world stage. After all, by World War I British imperialism had acquired the largest empire in history, ranging from Ireland to India to the detriment of both occupied nations.

At the Nuremberg trials, German military commander Alfred Jodl revealed "If we did not collapse in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact

that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions. General Siegfried Westphal corroborated this point by noting that if the French had attacked in force in September 1939 the German army "could only have held out for one or two weeks."

Poland would be sacrificed to the Anglo-American imperialist goal of having Germany and the USSR fight to death so that Washington and London could come in and pick up the pieces as they tried to do in their joint invasion of Russia in 1919 and the planned partition of southern Russia that London and Paris had engineered just 1 month after the Bolshevik Revolution (Gronowicz 350). Poland would be sacrificed to anticommunist imperialism (Leibovitz and Finkel 1997, 234, 254) and subsequently to anti-Russian imperialism consistent with Washington's desire to rule the world as set forth in the Pentagon's June 2000 Doctrine of Full-Spectrum Dominance.

In his diary, Chief of the Army Command General Franz Halder noted that Hitler addressed his key generals on the need for "the Destruction of Poland ... The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival of a certain line. Even if the war should break out in the west, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective ... Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people [Germans] shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the right. Greatest severity."

Katyn

After the crucial Red Army victory at Stalingrad (August 20–January 31, 1943) that changed the course of history and produced the greatest loss of life on both sides in any battle ever, Germany mounted a false flag operation designed to split the Anglo-American-Soviet alliance. On April 13, Berlin released the *Amtliches Material*, which claimed that near the Katyn forest, Nazi troops had uncovered thousands of Polish officers shot by the Soviets and buried in April–May 1940. Three days later, Moscow responded, "The German-Fascist reports on this subject leave no doubt as to the tragic fate of the former Polish POWs who in 1941 were engaged in construction work in areas west of Smolensk and who, along with many Soviet people, residents of the Smolensk region, fell into the hands of the German-Fascist hangmen in the summer of 1941, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Smolensk area." Berlin claimed that none of the items found on the Katyn corpses was dated after April 1940, but admitted that the spent shells were German in origin. Nazi propaganda Chief Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary, "Unfortunately German munitions were found in the graves of Katyn ... it is essential that this incident be kept top secret. If it were to come to the knowledge of the enemy the whole Katyn affair would have to be dropped" (*Goebbels* 1948, 354). Professor Grover Furr pointed out, "Goebbels was correct. The use of German ammunition and only German ammunition at Katyn is *prima facie* evidence of German guilt" (Furr 2018, 42).

Once Germans had been expelled from the Katyn forest in September 1943, the Soviet Burdenko Commission investigated the massacres and determined that the Germans had committed the mass murders of Polish POWs after the Battle of Stalingrad in order "to set the Russians and Poles at loggerheads." During its forensic investigation, Kathleen Harriman went to Katyn with her father Averell. Her letter to Sister Mary and to Pamela Churchill reveals that "every Pole had been shot through the back of the head with a single bullet. Some of the bodies had their hands tied behind their backs, all of which is typically German ... Though the Germans ripped open the Poles' pockets, they'd missed some written documents. While I was watching, they found one letter dated the summer of '41, which is damned good evidence." Her report to the 1951 US House of Representatives Madden Commission cited "an unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941" (Furr 2018, 186–187).

Furr reasoned, "The Polish POWS whose bodies were buried at Katyn were presumed to have been in the Soviet POW camp at Kozel'sk, near Smolensk. But many POWs listed among the bodies which the Germans claimed they exhumed

at Katyn had in fact been in the Starobel'sk or Ostashkov POW camps. The Germans did not remove these names... the Germans would never have 'faked' – invented – these names. Today both sides recognize that their presence at Katyn undermines the 'official' Soviets-did-it-case" (Furr 2018, 31).

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin released a third report, "Closed Packet No. 1," that blamed the NKVD. One document was forged "in a clumsy manner but for some reason not discarded. There is no plausible alternative explanation for it except that it was part of a broader forgery job" (Furr 2018, 32). Three years later, Iurii Mukhin published *The Katyn Mystery* in which he demonstrated how the "smoking gun" documents of "Closed Packet No. 1" were fabrications (Furr 2018, 67–73).

In 2008, in an article supporting Burdenko, Andrei Pamiatnykh wrote:

> "Outsiders" at Katyn are very important for supporters of the Stalin version of the responsibility of the Germans for the crime of Katyn. Their presence would mean that at Katyn were buried not only prisoners from the Kozel'sk camp, but also prisoners of other camps, and that would mean that doubts about the results of the German investigation of 1943 and the Soviet-Russian investigations 1990–2004 are creeping in. According to the results [of these investigations] prisoners of Kozel'sk were shot and were buried at Katyn, and prisoners of Starobel'sk and Ostashkov, according to the results of the Soviet-Russian investigation, were buried at Kharkov and Mednoe respectively. Here is what Vladislav Shved and Sergei Strygin, proponents of the Stalin version, write in their main article on Katyn: "But in the Katyn graves there were also found the corpses of Poles who had been held in the Starobel'sk and Ostashkov camps. These Poles could have arrived in Smolensk oblast' from Khar'-kov and Kalinin only if in 1940 they were transported to the camps of special designation near Smolensk. In that case only the Germans could have shot them.

Moreover, aided by his fluency in French, German, and Russian, as well as a reading knowledge of Czech, Polish, and Ukrainian, Furr demonstrated how "some of the prisoners whose bodies were found at Katyn lived until late 1940 and into 1941" (Furr 2018, 57, 179, 182). Soviet partisans testified that Germans had dug up bodies from the Smolensk civilian cemetery and bodies of Red Army officers and men killed during the defense of Smolensk against the German invasion and transported them to Katyn (Furr 2018, 129–136, 184).

Importantly, Furr stressed that "... a large percentage of the bodies in the mass graves are of children. There has never been any evidence that the Soviets executed children. There is a great deal of evidence that the Germans did. ..." (Furr 2018, 82).

Furr cited the research done since 2010 by Professor Valentin Sakharov of Moscow State University. A crucial finding is that after the Germans captured Lwow in June 1941, they renamed it Lemberg. According to the "official" version and the German Report (AM), the Katyn massacres took place in April and May 1940, yet documents found in the mass graves had "Lemberg" on them (Furr 2018, 118).

In 2011, forensic archaeologists issued a report on excavations at the mass murder site in Volodymr-Volyns'kiy, Ukraine. They found badges of two Polish POWs in a mass grave in Western Ukraine that the German and closed packet version claimed were shipped to Kalinin (now Tver'), Russia, where the doomed prisoners were executed and buried at Mednoe. No one questioned why they were at Volodymr-Volyns'kiy. After this crucial discrepancy was uncovered, the excavation was quickly filled in so that the killings could continue to be falsely attributed to the NKVD, consistent with the ideological imperative of postcommunist Poland. Between 96% and 98% of the shell casings found at VV were German made and dated 1941. The graves themselves displayed the mark of the *Einsatzkommando*, the so-called Sardinenpackung where doomed men lay down in rows on top of those already killed to become the next victims. At this site, German troops, aided by Ukrainian nationalist auxiliaries, shot many Soviet citizens and Jews soon after their June 1941 invasion (Furr 2018, 32). Furr concluded, "Both the Germans and the Polish Government-In-Exile were interested only in a conclusion that indicted the Soviets" (Furr 2018, 247). On February 14, 1942, the Polish Underground Army was formed to combat foreign presence on its soil. At 400,000 men and women, it was one of the three largest resistance movements in World War II Europe.

On July 4, 1943, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, the head of the Polish government-in-exile, died in a plane crash. Stalin had embraced Sikorski's plan for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union to reconstitute a new Polish state at Germany's expense. The proposal made sense to save Polish lives as neither Churchill nor Roosevelt wanted to go to war over Poland when Western Europe's liberation was still on the horizon (Dorril 2000, 251).

The Warsaw Rising of 1944

By the summer of 1944, the London Poles despaired as Soviet troops swept into Poland in pursuit of retreating German forces. On July 31, 1944, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's first Belorussian Front reached the outskirts of Praga, the Warsaw neighborhood on the east bank of the Vistula River that separated it from Warsaw proper. The next day, the self-exiled London Poles ordered Polish Underground Army General Tadeusz Bor-Komarowski to stage an uprising in Warsaw. The Germans then did to most of Warsaw what they had done to the Jewish ghetto the year before when 13,000 Polish Jews died at the hands of the Germans in the heroic Warsaw Ghetto Uprising under the command of the Jewish communist, Mordechai Anielewicz.

This time, 300,000 Poles died (Werth 1964, 870). General Klaus von Tippelskirch who commanded several German armies in the vicinity wrote in his diary: *The Warsaw Rising started on August 1, at a time when the strength of the Russian blow had exhausted itself* (Werth 1964, 875).

Eight days before the uprising, the Red Army had liberated Lublin. In Chelm, on July 22, a published manifesto announced the formation of the Polish National Liberation Committee, nominated by the *Krajowa Rada Narodowa*, a parliament-like political body created in German-occupied Warsaw. The liberation committee comprised "representatives of the Peasant Party and other democratic elements inside Poland." The manifesto denounced the London emigres as a "usurper" government that had adopted the "fascist" constitution of 1935. The manifesto drafters recognized the 1921 "democratic" constitution until the Constituent Assembly met to draft a new constitution.

On August 26 in Lublin, BBC Russian correspondent Alexander Werth interviewed Rokossovsky for his classic work, *Russia at War*. Rokossovsky recounted, "After several weeks' heavy fighting in Belorussia and eastern Poland we finally reached the outskirts of Praga about the 1st of August. The Germans … threw in four armored divisions, and we were driven back [sixty-five miles] … "If the Germans had not thrown in all that armor, we could have taken Warsaw, though not in a frontal attack; but it was never more than a 50–50 chance. …The insurgents started it [the rising] …without consulting us. … An armed insurrection in a place like Warsaw could only have succeeded if it had been carefully coordinated with the Red Army…The Warsaw insurgents are badly armed, and the rising would have made sense only if we were already on the point of *entering Warsaw*. That point had not been reached at any stage … We couldn't have got Warsaw before the middle of August … we shall try to capture both Praga and Warsaw, but it won't be easy. …the Germans are doing their damnedest to reduce them [the bridgeheads south of Warsaw]. We're having much difficulty in holding them, and we are losing a lot of men… we have fought non-stop for over two months now. We've liberated the whole of Belorussia and nearly one fourth of Poland; but even the Red Army gets tired after a while. Our casualties have been very heavy. … [With respect to air drops] it isn't much good. They are holding only isolated spots in Warsaw, and most of the stuff will fall into German hands. …this high altitude dropping of supplies on Warsaw by Western planes serves practically no purpose at all. …*We* [the Red Army] are responsible for the conduct of the war in Poland, *we* are the force that will liberate the whole of Poland within the next few months … the political stunt [of the London Poles] is going to cost Poland hundreds of thousands of lives. It is an appalling tragedy, and they are now trying to put the blame on us. It makes me pretty sick when I think of the many thousands of men we have already lost in our fight for the liberation of Poland. And do you think that we

would not have taken Warsaw if we had been able to do it? The whole idea that we are in any sense afraid of the AK is too idiotically absurd" (Werth 1964, 876–878). No evidence has yet surfaced that would refute Rokossovsky's assessment.

To seize the initiative from the Red Army, on July 25, London Pole military leader Bor-Komarowski had given the order to stage an uprising on August 1 (Werth 1964, 879). This desperate move came *after* the Red Army tried on July 25 to cross the Vistula but were repelled by superior German forces.

This crucial point is corroborated by the German general charged with beating back the Red Army advance. General Heinz Guderian wrote, "... an attempt by the Russians ... to cross the Vistula at Deblin on July 25 failed, with the loss of thirty tanks ... We Germans had the impression that *it was our defense which halted the enemy rather than a Russian desire to sabotage the Warsaw uprising*. ... On August 2 the 1st Polish Army ... attacked across the Vistula with three divisions in the Pulawa-Deblin sector. It suffered heavy casualties, but secured a bridge-head ... At Magnuszew a second bridgehead was established. The forces that crossed here were *ordered to advance along the road running parallel to the Vistula to Warsaw, but they were stopped at the Pilica*. ... The German 9th Army had the impression, on August 8, *that the Russian attempt to seize Warsaw by a coup de main had been defeated by our defense, despite the Polish uprising, and that the latter had, from the enemy's point of view, been begun too soon*" (Werth 1964, 881–882). All told, the USSR lost a million lives liberating Poland, while Germany murdered 3 million Polish Catholics and 3 million Polish Jews.

Resuscitating Intermarium

In late 1944, Polish Second Army Corps officers in Italy strove to resuscitate Intermarium (Dorril 2000, 170) through Polish foreign minister in exile, Count August Zaleski, who led a London study group funded by MI6 and the self-exiled London Poles. Though Poles wielded some influence, "the top echelon of Intermarium became

increasingly dominated by ex-fascist leaders and known collaborators ... a core of Croatian Ustase, Slovakian Hlinka Guard and Hungarian Arrow Cross members and a sprinkling of extremist Poles" that included Kazimierz Papee, Poland's ambassador to the Vatican from 1939 (Dorril 2000, 171) to 1958 when dismissed by Pope (1958–1963) John XXIII who recognized the People's Republic of Poland as the legitimate government of the Polish people.

Poland's Western Borders Restored

The Baltic port city of Gdansk was returned to Poland after the World War II defeat of Germany. Polish borders were then shifted from east to west to correspond to the western Oder-Nisa river boundaries of the original Polish nation when Gdansk was founded in the tenth century by Mieszko I, the first Piast dynasty ruler. The eastern boundary became the Curzon Line. It had been drawn by the British Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon after World War I to mark the boundary between the Second Polish Republic and the Soviet Union, and only became recognized after World War II. As historian-poet Antoni Gronowicz pointed out, "In this way, Poland became united geographically and ethnologically and was in a measure repaid for her losses" (Gronowicz 1951, 10). For much of Gdansk's history, it had been occupied primarily by Germans with the city mainly called Danzig until World War I led to the creation of the Free City of Danzig under League of Nations supervision. After World War II, as Poles moved into Gdansk and Germans left, the construction of the Lenin shipyards became the highpoint of Gdansk's rebuilding.

Soviet-Sponsored People's Republic of Poland Replaces Self-Exiled London Poles

On July 22, 1944, a Soviet-sponsored Lublin government took over from the self-exiled London Poles. A British treasury loan supplemented by

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funds from MI6 kept the London "government-in-exile" and its "Home Army" afloat until Great Britain and the United States finally recognized the procommunist Polish government in July 1945 (Dorril 2000, 206, 253). The Polish Home Army then resorted to terrorist attacks against communist Poles and pogroms against the surviving Jewish population.

By the end of 1945, both Soviet and US intelligence agencies were aware that the Promethean League was an MI6 operation "to re-arm Ukrainian neo-Nazis under the cover of [Protestant-Evangelical] General Anders' Polish Army" (Dorril 2000, 206). Under London's direction, Anders's army sacrificed themselves in numerous battles outside of Poland, most famously at the 1944 Battle of Monte Cassino when the Polish army suffered 1000 dead and 3000 wounded.

London continued to nourish the dreams of self-exiled Poles to lead an "East European Federation." Financing would be through a British Treasury loan to be repaid by the postwar Polish government. After London and Washington recognized the People's Republic of Poland, MI6 continued to prop up this enterprise through various front groups (Dorril 2000, 206). In 1947, the Promethean League and Intermarium were folded into the Anti-Bolshevik League for the Liberation of Nations (ALONS) (Dorril 2000, 213) and Smal-Stocky emigrated to the United States for a tenured position at the Catholic Marquette University.

MI6's covert activity was multipronged. One network was run by Captain Michael Sullivan who disguised himself as the head of a British relief agency. During 1945, Sullivan helped "incite Anti-Semitic demonstrations" and "psychological warfare operations, resulting in bread riots." Many of his secret agents were arrested by the NKVD and put on trial (Dorril 2000, 256).

Special action units of the extreme nationalist National Military Union (Narodowy Zwiazek Wojskowy – NZW) conducted "pacification raids" against pro-government villages, while the well-organized Ukrainian nationalist UPA underground army threatened the south-east border. Civil war loomed as guerrilla groups roamed the countryside (Dorril 2000, 257), while MI6 agents sent into Poland were routinely arrested or executed (Dorril 2000, 262).

Those Armia Krajowa (AK) Polish underground fighters, who believed that continuing armed struggle was counterproductive (Dorril 2000, 257) and accommodation with Moscow essential, created a new military organization, Freedom and Independence (Wolnosc i Niepodlegtnosc – WiN), on September 2, 1945. That winter, the Soviets greatly reduced their troops on Polish soil. By mid-1947, the Polish Security Service, Urzad Bezpieczenstwa (the UB or Bezpieka), had thoroughly penetrated WiN. They captured the WiN leader, Stefan Sienko, who agreed to cooperate with the UB as a double agent. The entire WiN Home Organization network had become an elaborate deception operation orchestrated by the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB 1946–1953) (Dorril 2000, 265). Information reaching MI6 from Warsaw was Soviet disinformation.

Meanwhile, CIA determined to infiltrate US labor unions and employ them abroad to undermine communist worker appeal. The CIA-funded International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), established in London in 1949 and comprised of non-communist unions, actively subverted civil society in Poland (Peck 1978, 228, 231).

Solidarnosc Created

In 1970, worker protests of government policies were organized, and the devout Catholic antiabortion homophobic Lech Walesa assumed leadership. On August 14, 1980, a rise in food prices provoked a strike at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk. This strike inspired other work actions. On the 31st, the government granted these shipyard workers the right to strike and to form an independent trade union. The Strike Coordinating Committee legalized itself as the National Coordinating Committee of the Solidarnosc (Solidarity) Free Trade Union. Walesa was chosen to be chairman of the Committee. At its peak in September 1981, its 10 million members amounted to almost one-third of the population and one-third of the working class.

To stoke further resentment, during the Polish political crisis of 1980–1981, CIA planted "fake news" that the Soviet Union would invade Poland. No evidence has been found in KGB files to substantiate this tale. Rather, CIA through various US-based entities provided major funding to Solidarity, the main opposition group, to destabilize Polish socialism (*Polish-American Journal* 1993). The AFL-CIO raised $300,000 from its union members that was used to provide material and cash directly to Solidarity. On top of this interference into the internal affairs of a sovereign state, the US Congress authorized the National Endowment for Democracy to allocate $10 million to Solidarity. Journalist Carl Bernstein reported that "Tons of equipment – fax machines (the first in Poland), printing presses, transmitters, telephones, shortwave radios, video cameras, photocopiers, telex machines, computers, word processors – were smuggled into Poland via channel established by priests and American agents of the AFL-CIO and European labor movements. Money for the banned union came from CIA funds, the National Endowment for Democracy, secret accounts in the Vatican and Western trade unions" (Bernstein 2001).

On March 10, 1981, Walesa met General Wojciech Jaruselski for the first time. At that meeting, Walesa assessed the regime, "It's not the case that the name of socialism is bad. Only some people spoiled the name of socialism." Jaruselski reminded him that the Warsaw Pact would be holding war games from March 16 to 25, and it would be wise if he maintained social order and forgo any anti-Soviet rhetoric, since Solidarity was receiving substantial funding from western capitalist nations.

The Attempted Assassination of the Only Polish Pope in Vatican History

On May 13, 1981, Mehmet Ali Agca, a member of the far-right Turkish Grey Wolves, seriously wounded Pope (1978–2005) John Paul II in an assassination attempt that occurred 15 days before the Pope's mentor, Cardinal (1946–1981) Stefan Wyszynski, succumbed to stomach cancer, and

14 months before the *Solidarity*-financing Vatican Bank declared bankruptcy.

CIA enlisted the *New York Times* in one of its most successful disinformation projects, the so-called Bulgarian connection. CIA wanted the world to think that the Soviet Union through their Bulgarian surrogates had masterminded the assassination plot, thereby fomenting Polish unrest against the Soviet Union that it was hoped would result in a Soviet invasion. Since the Soviets were embroiled in Afghanistan, CIA hoped for a two-front war, in a continuation of the military pincer that Washington promoted in the 1930s between Japan in the east and Germany in the west (Gronowicz 2017, 357–358).

In full-column full-page stories, the *New York Times* published a detailed, false account of how the KGB working through the Bulgarian government had choreographed the attempted assassination of the only Polish pope in Vatican history. The author of this ambitious canard was CIA-funded journalist Claire Sterling. Sterling's obituary described "The Bulgarian Connection" as "one of the most successful cases – certainly the most publicized – of disinformation carried out by a Western intelligence agency since the Second World War" (Achtner 1996). Twenty-one years afterward, Pope John Paul II journeyed to Bulgaria to state unequivocally, "I never believed in the so-called Bulgarian connection" (*New York Times*, May 27, 2002).

Washington prosecuted Antoni Gronowicz for publishing the first biography of this pope. Gronowicz wrote how John Paul II related to him that CIA could have prevented the assassination attempt. In 1984, to compel Gronowicz to reveal his sources, the government convened a grand jury – a secret tribunal unique to the United States among English-speaking nations – to interrogate him. Gronowicz's federal case represented the first time in US history that an author other than a journalist was subjected to a government inquisition to ascertain his sources (Editorial 1984).

The Author's Guild, the Author's League, the Dramatists' Guild, the American Civil Liberties' Union, and two of the top US civil liberties' scholars, Burton Caine and Thomas Emerson,

protested this violation of free speech (Brief *Amicus Curiae* of the Authors League of America, Inc. in Support of the *Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1985, In Re Grand Jury matter Antoni Gronowicz v. United States of America*). American authors Norman Mailer, Arthur Miller, William Styron, and Kurt Vonnegut wrote a joint protest letter.

As the case wended its way to the Supreme Court, Gronowicz died of a heart attack. Judge Dolores Korman Sloviter of the Third Circuit US Court of Appeals, who later became its Chief Judge (1991–1998), compared Gronowicz's tribulations to those of Galileo. In her opinion, she wrote, "Searching somewhat deeper into history, one could add Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* and the works of Galileo, all were seen in their time as threatening the views of the orthodoxy."

Lech Walesa's Political Odyssey

The attempted assassination of the only Polish pope and CIA's attempt to pin it on the Soviets contributed to the decision of General Jaruselski to declare martial law on December 13, 1981. The armed forces remained loyal to the government and protests over the next year killed almost a hundred Poles. Walesa and other strike leaders were imprisoned. After Solidarity was outlawed on October 8, 1982, Walesa was released on November 14. Martial law was lifted on July 22. Jaruselski served as Poland's first president until 1990 when Lech Walesa succeeded him.

After Walesa became President, the Balcerowicz Plan introduced privatization and a transition to a free-market economy (Kureth 2014). Walesa successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and a reduction of foreign debt. He supported Poland's entry into NATO and the European Union. He narrowly lost the 1995 presidential election to Aleksander Kwasniewski who represented a resurgent Democratic Left Alliance that contained communist members. Walesa then went on a round-the-world lecture tour and made a lot of money,

consistent with his first Man of the Year award that came in 1980 from the *Financial Times*, followed by numerous others, including the *Saudi Gazette* (1989), and in 1983 the Nobel Prize for Peace, and by 45 honorary degrees that included Harvard University and the Sorbonne.

When Walesa ran again for the presidency in 2000, he received 1% of the vote, while Kwasniewski was reelected with 54%. At this point in time, Gdansk, the birthplace of Solidarity, was confronting poverty and unemployment as most of the ship building industry had closed. In 2006, Walesa quit Solidarity because the union supported the now ruling right-wing Law and Justice party run by the twins, Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who occupied the posts of president and prime minister, respectively. During the 2008 economic crisis, Poland was the only European country that continued to show economic growth.

In 2017, persistent rumors that Walesa had been working for the Polish Communist Security Service from the time of the 1970 worker protests took on a new life when papers were seized from the home of a recently deceased former interior minister, General Czeslaw Kiszczak. They included a verified handwritten note dated December 21, 1970, in which Walesa promised that he would work for the secret police in return for not being imprisoned. He swore never to disclose his collaboration – "not even to his family." His reports on fellow workers in the 279-page dossier were signed with the code name, Bolek (Koper 2017).

Poland Joins NATO

On March 12, 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined NATO. The encirclement of Russia on its western front had taken a leap forward. Washington then triggered a new arms race with Russia by insisting on stationing missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin reacted, "It wasn't us who initiated a new round of the arms race . . . We have signed and ratified the CFE [the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which

limits WMDs] and are fully implementing it. We have pulled out all our heavy weapons from the European part of Russia to (locations) behind the Ural Mountains and cut our military by 300,000 men. ... Either you ratify the treaty and start observing it, or we will opt out of it. ...It's dangerous and harmful. Norms of the international law were replaced with political expediency. We view it as *diktat* and imperialism" (Isachenkov 2007). In 2007, news surfaced that from 2003 to 2005, CIA "ran" secret prisons in Poland, Romania, and Mauritania, where kidnapped suspects from other nations were tortured (Ganley 2007).

On the heels of becoming European Council President (2014–present), Poland's Donald Tusk strenuously campaigned for cancelation of Nord Stream 2, the gas pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea that would help implement a peaceful strategic trade partnership between Germany and Russia. Tusk took his cue from the Polish Foreign Minister (2007–2014) Radoslaw Sikorski who likened the pipeline to "the Nazi-Soviet Pact" (Beunderman 2006). His wife, Washington, D.C.-born journalist, Anne Applebaum, who sits on the board of the CIA-run National Endowment for Democracy, came up with the shortest explanation for the World War II: "Stalin started the war" (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2013).

With Germany already receiving 35% of its gas from Russia (Keating 2018), on August 18, 2018, Russian President Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel met to implement the project. Once again, ultranationalist Poles have deluded themselves into thinking that they can successfully challenge Germany and Russia. Thanks to China's Belt and Road Initiative and Russia's energy supplies and missile defense, Germany is positioned to aid in the peaceful unification of the giant Eurasian land mass as the principal player in Western Europe, while Poland has stubbornly refused to serve as its Eastern Europe equivalent.

As evidence of this growing nationalist economic tendency and in contrast to the 1990s when "an orderly transfer of the banking sector to private owners, especially international banking groups, was a key part of the success of Poland's transition ... the government silently renationalizes large swaths of the banking industry. ... In the autumn of 2015, the state-owned insurance company PZU acquired a substantial stake in Alior Bank, Poland's most successful entrepreneurial lender. ... UniCredit, the Italian banking giant, completed the sale of its controlling stake in Bank Pekao, Poland's second-large bank, to PSU and the Polish Development Fund for a total of 10.6 bn zlotys (2.5 bn L). UniCredit's investment in Pekao was the biggest equity stake held by an international bank in a Polish bank" (Rohac 2017).

On November 11, 2017, the 99th anniversary of Polish independence, the Polish government hosted a gathering of 60,000 pro-Nazi demonstrators from across Europe. It was part of Poland's ultranationalist government's plan to resuscitate Intermarium (Korybko 2017). On the centennial, 200,000 marched, many of them fascists, led by Polish President Andrzej Duda who did not repudiate this clerical-fascist support. A tragic consequence of this promotion of intolerance came on January 13, 2019. Pawel Adamowicz, the mayor of Gdansk, was assassinated. In the words of the *New York Times* editorial board, his killing "was a consequence of the hatred and malice that have spread through Poland under the ultraconservative, nationalist and increasingly authoritarian Law and Justice Party. ... [that] has actively curtailed the independence of the judiciary and the news media to promote its rightwing, anti-European Union, anti-immigrant agenda (Editorial Board 2019; New York Times, January 22, 2019)."

In February 2019, Poland hosted an anti-Iran conference that provided a platform for the Trump administration to rally support for its position on withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement, a position that the EU, Germany, and France opposed. The conference failed in its mission, but once again, as in 1936 when it drew close to Germany, Poland is skirting national disaster because it would be directly in the line of fire in another world war. Its stance is consistent with having hosted the most important black site for torturing terror suspects during the run-up to the Iraq War.

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Police State

Political

Political and Civil Rights

Political Cinema

Political Cinema and Anti-imperialism

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Hollywood; Political cinema; Propaganda; Third cinema; Third world

Definition

The imperialism/anti-imperialism dichotomy offers one way to categorise political films. These encompass a wide range of contexts, practices, and genres; they cover cinematic traditions produced in Europe, Latin and Central America, Africa, and Asia, and include industrial, commercial, independent, and governmental films. In the early decades of the twentieth century, cinema was often called upon to propagate colonial propaganda, and this relationship between cinema and empire has remained central to Hollywood and British film industries up to the present day.

This essay argues that the politics of anti-imperialism in cinema have been plural, multi-directional, and have even at times presented conflicting ideologies, particularly insofar as Third Cinema failed to account for the direct impact of imperialism on women's conditions. This essay seeks to move beyond the traditional binary imperialism/anti-imperialism and suggests ethical connections between ongoing redefinitions of anti-imperialist cinemas and critical reassessments of cosmopolitanism. A short, selective filmography is included at the conclusion for more specific examples of the geographical and thematic range of films denouncing various forms of imperialism.

'All films are political, but films are not political in the same way', Mike Wayne states in the opening lines of his 2001 book *Political Film: The Dialectics of Third Cinema*. The imperialism/anti-imperialism dichotomy offers one way to categorise political films. These encompass a wide range of contexts, practices, and genres; they cover cinematic traditions produced in Europe, Latin and Central America, Africa, and Asia, and include industrial, commercial, independent, and governmental films. For French scholar and film curator Nicole Brenez, 'a politically committed filmmaker is first of all someone who thinks of collective history, thus someone who thinks in terms of the future that he wishes to call forth, and who sows the seeds of justice in the form of images knowing that, at best, they will grow later' (Brenez 2012).

In the early decades of the twentieth century, cinema was often called upon to propagate colonial propaganda; according to James Chapman and Nicholas J. Cull, authors of *Projecting Empire: Imperialism and Popular Cinema* (2009), this relationship between cinema and empire did not stop in the 1930s and has remained central to Hollywood and British film industries from the 1930s onwards to the present day. Accounts of early cinematic critiques of British and Japanese imperialism have been documented in Hollywood, Indian, and Chinese films in the 1930s, yet, the eruption of anti-imperialist struggles and the formulation of clear political strategies by filmmakers are more commonly

connected to the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the period saw the convergence and intensification of two discourses: anti-colonialism, fuelled by the decolonisation wars opposing Britain and France against their respective South-East Asian and African colonies; and anti-imperialism, spurred by growing discontent across Central and South America with encroaching US economic and diplomatic policies. More recently, with the general acceptance of globalisation as the new dominant paradigm, concerns about cultural homogenisation, transnational corporate monopoly, and global inequalities, the strict antagonisms of the past are being replaced by intersecting and overlapping geographies. Needless to say that politics of anti-imperialism in cinema have been plural, multidirectional, and have even at times conduced to conflicting ideologies. The most blatant example of such conflicts concerns the inability of Third Cinema to account for the direct impact of imperialism on women's conditions. For practical reasons of length, this essay cannot cover everything. The selective overview offered here seeks to move beyond the traditional binary imperialism/anti-imperialism and to suggest ethical connections between ongoing redefinitions of anti-imperialist cinemas and critical reassessments of cosmopolitanism. A short, selective filmography is included at the end for more specific examples of the geographical and thematic range of films denouncing various forms of imperialism.

In the history of political cinema, the long 1960s (meaning the period that starts in the mid-1950s and ends in the early 1970s) are remembered as the golden age of revolutionary militant filmmaking. In contrast to the instrumentalisation of film by colonial and fascist propaganda campaigns during the first half of the twentieth century, post-war times marked a leftist re-signification of political cinema. The term then became synonymous with a critical practice indicting bourgeois social values, colonial oppression, military and economic imperialism, and free-market capitalism. Wars of independence in Africa and South-East Asia were bringing European colonialism to its knees; popular revolutions were rattling South America, causing

serious political and social turmoil worldwide. In Europe and the US, mass protests were calling for the end of colonial wars in Vietnam and Algeria, demanding greater social freedom, denouncing cultural elitism, and advocating for gender, racial, and sexual equality. Cinema played a major role in giving visibility to those movements, but most importantly, debates initiated in the early 1920s by Soviet cinema about the ideological nature of cinema as a medium, as an industry, and as a sociocultural praxis resumed, most notably in Latin America.

Following the first jolts of the Cuban revolution and the victory of Fidel Castro in 1959, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil became stages for violent popular revolts against the newly instituted military governments. Numerous filmmakers sided with the people. Several manifestoes – Glauber Rocha, 'Aesthetic of Hunger' (Brazil, 1965), Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino 'Towards a Third Cinema' (Argentina, 1969), and Julio García Espinosa 'For an Imperfect Cinema' (1969) – defined the aesthetic and economic principles of a new, revolutionary cinema. Third Cinema would achieve what the Second Cinema of the European New Waves could not complete; that is, exist outside of the System and develop aesthetic and industrial alternatives to the passive consumerism and alluring visual escapism of First Cinema. While Second Cinema was seen as an attempt to awaken the spectator from First Cinema's glossy superficiality, the proponents of Third Cinema deplored the financial and industrial entrapment of their European counterparts and the ineluctable assimilation of their films within the international film industry. This certainly rings true today when we consider the role festivals, awards ceremonies, and critics play in the international legitimation and reproduction of art cinemas.

Third Cinema sought not only to document the process of decolonisation, independence, and access to self-sovereignty on the screen, but it also, first and foremost, endeavoured to 'decolonise the mind' of the spectator, taking after Frantz Fanon's seminal analysis of colonisation *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). This meant working outside and against the structures of

production, exhibition, and reproduction that, in their mind, precluded cinema from being an effective medium of political consciousness. In Brazil and Cuba, Glauber Rocha and Julio García Espinosa turned the chronic under-development of their countries into counter-aesthetics and political interventions: hunger and imperfection were upheld as the antidote to the commercial entertainment promoted by Hollywood. The question of funding quickly posed itself. For Mike Wayne, state funding was admittedly 'a problematic necessity' for Third Cinema (Wayne 2001: 79). David M.J. Wood adds that, in spite of their initial reluctance to accept state sponsorship, regional film archives, private and public, ended up playing a central role in the diffusion of the films and 'the language of anti-imperialism', providing filmmakers with decentred spaces from where they could pursue their efforts to 'move from existing bourgeois towards new proletarian modes of film spectatorship' (Wood 2010: 167). French militant filmmaker Luc Moullet, who shared similar political values and was an active proponent of cinemas of transnational social consciousness, mocks such financial quandaries and his own artistic hypocrisy in his anti-imperialist documentary *Genesis of a Meal* (1978).

The long-lasting influence of Latin American Third Cinema on European militant filmmaking and on post-colonial cinemas alike lies in the unique and far-sighted historical compression its political agenda evidenced. The movement targeted all at once European colonialism, US imperialism, and, to some anachronistic extent, the transnational mechanisms of globalisation. Furthermore, it provided a structure for transnational solidarities across three continents, supporting the Tricontinental Revolution called forth in the late 1960s by intellectuals and political figures such as Che Guevara and Frantz Fanon. Although Third Cinema was very much the product of specific local and national conditions, Solanas and Getino's 1969 manifesto, premised the success of the social revolution on the intertwining of both scales:

> Testimony about a national reality can be an inestimable means of dialogue and knowledge on a global scale. No internationalist form of struggle can be carried out successfully without a mutual exchange of experiences between peoples, if peoples cannot manage to break out of the Balkanization which imperialism strives to maintain. (Solanas and Getino 1997/1969: 46)

In Africa, Mohammed Lakhdar-Hamina's *The Winds of the Aures* (1967) and Ahmed Rachedi's *Chronicle of the Years of Fire* (1975) epitomise the violence of early Algerian cinema, and the interweaving of war and nation building. Further south, in sub-Saharan Francophone Africa, early anti-colonial and post-colonial cinemas focused more extensively on how persistent economic dependency precluded the development of local economies and affected the capacity of filmmakers, in particular, to lay the foundations of African cinema on their own terms. When film had to be shipped and processed in France, the very possibility of an African cinema was compromised. In the early years of this enterprise, the persisting economic dependency upon France was nonetheless counterweighted by the creative influence of Soviet cinema. Several young filmmakers received scholarships to study film making in Moscow, including Ousmane Sembène, Souleymane Cissé, and Abderrhamane Sissako. Post-colonial Francophone African cinemas were very much the product of this tri-headed cultural and ideological root – African cultural traditions and experiences, French (neo-)colonialism, and a Soviet-inspired dialectical approach to cinema. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, African filmmakers strove to undo past European narratives and images about their continent and their people, and their films developed, as in Latin America, a national and continental political language that could expose and expel what Sembène described as 'all the things [they] ha[d] inherited from the colonial and neo-colonial systems (qtd. in Pfaff 1984: 11)' (Pfaff 2004: 2). In recent years, post-colonial emphasis on national sovereignty and African cultural integrity has intersected with anxieties about unbounded economic and cultural pressures exerted by globalisation.

Since the 1990s, the principles laid out by Third Cinema have bifurcated: documentary, small, and new media continue to circumvent

media conglomerates, financial monopoly, and alternative platforms of distribution whenever possible, while feature-length fiction cinema has produced sophisticated geopolitical allegories engaging the filmmaker's position in a world governed by colonialist, imperialist, and globalist impulses (Jameson 1991; Stam 2003). Brazilian cinema, for instance, has found in 'garbage' a symbolic:

> point of convergence [...for the] three themes of hybridity, multiplicity and the redemption of detritus. [...it] captured the sense of marginality, of being condemned to survive within scarcity, of being the dumping ground for transnational capitalism, of being obliged to recycle the materials of the dominant culture. (Stam 2003: 40–41)

African cinema, in comparison, has privileged the metaphor of crossroads in its negotiations of unresolved 'postcolonial asymmetry' (Akinwumi 2011: 9). In *Moolaadé* (Sembène 2005), transactions of all kinds (economic, social, sexual and political) continuously draw the characters to the centre of the village; the dramatic junction of several destinies, the place 'is the point where journeys begin [...] and the place to which the traveler may return' (Akinwumi 2011: 10). In *Bamako* (2006), Abderrahmane Sissako enacts the impossible intersection of everyday West African life (the conditions of underdevelopment in the global South) and the global Empire: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, and European neo-colonialism.

Colonialism and globalisation are often seen as equally oppressive and exploitative states that enforce economic dependency and cultural hierarchies between hegemonic powers (Europe, the US, Japan, China, and transnational financial corporate institutions) and the global South, formerly referred to as the Third World (Central and South America, Africa, South-East Asia). The amorphous quality of the global Empire has increasingly blurred boundaries between First, Second, and Third Cinemas. Frank Ukadike notes in several analyses of the transformation of Anglophone African media industries from the 1980s onwards that the ability of Nollywood (the Nigerian commercial video industry), for instance, to

emancipate its production from 'extant distribution/exhibition systems' and to break traditional categories of spectatorship might seem in line with the goals of Third Cinema. The commitment of these videos to their actual social and ethical emancipation from First Cinema's commercial popular clichés is nevertheless questionable (Ukadike 2003: 140). Yet, the economic affirmation of India's Bollywood and Nigeria's Nollywood has been key in establishing industrial counterweights to Hollywood, disrupting traditional geographies of cultural production and consumption. Similarly, Hollywood itself has produced over time films denouncing the very hegemonic and imperialist nature of their own structures of production. Certainly the most recent to be worthy of consideration concerns critical accounts of James Cameron's *Avatar* (2009), one of the largest grossing US blockbusters of all times, that have positioned the film at the intersection of consensual US popular culture and anti-imperialist political charges. Yet, if the charge against imperialism is admittedly visible in Cameron's ecological plea and denunciation of military neo-liberalism, critics have nonetheless highlighted the film's inability to articulate a critique of imperialism that could be anything but Western centric (Alessio and Meredith 2012).

The persisting threat of assimilation of anti-imperialist films and practices by the System has only been enhanced by the wide availability of digital technologies from the 1990s onwards. The Internet and new technologies have admittedly opened the gates to seemingly independent, alternative channels of diffusion, reproduction, and (thanks to social media and funding platforms) more recently to production. However, they have also transformed political video making and film making from a fundamentally co-operative project into an individual endeavour. The collaborative dimension, which had been foregrounded in Third Cinema and in post-colonial African aspirations to build national cinemas, has thus shifted from production to reproduction and circulation. Michael Chanan's most recent work draws attention to the digital renewal of political cinema and video and the role new media might play in the twenty-first century. In his 2012 e-book, *Tales of a*

Video Blogger, Chanan chronicles several forms of 'citizen journalism' that preview the form and content of a Third Cinema 2.0. He describes how the production of agitational videos during the 2010 General Election in the UK and the use of mobile phone cameras during the Arab Springs, for instance, adapt and reinvent past experiments, such as the *cine piquetero* movement in Argentina in 2001, and indigenous videos in Mexico, Chile, and Brazil during the late 1980s. As Chanan points out though, imperialism and its critics are now even more closely intertwined as 'growing numbers of people are using the products of consumerism to try and combat the power of the same global corporate capitalism that sells them the instruments of digital social communication to begin with' (Chanan 2012: 36).

In their efforts to design an equal, fair and respectful 'conception of the world', anti-imperialist cinemas have always simultaneously engaged different geographical scales of experiences: the local, the national, and the global. Film praxis of anti-imperialism is best described as the endless re-opening of the viewer's relationship with the film, but most importantly, with the world that surrounds him or her. While these political cinemas have already triggered geopolitical shifts, they continue to be seen in oppositional terms vis-à-vis imperialism, a theoretical position that unfairly replicates the normative preeminence of exploitative impulses. Michael Chanan's new geographies of Third Cinema fold the margins and the interstices of the global Empire back into its centre; there, he hopes, they can redefine the terms of a collective politics of resistance appropriate to the increasingly interlaced experiences of the social outcasts of the North and the South (Chanan 1997). The programmatic commitment of anti-imperialist cinemas in Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia evolved but never ceased to question the normativity of Western and American globalism. Yet, fixing these evolutions in the anti-imperialist struggles of the 1960s denies them the complexity of their contemporary responses to social, cultural, and technological transformations. Another geography is possible, and these cinemas have been relentless in uncovering the constant mutability of imperialism,

as a political, social, cultural, and economic system, and inviting us to envision a (utopian) alternative to the imperialist essence of modernity. In over half a century, political cinemas of anti-imperialism have shaped an alternative conception of the world. They have 'engag[ed] in practices of global justice confronting all systemic relations of subordination while [staying] committed to establishing projects of egalitarian and pluralist universalism', and in doing so, they have contributed to the critical redefinition of cosmopolitanism, the antithesis of imperialism (Kurusawa 2011: 290).

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▶ Cinema and Anti-imperialist Resistance

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Political Economy

▶ Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex

Political Economy of the European Periphery

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Synonyms

Economic cycles; Economic inequality; European union economic inequality; European union's core-periphery division; Geographical value transfer; Labour force exploitation; Marxian political economy; Unequal labour exchange

Definition/Description

The political economy of the European periphery furnishes empirical content to the thesis that the European integrational project locks its member countries into the relations of unequal labor exchange. Derived from cross-country economic inequality and facilitated through international trade, such a scenario allows the affluent member states to take economic advantage over their less developed and, in this sense, peripheral trading partners. Accordingly, this chapter provides an analytical framework explaining the existing imperialist design as an antithesis to the idealized European Social Project. It explains why European integration demands for ever-expanding geographical coverage and why the peripheral countries' benefits are conditional upon much larger benefits draw by the core. Contrarily, through the analysis of the entire economic cycle, this chapter proves an argument that economic losses generally remain a peripheral concern. This asymmetrical cross-country benefit distribution exhibits that the European integration is led by underlying economic forces which, instead of equality, solidarity, and cohesion, are structurally rooted in the cross-country dependence and geographical value transfer, both of which benefit the core.

Introduction

Throughout history, European soil has been the birthplace of various political and economic modes of social organization. Europe's frequently pioneering role in governing relationships between individuals and society has taken many forms, most of which have been led by military imperialism and resulted in historical misfortunes on a global scale. Numerous instances of trial and error brought about, from the aftermath of the Second World War, the European integration that hitherto proved successful in the provision of peace. Consequently, regardless of the fact that it does not represent geographical totality, the European Union (EU) presently dominates over the continental landscape whereas the Eurozone

dominates its economic sphere. On these grounds, political economy of European periphery analyzes the economics of European integration in order to investigate the extent to which the EU was successful in the abandonment of its long-standing imperialist legacy.

The foundation of the EU and even more so its common currency subset, the Eurozone, is based on the premise that the expansion of the single market inevitably enhances economic efficiency and increases the living standard of European peoples. This is evident from the 1986 Single European Act (European Commission 2012) which guarantees, in addition to freedom of establishment, free movement of persons, services, goods, and capital (Four Freedoms of the EU). From the theoretical standpoint, such rationale is centered around the concept of perfect competition anchored to perfect factor mobility and unobstructed trade (Bork 1993). The transnational implementation of established freedoms generates a territory liberated from regulatory obstacles which should enhance efficient use of resources and optimize economic welfare. This implicitly desirable ideal of perfect competition rests on the assumptions that the internal market should be comprised of numerous rational agents trading homogeneous commodities without the individual power over price levels, operating in an environment restrained from externalities and transaction costs with well-defined property rights and competition enhancing rule of law. This inherently implies tendential commodity-price, factor-price, and factor-efficiency equalization, as a consequence of the perfectly competitive setting which precludes the existence of the suboptimal market stakeholders.

Fulfillment of these conditions begets a single economic territory marked by efficient factor allocation, efficient firm size, efficiently distributed relations of production, and by matching supply and demand, i.e., marked by Pareto (1894) optimality where, given the current allocation of resources, advancement of any one individual can occur only by making another worse off. Effectively, society reaches a grand utility possibility frontier (Ferguson and Gould 1975) where no Pareto improvements are achievable and

economic welfare is maximized. From the economic viewpoint, this constitutes the theoretical backbone of the Eurozone internal market.

However, idealizing features of perfect competition omit the vital effects of imperfect competition, market failures, and distinct efficiencies among market participants. Hence, in line with Amin (2011), this study debunks the myths of perfect competition and a global-level playing field and provides arguments for the claim that imperfect competition is a key criterion driving a wedge between the core and periphery and segregating the European single economic territory. This argument is advanced through the exposition of the imperfect competition as a leading factor behind disequilibrium market prices, heterogenous levels of cross-country economic efficiency, and distinct structure of country-specific productive factor endowments, all of which are the root cause of the core-periphery cleavage. The acute issue of the European core-periphery division is investigated as a function of cross-country unequal recognition of the labor consumed. That being said, this study draws on the Marxian economic tradition and dependency theory to show that the un-equivalent labor recognition leads to value transfers (Emmanuel 1972) that set in motion the exploitative cross-country dynamics (e.g., Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950; Amin 1976; Bauer 2000).

This research displays an empirically validated theoretical account of the hypothesis that the Eurozone periphery joins the integration, expecting benefits they consider through the Pareto efficiency lens. Conversely, the core countries are taking into account the fact that the free market integrates the countries into the relations of the imperfect competition where they can employ economic power over their peripheral trading partners. Thus, the European international trade regime becomes a principle vessel that facilitates cross-country un-equivalent value transfer (Rubinić and Tajnikar 2019a, b). In such framework, based on the unequal exchange as a concealed cause of European economic inequalities, it is no surprise that the European core-periphery split receives considerable analytical attention in both the academic community and

public debates. This sheds new light on the process of the Eurozone's enlargement, which evidently enables the core to further establish its beneficiary status. Given that the core systemically derives unrequited positive value transfers from the periphery, the European integrational project must be analyzed as the continuation of imperialist dynamics (Cope 2019) in which the periphery economically gravitates, through conditions of subordination toward the European monetary system and its political institutional setting.

A Concise Evolution of the European Integrational Project

The EU is a transnational economic and political partnership of 28 sovereign countries conceptually founded on the thesis that fostering trade and interdependence among European nations translates into the synergic advancement of social welfare.

The birth of European integration can be tracked back to the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community and the 1957 European Economic Community, which brought together six founding member states: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Germany. The European integrational project came into force in 1958 through the implementation of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957). The so-called Treaty of Rome formed the constitutional basis of what is to become the EU. It proposed progressive eliminations of internal barriers to trade and establishment of the customs union which should be followed by the creation of the common market and later by the single market with the EU's Four Freedoms. Additionally, the Treaty advocated for the introduction of various international policies and the formation of the European Commission. The fundamental guidelines that were laid out reflect Hayek's (1948) vision of European interstate federalism which promotes the idea that the reduction of impediments to EU's Four Freedoms lead to the single market where "prices and wages would tend to reflect production costs and living conditions

across member states, avoiding arbitrary divergences imposed by the state authorities" (Lapavitsas 2019:14–15). In other words, it leads to a perfectly competitive environment in which all parties involved, as argued by the orthodox theory (e.g., Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933), draw benefits from international trade.

In the following decades, the European Community proved to be successful in achieving economic growth. This led to the 1973 integration of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Soon after, in 1981, Greece joined the partnership, while, 5 years later, the same path was followed by Portugal and Spain. These enlargements were incentivized by positive experience of previously integrated countries. They were primarily driven by capital demands for a larger markets (utilization of the economics of scale) promoted through the transnational economic and territorial cohesion. In contrast, considerably less integrational focus was placed on social cohesion through the foundation of EU structural funds.

A giant leap forward occurred in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union 1992). This Treaty introduced fundamental alterations to the existing cooperation through the establishment of the EU and set the groundwork for a common currency. As was planned, within the 1986 Single European Act (European Commission 2012), in 1993, the European single market became fully operational, whereas, in 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members.

In 1996 the Stability and Growth Pact facilitated an agreement to establish the Eurozone and introduced a deficit and debt criterion, designed to ensure countries' fiscal disciplinary coordination as a precondition for the admission to the common currency area. With the purpose of carrying out the vision of the monetary union, the European Central Bank was established in 1998. With the principal task of administering the common monetary policy and maintaining price stability within the forthcoming union, the European Central Bank, in 1999, enabled the launch of the EU currency (the Euro) and brought the Eurozone into existence.

Implemented in 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), through substantial changes

regarding the capital-centered structure, amended the Treaty on European Union. This introduced the principle of social cohesion and reduction of regional development disparities, including the social policy on the list of the EU's legally binding priorities (Eißel 2014). The social inclusion and fight against poverty was further advanced in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) and has therefore become a permanent supplement to the initial EU values.

The last in a series of vital developmental moments started in 2004 with the single biggest enlargement of the EU. With the admittance of ten new members (Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), the EU increased its member count by 40%. This expansion was continued in 2007 with Bulgaria and Romania, and in 2013 with Croatia. The introduction of countries with significantly different economic performance, as will be shown, have considerably altered the European setting and posed great challenges to the integrational unity and shared prosperity.

Followed by the enlargement, the EU has engaged in the organizational, institutional, and ideological expansion that resulted in the shared institutional setting comprised of a variety of formal institutions. Through a transnational regulatory framework disabling inner-country subsidies, sovereign involvement into countries' economic affairs was minimized.

This simplified outlook on the evolution of the European integrational scheme can be summarized through the confirmation that the EU is a sui generis international trade regime that, through international law, rejects the use of cross-country countermeasures and reciprocity mechanisms in the organization of the relationships between countries (Phelan 2012). Considering its magnitude, the EU must be investigated as an unprecedented transnational attempt to connect the competitive enhancement of market freedoms and economic well-being with shared values of cross-country solidarity and cohesion, social inclusion, promotion of equality, elimination of backwardness and poverty, combating all kinds of discrimination, and promoting outlook in which European peoples are seen as equals regardless of their national origin (Consolidated

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version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012).

Conflict Between Integrational Values and Core-Periphery Inequality

Self-interest as the disposition of economic agents, unlike the state through which they materialize, seldom change. Hence, logic dictates that the antagonism between European shared values and the reality of core-periphery inequality must first acknowledge that the vast majority of the old member countries are former colonial and imperial powers. The historical account confirms that these countries not only violently appropriated capital through primitive accumulation (Harvey 2005) but also "...relied heavily on trade protection and subsidies, ignored patent laws and intellectual property rights, and generally championed free trade only when it was to their economic advantage" (Shaikh 2007: 60).

Therefore, as an international trade regime, the EU must be primarily considered as the neoliberal project (McNamara 1998; Lapavitsas 2019) centered on the proposition that the union of member countries integrated on the basis of maximization of their national self-interest can be transmuted, without the loss of common values, into the maximization of the joint integrational well-being. Such rationale relies on Ricardo's (2001) theory of comparative advantage which, interpreted in narrow terms, argues that international free trade brings, through specialization, benefits to all parties involved which would not be attainable in an autarky. However, like Pareto, Ricardo is not inherently concerned about potential distributional inequalities nor is he concerned with the trade's capability to determine national conditions of production and cross-country inequality, accordingly.

By considering the average gross domestic product per capita (World Bank 2017), as a proxy of the economic development, it can be concluded that the EU founding countries had more than 43,000 2011PPP\$, the countries admitted between 1973 and 1995 had more than 42,000 2011PPP\$, and the countries admitted after 2004 had little over 26,000 2011PPP\$. When the

analysis is extended to the number employed (Eurostat 2019) and capital stock (estimated through the Hardberger (1978) method), the founding countries report more than 520,000 2011PPP\$ capital per laborer, the countries admitted between 1973 and 1995 had more than 514,000 2011PPP\$ capital per laborer, whereas the post-2004 countries had barely over 317,000 2011PPP\$. As will be subsequently elaborated, a similar motion holds in the case of the majority of other economic indicators, thus proving that the evolutionary dynamics of the EU confirm Shaikh's argument and question the common values.

The trade surpluses and deficits within a single country cancel each other out (Marx 1971). The same may be the case with the commodity exchange among equals where, in accordance to comparative theory, all are expected to draw benefits. Consequently, by acknowledging the homogeneity of old member countries, one can fathom why the developing (pre-2004) EU was a progressive project. However, with the EU's enlargement, this cross-country equality disappeared. This has produced a setting in which affluent countries' comparative advantages, via international trade with less developed competitors, develop into the absolute advantage (e.g., Seretis and Tsaliki 2016; Tsaliki et al. 2017) that contradicts the EU founding principles.

Moreover, the EU did not only enlarge quantitatively but also qualitatively. The development of the common institutional settings, the commitment to continuous economic expansion, and the elimination of impediments to trade, as well as subsidies, have further exacerbated the state of affairs. This is best observed within the case of the Eurozone's monetary union, where the cross-county initial differences evolved into permanent inequality determinants. The latter occurred due to the loss of monetary sovereignty, the European Central Bank's mission to ensure nominal stability and to keep the inflation under control, and the Stability and Growth pact which, through the debt and deficit criteria, effectively disabled the countries' fiscal sovereignty (e.g., Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Stiglitz 2016).

The processes mentioned, with the lack of adequate transnational corrective mechanisms,

expose the limitation of the orthodox outlook, revealing that the EU is governed by the capital's imperatives and that the affluent countries have a vested interest in preserving cross-country inequality (Peet 1975). This violates the EU treaties, contradicts its shared values, and necessitates a fundamental shift toward the analytical approach that will allow the systematic investigation of the core-periphery division, i.e., it calls for the employment of the unequal labor exchange and dependency theories' frameworks which determine the international trade to be a concealed facilitator of the cross-country value transfer and core-periphery division.

Methodological Approach to European Cross-Country Unequal Value Transfer

Examination of the European trade inequalities departs from a theoretical model of Eurozone cross-country unequal labor exchange, formulated by Rubinić and Tajnikar (2019a). This model is a synthesis of the Marxist and heterodox traditions based on the innovative use of well-known linear models (e.g., Marx 1990; van Schaik 1976; Bródy 1970; Wolfstatter 1973; Newman 1962; Sraffa 1960; Morishima 1973). Accordingly, European cross-country inequalities stem from, among others, market disequilibria, distinct factor endowments, economic efficiency, and distinct rates of labor force exploitation, resulting in division between the affluent core and dependent periphery.

The model is based on the physical system of a productive economy, where the resultant physical surplus mirrors the net positive production of a given country. The useful property of this system is that it can adequately bypass the infamous deficiency of the Marx-based models, the transformation problem. The physical surplus can take the form of national income by multiplying its elements with prices. Alternatively, it can be expressed through the quantity of labor consumed in its production, as the new value (NV) created. To that end, the physical surplus is regarded as the understructure concurrently reflected in both the price and value systems. It suffices to mention that

first, in agreement with Choonara (2007) and Gibson (1980), all previous magnitudes can be measured as the sums of money value required to produce the physical surplus, and second, within the empirical part, the theoretical category of national income is measured as gross domestic product (GDP). The three-system disaggregation (physical, price, and value) makes it possible to investigate the degree of exploitation of labor power by capital (Marx 1990) and allows for comparison of a country's consumed labor within the production process with its market recognition within the national income.

This analytical framework employs a "fixed cake" understanding of the economy (Fine and Saad Filho 2016) in which the surplus is, via inner-country exploitation, divided between the capitalists and laborers. Given that within the contemporary capitalist mode of production, the international social relations are deeply rooted within the sphere of national production, this model can be transmuted to cross-country exploitative dynamics. On these foundations, the central question the developed model seeks to answer is: to what extent is the country's labor consumed, upon international exchange, recognized within the country's GDP?

Provided that the long-run equalization of factor remuneration is understood as the center of gravity, the model allows for the computation of the long-run equilibrium (production) prices of the factors of production and the corresponding, country-specific equilibrium national income (GDP_{pc}). Hence, the production prices consist of uniform wage and profit rates disincentivizing any reallocation of existing factor placement. In effect, the country's actual-to-equilibrium national income ratio points out the effect of the market (price) disequilibrium on the economic output of a given country. At this point it must be stated that, as argued by Marx (1991) and Amin (1976), a deviation between market and production prices begets the monopoly prices, which are captured by the effect of the market (price) disequilibrium.

The equilibrium national income can also be calculated based on the assumption that the countries share equivalent organic compositions of capital (capital-to-labor ratio). In that case, the

country's actual GDP would be proportional to the amount of labor consumed, i.e., to the new value created. Hence, variation between the new value created and the equilibrium national income reflects the influence of the organic composition of capital on the asymmetrical benefit distribution. This is what Emmanuel (1972) defines as the unequal exchange in a broad sense. The effect of the cross-country distinct capital composition mainly reflects through the country's profit incomes, actual national income, and national income per employee.

Analogously, by acknowledging the cross-country tendential equalization of the efficiency levels, the model makes it possible to calculate the country's national income which would be obtained if the country would achieve across-the-board-average levels of capital efficiency and labor productivity, denoted GDP_u. The deviation between the actual national income and the efficient equilibrium national income answers to what extent the economic efficiency effects the unequal labor exchange and country's economic performance.

Consequently, the existing disequilibrium prices, divergent organic compositions of capital, and divergent efficiencies are cross-country inequality determinants causing the country's GDP per employee to lag behind or exceed that of its trading partners. As an outcome, the emerging cross-country discrepancies are exhibited through a country's labor and capital incomes.

Since it is inferred that the physical surplus is merely a result of labor consumed in its production, within the model used, the country's national income can be expressed through the embodied labor. Assuming that all labor produces value (Harvie 2005) and is homogenous, by following the procedure formalized by Rubinić and Tajnikar (2019a), one can calculate the monetary magnitude of the new value created. Subsequently, the difference between the new value created and the actual national income identifies the combined effects of all inequality determinants and points out cross-country divergence in social recognition of the labor consumed within the country's production. This disparity is, in both perfectly competitive environment and the real-world setting of

imperfect competition, a confirmation of cross-country un-equivalent labor exchange. As a consequence, the cross-country un-equivalent labor exchange channels the outcomes of these complex transnational relations on the inner-country dynamics, through the price levels. The prices at which the cross-country commodity exchange realizes affect the prices of inner-country commodity exchange and are setting unequal market prices for identical quantities of labor consumed. Therefore, it can be concluded that the European trade inequalities are based on unequal cross-country commodity exchange, regarding the quantities of embodied labor.

To summarize, European cross-country inequality is the outcome of a disproportional conversion of the country's consumed labor into socially recognized labor. This disproportionality is a direct measure of the cross-country exploitation. In this way, the developed model connects the exploitation rate with the unequal labor exchange and cross-country inequality. Ultimately, the employment of this concept allows for the European core-periphery distinction and reveals its exploitative nature, driven by inequality determinants and their effects: labor incomes, profit incomes, and labor force exploitation.

Eurozone Core-Periphery Classification

A broad consensus in academic literature (e.g., Storm and Naastepad 2014; Regan 2015; Matthijs 2016; de Freitas 2017; Rubinić and Tajnikar 2019b) endorses the axiomatic fact of prevailing European core-periphery stratification. This binary cross-country tension was, among others, identified in geographical theory as a north-south divide, in financialization theory as creditor-debtor divide, and in varieties of capitalism theory as the divide between export-led and demand-led models. To fill in the existing literature gap, this study furnishes the two-tiered categorization of the European core-periphery centered around the paradigm of surplus and consequential exploitation-induced economic inequality.

The core-periphery categorization is performed in two comparable stages. The first stage

encompasses the Eurozone countries, while the second extends the research to the entire EU. In both cases, the research departs from the hypothesis that the grouping of the Eurozone countries can be performed by taking into account the net difference between the country's labor consumption and its realization within the GDP. The analysis, according to all parameters, is based on the averaged data for the period between 2003 and 2017. Such a method departs from Sraffa's metaphor of "instantaneous photograph" or "snapshot" (Sraffa unpublished notes D3/12/13), which depicts the economic system as frozen at one point in time.

The Eurozone (and later the EU) is treated as a closed economy whose aggregate GDP is considered to be entirely the product of the labor consumed within its member countries. However, regardless of the fact that the majority of the economic activity is the result of inner-group activity, the Eurozone countries also trade outside of the common currency area. In 2013, according to the World Bank (2017) WITS database, the GDP-weighted Eurozone across-the-board average extra-group export amounted to 19% and extra-group import amounted to 17% of total output. Given that this trade originates from the exchange of commodities constituting a part of the Eurozone's GDP which, in turn, results from the work invested within their member countries, it is self-evident that the international trade balance is mostly the result of labor invested within these same countries. From here it follows the assumption that the Eurozone's aggregate GDP is the result of the labor invested in its production. Once the commodity exchange has been completed, the Eurozone's aggregate GDP is distributed among the member countries in various ways. The latter forms the basis for cross-country value transfers that constitutes the prime concern of this study.

The starting point of the Eurozone's core-periphery disaggregation rests on the cross-country differences in the GDP per employee ($GDP_{p/e}$).

Figure 1 clearly depicts Eurozone core-periphery distinction. The grouping departs from the distribution of Eurozone aggregate GDP that averages 12.43 trillion 2011PPP\$ annually (Table 3). The core countries report above-average GDP per employee. These nine countries (Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, France, Germany, and Finland) surpass the remaining ones in both categories with a group GDP of 9.98 trillion 2011PPP\$ (80% of Eurozone's aggregate GDP). Conversely, there exists a homogenous group of ten peripheral countries (Spain, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia, Portugal, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) that suffer through exchange. These countries have below-average GDP per employee and a group GDP of 2.44 trillion 2011PPP\$ (Table 3).

The Eurozone core-periphery grouping is performed on the empirical analysis that accounts for seven independent and intertwined factors. Apart from the GDP per employee ($GDP_{p/e}$), the clustering technique includes the following cross-country inequality determinants: the effects of the disequilibrium prices (GDP-to-GDP_{pc} ratio), the organic composition of capital (NV-to-GDP_{pc} ratio), and the economic efficiency (GDP_{pc}-to-GDP_u ratio). Ultimately the effects of all inequality determinants are manifested through the formation of wage rates (actual-to-equilibrium wage rates ratio; W/W_{pc}), the formation of profit rates (actual-to-equilibrium profit rates ratio; Π/Π_{pc}), and the social recognition of the consumed labor (GDP-to-NV ratio). Derived from these factors, the Eurozone member countries are classified in the following table.

The Eurozone core-periphery ranking builds on Fig. 1, by departing from the GDP per employee. Thereupon, the classification is influenced by the country's status, with respect to the utilization of the existing market disequilibria. The results indicate that the countries with above-average GDP per employee obtain above-equilibrium prices for the commodities they exchange, i.e., their actual GDP is higher than what would be the case in the equilibrium. This rationale does not hold for Finland nor France which, according to this category, fall into the peripheral group. Relatedly such rationale holds for Malta which moves to the core. Within Table 1, these "moving" cases are distinguished by their positioning below the dash-dotted line. The peripheral countries obtain below-equilibrium prices for the commodities they realize.

Political Economy of the European Periphery, Fig. 1 Eurozone cross-country gross domestic product per employee (2003–2017 average). Note: Countries are ordered alphabetically as Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Cyprus (CYP), Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Lithuania (LTU), Luxembourg (LUX), Latvia (LVA), Malta (MLT), the Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), and Slovenia (SVN). (Source: Authors' own calculations based on data from the World Bank (2019) and Eurostat (2019))

Given that the Eurozone's unequal exchange is seen as a *zero-sum* game, based on the peripheral exchange of commodities labeled with below-equilibrium prices with those of the core with above-equilibrium prices, the periphery experiences a loss of 379 billion 2011PPP$ annually (Table 3). If the latter was not the case, the peripheral aggregate GDP would be 2.82 trillion 2011PPP$ annually. More importantly, by the same token, these peripheral countries' deficits constitute the cores' surpluses.

The cross-country differences in organic composition of capital are reflected through profit income differentiation and the GDP per employee. If the Eurozone countries had the equivalent organic composition of capital, the actual GDP of all members would be proportional to the amount of labor consumed within them, i.e., it would equate to the new value created. With the exception of Germany, all core countries have GDP per employee higher than the new value created. Opposite is the case for the entire Eurozone periphery. This is to suggest that because of distinct cross-country capital-to-labor ratios, even in the equilibrium state, the Eurozone countries would not receive the entirety of the recognition of labor consumed within their

productions. Within the equilibrium state, the Eurozone's international trade would inflict value transfer from the periphery with low, to the core with a high capital-to-labor ratio. In quantitative terms, this transfer amounts to 300 billion 2011PPP$ annually and is the reason why the core countries experience positive difference between their equilibrium GDP and the new value created (Table 3). That having been said, it must be mentioned that the countries with low organic composition of capital reported comparably lower capital stock and lower profit incomes as a part of the GDP, as well as lower GDP per employee. However, generally speaking, these countries exhibited higher profit rates comparable to the core countries which gain through the exchange due to unequal transfer of value.

Similarly, with Luxembourg excluded and Spain included, the core countries' equilibrium GDP exceeds their efficient, equilibrium GDP. The opposite is the case with the periphery whose countries are, from the viewpoint of the equilibrium, inefficient, i.e., their levels of capital efficiency and labor productivity are below the Eurozone's across-the-board average. Due to this underperformance, all countries that do not reach the highest level of economic efficiency lose

Political Economy of the European Periphery, Table 1 The Eurozone core-periphery clustering

	$GDP_{p/e}$	$\frac{GDP}{NV}$	$\frac{GDP}{GDP_{pe}}$	$\frac{NV}{GDP_{pe}}$	$\frac{W}{W_{pe}}$	$\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_{pe}}$	$\frac{GDP_{pc}}{GDP_u}$
Core	AUT	AUT	AUT	AUT	AUT	AUT	ITA
	BEL	BEL	BEL	BEL	BEL		ESP
	DEU	DEU	DEU		DEU		FIN
	FIN	FIN		FIN		FIN	DEU
	FRA	FRA		FRA	FRA	FRA	BEL
	IRL	IRL	IRL	IRL			IRL
	ITA	ITA	ITA	ITA			AUT
	LUX	LUX	LUX	LUX	LUX		NLD
	NLD	NLD	NLD	NLD	NLD	NLD	FRA
			MLT			ESP	GRC
Periphery	CYP	CYP	CYP	CYP	CYP	CYP	LUX
	ESP	ESP	ESP	ESP	ESP		PRT
	EST	EST	EST	EST	EST	EST	CYP
	GRC	GRC	GRC	GRC	GRC	GRC	SVN
	LTU	LTU	LTU	LTU	LTU	LTU	MLT
	LVA	LVA	LVA	LVA	LVA	LVA	EST
	MLT	MLT		MLT	MLT	MLT	LVA
	PRT	PRT	PRT	PRT	PRT	PRT	SVK
	SVK	SVK	SVK	SVK	SVK	SVK	LTU
	SVN	SVN	SVN	SVN	SVN	SVN	
			FIN	DEU	FIN	BEL	
			FRA		IRL	DEU	
					ITA	IRL	
						ITA	
						LUX	

Note: In the last column, the countries are ordered in accordance with descending levels of economic efficiency, otherwise the countries' core-periphery grouping is ordered alphabetically. Source: Authors' own calculations based on previous work (Rubinić and Tajnikar 2019a)

approximately 125 billion 2011PPP\$ annually, in contrast to the core countries of Italy, Spain, and Finland which reach the highest efficiency level (Table 1).

The asymmetrical benefit distribution arising from the disequilibrium prices bears high explanatory power with respect to the determination of the cross-country labor income differentials. Namely, regardless of the above-average profit rates, because of the below-average prices of their commodities, the Eurozone's periphery suffers annual losses of 387 billion 2011PPP\$, which comes at the expense of the peripheral labor incomes (Table 3). The latter directly violates the EU's "...principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value" (Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012: 118). These losses, in addition to the periphery, encompass Ireland, Italy, and Finland, which are otherwise considered the core. In the Finish case, the loss occurs alongside below-average price levels. The special position goes to France which, by taking the advantage of the high organic composition of capital, maintains above-equilibrium wage levels despite below-equilibrium prices. In contrast, Malta enjoys the benefits because their commodities reach above-equilibrium prices; however, these effects are not transmitted toward the labor incomes, which are below-equilibrium.

On the other hand, the asymmetrical benefit distribution arising from the organic composition of capital primarily externalized through the cross-country differences in the profit income,

but not through the cross-country profit rate differentials. The peripheral countries exhibited above-equilibrium profit rates regardless of the fact that they reported lower profit incomes as a consequence of the low organic composition of capital. Since the labor price is formed in accordance to the average value of labor power multiplied by the level of demand for labor (Cope 2019), the peripheral net status is understood as the consequence of the national labor markets relations, where the higher unemployment rate causes downward pressure on wages and creates higher returns to capital. The supporting evidence is presented in Table 2 where some of the core countries, as a consequence of somewhat higher labor incomes, fail to obtain average profit rates.

The empirical analysis thus confirms the Eurozone's divide. The peripheral countries have

Political Economy of the European Periphery, Table 2 The European Union core-periphery clustering

	$\mathrm{GDP}_{p/e}$	$\frac{\mathrm{GDP}}{\mathrm{NV}}$	$\frac{\mathrm{GDP}}{\mathrm{GDP}_{pc}}$	$\frac{\mathrm{NV}}{\mathrm{GDP}_{pc}}$	$\frac{\mathrm{W}}{\mathrm{W}_{pc}}$	$\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_{pc}}$	$\frac{\mathrm{GDP}_{pc}}{\mathrm{GDP}_{u}}$
Core	AUT	AUT	AUT	AUT	AUT	AUT	GBR
	BEL	BEL	BEL	BEL	BEL	BEL	DEU
	DEU	DEU	DEU	DEU	DEU	DEU	ESP
	FIN	FIN	FIN	FIN	FIN	FIN	GRC
	FRA	FRA	FRA	FRA	FRA	FRA	ITA
	IRL	IRL	IRL	IRL	IRL		FIN
	ITA	ITA	ITA	ITA	ITA		BEL
	LUX	LUX	LUX	LUX	LUX		IRL
	NLD	NLD	NLD	NLD	NLD	NLD	AUT
	DNK	DNK	DNK	DNK	DNK	DNK	SWE
	GBR	GBR	GBR		GBR		NLD
	SWE	SWE		SWE	SWE	SWE	DNK
			CYP	ESP		ESP	PRT
			MLT			SVN	FRA
Periphery	CYP	CYP		CYP	CYP	CYP	CYP
	ESP	ESP	ESP		ESP		SVN
	EST	EST	EST	EST	EST	EST	MLT
	GRC	GRC	GRC	GRC	GRC	GRC	EST
	LTU	LTU	LTU	LTU	LTU	LTU	HUN
	LVA	LVA	LVA	LVA	LVA	LVA	CZE
	MLT	MLT		MLT	MLT	MLT	LUX
	PRT	PRT	PRT	PRT	PRT	PRT	HRV
	SVK	SVK	SVK	SVK	SVK	SVK	LVA
	SVN	SVN	SVN	SVN	SVN		SVK
	BGR	BGR	BGR	BGR	BGR	BGR	LTU
	CZE	CZE	CZE	CZE	CZE	CZE	POL
	HRV	HRV	HRV	HRV	HRV	HRV	ROU
	HUN	HUN	HUN	HUN	HUN	HUN	BGR
	POL	POL	POL	POL	POL	POL	
	ROU	ROU	ROU	ROU	ROU	ROU	
			SWE	GBR		GBR	
						ITA	
						IRL	
						LUX	

Note: In the last column, the countries are ordered in accordance to descending levels of economic efficiency, otherwise the countries' core-periphery grouping is ordered alphabetically. Source: Authors' own calculations based on previous work (Rubinić and Tajnikar 2019a)

less capital per employee, they are marked by significant, below-average labor incomes, and they obtain below-average (market) prices for their commodities and are lagging behind in efficiency levels. Relatedly, the core countries report contrasting trends, resulting in higher labor incomes and, to an extent, lower profit rates. With that in mind, it becomes evident that the core-periphery divide reflects through all determinants and their effects.

From the viewpoints of cross-country labor recognition, inequality, and exploitation, this analysis confirms that the GDP of the Eurozone countries does not mirror the labor consumed in their productions, i.e., the distribution of the Eurozone's aggregate GDP is not proportional to the cross-country labor consumption. Accordingly, the core countries obtain, through their GDPs, a higher labor recognition relative to the consumption of labor. Given that this is not the outcome of the core's labor employment, such dynamics favors the core with an estimated 574 billion 2011PPP\$ annually and constitute the value transfer that renders the periphery net loser with an equivalent loss of unrecognized labor (Table 3). These economic forces at play provide a basis for Lapavitsas' (2019) and Cope's (2019) leftist arguments against European integration. Inflicted by the Eurozone's cross-country unequal commodity (labor) exchange, this implicit value transfer differentiates the core from periphery and explains the root cause of the Eurozone's inequality.

The Eurozone core-periphery division becomes even more pronounced when the subject matter is investigated over a longer time by encompassing the entire economic cycle. This has been done by Rubinić and Tajnikar (2019b) for the period between 2003 and 2014.

Figure 2 displays a reoccurring pattern of the Eurozone core-periphery split. Core countries that exhibit higher consumed labor recognition are significantly more balanced with respect to the cyclical effects. This is evident from the lacking fluctuation effects of the Great Recession. Provided that the periphery reported a vastly different outcome, this perspective (in line with the dependency theory advocates) provides further arguments in support of the claim that the Eurozone's

unequal development rests on the asymmetrical benefit distribution between the developed core and the less developed periphery.

Moreover, the figure clearly shows that the convergence and divergence sequences are exclusively dependent on the movement exhibited within the periphery, while the core remained predominantly stable throughout the examined period. These trends must be investigated in light of the labor market influence largely induced by the cyclical fluctuations. The crisis-led increase in the peripheral unemployment, through the lesser labor consumption, resulted in the nominal increase of social recognition of the labor consumed that is being recognized within the GDP of the peripheral countries, i.e., the crisis has, as an outcome of the lesser overall labor consumption, decreased the cross-country labor force exploitation.

A similar motion holds when it comes to the post-crisis cross-country convergence regarding the influence of the organic composition of capital on the GDP per employee. The observed core-periphery differences were reduced with the onset of the Great Recession primarily as the result of a peripheral drop in the number employed. This is no surprise since the number of employed is the denominator of the organic composition of capital seen as the capital-to-labor ratio. Within the period of contraction, such effect alongside with the less intensive employment of the means of production has caused an increase in the peripheral economic efficiency and has reduced the core-periphery efficiency gap. Correspondingly, within the expansion phase, the differences in cross-country disequilibrium price influence have declined in a way that favored the periphery. However, with the crisis outbreak, this converging pattern was halted and evolved into cross-country divergence at the expense of the periphery. The Great Recession has undisputedly altered the peripheral countries economic performance and prevented any severe convergence toward the core, whose countries did not indicate severe crisis' influence. In other words, the crisis has forced the peripheral countries to structurally alter the organization process and the governance of their national productions

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Political Economy of the European Periphery, Table 3 Empirical aspects of the EU core-periphery divide (2003–2017 average)

Category	GDP		$\frac{GDP}{NV}$		$\frac{GDP}{GDP_{pc}}$		$\frac{NV}{GDP_{pc}}$		$\frac{W}{W_{pc}}$		$\frac{\Pi}{\Pi_{pc}}$	
	EU	EMU	EU	EMU	EU	EMU	EU	EMU	EU	EMU	EU	EMU
Total GDP/transfer	17,366	12,432	1,468	574	689	379	884	300	1,035	387	597	–337
EMU core GDP/gains	9,987	9,987	1,328	574	589	379	–804	300	881	387	–514	–337
EU extended core GDP/gains	3,021	–	139	–	101	–	–80	–	154	–	–83	–
EMU periphery GDP/losses	2,445	2,445	–332	–574	–233	–379	163	–300	–513	–387	240	337
EU extended periphery GDP/losses	1912	–	–1136	–	–456	–	721	–	–523	–	357	–

Note: Values are expressed in billions of 2011 PPP$; EMU denotes the Eurozone. (Source: Authors' own calculations based on previous work (Rubinić and Tajnikar 2019a))

Source: Rubinić and Tajnikar, 2019b.

Political Economy of the European Periphery, Fig. 2 The Eurozone unequal exchange and determinants of inequality (2003–2014). (Source: Rubinić and Tajnikar 2019b)

in order to enhance the competitiveness *vis-á-vis* the core. This, in turn, both directly and indirectly exacerbated the Eurozone's cross-country inequalities.

European Union (Extended) Core-Periphery Classification

The methodology behind the evaluation of the international value transfer limits the scope of this analysis to flow among countries encompassed by this study. Since, it is assumed that the Eurozone's aggregate GDP is the result of the labor consumed within its countries, hitherto the core's gains and the peripheral losses

reflect only the volume of transfers generated within the Eurozone.

With the acknowledgment of the former characteristics, it becomes evident that the geographical coverage expansion inevitably leads to the identification of the larger portion of the global value transfers. Thus, the inclusion of new countries discloses additional core gains and a larger section of peripheral losses, both of which are investigated through GDP shares. Consistent with the previous sections, derived from the international un-equivalent exchange of labor embodied within the traded commodities, the arising asymmetrical value distribution is prescribed to disequilibrium prices, organic composition of capital, and economic efficiency.

Political Economy of the European Periphery, Fig. 3 The European Union's gross domestic product per employee (2003–2017 average). Note: Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Germany (DEU), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Luxembourg (LUX), the Netherlands (NLD), Denmark (DNK), the United Kingdom (GBR), Sweden (SWE), Cyprus (CYP), Spain (ESP), Estonia (EST), Greece (GRC), Lithuania (LTU), Latvia (LVA), Malta (MLT), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Bulgaria (BGR), Czechia (CZE), Croatia (HRV), Hungary (HUN), Poland (POL), and Romania (ROU). (Source: Authors' own calculations based on data from the World Bank (2019) and Eurostat (2019))

Once the core-periphery classification is extended to include the entire EU, the abovementioned issues become crucial for a precise interpretation of the empirical results received. Hence, this section builds upon the two-tiered Eurozone approach and amends the initial geographical coverage by nine EU countries, by departing from the category of the GDP per employee.

As can be seen from Fig. 3, the GDP per employee as the paramount clustering criterion defines the core countries as those with above-average performance and the peripheral countries as the remaining. Eurozone countries, without exception, retain their initial core-periphery status while, from the group of newly introduced countries, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden join the core (EU core extension), whereas Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania augment the periphery (EU periphery extension). The figure points out another relevant detail. Since the EU periphery extension includes the comparably underperforming member countries outside the Eurozone, unlike the core's

extension which does not alter the group's homogeneity, the peripheral extension significantly interferes with the group's overall performance. By following well-established procedure, a detailed breakdown of the EU core-periphery clustering is presented in the subsequent table.

The core-periphery enlargement extends the scope of research, from the Eurozone's aggregate GDP of 12.43 trillion, to the EU's aggregate GDP of 17.36 trillion 2011PPP$ (Table 3). On this basis, the causes and consequences of the EU core-periphery relations are quantified in the following demonstration of the most relevant indicators.

From the presented table, one can conclude that the modified core, by receiving even more value in the GDP than the labor consumed, intensifies the exploitation of the periphery. The opposite is the case with the newly admitted periphery, i.e., less of the labor consumed becomes realized within the peripheral countries' GDPs. Consequently, as the difference between the new value created and the actual GDP, the total EU core-periphery value transfer is calculated to be 1.46

trillion 2011PPP\$. At the peripheries' expense, this transfer results from cross-country unequal labor exchange and benefits are reaped by the core. From this amount, the Eurozone's core appropriates 1.32 trillion 2011PPP\$ of the value produced by the EU periphery.

Table 3 demonstrates that the cross-country value transfer inflicted by the Eurozone's unequal labor exchange accounts for 5.7% of the core's aggregate GDP. The broader outlook of the EU core-periphery reveals that the core's appropriation of the value produced by the periphery amounts to 11.3% of the EU core's GDP. As can be observed from Table 3, the extent of the unrecognized, peripherally consumed labor was overestimated within the initial Eurozone core-periphery analysis. With the inclusion of the EU extended periphery, the losses experienced by the Eurozone's periphery decreased from the 574 billion 2011PPP\$ to 332 billion 2011PPP\$. This is to suggest that a portion of total value transferred toward the core indirectly flows from the Eurozone's periphery and originates from the EU's extended periphery.

Hence, the Eurozone's periphery comes as a mere intermediary that obscures the full magnitude of the existing exploitative relations. From this, it follows that a significant section of the core's GDP is the result of peripheral labor. This fundamental difference between the European core and the periphery is a straightforward confirmation of EU cross-country exploitation. It becomes obvious that the European periphery can be investigated as the Eurozone's periphery and the so-called EU extended periphery, which remains outside the single currency area. Such a divide finds its validity in the fact that as much as 77.4% of the total core-periphery value transfer (1.13 trillion 2011PPP\$ of the core's gains) can be explained through the losses suffered by the EU extended periphery. Provided that the vast majority of the Eurozone periphery and the entirety of the EU extended periphery is comprised of countries accessed from 2004 onward, the enlargement of the European integration and the single market expansion purposefully serves, instead the overall well-being of the EU citizen, as the project enriching the core.

The model presented allows for an in-depth investigation of the subject matter. With Sweden being the exception, the core countries of the EU (Table 2) obtain higher prices for the commodities they exchange (GDP-to-GDP$_{pc}$ ratio). However, the price effect on the core-periphery value transfer is smaller than that of the organic composition of capital. The price effect is responsible for 47% of the total EU core-periphery value transfer, whereas 66.2% of price effect value transfer occurs at the expense of the EU extended periphery. The countries of Cyprus and Malta, which are normally included in the periphery, reach above-equilibrium prices. Other than this minor deviation, the EU core represents a homogenous group that, from the standpoint of disequilibrium prices, dominates the unequal labor exchange and makes a clear distinction between the core and periphery.

The EU core-periphery classification solidifies the second cross-country inequality determinant, the influence of organic composition of capital (NV-to-GDP$_{pc}$ ratio), as the leading factor behind the cross-country value transfer. Thus, the set of countries whose GDP is higher due to the higher organic composition of capital match the set of countries of the EU core (Table 2). There are two exceptions to this rule. The first one is the United Kingdom, as a core country with lower organic composition of capital, drawing its un-equivalent labor exchange advantages based on the above-equilibrium prices of their commodities. The second one is Spain, as the peripheral representative with positive influence of the organic composition of capital on the un-equivalent exchange. This inequality determinant bears the highest impact with respect to the core's value transferring benefits (Table 3). The core's benefits inflicted by the organic composition of capital account for 60% of the total benefits, out of which 81.5% are derived as a consequence of unequal exchange with the EU extended periphery, which is in a disadvantageous position. Accordingly, losses resulting from lower organic composition of capital surface primarily through lower profit incomes and lower economic output of the peripheral countries.

When it comes to economic efficiency, the United Kingdom reached the highest level and Bulgaria the lowest (Table 2). All countries of the

EU extended periphery reported below-average efficiency levels. By considering the cross-country economic efficiency losses alongside the data from Table 3, it follows that the EU extended periphery, with a share of 11% of the aggregate EU GDP accounts for 26% of the total losses reported on the grounds of lesser efficiency. The core countries with a share of 74.9% of the aggregate EU GDP have experienced 15.3% loss on the grounds of lesser efficiency. The Eurozone's periphery, with a share of 14.1% of the aggregate EU GDP, has experienced 10.8% loss on the grounds of lesser efficiency. Thus, the economic efficiency determinant also confirms a clear division of EU countries between the core, the Eurozone periphery, and the EU extended periphery.

Finally, as core countries report above-average labor incomes and below-average profit rates (Tables 1 and 2), concurrent with the periphery reporting losses due to the combined effects of the described inequality determinants as well as the above-average profit rates, the resulting peripheral below-average labor incomes come as no surprise. In this sense, both the profit and wage cross-country differentials further strengthen the advanced EU core-periphery division.

Conclusion

European integration is characterized by a high degree of cross-country intricate dependence. The bonds that keep this transnational partnership nexus interconnected are primarily defined through the unobstructed international mobility of products, services, capital, and labor. Centered around the free market expansion which purportedly enhances cross-country cohesion through the allocative efficiency aimed at achieving Pareto optimality, the mainstream economics failed to recognize that the indispensable unity and shared prosperity of the European economies is, rather than systemic, superficial at best.

Fostering international trade has strengthened the ties between European countries. However, in contrast to the economic philosophy of free market capitalism, these ties were, instead of synergic benefit advancement, conceived on the countries' integration into the relations of unequal labor exchange, where spatial consumption of labor is disjointed from its geographical recognition. The European unequal labor exchange points out that the international trade inequalities distort the labor recognition within the GDP of a country other than the country where it was consumed. This is what forms a basis for the European core-periphery division. Consequently, this phenomenon allows the core to extract a part of the surplus value produced by the periphery thus generating the European cross-country value transfer and exploitation.

The EU core-periphery classification is determined by several factors. Among them the variation in the organic composition of capital bears the strongest influence. This is because, across countries, European laborers are equipped with distinct means of production. The latter distorts the cross-country competition and produces a transfer of value from the periphery with low capital intensity toward the core with high capital intensity. These cross-county differences in the capital stock are creating an uneven playing field that cannot be eliminated in the foreseeable future. This is a sign that the founding principles of the EU overlook the fact that their economies are, instead of an inequity-free single market, locked into capitalist relations of production. Furthermore, they neglect that the European markets are permeated by imperfect competition allowing the core countries to utilize advantages arising from the price disequilibria. The former is responsible for the second determinant that divides the EU between the core with commodities priced above equilibrium and the periphery with underpriced commodities comprised of comparably higher quantities of embodied labor. The last determinant causing the un-equivalent social recognition of labor is economic efficiency. Distinct cross-country capital efficiency and labor productivity differentiate the EU on the affluent, more efficient core and dependent periphery with less efficient economic performance.

The research confirms that the EU is a differentiated integration made up of interdependent members belonging to the core, the Eurozone's periphery, and extra-Eurozone, EU periphery.

This study suggests the moderate influence of the common currency on the subject matter, thus disproving a common belief that the euro is a dominant driver of the core-periphery divide. What seems to be fair international trade driven by the competitive logic of self-interest transmuting into the welfare maximization, below the surface, discloses a profoundly different substructure. The differences across core-periphery constituents become apparent through concealed forces of the cross-country unequal labor exchange (recognition) and inequalities in terms of international degree of labor force exploitation. These trade inequalities are causing a transfer of values that externalize through the profit and wage differentials. Due to its nature, such a reality exacerbates the cross-country inequalities which cannot be eradicated without a fundamental alteration of the EU's structurally flawed design.

The economic forces acting as the root cause of the unequal labor exchange are not constrained to integrational borders and are undeniably extending their influence outside the EU. On these grounds, in order to sustain their high standard of living, the core countries are compelled to exercise economic power over the periphery. Furthermore, due to the lack of a viable alternative, the periphery is economically adhered to these unfavorable conditions because their share of integrational benefits is conditional upon the core's performance, i.e., the peripheral benefits can occur only as the reflection of the core's development. Such motion generates an exploitative deadlock which incentivizes the periphery to advocate for the integrational enlargement that will include less developed countries of which they will be able to take advantage. In light of this, the European cross-country exploitation is a self-sustained institute because the existing power relations demand for its continuous expansion.

This challenges the conception of the EU as a fundamentally progressive force and questions the sustainability of the European integrational project. In addition to the abovementioned cohesive forces, the EU is also characterized by the forces of convergence. However, the EU institutional mechanisms proved incapable in promoting Cohesion policy, in terms of supporting cross-country harmonious development, and underperformed in terms of the targeted cross-country convergence. Nonetheless, since these detrimental tendencies stem from societal relations, they can be regulated by society. This negative pattern can be partially countervailed through the capital mobility enhancement. Theoretically, this should channel the capital from the core with low profit rates toward the periphery with high profit rates and may curtail the influence of distinct organic composition of capital. Similarly, improved capital flow may equalize cross-country GDP per employee and should balance out the existing efficiency differences. A much greater obstacle is being posed by the existing market (price) disequilibria. The data demonstrates high movement of goods and services and low movement of capital and labor. This distorted mobility is not adequate to cancel out the cross-country differences in the structure of exports and imports, nor is it sufficient for the elimination of differences in commodities intended to satisfy domestic demand. Therefore, it becomes obvious that the problem of EU cross-country inequality is not principally anchored to the effectiveness of national productions as it is to their structures, i.e., the problem is not how countries produce their commodities, but which commodities they produce and which prices they obtain, accordingly.

The EU core-periphery antagonism and resulting lack of economic and social cohesion produces a crucial macroeconomic dilemma. The cross-country initial factor endowments, through capital and labor incomes, hinder international trade as an essential part of the EU single market. Consequently, this calls for a systemic change and a certain degree of EU-level fiscal redistribution ensuring an adequate inner-country effective demand, fostering trade, and bringing European integration one step closer to the self-imposed ideal of optimality. Among abundant transnational technical solutions such as reform of structural funds, unemployment benefit reinsurance, collective wage bargaining, debt restructuring, coordination of economic policies, and tax harmonization, the fiscal redistribution aimed at equalizing the cross-country social labor recognition represents the most radical institute for

tackling the existing inequalities. The importance of these mechanisms is paramount, not only for the creation of an even playing field and restoring the national competitiveness but also for the revival of the European countries' national sovereignty, with a special focus on the periphery.

From this perspective, it is undeniable that the European unequal labor exchange, seen as the unrequited value transfer from the periphery to core, represents a disguised adaptation of the economic imperialism of free trade. Its triumph, through uneven recognition of labor power of formally equal European citizens, brings about denial of the European democracy that undermines the authority of disempowered national governments who may be in office but are effectively out of power. Needless to say, this violates the EU treaties and founding values, sheds light a new meaning behind the concept of the EU as a sui generis integration, and calls for immediate action aimed at re-institutionalizing European solidarity and protecting the admirable values that unified the European countries in diversity instead of inequality.

Cross-References

▶ Emmanuel, Arghiri and "Unequal Exchange"
▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ Global Value Transfers and Imperialism
▶ Samir Amin (1931–2018)
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery
▶ Unequal Exchange

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Political Economy of the First World War

▶ First World War and Imperialism

Political Transformation

▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

Politicide

▶ Genocide and Imperialism

Portuguese Imperialism

▶ Imperialism, Uneven Development, and Revolution: The Example of Amilcar Cabral

Post Colonialism

▶ Postcolonial Social Movements

P

Postcolonial Peripheries

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Postcolonial Social Movements

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Synonym

Colonialism; Global South; Neoliberalism; Post colonialism; Poverty, Dispossession; Protest; Social movements

Definition

Across the regions of Latin America, Asia, and Africa a wide array of subaltern groups – peasants and landless workers, women, informal sector workers, slumdwellers, indigenous peoples, and marginalised youth – have come together in social movements that in a myriad of ways challenge dispossession and disenfranchisement and raise alternatives to a neo-liberal world order that is increasingly mired in crisis. This world of protest has a long historical lineage. In fact, properly understood, its origins can be traced to the post-colonial development project's unravelling (in the sense of protracted decay), and beyond to the anti-colonial movements that brought this project into being by vindicating the demand for national sovereignty and social justice against a world system in which populations, territories, and resources had been subjugated to Western imperial rule since the late 1700s. And it is for this reason that is useful to think of popular resistance in the global South in terms of postcolonial social movements. In the following essay, I delineate the two main axes of this unravelling: on the one hand, the emergence of new social movements and a resurgent Third World radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s; on the other hand, the eruption of popular resistance to neo-liberal restructuring in the 1980s. I then move on to discuss how these two axes of protest are fused in the collective oppositional projects of contemporary social movements in the global South.

To look at the global South in 2014 is to look at 'a world of protest; a whirlwind of creative activity' (Prashad 2012: 9). Across the regions of Latin America, Asia, and Africa a wide array of subaltern groups – peasants and landless workers, women, informal sector workers, slumdwellers, indigenous peoples, and marginalised youth – have come together in social movements that in a myriad of ways challenge dispossession and disenfranchisement and raise alternatives to a neo-liberal world order that is increasingly mired in crisis (Cox and Nilsen 2014; Motta and Nilsen 2011a).

This world of protest has a long historical lineage. In fact, properly understood, its origins can be traced to the postcolonial development project's unravelling (in the sense of protracted decay), and beyond to the anti-colonial movements that brought this project into being by vindicating the demand for national sovereignty and social justice against a world system in which populations, territories, and resources had been subjugated to Western imperial rule since the late 1700s (Prashad 2007; Silver and Slater 1999).

And it is for this reason that is useful to think of popular resistance in the global South in terms of postcolonial social movements. In the following essay, I delineate the two main axes of this unravelling: on the one hand, the emergence of new social movements and a resurgent Third World radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s; on the other hand, the eruption of popular resistance to neo-liberal restructuring in the 1980s. I then move on to discuss how these two axes of protest are fused in the collective oppositional projects of contemporary social movements in the global South.

Decolonisation and the Postcolonial Development Project

During the interwar years (1918–40) the politics of anti-colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa underwent an important transformation. Initially,

demands for national selfdetermination had been articulated by native elites who 'made little attempt to mobilise the mass of the population into the nationalist struggle' (Silver and Slater 1999: 200). This changed in the wake of the revolutionary upheavals in Mexico and Russia as nationalist leaders geared their efforts to mobilising peasants and workers into large-scale popular movements, and increasingly co-ordinated their political projects between countries and regions (Motta and Nilsen 2011b; Prashad 2007). As the scope of mobilisation broadened, so too did the substantive content of anti-colonialism: the imperative of national liberation was wedded to ideals of social justice and an end to poverty. Anticolonial movements, then, came to vindicate not just 'the liberty and equality of peoples', but also 'liberty and equality among the people' (Wallerstein 1990: 31).

As colonial rule came to give way to national independence for the Third World in the post-war era – first in South- and South-East Asia, and then in Africa – anticolonial nationalism was also transformed from a collective oppositional project to a nation-building project in which development emerged as the central ambition of newly independent states (Desai 2004; Patel and McMichael 2004). 'Every step in the government's power, both internally and in its external relations', declared Kwame Nkrumah, 'will be taken to further the development of the nation's resources for the common good'. And it is this endeavour that can be referred to as the postcolonial development project.

The postcolonial development project centred on strategies of 'national capitalist development' (Desai 2004: 171) in which agriculture and industry were to be modernised through the initiatives and leadership of 'the developmental state' (see Kiely 2007: 49–57). In order to provide a social undergirding for the postcolonial development project, the erstwhile leaders of anti-colonial movements sought to forge a network of horizontal alliances between dominant agrarian and industrial interests, and vertical alliances between these dominant groups and the subaltern masses that had rallied to the cause of anticolonial nationalism (Walton and Seddon 1995). Within the parameters of such 'developmentalist alliances'

(Cardoso and Faletto 1979), industrial and agrarian elites retained their property rights and privileged access to the levers of political power, while subaltern groups were offered greater access to expanded public employment and public services, as well as a minimal 'social wage guarantee' through various forms of subsidised consumption (Walton and Seddon 1995).

As Walton and Seddon (1995) have argued, this was a constellation of compromises and concessions that won acquiescence and consent from below to nation-building projects that were ultimately elite-led. However, it was also the unravelling of these projects that signalled the emergence of the long wave of popular resistance that can be designated as postcolonial social movements.

The Year 1968 and its Aftermath in the Global South

In 1968, the world erupted in a global revolt that 'cut across the tripartite division of the world system at the time – the West, the Communist bloc, and the Third World' (Wallerstein 2006: 6). The Southern moment of this global revolt was a profoundly multifaceted one, in which subaltern groups and popular classes came together in a multitude of anti – systemic movements that challenged both the contradictions of the postcolonial development project and the continued subordination of Third-World countries in the capitalist world system (Berger 2004; Prashad 2007; Watts 2001).

One significant facet of the 1968 revolt in the global South was the emergence of popular movements that targeted 'the nationalism and institutionalized elite politics . . . of the first generation of independent third-world states' (Watts 2001: 172). For example, in India – one of the leading 'first-generation Bandung regimes' (Berger 2004: 11) – the late 1960s witnessed the eruption of guerrilla warfare against the state in the form of the Naxalite movement that emerged in West Bengal to mobilise landless peasants against the semi-feudal rule of landed elites and the power of a state that was deemed to be a bridgehead of neo – imperial power in the country (see Banerjee 1984;

Roy 2012). Despite its brutal repression – ironically, at the hands of a state government run by the parliamentary left – the Naxalite movement constituted a political watershed in independent India. In its wake emerged a swathe of new social movements that mobilised social groups that had often been at the very margins of the postcolonial development project – for example, Adivasis, women, Dalits, and workers in the informal sector – and outside the domain of electoral politics. These groups challenged the ways in which this project centralised political power in an elite-dominated state apparatus which advanced a form of development that had dispossessed marginal peasants and subsistence producers, and had failed to curtail the gendered and caste-based violence to which women and Dalits were still subjected (see Omvedt 1993).

The Indian trajectory is only one of many instances from across the global South of how the late 1960s and the decade of the 1970s were an era in which subaltern groups struggled to develop new forms of collective action through which to challenge their adverse incorporation into the political economy of the postcolonial development project. Despite the fact that these movements were often met with fierce repression from above – most egregiously in the form of the state terrorism unleashed by Latin American dictatorships with US backing in the 1970s – their critiques of dispossession and disenfranchisement still echo in the politics of more recent popular mobilisations across the three regions of the South (see e.g. Nilsen 2010).

Another key facet of the Southern revolt of 1968 is the emergence of what Mark Berger (2004: 19) has called 'second-generation Bandung regimes' and the resultant radicalisation of Third Worldism. As a category, 'second-generation Bandung regimes' refers to an arc of regimes that ultimately stretches from Ahmed Ben Bella's Algeria (1962–65) to Sandinista rule in Nicaragua (1979–90). Other significant examples of this new generation of Third-World regimes would be Chile under Salvador Allende (1970–73), Samora Machel's Mozambique (1975–86), and Jamaica under Michael Manley (1972–80). And what these regimes had in common was 'a more radical,

more unambiguously socialist, Third Worldism than the first-generation Bandung regimes. Many of these regimes had emerged through protracted and particularly violent struggles against colonial domination – Algeria and Mozambique being cases in point (19–23).

The appearance on the world stage of these regimes coincided with a radicalisation of the Third-World project that had first crystallised at the Afro-Asian people's conference in Bandung in 1955. The first manifestation of this was the Tricontinental Conference that brought together national leaders and the representatives of liberation movements from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East (see Prashad 2007: ch. 8). The tenor of the conference was marked by the militancy of the second-generation regimes: this was evident not only in the increased support for armed struggle as an anti-imperialist strategy against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Vietnam, but also in the various ways that these regimes 'attempted to radicalise state-mediated national development efforts in various ways in the name of socialism and national liberation' (Berger 2004: 21). Resurgent Third Worldism was also manifest in the global arena in the form of the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that was put before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, in which the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for a radical restructuring of the international economy in order to enable the countries of the global South to break free from their subordinate and dependent position in the world system (see Prashad 2012: 24–34).

The resurgence of a radicalised Third Worldism eventually foundered – in part due to the intransigence of the global North, in part due to the erosion of internal solidarity among the states of the global South, and in part due to the onset of the international debt crisis in the early 1980s (see below). However, the indictment that the second-generation Bandung regimes levelled against the persistence of unequal power relations in the global political economy in many important ways foreshadowed the critiques of neoliberal inequality that have been articulated more recently by social movements across the global South.

Neo-Liberalism and Its Discontents

If the emergence of new social movements and radicalised Third Worldism during the late 1960s and 1970s constitute one axis of the lineage of postcolonial social movements in the global South, another equally significant axis can be identified in the eruption of popular resistance to neo-liberal restructuring in the 1980s.

During the 1970s, regimes across the global South sought to counter economic stagnation by borrowing large sums of money from an international banking system that was flooded with excess dollars. Whereas these loans allowed Southern states to offset stagnation in the short run, this was nevertheless a strategy that created significant long-term vulnerabilities. This became clear when, in 1979, the US Federal Reserve implemented a significant hike in interest rates as part of a strategy to lift the country out of recession. The combination of significantly increased interest rates on loans with a downturn in demand and terms of trade for products from the global South in world markets rendered debt-servicing an impossibility. And as credit in global financial markets evaporated, further borrowing was out of the question (see McMichael 2004).

The response to the international debt crisis came in the form of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) administered by the IMF and the World Bank. In return for fresh loans and debt rescheduling, countries in the global South had to carry out a number of reforms geared towards a profound alteration of their political economies: currencies were devaluated; public expenditure was downsized; prices and commodity markets were deregulated; public-sector companies and utilities were privatised and sold off, often to foreign investors (Walton and Seddon 1995). In short, the outbreak of the international debt crisis heralded the coming of neo-liberalism in the global South, and with it the unravelling of the postcolonial development project (Kiely 2007).

Neo-liberal restructuring through SAPs 'eroded national economic management, and, by extension, the social contract that development states had with their citizens' (McMichael 2004: 140). As I showed above, the postcolonial development project had been based on an alliance of social forces in which the consent of subaltern groups was gained by extending access to public-sector employment and various forms of subsidised consumption that came to constitute a social wage guarantee for these groups. Under the aegis of neo-liberalism, states in the global South withdrew from these arrangements, and – as is evidenced by the escalation of poverty and declining trends in social development that plagued Latin America and Africa in particular in the 1980s and early 1990s – this withdrawal in turn impacted adversely on subaltern livelihoods and living standards (George 1991).

The response to neo-liberal restructuring from below came in a form of popular resistance that has been referred to as 'IMF riots' or 'austerity protests', which Walton and Seddon (1995: 39) define as 'large-scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization implemented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies'. As many as 146 cases of austerity protests occurred across the global South from the middle of the 1970s to the early 1990s. These protests, which were an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon, rallied the urban poor, the working classes, and at times also segments of the middle classes in opposition to the distributional outcomes of SAPs (39–44).

At the heart of popular resistance to neoliberalism was a 'moral economy of the urban poor' that had been forged in and through the postcolonial development project (Walton and Seddon 1994: 48). The social wage guarantees provided by postcolonial states had come to be seen by subaltern groups in the urban centres of the global South as a legitimate bundle of rights that was owed to them in exchange for their active or passive consent to the elite-led postcolonial development project (48). Thus, when states, as part of the implementation of SAPs, phased out price subsidies and public services and cut back on public-sector employment, the urban poor experienced this as a violation of their rightful expectations: 'Protestors demanded that the state meet its

responsibilities to the people who, during the decades of patron–client politics, had upheld their end of the bargain' (Walton and Seddon 1994: 50).

The politics of the IMF riots were essentially defensive. In contrast to the new social movements of the 1970s, which had targeted the centralisation of political power in the developmental state, austerity protests were geared towards upholding facets of the state–society relations of the postcolonial development project that accommodated the needs and interests of subaltern groups (Motta and Nilsen 2011b: 14). However, this should not lead us to conclude that popular resistance to neo-liberal restructuring was simply a backward-looking form of protest. Rather, what austerity protests in fact articulated was an incipient opposition to the forms of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2005) that have been at the heart of the neo-liberal project and central to the systematic transfer of social wealth 'from the mass of the population towards the upper classes [and] from vulnerable to richer countries' (Harvey 2007: 34). In doing so, austerity protests played a vital role in giving shape to the counterhegemonic projects of the social movements that are currently asserting radical claims from below in the global South.

Postcolonial Social Movements in the Contemporary Global South

If the unravelling of the postcolonial development project from the late 1960s onwards opened up a space in which novel resistances could be articulated, the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed the consolidation across much of the global South of social movements that fuse and develop key aspects of these resistances in new oppositional projects.

One of the most significant manifestations of this development was the outbreak of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico in 1994. The politics of the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional was multi-layered in that it brought together a rejection of the political

economy of developmentalism – a political economy in which indigenous peoples in Mexico had been dispossessed in the name of national progress – with a trenchant critique of the structural inequalities – both national and global – that are intrinsic to neo-liberal globalisation (see Collier 2005; Harvey 1998; Morton 2011: ch. 7). Indeed, such twin indictments of both developmentalism and neo-liberalism are not unique to the Zapatistas – they have figured centrally, for example, in resistance to dispossession in India's Narmada Valley (Nilsen 2010) and indeed in the popular protests that have recently shaken the Arab world (Dabashi 2012) – and they draw their significance from the ways in which they bring together the two axes along which the unravelling of the postcolonial development project have been traced above. There are three particularly important manifestations of this tendency in contemporary social movements in the global South.

First, current mobilisation from below in the global South has continued to criticise the exclusionary and centralising tendencies of political decision making in postcolonial states. Furthermore, many movements have worked consistently to develop strategies that foster the emergence of more participatory forms of politics either in and through their activism – for example, by enabling subaltern communities to take control of local political arenas, whether through urban neighbourhood assemblies or by participating in local electoral processes – or by championing various forms of devolution of political power. Beyond the national level, social movements from the global South have been intensely vocal in articulating a critique of the plutocracy that reigns in transnational institutions like the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and the G7.

Second, resistance to dispossession has increasingly come to the forefront of the politics of social movements in the global South, both in rural contexts where natural resources are increasingly subject to commodification and in urban locales where financial crises have wreaked havoc on industrial manufacturing. However, rather than appealing for a return of the developmental state, social movements have increasingly turned towards developing alternative forms of

community-based collective ownership; for example, when the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra in Brazil organise agricultural production through democratic co-operatives, or the Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados in Argentina occupy disbanded factories and operate them through systems of workers' management.

Third, the hierarchies of political and economic power that structure the capitalist world system are still a target of critique in and through the collective agency of Southern social movements. This is particularly manifest in the way that the politics of these social movements link the exigencies of localised struggles to the dynamics of global power structures and mobilise to achieve progressive changes across spatial scales. For example, the emergence of networks of transnational agrarian movements have been integral in linking the disparate struggles of rural communities across the South in opposition to a global 'corporate food regime' and in defence of the notion of 'food sovereignty' as an alternative to neo-liberal agricultural policies.

Ultimately, this raises the question of how to locate contemporary social movements in the global South in relation to the postcolonial development project. Some scholars – most notably, perhaps, Arturo Escobar – tend to see subaltern resistance as a form of collective agency that rejects development – understood as a discursive formation that enables the North to discipline and control social change in the South – altogether. On this reading, social movements in the global South are portrayed as the harbingers of a 'post-development era' (Escobar 1995). However, there is much evidence that suggests that this interpretation is problematic. Studies of social movements in the global South often uncover a more complex reality, in which the imaginaries and practices that are forged through the collective action of subaltern groups mobilise and draw upon idioms that were central to the postcolonial development project and at the same time – through this mobilisation – expand and transform their meanings (see e.g. Nilsen 2010; Rangan 2002). Thus, what these social movements contest is not so much development in and of itself as the direction and meaning that has been given

to developmental trajectories and discourses through the exercise of power from above. And, in extension of this, what might emerge from their resistance is a reinvention of development as a genuinely emancipatory project of social change.

Cross-References

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism

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Puerto Rico: Colonialism and Neocolonialism

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Synonyms

Caribbean; Imperialism; Latin America; Small island state; United States

Description

Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony from 1508 to 1898 and has been officially an unincorporated territory of the United States (US) since 1898. Simply put, Puerto Rico is a colony of the US subordinated to the plenary powers of the US Congress under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution. The three branches of US government, Puerto Rican politicians, United Nations, and academics around the world have confirmed the colonial status of the Caribbean archipelago. Puerto Rico cannot be considered a

neocolony because the US has direct control of the archipelago.

Introduction

A US Republican congressman from Arkansas recently stated, "I think it is time that America should stop colonising. (. . .) The great America of the United States has a colony, and I think it is time that we change that" (Young 2017). Colonialism is imbricated in Puerto Rican history. According to Dietz (2002), colonialism has imposed limits of action on Puerto Ricans and has established the "rules of the game." This is a historical fact and has been a reality during the Spanish and the US colonial rule of the Caribbean archipelago.

Puerto Rico's relationship with the US is openly described in the Territorial Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America (Article IV, section 3, Clause 2): "The [US] Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Throughout the US colonial period, the three branches of the US government have repeatedly confirmed the colonial status of Puerto Rico. In 2016 the three branches of the US government confirmed that Puerto Rico is not sovereign and is subjected to the US Congress, revealing the lack of political and juridical sovereignty of Puerto Rico (Denis 2017; Newkirk 2016; Wolf 2016). The colonial domination of the US Congress over Puerto Rico was recently reconfirmed with the imposition of an unelected financial control board, which has not only imposed an austerity program since late 2016 but also took control of legislation enacted by the Puerto Rican elected government, arguing that all new laws must be consistent with the board's Fiscal Plan.

This essay aims to briefly collect the historical context of colonialism in Puerto Rico since the Spanish era but primarily focuses on revealing the reasons to consider Puerto Rico as a colony and non-self-governing territory of the US – rather than a neocolony of the US. Later, the article addresses the three non-colonial options recognized by the

1514 United Nations (UN) Resolution and the results of the five referendums on the political status of the Caribbean archipelago held over the last five decades. The essay concludes that Puerto Rico is undoubtedly a colony and asks for the United Nations and the sovereign countries of the world to denounce this illegal colonial relationship that subordinates residents of Puerto Rico to the will of the US Congress where they have no voting representatives. The right to self-determination needs to be finally recognized to Puerto Rico and the remaining colonies listed and not listed in the UN roster of non-self-governing territories.

Brief Conceptual Framework

Chaturvedi clearly distinguishes colonialism and neocolonialism as two forms of imperialism – simply understood as the control of one country over another country.

> This can take the form of colonialism, the attempt to establish overt political control and jurisdiction over another country; neo-colonialism, control exercised through economic domination; or cultural imperialism, the destruction or weakening of an indigenous culture and the imposition of an alien one. (Chaturvedi 2006, p. 143)

Kohn and Reddy (2017), on the other hand, argues that individuals erroneously treat imperialism and colonialism as synonyms because of the shared implication of political and economic control of the imperial/colonial power over a dependent territory. These two researchers define colonialism as the domination of one people to another via subjugation, which involves the transfer of population to the colony as permanent settlers. However, imperialism refers to the exercise of power of one country over another through sovereignty, settlement, or indirect mechanisms of control.

Colonialism is understood in this article as a system of domination and hegemonic relationship involving a territorial control of an indigenous or native majority over by a foreign minority (Osterhammel 1997). A colony is a non-self-governing territory subject to the sovereignty of a foreign country.

Nkrumah argues that imperialism moved into a new stage, from colonialism into neocolonialism, in the aftermath of the Second World War. Under neocolonialism "the subordinate state is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside" (in Higginbottom 2016, p. 553; Nkrumah 2002, p. ix).

The Historical Context of Colonialism in Puerto Rico

November 19, 1493, is observed in Puerto Rico as the day Christopher Columbus "discovered" *Boriquén* – the indigenous name used by the *Taíno* people to identify the archipelago of Puerto Rico – on the second trip of the conquest. However, Brau (1983) argues this first stop was a strategic one – to collect water and reorganize ships in their way to Hispaniola – and does not involve the colonization of the territory and the indigenous people living in the archipelago. In 1505, the Spanish crown granted a capitulation to Vicente Yañez Pinzón to colonize "San Juan de Boriquén" which was later officially named Puerto Rico (Moscoso and González Vales 2012, p. 93). Juan Ponce de León was in charge of the colonization of Puerto Rico. A first exploration voyage was conducted in 1506, where the *conquistadores* learned about the social structure, political organization, and the geography of the territory (Moscoso and González Vales 2012, p. 94). Two years later, in 1508, Ponce de León initiated the conquest in the chiefdom of the principal *cacique* Agüeybana – located nowadays in the southwestern town of Guánica (Blanco 1973).

For almost four centuries, Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony. The *Taíno* indigenous population was decimated. Estimates vary considerably, but Blanco (1973) refers to a reduction from around 5,500 in the early days of the conquest to less than 4,000 in 1515, 1,148 in 1531, and 70 in 1544. Previous estimates do not consider hidden communities of *Taínos* and were corrected in the late eighteenth century to around 2000 "pure indigenous" by the mid-sixteenth century (1973, p. 13).

A Captain General - a military title - ruled internally Puerto Rico since 1580, which "could do pretty much as he pleased" (Trias Monge 1997, p. 6). However, the Caribbean archipelago was part of the viceroyship of New Spain – nowadays Mexico.

Puerto Ricans had to wait until the end of the nineteenth century for their first legislature. Even though mayors were de jure elected positions, only five of them were de facto elected by the end of the nineteenth century (Trias Monge 1997, p. 7). However, as Trías Monge argues, in the short-lived Spanish 1812 Constitution, Puerto Rico and the rest of the Spanish colonies officially became Spanish provinces with full voting representation in the Spanish Cortes (Parliament). Right to universal male suffrage and Spanish citizenship was imposed to free Puerto Ricans, and the extension of human rights became a reality for the first time. These freedoms and rights only lasted for 2 years, and with some intermissions, the Spanish Monarchy ruled Puerto Rico with absolute power until 1869. Puerto Rico regained the right to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes in 1869, along with the Spanish citizenship, and the recognition as a *Diputación Provincial* with a local parliament in 1876.

In the first chapter of the *Economic History of Puerto Rico*, Dietz (2002) summarizes the economics of the Spanish colonial rule over Puerto Rico. The first three centuries resulted in a limited and unequal economic development. An eighteenth-century document highlights Puerto Rico as the poorest territory of Spanish America (2002, p. 27). Puerto Rico's national economy began to consolidate behind the sugar industry in the late eighteenth century and especially during the nineteenth century. The economic interest of the US over Puerto Rico was clear since the nineteenth century. By 1830, 49% of Puerto Rican exports went to the US – versus 6.8% to Spain – and 27.2% of Puerto Rican imports came from the US (Steward 1956, p. 52). According to Dietz (2002), the nineteenth century brought a relative economic and social progress to Puerto Rico. Although Spain tried to limit the industrialization of the archipelago with the prohibition of imports and credit restrictions, the manufacturing sector

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grew, especially in sugar, rum, and cigars. Nonetheless, Dietz argues that the basis of the Puerto Rican economy continued to be primitive agriculture (2002, p. 33).

One of the paramount political achievements in the Spanish colonial era was the Autonomic Charter decree on November 25, 1897. It is considered as the "most advanced document of any Caribbean colony until after the Second World War" due to the degree of self-government granted to Puerto Rico (Trias Monge 1997, p. 13). What does the Autonomic Charter granted to Puerto Rico? First a local parliament of two chambers. The lower chamber was elected entirely by universal suffrage.

Meanwhile, eight of the members of the higher chamber were elected by universal suffrage, and the Governor appointed the remaining seven. However, the local Parliament was not able to sponsor a bill on his own, and the Spanish King was able to veto any local law.

Nonetheless, the degree of self-government with the 1897 Autonomic Charter was higher than the actual level in several aspects. The most significant concession from Spain to Puerto Rico was that only the Insular Parliament had the power to request an amendment of the Autonomic Charter. On the contrary, and as this chapter discusses below, Puerto Rico is nowadays subject to the plenary powers of the US Congress, which legislate directly on Puerto Rico without any Puerto Rican voting members in the US Congress.

The US colonial era started in 1898. McKelvey (2016) argues that the fear of economic crises caused by overproduction is the origin of US imperialist policies. This fear gave rise to a new US expansionist foreign policy. The "goal was to find new markets outside the US for the US manufactured and agricultural products" (2016, p. 756). US "capitalists hoped to solve the imbalance of production of demand through expansion into foreign markets" (Olson 2016, p. 771). The US government focused their efforts in Hawaii, Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines because of their strategic geopolitical locations in the Pacific and the Caribbean.

The Cuban–Hispanic–American War in 1898 is considered the first practical implementation of US imperialism, although the US justified the colonial character of their military interventions and territorial acquisitions in a new manifest destiny to expand the values of democracy, justice, and liberty to overseas territories (Arboleya 2008). The US bombed Puerto Rico and later invaded the Caribbean archipelago on July 25, 1898, during the Cuban–Hispanic–American War (González Vales and Luque 2012). Since then, Puerto Rico has been a colonial possession of the US.

Colonies are valued possessions. The US considered Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific as useful ports and coaling stations for US trading ships in their road to the Asian markets (Olson 2016). The idea of a Central American isthmus – which was later materialized with the independence of Panama and the construction of the Panama Canal – required possessions in the Caribbean for security reasons. Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands – former Danish possessions – fulfilled the geopolitical purposes for the establishment of US military bases. The US did not see most of these overseas possessions as potential future full members in the US Federation (McCormick 1967). The Insular Cases in the US Supreme Court established that Puerto Rico was a US possession and not part of the US. The US made a clear distinction between territories destined to become part of the US Federation (e.g., Hawaii, Alaska) and those territories that would remain as unincorporated territories (e.g., Puerto Rico, the Philippines, US Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Marian Islands) (Cruz-Martinez 2017c). US Senator Foraker told the US Congress in 1900:

> We understand that the effect of the treaty [of Paris] was to put the United States into possession of Puerto Rico. We do not understand it was intended or expected to make them a State or to do that which entitled them to be called even a Territory. We understand (...) that we have a right to legislate with respect to them as we may see fit. (Congressional Record 1900; in Fernandez 1996, p. 9)

During the first years of the US colonial era, a military authoritarian government appointed by the US ruled Puerto Rico. The military governors

dissolved the elected Puerto Rican Council of Ministers, threatened newspapers who demanded the end of military rule, appointed US citizens at the head of the insular police force, and suspended civil authority by dismissing mayors and local councilmen (Trias Monge 1997). The US Secretary of War was officially in charge of Puerto Rico – and it remained for several decades before passing the colony to the jurisdiction of the US House Committee on Natural Resources. This could be understood as if Puerto Rico was first valued as a military possession and now as a natural resource of the US.

The US transformed the Puerto Rican economy from a "diversified agricultural export economy (...) to a monoculture economy that was almost exclusively dependent on sugar production for US market" (Caban 1999, p. 70). Quintero Rivera (1980) argues that the monetary measures by the US during the first years of colonization were aimed at establishing the hegemony of US sugar corporations by replacing domestic producers and landowners (i.e., *hacendados*). Besides the use of tariffs with Spain and the rest of Europe, US President Mckinley decreed the use of US dollars and devalued the Puerto Rican currency to an exchange rate of 60% against the US dollar (Caban 1999, p. 75). The forced devaluation aggravated the situation of the local *bourgeoisie* by reducing the value of their savings and assets and making new loans relatively more expensive.

Puerto Ricans had to wait until May 1900 to have a civil government back in power, although not democratically elected. The 1900 Foraker Act was the first organic act imposed by the US. The Foraker Act implemented the Resident Commissioner (i.e., the nonvoting Puerto Rican member in US Congress); a limited number of residents in Puerto Rico obtained voting rights to elect the 35 members of the House of Delegates (i.e., lower chamber), while the US President appointed the Executive Council (i.e., higher chamber) and the governor (i.e., head of government). The US Congress had the power to annul any law approved by the insular legislature. Directly or indirectly, all members of the judiciary system were appointed by the US. All US

laws were extended to Puerto Rico, without the previous consent of Puerto Ricans.

US colonialism took away several rights to Puerto Ricans. Residents in the archipelago lost equal citizenship to the metropolis, representation in the legislature of the metropolis, right to universal male suffrage, a locally elected parliament, the right to establish its tariffs, and the right to enter into commercial treaties with foreign countries. As Trias Monge (1997, p. 43) eloquently pointed out, the most significant loss was "the right to government by consent of the governed." The 1897 Autonomic Charter was subject to the constituents of Puerto Rico and was only amendable at the request of the elected local parliament. On the contrary, since the US occupation until nowadays, Puerto Rico remains subject to the unilateral will of the US Congress under the plenary powers of the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution. The supposedly temporary act to provide Puerto Rico with a civil government has never been repealed, and some of its sections are still in place nowadays as the Federal Relations Act.

In 1917 the US enacted the second organic law for Puerto Rico: the Jones Act. The most significant modification was the imposition of US citizenship to all Puerto Rican citizens in the eve of the First World War, although there were discussions around this issue since at least 1910 (See Vazquez-Lazo 2017). Caban (2002) argues that the imposition of the US citizenship aimed to silence the growing expressions for sovereignty and to accentuate the interest of the US to retain Puerto Rico as a possession for an indefinite time. A local Senate replaced the Executive Council, although the effective decision-making power remained in the US-appointed governor. The Jones Act did not alter the US Congress's plenary powers over Puerto Rico, and the archipelago remained under the jurisdiction of the War Department. A bill of rights was included in the Jones Act, although US constitutional protection was not extended to the colony.

US agricultural trusts turned the archipelago into a monoculture plantation economy (Dietz 2002). Following the trickle-down ideology, Neveling (2016) argues US capital investors

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asked for political and financial support from the insular Caribbean government (e.g., tax breaks) because, according to investors, they were bringing profitable investment and employment to Puerto Rico. In 1947, Puerto Rico became the first export processing zone – also known as a special economic zone or free-trade zone (Neveling 2016) (See Neveling 2015, 2017 for an in depth analysis of the role of Puerto Rico in the formation of global export processing zones).

The tax break scheme used by the US Congress was one of the essential ingredients of Puerto Rico's longtime "industrialization by invitation" model. The US Congress decided to industrialize Puerto Rico by attracting US capital and creating a kind of tax haven with multiple federal and national tax exemptions. The US Congress decided to take away the fiscal benefits of section 936 in 1996. In 2006 section 936 of the US tax code was eliminated entirely, the tax incentive disappeared, US firms stopped being able to relocate the income generated by subsidiaries in Puerto Rico as tax-free dividends, and the entire model collapsed (Cruz Martinez 2017). Caraballo-Cueto and Lara (2018) argue that the removal of section 939 „set the stage for the worst depression in the Puerto Rican economy in more than 100 years" by igniting a deindustrialization process with a sharp decrease in manufacturing employment, which led to an increase in government borrowing. The archipelago entered into a spiral of economic, fiscal, and debt crises, later accentuated by the global financial crisis – colloquially known as the Great Recession – and the subsequent destruction of the Hurricanes Irma and Maria (see the special issue by Cruz-Martínez et al. (2018) and Bonilla and Lebrón (2019) to explore the causes and consequences of the hurricanes).

In the aftermath of the Second World War and under the international agenda to eradicate colonialism, the US Congress passed two bills with relevant ramifications for Puerto Rico. The Elective Governor Act of 1947 allowed Puerto Ricans to elect the head of government for the first time. Public Law 81–600 established the procedures for an elective government with local autonomy although without sovereignty (i.e., still under the

plenary powers of the US Congress). Public Law 81–600 allowed Puerto Ricans to enact a local Constitution. Nonetheless, US Congress modified it before the final approval. The US used Public Law 81–600 and the 1952 Constitution, which officially established the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico – or Free Associated State as it is known in Puerto Rico – to take Puerto Rico out of the UN list of non-self-governing territories. However, the new invention (i.e., the Free Associated State status) kept Puerto Rico a US colony. David M. Helfeld eloquently argued that:

> Though the formal title [of Puerto Rico's status] has been changed, in constitutional theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that the [US] Congress continues to possess plenary (. . .) authority over Puerto Rico. (. . .) Congress may repeal Public Law 600, annul the Constitution of Puerto Rico or veto any insular legislation which it deems unwise or improper. (. . .) the compact between Puerto Rico and the Congress may be unilaterally altered by the Congress. (. . .) Constitutionally, the most meaningful view of the Puerto Rican Constitution is that it is a statute of the Congress which involves a partial and non-permanent abdication of Congress' territorial power. (Statham Jr. 2002, pp. 34–35)

Following Torruella (2018), the establishment of the 1952 Constitution in Puerto Rico could be considered as one of the five experiments in US colonial governance of Puerto Rico. The authoritarian military government during the first years of US colonialism was the first experiment. Later, the Foraker Act started the second colonial governance experiment (1900–1917). The third period began with the 1917 Jones Act and lasted until the 1952 Constitution. With the Puerto Rican Constitution and the status as a Free Associated State, the Caribbean archipelago began the fourth long experiment of US colonial governance. The fifth period began when the US Congress approved the federal law "Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act" (PROMESA) (US Congress 2016) in June 2016. The US Congress took away the fiscal autonomy of Puerto Rico and transferred it to an unelected Fiscal Control Board in charge of Puerto Rico's finance since then. In exchange, Puerto Rico was allowed to enter into a bankruptcy-like process to restructure the US$72 billion dollars in debt and over US$40bn in unfunded pension obligations. It

is of utmost importance to notice that until 1984 Puerto Rico was allowed to declare bankruptcy under chapter 9 of the US bankruptcy code. Since then the US Congress denied the archipelago of that right.

Why and Who Consider Puerto Rico a Colony?

César Ayala and Rafael Bernabe imply that the colonization of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines in 1898 inaugurated an era of US neocolonialism in the Caribbean and Central American region. "Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and other formally independent republics became de facto U.S. protectorates" (Ayala and Bernabe 2009, p. 7). However, the three branches of the US government have confirmed the colonial status of Puerto Rico. This section briefly addresses some of the most significant decisions by each of the three branches. See Puerto Rico Report (2011) for an extensive and updated list on the national and international statements over Puerto Rico's colonial status.

Judicial Power

The US Supreme Court was the first to confirm the colonial status of Puerto Rico. From 1901 to 1905, the US Supreme Court in the well-known and studied Insular Cases cleared out some controversies. The Supreme Court was debating whether to allow the US to become an empire and break the tradition of the eventual admission of territories as states of the US Federation or to condemn colonialism. The Supreme Court confirmed that the US could have two types of territories (i.e., incorporated and unincorporated). The former is considered part of the US, and the unincorporated territories are US possessions and not part of the US Federation. Maybe the most important decision from the US Supreme Court to understand colonialism in Puerto Rico is the 1901 *Downes* versus *Bidwell*. Because of a dispute over imports of oranges from Puerto Rico to New York, the US Supreme Court explicitly confirms that Puerto Rico is not and has never been part of the US in the domestic sense, the US Congress has plenary

powers over Puerto Rico, and Puerto Rico is indeed a colony of the US. Therefore, the Supreme Court of the US legally allowed for the formation of a US colonial empire. The US was allowed to hold territorial possessions for an indefinite amount of time and to discriminate colonies against states of the US. In the Supreme Court own words:

> The result of what has been said is that, while in an international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been incorporated into the United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as a possession. (US Supreme Court 1901, p. 182)

Later in 1922, the US Supreme Court confirmed in the Balzac case that the fact that Puerto Ricans are US citizens do not make Puerto Rico part of the US (US Supreme Court 1922). In a second circuit case, *Romeu* versus *Cohen* confirmed that a US citizen residing in Puerto Rico does not have the same voting rights as a US citizen living in any of the 50 states of the federation (US Court of Appeals 2001).

The US Supreme Court recently made a significant decision in 2016: *Puerto Rico* versus *Sanchez Valle* (US Supreme Court 2016). Two individuals were accused of selling a gun to an undercover policeman. Both Puerto Rico and US courts indicted them. They pleaded guilty to the US federal charges and asked for a dismissal of these charges in Puerto Rico on double jeopardy grounds (i.e., a person cannot be prosecuted twice for the same crime in the same sovereignty). In the US judicial system, a state has its sovereignty – different from the US federal government. Therefore, an individual can be prosecuted for the same crime in the US federal court and a US State Court. However, the US Supreme Court decided on a 6-2 decision that "Puerto Rico does not have independent authority to prosecute someone for the same crime that has been charged in federal court. The argument appears to diminish the constitutional stature that the Puerto Rican government thought it has had for nearly seven decades" (Denniston 2016). Therefore, this decision confirms that Puerto Rico lacks judicial sovereignty because

it is entirely subordinated to the US Congress under the US Constitution's Territorial Clause.

Finally, in *Harris* versus *Rosario*, the US Supreme Court decided that the US Congress can make all requiring "rules and regulations respecting the territory (. . .) belonging to the United States" (US Supreme Court 1980). Therefore, Puerto Rico could be treated differently from any actual state of the US Federation as long as the US Congress considers there is a rational basis for this discrimination. In *Torres* versus *Puerto Rico*, the US Supreme Court confirmed that Puerto Rico has no sovereign authority over its borders, contrariwise US federal officers control borders and customs (US Supreme Court 1979).

Executive Power

In the year 2000, US President Bill Clinton created a workgroup called "Task Force on Puerto Rico's status," which intended to assess the situation of the status of Puerto Rico. In 2005, under the administration of George W. Bush, the Task Force confirmed that Puerto Rico is a territory subject to the authority of Congress under the Territorial Clause. It was noted that the US Congress could revise or revoke the current status at its discretion and legislate directly on local issues. Furthermore, the report noted that Congress had the power to grant independence to Puerto Rico or even transfer it to another nation-state. The Task Force published two additional reports in 2007 and 2011. The latter set a deadline to solve the colonial status of the archipelago by 2012. At the time of writing, no concrete progress to decolonize Puerto Rico has been made.

US Department of Justice confirmed the territorial status of Puerto Rico and argued that the archipelago could overcome this status either by incorporation to the US Federation or via sovereignty (US Department of Justice 2015). Former Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed in 2003 Puerto Rico's lack of sovereignty to conduct foreign relations without the consent of the US (Powell 2003). According to Raben (2001), Assistant Attorney General to former President Bill Clinton, the US Congress is entirely vested of legislative powers by the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution.

Legislative Power

In 2016, a US Congressional Task Force confirmed that Puerto Rico, along with Guam, American Samoa, US Virgin Islands, and Northern Marian Islands, are unincorporated territories of the US (Duffy et al. 2016). Therefore, the colonial status of the five territories was confirmed as all are subject to the US Congress's plenary powers and can be discriminated by the US Congress against US states. The best example is the second-class coverage provided by the US government in social welfare programs destined for its colonies. For example, in October 2018 the US confirmed their power to discriminate against US citizens residing in Puerto Rico by not extending the Supplemental Security Income Benefits – a targeted social assistance cash transfer program for income poor individuals (Figueroa Cancel 2018). See Duffy et al. (2016, pp. 95–111) for a list of US federal programs under which Puerto Rico receives a discriminatory treatment in comparison to the US states.

In a Congressional Research report from 2008, the US Congress confirmed that the status of Puerto Rico did not change with the 1952 local Constitution because US Congress did not cede its plenary authority over the archipelago (Garrett 2011). US Congress reminded us that not all constitutional rights are extended to residents of the territories. Puerto Rico remains a colony of the US subject to the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution. US Congress has the power to enact legislation on internal matters of Puerto Rico, as it recently did with the approval of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) (US Congress 2016).

The US Congress could be considered as an "almighty" institution regarding its power over Puerto Rico. If US Congress "chose to alter Puerto Rico's political status, it could do so through statute. Ultimately, the Territory Clause of the U. S. Constitution grants Congress broad discretion over Puerto Rico and other territories" (Garrett 2017, p. s1). The power of the Territorial Clause was also confirmed in a 1997 General Accounting Office report (GAO 1997).

Puerto Rican and International Actors

Local Puerto Rican politicians from all three main political parties have confirmed and condemned the colonial status of Puerto Rico. Former pro-statehood governor, Carlos Romero Barceló, equated the official territorial status to the more straightforward and widely known concept of the colony. "In constitutional terms, U.S. terms, [Puerto Rico] is a territory. In international terms, it is a colony. But it is the same thing to me, territory, colony, what the heck" (Fernandez 1996, p. 229).

A recent paper by Developments in the Law (2017) published in the Harvard Law Review confirmed that Puerto Rico is a non-self-governing territory under international law. In 1953 the United Nations wrongly misjudged the level of internal autonomy of Puerto Rico under the 1952 Constitution and took the archipelago out of the list of recognized colonies. This publication argues that Puerto Rico does not meet the United Nations standards of self-governance because (1) the PROMESA Oversight Board – colloquially known in Puerto Rico as the Fiscal Control Board – has extensive powers incompatible with the standards of self-governance and (2) recent judicial decisions confirmed the power of the US federal government to impose capital punishment even though it was abolished internally in Puerto Rico since 1929.

Since 1972, the United Nations Decolonization Committee has approved 37 resolutions demanding the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence according to the 1514 resolution from the UN General Assembly. The US Congressional Research Service acknowledged that: "Although the Constitution of 1952 provides for self-government by Puerto Ricans, US Congress ceded none of its own plenary authority over the islands" (Garrett 2011). This makes the 1953 approval of UN Resolution 748, which removed Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-governing territories, seems a little disingenuous. The last resolution by the UN Decolonization Committee was approved by consensus on June 2018 and requested the US to promote a self-determination process in Puerto Rico that indeed guarantees a non-colonial status. What are the internationally recognized options to decolonize Puerto Rico once and for all after over five centuries of colonialism?

Options for Decolonizing Puerto Rico

The United Nations recognizes three options for the decolonization of a non-self-governing territory. The first one is the emergence of the colony as a sovereign independent state, which has historically been the traditional option for decolonizing a territory. The second option is a free association with an independent state, and the third option is the integration within an independent state. The actual status – the Free Associated State – is not recognized under international law as a self-governing status. The status quo perpetuates colonial power of the US over Puerto Rico because the archipelago remains subordinated to the powers of the US Congress and subject to the Territory Clause of the US Constitution. This section briefly addresses the non-colonial options for decolonizing Puerto Rico.

Option 1: Independence

"Independentistas" – supporters for Puerto Rico's independence – have based their arguments for sovereignty on national identity and economic opportunities. Their first argument is simple; Puerto Rico is a Latin American nation with their language and traditions. Therefore, in order to maintain the Puerto Rican identity, the archipelago must not be annexed to the US as the 51st state.

The economic argument is based on political power. Pedro Albizu Campos – one of the leading figures for independence in the twentieth century – argued that "economic development was inextricably linked to, and based on, political power" (Fernandez 1996, p. 112). The political power would be used – according to the Independence Party – to integrate Puerto Rico in the global economy by creating bilateral and multilateral agreements, joining international organizations

and regional blocks (e.g., CARICOM, UN, CELAC), and by being able to use the monetary policy to control inflation and promote investment (PIP 2012). In addition, imported goods are expected to become up to 30% cheaper with the abolition of the Cabotage Laws that oblige Puerto Rico to use the US marine merchant to transport goods between the archipelago and the US (EFE 2014) (see Valentín-Mari 2014 for a detailed analysis of the Cabotage Laws and the impact on the economy of Puerto Rico). The Cabotage Laws (i.e., the Jones Act of 1920) have had an estimated negative impact on the Puerto Rican economy of US$ 29 billion during 1970–2012 (Telesur 2015).

Advocates for independence argue that electoral support for independence has been decimated during the last century for the repression and persecution of "independentistas" by the insular and US governments and by manufacturing consent in the Puerto Rican *psique* equalizing independence with poverty and communism (Denis 2015). According to the former president of the Independence Party, the government was able to indoctrinate political and economic fears to independence (Berríos Martínez 1983).

Option 2: Free Association with an Independent State

Free association is the second option for the decolonization of non-sovereign territories under international law. If Puerto Rico takes this path, it will become a sovereign state with a free and voluntary association with the US.

The main difference with the actual status of Puerto Rico is that free association does not subordinate the archipelago to the US Congress. This is instead supposed to be a relationship between sovereign states, where they establish an agreement that legally connects them in designated political, economic, military, monetary, or other areas (see below for a critical argument from Ramón Grosfoguel). The Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands have established a free association agreement with the US. The US provides economic and programmatic assistance, and the Pacific Islands provide military bases for the US. Also, both benefit from a free movement of

people clause (Berríos Martínez et al. 2010, p. 172). Niue and Cook Islands are also examples of countries with a free associated relationship, in this case with New Zealand.

According to the "Movimiento Union Soberanista" (MUS) – political party in favor of the free association – there are numerous benefits for this non-territorial option. Residents in Puerto Rico would benefit from a dual citizenship (the US and Puerto Rico), free movements of people and goods between the US and Puerto Rico, and actual beneficiaries of the US social security benefits would be able to continue receiving these contributory benefits. Also, the MUS argues that Puerto Rico would be able to claim economic reparations for the damages suffered during colonial subordination and for the violation of human rights (MUS 2016). The free association compact would be signed by both sovereign states and could be terminated – after due procedures – unilaterally by any party.

Option 3: Integration Within an Independent State

Integration of a non-sovereign territory (i.e., Puerto Rico) into a sovereign state (i.e., the USA) is the third decolonizing option recognized by the United Nations. After integration, peoples of both territories should have equal rights and responsibilities without distinction nor discrimination, equal citizenship, and equal opportunities for political participation in all branches of government.

Advocates of statehood argue that this is the only non-colonial status that guarantees US citizenship and a permanent status with the US. Moreover, Puerto Rico would gain representation in US Congress and the right to vote for the head of state. There would be equal access to social assistance and social security benefits, whereas now Puerto Ricans contribute to Medicare but are not entitled to receive Supplemental Security Income in older age. Statehood advocates also argue that the political stability of the US will bring more inward investment.

US Congress would have to accept the incorporation of a Spanish-speaking Latin American country during the xenophobic administration of

Donald Trump. Not only would the new State come with an unsustainable debt of around US$72 billion plus over US$40 billion in unfunded pension obligations, but it would also have more representation in Congress than several less densely populated states. The US Government Accountability Office highlighted the high cost of statehood for Puerto Rico, adding US$2.3 billion in new federal taxes (Brito 2014; GAO 2014).

A 2016 public opinion report shows that support for Puerto Rico's statehood in the USA has risen from 35% in 2013 to 40% in February 2017 (Rasmussen Reports 2017). In addition, 39% disagree that Puerto Rico should become a state of the union and 21% are undecided. If we consider these numbers to be representative of the opinion of congressional representatives, there is still a long road to have an absolute majority favoring the incorporation of Puerto Rico. However, what is the desire of the residents in Puerto Rico toward the political status options and its relationship with the US?

Referendums

Trias Monge (1997, p. 12) duly notes the similarities of the public opinion in Puerto Rico and political organization in the late nineteenth century with the present, where three groups are identified in the archipelago: annexationists – formerly to Spain and nowadays to the USA – prosovereignty, and status quo devotees.

Puerto Rican governments have held five referendums on political status since 1967, but the US Congress has endorsed none of these despite being the only stakeholder with the constitutional power to resolve the colonial status of Puerto Rico. The options to date are presented in Table 1.

The Free Associated State option was favored in the first two referendums (1967 and 1993). In 1998 the pro-statehood New Progressive Party boldly added an extra option in the hope of dividing status quo voters, but ultimately it was the "none of the above" option which won out with 50.3%. In 2012 there were two ballots. In the first ballot, most electors voted to change the current territorial status, and in the second ballot, statehood was the preferred non-colonial option, though it received less than 50% of the ballots.

The last referendum held in 2017 was designed to have only non-colonial options recognized by international law in the ballot. However, the US State Department demanded the inclusion of the status quo option. The intromission of the USA on

Puerto Rico: Colonialism and Neocolonialism, Table 1 Options in the five status referendums to date

Option in the previous ballots	Description	Colonial or non-colonial status?
Free Associated State (commonwealth)	Mandate to develop the relationship between the USA and Puerto Rico to the maximum of self-government compatible with the common defense, the common market, the common currency, and the indissoluble bond of the US citizenship. Supporters of status quo portray it as an enhanced Free Associated State	Colonial; Puerto Rico gains autonomy but not sovereignty. It remains under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution. International law does not recognize it as non-colonial
Statehood	A vote for the statehood is a mandate to claim the entry of Puerto Rico as a state of the union (USA)	Non-colonial; Puerto Rico will join the USA with the same rights and duties as all 50 states
Independence	A vote for the independence is a mandate to claim the creation of a new sovereign state	Non-colonial; Puerto Rico will become a sovereign state
Territorial commonwealth	Status quo; Puerto Rico will remain with the actual territorial (colonial) status	Colonial; Puerto Rico will remain under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution
Free association/ sovereign Free Associated State	Mandate to become a sovereign state with a free and voluntary association with the USA	Non-colonial; Puerto Rico will become a sovereign state

A summary of the options available in Puerto Rico's five referendums
Source: (Cruz-Martinez 2017b)

the internal affairs of Puerto Rico provoked a call to boycott the referendum. The actual leading opposition party and pro-status quo supporter (i.e., Popular Democratic Party), the Independence Party, and a multiparty coalition supporting free association opted not to participate in the referendum. The Popular Democratic Party argued that the status quo option described in the ballot undermines their view of an enhanced Free Associated State. Supporters of Independence and free association, meanwhile, refuse to participate in a referendum that includes an extension of the current status.

Once again, the US Congress has not recognized the results of the fifth referendum. With a record high 76.8% of abstention, it is reasonable not to consider these results to be the will of the people of Puerto Rico. Nonetheless, Puerto Rico should learn from the disastrous experience of the Venezuelan opposition with the abstention in the 2005 legislative elections, which allowed the former President Hugo Chavez to take control of a large part of the government. Therefore, abstentionism might not be the most effective solution.

This is why the US Congress should sit down with social movements, political parties, and other groups of the Puerto Rican society to establish a set of non-colonial options for inclusion in a binding referendum. The second alternative is to call a national constituent assembly where the residents in Puerto Rico could establish a non-colonial set of options to be validated later at a referendum (see Pérez Soler 2016). See Table 2 for the results of every referendum since 1967.

In January 2017, Jenniffer Gonzalez, the non-voting US congressional representative for Puerto Rico, introduced the Puerto Rico Admission Act, which proposes January 3, 2025, as the date of incorporation if statehood was chosen in the last referendum (Gonzalez-Colon 2017). The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs on February 2017. The bill was never considered on the floor of US Congress.

The governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo Rosselló, considers that because statehood won on June 11, 2017, he has the mandate to pursue

the unilateral "Tennessee Plan" followed by Tennessee, Michigan, Iowa, California, Oregon, Kansas, and Alaska to become states of the USA (Garrett 2011). However, it is the US Congress who would first need to incorporate Puerto Rico and then admit it as a US state. This might be one of the reasons why the nonvoting US congressional representative for Puerto Rico introduced in June 2018 the Puerto Rico Admission Act of 2018 (i.e., a second bill on the admission of Puerto Rico as a state of the US Federation, with a transition period as an incorporated territory) (Gonzalez-Colon 2018). The bill has been largely ignored like the 2017 admission act and has not been considered in the US Congress floor, and the last action was on July 2018 where the Committee on Natural Resources referred it to the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs. The lack of attention and serious consideration by the US Congress on this matter is not a novelty; US actions over the last century have shown disdain for the idea of ending colonialism in Puerto Rico. A Democratic Representative for Florida, Darren Soto, introduced the H.R.1965 Puerto Rico Admission Act in March 2019. The bill ask US Congress to incorporate Puerto Rico into the US federation as the 51st state 90 days after the measure becomes law without the need for a new referendum because it considers the boycotted and non-binding 2017 referendum results as valid. At the time of writing, the House Committee on Natural Resources has made no concrete action with this bill.

Is Puerto Rico a Neocolony?

Grosfoguel (2008) argues that the two forms of sovereignty recognized as non-colonial status by international law (i.e., independence and free association) will produce a neocolonial Puerto Rican republic. According to Grosfoguel, any of these two decolonial options would allow the US empire to take away the "rights that have been won through much sweat and blood" using a strategy of neocolonial recolonization. The romanticized argument by Grosfoguel implies that the social and welfare rights of the residents

Puerto Rico: Colonialism and Neocolonialism, Table 2 Results of the five referendums on the political status of Puerto Rico

	Votes	Per cent
Referendum 1967		
Free associated state (status quo)	425,132	60,11
Statehood	274,312	38.78
Independence	4,248	0.60
Null votes	3,601	0.51
Referendum 1993		
Free associated state (status quo)	826,326	48.58
Statehood	788,296	46.34
Independence	75,620	4.45
Null votes	6,549	0.39
Blank votes	4,199	0.25
Referendum 1998		
None of the above	787,900	50.30
Statehood	728,157	46.49
Independence	39,838	2.54
Free association	4,536	0.29
Territorial commonwealth	993	0.06
Null votes	2,956	0.19
Blank votes	1,890	0.12
Referendum 2012		
First ballot		
Do you agree that Puerto Rico should continue to have its present form of territorial status?		
No	970,910	51.67
Yes	828,077	44.07
Blank votes	67,267	3.58
Null votes	12,948	0.69
Second ballot		
Which of the non-territorial options would you prefer?		
Statehood	834,191	44.39
Blank votes	498,604	26.53
Sovereign Free Associated State	454,768	24.20
Independence	74,895	3.99
Null votes	16,744	0.89
Referendum 2017		
Plebiscite for the immediate decolonization of Puerto Rico		
Statehood	508,862	96.9
Free association/independence	7,981	1.52
Actual territorial status	7,048	1.34
Blank or null votes	1,247	0.24

Source: Official results published by the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission

in Puerto Rico would not continue (or improve) with a free association or an independent state. However, there is no evidence on this matter. Grosfoguel might be referring to the US federal transfers to Puerto Rico, which as expected would be reduced. In 2014 Puerto Rico received 17 billion dollars in US federal transfers. However, we need to distinguish contributory benefits (i.e., benefits received as a result of tax payment or service provided) and granted benefits

(i.e., benefits transferred without contributions or service). Almost 80% of US federal transfers to Puerto Rico in 2014 were contributory benefits, which residents of Puerto Rico receive after contributing and meeting the eligibility requirements (i.e., social security, Medicare, military pensions, among others). Residents in Puerto Rico contributed to these programs, and a sovereign Puerto Rico would necessarily receive a fund from the US to cover these welfare programs.

Grosfoguel argues for a radical statehood option as a decolonizing option for Puerto Rico. According to him, this will prevent Puerto Rico from becoming the new neocolony in the Caribbean of high-income countries. Moreover, he argues that statehood will introduce a Latin American country to the US empire, with full political rights and the power to transform it from the inside into "a truly democratic, anticapitalist, anti-patriarchal and anti-imperialist society" (Grosfoguel 2008, p. 7).

Puerto Rico is a colony and not a neocolony of the US as several academics and news media has confirmed. However, as Grosfoguel contends, a sovereign resolution for the archipelago, either as independence or free association, enables the possibility of Puerto Rico becoming a new US neocolony. Why? A sovereign Puerto Rico would be out of the direct control of the US Congress under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution. However, as it was argued above, Puerto Rico could become a neocolony of the US – like many others in the region – if the economic system and policy decisions in the archipelago are directed from Washington DC. With this knowledge in mind, politicians and leaders of a potential sovereign Puerto Rico would need to take this with extreme seriousness when – and if – the time comes.

Conclusion

This essay presented a historical context of colonialism in Puerto Rico under the Spanish Empire (1508–1898) and the US empire (1898–present). Puerto Rico is a colony of the USA for two principal reasons: (1) Puerto Rico is subjected to the plenary powers of the US Congress under the Territorial Clause of the US Constitution; (2) Puerto Rico does not have the right to government by consent of the governed because sovereignty does not lie on the people of Puerto Rico but on the US Congress, which can annul or modify the insular Constitution and legislation unilaterally (i.e., without the consent of the governed) and without any voting representation in the US Congress. The three branches of the US government have confirmed this colonial relationship, as well as Puerto Rican politicians and international organizations. However, up to this date, the US has not shown or accepted a concrete solution to end colonialism in the Caribbean archipelago. Finally, it is of utmost relevance to point out the colonial status of Puerto Rico rather than referring to it as a neocolony. Puerto Rico cannot be considered a neocolony of the US because the metropolis directly excercise its control over the archipelago.

Cross-References

▶ Cold War and Latin America
▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ Nicaragua and Contemporary American Imperialism
▶ Taxation, Capital Flight, and Imperialism

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Qing Dynasty

▶ Taiping Rebellion

R

Race

Race Brexit

Race to the Bottom

Racial Capitalism

Racialization

Racialization: Racial Oppression of Roma

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Synonyms

De-humanization of Roma/Gypsies; Discrimination against Gypsy/Roma; Inferiorization and stigmatization of Gypsy/Roma; Racism against Gypsy/Roma; Social exclusion of Gypsy/Roma

Definition

Racialization and racial oppression of Roma are discursive and structural mechanisms that place them in an imaginary hierarchical classificatory system based on phenotypical, cultural, and social markers and render them as "other"/sub-human. These oppressive discourses became articulated and solidified in concrete social practices, mechanisms, policies, and structures in Roma people's everyday lives.

"Roma" is a politically constructed identity used as a category to capture various ethnic groups throughout Europe, North and South America, and other parts of the world regardless of whether they are nomadic or sedentary communities who identify as Roma, Gypsy, Travellers (in Ireland), Sinti (in Germany), Zigeuner, Cigani, Gitano, Kalderash, Lovara, and so on. These ethnic groups are connected by related diverse cultures, traditions, and languages, as well as by a shared experience of racialization, racial prejudice, discrimination, and violence. Despite the negative connotation attached to the term "Gypsies," there are some communities, such as the English Romanichal Gypsies in the UK, who reclaim the name and attach an important historical and political significance to the term. The self-identification and identity construction of Roma by themselves are critical in their struggle for political recognition.

As a global diasporic racialized ethnic group, Roma are dispersed unevenly. Knowledgeable estimates suggest between 6 and 12 million people in Europe, two-thirds of whom live in Central and Eastern Europe (Ringold et al. 2004). It is difficult to gather statistically correct data because of the lack of or inaccurate official demographic data on Roma, as well as the reluctance on the part of Roma to identify themselves to state officials due to the historically well-founded fear of data misuse that can lead to discrimination and violence.

The origins of Roma are still debated in academia. According to one approach, Romani people were already present from the tenth- and eleventh centuries onwards and connected to a diasporic group from India whose occupation and character are attributed to the Romani people (Heng 2018, pp. 417–418; Fraser 1995, p. 33). The Indian origin theory is supported mainly by linguistic evidence (Hancock 1987; Fraser 1995; Matras 1995, 2002), which is confirmed by genetic studies (Gresham et al. 2001; Morar et al. 2004). This school of thought evolved from the ideas of two eighteenth-century researchers, Johann Rüdiger (1751–1822) and Heinrich Grellmann (1753–1804). Rüdiger, a scholar of comparative linguistics who later become a professor of

political economy, published his *Von der Sprache und Herkunft der Zigeuner aus Indien* [On the Language and Indian Origin of the Gypsies] in 1782 to prove the Indian origin of Romani language by comparing it to Hindustani. According to Yaron Matras, this was the "first concise grammatical description of a Romani dialect as well as the first serious attempt at a comparative investigation of the language, it provided the foundation for Romani linguistics" (Matras 1999, p. 89). Grellmann also advocated the theory of the Indian roots of the "Gypsies" in *Die Zigeuner* [The Gypsies] published in 1783 – which received wider publicity than Rüdriger's book – and became a point of reference for Roma in Europe (van Baar 2011, p. 78; Mayall 2004, pp. 118–120; Matras 1999). This linguistic approach focused on the Indian origins of the Romani language and distinctive (orientalizing) cultural and behavioral differences underpinned by the belief in inheritance and blood ties (Mayall 2004, p. 35).

The second main school of thought rejects and sharply critiques the legacy of eighteenth-century Gypsy studies which orientalized Roma and their alleged non-European origins, language and culture (Okely 1983). This new approach was most articulated by the "Dutch constructivists" Leo Lucassen, Wim Willems, and Annemarie Cottaar in *Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups: A Socio-Historical Approach* (1998). Their central argument is that "Gypsies" are not the descendants of Travellers who came from India centuries ago. Rather, they are an indigenous population whose occupations rendered them wanderers and therefore stigmatized them in Europe whose distinct cultural traits developed as a reaction to resist and survive in an extremely hostile environment. According to Lucassen et al., using ethnicity and diaspora as the theoretical frame to conceptualize the situation of Roma "symbolizes a deathtrap." Ethnic identity is based on the assumption of having a common descent, a shared history and culture. Yet the social constructivist argument is inevitably connected to eighteenth-century modernity and the Enlightenment project that used repressive measures against Roma as an integral part of the nationalism and racism that

excluded Roma from the mainstream cultural canon. Huub van Baar provides a detailed critique: "Their central thesis builds on, firstly, a singularized and overly negative representation of Enlightenment thought and, secondly, on the suggestion that the 'core' of Enlightenment has been preserved in all later events, at least when it comes to how this supposed core has continuously reinforced Roma stigmatization" (van Baar 2011, p. 93). van Baar compellingly illuminates the limitations, challenges, internal contradictions, and differences of these two contested and still prevalent scholarly strategies, which continue to be reproduced to influence the development of political, institutional, cultural, and scholarly representations of Roma (Ibid., pp. 77–105).

These dominant scholarly approaches not only attempt to explain the origins but also contribute to the racialization of Roma. The first approach emphasized the distinctiveness, singularity, and peculiarity of Roma by constructing and reconstructing inflexible identity boundaries. David Mayall succinctly explains: "Their [Roma] separate racial identity was constructed around notions of foreign origin and distinct language, cultural and behavioural differences, their mode of earning a living and, lastly, but perhaps most centrally to the race concept, a belief in physiological distinctiveness" (Mayall 2004, p. 118). This kind of categorization is based on a perceptual saliency that racializes Roma in connection with their hierarchization, inferiorization, subjugation, and oppression. Moreover, it posits a racially defined, fixed, unchangeable, and permanent Romani culture. Conversely, the constructivists challenge the narrative of Roma as a suffering, homogenized, and continuously victimized ethnic group, assumed to be a counterproductive and homogenizing political claim (van Baar 2011, p. 87). By the same token, they dismiss the complex reality and relationship of Roma to knowledge production and completely underestimate the political agency of Roma that shapes, alters, or even subverts their own representation.

While the first language- and culture-centric approach (consciously or unconsciously) uses socially constructed racial categories that inevitably do form the basis of social identities, the second school of thought aims to eliminate any kind of ethicized or racialized term at the expense of neglecting and obscuring Roma identity and its interplay with structural racism. The social constructivist argument of the Dutch school of Lucassen, Willems, and Cottar (1998) has recently been rearticulated by Martin Kovats (Kovats and Surdu 2015) and Mihai Surdu (2016).

Alternative Epistemology on Race/ Racialization

In academia, the racialization of Roma has either been neglected or not theorized at the same level of detail as for other racialized groups, including blacks, Jews, Muslims, and others. Perhaps the negligence of Roma in mainstream race/racialization-related scholarship is merely a reflection of the tacitly enacted racial and epistemic hierarchy.

However, Roma have nonetheless been racialized and perceived and treated as a different Other and/or inferior under the rubric of culture and ethnicity. As Thomas A. Acton convincingly argues, scientific racism was a long-standing norm of international science, and despite its loss of legitimacy in academia, "it continued to influence both popular culture and academic discourse about Roma/Gypsies/Travellers" (Acton 2016, p. 1187). In the wake of World War II, when the Holocaust (Lewy 2000) became the primary reference point for race, in Europe, race became erased and denied (Goldberg 2006). However, its meaning and consequences never evaporated; rather, the concept of race solidified in social relations, practices, and structures.

Roma-related scholarship has found countless ways to talk about racialization without drawing on the category of race or the process of racialization. Terms include "Romani lifestyle," "otherized minority," "ethnicized poverty," "minoritized population," and so on. Recently, a new trend has emerged, mainly through the schools of critical race theory and feminist intersectional theory which use race as an

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analytical category (besides gender, class, and others) and racialization as a process and condition to explore the situation of Roma (Kóczé 2018a). Bonilla-Silva (2015) suggests some new directions in critical race theory, including the imperative of new theoretical and empirical work which has to come from subaltern scholars. In academia, the widely shared assumption is that epistemology and knowledge production is neutral and detached from the social, political, and economic context. This belief has been challenged by feminists and black theorists. As a result of the influence of these innovative works, decades later, Romani feminist scholars have become the frontrunners in challenging racist and sexist epistemology and the notion of neutral knowledge production in Europe (Kóczé 2018a). Challenging Roma-related epistemology is a prerequisite for using race, racialization, and racial formation as analytical apparatuses to understand the enduring structural discrimination against Roma. By using intersectional theory and methods – termed and introduced by black feminist scholars – Roma feminist scholars have begun to expose intersecting race, class, and gender-based oppressions and also created a conceptual language and alternative explanatory framework. Charles Mills succinctly explains that alternative epistemologies must come from subaltern's perspective. He argues: "hegemonic groups characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about society's functioning, whereas subordinate groups characteristically have experiences that (at least potentially) give rise to more adequate conceptualizations" (Mills 1998, p. 28 cited by Bonilla-Silva 2015, p. 79). It matters how racialized experience is articulated, shared, and transformed into knowledge. Alina Lemon has made a similar observation on the importance of race-related knowledge that is socially mediated by people who are affected by the impact of systemic racism. "Moreover, white elites rarely sustain relations with white poor [...], however, even the most intrepid white elite investigators do not convey knowledge of material conditions in the same ways do those who know poverty by smell and by touch, by haptic means" (Lemon 2019, p. 20).

Historical Racialization of Roma

Most scholars who work on the concept of race as a classification and hierarchization of human beings argue that it derives from the late eighteenth century and the beginning of European colonization (see Omi and Winant 2014; Allen 1994; Hannaford 1996). Geraldine Heng (2018) challenges the common assumption that race, racism, and racial logic are the social, cultural, and political product of the modern era. She bravely analyzes Europe's encounters with various racialized groups including Roma (referred to as "Gypsies") from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries to trace the trajectories of Roma in medieval Europe. Her collection of excerpts from the medieval historical written record exposes the racial attributions ascribed to Roma which define their collective racialized identities. Heng points out that her representation is about how Europeans perceived Roma and not how Roma represented themselves, a subject that remains under-researched and under-theorized, not just in medieval but also in modern historical scholarship (Heng 2018, p. 417).

The first assumption is that Roma were represented by others in the tenth and eleventh century based on a few historical texts first presented by Angus Fraser (1995) and reused by Geraldine Heng to exemplify the prejudiced description of Roma. The Arab historian Hamza of Isfahan (c. 950) recorded the encounter of the fifth-century Persian monarch Bahrum Gur with the descendants of Roma, who are called the Zott. According to the text, Bahrum Gur decided that "his subjects should work for only half the day and spend the rest of their time eating and drinking together to the sound of music, encountered one day a group which had wine but no music [...] The monarch then persuaded the king of India to send him musicians – 12,000 of them – and they were distributed to the various parts of the Persian kingdom, where they multiplied" (Fraser 1995, p. 33 cited by Heng 2018, p. 418). Heng assumes that these people are the descendants of Roma. Fraser also explains that these musician migrants were called Zott by Hamza and Luris in Firdawsi's eleventh-century Persian

epic. He notes that both names Zotti (plural Zott) and Luli or Luri are Persian names for Gypsies. According to the Firdawsi's epic, the recent migrants from India were not praised and appreciated by the Persian people. The ruler of Persia generously offered some resources; however, the immigrants from India were described as spineless and ungrateful. They could not even commit to working long-term; rather, they opted for short-term satisfaction and were punished with enforced nomadism (Heng 2018, p. 419).

This very first medieval text sowed the seeds of the perennial, pervasive assumption about Roma as feckless, ungrateful, irresponsible aliens who do not possess wealth or any military, economic, or political power and influence, who rather use their portable skills and wits to survive. So, even this kind of description employs a racial logic and places them as inferior to the settled population. Heng meticulously examines several historical texts mainly used by Angus Fraser (1995) and Ian Hancock (1987) to show that Roma, by virtue of their distinctive occupations, skills, and diasporic existence, have been perceived as a different race. After a lengthy discussion and textual analysis, she succinctly explains: "Our sojourn into medieval race has made a practice of emphasizing how operations of race-making proceeded from the outside: how differences among humans were selectively essentialized in absolute and fundamental terms, and attached to a human group to characterize it definitively, positioning the group within a hierarchy of power relations" (Heng 2018, p. 447).

Heng also gives a full account of the practices of medieval anti-Gypsy prejudice, race-making, and sub-humanization, which provided full legitimization for the enslavement of Roma from the thirteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, as a "race during their centuries-long sojourn in parts of south-eastern Europe – in Wallachia and Moldavia, two territorial polities that later joined to become Romania in 1859" (Heng 2018, p. 436). Based on various researches (Gheorghe 1983; Hancock 1987; Beck 1989; Achim 2004), large sections of the Romani population became dehumanized, enslaved by the monasteries and the boyars (feudal masters, Romani slaveholders).

Their slavery contributed to the feudal economy both in the mediaeval period and later for Romanian nationalism and state formation until their emancipation in 1855 and 1856 (Ibid.).

In his revealing text, Sam Beck shows that: "Gypsies came to be seen as universally marginal sub-humans," and claims: "As is true today, Gypsies were to be found in a diversity of social and economic levels within society, even though" Gypsy "(Tigan) became synonymous with slave (rob)" (Beck 1989, p. 45). Beck makes an important point about slavery. Firstly, he states that slavery is a commodification of human beings which reflects not only the value of the human labor but which also reifies human relations. Aime Cesaire's seminal book *Discourse on Colonialism* (1972) introduced the theory of "thingification" that describes the transformation of the oppressed into objects functioning solely to satisfy the needs of the colonizer. Cesaire's "thingification" is related to the "commodification" that Beck discusses regarding the slavery of Roma. Secondly, Beck's bold proposal is that: "Gypsy slavery as a system of oppression was formative, generating a culture of prejudice" (Beck 1989, p. 54). In other words, the systemic and continued hostility to and persecution of Roma created a structural condition which reinvigorated and perpetuated the racialization of Roma. As Beck comments: "[...] certain groups of people are allowed to be dehumanized, while others are not" (Ibid.).

By the late eighteenth century – when science was used to justify and rationalize capitalist exploitation and colonialization by means of hierarchical classificatory system in which usually dark-skinned people were relegated to the lowest section of humanity compared to other, lighter-skinned populations – the Roma were already socially interiorized and dehumanized in Europe. White Europeans encountered Roma in Europe as an internal inferior long before the global discoveries from the fifteenth to mid-seventeenth century, when they encountered human beings in Asia, Africa, and the Americas who looked and acted very different from themselves. The literatures refer to this pseudo-scientific innovation as necessary tool to explain the social and cultural

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differences in biological terms. This served to justify their efforts to colonize, exploit, enslave, and even exterminate certain groups. Although the biological idea of race, based on differences and hierarchization of human beings, has been discredited by academia, however race as a socially constructed category and racialization as social and economic process and condition still should be of continuing interest to social analysis. Regarding Roma-related academic scholarship, Beck critically notes: "[. . .] much work has been carried out on how Gypsies are marginal in specific societies. The origins of such marginalization, power relations in particular, historical processes in general, active resistance, or even active participating in the forces that dominate them have not been part of the scholarly discourse concerning Gypsies" (Beck 1989, p. 54).

Beck calls for a new research agenda that resonates with the meticulous analysis of Gypsy-related studies, which focuses on the conflicting and controversial process of both the formation and reproduction of Gypsy identities from the early sixteenth century until the present by David Mayall (2004). In his pivotal book, Mayall uses an expressive analogy to show the construction of Gypsy identity through various schools of thought. "The foundations of the *racial Gypsy* house are rooted nineteenth-century scientific theories" (Mayall 2004, p. 35, my emphasis). In fact, according to Mayall, post-1945 studies on Roma construct them as an ethnic group, rather than a racial group, in which nomadism and nomadic ancestry are replaced by migration and foreign origin. As he points out: "it very closely resembles the racial building, using the same bricks but in this case holding them together by the mortar of origin, culture and ancestry rather than racial science" (Ibid.). Mayall's suggestion is to critically interrogate the process and its significance in the use of different methods, approaches, and theoretical frameworks produced by various school of Roma-related studies; however, he does not offer a way out from the perpetual repetition and reproduction of the constructed perspectives on Roma. "The belief that the Gypsies constitute a separate racial group has long outlived the scientific discrediting of the classifications: although the

foundations of the racial house have been removed, the building remains standing largely as a result of the ideas and writings of certain individual authors and groups of writers contributing to the persistence of this particular construction through its repetition in various forms" (Mayall 2004, p. 36). I agree with Mayall's main conclusion about the continued repetition and his argument that despite the claim to objectivity, Roma-related studies should be read and understood as a product of their social and political time, one that is limited by the classification of peoples. However, what Sam Beck suggests is not just a critical reflection on knowledge production about Roma where positions and power relations are important but also an invitation to integrate and relate broader historical, social, economic, and political processes, as well as to provide space for Roma to participate and offer an alternative epistemology to shape and form the "forces that dominate them" (Beck 1989, p. 54).

Nicolae Gheorghe (1946–2013), a sociologist and one of the best-known Romani intellectuals, also participated in the construction of Roma identity. He attempted to contradistinguish the Roma "ethnic identity building" from the late eighteenth-century nation- and state-building efforts which significantly contributed to the exclusion, stigmatization, and criminalization of Roma. Gheorghe's agenda merged with that of pro-Roma international and human rights organizations who fought to transform the hated, inferior Gypsy into respectable and equal Roma. He explained thus:

> Why have I used the word 'transnational' from the array of concepts which are on offer to describe non-territorial or cross-stata [*sic*] or dispersed minorities? The idea, the meaning, is to indicate that we can evolve in a different way from nation states and national minorities. I wish to assert that we can build up an ethnic dynamic and a new image by reference to an interaction with non-national institutions or supra-national institutions. (Gheorghe 1997, p. 161 cited by Mayall 2004, p. 32)

Gheorghe admits that any identity is invented, constructed, and political. However, he conceived the Roma transnational identity as different from any other national identity and as a consequence

following a different political strategy. In 1997, he co-authored a paper "The Roma in the Twenty-First Century: A Policy Paper" with the prominent Roma anthropologist Andrzej Mirga, in which they elaborated some dilemmas and possibilities, including transnational identity building and other political projects that mark the future of Roma.

Global Capitalism: Deep-Seated Structural Racialized Oppression of Roma

The vast majority of Roma people have historically suffered from hostility, structural discrimination, violence, racialization, and accumulated socioeconomic disadvantages which prevented them through centuries to integrate in the institutional and social fabric of Europe. The perception of Roma has been historically framed in different ways: initially they were portrayed as vagabonds, criminals, and untrustworthy, and more recently, they are still depicted as inherently nomads and racialized others (Okely 1983). However, all the negative perception and representations of Roma became normalized and tacitly transformed into various social mechanisms and structures. The racialized perception of Roma provides an ample justification for repressive policies, legislations, and reinforcement of racialization and deep-seated structural discrimination and oppression at the transnational and local level (Kóczé 2018b).

In the era of post-structuralism and post-modernism, the grand narrative of imperialism is on the wane and is seldom discussed in relation to Roma exclusion and racialization in global hierarchies. While structural imperialism explains the persistent inequalities between imperialist and exploited countries (Galtung 1971), the world system analysis goes beyond the nation- or state-centered political structure. It provides an understanding on the imperialization of interconnected transnational political units entangled with world economy between and within countries at the centers, semi-peripheries, and peripheries (Wallerstein 2004). Most world system scholars recognize the significance of racism but tend to regard race and racialization as an ideology or

symptom of the global capitalist system (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). In Wallerstein's understanding, both racism and sexism are ideologies that sustain and reproduce the global capitalist economy: "[racism] allows a far lower reward to a major segment of the work force than could ever be justified on the basis of merit" (Ibid., p. 34). Here, Wallerstein is mainly referring to the exploited and underpaid working class, which can be composed of "white" and racialized groups, but does not explain the racialized structural unemployment faced by many Roma in Europe. The recent EU Agency for Fundamental Rights report concedes that 20 million people in Europe are threatened by poverty and social exclusion by 2020 and that Roma are overrepresented in this population (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2020, p. 9). Moreover: "80% of Roma continue to live below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold of their countries. Every third Roma lives in housing without tap water; one in 10 in housing without electricity; and [...] every fourth Roma (27%) and every third Roma child (30%) live in households that faced hunger at least once in the previous month" (Ibid.). The data shows that racialized Roma face structural unemployment, social exclusion, and political disenfranchisement in both core (Western European) and semi-periphery (East Central and South Eastern European) countries. Quijano describes the general law and mechanism of contemporary capitalist accumulation which reproduces and reworks racialized and gendered difference through the social and spatial hierarchies that exclude minimal wage work, hyper-exploited workers, racialized people, and segregated places from capital accumulation (Quijano and Ennis 2000). According to Marx, unemployed (unproductive) people are the "surplus population" created and perpetuated by capitalist conditions (Marx 1990, p. 794). They can be categorized into three categories: *floating, latent,* and *stagnant,* and he later added a fourth, *lumpenproletariat.* The last category is distinguished from the working class; it is described as the lowest stratum of society, including vagabonds, criminals, and prostitutes (Ibid., p. 797). During state socialism and the domination of

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Marxist doctrine, Roma were associated with deep-seated stereotypes and prejudices based on the *lumpenproletariat*.

The point here is not to give a full critique of Marx's Eurocentric categorization, but rather to illustrate that in the logic of capitalist accumulation, the global hierarchical division of labor is reproduced in the localized economic system where the (unproductive) "surplus" population become differentiated in both social (racialized) and spatial (segregated) terms. Prem Kumar Rajaram persuasively argues that: "Capitalist modes of production do not simply create a racialized structure, a superstructure of ideology of racism. Capitalism is constituted by these histories (Hall 1996; Dirlik 2002)" (Rajaram 2018, p. 629). There is a dialogical relation between capitalism and racialization as processes of dehumanization and inferiorization constituted through the material grounding and epistemological, structural hierarchies of global capitalism (Quijano and Ennis 2000). As the 2020 EU report notes, 80% of Roma who continue to live under the poverty line embody the racialized surplus population, based on their accumulated structural disadvantages and permanent socioeconomic exclusion. Their marginalization must be seen through the lens of hierarchical global capitalism.

New Direction: Rethinking Racism and the Racialization of Roma

If we rely on social constructivist explanations, then any attempts to deal with identity formation and consolidation will inevitably essentialize and racialize Roma. One productive way out from this perennial race crafting is to deconstruct the existing literature on Roma by explaining the changes, continuity, and resistance of Roma in the various gendered and racialized orders. Moreover, this would relate, connect, and bring together various local histories, narratives, and struggles and create synergies and solidarities among other racialized and oppressed population.

At the same time, this will also serve to construct a new language and analysis to humanize a Roma population that has been humiliated, harassed, violated, discriminated, and, in the most extreme case, exterminated through centuries. During World War II (1939–1945), more than half a million Roma were systematically killed by the Nazis and their allies (Hancock 1987).

Besides the critical revision and reinterpretation of the archives of Romani studies, critical race theory provides an analytical framework, methodology, and language to elaborate the system of oppressions and racialization and to think about race not exclusively as an identity but rather an imposed and changing social hierarchy.

Yet the concept of racism has become a central focus in number of Roma-related studies focused on "racial prejudice," anti-Roma attitudes, "Romaphobia" (McGarry 2017), and "anti-Gypsyism" (Rostas 2019). These approaches are very important; however, they still downplay the significance of materiality. Furthermore, as they center around identity, and analyze racism as an ideology, a psychological phenomenon at the individual level, they understand racism as a moral and behavioral failure or simply function as a rearticulation of historical anti-Roma racism. Following Eduard Bonilla-Silva (1997), racism should be understood as social system embedded and reproduced in ideological, economic, and social structures which intersect with class and gender structuration in the society. Analysis must therefore expose the covert and invisible (color-blind) racial operation of institutions which sustain and reproduce systemic racial inequality. As Bonilla-Silva stresses: "we cannot go to post-racialism without first eliminating the racialism from our midst" (Bonilla-Silva 1997, p. 85). I would only add that we cannot transcend the analysis of racism, race, and racialization without showing the material social conditions and mechanisms in different historical moments that have enabled the discursive and structural racialization of Roma.

Cross-References

► Orientalism
► Racial Capitalism
► Racism and Imperialism

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Racism

Racism Against Gypsy/Roma

Racism and Imperialism

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Synonyms

British Empire; Ethnic cleansing; First World War; Forced migration; Genocide; Minorities; Nationalism; Nazi Empire; Ottoman Empire; Second World War; Soviet Union

Definition

This essay begins with an introduction on the relationship between racism and imperialism.

The second section tackles the importance of ideology, using the examples of the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Nazi Empire and the Soviet Union, the case studies utilized throughout this contribution. The third section examines the practice of racism within these entities, i.e. the ways in which ethnic and racial hierarchies operated, which, in the case of the short-lived Nazi empire, meant genocide. The final substantive section tackles the rise of racism and intolerance as a result of imperial collapse in which new nationalisms can lead to genocide and ethnic cleansing. The conclusion emphasizes the multifaceted links between racism and imperialism.

Racism has a complex relationship with imperialism. On the one hand, the rise of empire during the course of the nineteenth century played an important role in its ideological evolution as Europeans made contact with people in Africa and Asia and came to the conclusion that they had not reached the same level of economic, social, cultural, and religious development because they formed part of inferior racial groups. This type of inequality is found in pre-modern empires such as the Ottoman, in which those of the Muslim faith always remained top dogs in a religious hierarchy. Empires in the twentieth century have practised the most extreme forms of racism, epitomised by the actions of the Nazis during the Second World War, who carried out a series of genocides against those whom they had constructed as racial inferiors (Mazower 2008). However, some empires have also displayed diversity and even equality. While Turks may have found themselves at the top of the religious tree in the Ottoman Empire, elements of diversity existed within the system which they had created since the late Middle Ages. The best example of an empire practising equality consists of the system constructed after the Russian revolutions of 1917 in the form of the Soviet Union. This gave rights based upon nationality to peoples over the vast areas which it controlled. Some of the worst acts of racism and ethnic intolerance have actually taken place when empires have come to an end and when concepts of nationalism have replaced those of diversity, as the examples of both the dying Ottoman and Soviet Empires demonstrate.

We therefore need to see empire as a system of control in which some elements of diversity may exist, but in which a perceived ethnic, racial, religious, or political trait means that a particular group remains at the top of the hierarchy. While some empires might recognise diversity, all also practise exclusivity. Some are clearly more inclusive than others. On the one hand we might identify the Soviet Union as the most egalitarian while, on the other, we can point to Nazi Europe during the Second World War as the most racist. In this way we need to understand empire as a system in which one ethnic group controls a series of others, often before the others have any sense of national or ethnic consciousness but in which this control helps to bring such consciousness into being.

The racism which imperial regimes practise manifests itself in a variety of ways. In the first place, we can identify ideology, which varies from the fairly inclusive USSR to the overtly exclusive Nazis. In between we can identify, for example, the British and Ottoman Empires. Ideology manifests itself in a variety of ways including decisions upon who holds power. In the Nazi, Ottoman and British cases, this depended upon possessing the correct racial, religious, or ethnic credentials; in the Soviet case, ideological soundness played a determining role. Most empires carry out acts of persecution, often in the most extreme form of genocide. However, some of the worst cases of mass killing have taken place when nation states, with their exclusive nationalistic ideologies, have replaced more inclusive polyethnic entities.

Ideology

Empire may not have invented racial ideology, but racism became an ideology in the age of empire in the decades leading up to the First World War. The fathers of racial ideology, such as Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau and Robert Knox, created racial hierarchies in the middle of the nineteenth century at a time when Europeans increasingly came into contact with peoples throughout the world whom they found unfamiliar and therefore rationalised the differences which they perceived precisely by establishing racial hierarchies (see

e.g. Biddiss 1970; Lorimer 1978). However, while many European empires came into contact with people beyond Europe, others racialised those they found on their doorstep. The main focus of nineteenth-century British imperial racism may have consisted of the people it controlled in Africa, Asia, and the West Indies, but the subjected people of the colony on the British doorstep, Ireland, also found themselves constructed into a different race (Curtis 1971). Similarly, while the German Empire may have utilised the same racist ideology in the territories which it seized beyond Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, (Conrad 2011) German racial ideologues also began to racialise the people whom it controlled in Poland, seized by Prussia during the course of the eighteenth century (Broszat 1972).

Racial ideology played a central role in the classic colonial empires which emerged during the course of the nineteenth century. However, the most overt example of racism and empire consists of the self-appointed Third Reich, which controlled most of Europe during the Second World War. The ideas upon which it operated essentially put into action the views of Nazi ideologues, especially Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. At the top of the racial hierarchy stood the German Aryans, who essentially had the role of controlling the territories that the Nazis had seized because of their imagined racial purity and superior intellectual ability. In order to make Nazi dreams come true, the new masters of Eastern Europe had to utilise the power of the indigenous populations of the territories they conquered in the form of Slavs, whom they could work to death if necessary. In this new and perverted Garden of Eden, some groups would face expulsion (the unhealthy, the Roma and the Jews) because the racial ideology and hierarchy constructed by the Nazis meant that they should face extermination (for an introduction, see Burleigh and Wippermann 1991).

Other empires practised racism in less obvious ways. The Ottoman Empire controlled a variety of ethnic groups in the territories which it had conquered in the Balkans from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Some of these would certainly have had advanced concepts of their own religious

and perhaps ethnic identity (at least in a pre-modern sense), including the Orthodox Serbs and Greeks. While the empire may have carried out acts of persecution when sweeping westwards, one of the reasons why these identities evolved into nationalism from the end of the eighteenth century was that the Ottomans recognised their existence through the millet system, which allowed different religious groups to continue functioning and practising their own faiths. This gave an element of multi-ethnicity to the Ottoman Empire, although this had its limits as Muslims remained at the top of the tree and multi-ethnicity only functioned as long as the controlling ideology did not come under threat. When it *did* come under threat, as the Empire began to collapse during the course of the nineteenth century, those who threatened the status quo would face the consequences (Quataert 2005).

One of the least racist empires was the USSR. While it does not always attract the label of empire, it operated in this way in many senses, being ultimately controlled from the central point of Moscow, and building on the foundations laid by its Tsarist predecessors who had expanded their domains from this point. While the decades leading up to the First World War had witnessed the implementation of a policy of Russification, which meant the suppression of a variety of ethnicities (Weeks 1996), the Soviet Union operated in a different way. In theory, no racism existed in the Soviet Union. Rather like the Ottoman Empire, the USSR tried to maintain control by recognising, perpetuating, and even creating ethnic difference (see e.g. Martin 2001), as long as it did not threaten the status quo. However, once it did, as happened during the Second World War, those who questioned the system would, like nationalists in the late Ottoman Empire, face the consequences in the form of ethnic cleansing, especially in connection with perceived and real acts of treachery which followed the arrival of German armies during the Second World War.

Imperialism and the Practice of Racism

The racial ideologies which form the basis of imperialism manifest themselves in a variety of ways, including the implementation of hierarchies and the practice of persecution. This is especially so when the established order expands or feels threatened by ideologies, above all modern nationalism, which threaten the status quo. Even in the case of the ethnically egalitarian USSR, the Empire carried out acts of persecution against those perceived as threatening it.

The millet system within the Ottoman Empire only functioned on the basis of the Muslims maintaining their position at the top of the tree, which manifested itself in a variety of ways by the end of the eighteenth century. While there was a certain equality in terms of the right to religious worship, clothing laws, for example, distinguished people according to social status and ethnicity. At the same time, while all law courts may have been equal, Muslim courts were more equal than the rest (Quataert 2005: 142–194).

As well as creating and perpetuating structures of ethnic exclusion, the Ottoman Empire also carried out acts of extreme persecution, especially during its rise and fall. The expansion of the Empire into the Balkans meant acts of extreme intolerance in the context of medieval warfare carried out against a series of groups which they conquered, including Greeks, Bosnians, and Bulgarians (Kinross 1977; Malcolm 1994: 43–50; Palmer 1992; Wheatcroft 1995: 1–22).

The rise of nationalism during the course of the nineteenth century fully revealed the nature of Ottoman intolerance as the patriarchal and dying entity came under threat from new and more dynamic belief systems which, by attempting to split away from the established Empire, appeared to threaten its very existence. While a variety of ethnic groupings faced the wrath of the Ottomans, those which would experience some of the most extreme persecution included the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Armenians. The reaction towards the rise of Greek nationalism in many ways set the scene for what would occur over the next century. The revolt of the Greeks in the 1820s instantly resulted in their repression, which included the brutal hanging of the patriarch of Constantinople. Ultimately, this act of vengeance, like many of those which followed over the next century, would prove futile with the emergence of the first Greek state in the 1830s

(Clogg 2002: 17–97). Similarly, the 'Bulgarian Massacres' of 1876 could not prevent the formation of 'large Bulgaria' (Crampton 1997; Jelavich 1983: 346–348). On the other hand, the late Ottoman Empire carried out its most extreme acts of persecution against the group, which did not ultimately emerge into a nation state until the end of the Soviet Empire in the form of the Armenians. They differed from most of those which would emerge into nationhood because of their location in core Anatolia, rather than the ultimately peripheral and dispensable Balkans. While the Armenian genocide, like the 'population exchange' between Greece and Turkey, happened at the end of empire, less extreme acts occurred against them before the final death throes of this entity in the First World War and its aftermath. For example, in 1894 3,000 Armenians were murdered in Sasun, while in the following September an Armenian demonstration in Constantinople led to the murder of thousands of Armenians. In August 1896, a further 20,000–30,000 may have been killed while another peak of late pre-War persecution occurred with the Adana Massacre of 1909 (Kevorkian 2011; Walker 1990: 136–242).

The British Empire overtly operated upon the principle of superiority of the white races. On the one hand, this manifested itself in the ideologies about conquered peoples which had emerged from the first imperial encounters of the seventeenth century and would become increasingly sophisticated during the 19th. At the same time, acts of extreme intolerance also occurred, especially against native Americans from the seventeenth century and indigenous Australians subsequently. Finally, as in the case of other empires, a hierarchy developed in which white Protestants held the upper hand in imperial administration, despite examples of local autonomy which emerged from the nineteenth century (see e.g. Daunton and Halpern 1999; Evans 1988; Rich 1990; Schwarz 2011; Trautmann 1997).

The most extreme example of an empire which practised persecution was the Third Reich. Born in an expansionist war aimed at acquiring territory in Eastern Europe, the Nazi regime implemented the hierarchy which had emerged in German racist ideology since the early nineteenth century. At the top stood the Germans, comprising both invaders and the millions who had lived in Eastern Europe for centuries, either as a legacy of the collapsed Austro-Hungarian Empire, or as a result of migration which had taken place eastwards. They would now find themselves a privileged ruling elite. Below them stood a range of racial undesirables who would face the twentieth century's worst acts of racism.

Nazi anti-Semitism meant the attempted elimination of all Jews on the European continent, initially through ghettoisation and consequent starvation; then though the actions of the mobile killing units (*Einsatzgruppen*), which carried out mass shootings and also utilised local anti-Semites throughout Eastern Europe; and, finally, by the use of the gas chambers concentrated in the Polish death camps. These formed part of a vast system of incarceration throughout Europe, which had initially emerged in the Nazi German homeland in the 1930s. In all, 5,933,900 out of 8,861,800 Jews in the countries occupied by the Nazis were murdered, meaning a death rate of 67% (for an excellent outline, see Dawidowicz 1987).

The outbreak of the Second World War meant that the Nazis also decided upon a 'Final Solution' to the 'Gypsy Question'. As many as 500,000 Roma may have perished as a result of this decision. The fact that the Nazis were not as focused upon exterminating European Gypsies as they were upon eradicating the European Jews meant that the former had a higher survival rate despite the Nazis using similar methods of extermination. Following the invasion of Poland, they initially found themselves concentrated in the ghettos. In November 1941 they were gathered in the Lódz ghetto with a view to their extermination, subsequently being sent to the death camp at Chelmno. At Auschwitz, a separate sub-camp was created for Gypsies ('B II e'), where they were subjected to the experiments of Josef Me ngele (see e.g. Lewy 2000).

While the Nazis implemented genocide against the Jews and Roma, the third major group which they came across in Eastern Europe, in the form of the majority Slavic populations, also had their role to play in the new order. Building upon racial ideology which had emerged during the course of the nineteenth century and which had

marginalised Eastern Europeans, they were now viewed as subhuman. Consequently, the invaders had no hesitation in killing either soldiers or civilians. The Soviet Union, as the homeland of both the supposedly racially inferior Slavs and communism, suffered particularly badly, resulting in the deaths of up to 20 million of its citizens and the destruction of around 1,700 towns and 70,000 villages. The invading Nazis commandeered agricultural produce, shot all communists, and brutally treated prisoners of war, meaning that about 3.3 million of the 5.7 million seized between June 1941 and May 1944 died, mostly due to starvation, although the SS may have executed about half a million (Förster 1986; Kumanev 1990; Mayer 1990: 259–275). The real role of the Slavic populations of Eastern Europe in the new Nazi order was as workers under the control of German masters. At the same time as utilising the labour power of the populations it came across on the ground, the regime also imported millions of Eastern Europeans to work in agriculture and in the armaments factories of mainland Germany (Herbert 1997).

A series of explanations presents itself for the level of persecution which the Nazis carried out. In the first place, the leader, the party, and much of the German population believed in a dynamic racial ideology which established and then implemented ethnic hierarchies. Just as importantly, the acts of genocide occurred in the age of Total War, when the killing of both soldiers and civilians became a central aspect of everyday life throughout the European continent.

While not quite on the same scale as the actions of the Nazis, the Soviet Empire also implemented acts of ethnic cleansing during the course of the Second World War against those regarded as having committed treachery. As we have seen, during the 1920s and 1930s this regime acted in some respects in a fairly egalitarian way in ethnic terms, even though it had murdered millions of people because of their social status.

Language policy provides an indication of egalitarianism, although it also indicates contradictions. The Bolsheviks believed in the equality of all languages and opposed the dominance of Russian. By the middle of the 1930s, native language schools had therefore opened in all regions of the country and textbooks were printed in 104 different languages. However, at the same time as native languages were extended, so was Russification, a process actively pursued from the late 1930s and continued after the Second World War. After 1945, the Soviet state pursued a policy of bilingualism, with an emphasis on Russian. Soviet language planning therefore had two clear but inevitable and contradictory results. On the one hand, minority languages survived and thrived in many cases, despite the disappearance of some. On the other hand, use of Russian clearly expanded. According to the census of 1970, the Soviet Union had 130 ethnic groupings which spoke 130 different languages (for an introduction to Soviet language policy, see e.g. Anderson and Silver 1992; Bilinsky 1968; Comrie 1981; Lewis 1972).

While nationality policy may have demonstrated elements of ethnic tolerance, religious policy did not, as the example of the fate of Muslims in the Soviet Union demonstrates. Islam experienced extreme repression during the early days of Stalin in the late 1920s and early 1930s, which meant the arrest and deportation of nearly all religious functionaries, the closure of virtually all of the 25,000 mosques which had existed in 1917 as well as Muslim schools, and the threat of dismissal of Soviet officials practising their religion. Some revival took place during the Second World War, although further repression followed under Khrushchev (see e.g. Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985; Pipes 1955).

One Muslim group, the Crimean Tatars, would face even more extreme persecution during the Second World War as a result of their perceived connection with the enemy. During the 1930s, a process of Sovietisation meant an attempt at assimilation and consequent alienation of the Crimean Tatars. During the Second World War, some fought on the side of the Nazis and, while others played a part in the Red Army, Stalin's vengeance was total. Immediately after the expulsion of the Nazis in the spring of 1944, all Tatars who had served in the German armed forces were executed. The rest of the population faced deportation to the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and

Central Asia, mostly Uzbekistan. Of the 110,000 people deported, about 46% died in an action tantamount to genocide (Nekrich 1978).

The Soviet Germans suffered a similar fate because of their perceived connection with the Nazis. This complex ethnic group had resided throughout Russia for several centuries. In the early Soviet Union they had actually done quite well, as indicated by the establishment of the Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of the Volga Germans in January 1924. During the Second World War, as a result of accusations of acting as an internal front for the invading Nazi armies, the Soviets dissolved the Volga Republic and deported its German populations out of European Russia and into Siberia and Central Asia, a process which took several years. As a consequence of the expulsion of the Germans from European Russia, the numbers of Germans in the Soviet Union decreased because of movement out of the Soviet Union, either into Germany, or, in a few thousand cases, beyond the European continent (Pinkus 1986).

Imperial Collapse

Some of the worst imperial persecution of ethnic groups has occurred when empires collapse, being committed either by the regimes themselves or by those which succeed them as, in both cases, a move occurs away from any semblance of multiethnicity or diversity towards monoethnic nationalism. This has happened especially during the course of the twentieth century, as seen in the fall of the Ottoman and British Empires.

The end of the Ottoman Empire provides one of the best examples of such processes in action. As we have seen, the Turks became increasingly intolerant as they lost territory during the course of the nineteenth century. However, at the same time as they persecuted those they regarded as treacherous, Muslim populations which remained in territories lost by the Empire became victims of some of the earliest acts of what would become known as ethnic cleansing during the course of the twentieth century (McCarthy 1996). The worst

intolerance occurred in the era of the First World War, beginning with the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and ending with the 'population exchange' between Greece and Turkey during 1922–23. These events occurred against the background of the death of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, replaced by excluding nation states such as Greece and Bulgaria, which tried to eliminate their Muslim and other 'enemy' populations by deportation. At the same time, within Turkey itself, the Ottoman ideology, which had accepted diversity upon its own terms, now found itself controlled by a more dynamic and exclusionist Turkish nationalism which undertook the same acts of ethnic cleansing (but on a much larger and more ruthless scale) as those states which replaced it in the Balkans. As during the Second World War, the unravelling of the Ottoman Empire and its consequences for minorities took place against the background of Total War, when killing of soldiers and civilians became part of everyday life.

As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 involving Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia, populations with the wrong ethnic credentials found themselves living in areas controlled by governments with which they had no ethnic affiliation. The area acquired by Greece to the north of its existing territories included a minority of Greeks, with a larger percentage of Bulgarians and Turks, some of whom faced expulsion (Dakin 1972: 190–200).

The worst act of intolerance occurred during the First World War, in what has become known as the Armenian Genocide. Under threat from the Turkish authorities, it is estimated that between 1.5 million and 2 million people fled their homes in south-eastern Anatolia towards the Syrian desert, of whom about half died, while others fled westward as refugees (Melson 1992: 145–146). These events took place not only against the background of war and rising nationalism, but were rooted in the resentments which had characterised relations between Turks and Armenians over the preceding century. The spark for the genocide came from the idea that Armenians had fought with the Russians against the Ottoman Empire, which faced defeat at the

Battle of Sarikamiş in January 1915. At the same time, the Armenians differed from many of the national groups that lived in the Balkans because of their location in the heart of Anatolia. Ultimately, during the Ottoman Empire's collapse, its Balkan, Middle Eastern, and North African territories became dispensable as the newly emerging Turkish nationalists became determined to hold on to Asia Minor.

For this reason over a million Greeks, whose ancestors had lived on the Aegean coast of Turkey around Smyrna for millennia, found themselves deported to Greece in 'exchange' for several hundred thousand Muslims from Greece following the Greco- Turkish War of 1921–22 (Hirschon 2003). The new slimmed-down Turkey felt that it needed to eliminate all surplus populations with the wrong ethnic credentials, especially those perceived as having connections with internal and external enemies.

Other empires have also declined in similarly, if not equally, bloody circumstances. While Britain may ultimately have surrendered most of its possessions in a relatively peaceful way, reactions to rising nationalism often proved hostile. In India, we can point to examples such as the suppression of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 or the Amritsar Massacre in 1921 (see e.g. Collett 2005; David 2002). However, the worst acts of genocide in the case of British imperial decline occurred in the immediate aftermath of the retreat from India, as the newly emerged and dynamic nationalisms of India and Pakistan, mirroring similar nationalisms which had developed in the Balkans, ethnically cleansed themselves of over 10 million of their perceived Muslim and Hindu enemies (Talbot and Singh 2009).

At the same time as this 'population displacement' occurred, so did the ethnic cleansing of Germans from Eastern Europe, as the short-lived Nazi Empire collapsed. As many as 13 million Germans may have fled westwards towards rump Germany between 1944 and 1947. These included people who simply escaped the advancing Soviet armies. However, much of the migration occurred as a result of the movement westward of the Soviet border. In turn, the Polish border also moved further to the west, leading to an ethnic cleansing of German parts of Poland. Those nation states invaded by, but now liberated from, the Nazis (including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania) also expelled their ethnic German populations, which had lived in these nation states before they had emerged as such entities in the fall-out from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 (see e.g. Bethlehem 1982; de Zayas 1993).

Conclusion

Racism therefore characterises empires not only during their existence but also their aftermath. All of these entities produce some sort of racial and ethnic hierarchies, implemented in varying ways. At the most extreme, we can point to the genocidal Nazis, who had no pretence of equality of peoples in their imperial entity, but instead wished to create the racial hierarchies which had emerged in German right-wing thought over more than a century. At the other extreme we might point to the ethnically egalitarian Soviet Union, which, however, could carry out acts of persecution against those perceived as treacherous, illustrated by the fate of Germans and Tatars during the Second World War. At the same time, those who held on too strongly to their religiously based ethnic identity could also face persecution. In between the Soviets and the Nazis, we can identify empires such as the British and Ottoman ones, where a type of de facto ethnic diversity existed, but in which white Britons and Muslims remained top dogs. Those who threatened this hierarchy faced persecution.

However, some of the worst examples of ethnic and racial persecution have occurred as empires have declined and collapsed. On the one hand, the imperial powers have reacted badly to a change in the status quo in the systems they have established, as the example of the Ottomans in the nineteenth century illustrates. Yet the final unravelling of empire reveals new forms of intolerance, as the old order collapses. New nationalisms reject any concepts of diversity which may have existed, as they wish to create new ethnically pure entities.

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Radiation Health and Environmental Effects

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Refugees

Refugees and Empire

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Definition

Emerging in its modern form at the beginning of the twentieth century from the ashes of European empires, the modern refugee institution has functioned since then as a discursive and material cog for the assertion and upholding of key principles and practices in the international sphere, and of the hierarchies associated to them. The refugee is and has always been deeply implicated with the disruption, establishment and consolidation of international politico-institutional orders.

The Refugee and Institutional Order

Contemporary theorisations of imperialism and empire, in their disparate analytical approaches and political inclinations, share a particular concern with the figure of the refugee. This is not surprising, as histories of empires and refugeeing are inextricably linked to each other. Emerging in its modern form at the beginning of the twentieth century from the ashes of European empires, the modern refugee institution has functioned since then as a discursive and material cog for the assertion and upholding of key principles and practices in the international sphere, and of the hierarchies associated to them. The refugee is and has always been deeply implicated with the disruption, establishment and consolidation of international politico-institutional orders.

'Refugee' is the Anglicised version of the French term *réugié*, a term that had been used in France since the high medieval period to denote people fleeing religious persecution. The term derives from the Latin *fugere* (to flee) and the prefix *re* (back to, return), referring to a person fleeing back to safety (Soguk 1999). The

connotation of the refugee as a person who simultaneously escapes and returns, to safety in this case, is crucial for understanding the liminal character of the refugee institution as a figure in between politico-institutional orders, simultaneously an evidence of failure and a confirmation for such orders. Indeed, while in those days safety was primarily defined in terms of refugees' escape – the *fugere* – its contemporary usage is premised on refugees' re-turn to the 'protective' embrace of the inter-state system.

The most widely recognised definition of who is a refugee was delineated in the wake of the Second World War, and is contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. The Convention establishes that a refugee is a person who can be determined to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion; who is outside the country of his nationality; and who is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (UNHCR 2005). This definition evidences the nature of the refugee as an element of both confirmation and disruption of politico-institutional orders. On one side, the definition asserts and universalises state-centred interpretations of social life. A person is a refugee as a result of his or her escape from state persecution; a person can become a refugee only through the recognition of his or her claims by state authority. On the other side, the definition enables forms of inter- and transnational governance. Its normative content legitimises, in fact in many cases demands, the operations of inter-governmental bodies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and transnational and local non-state organisations; it generates global humanitarian discourses, regional programmes, and sectorwide 'best practices' for the protection and assistance of refugees; it engenders activities, propositions, critiques, and manipulations (Novak 2013).

The refugee has always been implicated in practices of state making and intergovernmental regimentation: refugee migrations are the product of crises or at least of profound changes in forms of government, while at the same time producing new forms of government (Soguk 1999). The refugee is a limit concept (Nyers 1999), a person inhabiting a liminal space (Malkki 1995) within accepted forms of institutional order.

The liminality of the refugee thus conceived makes it crucial to contemporary theorisations of empire and imperialism. The latter find a confirmation of their analytical propositions, by focusing alternatively on the *exceptional* character of the refugee, on its constitutive *force,* or on the material forces that shape and sustain refugee-related operations (Novak 2011 makes a similar categorisation).

The Refugee Exception

The author who more forcefully explores the institutional liminality of the refugee is Giorgio Agamben. Agamben's work is premised on Carl Schmitt's formulation that the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the law. The simultaneity of this condition is what constitutes the paradox of sovereignty: the sovereign, possessing the legal power to suspend the law, puts himself or herself legally outside the law (Agamben 1995). Such a zone of indistinction between public law and political fact represents sovereignty's *limit,* understood as both its beginning and end: it represents the foundational moment of sovereign power; it includes through exclusion. This understanding of sovereign power is associated to the figure of the *homo sacer*, a condition or form of life described as bare, that is, naked or depoliticised. Excluded from both divine and juridical law, *homo sacer* similarly exists in a no man's land, at the threshold between the spaces of law (Mitchell 2006). *Homo sacer* is the excess of the process of sovereign political foundation: he is excluded from the normal limits of the state, yet as the limit upon which sovereign power is founded, he is also simultaneously an integral part of it (Kumar Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004).

The figure of *homo sacer* is, and has been, readily associated with that of the refugee. As the embodiment of citizenship and statehood

boundaries, in fact, the refugee reifies such boundaries, rendering their meaning concrete. As a residual (excremental, as Agamben would put it) subject who can be encompassed neither territorially nor in relation to the nation, however, the refugee simultaneously challenges that norm. The UN Convention definition above and more broadly refugee law re-encompass within the inter-state system what escapes from the trinity 'nation–state–territory', thus defusing such challenge. The refugee represents the 'exception' on which the norm relies.

It is the exposure of the political act hidden in the refugee definition – that of considering human life exclusively in relation to sovereignty and citizenship – which makes the refugee exception crucial for capturing, from this perspective, the imperial order of our times. On one side, the refugee represents a disquieting element in the order of the nation state, because it breaks the identity between the human and the citizen, that is, it conceives human beings exclusively by deference or reference to the nation state; the refugee brings the fiction of sovereignty to a crisis (Agamben 2008). On the other side, in a context like the contemporary one, where growing sections of humankind are no longer representable through nation state frameworks, the act of re-drawing boundaries of inclusion and exclusion signals the constitution of new forms of sovereign power. Indeed, one of the principal lessons of imperialism is that the historical and geographical specificity of certain spaces is linked to the specifiability of certain people (Reid-Henry 2007), and it is from this perspective that the refugee acquires analytical prominence in contemporary theorisations of empire and imperialism.

To transpose Agamben's reflections on the state of exception to our contemporary world, in fact, theorisations that follow this analytical perspective portray the events of '9/11', and the exceptional response that ensued, as the foundational moment in the constitution of a new imperial order. Through this optic, places like Guantanamo (Aradau 2007), or the exceptional geographies delineated by the 'War on Terror', can be seen as archetypical examples of the spaces of exception defining the political *nomos* of our contemporary world (Minca 2006). Similarly, detention centres for irregular migrants (Perera 2002) and refugee camps in Tanzania (Turner 2005) or Kenya (Jayi 2011), as much as, more broadly, the treatment of irregular migrants (Kumar Rajaram 2006), are portrayed as reconfiguring world spaces into a colonial present.

Agamben's concern with boundaries of inclusion or exclusion into the political space is at the centre of theorisations of imperialism premised on the exceptional power to define the realm of the political. The refugee, as a liminal body that exposes the self-contained institutional order between sovereignty, law, and the inter-state system, is thus a central figure of our time: it exposes those who hold the sovereign power to define the realm of the political. Indeed, the key insight offered by Agamben for understanding the contemporary world is his suggestion that democratic liberal governments are becoming totalitarian states through the powers of exceptionalism. No longer temporary or occasional, the state of exception has become the rule (Mitchell 2006).

The Refugee and Its Force

The relation between liberal governments and the refugee is also at the centre of a second strand of imperial theorisations, which, rather than focusing on the sovereign's act of exclusion, emphasises the enabling and generative dimension of the refugee institution, that is, its *force* in constituting new politico-institutional governance regimes. These contributions are mostly, albeit not exclusively, premised on the work of Michel Foucault, particularly on the concepts of productive power (Foucault 1981) and governmentality (1991), and thus emphasise the productive, that is, enabling and generative, nature of the refugee institution. Rather than seeing the refugee as a conceptual category at the threshold, and constitutive, of sovereign power, these contributions are concerned with the refugee as an object of thought and intervention, and on the discursive and material effects of contemporary refugee-related and humanitarian interventions.

Nezvat Soguk's account is exemplary in this respect because of the extreme depth and span of its research, as well as its theoretical rigour. Soguk (1999) traces the political rationalities and technologies of government that transformed the refugee into a practical field of governmental activity, through the identification of the refugee's three essential elements (a state-based territoriality, the establishment of a nationality–law nexus, its inter-governmental regimentation). These elements are associated to a centuries-long process of institutional transformation marked by three episodes of displacement – the displacement of the Huguenots, the French Revolution émigrés, and post-First World War displaced populations across Europe – that represent key moments for the definition of law-making practices in relation to territory, nationality, and inter-governmental regimentation respectively. By constituting refugee displacement as a problem of government, the refugee enables and defines the contours of a wide range of protection and assistance practices, an 'ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of a very specific albeit complex form of power' (Foucault 1991, p. 102): a form of power that attempts to shape and direct human conduct towards specific ends.

At its broadest, thus, refugee interventions are variously portrayed from this perspective as an expression of liberal rationalities of government (Lippert 1999), as forms of governance that stabilise, reconfigure, and reproduce world hierarchies (Nyers 1999) and that are geopolitical in their nature and intent (Lui 2002), despite their humanitarian justifications. Interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine thus enable the creation of an 'architecture of enmity', which reconfigures international relations into a colonial present (Gregory 2004, pp. 17–29).

Duffield (2001) most forcefully develops the link between so-called complex humanitarian emergencies and neo-colonial forms of liberal imperialism. Setting his analysis in relation to the so-called new wars characterising the context of globalisation, he questions the motives justifying humanitarian interventions, seeing them as a pretext to bypass the principle of sovereignty and to establish a global governance regime premised on liberal ideas. Such regime brings together governments, non-governmental organisations, military establishments, and private companies in complex and cross-cutting governance networks operating from the supranational to the local level. These networks are the vehicles of neoliberal governmentality, and attempt to impose a radical agenda of social transformation to which states are subordinated. This is part of a strategy that, establishing a link between security, development, and humanitarianism, attempts to spread Western liberal states' influence and control over illiberal regimes and so-called global borderlands, thus consolidating their external frontiers. Although premised on equality and democracy and the rights and freedoms of people, the effect of such form of governance is to institutionalise hierarchies among peoples and states (Duffield 2007).

Drawing from a far wider range of political and philosophical sources, and in more controversial, but also influential, ways, Hardt and Negri (2002) similarly premise their understanding of empire as a post-sovereignty and all-encompassing networked form of government, on the creative and generative power of refugees, understood here as part of a multitude. However, rather than seeing refugees as the enabling object of intervention upon which global governance regimes are premised, they see the multitude's constituent power as the best hope for a progressive transformation of the current socio-political order, as it is on its constitutive power that empire's rule rests. In their understanding, the humanitarian complex, that is, the ensemble of organisations, agencies, and principles informing humanitarian and developmental actions, is one of the pillars sustaining a new form of political rule, which does not possess any single locatable source, or any territorial centre of power. It is a global political order that accompanies the globalisation of capital, and that is premised on the establishment of flexible hierarchies and networks of command. Empire has no limits: it progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers, and it operates on all registers of

the social order extending down to the depths of the social world. The refugee, the irregular migrant, and all those who compose the multitude are the expression of a counterimperial ontology that attempts to disrupt empire, by destabilising its foundation.

The Refugee and His or Her Material Forces

A third strand of theorisations concerned with the relation between the refugee and imperialism sets instead the refugee institution and refugee-related intervention in relation to historical and material contexts shaped by capitalism and geopolitics. Although engaging with the refugee as a conceptual category and as the object of concern of humanitarian interventions, these contributions tend to emphasise the geopolitical nature of the former, and the instrumentality of the latter in serving the interests of powerful states. This approach is sceptical towards the ontological concerns of the previous two strands, and reaffirms more traditional understandings of imperialism as a state project. Analytical attention is thus concerned with highlighting the *material forces* of production that shape the structure of society in any given historical moment. From this perspective, the refugee plays the role of a ruse, hiding the imperial projects of powerful states, most notably the US.

At their broadest, political-economy conceptualisations of the refugee reject residual understandings of this institution, that is, definitions that are based on the notion of lack of protection, such as that contained in the above UN Convention. Rather, they emphasise the historically evolving process of production of the refugee institution, the contextual and dynamic processes and practices of its social re-production, and the productive forces underpinning both. Such relational understanding of the refugee entangles both refugee migrations and humanitarian aid with national and international politico-economic structures (Novak 2013). Most notably, such narratives conflate the US's geopolitical interests with capital's endless accumulation drive. The dispossession of resources and environmental degradation, privatisation, and all those processes associated to the current bout of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005) produce refugee displacement by crafting profoundly unequal and violent political and economic contexts; refugee-related interventions and their geopolitical rationales provide a convenient fig leaf for the re-production of such imperatives and rationales.

Through this optic, emphasis is therefore given to the strategic dimensions associated with refugee protection, as seen from the perspective of powerful states. The above UN Convention definition, thus, premised refugee protection on civil and political rights, as opposed to socio-economic rights, because it facilitated, in the context of the Cold War, the condemnation of Soviet politics against ideological dissent. It emphasised state persecution on the basis of religion, race, or membership in a social group, because these issues were historically problematic for the Eastern Bloc. Its selective and intermittent use, as much as the historically changing attitudes towards asylum at global level since then, function as a confirmation of the inextricable relation between the refugee and the interests of powerful nations (Chimni 2000).

Indeed, evidence supporting the materiality of such relation can be traced to the strategic deployment of the various principles embedded in the above refugee definition. The latter embodies and reproduces all the contradictions and tensions characterising modern international relations: the frictions between universality of human rights and territorial sovereignty; the compromise between individual and state rights; the contradictory principles aspired to by the Charter of the UN, such as state sovereignty, national self-determination, democracy, and respect for human rights. The emphasis on one or the other such principles, in different geographical contexts and historical moments, demonstrates how these principles are a ruse, and ultimately serve the interests of countries like the US in their attempt to deny sovereignty to countries such as Iraq (Bellamy Foster et al. 2008) or Afghanistan (McLaren and Martin 2004). Humanitarian interventions,

together with state-building and development policies and practices, transform international relations and reconfigure relations between non-Western states and their societies; they are an expression of imperial power, which acts by hiding its actors behind a language of democracy, human rights, and humanitarianism, thus denying the possibility of holding them accountable. Empire is in denial (Chandler 2006).

Of course, these same principles can be used to reach conclusions that stand in a diametrically opposite position vis-à-vis those put forward by the above analyses. Advocates of empire condemn human rights violations and lack of democracy, and highlight the threats posed by failed and rogue states, all of which are said to be causes of refugee displacement. Niall Ferguson's (2004) nostalgia for empire, as much as the call by Robert Cooper (2002) for a new liberal imperialism based on the principles of the UN Charter, mentioned above, was making headlines at the turn of the millennium. The seemingly systemic crises of the last decade, however, seem to have silenced these invocations – it is hoped for good.

Refugees and Institutional Incompleteness

The theorisations presented above offer alternative, albeit often overlapping, conceptualisations of the relation between imperialism, empire, and refugees. Whether focusing on the exceptional character of the refugee as a conceptual category, on refugee displacement as generative of networked forms of imperial rule, or on refugee migrations and interventions as a confirmation of more traditional understandings of state-centred imperialism, they substantiate the proposition that the refugee is a key political figure of our times. Indeed, the major insights offered by these contributions to the long tradition of theories of imperialism stem precisely from their ability to systematically and convincingly connect the figure of the refugee with the establishment of imperial institutional orders.

However, there are limitations to their analytical frameworks, which stem from the all-

encompassing nature in which they define those connections. Surely, the global reach and the extent of the forms of imperial power that these frameworks uncover beg for theorisations that capture these relations at its broadest. This is what makes the above analyses powerful, and analytically useful for the identification of imperial projects, their key agents and institutions, and their overarching power. Yet by starting their analysis from, and emphasising the decidedly global nature of, imperial politico-institutional orders, the theorisations explored above develop the connection between such orders and refugees *away from* the latter. Implicitly or explicitly, this connection is seen as unidirectional, unfolding in a top-down way: the multiple contingencies and contextual occurrences through which such connection concretely takes shape across the world are the result of the more or less resisted but nonetheless direct consequence of imperial projects, and the more or less coercive power of their key agents. Such contingencies and occurrences, in other words, are treated as 'parochial': they occupy a second-order rung in the analytical scaffolding of contemporary imperial theorisations (Novak 2011). All episodes of refugee displacement, protection, and assistance, thus, can ultimately be explained by an already existing imperial project, and identifying the most convincing of these theorisations becomes a matter of (intellectual and political) *faith*.

Put differently, while these theorisations make broad claims about how the world as a whole or a big part of it actually worked and work, most of these contributions evince little curiosity about the extent and limitations of the knowledge necessary to make those kinds of statements. The *naming* of empire as a form of power to be embraced or feared contributes little to political debate. Extracting a moral from historical context and trajectories, and turning it into a policy recommendation, diminishes politics as well as history. Thinking about the varied ways in which power has been exercised, constrained, and contested – within and beyond empires – may help to open the political imagination and focus the mind on the stakes and the consequences of political action (Cooper 2004, p. 272).

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Examining the concrete operational mechanisms of refugee-related interventions in their historical and geographical diversity, on the contrary, foregrounds the wide variety of discursive, institutional, and material practices associated to the refugee institution, as well as refugees' own strategies and projects of engagement and interaction with them. Imperial 'orders' centred on the figure of the refugee do not respond to a singular logic, they do not completely fulfil the objectives they set themselves, and neither do they produce uniform outcomes. Refugee-related interventions unfold at a variety of scales and operate in multiple directions: they are seized, deflected, and manipulated by various humanitarian bodies and organisations, and by refugees themselves. Foregrounding the limits of such imperial politico-institutional orders, that is, the contextually mediated ways in which these 'orders' dynamically and concretely take shape in different contexts, renders the relation between imperialism, empire, and the refugee always incomplete (Novak 2011).

This does not mean denying the existence of empire or of imperial projects. Rather, grounding the arguably disembodied imperial theorisations presented above interrogates the imperial scale of analysis as pre-given and discrete from other levels of analysis; it attempts to capture the relation between imperial projects and refugees in an embodied way, by epistemologically situating and grounding cartographies of imperialism centred on the figure of the refugee. Such embodied epistemology may have the potential to subvert dominant geopolitical narratives, and may have concrete effects on the lives of people who are players in such events (Hyndman 2004). Indeed, focusing on the multi-scalar operations that define the connection between empires and refugees, *makes more visible the forces and agents that negotiate their existence around the refugee institution, and in so doing reproduce themselves* (Sinha 2008). From this perspective, then, the incompleteness of imperial politico-institutional 'orders' may well be a form of political rule (Bhatt 2007) as it reproduces the hierarchy of *material forces* brought together by the generative *force* of the refugee *exception*.

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Reggae Blues, National Anthems

▶ Music, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism

Regime Change

▶ Chomsky, Noam (b.1928) and Anti-imperialism

▶ Nicaragua and Contemporary American Imperialism

Religion

▶ Counter-discursive Practices of Vodou: Challenges to Haitian Imperialism

Remittances

▶ Immigration and Imperialism

Renationalisation

▶ Nationalisation

Repression

▶ Ethiopia, Revolution, and Soviet Social Imperialism

Republicanism

▶ James Connolly: Labor, Empire, Ireland

Resistance

▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism

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Resistance to Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1856–1983

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Caribbean; Colonialism;
Imperialism

Definition

When Christopher Columbus, a representative of
King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain, landed
on the shores of Guanahani (now Watling Islands in
the Bahamas) in 1492, it marked the beginning of
Western European domination of the Caribbean
Basin, leading to the genocide of the indigenous
inhabitants of the region and the oppression of Afri-
cans and other Third-World people. While each var-
iant of colonialism was different, all the European
powers viewed the Caribbean islands as spaces for
exploitation of land, labour, and capital. Historically,
the region was divided into the English Caribbean,
the Dutch Caribbean, the French Caribbean, the
Spanish Caribbean, and the US Caribbean. However,
for the purposes of this discourse on Caribbean resis-
tance to imperialism, this essay focuses on the
English-speaking islands of the Caribbean. It exam-
ines Caribbean resistance to imperialism from differ-
ent time periods: post-emancipation to 1856–81,
1900–36, post-1936–1950s, 1960s–1970, and finally
from 1970–83.

When Christopher Columbus, a representative
of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain,
landed on the shores of Guanahani (now Watling
Islands in the Bahamas) in 1492, it marked
the beginning of Western European domination
of the Caribbean Basin, leading to the genocide of
the indigenous inhabitants of the region and the
oppression of Africans and other Third-World
people. Initially, Spain enjoyed sole ownership
of all the islands, which was made possible

when Pope Alexander VI issued The Papal Bull
'Inter Caetera' in 1493. Subsequently, with the
Spanish discoveries of gold and silver in Mexico
and Peru, other European nations such as
England, Holland, and France – which had been
excluded from the Treaty of Tordesillas (1495) –
laid claims to the Caribbean in the 16th century.
The region, therefore, was divided into the
Spanishspeaking Caribbean, the English-
speaking Caribbean, the Dutch-speaking Carib-
bean and the French-speaking Caribbean. While
each variant of colonialism was different, all the
European powers viewed the Caribbean islands as
spaces for exploitation of land, labour, and capital.

The Caribbean consists of many large and
small islands and three countries in Central and
South America. These entities include the Baha-
mas, Turks and Caicos, Cuba, Cayman Islands,
Belize, Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, Anguilla,
St Maarten, St Barthelemy, Antigua and Barbuda,
Saba, St Eustatius, St Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat,
Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, St Lucia,
St Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, Gre-
nada, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suri-
name. Historically, the region was divided into
the English Caribbean, the Dutch Caribbean, the
French Caribbean, the Spanish Caribbean, and the
US Caribbean. From the 15th century until the
enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, European
nations enjoyed hegemony in the region. While
Great Britain enjoyed the 'Lion's Share' in the
region, its dominance waned at the end of the
Second World War when the US became the dom-
inant superpower of the capitalist system. How-
ever, for the purposes of this discourse on Caribbean
resistance to imperialism, this essay focuses on the
English-speaking islands of the Caribbean. It exam-
ines Caribbean resistance to imperialism from dif-
ferent time periods: post-emancipation to 1856–81,
1900–36, post-1936–1950s, 1960s–1970, and
finally from 1970–83.

The Post-emancipation Period, 1856–81

In 1833, the British Parliament passed an act that
abolished slavery; however, this measure did not

mean that the ex-slaves in the British colonies enjoyed complete freedom. In order to appease the powerful planter class, the authorities compensated them to the tune of millions of British pounds and imposed a kind of apprenticeship on the ex-slaves for a period of five years until the system was abolished in 1838. While some of the ex-slaves continued to work as wage-labourers on the plantations, thousands left and became independent peasants, and others moved into urban areas where they engaged in occupations. However, their material life did not change significantly in the years following emancipation.

In the post-emancipation period, the former slaves were subjected to the same political and economic conditions that had prevailed under slavery. Many ex-slaves were willing to remain on the plantations and work for wages; however, the planters were not keen on offering a living wage and proper working conditions. One of the earliest forms of resistance to British imperialism that occurred during the post-emancipation period took place in Guyana in 1856. John Sayers Orr, a colourful preacher, used his sermons to address issues that affected the black and coloured population. Faced with discrimination and competition from the Portuguese immigrants who came to the colony as indentured servants, Orr and his followers rioted from 16–17 February 1856 in Georgetown when the authorities tried to suppress their meetings. The riot was not confined to Georgetown but also spread to Demerara and Essequibo.

Resistance also occurred in St Vincent in 1862. In their attempt to suppress wages, the British authorities initiated a policy of indentureship whereby they imported East Indians from India to work on plantations in St Vincent. The arrival of these immigrant workers created much anxiety among the African labour force. A slump in sugar prices further aggravated the situation and resulted in the slaves taking direct action to protect their interests. In St Vincent in 1862, when the price of sugar fell and the first ship arrived with Indian indentured workers and the planters took cost-cutting measures to suppress wages, the ex-slaves rioted. The exslaves not only protested but were willing to become independent producers.

In Jamaica, the ex-slaves wrote a petition to Queen Victoria requesting land to grow their own food. Rather than affirm their request, the Queen replied that the prosperity of the colony depended not on them becoming independent producers but rather wage earners, which would guarantee the prosperity of the British Empire. This response evoked anger among the black population and eventually led to the Morant Bay Uprising in 1865. Led by Paul Bogle, a small well-organised group of men and women raided the police station on 11 August and stole muskets and bayonets. This insurrection caused much rioting and looting and lasted for three days. The British authorities sent the warships *Wolverine* and *Onyx,* troops, and enlisted the maroons. Declaring martial law, the British imperialist and its representatives in Jamaica seized the upper hand and crushed the insurrection. Almost 430 men and women were either shot or executed and over 600 persons were flogged. Both Boyle and George William Gordon were tried by court martial and hanged. Even though the authorities crushed the opposition, it did not stop ex-slaves from rebelling against British imperial rule.

In Trinidad, in 1881, the 'Jamette', a group of lower-class black Trinidadians who formed street bands and participated in the Carnival celebrations, organised a planned resistance and rioted in the streets of Port of Spain for the right to stage their own celebrations which the British authorities deemed vulgar. Additionally, East Indian indentured labourers used the Islamic festival of Muharram to protest against what they saw as restrictions to their expression of cultural freedom. However, they also protested against their working conditions on the estates and the passing of new regulations regarding the festival. On 30 October 1884, undaunted by threats from the authorities, the East Indians took their celebrations to the streets of San Fernando. There they were met with violence when the British troops opened fire, killing some nine people and wounding 100 others. These acts of protest were not isolated events but can be linked to global struggles waged by the working classes in Europe and North America. These struggles laid the foundation for more organised resistance that occurred during the 20th century.

R

Resistance, 1900–36

With the coming of the new century, the attitudes and policies of the British imperialist towards the British West Indies colonists did not change. However, the masses in the West Indies were not content to wait on the colonists to effect changes but took matters into their own hands. In 1905, fed up with the water situation in Trinidad, the people in Port of Spain rioted over a new Water Ordinance. This riot spread and resulted in some of the participants burning down the old Red House and destroying government papers and records. While not connected to the situation in Trinidad, sugar workers, stevedores, porters and other workers in British Guiana rioted during the period November–December 1905 to protest against low wages. The riots began on the Ruimveldt plantation but soon spread to other sugar estates on the East and West Banks of the Demerara. In Trinidad in 1915, a large contingent of cane farmers from the outlying towns of Princes Town, Chaguanas, Sangre Grande and surrounding areas staged a massive protest for higher cane prices. Furthermore, in March 1917, oil, dock, and asphalt workers in the southern part of the country took strike action against United British Oilfields and the American-owned Trinidad Lake Asphalt Company. This strike laid the groundwork for the massive strikes and further resistance by Trinidadian workers that occurred in 1919.

At the end of the First World War in 1918, Trinidad and Tobago faced increasing tensions as both the African and East Indian working class faced worsening economic hardships as a result of high inflation triggered by the war. In addition to high food prices, East Indians pressed for higher wages and repatriation to India. These issues exacerbated the tensions between the workers and merchant class, and drew the attention of the British colonial authorities who saw these issues as potential grounds for more social unrest. By 1919, the socio-economic conditions had worsened as a result of repressive management practices, low pay, arduous work, terrible working conditions, and lack of bargaining rights. Under such conditions, the anti-colonial forces came to the fore to defend the interest of the

working class. Consequently, during 1919, the dockworkers at the Port of Spain waterfront staged a strike for higher wages and better working conditions. This strike quickly attracted the attention of city council workers, female coal carriers, estate labourers, vendors, low-ranking civil servants, shop assistants and the Port of Spain mob comprising the black slum dwellers and city's unemployed, all of whom seized the opportunity to press for their own demands. In addition, workers from Cedros, San Fernando, Carapaichima, Couva, Chaguanas, Sangre Grande, Toco, and Tobago joined the strike. Because of a standoff between the representatives of labour and capital, a group of white businessmen led by George F. Huggins requested that the colonial secretary suppress the *Argos* newspaper, arm the white population, and station British troops on the island. The colonial authorities responded to the demands of the business elite by dispatching HMS *Calcutta* to suppress the strike and restore law and order. Moreover, they used the courts to impose punitive charges on the leaders of the strike. Furthermore, the colonial government passed the Sedition Ordinance on February 1920 that give it wide powers to arrest, fine, and jail alleged agitators and shut down the *Negro World* and *Argos*, two newspapers that it deemed were inciting rebellion. In the aftermath of the strike, the authorities deported Brutus Ironman, Bruce McConney, J.S. de Bourg and E.S. Salmon to their respective countries. The workers' struggle of 1919 had great significance because it laid the foundation of the working-class struggles that occurred throughout the English-speaking Caribbean in the 1930s.

Labour Resistance in the 1930s

The Great Depression of 1929 had brought the capitalist world economy to a grinding halt. While inflation and high unemployment had gripped the Western industrial countries, workers and peasants in the colonies faced severe hardships as a result of depressed prices for tropical products. Faced with deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the working class in the Caribbean took

direct action against colonial authorities for better wages, improved working conditions, employment and political reforms. Starting in 1933, the National Unemployment Movement (NUM) mobilised hundreds of unemployed people and organised several demonstrations in Trinidad. Two years later in British Guyana, sugar workers engaged in a series of strikes and disturbances. In Jamaica, port workers in Kingston and other areas and banana loaders engaged in strike action. These demonstrations, disturbances, and strikes were the beginning of militant protest and conflagration that spread throughout the entire British Caribbean. The small island of St Kitts figured prominently in this wave of militant protest. On 28 January 1935, sugar workers in Basseterre refused to reap the crop over and refused the payment offered by their employers. News of their action soon spread to other parts of the colony. This led to the authorities calling out the local military and reading the riot act. Several workers were killed and the next day the British government landed marines. In the ensuing days, workers were arrested and some were sentenced to prison terms lasting from two to five years. This militant action was very significant because it marked a serious political challenge to elite rule in St Kitts and demonstrated the organisational capability of the working class.

The struggle in St Kitts became a template for more militant action and soon spread to the island of St Vincent. Faced with rising food prices, workers rioted on 21 October 1935 in the capital of Kingston. They attacked government officials, invaded government property, and destroyed and damaged buildings and cars. Despite the arrival of a British warship and the declaration of a state of emergency that lasted three weeks, workers in other parts of the country defied the authorities to press their demands for land, better wages, and living conditions. News of the workers' militancy in St Vincent soon spread to St Lucia where coal loaders took strike action. However, the authorities, learning from the riots in St Vincent, dispatched a warship and landed troops on the island to quell the protest. On August 1937, another strike occurred when agricultural workers abandoned their jobs to protest for higher wages.

These events in St Kitts, St Vincent, and St Lucia garnered the attention of workers in Barbados.

Barbadian workers' resistance to British imperialism occurred as a result of the deportation of Clement Payne, a worker's organiser and member of the Trinidad Workingmen's Association. Payne returned to Barbados at the age of 33 and declared to the authorities that he was born in Barbados. On his arrival, he began to mobilise workers by organising a May Day rally on 1 May 1937. Payne used this occasion to educate the workers on the need to organise a trade union to protect their interests. In response to Payne's agitation, the governor arrested him for making a false declaration, fined him in the courts, and secretly deported him back to Trinidad. News of Payne's deportation reached the masses who took spontaneous action by taking to the streets and destroying pubic property. This conflagration affected workplaces where workers either went on strike or threatened strike action. In order to avert a national crisis, the authorities struck by using brute force to quell the disturbances. The security forces killed 14 workers and arrested some 500. News of Payne's arrest and the conflagration reached Trinidad where tensions ran high among the working class.

Unlike the smaller British colonies that were predominantly based on agriculture, the British had developed a very sophisticated oil industry in Trinidad. Oil had been discovered in 1857 and commercial production began in 1908. The industry attracted workers from Grenada, St Vincent, and other small islands. In addition to the oil industry, the sugar industry was very buoyant and used East Indian indentured labour. This mix of African and East Indian working-class people created a dynamic for agitation, with groups like the Negro Welfare Cultural and Social Association (NWSCA) and the British Empire Workers' and Citizens' Home Rule Party (BEW&CHRP) conducting political work among the workers. In both industries, and especially in the oil industry, workers faced meagre wages, inhumane working and living conditions, poor grievance procedures, oppressive management, racial discrimination, and lack of upward social mobility. These conditions created the conditions for a general strike in

the oil industry that also spread to the sugar industry, agriculture, port services, and the general working population. From 19 June–2 July 1937, the working class engaged in revolutionary insurrection that had the effect of paralysing the economy. In their attempt to protect their economic interests, the British authorities dispatched HMS *Ajax* and the HMS *Exeter* to Trinidad and violently suppressed the insurrection.

All these violent strikes, protests, and demonstrations contributed to the development of trade unionism in the Caribbean. Prior to 1937, the British had declared trade union activity to be illegal in the Caribbean. The General strikes and insurrection empowered the working class, and a number of powerful trade unions, such as the Oilfield Workers' Trade Union (1937) and labour parties, such as the Trinidad Labour Party, the Barbados Labour Party, the Jamaica Labour Party, and the British Empire and Citizens' Home Rule Party emerged throughout the Caribbean. Additionally, the events marked the entrance of the working class into Caribbean politics, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Caribbean Resistance During the Cold War, 1945–1960s

The 1936 general strike and insurrection had propelled the working class into the vanguard for independence movements in the Caribbean. Because of the radical nature of the insurrection, the British authorities were forced to make concessions by way of the Moyne Commission that visited the British colonies. Emboldened by their ability to wrench these concessions, labour organisers, like Nathaniel Critchlow (1884–1958) from British Guiana, were instrumental in organising the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in 1945. This group consisted of a broad coalition of labour leaders who espoused socialist ideals that ranged from Fabian socialism to Marxism. This confederation championed working-class control, regional economic planning, broader democracy for the Caribbean working class and masses, independence, and a socialist

Caribbean Federation. Formed, at the end of the Second World War, the CLC had to confront the harsh realities of Cold War politics as promoted by the US in the Caribbean. Being the leader of the free world in the post-Second World War period, the US pushed for markets and resources in the Caribbean. This meant that US multinational corporations like W.R. Grace, Texaco, and Reynolds among others became very visible in the economies of British Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. This economic thrust meant that the US felt compelled to target groups such as the CLC that advanced socialist ideas. In the larger theatre of the Cold War contest between the US and the Soviet Union, the CLC became a victim of that conflict. Originally a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the CLS leadership began to fracture ideologically when Richard Hart and Grantley Adams fought over the political direction of the confederation. Hart insisted that the CLS should line up with the WFTU, whereas Adams felt that the body should affiliate with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). As a result of this conflict, the CLS was disbanded and replaced by the Caribbean Area Division of the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT), a US-sponsored labour organisation that helped shape the American regional organisation of the ICFTU in 1952. This move paved the way for liberal politicians and parties to lead the push for constitutional independence from the 1950s onwards. While the nationalist rhetoric of these parties portended challenges to British and American imperialism, their programmes and policies ensured that neo-colonialism became entrenched in the Caribbean region until the 1970s when a younger generation embraced the ideology of Black Power.

Black Power Revolution, 1970

By the late 1960s, a younger generation of Caribbeans began to question the meaning of independence in countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. For many of them, independence did not put a stop to colonial exploitation, provide

much needed jobs, or end the practice of racial discrimination. Largely influenced by the teachings of Marcus Garvey, Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Malcom X, Stokely Carmichael, Ho Chi Ming, Amilcar Cabral, the Black Panther Party and other radical ideas, these young people became attracted to the ideology of Black Power. Following the lead of young African-Americans who had become impatient with the moderate ideas of the Civil Rights Movement, the young Caribbean youths also abandoned the teachings of Eric Williams and Alexander Bustamante, respectively. Additionally, inspired by the actions of Caribbean students at the Sir George William University in Canada, who were charged and expelled for destroying university property, these young people began to adhere to an ideology that fused anti-imperialism, black nationalism, and Marxism to address the socio-economic conditions that confronted them.

In Trinidad and Tobago, the country where Black Power found its widest expression, the young people organised themselves under the banner of the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC), a coalition of groups comprising trade unions, youth groups, students and community-based organisations. Between 26 February 1970 and 21 April 1970, thousands of young people, united under the banner of the NJAC, converged on the main streets of Port of Spain and Tobago to demonstrate against the People's National Movement (PNM) Government. Additionally, the protestors were joined by officers Raffique Shah, Rex LaSalle, Mike Bazie, and David Brizan who led a small fraction of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment in their attempts to overthrow the government. These Black Power protests and demonstrations in Trinidad and Tobago were not isolated events but were part of growing anti-colonial, antiimperialist movements that had emerged in the Third World. These massive protests and demonstrations, throughout Trinidad and Tobago, which continued for months and grew in their intensity, caught the attention of the media in the US, Britain, and Venezuela, and some commentators have suggested that the government sought military assistance from these three countries in its attempt to quell the rebellion. In order to limit and control the impact of the activities, the PNM Government declared a state of emergency on 21 April 1970, arrested and jailed scores of activists. and passed repressive legislation including the Public Order Act that sought to limit and control demonstrations.

Despite the repression of the Black Power Movement, the new opposition forced the PNM Administration to re-examine its Third Five-Year Plan and institute far-reaching reforms that sought to reorient the economy to address the pressing needs of the majority of the population. Moreover, Black Power was not simply an imported slogan but a movement that forced the PNM Government to develop the public sector to remedy years of inequality. The movement demanded nationalisation of the oil industry, the sugar industry, the banking sector and all other industries that were important to the country's economic security. More importantly, in the aftermath of the 'Revolution', a number of Marxist groups emerged throughout the Caribbean that would educate the masses on the need to transform the Caribbean based on socialism. This idea was not lost on a younger generation of Grenadians who would directly confront US imperialism in 'their own backyard' in 1979.

The Grenada Revolution, 1979

Early in the morning on 13 March 1979, the New Jewel Movement-led People's Revolutionary Army overthrew the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) led by Sir Eric Gairy. They launched an armed attack on the radio station, police barracks, and key government buildings and installations. Grenada, a very small island in the eastern Caribbean, was ruled by Eric Gairy from 1967 to 1979. A former trade union leader, Gairy and the GULP to which he belonged had led a general strike in 1951 that demanded better wages and working conditions for agricultural workers. This strike cemented his place in the country's politics, and his party dominated Grenadian society afterwards. Over time, the GULP came to represent the Grenada elite and abandoned the interests of the working class. Grenada

obtained constitutional independence in 1974 and shortly thereafter the Government became very repressive, waging attacks on all forms of opposition, especially against the New Jewel Movement (NJM) which proposed an alternative Grenadian society. The NJM was an amalgam of two organisations: the Jewel and the Movement of the Assemblies of the People (MAP). Alarmed by the NJM's popularity and organisational capability among the masses and workers, Gairy, in 1970, established a secret police force known as the 'Mongoose Gang'. Similar in nature to the Ton Ton Macoute that had been organised by Francois Duvalier to repress the Haitian people, the 'Mongoose Gang' inflicted violence on the NJM leaders and their followers. On 21 January 1974, in the run-up to independence, the NJM and other groups staged a massive protest. This protest was put down violently and resulted in the murder of Rupert Bishop, father of Maurice Bishop. This murder and other incidents marked a turning point in Grenada's history, when, for the first time, in the history of the English-speaking Caribbean, the people took up arms and successfully overthrew the Government.

Following the overthrow, Maurice Bishop took to the airwaves and called upon the working people, the youths, workers, farmers, fishermen, middle-class people, and women to join the armed revolutionary forces to protect the revolution. Subsequently, the NJM formed the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) and sought the support of other regimes in the region. Most in the wider Caribbean, with the exception of Cuba, denounced the revolution and called on the Reagan Administration to defend democracy here. The PRG also received support from various progressive organisations in the Caribbean, among them the powerful Oilfield Workers' Trade Union, which had developed a relationship with the NJM. Declaring that they would embark on building socialism on the island, the PRG Government began to reorganise the country and implement its programme. From 1979 until the revolution was aborted in 1983, the PRG, in its attempt to transform Grenada and broaden democracy declared that it would suspend the holding of general election and instead embark on promoting people's democracy. To achieve this objective, the PRG reorganised the country politically into community groups, zonal councils, parish councils, workers' parish councils, parish co-ordinating bodies, and community work brigades. These bodies were created to foster meaningful dialogue between the people and the PRG leaders and government officials. As part of its thrust to develop a socialist society, the PRG initiated a number of reform programmes concerning matters such as literacy and education, school repair, land distribution, free milk, school meals, and national house repair. A major highlight of the projected socialist reform was education.

Based on the Cuban model of literacy, the Center for Popular Education (CPE) programme commenced in 1980 with the goal of reducing adult illiteracy on the island. Based on the principle 'it was not too late to learn', hundreds of volunteers streamed out all over Grenada, Carriacou, and Petit Martinique where they tutored the residents. Moreover, the PRG developed phase II of the program with a stated objective of primary education for adults. The curriculum included basic English, Mathematics, Geography and Natural Science, and History, with an emphasis on Grenadian history. Other popular programmes included the establishment of the National-In-Service Teacher Education Program and the Community Day School Program (CDSP). The stated objectives of the CDSP-supported community school councils were to:

- Make the school the centre of the community, and so promote a sound relationship between the two;
- Involve the school and community in building the nation through joint work;
- Develop a work–study approach and so make students conscious of the relationship between theory and practice;
- Help with the formation of a new curriculum by linking school and community, using experimental new ideas and experience, and showing the importance of the new approach to study;
- Offer a different outlook on life and prepare students for more productive participation in the building of the nation;

- Awaken hidden talents in the students and community;
- Develop and encourage both quality and quantity towards greater production;
- Promote a keen sense of patriotism.

Furthermore, the government created scholarship programmes for Grenadian students to study overseas. The PRG sent students to Cuba, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Additionally, the PRG funded several programmes such as the Ministry of Education, Women's Desk School, and a uniform programme to assist families needing to purchase books and uniforms. While these programmes were aimed at fostering growth and development, the revolution faced serious internal and external attacks.

Internally, not all Grenadians supported the PRG. Centuries of colonialism did not eradicate strong allegiances to Great Britain. Moreover, the GULP maintained strong support among the Grenadian peasantry, who saw Eric Gairy as a 'Champion of the people'. The regime also faced opposition from the Committee of Freedom Fighters Against Tyranny in Grenada, which distributed a five-page document titled 'More News about Bishop and his illegal Communist regime in Grenada'. Furthermore, groups such as the Chamber of Commerce called on the government to hold 'free and fair elections.' Externally, the regime faced hostility from other Caribbean governments including those of Dominica, Barbados, Jamaica (under Edward Seaga, a rabid anti-communist)and Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, the Reagan Administration declared the revolution a threat to its national security in the region. Seen as a proxy of the USSR and Cuba, the US declared its intention to defeat the revolution and defeat socialism in the Americas. This policy was part of the US Cold War policy in the Americas to maintain its imperialist designs.

These internal and external attacks created tensions within the PRG which led to internal divisions and eventually implosion. Within the party and the Government, a split emerged between Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard over the ideological direction. Coard and his faction accused Bishop of being a reformist and not adhering to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. These internal ideological struggles led to deep fractions and eventually split the Government into two camps. Evidently, this struggle led to the staging of a military coup by Coard supporters on 16 October 1983. Bishop and his some of his cabinet members were placed under house arrest, and the army loyal to Coard instituted a state of emergency. This did not deter the Grenadian people from taking to the streets to defend the revolution and freeing Bishop and those arrested. In response, on the morning of 19 October 1983 the army unleashed a reign of terror on the masses, killing hundreds of people. Maurice Bishop and others loyal to him were captured and brutally executed. This attack was strongly condemned by Fidel Castro who, in a speech to the Cuban people, called Coard and his supporters 'The Butchers of St George's'. This internal political crisis led to the US invasion of Grenada in 1983.

On 25 October 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued the command for the invasion of Grenada, codenamed 'Operation Urgent Fury'. Almost 10,000 soldiers landed on the island and began to dismantle the 'Socialist project'. However, the Americans met stiff resistance from Cubans and Grenadians who took up arms to defend the revolution. After a week of fighting, the US military subdued the opposition and took control of Grenada. Shortly thereafter, a new regime was installed that pledged its allegiance to the US. The military invasion dashed the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of many people in the Caribbean, who saw the revolution as a beacon of hope for the working class. Although it lasted only four years, the Grenada revolution became a watershed in Caribbean history by demonstrating that its people had the potential to create a new type of society that challenged the imperialist paradigm which oppressed workers and peasants.

Cross-References

▶ Dutch Imperialism, Caribbean
▶ Padmore, George (1903–1959)
▶ Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)
▶ Trade Liberalisation in the Caribbean

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Resource Control

Resource Extractivism

Revenue

Revolution

Revolutionary Feminism

Rights

Rights of Nature

Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)

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Definition

Born in Georgetown, Guyana, on 23 March 1942, Walter Anthony Rodney an icon of the Pan-African, Rastafari, and Black Power revolutions which culminated in the late 1960s. Rodney's

most famous and controversial book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, was published in Dar es Salaam in 1972.

Born in Georgetown, Guyana, on 23 March 1942, Walter Anthony Rodney won a scholarship to enter Queen's College in Georgetown in 1953. In the same year, he had his first political experience when he distributed leaflets calling for the victory of the Marxist-oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP) in the first general elections ever organised in the colony of British Guyana. Against the background of the early Cold War, the elections won by the PPP were cancelled after the British troops, with the support of the US and the US multinational corporations, landed in Guyana in order to save the people from a 'communist menace' (Prescod 1976, p. 114). Rodney grew up in a global environment and benefited from the experience of political activists and working people who had shown an early and deep interest in socialist and anti-imperialist movements.

In 1960, Rodney joined the Mona campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI) in Jamaica. There he actively supported the stillborn project to form a Federation of the West Indies to oppose the US hegemony in the Caribbean. Travelling to the Soviet Union and to Cuba as a representative of the UWI's students, Rodney returned from his trips with Marxist and anti-imperialist literature which, regarded as subversive, was seized by the Jamaican customs. From this moment on, he fell under the scrutiny of the Jamaican, Guyanese, and American services. In his own words, 'travelling to Cuba was also another important experience, because I was with Cuban students and I got some insight at an early period into the tremendous excitement of the Cuban Revolution. This was 1960, just after the victory of the revolution. One has to live with a revolution to get its full impact, but the next best thing is to get there and see a people actually attempting to grapple with real problems of development' (Rodney 1990, p. 17).

In 1963, he moved for doctoral research to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, where he expanded his intellectual and social life. Under the supervision of Richard Gray

at SOAS, he studied the impact of slavery in West Africa; his research led him to explore the Vatican archives in Rome, and to visit research libraries in Spain under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco and in Portugal under the authoritarian regime of António de Oliveira Salazar. In Lisbon, he became aware of the ongoing struggle led by Amilcar Cabral and other prominent figures for the liberation of Africa from Portuguese colonial domination. Frustrated by the classic and bourgeois vision of African history at SOAS, Rodney became associated with a group of Caribbean students who were organising lectures on Marx, Trotsky, imperialism, and revolutions at the London home of the Trinidadian thinker C.L.R. James. Rodney, who had performed in academic and political public debates since his years at the UWI, joined his comrades at the Hyde Park Speakers' Corner, where they denounced the regimes of apartheid in South Africa, the remaining colonial powers in Africa, and the institutionalised racism that continued in England through the 1962 Immigration Act, and in the US with segregation.

After defending his doctoral thesis, which launched controversies on the impact of slavery and European trade on African societies, Rodney broke with the tradition of the typical Caribbean scholar graduating in England, who would go back home to inculcate in his own students the biased colonial British knowledge. After an unsuccessful application for a job in Senegal, he was recruited as an assistant lecturer in the department of history at Dar es Salaam University, established 3 years previously by Terence Ranger. Rodney arrived in a decisive period in Tanzanian political history: in February 1967, the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, proclaimed the Declaration of Arusha, which urged the creation of an African form of socialism, known as 'Ujaama'.

This radical and progressive turn of the Tanzanian regime encouraged Rodney to develop new themes and methodologies in his teaching of African history. A subversive thinker, he contested the mutually accepted division of intellectual labour between historians working on the past, social and political scientists working on the present, and economists trying to predict the

future. In his mind, history, especially in Africa, should be oriented towards social transformation, and should not be relegated to the study of the past in itself. Because he was 'interested in the past not for its own sake but with intent to illuminate the neo-colonial plight within which Africa was engulfed' (Swai 1982, p. 44), Rodney strongly rejected the glorification of the African past which had become prominent in the historiography developed in the new African independent states.

The decolonisation of history in the context of the emergence of newly independent nations in Africa and the Caribbean required the writing of a social rather than a triumphalist history. In this way, Rodney 'also avoided what can be called the "great kings and queens syndrome", which measured a society's worth based on the existence and power of its royalty, the size of its army, its political structure, its literature, and so on. Rodney rejected this notion of civilization in favour of concepts that reflected the way in which people related to one other in a given society' (Austin 2001, p. 64). Thus historical research should stress the initiatives of the people instead of reflecting the life of the ruling class. Engaging with the masses, therefore, Rodney learned Kiswahili and started to give lectures away from the university, teaching Tanzanian peasants about labour history, the impact of colonialism on environment, and political economy.

In January 1968, Rodney, his wife Pat, and their son Shaka returned to Jamaica. Now holding a position as lecturer in African history at the UWI, Rodney took the initiative of teaching off the campus, coming into contact with Rastafarians and working people and setting up joint discussions of African culture. His most relevant talks were published later in *The Groundings with my Brothers* (2001). Rodney's social activism and political solidarity with every group which had been repressed by the authorities finally caused alarm bells to ring. The government, which was controlled by the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP), decided to ban him from the country while he was away in Montreal at the Congress of Black Writers, giving a lecture on Black Power and African history.

On 16 October 1968, after the news spread in Kingston that Rodney had been sent back to Montreal in the same aircraft, hundreds of students and academics took to the streets between the campus and the city centre to force the prime minister, Hugh Shearer, to change his position. As the march came close to downtown Kingston, the situation became increasingly violent. The students were joined by groups of youths who were familiar with Rodney's activities, and by crowds of workers and unemployed people who had just taken part in a protest against the rise of bus ticket prices and the decline in living conditions. The march turned into a series of riots, with urban groups burning motor cars and buses, looting the stores, and attacking every symbol of the capitalist authorities, causing several million dollars' worth of damage. The civil riots claimed two lives, several policemen were injured, and over 30 people were arrested. Known as the 'Rodney riots', they became a mobilising event and a turning point in the history of the Caribbean. They also became 'part of the permanent political experience of a large number of students and staff. They have been politically educated in a direct and unforgettable way into the arbitrary of executive power, the naked use of physical force, and the mobilisation of the media of communication behind this power to justify its use and encourage its repeated used' (Girvan 1973).

Rodney had spread the concept of Black Power throughout Jamaica, arguing for a radical break with imperialism, mobilszing the African masses in the conquest of political power, and calling for a cultural reevaluation of the African legacy. Taking the theories of C.L.R. James on self-emancipation to a higher level, Rodney's teachings on black empowerment resonated with the middle-class dissident aspirations of the students, the sophisticated and eclectic philosophy of the Rastafari movement, the disciples of Marcus Garvey, the youth, the working people, and the sub-proletariat living in the most depressed urban areas. From this connection of diverse branches emerged a new radical Afro-Caribbean culture which emphasised reggae music, literature, painting, and dub poetry (Morley 2007, p. 134).

In this way Rodney became an icon of the Pan-African, Rastafari, and Black Power revolutions which culminated in the late 1960s. At the Congress of Black Writers, while Stokely Carmichael defended the racist branch of Black Power which opposed attendance by white people, Rodney took the opposite position. In Rodney's mind, the situation in 1968 needed a critical reassessment of the conclusions of the 1955 African-Asian Bandung conference, emphasising a single alliance of coloured people. The defeat of several progressive Third-World movements and the overthrow or containment of some anti-imperialist regimes in the years before the world revolution of 1968 had changed the course of history. As Western people were contesting their own governments, broader alliances were needed to globalise the revolution, and to insist upon the priority of class over race. This position placed Rodney among the ranks of the Third-World internationalist groups.

After a short stay in Havana and London, Rodney returned to Tanzania, where he spent the most distinguished years of his career. Meeting members of African liberation movements based in Tanzania, living with Vietnamese and Cuban diplomats, and debating on nationalism, Marxism, and Pan-Africanism with East African scholars, he raised essential issues concerning the African revolution, the use of violence, solidarity with Vietnam and Third-World anti-imperialism, and so on. While writing in several African academic and leftist political reviews, he also gave financial support to African fighters and served as a referee for the US-based African Liberation Support Committee.

At Dar es Salaam University, Rodney taught colonial and post-colonial African history and the economic history of Tanzania. He also introduced the first course on the history of the black peoples in the Americas. Taking in Samir Amin, Andre Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein's research on the global world system, his course on international political economy introduced to Tanzania the theory of dependency and the debate on the practical application of economic disengagement from imperialism and Euro-centrism. With a Marxist basis, his course on the English, French,

and Russian revolutions highlighted the historical formation of social classes and their role in the balance of power.

Rodney's most famous and controversial book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, was published in Dar es Salaam in 1972. After asserting his introductory thesis that 'African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries' (Rodney 2012, p. xi), Rodney detailed the ongoing process by which Africa was disempowered by the Western capitalist system over a long period from the trans-Atlantic slave trade era to post-colonial and neo-colonial times. His book clearly pointed out the alliance between the African neocolonial elite and the local *comprador* bourgeoisie, which endorsed economic policies of development that deprived African peoples of the control of their own destiny. Challenging myths and stereotypes of Africa and tackling W.W. Rostow's theory of the stages of economic development, Rodney argued that Africa's under-development and poverty were caused by European colonial capitalist interference. Rodney's research was the first systematised study to raise the dialectical relations between the impact of slavery and colonialism, the source of the capitalist accumulation, and the concept of global reparations as a consequence of the denial of opportunity which prevented Africans from realising their own vision of social and human development. In a sense, 'Rodney tried to understand why the moment of independence was also a moment of recolonization. This was due not only to the strength of international capitalism and the Western political alignment in the years following the Second World War, but also to the weaknesses of the social forces in the ex-colonial countries and of their political elite' (Lewis 1998, p. xvii). With important references to Che Guevara, Fanon, Nkrumah, and Cabral, the book was translated into Portuguese, Spanish, and German in the following years, and it became an essential text in many antiimperialist circles.

The Tanzanian fusion of politics and academics attracted scholars from all over the

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world. Under Rodney's banner, the Dar es Salaam school of historiography became 'the intellectual revolutionary hub of East Africa, Africa and the Third World generally' (Ngugi 1993, p. 166). However, in June 1974, in Dar, Rodney missed the Sixth Pan-African Congress for medical reasons. He also had been banned because of an undiplomatic paper that he had written for the congress. 'Aspects of the International Class Struggle in Africa, the Caribbean and America' (1975a) contains scathing critical attacks on several African and Caribbean regimes that had sent official delegations. Besides criticising his own government, the Guyanese authoritarian regime, Rodney expressly denounced the Brazilian delegates who had applauded the coup against Salvador Allende in Chile at an early stage. Rodney felt that his time in Tanzania had come to an end.

In summer 1974, the Rodney family, enlarged by the birth of two daughters, Asha and Kanini, returned to Guyana. However, Rodney's appointment as professor of history at the University of Guyana was cancelled by the authorities because of his political opinions; academic support and popular demonstrations in Georgetown, Washington, DC, and London did not improve his situation. Against all expectations, Rodney did not go into exile, and instead decided to engage with the political opposition while doing historical research on the social history of Guyana. Soon Rodney became the leading figure of a Marxist and multi-ethnic political party, the Working People's Alliance (WPA), which engaged in a political battle with the prime minister, Forbes Burnham. Rodney's desire was to become more involved in the revolutionary movements in the Caribbean, and to work and build lasting alliances with the progressive forces in Cuba, Trinidad, South America, and Central America. Writing of this situation, Wazir Mohamed (2007) emphasised that 'Walter anticipated the movements that are now flowering all over Latin America, the fusion of the struggles for collective land rights with the struggles for women's equality and human rights – represented by the horizontal and unemployed workers

movements in Argentina; the struggles of indigenous and black people, landless workers and trade union movements in Brazil; the indigenous Amerindian and water justice movements in Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru; the Zapatistas of Mexico; and of course Chavez's Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela.'

However, Rodney was active mainly in Guyana. Travelling around the country to teach history and to meet the bauxite miners (mostly Africans) and the sugar cane workers (mostly Indians), he tried to weaken the ideology of the regime, which politicised the ethnic division between these two communities, both of whom were working in a capitalist system which regulated their competition for better wages and living conditions. In one of his speeches, 'People's Power, No Dictator' (1981b, pp. 76–77), Rodney warned against the illusions of governmental policies of nationalisation by saying that 'the highest expression of modern capitalism is found in the multinational companies. The power of the modern capitalist is tremendous because it is on such a scale that it dominates entire nations and sustains imperialist exploitations.' These political rallies formed the public side of his scholarly investigations published posthumously in *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905* (1981a).

In the late 1970s, Rodney understood that his fight against the regime would not conclude as long as the masses did not organise and rise up. In 1979, he was arrested in the investigation of the criminal arson of an official building. He gained the status of a political prisoner when he was released but prohibited from leaving the country before the trial opened. However, in April 1980 he managed to enter Zimbabwe in April 1980, where he was warmly received by Robert Mugabe after the celebration of independence. While his unexpected presence humiliated Forbes Burnham, Rodney was offered a post as head of the department of history in the newly founded University of Zimbabwe. After he declined this opportunity – like many others emanating from African and Western universities – he returned to Guyana. A few weeks later, on Friday, 13 June 1980,

Walter Rodney was killed by a bomb in Georgetown, Guyana. His death remains unexplained, but his works and his life as an organic intellectual still inspire many people fighting imperialism all over the world.

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Rome and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Ancient Rome; Classical history; Imperialism; Tributary empires

Definition

This essay outlines the nature of the tributary imperialism of ancient Rome, and explores the various phases of its expansion, contraction, and ultimate collapse. It examines the ways in which contemporary writers understood Roman imperialism, and how later historians have explained its central dynamics. The essay describes how all sections of Roman society benefited from imperialism in different ways and to varying degrees.

Rome in the History of Imperialism

Rome has long occupied a central place in the theorisation of empire. One reason is that imperial symbols and language – eagles, fasces, laurel wreaths, and the Latin titulature of empire – have been repeatedly appropriated in the Western tradition by expanding powers and states. The Frankish King Charlemagne had himself crowned emperor by the Pope in Rome in 800. The title Kaisar (Caesar) was used by the rulers of successive German emperors in the Middle Ages, and Czar by various Eastern European powers up to and including the rulers of Russia. Medieval appropriations related as much to the contemporary presence of the emperors of Byzantium (who continued to be Caesars and to rule a Roman Empire into the fifteenth century) as to any close connection with earlier periods. But the increased interest in the classical past across Europe from the early modern period meant that Rome was

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repeatedly a mode. After the French Revolution and Napoleon's abolition of the Holy Roman (German) Empire, Roman titulature was adopted by French, Austrian, and British rulers. Many titles and symbols of Roman origin remained current until the middle of the twentieth century.

That reception history has been a mixed blessing for the study of ancient Rome (Harrison 2008). While it has meant that Rome has received much closer attention than many other early empires – such as Achaemenid Persia, the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Abbasid Caliphate – the repeated comparisons have introduced many anachronisms. Among these have been debates over the economic motors and costs of Roman imperialism, and over its civilising or brutalising effects. To some extent this remains the case in contemporary comparisons between Rome and America and even with postcolonial interpretations of ancient Rome, which sometimes seem tinged with postcolonial guilt. The best comparisons have in fact repeatedly drawn out contrasts between ancient Roman and modern European imperialism, and exposed the ideological component of claims to the contrary (Brunt 1965; Malamud 2009). It has even been suggested that we should not employ the term "imperialism" to describe Roman expansion, so as to avoid importing connotations of competing hegemonies led by modernising nation states (Veyne 1975): those who follow Lenin's notion of imperialism as a distinct stage of capitalism (1934) would also have to reject the label as it applied to Rome.

In practice it is not feasible to dispense with the labels "empire" and "imperialism," as similar problems face any alternative terminology. The most thoughtful recent approaches treat Rome as one of number of similar political entities often termed early empires. Depending on the focus of the analysis these are often qualified as tributary empires (in relation to their political economy) or pre-capitalist or pre-industrial if their economic life or technology seems more important. Broadly similar to Rome would be the sequence of Chinese empires that began in 221 BCE with the creation of the Qin dynasty, a series of empires based on the Iranian plateau including those of the Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sassanian dynasties,

probably the Neo-Assyrian Empire that controlled Mesopotamia and surrounding states in the first half of the last millennium BCE, a series of empires based on the Indo-Gangetic plain beginning with the Maurya dynasty of 322–185 BCE, the larger Macedonian-ruled kingdoms that divided the territory of the former Achaemenid Empire in roughly the same period, and a series of much later New World empires including those of the Aztec and the Inka. Each of these represented a system of political domination created by one people through the conquest and intimidation of a number of other peoples and often by the absorption of a number of earlier states. Typically they were sustained by exactions of labour (military and other), of agricultural produce, and of metals, and typically much of this was spent on rewarding various privileged populations or classes and supporting military forces. Most of these entities invested in infrastructure – roads, canals, fortifications, storehouses, and ports – and in ceremonial and monuments. Almost all were ruled by autocrats. Most (with the exception of the New World examples) had iron metallurgy; most used writing and had imperial systems of weights and measures. None had any source of energy beyond human and animal labour, and none had any system of communications faster than a sailing vessel or a relay of riders or runners could provide.

There is disagreement on the most appropriate boundaries of this analytical category. Some scholars would include some of the earlier and generally smaller expansionist states of the Bronze Age Near East, including New Kingdom Egypt, and analogous states in Central and South America like that of Wari, and some would include the shortlived hegemonies exercised by powerful city states over their neighbours in city state civilisations (see Hansen 2000, 2002). Whether medieval and early modern empires were essentially similar is also debated. A number of recent synoptic studies deal with these questions (Alcock et al. 2001; Bang and Bayly 2003, 2011; Morris and Scheidel 2009). Some of these draw on historical sociologies of empire (Doyle 1986; Eisenstadt 1963; Hardt and Negri 2000; Kautsky 1982). Despite these

disagreements over the proper limits of comparison, consideration of at least some other early empires provides a useful perspective on Roman imperialism. In particular, comparative analysis often reveals what was unique or unusual in the solutions Romans adopted to problems that were widely faced by early imperial powers, such as peripheral revolts, the integration of minorities, or the formidable limitations on long-distance communications before the industrial revolution.

The Phases of Roman Expansion

The full story of the growth, stabilisation, and collapse of Roman political domination can only be sketched out here (see Champion 2004; Nicolet 1977; Woolf 2012). Roman tradition dated the foundation of the city to the middle of the eighth century BCE, and archaeological research suggests that the site of Rome was at least occupied by that point. The institutions of a city state emerged around the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, probably a little later than in Etruria (Tuscany) just to the north or in the areas to the south where Greek cities were created. During the first half of the last millennium BCE, urban settlements and archaic states were created all around the Mediterranean and Black Seas. By the fifth century BCE some larger states – Athens, Sparta, Syracuse, and Carthage are the most famous – were coming to dominate their neighbours. Rome was not in quite the same league as these powers, but was probably already expanding at the expense of its immediate neighbours. During the fourth century BCE Rome first defeated the largest of the cities of southern Etruria, Veii, and then extended its control over its Latin-speaking neighbours and the hill tribes of central Italy. Wars fought almost every year, supported by contingents from its defeated "allies," extended a hegemony over most of Italy south of the Apennines, although this was not expressed in regular extraction of tribute, and most of the cities and people of the peninsula remained autonomous even if they had lost effective control of their foreign relations. A demonstration of the resilience of Roman control came in 280–275 BCE when Tarentum, one of the largest Greek cities of southern Italy, persuaded Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, to cross the Adriatic and challenge Rome. Although successful in several battles, Pyrrhus was unable to establish a power base, and his retreat in effect solidified Roman control of Italy. This was also the period in which Greek writers noticed the rise of Rome, and from this point on a more precise and accurate kind of history can be written.

The Mediterranean world in the third and second centuries BCE was dominated by a small number of political hegemonies. In the east the Achaemenid Empire conquered by Alexander the Great had been divided between three large kingdoms – Seleukid Syria, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Antigonid Macedon – and a number of smaller states that aspired to the same status, among them the kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and Pergamum in Asia Minor and that of Epirus in the Balkans. Between and around them were cities, leagues of cities, and tribal peoples like the Thracians, variously allies, suppliers of mercenaries, and victims of the wars between the Great Powers. Some cities, like Cyrene, Corinth, Athens, and Rhodes, were larger players than others. West of the Adriatic Rome had only one serious rival, the city of Carthage close to modern Tunis, which exercised a loose control over other Phoenician foundations in north Africa, western Sicily and southern Spain. Sardinia and Corsica, the remainder of Mediterranean Spain, and most of southern France outside the small area controlled by the Greek city of Marseilles and her colonies were settled by tribal peoples with little resembling cities or states. By the middle of the second century BCE Rome had established effective hegemony over the entirety of these regions.

A series of wars with Carthage (the Punic Wars) in 264–241 BCE, 218–201 BCE, and 149–146 BCE gave Rome control of the western Mediterranean. The first Punic war was fought largely over Sicily and resulted in Rome becoming a naval power, as well as the creation of the first overseas provinces in Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. The second Punic war saw Hannibal cross the Alps but then be driven out of Italy, and Rome assert control over the entirety of Mediterranean Spain. Carthage was destroyed in

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146 BCE and Rome established a foothold in north Africa; the Macedonian kingdom was defeated in 197 BCE and the Syrian kingdom in 188 BCE. Rome did not immediately annex any territory east of the Adriatic, and to begin with seemed content to extract plunder, disrupt local hegemonies, and leave the region in the control of its allies. This proved unsustainable or at least unstable. Macedon was again defeated in 168 BCE and the kingdom was abolished, to be replaced with four city states. Rome soon fell out with most of its east Mediterranean allies. The last king of Pergamum left his kingdom to Rome in his will, and so by the end of the second century Rome had provinces in the Balkans and western Asia Minor, had obliterated the ancient city of Corinth as an example of what happened to defiant allies, and seemed to contemporary observers like the Greek historian Polybius to be the undisputed ruler of the civilised world. Rome had not, however, developed very efficient institutions of control and relied on public contractors to extract revenue, basing no troops and very few officials in the east, and expecting both conquered territories and other powers (like Egypt) to accept orders from Roman envoys. When Mithradates, King of Pontus, invaded first the Roman province of Asia and then southern Greece he was able to exploit Rome's unpopularity, and Rome briefly lost control of all her possessions east of the Adriatic. That crisis coincided with a major rebellion by most of Rome's Italian allies. The first half of the last century BCE was largely spent re-establishing Roman control (Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995).

The instruments through which the Roman Republic took its empire in hand included armies serving for long periods overseas, the beginnings of a tributary structure, and the concentration of power into the hands of a small number of generals. Some of these were successful in using that power to extend Roman control well beyond the Mediterranean littoral. Between 67 and 62 BCE Pompey first co-ordinated a Mediterranean-wide elimination of piracy and then campaigned throughout the Near East: his armies reached the Caspian and in Mesopotamia the boundaries of the Parthian (Persian) Empire. Between 58 and

52 BCE Julius Caesar took control of all non-Mediterranean France, campaigning up to and beyond the English Channel and the Rhine. Civil wars, drawing on the same resources as conquest, interrupted campaigns but also fuelled the competition for glory and booty and led to the acquisition of new territory, most notably Egypt in 30 BCE. Caesar's great-nephew Augustus, the first emperor of Rome, masterminded campaigns that between 15 BCE and 9 CE extended Roman control to the Rhine and Danube. Other campaigns took place in Armenia, Spain, Africa, and Arabia. On Augustus's death in 14 CE the entire Mediterranean basin and much of its hinterlands were controlled either by provinces or through client kings. Some of those kingdoms were converted into provinces in the course of the first century CE. Wars of conquest in Britain began in 43 CE, continuing sporadically but never taking permanent control of more than the lowlands of Scotland. The German frontier was advanced from the Rhine to the Neckar at the end of the first century AD, and most of modern Romania (Roman Dacia) was conquered soon after.

The early second century CE marked the highwater mark of Roman power. A series of attempts to conquer Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) were made, and there were successful campaigns on several occasions through to the end of the fourth century, but a permanent presence was never established. From the last second century CE the empire came under more pressure. A 50-year period of chaos in the third century was marked by invasions, rebellions, a short-lived fragmentation, and an exceptionally rapid turnover of empires. The empire survived but lost the most recently conquered territories on the northern frontier. At the end of the fourth century large numbers of Goths crossed the Danube, and they were followed in the next two generations by more tribes, some coming across the Rhine. Control over first Britain and then northern Gaul was lost during the fifth century, and Spain and Africa followed. By the sixth century all territories west of the Adriatic were controlled by Germanic kingdoms, some making use of Roman institutions and bureaucrats. An attempt by the eastern emperor, now based in Constantinople, to reconquer parts

of the west later in the century met with limited success. Meanwhile Roman frontiers in the east were under intermittent pressure from the Persians. Around the middle of the sixth century, while eastern Roman armies were campaigning in Italy, the Persians sacked Antioch in Syria. Fresh invasions of Italy and the Balkans from the north followed, and in the early seventh century Rome lost Jerusalem and Egypt to Persia. The Persians did not enjoy their control of the Near East for long. In 636 Arab armies defeated the Romans at the battle of Yarmuk, but by 651 they had destroyed the Persian Empire and by 711 they had conquered all of north Africa and invaded Visigothic Spain. Byzantium survived as a micro-empire surrounding the Aegean Sea.

The key stages of Roman expansion may be summarised as follows:

1. c.500–275 BCE: Slow incremental extension of power within Italian peninsula.
2. 275–73 BCE: Progressive elimination of rival hegemonies within the Mediterranean basin.
3. 73 BCE–9 CE: Period of accelerating expansion including conquest of half of temperate Europe, Egypt, and most of the Near East.
4. 9–132 CE: Period of general consolidation with limited conquests and the absorption of client states into provinces.
5. 132–378 CE: Period of pressure largely survived with only some territorial losses.
6. 378–717 CE: Period of accelerating contraction.

The first part of this pattern closely resembles a trajectory followed by some other empires. The rise of Qin during the Warring States period was slow until the last generation, when it accelerated rapidly and then stopped in a moment of institutional consolidation that laid the foundations for Han China. The creation of the Achaemenid Empire too began with a slow rise to power of the Medes and Persians followed by the rapid conquest of Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian, and Lydian kingdoms and a period of institutionalisation under Darius. The Inka created their empire in less than a century, again by absorbing a series of well-established polities

and connecting them up with a new infrastructure. Historical sociologists sometimes describe this as a shift from "conquest state" to "tributary empire": that is, a set of institutions based on and supporting expansion came to be replaced – often after a crisis – with a new set of institutions invested in sustainable dominion. The current scholarly focus is on the expansion-bearing structures of the Republican period, and for the Principate on the means by which consent was secured from the empire's subjects. These emphases have largely replaced approaches that sought to understand the reasons for Roman expansion in the Republic and for Roman "stagnation" under the emperors, in terms of the motivations of leading political actors, and/ or else in terms of institutional or cultural exceptionalism. Those earlier approaches reflected ancient understandings of the rise of Rome.

Ancient Understandings

Ancient explanations of the rise of Rome tended to invoke the virtue and piety of the Romans, the excellence of their civic institutions, and the favour of the gods (Ferrary 1988; North 1993). So Ennius, the great epic poet of the second century BCE, wrote in *Annals* (a fragment cited in Cicero, *Republic* 5.1), "Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque" ("The Roman state depends on ancient customs and on its men" – or "... on its manhood," since virtue and manliness are denoted by the same word in Latin). This tended to be understood in terms of the cumulative virtue of individual Romans, especially of members of the propertied classes who supplied civil magistrates, priests, and generals. The first emperor, Augustus, represented this tradition when he filled the forum built around the temple of Mars Ultor (Mars the Avenger) with more than 100 images of *summi viri,* great Romans of the past who had extended the power (*imperium*) of the Roman people. Each statue was accompanied by a label that listed the individual's magistracies and priesthoods and the victories he had achieved. Alongside these were statues of the founders of Rome, Romulus and Aeneas, of the divine ancestors of the Romans

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and of Augustus' family, and of Augustus himself (Geiger 2008). A separate monument in the forum Romanum bore lists (*fasti*) that named all the Romans who had held the supreme magistracy – the consulship – and separately all those who had ever celebrated a triumph. Public monuments of this kind picked up a much older tradition. The family tomb of the Scipiones on the via Appia includes a series of sarcophagi with labels that for each prominent member of the family list their greatest (generally military) achievements. The announcements that Augustus made at the inauguration of his forum and the temple of Mars Ultor proclaimed that the deeds of the greatest Romans of the past would be a model for him and his successors to follow: young male members of the aristocracy underwent many of their rites of passage against the backdrop of these monuments.

The relationship between the Romans and their gods was thought of more collectively. Prodigies and omens were reported to the senate; colleges of senatorial priests were charged with devising and carrying out rituals to ensure the gods remained supportive; wars had to be declared according to particular rituals; generals consulted the heavens before going to war, made battlefield vows for success, and on their return set up temples to the gods concerned to acknowledge their help. The ever-evolving ceremony of the triumph brought the entire city together in a collective restoration of the peaceful order and a display of honour shared by the aristocratic general, the citizen army, and the gods themselves (Beard 2007; Östenberg 2009). Yet even in these collective ceremonies, individuals asserted themselves. Successful generals added the names of defeated peoples or places to their own, both in ordinary usage and on monuments (so Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus after the Allobroges he defeated in the middle Rhône valley, and Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus for his victories in the Punic Wars). The streets of Republican Rome came to be lined with victory temples, often fulfilling vows made on the battlefield by generals who paid for them from their share of the booty, and were eventually decorated with art works that commemorated the triumphs of the Roman

people (Holliday 2002). Temples of this kind were often maintained by the aristocratic descendants of the dedicator, and at noble funerals distinguished ancestors were animated by actors who wore effigies of the dead and robes appropriate to their status, while the military exploits of the deceased were rehearsed in speeches.

More generally, warfare was a central location for building fame. Wars lay at the centre of the epic poetry of Ennius and his predecessors, and then of Latin historiography. When Ennius's patron Fulvius Nobilior returned in triumph from campaigns in the Balkans, he created a great temple and precinct where plundered statuary was displayed, and sponsored a play about his victories. Individual achievements and the interests of the Roman people were repeatedly elided. Conversely when things went wrong it was often the result of inadequate ritual preparation on the part of the generals, or occasionally of other members of the senatorial order: a Vestal Virgin who broke her vow of chastity was sometime identified and punished with death. During the civil wars of the late Republic some orators and historians began to blame military and civil disasters on a general falling away of moral standards, the corrupting effects of luxury, contamination by alien values, and the like (Lintott 1972).

Institutional explanations for the rise of Rome were produced in parallel to these internal moralising debates. The Greek historian Polybius, who spent much of his adult life in Rome as an honoured hostage, attributed Roman success to what we would term the comparative advantage of its institutions. The Roman political system was a judicious blend of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements, and its military and religious institutions were superior to those of its rivals. The concepts Polybius employed were derived ultimately from the political philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, but they were not felt to be in conflict with native Roman ideas about the importance of virtue. Greek thinkers did not see political institutions in the way Hobbes did as a remedy for the brutalities of the state of nature, but rather as means of establishing ways of life in which humans naturally reached their full

potential. Although often ascribed to Aristotle, this idea was traditional: Xenophon had ascribed Spartan success to the perfection of its institutions and the habits they inculcated, and so it was natural for Polybius to move from the Roman constitution to Roman conduct. At least some of his Roman contemporaries would have agreed, even if others might have stressed the particular favour the gods showed to peoples of particular piety. Roman leaders were, on the whole, careful to establish that their wars were justified, both to ensure divine favour and to win the support of the popular assemblies that voted on war and peace. But these justifications, achieved by rhetoric and ritual, were focused on individual conflicts. Only in the last generation of the Republic did the notion emerge that Romans had a general mandate to conquer the world and rule it well (Brunt 1978; Ferrary 1988).

Ancient writers spent much less time trying to explain why Romans fought so many wars. One reason is that most ancient states were both warlike and engaged in sporadic disputes with their neighbours. City states generally fielded citizen armies, and military training was often a key part of the process by which young men became full citizens. Tribal communities seem also to have embraced a warrior ethos, to judge from grave goods and art works like Situla-Art of the Alps or the Gundestrup cauldron from Denmark. The question was not so much why cities and peoples came to blows, but rather why some did so more successfully than others. Thucydides had dramatised a debate on this theme between the Athenians and the Melians in the second book of his *Peloponnesian War*: the Athenians refuse to spare the Melians, on the ground that the strong always do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. A Roman legend told how when the Gauls were extracting indemnities from the Romans they were caught using false measures to weigh out gold. When challenged a Gallic chief pressed down the scale with his sword exclaiming, "Vae victis!" (Woe to the vanquished!; Livy, *History of Rome* 5.48.9). War was a normal state of affairs, and what was special about the Romans was not that they fought wars, but that they were so successful at doing so.

Explaining Expansion

The modern debate over the origins of Republican imperialism has taken a more tortuous route than that followed by ancient explanations. On the basis of the Roman notion that only just wars received divine support and on Roman accounts of the origins of several conflicts, it was for a while argued that Rome expanded accidentally, along the lines of Sir John Robert Seeley's quip that the British "conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind" (1914, p. 10). Romans, according to some, practised "defensive imperialism," responding only to external threats and finding themselves rather surprisingly in command of the world as a result. Support for this view was found in the supposed slowness of Romans to convert victories in the east into territorial provinces or to assume the imperial responsibilities to which their military success seemed to entitle them.

That view was comprehensively demolished by the demonstration that Romans consistently displayed attitudes that supported warfare, celebrated victory, and rewarded successful generals (Harris 1979, 1984). Among the institutions that cohered well with expansion were the practice of requiring defeated peoples to supply troops for further campaigns (Gabba 1976); the ritual of the triumph that marked the end of a successful war (Beard 2007); and a series of devices for expanding the citizen body, and so the citizen army (Raaflaub 1996). Warfare was not an absolute constant: there were periods of greater and less mobilisation. If Roman warfare was not primarily defensive there were certainly some wars that Rome did not choose, as when the King of Pontus invaded Rome's eastern provinces in the early last century BCE or when migrations penetrated the Mediterranean world from temperate Europe (Rich 1993). But in general it is fair to characterise the Roman Republic as a society geared for war, and in some respects dependent on warfare to satisfy the demands of its aristocracy and people for glory and booty.

That gearing naturally encompassed economic activity of various kinds. Rome had no independent mercantile class that might lobby for

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annexation. Indeed annexation reduced some opportunities for profiteering, as in the case of the slave trade (enslavement was in principle illegal within the empire), and because provincials had from the middle of the second century BCE some recourse to Roman justice that those outside the empire did not. There were no ancient equivalents of the chartered joint-stock companies that played such prominent parts in British, Dutch, and other European imperialisms from the seventeenth century on. Corporations had very little place in Roman law, the closest equivalent being short-lived *societates* – partnerships – which tendered for public contracts. The economic basis of pre-capitalist and capitalist imperialism was naturally very different.

All the same most sectors of Roman society benefited from expansion, directly or indirectly. Successful generals brought back great amounts of booty, and their personal share of it was not limited to what was spent on the gods or on triumphal feasts and games. Citizen soldiers and allies alike also received shares of the booty. The proceeds of conquest were spread more widely. The defeat of Macedon in 168 BCE was followed by the abandonment of direct taxation of Roman citizens in Italy. The sacks of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BCE were followed by a great aqueduct-building project, and monuments were set up in Italian allied cities as well as in Rome. Public building did not only benefit citizens by creating a more splendid built environment and sponsoring festivals within it. Army supply, the extraction of revenue, and its expenditure in building projects all came to rely on public contracts, generally issued by the censors in Rome. These contracts included the construction of public basilicas, paved forums, and roads, in Roman colonies as well as in the city itself. Only citizens could take public contracts, and in principle senators were forbidden to be principals. But great amounts of property were needed to guarantee larger contracts, and it is clear that behind the main contractors (*publicani*), who were often members of Rome's junior aristocracy, the equestrian order, there were senatorial backers. Polybius claimed in his Histories (6.17) that as early as the first half of the second century BCE "everyone" in Rome was involved. For a brief period in the last century BCE, when some contracts were very large, especially that for gathering the taxes of Asia, these bids and their five-yearly renewals did have political ramifications. But in general the propertied classes all benefited from empire.

Provincial populations bore the brunt. During the last century BCE in particular Roman power was exercised at the expense of provincial populations in many ways. Through plunder and purchase, the wealthy extracted cultural products from the Greek world – books and educated slaves as well as bronze and marble statuary and craftsmen. Caesar's campaigns in Gaul removed so much bullion from the region that silver and gold coinages were effectively extinguished north of the Alps. Large sums of money were occasionally lent to provincials at extortionate rates of interest, in the knowledge that the governors would allow the creditors to use Roman soldiers to recover what they were owed if borrowers defaulted. All this paid for grand villas and town houses, and also the bribery of electors and jurors. Verres, prosecuted by Cicero for corruption while governor of Sicily, was quoted as saying that he needed to extract three fortunes from his province, one to repay those who had elected him, another to bribe those who would try him on his return, and a third for himself (Cicero, *Against Verres* 1.1.40). Cicero's speeches allude to many other corruption trials, and a series of laws were passed from 149 BCE onwards aimed at recovering money embezzled by governors. Stories of violence and torture also circulated, and the cruelty and greed of Roman officials and tax-farmers form a regular part of the explanations offered in this period for revolts and anti-Roman movements. At the beginning of his *Annales*, Tacitus wrote that the provinces were unperturbed by the fall of the Republic because they had suffered so much from the feuding generals and corrupt officials and had no faith in legal redress in Rome (Levick 1994).

One other group which seems to have lost out in the process was the free peasantry of Italy, some at least of whom found their small holdings swallowed up by large estates, worked in part by

slaves. The absence of peasants on long campaigns and the enrichment of the generals that led them have been seen to be contributory factors, but the scale and timing of these changes are disputed (Hopkins 1978; Rosenstein 2004). Slaves never completely replaced free peasants, who still played a part in the agricultural regimes of Italy during the principate, and few subscribe to the thesis that imperial expansion was driven by the demands of a "Slave Mode of Production" (Rathbone 1983).

It is unsurprising, of course, that Rome in its expansionist phases had the institutions and ideologies that cohered with expansion (North 1981). But it is less obvious that those institutions and ideologies actually explain expansion as Polybius argued. A full explanation in terms of comparative advantage would have to look at Rome's rivals – Veii, Carthage, Macedon, and so on – and assess differences in institutions and how they fitted with differences in success or policy objectives. Multistate analysis of this kind, making use of political theory, has only just begun (Eckstein 2006, 2007). Besides, Roman institutions and ideas were in constant flux. Most importantly, innovations often seem to have been *reactions* to expansion, not preparations for it. Broadening access to citizenship came in practice as response to a series of crises in Rome's relations with her allies. The balance of power between magistrates and civil institutions that Polybius praised had in fact to shift over time as generals served further and further away from Rome and for longer periods. Perhaps the best illustration is provided by recent studies of the language of Roman imperialism (Richardson 2008). Romans developed territorial senses of *provincia* and *imperium* only in the last century BCE, long after they had *de facto* acquired first foreign possessions and then an identifiable sphere under permanent control. The same time lag is evident in the development of provincial taxation, in the elaboration of the role of governor from simply a military commander to a judicial official and plenipotentiary representative of Rome in the provinces, and in the gradual shift from annual citizen levies to what were in effect professional armies that might serve for years on end and needed to be re-integrated into

society when they were disbanded. In each case these changes responded to expansion rather than being designed to facilitate it.

The period of fastest expansion was partly driven by the failure of annual campaigns around the Mediterranean basin to stabilise Roman hegemony. The victories of the second century were followed by the return and disbanding of Roman armies. No garrisons and no administrations were left behind. A system of military commands that emanated from a competitive political system meant that even when there were a number of armies and generals in the field at the same time there was no guarantee that they would co-operate. Rome depended for information on embassies sent by her allies, who were often rivals. Much of the history of the second century BCE seems to have been driven by competition in the periphery, and when that became engaged with factionalism in the centre the effects could be very disruptive. Finally, there were some intrinsic difficulties facing any power that wished to control the Mediterranean world. One was a high incidence of piracy and banditry, which thrived in periods of political fragmentation: Hellenistic kingdoms had struggled to maintain some order and their defeat by Rome made the situation worse. A second problem was ecological in origin: strong economic and demographic ties existed between the societies of the Mediterranean littoral and those of its mountainous hinterlands. This meant that it was in practice impossible to control what is now Aegean Turkey without exercising influence over the Anatolian plateau; that Provence and could be governed if only the populations of the middle and upper Rhône were subjects or allies; and so on. From the late second century BCE onwards Roman armies were repeatedly drawn into the hinterlands of the Mediterranean World, and this required larger armies and greater co-ordination. Once these were supplied the results were at first impressive. During the last century BCE a series of generals, beginning with Marius and Sulla, showed what one general could achieve given very large forces for a substantial period of time and more or less freedom of action to make war and peace on whom he saw fit. "Peripheral imperialism" enabled Pompey to

conquer and settle much of Anatolia, the southern Black Sea coast, and the Near East, and allowed Caesar to make similar conquests in the north-west (Richardson 1986). Yet neither these large armies nor their generals could easily be contained with the institutions of the city of Rome. The logic of these developments was the shift from Republic to monarchy. One of the first acts of the first emperor was to create a professional army bound to himself and his family, and paid for from hypothecated tax income and a military treasury. In that sense the Roman Empire was a product of Roman imperialism.

None of this helps to explain, however, Rome's *initial* success. If it did not depend on extraordinary institutions or the virtue of generations of Roman aristocrats how are we to explain it? One answer is to set it in the context of wider histories of political growth in the Mediterranean world (Garnsey and Whittaker 1978). The size of political systems was increasing and their number decreasing over the last millennium BCE, presumably as a result of competition within an open system, economic growth and some advances in communications. The question then becomes why was Rome one of the eventual winners? Geopolitics might help. Rome benefited from a central position first within Italy, and later within the Mediterranean basin. Perhaps too Rome's position on the margin of politically plural systems helped: it was on the edge of the Etruscan city state civilisation, and later on the edge of the Hellenistic kingdoms, and that position (also enjoyed by Qin in the Warring States period, or Macedon in the fourth century BCE) seems to sometimes confer an advantage. Complexes of peer-polities often advance together, but sometimes tend to limit the rise of any one polity, through alliances of the others (Ma 2003; Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Change, or contingency, played a part too. Roman schoolchildren liked to debate what would have happened had Hannibal marched on Rome after Cannae, and Greek writers occasionally wondered what would have happened had Alexander marched west. We might also wonder how close Rome came to defeat in the Mithradatic Wars, or much later in the third-century crisis.

The Tributary Empire

If a conquest state is a polity dependent on constant expansion, a tributary empire is similarly invested in more sustainable and stable institutions (Bang and Bayly 2011; Crone 1989). Its political economy is based on regular exactions which are largely redistributed to the military, to officials, and to those who occupy privileged positions in the hierarchy of power. The rulers of tributary empires typically seek to reduce their transaction costs – imposing the running costs of empire on local elites, tax farmers, and the like – and they have few ambitions beyond retaining and passing on their power. Empires of this kind have been among the most stable political in world history, often enduring for centuries (Arnason and Raaflaub 2011). Typically they are characterised by universalising ideologies, and their rulers actively suppress signs of change and information about opposition (Bang and Kolodziejczyz 2012; Yuge and Doi 1988).

Rome extracted no revenue from its military supremacy until after it dominated the whole of the Italian peninsula. Campaigns paid for themselves, and the defeated contributed levies to future campaigns. Hellenistic kingdoms, by contrast, most of which were in effect successor states to the Achaemenid Persian Empire, had complex taxation systems. Once Rome began to extend its power overseas it encountered and incorporated some of these systems, and also began to need (or desire) greater revenues. One of the first fiscal systems taken over by Rome was a tithe levied on the cities of the kingdom of Syracuse by the third-century king Hiero II. After the second Punic war this system (the *Lex Hieronica*) was extended to the whole island province, and its revenues redirected to Rome. The same war brought Rome control of much of Mediterranean Spain, including silver mines near Cartagena. That conquest, and a need to provision Roman armies based for long periods in Spain, led in the second century to a regular levy on subject communities, the first provincial tax system devised by Rome (Richardson 1976). When the kingdom of Pergamum was acquired in 133 BCE the royal tax system was incorporated in the same way as the

Syracusan one had been (Cottier et al. 2008). The administration of Roman Egypt owed much to Ptolemaic precedents, which in turn drew on a deep sedimentation of Persian and Pharaonic systems. Probably there were other examples of this that are simply less well documented.

The transition from conquest state to tributary empire was not a sudden one. Roman armies of conquest never stopped extracting booty from conquered peoples. The Romans' initial response to the defeats of Carthage and Macedon was to impose indemnities to be paid in annual instalments over long but not indefinite periods. Only when those states were abolished was more regular taxation substituted. The tributary empire grew up within the body of a conquest state. The crucial period of change was the reign of Augustus, the first emperor, when provincial censuses were conducted across the empire with the aim of fixing permanent tax obligations. Ordering the empire was by no means a dry, bureaucratic process but was intimately linked to the creation of new universalising ideology of power, expressed in poetry and public monuments (Galinsky 1996; Gros 1976; Nicolet 1988; Zanker 1987). By the time of Augustus's death in 14 CE most of the empire was subject to taxation, only Italy and a few privileged cities enjoying exemptions from the land tax. Local civic elites collected most of the land tax, overseen by imperial exslaves and junior aristocrats named procurators, who also managed the emperors' own extensive provincial possessions and helped supply the army. Soldiers assisted the procurators where necessary, for example in escorting tax grain or bullion. There were also indirect taxes, for example on freeing slaves and on sales, many of them still managed by tax farmers (Brunt 1990). There were internal tariffs on trade between groups of provinces (France 2001). Over time tax-farmers seem to have been replaced by officials but it was a slow and patchy process, more a sign of a shift in imperial attitudes to government than of any global reorganisation. Bizarrely as it seems to us – but quite normally for a patrimonial empire – the whole was co-ordinated not by some central agency, but within the emperor's own household (Suetonius, *Divus Augustus* 101).

If the main lines of a tributary empire had emerged during the penultimate decade of the last millennium BCE with the first great provincial censuses, Rome continued to behave in some ways as a conquest state for some time longer. Augustus himself followed up this reorganisation with a long series of campaigns in temperate Europe that consolidated Roman control of Caesar's conquests and the Balkans and advanced armies up to and temporarily beyond the Rhine and the Danube. A series of defeats, culminating in a major disaster in 9 CE, slowed expansion. But there were further wars in Germany under his successor Tiberius and on the English Channel under Gaius, and under Claudius Britain was invaded. Later in the first century CE there were campaigns in south-west Germany as well as in Britain, before Trajan's spectacular wars in metal-rich Dacia in the early second century on the basis of which he created the greatest of the imperial forums in Rome, equipped with libraries, monumental statues, and the column that bears his name. One reason for these occasional expeditions – often undertaken by emperors who needed to demonstrate their ability – was that even if Rome's political economy was no longer geared to war, Roman public ideology could not dispense with the connection between virtue and warfare. All emperors were represented on statues, on coinage, and on monuments in military dress, all tried to maintain a close relation with the troops, and serious instability occurred only (in the third century) when emperors seemed no longer able to be effective war leaders. Another reason was that in many areas there was no obvious natural frontier: several expeditions in Britain and Germany do seem to have been designed to find limits that might be more cheaply and efficiently controlled. Yet the fact that the empire barely expanded beyond its Augustan limits indicates that on some level emperors understood that they had more to lose than gain by reckless and expensive campaigning. Tiberius understood the bottom line when he told one governor that he wanted his sheep shorn, not flayed.

Much remains unclear about early imperial tax systems. Taxes might be levied in cash or kind, and although kind presumably mostly meant

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agricultural produce examples are known of levies of other materials such as hides. But it is difficult to estimate the scale of monetised taxation. There was certainly wide variation in taxes and in mechanisms for their extraction: wherever we can see local arrangements in detail they are peculiar to that province or region. Everywhere the burden fell disproportionately on the poor and on those who were not Roman citizens. Evidently the emperors had no interest in creating empirewide systems, standards, or even tax rates. To the end of the third century CE, the tax system was really an agglomeration of local systems designed in different periods according to different principles, subsequently emended and supplemented, and run in a range of traditional ways (Brunt 1981). A number of inscriptions which stated exactly which taxes were current show that the system confused contemporaries as much as it does us.

If the emperors were not interested in rationalising systems there were nevertheless some consistencies in the kind of order they created through this mixture of violence and institutional bricolage. Most obviously they enlisted the help in all parts of their empire of the local ruling classes (Brunt 1976). Tribal chiefs in Gaul and Palestine, the priests of Egyptian temples, the wealthier members of Greek cities, kings in the Alps, the Atlas, and Anatolia, all were brought into a great coalition of interest, and tied through marriage, ceremony, and honours to the rulers of Rome. The pattern is familiar from other imperial systems (Cannadine 2001; Galtung 1971). This was a key difference from the Republican empire, which first in Italy and then around the Mediterranean had failed to include local rulers among the beneficiaries of empire.

Control and Its Limits

The Roman Empire at its peak contained around 60 million people, perhaps 20% of the global population. Its army never exceeded 500,000 men and was usually much smaller. It is evident that control could not depend on coercion alone.

It is widely agreed that a fundamental factor stabilising the empire was the fact that it served the propertied classes of the societies within it. Not only were they partners in extracting revenue. Many enjoyed the status of citizens, and by the second century the "better sort of people" (termed *honestiores*) enjoyed privileged legal status too, being treated better than others in investigations and, if found guilty, in terms of penalty (Garnsey 1970). Many found it easy to participate in the governance of the empire, becoming auxiliary commanders, members of the equestrian order, and even members of the senate. A few enjoyed the friendship and patronage of prominent Romans and even the emperor (Saller 1982). Interest was converted, at least among some of them, into a sense of membership and adherence to the imperial order. When dynasties collapsed new ones were put into place by alliances of courtiers, senators, and soldiers, all of whom had vested interests in the status quo. Beyond the wealthy it is difficult to gauge allegiances or opinion. Ceremony, ideology, monumentality, and governmentality together formed willing subjects in many places (Ando 2000). We know most about urban populations, especially those of Italy, but in those locations at least there are no real signs of disaffection. Urban populations, and not just their rulers, participated with enthusiasm in ruler cults of all sorts (Cancik and Hitzl 2003; Price 1984; Small 1996). More generally it is evident that a set of empire-wide cultural practices, styles, and habits became routine (Woolf 1998). How often participation in this was experienced consciously as political adherence is very difficult to say.

The alternative is to concentrate on episodes of unrest (Bowersock 1987; Momigliano 1987; Shaw 2000; Woolf 2011). Relatively few are well documented, and although this probably partly reflects deliberate under-reporting, those that are mentioned occurred in broadly similar circumstances. A number of conflicts took place in the generation immediately after conquest, and seem to have been fuelled in part by the social convulsions and transformations that affected many societies (Dyson 1971, 1975). Areas close to the edge of the empire – whether the northern frontier or the Romano-Parthian borderlands – were more likely to experience revolts than other

regions. Revolts were more common in time of Roman civil war. Mountainous areas were more difficult to control than plains or coasts. None of this is surprising. Attempts to link these outbreaks of opposition to cultural differences (e.g., Bénabou 1976) have not convinced many. A number of local disturbances seem to have had mainly local roots (Goodman 1987): perhaps this would be true of most if we had better information. Few were serious: the main threats to the authority of emperors came either from their intimate circle (from which assassinations emerged) or from armies led by their rivals. There were surprisingly few military revolts of that kind before the early third century CE (Shaw 1983; Woolf 1993). In all these respects Roman imperialism seems very like that of other early empires.

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Roy, Arundhati (1961–)

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Definition

Arundhati Roy is an Indian novelist, essayist, scriptwriter, and political campaigner who is best known for her novel *The God of Small Things* (1997), for which she won the Booker Prize for Fiction. Since then she has concentrated on developing her interest in politics, as manifested in her essays and novel on a range of political subjects, some of which are specific to India while others are more global in outlook.

Arundhati Roy is an Indian novelist, essayist, scriptwriter, and political campaigner who is best known for her novel *The God of Small Things* (1997), for which she won the Booker Prize for Fiction. Since then she has concentrated on developing her interest in politics, as manifested in her essays and novel on a range of political subjects, some of which are specific to India while others are more global in outlook. Since the late 1990s she has maintained an active presence in the media through her contributions to newspapers such as *The Guardian*, where she has written about issues including the plight of oppressed groups in India, the Mumbai terror attacks, Kashmir, India's nuclear weapons programme, ecosystems, and violence against women. She has been described as a spokesperson but believes that this is a misrepresentation of her intentions, which are to raise awareness about inequality and advocate the right to freedom but not to represent or speak for any particular group. Although esteemed in the academy, Roy is reluctant to be allied to elitist institutions because she thinks that those in power exploit the powerless in such a way that the latter are simply unaware of what is happening to them (Roy 2004, p. 120).

Biography

Suzanna Arundhati Roy was born on 24 November 1961 in Shillong in Meghalaya, a state in the north-east of India, to a Syrian Christian mother, Mary Roy, and a Bengali father, Ranjit Roy. Roy's parents divorced when she was young and her mother took both her and her brother to live in her home town of Ayemenem in Kerala, a coastal state in the south-west of India. One of Kerala's most distinctive features is its relatively high percentage of Christians: while Christians make up only a tiny minority of the total population of India as a whole (about 3–4%), Syrian Christians in Kerala comprise 20% of the population of the state. The inter-caste marriage of Mary and Ranjit Roy and their subsequent divorce meant that neither she nor her children would be wholly accepted back into her community. Moreover, Mary Roy had jeopardised

the *tharavad* (the family lineage that is passed down from the father's side): 'If you don't have a father, you don't have a *tharavad* [sic]. You're a person without address' (Roy 2004, p. 5). Undeterred by these attitudes, Mary Roy, an ardent feminist, was determined to make the best start for her children by giving them a good education. In 1986 she won a legal case in the Indian Supreme Court challenging the Syrian Christian inheritance law that stated that a woman can inherit at most a quarter of her father's property (or 5000 rupees, whichever was less). Her case made history and changed the law to give women equal inheritance; furthermore the law was backdated to 1956. Passionate about education, Roy's mother founded two schools: a small primary school, and in 1967 Corpus Christi (now called Pallikoodam School) in the town of Kottayam. Roy benefited from attending her mother's schools, where she was encouraged to learn without the restraints of conventional schooling, a trait that would influence her throughout her life.

Roy left her mother's school in Kottayam when she was 16 to attend the Lawrence boarding school in Tamil Nadu. From there she moved to Delhi to study architecture at the college of architecture, where she met a fellow student, Gerard Da Cunha, who would become her first husband. After engaging in architectural projects, Roy and her husband decided to abandon their professional lives and moved to Goa, where they made a simple living selling hand-made goods on the beach. Within 6 months or so Roy had tired of this life and moved to Delhi, separating from Da Cunha after a four-year marriage. It was here that she began her creative life as a writer. In 1984 Roy met and married the film-maker Pradip Krishen. Roy wrote screenplays for some of her husband's films, including *In Which Annie Glues it Those Ones* (1989, published 2003) and *Electric Moon* (1992).

Although Roy never pursued a professional career in architecture, the influence that the subject had on her sensibilities and outlook cannot be underestimated. From an academic point of view, it developed her understanding of the sociological aspects of housing. As a discipline architecture enabled her to develop her ideas structurally, on many different spatial and temporal levels.

Through a multilayered framework she was able to explore the hybridity of different cultures, a characteristic that was displayed in her first novel. By her own admission, '[s]tudying architecture taught me to apply my understanding of structure, of design and of minute observation of detail to things other than buildings. To novels, to screenplays, to essays. It was an invaluable training' (Roy 2003, p. xii).

Another aspect of her life that continues to underpin her work is the quest for liberation. Her family circumstances meant that she was not fully accepted in society and had to struggle against conventional Indian society, which some 50 years ago was opposed to inter-caste marriage and divorce. Being displaced was a double-edged sword because, although it meant that she was made to feel like an outsider because of her background, it also freed her from the expectations placed on women to prepare themselves for marriage. By not belonging to a caste or religion and being exempt from pressure to conform, she was free to explore her own identity on her own terms.

The God of Small Things

Roy's novel is semi-autobiographical and excels in its powers of observation and imagination. Set in Ayemenem, a village in Kerala, it draws on Roy's own life experiences while using the symbolic power of nature, and in particular the changing of seasons, as a backdrop. The plot centres on a relationship between a low-caste carpenter, Velutha, and a Syrian-Christian divorcee, Ammu, and the narrative is told from the perspective of Ammu's twins Estha and Rahel. The key events concern the visit of their half-English cousin Sophie Mol and her mother. At the beginning of the novel we learn that Sophie Mol has drowned in the river by the family's house. The text shifts between the past and present registers, moving from 1969 to 1993; meaning is created through the knowledge generated by memory, flashbacks, and flash-forwards. The non-linearity is one of the most distinctive features of the novel and means that the reader has to avidly connect with Estha and Rahel, who tell and re-tell the story at different points in their lives: when they are seven as they observe things around then, and

then at the age of 31 when they are reflecting on the past and trying to make sense of it.

One of the most characteristic features of the novel is the attention to detail; seemingly trivial actions or aspects of nature are connected with larger political and social issues, such as pollution, class struggles, and immigration. We learn that society is still shaped by the caste system, which defined the position that people would occupy in life; even though it was outlawed in the Indian constitution in 1949, it continued to dominate society in a real and pressing way. The depth of her world view, coupled with the intricacy of her writing style means, that Roy is able to forge a connection between the different levels of social, geographical, and economic reality, an ideal that reflects the sensory richness of India. Roy states that in the book she:

> connects the very smallest things to the biggest. Whether it's the dent that a baby spider makes on the surface of water in a pond or the quality of the moonlight on a river or how history and politics intrude into your life, your house, your bedroom, your bed, into the most intimate relationships between people – parents and children and siblings and so on. (Roy 2004, p. 11)

The above quotation conveys a more central and ongoing aim in Roy's writing, irrespective of its type: 'all of her writing shares the aim of telling a story, building bridges between the small realities of people's lives and the immense social forces that affect them' (Higgs 2004, p. 17).

The novel's richness means that it can be discussed on many different levels. A popular strand of interpretation examines it as an example of post-colonial discourse, which sets out to contest ideas of universality and to impose singular frameworks of meaning. We hear instead the voices of the silenced others, who are given platforms on which to speak. By focusing on the Christian community, rather than the Hindu or Islamic communities, Roy presents a fresh perspective of postcolonialism in South Asia.

Since its publication *The God of Small Things* has continued to be enormously successful, having sold more than six million copies worldwide and been translated into more than 40 languages. However, it has also divided critics into those who

lauded Roy's rich use of language and intricate plot and those who were bemused by the somewhat convoluted narrative. The award of the Booker Prize in 1997 was not only an individual victory for Roy but also marked the growing significance of writers from former colonial states, including Salman Rushdie (*Midnight's Children,* 1981), Keri Hulme (*The Bone People,* 1985), and Ben Okri (*The Famished Road*, 1991).

Political Activism

Both before and after her critically acclaimed novel, Roy was active in the writing of political essays, which raises the question whether she should be primarily defined as a novelist or whether her novel simply represented a literary excursion from her central objective. For the purposes of classification a writer's works are often divided into categories of fiction and non-fiction, of which the latter involves discussion of social, political and economic ideas often relating to projects or initiatives that have been or are currently being carried out. However, Roy does not believe in a clear-cut distinction between the purposes of non-fiction and fiction. In her opinion, although fiction is rooted in the imagination and may not be fact-based, it still has the capacity to truth-tell; indeed non-fiction and fiction simply represent two different forms of storytelling. *The God of Small Things* is a case in point, where the reader learns as much about religious, ethnic, and cultural practices and traditions as she or he does about the characters in the story and their complicated family life.

Roy's intellectual energy and wide political interests explain the extent of her commentaries on subjects that she is passionate about. Broadly speaking, she is interested in factors that have shaped the identity of India, including its colonial past and more recently the impact of neoliberalism. At the heart of her interpretation is the struggle between power structures and how this is played out between states, societies, and people. Roy's principles about social activism govern her approach to her work in general, and she strives 'to never complicate what is simple, to never simplify what is complicated'. In addition, she aspires

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'to be able to communicate to ordinary people what is happening in the world' (Roy 2004, p. 120).

Much of her criticism is levelled at what she deems to be pernicious practices of the Indian Government in exercising corporate control and militarisation. Capitalism has swept India with the government's active collusion, which is done under the aegis of globalisation and the global economy. Roy has defended the position of the Naxalite-Maoist insurgents, who she believes have been treated reprehensibly by a government which should recognise that these indigenous groups are trying to protect their land from corporate takeover, and should not view them as an internal security threat.

One of her main projects is the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a social and grassroots movement opposed to the construction of dams across the Narmada river and consisting of groups of people from different strata of society including adivasis (tribal groups throughout India), farmers, and human rights activists. In spite of the Indian Government's insistence that the dams will benefit the population, many communities have been displaced since the building of them began in the 1980s. The construction of the dams has threatened the homes and livelihoods of a vast number of people. The campaigning has been nonviolent, in keeping with Gandhian principles, or truth (*satya*) being attained through nonviolent means. Roy has been an active participant in the protests, and was arrested at the site of one of the proposed dams in the village of Sulgaon, but she escaped a jail sentence after paying a fine. Her donation of her Booker Prize money (about £50,000) to the organisation reflects her continuing commitment.

Like many other post-colonial writers, Roy is an active proponent of anti-globalisation and believes that modernity should not be incompatible with the preservation of traditions, arguing for the importance of sustainability. Roy argues:

> It's as though the people of India have been rounded up and loaded onto two convoys of trucks (a huge big one and a tiny little one) that have set off resolutely in opposite directions. The tiny convoy is on its way to a glittering destination somewhere near the top of the world. The other convoy just melts into the darkness and disappears. (2002, pp. 2–3)

Some critics may view her desire to write in English as inconsistent with the efforts to preserve the numerous vernacular languages in India, and as contrary to the objective, following Independence, to preserve Hindi as the national language of India. This is especially striking given that Roy is not an expatriate. An alternative view is that Roy intended to show the effects that colonialism had on the Indian psyche whereby English became synonymous with everything that was cultured and elite. In *The God of Small Things* she intersperses Malayalam words in the text to give a sense of the cultural exchange between different languages and dialects which is a trademark of communication in India even today.

One of Roy's most recent books, *Broken Republic: Three Essays* (2011), analyses the effects of India's economic policies on its people and the environment. The first essay is about the government's war on the forest-dwelling people in the state of Chhattisgarh as it attempts to mine the land's mineral supply. The second essay, 'Waking with Comrades', is a poignant piece about Roy's three-week journey into the Chhattisgarh forest and her time with the Maoist rebels who befriended her. This excursion symbolises her shift from her earlier position of nonviolent resistance. She discusses problematic cases where violence is justifiable: a violence of resistance, or type of counter-violence, as when defending human rights against the brutalism of governmental policies. Like other texts, *Broken Republic* combines Roy's allegiance to the people of India with her poetic mindset.

Roy's denunciation of the caste system is implicit in many of her texts, and is more explicit in her recent introduction 'The Doctor and the Saint' to B.R. Ambedkar's *The Annihilation of Caste* of 1936 (2014b). Ambedkar was a politician and social reformer who campaigned against caste discrimination and for rights for the Dalits. In a radical but undelivered speech, which was self-published, he criticised many ideas that were sacrosanct to Hindu values including the caste system, the effects of which he believed were ubiquitous in society. His radicalism stemmed from his advocacy of breaking up the caste

system, which he believed meant tackling it at its heart, that is, destroying religious ideas that upheld that tradition. Roy's support for his efforts to expose such systemic injustice is conveyed in her introduction to his book, which was published in 2014 by Navayana. The same year also marked the publication of Roy's stark examination of the invisible masses of Indians who, in their power-lessness, go unnoticed. *Capitalism: A Ghost Story* (2014a) is an examination of the real nature of democracy in contemporary India. Focusing on the gross inequality of the distribution of wealth, Roy tells the story of a nation of 1.2 billion people where there are pockets of wealth but also legions of 'ghosts' – the poor and the oppressed.

Controversy

Although it has not been Roy's intention to court controversy and it is certainly not her wish to be regarded as a celebrity, there have been occasions when she has been thrust into the spotlight. This is mainly because of her forthright views on develop-ment and class politics, which have offended the Indian upper classes and nationalists and marked her out as a dissenter. She came under scrutiny after the publication of *The God of Small Things* on a charge of obscenity because of the graphic sex scenes, which caused offence in India. All her campaigns have in common the need to expose the internal corruption in India, which purports to be a democracy, the world's largest democracy in fact, an ideal that is not reflected in the invidious split between those in power who make the deci-sions and those who are disempowered on the basis of caste and class. Roy speaks up for the rights of under-represented and disenfranchised communi-ties. In 'The Great Indian Rape Trick' (1994) Roy writes about Shekhar Kapur's 1994 film *Bandit Queen,* criticising the fact that he did not approach the real-life protagonist for her consent to the rep-resentation of her rape. In 'The Greater Common Good' (1999) she expresses her dissatisfaction with the Indian Government's neglect of the dev-astation done to the lives of its citizens by the building of the dams. Its lack of concern is reflected

in the inadequate official records kept of the people affected. Since most of the displaced people were the *adivasis* and the Dalits, who are treated as 'non-persons' anyway and are not granted the same human rights as other groups, the government did not take their plight seriously. Systems such as the caste system that are integral to Indian society perpetuate the structural inequalities and the con-tinued oppression of the underclasses, a fact that is explained by the problematic concept of karmic justice.

Contribution

Roy is an important figure in post-colonial and women's writing, following writers such as Jean Rhys, Anita Desai, and Nadine Gordimer. Focusing on questions of identity and history, she discusses India in the post-Independence era, which has an evolving identity that is defining itself against its colonialist legacy by considering its mythic past and ideals. Her contribution to women's writing is in the acknowledgement and articulation in her narratives of women's experi-ences in their individuality and diversity, thus recognising their impact as agents of history and transformation, rather than as passive recipients. The public attention to *The God of Small Things*, and the eager anticipation of her next novel (if indeed there is going to be one), should not overshadow her continued commitment to politics, and awards such as the 2002 Lannan Prize for Cultural Freedom testify to her work in this area. Although Roy's status as a novelist contributed to her initial success, the impact of her subsequent projects, which include political essays and cam-paign work, should not be underestimated. Roy remains fiercely committed to combating the cor-ruption caused by imperialism, in particular the realignment of the Indian Government with the US at the end of the Cold War and the concomitant rise of Hindu nationalism. She describes the militarisation and corporatisation of the govern-ment as contributing to the 'hollowing out' of democracy, and is focused on articulating the plight of the oppressed in her home country and beyond.

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Rule of Law and Imperialism

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Definition

The rule of law can be defined as the existance of a system of laws that provide both predictability and stability in regulatory governance; it is best understood as the opposite of the rule of men, which is to say the rule of law indicates a governance system that is independent of the views, opinions or interests of any specific member of the ruling class or organisation.

The rule of law is often contrasted with the rule of men, to suggest that *law*-based *governance* removes (or at least constrains) arbitrary and capricious *government*. In the (contested) history of *imperialism*, the rule of law is often presented as a key social benefit gained by countries and societies ruled from the *metropole*; whatever the other costs of imperialism, the introduction of the rule of law, it is suggested, has had significant subsequent benefits for these societies. The continuing and contemporary "encouragement" to adopt the rule of law is also sometimes seen as an imperialistic project itself, driven by an *epistemic community of lawyers* who promote a specific form of westernized liberal *legality*.

The rule of law has become to a large extent the common sense of global politics in the new millennium, even if it remains politically contested especially by populist nationalists in Europe and elsewhere. The rule of law also has a contested relationship with the history of imperialism, with some commentators seeking to argue that whatever its other faults, one of the key benefits of imperialism was to bring the civilizing force of the rule of law to countries and cultures that previously had lacked a rounded and developed appreciation for, and practice of, legality; others are not so sure. In this essay I briefly introduce the idea of the rule of law and then assess the arguments about its links with the imperialistic project from two angles: firstly relating the rule of law to the international history of imperialism and colonialism and secondly examining the more recent suggestion that the "support" for the strengthening of the rule of law across the global system is a contemporary form of (legal) imperialism.

The Rule of Law

There is an extensive literature that seeks to establish and justify particular definitions of the rule of law; it usually centers on a well-established distinction (utilized in jurisprudential discussions but also in political and socioeconomic analysis) which divides contending definitions between the "thin" and "thick" versions of the norm. However, given the range of definitions, it is easier to think of these arrayed along a continuum between *thinnest* and *thickest* version, rather than merely falling into one or other broad groups (May 2014: Chapter 2). For ease, while there is a clear distinction between common law and civil law, as far as the global norm of the rule of law is concerned, this is perhaps of less immediate consequence, and so here I will only be concerned with this more generalized depiction.

If Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant are correct that the "new planetary vulgate rests on a series of oppositions and equivalences which support and reinforce one another to depict the contemporary transformations that advanced societies are undergoing" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001: 4), then the central defining opposition that grounds the rule of law norm is the contrast between the rule of men *and* the (preferred) rule of law. This is reflected in much of the contemporary jurisprudential debate about the norm which starts by asserting the need to remove the rule of individuals, before differing on how this might be best accomplished.

Such discussions usually take place on the terrain of the distinction between the thick rule of law, encompassing a wide set of legal/social norms such as equity and justice, and a narrower thin rule of law limited to procedural and organizational matters. These contrasting depictions are both ideal types with competing definitions of legality facing in one direction or another; the division between thick and thin conceptions is best seen as a continuum between nodal points, rather than two clearly distinguishable (essentialized) positions.

It is worth stressing that even the thinner procedural notion of the rule of law is, of course, normative in the sense that it supports a view about good and proper modes of procedure that

cannot be said to be natural or pre-/nonsocial. The rule of law's thick-thin continuum is a range of normative positions, and while tendencies and relative positions can be identified, it is unlikely that one would find anyone expressing the ideal typical endpoints themselves.

While, as noted, there are many definitions of the rule of law to choose from, here I deploy Lord Bingham's specification. This is an inclusive statement of the current (popular/general) characterization of the rule of law; it depicts the rule of law in its role as the common sense of (global) politics in a manner that was easily recognized in both legal and political communities (May 2014: Chapter 2). This is clearly a British view of the rule of law and thus sits within a specific set of jurisprudential debates and cannot in any sense be regarded as definitive (not least as no view has gained sufficient traction to be so regarded). However, when introduced to the elements Bingham proposes, most people (in western capitalist societies, at least) would recognize them as being parallel to their own more casual assumptions about the legitimate operation of the system of law.

Any depiction of the thin norm is nested within the wider/thicker rule of law, and as such thicker readings of the norm often set out the thin elements as part of their overall depiction. Lord Bingham's book length discussion of the rule of law does this particularly well, and as such I reproduce the eight elements he sets out – the first four being broadly the basis of a thin reading of the norm, while the addition of the second four expands the definition toward the thicker end of the normative continuum (although Bingham does not offer such a bipartite distinction).

Following Bingham, the rule of law's central characteristics can be described in the following manner:

1. "The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable": law-abiding behavior requires those governed to be able to ascertain what the law actually is (Bingham 2010: 37–47).
2. "Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law

and not the exercise of discretion": discretion must be exercised within the bounds of the law, and therefore no decisions should be arbitrary or without recourse to some law or another (Bingham 2010: 48–54).

3. "The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation": all must be equal before the law, with no distinction between, for instance, the rich and the poor or the weak and the powerful. Where the law distinguishes responsibility by age, there may be some reason to treat people differently but only when these differences are "objective" and not social, political, or economic (Bingham 2010: 55–59).

4. "Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the power were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably": Bingham actually intends this to underpin judicial review, so that the state can be held accountable to the laws parliament has enacted and does not go beyond that democratically grounded intent (Bingham 2010: 60–65).

Up until this point, Bingham's elements are essentially procedural, requiring little or no judgment of the content of the law. Even the invocation of objective differences under three can hardly be said to be normative toward a liberal sense of equality, as "objective" differences are often in the eye of the (political) beholder, for instance, racists see differences between ethnicities as objective (although for Bingham this would have been unacceptable). The following four characteristics move Bingham firmly toward a thicker reading of the rule of law.

5. "The law must afford adequate attention to fundamental human rights": spending some time exploring various articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, Bingham argues, as do many supporters of the thick norm, that the rule of law cannot be said to obtain where there the procedures of law explicitly are intended to maintain injustice(s) (Bingham 2010: 66–84).

6. "Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve": if effective representation is blocked by costs to all but the wealthiest defendants, then the law is not treating all equally. Bingham offers a clear defense of legal aid and expeditious legal process as crucial to the maintenance of the rule of law, reflecting a political position about the good society and the amelioration of extralegal inequality (Bingham 2010: 85–89).

7. "Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair": the judiciary and legal profession must be independent of the state, allowing both sides (prosecution and defense) a fair trial, with defendants knowing the charges against them (through a writ of habeas corpus if necessary). In supporting a particular norm of independence, Bingham identifies the danger of politicization which would then require a judgment about political organization rather than the procedures of the law themselves (Bingham 2010: 90–109).

8. "The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law": the state's obligations do not end with its own law, but rather extend to the realm of global politics including as noted above, human rights, but also the rules of war and other international regulatory arrangements (Bingham 2010: 110–129).

Bingham's discussion of the rule of law is intended to demonstrate that the norm itself is multifaceted but also that merely recognizing procedural norms should not be sufficient for any state to be accorded the recognition of being governed by the rule of law. For Bingham the political standard is higher than merely acting in line with basic legal norms; it is more than just rule *by* law.

A thin reading of the rule of law can be a generalized (largely non-political) yardstick for gauging social organization, but for Bingham the problem with a thin conception is that it reduces law to its positive legal characteristics. This then suggests that the legitimate agency of government is the source of law, and it is difficult to conceive

of how such a system can effectively hold rulers to legal limits, as they are also its source. Moreover, whatever the formal and/or normative considerations, governments tend to attempt to reserve for themselves the power to decide what the limits to the rule of law are and when other values (most obviously, national security) should be privileged. However, even if the question of states' ability to define the condition of legal exception looms over the exercise of the rule of law (Agamben 2005), actually many states (and many other global actors), for much of the time, do seem to accept some version of the (thicker) rule of law, rather than merely a procedural and thinner form, and so the norm in use seems to be more substantive than its thinner depiction might indicate.

Having now stipulated a multifaceted definition of the rule of law drawn from Bingham's account, I will review the claims that have been made about the impact of this norm through the practice of imperialism and its aftermath. It is also worth noting that the norm itself really only solidified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (despite elements having a much longer pedigree), so to some extent, all projections of the norm back into the history of imperialism have an element of anachronism about them while also retaining some salience due to the norms extensive prehistory.

Contested Claims About the Rule of Law and Imperialism

Having defined the rule of law at some length, it is likely less necessary to define imperialism in quite such detail. Nevertheless, given how I will use the term later in this essay, it is worth setting out briefly how I understand it. Here I will use imperialism as a term to capture the external imposition of (elements of) a political economy on another society. Crucially, for reasons that will become clear, I expand this from being only a function of interstate relations or relations patterned by a strong organized state on one side and a society without a similar formally institutionalized political structure on the other to one that includes relations of power and domination between

non-state groupings (albeit groupings that have considerable coherence and political resources). Nevertheless, I also recognize that the term itself finds its origins in the relations between dominating state and subject populations (however organized), and the wider definition that I deploy later can sometimes become a very loose and unfocused critical trope (a failing I hope to avoid below).

While certainly not the universal experience of imperialism, for many societies subject to the rule of the metropole during the decades (or even centuries) of imperialist control, the key mechanism utilized was the imposition of a legal system which either replaced local law or so dominated it to render prior legal systems marginal to the practices of governance. One way to understand this process is the establishment of a new space of law – a nomosphere – which displaced other spaces of governance to establish new forms of social relations (typically) focused on western notions or property rights (Delaney 2010: Chapter 5). This is not a process of displacement, or overlaying, but rather the dismantling by imperial powers of the prior customary or traditional legal systems that stood in their way.

This experience has, however, been presented not as the destruction of prior social practices but rather the introduction of the rule of law as a key civilizing mechanism. The reason that the thin to thick continuum has some analytical utility here is that often what we find is the value of the rule of law "sold" on the basis of its justice and democratic (thick) elements (the introduction of "western values"), but when we look at legal structures themselves, what is often more obvious is that only the thinner elements, which is to say the procedural elements of the norm, are operative. Thus, for instance, in nineteenth-century India, in an attempt to recognize the continuing relevance of local legal mores, the British explicitly referred to introducing the procedures or modes of law but not necessarily all its English substance (Hussain 2003: 63–66). This far from isolated example helps explain why subsequently across the political spectrum the rule of law has become a common sense (May 2014); it is sufficiently imprecise and flexible to cover a range of legal settlements

while supposing all are constituent of an emerging global society that has put behind it the histories, exploitations, and violence of imperialism.

This positive account of the rule of law under imperialism runs through much of Niall Ferguson's revisionist celebration of the British Empire (a book and TV series). Here, the British concern with law and the introduction of common law procedures and practices is presented as having had a significant developmental payoff for postcolonial states "lucky" enough to have been part of the Empire; indeed he concludes that "we should not underestimate the benefits conferred by British law and administration" (Ferguson 2003: 361). He argues that due to the increasing liberal character of Imperial policy, the "rule of law had to take precedence, regardless of skin colour" (Ferguson 2003: 195), and as such the imposition of this norm led to the establishment of legal systems that would subsequently be advantageous to societies in the post-imperial period.

This presentation of the rule of law's centrality was expanded 8 years later in his account of civilization where (in a triumph of anachronism) the rule of law is presented as one of the "killer aps" for the achievement of a modern civilized society (Ferguson 2011). That the beneficial rule of law in this view had a specific set of advantages is also attested by discussions of how the Middle East has been held back (economically) by the particularities of Islamic law(s) (Kurran 2011). In other words, the advantage of western imperialism for the colonized countries was that this introduced not just the rule of law but the *right* laws. However, as a number of colonial examples attest, the introduction of the rule of law by an imperial power was not the handmaiden of "civilization" (so-called) and democracy but mostly entrenched the power of existing elites with whom the imperial power was most engaged with (Brown 1995; McBride 2016). The subsequent political value to dominated societies of the introduction of the rule of law (often by force) was considerably compromised by the partiality of its deployment – often expectations raised by an understanding of the thicker aspects of the norm were undermined when elites maintained their power and position by utilizing the procedures

of the law but not its (supposed) support for equality or even "fairness."

It is notable that during the nineteenth century, political commentary on the legal facets of imperialism (the manner in which the law was used to suppress colonial populations) was actually far more widely discussed and criticized than its current celebrants might allow (Kostal 2005). Even then the divergence in the value of the rule of law depends on the form in which it appeared (broadly whether it was a thick or more usually thin version). As Nasser Hussain argues at some length, one of the key aspects of the rule of law under imperialism was to legitimize the use of emergency powers to deal with dissent and resistance. While this was frequently contested by indigenous populations, nevertheless, it was this legal and political order that was (re)produced in the new constitutions of independence (largely built on the legal foundations inherited from the colonial era) and as such has seen the continued normalization of the recourse to the state of emergency in many postcolonial states (Hussain 2003: 133–144). However, this is not to say that all postcolonial states have experienced similar legacies in the legal sphere from their experience(s) of imperialism.

There is some evidence that there are different effects depending on whether the colonial rule was direct or indirect (which is to say whether the institutions of government were staffed by colonial officers – direct rule – or by locals – indirect rule). Where British officers ran the state, it seems to have resulted in a legacy more like that which Fergusson and others have claimed, but where locals were more involved, the imperial introduction of the rule of law seems to have had less "beneficial" effect (Lange 2004). This suggests that the "value" rule of law *was*, as British colonial officers had claimed, more than just the procedures but rather involved the inculcation into its modes of operation. This "value" may also differ depending on whether the colonial power introduced a system of common law or one based on civil law; there may be a range of reasons for this, but Sandra Fullerton Joireman has argued that the more extensive bureaucratic demands in civil law systems may

have led to a divergence of postcolonial societies' legal institutionalization (Joireman 2001). The legal legacy of imperialism is variable and subject to a number of factors.

However, in the case of African colonialism, it is not clear that the introduction of the rule of law was universalized; Mahmood Mamdani argues that there was a frequent distinction drawn between the colonizers whose lives were ruled by law and the indigenous population whose lives remained rule by custom(s). Thus:

> The language of rights bounded law. It claimed to set limits to power. For civic power was to be exercised within the rule of law, and had to observe the sanctity of the domain of rights. The language of custom, in contrast, did not circumscribe power, for custom was enforced. The language of custom enabled power instead of checking it by drawing boundaries around it. In such an arrangement, no rule of law was possible. (Mamdani 2001: 654)

Only by according recognition to the non-indigenous civil society did locals find themselves within the purview of the rule of law; this clearly violates the thicker norm (around non-discrimination, for instance), even it might plausibly deliver a thin rule of law. The introduction of the rule of law and its institutions therefore was often not a mechanism of general social development (as presented in the positive imperialist narrative); rather it was a mechanism by which a minority could rule by co-opting a ruling elite into the ways of legality as citizens while excluding the majority, left to be "so many custom-driven ethnicities" (Mamdani 2001: 663). This leads Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader (2008) to conclude more generally that the (pretended) universality of the rule of law, by excluding much that is local/regional and established under different legal norms, is undermined by the actual imposition of a westernized rule of law that seeks to structure societies to enhance and facilitate the plunder of the local resources.

Mattei and Nader therefore argue that the "ideological construction of the rule of law protecting private property as a desirable aspect of human civilisation *per se* has been very successful" (Mattei and Nader 2008: 196). Moreover, their argument is that the imposition of a westernized rule of law through a process of legal imperialism has closed off a range of developmental

strategies and allowed the political economic relations of nineteenth-century imperialism to be maintained and reproduced across the contemporary global system. This leads Anthony Anghie to observe that it is clear that the history of international law is one in which it "continuously disempowers the non-European world, even while sanctioning intervention within it," but international law itself "remains oblivious to its imperial structures even when continuing to reproduce them" (Anghie 2005: 312). Moreover by regarding imperialism as a thing of the past, the international legal community often seems blind to it continuing imperialist practices and affordances. Therefore, it makes sense to move beyond an understanding of law and imperialism that merely focuses on the history of colonialization to ask what forms does legal imperialism take in the new millennium.

Debates About the Rule of Law as an (Imperialistic) Imposition

The discussion of the rule of law's link with imperialism tends to move toward a singular position on the rule of law; there is a relatively universal norm that societies need to approach if they are to be prosperous, democratic, and successful. Indeed, the contemporary linking of human rights and the rule of law has underpinned the re-inscribing of the "civilizing mission" of legal aid, technical support, and "capacity building" to allow societies to escape from the prelegal systems patterned by customary legal traditions that lack the formality of the westernized model (Hussain 2003: 142). As this suggests there is a general acceptance by policymakers and in the wider academic community that the rule of law is central to the successful establishment of market societies (See the survey of literature in Trebilcock and Prado (2011: 41–79) and/or in Trubek (2006).). This link between the rule of law and economic development is central to the account of the norm's continuing link with imperialism.

As Svetozar Pejovich puts the standard development position:

> Private property rights and the law of contract generate efficiency-friendly incentives that move resources to their highest-values uses. An

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independent judiciary and a constitution protect those incentives from decision makers in government, rent-seeking coalitions, and majority rule. (Pejovich 2008: 165)

This focus on property and contract and the downplaying of democracy (protection from "majority rule") has also been stressed by Judge Richard Posner (an influential proponent of the law and economics perspective):

Legal reform is an important part of the modernisation process of poor countries, but the focus of such reform should be on creating substantive and procedurally efficient rules of contract and property *rather than on creating a first-class judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties.* (Posner 1998: 9, emphasis added)

Here law is instrumental in promoting economic growth but only if relatively unencumbered by demands emanating from noneconomic interests. Immediately we can see a parallel with the discrimination between those benefitting from the rule of law and those excluded under imperialism or under the call for the rule of law as a key aspect of economic development policy and practice. In this sense once again, the thicker rule of law is the public face of the thinner rule of law as supported by foreign aid.

Certainly, it is also the case that while other authors agree that the property rights/contract rights development nexus is important, they may also recognize the need for a wider set of laws to be considered as part of the underpinnings of successful development (Trebilcock and Prado 2011). Nevertheless, in general terms the economic development approach to the rule of law might be best summarized as good law + good enforcement = improved economic outcomes (Milhaupt and Pistor 2008: 5). The reflects a view of the history of capitalism that draws from Max Weber's analysis of the rise of legalism in Europe; it was the development of a law that was largely autonomous and which was (relatively) unchallenged as a social authority, which (it is proposed) lay behind the successful expansion of European capitalism.

The reduction (or obstructing) of other normative schemes in society allowed rationalization (parallel to the professionalization of the law) to underpin the development of capitalist society (Trubek 1972), and as such only as legalism became widespread did capitalism prosper in Weber's view. Thus, the move to reduce the role of local practices and customs (which encompass competing norms) draws at least some sustenance as an analytical position from Weber's work. The rule of law facilitates economic development by diluting social barriers to the deployment of resources and through *formalization* reduces the impact of prior social constraints. The rule of law removes socially obstructive local customs and practices, replacing them with a universal economic rationalism.

Although the rule of law may be necessary for (capitalist) economic development, it is unlikely to be sufficient, with law interacting with other aspects of society to either promote (or hinder) development (Dam 2006). There may be considerable interaction (and thus hybridization) between a rule of law culture and other socially evident culture(s) that inform social practices and norms, especially in the economic realm. However, analyses that link law and development often start from the proposition that if it doesn't look like the liberal and western rule of law, then it cannot support economic development *properly.* And it is here, in the totalizing approach to the specific rule of law favored for capitalist development, that we can best see the new imperialism of the rule of law, an imperialism that while involving states is perhaps most clearly prosecuted by the epistemic community of lawyers.

Elsewhere I have suggested that the global society of lawyers (including those only involved in national legal affairs) constitute an epistemic community of lawyers (May 2014: 67–74). Like an epistemic community, lawyers as a group exhibit a relatively high level of coherence and professionalism, work in an area where in-depth knowledge and expertise are at a premium leading to considerable uncertainty by non-adepts about how to proceed, and have a highly developed set of formal and informal networks through which their influence flows.

This epistemic community of law has "promoted" a legal mode of thought. Like other transnational networks identified by Margaret Keck

and Kathryn Sikkink, lawyers "try to frame issues in ways that make them fit into particular institutional venues" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 201), and their preferred venue, unsurprisingly, is the legal system. This is to say that law is waiting in the wings always ready to be deployed on demand. This is what the legalization of global politics has wrought: the recourse to law as a tool for resolution of a wide range of social tensions, conflicts, and decisions is always available and legitimate. The "legal episteme" is spread by the actions and practices of lawyers and their sympathetic political interlocutors throughout the global system. For many this is an analogue to previous forms of imperialism; the external imposition of a mode of regulation and governance importing mores and values that are far from indigenous yet are presented as both necessary and a move toward civilization.

Thus, one of the major effects of the mainstream legal episteme is the acceptance of the rule of law as a technology, where law can be treated in Martin Krygier's words, as "technical equipment, social machinery, which can be transported and plugged in wherever the need for them arises" (Krygier 1999: 82). Of course, this foregrounds the procedural aspect of a thinner view of the rule of law and tends to sideline the thicker elements that require a set of social and normative commitments that (while valuable to liberals) may be antagonistic to the leaders and elites of countries receiving rule of law-related assistance. This form of assistance is not necessarily a recent development with the ICJ already identifying the lawyer as a social engineer in 1965 (ICJ 1965: 72) and was an important contributory factor in the World Bank's expansion of its program of legal technical assistance.

At the international level (beyond particular states), the epistemic (sub)community of international public lawyers has taken command of the "technology" to promote the expansion of international customary law with less regard to particular state interests than might be found in international treaty law. Andy Olson observes that this community has forcefully argued that "customary international law is *created* through the convergence of the opinions of members of that community" (Olson 2000: 24), dividing law off from its subjects. Here, the professional project of the epistemic community is surely pushed to its extreme limits, and as such it is no surprise that this has been termed imperialism by those on the receiving end.

More generally as Shirley Scott has argued, because the legal realm is perceived or perhaps presented as having considerable autonomy from politics, international lawyers now often "serve as guardians of the relative autonomy, cohesion and consistency of international law" (Scott 2007: 420). As with legal argument more generally, this is not to say that such opinions are wholly indeterminate, but it *is* the epistemic community itself that informs and shapes the boundaries of the acceptable and unacceptable reach of legal opinion (even if these boundaries may move through dynamic processes within this community) (Scott 2007: 417). This helps explain why while particular laws may be subject to change and shifting political pressures, the underlying (globalized) logic of the rule of law remains remarkably constant as a political foundation and why given its particular western or European character it can be perceived as an imposition rather than a negotiated joining.

Increasingly the exploration of legal pluralism suggests that this process of legal imperialism may mistakenly marginalize non-western legalities. A pluralist approach to the rule of law requires recognition of the different forms the rule of law might take and in the terms utilized in the first section may well push the threshold for recognition toward a thin (which is to say the more procedural) characterization of the norm. There are a number of taxonomic strategies that can be used to make sense of this plurality, but Ugo Mattei's classification system for the plurality of legal systems is clear and concise. Mattei presents three elements which are always present but differently weighted in specific legal systems: the rule of professional law, the rule of political law, and the rule of traditional law. Each pattern of "social incentives (or social constraints) are at play in all legal systems simultaneously. The only difference is in terms of quantity, acceptability and, most importantly, hegemony" (Mattei

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1997: 16). This leads him to argue that all legal systems can be recognized as belonging to one or other of these groups of families (where their defining aspect is hegemonic).

Once there is something that might be recognized as a system of (legal like) rules, then what captures that extent and character of the pluralism in the global system is the balance between these three aspects of rule. Most explicitly, he seeks to reject a classificatory scheme that privileges the "Western Legal Tradition" (Mattei 1997: 19). This classification is concerned with the normative grounds for a legal system not the specific institutionalization of those norms (Mattei 1997: 20). For Mattei these three interpenetrated rule of law types are not absolutes but points on a triangle between which actual legal systems (the real rule of law) can be located. As this implies, understanding the legacy of imperialist and colonial imposition can be framed as a (forced) shift across this triangle, as can the differently understood imperialism of the epistemic community of lawyers. The triangle is the political realm (or in Delaney's terms, the nomosphere) in which fraught (and in the past violent) disputes about legal practice(s), rights, and empowerment(s) have taken place and continue to do so.

The rule of professional law is broadly coterminous with the western legal tradition (where the distinction between common and civil law is treated as a variation within the type). Key aspects of this type of legal system are that it is clearly distinguishable from the political arena, the legal process is essentially secular, and therefore decisions are taken on their technical and legal merits as interpreted by (legal) professionals and (rhetorically at least) claim legitimacy through democracy (Mattei 1997: 23–27). Much of its character is encompassed by Bingham's characterization introduced above. *The rule of political law* is typified by the lack of separation between law and politics, with the legal process often determined by political relationships, and as such the notion of limiting government's actions through the legal system is inconsistent with how the purpose of law is understood. Certainly, most of the time, the government and its agencies may

rule by law, but this is not regarded as a strong limitation on their activity. As Mattei points out, for those looking at this system from the perspective of the rule of professional law "many aspects of the rule of political law are labelled "corruption", are considered a pathology, and in general are not accepted or regarded by the social actors as structural elements of the social order" (Mattei 1997: 29). However, these concerns are less important within these systems as they are formally focused on a "political target, be it free market and privatisation, be it self-sufficiency, or be it development [which] determines, justifies and makes socially acceptable the outcome of most decision making" (Mattei 1997: 31). The rule of political law is often self-defined as being part of a transitional phase; at some point the legal and political structures may change (more democracy may be allowed), but only when the political goals have been reached (Mattei 1997: 35). From outside there may be a question about how and when the assessment of the completion might be made, but this of course emphasizes that it is the rule of political law; this will also be familiar from how the imperial rule of law has been presented by those who imposed it as part of the colonial project.

The third type that Mattei identifies is *the rule of traditional law*. Here there is no division between the system of law and a society's religious (or other belief) system, and as such the "individual's internal dimension and the societal dimension are not separated" (Mattei 1997: 36). To stress the religious and philosophical/transcendental beliefs that might govern such a legal system, he labels this the Eastern Legal Tradition. While the role of religious and other values plays an important role here, nevertheless, there is also often considerable structural similarity between this group and societies where professional law obtains. Thus, Mattei stresses that one should not confuse the rule of traditional law with the absence of law or even the absence of formal legal institutions. In the rule of traditional law, formal legal institutions do exist, but the working rule is different from what we are used to in western societies (Mattei 1997: 39).

> Rather than seeking to justify the system by appeals to democracy, in the rule of traditional law hierarchy, including deference to religious opinion (and elders), is crucial for the making of decisions with the 'strong, very ancient and respected rhetoric' of supernatural legitimisation playing a major role. (Mattei 1997: 40)

This is the form of "law" that imperialism sought to dismantle as not being law at all.

Most importantly, Mattei's argument stresses that while systems may tend toward one or other of these points (on a taxonomic triangle), no system completely excludes the characteristic aspects of the other two. This is why it may be possible, as Gosalbo-Bono suggests, that a very basic (very thin) form of the rule of law can support a claim that there is a universally accepted idea of the rule of law, even if it is only a sliver of what those who propose a thicker reading of the norm would accept. However, one of the key insights of pluralism is that law, in Paul Schiff Berman's words, is "an ongoing process of articulation, adaptation, re-articulation, absorption, resistance, deployment and on and on. It is a process that never ends" (Berman 2009: 239). As such, the interaction and interpenetration of Mattei's three "families" of law may indicate how new forms of the rule of law may emerge. The imperialism of the epistemic community of lawyers can be then seen as a strong push toward the professional law point of the triangle even as the notion that social values might be included in a thicker rule of law tugs the rule of law toward the traditional point.

Conclusion

Using Mattei's framing we can locate both the historical processes of imperialism and the new imperialism of the epistemic community of lawyers within the same (contested) realm of legality. The imperialism of the rule of law has moved from the physical to the normative, but using this depiction of the wider realm of contested legality, this shift can be located into a more general understanding of how the rule of law has historically interacted with the politics of imperialism. Any claim that the rule of law is merely a technical and neutral form of governance has to contend with this history and recognize that the rule of law and imperialism remain intertwined.

Cross-References

▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
▶ Decolonization in South Asia
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ France and Political Economy of Contemporary Imperialism
▶ India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism
▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Neoliberalism and European Democracy Promotion

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Rural Labour

▶ Food and Imperialism: Food Regimes, Hegemony and Counter-hegemony

Russia

▶ Ukrainian Capitalism and Inter-imperialist Rivalry

Russian Revolution

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

Ruy Mauro Marini

▶ Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International

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Said, Edward W. (1936–2003)

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Definition

Said first achieved prominence with the publication in 1978 of *Orientalism*. He is acknowledged as one of the major intellectuals of the end of the twentieth century, a figure of personal and intellectual courage and integrity.

In a manner which would no doubt have afforded him some wry amusement, Edward Said's standing in the academic world and beyond typifies the fickle, and ultimately rather shallow, nature of fashion in an area which ought to be above it. Said first achieved prominence with the publication in 1978 of *Orientalism*. Such was the effect that the book created that it was often (incorrectly) regarded as the single foundational text of the emergent field of post-colonial studies. At the same time, Said was often (incorrectly) hailed as the founder of that same emergent field. After this initial (over-)enthusiasm, Said's status declined in various quarters as he was considered insufficiently 'theoretical' in comparison to the other major figures in postcolonial theory, such as Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha. Over the next couple of decades, however, in the period up to his death and since, his standing has never ceased to grow, to the point where he is acknowledged as one of the major intellectuals of the end of the twentieth century, a figure of personal and intellectual courage and integrity.

Said was born in Jerusalem to Palestinian Christian parents (Anglican on his father's side, and Baptist on his mother's) and brought up in Cairo where his father's successful stationary equipment business was located. As a result, Said was able to attend fee-paying English schools, including the prestigious Victoria College, where, as well as the assumed benefits of a 'good' education, he acquired an awareness of the pretentiousness, hypocrisy, and frequent downright racism of his colonial 'masters'. The same financial background, as well as his father's adopted American citizenship, saw Said sent to complete his secondary education and attend university in the US, which became his home for the rest of his life. While many might have seen this as a smooth and comfortable progression, Said nevertheless felt that his was a life characterised by 'the many displacements from countries, cities, abodes, languages, environments that have kept me in motion all these years' (1999, p. 217).

That sense of displacement came to be epitomised by the condition of, and Said's

relationship to, the country of his birth, Palestine. In 1948, the *nakba* (disaster) occurred: the brutal occupation of Palestinian land by the Israelis and the concomitant expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian population from their homeland, which meant that henceforth Said's life would be lived as one of the millions in the diaspora. The Israeli victory in the June war of 1967 saw the loss of the remaining Palestinian territory. It also deepened Said's sense of displacement, since there was now no Palestine left to return to, as well as marking his political awakening. Henceforth, Palestine would form the focus (implicit or explicit, partial or whole) of much of his work, particularly in his later years, and he would become one of the most eloquent spokesmen for his country and his people. Despite the degree of his attachment to Palestine, his feelings for the country were not altogether straightforward, as he expressed in his memoir *Out Of Place*:

> Even now the unreconciled duality I feel about the place, its intricate wrenching, tearing, sorrowful status as exemplified in so many distorted lives, including mine, and its status as an admirable country for *them* (but of course not for us) always gives me pain and a discouraging sense of being solitary, undefended, open to the assaults of trivial things that seem important and threatening, against which I have no weapons. (142)

In view of this sense of repeated displacement and loss of homeland, it is no surprise that the idea of exile came, as we will see, to play an increasingly important part in Said's thought.

In the same memoir, Said comments that during his time as an undergraduate at Princeton he developed 'a fascination with complexity and unpredictability' (277), and although 'complexity' did not translate into the way in which he wrote about complex issues (arguably quite the reverse) a certain 'unpredictability' could be held to characterise his performance as theorist. One finds this above all in his existence as a traditionally formed professor of literature who at one point champions radical theory but subsequently turns away from it, but also as a literary theorist who argues that the point of theory is to engage the experiential and the social; in his terms, 'the worldly'. Indeed, the manner in which theory

approaches the world, or not, became for Said one of its most important qualities. In addition, a form of 'unpredictability' as resistant, transgressive, or in Saidian terms 'unco-opted', intellectual practice typifies much of his approach to theory.

Although for many readers Said is principally associated with post-colonial theory, his engagement with theory is earlier, and different, and it is worth briefly examining his changing relationship with its different forms. His book *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (1975) is notable for its inclusion of a range of structuralist and post-structuralist theorists (Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ferdinand de Saussure, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida), and he was subsequently known as an advocate and populariser of continental theory. It therefore came as a surprise to many when, less than a decade later in his 1984 collection *The World, the Text, the Critic,* he subjected Derrida and Foucault, the most substantial of the theorists in *Beginnings,* to stringent critique in 'Criticism between Culture and System'. Of the two, it is Derrida who comes off worse, but even Foucault is seen to epitomise many of the problems which Said had come to regard as vitiating theory. In particular, they both espouse theory which insufficiently engages the world. Derrida's theory, as Said says, leads us *into* the text; Foucault's *in* and *out*. While Derrida's approach thus leaves the reader trapped in the realm of the textual, even Foucault's putative re-emergence into the world is insufficient. His theory of power/knowledge, for example, perhaps his most 'worldly' in Saidian terms, and one which Said made some early use of, still fails to display an appropriate sense of historical change or, more significantly, a recognition of what Said, in an echo of Walter Benjamin, calls the 'coarse items' (1984, p. 221): class struggle, military coercion, wealth, and privilege.

In addition to what theory does (neglecting the social, 'textualising' itself), there is also the problem of what can happen to theory. In the essay 'Travelling Theory' in *The World, the Text, the Critic,* Said identifies a pattern of rise and fall, whereby a dynamic, perhaps oppositional, theory emerges, flourishes, but through a process of

repetition becomes tame and ineffectual. Part of that repetition may involve a trajectory of transmission, from one theorist and one socio-historical location to another, and the example Said uses is the incremental diluting of the radicalism in Georg Lukacs's *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) as it passes through the work of Lucien Goldmann in Paris in the 1950s, and that of Raymond Williams in Cambridge in the 1970s. A different kind of trajectory, but no less negative, is that taken by theory as it loses radical energy, becomes increasingly institutionalised, co-opted, part of the system it originally aimed to oppose. A final element in what Said calls 'the systematic degradation of theory' (1984, p. 243), with its echoes of 'the seductive degradation of knowledge' from the final page of *Orientalism,* is the shift from theory as progressive intervention to theory as, in Said's terms, 'cult' with its chief priests and hordes of disciples.

The question arises whether Said is offering a general account of the (inevitable) problems of theory, or one which is historically specific, particularly to the US academy in the 1970s and 1980s, which he analyses in a number of essays. One of the clearest answers is provided by 'Travelling Theory Reconsidered' in *Reflections on Exile* (2000a), an important example of Said rethinking concepts and locating them in appropriate social and historical contexts. Here, despite the previously identified problems, all is not lost: the degradation of theory, in its over-specialisation and professionalisation, and as a result of 'travelling', is not inevitable. The same Lukacsian theory now goes in the opposite direction, towards a better, more resistant intellectual practice in the person of Theodor Adorno, and, most importantly, towards the world and the political in Frantz Fanon's anti-colonialism, internationalism and visionary humanism. If theory's journey was previously a marker of its flaws, degradation, and decline, now, interestingly, 'The point of theory ... is to travel, always to move beyond its confinements, to emigrate, to remain in a sense in exile'. (2000a, p. 451) Also, the situating of theory 'in exile', as a worldly location, is no coincidence.

Despite what might look like a form of redemption in the previous example, one of the results of the perceived failure of theory as a general intellectual and cultural project is that Said increasingly distances himself from it, though this is nothing like the simple, wholesale rejection of theory that some have portrayed it as being: as he commented, 'to say that we are against theory ... is to be blind and trivial' (2000a, p. 383). Nevertheless, he is concerned to rethink and rename his practice, and the term chosen, for a variety of different reasons, is criticism, above all, 'secular criticism': humanistic, socially grounded, and embodied in a 'critical consciousness'.

Said's first major 'worldly' intervention came in 1978 with the publication of *Orientalism.* The impact of the book has been such that it merits its own separate entry, and discussion of it here will be accordingly brief. Importantly, it made strategic and eclectic use of theory to demonstrate the way in which ideas (from the commonsensical to the philosophical, from the literary to the scientific) individually and, more significantly, collectively worked to produce the demeaning representations of other cultures that served to legitimise colonial occupation and oppression.

Although *Orientalism* remains Said's best known work, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) has a claim to at least equal importance. It is in many ways an even more 'worldly' text than its predecessor, of which it is a continuation and extension, as well as its opposite, Other, face. For instance, if *Orientalism* is a study in the construction and maintenance of hierarchical and oppressive cultural divisions by means of ideas, images, and texts, *Culture and Imperialism* is an argument for recognising the many possible connections which bridge those divides. One of the sections of the book is entitled 'Overlapping territories, intertwined histories', which indicates how far Said is from the conventional view of the gulf separating coloniser and colonised. Here, we enter that space of 'complexity and unpredictability' mentioned earlier, as Said challenges received wisdom, even its radical forms, in setting out a more complex view of colonial and post-colonial relations. At the same time,

Orientalism's thesis about the material impact of ideas remains central to the new study: 'For the enterprise of empire depends upon the *idea* of *having an empire* ...' (1993, p. 10, emphasis in the original).

To a certain extent, *Culture and Imperialism* looks like a more Saidian book than *Orientalism*, since it devotes a great deal of space to discussing the classic European novel, the subject he taught for the whole of his career. The approach adopted is modest and iconoclastic: in addition to (modestly) noting the connections between the European novel and imperial expansion, Said argues for the mutually constitutive nature of those connections, which outraged various literary scholars, as well as drawing accusations of 'culturalism' from certain, especially Marxist, quarters. At the heart of the analysis is Said's own strategy of 'contrapuntal reading'. Derived from musical counterpoint, where various themes or voices interweave without dominance or necessarily any overall resolution, the contrapuntal aims to show the 'overlapping territories, intertwined histories' in text and world.

In addition to reading these great novelistic assertions of colonial cultural authority in contrapuntal fashion, Said also sets them in a different counterpoint alongside their antithesis, *Orientalism's* significantly (if appropriately) absent Other: anti-colonial resistance. The opposition of Fanon, Yeats, Césaire, C.L.R. James, Ngugi wa Thiong'o and others to colonial oppression, as well as their complex relation to colonial culture, is examined. The latter is embodied in the ambivalence of the 'Voyage in' to the metropolitan centre, which, despite the possibilities it creates for assimilation, more usually functions as 'a sign of adversarial internationalism in an age of continued imperial structures' (1993, p. 295).

One of the available forms of resistance (as well as classic expression of colonial power) is narrative, and in *Orientalism* Said had already noted its ability to disrupt the reifying power of the imperial 'vision'. Here, in terms which prefigure his essay on the politics of narrative in relation to Palestine ('Permission to Narrate', in Said 1995), he says: 'The power to narrate, or to

block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them' (2003, p. xiii). In that context, the struggle to tell one's own story has implications, and effects, far beyond the aesthetic.

The combined battle to resist the blocking of the Palestinian narrative (by Israel, the US and others), to recognise, encourage, and discuss the various attempts at the creation of such a narrative, and, finally, to play his own part in the creation, occupied Said in many different ways over the course of many years. It was his most worldly, and most important, intervention. Although *Orientalism* made occasional mention of Palestine, it was the book which immediately followed it, *The Question of Palestine* (1979), that marked his determination to bring the condition of his people and his homeland to the world's attention. Between its publication and the second edition in 1992, there were, as Said points out in his Preface, momentous events across the world, but nothing had changed for the Palestinians: 'the main aspects of Palestinian life remain dispossession, exile, dispersion, disenfranchisement (under Israeli military occupation), and, by no means least, an extraordinarily widespread and stubborn resistance to these travails.' (1992, 1979, p. vii). While it was difficult enough to focus people's attention on the 'negative' dimension of the narrative (dispossession, exile, and the rest), the 'positive' aspect, embodied in the numerous forms and strategies of Palestinian resistance (many of them peaceful, progressive, non-violent; completely removed from the convenient stereotype of Palestinian terrorism) tended to disappear completely. Said could confidently say, 'Palestine is the last great cause of the twentieth century with roots going back to the period of classical imperialism' (1992, 1979, p. 243), but adequate recognition of the fact and, even more so, anything resembling appropriate action consequent upon the recognition, could be hard to spot.

Part of the reason for the widespread refusal either to recognise or to act lies in the fact that, as Said put it, the Palestinians are 'the victims of the victims': 'We are clearly anti-colonialist and

antiracist in our struggle but for the fact that our opponents are the greatest victims of racism in history, and perhaps our struggle is waged at an awkward, postcolonial period in the modern world's history' (1992, 1979, p. 122). The repeated distorted representations in media and political discourse of Israelis as permanently vulnerable potential victims, always threatened by the possibility of a second Holocaust, and the Palestinians as aggressors, if not terrorists, help to maintain the oppressive status quo; and this despite the fact that 'there is nothing in Palestinian history, absolutely nothing at all to rival the record of Zionist terror against Arabs, against other Jews, against United Nations officials, against the British' (1992, 1979, p. 172).

Opposing such distortions is a task for anyone concerned with truth and justice, but it is particularly a task for intellectuals, a group Said spoke and wrote about on many occasions in the last decade of his life, most famously in his (variously controversial) BBC Reith Lectures in 1993, subsequently published as *Representations of the Intellectual* (1994). Speaking out on behalf of the Palestinians is, however, nothing like special pleading, since it introduces another intellectual-specific function: 'For the intellectual the task, I believe, is explicitly to universalise the crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the sufferings of others' (1994, p. 33). In this particular context, the specific example of Palestine takes its place in the ongoing and dreadful history of oppressed communities (alongside, among others, the Jews), but given due weight, understanding, and human sympathy, rather than the routine dismissals or demonising perpetrated by the media or antagonistic politicians. An additional aspect of the universal is that of universal values (which intellectuals are to fight for and instantiate) as well as universal human rights. Once again, Palestine is central: 'Palestine, I believe, is today the touchstone case for human rights, not because the argument for it can be made as elegantly simple as the case for South Africa liberation, but because it *cannot* be made simple' (2000b, p. 435). In part, that

absence of simplicity is the result of the deeply implicated human situation of Israelis and Palestinians, the product of 'Overlapping yet irreconcilable experiences ...' (2004, p. 143). This is a reminder that the more positively inflected 'overlapping territories, intertwined histories' of a decade earlier are no guarantee of a positive outcome.

There are other ways in which Palestine has a representative function. Said and the majority of Palestinians live a life of exile. That material fact is then extended to the position of contemporary intellectuals, creating the duality that 'while it is *an actual* condition, exile is also for my purposes a *metaphorical* condition. . . . Exile for the intellectual in this metaphysical sense is restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others' (1994, p. 39, emphasis in the original). This restless, unsettled and unsettling intellectual clearly has something of the displaced, complex, and unpredictable figure we encountered earlier.

A final area of intellectual endeavour, which requires very much more space than is available for discussion here, is humanism. Said, never a follower of fashion, remained an unrepentant humanist throughout his career, while humanism became one of the most unfashionable areas in academe. He was, however, fully aware of the failings of traditional humanism and in the final book completed before his death, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, he discusses at length what humanism ought to be, and how humanist intellectuals ought to act. As a first step, and completely contrary to how it is typically viewed, 'humanism is not a way of consolidating and affirming what "we" have always known and felt, but rather a means of questioning, upsetting, and reformulating so much of what is presented to us as commodified, packaged, uncontroversial, and uncritically codified certainties, including those contained in the masterpieces herded under the rubric of "the classics"' (2004, p. 28). On that terrain of oppositional activity, 'the intellectual's provisional home is the domain of an exigent, resistant, intransigent art into which, alas, one can neither retreat nor search for solutions. But only in that precarious exilic realm can one

first truly grasp the difficulty of what cannot be grasped and then go forth to try anyway' (2004, p. 144). It is impossible not to imagine Edward Said going forth and trying.

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Samir Amin (1931–2018)

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Definition

This entry evaluates Samir Amin's contribution to the understanding of and the struggle against imperialism along with his contributions to Marxism.

Introduction

Samir Amin stands out as perhaps the greatest and most influential African Marxist theorist of the twentieth century. In this essay, I will try to evaluate Samir Amin's contributions to the understanding of and struggle against imperialism. To this end I propose that Amin made two major contributions to Marxism. Firstly, he undermined what can be characterised as the linear interpretation of Marxism which sees human history as necessarily passing through five definite stages of production, a theory which Amin saw as the product of a Eurocentric Marxism. Secondly, Amin contributed to the broad tradition of dependency theory and, in particular, the theory of unequal exchange in order to explain the way in which imperialism operates under conditions of world trade.

While this essay is primarily oriented towards the major theoretical contributions of Samir Amin, as a biographical essay it will also touch on some of the experiences that appear to have shaped his political thought so as to try and get a grasp of the man behind the theory. In the concluding part of the essay, I will provide an overview of the political demands to which Samir Amin feels the radical left should pay attention in the twenty-first century.

The Life of Samir Amin

Born in 1931, Samir Amin spent his formative years in Cairo, then a British colony. He studied within the French education system in Egypt before studying at the Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris in France, obtaining a diploma in political science in 1952. He then studied at the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, where he obtained his PhD in 1957. During his time in France, Amin became involved with the French Communist Party and developed networks in various communist and anti-colonial groups, in particular through the National Union of French Students.

Amin, along with the rest of the anti-colonial student movement in France, generally supported national liberation movements in the Third World, a position that led them into tension with the French Communist Party. It was this experience that led him towards Maoism, and Amin himself would note that 'from 1957 to 1960 I almost fully shared the positions of the Chinese Communist Party, whereas after 1980 I had a more critical view of the Chinese openings to capitalism' (2014a, p. 1). Amin would later drift from this position, developing a critique of the limits of Maoism based on the experience of the defeat of socialism in China (Amin 2014a, p. 4).

Amin's early professional experience involved working as part of Egypt's planning agency immediately after the end of British colonisation. Simultaneously he worked underground for the Egyptian Communist Party. As President Gamal Abdel Nasser stepped up the persecution of communists in Egypt, Amin was forced to leave his homeland (Amin 2014b, p. 6). After staying in France for some time working for the department of economic and financial studies, Amin shunned a First-World existence in favour of giving service to the newly independent government of Mali as part of the ministry of planning (Amin 2014b, pp. 6–7).

Amin's experience in Mali would help to shape his theoretical work, in particular the noted obsession of the government with a plan to 'close the gap' with the West, a policy objective which led Mali (and as he would later argue, other countries) to pursuit a ruthless growth-oriented policy at the expense of both political and social democracy (Amin 2014b). Against this, Amin's position amounted to the argument that it is impossible to 'catch up' with the West through integration in the global capitalist economy. Amin and the rest of the dependency school argued that the basic structure of the global political economy had been established along imperialist lines. Accordingly, the more integrated a newly independent or otherwise Third-World country became with global capitalism, the worse off it would be.

By 1963, Amin had taken up a position with the United Nations' Institut Africain de Développement Économique et de Planification (IDEP), where he worked along with part-time academic roles in universities in both France and Senegal (Amin 2014b, p. 8). In 1970, Amin became superintendent of the IDEP; this position allowed him to launch various non-governmental organisations, the most memorable of which would be the Third World Forum, an organisation devoted to the development and promotion of policy alternatives in which Amin plays a leading role to this day.

Amin's Theoretical Work

Samir Amin has written over 30 books in both English and French, alongside numerous articles. Within such a short biographical essay it is impossible to even scratch the surface of the work of such a prolific writer. Despite this, I will attempt to introduce the reader to what I believe to be some of Amin's key theoretical contributions. In summary these are the rejection of a stagiest view of history; the promotion of an unequal-exchange or dependency perspective of political economy; and an analysis of monopoly capitalism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I will provide a basic introduction to Amin's contributions to each of these areas in turn.

The Tributary Mode of Production and a Rejection of Stageism

One of the central tendencies of Amin's thought was the rejection of stageist theories of development, whether liberal or Marxist. The majority of Marxism after Marx has remained committed to the idea that every society must strictly pass through the same stages of development experienced by Europe. One of Amin's main contributions was to debunk this conclusion, and one of the important ways in which he did this was through the development of his concept of the 'tributary mode of production'.

Amin posed a number of difficult questions for orthodox understandings of Marxism, such as why certain countries like China developed far earlier than those in Europe, but did not develop a capitalist mode of production until it was brought on exogenously by imperialist intervention. The conclusion reached by Amin is that there are five basic modes of production which have defined the majority of human history, namely the following (Amin 1974, pp. 57–58):

1. The 'primitive' community mode of production, the only one which antedates all the others;
2. The tribute-paying mode of production, juxtaposing the persistence of the village community and that of a social and political apparatus exploiting the latter in the form of exacting tribute. This tribute-paying mode of production is the most common and most general form characterising pre-capitalist class formation; I propose to distinguish between the early forms and the advanced forms, such as the feudal mode of production in which the village community loses the eminent domain of the land to the benefit of the feudal lords, the community persisting as a community of families;
3. The slave mode of production, which is a relatively rare form although widely scattered;
4. The simple petty-commodity mode of production, a frequent form but one which practically never constitutes the dominant mode of a social formation; and finally
5. The capitalist mode of production in its 'pure state'.

Contrary to many historical and contemporary Marxist and modernisation theory analyses, Amin argued that feudalism was a phenomenon specific to Europe, rather than being a universal stage of development. Importantly, Amin would argue that the majority of the Third World was not characterised by feudalism, but instead by his tributary mode of production.

For Amin, the primary difference between the tributary mode of production and the capitalist mode of production is not the development of productive forces. Instead Amin argues that the primary difference lies in the way in which value is extracted. Amin argues that Marx's law of value applies under capitalism's generalised commodity production, and surplus value as such is generated. By contrast, under the tributary mode of production, 'tribute' is extracted using non-economic means. The historical conclusion to which this leads Amin flies in the face of the majority of criticisms of Marxism, the argument that it is an economic determinist theory. Contrary to this position, Amin argues that for the majority of human history the political has dominated the economic. Only under capitalism does the economic base begin to subvert (let alone determine) the political and cultural superstructure.

The Law of Worldwide Value

The basic argument advanced in Amin's *The Law of Worldwide Value* (2010) is that the division between the First World and Third World is the defining contradiction of global capitalism. Accordingly, the primary locus of struggle against global capitalism is in the Third World. Amin's *The Law of Worldwide Value* describes a system of unequal exchange whereby the imperialist countries are the beneficiaries of what he terms imperialist rent.

Amin's *The Law of Worldwide Value* serves as an important counterweight to what can be termed the 'globalisation thesis', the argument that globalisation has led to the free flow of capital, thus weakening the role of the nation state. For Amin, the state plays an important role in either restricting or promoting the mobility of labour, and utilising state power in service of local capitalist interests (Amin 2011). The end result of this process is a

system of Third-World super-exploitation. Amin demonstrates that wage differentials between the First and Third Worlds are not completely explained by productivity but rather by the political and historical factors he describes.

Amin for the most part skirted the edge of the thorny question of what is variously referred to as either the 'labour aristocracy' or the 'majority exploiter' thesis, the argument that most First-World workers are actually net beneficiaries of the global capitalist system. Brolin (2006, p. 243) even argues that the 'popularity of Samir Amin, who was a prominent participant in French debates, is largely explained not only by attempting to place unequal exchange in a perspective where productivity differences matter more, but also – so it is suggested – by the theoretical vagueness on this point, and by his drawing the politically correct conclusion. In line both with the "state capitalist" interpretation popular in France at the time, but more so the general dependency stance in France and elsewhere.' Amin's argument is largely limited to an observation that at the very minimum there is a significantly different rate of exploitation of labour between the First World and the Third World, and that this difference is one of the primary obstacles to unity between the working classes of the First World and the Third World. In place of Marx's 'workers of the world unite', Amin contends that the reality of the global class structure and its associated politics is far more complex (2010, pp. 92–93).

The political conclusion drawn from the above, namely that there is only one imperialist world system of which all countries are part, is of great significance for the international struggle against capitalism. The key actors in this world system are the forces of international capital, but also importantly the 'triad' (the concerted state power of the US, the European Union, and Japan).

Within the imperialist world system, however, Amin is critical of a narrow reading of imperialism as if it were constituted purely at the economic level. In Amin's own words:

As if the world were fashioned purely by economic laws, expressions of the technical demands of the reproduction of capital. As if the state and politics,

diplomacy and armies had disappeared from the scene! Imperialism is precisely the amalgamation of the requirements and laws for the reproduction of capital; the social, national and international alliances that underlie them; and the political strategies employed by these alliances. (1989, p. 141)

The culmination of Amin's political thought and analysis can be seen in the book *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization.* In this work he distils what he sees as the five major monopolies underpinning the world capitalist system, namely 'the monopoly of technology generated by the military expenditures of the imperialist centres, the monopoly of access to natural resources, the monopoly over international communication and the media, and the monopoly over the means of mass destruction' (1997, p. 3). For Amin, the fight against global capitalism boils down to the fight against these five monopolies.

Following the global financial crisis of 2008, Amin published *The Implosion of Global Capitalism* (2013a), documenting the self-destruction of the capitalist system and the way in which the presents a unique opportunity to the political left. In this work, Amin issues a challenge to the radical left, asking for 'audacity' in its political demands. Specifically, Amin recommends the socialisation of the monopolies, the de-financialisation of the management of the economy, and the de-globalisation of international relations (2013a, p. 136). I will briefly outline these demands as I believe that they represent examples of Amin's late-career thought; they are also important examples of his ongoing contribution to left politics in terms of not only critiquing the global capitalist system but also providing alternatives for which it is possible to fight.

For Amin, the socialisation of the monopolies involves far more than nationalisation. He is arguing for a complex political restructuring of the monopolies, not just their control by the state. Amin (2013a, p. 137) imagines 'Public institutions working within a legal framework that would set the mode of governance must replace the monopolies. These would be constituted of representatives of (1) farmers (the principal interests); (2) upstream units (manufacturers of inputs, banks) and downstream (food industry,

retail chains); (3) consumers; (4) local authorities (interested in natural and social environments – schools, hospitals, urban planning and housing, transportation); and (5) the state (citizens).' At the early stages of Amin's socialism, we see a form of syndicalist political system where the monopolies created by global capitalism are brought under the control and management of democratically governed, representative interest groups.

A major exception to Amin's generally syndicalist approach to governance comes in his discussion of the banking system. Amin notes the conflict of interest between the banks and the rest of the economy, even under conditions of nationalisation or socialisation. This is the result of what he terms the financialisation of the economic system, which he argues has occurred as a result of the past 40 years of neoliberal politics (2013a, p. 141). As a counter to this, Amin argues for de-financialisation in order to unpack this legacy. While he argues for a 'World without Wall Street' it is notable that Amin is nonetheless arguing for a form of market socialism:

> In a world without Wall Street, the economy is still largely controlled by the 'market.' But these markets are for the first time truly transparent, regulated by democratic negotiation among genuine social partners (for the first time they are no longer adversaries as they are necessarily under capitalism). It is the financial 'market' – opaque by nature and subjected to the requirements of management for the benefit of the monopolies – that is abolished. (2013a, pp. 142–143)

For Amin, definancialisation and the world without Wall Street amount to the end of an economic system geared to the maximisation of monopoly rents. In its place, he envisions that the 'state and markets [would be] regulated by the democratic negotiation of social partners' (2013a, p. 143).

The final component of Amin's political argument is one that he has advocated consistently throughout much of his theoretical work, that of 'delinking'. While the concept of delinking is often quick to be branded as autarky, Amin has always been at pains to argue that this is not the case. Instead, delinking really amounts to self-determination in development, or 'the reconstruction of a globalization based on negotiation,

rather than submission to the exclusive interests of the imperialist monopolies' (ibid.).

It is in his argument about delinking that Amin not only makes the case for the most advanced development of his challenge to the radical left, but also lays out a basic narrative of twentieth-century industrialisation. Amin argues that the response to dependency, where imperialist countries monopolised industry, was that twentieth-century national liberation movements industrialised the Third World. Despite this, modern imperialism led by the triad of the US, European Union, and Japan has monopolised Amin's big five monopolies, which remain the key obstacles to progress for the Third World.

In the late stage of his career, Amin has issued a call for audacity from the radical left. Rejecting compromise and social democracy in favour of the road to socialism, Amin has argued that it is 'necessary to propose strategies not "out of the crisis of capitalism," but "out of capitalism in crisis"' (2013a, p. 146). Amin suggests that the radical left can be the political vehicle for this transition, and that in particular a coalition between anti-monopoly coalitions in the First World and anti-comprador coalitions in the Third World can achieve this. Here we see Amin's reaffirmation of the potential of political forces in the First World to play a role in the end of global capitalism, a popular position within the radical left, but one that has yet to be proved effective.

The one major blot on Amin's record as an anti-imperialist comes in the form of his public position on the French intervention in Mali. Amin chose to support the French intervention against the Tuareg rebellion, largely because of his opposition to political Islam, which he describes as follows:

> You need a good deal of naivety to believe that the political Islam of some – described on account of this as 'moderate' – would be soluble in democracy. There is of course a sharing out of chores between them and the 'Salafists' who they say exceed them with a false naivety by their fanatic, criminal and even terrorist excesses. But their project is the same – an archaic theocracy that by definition is the polar opposite of even minimal democracy. (Amin 2013b)

In the absence of the space to go deeply into Amin's analysis of the situation, it can be said that the basic terms of his conclusion are twofold. Firstly, Amin as we have seen is extremely hostile to all forms of political Islam. There are shades of the late Christopher Hitchens in this kind of late-career support of imperialism. Secondly, it can be seen that Amin felt France capable of breaking away from the 'triad' (the US, European Union, and Japan), the monopoly imperialist bloc, by providing an alternative pole. This turned out to be a fairly ill-conceived position, as the US was quick to praise France for its intervention and keep it firmly within the 'triad' camp (Boerma 2013).

While it is possible to direct criticism at elements of his work, and in particular his late-career position on the French imperialist intervention in Mali, in the broad analysis this can probably be written off as an aberration, one that should not be seen at the expense of Amin's overall career. Samir Amin has proved to be a lifelong radical, a steadfast supporter of revolutionary socialism and of the rights of peoples to self-determination in both a political and an economic sense. A prolific writer and a tireless activist, Samir Amin has made a massive contribution to anti-imperialism.

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Sanctions

▶ Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law

Sanctuary Movement, United States, 1981–1992

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Origins

The Sanctuary Movement arose in response to the millions of refugees who fled the civil wars that gripped Central America during the 1980s. The overwhelming majority of those who made it across the border into the US were denied asylum. At best, the US authorities dumped the refugees back across the border into Mexico and, at worst, deported them back to their home countries, where they faced further persecution. This was in contrast to the welcome offered to those fleeing communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Cuba. The US government faced a contradiction between, on the one hand, supporting, funding, and arming the right-wing governments in El Salvador and Guatemala and, on the other hand, having to accept the testimony of the refugees from those countries alleging persecution, torture and killings by those governments.

The Sanctuary Movement was initiated by Quakers and Christians in Tucson, Arizona.

They had first-hand experience of witnessing the plight of these refugees as they crossed the border. After exhausting all the legal routes to gaining asylum for the refugees, the activists in the Sanctuary Movement began to deliberately evade the law by assisting them in various ways. At first this mainly involved hosting refugees in their homes, providing them with donations of food and clothes, and assisting the refugees to cross the border without being detected by the Border Patrol. In response to the swelling numbers of refugee arrivals and threats from the authorities to prosecute the activists for illegally transporting and sheltering aliens, activists began to rehabilitate the ancient notion of sanctuary. This involved declaring churches to be spaces in which refugees could seek shelter from persecution, and also from the secular authorities wishing to deport them. One leading figure in the Sanctuary Movement declared: '[The Church's] reasoning was based on Christian hospitality. We decided that we had always helped people before on the basis of human need, and that we'd never asked anyone for their IDs, or green cards' (quoted in Bibler Coutin 1993, p. 29).

On 24 March 1982, the second anniversary of the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in San Salvador, the first public declaration of sanctuary was made by the Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson. Slogans hung on banners outside Southside Church declared: *La Migra No Profana El Sanctuario* (INS, Don't Profane the Sanctuary) and *Este es El Sanctuario de Dios Para Los Oprimidos de Centro America* (This is a Sanctuary of God for the Oppressed of Central America). On the same day a further five churches in the Bay Area around San Francisco declared themselves as sanctuaries. The Bay Area churches had earlier been part of a sanctuary movement during the Vietnam War. They had provided sanctuary to draft-resisters and others who refused to fight and who were evading arrest by the government for their refusal. Indeed, there are a number of continuities between the anti-Vietnam War movement and the Sanctuary Movement, both in terms of the people involved and the concern with peace, and resistance to US imperialist intervention. The decision to go public was based partly, at

least, on the potential to raise public awareness of the plight of the refugees and to force the government to acknowledge the veracity of their claims for asylum. As such, the Sanctuary Movement made a decisive turn from Christian charity and humanitarianism towards political agitation. Arguably, the judgement of a government undercover agent who attended the public declaration in Tucson was accurate when he reported: 'It seems that this movement is more political than religious' (quoted in Cunningham 1995, pp. 33–34).

Growth of the Movement

During the first year alone, Southside Church provided sanctuary for over 1,600 refugees (Smith 1996, p. 68) The movement quickly spread. By the end of 1982, 15 churches had declared sanctuary, with another 150 churches supporting refugees in various ways, such as raising money, and providing food and clothes for them (Crittenden 1988, p. 100). In addition to the public declarations, an 'underground railroad' developed linking together churches, private homes, and other spaces all the way from the Mexico/Guatemala border north across the US/Mexico border and onwards throughout the US and up into Canada. By the end of 1982, the Sanctuary Movement remained 'by any measure … tiny. But it was beginning to irritate the colossal United States government' (Ibid.) At the end of February 1983, less than a year after the public declaration, the Tucson Ecumenical Council (TEC), an official body comprising local churches and synagogues, agreed that its employees could engage in actively assisting refugees to reach sanctuary churches. In effect, the Tucson churches were endorsing and paying for refugees to be smuggled illegally across the border.

By the autumn of 1982 the numbers of refugees arriving across the border had increased exponentially, and the existing sanctuary activists struggled to cope. So they approached the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA) for help. The CRTFCA had been founded in January 1981 by a group of political activists based in a variety of local churches in response to the rape and murder of four US nuns

by right-wing paramilitaries in El Salvador. CRTFCA's goals were to raise awareness of the conditions that war and dictatorship were imposing on the people of Central America, mobilise opposition to the US government's support for repressive regimes in the region, and build solidarity for Central Americans both in their own countries and with those who had fled as refugees to the US. The CRTFCA helped set up a national network of sanctuaries across the US and 'refined the concept of public sanctuary' by developing the practice of getting the refugees to give public testimony in churches and to the press about what was going on in Central America, and the experiences that had led to their flight (Crittenden 1988, p. 90) This emphasis on getting refugees to speak publicly gave them a voice and created a human story that allowed others to identify with them. It was also deemed necessary to educate the US public about their government's involvement in wars that were being little reported in the media at the time.

By 1984 there were some 3,000 linked sanctuaries across the US, including, as well as churches, private homes, monasteries, Native American reservations, farms in Iowa, and synagogues (Golden and McConnell 1986, pp. 52–53). All the major Protestant denominations had endorsed sanctuary nationally, except for the Evangelicals, and many Catholic bishops had also endorsed it (Davidson 1988, p. 84). The Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Confederation of American Rabbis supported the movement (Lorentzen 1991, p. 29). At its peak a total of over 70,000 activists took part in the Sanctuary Movement, and its network extended into 34 states (Golden and McConnell 1986, p. 3; Lorentzen 1991, p. 14). About two-thirds of the movement were women, with many of the key activists 'housewives and nuns' (Lorentzen 1991, p. 3).

Prosecution

On 10 January 1985 a Federal Grand Jury indicted many of the leading Sanctuary Movement activists on charges of illegally transporting and harbouring aliens. When the case came to trial the judge prohibited defences based on international law, necessity, or religious or moral belief. Further, the question of whether the people helped by the defendants were refugees, or not, was deemed to be irrelevant. Instead the defendants were depicted as 'coyotes', slang for people smugglers. A further set of rulings banned the use of certain words, including describing the people being given sanctuary as 'refugees', along with terms such as 'tortured' or 'killed' when describing their experiences (Crittenden 1988, p. 271; Davidson 1988, p. 123) In May 1986, all but one of the defendants were found guilty, although they only received suspended sentences.

After the trial, one of the defendants and a founder of the movement, Jim Corbett, said: 'We'll stand trial as often as we have to. It'll continue as it has because the refugees and their needs actually set the agenda' (quoted in Guzder 2011, p. 115). Following the trial, the Sanctuary Movement was more or less left alone by the government, in spite of continuing sanctuary activities. The Border Patrol even pledged not to enter places of worship to make arrests. On a number of occasions a 'hot pursuit' of refugees by INS agents was terminated once they entered a church (Corbett 1992, p. 177).

Splits and Decline

However, the trial represented a turning point for the Sanctuary Movement in a number of respects. The profile of the movement was significantly raised through sustained media coverage of the trial. Over $1 million was raised to support the defendants, and over the course of the trial the number of publicly declared sanctuaries doubled. Yet it also proved to be the high-water mark of the movement. The decline can be attributed to two related developments: a split, and by a turn towards a much more legalistic approach by those activists working along the border. The movement divided between what became known as the 'Tucson' and 'Chicago' wings. 'Tucson' wanted the Sanctuary Movement to be guided by humanitarian aims based on the legal definition of

the refugee. They prioritised helping the refugees, irrespective of their politics, or of the politics that caused their flight. One controversial aspect of this, in practice, was that the Tucson activists assisted refugees who had previously been members of death squads and parties supportive of the right-wing governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as *campesinos* and other victims of the governments and the death squads.

'Chicago' framed sanctuary within a wider movement dedicated to political solidarity with the oppressed in Central America and to resisting US imperialism in the region. The CRTFCA's Statement of Faith was clear in staking out their position: 'The sanctuary movement seeks to uncover and name the connections between the US government and the Salvadoran death squads, and the connection between US business interests and the denial of human and economic rights of the vast majority of people. We believe that to stop short of this is to betray the Central American people and the refugees we now harbor' (quoted in Allitt 2003, pp. 177–178).

A further result of the trial was that those involved in bringing the refugees across the border, mainly those in the 'Tucson' faction, adopted an increasingly legalistic approach. '[T]hose returning from the [Sanctuary] trial had been profoundly influenced by court arguments and wished to implement procedures that would underscore the "legality" of Sanctuary work. Among these was the adoption of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) guidelines regarding refugee determination' (Cunningham 1995, p. 168). A theory of 'civil initiative' was developed in contrast to that of 'civil disobedience'. Whereas the latter involved breaking unjust laws, Corbett, speaking at Harvard in 1987, explained that: 'As civil initiative, sanctuary extends the rule of law by instituting a way for our society to comply with human rights and humanitarian laws when the government violates them' (quoted in Crittenden 1988, p. 345). In practice, this meant that members of the Sanctuary Movement would routinely screen those seeking help at the Mexican border, and if they failed to meet the strict definition of refugee according to international law then they were refused help in crossing the border. This led to a further split within the 'Tucson' group, with some believing that this corrupted the original, more open approach to sanctuary. One of the activists critical of this legalistic approach felt that the experience of the trial – 'trial trauma' – was responsible for this (Cunningham 1995, p. 169). It was also, perhaps, a result of these particular activists ignoring the political aspects of sanctuary.

Another problem identified by some commentators cut across the Chicago/Tucson divide. The refugees, it has been argued, were often perceived by the North American activists as '"objects" rather than empowered "subjects" of Sanctuary', or as subjects of 'pastoral' care rather than fellow activists engaged in a political struggle (Cunningham 1995, pp. 141–142; Lippert 2005). Even leading participants within the movement have claimed that refugee communities in urban centres took in many more refugees and provided far more sustenance than the Sanctuary Movement itself did (Golden and McConnell 1986: 61). During one sanctuary conference, the refugees demanded that the primary aim of the movement should be stopping US involvement in Central America. A Salvadoran refugee declared: 'We want to go back home. We want El Salvador and Guatemala to be sanctuaries' (quoted in Golden and McConnell 1986, p. 165). Although there were organisations of Central American refugees that worked closely with the Sanctuary Movement, it was the case that: 'Sanctuary itself . . . remained a movement about, rather than of, Central Americans' (Bibler Coutin 1993, p. 11).

Legacy

In the early 1990s the Sanctuary Movement began to wind down. Peace agreements were reached in El Salvador and Guatemala, which greatly reduced the numbers of refugees. Some legal victories were won giving greater rights to the refugees to seek asylum in the US. Many of them were allowed to have their cases heard again by newly trained officers, and they were allowed to work whilst their case was pending. The 1990

Immigration Act put in place a statutory basis for 'temporary protected status', which allowed more than 200,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans to remain within the US. In the view of many of its activists, this meant that the Sanctuary Movement had effectively won.

The Sanctuary Movement spawned a more long-lasting legacy in the form of 'sanctuary cities'. Over 50 cities in the US have passed 'sanctuary city' legislation that prohibits any municipal resources or employees from being utilised to enforce federal immigration laws. Some have gone even further by barring all municipal employees from enquiring as to someone's citizenship status. And inspired by the US Sanctuary Movement, churches in Canada, Great Britain, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany began giving sanctuary to asylum seekers from the mid-1980s onwards. The movement inspired the agitation for regularisation of undocumented migrants in the US beginning in 2007, with the creation of the New Sanctuary Movement. Today, many of the activists based in Arizona have moved on to providing assistance and help to the many irregular migrants crossing the US/Mexico border in organisations such as No More Deaths and *Humane Borders*.

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Sankara, Thomas (1949–1987)

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Synonyms

Biography; Imperialism; Marxism; National liberation; Thomas Sankara

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of Burkinabé revolutionary, Marxist, pan-Africanist, and President of Burkina Faso from 1983 to 1987, Thomas Sankara (1949–1987).

On 4 August 1983, Thomas Sankara led a coup d'état against President Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo and Colonel Somé Yoryan in the West African country of Burkina Faso (at the time known as Upper Volta or Haute-Volta). In the early 1980s, Burkina Faso, like many African nations, was deeply in debt. At the same time, global commodity prices had declined significantly, agricultural exports had decreased, and a sweeping financial crisis resulted in the retrenchment of poverty, joblessness, and precarity across Burkinabé society. The infant mortality rate was the highest in the world, estimated at 280 deaths per 1,000 infants. In this context, there was a growing popular dissatisfaction with the repressive neo-colonial political regime, evidenced by a series of labour-union strikes and military coups in these years.

Sankara described the state of Burkina Faso during this period, saying, "The diagnosis was clearly somber. The root of the disease was political. The treatment could only be political."

Sankara ambitiously set-out to de-link Burkina from this debilitating political disease by enacting programmes for auto-centric development, creating wide-sweeping reforestation programmes, implementing new educational models, transforming the national army, and working towards the emancipation of women. His radical political thought is known as Sankarism or Sankarist tradition: a Pan-African, anti-imperialist, and communist-inspired political praxis that emphasises holistic social transformation through the permanent dismantling of (neo-)imperial structures of dispossession. According to Sankarist tradition, this emancipatory social transformation is possible only through the collective energies and everyday actions of the Burkinabé.

Biography

Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara was born on 21 December 1949 in the town of Yako in northern Burkina Faso. In an interview with Swiss journalist Jean-Philippe Rapp in 1985, he reflected on his experiences growing up during the end of the colonial period in Gaoua. He vividly remembered how, as a child, he yearned to ride a bicycle that belonged to his European primary-school principal's children, a bicycle which none of the neighbourhood children was allowed to use:

> The other children dreamed about this bicycle for months and months. We woke up thinking about it; we drew pictures of it; we tried to suppress the longing that kept welling up inside of us. We did just about everything to try to convince them to lend it to us. If the principal's children wanted sand to build sand castles, we brought them sand ... One day, I realized all of our efforts were in vain. I grabbed the bike and said to myself, "Too bad, I'm going to treat myself to this pleasure no matter what the consequences." (Sankara 2007c/1985)

For this act, Sankara's father was arrested and Sankara was expelled from school. This early encounter with colonial injustice and inequality shaped Sankara's worldview. It was reaffirmed when his father was arrested again when Sankara's sister was caught throwing rocks to dislodge some wild fruit and some of the rocks fell onto the principal's house. Sankara reflected

years later: "[These falling stones] disturbed [the principal's] wife's nap. I understand that after a wonderful, refreshing meal, she wanted to rest, and it was irritating to be disturbed like this. But we wanted to eat." These encounters with the systems of oppression (where a father was arrested, in essence, for his child's hunger) can be seen as an early impetus for Sankara's political consciousness. He was deeply troubled by the gap between the people living in relative luxury, whose primary concern was leisure, and those living in uncertainty, whose primary concern was food. The struggle for dignity and sustenance would remain at the centre of his political project.

In 1970, Sankara attended officer training in Madagascar. There he witnessed the popular uprising of students, farmers, and labourers against the French-appointed leader Philibert Tsiranana. Two years later, he attended parachute academy in France and was exposed to some of the philosophies that would become the foundation for his revolutionary leadership, including Marxist political economy and development theory. At the age of 33, Sankara had risen as a military leader in the Upper Volta army. By 1980, he was speaking out against imperialism and building a network of allies within the ranks of the military. He was appointed minister of information in 1981, but quickly resigned after exposing high-level corruption to local journalists (Harsch 2013).

His anti-imperial political stance was not well received by Burkinabé elites and, as a result, Sankara and a handful of his supporters were arrested in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina, by the Ouédraogo regime. Thousands of Burkinabés took to the streets to protest and demand his release. Sankara's long-time friend and military ally Blaise Compaoré marched with 250 men on Ouagadougou, overtook the old regime and released Sankara. This insurrection became known as the August Revolution. Sankara describes the movement as a culmination of years of struggle and demonstration against neo-imperial domination. For the next four years, the National Council of the Revolution (CNR), under Sankara's leadership, ambitiously undertook one of the most radical collectivist and anti-imperialist projects on the African continent.

Sankarism and Contributions to Anti-imperialism

Sankara's emancipatory project was founded on a conviction that a radical transformation of the relationship between the people and the State in the post-colony was needed. He strove to dismantle the post-colonial Burkinabé State as an extension of neo-colonial power interests, one which facilitated the ongoing plunder of Burkina's resources for a small native elite while the majority of the population lived in poverty. He abandoned the use of wealth and status symbols, which had become a component of the post-colonial African elite, stipulating that his ministers must drive modest vehicles rather than the preferred Mercedes Benz. Breaking with a globalised political culture that idolises political leaders, Sankara refused to have his portrait on display. He advocated the consumption of locally produced goods for the self-sustainability of Burkina Faso.

Indeed, Sankara dressed modestly and boasted that his clothing, often a traditional Faso Dan-Fani, was made from materials woven in Burkina. Much like the name he selected for the country, Burkina Faso (the land of upright people), he encouraged and cultivated a love for country, for community and for self. This was a radical shift in consciousness for a post-colony that continued to draw upon the colonial education system, in which ideas of African selfhood were shaped and narrated through the colonial gaze. Twenty-three years after the formal end of colonial rule in Burkina, students continued to be instructed in French, the former colonial language, and in Western cultural, political, and social ontologies and epistemologies. Sankara described this system: "The colonial schools were replaced by neo-colonial schools, which pursued the same goals of alienating the children of our country and reproducing a society fundamentally serving imperialist interests" (2007b/1983, pp. 81–82). At the time he came into power, 98% of rural Burkinabés were unable to read or write and only 16% of school-age children attended. He recognised the need for a radical re-education of Burkinabés, one that made necessary the building of a foundational respect for Burkinabé history, culture, and selfhood. In response, Sankara launched an educational campaign to begin the project of building and sustaining a critical political consciousness.

Sankara spoke with conviction, persuasion, and charm to argue for a holistic approach to social change, one that considered women's emancipation to be essential to the anti-imperial project. His contributions to women's emancipation are not focused on equality in the Euro-American sense; instead they articulate a gender complementarity approach, one which recognises that "Women hold up the other half of the sky" (Sankara 2007e/1983, p. 66). He did not replicate colonial or patriarchal power dynamics by professing to speak for women. Instead, he spoke *with* them, reflecting his abiding respect for the dynamic and diverse roles of women in social and political life. He said, "We do not talk of women's emancipation as an act of charity or out of a surge of human compassion. It is a basic necessity for the revolution to triumph" (ibid.). He envisioned the movement for social transformation as "one that entrusts responsibilities to women, that involves them in productive activity and in the different fights the people face" (ibid.). He implemented a national day of solidarity with housewives, encouraging men to adopt the work of women for a day as a means of cultivating recognition for women's essential roles in Burkinabé society. Sankara's commitment to the emancipation of women was a radical contribution to Pan-African politics, one that named patriarchy and male privilege as detrimental to the struggle for African empowerment.

Sankara's speeches often included direct confrontations with neo-imperial powers and reactionary forces. At the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 1984, for example, Sankara described the state of international politics as "A world in which nations, eluding international law, command groups of outlaws who, guns in hand, live by plunder and organize sordid trafficking" (2007d/1984, p. 155). He pronounced the indigenous Burkinabé elite as "a passive and pathetic consumer" (157). Sankara's goal of total emancipation and empowerment for every Burkinabé challenged the foundations of the neo-imperial capitalist system and threatened foreign and domestic elites. On

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15 October 1987, Sankara and 12 of his comrades were assassinated on the order of his political associate and deputy Captain Blaise Compaoré. On 17 January 1988, a death certificate was issued by the Compaoré regime, claiming that Sankara died of "natural causes." International political elites, including Guy Penne in France, the CIA in the US, Houphouet Boigney in the Ivory Coast and Charles Taylor in Liberia (Montanaro 2009; Ray 2008), are suspected of having been involved in the movement to violently remove Sankara from power and to stop his political momentum, which had gained significant international attention and support. A comprehensive investigation into the events of his death has never been carried out and the United Nations Committee for Human Rights closed its file on the assassination on 21 April 2008. After Sankara's assassination, Compaoré immediately set-out on a 'rectification' programme that opened Burkina Faso to the neoliberal economic reforms that have had devastating consequences for the Burkinabé population. Compaoré remains president of Burkina, after nearly 27 years in power.

Sankara's contributions to the anti-imperial struggle cannot be overstated. He led one of the world's poorest nations in one of the world's most radically egalitarian political projects. He emphatically refused to pay back debts that had been incurred during colonialism and by the neocolonial regimes that followed. He urged African leaders to unite in their refusal to repay. His courage and conviction were founded on an abiding respect for ordinary people and in his recognition of their intellectual, creative, and political contributions. He fearlessly critiqued the destructive and exploitative forces of global empire.

In moments that seem to be deeply reflective and anticipatory of his own assassination, he spoke of death, meaning, and the return to homeland. It is difficult not to read his tribute to Che Guevara, "You cannot kill ideas," as foreboding his own death. He said, "Che Guevara was cut down by bullets, imperialist bullets, under Bolivian skies. And we say that for us, Che Guevara is not dead … you cannot kill ideas. Ideas do not die" (2007a/1987, p. 421). A week later, he was assassinated by machine-gun fire. "La patrie ou la mort, nous vaincrons" (Homeland or death, we will win), Sankara declared triumphantly at the end of each of his speeches. Although there are powerful forces that would erase Sankara's memory and heritage, African youth, activists, and students across the continent continue to draw upon the tenets of Sankarism to criticise political corruption, to advocate political change, and to draw inspiration and hope for a better future.

Postscript

Under pressure from a popular youth-led movement, which drew inspiration from Sankara's political heritage and organised under the slogan "enough is enough," Blaise Compaoré resigned as president of Burkina Faso on 31 October 2014.

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Sembène, Ousmane (1923–2007)

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Definition

Senegalese Sembène Ousmane was one of the key African artists of the twentieth century as a writer and a film director.

Sembène Ousmane was born 9 years after Blaise Diagne was elected as Senegal's first African deputy to the French parliament. In the late nineteenth century, France had gained control over the territory of Senegal after the British had left. It became part of French West Africa. Over the centuries, this region had been exploited for slave and goods trade by the Portuguese and the Dutch. In 1946, Senegal became part of the French Union. Some 12 years later, it became a republic and part of the French Community.

Sembène saw all these changes, but also how they resulted from the struggle of the Senegalese people for emancipation. Hope for self-determination would soon be realised. In June 1960, Senegal became independent and a constituent of the Mali Federation, which it abandoned later that year. Leopold Senghor was the first president of the new republic, whom Sembène, as a communist and internationalist, criticised along with 'African socialism', particularly Senghor's Négritude and the endorsement of a Francophone Commonwealth. After a failed coup led by prime minister Mamadou Dia, a constitution was drawn up and approved. In 1966, Senghor's Senegalese Progressive Union became the country's sole political party and remained so until 1978. Abdou Diouf became president in 1981. Senegal and neighbouring Gambia aimed to combine military and security forces and so the next year they formed the Senegambian Confederation. It was dissolved 7 years later. The separatist movement in the southern province of Casamance gained momentum at the beginning of the 1980s. In 2000, the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade won the second round of the presidential election and ended 40 years of Socialist Party rule, introducing political changes such as giving the president power to dissolve the parliament. Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party won an overwhelming majority in parliamentary elections in 2001. When 1863 passengers died in a ferry disaster off the coast of Gambia, the incident had a political impact that led to the government's resignation. In October 2005, a dispute with Gambia over ferry tariffs on the border resulted in a transport blockade. The economies of both countries suffered. Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo organised talks to resolve the issue. In 2006, the Senegalese army launched an offensive against rebels from a faction

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of the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces. Senegal and Spain agreed to jointly patrol the Senegalese coast so as to curb the exodus of so-called illegal migrants heading for Europe, particularly for the Canary Islands. Senegal was and still is a common starting point for poor and desperate migrants setting out in rickety boats.

The Senegalese Sembène Ousmane, one of the key African artists of the twentieth century as a writer and a film director, was attentive to this historical process. As Pfaff states, his originality 'as a filmmaker lies in his having managed successfully to adapt film, a primarily Western medium, to the needs, pace, and rhythm of African culture', and, specifically, Senegalese culture (1993, p. 14). In the vein of the African tradition of telling and transmitting stories that creatively reflect the situation of its peoples, Sembène opted for fiction instead of documentary filmmaking. His novels, short stories, and films adopt a social-realist aesthetics and mode of narration, limpid and spare. His movies strengthened the cause of the liberation from colonial oppression. With a sharp political conscience rooted in knowledge of the history, culture, and reality of Senegal, these works portrayed the tensions generated by economic factors, the social classes, the racial statuses, the religious degeneration, and the gender conditions in the country. He was an African filmmaker and a political artist who criticised Négritude (the unreflective affirmation of the value of black or African culture, heritage, and identity) because Africa before the arrival of white colonisers was not an idyllic place.

David Murphy points out that a fundamental element for the understanding of Sembène's view of art is his paper 'Man Is Culture' (2000, p. 29). In this presentation as a Hans Wolff Memorial Lecture at Indiana University-Bloomington, Sembène explained that the concept of art as an adornment is unknown in West Africa. Humanity is art. Humanity is culture. That is, culture (of which art is a part) cannot be abstracted from the historical roots and human conscience that are at its origin and are produced by it.

Sembène was born in Ziguinchor, Casamance to a Lebou family, and he initially followed the path of his father and became a fisherman.

Working in plumbing and masonry gave him an inside perspective of the problems and challenges of the working class. His maternal grandmother reared him and greatly influenced him; she is arguably the reason why women play a major role in his works. Wolof was his mother tongue. He learned basic Arabic at a madrasa and French at a French school until he clashed with the principal in 1936. During the Second World War, Sembène was drafted into the Senegalese Tirailleurs, a corps of colonial infantry in the French army. Later he served with the Free French Forces, the resistance organisation founded by Charles de Gaulle in 1940 in London to continue the campaign against the Nazis and their allies. After the war, he returned to his home country. In 1947, he participated in a long railroad strike. *God's Bits of Wood* (1995/1960) is inspired by this courageous strike of the Dakar–Niger railroad workers, from October 1947 to March 1948. It is a portrait of post-Second World War French West Africa, set in today's Senegal and Mali (French Sudan), in the moment that the African working class became organised. It has no protagonist, much less a hero, except for a community of nearly 50 characters who band together in the face of hardship and oppression to defend their rights.

Late in 1947, he went again to France, where he worked at a Citroën factory in Paris, and then on the docks at Marseille, where he started writing. His first novel bears the title *The Black Docker* (1987a/1956), and is about an African immigrant who faces racism and mistreatment on the same docks. He witnesses the oppression of Arab and Spanish workers, making it clear that their problems have to do with labour despite the fact that they are experienced as racism and xenophobia. Sembène became active in the French trade union movement and joined the General Confederation of Labour and the French Communist Party (PCF), helping to organise a strike to hinder the shipment of weapons for the Indochina War, which he saw as a resistance war against French colonisation. During this time, he discovered two men who became major influences in his work: Claude McKay and Jacques Roumain. McKay was the author of *Home* to *Harlem*

(1928), which looked among the ordinary people for a distinctive black identity. The Haitian Marxist Roumain had been actively opposed to the US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934, the year when he founded the Haitian Communist Party with other comrades. It is clear that Sembène saw his artistic work and political activism as not merely a personal desire, but as a social necessity (Gadjigo 2010, p. 115).

He left the PCF in 1960, never leaving the communist ideal and continuing to be a militant through his art, which made use of historical materialism to interpret and intervene in Senegalese society. In his exchange with ethnographic filmmaker Jean Rouch, who had made films about African culture, he contrasted their approaches in a clear manner:

> You say seeing. But in the domain of cinema, it is not enough to see, one must analyze. I am interested in what is before and after that which we see. What I do not like about ethnography, I'm sorry to say, is that it is not enough to say that a man we see is walking; we must know where he comes from, where he is going. (Busch and Annas 2008, p. 4)

In order to discuss an artist, we usually discuss his work and its context. At times, we also consider his life and its connection with his art. Yet in this case we must examine his name as well. Should we write 'Sembène Ousmane' or 'Ousmane Sembène'? This is not a futile question. The first, which was adopted by the artist in his films and books, is written in the style used in official French documents, with 'Sembène', a patronymic surname, first. It bears the mark of history, therefore calling attention to the persistence of colonialism after the ending of colonisation. The second erases these associations.

Sembène's art gives voice to revolutionary Africa. Despite the individuated characters, the true protagonist of his fictions is the Senegalese people, catapulted by the historical development and the production relations of colonialism to the centre of the contemporary class struggle. His works unmask the new bourgeoisie and critique the persistence of feudalistic structures and cultural obscurantism. For him, the autonomy from colonial powers in Africa was often merely formal. It did not change the economic and social structures in place.

He realised that films could reach a wider African audience that did not have the means or the education to read his writings. In 1962, he went to study at the Soviet Gorky Film Institute in Moscow with a scholarship, where he studied with the Ukrainian filmmaker Mark Donskoy. After returning to Senegal, he directed two short films on 16 mm: the documentary *The Sonhrai Empire* (*L'Empire sonhrai*, 1963) and the drama *Cart Driver* (*Borom Sarret*, 1963). *The Sonhrai Empire* (produced by the Republic of Mali) depicts the history of the Islamic Songhai Empire. *Cart Driver* introduces an unidealised style that Sembène would develop later, portraying economic exploitation through the perceptive rendering of a cart driver's everyday in Dakar. His third short film, *Niaye* (1964), based on one of his short stories – 'White Genesis', later included in *The Money-Order and White Genesis* (1966) – is the tale of a pregnant young girl who faces the judgment of her community, which tries to prevent the scandal from reaching the French colonial administration. *Black Girl* (*La noire de . . .*, 1966) was his first feature and it adapts one of the short stories that can be found in *Tribal Scars* (1981/1974). It won the Prix Jean Vigo in France, because it was a French-language film, calling attention to African cinema and Sembène. The film's main character, Diouanna, is a Senegalese maid who is taken to the south coast of France by her French employers. It is only in this exiled condition that she realises what being colonised and African means; the same process that Sembène had gone through. The success of this film gave him an opportunity to make *The Money-Order* (*Mandabi*, 1968) in his native dialect Wolof. Once again, the film was based on one of his short stories, 'The Money-Order' (1987b/1966), about a village man, used to ordering around his wives, who receives a money-order from his nephew in Paris and helplessly attempts to cash it. Sembène exposes the vanity and cold ambitions of the petite bourgeoisie. It is not just the language that is important, but the power and history of oral communication in its public and private dimensions (Niang 1996: 67–68). In the late 1960s, the filmmaker developed two small projects for public television, *Employment*

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Problem (*Les Dérives du chômage,* 1969) and Polygamy (*Traumatisme de la femme face à la polygamie,* 1969), both focusing on social and cultural problems, which have roots in human exploitation.

The Money-Order had marked the adoption of a critical stance towards the corrupt African elites that followed the racial and economic oppression of the colonial government. *Xala*, as a novel (1974) and a film (1975), would prolong this analysis of the social and moral collapse of post-independence Africa, followed by the books *Niiwam and Taaw: Two Novellas* (1992/1974) and *The Last of the Empire: A Senegalese Novel* (1983/1981). It is the story of El Hadji, a rich businessman struck by what he believes to be a curse of impotence, *xala* in Wolof, on the night of the wedding to his beautiful, young third wife. Only after losing most of his money and reputation does he discover the source of the problem to be the beggar who lives outside his offices, whom he had wronged to acquire his fortune. The story satirises modern African bourgeoisie, exposing the corruption at the heart of post-independence governments, as if white colonialists had merely been replaced by a black elite who promote capitalism and imperialism. The man's erectile dysfunction is an image of this failure, the postponing of African emancipation. The short film *Taaw* (1970) is about an unemployed young man in modern Senegal. Although accused of being lazy, he is able to help his pregnant girlfriend who has been abandoned by her family. *God of Thunder* (*Emitaï,* 1971) is a film in the Diola language and French portraying the confrontation between French Gaullist colonists and the Diola people of Senegal in the last days of the Second World War. The women are at the forefront of the resistance and the film conveys their social power as keepers, preservers, and enhancers of myths, rituals, and stories. It was banned throughout French West Africa, and was showed at the seventh Moscow International Film Festival, where it won a Silver Prize. Sembène's films were always welcomed at this Soviet festival, which awarded him an honorary prize for his contribution to cinema in 1979. *African Basketball at the Munich Olympic Games* (*Basket africain aux Jeux olympiques de Munich,* 1972) was shot during the 1972 Summer Olympics that took place in the Federal Republic of Germany, but it was never commercially released due to the Munich massacre in which six Israeli coaches, five Israeli athletes, one German police officer, and five members of the Black September group died.

West African spirituality and religion are crucial topics in Sembène's work. As a child, he came into contact with the Serer religion, whose followers believe in a Creative Divine Spirit called *Roog.* Sembène often helped in the rituals of offerings to ancient saints and ancestral spirits that the Serer people call *Pangool*. Then he was attracted to the Layene brotherhood, a small Senegalese Muslim community in Senegal. Some of his artworks draw parallels with Serer themes, even if he opposed religion on the grounds that it mainly had been a social force, superstructurally connected with economic relations of domination and exploitation. His films stated and restated that it is the people who make their history, not the gods. *Outsiders* (*Ceddo*, 1976) is his most relevant film on the subject, laying bare the onslaught of Islam, Christianity, and the Atlantic and Arab slave trades in African history. It shows that the representation of history has been changed by the elimination of older beliefs, but also that the new religions integrated elements from the local culture. This is the reason why the film jumps from the conflict in the seventeenth century to the present to make connections. This was a narrative structure and editing pattern already employed in his first feature film, *Black* Girl. It was heavily censored in Senegal, apparently because of a problem with the required paperwork, but more probably because of its perspective on religion; in particular, its depiction of the killing of an imam by a tribal princess who resists forceful conversion to Islam. Sembène was able to release an uncut version for international distribution.

The Camp at Thiaroye (*Camp de Thiaroye,* 1988) was the only film that he made in the 1980s and it is a vigorous indictment of European imperialism in West Africa. The film focuses on an event that was a turning point in the fight for Senegalese independence: the Thiaroye massacre. In 1944, West African soldiers who had fought against Fascism in Europe were waiting for better living conditions and severance pay in a transit

camp in Senegal. In the film, the French officer in charge is at first diplomatic, but then tries to cheat them, which provokes a mass revolt. The French response is to open fire on them, killing 35 soldiers. The movie won the Special Jury Prize at the 45th Venice International Film Festival.

Guelwaar (1992) initiated a trilogy on daily bravery that goes unnoticed, which continued with Faat *Kiné* (1999) and *Moolaadé* (2004). *Guelwaar* opened the 13th Pan-African Film Festival in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which honoured Sembène as a father of African cinema. It was based on the events around the interment of Henri Thioune, a Christian Catholic who was a popular member of the anti-establishment resistance and whose body was mistakenly buried in a Muslim cemetery. This allows the filmmaker to analyse religious conflict as something that masks real economic and social problems. *Faat Kiné* dissects post-colonial Senegal, focusing on the day-to-day existence of a single mother of two children, whose name is the film's title, struggling for independence and equality. Her life of opulence and flashy female friends is at odds with the lives of other Senegalese women, but the present power and commodity relations inherited from the past shape both groups. *Moolaadé* won the Prix Un Certain Regard at the Cannes Film Festival, a prize that rewards cinematic originality and distinctiveness. Set in a small village in Burkina Faso, it denounces female genital mutilation. The last image of Faat Kiné's shows her feet curling in pleasure. The woman who protects young girls from genital cutting in *Moolaad*é is asserting the right to such pleasure.

All of Sembène's films were made under severe technical and financial constraints. Distribution was a challenge throughout his career, especially since he insisted, from *Mandabi* on, that his films be spoken in Wolof. He wanted the movies to be true to their subject matter and to their primary audience members, making them aware of their history (Busch and Annas 2008, p. 217) and situation (109). In other words, his cinema was a critical and popular narrative art, an activist art that was not simply made for the people, but came from them, out of their striving to be unshackled. Sembène's convictions were clearly embodied in his films and articulated in his public discourse:

Culture is political, but it's another type of politics. You're not in art to be chosen. You're not involved in its politics to say 'I am.' In art, you are political, but you say, 'We are. We are' and not 'I am'. (Cited in Busch and Annas 2008, p. xx)

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Semi-colonialism in China

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Definition

In China, the concept of semi-colonialism led two lives. In its usage by Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, it was overtly political and spoke to the types of class alliances necessary under

conditions of imperialism to confront foreign and domestic oppression as well as the nature of that oppression. In its usage by some Chinese academics (and by a small number of contemporary Western China scholars), it spoke to a more complicated assessment of how capital spread geographically and the level of deviation its forms of exploitation could assume from the classical case put forward by Marx in *Capital*.

Introduction

The problem of large-scale historical change has been a source of heated debate within Marxism since Karl Marx's own lifetime. In a now frequently cited exchange between Marx and the Russian socialist Vera Zasulich in 1881, the latter asked whether, as many Russian socialists were arguing, the Russian commune was "an archaic form condemned to perish by history, scientific socialism, and, in short, everything above debate" or could it be developed in a socialist direction (Zasulich, quoted in Shanin 1983, p. 99). In his response, Marx referred Zasulich to a passage from the French edition of *Capital* in which he states that the basis of the capitalist system was the total separation of the producer from the means of production. While this separation had only been accomplished "in a radical manner" in England, Marx believed that "all the other countries of Western Europe are following the same course" (Marx, quoted in Shanin 1983, p. 124 emphasis in original). He clarified that the historical inevitability of this developmental path was restricted to Western Europe where the private property of the small producer was transformed into the private property of the capitalist. The communal nature of property among the Russian peasants meant that *Capital* pointed neither to the abolition nor possible socialist development of the commune. The commune could, however, serve as "the fulcrum for social regeneration" if the pressures put upon it by capitalism were eliminated (Marx, quoted in Shanin 1983, p. 124).

This exchange anticipated the debates that emerged among Chinese Marxists in the 1930s and 1940s concerning China's social formation –

its mode of production. If, as the universalist, mechanistic laws of Soviet dialectical materialism prescribed, there were "[f]ive main types of relations of production" corresponding to five stages of sociohistorical development – "primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist" – then it was necessary to locate China in this evolutionary chain in order to plan the course of the revolution (Stalin [1938] 1975, p. 29). Like their Russian counterparts of the 1880s, many Chinese Marxists assumed that elements of Chinese society, such as the landed gentry, corresponding to what they identified as China's feudal stage would need to be destroyed so that society could move into the capitalist stage as a stepping stone toward socialism. The results of these debates were a general agreement, at least within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that China's development had been arrested in a type of transitional stage. On the one hand, because so much production took the form of landlords exploiting peasant households, yet without the older imperial political structures, China was considered semifeudal (Dirlik 1978, p. 96). On the other hand, because the majority of China's industrial production was controlled by Western and Japanese imperialist powers who, in turn, suppressed the development of a national bourgeoisie and supported "feudal" landlord-peasant relations, China was also semi-colonial (Su 1933). As Rebecca Karl (2017a, b) and Harry Harootunian (2015) have recently observed, however, there were also substantial efforts from Chinese Marxists outside the CCP, specifically the economist Wang Yanan, to use semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism not as covers for a transitional period in the inevitable march toward European-style, industrial capitalism and beyond but, rather, as a way of theorizing how imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had successfully spread the structures of capitalism by making use of already existing forms of exploitation in the East. To put it another way, they focused on the vast array of forms of exploitation that capital could accommodate without necessarily revolutionizing them. Although landlord-peasant relations did not operate like capitalist-worker relations, and although the labor process

employed by peasants took an immiserated form of traditional practices instead of becoming industrialized, all elements were nonetheless subject to the global structures of capital. The daily lives of Chinese peasants were directly connected to, for example, global textile markets.

Thus, in China, the concept of semi-colonialism led two lives. In its usage by Mao and the CCP, it was overtly political and spoke to the types of class alliances necessary to confront foreign and domestic oppression as well as the nature of that oppression. In its usage by some Chinese academics (and by a small number of contemporary Western China scholars), it spoke to a more complicated assessment of how capital spread geographically and the level of deviation its forms of exploitation could assume from the classical case put forward by Marx in *Capital*. This essay begins by providing the theoretical context for the importance of this concept through a discussion of Marx's concept of a mode of production. It then traces the usage of the term semi-colonialism by Lenin through his debates with M.N. Roy at the second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 to its use by Chinese Marxists in the 1930s and finally to Mao's integration of semi-colonialism into his own writing in 1939 and 1940.

The Concept of a Mode of Production

Academic opponents of Marxism are often quick to highlight what they see as the spuriousness of a universalist teleology within Marxism regarding the inevitability of societies (generally understood as nation-states) to develop toward industrial capitalism. Broadly, these scholars object to the idea of an "advanced" Europe during the Industrial Revolution that brought the "backward" places of the globe into the modern world, and they see within certain iterations of Marxism an overlap with modernization theory. During the period of decolonization in the twentieth century, both spoke of newly formed nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America "catching up" to Europe and the United States in terms of economic and cultural development. The West was

"ahead," while societies of the East/South were "behind" (for an example of this type of criticism, see Chakrabarty (2000)). The impetus for such criticism is not only to confront the racist assumptions underlying the "progress" of the West but to point out that the very foundations for such progress depend upon processes of colonization. Colonial places were no less modern than their European oppressors, because colonization and imperialism, the exploitative relations between the West and the rest, are what made the "modern" possible.

Many Marxists have made similar criticisms, referring to those variants that maintain a teleological view of history as "vulgar" Marxism. Indeed, as Marx's later writings were discovered and translated throughout the early and mid-twentieth century, it became increasingly difficult to use Marxism to defend a view of history as nation-states moving through predetermined stages (Anderson 2010). There is a marked and important difference between the way Marx presented the laws of motion in capitalist society and events leading to major historical change. The latter allowed far more room for contingency and variation than the law-like dynamics explicated in his economic writing. Marx's acceptance of historical contingency is perhaps most famously reflected in the following lines from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, given and inherited" (Marx [1852] 1996a, p. 32). However, this allowance for contingency in politics serves just as well for the spread of the relations of capital to new geographic areas or sectors of production. Throughout the *Grundrisse* and the three volumes of *Capital*, Marx makes repeated statements about the flexibility of capital to make do with "the labour process as it finds it...developed by different and more archaic modes of production" ([1867] 1990, p. 1021) and forms of exploitation that exist within capitalism yet "relate to the mode of production from the outside" ([1894] 1991, p. 745).

Far and away, the force most responsible for advancing the modernizationist, teleological

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version of Marxism was Soviet dialectical materialism and its adherents, many Chinese Marxists, and official CCP doctrine among them. This version of Marxism conceived of historical change as unfolding through a fixed series of modes of production (or historical stages) defined by the relationship between the forces of production (the level of technological and scientific development employed in production) and the relations of production (the relations between those who directly worked to produce goods and those who had the power to appropriate production surpluses). The concepts of semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism in China were born, on the one hand, of a sincere attempt to apply dialectical materialist philosophy to China's history and relationship to imperialism and, on the other hand, the impossibility of neatly fitting Chinese society into preapproved categories like slave society or feudalism.

The Frankfurt School Marxist Theodor Adorno described dialectical materialism as "the inversion of Marxism into a static dogma, deadened to its own contents" (2005, pp. 13–14). Among other things, Adorno's criticism was that Marx would never "tear thought free from the real movement of history" the way dialectical materialism had through its application of universal categories to all epochs of the human and natural worlds (2005, p. 14). This inversion of Marxism is clear in Stalin's *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*. In explaining the importance of production to historical change, he writes that "its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production...First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change" ([1938] 1975, p. 26). This was held to be true for all societies regardless of anything that might differentiate them from the West, which itself did not fit this model. On this view, historical research was reduced to the verification of theory, to asking questions for which the answer was already known. All one needed to do was periodize a given society along the five

approved stages by identifying the forces and relations of production corresponding to each stage. Preached in the name of Marxism, dialectical materialism became a form of metaphysics through its use of the dialectic as a "cosmological principle prior to, and independent of," historical research (Banaji [1977] 2010, p. 48). Yet, it was exactly this approach to history that Marx and Engels criticized as early as *The German Ideology*, in which they contrast the materialist conception of history with the idealist conception, stating that the former "has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period to look for a category, but remains constantly on the real ground of history" ([1846] 1947, p. 28).

For Marx, although the investigation of the "real ground of history" meant uncovering its abstract laws of motion, these laws were historically determined and specific to a given epoch rather than transhistorical. Furthermore, the abstractions he employed were concretized through historical research. While, for example, the concept of labor has a transhistorical dimension as the creative interaction between humans and their environment, in *Capital*, it also has a historically specific dimension as a commodity. Jairus Banaji ([1977] 2010) argues that this notion of an epoch with identifiable, historically specific laws of motion is one of two meanings given to the term "mode of production" in Marx. The second is roughly equivalent to "labor process" or "production process."

In the appendix to *Capital*, Vol. 1, Marx notes a distinction between the formal and real subsumption of labor, which correspond to the accumulation of absolute and relative surplus value, respectively. Labor is formally subsumed by capital once it is directed by capitalists toward the production of surplus value or, as Marx writes, once production becomes a process "involving the *factors of the labour process* into which the capitalist's money has been converted and which proceeds under his direction with the sole purpose of using money to make more money" ([1867] 1990, p. 1020). He notes that while these conditions mean production has become part of the relations of capital, "this change does not in itself imply a fundamental modification in the real

nature of the labour process" ([1867] 1990, p. 1021). For example, in the early twentieth century, Shanghai and its hinterlands were an important site of textile production in China. Although textile production itself took place through factory labor, the agricultural processes involved in producing cotton continued to rely on peasant labor operating according to traditional agricultural methods (Walker 1999). The only change to the labor process of the cotton-producing peasants was an increase in the amount of time dedicated to agricultural work. This increase resulted from demands for surplus production created by factories in Shanghai which in turn connected Chinese peasant labor to the world. Here, peasant labor is formally subsumed by capital in the production of absolute surplus value, which "turns exclusively on the length of the working day" (Marx [1867] 1990, p. 645). That is, it is a form of surplus value produced through the intensification of an old, inherited labor process.

The formal subsumption of labor under capital, according to Marx, is the "general form of every capitalist process of production," meaning that all capitalist production involves investment by the capitalist in the factors of the labor process for the accumulation of surplus value ([1867] 1990, p. 1019). Yet, "at the same time, however, it can be found as a *particular* form alongside the *specifically capitalist mode of production* in its developed form, because although the latter entails the former, the converse does not necessarily obtain [i.e. the formal subsumption can be found in the absence of the specifically capitalist mode of production]" ([1867] 1990, p. 1019, emphasis in original). This passage reveals the difficulty in understanding the term "mode of production" solely as epoch or historical stage. It would make little sense for Marx to claim that the formal subsumption of labor is the general form of capitalist production while stating that it may or may not exist alongside the capitalist epoch. To return to textile production, identifying "mode of production" with a historical stage would mean that peasant labor formally subsumed in cotton production existed in a different era than the labor of contemporary workers in factories in Shanghai, which had undergone a process of real

subsumption – meaning the labor process had been revolutionized through the introduction of machine technology. However, this is exactly the claim that both imperialist powers and members of the Comintern would make when they referred to the backward places of the world compared to the West or to urban centers in the East developed through capitalist imperialism.

This problem occurs again in *Capital*, vol. 3 in the discussion on usurer's capital (interest-bearing capital). Marx believed that usury existed in two forms prior to the capitalist era: (1) the lending of money to landed proprietors and lords and (2) the lending of money to small producers who possessed their own means of production. Its collection of production surpluses through interest, therefore, contributed to both the concertation of wealth and the impoverishment of small producers. He writes that usury, along with merchant's capital, belongs to the "antediluvian forms of capital which long precede the capitalist mode of production and [is] to be found in the most diverse socio-economic formations" ([1894] 1991, p. 728). This form of lending, "just like trade, exploits a given mode of production but does not create it"; instead, usury attempts to maintain the given mode of production "so as constantly to exploit it anew; it is conservative, and simply makes the mode of production wretched" ([1894] 1991, p. 745). Although the wretchedness created by usury aided in the passage from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe, Marx saw the ruin it brought to small farmers in the Roman Empire playing a role in the transition to the general use of slave labor. In instances where usurer's capital appropriates all of the direct producer's surplus labor, where the producer owns the means of production, and "where capital therefore does not directly subordinate labour, and thus does not confront it as industrial capital," usury "impoverishes the mode of production, cripples the productive forces instead of developing them, and simultaneously perpetuates these lamentable conditions" ([1894] 1991, pp. 730–731). Yet, archaic as it might be, usury also "has capital's mode of exploitation without its mode of production" and "recurs within the bourgeois economy in backward branches of industry,

or those that are struggling against the transition to the modern mode of production" ([1894] 1991, p. 732).

On the one hand, given the references Marx makes to epochal social formations like the Roman Empire and feudalism, it is likely that when usury "impoverishes the mode of production," this could point to both a sociohistorical epoch and the labor processes which predominate in it. On the other hand, usury's recurrence within the bourgeois economy among branches of industry, resisting the "modern mode of production," harkens back to Marx's discussion of the formal and real subsumption of labor by capital. In either case, what should be clear is that Marx's use of terms like "capitalist mode of production" does not point to a cleanly delineated, inevitable moment in every nation-state's history defined by forms of exploitation of labor homogenous with every other capitalist nation-state. Rather, the social relations in capital which lead to the production and accumulation of surplus value can tolerate a high degree of variability in the forms of exploitation by which accumulation takes place.

The adaptability of capital to older forms of exploitation, older labor processes, created a major problem for Chinese Marxists attempting to apply dialectical materialism to Chinese society. As Banaji writes, "one of the most widespread and persistent illusions of vulgar Marxism" was that "modes of production were deducible, by a relation of 'virtual identity', from the given forms of exploitation of labour" ([1977] 2010, p. 53). The idea ran thusly: if wage labor is the form of exploitation proper to capital, then the absence of wage labor is equivalent to the absence of capitalist mode of production in the epochal sense. That is, the society has not yet reached the capitalist stage. Following this logic, prior to the Civil War, the Southern United States was a prefeudal slave society. Yet, Marx wrote that while "the slavery of Negroes precludes free wage labor, which is the basis of capitalist production," it was nonetheless true that "the business in which slaves are used is conducted by capitalists. The mode of production that they introduce has not arisen out of slavery but is grafted onto it. In this case the same person is capitalist and landowner" (quoted in Anderson 2010, p. 169).

The point of this discussion is not to demonstrate that Chinese Marxists were "bad" Marxists. Many of Marx's texts cited above were unavailable in China during the 1930s and 1940s, and many Marxists, especially those in the CCP, were writing under the impossible conditions of revolutionary war using what Soviet texts had been translated and made available. Marx's more philosophic writings only became available in the late 1920s and 1930s, by which time Soviet dialectical materialism had hardened into dogma. Elements of Marx's writing that contradicted their stagist view of historical change or cosmological application of dialectics would not have been included in their textbooks, which served as a major source for Chinese Marxists including Mao Zedong (Knight 1990). Rather, the point of this discussion is to demonstrate that Marx himself was acutely aware of the malleability of capital's forms of exploitation, its willingness to accommodate labor processes outside of the "classical" form of factory labor. Older forms of exploitation were outside the capitalist mode of production in the labor process sense but were not sufficient evidence that a society existed outside of the capitalist epoch. Furthermore, the emergence of concepts like semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism in Chinese Marxist debates serves as testimony to the historical fact of this malleability. Despite the inaccessibility of Marx's scattered writing on the subject, Chinese Marxists, building on the work of Lenin and others, confronted the nonidentity between the dialectical materialist concept of history and the lived experience of capitalist imperialism.

Semi-colonialism and the Second Congress of the Comintern, 1920

The Communist International (Comintern) was founded in March 1919 at a small congress of only 51 delegates. Its predecessor, the Socialist International, in which Friedrich Engels was an active participant, had collapsed after the outbreak of World War I when its leaders voiced staunch support for the chauvinist policies of their respective national governments. Little was discussed at

the First Congress beyond debates over whether to establish a new revolutionary international organization (Riddell 1991). Although the Communist Party of Germany felt the timing was not right, the First Congress voted in favor of its creation, and the Second Congress was quickly scheduled to be held in July 1920. Comintern leadership felt that the success of revolutionary parties in the "advanced" countries of Western Europe and the United States required alliances with oppressed people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and Lenin was tasked with writing a draft resolution on how this was to be accomplished. Among his original theses, he stated that in "the more backward states and nations, in which feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate," the duty of Communist parties was to "assist the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement" (quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 51). This sparked a debate between Lenin and M.N. Roy, a delegate from India and founder of the Mexican Communist Party and the Communist Party of India. The exchange resulted in two sets of theses adopted at the Second Congress that would shape a great deal of how Marxists in China understood the significance of the term semi-colonialism in national revolutions.

The general parameters for how semi-colonialism was understood by congress delegates were already set by Lenin in his 1916 pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. There, Lenin used semi-colonial states to "provide an example of the transitional forms which are to be found in all spheres of nature and society" ([1916] 1970, p. 240). They were transitional because they had neither won national sovereignty through revolution nor had finance capital succeeded in stripping away their political independence. He wrote that semi-colonies were a "typical example of the 'middle stage'" of a "form of subjection" by finance capital that threatened to turn them into full colonies ([1916] 1970, p. 240). Because of their shared position under imperialist oppression, however, Lenin frequently referred to places like India, Indo-China, and China together as a set of "colonial and semicolonial countries" ([1916] 1970, p. 276). The term semi-colonialism, therefore, served only to describe the diminished

national sovereignty of such countries, which placed their political interests in line with the rest of the colonial world.

Lenin and Roy both participated in the Second Congress's Commission on the National and Colonial Questions. During the proceedings, they presented their respective theses, which had already been unanimously approved by the Commission prior to the Second Congress. According to Lenin, the three basic ideas of the theses he and Roy presented were (1) that the imperialism had now divided the entire world such that 70% of the global population consisted of oppressed peoples living in countries that were "in a state of direct colonial dependence or are semi-colonies"; (2) that the world political struggle as a whole was determined by a small number of Western imperialist powers against Soviet Russia and its allies; and (3) that the Comintern could no longer speak of the bourgeois-democratic movement but should rather speak of national-revolutionary movements (quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 212). The final point was most significant. Through their debates, Lenin and Roy concluded that there were two movements for national independence in colonial and semi-colonial counties. The first was a bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement "with a program of political independence under the bourgeois order," and the second was a potentially revolutionary movement formed by the "mass action of the ignorant and poor peasants and workers for their liberation from all sorts of exploitation" (Roy, quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 220). Working with bourgeois-nationalist elements could serve among the means of overthrowing imperialism, but the ends for colonial and semi-colonial places had dramatically changed.

In its investigations, the Commission posed itself a question not unlike what Zasulich had asked of Marx 40 years prior: Was it the case that "the capitalist stage of economic development is inevitable for backward nations now on the road to emancipation and among whom a certain advance toward progress is to be seen since the war?" (Lenin, quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 215). The answer, they decided, was "no." If the nationalist revolution were guided by a Communist

Party of the Proletariat, it would be able to initiate a system of soviets and move toward communism "without having to pass through the capitalist stage" (Lenin, quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 215). Roy confirmed this as well, noting while the revolution in the colonies (and semi-colonies) would not be communist in its initial stages, a Communist vanguard could keep the masses from being "led astray" and help them move "forward through the successive periods of development" (quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 221). Lenin and Roy's assessment differed slightly from Marx's thinking presented above. It retained a teleological notion of history moving through stages of development, but it allowed that the proper historical development of colonial and semi-colonial societies could be "hindered" by imperialism. According to Roy, India and China had not developed thriving national capitalism because the forces of imperialism "prevented them from developing socially and economically side by side with their fellows in Europe and America" (quoted in Riddell 1991, p. 220). The development of the forces of production that *should have* occurred under the capitalist stage had been foreclosed by imperialism, but it could be guided by the Party.

This concept of derailed historical development continued within the Comintern throughout the 1920s. In 1928, 7 years after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the Sixth Congress reaffirmed the validity of the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions adopted by the Second Congress and noted that the significance of the colonies and semi-colonies to global capitalism had only increased (Communist International Congress 1929). Along with other colonial and semi-colonial places, China's alliance with the Soviet Union provided the possibility of sovereign economic and cultural development "avoiding the stage of the domination of the capitalist system or even the development of capitalist relations in general" (Communist International Congress 1929, p. 8). Here, however, this was possible because the stagist understanding of history had switched from a national to a global scale, claiming that capitalism had "already fulfilled its progressive historical role" (1929, p. 8). "In the final analysis," the Congress

concluded colonial forms of capitalist exploitation "hinder the development of the productive forces of the colonies concerned" (1929, p. 31). Regarding the struggle in China, the Sixth Congress declared that the immediate tasks for the Party were the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution through armed insurrection and the simultaneous overthrow of three forces: the imperialists, the landlords, and the national bourgeoisie in the form of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party). This would bring about a revolution against China's status as a semi-colony, its semi-feudal relations of production in the countryside, and its domestic capitalist classes, respectively.

Semi-colonialism in China

Semi-colonialism was a hotly debated concept in China in the 1930s. It was part of larger debates around how to define China's social formation (mode of production in the epochal sense) and was closely connected to simultaneous debates about the periodization of China's feudal stage and the problem of feudal remnants. The first major attempt to periodize all of Chinese history according to a Marxist schema was Guo Moruo's *Research on Ancient Chinese Society* (*Zhongguo gudai shehui yanjiu*). Relying heavily on works by Friedrich Engels and Lewis Morgan on primitive societies, Guo combined their technology-based ideas of progress with Marx's periodization of social formations in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Dirlik 1978, p. 141). There, Marx wrote, "A social formation never comes to an end before all the forces of production which it can accommodate are developed, and new, higher relations of production never come into place before the material conditions of their existence have gestated in the womb of the old society" ([1859] 1996b, p. 160). The social formations Marx identified as "progressive epochs in the economic development of society" were Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern ([1859] 1996b, p. 160). From these works, Guo surmised a theory of historical change similar to that proposed by Stalin above: "The entire structure of society is

built on its economic foundations. As the mode of production (*shengchan de fangshi*) changes, the foundation of the economy develops to a new stage. As the economic foundation develops to a new stage, the entire society must necessarily form new relations, new organizations" (Guo [1930] 1982, p. 153). Guo believed that the Western Zhou dynasty (1046–771 BCE) constituted Chinese society's slave stage. The transition to feudalism began during the middle part of the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 BCE) and was completed by the emergence of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), and Chinese society remained feudal until roughly the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Qing dynasty and the British Empire ([1930] 1982, p. 154). Arif Dirlik (1978, pp. 187–190) has demonstrated that this periodization was mostly shared by other Chinese scholars of the 1930s with heated debates emerging around what amounted to minor differences. How one understood the period after the Opium War, however, differed based on political affiliation and had immediate consequences for the organization of Chinese society. Guomindang scholars like Tao Xisheng spoke of China's "feudal remnants" to address a perceived agrarian backwardness of the central state which conflicted with the advanced political economy of urban areas like Shanghai. Communist scholars used terms like semi-feudalism to describe the dual appropriation of surplus value by landlords and Western and Japanese imperialists (Karl 2017a, p. 116).

The century between the war and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was one of the intense social upheavals. The Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the war, was signed on August 29, 1842 and granted the British Empire five treaty ports – Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Canton. By signing the treaty, the Qing government agreed to allow British subjects to live in these cities "for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint," and these cities, especially Shanghai, became the main centers for all industrial, commercial, and banking enterprises in China (quoted in Spence 1990, p. 159). According to Kathy Le Mons Walker, by 1920, the

imperialist powers "controlled 99 percent of China's iron ore and pig iron, 93 percent of the railways, 76 percent of the coal, 83 percent of the steam tonnage cleared through maritime customs, and 73 percent of the steam tonnage on the Yangzi [River]" (1999, p. 14). Peasants working in the hinterlands of these cities were incorporated into global capitalist production by the comprador bourgeoisie, a class category that, as Karl (2017b) notes, is conventionally seen as a non-revolutionary group representing the interests of foreign capital in the local society while also creating linkages of consumption and exchange between urban and rural areas. Through their access to global capital and local bureaucratic privileges, compradors maintained the older forms of exploitation upon which imperialist accumulation of value depended. They may, therefore, be understood as a form of exploitation not dissimilar from Marx's assessment of usury. Compradors profited from the immiseration of peasants in traditional labor processes and were a largely conservative force.

In a 1933 article in the journal *Chinese Economy* (*Zhongguo Jingji*), Su Hua identified two broad schools of thought on China's social formation. The first, which included Guo Moruo, claimed that China was already becoming capitalist and went as far as to say that China's feudal economy was a "remnant of a remnant" (*canyu de canyu*) (1933, p. 1). The second claimed that China was still stuck in the feudal stage. The capitalist economy was in its infancy, and the feudal economy still occupied the dominant position in society. In Su's view, whether China was capitalist or feudalist was the wrong question. The key to understanding China's social formation was to understand the mutual relationship between imperialist capital and Chinese national capital. "From the standpoint of the destruction of China's older relations of production," Su wrote, "the development of China's capitalist economy and the development of the imperialist economy in China are producing the same effects" (1933, p. 3). That is, both were eroding the political and economic structures of China's feudal stage. However, these two forms of capital were not equal. Imperialist capital placed Chinese national

capital in a position of dependency. Su's summary of this contradiction is worth quoting at length:

> The imperialist economy and the national economy have...formed an organic relationship, but it is a relationship between the dominator and the dominated – between a sovereign nation and a vassal. This is not only a formal difference but an essential one. The development of communication facilities, the digging of mines, etc. unconsciously created the objective conditions for development of the Chinese national capitalist economy. Therefore, the national capitalist economy develops evermore abnormally. But, on the other hand, in order to turn China into a full colony, and keep its economy from developing to the point of clashes with sovereign interests [of the imperial powers], imperialism consciously makes use of the remnants of feudal power (chiefly the warlord system!) to destroy and obstruct national capitalist development. That is, the development of the imperialist economy in China has also become a burden on the development of the national capitalism. (1933, p. 17)

Su argued that the results of this underdevelopment of the Chinese national capitalist economy created a "transitional period" of semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism (1933, p. 18). His concluding remarks echo Lenin's original assessment of semi-colonies: "Chinese social and economic development has been subjected to the oppression of international imperialism, and the fetters of feudal relations of production...*almost to the point that it is impossible for it to complete the transition from the precapitalist to the capitalist stage*; what we are faced with is this: a completely colonial, non-capitalist future!" (1933, pp. 18–19, emphasis in original). The Japanese-occupied areas of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia had already entered a stage of complete colonization and offered a vision of the future for the rest of China if the revolutionary movement was not successful.

Writing in 1937, Chen Hongjin characterized semi-colonial countries as places where the social formation was dominated by precapitalist relations and imperialist forces took a controlling position in national politics and economics. Beyond this, the particularities of semi-colonial countries included formal political sovereignty, capital export via imperialism, demands for national unification and state capitalism, politics that wavered between democratic and dictatorial,

and the important role they play in the global revolution against capitalism (Karl 2017a, p. 117). Both Chen and Su were clear that semi-colonialism was impermanent. All semi-colonies are characterized in some way by the struggle for national sovereignty against imperialism, leaving full colonization as the only other option. While the former would allow a revolutionary party to guide society through successive economic stages, the latter would doom the new colony to backwardness.

Recent studies of the work of Marxist economist Wang Yanan have uncovered a more nuanced approach to China's social formation during this period. In some respects, Wang's view of the situation confronting China was similar to his contemporaries. Wang noted the destruction of the natural economy in agriculture (production for direct consumption) in favor of the production of cash crops, commenting that, along with cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, and hemp, even grain had been drawn into production for the market through urban population growth and commercial usury. Household and handicraft production that had formally been inseparable from agricultural production had left rural areas and become a "component part of modern industrial capitalism outside the factory" ([1946] 2007, p. 852). Such changes indicated the complete breakdown of feudal relations of production. However, the great imperialist powers had no intention of allowing China to become a fully capitalist country. Although the new means of transportation, new financial structures, and new capitalist enterprises brought to China via imperialism had stimulated the birth and advancement of Chinese national capitalism, past a certain point, "the development of Chinese national capitalism signifies the loss of a market for manufactured goods and the loss of the imperialists' special rights to Chinese cheap labor and natural resources" ([1946] 2007, p. 852).

Wang differed from theorists like Su in one important respect. Semi-colonialism pointed to capital's inability to fully subsume older social formations, not a transitional period along the road to nation-state or colony. As Karl writes, Wang argued that "the particular historical

formation of capitalism in its sem-icolonial form had demanded structural revisions *in capitalism itself* at the same time as it forced structural revisions in China's relations of production/social formation" (2017a, p. 120 emphasis in original). Wang's work anticipated contemporary theorization of imperialism by Marxists like David Harvey (2003) and Ellen Meiksins Wood (2003) by highlighting how the Chinese experience demonstrated that the extra-economic exploitation of primitive accumulation was not a preparatory process prior to and distinguishable from the standard operating practices of capitalism. Instead, capitalism in its imperialist form was adapting to the forms of exploitation it found already in place. The comprador bourgeoisie that many Chinese Marxists identified as remnants of feudal relations of production were, in fact, and to use Marx's language, a product of the formal subsumption of labor by capital. "Imperialist capital/economy in China" (*diguozhuyi zai hua de jingji*) and the "Chinese national capitalist economy" (*Zhongguo minzu zibenzhuyi jingji*) were not two contending chronologies, one advanced and one behind. They were mutually constitutive. For semi-colonial places like China, the awaited transition to capitalist production in the "classical" sense was not coming. This was not because China's development had been hindered but because global capitalism itself had transformed to create a potentially permanent state of primitive capital accumulation in colonial and semi-colonial places. The uneven development created through the relationship between imperialist capital operating in treaty ports like Shanghai and the comprador bourgeoisie and landlords directly guiding production of raw materials in the countryside had become a core feature of capitalism, not an aberration.

Semi-colonialism and the Chinese Revolution

Of course, no discussion of Marxism in China is complete without addressing how the given topics factored in the writings of Mao Zedong. His writing on semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism

cemented their usage by members of the CCP and guaranteed their direct political significance for the course of the revolution. In keeping with the statements published after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Mao used a comparatively simpler concept of China's social formation to determine the enemies of the revolution and possible class alliances on the road to national liberation. The first use of the term semi-colonialism in *Selected Works* appears in *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society* ([1926] 1965a). There, Mao explains the impossibility of the alliances with the landlord and comprador classes who "represent the most backward and most reactionary relations of production in China and hinder the development of her productive forces" ([1926] 1965a, p. 13). These classes, Mao predicted, would invariably side with the imperialists from whom they drew power and, therefore, constituted an extreme counter-revolutionary class. In line with the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions written by Lenin and Roy, however, Mao saw within China's semi-colonial condition the possibility for other alliances not strictly born of a proletarian revolution against capitalism.

While at the CCP base at Yanan in the late 1930s, Mao studied a series of recently translated Soviet works on dialectical materialism and composed two of his most famous philosophical essays: *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*. In the latter, Mao applied the cosmological view of the dialectic to the struggles faced by the CCP in the revolution. All things, including society, are in the process of motion and development fueled by an unending series of internal contradictions. However, not all contradictions carry equal weight. Mao wrote that in capitalist society, the principal contradiction was between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This contradiction "determined or influenced" all other contradictions in capitalist society, "such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie...between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies" ([1937] 1965b, p. 331). China's semi-colonial status complicated the relationship between principal and

non-principal contradictions. After imperialists launch a war of aggression, all but the most traitorous classes can come together in a war for national liberation. The principal contradiction becomes that between the imperialists and the country under attack, and the former principal contradiction, that between "the feudal system and the great masses of the people," takes a secondary position ([1937] 1965b, p. 331). Such a scenario theoretically justified alliances like the second United Front between the CCP and the Guomindang (1936–1945) to fight back against Japanese invasion despite Guomindang attempts to eradicate the CCP beginning in April 1927. However, if imperialism operated through different means (e.g., those explored by theorists of semi-colonialism), then the primary contradiction may take the form of a civil war between, on the one hand, the imperialists and their allies among the feudal classes and, on the other hand, the masses – proletarian and peasant alike. This second scenario provided theoretical justification for the Agrarian Revolutionary War between the Guomindang and the CCP in the decade between the first and second United Fronts.

Mao's understanding of China's history and current social formation can be found in *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, the first chapter of which was written by other party members but edited and revised by Mao himself. This work confirms the periodization of China's feudal stage proposed by Guo Moruo and lists its four primary features: (1) the predominance of a natural economy of peasants producing for their own consumption; (2) a feudal ruling class "composed of landlords, the nobility and the emperor" who "owned most of the land, while the peasants had very little or none at all"; (3) the landlords and other nobility lived off surpluses extorted from peasants in the form of rent and other services which were used to support the state and military; and (4) a centralized feudal state that protected this system of exploitation ([1939] 1965c, p. 307). Post-Opium War China "gradually changed into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society," and, after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, "China changed

further into a colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society" ([1939] 1965c, p. 309). Mao repeated this idea the following year in his essay *On New Democracy*, describing China as "colonial in the Japanese-occupied areas and basically semi-colonial in the [Guomindang] areas, and it is predominantly feudal or semi-feudal in both" ([1940] 1965d, p. 341). The latter work marks one of Mao's clearest arguments for why China need not pass through a capitalist stage so long as the development of the forces of production is properly guided by the CCP. Citing the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Mao wrote that the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and the establishment of socialism demonstrated that the phase of bourgeois-democratic revolutions has already passed on a global scale. China and the Soviet Union were involved in a new type of world revolution that "has the proletariat of the capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies as its allies" ([1940] 1965d, p. 346). This revolution would use the technological forces of production developed under capitalism to rebalance the uneven temporalities of the world, the difference between advanced and backward countries, under socialism.

Conclusion

In the *Grundrisse*, Marx writes, "The positing of the individual as a *worker*, in this nakedness, is itself a product of *history*" (1993, p. 472, emphasis in original). That is, the separation of small producers, who had previously labored largely for their own consumption, from the land and other means of production is not a natural condition of the individual, as bourgeois economics teaches. Rather, it was the result of long, bloody struggles waged by the capitalist classes against both the old political order and peasant populations. As capitalism spread from Europe to Asia, Africa, and Latin America via imperialism, the ways in which this separation took place followed a set of *tendential* laws of accumulation that found ways to accommodate older production processes and

repurpose traditional political structures. In this sense, semi-colonialism in China, despite the particularities of historical events like the Opium Wars or Japanese invasions, shared much with the experiences of colonies and semi-colonies the world over. All were subject to a process of perpetual primitive accumulation and the emergence of structures of global capitalism that depended upon and continuously recreated conditions of uneven development between the (semi-) colonies and the metropole.

Recent interest in the writing of Chinese Marxists on the subject has sparked debates within Asian History about the ability of capitalism to ever fully subsume a society and bring it into alignment with what is taken to be the archetype of industrialization and liberal democracy provided by Europe and America. On this view, the "transition" to capitalism is never complete because the structures of capital depend upon older forms of exploitation for the accumulation of value. Among these scholars, whether to use semi-colonialism as an analytic category or take its emergence as a symptomatic event in the history of capitalist imperialism has yet to be decided, and valuable work for understanding imperialism is being produced on both sides (for the former, see Walker (1999); for the latter, see Karl (2017a, b) and Harootunian (2015)). In either case, the persistent use of the term by Marxists of the early twentieth century speaks to the impossibility of the mechanistic, stagist view of history produced by dialectical materialism as much as it does to the malleability of the structures of capital.

Cross-References

▶ China: Anti-imperialism from the Manchu Empire to the People's Republic
▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism
▶ Mao Zedong (Mao Tse–tung) (1893–1976)
▶ Maoism, Nationalism, and Anti-colonialism
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
▶ Marxism and Imperialism
▶ Stalin, Joseph (1878–1953)

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Sendero Luminoso

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Synonyms

Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path; Imperialism; Maoism; Peru

Definition

Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, emerged in 1980 as a guerrilla organisation in the south-

central highland department of Ayacucho, Peru. Espousing a radical Maoist ideological line of people's war from a part of the country that was both quite isolated and largely rural and indigenous seemed at the time to be quixotic in the extreme, given the larger national context at that very moment of an unprecedented democratic transition. Yet over the course of the next decade or so, political violence in Peru delivered death and destruction to large swathes of the country and brought central government virtually to its knees. Just when it appeared that Sendero was poised for victory, however, the tables abruptly turned with the September 1992 capture of the group's founder and "maximum leader" Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. Within months, government forces had regained the advantage, and, by the mid-1990s the guerrillas were a spent force. Although no longer a threat to the state, scattered armed cadre remnants remained which, beginning in 2006, gradually regenerated a modest operational capacity in coca growing and cocaine-producing enclaves of the Upper Huallaga and Apurímac river valleys. Some Sendero sympathisers also retained influence within the national teachers union, while others established a popular-front-type political wing based in Lima in an effort to influence national politics. While it is unlikely that what remains of Shining Path in its most recent manifestations will become a significant guerrilla or political force in the future, its violent past continues to affect Peru in multiple ways.

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Explaining the Origins and Rise of Sendero Luminoso

Guerrilla movements usually emerge in response to some combination of repressive dictatorship, systematic exploitation, and sustained economic crisis. The case of Peru and Shining Path, however, was in a number of ways the product of a somewhat different and more complex set of forces. The military regime in power there between 1968 and 1980 was authoritarian, to be sure, but at the same time was arguably, also, the most reformist government in Peru's post-independence history. This self-titled "Revolutionary Military Government" carried out a major agrarian reform, nationalised the country's most important mining companies, began the reorganisation of private industry into worker-managed enterprises, and became a leader in the international non-aligned movement. The stated goal of the military leaders was, at root, focused on national security. They wanted to reduce or even eliminate the possibility of a guerrilla insurgency by overcoming extreme poverty and exploitation through a "revolution from above" under their direction for the benefit of peasants and workers.

However, for a variety of reasons, the military in power gradually lost its reformist momentum. First, it was unable to generate from the domestic economy the large quantity of new resources needed to finance its ambitious initiatives, so it turned to shortterm foreign loans. Second, the expected revenues from exports of significant oil deposits discovered in 1972 were delayed for several critical years by problems in developing the infrastructure which would bring them to market. Third, the regime lost its most ardent reformer with the illness, replacement, and death of head of state (1968–1975) General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Fourth, an economic crisis which included stagnation in economic growth, rising inflation, and significant arrears in repayment of the ballooning foreign debt gripped Peru in 1977 and 1978.

In addition, the implementation of the agrarian reform in the highlands, or sierra, turned out to be ill suited to the dominant pattern there of large numbers of indigenous communities and few prosperous private estates subject to expropriation. As a result, the heightened expectations generated by the official rhetoric of "land to the tiller" were dashed with the implementation of the agrarian reform, as the already modest pre-reform livelihoods of most highland peasants deteriorated even further.

In combination, then, a significant, unintended, and totally counter-productive consequence of the military's multiple initiatives to change the structure of economic, social, and political power in Peru was the gradual fostering of a reality that was more rather than less favourable for guerrilla activity, particularly in parts of the Peruvian sierra.

Other factors, both historical and contemporary, also help to explain the emergence of Sendero Luminoso as a guerrilla force in the sierra more generally and in Ayacucho in particular. One relates to the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, centred in the Andean highlands, and almost 300 years of Spanish administrative control of the region under a viceroyalty from its capital, Lima, on the coast. This introduced a centuries-long period of coastal domination of the largely indigenous sierra, a pattern of

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centralised control which continued for almost 200 more years, from independence in the 1820s all the way through the twentieth century. As a result, government resources as well as economic activity were concentrated in Lima and the coast, leaving most of the sierra population poor and marginalised, and progressively reinforcing over time an ethnic cleavage as well as the profound natural geographic cleavage between the two regions.

A more contemporary factor specific to Ayacucho was the refounding of the colonial university there in 1959, some 80 years after its closure due to Peru's economic collapse with its loss to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–83). The National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH) was reopened with the lofty goal, unique at the time, of serving as an incubator and promoter of local development and of providing an opportunity for first-generation Spanish speakers from the indigenous communities predominating in the region to receive a university education. During its first few years, with an ample budget and a unique vision among Peruvian universities of the day, it attracted some of the country's leading scholars with a diversity of ideological perspectives, along with a few recent graduates of other institutions, including, in mid-1962, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso.

Although no-one could have predicted it at the time, Guzmán turned out to be another critical factor in laying a foundation for the armed struggle in Peru; the key figure any potential revolutionary movement must have to organise, inspire, and lead a guerrilla campaign against established authority. Originally appointed as a professor of philosophy in the Education Programme, he had soon revitalised the Communist Party of Ayacucho and established himself as a leading Marxist at UNSCH as well. A charismatic teacher, strategist, and organiser, he attracted many students and a number of fellow professors as well with his Marxist-Leninist and then Maoist rhetoric after the 1962–1963 Sino-Soviet split. He became the head of the teacher-training school, where he helped to prepare a generation of elementary school teachers, many of whom returned to the primary schools in their home indigenous communities of rural Ayacucho. After his supporters won university-wide elections in 1968, he was named UNSCH secretary-general, with control over most appointments. Over time, he became a dominant figure in the Maoist movement and then its undisputed leader by the early 1970s. In the name of ideological purity, he gradually undermined the early academic diversity of the university and turned its original regional development role into a vehicle for expanding a Maoist world view throughout the Ayacucho hinterlands.

With the financial support of the Beijing government, Guzmán made at least three extended trips to China for training between 1965 and 1976, along with most of the other members of his party's central committee, which was drawn largely from former UNSCH students and faculty. Their trips coincided with the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Over time, the Peruvian contingent progressively identified with the Cultural Revolution's most radical faction, led by Madame Mao as the head of the so-called Gang of Four, which advocated permanent revolution in the name of ideological purity. When this faction eventually lost out within China to the more moderate elements led by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese support for Guzmán and Peru's Maoists ended and they were left to fend for themselves.

This unanticipated event marked a historical turning point in the development of Sendero Luminoso over the next four years. Guzmán's analysis of successful Communist revolutions, including those in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, concluded that all had betrayed the Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideological principles upon which they had been founded. As a result, he believed, the only way to sweep away the forces of capitalism as well as the now corrupted socialist states was through a new world Communist revolution which would lead in time to the establishment of more pure "New Democracies." Given such a betrayal, it would be necessary, Guzmán believed, to begin anew with a true revolution that would start in Peru under his leadership.

Having been cast aside by China, his erstwhile outside mentor and supporter, Guzmán was

determined to build a revolutionary force with resources drawn totally from within the country. He would lead the guerrilla struggle with the group that he had been slowly building for more than a decade. He considered it to be the only truly revolutionary communist party, which he insisted in calling the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) even though those outside the movement continued to label it Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. With the foundations of local organisation and support already well established under his guidance in Ayacucho, Guzmán concluded that the Maoist people's war would begin there. Since this region remained quite isolated from the rest of the country both geographically and administratively, the preparation of armed cadres and organisational capacity took place over time mostly unperceived by central government. As the military regime lost momentum and legitimacy in the late 1970s and began the transition to national elections and civilian government, Guzmán decided that this was the right moment to launch the people's war, a decision ratified in an April 1980 PCP assembly.

The initial action took place on 17 May 1980 in Chuschi, a small district capital in Ayacucho, with the burning of ballot boxes which had been readied for the next day's national elections, Peru's first since 1963. There was no way of knowing at the time that this act would presage years of guerrilla war and military response and produce close to 70,000 deaths and the destruction of over $20 billion in property and infrastructure, along with some 650,000 internal refugees and more than 1 million emigrants. Although the department of Ayacucho bore the brunt of the violence, over the course of the next dozen years political violence and physical destruction spread to almost every part of the country, and for a time threatened the very foundations of the Peruvian state.

Explaining Sendero Luminoso guerrilla Advances

Several factors help to explain why Sendero Luminoso's people's war advanced as far as it did. They include both the nature of the Peruvian state's response and the way the Shining Path pursued the armed struggle. As far as the role of the state was concerned, an important consideration was the initial reluctance of the newly elected civilian government to take the group seriously and to respond when it was still a small, weak, and localised guerrilla force. Ayacucho was remote and far removed from the capital in Lima, and the early actions of Sendero were seen as nothing more than those of local cattle rustlers and their ilk. In addition, newly elected president Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963–1968 and 1980–1985) had been removed from office by a military coup during his first term. As a result, he was very sensitive to any initiative he might take at the outset of his second term, which would expand the role of the armed forces and quite possibly put his presidency at risk once again.

President Belaúnde delayed issuing a presidential order to commit the military to engage Sendero in Ayacucho and the surrounding area until December 1982, more than a year-and-a-half after the first guerrilla actions. As a result, the insurgents had time to grow and to establish a presence in much of rural Ayacucho as well as in the neighbouring sierra departments of Huancavelica and Apurímac. They attacked the small police stations scattered throughout the provincial capitals, seizing the weapons and ammunition stored there and forcing the virtually complete withdrawal of their personnel to the department capital. With the countryside then bereft of government presence, Sendero cadres and sympathisers were able to gain control of scores of indigenous communities in the region. The one action Belaúnde *did* take, in 1981, was a disaster. He ordered a specialised contingent of police, called Sinchi, to Ayacucho, but when their actions included pillage, rape, and drunken brawls, he was forced to remove them in disgrace.

Under the Peruvian Constitution of 1979, provinces under significant natural or manmade threat could be declared Emergency Zones, which included suspension of constitutional guarantees and the supplanting of civilian authority with military control. President Belaúnde finally invoked this provision in seven provinces of Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica at the end of 1982.

Over the course of the following decade as political violence spread, about one-third of Peru's 185 provinces, containing over half the national population, became subject to military authority.

Unfortunately, throughout the 1980s, central government's response to the expanding threat of Shining Path was almost exclusively military in nature, and as such, it actually made the situation worse by often indiscriminate killings and repression of local populations, more often than not indigenous ones. The first two years of major military operations to deal with the guerrillas, 1983 and 1984, were also among those marked by the highest numbers of civilian casualties (well over 4,000 each year) during the entire conflict. There was a lack of awareness or understanding of sierra mores and customs, made even worse by central military authority's unwillingness to send troops from the area to their regions of origin. Such levels of violence against citizens by forces ostensibly sent to protect them from Sendero wound up pushing many into the arms of the very group the state was trying to eliminate.

By the end of the decade, Shining Path was in effective control of large areas of rural Ayacucho, where its operatives had established between 700 and 800 "generated organisations" at the community level. There was an approximate total of 1,100 such building blocks sierra-wide in what was to become the group's "New Democracy." With a central committee headed by Guzmán and six regional committees under his guidance but with operational autonomy, guerrilla violence spread throughout most of the sierra. Annihilation squads targeted local figures for elimination, focusing primarily on elected officials and judges, which dissuaded many others from running for office. In the 1988 local elections, hundreds of districts lacked candidates and turnout was dramatically reduced. At about the same time, Guzmán, believing the moment had arrived to "encircle the cities," began a campaign to cut off Lima's access to food, water, and electricity from the sierra and to take the guerrilla war to the capital. With access to new sources of revenue after 1987 in the coca-producing Upper Huallaga Valley in the north central highland

department of San Martín (from "taxes" levied on the cocaine paste carried by planes flying out of the valley to Colombia), Shining Path was becoming an even more formidable adversary. By the end of a decade of "people's war," Sendero was estimated to have between 7,000 and 10,000 armed cadres operating in all but one of Peru's 24 departments, and between 200,000 and 300,000 supporters and sympathisers nationwide.

At the same time, the so-called "heterodox" economic policies pursued by the elected government of Alan García Pérez (1985–1990) were producing rapidly increasing inflation and negative growth which generated a significant erosion of central government capacity and popular support. With hyperinflation gripping Peru and Lima facing greater and greater shortages provoked by a combination of foreign debt default and Sendero's urban campaign, hundreds of thousands of Peruvians fled the country. As the 1990 national elections approached, Peru's situation appeared to be increasingly dire. Given the successive failures of two successive traditional parties to govern effectively in office (Belaúnde's Acción Popular, AP; and García's Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA), it is not surprising that an increasingly desperate electorate turned to an outsider with no prior political experience or the backing of an organised political party, Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000).

In the short run, the situation worsened. Inflation peaked in 1990 at 7,650%, an economic shock programme created even greater hardships among an already beleaguered population, and government institutions verged on collapse. Guzmán declared the guerrilla war at a stage of "strategic equilibrium" in its battle against government forces and began to predict victory in the very near future. President Fujimori appeared to play into Sendero hands in April 1992 when he suspended congress, the judiciary, and constitutional guarantees in an *autogolpe* or self-coup that ended democratic process. In the months that followed, Guzmán and his Central Committee drew up plans for a "final offensive" scheduled to begin in October and culminate with a guerrilla triumph in December, the month of Mao's birthday.

Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Failure

Yet just when Sendero appeared to be on the verge of a stunning triumph, Guzmán and several key subordinates were captured, along with the guerrilla organisation's master files, blows from which it never recovered. The explanation for such a dramatic and apparently sudden turnaround relates to a number of factors involving both government and the guerrillas.

Beginning in 1989, the armed forces, belatedly recognising the failure of their long-standing approach to fighting Sendero which focused almost exclusively on military actions, conducted a comprehensive review that produced a new counter-insurgency doctrine. Core tactics now began to emphasise civic action, human rights training, the use of military personnel from the localities of operations, and, for the first time, the training and equipping of community civil defence groups (*rondas campesinas*) as the first line of defence against guerrilla attacks. At about the same time, the Interior Ministry, responsible for the national police, established a small autonomous unit with the task of locating and tracking Sendero leadership. Both of these significant initiatives, begun near the end of the García Administration, were continued and reinforced by President Fujimori.

In 1991 and 1992, the Fujimori Government also established several micro-development organisations explicitly designed to provide small-scale assistance to the poorest districts in Peru, almost all of which were rural and were affected by political violence. Communities chose the projects, which included potable water, electrification, roads, schools, irrigation, soil conservation, and reforestation. They provided the labour and the oversight, while the organisations, each comprising no more than 300 well-qualified professionals with substantial regional autonomy, gave materials and technical assistance. Between 1992 and 1998, these small micro-development programmes, though averaging about $2,000 each, in combination delivered over $1 billion in projects to poor districts and contributed to a reduction in extreme poverty of more than 50 per cent.

A more controversial initiative, but one born of necessity, was the establishment of "faceless" judges to protect officials from threats and assassination while they oversaw trials of captured guerrillas. Since between 1988 and 1992 Shining Path cadres had killed over 100 judges and had threatened hundreds of others, this appeared at the time to be the only way to protect judicial-system personnel while fostering greater efficiency and effectiveness. Though later declared void by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), thereby requiring new trials in the early 2000s, the unorthodox judicial procedures helped to re-establish a semblance of the rule of law and governmental capacity in the eyes of the Peruvian public.

Another measure, instituted after the capture and trial of Guzmán and the rounding-up of hundreds of upper and middle-level guerrillas, was a government-decreed repentance law. It was designed to encourage Shining Path members and sympathisers to turn themselves in with whatever weapons and information they possessed, in exchange for government-sponsored rehabilitation, job training, and a stipend, followed by their return to their home communities. During the two years the law was in effect, over 5,000 availed themselves of this opportunity, effectively draining Sendero of much of its remaining support.

While this array of government initiatives, however belated, contributed in various ways to help overcome the very real threat that Shining Path posed to the continued existence of the state, other factors relating to the guerrilla organisation itself also played a significant role in its demise.

One of the most important was the remarkably hydrocephalic structure of Sendero. Abimael Guzmán Reynoso was not only the founder, but also the key interpreter of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology as well as the organiser and strategist. From his earliest years at the University of Huamanga in the 1960s through the 12 years of "people's war," Guzmán embraced a cult of personality towards himself far beyond that of any previous successful revolutionary leaders elsewhere during the course of their guerrilla struggles. Given his overwhelmingly dominant role, then, his capture effectively cut off the head of

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the movement, left no legitimate successor, and dealt a devastating psychological blow from which Sendero never recovered. "The capture of the century," as Peruvian media called it, was the definitive turning point in the guerrilla war; besides vindicating official counter-insurgency strategy, it also gave government the public support it so desperately needed at that critical juncture in its struggle to survive.

Another key factor was Guzmán's obsession with ideological purity in his quest for a true revolution that would not fall into revisionism once successful, as he believed had occurred in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, among others. His writings are replete with laboured analyses of the ideology of leading Marxists in his search for ideological correctness. Such an obsession led him to totally misinterpret the actual reality of Peru as he prepared for and then led his guerrilla war – the military's reforms, however incomplete, had ended any vestiges of feudalism and landlord domination in the countryside, while hundreds of centuries-old indigenous communities retained their presence throughout the sierra. Peru in the 1980s bore little resemblance to China of the 1930s in spite of Guzmán's insistence that they were at similar stages of pre-capitalist and capitalist development.

He also failed to follow Mao's dictum that the rural-based guerrilla movement must be like "fish in the water" during the struggle and respond to peasant priorities to gain their support. Instead, he insisted on ending ubiquitous indigenous markets because they were capitalist manifestations and also imposed a new structure of ideologically correct "generated organisms" in communities where indigenous structures of *ayllu* and *varyoc* had prevailed for centuries. As a result of the local resistance created by such initiatives in areas under Sendero influence, guerrilla cadres resorted to increasingly repressive measures to retain control. When the government finally changed its counter-insurgency approach, beginning in 1989–1990, local populations increased their efforts to take on Shining Path forces with community-based rondas, and progressively abandoned guerrilla control as government presence increased across the sierra.

Another significant factor in Sendero's demise was Guzmán's decision to apply Maoist tactics of "surrounding the cities from the countryside," specifically Lima, beginning in 1988. This campaign experienced initial successes by cutting off two of the three major electrical transmission lines from the sierra into Lima, as well as sabotaging the most important aqueduct, the railway line, and the one paved highway from the highlands to the capital. In addition, the urban campaign included targeted assassinations of some key popular neighbourhood leaders, along with regular bombings of banks, commercial establishments, and even apartment buildings in middle-class neighbourhoods. As the guerrilla campaign began to seriously affect the daily lives of the capital city's eight million people for the first time, the realisation grew that this struggle was not limited to remote areas of the highlands, and public pressure grew for central government to take effective action. Such pressure contributed to the major review of official approaches to the insurgency in 1989 and 1990 and to the significant adjustments that occurred as a result. These played major roles in defeating Shining Path in the early 1990s.

In addition to provoking the large urban population, the decision to take the guerrilla war to Lima as a prelude to the "final offensive" had the unintended consequence of giving Peru's intelligence services an advantage they had not had in the sierra. They were much more familiar with the urban setting and had a much stronger presence in the capital. As a result, government intelligence operatives were better equipped to track down guerrillas there, and had a number of successes even before locating and capturing Sendero's supreme leader in the Lima suburb of Surco in September 1992. This operation was a model of urban counterinsurgency, which included several weeks of placing police intelligence personnel in key locations around Guzmán's "safe" house and disguising them as neighbours, vendors, and rubbish collectors. When one of the guerrilla leader's subordinates went out to buy wine and cigarettes at the corner store, they followed her back into the house and, without firing a shot, captured Guzmán, four other members of the Central Committee, and the master plans for the "final offensive."

Conclusion

Although it took some time for the political violence to subside, the blow to Sendero caused by the dramatic capture of its leader signalled that the government's victory over the guerrillas was all but inevitable. In combination with economic recovery and the restoration of sustained growth without inflation, as well as the re-establishment of democratic procedures under pressure from the Organisation of American States (OAS), Peru gradually regained its equilibrium. Although President Fujimori was removed from office by congress in 2000 for pursuing an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian political agenda, a combination of elected presidents and economic growth since then have gradually helped to consolidate democracy in Peru. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission produced a comprehensive study of the conflict in 2004 which documented abuses by both Shining Path and the military and made recommendations for reparations to the most affected communities and individuals, overwhelmingly concentrated in Ayacucho and surrounding districts. After long delays, remuneration for some 1,500 communities was provided in 2011, and for more than 17,000 individuals by late 2013.

Remnants of Shining Path re-emerged in the Apurímac and Upper Huallaga river valleys after 2006, both financed by coca and cocaine production, but, after some years of official missteps, were significantly weakened by police (2012, Upper Huallaga) and combined military-police (2013, Apurímac) responses and represent no threat to the state. A political group based in Lima, the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Human Rights (MOVADEF) is sympathetic to a variation of Sendero ideology but espouses protest rather than violence and tried unsuccessfully to register as a political party for either the 2011 national or the 2014 local elections. Guzmán remains in jail, serving a life sentence, and now asserts that this is not a moment to pursue revolutionary violence in Peru.

While the effects of the 1980–1992 "people's war" linger, especially in those parts of the sierra which experienced most of the violence, the nation was able to overcome the most serious internal threat ever faced in its history as an independent republic.

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▶ FARC in Colombia: Twenty-First-Century US Imperialism and Class Warfare
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America
▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism
▶ Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)
▶ Peru, Underdevelopment, and Anti-imperialism

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Senegal

▶ Senghor, Leopold Sédar (1906–2001)

Senghor, Lamine (1889–1927)

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Synonyms

Anti-colonialism; Colonialism; Communism; Lamine Senghor; League against Imperialism; Racial capitalism

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of Senegalese political activist, Sengalese nationalist, and French Communist Party member Lamine Senghor (1889–1927).

In the mid-1920s, Lamine Senghor (1889–1927), a Senegalese veteran of the First World War, was one of the most celebrated figures in the emerging, global, anti-colonial movement. However, he was also a very sick man: during the war, his battalion of *tirailleurs sénégalais* (colonial infantrymen drawn from across French West Africa) had been gassed near Verdun, and Senghor suffered terrible injuries from which he never fully recovered. In the summer of 1927 his health failed rapidly, and the movement he had launched began to crumble. After his premature death that November, aged just 38, his reputation quickly faded, and the inter-war period later came to be seen as a 'failed' one for the anticolonial struggle. However, since the 1990s, there has been renewed interest in his career and the movements he led.

In the autumn of 1924, Senghor joined the Union Intercoloniale (UIC), an organisation created by the French Communist Party (PCF) with the aim of providing a forum in which different colonised groups could join together in opposition to empire (Nguyen Ai Quoc, the future Ho Chi Minh, was one of the most active members of the group in the early 1920s). The UIC was perceived as a threat to colonial interests, for the Communist International (Comintern) of 1920 had adopted a resolutely anti-imperial stance. In practice, this led to little concrete anti-colonial activity but, in 1924, the Comintern called on communists to seek alliances with anticolonial nationalist movements. This united anti-colonial front would only last a few years but it is in this context that we must situate Senghor's activism.

Senghor quickly became a mainstay of UIC activities and a regular contributor to its firebrand newspaper *The Pariah.* In 1924–25, the PCF carried out its most sustained anticolonial campaign when it organised opposition to the war in the Rif Mountains of Morocco. Senghor threw himself into the campaign, speaking at countless rallies, and developing his extraordinary skills as an orator. He adopted the 'official' Comintern line and promoted an alliance between all those engaged in anti-colonial struggle. Whereas Jacques Doriot 'translated' the actions of the Rif rebels into a proto-communism, Senghor regarded the sense of despair and oppression felt by the Islamic world as sufficient motivation for revolt: the Rif war was not the result of a Samuel Huntington-style clash of civilisations but rather the understandable resistance of a colonised people to external domination.

After loyally serving the PCF/UIC throughout the Rif campaign, Senghor gradually came to resent the limited space devoted by the communist movement to black questions in general, as well as

to his own marginalised status in particular. He decided that in order to promote the interests of black people, it was necessary to create independent black organisations, and in March 1926 he launched the Committee for the Defence of the Negro Race (CDRN), a less revolutionary, more reformist-minded group (initially at least). He immediately embarked on a tour of France's port cities in order to try and convince the small, largely working-class, black community to join the CDRN: his skills as a public speaker served him well and by the summer it was estimated by the secret police of the Ministry of the Colonies that he had recruited over 500 members (in a black population numbered at less than 20,000).

The most original aspect of the CDRN was its critical reflection on the language of race and its exploration of the modes of self-definition available to black people. In his article 'The Negroes have Awoken' (published in *The Pariah* in April 1926), Senghor articulates a black identity that is based not on shared racial characteristics but on a shared sense of oppression. To call for 'the awakening of the negro' was immediately to evoke a set of ideas and a vocabulary that had been rendered popular by Marcus Garvey in the early 1920s. In the course of his seemingly inexorable rise as a major leader of black America, Garvey had consistently called for the black world to wake from its long sleep, and his appeals for black people to take pride in themselves had resonated around the world (even though his influence in French contexts has generally been underplayed). The most striking aspect of this influence was the CDRN's use of the term *'nègre'* [negro] as a badge of self-identification, just as Garvey proudly proclaimed himself a 'negro'. In an era when the term '*noir*' [black] was widely gaining prominence as a more dignified replacement for '*nègre*', seen as derogatory and demeaning, Senghor and the CDRN deliberately chose *'nègre'* as the term that encompassed all black people. In CDRN discourse, the *'nègre'* is an individual who has been downtrodden and oppressed through slavery, colonialism, segregation: the terms '*noir*' and '*homme de couleur*' [coloured] are seen merely as escape routes for educated blacks seeking a minor role in a dominant white society. The first step towards liberation is to embrace one's identity as a '*nègre*': for that allows one to perceive the true nature of Western oppression of the black world.

Even as the first issue of *The Voice of the Negroes* proudly and insistently proclaimed the unity of '*les nègres*' (negroes), the CDRN was in fact in the middle of a protracted schism. Much of the rancour centred on Senghor's ongoing clandestine links to the PCF; this would soon lead to the break-up of the organisation, with Senghor and his fellow radicals deserting en masse to create the *League for the Defence of the Negro Race*. In the midst of the CDRN in-fighting, he enjoyed one final moment of glory, when he was invited to speak at the inaugural meeting of the League against Imperialism (LAI) in Brussels in February 1927: the LAI was largely a communist initiative, but in its initial phase it sought to unite all anti-colonial forces. In Brussels, Senghor shared a platform with prominent nationalist leaders from India (Jawaharlal Nehru), Indonesia (Mohammed Hatta), and other parts of the colonised world, and his speech was widely greeted as one of the highlights of the Congress: it was almost immediately translated into English and published in the US. He launched a vehement attack on imperialism as a renewed form of slavery, denounced violence against the colonised, forced labour, as well as the iniquity and double standards of the pensions paid to colonial veterans of the First World War. In the final stages of the Congress, the LAI placed Senghor at the head of the working party asked to draft the 'Resolution on the negro question'. Little more than two years after his first public appearance, he had carved out a position as a radical spokesman not only for black people in France but also internationally.

The final act in Senghor's career was the publication of *La Violation d'un pays* [The rape/violation of a land] in June 1927. This slim volume relates, in polemical fashion, the bloody history of slavery and colonialism. It is a deeply hybrid text that mixes the form of the fable with a highly didactic approach, utilising the political language of revolutionary communism: the text is also accompanied by five simple line drawings that reinforce the political message.

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In many ways, *La Violation d'un pays* might be seen as a founding text in a tradition of hybrid pamphlets-essays that would later become a dominant form for black anti-colonial thought in French (from Aimé Césaire to Frantz Fanon to Achille Mbembe). It concludes with the overthrow of the colonial regime by a world revolution that liberates not only the colonies but also the metropolitan centre from the yoke of capitalist imperialism. This resolution is obviously unrealistic in the context of the 1920s, but it acts, within the context of Senghor's story, as a form of ideological wish fulfilment. For the first time under the French imperial nation state, an author sought to give narrative form to the independence of the colonised world. Within a month of the volume's publication, however, his health faltered, and he passed away just a few months later.

At the heart of Senghor's writings and his activism is an attempt to reconcile the claims of race and class (Was the exploitation of the 'black world' the result of racial or economic exploitation or both?), questions that would be central to the careers of later black writers/militants from Richard Wright to George Padmore to Aimé Césaire. Unlike them, Senghor was not forced to make a choice between pan-Africanism and communism, but he appeared to believe that these ideologies could complement each other in the quest for black liberation. On the evidence of his activism and his writings, Senghor might thus be situated within a lineage of left-leaning pan-Africanists (from his compatriot Ousmane Sembene to C.L.R. James and Frantz Fanon) for whom both pan-Africanism and Marxism remained throughout their lives crucial to constructing a transnational politics as well as transnational forms of identification.

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Senghor, Leopold Sédar (1906–2001)

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Synonyms

Abdou Diouf; Creoleness; Francophonie; May 68; Senegal; World literature

Definition

This article is a biography of Leopold Sedar Senghor who was one of the pioneers of the Negritude movement. His contributions in Senegalese and African politics and culture are put into perspective with postcolonial theories, literary movements such as Creoleness and the current socio-political events in the contemporary world.

Léopold Sédar Senghor was born on 9 October 1906, to a family of wealthy tradesmen, in Joal, Senegal. Like most Senegalese children, his education was a colonial one, overseen by missionary priests. After spending his early years at Father Léon Du Bois's Catholic mission school, which he entered in 1913, and the Fathers of the Holy Spirit school in Ngazobil, he went on to attend the Collège Libermann in Dakar. In 1928, he was to

win a scholarship to the prestigious Lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, after which he continued his studies at the Sorbonne. At Louis-le-Grand, he befriended the future French president Georges Pompidou (1911–74), and, more importantly, the Martiniquan student Aimé Césaire (1913–2008), with whom, together with his Guyanese friend Léon-Gontran Damas (1912–78), he was to found the Négritude movement, influenced by contemporary civil rights movements in the US. The 1931 colonial exhibition in Paris, designed to celebrate France's 'civilising' mission and colonial power, represented an opportunity for the young movement to question this ideology and its explicit erasure of colonised peoples' cultures.

Négritude and Its Critics

In 1932, together with Césaire and Damas, Senghor outlined the concept of Négritude, defining this cultural and political movement as 'the combination of all the cultural values of the black world' (Senghor 1964: 9). According to Césaire, even though the political struggle for black peoples' independence and development was to continue, the cultural battle would be over once Négritude was recognised and valued as equal to French culture, for Négritude was a 'realisation of difference as memory, fidelity and solidarity' (Césaire 2004: 83). With Senghor, Césaire was a member of the editorial board of the short-lived journal *L'Etudiant* noir (1934), dedicated to expounding the movement's theses and violently condemning colonialism.

In 1936, Senghor's interest in the humanist theories of socialism motivated him to join the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO). His commitment to acknowledging the value of African cultures is powerfully expressed in a 1937 lecture on 'The Cultural Problem in French West Africa', which is included in *Liberté I. Négritude et Humanisme* and is summed up by the following:

> Intellectuals have a mission to restore *black values* in all their truth and excellence, to awaken within their people the taste for bread and games of the mind, which makes us *human*. Especially through the arts.

> There is no civilisation without a literature to express and illustrate its values, as a jeweller hones and polishes the jewels for a crown. (Senghor 1964: 19; this and subsequent translations by the author)

Senghor broadened and developed his definition of Négritude in *Liberté V. Le Dialogue des cultures*: 'Négritude was, traditionally, for scholars and ethnologists, what Maurice Delafosse called the "black soul", and Leo Frobenius "African civilisation", or, to borrow from his own vocabulary, "Ethiopian civilisation"' (Senghor 1993: 17). He was later to expand this definition by evoking a 'negro being' endowed with a specific *Weltanschauung.* Many African writers and intellectuals of African origin criticised these aspects of the definition, which they saw as being rooted in the ethnological myths used to validate the colonial system.

Among the intellectuals reluctant to embrace Négritude were many West Indian writers, such as Frantz Fanon (1925–61), who, in his *Wretched of the Earth* (1961), warned that the movement was heading for a dead-end and chose to fight instead for political independence. African authors – for example, the Cameroonian Marcien Towa (1931–) and the Beninese Stanislas Adotevi (1934–) – harshly criticised the movement in works such as *Négritude ou Servitude* (1971) and *Négritude et Nécrologues* (1972). Anglophone writers and intellectuals from Ghana and Nigeria were also to voice their disapproval, as with the famous phrase from Nigerian Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka (1934–), at the 1964 Berlin Conference on African Arts: 'A tiger does not proclaim his tigritude, he pounces' (Jahn 1968: 266).

As far as post-colonial writers are concerned, they seem to favour Césaire, who inscribes the concept in a more global dimension, seeing it as 'one of the historical forms of the human condition' (Mbembe 2013: 230). Even today, many critics blame Senghor for the essentialist tendency that continues to lend a mythical quality to the French vision of Africa. Thus, the speech made by the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy (1955–) in Dakar on 26 July 2007, considered by many to be a milestone in the African continent's recent history, contained numerous *faux-pas* which some argue are a direct legacy of Senghor's Négritude.

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The Cameroonian intellectual Achille Mbembe (1957–) reacts strongly against this speech written by Sarkozy's adviser Henri Guaino, who evokes 'the main sources of Senghor's thought mobilised by Henri Guaino in the hope that he will give the presidential words a native stamp. Isn't he aware of the inestimable debt that the Senegalese poet, in his formulation of the concept of Négritude or of the notions of culture, civilisation, even *métissage,* owes to the most racist, essentialist and biologising theories of his time?' (Mbembe 2007). Mbembe's reaction shows just how vigorously the idea of Négritude is still criticised, as it has been since Francophone African countries became independent. This is not to say, however, that Senghor did not attempt to inscribe his movement in a pragmatic setting, underlining its cultural and political implications in *Liberté* V:

> It is a project insofar as we wish to anchor ourselves to traditional ideas of Négritude so that we may play our part in the Civilisation of the Universal. It is an action insofar as we take concrete action to carry out our project in all fields, particularly the fields of literature and the arts. (Senghor 1993: 17).

Senghor's humanist vision aims at the collaborative coexistence of the world's civilizations as a means of achieving what the poet calls 'cultural symbioses'. It was from this perspective that he was, after the Second World War, to write *La Communauté impériale française*, in which he condemns colonisation and its rejection of foreign cultures, while putting forward the idea of a great community in which people, motivated by a shared ideal, would strive for a mutual development that would respect their differences and safeguard cultural equality.

Senghor's poetry is also oriented toward the universal, evoking the realm of childhood. He started publishing collections of poetry in 1945 with *Chants d'ombre,* followed by *Hosties noires* (1948), *Ethiopiques* (1956), *Nocturnes* (1961), *Lettres d'Hivernage* (1972) and *Elégies majeures* (1979). In a text entitled 'Ce que l'homme noir apporte', Senghor was to coin his now-famous phrase: 'Emotion is Negro, as reason is Hellenic' (Senghor 1964: 24). Facing criticism in Senegal and Africa, he attempted to clarify it in his subsequent writing. In his article 'Senghor: Raison Hellène,

Emotion Nègre', Jean Bernabé tries to 'mitigate the misunderstanding' surrounding Senghor's phrase. According to him, '[r]e-calling the "Greek miracle", the Négritude poet aims, symmetrically, through words, to define the essential part that Africa has played in the development of humanity. He therefore suggests, through his much-maligned phrase, the possibility of a form of "African miracle"' (Bernabé 2011: 123). Despite his adversaries' attacks, the president-poet continued to fight for the rehabilitation of the black world's cultural values. Hence, in collaboration with the journal *Présence Africaine*, he organised the first World Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar in April 1966, to which dignitaries from across the globe were invited. France was represented by André Malraux (1901–76), minister of culture under General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970). In strong contrast to Sarkozy some 40 years later, Malraux's speech referred to Africa's contribution to world heritage through its dance, music, symbolic sculptures, and 'furiously emotional' poetry (Malraux 1966). For Senghor, this key event in African cultural history held the promise of a new humanism, whose lessons were to be drawn from African art – an art whose sheer imagination and symbolism exceeds the measure of man. Senghor's aim was to promote the black man's contribution to humanity through his very being-in-the-world (*être-au-monde*), as it is illustrated in his philosophy and works of art. By mastering the symbolic, the Senegalese poet believed, the Negro aesthetic embodied an egalitarian vision, in which culture is made by all and for all. The festival's objective was also to allow Africa's voice to be heard, thus contributing to the construction of the Civilisation of the Universal, so close to Senghor's heart. For him, as for Césaire, 'the universal exists only insofar as it is a community of singularities and differences, a sharing which is at the same time a pooling and a separation', as Mbembe puts it (Mbembe 2013: 228).

Politics: Successes, Controversies, and Pluralism

Returning to Senegal in 1945, Senghor was encouraged to enter politics by Lamine Guèye

(1891–1968), then mayor of Dakar. The political side of his humanist vision was to come to the fore when he was elected to the French National Assembly in 1945 as the representative of Senegal-Mauritania. He left the SFIO, convinced that it no longer represented the interests of African people, and in 1948, joined forces with Mamadou Dia (1910–2009) to create his own political party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS). He went on to be elected mayor of Thiès in 1956, president of the Federal Assembly of Mali (which included today's Mali and Senegal) in 1959, and finally president of the Senegalese Republic in 1960, following the dissolution of the Federation of Mali.

The dismantling of the latter led Senghor and Dia to establish a dyarchical system (a political regime where power is held jointly by two persons or two groups), which was to cause a serious crisis among the Senegalese leadership. The conviviality and friendship that the two men shared was to be seriously compromised in the wake of political differences and Senghor's desire to see the political system evolve into a presidential regime. Accused by Senghor of preparing a coup against him, Dia and several of his ministers were arrested; the High Court of Justice arbitrarily sentenced him to be deported and jailed for life in a fortress prison. This political injustice left its mark on the Senegalese national consciousness, which increasingly saw Dia as a pillar of its developing statehood and the heir to Senegal's democratic legacy. Even though a proportion of the Senegalese population remains unaware of Dia's activism to this day, the sacrificial dimension of his fight for his country's greater good has contributed greatly to his progressive rehabilitation as a national figure.

After organising a vote for a new constitution in March 1963, Senghor exercised power alone. His party's victory at the general election was contested by opposition parties and the degradation of the terms of trade weakened the country significantly, making it difficult to overcome the economic challenges it faced. Senghor tried to unite all of the political factions in order to face the situation. Thus, in 1966, Senghor and Dia's party, the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS)

embraced all of the existing political organisations. But differences of opinion were to divide the coalition and, against a backdrop of increasing violence, a coup was organised against Senghor, from which he escaped unharmed. The political upheaval in Senegal was, partially only, a knock-on effect of the events of May 1968 in France. Senegalese politician and professor Abdoulaye Bathily (1947–) experienced the social upheaval of May 1968 first hand in his country, dedicated his *Mai 68 à Dakar* (1992) to showing how events in Dakar antedated the French upheavals. Indeed, since 1966, a 'creeping May 68' was at work in Senegal, with student protests, agricultural crises, dramatic decreases in purchasing power, and the rallying of workers and economic players. Students seized the opportunity to condemn corruption and accuse the president of being an accomplice to neocolonialism and the 'lackey' of French imperialism. Senghor responded positively to these protests by creating a new regime which delegated power to the prime minister and moved towards greater democratisation. During the transition, he appointed the young executive Abdou Diouf (1935–) as prime minister on 26 February 1970, after revising the constitution via a referendum.

In 1970, the UPS held all of the seats in the National Assembly. Student unrest followed Pompidou's visit to Dakar in 1971, which progressively led Senghor to consider opening up the political system in 1973. On 31 July 1974, lawyer Abdoulaye Wade (1926–) founded the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS), and, in 1976, reforms designed to usher in a multiparty political system were implemented. They also guaranteed the separation of powers and the freedom of the press. On 31 December 1980, Senghor announced his intention to stand down; a step that he had been planning for the previous 10 years. He nominated Diouf as his successor and left for France with his wife to avoid impeding the young president's work, as he put it. His election, in 1983, to the Académie Française elicited renewed criticism from his adversaries in Africa, who once again accused him of Francophilia, but it helped him to achieve global renown, ensuring that he was invited to speak at international universities.

Cultural and Political Legacy

The death of his son Philippe-Maguilen Senghor in a car crash in 1981 in Dakar was to haunt him for the rest of his life. He turned increasingly to his writing, perhaps finding in it new forms of resilience. He published *Liberté 4* in 1983, subtitled *Socialisme et planification.* In 1988 his *Ce que je crois* appeared: a defence of Négritude and an optimistic discourse on the Francophone world. In 1993, he published his final book, *Liberté 5. Le dialogue des cultures.*

Senghor passed away on 20 December 2001 in Verson (France), aged 95, after years of ill health. The Senegalese people reacted to news of his death with great emotion, and numerous national and international delegations came to pay their last respects in front of the National Assembly in Dakar, where his body lay in state. A Latin mass was held at Dakar cathedral, in the presence of his wife Colette Hubert and numerous dignitaries from across the world.

Because of the quasi-systematic way in which a number of African countries hijacked power and implemented dictatorships following their independence in 1960, the process of democratic transition initiated by Senghor is still viewed favourably by Senegalese and African people today. His reforms, facilitating democracy through the devolution of power, put Senegal on the path to good governance despite the troubled times experienced under Abdou Diouf's successor President Abdoulaye Wade. The years from 2000–12, marred by nepotism and corruption, were happily brought to a close in an exemplary fashion by a highly educated civil society which has Senghor to thank for its democratic culture. By investing massively in the education sector when he headed the country, Senghor's foremost aim was to produce citizens who would be able to understand the issues facing their country, Africa, and the world. While Senghor has on occasion been accused of favouring men of letters over engineers and scientists, one cannot overlook the fact that the large numbers of Senegalese intellectuals and executives, and an ever-expanding student body, have laid the foundations for a society capable of expressing concrete demands regarding its national interests.

When assessing Senghor's achievements, we tend to remember his humanism rather than his politics. By claiming his own biological and cultural *métissage,* he was to become the advocate of an Africa rooted in its values but open to the world. It was in this role that he appealed for the creation of political and cultural partnerships between Africa and Europe, which was to spawn an economic community and a Francophone movement, which he defined as '[. . .] this integral Humanism, which spins its web around the earth: this symbiosis of "sleeping energies" from all continents, all races, awakening to their complementary warmth' (Senghor 1962).

Today, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) comprises 57 member states, and it was chaired by the former Senegalese President Abdou Diouf from 2002 to 2014 in a tacit homage to one of its founding fathers. Louise Mushikiwabo, a politician from Rwanda, is the leader of the organization since 2018. The core missions of the OIF include the defense of human rights, the promotion of democracy and dialogue between cultures, as well as possible interventions in political crises affecting member states.

The organisation now includes Eastern European and former communist countries, and intercultural dialogue is increasingly becoming a reality. Yet it has also come under fire for being an avatar of French colonialism, at the very least a decoy used by France to encourage its Francophone members to preserve its language, now overshadowed by English. Many Francophone intellectuals and writers have called for it to be replaced by a concept of French-language world literature. A manifesto appeared in the newspaper *Le Monde* on 15 March 2007, followed by the book *Pour une littérature-monde,* edited by Michel Le Bris and Jean Rouaud.

Today, Négritude is often seen as an obsolete, essentialist concept that fails to reflect the world we live in; a world in which black diasporas can be found across the globe. The current consensus that identity is, in fact, made up of multiple identities invalidates any exclusivist approach to what Patricia Donatien-Yssa calls 'the image of the self' (Donatien-Yssa 2006: 16). In the context of the definition of West Indian identity,

in which Césaire and Damas both participated, Francophone West Indian writers thus view Négritude as retrograde. Considering Africa to be just one of their multiple origins and Négritude as one side only of an identity dependent on interrelations, West Indian writers have gone beyond Senghor's concept by identifying additional traces or *tracées* (Chamoiseau and Confiant 1991: 12), leading to the concepts of *Antillanité* and *Créolité.* As a consequence, the concept of Négritude has now been completely absorbed into postcolonial studies and replaced by Edouard Glissant's (1928–2011) philosophy of Relation and new approaches to plural, multicultural, and transnational identities.

Nonetheless, Senghor's ideas are today more relevant than one might suppose, in the links he establishes between the actual conditions in which we exist in today's world and his vision of a *presence* of that world, a beauty which 'is not a matter of essence or transcendence, but of the ephemeral plenitude of a series of evolving processes' (Chamoiseau 2013: 45–46). His politics are a *poetical intention,* a true *Relation* that he anticipated throughout his life: dialogues and exchanges without domination, where only cultural enrichment matters, as well as fraternity between whole civilisations, to strive for a better future. Senghor's voice reaffirms the –'inflexible beauty of the world'– in all its diversity. The path he chose is etched with the *tracées* of resistance against all forms of imperialism; the same *tracées* that herald the advent of a richly multifaceted world.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)
▶ Pan-Africanism

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Separatism

▶ James Connolly: Labor, Empire, Ireland

Sepoy Mutiny

▶ Indian Mutiny (1857): Popular Revolts Against British Imperialism

Settlement

▶ Settler Colonialism

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Settler Colonialism

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Synonyms

Colonization; Settler imperialism; Settlement

Definition

Settler colonialism is a specific mode of domination where a community of exogenous settlers permanently displace to a new locale, eliminate or displace indigenous populations and sovereignties, and constitute an autonomous political body.

The outcome of settler colonialism is a sociopolitical body that reproduces in the place of another. As a specific mode of domination, it is especially concerned with space. It is significant that the "inventor" of modern geopolitics, William Gilpin, should have been a committed and prominent settler colonialist of the nineteenth century and that Carl Schmitt should have developed his theory of "large spaces" with reference to US President Monroe's enunciation of the ultimate incompatibility between colonial and settler colonial forms (see Karnes 2014, 341–343; Legg 2011, esp. chaps. 3 and 6). On the basis of the distinction between "Europe" and "America" and their "essentially different [. . .] systems" of rule overseas, Monroe had proclaimed to Congress: "the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle [. . .] that the American continents [. . .] are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers" (Monroe Doctrine 1823). Later, future US president Theodore Roosevelt wrote in *The Winning of the West*: "It is of incalculable importance that America, Australia, and Siberia should pass out of the hands of their red, black, and yellow

aboriginal owners, and become the heritage of the dominant world races" (1889, 45).

Settler projects are typically defined in continental terms, colonial ones in oceanic ones. The rebelling settlers of what would become the USA built a "continental" army, their representatives met in a "continental" congress, and the settlers of South Africa met undifferentiated "Africans" and self-defined their collective and language as "Afrikaner." Similarly, US President James Monroe developed his doctrine to fence off clearly defined *continental* limits, Australian Federation united an "island-continent" and invited the "Australasian" settler colonists from across the Tasman to join, and Canada was built around a "continental" railroad from "sea to sea."

Coherently, when it comes to the prospect of decolonization, settlers generally prefer that a "blue water" definition be adopted: the latter does not apply to them and the ways in which the boundaries of their polities are drawn. Considering the similarities and differences of British and American imperialisms, Bernard Porter commented that to "exclude the colonisation of the American West from the rubric "imperialism" simply because it didn't involve getting into boats is tendentious, to say the least" (Porter 2006, n.p.). Quite tellingly, the USA insisted in the 1960s on a "blue water" definition of colonialism in order to exempt its ongoing settler colonialism from the purview of developing international law on decolonization. The UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (passed after the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples") was premised on this definition of colonialism (see, e.g., Goldstein 2014, 13). When the UN finally caught up with settler colonialism as a mode of domination in 2007 and "declared" the inherent rights of the world's indigenous peoples, the settler polities were unsurprisingly skeptical (see, e.g., Merlan 2009; on the global rise of indigeneity as a political category, see Niezen 2003). Nonetheless, the study of settler colonialism is necessarily premised on the realization that colonialism does not always arrive on boats and that settlers typically act on their own behalf, not as agents of distant metropoles. Settlers characteristically arrive in their wagon trains, and the study of

their colonialism is premised on the parallel realization that they rarely sail away.

The study of settler colonialism as a specific mode of domination only consolidated during the last two decades. The study of colonial phenomena is much older. After the initial inception of colonial studies during the "age of decolonization" in the 1950s and 1960s, the study of colonialism fragmented in a variety of discourses, methodological approaches, and associated terminologies (for founding statements, see Memmi 1957; Fanon 1961). "Neocolonialism" emerged almost immediately to denounce relations that ostensibly acknowledged the equality of former colonizer and former colonized but did not actually affect structuring inequalities (Nkrumah 1965; Sartre 1964). "Internal colonialism" emerged in the 1970s, focusing on the resilience of colonial relationships *within* a specific polity – a predicament that could not be approached by envisaging the ultimate sovereign independence of the colonized (see, e.g., Casanova 1965; Hechter 1975). It was eventually applied to a remarkable variety of polities and realities, including Apartheid South Africa, Appalachia, the position of African Americans, and the Celtic "fringe." "Postcolonialism," or "post-colonialism," emerged as a scholarly approach in the 1980s to emphasize the enduring legacy of colonial regimes and the ways in which these legacies continue to inform relationships and representational strategies after the end of formal colonial subjection (on Orientalism as discourse, see Said 1978; on "othering" as the inevitable outcome of colonial relationships, see Spivak 1985; on "hybridity," "ambivalence," and "mimicry" as subversive strategies, see Bhabha 1994). The "new imperial history" followed in the 1990s; today the study of imperial and colonial formations is a lively and remarkable scholarly field (see, e.g., Aldrich & McKenzie 2014; Howe 2009).

All of these methodological approaches centered on what historian Partha Chatterjee insightfully defined as "the colonial rule of difference" (Chatterjee 1993, 19, 33). As such, they all related to colonialism as a set of social phenomena that is characterized by the ability to reproduce itself, that is, by the ability to maintain the fundamental inequality that separates colonizer and colonized. On the other hand, analyses that adopted "settler colonialism" as paradigm emphasized circumstances primarily characterized by a determination to erase colonized subjectivities rather than reproduce their subordination (Veracini 2010). Unlike the other colonial formations, settler colonialism supersedes rather than reproduces the colonial rule of difference; settlers win by discontinuing unequal relationships rather than maintaining them.

The consolidation of settler colonial studies as a scholarly subfield relied crucially on Patrick Wolfe's seminal theorization of settler colonialism:

> But what if the colonizers are not dependent on native labour? – indeed, what if the natives themselves have been reduced to a small minority whose survival can hardly be seen to furnish the colonizing society with more than remission from ideological embarrassment? [...] In contrast to the kind of colonial formation that Cabral or Fanon confronted [i.e.: 'franchise' or 'dependent'], settler colonies were not primarily established to extract surplus value from indigenous labour. (Wolfe 1999, 1)

A focus on land and a relative neglect of the labor of the colonized set settler colonialism as a mode of domination apart. Like the scholars of "internal colonialism," the scholars contributing to settler colonial studies have emphasized the *continuing* operation of an unchanged set of unequal relations. Indeed, settler colonialism as a mode of domination, it was often noted, has typically resisted formal decolonization. As a result, postcolonial approaches were deemed unsuitable to the analysis of the settler societies and the ongoing subjection of indigenous collectives. Australian poet and militant Bobby Sikes had ironically captured this incongruity: "What? Postcolonialism? Have they left?" (cited in Tuhiwai Smith 1999, 24).

The distinction between colonial and settler colonial formations, however, is much older than settler colonial studies. Karl Marx, for example (who had an ongoing interest in colonial questions and even pondered as a young man whether he should emigrate as a settler to the USA), defined them as the only "real colonies, virgin soils colonised by free labour" (Marx 1867, 931). Similarly, Friedrich Engels defined in a letter to Karl Kautsky the settler colonies as the "colonies

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proper." They were the opposite of what he defined as "the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated – India, Algeria, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and Spanish possessions" (Engels 1882, n.p.). Marx was responding to the theory of "systematic colonization" advanced by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, who had originally "discovered" primitive accumulation while noting the ways in which the presence of "free lands" in settler colonial peripheries enabled servants to abscond and rely independently on a subsistence economy that undid their previous subjugation (Piterberg and Veracini 2015). But liberalism as a set of political traditions was also fundamentally shaped by ongoing and sustained reflection on settler colonial issues (see Bell 2016). The scholars of the evolution of socialism and liberalism ignore settler colonialism at their peril.

Indeed, during the nineteenth century, the difference between what we now define as colonialism and settler colonialism as distinct modes of domination was clear to most observers (Foley 2011). Influential British historian J. R. Seeley had aptly encapsulated this sociopolitical distinction in the nineteenth century: the settler "colonies" and "India" are "in opposite extremes." He concluded: "Whatever political maxims are most applicable to one, are most inapplicable to the other" (cited in Bell 2009, 8). The distinction was also abundantly clear in the USA, as epitomized by the distinct ways in which different conquered areas were dealt with during the Mexican War of 1846–1848: temporary "occupation" south of the Rio Grande and organic incorporation north of it. The turn of the century US anti-imperialists based their opposition to the prospect of further expansion on this distinction (see, e.g., Kramer 2002; Cullinane 2012). For a very long time, one could approve of one mode of domination and *precisely for that reason* dislike the other. John A. Hobson, for example, approved of "settlement" as much as he disliked "imperialism" (Bell 2016, esp. 341–362). His ideas about "imperialism" would transform the world; his ideas about settler colonialism were common place.

These interpretative traditions developed in the context of what James Belich has called the global "settler revolution" (Belich 2009). The ideology that accompanied and propelled this "revolution" in the nineteenth century comprehensively reformed the generalized perception of settlers and their societies. From undefined places where "rebarbarized" demi-savage Europeans lived at the margins of civilization, the "frontiers" of settlement eventually became sites of political experimentation and, typically, "manly" regeneration. A revolution in the imagination was premised on a revolution in colonial politics.

As a specific term, settler colonialism was first used in the 1920s to indicate a particular type of British colonialism in an Australian context, to distinguish it from convict colonialism, and to differentiate between South Australia and New South Wales (Veracini 2013). The former had been originally settled by "free" settlers. As a compound term, however, it had originally developed in relation to what were generally called "bona fide" or "actual" settlers. In the USA and in the British Empire during the nineteenth century, these widely used expressions identified a particular constituency of "migrants" or "colonists": those who, unlike mere colonial sojourners, had displaced with an intention to remain in a particular locality or colony.

During the 1970s, and in the presence of bitter anticolonial insurgencies in Africa, "settler colonialism" was used to identify a type of "ultra-colonialism" whereby settlers held power without a demographic majority (Emmanuel 1972; Anderson 1962; Good 1976). However, beginning with Donald Denoon's seminal work on the settler economies of the southern hemisphere, "settler colonialism" eventually became associated (again) with the polities where settlers and their descendants were in power *and* a normalized majority (Denoon 1983). Thereafter, settler colonial studies progressively expanded its geographical scope. An inherently comparative approach defied recurring claims pertaining to local national exceptionalisms. While the USA and Israel were for some time not included within the bounds of settler colonial studies as an emerging transnational field, they eventually became important sites for the exploration of settler colonialism as a specific mode of domination (Hixson 2013; Shafir 2005). Today, the concept is applied to

analyze a vast variety of locales beyond the settler societies of the world, including postcolonial African nations, Latin America, Taiwan, and even Pakistan, a polity established by settlers endowed with a particular political ideology and a mandate that did not recognize the political autonomy of existing populations. As a scholarly field and as paradigm for analysis, settler colonial studies have gone global.

Settler colonialism is a relationship. It is related to colonialism but also inherently distinct from it. As a system defined by unequal relationships (like colonialism) where an exogenous collective aims to locally and permanently replace indigenous ones (unlike colonialism), settler colonialism has no geographical, cultural, or chronological bounds. It is culturally nonspecific. It can happen at any time, and everyone is a settler if she is part of a collective and sovereign displacement that moves to stay, that moves to establish a permanent homeland by way of displacement.

Settler colonialism is also an exercise in the deliberate alteration of time and space. Triumphant settler colonialism is a violent act against geography: settler colonialism turns someone else's place into space and then into place again. The latter place looks like the one the settlers left behind or should. When it doesn't, the settler project needs to compensate (see, e.g., Lynch 2015). Settlers exchange countries but also change countries; they literally transform them, aiming for greater productivity and recognizable patterns of land use. They often dream of other locations, places as they could be, and places that are other. Settler structures of feelings are in many ways defined by what Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey called the "tyranny of distance." That was the negative definition; more positively, but underwritten by the same determination to disavow distance, Australian arch-settler Prime Minister Robert Menzies famously proclaimed a sense of Britishness stretching from "Cape York to Invercargill" (on the profound ecological transformation associated with settler colonialism, see, e.g., Cronon 1983 and Griffiths and Robin 1997; on Robert Menzies, see Brett 1993; on the "Tyranny of Distance," see Blainey 1966). Settlers often wish their places were somewhere else:

modern-day Israel, for example, is in "Asia," not in "the West." It is one side of Suez and not the other, one side of Istanbul and not the other, and one side of the sea and not the other.

Settlers see both time and space as inherently malleable. Indeed, even if settlers often represent their activities in a "new" land as absolute beginnings (this is why they often call the peoples they encounter "Aborigines" – people that were there *ab origine*, at the beginning), they do not begin from scratch. They are endowed with what Patrick Wolfe has called, talking about the Zionist conquest of Palestine, as "preaccumulation" (Wolfe 2012). The settlers traveled with their preaccumulated social, technical, and other capital with them. Resulting from a specifically settler colonial type of uneven and combined development, during the high tide of the settler revolution, their polities were immediately autonomous and ultramodern. John Stuart Mill was enthusiastic about their collective capacity for social experimentation (see Bell 2016, esp. 211–236). But settlers also manipulate time in the other direction, and often move to return (see Piterberg 2008). They move back in time as they move forward through space: return to a pristine social order disturbed by modernity, return to appropriate social mores disturbed by gender and other revolutions, return to the land, and return to the ability of genuinely own it, an ability that had been disturbed by enclosures and other dispossessions.

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Settler Colonialism and the Communist International

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Comintern; International communism; Settler colonialism; Soviet Union; Third International

Description

The Bolsheviks led international communism through the Third International (also known as the Communist International or the Comintern), which operated from 1919 to 1943. A major target for the Comintern was world imperialism. The Comintern proclaimed itself as a partner of all oppressed peoples and supported colonial liberation. As part of its efforts, it gradually grew to appreciate the differences in the colonial world and developed some consideration of settler colonialism and its effects. Communist parties around the world attempted to create platforms in their local contexts which dealt with their understanding of their country's history and the treatment of Indigenous peoples. Despite realizing that settler colonies had different aims than exploitative colonies, the Comintern tended to still treat the colonial world uniformly.

Introduction

In March 1919, the Bolsheviks sought to form the revolutionary International they and their sympathizers felt was needed in the post-First World War world. The Communist International, also known as the Third International or the Comintern, responded to the ideological bankruptcy of the Second International, which had splintered and dissolved during the war as many socialists had supported the war effort of their respective nations. The Comintern also represented an opportunity for the left to respond to the national movements which gained prominence and momentum, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and calls for self-determination. It operated until its dissolution in 1943.

Traditionally, the left had dealt poorly with the non-European world. Indeed, many members of the Communist International would make clear that the Comintern represented an evolution of Marxism which was truly internationalist, even if it fell short of those goals. In doing so, it accepted V.I. Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written in 1916, as a key part of its worldview. The Comintern attacked Wilsonianism and social democracy for falling short of their aims and instead tricking the non-imperialist world into thinking that things would change. From the Comintern's inception, the Bolsheviks and their supporters emphasized colonial affairs and emphasized their support of colonized peoples alongside those of the proletariat. By 1920, the Comintern had formed a set of theses to guide communists in colonial liberation efforts. Two years later, communists started to notice differences in the development of some colonies and the problems of a generalized program. Despite not referring to it as such, one notable change was a reflection on settler colonialism.

This appreciation for settler colonialism as a subcategory of leftist colonial analysis was not new to the Bolsheviks. Fredrik Engels noted in 1892 that settler colonies were "the colonies proper" (Veracini 2010). Historian Lorenzo Veracini has noted that settler colonialism was not the same as colonialism itself, highlighting that settler colonies "'tame' a variety of

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wildernesses, end up establishing independent nations, effectively repress, co-opt, and extinguish Indigenous alterities, and productively manage ethnic diversity...whereas colonialism *reinforces* the distinction between colony and metropole, settler colonialism *erases* it" (Veracini 2011). Communists developed their own differentiation based on their appreciation of the world situation at the time and more generally saw a difference between what they termed to be "colonies" and "semicolonies." By the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, which took place in 1928, these were tiered further, based on a colony's economic development. Furthermore, these definitions fell into lines that would appear awkward to a casual observer. To take one example, the Comintern defined Australia and Canada as part of one tier; New Zealand and South Africa were part of another. Finally, local variations in the application of Comintern doctrine led to unique responses to settler colonialism and often without direct guidance from the centralized organization.

To explain the Comintern's approach to settler colonialism, this article will first outline how communists saw the colonial world and how at the First and Second Comintern Congresses they originally defined the battle for colonial liberation and the role communists were to play. It will next explore how from the Fourth to Sixth Congresses the Comintern started to differentiate between different colonies and how it defined those categories. Following an explanation of how the Comintern perceived settler colonialism, this article will outline how communists in a number of settler colonies dealt with their past and the ideological perspective the Comintern had developed.

Overview

The Comintern made clear from its inception in 1919 that the colonial world would not be ignored by its member parties. The Manifesto of the Comintern, written by Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky, listed the peoples of the world, highlighting specifically the colonized peoples in Asia and Africa, and stated that communists would stand with them (Riddell 1987). The Second Comintern Congress,

taking place in July–August 1920, approved a set of tactics, the Theses on the National and Colonial Question. Lenin wrote the preliminary theses and led the discussion, emphasizing the importance of the issue to the Comintern. The theses themselves were only a start and perceived the colonial world as a singular mass, making little differentiation between different regions or forms of colonialism. Stressing the dimension of capitalist development as the key characteristic of the colonial world, Lenin referred to them as "backward" and highlighted colonialism's "feudal" nature. The Comintern saw colonized people as akin to the proletariat, victims of the imperialism all the same, and required communists to fight on their behalf. The biggest disagreements among communists on the issue stemmed from the general tactics the Comintern recommended. Lenin argued that communists should align with "bourgeois-democratic liberation movements" in the colonies. Lenin ultimately saw a value in working with any nationalist movement in order to help bring communism to the "East," the term frequently used in Bolshevik circles to describe Asia and Africa. Indian communist Manabendra Nath Roy, representing the Mexican Communist Party, took issue with this approach, and Lenin recommended that Roy write his own theses to complement his. Roy argued that communists should work with "national-revolutionary" forces which reflected the will of the people instead of just any national movement, highlighting that bourgeois forces would seek to maintain their control. Lenin accepted these alterations, and both Lenin and Roy's theses became the basis for Comintern tactics from then on regarding colonial liberation (Riddell 2013).

Differentiating Colonies

Roy remained an important figure in the Comintern for the remainder of the 1920s until he was excommunicated from the movement due to clashes during the Stalinization of the Comintern in the late 1920s. In 1922, he became the first figure to distinguish between different colonies and their capitalist development, requiring

communists to consider the implementation of unique tactics to each subgroup. Stressing that the colonial world was not a "politically, economically, or socially homogeneous entity," he elucidated three tiers. The first included countries where industrialization and capitalism had taken hold, developing a "native bourgeoisie" with a proletariat. The second category included colonies where capitalism had started to grow but remained "feudal" in character. Finally, the third group included nations where "patriarchal feudalism" remained in place and capitalism had not yet taken any firm hold. At the Fourth Congress, Roy stressed a need to appreciate these distinctions (Riddell 2012).

The Theses on the Eastern Question, the set of tactics that stemmed from the discussion which included Roy's arguments, equivocated on many of the distinctions, still tending to treat colonies and semicolonies as a mass in which communists should continue to apply generalized tactics. That said there was some differentiation, largely stemming from regional differences. A curious example came in the realm of the Pacific and the emphasis on immigration issues. Placed alongside the United States, Japan, and Great Britain as imperialist countries of the Pacific were Australia and Canada, the first time the Comintern placed two dominions alongside major imperial powers. Their inclusion came because of their harsh immigration laws which targeted cheap and racialized labor, predominantly from Asia (Riddell 2012; Gupta 2017).

The Fifth Congress regressed on colonial issues, with Ukrainian Bolshevik Dmitry Manuilsky, in his report on the topic, calling for generalized platforms instead of considering the uniqueness of different regions, colonies, or development (Gupta 2017). But the Sixth Congress in 1928 saw colonial affairs return to the forefront. The Congress came a year after the disastrous end to the communist alliance with the Chinese nationalist group, the Kuomintang (KMT). After years of recommending that the Chinese Communist Party work with the KMT, including having Communists join the party and offering Soviet military advice, in hopes that the communists could take the leadership of the

movement in the future, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek violently broke with the communists (Pantsov 2017). Furthermore, more colonial communist parties joined the Comintern and attended the Sixth Congress. As a result, the Comintern reconsidered its approach and officially accepted the categorization of different colonies, which included its own acknowledgment of the distinct character of settler colonialism. In point 10 of the Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, the Comintern declared "it is necessary to distinguish between those colonies of the capitalist countries which have served them as colonising regions for their surplus population, and which in this way have become a continuation of their capitalist system..." and exploitative colonies, which imperial powers used for raw materials or to augment their economies. The first category contained dominions, albeit with some caveats (Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies 1928). These were settler colonies, where whites implanted "the class structure of the metropolis." Indigenous peoples were "exterminated" (Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies 1928). These countries would be considered secondary, imperialist nations from the Comintern perspective and notably had graduated entirely from colonial status. Canada and Australia were two explicit examples, although they still were not wholly independent from British rule. Communists then noted there was a transitionary status afforded to some colonies, such as South Africa, New Zealand, and the French colony Algeria, where a substantial white settler population lived alongside the majority Indigenous population. They were "emigrant colonies" or a "colonial 'prolongation' of the bourgeoisie of the metropolis" (Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies 1928). Another important characteristic of the communist view of settler colonies included their role in imperialist conflict; these autonomous colonies could side with alternate imperial powers than that which originally colonized them for their own economic reasons. Notably, the consideration of settler colonialism, in this limited form,

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did not include the United States in its discussion. Instead, the Comintern focused on the relationship with the African-American population, particularly in the south. These distinguishing characteristics reflected the reality of the 1920s and the international situation with which communists interacted. Meanwhile, the second category of colonies focused on exploitative colonies with varying levels of capitalist development and included China, India, and much of Africa (Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies 1928).

The United States and Latin America

The Comintern had already accepted the United States as an imperialist power, especially by 1928 and the Sixth Congress, but it did not mean ignorance of its settler colonial past. In the Latin American Secretariat, one of the regional organizational bodies of the Comintern, a discussion took place that clarified how some Comintern bureaucrats, such as Jules Humbert-Droz, saw the history of the Americas. Humbert-Droz suggested that the development of North America was unique compared to the Latin American case. Spanish and Portuguese settlers arriving in Central and South America focused on extracting anything useful from the region while subjugating Indigenous peoples. They developed exploitative colonies in the region. In the United States, however, British and French settlers arrived with the aim of transplanting their way of life to the new world, exterminating any Indigenous peoples. Directly applying the same worldview established at the Sixth Comintern Congress, Humbert-Droz reaffirmed it in the Latin American Secretariat, adding that the United States, and its early development, was the same as that of the British dominions (Drachewych 2018).

But whereas the Latin American Secretariat did make that difference theoretically, communists in the United States and in Latin America dealt with Indigenous peoples differently in practice. For the American communists, attention generally was placed on African-Americans as the colonized people that required the application of

self-determination. Over the course of the 1920s, black communists traveled to Moscow, and many became important figures in driving the Comintern to support self-determination for African-Americans, seeing blacks, especially in the Southern United States, as an oppressed nation, similar to how communists viewed the Irish in the British Isles. Communists defined the American Civil War and Reconstruction as the unfinished bourgeois revolution and emphasized the shared culture, identity, and socioeconomic position of African-Americans in the South as creating a national sentiment. In response, the Comintern promoted the Black Belt Thesis which called for an African-American republic in the Southern United States and which became a prominent feature of American communism in the 1930s (Cottle 2011; Adi 2013; Zumoff 2015; Drachewych 2018, 2019).

The settler colonial history of the United States was largely circumstantial, and irrelevant, now that the United States was one of the leading imperial powers. Indigenous people were not ignored, although they were not a prominent theme for the party in the interwar period and the Comintern gave no guidance from its end (Cottle 2011; Drachewych 2018). That said, communists in the Western United States did inform workers about the plight of Indigenous peoples and the exploitation and atrocities they had suffered throughout the history of the United States, publishing pieces on these subjects in the *Western Worker*. Some Indigenous Americans even wrote to the party organ, sharing their reasons for following communism. The party ran Raymond Francis Gray, a Metis leader, for a senate seat in Montana in 1934. In its most vociferous condemnation of the United States' settler colonial past, articles in the *Western Worker* emphasized illegal land claims and settler attempts to exterminate Indigenous peoples in the Southwestern United States (Balthaser 2014).

Communists stressed Indigenous self-determination in Latin America more frequently. Following the advent of the Third Period at the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, the Comintern began to support the Black Belt Thesis, referred to as the Native Republic Thesis in South Africa,

and encouraged its application in other regions, such as Latin America. Here, it was hoped that Indigenous peoples would gravitate to the movement and would see an opportunity to retain their own territorial rights. Peruvian Marxist Jose Mariategui had already started to criticize the evils of European imperialism and white settler colonialism in Latin America. Seeing the Spanish, Portuguese, British, and French all as imperial powers seeking to exploit and continue exploiting Latin American Indigenous peoples, even after independence, Mariategui argued that displacing established landholders with Indigenous peoples was necessary to achieve communism (Becker 2006, 2019; Mosquera 2018). Mariategui ended up being on one side of the discussion as the "Indian Question," and, with Comintern urging, the establishment of Indigenous republics to solve that problem became the topic du jour for Latin American communists. In Peru, Mariategui took a class-based approach to the problem and saw this push for "native republics" as unhelpful, compounding their economic impoverishment. Instead, he promoted the reform of the land tenure system in Latin America. To him, focusing on race was only taking a bourgeois approach to the problem and Mariategui was steadfast in his classical Marxism. Mariategui's position carried great weight as an ideological leader in the region. In Ecuador, however, communist leader Ricardo Paredes embraced Indigenous nationalism, agreeing with the platform because of his personal interaction with Indigenous peoples and his presence at the Sixth Congress in Moscow. At the Sixth Congress, Paredes even weighed in on the categorization of colonies, adding that a class of "dependent countries," autonomous countries that still are influenced by imperialism, was needed. Seeing Indigenous peoples of Latin America as naturally inclined to socialism, he saw them as a key pillar to any hopes for revolution. However, Ecuadorian communists did little to advance self-determination, instead using Indigenous nationalism to underpin their efforts in rural activism. Other communist parties, such as the Bolivian party, also followed the Comintern's lead in placing emphasis on the Indigenous national struggle (Becker 2006, 2019).

Canada and Australia

Canada and Australia undoubtedly, in Comintern rhetoric, had a settler colonial past. They also had higher stages of capitalist development, and after the Sixth Comintern Congress, the simplistic view, that white settlers arrived and had "exterminated" all Indigenous or Aboriginal peoples, was the accepted worldview. Prior to that though, both the Canadian and Australian communist parties saw their respective dominions as colonies under British control. Their efforts predominantly focused on independence from the greater imperial power, and if there was any discussion of Indigenous peoples, it was only in passing, if at all.

Following the Sixth Comintern Congress, Canada and Australia took very different approaches to dealing with the newfound imperialist categorization that the Comintern had placed on them. In this reimagining of the world, Canada and Australia were secondary, imperialist nations, still dealing with holdovers from their colonial past, but the bourgeoisie of each individual nation was engaged in its own exploitation of the proletariat and had its own colonial affairs. Canada, through the Royal Bank of Canada, had investments in Cuba and in Latin America, whereas Australia had mandate control over New Guinea (Drachewych 2018). The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) accepted the new status relatively quickly and included condemnations of Australian imperialism in its pamphlets, speeches, and platforms. Beginning in 1931, the CPA published "Communist Party's Fight for Aborigines" in its party organ, *Worker's Weekly*. This piece detailed the horrible living conditions and historical exploitation and atrocities suffered by Aboriginal peoples in Australia, emphasizing that they were "slaves of slaves" and pointing the finger at Australian and British imperialists. The party called for the extension of equal rights to Aboriginal peoples, which included the defense of their culture, political autonomy, and land rights in Central, Northern, and North West Australia. This piece was the first of what became a generalized campaign in CPA publications for the first half of the 1930s. A brief pause in 1935, potentially because of a growing desire by the Comintern to

limit attacks on potential allies in its fight against fascism, occurred, before the campaign was revived and took on a more vociferous tone heading into the Second World War (Boughton 2001; Drachewych 2018, 2019; Piccini and Smith 2018).

In 1939, CPA party leader Tom Wright published "A New Deal for Aborigines," inspired by American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal, which sought to establish a full campaign for Aboriginal rights. Directly mentioning the settler colonial nature of Australia's development and its impact on Aboriginal peoples, he sought to call out the Australian Government's continued oppression of, while developing a legitimate plan for, Aboriginal peoples. Focusing on "full-blooded" Aboriginal peoples, he demanded inviolable reserves which respected tribal differences; full access to the land they were given, including the right to extract resources; the end to religious intervention; and a nationwide Aboriginal policy, ending the existing state-by-state approach in use at the time. He added that any mixed-raced Aboriginals should be given full rights as Australian citizens. Wright's New Deal was republished in 1944 and enjoyed significant support from the CPA, making it widely available and reproducing excerpts in its party organs (Wright 1944). It precipitated another publication campaign which took an informational tone, describing everything from the way of life of Aboriginal peoples in Australia to government appointments relevant to Aboriginal affairs. But the campaign still had some problematic holdovers, reflecting civilizing mission rhetoric, notably on the need to help Aboriginal peoples reach the same status as white Australians, or expressing a concern that financial assistance would be spent on vices such as alcohol. The party developed a similar platform for Melanesian workers working in New Guinea and Queensland (Boughton 2001; Drachewych 2018, 2019).

The CPA's platform was not dictated by the Comintern; instead it was created in-house by Australian communists who felt a need to expose the exploitation suffered by Aboriginal peoples. The Comintern did little to encourage the platform, making it all more remarkable that the CPA was able to develop a platform that considered Australia settler colonialism at its heart, regardless of the antiquated rhetoric it would revert to later. Urged to consider Australian imperialism and emphasize it in its rhetoric and propaganda, the party took the additional step of tying Australia's imperialist past and present to its continued poor treatment of Indigenous people, making it one of the only platforms communists developed during the interwar period directly speaking to settler colonialism in a given nation.

Its efforts are even more notable when compared to those of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). Until 1928, the CPC called for independence from the British Empire, while also highlighting its proximity to the United States, arguing it was a potential battleground between the two largest imperial powers. When the Comintern changed Canada's status in its rhetoric to being a secondary, imperialist nation in 1928 and called on the party to reflect this shift in 1929, the CPC hesitated and disagreed leading to a particularly embarrassing clash with Comintern officials. After being reprimanded, the party leadership accepted the new designation and moved forward, accepting Canada's imperial nature. Parts of the leadership attempted to revert back to asserting Canada's colonial status during the Second World War, suggesting that some Canadian communists did not see Canada as an imperial power and instead had always been under the thrall of British imperialism (Angus 1981; Penner 1988; Drachewych 2018).

Canadian communism's struggles with its position as a colonial or an imperialist power also were compounded by the CPC's lack of any real platform regarding Indigenous peoples until 1937. At its Eighth Party Convention, the party attacked the poor living conditions of Indigenous peoples. It said the Canadian Government had ignored treaties with Indigenous peoples and the protection of Indigenous traditions. The CPC passed a resolution asking for government support and the extension of equal rights to Indigenous peoples. Another resolution, this time regarding Metis people, was passed in 1943 (Drachewych 2018, 2019). Otherwise, the party generally supported some nascent efforts by activists, such

as Malcolm Nurse and James Brady, in the Prairies during the 1930s (Dobbin 1981). The limited engagement with this settler colonial past could also be a result of the party taking to heart the worldview promoted by the Comintern in 1928, where Indigenous peoples were "exterminated" and their population considered to be largely decimated. This same evaluation was repeated in Communist Party of Canada training schools as late as 1938 (Drachewych 2018, 2019).

Where the CPA developed its own platform on Aboriginal peoples reflecting its settler colonial past, the CPC failed to do so until the 1950s, well after the Comintern's dissolution. Notably, both parties received little, if any, instruction from the Comintern, despite the Comintern initiating the reflection of each party on its nation's past. It showed that individual communist parties could develop their own local solutions but that communists did not necessarily fully grasp settler colonialism and its effects on society.

South Africa

The situation in South Africa was more critical to communists. Although the Comintern considered South Africa to be a transitionary colony, it prioritized communist tactics in the region, forcing upon the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) its most well-known policy, the Native Republic Thesis, in 1928. The Native Republic Thesis called on the party to emphasize the creation of an independent black African state in South Africa. It treated black Africans as colonized people and sought to extend self-determination to them. The thesis was intended to win over the black African population, radicalize them, and show them that communism was their best chance to end their oppression.

Beforehand, however, the CPSA had tended to downplay racial difference. Its leadership, led by Sidney Bunting, was classical Marxists and, as a result, took two approaches relevant to this overview. The first was that it called for racial unity but realized it needed to win over white workers to this position. The second, relevant to a consideration of communist responses to settler colonialism during the interwar period, was that the CPSA tended to downplay South Africa's colonial position. The CPSA did not call for independence, nor see it worth prioritizing, instead focusing on domestic and racial labor issues. It sought to stand for all workers. This approach led the party, and the Comintern, to issue problematic statements in the aftermath of the Rand Revolt of 1922. At Rand, white workers sought to defend their privileges, at the expense of nonwhite workers. The strikes turned violent, with slogans such as "White Workers of the World, Unite!" appearing on banners. In the aftermath of the event, the Comintern and the CPSA supported arrested workers, many of whom were white, showing a naiveté or a blindness to certain racial problems which required a more careful solution. When trade unionist James La Guma arrived in Moscow in 1927 and provided the Comintern with firsthand information that suggested a need for its intervention and a radical policy, the Comintern called for the new line (Davidson et al. 2003; Drew 2003, 2004; Riddell 2012; Adi 2013; Filatova and Davidson 2013; Drachewych 2018, 2019).

Under the Native Republic Thesis, the Comintern assumed South Africa's colonial position, forcing the CPSA to call for independence, under the guise of a black African independent state. The new line was not very successful for a number of reasons. New leaders of the party, backed by the Comintern, forced the old, popular leadership, including Bunting, out. A significant faction developed that criticized the new leadership for speaking plenty about what needed to be done, but actually doing little. Party membership dwindled as many left the embattled party. Despite these issues, the new line did encourage more black Africans to head to the Soviet Union to learn at some of the Comintern schools, and the CPSA saw more black Africans join its leadership (Drew 2004; Drachewych 2018).

When, beginning in 1935, the Comintern relented and agreed that the Native Republic Thesis needed to be amended, it expanded the platform to become a call for an end to exploitation of the racialized groups of South Africa. It maintained a focus on the black African

population, keeping the foundational principle of the Native Republic Thesis. The Comintern expanded the thesis to include CPSA agitation on behalf of the colored and Asian immigrant communities who also were prominent features of the demography of South Africa. Most notably, Afrikaners were also highlighted as another group that needed to be won over to the cause. This last point suggests that the Comintern focused more on undermining the white, British settler bourgeoisie, and therefore, its reimagining of the Native Republic Thesis, the call for South African independence, was not steeped in a strong condemnation of settler colonialism. Regardless of this flaw, and limitation of Comintern consideration of South Africa's settler colonial past, the Native Republic Thesis and the focus on the racialized, colonized, Indigenous community in South Africa made it international communism's most prominent and prioritized platform in attacking settler colonialism and racial oppression (Drachewych 2018). The thesis did prove influential; the African National Congress and South African Communist Party revived it in a reconsidered form in their tactics to fight apartheid in the 1960s (Filatova and Davidson 2013).

Other Settler Colonies

In other settler colonies, the Comintern tended to focus more on combatting imperialism generally than on making any grand statement on settler colonies. If interwar communists did use some messaging that is reminiscent of an understanding of settler colonialism, it was unintended. Nowhere was this more evident than with the Comintern's approach to Ireland and other Celtic nations. Ireland was an important battleground for communism's attack on imperialism, particularly British imperialism. Its close proximity to the metropole and the extensive diaspora of Irish peoples throughout the Anglophone world made it a coveted target for the spread of world revolution (O'Connor 2004, 2005).

Comintern attention focused on protecting the Irish nation and supporting its independence from British influence while also building a communist

movement. Since communism was still in its nascent stages in Ireland, the movement aligned with other powerful national forces, with Irish communist leader Roddy Connolly hoping to convert them to the movement. Therefore, supporting republicanism, which the Comintern suggested only out of necessity, and especially the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had practical benefits for the communists. The IRA also saw potential benefits, seeking weapons from the Soviet Union and traveling to Moscow to shore up potential deals multiple times in the early 1920s. The Irish communist movement in the 1920s was also unstable, especially with Jim Larkin taking over the leadership of it. Larkin had nationalist aspirations too, but his personality drew the ire of Irish communists and leaders in Moscow alike. The Comintern turned to the IRA to provide information about the Irish situation and potentially to spearhead the movement. By the late 1920s, and Larkin having left the moment, the Comintern did what it felt was best for its prospects in supporting the movement on the British Isles generally; it focused on empowering the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) to take the lead on many of these issues and mentor whatever Irish communist movement there was. Perhaps in the clearest sense that the Comintern had no consistent understanding of settler colonialism, it mirrored the original imperial framework it hoped to undermine. Furthermore, the CPGB tended to take a paternalistic attitude toward their Irish comrades, what historian David Convery has labelled "culturally imperialist." Although there certainly were some interested communists who sought to make it an important issue, the Irish question tended to be downplayed in British circles (O'Connor 2004, 2005; Jones 2017; Convery 2018).

At the same time, Irish communist attempts to undermine the Catholic Church caused a rift with the IRA. Furthermore, changes in Comintern tactics during the Third Period, namely, an end to working with other nationalist groups in favor of communist-led ones, led to moments where Irish republicanism was no longer considered useful. Further problems occurred due to the mistakes of the CPI. When the Republican Congress, led by leftist IRA members, took place in 1934, the CPI

disagreed with calls for the congress becoming a party and its republican aims. As a result, a split occurred, preventing the concept from gaining further traction. Following the Popular Front in 1935, the CPI turned down the volume on its calls for revolution in Ireland and, with the lack of any strong partnerships with other groups, quietly disappeared from the political scene (O'Connor 2004, 2005; Jones 2017; Convery 2018).

Unlike Ireland, however, the Scottish and Welsh national movements were always directly under CPGB control, with national factions being directly tied to the party. Both had slow developing movements, owing to the British party opting for a general British workers' movement, ignoring national divisions. One leader, John MacLean, had attempted to start a Communist Party of Scotland, separate from the CPGB, in the early 1920s, but never was able to get it off the ground. It would not be until the mid to late 1930s that the CPGB started to explicitly call for self-determination for Welsh and Scottish peoples, spurred on by the Popular Front and Comintern demands to consider more strongly national elements of the domestic struggle (Kristjansdottir 2002; Jones 2017).

In Scotland's case, communists debated whether England economically exploited the Scots. In the early 1930s, spurred on by concern about nationalism as a force of fascism, a series of articles appeared in CPGB publications on the topic of Scottish nationalism. There seemed to be disagreement about whether Gaelic could be considered still in use and whether Scotland was really exploited by Britain; these arguments appear to have been made and supported by the CPGB largely to downplay Scottish nationalism and maintain a general unified British movement. When the Comintern instituted the Popular Front in 1935, it wanted parties to be more aware of the strength of national questions, ideally taking advantage of national sympathies to draw people to communism. In doing so, communists hoped nationalists would ignore fascism. Following this lead, the party encouraged the adoption of a progressive response to the Scottish national question and sought a response from the Scottish District Party, the Scottish section of the CPGB. After

some delay, the CPGB approved the Scottish communists' plan and adopted the call for self-determination for Scotland. As part of this platform, the CPGB would work with Scottish nationalists, but such a partnership failed to develop with the outbreak of the Second World War (Kristjansdottir 2002; Jones 2017).

Welsh communists seemed more willing to support Welsh self-determination, beginning in 1937. They defined the nationalist struggle around three issues. The first surrounded the Welsh Nationalist Party. Although working with them was rejected, the CPGB did seek to draw nationalists into communism, while also criticizing any fascist tendencies as part of the international campaign against fascism. The other two issues were intertwined. The first was Welsh self-government, initially autonomy, similar to that of British dominions. The second focused on the defense of Welsh culture and language. Again, concepts that defined settler colonialism, namely, the attack on Indigenous languages and culture, came to the fore, and this latter problem was a prominent theme in any propaganda on Welsh self-determination. That said, it took a different tact; the Anglicization of Wales was the work of British capitalists, thus blaming the Welsh bourgeoisie and English capitalists equally. This approach would ensure that English and Welsh workers would still be allies, instead of placing the Welsh proletariat against England itself. Also in 1938, the CPGB agreed to the Welsh program, including the call for self-government. Unfortunately, much like the Scottish Question, the Second World War derailed these efforts until after the war (Jones 2017).

In both cases, the focus was on undermining British imperialism and its exploitation of Celtic peoples. In each case, the Great Depression added to the material realities of each nation and its industry. Including Ireland further in the discussion, there was little discussion of settler colonialism in terms of its stamping out of the Celtic peoples or when discussing cultural or linguistic Anglicization. Emphasis was on British capitalism instead of solely England. Although the Scottish and Welsh movements did stress their individual national culture and, to a lesser extent,

language, all three Celtic national questions, through the Comintern, through the CPGB, and through the Irish communist movement, were placed in the paradigm of exploitative colonialism and a need to attack British imperialism writ large.

The assault on British imperialism defined the worldview and campaigns communist parties in other settler colonies employed. Take the example of Palestine. Led by their understanding of Leninist principles, the Communist Party of Palestine (PKP) ignored the differences between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples in its approach, instead gravitating to a unified struggle of all exploited peoples of both nations. Although the concept of Zionist settler colonialism is still under debate, it was a discussion communists tended to ignore. Instead, PKP members, Jewish and Palestinian, focused on fighting British imperialism and its efforts in the colony. At most, Zionists were seen as partners of the British, who were perpetuating the colonial project similar to other settler colonial bourgeoisie. Communists also tended to discount the strength of any Palestinian national movement (Locker-Biletzki 2018). These positions become all the more complicated when considering the Soviet Union's support for the Israeli state following the Second World War.

The Comintern denied New Zealand's position as a settler colony in 1928, declaring it to be a transitionary state, similar to South Africa, in its worldview. Evidence of the inconsistency of approach from the Comintern itself was its deep interest in the Indigenous peoples of New Zealand, the Maori, and Samoans. When the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) officially formed in 1928, the Comintern urged it to draw them into the party. Communism saw the Maori and Samoans as colonized people and therefore under the purview of the National and Colonial Question and self-determination was the correct course of action. The leadership of the Comintern encouraged the CPNZ to work with the Mau movement, the Samoan nationalist movement, and kept pressing the CPNZ to gain more Samoan and Maori membership well into the 1930s. The New Zealand party however dealt with these issues inconsistently, having a small publication campaign, similar to that of their Australian counterpart, highlighting the poor living conditions and oppression suffered by the Maori. It attempted to make the Maori question a general election issue in 1935, but the pamphlets printed were released too late, thereby not having the desired effect (Taylor 2002; Drachewych 2019).

The communist focus on fighting imperialism broadly was felt in the settler colonies of other imperial powers. In Algeria, one of the examples mentioned as a transitionary colony alongside South Africa and New Zealand at the Sixth Congress, Algerian communists were a subparty, directly under the supervision and control of the Communist Party of France (PCF). Early on, this arrangement led to Algerian communist publications being geared to a European readership and downplaying Algerian issues. Some sections argued that national liberation was premature for Algeria. Following Bolshevization of the PCF, the party started to focus more on Algerian affairs and to draw more Algerians into the party, although with great difficulty. This drive toward indigenization led to Algerians running in elections, including Hadj Ali Abdelkader in Paris, spurring further Algerians, both in France and in Northern Africa, to become involved. The Rif War offered an opportunity for more anti-colonial work in Northern Africa but also increased repression which curbed communist efforts. That said, the connection of the Algerian movement to the French movement had other effects. Whereas the CPGB in Ireland understood the strength of Irish independence, French communists were less convinced, and local communists in Algeria, in part because of the arrangement of the movement, called for proletariat unity and equality instead of national liberation. Some communists wanted to convince their peers of the value of pursuing national independence in Northern Africa. One author asked European communists to spurn their own views of racial superiority in hopes of seeing the merits of liberation, a nod to settler colonial attitudes that still existed in European parties. In 1926, communists voted to support national independence. The tensions of settler colonialism are evident in the French-Algerian partnership (Drew 2003).

Conclusion

The Communist International had some sense that there was a difference between white settler colonies and exploitative colonies, although it struggled to develop a consistent program that prevented a reversion to the generalized program, that of self-determination for any exploited peoples. It had no real Indigenous program, and many parties were left to their own devices in determining whether to do anything for those peoples' plight. For every Australian or Ecuadorian party, there were others who struggled to find a way to deal with their nation's settler colonial past. In some cases, communists deemed other oppressed nationalities more important, such as African-American peoples in the United States, devoting more attention to solving their problems and calling for their autonomy. During the interwar period, communists were still figuring out how to make sense of the world they sought to change. While they understood that white settler colonies developed capitalist structures quicker than their exploited colonial counterparts and caused great devastation to Indigenous peoples, oversimplifications and inconsistency from Moscow often became a problem. Furthermore there was a failure to deal with Russia's (or the Soviet Union's continued) settler colonialism in Siberia and in Central Asia giving the Comintern-led communist movements a hypocritical bent. Communists, however, developed what they felt were the best practices to overcome past and continued exploitations, whether through the development of native republics or full campaigns to give Indigenous peoples autonomy or cultural protections. Combined with its broader efforts to fight imperialism, despite the Soviet Union's faults, international communism's efforts marked a significant campaign to change a global reality.

Cross-References

▶ Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)
▶ Marx, Karl (1818–1883), and Imperialism
▶ Settler Colonialism

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Settler Colonialism: Regional Development and the Dispossession of the Negev Bedouin

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Synonyms

Bedouins; Development; Dispossession; Israel; Land disputes; Law; Modernization; Progress; Settler colonialism

Definition

Of all the varieties of settler colonialism, the form it takes in the Negev desert and its role in the dispossession of the Negev Bedouin is arguably one of the most interesting. The reason for this is that it illustrates the complex intersection and convergence of different forms of rationality, ideology and discourse that operate in a settler colonial context. Through interrogating these forms, we can come to a better understanding of the relationship between economic development and colonialism not as competing but as complementary projects that follow a similar logic. In this process, law proved to be a useful instrument.

Introduction

In an interview with the *Jerusalem Post*, Israel's minister of agriculture Yair Shamir declared his intention to find a resolution to the decades-long land rights dispute between the State of Israel and the Negev Bedouin. Shamir explained that, in formulating his plan, he will consult the Bedouin and try to reach an understanding with them. However, Shamir went on to explain that, failing that, his plan would be carried out anyway 'by force' (Ben Solomon 2014). These comments are characteristic of the State's attitude towards the Negev Bedouins throughout the decades. Shamir

was tasked with solving the decades-long dispute in early January 2014, after the Prawer Plan was halted as a result of a successful campaign of protest by Bedouin activists, non-governmental organisations, human rights groups, and international condemnation of the plan. Shamir's goal is to make amendments to the Prawer Plan before implementing it. It is unclear how many Bedouins would be dispossessed, but projected numbers are from 30,000–70,000 (Amara 2013, p. 42). While for the time being the Prawer Plan is on ice, its revival or the introduction of a new similar plan for the relocation and dispossession of the Negev Bedouin is on the horizon, rendering their future uncertain. Even without the Prawer Plan, the threat of dispossession for the Bedouin due to development plans in the Negev region is ever present (Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality 2014a).

Of course, the situation facing the Bedouin has a history and can thus only be understood in context. This means looking firstly at the historical context of the dispute between the Negev Bedouin and the State of Israel as well as the wider historical context of colonisation. Secondly, this also means looking at the contemporary context where other groups share a similar fate with the Bedouin in other development settings worldwide. In this essay I examine certain aspects of the history of the dispute between the Negev Bedouin and the State of Israel and I reach the conclusion that there exists a certain continuity and overlap between the projects of colonialism and economic development, and that the law and its interpretation are immensely important as a vehicle for the achievement of these projects. I conclude that the dispute between the Negev Bedouin and the State of Israel is in a sense unique because the genesis of the dispute happened at a unique historical juncture that provides a clear example of the intimate relationship between the projects of colonialism and development.

The Negev Region and the Bedouin

Today, Israel's Negev Bedouin population numbers approximately 210,000, with 90,000 living in unrecognised villages (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013) and laying claim to 800,000 dunums of land of which the Prawer Plan would recognise only 200,000 dunums as belonging to the Bedouin (Nasasra 2014, p. 50). Those living in unrecognised villages are under the perpetual fear of having their homes and other structures demolished (Human Rights Watch 2008, pp. 54–88). A recent report by the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (2014b, p. 19) documented 1,261 home demolitions in Bedouin villages in the Negev between January 2012 and July 2013, with demolitions continuing through 2014 (Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality 2014c).

The importance of the Negev desert as a site for Zionist settlement and development was recognised early in the twentieth century, even though this did not lead to the establishment of a significant Jewish presence in the area (Oren 1989, p. 198). However, by the early 1940s, the Jewish National Fund, the most important vehicle for the acquisition and development of land in Mandate Palestine, placed the purchase and development of land in the Negev high on its agenda (Tuten 2005, p. 22). For the Zionist leadership, economic, ideological, political, and strategic considerations converged and made the settlement and development of the Negev a priority. This was particularly true in the case of David Ben-Gurion, who would later become Israel's first prime minister (Oren 1989, p. 197; Tuten 2005, p. 22). This is also evident in the fact that since the founding of the State of Israel, the settlement and development of the Negev has been used as a way for the state to assert its sovereignty, and in pursuing this goal the state has provided strong financial incentives to attract investment for development to the region (Evans 2006, p. 585).

The Ideology of Economic Development

The Bedouin have historically been seen as an impediment to economic development. This was the case even before the founding of the State of Israel, during the Mandate period. For example, in the Hope Simpson Report (Simpson 1930), after

the seemingly indeterminate nature of Bedouin land rights was considered, they were described as 'an anachronism wherever close development is possible and is desired'. Similarly, the assistant district commissioner of Nablus (quoted in Atran 1989, p. 734) described the presence of Bedouin in the area as a 'nuisance and only serves to impede the proper development of a very valuable area'. In general, Zionist discourse during the Mandate period seeking to advance the cause of Jewish settlement in Palestine was dominated by arguments about the benefits of modernisation, development and progress that would be achieved by Jewish immigration and colonisation, and about how Arabs would benefit as well from these progressive changes and be freed from the fetters of traditionalism (Bisharat 1994, pp. 484–486). Another significant and related part of Zionist discourse at the time bore a strong affinity to John Locke's labour theory of value: right to land ownership stems from the agricultural development of land, and while the Arabs neglected the land, according to this argument, Jews and Jewish settlers developed it (Kapitan 1997, pp. 20–21).

Shortly after the State of Israel was established, prime minister Ben Gurion called for the relocation of the Bedouin to the North of the Negev 'in order not to disturb development plans' (quoted in McGreal 2003). Not only were the Bedouins seen as an obstacle to development but, as former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir put it, at the same time they were to be made 'civilis[ed]' (ibid.). Similarly, Moshe Dayan in 1963, at the time serving as minister of agriculture, said '[w]e should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat. . . this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear' (quoted in Shamir 1996). As Sa'Di (1997, p. 38) showed, themes relating to progress, modernisation, and development feature heavily in discussions on the relationship between Zionists and Palestinians, which portray the former as the benevolent and enlightened 'agents of modernization' and the latter as the beneficiaries of the resulting progressive changes.

Nisbet (1994, p. 334) has demonstrated that 'there has been close relationship between belief in the general progress of mankind and belief in

the necessity of economic growth and development'. The origins of development theory, the so-called 'era of development', and the notion of development in general are commonly traced back to the end of the Second World War (Arndt 1987, p. 49; Esteva 2010, p. 1; Leys 1996, p. 5). However, Cowen and Shenton (2005, p. 26) dispute this standard genealogical account of the idea of development and instead trace it to the nineteenth-century notion of 'trusteeship' when 'those who saw themselves as developed believed that they could act to determine the process of development for others deemed less-developed'. The fact that the history of the notion of development – even though it underwent many changes and redefinitions and at any given time had slightly different meanings – goes back to the period of colonisation merits more attention when it comes to considering the relationship between colonialism and development today. For example, Edward Goldsmith (1997, p. 69) finds a 'disquieting continuity between the colonial era and the era of development'. Indeed, the old notion of bringing 'civilisation' to the colonised has now been supplanted by the notion of bringing 'economic development' to Third World countries (Collier 1998, p. 184).

Law, Progress and Development

Interestingly, Western law has had a history whose evolution parallels that of the notion of development and embodies similar concepts and assumptions. The association of 'Western-type' law with moral and civilisational progress has a long history. This understanding of modern Western law and its association with notions of progress, order, development, and modernisation has its origins in the Enlightenment and has in fact had an enabling role in colonialism and was projected as a force of 'civilization' opposed to 'savagery' (Fitzpatrick 2002, pp. 72–111).

Law of course, played a central part in the processes of modernisation and development, and this can be seen in the prehistory of Israel, during the Mandate period. In his study of law during that period, Shamir (2000, p. 08) notes that

'[t]he establishment of a functioning, "Western-type" state apparatus in general and the reconstruction of the legal system in particular, enhanced a general rationalization process that was perceived by most Zionists as a blessed mark of progress and order'.

When considering the dispossession of the Negev Bedouin by the State of Israel, the relationship between law, colonialism, and economic development is important for two reasons. Firstly, in can be argued that the State of Israel can be placed within the colonial context and be properly understood as a settler-colonial state. Indeed, many academics have made this case convincingly (Rodinson 1973; Veracini 2006, pp. 1–2; Yiftachel 2003). Secondly, as mentioned above, Zionist accounts of the relationship between the settlers and the state on the one hand and Palestinian Arabs on the other are guided by notions of modernisation. This also holds true particularly in relation to the Negev Bedouin. As Rosen-Zvi (2004, p. 50) explains, according to official accounts, which find support from planners and some academics, the state's handling of the situation of the Bedouin is 'based on notions of development, modernization'. Considering the above, the way in which the Negev Bedouin came to be dispossessed can only be properly understood if placed within the historical context of colonisation. To be more precise, the relationship between the State of Israel and the Negev Bedouin can be best understood as internal colonialism (Yiftachel 2012). The reason why the colonial paradigm is important when studying the dispossession of the Negev Bedouin is that a particular mode of land acquisition of land using law, and the legal justifications, are characteristic of colonialism. These can be clearly seen at work in the dispossession of the Bedouin in the process of developing the Negev region.

The Beginnings

Traditionally, the Negev Bedouin did not hold formal title for their lands as they saw themselves as autonomous and they were wary of outside authorities (Kram 2012, p. 141). Instead, their claims concerning ownership, use, and occupation of land emanated from traditional law and custom (Bailey 2009, pp. 263–271; Shamir 1996, p. 235). This was the case under both the administration of the Ottoman Empire and later during the Mandate government when the British created the Department of Land in order to formalise land rights (Hussein and McKay 2003, pp. 107–108). The Bedouins showed no interest in having their lands registered as their rights over the land they occupied had not been contested yet (113). The consequence of this was that the failure to register the land meant that it was classified as *mawat*, that is, state land (110). *Mawat* (Arabic for 'dead') was a land classification under the Ottoman Land Law 1858 referring to 'undeveloped or unused land not owned or possessed by anybody' (106). *Mawat* land could be 'revived' through cultivation with permission, in which case payment was not required, or without permission, in which case payment was required before title of the land could be passed to the applicant (109). Even though the *mawat* classification was abolished by the 1969 Real Estate Law along with other antiquated Ottoman land classifications and all *mawat* land passed to the state, the classification was later resurrected by the State of Israel and used in such a way so as to deny the claims the Bedouin had over their lands partly by arguing that since the vast majority of the Bedouin had failed to register those interests, the land therefore passed to the state (Fields 2010, pp. 73–74).

Following the creation of the State of Israel and after the War of Independence broke out, many Palestinian Arabs either escaped the hostilities or were expelled from their homes forcibly. The Negev Bedouin shared the same fate, with the vast majority of them either making their way to Jordan or to Gaza and the West Bank with only 11,000 of them remaining in the Negev (Abu-Saad 2008, p. 1725). Eventually, the majority of those remaining were expelled as well and were transferred to a small area called the 'Siyag', a previous sparsely populated area in the northeast Negev, designated by the Israeli government (1726). Now, under military government, they were prohibited and cut off from most of the Negev and not allowed to visit their lands to

tend to or cultivate them, nor to graze their herds (1725–1726).

Following the forced concentration of the Bedouin from most of the Negev to the 'Siyag', the state used the 1950 Transfer of Property Law and the 1950 Absentees' Property Law to nationalise their lands, and later the 1953 Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law placing them under the control of the Development Authority which was established in 1952 in order to manage them for state-initiated development projects (1729). While the military government came to an end in 1966, the Bedouin who attempted to leave the 'Siyag' and make their way back to their lands found that they were forbidden to do so, and those who tried found themselves to be trespassers on state land (Hussein and McKay 2003, pp. 128). In their absence, the lands that the Bedouin had previously occupied had begun to be developed by the state and with numerous development projects taking place the Bedouin were completely left out of the picture (ibid.). This process of exclusion continued immediately after with the development of a forced sedentarisation scheme in combination with the Planning and Building Law of 1965 which rendered construction that did not conform with the official planning zones (such as residential and agricultural zones) to be illegal. This meant that the Bedouin now lived in unrecognised villages (Hussein and McKay 2003, pp. 258–259). Moreover, the application of the law discriminated against Palestinians, who were ignored by the planning authorities (259). The aim of the sedentarisation scheme was to concentrate the Bedouin and settle them in an even smaller area of the 'Siyag', in townships (Abu-Saad 2008, pp. 1730–1734). It appears that the motive behind the forced sedentarisation schemes for the Bedouin was the acquisition of their lands by the state (Falah 1983, 1989, p. 88). The provision of services in these townships is substandard compared to that in Jewish towns (Abu-Saad 2008, pp. 1733–1734).

The state's policies led to a situation today where those Bedouins, approximately 70,000, refusing to settle by moving to these towns live in 'unrecognised villages' and are under the constant fear of having their homes demolished. The process of dispossession continues to this day and is as dire as it was, as they continue to be marginalised by and excluded from development projects (Humphries 2009, pp. 511–512).

As mentioned above, *mawat* (dead) land was a legal classification of the Ottoman Land Law 1858 referring to land that is not cultivated and is neither owned nor possessed by anyone. The 1858 law provided that the cultivation of *mawat* land constituted 'revival' of the land and, thus, the persons responsible were eligible to acquire formal title to the land (Hussein and McKay 2003, p. 109). However, as Forman and Kedar (2003, p. 502) argued, the *mawat* category during the Mandate was interpreted on the basis of 'Western concepts of land use and colonial exigencies'.

Not only that, the British Mandate government made a number of amendments to the Ottoman Land Law 1858. These included issuing the 1921 Mawat Land Ordinance which gave an unrealistic two-month deadline from the day of its passing for anyone claiming any claims over *mawat* land to formalise them with the administration by way of registration. Once those two months had elapsed, title to the land in question would immediately pass to the government. However, in practice, this did not interfere with the traditional rights and usage of land for those who failed to register their claims (Forman and Kedar 2003, pp. 514–515). But, as noted above, after the State of Israel was founded, in the process of dispossessing the Negev Bedouin, it seized upon this fact to argue that since they had failed to register their interests, the land had passed to the state.

Shamir (1996, p. 232), in his analysis of a series of decisions by the supreme court of Israel dealing with Bedouin land claims, argues that the process of dispossession cannot be explained solely by reference to conscious and calculated attempts to seize Bedouin lands by the instrumental use of the law. He emphasises the influence of British colonialism on the development of Israel's legal system, which was important in 'asserting Zionism's identity as a modern Western project that resists a backward-looking and chaotic East' (237). According to Shamir (232), in the Negev

'as in other colonial settings, a cultural vision complements the physical extraction of land and the domestication of the local labour force and... the law of the colonizers creates an infrastructure for the advancement of such goals'.

Modern law, argues Shamir (233), is characterised by an obsession with order and as such its operation is premised on the idea 'that the most accurate and reliable way for knowing reality (hence 'truth') depends on the ability to single out the clearest and most distinct elements that constitute a given phenomenon'. He shows how the Bedouin have been conceived as 'rootless nomads' by the supreme court, with the effect of their claims to their lands being denied on the grounds that they had not registered them during the Mandate, thus causing them to fall under the *mawat* classification. As they had allegedly not cultivated the *mawat* lands, they were not revived, therefore remaining the property of the state (238–242). However, contrary to these claims, the Negev Bedouin had been cultivating their lands (Marx 1967, pp. 18–23, 81–88, 91–100; Meir 2009, pp. 826–827). However, Israeli courts interpreted the notion of 'cultivation' of *mawat* land so narrowly as to cause all the horticultural or agricultural activities engaged in by the Bedouin to fall short (Amara and Miller 2012, p. 86; Shamir 1996, p. 241).

Unlike Shamir, Kedar (2001, p. 964) finds more room for legal instrumentalism in the process of dispossession; as he explains, 'as in many other settler societies, the quest for land served as a major motivating force that influenced the law's development'. Indeed, it is hard not to notice the immense similarities in how the classification of *mawat* land was used in dispossessing the Bedouin with conscious colonial justifications based on John Locke's labour theory of value for dispossessing native populations from their lands, most notably in the Americas in relation to the Native Americans (Arneil 1996a, b, pp. 132–167; Fitzpatrick 2002, p. 82). Bisharat (1994, p. 483) has noted how in the case of the Bedouin and their lands, the colonial justification provided by Locke could actually be applied (as it could not apply in the case of the rest of the Arab population), but he does not go on to consider how the *mawat* land classification and the

fact that *mawat* land could only be vivified through cultivation were used to dispossess them and the similarities of the process with the Lockean labour theory of value.

Bedouin and Dispossession in International Perspective

The legal arguments that the State of Israel and its institutions utilised in order to dispossess the Negev Bedouin bear a striking similarity to the doctrine of *terra nullius* (Champagne 2012, p. 278). The doctrine of *terra nullius*, a staple justification in the dispossession of indigenous peoples by colonial powers, was successfully challenged and rejected before the International Court of Justice in 1975 and more recently before the High Court of Australia in 1992 in relation to aboriginal land rights (Sheehan 2012). While significant progress has been made in relation to the land rights of indigenous peoples as a result of such legal developments, Sheehan (231) notes that 'the State of Israel has been unwilling to reach an accommodation similar to that demonstrated by other comparable jurisdictions, such as Australia'.

Changing focus from the colonial paradigm to the paradigm of development-induced dispossession, the experience of the Negev Bedouin is not unique and definitely not the most severe. Development-induced displacement is a worldwide phenomenon with severe consequences. For example, in the span of four decades, 2,550,000 people were internally displaced in India due to mining projects (Downing 2002, p. 3). Another example, according to the World Commission on Dams (2000, p. 104) is the development of dams in India and China which may have dispossessed a combined 26,000,000–58,000,000 people. It is estimated that development-induced displacement accounts for the dispossession of 15,000,000 people per year (Cernea 2006, p. 26).

However, in a sense it can be argued that the situation of the Negev Bedouin remains unique. The on-going land disputes between them and the State of Israel came into being at a historical juncture where in the process of their

dispossession, the colonial paradigm and the development-induced internal displacement paradigm overlapped. In other words, there can be observed an immediate continuity in the method of their dispossession, which is identical and illustrates perfectly the continuity between the projects of colonialism and development.

Conclusion

Considering the above analysis, it is not hard to notice the continuity and overlap between colonialism and development, especially in the case of the Negev Bedouin where regional development is taking place in a colonial context. Both colonialism and development advance similar claims as to the alleged benefits of their respective projects, and both justify and rationalise their actions by recourse to notions of progress, modernisation, and order. Additionally, both use the law in order to implement their goals. The law may appear neutral, but its interpretation is not neutral. As was shown above, legal categories and even everyday words like 'cultivation' are interpreted narrowly by the state and the courts so as to achieve policy goals relating to regional development. The history of dispossession of the Negev Bedouin serves as an example and a warning to approach claims of benevolent and beneficial development targeting an unwilling and reluctant group with a degree of scepticism, particularly when that group is marginalised and the balance of power is against it.

Cross-References

▶ Land Grabs, Imperialism, and Anti-imperialism in Africa

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Settler Imperialism

▶ Settler Colonialism

Settler Imperialism and Indigenous Peoples in Australia

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Definition

Settler colonies operate within the larger framework of colonial projects, at times intersecting or overlapping with, at times subverting, other forms of colonisation or empire building. In contrast to other colonisers, settlers superimpose a new social, economic, and ecological order, aiming at the permanent transformation of their new home.

'Settlers come to stay' (Wolfe 2006, p. 388). These four words characterise the central characteristic of a particular colonial formation: the settler colony. It operates within the larger framework of colonial projects, at times intersecting or overlapping with, at times subverting, other forms of colonisation or empire building. In contrast to other colonisers, however, settlers superimpose a new social, economic, and ecological order, aiming at the permanent transformation of their new home. Indigenous populations are therefore to vanish either by assimilation, dislocation, or physical annihilation. As such, settler colonialism is an inherently genocidal, open-ended process to establish and maintain settler supremacy.

Critical approaches to analyse the particularities of settler colonisation have varied over time. Recent understandings of the phenomenon developed in the context of the twentieth-century anti-colonial movement, and strive for self-determination of Indigenous peoples. They have demonstrated that settler colonialism is as a

larger, global phenomenon of imperialist expansion which manifests in multiple forms in different colonial situations: Algeria, Argentina, Manchuria, German South-West Africa, and Palestine are considered prominent examples (Veracini 2010). The interest in the topic has intensified over the last few years and crystallised into an academic journal, *Settler Colonial Studies*, first published in 2011.

Due to the extent and impact of nineteenth-century British overseas settlement, the analysis of past and present settlerism in the 'Anglo-world' (Belich 2009, p. 6), i.e. Canada, US, South Africa, Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand) plays a prominent role in current debates. Recent scholarship is led by a strong interest in the transnational aspects of the history of British settler colonies, investigating how colonial knowledge gained at different sites was exchanged, and the cultural, juridical, and political characteristics they shared. In doing so, many scholars focus particularly on the process of land acquisition, dispossession, and removal of Indigenous populations. Their findings stress the shared legacy of the common law and the vital role notions of individual proprietorship and improvement played in legitimising the appropriation of Indigenous land. They highlight the dynamic relationship between settlers, colonial administrations, and capital interests in the metropoles, such as Chicago or London, and emphasise the influence of common concepts of 'improvement', collective imaginary geographies of 'empty lands', and racist discourses of Indigenous peoples and cultures on settler policies and actions. Environmental and economic histories have made significant contributions to this debate. As Norbert Finzsch has demonstrated, it is vital to analyse the interconnectedness between economic, social, cultural, and ecological dimensions of Australian settlerism. Employing socioecological system theory, he argues that settler expansion is 'achieved in the context of a democratic and egalitarian society of white, predominantly Protestant Anglo-Saxon settlers organized in farms and family households', and is directed against an Indigenous Other (Finzsch 2010, p. 253). Economically, it 'rests on a link between agrarian

home production on the frontier and rentier capitalism in the cities' and has thus 'no periphery and no core, since the capital-owning elites in the cities and the social actors on the frontier form one complex interactive community' (253–254). Finzsch chose the term 'settler imperialism' to designate this particular form of settler colonisation. Settlers play a vital role in this model: their small-scale, local, mundane actions such as squatting, clearing, fencing or tilling the land generated a rhizomatic series of events which transformed the landscape, driving Indigenous people into uninhabitable areas, destroying the material basis of their livelihood and culture (254).

The Australian Case

In 1788, when the 1,483 men, women, and children of the first British convict transport landed at Sydney Cove, the Australian continent was inhabited by approximately 750,000 people, who were organised in a complex network of nations, clans, and families. Their ancestors had migrated to Australia 45,000 years earlier and had cultivated and cared for the landscape ever since. Aboriginal societies had developed a multi-layered system of land ownership and usage based on the principle that different groups held custodianship for particular sacred sites, and with an intricate set of rules managing the access to resources by hunting, foraging, or travelling. Each group developed highly specialised technologies to secure food supplies in adaption to their specific environment. They were interconnected by long distance trade routes along which people, goods, and information travelled across the continent. This diversity is reflected by today's terminology, which explicitly addresses the variety of Indigenous communities living on Australian territory at the beginning of the twenty-first century as Australian Aborigines, Torres Strait Islanders, Papua New Guineans, and Timorese. Each nation, in fact each community, was affected individually by the European settlement. Yet, they all share experiences of violence, dispossession, resistance, and survival. In the following, I will focus on three select aspects of these shared experiences: land rights, violence, and assimilation. Each represents a particular moment in the double sense of the word: a historical moment in terms of a historical key situation or bifurcation and a *momentum*, the driving force of the unresolved conflict of colonial invasion.

Taking the Land: The Doctrine of *Terra nullius*

The captain of the First Fleet, Governor Arthur Phillip, had been issued very specific orders by the Crown concerning the management of the new British outpost. These included directions regarding British–Aboriginal relations: after landing, he had to protect the settlement from possible attacks. He was to establish 'an Intercourse with the Natives and to conciliate their affections'. If any of the Crown's subjects killed an Aborigine or unnecessarily interrupted 'the exercise of their several occupations', Phillips was to punish the perpetrator accordingly. His instructions were less specific regarding the question of Indigenous consent to the establishment of a British outpost and the occupancy of Aboriginal territory. Philips was informed that the Crown intended to provide the project with additional supplies and material which would enable Phillips 'to barter with the Natives either on the Territory of New South Wales, or the Islands adjacent in those Seas' (Commonwealth of Australia 2011a). Yet, the document did not mention Indigenous sovereignty, land occupancy, or tenure that preceded British claims.

This absence, regardless of whether it was by neglect or choice, opened the door for a divergence from established British colonial policy regarding Indigenous land rights that had evolved from the encounter with American Indians over the course of the previous 150 years. Starting with local trade and peace agreements, it had gradually become customary to negotiate with Indigenous inhabitants of a colonial territory for land cession, offering material compensation in return. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 enshrined this practice in British law, stipulating that only the Crown and her

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representatives were entitled to sign such a contract. It also aimed at limiting settler encroachment on Indigenous territory: colonists were forbidden to settle beyond contractual established boundaries. Illegal squats were to be abandoned. Although British colonial administrations often lacked the resources or the political resolve to enforce this stipulation, the Proclamation acknowledged the existence of Indigenous claims and land rights. In the newly established colony of New South Wales (NSW), by contrast, settlers and officials acted on the assumption that no Aboriginal land title existed since the Australian landscape lacked the most significant marker of proprietorship: agricultural usage or 'improvement' of the land, as for instance stipulated in John Locke's famous *Two Treatises of Government* (1689). The territory was considered 'desert and uninhabited' or, in terms of Roman law, a *res nullius,* a land supposedly without a sovereign or a proprietor which was taken into possession by the British Crown by right of discovery, not conquered or acquired by cession (Blackstone 2008/1765–69). By the beginning of the twentieth century, it had become common in international law to refer to this notion as the doctrine of *terra nullius.*

Yet, from the early beginning of colonisation, settlers found ample evidence of Aboriginal land usage. But empirical observation did not suffice to question the doctrine of *terra nullius.* On the contrary, a series of juridical and political decisions bolstered the myth of the empty land. The most prominent among them was the reaction of Governor Richard Bourke when John Batman signed a treaty with a group of Wurundjeri elders on 6 June 1835 in which he acquired 600,000 acres around Port Phillip and along the Yarra River, today the location of the city of Melbourne. Bourke declared this treaty to be 'void and of no effect' in August 1835. The Governor reaffirmed the notion that all 'vacant Lands' were the Crown's property. Only governmental licence could establish a legitimate land title (Commonwealth of Australia 2011b). His decision was approved by the Colonial Office the following October, affirming the concept of *terra nullius.* It took until the end of the twentieth century to overturn it.

Many Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders fought for the recognition of their traditional land titles since the 1940s. They employed strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of political protest to make their demands heard. One of the most effective tools of this struggle was the court procedure: in 1982, three activists (Eddie Mabo, David Passi, and James Rice) filed an action in the Australian High Court in response to the Queensland Amendment Act. They argued that their people, the Meriam, were the traditional owners and proprietors of the islands of Mer (Murray Island), Dauar and Waier, located in the Torres Strait and annexed by Queensland in 1879. These proceedings, Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) also known as Mabo, served as a test case to determine the land rights of Indigenous peoples throughout Australia. In a landmark decision, the court rejected the doctrine of *terra nullius* and recognised the Meriam people's land title on 3 June 1992. The juridical concept used to describe their proprietorship, 'native title', acknowledges the persistence of Aboriginal land rights after settlement. Conceptually, it draws upon earlier decisions in other British settler colonies concerning Aboriginal land rights, e.g. the US (1831) and Nigeria (1921), and was fleshed out in the Native Title Act, passed by the Australian Parliament in 1993 (amended in 1998, 2007, and 2009). The act regulates its recognition, protection, and 'co-existence with the national land management system', installing the National Native Title Tribunal to mediate conflicting interests and claims (National Native Title Tribunal 2013). Subsequent court decisions, such as the Wik case in 1996, established that in case of a conflict of rights, native title would be extinguished by privileges acquired by a pastoral lease.

Although a huge success in abolishing *terra nullius,* the concept and practice of native title were soon criticised, especially after the dismissal of the claims of the Yorta-Yorta nation in a series of trials between 1998 and 2002. During these proceedings, it became obvious that the burden of proof lay exclusively on the Aborigines' side. Continued land usage, according to traditional customs, the central criteria to establish native

title, was interpreted within a rigid framework that did not allow for cultural change. According to this view, strategies of survival and resilience, such as adaptation or acculturation, are seen as abandonment and discontinuity, cancelling out all legitimate land claims. The 'tide of history', to use the words of Justice Olney in his original ruling of 1998, was presumed to have washed away traditional laws and customs. As a result, the doctrine of *terra nullius* was replaced by the 'doctrine of extinguishment' (Anaya 2004, pp. 198–199).

Slow Violence and Low-Level Warfare

Initially, the British settlement was boxed in between the Blue Mountains and the ocean. But as soon as, with the help of Aboriginal guides, a passage across the topographical obstacle was found in 1813 and governmental efforts to contain settlement within the prescribed 'Limits of Location' were dropped, the colonists quickly spread across the continent. In contrast to the US, the most commonly known model of settler expansion in the Angloworld, Australian settlement did not proceed unidirectionally from South-East to North-West but inwards, starting from several beachheads at the rim of the continent such as Sydney, Port Phillip, and Adelaide.

Based on the legal fiction of *terra nullius,* the Crown acted as the sole proprietor and its representatives handed out land grants to reward services or to encourage the emigration of wealthy and respectable free settlers during the early years of colonisation. After 1831, land titles were sold and the revenue used to finance a very successful scheme of assisted immigration: in NSW alone, the number of free immigrants rose from 8,000 persons during the 1820s, to 30,000 and 80,000 in the 1830s and 1840s respectively (Macintyre 2006, p. 73). As the Australasian colonies were successively granted responsible government, starting with NSW in 1855, the control of land policies and responsibilities of revenue from land sales transferred to the colonial legislatures. Concomitantly, landed property, the sign of social status, of wealth, of freedom and respectability during early colonial times, became the key to

building a settler democracy as the franchise was linked to land ownership (as well as male gender and age).Thus, the financial interests of the ruling elite and the political interests of male settlers became intertwined with the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples. The strongest motivation, however, was the individual desire to gain wealth, be it as farmer, miner, or entrepreneur. The largest source of revenue throughout the long nineteenth century, the era of settlement expansion, was wool. In 1850, sheep pastoralists' sales exceeded £20 million per year, amounting to more than 90% of all the colonies' exports. In NSW alone, sheep numbering 4 million in 1840 and 13 million in 1850 grazed on former Aboriginal hunting grounds (Macintyre 2006, p. 57).

The impact on local ecosystems was severe: billabongs were depleted and habitats of marsupials ruined by introducing new herbivores and pasture, massive overgrazing, and erecting fences. The ecologically highly integrated Aboriginal foraging practices were similarly affected as access to water and food was denied. Being cut off from sacred sites corrupted the social cohesion of Aboriginal communities. Thus, environmental changes resulted in a form of 'slow violence' (Nixon 2011, p. 2), which destroyed spiritual and cultural bonds, displaced communities, and killed Aboriginal people. In a similar manner, the destructive power of contagious diseases unfolded. The most important among them was smallpox. It travelled along trade routes, familial and social bonds beyond the limits of European settlement. Settlers often mistook the symptoms for an endogenic Aboriginal illness which rendered the disease and its effects invisible. We know from similar colonial scenarios that the average mortality rate of Indigenous populations lay between one-half and two-thirds, with incidents of whole communities being wiped out. Smallpox also had devastating longterm effects for the survivors: causing blindness, sterilising women, and starving those who were unable to hunt, fish, or gather sustenance.

From the beginning, Australian Aboriginal nations fought against colonisation. As Henry Reynolds demonstrated, motivation, methods, and forms of indigenous opposition against

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the settler invasion were multiple and varied over time. One of its characteristics, however, stands out: in contrast to other Indigenous peoples, Australian Aborigines did not organise in larger political confederacies or alliances. Corresponding to their decentralised way of social organisation, they operated in small, independent groups on a local level. Aboriginal warriors adapted their tactics to the new circumstances, targeting cattle, farms, and infrastructure by relying on their tracking skills and the element of surprise. Instead of incorporating new technologies, such as the use of firearms, Aborigines developed a new form of economic warfare. They abandoned the cycle of foraging and fighting for a combination of raiding and securing resources: the 'Australian frontier warfare' (Connor 2003, p. 21).

During the early phases of settlement, Aboriginal attacks often posed a serious threat to the lives and economic success of the colonies. By the end of the 1820s, for instance, the attacks of the Tasmanian Aboriginal nations had engendered large-scale fear among the white population and provoked thoughts of giving up the colony entirely. James Ross, editor of the *Hobart Town Courier,* declared: '[i]f the outrages of the Blacks be not put down [...] we must abandon the island, we must look for safety only to our ships that will carry us to another shore' (Ross 1830, p. 3). In response to the Aboriginal resistance, Lieutenant-Governor George Arthur declared martial law in 1826 and organised one of the largest counter-insurgency operations in Australian history: the so-called Black Line. From 7 October to 30 November 1830, about 2,200 men (among them approximately 550 soldiers, 440 free men, 800 assigned convicts) joined up to form a line or rather several lines to drive the Tasmanian Aborigines out of their hiding places to the South end of the Island to be shipped to an offshore reservation. The outcome of the £30,000 operation was unexpected: only two Aboriginal Australians were captured, two more reported killed. The overwhelming majority slipped through during the cover of night and/or hid in more inaccessible areas of the island. But it succeeded in forcing the Big River and the Oyster Bay nations to surrender in 1831 (Clements 2013, pp. 21, 27–28).

As a form of governmentally organised violence, the Line was, however, the exception. Decentralised, local, low level acts of violence were much more common as the rhizomatic expansion proceeded: settlers shot Aboriginals they considered to be 'trespassing' on their land, poisoned wells to murder clans living nearby, and organised counter-raids to kill Aborigines, exerting vengeance and striking terror into the hearts of those whom they believed to be their subhuman enemies (see e.g. the cases documented by Ryan 2008). Among the best-known cases is the massacre at Myall Creek in 1838. Here, 12 stockmen, in pursuit of Aboriginal warriors who had carried out a successful attack on the whites' cattle, encountered a group of Wirrayaraay, mainly women and children, who had sought refuge with local hut keepers and shepherds. Under pretence, the stockmen led the Aborigines away and murdered them. Myall Creek is unusually well documented as seven of the massacre's perpetrators were not only convicted of murder but also executed; a singularity in Australian history.

Settler violence escalated in the second half of the nineteenth century once the army withdrew from punitive expeditions after 1838. Factors responsible were: the rise in immigrants increasing demographic and economic pressure on the land; land-consuming exploitation initiated by the discovery of valuable minerals such as gold or copper; self-governance giving settler interests more and more influence on politics. Additionally, new strategies and methods were applied to counter Aboriginal tactics and skills: rifles instead of muskets, and a fast, mounted pursuit assisted by Aboriginal trackers. In Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, and the Northern Territory, this took the form of establishing native police forces.

Survival and Assimilation

Violent resistance was not the only response of Aboriginal communities to British colonisation. Numerous instances of creative adaption, co-operation, and acculturation are documented in the historical records. Their exact form

depended on the economic and demographic circumstances Aboriginal people were confronted with. Aboriginal Australians were, for instance, part of urban life right from the beginning of settlement. Starting in the 1830s and 1840s, Aboriginal men and women worked as farm hands, shepherds, and shearers on pastoral farms. Often, they would accept only seasonal labour, 'going in' to obtain money or valued commodities, and leaving as soon as their interests had been fulfilled. The most lasting impact of Aboriginal adaptation, however, can be found in the Bass Strait area where Indigenous women from Tasmania as well as Southern Mainland and a group of sealers established a 'creole society' during the first three decades of the nineteenth century (Ryan 2012, p. 58). As 13% of the men were of a non-European background, this community was not only bi- but multicultural in its origins. Initially abducted, or acquired from Aboriginal clansmen in exchange for the highly valued hunting dogs, the so-called tyereelore women were often sexually and economically exploited. Yet, they also gained considerable influence as the sealers relied on their hunting skills to catch seals and muttonbirds. They kept their cultural heritage alive and created new traditions by inventing their own corroboree songs and dances. Due to their cultural and economic influence, they became the guardians of a new and predominantly matriarchal society.

These forms of resilience were, however, overshadowed by the colonisers' relentless efforts to eliminate Aboriginal traditions and culture by forced assimilation. The means applied varied over time, but most often included governmental schemes to restrain their movement, to settle and compel them to subsistence farming. As in many other colonial contexts, missionaries played a crucial yet ambiguous role in these programmes, as did Christianisation. The most devastating effect on Aboriginal communities, though, was the continued practice of child removal. It began during the colonial era when children, who had been orphaned by European diseases or violent conflicts, were taken into settlers' homes. Some of them were kept in wealthy households as curiosities or, in the spirit of humanitarianism and enlightenment, as living experiments to explore

the transformative power of education. Other motivations were of a more prosaic nature: Aboriginal children were abducted and exploited as unpaid labour. Girls were often not only trained as household servants but also forced into concubinage. Government agencies employed removal on a large scale from the turn of the twentieth century to sever the children's familial and cultural ties in order to integrate them into white Australian mainstream society. These policies explicitly targeted the descendants of mixed relationships. Raised in white foster families, they were encouraged to intermarry with non-Aboriginals to 'breed out' Indigenous cultural and genetic characteristics. According to the report of the *Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission*, published in 1997, no fewer than 100,000 children were displaced in this manner between 1909 und 1969. The report also revealed that although the official programmes had been abandoned, Aboriginal children were still preferably transferred into the care of white families for foster care or adoption (Commonwealth of Australia 1997).

Forced assimilation can be considered as the biopolitical flipside of the 'logic of elimination' (Wolfe 2006, p. 387) that structured Aboriginal–settler relations. As the productive element of settler colonial governmentality, it complements dispossession and annihilation by paternalistic policies of protection, education, and amalgamation. On 13 February 2008, Kevin Rudd, as newly elected prime minister, apologised for 'the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on' Aboriginal Australians. His speech put particular emphasis on 'the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country' and 'the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind' (quoted in Barta 2008, pp. 204–205). In his carefully phrased apology, Rudd focused on the human dimension of suffering, thereby, as critics point out, playing down the systematic, genocidal character of assimilation policies, including first and foremost child removal.

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Ways of Conclusion

Despite this important gesture, Australian settler imperialism and its genocidal history remain unresolved. Under the conservative administration of prime minister John Howard (in office 1996–2007), governmental support of the reconciliation process waned. A move away from what was contemptuously called 'black armband history' was encouraged and central findings of the Commission criticised. Conservative journalists, most prominently Keith Windschuttle, stipulated that the decline of Aboriginal societies was not the result of settler violence. Again, the fate of Aboriginal Tasmanians was utilised as a case study, echoing nineteenth-century 'extinction discourse' (Brantlinger 2003, p. 1). The resulting debate, also known as 'History Wars', has inspired an even more critical inquiry into the history of settler imperialism in Australia and has broadened our understanding of the dimensions of settler–Aboriginal interaction. Yet, as Larrissa Behrendt has emphasised, 'the History Wars are not about Aboriginal history at all, but about a growing crisis in white identity in Australia' in the face of economic globalisation and increasing nonwhite immigration (Paisley 2003, p. 5).

Access to land and its resources has lain at the heart of the conflict between Aboriginal peoples and settlers right from the beginning of colonisation. It generated a particular kind of violence, systematic in its aim to dispossess and dislocate the traditional custodians of the land, driven by converging economic and political interests yet without a master plan, executed in unspectacular everyday practices but also erupting in bursts of localised guerrilla warfare and vigilantism. Assimilation politics disrupted families and shattered identities. The repercussions of these events are still felt today: according to the 2006 Census, about three-quarters of the approximate 464,000 persons identifying as Aboriginal Australians live in urban areas. As a group, they are highly overrepresented in prisons, unemployment, crime, drug and alcohol abuse statistics. Simultaneously, however, more Aboriginal Australians than ever before have seized the opportunities offered by access to higher education and to modern media to reclaim their land and to improve the situation of their communities.

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Settler-Colonialism and the New Afrikan Liberation Struggle

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Overview

Most elementary students in the United States are instructed that the United States is "one nation, under God with liberty and justice for all." This notion has been historically challenged by Black revolutionaries, particularly the New Afrikan Independence Movement (NAIM) The New Afrikan Independence Movement (NAIM) is an ideological trend in the Black freedom struggle that has sought independent statehood for African descendants in the United States. The distinguishing event for the modern manifestation of the NAIM is when 100 Black nationalists declared their independence from the United States in 1968 and identified the states of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina as their national territory. The New Afrikans demanded reparations, including their national territory, as reparations from the United States (Provisional Government of the Republic of New Africa 1969). The New Afrikan movement has asserted that the United States is not "one nation under God," but an empire whose foundation is based on annexation of the land and genocide of indigenous peoples and the captivity and exploitation of the labors of Afrikan (The author spells Afrika with a "k." This spelling has been consistently used by Black nationalists as a form of self-determination since the 1970s) people. This position argues the United States was founded as a white settler colony of European (particularly Anglo) settlers that occupied the territories of indigenous nations of North America, Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Captive Afrikan people were forcibly transported to the western hemisphere and forced to work within the US empire in the system of racial slavery, which was fundamental to the development of the United

States and its capitalist economy. Revolutionary nationalists have defined the United States as an "imperialist state" since its very origin and foundation was the occupation of the land and the genocide of the indigenous population, as well as the enslavement and super-exploitation of captive Afrikan labor (Muhammad n.d.).

Colonial History

From the sixteenth through the nineteenth century, western European imperialists invaded the western hemisphere in search of gold, wealth, and new territories for settlement and exploitation. The Dutch, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and British spearheaded the invasion of the Americas and competed to establish their presence and dominance in the hemisphere. European imperialists viewed the vast land of North America as a territory with great potential for settler colonies. The European imperialists ignored and disrespected the relationship that indigenous people had with the land they lived on since the origins of humanity and claimed these territories for themselves. European monarchies and commercial interests were involved in the establishment of settler colonies in North America. The establishment of settler colonies meant the removal and genocide of indigenous populations.

The British imperialists and their Anglo offspring in the US empire ultimately outmaneuvered their European competitors for dominance in North America. The Dutch lost their claim to New Netherlands settler colony (which includes the contemporary states of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Connecticut) to England as a result of two wars between the two colonial powers. The Spanish established a settlement in what is now coastal South Carolina and Georgia in 1526, which was overthrown by captive Afrikans and indigenous people the same year. The Spanish did maintain a presence in Florida for nearly two centuries. With the exception of its settlement in Saint Augustine (founded in 1565), the Spanish primarily used Florida as a buffer between British colonial expansion in the southern territories of North America and Spanish colonies in the Caribbean

(e.g., Cuba, Santo Domingo). The Spanish ultimately surrendered claim of Florida first to the British in 1763 and later to the US empire in 1819. The French established a presence in the Louisiana territory and arrogantly made claim to nearly a third of the North American mainland. The Louisiana territory included the coastal region north of the Gulf of Mexico. France granted the city of New Orleans and surrounding parishes to Spain in 1762, but reclaimed these colonial possessions in 1800. The US empire purchased the Louisiana territory from France in 1803. This sale of the European claim to a third of North America was necessary due to financial losses suffered by France in defeat of its colonial war in San Dominque (Haiti). The white settlers' thirst for indigenous land, now claimed by the US imperialist state, accelerated the drive for "Manifest Destiny."

The Virginia and the South Carolina colonies served as the basis for racial slavery for the lands occupied by the Anglo settlers in North America. The British established the Jamestown settlement in Virginia in 1607. The Virgina colony was the first to introduce captive African labor into Anglo North America in 1619 with 20 Afrikans from West-Central Afrika. The initial group of captive Afrikans in the Virginia colony had the status of indentured servants. The indentured servants assumed lives as independent laborers, even landowners, after working off their sentences. In the decades to come, the Virginia colony would institute the policy of racial slavery assigning Afrikans the status of perpetual captivity. White indentured servants and other Anglo settlers aligned themselves with captive Afrikans during Bacon's Rebellion of 1676. Bacon's Rebellion was ostensibly an attempted insurrection of Anglo settlers against their rulers in order to break agreements with indigenous people to seize more Indian land. The rebellious Anglo settlers aligned themselves with white indentured servants and captive Afrikans in their insurgency against the British crown. This motivated Virginia's settler colonial ruling class to employ "divide and conquer" strategies between marginalized white settlers and captive Afrikans. White supremacist ideology was emphasized to create solidarity between all white settlers. The practice of white indentured servitude was

gradually ended and captive Afrikans became the primary labor force in the colony.

Unlike Virginia, the South Carolina settler colony did not transit into racial slavery but instituted the policy of racial slavery from its foundation. Anglo slaveholders from the British colony of Barbados led the establishment of the colony in the 1670s. The English slaveholders brought the slave code and other policies and practices of oppressing captive Afrikans of the Caribbean sugar colony. Establishing indigo and rice plantations utilizing captive African labor, the white settler colony of South Carolina had a Black majority by 1750. In 1739, the Stono Rebellion, led by enslaved Afrikans from West-Central Afrika, motivated the white settlers to reinforce the measures of its initial slave code. The South Carolina code would be modeled in subsequent slave societies in the southern colonies, particularly in the Georgia colony founded in 1733 and embracing racial slavery in 1751.

Settler Colonialism and the Founding of the White "American" Republic

North American white settler nationalists sought independence from British imperialism in the eighteenth century. The white settler bourgeoisie organized resistance to the British empire to assert their economic independence. Rebelling against the British crown, the white settler war of independence was a bourgeoise democratic revolution seeking a republican form of government opposed to monarchy. While a person of Afrikan descent and fugitive from captivity, Crispus Attucks, was the first to die in the American revolt against the British empire, the "American Revolution" was ostensibly pro-slavery, anti-Afrikan, and hostile to indigenous nations, who they considered "savages." For example, one of the charges the white settlers made of England's King George in their Declaration of Independence was:

> He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions (National Archives 2019).

The founders of the white settler "American Revolution" were divided on the question of slavery. In an essay titled "The Founding Fathers and Slavery," historian Anthony Iacarrino states a significant number of the most prominent "founding fathers" were slaveholders (2019). The British empire and their loyalists exploited the contradiction of the exclusion of Afrikan and indigenous people from the white settler rebellion. To undermine the American white settler economy, the British would offer emancipation to enslaved Afrikans who escaped to British-controlled territory in the conflict. The British also offered arms to captive Afrikans and formed alliances with indigenous nations and with outlying New Afrikan resistance communities (so-called maroons or kilombos). The crisis created by the conflict also provided captive Afrikans, particularly in South Carolina and Georgia, to escape to the woods and swamps in the frontier. Captive Afrikans seeking refuge formed alliances with indigenous nations in Florida to form the Seminole confederation. After the British incorporated Afrikans in their military, the American settler nationalists in some cases conscripted Afrikans into the "patriot" military. Slaveholders even required captive Afrikans to replace them on the battlefield.

The new Euro-American settler republic would extend full democratic rights to the white bourgeoisie and privileged property owners fearing common laborers and small farmers among the settler population. White women, indigenous people, and Afrikans, enslaved and "free," found themselves in a subordinate position. The subject status of people of Afrikan descent was codified in the Constitution of the US imperialist state, which was a pro-slavery document. The US Constitution counted captive Afrikans as "three-fifths (3/5) of person" for the sake of counting the population for representation in the national legislature and determining what each state owed for taxation to the federal government. The Constitution also declared Afrikan runaways as property that had to be returned to slaveholders (a "fugitive slave" provision), and continued the traffic in Afrikan humanity (the so-called slave trade) for 20 years from 1787 to 1807. The "fugitive slave" provision was reinforced in Congressional legislation in 1793 and 1850. The

provision to maintain the international traffic in Afrikan labor was a compromise. Georgia and South Carolina advocated maintaining the traffic to replace the loss of captive Afrikan laborers who escaped during the white settler war of independence. Other states wanted to end the traffic fearing the increased importation of enslaved African within the United States may produce a majority New Afrikan population in North America similar to Caribbean nations. These states didn't want the demand for African labor to result in the rest of the United States going the way of South Carolina and its Black majority.

The innovation of the cotton gin in 1793 made the cultivation and production of the crop more profitable and would drive the US economy for the next 130 years. The potential of profits from cotton increase the demand for land for its cultivation. Removal of indigenous peoples from the southeastern territory of the US empire and the expansion of the system of racial slavery became primary objectives of the white settler interests and the imperialist states. Indian removal from Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana and massive genocide of indigenous nations led to the period known as the "Trail of Tears." Particularly, as the legal international traffic in Afrikan labor was ending, to meet the demand for Black labor in the new, acquired occupied territory, the exporting of captive African laborers from the original settler colonies to cotton-producing states in the deep south. The domestic exportation of captive Afrikan workers meant the inhumane separation of captive Afrikan families, as spouses were separated and parents were severed from children. The new demand for captive Afrikans also motivated breeding enslaved Afrikans to export in the domestic traffic of Black labor.

Resistance and the Formation of a New Afrikan Nation

The New Afrikan Independence Movement argues that the descendants of captive Afrikans exist as a colonized people or nation within the US empire. They argue that the ethnic groups from West and West-Central Afrika who were forcibly transported to North America as captive labor merged culturally into one people, a New Afrikan people. The initial group of captive Afrikans were born in Afrika and established the foundation of the culture, including the language, food ways, and spirituality, for the New Afrikan nation. The majority of the Afrikan population, "free" and captive, were born in North America by the first decades of the nineteenth century. They no longer identified themselves by their Afrikan ethnic identities (e.g., Igbo, Mandinka, Mende, Bamana, Wolof, or Kongo) but generally saw themselves as one people (Gomez 1998). The heart of this New Afrikan nation was located in the southeastern section of the US empire. The New Afrikan people interacted with indigenous nations often receiving refuge and forging political and military relationships. Some New Afrikan and indigenous people married and produced and joined lineages.

The northern states of the newly formed white settler republic did not see an economy based on chattel slavery as the best direction for its economic development. The white settler states in the north gradually eliminated chattel slavery after gaining their independence from England. While eliminating chattel slavery, the emancipated Afrikans in the northern states still found themselves subject to discrimination and often disenfranchisement. Some emancipated Afrikans formed mutual aid societies, social organizations, churches, and other forms of solidarity to build community and protection in a hostile environment.

Indigenous Afrikan philosophy defined a people's land by where their ancestors were buried. New Afrikans began to identify with land in North America, particularly in the south where the majority lived and labored after generations of captive and "free" Afrikans were buried in the soil of North America. In his book *There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America*, historian Vincent Harding documented an example of this New Afrikan national consciousness in a song sung by Black insurgents on the South Carolina Sea Islands:

> Hail! all hail! Ye Afric clan! Hail! ye oppressed ye Afric band! (Repeat).
>
> Who toil and sweat in slavery bound, And when your health and strength are gone, Are left to hunger

and to mourn. Let independence be your aim, Ever mindful what 'tis worth;

Pledge your bodies for the prize, Pile them even to the skies!

Chorus: Firm, united let us be, Resolved on death or liberty! As a band of patriots joined, Peace and plenty we shall find.

Look to heaven with manly trust. And swear by Him that's always just. That no white foe, with impious hand. (Repeat).

Shall slave your wives and daughters more, or rob them of their virtue dear! Be armed with valor firm and true, their hopes are fixed on Heaven and you, That Truth and Justice will prevail.

Chorus.—Firm, united, etc.!

Arise! Arise! shake off your chains. Your cause is just, so Heaven ordains; To you shall freedom be proclaimed! (Repeat).

Raise your arms and bare your breasts. Almighty God will do the rest. Blow the clarion's warlike blast; Call every negro from his task; Wrest the scourge from Buckra's (New Afrikan term for white oppressors) hand. And drive each tyrant from the land! (Harding 1993)

This anthem demonstrates a clear insurgent, national consciousness and desire for self-determination and national liberation in the early nineteenth century. Their identification with their Afrikan ancestry (Afric clan), call for independence, and desire to be free from the tyranny of white oppressors are similar to the revolutionaries in Haiti nearly a decade earlier. The 1811 March to New Orleans led by Charles Deslondes in Louisiana reflected similar revolutionary nationalism and desire for freeing territory to establish an independent state.

Captive Afrikans organized insurrections to free themselves from enslavement. Historian Herbert Aptheker documented over 250 attempted insurrections and conspiracies by captive Afrikans in North America. The most notable are the New York conspiracy of 1712; the Stono (South Carolina) Rebellion of 1739; the Gabriel Prosser-led uprising of 1800 in Henrico County, Virginia; the March to New Orleans of 1811; the Denmark Vesey-led conspiracy of 1821 in Charleston, South Carolina; and the rebellion led by Nat Turner in Southampton, Virginia, in 1831.

Another form of collective resistance was the organization of kilombo communities and networks in the frontier. The Seminole Wars (1817–1818 and 1835–1842) represented one of the best examples of resistance to white settler colonialism and the system of racial slavery. White settler demand for land coupled with the existence of New Afrikan kilombo communities aligned with the Seminole nation represented a motivation to expand into Florida and led to the Seminole Wars. Afrikan runaways constituted a critical population in the Seminole confederation. Afrikan experience with tropical warfare was very applicable to the military conflict in Florida. The agricultural skills of Afrikan people and their knowledge of the language and culture of the white settlers were also assets to the resistance of the Seminole nation versus white settler invasion. While considered an "Indian war," US military command stated the engagement as a "Negro war." The conflict in Florida ended with the indigenous Seminoles and "Freedmen" provided free passage to Indian territory in Oklahoma. After discerning that they were betrayed, several of the Afrikan Seminoles escaped to Texas and Mexico to form new kilombo communities.

The Afrikans also established kilombos in other parts of the US empire. The largest population of runaways were in the Great Dismal Swamp of southeast Virginia and northeast North Carolina. The Swamp was originally occupied by indigenous people and marginalized white settler who formed communities in the middle and late seventeenth century. Afrikan fugitives established outlier communities in the eighteenth century and ultimately became the majority residents of the Swamp by 1750. Scholars agree that thousands of Afrikans sought refuge in the Swamp, while no definite number has been determined. The fugitive rebels of the Dismal Swamp maintained their autonomy from slaveholders in Virginia and North Carolina until the end of the US Civil War.

One People: Multiple Political Cultures

The works of historians Michael Gomez and Cedric Robinson established the heterogeneous character of Afrikan descendant political culture and consciousness in the United States. Gomez asserts that by 1830 "two distinct and divergent visions of the African presence in America" emerged. One vision was the desire to seek

inclusion within the white setter institutions and civil society of the United States as "full participants in the American political experiment" (Robinson 1997). The other was less hopeful of inclusion as equal partners within the US power structure, seeking more autonomous direction and held "close to the bosom of Africa as they could get" (Gomez 1998).

In his book *Black Movements in America*, Cedric Robinson also argued that "two alternate Black political cultures" emerged by the 1850s, one assimilationist and elitist, another separatist (or nationalistic) and communitarian. The Afrikan political experience in the United States has diverse ideological currents ranging from assimilation, pluralism, autonomy, radical transformation, and nationalism. The desire for "first-class" US citizenship became one political objective of Afrikan descendants. Others had greater desires for self-determination and autonomy. The desire for self-determination has a variety of expressions, particularly seeking a distinct identity from the United States and an autonomous or independent political existence. The impulses for inclusion and self-determination competed with each other and co-existed within Afrikan descendant communities within the United States.

Manifest Destiny, Occupied Territory, Leading to Civil War

The desire of white settlers to occupy more indigenous and Mexican land westward led to the concept of "Manifest Destiny," which was basically the belief that white settlers had a "God-given" right to seize and occupy all the territory in the North American continent. The conflict between two different economies within the US settler colony led to civil war. This concept further accelerated indigenous genocide and the white American occupation of northern Mexico. White settler slaveholders were motivated to occupy northern Mexico, ignoring the sovereignty of the Mexican people and seizing their territory for cotton production based on captive Afrikan labor in Texas, ultimately to expand in other lands in the territory.

The newly acquired lands of the US imperialist state increased the contradiction between the slave-holding economy and the growing manufacturing economy backed by finance capitalists based in the northern states of the empire. One issue was the northern finance capitalist advocacy for tariffs on imported commodities from French and British to capitalists to eliminate competition with US-based products from the manufacturing industry. Newly white settler-occupied territories seeking to enter the United States as states within the union also became a political issue. Would the new state enter the US legislature supporting the policies and economic interests of the pro-slave holding or pro-manufacturing and finance capital dominant development? With the political factor of the abolitionist movement entering the fray, this contradiction led to armed conflict, particularly in the struggle for the Kansas territory becoming a state within the United States.

The relationship of Afrikan descendants to the US imperialist state would be raised in the empire's national legislature and judiciary. The Fugitive Slave provision of the US Constitution was reinforced in 1850. This provision made the liberty of Afrikans who escaped from racial slavery in the "free" states in the north and western regions. Black communities organized vigilance committees to protect runaways from slave catchers.

A captive Afrikan sued for freedom against his slaveholder and took his case all the way to the US Supreme Court. Dred Scott lived over a year in the "free" state of Illinois and challenged the legal jurisdiction of his slaveholder, who wanted Scott to return to a slaveholding state. The Supreme Court ruled in Scott case that citizenship in the United States only applied to white people, not people of Afrikan descent. This ruling questioned the status of "free" people of Afrikan descent in nonslaveholding territories.

The 1850 Fugitive Slave bill and the Dred Scott decision increased numbers considered emigration to Africa or other territories. Others considered insurrection as a possibility. One Black minister and political activist quoted in Sterling Stuckey's *Slave Culture*, Henry Highland Garnet envisioned Black self-determination emerging in the southern region of the US empire. At a public meeting,

Garnet advocated for a "grand center of Negro nationality, from which will flow the streams of commerce, intellectual, and political power." Garnet identified the southern United States when asked the location of the center of Afrikan nationality. He argued, "Hayti is ours. . .Cuba will be ours soon, and we shall have every island in the Caribbean Sea." He concluded, "If we do not form a Negro nationality" in the South ". . .I am mistaken in the spirit of my people" (Garnet quoted in Stuckey 1987).

Civil War Between White Settlers

The US Civil War was initiated by the majority of the states who depended on captive Afrikans as the primary labor source. The pro-slavery Confederate States of America wanted to import goods from European manufacturing economies, particularly England and France, with tariffs by the federal government. They also wanted to expand the policy of slaveholding into new territories in the west and considered re-opening the trans-Atlantic traffic of African labor. The Confederate States included Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee.

In the initial years of the settler colonial civil war neither side supported the emancipation of captive Afrikans. The Confederates clearly unambiguously supported the system of racial slavery. US President Lincoln's priority was the maintenance of the unity of white settler colonial republic. Lincoln stated:

My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy Slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union (Vorenberg 1993).

Advocates of the emancipation of captive Afrikans saw the war as an opportunity to eliminate racial slavery. They lobbied President Lincoln to arm Blacks willing to join the Union Army

and to emancipate enslaved Afrikans. Lincoln was clear that his decision to emancipate captive Afrikans in the states of rebellion was a "fit and necessary war measure for ending the rebellion" (Lincoln 1863). Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was utilized to encourage escape of captive Afrikans from southern plantations to undermine the Confederate economy. Lincoln would state his emancipation policy and recruitment of Black people into the Union war effort were the key elements in defeating the Confederacy. In his classic work *Black Reconstruction*, W. E.B. DuBois labeled the self-activity of captive Afrikans to undermine the Confederate economy as the "General Strike" (DuBois 2007).

Reconstruction: Self-Determination or Subjugation

The end of the US Civil War was an opportunity for the United States to end its colonial relationship with captive Afrikans. The US government had to decide whether it could offer Afrikan descendants the right to self-determination or to further subjugate them. The founders of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika (PGRNA) argued in 1968 that the United States denied the Afrikan descendant population their right to self-determination by making Black people US citizens without their consent after emancipation. New York activist attorney Joan Franklin utilized international law to develop the PGRNA's argument that Black people in the United States, the descendants of captive Afrikans, were denied the right to self-determination. The PGRNA founders argued:

Black People have never had legal citizenship in the United States. To begin with, when our ancestors were set free from slavery they should been allowed to choose what they wanted to do. They should have been allowed to choose whether they wanted (1) to be United States citizens (2) to go back to Africa or somewhere else, or (3) to set up their own nation. This is international law (Provisional Government of the Republic of New Africa 1969).

They also argued that Afrikan descendants were also not treated as US citizens after emancipation. The 13th amendment to the US Constitution

formally ended chattel slavery (except for punishment for crime) in 1865. This act legally brought emancipation to captive Afrikans in the United States. The PGRNA and New Afrikan Independence Movement's position is that the United States had to make an offer to the emancipated African community to determine their political destinies and relationship with the United States.

The closest thing to an inquiry of what Afrikan desires were after their captivity ended was when Union General William Sherman convened a meeting of 20 Black clergymen in Savannah, Georgia, in January 1865. Sherman's troops conquered coastal South Carolina and Georgia. This region was predominately Afrikan descendants prior to the Civil War, and was even a greater New Afrikan ratio to whites, with many pro-Confederate whites leaving the region with Sherman's army victories on the coast. Sherman ordered one of his generals, Edwin Stanton, to convene a meeting with Black leaders to determine their desires. All but one of the Black leaders wanted to live in their own communities and engage in agriculture. They pledged their allegiance to support the US war effort in return for the promise of land acquisition. On January 16, 1865, Sherman issued his Field Order #15 after the gathering offering lands in 40-acre plots to any emancipated Afrikan family residing on or moving to coastal Georgia and South Carolina, including the Sea Islands. No white person was to enter this territory without the permission of the Union military and the New Afrikan population would be allowed to have local autonomy, governing themselves in this area.

Tunis Campbell was a New Jersey-born free person of Afrikan descendant. He was appointed to be an administrator of the federal Freedman's Bureau. Campbell was assigned by the federal government to manage the emancipated Afrikans in coastal Georgia Sea Islands, particularly Sapelo, Saint Catherine's, and Ossabaw. He organized an autonomous government on these islands with a legislative body and court system and a militia of 275 Afrikan men. The Union Army would force Campbell off of the Sea Islands to the mainland after being made aware of his efforts toward self-governance.

One option for the United States was to send emancipated Blacks outside of the United States.

Lincoln did not believe that Afrikans and white American settler descendants could live in peace. Supporters of Lincoln's position actually allocated funds in Congress to settle emancipated Afrikans in another territory outside the United States. Lincoln believed transportation of millions of Blacks to Liberia to be too expensive. He investigated possibilities of re-settling emancipated Afrikans to the Caribbean and Central America and posed this idea to Black leaders in 1862 (Vorenberg 1993). Some like Frederick Douglass opposed the idea of Black colonization outside the United States. Henry Highland Garnet supported the proposal.

Another option was to offer citizenship to emancipated Afrikans. The federal government was controlled by the Republican Party. The former Confederates were concentrated in the Democratic Party. To gain political control in the southern states, the Republicans aligned themselves with the political leaders of the newly emancipated Afrikan descendant communities. The Republican Party proposed the emancipation of the New Afrikan population through the 13th Amendment of the US Constitution, which eliminated involuntary servitude (except for punishment of crimes). Citizenship to Afrikan descendants through the 14th Amendment made any person born in the United States a citizen. The 14th Amendment legally reversed the Dred Scott decision. Furthermore, adult males of Afrikan descent were given the right to vote under the 15th Amendment. A century later, New Afrikan nationalists would argue that citizenship could only be offered to emancipated Afrikans, not declared by Congress. The U.S. federal legislature had no Black representation in 1868, when the 14th Amendment was ratified and other than Sherman's gathering in Savannah, Black people had not been formally consulted.

The citizenship, human rights, and relationship of Black people with the United States were tenuous and contested. Immediately after the war, the Republican policy toward the emancipated people of Afrikan descent was not uniform. Texan Andrew Johnson was sworn in as President after Lincoln's assassination in 1865. Johnson was conciliatory toward the former Confederates and allowed the institution of the "Black codes" or laws meant to

maintain white social and political control of Afrikan descendants in southern states. Republicans in Congress exercised their power to take over reconstruction from the President with the Reconstruction Act of 1867. This divided the old Confederacy into five military districts, empowered and armed Blacks and Republicans in the south to form militias to protect themselves and the Reconstruction state governments, and stipulated former Confederate states must ratify the 14th and 15th Amendments to regain status in the Union. A minority of Republicans wanted radical redistribution of land in the south to provide economic empowerment for emancipated Afrikans. The majority favored a more paternal policy that encouraged Black people were laborers in a servile position. The later policy was consistent with industrial capitalism, as the cultivation of cotton was still necessary for the textile industry and Afrikans were still needed to pick it.

Black leaders made an alliance with the Republican Party in local, state, and federal politics. Black participation in Reconstruction governments instituted public education and other reforms. Besides advocacy of their political agenda through the Democratic Party, the former Confederates also formed paramilitary groups utilizing violent terror to intimidate, brutalize, and kill Black people and their leadership and to maintain white supremacy. Terrorist violence was also essential to maintain Black people as a servile labor force. With racial slavery eliminated, southern capitalist instituted policies to create a system of peonage, utilizing Blacks convicted of petty and major criminal offenses as a labor force. The Republican Party needed Black votes and participation to build its presence in the South. Defending Black civil and human rights were temporarily consistent with its Reconstruction political agenda.

Unfortunately, the Republican alliance with Black people ended in the 1870s. The federal government ultimately betrayed Black people at the conclusion of Reconstruction. Historians agree the Hayes-Tilden compromise in the Presidential Election of 1876 marks the end of Reconstruction. None of the candidates for President in the election of 1876 possessed the majority of the Electoral College. A compromise was negotiated in the House of Representatives in 1877 to install the Republican candidate Rutherford Hayes as President with the Democratic Party could regain political power in the southern states. The compromise allowed former Confederate states to disenfranchise Black voters and the consolidation segregation or racial apartheid (aka Jim Crow) laws relegating Black people to an inferior status in civil society. The organization and presence of the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist paramilitary groups and the use of mob rule to maintain social control became part of the social order. The end of Reconstruction meant the end of democracy and the legitimization of white settler colonial rule in the southern United States. While Blacks were "citizens" in US law, they were denied the rights and privileges of citizenship accorded to white Americans.

Nadir Period

The federal government ignored the 14th and 15th Amendment and other civil rights legislation after the Compromise of 1877. Southern state governments exercise white supremacy in matters of policy, and terrorism was utilized to enforce the policy. The decades following the end of Reconstruction were labeled by historians as the nadir of the Black experience in the United States. Historian Rayford Logan argued the post-Reconstruction era was the lowest point in the status of the Afrikan descendants in the United States. The policies and practice implemented to enforce white supremacy were similar to other settler-colonial regimes in apartheid South Africa, white minority rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and zionist Israel.

Southern local governments and states moved quickly to institute Jim Crow segregation laws. Racial segregation was established in areas of public spheres, including education, transportation, dining, and recreation. The US Supreme Court endorsed these segregationist practices in 1896 in the Plessey v. Ferguson case, arguing "separate but equal" policies in public facilities were legal under the US Constitution. Lynchings as a means of social control of Black people became a common practice in US political culture. For example, in the decade between 1890 and 1899, there were 1200

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documented lynchings, an average of 120 a year. The campaign against lynchings would be the primary work of activists like Ida Barnett Wells.

Southern states had high percentages of Afrikan descendants due to their role in agricultural production in the labor system of racial slavery in the region. Black disenfranchisement was essential to the establishment of white supremacy in the South. From 1890 to 1910, southern legislatures developed new constitutions to disenfranchise Black voters in nine of the ten former Confederate states. Gerrymandering, poll taxes, literacy tests, white-only primaries, and denying the right to vote for criminal offenses were all implemented as means to suppress Black participation in southern elections.

Southern states and municipalities also maintained a servile Black labor force through peonage to replace racial slavery as a labor system. Black agricultural households agreed to work on white plantations in order to pay off debts owed for tools, seeds, land, and commodities necessary for survival. Black prisoners constructed roads, buildings, and other infrastructure development and engaged in agriculture through the convict-lease system.

Black Migration North and West

Ninety percent of the Afrikan descendant population in the United States lived in the southern states, with a concentration in the Black Belt South. The Black Belt South is a contiguous region of counties with a Black majority in the southern United States. It ranged from Maryland and Virginia to the east to Arkansas and eastern Texas to the west, and runs through the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, northern Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana. The population of this region became predominately Black due to the dependence on Black labor during racial slavery with the states of Mississippi and South Carolina possessing Black majorities at the end of the Civil War.

White supremacist violence, the conditions of labor and peonage in the south, and demand for Black labor in the north and western states of the US empire drove an intense migration of people of Afrikan descent out of the south. The mechanization of agriculture and the impact of boll weevil infestation greatly affected the cotton production in the region, thus decreasing the demand for Black agricultural workers. Six million Afrikan descendants migrated from the Black Belt and other area of the rural south to urban centers in the US empire between 1916 and 1970. Historians call this movement of people the Great Migration.

Black Resistance During the Nadir Period

Black people continued to challenge white supremacy through the variety of elements of its diverse political culture. Some resisted through the prism of inclusion. Ida Barnett Wells was the spearhead of exposing the numbers and white supremacist motivations of lynching and other forms of racial violence. Wells' journalism had an impact internationally. Scholar–activist W.E.B. DuBois and political agitator Monroe Trotter brought together other activists to form the Niagara Movement in response to white supremacist violence, disenfranchisement, and denial of civil rights of Black people. A multiracial group formed the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909.

The pro-self-determination tradition had its own response to the white supremacist assault on Black humanity in the United States. Prominent Colored Methodist Episcopal clergyman Lucius Holsey called for the independent state for Black people after the 1899 lynching of Sam Hose in Georgia. African Methodist Episcopal Bishop Henry McNeal Turner advocated the United States pay reparations to Afrikan descendants through repatriation to the Afrikan continent.

Black Nationalists and Pan-Africanists of the early twentieth century aspired to have independent nationhood for African descendants in the United States. In 1914, Egyptian Pan-Africanist Duse Muhammad Ali envisioned the possibility of the organization of an "Afro-American army" to form an "Afro-American nation" in the Black Belt territory in the south (Ali 1914). Ali was the founder of a Pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist periodical published in London, England titled

the *African and Orient Review*. He joined radical nationalists from the Caribbean and the United States to form the Hamitic League of the World founded by southern-born and Nebraska-bred historian and organic intellectual George Wells Parker in 1917. Other co-founding members of the Hamitic League included St. Kitts born-journalist Cyril Briggs and armed resistance advocate and writer John Edward Bruce. The Hamitic League was a Pan-Afrikan nationalist organization promoting pride in Afrikan heritage. Parker stated the purpose of the organization was to:

> To inspire the Negro with new hopes; to make him openly proud of his race and of its great contributions to the religious development and civilization of mankind and to place in the hands of every race man and woman and child the facts which support the League's claim that the Negro Race is the greatest race the world has ever known (Wikipedia 2019).

Briggs would edit the Hamitic League's publication *The Crusader* and later organize a revolutionary nationalist secret society, the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB). Briggs stated in 1918 that the solution to white supremacy and oppression was, "nothing more or less than independent, separate existence" and a "Government of the (Negro) people, for the (Negro) people and by the (Negro) people" (Briggs 1918). Ali, Briggs, and Bruce joined with the most massive Afrikan descendant mass movement in history, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) founded by Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey. Garvey initiated the UNIA in Jamaica in 1914 and it grew to millions of members internationally by the early 1920s. In the United States, it had members in major urban centers like New York, Chicago, New Orleans, and Los Angeles, as well as Black Belt communities in Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana. While much is made of Garvey's conciliatory relationship with white supremacists like the Ku Klux Klan, UNIA members in the south were concerned about organizing self-defense networks to combat white racists (Rolinson 2007). The US repressive apparatus was effectively utilized to dismantle the UNIA through infiltrating the organization's leadership and incarcerating and deporting Garvey.

The ABB and other Black radicals were inspired by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Czarist Russia and V.I. Lenin's position on self-determination for oppressed nations. The position advocating self-determination for the "Negro people" for "self-determination in the Black Belt South" developed from the relationship of the ABB with the Communist International, headquartered in Moscow. Key ABB members, including Briggs and Black Belt thesis architect Harry Haywood, joined the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). Black membership in the CPUSA increased from 50 to 500 within 5 years of its advocacy of self-determination in the Black Belt position. CPUSA organizer also organized the Sharecroppers Union in the Black Belt counties of Alabama and advocated Black self-determination in its publication *The Negro Liberator*.

Civil Rights Movement Emerges

Similar to other colonized people in Africa and Asia, the Black freedom struggle gained momentum in the 1940s and 1950s as Black people challenging racial discrimination. The focus of the Black freedom struggle was to eliminate segregation and white supremacist violence. Labor organizer A. Philip Randolph negotiated desegregation of the US defense industry in order to his mobilization of an all-Black march to Washington D.C. during World War II. The Committee for Equal Justice for the Rights of Mrs. Recy Taylor was founded in 1944 in Alabama by Rosa Parks and Taylor to pressure state officials to investigate a prosecute six white males accused of sexually assaulting Taylor. The Committee did wage a vigilant national campaign that forced a grand jury for the accused white rapists, who were not indicted. The Regional Council for Negro Leadership (RCNL) organized a "Don't Buy Gas Where You Can't Use the Restroom" campaign in the Mississippi Delta in the 1950s. The RCNL and the NAACP sponsored an investigation of the murder of 13-year-old Emmett Till. Till was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by two white men, Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam, for the "crime" of whistling a Bryant's wife in a grocery store. The 13-year-old corpse was found days later in Mississippi's Tallahatchie River. Till's mother,

Mamie Till-Mobley, decided to have an "open casket" funeral to show the world how her son's body was violated. Till's murder would motivate a generation of young people to enter the Black freedom struggle (Umoja 2013).

The Afrikan descendant community of Montgomery, Alabama took the Black freedom struggle to a new level by sustaining a boycott of segregated buses for 3 months. The boycott was sparked by the arrest of Mrs. Rosa Parks who refused to give up her seat to a white male on a segregated bus. The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. emerged as a national leader and spokesperson for the Black freedom struggle due to the example of the boycott of a Black community standing united against white supremacy. King also became an advocate for nonviolent direct action. King would unite with leaders of other activist Black ministers and laypersons to form the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

An important development occurred in Monroe, North Carolina in 1957 when the local NAACP led by Robert F. Williams organized the armed, paramilitary Black Guard to repel Ku Klux Klan from invading the local Black community. Williams would publicly advocate meeting "violence with violence" and along with his wife Mabel Williams and their neighbor, Ethel Azalea Johnson produced a newsletter *The Crusader*, which advocated armed resistance within the Black freedom struggle. Supporters of the Monroe movement and Williams public advocacy of armed self-defense circulated *The Crusader* and raised funds around the US empire. Due to trumped-up charges, Williams and his family would be forced into exile in Cuba. Robert and Mabel Williams continued to promote armed self-defense through *The Crusader* and radio broadcasts from Cuba (Williams 2005).

The strategy of nonviolent direct action was bolstered when Black students from historically Black colleges in Greensboro, North Carolina staged sit-in protests at segregated lunch counters. Sit-in protests initiated by Black college students proliferated throughout the south. Veteran activists Ella Baker invited Black college activists to a convening at Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina to organize the Student Nonviolent

Coordinating Committee (SNCC). SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) organized voter registration campaigns in Black Belt counties in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

SCLC organized a dynamic nonviolent direct-action campaign in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963. Birmingham was known as "Bombingham" due to the bombings of institutions and residences in the Black community by white supremacists. The international community was shocked at the inhumanity of white supremacists after a bombing of 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham killing four Black female children.

SNCC, CORE, and local NAACP chapters formed the Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) in Mississippi to challenge the white-only primary practices of the Democratic Party in the state. The white-only primary had already been ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. The MFDP organized to challenge the credentials of the Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National Convention in 1964. The leaders of the Democratic Party were afraid to alienate white supremacist voters in the south by seating the Black-led MFDP. The MFDP refused to accept a compromise by the National Democratic Party to accept representation of only two of its members within the white supremacist Democratic Party. The betrayal of northern liberals at the Democratic National Convention demonstrated they were not reliable allies to the Black freedom struggle. The possibility of bringing about substantive change within the context of liberal frameworks for social change seemed unrealistic. For many a radical alternative became a rational choice.

Pro-Self-Determination Sentiments in the 1950s and Early 1960s

One critic of integrationist and Black liberal politics during the Civil Rights movement was the Nation of Islam (NOI). The NOI was gaining membership and influence in the northern urban centers in the 1950s and early 1960s. Under the leadership of rural Georgia-born Elijah Muhammad, the NOI taught that Blacks needed to separate from the

white "devils" and needed a land of their own. Muhammad encouraged NOI members to start Black enterprises and "do for self" rather than strive for integration. Called "Black Muslims," NOI also refrained from participation in desegregation protests. The NOI was aided in its popularly through Muhammad's charismatic spokesperson, Malcolm X Shabazz. Shabazz was adept speaking to working class and poor Blacks, as well as college students. The United States and the international community took note when Malcolm X recruited boxing's heavyweight World Champion Cassius Clay to the NOI. Clay was named "Muhammad Ali" by Elijah Muhammad after winning his boxing championship. Ali's refusal to be inducted into the US military during the Vietnam War had a major impact on Black resistance and the anti-war movement in the United States.

Malcolm X would leave the NOI due to internal conflicts within the organization and start two groups, the religious Muslim Mosque, Inc. and the secular Organization of Afro-American Unity. Malcolm's ideas and promotion of Pan-Africanism, Black Nationalism, internationalism, and armed self-defense were embraced by a significant number of activists in the Black Freedom struggle, including members of SNCC and CORE.

Some young activists were influenced by the activism of the Civil Rights movement, the nationalism of Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam, and the armed resistance position of Robert F. Williams. They agreed with the analysis of Black political theorist Harold Cruse that Black people in the United States were a domestic colony. Young Black radicals formed the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM). One of RAM's advisors was Queen Mother Audley Moore, who called Afrikans in the United States a "captive nation" and organized Blacks to call for reparations.

Toward Black Power: Self-Determination, Self-Respect, and Self-Defense

The ideological thrust of Black autonomy and self-determination began to assert itself as the dominant theme of the Black freedom struggle in 1965. This new thrust was identified by Black activists as the Black Power movement. According to historian and scholar–activist John Bracey, by 1965 the term "Black power" was popular among the Black masses in US cities as a response to white racism. Black activists from Chicago, Detroit, and other Midwestern cities came together to form the Organization for Black Power (OBP). Black worker, organic intellectual, and socialist theoretician James Boggs made the inaugural address to the OBP citing the potential of Black people to achieve political control of US urban centers. Boggs encouraged his fellow activists to develop a movement to take political power, not to make appeals to the moral conscience of "America" as the integrationist Civil Rights movement proposed (Ward 2011; Boggs 2012).

A spontaneous rebellion occurred in the Watts community of Los Angeles, California, in August 1965. An incident of political brutality against a Black motorist, Marquette Frye, and his mother and brother, resulted in 6 days of upheaval, 34 fatalities and damages estimated in the tens of millions. The uprising was considered a Black rebellion and became a national symbol of resistance, labeled a "riot" by the media and power structure. Moderate leaders call for calm was rejected by grassroots Black resistors of Watts. New, more militant spokespersons surfaced to articulate the rage of the oppressed Black masses. Hakim Jamal's Malcolm X Foundation and Maulana Karenga's Us Organization were two of the groups that emerged "like a phoenix" from the flames of the Watts revolt. Members of street organizations and neighborhood clubs (a.k.a. gangs) were politicized from the resistance of Watts and joined helped form new groups like the Community Alert Patrol and the Southern California chapter of the Black Panther Party. Watts served as an inspiration to Blacks radicals throughout the US empire. From exile in Cuba, Robert Williams stated Watts was, "the beginning of a ferrous and devastating firestorm. . .. We are living in an age. . .of revolution." Spontaneous rebellion became routine events in cities around the United States in the 1960s. These uprisings reflect the militant consciousness of the period and a rejected of integration, nonviolence, and the politics of respectability in the Black freedom struggle. Black Power

activists like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown became spokespersons to interpret and articulate the rage of the spontaneous resistance.

Black nationalist spokesman Malcolm X was assassinated on February 21, 1965. Prominent author and playwright Leroi Jones (later called Amiri Baraka) was extremely affected by Malcolm's death. Weeks after Malcolm's assassination Jones move his base of creation and operations from predominately white, "avantgarde" Greenwich Village to the Black community of Harlem to initiate the Black Arts Repertory Theatre (BART). Jones connected with activist and radical nationalist Black writers, particularly Rolland Snellings (AskiaToure) and Larry Neal in Harlem to found the Black Arts Movement. The Black Arts Movement became a national phenomenon and the artistic wing of the Black Power Movement, primarily producing poetry, plays, music, and visual art.

The creation of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO) in rural Alabama was another development that sparked the emergence of a new movement. This SNCC-organized group was developed as an alternative to the Democrat and Republican Party and represented a move toward independent Black politics. The following year SNCC's Chairman and former LCFO organizer would make the call for "Black Power" at a rally in Greenwood, Mississippi. The press coverage of the rally served to popularize the "Black Power" slogan.

The LCFO's symbol was an image of a black panther. Inspired by the LCFO, members of RAM and SNCC sought to build Black Panther political parties in northern urban areas like Harlem, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Francisco as a political party for the Black Power movement. Two northern California college students, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, developed the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP). This radical Black group based in Oakland, California, grew to a national organization promoting armed self-defense, political power, and organizing "serve the people" programs, including free breakfast for children and free medical, legal and clothing services. Ultimately, the BPP became the largest

and most feared group in the Black Power movement. The BPP would call for a plebiscite to determine the relationship of Black colonial subjects to the US empire.

These events, which included the Watts uprising, the initiation of the Black Arts Movement, the development of the Organization of Black Power, the organization of Lowndes County Freedom Organization, and establishment of the BPP, were all a part of a new generation of resistance. By the nature of these manifestations, a national movement came into existence that represented the emergence of new social forces interrelated by an ideology distinct from the integrationist Civil Rights movement. Black Power would represent a challenge and even dominated the Civil Rights orientation of the Black freedom struggle, from the mid-1960s through the middle of the next decade.

Conclusion

Defining the political reality of the relationship of Afrikan descendants with the US empire as a colonial situation or not will determine what types of solutions one see to bring a resolution to the problem. Intellectuals have moved away from this analysis after the decline of the Black Power movement in the 1970s in favor of liberal and or classical Marxist paradigms. The liberal and classical Marxist paradigms see the borders of the United States as sacred and legitimate, which buys into notions of Manifest Destiny and white supremacy and denies the humanity of indigenous nations, and the peoples of Mexicano, Hawaiian, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Liberal and classical Marxist analysis also deny the right of New Afrikan people to self-determination and national liberation. Revolutionary New Afrikan nationalists have been consistent in defining the United States as an empire based upon settler colonialism (Green 1977). Insurgent scholarship is now re-examining this question as radical intellectuals are beginning to define structural racism in the United States as settler colonialism. Issues as the extrajudicial killing of Black people by police,

security guards, and white vigilantes; gentrification and land grabs of Black neighborhoods by corporate interests; mass incarceration; and the "achievement gap" in education are now being connected to the legacy of settler colonialism.

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Sino-Soviet Split

Six-Day War (1967)

Slavery

Small Island State

Social Costs of US Imperialism

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Synonyms

Military spending; Social policy; US history; US imperialism

Definition

This essay attempts to assess the social costs of US imperialism borne by the American people themselves. It argues that when the cumulative effect of military spending is combined with the cumulative national debt, they show the diversion of trillions of dollars in capital from socially useful policies and the accruing of a debt whose annual interest payments provide further super profits for creditors in the US and abroad. It concludes that the cumulative effects of imperialist policies serves as a deterrent to the funding of programmes to raise the living standards and improve the quality of life for the American people, not to exporting death and destruction in the name of national security and defence throughout the world.

The 'American Way' of Imperialism

The terms 'imperialism' and 'colonialism' are often used interchangeably but they are not the same. Formal colonies based on direct control of territories are the best-known form associated with imperialism, a form which covered large parts of the world until its collapse after the Second World War. Two forms of indirect control, the establishment of what now are usually called 'client states' (formerly called 'protectorates' or 'satellites') and spheres of influence, together often called 'neo-colonialism' in Africa and other former colonial regions, are the leading expressions of imperialism today. This indirect control functions through bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements on the model of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The American anti-colonial revolution of the eighteenth century established a republic which began to call itself a democracy in the 1830s before any other modern nation did. Thomas Jefferson, revolutionary leader and author of the Declaration of Independence, advocated an 'empire for liberty', a continental empire which through territorial expansion would enable farmers and artisans to live in peaceful and prosperous coexistence with the merchant capitalists, slaveholders, and large landowners – the ruling elites of the new republic. Jefferson as president advanced this policy through the Louisiana Purchase, the purchase of France's land claims in North America.

US expansion through the nineteenth century was to contiguous territories. Indigenous people, called 'Indians', were the first direct victims of this 'empire for liberty'. They signed treaties which US governments routinely broke, and were forced onto reservations after many bloody wars by the end of the nineteenth century.

It would not be until the early 1930s that the first serious reforms in US government policy toward indigenous peoples would be enacted under the leadership of John Collyer, director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in the New Deal Government of Franklin Roosevelt.

The indigenous peoples were defined as 'savages', whether they were land-owning and even slave-owning Cherokees in Georgia, warring Apaches in the South West, Sioux horseman in the Dakotas, or buffalo herders on the plains. And 'savages' had no rights to land because they could not develop the land.

The most important long-term social cost of this policy to the American people perhaps was the connection of these policies with concepts of 'democracy'; a 'democracy' based on exclusion of 'Indians', slaves, Spanish-speaking Mexicans seen as inferior to Anglo-Saxons, a policy which by the 1840s was called 'manifest destiny'.

Manifest destiny was often associated with anti-colonial rhetoric. The conquest of much of northern Mexico in the Mexican-American war (1845–49) was, for example, seen by some as a war to destroy the last vestige of the Spanish Empire in North America. The slave states were among the strongest supporters of manifest destiny and abolitionists opposed the Mexican War as a slaveholders' conspiracy to expand slavery, seeking unsuccessfully to have Congress block war appropriations and also pass the abolitionist-inspired Wilmot Proviso, a congressional resolution which would have barred slavery on all territories taken as a result of the war.

Manifest destiny in the hands of pro-slavery politicians led the slave states to attempt to expand their system into the western territories through the brutal Fugitive Slave Act (1850), the failed 'Ostend Manifesto' calling for the purchase of Cuba, Spain's major slave colony (1854), the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1819 which restricted slavery geographically, and the subsequent use of force to impose a pro-slavery constitution in the Kansas territory. The slave states also demanded total compliance with the slaveholder-dominated Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision (1857), which would have declared slavery to be legal everywhere in North America and deprived all free Blacks of citizenship rights.

The final and necessary social cost of the antebellum 'empire for liberty' was a revolutionary civil war, whose losses counting both sides would be greater than US losses in the two world wars combined. It was a war that devastated large areas of the former slave states and led to both the end of slavery and the establishment of a new political party system and power structure which would advance industrial/financial capitalism.

US Imperialism in the Age of Industrial/Financial Capitalism

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the major European powers began to extend colonial imperialism and fight with each other for colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence around the globe. This was the imperialism of industrial/financial capital, an imperialism which sought markets and raw materials like the earlier commercial capitalist imperialism, but now began to export capital itself to find cheaper and cheaper labour for an expanding world market which needed in quantity and variety more raw materials, larger markets, and much greater military and naval forces to defeat imperialist competitors and subjugate people.

By the 1880s, the US began to strengthen its naval power (a policy endorsed by the steel Industry) as its industrial capacity grew by leaps and bounds. US investors bought sugar and other plantations in Spanish Cuba and the Independent Kingdom of Hawaii, and competed for commercial gain and influence against European imperial powers and the Japanese Empire in China and the Pacific.

In Hawaii, American planters, faced with economic ruin thanks to the McKinley tariff of 1890, colluded with US officials to launch a 'revolution' in the islands and annex them to the US. This policy was implemented paradoxically by President McKinley (1897), whose tariff (in the interest of the stateside industrialists who generally supported the Republican Party) threatened the American planters in Hawaii, who were also strong supporters of the Republican Party. For

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the indigenous population of Hawaii, territorial status meant, as Jawarlal Nehru would say famously about British imperialism in India, living as servants in their own homes. As Britain sent indentured Indian labour to its African colonies, the US would, through negotiations with Japan and China, import Japanese and Chinese labour to the Hawaiian Islands.

Spanish-American War and the 'Cuban Model' of US Imperialism

Faced with an uprising in Cuba against Spanish colonial control which threatened US investments, the McKinley Administration declared war on Spain in 1898, ostensibly to liberate Cuba. Very soon, the US navy destroyed the Spanish Pacific Fleet and occupied the Spanish colonial Philippines in the Western Pacific. When the smoke had cleared, the McKinley Administration, in the face of substantial opposition, annexed the Philippines and Guam in the Pacific and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean as colonies.

While this was 'minor' compared to British, French, German, and Belgian colonisation in Africa, and British and French colonisation in Asia, it was the first overseas colonial intervention by US military forces. The US in the first years of the twentieth century fought a bloody counter-insurgent war against Filipinos who had initially welcomed them as liberators, losing many more troops then they had in the Spanish-American war itself, destroying whole villages, and taking the lives of an estimated 250,000 Filipinos.

In Cuba, the US first refused to permit the Cuban revolutionary army to participate in the surrender of the Spanish colonial forces in 1898, and then refused to end its occupation of the island until the Cubans had written into their constitution the Platt Amendment, a resolution drafted by Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut. The amendment demanded Cuban acceptance of the US government's right to determine Cuba's economic relations with foreign powers and intervene militarily in Cuban affairs to 'protect Cuban self-determination'. To back this up, Cuba also ceded a naval base at Guantanamo Bay to the US.

The 'Cuban model', accurately called by American anti-imperialists 'gunboat diplomacy', was rapidly extended to many nations in Central America and the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and beyond. Just as Britain had played the leading role in the development of the Suez Canal and then used defence of the canal to extend its empire, President Theodore Roosevelt bought out the assets of a bankrupt French company seeking to build a canal through the Columbian province of Panama and then conspired with the CEO of the company to stage a 'revolution' supported by the US navy to establish an 'independent Panama' which would permit the US to build the canal. The existence of the canal and its defence then became a rationale for scores of US interventions mostly carried out by the Marines, whose actions were romanticised in US popular media in ways similar to those of British Grenadiers and other colonial forces elsewhere.

The direct relationship of US corporations and investors with the US government was deepened and US military and civilian authorities both exported racism across the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific and through those actions intensified racism at home. Two examples highlight this. At a time when European colonialists were contending that colonies would serve as a way to export socially disruptive surplus populations from the imperialist countries, Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, leader of the Democratic minority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to the State Department suggesting the possibility of resettling Southern Blacks in the Philippines and giving them land that would be taken from the Filipinos (the State Department didn't reply). African-Americans, fighting in the segregated units of the US army against the Filipino uprising, faced for the first time appeals from Filipinos not to fight for whites who oppressed them against a dark-skinned people. Also, there were reports that both white and black US soldiers, in burning Filipino villages, would shout 'Nigger', long established as the most pre-eminent hate word in the US, at the Filipinos. From their letters back home to family, friends, and ministers, it is

clear that many African-American troops were particularly traumatised by the open and extensive racism of a war in which they were fighting in the army of the racists.

Under the Platt Amendment, there would be major and minor US military interventions until Franklin Roosevelt formally repudiated it, rejecting US direct military intervention to protect US economic interests and proclaiming a hemispheric 'Good Neighbor policy'.

Here are a few highlights nation by nation of that policy, called gunboat and dollar diplomacy in the US and 'Yankee imperialism' by most Latin Americans. The US applied Platt Amendment principles to turn the Dominican Republic into a protectorate (1905) and Marines occupied the Dominican Republic (1916–24) to maintain order and protect US investments. When US-trained National Guard leader Rafael Trujillo became dictator of the Dominican Republic in the mid-1930s without direct US intervention, Franklin Roosevelt said famously 'he's a son of a bitch but he is our son of bitch', a frank admission of what the US policy of gunboat/dollar diplomacy meant, even after the gunboats were withdrawn.

The administration of President William Howard Taft further developed this policy, encouraging US investment banks to invest in China and Caribbean nations to strengthen US interests against imperialist rivals The US also enlarged its naval military power to protect these growing investments. Under Taft, this was known as 'dollar diplomacy'. Under what should be called gunboat/dollar diplomacy, Marines occupied Nicaragua in support of President Diaz, former treasurer of a US mining company (1910), and then reoccupied the country to crush anti-Diaz forces as he held an election with 4,000 eligible voters and himself as the only candidate The US kept troops in Nicaragua until 1925. The following year, Marines returned to battle the radical reformer Augusto Sandino, whom the Coolidge Administration called an agent of a 'Nicaraguan-Mexican-Soviet' conspiracy to establish 'Mexican-Bolshevist hegemony' over Nicaragua as a springboard to attack the Panama Canal (1926), a Monty Pythonesque early expression of what was later known as the Domino Theory.

US Marines left Nicaragua in line with the Good Neighbor Policy (1933) but National Guard Commander Anastasio Somoza murdered Sandino and established a family dictatorship which lasted from 1934–78. While FDR expressed no sympathy for Somoza, he somewhat disingenuously contended that intervention against him would be a return to the Platt Amendment in violation of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Interventions might also be 'private'. The overthrow of a liberal regime in Honduras was funded by banana company tycoon, Sam Zemurray, and directed by US mercenary Lee Christmas, whom new conservative president Manuel Bonilla made head of the Honduran army (1911). The Harding Administration brokered a deal with Guatemalan elites to oust a liberal government for the United Fruit Company (1921).

Racism, always present, sometimes took strange turns. Under Woodrow Wilson, who rejected 'dollar diplomacy' verbally but increased US military interventions in the Caribbean, the US occupied and turned Haiti into a protectorate (1915). US troops remained until 1934. During the First World War, Franklin Roosevelt, assistant secretary of the Navy, actually wrote the Haitian Constitution. In 1919, the US Marines ruthlessly suppressed a Haitian uprising, During the occupation, Haitian presidents and other prominent Haitians were barred from the elite US Officers Club on the island because they were black!

Gunboat/dollar diplomacy continued unabated in Cuba. A Cuban uprising against the Platt Amendment led to an invasion/occupation by Marines (1906–09). US Marines intervened again under Taft to smash a strike of sugar workers which threatened US, investors (1912). US Marines re occupied Cuba (1917–22) under Wilson and Harding until 'stability' (protection of US economic interests) was restored. These policies created enmity toward 'Yankees' and 'Gringos' throughout Latin America.

But the Marines were often glorified in US media under such slogans as 'the Marines have landed' and 'the Marines are here to clean house'. Such headlines were similar to media portrayals of British Grenadiers and French Foreign

Legionnaires in the British and French Empires, creating mutual hostilities that undermined positive relationships.

The New Deal Government inherited these policies in the midst of a global depression. As in other areas, Roosevelt, a major reformer in the US context but no revolutionary, sought to reshape this policy in ways that would win over the people of Latin America without abandoning US business interests. First, Roosevelt announced a Good Neighbor Policy and abrogated the Platt Amendment (1933–34). He surprised many by sending US warships to support democratic forces which in 1933 ousted the brutal Cuban tyrant Gerardo Machado (toasted by Coolidge and Wall Street in the 1920s). This was a rarity in history, where the US intervened against a right-wing dictator.

But then, faced with a reformist government and a powerful left, the US supported strongman Fulgencio Batista behind the scenes in establishing his first dictatorship to protect US investments on the island. Mexico was a much greater problem which FDR responded to in a creative way, making his fullest break with gunboat/dollar diplomacy and advancing a policy of Pan-American co-operation.

Under Woodrow Wilson, the US launched a naval assault and occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in opposition to military strongman Valeriano Huerta, whom Taft had supported in the overthrow and murder of the reformer Francisco Madero as the Mexican Revolution ended the 40-year dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1914). Wilson's subsequent interventions, first for and then against North Mexican leader Pancho Villa, led Villa to launch raids against US territory as the First World War raged in Europe. Wilson sent the US army into Mexico to catch him. This ended disastrously, as US troops clashed with anti-Villa Mexican forces and never caught their target. In the aftermath of the Coolidge intervention in Nicaragua (defined as a defence against the expansion of 'Mexican Bolshevism' which would threaten the Panama Canal but in part a ploy against Mexico's threat to nationalise US oil holdings), the Hoover Administration sent warships to support the defeat of an uprising in El Salvador of workers and peasants led by communist Faribundo Marti, the first real communist-led

revolutionary uprising in the Western hemisphere, resulting in the killing of Marti and the massacre of over 8,000 peasants and workers (1932).

When Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas nationalised the Mexican oil industry and US investors, led by the Hearst Press demanded military intervention of the kind that Coolidge had used against Nicaragua, Roosevelt responded by having the Import Export Bank give Mexico a $25 million loan to compensate US investors. US–Mexican relations sharply improved under the Roosevelt Administration even though Cardenas was by far the most socialist-oriented president that Mexico would have in its history.

As a complement to its Good Neighbor Policy, the administration fostered a broader vision of Pan-Americanism based on co-operative hemispheric economic development. However, these policies would not survive the beginnings of the Cold War. An attempt was made by left New Dealers in the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), chaired by vice president Henry Wallace, to extend the New Deal through Latin America. They sought to have firms with US government contracts provide their workers with minimum wages, trade union rights and other benefits the New Deal had established for American workers, but the initiative was defeated by conservative elements within the administration backed strongly by Wall Street.

Under the Truman Administration, the US Army established the School of the Americas (1946) an upgrading and major extension of the Hoover policy of training and making into middlemen the Latin American military elites whose principal role would be to fight their own people. The school remains in existence today, having trained thousands of future military and police authorities including officers who would lead in the overthrow of democratically elected governments and advance policies that would lead to the deaths of tens of thousands of their own people.

Globalisation of Gunboat/Dollar Diplomacy

When the Second World War ended, US prestige among progressive and revolutionary forces through the world was never greater. Under the

New Deal Government of Franklin Roosevelt, the US had served as the centre of the 'Allied Powers', holding the British Empire, under conservative leadership seeking to maintain its empire, and the Soviet Union, under Communist leadership fighting a war of survival and liberation for its own people and the people of Europe together, to defeat the fascist imperialist Axis powers.

The US had also used its influence to establish a United Nations organisation, and under the New Deal Government (itself relying on a domestic centre-left coalition of labour and political forces) advanced policies to make the UN serve through its social agencies as the force to implement global policies to increase food production, sanitation and health care, international labour standards that address the economic and social inequalities that produced war and past imperialist policies which had greatly increased all of those inequalities.

But the balance of political forces in the US had changed significantly during the war. Wartime economic expansion connected to the creation of what would later be called the military-industrial complex strengthened corporate and conservative forces. They would recycle and update US policies of gunboat/dollar diplomacy and seek to apply these to the whole world.

The Big Picture of US Imperialism and the Cold War

First, the Truman Administration expressed hostility to the Soviet Union from its very first days in April 1945, as the Red Army fought the last Battle of Berlin and the European War ended. Then the Truman Administration, initially fearful of the Red Army's military power and the influence of the Soviets and Communists throughout Europe and Asia, began to see in the atomic bomb a weapon that could enable it to frighten the Soviets into complying with its demands for the economic and political organisation of post-war Europe and Asia.

Even before the Second World War ended, the Truman Administration had adopted the policy that Churchill in the last years of the war sought to have FDR adopt: to abandon anti-fascist co-operation with the Soviets and 'Big Three Unity' and

move toward a policy of undermining communist-led insurgent movements, even if that meant quietly embracing fascist collaborator forces, as the British army did in the fall of 1944 when they invaded Nazi-occupied Greece and opened fire on the communist-led insurgents who had led the fight against the Nazis since the German invasion.

The US also began this policy in the Asia Pacific region even before the end of the war. In the bloody fighting for control of the Philippines, General MacArthur's Intelligence staff put down its most important grass-roots ally, the communist-led people's army (HUKs) which had saved the lives of Americans and worked with American troops, as the British had in Greece months before. After the Japanese surrender, the Truman Administration used the large Japanese armies on the Chinese mainland as a police force to keep, as Truman admitted in his memoirs, the Chinese Communist Party, whose influence had grown tremendously during the war, from leading the Chinese people to victory.

Also, the Truman Administration retained the Japanese emperor, Hirohito, whom Americans during the war had seen along with Hitler and Mussolini as the third member of an 'Axis of Evil', and gave him and all members of an extended royal family immunity from war crimes prosecution, even though a number were directly involved in atrocities against the peoples of China and other Asian nations.

When the war ended, Korea was 'temporarily divided' into US and Soviet zones of occupation. In the South, Syngman Rhee, a conservative who had spent most of the previous 35 years on US soil, was brought in by the US occupation. Rhee was soon to become 'our son of a bitch', the first of many local tyrants whom the US would establish and/or keep in power. In Korea, the US occupation employed well-known Japanese collaborators in the police to suppress student and worker opposition to Rhee and the American Military Government (AMG).

US policy was deeply influenced by its closest ally the British Empire, mixing and matching old British imperialist policies of creating balances of power, now in the name of 'freedom' and 'democracy' as against the British 'progress' and 'civilisation'. After the British army attacked

the anti-Nazi resistance movement in Greece in 1944 (a centre of its 'traditional sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean) and installed a conservative monarchist regime filled with many Nazi collaborators and pre-war Greek fascists, a bloody civil war ensued. But by the winter of 1947, the British Empire, bankrupt ideologically and financially, was withdrawing everywhere.

The Truman Administration, already using threats against the Soviets in Europe and recruiting former Nazis from the Intelligence and police services of Axis Europe, 'experts' in anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, leaped in with a 'Greek Turkish Aid bill' to replace Britain in the Greek Civil War. Along with this specific policy, Truman called for a US commitment to 'aid free peoples' who are fighting against 'subjugation' by 'armed minorities' or 'outside pressure.'

Former vice president Henry Wallace called this 'Truman Doctrine' a 'world Monroe Doctrine'. One could also call it an extension of gunboat/dollar diplomacy imperialism from the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere to the whole world, with a new version of the Platt Amendment giving the US the 'right' to intervene in the affairs of all nations in defence of their rights to 'self-determination' and 'independence' as the US government defined these terms.

In the years to come the earlier invasions of Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, the failed interventions in Mexico, would be repeated in Greece, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Lebanon, Iraq, directly; and in France, Italy, Indonesia, the Congo, Brazil, Chile Angola, Mozambique, East Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and today Syria, indirectly. These direct and indirect interventions were in support of 'our sons of bitches' around the world with military and economic 'aid'; the training of military and police forces; the advance of 'free-market' policies that aided foreign investors and local elites; and the fomenting of economic crises and internal subversion against those governments which resisted US Cold War policies. The process was ritualistically defended as a major part of an unending war against a Soviet-directed 'world Communist conspiracy', a perpetual Cold War to prevent a nuclear hot war.

The Big Picture of Cold War and 'Post-Cold War': Consequences for the US

The distinguished historian of US foreign policy Walter LaFeber estimated that US military spending during the period from the Truman Doctrine to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, with all of its hidden and ancillary costs, amounted to 10 trillion dollars. By a conservative estimate, given military spending over the last 22 two years in the 'post-Cold war period', spending has been even greater than that. The pattern of expansion (Korean War), plateau (post-Korean War), expansion (Vietnam War) very short inflation limited plateau (post-Vietnam War) great expansion (Reagan Hollywood 'virtual wars'), plateau ('post-Cold war'), G.W. Bush expansion, called by historian James Reed 'Reagan on steroids' ('wars and occupations against terrorism' Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, and who knows where next) continues to this day, regardless of the administration.

The pre-Cold War policy of US imperialism (the use of protectorates, satellites, client states and spheres of influence as against formal colonies) had both avoided the high overhead costs of the former Great Powers' colonial imperialism and the politically disadvantageous loss of life that their colonial military interventions had led to. This was its 'strength' as it developed its control over the Western Hemisphere and campaigned to open up the colonial regions, protectorates, and spheres of influence of its imperialist rivals.

The' globalisation' of this policy with the Truman Doctrine, the formation of NATO and subsequent multilateral military alliances (SEATo, CENTo) and numerous bilateral military alliances, meant that from 1947 to the present the US would spend much more on the global Cold War and its sequel, the global war against terrorism, than all of its allies and enemies combined. Also, the US would in the name of 'containment,' 'counter-insurgency,' 'low-intensity wars' and 'proxy wars' do among the great powers most of the fighting and suffer most of the casualties in the large Cold-War Korean and Vietnam Wars and later 'wars against international terrorism' in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Some Speculation About the Costs of Roads not Taken

In calculating the 'price' of American imperialism to the American people, the overwhelming majority of whom are workers and salaried employees, retirees (former workers and salaried employees) students (future workers and salaried employees), many of the costs are incalculable, because of what did not occur. How much higher would general social security benefits have been over the last 66 years if general revenues had been added to the regressive payroll taxes (which Roosevelt showed sympathy for and progressives put forward in legislation), if the social-security-based national health system that was the subject of a fierce legislative battle after the war had been enacted, if the large public power projects on the TVA model for the Columbia and Missouri Rivers had been enacted, along with public housing legislation on the model of the original United States Housing Authority and federal aid to education in the model of the National Youth Administration.

Given the wartime economic expansion, the establishment during the war of a system of progressive taxation, the fact that one-third all workers outside of agriculture were unionised and (even with the divisions between the conservative exclusionist AFL and the inclusionist CIO), the organisational support to establish this postwar programme, to which public opinion was sympathetic, existed on paper in 1945.

The Cold War was not the only reason why groups like the American Medical Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the private power companies were able to bury this programme, but it was a central reason.

The association of this programme (a social-security-based system of national health care, public power expansion on the TVA model, federal aid to education, housing, and transportation,) with 'creeping socialism,' the purges in the trade union movement and the arts, sciences and professions of its most militant advocates, all in the name of Cold War anti-Communism, systematically doomed the programme. And there were other costs that could not easily be calculated in dollars and cents.

For example: the cost to the trade union movement over the last 66 years of tens of millions of real and potential members as the number of workers in private-sector unions dropped from 35 per cent in 1947 to single digits today; the cost to hundreds to millions of Americans over that period of many billions of dollars in out-of-pocket health-care expenses that working people in the rest of the developed world do not have to pay; the high rate of infant mortality relative to other developed countries that exists in the US; and the emergence from the Reagan era to today of children as the largest group living in poverty.

Interventions and Their Concrete Social Costs

Here are some of the most important Cold-War interventions and their social costs.

In China, the Truman Administration spent over $3 billion in military aid to Chiang Kaishek's Kuomintang regime (1945–49), organised the regime's 'elite divisions', and only ended its formal aid when the revolutionary forces had clearly gained the upper hand. The US then refused to recognise the Peoples Republic of China, blocked its admission to the UN until 1972, and did not establish full diplomatic relations with it until 1978, providing over time many billions of dollars in military aid to 'the Republic of China' (Chiang's rump regime in Taiwan). Also, the US helped to train Chiang's commandos for raids of the Chinese mainland, threatened war with China in the 1950s over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Formosa Strait, provided financial and indirect military aid to feudal-religious elements for an uprising in Tibet against the People's Republic of China (1959), and subsequently, as it came to recognise China, manoeuvred to create conflicts between China and India and use China as a 'strategic ally' against the Soviet Union.

For the American people, the costs were real-war dangers as US paratroops prepared to attack the Chinese mainland in the event of full-scale war in the Formosa Strait in the mid-1950s, a peacetime draft that undermined working-class communities by taking from those who could

not be deferred for medical reasons or were enrolled in colleges or were unacceptable due to criminal records.

In Italy, the new CIA 'passed' its first 'test'. The agency (called by its members 'the company') spent millions of dollars to defeat a united front of Communist and Socialist Parties which had been expected to win the 1948 elections. It also used the Democratic Party to mobilise Italian Americans to send telegrams to relatives, provided both Marshall Plan aid and other forms of aid to the Italian government, funded Mafia elements in Sicily and southern Italy to undermine a free election, and continued over the next four decades with limited success to try to defeat and isolate the Italian Communist Party, supporting both former and neo-fascists, traditional conservatives, and anti-communist factions of the Socialist Party to achieve those ends.

The CIA's activities began a pattern of involvement with organised crime groups who would use their increased wealth and connections to develop in the 1950s the heroin market in US working-class communities, destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and increasing crime significantly in US cities.

After independence in the Philippines (1946), which the New Deal Government had promised in the 1930s, US 'military advisors' organised the campaign to crush the communist-led anti-Japanese Huk army, electing and then removing Filipino presidents until the 1960s when one of their 'assets', Ferdinand Marcos, realising that the US was turning against him, made himself 'president for life'.

US agribusiness corporations, Dole especially, participated in and profited greatly from the exploitation of the Filipino people in alliance with terroristic regimes and local right-wing gangs to murder peasant organisers and drive poor peasants from their land.

Edward Landsdale, a classic imperialist adventurer in the tradition of Britain's Chinese Gordon and Lawrence of Arabia, organised the post-war political campaign to elect Ramon Magsaysay as president of the Philippines, then led the US military mission to French colonial Indochina (1953) to remove the French and bring in Ngo

Dinh Diem, a US 'asset' to establish a dictatorship, and finally served as director of the CIA's Operation Mongoose (1961), the largest and most expensive CIA operation in the world aimed at overthrowing the revolutionary government of Cuba and murdering Fidel Castro and its other leaders.

Lansdale, an advertising man from San Francisco before the Second World War, was the stuff of which nineteenth-century imperialist 'heroes' were made. He even used his influence to have Hollywood change the screenplay of Graham Greene's novel *The Quiet American,* turning a character widely believed to be based on him from a villain to a hero.

The US intervention first in the French colonial war and then in its own version of a colonial war (1950-–75) would eventually cost directly 58,000 lives, hundreds of thousands wounded, and the psychic trauma that many experienced because of the atrocities that were and are the reality of 'counter-insurgency' as against the rhetoric of winning the hearts and minds of the people. Of course, it also cost the people of Indochina over 3 million lives. For millions of Americans, the great struggles unleashed by the Civil Rights movement and enacted in Great Society legislation brought with them the possibility of winning decisive victories against poverty and racism in the US. The intervention in Vietnam, when all the slogans were stripped away, was, like the dozens of interventions in Latin America before and during the Cold War, a war against the poor with a large racist subtext.

US involvement in the Korean civil war (1950–53) was explained to Americans as a UN 'police action' (US interventions in the Caribbean had been defined as the use of 'the international police power' under the Platt Amendment to 'maintain order' and protect 'independence'). The Korean War produced a 'truce,' a devastated Korea (an estimated 3 million dead) with the US creating the largest 'protectorate/satellite' in its history, establishing a large military presence and forward bases against North Korea, China, and potentially the Soviet Union, supporting repressive regimes and the military over the decades, and doing nothing to resolve either the

Korean national question or the threat of war that its large and costly military presence represented and continues to represent.

Full globalisation of the Truman Doctrine after Korea meant spending trillions of dollars over time on military-industrial complex corporate subsidies, a 'warfare state' that would prevent the development of a modern 'welfare state' social system in the US.

Over subsequent decades, US life expectancy declined in relation to other developed countries, public education and child-care services both stagnated, and the US developed a much higher level of income and wealth inequality.

And a phenomenon the CIA called 'blow-back', that is, disastrous unintended consequences, became a result of US policy.

The US intervened indirectly in Iran (1946) against a Soviet-supported uprising by the Azerbaijani minority in northern Iran (Azerbaijan was a Soviet republic at the time) threatening the Soviets indirectly with nuclear blackmail, which led the Soviets to withdraw their support. The Iranian government followed with widespread repression against the Azerbaijani minority.

After Mohammed Mossadegh, democratically elected prime minister, nationalised what was a private monopoly of the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company, Britain launched a blockade of Iranian oil. When the US government refused him any assistance, Mossadegh turned to the Soviet Union to break the blockade. The Eisenhower Administration then declared Mossadegh a 'communist' and orchestrated his overthrow (1953), replacing him with the Shah, previously a constitutional monarch, who established a brutal terroristic dictatorship in which the US was the principal backer and beneficiary. The oil was then privatised and, in a classic imperialist 're-division,' US oil companies received 40 per cent, other US-influenced companies 20 per cent, and the former Anglo-Iranian oil company, now calling itself British Petroleum (BP), more famous today in the US for spilling oil than spilling blood, received the remaining 40 per cent.

US corporations did very profitable business with and in Iran for the next 25 years, selling arms, engaging in construction projects, and taking their

cut of the oil. Secular liberal forces, the Tudeh (Communist) Party, and all other opponents of the regime were ruthlessly suppressed, leaving the Islamic clergy as the only major venue for opposition.

The 1979 revolution, in which millions took to the streets, millions who understood the history of 1953 and all that had followed, was taken over by a section of the Islamic clergy to establish a clerical 'Islamic Republic' which channelled mass opposition to imperialism into portrayals of the US and its people as 'the great Satan' and secular 'Western society' as at war with all Muslims. US corporations lost billions in Iran, although the US froze Iranian assets in US securities valued at over $20 billion in 1980. (They remain frozen, and their present value is unknown.) The Reagan Administration did 'receive' over $50 million dollars from the Iranian government in the illegal 'arms for hostages' deal in order to provide the Iranian military, which had received arms from the US until the revolution, with weapons to use in their war against Iraq, which the Reagan Administration had supported.

Most of this money 'disappeared', although some was siphoned off to support the Nicaraguan Contras, an expression in the 1980s of old-fashioned Platt Amendment gunboat diplomacy.

Among the most important social costs of the 'warfare state' in the US was a labour movement whose leadership supported all of these policies and did nothing to resist the massive export of capital abroad, which was in effect the domestic policy of imperialism in the US, producing chronic economic crisis and a political vacuum on the labour left which, with the blowback of the Iran Hostage crisis, provided the background to the Reagan presidency.

Gunboat/dollar diplomacy also returned with a vengeance to Central America when the CIA overthrew the democratically elected Arbenz Government in Guatemala (1954) and brought to power a brutal dictatorship under Carlos Castillo Armas (a US-trained officer) which would take thousands of lives: the most terroristic regime in the region to date.

When the Cuban revolution triumphed in 1959, the National Security Council and the CIA

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were initially confident that Cuba would be another Guatemala After a steady escalation of attacks on the revolutionary government and an embargo which compelled it to turn to the Soviet Union for aid, Eisenhower and then Kennedy authorised the CIA to create a Cuban exile military force to launch an invasion of Cuba to establish a regime that would suppress all pro-revolutionary forces and restore all US property (on the Guatemalan model).

Continued CIA actions after the failure of this Bay of Pigs invasion to overthrow the Cuban government, raids against Cuba, use of bacteriological warfare to destroy Cuban swine herds, organised sabotage campaigns against the Cuban economy, and plots to murder Fidel Castro (the last documented one in Angola in the mid-1970s) went on for the next three decades. Finally, the economic blockade was intensified against Cuba following the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.

The cost to the American people was first the spending over the last 54 years of billions of dollars of public funds in a futile attempt to destroy the Cuban revolution.

One must factor in the suffering of the Cuban people that these policies continue to produce. Finally, one might look at the loss to all of Latin America of what a policy of Cuban-American friendship and solidarity could have meant for the development of the region, given the outstanding achievements of Cuba in education and health care, connected to what the US has to offer in terms of technology, capital, and its own technical and professional workers. Also, the American people suffered a major blowback from the Cuban policy in the Watergate conspiracy (1971–74), in which former FBI and CIA agents organised a group of Cuban criminals who had worked in CIA terrorist actions against Cuba throughout the 1960s to wiretap phones and microfilm documents at the headquarters of the National Democratic Party in Washington. And the policy produced its spin-offs.

Indirect CIA intervention in the Dominican Republic to support Juan Bosch as a 'democratic alternative' to Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution was then transformed into support for a right-wing military junta's overthrow of Bosch when his government moved in a socialist direction and threatened the interests of US corporations. This was followed by an invasion by 25,000 US Marines in the name of defeating 'communists' after constitutionalist military officers sought to restore Bosch to the presidency he had won (1965). This was the largest direct military intervention by the US in Latin America in history, 32 years after FDR had formally repudiated the Platt Amendment.

The US also provided indirect support for a military coup in Brazil (1964), ousting a democratically elected progressive-oriented government. Finally, there was active support for military junta regimes in Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, etc., and either support for or opposition to civilian governments based on their subservience to US economic interests, all in the name of 'containing' the spread of 'Soviet-directed Cuban communism'. Starting a year before the Cuban revolution, the CIA intervened in the Chilean elections of 1958, 1964, and 1970, funding opposition to the Popular Unity (Peoples Front) coalition of Socialist and Communist Parties and liberal groups led by Socialist Party leader Dr. Salvador Allende. Unlike many Latin American countries, Chile had a history of free elections and an independent trade-union movement.

The Nixon Administration launched economic/political war against Allende after his coalition won the 1970 elections, fomenting strikes and inflation, supporting rightist and ultra-left groups to destabilise the government, and creating the context for the bloody Pinochet coup and massacre of thousands of Popular Unity partisans. This was followed by economic aid and political support for the Pinochet regime as it destroyed trade unions, privatised Chilean social security, established with the 'advice' of economists associated with Milton Friedman a regime of 'free-market fascism', regarded by scholars of Latin America as the most brutal and repressive regime in Latin American history.

The return of gunboat diplomacy was seen most dramatically in the Reagan years by the 'Contra War' (Contras were elements of the

former Somoza dictatorship, first established in 1934) against the revolutionary Sandinista government (established in 1978 and named after the martyred Augusto Sandino) in Nicaragua. The US also supported the more traditional ultra-right Salvadorian government against the revolutionary FSLN (Salvadorian National Liberation Front), thus running two 'low-intensity wars' (the new term of the 1980s) that claimed in excess of 120,000 lives in two small countries throughout the 1980s.

Blowback here came in the form of the Reagan Administration's continued support for the Contra War, following the murder of US nuns in Nicaragua and passage of the Boland Amendment. This barred direct US aid to the Contras. Reagan also intensified surveillance of the US peace movement, especially The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES).

In the twenty-first century, oil-rich Venezuela has been the target of US imperialist policies. The Bush Administration's support for a failed coup against the government of Hugo Chavez (2002) was then followed by harassment as it moved in a socialist direction. Venezuela's oil wealth and location offered and continues to offer its socialist-oriented government protection from direct gunboat diplomacy intervention, even after Chavez's death, though US media continues to demonise his successors and does what it can to support the political opposition. Very recently, the Obama Administration has called for the normalisation of US–Cuban relations, something that is long overdue. The blockade, though, remains in tact and relations have in effect worsened, limiting expectations for a 'new Good Neighbor Policy' in the region.

In the Pacific, the US government was to be complicit in events that would claim an estimated 1 million lives in Indonesia in 1965. At first the US refused to aid the restoration of Dutch colonialism after the Second World War and supported Sukarno, a Japanese collaborator, as leader of an independent Indonesia, because of his opposition to the country's Communist Party (1948).

This policy changed as Sukarno formed an informal alliance with the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) against both Islamic

conservatives and the military. The CIA supported assassination attempts against Sukarno in the 1950s and worked with conservative elements of the military against the Indonesian left in the fifth largest country in the world in terms of population at the time.

The US involved itself directly in the massacres of 1965, in which an estimated 1 million PKI activists, workers, peasants, and members of the ethnic Chinese minority were killed by the military and vigilantes linked to right-wing Islamic groups, as a countercoup in response to an alleged PKI-supported coup.

The CIA would boast of its list of 10,000 key PKI cadres provided to the military, all of whom were allegedly murdered. US support for the brutal corrupt Suharto regime lasted for decades. Subsequently, the US denied all involvement in this sordid history after Suharto's removal in 1998, claiming since the 9/11 attacks to represent the forces of liberty and democracy against 'Islamic terrorism' in Indonesia, although such groups are the successors to the Islamic vigilante groups that the CIA supported indirectly in 1965.

While most of this was then minimised in the US and the US/NATO bloc countries, in large part because the people massacred were communists and people of the left, Indonesia's invasion and occupation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, supported by the US in 1975, became the source of an international protest movement.

East Timor, whose population is primarily Christian, had before the Indonesian invasion declared its independence from Portugal. Amnesty International has estimated that the Suharto Government murdered, with US-supplied weapons, as many as 200,000 of East Timor's population of 700,000, while the US continued to support Indonesia's 'sovereignty' over East Timor in the United Nations and blocked attempts to punish it for its crimes.

All Americans suffer in the eyes of history the costs of their government's actions in funding, aiding and abetting what were two genocidal campaigns.

In the post-Second World War Middle East, the Cold War context was largely a distraction from what was and is the real issue: oil. First, the US

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replaced the British and French Empires, supporting British-installed monarchies in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. Working closely with the Saudi Arabian monarchy, centre of the world's largest concentration of oil deposits, US oil companies established the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), a consortium to develop the oil.

The US was initially cool toward Israel in the multi-faceted conflict between Arab nations, Israel, and the Palestinian population of the former British mandate/colony (1948–present), favouring an 'Arabist policy' of support for conservative monarchist regimes in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to protect the oil. However, nationalist and socialist-oriented revolutions in Egypt (1952) and Iraq (1958) undermined this policy. Even though the Soviet Union supported those developments, both the US and the Soviets opposed the British-French-Israeli invasion in the Suez Crisis (1956) as a message to the old colonial powers that US imperialism was calling the shots in the region in competition with the USSR and would not tolerate any restoration of British and French power. The following year, the Eisenhower Doctrine pledged US military intervention in the region against 'Communist influence'. US Marines then intervened under the doctrine in Lebanon against Pan-Arab pro-Syrian and Egyptian forces which had nothing to do with the communist movement.

After socialist-oriented military officers overthrew the monarchy in Iraq (1958), the CIA involved itself in plots with the nationalist Pan-Arab Baath Party of Iraq in attempts to assassinate government leaders, using anti-communism and opposition to Soviet influence as pretexts. In the 1970s, Baath Party leader Saddam Hussein (previously a CIA 'asset' in the struggle against the revolutionary military government) played the Soviets against the Americans, established a personality-cult based dictatorship and, to the chagrin of the US, nationalised oil holdings. Hussein became a CIA asset again when, seeing the US–Iran conflict, he seized an opportunity to attack Iran and gain rich oil lands, launching an eight-year war which cost hundreds of thousands of lives and bankrupted Iraq.

During the war, the Reagan Administration acted to cover up Hussein's use of poison gas and other atrocities against Iran, encouraged its oil-rich protectorates to provide him with loans to finance the war, and resisted Iranian overtures to end the war contingent upon his removal. In the aftermath of the war, Hussein, believing the US would not oppose him (it hadn't in the past) invaded oil-rich Kuwait, leading to the First Gulf War (1991) as the Pentagon and Bush Administration sought to sustain military spending as the Soviet Union collapsed. After an easy decisive victory in the First Gulf War, the Bush Administration decided to keep Hussein in power after his regime's total military defeat as a pawn to be used against Iran. His subsequent massacres of Muslims of the Shia religious denomination and people of the Kurdish ethnic minority, both long-time enemies and victims of his regime, were ignored by the Bush I and Clinton Administrations in the 'post-Cold War era'.

In the tradition of the old colonial imperialism, nothing that Hussein did to his own people was ever an issue for the US. His nationalisation of oil in the 1970s and invasion of oil-rich Kuwait in 1989 were the only reasons that he lost US support.

The post 9/11 invasion and occupation of Iraq was based on contentions above and beyond anything that the US government had advanced in the Cold War era: that Hussein's regime was the ally of Al Qaida, which his government had sworn to destroy and whose members it had hunted down and killed; that the regime was hiding 'weapons of mass destruction', even through more than a decade of UN inspections showed this to be false; that the regime was a military threat in the region even though its military forces and strength were less than half of what it had been during the 1991, First Gulf War.

The subsequent occupation highlighted as nothing else would Reagan-Bush 'neo Robber Baron' capitalism. Private construction contractors, private food providers to the military, private security forces, robbed the US taxpayer of billions of dollars, outraging millions of unemployed Iraqis who saw foreigners taking their jobs, and placing the US military occupation forces in

greater danger. The American people pay and continue to pay the price of a 60-year policy recycling largely old British Empire policies in the interests of US-based transnational energy corporations, making the incomes and jobs of millions of American workers subject to the conflicts and crises in this region and the manipulations of the transnational energy corporations in alliance with various governments for their profit. The American people and the people of the world also pay the environmental costs of these policies to land, water, and air as alternative 'green' energy sources remain underdeveloped.

The US had not been involved in the colonial carving up of sub-Saharan Africa, although American firms like Firestone Rubber were involved in the exploitation of Europe's African colonies through various transnational corporations. Cold War US governments both supported the colonial powers as they sought to hold on to their African colonies and, as a plan B position, conservative nationalists, separatists, and military protégées of the colonial powers who would turn their nations into protectorates of the US and its allies on the old 'Cuban model', or 'neocolonies' as this kind of control were known widely in Africa.

Using the UN as a cover, the US and France intervened in the collapsing Belgian Congo (1960), scene of some of the worst genocidal crimes in human history at the end of the nineteenth century, to defeat the leader of the national liberation movement, Patrice Lumumba, whom the CIA and the National Security Council compared to Fidel Castro as a socialist revolutionary menace. The CIA helped orchestrate the murder of Lumumba, spent millions to keep his supporters from gaining power democratically, and supported Joseph Mobuto, who established what international observers regarded as one of the world's most corrupt regimes. Mobuto's regime looted billions while the overwhelming majority of the people were malnourished and plagued by the old diseases of poverty and a new one, AIDS, without the most rudimentary forms of medical care.

The US also supported Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique in the 1960s and 1970s. When a revolution in Portugal ended its empire, the CIA employed a plan B strategy in Angola of supporting Holden Roberto, corrupt nationalist brother-in-law of Joseph Mobuto, against the Marxist-influenced and socialist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The CIA allied itself with the South African apartheid government, first to use force to keep the MPLA from taking power and then, to support a rightist separatist guerrilla war led by the adventurer Jonas Savimbi. Similar developments in Mozambique took place with much greater South African participation. US escalation of these actions under the Reagan Administration, supporting and protecting South African military incursions and the wars of Savimbi in Angola and Renamo (the group made up of former Portuguese colonial forces under the direction of South Africa) in Mozambique led to endless war. Hundreds of thousands died and a greater number were made homeless through these interventions, which continued into the twenty-first century, largely destroying the possibility for progressive social development and socialist construction advanced by the MPLA in the 1970s.

In South Africa, the US supported under both Democratic and Republican administrations the apartheid regime, led from 1948 to its downfall by the Nationalist Party, whose leaders had been imprisoned by the British during the Second World War because of their support for and connections with Nazi Germany. Coming to power in an election in which the Africans (roughly 75 per cent of the population) were completely disenfranchised, the Nationalist regime wrote 'race laws' which were modelled and in some instance copied in regard to language from the Hitlerite Nuremburg race laws. The crimes and atrocities of the apartheid government were known and condemned through the world, including the US. This did not stop the major imperialist powers from continuing to invest in and profit from the apartheid regime, selling it weapons and protecting it from various political sanctions at the United Nations and other international organizations.

Whatever occasional negative comments US political leaders made about the apartheid state,

the CIA worked closely with its South African counterparts from the 1950s to the 1980s. The CIA helped to capture African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela in the early 1960s. It joined South Africa to advance the Savimbi forces in the 'Contra war' in Angola. It indirectly supported the South Africans as they occupied South-West Africa (Namibia) and sought to turn it into something between a colony and a protectorate. Under the Reagan Administration, the African National Congress was, because of its historic alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP), seen as an agent of Soviet and communist world domination. Furthermore, South Africa itself, as the most developed region of the continent with its abundant resources, was seen by the Reagan Administration as a potential Soviet Union of Africa if an 'ANC-Communist' government were to expand northward to put the entire continent under 'South African communist control'.

To counter this, the Reagan Administration put forward a policy of 'constructive engagement', a more extreme version of the appeasement policy the British Empire had directed toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s, encouraging and apologising for South African military aggression in Southern Africa as against refusing to act against Nazi aggression in Central and Eastern Europe, resisting in the United Nations and in the US movements for sanctions against the South African regime. People's movements in the US and globally eventually did compel both international and US sanctions and, through disinvestment campaigns, significant withdrawals of investment from the apartheid state. Its military defeats in Angola especially (where Cuban-MPLA forces won a decisive victory against South African-Savimbi forces) and the intensification of resistance by the South African masses led to the release of Nelson Mandela, the legalisation of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and other political groups, and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy from the ruins of apartheid South Africa, itself a monstrous relic of the Hitler fascism that had been defeated in Second World War.

Although President George H.W. Bush welcomed Nelson Mandela, now leader of a liberated South Africa, to the US (and lectured him about the superiority of capitalism over socialism), no major power in the world had done more to support the apartheid state since its inception, something that should be a source of both shame and outrage for all anti-racists in the US.

In the immediate aftermath of Mandela's death, the release of information that as part of the ANC-SACP alliance he had been a member of the SACP's central committee, led to attacks on his memory by rightist and old and new red-baiters through the world, an example of the old definition of a 'reactionary': someone who learns nothing and forgets nothing from history, compelled to do the same thing over and other again.

Conclusions on 'Cost Benefits' of the US Brand of Imperialism

When the cumulative effect of military spending is combined with the cumulative national debt, they show to all willing to see both the diversion of trillions of dollars in capital from socially useful policies and the accruing of a debt whose annual interest payments provide further super profits for creditors in the US and abroad. Today, the cumulative effects of these policies serves as a deterrent to the funding of programmes to raise the living standards and improve the quality of life for the American people, not to exporting death and destruction in the name of national security and defence throughout the world.

Even conservatives who have actively opposed both existing and proposed public-sector and social welfare policies in the name of opposition to 'big government' and 'waste and inefficiency' (not to mention most of the points made in this essay) might ponder the effects of the national debt and military-industrial complex expenditures on their hopes for an unregulated free-market economy and an expanding and prosperous middle-class mass society.

And, of course, there are the hundreds of thousands who were killed and wounded in the not so cold Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Americans

who were killed and wounded in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, US service men and women being killed and wounded in Afghanistan today, and all of the possibilities of interventions in the near future in the name of the 'war against terrorism', humanitarian intervention, and future catchphrases. Those in power in the US who use contemporary imperialist jargon about 'nation building' are examples of the old adage that those who learn nothing from history are condemned to repeat it.

Finally, for both Americans and peoples throughout the world, there are the cumulative costs of all the interventions, the endless 'trails of tears' (as the forced removal of Native peoples under Jackson's Indian Removal policy of the 1830s came to be known), the repeated direct invasions and indirect interventions in various forms through the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific in the pre-Cold War era under the banner of gunboat/dollar Diplomacy and then recycled through the Truman Doctrine and its many spinoffs. Those costs for North Americans, Latin Americans, Asians, Africans, Pacific Islanders, all people, are truly incalculable.

Cross-References

▶ Settler Colonialism: Regional Development and the Dispossession of the Negev Bedouin
▶ United States Expansionism and the Pacific
▶ United States Imperialism, 19th Century
▶ United States, Hawaiian Annexation
▶ United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity
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Social Movements

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Socialism, Nationalism, and Imperialism in the Arab Countries

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Imperialism, the cross-national social class heading the process of capitalist accumulation on a world scale in the era of monopoly/finance capitalism, articulates different modes of production with the view of extracting surplus value and ever higher rates of profits. It does so by exercising varying degrees of violence and immiseration meant to strip the masses of their command over their labor and their resources. The degree of violence varies with whether imperialism engages the weaker formation through super-exploitation, the long working hours in Third World sweatshops, or through commercial exploitation, the wars of encroachment that hijack peoples' will

en masse, only to snatch their resources, portions of their lives and the value with which they enjoy better lives. Human life is a resource, either mobilized or immobilized, but awaiting engagement in some domain of accumulation. Immobilized labor is potential labor power. Extinguishing human life in war occurs through militarism, a significant domain of accumulation. The demise of humans before their historically determined time lessens the social cost of labor reproduction and contributes to surplus value formation by the degree it reduces necessary labor. Although the practice of violence in various forms is necessary for the reproduction of all sorts of capitalist relations, more violence is associated with the encroachment wars that lay the groundwork for commercial or slave-like forms of exploitation.

In much of the world, imperialism, the imperialist class constituted of central industrial/financial circles and comprador capitalists, superexploits labor in mining, plantations, manufacturing and militaristic concerns. In the Arab World, as per the definition of the Arab League (hereinafter AW), oil and war are the principal industries with which the imperialist class engrosses itself, and the principal channels through which the AW cointegrates with the global economy. It is through the residual revenues, the revenues remaining after the imperialist class usurps its share of the total Arab product that the AW sustains or, as per its observed degenerative condition, de-sustains itself.

As a result of the combined effect of war and attendant neoliberal austerity, the AW has since c. 1980 deindustrialized (UNIDO 2015), exhibited some of the highest global rates of unemployment and income inequality (ILO various years; TIID various years), and the highest rate of food-import dependency (UN-Survey various years; FAOSTAT 2016; (UNIDO 2014; ILO various issues; FAOSTAT; UTIP 2008; UN 2012) The AW exports precious little other than low value-added products, raw materials, especially oil (UN-Survey various years). While between 1980 and 2011, the average annual growth rate oscillated between 2% and 3%, which is roughly equivalent to the population growth rate, the labor share fell from around 50% in the mid-1980s to around 25% in 2010 (ILO 2011; Marquetti and Foley 2011;

Guerriero 2012). Through control of the AW, the imperialist class amasses astronomical rents. It liquidates Arab national assets, raises the profit share of the Arab comprador class through neoliberal tax and monetary policy, and, most crucially, it belligerently hollows the Arab state while fortifying US-led power over the region. It should come as no surprise that over the last four decades, the AW has held many of the global poor development records. Not surprisingly, it also endures the highest frequency of conflicts (SIPRI various years; SIPRI 2015) Combining the immediate war dead numbers with the numbers of people whose lives are piecemeal shortened by the fallout of war and its austerity, the AW can practically compete with the Congo in terms of degree of immiseration and outflux of refugees.

Oil is a strategic commodity whose *control* offers the US-empire unique powers. Control is a de facto transfer of oil ownership from the purview of the national masses to the imperialist class. Such a transfer occurs by the violent suppression of the masses or the co-optation of states upon whose lands oil is found. The encroachment wars, the bloody processes of stripping peoples of their will and resources, are also blatant violations of human rights as per the first article of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. One is reminded that the first article of that covenant says that all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, and in no case may they be deprived of their own means of subsistence (OHCHR 1966).

The history of the AW, the rise of its modern states, colonially designed and fragmented to ensure inter-Arab dividedness, its continued debilitation and deprivation of resources by imperialist aggression, the ethnic cleansing of Palestine by Israel, an expansionary colonial settler state whose Zionist ethos promotes imperialist interests far afield, all add up to the crushing power of history "that weighs like a nightmare upon the shoulders" of the Arab masses. The same history is also a history of heroic national liberation struggles that have often been quelled by the technical superiority and savagery of European war culture and weaponry. The current famines and wars in

Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, malnutrition in Egypt and Morocco, and wars in Libya, Iraq, Occupied Gaza and Syria are symptoms of that outstanding history.

While the control of oil requires war, war itself is a source of control and an industry in its own right. Imperialist war, a subcategory of accumulation by militarism, is an enterprise of violence whose product is *waste* and especially, the wasted lives *qua* absolute and relative depopulation.

> Capitalist production, when considered in isolation from the process of circulation and the excesses of competition, is very economical with the materialised labour incorporated in commodities. Yet, more than any other mode of production, it squanders human lives, or living-labour, and not only blood and flesh, but also nerve and brain. Indeed, it is only by dint of the most extravagant waste of individual development that the development of the human race is at all safeguarded and maintained in the epoch of history immediately preceding the conscious reorganisation of society. Since all of the economising here discussed arises from the social nature of labour, *it is indeed just this directly social nature of labour which causes the waste of life and health.* (Marx 1893)

In a world plagued by constant crises of overproduction and in line with demands for underutilizing resources, war disengages resources. It thwarts the coming of new Third World industries onto the world stage, especially, those which could compete with the occidental monopoly over the production of high value-added products. Concomitantly, imperialist war disciplines the labor process. It pacifies labor and levels the social grounds for production to the desires of capital and its more intensified form, imperialism. Beheld as the practice of the law of value, war imparts the power to regulate social time and lowers input prices below value. In terms of its role in international relations, imperialist war serves as a show of power through its demonstration effect, which in turn feeds its ideological strength. It imposes its own vernacular as the science of social reproduction and, more often than not, it disarms nations and/or resisting masses without firing a shot.

The encroachment side of imperialist war enforces the agenda of the victors upon the conquered nations. It dismantles the economic safeguards of the vanquished state, especially its

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capital and trade accounts. The deregulation removes the measures that recirculate the wealth of the nation within the subdued nation. It also dismounts the social programs that prop up the quality and longevity of people lives. As a matter of priority, it spares no effort to undermine any social model as an alternative to the reign of free capital. Iraq's occupation, de-facto dismemberment first by military assault and then de jure by the Bremer constitution, its continued debilitation by neoliberalism, are outstanding examples of imperialism as practiced in the AW. In the last moment however, all imperialist assaults upon weaker Third World formations lubricate the mechanisms for value usurpation by coordinating the function and the reproduction of labor, including, population growth to the requirements of central capital.

Apart from its egregious side, war can be thought of just as any other run of the mill industry. It engages waged labor with advanced machinery and/or forces labor to produce ruin and the deaths of other humans. Just as many deleterious commodities are consumed by society, the loss of life and the loss of nature and resources that support life, otherwise social nature, are themselves the highly valued products and consumption items of war. Waste accumulation and its waste product, either in its pollution that reduces lives or immediate human deaths, is a valuable commodity that undergirds the whole of capital's metabolic order. Capital's ideological apparatuses and its dominant ideas are also its accumulated historical surplus value, a constituent of its wealth, and these in turn condition the desire for the consumption of useful as well as harmful commodities. Capital produces the commodity, its first product, and the social man, its second product, who is willing to consume any of its commodities (Lebowitz 2003), no matter how poisonous, and still be consumed by capital in a lifespan earlier than that accorded by the prevailing development of the productive forces (Kadri 2019; Lebowitz 2003).

Another ideological impact of war, one desperately desired by capital, is to stamp out revolutionary consciousness and attendant forms of labor organization that give strength to the working class. War is unadulterated waste. The fervor of war's ultra-sectarianism or nationalisms foments inter-working class divisions and recreates the worker who is willing to consume the life of another worker. It accentuates the waste side of accumulation, which is already the inherent predisposition of capital. In capital's metabolic order, which grows by devouring man and nature, the rate of destruction to human life and the natural environment, the latter's end is to support the reproduction of human life, is the technical measure of the productive efficiency of war. In the oneness of man and nature, it has to be recalled that it is not the trees that have to be reduced to objects but it is the human who recognizes capital's symbols of power.

To be sure, imperialism is an intensification of capital's relationship in the age of monopoly in combination with finance. It resolves capital's contradiction, the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and spheres of influence for finance capital on the other, by means of expansion through war (Lenin 1916). The violent forms by which imperialism demolishes man and nature, accumulation by a higher degree of waste, characterize the highly entropic tendency of the capitalist system. Imperialism compresses the chronological time in which the consumption of labor in production occurs. In more holistic terms, one may add, both necessary and unnecessary labor, the one-sided historical abstractions used to develop a particular in a universal condition, or logically the latter labor serves a predicate of the former and vice versa; hence, there is only one labor, living labor, neither necessary or productive nor unnecessary or unproductive, which forms value.

Both man and nature, together in unison as social nature, are engaged as the cheap inputs behind the making of the momentarily low prices of consumables sold on the market. Prices are the epiphenomena of mediated value relations given as *immediacy.* The emphasis on *immediate* prices is to underscore the fact that over its life cycle society lays out in real value upon a commodity, in objectified necessary labor time, far in excess of the price paid for it during the instance of

purchase. The price is the appearance of value whose essence is social production. The costs to nature and man, the taxes to repair nature and pay for war, are the value outlays on production shifted upon the shoulders of the consumerist working class in a social time-defined, open-ended turnover, and realization cycle. Imperialism contributes to the monolithic power that blinds people from the real costs of capitalist production. These not-so-exposed value inputs may be imputed in their corresponding price manifestations during the manifold exchange processes or may materialize with a time lag determined by the social forces that regulate the social nature of time, as in the recent appearance of the carbon tax.

So far, the historically accumulated costs of destructed man and nature exceed the wealth or the sum of the dollar-prices of the heap of commodities grouped together; capitalism's existentialist debacle. That many input costs can remain apparently un-priced, underpriced, or hidden, while "autophagous society" auto-destructs, proves the dissolution of labor's revolutionary consciousness. The culture, the accumulated stock of knowledge of humanity hijacked by Western civilization, is an integral part of the historical surplus value. The deleterious wealth stock as social matter has also a deleterious social relation associated with it, a substance with subjectivity, which reproduces it. (I use the descriptors European, Western, Southern, or Northern in the ideological sense, in contrast to the geographic one.) The grip of Eurocentrism, especially the state of consciousness of capital's floated Marxists, the self-appointed interlocutors of the Northern working class, a class whose wages contain a rent component arising from imperialist pillage, investigate the alleged crimes of Stalin not to pursue the virtue of truth, but to prop up the power of the ideological avalanche of capital as it devours what is left of the planet. Invariably, the study of history serves a contemporaneous class position. History, the surrogate capital, is an immense ideological power structure and a daily genocide. It is this power structure, the historical moment, which often escapes enquiry by scholars deeply besotted with Western democracy and capitalism as progress. Even what appears as critique of capital in

Western philosophy and science, including many of its Marxist strands, have been allowed to surface freely, without the usual repression, because they intoxicate and co-opt the anti-systemic process, indeed doing so at a rate and efficacy surpassing that of the fascist right, which has historically represented a false anti-systemic alternative in its own right.

The de-subjectification, equally objectification, of labor, the failure of labor to come to terms with its historical identity and agency, its failure to negate capital and reorganize and socialize the natural reproduction order, is a form of slavery. Under capitalism, chattel slavery initially served as a pedestal that supported the industrialization and the wage-slave worker of the North. As per Malcom X, capital preferred *the pliant house negroes to the field negroes*; the former were slaves who revered their white masters, much like Marxists adhering to bourgeois democracy. In latent capitalism, the introjection of capital's "bourgeois democratic" ideal by Northern working classes *living off the avails of imperialist procuring*, generalized the house negro's state of submission to the masses. In his chez-d'oeuvre, One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse (1964) labels the Northern formation as totalitarian by virtue of its self-alienated labor, or the labor that has internalized the ethos of capital and identified with it. Slavery is the disempowerment of labor by ideological or physical coercion. Unlike the predominant forms of slavery in the North, imperialism bombs, disempowers, and enslaves whole nations and masses in the South. Thus, inasmuch as early Southern slavery served as a pedestal for the industrial North (Marx 1867), the modern forms of Northern labor's de-subjectification *qua* slavery, the support for bourgeois democratic governments that colonies and imperialize, inversely serve as pedestals for the industry of war that enslaves the South.

With the certainty of hindsight, the negative dialectic of capital, the spiral that develops from bad to worse, has prevailed. *Ex post facto,* there is and there was nothing progressive about capitalism. Lenin's dictum "imperialism will be last stage of capitalism" is already borne out by the facts, but not because of the world revolution he

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envisaged, because the unfettered capital has been consuming so much of social nature and nature to the point that the losses to life in general have become irreparable.

For imperialism as practiced in the AW, it is necessary but not sufficient to only neutralize revolutionary consciousness or for the masses to introject defeatism. Sufficiency arises from the practice and the impact of war in the literal sense, that is in the premature ending of human lives. Through its bombings and imposed austerity, war reduces the population or the life span of an allegedly superfluous population to an average age that falls below the historically determined level of life expectancies. The Arab value making process unfolds upon two principal channels: first, the cutting down of lives is waste produced by value outlays in militarism; and, secondly, the undue reduction of the population reduces the social cost of reproduction of Arab labor. To reemphasize: the Arab share of wages is determined residually after the imperialist cross-national class determines its priorities and profit shares, as opposed to nationally. The Arab working-class struggle is a struggle against their own comprador and the many regional US military bases and proxy armies.

In an already overproducing world, absolute or relative depopulation reduces the costs of the reproduction of labor over the lifecycle of the laborer as a result of reduction in the value outlays on labor, the social cost of reproduction, and its form given in the *immediate price category* known as the wage bill. Hence, a primary objective of imperialism is to depopulate. For Arabs and Africans, the anti-imperialist struggle is more than just a war of cultural preservation or resistance. It is plainly a war of physical existence. It is necessary and sufficient for imperialism to eviscerate the consciousness of resistance and mow down people. Capital ontologically aggresses even its own sub-circles in a process of waste accumulation determined by auto-negation.

To illustrate the war of existence, the ontology of capital, let us now consider the case of the Arabs in Palestine. Regardless of the myths of Jewish supremacy or racism, or for that matter national supremacy or whether a monotheistic deity condoned the ethnic cleansing of Palestinian towns and villages or not, that is to say no matter the justification for the settler colonial assault visited upon the Palestinians, all these concocted explanations remain excessive because, at a sedimentary level, imperialism assuming its chauvinist form in Zionism must *industriously* depopulate the Palestinians as well as others. It must cut short lives or waste lives as values consumed in a lifecycle of waste *qua* surplus value creation. The Marxist refrain that "nothing is constant but change" should be put instead as "nothing is constant but war." Under capital, depopulation abounds by the diktat of commodities, assuming fetish qualities, proxying for humans, whose exchange governs the modality of social reproduction. War is a primary industry and a final realization stage for commodities. It produces the death/waste commodities. It mobilizes excess moneyed surpluses under monopoly capital. The power garnered through war is a crucial link in the realization process of civilian-end use commodities, their manifestation in the money form, and that is so because imperialist war cum ideology disembowels the consciousness of labor, the human whose consent inversely founds the substance of power. It creates the labor who recognizes and reveres the money form of value as imposed by capital.

Depopulation, a component of the waste industry in its imperialist war practice, of which there is plenty in the AW, represents the determining moment in the negative dialectic of capital. As a reminder, war, the concrete implementation of militarism, falls under the more general category of accumulation by waste. Capital targets nature not only to acquire cheap raw material but also to target the reproduction of man, because it is man who fathoms the money and power symbols and not the trees. To de-reproduce society by war or by the immiserating aftereffects of austerity, capital redresses its profitability and steadies its rule.

For a capital commanded by commodities that have assumed godly status through the market, war is a boon. It drives publicly funded R&D to be privately appropriated, redeploys the monopoly/financial surplus in military industry, as opposed to areas that could provide autonomy to

labor like health and education, and, ultimately, it regulates the reproduction of the labor force. War, as the practical manifestation of the law of value, situates the US-empire atop the global technological pyramid and lodges new investments in waste concerns. It taxes the working class and deprives it of the living security required for autonomy. Either by its national zeal, its so-called "purifying power," or by the outright diminution of labor's numbers, revolutionary consciousness, and organization, war elevates the principal repressive organ of capital, the state, to a divine position. By masking over the criminality of the labor process, war legitimates the otherwise fictitious construct of capital. Positing that the value category under capitalism is *immanently* unethical and ugly, war's products, the wasted lives, are then the surplus value that emerges by the act of consuming human lives as inputs in waste production. By *immanent*, I mean that capital necessarily but not exclusively emits *ugly* surplus value (ugly as in the aesthetic category) as a result of its inner workings, an issue that cannot be gauged by question of degree.

The "war for war's sake" and the "war for oil" nexus robs the Arab masses of their power and, hence, the right to their resources and development. The little remaining oil revenues, after the US-led imperialist class grabs its share, is deployed by the comprador in Saudi and other Gulf states to sow identity divisions amongst the Arab masses. As every country becomes a tinderbox of various sects vying for their share of the imperialist imposed scarcity in resources, either development goes into a tailspin as a result weaponizing cultural identity against the working class or the US-led military intervenes to dismantle the productive order of society.

Scarcity is a derived condition of central overproduction. Upon such constructed scarcity, a "lifebuoy ethic" is mounted. Because the world is sinking in its fight for supposedly scarce resources, and because the West cannot accommodate refugees dipping into its scarce resources, sinking refugee boats at sea is not all that unethical. However, the degree of perceived scarcity as self-evident truth corresponds to the degree of development or the degree to which the masses own and control their resources. Development is

thusly a resultant of the class struggle. In its ideological stance, it is the demystification of the fetishes of capital alongside the strengthening of the global working class front contra imperialism.

By the time of the Arab Spring in 2011, it had become pellucidly clear that the masses in the AW have lost the momentum of the class struggle and, correspondingly, the AW experienced lumpen development or de-development (Kadri 2014). Standards of living fell below subsistence – that is below the historically determined level of the living wage, and the numbers of war dead since the launch of the USA's war on terror, not counting earlier wars, has reached anywhere between two and four million people, mostly Arabs, while the number of internally and externally displaced refugees is several times this figure (Physicians for Social Responsibility as quoted by MintPress News. Do The Math: Global War On Terror Has Killed 4 Million Muslims Or More A recent study suggests the "War on Terror" has had two million victims, but reporter Nafeez Ahmed claims this may be only a fraction of the total dead from Western wars. https://www.mintpressnews.com/do-the-math-global-war-on-terror-has-killed-4-million-muslims-or-more/208225/).

These imperialist wars created trillions in US debts to be redeemed by the working class or, on the flip side of the accounting identity, an equal amount of risk-free credit to the US-led financial class. At the same time, these wars are part and parcel of the global production process. Their relative and absolute depopulation, or the act of trimming down the costs of the immense reserve army of labor to the requirements of underutilization under crisis of overproduction, is both a production sphere of waste and a stage of anachronic realization for other spheres of production. Anachronic is used here in the sense that in a continuous cycle of production there is no particular sequence in chronological time to follow. At any rate, the making of surplus value does not occur in the limited space of the single factory floor. Nor does the commodity that such a factory produces realizes represents the final stage in the chronological order in which it was sold on some market. In an interconnected global production process, the whole of the input-output chain is the real factory. The social product,

the incremental additions to the physical instantiations of the surplus value, begins with the making of people and ends with the remaking of people. The turnover cycle, the time in which the first commodity, labor power is produced until the time depopulation regulates the production of the stock of labor power for the production process, is a recurrent cycle occurring in social time, or the class-struggle *cum* power-derived time.

The contribution of social nature, the nature that reproduces man, and much unpaid or underpaid labor to the making of surplus value are unnoticed until power balances, including the fluctuations in the self-realization of revolutionary consciousness, shift and assign market prices to the past value inputs, such as the environmental taxes paid today. Social or abstract time is the concomitant of the forces that own and controls the means to compress or decompress the necessary labor time in production while managing unutilized resources by disengagement or, in the case of people, by outright depopulation.

Although un-developing and disarming the Arab masses has always bestowed Europe with power over much of space and time, the discovery of oil early in the twentieth century and its pursuit for strategic control has turned the Arab region into a furnace for the war-industry. In particular, the USA's reign over the Gulf region's Hormuz or Bab al-Mandeb Straits, channels where much of world trade and nearly a third of all seaborne oil passes, is an immediate lever of power over much of the globe and a pillar of imperial rents. Oil is the principal commodity backing global dollarization (Patnaik 2009); however, the strategic control of oil is what ensures that oil sales continue to be dollarized while holding energy insecure nations hostages to US policy (Kadri 2016a). The proximity of the AW to Europe and later its strategic oil reserves have qualified and distinguished the practice of imperialism in this region and the features of Arab struggles.

The Postindependence and Arab Socialist Experience

As the rest of the developing world, the Arab world emerged from colonial rule burdened with underdevelopment. Colonists ensured the national bourgeoisie remained tied down in merchant activity as opposed to industrialization. The reshaping of the then budding Arab bourgeoisie into a subordinate merchant partner of Europe can be dated to European and, specifically, to early nineteenth-century Napoleonic changes to landholding laws empowering individual capitalists (Abdel-Malek 1968). In Egypt, the rise of the Egyptian bourgeoisie in its commercial form corresponds to the Napoleonic law of 16 July 1798, which allowed Egyptians to own land, and to the steps taken by Mohammad Ali to distribute two million acres between 1813 and 1816 to state officials. Similar reforms to land ownership boosting cash crop production occurred in the Levant (the Silk cocoons) as well as the Maghreb (subtropical crops).

The postindependence national bourgeoisie exhibited a shortage of finance and real capital and had shady ties to the previous colonist. As such, it has then become possible for a coalition of classes to constitute a surrogate bourgeoisie, a state bourgeoisie, and fill the class power vacuum (Hussein 1971). However, the embryonic formation of the intermediate stratum (the state bourgeois class) took hold as Arab industry in the early twentieth century grew under the shadow of European industry and war (Abdel-Malek 1968). The intermediate strata, bureaucracy, and professionals grouped around the state represented the state bourgeoisie. In terms of structure, the intermediate stratum comprises skilled professionals – such as schoolteachers, university professors, civil servants, accountants, military officers, medical doctors, engineers, and lawyers – whose status is not dependent on the ownership of property and wealth but on their training and performance. The intermediate stratum refers to a differentiated relationship within the working class distinguished from the less-privileged working-class on the basis of salary, education, skill, and, more decisively, by the degree of control over the means of production delegated to it by the military. Note that in a war context with weak institutions resulting from the potential insecurity of the state, the military emerged as the key player on the Arab political scene. In these new social relationships of production, the state bourgeoisie

maintained not only its relation to the means of production through the state itself but also distributional arrangements that reinforced the pace of capital accumulation. This was the organized dimension of capital under the class of Arab socialist regimes: a political process safeguarding capital as a social relationship and the inevitable capitalistic growth of the state bourgeois class.

The Arab bourgeoisie remained in its weak and subordinate state until the time of independence in the mid-twentieth century. The struggle for independence was a combination of national and class struggle against the colonial powers and its comprador sections of the bourgeoisie. The history of modern Arab states, like European history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is a history of national movements (Rodinson 1978). Alongside the national struggle for liberation, there existed a social struggle against a national bourgeoisie tailing Western colonial interests and industry.

After independence, the design of the state and its constitution mirrored the degree to which the power of the comprador was extirpated during the wars of national liberation struggles. In Algeria where the comprador was eliminated, for instance, a people's socialist republic followed, whereas in Lebanon, a deal was struck to leave the comprador and its sectarian social constellation in power in return for French withdrawal (El-Solh 2004). In Lebanon, France left behind a superb working class-dividing state and a comprador that suppresses anti-imperialist resistance. Jordan's buffer state model and other Arab monarchies function similarly to the Lebanese model. However, the undercurrent function of these compradors is to lay the groundwork for militarism and set alight their own social formations.

As elsewhere after the end of the Second Great War and in the postindependence period, the AW experienced a bout of development, which rested on the then prevailing policy order of industrialization alongside protective and regulatory finance and trade measures. Of all the Arab countries, the socialist Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and, somewhat later, Communist South Yemen exhibited a healthy growth and developmental record. These were blurred copies of the USSR's model combining, security, development, and industrialization. Although it is

difficult to compare two processes across different time periods, still in terms of real measures that are weighted historically, the Arab socialist model has outperformed the ongoing neoliberal model in terms of growth, productivity, and rate of employment generation (Kadri 2016a). These states undertook massive land reform measures, nationalized industry, and financial institutions, provided universal healthcare and education, and clamped down on the cycle of resource usurpation. This class of Arab states adopted a policy of self-reliance and sought self-sufficiency in production, endorsed import-substituting industrialization, and effected public investments in heavy industry while synchronizing the demands of a growing industry with adequate human skills. These states relied on technology transfers while endogenizing know-how through linkages. To be sure, standards of living are historically determined, that is they are a subset of a continuously rising wealth level, the period 1960–1980 represented an epoch in which Arab countries displayed a more dynamic performance in terms of real wage growth, more equal income distribution, and sturdier improvements in infant mortality and life expectancy, as well as many other social indicators (Kadri 2016a, 2017).

Accounts of the detailed aspects of the interface between national policies and their developmental outcomes show that the broad determinants of the relative success of the Arab socialist regimes stem from the fact that they tackled security and developmental concerns jointly. In terms of definitions, development policies remain the resource-channelling mechanisms that direct wealth flows to the social class in command. Security is a totality that encompasses communal and national securities, knowledge-related productive capacity, including health and education, with working-class security the backbone of national sovereignty.

Despite the fact that the Arab socialist model has been an engine of growth, the twist of the mainstream in explaining the shift away from Arab socialism remained stuck in a fictitious story of rising debt associated with war effort or a failure of import substitution policy, which had put the brakes on the advance of government spending. To be sure, this is the same spin tale

that was developed with the rise of finance and neoliberalism to arrest the development of state supported social programs elsewhere. However, the debt to GDP ratio under Arab socialism was lower than at any other stage in the neoliberal phase. The debts of Arab socialist countries were principally associated with Soviet weaponry purchase against loans handed at concessional rates. Moreover, industrialization proceeded at very high rates under import substitution policies, unlike the de-industrialization experienced under neoliberalism. The turn away from socialism was the by-product of an anti-socialist ideological slide gripping the world, to which Arab defeats in Arab-Israeli wars acted as catalyst in the transition to neoliberalism.

At a further remove, the emphasis in Arab socialist policy was on industrialization supported by agricultural land reform and rising productivity. A sort of harmonious development in which rising agricultural productivity freed the state to supply credit to industry and social endeavors. In the mid-1960s, the Syrian Ba'ath carried out massive land reforms. In Iraq, the Ba'ath nationalized oil in the 1970s and redistributed land and oil revenues in more equitable ways. In Egypt, state-owned enterprises accounted for about 60% of value-added in manufacturing, and in Syria they accounted for about 55%. The output of these newly established public enterprises recorded 13% of GDP in Egypt and 11% of GDP in Syria (Richards and Waterbury 1990). In every case, land reform accompanied industrialization, and increasing agricultural productivity partly stemmed rural–urban migration. Until 2006, Syria was exporting cereals (AMF 2007). With extensive social investment, standards of living rose significantly (Ayubi 1995; Anderson 1987). In the uncertain immediate post-independence war-threatened environment, the state acted as a guarantor of long-term investments in plants and equipment. State-owned industrial and agricultural banks lent to national projects at low long-term rates. A so-called blacklist protected national industry from foreign competition. A tightening of the capital account and a multiple interest and exchange rate policy galvanized national resources and provided exchange

rate stability. Subsidies and price controls in essentials raised the standard of living for the rural population, while increasing agricultural productivity lowered the costs of basic commodities for the working classes.

There are no factual grounds to support the thesis of the imperialist corpus, which blamed debts, import substitution policy and war fatigue for the failure of Arab socialism. It is the class as agent of history that does and not the procedures it takes to self-reproduce, its instrumentalization of policy, which do. The latter mode of thought is utter reification. Given the failure of the neoliberal model, it is not difficult to prove that socialism had outperformed the neoliberal model on economic dynamics and social measures. Deficits, inflation, and unemployment were all at lower and tolerable levels. What was intolerable was the state of military and ideological defeats that shifted the allegiances of bourgeois, military, and sections of the intermediate strata, the state bourgeoisie, from the national base to foreign class alliances and pursuits.

At any rate, the shift in policy is a symptom of a class and ideological swerve to the right that was taking place on a global scale. The defeat of socialism was associated with socialist ideological defeat across the globe. Imperialist Anti-Arab belligerence, especially the devastation of Iraq in 1991, coincided with global retreat in socialist ideology. The alignment of national defeats with the collapse of internationalism resulted in more than mere destruction of assets; the AW introjected defeatism and lost its ideology of resistance, Arabism, and its related socialism. Larger scale imperialist inflicted carnage, hunger and malnutrition followed. One substantive reason, which shows that Arab socialist regimes were not wholeheartidly committed to the working class cause is the absence of organised popular armies. A peoples' army would have mitigated much of the losses incurred by the working class once the transition to neoliberlaism occurred.

Imperialism does not rest while the Third World develops. Its anti-Arab wars, in Suez 1956, against a debilitated Algeria by the Moroccan proxy in 1963, the wars visited upon the Yemen in 1962, and the 1967 and 1973 Israeli

aggressions and occupation of new Arab lands are but few examples. Imperialist interventions such as the crushing of the Dhofar revolution in Oman, the manipulation of the Kurdish people struggle for self-determination in Iraq, and above all the infiltration and subjugation of the Fatah-Palestinian leadership, which ended up as a proxy army for Israel policing Palestinian resistance, are landmarks of imperialist sabotage.

Why emphasize Palestine? Because forfeiting the Palestinian historical rights is not only a land issue, it is a recognition of the power of US-led imperialism. Such step is the doorway through which the comprador across the globe can further submit to the USA's demand of value usurpation by the Alibi of a conforming Palestinian leadership. As Mao Zedong noted "it is not just a question of Israel but of who stands behind Israel." (Quoted from Democracy and Class Struggle http://democracyandclasstruggle.blogspot.com/2011/02/chairman-mao-zedong-on-palestine-and.html) Colloquially put, if the indigenous people of Palestine accepted the terms of imperialism and its offshoot in Zionism, then why should anyone else Don Quixote the hegemon or be a last-ditch resister against an uncrushable US power. Such is the weight of the Palestinian question in the international class struggle.

The Weight of History

Capitalism, the historical period characterized by the rule of the capital relationship, dawned at around AD 1500. Forms of waged work in navigation and soldiery began to take shape prior to the sixteenth century. As the planet recovered from its demographic slump, circa 1450, and as China grew inwards with its land Silk road encumbered by Tatar invasions splitting the far from the near East, Europe was the only space set to lead by the practice of capitalism. Apart from the global shortage of labor during the pre-sixteenth century decline, which made labor dear and boosted agricultural productivity (Wallerstein 1974), the Crusaders hiring of Venetian ships and traders hiring their own armies to impose their trade conditions (Edwards and Ogilvie 2008) are

circumstances of capitalist wage processes (Kadri 2016b; Edwards and Ogilvie 2008). Merchant wealth was the precursor to capitalism and it grew by the practice of European piracy, pillage, and control of sea trading routes. (The warring Ottomans, Mamluk, and Timurids, including the latter's occupation of the Levant and severing the land Silk road plus the mass transfer of the Levantine artisanal workforce, were all factors at play to Central Asia represent some of the early conditions of Oriental lapse vis-à-vis a victorious Spanish Kingdom empire. Taqoush 2002.)

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, Signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. (Marx 1867, Ch. 31)

The early manifestations of capitalist accumulation, its primitive accumulation, were waged work in the practice of colonial butchery and genocide, as opposed to the rise of procrustean model of capitalism in the English agriculture as per Brenner (1977) and Woods (1998). The latter internalist view is logical, as in formal, but not historical. The world's history cannot be confined to the English countryside unless one's perspective of history, specifically, the universal *culture* necessary as subject for development in the productive forces, the stock of humanity's knowledge cannot be limited to that countryside. In its decisive moment, capital is a waste-producing social relationship (Kadri 2019). The growth in merchant wealth alongside rising global demand necessarily expedited rising productivity associated with new forms in the social division of labor.

Shoots of capitalist development were in evidence in many parts of the globe; however, as is necessary for capital in its course of development, the industrialization of one part requires the deindustrialization of another weaker part. The slowly incubating capitalist relations in the AW picked up speed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but these were the sort of capitalist relations that undermined indigenous productivity. They commodified all forms of social relations

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but stunted the capability of society to meet the basic subsistence requirements by local means. It is the sort of asphyxiating measures that regulate social, including demographic, reproduction. The practice of the Napoleonic French invasion of Egypt exemplified in the destruction of local sources of knowledge, the burning of Al-Azhar University, the infusion of sectarian divisions, and the theft of archaeological sites, all of which are prelude to the more austere measures to follow upon by the colonial forces to arrest Egyptian development (Al-Duri 1969).

In Ottoman times, neither the grip of the state over its expansive territory nor the level of development in capitalist social relations, technology, and production know-how could regiment resources, especially human resources, to potentially socialize them. The Arab peasants were unlike the more sedentary European serfs (more bonded to the land), and they enjoyed more freedom of movement (El Kodsi 1970). Despite nearly half a million people employed by the Ottoman states in various social functions (numbers from Gelvin 2004, p. 80), the empire's capacity to engage technological change and productivity was still lagging in comparison to Europe. While the modern nation-state was already an instrument of European capital and advances in wage-driven production were afoot, the few Arab experiments that attempted to uncap production potential wealth via capitalist development – Mohammed Ali of Egypt and the industrial southern belt of the Ottoman Empire linking Tripoli, Aleppo, and Mosul – were strangled in the cradle (Al-Duri 1969). The shaping of capitalist development by colonialism selectively reinforced repressive precapitalist relations as the ruling relations of the colonies for ease of control. Colonialism institutionalized designated cultural identity making it the principal form of organization and means by which such ascriptive groups could access their rent/share acquisition of the social product. The newly politicized cultural identity, imposed by capital through the constitution as the purveyor of rent, crushed the old social order and splintered the potential for the formation of a cohesive, identity-subsuming, working class. The inter-working class fragmentation, often leading to inter-working class conflict, is itself

foundational for the regimentation of the labor process and the nonfictitious disasters of a fictitiously constructed capital.

Once outlying social formations and their resources come within reach of European colonialism, they fall under the rule of the capital relationship. They become capitalist irrespective of their outdated technology. Their resources will be actually or potentially commodified, as in consummated, or awaiting consummation, in the circuit of capital. The same capital relationship that encourages productivity in Europe, established that while there was a secular trend of population growth globally, the developing world's industrial expansion and productivity should remain sluggish. The developing world should not modernize nor meet the demands of population growth. Its growth should be tied to the demands of central capital. The imposition of de-modernization upon the South founds the contradiction between capital and demographic growth resolved in measures of absolute and relative depopulation. It is the political rule of capital and not the level of advancement in machinery, which determined the rates of depopulation and accumulation of capital as well as ascribe capitalism to a social formation.

Salient accounts on the rise of Arab capitalism pin it down to the high rate of expansion of European capital as it hitched Arab formations to colonialism (as in Owen 2004). But just as the degree of advanced machinery alone does not signify the onset of capitalism, the same could be said for a higher degree of integration by trade volume with Europe. The empirically constructed concept of machinery, its material substance alone, informs little without the social relations setting into process the progress of machine development.

Prior to European colonial ventures, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a dual course of development towards capitalism: firstly, by the development of its own capacities, and, secondly, by its desultory ties to European capital. Capital as a social relationship arose in the AW as it did on much of the planet, via the exigencies of development in the productive forces, but its hold over social processes was cemented as the power of Europe weighed-in structurally, that is by the

perceived mass of its rising European power, or actually as Europe became the de facto colonial power. The Ottoman Empire was shifting its property laws by the outside pressure of Europe even before Europe set foot in the AW (Lutsky 1969). This differentiation is key because it responds to the Eurocentric argument that capitalism was purely a European phenomenon related to its liberal values whereas its fast pace of development was co-integrated with the de-development of hegemonized Southern formations. The capitalist rupture between the forces and relations of production is an overdetermined historical condition, a collision of coincidence and necessity in the historical event, whose subject assumes the structure of European capital. It is the rising power of Europe that charted the redesign of older forms of political organizations into nation-states, the type of civil administrative service governing social life processes. As Europe's power rose, the historical process dominating the AW became a product of colonialism.

To be sure, there were cash crop cultures across the AW. Palestine exported half a million boxes of oranges to the UK in the late nineteenth century (Scholch 1982). However, much of Arab agriculture remained at subsistence level with immense numbers of demobilized labor. As trade volume with Europe rose, colonial capital further subsumed the Arab subsistence agriculture. It hegemonically articulated the Arab mode of production into what Mahdi Amel dubbed the colonial mode of production (Amel 1990/1972). Although enjoying some textile industries and dozens of commercial sea trading posts prior to European colonialism, the AW could not leap ahead of Europe in developing its productive forces because its subject assuming an autonomous political structure had already been stymied by rising Europe. In addition to political subjugation, the AW lacked a centralized political authority. There was no "precapitalist" Arab formation being assimilated by the Europeans; once capitalism arrives on the world stage, the world that falls under the real and ideological dominion of Europe becomes capitalist. As such, while the manifestations of capital in Europe assumes rising productivity with advanced machinery, it assumes forms of slavery or genocide in the colonies, where the principal product of capital centers around the premature consumption of human lives.

Once under colonialism, the colonial power implanted itself in the nascent Arab states as the ultimate power broker. The surplus peasant population, although apparently delinked from capitalist production, it represented a mass of workers that predicated the capitalist labor process and maintained downward pressure on national and international wages. The social cost of colonial labor reproduction was regulated by severe austerity and war, resulting in constant depopulation. The rate of premature deaths relative to historically determined life expectancy mirrored the trends in the rate of surplus value and value drain.

Capital after all is a social relationship of control, *an ideology arising upon a social relationship tout court whose dynamic of profit making drives the movement in the material substance supporting or, more appropriately, un-supporting life*. As a class relation, it has straddled the Arab historical process. It is not therefore possible for a hybrid mode of production, half capitalist and half precapitalist, to have emerged when capital is defined as a social relationship, a subject to object relationship, as opposed to capital being just the object, a pile of commodities or a mass of money. Adjacently, there is no such a thing as good or bad capitalism. Capitalism, the history in the making, is an objective and impersonal historical process. In the AW, capitalist relations sublated (preserved and negated) noncapitalist relations to the extent that their impact on the social regimentation of labor served the desire of the stronger European capital circle. As a matter of primacy, debilitated by European military incursions from the outset, national capitalism germinating in the AW, the accumulation of knowledge setting on course a rise in endogenous productivity could not have possibly pursued its own route to development. Once "a world economy becomes the economy of the world" as per Braudel, capital's law of value governs the labor process, its associated reserve army of labor, and wage system emerge. The wage system transforms precapitalist social relationships. They, however, do not become ancillary to the central labor process, serving to deliver inputs into the

"final" commodity that the Western world produces with better machinery. They become the determining moment of capital and its accumulation process, the beginning and the end of the turnover cycle at once, and the order that is maintained by the shape and substance of the political form of organization, *the state or pan-statal forms whose principal function is to differentiate labor.* Unpretentiously, there is more in the sale of human deaths by capital's machination, in real value and corresponding price form, than there is in the sale of a BMW.

In colonized formations, the colonial power chooses the measures of distribution by which value emerges from the labor of the subjugated working class, but more importantly, it designs how the distribution impacts all the joints of social and political domination. The newly erected Arab state gestated socially in a colonial anti-developmental context, and the forces opposing indigenous development were reinforced by the discovery of oil qua oil control. The inertia of colonial underdevelopment and its unequal exchange lingering from colonial days still affords the postcolonial imperialist forces with the authority to dictate the terms of exchange. Here I am using unequal exchange to mean the totality of interactions and value relations and not the narrow declining barter terms of trade dictum of dependency theory.

Following the success of the early and mostly socialist-leaning postcolonial development project, Arab capitalism has relapsed into severe crisis since 1980. Its rate of build-up in productive capacity generated from within has been sluggish. Instead of social transformation and institutions mediating local development requirements with their global contexts – including knowledge exchange and trade that could galvanize local production – the militarized side of global capital seized upon the opportunity presented by social retrogression and unemployment and shattered the Arab social entities with a paraphernalia of identity politics. In resource-deprived formations, the schism between social being and social consciousness, between what living conditions are and what revolutionary ideas engage people in a development project, gaped wide.

After Colonialism

After decolonization, many Arab states, weakened under military or neoliberal assaults, were dubbed "failed" or semi-failed states. In its social impact, the neoliberal package is not too distinct from military assaults; in the AW at least, neoliberalism is itself an outcome of Arab defeat, the defeatism accruing to revolutionary consciousness, and waning sovereignty. By the latter, I mean popular democracy gauged by the control of the masses over the means and channels of value creation and transmission. Neoliberalism in the developing world is synonymous with the tribute transfer channel to empire. No cohesive working class represented in a state would tolerate surplus drain under neoliberalism unless it were in a state of surrender. Arab military defeats imposed the neoliberal wealth-draining policies and restructured national classes to imperialist terms. More recently, many Arab states, such as Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, have splintered. These fractures are not a one-time occurrence after which states are resurrected in better form. There are no Marshall plans here. By the imperatives of militarism, the domain of accumulation, imperialism incites and rears outstanding proxy wars as means and ends at the same time. Arab states may retain the outward display of national symbols and borders, but they are steadily collapsing, and their process of collapse is the desired end that imperialism seeks to maintain. As a matter of building national development, it is not only the Arab state effectiveness in development that is receding but it is also health, education, life expectancy, and the social costs of the reproduction of labor alongside the productive infrastructure.

The old colonial powers left the AW but did not leave it much freedom to develop. Apart from the Zionist-imperialist wars and other covert measures of destabilization against the progressive Arab states, the comprador represented mostly in the Gulf states used oil revenues to fund reactionary Salafism. As socialist ideology retreated globally, the doctrine of Salafist Islam mystified living conditions. The obscurantist Gulf comprador reinvented and weaponized the colonially constructed identity forms, such as Sunni/Shiite, as means to polarize the working class. Arab

migrant workers returning from the Gulf to the protected economies of Syria and Egypt in the early 1980s were holding on to high-purchasing-power US dollars exchanged on the clandestine market for several folds the official exchange rate and acquiring social assets cheap along with the ideals of anti-socialism. It may be as well to note that political Islam was the Trojan horse of colonialism, first reared by the British and then by the USA as its sponsored hordes of the Mujahedeen who fought to Soviets in Afghanistan. Between defeats in war imparting defeatism and the crushing of the spirit of resistance and the inculcation of purely formalized modes of comprehending reality, a logic unrelated to all that is real, the general state of consciousness mimicked a schizophrenic way of perception – a confounding of the causes of underdevelopment, the imperialism at play, for its symptoms embodied in reactionary regimes, sectarian working class divisions, and immiseration (Matar and Kadri 2015).

Hegemony over the AW served as both, a logical and a historical *sine qua non* for US-led capital to contain other rising powers. Imperialism in the AW can best be explained with politics first and economics second – literally in that order. Merchant accounts that US-led capital's ultimate goal is to own all the oil wells, as if by title deed, or to trade with this poorer part of the world whose total working class income is less than 1% of world income, conceal the fact that capital is primarily about control, hegemony, and regimentation, and that without these conditions neither appropriating the rents from oil nor drawing the strategic control necessary to set oil as the commodity standard of the dollar are viable. When in control, imperialism practically owns the resources, regulates the social production process, and controls the value transfer channels.

Conclusion

On the face of it, the imperialism visited upon the AW appears to fulfil capital's insatiable thirst for cheapened resources and the power it takes to command the circuit of capital. At its core, imperialism is an intensification of the law of value, especially its militarism, a subcategory of accumulation by waste, *and* the practice of violence. The Western corpus narrowly perceives the law of value as the measures that regiment and discipline workers on the factory floor. These are mostly workers slotted under the category of productive labor, engaged alongside advanced machinery, creating supposedly high rates of surplus value, and producing a rather expensive product. Surplus value is not value added. Productive labor is not living labor, and it is living labor, which is the source of surplus value. The organization of living labor is an exercise in dictating the length and the quality of life. '*Since the labourer passes the greater portion of his life in the process of production, the conditions of the production process are largely the conditions of his active living process, or his living conditions, and economy in these living conditions is a method of raising the rate of profit'* (Marx 1893).

A broader more global view of accumulation constructs the law of value as the mainly violent measures undertaken by imperialism to regulate the reproduction of global labor. An offshoot of such understanding follows from the fact that militarism is a domain of accumulation and, hence, war is a market whose death or waste products are value in their own right. Arab formations provide a vibrant space upon which the war industry thrives and realizes its end in destruction. Arab states are also imperialist pawns whose control boosts inter-capitalist positioning and financially accrued imperialist rents. Conversely, Arab autonomy with respect to territory, resources and policy becomes anathema to imperialism. Subsequently, Arab reverse of development or the lumpen development under neoliberalism correlates with the structural terms of surrender to imperialism.

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Socialist Construction

▶ Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969)

Socialist-Feminism

▶ Ifeoma Okoye (1937–)

Socialists

Socioeconomic and Cultural Rights

Solidarity

Somalia

Sources of Surplus Value and Imperialism

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Definition

Empire turns on prime forces: a stronger power's initial siege and pillage of material values from a weaker one, followed by a yoke of tyranny imposed upon resisting populations and extraction of surplus-value from their labour.

Here we sketch these contours, framing each historically, concentrating on Britain's evolving global empire and its ideological foundations, crisis of capital accumulation, and expanding colonial system.

Material Value

The underlying sources of *material value* are not generally known or recognised as being associated with the Sun's irradiation of Earth that, over the last 4.8 billion years, created and stored energy in rock, soil, water and atmosphere; energy ultimately used by plants and animals.

As living varieties, these sustained and gave life to our species to gather, hunt, and domesticate the means of existence, providing the sources of energy that populations require for survival and shaping materials for personal consumption and exchange (Krooth 2009).

Over the stretch of millenniums, these initial sources of use-and exchange-values fused as *accumulated wealth* (linked to other forms taken through pillage, wars, and conquests; mercantilism and the extraction of labour-effort from those in bondage) in peonage or slavery, *ecomienda* or serfdom, wage-work or under the head-right system of tribal leaders providing community labour for the coin of empire.

Ancient and Modern Imperial Ruin

To one degree or another, all these sources of accumulated wealth came to centre in emergent primitive communities, feudal estates, enlarging cities, and imperial helotries: controlling, exploiting, and impoverishing populations and the natural world.

Failing agricultural output, internal social conflict, and military build-up often bred crises of too little food and resources to support local populations and maintain the power position of an elite among the discontented many. Failing legitimacy of the elite might then be offset by foreign conquests to replace diminishing domestic resources used to pacify home populations.

More intensive exploitation domestically and abroad foretold environmental tragedies: terrain denuded of forests; soil fertility declining and eviscerated; food production plummeting and putrefied; resources and raw materials in short supply; skills and crafts undermined; and attempts at foreign conquest meeting resistance and sometimes defeat.

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Imperial ruin then set up new equations of power between social classes and between them and the natural domain, producing stresses that might only be lessened by conscious measures to secure both populations and the remains of the natural order. Yet most empires rose and fell without such resolution, leaving behind weakened, dispersed peoples and environmental degradation (29–33, 191–192).

Use-Values and Merchant Capital

Empires and their precursors nonetheless varied; and the nature of each left a unique footprint of collected resources and material wealth, still seen in ancient cities and museums.

Marx wrote that the merchant capital carrying trade of *use-values* practised among the Venetians, Genoese, and Dutch merely circulated commodities and money to accumulate profit. 'No matter what the basis on which commodities are produced, which are thrown into circulation as commodities – whether the basis of the primitive community, or small peasants or petty bourgeois, or the capitalist basis, the character of products as commodities is not altered, and as commodities they must pass through the process of exchange and its attendant changes of form' (Marx 1961a, p. 320).

Money or goods would be exchanged for products in one location at one price, then the products would be sold for more money or wares at another location, with the merchant taking the profit; next the process would be repeated, taking products to others buyers elsewhere 'where the principal gains were not made by exporting domestic products, but by promoting the exchange of products of commercially and otherwise economically underdeveloped societies, and by exploiting both producing countries' (323).

European Expansion

The future foundation for comparable merchant trade in use-values evolved as Europeans expanded their reach into the Americas.

Led by the discovery of the New World and driven by European drives to appropriate wealth, initial Spanish and Portuguese conquests in the Americas encompassed genocide and brigandage; followed by brutalising labour mining gold and silver; then agricultural field slavery; and, lacking biological immunities to European diseases, plague, from all of which the indigenes lost 81–90 million of their populations over the next 500 years (Krooth 2009, pp. 218–223; 237–238, 244).

Designed by Catholic popes an ocean away, issuing edicts dividing America into viceroy-alities to satiate a handful of crowned heads, noblemen and courtiers, they planned the importation of African slaves to mine bullion, to colonise food production under labour *ecomienda;* and thereafter by mercantilism to impose inequitable trade.

These were the sometime overlapping steps of the invaders.

By the opening years of the sixteenth century, the Spanish had contracted with the Portuguese to supply slaves for their New World colonies. And the Spanish sovereigns then began a system of special contracts (called 'Assiento') with foreign nations, corporations, or their subcontractors to bestow from time to time a monopoly to supply Africans for their American possessions (Krooth 2013, pp. 32–33; Morel 1969/1920, pp. 15–19, 153–155).

Early records vary recording this lucrative commerce in human flesh and labour. But from 1776–1800 an average of 74,000 slaves each year were imported into all the South and North American colonies and territories, totalling 1,850,000. The Portuguese annual average alone was 10,000 (Morel 1969/1920, pp. 15–19). On went the carnage until more than 10 million souls were chained in the Middle Passage, more than half of them dying in wretchedness of starvation and sickness en route.

From the Sundered

From the sundered was torn labour's toil, transformed into ingots fulfilling the mercantile system's conception of wealth (Krooth 1975, p. 2, 2013, pp. 33–35).

Thereby, between the European discovery of America and the acceleration of Britain's initial

industrial revolution about 1760, some $1,859 million in gold and $3,994 million in silver were produced by enslaved populations throughout the world. As the periodic production of bullion rose steadily eight-and-a-half times, the major European sea powers accumulated metallic wealth in order to pay past debts to the leading Italian banking families, the Lombards and Fuggers, the remainder to buy foreign wares and to lay the base for new capitalist industries (Krooth 2013, pp. 35–36).

The Spanish concentrated on Mexican slave mines, eventually becoming the principal colony for extracting gold and silver, shipping one-fifth to the Spanish Crown in Madrid. Under occupation, the population meanwhile plummeted from 11 million in 1519 to some 1.5 million around 1650. (36; Wallerstein 1974, p. 189, fn 74).

From Mexico, Father Mololina openly denounced the Spaniards' cruelty, fulminating that 'countless' natives were killed in labour in the mines; that forced service at Oaxaca was so destructive that for half a league around it one could not walk except on dead bodies or bones; that so many birds flocked there to scavenge that they darkened the sky. Only he who could count the drops of water in a rainstorm or the grains of sand in the sea could count the dead Indians in the ruined lands of the Caribbean Islands (Hanke 1959, p. 22).

With brutalising efficiency, the *ecomienda* system also enslaved native peoples and chained millions to the land. Miguel de Salamanca, the oldest and most authoritative of the Spanish clerics, described the system as 'Indians … being allotted for life in order that, working as they are worked, all the profit deriving from their work goes to those who hold them in *ecomienda*; whereas this form of *ecomienda* and the manner to which it is executed is contrary to the well-being of the Indian Republic' (Hanke 1960, p. 56).

Little bullion was discovered north of the Rio Grande however, Britain gradually turning towards establishing mercantile colonies, changing policies from seeking to accumulate wealth by raiding gold from the Spanish Main to establishing colonial trading territories from which emergent British industries could draw low-price raw materials to manufacture and return them at a high-price to the colonial market (Krooth 2009, pp. 215–217; Lewis 1841: passim; Smith 1937, pp. 531; 555–556).

Mercantile Capital Accumulation

Starting in 1660, the British mercantile or colonial system moved beyond accumulating profits by pure merchant trade. Copied from Dutch merchants and adapted in Charles II's first Parliament as a *Navigation Act* (renewing and extending one passed nine years earlier), its object was to exclude the ubiquitous Dutch and other foreign shippers plying the North American colonial trade at a moment when barely half of England's 13 North American colonies had been established.

Britain was determined to completely regulate mercantile trade.

As the colonies were viewed as vast 'plantations' existing for the welfare of the Mother Country, they were to supply what the Mother Country could not produce herself, and to take in exchange the surplus produce and manufactures of the Mother Country. Colonial industry was to be stimulated or not along the lines of this policy. While the welfare of the colonies themselves was a secondary consideration, it could be generously measured when it produced no conflict with the welfare of the Mother Country.

It thus was to be a closed commercial system. No goods were to be imported into or exported from British possessions save in British or colonial ships. And under a system of 'enumerated articles' covered by more than 100 acts of Parliament, Britain admitted to her ports colonial foods and raw materials at a lower duty than was levied on similar goods from foreign nations.

The system also concentrated on mercantile colonies as a vent to sell at a high price varieties of British manufactured textiles, tools, and other factory products. Colonies were to sell to England at low prices their foods and produce to feed the Mother Country's emergent working class; to supply British factories with low-cost raw materials so that the manufacturers might secure for

themselves all the advantages arising from their further improvement at elevated prices – also prohibiting the colonies from manufacturing goods (not even a nail for a horseshoe railed the Earl of Chatham in Parliament) for their own markets, effectively keeping colonies and their labourers as permanent debtors (Krooth 1975, p. 3; Lewis 1841, pp. 206–208, and passim). The resulting trade balance favouring Britain actually reflected more labour-toil drawn from the colonised exchanged for less labour-effort drawn from Britain's factory proletariat using machines driven by steam-power.

When the North American colonies had grown into large and flourishing communities able to mine resources, to manufacture, and to ship commodities, however, the British government required them to contribute to its expenses to subjugate them by arms; and though they had the means of payment, they also had acquired the power and disposition to resist. Describing themselves as Americans, anti-colonialism successfully began, leading to the 1776 revolt, victorious in 1783, eventually creating an unbroken continental nation from the Atlantic to the Pacific which was able to export commodities and, two centuries later, financial capital (Krooth 1975, pp. 3–6, 28; Lewis 1841, pp. 206–208; Sides (2006, p. 209, 214, 308).

Tracing the Past

Such expansive continental futures could hardly be successful in a geographically partitioned Europe of nation states, though after 1751 the wages system had become central to the British political economy, turning on increased factory production, employment of a dispossessed proletarian army, and expansive overseas markets.

As the Industrial Revolution took hold, the basic sources of surplus-value expropriated by capital and elaborated by empire were variously described by Scottish free-trader Adam Smith as being values created from workers' exertion over and above the value of the wages paid to them, seen as the underlying source of the wealth of all nations.

And yet by 1832, vis-á-vis surplus-value, English workers could no longer win higher

relative wages or improvements under the existing social order; they proved themselves unable to overturn and take charge of the production forces then in the hands of a determined owning class dominating parliament (Engels 1940, p. 14: Thompson 1963: passim),

Marx and Engels insisted nonetheless that this was the only path for labour to secure the full labour-value of its whole output.

Marx railed that: 'A forcing up of wages . . . would therefore be nothing but better payment for the slave, and would not conquer for either the worker or for labour their human status and dignity' (Marx 1961b, p. 81).

Engels more pointedly explained:

> It is not the highness or lowness of wages which constitutes the economical degradation of the working class: this degradation is comprised in the fact that, instead of receiving for its labour the full produce of this labour, the working class has to be satisfied with a portion of its own produce called wages. The capitalist pockets the whole produce (paying the laborer out of it) because he is the owner of the means of labour. And, therefore, there is no redemption for the working class until it becomes the owner of the means of work — land, raw material, machinery, etc. — and thereby also the owner of the whole produce of its own labour. (Engels 1940, p. 14)

Thomas T. Malthus held another view, emphasising natural restrictions on population growth by lack of the means of subsistence to maintain the multiplying millions.

Malthus had come to this conclusion in his 'Essay on Population' (1798) by drawing on Sir James Steuart, De Foe, and others to attack the French revolutionary teachings of Condorset. Rather than focus on the workers' lack of control of the means of production and inability to purchase their whole output, Malthus simply ignored the capitalists' appropriation of the entire product from which wages were paid. Rather, he said that the causes of labour's lack of sustenance were due to the population's reproduction on a geometric scale, while the landlords directed a peasantry that could only produce increasing quantities of food on a mathematical scale:

> Taking the whole earth and supposing the present population to be equal to a thousand millions, the human species would increase 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32,

64, 128, 256 and subsistence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. In two centuries, the ratio of the world's population to means of subsistence would be 256 to 9; in three centuries, it would be 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years, the difference would be incalculable. (Malthus 1926, pp. 13–16)

With such a dismal comparison, Malthus concluded that the only remaining alternatives were depopulation: 'positive checks' associated with famine, starvation, epidemics and plagues; general pestilence, other natural disasters, and the 'vices of mankind' such as murder and wars.

But at root, Malthus's system rested on a theory of landlordism in which under-consumption in society could be alleviated by calling on the landlords to take up any excess of production.

Malthus revealed he actually understood capital's exploitation of labour: the excess of production was due to the lack of consumers, given the capitalist class had little incentive to continue to employ workers to produce goods that could not be sold, clearing the market. Labour's wages would only buy subsistence, with capital's surplus equal to the balance of commodity values workers created over and above wages paid. Even the capitalists themselves did not purchase enough to take up the excess supply of commodities, for they sought to accumulate their savings.

With the market glutted, only the landlords were able to take up the excess output and keep the system operating smoothly. Malthus insisted that it was essential that a nation 'with great powers of production should possess a body of unproductive consumers' (Malthus 1836, pp. 38–39, 463). Here was a way to avoid the disastrous fluctuations of market overproduction.

Relations of Production

Adam Smith was alive to these and other changes in the source of value over time, viewing a nation's capital stock as equivalent to our present-day meaning of 'accumulated capital'.

Pointing to its sources from the ever changing relationship between investors of capital in workshop production on one side of the social equation, and on the other side, the employment of workers with nothing to sell save their labour-

power, Smith judged that a rise in wages paid by capital to those workers would necessarily follow when demand for labour exceeded its supply.

'The reward of labour, therefore, as it is necessary effect,' he wrote, 'is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty maintenance of the laboring poor, on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are at a stand, and their starving condition that they [the conditions sustaining national wealth] are going fast backwards' (Smith 1937, pp. 73–74).

When a nation's industrial ownership classes were *accumulating capital,* wages were increasing because employers tended to put everyone to work and there were more jobs offered than workers available. At mid-point in a nation's economic life (when the *capital accumulation* process slowed), employers tended to cut wages to lower the cost of production, in order to lower market prices and thereby stabilise or elevate profit accumulation. When the point of the *disaccumulation of captal* was reached, however, employers grew anxious to reimburse themselves for losses and pressured the labour force to accept lower wages for increased efforts.

Workers thereafter could no longer win a greater share of the value of their own output under the rigid social order; and to win the full value of their labour would have to strive to control the production forces still held by the capitalist class.

Class Entitlements to Surplus-Value

The distribution of surplus-value to the different sectors of the ownership class of capitalists and others ultimately bred a struggle between its claimants. Those who argued for their own class entitlements to portions of surplus-value variously supported, attacked, or sought destruction of the wage system.

Petty capitalist engaged in craft and petty workshop production wanted to destroy not only the wage system and the instruments of labour, but also the inventors who created the technology and methods which threw them out of craft labour by competitively superseding their workshop output;

the hallmark of the petty commodity form. They initially responded by hanging inventors of the machines that had put them out of work, burning and idling factories, and destroying the very commodities factory workers had made. As these methods failed to relieve the market crisis, they then variously moved to take over factories and to appropriate manufactured commodities. And a pending revolution possible, the owners responded by mobilising hired guards and state police to destroy the power of both anarchistic and organised labour (Mantoux 1978, pp. 23–42).

Socialists also wanted to destroy the wage system; but they were determined to capture the means of production as their own, not to destroy them.

Supporting the wage system, preserving the production relationship between capital and labour, were reformers like: John Stuart Mill, who believed that the market *redistribution of output* could be altered in favour of labour (Mill 1909, pp. 199–201, ff.); and Nassau Senior, representing the interests of manufacturers, who sought to annually pay workers subsistence from a fixed, invariable wage-fund and, as a residual, to reward capital's investment in production (rather than their use of it for personal consumption) with profits earned during the last hour of a 12-h workday (Senior 1836, p. 153, 168 ff., and passim).

David Ricardo: Protector of the Manufacturing Class

But the whole fault with capital's lack of a proper return on its investment lay at the doorstep of the landlords, insisted David Ricardo in his *Principles of Political Economy,* at base designed to protect the industrial class.

He argued that, as the land put into agricultural use produced diminishing returns and more labour was required to produce the same bushel of corn (that is, wheat), the landlords would receive higher prices. With the corn supply limited, and the Corn Laws keeping out cheaper foreign grain, high demand would raise corn prices. Land rents would reflect such prices as the

landlords parasitically cut deeper into what was rightly due to labour for subsistence and reproduction of its social class, and thereafter to capital. Thus were the landlords raising the price of bread that workers paid for subsistence, in turn raising their demand for wages, thereby reducing capital's residual share of surplus, causing the falling rate of profit on capital invested – though no additional quantity of manufacturing labour was required that independently would raise the price of manufactured goods (Ricardo n.d., p. 64).

Thereby the landlords were receiving rent as unearned income. And since they added to the cost of production by increasing the price of corn and other necessities workers purchased, driving labour's upward pressure on wages, the landlord's unearned surplus was at the expense of the residual share due capital *after* wages were paid. The landlords' appropriation of rents was thus opposed to the interests of both labourers and manufacturers.

A bitter argument broke out concerning the Corn Laws of 1815. The great landowning families had isolated themselves from every other social class by using the Corn Laws for their own selfish profit. And in 1838 the workers and owners united in the Anti-Corn League against their mutual oppressors, agitating for repeal of the duties on imported grain. Reaching a head in 1845–46, repeal of the Corn Laws initiated the golden age of free trade for the manufacturers, with their import of cheaper raw materials for manufacture in heavily tooled industries, and after 1850 cheaper foodstuffs for the working class (Krooth 1980, pp. 11–13).

Lines of Demarcation

Meanwhile, in Britain, how social classes were properly demarcated depended upon the way in which surplus-value was taken, distributed, and redistributed.

The free market was hardly free to the workers selling their labour-power, faced as they were with landlords and manufacturers monopolising the market prices that workers paid for subsistence and other commodities.

British landlords had long since kept their workers in check by turning the countryside into sheep-runs, driving serfs into parishes under the Speedhamland System and Poor Laws to labour in workshops under severe conditions in return for so-much bread and wine. When the labourers refused to work at capacity, the outraged parish ratepayers then abolished the subsidies, and the mill-owners carted them off to factories as slaves, there to labour and die.

The British mill-owners who drove the enslaved, then paid them in subsistence or not at all, carried their output to domestic markets at whatever price they could secure above their labour-value; then dumped the excess output in foreign markets, spreading their original investment in the fixed costs of factory machinery over the increased number of *all* units their workers produced. In so doing, they lowered unit costs, captured world markets, and maximised overall profits.

Between 1840 and 1880, market shares held by world traders changed. Though the United Kingdom controlled 32% of the volume of international trade in 1840, her share had fallen to 23% by 1880. And although the overall world market had vastly enlarged, with France's share barely increasing (from 10% to 11%), the upstart US post-Civil-War manufacturers had enlarged their share from 8% to 10%, and from 1871 the ongoing consolidation of Germany 'blood and iron' empire raised its share of global trade from zero in 1840 to 9% in 1880 (Ministère du Travail 1925, pp. 339–342; *Statistical Abstract of the US* 1921, p. 923; *Statistical Abstract of the US* 1928, p. 447, 450; *Statistische Jahrbuecher fuer das Deutsche Reich* 1880–1914: passim).

To prevent the domestic disaccumulation of surplus-value, free-trade Britain quickly: moved to protect its home market with tariffs just high enough to keep out foreign manufactured goods; undercut its competitors by dumping manufactured commodities at slightly lower prices; mercilessly driving its workers to outperform competitor nations, providing them with imperial imports of subsidised foods and five high-powered stimulants: sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, and opium.

Thereafter, until 1880–82, foreign revenues became British manufacturers' (and the nation's) major source of accumulated surplus.

From Mercantilism and Free Trade to Financial Capital Exports and Colonies

The wages system and free trade were locked together in an unholy dance that periodically led to a larger body of workers than available wage jobs; the vast accumulation of surplus wealth from labour-toil at home; nonetheless falling profit returns on capital; the bank centralisation of previous forms of assets and revenues; the accelerating export of finance capital, iron, steel, and machines; as well as administrative oversight of colonial production (Krooth 1980, pp. 19–20; see also Andrew 1910, p. 3, Table 1; 17, Table 7; 18, Table 8).

Though the population of England and Wales increased about 20% from 1861 (28,927,485) to 1881 (34,884,848), Britain still had to import food as agricultural employment and production did not keep pace. Per capita consumption of foodstuffs, as well as stimulants like tea and sugar, meanwhile went up (3.68 tea/sugar lb per capita in 1867, and 5.02 lb in 1887), helping to drive the workforce to greater production of coal (1877, 14,610,763 tn; but 1887, 162,119,812 tn); pig iron (1877, 6,608,064 tn; but 1887, 7,471,000 tn) and steel ingots (1877, 904,567 tn; but 1887, 3,1916,778). As the basic ingredients for manufacturing abroad, iron and steel exports jumped, doubling from 1,355,128 tn in 1867 to 2,695,542 in 1887.

Along with these essentials, a labour force was also sent abroad. To sidestep domestic economic stagnation and the rise of unemployed people, debtors and the dangerous-idle stealing bread and horses, the 'excess' population was put in workhouses, or sent to the gallows, or shipped to colonies to extract surplus-value from their own and indigenous people's toil at mining, agriculture, and commercial activities. This temporarily 'solved' the crisis of too many people and too little food in Britain.

The bond was not to be broken, as the most rapid expansion of colonies and export of finance

capital came in the 1880s (when, as already said, British goods quickly lost markets to German and US competitor wares), threatening the further accumulation of profits at home. As an offset, Britain again shifted its imperial posture, now sending financial capital, pig iron, steel ingots and machinery for production, and consumer goods to other industrial nations and colonies, thus tying its future success to exogenous wealth accumulation (Krooth 1980, pp. 20–21; see also Andrew 1910, p. 19, Table 9, for the continuous increase in global imperial revenues: £69,600,218 in 1867–68; £77,730,671 in 1877–78; £89,802,254 in 1887–88; £106,614,004 in 1897–98; and £146,541,737 in 1907–08).

Meanwhile, between 1884 and 1900, Britain acquired 3,700,000 square miles of new colonial territories. By 1914 the British Empire covered 12.7 million square miles, of which the United Kingdom represented 121,000 or less than one-hundredth. In terms of population, moreover, of the 410 million British subjects, constituting about one-fifth of the people of the globe, 44 million resided in the United Kingdom; only a little more than one-tenth of the Empire's inhabitants.

From this empire ruled by the few came total trade of about £180,000,000 a year, bringing to Britain revenues amounting to approximately £19,500,000 sterling. And to this empire, British capital investors had sent £4 billion by 1913 (UK billions throughout this essay).

In returns, between 1880 and 1910, overseas investment earnings tripled (£57,700 in 1880 but £170,000 million in 1910), and other income from shipping, insurance, and services increased by more than a half (£96,400,000 in 1880 but £146,700,000 in1910).

Together, the sum of trade and earnings abroad was reflected in the accelerated accumulation of capital. In the 63-year period 1812–75, British wealth increased by £5.848 billion, as compared to the total accumulation of £7.924 billion in the following 37 years (1876–1912).

The more rapid accumulation of capital came from the large-scale expansion of colonies after 1875 and especially after 1882. For the colonies where British manufactured goods were exported

and raw materials and foodstuffs were obtained offered investment and loan rewards for British capital, while seeking reinvestment abroad.

Dividing Line: Export of Finance Capital

An expanded, more rigid colonial system and a vast effusion of finance capital now supplemented the free-trade commerce of earlier years. Finance capital export became the dividing line between mercantilism and free trade on one side, and, on the other, the imperial outgo of capital and machinery for production abroad.

This fundamental change turned on large-scale industrial techniques; the integration of finance with other forms of capital and industry; the monopolisation of production; and their combined influence over state policies, pushing finance capital exports and the export of capital goods and enhancing the foundation for accelerated gross imperial revenues (Krooth 1980, pp. 20–21, passim).

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, then, the wages system producing surplus-value and its vast accumulation transformed mere capital into financial means, neglecting investments within Britain, exporting it to multiplying colonies and dominions. It reached an historic *apogée* that in the future would outlast two world wars and dozens of smaller ones.

The Great Powers would again realign global territories to divide resources and working populations producing both commodities and surplus-values, overcoming the welfare of people at home and abroad; spreading ever new technologies of production and using fossil fuels that today threaten environmental conditions handed down from millenniums past and essential for the existence of species (Krooth 2009, pp. xxi–xxiv, 1–28, 549–648).

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▶ Class and Race Complexities in Understanding Large-Scale Land Deals as New Forms of Imperialism in Zimbabwe

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South-South Cooperation

South–South Co-operation

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Synonyms

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); South-South Cooperation; Sub-imperialism; Third World; Trade; Uneven and combined development; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Definition/Description

This chapter reviews the growing cooperation among Southern states in trade, economic assistance, and forms of economic sustenance for the mutual benefit of undeveloped countries and developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even as economic trade among states in the global South with the West is growing in an unequal manner, the chapter demonstrates that new more equitable economic relationships are developing among emerging countries of the South, for example, China and Africa. These new forms of trade are providing expanding opportunities which may reduce dependence on the imperialist core.

South–South Co-operation

South–South co-operation (SSC) refers to formal and informal co-operation between developing countries as well as the increasing economic ties (of trade, investment, aid, etc.) that are both cause and consequence of such co-operation. (This essay uses the terms 'South', 'global South', 'developing countries', and 'Third World' interchangeably.) The term was first used officially only in 2004 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) decided to change the name of its special unit on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC, mooted in 1974 and created in 1978) to the Special Unit for South–South Cooperation, which would later became the United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation. However, the ideas and practices of SSC have a much longer history.

This essay first outlines the terms in which the contemporary relevance of SSC is discussed and the questions about its true extent, sustainability, and political significance for the world economy which have emerged in it. It then traces SSC's history from its origins in anti-imperialist struggles and places it within a wider understanding of the uneven and combined development (UCD) of the capitalist world so that SSC's significance in the multipolar twenty first century can be fully appreciated. Then the extent of SSC in key areas is surveyed. After this, the conclusion returns to the questions raised in contemporary discussions to attempt some answers.

Understanding SSC: Overblown? Unsustainable? Sub-imperialist?

Time was when the dozen of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, along with Latin American countries seeking to break out of the informal domination of their economies by the advanced industrial imperial countries, professed a common anti-imperialist aspiration towards mutual co-operation and solidarity. However, it remained little more than a pious platitude, regularly affirmed with appropriate fanfare on various platforms by Third-World leaders who would then go back to the business-as-usual of North–South economic links that had been formed under formal and informal colonialism and kept them in the position assigned to them in the international division of labour that imperialism had built: 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'. The development performance of these countries was universally

regarded as less than spectacular in the early post-war decades and they were followed by a couple of lost decades of development in the 1980s and 1990s. By this time, most thought that, barring a small 'tiger' economy here or there, development in the Third World was a lost cause and SSC no more than a casstle in the air. However, things then began to change.

Beginning in the late 1990s and even more since the economic and financial crises of 2007 and 2008, growth in the Third World in general and among the emerging and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) economies in particular began to accelerate and overtook that in the developed world (O'Neill 2001). The economic centre of gravity of the world economy began to shift away from the advanced industrial countries for the first time since the birth of capitalism. Talk of 'US hegemony', 'globalisation' and 'empire' gave way to that of multipolarity. Now SSC began to be realised as never before. Developing countries began trading more with one another, investing in one another's economies, and even gave one another aid on a previously unimaginable scale. If this were not enough, they were also co-operating to present challenges to the power of the US and other developed countries on various issues of international economic governance, whether in the WTO or on climate policy (Desai 2013b, c; Hallding et al. 2013; Narlikar 2010).

These developments have been unsettling to many in the advanced industrial world, and its dominant discourse about SSC and the growth of the emerging economies on which it rests tends to yo-yo between disbelief and fear. Let us deal with the disbelief first. Many question the sustainability of the growth of the BRICs. However, apart from this or that temporary setback to growth, their best evidence is the BRIC and emerging economies' post-crisis growth slowdown. However, even the new slower growth rates remain many times higher than the near zero rates of the advanced industrial countries, and the trend towards an increasingly multipolar economy has, if anything, accelerated in the wake of the economic and financial crises. Others question the viability of the associated rise in SSC pointing mainly to political conflicts between the major

BRICs, not least the two most important among them, China and India. However, if these conflicts were indeed make-or-break matters, SSC would not have attained the levels it already has.

Rather than such blanket dismissals we are better advised to undertake a closer examination of these developments and possible roadblocks they may encounter. The 2013 *Trade and Development Report* of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) puts it most clearly:

> The continuing expansion of developing economies as a group (in particular the largest economy among them, China) has led to their gaining increasing weight in the world economy, which suggests the possible emergence of a new pattern of global growth. While developed countries remain the main export markets for developing countries as a group, the share of the latter's contribution to growth in the world economy has risen from 28 per cent in the 1990s to about 40 per cent in the period 2003–2007, and close to 75 per cent since 2008. However, more recently, growth in these economies has decelerated. They may continue to grow at a relatively fast pace *if they are able to strengthen domestic demand and if they can rely more on each other for the expansion of aggregate demand through greater South–South trade.* (UNCTAD 2013a, p. 4, emphasis added)

Both the slower growth of the developed economies and the faster growth of the developing ones means that in the new pattern of growth the former can no longer be relied on to provide the markets that will power growth from here on. They will only come from an expansion of the domestic markets and increased trade and SSC between them. This can only be a good thing given that an expansion of domestic markets would mean increasing domestic incomes. But here also lies the rub.

The growth spurt in the BRIC and emerging economies since the 1990s coincided with the general ideological drift towards neoliberalism worldwide and a shift among the BRIC and emerging economy governments towards progressively liberalising their hitherto state-directed economies and orienting them more towards exports to the US and Europe than they had been hitherto when there were pushing for import-substituting industrialisation. However, coincidence was not

cause. In fact, this growth spurt was, in fact, critically reliant on the economic base created during the more state-directed phase of their development and by such expansion of domestic demand as it had permitted (as I argue in the case of India in Desai 2007, 2010). However, many policymakers and opinion makers attribute it to economic liberalisation, and appear set to liberalise further. To the extent that they are successful, however, they will achieve the opposite of what is really necessary to sustain their growth: a restriction of incomes and demand at home and a reliance on slower-growing export markets.

In the wake of the recent crises, while there is some evidence that the Chinese government has read the writing on the wall and replaced lost export demand first with a vast investment boom and then with an expansion of domestic consumption demand, in particular by letting wages rise. And governments in South America had turned away from neo-liberalism much earlier. However, many other emerging-economy governments and policymakers remain too wedded to neo-liberal policy and its reliance on First-World markets when their continued growth depends on ending this reliance. There is no guarantee that they will see the light. Only when they do can the growth of the emerging economies and SSC be considered sustainable.

So much for the disbelief, now we come to the fear. Some regard rising SSC as a significant departure from the ideals of anti-imperialist solidarity proclaimed in earlier times (Nel and Taylor 2013) and others go further and argue that SSC may simply be the sanctimonious verbiage which shrouds relationships between the stronger-developing economies and weaker ones which are as bad as, if not worse than, North–South imperial relationships (see e.g. Bond 2012, 2014). After all, the imperialisms of the past were also cloaked in mystifying discourse, whether of the 'civilising mission' of the imperial countries, the 'white man's burden', or coloniser and colonised constituting a 'co-prosperity sphere'. Particular attention is paid to the allegedly predatory trade, aid, and investment activities of the BRIC countries in Africa.

If there is a rational kernel to these observations it is this. While the countries of the Third World were always more differentiated than their lumping into a single category allowed, the growth acceleration since the late 1990s was making the Third World even more disparate. The BRIC countries, including two of the Third World's most populous countries, and the wider set of emerging economies, were growing strongly but they were leaving the countries containing the 'bottom billion' farther behind (Collier 2007). While the idea of SSC was formatively connected with the ideals of anti-imperialist solidarity, it was finally growing on practically all fronts in this very different Third World in which power differentials between emerging economies were significantly greater.

Settling these questions about the true extent, sustainability, and political character of SSC requires a closer examination of the history and contemporary dimensions of the phenomenon.

South–South Co-operation in Historical Perspective

The core idea of SSC is a rejection of an unfavourable international division of labour and the economic relationships (between some countries that specialise in producing higher-value, mostly industrial good, and are thus rich, and others which specialise in producing lower-value largely agricultural good, and thus are poor [Reinert 2007]) which sustain it.

This rejection goes back to the nineteenth-century architects of the modern developmental state. Policymakers and intellectuals such as Alexander Hamilton in the US and Friedrich List in Germany saw the real rationale of *laissez faire* and *laissez passer* rhetoric. Its *raison d'être* was to maintain the international division of labour unfavourable to them and favourable to the first and at the time most competitive industrial capitalist country, the UK. Against this, they constructed and theorised the first developmental states (Woo-Cumings 1999), which employed a battery of policies, including trade protection, to foster industrialisation, first and foremost by substituting imports.

Uneven and Combined Development

This dialectic of international competition in which the industrialisation of some countries prompted others to hothouse industrial development was dubbed 'uneven and combined development' (UCD) by the Bolsheviks, and it framed their understanding of their own revolution. As outlined by Trotsky in the first chapter of his *The History of the Russian Revolution*, UCD was an international dynamic specific to capitalism. Like all human advance, capitalist development was always uneven. However, in previous phases of human history, backward countries 'assimilat [ed] the material and intellectual advancements of the advanced countries' by repeating the stages through which the advanced society had passed in a 'provincial and episodic' manner. The capitalist phase, by contrast, 'prepares and in a certain sense realises the permanence of man's development' and rules repetition out (Trotsky 1934, p. 26). Instead, it 'compels' backward countries 'to make leaps'. Thus, 'a backward country does not take things in the same order' as an advanced one. Instead, it exercises the 'privilege of historic backwardness' by 'skipping a whole series of intermediate stages', as Germany and the US had recently done while the United Kingdom was paying the price for its early lead (26). Such skipping compressed 'the different stages of the journey' in 'an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms' (1934, p. 27). Such combined development was the distinctive feature of capitalism. While it had taken capitalist forms in the US and Germany, it could also take communist forms, as it did in the USSR. Both forms constituted a rejection by particular countries of the unfavourable position they had been assigned in the international division of labour.

As I have argued elsewhere (Desai 2013a), contrary to neo-classical views that productive capacity has spread around the world through markets, or the view in certain Marxist quarters that it has spread through imperialism (Warren 1980), it has actually spread as a result of the operation of the dialectic of UCD. This dialectic has characterised capitalism since its origins. The first instances of combined development were the US and Germany which industrialised to challenge the United Kingdom's industrial supremacy as the first capitalist industrial power, and the most recent ones are the BRIC countries and other emerging powers. This is why the development and industrialisation of today's developing countries must be seen within the historical perspective that encompasses that of the 'now developed countries' (Chang 2002; Desai 2011).

Specificities of Post-war Combined Development

While the rejection of existing positions in the international division of labour had deep historical roots, which connect our understanding of the experience of developing countries today to that of the now developed countries, the associated idea that this might be promoted by anti-imperialist solidarity and cooperation among developing countries was the product of the specificity of the post-war conjuncture in which Third-World countries embarked on their development. SSC can best be understood if it is seen as having gone through two distinct phases. In the first phase, which culminated in the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, SSC emerged as a powerful motivation and aspiration but its realisation left much to be desired. Indeed, the developments that followed the demand for the NIEO, including two 'lost decades' of development, seemed to suggest that it was roundly defeated. In retrospect, however, the second and contemporary phase, in which SSC was realised much more substantially and the discourse about it was considerably more pragmatic and muted, can clearly be seen to rest on the gains of that first phase.

The idea of SSC as an alternative to North–South linkages emerged in the post-war period rather than in conjunction with earlier attempts at combined development because of three new factors. There was, first, the sheer number of countries that now sought to industrialise. This was a radically novel situation, contrasting starkly with the relatively isolated cases of industrialisation hitherto. It created special circumstances and

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these had to be understood by new theories. One of the most important was the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1975/1950) about deteriorating terms of trade for agricultural production. It contradicted the neoclassical expectation that they would, over time, rise because productivity would increase in manufacturing faster than in agriculture. This could not happen precisely because of the sheer number of hitherto agricultural economies which now sought to increase their export earnings to industrialise.

There was, second, the fact that with decolonisation and the resulting gain in policy autonomy by the newly independent countries, the formerly imperial developed countries lost the access to colonial markets that they had once secured by imposing 'one way free trade' on their colonies. In place of colonial markets, they now had to expand their own markets by increasing domestic working-class consumption to a hitherto unprecedented extent (Desai 2013a, 2015). Though forced on capitalist countries, this was in itself an entirely salutary development for Western working classes. However, it also created a new international pattern of demand in which developing countries' gains in policy autonomy and their ability to protect domestic markets were offset by the small size of their markets, shrunk by decades of colonialism. So they were put in a position of competing with one another for the far deeper First-World markets, and the idea of SSC was in part a way of replacing this competition with co-operation.

The Transition from an Imperial to an International World . . .

The third factor affecting the timing of SSC's emergence was post-war multilateralism. While it was, as most claim, an idea, it was more than that: it was a necessity, and understanding this and how it was not fulfilled in the post-war period is critical for our purposes as it is shrouded in misunderstandings.

The structures of international trade and finance which had worked, in a manner of speaking, before 1914 had broken down in the course of the Thirty Years Crisis of 1914–45. Indeed, their breakdown was a major component of that crisis. The broken-down structures were not, as the widely accepted Hegemony Stability Theory (which originated in Kindleberger 1973) would have it, a stable gold-sterling standard regime presided over by the UK and eventually replaced in the postwar period by one centred on the dollar and the US. In reality, the so-called gold standard was always less stable than generally believed (De Cecco 1984) and US attempts to effect a replacement were bound to be even less so (as I argue in Desai 2013a), not least because the gold-sterling regime, such as it was, rested on Britain's vast formal empire, something which the post-war US patently lacked.

Indeed, what had broken down in the Thirty Years' Crisis was the imperial order, and by the end of that crisis it was replaced by an international one. This new order would be overwhelmingly governed by international relations between its constituent independent nation states, not imperial ones between mother countries and their colonies and war-inducing imperial competition between the imperial powers. The international governance and international economic governance of this new order could only be based on multilateral structures. Needless to say, the nation states that would be the collective authors of such structures would not be willing to settle for arrangements in which they were not free to pursue national economic goals – including, pre-eminently, those of development, industrialisation, and full employment. This would mean, above all, a rejection of free markets and free trade (Block 1977).

. . .and the US Attempt to Turn Back the Clock

This was recognised by all parties but such recognition was at best grudging on the part of the US. For it had set its heart on having its turn at being the 'managing segment' of the world economy, with its currency serving as that of the world as, it imagined, the UK had been before 1914 (Parrini 1969). Its power to attempt to realise

this impossible goal had been magnified by the war, which had destroyed rival powers' economies while boosting its own to an extent unknown before or since. So the US sought on the one hand to advance its agenda, which was antithetical to the very conception of multilateral economic governance, under the camouflage of its rhetoric. On the other, it attempted to compromise the multilateral structures that had been created – the famous Bretton Woods quartet of the United Nations (UN), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – by biasing them towards free markets and free trade, and by securing for itself and the dollar a privileged position in them (Block 1977; Desai 2013a).

In doing so, the US ensured that Keynes's idea of a multilaterally managed super-sovereign currency would not come to fruition (Desai 2009, 2013a, and 2012, which details the cost the world in general and the Third World in particular have paid and continue to pay for these arrangements, and reviews the possibilities for alternatives to them). Instead, the US dollar would have a privileged world role. It also ensured that the three main institutions of international economic governance would be biased towards free trade, which would initially exclude most developing countries from participating in them (Block 1977; Hudson 1972; Murphy 1983).

By contrast, the newly independent countries of the Third World needed and were always more committed to and earnest about multilateral international economic governance of a sort which left individual nation states with the policy autonomy to regulate their economies. Here lay the crux of the battles that would be fought out in coming decades between North and South.

As the emergence of multipolarity encourages us to look at the recent and more distant history of the capitalist world order afresh, the history of the post-war tussle between the developed capitalist countries and the developing and communist countries (and we should remember that China continues to be ruled by the Communist Party) will come into clearer focus as the key axis of tension and struggle. As so many of the most prescient critics of the US world role have long

recognised, the Cold War was waged as much against developing countries attempting to break out of relations of 'complementarity' with the US and the West as against communism. Along this axis of UCD, developing and communist countries, combined developers all, attempted to counteract US and developing country influence and power to create more truly multilateral structures of international economic governance which would permit sufficient variety of economic forms so both forms of combined development, capitalist and communist, could be accommodated. Indeed, this is where SSC first emerged as an idea and a set of practices *avant la lettre*.

SSC Mark I

If SSC was less than adequately realised in the first phase, it was certainly not due to any lack of understanding of its necessity. Such necessity was underscored by reams of critical scholarship on development; much of it produced by UNCTAD, itself arguably one of the earliest and most important of the products of SSC. UNCTAD's analysis pointed out that, by remaining imbricated in their hub-and-spoke economic links of trade and investment with the developed world, developing countries were simply perpetuating the unfavourable international division of labour.

The problem for many decades after the Second World War, however, was that North–South links formed when the developing countries were (formal or informal) colonies of the developed world seemed inescapable. The formerly imperial, advanced, industrial countries recovering from wartime devastation were the growth powerhouses of the post-war period. Without substantial industrialisation in developing countries, their trade complementarities were strongest with the developed countries and, indeed, very weak with other developing countries whose productive structures were far too similar. And not only did North–South trade have the strongest prospects for the export earnings that could finance the investment in industrialisation necessary to break out of North–South linkages, they were also the chief sources of the necessary capital

and technology. It seemed a Catch-22. If, over the following decades, some substantial industrialisation was nevertheless achieved in the Third World, it was thanks to a combination of the ability of many developing countries to take the high and hard road of attempting industrialisation in these difficult circumstances, and to their willingness to stand up to the inevitable pressures from the developed world to which these attempts were inevitably subject, and to key SSC initiatives.

The Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of 1955, the launch of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1977, creation of the Group of 77 and UNCTAD in 1964, and the demand for a NIEO a decade later were probably the greatest milestones in this early phase of SSC. Craig Murphy's carefully researched study of *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology* traces them to the widely shared agreement about the need for multilateral international economic governance at the end of the Thirty Years' Crisis of 1914–45 (Murphy 1983, pp. 28–29).

The conflict between the developed world and the rest was slow to emerge in the early post-war years not least because the North–South economic divide was considerably less sharp than it would later become. The size of many Latin American economies, for instance, was not only fairly large, especially when considered against the background of the devastation of Europe and Japan, but many among them could point to their contribution to European recovery, as indeed could India (34). These contributions had been made in the name of international solidarity and collective international responsibility for restoring the world economy to health, and the contributors expected a certain reciprocity once the immediate problems of the war-devastated economies were addressed.

However 'as soon as industrialization became an openly discussed topic, the ideological split between north and south became obvious' (43). Third-World countries interpreted Chapter 9 of the UN charter, which spoke, inter alia, of 'respecting "equal rights" of nations large and small, of promoting better standards of living, full employment, and development' (quoted in Murphy 1983, p. 29) as giving them the right to

violate the principles of free markets, free trade and even property (in cases of nationalisation of foreign-owned enterprises, for example) in the interest of promoting development and asserting sovereign rights over resources and productive capacity. It also, according to them, imposed upon the developed countries the duty to aid developing countries in their efforts to industrialise (28–29). These efforts were, moreover, justified in terms of the widely accepted goals of expanding production, employment, and trade worldwide. However, it soon became clear that US and developed countries generally had no intention of aiding Third- World industrialisation to anywhere near the extent that European recovery had been aided; and worse, they even justified the existing international division of labour in neo-classical terms as 'specialisation' and, for good measure, rationalised the lack of industrialisation in the Third World as a 'cultural' matter (44).

The critique of such ideas, which would soon take the form of a fully fledged 'modernisation theory' (Gillman 2003), by intellectuals from the Third World was now inaugurated by the work of Raul Prebisch on terms of trade between industrial and agricultural countries. The unfairness of the developed countries' position was further underlined when these intellectuals were able to point to a range of practices of developed countries and their corporations which violated their own free-market principles. These included the role of northern monopoly corporations in fixing prices, and high military spending as a form of economic stimulus (Murphy 1983, p. 45).

These grievances led governments of the newly independent Asian and African countries to cement a new solidarity, which climaxed in the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. Sino–Indian relations paved the way, particularly the 'Panchsheel' or five principles of peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, and co-operation. Together, these amounted to 'a recognition of the rights of states to have different economic and political systems' (37) and were adumbrated in treaties between the two countries. While Third-World

states, not least India and China, have had their conflicts and even wars, '[w]ith inconsequential modifications [these principles] have been included in all the key agreements among Third World countries that became the background for the New International Economic Order proposals' (37).

The initial emphasis of Third-World solidarity amid rising East–West tensions was on support for the principles of the UN Charter, in particular equal sovereignty and noninterference. Following a conference in Cairo in 1957, they created the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) at Belgrade in 1961. Though its proclaimed goal was to steer a middle path between the capitalist and communist blocs, the logics of UCD ensured that the NAM would always sail closer to the communist countries than to the capitalist ones.

Economic dissatisfactions were also emerging. The developing world had long complained about monopoly pricing of manufactured goods and the lack of an equivalent structure in relation to the prices of primary commodities. One answer was a commodity producers' cartel, and the first and most successful of these, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), was created in 1960. Broader southern unity found an initial expression in the creation of the Group of 77 and UNCTAD by the UN in 1964 on the strength of Second- and Third- World votes in the United Nations General Assembly and on the basis of a rival understanding of world trade issues to that embodied in the GATT. UNCTAD was charged with the responsibility of developing that understanding on a range of fronts which eventually included the role of trade in the widening North–South income gap, transnational corporations, commodity prices, technology transfer, tied aid, international debt, the international monetary system, and the international financial system. Over the decades, UNCTAD has been at the forefront of developing critical perspectives that challenge the Northern views on all these issues (UNCTAD 2004). This role has not, naturally, been uncontroversial: witness the Northern countries' attack on UNCTAD for its prescient analysis of the housing bubble and the 2008 financial crisis that ensued when it burst (Prashad 2012).

These developments climaxed in the proposals for a NIEO in 1974. It represented the fruition of the foundational intellectual work done by UNCTAD as well as a range of other agencies such as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and intellectuals, particularly the Dependency School. It came at a time when the larger international system that the US had attempted to construct and which was the target of the developing world's critique entered its most serious crisis.

Given the apparent (and only apparent) restoration of the system in the 1980s and 1990s, it is often hard today to appreciate the gravity of that crisis. The dollar-gold system had collapsed in 1971 and practically the entire world (Europe, the South, and OPEC) was in revolt (Hudson 1977, p. 59 ff.) against the US and in 'a movement ... to become independent of the U.S. economic orbit and more closely integrated economically and politically with one another' (Hudson 1977, p. 1). In this contest, the call for a NIEO 'based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations' (United Nations 1974) constituted a frontal challenge to the broken-down Bretton Woods system. It was 'a defiant call for international trade, finance and monetary systems that would amend or replace those that were already existing' (Murphy 1983, p. 113). It also represented an unprecedented state of unity among Third-World countries based on the recognition that they all suffered from 'the same international structural impediments to development' (110).

South–South Co-operation Today

The call for a NIEO would constitute the high point of a common Southern front for decades as the crisis of the 1970s appeared to be resolved

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(though only apparently and temporarily) on capitalist and First-World terms which also consigned the developing world to two lost decades of development. During this time, Third-World unity fell into disarray, and when South–South co-operation re-emerged in a new form, beginning in the late 1990s, it was connected with the emergence of the BRIC countries and other emerging economies which widened the income gaps within the Third World, raising the new questions about the meaning of SSC mentioned earlier. To put these in context, we must first survey the nature and dimensions of the linkages between developing countries today.

Trade

With the post-war shift in the pattern of demand towards first-world working class consumption, and the widening divergence in incomes between first and Third Worlds, the major problem for developing countries was their low and decreasing role in international trade, in particular when measured by value (rather than volume). This began to be reversed in the current century. Developing countries began to account for an increasing contribution to world growth, and an increasing share of world trade, going from about 25% in 1985 to about 45% in 2012 (UNCTAD 2013c, p. 2). Moreover, within this, South–South trade accounted for about 25% of global trade, having doubled over 20 years. This increase was led by trade between Asian developing countries and Chinese exports in particular accounted for nearly 20% of South–South trade. In terms of products, though fuels accounted for 25 of South–South trade, manufactured goods came in second at 19% and parts and components for electrical and electronic goods, at 15% (UNCTAD 2013d).

Aid

Depending on how aid is counted, Southern countries are changing the aid regime slightly but significantly, or massively. If aid is counted in the hitherto conventional way, South–South aid constitutes only 6.3% of the world total (Centre for

Policy Dialogue 2014, p. 12). However, 'when the external financing from the national development banks and state export–import banks of the BRICs to the developing world are added into the mix, the numbers get much larger and exceed the lending totals from the World Bank' (Chin and Quadir 2012, p. 494). This amounts to a veritable 'silent revolution' in aid (Woods 2008).

This quantitative change is magnified when one considers the changing aid scenario more generally. On the one hand, traditional donors (the developed countries) have been scaling back their aid thanks to austerity, making it more targeted towards the poorest and shifting it away from broader development goals of increasing production and productivity. The focus has increasingly been on 'humanitarian aid' within the wider framework of humanitarian intervention and its inevitable less savoury accompaniment, regime change. On the other hand, new and newly important donors from the South are emphasising broader development goals, including infrastructure and industrialisation, re-labelling aid as 'partnership for development' and steering clear of political conditionalities. China, in particular, which is a 'net donor', has attempted to remain a recipient of aid in a larger effort to retain its identity as a Third-World country, though how long donors will allow this to continue is another matter (Chin 2012).

Foreign Direct Investment

The growth of the BRICs and emerging economies is also transforming the world of international production. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is no longer the preserve of developed countries as it was until very recently. Flows of FDI as well as stocks from developing countries in general, and the BRICs in particular, are growing: the share of developing economies in FDI has risen from 12% in 2000 to 35% in 2012 (UNCTAD 2013b, p. 4). The share of the four BRICs countries rose from 1% of the total in 2000 to 10% in 2012 (UNCTAD 2013b, p. 5). In the context of crisis and austerity in the developed world, these shares are likely to grow. In 2012, nearly half of the BRICs investments went to

other developing economies while 42% went to the developed world and the rest to transition economies (UNCTAD 2013b, p. 5).

The pattern of FDI from the BRICs focuses on acquiring locational assets such as workforce skills or access to international markets to increase competitiveness, on investment within the home region, and on investment further afield to access new markets or resources. Such FDI is characterised by strategic considerations rather than short-term profits, something the corporations can do more easily because so many of them are state-owned, such as the majority of Chinese TNCs and those from the other BRICs such as Petrobras, ONGC Videsh and Gazprom. These TNCs 'have become truly global players, as they possess – among other things – global brand names, management skills, and competitive business models. Some of them, ranked by foreign assets, are: CITIC (China), COSCO (China), Lukoil (Russian Federation), Gazprom (Russian Federation), Vale S.A. (Brazil), Tata (India) and ONGC Videsh (India)' (UNCTAD 2010, p. 7). While there have always been state-owned TNCs from the developed world, such as France Telecom, the increased profile of the BRICs in FDI has increased their number. Both state-owned and private TNCs from the BRICs enjoy considerable state backing.

International Economic Governance

As we have seen, deep differences between developed and developing countries over the nature and shape of international economic governance have existed from the beginning of the post-war era, and they culminated in the demand for a NIEO by the developing and communist countries in the 1970s. It appeared for a long time thereafter that the matter had been settled in favour of the developed world for good. However, the underlying issues have never gone away and in the new century the BRICs and emerging economies have begun to pose a powerful challenge in and to the inherited institutions of international economic governance. This is evident in a number of ways. The G7 has been replaced by the G20 as the chief forum for international economic policy co-ordination, so that this is no longer the preserve of Western countries but includes a majority of developing countries as well as Russia. In the WTO (notwithstanding its launch, amid great fanfare, as the flagship of 'globalisation'), the clash between Northern and Southern demands ensured that negotiations of the first round of WTO talks, the Doha Development Round, would remain stalled. More generally, thanks to the increasing problems of the developed world and the structures of international economic governance they have created, combined with the increasing assertion and importance of the developing world, a 'productive incoherence' has emerged in the established institutions of international economic governance, widening the 'policy space' for the developing world through a series of bilateral and multilateral and regional initiatives (Grabel 2010, 2011; Tussie 2010) as well as some grander ones like planned BRICs development bank and reserve pooling initiatives (Desai 2013b, c).

And there are at least some indications that a deeper and broader challenge to the flawed Bretton Woods and dollar-centred institutions of international economic governance might be afoot. Within months of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the governor of the People's Bank of China was calling for what amounted to a revolution in the international monetary system: the creation of a supersovereign currency on the model of Keynes's original proposals for the Bretton Woods conference (Desai 2009, 2010; Zhou 2009). At the same time, the BRICs, in the van of the developing countries in general, are calling for a reform of the IMF and the World Bank and are outflanking the inevitable resistance from the developed world by moving towards building alternative institutions of international economic governance such as a BRICS development bank.

Conclusion

We can now return to the questions about the extent, sustainability, and political character of SSC raised earlier. The above survey of SSC should make it clear that both the growth of emerging economies and co-operation between

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them are not only considerable, but are changing the nature of the world economy and its governance. The question of whether these trends are sustainable is more complex and the answer depends on whether emerging-economy governments are able to see the writing on the wall that sustaining their growth requires a U-turn from the neo-liberal path they have embarked upon, even if this may not be particularly palatable to powerful interests within their respective jurisdictions.

As was pointed out earlier, there is no guarantee that they will. However, three factors may force their hand. There is, first, the example of China, which not only remains the most important and fastest growing among the major emerging economies, but also appears to have read this writing on the wall most clearly. Increasingly, governments aiming for growth will be taking their lessons from the demonstrated success of China rather than neo-liberal preaching from stagnant Western countries. Secondly, stagnant Western economies can no longer support neo-liberal export-led growth with their demand as they did before 2008. Finally, emerging-economy governments are today, more than ever, under pressure to accelerate growth from their own restive middle classes whose revolts across the developing world, from Venezuela to Egypt and from Turkey to Thailand, are in response to slowing growth. These pressures can be expected to lead them eventually, that is after a longer or shorter period during which their attempts to achieve growth along neo-liberal lines are finally proved to be in vain, to a more developmental path.

Finally, there are questions about the political character of SSC today: Is it simply a replication of Northern imperialism on a smaller shabbier scale? There is certainly no doubt that, as Jayati Ghosh has pointed out, 'much of the cross-border economic interaction has been driven by corporate interests rather than broader interests of the citizenry in general' and that this is why 'many recent South–South trade and investment agreements (and the resulting processes) have been similar in unfortunate ways to North–South ones, not just in terms of the protection they afford to corporate investors but even in guarding intellectual property rights' (Ghosh 2013). And

certainly a shift towards more progressive policies will require a greater democratisation of economies as well as international economic linkages. Such a democratisation is, one should note, more likely if the emerging economies shift away from the neo-liberal agenda, as their continued growth requires.

However, even as things stand, there is an increasing number of studies now about Chinese trade and investment with Africa, and while none is entirely uncritical of its effects, the weight of the evidence seems to point to a qualitatively more equal relationship between China and the African countries it deals with than the relationships between African and Western countries (e.g. Brautigam 2009). Not only do the emerging economies come with histories of anti-imperialism rather than imperialism, but the increase in the sources of trade, aid, and investment that they have generated has, in itself, expanded the options for any canny government much as the existence of the USSR in the twentieth century expanded opportunities for the developing countries. This was ever the promise of UCD.

Cross-References

▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law
▶ India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Uneven Development Within Global Production Networks

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Sovereignty

▶ League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)
▶ Nationalisation

Soviet Imperialism

▶ Turkish Left and Anti-imperialism in the 1970s

Soviet Union

▶ Castro, Fidel (1926–2016)
▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)
▶ Racism and Imperialism
▶ Settler Colonialism and the Communist International

Spartakusbund (Sparticist League)

▶ Luxemburg, Under-Consumption, Capitalist Crisis, and Imperialism

Spivak, Gayatri C. (b. 1942)

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Synonyms

Butler, Judith (1956-); Cultural imperialism; Deconstructionism; Feminism, Third World; Post-structuralism Sub-alternity

Definition

This essay explores the life and work of Indian scholar, literary theorist, and feminist and post-colonial critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1942-).

Born on 24 February 1942 to the middle-class family of Pares Chandra and Sivani Chakravorty in Calcutta, Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak is a self-styled philosopher and literary theorist. As a professor at Columbia University and the founder of the Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, Spivak became known for her essay 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' of 1985 and for her translation of and introduction to Jacques Derrida's *De la grammatologie* (*Of Grammatology*) of 1976. She is widely associated with debates on cultural imperialism and the survival of colonial legacies in non-European domains. Best known as a post-colonial theorist and a prolific writer advocating the subaltern and other marginalised social groups such as women (Sharp 2008), Spivak describes herself as a 'para-disciplinary ethical philosopher' with a 'reactive' attitude towards various socio-cultural arguments, but her beginnings are unmistakably situated in post-modern analysis, post-structuralism and the deconstructionism of post-war philosophers such as Derrida (Kilburn 1996).

Personal Life and Education

Spivak graduated from the Presidency College at the University of Calcutta in 1959 with first-class

honours and awards in English and Bengali litera-
ture. In an interview with Alfred Arteaga of 1993–
94, she stresses the political atmosphere in which
she grew up and the ways this fostered a polemics
that deconstructed colonial hegemonies from within
(Landry and MacLean 1996: 16–18). The term
'deconstructionism' acts as a key word in Spivak's
work and has influenced both European and trans-
antlantic academies. It refers to a theoretical move-
ment inspired by Derrida that seeks to question and
destabilise the logic of binary or dualistic thinking
underpinning Western traditions of thought.
Recognising herself as one of the first Indian intel-
lectuals born free by 'chronological accident'
(Landry and MacLean 1996: 17), Spivak attained
most of her higher qualifications in the US: on
borrowed money she completed her master's
degree in English at Cornell University, where she
also served as the second female member of the
Telluride Association, and she undertook a PhD at
Iowa under Paul de Man. Her thesis, published
under the title *Myself Must I Remake: The Life
and Poetry of W.B. Yeats* (1974b), signalled the
completion of her 'apprenticeship' in structuralism
and post-modern deconstructionism. In 1967 she
had already started working on a translation of *Of
Grammatology;* during this period she married and
divorced the novelist Talbot Spivak, known for *The
Bride Wore the Traditional Gold*, an autobiograph-
ical novel dealing with the early period of this
marriage. Spivak became the first non-white female
professor at Columbia University in 2007, and in
2012 she was awarded the Kyoto Prize in Arts
and Philosophy. She is founder of the Pares
Chakravorty Memorial Literacy Project Inc.
(1997) – a non-profit organisation dedicated to pro-
viding primary education for poor children – and
continues to be active in international charity
projects.

Theoretical Milestones and Contributions

Spivak became known for her preface to Derrida's
Of Grammatology, which was hailed for its self-
reflexive quality (Spivak 1976) and was a product
of several years of work about the politics and

poetics of language (Spivak 1974a). Between
1967 and 1985, as a member of the Subaltern
Studies Collective, she produced several essays
on feminist politics and cultural imperialism. Dur-
ing those years she developed a theoretical orien-
tation focusing on subaltern subjects, especially
women, who are caught in the cogs of Western
discursive institutions. Her ethics were defined by
herself as Marxist, deconstructionist, and practical
feminist but her overall work figures today among
notable 'cultural imperialism' contributions that
debate Western hegemonisations of powerless
cultures. Marxists have viewed her as 'too
codic', feminists as 'too male-identified', and
indigenous theorists as too committed to Western
theory, and this puzzlement continues to consign
her to an outsider's liminality.

'Can the Subaltern Speak?', which debates
how racial discourse contributed to the banning
of sati, has a distinctive feminist undertone. In
Hindi and Sanskrit texts sati appears as a funeral
practice among some Indian communities, dictat-
ing that a recently widowed woman ought to
immolate herself on her husband's funeral pyre.
Spivak (1988) debates the practice as a form of
gendered regulation in pre-colonial India, to
which British colonial rule and the colonial ban-
ning of sati were superimposed as a 'civilising
process'. Subsequently, she argues, Indian
women experienced a form of twin imprisonment
that 'muted' them both in the native community
and in the eyes of foreign rulers, and which fos-
tered social rejection, mental illness, and even
suicide. Through archival research and theoretical
analysis Spivak promoted an extensive decon-
struction of Western scholarly representations in
the works of Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Giles
Deleuze that renewed the plane of feminist critical
scholarship: the 'subaltern', she claimed, is not
silenced only by bureaucratic institutions but
also in Western scholarship.

Although Spivak's writings have been pre-
sented as fragmented or incoherent, the epistemo-
logical themes she introduced in this essay run
through her work with great consistency. In *Out-
side the Teaching Machine* (1993) Spivak ques-
tions the ways in which power is structured
through a collection of works of literature such

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as Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, Karl Marx's writings, and the work of twentieth-century thinkers such as Derrida. In doing so she provides a voice for those who cannot speak, proving that the true work of resistance takes place in the cultural margins. In *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (1999) Spivak also provides an analysis of Western (European) metaphysics to suggest that notable philosophical contributions deny non-European subjects their humanity. She argues that the figure of the 'native informant' emerges through various cultural practices and domains (philosophy, history, literature) as a metropolitan hybrid. The text addresses feminists, philosophers, critics, and interventionist intellectuals through the ways in which the notion of the 'Third World interloper' as the victim of a colonial oppressor is sharply suspect. In this book she introduced the term 'strategic essentialism', which also appears in anthropological literature – though Spivak does little to acknowledge this. Reminiscent of the thought of Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), strategic essentialism allows the subaltern to act under structural constrictions by temporarily aligning with hegemonic representations. However, strategic essentialism also debates how subordinate or marginalised social or ethnic groups may put aside 'local' differences in order to forge a sense of a collective identity, usually for political means (for example, uses of the term 'Black British' in the 1980s and 1990s by immigrant groups, and those groups' accompanying rituals and sub-cultural performances are a form of strategic essentialism). The concept resonates with post-colonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha (1994), who pioneered 'colonial mimicry' as the subaltern's twin strategy of colonial parody and emulation. Both Bhabha and Spivak coincide with the Foucaultian argument of the post-colonial critic Edward Said (1935–2003) on the insidious nature that colonial power relationships can attain. More a *topos* or abstracted and homogenised space than a place for the Europeans, the 'Orient' served as a tabula rasa for conceptualizations of non-European otherness that were placed in the service of Western colonial bureaucrats and artistic apparatuses alike,

allowing Western European hegemons to produce and subject natives as irrational, 'backward', and subaltern beings (Said 1978).

The turn of the century found Spivak addressing issues pertaining to the globalisation of culture, language, and literary traditions with renewed emphasis on global cultural flows. *Death of a Discipline* (2003) declares the death of comparative literature as we know it and sounds an urgent call for a 'new comparative literature' that is not appropriated and determined by the market. Spivak asks how in this new era we should protect the multiplicity of languages and literatures at the university. Closer to debates on cultural imperialism, *Other Asias* (2005) prompts readers to rethink Asia, in its political and cultural complexity, by focusing on the Global South and the metropolitan centres – broadly speaking a theoretical convergence between Spivak and the British cultural theorist Raymond Williams (1974). Between 2005 and 2010 Spivak's theoretical interventions were mostly confined to short essays and interviews, in which she further elaborated on sub-alternity. An exception is a collection of her reflections on distributions of socio-cultural action between 'public' and 'private' spheres, which was published as a book. In *Nationalism and the Imagination* (2010) she discerned a collusion of nationalism with the private sphere of the imagination in order to command the public sphere. The argument resonates with Partha Chatterjee's work on Indian nationalism (1986, 1993), which Spivak debates in *An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization* (2012), but also prominently with the Harvard anthropologist Michael Herzfeld's thesis in *Cultural Intimacy* (2005, first published 1997). In *An Aesthetic Education* she declares the old polarities of tradition and modernity or colonialism and post-colonialism insufficient for interpreting the globalised present, proposing aesthetic education as the last available instrument for implementing global justice and democracy. Her argument focuses on the role of 'linguistic imperialism' in the production of the new 'corporate university' education and the power of literary theory to cancel such developments.

Spivak's work is dedicated to the articulation of an ethical discourse that borrows from different

theoretical traditions. Both her personal activism and her critical theoretical contributions work towards what she has termed 'ethical singularity', our willingness to engage with the Other in non-essentialist terms. This reciprocal flow of responsibility and 'accountability' ('How to Teach a "Culturally Different" Book', in Landry and MacLean 1996: 256) matches Mikhail Bakhtin's conception of 'answerability' in which 'I-for-myself' exists in public only as an 'I-for-others' (Bakhtin 1990: 32). It was in fact on the basis of this ethical commitment that Spivak gained the badge of 'pretentious eclecticism': certain theorists suggested that her representations of the Other and 'working out one's subject position' became for her 'more important than the activist struggle of universal socialism' (Wallace 1999). The following section revisits this controversy alongside the scholarly network in which one can evaluate Spivak's work as an interdisciplinary contribution to social and theory.

Scholarly Connections and Critical Evaluations

Subalternity is a theme that occupied space in post-colonial and other adjacent anthropological debates extensively. Spivak's introduction of the 'subaltern' as the subject that cannot achieve successful dialogical utterance is mirrored in the works of the sociologist Bonaventura de Sousa Santos (2002), who uses the term more loosely to denote the oppressed groups living at the social margins and struggling against hegemonic globalisation. Spivak herself has stressed that the concept of the subaltern should not be used indiscriminately to describe any marginalised group, a practice often adopted by such groups. Hence, for her the working class does not necessarily become subaltern when it is oppressed. Others claim that in post-colonial terms, 'everything that has . . . no access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern – a space of difference' (de Kock 1992: 45). It is worth stressing that her examination of the effects of subalternity is not very dissimilar from the argument developed by Paul Gilroy (1987), who claims that cultural

difference emerges as resistance to hegemonic modes of representation. Working from post-Hegelian and Marxist theory, Gilroy examines cultural difference in the context of dialogical role-making, of fostering an intersubjective engagement of black performance and other-observation. For Gilroy, black culture's own voice offers an alternative to dominant cultural practices. Because the voice of difference comes from within the black community, it generates the predicament of collective self-narration: others are an inescapable condition of collective self-recognition, and they cannot be ignored, as public (self-) presentation needs an audience to be meaningful (Tzanelli 2008: 11–12).

Studies from the European margins attest to 'crypto-colonial' overlaps of social (working-class) and cultural (subaltern) identities. The term 'crypto-colonialism' was coined by the Harvard anthropologist Michael Herzfeld in his mid-career essay 'The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism' (2002). Like Santos (1999; see Barreira 2011: 154), Herzfeld debates the ability of institutional frameworks to erase or amplify disenfranchised voices that escape through the cracks of officialdom into global spheres. While preserving a distinctive Derridian sentiment in his argument, Herzfeld focuses, however, on countries such as Greece and Thailand, which, though never colonised by the West, were steeped in colonial ideas that enforced an inferiority complex in both domestic cultural practices and international political discourse. Although Santos and Herzfeld do not figure as Spivak's interlocutors, they share with her a distinctive cosmological sentiment (e.g. protection of the disenfranchised in post-colonial domains) and the potential for her work to be connected to a feminist poetics.

Spivak was (inaccurately) criticised by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Professor of History and South Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago, for being 'inauthentic' because she engages with Western thinkers and publishes in English (Wallace 1999: 2). Ironically, Spivak and Chakrabarty share views on the harmful effects of European colonialism in the production of ideal forms of 'human'. As a historian, Chakrabarty (2000) has recourse to precisely

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those essentialisations of subjectivity that condition theoretical lapses to identity-production – a move he also appears to perform in his criticism of Spivak. The suspicion that such criticisms pertain to a para-nationalist feeling of betrayal (of one's native language and culture) by one of the few famous female Indian scholars may be closer to the truth. A similar rift emerged when Terry Eagleton, then Professor of English Literature at the University of Oxford, attacked Spivak for her radicalism, which 'tends to grow unpleasantly narcissistic' and 'guilt-ridden' while simultaneously being 'deprived of a political outlet' (Eagleton 1999). Rejecting her theories as 'opaque' and 'a kind of intellectual version of Attention Deficit Disorder', Eagleton set himself against Spivak's supporters from postcolonial and feminist studies alike.

Judith Butler (1999), then professor at the University of California, Berkeley, stressed Spivak's contribution to 'Third-World' feminism, casting Eagleton's 'polemics' as a specimen of covert sexism. Although the 'Third-World' concept emerged as a category of representation in the post-Second World War and Cold War contexts to embrace women from developing countries (usually black and oppressed by local patriarchy), feminist activism in them assumed a life of its own as a counter-polemic to 'First-World' hegemonic representations of subalternity: these women have a voice that has to be heard and understood separately from what 'First- World' activism has to say about them. Spivak and Butler share in theoretical analysis: Butler uses the term 'performativity' (1990, 1993) to analyse the ways in which subjects are both subjected to discursive manifestations of power and 'emerging'. Just as Spivak considers strategic essentialism to be a double-edged sword, Butler does not consider the creation of the human subjects outside the confines of power. Significantly, in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* Spivak recognises that even feminist activists have to temporarily adopt an essentialist position in order to act, especially in the face of a fragmented feminist agenda. Though coming closer to the distinction of 'strategy' from 'tactics' made by Michel de Certeau (1984, 1985), Spivak's strategic essentialism does not neglect

'feelings of doing' and individual ontological knowledge tied to bodily practices, as her conception of the subaltern (1988) shows. Nevertheless, the unresolved tension in her work between epistemologies of otherness (this she consigns to 'the domain of law': Spivak 2003: 83) and the 'eruption of the ethical' as an epistemological interruption (ibid.) continue to invite criticism as much as they bring her closer to established conceptions of cosmopolitanism as a project of world solidarity. Her declaration that one has to unlearn one's privilege does not match her philosophical resolution to respect one's difference intact – a post-war philosophical position that we encounter in Emmanuel Levinas (1969) – and clashes with her support of strategic essentialism that is rooted in practical ethics. This dissonance is yet to be resolved in her work.

Spivak's work has gained in interdisciplinary popularity across fields as disparate as those of media and visual studies, tourism, and literary political theory and post-colonialism (Elkins 2013; Moynagh 2008). Her borrowing from diverse European and non-European traditions and their application to the social realities in post-colonial settings invite openness and a fusion of cultural horizons once monopolised by overwhelmingly white male hermeneuticians – a prominent point in Spivak's writings. It is ironic that she has been simultaneously accused of leaps from 'allegory to the Internet' and 'US market philosophy' (Eagleton 1999: 3–4). True to her beliefs, Spivak has highlighted with reference to her philanthropic activism the significance of developing 'rituals of democratic habits' (McMillen 2007) even where democracies appear to be in place. And even though she insists that the human imagination cannot be digitised but is enlarged instead through embodied classroom interactions (ibid.), her writings and her activism appear to assume a life of their own on the World Wide Web and the new digital humanities. Examples have been the recent debates on the whiteness of new digital humanities, that is, how the digital divide between developed and developing countries should be assessed by considering how social inequalities thrive on combinations of 'race' and colour.

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Sport

Stalin, Joseph (1878–1953)

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Definition

This essay includes a short biography of the man with a particular focus on his contribution to anti-imperialism (and by proxy the contribution of the Soviet Union under his leadership).

Introduction

Stalin is a polarising figure no doubt, but one who it is essential to discuss in considering the history of imperialism and anti-imperialism. For this reason I was glad to accept the task of writing this essay about him, and hope to have done the subject justice. (Special thanks to Dr Zak Cope, Scott Horne, and Prerna Bakshi for their comments.) In the space I have available, it is impossible to comprehensively study a figure of Stalin's significance. As such, this will not be an essay that discusses in depth his general contribution to Marxism, to socialist politics and history, or his role as the leader of the USSR beyond the anti-imperialist context. Owing to his significance as a

world historical leader, much has been written about Stalin along these lines, which can be found elsewhere. (For a friendly reading of Stalin, readers would be well advised to consult Anna Louise Strong, Ian Grey or Ludo Martens. There is no shortage of critical readings of Stalin in Western scholarship.) Instead, this essay includes a short biography of the man with a particular focus on his contribution to anti-imperialism (and by proxy the contribution of the Soviet Union under his leadership).

This essay will begin with a brief introduction and description of Stalin's life. While it would be surprising if readers' first encounter with Stalin were through these pages, I include it nonetheless due to both the biographical nature of this essay and as a way of introducing Stalin the man as well as Stalin the anti-imperialist. Stalin's contribution to anti-imperialism will then be assessed through historical analysis of the role of the Soviet Union in the decolonisation of the Russian Empire as well as support to antiimperialist movements, and the defeat of imperialism during the Second World War.

A Short Biography

Stalin was born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili on 18 December 1878 in the city of Gori in what was then part of the Russian Empire, but is now part of Georgia. His parents, Georgians, were of humble backgrounds. His father, Besarion Dzhugashvili was a cobbler and his mother, Ketevan Geladze, was a domestic labourer. Stalin's early upbringing was difficult with the Dzhugashvili household suffering from domestic violence. It would not be until Stalin's mother left her husband that Stalin would find any semblance of stability.

Devoutly religious and with the aim of her son joining the clergy, Stalin's mother arranged for him to be sent to a seminary to train as a priest. This experience, according to Stalin, was one of the first major motivations for him to become a revolutionary activist. In an interview with German author Emil Ludwig, Ludwig suggested that Stalin's revolutionary turn might have been

motivated by his difficult upbringing. Stalin suggested otherwise:

> No. My parents were uneducated, but they did not treat me badly by any means. But it was a different matter at the Orthodox theological seminary which I was then attending. In protest against the outrageous regime and the Jesuitical methods prevalent at the seminary, I was ready to become, and actually did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism as a really revolutionary teaching. (Stalin 1954, p. 115)

Stalin joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), part of which would become the Bolshevik Party, in 1903 and worked as an organiser in the Caucasus. During this time he led a strike of oil workers which resulted in the first collective bargaining agreement between the workers and the oil owners (Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 1949, p. 14). In addition to organising, Stalin was active in illegal work to raise money for the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP in defiance of the orders of the party. Stalin was a noted organiser of the 1907 Tiflis Bank Robbery, which was planned and organised with many of his later comrades including Vladimir Lenin and Maxim Litvinov. As a result of his activities, Stalin spent a great deal of time in Siberian exile on no less than seven occasions. Upon his final release, he would go on to play various important roles in the Bolshevik Party and the Russian Revolution, becoming the editor of *Pravda,* a member of the Central Committee, and played a key role in helping Lenin avoid capture.

Following the Russian Revolution, Stalin was appointed people's commissar for nationalities affairs as a result of his theoretical contribution on the relationship between nationality and Marxism as conceptualised in 'Marxism and the National Question' in 1913. Under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet government introduced a policy of equality between all Soviet citizens, the official recognition of the mother tongues of all the nations of the Soviet Union, and the formation of the soviet of nationality affairs, the Narkomnats. Though he would later be criticised for being an agent of 'Russification', it is notable that Stalin was key in shifting Soviet policy away from opposition to national autonomy during his tenure. Early Soviet nationality and language policies would include the development of written languages (if lacking), attempts at national language planning for minority nationalities, and the development of native language presses and books (Slezkine 1994, p. 431).

In 1922, Stalin would be appointed general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a position he would hold for life. During the early period of his leadership, and following the death of Lenin, he became embroiled in a series of power struggles centred around which personalities and which political lines would be decisive in the post-Lenin leadership of the Soviet Union. After outmanoeuvring his opponents politically, Stalin would emerge victorious as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union until his death in 1953. The period of Stalin's leadership of the Soviet Union is the most critical with regard to his contribution to anti-imperialism, and will be assessed in greater detail in the following sections of this essay.

Stalin's Theoretical Contributions to Anti-imperialism

The following section presents a review of Stalin's key theoretical contributions on the subject of anti-imperialism. The shortest way to summarise Stalin's contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory is that his work addressed a key weakness in Marxist theory, namely the complex relationship between nation and class. Prior to Stalin's work on the national question, and indeed even in Stalin's early work on the subject, Marxist theory had assumed the impossibility of identification between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of any given nation on questions of culture, language, or territory (Van Ree 1994, p. 227). This position amounted to an effective denial of the role of nationality, culture, or language in terms of the political behaviour or aspirations of peoples. This clearly unsustainable position flew in the face of historical experience of multiclass national alliances, and would continue to be disproven throughout the twentieth century and the experience of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements.

In *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin laid out a definition of the nation that was key to establishing the Bolshevik position on national self-determination. In this work, Stalin (1955, p. 307) defined a nation as 'a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture'.

Stalin's theory of the nation was critical to Marxist thinking around anti-imperialism. The core contribution of Stalin's thinking was to recognise firstly that national oppression impacted the exploited classes more than the exploiters, as can be seen in his statement that:

> Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard the free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down. (1955, p. 316)

Secondly, Stalin noted that at historically contingent moments, national oppression creates a temporary identity of interest between classes that would otherwise be engaged in struggle with one another. Stalin noted that:

> . . . the policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. It diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions 'common' to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about 'harmony of interests,' for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers. (1955, p. 319)

Implicit in this understanding is that the resolution of questions of national liberation is a necessary precursor to the advancement of socialism and the class interests of the proletariat. In this respect, Stalin departed from most Marxist theory at that time.

In assessing the contribution of Stalin to the Marxist theory of nations, Van Ree summarises Stalin's contribution like this: 'Stalin was the Marxist who finally destroyed the traditional Social-Democratic concept, to which even Lenin had stuck, that the victory of socialism implied the quick demise of the nation' (Van Ree: 1994, p. 230). In the chapter 'The National Question and Leninism', Stalin made the fairly obvious suggestion that various aspects of nationality, such as language and culture, had historical roots prior to capitalism (Stalin 1955, p. 351). In making this suggestion, Stalin implied that these would continue to be important even under socialism (Van Ree 1994, p. 226).

The centrality of the national question extended beyond Stalin's views about life in the Soviet Union and would play a key role in his understanding of imperialism and contribution to anti-imperialism. In 'The Foundations of Leninism', Stalin noted that:

> the struggle that the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the independence of Egypt is objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of the Egyptian national movement, despite the fact that they are opposed to socialism; whereas the struggle that the British 'Labour' movement is waging to preserve Egypt's dependent position is for the same reasons a reactionary struggle, despite the proletarian origins and the proletarian title of the members of that government, despite the fact that they are 'for' socialism. (Stalin 1924: Chap. 6)

In contrast to most Marxist theorists of his day, who were disdainful of the role of the peasantry and other non-proletarian classes in waging struggles for liberation, Stalin placed great faith and saw great strategic significance in the world's national liberation movements. While most of Marxism was looking towards the advanced countries of Europe for socialism, Stalin correctly looked to Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and therefore to anti-imperialism as being the centre of gravity for socialist revolution.

The USSR and Anti-imperialism Before the Second World War

The role of the USSR under Stalin and its contribution to anti-imperialism prior to the Second World War can be divided into two main parts,

namely the contribution to antiimperialism inside and outside the Soviet Union. As will be demonstrated in this section, these efforts were not unproblematic and achieved mixed results. They were, however, attempts and achievements that were without parallel for their time.

It should be stressed that the history of decolonisation in the twentieth century began with the Soviet Union. In accord with Stalin's theories as laid out in *Marxism and the National Question*, the Soviet Union began decolonising the former Russian Empire based on the principle of the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession. Padmore (1946, p. 48) notes that the decolonisation process began despite the ongoing Russian civil war in which the interventionist forces of the various imperialist powers were aligning themselves with various social forces in Russia's former colonies (51).

The political system established by the Soviet Union was based on national delimitation into constituent republics on the basis of Stalin's definition of the nation. Writing on this administrative division, Padmore notes that 'this structural form of administration' enabled 'each national and racial minority living within another ethnographic area to maintain its own identity, if it so wishes, and helps to nurture the many distinctive cultures of the several peoples' (67). The structure of the Soviet political system was designed to avoid the dominance of one national delimitation over another, with the soviet of nationalities being represented by an equal number of delegates from each republic (69–70).

Beyond the design of the political system was an active attempt by the central Soviet leadership to develop the political and institutional capacities of the former colonial republics. This strategic policy was known as Korenisatsiya (nativisation or indigenisation). Korenisatsiya entailed the 'full recognition of the national languages on par with Russian' (Grenoble 2003, p. 44) and ensured that the language of local administration and education would be the local language. In addition to this, 'new national elites were trained and promoted to leadership positions in the government, schools, and industrial enterprises of these newly

formed territories' (Martin 2001, p. 1). Stalin's policy intent can be seen in his comment that:

> it would be an error if anyone thought that in relation to the development of the national cultures of the backward nationalities, central workers should maintain a policy of neutrality ... Such a view would be incorrect. We stand for protective policy in relation to the development of national cultures of the backward nationalities. I emphasise this so that it will be understood that we are not indifferent, but actively protecting the development of national culture. (Stalin [1929, 9] RTsKhlDNI 558/1/4490, cited in Martin 2001a)

As will be demonstrated, Korenisatsiya (and by extension, Stalin's nationalities policy) was contested from its very inception, reflecting forces internal to the Soviet Union that either directly or indirectly supported the Russification of the Union. These will be discussed in the following section, and Stalin's role (whether in favour of anti-imperialism within the Soviet Union or otherwise) will be evaluated. A number of critics, for example Marsden (2002, p. 106) and Van Ree (1994, p. 164), identify Stalin as a Great Russian nationalist (or even a chauvinist), determined to assimilate minorities and 'Russify' the Soviet Union, and turn the Soviet republics into dependencies of Russia. These claims will be evaluated in this section.

The starting point for the discussion of Stalin's possible role in the Russification of the Soviet Union can be seen in Lenin's criticism of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinskii as 'great Russian chauvinists' in the political debate that surrounded the framing of the Soviet constitution (Martin 1998, p. 100). Martin criticises the position taken by Lenin thus:

> with regard to the rights of the non-Russians, there was little difference between their rival constitutional proposals. Both plans had the identical three tier commissariat structure. Lenin's proposal was slightly more favourable to the independent republics and raised them above the autonomous republics in status ... Stalin's plan however was more favourable to the existing autonomous republics, such as Tatarstan and Turkestan who would be given the same status as Georgia and the Ukraine. (101)

In fact, Stalin debated furiously with both Lenin and the Tatar Communist Mirsaid Sultan-

Galiev against the creation of a specifically ethnically Russian Soviet in place of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, as he believed that Russians had historically benefited from their position as the imperial nation, and even contemporarily benefited from being the 'state-bearing nationality' of the Soviet Union (ibid.).

In response to the policy of Korenisatsiya, there was a backlash from both the Russian population and Russian figures within the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These political considerations weighed on the ability of Stalin to pursue the affirmative action policies based on his theory of the national question. This can be seen, for instance, in the comments of the soviet secretary of nationalities, Tadzhiev, who suggested that:

> Local misunderstandings develop because we observe an opposition to assimilation. One sometimes even observes this among communists. In fact, we should not oppose assimilation. Our nationalities policy is absolutely clear and we can never permit forced assimilation. We won't allow that, but we should by all means welcome natural assimilation, we should welcome natural assimilation which takes place at its own pace. This is good as it leads to the formation of a single nation, a single language. (Martin 1998, p. 109)

Tadzhiev was by no means an isolated political voice as can be seen by the comments of Khatskevich, his successor in the soviet of nationalities, that:

> many incorrectly understand the rights of national minorities in their economic and cultural development . . . More attention must be given to realizing the right of free choice to use any language according to the choice of the population itself and each citizen individually . . . Each *natsmen* [national minority within the Soviet Union] should have the right to liquidate their illiteracy in their native language, but if they want to liquidate it in Russian, living somewhere in the *kraia* and *oblasti* of the RSFSR, then one must give them that right and possibility. (ibid.)

As noted by Martin (Ibid.), the liberal positions of both Tadzhiev and Khatskevich acted in a way that was oblivious to the historical power structure of the former Russian Empire, which carried over into the modern Soviet Union. A liberal position

such as the one they took is simply a softer way of supporting Russian nationalism, remaining neutral while the stronger force decides the power struggle.

Beyond the fact that these positions were allowed to develop under Stalin, it is difficult to point to Stalin as the motive force behind the kind of soft assimilationist policies proposed by elements of the Soviet leadership. The extent to which these pronouncements contradicted Stalin's own position on nationalities and policies up to this period of Soviet history suggests that these forces existed despite and not because of Stalin. They were part of a political landscape within which he had the space to govern, and they can be seen as a reaction to the Korenisatsiya framework that suppressed Russia, Russian, and Russians in favour of minority nationalities, their leaders, and their languages. What can be said is that as a result of the balance of forces, the 1930s became a period of compromise between Russian nationalism and minority nationalisms in the Soviet Union. The question remains then to what extent Stalin contributed to or supported Russification in the Soviet Union, and to what extent he opposed the forces that were in favour of ending Korenisatsiya.

A key point in Soviet nationalities policy came in 1938 when Russian became a mandatory subject of study in all Soviet schools (Kirkwood: 1991, pp. 63–64). While scholars such as Kirkwood (ibid) consider this policy to be evidence supporting Stalin's desire for Russification, the political context of the time suggests otherwise. In 1938, the People's Commissar for Education, Tiurkin, proposed to introduce Russian as a subject from the first grade on a par with the local language, a policy that was rejected by Stalin (Suny and Martin: 2001, p. 258). Zhdanov (259), paraphrasing Stalin, noted that he thought 'what Comrade Stalin pointed out must be included in the draft – that there must be no suppression of, or limitation on, the native language, so as to warn all organizations that Russian is to be a subject of study, not a medium of instruction'. Blitstein notes that the decision to mandate Russian language instruction was mostly tactical and on the basis of '(1) the need for a common language in a multinational state seeking further economic

and cultural development; (2) the importance of Russian for the advanced training of non-Russian cadres; and (3) the requirements of defense' (258).

It appears that the rehabilitation and elevation of certain pre-revolutionary political and cultural figures occurring during Stalin's leadership can be viewed in the context of a tactical compromise in light of the impending struggle against fascism. In addition to this, however, is the difficulty in resolving the discord between the leading role played by Russian workers in the Russian revolution (and later the leading role played by Russians in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45), and the strategic objectives of Soviet nationalities policy under Stalin. Often, Stalin could be seen as torn between these two poles. On a number of occasions, he was seen to refer to the Russian people as the leading force, or the first amongst equals in the Soviet Union (Martin 2001b, pp. 271–272).

The rehabilitation of political figures such as Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, and Alexander Nevsky, and cultural figures such as Pushkin and Tchaikovsky, can be seen in this light, as can the rehabilitation of the Russian Orthodox Church. In addition to this, overtures toward Russian nationalism can be seen in wartime propaganda materials, in the invocation of 'Mother Russia' (Lieven 2000, pp. 305–306). These comments and the associated political decisions should be placed in their correct historical (the lead-up to the Second World War) and political (the need to accommodate Russian nationalism whilst simultaneously combating chauvinism based on the historic experience of the Russian revolution) contexts.

While the Soviet Union under Stalin would continue to provide significant support for the development of minority cultures, the period of compromise represented the passing of the high point of the decolonization efforts of the former Russian Empire. The Soviet Union had moved from an aggressive policy of affirmative action to a position of support for minority nationalities alongside the promotion of Russian as a lingua franca for the purpose of multinational state building and defence, to the temporary acceptance of Russian nationalism in the face of the Nazi onslaught. The problem with some tactical compromises is that they can evolve into strategic

shifts, and this appears to have occurred under the post-Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Union.

The evidence suggests that rather than Stalin, Khrushchev, the Soviet leader most responsible for unpacking and reversing Stalin's legacy, was primarily responsible for the Russification of the Soviet Union. Capitalising on the tactical compromises made by Stalin in education and in cultural policies, the post-Stalin leadership steered Russia in the direction of its former imperial past. Suny and Martin note that:

> it was only in the post-Stalin period, with the school reform of 1958, that non-Russians were given the *choice* to educate their children in Russian, rather than in their native languages. Whereas during Stalin's rule, educational policy probably acted as a brake on linguistic Russification, in the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev periods hundreds of thousands of non-Russian parents sent their children to Russian-language schools in order to ease the path to social advancement. (2001, p. 12)

To summarise Stalin's contribution to decolonisation within the Soviet Union, then, the Stalin period witnessed an attempt at maintaining and reviving national and minority cultures that was attempted on a scale that had never been seen before, and has not been seen since. The existence and vibrancy of the cultures of many nationalities that were part of the Soviet Union is to a large extent explicable by Stalinist policy. Due to significant internal and external pressure, there was a limit to how far and for how long these aggressive nationality policies could be pursued. Stalin found himself in a position where he needed to maintain unity in the face of external aggression. Following Stalin's leadership, the active 'de-Stalinisation' campaign of Khrushchev would see Stalin's work on the national question and its associated policies buried.

Anti-imperialism Outside the Pre-war Soviet Union

Outside the Soviet Union, a critical historical question about Stalin's anti-imperialism concerns the influence of the Comintern on the Chinese revolution and its war of national liberation, and on the Spanish Civil War.

One of the most notable criticisms of Stalin and the Comintern comes in relation to their influence on the strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, even the Chinese Communist Party criticised the errors of Stalin and the Comintern in terms of their influence in China, suggesting that:

Long ago the Chinese Communists had first-hand experience of some of his [Stalin's] mistakes. Of the erroneous 'Left' and Right opportunist lines which emerged in the Chinese Communist Party at one time or another, some arose under the influence of certain mistakes of Stalin's, insofar as their international sources were concerned. In the late twenties, the thirties and the early and middle forties, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists represented by Comrades Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi resisted the influence of Stalin's mistakes; they gradually overcame the erroneous lines of 'Left' and Right opportunism and finally led the Chinese revolution to victory. (Communist Party of China 1963, pp. 123–124)

Here Mao is referring to a number of political lines suggested by the Comintern and implemented by figures in the Chinese Communist Party, namely those centring the Chinese struggle around Urban Insurrection (Li Lisan), Frontal Confrontation between the armies of the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (Otto Braun alias Li De), and the influence of the 28 Bolsheviks group, most notably Wang Ming whom Mao criticised for a dogmatic application of the Soviet experience to Chinese circumstances.

Nonetheless, the Chinese Communist Party resisted an over-attribution of power to Stalin, suggesting instead that as much as Stalin or the Comintern made theoretical errors in their analysis of the Chinese situation, the real weakness was of elements in the Chinese party who uncritically implemented these ideas.

But since some of the wrong ideas put forward by Stalin were accepted and applied by certain Chinese comrades, we Chinese should bear the responsibility. In its struggle against 'Left' and Right opportunism, therefore, our Party criticised only its own erring comrades and never put the blame on Stalin. The purpose of our criticism was to distinguish between right and wrong, learn the appropriate lessons and advance the revolutionary cause. We merely asked the erring comrades that they

should correct their mistakes. If they failed to do so, we waited until they were gradually awakened by their own practical experience, provided they did not organise secret groups for clandestine and disruptive activities. (ibid.)

What this analysis suggests is that while Stalin and the Comintern's line during the pre-war period was, according to the Chinese Communist Party, incorrect, the impact of this should not be overstated. Mavrakis (1976, pp. 127–128) similarly disputes the 'command and control' view of the Comintern's role in China, arguing that

how can Stalin be held responsible for the mistakes made by the CCP in the period 1928–35 when we know: 1. that an exchange of messages between the Kiangsi bases and Moscow required six to eight months; 2. that, whenever he had knowledge of them, Stalin upheld the positions of Mao Tse-tung and not those of the CCP leadership which he is supposed to have put in the saddle. 3. that the latter carried out the Comintern's instructions only when it suited it to do so.

This logic suggests that even if incorrect, the ability of Stalin and the Comintern to negatively impact the political line of the Chinese Communist Party, let alone its day-to-day operations, should not be overstated.

The question remains as to what if anything was the contribution of Stalin and the Comintern to anti-imperialism.

Along with Mexico, the Soviet Union was the only state to provide assistance to the Spanish republic during the Spanish Civil War. The Falange under General Francisco Franco received substantial support from Hitler and Mussolini to bring down the elected government (see Whealey 2004). During this period, it is notable that the Western powers maintained a policy of 'neutrality' in the face of the fascist takeover of Spain. According to Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a leading British military adviser to Lloyd George, Anthony Eden (British foreign secretary) and Winston Churchill, 'Whitehall circles were very largely pro-Franco'.

Despite hugely superior naval power, instead of blockading the German and Italian intervention, illegal under the 1919 Versailles Treaty and the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, Hart was 'saddened that so many leading lights of his society 'desired

the [Spanish Nationalist] rebels' success' and correctly concluded that '[class] sentiment and property sense would seem to have blinded their strategic sense'. Thus, a non-Intervention Committee under League of Nations auspices was set up, to which Germany and Italy were a part. This prohibited the supply of arms to the Spanish Republic. However, even with France having its own Popular Front government under 'Socialist' premier Leon Blum, it did nothing effective to prevent German and Italian soldiers and materiel from reaching Franco's army (Leibowitz and Finkel 1998, pp. 53–58).

It was clear that nothing was being done to stem the fascist involvement in Spain's affairs. Concerned to contain fascism, and particularly to prevent its encirclement of military ally France, the Soviet Union weighed in on the Republican or 'loyalist' side. The first cases of rifles and ammunition – labelled 'pressed meat' – left the Black Sea coast of Russia on 18 September 1936 (Haslam: 1984, p. 115). In total the USSR provided Spain with 806 planes, 362 tanks, and 1,555 artillery pieces; it was the Republic's only important source of major weapons, without which, the Republic would not have lasted a week. British historian Helen Graham (2002, p. 153) writes:

> In 1936 the Soviet government would dispatch at least 50% (and probably more) of its precious total annual production of military aircraft to Republican Spain. Later in the war too the Soviet government would provide substantial credits to the Republic when it knew that it had virtually no chance of recouping them.

Soviet anti-imperialist assistance was not however limited to contexts where aid would provide immediate assistance to a communist party. One example of this includes Soviet military aid provided to Nationalist China in the war against Japan. As a result of the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and Mutual Assistance treaty, China was the recipient of military material and advisors, all of which were provided on credit. Additionally, the Soviet Union supported Nationalist China against Japan through Operation Zet, which consisted of a cover Soviet volunteer air force (Demin 2000).

While this is not a comprehensive account of all assistance provided by the Soviet Union to anti-imperialist efforts worldwide, these examples demonstrate the willingness of the Soviet Union under Stalin to provide internationalist aid and assistance, in particular where no benefit to the national interest of the Soviet Union could be obtained. Stalin thus made significant contributions to antiimperialism prior to the Second World War.

The USSR in the Second World War

The contribution of the USSR in the Second World War constitutes one of the principal contributions against both fascism and imperialism in the twentieth century. While victory in the 'Great Patriotic War' cannot be wholly attributed to Stalin, a significant degree of credit is owed for a number of reasons, many of which have their origins in Stalin's pre-war policies. This section will assess the contributions of Stalin to the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the impact which this had on broader anti-imperialism.

First, the ability of the USSR to respond militarily to the might of fascist Germany is a vindication of Soviet industrialisation policies during the pre-war Stalinist leadership. In the words of Hitler himself, 'If I had known about the Russian tank's strength in 1941, I would not have attacked' (Barnett 1989, p. 456).

Second, the development of the Soviet military between 1939 and 1941 is a vindication of the tactical delay encompassed by the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. Meltyukhov (2000, 446) notes that between 1939 and 1941, the Soviet Union expanded its military strength significantly, growing its overall number of: divisions by 140.7%; military personnel by 132.4%; guns and mortars by 110.7%; tanks by 21.8%; and aircraft by 142.8%. The ability to pursue this dramatic expansion of the Soviet military shows the positive effects of both industrialisation and the delay of the outbreak of hostilities that resulted from the pact (itself forced on the USSR by the failure of its consistent efforts to secure a Collective Security alliance with Britain and France).

Third, the contribution made by the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany was far greater than that of all the other powers combined.

> The length of the Soviet-German front differed in different years, varying from 2,200 to 6,200 km, whilst the Allies front never exceeded 800 km after the landing in Normandy and 300 km in Italy. Active hostilities were conducted on the Soviet-German front for 1,320 days out of a total of 1,418 days (93% of the total fighting time), the corresponding figure for the North African, Italian and West European fronts being 1,094 days out of a total of 2,069 days (53%). The third Reich suffered its heaviest losses on the Soviet German front: more than 73% in manpower, 75% in tanks and aircraft and 74% in artillery. (Zhilin 1985, p. 40)

The Soviet victory over fascist imperialism is one of the most important contributions of Stalin's period of leadership to the cause of anti-imperialism. The result of this conflict was the defeat of major imperialist powers in Europe, and a restructuring of international relations that laid the groundwork for the spread of decolonisation in the twentieth century. The example of the Soviet Union demonstrated to liberation movements worldwide that victory over highly advanced imperialist powers was indeed possible.

The USSR and Post-war Anti-imperialism

Despite the crippling effects of the Second World War, as a result of the industrialisation process of the previous two decades under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet Union emerged from the war in a position to offer assistance to newly liberated countries. This section will discuss some key examples of aid provided to such countries in the post-war period through the leadership of Stalin, including aid to Albania, Korea, and China, as well as the establishment of peoples' republics in Eastern Europe. Following this there will be some discussion of the Soviet role in denazification in Germany. It is important to note that these subjects are entire research questions in themselves and as such the discussion will be a fairly superficial introduction due to space constraints. However, the reader is encouraged to explore these anti-imperialist achievements further.

The Soviet Union under Stalin provided significant support to anti-imperialist political forces. Some examples of this include the role of the USSR in arming the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK; Anthony 1998, p. 151). Beyond the mere arming of the DPRK, however, the USSR provided broad economic assistance to it through the provision of scientific and technical personnel and equipment, the majority of which was provided on the basis of credit (Wilson Centre Digital Archive 1949). Under an agreement between Stalin and Kim Il-Sung, the DPRK was provided with significant military assistance as well.

It is notable that only the strength of the Soviet Union was able to prevent the wholesale US imperialist takeover of Korea in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. During this time, Stalin played an important role in checking the military adventurism of Kim Il-Sung who was advocating a war of national liberation in US-occupied Korea. Stalin's position would change after the liberation of China in 1949 and the withdrawal of US troops from the Republic of Korea in the same year, at which time the balance of forces had changed sufficiently in Asia to allow Kim Il-Sung to proceed with his attempt to unify Korea (Wilson Centre Digital Archive 1950).

An additional case of the internationalist anti-imperialist solidarity of the Soviet Union under Stalin came in the form of assistance to the newly formed Albanian People's Republic. Walters (1970, p. 91) estimates that between 1945 and 1966, a reported US$246 million in aid was provided to Albania. Given that the Soviet Union withdrew support entirely from Albania in 1961 owing to the Albanian–Soviet Split in 1961 (167), this aid can be seen as even more significant, and the majority of it was provided under Stalin's leadership.

The establishment of peoples' republics in Eastern Europe under Stalin's leadership is another critical contribution by Stalin to antiimperialism (Minc 1950). The consolidation of these republics and the extraction of reparations from defeated Germany were crucial in preventing further aggression against the countries in question as well as against the Soviet Union. In evaluating Stalin's contribution in this respect it is important to differentiate between Stalin safeguarding Eastern

Europe from imperialist expansion, and the way that subsequent Soviet leaders would turn Eastern Europe into economic dependencies in what is generally conceptualised as Soviet social-imperialism (Xhuvani and Hana 1981).

In 1950, the Soviet Union under Stalin would engage in a key piece of anti-imperialist foreign policy, safeguarding the newly established People's Republic of China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000). The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance shielded China from the possibility of imperialist intervention. The alliance between China and the Soviet Union began a period of significant co-operation between the two powers, which ended with the Soviet withdrawal of assistance during the Sino-Soviet split beginning in 1960.

While Stalin would only outlive the Second World War by eight years, and would become increasingly marginalised politically, during this period he made a number of valuable contributions to anti-imperialism. The assistance provided in Eastern Europe, China, and Korea is by no means an exhaustive list, however, these examples demonstrate that even in the context of post-war devastation, the Soviet Union under Stalin was willing to provide significant assistance to other countries in the name of anti-imperialism.

Conclusion

This essay has assessed the contribution of Stalin to anti-imperialism in three major phases: the period before the Second World War, the war itself, and the period following the Second World War up to Stalin's death in 1953. It has been argued that Stalin made major contributions to the decolonisation of the Soviet Union itself through his analysis of the National Question and the implementation of his theories in policy terms. While Stalin faced significant opposition to the implementation of affirmative-action policies which benefited minority nationalities within the Soviet Union, the policy of Korenisatsiya was unprecedented and has yet to be matched in modern history as an example of support for the rights of national self-determination.

This essay has attempted to explain the reasoning behind the retreat from the heights of Korenisatsiya in the late 1930s. Both this and the overtures made to Russian nationalism were seen as the result of both the external pressure due to the threat of imperialist invasion of the Soviet Union and internal pressure from various social forces including a significant number of the Soviet leadership who took up Russian nationalist positions. It has been argued that these tactical compromises evolved into strategic shifts toward the Russification of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Outside the Soviet Union, Stalin provided important contributions to anti-imperialism by providing support to the Spanish Republic and to Nationalist China. Following the Second World War, Stalin continued to contribute to anti-imperialism through his support of various countries in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Overall, therefore, Stalin's contribution to anti-imperialism is a major one. By no means can it be considered perfect or flawless. However, the fact that Stalin was able to contribute so much to the cause of anti-imperialism in difficult circumstances, and in the face of both internal and external pressures within the Soviet Union, speaks volumes for his status both as a historical figure and as a Marxist.

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State Clientelism

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

State Violence

▶ Gender and Violence

Strategic Location

▶ Korea and Imperialism

Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery

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Introduction

The idea that we live in a highly unequal global political economy is hardly insightful; yet, the

suggestion that given its mode of accumulation the *modern capitalist world-system* cannot exist without this inequality might seem controversial. Still, the exploitative practices of those at the top (core) of the world-system hierarchy, on those at the very bottom (periphery) and middle (semi-periphery) are hard to ignore. In the world-system, *core* countries benefit the greatest from the surplus derived from *global commodity chains* while *peripheral zones* see no benefit. The economic activities of core countries are capital-intensive as opposed to the labor-intensive ones of peripheral areas. Factoring into this, is the fact that the *core* countries engage in reproductive accumulative strategies compared to the primary accumulation strategies of the periphery.

However, conceptualizing the modern capitalist world-system in terms of core-periphery can be misleading as it overlooks the *semiperiphery*, which engages with both types of accumulation strategies and capable of profiting from global commodity chains. The semiperiphery is exploited by the core but also engages in the exploitation of the periphery through *unequal exchange* (Wallerstein 1974a). According to Immanuel Wallerstein, there is a small group of core states at the top of the stratified world-system, a medium-sized semiperipheral zone, and a large peripheral zone exploited by both strata at the top (see Fig. 1).

In this global structure and system, unequal exchange is enforced by the strong states on the weak. Furthermore, unequal exploitative trade practices by the core that are masked by market

Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery, Fig. 1 Tripartite organization of the world-system

processes and backed by existing military and political systems facilitate a semi-stable world-system, at least, according to Immanuel Wallerstein. Conversely, Albert Bergeson (1990) contends that unequal exchange in trade (and/or long commodity chains) do not construct the core-periphery hierarchy, but rather, it is the core-periphery domination relationship that makes unequal exchange possible and reproduced throughout the system (1990, p. 74).

Still, this system of unequal exchange in the world-economy means that core countries maintain their position by taking advantage of low labor cost in the periphery and the semiperiphery with a net effect of increased capital resources in the core. If the goal of capitalism is to continuously expand a system of production to maximize profit, then Wallerstein's thesis that unequal exchange is necessary for the proper functioning of the modern capitalist world-system is plausible. Although one of the implications of all of this is a semi-rigid system, none of the above means that peripheral and semiperipheral zones are completely devoid of agency.

In fact, this chapter will advance the idea that despite empirical evidence to support a strong structural pull toward a tripartite world-system, (a) over the last 50 years there has been a particular type of mobility within the trimodal system – a growing semiperiphery, and declining periphery; (b) the semiperiphery, which participates in exploitative practices like core countries, continues to maintain the tripartite system, while at the same time being the zone in which significant technological and organizational change has historically occurred; (c) there is still a certain amount of unevenness, with peripheralization and semiperipheralization occurring throughout the tripartite world-system. This is called *nestedness*, an example of which is found in the work of Wilma Dunnaway (1996). Who exploits whom, then, becomes an interesting starting point to discuss the stratified world-economy.

The chapter begins with a discussion of stratification in the modern world-system, building on the idea of system hierarchy; followed by an examination of the semiperiphery in the context of a rising China; and periphery with sub-Saharan

African region as an example. Then the discussion is broadened to discuss the unevenness of peripheral and semiperipheral development as exemplified by the Appalachian region of the United States.

Stratification

In the context of this chapter, we propose that global stratification implies a hierarchical system. Yet, peripheral, semiperipheral, and core zones do exist outside of hierarchical systems. Hierarchical core-periphery systems involve domination and exploitation, as opposed to core-periphery differentiation which implies networks of systemic inter-polity interaction (Chase-Dunn and Grell-Brisk 2016; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). For hierarchy to emerge, the capability of domination and exploitation must be present and the modern capitalist world-system offers such a situation. Therefore, this chapter's focus is primarily on the modern world-system but does acknowledge that world-systems did exist in the pre-modern world as described by Christopher Chase-Dunn (1989) and Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1995).

According to Wallerstein, hierarchy emerged in the long sixteenth century because of the capitalist system that developed in Europe. However, other scholars have long argued that the modern capitalist world-system and historical political economy as conceived by Wallerstein was historically limited (Abu-lughod 1989, 1993; Gunder Frank and Gills 1993a), even Eurocentric (Gunder Frank 1998; Gunder Frank and Gills 1993b), and asserted that the world-system(s), *even capitalist ones*, existed prior to the sixteenth century and outside of Europe (Abu-lughod 1989, 1993; Anievas and Niancolu 2015; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1995; Gunder Frank and Gills 1993a). As an example, using primary and secondary source evidence, Janet Abu-lughod (1989) describes the emergence of an extensive trade and capitalist world system between 1250 and 1350 long before Wallerstein's modern capitalist world-system.

Andre Gunder Frank, like Abu-lughod, conceived of a capitalist world system that was acutely different than Wallerstein's. He maintained that a

world system existed much earlier than the long sixteenth century, with China occupying the center. His *World Accumulation* (1978) laid the groundwork for much of his later scholarship (although he later levies claims of Eurocentrism at that particular work). In it, he maintained that there has been *one* continuous process of capital accumulation in recent centuries including the preindustrial capitalist societies. Feudal modes of accumulation or concepts such as primary accumulation were not useful. He reasoned that preindustrial capitalism generated long economic cycles in which a geographical external expansion phase occurred, including the extension of trade and commerce. However, this eventually led to a crisis phase. The expansion phase induced external transformation and the crisis phase led to internal transformation leading to development or underdevelopment in particular regions. In *ReOrient*, Gunder Frank took Abu-lughod's claims about the world-system a bit further, noting that the world economic system was centered in Asia; and not only was China at the center, but that Europe occupied the peripheral economic zone (Gunder Frank 1998). He argued that this was due to the size of China's economy relative to all the other world regions and the fact that for centuries, China held a trade surplus and most of the world's silver.

This was not a new argument for Gunder Frank, who had made earlier similar claims, along with his colleague Barry Gills (Gunder Frank and Gills 1993a). Gunder Frank also expressed another particular point that echoed and expanded earlier arguments made by Abu-lughod: that the rise of the West only occurred after the decline of the East and only due to Europe's exploitation of American money/silver and Europe buying into Asian wealth. Therefore, for Gunder Frank, the rise of contemporary China was simply a return to a Sinocentric world system (Gunder Frank 1998).

In any case, conceptions of world-system hierarchy is based on the idea of unequal exchange originally put forth by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) and Ernst Mandel (1975) –suppressing wages in peripheral regions allowed for exploitative trade practices by the core. Furthermore, market processes mask these exploitative practices which are

further reinforced by the political systems in both the core and the periphery but also by the semiperiphery. For Wallerstein, the mode of accumulation in capitalist countries is profit maximization which requires the continued expansion of the size of the division of labor and that requires unequal exchange. Giovanni Arrighi (1990) notes that Emmanuel (1972), Mandel (1975), and Wallerstein's (1974c) unequal exchange was not so much about where a country was located in networks of trade (as advanced by network analysis scholars), as it is about trade that is based on different wage levels for the same rate of productivity and profit. This means that the regions with the higher wage levels will benefit the most from these trade activities giving rise to a hierarchy comprising of a small core, middle semiperiphery, and bottom large periphery. To put it in other words, in the populous periphery, laborers work long hours with extremely low wages compared to the core and even the semiperiphery.

Although Wallerstein, like many other development and modernization theorists in the 1970s, held that unequal exchange was the primary means with which the world-system structure remained highly differentiated; Arrighi (1990) has argued that unequal exchange was only the start. He contends that unilateral transfers of labor, both voluntary (immigration) and involuntary (labor of slaves and prisoners of war), contributed to the formation and continued reproduction of the world-economic system and structural hierarchy. So did unilateral transfers of capital resources both voluntary (financialization) and involuntary (extortion of capital from colonies) (Arrighi 1990). Using the example of Japan and Korea, Arrighi notes that unequal exchange and unilateral transfers of labor and capital resources work both to polarize and depolarize the world-system hierarchy.

Arrighi raises a salient point. Even in a highly unequal and stratified world-system, there is some ability to move both up and down the hierarchy. However, this movement is limited particularly in terms of mobility from periphery to semiperiphery (and vice versa) or semiperiphery to core (and vice versa). It was previously held that industrialization could cause upward mobility in the world-

system. However, historically, as more countries embraced the movement toward industrialization, the payoff became less significant. Empirically, countries in the periphery were able to modernize/industrialize (measured using the percentage of gross domestic product generated through manufacturing) to the point of catching up or even surpassing the levels of industrialization of core countries (Arrighi 2007; Arrighi et al. 2003, 2005). This, however, did not result in the leveling of the difference in global economic power or even income distribution between the core and periphery (Arrighi et al. 2003, 2005) as was initially imagined by development scholars like Bell (1973). Yet, this push for industrialization continues, particularly in the discussions regarding sub-Saharan Africa and its engagement with China.

Most world-systems scholars acknowledge that states are able to move from one position to another in the world-economic hierarchy over time. Nonetheless, Wallerstein has held that "the fact that particular states change their position in the world-economy...[however] does not itself change the nature of the system... the key factor to note is that within the capitalist world-economy, all states cannot 'develop' simultaneously by definition, since the system functions by virtue of having unequal core and peripheral regions" (Wallerstein 1974a, p. 24). This reiterates the intrinsic inequality of, and challenge of upward mobility in, the modern capitalist world-system.

Marilyn Grell-Brisk (2017, 2019) empirically demonstrates the persistence of the tripartite distribution in the world-system or to say it differently, the tendency for clustering or formation of "convergence clubs" in the distribution of global wealth. This is consistent with previous studies of global income/wealth distributions (that cut across disciplines and methodological approaches) by Arrighi and Drangel (1986), Bianchi (1997), Babones (2005), Henderson et al. (2008), Pittau et al. (2010), Grell-Brisk (2017), and Karatasli (2017). More importantly, the scholars all found persistent gaps between the core-semiperiphery-periphery that could be interpreted as pseudo-boundaries between core-semiperiphery-periphery zones. These gaps are

incredibly difficult to overcome. Chase-Dunn (2014) contends that the gaps exists because of the primarily economic indicator (gross national product, gross domestic product etc.) used in these studies. He argues that a multidimensional set of power hierarchies would render a more continuous hierarchy.

Jeffrey Kentor (2008) measured a country's place in the world-system; i.e., whether a country fell into the core, periphery, or semiperiphery, based on economic and military power with three dimensions – a country's economic power (gross domestic product per capita; gross domestic product; total exports; ratio of external foreign investment to internal foreign investment), a country's military capacity (gross military spending, military exports, ratio of military exports to military imports), and a country's global dependence (export commodity variety, foreign debt as a percentage of total GDP, military imports as a percentage of GDP). Pointing to Kentor (2008), Chase-Dunn writes, "But another way to look at the core/periphery hierarchy is as a multi-dimensional set of power hierarchies, that includes economic, political and military power forming a continuous hierarchy that is a relatively stable stratification hierarchy in the sense that most of national societies stay in the same position over time, but that also experiences occasional instances of upward and downward mobility?" (Chase-Dunn 2014). However, Grell-Brisk and Chase-Dunn's (2019) most recent work show that, even with military data, the gaps between core-semiperiphery and periphery are still present and possibly more pronounced than in the economic data.

Semiperiphery

Structural inequality persists and according to Wallerstein, the semiperiphery plays a significant role in this. Indeed, he theorizes that the semi-periphery is absolutely necessary for the stability of this unequal system. The semiperiphery is not a phase in development. It is not a transitional point. It is a permanent fixture of the modern capitalist world-system. In fact, the world-system includes a large periphery, a smaller middle semi-periphery, and an even smaller core (again, see Fig. 1). "Neither [military] force nor ideological commitment. . . would suffice were it not for the division of the majority into the lower stratum and a smaller middle stratum (Wallerstein 1974b)."

According to Wallerstein, the semiperiphery is essential to the proper functioning of the system for two reasons, political and political-economic. The political reasons go back to the idea of *cultural stratification* (Wallerstein 1974c). A dichotomized and highly unequal world-system is more likely to be volatile and lead to revolts. Therefore, in some ways, the semiperiphery acts as police for the system. Small in comparison to the periphery, the countries in the semiperiphery tend to consider themselves somehow better than the periphery; if the periphery rose in rebellion against the core's unremitting exploitation, the semiperiphery would support the core and manage and suppress any insurrection on the part of the periphery (Wallerstein 1974c).

Antonio Gelis-Filho presents cultural stratifi-cation in a slightly different way, renaming the semiperiphery the "abandonat" – a loose, semi-peripheral social group characterized by its strong support and identification with the values of the countries in the core. *Abandonat* describes "the psychological process. . . characterized by the geocultural connection between a set of people in the semiperiphery and the values of the core countries. That connection results in a disconnection from the local sociological reality, something that can be describes as a feeling of being "aban-doned" in the semiperiphery by. . . the core" (Gelis-Filho 2017, p. 36). The abandonat is not only the core's geocultural, "world-system police force"(Gelis-Filho 2017, p. 36), it also serves as its cheerleader.

Still, Grell-Brisk (2017, 2018) and Sahan Karatasli (2017) have both shown that within the last 50 years, there has been an increasing change in the structure of the world-system, with Grell-Brisk contending a continued tripartite structure with a movement toward a larger semiperiphery (see Fig. 2), and Karatasli arguing that we are moving away from a tripartite structure to a quad-modal form of stratification. In either case,

Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery, Fig. 2 The dismantling of the tripartite world-economic distribution of wealth. (Source: Adapted from Grell-Brisk and Chase-Dunn (2019))

these studies present a different look to the world-economic distribution than that of Wallerstein's.

For Grell-Brisk, unlike Wallerstein and Gelis-Filho, the idea that semiperipheral countries would automatically fall in line with core states when there is systemic conflict, seem out of place in today's political economic atmosphere. China, which is often classified as *the* semiperipheral state with the most global economic and political clout, tirelessly sells itself as being a voice for both the developing and underdeveloped world. It claims that its motives for trade and foreign aid and investments are guided by "post-colonial solidarity" (which has a certain anti-core sentiment) and principles of equality and mutual benefit; touting multipolarity as the way of the future. The decline of the American hegemony has also fostered a general ambivalence toward core states, with semiperipheral and peripheral states seeking to come together against the growing systemic crises.

Within the last couple decades, we have witnessed an increasing number of regional (such as ALBA) and multilateral state cooperative efforts (such as BRICS or AFTA) that are economic as well as noneconomic responses to pressures from core countries (Grell-Brisk 2017). China's *Belt and Road Initiative* (the latest rebranding of the *One Belt One Road*

development strategy initiated by China) which admittedly, like most Chinese policies is opaque, is a development strategy that attempts to link periphery and semiperiphery as well as some core countries. This is a bold move toward a cooperative approach to development. Still, with the declining number of countries identified as being in the periphery, we might see an increase in conflict within the semiperiphery itself. However, there is the issue of the time horizon – not enough time has passed to make a definitive empirical statement. For now, we can point to the increasing military budget of semiperipheral states and China in particular; China's increasingly aggressive stance in the South China Sea; and its growing military presence in Africa.

Wallerstein's political-economic reason for the existence of the semiperiphery (1974a) is much more convincing. One of the characteristics of a core state is its strong state apparatus coupled with strong sense of cultural national identity. This serves to mask and justify disparities between the core states and global economic zones (Wallerstein 1974b). It also helps maintain the wage-productivity squeeze (essential to unequal exchange) in the core which allows them to reap the most benefit from the international division of labor. But, this also forces capitalists to shift focus

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to the semiperiphery. Semiperipheral zones are always seeking to trade with both core and periphery and so their economic decisions tend to follow the logic of state-based methods of market control. The BRICS countries, which typically fall in the semiperipheral bracket, conform to this thesis, particularly in the case of China (Grell-Brisk 2017). Hung (2016) demonstrates the level with which China has maintained state control and management of its economy since the 1990s, with what many have dubbed its "state-based capitalism." From the opening of its market to its major economic reforms, China has operated as a strong state machinery, and a particularly state-centric culture (Canton 2015; Grell-Brisk 2017; Hung 2016).

Unlike Wallerstein, who argues that the semiperiphery acts a stabilizing factor that moderates the contradictions of core/periphery polarization, Christopher Chase-Dunn contends that the semiperiphery is in actuality, a locus of change in the world-system (1988). It is the zone in which we see the implementation of new organizational and technological features that transform the world-system (Chase-Dunn and Grell-Brisk 2016). Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall have also contend that although in some cases the semiperiphery may stabilize the existing hierarchy (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Goldfrank 1990;

Martin 1990; Silver 1990), semiperipheral and peripheral marcher states have also been a force of change, challenging core powers to form larger empires and spread the commodification of production across the whole regions (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

Periphery

The periphery, characterized by a weak state apparatus and where raw materials and natural resources are plentiful, is generally exploited by the semiperiphery and core states. Further, the peripheral zone receives very little from the benefits of the global division of labor.

Wallerstein has argued that the core-periphery hierarchy is a condition of the world-economy, undergirded by unequal exchange. Yet, much of the periphery is former colonial regions where weakened or nonexistent state apparatuses were created by the core states themselves. This is particularly apparent with the sub-Saharan African region. Majority of the empirical studies place the countries in the region at the peripheral level (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Karatasli 2017; Smith and White 1992; Snyder and Kick 1979). In Fig. 3, Grell-Brisk demonstrates how starkly

Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery, Fig. 3 Percent of Sub-Saharan Africa in the Periphery and Semiperiphery from 1965 through 2015

(from left to right). Source: Adapted from Grell-Brisk (2019)

sub-Saharan Africa performs in comparison to the rest of the world.

Despite the fact that a vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa falls into the peripheral zone, individual countries within the region have made considerable gains in the world-economic hierarchy. Grell-Brisk (2018) notes that sub-Saharan countries' position in the stratified world-economy is significantly influenced by their political economic condition at the time of decolonization. So, countries like South Africa or Seychelles entered the world-economy in a qualitatively better position than most sub-Saharan countries. These countries also tended to maintain their position.

Given China's growing influence in the world-system, claims of neo-colonialist tendencies have been lodged against it. Heavily criticized in the Occident, China's involvement in the Global South has been claimed as exploitative, even "neoimperialistic" or "neocolonialistic" (Lyman 2005; Norberg 2006), sometimes even colonialist (Bergeson 2013). And some of these criticisms of Chinese engagement in Africa are not unfounded. For example, in terms of foreign aid, China spends $354.4 billion on overseas finance but only $81.1 billion on overseas aid or official development assistance (ODA). ODA is finance for local economic development that does not profit the donor country. Contrast this to the United States which spends $394.6 billion on overseas finance and $4366.4 billion in overseas aid (Dreher et al. 2017). Or, in terms of resource extraction, one third of the world's cobalt (used in electric vehicle batteries) supply come from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and eight of the fourteen largest cobalt mines in the DRC are owned by a single Chinese company, Huayou. There is no cobalt processing in the DRC despite talks in 2018 of creating a special economic zone for cobalt processing, which preceded talks of partnering with Tanzania to process cobalt. And then, there is the question of China creating a debt trap for Africa countries. Starting at 2% in 2005, China now owns a full 15% of sub-Saharan Africa's external debt as of 2015 (Dreher et al. 2017). In 2018, 72% of Kenya's bilateral debt is to China up from 57% in 2016 (Dahir 2018; Eom

et al. 2018). In Cameroon, China is the largest single creditor but holds 1/3rd of the total debt; in Djibouti, Chinese financiers hold 77% of debt (Eom et al. 2018).

Still, loaded terms and vague concepts such as neocolonialism or neoimperialism do not always clearly capture the relationship between China and its Global South counterparts. Furthermore, in a hierarchical world-system, is it even possible for a semiperipheral state like China to be imperialist? Both John Smith and David Harvey have addressed this specific question, spurring an interesting intellectual debate (Harvey 2018; Smith 2016).

Nonetheless, the upward mobility of some sub-Saharan African countries has been tied to their increased interactions with China. Its engagement with Africa has garnered much discussion in academia and was initially viewed as an effort to gain access to natural resources to support a growing China economy (Brautigam 2008, 2010, 2011; Kaplinsky et al. 2010; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). This is because the structure of China's import from Africa was very biased toward oil-rich and other natural resource-strong African countries (Grell-Brisk 2016; Sandrey 2006). Yet, the relationship has been beneficial for Africa not only in terms of increasing aid and investment from China but also the fact that other countries (Japan, India, Brazil, and Singapore, to name a few) have begun seeking and gaining entry into the African market and that could mean better terms of trade for African countries. African countries that vote with China at the United Nations, receive 86% more in aid from China (Dreher et al. 2015). Not only this, but Dreher et al. (2017) have also found that development (using nighttime light as a proxy for development) is positively related to receipt of aid from China. And, for every percentage point increase in Chinese aid, African countries received 15% fewer conditions from the World Bank (Hernandez 2017). Therefore, it is good politics to continue to engage with China. Xiaojun Li has also argued that African countries now realize that when it comes to aid, they need options, not conditions (2017).

Africa is, on the one hand, particularly appealing as a market for technology, foodstuffs, other

capital goods, consumer products, and services, but conversely, a supplier of raw materials and commodities, as well as a potential source of cheap labor for Asia. One must remain cognizant that despite the uproar surrounding China's involvement with Africa, the United States remains one of the African regions' most important trade partners. The United States' total goods traded bilaterally with sub-Saharan Africa were $39 billion for 2017 which was an increase from 2016. The top markets the US exported to were South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Angola and the top import suppliers to the US were South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Cote D'Ivoire, and Botswana [mostly mineral fuels, platinum and diamonds, cocoa, iron and steel] (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2017). But with China's increasing engagement with sub-Saharan Africa, the United States now feels added pressure to engage more fully with the region. The United States' International Development Finance Corporation now plans to distribute some of the 60 billion dollar at its disposal in Africa (Olander 2018).

World-System upward mobility by sub-Saharan Africa is directly tied to those countries with high levels of natural resources (particularly oil and minerals). This type of upward mobility is typically minimized and theorized around questions of resource-curse and the feasibility of maintaining growth and mobility. Understandably so – Zambia's difficulties with the rise and fall of copper prices is a classic example. Without getting into the specifics of natural-resource type (re: gold vs. copper or diamonds vs. oil) and examples of countries whose economies have remained stable despite being completely dependent on a natural-resource, Volker Bornschier and Bruno Trezzini (1996) offer a way to conceptualize the gains made by resource-rich dependent countries. They argue that resource-rich semiperipheral states behave like, and are similar to, peripheral ones. Bornschier and Trezzini contend that in resource-rich semiperipheral states, the income received from the natural resources go to and are kept by the elites; there is little to no investment or incentive to invest in infrastructure; and government legitimacy is obtained through coercive measures. However, this implies that these countries are really not semiperipheral, but some other category. This highlights the problematic conceptualization of the semiperiphery as "we will know a semiperipheral state when we see one." It makes the determination of semiperiphery somewhat arbitrary. As far as sub-Saharan Africa, Grell-Brisk (2019) showed empirically that the countries in the region that were upwardly mobile did so slowly, over long periods of time, and tended to hold to their gains.

Uneven Peripheralization and Semiperipheralization

The unit of analysis of the world-systems paradigm is the world-system itself. This does not mean that world-systems scholars completely ignore the internal dynamics of nation-states. Scholars have pointed out that even within the core countries, we find certain regions of peripheral-ness and semiperipheral-ness. This is referred to as nestedness. Given the way the United States is organized politically (with states and a federal government), it is easy to observe the ways in which different geographic regions fall into core-semiperiphery-periphery hierarchy. A well-studied region in terms of internal state stratification in the United States is Appalachia, particularly Southern and Central Appalachia.

Wilma Dunaway (1996) presents historical evidence to demonstrate that despite participating in the global economy (via the slave and fur trade), the Appalachian region did not benefit much from the international division of labor. This was notably a consequence of landless workers and absentee investors, a concentration on agriculture and the overuse of natural resources as the primary source of economic activity. As such, the region did not undergo the typically linear advance to modernity and was a frontier peripheral zone. The complete decline of Appalachia happened with the decreasing demand for large-scale agriculture.

Other scholars (Eller 1978; Lewis 1978; Lewis et al. 1978) previously viewed the Appalachian region more as a colony precisely for some of the

reasons Dunaway claims – predominance of absentee landowners and the extractive coal and agricultural industries. Hellen M. Lewis notes that "[Appalachia's] history also demonstrates the concerted efforts of the exploiters to label their work as 'progress' and to blame any of the obvious problems it causes on the ignorance or deficiencies of the Appalachian people. We believe that there are peoples all over the world who have experienced this sort of 'development'… and who can easily identify with… the colonization of Appalachia" (Lewis 1978, p. 2). John A. Williams (1979) rejects this framing of Appalachia as a colony pointing out that nation-hood was never an option for the region and neither did they have the ability to throw out the so-called invaders. At the same time, David Walls provide a slightly different conceptualization of Appalachia, presenting Central Appalachia as being spatially and institutionally between core and periphery; i.e., semiperipheral. He notes, "the internal colonialism model applied to Central Appalachia needs to be superseded by a model of peripheral regions within an advanced capitalist society" (Walls 1978, p. 339). Although he does not completely throw out the colonial framing of Appalachia, he sees the region from a more world-economy perspective.

Similarly, a newer study documents the role of the coal industry in the reproduction of Central Appalachia as an internal periphery within the United States (Wishart 2014). It outlines the economic, ecological, and human inequalities that entailed this peripheralization of the region. William R. Wishart argues that the area's designation as "extractive periphery" in the United States is due to the processes of unequal exchange contributing to the development of the nation at large while degrading the region and its people. He again mentions the extractive policies with regards to coal – the center of the region's economy.

Final Remarks

The concepts outlined above are only part of a rich interdisciplinary discourse on global stratification and the tripartite world-economy. World-Systems analysis is typically seen as particular to Immanuel Wallerstein. Yet, a close reading of the literature reveals that the world-systems perspective has evolved to include multiple approaches and methodologies, including but not limited to, surveying global commodity chains (including Wallerstein himself or Dunaway and Clelland (2016)), global economic stratification (including Arrighi (1986)), transnationalization processes (including Robinson (2004)), the historical semiperipheral processes which generate movement to core or toward technological innovation (including Chase-Dunn (1997)) or even world systems as a study of holistic social systems that include those of the premodern capitalist system (including Günder-Frank (1993b)).

The concepts of global stratification, periphery, and semiperiphery are not limited to the work of world-systems scholars and have found adherents in economics, political science, anthropology, history, and even entomology. A proponent of interdisciplinary work, for Wallerstein (2003) this is as it should be.

Notes

1. World-system is an inter-societal system with a self-contained division of labor. It is a system that is a world, and is a fundamental unit of analysis (Wallerstein 1993). The modern capitalist world-system is a world-system whose mode of accumulation is capitalist, interacts politically, economically, socially, and culturally but is not dominated by one political system (Wallerstein 2005). One state can dominate the world-system without **overt** coercion (hegemony) but the whole modern world-system has never been united under one political system.
2. According to Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986), a commodity chain refers to a network, of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity. The majority of products consumed in the capitalist world-economy cross national boundaries linking core and non-core.

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Structural Adjustment

▶ Agriculture from Imperialism to Neoliberalism

Structural Adjustments

▶ Ecological Imperialism: A Theoretical Overview

Structural Violence and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Center-periphery; Conflict; Dependence; Dichotomy; Domination; Exploitation; Force; Inequality; Power; Verticality

Definition

Peace is humanity's much sought-after goal. However, conflicts and the ensuing violence are also pervasive features of domestic and foreign affairs. Regarding the latter, imperialism is hard perennial in international relations. The Norwegian mathematician and sociologist Johan Galtung has made important contributions regarding the studies of peace and conflict, from which his approaches to violence and imperialism were derived. He first discussed structural violence. In his view, there are violent situations that cannot be evaluated and mitigated in terms of a perpetrator and a clearly defined intention. These situations are usually invisible, which makes them repeatable, and therefore long-lasting. Violence implies a condition where a potential stage cannot be achieved, creating a gap between actual and potential. This difference is due to violence, not only direct or visible violence, but invisible and structural. By analogy, imperialism cannot always be fully understood in relational terms alone, that is, as a power relation between a dominant power and a dominated country or region, usually by direct military means. Imperialism creates a long-lasting, but not monolithic, structure of inequality which persists and prevents underdeveloped countries or regions to fulfill their potential. Structural imperialism is therefore a form of structural violence.

Introduction

Structural violence and imperialism must be understood as parts of a major research project about Peace and Conflict Studies. In order to achieve durable peace, violence must be diagnosed and engaged. But what if violence cannot be seen or perceived as such? Direct, visible, or explicit violence causes wide social rejection and punishment. There are different forms of violence, even though they all have the same consequence in terms of impairment of human capacity to achieve her goals. These invisible forms of violence, without a clear and identifiable actor or agent and motivation, is what Galtung denominates structural. This form of violence can be ingrained in society and repeated over the long haul.

Using the same structural approach, Galtung addresses the issue of imperialism. The classic theory of imperialism, in the writings of Hobson, Lenin, Hilferding, Bukharin, Rosa Luxemburg, among many others, has a strong economic bias, even thought militarism is a frequent companion. Economic differentiation among countries and regions explains the likelihood of imperialist inclinations. Politics and military aggression appear as necessary consequences. Galtung develops a new approach in the 1970s and 1980s. For him, economic imperialism is not more important than political, military, communicating, and cultural in fostering inequalities. As part of the world capitalist system, the former Soviet Union also engaged in what Galtung calls social imperialism. In his treatment of imperialism, he divides the world system into centers and peripheries. Yet, he discusses imperialism in terms of divisions that take place both between and also within countries, where the same dual structure is proposed. This allows the concept of structural imperialism to cope with interdependence situations that are far more complex in terms of interactions between different centers and peripheries.

This entry presents and discusses these two fundamental contributions of Galtung for his humanitarian project of peace-building and conflict-resolution.

The Theory of Structural Violence

As part of his overarching project about Peace and Conflict Studies, Galtung (1969) distinguishes between personal or direct and indirect or structural violence – sometimes he also labels it social injustice. The distinction matters because he defines peace as the absence of violence, but this is valid as long as an analytical treatment and definition of the latter is available. He argues that, in defining violence, it is important to go beyond the relational approach that places emphasis on situations in which an actor intentionally inflicts somatic incapacitation on others, influencing the latter to be below their potential concerning a specific goal. In this regard, violence in general is always the cause of an avoidable shortfall between actual and potential outcomes. Indirect violence is built in the social structure, working as a background condition, and appears as unequal power, being invisible, more pervasive, and stable over time when compared to direct forms. It is more difficult to determine the explicit source of damage, and therefore to build peace by eliminating or mitigating this form of violence. Therefore, agency alone is insufficient to define situations where violence exists but no purposeful actor can be clearly identified or even when no such actor exists. There is also a fundamental difference in the velocity of outcomes regarding direct (quick) and structural (slow) violence that also contributes to the persistence of the latter. In another work (Galtung 1990), the author develops the concept of cultural or symbolic violence, understood as a means, including religion and ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science, or aspects of culture in general, to legitimize the two other forms of violence. Galtung and Höivik (1971) compares direct and structural violence in terms of killing, the former quickly and the latter slowly, showing how the difference between the two types could be operationalized. They propose using as unit of measurement for empirical works the number of years of life lost due to kills. The difference would then be due to structural violence.

Regarding the connections between violence and imperialism, against a background where

peace is the ultimate goal, Galtung argues that advanced imperialism is structural rather than directly violent. He characterizes the pervasive inequalities between and within countries, intrinsic features of structural imperialism, as forms of structural violence. Yet, it is a matter of degree, with imperial domination combining the ability to exert structural violence with the retention of directly violent military imperialism as a major resource for exploiting and reproducing existing inequalities. The periphery can never achieve the higher performance or potential of the center as a result, experiencing a situation of permanent under-performance and therefore violence. Structural imperialism is always a form of structural violence, because it is embedded in the structure of the world system.

The work of Galtung on structural violence remains a fruitful source of discussion, debates, and mobilizations for changing the social order towards a more equal one. Webb (1986) and Weigert (2008) provide useful syntheses of the concept and its applications. Winter (2012) organized a symposium to revisit the theory in face of current political developments. The articles show that the breadth of Galtung's concept is vast, illuminating the multiplicity of forms of violence, but also it has important limitations when contrasted to other forms of violence. Winter (2012) argues that structural violence is still relevant to understand experiences that cannot be properly dealt with by relational approaches emphasizing the role of agency. The articles included in the symposium suggest that even situations characterized by an apparent lack of explicit violence cannot, nonetheless, be peaceful. The issues tackled include, for example, the visibility of violence, when it is openly and tragically repeated so many times that it becomes naturalized or normalized, changing the perception of what is and what is not violent. If this were the case, though, Galtung's concept of cultural violence would be less relevant to legitimize episodes of violence. By the same token, another contribution shows that the term 'catastrophe' is relegated to episodic, discrete moments or events. But capitalism, colonialism, and other modes of domination are permanent and continuous catastrophes, a form of

persistent violence similar to Galtung's concept. Also, it is argued that Neoliberalism has an embedded or endemic structural violence in the form of a necessary unequal distribution of resources. This means that Neoliberalism and Imperialism could be considered similar concepts, which raises semantic, epistemological, and ontological questions. Structural violence is then compared to foundational violence, at the same time secret and transparent, that arises when new orders or arrangements come into being at the violent expense of previous forms of political and social organization. This may happen even with the help of liberal instruments such as contracts and deliberation.

It is therefore clear that the concept of structural violence is still useful and valid to understand many recent situations and experiences and also structural historical changes.

The Theory of Structural Imperialism

Galtung coined the term 'structural imperialism' for the first time in a paper published in the *Journal of Peace Research* (Galtung 1971), established by Galtung himself in 1964. The theory of structural imperialism seeks to explain both the existence and the persistence of inequalities of all sorts between countries, assuming that equality should be a major goal of humankind. These inequalities are the result of a structural dichotomy in the world system between imperialist and dependent countries, in which the former dominates and exploits the latter. Similarly, within each country there is a class structure which is divided between 'center' and 'periphery', and therefore the world system mirrors the national cleavages and vice-versa.

In a subsequent article (1980), Galtung explains and highlights some issues raised by the original paper, assessing and evaluating how the world system, as it then existed, could still be understood using the structural theory devised ten years before, and whether the theory should be changed to cope with new challenges. Like the idea of structural violence, the concept of structural imperialism provides an interpretation of

international domination without essentially appealing to specific actors or specific motivations. That is, Galtung also downplays, but does not ignore, the role of agency and therefore of relational analyses in his account of imperialism. In the structural theory, imperialism is a special type of domination between nations and not merely an outright exercise of relational power. The existing structural division in the world system creates varying degrees of harmony among centers, including the 'centers' in the periphery of the world system. Similarly, there are varying degrees of conflicts of interests, defined as countries pursuing incompatible objectives, such as reducing a broadly defined 'living condition gap' between center and periphery. Inequality is therefore a structural feature of capitalism, and there cannot be capitalism without imperialism, as argued by, for example, Schumpeter (1951), who considers capitalism to be intrinsically anti-imperialist.

Formally, the approach of structural imperialism also provides explanations for relational situations in which a country in the center of the world system exerts power over a peripheral country, creating an overall conflict or disharmony of interests, at the same time as harmony between the centers in both countries increases. Consequently, this requires a strong disharmony between the peripheries, similar to the effects of a labor aristocracy on the workers' struggles in Lenin's classical theory of imperialism. Thus, the transference of wealth and resources from the periphery to the center of the world system creates inequality, with both centers improving their positions or living conditions at the expense of the periphery in the periphery, but not necessarily of the periphery in the center. This causes some degree of cohesion in the center of the world system, at the same time as the periphery is strangled by different types of conflicts. Structural imperialism is therefore an international system of domination, yet with substantial intra-national repercussions that feed and are fed by the international structure.

Galtung argues that structural imperialism has two mechanisms, five types, and three phases. The two mechanisms are the vertical interaction between center and periphery (between and within countries) and the feudal structure of interactions between centers and peripheries in the world system. The former relates to exchanges between center and periphery, mainly in economic and financial terms, but with different international and intra-national, positive and negative, effects. Galtung assumes some sort of unequal exchange, but in an evolving world structure that changes both countries permanently (in the 1980 article, he argues that there are no fixed poles in the world system). The theory emphasizes the existence of a processing gap in production, a disparity between center and periphery that is paramount to the theory of structural imperialism. This gap, mainly technological, is responsible for the inequality between countries even under conditions of equal exchange. Yet, the most important effect of imperialism is a cumulative asymmetric interaction in which the living condition gap increases, reinforcing the initial inequality. Consequently, the periphery in the world system suffers from persistent or structural poverty.

The feudal structure of interactions explains the persistence of inequality. This structure precludes the likelihood of interactions between peripheries in the periphery of the world system, and of connections between peripheries linked to a specific center with other centers. Therefore, a possible political organization of peripheral countries is avoided. The feudal structure imposes upon the periphery the asymmetric vertical interaction based on trade relations, with peripheral countries exporting commodities and raw materials, in a process that generates dependency and vulnerability, and center countries exporting manufactured goods. Structural imperialism is hence similar, for the center, to a policy of divide and conquer.

There are five types of imperialism. These types cannot be easily distinguished and are different dimensions of the same structural imperialism. The first type is economic imperialism, stressing vertical interactions and the processing gap. The second is political imperialism, associated with decision-making in the centers and obedience in the periphery, given the power difference. Military imperialism is the third type, characterized by differences in terms of the machines and technology available to build means of destruction in the center, discipline the

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periphery, and allow the acquisition of only traditional hardware. Next, communications imperialism includes communications and transport, controlling the interactions that enhance the feudal structure between centers and periphery. This type of imperialism has influenced the area of communications studies and media imperialism (Thussu 2006). Finally, cultural imperialism imposes a separation between masters in the centre and apprentices in the periphery, creating monopolized structures of scientific knowledge, creative activity, and learning.

Regarding the phases of structural imperialism, the theory posits that domination is stable over time, but that it depends on the existence of different degrees of harmony between center and periphery in the world system. With underdeveloped means of transportation and communications, colonialism requires a physical military presence. The second phase, neo-colonialism, starts with communications and transportation improvements. In this phase, there are international organizations physically present in the periphery, such as multinationals, political groups, military alliances, news corporations, and non-governmental organizations. These institutions, which establish identities between the centers in the center and the centers in the periphery of the system, can change over time, creating five stages or sub-phases. In the first sub-phase, national frontiers make their presence difficult. In the second, the foreign elements become subversive regarding national governments. The third sub-phase has organizations created in the periphery of the system, controlled by the center in the periphery, but directed by the center in the center. During the fourth sub-phase, the nation states in the periphery become less important and the asymmetry of power between the world structures becomes clear. The fifth sub-phase presents the possibility of globalization without states.

In the third phase of imperialism, neo-neocolonialism, instantaneous and flexible communications networks make physical presence less important, and the centers can co-ordinate their domination tactics more effectively without relocating to the periphery. The theory claims that military intervention is not the same as military invasion.

The next issue regards the convertibility of one type of structural imperialism into another. Structural imperialism is not hierarchical, but characterized by multiple effects, spin-offs, and spill-overs that reinforce each other. Co-operation and agreement among elites, in the various centers, generalize imperialism, requiring it to be convertible: from the economic to the military type, from political to economic, from military to communications, from communications to cultural, and so on. Liberal democracies assume the equal distribution of all different attributes or types, but the only locus in which they can all co-exist is in the center of the world system. Moreover, this concentration makes possible the domination of peripheral countries. A perfect structural imperialism would require, however, satisfying all the conditions described for harmonizing the class interests at the center.

Empirical Evaluations

The theory of structural imperialism has a strongly empirical nature, and Galtung proceeds to evaluate the economic gap between nations in terms of development, inequality, vertical trade, and feudal interactions, accepting the positivist methodology with reservations. The results obtained by Galtung cannot disprove the theory, but cannot shed light on how structural imperialism works either.

Gidengil (1978) carried out another empirical test, using the cluster analysis approach. She found a group of 20 countries, in a sample of 68, displaying characteristics of center, 13 characterized as periphery, and other countries considered intermediate. The results support the claim that vertical interaction is the major source of inequality. Youngblood (1982) applied the theory in order to understand the interactions between church and state in the Philippines and equally found empirical support for it.

Extensions

Galtung (1976) introduces the concepts of social imperialism and imperialism by delegation or sub-imperialism as synonyms of structural

imperialism, in order to understand emerging rivalries, conflicts, and relations of domination within the then Soviet Bloc and between the imperialist structure or system (capitalist and socialist) and the periphery. He tackles the disputes between China and the Soviet Union, with the former complaining about the capitalist nature of the latter, and the consequent economic imperialism in its external relations. Galtung rejects the explanation for lack of evidence, but agrees that social imperialism, being a feature neutral regarding capitalism or socialism, is an appropriate term. Thus, social imperialism is a relationship between a center country and a periphery country, with the former imposing a model social structure on the latter (Galtung names this phenomenon penetration), including a center to work as bridge between them to establish exploitative connections and dependency relations. Thus, the periphery subject to this domination is deprived of an autonomous development, just replicating the social structure of the center. This replication has an important role in legitimizing and confirming the validity of the center' social structure. As a consequence, Galtung sees this expansionism as social more than as economic or political imperialism.

The issue of sub-imperialism is at the same time empirical and political. Galtung considers the imperialist powers of the time (the United States, European Community, Japan, and the Soviet Union) and their similarities and differences in terms of domain (countries and regions dominated) and scope (types and mechanisms of imperialism). Since imperialism is expansive, all the above powers would have to compete for areas of influence. However, they also need to combine and coordinate to survive and avoid disruptions in the imperialist structure. The United States would play the role of coordinator. The relevant rivalry here is with the periphery of the system and its resistance to centrist domination. Sub-imperialism could be accomplished by using the existing structure, with the support of an existing imperial country, or even one aspiring to become imperialist in a given peripheral region that is an ally of a powerful country at the center. As a reaction, the periphery would coordinate their revolts in response.

Criticisms

Vorobej (2008) argues that the theory of structural violence has been subject to apparently unfair criticisms. For example, the concept has been considered theoretically unsound. Also, Galtung's work has been criticized for having not recognized nor addressed the problems raised by his definition of structural violence, that it boils down to absurdities in some circumstances, is vague and ambiguous, conflating personal and structural features, is propagandist or has a hidden manipulative political agenda, has different moralities, and has problematic practical outcomes. Vorobej (2008) addresses all these critiques in detail, and shows that they are incorrect and invalid.

In contrast to the structural violence approach, which has become a widely influential concept, it seems that the theory of structural imperialism has not been adequately appreciated. There are not many studies criticizing or testing it in this regard, despite its shortcomings. One exception is Van den Bergh (1972), who raises several criticisms against Galtung' structural theory of imperialism. First, it has been considered static, and there is no explanatory power of processes such as changes in the phases of imperialism identified, relying excessively on transportation and communication technologies. Also, the use of a two-nation model for definition and theory cannot capture more complex intra- and inter-national relations. It is only useful for a classification scheme or taxonomy of attributes of and relations between actors. It requires a consideration of the development of the global configuration of power relations and inter-dependencies in a context of international competition. Van den Bergh also criticizes the convertibility of one type of imperialism into another. This argument, he claims, is a-historical and cannot account for conflicts within and between ruling groups in each type of imperialism, that is, the connections between inter-dependence relations. The fundamental weakness in Galtung's theory, according to Van den Bergh, is the lack of precise criteria for defining the living conditions gap, since this difference between them explains the harmony and conflict of interests that underscores the theory. That is, Galtung's taxonomy has not a well defined criteria for

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classification. Finally, Van der Bergh chastises the concept of interaction, arguing that it is based on physics, not society. He proposes instead using interdependence, which allows understanding the pattern of and changes in interaction.

One a more historical evaluation, considering the developments and transformations in the capitalist world system since the 1970s and 1980s when the theory was proposed, it is clear that Galtung's approach downplays the role of capital exports emphasized by Lenin and the Marxist scholars, mainly in its modern form of multinational enterprises, as depicted by Petras and Veltmeyer (2007), or Foreign Direct Investment. Furthermore, social classes are only implicit in the theory of structural imperialism, not connected to property or contractual rights to the surplus. The theory equally underrates the role of resistance against domination in the periphery. The claim that globalization could move forward without an active role for the state, at least in the center, is doubtful, if one considers the issues brought about by the work of Panitch and Gindin (2012).

Perhaps the theory has fallen down along with the structuralist approach in the social sciences, with the rise of post-structuralism and post-modernism. Nonetheless, it provides a wide variety of insights and tools to understand the international relations of domination and national conflicts. The need for horizontal interactions that it calls for as a way to weaken the domination of the center over periphery anticipates today's South–South co-operation (Bartels and Vinanchiarachi 2009). Inequality is persistent and has been widening (Milanović 2005), as foreseen by the theory. The most important contribution of the theory of structural imperialism, however, is perhaps its method. The theory provides a powerful analytical perspective and therefore offers an alternative to agent-based relational perspectives, mainly the rational choice school. The structural approach regarding nations can incorporate the dynamics of social class in the center and in the periphery, since it is implicitly there. The approach has the potential, to this date unfulfilled, to combine and unify the recent scholarship in the theory of imperialism and the most important components of imperialism into a single systematic and dynamic account of the fundamental issues of capitalist international and national relations.

A Proposed Generalization for Action

Galtung was concerned not only with theoretical issues, but also with a political agenda for changing the world. In this regard, it is possible to generalize the theory of structural imperialism in different ways for highlighting the political possibilities of alliances. First, it is possible to include three types of nation (center, periphery, and intermediate) and three types of social classes. Second, it can cope with the existence of more than one imperialism and include extra-territorial actors. The main conclusions would still obtain. Nonetheless, the strategic implications of the theory of structural imperialism are clear. There is an international and intra-national system of domination, and in order to overcome it structural changes are required. The strategy regarding the international part must involve horizontal interactions, fostering equal exchange and autonomy, and de-feudalizing interactions, enhancing equal exchange and developing institutions in the periphery to manage class conflicts and disharmony of interests. Multinational and symmetric organizations must contribute to multilateral interactions among centers and peripheries, while destroying asymmetric organizations. In order to change intra-national domination structurally, it is important to reduce harmony and increase disharmony among the centers in the center, by means of decreased contacts that force changes in objectives, and to reduce disharmony among the peripheries by means of violent and non-violent revolutions and co-operation.

Conclusion

After exposing the theories' main tenets, it is possible to evaluate Galtung's contribution to our knowledge about violence and imperialism.

The concept of structural violence is very useful. Violence can be perpetrated in several forms, not always clearly distinguishable by the analysts. Pursuing peace requires paying close attention to this invisible threat. The theory of structural imperialism is also rich, and sheds light on the existence of pervasive inequalities in the capitalist world system. More important, it stresses the different forces and interactions that reproduce vertical structures, and how they could change overtime. The mechanisms that contribute to this state of affairs, however, must be updated. The theory must engage with historical patterns and face the challenge of grasping dynamic situations. It seems that the theory is flexible enough to incorporate those criticisms. This is an important research agenda that should not be forgotten.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Cold War Imperialism and Anti-imperialist Protests at the End of the Cold War
▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange
▶ European Periphery in an Age of Imperialism
▶ Industrialisation and Imperialism
▶ J. A. Hobson and Economic Imperialism
▶ Lenin (1870–1924) on Imperialism
▶ Luxemburg, Rosa (1871–1919)
▶ Mass Media and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ South–South Co-operation
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semi-periphery and Periphery
▶ Unequal Exchange

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Struggle

▶ Adivasis and Resistance to Imperialism

Struggle for Independence

Student Movement

Subaltern Studies

Sub-alternity

Sub-imperialism

Sudan

Suez Canal

Superexploitation

Super-Exploitation, the Race to the Bottom, and the Missing International

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Synonyms

Brazil; General law of accumulation; Global working class; Labour segmentation; Marxist dependency theory; Race to the bottom; Ruy Mauro Marini; Superexploitation

Definition

While notionally at the edges of Marx's labor theory of value, the concept of superexploitation was first theoretically elaborated by Ruy Mauro Marini. Superexploitation manifests in a variety of low-wage, physically exhausting, and often dangerous work. It involves the extraction of an "extra" degree of surplus value from expended labor power, which manifests as the lowering of wages below the level necessary for the worker to reproduce their labor power. In the context of nineteenth century and later neoliberal free trade, superexploitation occurs in sectors of dependent economies tied to the global economy by export-led models, which do not rely on workers to act as consumers of the use values they produce. In the nineteenth century, superexploitation of Brazilian labor substituted for the development of worker productivity. Nonetheless, the products of Latin American labor, in the form of cheap raw materials and foodstuffs, did support a qualitative shift in worker productivity in the English industrial revolution.

One way to understand the current crisis of the global working class is to examine the revival of superexploitation in the most dynamic and globally integrated sectors of countries like Brazil. Attention to superexploitation by Marxist dependency theorists has helped to reposition the

capital-labor relation in the context of global strategies of accumulation that rely on unequal rates of exploitation, or forms of labor segmentation. Labor segmentation, in turn, suggests an expansion of Marx's general law of capital accumulation, to clarify the underlying relations between sections of the global working class, tied to one another in a downward spiral of working terms, conditions, and living standards.

There have been many opportunities for people with radically different conceptions of the world system to see their basic suppositions and truths, often untouched by the conjuncture, reborn in the face of the post-2008 world. This has been particularly stark in recent accounts of the apparent flip in fortunes of 'the West and the rest', as the layers of the structurally unemployed and precariously employed historically associated with the Southern periphery now appear to be regular features of advanced capitalist societies, particularly in Europe (see Breman 2013); while at least initially, the full effects of the global financial crisis seemed to be forestalled in emerging economies, particularly those rich in natural resources.

In crude relief, consider two recent national anecdotes back to back. In December 2010, with the official unemployment rate at the historical low of 5.7%, Brazil's outgoing president Lula da Silva declared the country to be on the verge of reaching full employment (IBGE 2010; Partido dos Trabalhadores 2010). The discourse that followed has linked the country's relatively healthy rates of GDP growth to the growing purchasing power of a burgeoning young workforce; millions of workers having ostensibly joined the ranks of a new 'middle class' on the back of rising real wages, labour market participation, and formalisation (e.g. Maia Junior 2012; cf. ILO 2013). While emphasising favourable conjunctural elements including the global sellers' markets for Brazil's main commodities and auspicious macroeconomic conditions, this discourse downplays continuing structural contradictions that become clear once this 'new middle class' is put back into the context of Brazil's class structure overall; one which continues to be characterised by historical problems associated with Brazilian dependent development, including

structural unemployment, a massive relative surplus population, low wages (and more recently, an over-reliance on household credit), income inequality (Duarte 2013), and new degrees of displacement from, and denationalisation of, land (Teixeira and Gomes 2013, particularly the essays by Teixeira and Sauer).

Meanwhile in Europe, certain commentators see even an imperialist power like Britain on the road to becoming a 'developing country', as it slips down the rankings of key competitiveness indicators in relation to Asia (Chakrabortty 2013). Conveniently ignoring the historical and continuing provenance of the City of London's 'natural resources' in value transfers from the global South (Norfield 2013), the head of the *Guardian's* economics desk writes that:

> In Britain, we have become used to having our resources skimmed off by a small cadre of the international elite, who often don't feel obliged to leave much behind for our tax officials. An Africa specialist could look at the City and recognise in it a 21st-century version of a resource curse: something generating oodles of money for a tiny group of people, often foreign, yet whose demands distort the rest of the economy.

These blinkered accounts of the forward march of history (in the latter case, suddenly going into reverse) have found widespread expression on the left. In Western Europe, many sections have proposed a renewal of the post-war Keynesian social consensus to preserve historical working terms, conditions, and living standards in an extremely hostile environment, and as an exit to the current crisis more generally. What have been lost in this appeal are the global dimensions of accumulation that sustained the original post-war consensus, even following the end of formal empire, and the social contradictions between sections of the working class globally through which such accumulation continues.

This has cropped up, for example, in the concerns voiced by various trade unions that an eventual trade and investment agreement between the European Union and US (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP) may threaten labour, environmental, healthcare and education standards associated with an already beleaguered social Europe; very legitimate fears

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which stand in stark contrast to the general silence (with some exceptions) that greeted the negotiations of similar, but many would argue neo-colonial, treaties that the EU has carried out with the periphery over the last 20 years (including the Africa-Caribbean- Pacific Islands [ACP] group, Latin America and India, amongst others). Similarly, the latest wave of criminalisation and deportation of migrant workers from Western Europe has been marked by an unfortunate lack of outrage and meaningful action by the traditional left as, either overtly or *soto voce,* it retreats into protectionism over jobs and housing for its own, 'native' working class; rather than, alternatively, fighting the very mechanisms which are driving the crisis faced by workers everywhere. Over the last generation, increasing numbers of workers have become 'free trade refugees': people moving from Southern countries devastated by neo-liberal trade and investment agreements to the very co-signatories to these agreements which, in partnership with their national bourgeoisies, have facilitated a new, neo-liberal phase of underdevelopment. Hence, the recent revival of a slogan from anti-colonial struggle in the UK in relation to the horrifying story of Colombian Isabella Acevedo, the former cleaner of a one-time Tory immigration minister, who was criminalised and deported in July 2014: "'We are here because you are still there'" (see Oldfield and Naik 2014; Ordoñez 2014). The inaction surrounding global structures like trade agreements and immigration controls that pit the interests of workers and oppressed classes (rather than nations, per se) against one another would seem to signal a tacit acceptance that working-class interests in the North are in fact served by these structures; in other words, of an alignment of working-class interests with those of 'their' national capital. In the imperialist nations of the North, this can only be reactionary.

The objective of this essay is to locate an alternative starting point from which to speak about the global crisis of labour in the current phase of imperialism; that is, not from the standpoint of the neo-liberal crisis of work, labour rights, trade unions, and living standards in the global North (and indeed, around the world), but by reflecting on the resurgence of super-exploitation in the global South. Theoretical treatments of the phenomenon emerged in the context of the Marxist strand of dependency theory, whose use is still largely confined to Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and South Asia. The reasons, in turn, for the continuing significance (or in some quarters, revival) of the dependency perspective stem from its ability to provide conceptual tools for reckoning capital–labour relations (and so, struggle) within a nation, regional and global framework. Such tools are badly needed to overcome the limitations of anti-capitalist strategies that remain tied to the trope of the local or nation in the imperialist age; and particularly those emanating from the global North.

The essay is broken into three sections. It begins by reviewing the episodic treatment of *super-exploitation* and a related phenomenon, *labour segmentation,* in *Marx's Capital.* While Marx noted that the retention of super-exploitation in the midst of higher degrees of labour productivity was central to the development of the prototypical English industrial revolution, he neglected to incorporate either super-exploitation, or labour segmentation more broadly, into his labour theory of value. With this issue unresolved in Marx, two important issues have subsequently been glossed over by much of the Marxist left. First, the role of difference – conceived not simply as a series of mystifying ideologies (of race, gender, sexuality, immigration status, etc.) that obfuscate the unity of the working class, but as a feature of core social relations under globalised capitalism – in structuring the highly unequal ways that labour power is valued within both national and global markets. Secondly, as we saw in the two earlier anecdotes, there has also been a tendency to abstract the life chances, working terms, and conditions enjoyed by workers in a given *national* social setting from the *global* patterns of accumulation upon which they today depend.

The essay then moves on to consider the work of the Brazilian Marxist dependency theorist Ruy Mauro Marini. Marini (1978, 2005a, b) examined one example of labour segmentation established under the imperialist division of labour of the classical free trade era and, in this context,

developed the arguably most rigorous treatment of dependency from a labour (or production) standpoint in the context of works such as *Dialéctica de la dependencia* (or The Dialectics of Dependency, originally published in 1973). Recovering a key contribution of the dependency perspective, the essay argues that accumulation in the imperialist age, rather than creating conditions for the emergence and generalisation of 'modern' modes of labour productivity, has driven the reproduction of labour super-exploitation in dependent economies like Brazil. It suggests more generally that what unifies imperialism as a period (whether we think of captured trade under mercantilism and settler-colonialism to formal empire, the ascendant finance and monopoly capital of the late nineteenth–early twentieth century, or the hegemonic circuits of productive and financial capital following the Second World War) are two things. First, the degree to which core social relations in countries of the global South (despite being formally independent since the early nineteenth to twentieth century, depending on the region) have been reproduced to sustain the extraction and external accumulation of surplus value (Bresser Pereira 1984, pp. 50–54; Latimer 2014, p. 2). And secondly, the degree to which this global accumulation takes place on the basis of the combination of different rates of exploitation. By way of example, the essay turns to examine the resurgence of super-exploitation in one of the most dynamic and globally integrated sectors of the so-called new 'Brazilian Miracle': the sugar/ethanol industry. Here, despite recent improvements in real wages and job formalisation, higher rates of profit were in fact made possible by the general lowering of labour costs a decade earlier, following trade liberalisation and neo-liberal restructuring of the labour process, job markets and regional production; what I would identify as the neoliberal crisis of labour (Latimer 2014).

The final section returns to Marx, and to the implications of this argument for class struggle. It revisits the discussion of the general law of accumulation in *Capital Volume I* (Marx 1974: ch. 25) to comment on particular and general forms of exploitation in the global crisis of labour. The essay ends by arguing that the structural divisions within and contradictions between sections of the global working class need to be at the core of anti-capitalist strategy, if the global left is to be able to construct an international capable of effectively challenging global capitalism.

Super-Exploitation in the Labour Theory of Value: From Marx to Marini

Super-exploitation, broadly defined as a mode of extracting an 'extra' degree of surplus value involving recourse to extreme exploitation, is best understood in the context of a division of labour involving *differential* rates of exploitation, or labour segmentation. With few exceptions, neither super-exploitation nor labour segmentation has been addressed in the labour theory of value in any systematic way. Rather, in many ways, the phenomenon is caught in the empirical realm. In anthropology and cognate disciplines, for example, recourse to systematically higher rates of exploitation in Southern economies is often explained in cultural terms; for example, with the argument that capital in the exportprocessing zones embeds forms of exploitation in existing culturally specific forms of inequality (based, for example, on gender, kinship, and regional hierarchies) to order and control highly exploitative labour processes (e.g. Granovetter 1985; Pun 2005; Ong 1987; cf. Heyman 1998).

Throughout *Capital I*, Marx himself (1974) observed the continuing use of outmoded, exhaustive forms of exploitation in the shift from absolute to relative surplus value that underpinned the industrial revolution in England: in the gendered and age-related division of labour that saw women and children performing labour-intensive tasks in early industrial factories (ch. 15, 422); and in the production and leveraging of the relative surplus population to increase the rate of exploitation in formal labour settings (ch. 25). In the latter, for example, Marx observed that young men were 'drained of their strength while still at a tender age, after which they were treated as useless and left to perish' as members of a floating surplus population (Catephores 1981, pp. 275–276). Illustrating how segmentation

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may constitute 'a barrier to the expansion of the productive forces to the extent that it restricts the supply of labour, [and] limits the development of labour power' (Bowles and Gintis 1977, p. 179), this took place at the very life stage when, in earlier forms of industry, young men might have been taken on as journeymen and apprentices and trained for adult tasks. (For recent efforts to mediate the often overwrought distinction between exploitation and oppression in advanced capitalist societies, see Dixon 1977; Heyman 1998; Ness 2005; Valiani 2012; Walia 2010. Their works examine the role of segmented labour markets in the super-exploitation of gendered, racialised and/or migrant labour.)

In both instances, Marx noted that the segmentation of the workforce (in the first instance, 'forms of organization of labour rendered obsolete by the very development of capitalist production', and in the second, the periodic cycling of workers through formal employment and out again) was crucial to accumulation (Catephores 1981, p. 274).

> Although then, technically speaking, the old system of division of labour is thrown overboard by machinery, it hangs on in the factory, as a traditional habit handed down from Manufacture, and is afterwards systematically re-moulded and established in a more hideous form by capital, as a means of exploiting labour-power. (ch. 15, quoted in Catephores 1981, p. 274)

However, Marx neglected to elevate these instances of super-exploitation (and more generally, of the combination of differentiated rates of exploitation) to a high level of abstraction in *Capital,* and ultimately assumed that the rate of exploitation would equalise across a given society (Catephores 1981; Higginbottom 2012; Sotelo Valencia 2014, p. 541; cf. Marx 1974, pp. 212, 235). As others have suggested, this is arguably one of many heuristic devices Marx used in the course of elaborating the labour theory of value; crucially, for example:

> *Assuming that labour-power is paid for at its value,* we are confronted by this alternative: given the productiveness of labour and its normal intensity, the rate of surplus-value can be raised only by the actual prolongation of the working-day; on the other hand, given the length of the working-day,

that rise can be effected only by a change in the relative magnitudes of the components of the working-day, viz., necessary labour and surplus-labour; a change which, *if the wages are not to fall below the value of labour-power,* presupposes a change either in the productiveness or in the intensity of the labour. (Marx 1974, p. 511, emphases added; cf. Bueno and Seabra 2010, p. 71; Marini 2005b, p. 187)

While perhaps a valid analytical step, as Bowles and Gintis (1977) argue in an otherwise problematic analysis of labour segmentation, 'the assumption of equal rates of exploitation is in no way required by historical materialism and is inconsistent with a critical Marxian concept: uneven development' (176; also Rosdolsky, in Foster and McChesney 2012, p. 131). This elision was also historically problematic in the setting of the original industrial revolution, during the extension of global capitalist relations in the same period (the 'classical' phase of global accumulation, c.1769–c.1880), and in the imperialist phase which followed (Cope 2012: part I). If we understand imperialist expansion in the latter as a response to contradictions between capital's drive to expand production and stagnating rates of profit in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, then the ordering and articulation of a new division of labour between diverse sections of slaves (until 1888 in Brazil), other forms of unfree labour, unpaid domestic labour, rural and urban workers, and peasants in the colonial (and, in relation to Latin America, neo-colonial) periphery and those in the metropolitan core should be understood as an epochal key to their resolution. (In this sense, this essay is conceived in part as a contribution to a broader research project that explores the role of differentiated rates of exploitation in global accumulation strategies under imperialism, which to date counts such valuable works as Cope 2012; Nash and Fernández-Kelly 1983, particularly the essays by Nash, and Bonilla and Campos; Rodney 1981; Sanderson 1985; Tomba 2007.) In the context of formal empire, for example, both Lenin and Bukharin observed that the division of labour enabled the production of super-profits in the colonies through the super-exploitation of colonial labour (Higginbottom 2012, p. 253). Decades later, a key contribution of the Marxist strand of

dependency theory would be to illustrate this dynamic in a division of labour now organised around formally independent nation states. In this vein, I would suggest that the combination of differentiated rates of exploitation (including super-exploitation) is a key characteristic of class formation and accumulation under the consecutive stages of imperialism, including neo-liberalism.

From the genocidal displacement of Indigenous communities in the early sixteenth century and the equally genocidal trade in and exploitation of enslaved Africans, to the marginalisation of freed Africans in the transition to a wage-based economy and their displacement by immigrant labour, super-exploitation and labour segmentation have been intrinsic to the formation of Brazilian capitalism, which itself 'cannot be understood separately from its globally-informed structure and function' (Marini 2005a, p. 138, my translation; also Duarte 2013, pp. 196–199; Lockhart and Schwartz 1984, pp. 198–201). In a description of the racial economy of colonial Brazil, Lockhart and Schwartz (1984) quantify the subhuman valuation of African life in arguably the harshest plantation economy of the day which, despite unceasing slave uprisings and republican movements, would last until abolition in 1888.

> Slave owners estimated that a slave could produce on the average about three-quarters of a ton of sugar a year. At the prices of the period, this meant in effect that slave would produce in two or three years an amount of sugar equal to the slave's original purchase price and the cost of maintenance. Thus if the slave lived only five or six years, the investment of the planter would be doubled, and a new and vigorous replacement could be bought. (218)

Likewise, Souza (1974) would comment on the revival of super-exploitation a century later in the highly competitive auto sector of greater São Paulo during the so-called Brazilian Miracle (1968–72), in a passage that closely echoes Marx's observations of modern industry above:

> In all its stages, the economic process instituted in Brazil was based on the coexistence of advanced forms of capitalist exploitation and the most backward forms of production. The basis ... of this development was the intensive exploitation of

labour power and not the utilization of technology. However, these two forms complemented each other, and only when the world system required the more advanced forms of production (agricultural or industrial) were they introduced. (See also Humphrey 1980; Pinto 1965; Sotelo Valencia 2014, p. 543)

It is in this context that the contribution of Ruy Mauro Marini (2005a, b) to the labour theory of value, in the form of his thesis on super-exploitation, is significant, insofar as it offers one of the most rigorous treatments of this apparent 'backwardness' to date (see also Bueno and Seabra 2010; Osorio in Almeida Filho 2013; Sotelo Valencia 2014; on the significance of this thesis to historical and contemporary debates within Marxist dependency theory, see Kay 1989; Prado 2011; Sotelo Valencia 2014). While many use the term figuratively or descriptively to talk about a variety of low-wage, physically exhausting and often dangerous work, Marini examined the historical function of super-exploited Brazilian labour, unfree *and* free, in the production of particular use values for consumption in the metropolitan core during the nineteenth century. On this basis, he began to theorise a new modality, if not a discrete form, of extracting surplus value; one which Marx might have observed in concrete settings but which he declined to fully integrate in the labour theory of value, as illustrated above.

Super-exploitation involves the extraction of an extra degree of surplus value through any combination of techniques (for example, the extension of tasks or hours in the working day, the intensification of the labour-process) which amount to qualitatively higher degrees of exploitation, rather than through the development of the worker's productive capacity per se (Marini 2005a, p. 156; b, p. 189; cf. Furtado 2007, pp. 232–233); that is, without an increase to the technical composition of capital (or the proportion of capital invested in the purchase of labour power, or wages, to that of constant capital, or machinery). In other words, the improvement of productivity through new technology and techniques of production is neglected in favour of intensifying the physical labour process, often to the point of complete exhaustion.

The relation of super-exploitation to the two modes of surplus value identified in *Capital* is a current subject of debate. In Marini's work, the concept cannot be reduced to either absolute surplus value, with which it is often conflated (Marini 1978; cf. Salama 2009; Cardoso and Faletto 1979), or to relative surplus value, although it may occur in combination with either. Starting from Marini's original texts, Bueno and Seabra (2010) argue that superexploitation 'brings together diverse modalities of extracting surplus value, centred on the evasion of the law of value in relation to the labour-power commodity' (74) in so far as it bypasses the exchange of commodities of equal value (71, my translation). For Higginbottom (2009), super-exploitation constitutes a third mode of extracting surplus value that arose under, and has come to characterise, surplus value extraction from the global South during the imperialist phase of capitalism. I accept the position of Sotelo Valencia (2014) which positions superexploitation as an imminent mechanism that conditions the development (or, perhaps better, limits the generalisation) of relative surplus value in low-wage and 'emerging' economies like Brazil: 'Super-exploitation as a production regime is not negated in dependent countries when relative surplus value emerges, even to a limited extent, and imposes its logic – though not its hegemony – in the production and accumulation of capital' (5).

However, super-exploitation also by definition involves a reduction or suppression of wages to the point where it falls below the value of the worker's labour power, or the level necessary to reproduce her or his labour power in a given social formation. This rendered section of the worker's wages is thus converted into an extra source of surplus value that is appropriated by the capitalist (Bueno and Seabra 2010; Marini 2005a, pp. 154–155). This element in fact arises later in *Capital Volume* I, where Marx amends one of the problematic working assumptions flagged earlier and so makes conceptual space for super-exploitation as a general tendency of capitalist development:

> In the chapters on the production of surplus-value it was constantly pre-supposed that wages are at least equal to the value of labour-power. Forcible reduction of wages below this value plays, however, in practice too important a part, for us not to pause upon it for a moment. It, in fact, transforms, within certain limits, the labourer's necessary consumption-fund into a fund for the accumulation of capital. (Marx 1974, p. 599; see Higginbottom 2012, pp. 263–264)

Finally, Marini (2005a) locates super-exploitation at a specific position in the global system shaped by imperialism, rather than as a universal historical stage: specifically, as a characteristic of capitalist development specific to dependent economies, such as the export-oriented economies of Latin America (and elsewhere) where, in contrast to advanced capitalist countries, workers were not expected to fulfil their second function as consumers of the use values they produced (154–155, 165). Rather, this kind of exploitation marked sectors that relied on the extensive and intensive use of labour (namely, extractive industries and plantation agriculture) and, consequently, in which there was little need for high or continuing reinvestment of constant capital. Marini suggests that the tendency of local oligarchies at the periphery of the global system to resort to super-exploitation explains why the supply of prime materials and foodstuffs from Latin America increased in the very period that their terms of trade diminished (153, 156).

Crucially, this systemic reliance on super-exploitation in the nineteenth-century division of labour draws our attention to some of the structural contradictions which shaped the global working class in this period. Marini (2005a) argues that the super-exploitation of Brazilian labour underwrote a qualitative shift in English industrial development from 1840 onwards, with the provision of cheap foodstuffs and raw materials (142–147). This flow (amongst others, of course) supported the shift from absolute to relative surplus value; in other words, to the generalisation of a stage of expanded production based on higher rates of labour productivity, or a higher technical composition of capital (Marx 1977, p. 145). This shift would only be approximated in Brazil itself a century later and never, to date, in a generalised way. Marini's argument is that this shift took place (in part) not only due to higher national rates of labour productivity in England,

but also to its reliance upon cheaper imported raw materials and foodstuffs; in other words, upon a lowering of the costs of production and social reproduction respectively in the core economy on the basis of super-exploitation in the periphery. Thus, in the bid to develop the productive forces of one core region, he illustrates how imperialism accentuated and relied upon different rates of exploitation overall: '. . . the combination of forms of capitalist exploitation are carried out unevenly throughout the system, engendering distinct social formations according to the predominance of one form or another' (Marini 2005b, p. 189).

With echoes of Marx's deconstruction of the bourgeois origin myth of primitive accumulation, this element of Marini's work undermines yet another origin myth: that the shift to relative surplus value in England was entirely the product of *national* class struggle by its working class, a common theme of Eurocentric histories of the classical Industrial Revolution. There is both an historical and geographical (or system-level) point to be made here. Where Marx (1977) argues that the increased degree of labour productivity reached in the shift to the production of relative surplus value 'rests on a technical basis, and must be regarded as given at a certain stage of development of the productive forces' (145), Marini illustrates that this moment of industrial 'progress' was paid for (in part) by the super-exploitation of unfree and free workers elsewhere in the global system. This contrasts with traditional Marxist narratives that assume (more or less explicitly) that the national frame is the most appropriate scope with which to interpret capitalist development (and the social, democratic progress), even within imperialist countries, and that capitalist development will ultimately progress from stage to stage in all national economies of the capitalist world. Rather, this case illustrates how, when adjusted to the global frame (or within the nation state, a framework that encapsulates all workers, active and reserve), capitalist development drives backwardness; it is not its cure. What Marini offers is a single case (for now, abstracted from a more general picture of the global system of the period) that illustrates the continuing reliance of core industrial development on accumulation by means of super-exploitation, albeit now through the arm's-length relations afforded by free trade and dependency.

Super-Exploitation Under the New Brazilian Miracle

Adding to the effort of those attempting to revive Marini's contribution in analyses of this latest phase of imperialism (e.g. Almeida Filho 2013; Amaral and Carcanholo 2009; Bueno and Seabra 2010, 2012; Duarte 2013; Higginbottom 2012; Marini 2008; Martins 2011; Osorio Urbina 2004; Sader et al. 2009; Sotelo Valencia 2009, 2014), I suggest that labour segmentation has became one of the key challenges to Brazilian class struggle over the past generation, in the context of the restructuring of production, of labour processes, and of labour markets; in other words, in the context of the neo-liberal crisis of labour (Latimer 2014; cf. Duarte 2013). Certain elements of this crisis are not new. However, the perennial tension of structural divisions within the working class have taken front-and-centre stage in the neo-liberal period. The deepening of divisions within the working class (writ large to include rural and urban wage earners, informal-sector workers, semi-proletarianised peasants, and the increasingly complex reserve army) have enabled the resurgence of super-exploitation in already labour-intensive sectors, and particularly those which benefited from the opening to deregulated trade and direct investment flows in the 1990s, financial deregulation, and constant demand for minerals and raw materials in the new century (Duarte 2013, pp. 198–201).

Perhaps nowhere is this trend clearer than in agribusiness, the sector now celebrated as the core of a new 'Brazilian Miracle' (cf. Amann and Baer 2012). According to the Economist (2010), the source of this sector's success lies in its smart use of the country's abundant land base and resources; in the state's attention to developing new technologies rather than to subsidies, regardless of the new monopolies that have developed around them; the successful introduction of

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genetically modified crops, championed by capital and the central government after a protracted battle with land-based social movements, non-governmental organisations and dissident state governments throughout the 1990s; and the embracing of trade liberalisation, competition, and capital-intensive farming through economies of scale.

Echoing similarly myopic visions of the previous 'Miracle', the new conditions of labour and land relations which have made this boom possible have been sidelined altogether in this account. Take, for example, the conditions faced by day labourers in the sugarcane fields of São Paulo state, which came to light following a series of work-related deaths. Brazil is now the largest global producer and exporter of sugarcane and sugar-based ethanol, and one of the largest domestic markets for biofuels. In 2006, the highly modernised sugar/ethanol sector of São Paulo state accounted for 55% of the value of sugarcane production in the country (DIEESE 2007, p. 2; IBGE 2009, p. 734). The *paulista* sector saw heavy investment in fixed capital throughout the 1990s, accounting for 75% of all mechanisation in the sector, while 32% of the national workforce in the sector was discarded in the same period (DIEESE 2007, pp. 19–20). Traditional sugar oligarchs, now in partnership with multinational subsidiaries in sectors that use sugar(-based) inputs, claim that the new technology has allowed them to move from production on the extensive margin (that is, bringing in additional land under cultivation, often through recourse to the illegal but established habits associated with *grilagem,* or land-grabbing) to intensive production (which includes recovering the *cerrado,* or scrublands, which extends over nine states including São Paulo), thus reducing the social basis of land-related conflict (cf. Mendonça 2009, p. 68; for historical examples of *grilagem* with respect to public and Indigenous lands, and the use of the 1850 Land Law to restrict land access to freed African slaves, see Duarte 2013, pp. 196–197; Lockhart and Schwartz 1984, pp. 402–403). However, increasing productivity margins have allowed agribusiness complexes to push smaller farms out, exacerbating land inequalities and adding to the reserve army (DIEESE 2007, p. 5, 24; IBGE 2009, p. 111).

This is a highly modernised sector which entertains an 'ideology ... that tries to negate the existence of human labour on sugarcane plantations' (Silva 2011, my translation). And yet researchers and activists have pointed to a resurgence of super-exploitation at the interstices of a segmented workforce, falling real wages, and extreme hikes to the physical demands placed on workers (Alves 2006; DIEESE 2007, p. 20; Mendonça 2009; Silva and Martins 2010). A recent study by DIESSE (the Inter-Union Department of Socioeconomic Statistics and Studies, 2007) shows that rural unions have in fact made considerable gains in terms of the overall number of formalised workers in the *paulista* sector; that is, those working as registered workers (with a signed workers' card that provides access to labour rights under federal legislation) and under collective agreements. However, these gains have been offset by the effect of waves of newly arrived migrants from the North-East (most recently, the state of Maranhão) and nearby Minas Gerais, most of whom have been added to the workforce as unregistered workers. Amongst registered workers, average wages fell 26% between 1992 and 2002 to R$310 (US$140) monthly, less than the current minimum wage.

Since 1992, workers harvesting the cane manually have also faced sharp increases to their daily quotas: in contrast to the average national daily quota of 6 tons in the 1980s, workers are now faced with daily quotas of 7.4–10.7 tons just to meet the grade of 'regular to good' productivity, and up to 13.4 tons daily to meet the 'optimal productivity' target. According to DIESSE, this is 37% higher than the daily output expected of workers in the North-East, while workers in the *paulista* sector are paid only 15% more (DIEESE 2007, p. 23). The physical costs to the worker are profound. To meet the medium range target of 10–15 tons daily, workers must deliver '30 strikes [of the machete] per minute for eight hours per day', according to one researcher (Mendonça 2009, p. 72).

> Beyond insufficient dietary conditions – caused by low salaries, from excess heat, from the elevated consumption of energy due to the extremely strenuous tasks involved – the imposition of the quota (that is, the ever-increasing daily amount of cane cut) has set the pace increasing labour productivity since the 1990s, when machine harvesters became employed in increasing numbers. The rate affects not only migrants but also local workers. For this reason, these capitals require a young workforce, gifted with great physical energy to perform this activity. And so, the turnaround has become very high by virtue of the constant replacement of labour consumed during the production process. (Silva and Martins 2010, pp. 213–214, my translation)

All told, heightened rates of exploitation have been observed across the board, often to the point of death (Silva and Martins 2010, pp. 213–214; see also Alves 2006). In 2005 alone, a Regional Labour Delegation registered 416 deaths in the state due to workplace accidents (including burning to death), heart attacks, and cancer (Mendonça 2009, p. 73). It has also resulted in the rise of working conditions which labour activists and the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MTE) identify as de facto debt slavery. Several of the largest exporters of sugar/ethanol have been recently added to the government's 'dirty list' of firms whose operations have been found to use forced labour. These include: the Cosan Group, Copertrading, the Moema Group, Louis Dreyfus Commodities, the Noble Group/Usina Cerradinho (ONG Réporter Brasil 2011; also Instituto Observatório Social 2004).

Industry in São Paulo has seen a threefold increase in the tonnage produced annually between 1991 (144.6 tons) and 2011 (406.5 tons) by these means, rather than simply by technological improvements to productivity alone (Instituto da Economia Agrícola 2012).

The first thing to note here is the significance of transnational class relations in the reproduction of this pattern of exploitation which (despite clear resonances with the description of super-exploitation provided by Lockhart and Schwartz 1984) should be understood not simply as a backward survival of an earlier stage of development, but rather as an inherent feature of accumulation in a *modern,* dependent economy (Marini 2005b:

192). These processes are driven by the demands of northern and 45 emerging' nations for cheap agricultural, energy, and industrial inputs, which include US, EU and Japanese markets for biofuels (Franco et al. 2010; Mendonça 2009). They have also been enabled by trade liberalisation, new speculative markets in land and agricultural commodities (particularly since 2008), measures to facilitate the commodification and marketing of biotech inputs (seeds, fertilisers), and those to facilitate the domestic and foreign concentration of land ownership (Teixeira and Gomes 2013).

While such trends have allowed increasing control over the production chains in question to be centralised by multinational agribusiness giants and finance capital, the externalisation of the most labour-intensive stages of production to subcontractors enables companies to deny knowledge of any rampant human and labour-rights violations taking place in upstream sectors (Instituto Observatório Social 2004, p. 12). In this sense, the logic of outsourcing that shapes transnational capitalist class formation (that is, alliances between Brazilian and northern capital) provides the mirror image of the segmentation of labour (cf. Marini 2008, p. 254); however, *both* are necessary for super-exploitation to occur. Finally, while working communities around the world have experienced some version of the neo-liberal crisis, these rates of exploitation are (generally) not found in countries of the industrialised north. Taken as a whole, these points should put the particularities of Southern labour back on the agenda of class-based, anti-imperialist struggles.

The General Law of Accumulation and the Race to the Bottom

> To-day, thanks to competition on the world-market . . . we have advanced much further. 'If China,' says [John Stapleton MP] to his constituents, 'should become a great manufacturing country, I do not see how the manufacturing population of Europe could sustain the context without descending to the level of their competitors.' . . . The wished-for goal of English capital is no longer Continental wages but Chinese. (Marx 1974, p. 601)

There is one more aspect we can take from Marx (1974) on the issue of labour segmentation; namely its implications for class struggle. This comes, in embryonic form, in the context of his discussion of the general law of accumulation (ch. 25). At moments of accelerated accumulation (rather than crisis), Marx observes that:

> The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and, therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productiveness of its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army. The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, develop also the labour-power at its disposal. The relative mass of the industrial reserve army increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus-population, whose misery is in inverse ration to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazarus-layers of the working-class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is *the absolute general law* of *capitalist accumulation.* Like all other laws it is modified in its working by many circumstances …. (644, emphasis in the original)

Using the concrete example of the shift to a generalised regime of relative surplus value in England, Marx argues that capitalist accumulation tends to produce a population that is contingently and then absolutely unnecessary to its reproduction. Ultimately, in volume 3, Marx (1977) positions this essential, 'immanent contradiction' as a response to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (ch. 13; Mattick 1983, p. 94), insofar as the weight of the reserve population can be used to temper workers' demands for better wages and working conditions and so, to bolster the rate of profit.

In terms of the issue of what extent the 'general law' of accumulation can be said to constitute an actual law of capitalist development, I agree with Veltmeyer (1983) who sees it as referring to 'certain tendencies rooted in the basic structures of the capitalist mode of production' which can be modified through particular historical circumstances, and certainly by class struggle (218–219; Foster and McChesney 2012, pp. 130–131). Since Marx's time, various authors have highlighted the ways in which such circumstances were created by imperialism, including the welfare legislation established in the post-Second World War

period in core nations (initially paid for with colonial revenue) to offset the potential for social instability in times of long-term hardship (Mattick 1983, p. 97); the leveraging of the rate of profit in manufacturing following its collapse in the 1970s by the internationalisation of production and increased competition between regional workforces (Latimer 2014; Marini 2008, pp. 253–254; Sotelo 2009: ch. 2, 2013, p. 2); and the current appropriation of surplus value from the South through new financial instruments and markets (Norfield 2013). And so, while 'the modifications the system undergoes in the very course of its development may set aside the general law of accumulation … and thus meet the optimistic expectations of the ruling class and raise doubts among the exploited classes about capitalism's vulnerability … [they] do not affect its general validity' (Mattick 1983, pp. 95–96).

It is in this discussion of the general law of accumulation where Marx best captures contradictions between social layers of the working class (in this context, within a single social formation) that actually facilitate capitalist reproduction from one cycle to the next (Latimer 2014). The various layers of the reserve army in Chapter 25 are not, I would argue, significant in and of themselves; nor were they intended to be understood as something extraneous to exploitation and productivity in the formal labour process following capitalist expansion. Rather, the law speaks to the unity of the working classes, or the intrinsic link between the active layers of workers and those so-called 'ex-workers'; in countries like Brazil, many of them also recently, or occasionally, 'ex-peasants'.

In this sense, the general law of accumulation is a good way to think through the contemporary 'race to the bottom'; or the general social relation that links national and subnational segments of workers across borders with 'profound inequalities of labour-powers' (Higginbottom 2012, p. 252); a relation which, rather than leading to an equalisation in rates of exploitation, tends to tie each to the other in a downward spiral of working terms, conditions, and living standards. The previous section illustrated that super-exploitation continues to be a modern feature of class

formation, here as a response to the particular way Brazilian agribusiness has entered the global system in the neo-liberal period. The general law of accumulation helps to clarify the intrinsic connection between such particular forms of exploitation and the general crisis of labour amongst working peoples (of the generalisation of precarious labour arrangements, for example); and so, the capacity of capital to leverage the fortunes and gains of one layer of workers against others (for example, the pitting of jobs in extractive industries against acts of Indigenous sovereignty around land and resources in settler colonies).

Marx himself never developed the general law of accumulation to its logical conclusion – in other words, by exploring its implications for anti-capitalist struggle – but there are kernels.

> As soon, therefore, as the labourers learn the secret, how it comes to pass that in the same measure as they work more, as they produce more wealth for others, and as the productive power of their labour increases, so in the same measure even their function as a means of the self-expansion of capital becomes more and more precarious for them; as soon as they discover that the degree of intensity of the competition among themselves depends wholly on the pressure of the relative surplus population; as soon as, by Trades' Unions, &c., they try to organise a regular co-operation between employed and unemployed in order to destroy or to weaken the ruinous effects of this natural law of capitalistic production on their class, so soon capital and its sycophant, Political Economy, cry out at the infringement of the 'eternal' and so to say 'sacred' law of supply and demand. Every combination of employed and unemployed disturbs the 'harmonious' action of this law. But, on the other hand, as soon as (in the colonies, *for example*) adverse circumstances prevent the creation of an industrial reserve army and, with it, the absolute dependence of the working class upon the capitalist class, capital, along with its commonplace Sancho Panza, rebels against the 'sacred' law of supply and demand, and tries to check its inconvenient action by forcible means and State interference. (Marx 1974, p. 640, italics in the original)

If the general law is the central contradiction of the capitalist mode of production, the only issue of equal importance was that of how workers would address this 'secret'. In other words, it concerned whether workers could achieve means of common struggle predicated on the recognition not of an undifferentiated subject and class interest, but rather of a long-term common fate across vastly different realities (including the violence intrinsic to class formation in a colonial setting; see also Lindberg 2014).

Conclusion

As may already be apparent, there isn't much in this essay that is actually new (see e.g. Veltmeyer 1983), although there is much that has been systematically sidelined or dismissed in contemporary debates on left and left-labour strategy. As exemplified by Chakrabortty (2013) at the outset, the current crisis affecting European workers (expressed in terms of austerity measures, harder and longer working lives, mass unemployment, destitution, and elder neglect, weakened unions, and the end of the welfare state) has given rise to easy comparisons with the plight of workers in the global South under neoliberalism. However, without trivialising the hardships faced by working-class communities in the North (particularly racialised youth, migrant workers, and women), super-exploitation as it appears in an emergent Brazil has not existed in Europe for more than a century (cf. Sotelo Valencia 2014, p. 549). This is not to say, however, that for better or for worse, the conditions and horizons of possibility for jobs, pay, working and living standards in both regions are not tied together, if we are to take a global reading of the general law of accumulation seriously.

Using a case from Brazil, this essay sought to use the resurgence of super-exploitation in the global South as an alternative starting point from which to consider the global crisis amongst working people. It is positioned as a contribution to current efforts to grapple with the particular and general forms of exploitation in the global crisis of labour, and the structural divisions and contradictions between sections of the global working class that have crippled organised labour and communities in resistance to global capitalism. In adopting this tack, the essay is not intended to be a celebration of the fragment, or part of some conspiratorial assault on Marxist analysis by post-structuralism, but simply a call to attend to the ways that workers have been put in order

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historically and geographically by capitalism in its imperialist phase. In this context, 'backward' forms of exploitation continue to be reproduced, not because of the inadequacies of class struggle in closed social formations in the South, but, in the first instance, because they continue to be profitable and functional to global accumulation at the hands of both national and international capital. In dependent countries, workers are forced to contend not only with 'their' national capital but also the financial, governance and trade-related structures controlled by the capital of advanced capitalism under which they operate; this still holds true, despite the rise of export-capital from so-called 'emerging' economies like Brazil (Bueno and Seabra 2010; Foster and McChesney 2012, p. 139). If the general law of accumulation can be argued to hold beyond national borders, these forms arise because they are possible in the absence of a viable international struggle for socialism, rather than the current forms of accommodation.

Early works from the dependency perspective were often positioned with an eye to understanding why, following the globalisation of capital in the first phase of imperialism, a worker's international capable of challenging capital at a structural level had not followed suit. In the North, it is discouraging to see the degree to which efforts to theorise capitalism in its latest phase of globalisation (it bears rephrasing: theories which emerged in the very moment that global production moved *en* masse to the South) have systematically attempted to sideline both the global (class) dimensions of accumulation and the particular role of Southern labour within it. For this reason, I expect that the challenge of labour segmentation, which this essay argues has become a central challenge to class formation in the neo-liberal age, will be solved through the practical efforts of workers who see internationalism as central to their self-interest and even liberation (Lindberg 2014), not in theoretical debate. No more compromises.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa

▶ Enslaved African Labour: Violent Racial Capitalism
▶ 'Global Labour Arbitrage' and the New Imperialism
▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation
▶ Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)
▶ Samir Amin (1931–2018)

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Syria

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Syria and Imperialist Intervention: Past and Present

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With its major cities having long served as key centers of cultural and intellectual production and bordered by Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, Syria has long been regarded as one of the most strategically important states in the Arab world. Unsurprisingly, therefore, since the mid-twentieth century, two of the most powerful external actors in the region – Britain and then the USA – have repeatedly sought to influence its politics and, in more extreme cases, topple its most uncooperative regimes. Drawing on a range of primary and secondary sources – including archived official documents, published records of diplomatic correspondence, and NGO reports – this chapter attempts to understand the various British- and US-sponsored Syria-focused campaigns by identifying and appraising the tactics and strategies used and by situating them in their correct historical contexts stretching from the rise of Arab nationalism and the Cold War to the 2011 Arab uprisings.

From Arab Nationalism to the Cold War

Although limping through the Second World War as a technical victor, Britain's surviving global empire was nonetheless in retreat. With repeated uprisings and national liberation movements chipping away at overseas possessions, Whitehall officials and planners were already expert in devising strategies aimed at blocking or reversing indigenous challenges. But with increasingly resource-intensive heavy industries requiring vast imports of basic materials at a cheap and stable price from their remaining colonies and protectorates, such counterrevolutionary efforts had to become much more focused on what had become the greatest threat of all: economic nationalism. Certainly, the enemy insurgents Britain was facing by the mid-twentieth century were no longer being measured by their ideology, religion, or barbarity, but quite clearly by their capacity to nationalize resources and industries or, at the very least, build states capable of demanding greater stakes in the local production of wealth.

Since its secret Sykes-Picot agreement with France that effectively carved up the territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War, Britain's grip over much of the Middle East and its resources had been more or less uncontested. But by the 1950s and certainly the 1960s, a potent pan-Arab movement was threatening to unseat remaining British client rulers in the region and jeopardize lucrative trade arrangements and control over valuable natural resources. With "classic nationalism [having become] impotent" in the Middle East, as veteran correspondent Patrick Seale described, many of the new "Arab nationalist" revolts were effectively military operations, often led by army officers intent on forcibly removing foreign influences from their countries. Described by some as "armed plotters waiting in the wings, legitimized by a third world discourse" (Seale 1987, pp. 3–5; Filiu 2015, p. 32), the Arab nationalist uprisings and revolutions may have had little in common with the progressive movements of mid-nineteenth-century Europe, but, as illiberal as they were, they nonetheless represented one of the

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most organized and potent challenges to imperial structures Britain had ever faced.

The gravity of the situation was not lost on London: Foreign Office reports warned of Middle Eastern ruling elites "losing their authority to reformist or revolutionary movements which might reject the connexion with Britain"; official references were made to the dangers of "ultra-nationalist maladies"; and the cabinet secretary informed the prime minister in no uncertain terms that "we are fighting a losing battle propping up these reactionary regimes" (Curtis 2003, pp. 256–257). According to a particularly candid 1952 Foreign Office study entitled *The problem of nationalism*, there were two strains to watch out for. The first was "intelligent and satisfied nationalism" which was not very well defined but seemed to involve Britain being able to divert inevitable nationalist sentiments into regimes that would "minimize losses to Britain." The other, however, was likely to be very harmful to British interests as it would lead to new governments that would "insist on managing their own affairs…including the dismissing of British advisers, the appropriation of British assets, unilateral denunciation of treaties with Britain, and claims on British possessions" (Hiers and Wimmer 2013, p. 239; Curtis 2003, pp. 237–238). Declassified documents from 1961 have shown that British officials were even wary of the "force of liberalism" in such countries for much the same reason (Curtis 2003, p. 256).

Despite some muted discomfort over the imperialist practices of its British and French allies, the USA of the mid-twentieth century was rapidly waking up to the demands of its own resource-hungry industries and the realities of its Cold War stalemate with the Soviet Union. Ensuring vacuums left in the wake of the retrenching European empires were not filled by antagonistic forces bent on nationalizing assets or – equally dangerously – liberation movements likely to align themselves with Soviet-sponsored international communism, the US government and its intelligence agencies soon found themselves at the very forefront of counterrevolutionary action. As Karl Korsch put it, the USA may have been based on the ideals of revolutionary France, but by this stage, it was fast losing its "capitalist infancy" (Korsch 1940).

Soon advancing into the void left by Britain's retreat and quickly overcoming their initial fence-sitting on Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, by the mid-1950s, US planners acknowledged that securing the Middle East was going to be vital to the future prosperity of Western industries and, in turn, for holding the Soviet Union in check. As it was in the rest of the world, the extraction of natural resources was once again an obvious priority, so all indigenous attempts to nationalize economic assets – regardless of any progressive, liberal, or even democratic agendas – needed to be intimidated or destroyed by the USA. In 1955, according to secret correspondence between British officials, President Dwight Eisenhower had even called for a "high-class Machiavellian plan to achieve a situation in the Middle East favourable to our interests which could split the Arabs and defeat the aims of our enemies" (Kyle 2011, p. 552; Curtis 2012, p. 62).

Just 2 years later, the region got its own "Eisenhower Doctrine," an evolution of the earlier Truman and Monroe doctrines that had sought to secure US interests against international communism and foreign encroachment on the American continents. Stating that "the US regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East," Eisenhower effectively made the Middle East a special zone of US control. Moreover, as with Truman's more global declaration, Eisenhower sought to tie the Cold War to all threats to the Middle Eastern status quo by claiming he was "prepared to use armed forces to assist [any Middle Eastern country] requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism" (Blum 2014, p. 89). He also proclaimed that "the existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia" (Dreyfuss 2006, p. 121).

Thus, in this context the USA and its nascent intelligence organizations soon started to look beyond Nasser's Egypt and effectively began to assume prime responsibility for countering most of the other Arab nationalist movements in the

Middle East and North Africa. Worryingly for Washington, its enemies had even reached Israel's gates as a series of ineffective military dictatorships in Syria came to an end in 1954 when Syrian "free officers" restored free and fair elections. With the nationalist People's Party and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party – the *Ba'ath* – winning a combined 55 out of 140 seats and thus representing the biggest bloc in parliament, the former French protectorate seemed finally poised to pursue an independent foreign policy (Nohlen et al. 2001, pp. 54–5; Filiu 2015, pp. 32–35).

Refusing all US aid and staking out its Cold War neutrality, the new Syrian government confirmed the Department of State's fears, with embassy cables from Damascus warning that "if the popular leftward trend in Syria continues . . . there is a real danger that Syria will fall completely under left-wing control." Unsurprisingly, given the still gestating Eisenhower doctrine, the embassy also made multiple claims that the Syrian Communist Party was actively penetrating the government and the army, even though the party had won only one seat in the general election (Nohlen et al. 2001, pp. 54–55; Blum 2014, p. 85). Without evidence, one cable stated: "If the present trend continues there is a strong possibility that a communist-dominated Syria will result, threatening the peace and stability of the area and endangering the achievement of our objectives in the Near East." On this basis it recommended that "we should give priority consideration to developing courses of action in the Near East designed to affect the situation in Syria." But even within the embassy, there was confusion, as another cable stated: "In fact the [Syrian] Communist Party does not appear to have as its immediate objective seizure of power. Rather it seeks to destroy national unity . . . and to exacerbate tension in the Arab World" (Blum 2014, pp. 85–86). British government reports were much the same, warning that "[Syria's] army is deeply engaged in politics and increasingly under the influence of the extreme left; and there's much communist penetration." Foreign Office records also reveal that the British cabinet agreed an attempt should be made to "swing Syria on the right path" (Curtis 2012, pp. 70–71; Public Records Office 1956a, c).

Keeping it in the family, the CIA's Archibald Roosevelt – a cousin of Kermit, the officer who had played a major role in the CIA's covert operation in Iran a few years earlier – took the lead after a meeting with the leader of Syria's conservative Populist Party. The memoirs of a former National Security Council official indicate that, after a discussion of what aid the USA could supply to bring them to power, money was given to the party so that it could buy off military officers, radio stations, and newspapers (Blum 2014, pp. 86–87). MI6 meanwhile arranged for a Turkish border incident to take place: serving as a distraction for the Syrian military, it was to allow British-funded Iraqi tribes to rise up and cross Syria's eastern border while Lebanese elements would come in from the west. Moreover, in the same vein as its outreach to Egypt's Brotherhood and Iran's ayatollahs, Britain also began to put into effect an Islamist "Plan B" by contacting the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and encouraging it to stage simultaneous demonstrations in Syria's cities. The aim, it seems, was for the ensuing confusion to create a state of anarchy requiring intervention from the still pro-British Iraqi armed forces (Curtis 2012, p. 71). Worryingly, British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd also wrote to the new prime minister, Anthony Eden, with details of a longer-term plan. According to their correspondence, after the CIA- and MI6-sponsored coup had taken place, an effort would then be made to "attach Syria to the Iraqi state . . . in connection with the development of the fertile crescent" (Public Records Office 1956b). A date for the coup, known as "Operation Straggle," was set for late October 1956, while an aftercare plan was drawn up involving the sealing off of all Syrian border posts and with the USA immediately granting recognition to the new government (Curtis 2012, p. 71; Blum 2014, pp. 86–87).

Although the Suez Canal crisis derailed Straggle, with Eden asking for it to be aborted on the grounds that anti-Western sentiments were running too high in the region, within 3 months Damascus was back in the spotlight after it signed a technical aid agreement with the Soviet Union. According to Department of State reports, "the British [were] believed to favour active

stimulation of a change in the present regime in Syria, in an effort to assure a pro-Western orientation." By summer 1957 a new coup was thus prepared, this time with Kermit Roosevelt back at the helm. Known as the "Preferred Plan," it was again to rely on Brotherhood demonstrations along with the arming of "political factions with paramilitary capabilities." As before, violent border incidents were to be staged, but this time they were to be false flag operations so as to place the blame on the Syrian government. More drastically, Eden also authorized the assassination of a number of Syrian officials including the head of military intelligence and the chief of the general staff. Rather than relying on the Populist Party to take power, the USA and British fell back on the more tried and tested strategy of installing a strongman after the expected collapse of the government (Blum 2014, pp. 87–88; Curtis 2012, pp. 72–73). Opting for Adib Shishakli, London and Washington consciously backed the country's former military dictator who had staged an election in 1953 to install himself as president and had then banned all newspapers critical of him (Torrey 1964).

One of the CIA officers who had been involved in the earlier Iran operation was sent to Damascus, and Shishakli's former chief of security was brought to Lebanon so that he could then be smuggled across the border in a US diplomatic vehicle. The stage was set for the Preferred Plan (Blum 2014, p. 88; Curtis 2012, p. 73). Or so it seemed. In fact a number of the USA's paid informants in the Syrian military had handed over their cash payments to Syrian intelligence along with the names of the CIA agents involved. They also revealed that the USA had promised the Shishakli faction between $300 and $400 million in aid if it made peace with Israel once it had seized power. The idea of a continuing US presence had quickly become untenable. Especially bitter, the expelled US Army attaché ran his Syrian motorbike escort off the road as he reached the Lebanese border, shouting to him that the Syrian chief of intelligence "and his commie friends" would have "the shit beaten out of them by him with one hand tied behind his back if they ever crossed his path again" (Blum 2014, p. 88).

Smarting from failure and forced to gaze in from the outside, the USA's focus on Syria nonetheless remained strong, with the Syrian government repeatedly complaining of "unidentified aircraft flying over Latakia" – the Mediterranean port where most foreign ships docked. As a NATO member since 1952, Turkey also seemed willing to be drawn into the standoff, likely in an attempt to underscore its role as an Eisenhower Doctrine-enforcing state. Indeed, at one point Eisenhower himself stated that the Turks were massing on Syria's border with a "readiness to act" due to "anticipated aggression" from Syria and that "the US would undertake to expedite shipments of arms already committed to the Middle Eastern countries, and further, would replace losses as quickly as possible" (Blum 2014, p. 91).

On top of these pressure-building tactics, the US media continued its campaign to brand Syria a "Soviet satellite," even though there was little evidence to support such assertions. Certainly by 1958 this seemed wholly implausible as under the terms of Syria's merger with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic both states had declared their respective communist parties to be illegal (Blum 2014, p. 94). As a *New York Times* correspondent later described, a number of reports were nevertheless still filed, mostly describing Soviet arms and aircraft arriving in Syria, but these later proved to be false (Blum 2014, pp. 90–91). Even the Department of Defense was reluctant to buy into the ongoing CIA and Department of State Soviet-Syria narrative, with one of its reports stating that "the Soviet Union has shown no intention of direct intervention in any of the previous Middle Eastern crises, and we believe it is unlikely that they would intervene, directly, to assure the success of a leftist coup in Syria" (Blum 2014, p. 91). Furthermore, on the subject of the anti-communist Turkish antagonism, one of Eisenhower's own advisers later wrote of how the undersecretary of state "reviewed in rueful detail . . . some recent clumsy clandestine US attempts to spur Turkish forces to do some vague kind of battle against Syria" (Blum 2014, pp. 91–92; Hughes 1963, pp. 253–254).

Although a glimmer of hope came for the White House in 1961 following an army-led

coup d'état that took Syria out of the short-lived United Arab Republic (with Egypt) and restored Syrian independence, in many ways its only real function was to reverse Egyptian encroachment and end Damascus' subordinate status to Cairo. Weak and lacking popular support, the post-coup regime was soon vulnerable to an increasingly militant wing of the *Ba'ath* and its numerous sympathizers within the armed forces. After seizing power in 1963, the *Ba'ath* renamed Syria the "Syrian Arab Republic" (Oron 1965, pp. 605–607; Filiu 2015, p. 51) and sought to reaffirm its nationalist credentials, albeit outside Nasser's sphere of influence. Pro-*Ba'ath* military officers were promoted, including a prominent lieutenant colonel, Hafez al-Assad, who was made commander of the air force, while his brother Rifaat assumed control over the party's militia (Filiu 2015, pp. 58–59). As this worst-case scenario unfolded, the US and British leaders met but were only able to agree upon a vague path forward that sought the "penetration and cultivation of disruptive elements in the Syrian armed forces . . . so that Syria can be guided by the West" (Blum 2014, p. 89).

From the War on Terror to the Arab Uprisings

In the wake of the "9/11" attacks in 2001 and the subsequent US intervention in Afghanistan, the George W. Bush administration had begun to mark up additional regimes in the region that, like the Taliban, were similarly uncooperative and in command of resource-rich and strategically significant territories. Unable to establish the same sort of links between these states and the purportedly 9/11-linked Al-Qaeda, the USA moved to an effective second stage in its "War on Terror," with Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address declaring that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were all part of an "Axis of Evil" that more broadly supported terrorism and sought to produce weapons of mass destruction (PBS 2002). Borrowing from Yossef Bodansky's "New Axis Pact" – as described in a 1992 paper prepared for the House Republican Research Committee –

Bush's target list was soon supplemented by his equally neoconservative colleagues. In May 2002 Undersecretary of State John Bolton then announced his "Beyond the Axis of Evil," adding Libya, Cuba, and Syria (by this stage presided over by Hafez al-Assad's son Bashar) as fellow travellers (Bodansky and Forrest 1992; BBC 2002).

Although the failures associated with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq effectively prevented the War on Terror from ever really reaching Bashar al-Assad's Syria or the other members of the two "evil" axes, the 2011 Arab uprisings nonetheless provided the USA and its allies with an invaluable opportunity to again try to dismantle the al-Assad regime and, in parallel, the equally problematic Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi. In this sense, the amorphous nature of the so-called Arab Spring was exploited for its strategic silver lining. Although the mass nationwide uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen had clearly knocked out key Western clients, the idea was to give ostensibly similar but evidently much smaller-scale protest movements in Libya and Syria the sort of outside helping hand they needed to become full-blown and state-threatening insurgencies.

Apart from the staunchest of anti-imperialists, few of course would dispute that by this stage the al-Assad and Gaddafi dictatorships were equally if not more venal and repressive than those of Hosni Mubarak, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and Ali Abdullah Saleh. Few also would doubt that their supposed "resistance" to states like Israel was largely for show and primarily a function of their own legitimacy building. As Hamid Dabashi explains, by then both Syria and Libya, along with the Arab world's other authoritarian-socialist states and Iran-aligned powers, were mostly "united in hypocrisy" as they "offered no alternative to domination by imperialism; they are a condition of this domination" (Dabashi 2012, p. 111, 204). But the fact remained that these two regimes, sitting astride vast natural resources and in command of key ports, rivers, and borders, were still significant obstacles that had long frustrated the ambitions of Western governments and their constituent corporations to gain greater access.

With the Western publics still mindful of the disastrous Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns and with the stakes too high for Washington, London, or Tel Aviv to get caught directly supporting opposition movements in Libya and especially Syria (which was not only allied to Iran but had also long been home to a Russian naval facility), the solution appears to have been to use Arab proxy powers. In this sense, the same pro-Western states in the region that had survived the Arab uprisings and were already sponsoring counter-revolutionary activity in Egypt and Tunisia soon took on the concurrent role of funding and weaponizing a more violent and Western-sponsored version of the "Arab Spring." With Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar duly working together but separately against the Syrian and Libyan governments despite their differences elsewhere on the regional chessboard, a sort of "alliance of rivals" had formed where, as per state cartel theory, the benefits of cooperation were clearly deemed to outweigh the costs (Hobson 1902, p. 301). Sometimes referred to as the "Axis of Moderation," derived from a speech delivered by Tony Blair to the World Affairs Council in 2006 in which he called for an "alliance of moderation" in the Middle East to counter the "arc of extremism," and clearly modelled on Condoleezza Rice's 2007 definition of "centers of moderation" that could fight those "on the other side of that divide . . . that have made their choice to destabilize," these three proxies, along with Kuwait, Jordan, and others, were ready to take on the "Axis of Resistance" (BBC 2006; New Yorker 2007).

The War for Syria

Although as 2011 progressed and Bashar al-Assad soon outlasted Muammar Gaddafi, his long-term survival prospects seemed little better. Despite much fragmentation and a growing jihadist menace, what Syrian blogger Shadia Safwan describes as a "domestic nucleus of opposition" was nonetheless forming (Safwan 2012, p. 121). Even if most of the Syrian population remained loyal to the government, as also initially seemed to be the case in Libya, it became increasingly apparent that

such a nucleus was to serve as the conduit for external support and perhaps even a full-scale intervention. Certainly, with a number of so-called "moderate" opposition groups coalescing into a "Free Syrian Army," their new shadow government – known as the Syrian National Council – seemed well placed to assume the same sort of pro-Western role as the Libyan National Transitional Council had eventually done. Sensing victory, even the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's several fighting brigades – by then known as the Commission of the Shields of the Revolution – had quickly subordinated themselves to the bigger Western-backed FSA despite many of their preachers continuing to call the USA the "world's leader in terrorism" (Lefevre 2015, pp. 56–57).

With al-Assad's family and many of his key military and security commanders being Alawite, a minority Shia sect which accounted for about 12% of the Syrian population in 2011, it seemed that the quickest way for the Western powers and their regional allies to boost the prospects of both the FSA and the Brotherhood was by adding a stronger sectarian edge to the conflict. In this sense, regardless of the nonsectarian slogans of the original protests in Daraa, Hama, Homs, and elsewhere, it was reasoned that if the regime could be portrayed as a cadre of Shia overlords, then it could more easily be overwhelmed by a full-scale nationwide revolution led by a Syrian Sunni majority. Leading the charge were prominent preachers in the Gulf monarchies, some of whom had online followings in their millions. Kuwait's Nabil al-Audi, Saudi Arabia's Mohamad al-Arefe, and the Saudi-based Syrian cleric Adnan al-Aroor all jumped on the bandwagon by repeatedly describing the Syrian uprising as a jihad against the "polytheist" Alawite regime and, more broadly, as part of an international Sunni struggle against Shia oppression (European Parliament 2013, p. 14; Brownlee et al. 2015, p. 91). Although most US officials were naturally too cautious to offer their opinions, a number of key opinion-makers nonetheless seemed firmly on board. As one of the most influential supporters of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Stanford University's Fouad Ajami perhaps unsurprisingly chose to rationalize the Syrian conflict as a "revolt

that fused a sense of economic disinheritance and the wrath of a Sunni majority determined to rid itself of the rule of a godless lot" (Ajami 2012). Similarly, as early as August 2011, the University of Vermont's Gregory Gause had already described "the sectarian element of the Syrian confrontation, with an ostensibly secular and Alawite Shia-dominated regime brutally suppressing the Sunni Muslim majority" (Gause 2011).

Although European government briefings noted how such efforts to sectarianize the conflict were fuelling the image of a "regional Shia conspiracy," the problematic reality in Syria was quite a bit different, helping us understand why the Sunni masses did not immediately shift their allegiances away from the regime to the rebels. As one rebel fighter wistfully told the *New York Times*: "Before the revolution, we never had this feeling toward any sect" (European Parliament 2013, p. 14; New York Times 2016). In Ziauddin Sardar's words, for all its faults, the al-Assad regime was "a bit more inclusive, sharing power between Sunni, Christian, Druze, and Alawite elites." As he has since reflected, this is "perhaps why [Bashar] still has support from members of all communities" (Sardar 2012, p. 7). As others have pointed out, not only is Bashar's wife's family Sunni but so too have been many high-ranking officials in the Syrian government including Walid Muallem who, as foreign minister, is arguably the second most public face of the regime (USA Today 2013; Weiss and Hassan 2015, p. 91). Leading Sunni clerics also remained loyal to the regime, although as Edinburgh University's Thomas Pierret has astutely demonstrated, this was mostly a result of the government having earlier co-opted much of the religious establishment into the political fold (Pierret 2013; European Parliament 2013, p. 11).

Likely hoping US or NATO air strikes could be avoided, not least given Syria's complicating alliances with Iran and Russia, the Western governments sought at first to keep their support for the opposition as discreet and as limited as possible. While some have accused the Western embassies of having stirred up the original uprisings, there is little hard evidence to support this view, although there is no doubt they had made early expressions

of solidarity. In July 2011, for example, the US and French ambassadors had visited the opposition stronghold in Hama which led to a strong condemnation from the Syrian government. According to the interior minister, "Ambassador Ford's visit to the restive central city of Hama was proof that Washington was inciting unrest." He also claimed that "Mr Ford met with saboteurs and incited them to violence, protest, and rejection of dialogue." Defending the episode, US officials have explained that Ford and his French counterpart, Eric Chevallier, had indeed travelled to Hama to meet with demonstrators but had left shortly before the protests began. They claimed that when the two men entered the city "their car was immediately surrounded by friendly protesters who were putting flowers on the windshields, they were putting olive branches on the car, they were chanting down with the regime" (BBC 2011).

But by 2012, with the Syrian uprising still not having evolved into a fully national revolution or even a sectarian civil war, there was a growing realization that much more direct support was required. At the very least, the opposition needed to get more weapons and funding so they could keep fighting, and ideally they needed sufficiently sophisticated battlefield equipment so that they could enjoy a qualitative advantage over the much larger Syrian government forces. According to Seymour Hersh, a CIA- and MI6-sponsored "ratline" for weapons duly began, with arms that had originally been sent to Libyan rebels, mostly supplied by Qatar and the UAE, then being re-exported to the Syrian conflict. As he explains, Australian front companies earlier set up in post-Gaddafi Libya took care of the logistics, while the CIA's inclusion of MI6 as its partner was designed to enable the agency to classify the operation as a "liaison activity" and thus allowed it to circumvent the layers of congressional oversight that had been installed in the wake of the Nicaragua campaign (London Review of Books 2014). As later reports in the *Washington Post* and *IHS Janes* indicate, by 2013 this had evolved into a more comprehensive CIA operation, while in parallel the White House announced a more public $500 million program to train and equip "the right

militants" and the "moderate rebels," a process which apparently involved some sort of screening for extremist views and then the transfer of heavy weapons including US-manufactured anti-tank missiles (Washington Post 2014; Huffington Post 2014; IHS Janes 2014).

The Proxy War Unfolds

In an almost carbon copy of the leading role they had undertaken in Libya, the Gulf monarchies were strongly encouraged to enmesh themselves in the politics and financing of the Syrian opposition. As far as these and other nearby Western proxies were concerned, there seemed little downside to having Bashar al-Assad ousted. Moreover, having witnessed the speed and success of NATO's intervention in Libya, it is likely that even if no promises had been made by Washington, the Gulf rulers nevertheless expected a similar intervention, at least in the form of a no-fly zone. In this scenario, they could be confident that the conflict would be wrapped up within a few months, thus giving Iran and Syria's other allies such as *Hezbollah* as little opportunity as possible to mount a counter-attack.

As they had in Libya with the National Transitional Council, the Gulf monarchies began by using the Arab League as a vehicle to endorse the Syrian National Council and expel the Syrian government. Under Qatari chairmanship the organization had already agreed to do this in November 2011, albeit with Lebanon and Yemen voting no, Iraq abstaining, and Algeria raising serious objections on the basis it would complicate future peaceful solutions. In parallel, the Arab League was also used to lobby the UN Security Council to do the same, but with only limited results given the vetoes of both Russia and China. More successful were Saudi Arabia's efforts to use its UN Human Rights Council membership, which the British government had helped it to secure, to call for "concrete, immediate, and comprehensive reforms" to address the "deplorable situation of human rights" in Syria (Atwan 2015, p. 96; Mann 2012; Ulrichsen 2014, p. 135; Independent 2015b).

Writing soon after the Arab League decision, Columbia University's Joseph Massad made it clear that the "League and imperial powers have taken over the Syrian uprising in order to remove the Al-Assad regime" (Al-Jazeera 2011). Taking a similar position, so it seemed, was the UN and Arab League's joint peace envoy who chose to drop his Arab League affiliation on the basis that it was "backing the opposition at all costs" and preventing key powers such as Iran from participating in negotiations. Nonetheless, by the beginning of 2013, the Arab League had begun inviting the head of the SNC to sit as Syria's representative under the Syrian flag in its meetings, while it succeeded in freezing Syria's assets in most of its member states and blocking further Arab investment in Syria (Atwan 2015, pp. 96–97; Ulrichsen 2014, p. 134). Co-founded by a grandson of the previously described former military dictator who had been backed by the CIA and MI6 in their attempt to overthrow the Syrian government in 1957, the SNC was by this stage running a de facto shadow government from bases in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey (Times of Israel 2013).

On a state-to-state level, the Doha regime certainly began to assume one of the biggest roles, much as it had in Libya. Suspending all diplomatic relations and trade agreements with Damascus and thus abruptly reversing the once burgeoning relationship between the al-Thani and al-Assad dynasties, Qatar and Al-Jazeera soon sought to portray the Syrian uprising as yet another instance of the Arab Spring, just as it had done with the Benghazi protests. Described by al-Assad loyalists as broadcasting "exaggerated and dishonest coverage," Al-Jazeera's intensive coverage of Syria was, as Marc Lynch notes, seen by many as an "energetic media campaign organized outside Syria . . . largely divorced from realities on the ground" (Lynch 2012, p. 181).

More importantly there is compelling evidence that the US CENTCOM-hosting Qatar also became the principal NATO link to the conflict, being best placed to provide substantial levels of funds and weapons to the Syrian rebels far beyond the cautious and modest assistance provided by the CIA and MI6. As with its similar job in Libya,

however, this was initially obscured by attempts to frame Qatar's intervention as an opportunity for Doha to take a stand against "tyrannical rule." Sultan Barakat of the Brookings Doha Center, for example, described it as something of a natural shift to a more interventionist foreign policy due to the opportunities of the Arab Spring, while the *Economist* explained Qatar's actions as part of its "pursuing an aggressively non-aligned foreign policy" (Barakat 2012, p. 36; Economist 2013). Others have even tried to present Qatar's intervention as part of "stepping up to play a role" in the context of Mubarak's demise and "[the] US having lost in a way its central diplomatic partner in the [Arab] world" (NPR 2013).

Much closer to the truth, however, was the investigative reporter Elizabeth Dickinson who wrote in an extensive *Foreign Policy* essay in 2014 that "[Qatar] had such freedom to run its network for the last three years because Washington was looking the other way." Putting it more precisely, she also stated that "in fact, in 2011, the US gave Doha de facto free rein to do what it wasn't willing to do in the Middle East: intervene" (Dickinson 2014). In an article for the BBC, King's College London's David Roberts, who had previously been based in Doha, similarly concluded that "there is no chance that Qatar is doing this alone: the US and Britain governments will certainly be involved in or at least apprised of Qatar's plans" (BBC 2015).

Getting money to the rebels was relatively straightforward, with Qatar having set up a number of funding channels for the Syrian National Council and in some cases directly to the Free Syrian Army. In early 2012, for example, it was reported that the Qatar-backed Libyan National Transitional Council had recycled $100 million to "anti-al-Assad officials" in Syria, ostensibly as Libyan humanitarian aid for Syria. With further donations made, some directly from Qatar, the SNC promised that they would reduce any confusion by serving as the "link between those who want to help and the revolutionaries." Qatar's prime minister gave his public blessing to such assistance on the grounds that the Syrians are "right to defend themselves . . . I think we should help these people by all means" (Guardian 2012).

In late 2012 he further justified his country's support on the basis that Syria was no longer just in a state of civil war but that the government had begun to carry out genocide (Agence France-Presse 2012).

Naturally, as was the case with its Libya strategy, Qatar was not only backing the formal opposition but was also making sure funds reached the more extremist groups, including even Al-Qaeda's *Jabhat al-Nusra* franchise. As brazen as Qatari officials had been about contravening the UN resolution on Libya, by admitting the deployment of their special forces on the ground, so too were they quite open about the sort of groups they were willing to finance in Syria. Speaking at a conference in late 2012, Qatar's deputy foreign minister explained to the audience that "I am very much against excluding anyone at this stage, or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them as Al-Qaeda given Qatar's perceived necessity of removing al-Assad at all costs" (Dickinson 2014). Indeed, in a 2012 interview with a German correspondent, one *Al-Nusra* member stated bluntly that his organization's evocative name was "a great name . . . we get money from the Gulf with it" (Weiss and Hassan 2015, p. 100).

Designated a terror fundraiser by the US Department of the Treasury, an Iraqi cleric had already appeared on Al-Jazeera praying at the opening ceremony of Qatar's state mosque and standing only a few feet away from the Qatari crown prince (New York Times 2014). Similarly, Qatar's ministry for Islamic affairs was understood to have invited a Kuwaiti cleric known for his running of a Syrian opposition support network. Allowed to preach in a Qatari mosque, he argued that mere humanitarian assistance to Syria was insufficient and declared that "the priority is the support for the jihadists and arming them" or, as the *New York Times* reported him saying, "give your money to the ones who will spend it on jihad, not aid" (New York Times 2014; Dickinson 2014). After he had returned to Kuwait, collections were raised on his behalf by an individual whose Twitter biography described himself as "loving Sunni jihadists who hate Shia and infidels" and whose Twitter timeline was "flush with praise for Osama bin Laden." When particularly

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big donations were received, they tweeted them, including pictures of expensive Qatar-bought jewelry. One Al-Qaeda-linked brigade even released a video in which the Kuwaiti cleric personally appeared to thank "the kind people of Qatar, O people of the Gulf, your money has arrived" (Dickinson 2014).

Some Syrian rebels were also reported to have "[deliberately] grown the long, scraggly beards favoured by hardline salafist Muslims after hearing that Qatar was more inclined to give weapons to Islamists," while others were understood to be using the money to "buy weapons in large quantities and then burying them in caches, to be used after the collapse of the al-Assad government" (New York Times 2012a). The *New York Times* also claimed that members of the Qatari funding and tweeting circle had appeared on Al-Jazeera and had received favorable coverage, while perhaps even more remarkably, others reported that *Al-Nusra*'s leaders had begun to visit Doha in person and, according to both US officials and those of other Arab governments, had held meetings with senior Qatari officials and key financiers (New York Times 2014; Wall Street Journal 2015b; Independent 2015a).

As far as the USA was concerned, there only seemed to be one limit on what Qatar could help supply. Likely fearful of civilian aircraft being brought down, a request was reportedly made that no heat-seeking shoulder-mounted antiaircraft missiles be delivered to Syrian rebels. But by 2013 even this seemed to have been ignored, with US intelligence officials claiming to have knowledge of "Qatar's shadowy arms network," stating to the *New York Times* that at least two batches of such missiles had been sent to Syria since the beginning of the year, one being Chinese-manufactured and the other Eastern European and previously part of Libya's arsenal. A few months later, some of the videos produced by rebel units, including known extremist groups, rather embarrassingly featured such missiles – none of which were known to have been part of the Syrian government's inventory nor to have appeared in the Syrian conflict before (New York Times 2013c).

According to data supplied by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, over the course of late 2012 and the first half of 2013, approximately 160 military cargo flights arrived in Turkey and Jordan laden with a total of 3,500 t of weapons and equipment destined for Syria. As the SIPRI has stated, by far the largest number of flights, 85, originated from Qatar (New York Times 2013a). Helping explain this, US officials later confirmed that the CIA had been involved in a "consultative role" and that Qatar's activeness in the "global gray market for arms" had been greatly enhanced by its acquisition of C-17 military transport planes from Boeing. These aircraft, described as "capable of intercontinental flight and landing on short, poorly equipped runways," were understood to be being used for both military and humanitarian missions and had been delivered to Qatar in 2009, making it the only Middle Eastern state at the time in possession of durable long-range aircraft (New York Times 2013b, c; Agence France-Presse 2008).

Going through the motions, as they had done with Qatar's well-known equipping of Libyan militias, a batch of US officials had tried to place some distance between the two countries, stating that the "US had growing concerns that, just as in Libya, the Qataris are equipping some of the wrong militants" (New York Times 2012b). Other officials told the media that "the [Syrian] opposition groups that are receiving most of the lethal aid are exactly the ones we don't want to have it" and claimed that the weaponizing of the Syrian opposition was an operation that was "going awry." Complaining to the *New York Times*, they explained that "hardline Islamists have received the lion's share of the arms shipped to the Syrian opposition through the shadowy pipeline with roots in Qatar, and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia" (New York Times 2012a). More realistically, however, a few months later, a White House official explained that "Syria is [Qatar's] backyard, and they have their own interests they are pursuing" (New York Times 2013c).

Less is known about the extent of arms flowing into Syria from the other Gulf monarchies during this period; however, the SIPRI's data from late 2012 and early 2013 indicates that 37 of the incoming military cargo flights originated from various parts of Saudi Arabia (New York Times

2013a). Jordanian officials also claimed to have seized several shipments of arms destined for Syria that had come from Riyadh, indicating a land route had also been established of which they did not entirely approve (Atwan 2015, p. 102). Raising funds for such equipment seemed to be no problem, with reports circulating of numerous Saudi clerics soliciting donations. In one case, a Syria-based Saudi preacher who was known to be close to Al-Qaeda was discovered to be running a campaign called "Wage jihad with your money." As part of this, donors could earn "silver status" by giving $175 for sniper bullets or "gold status" for giving $350 to help purchase mortar rounds (New York Times 2013d). In another case a Saudi citizen known as Sanafi al-Nasr was reportedly killed in northwestern Syria after having served as an Al-Qaeda recruiter and having "moved funds from the Gulf into Iraq and then to Al-Qaeda leaders in Syria" (Reuters 2015b).

According to a *Wall Street Journal* investigation, the bulk of Syria-destined Saudi weapons seemed to have been procured from third-party countries. Their correspondents explained that, in line with the CIA's long-held preference for false flag signaling, "in September and October [2012], the Saudis approached Croatia to procure more Soviet-era weapons. The Saudis got started distributing these in December and soon saw momentum shift toward the rebels in some areas." Again, as with attempts to establish some distance from Qatar so as to insulate themselves from any possible fallout from such risky moves, US officials were cited as cautioning that "this has the potential to go badly wrong . . . [because of] the risk that weapons will end up in the hands of violent anti-Western Islamists." It was also claimed that "not everyone in the Obama administration is comfortable with the new US partnership with the Saudis on Syria," with some officials apparently balking at the role being played by Saudi intelligence chief Bandar bin Sultan al-Saud. Notably, there was a "fear [Syria] carries the same risk of spinning out of control as an earlier project in which [Saudi Arabia] was involved – the 1980s CIA programme of secretly financing the contras in Nicaragua against a leftist government" (Wall Street Journal 2013).

On top of its clerics visiting Qatar, there are also strong indications that Kuwait itself was serving as a logistical and financing hub for Syrian opposition groups, including extremist organizations. Described in one particularly detailed report as the rebels' "back office" and as one of the main "back channels" for private weapons transfers (Ulrichsen 2014, pp. 138–139; National 2013), the emirate's reputation was not helped when a Kuwaiti preacher openly bragged on a Saudi-owned television station in 2013 of having personally bought up weapons from the "Western-backed councils" in Syria. As he put it, "when the military councils sell the weapons they receive, guess who buys them? It's me." Later identified by US officials as a leading supporter of *Al-Nusra*, he also usefully confirmed on television that "all the Gulf intelligence agencies are competing in Syria and everyone is trying to get the lion's share of the Syrian revolution" (New York Times 2014).

Much of the Kuwaiti funding for such individuals and their networks seems to have come from a mix of informal mosque collections and those held in family-owned *diwan* meeting houses. In 2013, for example, the *New York Times* described how one such Kuwaiti effort raised enough to pay 12,000 rebel fighters $2,500 each. When interviewed about this, one former Kuwaiti soldier reasoned that "now we want to get Bashar out of Syria, so why not cooperate with Al-Qaeda?" (New York Times 2013d). According to Elizabeth Dickinson, social media also played a prominent role in "touting their cause." As she explains, in this way "a deep Rolodex of Kuwaiti business contacts, clerics, and other prominent Kuwaiti Sunnis raised hundreds of millions of dollars for their clients" (Dickinson 2014). As a briefing prepared for the European Parliament alleged, one such preacher was able to raise so much money in this manner that an entire Syrian brigade named itself after him – the *Katibat al-Sheikh Hajaj al-Ajami* (European Parliament 2013, p. 14).

With al-Assad still very much in place by the end of 2013, the Western powers and their regional proxies effectively revamped their strategy of strengthening the rebels on the ground. With Damascus' Iranian allies now clearly playing a pivotal role on the battlefield and with

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Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah having already declared of Syria that "This battle is ours . . . and I promise you victory" (BBC 2013), the US' fallback option seemed to be a massive and urgent increase in its backing for those opposition groups it still felt were publicly supportable, alongside turning an even blinder eye to the type of Syrian rebels that the Gulf monarchies were continuing to support.

Greatly reinvigorated and expanded, the USA's program of supplying the "right militants" spawned a string of statements over the course of 2014 promising further weapons. In February 2015 the USA announced that teams of such rebels would be brought across to Jordan and Turkey for training and would then be supplied with Toyota Hi-Lux trucks. The Toyotas were to be "outfitted with a machine gun, communications gear and global positioning system trackers enabling them to call in airstrikes. . . along with mortars" (Wall Street Journal 2015a). In October 2015, just days after Russia began to conduct air strikes on behalf of the Syrian government, US officials informed the media that they had begun to make "air drops of small arms ammunition" to unspecified Syrian rebels in northern Syria. They explained this was part of their "revamped strategy" (Reuters 2015a; Al-Jazeera 2015a).

As well as the US-supported units often turning on each other, including the worryingly named "Knights of Righteousness" eventually fighting the "Syrian Democratic Forces," a more serious problem for the USA's renewed efforts was that most of the fighters the CIA had chosen to back had already suffered numerous defeats, with many having had their weapons seized by *Al-Nusra* or other such groups (Washington Post 2014; IHS Janes 2014; Los Angeles Times 2016). According to one Arab intelligence officer, "[extremist organizations] say they are always pleased when sophisticated weapons are sent to anti-al-Assad groups of any kind, because they can always get the arms off them by threats of force or cash payments" (Cockburn 2015, p. 3). Similarly, as per the USA's own intelligence assessments from late 2014, funding from the USA and its allies that was flowing to anti-regime rebels was still "consistently ending up in the

hands of the most virulent extremists" (Middle East Eye 2015). As a former Defense Intelligence Agency official described, once US-backed fighters crossed back over the border into Syria, "you lose a substantial amount of control or ability to control their actions" (Los Angeles Times 2016).

An even bigger issue for the USA, however, was whether its favored "moderates" were ever really moderate to begin with. Department of Defense officials had reportedly been aware for some time that the "vast majority of moderate Free Syrian Army rebels were in fact, Islamist militants" (Middle East Eye 2015). Also critical of the FSA's credentials was Britain's former ambassador to Syria, who stated bluntly in television interviews that the "so-called FSA is just a footnote . . . let's be clear here, we're talking about jihadists, most of the opposition groups are jihadists" (Sky News 2015). Similarly, as a former director of French intelligence warned, either the intelligence services had been "given bad information or it was [the government's] policies that, despite the information, wanted to go in a direction that was not the reality." In particular he worried that "we will be manipulated into helping people, supposedly rebellious, whereas in reality they have been pushed by Al-Qaeda. . ." (Paris Match 2016). Pointing out that well-known FSA commanders had already publicly defected to the Islamic State or "other, more militarily successful extremist groups," Abdel Bari Atwan was equally suspicious (Atwan 2015, p. 104; Al-Jazeera 2013b). Published in summer 2013, a report prepared for the European Parliament stated that *Al-Nusra*'s fighters had "operated many times alongside FSA formations on the battlefield earning public praise from prominent rebel leaders." It also described how "many salafists are believed to fight within FSA units but these rebel formations portray the uprising as a national struggle against an oppressive dictatorship rather than as a Sunni jihad against an Alawite regime" (European Parliament 2013, pp. 16–17). An International Crisis Group report from 2012 made much the same suggestion, arguing that "mainstream rebel groups eager for more effective weapons and tactics likely find that benefits of such collaboration

[with extremist groups] outweigh any long-term political and ideological concerns" (International Crisis Group 2012).

Others also questioned the FSA's ability to police criminality within its own ranks. Writing for *Middle East Policy*, counter-terrorism specialist Ahmad Hashim noted how the "undisciplined and brutal behaviour of the FSA" stood in contrast to the much more disciplined *Al-Nusra*, which often set up efficient food and medicine distribution systems in areas under its control (Hashim 2014, p. 7). Similarly a British journalist familiar with the region accused the FSA of engaging in looting and banditry (Cockburn 2015, p. 85), while Arabic media correspondents reported that former peasants had been enriching themselves through the FSA, allowing them to buy "huge new homes and expensive cars" (Atwan 2015, p. 105). Giving more detail, an extensive *Daily Telegraph* report featured interviewees in Syria describing how FSA commanders had been focused on profiteering, gun-running, and the extracting of tolls from road checkpoints. One interviewee even described how the FSA was taking bribes from the Syrian regime to allow government forces to get supplies to besieged units. The report concluded that in northern Syria at least the FSA "has now become a largely criminal enterprise" (Daily Telegraph 2013). Disturbingly, in 2015 *NBC News* even had to revise its official account of the brief 2012 kidnapping of its chief foreign correspondent Richard Engel (NBC 2015). Having originally stated that Engel was captured by the pro-regime and predominantly Alawite *Shabiha* or "Ghosts" militia before then being rescued by "Sunni rebels," *NBC News'* position dramatically changed following an investigation by the *New York Times*. Having interviewed *NBC News* employees and Syrian activists, it was suggested that "Mr Engel's team was almost certainly taken by a Sunni criminal element affiliated with the FSA, the loose alliance of rebels opposed to Mr Assad." The *New York Times'* correspondents concluded that Engel was likely misled by his captors in order to discredit the Syrian government (New York Times 2015).

To make matters worse, there was considerable evidence that known extremist groups in Syria were actively trying to sanitize their images and present themselves alongside the FSA as suitable candidates for US support. In journalist Patrick Cockburn's assessment of such groups, and especially those close to Damascus, those that had earlier given themselves "Islamic-sounding names to attract Saudi and Gulf financing" had by this stage "opportunistically switched to more secular-sounding titles in a bid to attract US support" (Cockburn 2015, p. 26). According to a European Parliament report, one such organization based close to the Lebanese border had changed its name to the "Rafic Hariri Brigade" in reference to the pro-Western former Lebanese prime minister (European Parliament 2013, p. 13). Moreover, the Yarmouk Brigade and other such groups, which ended up becoming part of the US- and Saudi-sponsored "Southern Front" based out of Jordan and eligible to receive advanced weaponry such as antiaircraft missiles, had frequently been spotted fighting alongside *Al-Nusra* (Cockburn 2015, p. 53). In 2013 the Yarmouk Brigade was also understood to have repeatedly detained UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights, and in late 2014 a Lebanese newspaper accused it of having already secretly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Atwan 2015, p. 109; Al-Jazeera 2013a; As-Safir 2014).

The "Syrian Islamic Liberation Front" seems to have tried to follow the same sort of path, having recognized the FSA and fought with it but then disbanding within a year after many of its ultra-conservative members had joined *Al-Nusra* or the Islamic State (Atwan 2015, p. 107). Moreover, in a widely read January 2014 *Foreign Affairs* article a group called *Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya* or "The Islamic movement of the free men of the Levant" was openly described as "an Al-Qaeda-linked group worth befriending," with the three US thinktank authors trying to place it temporarily within the US-friendly camp. But although it had cooperated with the FSA in military actions, others have noted how many of its fighters later moved over to the Islamic State and that it was still very much an Al-Qaeda-style organization, having been co-founded by Abu Khalid al-Suri. Indeed, US federal prosecutors have since described it as

"frequently fighting alongside *Jabhat Al-Nusra*" and as having the goal of "installing an Islamic state in Syria." Nonetheless, as recently as July 2015, *Ahrar al-Sham's* spokesman wrote on the *Washington Post*'s website that it still favored "a moderate future for Syria that preserves the state and institutes reforms that benefit all Syrians," while a few months later Qatar's foreign minister claimed in an Al-Jazeera interview that it was not an extremist organization but rather "a Syrian group [looking] for their liberation, and they are working with other moderate groups" (Doran et al. 2014; Atwan 2015, p. 107; Washington Post 2015; Al-Jazeera 2015b; Daily Telegraph 2016).

The most remarkable attempt at a volte-face has, however, been the Saudi-backed *Jaysh al-Islam* or "Army of Islam" – an umbrella for dozens of rebel groups created in late 2013 (Guardian 2013). Giving an interview on its behalf in May 2015, former *Liwa al-Islam* leader Zahran Alloush tried to backtrack completely on his earlier sectarian and anti-democratic statements. As the University of Oklahoma's Joshua Landis observes, this was evidence of Alloush's increasing savviness as "every major player wants to be acceptable to the West and to the international community" (McClatchy 2015). Not all, however, were convinced, as a few months later the Jordan government reaffirmed its designation of the group as a terrorist organization, while *Al-Hayat* newspaper reported that *Jaysh al-Islam*'s fighters in Ghouta were putting Alawite civilians in iron cages and using them as "human shields" (Al-Monitor 2015; Al-Hayat 2015). Since then Russia has attempted to add *Jaysh al-Islam* along with *Ahrar al-Sham* to the UN terror sanctions blacklist, but its efforts have been blocked by the USA, Britain, France, and the Ukraine, with a US spokesman stating that "now is not the time to shift course, but rather double-down on our efforts towards a reduction in violence" and with an anonymous diplomat stating that such a designation would "provide a pretext for yet more moderate groups to come under target" (Agence France-Presse 2016).

More information is slowly coming to light about Britain's support for such Syrian rebels, as it seems to have followed the same trajectory as

the USA, with the definition of "moderate" being stretched extremely widely. Following an investigation by the *Guardian*, it transpired that since 2013 the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense had been hiring contractors to "produce videos, photos, military reports, radio broadcasts, print products, and social media posts branded with the logos of fighting groups." According to the investigators, which had seen government contracting documents, Britain was "effectively running a press office for opposition fighters" and that the materials it circulated online were "posted with no indication of British government involvement." The campaign appears to have been funded by the "Conflict and Stability Fund" and to have been based out of Istanbul under the guise of delivering "strategic communications and media operations support to the Syrian moderate armed opposition." Worryingly, the contracts seen by the *Guardian* included references to *Jaysh al-Islam* and a group called *Harakat Hazm* or "Steadfast Movement" which had collapsed in March 2015 with most of its weapons being seized by *Jabhat al-Nusra* (Guardian 2016; Al-Akhbar 2014).

Further light has been cast on British involvement by the circumstances surrounding the collapse of the London trial of a Swedish citizen accused of attending terrorist training camps, receiving weapons, and working with "a group considered to be Al-Qaeda in Syria." With the evidence supplied to the court having reportedly made clear that "Britain's security and intelligence agencies would have been deeply embarrassed if the trial had gone ahead," the suspect's lawyer had stated: "If it is the case that [the British] government was actively involved in supporting armed resistance to the al-Assad regime at a time when the defendant was present in Syria and himself participating in such resistance, it would be unconscionable to allow the prosecution to continue." Another lawyer involved in the case agreed, arguing: "Given that there is a reasonable basis for believing that the British were themselves involved in the supply of arms, if that's so, it would be an utter hypocrisy to prosecute someone who has been involved in the armed resistance" (Guardian 2015).

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Syria's Political Economy and Imperialism

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Introduction

In 2019, the military imperialist assault on Syria has entered its eighth year. As the political rift widens between the global powers – Sino-Russian versus American – the war ravages Syria's infrastructure, physical assets, people, and cultural heritage. The Syrian uprising began in 2011 calling for civil rights. It has led to territorial disintegration, imperialist blockade, immense losses in life and assets, large population displacements, and the weakening of state autonomy. It is inevitable for internal strife in a geostrategic country like Syria to metastasize into international conflict. As the social unrest unfolded, regional and international players intervened in Syria, following their own political calculations. This is

evidenced by the US and Western backing of the Syrian opposition from the start, along with Qatar's early arming of rebel groups and Turkey's and Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of trans-state movement of non-Syrian militants into Syria. The Gulf countries armed and financed the opposition insurgency. Turkey also organized anti-government forces and provided safe havens through which foreign fighters transported. Salafist-jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (now known as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS)) and Ahrar al-Sham, and ISIS played a prominent role in escalating the insurgency of the Syrian conflict (Phillips 2016). On the side of the government, Iran and Hizbullah forces provided backing early on. Since 2015, Russian military support has enabled the Syrian government to conquer much of the rebel strongholds. Moreover, China's global economic rise and support for the national integrity of Syria are the power behind the sustainability of the Russian and Syrian ground and air forces.

Foreign intervention have complicated the overall geopolitical picture and blocked attempts to resolve the crisis diplomatically. At the time of writing, the Syrian government controls nearly three quarters of the country. Various jihadist extremist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), National Liberation Front (a Turkish-backed rebel alliance), Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion, which is a pro-al-Qaeda HTS splinter group), and Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) (Chinese Uighur-dominated jihadist group) are now concentrated in the Idlib province in Syria's northwest (BBC 2019). The American-supported Kurdish armed forces are in control of Syria's northeast. The Kurdish minority took advantage of state's loss of territorial control to further its imperialist-backed plans of re-designing borders. It gave rise to a political movement, known as PYD, that sought to some extent federalization and self-governance as compared to the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq (Hinnebusch 2019).

Imperialism is reattempting a re-division of the region, in a similar fashion to the Sykes-Picot treaty. To be sure, that splintering of the people of the region into colonially divided states has weakened the peoples' control over their fates

and resources. It has facilitated the ethnic cleansing and colonial settlement of historical Palestine. The splintering of the region remains a tinderbox of wars and a big boost for the industry of oil and militarism.

This entry reviews the history of imperialist intervention in Syria. It is structured into three parts. Section "Syria's Historical Struggle for Autonomy" covers post-independence Syria and its struggle to build autonomy amidst post-independence political instability. Section "The Neoliberal Ride" covers the al-Asad rule – father and son – and the subtle deconstructive mechanisms of imperialism that weakened society's institutional safeguards and debilitated the social bases of support. Section "The Current Conflict" tackles the current imperialist intervention, mainly evident through the internationalization of the conflict and the Western siege imposed on Syria. The central thread running through the entry is that Syria has been continuously subjected to imperialist assault in the form of international blockade, sanctions, neoliberal policies, and proxy war, all aimed at undermining Syria's autonomy and national integrity.

Syria's Historical Struggle for Autonomy

Like neighboring Arab states, the Syrian state came into being following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI and subsequent British and French colonization of the empire's territories in the early twentieth century. The Sykes-Picot treaty was one form of Western meddling that sketched the contours of Syria's and other Middle Eastern nation states, creating unfavorable conditions for subsequent state formation which remained in place after Syria's independence (Hinnebusch 2019). It split Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan from Syria. The state of Syria, as it is known today, is therefore considered a "residual state" of whatever was left of the previous "natural Syria" (Salama 1987). It was not only then that Syria was subjected to foreign intervention and manipulation. As this entry demonstrates, Syria has since struggled to ensure for itself a

modicum of autonomy. Starting with imperialistically designed treaties and conventions and moving to the armed conflicts and Arab defeat of Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars, these events represent a fraction of Syria's embattled post-independence history. US labeling of Syria as a supporter of terrorism since the 1980s, followed by US sanctions between 2003 and 2006, and the longstanding US blockade that prohibited Syria's accession into the WTO, all make crystal-clear that imperial powers have spared no effort to undermine Syria's sovereignty (Kadri 2016). For instance, the US Congress passed the Syria Accountability Act in late 2003. It is one of US sanctions levied against Syria, aimed to punish it for its alleged support of international terrorism. The Act prohibits US aid to and investment in Syria and restricts bilateral trade between the two countries so as to pressure Syria to end its relations with Iran, Hizbullah, and Hamas. In 2006, sanctions were imposed in light of the consequences connected to the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Furthermore, imperialist meddling has penetrated Syria through the international financial institutions' propagation of the hegemonic ideology, which influenced Syria's comprador class, leading them to further neo-liberalize Syria. One cannot underestimate the power of neoliberal ideology and the free-market ideal to which many national institutions have succumbed. More recently, imperialist intervention has reached its zenith through the prolonged proxy war on Syrian land, which has now lasted more than 8 years. Syria's complex history, marbled with war, sanctions, and consistent threat, reminds us of Mao's quotation: "In approaching a problem a Marxist should see the whole as well as the parts. A frog in a well says, 'The sky is no bigger than the mouth of the well.' That is untrue, for the sky is not just the size of the mouth of the well. If it said, 'A part of the sky is the size of the mouth of a well,' that would be true, for it tallies with the facts" (Mao 1935: 159). With this in mind, I analyze Syria's political economy against the imperialist context that has played a primary role in degrading Syria's autonomy, gradually enfolding it into monopoly capitalism, and weakening the institutional

safeguards that were once the guarantors for its post-independence security.

Syria gained its independence in 1946. Although it was born a liberal state in the postcolonial period, it remained dependent on external support, bearing in mind the legacy the break-up of the Ottoman Empire had imposed on postcolonial societies (Khoury 1984). The splitting up of Arab provinces then and the creation of national borders was a blow to the nascent national capacities. Colonial powers had severed the three major cities of the Arab Mashreq – Tripoli (the port city), Aleppo, and Mosul, which once formed the industrial heartland of the Mashreq during the early twentieth century – from Syria. The latter fragmentation weakened the industrial capacity of the Arab world and Arab merchants lacked the capacity to act independently of colonial powers during the Mandate period as they remained dependent on European firms (Issawi 1955). Furthermore, the colonial administration in Syria (1920–1946) opposed any serious attempt to enhance economic independence and industrialization.

The old bourgeois class therefore emerged financially weak and dependent on the state, failing to lift the economy out of the fragile conditions that existed in the post-independence period. In the crucible of such structural weaknesses – a poorly capitalized bourgeois class and semi-feudal postcolonial conditions – a different mode of development emerged. The state was the main capital holder, and pursued development independently from colonial powers by guaranteeing funds to building infrastructure, nurturing the national agricultural systems and industrial nuclei, and developing social projects. This ensemble led to the emergence of a state-led economic structure, which essentially prevailed until the late 1980s. The main economic pillars of this economic structure were extensive nationalization, land reform, and social-friendly economic measures (Matar 2016, 2018).

By launching a revolution against the postcolonial structure in 1963, the Ba'athist military officers, who upheld secularist and socialist values, seized control of the state and in turn secured power over resource allocation. By promoting pan-Arabism, the Syrian Ba'ath party,

which was officially founded in 1947, aimed at liberating the Arab world from colonialism and Western dependence. The party mainly constituted of militants who came from rural areas. Their rural origins partly explain their socialist leanings (Batatu 1981). In order to widen their social base, they allied themselves with the educated middle and unprivileged working classes. The government kept its ears close to the ground, ensuring the rules of development met working class aspirations. Thus, there were few unmet demands, and little opportunity for seeds of dissent to germinate. However, economic rights which were granted to the working class in the form of public services and job creation were manifest as a top-down process. They were more grants from on high than the fruit of worker control of government. People were not empowered to participate through political freedoms, even amidst the government decision to expand its social base by providing economic necessities. Through state-guided development and import-substitution investment (ISI), the Ba'athist government allocated a considerable amount of government spending to public investment and social development projects. It tailored fiscal and monetary policies towards achieving its successive economic five-year plans. The process of capital accumulation during the 1960s and early 1970s met rising social needs, generated employment, and wove social safety nets. This occurred amidst unique historical conditions which influenced the radical measures of the Ba'athist government. These occurred against the 1948 creation of Israel as a settler colonial state in Palestine and Israel's regional military superiority. The threat of Israel loomed, casting a shadow over development planning. The Ba'athist government consolidated its social base by incorporating cross-class alliances into its national front. Socially responsible policies and political control underpinned its national security structure. Furthermore, the economic assistance of the former Soviet Union, the paragon of state-led development, fostered Syrian economic dirigisme. The USSR's military assistance boosted Syrian self-defense capacity, in the event of Israel (or US) attack. The Soviets supplied Syria with weapons,

rebuilt its army and air force in the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 wars, and established a naval base in Tartus. Syria struggled in the post-independence era to build up its autonomy. An expanding Israel, a Western-armed settler colony, to its south threatened its national security, instigating "hot" conflicts and haunting Syria with ongoing military superiority.

Against a backdrop of insistent danger, the dirigiste model led to considerable and beneficial shifts for the Syrian people. Syria became a relatively prosperous and economically self-reliant nation. The land reform, for instance, led to tangible gains for the farmers, eventually leveling much of the old landed notable class and forging mass rural for the Ba'athist government, so solidly rooting the Ba'ath as to preempt political challenge from the old oligarchy. Syria registered significant advances, moving by leaps and bounds out of its post-independence indices of underdevelopment (or colonial development). It vanquished illiteracy, improved healthcare, and lifted other human development indicators. Syria also ensured its economic independence by locking resources in the economy, raising production to secure self-sufficiency, and channeling capital to sectors that exhibited high potential for employment creation. However, despite these *soi-disant* socialist measures, the Ba'athist model was not genuinely socialist. Its class structure remained capitalist as the state capitalist class accrued surplus value through its control of the means of the production and its regimentation of labor. The Ba'athist model did not empower the working class, who lacked political representation in the state. Although economic activities sought to increase output, the distribution of wealth was tilted in favor of the state bourgeois class, which gained privileges through its control of state. The latter process enabled Syria to attain, for a time, relative economic and political stability. But it was not to last. Syria's defeat in the wars against Israel and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union have paved the way for it to part with the socialist *dirigiste* model and endorse the dominant ruling ideology – neoliberalism – starting in the late 1980s. One can argue that Syria was not unique in remolding its economy along neoliberal

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lines. Syria, however, is different. It exists in a war zone. The fall of Iraq in the 2003 invasion further destabilized the region and weakened remaining states facing the American-Israeli alliance, never mind the ongoing aggression of Israel in the lands of historical Palestine. The recent quagmire into which Syria has fallen stands as proof that Syria's adoption of neoliberalism laid waste to its national security.

The Neoliberal Ride

Neoliberal's birth lay in the decision of Syria's ruling elites not to strengthen the Ba'athist model, which ensured that social needs were met via a top-down distributional approach. Syria's military defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a turning point. It weakened the Ba'ath party's political agenda, stirring political contention among the party's members. Then-Minister of Defense, Hafiz al-Asad, purged the political strife within the party through a military coup in 1970. His leaning to the right can be exemplified by his containment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1976 and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and his siding with the Gulf states against Iraq in the Gulf War in the early 1990s (Kadri 2016). His government parted with Ba'athist radicalism and introduced the "corrective movement" which heralded the reversal of the previous era's poor-friendly economic measures. The "corrective movement" of 1970 was a set of economic reforms aimed at achieving high growth using public and private resources at the expense of social considerations (Perthes 1995). It was the conduit through which Syria's bourgeois class pushed for economic liberalization and the private sector gradual takeover of economic decision making. The Ba'ath party since then has functioned as a means for propaganda for the al-Asad government to mobilize the social constituency.

Syria's embarking on the neoliberal journey occurred amidst the collapse of socialist ideology on the international stage (Kadri 2012). Since the 1980s, neoliberalism increasingly became the globally dominant ideology – that of the global financial class. Most developing states adjusted their macroeconomic strategies at the behest of the IFIs. US-led imperialism penetrated the global south, shattering and re-working modes of production of developing states to better fit those of the developed states (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004). Within this context, Syria's economic policies were overtly and covertly molded by the neoliberal ideology and its price-based resource allocation mechanism – comparative advantage and the law of value. The challenges faced by the Hafiz government and the subsequent strategies should be understood within these historical circumstances. The Hafiz government gradually lifted state control over different sectors of the economy, allowing for free movement of capital, trade, and investment. Its market-friendly economic measures gradually eroded Ba'athist economic planning and protectionism, which had ensured economic resilience at an earlier phase. In terms of class analysis, the post-liberalization commercial bourgeoisie gradually relinquished its alliance with the local industrialists to unite with the international financial class. The newly allied commercial and state bourgeoisie became convinced that they could earn more wealth by joining the imperialist orbit than from building national economic resilience (Kadri 2016). They were keen to guarantee the growth of their nationally produced wealth in dollar-denominated terms, as those circuits fused with those of international finance (Kadri 2012). My computation of the stock pile of Syrian money held abroad, based on data of the Bank for International Settlements, reveals that net Syrian deposits in international banks reached an accumulated average of $24 billion by 2008 (Matar 2019). However, this figure remains an estimate. In my discussions with Syrian policymakers in 2007, they were clearly convinced of the received wisdom: the growth-focused free market model would eventually trickle down, even after a setback of sorts in aggregate welfare. Such distant gains proved to be mirage.

During the process of economic liberalization, investment was directed to commercial activities, ensuring quick returns to the post-liberalization commercial bourgeoisie at the expense of building up productive capacity. The state introduced investment laws to facilitate the restoration of

private property ownership, previously confiscated by the Ba'athist government in the 1960s. In 1990, the Hafiz government introduced investment law No.10 of 1990 that was salient in revitalizing private sector activities. In 2007, the Bashar government then introduced Decree No.8 that removed all remaining state controls that acted as obstacles against private investment (Matar 2016). By reinstating private ownership, the state bourgeoisie formalized their informal ownership of the means of production. By the end of the millennium, they transmogrified into business tycoons who controlled the major economic activities through monopolies and quasi-monopolies (Matar 2016). During my field work in Syria in 2007, the industrialists had expressed dismay about the investment reforms and the state's lifting of protection over national industry. However, the shift away from industry to commerce was accompanied by an ideological shift away from nationalism, pan-Arabism, and radicalism, weakening not only the social base of the government but also loosening the integuments which bound the working class to any broader state project (Kadri and Matar 2019).

One can argue that Bashar government's choices were also influenced by the ideological tendency which the Hafiz government had already crystallized in its policies. After 2005, the Bashar al-Asad government aggressively embraced the mainstream economic strategies under the tutelage of the international financial institutions. The government's five-year plan was socialist in principle but capitalist in practice. It put in place a series of intensified mainstream economic measures between 2006 and 2010. It prioritized macroeconomic stabilization, inflation targeting, fiscal consolidation, and trade and capital account liberalization. These conventional goals were achieved at the expense of building capacity, promoting self-sufficiency in food production, and guaranteeing social safety nets. The interworking of fiscal, monetary, and balance of payment tools contributed to resource misallocation that deepened the misery of the working population (Matar 2019). In 2006, the government ended the exchange rate populism that offered immediate benefits to the poor through cheaper imports and subsidized prices. Goods of first necessity, such as milk and sugar, were no longer exchanged at an overvalued rate against the dollar but placed in the same category as luxury items such as cars (Seifan 2013). In its review of the progress of Syria's neoliberal reforms in 2009, the IMF praised the government's effort in streamlining its expenditure by endorsing contractionary fiscal policy. It advised the government to introduce VAT in 2011 at the expense of lifting subsidies and other public and welfare provision (IMF 2010). By this time, Syria had surrendered its autonomy over its policies. Its orthodoxy in its five-year plan vis-à-vis IMF economic advice evidences Syria's complete divorce from its previously autonomous path. Furthermore, Syrian liberalization of its capital account meant economic regulation was under the aegis of international market forces. With such openness, the government inhibited capital retention and lost sovereignty over issuing credit backed by national assets and capacities. Instead, it built reliance on foreign capital into the architecture of its national financial and economic system.

Accelerating neoliberal reforms misallocated resources and favored capital over labor, eventually widening social polarization. The government allocated less resource to the productive sectors as compared to non-productive ones, which neither created enough job opportunities nor reduced poverty. Real wages' share in total GDP decelerated in the 2000s. It dropped from 32% in 2000 to 25% in 2010 (ILOSTAT database), eroding the income share of labor out of total GDP (Matar 2019). People struggled to earn a living and longed for a bygone time when necessities were affordable. Syrian neoliberalism was not sustainable. The proof of its unsustainability is the destruction that has been wrought upon Syria.

The Syrian state bourgeoisie designed macroeconomic strategies that favored capital and its holders over labor. But that is not all. They also sought rapprochement with US imperialism. While their national plans replicated word-by-word conventional IFI strategies, aiming to appease the global powers, the latter often obstructed reconciliation. Even though Syria's ruling elites endorsed market-friendly reforms to

facilitate Syria's entry to the WTO, since 2001 the US vetoed such accession (Reuters 2010). Syria abandoned state-administrative pricing, lifted price caps, and revoked protectionist measures that safeguarded its national industry in order to meet the economic conditions of the dollarized global market. Despite so many efforts to appease and integrate into the economic channels of imperialism, Syria faced international political blockade, which further subordinated Syria's bourgeois class to US imperialism. It was only 9 years later, in 2010, that the US lifted its veto, allowing Syria to attain observer status in the WTO (Bloomberg 2010). US sanctions were another form of international obstruction, aimed at penalizing Syria for its alleged support of international terrorism. Syria was placed in the US's designated list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979 (Sharp and Blanchard 2012). Since the 1980s, the US has restricted its bilateral trade with and cut off its aid to Syria (Sharp and Blanchard 2012). Since the 2000s, the US has also repeatedly levied individual financial sanctions targeting al-Asad government's inner circle. More recently, the EU and the US imposed an even more rigid and crippling sanctions apparatus, as part and parcel of the current war, as elaborated further below. By following a rhythm of loosening and strengthening such international restrictions, the US has used the carrot and the stick to cajole and pummel Syria, in this way entangling Syria's bourgeois class into international circuits and weakening Syria's national autonomy. In retrospect, we may see plainly that as Syria's bourgeois class, ideologically influenced by neoliberalism, struggled to join global capital, it compromised the economic and social buffers protecting the nation. As argued by Kadri (2016: 119): "class ties of the leading capital interests supersede national interests." It was only when the Syrian working class, quite like others in neighboring states, were persuaded by the crisis of rule and the vulnerability of their governments, began to protest, in this way showing their discontent and unease with the governing order (Kadri and Matar 2019).

The strength of the alliance between Syria's bourgeoisie and the international ruling financial class, with US imperialism at the helm, has been influenced by the vortex of history. As power balances between major global players shifted, Syria's bourgeoisie situated itself within what it thought was a series of safe berths in the global power structure. In the Soviet days, Syria was a Soviet protectorate. After the collapse of the Soviets, it gradually moved into the orbit of US imperialism. The latter's disintegrative mechanisms worked discreetly prior to the conflict. Towards the end of the millennium, they were neither subtle nor difficult to detect. With the beginning of the conflict, imperialism's belligerency became all too apparent, as imperialist forces appeared, ready to bring down the whole of Syria's social formation, as they did to Iraq. The pre-conflict alliance between Syria's bourgeoisie and global capital has also come to an end since the conflict's dawn, because the destruction of Syria is far more crucial to imperialism than the latter's trading in Syrian goods and services (Kadri 2016). As of late, and in consequence of that shift, Syria has re-allied with China and Russia.

The Current Conflict

The imperialist assault on Syria has now reached its apex. The country is now divided between Russian-supported government areas and other imperialist-controlled regions. The war continues as the Syrian Arab Army fights against imperialist-sponsored armed groups and the fragmented "opposition" forces. Throughout the war, Syria's military and political fault lines realigned according to the degree of imperialist support and funding to the warring parties in Syria. A clear manifestation of such processes was the rise of the Islamic State and its seizing major Iraqi and Syria cities. In the words of Hinnebusch (2019): "It was the US invasion of Iraq, dismantling the Ba'athist state, that created the authority vacuum enabling the rise of al-Qaida in Iraq ("AQI"). ISIS was born out of an amalgamation of AQI with ex-Iraqi Ba'athists (displaced by the US invasion) and tribal supporters (trained and armed by the US in the late 2000s but marginalized by the Shia dominated Baghdad government)."

When the central governments lost control in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq, the latter arena became the breeding grounds of trans-state jihadists. Syria therefore has been confronted by an appalling situation, involving war, insurgency, and the shattering of the state's territorial integrity.

Militarism and the wars which compose it and underpin it are fundamental mechanisms of US-led imperialism. Wars underwrite the expansion of the dollar-denominated money supply, leading to the rise in financial wealth of the global financial class. There are basically two channels of value extraction from Syria: first, the heightened tensions that promote militarism and second, the destruction of assets and human lives which are, on their own, a value-creating operation (Kadri 2019). Not so long ago, imperialist intervention in the Arab region was demonstrated in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. These tragedies wrecked the Iraqi and the Libyan states and annihilated their societies. Syria faces a similar threat. Syria's priority now must be to restore its national integrity. This will be a composite effort, which includes the living security of its population, as well as national security broadly understood. In other words, a cohesive and sovereign state is *ipso facto* a fundamental requirement in Syria's national struggle against Western-backed insurgency.

In the last 8 years, the landscape of war has been driven by external tensions and contradictions rather than internal rivalry, thereby adding more complexity to the Syrian conflict. International and regional powers have aimed at settling their scores in Syria, defaulting to military solutions rather than political negotiations. Shifts in the international power balance achieved on Syrian territory in favor of the Russian forces would weaken US global hegemony. China, a global economic power, is a strong advocate of Syrian sovereignty and has consented to the Russian military intervention in Syria. Conversely, Syria's obliteration by US-led Islamist armed groups would also enhance US–Israeli power over the Arab region. Russia has re-confirmed its commitment, amidst its support for the Syrian Arab Army maneuvers to liberate lost territories from armed rebel groups. The result has been a shift in the balance of power – in favor of the al-Asad government and its Russian, Iranian, and Chinese allies. It has also reduced the Islamic State (IS) to small pockets. However, the geopolitical implications remain gloomy as stubborn contradictions between global powers may lead to an unthinkable global war (Chossudovsky 2018). Such is the enormity of the situation evolving in Syria.

War and territorial disintegration have weakened the capabilities of the Syrian economy (Kadri and Matar 2019). The loss of control of oil and agriculture in Syria's northeast to the American-controlled Kurdish forces is an outright confiscation of national resources from the political control of the Syrian state by imperialist aggression and dispossession. Oil output, the main source of revenue to the government, has almost dried up. The economy suffers from fragmentation, ruptured supply chains, and obliteration of infrastructure (roads, factories, electricity, irrigation systems, mills, etc.). War-induced economic and infrastructural disruptions have dampened overall production and weakened national sovereignty. Even worse, a war economy based on looting, pillage, and plunder has emerged, giving rise to war-traders who control food supplies to win allegiance in government-controlled and the "opposition"-controlled areas. Simply put, since the start of the war, Syria has suffered from the deliberate and acute reversal of decades of development.

Imperialist assault against Syria also manifests through the wide-ranging sanctions that have besieged the nation since 2011. The US, the EU, and Turkey have imposed their blockade by sanctioning Syrian individuals, its financial, trade, and energy sectors, and investment companies. While these sanctions are not uniform in range and scope, they seek to cripple Syria's productive capacity and rip its social fabric to shreds. Among the restrictions are severing cooperation with Syria's Central Bank, blocking trade and investment deals, freezing Syrian assets abroad, and prohibiting commercial and banking transactions with Syrian entities. Given that Syria's biggest trading partner is the EU, its sanctions have strangled the Syrian economy following the

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depletion of Syria's oil exports. Even worse, sanctions have exhausted Syria's foreign currency reserves, adding pressure on the Syrian pound which has faced a speculative attack. The double impact of supply shortages and currency devaluation has taken its toll on the economy as consumer prices rose steeply, further debilitating Syrian purchasing power. According to the UN, the siege on Syria has worsened the calamity by inhibiting the delivery of humanitarian aid and other essential commodities such as foodstuffs, fuel, and healthcare products (UN 2016). The Syrian humanitarian crisis has been described as one of the worst since WWII with nearly half of the population internally displaced, a few million refugees externally displaced, and another several million in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. As argued by Rosen (2019): "The same West that was protesting the sieges imposed by the Syrian army and the humanitarian suffering it caused is now imposing a siege on the Syrian people and hoping that their suffering will lead to political concessions." The humanitarian implications resemble Iraq in the years between 1990 and 2003 when UN sanctions destroyed the Iraqi productive capacity and brought its society to the brink (Gordon 2010). These embargos, first on Iraq, and now on Syria, have collectively punished innocent civilians, including women, children and the elderly. Syria, like Iraq, has suffered from the dire consequences of inhumane sanctions and the international community is blind to this reality.

As the war destroyed hospitals and other medical services, injured people lost their lives due to shortage in necessities like medicines and medical equipment – banned by the siege. In the words of Sen et al. (2012: 198): "Sanctions in general have caused controversy because economic embargoes inevitably affect all parts of an economy including households. They affect the cost of living, the prices of medicines (which households have to purchase) and the price of utilities such as electricity and water... Such actions in principle contravene the charter of the UN Covenant for Economic Social and Cultural Rights because they cause major disruption to food, pharmaceuticals and sanitation supplies." Unless the Syrian state installs a pro-working class economic recovery plan that can absorb the shock of the sanctions, they will perpetuate the conflict, ripping and tearing Syrian society and human capacity.

Conclusion: Building Resilience

As argued above, Syria's historical trajectory has been tangled in the brambles of political instability, sanctions, and war. These facts have not been conducive to developmental growth. Syria's state bourgeoisie, committed to building the national economy to enable a certain degree of autonomy during the state-controlled period, engendered better developmental outcomes than the succeeding neoliberal structure. The state bourgeoisie and the post-liberalization commercial bourgeoisie, influenced by the dominant neoliberal ideology and intrigued by the prospect of safer returns on private investment, aggressively liberalized the economy between 2000 and 2010. In hindsight, the outcome was anything but equitable development. Inequitable development in the Syrian case was manifest in crisis in capital accumulation, contributing to the objective conditions for the onset of the social unrest. The conflict and territorial dismemberment provided the gateways for imperial forces to intensify their intervention in Syria. This time, they would take the course of military aggression.

Nevertheless, Syria has recently regained lost territorial ground. Territory is needed but insufficient. The government should design a national plan for reconstruction and economic recovery that buttresses economic resilience. Reconstruction/economic recovery should allocate resources to the home front. Rehabilitating the social infrastructure and building economic resilience can strengthen the least powerful and most vulnerable elements in Syria, and empower the anti-imperialist resistance, which, in turn, can buttress the national front (Hemesh 2019; Matar and Kadri 2019). Building economic resilience should go hand in hand with a divorce from the neoliberal doctrine that has weakened the national economy over the past two decades, making it subservient to Western imperialism.

By preserving its autonomy over policy, the government can re-establish sovereignty. Previous

Arab experiences (Iraq and Lebanon) reveal that Western-supported recovery plans/constitutions were based on sect or ethnic classification, which has sown the seeds for permanent instability and conflict (Kadri and Matar 2019). Syria should reach out to its allies, especially China, the global economic powerhouse which has safeguarded Syrian integrity, for financial help and investment cooperation, amidst an acute lack of government revenues and foreign reserves. China has expressed interest in contributing to Syria's reconstruction as part of its gigantic outward investment project, the new Silk Road, to the Arab region.

To be sure, China extends loans for infrastructural and construction projects with the aim of furthering mutual economic cooperation with developing states. It may be worthwhile to recall that China's three main points of departure in BRI project-setting include joint discussion, joint venture, and joint benefit. Its conditions are usually limited to the projects themselves. China usually demands projects in host economies be carried out using Chinese construction companies, Chinese material, and Chinese human resources. However, Chinese conditions do not go beyond the projects to revamp national plans and development strategies. This is in contrast with the Washington Consensus program that usually requests developing states to restructure their national policy framework. The Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) usually attach conditions to their loans, including a whole set of policy reforms, including fiscal, monetary, investment, capital, and trade measures. Drawing upon the experience of various developing states, the "one-size fits all" strategy has often led to ill-fated socioeconomic outcomes (Stiglitz 2003). The chance now remains for Syria to cultivate its national resilience. There is no other way forward.

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Taiping Rebellion

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Chinese empire; Heavenly kingdom; Qing dynasty

Definition

This essay explores the historical, social, and political background to the Taiping Rebellion waged in China from 1850 to 1864 between the Manchu-led Qing dynasty and the Hakka-led Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. It examines the motivations and goals of the leadership of the revolutionary movement, and its central ideology. It concludes with an assessment of the historical significance of the Rebellion, and its strengths and weaknesses as a social and nation liberation movement.

Background

Chinese history can be characterised by the dynastic cycle. A dynasty would be established by foreign conquest or a native peasant uprising. It would initially be strong, protect China from foreign invaders or raiders, and preside over a degree of economic prosperity. Over time, however, centrifugal forces would assert themselves and provincial power groups would contest rule from the imperial capital. This process would often go hand in hand with decadence in the centre as a series of weak or incompetent emperors replaced the strong founders. A period of chaos would ensue as the ruling dynasty became increasingly unable to maintain order. In the eyes of the Confucian ruling class the dynasty would lose its legitimacy or the 'mandate of heaven' and would be ripe for replacement. The cycle would continue.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was the last dynasty to be ruled by ethnic Chinese. It derived from a peasant revolt against the collapsing and chaotic Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368). Under the Ming the central government established greater control over the population by way of a large standing army, a secret police network, a village control system hampering peasant mobility, and an inspectorate system. Despite this the Ming appear to have achieved a degree of popularity. There was an extended commercial boom, and in the early years the dynasty supported a series of exploratory missions, with the fleet of Zheng He reaching the coast of Africa.

The Ming began to decline with a financial drain resulting from wars with Korea and Japan, which escalated into a crisis with a severe shortage of silver, then used as a medium of exchange,

owing to Japanese and European trade policies. This was compounded by shorter growing seasons connected with the global 'Little Ice Age' of the seventeenth century, which led to a series of famines. Contributing to the crisis was a period of instability created by the influence in the bureaucracy of powerful court eunuchs.

The Ming dynasty was replaced by the Qing dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China. The Qing (1644–1912) was led by the Manchu, a Sinicised northern people derived from clans of the Jurchen tribe. Early Qing emperors were strong, and during the reign of the Emperor Kangxi the Chinese state consolidated control over border regions, assimilated Taiwan, and repelled Mongol invaders. The Qing, in spite of their foreign origin, saw themselves as guardians of traditional Chinese culture and enforced a deadening conservatism in terms of literature, the role of women, technological innovation, foreign trade, and other areas.

Although gifted with a number of strong emperors, the Qing dynasty was often faced with crises of legitimacy. Corruption was rampant; there was resentment against a perceived foreign dynasty, and nostalgia for the defeated Ming and support for remnants of the dynasty remained strong in south China. After the suicide of the last Ming emperor, Ching Zhen, in 1644, regimes collectively known as the Southern Ming resisted the Qing for another 49 years. The Ming loyalist Zheng Cheng Gong, known as Koxinga, seized Taiwan after defeating the Dutch occupiers, and he and his son used the island as a base for attacking the Qing thoughout the mid- and late seventeenth century. The Qing emperor Kangxi (1654–1722) temporarily evacuated coastal areas in order to deny anti-Qing forces a basis of support. Large numbers of anti-Qing Chinese fled to Burma, Vietnam, and Japan, and many anti-Qing secret societies emerged in the south, some becoming religious or mystical while others moved in a revolutionary direction.

The founder of the sect that became known as the Taiping, and its initial core membership, derived from the Hakka minority, a group living in areas of south China. The Hakka are widely believed to be at least partly descended from Han Chinese from the north, who migrated south during times of political turmoil during the 12th and 13th centuries. After the Qing evacuation of southern coastal areas under Kangxi these areas were repopulated with outsiders descended from such northerners. Families moving to these coastal areas were termed 'guest families', or Hakka. Tensions developed in these regions between Cantonese-speaking people of local origin and the now self-described Hakka. Many Chinese revolutionary leaders have had Hakka ancestry.

From the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century China experienced a rapid growth in its population, which quadrupled from 100 million to 420 million by 1850 (Marks 2002). This reduced the productivity of the land and created changes in the traditional relationship between the Confucian aristocracy and the peasantry. The nineteenth century also saw increased corruption resulting from the opium trade and an increase in banditry and peasant rebellions due to high taxation, high rents, and poor harvests. There were periodic mass famines caused by severe droughts.

During the nineteenth century the Qing suffered a series of defeats at the hands of Western imperialism. Most important of these were the Opium Wars (1839–60), in which the Qing were defeated by the British and were forced to allow the import of opium, to turn over Hong Kong to the British, and to open up ports to foreign trade. The Opium Wars also led to further humiliating defeats and encroachments on Chinese territory.

Hong Xiuquan

Hong Xiuquan (1814–64), originally named Hong Renkun, was born in Fuyuanshui village in Guangdong, in what are now the far northern suburbs of Guangzhou. He was the third son of a Hakka peasant family. From an early age he attempted to work his way up through the brutally competitive Confucian examination system for entering the civil service. By the age of five he could recite the Confucian classics, and by the age of seven he began to study at a preparatory school. When Hong reached the age of 15 his parents could no longer afford his school tuition and he

began working as a tutor in his village while also studying independently. After coming first in the local preliminary examination in 1836, at the age of 22 Hong took the provincial examination in Guangzhou. However, he did not pass the higher imperial examination; he retook this four times but failed because of the extremely stiff competition and his inability to bribe the notoriously corrupt Qing officials.

While on his way to take the imperial examination in 1836 Hong encountered Christian missionaries for the first time, receiving tracts on the Bible and Christianity. He suffered a nervous breakdown after his first failure to pass the imperial examination, and during his recovery in 1837 he had a number of terrifying dreams which he interpreted as mystical visions. In these dreams he would be visited by two figures, an old paternal figure and a middle-aged elder brother figure, both archetypes in Chinese culture: in one dream the older figure complained to Hong about men worshipping demons rather than himself, and in another Hong saw Confucius being punished for faithlessness. Later Hong dreamt of angels carrying him to heaven, where the elder brother figure, wearing a dragon robe and a long beard, gave him a sword and a magic seal and commissioned him to rid China of demons. At this time Hong did not act on his visions.

After failing the imperial examination for the fourth time in 1837 Hong gave up studying and began to work as a teacher at several schools near his home town. In 1843 he became convinced that the religious tracts he had read years earlier were the key to understanding his dreams. He identified the older father figure with both the biblical Jehovah and the mythological 'Yellow Emperor' Shangdi, regarded in Chinese folk religion as the Celestial Emperor or King of Heaven. Hong identified the elder brother figure with Jesus and so now regarded himself as Jesus's younger brother, changing his given name to 'Xiuquan' or 'Younger Brother'. He believed that his 'Elder Brother's' command to rid China of demons meant eliminating both the corrupt Qing rulers and the teachings of Confucius.

Hong began preaching his new religion to fellow Hakka in his village. His two earliest converts were relatives who had also failed their examinations, Feng Yunshan and Hong Rengan. Hong, his two relatives, and their followers then began a campaign to destroy sacred statues in the local villages. Their iconoclasm angered townspeople and local officials, and Hong and his two relatives were forced to leave their jobs as village tutors. In 1844 Hong and Feng Yunshan walked 300 miles to a rugged region of east Guangxi province called Thistle Mountain, where a large Hakka population was more sympathetic to Hong's new religion.

Thistle Mountain

Hong began to preach on Mount Zijing in the village of Jintian (present-day Guiping) to an impoverished, primarily Hakka population. The religious rituals of the movement, at that stage known as the Society of God Worshippers, combined Christianity with Chinese folk religion. Society was to be radically egalitarian, with all wealth shared and class distinctions eliminated. All men and women were equal as 'brothers and sisters'; many posts in what became the Taiping state were assigned to women, although the sect practised strict segregated of the sexes. All wealth was to be shared. In contrast with the shaved forehead and queue (ponytail) required by the Qing rulers, the sect's men wore their hair long.

By 1844 Hong had developed a following of 100. A young illiterate firewood merchant named Yang Xiuqing, who practised faith healing, emerged as a leader in the movement. Another important early convert was Shi Dakai, a member of a wealthy landlord family who was able to persuade most of his family to join the sect and contribute much money to Hong's treasury. Wei Changwei, whose clan controlled Jintian, became an important leader. Local miners skilled in tunnelling and in the use of explosives, important in the rugged terrain of east Guangxi, were also prominent converts. While the class composition of the movement was mixed, the movement attracted poor peasants, small layers of wealthy anti-Qing scholar gentry, and members of minority groups including the Hakka, Yao, and Miao peoples, and river pirates.

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From 1845 to 1847 Hong stayed in the village of Shiling, where he wrote books and pamphlets expounding his interpretation of the Bible and his social theories. In 1847 he responded to an invitation from the American missionary Issacher Roberts to study Christianity in Guangzhou and remained there for 2 months. Hong is believed to have gained most of his knowledge of Christianity during this time. Roberts, suspicious of people converting to Christianity for financial gain, turned down a request for aid to his sect and refused to baptise him.

Guangxi province at this time was unstable and bandit-ridden. The Qing authorities apparently initially chose to leave Hong and his followers alone. However, the God Worshippers were largely Hakka, and there were growing tensions between the sect and local villages, clans, and other groups. Hong's followers also ran into conflicts with pirates and river bandits in the highly mountainous and riverine province.

The Jintian Uprising and the Heavenly Kingdom

By 1850 the new religion numbered between 10,000 and 30,000 followers. Provincial authorities began to be alarmed at the growth of the sect and ordered it to be dispersed. A local force was sent to subdue it, but the sect defeated the Qing in December 1850. The sect organised a 10,000-strong army which routed a full-scale attack by Qing forces against the sect's base in Jintian; the Manchu commander of the imperial army was beheaded. This victory became known as the Jintian Uprising. The movement was now a force to be reckoned with in south central China.

On 11 January 1851 Hong declared the founding of a new kingdom, the Taiping, or 'Heavenly Kingdom', and gave himself the title of 'Heavenly King'. The political structure of the kingdom was somewhat vague and fluid. In 1848, while in a state of trance, Hong had accepted Yang Xiuqing's claim to be able to act as the 'voice of God' and his right to direct the political wing of the movement. With the founding of the Taiping he named Yang the 'East King' and, despite Yang's lack of military experience, made him supreme commander. Yang was to have supremacy over four other 'kings', the identities of whom varied.

The Taiping was to be a unified theocratic state in which the Heavenly King had absolute power, and a single organisation directed all religious, administrative, and military tasks. China would achieve peace and prosperity when all people worshipped the true God. The Taiping's egalitarianism and strong anti-Qing nationalism provided a powerful attraction to peasants and other oppressed layers.

After the initial victory at Jintian the Taiping remained outnumbered by the local Green Standard army, a Qing provincial army made up of ethnic Han, which together with local river pirates kept the Taiping confined to Jintian. After preparing for a month, the rebels managed to break though the blockade and fought their way to the town of Yongan, which they captured on 25 September 1851.

Hong and his troops remained in Yongan for 3 months. They were supported there by the local elite, who were hostile to the Qing. The imperial army then regrouped and launched another attack on the Taiping. Hong's army ran out of gunpowder, and the rebels fought their way out of Yongan by sword and made their way to Guilen. Guilen, however, had strong defences, and after a 33-day siege the Taiping gave up and went northwards towards Hunan. There the Taiping came up against an elite military force created by Zeng Guofan, a Qing general who was later to be important in the defeat of the Taiping. Zeng's 130,000-man Hunan army defeated the Taiping in June 1852, largely pushing it out of the province. Some 20% of the rebel army were killed, and the Taiping were forced to retreat.

Nanjing

By a stroke of luck, in December 1852 the Taiping army entered the wealthy town of Yuezhou almost unopposed. Here they seized 5000 boats, weapons, and gunpowder. The cities of Hangzhou and Wuzhong surrounding Nanjing fell in

December 1852 and January 1853 respectively, providing the Taiping with a large fleet of boats and money from the provincial treasury. In March 1853 Nanjing, lightly defended by Manchu troops, was conquered by the Taiping. This city, historically China's 'South Capital', was made the Taiping capital and was renamed Tianjing, or 'Heavenly Capital'. After an initial period of pillage and slaughter, Yang Xiuqing disciplined troops by threatening to execute any officer who entered a private home.

The Taiping ruled their state from Nanjing from 1853 to 1864. By this time Hong had withdrawn from active direct control of the movement, preferring to rule indirectly though cryptic proclamations. He appointed Yang Xiuqing prime minister. Opium was outlawed, and an extreme asceticism was practised, with alcohol and dancing prohibited and the sexes strictly segregated. The calendar was reformed, and rules were introduced to promote the equality of the sexes. Property was socialised, with money held in a common treasury, and most trade was suppressed. An examination system was revived, based on the Bible and the Taiping's interpretation of Christianity. This was equally open to men and women. A system of land reform was carried out with a system of family-based military collectivised farms. Polygamy was outlawed except for Hong and other leaders; Hong at one time had a harem of 88 women, and other leaders had similar numbers of consorts.

The Northern Expedition

After it took Nanjing the Taiping army was divided into three parts. One division was to remain in Nanjing to defend the city, another was to hold the cities of the Yangtze valley, and a Northern Expedition was to march north to Beijing. The Northern Expedition, consisting of 70,000 Guangxi veterans and newer recruits, left in May 1853. The march to Beijing proved far more difficult than the earlier march to Nanjing, with many towns putting up a strong resistance. By October 1853 the expedition had reached the outskirts of Tianjin, near the Grand Canal, about

100 miles from Beijing. There it was cut off from its supply train. As southerners, the troops coped poorly with the cold northern winter, and there was a high casualty rate. In May 1854 the Qing army surrounded the exhausted Taiping forces with earthworks and then diverted the Grand Canal, flooding the Taiping camp and destroying the army. The Taiping commander was captured and executed. Meanwhile the Yangtze valley army, commanded by Shi Dakai with the aid of triad forces from Guangdong, conquered most of Jiangxi province. Jiangxi became a major food source for the Taiping.

Tianjing Incident

After receiving recognition of his ability to speak in the name of God, Yang Xiuqing increasingly came to upstage Hong, who was nominally still the supreme leader. Yang proved to be a brilliant military commander and won victories at Yongan, Yuezhou, and Wuzhong. After he defeated an encirclement of Nanjing in 1856 by diverting the Qing to attack relief forces sent to other cities, then sending his own troops against the divided enemy, he became increasingly arrogant and power-hungry, creating tensions in the Taiping leadership. On several occasions he had leaders flogged for disobedience, and in what appeared to be a ploy to seize power he sent the generals Wei Changhui and Shi Dakai out of Nanjing to reinforce the western frontier. After being alerted to suspicions of a coup attempt by Yang, Hong ordered his commanders to move against him. On 1 September 1856 thousands of loyal troops met at the gates of Nanjing; they killed Yang and his 54 wives and concubines, and in the following weeks Wei Changhui waged a campaign to kill all who were believed to be Yang's followers, killing over 27,000 people in all.

In late September tension developed between Shi Dakai and Wei Changhui over the extent of the massacres and suspicions over Wei's own power-seeking. After severely condemning Wei for excesses, Shi fled to Tianjin. Wei had his family and followers killed. Shi attempted to rally the army in a rebellion against Wei. Realising

that Shi had the army on his side, Wei attempted a coup and launched an attack on Hong's palace in Nanjing, but this failed and Wei was executed by Hong's elite bodyguard. Hong ordered Shi Dakai to return to Nanjing and assume leadership, and Shi now helped to restore order and began to rebuild the Taiping's morale. However, Hong grew suspicious of him and sought to undermine his power. In 1857 Shi left Nanjing with an unknown number of followers.

For 6 years Shi Dakai and his followers fought a separate war against the Qing, although Shi continued to claim loyalty to the Taiping; his army was in Sichuan province for most of this period. In June 1862 Shi surrendered to the Qing on the condition that his men would be spared. He was executed by the 'death of a thousand cuts', and 2000 of his men were killed, with 4000 released. The Tianjing incident weakened the Taiping. Many of its most able leaders were killed, and the loss of Shi Dakai's army was a blow to the movement.

Hong Rengan and Victory over the Qing

In 1859 a cousin of Hong Xiuquan, Hong Rengan, joined the Taiping at Nanjing. Hong Rengan was an early follower of Hong Xiuquan who had become separated from the movement. He had spent a period in Hong Kong and had been influenced by Swedish Lutheran missionaries; upon rejoining the movement he sought to introduce elements of Protestant worship into Taiping ritual. Because of his education Hong Xiuquan made him prime minister in place of the defeated Yang Xiuqing. Hong Rengan centralised the Taiping administration and advocated building railways and establishing a banking system. He also attempted to gain the support of the Western powers.

Shanghai was an international port with a large foreign settlement and one of China's most important cities. It had been occupied by the Taiping from 1851 to 1853 and later was briefly occupied in 1860. Since 1858 the Qing Jiangnan army of 200,000 had laid siege to Nanjing, which was then defended by only 20,000 Taiping. Hong Rengan

devised a plan to retake Shanghai by first drawing off Qing forces besieging Nanjing and taking the surrounding cities of Hangzhou and Suzhou. He gave Li Xiucheng, who by this time had emerged as the most important Taiping military commander, the duty of capturing Shanghai. Li was to attack Hangzhou, drawing off Qing troops from Nanjing, and then march back, smash the remaining Qing troops at Nanjing, and take Suzhou. After that he was to take Shanghai. The Taiping expected to be welcomed by the foreign Christians in the city.

Hong Rengan's plan initially worked well. In May 1860 the armies of Li Xiucheng and Shi Dakai attacked and routed the Qing from the rear. The Taiping captured 20,000 horses, making this one of the few times the rebels were able to use cavalry. In a major defeat the Qing lost an estimated 60,000 men and many leading Manchu commanders. Li Xiucheng then encircled the region of Jiangnan, the geographical area to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze river, including Shanghai. He took the cities of Suzhou and Hangzhou in 1860; Suzhou was taken without a single shot being fired, and the capture of Hangzhou led to that city's mayor committing suicide. A Taiping army of 20,000 occupied Shanghai for 5 months.

The Qing general Zhang Youliang, commanding a force of 36,000, was ordered to attack Li Xiucheng. The result was a crushing defeat for the Qing in what became known as the 'Second Rout of the Jiangnan Daying', so called because it was the second major defeat of the Jiangnan army.

The defeat of the Jiangnan army and the capture of Hangzhou alarmed the Qing ruling class. By the early 1860s China was under the de facto rule of the Manchu Cixi, the daughter of a Manchu bannerman, who had been chosen to be a concubine to the Emperor Xianfeng. Thanks to her ability to speak and read Mandarin and her diplomatic skills, by 1861 Cixi had worked her way to absolute power, although technically she was still a regent. In the early 1850s General Zeng Guofan, who was a prolific Han scholar and a reform-minded military commander, had built an effective regional army in Hunan by bypassing the

Qing bannerman system and stressing Confucian values and the officer–soldier relationship. After Zeng's army pushed the Taiping forces out of most of Hunan province he came to the notice of Cixi, who appointed him viceroy of Liangjiang (Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces) and made him supreme military commander. Zeng helped to transform the imperial military system and was important in the eventual defeat of the Taiping.

The Battle of Shanghai

By 1860 the initially sympathetic Western view of the Taiping had changed. Westerners were repelled by what they saw as the eccentricities of the Taiping's Christianity, and they regarded the Taiping as a threat to the lucrative opium trade. The *North China Herald* reported on its atrocities, alarming the large foreign community about the Taiping advance. Issacher Roberts, Hong Xiuquan's former missionary teacher, visited Nanjing and reported that Hong was insane.

In early 1861, the Taiping general Li Xiucheng's army of 600,000 controlled much of the Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces bordering the Yangtze. At his request Great Britain and France, with their commercial interests in Shanghai, promised to stay neutral. The Taiping began the battle for Shanghai by invading the nearby Pudong area with 20,000 troops.

The Europeans and the Chinese business elite of Shanghai became alarmed at the approach of the Taiping and feared fighting in the city, but the Europeans were reluctant to commit their troops. In 1860 a group of Chinese businessmen hired the American mercenary Frederick Townsend Ward to organise a small Shanghai Foreign Arms Corps (FAC) of 100, initially made up of Western drifters and ship deserters recruited from the wharfs of Shanghai. Later Filipino and other mercenaries were added to the force. In 1861 Ward's group blocked the Taiping's approach to Shanghai at Chingpu, but at huge cost. The 'low-life' nature of Ward's outfit angered Western businessmen in Shanghai, who feared that the Taiping would cut off their trade. The Taiping were initially surprised to be fired on by Europeans.

After a 15-day Christmas cease-fire the Qing sent an army of 20,000 to Jiangnan. In early April 1862 the Qing general Li Hongzhang was made governor of Jiangsu province and took overall military command. A unit of the Green Standard army was sent to attack the city of Taicang, occupied by the Taiping, some 40 miles from Shanghai. Li Xiucheng sent 100,000 men to relieve the city and, after its commander disobeyed orders to withdraw, the entire Qing unit was destroyed. By late April the Taiping occupied Jiading, a town outside Shanghai, which they planned to use as a base to attack Songjiang, today a district of Shanghai, and the city itself. Li Hongzhang ordered a counter-attack. By mid- May the Taiping were pushed out of east and south Shanghai.

The Qing were aided by a greatly enlarged foreign led army. In the summer of 1861 Ward reorganised his force. Financed by wealthy Shanghai merchants, hundreds of Western mercenaries were recruited, and by September 1862 the FAC had over 5000 Chinese troops. Recruitment was aided by increasing peasant resentment of Taiping harassment. Troops were trained in Western drill and military techniques very different from those of traditional Chinese warfare. Ward's force became known as the 'Ever Victorious Army' (EVA).

In January 1862 the Taiping re-entered Jiangnan with 120,000 troops. In September they mounted a second attack on Shanghai with an army of 80,000. Li Xuicheng's 20,000-man army was beaten back by Ward's smaller force of 1500 in Soonjiang, and all 20 Taiping camps were destroyed; Li's army was forced to retreat after suffering heavy losses. Unfamiliar with Westerners and Western military technique, the Taiping often fled. Another Taiping force of 70,000 counterattacked from bases in Taicang and Kunshun and got to within a few miles of the city, managing to surround 20,000 imperial troops, but in a seven-hour battle the imperial troops were relieved and the Taiping's retreat was cut off, with 30,000 troops lost. The Taiping launched four more attacks on Qing forces defending Shanghai before Hong Xiuquan ordered the offensive to be ended.

Until its disbandment in 1864 the EVA continued to win victories against the Taiping. Ward was killed at the battle of Cixi, near Ningbo, in September 1862. Henry Burgevine, another American freebooter, initially took command of the EVA, but his personality and his alcohol and drug use made him unpopular; he was demoted and subsequently changed sides. In March 1863 the British officer and imperialist Charles George Gordon took charge of the EVA. He relieved Chansu, a town 40 miles from Shanghai, and then took Kunshun with heavy losses. He also took Suzhou in November but left the city after a disagreement with Li Hongzhang over the execution of enemy officers. Later Gordon rejoined Li Hongzhang and captured Changzhong, the Taiping headquarters in Jiangnan. The EVA was disbanded by Li and did not play a role in the final siege of Nanjing.

The advance of Qing forces between June and November 1863 cleared the Taiping from the Yangtze valley and cut off Nanjing. Zeng Guofan directed the siege of the Taiping capital. Hong Xiuquan died on 1 June 1864, possibly from poisoning after eating weeds growing near his palace. His son Tiangui Fu took his role. On 19 July a gunpowder blast blew a hole in Nanjing's east wall, allowing the Qing to enter. The city was sacked, and according to some accounts most of its 100,000 inhabitants were killed. Tianqui Fu and Hong Rengan escaped; Li Xiucheng was captured and executed; Hong Rengan and Tiangui Fu were captured in October, and were both executed in November. Between 20 and 30 million people died in this conflict.

The surviving Taiping, under Lai Wenkwok, attempted to link with the concomitant Nien Rebellion, but Lai was captured and executed in 1868. The last remaining Taiping army was defeated in 1871.

The Taiping army was fanatically disciplined, but its ideology and command structure inhibited serious strategic thinking and consolidation of objectives. Leaders gained their authority from God, providing little room for disagreement. Although at their height the Taiping came close to threatening Qing rule, they were ultimately unable to support a sustained drive to control China, and their failure to link up with other anti-Qing rebellions of the time contributed to their eventual failure.

Cross-References

▶ China's Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities
▶ China's National Question Since 1949
▶ Maoism, Nationalism, and Anti-colonialism
▶ Semi-colonialism in China

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Tax

Tax Revenue

Taxation

Taxation, Capital Flight, and Imperialism

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Synonyms

Capital flows; Colonialism; Expansionism; Financial inflows; Financial outflows; Illicit financial flows; Neo-colonialism; Revenue; Tax; Tax revenue

Definition

For tax practitioners and academics, capital flight is an interesting yet protracted area of research and general debate. This Chapter analyses the interlinkages between taxation, capital flight and imperialism. It starts by defining key terms used within the Chapter as well as their significance in the main discourse. A brief introduction of taxation and its basic principles are discussed in the context of state-subject relations. It is within the realm of taxation, usually through the manipulation of tax systems and regulations, that capital flight occurs. Some have linked capital flight to power relations between states, relations which this Chapter explores (to a certain extent) from an imperialist point of view. Throughout its length, the Chapter breaks down the concept of capital flight, delving into the various practical forms in which it presents itself. The role of powerful states and multinational actors in propagating capital flight from poor and developing countries is also discussed. The Chapter concludes by giving solutions to curb capital flight, keeping in mind the role played by both powerful and poor countries in its facilitation.

Introduction

It is estimated that developed and less-developed countries lose a significant amount of capital and assets through capital flight. One of the methods through which capital flows outside these countries is through loopholes in legal and institutional frameworks. While governments of these countries have put safeguards for revenue collection, they still face challenges as individuals and companies find ways to avoid and evade tax while manipulating tax regulations for their own benefit. In Africa, it is estimated that in the last 50 years, the continent has lost approximately $1 trillion in illicit financial flows alone. This figure is on the rise, with estimates being blurred due to inaccurate data on actual capital flight from the continent.

The discourse surrounding taxation and capital flight is not conclusive without the theme of imperialism finding its way in these discussions. Capital flight has been blamed on weak fiscal laws as developed countries continue to syphon capital and assets from their poorer counterparts. While some scholars have analyzed this phenomenon in

the context of imperialism, some have challenged the notion, introducing newer themes such as capitalism into this debate. According to various schools of thought, exploitation of poor countries by their richer counterparts during the colonial period did not end with decolonization. In fact, poor countries still experience economic exploitation, albeit not as a result of imperialism, but as a result of neocolonialism and capitalism.

In order to contextualize the interplay between taxation, capital flight, and imperialism, a breakdown of these themes is important. This chapter attempts an explanation of technical terms in relation to tax, relating this theme to that of capital flight and imperialism. The discussion will also focus on imperialism, its history, and whether it is "alive." The bulk of this chapter will focus on capital flight, analyzing the phenomenon, characteristics, perpetrators, as well as the methods by which it is facilitated. In the end, the chapter will provide possible solutions in curbing capital flight, on the global, regional, and national scale.

Taxation

In order to appreciate the discourse on taxation, imperialism, and capital flight, basic understanding of taxation is important. Taxation is the imposition by taxing authorities, usually governments, of a compulsory levy or charge, referred to as a tax, upon its people. The term "tax" has varied definitions, with all of them denoting an unreciprocated and compulsory payment or contribution of money to a government or a public authority. The objective of tax collection by governments is well captured famous statement made by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes – that "taxes are the price we pay for a civilised society."

Hugh Dalton (2009) defines a tax as "a compulsory contribution imposed by a public authority, irrespective of the exact amount of service rendered to the tax-payer in return, and not imposed as a penalty for any legal offence." He notes that the centrality of taxation to public finance is occasioned by the lack of equally productive and reliable sources of public finance (Dalton 2009) He observes that if public

authorities and governments, for instance, held vast income generating properties and businesses, perhaps taxation would be necessary only to a small extent (Dalton 2009).

Saleemi's definition of tax as "a compulsory contribution imposed on individuals to meet the expenses which are incurred for a common cause," identifies three characteristics of tax. Accordingly, tax is, firstly, a compulsory payment imposed by the government on its residents; secondly, it is a payment that is subsequently utilized by the government to execute plans, programs and projects that serve the common good; and thirdly, it is not levied in return for any specific services rendered by the government to the taxpayer. The tax payer cannot, in exchange for the payment of tax, claim an entitlement to receive a quid pro quo from the government. In other words, the benefits received by taxpayers from the government are not related to or based on their being taxpayers. A tax is a generalized exaction, which may be levied on one or more criteria upon individuals, groups of individuals, or other legal entities.

The truth in Dalton's (2009) observation of the parallelism between taxation and increased public expenditure is reflected in the history of taxation as a key source of public finance. Throughout history, the introduction of a new form of tax could almost always be traced to a new or an increased demand on available public funds. For instance, colonial authorities introduced taxes in the colonies to finance and sustain the colonial administration. The industrial revolution also led to increased taxes as nations tried to outdo each other in industrial advancement (Hartwell 1981). Income Tax was first established in England in 1799 to support the war against Napoleon (Hartwell 1981). Wars, in fact, were a notable drain on public coffers and a common cause of increased rates of taxation. Hartwell (1981) quotes Sydney Smith as having lamented:

> *We can inform Jonathan what are the inevitable consequences of being too fond of glory; — Taxes upon every article which enters the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot — taxes upon everything which is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste—taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion— taxes on everything on earth and the waters under the earth— on*

everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home—taxes on the raw material—taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man—taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug that restores him to health—on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal—on the poor man's salt, and the rich man's spice—on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribands of the bride—at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay— The schoolboy whips his taxed top— the beardless youth manages his taxed horse, with a taxed bridle on a taxed road: —and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has paid 7 per cent., into a spoon that has paid 15 per cent., —flings himself upon his chintz bed, which has paid 22 per cent., —and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a license of a hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from 2 to 10 per cent. Besides the probate, large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel; his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble; and he is then gathered to his fathers, —to be taxed no more.

Categorization of Taxes

There are different kinds of taxes, with the widest categorization being direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes are taxes imposed upon and collected directly from the taxpayer, either an individual or entity such as a company (Smith 1776). Examples of direct taxes include income tax which is imposed and collected from the income earner. Property tax is also a form of direct tax which is imposed and collected from the property owner. Indirect taxes, on the other hand, are taxes that can be passed on from the person to whom it is imposed to someone further along the chain (Smith 1776). A good example of indirect tax is value added tax (VAT), which is imposed on the manufacturer but passed on to the purchaser to be paid when an item is purchased.

Imposition of Tax: Principles of Taxation and Best Practice

Though an imposition, taxation is still expected to conform to the rule of law, principles of good governance and general fairness, and to allow for public participation. Adam Smith (1776) developed what are today known as the canons of taxation, which are the basis upon which most tax systems have developed. They can be summarized as follows:

(a) *Canon of equality* – that the subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities, that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State.

(b) *Canon of certainty* – that the tax which the taxpayer is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the quantity of payment, the manner of payment ought to be clear to the taxpayer and to everybody else. Uncertainty of taxation would favor the unchecked authority and expose the taxpayer to corruption and insolence.

(c) *Canon of convenience* – that every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner in that is most likely to be convenient for the taxpayer to pay it.

(d) *Canon of economy* – that tax ought to be so contrived so as to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into government coffers. This is to say that authorities should collect taxes efficiently ensuring that the process of collection does not swallow up all the tax collected and thereby necessitate the imposition of additional taxes. Secondly, taxation should not discourage or disadvantage activities which enable taxpayers to pay tax easily, for instance, authorities should not impose taxes that disable business. Thirdly, punishment for tax evasion should not ruin the income earning capacity or activity of the offending party, therefore making it impossible for them to pay tax in future. Lastly, odious tax collection methods and procedures are likely to be hard on tax payers, even if not financially.

While Smith originally envisioned four canons of taxation, these later developed into more principles in order to suit modern-day economies. These additional principles include: productivity, simplicity, diversity, elasticity, and flexibility.

Imperialism

The term "imperialism" derives its meaning from "empire-building" which dates as far back as the Mesopotamian times (Steinmetz 2005). There are four categories of imperialism, namely, colonial, economic, political, and socio-cultural imperialism. The Britannica Concise Encyclopedia defines imperialism as "the policy of extending a nation's authority by territorial acquisition or by the establishment of economic and political hegemony over other nations." Going by this definition, the discourse on imperialism is usually focused on the colonization narrative, involving rich western countries dominating their poor counterparts. That this is the common conceptualization of imperialism is not odd, considering that colonization combined all forms of imperialism. Apart from the actual conquest and occupation of other territories, colonial powers would impose political ideologies, economic policies, and socio-cultural ideals that favored them to the detriment of the natives.

Imperialism and the African Context

The scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent colonization of Africa marked the beginning of imperialism in Africa. At that time, the term imperialism was more commonly used than it is now, and it was the norm to refer to colonial masters as imperial masters. During the colonial period, the term colonization was used interchangeably with the term imperialism. The term denoted the systematic subjugation and oppression of African nations and populations, the exercise of absolute executive power over all affairs of the African nation, and the imposition of laws and policies by the colonial masters and all other processes and systems that amounted to colonization.

Though used predominantly to describe colonization in its early manifestations, imperialism survived colonization and it has continued to adopt to the changing political and economic realities so that today, imperialism is a more indirect form of domination exercised over the economy of former colonies, mostly but not exclusively, by their former colonial masters. Post-independence,

political and economic commentators of the time observed that imperialism had survived colonization in the form of neocolonialism. Nkrumah (1965) noted as follows:

> The neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. In the past it was possible to convert a country upon which a neo-colonial regime had been imposed into a colonial territory. Today this process is no longer feasible. Old-fashioned colonialism is by no means entirely abolished. It still constitutes an African problem, but it is everywhere on the retreat. Once a territory has become nominally independent it is no longer possible, as it was in the last century, to reverse the process. Existing colonies may linger on, but no new colonies will be created. In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less-developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. (Nkrumah 1965)

Neoliberalism: Structural Adjustment Programs

The transition from colony to independent state came with its own challenges for newly independent African States. In the 1970s, rising oil prices, rising interest rates, and a sharp reduction in the prices of primary commodities which formed the bulk of African exports left many newly independent African countries unable to repay mounting external debt (Kingston and Irikana 2011). By the late 1970s, the growth spurt that accompanied independence had long petered out and most countries were experiencing some form of economic crisis. The crisis revealed itself in drastic declines in the output of key sectors such as agriculture and industry, unsustainable balances of payments and inflationary budget deficits, resulting in reduced government spending on social services as well as overall incapacity of governments to maintain productive infrastructure (Gulati 1998). At the same time, these states were under intense pressure to pay their already

high foreign debt (Kingston and Irikana 2011). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund stepped in to alleviate the financial crunch by offering loans to meet the immediate domestic needs and to service foreign loans. In order to qualify for these loans, a country had to accept a set of conditions, collectively known as the Structural Adjustment Programs, which were aimed at restructuring the economy of the borrowing country (Kingston and Irikana 2011). The programs were viewed as "a means to address long-term development issues" requiring Sub-Saharan African countries to urgently adjust the structures of their economies to make them less vulnerable to external shocks and to enable them to respond more flexibly to such shocks. Structural adjustment programs were aimed at integrating national and subregional economies, diversifying production, and building infrastructure (Mills 1989).

The structural adjustment programs required nations to adopt free market and neoliberal principles. Privatization was encouraged and government spending on social services was rolled back (Sayson 2006). Market liberalization saw the removal of trade tariffs and currency devaluation. The lending institutions also offered taxation advice, recommending that the main role of tax policy should be to raise revenue and not to direct economic activity, which was to be left to market forces (Kingston and Irikana 2011). Additionally, trade taxation was discouraged and developing countries were encouraged to shift the burden of taxation to consumables (Dom and Miller 2018). In this way, export taxation reduced.

It is worth noting that between 1984 and 1990, when Structural Adjustment Programs were fully in force, countries under the programs transferred about $178 billion to Western commercial banks (Kingston and Irikana 2011). By severely restricting government spending on social services such as health and education in favor of debt repayment, the loan terms of the International Monetary Fund grossly undermined the development of African social infrastructure and the effects of this can be felt even today. During the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa in 2015–2016, there emerged the reality that the health infrastructure of the affected countries, especially Liberia,

was very poor. It was argued that this was a legacy of the Structural Adjustment Programs which were imposed and praised by western institutions as effective, while all the while they were slowing down Africa's development.

Is Imperialism Dead?

Certain aspects of imperialism still manifest themselves in the modern-day world and in the face of globalization and interdependence of states. Today, even in the absence of colonialism, imperialism is seen largely in the economic domination of smaller economies (mostly former colonies) by larger economies (mostly former colonial masters and new and emerging superpowers).

The modern-day strand of imperialism is described by Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik (2017) as an element of capitalism which they refer to as income deflation. Central to the modern understanding of imperialism is the operation of the market forces of demand and supply, which are neoliberal principles championed by large capitalist economies (Patnaik and Patnaik 2017). Imperialist thought is informed by the fear of a threat to the value of money, upon which the stability of large economies depends. This threat occurs when local producers in poorer nations are able to consume the goods they produce. This would increase demand for those goods, which, in accordance with the rules of demand and supply, would increase the price of those goods. Importing nations would therefore have to spend more to import those goods, thus threatening the value of the money they hold (Patnaik and Patnaik 2017).

Income deflation existed even during the colonial times. It was instigated through colonial tax systems. The native population, which formed the bulk of the productive labor force, was highly taxed, thus reducing its capacity to consume the goods they produced. The demand for those goods therefore remained relatively low, making it possible for the colonial government to purchase and export those goods at low prices, and with the taxes they had collected from the producers no less (Patnaik and Patnaik 2017). As the local goods were exported, manufactured goods from the colonizing nation were imported into the

colony. This left no room for industry or value addition in the colonies and the local population remained untrained. The only opportunity of raising income was therefore to labor in the limited economic activities supported by the colonial government for its benefit. In this way, colonial governments created a ready pool of labor in the colonies and this kept the cycle going (Patnaik and Patnaik 2017).

In the postcolonial period, income deflation is instigated through a variety of neoliberal market principles, chiefly that of fiscal policies (Patnaik and Patnaik 2017). In order to meet their development goals, developing and less-developed states are always seeking out financing avenues. Financing opportunities present themselves in the form of foreign direct investment, commercial loans, foreign portfolio investment, and official flows. In order to lure investors, countries are often required to make concessions. On the other hand, lenders ordinarily require the adoption of measures that will guarantee repayment of their loans. The outcome is a reduction in public expenditure and in some instances, the introduction of new taxes. In 2016, for instance, the International Monetary Fund offered Rwanda a Standby Credit Facility of $204 Million because the country was facing a shortage of foreign currency due to high imports and low exports. In exchange, Rwanda had to scale down on public expenditure while ongoing projects faced the threat of abandonment (The East African 2016). In September 2018, Kenya, after pressure from the International Monetary Fund, introduced a fuel levy of 16%, causing a sharp increase in the cost of living. The resultant public outcry halved the levy to 8% (Daily Nation 2018).

Capital Flight

It is almost impossible to discuss taxation and imperialism without running into debates relating to capital flight. It is worth noting that there exists no universally accepted definition of capital flight. However, some existing definitions are instructive. Capital flight has been defined by some as unrecorded capital flows between a country and the rest of the world. Others have defined it as widespread currency speculation, especially where this leads to cross-border movement of private funds whose magnitude is large enough to affect national financial markets. Capital flight should be distinguished from normal capital outflows; however, the line is thin as the distinction is usually a matter of degree. Capital flight typically manifests itself in the acquisition of foreign investments by residents of one country in another country, which investment does not generate investment income in the country from which the capital flees (Gulati 1998).

It is also noteworthy that the term "capital flight" has geopolitical connotations, in that it is used mostly in reference to capital outflows from countries with relatively slow economies coupled with high indebtedness but not with regard to large economies. For instance, an American citizen channelling significant capital into African country is viewed as an investor and his money as an investment. If it were an instance whereby an African channeled a significant amount of money into a project in the USA, this would more likely be viewed as capital flight (Gulati 1998).

Possible Causes of Capital Flight

A number of reasons are speculated to be the likely causes of capital flight. First is the likely devaluation of a currency. Any resident will try to take their money and may be tempted to change local investments for foreign ones if there appears a possibility that those local investments will be worth very little in the near future (Gulati 1998). Second, discriminatory taxation policies, whereby a country taxes domestic currency denominated asset but does not tax foreign denominated currency assets, high-wealth individuals are likely to prefer foreign investment over local investment (Gulati 1998). A third reason is financial repression. Residents of a country with traditionally low interest rates are likely to prefer investing in countries with higher interest rates (Gulati 1998). While these are said to be the main causes of capital flight, recent reports indicate that a mounting foreign debt may be a cause of capital flight. This is because the residents of a highly indebted

country stand the risk of having a new tax imposed in order to make timely payments of the debt. Such residents may prefer to take their investment to countries where the likelihood of new taxes or other shocks to the economy is low. All the above factors that promote capital flight are more likely to be present, either singly or in combination, in developing nations.

The obvious result of capital flight is that developing countries are deprived of capital, which would be spent on investment and on other public initiatives. This means that to invest, developing countries have to borrow, which borrowing, as explained above, allows the developed world to impose lending conditions and taxation policies and generally continue the vicious cycle of imperialism.

Characteristics of Capital Flight Within the Realm of Taxation

Capital flight should be distinguished from normal and legal monetary and resource flows. Christensen's breakdown of these characteristics is useful. Firstly, flight capital takes the form of domestic wealth permanently put beyond the reach of appropriate domestic authorities. Oftentimes, this is usually disguised and unrecorded as a result of deliberate misreporting and misinvoicing. Secondly, capital flight is associated with private gain at the expense of public loss. This is obviously because in most cases, little or no tax is collected on capital flight. Thirdly, capital flight represents itself as a form of money laundering due to the fact that illegal capital flight is sanctioned by most jurisdictions; therefore, the management of flight capital is illicit and necessitates money laundering to disguise the source and ownership of transferred capital (Christensen 2009, p. 13).

In contrast, legal and reported capital flows are well-documented, taxed, and form part of everyday commercial transactions. These legal cross-border financial flows usually have the following characteristics: firstly, the source of capital being transferred to another jurisdiction from the country of origin is legal; secondly, fair payment is made in such commercial transactions; thirdly, no laws of the country of origins are

violated in the said transaction, especially those on foreign exchange and capital control; fourthly, all taxes due on the transfer of wealth are duly paid to the country of origin; and lastly, such transactions are properly recorded, documented, and reported, and they form part of the official statistics of the countries involved (Christensen 2009, p. 14).

Perpetrators of Capital Flight

Capital flight is facilitated by different actors, the following being the main perpetrators:

(a) MNCs
(b) Individuals – including corrupt government officials, politicians, and wealthy figures
(c) Professionals such as accountants and lawyers
(d) Banks and other financial institutions

Mechanisms for Capital Flight

As already discussed, the main mechanism through which capital flight is facilitated is through illicit financial flows (IFFs). IFFs constitute funds that are earned, transferred, or used illegally (AU/ECA 2015, p. 9). Considerable research analyzing IFFs has established three main sources through which such funds originate, that is, through commercial activities, criminal activities, and through bribery and theft. Commercial activities through which IFFs is facilitated include tax evasion by companies and other entities, trade misinvoicing as well as through abusive transfer pricing. Examples of criminal activities leading to illicit movement of funds include drug and human trafficking, smuggling, illegal arms dealing, and money laundering. Bribery and theft, on the other hand, are usually facilitated by individuals, especially corrupt government officials.

In order to understand the extent of capital flight from developing countries to their developed counterparts, one has to appreciate the technicalities involved in its perpetration. Governments of developing and less-developed countries have been criticized for allowing loopholes within their legal and institutional frameworks, making the fight against capital flight in its different forms difficult. Another problem

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facing poor countries is that they lack tax expertise to understand the sources, perpetrators, and the extent of capital flight from their countries. Some have suggested thorough capacity building targeting not only tax authorities but also policymakers as one of the solutions to curbing capital flight from poor states. The following section provides a brief discussion of some of the common terms in taxation and capital flight.

Transfer Pricing

Simply put, transfer pricing is the accounting and taxation-linked practice allowing companies to save on taxes (Investopedia 2018). The transfer price is the price of transactions occurring between related companies, in particular companies within the same multinational group (McNair et al. 2019, p. 3). Where a company operates subsidiaries in various countries, they take advantage of transfer pricing rules set by governments to determine how tax should be apportioned to the entity. While transfer pricing in itself is not an illegal practice, it is linked to illegal capital flight whereby transfer pricing regulations are abused so as to avoid or evade tax (Eden and Murphy 2011). Abusive transfer pricing involves the manipulation of a transfer price so as to shift profit from one country to another – usually from a jurisdiction with higher taxes to a low-tax one (AU/ECA 2015, p. 11).

Money Laundering

Another method used by individuals and companies to facilitate capital flight is through trade-based money laundering. This involves trade mispricing with the intention of disguising income whose source is an illegal activity.

Trade Misinvoicing

Trade mispricing and trade misinvoicing are two almost related but distinct terms. False invoicing involves making false declarations as to the value of imported or exported goods for the main purpose of evading customs duties and taxes, circumventing quotas or laundering money. In this case, it is the value of goods that is understated (in the case of exports) while the value of imported goods is overstated. More often than not,

proceeds from the understated or overstated values are illegally channelled abroad (AU/ECA 2015, p. 10).

Bribery and Other Unscrupulous Payments

While capital light facilitated by commercial entities is largely estimated to use mechanisms such as transfer pricing and trade misinvoicing and mispricing, capital flight by individuals, especially corrupt government officials, is though bribery and unscrupulous payments (Global Financial Integrity 2018).

Tax Evasion Versus Tax Avoidance

Capital flight, specifically illicit financial flows, from Africa has been largely facilitated through tax evasion and tax avoidance. A distinction of the two terms is important, because, while one is legal, the other is illegal. Tax avoidance is defined as the legal practice of seeking to minimize a tax bill by taking advantage of loopholes or exceptions to tax regulations or adopting an unintended interpretation of a country's tax laws. Tax evasion, on the other hand, denotes the action by a taxpayer to escape a tax liability by concealing from the revenue authority the income on which the tax liability has arisen. One of the ways of preventing tax avoidance is by putting in place anti-avoidance laws.

Tax Evasion, Tax Havens, and Capital Flight

As already discussed, capital flight may also present itself in the form of illicit expatriation of capital by persons resident or taxable in a host country. Usually disguised, such expatriation of money negatively impacts on the development of the host country. One of the main factors that encourage capital flight is tax evasion. Tax evasion through tax havens has exacerbated capital flight as well as financial crises and slowed economic growth for poor countries.

Tax evasion and capital flight are interlinked, especially because tax evasion can be looked at as a motive for capital flight. While domestic tax evasion and capital flight impact negatively on

poor economies, flight of capital to another jurisdiction is more detrimental to the host country. Some are of the view that domestic tax evasion is not as detrimental because in this case, the money is still retained in the country. Accordingly, in the latter case, the money would still be subject to other forms of tax, including VAT should it be utilized in the local economy. In contrast, capital that has fled the host country is oftentimes invested in another country, hence not generating revenue for the host country.

It is evident that tax evasion and capital flight present barriers towards financing for development through domestic resources. Developing countries should rethink their fiscal laws in order to strengthen national revenue administration to address capital flight and tax evasion. However, national sovereignty alone is not the key to combating these barriers – international cooperation is useful in ensuring these issues are addressed.

Foreign Investment, MNCs, and Capital Flight

It is noteworthy that there exists no agreed definition of the term "foreign investment." A possible explanation for this is that the term "investment" varies based on the purpose or objective of a particular investment instrument. However, the bottom line is that foreign investment occurs where there is an international flow of capital from one country to another. Investment of this nature can also be manifested through the uptake of management roles by foreigners in their investment in the host country.

In discussing taxation, capital flight, and imperialism, the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) cannot be overlooked. In a globalized world, the place of MNCs in trade and development is central. MNCs have been in existence since colonial times, manifesting themselves in those earlier times as instruments of British imperialism. Some notable MNCs involved in the exploitation of resources in Africa during the colonial times include the Imperial British East African Company (IBEACO) which administered parts of the East African region on behalf of

the colonial master. Though rendered defunct after a short stint, the company was instrumental in developing trade in the regions which it controlled.

Present-Day MNCs and Capital Flight

An MNC is defined as a business entity which has operations in other countries other than its home country, operations which allow the entity to transfer products and capital across borders based on demand and price conditions (Gardner 2014). The term "multinational corporation" is usually used interchangeably with "transnational corporation." The MNC is also defined as the organizational form that defines foreign direct investment (FDI) (Lazarus 2001). Such a corporation may be incorporated in country A and have subsidiaries, branches, and production and retail activities in countries B and C or more.

Foreign investment can be classified under four main categories: FDI, FPI (financial portfolio investment), commercial loans, and official flows. FDI is a financial phenomenon which occurs when a company owns voting stock of more than 10% in a commercial entity incorporated abroad (Cohen 2007a). Many corporations and individuals have chosen to invest abroad for various reasons. For one, foreign investment has been necessitated by less experience, or lack thereof, by host countries in areas such as technology and trade. For some, exploring newer markets abroad is as a consequence of a saturated market back home. While some of these reasons may be so informed, some MNCs invest abroad so as to maintain their market share at home and to stay ahead of their competitors who may have already moved their operations abroad to take advantage of cheap labor. Some MNCs have also been known for exploring and exploiting foreign markets so as to benefit from lower tariffs on production in the foreign country. FDI manifests itself in various forms and is to be distinguished from FPI, otherwise known as indirect investment (Cohen 2007a). While indirect investment may be in the form of share purchase in an already existing company in a foreign country, direct investment involves "the creation of new businesses, and the capital transfers to underwrite them"

(Cohen 2007a). It also means the ownership and control of an enterprise abroad, in the form of a branch or subsidiary. The other two forms of foreign investment are commercial loans, which entail loan facilities issued by domestic banks to the government of a foreign country, and official flows, which entail developmental assistance given by a country to another, the latter usually being a developing country.

Developing states have for a long time relied on foreign investment in its various forms to drive their own development. Whether this is effective or not is a question that has been debated upon for many years now. Apart from the continued allegations of human rights violations perpetrated by MNCs in various parts of the world, there has been evidence of involvement in capital flight by MNCs. Recent reports, such as the Panama and Paradise Papers have exposed the activities of MNCs in illicit financial flows, mostly from resource-rich African countries.

The Extractives Sector: Victim of Capital Flight

Tax avoidance, tax evasion, and profit-shifting by MNCs are rampant in developing and less-developed countries. Out of the various sectors of the economies of these countries, the extractives sector is one of the main sectors that is worst hit by illicit outflows of capital and assets. In Zambia, for example, the government estimates losses of at least $2 billion annually (an equivalent of 15% of its GDP) to tax avoidance by MNCs which operate in the country's copper mines (Curtis 2015).

In most resource-rich developing countries, governments, ironically, do not collect as much revenue as is expected (Ramdoo and Bilal 2014, p. vii). There are possible explanations for this – firstly, that these countries lack technical expertise necessary to exploit their own resources; secondly, that MNCs are given incentives to exploit resources in these countries yet they end up channelling profits back to their own countries, usually through loopholes in the legal and institutional frameworks of the host country; and thirdly, that developing and less-developed states that are rich in mineral resources are not keen on diversifying into other sectors of the economy for growth. In the absences of linkages between

resources and other sectors of the economy, resource-rich countries end up poor in the face of exploitation of its resources by MNCs. Profit-shifting by MNCs is detrimental to the development of developing and less-developed states as it leads to the tax base erosion. The ripple effect is the exposure of these poor countries to financial crises as a result of increased indebtedness.

Curbing Capital Flight: Solutions for Developing and Less-Developed States

As victims on the receiving end of the consequences of capital flight, developing and less-developed countries must rethink their fiscal policies and introduce safeguards to prevent further capital flight from their countries to the developed world. For most developing countries, the main challenge in the fight against capital flight is the lack of foolproof institutional and legal frameworks. However, this is not to say that these countries have not made steps to rectify the issue.

Cooperation Among States

The issue of capital flight is not a national or regional problem, it is a global one. While developing and less-developed states are usually the primary origin of capital flight, mechanisms for capital flight involve actors outside these countries, including both private and public actors. The fight against capital flight should, therefore, be a collective duty of all states, especially involving states which are recipients of flight capital.

Tax Reforms

Another effective way of curbing capital flight from developing and less-developed countries is rethinking fiscal laws. Poor countries must ensure that they reform their laws to make them concise and clear so as to minimize cases of incorrect and inaccurate stating of prices of goods and services. Clarity in regulations governing exports and imports would make it harder for individuals and commercial entities to engage in the manipulation, evasion, or avoidance of taxes including excise and custom duties.

Institutional Reforms

Apart from strengthening laws, countries that are vulnerable to capital flight should consider an overhaul of their taxing authorities and supporting bodies. For example, it would be prudent for revenue authorities in these countries to put in place requirements for institutions in charge of company registration, especially of foreign companies, to require that these companies be also registered for tax purposes. Requiring proof of tax registration prior to company registration would require the linking of databases of both company registrars and tax authorities. Not only would such a mechanism introduce stringent safeguards against capital flight but it would also provide sufficient data to track illegal activities by companies and individuals behind them.

Beneficial Ownership Declarations

Another closely related method of curbing capital flight from poor countries is the requirement that foreign countries should declare their beneficial ownership (AU/ECA 2015). This information should be asked for at the point of registration of companies, trusts, or other business dealings between a foreign entity and a government agency. Such information should be publicly recorded, while false declarations penalized.

The Arm's-Length Principle and Reporting Requirements

In order to curb abusive transfer pricing by companies, one of the globally accepted standards adopted by states is the "arm's length principle." In order to ensure that this principle works effectively in the fight against capital flight, developing and less-developed countries are encouraged to establish transfer pricing units within their revenue authorities. Some African countries have already established transfer pricing units, for example, Kenya. However, one of the challenges facing these units is the lack of capacity and expertise to detect and deal with cases of abusive transfer pricing. Apart from setting up these units, governments should require MNCs operating within their jurisdictions to avail transfer pricing reports in respect of their disaggregated financial reporting. The format of this reporting system should be streamlined so as to ensure acceptability across revenue authorities in other poor countries (AU/ECA 2015).

The OECD-Led BEPS Initiative and Information-Sharing Requirements

The OECD has led an initiative geared towards curbing base-erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS), which poor countries are encouraged to support (OECD 2016). The OECD's response involves improving access to information held by MNCs. The reality is that, while the OECD's response is a good cause, it may not be a foolproof solution for countries that are victims of base erosion and profit-shifting, especially African countries. Perhaps what would work best is an African solution to the African problem of capital flight, whereby these countries rally together to demand better terms in terms of more stringent information-sharing requirements on a global scale. In order for this to work, African governments should consider strengthening their own institutional capacity, especially in respect of data protection so as to maintain confidentiality of relevant business information.

Rethinking DTAs Between States

While double taxation agreements (DTAs) are beneficial to developing and less-developed states, some of the provisions contained in such agreements may be detrimental to domestic resource mobilization efforts by poor countries. DTAs have been known to provide loopholes and avenues for capital flight. Before signing DTAs, countries vulnerable to capital flight should review the terms therein before signing and committing to them. DTAs with countries known for being tax havens should be scrutinized more (AU/ECA 2015).

The Role of Regional Blocs

Regional blocs can play a significant role in ensuring that fellow members do not open their borders to foreign direct investment at the expense of illicit financial outflows. These blocs should be empowered to spearhead and demand for sound tax incentives and standards that would safeguard member countries from FDI-related capital flight.

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Repatriation of Stolen Assets and Capital

Perhaps one of the most neglected topics of discussion in the capital flight discourse is the treatment of flight capital once detected (Fofack and Ndikumana 2010). While most experts have focussed their discussion on resource mobilization for development in poor countries, the issue of capital flight and the potential gains for affected states has been overlooked. Once detected and investigated, capital flight should be repatriated. Repatriated capital flight would not only boost domestic investment but also increase the taxable base in poor countries. Subsequently, these countries would experience an increase in capital formation translating into long-term economic growth. The big question lies in how to repatriate flight capital. Capital flight repatriation largely depends on the will of states, especially countries to which capital flees. Western governments could play an important role through enforcement of highly transparent banking and financial systems. They could also lend their sophisticated financial and economic intelligence to the recovery of stolen assets and illegally acquired funds. Governments of poor countries, on the other hand, should improve their regulatory systems so as to minimize the attraction of illegally acquired private assets. Additionally, governments of poor countries should improve their governance and leadership to build confidence in asset holders in foreign countries to repatriate their legally acquired assets back home, and that these shall not be subject to discriminary or excessive taxation. Asset repatriation has been successfully done before, for example, in the USA, where the Lacey Act was used to recover illegal fishing proceeds and repatriate them to South Africa (Fofack and Ndikumana2010, p. 16).

Conclusion

Throughout the length of this chapter, the gravity of the issue of capital flight has been highlighted. From a developing country perspective, capital flight is facilitated by rich economies which still yield power over poor economies. Whether this is a continuation of imperialism or an evolution of the same, the bottom line is that capital flight is detrimental to the development of developing and less-developed countries. The answers to most of the issues raised in this chapter lie in the realization that poor countries must do more in terms of strengthening their fiscal laws to ensure that loopholes which facilitate capital flight from their jurisdictions are reduced.

Cross-References

▶ Culture and British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century
▶ Eco-imperial Relations: The Roots of Dispossessive and Unequal Accumulation
▶ Eurocentrism and Imperialism
▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt
▶ India: Liberal Economic Development, Inequality, and Imperialism
▶ Kenya: Repression and Resistance from Colony to Neo-colony 1948–1990
▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Nigeria: Modern Economic Imperialism (c. 1980 to Present)
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semi-periphery and Periphery

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The Danish Realm

▶ Danish Colonialism

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▶ US Military Presence in Africa

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Theories of Economic Development

▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology

Third Cinema

Third International

Third World

Third World Approaches to International Law

Third Worldism and Marxism

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Definition

Third Worldism is a trend in Marxism that uses many traditional Marxist categories while examining global structural disparities, thereby amending many of the key conclusions expressed by popular Marxist analysis. Third Worldism looks at prominent political divisions within the working class created through the history of national oppression and modern wage scaling.

Introduction

In broad terms, Third Worldism is a trend in Marxism that uses many traditional Marxist categories while examining global structural disparities, thereby amending many of the key conclusions expressed by popular Marxist analysis.

Rather than defining the world as principally divided between a working-class proletariat and capital-owning bourgeoisie, Third Worldism looks at prominent political divisions within the working class created through the history of national oppression and modern wage scaling. It highlights how these divisions are not simply the result of 'false consciousness' but are based on the development of a centre–periphery relationship inherent to the capitalist-imperialist world-system, and stresses that revolution against global structural inequalities is a prerequisite component of any socialist revolution. Though elements of Third Worldism can be found in the writing of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 put the ideas of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Third Worldism in the spotlight for the first time. In broad form, Third Worldism was a major theme of the twentieth-century revolutionary movements which peaked in the 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, influenced by the wave of anti-colonial movements, radical intellectuals began picking up and exploring the major themes of Third Worldism, looking further into the history, political economy, and cultural qualities of capitalist-imperialism. Finally, into the twenty-first century, Third Worldism has taken on an increasingly interventionist role in presenting itself as modern Marxism while critiquing left-wing politics that deny the existence of a significant vertical split in the working class.

Key Concepts and Terms

While using many of the key concepts laid out by Karl Marx (such as proletariat, bourgeoisie, class struggle, etc.), Third Worldism has throughout its history employed additional language and terms to advance concepts related to the stratification of labour, the transfer of surplus value, qualitative

developments of capitalism as a mode of production, and strategies for social change.

Among the foremost terms employed by Third Worldists are 'First World' and 'Third World'. While many additional terms are used in their place, some more technical and some more literary, the basic concept remains the same, reflecting a relationship in which 'the [preferential] conditions of life for the working class in the countries of the Global North are predicated upon the immiseration, national oppression, and exploitation of the workers and farmers of the Global South' (Cope 2012: iv). Additionally, Third Worldism tends to place stress on the national dimensions by which the proletariat is cast in the modern world, using terms like 'oppressed' and 'oppressor' nations. (Lenin 1976/1916; Sakai 1989) At the heart of Third Worldism is the tendency to look at how divisions imposed by capitalist-imperialism affect structures of class relations in modern society.

Imperialism is a central category of Third Worldist analysis, as it underpins the basic relationship between the First and Third Worlds. As Lenin notes, imperialism is 'the monopoly stage of capitalism' (1974a/1916: 265). More recently, Samir Amin described capitalism as 'inseparable from imperialist exploitation of its dominated peripheries by its dominant centers' (2012: 83). In both cases, exploitation increasingly takes the form of imperialist rent (profits derived from monopoly power) accumulated by multinational corporations at the expense of dependent sections of an integrated world-economy. Also central to Third Worldist analysis is wage scaling; that is, the different rates of income and life expectancies that different groups of workers can reasonably hope to achieve and work toward under the present system. Terms like super-exploitation, (Lenin 1979/1919: 15) super-profits, and super-wages are employed with qualitative regard to labour, reflecting contrasting general relationships of labour to global capital accumulation (Edwards 1978: 20; Emmanuel 1972b: 110–120). Third Worldists also use terms such as 'neo-colonialism' to describe the political characteristics of modern class rule and terms such as 'comprador' and 'labour aristocracy' as archetypal

political and economic subsets to the bourgeoisie and working classes, respectively.

A major theme of Third Worldism is the strategic significance of the relations imposed by capitalist-imperialism. Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, for example, explained in his 1967 'Message to the Tri-Continental':

> Let us sum up our hopes for victory: total destruction of imperialism by eliminating its firmest bulwark: the oppression exercised by the United States of America. To carry out, as a tactical method, the peoples' gradual liberation, one by one or in groups: driving the enemy into a difficult fight away from its own territory; dismantling all its sustenance bases, that is, its dependent territories. (1967)

Similar convictions on the need for an international united front and global people's war against imperialism were expressed in the same period by Lin Biao, a leading leftist during the early half of China's 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (1967: 42–58). In the same period or soon after, groups like the Revolutionary Action Movement and May 19th Communist Organization in the United States took up similar political lines, adding that groups within imperialist centres could act in unity with a global anti-imperialist revolutionary movement.

In more recent times, Third Worldists have looked more closely at how global contradictions might affect any global socialist revolution. The Maoist Internationalist Ministry of Prisons ('FAQ') describes a 'Joint Dictatorship of the Proletariat of the Oppressed Nations' over imperialist countries as the first major step toward communism. Samir Amin (2006) has described the immediate task as twofold: defeating the US's military hegemony over the world and overcoming the 'economic liberalism' imposed by the various institutions of 'collective imperialism'. The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement (2013 ['12 Point Program']) has described the necessity of a global new democratic revolution, in which global political and economic power are redistributed on an egalitarian basis, as the first step of socialism.

Additionally, Third Worldists have occasionally used modifications of words and phrases to reflect political meaning, or used indigenous

names of locations instead of their common ones. Examples of this include 'united $tates' instead of 'the United States of America', thus denoting the oppressive and illegitimate qualities of the subject, or Boricua instead of Puerto Rico and Azania instead of South Africa. This, Third Worldists claim, is part of challenging the cultural hegemony of imperialism (Maoist Internationalist Movement 1999).

Differences with Other Marxisms

Three World's Theory, the governing ideology of China's foreign policy in the late 1970s and 1980s, uses similar language as Third Worldism to offer dissimilar analyses of the categorisation of countries.

Third Worldism differentiates the world based on economic relationships of capital accumulation. Prototypical Third World countries are, for Third Worldists, countries that export surplus value, while First World countries are importers of surplus value (Amin 2010: 89). The Three Worlds Theory used First, Second, and Third World to characterise the international political power of various sovereign states. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) beginning in the 1970s, the First World was the US and Soviet Union, the Second World included perceived 'middle elements' such as Canada, Western Europe, and Japan, while the Third World included states with little or no power in the world-system, including China (Mao 1974).

In its polemical form, Third Worldism often counter-poises itself to opportunism, social chauvinism, and First Worldism, which are all seen by Third Worldists as having a material basis in the existence of a large labour aristocracy (Lenin 1979/1916: 5). Recently, Zak Cope defined First Worldism as: 'The governing ideology of the rule of entirely parasitic nations over the whole of the dependent Third World. First Worldism is the sense of entitlement to a standard of living predicated on superexploitation as felt by the vast majority in the advanced industrial countries' (2012: 119). Third Worldists claim First Worldism ignores historical structural divides among the

working class, the effect this has on working-class solidarity, and mistakenly pursues strategies based on the interest and consciousness of middle classes, including an elite section of the global workforce (299).

Historically, Third Worldism has been more associated with Maoism than Trotskyism. For example, as early as 1952, Chen Boda, who would later be a prominent leftist during China's Cultural Revolution, declared that 'Mao Tse Tung Thought' – and more specifically the policies of people's war and the united front – had universal significance for 'the entire world struggle' (1953/1952: 86). However, a recent essay published by the Trotskyist Socialist Economic Bulletin (Burke 2014) examines imperialism as a material factor for shaping public opinion in the First World.

While much of contemporary Third Worldism shares many ideas with Immanuel Wallerstein's treatise on world-systems analysis (2004), many Third Worldists take a more classically Leninist approach to strategies for social change, stressing the necessity of a vanguard party that organises a popular movement in order to seize power and institute a centrally planned economy with new social relations.

Differences from Other Critiques of Imperialism

As a radical ideology rooted in Marxism, Third Worldism goes beyond many other critiques of imperialism. These include: liberal populist strands of anti-imperialism as represented by the short-lived Anti-Imperialist League, founded in 1898 as a response to the US annexation of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico following the Spanish-America War, and modern strands of the same ideas usually found in libertarianism; analyses of the cultural aspects of imperialism, such as those expressed by Edward Said (1979, 1994); and modern critical expositions on the crimes of imperialism such as those written by Ward Churchill (2003), William Blum (2000), Jean-Betrand Aristide (2002), and John Perkins (2004). Third Worldism is more thoroughgoing, examining imperialism as a system of social relationships of

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production that manifest in historical economic disparities and cultural qualities (Cope 2012: 41–136), while highlighting the features of imperialism as being significant for the potentialities of revolutionary struggles (Amin 2010: 127–130).

Within Marxism, Third Worldism entails more than support for the economic and political agendas of nominally independent Third-World social democracies, such as India in the 1950s or Venezuela today, but rather includes support for popular national struggles led by communists against rule by imperialism (Amin 2012: 124; Lin 1966: 19).

History of Third Worldism in Marxism

The first examples of a Third Worldist trend within Marxism emerged from Marx and Engels themselves.

Engels, writing to Marx in 1858, noted that:

> The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *alongside* the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable. (quoted in Lenin 1979/1916]: 12)

Speaking on imperialism and the working class, Engels explained:

> The truth is this: during the period of England's industrial monopoly the English working-class have, to a certain extent, shared in the benefits of the monopoly. These benefits were very unequally parceled out amongst them; the privileged minority pocketed most, but even the great mass had, at least, a temporary share now and then. And that is the reason why, since the dying-out of Owenism, there has been no Socialism in England. With the breakdown of that monopoly, the English working-class will lose that privileged position. (1977/1844)

And, writing to Engels in 1869, Marx commented:

> For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendancy. I always expressed this point of view in the *New York Tribune.* Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will *never accomplish anything* before it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland. That is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement in general. (1988/1869)

These statements contain the kernel concepts within Third Worldism regarding the effect of imperialism on working-class unity and the necessity for a 'lever' of struggle to be applied among the nations oppressed by imperialism.

These ideas would also become themes in Lenin's later writing. Writing in 1918 about various strands of reformism in Europe and the US, he noted:

> [I]n all the civilized, advanced countries, the bourgeoisie rob – either by colonial oppression or by financially extracting 'gain' from formally independent weak countries – they rob a population many times larger than that of 'their own' country. This is the economic factor that enables the imperialist bourgeoisie to obtain super profits, part of which is used to bribe the top section of the proletariat and convert it into a reformist, opportunist petty bourgeoisie that fears revolution. (1974c/1918: 433)

Lenin's tone was often polemical, including in his writings about imperialism and the labour aristocracy that developed within it a class subset he believed was a basis of opportunism within the working-class movement (1966b/1920: 193). This polemical characteristic would continue to be a lingering trait of Third Worldism, and Lenin himself would take an increasingly Third Worldist stance in the latter part of his life. In 1923, months before his death, he remarked:

> In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And during the past few years it is this majority that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured. (1973/1923: 500)

Lenin's view was shaped by the fact that socialist revolution failed to occur in Western Europe and the US during the First World War. Instead, many social-democratic parties with which he had previously aligned took positions in favour of their own countries' war efforts. To make matters worse, the victorious Western imperialist countries experienced a period of post-war economic growth and social stability, in part, Lenin believed, due to a 'labour aristocracy' which had

seized the reigns of working-class movements (1966a/1920: 230). Thus, in its first years, the Comintern sought to combat the influence of the labour aristocracy over the workers' movement, declaring in 1921:

> Those who promote the interests of the labour aristocracy, either counterposing or simply ignoring the interests of the unemployed, destroy the unity of the working classes and are pursuing a policy that has counter-revolutionary consequences. The Communist Party as the representative of the interests of the working class as a whole, cannot merely recognize these common interests verbally and argue for them in its propaganda. It can only effectively represent these interests if it disregards the opposition of the labour aristocracy and, when opportunities arise, leads the most oppressed and downtrodden workers into action. (Communist International 1983/1921: 287–288)

With the growth and success of anti-colonial movements following the Second World War, the impact and influence of Third Worldism grew as well. A landmark in this early revival of Third Worldism was the 1949 victory of China's New Democratic Revolution led by Mao Zedong and the CCP.

In synthesising Marxism with the conditions of China at the onset of the Japanese occupation, Mao outlined successive aims for popular revolutionary movements in 'semifeudal, semi-colonial' countries that encompassed most of the Third World:

> The first step is to change the colonial, semicolonial and semi-feudal form of society into an independent, democratic society. The second is to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society. (Mao 1955/1940]: 110)

Mao's theory and practice of new democratic revolution were connected to his theory and practice of protracted people's war, described by CCP leftist Chen Boda as a concrete development of Marxism-Leninism directly applicable to the 'East' and of 'universal significance' to the 'entire world struggle as a whole' (1953: 85–86). Ten years later, in 1963, the CCP began openly criticising the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for its failure to strategically support and defend the right of oppressed peoples to engage in struggles against imperialism (Communist Party of China, Central Committee 1963).

Inspired by the success and development of anti-colonial revolutionary movements, the Bandung Movement took shape in the mid-1950s, launching the first Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. The conference, sponsored by the governments of India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma (modern Myanmar), and Ceylon (modern Sri Lanka), was attended by representatives of 24 other countries, and sought to discuss matters of co-operation between the formerly colonised peoples. Decades later, Samir Amin remarked on its origins that:

> Bandung did not originate in the heads of the nationalist leaders (Nehru and Sukarno particularly, Nasser rather less) as is implied by contemporary writers. It was the product of a radical left-wing critique that was at the time conducted within the communist parties. The common conclusion of these groups of reflection could be summed up in one sentence: the fight against imperialism brings together, at the world level, the social and political forces whose victories are decisive in opening up the possible socialist advances in the contemporary world. (2010: 123)

While the African-Asian Solidarity Conferences of 1955, 1957, and 1961 brought together states, the Organisation for the Solidarity of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, founded after the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in 1966, assembled organisations and parties from 82 countries, a majority of whom jointly supported a mutual cause of anti-imperialist struggle (Hsinhua Correspondent 1966: 19–25).

The 1960s itself was a decade of intense struggle around the world. Revolutionary figures such as Dipa Aidat (1964), Kwame Nkrumah (1965), Amilcar Cabral (1966), and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (1967) put forward various theses on the nature and significance of the ongoing struggles in the global South. Franz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* (1963), which examined the condition of the colonised, has since become part of the academic canon on anti-colonial resistance.

In the tumultuous 1960s, the influence of Third Worldism was even felt in the US. In 1965, the US sent ground troops to Vietnam, setting off student protests led by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which three years previously had begun exploring more radical positions and

rejecting a hegemonic anti-communist Cold War narrative (in its 'Port Huron Statement'). By 1968, SDS had upwards of 100,000 active members, and different factions had developed within the organisation (Rudd n.d.). The principal factions advocated two dissimilar strategies, one based on developing a 'worker-student alliance' and another on building a 'revolutionary youth movement' in unity with the struggles of oppressed nations. In the 1968 document 'You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows' (Weathermen 1968) the leaders of the latter trend explained, in an implicit retort to the former: 'any conception of "socialist revolution" simply in terms of the working people of the United States, failing to recognize the full scope of interests of the most oppressed peoples of the world, is a conception of a fight for a particular privileged interest, and is a very dangerous ideology'. The same document went on to note: 'Virtually all of the white working class also has short-range privileges from imperialism, which are not false privileges but very real ones which give them an edge of vested interest and tie them to a certain extent to the imperialists, especially when the latter are in a relatively prosperous phase'.

Following the 1968 split between the two principal trends inside SDS, members of the latter went on to form the Weather Underground Organization in the 1970s (which had Third Worldist leanings) and the May 19th Communist Organization in the 1980s (which was more Third Worldist).

Third Worldism also appeared in the radical movements spearheaded by African Americans during the same period. The Revolutionary Action Movement, which was founded in 1962 and heavily influenced by Malcolm X and Robert F. Williams, published its own 1966 manifesto, *World Black Revolution*, which advocated for a black insurgency within the US as part of a larger world revolution against 'white' imperialism (Ahmad 2007: 95–165). As its founder, Muhammad Ahmad (then known as Maxwell Stanford Jr), recounted decades later, RAM was an 'anti imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist' 'revolutionary Black nationalist organization' which believed the 'major contradiction in

the world was between western imperialism and the revolutionary people of color, the Bandung World' (Stanford 1989: 145).

Explaining RAM ideology, Ahmad goes on:

The US was hopelessly corrupt and racist. Reform was impossible [. . .] Black people in the US were part of the Bandung world which is [sic] made up of all people of color from Asia, Africa, Latin America, Central America, the Caribbean, North America, the Indian sub-continent, and the Pacific Islands. The Bandung world's historical relationship to the West was based on the exploitation of people for the labour and the raw materials the colony could export to the metropolitan country. Bandung people shared the same enemy. (ibid.)

In the immediate wake of the Bandung period (and emboldened by the existing challenge to Marxist orthodoxy as represented by the Sino-Soviet split), another strand of Third Worldism began to emerge. Rather than being founded in political activism and movement building, independent Marxist economists began to challenge existing understandings of the development of capitalism by placing a greater emphasis on imperialism in shaping the contemporary world. While this new trend was hardly homogenous, it contained a common belief that imperialist countries were enriching themselves at the expense of the masses of Third World countries. Less concerned with directing political movements, instead this group focused on a rigorous analysis of imperialism as a set of social relations and economic processes, thus examining imperialism as a historically developed system.

In the US, the growth of such academic Third Worldism owed a great deal to *Monthly Review,* founded in 1949 in New York City as an independent socialist magazine, and its editors Paul Sweezy, Leo Huberman, and, beginning in 1969, Harry Magdoff, a public acquaintance of Che Guevara and author of the 1969 book *The Age of Imperialism.*

The positions put forward by various authors in this academic Third Worldist trend were typically nuanced and well developed. For example, in the introduction to his *Imperialism and Unequal Development,* Samir Amin takes issue with crude Third Worldism, positing it as a Western response to dominant social-democratic ideology:

It is not surprising that the repercussions of this situation are causing the extreme left in the West to react by executing 180-degree turns. Social-imperialist collusion gives way to Third Worldist outbursts. For Third Worldism is a strictly European phenomenon. Its proponents seize on literary expressions, such as 'the East wind will prevail over the West wind' or 'the storm centers,' to illustrate the impossibility of struggle for socialism in the West, rather than grasping the fact that the necessary struggle for socialism passes, in the West, also by way of anti-imperialist struggle in Western society itself. They sway between extremes without understanding the crux of the matter – the significance of imperialist hegemony. (Amin 1977: 11)

Nonetheless, paragraphs later, Amin also reasserts some of the main notions behind Third Worldism while offering his own take on revolutionary strategy in the form of 'de-linking':

The current crisis reminds us forcefully of the chief characteristics of the capitalist system in its imperialist phases – the transfer of the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production from its dominant imperialist centers to its dominated periphery; the revolutionary and socialist potential of the struggle for national liberation; the social-democratic ideological domination of the working classes in the centers. This is not a question of prophecy, but merely of an analysis of forces that have been operative for almost a century. The detachment of the periphery from the capitalist system, to be sure, would alter the conditions of class struggle in the center. It is not excluded that if the current crisis should deepen and lead to new revolutions in the periphery, the weight of the contradictions of capitalism would have an impact on the metropolitan laboring classes such as to radically alter the pattern of the socialist transformation of the world. (14)

Underpinning this new academic Third Worldist analysis was a challenge to normative accounting of the Third World as merely 'underdeveloped' or lagging behind 'advanced capitalist countries' (Amin 2010: 90). As Andre Gunder Frank explains in *The Development of Underdevelopment* (1966) and Walter Rodney in *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1981), 'underdevelopment' in the global South is the result of centuries of participation in world capitalist development. In order to better illustrate how imperialism structures local economies in the Third World, academic Third Worldists such as Samir Amin have used the term 'lumpen-' and 'mal-development' (Amin 2013: 47).

Going further than many other academic Third Worldists, Arghiri Emmanuel (1972a) questioned the existence of a material basis for working-class solidarity across the 'north–south division':

While all the working classes were subjected to exploitation, no matter how disparate its degree, even when one was 90% exploited and the other 10%, they had an interest in uniting and fighting arm-in-arm, and together expropriating their exploiters, despite the fact that this expropriation improved the situation for some considerably more than for others. But from the moment the workers of certain countries ceased to be the suppliers of surplus-value (no matter how little) and became recipients, the situation was reversed and the positions of the working classes became antagonistic to one another.

It might be maintained that this comparison in terms of dollars or surplus-value rates is too abstract and illusory. I will suggest another, in physical terms. Today, the citizen of America consumes an extraordinary amount of basic raw materials. Were all the inhabitants of this planet to follow his example and consume the same amount per person, all known deposits of iron ore would be exhausted in forty years, copper deposits in eight years, tin deposits in six years, and petroleum in five and a half years! [...]

It follows from this that apart from all other considerations and all other antagonisms, under today's objective natural and technological conditions, and in the foreseeable future, the people of today's rich countries can consume all the things that make up their material well-being and which they seem to value, only because others use them either very little or not at all. They can reprocess their wastes simply because others have nothing much to reprocess. Otherwise, the ecological balance would be fatally imperiled. This is what makes the antagonism between the center and the periphery irresolvable and transforms the entire working class of certain countries into the worker aristocracy of the earth.

While Emmanuel's line of thinking may have been unfamiliar to traditional Marxism, the same could be said for many in the academic Third Worldist trend. Paul Baran (2012), for example, reintroduced the notion of 'economic surplus' (as distinct from surplus-value) as a means of analysing and understanding existing and emergent economic processes and social structures in the world economy. In Baran's view, economic surplus (i.e. the portion of the economic product above the material requirements of the labouring classes) made up not just profit and surplus-value

but also part or all of the income for some sections of the working class (43).

Lastly, academic Third Worldists stressed the role of trade in the functioning of imperialism, thus giving rise to theories on 'unequal exchange' as a means of imperialist exploitation. In this sense, the academic Third Worldism which emerged primarily in the 1960s implicitly challenged Lenin's notion that imperialism amounted to the export of capital, instead understanding it more as the import of surplus-value owing to the unequal exchange of commodities embodying different quanties of value (Emmanuel 1972b: 187).

Following and developing separately from the Third Worldist academic trend (though to some degree influenced by it), a contemporary interventionist trend of Third Worldism emerged. This latter contemporary trend, more polemical in nature, challenges what it sees as chauvinism within left-leaning ideologies while claiming that a correct analysis of modern political-economy and class structure is of central importance for Marxism.

This trend was spurred on by the Maoist Internationalist Movement (MIM), an organisation which existed between 1984 and 2005 in the US (Maoist International Movement 1994, 2005). MIM saw the 'North American white working class' as 'primarily a non-revolutionary worker elite' (1992). Throughout its existence, MIM would devote a large proportion of its efforts toward debating this matter with other members of the left in the US. MIM's stance regarding the 'white working class' was greatly influenced in the late 1980s by *Settlers, the Mythology of the White Proletariat* by J. Sakai (1989), and *Labour Aristocracy, Mass Base of Social Democracy* by H.W. Edwards (1978). The former title, a damning look at US history and critique of the American left, is still popular among Third Worldist and other sections of the radical left.

Following MIM's 2005 dissolution, the interventionist Third Worldist trend continued via different independent efforts. The Maoist Internationalist Ministry of Prisons (MIMP), an organisational descendent of MIM, today describes itself as 'a cell of revolutionaries serving the oppressed masses inside U.$. prisons' (n.d.).

Explaining its focus on prisoners in terms of Third Worldism, MIMP states:

> Since we live within an imperialist country, there is no real proletariat – the class of economically exploited workers. Yet there is a significant class excluded from the economic relations of production under modern imperialism that we call the lumpen. Within the United $tates, a massive prison system has developed to manage large populations, primarily from oppressed nations and many of whom come from the lumpen class. (ibid.)

As part of MIMP's strategic practice, it sees 'prisoners in [the US] as being at the forefront of any anti-imperialist and revolutionary movement' (ibid.).

Separately from MIMP, the Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement (RAIM) is 'a collective of revolutionary communist organizers, activists, artists, and technical workers based mainly in the imperialist countries' (n.d. ['What is RAIM?']). Echoing Emmanuel, RAIM believes:

> The masses of the First World are typically net-exploiters whose incomes are above the value they create. This is accomplished primarily through global wage scaling and imperialist exploitation of Third World peoples. 'Super-wages' for a minority of the global workforce has the economic function of saturating wealth in First World corezone economies and an ideological function of transforming the masses in these economies into agents of global oppression and capitalist-imperialism. (Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement 2013)

For RAIM, this creates the historical necessity of a 'global new democratic revolution': 'the hemming in and wide-ranging defeat of imperialism by an international proletariatled coalition of progressive classes, and the building of the requisite productive forces, class alliances, and consciousness to continue the struggle for socialism and communism' (Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement n.d. ['What is Maoism']: 3).

Additionally, RAIM has been openly critical of a pervasive influence of 'First Worldism' within the international communist movement, describing it as 'a trademark of reformism, revisionism, and chauvinism' (Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement 2014: 64).

Zak Cope's academic work also fits into the interventionist trend of Third Worldism. In his 2012 book *Divided World, Divided Class: Global*

Political Economy and the Stratification of Labour, he describes 'First Worldist left-populism' as 'distinguishable from its rightwing variant only by its less openly racist appeal and its greater approval of public spending', elaborating that, 'In neglecting the reality of superexploitation, imperialist-country parties and organizations calling themselves "socialist" are socialist only in the sense that Goebbels and the Strasser brothers were – that is, in advocating a larger share of superprofits, whether in relative or absolute terms, for their own nation's workers' (2012: 296, 297). More recently, in 'Global Wage Scaling and Left Ideology' (2013), Cope responds to an academic dismissal of the labour aristocracy featured in the Marxian journal *Historical Materialism.*

Contemporary Trends in Third Worldism

Relative to Third Worldism as an analysis of global productive relationships order via imperialism along with the basic implications this has for the Marxist conception of revolution, emergent trends within Third Worldism have begun examining shifts in the social composition of privilege and changes to the very nature of the world-economy.

While maintaining the First and Third Worlds as central categories of analysis, Cope notes the political significance of changes in the contemporary labour aristocracy: a growing proportion of 'unproductive labour' it performs and its predominance in tertiary sectors of the economy (2012: 130).

Still writing with lucidity and creativity in 2010, Samir Amin articulates in *The Law of Worldwide Value* a tendency in which, owing to a high productiveness of labour, no more than a tiny fraction of the labour force is set in motion for the creation of the social product. Under such a situation, class rule is principally expressed in an unequal distribution of the total income. Moreover, the maintenance of the existing hierarchies through physical coercion and imposed ideologies of consent would supplant the expansion of capital (i.e. the exploitation of labour) as the governing principle of the world-economy. Such a

system, Amin contends, would no longer be capitalist, but better described as 'neo-tributary'. Not only is such a system possible, Amin maintains, but it is being built right now, expressed by growing socio-economic polarisation characterised as 'apartheid on a global scale' (2010: 52–53). Implied in such a concept of 'neo-tributary' political economy is a shift from a capitalist-imperialism driven by the quest for profit toward a wholly reactionary imperialism chiefly devoted to maintaining and expanding the extant social features of class rule. Due to their recent introduction, no apparent consensus or general view on these topics exists among Third Worldists.

Conclusion

Rather than being confined to a single worldview or interpretation of Marxism, Third Worldism encompasses a historical trend within Marxism centred on the significance of imperialism. Rather than being marginal or ineffective, Third Worldism has been a persistent element in the revolutionary history of Marxism.

Marx and Engels set the fundamental foundations of Third Worldism in place, noting the embourgeoisement of a minority of the working class (made possible by imperialist super-exploitation of a broader section of workers) and also realising its significance as a relevant countervailing tendency to their normal pronouncements on working-class solidarity. The Third Worldist trend took further historical shape in the struggles waged by V.I. Lenin, the leader of the first major socialist revolution, against the opportunism of the social-democratic parties. Lenin's latter views on the revolutionary potential of the 'East' turned out to be correct. Third World countries became the major sites of revolutionary struggles, and Third Worldism became a prominent theme of Marxism during the Bandung period. In the wake of these anticolonial upheavals, intellectuals carried the trend forward, examined additional features of capitalist-imperialism as a predominant mode of production, and often added to or amended orthodox Marxist verdicts. Finally, as a trend, Third

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Worldism has most recently developed in an interventionist manner which seeks to more directly challenge the influence of 'First Worldism' within Marxism.

Given its penchant for creatively adapting to existing situations and its sense of urgency in relating to questions of economic structure and political super-structure, Third Worldism will assuredly continue to develop, especially as the subjects of its focus – capitalist-imperialism and class struggle – take further shape. Conversely, while class struggle will continue for some time in accordance with the ongoing relationships characterising capitalist-imperialism, the revolutionary quality of such struggles (i.e. their long-term progressive impacts) will depend in part upon the degree to which oppositional forces accurately come to grips with the same questions historically driving Third Worldism forward. Though not homogenous in time and space, the Third Worldist trend of Marxism is broadly implicative, suggesting not simply who will make revolution but, perhaps more importantly, what revolution will substantively look like. In this manner, Third Worldist Marxism is at once comprehensive and concise, incisive and critical, and firmly rooted in the internationalist trend which has broadly characterized revolutionary Marxism throughout history.

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Three Worlds Theory

Trade

Trade Liberalisation in the Caribbean

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Definition

Trade liberalisation is premised on the universalising assumptions of neoclassical economics, which provides a 'one size fits all' solution to all countries, regardless of their particular histories or their political and social contexts. It can best be understood as a series of policy reforms whereby free trade is encouraged through the reduction of tariffs, subsidies, and quotas which will in theory allow countries to focus on their respective comparative advantages. Yet, despite the insistence of the economists at the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade liberalisation has not benefited the Caribbean, and because of the inherent imbalance in power relations in many ways it has become collateral damage.

Introduction

Trade liberalisation is premised on the universalising assumptions of neoclassical economics, which provides a 'one size fits all' solution to all countries, regardless of their particular histories or their political and social contexts. It can best be understood as a series of policy reforms whereby free trade is encouraged through the reduction of tariffs, subsidies, and quotas which will in theory allow countries to focus on their respective comparative advantages. Yet, despite the insistence of the economists at the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade liberalisation has not benefited the Caribbean, and because of the inherent imbalance in power relations in many ways it has become collateral damage. In contrast to the claims of the international financial institutions, the Caribbean provides a stark and troubling example how globalisation and trade liberalisation can play havoc with a region's traditional economic base, dismantling it and as a result tearing apart the social fabric in order to satisfy the interests of American multinational corporations such as Chiquita and Riceland Foods.

When contrasted with the modest but important developmental gains in the post-independence period, particularly in the areas of healthcare and education, the increases over the last 30 years in poverty, inequality, unemployment, and lack of opportunity and the erosion of social services as a result of trade liberalisation have provided the conditions in which the majority of the population are leading lives of increased hardship. The impediments to the achievement of genuine, self-directed development are so numerous and wide-ranging that in 2012, the St Lucian prime minister, Kenny Anthony, remarked, 'Make no mistake about it. Our region is in the throes of the greatest crisis since independence. The specter of evolving into failed societies is no longer a subject of imagination. How our societies crawl out of this vicious vortex of persistent low growth, crippling debt, huge fiscal deficits and high unemployment is the single most important question facing us at this time' (Sanders 2012).

This essay will make clear using the examples of Haiti and the islands of the Eastern Caribbean that the current crisis facing the Caribbean is not one of hyperbole or exaggeration. Despite the

grand promises made about the benefits of trade liberalisation, it has become an unfortunate reality that for many, survival in the modern Caribbean consists in three major strategies: migrating abroad (either permanently or for seasonal labour), dependence on remittances, and supplementing their reduced incomes by working in the informal sector – be it legal or illegal.

Historical Context

When neoliberalism made its initial contact with the Caribbean in the early 1980s, the region had just witnessed the ending of three important, differing, but ultimately unsuccessful experiments with socialism. In Jamaica, Michael Manley's attempt at building democratic socialism was undermined by massive capital flight, political destabilisation, and significant external debt due to the two oil price shocks in 1973 when Arab oil producers in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut back production in order to punish the US and Israel's allies for their support of the 'Yom Kippur War' against Egypt. This led to a quadrupling of oil prices, triggering fiscal crises throughout the world. For small, energy-dependent states like Jamaica, this crippled the domestic economy and led to skyrocketing debt. In Grenada, Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement's Grenadian revolution was violently cut short by an internal coup and US invasion. Lastly, Guyana's co-operative socialism led by the high-flown rhetoric of Forbes Burnham became politically and economically isolated because of his descent into dictatorship fuelled by a mix of coercion, corruption, and racial violence.

While the commitment to revolutionary change varied among the three nations, there was an overall rejection of the possibility of self-determination and meaningful growth under capitalism. All three of these political experiments sought to reorganise their societies and economies in order to overcome the legacies of slavery, the colonial plantation economy, and imperialism which had kept them in a condition of economic dependence and persistent underdevelopment.

Despite their respective failures due to a myriad of internal and external factors, the Caribbean was still regarded by the administration of Ronald Reagan as a very real hotspot for 'communist subversion. In his 1982 speech to the Organization of American States, Reagan remarked that 'A new kind of colonialism stalks the world today and threatens our independence. It is brutal and totalitarian. It is not of our hemisphere, but it threatens our hemisphere and has established footholds on American soil for the expansion of its colonialist ambitions' (Dallek 1984, p. 177).

In order to temper the revolutionary and nationalist sentiments in the region, in 1983, Reagan and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the 'Caribbean Basin Initiative' (CBI) whereby Haiti, Jamaica, and other islands were encouraged to start exporting light manufactured goods while accepting subsidised agricultural products from the US. True to neoclassical economic theory, the CBI argued that a reduction of tariffs combined with an increase in trade would allow for specialisation and lead to a more efficient use of resources. Thus the protections on agriculture were to be eliminated, and market forces would eventually remake the Caribbean in accordance with an export-oriented development model which would reproduce the 'Asian Miracles' of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea (Rosen 2002, p. 132).

During this time, much of the Caribbean was still largely dependent on agriculture as a primary source of employment, government revenue, local food requirements, and exports. Thus trade liberalisation would displace significant proportions of the population which made their livelihood in the agricultural sector. Evidence of this can be seen in the example of Haiti, where in the late 1970s an estimated 70% of the population was engaged in agriculture (Dolisca et al. 2007). Furthermore, during the peak of banana production in the late 1980s, an estimated 50% of the labour force of the Eastern Caribbean (St Lucia, St Vincent, Dominica, and Grenada) was directly engaged in the cultivation of bananas (Thomson 1987, p. 61). The CBI argued that those displaced from agriculture would be able to find

employment in the new export processing zones, which were dominated by the textile and apparel assembly industries.

While the stated goal of the initiative was to reduce poverty through developing export-oriented economies and deeper economic integration with the US, it was primarily a way to combat and contain the 'growing influence' of progressive leadership in the region, as witnessed by the rise of Manley and Bishop. As a result, the stage was set for trade liberalisation with the eventual reduction of tariffs, subsidies, and taxes occurring across the majority of the Caribbean. While it is possible to generalise on the negative outcomes related to trade liberalisation, an analysis of Haiti and the Eastern Caribbean provides a much more detailed understanding of how each respective society was negatively affected by the implementation of policies which ultimately benefited US multinational corporations.

Trade Liberalisation and Haiti's Rice Industry

The grim statistics describing Haiti's poverty have been repeated ad nauseam to the point that the nation has become widely known as 'the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere'. Nationally, 76% of the Haitian people live on less than US$2 per day and 56% on less than US$1 per day (World Food Program 2010). The most recent reliable statistical data indicate that the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2004 was US$400, nearly half of the US$750 per capita reported in the late 1960s (Hallward 2007). Of Haiti's 9.3 million people, between 2.5 and 3.3 million are estimated to experience food insecurity, with chronic malnutrition affecting 24% of children under five (FAO 2012). Despite the alarming situation, however, things were not always this way.

Despite Haiti's close ties to the US under the Duvalier dictatorships from 1957 to 1986, Haiti was similar to many Latin American countries in pursuing a mixture of import substitution industrialisation polices, with the agricultural sector largely protected behind tariff barriers.

Because of the geopolitical climate of the Cold War, the agricultural tariffs were not seen as a hindrance as long as Haiti remained a political and military ally of the US and acted as a regional counterbalance to Cuba.

Because of this geopolitical situation, the Duvaliers were able to resist demands to remove the 50% tariffs on imports of food, especially rice. These policies enabled Haitian farmers to continue producing the vast majority of the rice consumed in Haiti while limiting other food imports. Prior to the IMF's push towards agricultural tariff liberalisation in 1986, Haiti was largely self-sufficient in the small-scale production of major food staples such as rice, meat, cassava, beans, and corn (Chavla 2010). According to Alex Dupuy (2011), 'All that changed after Jean Claude Duvalier was overthrown in February 1986. The US government successfully pressured the government of General Henri Namphy to "liberalize" the Haitian economy by, among other things, slashing import tariffs and reducing subsidies to domestic agriculture.'

The results that these reforms had on the Haitian agricultural sector are horrific. Haiti imported 16,000 metric tonnes of rice in 1980 and 340,000 tonnes by 2009 – a 21-fold increase in 30 years (Chavla 2010). In 1987 Haiti met over 75% of its domestic rice consumption, but today that number is reversed, with 80% of the nation's 400,000 tons of consumption coming from the US, making Haiti the third largest importer of American-grown rice (Holt-Gimenez 2009). Bill Reed of the Arkansas-based Riceland Foods Inc. (the world's largest marketer and miller of rice) regarded this as a logical situation, as 'Haiti doesn't have the land nor the climate ... to produce enough rice. The productivity of U.S. farmers helps feed countries which cannot feed themselves' (Katz 2010).

The matter of the Haitian rice industry was much more complex than what Reed was arguing. Because of the massive subsidies to producers in the US, Haitian farmers could not compete, according to a 2004 Oxfam report; these subsidies totalled approximately US$1.3 billion in 2003 alone, amounting to more than double Haiti's entire budget for the year (Oxfam International

2004). The former President of Haiti and agronomist Rene Preval stated, 'In 1987 when we allowed cheap rice to enter the country applauded "Bravo" . . . But cheap imported rice destroyed the Artibonite rice. Today, imported rice has become expensive, and our national production is in ruins' (Lindsay 2008).

With the destruction of Haiti's rice industry and the accompanying loss of employment and income, there was a massive exodus from rural communities to Port au Prince, where the migrants sought jobs in low-wage garment assembly plants. With the passage of time it has become apparent that USAID officials actually knew beforehand that trade liberalisation policies would 'increase poverty and contribute to a decline in average Haitian income and health standards' (Chavla 2010). Despite this knowledge, the CBI went ahead, opening the door to the dismantling of the rural economy and the massive dependency that we now witness in Haiti. A Grassroots International report stated that:

> As recently as 2007, a USAID agronomist told Grassroots International that there simply was no future for Haiti's small farm sector – a callous prognosis for the nation's three million-plus small farmers (of a population of 9 million). In a nutshell, USAID's plan for Haiti and many other poor countries is to push small farmers out of subsistence agriculture as quickly as possible. (Grassroots International 2010)

Thus it was decided in Washington that Haitian agriculture was to be dismantled, as self-sufficient agricultural practices would not lead to the growth of agribusiness markets or develop pools of excess cheap labour needed for industrialisation. To make matters worse, in 2009 a report from the World Bank-affiliated group, Nathan Associates, acknowledged that for low-wage factory workers, 'the costs of transportation to and from work and food purchased away from home eat up a substantial share of that minimum wage' (Nathan Associates Group 2009). Thus the implementation of trade liberalisation policies opened the floodgates to cheap, highly subsidised rice, known as 'Miami Rice', into the country and to exploitative sweatshop jobs with minimal contribution to the domestic economy.

After the devastation of the 2010 earthquake, the United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti and co-chair of the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Committee (IHRC), Bill Clinton, admitted that US free market agricultural policy towards Haiti has not worked for the Haitian people, but had been profitable for US agribusiness. In a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 10 March 2010 the former president stated that '[i]t [Haitian trade policies that cut tariffs on imported US rice] may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake' (Dupuy 2011). Clinton further reflected on his role in undermining Haitian agriculture by stating, 'I have to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody else' (Chavla 2010).

In another interview at the International Donors' Conference in New York on 31 March 2010 the confession of lessons learned continued as Clinton told reporters that '. . . [w]e made this devil's bargain on rice. And it wasn't the right thing to do. We should have continued to work to help them be self-sufficient in agriculture' (Ives 2011). However, when asked how the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Committee planned to revive the Haitian agricultural sector and selfsufficiency, Clinton quickly reverted to the implementation of more of the very same failed policies which had devastated local producers, undermined the nation's food security, and called for increased employment in foreign-owned sweatshops.

Trade Liberalisation and the Eastern Caribbean Banana Industry

In 1957, a preferential trading system was established between the Windward Islands of the Eastern Caribbean (St Lucia, Dominica, St Vincent and Grenada) and the United Kingdom. This was expanded upon in 1976 when the Lomé Convention was signed between the European Community and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) nations, in an extension of preferential

trading policies to former colonies to serve as a form of aid and reparations to ACP nations for centuries of European terror rooted in colonialism, exploitation, and slavery (Payne 2006). The Lomé Convention was the key article in the development of a European banana regime which would ensure that banana growers in the Eastern Caribbean and other ACP nations would have a guaranteed market for their produce in an industry that was otherwise dominated by Latin America.

With such policies in place, the banana industry quickly became the backbone of the Eastern Caribbean economy. The World Bank estimated that during the steady period of production in the 1980s, the banana industry injected almost €1 million into the St Lucian economy every week (Thomson 1987). This infusion of money into the hands of small farmers had a tremendous multiplier effect on the economy, in contrast to tourism or manufacturing based in export processing zones.

Despite being an industry historically rooted in highly unequal terms of trade, the banana trade did bring forth a degree of stability and genuine economic development to a significant portion of the Eastern Caribbean and supplied the governments with their primary source of income. Bananas affectionately became known as 'Green Gold' among the small farmers as the steady prices enabled them to raise their humble standard of living. For the first time, the state was receiving enough money to begin nationwide infrastructure programs, bringing paved roads, running water, and electricity to those located outside the capital cities.

Shortly after the introduction of the European Union's new banana regime in 1993, it was challenged at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by five Latin American nations (Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica) for contravening free trade rules. The Latin American nations claimed that the European Union was unfairly discriminating against them by implementing tariffs, which limited the competitive advantage of Latin American bananas. While the Windward Islands as a whole contributed only 4.6% of the world's total banana exports in 1995, this did not prevent the US Trade

Representative and corporations such as Dole, Del Monte, and Chiquita from continually portraying these tiny islands as a threat to the global economic order and the hegemony of free trade (Myers 2004).

Despite contributing only 2% of the global banana trade, the tiny Windward Islands of the Caribbean and their protected trade with England became the primary battle-ground for sanctity of free trade with the WTO leading an all-out assault on the nearly 50-year-old protected trade arrangement (Myers 2004). The WTO's rulings turned the uncertainty surrounding the Eastern Caribbean banana trade into a foregone conclusion that despite being the economic backbone of the region, in the new era of free market fundamentalism it was too inefficient to exist. Therefore from 1993 to 2012, the Eastern Caribbean would become engulfed in the largest and longest-running trade war in the history of the WTO.

The key figure pushing for the dismantling of the protected banana trade was Chiquita's Carl Linder. Between 1990 and 1997 Linder donated over $2 million to both parties to purchase as many allies as possible for his assault on the Caribbean banana trade. In order to set things right for Chiquita, Linder arranged for a meeting with Bill Clinton's trade representative and pleaded his case for trade sanctions against Europe in retaliation to their protected markets. Chiquita claimed that the protected trade 'establishes arbitrary and disruptive sourcing requirements; authorizes confiscatory and discriminatory licences and fees; and, since its signing, has worked a substantial incremental hardship on US commercial interests' (Myers 2004, p. 77). In order to prove this, Chiquita filed a petition under section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, claiming that the Hawaii Banana Industry Association had been negatively affected, even though Hawaii had never exported any bananas. This manipulation of the trade law was not based on knowledge of the law alone, but was also due to the significant power Linder had in the White House.

Finally, the influence of Carl Linder and his money also overpowered the statements of the Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic

Command, General John Sheehan, who publicly expressed his fear of 'regional destabilization and increased drug flows if US policy on bananas did not change' (Myers 2004, p. 107). Furthermore, in 1996 an International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the US State Department warned that 'the terrain in the Windward Islands was most attractive to South American transhipping of cocaine and that struggling farmers had been turning to marijuana as a cash crop to replace lost earnings' (ibid.). By ignoring these statements, it revealed that the motivation for US policy clearly came from corporate board rooms, where profit maximisation and 'strategic geopolitical interests' were simply one and the same.

Over the course of the 21-year dispute the Caribbean has seen a dramatic decline in its agricultural output as the region can no longer rely on traditional markets for its produce. As Professor Thomas Klak of the University of Miami stated, the Caribbean banana trade has gone from 'riches to rags' (Klak et al. 2009, p. 34). For example, in 1988 Dominica and St Lucia produced 76,872 and 168,060 tonnes of bananas respectively; by 2011 Dominica produced 23,039 tonnes of bananas, with St Lucia managing 23,810 tonnes – a drop of nearly 70 and 85% in 23 years (FAO STAT 2013).

In St Lucia, the unemployment rate stands at over 20%, with the youth unemployment rate reaching a staggering 32% ('Unemployed Youth can Take Hope' 2012). International financial institutions have openly stated that St Vincent's unemployment rate is difficult to discern, but agree that annually fluctuates between 25% and 30% (IMF 2011).

One of the primary challenges of demonstrating the negative impacts of globalisation is that progress and development are measured simply by a rise or fall in the GDP. In St Lucia, by GDP alone, the country stands as a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of US$6626. However, this statistic – often the backbone of most neoliberal arguments – does not tell us anything regarding how income is distributed within the nation. A closer look at St Lucia reveals that while the GDP is steadily rising, so is the income inequality between different segments of society. In its 2009 Population Data Sheet, it was revealed that 41% of the St Lucian population lived on less than $2 per day, which put it second in the region only to Haiti, where 72% of the population fall in this category (Population Reference Bureau 2009).

Commenting on the economic devastation that neoliberal trade policy had upon the island, St Lucia's minister of foreign affairs and international trade commented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1998: 'Mr. President, international terrorism can take many forms – to destroy a country's economic base and thrust its people into unemployment, poverty and despair, is as horrendous as blowing up its citizens with bombs' (Odlum 1998).

The Caribbean in the Contemporary Context

Because of their small size and the structural legacies of colonialism, the countries of the Caribbean were already some of the most vulnerable economies in the world and were marginalised on the periphery of the global economy. Despite the foundational assumptions of free trade, the spread of trade liberalisation to the Caribbean has revealed that the supposedly 'neutral' idea of free trade is used as a vehicle to further the interests of the most powerful nations and their respective corporations. While this essay has dealt specifically with the case studies of Haiti and the Eastern Caribbean, a similar narrative about the predatory role that multinational corporations have in the region has also played out across the region.

Indeed the economic restructuring of the Caribbean has taken on troubling neo-colonial characteristics. Despite reassurances that the region would find new and effective substitutes for the lost sectors, nothing comparable has emerged. Under the current global trading system, the Caribbean has been coerced into the liberalisation of trade; into the opening of its economies while at the same time the developed world – the same promoters of free trade – engages in protectionism and other unfair trading practices.

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While tourism is now the largest contributor of income in the Caribbean, its current structure does little to stimulate the local economy, as links to other industries such as agriculture must be created. For instance a 2011 World Bank report on Jamaica revealed that as much as 80% of tourism earnings do not stay in the Caribbean region, one of the highest 'leakage' rates in the world (Jackson 2012; World Bank 2011). According to Victor Bulmer-Thomas of London University, 'In all-inclusive Caribbean hotels it is common for only 20% of revenue to be returned to the local economy' (McFadden 2012). Thus as a result of trade liberalisation, the governments of the Caribbean have seen their primary sources of revenue disappear – with new industries such as tourism, garment manufacturing, and financial services demanding low or no tax concessions. This has resulted in a decrease of government spending in healthcare, education, and infrastructure across the region.

Given the erosion of the region's economic base it should not come as a surprise that according to a 2006 study by the IMF, the Caribbean had the highest emigration rates in the world (Mishra 2006). In May 2013, the *Jamaica Gleaner* reported that because of a lack of opportunity on the island an estimated 85% of university-educated Jamaicans migrate to find jobs elsewhere (Haughton 2013). While Jamaica's experience is shockingly high, it does not even lead the region, as Guyana occupies that position with 89%. Haiti and Trinidad follow with respective rates of 84, and 79%. Furthermore, most Caribbean countries rank among the top 30 countries in the world with the highest remittances as a percentage of GDP. The Caribbean is the world's largest recipient of remittances as a share of GDP (Mishra 2006).

Commenting on the inability of enclave industries such as tourism and garment assembly to bring about tangible benefits to the Caribbean, together with the increased rates of emigration and the higher cost of living, a 2012 report published by the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean revealed that poverty and inequality were on the rise throughout the region, leading to increases in crime and social dysfunction (ECLAC 2012). Thus it is no coincidence that trade liberalisation and the resulting collapse of the Caribbean's agricultural industries have provided fertile ground for the drug trade to expand and intensify across the region. The scale of crime has coincided with the area being declared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2007 as the most violent region on earth (UNODC 2007).

Overall, the restructuring of the Caribbean's economic base has had a very sharp neo-colonial character to it, as the shift towards tourism and low-wage garment manufacturing means that once again the Caribbean is primarily a region organised in order to serve and cater to the demands of Western economic interests. Indeed given the experience of the Caribbean, trade liberalisation must be regarded as a negative economic shock from which the region has yet to recover almost 30 years later. Throughout the region financially strapped governments lack the ability to fund social programmes or infrastructure, and are unable to effectively counter the increasing rates of poverty, inequality, and crime. The 2008 financial crisis and resulting decline in development assistance from the US and the European Union has threatened to accelerate the erosion of the important developmental gains made in the region. In many ways, the Caribbean is experiencing its own extended version of Latin America's lost developmental decade of the 1980s.

However, because of nearly two decades in which the neoliberal trade agenda has torn apart the social fabric and economic base of many Caribbean nations, the region is increasingly forging closer ties with nontraditional allies opposed to US hegemony such as Venezuela. The primary institutions which anchor this new relationship against US hegemony and free trade in the region are Petrocaribe, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), and the newly formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). While there are indeed undeniable pragmatic motivations behind the Caribbean's shift towards Caracas, it also highlights the potential of regional integration within the Caribbean and the benefits of increased South–South

co-operation. Previously fragmented and highly vulnerable to external shocks, the Caribbean's new partnership with Venezuela has provided a progressive breathing space for re-imagining regional integration and the possibilities of national self-determination.

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Transnational Ireland: Political Economy, Colonialism, and Resistance in the Global Context

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Introduction

Colonial polities do not exist within a vacuum, nor are they connected only to their metropole. Imperial powers either directly or indirectly link their colonies to one another in multiple ways in order to allow for the constant evolution of their tactics of colonial control. The case of British colonialism in Ireland is no different: for centuries, British control over Ireland did not just impact the island itself. From the early settler colonization of Australia with Irish convicts to the use of the Black and Tans to put down Palestine's Great Revolt of 1936–1939, Irish history has long been linked to colonial histories across the globe. Therefore, it does Irish history a disservice to limit its telling to events which occurred exclusively on the island itself.

This chapter seeks to tell the story of British colonization and Irish resistance through a transnational lens. It first sets the stage by detailing the early years of colonization and showing how settler colonialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries impact dynamics on the island to this day. Second, it explains the transition from direct settler colonialism to the incorporation of Ireland into the United Kingdom via the Act of Union with an explicit focus on the ways in which the evolution of British control on the island shaped how the tragedy of the Great Famine unfolded. Bringing Ireland into the global context, it connects the British convict system that forcibly removed thousands of Irish from their homeland with the settler colonization of Australia. Third, it contextualizes the Easter Rising and War of Independence within the changing face of colonialism globally in the early twentieth century. Fourth, it argues that partition of the island was no decolonization, even for the south; through a detailed economic history of the early years of the Free State (and later the Republic), it makes clear the ways in which Britain has retained a neocolonial hold on Ireland through economic dependency. Fifth, it links the most recent anticolonial rising on the island – the Troubles in the North – to the decolonization processes and global civil rights movement of the 1960s as well as the struggle in Palestine, reframing the Troubles as anti-imperial resistance with impact beyond the six counties. Finally, it looks to the future, examining the possible impacts of Brexit and detailing what the current geopolitical environment means for the possibility of a united, socialist Ireland.

Setting the Scene: British Conquest and Settlement, 1606–1778

From the time of the Norman invasion and conquest of the island in 1169, the English utilized tactics of both colonialism and settler colonialism to maintain control over Ireland. The early years of colonization saw the English struggling for control as power vacillated between the English colonizers and native Irish chieftains. To address this, the English introduced settler colonial tactics as a means by which to keep the island under their control. The Plantations of Ulster – the first official, policy-based instance of settler colonialism in Ireland – were settled in the early seventeenth century, a full century before the Act of Union (1707) which incorporated Scotland into Great Britain and nearly two centuries before a similar act brought Ireland into the United Kingdom (1800). Between the invasion of the Normans in the late twelfth century and the Elizabethan wars of the mid sixteenth century, the English maintained a presence in Ireland, but their power fluctuated with that of the native Gaelic chieftains (Connolly 2017). By the time of the Protestant Reformation in the mid-late sixteenth century, however, the English solidified their control, instituting a centralized government and disarming the native lords on the island. They utilized settler colonialism to maintain this control, dispossessing natives who attacked the crown and replacing them with thousands of Scottish settlers (Beggan and Indurthy 1999). Britain had effectively integrated Scotland only a few years prior, in 1707, and King James I utilized the newly-integrated Scots as settlers in the North of Ireland. The king approved the dispossession of rebellious landowners and claimed that only loyal landowners with legitimate claims to their lands had the right to keep them. However, the British government subjectively determined the categories of "rebellious" and "loyal" landowners.

On the stolen land, the British government and government-sponsored companies build plantations. The first plantation was set up by Scottish Protestants in north Down in 1606, and quickly spread into Belfast and across the rest of county Down and county Antrim (Connolly 2017). In 1607, Catholic leaders began to flee for fear of persecution from the colonial government as settlement of their land in Donegal, Tyrone, Derry, and Armagh began (Mitchell 2000). The official, government-funded plan for the "Plantation of Ulster" was formally put into place in County Derry in 1610. London-based companies, which claimed the settlers were "civilizing" Derry, predominantly funded the seizure of land by settlers (Connolly 2017). The companies divided the land between Scottish and English settlers who were prohibited to rent to Irish tenants. The native Irish were pushed to the less fertile lands both outside and on the fringes of the province of Ulster – for

which they often paid double rent. By 1622, settlers constituted 10% of the island's population, numbering approximately 14,000 (Connolly 2017). Irish resistance was limited, primarily as a result of both legal limitations and the island's history of colonization, but the settlers failed to take complete control of even the northernmost regions of Ireland. This was in part due to the fact that fewer settlers emigrated to Ireland than had been anticipated (Mitchell 2000). Tensions also played a role: Protestant settlers were fearful of the dispossessed natives, while the native Irish Catholics were resentful of the violence under which they were displaced, expelled, and continued to suffer.

Over the following 150 years, tactics of British settler colonialism in Ireland would evolve from the active seizure of land to legal restrictions on the civil, political, and economic rights of Irish Catholics. These restrictions were harshest in their limits on land ownership across the island, and, as a result of them, by 1778 barely 5% of the land on the island was legally held by its native inhabitants. Many of the native Irish were forced to become tenant farmers on the lands which they used to own in order to survive (Connolly 2017).

Legacies of Settlement, Realities of Colonialism: Incorporation of the Island and the Great Famine, 1800–1900

In 1801, following nearly 200 years of de facto British rule, the Act of Union was passed to legally incorporate Ireland into the Kingdom of Great Britain. While the power of the Irish legislature over the island had been largely ceremonial under English colonial control, its dissolution under the Act of Union was the final nail in the coffin of Irish home rule. During this period, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was set up to police rural areas where unrest grew following the Act of Union; the RIC would be the primary force of colonial counterinsurgency in Ireland until the force's post-partition dissolution. Additionally, in the nineteenth century, the structures of land ownership and renting which had begun to take shape in the late eighteenth century were well

established. Ireland was predominantly owned by absentee landlords living in Britain who ran their estates via the middleman system, wherein landowners left rent collection up to middlemen who were in a position to exploit the native Irish – the majority of whom lived in poverty on ever-shrinking plots of land, where potatoes were the only crop which could be grown in a high enough quantity to feed a family – before returning rent revenues to their bosses back in Britain. This wealth extraction was economically disastrous for Ireland; in 1842, it was estimated that £6,000,000 (accounting for inflation, this amount would be worth nearly £700 million today) was extracted from Ireland just in rents (Woodham-Smith 1962). The privatization of land via enclosure was vital in allowing this process to develop, as it allowed those who could afford to own land to extort those who could not by accumulating more and more acreage while locking the poor into exploitative rental agreements. As a result of this system, primarily Irish Catholic tenants paid exorbitant rents and received minimal wages to raise crops, the vast majority of which were exported to Britain. In this way, the absentee landlord system provided an additional means of British colonial control in its structural exploitation of the Irish workforce and extraction of resources in the form of Irish agricultural products. It was in this context that, in 1845, the disease *Phytophthora infestans* arrived on the island, destroying anywhere from one-third to half of that year's potato crop (Ó Gráda 2005).

Because the Irish peasantry – who made up the vast majority of the Irish population – was dependent on the potato as their primary source of food, they were the main victims of the famine. When the blight destroyed over three-quarters of the potato crop in 1846 while other foodstuffs were still being exported to Britain and mainland Europe, the dying Irish began looking for answers (Kennedy et al. 1999). They first looked to the colonial government for a response to the quickly-snowballing crisis. Long before the start of the famine, colonialism had taken Irish economic prosperity out of the hands of the Irish and put it under the control of British landlords and the colonial regime. The Tory government which was in power in Westminster at the start of the

famine did little to abate its early impacts; by the time a public works program was set up and tariffs on grain were repealed in 1846, the response was too little too late. The Whig government which took power in late 1846 were no better. Their policies were deeply based in laissez-faire economics, and therefore they continued to encourage food exports from Ireland while also ending the limited food and relief programs put into place by the Tories (Ross 2002). Though they ended these programs in mid-1847 and replaced them with the Irish Poor Laws in an attempt to abate the widespread starvation, the costs of the laws were borne primarily by the landlords and middlemen whose predatory practices had contributed significantly to the famine's devastation. As a result, landlords began to evict renters on smaller plots in order to combine them and rent them at higher prices. It is estimated that between 1846 and 1854, over half a million people were either evicted or pressured into "voluntarily" surrendering their land (Póirtéir 1995). Devastated by starvation, disease, and landlessness, the Irish lower classes had little choice over their fate. By the end of the famine in 1851, it is estimated that nearly 1.5 million had died while another million had emigrated since the blight struck in 1846 (Mokyr 1983; Census of Ireland 1851).

Many Irish who left the island during the famine period found their way to Australia, either voluntarily or not. Some voluntarily emigrated, while others were sent under the convict system to serve their sentences. The liberalization of penal codes in the early nineteenth century turned British society against both the death penalty and the wide range of crimes for which it was the punishment, and, as a result, British lawmakers found themselves facing a sharp increase in the volume of convicts entering the empire's jails (Hughes 1986). In an attempt to address this situation, lawmakers broadened the category of "transportable" offenses, which were punished by shipment to Australia. Seen as a more humane tactic of punishment as opposed to death, transportation to Australia became the fate of nearly 149,000 convicts of the British Empire between 1788 and 1868 (Hughes 1986). As one of the largest single ethnic groups within the population of convicts, Irishmen constituted nearly a quarter of this total number (Hughes 1986). As the primary means by which the British settled Australia, the convict system served as a link between Britain's settler colonies of Australia and Ireland. The settler population was essentially made up of the undesirables – the convicts, the poor, and the colonized – of the metropole (Hughes 1986). The elimination of the Aborigines of Australia began with the arrival and subsequent actions of settlers, who held significant power over the Aborigines, in stark contrast to their lack of such power back home. The settlers were given complete control over the Aborigine populations. Seemingly without concern for their shared past as colonized subjects, they implemented devastating strategies of settler governance alongside tactics of elimination, all while the transfer of settlers continued.

The connections between settler colonialism in Ireland and Australia are relevant to understanding why settler colonialism in Australia led to an elimination of the Aborigines even in the face of Aboriginal resistance. The tactics of population transfer used to colonize Australia did not just appear out of thin air. Settlers landing in Australia employed – with the support of Great Britain – evolved versions of the tactics used to settle Ireland. In addition to the tactics of settlement, strategies of counterinsurgency also moved from Ireland to Australia. The RIC – Britain's counterinsurgency force in Ireland from 1822 until 1922 – provided both officers and strategic guidance to Australia's fledgling Victoria Police (Herlihy 1997). After the famine, however, the RIC became quite busy at home. The growth of organized Republicanism in the latter part of the nineteenth century provided the structure needed for the Fenian Rising of 1867, the Easter Rising of 1916, and the outbreak of the Irish War of Independence, which shook the very roots of British control over Ireland.

Rebellion and "Independence": Fracturing the Union, 1916–1922

The early part of the twentieth century saw the Irish fight for independence intensify both in the

legislature and in the streets. The Third Home Rule Bill was passed through Westminster in mid-1914, but the outbreak of World War I led to its suspension almost immediately. In 1916, the Irish Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers – both newly created militant Republican organizations – rose up against British rule in Ireland in the Easter Rising. They targeted strategic sites of British control across the island, particularly in Dublin. Due to limited public support and the sheer size and technological prowess of the RIC and British military, the rising was crushed within the week. However, the execution of the rising's leaders, internment of hundreds of its participants, and imposition of martial law in its aftermath drew a large portion of the Irish public towards Republicanism (Coleman 2013). In 1919, after Sinn Féin won three-quarters of the Irish seats in Westminster, a group of the newly elected representatives gathered to form the first Dáil Éireann, declaring themselves the parliament of a 32 county Irish Republic with sovereignty over the entire island. When the British refused to negotiate with the Dáil Éireann or recognize Irish independence, the War of Independence broke out between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British military.

The years immediately following World War I saw the beginning of the end of formal colonialism, with many colonies particularly in the Middle East and North Africa turning into mandates or protectorates under European powers. Although the Western powers maintained colonial control over the mandates, they were set up with the stated intention of eventually becoming independent states. Within this global context, Britain recognized that it could not maintain its control over Ireland. In light of this and in order to end the War of Independence, the British government agreed to negotiations with representatives of the newly declared Dáil Éireann, out of which came the Anglo-Irish Treaty that partitioned Ireland into the southern 26 counties, which became the Irish Free State, and the six northeastern counties, which remained a part of the United Kingdom. Immediately following the partition of the island, a civil war broke out across the island between those who supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty and

those who thought that supporters of the treaty were sellouts to the British government and had given up the goal of unified Irish independence. Additionally, there were tensions as to whether the new state should become a capitalist or socialist republic. Because a significant portion of those who had fought for independence were a part of the Irish Citizen Army – an avowed socialist republican organization – there was sympathy for the new Irish state to become a socialist republic. Some, such as renowned socialist republican James Connolly, went so far as to suggest that Ireland existing as a capitalist state would allow it to continue to be dominated by England, despite achieving formal independence. He argued, "if you remove the English army tomorrow and hoist the green flag over Dublin Castle, unless you set about the organisation of the Socialist Republic your efforts would be in vain. England would still rule you…through her capitalists, through her landlords, through her financiers, through the whole array of commercial and individualist institutions she has planted in this country" (Connolly 1897). Despite Connolly's warning, the 26-county Irish Free State was established as a capitalist republic. As Connolly predicted, it remained deeply tied to the British economy, which allowed Britain to maintain neo-colonial power over the Irish state. Additionally, while the Free State government attempted to build a new state and repair its relationship with Great Britain, Irish Catholics in the newly established Northern Ireland grew more intensely oppressed politically, economically, and socially.

Building the New Nation: 1922–1970

Formally established in 1922, the Irish Free State's economy benefited from the post-war boom that had increased profits for both agriculture and industry across the island. The Irish economy still had significant financial issues. Namely, it was very reliant on Irish banks for loans in its early months, in part as a result of the challenges that tax avoidance and evasion posed to increasing the new state's revenues (McLaughlin 2015). The government had to

continually ensure that its income tax rates were below those of Britain in order to keep hold of the limited number of taxpayers who contributed to its revenues; while this prevented population loss and draining of capital, it also decreased the possible revenues of the government. As a result of this limited revenue, the Free State also had to cut welfare spending, much of which it had inherited via British programs. In the area of monetary policy, the new government actively chose to put off establishing a new currency and instead pegged the Irish pound to the pound Sterling (McLaughlin 2015). This directly tied Irish monetary policy to that of Britain, which allowed Britain to retain some control over the health and policies of the Irish economy. Additionally, due to rising inflation across Europe, the new Irish state feared that changing currencies would lead to unpredictable financial fluctuations that could harm both the salience of and confidence in the new government and economy (McLaughlin 2015).

In the agricultural sector, output prices were falling as international competitors who had dropped out of the market during World War I reentered it. Growth in the Irish agricultural market was primarily dependent on exports, a significant portion of which went to Britain (Hynes 2014). As William Hynes notes, "75% of aggregate money receipts of Irish free state farmers came from sales of livestock, livestock products and crops to export markets," which made agricultural export development vital to the health of the Irish economy (Hynes 2014). In an effort to boost growth in the agricultural sector, Cumann na nGael put policy regulations into place in an attempt to improve the quality of Irish produce in order to make it more competitive in the international market (McLaughlin 2015). In the industrial sector, the primary aim of the Free State was to create a strong industrial capacity, as the predominance of Irish industrial capabilities had been concentrated in the northeastern six counties, which had remained a part of the United Kingdom and were no longer contributing to the Irish economy following partition. Significant foreign direct investment by American and German companies such as Ford and Siemens-Schuckert boosted the

industrial sector in the Free State, but it still failed to compare to the pre-partition production (McLaughlin 2015). Following the global market crash in 1929, in an attempt to boost the Irish economy, Cumann na nGael introduced limited import tariffs in 1931. These efforts were not seen as strong enough to combat rising unemployment and decreasing opportunities for emigration, and paved the way for the 1932 election of Fianna Fáil, whose economic platform was known for its far-reaching protectionism.

Fianna Fáil argued that rising Republican paramilitary activity on the island was in part a consequence of economic deprivation which had resulted from Cumann na nGael's failed economic response to the depression (Daly 1992). Thus, when Eamon de Valera – an Easter Rising leader and known Anti-Treaty activist – and Fianna Fáil won the election of 1932, they radically shifted economic policy and ramped up the Free State's protectionist policies in order to develop Irish industry and cut remaining links between the Irish state and Great Britain. When the new government suspended payments on land annuities to Britain and thus defaulted on loans and obligations of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in mid-1932, the British government put tariffs in place in order to recover their losses, and the Irish government responded with counter-tariffs. This back-and-forth led into the Anglo-Irish Trade War of 1933–1939.

The first sector which fell victim to British tariffs was agriculture, where the British primarily targeted Irish cattle exports with a 68–88% customs duty (O'Rourke 1991). This severe response – though economic in nature – was based upon political interests. As Kevin O'Rourke explains, "de Valera's move was seen as a first step toward the eventual demolition of the many constitutional ties still linking the Irish Free State with the United Kingdom. British ministers hoped that trade sanctions, by damaging the interests of Irish farmers, would make de Valera's minority government unpopular and lead to his replacement by the more cooperative Cumann na nGael party" (O'Rourke 1991). Nevertheless, the Fianna Fáil government dug in their heels, and by 1937, the average Irish tariff was 45% and nearly 2000 articles were subject to import controls

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(O'Rourke 1991). Irish tariffs exceeded British tariffs by one-third, and while they were initially implemented as a reactionary measure, they became a tool of development and protectionism of Irish industries (Daly 1992). While the British had hoped the trade war would hurt Fianna Fáil politically, by the middle of the 1930s, Cumann na nGael publicly supported Fianna Fáil's economic policy decisions, and this in part led to the settlement of the trade war.

Irish neutrality in World War II was supported by all major political parties, and instead of entering the war, de Valera called a state of emergency. As a result, restrictions were placed on movement, particularly for farmers. Nevertheless, emigration doubled in the 1940s compared to the years during and after the Great Depression (McCann 2011). The primary impact of the state of emergency, and partly the reason for increased emigration, was scarcity and the resulting decrease in living standards. In addition to scarcity, wages for workers in the Free State – unlike those in the North, whose economy and industrial sector benefitted from British involvement in the war – decreased by 30% (McCann 2011). Despite these temporary economic difficulties, the Free State emerged from World War II with a per capita GNP which was equivalent to that of the pre-war period as well as a blossoming tourism sector which had developed during the war as an escape from the conflict, primarily for residents of Britain and Northern Ireland.

In the years immediately following the war, the Irish Free State formally became a republic via the Republic of Ireland Act of 1948, which was implemented in early 1949. In naming itself as the Republic of Ireland, the former Free State formally exited the British Commonwealth, thus putting the power which had previously belonged to the British monarchy in the hands of a President, the new head of state. This declaration cut the last political linkages between Great Britain and Ireland, and while the functional changes were minimal, the early years of the republic were fraught with economic difficulty.

At this stage, the Republic became even more economically differentiated from the North, which was primarily shown in the significantly lower living standards in the Republic. Additionally, the Irish economy remained dependent on its agricultural exports, which constituted 80% of total exports (Daly 2016). Britain remained one of the few countries still importing agricultural products to a significant extent, and it held a large portion of Ireland's economic salience in its hands due to Irish dependence on British demand (Daly 2016). As markets contracted globally, the Irish government responded by cutting public spending even more than in 1922, which only compounded the Republic's economic troubles. One of the main issues that arose when "government spending...was reduced by 15 per cent and the public sector's percentage of national income dropped from 35 per cent to 30 per cent" was that public sector employment was no longer an option for many new entrants to the workforce (McCann 2011). This, unsurprisingly, only worsened the Republic's already severe emigration crisis. With economic crisis looming, Ireland turned to the European Economic Community (EEC) as a chance to improve their economic prospects.

In their first attempt to gain entry into the EEC in 1961, the Irish government began to significantly cut tariffs and move towards free trade for the first time in over 30 years by investing more in the public sector while also implementing tax incentives and other tactics to attract multinational corporations and foreign direct investment in order to internationalize the Irish economy. This was a major shift from the protectionist policies which had defined much of Irish economic policy since partition, and pushed it further along the track towards joining the EEC. This membership would be vital, as "the EEC route provided something new for the Irish government that would eventually locate it in a dynamic developmental process which would, significantly, be outside the orbit of and dependency on the British economy" (McCann 2011). Primarily, it would give Ireland more open access to European markets in order to reduce its dependence on British demand and consumption, particularly within the agricultural sector. Ireland did not end up joining the EEC at this stage, however, as a French veto of Britain's concurrent application led the Irish government to withdraw its own.

However, in 1965, the Irish government shifted its policies. While Ireland's Central Bank attempted to reduce imports, exports fell significantly, and the government attempted to regain control over the economy by introducing tax hikes compounded by cuts to public spending (Daly 2016). In a response, the Republic signed the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement in 1965. This agreement opened Irish markets to British manufacturing imports while also opening British markets to Irish agricultural goods. While it was promising for Irish agricultural producers at the beginning, Daly argues that the agreement held limited agricultural export gains for the Irish and kept them dependent on British consumption while allowing the British to increasingly restrict Irish market opportunities (Daly 2016).

Much of the period following the transition from Free State to Republic was also characterized by Irish Republican Army (IRA) activity along the border with the North. Harsh security measures put in place in the early years of the Republic crushed most IRA activity until the mid-1950s, when a reinvigorated and re-armed IRA began a series of border campaigns against military and infrastructural targets in the North. As Séan Cronin, the primary organizer of the border campaigns, wrote, the aim was to "break down the enemy's administration in the occupied area until he is forced to withdraw his forces. . .in time as we build up our forces, we hope to be in a position to liberate large areas and tie these in with other liberated areas – that is areas where the enemy's writ no longer runs" (General Directive for Guerrilla Campaign, 1957). The campaign was launched in late 1956 and remained active for 5 years primarily attacking barracks of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and other key military targets. The introduction of internment in mid-1957 by the Fianna Fáil government made IRA activity even more difficult, and diminishing popular support in the following years led the IRA to abandon the campaigns in late 1961. The failure of the border campaigns provided a stark example of the difficulty of post-partition resistance to British control over the North. While militant Republicanism maintained a presence in the south, the complications of having to navigate two different regimes of internment in addition to a hostile government and nonsympathetic public made resistance nearly impossible. The end of the border campaigns was by no means the death of the Republican movement or even just its armed wing. When the Troubles broke out in the North shortly thereafter, the Provisional IRA – a successor to the IRA of the border campaigns – came to the forefront of the Republican struggle.

The Troubles: Colonial Legacies and Realities, 1969–1998

As global movements for civil rights and decolonization began to strengthen during the 1960s, Irish civil rights activists joined the struggle for their comrades in the North. Civil rights activists, including those who spearheaded the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), found solidarity particularly with African-Americans who were fighting for their rights in the USA. As human rights activist Brian Dooley explains, "as early as 1963, civil rights protesters in Northern Ireland had compared themselves to blacks in Alabama and Little Rock. . .They sang 'We Shall Overcome' at their marches and in early 1969 deliberately modeled a protest march on the lines of the Selma-Montgomery march" (Tewksbury 2008). Their solidarity was not unmatched, however; just as police and white communities did in the USA, the British military and settler Unionists increasingly unleashed violence against Irish Catholics as their political rights remained stifled. By 1968, confrontations between civil rights activists and their oppressors ushered in the era known as "the Troubles" as Irish Catholics rose up once more to fight for their rights.

On 5 October 1968, police in Derry injured over 30 people when they unleashed indiscriminate violence in the form of batons and water cannons to break up a civil rights protest in Derry (Purdie 1990). In response, local paramilitaries on each side reemerged – the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA) for the Unionists and the IRA for the Republicans. In mid-1969, the British

government granted the RUC's request for more troops on the ground in Belfast and Derry. By this time, 7000 Catholic refugees had crossed the border into the Republic of Ireland (Kennedy-Pipe 2006). As the IRA recommitted to armed struggle and launched a campaign against the British Army, the Parliament of Northern Ireland at Stormont (which at this point functioned as a devolved governing body that controlled regional affairs but continued to answer to Westminster) passed emergency legislation to introduce internment without trial against those suspected of insurgency. This order angered Catholics specifically, as they were targeted for in-depth interrogations and were disproportionately interned in the special prisons set up under the internment regime. This all occurred while house searches, curfews, and other British military campaigns, which had been facts of life in the North prior to the Troubles, spiked with the return of British forces. Divisions within the Unionist and Republican sides fractured the system of shared governance, and on March 20, 1972 – following mass demonstrations against the January murder of 13 civil rights demonstrators by a parachute regiment of the British Army in Derry – the British government closed Stormont, introducing direct rule (Purdie 1990).

Direct rule contributed to some of the highest levels of violence seen throughout the Troubles; the deaths of 480 people in 1972 is the highest casualty rate of the conflict by far, with the next highest occurring in 1976 with 297 deaths (Sutton 2002). Following the failure of a 1973 referendum as to whether the North should remain a part of the United Kingdom, the British government released a White Paper that created a power-sharing executive and the Council of Ireland, which was meant to promote cooperation between the North and the South as well as foster the development of a devolved government (Kennedy-Pipe 2006). This policy collapsed in mid-1974 as a result of blowback from Unionists, who claimed that the Council of Ireland was little more than a back channel in favor of Irish unity.

Following the dissolution of Stormont in 1972, the British government made a clear point to avoid announcing a state of emergency or declaring war on the IRA in order to emphasize that the situation was one of criminal activity rather than an anticolonial struggle. The British goal was to not legitimize the IRA or endorse the grievances of the colonized majority (Kennedy-Pipe 2006). This decision was compounded by the removal of special category status. Paramilitary prisoners convicted of terrorism were considered criminals, which prevented them from wearing their own clothes and freely associating with other prisoners. These were rights they had enjoyed when they were classified as political prisoners (Kennedy-Pipe 2006).

Hunger strikes against this policy change, led by Bobby Sands, were met with a harsh response from the British government that was widely condemned by both the European Commission on Human Rights as well as the US government. The strikers received substantial global solidarity, most notably from Palestinians in Israeli prisons who affirmed that prisoners in Nafha and the H-Blocks as well as the PLO and the IRA were engaged in a common struggle. Specifically, the message of solidarity was expressed by Palestinians in Nafha prison, who wrote to the Irish hunger strikers in 1981 expressing support for their "cause of freedom against English domination, against Zionism and against fascism in the world" (Samidoun 2012). Irish-Palestinian solidarity in the fight against settler colonialism persists to this day.

At this point, the Republican movement began its "ballot box and armalite" strategy of resistance – this referred to its plan to both run candidates in elections to local governing bodies and the Dáil as well as use armed struggle. In a surge of support that Sinn Féin received following the 1981 hunger strikes, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) attempted to arrange the New Ireland Forum (to which Sinn Féin was not invited) in order to gain some form of a unitary position among the Irish nationalist parties. The three options offered in 1984 – a unitary state, a federal system, and a joint Anglo-Irish authority – were rejected by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The New Ireland Forum published a report that became the foundation for creating the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which provided a discussion forum for both British and Irish

ministers as well as closer collaboration on security issues. In 1987, the IRA began a two-year campaign of violence in England itself, specifically targeting British military personnel. The British responded with harsh crackdowns by way of internment and violent "policing" that led the IRA to doubt the possibility of armed struggle succeeding in pushing the British out of Ireland. Sinn Féin began backchannel negotiations with John Hume of the SDLP and the Dublin government. Key to these negotiations were talks of decommissioning weapons.

The IRA was wary of decommissioning their arms, however, because while the British Army was no longer a major risk to the lives of Republicans, Unionist paramilitaries increasingly were (Kennedy-Pipe 2006). The peace process resumed, however, especially after the election of Tony Blair and a Labor government in Britain. Blair, though still reaffirming his support for the union, broke from previous British policy in reopening inquiries into the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972 and seeking outside intervention from then-President Bill Clinton and his special envoy to Northern Ireland, Senator George Mitchell (Kennedy-Pipe 2006). The Good Friday Agreement was signed by the conflicting parties in 1998 as framework meant to reduce violent attacks rather than build a peace around co-existence and equal rights in the region.

As Sutton (2002) reports, of the over 3500 casualties over the 30 years of the conflict, Republican paramilitaries were responsible for 2000, while Unionist paramilitaries and British state forces combined were responsible for just over 1300. Because of this, Unionists often claim victimhood. Over a third of the total killed in the Troubles were members of British security forces, however, and nearly double the number of Catholic civilians were killed as Protestant, which upends Unionist claims by showing that Republicans tended to target actors directly involved in the violence, while Unionists targeted more civilians (Sutton 2002).

Thirty years of violence also took a toll on the North's economy. As Teague (2016) argues, the years of the conflict were characterized by severe deindustrialization as well as substantial public sector growth, which led to the North's increased reliance on the British economy. The violence posed a risk to businesses, and as a result many firms pulled out of the North or did not newly invest in the area. Public sector employment in the North grew at more than double the rate of the rest of the United Kingdom, supported by a subvention from the British government. Teague (2016) explains that "the subvention...indemnified the British Government from the risk of an economic crisis emerging alongside the political crisis in the region, running the danger of pushing Northern Ireland into full scale civil war." While this expansion of public sector employment may have prevented complete economic collapse, it also made the economy dependent on a large public sector. This dependency remains to the present day.

Looking Forward: Brexit and the Possibility of a United, Socialist Ireland, 2015–Present

The outcome of the British referendum to leave the EU came as a shock to the world, and while Brexit certainly already has impacted the global economy, there is no place outside Britain where its effects will be more pervasively felt than the island of Ireland. Politically, Brexit threatens the tentative peace in the North due to the threat of an imposition of either a hard border between the North and the Republic or an effective unification of the island. At the same time, however, the Brexit debacle has brought to light once again the sheer depth of continued British involvement in the politics and economics of the Republic. As Brigid Laffan explains, "Brexit threatens Ireland's core geo-political and geo-economic interests...Of the remaining twenty-seven EU member states, Ireland is most affected because of Northern Ireland, the intensity of the economic relationship and the common travel area. Put simply, Brexit is high politics for Ireland" (Laffan 2018). The chaos caused by Brexit illustrates the ways in which Britain's neocolonial hold on Ireland remains strong; the two economies remain deeply intertwined and British political choices consistently have significant impacts on the Republic,

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though they are often made without consideration for the impact on Ireland and its residents. Brexit provides a moment of opportunity that Ireland has not had since 1916. With a majority of British citizens in the North having voted to remain in the European Union and considering the risks that Brexit poses to the economy and political stability of the island, the possibility of a united Ireland appears more realistic than ever. However, the question remains – what would a united Ireland look like?

This analysis does not seek to put forward particular policy proposals regarding which aspects of British or Irish government policy should be adopted into the North, but rather aims to build a political imaginary of what a united Ireland could be. A united Ireland should not just be the absorption of the North into the currently existing Republic of Ireland, but rather the reimagining of what Ireland is and what it could be. It is naïve to think that a unity poll will be won through mere demographic shifts; even if there are more Republicans than Unionists in the North and a unity vote is won, the united republic would replicate the same sectarian divisions built and maintained by British imperialism. The struggle for a united Ireland is not merely creating one state on the island, but rather it is a political struggle for freedom from the chains of imperialism that have held Ireland and its people in bondage for centuries. Even after the south gained de jure independence, it remained deeply dependent on Britain via its capitalist class. As James Connolly argues, the Irish upper classes are "tied by a thousand economic strings in the shape of investments binding them to English capitalism" and therefore, the working class must be the "incorruptible inheritors of the fight for Irish freedom" (Connolly 1910). Therefore, a political struggle for Irish unity ought to be built by a broad coalition of the working class. Such a struggle should seek to bring about equality for all on the island built upon an anti-imperialist workers' movement that aims to root out the remnants of British colonialism on the island. It should uplift migrants and workers and society's most vulnerable. As the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916, "we declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and

indefeasible" (Proclamation of the Irish Republic 1916). Though the future remains uncertain, this principle ought to remain at the heart of the fight for a united Ireland, as the island ought to belong to its people – not to its imperial masters, not to its neocolonial capitalists, but to all those whose destinies have been stolen from them by British imperialism and neoliberal capitalism.

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Transnational Nuclear Industry

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

Transnational Transfer of Value

▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism

Transportation

▶ British Slavery and Australian Colonization

Tribal Peasants

▶ Adivasis and Resistance to Imperialism

Tributary Empires

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Trinidad and Tobago

▶ James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)

Trinidad and Tobago: George Weekes and the Oilfields Workers Resistance to Imperialism, 1962–1987

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Caribbean; George Weekes; Imperialism; Oil; Oilfields Workers Trade Union; Trade unions

Definition

Trinidad and Tobago has one of the oldest oil industries in the Western Hemisphere, dating back to 1857. From 1908, oil was produced in commercial quantities and, as a result, multinational oil corporations such as BP, Shell, Texaco,

Tesoro, and AMOCO became major investors in the industry. Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago attracted other multinational corporations such as Nestle, Haliburton, Dunlop, W.R. Grace, Alcoa, Cable and Wireless, and BATA. These entities took advantage of the generous investment incentives and concessions offered by the People's National Movement (PNM) Government's 'Industrialisation by Invitation' policy that was implemented in the late 1950s. However, in their quest to exploit the natural and human resources of the nation, these multinational corporations met massive resistance from progressive trade unions, especially the Oilfields Workers' Trade Union (OWTU). Under the leadership of George Hilton Weekes, the union took the leadership role in the working-class struggles against the multinational corporations.

Trinidad and Tobago has one of the oldest oil industries in the Western Hemisphere, dating back to 1857. From 1908, oil was produced in commercial quantities and, as a result, multinational oil corporations such as BP, Shell, Texaco, Tesoro, and AMOCO became major investors in the industry. Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago attracted other multinational corporations such as Nestle, Haliburton, Dunlop, W.R. Grace, Alcoa, Cable and Wireless, and BATA. These entities took advantage of the generous investment incentives and concessions offered by the People's National Movement (PNM) Government's 'Industrialisation by Invitation' policy that was implemented in the late 1950s. However, in their quest to exploit the natural and human resources of the nation, these multinational corporations met massive resistance from progressive trade unions, especially the Oilfields Workers' Trade Union (OWTU). Under the leadership of George Hilton Weekes, the union took the leadership role in the working-class struggles against the multinational corporations.

Emergence of George Weekes (27 April 1921–2 February 1995)

On 25 June 1962, George Hilton Weekes emerged as the third president general of the OWTU (1962–87). In trade union and political circles, he was called George 'PG' Weekes. A former senator and government minister, Weekes was awarded the Trinity Cross and the OWTU Labour Star. His ascendancy into the leadership position dramatically changed how the OWTU viewed the relationship between trade unionism and politics. Moreover, because of his political influence, Weekes was able to galvanise a new social movement that challenged the Eric Williams regime and the multinational corporations that operated in Trinidad and Tobago.

Weekes's entrance into the OWTU's leadership and his emergence into Trinidad and Tobago's politics were not isolated events but were directly related to the emergence of other radical elements within the worldwide trade union movement. The shift in the OWTU's approach from Rojas's style to Weekes's more agitative stance must be viewed in the context of the struggles various nationalist groups waged against British and French colonial rule in Africa and Asia. These struggles (which included peaceful protest, mass insurrection, and military action) caught Weekes's attention, and they helped to shape his growing political consciousness to seek justice for workers. In relation to Africa, Weekes held a deep affinity for the political and economic aspirations of the continent, and he became a member of the African Nationalist Movement (ANM) that was formed in 1947 and later renamed the Pan African League in 1948. Moreover, he was actively involved in the Port of Spain-based Universal African Nationalist Movement (UANM), an organisation that was influenced by the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). By identifying with the struggles for freedom and independence, Weekes, in his early years, expressed solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the continent and other nations.

Second, the ascension of Weekes and his more confrontational approach must also be viewed in the context of the presence of the US multinational corporations in the country that had supplanted the influence of British commercial interests in the post-Second World War period. In the Latin American and Caribbean regions, US imperialism through the multinational corporations had invested heavily in the region by

expanding into various sectors such as the agricultural, bauxite, oil and manufacturing industries. For example, in the 1960s, US foreign direct investment (FDI) stood at $9.8 billion. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, Weekes saw the arrival of Texaco, W.R. Grace (Federation Chemicals) and Alcoa. Working at Texaco Point-a-Pierre, Weekes had first-hand experience of the industrial relations practices of the company and its effects on the oil workers.

Third, the rise to power of the 'Rebels' must also be viewed in the context of the rise of radical nationalism and anti-imperialism that occurred in Cuba as a result of the Fidel Castro-led Cuban revolution in 1959. This revolution offered hope to the Caribbean peoples and pointed to other alternative means of attaining independence and reorganizing a country's economy. By 1960, the Castro regime had nationalised all foreign and most large Cuban enterprises; this measure coincided with the OWTU's first strike against Texaco. Khafra Kambon noted that the Cuban experience inspired George Weekes and other militants who had been agitating for the PNM Government to adopt similar policies.

Fourth, the Rebels' rise to power must also be analysed in the context of the influence of revolutionary ideologies such as Marxism, socialism and Trotskyism. George Weekes fought in the Second World War and returned to Trinidad in 1943 a changed young man, imbued with a high level of political consciousness. Marxism and socialism fascinated him, and he developed an intellectual passion for these two political philosophies. Moreover, the Negro Welfare Cultural and Social Association (NWCSA), which was founded in 1934 by Elma Francois, Jim Barrette, and Christina King, also played a key role in the advancement of socialist ideas among the working class by engaging in political education throughout the trade union movement and in various communities in Trinidad and Tobago. With regard to dissemination of socialist ideology, activists like Bernard Primus, Lennox Pierre, John La Rose, Kack Kelshall and George Bowrin were instrumental in the process within the OWTU. These individuals played a very influential role in Weekes's socialist ideological development and also in shaping the OWTU into a powerful anti-

governmental organisation. As for Trotskyism and its influence on the Rebel movement, one has to look at C.L.R. James and the critical role he played in developing this ideology on his return to Trinidad to assist the Peoples National Movement. James adhered to the Trotskyist perspective as opposed to the views of the Communist Party led by Stalin. He was highly instrumental in organising the Workers and Farmers Party, of which George Weekes was a very active member.

Finally, from a local standpoint, the Rebels' quest to transform the OWTU and provide new leadership to the members must also be viewed in the light of the problems that confronted the working class of Trinidad and Tobago. In 1958, the labour force totalled 297,000 workers. However, of this active figure, some 28,000 were unemployed and by 1962 unemployment would surpass the 1958 figure by 100%. In addition, the scale of wages in various industries was very low. The 1958 Budget figures revealed that workers with paid jobs in 1956 earned less than $50.00 a month. In addition, it painted a grim reality that 'seven out of ten paid workers with jobs in Trinidad and Tobago in 1956 did not earn enough to bring them within the income tax net. Furthermore, the average wage earning of the lowest-paid unskilled workers in large non-agricultural firms employing ten persons or more in 1958 was $632 per year in services and commerce; $641 per year in manufacturing (clothing), and in many other areas it did not go above $725 per year. In oil, transport, communications, and ports, it stood slightly above $1,200. Even though oil workers received higher comparable wages, Weekes and the Rebel team were not only concerned about the welfare of the oil workers but viewed themselves as part of a new grass-roots movement that rose up in defence of the working class to challenge the PNM's political and socioeconomic independence paradigm.

OWTU and Resistance to Imperialism (1963–69)

Shortly after Weekes and the Rebels took control of the leadership, British Petroleum, a British

multinational corporation, served notice to the OWTU of its intention to retrench hundreds of workers at the Point Fortin refinery. Understanding the lessons of the 1962 struggle against BP, the new OWTU leadership mobilised the workers at the refinery under the slogan 'Not A Man Must Go'. On 17 February 1963, 2,600 BP workers took strike action which lasted for 57 days and forced the company to rescind its plans. This strike was significant because it occurred six months after Trinidad and Tobago had obtained constitutional independence from Great Britain. Moreover, in the same year, the OWTU, through the collective bargaining process with Texaco, negotiated the first pension plan in Trinidad and Tobago for workers. Prior to this, only expatriate managers and supervisors at Texaco received pensions. This concession, extracted from a giant multinational corporation, was a victory for the working class and became a model for other unions in their collective bargaining agreements with private companies. Furthermore, in 1965, George Weekes and other progressive trade unionists vigorously opposed the passage of the Industrial Stabilisation Act.

This piece of repressive legislation was aimed at taking away the unions' right to take strike action. The progressive trade unions opposed it because it favoured the rights of the multinational corporations over the workers. Additionally, in 1967, almost five years into his leadership of the OWTU, George Weekes faced a crisis when British Petroleum announced its intention to reduce the number of oil workers at its plants. By 1967, British Petroleum was locked in a struggle with the OWTU over the attempts of the company to reduce manpower. However, at the same time, the company was witnessing its oil fortunes increase dramatically with large discoveries of oil in the Prudhoe Bay and Forties in the North Sea that boosted the company's reserves outside of the Middle East. As a result of these large deposits of oil being found, the company's board of directors unanimously agreed to rid BP of unprofitable operations and steer its exploration funds to these two new areas. Meanwhile, BP's Trinidad and Tobago operations witnessed a dramatic decline from 40,913 million barrels in 1967 to 29,716

million barrels in 1969. The company claimed that this drastic fall affected its profit margins and, as a result, ceased its exploration activities, embarked on a redundancy programme, and invited Shell and Texaco to purchase its assets. However, both companies declined BP's offer.

This action created political problems for the government. Although the oil workers were members of the militant OWTU, the vast majority were also PNM party supporters who were in danger of losing their jobs with dire socioeconomic consequences for their families. On 30 March 1967, the union held a mass membership meeting at Palo Seco and called on the PNM Government to acquire the assets of BP and establish a National Petroleum Company. The union's leadership felt that nationalisation of the foreign-owned oil company had the capacity to generate jobs and boost the national economy. Furthermore, the union requested that the government block Texaco from purchasing BP's assets. Following the public meeting, the OWTU, on 4 April 1967, presented to the PNM Government a memorandum entitled 'Oil in Turmoil and OWTU Memorandum on the Formation of a National Oil Company'. In response, George Weekes wrote acknowledging receipt of the Memorandum and also the Resolution. OWTU's memorandum was divided into two parts: 'Oil in Turmoil' and the 'OWTU Memorandum'. The former examined the state of the industry, its importance to Trinidad and Tobago's economy, the global control of the industry, competition, prices and markets, production costs, the true state of oil production, the establishment of a National Oil Company, internal competence, and funding.

In its conclusion, the OWTU pledged to commit monetary and human resources towards the purchase of BP's assets. In the latter part of the document, the union presented a 15-point memorandum that detailed all aspects of BP's local and international operations that included holdings in Trinidad Northern Areas, Trinmar Ltd, BP Caribbean Ltd, Kern Trinidad Oilfields Ltd, Apex (Trinidad) Oilfields Ltd, Trinidad Petroleum Development Ltd, and BP (Trinidad) Ltd, the holding company. In addition, the OWTU offered a number of practical solutions to the PNM

Government on purchase of and payments for BP's assets. For example, the union proposed a series of methods that included amortised payments over a 15–20-year period, National Bonds bearing 2.5% interest rates redeemed over 15–20 years, and government takeover whereby the state purchase 4% of the shares and the remaining 96% were offered to the public. Although the government rejected many of the proposals contained in the OWTU's memorandum, it purchased BP's assets in 1969 and formed a joint-venture company with Tesero, an American oil company. While the government did not follow the detailed demands of the OWTU, the union's action clearly influenced its approach in dealing with the oil industry. The anti-imperialist struggles waged in the 19760s cemented George Weekes's leadership in the trade union movement and pushed the OWTU to play a vanguard role in the 1970s.

OWTU and Resistance to Imperialism (1970–79)

By 1970, the militant mood of the working class had intensified with their support of the Black Power Revolution that called for the nationalisation of oil and sugar industries that were controlled by multinational corporations. This wave of militancy against the proliferation of multinational corporations and economic dependency was not limited only to Trinidad and Tobago but was part of the growing radical social movements all over the Third World, whether it was expressed as Black Power, socialism, Pan Africanism, Black Nationalism or Radical Nationalism. It was in this context that OWTU members waged struggles against multinational corporations. In 1965, the OWTU won recognition to represent workers at Federation Chemicals, a subsidiary of W.R. Grace, N.A. Late in 1970, the OWTU and the company entered into negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement over wages and other workers' related benefits, compensation, and working conditions. Due to the slow pace of the negotiations coupled with the firing of six workers, the entire workforce

went on strike. In support of the strike, the OWTU, in July 1971, mobilised other branches from oil, electricity, and agriculture to support the striking workers at Federation Chemicals. Moreover, in October 1970, workers at Halliburton, an American oil contracting company, downed their tools and took protest action over the dismissal of their coworkers and racist management practices. Additionally, in the same year, oil workers at Texaco Guayaguayare went on strike over the hiring of scab labour. These two strikes were significant because workers did not consult the union leadership. Moreover, in 1971, workers at Dunlop went on strike over management's policy of hiring white South African managers. Furthermore, from 27 March 1975–28 April 1975, workers at Texaco went on strike to protest against Texaco's failure to negotiate wage increases. After several meetings, union called off the prolonged strike because workers were losing wages. However, the union secured recognition for the monthly paid staff, and it became a bargaining unit within the OWTU.

In 1978, Texaco celebrated 22 years of operations in Trinidad and Tobago; however, this celebration did not prevent the company from launching an attack on the OWTU by dismissing safety officer Victor Singh and suspending branch officer Glen Walcott, the entire pump department and 13 waterfront workers. Therefore, it was against this background that the OWTU went into the negotiations to bargain on behalf of the Texaco workers. Using a strategy that involved comprehensive research into Texaco's local and global operations that was prepared by Trevor Farrell, a lecturer in Economics at the University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, and a specialist in Petroleum Economics, the OWTU entered the negotiations seeking 120% but was willing, in the interest of time, to settle for a compromise increase of 100% in wages. The claim was based on a number of factors including: the contribution of oil workers to the country's economy and the wealth of the company; the impact of inflation on the workers' real wages; the impact of projected inflation; the increase in workers' productivity; the modern industrial relations practice as it related to employee welfare;

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and the beneficial impact of a settlement on the country's welfare. In terms of the oil workers' contribution to the economy, the union, utilising official government statistical figures, pointed out that between 1973 and 1977, oil workers had contributed some $2.676 billion to government's recurrent revenue. Percentage wise, this meant that oil workers' contribution to the economy grew by 62% between 1974 and 1976, and government's revenue increased by 81% between 1974 and 1977. Moreover, on the issue of inflation and its relation to real wages, the OWTU argued that Texaco should increase the oil workers' wages because the cost of living index had increased from 241.2 points in February 1975 to 326.6 points by December 1977, an increase of 85.4 points or 35.4%. Additionally, the union argued that the old Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), based on the 1975–78 collective bargaining agreement, needed to be adjusted because on average wages had been eroded by 22% over the three-year period. Therefore, on the basis of the negotiating team's calculations, the union requested an increase of 14.7% to restore the workers' real wages. Moreover, the OWTU, in its attempt to protect the workers from any anticipated rise in the rate of inflation, proposed an increase of 17.59% as a hedge against future inflation as it related to COLA.

All these positions were made to counter the claims of Texaco's negotiating team that 'the company lost money; that it had an onerous tax burden; that its cost of production was relatively high; that its competitive position was weak and that further increased cost would erode its competitive position in the world market'. For example, on the company's claim that it made losses, the union's negotiating team exposed the company's position by providing figures that showed among other things that Texaco had gross income sales of $64.63 billion in 1975; net income profit of $2,087.28 million in 1976; profits totalling $1,747.92 million, an increase of 14% over the first nine months of 1976. Based on the above data, Texaco was certainly in a position to pay a living wage to the oil workers because (following OPEC's decision) oil prices at that time had skyrocketed and all the oil companies, including

Texaco, reaped profit 'windfalls'. This certainly caught OWTU's attention as it prepared its position to defend the oil workers' interests.

Clearly understanding what was at stake, the OWTU leadership printed thousands of copies of the booklet titled, *In Defense of Our Members and the People of Trinago against Global Texaco-Exploiter of Labour and Natural Resources: Negotiations 1978* to educate the oil workers in particular and public in general on the international oil industry, Texaco's operations in Trinidad and the relationship between the oil companies and the country's economy and the union's justification of its wage claims. This tactic was a key weapon in the union's mass mobilisation drive to ensure that the workers knew the issues at hand, what was at stake, and how their participation by way of discussions at the workplace, at union branch meetings, and mass meetings were important to the process. The leadership positioned the 1978 negotiations as a class war between the workers and the capitalists in which the future of their children, their grandchildren, and the workers' freedom, dignity and selfrespect were at stake.

Moreover on 1–2 July 1978, the OWTU held a special conference of delegates at Paramount Building, the union headquarters, to discuss 'International Policy and the OWTU'. The conference was called to educate the rank and file of the importance of supporting the union's position against Texaco. In this case, a group of workers violated the directive of the General Council that placed an embargo on Antigua. The OWTU took this action because the Vere Bird regime that governed Antigua allowed its country to be used as a trans-shipment point for arms to the South African government that used a policy of apartheid to oppress and marginalise the majority black South African population. Additionally, the conference educated the members on the need to adopt new strategies to survive the dominance of the multinational corporations. Moreover, it called for international trade union solidarity to combat the destruction of trade unions in a world dominated by global capitalism.

These struggles of the 1970s clearly showed that the OWTU was up against formidable

adversaries that had enormous financial resources and political connections that made it difficult for the union to wring maximum benefits for its workers. On the other hand, the OWTU showed great resolve in defending the interests of the workers and the country against exploitation of its resources. However, these struggles would intensify during the 1980s as the union continued to protect the interests of its members and fight for further nationalisation of the oil industry.

OWTU and Resistance to Imperialism (1980–87)

From 1981–86, Trinidad and Tobago's economy experienced severe economic crisis as a result of the worldwide recession. During this crisis, the capitalist class launched many attacks on the working class by way of plant shutdowns, massive retrenchment, and privatisation. During this period, many workers took strike action. Once again, the OWTU, under George Weekes's leadership, waged serious struggles against the multinational corporations such as Dunlop and Federation Chemicals. Additionally, the union spent considerable time in pressing for the nationalisation of Texaco and AMOCO (American Oil Company).

Not satisfied with it the outcome of the 1972 collective bargaining agreement, Dunlop's management made another concerted attempt in 1984 to defeat the union. One of the objectives of any multinational corporation is to make profits both in the short run and the long run. In terms of Dunlop, this view was expressed clearly by one of its former managing directors John Crittenden, who outlandishly proclaimed: 'Not because I carry a grey beard, you would take me for a Santa Claus; I have no money bag on my back …. Dunlop is here to make money!!' One of the methods that companies utilise to cut cost is retrenchment or layoffs. In October 1983, Dunlop's management put its strategy into operation by stockpiling tyres to justify its position of retrenching both permanent and casual workers. Unaware of the company's grand scheme, the workers continued their productivity drive to meet Dunlop's required productivity quota for the given period. This strategy had a twofold aim of cutting costs and making profits in the short run with a reduced staff. However, Dunlop workers were not to be fooled by this age-old capitalist trick. United in their efforts to save their jobs, on 6 October 1983, both hourly and monthly workers took a unanimous decision to vigorously oppose the company's retrenchment programme.

However, despite the workers' show of unity, Dunlop's management retrenched over 75 casual workers. In any given retrenchment situation, casual workers are always the first in line to be fired and this was no exception at Dunlop. Therefore, sensing that permanent workers were next in line for possible retrenchment, Dunlop workers took strike action against the company on 10 May 1984. Following a meeting between the union's executive, the Ministry of Labour, and the company, the workers returned to their jobs 'to demonstrate good faith and on the perception that the Company would have seen the wisdom in withdrawing the warning notices at that meeting'. However, Dunlop's management was in no mood for reconciliation, and on 17 May 1984, they increased security, padlocked the gates and issued over 250 suspension notices to all the workers from the two shifts.

Undaunted by Dunlop management's actions, the workers erected a strike camp and dug in because they knew that not only were their jobs at stake but also the Point Fortin community would be affected. Under the militant leadership of branch president Martin Woods and secretary Winston James, the workers began a mobilisation drive to sensitise the Point Fortin Community concerning the strike and the effects it would have on the workers, their families, and the entire community. The workers received support from wives and girlfriends who supplied the striking workers with food throughout the strike's duration. Moreover, the workers kept the unity among them by organising rap sessions and other activities that kept a constant flow of workers to the camp. Furthermore, they printed bulletins and held a public meeting in the 'heart' of Point Fortin where Martin Woods connected the workers'

struggle with the wider struggle against retrenchment, wage-cuts, and roll-backs that employers unleashed on the workforce. In addition, the Dunlop workers received the support of various branch leaders, area labour relations officers and executives. Because of this show of solidarity and the workers' resolve, the union and company met at the Ministry of Labour on 23 May 1985 and hammered out a settlement. The parties agreed to: the withdrawal of all warning notices; withdrawal of letters of suspension plus compensation pay for workers; no victimisation of workers; and that both parties would co-operate towards restoring a good industrial relations climate. Faced with this militant action of the Dunlop workers, the government intervened to contain the spate of industrial unrest that had engulfed many parts of the country. However, if the government felt that the industrial relations climate at Dunlop had improved, the workers felt otherwise and resorted to further strike actions in April 1985.

One year after the 1984 strike, the workers at Caribbean Tire Company (formerly Dunlop) reverted to strike action in their attempt to force the company to make 54 casual workers permanent. When the permanent workers took strike action in 1984, the casual workers gave them their unwavering support. In their support for the casual workers, the permanent workers made the permanent job security of the casual workers a priority by placing it at the top of the list of grievances. The permanent workers had just cause because it formed part of the 1984 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The specific clause stated that as long as casual workers held down permanent jobs, they would be classified as permanent workers effective from 16 December 1984. In April 1985 when the permanent workers decided to strike, they included the casual workers and other negotiated issues that the company had failed to honour as justification for the strike. Faced with warning notices and the threat of suspensions and dismissals, the workers downed their tools on 1 April 1985 and walked off the job. Just as they had held their ground during the 1984 strike, the workers stood firm and resolute for their demands this time. The company maintained a hardline position on the issues until

a meeting was convened with Errol McLeod (OWTU's first-vice president) and the branch officers at the San Fernando office of the Ministry of Labour on 5 April 1983. At that meeting, the parties arrived at a resolution that the company's management would begin the process of classifying the 54 casual workers as permanent workers. However, this industrial peace at the plant was short-lived; the economic climate of the country favoured the Employers Consultative Association and the Manufacturers Association which had wanted to break the unions, especially the OWTU. The management of Caribbean Tire joined the chorus and took action once more against the workforce.

In September 1985, Dunlop management locked out the workers, dismissed the great majority of them, and resorted to police attacks and court injunctions against the workers. Both parties took the industrial dispute to the Industrial Court and the judges found Dunlop guilty of engaging in an illegal lockout and fined it $25,000. Instead of heeding the Court's directive, the company resorted to delaying tactics hoping that workers would drop their demands and return to work. However, the situation worsened and the company appealed the judgment. As 1985 drew to a close and this case headed for the Industrial Court, the OWTU executives and its members would be faced with more challenges in 1986 as the capitalist class took the fight to the workers and their trade unions.

By 1986, the political mood of the electorate had swung against the PNM Government in favour of the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), a three-party coalition composed of the Organisation for National Reconstruction, the Tapia House Movement and the Democratic Action Congress, and the United Labour Front. While these two parties battled for political supremacy to determine which section of the capitalist class would rule the country, the working class did not let up with its struggles against the onslaught of the ECA. By late January/early February 1986, Federation Chemical's management locked out its monthly paid workers, whom the OWTU had recently organised into a bargaining unit. After three weeks of holding

out, the workers eventually signed individual contracts. Sensing that the monthly paid workers had caved in, management decided to target its hourly paid workers into signing individual contracts; however, the daily paid workers did not fall for the bait. Rightly so, they understood that if they signed the contracts in effect they would have lost their Cost of Living Allowances (COLA). Failing to convince the daily paid workers to sign the agreement, management resorted to locking out all hourly paid workers in August 1986.

Compared to the previous strikes, the workers adopted new tactics. Rather than just set up a strike camp and protest, they developed a massive public-relations and education campaign whereby they went into all the major population centres throughout the country and interfaced with the citizens about the company's action. The workers understood that the issue of COLA had major implications for all workers in Trinidad and Tobago, and they wanted to educate the nation on the issue. As 1986 was also an election year, the workers reminded politicians concerning the attacks on the working class. They signed petitions and picketed the offices of George Chambers and Errol Mahabir (two senior cabinet members of the People's National Movement Government), along with Parliament, and organised vigils at the Queen's Park Savannah and Woodford Square. In addition, they took their campaign to the NAR Government that had defeated the PNM at the December polls; they waged a campaign to get it to invoke Section 65 of the Industrial Relations Act to end the lock-out in the national interest. When this failed, the workers resumed picketing the Parliament and the Ministry of Labour. Even though the NAR had swept the polls, the working class did not give them any holiday but pressured them to take action on issues affecting the working class. Eventually, in January 1987, the OWTU and the workers succeeded in convincing the NAR Government to pass the amendment that sent the workers back to work. This decision came at a time when the OWTU was in a period of transition. On 5 September 1987, George Weekes, who had led the organisation since 1962, passed the leadership mantle on to Errol McLeod, the union's first-vice-president. In his

address, McLeod noted that this transition had commenced in 1984 and the process was a smooth one. Whether or not the leadership transition went smoothly, McLeod promised to continue Weekes's legacy. While the OWTU fought to save the jobs of workers, it renewed its struggle for full nationalisation of the petroleum industry.

The call for the nationalisation of the petroleum industry did not begin with George Weekes and the Rebels but can be dated to as early as 6 October 1936 when Tubal Uriah 'Buzz' Butler, in his capacity as leader of the British Empire Workers and Citizens Home Rule Party, wrote a letter to Governor Murchison Fletcher expressing the oil workers' desire for state control of the local petroleum industry. In the aftermath of the OWTU receiving official recognition as a trade union in July 1937, its new leader Adrian Cola Rienzi appeared before the Arbitration Tribunal in December 1937 to deal with a dispute with the Petroleum Association which fell under the Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1938. At the hearing of the dispute, Rienzi called for nationalisation of the oil industry, arguing that nationalisation had the effect of saving costs, reducing competition and wild-catting, and would increase overall productivity in the industry. However, when Rienzi made this statement, the oil companies regarded him as a 'dangerous communist'. During the aftermath of the 1937 labour uprising in the British West Indies, the British government stepped up its campaign to stop the spread of socialist ideas in the trade union movement, and progressive leaders who identified with socialism became the primary victims of attacks. It took another 19 years for the OWTU to make another push for nationalisation of the oil industry.

During 1956 under John Rojas's leadership, the union together with the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Caribbean National Labour Party (CNLP) passed a joint resolution that attempted to block Texaco's entrance into Trinidad and Tobago's oil industry. The resolution stated that, 'If the ownership of the Trinidad Oil Company is transferred to the British Government as Trustees for the Trinidad Government or the new proposed Federal Union, after the purchase price for the same will have been liquidated, it would assist

tremendously in enabling the country to achieve national economic stability. ...' While the resolution was unsuccessful, it did not prevent the OWTU's leadership from agitating for local ownership of the industry. This agitation intensified under the leadership of George Weekes, especially in the 1980s.

By 1982, the government found itself in a precarious position when Patrick Manning, minister of Energy and Natural Resources, reported to cabinet that Texaco had slashed its production. This had implications for the government's D-plan for the industry which involved multimillion-dollar investment in expansion and upgrading of the Trintoc refinery. Troubled by this new development, Manning submitted a cabinet note dated 24 March 1982 in which he stated, among other things, that government should seriously consider a policy of rationalisation of existing refinery capacity in Trinidad and Tobago as representing the best possible solution to increase the profitability of both the Texaco and the TRINTOC refineries.

On 20 September 1982, the union presented a memorandum on the oil industry entitled *Our Fight for People's Ownership and Control of the Oil Industry* to the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Consisting of 80 pages, the memorandum laid out the state of the international oil industry, Texaco's position on the industry in Trinidad and Tobago, the government's position on the industry, the OWTU's position, the petroleum industry and the national interest, and a proposal for change. Essentially, the OWTU called on the government to acquire Tesoro, Texaco, and Amoco, and offered its services to the government to bring the acquisitions to fruition. Citing the Mexican case study of the nationalisation of its oil industry in 1938, the union proclaimed that ownership of the industry would enable Trinidad and Tobago to obtain significant economic independence. Moreover, it called on the government to adopt a new approach to decision making in its position on the oil industry by involving the citizens of the country and in particular the OWTU and the oil workers. However, instead of accepting the union's recommendations, the PNM Government made further adjustments to the tax structure.

In 1983, in order to meet the demands of oil companies, especially those of Texaco, the government amended the Petroleum Taxes Act of 1974; it reduced the Supplemental Tax Rate for land production tax from 35% to 15%. From Texaco's standpoint, it appeared that the reduction in the tax was insufficient to offset the cost of operating the Point-a-Pierre refinery. Rather than adjust its expectations, Texaco reacted by: closing down non-essential operations; adjusting retirement ages and provisions; reducing the workforce; and cutting expenditure. Texaco took these measures even while negotiating with the government for a possible take-over of the company. After nearly two years of intense negotiations, the government and Texaco's negotiating teams met in March 1985 to negotiate on the purchase of Texaco's operations in Trinidad and Tobago, which included the Point-a-Pierre refinery, the harbour facilities, the landing producing assets, Brighton offshore, the company's interest in SECC (South East Coast Consortium) and in Block I, and the Belpetco blocks in the Gulf of Paria plus certain other assets.

At the signing ceremony, Elton G. Yates, chairman of Textrin's board of directors, represented Texaco and George Chambers, prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, represented the government. The parties agreed that Textrin retain its one-third interest in Trinmar and in the offshore East Coast Productionsharing Contract in Block 6 with Tenneco (i.e. Dolphin Gas). The purchase consideration was US$189.2 million (TT$454 million) and on signing, the government agreed to pay Textrin US$98 million (TT$235.2 million) of which the government agreed to provide TT$174.7 million and TRINTOC (Trinidad and Tobago Oil Company) to provide TT$60.5 million. In terms of the balance that amounted to US$91.2 million, the government agreed to pay Textrin over a ten-month period in the form of petroleum products at the rate of approximately 9,800 bpd.

By agreeing to pay Texaco this price for a refinery that had lost its technological edge, the government demonstrated its inability to effectively deal with the oil multinationals. The refinery no longer served Texaco's global strategic needs and this meant that the government had to

import crude to keep the refinery running. More-over, the payments were made in the post-oil boom period when the economy went into a deep recession. Even though the purchase of Texaco was a step in the right direction, the industry remained firmly entrenched under the control of the multinational oil companies, and this helped to explain government's failure to successfully own and control the entire petroleum industry. This inability to achieve its original objectives in dealing with the Texaco oil company strengthened the OWTU's argument for the nationalisation of the nation's petroleum industry.

In 1987, with the NAR Government in control of the state, the OWTU presented the new government with a memorandum that covered: the economy, the oil industry; divestment/privatisation; industrial relations; health and safety legislation; the media; and the democratic process in Trinidad and Tobago. In terms of ownership and control of the industry, the OWTU proposed that the government: purchase Texaco's one-third share; initiate a six-month time frame to merge all existing state oil companies; reconsider its new Draft Energy Policy; upgrade Trintoc's refinery to make it more efficient; revamp the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and make it the energy sector's central policymaking body; explore all the alternatives to take control of AMOCO; oppose the private sector's proposal on the oil industry; and create a research and development unit that would cater for the needs of the oil industry. Unlike the previous administration that had at least committed to some aspects of control of the oil industry, the NAR Government pursued a programme of divestment and privatisation of the oil industry.

Cross-References

▶ Dutch Imperialism, Caribbean
▶ Padmore, George (1903–1959)
▶ Resistance to Imperialism in the Caribbean, 1856–1983
▶ Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)
▶ Trade Liberalisation in the Caribbean
▶ Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

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Tripartite Aggression (1956)

Trump

Turkey

Turkey and Imperialism (1923–2018)

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Synonyms

Capitalism; Dependency; Imperialism; Neoliberalism; Ottoman Empire; Turkey

Definition

This entry chronicles the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the wider imperialist trade and investment networks dominated by Britain and other Western capitalists. It describes how Turkey failed to extricate itself from asymmetrical dependency relations of imperialism after 1946 despite its emphasis on antiimperialism and indep/endency from the outset of the republic (1923) to 1946. It proceeds to examine the economic ramifications of Turkey's extraverted national development, and its impact on the country's class structure and foreign policy. This entry discusses the radical neoliberal transformation of Turkey in 1980 after developing relatively autonomous policies between 1960 and 1980. Finally, the consequences of Turkey's growing dependency (particularly after 2002) on foreign capital inflows and the close ties between the neoliberal Islamic model of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the imperialist interventions in the Middle East are examined.

Introduction

The roots of imperialism in Turkey can be traced back to the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire starting with the sixteenth century entered into an economic dependency relationship with European countries via continuous and widespread capitulations. However, it was the "Balta Limanı Treaty" (1838) concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Britain that culminated with the Empire entering into the domination of imperialism via abolishing its monopoly over the domestic market, removing restrictions on foreign capital, and allowing British capitalists to establish their network (banks, and insurance agencies) (Kasaba 1993). The Ottoman Empire, which made similar agreements with other European countries over time, was connected to the world economy, within a short period becoming a semi-colonial country exporting raw materials and importing industrial products while raising massive external debts. The Ottoman Empire declared Moratorium in 1876, and in 1881, was obliged to accept the creditors' taking control of the Empire's sovereign right of collecting taxes for the payment of debts via establishing an international commission the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA)

(Köymen 2007). Although the Ottoman Empire maintained its independence on paper, it came under the institutionalized control of imperialism before the end of the nineteenth century.

The first attempts to break the dependent relations with European imperialist states commenced with the establishment of the Government of "Committee of Union and Progress" (CUP) that came into power with the proclamation of the Second Constitutional in 1908. The CUP, which was mainly composed of "the petty-bourgeois intellectuals" (Boratav 2011), failed to cut the structural ties with imperialism, although its leaders had aimed to establish an independent and nationalized capitalism by abolishing economic concessions (Gürcan and Mete 2017).

The Ottoman Empire, which was defeated in the First World War, became history with the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923). The Turkish Republic was established on October, 29, 1923 after the victory of the national liberation war (1919–1923) under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. With a monumental progressive process of political revolution, the Turkish Republic transformed itself into a secular and modern country from a feudal Ottoman society.

The political cadres, who established the Republic, without considering the organic link between imperialism and capitalism, assumed that a politically independent and economically industrialized country with a nationalized bourgeoisie could be released from the asymmetric equilibrium of imperialist relations. That is why one of the main objectives of the Kemalist was to create a national bourgeoisie, which would be a driving force for industrialization, modernization, and integration of the country to the advanced Western civilization. However, it was the non-Muslim merchants (Greek, Armenian, and Jewish) in the pre-capitalist economic structure of the Ottoman Empire (and under the tutelage of Western capitalists) who accumulated capital, benefited from capitulations and free trade agreements, and prevailed in trade (compared to Muslim business) (Gürcan and Mete 2017). Thus, there was an attempt to build a national capitalist class through the alliance of Muslim landowners and relatively small and powerless Muslim merchants in cities (Savran 2004). However, as an objective consequence of the expansionist character of capitalism, this state-protected capitalist ruling class soon started basing its political ascendancy upon building cross-class alliances with the dominant capitalist classes and the institutions of the metropolitan economies. In this regard, despite its emphasis on anti-imperialism and attempt to articulate the international capitalism as an independent country, Turkey would not make a radical break with imperialism.

1946–1960: Installing Ties with Imperialism and Proxy Foreign Policy

Turkey remained a nonbelligerent state during the Second World War thanks to the statist and protectionist industrialization policies that followed the 1929 Great Depression. The planned economic strategies in the statist period were financed by national savings instead of external borrowing, which helped the young Republic to maintain its distance from asymmetric dependency relations of imperialism. On the other hand, the major amounts of national savings were mostly obtained at the expense of exploitation of the working class and peasants and thus, class conflicts have dramatically escalated in the detrimental conditions of the war. However, any kind of protest was suppressed by repressive measures of the government.

To comply with the new standards of Western capitalism, the government of the Republican People's Party (CHP) adopted the multiparty democracy of the capitalist system (1946 first elections) (Gürcan and Mete 2017). Starting in 1946, it became a requisite for the political parties to get the consent of subordinated classes in elections (Boratav 2011). From that point onward, the more the governments ran policies in the interest of capital, the more they implemented populist policies together with counterrevolution strategies such as imaginary security threats (internal and external), nationalism, and re-Islamization.

In 1946, the CHP (Prime Minister İsmet İnönü) with the support of the dominant class

(bourgeoisie and landowners) played the security threat card for the coming elections. The perception of "Soviet threat" and "communist danger" was constructed using the state means and media power to discredit the left-wing opposition, to weaken the class struggle, and to divide the opposition front (Özkan 2017).

İnönü's move was in line with the interests of the Turkish bourgeoisie who were eager to participate in the institutional, legal, political, and military establishment of the postwar capitalist accumulation model and rising US global hegemony. To become a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on September 7, 1946 Turkey devaluated the Turkish Lira (TL) at a rate of 54%. Turkey tried to intensify its relations with the US via concluding bilateral agreements. An agreement between two sides was concluded on May 7, 1946 concerning the debts of Turkey received in wartime through land-lease agreements. The US wiped off the debts of Turkey and in return Turkey accepted to reduce customs tariffs and quotas and liberalize its foreign trade regulations (Sander 1979). The relations of Turkey and the US gained momentum with the declaration of the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947); in fact, the main target of the Doctrine was not Turkey but Greece. This is why $300 million worth of military aid was allocated to Greece while Turkey received just $100 million. A possible victory of communist guerillas in the civil war of Greece might have paved the way for communist parties to come to power in Western European countries (particularly in Italy and France). The Truman Doctrine aimed to prevent an alternative socialist model from attaining political power in Western Europe that might preclude the realization of an open market model. As Sakkas pointed out: "Imaginary communist, Soviet-back threat contributed to the right-ward swing of Greece's politics and facilitated the establishment of an extreme conservative-monarchist regime" (Sakkas 2013). The Truman Doctrine succeeded in building an imaginary threat of "Soviet expansionism" and a "common enemy" in the Western Bloc and bound them up with military pacts, aid programs and institutions (North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO), which were orientated toward an American hegemonic system.

American imperialism came into Turkey via the Truman Doctrine, which was followed by the Marshall Plan. In accordance, Turkey concluded the Economic Cooperation Agreement (July 4, 1948) with the US. In the ongoing process, an American delegation committee came to Turkey and settled in Ankara to monitor the aid program, prepare advisory reports, and settle the necessary conditions for the furtherance of the aid (Ünlü 2015). The common focus of the reports (1948 Hilts Report, Neumark Report (1949), Thornburg Report 1949–1950) prepared by the American experts was to persuade Turkey to renounce its industrialization objectives and to integrate into the international capitalist system as a country that exports agricultural and mineral goods while importing industrial goods, in the same vein as in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. The Democrat Party (DP), headed by Adnan Menderes, which came to power in the elections of 1950 tried to fulfill this role attributed to Turkey. Turkey substantially abandoned the statist development policies and launched a rapid liberalization through import-led strategies (Gürcan and Mete 2017) and enacted laws such as "Foreign Investment Encouragement Law" (1951) and "Petroleum Law" (1954), which set the ground for the implication of an extreme liberal economy.

The foreign trade deficit, which emerged with the removal of protection in foreign trade and transition to open economy, tried to be supplied with US aids and external loans (Boratav 2011). From 1948 to 1956, the total amount of direct and indirect aids reached $600 million (Baba and Ertan 2016). However, it became increasingly difficult to reach the necessary external resources in the second half of the 1950s. The budget deficit of Turkey was 29 million TL in 1953 and reached 107 million TL in 1959 (Gürcan and Mete 2017). The American delegation in Ankara did not allow the allocation of American aid to nonagricultural and public industrial investments (Ekzen 2009) and opposed protectionist policies. Ultimately, as of 1958, Turkey became unable to pay its external debts. In 1958, at the IMF and the US insistence, Turkey carried out a large-scale devaluation. Ultimately, after its declaration of a moratorium on May 11, 1959, Turkey was forced to conclude a

consolidation agreement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the US.

Proxy Foreign Policy of the Democrat Party

Turkey's subordinated position in the imperialist hierarchy in regard to the economy was accompanied by proxy foreign policies, based on anti-communism, which pursued the interests of Western imperialism.

In 1950, the Menderes Government, without the approval of Parliament, sent troops (4,500) to the Korean War to join NATO. The Balkan Pact was established on February 28, 1953 between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, with the encouragement of the US to link Yugoslavia to NATO via Turkey and Greece (Baba and Ertan 2016). With the Military Facilities Agreement on June 23, 1954, Turkey allowed the US to build military bases-airports on its territory. Several American bases and facilities have been established with this agreement including Adana Incirlik Air Base (1955), which is still being used as the most important operational military base of the US in the Middle East.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, attending the Bandung Conference (1955), criticized the emerging nonalignment movement, referred to the Soviet Union as a real threat to Europe and Asia (Gerger 2012), and invited the Conference attendees to participate in the Western bloc (Baba and Ertan 2016). Consistent with this rhetoric, Turkey took sides with the official French position during the UN voting held for the independence of Algeria and Tunisia throughout the 1950s. Turkey had abstained on the recognition of Algeria's independence in 1958 and the one vote difference caused by Turkey was an important factor in the further 3-year extension of Algeria's war of independence (1954–1962).

The Baghdad Pact was established in the same year as the Bandung Conference (comprising of Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the UK, which later joined) with the coordination of the US against Arab nationalists in Egypt and Syria, both of which were striking to implement autonomous industrialization strategies and trying to create their own national capital while developing good relations with the Soviet Union and pursuing non-alignment neutral policies. The Baghdad Pact had such a negative impact on Arab countries that Turkey was accused of acting as an imperialist collaborator (The Trojan horse of imperialism), with demonstrations held in many Arab cities (Gerger 2012). In 1958, the Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party seized power and shortly afterward the Pact dissolved. The Pact was replaced by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959, but it was also dismissed in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

During the Suez crises in 1956, Turkey took sides with the occupying powers (the UK and France). In 1958, Turkey, which became involved in the "Preferred Plan" that the US put into effect for regime change in Syria, massed troops on the Syrian border upon US request (Jones 2004). At the end it was the USSR support to Syria that averted war. After the USSR's putting the Sputnik satellite into orbit in 1957, the Dwight Eisenhower Administration began to place medium-range missiles capable of hitting the USSR territories via Europe (England, Italy, and Turkey). By a technical agreement that was not disclosed to the public and Parliament, the government of Menderes deployed Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The existence of these missiles played a crucial role in the Cuban Crisis (1962), one of the rare confrontations of the Cold War.

As a result, during the years of 1946–1960, Turkey maintained a stance close to economic and foreign policy interests of the capitalist core and hegemony. A military coup took place on May 27, 1960 in Turkey, but this did not lead to a fundamental change in Turkey's main axis. Nevertheless, the first announcement of the coup plotters was that Turkey would stay connected to NATO and CENTO (Gerger 2012).

1960–1980: Import-Substitution Model and Relative Autonomous Foreign Policy

The period of 1946–1974 was the Golden Age era of the postwar capitalist accumulation model. In

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that period, the over-accumulation problem had not yet arisen, the movements of finance capital were kept under control of the Bretton Woods regime, the tendency of falling rates of profits had not yet occurred, a consensus between classes still existed in the Keynesian welfare state model, international monopolies had not yet grown enough to launch a competition for sharing the world, and lastly, real socialism was still a limiting factor in preventing hot conflicts in the strategic parts of the world. There was still no need for a structural transformation in the capitalist accumulation model and as Boratav put it: "During this period the aggressive characteristics of imperialism became relatively milder" (Boratav 2010).

During this period, similar to other peripheral economies, Turkey was integrated into the international capitalist accumulation regime with an import-substitution industrialization model and this model complied with the interests of advanced capitalists (Boratav 2010). Manufactured goods (durable consumer goods) whose high technology and basic intermediate inputs imported from the capitalist core were montaged within the country and sold in the domestic market. Produced industrial goods were not for exportation and real wages were relatively high due to there being an element of demand in the reproduction of capital (Boratav 2011). At that juncture, the 1960s and 1970s (despite the military memorandum in 1971) were characterized by the rise of anti-imperialist, left-wing student movements and labor mobilizations in Turkey. Although the alliance between bankers, industrial capitalists, and merchant elites in the politics still constituted the ruling bloc, the ruling governments (mostly in the form of coalitions) were obliged to take the growing strength of left-wing movements into consideration. In the same vein, the state bureaucracy that prepared the three 5-year economic development plans gained a relative autonomy from the ruling bloc.

In these circumstances, coalition governments in two decades had the ground to develop relatively autonomous policies from organized Turkish bourgeoisie and also the US as compared to the period of the 1950s. For instance, despite the US opposition, Turkey restarted opium production in 1974 and intervened militarily in Cyprus (against unanimous Western bloc opposition), and transferred control of 21 US military bases into the direct charge of Turkish Armed Forces in response to the US arms sale embargo. However, it wouldn't be right to claim that Turkey pursued an anti-imperialist foreign policy during this period. Neither that period nor after did Turkey cancel its NATO membership nor make any changes in its capitalist accumulation model and always stayed loyal to the Western bloc.

The economy of Turkey continued to expand and enjoyed relatively high growth rates in Gross National Product (GNP) throughout the 1960s. Nevertheless, this economic expansion constantly created a chronic current account deficit problem (overreliance on imports and oil). Imports rose from $468 million in 1960 to $7.9 billion in 1980 while foreign debts increased from $992 million in 1960 to $16 billion in 1980 (Gürcan and Mete 2017). During 1961–1970, Turkey had to conclude standby agreements annually with the IMF and eventually obliged to devalue TL at a rate of 66% in 1970 (Sönmez 2013). Following the oil crisis in the 1970s, Turkey entered into a full-fledged economic crisis (foreign exchange shortage) in 1978. The State Planning Organization prepared the Fourth Industrial Development Plan, which aimed to stimulate industrialization with public investment (Ekzen 2009). However, the external financing required for the implementation of the plan failed to get the approval of the IMF and the World Bank. These two institutions evidently had a different plan for Turkey; a radical transformation to neoliberalism.

Concomitant to these developments, the organized industrial monopolies in Turkey (particularly, Turkish Industry and Business Allocation-TUSIAD) had begun to exert pressure on coalition governments for a shift from import-substitution model to the outward-oriented (export-led) open market model and financial liberalization as well as suppression of wages, privatization, removing of bureaucratic obstacles (autonomy), deregulation, and reduction in corporate taxations. Turkey's transformation to an export-oriented model was initiated by the decree of January 24, 1980, announcing the Stabilisation Programme, which

was prepared by the IMF and Turgut Özal the then undersecretary of the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel (Gürcan and Mete 2017). The stabilization program was impossible to be implemented within the existing political conditions of Turkey in which trade unions resisted impoverishing economic adjustments, worker strikes increased to record highs, and the unstable minority government of Demirel lacked the capacity to carry out a large-scale transformation of the economic structure. The program was made applicable on September 12, 1980 with the leverage of the military coup d'état. As Friedrich von Hayek highlighted once: "Free markets may require a dictatorship" (Quoted in Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009).

1980–1997: Integration to International Neoliberal System

The neoliberal macroeconomic transformation of Turkey and market-based policies were put into full force after the military takeover and gained momentum with the civil Government of Motherland Party (ANAP), which won the 1982 general elections and established a single-party majority government. ANAP, headed by Özal, embarked upon a major liberalization program (Öniş 1991).

Under the hegemony of ANAP, the import-substitution model was transformed to an export-oriented model, exporters-importers were promoted with tax exemptions, restrictions on imports were mostly lifted, subsidies to agriculture were reduced, and incentives were guaranteed for foreign investment (Boratav and Yeldan 2006). The export-oriented model required wage suppression and suppressed the organized workforce. Thus, the share of labor, which accounted for 35% of manufacturing value added in industrial production between 1977 and 1980, fell to 20.6% in 1988 (Boratav and Yeldan 2006).

The foreign currency trade regime was liberalized in 1984 and the full convertibility of the Turkish Lira was realized under the guidelines of the IMF (Gürcan and Mete 2017). In 1989, with the Decree No. 32, Turkey liberalized capital accounts, which enabled the free movement of capital inflows and outflows (Akçay 2018).

From that point onward, Turkey's economy has increasingly become dependent on financial cycles and hot-money movements (Boratav and Yeldan 2006). Hereafter, the beginning and the end of the crises of 1994, 1998–1999, 2001, 2008–2009, and 2018 in Turkey would be determined by the decline and rise of finance capital inflows and outflows (Boratav 2019).

The high cost of imports, a steady debt-creating bill of finance capital, negative public savings, high incentives to capitalists, and allocation of tax revenues to the interest payments (Boratav and Yeldan 2006) resulted in the growth of the budget deficit. There was an attempt to solve the deficit problem by public borrowing via government bonds offering high interest rates. In 1999, 43% of the budget was allocated just for the payment of interest (Oyan 2010). In 2000, even the allocation of whole tax revenues remained insufficient to meet the interest resulting from public and foreign debts (Oyan 2010). The commercial banks focused on marketing Treasure Bills to private investors through short-term borrowing-repurchase agreement (repo) operations and the repo-reverse repo trading volume reached $221 billion in 2000 (110% of the GNP), which was $5 billion in 1997 (Boratav and Yeldan 2006). Turkeys' dependency on finance capital deepened substantially. Gaining access to external credit resources became crucial for Turkey and the impact of international finance capital and imperialist institutions (particularly IMF, World Bank, and European Union-EU) on Turkey's decision-making process increased dramatically.

Throughout the 1990s, due to the regained strength of the working class, coalition governments again began to rule Turkey. Although they failed to accelerate the neoliberal marketization process, all of these coalition governments were committed to the neoliberal agenda (Akçay 2018).

Turkey became a party to the agreements – General Agreement on Services (GATS), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). In accordance with these agreements, Turkey committed to giving full market access to international capital including sectors from the hospital services education, banking, finance,

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insurance business, and hotel-restaurant-tourism (Güzelsarı 2003). Furthermore, in line with the "national treatment rule" and "most-favored nation rule" Turkey accepted to avert discrimination between imported and domestically produced goods.

Turkey's accession into the EU Customs Union (CU) on March 6, 1995 in accordance with the association process launched by the "Ankara Agreement" (1963) was the last nail in the coffin of Turkey's independent trade regime. It can be claimed that the CU is the best indicator in revealing the asymmetric dependency relations of imperialism and Turkey. This is not just because Turkey removed all customs duties, quantitative restrictions, quotas, and other technical obstacles on trade for the industrial goods with the EU, which led to a constantly soaring trade deficit for Turkey, but also because Turkey has been obliged to adjust to the EU's (present and future) common tariffs and trade regimes applied for third countries. Turkey has to obey and adopt all the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) or Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) that the EU concludes with non-member states (currently more than 100 states). Although Turkey, as a CU member, is bound by the trade agreements that the EU concludes, the contracting parties (non-member) do not have the same obligation to include Turkey in the trade concessions (tariff reductions) that they provide to EU members. Beyond the neo-capitulations undertaken, Turkey has to harmonize its legal system non-interruptedly with the EU legislation including competition law, intellectual property rights, subventions, and other technical issues. Despite all the obligations that Turkey has to meet, Turkey (since it is not a member of the Union) is not included in the decision-making or dispute settlement mechanism of the EU.

The subordinating character of the CU has never been openly criticized (beyond some update requests) by the subsequent governments of Turkey. This is not only because the Turkish oligopolies have developed organic ties and close alliances with their EU counterparts (such as, European Roundtable of Industrialist, BusinessEurope, or Eurochambers) and the continuation of the CU has been in their interest but also because the CU has marked the commitment of Turkey to integrate with and become bound up in the international capitalist system and its institutions or put simply, imperialism itself.

Turkey's New Commitments to Imperialism

The military coup in 1980 not only articulated Turkey to the neoliberal world economy but at the same time it bound Turkey to the new imperialist attacks of the West.

In 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, and the Iran Islamic Revolution caused the US-Western world to lose its principal military ally in the Persian Gulf-Middle Eastern region. As a consequence of these international developments, the geostrategic importance of Turkey increased dramatically. The US remodeled its twin pillar policy based on Saudi Arabia and Iran (Uzgel 2013) and this new policy culminated with the declaration of the Carter Doctrine (January 24, 1980), which proclaimed the Persian Gulf as a vital area for the US national interest. In the following year, the US established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for the Middle East region in March 1980, which converted to Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983. Turkey, did not not allow the deployment of RDJTF from Incirlik airbase and did not allow the use of existing air bases for American U-2 spy plane flights conducting espionage activities over the Soviet Union. In the same vein, Turkey also recognized the new regime of Iran immediately after the revolution (Uzgel 2013).

Turkey had pursued a relatively autonomous foreign policy during 1960–1980; however, the developments in the late 1970s indicated that a new era of imperialist expansionism (including the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc) was about to launch and Turkey's multifaceted or semi-independent foreign policy could no longer survive within the tolerant limits of imperialism. The junta regime in Turkey committed itself to meeting the demands of the US-Western bloc,

which were not accepted by the governments of Turkey before the coup (Uzgel 2013). In this regard, it was neither surprising nor coincidence that Paul Henze who was the then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Turkey (assisting Zbigniew Brzezinski in the US National Security Council) gave the news of the coup to President Jimmy Carter by saying "Our boys have done it" (Uzgel 2013).

The junta regime in Turkey, just 2 months after the coup (November 29, 1982) concluded the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the US and the US military regained access to military facilities and intelligence installations in Turkey The (Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement 1982). In 1982, with a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two and it was agreed that the US would modernize ten air bases in Turkey while constructing two more in Muş and Batman (Gerger 2012). These military bases particularly Incirlik would become the main operational base for the upcoming imperialist operations of the West in Iraq, Syria and other targets in the Middle East.

In the 1980s, the junta and ANAP were both compliant with the Green Belt-Crescent project, which was put into force by the US in the late 1970s. The project aimed to facilitate militarized political Sunni Islam movements to spread all around the Middle East and Turkey with the financial leverage of the Gulf States (particularly Saudi Arabia). The Islamic neo-containment project seemed to target Shia Iran and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but in reality the basic concern of the project was to ensure the continuity of collaborative regimes and control mass mobilizations that might lead to regime changes, like it did in Iran. The political conditions in Turkey (strong trade unions, general strikes, and social unrest) in the late 1970s raised alarms in the US for a possible revolution in Turkey, which would have been disastrous after having lost Iran. Thus, consistent with the objectives of the Green Belt Project, Turkish-Islamic synthesized ideology turned into a state-led, organized identity-building policy starting with the military regime and followed by subsequent right-wing political parties.

The US maintained its regulatory leadership during the 1990s, in opening up new spheres for capital accumulation, if necessary by use of force, for the benefit of all metropole economies. Germany, Japan, and the Gulf countries accepted to pay the $54 billion (Arrighi 2005) heavy bill of the Gulf War in 1991, while France, the UK, Italy, Germany, and other NATO members actively participated in the dissolution of Yugoslavia under the pretext of "humanitarian intervention." Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relatively autonomous capitalist countries that benefited from the stability of the bipolar system became direct targets of the US-led imperialist interventions. Most of these countries were geographically close to Turkey (Yugoslavia, Syria, Iraq, Iran).

At the beginning of the 1990s, the imperialists expected Turkey to use its historical-cultural relations (Ottoman heritage) with the Turkic-Muslim Republics in Caucasus, in the Balkans, and in the Middle East as leverage to establish close relations (as a model) with states in the region thereby paving the way for the entrance of foreign finance capital and easing the integration of these countries into global capitalist markets. This is why imperial discourses such as the establishment of the "Turkish World (hegemony) from the Adriatic to the Great Wall in China" were abundantly used by the Turkish politics in the first half of the 1990s without taking into consideration the real imperialist actors behind them. However, Turkey's imperial ambitions or dreams would rapidly meet the reality of the political economy. Turkey was itself a subordinated country ranked at the lower levels of imperialist hierarchy and its economic, military, political, and cultural capacities were structurally insufficient to achieve hegemonic goals. Turkey held the same ambitions while attempting to gain a share from Syria after 2010 via Neo-Ottoman policies, yet encountered the same reality.

In the second half of the 1990s, the coalition governments in Turkey had pursued more cautious foreign policies and although they supported and to some extent provided military contributions to US-led imperialist intervention policies in Iraq and Yugoslavia, they attempted to keep a low profile in international relations.

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1997–2018: Triumph of Neoliberalism Under IMF Programs and AKP Rule

The global fiscal expansion in the 1990s was incredibly large; it was even described as "irrational exuberance" by Alan Greenspan who was chairman of the Federal Reserve (FED) in 1996 (Brenner 2000). In the 1970s, the global movement of financial capital was $59 billion annually, this figure reached $3.2 trillion by the end of the 1990s (Allen 2000) and more than 300 trillion dollars by 2018. This explosive growth of global finance transactions went hand-in-hand with chronic financial crises first in the peripheral economies (in the emerging markets, by neoliberal expression) throughout the 1990s and secondly, in the metropolitan countries after 2008.

The "first generation crises of financialization" (Yeldan 2009) wave (Mexico, Russia, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia) hit Turkey twice between 1994 and 2001. This crisis wave, which remained limited in peripheral economies, was controlled by the hegemonic repression by the US and the cruel austerity measures of the IMF and World Bank and resulted in net resource transfers from periphery economies to the centers of imperialism. The burden of imperialism on peripheral countries aggravated with the second half of the 1990s (Boratav 2010).

The first-generation crisis wave had some consequences in re-approaching the role of the state in peripheral economies. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the role of state was defined by the Washington Consensus as "deregulation," which involved the minimizing of government expenditures and interference while securing property rights, privatizing state enterprises, ensuring fiscal discipline, liberalizing trade and finance, suppressing wages, carrying out policies to flexibilize labor, and removing restrictions on capital transactions (Williamson 2005). However, after the aforementioned crises, a new approach, the Post-Washington Consensus, was developed for the states of emerging markets (peripheral economies) referred to as "institutionalism," which involved accepting the "collective global surveillance" (Soederberg 2002) of the

institutions of the international financial capital (under the coordination of the IMF and the World Bank) and transforming national monetary institutions into autonomous institutions in which international capital could represent its interests. The Post-Washington Consensus aimed to improve the regulation capacity of governments in order to prevent de-valuation of capital (disinflation policies) and to set "flexible" and "soft" measures to keep class conflicts and mass mobilizations under control. In accordance with these new approaches, an institutional strategy was adopted in the Group of seven (G-7) Summit meetings in the late 1990s (particularly in the Cologne summit of 1999) to integrate the emerging markets more tightly into the global finance system (Soederberg 2002). For this purpose, the leaders of the G-7 selected Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Australia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Indonesia as "strategically important" emerging markets and established Group 20 (G-20) in which the representatives of the EU, IMF, the World Bank, and the G-7 countries were included (Soederberg 2002). The basic goal of establishing G-20 was to integrate these strategically important markets into the "official rules and standards of the core alliance" (Soederberg 2002).

Turkey was defined as a "strategically important" market by the centers of imperialism and it was also included in the enlargement process of the EU as an official candidate state in the EU Helsinki summit in December 1999. In addition, Turkey concluded a standby agreement with the IMF in 2000, which was a follow-up of the staff monitored program (1998) put into force to authorize a closer IMF supervision on the economy of Turkey (Boratav and Yeldan 2006). The stabilization and restructuring programs of the IMF and the World Bank continued uninterrupted for 10 years between 1998 and 2008 and put Turkey under the supervision of the financial capital core. The "experimental" and "risky" (Boratav 2011) IMF-led disinflation program that Turkey fully adopted from 1999 to 2001 resulted in a major economic crisis creating severe social consequences in Turkey. As a result of the early general

elections held in 2002, the three political parties who held seats in the Turkish Parliament failed to pass 10% thresholds and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was founded in 2001 and had no link to the deteriorating IMF programs, won the elections and established a single-party majority government and embarked upon building a neoliberal Islamic regime.

AKP was founded by the politicians, mainly Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, estranged from the Islamist "Welfare Party" (RP), which was forced to leave power as a result of the "National Security Council" decisions on February 28, 1997 and subsequently dissolved by the verdict of the "Constitutional Court" in 1998. The AKP-Erdoğan regime (after 2016, gaining control of all state apparatuses under Erdoğan's authority) came into power with more favorable conditions than any other political party in the history of Turkey. In the period of 2002–2013 (excepting 2008–2009), in favorable financial conditions of massive international fiscal expansion, the AKP found the opportunity to build a model based on Islamic "neoliberal-populism" (Akçay 2018) which was consistent with the standards of the post-Washington Consensus.

AKP rose to power and established its hegemony with the leverage of the broad imperialist alliance bloc: institutions of financial capital (the IMF-the World Bank-the G-(7) and the G20); hegemony and semi-hegemony (the US and the EU); oligarchic corporations – the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and the Islamic rural "Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association" (MUSIAD); the bourgeoisie in Turkey. AKP successfully disguised its affiliation with neoliberalism and obtained the consent of mass majority through criticizing IMF programs at first and after 2002 through "widening of financial inclusiveness" (Akçay 2018), transforming class conflicts to religious-national identity conflicts and constructing national security threats which went hand-in-hand with changing necessities of the new regime-building process of the AKP-Erdoğan. The AKP also received the support of a highly instrumental and organized Islamist organization, the "Cemaat," headed by Fethullah Gülen, from 2002 to 2013. Their alliance mostly focused on inducing series of lawsuits and criminal operations against civil and military bureaucrats (mostly right-wing Kemalists) who were in high ranking or critical positions in military, judiciary, security or intelligence services and posing threat to the construction of the new regime. The alliance of the AKP and the Cemaat came to an end with the attempt of the "Cemaat" to topple the AKP-Erdoğan regime in a failed coup on July 15, 2016.

The AKP's majoritarian rule provided political stability for the implementation of the IMF's "Strong Economy Program" prepared by Kemal Derviş, the former Minister of Economic Affairs (also former vice president of the World Bank) and IMF experts. The AKP totally fulfilled the liberalization program based on: tight monetary policy, free movement of capital, liberalization of labor markets, disinflation-price stability policies, and privatization of state enterprises (Boratav 2016; Akçay 2018). In 2005, AKP signed another standby with the IMF for three more years. The neoliberal economic policies of the AKP are characterized by: large-scale privatizations, net capital imports (speculative hot money), high net resource transfers (profit and interest revenues), import-dependent exports, a steady increase in external and households indebtedness, debt-led consumption, dependent economic growth based on foreign capital inflows, a boost in the construction sector, and large-scale infrastructure projects (Boratav 2016).

The neoliberal policies of the AKP have scored high marks from the top cores of imperialism. The Accession Partnership documents and the progressive reports that the EU has prepared for Turkey have several times commended Turkey for its good functioning in privatization processes or for opening up unlimited access to financial capital. The IMF was also pleased with the neoliberal policies of the AKP, which extraordinarily provided $10 billion credit to Turkey in the 2005 standby agreement. The IMF revealed that this credit was given within the "exceptional circumstances" context aimed to support the AKP in the then upcoming 2007 elections (Boratav 2011).

Privatization of State Economic Enterprises and New Labor Regime

The AKP has accomplished a record-high level of privatization in Turkey's economy (Akçay 2018). The total revenue of privatization was $8 billion during 1986–2002 in Turkey and it shifted tremendously to $62 billion between 2002 and 2018 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Treasury and Finance 2018). The privatizations achieved by AKP were consistent with the standards of the Post-Washington Consensus because privatizations did not just function for public debt-cleaning but they also served to facilitate the dissolution of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). Shutting down SEEs was conducive to a comprehensive neoliberal transformation such as through the weakening of organized labor (a large percentage of organized labor was working in SEEs), the commodification of cheap public goods and services (Akçay 2018), and the liquidation of small peasantry while opening spheres to transnational agricultural corporations (Oyan 2013).

In a similar vein, AKP issued legislations concerning agriculture, such as the "Law Regarding the Protection of Plant Bleeders" (2004) and the "Seed Growing Law" (2006), and made it compulsory for farmers to buy conventional seeds solely from registered firms (Aydın and Biber 2014). Non-coincidentally, 99% of these firms operating in Turkey were multinational corporations and they were acting as dealers of six worldwide monopolies, namely, Novartis, Monsanto, Cargil, Dupont, ADN, and Bayer (Aydın and Biber 2014). The legislations on agriculture simply demonstrates how imperialism ("exploitation and dependency" Boratav 2010) works in Turkey under the hegemony of the AKP.

AKP issued four legislative regulations for the neoliberalization of the labor market: Labor Act No 4857 (2003), "Private Employment Agencies Regulations" (2004), "Omnibus Act of 2011," and in 2016 another regulation for private agencies but known as "Slavery Act" concerning the renting of workers (2016) (Gürcan and Mete 2017). All of these regulations laid the legal groundwork of flexible, subcontractual, and unorganized employment with reduced job security, which complied with the demands of big capital in Turkey (Akçay 2018). Concomitantly, the trade unionization density in Turkey, which was around 30% in 2001 declined to 6% in 2013, and the ratio of workers working under a collective contract fell to 6% of the total employment levels in Turkey (EU Commission Final Report 2016).

Dependency on Foreign Capital Inflow and Net Resource Transfers

The Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875 facilitated the legal conditions with regard to the inflows of foreign direct investments and enhanced the rights protecting investors. The total foreign capital inflows to Turkey during 2002–2017 exceeded $600 billion and $193 billion of the total amount were net foreign direct investments (Presidency Investment Office 2018) The number of companies in Turkey with foreign capital in 2002 was 5600, which rose to 58,400 in 2017 (Presidency Investment Office 2018). The annual average of foreign capital inflows to Turkey was $2.2 billion in the period 1995–2005; it reached $20.7 billion in the period 2006–2008 due to the augmentation of privatizations, $9 billion in the period 2009–2010 during which the effects of the crisis continued, $14.2 billion in 2011–2016, and then $10.8 billion in 2017 (Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneği 2018). The massive inflows of foreign capital to Turkey were mostly used for the finance and construction sectors and for the purchase of real estate. Only limited portions of foreign capital inflows were invested in the productive sectors (e.g., the manufacturing industry). For instance, in 2013, $5.4 billion out of the total $13.6 billion in capital inflow were invested in the productive sectors (manufacturing industry, energy, mining, etc.), $5.1 billion were invested in the service sectors (finance insurance, transportation, storage, etc.), and $3 billion were invested in real estate purchases. In 2017, $2.6 billion of the total foreign capital inflow of $10.8 billion were invested in the productive industry, $4.8 billion in the service sectors, and $4.6 billion in real estate purchases (Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneği 2018).

Industrial production in Turkey has specialized on low and medium-low technology industrial goods such as textiles, food, vehicles, machine parts, and iron and steel products. According to data from the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (Istanbul Sanayi Odası 2016), in 2016, 39.3% of the added value created in the manufacturing industry relied heavily on medium-low technology productions, while 37.4% relied on low-technology; 19.5% relied on medium-high technology and just 3.7% relied on the high-tech industry group (Istanbul Sanayi Odası 2016). According to the same data, as of 2016, 123 companies out of the 500 largest industrial corporations in Turkey were foreign share capital enterprises and the total amount of exports of these 123 corporations reached 47.8% of total exportation (Istanbul Sanayi Odası 2016). According to data provided by the State Institute of Statistics, the rate of exports meeting imports was 67.1% in 2017 (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 2017), and this rate indicates the dependency of the manufacturing industry on imports.

The sum of "net profit-interest remittances" (Boratav 2010) or net resource transfers of international financial capital from Turkey during 2010–2015 equal $77 billion (Boratav 2017). The ratio of international capital asset acquisitions in Turkey and all foreign gross assets within national income was 52.9% in 2008, and it soared up to 82.7% in 2014 (Boratav 2016). To conclude, Turkey's attribution to international capitalism took the form of importing net capital while transferring net resource to international financial capital.

External Debts and Fragile Economy

One of the most apparent indicators of Turkey's dependency on imperialist composition is its high sensitivity to hot money inflows and outflows as well as steady growth in its external debt stock. During the 2008–2009 crisis, the hot money inflows to Turkey stopped abruptly and turned into a net foreign capital outflow reaching $10.9 billion between October 2008 and October 2009 (compared to $75.7 billion in the same time period

the previous year) (Boratav 2016). In the same year, Turkey made net foreign debt payments of $26.4 billion to international financial capital and was concomitantly dragged into a severe crisis wherein its economy shrank by 7.9% (Boratav 2016). The quantitative easing policy initiated by the US, which was then followed by the EU and Japan in 2008, rescued Turkey from entering a deep recession since the inflows of short-term foreign capital into peripheral economies resumed again. However, reliance on debt-creating outsourcing contributed to the foreign debt burden of Turkey. The amount of external debts, which was $129 billion in 2002, increased sharply to $453 billion in 2018. In addition, as a consequence of the cheap credit-based consumption model of the AKP (as a part of their "financial inclusion policies"), the percentage of household debt in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased to 19.6% in 2013, up from 1.8% in 2002 (Akçay 2018). During the periods 1997–2007 and 2008–2015, the rate of increase of household debts in GDP reached a record high rate of 329.8% (Bedirhaoğlu 2019).

Alignment with Imperialism

In the second half of the1990s, the global control capacity of the US hegemony was in a relative decline concomitantly with an escalation in structural defects of the capitalist accumulation model on which the US hegemony was built. On the other hand, other regional actors, such as Russia, Germany, and China, were extending their impact power. To maintain leadership of the imperialist system, containment strategies, geostrategic deployments, and alliances with collaborative local actors became important for the US.

The dual policy of the US concerning the Middle East began forming in the late 1990s. The first pillar of this policy focused on initiating new security architecture in the Middle East through military interventions, occupations, forced regime changes, and velvet revolutions (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu 2009; Uzgel 2009). The second pillar, aimed to integrate authoritarian Arab regimes with low legitimacy into a neoliberal

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capitalist democracy Post-Washington Consensus with a comprehensive transformation in politics and society; this was announced as the Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative (GMEI) in 2004. Further, these policies aimed to prevent uncontrolled radical Islamists from seizing power. In this context, the US supported moderate Islamic movements, such as the "Society of Muslim Brotherhood," which has been the most organized and expanded Islamic movement in the region and the most eager to collaborate with the US.

The neoliberal moderate Islam-democracy of Turkey, which has close ties with the West, would be an inspiring model for the region. However, the RP (Refah Partisi, or Welfare Party emerging from the National View Movement), which came into power in Turkey in 1996, did not meet the expectations of the United States when its leader and co-founder Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan made his first official foreign visit to Iran, attempted to establish an international Islamic organization (Developing 8, or D8), raised the opportunity of an Islamic common market, made appeals to save the Turkish economy from Western domination (Uzgel 2009), and called for "Just Order," which resembled "protectionist economic nationalism" (Madra and Yılmaz 2019). At the end, as mentioned before, Erbakan had to step down as a result of "National Security Council" decisions on February, 28, 1997 (mostly referred to as a postmodern coup) and the RP resigned from government. The RP was shut down by the Constitutional Court and its successor, Virtue Party (FP), was later dissolved on June 22, 2001.

The AKP was founded on August 14, 2001 and its founders Erdoğan and Gül visited the US immediately after the dissolution of the FP and attended several meetings held in influential organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the American Enterprise Institute. In both Erdoğan's and Gül's speeches presented during their visit, they emphasized their willingness to improve relations between Turkey and the US and support Turkey's commitment to the EU accession process. They also stated on every occasion that they cut ties with the RP-FP's "National View Movement" (Uzgel

2009). In short, before the AKP came into power, its founding cadres made it clear that the AKP would pursue pro-American, pro-EU, and pro-liberal policies, and it would not come into conflict with the structural interests of imperialist centers.

As mentioned before, the AKP came into power in 2002 under very favorable conditions. The leader of the "Kurdistan Workers' Party" (PKK) organization, Abdullah Öcalan, was delivered to Turkey via an operation of the CIA in February 1999. The US was in need of Turkey's military and logistic corroboration for the planned Iraq invasion and did not want Turkey to be distracted with a PKK threat. After the capture of Öcalan, the PKK withdrew its armed forces outside of the Turkish border and declared a one-sided ceasefire (1999–2004). As such, the AKP came into power in a relatively peaceful environment without developing a policy on the Kurdish question in Turkey.

After the 2002 elections, the officials of the AKP government and the US agreed on Memoranda of Understanding for the deployment of US soldiers (in addition to the use of airports and seaports) for launching the invasion of Iraq from the north via Turkish territory (Yılmaz and Özdemir 2017). Nevertheless, the AKP government failed to pass the bill on March 1, 2003 in parliament as a result of resistance from the Republican People's Party (CHP), the only opposition party in parliament, along with unfavorable votes from some AKP members. The then US President George W. Bush and the neo-conservative team were stunned with the rejection of the bill because they had assumed that the AKP government would play a key role in both pillars of the US Middle East Policy (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu 2009).

The defeat of the bill had severely affected the relations of the US and the AKP government at the beginning. In order to restore the relations, Erdoğan wrote an article in the *Wall Street Journal* titled "My Country is Your Faithful Ally and Friend" on March 31, 2003 (Erdoğan 2003) to remind that Turkey and the AKP have both been in line with US interests. Soon after, the AKP government became actively involved in the

second pillar of the US policy (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu 2009) and made several visits to Arab countries, where they presented Turkey as a moderate-Islamist model successfully integrated into the international system and promoted GMEI objectives, such as transformation to multiparty democracy and the necessity of social change or freedom of opinion (Uzgel 2009). The GMEI objectives were not welcomed by the authoritative rulers of the Middle East and the project discontinued after 2006. However, the contribution of the AKP to the second pillar of the US policy continued in a different manner.

In the second half of 2000s, Erdoğan began to emphasize the Ottoman heritage of Turkey and gave speeches as if he was the defender of Muslims in former Ottoman territories. In 2009 at the Davos meeting, Erdoğan explicitly accused the then Israel Prime Minister Simon Peres as murdering Palestinians and became the most popular political figure in the Arab public. Erdoğan developed close relations with political figures such as Bashar al-Assad, Khaled Mashal, Muammar Gaddafi, and Omar-al-Bashir. Erdoğan's reputation created the illusion that Turkey could be the guardian of Sunni masses. On the other hand, Erdoğan as a prime minister allowed the use of Incirlik airbase and Turkish airspace for imperialist operations of the US in Iraq and Syria and the NATO Radar Base in Malatya was established in 2011 for the surveillance of Iran.

The Trojan horse role that Turkey played on behalf of imperialism ended in 2011 with the beginning of the Arab Revolts. In 2011, Izmir became the command center of NATO for Libya's intervention, and the jihadist terrorists passed to Syria via Turkey borders and they have received logistic, military, and diplomatic help from Turkey (Ozkan 2018; Chivers and Schmitt, 2013). From 2011 to 2013, the AKP government was backed by the Atlantic front and dreamed of becoming an Islamic hegemon power in the Middle East. When the political parties of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ihvan) came into power, the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia and Muhammad Mursi in Egypt, the AKP, which had close relations with that Islamic movement, presented itself as a mentor; this

position soon turned into a fantasy of becoming the leader of the "Sunni Muslim Belt from Sudan to Syria" (Ozkan 2018). However, the wide-ranging Turkish protest movements beginning in June 2013 with the Gezi uprisings exposed the Islamist authoritative character of Erdoğan, which effectively tarnished his image as a democratic-Islamist liberal and globally exposed that he did not possess the popular support. Further, Mursi and the Ennahda lost their ruling power in 2012 and 2014, respectively.

The 2012 assassination of Christopher Stephens, the US ambassador to Libya, by fundamentalist Islamic groups and pressure from Saudi Arabia-Gulf countries (except Qatar) on the US to retract its support for Ihvan parties led the US to alter its "moderate Islam" politics (Ozkan, 2018) that had been in place since late 1990s.

The military inclusion of Russia into the ongoing war in Syria in September 2015 in order to help the Assad regime decisively ended Turkey's dream of becoming a regional hegemon power in the Middle East. Turkey, at the end of 2016, obliged to make a compromise with the Russia-Iran-Syria front via the Astana Process launched by the leadership of Russia. Even though Turkey has tried to maintain its influence in the region by benefiting from the contradictions between the global powers, the title of President Erdoğan's article written to the *New York Times* on January 7, 2019 portrays the idea that Turkey has been cooperating since 1946: "Trump Is Right on Syria. Turkey Can Get the Job Done" (Erdoğan 2019).

Concluding Remarks

The organic link between capitalism and imperialism connecting comprador bourgeoisie of Turkey to capitalist classes-institutions of the metropole economies officially established in 1946 with the articulation of Turkey into the Atlantic bloc and Bretton Woods institutions. The integration of Turkey to the asymmetric dependency relations of imperialism gained momentum in 1989 when Turkey removed the

restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. From that point onward, Turkey's economy has increasingly become dependent on financial cycles and hot-money movement. By 2018, Turkey's economy may be characterized as net capital importing and net resourse transferring in respect to international financial capital, that is, imperialism. Regardless of the rise and fall in Turkey's relations with the US or the West, it has always maintained a stance close to economic and foreign policy interests of the capitalist core and hegemony.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-imperialism in Greece and Turkey Regarding Cyprus (1950s and 1960s)
▶ Turkish Left and Anti-imperialism in the 1970s

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Turkish Left and Anti-imperialism in the 1970s

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Synonyms

Anti-imperialism; Communist Party of Turkey; Kemalism; Leninism; Maoism; Sino-Soviet split; Soviet imperialism; Turkey

Definition

This essay examines the many factors involved in the deep polarisation of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1970s as fundamentally predicated on the Sino-Soviet split of the previous decade. However, to understand the "local" significance of polemics between pro-China and pro-USSR factions, the essay analyses the historical legacy of the anti-imperialist movement in the political history of Turkey. The socialist movement in the

1960s had a strongly anti-imperialist character, and the essay argues that it is possible to observe the evolution from a Kemalist version of anti-imperialism to one based on various versions of Marxism-Leninism.

Introduction

The 1970s were marked by the rise of the left-wing and anti-imperialist movement in Turkey. This was the Turkish revolutionary movement's strongest period in its history, during which the Turkish left in general was able to engage with extensive popular segments. While left-wing and anti-imperialist groups were mobilising millions, the mainstream Republican People's Party (CHP) adopted a leftist, social-democrat position in the 1970s with the change of its leadership from Inonu to Ecevit in 1972. It became the first party in the 1973 general election with 33 per cent of the vote, and it received 41 per cent of the vote in the 1977 general election. This period witnessed the flourishing of many parties and democratic organisations. The labour movement, student movement, peasant movement, women's movement along with illegal or semi-legal armed groups and resistance organisations acted throughout the country. On 12 September 1980, this period came to an end with the military coup d'état and subsequent dictatorship of General Kenan Evren. This crushed all organisations and suppressed the movement.

Despite the existence of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) since 1920, the socialist movement consisted of a small group of intellectuals and workers that permanently faced state repression until the 1970s. Following the rise of the people's movement in the 1960s, the youth movement radicalised, Marxist publications attracted the interest of intellectuals, and strong labour confederations and student organisations were formed. Many revolutionary parties and organisations emerged at the dawn of the 1970s. Despite the 1971 military memorandum and the elimination of the revolutionary movement's leaders through a series of political murders in 1972 and 1973, the socialist movement was able to

strengthen between 1975 and 1980. On 12 March 1971, a military memorandum was signed by the Turkish generals and given to the president. It demanded that the Turkish government should resign, which it duly did for fear of a coup d'état. The military accused the elected government of failing to overcome the social and economic unrest. This was the second successful military intervention in the Republican period after the 1960 coup (Ersan 2013). The left-wing movement not only organised large mobilisations of masses for political, economic, and social purposes, and organised campaigns, but also tried to counter the state oppression, political murders, and paramilitary-fascist terror that began to turn into a civil war in the late 1970s. Turkey was a highly polarised society during this decade.

This polarisation was not just on the left–right axis. There was also a strong polarisation within the revolutionary movement of Turkey. This polarisation was a result of the international dispute and consequent struggle within the international socialist movement led by the confrontation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Revolutionary/socialist parties and organisations in Turkey determined their position within this conflict and began to struggle with each other, mainly in the form of political and theoretical debates and not without some forms of violent clashes. A weak socialist tradition along with intense state oppression coincided with the Polemics within the international socialist movement, and despite the rising mass support for the revolutionary movement, it could not succeed in uniting to counter the fascist terror and the military junta.

Apart from the ideological debates between the CPC and CPSU, anti-imperialist thought also contributed to how the revolutionary organisations positioned themselves. There was continuity between the 1970s movement and the 1960s anti-imperialist movement. The anti-imperialist consciousness that developed in the 1960s influenced the revolutionaries of the 1970s. In addition, the historical confrontation between the Turkish and Russian states, in view of the latter's historical imperialist ambitions, should be taken into

consideration. In the context of the USSR's super-power position and Turkey's affiliation with NATO in the post-war period, this antiimperialist historical consciousness had an impact on the Turkish left, especially with regard to the acceptance of the Maoist 'social-imperialism' theory and its adoption in the contemporary politics of the 1970s.

This essay argues that the domination of the critique of the 'modern revisionism of the USSR' and the influence of the Maoist approach in the 1970s was the consequence of the strong anti-imperialist movement.

The Left in the 1970s and Positions towards the 'Polemics'

Brief Historical Background

The TKP was formed in 1920 at Baku by the unification of three socialist groups under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi, who had been a prisoner of war (POW) during the First World War. One of these socialist groups was formed by former Turkish POWs who had been held by the Tsarist Russian army and met with socialist ideas during the October Revolution. The other group was established by Marxist students who were politically active during their university lives in Germany (Turkish Spartakists) and France, and who aimed to wage the revolutionary struggle in their own country. The third group belonged to the local revolutionaries and socialists organising in Istanbul and other Anatolian cities, participating in the local resistance groups against occupying forces after the surrender of the Ottoman Empire (Ağcabay 2009).

Mustafa Suphi and his comrades formed the Turkish Red Militias, a nucleus of the Turkish Red Army formed by former POWs. Their strategy was to join the resistance movement led in Ankara by the Government of Mustapha Kemal. By forming a wellfunctioning party and an organised armed group, they aimed to form a United Front with the Kemalist Government for the independence of the country against the British, French, and Italian imperialist interventions and the Greek occupation. This proposal was accepted by the Kemalist Government. However, on the way to

Ankara from Baku, Mustafa Suphi and his 14 comrades (members of the Central Committee) were murdered in Trabzon in 1921. There are claims, but not any certain evidence, that link this massacre with the Kemalist Government. Later, the Turkish Red Militias were mobilised for the Bolshevik victory in Caucasia and could not return to Turkey as an organised group (Ağcabay 2009).

The period from the 1930s to the 1950s was marked by the continuous attempts of the TKP cadres to organise and reorganise against the unending government pressure. The secretary general Dr. Şefik (Shefik) Hüsnü, Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, and the world-famous poet Nazim Hikmet spent decades of their life in prisons. TKP aimed to organise workers and students; they formed the first examples of trade unions and labour associations in the Republican period. There had been labour organisations in the nineteenth century in the main industrial and commercial cities of the Ottoman Empire such as Istanbul, Salonika, Izmir, and some Macedonian towns. However, as a result of the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the emergence of new independent states in the Balkans, mass migrations, and deportations during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, these labour organisations, formed by workers of various nationalities, were dissolved. TKP was operating illegally, but tried to form legal socialist parties and labour organisations and to publish legal magazines, but these were not permitted by the Kemalist Government. There was also a TKP radio station, based in Bulgaria. Until the end of the Second World War, TKP had a relatively positive approach to the Kemalist Government despite the ongoing pressure which the latter applied to them. TKP defined the new system as a bourgeois state against feudalism and reactionary forces, backed its modern reforms in superstructure, and supported armed suppression of the Kurdish rebellions, which it analysed as reactionary responses of the feudal forces. TKP strictly followed the official directives of the USSR and the Comintern (Ağcabay 2009).

In the 1960s, TKP benefited politically and organisationally from the rising, antiimperialist, youth movement and also contributed to the

anti-imperialist movement. TKP cadres were active in forming the first legal trade unions in the 1950s, and they were one of the main forces in organising the split from the central labour confederation (Türk-I·s, The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions formed in 1950) and establishing DISK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) in 1967. As an illegal party, TKP also supported the legal Workers Party of Turkey (TIP), which had been founded in 1961 by a group of trade unionists (Babalik 2005). TIP was the first socialist party in Turkey to win representation in the parliament. In the 1965 general election it got 3 per cent of the vote and won 15 seats in the parliament. The activities of the socialist members of parliament earned the sympathy and support of the rising anti-imperialist student movement as well as the labour and peasant movements. TIP was banned after the 1971 military memorandum and re-established in 1974. It was banned once again by the 1980 military junta.

Another main left-wing approach was defending the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) theory. This was a left-Kemalist theory defended by a periodical (YON) and some former TKP cadres such as Mihri Belli. Mihri Belli was the son of a commander during the War of Liberation in the Thrace Region. He studied in the US at Mississippi University where he was introduced to Marxism, and joined the labour and student movement in organising black peasants. When he returned to Turkey, he joined TKP in 1940. During the Greek Civil War, he participated as a guerrilla in 1946 and became a commander, known as 'Kapetan Kemal'. Until his death in 2011, he was an active leader within the socialist movement. The National Democratic Revolution theory advocated the alliance of progressive army officers and intellectuals in seizing power via a kind of leftist coup d'état. Its adherents proposed a planned economy with state control aimed at rapid development and industrialisation (Kaypakkaya 2013). Anti-imperialism was the focal point of this theory, mainly criticising the US dominance over Turkish politics, and the NATO affiliation.

These two main approaches benefited from, and contributed to, the anti-imperialist student movement of the 1960s. This campaigned against the European Common Market ('they are common, we are market') and demanded the nationalisation of petroleum. The student movement also campaigned against Turkish-based US bases and attacked US soldiers. On 16 February 1969, students protested against the Sixth Fleet of the US Navy visiting Istanbul, and two students were killed after a provocative fascist attack against the students. There were demonstrations to support Vietnamese revolutionaries and anti-colonial struggles against imperialist states. In 1968, students in the Middle Eastern Technical University burned the automobile of US ambassador Kommer who was known as the 'Vietnam butcher' (Behram 2005; Karadeniz 2006).

The 1970s

The anti-imperialist movement of the 1960s radicalised and shifted towards Marxism during the first years of the 1970s. From an anti-imperialist opposition, it began to focus on the power relations and searched for ways to achieve an independent and socialist system via revolution. The leaders of the 1970s had been active in the movement of the 1960s. So at this conjuncture, they found themselves in a position to understand the Polemics within the international socialist movement and to choose 'the real Marxist-truly revolutionary' way to continue the struggle in Turkey (Müftüoğlu 1990).

Political Actors

There are three important revolutionary leaders who had great impact over the next generations, and who were killed by the state very early, shortly after their establishment of organisations.

Deniz Gezmiş is considered to be the most popular Turkish leader of that period, and his appeal may be compared with that of Che Guevara. He was the founder leader of THKO (Peoples Liberation Army of Turkey). After the military memorandum in 1971, along with his comrades, he initiated a rural guerrilla struggle, but was captured by the army after a short while.

He was executed on 6 May 1972 together with his two comrades, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan. He had a pioneer position within the anti-imperialist youth movement. He joined the Palestinian resistance and had an armed training at Palestinian camps. He was a member of TIP and he was defending the NDR theory in the 1960s. Thus, he found the Kemalist revolution to be a progressive development. He aimed at fulfilling this progress by an anti-imperialist revolution against the ruling class, which had taken power by a counter-revolution and aligned Turkey with the US imperialism. Many organisations have claimed to be successors to his cause. For instance, one of the most important was called 'People's Liberation' in the 1970s, 'Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey (TDKP)' in the 1980s, and the legal 'Labour Party' (EMEP) from the 1990s to today. These parties generally positioned themselves with Maoism in the 1970s and then aligned with Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian socialists (Behram 2005; Ersan 2013).

Mahir Çayan (Chayan) was the founder leader of THKP-C (People's Liberation Party of Turkey-Front). He initiated urban guerrilla warfare and then shifted to rural guerrilla fighting. After kidnapping three technicians (two British and one Canadian) from a NATO base in order to liberate Deniz Gezmiş and his comrades from execution, he was killed on 30 March 1972 together with ten of his comrades. He also defended the NDR in the 1960s and then, after studying Marxism, rejected the positive role of the military given by that theory and advocated the necessity for armed propaganda for an anti-imperialist, democratic revolution. He was influenced by the Chinese and Cuban revolutions (Çayan 2008).

There have also been many organisations claiming to be successors of Mahir Çayan. The two main ones are Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way), which has been one of the strongest organisations from the 1970s and until today, and has mainly adopted legal ways of struggle. The other was Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) in the 1970s and 1980s, which changed its name to Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) in the 1990s and has mainly followed illegal and armed means of struggle (Ersan 2013).

The successors of Çayan did not align themselves with any of the sides of the Polemics within the socialist movement and criticised both parties, but their position was closer to Maoism. They accepted the main arguments of the Communist Party of China (CPC), accusing the USSR for being modern revisionists, but also criticised it as following narrow nationalist policies which prioritised their state interests while engaging in ideological debates. They also rejected the social imperialism theory proposed by the CPC as far as the USSR's character was concerned. They defended that even though the leadership of the USSR was modern revisionist, claiming it to be a result of the socialist economy and socialist superstructure. They argued that there was an ongoing struggle among Marxists and revisionists and it was not possible for a socialist state to be imperialist just after revisionists had captured power (Devrimci Gençlik 1978; Müftüoğlu 1990).

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya was the founder of the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist, Worker's Peasant's Liberation Army of Turkey. Kaypakkaya was captured by the army while he was waging rural armed struggle in 1973. After almost 4 months of torture, he was killed on 18 May 1973 without giving any information about his party. This organisation is still active with the same name, operating illegally and mainly through armed rural guerrilla groups following Mao's strategy of People's War. It has clearly been a Maoist party since its establishment, defending Maoist principles and struggling for the NDR, which is anti-imperialist in essence. The NDR theory of Mao demonstrated the way to achieve socialism for the semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries. This requires a democratic transition period (Kaypakkaya 2013).

Another organisation defending policies of the CPC was led by Doğu Perinçek, who has remained active in politics since the 1960s. He founded the Revolutionary Worker Peasant Party of Turkey (TIIKP-İllegal) in the early 1970s, and he then founded legal parties, successively the Worker Peasant Party of Turkey (TIKP) in the late 1970s (one of the strongest in that decade), the Socialist Party in the 1980s, and the Worker Party (IP) in the 1990s. He followed the official

policies of the CPC in both Mao's period and post-Mao. He defends Kemalist principles and uses Kemalist and Maoist terminology together by focusing on anti-imperialism (Perinçek 2011).

Within the pro-Soviet parties, the main and strongest one was TKP. TKP was a small party until the 1970s, but as a result of a campaigning period which is known as the '1971 Leap' in TKP's history, it became a strong organisation. TKP was following the policies of the USSR, demanding reforms for progress from the government. It was in the leadership of the leftist trade union confederation, DISK. TKP was against the NDR theory of the 1960s, and actively debated against Maoism in the 1970s. Maoist organisations accused TKP members of being 'social fascists' and agents of the social imperialism. After the dissolution of the USSR, TKP also dissolved itself and its cadres played active roles in the formation of various legal socialist parties during the 1990s (Babalik 2005). One of these groups of former TKP cadres re-established TKP as a legal party in 2012.

Anti-Imperialism and the Polemics: Anti-Imperialism and its Historical Legacy

In Turkey, there is a strong anti-imperialist tradition. This was mainly rooted in the National Liberation War after the First World War between 1919 and 1922 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The Kemalist Government in Ankara succeeded in becoming recognised by the Great Powers, and declared independence in 1923. According to the official historical narrative and the Kemalist ideology, this was an anti-imperialist war and Turkey earned its independence against the occupational forces. This argument is also accepted in official histories, giving inspiration to all other oppressed nations in colonies and encouraging them to initiate their independence wars as well.

The left in general agreed with these main arguments but criticised some aspects of the official historical narrative. In general, the National Liberation War was considered as a progressive and anti-imperialist war. Additionally, the left in

general hailed and stressed the importance of Soviet aid during that war, which helped the Kemalist Government to organise the resistance movement against the occupation forces in its first phase. Lenin supported the Kemalist Government to maintain peace on the Caucasian border in order that he could focus on the civil war at home. In addition, the Soviet Government recognised the Kemalist Government as an ally against the imperialist interests of Britain (Avcıoğlu 1998).

However there are different approaches towards Kemalism in the post-Liberation War era. The TKP and the pro-Soviet left defended it as a progressive bourgeois movement until the end of the Second World War. Turkey's shift to the US camp in the first phase of the Cold War, under the Democrat Party Government, Turkey's participation in the Korean War and affiliation to NATO were considered as a break from the authentic Kemalist policy making which had been given importance to friendly relations with the USSR (Babalık 2005).

Deniz Gezmiş supported Kemalism as a progressive force and called for the Second Liberation War to achieve socialism; but, according to Mahir Çayan, Kemalism was a movement of the radical petty bourgeoisie, had a limited progressive role, and positioned itself within the capitalist world after independence. Perinçek also credited an anti-imperialist role to Kemalism and called for the fulfilment of the Kemalist revolution. These opinions converge in addressing Kemalism and the War of Independence as anti-imperialist progressive developments, and claim that a kind of counter-revolution occurred at the beginning of the Cold War when Turkey became a semi-colony of US imperialism. Due to the latter, they argue in favour of another anti-imperialist struggle for an independent socialist system.

Ibrahim Kaypakkaya had a different position on Kemalism. Kaypakkaya found a limited anti-imperialist factor in the War of Independence. He claimed that while the Kemalist Government was resisting the occupation, it aimed to reach an agreement with the imperialist powers even in unequal conditions, and by accepting the semi-colony status from the first days of the Republic,

the Kemalist Government moved towards imperialist interests (Kaypakkaya 2013). However, this analysis did not receive much support from the mainstream left movement.

Therefore the official historical narrative and the mainstream left agree on the importance of anti-imperialism for the foundation of the new regime after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. All reactionary, semi-colonial, premodern characteristics began to be symbolised by the Ottoman Empire; modern, progressive, and anti-imperialist ideas were associated favourably with the Republican period.

The Leftist historical assessment was also influenced by the student movement of the 1960s against the US bases and fleet, Turkey's affiliation to NATO and the European Common Market, and protests/attacks against US soldiers visiting the cities. Almost all left-wing leaders and intellectuals of the 1970s had been part of the 1960s movement, sharing strong nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments, and demanding full independence from imperialist domination. This period was also one of transition from a leftist version of Kemalism to an understanding and application of Marxist ideology and concepts to the concrete conditions of Turkey.

It is also necessary to mention the historical anti-Russian sentiments within Turkish society that had an impact on the left in how it adopted the theory of social-imperialism. In the official historical narrative, only the first phase of the Soviet Revolution under the leadership of Lenin is analysed in a positive sense, while both the histories of Tsarist Russia history that preceded it and the Stalin/post-Stalin USSR that followed have a negative image. From the sixteenth century to the end of the First World War, in four centuries, the Ottoman Empire waged 14 wars against Tsarist Russia. Russia is considered to be an imperialist state, claiming rights in the Balkans, Caucasia and Bosphorus and aiming to reach the Mediterranean. Therefore, during the Second World War, when Stalin demanded Turkey should join the war against Germany, and after the Second World War, when Stalin put forward proposals for a new regime for the Bosphorus by claiming more rights for the USSR and surrounding Turkey from

the Balkans in the West to Caucasia in the East, once again the historical concerns about the expansionism of the Russian state emerged. The signs of this consciousness may be seen in the famous slogan of the pro-China groups accusing TKP and other pro-Soviet associations: 'TKP wants US to go and Russia to come'. Also these groups tend to use 'Russia' instead of 'the Soviet Union' in order to separate the Leninist and Stalinist period from the rest, and to recall traditional anti-Russian sentiments.

The anti-imperialist youth movement, influenced by the official Kemalist ideology as well as traditional historical consciousness, led many socialist/revolutionary organisations and intellectuals to adopt the social imperialism theory in the course of the Cold War in the 1970s. Sympathy towards Maoism and the Chinese Revolution may be seen as stemming from both the characteristics of the Chinese Revolution and the contemporary national liberation/anti-colonial movements of the 1970s in Asia and Africa, mainly symbolised by the Vietnamese anti-colonialism. However, the historical reasons should be taken account as well.

Effects of the Chinese Revolution and the Vietnam War

The left in Turkey found many common characteristics between the Chinese Revolution and its own struggles. It was characterised by anti-imperialism, influenced by the official Kemalist ideology, and just beginning to learn about Marxism and socialist struggles worldwide.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the teachings and experiences of Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution were studied and debated carefully. It was generally considered to have been the revolution of an industrialised, imperialist/capitalist state which succeeded through an uprising in city centres and then moved towards the rural areas. However, the socioeconomic characteristics of Turkey were generally analysed as semi-colonial, and for many organisations Turkey was considered to be semi-feudal. In this sense, it was considered closer to the Chinese conditions than to Russian ones.

Turkey was a peasant country and industry was not yet developed. During the course of the 1970s, as a result of the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies, rapid development of capitalist enterprises, massive migration from rural areas to city centres, and formation of strong labour confederations were observed. Many organisations therefore shifted from their analysis of Turkey as semi-feudal to redetermine it as a dependent capitalist country.

However, in the early 1970s, the majority of leftist organisations and intellectuals had drawn parallels between the Chinese Revolution and the revolutionary programme and goals of the revolution in Turkey. The peasant's movement in Turkey and land occupations of the landless peasants in many parts of the country in the late 1960s in a peasant-dominated country influenced revolutionaries' decision to initiate a similar struggle in Turkey as well. An anti-imperialist struggle with armed peasants under the leadership of revolutionary youth leaders was an attractive idea for revolutionaries. It mobilised three revolutionary leaders of that period (namely Gezmiş, Çayan, and Kaypakkaya) to leave the cities to form armed groups in rural areas after the military memorandum of 1971. The Chinese Revolution was inspiring for young revolutionaries of that time, and Mao's writings on the People's War were very popular.

Yet there were other similar examples. Apart from the Chinese Revolution, the revolutionary movement in Turkey was greatly influenced by the Cuban Revolution, where young revolutionaries had mobilised peasants, swept away the US collaborators, and liberated their countries. Another inspiration was Palestine, and many young revolutionaries, including Deniz Gezmiş, directly participated in the Palestinian resistance, trained in Palestinian camps, and fought against the Israeli Army. They would learn the guerrilla struggle in practice and also witness the Chinese support for such struggles (Bulut 2000).

Socio-economic conditions and direct observation of the anti-imperialist struggles therefore brought the revolutionary movement in Turkey closer to the Chinese experience. Additionally, the Chinese Revolution was an anti-imperialist struggle both against the Japanese occupation during the Second World War and against the Kuomintang Government, perceived as lackeys of imperialism. Secondly, the NDR theory of Mao that emphasised the necessity of a democratic transition period to socialism for semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries was an attractive political programme for the revolutionaries in Turkey in comparison to the Russian experience of the Revolution. A left Kemalist theory of the NDR, which defended a 'left junta' by an alliance of progressive army officers and intellectuals, was very popular in the 1960s within the student movement, and the NDR theory as a Marxist approach was attractive for those who were beginning to learn and apply Marxist politics in the search for concrete solutions to the concrete conditions of Turkey.

For the revolutionary youth of Turkey, the great struggles of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the 1922 National Liberation War, and the 1949 Chinese Revolution were studied and debated carefully in order to shape the future of their own country. The Cuban Revolution and its resistance to US imperialism was also a contemporary struggle that had an impact on them. However, the deepest effect for the revolutionary movement that demonstrated the possibility of defeating imperialist powers under Cold War conditions was the Vietnamese Revolution. As in other parts of the world, the Vietnam War was an important agenda of the antiimperialist movement of Turkey. For instance, the car of the so-called 'Vietnam Butcher' Robert William Kommer was burned by revolutionary students during his visit to the Middle East Technical University in 1969. 'More Vietnam, Salutation to the Ho Chi Min' was an important slogan for youth of the day (Karadeniz 2006). The Vietnamese Revolution was conceived of as another confirmation of Mao's People's War theory, which was supposed to be the unchallengeable war theory of the proletarian revolutionaries against imperialists and their lackeys.

Conclusion

Many factors contributed to the deep polarisation within the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1970s on the axis of the Polemics in the

international socialist movement. However in understanding the reasons behind 'nationalisation' of these Polemics, there is a need to focus on the anti-imperialist movement and the historical legacy in the political history of Turkey.

The official historical narrative and Turkish Republic's Kemalist ideology had a great influence on the left movement. In the 1960s, it mainly had an anti-imperialist character and it is possible to observe an evolution from the Kemalist version of anti-imperialism to the international Leninist approach of antiimperialism. Apart from the Marxist-Leninist literature, the contemporary struggles in the 1960s and 1970s were also concrete practices and perceived as consequences of the Marxist revolutionary theory. Therefore, for the antiimperialist youth of Turkey, there were both national and international experiences and the historical legacy of revolutions that could guide them in the course of the liberation of their country from the imperialist exploitation.

At this period, the Chinese Revolution and Mao's teachings were attractive for the anti-imperialist movement in Turkey. Many common characteristics towards the programme and prospects of the Revolutions in both countries were found and this coincided with Turkey's foreign relations with the USSR and the historical sentiments towards Russian expansionism. Therefore many organisations in Turkey tend to accept the social imperialism theory without seeing much need to focus on the details of this theory.

It is possible to observe such debates and splits in all parts of the world within the socialist movement according to the Polemics, but without understanding the political and historical context of Turkey, it may not be easy to analyse the deep effects of this polarisation within the left-wing movement there.

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Two Pillars of US Global Hegemony: Middle Eastern Oil and the Petrodollar

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Definition

Throughout recent history, the oil-rich regions of the Middle East have played a key role in determining US foreign policy. This is simply because the Middle Eastern oil regions currently account for 65% of the world's proven oil reserves, and 30% of its day-to-day production, and therefore the Middle East has been the geographic centre of gravity of the world oil industry (Renner 2003).

Introduction

> [W]hoever controls the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot can control the global economy, at least for the near future. (Harvey 2005: 19)

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the Middle Eastern oil regions currently account for 65% of the world's proven oil reserves, and 30% of its day-to-day production, and therefore the Middle East has been the geographic centre of gravity of the world oil industry (Renner 2003). They are therefore a truly vital strategic US interest. Since the new and bountiful discoveries of cheaper oil in the Persian Gulf just after the Second World War, oil from the Middle East has gradually come to displace US oil. Without direct and secure access to this resource, the world economy would fall into a very serious crisis, and the position of the leading power, the US, would be dealt a mortal blow. In order to continue growing, the US-dominated world capitalist economy needs plenty of cheap and readily available oil. The Middle East supplied 22% of US oil imports, 36% of OECD Europe's, 40% of China's, 60% of India's, and 80% of Japan's and South Korea's in 2006 (Energy Information Administration 2006).

But this dimension cannot be reduced solely to matters of economic prosperity, even though it represents a part. Above all, the oil dimension in US foreign policy is a strategic one which mainly concerns exercising global power, a central part of US global hegemony. The purpose of this essay is to seek some understanding of how and why the oil of the Middle East came to play a central role in the rise and continuation of the hegemonic position of the US.

When a hegemonic power imposes its political and economic authority over a region, it does so in relation to its allies and its local protégés. Gramsci used the term 'hegemony' to signify that the dominant power leads the system in a direction that not only serves the dominant group's interests but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest (Gramsci 1971, pp. 106–120, 161). Harvey's usage of the term is similar: 'the particular mix of coercion and consent embedded in the exercise of political power' (Harvey 2005, p. 36). US ally Japan and West European economies are dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, and US protégés in that region, the oil monarchies, require US protection and military and political support. Through its influence over the oil-rich regimes in the region, the US has consolidated its strategic

presence in the Middle East by effectively controlling the 'global oil spigot'. This seems also an effective way to ward off any competition for top position in the global hierarchy as all its competitors are heavily dependent on this essential source, oil, coming from the Middle East.

It was during the First World War that the US accorded to the Middle East region a strategic importance due to its rich oil resources. At that time, Britain's declining global empire was controlled by key oil-producing regions of the Middle East. During the First World War, keeping those oil-rich lands under British control was a crucial goal for the British government. Sir Maurice Hankey, the powerful secretary of the British War Cabinet, wrote to the foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, during the war's final stage, that 'oil in the next war will occupy the place of coal or at least a parallel to coal'. Therefore, Hankey said, 'control over these [Middle Eastern] oil supplies becomes a first-class British war aim' (given in Yergin 1991, pp. 185–188). For a detailed analysis of Great Power rivalry over Middle Eastern oil, see James A. Paul's summary (2002).

Oil surpluses of the 1930s quickly disappeared during the Second World War, and the US, the new hegemonic state within the capitalist world, began to rely on foreign oil in the 1940s. With only 6% of the world's population, the US accounted for one-third of global oil consumption. Energy security, since then, has become an essential dimension of US state security, meaning the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price and unwavering access to foreign oil reserves. The question of US influence over Middle Eastern oil-rich countries has become increasingly important since the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1967, US companies increased their control of Middle Eastern oil from a mere 10% to over 60%. (Monthly Review 2002). The so-called 'Carter Doctrine' of January 1980 perhaps symbolises this heightened significance of the region's oil for the US state more than anything else: 'Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be

repelled by any means necessary, including military force' (given in Klare 2004, pp. 45–47). President Jimmy Carter, in his annual State of the Union Address to Congress, also reiterated his plans to increase military spending by 5%, with special emphasis on developing a 100,000-man 'rapid deployment force' capable of intervention in the region. President Carter himself did not use the term 'Carter Doctrine' to refer to his policies in the Middle East in any public statement during his term in office. However, the label was used later in official US documents (see Meiertons 2010).

More than 30 years have passed since the first expression of the Carter Doctrine, and the significance of the oil-rich Middle East for the global position of the US remains as one of the central pillars of world politics. It ensures, with the use of violence if necessary, that Middle Eastern oil remains accessible, free-flowing, cheap, and under US control.

In the rest of this essay, I will focus on three interrelated issues in order to appreciate this complex relationship, and to explain the role played by Middle Eastern oil, pricing of oil, and links between the region's oil trade and arms trade in sustaining the unique position of the US as supplier of the world's reserve currency.

The Emergence of the US as Global Hegemonic Power

During the early part of the twentieth century, the US patiently put key stepping stones in place to build its state as a modern imperial power. Once the dominance of the industrial North over the agrarian South was established soon after the American Civil War, the US government initiated essential foundations of its world system of control, first in Latin America and the Philippines, and then in Western and Central Europe, Japan, Korea, and the Middle East. Its superior army, high-tech weapons systems, and globetrotting military and intelligence networks have of course been central to this project. But equally important, if not more so, has been its strong grip on the world economy, trade, and financial markets, mainly through the role played by the

US dollar as the world's universal currency or reserve currency.

Reserve currencies are held by governments and institutions outside the country of issue and are used to finance international economic transactions, including trade and the payment of debts. Reserve currency status is not just an international status symbol. It brings international *seigniorage*, benefits for financial institutions of the issuing country, relaxation of the external constraints on macroeconomic policy, and wider geopolitical consequences of exercising currency hegemony. How did the US currency achieve this status?

During the war, the dollar became a world currency, equal in strength to the British pound. Among others, Eichengreen (2008) explains this process in detail. In one of his recent volumes, he traces the rise and fall of the dollar system with more recent data (Eichengreen 2011). Eichengreen sees, in particular, the Suez crisis of 1956 as the landmark event undermining once and for all the importance of the British pound sterling.

During the war, European economies were short of capital, which meant high rates of return for the US loans, which further strengthened the dollar, and pushed the French and the British to peg their currencies against the dollar at depreciated rates during the 1940s and 1950s (Kennan 2000, pp. 449–454).

Dollar hegemony has always been critical to the future of the US-dominated global hierarchy, and due to its extensive financial and political consequences even more so than the US' overwhelming military power. In turn, the US economy is intimately tied to the dollar's status as a reserve currency for dealing with trade deficits and keeping the interest rates low at home. The continuing dominance of the US dollar was not only a matter of simple economics and finance, but was also 'deeply rooted in the geopolitical role of the United States' (for a detailed explanation, see Gökay and Whitman 2004, pp. 65–69).

The central place that the US superpower, 'actually existing American empire' in David Harvey's words, has come to occupy in the global system rests on a particular convergence of

structure and history (Harvey 2005, p. 6). The most crucial and conclusive phase in this process occurred during and after the Second World War. Only after the twin disasters of the 1929–30 Depression and the Second World War did the world capitalist system obtain a new lease under the hegemonic leadership of the US. This reorganisation of capitalism could not have been accomplished without the uneven development of certain structural characteristics that also shaped the post-war leadership of the US imperial state. This process was well examined by Peter Gowan under the apt title *Contemporary Intra-Core Relations*: 'the empire-state offers a mechanism for managing the world economy and world politics which is sufficiently cognisant of trans-core business interests' (Gowan 2004, p. 490). This required that the US create a new international monetary system advocating new trade regimes and imposing new development strategies. US-dominated international institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, came to dictate and conduct the modus operandi of such development strategies. The post-war state of ruin, in both physical and economic senses, in much of Europe, Asia, and parts of Africa, which created a power vacuum in the world system, provided conditions for this total restructuring of international trade and finance under the leading role of the US and its multinational companies. The economic and financial system in France was exhausted, the whole of the German state was disintegrated, Britain was on the brink of bankruptcy, and the Japanese economic system was completely shattered and disorganised after the collapse of its imperial state. All these countries needed urgent economic assistance of some kind and they looked to the US for that. With the crumbling of international competitive capital, only the US remained as a secure capitalist state capable of determining the terms of a new world economic order. For the next two decades, the American economy was able to produce and sell all the vital industrial products so much more efficiently than other industrial powers that it could outperform producers in these other countries' home markets. Hence, the world system had entered a new phase in which the

conditions were ripe for the US, the only superpower capable of re-structuring the capitalist world economy according to its own vision.

The first task in rescuing the global capitalist order was to reorganise the nation states of Europe and Asia as willing members, while placing the US at the command centre of the world system. Hence emerged the *Pax Americana,* a historically specific inter-state system; in other words, what Peter Gowan fittingly referred to as the 'protectorate system', a US-centred global 'hub-and-spokes' arrangement (Gowan 2002). Economically, this required the creation of a new international monetary system that could provide the necessary movement of capital for the reconstruction process, and the construction of a system of world trade that could eliminate the persisting effects of the Depression and the war. The post-war restructuring began at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, which adopted a gold standard for world currency, and encouraged the rapid expansion of direct foreign investment and world trade. The Bretton Woods system was an international monetary framework of fixed exchange rates. Drawn up by two leading powers, the US and Britain, John Maynard Keynes was one of the architects (Gökay and Whitman 2009). The pre-war gold-exchange system remained in place as the currency standard, except that it substituted the dollar for the British pound as the key reserve currency. This meant that all economies that were to be part of this system would be required to recognise dollars as their basic reserve currency and link their own currency to its value. The US dollar, however, enjoyed immunity from any currency instability, because it was, as the universal/reserve currency, pegged to the value of gold, which was fixed at $35.00 an ounce. The Bretton Woods system was a natural consequence of the already obvious, global, economic supremacy of the US. Huge amounts of gold were accumulated by the US, primarily from Britain and the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease programme, which required payment in gold for war-time assistance, to both military and civilian sectors. Lend-Lease agreements were first formulated in December 1940, and then formally set up seven months later. By the end of the war, the bulk

of the world's gold supply was held by the US in Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the massive supremacy of US industrial production guaranteed that it would enjoy huge surpluses in its balance of trade (IMF, March 2006).

In the wake of the so-called economic miracles of the 1950s and 1960s ('the Golden Age of Capitalism', as Eric Hobsbawm called it [1994: 285ff.]), the high growth rates, technological innovation, social and geopolitical peace, and rapid development of US-led Western capitalist economies enabled them to accumulate millions of dollars as reserves (Mann 1995, pp. 104–105). As a result, these years witnessed steadily rising levels of investment, and a continual boom.

As the 1950s and 1960s passed, an inequitable distribution of power and wealth within the Bretton Woods system led the US to overreach the advantages offered by the dollar's reserve currency role. The US became more and more inflationist with regard to the value of the dollar, particularly with respect to Japanese and West European economies. As the dollars accumulated in foreign banks, the actual value of the dollar sank against gold. Gold flowed progressively out of the US during this period: US gold stock dropped from over $20 billion in the early 1950s to less than $9 billion by 1970. Nervousness about this gold depletion was expressed in the early years of the Kennedy Administration, but it didn't become a crisis until the late 1960s and early 1970s when the US balance of trade became negative (Gökay and Whitman 2010).

In parallel with the decline in gold stocks and competitive trade, US corporate profits also begin to decline in the face of competition from Germany and Japan. After this, the US lost some of its power over global trade and finance. Collectively, these trends indicated the beginning of a long decline in the comparative dominance of the US economy. The late 1960s and early 1970s were particularly harsh times for US finance: the dollar was weakened further, which opened the door for other central banks to diversify and start keeping alternative currencies as a hedge against any steep decline in the value of the dollar. French president de Gaulle, witnessing the sharp decline of confidence in the US

economy and currency, happily sold US dollars, eventually accumulating more gold than Fort Knox (Time Magazine 1965). The Bank of England joined the French in demanding gold for dollars, which accelerated a run on the dollar, provoking a currency crisis that lasted until the middle of 1971. At that point, bowing to a tripling of the US balance of trade deficit and an increasing outflow of capital, President Nixon announced a series of drastic changes in the world's currency arrangements. In a dramatic televised address to the nation on 15 August 1971, Nixon declared an end to the Bretton Woods fixed dollar–gold link, which meant that the US would no longer honour the dollars for gold valued at a fixed rate, but would only agree to a system of floating exchange rates, whereby each currency would be valued according to world demand (El-Gamal and Jaffe 2010, p. 4). At one stroke, the US president invalidated 25 years of currency agreements, and introduced a prolonged period of currency instability (Fouskas and Gokay 2012, pp. 65–68).

The US administration's spectacular end to the convertibility of the dollar reinstated the economic autonomy of the US state. The US dollar, however, no longer convertible into gold at a fixed price, entered into a process of prolonged decline. The devaluation led almost immediately to an explosion of global price inflation and a collapse of share values on equity markets, which in turn restored the US balance of trade. With this radical shift, the dollar became an irredeemable currency, no longer defined or measured in terms of gold, and no longer restrained in its printing.

From the early 1970s onwards, the unspoken objective of all US administrations has been to slow down the decline of the US economy. First and foremost, it was a serious crisis inspired by a significant loss of confidence in the dollar. As a result, the dollar was left 'floated' in the international monetary market, which weakened its position as the hegemonic currency. Now the dollar had no firm backing other than the 'full faith and credit' of the US government. From that point on, the US had to find a way convincing the rest of the world to continue accepting every devaluated dollar in exchange for economic goods and

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services the US required getting from the others. It had to find an economic reason for the rest of the world to hold US dollars: oil provided that reason and the term *petrodollar* became the crucial link in this. Since the 1971 devaluation, the petrodollar has been at the heart of US dollar hegemony (Fouskas and Gokay 2005, pp. 16–19).

Petrodollar System

After 1971, the US economy entered into a long period of instability. During this period there were a number of recessions, including a mini recession in 1971, a deeper and larger recession from 1973 to 1975, a period of hyperinflation from 1979 to 1980, a severe recession in 1981–82, a real-estate bubble and stock market panic in 1987, and a deep recession in 1992–93. Nine of the 22 years from 1971 to 1993 were 'economically troubled', together with the years in-between reflecting uneasy transitions from one crisis to another. The one persistent effort that marks this volatile period was a forceful attempt by the US to restore the role of the dollar as the universal reserve currency by linking the dollar to yet another commodity: petroleum, thus creating the petrodollar. The petrodollar system provided some strength and prestige to the US currency, and shifted the focus of global politics to the oil-rich Middle East.

A petrodollar is a dollar earned by a country through the sale of oil. The term 'petrodollar system' derives from the way the diplomatic relations between the US and Saudi Arabia linked the sale of oil to the dollar through a series of negotiations and agreements concluded during the 1972–74 period. As a result, the US government reached a series of agreements with Saudi Arabia, known as the US-Saudi Arabian Joint Economic Commission, to provide technical support and military assistance to the power of the House of Saud in exchange for accepting only US dollars for its oil (Department of the Treasury 2002). This understanding, much of it never publicised and little understood by the public, provided the Saudi ruling family the security it craved in a dangerous neighbourhood while assuring the US a reliable and important ally in the

Middle East (Kaiser and Ottaway 2002). Saudi Arabia was and remains the largest oil producer in the world and the leader of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC (US Energy Information Administration 2014a). It is also the only member of the cartel that does not have an allotted production quota, which makes it the 'swing producer', meaning that it can increase or decrease oil production to bring about an oil drought or glut in the world market. Saudi Arabia hence practically determines, or has the means to determine, oil prices. Soon after the agreement with the Saudi government, an OPEC agreement consented to this, and since then all oil has been traded in US dollars (Klare 2004, pp. 40–45).

Now Why Would this Matter So Much?

Oil is not just the most important commodity traded internationally. It is the key industrial mineral; it has a central role in modern economies, without which no modern economy works. If you don't have oil, you have to buy it, and if you need to buy it on the world markets, you commonly have to purchase it with dollars. This provides an essential base for the dollar's reserve currency status: other countries buy and hold large reserves of dollars (in the same way they buy and hold gold) because they cannot purchase oil without dollars. This made the 'petrodollar' a de facto replacement for the pre-1971 gold-dollar standard, guaranteeing a constant demand for dollars whose value was linked to oil through the OPEC pricing standards. In 2002, a former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia told a committee of the US Congress: 'One of the major things the Saudis have historically done, in part out of friendship with the US, is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore the US Treasury can print money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has' (Nixon 2003).

This system of the US dollar acting as global reserve currency in oil trade keeps the demand for the dollar 'artificially' high. This allows the US to print dollars at next to no cost to subsidise increased military spending and consumer spending on imports. As long as the US has no significant challengers and the other states have faith in

the US dollar, the system operates well (Spiro 1999, p. 121). This has been the situation and the crucial basis for the US economic hegemony since the 1970s. Needless to say, this system also empowers the US administration to compellingly control the world oil market. The dominance of the dollar is not simply the result of the size of the US economy; it is also the result of two other things: global politics and finance. In this scheme, the industrialised countries had to purchase oil, either from OPEC or from one of the smaller oil producers, but they could conduct these purchases only by pricing and buying oil in dollars, thus restoring the dollar's role as a required reserve currency (see among others Gökay and Whitman 2004, pp. 64–65).

So long as OPEC oil was priced in US dollars, the US government benefited from a double loan. The first portion of the loan was for oil. The government could print dollars to pay for oil, and the US economy did not have to generate goods and services in exchange for the oil since OPEC used the dollars for all traded goods and services. Obviously, the strategy could not work if dollars were not a means of exchange for oil. The second part of the loan was from all other economies that had to pay dollars for oil but could not print currency. Those economies had to trade their goods and services for dollars in order to pay their oil imports to OPEC producers (Spiro 1999, p. 121).

In this situation, dollars rapidly accumulated in foreign banks, particularly those serving petroleum-exporting countries. This petrodollar overhang created an additional financial issue: unlike Western Europe and Japan, most of the oil-exporting countries had limited possibilities for domestic development and consumption, and therefore they could not invest most of this money. Many of these economies in the region are structured strictly on 'rents' from oil, which provide most of the export earnings and state revenues. Despite their extensive oil wealth, the oil-rich countries of the Middle East have failed to develop a diversified economic base. All finished manufactured goods as well as financial and hightech services are imported and controlled by Western multinationals. Adam Smith once

commented that the Tartars and other Asian nations may be rich precisely because they are resource poor. 'In the Middle East, . . . the political process is that the rulers do not tax citizens or businesses, but hand out selective privileges, financed by oil revenues, against loyalty and support from a largely parasitic private sector' (Noreng 2006, pp. 87–88). Some efforts were made to redistribute oil revenues across the populations by subsidising housing, education, and health care. But mostly, oil money was used to support excessive consumption, corruption, and gross waste. The Nixon Administration responded 'creatively' by coaxing these countries into purchasing US Treasury bills and bonds, which performed as yet another subsidy for the US economy. This has, since that time, been the primary strategy for the US administration to deal with its colossal trade deficits by keeping domestic interest rates low (Kaiser and Ottaway 2002). The cash balances of oil exporters soon found their way into the US-controlled international banking system, and these petrodollars went straight back into the US economy at zero currency risk. Some of this cash was recycled as loans, with some interest of course, to oilimporting countries, mainly by US-controlled international financial institutions.

For a long time everything worked smoothly. But the end of the Soviet-controlled socialist bloc economies in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a new single Europe and the European Monetary Union in the early 1990s began to present an entirely new challenge to the global position of the US economy. In particular with the creation of the euro in late 1999, a totally new factor was added to the global financial system. Within a relatively short period, the euro has emerged as a realistic alternative, establishing itself as the second most influential currency in the world's financial markets. If a considerable part of petroleum trade were to use euros instead of dollars, many more countries would have to hold a greater part of their currency reserves in euros. According to a June 2003 HSBC report, even a moderate shift, as small as 15%, away from dollars, or a change in the flow, would create considerable changes (HSBC 2003). The dollar

would then have to openly battle with the euro for global trade and financial markets. Not only would Europe not require dollars anymore, but also Japan, which imports more than 80% of its oil from the Middle East, would have to switch most of its dollar assets to euros. The US, too, currently being the world's second largest oil importer after China, would have to retain a significant amount of euro reserves. This would be catastrophic for US efforts at monetary management: the US administration would be compelled to drastically change its current tax, debt, and trade policies, all of which are relentlessly volatile.

Today, US citizens spend $700 billion (US) a year more than they generate, so they require a reserve of an additional $700 billion. This means that, on average, each US citizen benefits from $3,000 more imported products per year than he/she earns (US National Debt Clock 2006). They acquire this large amount of money from the Central Banks of China, Japan and European countries, thanks to the US dollar's status as global reserve currency and the simple fact that all other central banks hold dollar reserves. China is the principal holder of US currency reserves with $853.7 billion, and Japan is the second biggest with over $850 billion in dollar assets (Bloomberg 2006; Mainichi News 2006). So the rest of the world are producers and sellers: Japan, China, India, Brazil, the EU, and the rest. The rest of the world invests, produces, and exports to the US. They lend more and more to the US. This situation is, however, considered unstable and very risky by experts. The increasing instability of the US economy is emphasised by a major 2005 report from the IMF (IMF 2006) which pointed out that the US economy is increasingly being maintained by what it described as 'unprecedented borrowing' from foreigners. The report went on to describe the US deficit as unmanageable and risky in the long term.

Weapondollar-Petrodollar Circulation

The politicisation and concentration in the Middle East of the oil business went hand in glove with the region's commercialisation, privatisation, and concentration of the global arms trade. In the 1950s, some 95% of US armament exports had been provided as foreign aid, whereas by 1980 the foreign aid as armaments had fallen to 45% and by 2000 to less than 25%. From the early 1970s onwards, when the petrodollar became an essential dimension of the US global hegemony, US defence production experienced a high degree of privatisation and internationalisation, followed by an unprecedented degree of mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations according to the pattern of 'new multinational corporations'. From the early 1970s onwards, the Middle East became the world's chief importer of weaponry, taking the lead from South-East Asia. In this way, a large amount of that oil income, petrodollars, started to be spent on buying armaments and hence turned into weapondollars. Tensions in the region, in particular the escalation of Arab-Israeli conflict, created the necessary conditions for a type of dollar recycling based on arms trade. Since the 1940s, the role of the Middle East in world accumulation had been intimately linked to oil exports, and from the 1970s onwards, this trade became the basis of the petrodollar system, which was then accompanied by another dimension: turning a large amount of this oil income into weapondollars (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, p. 25). These two flows provided a powerful new lease of life for the US economy, inasmuch as their combination was associated with the generation of substantial profits for the US arms manufacturing industry, American-British giant oil companies, and of course the US Department of the Treasury. Most importantly, these two flows (oil going out, and weapons coming in) were dollarised. Thus, for example, in 1974, Saudi Arabia's arms imports were worth $2.6 billion in 1974, whereas between 1985 and 1992 this figure increased ten times and reached $25.4 billion. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the US increased its arms sales to Middle Eastern states, in particular during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980–88. The amount of arms sales to the region reached its peak in 1988 when 'the Administration suggested increasing US arms exports by $3.3 billion, to a

level exceeding $15 billion – with proposed shipments worth $3.6 billion to Israel, $2.7 billion to Egypt, 4950 million to Saudi Arabia, and $1.3 billion to other Middle Eastern countries' (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, p. 261, f.n. 26). Sharply intensified armed conflict and quickly rising tensions in the Gulf region and (with the end of the Cold War) Central Asia and North Africa, including the Pakistani/Indian conflict, meant much greater US military involvement in the region, and greater consolidation of the alliance between US arms manufacturing/weapons trade and energy interests.

Did any of these policies reverse the longterm relative historical decline of the US? The short answer is plainly no.

It did not take long for the contradictions of the system to break down. The entire system of petrodollar-weapondollar coalition managed to keep demand for dollars artificially high, and as the price of oil went up following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the demand for dollars intensified even further, raising the value of the dollar sharply and, as a result, once again subsidising US domestic and military spending. This form of speculative dollarisation, however, enhanced further the inflationary trends in the US, Europe, and Japan, intensifying the stagnation of the global economic system. The yin and yang of this petrodollar/weapondollar system also meant that US benefits were counterweighed by rising costs inflicted on other members of the world economic system. These were predominantly those countries recently emerged from post-colonialism, other weak economies, and periphery states, as the US practically exported its own economic and financial problems. Thus, when the system was faced with various crises (such as the 1973–75 recession, the hyperinflation of the late 1970s, and the sharp global recession of 1981–82), the US administration could successfully shift the negative effects onto its lesser partners, which then suffered the greater burden as world oil prices rose sharply after 1974. William Greider (1989) effectively demonstrates how the US shifted the effects of the 1979–83 crises were shifted to the periphery.

At the same time, rather than promoting sensible social investments in its allies in the Middle East, the US continued to encourage using the petrodollar/weapondollar overhang as an opportunity to promote the purchase of US Treasury bonds and bills, to deal with its current account deficit. As a result, the US increasingly came to depend on foreign investors as the prime financial source for domestic account management, which had the effect of artificially increasing prices, leading to an inflationary surge that eventually weakened the perceived value of the dollar, triggering an acute fall in demand for dollars and a resultant upward spike in US interest rates (Kaiser and Ottaway 2002).

All this was an unsteady attempt by the US administration(s) to restore the global role of the dollar and US economic supremacy by linking the dollar to two key commodities of the world economy: petroleum and weapons. There were clear reasons underpinning the functionality of this weapondollar-petrodollar system. The first was economic, in that the Bretton Woods system never found a way to effectively recycle the massive profits and extensive speculation the global oil trade produced; the second was political, in that the administration(s) transferred the focus of global politics to weapons procurement and built-up, as well as to the petroleum production and conflict in the Middle Eastern region (Gökay 2005, pp. 40–56).

Understanding how that system was first constructed and advanced with all those existing flaws and contradictions reveals important insights into the current state of the US hegemony and the root causes of its direct military involvement in the region since the end of the Cold War. What emerges is that all the wars and acts of military aggression conducted by the US since 1991 have been those of an economically declining power, rather than an indication of superiority. Andre Gunder Frank identified this strategic trend in post-Cold War US foreign policy as 'Washington sees its military might as a trump card that can be employed to prevail over all its rivals in the coming struggle for resources' (Frank 1999).

Impending Scenarios: Hegemonic Reversal

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has waged four wars in the region (two in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and one in Libya) and is currently threatening more. Each conflict has of course its own specific reasons related to local conditions. However, there is a common denominator: the need to keep the oil of the region ample and inexpensive, and most importantly, under firm US control, so that the US-led system of global capitalist economies can continue to grow. US strategists do not simply want to obtain oil, which is a simple matter if one has money. They also want to eliminate all potential competitors, safeguarding the region politically and militarily so that the flow of oil from the Middle East to world markets can happen under its direct control.

The US military is now dominant and its limitations are minimal. Its spending is almost as much as that of the next 11 countries combined ranked beneath it (SIPRI 2013, pp. 6–7, 9.). Yet the economic power of the US has been in stagnation since the 1970s and has declined since the end of the Cold War. The world economic landscape is rapidly changing and a very different world is emerging. In particular, the US share of world trade and manufacturing is substantially less than it was just prior to the end of the Cold War, and its relative economic strength measured against the EU and the East Asian economic group of China, India, and the 'South-East Asian tigers' is similarly in retreat. The persistent use of US military power can therefore be viewed as a reaction to its declining economic power and not merely as a response to the post-Cold War geopolitical picture. US leaders see their superior military power as the key weapon that can be employed effectively to prevail over all rivals, and thus to stop this decline. The expansion of the Chinese economy, so far the closest contender for a global hegemonic position, is directly dependent on access to petroleum, and therefore securing access to the oil reserves in the region is a cornerstone of Chinese policy (Roberts 2005: 158–164). In September 2013, China's net imports of petroleum and other liquids exceeded those of the US on a monthly basis, making it the largest net importer of crude oil and other liquids in the world (US Energy Information Administration 2014a).

In the Middle East, control of the region's oil resources, keeping the US dollar as the only currency used in the world oil trade, and using these effectively to prevent any challenge to the hegemonic position of the US are all interlinked and cannot be separated from each other. On 22 March 2003, at the beginning of the US-led war against Iraq, General Tommy Franks, chief commander of the US forces in Iraq, was explaining one of the key objectives of the Operation Iraqi Freedom as 'to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources' (CNN.com 2003). Securing US interests regarding the oil resources of the Middle East is not as simple as just going and militarily capturing key positions of a country. Political events since 2001 have clearly demonstrated that superior military forces of the US and its Western allies may take but cannot hold Iraq's, Libya's, or other Middle Eastern countries' oil. Far from staving off the downfall of the US economic and financial hegemony, the continuing military aggression and arrogance of the US state may instead push the regional powers to distance themselves from its strategic goals. Member countries of OPEC, for instance, have sharply increased deposits in other currencies including the euro and the Japanese yen, and placed less in dollars starting from 2001 and the Afghan War. OPEC members cut the proportion of deposits held in dollars from 75% in the third quarter of 2001 to 61.5%. US dollar-denominated deposits fell from 75% of total deposits in the third quarter of 2001 to 61.5% in the last quarter of 2004. During the same period, the share of euro-denominated deposits rose from 12% to 20% (FT.com 2004).

Competition for the rich oil resources of the Middle East played a central role in the twentieth-century's key military and political conflicts. Even the two major world wars, which happened in the first half of the twentieth century, were intrinsically linked to competition for access to the energy-rich Middle East. If history provides any reliable guide to the future, the present century

will more and more be marked by new wars for this still very significant but increasingly scarce natural resource in the region. 'This is the secret ticking bomb under the global economic system in the twenty-first century. The only long-term solution is to significantly reduce our energy usage' (Fouskas and Gokay 2012, pp. 139–140).

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U.S. Imperialism

▶ Global War and the Battle for Afghanistan

U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

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Synonyms

Central America; Finance; Imperialism; Multinational corporations; South America; US imperialism; Western hemisphere

Definition

This entry charts the development of US imperialism in the Western hemisphere in the context of the evolving world system. It examines how British colonies in North America first entered the world economy in a semi-peripheral position. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had become one of the core nations, with high levels of manufacturing and capital and a high standard of living. The entry argues that from this time, the capitalist world economy entered the stage of monopoly, characterized by highly concentrated industry and finance. With the colonial domination of the world nearing completion, and with anti-colonial movements among the colonized beginning to emerge, new forms of core penetration into peripheral and semi-peripheral zones came into being, including control of financial institutions and indirect political control with the support of national bourgeoisies. This new imperialist stage would preserve the core–periphery relationship, even while maintaining earlier mechanisms of core domination such as direct political control and military force. This essay focuses on the diverse military, political, and ideological strategies designed to ensure access to raw materials and control of foreign markets by US capital.

The modern world-system emerged as a consequence of the Spanish and Portuguese conquest of America, where forced labour was imposed on the indigenous populations in order to obtain gold and silver. The precious metals were used to purchase products from north-western Europe, thus stimulating the modernisation of agriculture and the expansion of industry. Thus emerged a world economy, in which north-western Europe functioned as a manufacturing centre, and Latin America and eastern Europe became peripheral zones, supplying raw materials to the centre, on a foundation of forced labour (Wallerstein 1974–2011: vol. 1; Wallerstein 1979).

During the period from 1815 to 1917, Great Britain, France, and other European nations

conquered and colonised vast regions of Africa and Asia, incorporating them into peripheral zones, which acted as suppliers of raw materials to the core on a base of forced labour. During this period, most of the nations of Latin America became independent republics, but the core–peripheral relation was maintained, so that the republics were functioning as semi-colonies (Arboleya 2008; Frank 1979; Regalado 2007; Wallerstein 1974–2011: Vol. 3).

The structures of the world-system establish limited possibilities for ascent, and the most spectacular case of ascent has been that of the US. The British colonies in North America entered the world economy with a semi-peripheral role, purchasing manufactured goods from Great Britain and supplying a diversity of food and animal products for the slave plantations of the Caribbean. This lucrative West Indian trade facilitated the accumulation of capital in New England and the mid-Atlantic colonies. During the nineteenth-century expansion of the world-system, the US South was converted into a peripheral region, producing cotton and other raw materials on a base of African slave labour. The north-eastern US utilised capital accumulated from the West Indian trade to develop industries that supplied manufactured goods to the South, thus establishing a North–South core–peripheral relation, which further fuelled the ascent of the north-eastern region. By the end of the nineteenth century, the US had become one of the core nations of the world-system, with high levels of manufacturing and capital and a high standard of living (Frank 1979: 64–68; Galeano 2004: 87; Genovese 1967).

By the end of the nineteenth century, the capitalist world economy entered a stage of monopoly capital, characterised by concentrated industry and banking (Lenin 1996). With the colonial domination of the world nearing completion, and with anti-colonial movements among the colonised beginning to emerge, the stage was set for the evolution of new forms of core penetration into peripheral and semi-peripheral zones, including control of financial institutions and indirect political control with the support of a national bourgeoisie. This new imperialist stage would preserve the core–periphery relation, and it would maintain earlier mechanisms of core domination, such as direct political control and military force. Thus the imperialist stage is characterised by a diversity of military, political, and ideological strategies designed to ensure access to raw materials and control of markets by core corporations.

The Origin of US Imperialist Policies

With the concentration of industry and the emergence of a few large companies that controlled the market in several key industries, productive capacity in the US reached a level that overextended the capacity of its domestic market. This could give rise to a surplus of goods and a fall in prices. Periodic crises of over-production had been a pattern of capitalism, but the problem was deepened by the arrival of the system to this new phase of large-scale and concentrated production. Therefore, in order to maintain or increase levels of profit, US companies would have to find new markets for their products beyond the frontiers of the US.

In the 1890s, there was consciousness among US producers of the need for new markets as a result of the economic crisis of 1892–93, which was widely interpreted as having been caused by over-production. This situation gave rise to the formulation of a new expansionist foreign policy by the US Government. The new foreign policy was called 'imperialism' by its promoters. The basic goal was to find new markets outside the US for US manufactured and agricultural products. Strategies were proposed by the platform of the Republican Party in 1896. They included the expansion of the army and the establishment of military bases abroad; control of Hawaii and the purchase of the Danish Virgin Islands; support of Cubans in their war of liberation from Spanish colonial rule; and the construction of a canal across Nicaragua to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Control of the Caribbean and the Far East was considered central, and thus the Philippines, Hawaii, and Cuba were viewed as having high strategic value as locations for US

military bases. The election of William McKinley in 1896 was a political victory for the promoters of the new imperialist policy (Arboleya [2008]: 35–37).

The first practical implementation of the new expansionist policy was US intervention in Cuba in 1898, launching what US historians have called the Spanish–American War, Cubans call the Cuban–Hispanic–American War, and Lenin considered the first imperialist war. The war resulted in Spain ceding to the US the Caribbean islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico and the Pacific islands of the Philippines and Guam (Arboleya [2008]: 37, 40).

With the acquisition of these territories, the US was becoming a colonial power like those of Western Europe. However, in justifying the expansionist policy to the people of the US, the government obscured its colonial character and sought to present the policy as fulfilling a civilising mission consistent with the values of democracy, liberty, and justice. The discourse of the political elite was effective in convincing the people that the expansionist policies were defending freedom and were the fulfilment of a 'new manifest destiny', in contrast to the decadent European empires (Arboleya [2008]: 41–42).

US Imperialism from 1903 to 1932

The development of US imperialist policy took a significant step forward during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–09). Although the US had intervened in Cuba in 1898 in response to the challenge to its economic interests and imperialist intentions posed by the Cuban revolutionary war of independence, non-intervention continued to be the norm that guided US foreign policy. But 'Roosevelt broke with this tradition and promoted interventionism without reserve' (Arboleya [2008]: 73). As the Cuban scholar Roberto Regalado has written:

> During Roosevelt's term in office, Washington sponsored the forcible secession of Panama (1903), enabling it to refuse to recognize the Columbian Congress's rejection of the proposal to construct the Panama Canal; intervened militarily in

the Dominican Republic (1904), which led to control over that country's customs policy (1905–12); occupied Cuba for the second time (1906–09); sent in the marines in order to obtain political dividends in the wars that broke out between Guatemala and El Salvador (1906) and between Honduras and Nicaragua (1907); and applied interventionist policies that led to the resignation of President Santos Zelaya in Nicaragua (1909). (Regalado [2007]: 116–117)

The imperialist policies of Theodore Roosevelt continued under his successor, William Howard Taft (1909–13). Taft adopted different rhetoric, replacing Roosevelt's 'big stick' with 'dollar diplomacy', thus promoting a policy of facilitating US economic and financial penetration through the buying of politicians in the neo-colony (Arboleya [2008]: 74–75). But the military interventions and aggressive policy continued, with military interventions in Honduras and Nicaragua and threats designed to hinder the Mexican Revolution (Regalado [2007]: 117).

The foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson 'was equally expansionist in relation to the Caribbean and Central America, and he developed a policy as interventionist as his predecessors' (Arboleya [2008]: 82). Although he was critical of 'dollar diplomacy' because of its ethical implications, he expressed a similar view when he affirmed that dollars 'ought to be reserved for the ministers of the state, even if the sovereignty of the reluctant nation is mistreated in the process' (quoted in ibid.). In addition, military interventions continued in a way consistent with the policies of Roosevelt and Taft. Between 1913 and 1921, under the pretext of 'promoting democracy' and 'stopping German intervention', the US Government interfered in Mexican international affairs, occupied Haiti (1915–34) and the Dominican Republic (1916–24), intervened in Panama (1918), and supported *coups d'état* and dictatorships in Central and South America (Regalado [2007]: 117).

Wilson, however, developed a more advanced ideological formulation of imperialism. Roosevelt and Taft had proclaimed imperialist policies to be consistent with the values of democracy and freedom, but in the implementation of the policy, the emphasis was on the application of military force (the 'big stick') and economic pressure ('dollar

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diplomacy'). But Wilson sought to establish a new international order on a foundation of US political values, thus facilitating greater global acceptance of US intervention and economic penetration and reducing the need for the application of force and pressure. As Arboleya has written, Wilson believed that US national interests would be served best by 'the establishment of an international order that would universalize North American political values. A mixture of divine mission, democratic crusade, and expansionist will constituted the ingredients of this international project, which in reality was no more than a modernized version of "manifest destiny"' (2008: 82).

However, national and international conditions had not yet arrived at a point that would make possible the implementation of the Wilsonian vision. Following the First World War, Wilson encountered opposition from Britain and France, who objected to those components of Wilson's policy that would involve a reduction of their spheres of influence. The US was not yet able to impose international rules of conduct on the nations of Western Europe. At the same time, Wilson's goals for the post-war era also encountered opposition in the US. US capitalism and political culture had not yet developed sufficiently, and important sectors of the capitalist class were not convinced that the 'new world order' proposed by Wilson would provide sufficient guarantees for the protection of their capital. The US Government therefore did not enter the League of Nations that had been promoted by Wilson (Arboleya 2008: 82–86). The presidential administrations of Warren Harding (1921–23), Calvin Coolidge (1923–29), and Herbert Hoover (1929–33) continued US imperialist policies towards Latin America, supporting military dictatorships in order to constrain popular struggles in opposition to the neo-colonial system and initiating new interventions in Panama, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Regalado 2007: 118).

Imperialism and the New Deal

During the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933–45), domestic political factors worked against the continuation of the military interventions in Latin America that had been central to US policy since 1903. Keynesian economic policies made necessary a more democratic discourse, placing ideological constraints on the capacity of the government to act aggressively in other lands. Moreover, there had emerged a renewal of isolationist tendencies and a rejection of armed interventions, expressed in new laws on neutrality that limited the possible participation of the US in future armed conflicts; armed interventions in Latin America came to be viewed as unconstitutional. At the same time, there had emerged in Latin America during the 1920s an anti-imperialist popular movement, which had been able to develop popular nationalist consciousness in opposition to US interventions, requiring even elite sectors in alliance with the US to adopt a nationalist rhetoric. Such opposition to interventionism both nationally and internationally required the US to adopt a non-interventionist foreign policy (Arboleya 2008: 104).

So the US turned to a 'Good Neighbor' policy of non-intervention, seeking to pursue its imperialist goals through means other than direct military intervention. The strategy was to strengthen the military in the Latin American nation, in order that it could play a more active role in maintaining social control. In some cases, this involved supporting military dictatorships that had been established through previous interventions during the period 1898–1926. In other cases, it involved establishing military dictatorships through diplomatic manoeuvring and economic pressure. In still other cases, the system worked with constitutional and even progressive governments in power.

In addition, it was necessary to give more economic space to what the Cuban scholar and former diplomat Jesús Arboleya (2008: 8) has called the figurehead bourgeoisie, which he defines as a national bourgeoisie that conforms to the interests of international capital. In providing the figurehead bourgeoisie with more possibilities to pursue its particular interests, albeit in a context limited by the neo-colonial system, this class would have a stronger commitment to the

world-system and a greater capacity to develop mechanisms of social control.

These new policies represented the pursuit of an imperialist agenda through alternative means, and as such they signified a more advanced and sophisticated form of neo-colonialism, under which US corporations continued to control the labour, the raw materials, the financial and productive structures, and the markets of the neo-colony. The 'Good Neighbor' policy of the New Deal does not represent the abandonment of imperialist goals, but the adaptation of imperialist policies to new economic, ideological, and political conditions (Arboleya 2008: 105–107; Regalado 2007: 118).

Imperialism and the Cold War

Following the Second World War, the war industry expanded. The justification for expansion of military expenses in peacetime was provided by the ideological construction of the Cold War, which maintained that the expansion of the US military was necessary in order to contain the expansionism of the Soviet Union. In reality, Soviet foreign policy was not expansionist. It sought to construct a cordon of security around its territory and to peacefully co-exist with the capitalist powers, a policy that created tensions in Soviet relations with the anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial revolutions in the Third World during the period 1945–89. However, the Cold War ideology served the interests of the arms industries and functioned to justify and legitimate an arms race (Arboleya 2008: 133–134).

Thus militarism came to dominate the US political system. 'In a kind of militarist application of Keynesian theory, defense expenses replaced public spending as the principal driving force of the economy and the scientific development of the country' (Arboleya 2008: 133). Arms production became integrated with other branches of the economy and made possible the expansion of the large corporations, prompting President Eisenhower to warn of a 'military-industrial complex' (Arboleya 2008: 134).

The militarism of US society shaped the cultural and ideological formation of the people. 'Communism was presented as a phantasmagoric force that intended the domination of the world', thus fabricating a climate of fear and insecurity (Arboleya 2008: 134). Anti-communism was an enormously powerful ideological tool, enabling the US to present a distorted image of Third-World anti-colonial and anti-neo-colonial movements as manifestations of the spreading menace of communism, thus justifying imperialist interventions throughout the world. Interventions in defence of neo-colonial interests were presented as the defence of democracy, and this Orwellian inversion was widely accepted by the people. A liberal-conservative consensus emerged. There was wide agreement on the militarist application of Keynesian economic principles, facilitating the growth of the economy and the capacity for military intervention anywhere in the world (Arboleya 2008: 133).

Utilising the Cold War ideological construction, the US presidents Harry Truman (1945–53) and Dwight Eisenhower (1953–60) provided economic and military support to Latin American governments that utilised repressive tactics against communist and socialist parties as well as progressive organisations. Eisenhower's 'Good Partner' policy included Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support for a counter-revolutionary force in Guatemala in 1954 in opposition to the government of Jacobo Árbenz, a democratically elected president who had nationalised some of the properties of the United Fruit Co. In addition, US policies led to the fall of governments in Brazil (1954), Argentina (1955), and Paraguay (1956), and they undermined the revolutionary governments in Bolivia of 1952–60. The dictatorship of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti also emerged during this period (Regalado 2007: 122).

The Alliance for Progress

The foreign policy of the administration of John F. Kennedy (1961–63) gave greater emphasis to the Third World as the arena of the Cold War

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conflict between the superpowers, developing a perspective that viewed the national liberation movements and newly independent nationalist governments as expressions of communism and Soviet influence and downplaying their nationalist, anticolonial, and anti-imperialist character. The US strategy included the development of a US capacity for counter-insurgency, involving armed confrontation with the revolutionary movements of the Third World. The Special Forces ('Green Berets') were developed in order to give the armed forces the capacity for a flexible response in any place or circumstance in the world. In addition, the CIA became involved in training military and para-military groups in the neo-colonies of the Third World, developing techniques that included torture, disappearances, assassination, and terrorising the people. Believing that the US and its allies in the neo-colonies were confronted with a supposed 'international communist conspiracy', and assuming that the insurgent revolutionaries were uncivilised and lacking in ethical norms of conduct, the Kennedy Administration excused any excess on the part of the counter-insurgents, including the most brutal forms of behaviour (Arboleya 2008: 151–155).

In Latin America, alongside the development of counter-insurgency as a primary strategy, a secondary strategy of the Kennedy Administration was economic reform of the neo-colonial system.

> The fall of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba – precisely two of the nations where the US neocolonial model had been most advanced – called into question the capacity of the Latin American oligarchy to continue to guarantee control of the region. Its nearly feudal mechanisms of exploitation tended to reduce the expansion of the market, and the extraordinary reactionary character of its ideology as well as its inclination to the most brutal and generalized repression, were destabilizing factors of the system and a problem for the foreign policy that Kennedy intended to project. (Arboleya 2008: 156)

Kennedy therefore called for social changes, including structural reforms in land tenancy and reforms in the distribution of wealth. His policy involved an abandonment of the traditional land-owning oligarchy that up to then had been considered as sustainer and protector of the neo-colonial

system. Proclaiming a 'revolution of the middle class', the Kennedy strategy was to support the reformist sector of the national bourgeoisie, which up to that point had confronted the powerful obstacle of the traditional oligarchy. The Alliance for Progress committed $20 billion over a decade for concrete projects for the development of this reformist sector, which also would have the consequence of establishing new possibilities for US investment (Arboleya 2008: 156–157).

The proposed reforms in Latin America did not represent fundamental structural changes that would involve a transition from a neocolonial system to an alternative more just and democratic world-system. They were proposed reforms of the neo-colonial system.

> The modernization that Kennedy proposed for Latin America was not based on the development of an independent national bourgeoisie as an alternative to the traditional oligarchy. Rather, it was based on producing a 'new class' that … would form a part of the US transnational corporations and would share their interests. In short, it aspired to consolidate US neocolonialism in the region, through the articulation of a new relation of dependency, which would require a national class organically tied to foreign capital. (Arboleya 2008: 157)

The proposed economic reforms of the neocolonial system did not succeed, and it was not possible for them to succeed. The Kennedy plan encountered political opposition from those sectors of US capital that were historically tied to the traditional oligarchy in Latin America. In addition, the national bourgeoisie did not have sufficient economic and political strength to play the role assigned to it by the plan. There was in this regard a fundamental contradiction: the national bourgeoisie, according to the plan, would transform itself into a class economically dependent on foreign capital, discarding any thought of leading the nation in a project of independent economic development. At the same time, since the plan involved challenging the control of the oligarchy, it would be necessary to mobilise popular support, which could be most effectively attained through the promise of autonomous economic and cultural development. Thus the plan placed the national bourgeoisie in a position of promising to the people what it could not deliver. The

national bourgeoisie would become increasingly discredited by nationalist popular sectors, which would search for more revolutionary approaches and more independent approaches to national development (Arboleya 2008: 157).

US Imperialism from 1963 to 1980

US policy towards Latin America under presidents Lyndon Johnson (1963–68), Richard Nixon (1969–74), and Gerald Ford (1974–76) abandoned efforts at economic reform of the neo-colonial system. They returned to interventionism, alliance with the Latin American estate bourgeoisie, and support of military dictatorships, in reaction to the intensity of anti-imperialist popular movements that pervaded the region during the 1960s and 1970s.

During the Johnson Administration, the US intervened militarily in Panama in 1964 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965. It supported *coups d'état* in Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1964), and Argentina (1966). It provided economic and military assistance to governments that were participating in the US counter-insurgency strategy in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay (Regalado 2007: 143).

The Latin American dictatorships of the period followed an approach first adopted in Cuba during the 1930s with Batista. They were based on the development of the military as an institution and the strengthening of its capacity to control the population through repression. They were different from 'strongarm or *caudillista* dictatorships' (Regalado 2007: 143) that had been the norm before the 1960s, which were characterised by personal rather than institutional control. The new type of institutional military dictatorship was more able to carry out repression, and violations of human rights became systematic and widespread (Regalado 2007: 144).

Like the Johnson Administration, the Nixon Administration supported the institutional military dictatorships and, when necessary, intervened to establish them. 'In response to the rise in nationalist and revolutionary currents in Latin America, the policy of the Nixon administration was to destabilize and overthrow governments that it considered

a threat to the 'national interest' of the United States, and to install new dictatorships' (Regalado 2007: 147). This occurred in Bolivia in 1971 and in Uruguay in 1973. And on 11 September 1973, the socialist government of Salvador Allende, democratically elected by the people in accordance with widely recognised norms of representative democracy, was overthrown (ibid.).

Jimmy Carter, US president from 1977 to 1981, believed that the US ought to respect human rights in the conduct of its foreign policy. His administration took two important steps that symbolised respect for the autonomy of Latin American governments: negotiating control of the Panama Canal by the government of Panama; and the establishment of limited diplomatic relations with Cuba, through the agreement for a Cuban Interest Section in Washington and a US Interest Section in Havana.

But Carter's moral evaluation of US policy was limited in scope. It did not question the fundamental structures of the neo-colonial world-system that promote underdevelopment and poverty in vast regions of the world. Carter wanted to respect human rights, but he did not discern that the violation of human rights was a necessary component of the core–peripheral relation between the US and the Third World. The functionality of repression in the preservation of the neo-colonial world-system placed practical constraints on the implementation of Carter's human rights policy.

Like Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter envisioned a softer and more humane form of imperialism. He accepted as given that the US policy would continue to promote the economic and financial penetration of US corporations and financial institutions, and that the neocolonial world-system should be preserved. He was seeking moral conduct in the context of immoral social structures.

The Nation Turns to the Right

The administration of Ronald Reagan (1981–89) disdained international organisations, and accordingly it ignored the Organization of American States (OAS), established in 1948 with the

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intention of institutionalising the cooperation of Latin American and Caribbean states with the structures of neo-colonial domination (Regalado 2007: 123–127). The Reagan Administration violated an important principle of neo-colonial domination, namely, the satisfaction of the interests of the figurehead bourgeoisie.

The unilateralism of US foreign policy after 1980 is illustrated by the US response to the triumph of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979. The measures adopted by the Sandinista government were not radical: it confined nationalisation to those properties of owners who had fled the country after 1979; it did not join the socialist bloc, but merely diversified its economic and diplomatic relations to include the West, the socialist bloc, and the Third World; and its 1984 constitution established structures of representative democracy, and not structures of popular democracy, as had been developed in Cuba. Nevertheless, the US in the 1980s embarked on a campaign to destabilise the Sandinista Government. In 1981, it ended economic relations with the government of Nicaragua and began to provide economic and military assistance to a counter-revolutionary guerrilla army, most of which were stationed in Honduras along the Nicaraguan border (Booth and Walker 1993: 140–146).

In El Salvador, the Reagan Administration gave $6 billion in economic and military assistance to the government. The Salvadoran Government represented the interests of the coffee oligarchy, and it was seeking to maintain itself before the onslaught of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN, or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front). Established in 1980, the FMLN was formed by five groups that had taken to armed struggle in the aftermath of government repression of popular protest, and it was allied with a federation of progressive and leftist political and social organisations, the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR, or Revolutionary Democratic Front). During the 1980s, the FMLN constituted the de facto government in many rural communities in the eastern region of the country, and it operated clandestinely in the cities (Harnecker 1998:

32–33, 42–43; Prieto Rozos 2009: 36–43; Regalado 2008: 143–144, 156–157).

The Reagan Administration also initiated neoliberalism, with the rejection of Keynesian policies, cutbacks in domestic programmes, and the first steps towards international financial deregulation. More systematic application of neoliberal policies on a global level was adopted by the administration of George H.W. Bush (1989–93), which sought to restructure the inter-American system of domination on a foundation of three pillars. The first of these pillars is support for representative and parliamentary democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, replacing the military dictatorships of national security. This so-called 'transition to democracy' was necessary, given the popular struggles against the military dictatorships and their total lack of legitimacy, and was possible, given the increasing concentration of capital, greater dependency of the Latin American elite, the declining autonomy of Latin American governments as a result of the external debt, and the limited organisational capacity of the popular movements as a result of repression by military dictatorships. The second pillar is the economic one, characterised by the imposition of neoliberal polices, efforts to impose a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the signing of free trade agreements with various nations. The third is the military pillar, in which the US seeks to establish a greater military presence in the region, using the 'war against drugs' and the 'war against terrorism' as pretexts (Regalado 2010).

The administration of Bill Clinton (1993–2001) continued to develop the three pillars of the restructured inter-American system of domination that had been established by the Bush Administration. However, the Clinton Administration encountered opposition. On the domestic front, labour organisations were opposed to the free trade agreements because they were concerned with their implications for the job security of US workers. At the same time, there emerged in Latin America during the period 1994–98 popular mass demonstrations in opposition to the free trade agreements and the neoliberal project. This stage of the Latin American popular struggle was inaugurated with the Zapatista

rebellion in Mexico in 1994, launched on the day the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect. After 1998, beginning with the election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela, the popular struggle would pass to a more advanced stage, transforming the political reality of Latin America (Regalado 2010).

The neoliberal project of the 1980s and 1990s was developed on the basis of the economic theory proposed by Milton Friedman and others at the school of economics of the University of Chicago. Its premises are: (1) the state should not distort the natural and spontaneous economic order; (2) governmental policy should be based on the principle of the unlimited supremacy of the market; (3) states should not interfere with the free play of supply and demand; and (4) governmental interference in the economy ought to be eliminated. Specific neoliberal policies include the elimination of government protection of national currency and the trading of currency at a free market rate; privatisation of government-owned enterprises; reduction of protection for national industry, reducing or eliminating tariffs and taxes on imported goods; facilitation of the free flow of capital into and out of the country; and the elimination of union restrictions on the free play of supply and demand (Prieto Rozos 2009: 108–111).

Osvaldo Martínez Martínez, director of the Center for the Study of the World Economy in Cuba, sees neoliberalism as a strategy of imperialist domination. He maintains that 'free trade' is a rhetorical phrase that is an integral part of a coherent package expressing the interests of the transnational corporations and the governments that represent them. He argues that neoliberalism is full of contradictions, inconsistencies, and myths, and that as a result it is in crisis (1999, 2005, 2006).

The 'Neocons' Take Control

During the 1990s, a number of conservative think tanks financed by international corporations reformulated the conservatism of Reaganism, seeking to adapt to changes occurring at the end of the century, including the end of the Cold War. The neoconservatives, or 'neocons', sought to reverse the decline of US hegemony. They envisioned the establishment through any means necessary, including military force, of the American concept of democracy and American civilisation as the universal world standard. Accordingly, they favoured expansion of military expenditures and the maintenance of US military dominance. In reaction to what they saw as the decadence of Western civilisation, they sought to restore discipline, order, and hierarchy. They were opposed to egalitarianism, feminism, environmentalism, sexual tolerance, and the absence of prayer and the teaching of the theory of evolution in schools. They gave priority to security over civil liberties. They viewed the neoconservative movement as a permanent counter-revolution that would consolidate neoconservative values in the long term. They sought to convert popular insecurity resulting from the structural crisis of the world-system and from the US hegemonic decline into a social fear that would generate support for neoconservative policies. They envisioned strategies of creating enemies and threats in order to establish pretexts for extreme policies. A number of prominent neoconservatives supported the candidacy of George W. Bush, some of them becoming prominent members of his cabinet when he assumed the presidency (Castro 2010: 11–12; Schmitt 2003).

The attacks of 11 September 2001 provoked an opportunity for the neoconservatives to pursue their vision more aggressively. The George W. Bush Administration launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and expanded the US's global military presence. US naval ships engaged in manoeuvres near Iran and North Korea, two nations not under US neo-colonial control, with the pretext of the nuclear programmes of these nations. The US's military presence in South America increased, under the pretext of the control of illegal drug trafficking.

The Bush Administration's policy towards Latin America sought to take advantage of the events of 11 September 2001 to overcome the stagnation that had beset the implementation of the new system of inter-American domination.

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However, from 2003 to 2009, there was increasing Latin American resistance to the implementation of the restructured system of domination that first had been formulated by George H. W. Bush and had been continued by Clinton. Major developments included the defeat suffered by the FTAA at the Ministerial Meeting on Finances and the Economy of the Americas in 2003; the inability of the US to successfully promote its favourite candidates for the position of secretary general of the OAS in 2005; the failure of the US effort to reform the Inter-American Democratic Charter, in order that it could be used against the government of Hugo Chávez, in 2005; the defeat suffered by Bush in the effort to revive the FTAA in the Summit of the America in Mar del Plata in 2005; the entrance of Cuba into the Río Group in 2008; and the repeal of the 1961 decision to expel Cuba from the OAS in 2009 (Regalado 2010).

Obama: More Continuity than Change

Barack Obama won the presidential elections of 2008 with a promise of 'change'. There was indeed a change from the administration of George W. Bush, which had followed a policy of aggressive pursuit of US interests through unilateral military action. In the view of the Obama Administration, this strategy had backfired, because it alienated US allies and thus weakened US influence. So the Obama Administration adopted a new strategy of 'smart power'. However, the new approach was a change more of tone than of policy. Claudia Cinatti writes that the Obama strategy

> is nothing more than the old recipe of combining the use of military and economic power with diplomacy and negotiation in order to attain the support of allies, semi-allies, and partners of convenience in the attaining of the national interests of the US. Concretely, it implies an ordered withdrawal of the US from 'extravagant' objectives – like installing 'democracy' in failed states or dedicating itself to 'nation building' in Iraq or Afghanistan – in order to concentrate on intervening where imperialist interests are truly at stake. (2010: 74–75)

Accordingly, when Obama took office, the aggressive and arrogant tone of Bush was abandoned, and Obama adopted a different rhetoric. But the imperialist policies of the Bush Administration in essence continued, as can be seen in Latin America. As of June 2015, the blockade against Cuba has continued; in December 2014, the US announced its intention to end this universally criticised policy, indicating that it will pursue through other strategies its goal of changing Cuba in accordance with its interests. The US ultimately legitimated the 2009 *coup d'état* in Honduras, and there possibly was US involvement in the failed *coup d'état* in Ecuador in 2010. The US signed an agreement in 2009 with the government of Colombia for the installation of seven new military bases, and subsequent agreements for military bases were made with Panama and Costa Rica. Moreover, the US continues to interfere in the political affairs of Venezuela and Bolivia, seeking to strengthen the opposition. In general, the US under Obama continues to oppose the process of reform and revolution that is under way in Latin America (Ceceña 2010; Cinatti 2010: 76; Regalado 2010).

Trump: Aggressive Imperialism Returns

The Trump Administration has returned to the aggressive imperialism of George W. Bush. It has undertaken a campaign against what it calls the "troika of tyranny," the three countries presently in the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle. The campaign has included an unconventional war against Venezuela, including financial, commercial, political, and military dimensions, seeking to overthrow the constitutional government of Nicolás Maduro; the intensification of the economic, commercial, and financial blockade against Cuba; and a destabilization campaign against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In addition, the Trump Administration supports a violent *coup d'état* against the constitutionally-elected president Evo Morales in Bolivia; and it has supported the government of Lenin Moreno, who through a Trojan Horse strategy, has removed from power the Citizen Revolution led by Rafael Correa.

Conclusion

The period from 1898 to 1932 saw the consolidation of imperialism as a basic principle of US policy. Imperialism sought the attainment of new markets for surplus US production through military interventions and 'dollar diplomacy'. In establishing itself, imperialism had to overcome a strong tendency towards isolationism in US political culture. In the period from 1933 to 1945, imperialism adopted a softer strategy, seeking to appear as a 'Good Neighbor'. The quest for new markets, for control of existing markets, and for access to cheap raw materials continued, but the forms of intervention in Latin America were more indirect. In the period 1945–79, the US emerged as the hegemonic core power of the neo-colonial world-system, and US imperialist interventions became more global in scope. The Cold War provided a justification for more active intervention than was characteristic of the 'Good Neighbor' era. But important components of the previous period were preserved, such as depending primarily on military repression by the neo-colonial state, with direct US military intervention applied only when necessary. Conservatives promoted an aggressive Cold War approach, but liberals shared the basic premises of the Cold War and imperialist policy, forming a liberal-conservative consensus. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress was a short-lived and unsuccessful reformist approach, but even during the Kennedy Administration the Cold War assumptions that justified indirect and sometimes barbaric interventions in the Third World prevailed.

In the context of the structural crisis of the world-system and the US hegemonic decline, the nation has turned to the right since 1980. The neoliberal project was imposed, taking advantage of external debt, through free trade agreements and international finance agencies. Military intervention in pursuit of US interests has been constant. These policies have been justified on the grounds that they defend democracy, understood in the limited liberal sense of political rights and economic liberty. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, US national political leaders struggled to find an enemy that could be portrayed as a threat to democratic values. But the attacks of 11 September 2001 made possible the establishment of the 'war on terrorism' as the prevailing ideological frame for the justification of imperialist interventions. Imperialist policies have continued under Obama, in spite of a vague campaign promise of 'change and under Trump'.

Thus we can see that imperialism has been a policy actively pursued with continuity by US governments from 1898 to the present. Although generally presented with a democratic face, imperialist policies, in essence, have involved the pursuit of markets, raw materials, and sources of profits, without regard for the consequences for the sovereign rights of formally independent nations or for the social and economic rights of their citizens.

Imperialist policies have practical objectives, and they have provided concrete material benefits to the people of the US. They have been a significant factor in providing the US with additional markets, new sources of investment and profit, and access to cheap raw materials, and they therefore were central to the ascent of the US from 1898 to 1968.

However, the imperialist polices of the global powers are no longer practical. When the world-system reached the geographical limits of the earth around the middle of the twentieth century, a new situation was created. In the present historic moment, the aggressive quest for control of the raw materials, labour, and markets of the planet by the global powers creates political instability in the world-system, generating endless conflicts and wars, and it threatens the ecological balance of the earth. The continued pursuit of imperialist objectives by the global powers increases the probability of greater political instability on a global scale, establishing the possibility of the disintegration of the world-system and a global decline into chaos, in which the extinction of the human species as a consequence of environmental factors could occur.

Furthermore, imperialism is no longer in the interests of the people of the US. The expansion of military expenditures, necessary for the implementation of imperialist policies, diverts limited resources away from investments in new and

sustainable forms of economic production that would provide concrete benefits to the people. In addition, financing military expenditures through government debt financed with foreign sources of capital undermines the sovereignty of the nation.

The establishment of political stability requires the economic and cultural development of neo-colonised nations, which is impossible under the structures of the core–peripheral relation. Global political stability requires autonomous national projects for economic and cultural development, which emerge when popular movements in neo-colonies take control of the government and seek to govern in a form that represents the interest of the various popular sectors. Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have seen the realisation of this possibility. It is in the interests of the people of the US to co-operate with such autonomous national projects, seeking to participate in the development of a more just, democratic, and sustainable world-system. This is the way to overcome the structural crisis of the world-system and to respond to the challenges that humanity today confronts.

Cross-References

▶ United States Expansionism and the Pacific
▶ United States, Hawaiian Annexation
▶ United States Imperialism, 19th Century
▶ United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity
▶ Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolutionary Anti-imperialism, and Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

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U.S.-China Cold War

▶ Chinese Imperialism and the World Economy

Ukrainian Capitalism and Inter-imperialist Rivalry

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Synonyms

Democracy promotion; EU enlargement; Free-trade areas; Kleptocracy; Nationalism; NATO expansion; Oligarchy; Post-Soviet; Revolution; Russia; USA

Definition

The post-Soviet space – and Ukraine in particular – is positioned on the crossings of reinvigorated geopolitical rivalries and conflicting agents of the empire of capital with its internal competitions and shifting spatial and social boundaries. It is torn by inequalities, economic crises, predatory capital (home-grown or otherwise), various forms of conflict, and reinvigorated struggle for geopolitical presence between Russia and the new-old West. The empire(s) and imperialisms we discuss in this chapter cannot be reduced to states' boundaries and their assumed associated interests. Yet they do have a geopolitical dimension in global political economy, as Desai thoroughly documents (2013). Ukraine fell victim to the relentless spread of the empire of capital where Russian and Western capitalist geopolitical imperialisms collided.

Any discussion of imperialism needs to commence with a clear statement of how we define the term, as both the essence and the definitions of the phenomenon have been transforming. As Harvey accurately noted, "anyone who sets out to conceptualise a 'new imperialism' is stepping into a cauldron of dissenting views carrying on their backs the huge baggage of past controversies" (2007, p. 60). Empire of capital spreads with historic and deliberate unevenness that involves

(geo)politics, economic, and social relations and produces geographies of dependencies, extraction, and exploitation (Patnaik and Patnaik 2017; Desai 2013) with a dimension of militarism (Foster 2006; van der Pijl 2006). The 2003 US attack on Iraq, its entry into the "naked imperialism" phase (Foster 2006) in turn, provided a whole new boost to the debate on the so-called new imperialism and relationships between the political, the economic, and the warfare in contemporary capitalism (Harvey 2003; Callinicos 2005, 2007; Panitch and Gindin 2006; Wood 2005). Imperialism in the twenty-first century must, therefore, be seen as a combination of competing geopolitical and economic imperialisms (which are more than one), yet ideologically they remain capitalist to the core. As the states and their imperialisms compete in a global capitalist system, so they too become transformed in the process, reproducing that system. In that competition, they rely on a combination of means available to them: social, political, economic, ideological, geopolitical, and military.

The empire of global capital spreads through transforming societies and their institutions by passive revolution and *trasformismo* (Gramsci 1971) where the ruling bloc is often comprised of willing and responsible implementers and beneficiaries of marketization reforms. Market fetishization, i.e., treating marketization as the only viable reform option, is the myth on which holds the neoliberal comprehensive concept of control (Bode 1979) as a combination of an "accumulation strategy" with a "hegemonic project" (Jessop 1983; see also Jessop 2016 for elaboration of the state theory). Crystallized in economic models, the concept of control is then channeled indirectly via international institutions (IMF, EBRD, WTO, the EU/EC, and the like) and directly via interest and lobby groups (Carroll 2010) of which in Ukraine there are four – American Chamber of Commerce (ACC), Center for US-Ukraine Relations (CUSUR), US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC), and European Business Association (EBA) (Yurchenko 2013, 2018). The concepts of control are articulated in reform prescriptions to transition economies and, particularly, Ukraine, through such mechanisms as

structural adjustment loans, where the myths of growth through neoliberal marketization aim to secure consent (by convincing or fraud; elaborating on Gramsci 1971) to the reform implementation at any cost. Russia and Ukraine both underwent capitalist transformation yet each with its own idiosyncrasies: the first went through shock therapy to become a state-run paternalistic oligarchy; the second became a neoliberal kleptocracy. The crucial differences between the two unfolded in the remaking of the countries' institutional backbone, the state.

Empire of capital relies on the state as an institution that in its turn is a momentary crystallization of social forces and their competing interests in power structures that enable and/or curtail their agencies (Poulantzas 1975, 1978); the state and its institutions then embody those contradictions. The state is "the only non-economic institution truly indispensable to capital" (p. 139); yet, we must acknowledge that the new imperialism needs "a new theory of the capitalist state" (Harvey 2007, p. 67): that one must acknowledge the transforming mechanisms of accumulation and capitalist class structure globally and that there are classes and their fractions in each state that favor policies which go contrary to the interest of the state and/or society as we can see in concrete political decisions globally and frequently – inconsistencies of policies dispensed by Yanukovych, Poroshenko, Putin, and US and various EU's officials. Yurchenko (2018; see also Powell and Yurchenko 2019) suggests resolving these contradictions by treating "capital. . . as a force that is shaped by and shapes the state and society alike yet has its own degree of autonomy." Building on Cox's "state-society complex" (1981, 1986), she redefines it thus to the "state-society-capital complex" and argues that it is the balance of power in that complex and the proportion of capital orientated on transnational accumulation in it that determine the directions and conflict of policy-making on the level of state institutions and geopolitical strategies. Sovereign functioning of Ukraine's state, for example, is impossible when the interests of capital take precedence, when the autonomy of decision-making is compromised by complex economic

dependencies with geopolitical component, and when accumulation interests of transnational capital from Ukraine, West, or Russia are guaranteed by law at the expense of socially oriented investment.

In the following sections, we explicate Ukraine's uneven incorporation into the global capitalist system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We explore Ukrainian capitalism's internal contradictions and shifts of power between oligarchic blocs, discuss their unfolding in the context of neo-imperialist rivalry between the USA, the EU, and Russia. We zoom in on some of the major outcomes of that dialectic that facilitated a major multilevel crisis of 2013–2014 and led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia's annexation of the southern peninsula Crimea, and the war in eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. We provide a critical review of the major narratives on the nature and role of Western and Russian imperialisms in Ukraine's crisis. We conclude with the discussion that we started in the introduction: the one on the nature and varieties of imperialisms in the system of transforming transnational capitalism and the need for careful (re) theorizations of its workings and effects in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Ukraine's Capitalism with a Twist

Ukraine's integration into global capitalist economy meant abandoning planned economy and welfare functions of the Soviet state for the sake of planning for markets (Gowan 1995). It was premised on a mythological idea that "transition to market" based on IMF, WB, and EBRD modeling had to occur in the ex-USSR republics (Yurchenko 2018). However, politico-economic complexity cannot be captured by that modeling because apart from the (socio-)economic factors there also are their political forms, e.g., institutional, ideological, cultural, etc.; thus, the implementation yields disruptive consequences. Second, the modeling presumes that there must be a transition to neoliberal market capitalism with no reasons given for that choice. Market (mis)planning and the weakening of the state, its

"retreat" from its "essential responsibilities, lack of vision and inability to develop coherent social and macroeconomic policies," were the main factors that led "to perverse economic restructuring and highly undesirable social and economic outcomes on a grand scale" (Ivanova 2007). There was one more decisive component in Ukraine's institutional transformation, and that is the criminal-political nexus, i.e., the kleptocratic network that ran through the state apparatus, security institution, and the judiciary (Godson 2003; Shelley 2003). Since the 1990s, Ukraine's nascent ruling bloc utilized the multiplicity of already available and constantly expanding mechanisms of accumulation in the global capitalist system, legal and extralegal, hastily advised to adopt by the IMF and the EBRD to produce a regime of neoliberal kleptocracy. Through domestic and foreign economic policies of selective liberalization and protectionism that favored oligarchic capital and through the creation of virtual spaces of accumulation for offshoring profits and institutionalized expropriation, "black holes" were designed in the economy (Yurchenko 2012). They materialized in four forms of state asset embezzlement: (1) privatization, from primitive accumulation to concentration and centralization of SOEs in the hands of financial-industrial groups and essentially oligarchs; (2) FDI regulations, overlapping series of reforms and their uneven implications for accumulation by both domestic and foreign capital; (3) the creation and functioning of special economic zones (SEZs) and priority development areas (PDAs); and (4) legislative reform on tender, state purchasing and abuse of procedure (Yurchenko 2012). Creation of SEZs and PDAs was one of the examples of temporary compromise between Dnipropetrovsk "leaders" in Kiev and the ascending Donetsk capital. The areas were established with the adoption of the law of Ukraine "On general positions of establishment and functioning of Special (free) Economic Zones" (SEZs) between 1998 and early 2005 and an array of other laws and bylaws which together regulated the founding and functioning of 12 SEZs and 72 PDAs on October 13, 1992. Two largest and most comprehensive zones in terms of granted privileges – "Donetsk" and

"Azov" – were in the Donetsk oblast with "ferrous metals, coal mining and electric power generation, [or industries associated with oligarchic FIGs, were] included in the list of priority sectors and industries in the law" (Pekhnyk 2007, p. 45 *et passim*; see Yurchenko 2012, 2013, 2018 for more detail).

Neoliberal kleptocracy evolved over five discernible periods. Ukraine's ruling bloc, i.e., historic bloc (Gramsci 1971) with institutional control, has historically been fragmented into a few identifiable dominant fractions. Two major blocs dominated Ukraine's political scene between the early 1990s and 2013 and can be referred to by their regions of origin: Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk – industrial centers of USSR-level importance, influential economically, and in terms of USSR Communist Party representation. Rivalry over access to power (social, economic, and political) and inability to achieve a consolidated strategy between the dominant and contender blocs shaped Ukraine's post-Soviet history and its turbulence in the following order.

The first post-independence period of 1991–1998(9) was clearly dominated by the Dnipropetrovsk bloc led by Presidents Kravchuk (1991–1994) and Kuchma (since July 1994), and Prime Minister Lazarenko and was composed of neo-nomenklatura and capitalists-in-the-making who emerged from the criminal-political nexus and Komsomol. During that period, the first oligarchic capitalists emerged in the spheres of gas, oil, lubricants, and fuel trade with Lazarenko, Tymoshenko, and Pinchuk in the lead. Simultaneously and often through brutal crime, a rival capitalist class fraction was forming in Donetsk oblast as primitive accumulation unfolded on prescription of the IMF and their structural adjustment loans (since 1992). In 1996, the Constitution of Ukraine was adopted, making it a presidential republic and maintaining centralized control in the hands of the presidential administration, i.e., Kuchma and his cronies from Dnipropetrovsk.

In the second period of 1998(9)–2004, the growing leverage of the Donetsk bloc in economic and political spheres became noticeable. It included a number of top state administration

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appointments, e.g., prime ministers Azarov and later Yanukovych. Capitalist class fractions formed through primitive accumulation of the SOEs and concentration of capital in the financial-industrial groups with pronounced dominance of the Donetsk forces. By the late 1990s, they emerged as class-fractions-for-themselves and formed the Party of Regions – among others – to pursue their interests through direct participation in the country's legislature. SEZs and PDAs were established and attracted the largest FDI inflow, thus creating the pretense of economic growth by recycling oligarchic money through offshore zones (Pekhnyk 2007, p. 44) – foreign investors tend to "avoid enterprises in branches requiring extensive restructuring, such as steel, coal mining, heavy machinery and basic chemicals" that were FDI targets in Ukraine (Carlin in Lyakh 2007, p. 78). The situation was further aggravated by low availability and high-interest rates on credit combined with low incomes, which inhibited the development of small and medium business. The gradual shift of power from the Dnipropetrovsk neo-nomenklatura to the Donetsk fraction has commenced with Lazarenko's money laundering scandal, Tymoshenko's and YeESU's loss of control over the gas market, and finally – the Kuchma/Pinchuk class fraction compromise with the Donetsk forces. In late 2004, prior to the presidential election, another Constitutional reform shifted power over to the parliament in order to guarantee the Party of Regions/Donetsk leverage on the legislature in case of Yanukovych's potential presidential election defeat.

In the third period (2004–2007), the presidential election power struggle led to the so-called Orange Revolution. The leaders of the protest were the presidential candidate Yushchenko, his backer Tymoshenko/fractions of capital from Donetsk (ISD of Taruta and Mkrtchan) and Dnipropetrovsk (Privat Group FIG of Kolomoyskyi and Boholyubov), and finally Ukraine's Western partners – the USA and the EU. It was a reaction to the electoral fraud by the Donetsk bloc's Yanukovych whose candidacy was supported by the outgoing President Kuchma, Akhmetov (System Capital Management FIG),

Pinchuk (Interpipe Group), and Russia. Subsequently, the rival forces were unable to reach a political compromise. The conflict between the Party of Regions-dominated parliament and the opposition parties, their associated rival capitalist class fractions, and the inability of President Yushchenko to maintain allegiance with his previous backers led to (1) Prime Minister Tymoshenko's loss of office and (2) the subsequent appointment of Yanukovych as the new prime minister. Parties associated with Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were rapidly losing support, and in the Parliamentary election of 2007, the Party of Regions won the majority of seats.

Between 2007 and 2013/2014 (fourth period), the Donetsk bloc centralized political power in the country. Following the Parliamentary election of 2007 and formation of a coalition with Yushchenko's party Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko was appointed prime minister once again. As the global credit crunch hit Ukraine, Tymoshenko's rivalry with Firtash over the gas markets turned into the so-called gas wars with Russia which cost her popular support. That helped Yanukovych secure victory in the presidential election in 2010 that in combination with the Party of Regions' parliamentary majority now gave the Donetsk bloc control over the executive and the legislative branches of power. Centralization of power now accelerated and among other included (1) vertical concentration of power in the hands of the president through the reversal of the Constitutional reform of 2004 and (2) extension of control to include the judiciary through adoption of *The law on the judiciary and the courts from July 2010* (Verkhovna Rada July 2010) that "represented at one and the same time both an instrument for gaining and imposing power over the judiciary [by the president] and an attempt to improve the administration of justice" (Foglesong and Solomon 2001). By August 2012, according to the annual rating of *Korrespondent*, 9 out of 10 most influential people in the country were members of the Party of Regions, and 37 out of the 100 most influential people were also in the list of the top 100 richest oligarchs, which included the son of President Yanukovych, Oleksandr, who joined the list soon after his father assumed office

(*Korrespondent* 2012). Rinat Akhmetov's documented revenue, for example, in 2011 alone – a year of economic crisis – increased from $17.8 billion to $25.6 billion, most of which still remains untaxed (*Korrespondent* 2011). Donetsk centralized power but failed to generate a hegemonic consensus with contender blocs; those, in turn, used the pro-EU protests and anti-Yanukovych sentiments in the populace to facilitate his overthrow and take over the ruling position with reinvigorated inter-bloc rivalry.

The last period started in 2013–2014 with the Maidan uprising, followed by the annexation of Crimea by Russia, intensification of civil, and breakout of the armed conflict with Russia-supported separatists in Donbas – a highly industrial region in eastern Ukraine with a large percentage of ethnic Russian population – culminated from escalating international and domestic contradictions. Dislodging of the Donetsk bloc and Party of Regions top figures not only beheaded their centralized state power pyramid but also effectively intensified rivalry among the contender capitalist fractions. In conditions of intensified rivalry and lack of democratic mandate, the precarious ruling bloc relies increasingly on compartmentalization of society and vilification of oppositional agents and discourses. Below we briefly outline the development of the political crisis in Ukraine – still a highly contested issue in the opposing pro-Ukrainian/pro-Western and pro-Russian narratives.

EU Association Agreement with Ukraine and the Crisis of 2013–2014

Complex political economic and geopolitical reality created conditions where Kuchma, the second president of Ukraine (1994–2004), has opted for the so-called multivector, i.e., multidirectional, approach to foreign and economic policy that unambiguously ceased in 2014. By 2008 political economy of Ukraine was determined by a toxic combination of debt dependency (Kravchuk 2015; Kravchuk et al. 2016), uneven financialization, sectoral unevenness (Birch and Mykhnenko 2009), tax evasion, and state asset embezzlement (Pekhnyk 2007; Yurchenko 2012; Kravchuk 2015). As a result, Ukraine was among those hit hardest by the credit crunch despite the country's relatively modest and uneven integration into the global financial architectures. Even though sporadic borrowing of the early 1990s was partly systematized by the early 2000s, it still kept growing. Poor banking and, specifically, lending regulations allowed unsupported lending based on re-loaning combined with lending in foreign currencies (encouraged by lower interest rates than loans in Ukrainian currency *hryvnia*). In that context, a combination of three key factors conditioned the severity of the crisis: First, a dive in prices coincided with a slumping global demand for steel – an export that the economy heavily relied upon. Second, the persisting endemic problems in the banking sector of Ukraine. And third, the "gas wars" with Russia interfered with the supply, pushed the prices up, and significantly increased production costs in Ukraine's energy-intensive export industries (Doroshenko 2008). Competing pressures from economic deficiencies and dependencies crashed the economy. This contingency caused a deep financial and political crisis in the country that was resolved via added lending from International Financial Institutions with more and stricter conditionality. By December 2016, Ukraine became IMF's third largest borrower going from zero debt in 1991 to $70.97 bn (see more on state debt data here: Minfin 2017).

The signing of the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) was to mark the completion of the biggest step in rapprochement with the EU/Western partners yet. The agreement was to replace the earlier framework for collaboration, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and was unprecedented in its scope and depth due to three particular features: "comprehensiveness, complexity, and conditionality" (Petrov et al. 2015, p. 2 *et passim*). The idea of the agreement was born in 2006 under Yushchenko's pro-Western administration (in office 2005–2010). Following the talks that began in 2008, the agreement was initialed by the EU and Ukraine in 2012 with Yanukovych (Gardner 2017). Loans from the West and

dependency on energy imports from Russia, put into the context of chronic budget deficit, made the government and oligarchs vulnerable to Russia's pressure, which eventually led to President Yanukovych's decision to withdraw from the signing of the DCFTA with the EU, thus triggering the so-called Maidan protests. Meanwhile, the EU – partially succumbing to the USA' pressure – ignored Russia's demands for tripartite negotiations about the terms of the DCFTA agreement with Ukraine, which could help ensure that the agreement does not impede on the parameters of trade between Ukraine and Russia, instead imposing an exclusive choice between free-trade areas with the EU or Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (Hahn 2018, Chapter 6) on Ukraine, thus contributing to the souring relations with Russia.

The protests in support of EU association agreement with Ukraine that started in late November 2013 radicalized both in tactics and demands following escalating repressions and incapacity of the moderate opposition to propose any efficient nonviolent strategy against the government (see for English language extended analysis of the events in Ukraine from leftist perspectives, especially, de Ploeg 2017; Ishchenko 2014a, 2015; Yurchenko 2018). To an extent the opposition was guided by unwillingness to dial down the escalation, as both they and their associated oligarchs saw an opportunity to (re)claim power from Yanukovych's bloc of forces. The Maidan protests spread across the whole country, especially in western and central Ukraine, which is more pro-Western and Ukrainian-speaking. Eastern and southern Ukraine, however, being a more pro-Russian and Russian-speaking region, never demonstrated majority support or significant street mobilization for the Maidan movement (Ishchenko 2016a, p. 458; Kiev International Institute of Sociology 2014b). Despite impressive self-organization and widespread skepticism toward the opposition parties' leaders among regular Maidan protesters, there was a lack of autonomous political organizations and political articulation of their social grievances (PS.Lab 2015; Zhuravlev 2015). The right-wing oligarchic parties, pro-Western (neo)liberal

NGOs, and far right played the role of political and institutional representation of the Maidan movement. The latter – most prominently the major radical nationalist Ukrainian party *Svoboda* ("Freedom") and the Right Sector (*Pravyi Sektor*), an umbrella coalition of smaller and previously little known extreme right groups – were the most active and visible collective agents in the Maidan protests (Ishchenko 2016a). Because of the unique combination of resources – violent skills, revolutionary nationalist ideology, and political organizations – the Right Sector played the role of a violent vanguard in the protests and the armed uprising during the final wave of escalation that started on February 18, 2014 (Ishchenko 2018b). Several days later, Yanukovych left Kiev in a futile hope to lean on the local authorities from the pro-presidential Party of Regions (PoR) in southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, in the end asking for assistance in fleeing from Putin's administration. In the meantime, the parliament – now controlled by the opposition parties – decided to remove Yanukovych from power on doubtful constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, the Western leaders quickly accepted the transfer of power to the opposition, despite the previously mediated agreement between the president and the opposition parties, presupposing Yanukovych in power till at least December 2014, when snap elections were agreed to take place (Hahn 2018, Chapter 7).

The escalation continued with Anti-Maidan counter-mobilization and Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 – the peninsula with Russian naval base in Sevastopol and ethnic Russian majority – boosting support for President Putin above 80% in Russia. His administration's fears of exporting Maidan to Russia were thus precluded. The annexation of Crimea, Russian television propaganda, and possibly Russian agents fueled Anti-Maidan rallies in major cities of southern and eastern Ukrainian regions. These protests were smaller, decentralized, less organized, and more plebeian than Maidan protests before and, therefore, were more vulnerable and susceptible to external manipulation both from Russia and the PoR elites in Donbas, which were hoping to win concessions from the new post-Maidan

government. On April 12, a group of people from Russia led by Igor "Strelkov" Girkin, a former Russian security service officer, started an armed uprising in Donbas with Russian irredentist goals. The disoriented, demotivated, and underfinanced Ukrainian regular army was not capable of suppressing the rebels, so the volunteer battalions stepped in to take this role, with the radical nationalists playing a crucial role in this new formations (Malyarenko and Galbreath 2016). The conflict gradually grew into a full-scale war with a flow of volunteers, supply of arms, and equipment from Russia, and ultimately – an incursion of Russian regular forces during the decisive fighting in August 2014 (Robinson 2016). Two rounds of international negotiations in 2014 and 2015 in Minsk, Belarus, led to a road map for political solution of the conflict; however, even a stable ceasefire failed to be secured.

As a result post-Maidan Kiev government consolidated control over most of Ukrainian territory except for Crimea and parts of Donbas, however, without any radical change in the nature of the oligarchic neopatrimonial regime (Matsiyevsky 2018), further entrenching the neoliberal kleptocracy (Yurchenko 2012, 2013, 2018). Ukrainian government was now dependent, both economically and politically, on the Western states and institutions, and pushing forward with neoliberal reforms while at the same time resisting anti-corruption institutions, radicalizing nationalist, anti-Communist, and antidemocratic trends (Chemerys 2016; Ishchenko 2018a). In Donbas, two Russian puppet states (Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics [DPR and LPR]) were established. They have gradually consolidated and left even less space for politically relevant opposition than in Ukraine; most of the "wild" rebel warlords have been physically eliminated (Malyarenko and Wolff 2018). The left political groups and progressive elements were marginal in both the Maidan and the Anti-Maidan movements and did not have any realistic chances of competing for political power, let alone for a hegemonic position with much more resourceful right-wing forces, i.e., oligarchic parties, (neo) liberal NGOs, and radical Ukrainian nationalists within the Maidan movement, or with the Russian

nationalists and agents of the Russian government in the Donbas insurgency. Several factors, including the ban of the Communist Party of Ukraine (at least under that name), decommunization laws, repressions, and violent attacks against the left in Ukraine, and finally – very limited space for any independent politics in DPR/LPR – led to the eventual marginalization of the left in all parts of the country (Ishchenko 2016b).

Substitution of the Nation-Making Idea: Architecting False Consciousness

Sociopolitical destabilization of the country would not have been possible without the erosion of the collective mythology that bound the nation together in the boundaries Ukraine had in 1991 (Yurchenko 2018). In its 1991 borders by the Soviets in mid-twentieth century, the multiethnic, multireligious, multilingual nation needed a strong cosmopolitan foundation myth to bring it into a sovereign existence. The country's multiethnic, multireligious, multilingual nation (Sakwa 2015) needed a cosmopolitan constitutional backbone to prop up its survival and cement social cohesion necessary for economic transformation that lied ahead. And its leaders have produced that backbone, if de jure, as the country's Constitution, adopted in 1996. Unfortunately, "marketization and geopolitical games in the post-Soviet space were in contradiction with the potential construction of a cosmopolitan, egalitarian society and thus, different, divisive myths were used to shape public imagination" (Yurchenko 2018, p. 4).

As the empire of transnational capital was spreading with the EBRD, USAID, IMF and WB, neoliberal reforms were planted into the transforming system (in Ukraine and Russia alike, even if with different consequences), undermining the best of intention by their incompatibility with socioeconomic development and exacerbated by the existing and, too, transforming system of economic activity, legal and extralegal. They needed a different backbone, one patchworked from myths that would compartmentalize the society as an effect. They are four: the myth of transition, the myth of democracy, the myth of

"two Ukraines," and the myth of the "Other" (Yurchenko 2018, pp. 10–22 *et passim*). The myth of transition can be summarized in the idea that the "transition to market" based on IMF, WB, and EBRD modeling had to occur in the ex-USSR republics. First of all, politico-economic reality is much more complex than such a model presupposes, seeing that apart from the (socio-)economic factors there also are their political forms, e.g., institutional, ideological, cultural, etc. This means that by default the implementation process is set to have multiple negative consequences. Second, the model is premised upon an assumption that there must be a transition to neoliberal market capitalism in the first place and that it is the only alternative for the post-Soviet states; it is not clear at all why the above is treated as an axiom. Third, the process of "transition" toward a certain mode of production and social reproduction – capitalist or otherwise – is steeped in teleology of itself. Thus, as any social prescription it does not account for, if at all acknowledges, the social dialectic of its target locale. Moreover, the teleology of transition to market fetishizes a fictitious object, i.e., free market, which neither in theory nor in practice was shown to either exist or perform efficiently. No amount of complications nor crises emergent as a result of this ill-conceived policy fixation led to its revision. The myth of democracy helps maintain a façade of the market orientation being an ongoing popular choice, of a functioning democratic system, and of representation politics. Feasibility of a democratic rule in a polity where private interests come before public is one of the more insidious yet resilient myths that allows for authoritarian neoliberalism to survive and spread in Ukraine and elsewhere. Instead, what can be witnessed in Ukraine is the further entrenchment of a regime of neoliberal kleptocracy where political disempowerment of the voter became combined with their economic disempowerment and ideological hollowing out of political discourse.

The myth of "two Ukraines" (Riabchuk (1992) coined the term), east and west, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking, has been manufactured in what is a diverse and nonhomogeneous society, just like any other country, and its "heterogeneity is a historical norm, not the historical exception" (Menon and Rumer 2015, p. 1 *et passim*). The Yanukovych versus Yushchenko electoral campaign became the main defining moment where the boundary manufactured by political technologists between the two was demarcated in Ukraine's political discourse making Riabchuk's 1992 declaration a materialized prophecy. The myth of "the Other" is the most recent and also the most destabilizing and destructive for the country's social fabric and collective national consciousness. The Ukrainian is now locked in defining itself in opposition to the Russian "other" by the content of the infamous "decommunization laws" that labeled everything Soviet as Russian, i.e., associated with an aggressor country, and as the "other" to the Ukrainian by extension. So, the othering occurs not only on the level of separation of society into "patriots" and separatist/Russia sympathizers but also, intrinsically, on the individual level through rejection of a part of one's cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious identity. The recent manipulations by Poroshenko's administration with the separation of Ukraine's church from the Russian Patriarchy, the Tomos of autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodox church, i. e., decree on independent functioning, obtained from Constantinople confirm that this tendency is exacerbating, cutting deeper divisions into what was and could be a shared history, all hierarchies and imperialist/colonial narratives considered. In this way (as well as with other divisive nationalist policies, e.g., about language and history), the oligarchic regime is adding another characteristic to the image of the "other" in a divide-and-rule maneuver, pitching the faithful against each other. It is aimed to distract attention from the failures of Poroshenko's administration, adds to his image of liberator from "Russian oppression" – if not in the battlefields of eastern Ukraine than in the church yards – and is used to boost popular support in the upcoming presidential election.

Western Imperialism?

A popular interpretation of the political crisis in Ukraine among many left authors is to blame

Western imperialism for its unfolding (e.g., Amin 2016; Kagarlitsky et al. 2017; Pijl 2018), even when the lack of a consolidated strategy among the countries of the "Western bloc" is acknowledged. The crucial elements of this narrative are the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, "democracy promotion" via support of pro-Western (neo)liberal NGOs, and support for the Maidan protests and post-Maidan Ukrainian government from Western officials. All these were cumulatively interpreted in Russia as another step toward its encirclement by adversary regimes and encroachment on its spheres of influence. The above served as an excuse to "defensively" react by annexing Crimea and supporting Donbas separatists in order to secure Sevastopol naval base, preclude Ukraine's membership in NATO, and destabilize a hostile post-Maidan government. This narrative builds on important facts and has some merit; however, a number of caveats are necessary to make.

Indeed, the EU association agreement with Ukraine contained certain security clauses (however, quite vague, see Hahn 2018, Chapter 6). Besides, similar kind of agreements was often the first step toward NATO and EU membership for other countries, particularly, in eastern Europe (Nazemroaya 2012, pp. 51–53). Nevertheless, a number of countries (in Africa and Latin America) signed the EU association and free trade agreements without any short-term realistic prospects or even the desire to become NATO and EU members. Despite participating in many NATO partnership programs (pp. 60–62), the closest Ukraine got to prospective engagement with the Alliance was a declaration accepted at the 2008 NATO summit. Back then in Bucharest, it was declared that Ukraine (together with Georgia) will become NATO members in an unspecified time in the future, provoking a harsh reaction from Russia. The fact remains that Ukraine has never been granted a membership action plan, nor even a specific promise to become a member of NATO or the EU. This is happening despite favorable public opinion (Zolkina and Haran 2017) and the position of post-Maidan government and parliament that went as far as changing the Ukrainian constitution to fix the course on integration into Euroatlantic institutions. Many would

argue that Ukraine has never been "ready" for membership because of the poor economic development and lack of democracy, adding the territorial conflicts in Crimea and Donbas it has gotten since 2014 on top of that. Yet, poor ex-Yugoslavia countries with problematic democratic procedures were welcomed into Euroatlantic institutions. Although, it happened only upon NATO intervention into the internal ethnic conflicts that international parties failed to contain, let alone stop. Taking into account political, economic, and geopolitical implications of Ukraine's NATO membership, it is doubtful that similar strategies would or will be deployed in Ukraine as Germany's blocking of NATO exercise near the Kerch strait in February 2019 testifies (Donahue and Jacobs 2019). A multivariate regression analysis by Katchanovski (2011) shows that even if the level of democracy and economic development really mattered for EU membership of eastern European and ex-USSR countries (however, not excluding positive reverse causation of membership prospects), while the level of democracy and lack unsettled territorial conflicts mattered for NATO membership, the simple fact of being a post-Soviet country significantly reduced the prospects of Euroatlantic integration, even taking all other factors into account.

Such inconsistency toward Ukraine challenges a simplified narrative about Western imperialist expansion. After 2014 it became a popular notion to mention Zbigniew Brzezinski's geopolitical analysis that is arguing for Euroatlantic expansion to the post-Soviet space and, particularly, for a crucial role of Ukraine in the weakening of Russia's role in Eurasia (e.g., Hahn 2018; Pijl 2018; Toal 2017). However, such analyses are likely to be making the same kind of mistake as those authors that exaggerate the influence of far-right Eurasianism ideas of Alexander Dugin on Russian foreign policy (March 2018, p. 85). The Western elites have never been consolidated about Euroatlantic integration of Ukraine. Particularly, France and Germany have usually been more cautious than the USA (Pijl 2018, p. 26). Being more dependent on Russian energy resources supply and more vulnerable against a military attack and attempting to assert at least some independence from US foreign policy, they tried to avoid

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escalation with Russia. Moreover, despite prevalent anti-Russia prejudice among many US foreign policy advisors (Gessen 2018), there has always been a non-negligible voice of opposition to NATO expansion to eastern Europe among "realist" Western policy analysts and decision-makers, starting with George F. Kennan, the famous architect of the policy of containment toward USSR, who took Russian concerns seriously (Hahn 2018, Chapter 2; Toal 2017, pp. 28–33; Wood 2018, Chapter 5). Construction of a plausible argument about Western imperialist expansion needs a thorough address of the contradictions among Western policy-makers and among Western countries regarding post-Soviet space, Russia, and how they have been connected with the interests of the ruling and capitalist class fractions, both their own and Ukraine's.

The popular argument about Maidan as a Western-driven coup d'etat via intentional democracy promotion and color revolution "technology" is so far insufficiently grounded. Indeed, all the "usual suspects" like the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and George Soros' International Renaissance Foundation as well as many EU donors have long supported Ukrainian (neo)liberal NGOs. As Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, famously recognized in December 2013, the USA spent nearly 5 billion dollars on democracy promotion programs in Ukraine since its independence (de Ploeg 2017, pp. 54–58; Hahn 2018, Chapter 6). And indeed, such programs facilitate *trasformismo* and passive revolution, i.e., they help gradually transform public consciousness toward favoring marketization reforms over state ownership of industry, "free market" versus state regulation of economic activity, and capitalist over socialist politics. However, the actual role of pro-Western NGOs in the Maidan uprising is usually exaggerated in this narrative. The institutionalized civil society in Ukraine has been weak and split because of the detachment from the grassroot protest initiatives and actual concerns of the majority of citizens (Ishchenko 2017, pp. 216–218). During Maidan protests, (neo)

liberal NGOs did not play any outstanding role in mass mobilization of protesters: not more than 9% of protesters in Kiev claimed membership in any civic organization; not more than 14% who came from the provinces to Kiev were organized by any civic organization or movement (Kiev International Institute of Sociology 2014a). The NGOs were not indispensable in maintaining Maidan mobilization and protest camps: the opposition party resources and crowdfunding were more important. Neither have they played any significant role in violent clashes with the riot police – nor enticed these clashes – the radical nationalists played the vanguard role in the armed uprising. Only 17% of protesters in Kiev claimed that when figuring out when and where they should go to join the protests, have they used any form of online TV channels that had appeared on the eve of Maidan protests and were often supported by Western donors (the role of traditional radio/TV, Facebook, and family connections was mentioned far more often) (Onuch 2015, p. 228). Last but not least, NGO activists are not necessarily direct agents of their donors and often possess a high degree of autonomy. With their connections, communication skills and good English, the (neo)liberal NGOs were important primarily in communicating to the Western officials, media, and public opinion an attractive image of "a democratic, diverse, peaceful revolution of Ukrainian people against an authoritarian dictatorship" that helped legitimize international support for Maidan, even though they were only representing a small, and not even the most important, segment of the protest mobilization. The majority of protesters were a mixed (if skewed to western and central regions) demographic of citizens with a complex mix of socioeconomic and anti-authoritarian grievances and pro-EU and anti-Russian nationalist sentiments.

Support for Maidan protesters by Western officials was also inconsistent. Their major official position was a political compromise between Yanukovych and the opposition, presupposing a limitation of the president's power and the opposition's involvement into the government. Western officials supported "European aspirations" of

Maidan protesters and condemned governmental repressions; however, they also criticized the violent radicals from the Right Sector and were skeptical about the far-right *Svoboda* party (US Department of State 2014). A lot of noise has been made about the mid-protest appearances of a number of US and EU officials, members of parliaments at Kiev Maidan camp (see the list, e. g., in de Ploeg 2017, pp. 58–59); however, this presence was limited to symbolic support of the protesters in order to put pressure on the government and prevent repressions. It is also questionable to which extent these symbolic appearances were coordinated with the Western governments. The first visa sanctions against several Ukrainian officials, which the USA believed responsible for the repressions, were introduced only by late January after the first fatalities. Only after the massacre of dozens of protesters and law enforcement officers in Kiev by snipers, who are still unidentified, on February 20, 2014, has the EU decided to freeze assets of Yanukovych associates, while the USA expanded visa sanctions to 20 Ukrainian officials. Of course, the talk about sanctions from Western officials did produce pressure on pro-Yanukovych fraction of the Ukrainian ruling class, likely saving a large part of their assets in Western countries. Moreover, both the EU and the US de facto recognized the unconstitutional vote to remove Yanukovych from his seat on February 22, despite the president-opposition agreement, signed just one day before that. Nonetheless, the inconsistencies and contradictions in Western support of Maidan, cautiousness with sanctions, and skepticism toward the radical wing of the protesters do not fit the narrative about a purposeful Western-driven coup d'etat in Ukraine but rather point toward improvisation and adaptation of the EU and the US officials to the escalating developments in Ukraine, with them eventually seizing an opportunity to get a loyal government in Ukraine.

There are many reasons to call post-Maidan Ukraine a US client state (Dubovyk 2017). Although the famous "F...ck EU" conversation leaked in February 2014 between Victoria Nuland and the US ambassador in Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt is often overinterpreted by Maidan critics

as the process of "handpicking" the new Prime Minister Arsenii Yatseniuk rather than discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition leaders (e.g., Pijl 2018, p. 69); he was indeed strongly supported by the USA. In 2014–2015 Geoffrey Pyatt and US Vice-President Joe Biden had a significant, however, informal influence on decision-making and appointing government cadre (de Ploeg 2017, p. 80). Rivaling Ukrainian politicians were typically seeking support from American officials. Western-educated professionals were allowed to join the new post-Maidan government even without Ukrainian citizenship in violation of the law (de Ploeg 2017, pp. 79–80), although not only to please Western governments and pro-Western NGOs but in order to "prove" some changes after the "revolution." Nevertheless, the nature of Ukrainian political regime did not change – it was still dominated by patronal pyramids of local yet competing "oligarchs" (around President Petro Poroshenko elected in May 2014 and his coalition partner People's Front party) – and did not correspond to the cartoonish image of a country ruled from Washington, D.C. When Western neoliberals in the governmental offices helped solve the crisis of representation and strengthen the legitimacy of the new ruling oligarchic groups, they were gradually replaced with people loyal to the dominant oligarchs. Despite strong Western backing, Yatseniuk was ultimately pushed to resign and replaced by a new Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, initially more loyal to Poroshenko and coming from the same provincial center of Vinnytsia. The interests of Ukrainian oligarchs and Western governments have clashed most directly around the issue of corruption as far as selective preferential treatment from the state is one of the major competitive advantages of domestic business against transnational capital. Despite the fact that a set of anti-corruption institutions was imposed via a "sandwich model" (Nitsova et al. 2018) – working as a combination of local (neo)liberal NGOs' proposals combined with efficient Western pressure on Ukrainian government due to its critical financial dependency on the IMF – their work has been effectively sabotaged by the government. The notorious

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nationalist radicalization trends after 2014 were going against the interests of the West, for which they were only discrediting the idea of supporting Ukraine and helping destabilize its already weak state (Ishchenko 2018a). Instead it had much more to do with the ruling oligarchs' interests in splitting the opposition and conceding to the far right that contrary to a widespread denialism of pro-Ukrainian liberals is the segment within Ukraine's civil society with the largest mobilization resource (Ishchenko 2014b; 2018b).

Nevertheless, the argument for Western economic imperialism and an uneven mode of Ukraine's integration into the global capitalist system is sound. After Maidan's victory, the EU association agreement was signed. Poroshenko's administration, backed by the EU funded research, promoted the DCFTA as a treaty that would bring economic stability and prosperity to the country despite evidence from other EU states, and to this day the economic prognoses are not as optimistic (for the best critical analysis of the consequences of the DCFTA with the EU for Ukraine, see Kravchuk et al. 2016). The agreement endangers the most advanced sectors of Ukrainian industry that work primarily for Russian and other post-Soviet markets but are hardly competitive in the EU market and disrupts the import/export landscape with potentially catastrophic effects for relevant sectors. While the import-export landscape is changing, it is also closely intertwined with important partnerships both east and west. Deeper economic cooperation with the EU also means deindustrialization of Ukraine, growth in unemployment, and decrease in state budget income, making it even less possible for the state to invest in the modernization of the economy to improve competitiveness and even out increasing socioeconomic disparities. In the end, it means the integration of Ukraine as a peripheral economy of primarily raw material and cheap labor, moreover, without benefits of the EU membership. It has been estimated that the results of the agreement can also become catastrophic for the labor force of Ukraine, which already bears higher distributional consequences of the financial crisis fallout than in stronger economies (Onaran 2009).

The state of the economy is weakened by the consequences of the armed conflict and loss of industry in the east of Ukraine at the estimated cost of $7–8bl or some 6% of the GDP even by late 2014 (Havlik and Astrov 2014). Ongoing offshoring of profits is also an aggravating factor: according to the State Institute of Statistics, in the first 6 months of 2012, $5810.1 million from Ukraine ended up in offshore accounts of Cyprus alone. Offshoring of profits and recycling of capital continue tainting Ukraine's economy and effectively eroding its budgetary capacity (Antonyuk et al. 2018; Kravchuk 2015). For example, during 2015–2017 iron ore exports alone were under-invoiced by at least 20% – equivalent of a $520 million profit shifting offshore (Antonyuk et al. 2018, p. 21). This calculation indicates that if applied to "the whole of agricultural, iron ore and steel exports (~$14 billion), profit shifting of Ukraine's commodities could be at around $3 billion per year" – equivalent to the macroeconomic assistance Ukraine receives from the EU annually (Ibid). Ukraine's sovereignty is de facto being lost. Multiple dependencies and neoliberal kleptocracy have permeated Ukraine's social reality by manufacturing false consciousness (in a Marxist sense) that in its own turn destabilizes the country further and bears both disempowering and empowering potential for consolidation of a countermovement to the empire of capital.

In sum, although one cannot rule out Western imperialism as a factor of Ukrainian political crisis and especially its role in post-Maidan Ukraine, it is important not to exaggerate them, redefine what is meant by imperialism in the current context, and develop a more empirically based analysis. Transnational capital interests in Ukraine seem to be underestimated in comparison to NATO expansion – even if one is to consider NATO a military arm of Western imperialism – and geopolitical conflict with Russia, which is a point of contradiction even among Western states, elites, and class fractions. There is no sufficient evidence about consistent Western strategy of governmental change in Ukraine, while the role of classical democracy promotion mechanisms is overestimated. The combination of Western state power, power of

international (financial) institutions, embedded interests of transnational capital, and (geopolitical involvement of) NATO in an "accumulation strategy" with "a hegemonic project" (Jessop 1983) is a more convincing argumentation yet still requires a significant amount of conceptual nuance and empirical analysis. The West exploited the opportunity with Yanukovych's overthrow; however, the new oligarchic ruling elites in Ukraine have been capable of defending their interests rather efficiently, with only occasional lost cases, e.g., state takeover of Kolomoiskyi and Boholiubov's Privatbank (Olearchyk and Buckley 2016).

Russian Imperialism?

In case of Russian involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, the question is not about the scale and the strategy. The scale of Russian military intervention and support for Donbas separatists has been far greater than any NATO military support for Ukraine. As estimated in 2016, the USA had given Ukraine $3 bln in loan guarantees and $1.1 bln in nonlethal defense assistance (de Ploeg 2017, p. 224). Only since 2018 has the USA decided to start selling Javelin antitank missiles to Ukraine, although lethal weaponry supply from eastern European NATO countries, comprising of cache remnants from the Eastern bloc era, was likely and occasionally confirmed by Ukrainian officials (p. 225). Besides that, several hundred specialists from NATO countries have been deployed to train Ukrainian forces including radical nationalist volunteer units. In contrast, Russian intervention was not limited to the massive flow of nationalist volunteers to Donbas and a stable supply of weapons and specialists. After all, Russian regular forces have annexed Crimea and intervened directly, although covertly, into the fights with Ukrainian forces in the critical moments of 2014 and 2015 (Robinson 2016). DPR and LPR are fully dependent on Russian military and financial support, being de facto Russian puppet states, in contrast to the very uneasy relations between the US and Ukrainian oligarchs. Although the more aggressive actions of Russia primarily reflect "the necessities on the ground, as well as the larger importance

of the conflict to the Russian state" (de Ploeg 2017, p. 225).

The main question, however, is how to explain Russia's policy toward Ukraine and, particularly, whether "imperialism" is a good concept for this purpose. There are essentialist perspectives on Russian "imperialism" drawing it from some eternally expansionist drive of Russian foreign policy (e.g., Kushnir 2018). As March notes, "that the national interests of an ideological superpower (the USSR), the much smaller and weaker (geopolitically and economically) contemporary Russia and the Tsarist Empire can be reduced to fundamentally continuous great-powerness is more an act of faith rather than a serious analysis" (2018, p. 82). However, Marxist scholars have also hotly debated the concept of imperialism in relation to Russian policy toward Ukraine, attempting to put it in the framework of Russian post-Soviet capitalism. The discussion, nevertheless, has been rather scholastic so far and revolving around the question whether Russia is an imperialist state according to Lenin's theory of imperialism, which in itself is rather limited and needs clarifications and adaptations to the current conditions of analysis as we theoretically posit in this chapter.

Michael Pröbsting made, perhaps, the most systematic argument for Russia as an "emerging imperialist great power" (Pröbsting 2014a, b, 2016):

- Russia's economy is dominated by Russian not transnational financial-industrial groups with strong connection to the ruling elite that have monopoly position in the key sectors of the Russian economy.
- Russia's economy has grown during Putin's rule into a Top-10 world economy (as of GDP based of purchasing power parity). Besides, it has a relatively high ratio of the foreign exchange reserves in the foreign debt.
- Significant export of capital, particularly, to Third World countries.
- Russia is expanding its increasingly global political power (not only in post-Soviet space but also in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa). It is a strong military power with the third military budget in the world.

- There are internal colonies in Russia and oppressed people that are, particularly, residing in the areas with rich deposits of crucial natural resources.
- Russia forms the Eurasian Union, delineates its "sphere of influence," and actively intervenes into the politics of its neighbors.
- Russia exploits migrant workers, primarily from Central Asia (8–10% of Russian labor force, which is a ratio close to some of the Western European states).

However, a number of Marxist scholars and activists criticized the thesis of Russia as an imperialist state (e.g., Buzgalin et al. 2016; Clarke and Annis 2016; Dzarasov 2016a; Smith 2018) pointing primarily to the relative weakness and structural deficiencies of Russian economy in comparison with imperialist states:

- In a global perspective, Russian corporations are only a tiny fraction among the top corporations across the globe. Russian banks and the financial sector are particularly weak. The key economic indicators – such as wealth, GDP per capita, and labor productivity – lag far behind all major Western imperialist nations.
- Russia is exporting primarily raw materials and importing high added-value products from the West.
- There is no basis to the argument that Russia suffers from overaccumulation of capital like the advanced economies of imperialist countries, which are seeking to subjugate foreign markets of semicolonial countries. Russia, just like other post-Soviet states, suffered primarily from underinvestment and capital flight. Russian capital is exported, first of all, to the West and offshores, while Russian investment to the Third World is a tiny fraction of the investment from Western capital. Even Russian investments into the post-Soviet countries and, particularly, Ukraine have not been particularly sizeable. According to Pröbsting's data, only 18% of Russian FDI went to the ex-USSR (non-Baltic) states in 2012 (5% to Ukraine), while

38% went to Western Europe (2016, pp. 99–100). Moreover, Ukrainian oligarchs were also investing into Russia on a significant scale.

As a result, these authors tend to see Russian actions in Ukraine primarily as defense against Western imperialist encroachment and/or as a conflict between two semi-peripheral states – Russia and Ukraine (e.g., Buzgalin et al. 2016). The later, however, ignores not only that Ukraine is incomparably weaker in military strength to a nuclear power. If Ukrainian oligarchs aim at best to get a role of an intermediate in Western imperialist exploitation of peripheralizing Ukraine, Russia aspires in this conflict to be recognized as a great power on a par with Western imperialist states.

Overall, the debate may easily end up in the "half-full or half-empty glass" discussion. The proponents of Russia as an imperialist country thesis can agree that Russian imperialism is significantly weaker than Western, yet it is advancing (unlike Ukraine), while escalating conflict with the Western imperialism imposes a strong imperative for economic development and modernization on Russia. A progressive development of this debate could lie in the direction of recognizing and analyzing the *variety* of imperialisms. Particularly, Lenin (2000 [1916]) already noted that Russian tsarist imperialism was "much more crude, medieval, economically backward, and militarily bureaucratic" compared to Western imperialisms; its contemporary version bears some of those features to this day. Pröbsting emphasizes the necessity to take economic, political, and military power of the states in totality to assess whether they are imperialist or semicolonial (2016, p. 96). One could argue that the Russian military-industrial complex, which is comparatively stronger than other sectors of Russian economy on the global scale, might be naturally interested in expansionist foreign policy. It is also noteworthy that anti-Western views are stronger among the so-called *siloviki* fraction in the Russian ruling elite (connected with security service, army, intelligence and other enforcement

institutions) (Strokan and Taylor 2018, p. 160). Besides, a critical engagement with a concept of sub-imperialism in relation to Russia can be fruitful, even though it was initially coined to explain the expansionism of some Latin American regional powers like Brazil (see Sotelo Valencia 2017). In this perspective, some states can fit all elements of Lenin's definition of imperialism without breaking the structural dependency of their peripheral economies from the core imperialist states.

Similarly to the criticisms of analyses of Western imperialism, one needs to take seriously the inconsistency and contradictions of Russian actions in Ukraine that too were partly caused by the ongoing conflict of interests between Russia's dominating ruling and capitalist blocs. For example, Russia annexed Crimea but only supported Donbas separatists to the extent of preventing their military defeat from Ukrainian forces. Some authors even advocated the idea of a "betrayal" by the Russian government of the "workers' revolt" in Donbas (Clarke 2016; Kagarlitsky 2016). Despite having the opportunity to do so, Russia neither annexed Donbas nor officially recognized the DPR and LPR nor did it attempt to take control of the Ukrainian southeast (so-called Novorossia) and instead signed the Minsk accords, presupposing the return of Donbas under Ukrainian control. The result is a suboptimal situation for Russia with a semi-frozen conflict in Donbas, two subsidized puppet states with an elderly population, and a radical shift in electoral geography of Ukraine where coming to power of a relatively pro-Russian president or political party (as in 1994 and 2010) has become highly unlikely (D'Anieri 2019). A possible explanation lies in contradictions between the more aggressive and anti-Western *siloviki* and the more cautious liberal fraction of Russian ruling class with assets in the Western countries, with Putin playing the role of an "arbiter" between them (Dzarasov 2016b).

Last but not least, a significant tendency among Western and Russian left of justifying Russian actions since 2014 as "defense" or even "defiance" of Western imperialism requires a critical commentary. Russian policies in Ukraine and also Syria were partially driven by domestic causes by boosting the legitimacy of the ruling bloc and marginalizing the opposition. Defending the interests of the Russian ruling class should not be confused with defending the Russian national interests, even when geopolitical leverage is used. It is particularly dubious for the left to accept the "counterrevolutionary" actions of the Russian government in defense of "legitimate" authoritarian regimes as something more justifiable than "revolutionary" democracy promotion by the Western imperialism. Besides, despite the weak economic basis, Putin is very explicit about his ambition of winning a seat at the table among the great powers in the "multipolar world" and of a recognition for Russia's "spheres of influence" – the areas where Russian interests will be assumed as prior to any other great power or that of a domestic government. Russia is challenging US and EU interests in particular areas of global politics, but it is not challenging the global imperialist structure, nor is it challenging its capitalist makeup from which Russia and its oligarchs directly benefit.

Concluding Remarks

The combination of neoliberal marketization and a politically empowered kleptocratic internally heterogeneous ruling bloc of Ukraine has created a combustive atmosphere within the country, which has not gone away with Yanukovych's escape. Instead, the rule of neoliberal kleptocrats entrenched even deeper. Neither political consensus nor hegemonic order has been achieved by competing oligarchic groups. The war in Ukraine's east now serves as legitimation for further antisocial austerity reforms that will further untie the hands of oligarchs while keeping the IMF and the EU satisfied. All this comes at the expense of further state dependence on foreign debt, thus effectively making Ukrainian government more susceptible to external meddling in domestic policy-making in addition to making the economy increasingly vulnerable, more fragile under the wheels of the empire of

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capital. Volodymyr Zelenskyi who defeated Petro Poroshenko in the presidential election of 2019 is unlikely to question either the neoliberal policy agenda, or reduce Ukraine's Western dependeny - debt, economic or geopolitical.

Amidst the information warfare around the crisis in Ukraine in which "anti-imperialist" arguments are employed one-siddly only against either the West or Russia, the clash of imperialisms thesis could be the most promising and balanced theoretical framework for analyzing international dimension of the conflict in Ukraine. However, it requires certain important elucidations. First, revisiting of the classical Marxist analysis of competing rival imperialisms is needed to overcome the tendency in the recent Marxist theorizing about imperialism analyzing it as singular and effectively equating "the" imperialism with American imperialism (Stathakis 2008), while their limitations – contemporary and in the current context – must be carefully studied. Second, the global empire of capital operates through an increasingly complex system of local, national, and international institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and is driven by competing imperialisms. Thence, specifying and analyzing the contradictions within each imperialist camp (between the USA and the EU, between various fractions of US and Russian ruling class, transnationally oriented and not) is necessary to understand inconsistencies of real imperialist policies. Third, the nature, structure, and institutional power contestations of the capitalist class and its fractions in the conditions of neoliberal transnational capitalism globally must be acknowledged. Transnational capital is increasingly emboldened, legally protected, and freed from state oversight, while labor is increasingly disempowered, dispossessed, and surveilled. Thus, geographies across which class struggles unfold are fundamentally different today than at the time when classical texts where written. And fourth, dialectical causal mechanisms and connections between the ruling class/elite interests and aggressive foreign policy actions must be specified. It is important to build a "new imperialism" theory on classical imperialism theories as they are indispensable (for arguments on Lenin see: Michael-Matsas 2008 and elsewhere in this volume), and it is equally

important to understand their limitations and that the material reality – economic and institutional – has drastically changed (Wood 2005; Harvey 2007, p. 57). Crucially, Harvey stressed that Bukharin, Lenin, Luxemburg, and Kautsky's theorisations were not fully suitable for their time either and engaged instead in "bickering" that was partly due to their "fundamentally different political positions" over the necessary course of action and over "a theoretical failure to find a way to deal with the spatiotemporal dynamics that had long been constructing a global imperialist system" that over the twentieth century produced "the very conditions that Wood describes [in her book *Empire of Capital*]." This system has its (weakening) hegemon, i.e., the USA; its "benevolent empire" at home and abroad, i.e., the EU; and the strengthening rivals, i.e., Russia and China, who have their satellites and occasionally changing allies and whose spheres of interest overlap, sometimes with enough significance for armed conflicts to unravel. Each imperialism has its own idiosyncrasies conditioned by its own historically shaped circumstance and future trajectories determined by the dialectic of social forces and their material conditions. There is one thing that the competing imperialisms and their executing state-society complexes of today have in common: they all peddle variations of neoliberal capitalist system and thus all contribute to the survival of the global empire of capital. Rivalries between Western, eastern, and domestic forces in the process of capital accumulation and its geopolitical expressions are shaping the future of Ukraine and the rest of the post-Soviet states for the years to come.

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UN Sanctions

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Unequal Exchange

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Synonyms

Balance of emissions embodied in trade; Dark value transfer; Ecologically unequal exchange; Environmental load displacement; Imperialism of trade; Nonequivalent exchange; Physical trade balance

Definition

In the strict sense, an exchange where prices are determined by a rate of profit that tends toward international equalization (mobile capital) and wage rates (or some other factor price) that allow for significant international inequalization (immobile labour), suggested as a theory to explain the evolution in the terms of trade between developed and developing countries in the century after 1870; more generally, an exchange of nonequivalent quantities of value, often expressed in terms of labor values or environmental factors such as land, energy, raw material equivalents, virtual water, emissions embedded in trade, etc., independently of whether they result from differences in population density, affluence, technological efficiency, etc.

The term 'unequal exchange' became widespread in the 1960s and 1970s through Marxist debate on underdeveloped countries and their falling terms of trade. The source and centre of the debate was the Greco-French economist Arghiri Emmanuel, the English translation of whose work described it as 'the imperialism of trade' (Emmanuel 1972a). The terms of trade were central to this kind of imperialism, in contrast to the export of capital in classical Marxist analyses, or the transfers of profit by multinationals underlined within monopoly capitalist and dependency traditions – the 'old imperialism' decried in Truman's Point Four programme.

Emmanuel's theory stated, contrary to the assumptions of the by then conventional Heckscher-Ohlin theory and its recent reformulation by Samuelson, that relative prices depended on wages, not the other way around; and that, contrary to the assumptions of Ricardo's comparative costs, first, labour was sufficiently immobile to allow for significant wage-disparities between countries, and, second, that capital was internationally mobile and tended towards equalisation.

Theoretical novelty apart, controversy was occasioned by the implications for international worker solidarity. In terms of Johan Galtung's (1971: 83) structural theory of imperialism, which it may well have inspired, the equalisation of the rate of profit and non-equalisation of wages translates into a 'harmony of interest' among capitalists and a 'conflict of interest' among centre and periphery workers. The conventional explanation, then and since, of the commonly observed absence of worker solidarity was that a 'labor aristocracy' section of the working class, perhaps even whole nations, had been 'bribed' by capital. Emmanuel, by contrast, made the nationally enclosed workers movements into the principal *cause* of unequal exchange.

Immediately upon publication, there was an avalanche of attempts to reintegrate unequal exchange with more conventional Marxist and monopoly interpretations as a subcategory of a more general inequality in terms of labour transfers, starting with Bettelheim (1962, 1972), but repeated *ad nauseam* in the ensuing debates, and expressed as a difference between labour values and prices of production. The idea that different capital-intensities engender transfers of labour values is an established idea within Marxism. In addressing 'the question of nationalities' in 1907, Otto Bauer (2000) found that the more capital-intense German regions appropriated value from the less capital-intense Czech ones of the Hapsburg Empire. With the break-up of the Empire, by the time of the second edition in 1921, this unwittingly transformed into an *international* rate of profit and transfer of value. Bauer greatly influenced both Evgenii Preobrazhensky's (1965) model of Soviet industrialisation by extracting

surplus through domestic unequal exchange with the peasantry, and Henryk Grossmann's (1967) model where the international equalisation of profits entails an unequal exchange between Asia and Europe helping to offset the fall in the rate of profit. While Emmanuel did not consider these value transfers due to capital-intensities to represent unequal exchange, he did adopt the notion of internationally mobile capital. By contrast, the monopoly and dependency tradition (Sweezy, Baran, Frank; Bettelheim was a notable exception) was highly dismissive of an internationally equalised rate of profit and of international trade as a means of exploitation and transfer. Marxists in general considered interest in the relative prices of goods to be superficial 'circulationism' or commodity fetishism compared to the really heavy stuff such as production, multinationals, and the export of capital (Andersson 1972; Brewer 1990; Brolin 2006a: chs 2, 6; 2006b: chs 5–7, 12; Emmanuel 1972a: 94f; 1972b; Howard and King 1989, 1992).

Indeed, every subsequent alternative formulation to Emmanuel (e.g. Amin 1973, 1974; Andersson 1972, 1976; Braun 1977; Delarue 1973, 1975a, b; Gibson 1977, 1980; Marini 1973, 1978), and almost every critic since Bettelheim (1972), have abandoned wages as the independent variable, preferring to make higher productivity the cause (and thereby justification) of higher wages, and/or 'monopolies' the cause of unequal exchange. Having reviewed many of these (Brolin 2006a, b; Evans 1984; Mainwaring 1980, 1991), it is easy to agree with Koont (1987: 10) that: 'It would be desirable to extricate the concept of unequal exchange from the morass it has sunk into on the terrain of value transfers'. Unfortunately, this is not the path taken in the currently more vociferous ecological revival of unequal exchange, where the transfer of labour is simply supplanted or complemented by transfers of land.

Paradigmatically originating in urban–rural exchange, the idea that exchange of primary products for manufactures is disadvantageous was probably hoary with age already when mercantilists, protectionists, neo-mercantilists, import-substitutionists, and so on made it a cornerstone

of their policy recommendations. It was inherent to the original formulation of the Singer-Prebisch thesis. With its focus on the inherently immobile land factor, ecological criticism of industrial civilisation and globalisation has long demonstrated a certain anti-trade bias (Bramwell 1989: 17). Attempted integration with a critique of world poverty in the post-war era shifted emphasis from overpopulation to inequality, notably in 'centre- periphery' trade of industrial for primary products. Thus, Borgström (1972: 76–83) estimated how Europe imported huge 'ghost acreages' mainly through its overseas trade with European settlements; although focusing on Latin America he chose to see such exports as characterising underdeveloped countries (Brolin 2006a: 280). (Emphasising differently, Hardin [1993] similarly found no net imports into the US.) Borgström's idea of phantom or appropriated carrying capacity was renamed 'ecological footprint' by Rees (1992) under which name it has since become trademarked and calculations made opaque (Brolin 2006a: 285–297). Studies of the British industrial revolution have observed both the 'fossil acreage' (Catton 1982) added by the coal industry (Sieferle 2001; Wrigley 1988: 54f), and in colonial sugar and cotton imports (Pomeranz 2000: 274ff., 313ff.), arguing for their crucial importance in relieving industrial Britain's land constraints (for criticism, see Brenner and Isett 2002; Wrigley 2006). Translating point source fuels and minerals into areal units appears to constrain ecologist historical understanding of industrial civilisation. The identification of raw materials exporting peripheries with exploitation and underdevelopment is the central tenet of ecological unequal exchange (e.g. Bunker 1984, 1985; Cabeza-Gutés and Martinez-Alier 2001; Foster and Holleman 2014; Hornborg 1998, 2009; Martinez-Alier 2002; Odum 1971, 1996; Odum and Odum 1981), not worrying about contradictory North American, Australasian, or Scandinavian examples in the past (Katzman 1987), or, indeed, even the whole world until the post-war consumer society definitely tipped the scale (Bairoch 1993; Brolin 2006a). This disregard for falsifying economies that are both exporters *and* intensive consumers of

energy signals a possible inability to account also for this consumer society.

Thus, where the standard Marxist interpretation speaks of unequal, or non-equivalent, exchange as a net transfer of labour or labour values, ecological unequal exchange is commonly defined in terms of a net transfer of land or land values (natural resources, ecological footprints, energy, or elaborations thereof such as 'exergy' or 'emergy'). Both of these currently popular usages of unequal exchange are highly problematic, and this is what has occasioned me (Brolin 2006a) to try to revive interest in Emmanuel's original theory as well as Lewis's almost wholly neglected one.

While not an accepted concept in mainstream economics, these and other approaches to unequal exchange can be illustrated by reference to traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory based on productive-factor endowments. From this perspective, net transfers of *labour* simply result from exchange between relatively labour-rich (capital and land-poor) regions and labour-scarce (capital-rich and land-rich) regions. Net transfers of *land,* on the other hand, result from exchange between relatively land-abundant (labourscarce and capital-scarce) regions and landscarce (capital-rich and labour-rich) regions. For example, looking at the epoch for which it was conceived (the 19th and early 20th centuries), according to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, we should expect a net transfer of land incorporated in goods exported from relatively land-rich regions, such as Australasia, North and Latin America, to relatively land-scarce (Western) Europe, or conversely net transfers of labour incorporated in goods exported from Europe to the New Worlds. Labour or land inequalities would seem to exhaust almost all of the current literature and debate on unequal exchange/ecological unequal exchange. For the sake of completeness, however, although no such formulation of unequal exchange as yet exists, a net transfer of *capital* results from exchange between relatively capital abundant (labour-scarce and land-scarce) regions, and capital-poor (labour-rich and land-rich) regions. The same would be true for other possible factors, such as knowledge or skilled labour.

In theory, inequality in terms of one factor should be compensated for by inequalities of the others in ways that possibly benefit all participants and increase overall output. That is, however, given that there are no monopolistic distortions on either goods or, especially, factors markets, which brings us to a fundamentally different approach to unequal exchange.

The point of Heckscher-Ohlin is of course to argue that immobility on the factors market can be compensated for by trade in the goods produced by these factors. Even from this perspective, however, it can be admitted (Williamson 2002) that the indirect equalisation of factor remuneration via trade in goods is less efficient than the direct equalisation that would result if, parallel to the free international market for goods, there were an equally free and internationally competitive market for factors. The divergence from this hypothetical 'normal' state, due to monopolistic and other 'institutional' distortions on the factors market, is what constitutes unequal exchange according to Lewis (1954, 1969, 1978a, b) and Emmanuel (1962: 22; 1972a: 64; 1976b: 264; Latouche 1977: 240f).

If unequal exchange in the first view is part of the normal workings of any conceivable economy and not evidently detrimental (on the contrary, commonly beneficial in increasing overall output), unequal exchange in the second view is an aberration from the 'normal' workings and very much detrimental (cf. Bettelheim [1962] on unequal exchange in the 'broad' and 'narrow' senses; Emmanuel [1972a] on 'broad' and 'strict' senses; Brolin [2006a] on 'non-equivalent' and 'unequal' exchange). Similarly, Adam Smith noted how towns gained from monopolising both labour (through guild regulations) and land (through the better access to communications conferred by its location at junctions), occasioning an 'artificial advantage' in exchange with the country that gave townspeople a greater share of the annual produce of society than would otherwise fall to them (Smith 1937: 124f; cf. Andersson 1976: 39; Brolin 2006a: 36f; Raffer 1987: 14).

In the Marxist or ecologist literature on net transfers, it is mainly by denying that one or other of the productive factors (read 'capital') is

really productive that unequal exchange is found, and not always even then. Even when a net transfer of land or labour is found, it is not evident why this in itself should be something bad for the exporter; for example blocking its economic development and/or being detrimental to its ecology. Apart from its questionable explanatory value, approaching unequal exchange from the perspective of net transfers, as is now the case (whether in terms of land, labour, or both), is desperately incomplete, always verging on irrelevance since any true estimate of inequality would have to be made in the composite land-labour-capital-etc. factor, rather than to the exclusion of any particular one (read capital). This point was made by Emmanuel early in the unequal exchange debate.

While Emmanuel (1972a: xxxi) occasionally spoke carelessly of how low-wage countries exchange 'a larger amount of their national labour for a smaller amount of foreign labor', he (1972a: 325) then clarified: 'Since equivalence in capitalist production relations signifies not the exchange of equal quantities of labor, but that of equal aggregates of factors ([e.g.] labor and capital), nonequivalence (unequal exchange) can only signify the exchange of unequal aggregates of these same factors'. Attempts at measuring such aggregates would have to face problems of the incommensurability of its component parts, as well as the conclusions reached in the, so called, 'capital controversies' of the 1960s and 1970s. More precisely, for Emmanuel (1972a: 1f), then, 'the exchange of commodities represents, in the last analysis, an exchange of factors, that is, an exchange of claims [Fr. *droit*] to a primary share in the economic product of society'. Speaking of claims underlines the meaningful part of classical, Marxist, Sraffian, or other so called 'objective' price theories in pointing towards an underlying *social* reality, distributional conflicts, as opposed to the transfer of metaphysical entities embodied in goods: 'Now, as with all economic phenomena, unequal exchange reflects relations among people, in no way relations between things – in the present case the relations of underdeveloped man with developed man' (Emmanuel 1962: 12, my translation). The anomaly of falling terms of trade,

as it was first believed for raw materials, revealed, as it turned out, an underlying social inequality.

The Terms-of-Trade Debate

Development economics emerged as a clearly defined academic subdiscipline only in the early post-war period, very much on the fringe of economic orthodoxy and much more tolerant of radical political suggestions (such as land reform, state control, or even socialism) as necessary preconditions for economic development. One of the most hotly debated issues, and an important origin of unequal exchange theory, was the terms-of-trade debate, or the Singer-Prebisch thesis. Inspired by Amin (1974), Love (1980) even calls Prebisch *the* originator of the debate on unequal exchange but the sense in which this could be true is questionable. This is partly because Love underrates Singer, who made the substantial contribution with respect to the terms-of-trade debate (Toye and Toye 2003), and partly because the only other sense in which 'the' debate on unequal exchange originated would have to have been with Emmanuel (1962, 1972a).

Based on former studies by the League of Nations and Schlote, Singer concluded that average prices of primary commodities relative to manufactured goods had been declining over a period of more than half a century, the relative prices of primary goods deteriorating by about one-third since the 1870s and somewhat less than 30 per cent since 1913 (UN 1949: 23). Schlote's data for the United Kingdom went further back, and the trend up to the 1870s showed, by contrast, a marked increase for the goods imported over those exported. This shift in the trend went counter to the general assertion among classical economists, apparently correct at the time, that the development of productive forces in manufactures and the limited expansive possibilities of raw materials and 'land', would ensure that the terms of trade change in favour of the latter (Findlay 1987: 626).

Now, as evidenced by the rising standards of living in industrialised countries from 1870, there was 'little doubt that productivity increased faster

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in the industrialized countries than in primary production in underdeveloped countries', Singer explained (UN 1949: 126). 'Hence, the changes observed in terms of trade do not mean that increased productivity in primary production was passed on to industrialized countries; on the contrary, they mean that the underdeveloped countries helped to maintain, in the prices which they paid for their imported manufactures relative to those which they obtained for their own primary products, a rising standard of living in the industrialized countries, without receiving, in the price of their own products, a corresponding equivalent contribution towards their own standards of living' (ibid.).

If there is any single origin for the post-war debate on 'unequal exchange' in Love's (1980) more general sense, this conclusion is a good candidate. It was the report's most controversial implication, in line with Singer's (1949: 2f) slightly earlier recognition that the Marxist view of how rising standards of living for certain groups coincide with general deterioration and impoverishment was much truer for the international scene than for the domestic. Singer's 'clear message of historical injustice' was 'very shortly to be rejected by the subcommission' (Toye and Toye 2003: 450). It was, in fact, the reason why Prebisch avoided the general fate of UN authors to remain anonymous (Toye and Toye: 456f).

Prebisch quoted both Singer's data and his conclusion (ECLA 1950: 10, n. 3) to make the same point, adding only the 'centre-periphery' terminology. Technical progress had been greater in industry than in the primary production of peripheral countries: 'Consequently, if prices had been reduced in proportion to increasing productivity, the reduction should have been less in the case of primary products than in that of manufactures, so that as the disparity between productivities increased, the price relationship between the two should have shown a steady improvement in favour of the countries of the periphery' (ECLA 1950: 8), which would have distributed the benefits of technical progress alike throughout the world. Since the ratio actually had moved against primary products, centre incomes must have increased more than productivity: 'In other

words, while the centers kept the whole benefit of the technical development of their industries, the peripheral countries transferred to them a share of the fruits of their own technical progress' (ECLA 1950: 10). Singer (1950) reiterated these arguments in the context of possible disadvantages in receiving foreign investments that reinforced specialisation on the export of food and raw materials, and the advantages for investing countries in increased dynamism and lower prices of imports, concluding: 'The industrialized countries have had the best of both worlds, both as consumers of primary commodities and as producers of manufactured articles, whereas the underdeveloped countries had the worst of both worlds, as consumers of manufactures and as producers of raw materials. This is perhaps the legitimate germ of truth in the charge that foreign investment of the traditional type formed part of a system of 'economic imperialism' and of 'exploitation' (Singer 1950: 479f).

The most obvious empirical objection in the ensuing debate struck at the identification of primary/agricultural production with underdevelopment or backwardness. Viner (1952: 61ff) pointed to the numerous exceptions to this alleged rule: Denmark exporting butter and bacon; New Zealand exporting lamb, wool, and butter; Australia exporting wool and wheat; similarly with California, Iowa, Nebraska, and so on. Looking at Italy and Spain, neither was it evident that industrialisation was synonymous with prosperity. The problem in poor countries was not to be found in agriculture as such, or in the lack of manufactures as such, but in underdeveloped agriculture and underdeveloped industry. The large share of primary production was not a cause of poverty, but merely an associative characteristic of poverty and low agricultural productivity (Viner 1952: 50).

In fact, Singer himself had already noted as a major limitation of his UN study that it was based on price relations between primary commodities, which formed the major export articles of underdeveloped countries, and manufactured goods (specifically capital goods) which formed an important part of their imports. 'It may, however, be very misleading to conclude that changes in

total terms of trade as they affect under-developed countries follow directly from changes in price relations between these major classes of commodities. In particular, the high prices of food imported into under-developed countries must be considered before conclusions are drawn from simple changes in price relations between primary and manufactured goods' (UN 1949: 4).

The most significant contribution to the debates was made by Kindleberger (1956), concluding that there was no long-run tendency for the terms of trade to move against primary products as such (exemplifying North American wheat or Swedish timber), particularly allowing for changes in quality of manufactures. By contrast, the terms of trade ran heavily against underdeveloped countries. Since productivity presumably had increased more in industry than in agriculture, and obviously more in the developed than in the underdeveloped countries, if the commodity terms of trade ran in favour of developed and against underdeveloped countries, the double factoral terms of trade had done so still more (Kindleberger 1956: 240). That deteriorating commodity terms of trade suggested a more important deterioration in the double factoral terms of trade was of course the point all along. However, as observed by Streeten (1982: 8), the debate had been shunted onto the wrong track by disputing the historical evolution of the actual terms of trade, since the relevant issue was not what the terms of trade were compared to what they had been, but what they were compared to what they should have been.

The Singer-Prebisch theorem involved a renaissance for the age-old mercantilist belief in a 'fundamental inferiority of trade in basic produce as compared with trade in manufactures', later to re-emerge also with ecological unequal exchange. However, replying to Kindleberger's criticism, Singer (1958: 87f) himself largely abandoned this conception in favour of the idea that it was instead the terms of trade of developing countries as such that were deteriorating, whether they produce raw materials or manufactures. 'Singer I assumed the central peripheral relationship to reside in the characteristics of different types of *commodities,* i.e. modern manufactures versus primary commodities. Singer II now feels that the essence of the relationship lies in the different types of countries' (Singer 1974–75: 59). Recollecting the early years, Singer (1984: 292f) wrote of the 'point first made by Charles Kindleberger, that the tendency toward deterioration is more a matter of the characteristics of different countries than of different commodities', dubbing it the 'Kindleberger effect' as supplementing the 'Prebisch-Singer effect.'

According to Singer (1987: 627) the latter was originally explained by differing elasticities for primary products and manufactures (1 and 2), or disproportionate factor incomes in manufacturing (3 and 4): (1) a drop in the price of primary inputs will only mean a proportionately smaller drop in the price of the finished product and no great effect in demand can be expected; (2) demand for primary products is bound to expand less than demand for manufactured products, partly because as incomes rise a smaller share will be spent on agricultural products, partly because of the development of synthetic sub-statutes for primary commodities; (3) monopolistic profits of multinationals in addition to higher prices charged for innovations; (4) both labour and commodity markets are more organised in industrial countries, with trade unions, monopolistic firms and producers' organisations ensuring that 'the results of technical progress and increased productivity are largely absorbed in higher factor incomes rather than lower prices for the consumers' (Singer 1987: 627), whereas in underdeveloped countries increased productivity is likely to show up in lower prices, benefiting the overseas consumer rather than the domestic producer.

Interestingly, Kindleberger (1943a, b) had himself invoked 'Engel's law' of demand to explain why the terms of trade would inexorably move against raw material countries as the world's standard of living increased, arguing for industrialisation based both on the differing elasticities of demand for primary and manufactured products, and on the special institutional organisation of production in industry – arguments with which Prebisch (Love 1994: 421) and possibly Singer were both familiar. Now, however, Kindleberger (1956: 247) observed contradictions

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between the argument from elasticities and that from organisation of factors, concluding that the latter were supererogatory: 'If it can be conclusively established that the elasticities facing the underdeveloped countries are lower than those facing the developed, there is no lack of forces to explain why the terms of trade work as they do'. Emmanuel (1972a: 82) agreed that 'it is hard to see what a more dynamic posture of the factors could do in the face of a defective structure of external demand, if it is really demand that determines prices'. This led Prebisch ultimately into circular reasoning, 'taking wages sometimes as cause and sometimes as effect': 'Prebisch is looking for a cause for a certain evolution of world prices. He thinks he has found this in a certain evolution of wages, which is in turn conditioned by a certain evolution of productivity. Now, productivity can in no case affect wages except *through prices*' (Emmanuel 1972a: 87).

Of course, Emmanuel's (1972a: 172) declared objective was precisely to challenge the view that demand determined prices and prices wages, following the lead of Arthur Lewis who in 1954 had argued 'that in the long run in the less developed countries (LDCs) it is the factoral terms of trade that determine the commodity terms of trade, and not the other way around' (Lewis 1984: 124f).

Unequal Exchange between Temperate and Tropical Sections of the Dual World Labour Market

In spite of Lewis's 1954 article on the 'unlimited supplies of labor' being 'widely regarded as the single most influential contribution to the establishment of development economics as an academic discipline' (Kirkpatrick and Barrientos 2004: 679), his 'open' model explaining the terms of trade has been largely neglected. This contrasts with the stir created by both Singer-Prebisch and Emmanuel.

In Lewis's (1954, 1969, 1978a, b) basic model, 'unlimited supplies of labor' from the non-capitalist sector ensures that wages are kept down also in the capitalist sector, where profits are thus increased and investments can proceed at

an increased pace. Wages in the non-capitalist sector are basically set by the level of productivity in subsistence agriculture. So far as it concerns the terms of trade, his theory is this: productivities in subsistence agriculture determine the wage differential between the world's two large groups of migrants in the 19th and early 20th centuries, from Europe to temperate regions of settlement, and from China and India to tropical regions, which roughly correspond to the developed and underdeveloped world respectively, and are in turn kept separate by monopolisation of the high-wage labour market. With the wage level fixed or determined 'from the outside', an increase in productivity for tropical exports can only decrease unit prices, thereby explaining, in Lewis's mind, the terms of trade.

Asking why someone growing cocoa earns one-tenth of the income earned by someone making steel ingots, Lewis abandoned the conventional argument based on the relative marginal utilities of cocoa and steel. Since Lewis's model assumes the alternative option of growing food for subsistence, people's 'relative incomes are determined by their relative productivities in growing food; and the relative prices of steel and cocoa are determined by these relative incomes and by productivities in steel and cocoa' (Lewis 1969: 17). Demand was important in the short run, but the long-term determinants were the conditions of supply.

Lewis (1954, 1969) assumed a temperate country producing three units of steel and food respectively, and a tropical country producing one unit of rubber (or coffee) and food respectively. Accordingly, the commodity terms of trade were 1 steel = 1 food = 1 rubber (coffee), while the factoral terms of trade determined by relative productivities in food were 1 temperate wage = 3 tropical wages. Now, if productivity tripled in rubber (coffee) this would be excellent for temperate workers (as consumers), since then 1 steel = 3 rubber (coffee), whereas it would do tropical workers in either line of production 'no good whatsoever' (except as consumers of rubber/coffee) since their wages would continue to be determined by food productivity. If, on the other hand, tropical food productivity were to

triple, then tropical wages would rise correspondingly in both food and rubber (coffee) production, equalising the factoral terms of trade, and ameliorating the commodity terms of trade so that 1 coffee = 3 steel. Thus, temperate workers were better off if productivity increased in what they buy, and worse off if it increased in the tropical food sector. Tropical workers 'are benefited only if productivity increases in their subsistence sector; all other increases in productivity are lost in the terms of trade' (Lewis 1954: 183).

This gave Lewis the key to why tropical produce was so cheap, even in cases such as the sugar industry, where productivity was very high by any biological standard, and had been advancing by leaps and bounds, trebling over the 75 years preceding 1954, outdoing anything comparable in the wheat industry. And yet workers in the sugar industry continued to walk barefooted and to live in shacks, while workers in wheat enjoyed among the highest living standards in the world: 'The reason is that wages in the sugar industry are related to the fact that the subsistence sectors of tropical economies are able to release however many workers the sugar industry may want, at wages which are low, because tropical food production per head is low. However vastly productive the sugar industry may become, the benefit accrues chiefly to industrial purchasers in the form of lower prices for sugar' (Lewis 1954: 183).

The capitalists did not enter the argument, Lewis explained in parenthesis, 'because their earnings are determined ... by the general rate of profit on capital' (Lewis 1954: 183). This (necessary) assumption, vaguely made in passing, of a uniform rate of profit between the countries, was what Emmanuel found most revolutionary. *Somebody* had to benefit from the low wages, Emmanuel (1972a: 89) noted, and this could only be the capitalist (as in Lewis's closed model) or the consumer: 'If it is the capitalist, there may perhaps be exploitation or bad distribution within the nation, but there is no unequal exchange on the international plane. If it is the (foreign) consumer, we have plundering of some nations by others. If the capitalist cannot benefit by it (at least not in the long run), owing to competition of capital and the equalization of

profits, only the consumer is left, and for him to benefit it is necessary that prices fall'. Apart from this vagueness, Emmanuel found nothing to be said against Lewis's model, except that assuming the presence of a self-subsistence sector made it too restricted to serve as a general theory.

In fact, Lewis did not have just any subsistence agriculture in mind, but based his model on the historical example of the first global century before 1913, which saw the emergence of 'the new international order', as he termed it. Lewis's explanation is based on extending his model of unlimited supply of labour to the whole world, and on the politically enforced creation of a dual world labour market, based on farm productivity in Europe and Asia respectively. 'The development of the agricultural countries in the second half of the nineteenth century was promoted by two vast streams of international migration', about 50 or 60 million people leaving Europe for the temperate settlements (USA, Canada, Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa), and about the same number leaving India and China for tropical plantations, mines, or construction projects, largely as indentured labourers (cf. Williamson 2002: 21ff): 'The availability of these two streams set the terms of trade for tropical and temperate agricultural commodities, respectively. For temperate commodities the market forces set prices that could attract European migrants, while for tropical commodities they set prices that would sustain indentured Indians' (Lewis 1978b: 14). The Asians 'came from countries with low agricultural productivity, and were willing to work for a shilling a day or less', whereas Europeans 'expected wages in excess of those earned in Europe', where farm productivity was several times higher than in Asia (Lewis 1978a: 158).

The similar difference between European and tropical wage and agricultural productivity levels suggested a causal relationship. If agricultural output per man was six or seven times greater in Britain, the largest source of European migrants, and even more in the US, the largest recipient of European migrants, than in tropical agriculture, similarly, in the 1880s, the wage of an unskilled construction worker in Australia was nine

shillings a day, compared to the wage of a plantation labourer at one shilling a day (Lewis 1978b: 14ff).

This aspect of his argument is not the most convincing, unnecessarily restricting his theory and neglecting institutional differences that may similarly influence both productivity and wage levels. Lewis *did* mention several such influences, for example the interest of capitalists in certain colonial or imperialist policies directed against increasing productivity of the subsistence workers and thereby wages (Lewis 1954: 149). Thus, plantation owners had no interest in seeing knowledge of techniques or seeds spread to peasants, turned peasants off their lands, opposed land settlement, and would use their influence in government to the same effect. 'Imperialists invest capital and hire workers; it is to their advantage to keep wages low, and even in those cases where they do not actually go out of their way to impoverish the subsistence economy, they will at least very seldom be found doing anything to make it more productive. In actual fact the record of every imperial power in Africa in modern times is one of impoverishing the subsistence economy, either by taking away the people's land, or by demanding forced labor in the capitalist sector, or by imposing taxes to drive people to work for capitalist employers' (Lewis 1954: 149). Nevertheless, if capitalists did not enter his formal argument, neither did landlords, in spite of the prime importance of rents (together with wages) in the distribution of income in the first, although not the second, global century, and despite the various institutional settings and property relations in land necessary for his model to function as predicted. Thus, if land in the temperate settlements was free and abundant, this was an endowment that was partly an institutional or political artefact: 'In many cases the land was sparsely occupied by native peoples (Indians in the Americas, aboriginal Australians, African tribes). There was no hesitation in making war on these peoples, killing them off, or confining them to reservations, so that large acreages could pass into European farming' (Lewis 1978a: 183). Conversely, landownership in tropical regions was more concentrated, even becoming so by long-

term improvement in terms of trade together with short-term fluctuations (Williamson 2011), and could, if necessary, 'populate' them with slaves or indentured labour (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997). In fact, monopolistic concentration of landownership, supported by systems of labour control, will in itself result in, on the one hand, monopsony on the rural labour market and consequent lower wages (so to speak, *creating* unlimited supplies of labour) and, on the other, lower agricultural productivity (of both land and labour) (Griffin et al. 2002).

A crucial point of Lewis's argument, however, is the creation and maintenance of two distinct labour markets, which in turn set the prices of their respective exports, further offering temperate settlements highly divergent prospects from those of the tropics (Lewis 1978a: 158). From the high temperate income per head there came immediately a large demand for manufactures, opportunities for import substitution and rapid urbanisation, large domestic savings per head, with money available to spend on all levels of education, soon creating their own power centres and managerial and administrative élites, independent of and sometimes hostile to the imperial power long before formal independence. Thus, while the 'factoral terms available to them offered the opportunity for full development in every sense of the word', those available to the tropics 'offered the opportunity to stay poor . . . at any rate until such time as the labour reservoirs of India and China might be exhausted' (Lewis 1978a: 192). This was well understood by the working classes in the temperate settlements themselves, including the US, who 'were always adamantly opposed to Indian or Chinese immigration into their countries because they realised that, if unchecked, it must drive wages down close to Indian and Chinese levels' (Lewis 1978a: 192).

Obviously, no-one believes that Indians and Chinese would actually have preferred to move to horrific labour conditions in tropical areas, rather than to what has been called the 'workers' paradises' of temperate areas, had they had the choice. This is a fairly well-known, if unattractive, story of anti-immigration policy, surging with the welfare state and labour organizing against both

local capital and international low-wage competition. Economic recession and unemployment inspired protectionism, social policies and anti-Asian sentiments. Pre-First World War Australia was a pioneer in protecting itself from the flux of workers from Asia and the poorer regions of Europe, starting with Victoria State in the mid-1850s, the first restrictions on immigration appearing in the 1880s, and a federal-level European language test established in 1902, on the instigation of the Australian Labour Party. Restrictions were extended in the inter-war years to promote British settlers and hinder non-Britons, refusing entrance on national, racial, or occupational grounds. New Zealand followed suit already in the 1880s and 1890s; in the four decades from the 1880s to the 1920s, the Chinese population of Oceania actually decreased, while South Africa took measures against Indians and Chinese in 1913. The first restraints in the US were imposed with various Chinese Exclusion Acts from the 1880s onwards, and from 1917 Chinese were simply refused entrance. In the 1920s, a system including several European countries was instigated with quotas for each country of origin of a few per cent of the number having immigrated until 1910 or 1890. Immigration sank drastically in every decade, with new minimums following new restrictions in the depression years. Canada followed its big American brother from the early 1900s, notably Asians in the 1920s and Southern and Eastern Europeans in the 1930s, while at the same time encouraging Britons. Pioneered in the countries of British settlement, antiimmigration restrictions became generalised in the 1920s and 1930s (Bairoch 1997, I: 476ff; II: 176, 483f; III: 26ff; James 2001; McKeown 2008). This closing of national borders and weakening international solidarity just as cheaper travel made movement easier and the spread of knowledge opened up new vistas and horizons was 'frankly one of the most reactionary trends of our time', Myrdal (1964: 95) observed. 'The improved economic status and security of employment of the working classes have given even the labourer vested interests at home as a professional' (Myrdal 1964: 96). While certain types of specialised workers would have an international labour market, the common people were 'tied to their land of birth as firmly as in feudal times the serf was tied to the estate of his lord', allowed to go sightseeing or visit the market but obliged to return (Myrdal 1964: 97).

Picking up Lewis's idea of the dual character of the world labour market, Williamson (2002: 21ff) sees a segmentation of convergence regions in the high-wage West and the low-wage Rest. If, as Williamson argues, labour mobility was the most important force in convergence, monopolisation of the high-wage labour market (its opposite) could equally be treated as the major force in the 'great divergence' between developed and developing countries, but apart from Lewis and Emmanuel this seems never to have been done. If Lewis focused on the late 19th and early 20th centuries, unequal exchange in Emmanuel's perspective has a peculiar role in explaining the 'overdevelopment' of the postwar Golden Years.

Unequal Exchange as a Factor in Capitalist Overdevelopment

Already in the first global century before 1913, 'a well-integrated world capital market insured that risk-adjusted financial capital costs were pretty much equated the world around', Williamson (2006: 37f) has concluded: 'Thus, while capital was mobile internationally, labor and land were not'. Heckscher (1919) observed the great mobility of capital, relative immobility of labour, and complete immobility of land, but as his theory was formulated just after the globalising trends had collapsed in the First World War, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory instead assumed complete immobility of factors. Global goods and capital markets more or less recovered after the autocratic World War and Depression interval (Obstfeld and Taylor 2003, 2004), whereas the globalisation backlash of labour markets became a permanent feature not even discussed at the Bretton Woods conference and with only restricted revival in recent decades so as not to risk any 'convergence' (Chiswick and Hatton 2003; Hatton and Williamson 2005; McKeown 2008). These and other differences between

science and the city, underlined by Myrdal (1957, 1964) in his critique of Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions and predictions, became important for Emmanuel.

Emmanuel's theory assumes, on the one hand, a relative mobility of capital, sufficient to give rise to a tendency for global equalisation of the rate of profit, and a relative immobility of labour so that wage rates may differ considerably between countries; on the other, an exogenous (extra-economic, institutional) determination of nominal wages, depending on power relations between social classes in each country and each epoch (Emmanuel 1975a: 36).

The gist of all Emmanuel's demonstrations (1962, 1972a, 1975a), whether in Marxist price of production schemas or Sraffian input-output systems of varying levels of generality, is that an increase in (nominal) wages in any country will be passed on to the prices of the products of that particular country, whereas the corresponding decrease in the rate of profit will be spread out globally, entailing an increase in the relative prices of the products experiencing the wage increase; that is, an amelioration of their terms of trade. (Only then and according to consumption will real wages be determined.)

Less worked out historically than Lewis's model, Emmanuel thus explicitly posits a rate of profit that, unlike other factoral rates of remuneration, is internationally competitive and tends toward equalisation. Just as for Lewis, Emmanuelian unequal exchange is caused by monopolisation of the high-wage labour market, which results in higher prices than would otherwise be the case, and in better terms of trade with the surrounding low-wage market. Wages (the 'independent variable' of his system) are determined externally (not merely by agricultural productivities as for Lewis, but institutionally, politically, historically, etc.), and are, as his definition puts it, 'safeguarded from competitive equalization on the factors market' (Emmanuel 1972a: 64; cf. 1962: 22). Simply put: 'Underpinning unequal exchange there is a monopoly, all right; not, however, a monopoly of goods . . . but the monopoly position held by the workers in the advanced countries' (Emmanuel 1972a: 169).

While there was much controversy and misunderstanding over Emmanuel's Marxist price of production schemas (which he abandoned in 1970, along with arguments in terms of labour value, as soon as he was no longer obliged to relate to Bettelheim as his thesis supervisor), the real issues appear to have been the political conclusions on the lacking basis for international worker solidarity, and its theoretical counterpart in the choice of wages as the independent variable, something which every subsequent alternative unequal exchange theory discarded, but without resolving the theoretical problems thereby created (Brolin 2006a, b; Emmanuel 1985: 153ff; Evans 1980, 1984; Mainwaring 1980, 1991).

Emmanuel's view on wages as exogenously determined is arguably common to both classical and Marxist economics, where the baseline is set by subsistence agriculture as in Lewis, but with 'subsistence' consumption levels given an added variable historical and cultural element. Thus, apart from any initial wage differences (whether due to environmental factors, agricultural productivity, or other factors), Emmanuel (1972a, ch. 3; 1975a: 36) pointed to efficient developed-country trade unions and political mobilisation since the late nineteenth century, coinciding with successful repression of similar activities in the underdeveloped countries under colonial or semi-colonial regimes, plus the drain of means which could have enabled wage negotiations in these countries. Because of his emphasis, Emmanuel is perhaps not sufficiently alert either to how rising European emigration in the late nineteenth century might have helped political mobilisation, or to how domestic power relations might be affected by shifting commodity terms of trade, such as the century-long boom in tropical agriculture (in spite of the Singer-Prebisch thesis) that, along with short-term swings, contributed to deindustrialisation, concentration of land ownership, and lower wages (Williamson 2006, 2011). Just as the globalisation of goods and factor markets is related to the global extension of communications, Emmanuel's argument on nationally 'fenced' political organisation could profitably be linked to the 'globalisation backlash' as well

as an extensive literature linking nationalism and the press.

It was not unequal exchange or the terms of trade, but wage disparity in itself that gave rise to unequal development or the Great Divergence. The link between the variations in wages, or especially the foreseeable *increase* in wages, and those of development was based directly on international specialisation and choice of technology, on capital movements, and on investment incentives (Emmanuel 1972a: 371f; 1975b: 54f).

Perhaps inspired by Habakkuk (1962; cf. Allen 2009), Emmanuel (1972a: 174) saw high wages as the cause of technological development rather than the other way around, by their necessitating increased capital intensity and encouraging investment through expanding the market. This had further implications for the international division of labour, where it became relatively cheaper for investors in low-wage countries to choose branches of production with low capital intensity and little qualified work (Emmanuel 1975b: 56). 'Thus, low-paid laborers keep machines and engineers out of the underdeveloped countries, while machines and engineers take the place of highly paid laborers in the advanced ones', Emmanuel (1972a: 374) argued, concluding that this 'substitution of one factor for another, caused by market forces alone, is the most dynamic element in the blocking of subsequent development in the first group of countries and in the accelerated growth in the second group'.

The 'perverse' movements of capital (more recently revived as the 'Lucas paradox' after Lucas [1990]) from low-wage areas where there is a shortage of capital to high-wage areas where it is plentiful, had been generally observed in the early post-war development debate (Bettelheim 1962: 7ff; Lewis 1954: 440; 1978a: 177; Myrdal 1957, 1964; Nurkse 1952: 574; 1953; cf. Brolin 2006a: 205ff). Emmanuel (1972a: 372) observed: 'Since the prime problem for capitalism is not to produce but to sell, capital moves toward countries and regions where there are extensive outlets and expanding markets, that is, where the population's standard of living is high, rather than toward countries and regions where the cost of production is low. It thus moves toward high-

wage countries, neglecting those where wages are low'. Because of the lack of investment opportunities in poor countries, what little surplus was formed was either wasted in luxury consumption or expatriated and invested abroad.

Already Adam Smith (1937: 406f) and Tugan-Baranowsky (1913: 189) had observed that in a capitalist economy it is easier to buy than to sell. Emmanuel's explanation (1966: 1198; 1984) is based on the fact that revenue does not equal the produced but the realised value, only part of which, notably that corresponding to wages, is transformed into revenue before the sale and independently of its results, whereas profit (of enterprise) is not acquired as revenue until after the sale and according to its results. So long as there are unsold goods (which is always), the value of aggregate supply will exceed that of the aggregate purchasing power standing against it, making the market price tendentially inferior to the equilibrium price of production. This makes the system dependent on spending artificially created credit, creating a contradiction between the will and the power to invest, and giving the system a tendency to produce below full capacity in inherently unstable business cycles (Brolin 2006a: 217–230).

If depression in this sense was capitalism's normal state, the only way to explain the crisis-free post-war Golden Years (with unprecedented growth-rates, wage increases, and all but full employment) was by the partial or total reabsorption of the excess of production/supply over revenues/demand. While redistribution from profit of enterprise to other sources of income (that were partitioned before the sale) could alleviate the perceived disequilibrium, ultimately, some extraneously induced demand was needed, either in the form of a surplus balance of payments, a budget deficit, or 'overtrading', in the sense of purchasing beyond one's means.

A balance of payments in excess had been a lasting preoccupation of policymakers since mercantilist times, particularly in depressed times when they outweighed improving the terms of trade, as if 'the luxury of optimising the terms of trade can only be afforded once the maximisation of exports in particular and the marketing of the

social product in general have been more or less achieved' (Emmanuel 1984: 346). Their compatibility was evidenced by the fact that 'for almost a century, the terms of trade of the developed countries as a whole have been improving spectacularly, while the overall balance of payments of the same group has not been in deficit' (Emmanuel 1984: 350). This said, neither could a surplus balance of payment explain post-war development. Budget deficits also realised part of the social product with purchasing power from outside production, and their importance has certainly increased since Emmanuel's time (notably in the US), but in his view could not explain the Golden Age.

This leaves 'overtrading', meaning 'to spend a virtual revenue by anticipating its realisation' (Emmanuel 1984: 352), something which obviously presumes a type of credit (well-known to economists) which not only transfers purchasing power in space from saver to investor, but also in time from the future to the present. However, such *ex nihilo* generation of bank money was merely a necessary, not sufficient, condition. For overtrading to result there must also be perceived opportunities for profitable investments. Emmanuel (1978: 59f; 1984) distinguished three kinds of incentives to overtrade:

1. *Erratic and momentary,* by consequence of certain accidental ruptures such as technical or commercial innovations, discoveries, opening of external markets. While referring to an extensive literature ever since Schumpeter on the long-wave consequences of interlinked innovations, it seems that Emmanuel nevertheless may have underestimated this factor in postwar economic growth and stagnation.
2. *Recurrent,* linked to the upward phase of the business cycle, and, thus, while crucial for capitalist development in general, not the explanation behind the crisis-free growth of the Golden Age.
3. *Chronic,* following from certain modifications of structure, the most important in the developed countries being, on the one hand, an institutionalised inflation; on the other, a regular rhythm of augmenting wages which, in

turn, had 'been made possible by external resources originating in the exploitation of the Third World, and made effective by trade union struggle and, more generally, the political promotion of working-class aristocracies in Occidental societies' (Emmanuel 1978: 59, my translation).

If the general problem is one of the relative demand for money and for every other good, it is easy to see how a depreciation of the currency could act as a stimulant facilitating sale and as an incitement to overtrade, but while the flight from money was meant to stimulate domestic activity and commodities, it risked favouring the commodities and currencies of competitors. In modern capitalism of the post-war era, Emmanuel (1984: 384–394; 1985: 225–252) argued, the stimulus arising from inflation was closely related to that of wage increases, where the latter urge on the former in so-called cost-push inflation. This presumed either goldmines in countries not hit by the wage increase (as was generally the case), or universal inconvertibility of currencies, which became official in 1971 but was the unofficial practice before that. As a consequence, the rate of profit could vary independently of wages, by making wage increases wholly or partly nominal after they had occurred. In this way, the late capitalist system had managed to create double stimulation, partly through the expansion of the market for consumer goods due to any residual real-wage increase, and partly through the expansion of the market for means of production through overtrading, which had the important side-effect of lessening resistance to wage claims, thus restarting the process. Seemingly, this cornucopia could go on forever, but its limits revealed themselves when the rise in oil price put in doubt the continued growth of nominal wages at a rate faster than retail prices.

For Emmanuel, there was nothing as important as the variations of wages. Unlike any other mode of production, capitalism stood all the natural functions of human society on their heads, began with the end, with the actual or potential consumption downstream attracting production and capital upstream, as if 'it is the possibility of

clearing the estuary of a river that determines the volume of its tributaries' (Emmanuel 1974: 72). Production can only take place as a function of prior real or expected markets, but left to itself, capitalism's own laws of motion tend to prevent the expansion of this river mouth (Emmanuel 1984: 372).

In a closed system, an exogenous growth of wages would diminish the rate of profit at an alarming rate, but in a system open to trade with low-wage regions the cost of wage increases could be transferred to foreigners and the decline in the rate of profit be halted, thus simultaneously allowing high wages and a high rate of profit – Emmanuel's definition of the consumer society (Emmanuel 1985: 171–198). Unequal exchange was thus offered as the solution to the problem of the fall in the rate of profit, in a way similar to that suggested by Grossmann in the 1920s, although, by contrast, in Emmanuel's case the rise in wages was the source both of unequal exchange and the fall in the rate of profit (Andersson 1976: 41; Brolin 2006a: 69; 182f; Howard and King 1989: 316; Loxley 1990: 717).

In Emmanuel's (1972a: 172) view, for a country in a competitive system to derive an advantage from its foreign trade, paradoxically, it must consume more than the others do, whether in the form of direct wages or other forms of consumption. While seemingly natural that one can only spend as much as one earns, the object of his study on unequal exchange was 'to prove that under capitalist production relations one earns as much as one spends, and that prices depend upon wages'. Noting that what his critics had found most scandalising was being led to recognise 'that increased consumption brings about greater development and greater enrichment of nations', Emmanuel (1972a: 337f, emphasis in original) challenged his adversaries' astonishment with a Popperian generalisation: '*No capitalist country has ever become poorer for having spent too much*'.

The common basis for the blocking of under-developed countries and the overdeveloped feed-forwarding of consumption lay not primarily in deliberate conspiratorial, or uninformed strategies of great power-holders, or even in peculiarities of social structure and technology, but in freely working market forces. For when the primary problem is not to produce but to sell, 'he who dominates is not the biggest producer but the biggest consumer' (Emmanuel 1974: 72).

For Emmanuel (contrary to his Marxist brethren but much like contemporary ecological critics of overconsumption), exploitation and unequal exchange were not a question of production but of appropriation, and the development of the forces of consumption was more important than development of the forces of production. The unequalisable levels of energy and material consumption (Laulan 1972), and the ecological stress it created, ultimately explained the lack of solidarity between workers of rich and poor countries (Brolin 2006a: 200ff; Emmanuel 1974: 78f; 1975a: 63ff; 1976a: 71ff;). In this sense, unequal exchange is a kind of Maxwell's demon at the borders of countries with wealthy populations, maintaining and enforcing wage and consumption differentials (cf. Martinez-Alier 2002: 204). ('Maxwell's demons were unnatural beings who were supposed to be able to maintain, or even increase, the difference in temperature between communicating gases by sorting out high-speed and low-speed molecules' [Martinez-Alier 1994: 30].)

Directing attention towards the areas that Marx''s projected tomes left unfinished, although addressing economists of all denominations, Emmanuel also tried to integrate some unpredicted developments. Marx's recurrent theme of increasing polarisation of society into workers and capitalists may have been reasonable at a time when domestic inequalities were increasing and exceeded those between nations. Ironically, precisely around the publication of *Capital* in 1867, the secular rise in real wages in England and the developed world began, and the income differences between the West and the Rest exploded, so that today 80 per cent of world inequality is driven by location rather than class (Milanovic 2011: 109ff).

It is perhaps similarly ironic that Emmanuel's and other theories of unequal exchange and unequal development should have been formulated precisely at the moment of East Asia's wholly unpredicted economic rise (Crafts and Venables 2003). In the words of Joyce: 'The

West shall shake the East awake . . . while ye have the night for morn'. Theories of unequal exchange are nevertheless still relevant in interpreting a world economy that has been liberated from the traditional land constraints of an 'organic economy' by point source fossil fuels into a feed-forwarding, high-wage, high-technology spiral (Allen 2012; Wrigley 1988, 2006). Global 'big time' divergence is maintained largely by monopolistic exclusion of the world's poor peoples from rich labour markets in a way that is not only unequal but also increasingly recognised as the world's greatest economic inefficiency (Hamilton and Whalley 1984; Pritchett 1997, 2006).

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Unequal Exchange, Globalized Production, the Smiley Curve

▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism

Unequal Labour Exchange

▶ Political Economy of the European Periphery

Uneven and Combined Development

▶ South–South Co-operation

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Uneven Development

Uneven Development Within Global Production Networks

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Synonyms

Commodity chains; Global production networks; Global trade; Global value chains; Imperialism; Uneven development; Value; Value capture; Value creation; Value theory

Definition

Increasingly global trade is dominated by global production networks. The effect of these on developmental outcomes has been substantial but contradictory. In this piece we will identify the ongoing problems with current academic debates on this topic and the limitations of its theoretical approaches for identifying the cause of ongoing uneven development.

The reorganization of global trade developed from several analogous shifts in the structure of global competition from approximately the 1980s onward. The first and most commonly discussed are the deregulation of capital and trade movements, technological improvements in communication, and transportation which facilitated more flexible and smaller shipments – both of which undoubtedly provided the underlying mechanisms through which change could occur. However, more fundamental was the rise of specialization by firms in core economies in response to inter-capitalist competition with the emerging firms in rebuilding Japan and Germany and increasing tension managing large geographically centered manufacturing workforces in the Global North (see Arrighi et al. 1999 for an extensive discussion).

The organizational changes we have seen emerge from this have been complex; however, what remains consistent is the unbundling of specific production processes and the decline of large vertically organized firms producing a single commodity internally. Though "lead" firms which govern the production of specific commodities often still maintain the comparative advantages these vertically organized firms maintained, particularly branding, capacities for innovation, extensive hard to replace retail, or production facilities – what is significant is that the component production, individual inputs, final assembly, and business services necessary to create these products are distributed to independent firm. Though relationships do exist between these firms and are often maintained over time, they remain typically semi-formalized and take on the formal structure of a solely market transaction.

Identifying the effect on uneven development is complex as on aggregate several contradictory trends are ongoing. Firstly, on appearance the effects have been profound and expansive due to the competitiveness of peripheral firms in many individual tasks, as well as rapid cheapening of some capital goods, both of which have allowed substantive industrialization. This is not only a superficial phenomenon either but has involved active increases in the use of capital goods and measurable increases in productivity. Furthermore, the effect of these changes on specific lower-quality valued elements of consumption goods prices has substantially altered consumption in some Global South countries (Kaplinsky 2013).

This does remain starkly unequal though. Inside countries it has tended to privilege specific groups of labor and capital, it is highly centered in specific regions, and it has completely missed many countries where production networks have not become embedded. However, it is a process worth taking seriously as the impact is not insignificant and has certainly appeared as strong growth across key areas of the Global South.

In spite of significant change, Brewer (2011) and Hickel (2017) have correctly identified that there has been no closing of the developmental gap over this period of change. The benefits that regions and firms in the Global South have gained represent absolute change but remain relative to their starting point even when replacing complex highly productive elements of global production. Indeed, even the much-lauded changes toward "convergence" in GDP per capita only emerge if we weight GDP in a way which assumes all consumption is of equal quality and ignores the complex ways in which often necessary elements of consumption come to be priced differently. It is still just as difficult for a country in the Global South to directly purchase goods produced in the Global North (Freeman 2009).

In the face of this, analysis of global production networks as a distinct set of academic debates attempting to categorize these informal trade relationships is useful. Providing an understanding how this specific change in uneven development is taking place as well as its wider systematic outcomes.

In this contribution, we will be outlining two key points. The first is the substantial capacity for even mainstream research to open up analysis of uneven development using an approach which focuses on global production networks. Identifying that the development of this field from specifically radical foundations, in particular, the world-systems approach is impactful. It has helped integrate an emphasis on the directly exploitative elements of the relationship between firms in the North and South and due to its focus on concrete complex trading networks offers several novel insights which theories of imperialism should not ignore.

The second point we will be addressing is how value is understood in this approach, this underpins how it understands uneven development and furthermore has provided significant empirical depth to the concept. However, simultaneously we will show the limitations of a continual emphasis solely on value capture in this approach due to its legacy in developing the world-system approach through Schumpeterian analysis.

From World-Systems Theory to Global Production Networks

In this section we will identify the way in which the global production network developed as a way to understand the specific phenomenon identified above, in doing so a brief intellectual history will be sketched in which the specific terminology of global production networks emerged as part of a critique against the initial approach and has been later joined by more critical perspectives. Throughout, what is worthwhile recognizing is the continuity across critiques – largely due to the focus on expanding the approaches, understanding of power rather than a systematic challenge to how global production networks should be understood.

Building on the notion of "commodity chains" from world-systems theory, the initial attempts to theorize how global production networks operated emerged from the work of Gereffi (2005) as the global value chains approach. This form underpins much of the engagement with the concept by global capitalist institutions such as the World Bank (Bair 2005), occouring early in the emergence of global production networks to identify the potential developmental opportunities and challenges from a decrease in control over industrialization.

On the one hand, this modification not the world-systems approach came with a clear notion of how firms in the Global South could improve their position through the notion of upgrading and thus begun to challenge its pessimism on development. However, this only emerged within the context of a view that current problems with industrialization were rooted primarily in the power Global North firms had over their suppliers. Thus, increasingly focusing on forms of development which emerged from the relationships between sites rather than simply internally, a key theoretical claim of uneven development being formed through power became embedded in the analysis.

To operationalize this form of power the global value chains, key theoretical concept is the notion of governance. This is understood as the structure around which the potential development

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outcomes from engagement with global production networks become distributed between actors within a production network – reflecting the power of individual firms to discipline others and, in particular, the power to determine other firms' prices (Kaplinsky 2000). This framework remains broadly uncontested throughout all further discussions of global production networks and underpins its role in introducing a more radical understanding of how uneven development is structured into mainstream development analysis. However, in itself, it is insufficient as the final cause of differences in power remains contested and can still be considered internal to Global South countries even, while there is a recognition that the Global North takes advantage.

The first form of power considered by this approach was developed through an analysis of industry-specific mechanisms which could be exerted as mechanisms of control between buyers and suppliers. This included the complexity of information shared between firms within a production network as reflective of the trust required to ensure advance purchases would be met, if the information could be codified and therefore set out as strict standards or if it required relying on specific internal skills of partners, and finally the extent to which suppliers required further investment to maintain their position. Together, this allows a schema to be developed of the extent to which active coordination, long-term relationships, and investments are required to support production networks, with each providing certain opportunities for firms in the Global South to advance their position by leveraging the needs of other firms while simultaneously remaining dependent.

This approach faced several problems; foremost, its emphasis on a singular "chain" concept tended to over assume power was effectively only occurring in singular hierarchical relationships. Subsequently, although there were ways to compare chains through identifying high-value activities, it was not apparent how the power to be a lead firm or to take advantage of a position was created outside of chains. Confronting this, the notion of global production networks approach developed from the work of Henderson et al.

(2002) and sought to increasingly include geographical and thinking beyond chains between firms to the networks which organize global production as required for understanding how power was created.

The primary outcome of this critique is not to necessarily challenge a focus on the organization of production for specific use of goods (see Bair 2005 for an overview of the evolution of views on global production networks). Instead, it expands the actors relevant to the determination of power and begins to recognize the role of regional inter-network connections and shared resources. In practice, this largely functioned as a discussion of institutions role in shaping interfirm relationships. This occurs as territorial institutions define firm organization, ownership, and conditions of production are shaped, both within defined territories and across them as regional institutions are formed, and different institutions co-shape one another. In contrast to rents produced at the firm-level, regionally supported rents are geographically and historically contingent, rather than being formed by tangible skills, technology, laws, or forms of power. In contrast to tangible assets, these are both harder to replicate but also more vulnerable as state-level institutions are generated by multiple actors to support social as well as economic aims. Consequently, they tend to be self-reproducing and are difficult to actively change. This introduces a range of novel limitations and path dependencies which can derive from a range of actors which are not recognized with a focus solely on interfirm power (Dicken and Malmberg 2001).

The specific institutions that a territory engages in are also considered impactful and have been increasingly centered in the global production networks 2.0 approach by Coe and Yeung (2015). The further development of this approach has identified several cases in which the development of institutions which can both adapt to and develop innovation is crucial to the emergence of longer-term relationships. In contrast to other regional assets which maintain a certain degree of temporality, labor market regulation may be useful to maintain a skilled workforce till a skilled workforce is not needed, for example, innovation

represents a specific skillset requiring relatively developed institutions and long local experience and subsequently allows interdependent relationships within production networks to be maintained over time. The coupling of regions through anchor firms with deep reliance on one another for their competitive advantages, therefore, represents an important form of power particularly when it allows others in a network to create new markets, involves optimization of costs between two firms, and allows substantial access to capital and support (MacKinnon 2011).

The last element of governance power which has begun to be recognized is historical and actor-driven definitions of local assets. This form has drawn heavily on Marxist and feminist perspectives by Werner and Bair (2011) and argued that the way specific the Global South is brought into global markets is crucial for understanding how institutional development emerges from the historically specific actors that create a market. In this approach, the histories which shape inclusion define specific capitalist aims and labors integration with local markets. Firms and regions were not integrated in an ordered rational way but instead by concrete relationships between actually existing capitalists of which only some survived due to factors often outside of any individual capitalists' control.

This process does not represent a form of power but instead shapes how power is used in both positive and negative ways. On the one hand, Pickles and Smith (2016) taking a regionally defined market such as the European Union firms within Eastern Europe may find themselves in advantageous positions due to their relatively unique status as developing economies with a Global North led regulatory unit. Though it may not continue to be competitive in all areas, as capital is already invested and regulations for trade are well developed, they remain in a strong position even as investment slows, and new investments are not continually found. In contrast, Havice and Campling (2013) have provided an archetypical example of how Global South firms face processes of exclusion due to the same phenomenon. In the past firms in the global south relied on specific compacts between both local and global capitalists and between local capitalists and workers to create semi-unique forms of specialisation even with limited resources. Though this provided advantages with specific buyers, they dependended on these specific personal relationships as markets changed to retain any inclusion in global production networks. The shift in supermarkets from branded to non-branded Tuna undermined the value of ecologically friendly line-caught Tuna as a skillset among Oceanic island workers; however, local capital had already developed infrastructure with several buyers and subsequently withdrew from canning its brands to lower value loin processing.

This view posits a deeper discussion of why value is created, proposing market formation as a process as shaping long-term outcomes by defining actor intents which shapes which assets are developed and how they can develop. However, in focusing on a novel empirical element of production networks, its contribution to discussion of value continues to emphasize rents, albeit, while seeing them as dependent on the way social relations create dependencies on specific forms of production rather than viewing them as simply a feature of specific constellations of institutions, markets, and firms.

In sum, the discussion on global production networks has identified a critique of the power relations that govern global trade and made mainstream a view that developmental outcomes are not purely the fault of Global South countries failure to develop. The embedding of this development approach has been important for shifting the emphasis of developmental organizations toward some beneficial areas and tying in with the generalized changes toward a post-Washington consensus with an increased focus on market failures and industrial policy (Werner et al. 2014).

There are substantial limits to this, the World Bank (2017), for example, recognizes all these forms of power as relevant for the participation of developing country firms in global production networks. They also recognize this as being determined by rules drawn from Global North power and directly changing how increased industrialization. However, their advice remains focused on

demand from the Global North and emphasizes the potential win-win of engagement with production networks, emphasizing absolute change, and only superficially recognizing exploitation. In line with this, much of their advice focuses on domestic reform in Global South countries as well as increasingly freeing up trade as ways to expand production networks potential.

Capturing Value and Upgrading

Connecting this literature even further to radical debates is the direct usage of a notion of value capture as central to the mechanism which determines how developmental outcomes are understood and the exact way in which uneven development is restructured. The emergence of the initial specific debate on global production networks from its earliest days embedded the world-system approaches use of Schumpeter. This model draws significant on the notion of rents as a return to the management of competition – and in particular scarcity. Thus, the forms of power identified act as mechanisms in which scarcity is maintained, managed, produced, and shared.

This has significant effects on how changes in industrial capacity are understood as developmental and underpin the global production networks understanding of change as being defined by upgrading. In contrast to typical focuses on productivity, upgrading defines change by the extent to which it affects the ability of firms to change their power to influence competition relative to other firms. Improving productivity may allow two firms to gain equally as the savings generated are shared. Producing increasingly sophisticated products, or using experience to move into other production networks, may allow access to different buyers or to take on more functions within a production network but fundamentally does not necessitate any change in power unless this is less common or easier to protect. The only way in which power therefore changes is the movement into activities which are less common or rely on an internally protectable set of assets.

This focus has remained through all approaches to global production networks, even

as the simplicity of this model has been questioned. For example, it is often difficult to identify these individual forms of upgrading in reality. Often becoming more productive is a protectable asset – requiring significant labor skill and organizational capacity. Similarly, the development of more complex products often directly allowed the movement into entirely different production networks due to the separation of production networks by the quality and starkly different interdependencies required when dealing with more complex luxury products (Ponte and Ewert 2009).

The notion of upgrading as allowing increased value capture, as a theoretical approach to both explain uneven development and in general as a developmental process, runs into significant further problems due to its explicit emphasis on profits as a ratio. The focus on extra profits appearing as a ratio is a consequence of the litreature drawing largely on Schumpeterian analysis. In this approach product prices are soley market-determined, while the sale price in which value is realized is modified by a capitalists ability to realize rents as a return to scarce assets. This appears as a ratio between the markets tendency to equalise prices and reduce profits to zero and the ability of capital to protect and maintain innovation and unique asssets as an additional entrepreneurial profit.

Though this remains a useful theoretical apparatus for identifying the relationship between power and outcomes, the aim of capital as an actor is to produce with any profit not just a higher ratio to investment. This can also involve simply an absolute increase in capital invested and returned. Thus, in many cases firms may not be interested in the risky investment required to upgrade. Indeed, Blazek (2015) found substantial evidence that downgrading is a common strategy – why face increased competition in high-profit low-volume sectors, challenging innovative firms, or trying to replace functions currently held by core economies with deeper institutional support when the mass scale lower-quality global production networks offer the chance of large-scale investment.

This problem underpins a gap in evidence on the effect of upgrading on development

understood as social conditions and outcomes for labor. There is evidence that around many sites of upgrading we do see increases in wages; however, they do not parallel the apparent forms of upgrading which increase value capture and are often highly localized. The increasing need for specialized labor is linked to beneficial changes. However, a crucial division is that the need for more specialized labor is not a necessary feature of increased value capture. Increasing productivity does tend to require an increasingly specialized workforce although at a regional scale, this may result in unskilled workers being removed from production and thus not result in an aggregate change. Firms moving into higher value-added activities within a production network follow a similar process; however, as they maintain an ability to capture value and often need to protect their position within chains, they are more likely to retain unskilled workers to support higher skilled activities. In contrast, movement between production networks producing goods of different qualities or different goods entirely is highly dependent on the extent to which this requires the use of new assets and skill composition rather than simply altering inputs (Tokatli 2012).

The problem in this approach is not that value capture is an irrelevant process but it is incomplete. How much value is ever captured is unexplained and thus a ratio of ongoing change between two firms supporting each other in altering global valuation becomes meaningless in absolute terms, instead we just know that it does not involve the direct replacement of core activities value due to change occouring as a consequence of savings. This problem is paticularly evident in the difficulties of explaining high and low value activites simply as a derivative of the amount of rents they can maintain and is clear when we see firms from the Global South directly taking on previously core functions. Their is evidence that many firms the ability to generate rents is common, even routine, as a feature of the competition. This is a challenge to the typical view that the core difference between low and high value activities is effectively representative of how more complex products provide more extensive opportunities for rents.

Tokatlis (2012) work on Turkish apparel firms identified that they have maintained a competitive position for European retailers. Indeed, many cannot neatly be called "suppliers" as they often engaged in activities such as marketing, branding, and retailing, which are understood as high value-added, alongside assembly and component production. This did not always involve the firm becoming a buyer and often represented peripheral firms engaging in diversification strategies in which these activities supported lower-value activities for core-oriented production networks, while, on appearance, high value-added activities were used to compete within peripheral markets. Furthermore, although peripheral firms used these advances to support value capture in peripheral production networks, in core production networks it often appeared as a risk, as core firms expected them to utilize these capabilities to directly design items to be sold in core economies for little additional return. Here then, the ability to overcome barriers to entry and even protect them to produce rents appears secondary to the scale of these rents reflecting the specific production networks they are utilized in.

The global market moving success of global peripheral suppliers shows similar evidence. Though rarer, and largely only existing in larger Global South economies, these firms consolidated their role in multiple sectors due to their support for the sustained expansion of core consumer product markets. In doing so they not only developed increasing power in these markets but actively contributed to their creation. These firms have been able to rapidly outcompete peripheral rivals and have substantially upgraded as the scale of their production acted as a scarce asset allowing them further expansion into activities understood as high value-added. Similar dynamics as Turkish firms are, however, evident. For example, Yue Yuen, the core supplier for Nike, has dominated its suppliers by vertically integrating subcontractors and design and has even produced its innovative logistics services which directly manage lead firms' stock rooms. This has allowed it to generate its particular rents as it has sought greater control over its suppliers and maintain its lead firm role over them. In spite of this, its ability to pass on

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price increases to its buyers is limited, and even in its domestic market, it cannot command similar prices to Nike despite its extensive role in a range of their products.

In the absence of a clear approach to understanding how individual activities move from being low to high value, several problems emerge as the advantages of being in a high-value production network are substantial. The scale of value generated provides an ability to lead production networks; the scope of production networks as final product scale determines the range of inputs that can be included and provides territories with the ability to continually support themselves through large-scale investment. This depth is significant for differentiating the features of similar commodities quality. For example, the ability of core supermarkets to cushion food prices from fluctuations in global commodity markets relies on the scale of their production due to working in high-consumption markets requiring extensive integration with financial and commodities markets.

The process we can identify here does explain the initial statistical evidence presented at the start of this section. These cases all represent genuine changes in the productive capacity of some areas of the Global South through engagement with global production networks – this has often involved extensive capitalization and upgrading. However, underpinning it is a failure to engage with the process of devaluation that is intertwined with this. For example, the genuine changes in consumption we have identified have emerged in part through Global South firms increasingly being capable of producing lower-quality consumer goods for cheap through the benefits gained from this process. However, without an engagement with how value is created, it is not clear how this process will produce actual commensurability between the production of the Global North and Global South.

Limitations of Value Capture

Value capture is a valuable concept for understanding a specific mechanism of uneven development for several reasons. It represents a direct transfer between two sites and provides a succinct way of understanding how the production activities in one country actively contribute to another. It is also directly visible in many specific cases. Firstly, there are numerous mechanisms for foreign-owned firms to directly transfer the profits they make to other locations. This is also a problem for considering the extraction of profit in core economies through their primary role in the globalized financial sector.

These represent clear cases in which value produced in one territory is moved to another. We can also understand how they reflect incredibly difficult to represent features of Global North markets deriving from their sheer scale compared to the Global South, such as the ability to wield sufficient historical wealth to invest on good terms and to be sites for complex financial markets with global influence. However, although this is understood as a form of power and an ability to lead global production the direct role differences in the size of domestic markets play in shaping production is not emphasised in a focus on capture. The scope of domestic markets of the Global North define not only the higher quality requirements due consumption in these markets being led by high wages but, furthermore, create the need for extensive local innovation to maintain this competition and investment capacity to reflect the massive scales of capital required to match these markets depth. There is therefore a constant space in these markets for opportunities in which rents can be generated as a territorial feature of markets bounded by specific markets for consumption. This exists even as individual capitalists from the Global South can readily invest in firms and financial markets operating in these areas.

The argument that value capture is the primary way in which uneven development is maintained becomes more difficult when we are dealing with the direct changes caused by taking advantage of low-cost wages though, as in this instance it is not evident that direct transfers take place. This certainly creates a situation which firms in the Global North can take advantage of and can be understood in some instances as a scarce asset in

itself, as the ability to take extensive risks, afford choosing between and keeping multiple suppliers simultaneously, access to the extensive business services required to manage the massive information and organizational capacities to maintain complex production networks. However, outside of the depressingly common but often temporary cases in which particularly brutal methods are utilized to push Global South suppliers and labor below their socially acceptable reproduction rates, which may represent abject poverty, the normalization of specific value for certain forms of labor should be considered a permanent change in how capitalism values the skills required to create a specific use-value (see Smith 2016 for several accounts of this process and a discussion of it as a form of value capture).

This distinction between direct and indirect requires a careful approach. In over-relying on the view that the only advantages from global production networks for the Global North require rents, it is possible to overly associate uneven development with a distortion of "true capitalism" in which imperfections caused by power and protected the hierarchy between states are the sole reason for continued failures of development. This problem is common in approaches which draw heavily on the monopoly capital thesis, such as world-systems theory, and the subsequent rewriting by more mainstream scholars such as Schumpeter (Dunn 2017). In these approaches, the role of power in structuring completion was taken as the central organizing factor of firm success. In contrast, although price changes governed by other elements such as labor costs, changing technology, and reorganization of social relations are relevant, they are considered secondary influences.

In contrast to relying solely on an understanding of power, what is crucial in identifying the scale of value created is reshaped by the processes that govern average costs of production. Though individual firms may pay more or less than the average cost of production in making an initial investment in concrete labor, capital, and inputs, they will only realize a return in monetary value equal to the amount of labor that is realized as abstract labor equal to average production costs.

This often requires complex combinations of labor skill and specific capital to achieve adequate levels of productivity, however, on a global scale labor remains unique not only in its contribution to value but also in its immobility and relatively sticky pricing at a territorial level. Thus, the way in which new forms of production are introduced and come to be competitive when increasingly organised within the Global South is crucial as not all elements of production will converge.

In the circumstances in which we see initial reorganisations of production, this may represent instances of direct transfer through the deliberate underpricing of novel Global South firms competing with firms in the Global North. However, as new producers in the Global South become the norm and begin to specialised in the production of specific tradable goods, that is commonly exported rather than solely produced domestically, there is typically a reversion in the average costs toward the lowest value labor required to put the right capital and skills into motion. The competition between Global South suppliers and potential for access to some nonprotected elements of capital further supports this process of devaluation to, as the rules of competition continue to operate in mobile elements of production to and subsequently the ability to and need to increased productivity remain in place and often with the enthusiastic support from Global North capital.

Historically in radical theories, the political implications of value capture have been crucial for identifying a direct mechanism in which the exploitation of the Global North provides systematic benefits for the Global North. However, the limitations we can identify do not undermine this as a conclusion, but instead make the mechanism through which occurs less direct and more market-driven part of the routine historical development of capitalist accumulation rather than just political power. Due to their being no intrinsic dconcrete differences existing between labor in the Global North and South, except the capital which hires them, the structure in which valuation takes place being systematically advantageous to the Global North is meaningful. Both capital,

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through the ability to lower the cost of specific skills, and consumers, who can realize lower consumer prices while their own skills remain relatively less pressured, gain systematic advantages while the revaluation of production is led by markets in the Global North.

The Relevance of a Global Production Network Focus

Identifying devaluation as an intrinsic process of how global production networks effect how the Global South can grow through engagement in global capitalism, alongside real processes of value capture, offers a fertile area for further analysis of the contradictory way in which they change rather than end uneven development. Though approaching this problem through a critical reappraisal of the global production networks approach is nessescary the approach already contributes three crucial insights due to its focus on identifying the complexity of concrete production networks and the variety in how power can be utilized by individual actors.

The first interjection of the global production network approach is that it moves beyond viewing the global economy as made up of easily distinguishable sectors understood by their industrial form. Instead, production networks represent the combination of both generalisable activities and the specific inter-firm relationships in which they are embedded. Together these define qualitative norms for the production of specific use-values across sectors as specific industries which can be further divided by the specific markets they support. This shift in the scale of analysis from sectors to industries, and indeed to specific production networks within these, has wide consequences.

This change in scale is not often emphasized by global production scholars despite representing its core division from world-systems theory in the initial formulation of the approach by global value chain scholars and the starting point from which its analytical differentiation to a focus on specific chain relationships proceeds. However, it also produces a tension around the extent to which this causes industries to become removed from

their sectors and the market insitutions, such as labour markets for specific skills which cross sectors, they are embedded in.

Focusing on the specific nature of industries has allowed the introduction of several mechanisms which have become central to analyzing governance. This has been especially important for understanding how the consolidation of specific activities which drive the valuation of differentiated uses of similar sectors creates forms of power and control only visibile in the production of specific goods, such as the ability to organize production networks and the apparently "insubstantial" elements of this such as controlling technological processes and branding.

The presence of these elements also allows recognition of production networks as often meeting a specific derivation of sectoral demand, representing how they organize production which matches qualitative measures of quality. In contrast to apparently subjective measures of industries producing to match the quality of specific markets often require starkly different combinations: requiring the ability to codify and translate the requirements to match specific cultural norms, different economy of scale requirements in to match the scale of different markets including large portfolios of similar goods, or the ability to manage intensive divisions of production to facilitate customization.

Focusing on this scale of analysis is the central way in which the global production network approaches an understanding of how competition is organized. Furthermore, this scale is largely ignored in radical political economy which tends to abstract it to sectors determined generally. Though radical political economy should not exclude systemic analysis, and indeed it remains crucial to fixing the global production networks approaches overwhelming focus on individual production networks, identifying how this codetermines one another is essential to taking the actual structure of global trade seriously and preventing a view that problems simply represent different productive capacities to create easily understood use-values.

The second interjection of the global production network approach is a recognition of the

additional costs that involvement in production networks involves as a feature of cross-sector relationships. These represent the element of productions cost which are explicit, however, as they derive from the agglomeration of individual firms in different sectors as specialized forms of specific production facilities producing for what we understand as industries their role in shaping the costs of meeting certain needs is often ignored. Though typically the current global trading system is understood as driven by labor arbitrage in production, the importance of this needs to be weighed against the actual costing and construction of functional production networks which also allow secondary territorial advantages to be secured by the Global North and determine actual patterns of investment.

Often several costs essential to successful transactions are negotiated between lead and supplier firms. Examples of this include access to finance, paying for the costs of technological licensing, investment in infrastructure, and the costs of engaging in the social networks in which information can be effectively shared; together representing the massive expansion of infrastructure necessary for ensuring commodities can be made, moved, sold, and stored. These costs are often non-tradable and supported by specific regional agreements but are crucial to the actual structure of costs which lead the Global North to engage in the investment and relationship development required for any positive outcomes for the Global South.

These industry specific costs are also often representative of industry specific requirements of quality in Global North markets. For example, the value of oil production implicitly includes the transportation costs with minimal stoppages and extensive communication of demand. The structure of consumer habits in more complex domestic markets also adds additional costs such as the licensing of technology purchased as services, which although disciplining profitable production costs for sellers in the Global North, are also separated from the purchase of inputs for production itself. These costs often thus represent specific additional required costs for more complex Global North focused firms but are only required to maintain a form of quality rather than representing any intrinsic difference in the production process between higher and lower cost final goods.

These costs are typically understood as being returned to unproductive actors and thus do not create value. However, they often represent a necessary role which must be advanced to ensure capital advanced to match Global North demand is valorized, and subsequently do become an integeral element of costs which firms in the Global North must pay for to survive and thus come to form the higher final price they can realise. How they are organized therefore represents a distinct cost which is subtracted from the created value individual firms realise but is retained in specific sites which can provide these needs rather than being a component that can be captured by others within an industry who are part of the direct production process.

The last element of the debate which the global production network approach can help expand is class struggle. To some extent, this is a relatively limited debate among scholars within this approach. It has emerged primarily in discussion of the actual developmental impact of production networks and in attempts by critical scholars to identify the role that class struggle may play in actually supporting forms of power and maintaining sites of upgrading which would otherwise be lost (notably through Selwyn 2012s work on Brazil). However, by emphasising individual firms global relationships the global production network offers ways to understand class without reducing it simply wider changes in globalisation.

The connection to industries and emphasis on individual development of labor around specific production networks adds a concrete focus to this which can be lost in approaches which focus soley on national labour markets. Though production networks often do not result in development change which alters uneven development for entire countries, their effect on the structure of labor skill and rapid intensification of capital use are crucial areas for further investigation. Firstly, not only to identify how the creation of an increasingly skilled workforce and significant changes in labour demand may provide sites for future struggle. But also, to improve our understanding of

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how groups of labour who appear to be winning from production networks in the Global South impact wider changes accross the labour markets they are involved in within specific territories and how they shape global regimes for managing labour by capital. Identifying this is important for recognising that the fracturing of global production by increased specialisation in smaller firms may be impactful even if it is not resulting in global convergence between labour with specific skills across borders.

The individual production network focus also provides a way to integrate an understanding of the specific historical class structures which may be underpinning current positions of advantage and disadvantage at a local scale in interaction with global trade which are not immediately identifiable at a state level. Due to the historical nature of individual production networks development, they are often reliant on a scaling up and adaptation of national labor-capital relations rather than their simple replacement by a global model; determining the trajectories of even similar commodities for the same markets as it continually shapes the way resources such as land could be brought into production and formed a part of labors reproduction as well as other vectors of oppression such as Gender. For example, the maintenance of low-cost non union sources of labor within the Sri Lankan apparel industry relies on the maintenance of traditional gender roles and has separated the organization of labor into distinct groups (Goger 2013). The opportunities for understanding how already existing racial dynamics of imperialism are being disrupted by these patterns beyond continued unenven development thus offers a further opportunity to understand changes in global trade as disruptive rather than simply an assertion of a singular global capitalism.

Conclusion

To conclude, the global production network approach offers a way to look at uneven development which centers the flurry of complex inter-capitalist relationships that shape global production, investment decisions and choices over labors management. In this approach class and sectoral composition remain analytically national but interconnected and can only be recognized by identifying the various sites for production and demand which exist. Though this approach currently cannot provide a complete explanation for uneven development the perspective, tools, models of mapping and organizing how to identify specific trade relationships are all vital tools for moving towards more concrete focused analysis of imperialism. Significant problems exist within it, and it is worryingly amenable to co-optation by global capitalist development institutions. However, this reflects its narrow focus theoretical focus and its development as an attempt to produce clear concrete identifiable causes rather than offer an overarching explanation of uneven development. Work to improve it will thus be expansionary, building on its radical roots to identify the wider systemic process of devaluation that shape uneven development and identifying the complex role global trade plays in reshaping class struggle at multiple scales.

Cross-References

▶ Ecological Unequal Exchange
▶ Global Free Trade, Imperialism, and International Trade Law
▶ Marxism, Value Theory, and Imperialism
▶ Neoliberal Economics and Imperialist Ideology
▶ Neoliberalism and Education in the Global South: A New Form of Imperialism
▶ Stratification in the World-Economy: Semiperiphery and Periphery

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Unilateralism

▶ Chomsky, Noam (b.1928) and Anti-imperialism
▶ Nuclear Imperialism

United Arab Republic

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

United Kingdom

▶ Braithwaite, Chris (1885–1944)
▶ Nuclear Imperialism

United Nations

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

▶ South–South Co-operation

United States

United States Expansionism and the Pacific

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Synonyms

Commercial imperialism; Cultural imperialism; Great power rivalry; Pacific islands; Resource extractivism

Definition

The history of the Pacific islands is in part a history of Western entanglement ranging from voyages of discovery, competition for trade routes, and colonial expansion, to annexation, commercial exploitation, militarisation, population displacement, and nuclear weapons testing. As early as the sixteenth century, Western encounters with Pacific peoples were marked by cultural misunderstandings and frequent violence. By the eighteenth century, European voyages of exploration and scientific documentation established the South Seas both as a real site ripe for economic and territorial expansion, and an ideal space suited to the projection of desires for escape, spatial mastery, and sensual indulgence. By the 1770s, the US had started to bring its free-market values to the Pacific, when ships from the East Coast

sailed around Cape Horn, heading for the trans-oceanic Chinese trade routes laid down by Spain, France, and Britain. Spurred on by an expansionism born in the eighteenth century and soon harnessed to the nineteenth-century ideology of manifest destiny, the history of the "American Pacific," and of today's Pacific Rim and Asia-Pacific are grounded in the interconnected forces of realpolitik, economic imperialism, and mythic invention.

Pacific islands have long figured as idylls – a myth that conceals a history of Western entanglement ranging from voyages of discovery, competition for trade routes, and colonial expansion, to annexation, commercial exploitation, militarisation, population displacement, and dozens of nuclear weapons tests (as recently as 1996).

As early as the sixteenth century, Western encounters with Pacific peoples were marked by cultural misunderstandings and frequent violence, as is well documented in both Antonio Pigafetta's account of Magellan's major exploring voyage (1521) and Pedro Fernández de Quirós's journal relating Mendaña's failed attempt to colonise the Solomons (1595). By the eighteenth century, European voyages of exploration and scientific documentation, with their vivid accounts, established the South Seas both as a real site ripe for economic and territorial expansion, and an ideal space suited to the projection of desires for escape, spatial mastery, and sensual indulgence.

By the 1770s, the US had started to bring its free-market values to the Pacific, when ships from the East Coast sailed around Cape Horn, heading for the trans-oceanic Chinese trade routes laid down by Spain, France, and Britain. David N. Leff notes that the American flag first reached China in 1784, establishing a strategic goal that would dominate US–Pacific relations (Leff 1940, p. 3). Spurred on by an expansionism born in the eighteenth century and soon harnessed to the nineteenth-century ideology of manifest destiny, the roots of the "American Pacific" were grounded in the interconnected forces of real politics and mythic invention.

One of first colonising gestures made by the recently decolonised US nation took place in

1791, when Joseph Ingraham of the *Hope* claimed the northern islands of the Marquesas, naming them after luminaries of the US Enlightenment such as Franklin, Adams, and Hancock. Just three weeks later, Etienne Marchand reclaimed all of the Marquesas for France. Significantly, the Marquesas would become the site of the first major US military conflict in the Pacific, when Captain David Porter – sometimes called "the first American imperialist" (Rowe 2000, p. 83) – stopped at Taiohae harbour in Nukuhiva to refit his ship the *Essex* during the War of 1812. The 1812 war, as Thomas Walter Herbert notes, evinced a desire of the US to be recognised as a legitimate state, one of the "community of nations" (Herbert 1980, p. 79), as Porter's actions in the Marquesas seem to bear out. Following a breakdown of agreements with local people, Porter and his men became embroiled in ongoing conflicts between the Tei'i, Hapa'a, and Taipi peoples, and proceeded to raid Taipivai, burning whole villages and killing many of what Porter later described as its "unhappy and heroic people" (Porter 1822, p. 105). Porter formally took possession of the island, demanding that its people swear allegiance to the American flag. His subsequent "Declaration of Conquest" indicates the paternalism of a US Enlightenment vision:

> Our rights to this island being founded on priority of discovery, conquest, and possession, cannot be disputed. But the natives, to secure themselves that friendly protection which their defenseless situation so much required, have requested to be admitted into the great American family, whose pure republican policy approaches so near their own. (79)

The US government never ratified Porter's occupation, and 30 years later the French again claimed the island group. Still, Porter's "Typee War" marked the fierce impact of *haole* (outsiders) on Pacific locales, and it fascinated and haunted travellers in Polynesia (such as Herman Melville and Paul Gauguin) for years to come.

In spite of Porter's failures, his published account, along with others that appeared around the same time (the German-Russian circumnavigator Adam J. von Krusenstern's *Voyage round the World in the Years 1803 ... 1806* appeared in English in 1813, and his chief scientist, Georg H. von Langsdorff, published *Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World* in English in 1813–1814, with a US edition in 1817) helped reinforce a notion that Pacific islands could serve US interests. However, while accounts such as Porter's painted a relatively positive portrait of Pacific cultures and stressed connections between the Marquesas and the "great American family," there were other, more derisive images of Pacific life that undermined any sense of familial inclusion. Missionary reports written under the influence of Calvinist doctrine commonly figured Pacific islanders as cruel, violent, and needing religious conversion. Publications that backed missionary societies (such as the *Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Magazine and Niles Weekly Register*) were dedicated to "evangelizing the heathen," and they portrayed groups such as the Maoris and Society Islanders as indulging in warfare, orgies, cannibalism, and infanticide. These "hard primitivist" notions of barbaric savagery thus accompanied, and in many ways played off, "soft primitivist" concepts of noble savages inherited from European thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau; together they are emblematic of an underlying duality that has persisted in US representations of the Pacific.

Charles Wilkes's US naval expedition of 1838–1842 further manifested this contradictory stance: purporting to be objective and scientific, Wilkes would become better known for his strong-arm military tactics (much like Porter's before him) than for his contributions to enlightened American progress. During an aggressive campaign in Fiji on Malolo, the villages of Arro (now Yaro) and Sualib were burned to the ground as revenge for the killing of two officers in the midst of a trading dispute. At Wilkes's command, injured survivors crawled on their hands and knees, begging for his pardon. One of Wilkes's crew, Charles Erskine, was so stunned by the events that he wrote: "perhaps I may be pardoned for thinking it would have been better if the islands had never been discovered by Europeans; not that Christianity is a failure, but that our [Western] civilization is" (quoted in Perry 1994, pp. 52–53).

The political and commercial contours of the "American Pacific" era began to emerge with the help of the British-Chinese Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. The US found itself in a disadvantaged position regarding Pacific trade routes due to concessions granted to Britain, but lobbied for extended rights and therefore achieved a stake in the Pacific on a par with European powers. Soon after, the signing of the Oregon Treaty in 1846 signalled the coming of the "American Pacific empire," when US freemarket liberalism would supplant established European powers (Dudden 1994, p. xix). In 1850, California was declared the 31st state in the Union, and the vaunted ideology of manifest destiny effectively became a geopolitical reality. As the balance of power shifted west, California became central to Pacific trade, with the west coast now at the heart of "the global space economy of capitalism that would continue for the next century and a half" (Soja 1989, p. 190). Closely linked to these economic shifts was the growth of US whaling routes, which Porter had staunchly defended. By midcentury, the importance of whaling was manifested in the US presence and investment in Hawai'i: the commercial plantation periphery to the emerging global centrality of the US.

The work of the literary figure perhaps most closely associated with the whaling industry, Melville, offers insights into some of the anxieties raised by US expansionism. Melville's *Typee* (1846) gestures towards antiinterventionism, and questions fundamental assumptions behind Western cultural hierarchies:

> The enormities perpetrated in the South Seas upon some of the inoffensive islanders well nigh pass belief. ... We breathe nothing but vengeance, and equip armed vessels to traverse thousands of miles of ocean in order to execute summary punishment on the offenders. On arriving at their destination, they burn, slaughter, and destroy, according to the tenor of written instructions, and sailing away from the scene of devastation, call upon all Christendom to applaud their courage and their justice. How often is the term 'savages' incorrectly applied! (Melville 1996/1846, p. 27)

Melville's ironic reversals threaten to turn the logic of the imperial "civilising mission" on its head. By the time of writing *Moby-Dick* (1851),

Melville had outlined an even clearer sense that the growth of the American Pacific would engender not just tactical violence, but ongoing commercialism, culminating in an Oceanic domination where "new built California towns, but yesterday planted by the recentest race of men" would be directly linked to "low-lying, endless, unknown Archipelagoes, and impenetrable Japans" via islands overrun by the demands of US markets (Melville 1994/1851, p. 456).

Driven by market forces, US expansion after the 1850s was largely linked to demands for guano, a highly profitable commodity used as fertiliser. With the "Guano Wars" and Guano Act of 1856, Washington's leaders declared the legality of claiming territory in the name of commerce:

> Whenever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other Government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other Government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States. (quoted in Leff 1940, pp. 7–8)

Unincorporated territories such as Baker, Jarvis, Nikumaroro (Gardner), Fakaofo (Bowditch), and Howland islands, along with Kingman Reef and the Kalama (Johnston) Atoll, were taken under this provision. At the same time, copra (dried coconut for producing oil) was emerging as the primary industry in the region, with Germany holding the greatest stake. Increasing commercial competition over the coming decades had substantial effects on Pacific and migrant labourers, with black-birding (kidnapping indigenous peoples into slave labour) increasing through the 1860s.

As the commercial stakes got higher, a more clearly defined agenda emerged under Abraham Lincoln's secretary of state William Henry Seward, who envisioned the Pacific as central to the quest to develop a US "empire" that could gain control of world markets. Seward argued that the US could achieve global power through commercial competition, "depending not on armies nor even on wealth, but directly on invention and industry" (quoted in Paolino 1973, p. 4). Though Seward's wider ambitions were never realised

during his lifetime, shortly after the end of the Civil War, in 1867, he was responsible for bringing both Alaska and the Midway Islands under US control.

It has often been argued that as late as the 1880s, Washington was still exhibiting an ambivalent attitude towards undertaking extensive expansion in the Pacific. The US stake could be seen as meagre compared to European colonial networks', and its interests were largely limited to those of private shippers and traders. Donald Johnson and Gary Dean Best note that in the 1860s, Apia, Lauthala, Suva, and Papeete had US consular representatives, but even these numbers began to dwindle as France, Britain, and later Germany assumed control of various island groups. Though this diminished presence might be attributed more to the recovery period after the Civil War and the economic crash of 1873, rather than to a lack of official interest, Johnson and Best (1995, p. 123) argue that "there simply was no American colonial policy in the 1870s and 1880s, either in Congress or in the executive branch, although occasionally voices might be raised in favor of one or another expansive move."

A closer look, however, indicates that the US was hardly turning away from Pacific speculation but instead shifting focus onto a small number of strategic island sites. For Walter LaFeber, the years 1850–1889 can be viewed as the "roots of empire," a period of preparation for the imperial acquisitions of the 1890s (LaFeber 1998/1963, p. 55). US representatives successfully negotiated in 1872 for the use of the harbour at Pago Pago, and the close involvement of Albert B. Steinberger (a self-styled "special agent" of the US State Department who came to see himself as the future "arch-manipulator" of Samoan affairs) in the formation of a Samoan government in 1875 assured ongoing US influence in the midst of subsequent governmental power shifts (Davidson 1967, p. 60). By 1878, US interests were officially entangled in Samoa, and by the late 1880s the secretary of state, Thomas Bayard, was explicitly linking the US interest in Samoa to the strategic construction of a canal across Central America. It is not really possible, therefore, to separate the interconnected US designs on the

Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean. During this period, advocates of "preventive imperialism" urged for the acquisition of territories that were in danger of being taken by other nations, while illicit activities such as black-birding continued unabated.

Historians have contested the once commonly held notion that US imperial expansion during the 1890s should be seen as an aberration amid predominantly isolationist policies. Indeed, the scale of the events that took place over an 18-month period between 1898 and 1899 (when the US took possession of Hawai'i, the eastern islands of Samoa, Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, the latter as an occupied country and protectorate) suggests that these actions were hardly isolated or anomalous. In Hawai'i, Queen Liliuokalani was overthrown in 1893 by American forces as a direct result of increasing commercial exploitation of the sugar industry, but the act was not a fait accompli. Grover Cleveland's investigation, the Blount Report of July 1893, found that US forces had conspired against the monarchy, and Cleveland opposed annexation due to the islanders' resistance. The subsequent Morgan Report of 1894, however, reversed Blount's conclusions and refused Liliuokalani's return to power, leading to an interim colonial administration headed by an open enemy of Hawai'ian self-rule, Sanford B. Dole. President William McKinley, who took office in 1897, also favoured annexation. In 1898, he succeeded, arguing: "we need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny" (quoted in Morgan 2003, p. 225).

A member of the US Civil Service Commission, John R. Procter, summed up the momentous events:

> The year 1898 will be one of the epoch-marking years in the history of the United States. In this year is to be decided the great question of whether this country is to continue in its policy of political isolation, or is to take its rightful place among the great World-Powers, and assume the unselfish obligations and responsibilities demanded by the enlightened civilizations of the age. (quoted in Welch 1972, p. 21)

Procter invoked a "New Imperialism" rising from the ashes of European imperialism, and the

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Pacific was seen as the natural extension of manifest destiny. For pro-imperialists such as Procter, the issue was not merely political, but also moral and even explicitly racial. Procter's invocation of battles in the Philippines praises the systems developed by "Teutonic ancestors," finding them regenerated in US beliefs and practices: "from the blood of our heroes, shed at Santiago and Manila, there shall arise a New Imperialism, replacing the waning Imperialism of Old Rome; an Imperialism destined to carry world-wide the principles of Anglo-Saxon peace and justice, liberty and law" (quoted in Welch 1972, p. 26). Indeed, as Peter Hulme argues, "as the nineteenth century progressed, US Americanism increasingly became an ideology based on the supposed moral and political superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples" (Hulme 2012, p. 59), a concept reinforced in a closely related notion of "English-speaking peoples." This privileged category was promoted in the writings of Teddy Roosevelt (the first volume of his *The Winning of the West* is titled "The Spread of the English-Speaking Peoples") and later persisted in prominent works such as Winston Churchill's *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*.

The motives behind expansionism were summed up by McKinley: "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as fellowmen for whom Christ also died" (quoted in Dudden 1994, p. 84). With these objectives, the president placed what Kipling had ironically labelled the "white man's burden" firmly into US hands, perpetuating and extending established European colonial networks. Vincent Rafael reminds us that the Philippines mission was characterised by McKinley's policy of "benevolent assimilation," which incorporated a nostalgic vision of manifest destiny while at the same time patronising Filipinos as the colonial children of the US, separating out the good ones from those labelled "insurgents" (Rafael 2000, pp. 21–22). More than 200,000 Filipinos (perhaps as many as a million) were killed during the ensuing Philippine-American war.

Often represented as a benevolent mission, US expansionism was underpinned by political and economic motives. For example, the watershed year of 1898 would see the founding of the American Asiatic Association, with its mission of working to "foster and safeguard American trade and commercial interests" (i.e., to lobby to protect US trade routes across the Pacific) and to "co-operate with religious, educational, and philanthropic agencies designed to remove existing obstacles to the peaceful progress and wellbeing of Asiatic peoples" (American Asiatic Association 1925, p. 709). In 1899, the Association's secretary pushed aside prevailing messages about the "civilising mission" and offered a blunter analysis of the Philippines' annexation: "had we no interests in China," he noted, "the possession of the Philippines would be meaningless" (quoted in LaFeber 1998/1963, p. 410).

There were, nonetheless, open concerns regarding the annexations of 1898–1899. The Philippines conflict, for example, led anti-imperialists such as William James to argue that any possibility of the US retaining a moral advantage in international politics was lost: "now (having puked up our ancient national soul after five minutes reflection, and turned pirate like the rest) we are in the chain of international hatreds, and every atom of our moral prestige lost forever." For James, the debate over expansion in the Pacific was "surely our second slavery question" (James 1972/1900, pp. 108–109), pointedly collapsing the presumed gap between far-flung imperialist aggressions and domestic racial policies by highlighting continuities between "external" and "internal" (or "foreign" and "domestic") subjugations.

Advocates for expansion nonetheless were gaining the upper hand in the war of rhetoric, arguing that what once had appeared to be limitless space for advancement within US borders was filling up. The transcontinental railroad, completed in 1869, had shrunk spatial perceptions of the continent dramatically, reducing the travelling time from the East Coast to California from an arduous journey of months to one that could be done in under a week. Furthermore, by 1890, the US Census Bureau would announce that the

western frontier had officially closed. A range of scholarly and literary works began to lament the loss of free land, indicating that a pervasive "frontier crisis" had entered US consciousness (Wrobel 1993, p. 29). At the same time, rapid industrial expansion contributed to "boom and bust" economics: depression struck in 1873–1878 and 1882–1886, and would return with force in 1893, lasting through 1897. Rekindling the visionary thinking of empire-builders like Seward, historian Hubert Howe Bancroft laid out plans for escaping what appeared an increasingly urbanised and unstable American continent by reinvigorating manifest destiny across "the new Pacific":

> The year 1898 was one of bewildering changes … Almost since yesterday, from the modest attitude of quiet industry the United States assumes the position of a world power, and enters, armed and alert, the arena of international rivalry as a colonizing force, with a willingness to accept the labour and responsibilities thence arising. (Bancroft 1912, pp. 12–13)

Bancroft then envisions the new America: "Thus the old America passes away; behold a new America appears, and her face is toward the Pacific!" (ibid.)

Yet the shift of US military and commercial power towards the Pacific was not merely the logical extension of the westward march of empire; it can be seen as part of the socio-spatial dynamics that Rob Wilson (drawing on Edward Soja) has called "peripheralization," where the spatial mastery and centralisation of one area becomes yoked to the commodification and distribution of power over peripheral areas. Hence Pacific islands like Hawai'i become linked as plantation and tourist resources to the growth of California as part of a closely integrated "global dynamic" (Wilson 2000, p. 94). This period further encompassed the rise of what Emily Rosenberg calls the ideology of liberal-developmentalism in US diplomatic policy: the adaptation of free-market enterprise as a fundamental principle for all nations, coupled with the growing acceptance of government intervention to protect private enterprise and speculation abroad. This ideology was aligning itself with both religious and secular senses of the US "mission" overseas: the Christianisation of non-Christians through radical conversion and the bringing of technological and professional know-how, or "progress," to "underdeveloped" peoples around the globe (Rosenberg 1982, pp. 7–9).

By the start of the twentieth century, New World powers such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, like the US, were jockeying for position in the Pacific amidst established European colonial powers. It was thus hardly surprising when, in 1907, a rumour circulated that the US wanted to buy Tahiti from France for $5 million, presaging the "dollar diplomacy" that would shortly hold sway under William Howard Taft's Administration. With the Panama Canal's completion in 1914 (after Panama, backed by the US warship *Nashville*, declared its independence from Colombia in early 1904), the US gained an enormous advantage in the global commercial arena. Powers such as France (their own canal project having foundered) had long held that the canal was the lynchpin to gaining dominance over Pacific trade routes. The French journal *Océanie française* stated: "The Panama Canal is not only an instrument of economic conquest. The Panama Canal will also create incalculable consequences. It will permit an active reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, altered from its original intent now for the sole profit of the Americans" (quoted in Aldrich 1990, p. 261). The French clearly still felt the sting of the Monroe Doctrine's invocation which, starting in 1842, had prevented intervention in protectorates such as Hawai'i.

US investment abroad, both economic and psychic, proceeded apace: between 1897 and 1914 (before the First World War forced a temporary slowdown), US direct investments in overseas companies increased fourfold, while the immense popularity of missionary societies like the YMCA, "rushing to convert the world to American-style Christianity within their lifetimes," continued to gain ground (Rosenberg 1982, p. 28). When the War came, it did not spare the Pacific: in 1914, Australian troops fought German and Melanesian soldiers in New Guinea, while soon after, a German ship

bombarded Tahiti, rather than Samoa, due to the "high esteem" German naval commanders held for its population (Hiery 1995, pp. 23–27). The Pacific, the strategic crossroads of competing powers, would in just over 20 years' time end up as a theatre of war, where the simmering imperial conflicts would be fully acted out.

Robert Aldrich refers to the period between the World Wars as the apogee of colonial power in the Pacific: a time when the *idea* of colonialism reached its zenith, when expansionist lobbyists and new modes of technical reproduction were disseminating images of colonial ideology more widely than ever before (Aldrich 1990, p. 273). But tensions were visible: the policies of New Zealand administrator Brigadier General George Spafford Richardson in Samoa initiated the rise of the anti-colonial movement the *Mau* (Samoan for holding fast), with violent skirmishes between New Zealand police and *Mau* protestors in the late 1920s. The *Mau* movement was also active in American Samoa, which was still under US Navy rule (Margaret Mead, famously, lived in a Naval dispensary with an American family while researching *Coming of Age in Samoa* [1928]). Under US rule, Samoans still faced the prohibition of interracial marriage, and there were disputes relating to pay for workers in the copra trade and Samoan police guard. In 1929, in response to direct Samoan pressures, the US government changed the status of the territory from that of an "illegal" to a "legal" colony (Droessler 2013, p. 62).

As the Great Depression hit, US expansionism appeared to slow in terms of markets and territorial acquisitions, but at the same time tourism was helping to propagate the Pacific idyll in the popular imagination: by the 1930s, unprecedented numbers were embarking on luxury ships for "round the world" cruises. Pacific crossings included stopovers at ports that had long underpinned imperial trade networks. The establishment of Matson Lines' famous "white ships" (the S.S. *Malola* was launched in 1927 and the S.S. *Mariposa* in 1931) linked the east and west coasts of the US, via the Panama Canal, to Hawai'i, Samoa, Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia, reflecting the escalation of mass tourism and a substantial increase in tourist traffic through Pacific ports (the "white ships" perhaps echoing Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet of battleships, also painted white, sent to circumnavigate the globe in 1907 in a show of US military prowess). At the same time, commercial air travel was becoming a feature of modern life: in 1935, Pan American Airlines began services between San Francisco and Manila, with the *China Clipper* airplane becoming a symbol of national pride.

US military expansion also continued. The Panama Canal was widened in the mid-1930s to accommodate larger warships, and military installations on key sites such as Samoa were further developed, with the construction of a naval airbase and advanced fortifications at Pago Pago harbour in 1940. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the US immediately entered the Second World War; within days, thousands were flooding army recruitment stations to enlist for war, reflecting the powerful military, territorial, and psychic roles that Pacific island territories were playing in US life. Strategic planning in the run-up to war would prove enormously beneficial, when island bases served as supply sites and staging grounds for years of fierce air, sea, and land battles (a period of total militarisation of the "Pacific theater" of war) as the US and its allies battled Japan for Pacific mastery. As Rob Wilson notes, the *idea* of the "American Pacific" began to take root as early as imperialist struggles for Samoa and Hawai'i during the late 19th century, but it was realised only after these Second World War battles, when the US defeated Japan and took control via "strategic trust" in Micronesia and other territories of interest (Wilson 2000, p. 106).

Immediately following the war, the psychic hegemony of the American Pacific was so complete that James Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific* (1947) could represent the Pacific's "trivial islands" as essentially nostalgic playgrounds for American soldiers and their "native" love interests (quoted in Lyons 2006, p. 28). The new "American Pacific" became the sum of a US vision won through commerce, missionary work, and ultimately military conflict on an unprecedented scale. As constructed after the post-war

seizing of territories from Japan, it came to include the Marshall Islands, Belau, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Northern Marianas, Guam, and American Samoa. As of 1990, there were nearly 300,000 US military personnel based in the "Pacific theater," with the Department of Defense spending roughly $16.8 billion (US) to support its presence there (United States Government Accountability Office 1991). This military presence remains the war's most profound and controversial legacy, with whole islands having been used as test sites for nuclear arms, and others (such as Kalama Atoll) becoming military dumps for chemical weapons. At least 66 nuclear tests were conducted in the Bikini Atolls, held under the unprecedented legal arrangement of a "strategic trusteeship." Moved to make way for "Operation Crossroads," the first detonation of a nuclear device since the bombing of Nagasaki, the people of Bikini would experience a series of displacements that enacted severe physical and emotional hardships. They were moved to Rongerik Atoll, where mass starvation ensued, then to Kwajalein Atoll, living in tents alongside a military airstrip, and then finally to Kili Island, a tiny outpost without a lagoon for fishing, hence inadequate for supplying food. The majority remain there due to residual nuclear contamination.

The story of the Bikini islanders exemplifies the economic dependency, environmental degradation, and military dominance that still mark the US presence in the Pacific. In spite of their cultural richness, economic hardship (unemployment in American Samoa approaches 30 per cent) in various territories has led to an unusually high proportion of people seeking work in the US armed forces, with disproportionately high casualties in recent wars as a result (American Samoa has its own military recruiting station in Utulei). In unincorporated territories such as American Samoa and Guam, there are ongoing calls for political representation with full US voting rights, as well as movements calling for greater political autonomy, and independence.

Saleable terms such as the "Pacific Rim" and transnational "Asia-Pacific" markets have begun to absorb and supplant concepts such as the American Pacific. Fijian writer Subramani (1985) has argued that even a seemingly monolithic term like "American Pacific" has nonetheless long formed part of a broader, multicentred Pacific region that speaks to and has confronted a range of imperial centres. Works such as Vanessa Warheit's and Amy Robinson's film (and internet blog) *The Insular Empire* (2010), made in the Marianas, has addressed related issues of the paradoxes of presumed isolation versus actual transnational and transcultural interactions, charting everyday life in the still largely ignored spaces of empire. Barack Obama, raised in Hawai'i and hence, as Holger Droessler puts it, "America's first Pacific President," declared in a speech to Japanese leaders in November 2009 that the United States "is a nation of the Pacific; Asia and the Pacific are not separated by this great ocean, we are bound by it." The centrality of Asia to US foreign policy has thus led to the blurring and renewal of two distinctly twentieth-century terms ("American Pacific" and the "American Century"), with the twenty-first century being labelled as "America's Pacific Century."

Cross References

▶ United States, Hawaiian Annexation

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United States Imperialism, 19th Century

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Synonyms

US imperialism; History; Nineteenth century; US colonialism; Expansionism; Manifest destiny; Anti-imperialism

Definition

During the nineteenth century, the United States was transformed from a nation mostly hugging the Atlantic coast to an empire stretching across a continent with possessions in the Caribbean and Pacific. Despite the scale of US expansion, at no point was it an inevitable Manifest Destiny. Almost every imperial venture was met with resistance, both from those on the periphery being annexed and from people in the metropole who were opposed to a particular takeover. Some scholars see strong continuity throughout the century, arguing that the motivations and strategies used to suppress Filipino insurgents were in accord with those used to conquer Mexican territory and subdue Indian tribes. Other scholars emphasize the distinctiveness of different phases of American imperialism, arguing that specific political and economic contingencies determined whether the United States was able to assert control over a territory such as Texas in 1846 or

Hawaii in 1898. This entry examines the continuities and ruptures at play in American imperial expansion, with the nineteenth century broken up into three periods: 1800–1836, 1836–1865, and 1865–1898.

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Jefferson's 'Empire of Liberty' (1800–36)

In 1800 the US was one empire among many in North America. To the north, the British controlled Canada. In the west, the US faced two imperial competitors, as Spain ruled Mexico (including much of what would become part of the US in the 1846–48 Mexican War), and France had managed to regain Louisiana Territory. To the south, European powers had carved up the Caribbean, and throughout the century American leaders anxiously watched for an opportunity to grab some of these island possessions for themselves. France was eliminated as a major competitor in North America when it sold its territory to the US in the 1803 Louisiana Purchase. For a little over $11 million, the American empire gained

over 800,000 square miles. President Thomas Jefferson recognised this as a major windfall for what he sometimes called an 'empire of liberty', but the purchase also highlighted anxieties over imperial consolidation that would continue throughout the century (Onuf 2000: 3–9). Although most Americans lived in the eastern states, the population of the western territories grew quickly; how to exert influence over such a vast territory was a constant concern among national leaders. The US had been created out of a colonial periphery resentful of an imperial metropole, and many of the former revolutionaries worried that westerners would develop the same of rebellious attitude towards the east (Onuf 2005: 43–45).

The Territorial System

American empire building was a mix of public and private initiative, with governmental authority promoting the spread of settlers. Key to this project was how new territories were politically organised. In the territorial system, the federal government shaped local institutions and had ultimate authority over the populace. Local power cliques of landowners, merchants, and lawyers developed within the territories, but those cliques derived power from their connections with federal officials. The western territories relied on federal law to substantiate their property claims, and on federal troops to protect them from other empires or Native Americans. In the control that it exerted by appointing governors and providing protection, the federal government was following a tradition inherited from the relationship of Britain to its colonies.

The difference between the two relationships was that the territorial system ended in statehood. When the population of an organised territory reached 60,000, the territorial legislature could apply for statehood. The governments and constitutions of these new states tended to be modelled on those of states that had already been admitted, in part because congressional approval was required before a territory could be granted statehood. Once admitted into the Union as a state, a former territory would legally have the same

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privileges and sovereignty as any other state. In reality, the western states often resented the amount of political and economic strength that the eastern states held over them, but this resentment was rarely large enough to break ties built in the territorial stage (Eblen 1968: 18–23).

This imperial expansion was especially striking given the tiny size of American military forces for most of the century. Fear of standing armies had deep resonance within American culture, with most Americans afraid that a large army would subvert republican institutions. During a conflict such as the American Civil War the military would expand, but it would swiftly contract once the specific war was over. Often imperial missions, such as expeditions against native tribes, were not undertaken by the regular army, but by citizen militias within a given state or territory. Full political citizenship was tied to the potential to serve in the militia, and the exclusion of particular groups, such as women and blacks, from militia service was often used as an argument to exclude them from the ballot box as well.

Imperial Fits and Starts: The War of 1812, Spanish Florida, and the Monroe Doctrine

Many Americans looked to the north as an obvious place to expand the American empire. Resentment towards Great Britain remained strong after the War for Independence, and many hoped to push England off the continent for good. Part of the Continental Army had invaded Canada during the War for Independence, and after war was declared on England in 1812, Americans tried invading again, with no more success than their armies had had in 1775; Canadians had little desire to join the US. Even French Canadians, who often resented the imperial authorities of London, saw the US as a cultural empire deeply hostile to Catholicism (Taylor 2010: 15–30). America's first nineteenth-century attempt at conquering the territory of another empire failed, and the Treaty of Ghent in 1815 restored the antebellum borders between the two empires. Despite this, many Americans throughout the nineteenth century, particularly northerners, hoped that annexation of Canada would be only a matter of time. Surrounding Canada was one intention of Secretary of State William Seward's 1867 treaty to purchase Alaska from Russia; Seward and others believed that the economic ties between the US and Canada made annexation inevitable.

The War of 1812 failed to remove an imperial competitor from the continent, but American leaders continued to try to find opportunities to pick off new territory, often with the aim of securing their borders. In 1817–18, General Andrew Jackson seized much of Florida from Spain during his campaign against the Seminole Indians. Jackson and others argued that the decaying Spanish Empire had failed to police Florida, which had become a haven for criminals, hostile Indian tribes, and runaway slaves. Members of the federal government debated how to respond to Jackson's extralegal venture. Pressured by the US, Spain sold the territory through the Adams–Onís Treaty negotiated in 1819 (Eblen 1968: 5).

The US not only tried to expand at the expense of other empires, but also acted to dismantle those empires in the hemisphere. With the Monroe Doctrine, set out in 1823, the US proclaimed that it would prevent any European attempt to reassert control over the former Spanish and Portuguese territory that had won independence. Despite such an ambitious warning to European powers, the US lacked the economic and military might to enforce such a policy of non-interference. There were also limits to what types of revolution in the Western Hemisphere the US would embrace. When the slaves of Haiti achieved independence from France in the first decade of the century, the US failed to recognise the nation until the American Civil War. Although it claimed to be an empire of liberty, much of the empire had reason to fear the encouraging of a slave revolt (White 2010).

Native American Resistance and Adaptation in the Early Republic

Although the 1815 Treaty of Ghent restored a territorial balance between two North American empires ruled by whites, it undercut the power of

Indian tribes in the northwest and south-west to negotiate their way through imperial squabbles. Since long before American independence, Indian groups such as the Iroquois Confederacy had retained their position through playing European empires off each other. For example, neither France nor Britain was able to gain hegemony in the Great Lakes region during the seventeenth century, and therefore both were forced to co-operate with a variety of Indian tribes (White 1991: 50). This worked as long as one imperial power was unable to assert a monopoly of power over an area without being checked by another.

In the north-west this balance was already breaking down in the years preceding American independence, as Britain had pushed France out of Canada in 1763 and more and more settlers penetrated the west. Most Indian tribes who involved themselves in the struggle between England and her colonists fought for the British, realising that an American empire would promote settlement expansion at the cost of Indian land. After the War for Independence, many north-west Indian tribes continued to resist American expansion, winning victories against the regular US army in Harmar's Campaign in 1790 and St Clair's Defeat in 1791. Still, by the 1800s the north-west tribes were outgunned and vastly outnumbered by American settlers. Some Indian leaders such as Tecumseh of the Shawnee hoped to re-establish the old balance-of-power system, this time with the US and Britain taking the roles that France and Britain had previously filled. In the War of 1812, most of the north-west tribes again fought for Great Britain, and again they found themselves let down by how little their imperial allies were willing to support them. Tecumseh died fighting American troops at the Battle of the Thames in 1813, and soon after this many of the Indians in his alliance surrendered. After the war, the capacity of the north-west Indians to slow down American expansion was greatly reduced (Taylor 2010: 203–235).

Native reaction to American expansion was not monolithic, and military resistance was only one method by which Indian tribes negotiated their position within the American empire. Americans' positions on the status of Indian tribes

within the empire were equally diverse. Western politicians usually took the harshest line, advocating that Indian tribes were an alien influence that should be pushed as far west as possible and that the land that Indians occupied rightfully belonged to settlers. Others argued that Indians did not need to be destroyed, but should be 'civilised' to the point at which they took on the ways of American farmers. President Jefferson himself embodied this ambivalence towards Indians, in that he lauded the possibility of their mixing and becoming blended into white society, while at the same time holding that Indians who resisted such assimilation would have to be destroyed (Wallace 1999).

Some tribes tried to strike a balance between accommodation and tribal integrity, including the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who resided in the south-west: the Cherokee, the Chickasaw, Choctaw, the Seminoles, and the Creek. The Cherokee, who lived primarily in what is now north-west Georgia, adopted many of the cultural badges of southern white society, including a written language, Christianity, republican government, settled agriculture, and slave-owning.

This accommodation did not stop Georgian settlers from demanding their land. One by one the civilised tribes were forced to move west into Indian Territory (now Oklahoma). By the 1830s squatters found support from both the Georgia legislature and the administration of President Andrew Jackson. For years Cherokee leaders such as Chief John Ross tried to maintain their awkward position within the empire not through military resistance, but through court appeals. In the 1832 Worcester v. Georgia decision, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the sovereignty of the Cherokee deserved federal protection. President Jackson ignored the ruling and supported the Treaty of New Echota, which agreed to the selling of Cherokee land, even though the document was signed by only a small number of tribal members unelected to political office. In the resulting Cherokee diaspora, also known as the 'Trail of Tears', several thousand Cherokee died on their way to Indian Territory (Burbank and Cooper 2010: 268).

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Historians favouring Jackson have held that although the Trail of Tears was tragic, there was little a small federal government could have done in the wake of waves of private US citizens moving into Cherokee lands (Remini 2001: 279–281). However, the mix of private initiative and public support was indicative of US imperialism during the nineteenth century. Like any imperial venture or consolidation of the time, American society was divided on whether or not to support it. Other than in the Supreme Court, the Cherokee found allies among many northerners, including clergymen who hated the idea that a Christian tribe could be targeted for removal. Even some westerners protested against the seizure of Cherokee land, including Congressman David Crockett, who broke with his former ally Andrew Jackson over the issue. The removal treaty itself was passed in the Senate in May 1836 by only a single vote. Just as there was a continual impulse of imperial venture throughout the century, so was there a continual anti-imperialist tradition.

Slavery's Imperial Reach (1836–65)

For much of the nineteenth century, sectional divisions between North and South shaped imperial expansion. At the start of the century, most Americans believed that slavery was a dying institution. The cotton boom changed that. New technological developments like the cotton gin allowed new types of cotton to be grown far away from the coastline. At the same time, demand in Northern and European textile industries increased the profit in producing cotton. Slavery went from being viewed by Southerners as a necessary but dying evil to being seen as a system responsible for the US's most valuable commodity. Although most Northerners and Southerners in the early part of the century agreed that slavery was to be handled on a state level, the federal territorial system meant that slavery's fate was at stake each time Congress supervised the construction of a new area's institutions. With the change of each new territory into a state, the sectional balance between free and slave changed. The Missouri Crisis in 1820 brought sectional

politics to the fore, and the compromise reached provided a line to divide the empire between free and slave territory. From then on, any new imperial acquisition would bring with it the potential of undermining the sectional compromise.

Settler Imperialism: Texas and the US–Mexican War

Many Southern settlers brought their slaves with them when they moved into the Mexican territory of Texas. At first the Mexican authorities encouraged Americans to settlers the sparsely populated north, but they soon realised that the numerous white immigrants were a threat to their control of the region. In 1836 Texas declared independence, with most of the revolutionaries hoping for annexation by the US. Texas won its war, although Mexico refused to recognise the new government. For a decade Texas was an independent country, and during this time annexation was frequently debated in Congress.

In 1844, the Democrat James Polk ran for president on a platform urging the need to both annex Texas and put the majority of the Oregon territory (also claimed by the British) under the American flag. Soon after his election, Texas was officially annexed by the US. US troops under General Zachary Taylor were sent to secure the new border, which Polk had decided was at the Rio Grande. The resulting US–Mexican War (1846–48) ended in US victory as federal armies occupied north and central Mexico, including Mexico City. Although the US won nearly all the conventional battles against the Mexican army, the invading armies faced resistance from Mexican guerrillas and Indian tribes as the war continued.

Although the war had started as a means to annex Texas, the territorial ambitions of President Polk increased further as the US troops moved further into Mexico. In cabinet meetings there was even talk of annexing all of Mexico. Unfortunately for Polk, the emissary whom he had sent to Mexico City to dictate a peace, Nicolas Trist, became more and more disgusted with the war and more sympathetic towards the Mexican people

(Greenberg 2012). From the cables that Trist sent back to Washington, Polk realised that Trist was no longer his man. He recalled him, but Trist refused to leave Mexico before he had finished negotiating the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The treaty specified that for $15 million, the US would gain Texas, California, and most of the territory that would eventually become Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, and Nevada, but would not annex most of the Mexican territory that the US army now occupied. Polk thought of rejecting the treaty, but growing opposition to the war forced him to recognise that there was little political profit in continuing the war with Mexico.

Even before the war had concluded, Americans were deeply divided about what to do with the newly conquered territory. In August of 1846, Congressman David Wilmot, a member of Polk's party and not in principle opposed to the war, added a proviso to a war bill declaring that slavery would not be permitted to spread to territories conquered from Mexico. Controversy exploded over the bill: Southerners attacked it as undermining the property rights vital to an empire of liberty, while Northerners jumped on Southern opposition to the proviso as evidence that the war had been started only as a way to further the power of slaveholders.

Filibusters in the Caribbean and Central America

After the Mexican War, Manifest Destiny took on a sectional character. Slaveholders worried that they were becoming demographically outnumbered by the population of the free states. The only way to maintain influence over the federal government was to take new territory and reintroduce slavery to those places. Throughout the 1850s groups of individuals known as filibusters raised private military expeditions in attempts to conquer new areas in Latin America, including northern Mexico. Even on the eve of the Civil War, the Texan governor, Sam Houston, seriously considered leading an army into northern Mexico in order to project US power (May 1973).

Filibusters usually hoped that the American flag would follow their new private conquests. Texas served as a model, and Central America and the Caribbean were often the targets of these pro-slavery ventures. In 1856, the American adventurer William Walker invaded and became dictator of Nicaragua for a short time, before an alliance of neighbouring powers along with Nicaraguan opposition overthrew him. Not to be dissuaded, the would-be king returned to the US to raise money and armies. Walker tried on two other occasions to retake Nicaragua, eventually being captured and shot by his supposed subjects. Throughout the South, slaveholders and politicians praised filibusters like Walker.

Cuba was another target for possible expansion of US slavery. By the 1850s, it was one of the few places in the Western hemisphere (along with the US and Brazil) where slavery was still permitted. Many Southerners hoped to annex the island before the Spanish Empire was pressured by the British to abolish slavery. The 1854 Ostend Manifesto, written by US diplomats including the future president James Buchanan, argued that the US should make every effort to buy Cuba from Spain. The diplomats went further. If Spain was unwilling to sell Cuba to the US, then the US should not exclude military takeover of the island (May 2002: 54). The failure of these filibuster movements in the 1850s is a testament less to delusional fantasy than to the determined resistance from the peoples in places such as Nicaragua, combined with a growing coalition of anti-slavery political forces in the North. In the past, private venture had been combined with governmental support for annexation. As the 1850s progressed, North and South could no longer agree on what type of empire the government should promote; the resulting Civil War of 1861–65 can be seen as an imperial crisis.

Consolidation of the West and Pacific Expansion (1865–98)

After the Civil War the relative positions of the main political parties towards imperial expansion switched. Southern Democrats, the same faction

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that had been ardently expansionist before the Civil War, tended to be suspicious of proposed new conquests in the Gilded Age. Some of this may have come from partisan rivalry, since Republicans held the presidency for most of the time in the decades following the Civil War. The Republican Party included most supporters of imperial expansion, such as Theodore Roosevelt. Many within the party, however, were highly suspicious of empire. Former anti-slavery advocates such as Carl Schurz felt that a republic that had shed hundreds of thousands of lives in the name of demolishing slavery had no business to subjugate new peoples (Beisner 1968: 18–34).

Imperial Consolidation and Eyeing the Caribbean and Pacific

Latin America continued to be an area of interest for American policymakers after the Civil War. Americans continually worried that another empire would take over Mexico if they exerted control over their neighbours. During the Civil War these fears were realised when France set up a puppet regime under Emperor Maximilian. After the Union won the war, an army was sent to the Mexican border in order to both arm rebels fighting against Maximilian and threaten US intervention if France did not withdraw its troops, which it did. As usual, the US's interference in Latin American politics was motivated partially by a wish to prevent other empires from becoming further involved in the New World (Grandin 2007). In 1869, President Ulysses Grant submitted a treaty to the Senate for the annexation of the Dominican Republic, but this time annexation failed to find sufficient congressional support. The failure of the treaty showed that the anti-slavery forces of the antebellum era were divided about whether the US should expand now that the federal government was no longer in the hands of slaveholders.

Advocates of annexation also looked to Asia as a possible direction for the growth of the empire. American involvement in the Pacific predated military annexation: by the early 1800s,

American traders and whalers roamed the Pacific, establishing economic ties with the places where they landed, and missionaries from New England saw Pacific islands as places to spread their culture. In 1854, Commodore Perry had used his naval force to pressure the insular Japanese government to open up markets to Westerners. Places such as the kingdom of Hawaii were accustomed to an active US presence (Cumings 2009: 88).

Americans had looked to Hawaii as a possible conquest since the 1850s, but sectional divisions and British interference had prevented the US from annexing the island chain. In 1893, a group of American citizens, many of them sugar planters, organised a coup against the Hawaiian monarchy. Within a month of the 1893 revolution (or coup), President Harrison submitted a treaty of annexation to the Senate. Harrison put forward the treaty within the last few days of his administration, and for several months his successor, the Democrat Grover Cleveland, was unsure whether he would support it. Upon receiving reports about the heavy US involvement in the 1893 coup from fact-finders sent to the islands, Cleveland withdrew the treaty. His successor, William McKinley, pushed for the annexation of Hawaii, although it took him until the summer of 1898 to persuade enough senators and congressmen to agree to a resolution making the islands a US territory (Osborne 1981).

The US declared war on the Spain in the same year. The immediate cause was the supposed Spanish sinking of the USS *Maine,* which had exploded while in Havana harbour. Despite flimsy evidence that the cause of the explosion was Spanish action, newspapers throughout America demanded that President McKinley avenge the lost American lives. Other reasons had also attracted US attention to the island. For decades groups of Cubans had fought for independence from Spain; many Americans felt sympathy for these rebels. The US was also heavily invested in Cuban infrastructure and agriculture. Some of the investors worried that continued revolutionary bloodshed would put their business at risk, and saw US intervention as the fastest way to stabilise the region. Once war was declared, the US

quickly won after seizing Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. Many pro-war Americans downplayed the aid that their armies had received from Filipino and Cuban rebels. Within a short time, the US army found itself in a guerrilla war with Filipino rebels that would continue into the twentieth century.

Debating the Impetus of 1890s Expansion

Expansion was a much-debated issue within 1890s American society, and there was no clear indication of who would back Hawaiian annexation or intervention within Cuba and who would not. Anti-imperialists came from a variety of backgrounds. Labour leaders such as Samuel Gompers thought that cheap colonial labour would demean the value of the American working man and undermine the nascent union movement (Appel 1954). On the other side of the economic spectrum, the steel magnate Andrew Carnegie joined the Anti-Imperialist League and advocated Filipino independence. Racism was one reason for anti-imperialism, as many feared the effects of mingling with the peoples of Asia and the Caribbean. While nativism was always present in American society, in the Gilded Age federal legislation targeted people coming to America from the Pacific Rim, starting with the Page Act of 1875 and culminating with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Lee 2003: 30). If such laws were meant to protect American society from alien influences, anti-imperialists asked, what would be the possible benefit in annexing a territory like Hawaii, with tens of thousands of Asian labourers? As in the arguments against expanding the slave empire in the 1850s, antiexpansionist ideologies in the 1890s blended racism and humanitarianism.

Historians remain divided on why it was that in the 1890s, despite the musings of leaders and newspaper editors for decades, the US expanded into the Pacific and Caribbean. One strand of scholarship, exemplified in the work of William Appleman Williams, Walter LaFeber, and

Thomas L. McCormick, points to domestic economic anxiety as a cause. The second half of the nineteenth century was full of economic booms and busts, and many people at the time believed that busts happened whenever production of agricultural goods or manufactured goods outstripped domestic demand (LaFeber 1963: 78). Capitalists hoped to solve the imbalance of production of demand through expansion into foreign markets. The difficulty was finding a large untapped market. By the 1890s, American production already heavily penetrated Latin American markets, and any further expansion into Europe would come with fierce competition. Americans looked increasingly to Asia, and particular China, as a place for crops and manufactures to go. In order to exercise American influence into Asia, colonies would be useful as both trading ports and coaling stations for American ships. Key to reaching these Asian markets would be a canal across the isthmus of Central America (built with American capital), which would connect east coast ports to new areas of the globe. Controlling the canal would require securing the Caribbean, which meant taking Cuba and Puerto Rico. The goal would not be to annex permanently places like the Philippines permanently, but to establish an informal empire of economic and military control, exercised through friendly pro-US governments (McCormick 1967). The scholars who articulated this interpretation were part of the New Left and saw precedents for the Cold War politics of the US in the choices made by Americans in the 1890s.

While the New Left's diplomatic history has had a large degree of influence, criticism of an economic explanation for 1890s imperialism has come from several directions. Some scholars, including Robert Zevin, have emphasised geostrategic reasons for American expansion. Americans of the time such as Theodore Roosevelt or Henry Cabot Lodge saw the US as a young power capable of exerting just as much influence on the world stage as European empires. Such men were influenced by the work of Admiral Alfred Mahan, who argued that throughout history naval power had been what conferred power on the world stage; to compete against other empires, Mahan

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and his acolytes stated, the US should expand its navy and find outposts like Hawaii and the Philippines to serve as naval bases. Historians focusing on strategic reasons for imperial expansion argue that while Mahan and others occasionally made economic arguments, these were to shield their real motive of building up a strong military (this debate is covered well in Fry 1996).

Other historians such as Kristin Hoganson argue that cultural factors for imperialism must not be discounted in the face of economic or political ones. Hoganson (1998) points to rhetoric of the 1890s that lamented the closing of the western frontier and how this meant that American men no longer had a way to challenge their manliness. This crisis over masculinity translated into jingoistic language. Politicians who were against imperial expansion were open to accusations of effeminacy, which were deadly in a time where manhood was considered essential to having a political voice. Even the president was open to such a criticism; during the Cuban crisis McKinley's perceived hesitance to intervene in Cuba was attacked as indicative that the Civil War veteran had as much manly courage as an old woman. Anti-imperialists also made use of gendered language, arguing that wars in places such as the Philippines would sap the virtue of American males.

While scholarly debates over the particular contingencies of American imperialism continue, our understandings of what motivated imperialists and anti-expansionist have become more complex, and undermine any idea of necessity or Manifest Destiny. Each step of nineteenth-century imperialism was a contest, eschewing any simple explanation of American empire.

Cross-References

▶ United States Expansionism and the Pacific
▶ United States Imperialism, 19th Century
▶ United States, Hawaiian Annexation
▶ United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity
▶ Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolutionary Anti-imperialism, and Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

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United States of America

▶ Nuclear Imperialism

United States War in Vietnam, 1954–1975

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Introduction

The US War in Vietnam was a long, horrific attack against the people and land. Nearly four million Vietnamese were killed, thousands of peasant villages and a traditional way of life were destroyed, and millions of acres of cropland and forests were devastated and poisoned from bombing and chemical warfare. More than 58,000 Americans died, and at least 304,000 were wounded in a criminal war that produced the greatest military and citizen dissent in US history.

The Imperialist Roots of the War

For many Americans, historian Gabriel Kolko writes, the war was "the turning point in their perception of the nature of American foreign policy, the traumatic event that required them to look again at the very roots, assumptions, and structure of a policy that is profoundly destructive and dangerous" (Kolko 1969, p. xi).

Imperialist aggression against Vietnam was directed by the elite managers of the US national security state. The historical record confirms Kolko's thesis that "political power in American society is an aspect of economic power." International policies ultimately rest on this economic power, since the USA is "a capitalist society based on a grossly inequitable distribution of wealth and income that has not been altered in any essential manner in this century" (Ibid., p. 6, 9).

Especially since the end of the Second World War, the elite class associated with top corporations and law firms have organized and orchestrated imperialist wars and used "military power . . . to advance their enormous and ever-growing objectives. . . ." They require "a vast Military Establishment that is the logical, necessary effect rather than the cause of the basic objectives . . . of American foreign policy. . . ." (Ibid., p. 27). Fundamental to maintaining US imperialism, therefore, is the "advancement of American capitalism and an open field for development in the Third World. . . ." (Ibid., p. 79).

Historian Michael Parenti asserts that "imperialism" is the active "process whereby the dominant" class of one nation "expropriate for their own enrichment the land, labor, raw materials, and markets of another people." The ultimate aim is to serve the interests of multinational corporations and their owners. Frequent and massive terror is used to "prevent alternative, independent, self-defining nations from emerging" that might threaten the USA, that is, class, control (Parenti 2010).

Noam Chomsky challenges the dominant view that US wars represent the "national interest" or "national security." Following Kolko and Parenti, he asserts that to understand the foreign policy of any state, we must investigate "the domestic social structure. Who sets foreign policy? What interest do these people represent? What is the domestic source of their power?" (Chomsky 2003a, p. 93). It is a "mystification to speak of the nation, with its national purpose, as an agent in world affairs," because US foreign policy "is designed and

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implemented by narrow groups who derive their power from domestic sources. . .. Top advisory and decision-making positions relating to international affairs are heavily concentrated in the hands of representatives of major corporations, banks, investment firms, the few law firms that cater to corporate interests. . .." (Ibid., p. 98).

US imperialist interventions since 1945, the late former State Department official and historian William Blum writes, have been designed to keep "the world open and hospitable for . . . American-based transnational corporations, . . . preventing the rise of any society that might serve as a success example of an alternative to the capitalist model, and extending [class] hegemony over as much of the globe as possible.. . .." (Blum 2000, pp. 13–14). The "targets of American intervention" that have suffered "the wrath, and often the firepower, of the world's most powerful nation" in virtually every case have been nations in Third World. Their crime has been "a policy of 'self-determination': the desire, born of perceived need and principle, to pursue a path of development independent of U.S. foreign policy objectives" (Blum 1995, p. 15).

The late Carl Oglesby, scholar-activist and a leader of the SDS anti-Vietnam War movement, placed the guiding premises and objectives of US policy (defending "the Free World," democracy, the domino theory) in an economic and political context which argues that the real reasons for US involvement in Vietnam were imperialism and counterrevolution. The "issue of the Vietnam war is not Western freedom versus Eastern slavery but foreign versus local control of Vietnam. . .. [The] war is being fought to determine how and by whom the Vietnamese political economy is going to be developed" (Oglesby 1967, p. 112).

According to historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, the imperialism that Blum, Chomsky, Kolko, Parenti, and Oglesby critique ultimately rests on white supremacy: It is "the working rationalization and ideology of English theft of Native American lands, and especially the justification for slavery." The history of this imperialism, therefore, cannot be fully understood without confronting the genocide that Washington committed against indigenous peoples. White supremacy has been the core premise of US imperialism "from the origins to the present"; and white-supremacist imperialism is "inseparable from the content of this origin story and the definition of patriotism today" (Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, p. 9). The "very origin of the United States is fundamentally imperialist and racist, rather than imperialism being a divergence from a well-intentioned path" (Dunbar-Ortiz 2003, p. 3–4).

French Colonialism and the Origins of the US War in Vietnam

The roots of the US War in Vietnam are linked to French colonialism, commencing with the French army seizure of Saigon in 1859 and the complete occupation by 1884. Following their long history of struggle against foreign invaders, the Vietnamese resisted the French for the next 70 years.

French colonial rule was built on brutal economic exploitation but was justified on the grounds that it provided "material advancement and moral uplift – by performing . . . a 'civilizing mission.'" It profoundly changed life for the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese while enriching a tiny elite who served France – as the gap between the wealthy few and the many poor grew (Lawrence 2008, pp. 11–12). Out of this oppression, however, arose a Communist-led nationalist movement (the Viet Minh) that would defeat French colonialism.

As Vietnamese resistance increased, the French became the protector of the "free world," a defender against communism. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations supported them and viewed the Viet Minh as a tool of Soviet and Chinese expansion, despite the fact that the Soviet Union "had largely ignored the Vietnamese struggle for independence in its critical early years" and the Viet Minh gained power 4 years before the Chinese revolution "could possibly provide any material assistance" (Marr 1995, p. xvii).

Vietnamese resistance became an organized, powerful force in 1941, when the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Minh). In 1940, the Japanese

had taken over Vietnam but left local matters in French hands. The Viet Minh led the resistance against the Japanese and worked closely with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, forerunner to the CIA). By 1945, it had gained control of most of northern Vietnam and was the leading opposition force. Two days after the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, Viet Minh military forces took the city of Hanoi without any resistance, and by September they had defeated the combined Japanese-French colonialists (Kahin and Lewis 1967, pp. 15–17).

On September 2, 1945, President Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV); it did not last long, however, as the Allies allowed British and Chinese troops to occupy Vietnam, and British released and rearmed 5,000 French troops who had been held by the Japanese. They promptly staged a coup that led to military clashes between the Viet Minh and combined British, French, and Japanese (Kahin and Lewis 1967, pp. 23–24). The French forces that would receive US aid included Foreign Legionnaires who had fought for the Nazis (Young 1991, p. 29).

Shortly after VJ (Victory over Japan) Day, US merchant mariners witnessed the sight of "fully armed Japanese soldiers being employed by the British in Vietnam." These members of the National Maritime Union (NMU) protested "the policy of the United States Government in chartering ships, flying the American flag," to transport French troops "in order to subjugate the native population of Vietnam" (Isaacs: 116, 122). The mariners' action was the first organized antiwar protest against Washington's Vietnam policy, 20 years before campus protests began. In May 1954, despite American aid to the French efforts to defeat the Vietnamese struggle, the Viet Minh crushed the French military at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. It was the first major battlefield defeat of a European colonial power after the Second World War.

The Geneva Accords

After Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords established a temporary line in Vietnam dividing the country into two postwar administrative zones with the Viet Minh governing the North and the Bao Dai regime the South. The French were to withdraw from Vietnam, and by 1956 an election would be held to reunify the country – that even US intelligence sources made clear Ho Chi Minh would win overwhelmingly; therefore, the USA blocked it. All subsequent developments during the Diem Regime, including the rise of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1960 and the growing involvement of the USA, are intimately tied to the failure of Washington and the regime to hold the election. Historian George Kahin on this critical decision, "Having chosen not to carry out the heart of the [Accords], Diem made civil war inevitable. For when a military struggle . . . ends on the agreed condition that the competition will be transferred to the political level, the side which repudiates the agreed conditions can hardly expect that the military struggle will not be resumed" (Kahin 1965).

While the nine nations were meeting in Geneva to finalize the Accords, a CIA team under the direction of Colonel Edward Lansdale was sabotaging key installations in Vietnam that were to be turned over to the Viet Minh. He had arrived in Saigon to direct "paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare" (US Cong., House 1971: 10, pp. 274–275). The USA thus used a covert and illegal operation to undermine the Accords that it solemnly pledged it would not disturb. According to CIA veteran Ralph McGehee, the Agency also created a false story out of thin air to justify US involvement: "The Communist North was invading the Free World South" (McGehee 1983, p. 132).

The Diem Regime Under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy

The late historian Marilyn Young laid out the regime's repressive reign in the South. In 1955, Diem began a terrorist campaign against former Viet Minh who had fought against the French; tens of thousands were arrested and sent to "reeducation camps"; thousands were executed and jailed. To block Viet Minh sympathizers and other opponents of the regime being elected to

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village councils, Diem abolished them and appointed his own men (many of whom were Catholic refugees from the North) as village chiefs or leaders (Young 1991, p. 56). "Land reform" under Diem meant that landlords would follow the regime's army to the countryside where it evicted peasants from land that had been seized by the Viet Minh and given over to the latter (Ibid., p. 57). In the late 1950s, he deepened his rule with US support – through political repression that included searches and raids, arrests, interrogations, torture, forced relocation, jail, and executions. All of this repression was fully supported by US officials; and American media "at the time . . . served as a branch of the U.S. enterprise in South Vietnam, cheering Diem's successes and praising his efforts to defeat communism. . ." (Ibid., pp. 60–61).

Eventually, Diem's repressive policies caused former Viet Minh and other opponents of the regime to organize self-defense forces by 1958; it was this group that Diem derisively called the Viet Cong (Viet Communist) (Ibid., p. 63). And in January 1959, North Vietnam's Communist Party approved some armed actions against Diem, establishment of base camps in the South, and a limited return of former Viet Minh southerners there. Small-scale uprisings grew in a number of provinces in the South (Ibid., pp. 65–66).

The rise of what would be NLF resistance against the Diem regime, and ultimately the USA, was rooted in the regime's repression: it was not created by Communist Party directives from Hanoi or the NLF leadership in the South but from "agendas and leaderships that took shape at the grassroots level." By 1960, the NLF in the South worked to overthrow "the entire socioeconomic elite which constituted the foundation of the Saigon regime," attesting to its revolutionary temper as a popular movement (Hunt 2008, p. 6). Despite Washington's assumptions, "all available evidence shows that the revival of the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by Southerners at their own – not Hanoi's – initiative" (Kahin and Lewis 1967, p. 120). This contradicts the US view that the NLF followed direct orders from Ho Chi Minh and Communists in the North, who in turn got their marching orders from the Soviet Union and China.

Diem's terrorism made armed struggle and resistance inevitable; the USA aided this terror through the Michigan State University-CIA effort. In 1955, the MSU School of Police Administration received a $25 million State Department contract to "provide technical assistance and training [and] mass surveillance capable of monitoring subversion and dismantling the political opposition to Diem." This program "expanded the scale of violence" and was headed by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. MSU also trained the regime's Bureau of Investigation that served mainly as a "political police" and "political repression organization" (Kuzmarov 2012, pp. 142–143). As the war of resistance against Diem grew, MSU aided "the torture and killing of thousands of [NLF] fighters and civilians" (Ibid., p. 147).

The creation and growth of the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam during the Diem regime therefore "was the result of indigenous Southern opposition to an oppressive regime . . . that the support for the NLF [was] considerable, particularly among the peasantry, and certainly greater than the support . . . given the Saigon cliques. . ." (Herman and DuBoff 1969, p. 36). The USA, therefore, had to invent the "aggression and subversion" thesis in order to obscure the true origins and support of the resistance against Diem and ultimately itself.

Kennedy and Vietnam

As NLF resistance gained strength and began to defeat Diem forces in 1960 and 1961, the Kennedy administration escalated the conflict with increased military aid, as well as training for Diem's Civil Guard, a brutal paramilitary force that was composed mainly of Catholic refugees from the North. In May 1961, Kennedy approved a plan to send 400 Special Forces troops to engage in covert warfare against North Vietnam. This "marked Kennedy's first major escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. . .. The sending of Green Berets and the program for covert warfare pointed to the conception of a 'subterranean' war, largely hidden from public view" (Miroff 1976, p. 148).

Ralph L. Stavins, who worked with the Institute for Policy Studies, details Kennedy's "private war" against Vietnam. The various programs he approved were kept secret from the public or explained in such a way that most citizens had no knowledge about them. By the time Kennedy was assassinated, the USA had 16,500 troops in South Vietnam "pretending they were not fighting, and the Special Forces were executing a host of covert programs in North Vietnam." All of these programs answered to the White House; all were violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords (Stavins 1971).

Kennedy approved the use of chemical warfare against the Vietnamese that began in 1962. Although limited at first, it soon became a program of crop destruction. "The expanded program received strong financial and political support. . .. Thus, Washington was able both to authorize criminal programs and evade any responsibility for them" (Ibid.). These programs continued under President Johnson.

Beginning in 1962, Kennedy designated a special committee to help run his private war. It supervised and controlled all CIA activities and had jurisdiction over "every important covert program conducted anywhere in the world, including Vietnam." It organized the DeSoto destroyer patrols that operated along the Chinese and North Vietnamese coasts engaging in surveillance and sabotage thus leading to the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August 1964 (Ibid.).

Kennedy's policies followed Eisenhower's domino theory that was used to convince the public that the USA had to stay the course in Vietnam. "It is fashionable today to deride the domino theory, but in fact it contains an important kernel of plausibility, perhaps truth. National independence and revolutionary social change, if successful, may very well be contagious" (Chomsky 2003b, p. 31). If national liberation movements and revolutionary social change spread, "there would be a serious impact on the global system dominated by the United States and United States–based international corporations" (Ibid., p. 37). Developing countries like Vietnam must not engage in national liberation struggles to escape the US-dominated international system and focus on their own basic needs. "If they are so foolhardy as to disobey the international rules, they will be subjected to subversion, blockade, or even outright destruction by the global judge and executioner" (Ibid., p. 45).

JFK and the Overthrow of Diem

Kennedy officials concerned over the deterioration of the Diem regime were clearly alarmed when, in 1963, it was discovered that Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu contacted North Vietnam and the NLF in the South to propose "a peace settlement that would include a cease-fire, the departure of U.S. forces, the acceptance of N.L.F. representatives in his government, and an election in which the Communists could participate" (Porter 2005, p. 122, 126). Kennedy could never allow a settlement, however, that would force American withdrawal and the inclusion of the NLF and Communists in any South Vietnamese government – even if decided democratically.

The Pentagon Papers state that "the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility" for the Diem coup, because beginning in August 1963 Washington "authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts." Immediate US concern, however, was how to react to the coup in terms of an official public posture – that it be presented "not so much a coup as an expression of national will" (Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition 1971: Vol. 2, p. 207, 270).

The removal of Diem and his brother Nhu was part of US-orchestrated regime changes in the South. In 1955, it installed Diem through a fraudulent election; in 1963, it removed him because he and Nhu had contacted Hanoi and replaced them with General Minh. In 1964, the USA removed Minh, who opposed bombing the North, and replaced him with General Khanh; in 1965, Khanh was removed from office in a coup because he contacted the NLF for negotiations. He was replaced by Generals Ky and Thieu; the latter would rule through fraudulent elections and repression. The truth is that Saigon regimes were never independent of US control. The conflict, therefore, was not a civil war between North and South but between the Vietnamese and an outside imperialist power (O'Connell 2018).

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Kennedy's criminal policies in Vietnam were consistent with National Security Doctrine, especially embraced in Latin America under military regimes that engaged in systemic "assassination, torture, disappearance, and sometimes mass murder." He escalated US involvement as he "moved on to armed attack" upon the civilian population in the South that left it "utterly devastated with millions [of Vietnamese] dead, untold numbers maimed, widows and orphans, children being killed to this day by unexploded bombs, deformed fetuses in hospitals in the South … and a record of criminal savagery that would fill many a docket, by the standards of Nuremberg" (Chomsky 1993, pp. 25–26).

Economist Richard DuBoff highlights four major themes in National Security documents that shaped US policy during the French-Indochina War and the Diem-JFK period – all based on capitalist economic premises to maintain American imperialism in the Southeast Asian-Pacific region. Southeast Asia "was viewed as an essential part of a Pacific rim lands political economy…." If any part fell or [were to] "opt out of the free (enterprise] world, the repercussions would be felt throughout the area, particularly in Japan…." The "'Loss' of Indochina would have further grave domino effects . . . on America's power as guarantor of 'order' and 'stability.'" "No negotiations whatever were to be considered with Communists over the future of Southeast Asia" (DuBoff 1971, p. 27).

The USA, in violation of international accords and solemn promises, created and sustained a terrorist regime in South Vietnam against the increasing opposition of its own people. This policy was a continuation of French and Japanese colonialism and spawned a popular resistance movement, led by the Viet Minh and the NLF. This struggle would expand in the post-Diem period and be confronted by a growing US military force – as the war entered yet another historic phase, that of escalation and Vietnamization.

Escalation of the War Under President Johnson

The chronology of the escalation under Johnson led Noam Chomsky to conclude: "The record is clear, then," that when the USA escalated the war in February 1965, "it knew of no regular North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam, and that five months later . . . the Pentagon was still speculating about the possibility that there might be PAVN [People's Army of North Vietnam] forces [there]. In the light of these facts, the discussion of whether the U.S. was defending South Vietnam from an 'armed attack' from the North – the official U.S. government position – is ludicrous" (Chomsky 1972, p. 196).

To justify escalation and the outside aggressor thesis, it was necessary, writes British journalist Felix Greene, "to convince the American people that the war in the South was not a liberation struggle against U.S. forces but an 'invasion,' a 'war of aggression' against the south launched and controlled from Hanoi" (Greene 1966, p. 146). The presence in Vietnam of "a local, U.S. supported, U.S. financed, U.S. armed regime," however, cannot change the central fact that it is "essentially a war by the Vietnamese people against the military invasion of their country by the United States" (Ibid., pp. 150–151).

The Tonkin Gulf Incident

The official story is that on August 4, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked US destroyers on routine patrol in international waters. President Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing raids on North Vietnam and asked Congress for the power to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against US forces and prevent further aggression. This "incident" set the stage for the major escalation of the war in early 1965.

Historian Gabriel Kolko, however, shows that "It was known – and immediately documented in Le Monde – that the United States had been sending espionage missions to [North Vietnam] since 1957 . . . and that on July 30th [1964] South Vietnamese and U.S. ships raided and bombarded D. R.V. islands" (Kolko 1969, p. 125). Administration officials lied when asked if the USA had done anything to provoke an attack. In 2005, the National Security Agency finally "revealed that both the NSA and the Navy had suppressed definitive evidence that no enemy vessels could have

been in the vicinity of the U.S. ships, and . . . proved conclusively 'that *no attack* happened that night'" (Franklin 2018, p. 185).

In league with a compliant and passive Congress, no "major American newspaper questioned either the official version of the events or the appropriateness of the American response." The Tonkin incident was presented to Congress and the public as an overt act of hostility by Hanoi, exactly what Johnson's advisers "had told him he needed: a way to justify direct American participation in the war, a 'breakthrough into an irreversible commitment'" (Young 1991, p. 122).

Kolko condemned the US escalation and destruction of Vietnam as "the greatest flood of firepower against a nation known to history. The human suffering was monumental." In South Vietnam, the most conservative estimates were that "at least half of the peasants were forced into refugee camps or urban settlements one or more times, many repeatedly. . . . The result was the urbanization of a rural society in a manner unique in this century, for it was far more brutal and disorienting than. . . any that a Third World nation has ever experienced (Kolko 1985, pp. 200–201).

Agent Orange and Chemical Warfare

Adding to the death and devastation during this escalation period was the chemical warfare that began under President Kennedy. From July 1966 to July 1973, however, Congress did not oppose a single one of the 113 funding bills for the war and never once voted to curtail or deny spending for the Agent Orange program. Writer Fred Wilcox reminds us that some three million Vietnamese, including 500,000 children, continue to suffer from the effects of the toxic chemicals sprayed during the war. By the time defoliation spraying ended in 1971, it had destroyed some 4.5 million acres of the rural countryside in what was then South Vietnam (Wilcox 2011, p. 35). A 2003 study by public health scholar Jeanne Stellman "calculated that between 1961 and 1971 about 20 million gallons of herbicides were dropped on South Vietnam, exposing at many as 4.8 million people to the toxic chemicals" (Quoted in Black 2015).

The Tet Offensive 1968

The Tet (Vietnamese New Year) Offensive in late January 1968 resulted in coordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam; it shattered the illusion that the USA was winning the war. Resistance forces attacked almost every major American base – and every town and city in South Vietnam – and some entered Saigon itself. They opened the jails and liberated the regime's political prisoners. The Offensive had a strong impact upon American public opinion; "for the first time," writer Frances Fitzgerald reported, major news magazines began to "criticize the war overtly" (Fitzgerald 1973, p. 525). This criticism, however, was confined to tactics and strategy; it did not challenge the premises of the war or US foreign policy in general.

Kolko claims that Tet's "most decisive effect was to articulate clearly the fact that the United States was now confronting a potentially grave crisis. The first three months of 1968 were therefore the most important in the history of the entire American aggression in Vietnam" (Kolko 1985, p. 313). Powerful and influential men from "the world of big industry and finance . . . had been for the war because [they] believed in the objectives of American foreign policy which led to the intervention." After Tet, however, they changed their tune and eventually advised Johnson that the war could not be won and the USA had to find a way to change its policy (Ibid., pp. 318–319).

Noam Chomsky asserts that Tet caused a dramatic political shift in the US ideological system: "Virtually everyone suddenly turned out to have been an 'early opponent of the war' – in secret, since no record can be found." Tet was a "turning point for the cultural managers, who now faced several challenging tasks. One was to defuse the opposition. . . . Another was to restore the basic doctrines of the faith: The war must now be understood as a noble effort gone astray" (Chomsky 1993, p. 112).

The Hue Massacre

The official US story is that during Tet "the bodies of more than 3,000 Hue residents were found in

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mass graves outside the city," having been executed by NLF and North Vietnamese forces. Economist and media critic Edward S. Herman and historian D. Gareth Porter argued that "like so much else which concerns the history of the Vietnam War, this widely accepted 'fact' is a myth, originated by officials of the Saigon and U.S. governments, using phony documentation and plain lies." In their view, the massacre "has never been seriously questioned or investigated by the press" (Herman and Porter 1975, p. 8).

The official version essentially relied on a "captured document" that was released by the US Mission in Saigon in November 1969. This was 21 months after the massacre allegedly took place and about the same time that the public learned of the My Lai Massacre – whose truth is indisputable. Herman and Porter agree that the NLF and North Vietnam troops "killed some civilians during their occupation, but there is no evidence that they executed large numbers. In the massive carnage of the Vietnam War generally, and the battle of Hue in particular, the term 'massacre' applied to [the killing] of civilians at Hue is simply a deceptive propaganda ploy." The media's willingness "to swallow and institutionalize the myth of the Hue Massacre reflects [their] real role in a political and social system adjusted to cold war conflict" (Ibid., p. 13).

The My Lai Massacre

The official and corporate propaganda on the Hue Massacre served a vital purpose: it diverted attention away from the most infamous and publicized massacre of the war in the hamlet of My Lai on March 16, 1968. That same morning another massacre took place in the nearby hamlet of My Khe – to this day virtually unknown to the US public. The My Lai and My Khe massacres resulted in the murders of 504 unarmed Vietnamese civilians; most of the victims were women, children, and infants. Only Lieutenant William Calley Jr. was convicted of a criminal offense by an Army court martial and given a life sentence with hard labor. President Nixon intervened in the case, however, and Calley served only 3.5 years under house arrest and was then pardoned.

Reporter Seymour Hersh, who broke the original story in late 1969, returned to My Lai in December 2014 and at the My Lai Museum witnessed the gruesome details of what happened in those hamlets. "The museum's count, no longer in dispute, is five hundred and four victims, from two hundred and forty-seven families. Twenty-four families obliterated – three generations murdered, with no survivors. Among the dead were a hundred and eighty-two women, seventeen of them pregnant. A hundred and seventy-three children were executed, including fifty-six infants. Sixty older men died. . . . The message was clear: what happened in My Lai was not singular, not an aberration; it was replicated, in lesser numbers" (Hersh 2015, p. 57).

The first official military report from the American Division, however, "found no evidence of excessive civilian deaths." It claimed that "the civilian casualties had resulted from crossfire between the [NLF] defenders of the village and the American soldiers," a mind-numbing lie since there were no NLF forces in My Lai and no one fired on American soldiers. According to the Peers Army Report into the "My Lai Incident," the first Americal Division report started a process that included the disappearance of records and "a pattern of deliberate suppression or withholding of information . . . at every command level from company to division" (Goldstein et al. 1976, p. 33).

The Phoenix Program

The CIA Phoenix Program in South Vietnam operated from 1965 through 1972; it was organized to identify and destroy the organizational and support network of the NLF in South Vietnam. It led to tens of thousands of deaths, injuries, and disappearances. In congressional testimony, two former US military intelligence agents involved with Phoenix stated that Vietnamese "were indiscriminately rounded up, tortured, and murdered in the effort to eliminate" NLF officials (Quoted in Klare 1972, pp. 264–265). Another former agent testified that he "never knew an individual to be detained as [an NLF] suspect who ever lived through an interrogation in a year and a half, and that included quite a

number of individuals" (Quoted in Chomsky and Herman 1973, p. 28).

Douglas Valentine, author of the seminal work on Phoenix, puts the number killed at more than 25,000 in a program that targeted civilians, not soldiers. Under Phoenix, there was no due process, as "civilians whose names appeared on CIA black-lists were kidnapped, tortured, detained without trial, or murdered on the word of an informer." Phoenix's aim was "counter-terror ... in which enemy agents were brutally murdered along with their families and neighbors as a means of terrorizing the people into a state of submission. Such horrendous acts were ... often made to look as if they had been committed by the enemy" (Valentine 2013: www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/07/dirty-wars-and-the cinema-of-self-indulgence/).

The So-Called Bombing "Halt"

In a speech of March 31, 1968, President John announced a "partial" bombing halt over North Vietnam, made a plea for negotiations, and stated he would not run for reelection. The bombing would be restricted below the 20th parallel, but it actually meant a concentration of effort in that region and throughout South Vietnam, with "almost no reduction in total volume" (Littauer and Uphoff 1972, p. 13). At the end of October just prior to the US presidential election, he announced a complete bombing halt over North Vietnam. But as with the earlier halt, the devastation over Vietnam had not ended; it merely followed the earlier pattern. Some planes released from bombing North Vietnam were shifted to Laos; there were increased air strikes in South Vietnam. The result of this bombing, naval, and artillery attacks was catastrophic.

President Nixon, Vietnamization, and the End of the War

Richard Nixon's election in 1968 brought no basic change in the war. He prolonged the violence by continuing Johnson's "Vietnamization" program that was based on withdrawing American ground troops by shifting combat responsibilities to the Thieu/Ky regime – thus replacing American bodies with South Vietnamese and increasing the technical means of destruction. It was "little more than a change of tactics – and a change that originated not with him but with President Johnson. ... And it was the same strategy that led to the situation the United States took over [from the French] in 1954" (Fitzgerald 1973, p. 529). Nixon pursued this strategy to counter the rising antiwar movement, as he searched "for a formula which would permit the United States to survive a protracted war without loss of our Asian empire, and without incurring further upheavals at home" (Klare 1972, pp. 363–364). His adoption of Vietnamization simply involved more death and destruction – all in all, the war's eventual end would cause 3.8 million deaths, combat and civilian, and a total of 14.3 million refugees. In South Vietnam, there were 300,000 orphans and 800,000 children who lost one of both parents. 15.5 million tons of bombs and ground and naval munitions landed on Vietnam, more than double that used by the USA in all of the Second World War; and 20 million gallons of poisonous herbicides were spread over South Vietnam (Shannon 2000).

Having rejected North Vietnam's peace proposals at the end of 1972, Nixon blamed Hanoi and ordered the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in the heaviest air raids of the war. Worldwide protest erupted over the large number of civilians killed, and the hospitals and other humanitarian buildings destroyed. The level of US and worldwide protest over the Christmas attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong, however, was far less than the devastating bombing throughout South Vietnam during the war.

Nixon also continued the Johnson policy of "waging a largely covert campaign against prominent [antiwar] critics," using the FBI, NSA, CIA, IRS, and military intelligence that "spied upon, provoked, harassed, audited, entrapped, and slandered opponents" (Hunt and Levine 2012, p. 229). His war policy alone eventually led to the deaths of almost 500,000 NVA and NLF soldiers, over 100,000 Saigon regime troops, and 21,000 Americans and accentuated "already deep societal divisions and political bitterness" (Ibid., p. 236).

Prior to his election in November 1968, Nixon also helped to sabotage the Paris Peace talks that

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had begun in the spring of 1968 during the Johnson administration; in this effort, he was aided by Henry Kissinger. Just prior to the election, it appeared there might be a ceasefire in Vietnam, but Nixon intervened as a private citizen, violating US law by letting General Thieu know that he would get a better deal if the former became president. Kissinger, allegedly working for Johnson to foster peace talks, secretly passed on information to the Nixon campaign. Conservative columnist George Will has confirmed the facts (Fitrakis and Wasserman 2014). Johnson had secret recordings of Nixon's treasonous actions but chose not to go public with this information.

The POW/MIA Issue

In office, Nixon countered the growing antiwar movement by manipulating the POW/MIA issue. H. Bruce Franklin's seminal book on the POW/MIA myth that caused a majority of Americans to believe that the North Vietnamese still held POWs and MIAs after the Paris Peace Accords was signed in January 1973 describes the cynical orchestrated effort by Nixon and businessman Ross Perot, among others, to use the issue to prolong the shooting war. The issue "would serve mainly as an indispensable device for continuing the war, functioning on the domestic front as a potent counterforce to the antiwar movement while providing an ingenious tool for building insurmountable roadblocks within the peace talks." The issue would become "a major obstacle to normalized relations for more than [two decades] after the 1973 peace accords" (Franklin 1992, p. 48).

Belief in the truth of the POW/MIA claims was not simply based on "political rhetoric, rumors, and the POW rescue movies" but also on material that put forth "a coherent and superficially plausible pseudohistory compounded by self-deception, amateur research, anecdotes, half-truths, phony evidence, slick political and media manipulation, downright lies, and near-religious fervor." The anguish over POWs and MIAs "[permeated] the society, running especially strong in the working class"; it remained

for a long time "the most important concern of many Vietnam veterans, displacing their own problems with unemployment, homelessness, . . . Agent Orange, and inadequate medical care" (Ibid., pp. 5–6).

The late writer Jonathan Schell contrasted the plight of POWs with other US soldiers in Vietnam: "The wounded, the dying, and the dead went virtually unnoticed," because "attention was focused on the prisoners of war." Citizens got in line behind Nixon's lead and "began to speak as though the North Vietnamese had kidnapped four hundred Americans and the United States had gone to war to retrieve them. They became the objects of a virtual cult, and many people were persuaded that the United States was fighting to get its prisoners back" (Schell 1975, p. 76).

The concern for POWs did not extend to the treatment of Vietnamese POWs at the hands of American-backed forces in the South. The US Office of the Army Chief of Staff was forced to admit that the Thieu-Ky regime engaged in "cruel, sophisticated, calculated torture for information" that revealed the "hypocritical . . . pious statements about the treatment of POWs by . . . [Nixon]." According to the Far Eastern Review, "Those released from U.S.-run jails in Saigon were all incurably crippled" (Kuzmarov 2012, pp. 159–160). And concern for US MIAs never translated into even minimal concern for "the estimated 300,000 Vietnamese soldiers . . . still missing from war . . . a heartbreaking statistic that reverberates across thousands of Vietnamese families – mostly in the north." Although Vietnam "has made scattered efforts to search for remains, the resources devoted to finding the missing Vietnamese are a small fraction of those devoted to recovering the 1,600 Americans still listed from the same war" (Babcock 2018).

My Lai: 20 Months Later

When the My Lai story broke in late 1969, thanks to the persistent efforts of Army veteran Ronald Ridenhour and reporter Seymour Hersh, the

Nixon administration organized a campaign to divert attention from the massacre and William Calley's guilty court-martial verdict to continue the war policy and undermine the antiwar movement. It orchestrated media and public responses to smear Ridenhour and Hersh and worked out an elaborate plan to counter the negative news and growing public concern about what had happened. In response to My Lai, in late 1969 the US Army created the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group (WCWG), "a secret Pentagon task force that had been assembled . . . to ensure that the army would never again be caught off guard by a major war crimes scandal" (Turse 2013, p. 14). The WCWG files "alone demonstrate that atrocities were committed by members of every infantry, cavalry, and airborne division . . . that is, *every* major army unit in Vietnam" (Ibid., p. 21).

The Corporate Media and Public Response

When the US military first acknowledged the My Lai massacre and Calley's case in September 1969, the national media "responded with inattention and incuriosity" (Oliver 2006, p. 39). It was not until November 22 that *The New York Times* published its first editorial on the subject, "asserting that reports of the atrocity were so shocking, so contrary to principles for which this country has always stood, as to be beyond belief" (Ibid., p. 48). To what principles did the Times refer, given the sordid history of US massacres against Native Americans, Filipinos, and Koreans?

When it comes to My Lai and the war itself, Noam Chomsky places the ultimate blame where it belongs: "The planners in Washington are the real war criminals, not the soldiers in the field. The chain of command starts with the civilians sitting in Washington. These were the people charged at Nuremberg and Tokyo." Those with privilege, education, and training "are also the decision makers [who are] ones responsible, far more than those who don't have any choices" (Chomsky 2005, p. 130, 132).

The Military Antiwar Movement

US antiwar veterans rose up to challenge Washington, the media, and the public's denial on the war and belief in the essential goodness and honor of the country by providing firsthand evidence of what happened in Vietnam. These veterans used the My Lai Massacre to raise consciousness and demand that powerful civilian officials and the army brass be indicted for their role in the war. A key organization in this effort was the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), founded in June 1967. It would challenge, and face hostility from, the strongly pro-war American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars.

VVAW's first action was a full-page ad in the New York Times in November 1967 just before a major demonstration in Washington. The ad laid out its principles, "all of which emphasized the right of the Vietnamese to self-determination." There was a strong and positive response to the ad but hostile responses from the government, including Secretary of Defense McNamara, who was incensed and demanded that the FBI investigate many of those who had signed the ad. The CIA also investigated the group, in violation of US law (Hunt 1990, pp. 17–18).

Although founded in 1967, VVAW's deepened activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s "had a profound impact on the antiwar movement. . . . [It] transformed the movement by placing Vietnam veterans in the forefront of the nation-wide struggle to end the Vietnam War." Its members included "some of the most talented and perceptive organizers in the antiwar movement," and chapters around the country "offered services . . . that predated similar Veterans administration programs by nine years." While VVAW activists gained support and respect from a growing number of veterans and the public, "they also stirred fears in the highest levels of government" (Ibid., pp. 1–3).

Economist and labor historian Michael Yates asserts that VVAW reinvigorated the antiwar movement in what was an extraordinary moment in US history, as thousands of soldiers "spoke

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openly, honestly, and publicly about the folly of war and the costs to human beings and societies of allowing young men ... to engage in senseless murder." After the war ended in 1975, small numbers of veterans and other Americans visited Vietnam, "to make common cause with the Vietnamese and do what they could to aid in the rebuilding of the nation. They have been tireless reminders of what was done in the name of the United States" (Yates 2015, p. 10).

It was resistance within the US military, not domestic protest on campuses, that became the most powerful antiwar force against the war and the military hierarchy. In a brutally frank admission, Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr., Marine combat veteran, historian, and military analyst, captures the ramifications of this resistance: "The morale, discipline and battle worthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States. By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse.... Sedition ... infests the Armed Forces" (Heinl 1971).

The Antiwar Movement at Home

The domestic antiwar movement was built upon the black struggle for human rights in the 1950s and 1960s. As the war deepened, the black and antiwar movements began to come together to challenge it, creating increased anxiety among Pentagon and civilian officials. It was black civil rights' activists in the South who first critiqued the war on anti-imperialist grounds, with white antiwar activists followed. In July 1965, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party urged blacks to oppose the war: "No one has a right to ask us to risk our lives and kill other Colored People in Santo Domingo and Vietnam, so that the White Americans can get richer. We will be looked upon as traitors by all the Colored People of the world if the Negro people continue to fight and die without a cause." Six months later, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) stated: "We believe the U.S. government has been deceptive in claims of concern for the freedom of the Vietnamese people ... just as the government has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of the colored people in ... other countries ..." (Quoted in Grant 1988, p. 416).

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was the most influential New Left organization within the student antiwar movement of the 1960s. In its all-too-brief history, it played a crucial role in raising the civic literacy and political consciousness of that era. SDS activists were often outstanding students at the best universities and the most civically literate youth in the nation, particularly on US foreign policy. Violence by a tiny faction within SDS and the larger antiwar movement received the greatest attention and condemnation from political officials and the mainstream media, which lauded a war that would leave millions of people dead. On the issue of antiwar violence, however, philosopher Herbert Marcuse was right: "Can there be any meaningful comparison, in magnitude and criminality, between the unlawful acts committed by the rebels ... on the campuses ... and the deeds perpetrated by the forces of order in Vietnam...." (Marcuse 1969, p. 77).

The Road to the End of the American War

Paris Peace Conference
On January 27, 1973, in Paris, representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) that emerged out of the NLF and other nationalist groups in the South, the USA, and the Thieu regime signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. It recognized the Saigon regime and the PRG as co-equal administrations in South Vietnam and committed the USA and the other signatories to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam. It required the USA to "stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ... and end the mining of [its] territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways" (Indochina Resource Center 1973). The Agreement ended US

bombing of Vietnam, led to the withdrawal of American troops, and brought the release of American POWs, but allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam. The 1973 treaty also reaffirmed the 1954 Geneva Accords' provision that the line between North and South was provisional and temporary. As happened in 1954, however, a US-Saigon alliance subverted the treaty and forced a military settlement. Nixon and Kissinger, therefore, helped orchestrate 4 more unnecessary years of war and suffering for the Vietnamese (O'Connell 2018).

By 1974 most of the American people had become thoroughly disenchanted with the war in Vietnam. The major remaining support came from the Nixon Administration, and after Nixon's departure, the Ford Administration with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger doggedly advising more aid for what some were suggesting had become an obsessional crusade for him. The Pentagon had continued to urge increased support for the rapidly deteriorating military situation, but Congress finally refused to approve increases in funding (Washington Post 1975). Until May 10, 1973, however, *4 months after the Paris Peace Treaty was signed and the withdrawal of American troops*, the House had failed to pass any bill that would reduce or end US military activity in Southeast Asia.

The Collapse of the Thieu Regime and the End of the American War

The last months of the war showed that despite the Thieu regime's massive military, as a fighting force it was worthless and would collapse at the first real sign of battle. That is exactly what happened in the few months leading up to the end of the war in late April 1975. Thieu fled Saigon 9 days before the victory of the North Vietnamese and NFL forces, leaving for exile in Taiwan aboard a CIA-provided transport plane with tons of baggage and two suitcases filled with gold bars. As the regime unraveled near the end, high-ranking officials close to Thieu "were competing with the [South Vietnamese] air force for the dominant position" in drug trafficking (McCoy 2003, p. 203).

The end to the War in Vietnam came swiftly in 1975. In March, Thieu ordered his troops to withdraw from the northern provinces as a result of the defeat there. The "strategic withdrawal" collapsed in a rout. As South Vietnamese soldiers fled, they slaughtered women and children for scarce space on evacuating planes, ships, and motor vehicles; they even stole airplanes rather than utilize them to defend the regime. In contrast to US press reports of a North Vietnam final "offensive" in the South, Wilfred Burchett, the Australian correspondent who had covered the War in Vietnam behind the lines for two decades, contends: "What happened was that guerrilla forces . . . in cooperation with people's organizations inside the towns, won over many soldiers within the enemy's armed forces. Popular uprisings and infiltrations were combined with the operations of the regular Liberation Armed Forces in a coordination of effort for which people and soldiers had all been preparing ever since the National Liberation Front was founded in December I960" (Burchett 1975).

The corporate media and government history of the War in Vietnam continue the massive denial surrounding this epic conflict. When one examines US policy since 1975, it is clear that a fundamental lesson has not been learned: it continues to violently interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. One simply has to look at the historical record of direct and covert US aggression since Vietnam – Angola, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Iraq, Libya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Namibia, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, among others.

Some Lessons of the War in Vietnam

The following lessons that review the history raised in the essay are powerfully identified by historian Christian Appy:

> If we continue to excuse American conduct in Vietnam as a well-intentioned, if tragic, intervention rather than a purposeful assertion of imperial power, we are less likely to challenge current war managers who have again mired us in apparently endless wars based on false or deeply misleading pretexts. Just as in the Vietnam era, American leaders have ordered troops to distant lands based on boundless

abstractions ("the global war on terror" instead of the global threat of "international Communism"). And once again, their mission is to prop up governments that demonstrate no capacity to gain the necessary support of their people. (Appy 2018)

The USA Committed War Crimes Including Torture

US war crimes in Vietnam were legion; the evidence is overwhelming. The most death-producing and devastating crime was US bombing and artillery attacks against villages, especially in South Vietnam. The USA "made South Vietnam a sea of fire as a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a target. This is not accidental but intentional and intrinsic to the U.S.'s strategic and political premises. . .." In such an attack "against an entire people . . . barbarism can be the only consequence of the U.S.'s sledgehammer tactics" (Kolko 1971a, pp. 412–413). These are conceived and organized by the "true architects of terror," the "respected men of manners and conventional views who calculate and act behind desks and computers rather than in villages in the field" (Kolko 1971b, p. 15).

The US mistreatment of Vietnamese civilians and prisoners of war was strictly prohibited by the Geneva Convention, which the USA signed. "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability of any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for torture." US officials and mass media pundits, however, continue to assert that torture is a violation of "our values." This is not true: actual values are expressed by what the USA does – not what it says. Torture is as American as apple pie and was widely practiced in Vietnam, as documented by Anthony Russo, the whistleblower at the RAND Corporation who worked with Daniel Ellsberg to leak the Pentagon Papers. Russo's revelations are so explosive that 50 years later, RAND still keeps his report on CIA torture a secret (Myers 2015)

Washington Lied

Government lying was an essential part of the war. Ellsberg exposed perhaps the greatest lie that had a profound impact on the conflict: the official story

of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of August 1964. President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told the public "that the North Vietnamese, for the second time in two days, had attacked U.S. warships on routine patrol in international waters"; that this was clearly a "deliberate" pattern of "naked aggression"; that the evidence for the second attack . . . was "unequivocal"; that the attack had been "unprovoked"; and that the USA, by responding in order to deter any repetition, intended no wider war. All of these statements are untrue (Ellsberg 2002, pp. 12–13).

The War Was a Crime: Not a Mistake

Since the end of the war in 1975, there has been a concerted effort on the part of US officials, the corporate media, and influential intellectuals to portray US actions as a "Noble Cause" that went astray. Christian Appy profoundly disagrees, arguing that the findings of the Pentagon Papers and other historical documents provide "ample evidence to contradict this interpretation. . .. The United States did not inadvertently slip into the morass of war; it produced the war quite deliberately" (Appy 1993, p. 253).

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Condemned the War: And Was Vilified for It

Dr. King courageously confronted bitter and uncomfortable truths about the war and this nation. He proclaimed that he "could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today – my own government." The war was "a symptom of a far deeper malady within the American spirit, and if we ignore this sobering reality we will find ourselves organizing" committees to oppose other wars "without end unless there is a significant and profound change in American life and policy" (King 1967).

King's magnificent speech, still virtually unknown in this country, elicited strong attacks by the political and corporate media establishment and civil rights leaders. The New York Times

strongly condemned him for "recklessly comparing American military efforts to those of the Nazis"; the Washington Post claimed that some of his assertions were "sheer inventions of unsupported fantasy" and that he had "diminished his usefulness to his cause, to his country and to his people" (Quoted in Morgan 2012, p. 76). This condemnation actually reflected public sentiment: a Harris poll taken in May 1967 revealed that 73% of Americans opposed his antiwar position, including 50% of African Americans.

The Corporate Media Didn't Oppose the War: Only How It Was Fought

The corporate media did not oppose and undermine the war effort. They endorsed US support of French colonialism and only emerged as tactical critics of Washington's war after the Tet Offensive. They never challenged the fundamental premises of the imperialist "Noble Cause." The essence of their response to Vietnam is similar to what CBS Evening News anchor Dan Rather said about the bombing of the former Yugoslavia in 1999: "I'm an American, and I'm an American reporter. And yes, when there's combat involving Americans, you can criticize me if you must, damn me if you must, but I'm always pulling for us to win" (Quoted in Blum 2000, p. 10).

The First Antiwar Protests Came from the Merchant Marine Services

Opposition to US intervention in Vietnam did not begin with student protests in the mid-1960s but with American merchant mariners in the fall of 1945. They had been diverted from bringing US troops home from Europe to transport French troops to Vietnam to reclaim that colony. These merchant mariners vigorously condemned the transport "to further the imperialist policies of foreign governments" (Gillen 1991, p. 122).

Some two decades later, the most important opposition to the American War would come within the military itself – including criticism by Generals Matthew Ridgeway, David Shoup, James Gavin, and Hugh Hester. They and other military leaders, including Air Force General Lauris Norstad, Army Generals William Wallace Ford and Robert L. Hughes, Marine General Samuel G. Griffith, and Rear Admiral Arnold True, "testified before congressional committees, wrote books and articles, appeared on television and radio programs, and made the front page of American newspapers, always with the message that the Vietnam War was a political, strategic, and moral blunder from which the United States should quickly disengage." These "respected and influential military figures . . . initially spoke out against the war while the domestic consensus in support of American involvement was still strong" (Buzzanco 1986, pp. 561–562). Ridgeway, Shoup, Gavin, and Hester supported veterans' antiwar efforts and signed a New York Times antiwar ad in 1967; Shoup and Hester supported and spoke at rallies sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), and the FBI investigated them for Presidents Johnson and Nixon (Ibid., p. 574).

Myths and Lies About the Antiwar Movement Would Fill the Rose Bowl

Much understanding of the domestic antiwar movement, sociologist Penny Lewis argues, is based on two fundamental and erroneous premises: it "was largely an upper-middle-class social movement, led by privileged radicals, with college students serving as its troops, and supported by the sentiment of elite doves"; and the working class "distanced itself from or despised the movement, mostly supported the war and its makers, and was growing increasingly conservative during the era." In fact, "Working-class opposition to the war was significantly more widespread than is remembered and parts of the movement found roots in working-class communities and politics. . .." Unknown to most Americans, "the greatest *support* for the war came from the privileged elite.. . ." (Lewis 2013, p. 5). The antiwar movement was the largest in US history, and the October 1969 Moratorium Against the War was the greatest antiwar protest ever recorded in this country.

Adding to this antiwar movement, the late historian Marilyn Young writes, leading activists in

the civil rights movement began making the link between "racial justice at home and the war abroad." For example, in late 1964 Malcolm X condemned the war, as did James Forman, Air Force veteran and executive secretary of SNCC. In May 1967, the FBI noted "with considerable alarm" that there was a growing link between the struggle for racial justice at home and the growing antiwar movement (Young 2004, pp. 245–246).

Appeals to Support the Troops in Time of War Should Be Critically Examined

In 2013, President Obama and the Vietnam Commemoration urged citizens to support and honor those who served in Vietnam – an appeal that certainly does not extend to antiwar veteran activists. This charge to support the military in Vietnam, and all wars since, essentially asks citizens to uncritically support any US conflict. As the war in Vietnam continued, VVAW challenged such a view in the face of condemnation from prominent public officials and the corporate media.

My Lai Was a Massacre, Not an "Incident": And Has Been Virtually Erased from History in the USA

The most publicized US atrocity of the War, the slaughter of unarmed residents of the hamlet of My Lai on March 16, 1968, *was a massacre – not an "incident."* International law scholar Richard A. Falk argues that the My Lai and My Khe (about a mile away the very same morning) massacres must be understood in light of US war crimes committed in Vietnam. Although these massacres "[stand] out as a landmark in the history of warfare," it would be wrong to "isolate [them] from the overall conduct of the war." Policies that could be considered as war crimes include "the Phoenix Program; . . . aerial and naval bombardment of undefended villages; . . . destruction of crops and villages; . . . 'search and destroy' missions; . . . forcible removal of civilian populations; and . . . reliance on a variety of weapons prohibited by treaty" (Falk 1970, p. 80).

My Lai "is simply the foot soldier's direct expression of the . . . fire and terror that his superiors in Washington devise and command from behind desks. . . . The real war criminals in history never fire guns [and] never suffer discomfort. . . . What is illegitimate and immoral, a crime against the Vietnamese . . . is the entire war and its intrinsic character" (Kolko 1971a, p. 414). Regarding the stateside reception to the My Lai Massacre, Gabriel Kolko reminds us that the "rather triumphant welcome various political and veterans organizations gave Lieutenant Calley reveals that terror and barbarism have their followers and admirers at home as well as in Vietnam" (Kolko 1971b, p. 14).

In the USA, the final lesson of My Lai is that it has been repressed and thrown down Orwell's memory hole. According to "one of the most detailed recent accounts of the killing," British historian Kendrick Oliver writes, the massacre is "now almost completely forgotten, erased almost entirely from the national consciousness. What was once an image of incandescent horror has become at most a vague recollection of something unpleasant that happened. . . ." Christian Appy has asserted that My Lai "has virtually disappeared from public debate or memory" (Oliver 2006, p. 3).

Ecocide Is an Essential Legacy of the War

The horrific and illegal chemical warfare against the Vietnamese was condemned by prominent biologist Arthur Galston. At the end of the Second World War "as a result of the Nuremberg trials, we justly condemned the willful destruction of an entire people and its culture, calling this crime against humanity *genocide*. It seems to me that the willful and permanent destruction of environment . . . ought similarly to be considered as a crime against humanity, to be designated by the term *ecocide*" (Quoted in Knoll and McFadden 1970, p. 71).

The devastating environmental health effects of the war continue for Vietnamese and US veterans. Arthur Westing, the leading US authority on ecological damage during the war, addressed these effects: "Damage to the human environment

in a time of war is thus as old as warfare itself. . . . Nonetheless, the Second Indochina of 1961–1975 (the 'Vietnam Conflict'; the 'American War') stands out today as the [model] of war-related environmental abuse." The "massive and sustained expenditure of . . . chemical warfare agents against . . . South Vietnam . . . resulted in a large-scale devastation of crops, to widespread and immediate damage to cropland and . . . forest ecosystems, and in a variety of health problems among exposed human" (Westing 2002).

The USA Doesn't "Hate War": It Loves It

President Obama's 2013 Vietnam Commemoration speech claim – that we "hate war" and "only fight to protect ourselves because it's necessary" – was merely another in a long line of fantastical, historically untrue pronouncements by US officials. The Veterans for Peace website states: "*America has been at war* [224] *out of* [242] *years since 1776. Let that sink in for a moment*" (emphasis added).

Since the end of the war in Vietnam, virtually every calendar year has seen the presence of US military forces abroad (Torreon 2014). The historical record, therefore, reveals a nation wedded to war – organized and orchestrated by an imperialist ruling class and tragically aided by a public that has been disabled by education, the corporate media, and political officials.

The US War Against Vietnam Did Not End in 1975

The imperialist attacks continued for another 25 years. The USA used its domination of global financial institutions to wage economic war against Vietnam, accompanied by propaganda through the media, cultural institutions, and foundations. Immense suffering has continued as a result of unexploded land mines and bombs that have left more than 100,000 Vietnamese dead and maimed since 1975, and the effects of chemical warfare have afflicted millions (O'Connell 2018).

The ideological attacks against Vietnam and the distortion of American views of the conflict include the Burns-Novick 2017 PBS series "The Vietnam War" – based on the profoundly flawed premise that "decent men" pursued it in "good faith." This is one of the greatest lies of a war built on lies. This documentary is yet another effort begun in 1975 to legitimize the imperialist war and US role in the world.

Vietnamese Resistance to US Aggression Was Justified

Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the Vietnamese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1968, called war of resistance against the USA "the fiercest struggle in the history of Vietnam," forced upon a people who did not provoke or threaten the USA. The Vietnamese always believed that "they have the right to choose the political regime for their country without foreign intervention." The USA violated this right; therefore, resistance was justified (Binh 2003, pp. 455–456).

Daniel Ellsberg supports Madame Binh's assertions. "To say that we had 'interfered' in what is 'really a civil war,' as most American academic writers and even liberal critics of the war do to this day . . . was as much as myth of the earlier official one of 'aggression from the North.' In terms of the UN Charter . . . it was a war of foreign aggression, American aggression" (Ellsberg 2002, p. 255).

Advice from a Vietnam Veteran: Read Some Good History Books

A practical lesson of the war is offered by Vietnam veteran and sociologist Jerry Lembcke, author of *Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam*. "[The] vast majority of Vietnam War veterans would know more about the war today if they had spent their months of deployment stateside in a classroom with [historian and Second World War bombardier] Howard Zinn" (Lembcke 2013).

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Final Thoughts

Forty-four years after the US War in Vietnam ended in 1975, the central and most critical issue is the "struggle for memory." Whose story about the conflict will prevail? This struggle will help determine how we, the people, will respond to present and future US international conflicts. It should be clear that the dominant class has crippled citizens' ability to make informed judgments about that war and US international policies, aided by their corporate media and political minions. What Gabriel Kolko argued nearly 50 years ago bears repeating: Most citizens "are still incapable of . . . a searing reappraisal of their cherished assumptions and vision of society" (Kolko 1971b, p. 14).

The dominant view of the War in Vietnam has not called into question a single major premise of US foreign policy that formed the imperialist aggression against that nation. As stated by Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. government is honorable. It may make mistakes, but it does not commit crimes. It is continually deceived and often foolish . . . but it is never wicked. Crucially, it does not act on the basis of perceived self-interest of dominant groups, as other states do" (Chomsky 2003a, p. 157).

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United States, Hawaiian Annexation

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Definition

The US annexed the Hawaiian Islands by congressional resolution in the summer of 1898, the same summer in which it gained control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines by defeating Spain. Native Hawaiians negotiated and resisted each step, and studying the relationship between the US and the islands helps to show the contingency and complexity of the path towards annexation.

The US annexed the Hawaiian Islands by congressional resolution in the summer of 1898, the same summer in which it gained control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines by defeating Spain. Although debates about the merits of Hawaii had gained momentum in the 1890s, US involvement with the islands had begun over a century before. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Hawaii became tied politically, culturally, and economically to the US. This by no means meant that annexation was a smooth or inevitable process. Native Hawaiians negotiated and resisted each step, and studying the relationship between the US and the islands helps to show the contingency and complexity of the path towards annexation.

Contact and Initial Ties

Prior to contact with Europe, the Hawaiian Islands were divided among a series of competing kingdoms. Land within a given kingdom was in possession of the monarchy, with commoners earning the right to use it in exchange for labour and agricultural products. Historians disagree about the size of the pre-contact population, but one moderate estimate is that at least 300,000 Hawaiians lived on the islands. An English ship under the command of Captain James Cook discovered the islands in 1778, and soon they became a stopping point for Western ships. Diseases such as measles also travelled with the Westerners, and within a century of contact the native population of Hawaii had dropped below 40,000 (Basson 2005: 582).

The Kingdom of Hawaii was born out of this contact with European empires. In the decades following Captain Cook's voyage, a chieftain named *Kamehameha* unified the islands through a series of bloody campaigns and negotiations. Western technology such as muskets and cannon, along with advice from European consultants, was instrumental to his victories. Kamehameha I sought good relations with the various European powers whose ships came to Hawaii, especially Great Britain. On the basis of a treaty draft negotiated with a British naval officer in 1794, Kamehameha I actually thought that his monarchy was a protectorate of the British Empire, although the British Government denied that this was the case (Coffman 2009: 29). The US was one of the many empires that Kamehameha I encouraged to trade on the islands. Americans started visiting the islands soon after achieving independence from Great Britain in 1783, and Hawaii soon became a vital way station for American ships, particularly whalers.

Despite his willingness to adopt Western technology and ideas in order to unify the islands, Kamehameha I refused to convert to Christianity, arguing that he had no wish to overturn a set of cultural norms that had propped up his regime. Missionaries from the US arrived in 1820 and focused their efforts on reaching out to the royal family. They published the Bible in native Hawaiian and opened schools in order to better spread their message (Okihiro 2008: 187). These missionaries saw themselves as on a civilising mission, and many supported US annexation. Some of their children would take up important posts within the Hawaiian government, for instance as emissaries to other nations. Other descendants of missionaries acquired plantations on the islands, becoming the richest citizens in Hawaii and the leaders of the attempts to force US annexation.

Both missionaries and sailors helped tie Hawaii to the US, but they often found themselves at cross purposes about what Hawaii should become. Several times crews and officers rebelled against the missionaries' projects such as shutting down possible sources of prostitutes. Each faction had a different vision of what the imperial relationship with the US should look like.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the US jockeyed with the British Empire for influence over the islands. Despite the deepening economic ties between Hawaii and the US, it took until 1842 for the US Government to try to assert political authority. Until then it had failed to officially recognise the Kingdom of Hawaii, and it was the kingdom's signing of commercial treaties in that year that made the federal government realise that there was a risk of being marginalised by other imperial powers. President Tyler issued a statement proclaiming that the US had a special relationship with Hawaii and would protest against any other power annexing the islands (Baker 1964: 300).

Adaptation Within a Global Economy

By the 1840s, many of the elite of Hawaii suspected that annexation by the US was imminent. Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, the monarchy tried to handle the situation so that Hawaiian elites would not be dispossessed in the event of annexation. During the 1850s, Kamehameha III let it be known to the US Government that he would be open to annexation as long as certain conditions were met, one of which was that the royal family would be taken care of financially. Another condition was that Hawaii would skip the stage of being a territory, which would mean handing most powers to the federal government, and would be admitted directly as a state. Statehood would help secure the position of local elites. Although the treaty negotiations eventually collapsed on both sides, the demand of immediate statehood ensured that the treaty would have had little chance in a US Senate sceptical of admitting a population of non-whites as citizens (Tate 1962: 2).

Another attempt to mediate the dangers of annexation came in the form of reshaping the property regime that had governed Hawaiian life for centuries. The "Great Mahele" between 1845 and 1855 involved the transformation of the publicly held lands of the islands into individually owned plots; previously property rights had been non-transferable. The historian Stuart Banner has pointed out that Western powers remade traditional indigenous labour regimes in the simple-deed model of Western nations throughout the Pacific Rim in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Only in Hawaii was such a transformation undertaken by the native authorities themselves and without direct imperial coercion. Some historians have posited that this was done in an attempt to raise tax revenues during a time of depopulation, but Banner (2005) argues that it was intended to safeguard elite-owned lands in case of annexation, in the hope that imperial authorities would be less likely to seize land held by individual deed than land that was considered communal. It turned out that US annexation was further off than expected, and in the decades between the Mahele and annexation in 1898, the whites were able to consolidate the majority of the most valuable land through individual purchase.

The Hawaiian nobility were not the only ones who tried to negotiate their place in a changing imperial and economic world. Hawaiian emigrants became a labour force throughout the Pacific Rim, working in the gold camps of California alongside Chinese, whites, Hispanics,

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and everyone else attracted by the Gold Rush (Smith 2013: 10), and working on other Pacific islands during the Guano boom of the mid-nineteenth century. Given their maritime experience, many joined whaling ships and ended up as far away as Nantucket and New Bedford (Okihiro 2008: 130–135).

Although the American Civil War (1861–65) distracted the American Government from the issue of Hawaiian annexation, the conflict tied the islands closer to the American economy. Most domestic sugar in the US was produced in the Southern states, and Hawaiian plantations expanded rapidly to meet the hole in the Northern supply created by secession. As the price of sugar skyrocketed, Hawaii's economy centred more and more on production for US markets. When the war ended and Northerners regained access to Southern sugar, the Hawaiian market crashed, but the economic infrastructure of the islands remained pointed towards finding a way into US markets (Rigby 1988: 222).

The Civil War also touched Hawaiians in more direct ways. The majority of Hawaiians were pro-Union; the Kingdom of Hawaii was firmly anti-slavery, with its 1840 constitution banning the institution. In the 1850s, British emissaries made use of this anti-slavery sentiment when trying to persuade the Hawaiian monarchy to reject US annexation. They pointed out that Hawaii was at a latitude south of the line specified by the Missouri Compromise, and that if admitted as a state it would be forced to be a slave state (Tate 1962: 5). During the Civil War a great number of Hawaiian migrants fought and died for the Union in coloured regiments, and in the latter part of the war a Confederate commerce raider destroyed a huge number of whaling ships in the Central Pacific, including at least one under the flag of the Kingdom of Hawaii. Although it was not officially within the control of the US, Hawaii was close enough to be caught up a war dividing the American empire.

Pulling Towards and Pushing Against Annexation

After the war the bonds of the sugar trade continued to grow with the 1875 Reciprocity Treaty,

which ensured that the vast majority of the sugar produced in Hawaii would be shipped to the US. By 1890, well over 95 per cent of Hawaiian exports went to the US (Osborne 1981a: xii). Hawaii needed the markets of the US in order to survive, while the US had less need of Hawaiian sugar, and domestic sugar producers within the US, especially in Louisiana, were continually seeking to cut out competition from international sources such as Hawaii. This economic pressure translated into diplomatic leverage for the US, as Hawaiians knew that despite the treaty their sugar had precariously little protection.

In exchange for granting Hawaiian sugar a favoured place within the market, the US receiving leasing rights to Pearl Harbor. This harbour had attracted the attention of the US military for years, especially after a visit from General John Schofield in 1872 when he reported that it was the key to controlling the central Pacific (Rigby 1988: 224). The treaty itself did not give the US exclusive rights to the use of the harbour, at least until a revision of the treaty a few years later, but it did ensure that the US military would have a continual presence on the islands. In times of crisis for the Hawaiian monarchy, marines and sailors were in place to either undermine or support whoever was on the throne.

Whites in Hawaii, most of whom were American or descended from Americans, increasingly found themselves in conflict with the Hawaiian monarchy. In 1887 they forced the King of Hawaii to sign a new political constitution, also known as the Bayonet Constitution, which removed most executive power from the throne (Silva 2004: 122). Realising that most native Hawaiians resented the influence they had on the islands, the white leaders insisted that property qualifications for suffrage be introduced in order to disenfranchise the majority of commoners. Historians disagree about the state of the Hawaiian monarchy by the 1890s. Some point to the rapidly declining numbers of native Hawaiians and the support that the king often needed from outsiders in order to prop up his rule as evidence of a leadership vacuum on the islands. Others argue that although her predecessors were weak, Queen Lili'uokalani was deposed not because of the inherent instability of

the Hawaiian monarchy, but rather through US intervention.

Upon ascending the throne, Lili'uokalani tried to renounce the 1887 constitution and reclaim the authority of the monarchy. On 17 January 1893, a group of prominent whites engineered a coup against the monarchy. The American consul, John L. Stevens, encouraged them, promising that the government that they established would be recognised by the US Government. Stevens also deployed American sailors and marines stationed on ships docked at Pearl Harbor. These soldiers were supposedly employed to protect American lives and property, but their functional use was to serve as a buffer between rebels and retaliation from forces loyal to the monarchy. They also secured key government buildings. Realising that the Hawaiian forces would not be able to resist direct US intervention, the queen surrendered power to the organisers.

Within a few weeks of the coup, a treaty for annexation was negotiated, and President Benjamin Harrison submitted it to the US Senate. It came at the end of Harrison's presidential term, and it was his successor, Grover Cleveland, who had to decide whether or not he would back the treaty. Harrison was a Republican, the party that after the Civil War was more likely to support an imperialist venture, while Cleveland was a Democrat. Cleveland sent a fact-finder, James Blount, to Hawaii in order to investigate the 1893 revolution. Blount concluded that the queen had been overthrown without the support of the majority of Hawaiians, and also judged that Stevens had overstepped his authority in providing military aid to the rebels. Cleveland vacillated over what to do next; in one speech he floated the notion that the only honourable path for the US was to support the restoration of the monarchy. The backlash he received came mainly from Republicans, who attacked the idea of the US restoring a monarchy as hostile to the mission of empire of liberty (McWilliams 1988: 39).

Seeing that annexation was not going to happen quickly, the coup leaders organised a new republic, the Republic of Hawaii, which represented the interests of only a small minority of the islanders. Suffrage was determined by landownership, and by the 1890s the majority of the land was in the hands of those descended from Americans. Whites occupied nearly all the senior posts within the government, and the mission of the men in these posts, including President Sanford Dole, was to seek annexation as quickly as possible. Native resistance took several forms, from attempted armed uprisings to a petition campaign that helped to defeat an attempt to pass the annexation treaty in 1897 (Loomis 1976: 3).

Hawaiian annexation had its opponents within the US as well, including many within organised labour. Samuel Gompers, leader of the American Federation of Labor, thought imperial expansion would undermine unions by providing capitalists with ready access to cheap labour sources. The vast majority of labourers on the Hawaiian sugar plantations were contract labourers who served for fixed terms, often of 5 years, rather than working for a free wage. This indentured servitude was a sticking point in the debates over annexation, with congressmen often making references to slavery as a way of criticising the plan to take over the islands. At one point, McKinley suggested that after annexation the institutions of the islands would have to be preserved, since to upset the contract system would be to undermine the entire sugar industry of the islands (Appel 1954: 12). The idea of promoting an unfree labour system horrified critics of empire. Labour unions in the nineteenth century also tended to be extremely hostile towards Chinese immigration, and admitting Hawaii would also mean admitting tens of thousands of Chinese labourers into the Union.

In view of the failure to win annexation in 1897, historians have been divided about why the pro-expansionists won in 1898. The war with Spain provides one explanation. After Admiral Dewey took the Philippines in the spring of 1898, securing a chain of supply by grabbing Hawaii had an air of necessity. On the other hand, historians such as Thomas McCormick and Thomas Osborne (1981b) have argued that Hawaii and the Philippines were appreciated less as possessions in themselves than for the access that they could provide to markets in Asia, particularly China.

A sticking point for annexation was the question of what to do with the people on the islands once they had been annexed. American-born people made up only a small percentage of the populace, and even native Hawaiians composed a minority by the 1890s. The sugar boom, combined with a declining population, had meant that plantation owners had had to import contract labour from other places, particularly China and Japan. Portuguese labourers from the Azores and the Madeira had also been imported, since the people of those island chains had experience of growing sugar.

Would Hawaiians of all types be treated as imperial subjects or granted the benefits of American citizenship, including suffrage? Congress debated the merits of limiting suffrage on the islands by various schemes. Although the states had long since removed their property requirements for male suffrage, some congressmen hoped that the restrictive voting requirements of the Republic of Hawaii could continue when Hawaii became an organised territory. Most congressmen felt that the native Hawaiians themselves should be given the full rights of citizens, but there were sharp divisions over whether the contract labourers should be given such benefits (Basson 2005). Although the immediate debates surrounding who would get the benefits of citizenship within the empire subsided after the 1900s, reservations about the diverse mix of Hawaiians would continue. Hawaii spent over half a century as an organised territory, far longer than most the states which had been territories in previous decades.

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United States–Latin American Relations After September 11, 2001: Between Change and Continuity

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Synonyms

China; Dependency; Imperialism; Latin America; New imperialism; United States

Definition

This chapter seeks to analyse the current dynamics in US–Latin American relations, with a particular focus on the region's evolving international

political and economic profile. While the international relations of Latin America have long been viewed as revolving around the US, recent years have borne witness to "new" axes of relations. China is emblematic in this regard, though Latin America has also reached out to other countries and regions. In other words, during the last decade there has been a significant expansion in Latin America's international political and economic footprints. As a result, it has by now become common to refer to "rising" or "emergent" Latin and South America. Yet US influence and imperialist dynamics have in no way disappeared from the region. Further, to the extent that Latin America has indeed emerged from the US shadow, we must interrogate its rise as well, and its implications for how we conceive of imperialism and anti-imperialism vis-à-vis current regional and global geopolitical scenarios.

Introduction

Since the start of the new millennium, fundamentally new dynamics have been at play in US–Latin American relations. Long considered part of Washington's "backyard," and the target of frequent US interventions, Latin America has in recent years fallen from the list of US geopolitical priorities. In response, mainstream analysts – in *Foreign Affairs*, the BBC and elsewhere – have asked whether the US is "losing," or perhaps has even already "lost," South America in particular, and indeed Latin America as a whole. In sum, the region is no longer simply taken for granted as an inalienable part of the US sphere of influence.

This chapter seeks to analyse the current dynamics in US–Latin American relations, with a particular focus on the region's evolving international political and economic profile. While the international relations of Latin America have long been viewed as revolving around the US, recent years have borne witness to "new" axes of relations. China is emblematic in this regard, though Latin America has also reached out to other countries and regions. In other words, during the last decade there has been a significant expansion in Latin America's international political and economic footprints.

As a result, it has by now become common to refer to "rising" or "emergent" Latin and South America. Yet US influence and imperialist dynamics of course have in no way disappeared from the region, as we will see. Further, to the extent that Latin America has indeed emerged from the US shadow, we must interrogate its rise as well, and its implications for how we conceive of imperialism and anti-imperialism vis-à-vis the current regional and global geopolitical scenarios.

"Losing" Latin America?

While the aforementioned rhetoric concerning Washington's "loss" of Latin America is flawed in a number of ways, it does nevertheless contain an important kernel of truth: there has been a general decrease in US influence, involvement, and intervention in the region. The trend is not uniform, and indeed rumours of the death of US sway in Latin America have been greatly exaggerated. However, as indicated by Peter Hakim, president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, there has been a change in the nature (and frequency) of US engagement (and imperialist practices). While policing its "backyard" had traditionally been at the top of its foreign policy agenda, other regions have subsequently become more important to the US. Hakim (2006) comments: "After 9/11, Washington effectively lost interest in Latin America. Since then, the attention the United States has paid to the region has been sporadic and narrowly targeted at particularly troubling or urgent situations."

In contrast, Washington has been directing more of its energies towards engaging in repeated military adventurism in the Middle East as part of the supposed "War on Terror," as well as in countering the rise of China. In regards to the latter, the US is increasing its military presence in Asia as part of what Hillary Clinton has referred to as "America's Pacific Century." It is now commonly argued (both inside and outside of government) that the bilateral US–China relationship is the most important in the world. In turn, Latin America has often been an afterthought for US officials in recent years.

Accordingly, to take a representative example, Latin America played virtually no role in the 2012 presidential campaign. Even in the foreign policy debate, Barack Obama failed to dedicate a single word to the region. For his part, Mitt Romney did call for more attention to trade opportunities in Latin America, and also lambasted Obama for being willing to "meet with all the world's worst actors," among them the leaders of Cuba and Venezuela. Yet neither Brazil nor Mexico (the region's two powers) received even a single mention (see Keppel 2012).

However, this rhetoric concerning the US "losing" (or losing interest in) Latin America is problematic for a number of reasons. First, as Hakim himself suggests, Washington's interest in the region has not been nonexistent. Rather, it has been "sporadic." In certain respects Washington's interest in Latin America during the last decade has been downright intense. Examples include: ongoing efforts to isolate and undermine the region's left-leaning governments, especially in Venezuela and during the "successful" 2009 coup in Honduras against the left-leaning president Manuel Zelaya; the tremendous expansion of free-trade agreements with Latin American countries, specifically with Chile (2004), the Dominican Republic and several Central American countries (2005), Peru (2007), Colombia (2011), and Panama (2011); and steps towards the creation of a "security corridor" from Colombia to Mexico in order to "enlarge the radius of Plan Colombia to create a unified, supra-national counterinsurgent infrastructure" (Grandin 2010).

Periodically, US concerns have also been piqued by fears of Latin America becoming a staging ground for Middle Eastern "terrorist" groups. In this regard, Latin American-Middle Eastern ties (real or imagined) became a hot topic at CNN's "national security" debate during the 2011 Republican Party primary campaign. Addressing a question about "using the United States military," Texas governor Rick Perry's response included the following comments:

> I think it's time for a 21st century Monroe Doctrine . . . We know that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico, as well as Iran, with their ploy to come into the United States. We know that . . . the Iranian government has one of the largest – I think their largest embassy in the world is in Venezuela. So the idea that we need to have border security with the United States and Mexico is paramount to the entire Western hemisphere.

Later, in response to the question "What national security issue do you worry about that nobody is asking about[?]," former senator Rick Santorum commented: "I've spent a lot of time and concern . . . [thinking] about what's going on in Central and South America. I'm very concerned about the militant socialists and the radical Islamists joining together, bonding together." Romney also got in on the act, adding that, "we have, right now, Hezbollah, which is working throughout Latin America, in Venezuela, in Mexico, throughout Latin America, which poses a very significant and imminent threat to the United States." More specific rumours and accusations launched by US media and political figures include reports concerning Iranian-Cuban-Venezuelan terrorist plots to hack into US nuclear plants (El Universal 2011), the possibility of Iranian bombs exploding in Latin American capitals (Davis 2012), and South American-based agents of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's elite Quds Force preparing to launch attacks against "US interests" in the region (Warrick 2012). Suspicions have also routinely centred on the activities of Hezbollah and similar groups in the tri-border area, where Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina meet (Karam 2011). Seeking to address the perceived threat, Obama signed into law the "Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act" in December 2012.

There are further problems with this argument. The idea that the US has lost Latin America implies that, at least insofar as it concerns Washington's involvement, the region is in a post-imperialist phase. This is patently false. US–Latin American relations have of course changed markedly since the heyday of Cold War interventionism. Yet the US has not wavered in its desire to meddle in the region when it perceives its interests to be at stake. This much is clear from its machinations against the Hugo Chávez Government and attempts to further militarise the "War on Drugs."

In addition, the idea that US influence in Latin America is waning is often presented with an undertone of lament. In this narrative, Washington's divine right to play kingmaker in the region is being denied by the entrance of unwanted external actors such as Iran and China. While it is frequently argued, not unfairly, that Chinese and Iranian involvement in Latin America will likely have many negative effects for the region, the US role, past or present, is not often subjected to the same critical analysis. Those who long for the simpler days when Washington's influence went mostly unchallenged in Latin America of course overlook the long and sordid history of US intervention, and its continuing (though more "sporadic") attempts to subjugate the region.

Finally, the notion that it is the US that has lost Latin America suggests that Latin America itself has done nothing to provoke the changes in this relationship. That is, in attributing this shift entirely to the US, instead of in part to actions taken by Latin Americans themselves, this narrative denies the agency of Latin American actors. As noted, there are US-centred factors which help to explain the evolution in US–Latin American relations. These include the 11 September 2001 attacks, as well as Washington's concern with the rise of China, and its turn inward to focus on domestic economic and political crises. Yet Latin America has also been active in pushing for these changes. In short, many Latin American countries have become increasingly independent in recent years due to evolving economic and political circumstances. Respectively, these include greater stability and sustained growth (at least until the recent slowdown in parts of the region, such as Brazil), and a democratising trend that has brought left-leaning and/or nationalist-minded leaders to office in many of the region's countries.

In sum, while Latin America should not properly be anyone's to "lose," except for Latin Americans themselves, there have indeed been fundamental changes in US–Latin American relations in the post-9/11 period. Again: this is not to suggest that Latin America is fighting for or has created a new, post-imperial order, but rather that it has managed to carve out an unprecedented (if still highly insufficient) degree of autonomy

within the existing global power structures and hierarchies. The following section delineates in more precise terms the nature of these changes, and the continuance of imperialist dynamics in the region on behalf of the US as well as other actors. Though the point should not be overstated, as we will see, this analysis requires differentiating between the trajectory of South America and that of the more northern Latin American countries.

Latin America's Growing Autonomy: A "World Historical Event"

As the historian Greg Grandin (2011) observes, so dramatic have been the changes in US–Latin American relations that they constitute "a world historical event as consequential as the fall of the Berlin Wall, though less noticed since it has taken place over a decade rather than all on one night." One striking illustration of this shift concerns Washington's efforts to rally other countries to participate in its post-9/11 "global torture gulag." Grandin (2013) writes:

> All told, of the 190-odd countries on this planet, a staggering 54 participated in various ways in this American torture system, hosting CIA 'black site' prisons, allowing their airspace and airports to be used for secret flights, providing intelligence, kidnapping foreign nationals or their own citizens and handing them over to US agents to be 'rendered' to third-party countries like Egypt and Syria. [. . .]

> No region escapes the stain. Not North America, home to the global gulag's command center. Not Europe, the Middle East, Africa, or Asia. Not even social-democratic Scandinavia. Sweden turned over at least two people to the CIA, who were then rendered to Egypt, where they were subject to electric shocks, among other abuses. No region, that is, except Latin America.

> What's most striking . . . is that no part of its wine-dark horror touches Latin America; that is, not one country in what used to be called Washington's 'backyard' participated in rendition or Washington-directed or supported torture and abuse of 'terror suspects'. Not even Colombia, which throughout the last two decades was as close to a US-client state as existed in the area.

While Washington often used to exercise de facto authority over Latin America's involvement in international politics, in more recent years it has

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been unable to coax the participation of a single one of the region's countries in its "anti-terror" crusades. This holds even for staunch US allies.

Yet consideration of "Latin America's" relations with the US also calls for disaggregation. For Grandin (2011), what is really occurring is that much of South America is "pull[ing] out of the US orbit" while "Washington is retrenching in what's left of its backyard." This means that while Latin American countries in general are increasingly asserting their autonomy from the US, the trend is especially pronounced in South America; and not just in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, but also in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. Even US-friendly Chile, which at the time was negotiating a free-trade agreement with the US, refused to bow to Washington's pressure to authorise the 2003 invasion of Iraq at the UN Security Council (Baeza and Brun 2012). These are indeed different times.

Proceeding apace with this growing autonomy from the US, Latin America has deepened its relations with other countries in the global South. Leaving aside speculation about its political aims in the region, Iran's trade with Latin America has certainly surged in recent years. As of 2011, Iran was the world's largest importer of both Brazilian beef and Argentine corn (Charbonneau 2011; Warrick 2012). China has of course also made headlines for its growing economic interest in Latin America, and has displaced the US as the primary trading partner for a number of the region's countries. It has also become a leading lender and financier of infrastructure projects. One particularly audacious plan (which may or may not come to fruition) concerns a Chinese-financed canal in Nicaragua, to serve as an alternative to the current route through Panama. As *Time Magazine* laments, this suggests that "the can-do spirit Latin America used to expect from the US" now comes from Beijing instead of Washington (Padgett 2011).

South–South relations have also arisen along other, less publicised, axes (Funk 2013). Led by Brazil, South America in particular has greatly increased its presence in both Africa and the Middle East. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – a regional bloc that includes all 12 independent South American countries – has held a series of summits with the Arab League and African Union in recent years. These have provided an unprecedented forum for sustained, high-level contact between these regions. As Al Jazeera notes, then Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva "invested himself and Brazil's overall foreign policy heavily in Africa, maybe more so than any other non-African leader in modern history," thus earning himself the nickname "Secretary General of Africa" (Elizondo 2010). Political engagement with the Middle East has also reached new heights, with the UNASUR–Arab League summits representing the "first time" that "these two parts of the developing world were brought together." As noted by Celso Amorim (2011, pp. 48–49, 52), who served as Lula's foreign affairs minister and is the current defence minister, "Without any hesitation, I can testify that the Middle East was brought, perhaps for the first time, to the center of our diplomatic radar."

Economic relations between these regions have also soared. South American trade with both Africa and the Middle East has increased several times over in recent years. Brazil and Argentina are the primary players in this regard. Tellingly, Arab countries now comprise the second-largest market in the world for Brazilian agricultural goods (dos Santos 2012).

There are other indications of growing Latin American (and particularly South American) autonomy from the US. These include: the formation of regional blocs such as UNASUR and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), both of which exclude the US from participation; the region's increasing participation as protagonists in the global economic system, as indicated by the rise of Latin-American-based transnational corporations – the "Global Latinas" (Casanova 2009); and the emergence of Brazil as a regional and even global power, including its participation as one of the BRICS countries.

Yet here, caution is in order. It is easy to overstate the "change" that is embodied in Latin America's growing global involvement. For example, though the 2014 founding of the

BRICS' "New Development Bank" was met with much hysteria in the West, the grouping's achievements in this or other areas in actually challenging US hegemony or the primacy of the US dollar have been meagre, to say the least. Given the massive disparities and differences between the BRICS countries (in size, political systems, economic interests, and so forth), there is indeed reason to suspect that the BRICS will produce much counter-systemic rhetoric but perhaps little else.

More fundamentally, Latin America's increasing South–South relations, attempts at regional integration, and willingness to criticise US policies *do not* signify the end of US imperialism in the region. The US is still the world's leading imperial power, still views itself as "the world's indispensable nation," and still sees Latin America as its rightful "backyard." What has changed is not its imperial *intentions* but rather its ability to carry them out (again, prompted in part by Latin America's growing autonomy) in the usual fashion. In the current era of US imperialism in Latin America, the *means* are less the bullet and the military dictatorship than growing surveillance, free-trade agreements, and foreign aid to prosecute the ineffectual and economically destructive "War on Drugs," beef up security forces with extremely problematic human rights records in the name of fighting crime, and support opposition groups in the region's left-leaning states.

Thus, imperial aims toward Latin America are a bipartisan constant; what vary are the chosen tools to bring them about. Obama's would-be rapprochement with Cuba does not reflect a new, post-imperial US–Latin American relationship. The fundamental US goals of regime change and maintaining its colonial enclave in Guantánamo continue. What has changed is the recognition that greater US-Cuban engagement and the spread of capitalist relations will prove more efficient than a quixotic embargo in remaking Cuba in our image.

For their part, Latin America's leading states have indeed become increasingly assertive in recent years, though of course without presenting any fundamental challenges to the existing global order. Nevertheless, in comparison to Latin America's "Cold" War (during which US-backed military coups and interventions leading to widespread carnage were less the exception than the rule) much has indeed changed in the contemporary period.

Evaluating the "New" Latin America

It is at least clear in the current period that we must qualify the seminal International Relations theorist Robert Keohane's argument that Latin Americans "are takers, instead of makers, of international policy" (quoted in Carranza 2006, p. 814). Simply, US influence in the region is no longer as all encompassing as was the case a mere decade or two ago, as the above analysis demonstrates. History is of course contingent, and Latin America's gains in these regards could easily be reversed. Yet at least for now, the region has a degree of autonomy that is without historical precedent.

The prominent Colombian philosopher and legal scholar Oscar Guardiola-Rivera (2011, pp. 13, 18) takes up this point in his suggestively titled *What If Latin America Ruled the World? How the South Will Take the North into the twenty-second Century.* He writes: "Latin America is making world history, and looks set to lead the world into the twenty-second century." He also singles out South America's left-leaning governments for "manag[ing] to challenge the prevalent form of globalisation" through their deviations, real or imagined, from the prevailing neo-liberal model. South and Latin America's rise, then, is not only being concretised in the present but is also a harbinger for the creation of a better world.

Yet three caveats are in order vis-à-vis this sanguine account. First, if anything, capitalist relations and the "extractivist" model have become even more entrenched in Latin America in recent years, even under "left turn" governments (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). The region's historical inequalities and marginalisation of large sectors of the population have thus in general continued unabated, if not worsened.

Second, this again should not be taken to mean the end of imperialism in Latin America. In fact,

as suggested above, it does not even mean the end of *US* imperialism in the region. While there have indeed been fundamental changes in US–Latin American relations, Washington's attempts to discipline and intervene in the region are not exclusive to the pre-9/11 world.

Further, China's booming relations with Latin America have their own imperialist-style dynamics. The Chinese economic model in Latin America has largely been to import raw materials (from Chilean copper to Venezuelan oil) while exporting cheap manufactured goods that undermine local industry. Thus, there is a risk that Latin American countries are entering into a new "dependency"-style relationship with China, in which they will become trapped as commodity producers. In other words, the same wine, but in a new Chinese-made bottle.

Third, considering Latin American actors as "makers" (i.e., as actors who matter at a regional or global level) also suggests the need for a more critical analysis than Guardiola-Rivera and many progressive commentators present. There is certainly reason to applaud the fact that the US is no longer able to exercise the same stifling control over the external agendas of Latin American countries. But to the extent that Latin American actors (from governments to Global Latinas) are exercising power in international politics and economics, it must be scrutinised. We cannot simply assume that Latin America's rise will necessarily have positive social implications, or will bring into a being a more benign social order, and promote a nicer form of global capitalism. As Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2006, pp. 225–226) puts it, "The anticolonial response ought not to privilege the non-Western as a matter of principle – to do so simply mirrors in reverse the logic of imperial value." Instead, we must interrogate how Latin America is wielding this newfound power and to what ends it is taking advantage of its expanded autonomy.

This suggests a number of questions. For example: Are Latin America's booming trade relations with other areas of the global South actually serving to undermine the global capitalist system or neo-liberal economics in any way? Or are they in fact reinforcing them? What about the tremendous trade imbalances in some of these sets

of relations? For example, in 2011, Argentina exported around $1.7 billion (US) in goods to both Algeria and Egypt, its largest trading partners in the Arab world, while importing only $3.5 million and $74 million, respectively. Does this suggest South–South solidarity, or a quasi-neocolonial relationship?

A prima facie response suggests extreme caution about viewing these relations as the building blocks of a new world order that is significantly different from what we have now. In other words, it is not clear how much the global political and particularly economic systems would actually change "if Latin America ruled the world." This scepticism is further warranted based on Latin America's (and, again, particularly Brazil's) growing participation in the global weapons trade. Indeed, though it of course pales into insignificance in comparison to the US, Brazil is now the world's fourth-largest exporter of light arms, with annual sales tripling between 2005 and 2010. Unsurprisingly, then, Arab Spring protestors in Bahrain found themselves the targets of Brazilian-made tear gas canisters, which are alleged to have killed several infants (Santini and Viana 2012).

Closer to home, Brazil's economic activities within South America have also come under fire. Brazilian-financed infrastructure and mining projects from Ecuador and Peru to Guyana and Argentina have inspired local opposition. In the case of Bolivia, plans for a road through indigenous territories have prompted protestors to denounce the "São Paulo bourgeoisie" and the Brazilian government for "imperialist' tendencies" (Romero 2011).

The point is not to take an overly dim view of the rise of Brazil, or Latin America more generally. Again, to the extent that Latin Americans are now able to exercise greater control in the realms of national and international politics and economics, that is of course a positive development. So is the fact that a region which has long been marginalised and disenfranchised from making decisions at the global level is now increasingly (though only nascently) assuming that role, through institutionalised channels such as the UN and World Trade Organisation and also otherwise.

This could have positive consequences. To take one example, in comparison to China, which has often provoked anger for its heavy-handed approach to resource-extraction on the continent, Africans tend to see Brazil as a "less threatening" alternative partner (Carmody 2011, p. 78). Despite the aforementioned controversies, Brazil is also viewed quite favourably by many in Latin America (BBC 2011). Indeed, though ultimately ineffectual, its leadership in responding to the 2009 coup in Honduras is but one example of the constructive role that the country can play there. The push by Brazil and other regional leaders for the establishment of institutions such as UNASUR and CELAC is another development that could have salutary long-term effects in Latin America. Further, the general respect (at least rhetorically) of Latin American governments for international law, and reticence to support military interventions, may often be a helpful antidote to the rules of the US-led global order. Beyond the region's governments, transnational social movements such as the Latin American-inspired World Social Forum can provide a hopeful vision for a globalisation and international politics "from below" (Smith et al. 2008). Yet the beneficence of the region's actors in these regards must be interrogated, not merely assumed.

Conclusion

The post-9/11 period has borne witness to deep and historic changes in US–Latin American relations, and indeed in the international politics and economics of Latin America more generally. This is especially the case for South America. Meddling by the US and (to a lesser extent) other outside actors of course continues in the region, while China's increasing economic ties with Latin America appear more likely to lead to further dependency than development in the region. Latin America still exists within the prevailing capitalist, neo-liberal order, and we are far from a post-imperialist age in which the US and Latin America interact on anything approaching an equal footing. Nevertheless, it is also true that, on the whole, Latin American actors enjoy

greater autonomy at present than at any period since independence.

This has fed into repeated hand wringing in the US over whether Washington has "lost" Latin America. Yet while this line of argument is troubling for a variety of reasons (e.g., it suggests that Latin America is in a post-imperialist phase, and implicitly denies the agency of Latin American actors), it does hint at an important truth. Namely, as stated in UNASUR's Constitutive Treaty, many of the region's governments are aiming to create a more "multipolar" and "balanced" world (Itamaraty 2008). Regional integration is one manifestation of this desire, as is the diversification of Latin America's economic and political ties. This again does not portend a Latin America that is free of the imperial hand of Washington. But even greater latitude within existing imperial and global hierarchies, at least at the present moment, represents a markedly positive change from the Latin America of the "Cold" War.

As a result, it is important to recognise that despite the continuing imperialist dynamics that characterise US foreign policy, Latin American actors have an unprecedented (though still rather limited) degree of agency in the contemporary period. For a region that has long suffered, and continues to suffer, at the hands of foreign powers, this is a reason for applause. However, instead of merely cheering the region's rise, and Brazil's push for regional and global influence, scholars and activists, as well as the general public in these countries, must also scrutinise how Latin American political and economic actors are exercising this power. It is not enough to celebrate their arrival as makers; we must also enquire as to what they are making.

Cross-References

▶ Cold War and Latin America
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America
▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism
▶ Latin American Solidarity: Human Rights and the Politics of the US Left

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US Colonialism

US Exceptionalism

US Foreign Policy

US Hegemony

US History

US Imperialism

US Imperialism and Nazi Germany

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Definition

The relationship between the US and Germany from 1933–45, more specifically between the US and the German imperialist systems, was complex and ambiguous. It admittedly involved eager competition, sometimes bitter rivalry, and ultimately war, but also intimate and mutually beneficial collaboration, especially at the level of private enterprise.

This essay challenges the predominant notion that the US was an enemy of Hitler's Third Reich. In reality, the relationship between the US and Germany from 1933–45, more specifically between the US and the German imperialist systems, was complex and ambiguous. It admittedly involved eager competition, sometimes bitter rivalry, and ultimately war, but also intimate and mutually beneficial collaboration, especially at the level of private enterprise. This collaboration was also furthered by a shared antagonism toward the Soviet Union, the incarnation of anti-capitalist revolution and anti-imperialism which, under Hitler's auspices, German imperialism was expected to annihilate. Nevertheless, the US and German imperialist systems did eventually stumble into war against each other, with nothing less than supremacy within the restricted circle of the Great Powers at stake. Ironically, it was the huge sacrifices made by the Soviet Union that ensured US victory in the showdown at imperialism's OK Corral. When the war ended, German imperialism, defeated and therefore down but certainly not

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out, and henceforth under 'democratic' rather than Nazi management, was reduced to the role of a junior partner of US imperialism, willing and able to help the US establish its supremacy in Europe and to fight and eventually vanquish the Soviet Union in a new, 'cold' war.

Like other imperialist powers, the US is always looking out for ways to serve the interests of its big corporations and banks. In order to keep their profits at an acceptably – perhaps better? – at a desirably high level, important raw materials such as oil must be obtained as cheaply as possible, foreign markets must be opened up, and opportunities must be created everywhere for the profitable investment of excess capital. Access to cheap labour is also crucial, and labour must be kept cheap by combating unions and working-class political parties. The interests of US imperialism in the face of competition in the imperialist 'rat race' must be defended by all means, ranging from forging formal or informal alliances with other imperialist powers to conflict and war. Last but certainly not least, the system of which imperialism is a manifestation, capitalism, must be defended against any kind of unwanted change, above all revolutionary change, throughout the world.

The US, itself a former colony, has traditionally avoided seeking to accomplish all this by establishing direct political control over other countries (in other words, by acquiring colonies), as its European rivals used to do. Its favourite approach has been economic penetration, combined with the greatest possible amount of indirect political control. This strategy has typically required the collaboration of local comprador elites ruling via democratic or, if necessary, dictatorial regimes. Much of Latin America has been penetrated in this manner by US imperialism. Like colonial control, economic penetration has usually been associated with 'developing' countries, especially when it involves crude forms of indirect political control via regimes that could be defined as 'neo-colonial' or 'semi-colonial', such as the Pinochet regime in Chile or the Suharto regime in Indonesia. Economic penetration can also target fully developed countries, however, including other imperialist powers. And this kind

of penetration is of course likely to have a great influence on formal and informal relations, not only at government level, with the affected power. Let us examine the case of the relationship between the imperialisms of the US and Nazi Germany from 1933–45; that is, the dozen years during which, under Hitler's stewardship, German imperialism first flourished, then nearly collapsed, but – with US help – would manage to survive.

The First World War had been an imperialist war, fought by imperialist powers with imperialist objectives in mind: a reality that was semantically obscured by claims that it was a 'war to end all wars', a 'war for democracy', and similar hypocritical nonsense. At the end of that war, Germany's imperialist ambitions received a major setback. On the international stage, however, Germany remained a major player with a considerable imperialist appetite, which was to become obvious for all to see when Hitler came to power in 1933. To the US, this development posed a challenge but also created opportunities. In the context of the ongoing competition among imperialist powers, the US and Germany were competitors engaged in a rivalry that had the potential to explode into war, but they also stood to gain from a close collaboration; if not between their respective governments, then at least between their leading corporations and banks. During the First World War, a huge amount of capital had built up in the vaults and accounts of 'corporate America', which therefore looked out for investment opportunities abroad. For this kind of activity, Germany, which needed to disgorge hefty reparation payments to France and Belgium, proved to be a promised land. The result was that a wave of US direct investment flooded into Germany. In 1929, General Motors (GM) thus took over Germany's largest car manufacturer, Adam Opel AG, based in the town of Rüsselsheim. In the same year, Ford built a huge new factory in Cologne, soon to be known as the Ford-Werke. The result: a large share of the German auto industry was henceforth under US control. Other US corporations formed strategic partnerships with German firms. This arrangement involved joint ventures and understandings concerning access to raw materials, agreements concerning

prices, etc. A spectacular example is provided by the case of Standard Oil of New Jersey (later known as Esso, then Exxon), which went to bed with the German petrochemical trust IG Farben. By the early 1930s, an elite group of about 20 large US companies had some sort of German connection. A number of large US banks were also involved in this German investment offensive, for example J.P. Morgan & Co, which had made a fortune during the Great War. All these banks had their own German partners, such as the Deutsche Bank. US law firms were also involved in investments in Germany. The great specialist in these kinds of legal affairs was Sullivan & Cromwell, a prestigious Wall Street law firm run by the brothers John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, whose German-connected clients included the Rockefellers, owners of Standard Oil.

In the early 1930s, things did not go well for US investments in Germany. The reason for this was the Great Depression, whose main characteristic was the disharmony between supply, high because of increased productivity, and slumping demand. This crisis affected all capitalist countries, but it hit Germany particularly hard. At the German branches of US corporations, production and profits dwindled. To make things worse, the political scene became extremely unstable, with Nazis and communists battling each other in the streets of Berlin and other big cities. German industrialists and bankers – and US 'captains of industry' with investments in Germany – feared that the country was ripe for a 'red revolution' like the one which had put the Bolsheviks in power in Russia in 1917. But then a miracle happened: thanks to the generous political and financial support of German industrialists and financiers, including many with partners in the US, Hitler came to power in January 1933, and soon the situation changed politically as well as socially and economically. The German subsidiaries of Ford, GM and others quickly returned to profitability. The reason was that Hitler did what those who had brought him to power, Germany's leading capitalists, expected of him: he eliminated the threat of revolutionary change, embodied by Germany's communists, throwing many of them into concentration camps; and he dissolved other working-class parties and all labour unions, thus transforming the hitherto militant German working class into a flock of impotent sheep, forced to work 'harder and faster' for the benefit of their employers, including the German subsidiaries of foreign corporations. At Ford-Werke, for example, labour expenses declined from 15 per cent of the business volume in 1933, when Hitler came to power, to 11 per cent in 1938. Whenever workers displayed the slightest inclination to protest or strike, the Gestapo intervened with an iron hand in favour of the employer. General Motors' Opel factory at Rüsselsheim benefited from such an intervention in June 1936. The owners and managers of US corporations and banks with investments in Germany were in seventh heaven and publicly sang the praises of Hitler. Among them were William Knudsen, the chairman of the board of General Motors, Sosthenes Behn, the head of ITT, and lawyer John Foster Dulles. (The story of US investments in Nazi Germany is told in detail in Pauwels 2002, 2013.)

Hitler also found a way to lead Germany out of the doldrums of the Great Depression. His remedy was essentially Keynesian or 'demand-side'; that is, he stimulated demand by means of government orders. But Hitler's Keynesianism was of a military nature: at his behest the German state ordered tanks, guns, submarines, trucks, and planes in huge numbers. This was part of his great ambition, shared by Germany's industrialists and bankers, to rearm Germany so that, via a new war, it could finally achieve the grandiose imperialist ambitions for which the Reich had already gone to war in 1914 against its imperialist rivals. (Fritz Fischer first demonstrated this continuity in his famous book *Germany's Aims in the First World War,* published in English in 1967.) War was expected to bring wonderful results in terms of opening up sources of raw materials and markets in the form of overseas colonies, of course, but also of territories in Eastern Europe. It would obviously take quite a few years before Germany would be ready to wage war successfully. In the meantime, Hitler's rearmament revealed itself as a bonanza of profits for Germany's corporations and banks, as has been stressed in studies of the economic history of the Third Reich, such as

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Adam Tooze's *The Wages of Destruction* (2006). The German subsidiaries of US corporations shared fully in the 'profit explosion' made possible by the armament boom. The Ford-Werke, for example, which had suffered heavy losses in the early 1930s, benefited from massive state orders for trucks. And so the annual profit of Ford's German subsidiary climbed spectacularly between 1935 and 1939. General Motors' Opel factory, which had also suffered losses in the early 1930s, did even better thanks to orders from the Nazi regime. Other big US corporations that made a lot of money in Germany in the 1930s were: IBM, whose German branch, called Dehomag, supplied the Nazis with perforated card machines, the predecessors of the computer, which facilitated the automation of industrial production; and ITT, whose German subsidiaries, including Lorenz AG, produced all kinds of communications equipment for the Nazis, especially for the Luftwaffe. (IBM's happy adventures in the Nazi Wonderland have been described in great detail in a notorious book by Edwin Black [2001].)

Hitler's Germany was not only a low-wage Shangri-La for US investment capital, but also became a significant market for the finished products of US industry. Ford, for example, also exported truck parts from the US to Germany. Other US corporations, for example, Pratt & Whitney, Boeing, and Sperry Gyroscope (now known as Unisys), provided the Third Reich with 'significant quantities of all sorts of material related to aviation' such as 'automatic pilots . . . and artillery devices used in anti-aircraft defence' (Etzold 1975: 78–79). The US also exported raw materials of great strategic importance to Germany, including copper and rubber, for which, in view of its preparations for a 'motorised' war, Hitler's Germany had a great need. In preparation for the kind of motorised war that would be known as blitzkrieg ('lightning war'), involving countless gas-guzzling trucks, tanks, and planes, Germany also stockpiled enormous oil reserves, and much of that oil was supplied by US trusts. The percentage of petroleum products imported by Germany from the US quadrupled between 1933 and 1939. A corporation that earned huge profits from this business was the Texas Oil

Company, renamed Texaco in 1959. The German navy obtained the oil it needed from a Texas oil magnate, William Rhodes Davis. And Standard Oil assisted IG Farben in the production of synthetic fuel.

The profits made by US branches were for the most part reinvested in the 'land of unlimited possibilities' that Hitler's Germany appeared to be at the time, certainly in comparison to the US itself, which remained stuck in the mud of the Great Depression. The 'earnings' were reinvested in the modernisation of existing infrastructure, the building of new plants, and the purchase of government bonds. In 1935, for example, GM built a new Opel plant in Brandenburg, near Berlin; it was the most modern truck factory in the world. The value of US investments in Germany thus grew considerably. The Ford-Werke and IBM's Dehomag virtually doubled in value between 1933 and 1939. As for Opel, by 1939 its worth was estimated at $86.7 million, that is, 2.6 times the value of General Motors' original investment in Germany, which had been $33.3 million. Under Hitler's auspices, the total value of US investments in Germany, involving a total of 553 companies, rose to $450 million at the formal declaration of war against the US in December 1941. In the 1930s, then, US imperialism was profiting handsomely from close collaboration with German imperialism, then under Nazi management.

The fact that Hitler was a racist and a virulent anti-Semite did not trouble the owners and managers of US corporations active in Germany, many of whom were 'white supremacists' and anti-Semites themselves. Henry Ford, for example, had personally written an anti-Semitic tract in 1920 entitled *The International Jew,* which actually had a great influence on Hitler. Both men, like most contemporary anti-Semites on both sides of the Atlantic, subscribed to the theory of 'Judeo-Bolshevism', explained in detail in Damien Amblard's book *Le 'fascisme' américain et le fordisme* (2007). They considered Marxist international socialism to be an invention of 'international Jewry', a strategy developed by that supposedly inferior people to subvert the natural (or God-given) rule of the superior 'Nordic' or

'Aryan' race. The Russian Revolution in particular was seen as the evil work of Jews, and the Soviet Union, the first socialist state and a bastion of anti-imperialism, was despised as 'Russia ruled by Jews'. And it was believed that the Jews would not rest until they had subverted the entire world with their labour-union agitation, their socialism, or, worse, their communism. Ford and many other US industrialists and bankers admired Hitler because he had exorcised this 'red peril' from Germany. And they fervently hoped that he would soon proceed to fulfil his life's big ambition as outlined in *Mein Kampf*: namely, the total destruction of the Soviet Union, source of inspiration and guidance for 'Reds' worldwide, also stateside, where the political left was troublesome enough for the 1930s to be labelled the 'red thirties' by some historians.

And so it happened that US businessmen were unperturbed by Hitler's anti-Semitism and racism in general and happily helped him to prepare for war, a war whose victim was supposed to be the Soviet Union. Indeed, as late as the spring of 1939, Hitler was determined to wage war against the Soviets, as Rolf-Dieter Müller has convincingly demonstrated in his 2011 book *Der Feind steht im Osten*. Hitler was convinced that 'the West' – a codename for the imperialist powers – would not object to such a war and would therefore remain neutral as a *tertius gaudens.* This was not an unreasonable expectation, because the destruction of the Soviet Union was fervently desired by all imperialist powers. After all, that state was perceived as the incarnation of social revolution, a 'counter-system' to the international capitalist order of things, and the wellspring of anti-imperialist agitation worldwide. Moreover, via their infamous appeasement-policy, London and Paris had actually encouraged Hitler's great ambition and facilitated its implementation, providing him with a Czechoslovak 'springboard' pointing east.

The US and German industrialists and bankers who backed Hitler had another reason for looking forward to the war he would unleash. Hitler had to borrow vast sums of money to finance his armament programme. Germany's national debt was mushrooming, and it was clear that only the loot

resulting from a ruthless war of rapine would enable him to pay back the creditors; that is, the banks and other investors and purchasers of German government bonds, including US corporations and banks. Last but not least, it was hoped that the destruction of the Soviet Union would facilitate the recovery of the investments made by US corporations like Singer in the Empire of the Tsar, lost on account of the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Even though he was the dictator of a rival imperialist power, US capitalists were as happy with Hitler as they would have been with any comprador dictator they might have put in charge of some 'banana republic' in South America. Hitler, so the saying went, was 'someone you could do business with'. And great things were expected from him in the future, above all the destruction of the Soviet Union. US and German imperialism were on the same wavelength: they supported each other, they were forming a partnership, admittedly not a formal *political* partnership, but certainly an informal *economic* partnership; not a partnership at government level but a partnership at corporate level. The US government kept a decent distance from the regime in Berlin, which was despised by many ordinary Americans. But Washington certainly saw no reason to go to war against a country where US investment was flourishing. In fact, in the 1930s, the US had plans in the drawer for war against Mexico, Japan, and even Great Britain and Canada, but no plans at all for war against Nazi Germany (Rudmin 2006: 4–6).

The owners and managers of US businesses with branches in Germany were undoubtedly frustrated by the fact that, for reasons which cannot be elucidated here, the war unleashed by Hitler in 1939 turned out to be a war against Poland and the 'Western' powers Great Britain and France, instead of a war against the Soviet Union. But this was not very important. What was important was that this war opened up even more fabulous opportunities for making money. When war broke out on 1 September 1939, the New York Stock Exchange reacted enthusiastically and showed its biggest gains in more than two years. Indeed, in order to wage 'lightning war'

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(*Blitzkrieg*) and thus achieve 'lightning victories' (*Blitzsiege*) in 1939 and 1940, Hitler relied to a large extent on equipment and fuel provided by US corporations, which made a lot of money supplying these goods. For the benefit of all branches of the German armed forces, Ford-Werke and Opel cranked out not only trucks, but also planes, including the JU-88 bomber; ITT's subsidiaries manufactured radios and radar equipment as well as high-quality fighter aircraft such as the FW-190; IBM's German subsidiary, Dehomag, provided technology that allowed the Nazi war machine to operate 'on a large scale, quickly and efficiently,' as Edwin Black puts it; and the subsidiary of Singer, famous for its sewing machines, mass-produced machine guns. In 1939 and 1940, Texaco and Standard Oil continued to ship oil to Germany, much of it via neutral Spanish ports. Texas oil baron William Rhodes Davis supplied Mexican oil, refining it in his own German subsidiary located in Hamburg.

The military success of the Nazis was also the commercial success of US corporations and banks; the triumphs of Germany's Nazi imperialism were also triumphs of US imperialism. Major players of both sides celebrated the *Wehrmacht's* recent victories in New York on 26 June 1940, during a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. It was organised by Gerhard Westrick, a German lawyer who represented Ford, GM, General Electric, ITT, Standard Oil, and other US corporations with a German connection. Many high-ranking executives of US corporations and banks attended. Five days later the German victories were fêted again, this time during a party organised by Rieber, the boss of Texaco, and attended by more big guns of US industry such as Edsel Ford, Henry Ford's son.

The de facto alliance of US and German imperialisms, not at government level but certainly at the level of 'private enterprise', was also reflected in the happy and optimistic comments of US executives such as Rieber, Thomas Watson, the big boss of IBM, and oil baron William Rhodes Davis. They praised Hitler, his Nazi regime, and fascism in general, and expressed the hope that their great and profitable relationship might continue to yield fruit, for example in the shape of business to be done in the countries occupied by Germany. Conversely, Hitler honoured US industrialists such as Ford and Watson with prestigious decorations.

The fact that Hitler was a dictator and that many of his victims were democracies did not bother these captains of industry. Typical of this attitude was a comment by Alfred P. Sloan, chairman of GM, in June 1940, expressing satisfaction that the era of the democracies with 'their unintelligent, even stupid and limited leaders' was finished, and that the future belonged to Nazism and other forms of fascism, 'an alternative system … with leaders who are strong, intelligent, aggressive, [and] who make people work longer and harder'. Corporate America's spectacular demonstration of enthusiasm and support for fascism in 1940 is one of many historical facts that contradict the 'free-markets-and-democracy' notion; that is, the idea that the natural political partner of the social-economic system of capitalism, often euphemised as the 'free market' system, is democracy.

The war unleashed by Hitler was good for US imperialism, especially for the corporations and banks with German branches. But the war also revealed itself to be good for other corporations, namely all those, usually also 'big boys', that became involved in the stateside production of planes, tanks, and other war equipment. The US itself had been modernising its military for some time – the strategic bombers and aircraft carriers did not wait until the 1940s to be designed and built – and from Washington came increasing orders for trucks, tanks, planes, ships, etc. This increase in military spending by the state bolstered economic demand enough to finally put an end to the Great Depression. Furthermore, thanks to President Roosevelt's famous 'Lend-Lease' programme, US industry was also producing all kinds of military equipment for Great Britain, thereby allowing the latter to continue the war against Hitler after the defeat of France. Contrary to popular myth, Lend-Lease 'aid' did not amount to a free gift, but was a complex system of loans and credits, generating gargantuan profits for the US corporations and banks that were involved.

But Lend-Lease also promised *long-term* benefits for corporate America. The scheme required London to dismantle the protectionist system of 'imperial preference' tariffs, which had not prevented but certainly limited US exports to Great Britain and its dependencies; it served as a weapon for US products to conquer the British market, in other words, to economically penetrate – and thus weaken – an imperialist rival. Conversely, Lend-Lease drastically reduced the British share of the pie of the US market, in that it forced the British to divest themselves of virtually all their considerable stateside investments. Finally, on account of Lend-Lease, Great Britain found itself saddled with a colossal debt, which would not be completely paid off until 29 December 2006. The war unleashed by German imperialism, informally but intimately associated at the time with US imperialism, thus allowed the latter to clip the wings of its British rival in the imperialist rat race. During the Second World War, British imperialism, once so powerful but considerably weakened by the First World War, was reduced to the status of 'junior partner' of US imperialism.

From the perspective of US imperialism, Hitler had been good for business, but his war was nothing less than wonderful for business and strengthened the international position of US imperialism. There was no need for the US to get involved in the war in Europe, and the leaders of corporate America had no desire to see that war end soon. To the contrary, they wanted the war to last as long as possible, as Henry Ford openly admitted on one occasion. About the war in Europe, US industrialists regretted only one thing: namely, that the Soviet Union, the incarnation of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism and therefore the arch-enemy of all imperialist powers, had not been the victim of the *furor teutonicus*. On 22 June 1941, however, the *Wehrmacht* finally crossed the Soviet border with tanks and trucks made by Ford or GM and with gas tanks brimming with fuel provided by Texaco and other US oil trusts. If Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union ten, five, or even just one year earlier, the leaders of corporate America would have applauded unanimously. But in 1941,

their feelings were mixed. The sales to Great Britain had been the source of unlimited profit for many corporations, and it was obvious that their British customer's chances of survival improved considerably when the Nazis went for the throat of another enemy, especially when that enemy did not collapse after a few weeks, as the experts in Washington, London, and obviously Berlin had expected.

The Nazi regime's economic policy also played an important role in the decline of US enthusiasm for Hitler. US imperialism, like any other imperialism, wanted 'open doors' all over the world for its exports and its investment capital. But, starting in the late 1930s and increasingly in the early 1940s, the Nazis – in other words, the contemporary managers of German imperialism – moved to restrict access to the markets of Germany and the European countries it conquered to all but the most indispensible foreign products and raw materials such as oil. Most of Europe was thus converted into something US businessmen detested, namely a 'closed economic system', difficult if not impossible to penetrate economically. To US corporations with branches in Germany itself, this development did not present a considerable problem, but US corporate leaders who were not so privileged – and the many politicians convinced that US prosperity depended on foreign trade – were very perturbed. Even more irritating was the success of Berlin's aggressive international trade policy in Latin America, considered by US imperialism to be its exclusive commercial bailiwick. During the 1930s, the German share of the import volume of countries such as Brazil and Mexico was growing rapidly at the expense of the hitherto unthreatened US competition. Nazi Germany was rapidly becoming the 'most irksome competitor' of the US in that part of the world, as the German ambassador to Mexico put it in 1938 in a report to Berlin. Corporate America thus lost a lot of the sympathy it had previously had for the Nazi regime. The friendship between the US and German imperialist systems was cooling off rapidly. (Reference is made to Uwe Lübken 2004; the quotation of the ambassador is from Hallgarten and Radkau 1981: 337–338.)

When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, many US industrialists wished that neither side would win; they hoped that the conflict on the Eastern Front would last very long, until the antagonists were both exhausted. More and more members of the US power elite started to sympathise with the Soviets, if only because they worried that, in case of a Nazi triumph in the East, Hitler 'might be unstoppable' (Smelser and Davies 2008: 9–11); in other words, that such a triumph might crown German imperialism as the supremo of international imperialism – and a major threat to the US. Still, a hard core of US businessmen remained resolutely profascist and anti-Soviet and hoped that Hitler would destroy the cradle of communism. In all likelihood, this was also what the great majority of owners and managers of US corporations with German subsidiaries were looking for, because they produced the war materiel that enabled the Nazi legions to head for Moscow in that hot summer of 1941. To their great regret, the Nazi host was never to march triumphantly onto Moscow's Red Square.

Success in this *Blitzkrieg* was not just a military but also an economic precondition for a German victory in the Second World War. To win the war, Germany had to win fast, lightning-fast. After the campaigns of 1939 and 1940, there was enough fuel left only to wage war for about three or four months. But Berlin was confident that the Red Army could be defeated in six to eight weeks. A lightning-fast victory would make the abundant resources of the defeated Soviet Union available, particularly the oil of the Caucasus, and that would turn Germany into an invincible world power. In other words, victory over the Soviet Union would make German imperialism 'number one', not only in Europe, but in the entire world. But on 5 December 1941, when the Red Army launched a counteroffensive in front of the gates of Moscow, as devastating as it was unexpected, Hitler himself and the generals of the German High Command realised that the 'lightning war' in the East would not produce a 'lightning victory', and that Germany was therefore doomed to lose the war. That day, 5 December 1941, was the real turning point of the Second World War, but other than Hitler and his generals, hardly anyone

was aware of it. (Two 'outsiders' who were in fact aware of it were the Swiss secret services and the Vatican.)

America's 'captains of industry' did not have the vaguest idea what the failure of the *Blitzkrieg* in the Soviet Union really implied, but it was henceforth obvious that the Germans were going to have their hands full on the Eastern Front for quite some time. This would allow the British to stay in the war, which meant that the profitable Lend-Lease trade could continue for the foreseeable future. In other words, the success of the Red Army was good for business. In the autumn of 1941, the New York Stock Exchange recorded higher and higher stock prices as it became increasingly evident that the Nazi crusade in the East was not going to result in the great triumph that had been expected. The situation became even more advantageous when it appeared possible to do business with the Soviets as well. In fact, in November 1941, when it became obvious that the Soviet Union was not going to collapse anytime soon, Washington revealed itself willing to extend credit to the Soviets, and a lend-Lease agreement was signed. Thanks to that wonderful war in Europe, yet another foreign market opened up, at least partially and temporarily, for the benefit of US imperialism. Moreover, via 'reverse Lend-Lease', the Soviet Union also started to supply the US with important raw materials, including chrome and manganese ore as well as platinum; on account of this, the US even became a net beneficiary of wartime trade with the Soviets, at least according to the Soviet historian Pavel Zhilin (1985: 55–56).

Incidentally, it is a myth that the totally unexpected success of the Soviets against Nazi Germany was only possible because of massive US aid. First, US aid never represented more than 4 or 5 per cent of the total Soviet production of war equipment. Second, US supplies to the Soviets only began to make a difference long after the turning point of December 1941. According to Adam Tooze, 'the Soviet miracle owed nothing to western assistance [and] the effects of Lend-Lease had no influence on the balance of forces on the Eastern Front before 1943' (2006: 589). Third, the Soviets themselves manufactured virtually all

of their high-quality weapons, including the excellent T-34 tank. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union was at least neutralised by the unofficial, discreet, but nonetheless substantial, assistance provided to the Germans by US corporations. Without these resources, the Nazis would never have been able to attack the Soviet Union.

Viewed from the perspective of US imperialism, the war yielded all sorts of benefits and opportunities but also some problems, challenges, and dilemmas. The defeat of France and the Netherlands in 1940, for example, raised the question of what would happen to their colonies in the Far East, namely Indochina and Indonesia, rich in rubber and petroleum, respectively. With the 'mother countries' occupied by the Germans, these colonies looked like ripe fruits ready to be picked by one of the remaining competitors in the imperialist competition. But by which one? Perhaps the Germans, if they were to win the war and impose a harsh, Versailles-style settlement on the losers. But the prospects of a German triumph were fading fast as the Panzers had to shift into reverse gear in front of Moscow. A more likely candidate was Japan, an imperialist power with great ambitions in the Far East, and a keen appetite for rubber and oil. But the US was also a candidate. With Japan, the USs had had strained relations since the early twentieth century when, following their conquest of the Philippines, the US had become geopolitically interested in the Far East. Both powers had great and conflicting ambitions with respect to China, a huge but powerless country that seemed ripe to be economically penetrated and politically dominated by an imperialist power. To America's displeasure, Japan had already grabbed a sizeable piece of China in the 1930s, namely Manchuria. And now Indochina and Indonesia were up for grabs. The tension was mounting in Tokyo and Washington; who would make the first move?

In Washington, plans for war against the Japanese, underestimated as an inferior yellow race, had been ready for quite some time. They involved the use of aircraft carriers and strategic bombers, providing Uncle Sam with a military arm long enough to reach across the Pacific,

where the Philippines, strategically situated close to Japan as well as China, Indochina, and Indonesia, could serve as a useful base of operations. (Hawaii, annexed by the US in 1898, was of course an equally convenient *pied-à-terre* halfway across the Pacific.) In Washington, the President and his advisors felt it was imperative to act before Tokyo had a chance to beat them to it and create a fait accompli that might be impossible to undo. During the last few decades, more and more evidence has built up indicating that, via measures such as an oil embargo, the US leaders deliberately provoked Japan into bombing Pearl Harbor and knew that a Japanese strike force was on its way to attack the US base there (see Robert B. Stinnett's book *Day of Deceit* [2000].)

It was extremely important to make the Japanese attack the US, rather than vice versa. Indeed, only a defensive war was acceptable to Congress and to the US public. Moreover, an US attack on Japan would also have required Nazi Germany to come to the aid of Japan under the terms of their alliance, while a Japanese attack on the US would not. Tokyo was tricked into attacking Pearl Harbor just days after the strategic aircraft carriers had conveniently sailed away from there, and so President Roosevelt could easily 'sell' the war he wanted against Japan to Congress and to the US public. There would be no need to account for Germany, which had not been involved in Japan's so-called 'surprise' attack, was under no obligation whatsoever to come to the aid of its Japanese ally, and was known to be grimly focused on its war against the Soviet Union.

But on 11 December 1941, a few days after the attack on Pearl Harbor and much to Washington's surprise, Hitler himself declared war on the US. Very likely, he hoped that Tokyo would return the favour by declaring war on the Soviet Union, which would have revived Berlin's moribund hope for a victory on the Eastern Front. However, the Japanese did not declare war on the Soviet Union, undoubtedly figuring that they would have their hands full with their US enemy. Predictably, their armies swarmed out to the south, to resource-rich Indochina and Indonesia and to the Philippines, the major US bridgehead in the Far East.

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US imperialism was now an enemy of German imperialism, a partner and even friend not so long before, at least of corporate America. It was also an enemy of Japanese imperialism, a long-time rival in imperialism's Far Eastern hunting grounds. On its side was British imperialism, in the process of becoming the 'junior partner' it has remained ever since. And also on its side, rather surprisingly (if not shockingly), was Soviet communism, in principle an arch-enemy of all forms of imperialism, but formally at war only against German imperialism. The Soviet Union was a friend of the US and Great Britain, but only 'for the duration'; that is, on account of the principle that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. That friendship was doomed to end as soon as the common enemy was defeated.

The US and its British partner restricted their active participation in the war against Germany to a minimum, finding excuses for not opening a second front in Western Europe which would have provided considerable relief to the Red Army. While the 'Anglo-Saxons' thus sat on the fence, the Soviets functioned as cannon fodder, fighting titanic battles against the Germans at Stalingrad and elsewhere, inflicting huge losses on the *Wehrmacht.* On the Eastern Front, Germany would end up with no fewer than 10 million of its total 13.5 million men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner during the entire war; and the Red Army would end up with the credit for 90 per cent of all casualties in the German army. That was obviously to the advantage of the US and Britain, which did not care that the Soviets themselves also suffered grievous losses. In fact, it was hoped that the war in the east would end with both sides being totally exhausted, so that the US, together with Britain, could decisively intervene in the end, like a deus ex machina. (In similar fashion, the US had entered the First World War at a very late stage, suffered minimal losses compared to Britain and France, and emerged from the war in a much stronger position vis-à-vis allies who also happened to be imperialist rivals.)

The Soviets would make the biggest contribution by far to the Allied victory over Nazi Germany, but would indeed be bled white in the process. For each American who gave his life, in the Second World War, no fewer than 53 Soviet soldiers gave theirs. And while a total of approximately 300,000 Americans – and also approximately 300,000 British – were killed on all fronts, including the war against Japan, more than 13 million Soviet soldiers were killed, virtually all of them while fighting the Germans on the Eastern Front.

The informal partnership of US imperialism with German imperialism, and the discreet but intimate collaboration between the two, had never existed at the government level, but always at the corporate level, at the level of 'private enterprise'. (Which is why it has been virtually invisible to historians, who conventionally focus on the role of the state, in other words, on events of a political and military nature.) When, in December 1941, their governments suddenly and unexpectedly found themselves at war with each other, this mutually beneficial corporate collaboration did not come to an end; far from it. Business trumped patriotism, and making money proved more important than winning the war. As far as US corporations and their German branches were concerned, it was business as usual: 'profits *über Alles*!'

The German branches of the big US corporations were not confiscated by the Nazis after Pearl Harbor, as has often been suggested. Nazi intervention in their management remained minimal, and the headquarters in the US maintained at least a measure of control via trusted German managers and in some cases via branches in neutral countries such as Switzerland. They continued to crank out the military commodities desperately needed by Hitler to continue his murderous war long after he had abandoned all hope of victory. The US branch plants were specialists in mass production of this kind of material, and the Nazi leaders understood only too well that interference in the management of Opel and others could jeopardise that production. US branch plants continued to supply Nazi Germany not only with a huge quantity but also a high quality of military equipment. This included trucks equipped with all-wheel drive, radar systems, engines for the ME-262, the very first jet fighter, and turbines for the infamous V2 rockets. A US subsidiary also supplied

sophisticated equipment that assisted the Nazis in perpetrating their unprecedented crimes. We refer to the Hollerith calculators, produced by IBM's Dehomag, useful for 'establish[ing] lists of Jews and other victims with a view to deporting them'. Finally, at least some US corporations continued to provide the Third Reich with fuel, without which much of this equipment would have been useless. Via ports in the Caribbean and Spain, Standard Oil shipped not only petroleum products to Germany, but also other raw materials essential for waging war, such as tungsten and cotton.

It is true that, as apologists argue, the US branches in Germany had no choice but to produce for the Nazis. But this defence obviously does not apply to corporations that found ways to export oil and other commodities to Germany. And it is also true that the managers of the branch plants and their stateside bosses did not have to be forced; in fact, they proved very keen to produce for the Nazis. The reason was that producing for the Nazis in Germany remained highly profitable until the very end of the war. (Incidentally, the Nazi authorities paid the bills with money stolen from their Jewish victims, with gold looted from the national banks of occupied countries like Belgium, and with other riches yielded by their conquests and crimes; Swiss and international banks based in Switzerland were happy to make the arrangements.) The earnings of the Ford-Werke, for example, almost doubled between 1939 and 1943. Noteworthy determinants of high profit rates were the regressive employment policy of the Nazi regime and the massive use of forced labour. The Nazis froze the wages of German workers and introduced considerably longer working hours. At Opel and Singer, workers protested in vain as they had to labour 60 hours per week while their wages were reduced. Labour costs were also lowered, and profits thus increased, by the use of forced labour in the form of foreign workers, many of them deported involuntarily to Germany, as well as prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates. This amounted to a form of slavery, of which the branch plants of US corporations were also able to take advantage. Subsidiaries known to have benefited from such slave labour included Coca-Cola, Kodak, Opel, which favoured POWs, and the Ford-Werke, which on one occasion even employed inmates of the Buchenwald concentration camp (Billstein et al. 2000).

The profits made by US branch plants continued to be reinvested mostly in Germany, for example in the expansion of facilities and the acquisition of more modern machinery, which increased the value of the enterprise. The value of the Ford-Werke thus rose officially from Rm60.8 million in 1938 to Rm68.8 million in 1945, but in reality it likely more than doubled during the war. It also seems that profits were repatriated via banks in Switzerland, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. This financial institution – dominated and run by US and German bankers, even during the war – is known to have assisted the oil magnate William Rhodes Davis in repatriating some of the profits made by his German subsidiary. Before and after Pearl Harbor, the BIS collaborated with representatives of both German and US corporations. On the US side they included Allen Dulles, the representative in Berne of the US secret service (OSS, forerunner of the CIA). According to a German historian, Jürgen Bruhn, the OSS was 'from a social point of view, an association of executives of big companies, stock brokers and Wall Street lawyers [etc.]'. And indeed, before the war, Dulles, together with his brother, John Foster, had been a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell, a Wall Street law firm specialising in US investments in Germany and German investments in the US. Dulles's boss, the head of the OSS, was William Joseph Donovan, also a former Wall Street lawyer and a good friend of Gerhard Westrick, Ford's and Standard Oil's German lawyer, the man who had hosted the June 1940 celebration of the German victories in New York. During the war, Westrick was the administrator of the German branches of ITT and Kodak. Throughout the war, the BIS functioned as a kind of private club in which German and US businessmen, their eminent lawyers, and their favourite bankers could meet and do business. As the French writer Paul Valéry put it at the end of the First World War, in war 'people who do not know each other massacre each other for the

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benefit of people who know each other but do not massacre each other'.

In the US, the public was not aware that branch plants of prestigious US corporations were producing all sorts of weapons and other equipment for the Nazi enemy. The US government, on the other hand, knew very well what was going on, but chose to ignore this kind of 'trading with the enemy'. This tolerant attitude had a great deal to do with the fact that 'big business' has always had an enormous influence in the halls of power in Washington and even managed to increase that influence considerably during the war. A host of representatives of big business, including high-profile executives, descended on Washington and took over important positions in the state bureaucracy. They included William S. Knudsen, president of General Motors from 1938 to 1940, an admirer of Hitler, Edward Stettinius Jr., another former senior officer of General Motors, and Charles E. Wilson, president of General Electric, another firm with major investments in Germany. The overwhelming majority of these volunteers proceeded to advance the interests of their corporations, obtaining lucrative state contracts, and, unsurprisingly, safeguarding the interests of their subsidiaries in Germany. Thus, we can understand why the US government chose to piously ignore the fact that the country's big corporations were amassing fortunes in the land of the enemy. There were, however, exceptions to this general rule. Legal action was taken against a small number of corporations whose Nazi connections happened to be a public secret, particularly Standard Oil and IBM, but that led to nothing more than a gentle slap on the wrist. The fact that big business enjoyed unprecedented control over the US government also explains why the German branch plants of US corporations, including the huge Ford-Werke just outside frequently bombed Cologne, were only lightly bombed by the Allies (if at all), despite the fact that they were of vital importance to the Nazi war effort.

The failure of Hitler's *Blitzkrieg* in the Soviet Union in December 1941 had been the real turning point of the war, but until the end of 1942 everything still seemed possible. After the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943, however, the whole world knew that the German army had received blows from which recovery was impossible. The Red Army was henceforth on the march to Berlin; slowly, perhaps, but surely. In Washington and London, this caused alarm bells to ring. If nothing were done to prevent it, the Soviets might singlehandedly defeat the Nazis, occupy Germany, and liberate all of Europe. That would mean not only the end of German imperialism, but also a catastrophe to imperialism in general, because the Soviet Union embodied the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist revolution. Such an outcome would be particularly traumatic to US imperialism, which had invested heavily in German imperialism. US imperialism not only intended to maintain its profitable German connection in the coming post-Nazi era, but also looked forward to using it as a bridgehead for the economic penetration, combined with indirect political control, of the rest of Europe. In other words, US imperialism had a stake in the survival of German imperialism, albeit in a new, non-Nazi reincarnation.

Defeating German imperialism and not destroying it as the Soviets purported to do, but subordinating it to the status of a junior partner, combined with the hoped-for elimination of that pesky competitor in the Far East, Japan, was generally expected to bring about what the publisher of *Life*, Henry Luce, had already predicted in 1941: namely, that the twentieth century would be 'the American century' – one during which, as US writer Lewis Lapham predicted, the US would 'inherit the earth'. On the other hand, it was feared that US imperialism could get into deep trouble if Germany and Europe could not be brought into its orbit. The demand stimulated by war had pulled the US economy out of the slump of the Great Depression and even created a boom, but the war would soon end, so economists, journalists, and politicians expressed fear that the country might slide back into a depression, bringing unemployment and other social problems, and possibly demand for radical change. It was believed that this daunting scenario could be prevented if US industry could find ways to market its products all over the world. Some spokesmen of the US power elite even declared dramatically that the

preservation of the capitalist system in America depended on a considerable expansion of overseas trade and investment. It is in this context that the US sought to achieve a worldwide system of free trade via the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 and the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, supposedly *international* organisations that have in fact been dominated from the start by the US. All countries were henceforth supposed to provide an 'open door' to US exports and investment capital, and henceforth Washington actively supported governments that were favourable to such an arrangement and fought – openly or covertly – those that were not. In countries which the US itself liberated, for example Italy and France, the left-leaning resistance, planning all sorts of radical reforms of an anti-capitalist nature, was thus excluded from power in favour of elements embracing economically liberal and politically conservative ideas, often including former fascists such as Italy's Marshal Badoglio. The US hoped, moreover, that in the other countries of Europe, namely not-yet-defeated Germany and the East European states in the process of being liberated by the Red Army, governments would come to power after the war that favoured the kind of liberal economic policies from which the US expected such high dividends.

After the summer of 1943, the Red Army was on the move to Berlin, but it was still fighting deep in Russia itself and continued to face 'the overwhelming bulk' of the German army (Ponting 1995: 130). In order to be able to compete with the Soviets in an unspoken 'race to Berlin' the US and Britain now hastily made plans to land troops in France. This project would be implemented in June 1944 with the landings in Normandy, destined to be wrongly glorified in the West as the great turning point of the Second World War. Later that same summer, Operation Market Garden was launched with the aim of crossing the Rhine, taking Berlin before the Soviets could do so, and defeating and occupying most of Germany before the end of that year. In Germany, a fait accompli favourable to the US (and British) cause was thus supposed to be created, an arrangement which the exhausted Soviets would be

unable to challenge. Similar situations, favourable to the Western powers and unfavourable to the Soviets, local communists, and other anti-fascist and anti-imperialist forces with plans for radical if not revolutionary reforms, had already been created in Italy in 1943 and were created again in France and Belgium in the summer of 1944. But Market Garden was a fiasco, and the Allied advance from Normandy petered out near Germany's western border. In December 1944, the US was even temporarily forced onto the defensive by a German counter-offensive in the Belgian Ardennes, and it was only with difficulty that the ensuing Battle of the Bulge was eventually won. In early 1945, the Western Allies were still stuck more than 500 km from Berlin, while the Red Army resumed its offensive and advanced to Frankfurt (Oder), located a mere stone's throw from the German capital.

The hope of occupying most of Germany before the arrival of the Soviets had to be abandoned. Washington and London were therefore extremely gratified that at the Yalta Conference of 4–11 February 1945, Stalin agreed to a (presumably temporary) post-war division of Germany into occupation zones. This agreement assigned only the smaller and economically less important eastern third of the country, and only the smaller eastern third of Berlin, to the Soviets; however, when, during the last months of the war, the German resistance on the Western Front melted like snow under the sun, allowing US troops to advance across the agreed-upon demarcation lines into the zone assigned to the Soviets, the Yalta agreements were suddenly no longer advantageous to the West, thus generating the myth that at Yalta too many concessions had been made to Stalin.

In any event, it looked as if Washington would have to allow the Soviet Union to reap its fair share of the fruits of a common victory, a victory to which the Soviets had made the greatest contribution and for which they had made the greatest sacrifices. These fruits would include hefty reparation payments from Germany as well as the installation of governments in Eastern European countries like Poland that would not be hostile to the Soviet Union. From the perspective of US

imperialism, this was not a pleasant prospect. Indeed, it meant that the Soviet embodiment of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism would be able to recuperate from the trauma of Nazi aggression and resume, possibly successfully, its construction of a socialist 'counter system' to capitalism. German reparations to the Soviet Union also meant that, in future, the profits made by the German branch plants of US corporations would flow to the Soviets instead of into the pocketbooks of US shareholders.

And so Washington considered a number ways to prevent this scenario. Serious consideration was given to the 'Junker Option'. This scheme called for the replacement of the Hitler regime in Berlin by a junta of supposedly respectable *Wehrmacht* generals, mostly conservative Prussian aristocrats known as Junkers, who would then make the remainder of the German armed forces available for a joint operation against the Soviets. General Patton enthusiastically advocated such a common 'crusade' and offered to spearhead a drive to Moscow. With an eye on their possible utilisation against the Soviets, hundreds of thousands of German troops who had rushed into US and British captivity were allowed to keep their arms and uniforms and remain under the command of their officers. For the same purpose, countless Nazi spies and other 'experts' on warfare against Russia, many of them war criminals, as well as Ukrainian and other Eastern European Nazi collaborators, were 'debriefed' and then provided with false documents that allowed them to escape to a new life in South (and even North) America. Patton's proposed push to Moscow did not materialise, however, mainly because US soldiers and civilians made it abundantly clear via demonstrations and even strikes that they would not put up with such a cynical *renversement des alliances.*

When the war in Europe ended in early May 1945, US imperialism found itself on top of the world. It had achieved a triumph over German imperialism, originally an informal partner but then formally an enemy, which would have been a formidable rival had it not been defeated – ironically enough by the Soviets, with only minimal help from allies such as the US. It was indeed thanks to the Soviets that US imperialism could eliminate German imperialism as a contender for imperialist supremacy, place it under new and presumably democratic management, turn it into another junior partner, and with its help, economically penetrate and attain indirect political control over all of Western Europe. During the years following the end of the war, this US control would be solidly anchored in international organisations firmly controlled by Washington, such as the IMF and that reliable warhorse NATO, and also the emerging European Union (EU). The emergence of the EU as a US scheme to control Europe indirectly but securely, via a reliable German partner, has been described in detail in a recent book by the French historian Annie Lacroix-Riz (2014). Lacroix-Riz also explains how French imperialism, still a major player before the war but subordinated to German imperialism from 1940 to 1944, was happy to switch allegiance and become a junior partner of US imperialism upon the liberation of the country; it did so to prevent implementation of the plans for radical social-economic change formulated by the predominantly leftwing resistance movement. It was likewise in the context of the contemporary widespread popular support, throughout Europe, for anti-fascist and mostly anti-capitalist political and socio-economic changes, that German imperialism itself – personified by industrialists, bankers, and clerical and conservative elements in general – was happy to settle for the role of junior partner to US imperialism. Indeed, only US imperialism appeared able to rescue German imperialism from obliteration at the hands of Germany's resurgent (and radical) anti-fascist forces and the antiimperialist Soviets.

In any event, by the spring of 1945, German imperialism had been eliminated as a challenger to the US. Great Britain had already been reduced irrevocably to the role of junior partner, and French imperialism had just reported for duty as yet another subservient paladin. Moreover, it was clearly only a matter of time before Japanese imperialism would be vanquished and turned into another moon circling the US Jupiter. The US had become the supremo of international imperialism, the uncontested leading power of

international capitalism. The struggle for hegemony within the imperialist camp, which in many ways had begun in earnest in 1914, was settled.

Nevertheless, imperialism still faced a challenge: the Soviet Union. That irritant state enjoyed influence over an admittedly small part of Germany and over most of Eastern Europe, denying the US an 'open door' for its exports and investment capital as well as any form of political control there. Having emerged from the terrible ordeal of war as the world's second most powerful country, the Soviet Union also enjoyed enormous prestige, even in the 'Western' world. More particularly, it served too as a source of inspiration, guidance, and support for anti-imperialist movements everywhere. Inspired by its example, social and national liberation movements in China and Vietnam would even prevent the US from enjoying an unchallenged hegemony in the Far East, which had been the unspoken US war aim in the conflict against Japan.

The war against Japan ended with mushroom clouds rising over the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it did not have to be that way. Japan would have capitulated without the use of the atom bomb, mainly because on 8 August 1945, a declaration of war by the Soviet Union had robbed Tokyo of its last hope of attaching some minor conditions to its inevitable surrender. The atom bomb was really used to terrorise the Soviet Union into withdrawing from East Germany and Eastern Europe. (The bombing of Dresden in February 1945 had served a similar purpose.) But this 'atomic diplomacy', chronicled in great detail by the US historian Gar Alperovitz (1994), was unsuccessful, because the Soviet leaders responded by entrenching the Red Army in Europe as far west and as close to the US and British troops as possible, and by installing pro-Moscow regimes all over Eastern Europe.

And so, in the heat of the infernos of Dresden, and then Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Cold War was born. From the perspective of US imperialism, the Second World War had been a war against 'the wrong enemy', Nazi Germany and fascism in general, imperialist rivals but also fellow imperialists and fellow anti-Soviets; and alongside 'the wrong ally', the anti-imperialist Soviet Union. The Cold War would be the 'right' war in the sense that it would be fought against 'the right enemy' of US imperialism, and of imperialism in general: the anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist Soviet Union. In that war, the US would arrange to have, as 'the right ally', a supposedly 'new' and 'democratic' state established in the western part of Germany, ruled by an assemblage of deeply conservative men, including many former Nazis, who shared a pro-capitalist and anti-Soviet ideology. We cannot go into the details of the history of the Cold War, but that conflict would end in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of US imperialism. The US, since 1945 the undisputed leader of the imperialist camp, was henceforth the only superpower in a 'unipolar' world. But even that triumph would be far from complete, as US imperialism found itself confronted by new challenges such as the greatly increased might of China, a new great rival in the form of Putin's Russia, anti-imperialist movements in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America, and huge social, economic, and financial problems in the imperialist metropolises, including those of the US itself.

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US Imperialism and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

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Introduction

US military intervention in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s can only be understood in the context of US imperial ambitions at the end of the Cold War. The United States had been engaging in economic and geostrategic intervention in Yugoslavia as early as the 1980s to facilitate the imperialist goals of protecting the profit-making interests of private, US-based commercial banks while further opening Yugoslavia to foreign investment. By the 1990s, the US approach shifted to a US-led NATO intervention to strengthen and expand the purpose of NATO during the post-Cold War period, including changing the mission of the alliance to be directed to "out-of-area" military operations to protect access to oil supplies. The United States also pursued the expansion of NATO, and the utilization of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, to forestall alternative security arrangements being proposed by Germany and France. Therefore, NATO expansion in the post-Cold War period cannot be fully understood without attention to the politics of imperial rivalry and the fusion of state interests with the interests of powerful sectors of global capital (Gibbs 2009).

The geostrategic and economic interests of the United States in Yugoslavia were developed in position papers drafted by the Reagan administration as early as 1984. These documents guided the United States in its Yugoslavian policies from the 1980s through the disintegration of the country in 1992. A now declassified 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133), entitled "US Policy Towards Yugoslavia," outlined the goals of the United States in promoting a quiet revolution to overthrow communist governments and parties while reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into a market-oriented economy. The US agenda included a reliance on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to enforce structural adjustment plans in Yugoslavia whose purpose would be to strengthen the position of pro-Western and corporate interests in the country. A closely related objective was to ensure the collection of the debts owed to private (primarily US-based) commercial banks who had lent money to Yugoslavia during the 1970s.

US policymakers, such as Secretary of State James Baker, worked in tandem with international investment groups, including Kissinger Associates, to promote a reduced role for the state in economic planning and a series of cuts in state subsidies for food, heating fuel, gasoline, and transportation. The changes had been promoted by the IMF since 1982, when the Yugoslavian government

dropped food subsidies under IMF direction and, again in 1983, when prices for gasoline, heating fuel, food, and transportation rose by one-third after the elimination of government subsidies (Woodward 1995). During the same period, the Yugoslavian government froze investment in infrastructure and social services. In keeping with the outlines of the original plan, the IMF and the World Bank moved in 1990 to cut off loans to the central Yugoslavian government in favor of direct loans to the republics and provinces (World Bank 1991). This policy was designed to encourage a more rapid move toward private enterprise and Western trade in Yugoslavia by giving export subsidies (mainly through the World Bank), tax incentives, and foreign exchange to firms, sectors, and regions that were in the best position to engage in manufactured exports. Those firms and regions that were dependent on domestic production and had less access to transportation networks to the West were largely shut off from subsidies.

The United States also insisted upon a continuation of IMF-style stabilization programs as part of the 1995 Dayton Accords, which brought the Balkan Wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an end. The peace agreement resulted in a constitution that empowered the IMF to appoint the first governor of the Bosnian Central Bank, who, like the High Representative Carl Bildt (appointed by the European Union), was not allowed to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighboring state (*Dayton Peace Accords*, Article VII, 1995). This stipulation is consistent with the IMF and US economic objectives of the 1980s, which were designed to promote the creation of a Western-style Central Bank in Yugoslavia that would not be subject to the old-style consensual policymaking of republican representatives (Woodward 1995, pp. 74–81). In addition, the new constitution granted the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) control over the Commission on Public Corporations, authorized to oversee the operations of all public sector enterprises, including water, telecommunications, postal services, energy, and transportation. The EBRD president was allowed to appoint the chair of the commission and to direct the sale of state assets and the acquisition of long-term investment funds (*Dayton Peace Accords*, Agreement on Public Corporations, Article 1.10, 1995).

The US economic objectives toward the former Yugoslavia were interrelated with strategic objectives, most importantly the expansion and utilization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the foremost collective defense organization in the post-Cold War period. In February of 1992, officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council, in conjunction with the president and his senior foreign policy advisers, drafted a "Defense Planning Guidance document," which laid out the importance of NATO for long-term US economic and security interests. All high-level US advisers expressed agreement that the United States would face new challenges to Cold War international organizations in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist regimes. The ability of the United States to meet those challenges involved strengthening international institutions in which the United States exercises predominant authority. US planners explicitly identified the maintenance and expansion of NATO as crucial to US economic and political influence in Europe during the post-Cold War period. The drafters of the Defense Planning Guidance document noted that the preservation of NATO could enable the United States to link its military leadership to issues of economic cooperation with Western Europe and help dissuade Europeans from embarking on independent security arrangements which could weaken US influence on the continent:

> NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of Europe-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure. (Tyler, *NYTimes*, 1992, p. 14)

The US insistence on a NATO-led military presence to enforce the terms of the Dayton

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Accords is in keeping with the identification of NATO by high-level US planners as crucial to US objectives in the post-Cold War period. The United States actively discouraged the creation of any European defense organizations that would threaten the position of NATO as the leading international defense organization in Europe. US policymakers also rejected peace proposals prior to the Dayton Accords that called for a UN command structure to supervise peacekeeping operations. In fact, the United States identified the NATO role in Bosnia as crucial to ensure US support for any peacekeeping proposal, a condition satisfied only by the Dayton Accords, whose terms differed from an earlier peace plan by replacing a UN peacekeeping force with a NATO-led mission (Cohen 1995, p. 319). US officials identified NATO expansion as crucial to US military objectives for Europe and subsequently proposed to globalize NATO's defense commitments to include targeting of rogue states, defined by US policymakers as states that possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a visible threat to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

The following account examines the relationship between US economic and security goals and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. The analysis begins with an overview of the neoliberal agenda promoted by the IMF, the World Bank, and US officials during the 1980s. Then there will be an examination of how that agenda worked to undermine the Yugoslavian government by encouraging and rewarding politicians, provinces, and regions that successfully implemented neoliberal policies. West Germany furthered the process of disintegration within the United Nations by providing recognition to the breakaway Croatian Republic and by using its influence in the European Community to broker an EC position in favor of a recognition of independence to Croatia and Slovenia. The initial US position was in favor of a loose political union for Yugoslavia, despite that US policies helped promote economic and political destabilization.

After the economic, political, and ethnic tensions mounted and full-scale civil war had begun, US negotiators repeatedly moved to block the earliest efforts by the European Community, the United Nations, and the warring factions to agree to peace terms. In particular, US mediators advised the Bosnian Muslim leadership to reject the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, implying that the United States would back efforts to secure a better negotiated deal for the Muslim coalition. Furthermore, US negotiators worked with high-level US ambassadors and State Department personnel to channel money and arms to the Croatian military to force the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. Throughout a central issue for the United States was that NATO should be employed as the primary entity for the enforcement of any viable peace plan. In addition, the United States wanted certain guarantees in place that would allow multilateral lending institutions to direct and control a central bank that would be independent from Bosnian political control. In short, the United States insisted on a high degree of political and economic control of the terms of the peace plan, conditions which may well have served to prolong a viable settlement in Bosnia.

The Neoliberal Agenda and the Destruction of Yugoslavia

Long-term trends in international political economy during the 1980s provide a crucial context for understanding the mounting economic and political divisions that contributed to the breakup of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. By 1980, the IMF and the World Bank had increased their level of cooperation with private commercial banks in enforcing the political terms of structural adjustment loans to less developed countries. Following a decade of large-scale private bank lending to leading borrowers in the less developed world, including Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary within Eastern Europe, the beginning of the 1980s saw a reversal in the terms of indebtedness that proved threatening to the efforts of creditors to collect debts. A persistent fall in commodity and export prices, coupled with mounting interest rates, dramatically increased the debt burden of less developed countries and their governments. Multilateral lending institutions worked more

closely with creditors to enforce the terms and conditions of new loans to the less developed world during the 1980s, insisting upon the implementation of specific government reforms in exchange for the availability of new loans. Such strict conditionality represented an unprecedented level of cooperation between multilateral lending and private commercial banks, who agreed to defer new loans until agreements could be established.

The changing circumstances of the international political economy influenced the patterns of bargaining between the IMF and the Yugoslavian Republics during the 1980s. Those Yugoslavian regions that depended on the production of raw materials and primary commodities were hardest hit by the downturn in international markets. The concentration of agricultural, mining and metallurgy, and defense products in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, and in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina left these regions especially vulnerable to the economic crisis (Woodward 1995, p. 58). The crisis had dramatically escalated from 1980 to 1985, when as many as one million Yugoslavians were officially registered as unemployed. The official rate of unemployment was above 20% in every republic except Slovenia and Croatia (Woodward 1995, p. 73).

The wealthier Yugoslavian Republics, especially Croatia and Slovenia, emerged as the strongest advocates of a confederated Yugoslavia in which the economic and political powers of the federal government would be gradually weakened or eliminated. Both Croatia and Slovenia had production profiles which allowed them to compete more effectively in international markets than their counterparts in Yugoslavia. Each republic relied more on the production of manufactured exports than primary or agricultural commodities and enjoyed better access to transportation linkages with the West than other Yugoslavian regions. Most importantly, the Slovenian Republic began to restructure and modernize its older industries after 1979 in an effort to take advantage of export opportunities with Western Europe and to reduce its integration with the Yugoslavian economy (Bookman 1990, pp. 93–109).

The economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s opened dramatic fault lines within the institutional structures of Yugoslavia. First, republics such as Croatia and Slovenia, with their relative dependence on manufactured exports, found it much easier than their Yugoslavian counterparts to maintain economic growth by diverting their trade from Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc to Western Europe. Slovenian officials took advantage of the decentralized Yugoslavian institutional system to pursue independent economic policies that involved the restructuring and privatization of manufacturing industries to promote increased exports to Western Europe. By the mid-1980s, Slovenian and Croatian officials were using their parliaments to block moves by the federal government to increase federal expenditures for defense and development expenditures in the south. By 1986, Slovenian and Croatian officials justified withholding tax monies from the federal government and opposed moves to strengthen federal capacity (Mastnak 1990, pp. 305–317).

The increased tensions between the Yugoslavian Republics was accelerated by the IMF-backed austerity package of 1982, which proposed an anti-inflationary macroeconomic stabilization policy of radical austerity, trade and price liberalization, and institutional reforms to impose on firms and governments monetary discipline and real price incentives (Woodward 1995, p. 49). The IMF also wanted a stronger central government that was capable of enforcing a broad program of economic austerity by tightening monetary policies across the various republics. The terms of the IMF-led austerity package involved short-term credits from the agency targeted to refinancing the Yugoslavian debt, cutting imports dramatically by allowing for price liberalization, and promoting exports to hard currency markets in the West (Woodward 1995, p. 49). The agency also promoted an independent central bank that would make decisions on the basis of majority votes and would not be bound by consensual decision-making.

The results of the first austerity program were devastating to the Yugoslavian economy. As food and energy subsidies were abandoned, prices for gasoline and heating fuel, food, and transportation

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rose by one-third in 1983. Two currency devaluations cut the value of the dinar by 90% between 1979 and 1985, which squeezed imports and greatly impacted public sector firms with little or no foreign currency earnings. Government investment in social services, infrastructure, and other projects was frozen, weakening the ability of the federal government to use its economic resources to induce republics to comply with federal regulations, as had been the institutional pattern in the past. Susan Woodward describes the social polarization that followed the first austerity program:

> Firms showing losses were obliged to lay off workers instead of carrying them with lower wages. The small firms in the private sector–the government's primary hope for employing those laid-off workers and those affected by the slow-down in new jobs in the public sector–were cut off from access to credit by its prohibitively high cost under a real-interest rate policy in conditions of rapid price inflation. An underclass of unemployed, unskilled workers emerged, concentrated in urban areas. Wage and income restrictions, price increases, and unemployment among young people and women sent average household incomes plummeting to levels of twenty years before. Savings were rapidly depleted for 80 percent of all households, who found it increasingly difficult to live on their incomes. Official unemployment was at 14 percent by 1984, varying from full employment in Slovenia to 50 percent in Kosovo, 27 percent in Macedonia, and 23 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in large parts of Serbia, including the capital, Belgrade. (Woodward 1995, p. 51)

The disintegration of the Yugoslavian political economy was dramatically uneven, and the dynamics of class polarization explain much more about the breakup of the country than the supposed intractability of ethnic divisions. First, those Yugoslavians with access to hard currency markets in the West largely escaped the economic crisis, and some even profited from it. The political and economic elites of Croatia and Slovenia were in a better position than their counterparts in the other Yugoslavian Republics as a result of a production capacity that allowed each government to promote the export of manufactured goods to the West and to reduce dependence on the Yugoslavian Republic. However, even these republics were faced with mounting inequality between those elites who were able to take advantage of Western export opportunities and the sections of the population that were less skilled and educated. While the 1980s brought economic opportunity for some, the gap between rich and poor widened considerably – with the majority of the Yugoslavian population unable to keep pace with escalating food and energy prices, reduced wages, and, especially important, reduced federal subsidies to the poorest regions of Yugoslavia, including the agricultural sector, where farmers were facing a severe economic crisis originating in the strong drop in international commodity prices during the early 1980s.

By the late 1980s, political leaders and parliamentary elites within Slovenia and Croatia intensified their rejection of federal efforts to strengthen the tax base of the Yugoslavian government. Determined to pursue independent monetary and fiscal policies and critical redistribution efforts that would siphon money from their republics to other localities within Yugoslavia, elites within Slovenia and Croatia began an effort to mobilize support within their republics and internationally for political independence from Yugoslavia. The interesting question is why such political maneuvers for independence generated increased political, economic, and ethnic tension in Croatia (and ultimately between Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina) without having the same result in Slovenia. A major part of the answer is that while the Slovenian economy had managed a relatively successful economic strategy that emphasized industrial restructuring and export manufacturing, Croatian elites faced a much more uneven economic landscape that made the Croatian political economy a composite of Slovenia and Serbia. Like Slovenia, Croatia had wealthy cities, rich farmlands, and agro-industrial complexes concentrated along the coastlines and the Eastern plains of Slavonia and Baranja. Like Serbia, Croatia had an interior agricultural region that was relatively poor and dependent on domestic production and subsidies for its survival. Whereas Slovenia was able to escape the worst effects of the 1980s recession and austerity, the political economy of Croatia became increasingly polarized between the sections of the republic that were prospering from foreign trade and those

that were falling further and further behind (Woodward 1995, p. 51). The parliamentary leaders in Croatia advocated greater independence and autonomy in economic policy during the 1980s, while the sectors of the Croatian population that were most negatively affected by the economic crisis mobilized themselves in strikes, demonstrations, and work stoppages calling for increased aid to the poorer regions.

Faced with a growing economic and political polarization, Croatian political elites first played the ethnic card to increase support for Croatian nationalism and independence from the Yugoslavian government. Croatian leaders, the most famous and important of which is Franjo Tudjman (elected president of Croatia in 1990), relied on growing ties to Western governments, especially Germany, to legitimize the drive for independence. Domestically, Tudjman encouraged a series of reforms that were designed to appeal to a Croatian national identity and to be used as weapons against the increased demands of workers for higher wages, better working conditions, and subsidies to cover the spiraling costs of living. Tudjman insisted that working class demands for higher wages and better working conditions emanated from his political enemies who wanted to keep the Croats shackled under the thumb of Serbian and Jewish interests. The rhetoric of Tudjman was designed to silence political opponents within the Yugoslavian Communist Party who objected to Croatian independence efforts and preferred a united Yugoslavia. In addition, the escalating anti-Semitic and anti-Serbian racism was used to divert public attention from a widening gap between rich and poor and toward a Serb minority who was soon denied basic rights. In a series of political measures, Tudjman pushed through the Croatian parliament legislation that eliminated Serbs from positions in the Croatian government bureaucracy. Before the spring of 1993 when war broke out between the Muslims and the Croatians in Bosnia, the Tudjman government encouraged the sacking of Serbs from private sector jobs and public intimidation of Serbs who were subject to bombings and evictions by nationalist mobs with government support (Woodward 1986).

The European Community, under strong pressure from Germany, moved to recognize the independence declarations of Slovenia and Croatia as early as 1991 (Glenny 1992). Germany, which had emerged as the leading trading partner of Croatia, joined Austria in arguing against the historical legitimacy of the Yugoslavian federation. German commercial bankers and manufacturing firms were an important source of investment in Croatia, while Austrian-based banks, many of them German owned, and Austrian export firms were linked with Slovenia. The decision of the German and Austrian governments to recognize Croatia and Slovenia arose from their respective economic and political ties to these republics and ultimately helped to fuel political and ethnic warfare in Croatia, where Serbian and Croatian militias clashed in a bloody civil war in 1991.

The Serbian militias were mobilized on the basis of nationalist appeals to Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. Serbian nationalists argued that the separatist ambitions of Croatians would result in a systematic denial of human rights and a subjugation of Serbian people to the dictates of an expansionist Croatian army. Just as Tudjman had used nationalism to rally support for his policies, the Serbian leadership relied on nationalistic rhetoric to rally support behind a unified Yugoslavia under Serbian domination. Serbian militias were formed in Bosnia and were especially popular in isolated rural areas whose inhabitants came from a combination of agricultural and defense-related occupations. Rural villages that were relatively poor and historically dependent on small-scale farming for the domestic market comprised the majority of the recruits for the emerging Serbian militias, who were also recruited from depressed industrial towns who had seen dramatic increases in public sector layoffs during the 1980s.

Most importantly, the emergence of Slobodan Milosevic as president of Serbia provided added resources to the Serbian cause, as Milosevic used the Yugoslavian People's Army as a vehicle to promote Serbian nationalism, initially via an invasion of Kosovo in 1987 and later as a conduit for the expansion of Serbian militias into Bosnia – first to fight the Croats and then to fight the Bosnian Muslim government. The United States

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had been one of the strongest international supporters of Milosevic, especially given his brief reincarnation as an economic liberal and political conservative during the late 1970s through the mid-1980s. He was the director of a major Belgrade Bank in 1978–1982, an economic reformer while a Belgrade party boss from 1984 to 1986, and recommended the adoption of a strict IMF-type stabilization/austerity program while chair of the Milosevic Commission in May of 1988. The US government, along with the IMF and the World Bank, saw Milosevic and the federal prime minister Ante Markovic, newly appointed in December 1988, as political allies in an effort to promote a second phase of IMF-backed reforms (Vayrynen 1996, p. 33). The 1988 reform package, supported by US Secretary of State James Baker, US commercial bankers represented by Kissinger Associates, and both Markovic and Milosevic, moved to eliminate the remaining limits on foreign ownership, management, and profit repatriation, to privatize public property, and to encourage full market integration within Yugoslavia.

Both the United States and the international monetary authorities had consistently supported a neoliberal agenda implemented by the federal government of Yugoslavia. However, the attempts of the federal government under Prime Minister Markovic to implement this agenda only fueled the divisions among the Yugoslavian Republics, helping to create a political crisis that was heightened by the early results of the IMF-backed stabilization program of 1990. In autumn of 1989, Markovic met in Washington with US President George H.W. Bush to negotiate the terms of a new financial arrangement that would lead to the most extensive set of IMF-backed reforms. These measures included a new devalued currency, another wage freeze, sharp cuts in government spending, and the elimination of socially owned, worker-managed companies (Cohen 1995, pp. 55–57). By 1990, the IMF supported and helped to implement a tight money policy that placed a priority on servicing the Yugoslavian debt to private commercial bankers based in the Euromarkets of London and Paris. At the same time, the federal government slashed welfare and employment payments to the republics and provinces at the very time that the new stabilization program would accelerate business failures and high rates of unemployment.

In June of 1990, about 6 months after the austerity measures had taken effect, 8,608 enterprises employing 3.2 million persons, in a workforce of approximately 6 million at the time, were in financial crisis (World Bank 1991, pp. 10, 14). From late 1989 to September 1990, more than a thousand companies went bankrupt, and the annual gross domestic product had collapsed to a negative 7.5%. In 1991, the GDP declined by another 15%, while industrial output shrank by 21%. By September of 1990, 600,000 Yugoslavians had already lost their jobs, and another 2,435 industrial enterprises, employing 1.3 million workers, were slated for liquidation (IMF 1990, pp. 576–579). Yugoslav President Borisav Jovic warned that the reforms were having a markedly unfavorable impact on the overall situation in society. The further deepening of the economic crisis and the growth of social tensions has had a vital impact on the deterioration of the political-security situation (Remington 1990, p. 407).

On July 1990, Slovenian and Croatian leaders declared their sovereignty, refusing to adhere to various aspects of the stabilization plan and rejecting the legitimacy of the federal government. Serbian elites, once proponents of neoliberal austerity, were now faced with a strike of 650,000 Serbian workers who sought wage hikes and an end to privatization efforts that would eliminate jobs. Both Slobodan Milosevic and the newly elected Franjo Tudjman deliberately used ethnic mobilization in attempts to consolidate support for their rule of a Greater Serbia and Croatia, respectively. Both Slovenia and Croatia moved to create their own independent armies, which further aggravated the ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian presidency, as a body representing the republics and provinces, was split three ways by 1990, with Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo Albanians declaring their independence from the federal government; Macedonia preferring a further devolution of power from the federal government to the republics and provinces; and Serbia, Montenegro,

and the Yugoslavian People's Army wanting to retain a united federation. The move by Croatian and Slovenian elites to create separate army structures proved to be the most extreme threat to the Yugoslavian People's Army, which found itself faced with the possibility of dissolution and without adequate supplies and equipment, whose sources had been arms industries and research and development institutions spread throughout Yugoslavia.

The reaction of the West European governments and the United States to the political and economic crisis only worsened the ethnic warfare. First, Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and the Netherlands all recognized the right of Croatia and Slovenia to secede, with Germany exercising the greatest influence with the European Community in promoting a resolution in favor of succession. By the late 1980s, economic reforms promoted by political elites in Croatia and Slovenia had resulted in closer trading links with Western Europe than with other Yugoslavian Republics. German banks lent money to the Croatian republic and to private export firms in Croatia. In turn Croatian exporters, especially in manufacturing, increased their trade linkages with Germany. Similarly, Slovenia increased its trade with Austria as newly restructured and privatized industries took loans from German-owned banks based in Austria. US bankers based in the Euromarkets of Paris and London sought to collect loans that had been extended to the Republic in the 1970s. Represented by Kissinger Associates, these US banks worked with US government officials to support a neoliberal plan that advanced IMF allocations to individual republics who had made the most progress in restructuring and privatizing their industries for export production to the Western European market. At the same time, the US government promoted the 1990 IMF plan for centralizing the implementation of a tight monetary policy under the direction of the Yugoslavian Central Bank (Gervasi 1992, p. 42). The effects of this policy led to demonstrations throughout Yugoslavia and political pressure mounted on republican governments to address the social and economic problems arising from the structural adjustment programs.

With the threat of disintegration looming, Germany led a coalition of states in the European Community to recognize the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia, a move which opened the door for further regional and ethnic conflict. The United States, initially supporting a unified Yugoslavia, lost a political argument to persuade Germany and the European Community to delay recognition of the breakaway republics. At the same time, the United States had backed every phase of the IMF program for Yugoslavia, which contributed to the regional economic disparities and to the political pressures that heightened the likelihood of succession.

The United States began to shift its position toward support for Croatia and the newly formed Bosnian Muslim government as the policies of Slobodan Milosevic continued to shift from the economic liberal reformer of the mid-1980s to an ardent nationalist who began defending rights to a greater Serbia, nationalization of industry under the control of the Yugoslavian State, and the integrity of the Yugoslavian People's Army in an effort to consolidate his power. US officials, alarmed by the extremist rhetoric of their one-time ally, moved toward a closer relationship with the political elites of Croatia and Bosnia, especially as Milosevic sought to channel money, assistance, and military support to Bosnian Serbs in their effort to conquer territory in the name of a Greater Serbian state. The nationalistic posturing of Milosevic presented the United States with a fundamental challenge to a decade-long US effort to promote privatization, economic integration with the West, and centralization of debt payments as the pillars of US economic policy in Yugoslavia.

The United States, NATO, and the United Nations

The decision of Slovenia and Croatia to declare independence from the Yugoslavian federation helped fuel a civil war whose antecedents were becoming increasingly clear. The decision of various foreign powers, led by Germany and Austria but also including Great Britain and the Netherlands, to recognize the independence of

these breakaway republics contributed to the armed mobilization of rival factions within the former Yugoslavia. By 1991, national governments in Bosnia, Slovenia, and Croatia were consolidating their bureaucracies independently of the authority of the Yugoslavian federation, and each of these governments was pouring resources toward an expansion of military capacity. The Yugoslavian People's Army used its stockpile of weapons to help arm Serbian rebels in the Bosnian Republic and to wage a proxy war against Croatia, which under Franjo Tudjman was attempting to seize control of additional territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to mobilize Croats behind an ongoing ideological and political assault against Serbs in Croatia and in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia government was dominated by a Muslim faction that attempted to preserve its own power by establishing militias that could counter the dual threat of Croatian and Serbian military expansion. Slobodan Milosevic used his power as president of Serbia to funnel arms to Serb militants so as to support their efforts to create a Greater Serbia, by carving out territorial zones of control in Bosnia against both the Croatian and Muslim militias.

The UN Security Council established the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on February 21, 1991, with the intention of creating a peace plan for Croatia. UNPROFOR quickly expanded its mandate to include support for the provision of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia in order to address what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees called one of the worst humanitarian emergencies of our time (Leurdijk 2003, p. 60). UNPROFOR grew from the initial deployment of 10,000 troops to a force of some 52,000 spread from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The Security Council's authorization of these troop deployments was coupled with a series of resolutions covering humanitarian assistance, an arms embargo, economic sanctions, a no-fly zone, safe areas, international humanitarian law, and the mandate of UNPROFOR. As one analyst noted:

> In this almost permanent process of adaptation, the UNPROFOR peacekeeping personnel became involved in such elements of peace-enforcement as

ground monitoring at airfields as part of the no-fly zone; in deterring attacks on safe areas and in the implementation of exclusion zones, including control of the heavy weapons placed by the parties in designated weapons collection points. This mixture caused much conceptual and operational confusion, with serious consequences both for the UN and NATO and for their cooperation. (Leurdijk 1997, p. 462)

During the Yugoslavian crisis, the UN Security Council increasingly turned to Charter VII of the UN Charter to authorize regional organizations to monitor and enforce UN resolutions designed to facilitate the growing mandate extended to UNPROFOR. The Security Council recognized that UNPROFOR would not be able to undertake the full responsibilities and burdens associated with this ambitious peacekeeping effort. As a result, the UN Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council, approached NATO about the possibility of using its military resources to help enforce Security Council resolutions in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, NATO leaders were meeting in June of 1992 to discuss the principle of participation in peacekeeping missions, especially by making available its assets to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These deliberations on the part of the NATO leadership represented a strong US effort to recast NATO from a collective defense organization during the cold war to a regional organization that would intervene to quell civil unrest or to prevent regional instability from posing a threat to NATO member states. The willingness of the NATO leadership to redefine its mission so that its forces would be available to the UN Security Council is made clear by a written correspondence from the member states of NATO to a letter from the UNs Secretary-General, who had requested NATO assistance to help UNPROFOR's mission in the former Yugoslavia:

> We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security. We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. (Leurdijk 1997, p. 459)

As early as July 16, 1992, NATO began its involvement in the Yugoslavian crisis by stationing ships in the Adriatic Sea to monitor compliance with the Security Council resolution authorizing a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. Three months after NATO ships begin monitoring compliance by sea, NATO aircraft began a similar monitoring action in the air, after the Security Council had established a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The enforcement operations of NATO were undertaken simultaneously with the ground operations of UNPROFOR, although there were constant episodes of miscommunication and lack of effective coordination between the two organizations. The UN Security Council Resolution 836 authorized UNPROFOR to act in self-defense to protect designated safe areas from attacks that included bombardments against the safe areas, armed incursions into them, and deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.

At the same time, the Security Council authorized member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its tasks. This Security Council directive led to clashes between UNPROFOR and NATO over the extent to which UNPROFOR's presence on the ground was compatible with NATO's commitment to airstrikes to defend the safe zones. NATO officials were concerned that UNPROFOR's vulnerability on the ground might be used by the warring militias to deter air operations and to block effective military action against violations of the embargo. UNPROFOR's personnel were concerned that NATO attacks might be counterproductive to their humanitarian efforts to protect the safe areas and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies.

As the UN Security Council authorized resolutions designed to expedite the delivery of humanitarian aid and help bring an end to the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Secretary-General and the European Community sent mediators to the former Yugoslavia in an effort to negotiate an acceptable peace treaty with the warring parties. The first such peace plan was a set of guidelines for future political and institutional arrangements drafted by United Nation's Representative Cyrus Vance and the EU representative David Owen, under the institutional mechanism of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan recommended the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces, with the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs each to have a majority in three provinces. The plan called for Sarajevo to be the seat of government and an open city, with the provinces endowed with most governmental powers, excluding international responsibilities such as negotiations with foreign states. Each province and central government would have its own legislature, chief executive, and judiciary, while the weak central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be led by a nine-member presidency.

Once the ethnic warfare escalated among the three primary ethnic groups and military conflict erupted among the republics, the United States encouraged the Bosnian Muslim government and the Croatian Army to reject the early peace initiatives proposed by the European Community and the United Nations. US negotiators, led by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, relied on bilateral overtures to the Bosnian Muslims to encourage them to delay endorsing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), implying that such a delay would be rewarded by a better deal secured with Washington's help. The United States indicated that it would not send peacekeeping troops to defend the partition scheme advanced by the VOPP. The United States insisted that any deployment of US troops in a peacekeeping operation would have to be led by NATO, as opposed to the United Nations and the European Community. US negotiators encouraged the Bosnian Muslims, one party who held out against the VOPP, to wait for a better deal by taking advantage of the US-proposed a lift and strike strategy that recommended lifting the arms embargo and answering any Bosnian Serb ground offensive with air strikes (Owen 1996, 160–197). According to David Owen, the US position helped

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to doom the VOPP by convincing the Bosnian Muslim government that the United States would help them to withstand further Serbian advances in exchange for delaying any agreement on the peace plan.

The United States took the same position regarding a later proposed peace initiative advanced by a Contact Group that included the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany. The Contact Group plan offered to the warring parties a Muslim-Croat Federation that would receive 51% of Bosnian territory while giving the Serbs 49%. When this plan was proposed, the United States announced that it would no longer participate in efforts to stop arms shipments to Croatia or Bosnia. The United States criticized the efforts of the Contact Group as insufficient and of applying diplomatic pressure which was neither coherent nor constant (Owen 1996, pp. 160–197). The most notable effect of the US action was to harden the position of the Bosnian Serbs, who had rejected the Contact Plan from the beginning. However, the Contact Group, with the exception of the United States, was hopeful about alleviating the political obstacles to Serbian approval by trading Serb recognition of Croatia for Zagreb's willingness to grant the Krajina region substantial political autonomy and self-government. Opposing this policy initiative by the Contact Group, the United States moved forward to press for the elimination of the arms embargo and to work with private organizations, including Executive Outcomes, to funnel weapons to the Bosnian Muslims and the Croatian Army. The US strategy preceded and aided the Croatian ethnic cleansing massacre in Krajina, as well as the launching of an offensive by Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs on three fronts in the autumn of 1994: in the Bihac region, Central Bosnia, and south of Sarajevo. The later offensive received the vociferous support of the United States as the legitimate use of the right of defense by the principal victims of Serbian aggression (Petras and Vieux 1996, p. 21).

The United States only agreed to a peace proposal that would allow NATO to direct the peacekeeping operation, which ensured that the United States would be in a position of leadership in decisions regarding troop deployment and the reconstruction of Bosnia. The Dayton Accords were based on a partition of land that would give the Muslim-Croat Federation 51% of territory and the Serbs 49%. The terms of the Accords were strikingly familiar to the earlier Contact Group proposals with one key difference: the United States had bought time and relied on backing an interim strategy of military offensives against the Serbs as a way of advancing a peace plan that gave the US-NATO command primacy in the final deployment of international troops. In this way the peacekeeping operation played itself out as an international struggle of preferences between foreign powers, represented most notably by the European Community and the United States, who wanted to maximize their authority to direct the terms of the peace.

The US insistence on a NATO-led troop presence in Bosnia reflected a series of long-term goals of US foreign policy strategists, including greater influence within the newly emerging European Monetary Union and the reorientation of NATO toward a global mission that would allow the organization to respond to threats to US interests in Southern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East and to the emergence of rogue states that posed a threat to the economic and geostrategic objectives of US policymakers. The remainder of this chapter links the long-term strategic thinking of US policymakers to the goal of ensuring a NATO presence as part of a Bosnian peace settlement. Such a linkage between broader US economic and security objectives formed the outlines of an imperialist US policy in the former Yugoslavia, and such a framework also proves useful in understanding the most recent policies pursued by the United States in Kosovo.

Imperial Competition in the Balkan Wars

There is considerable evidence that the United States has structured its policies toward Western Europe with the goal of preventing the emergence of a rival defense organization that would threaten the influence of NATO. During the first term of the Clinton Administration, the

State and Defense Departments opposed French and German proposals to give the European Council – which consists of community heads of state and government – a role in defense decisions (Petras and Vieux 1996, p. 20). The United States was concerned about the potential for a powerful sub-alliance that could make defense decisions without US input. Instead, following US, British, and Dutch recommendations, the European Community pledged to relegate its discussions of defense policy to the Western European Union and in consultation with NATO. Dissatisfied with these arrangements, the French and German governments moved to develop the Eurocorps, a bilateral military organization open to membership by EC countries (Nelson 1993, p. 83). As Nelson concludes, American opposition to that initiative, at least until France and Germany spelled out the Eurocorps' subordinate relationship to NATO, led some Europeans to conclude that no form of military coordination among EC states was acceptable to the United States (Nelson 1993, p. 83).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia provided US policymakers with an opportunity to expand and redefine the role of NATO in the post-Cold War environment. As early as 1992, NATO sent about 100 personnel to Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish a military headquarters at Kiseliak, only a short distance from Sarajevo. The NATO deployment was part of an effort by US policymakers to gradually position the military alliance to intervene in the Yugoslavian war, which had been defined as part of a wider arc of geostrategic interests by US policymakers. The concern in the earliest phase of the Bosnian war was that the conflict would spread beyond Yugoslavia and bring in US allies on opposite sides of the conflict, including Turkey and Greece. Early US efforts to deploy troops to Macedonia were designed to prevent the war from spreading to the Southern Balkans and thereby destabilizing Turkey, defined by the United States as a vital link to the Middle East due to its borders with Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Robert I. Hunter, senior adviser to the Rand Corporation and US ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998, explained the rationale for what had broadly been labeled the Clinton Doctrine:

> It (the former Yugoslavia) is the gateway to areas of intense Western concern the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and Iran, Afghanistan, the Caspian Sea and Transcaucasia. Stability in southeastern Europe must be a precursor to protecting Western interests and reducing threats from farther East. (Shank 1999, p. 12)

The development of the Clinton Doctrine, as well as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance document, provided the geostrategic underpinnings for US policies in the former Yugoslavia. Contemporary US policies in Europe are rooted in the effort by the United States to maintain its influence as the dominant military power in the region, relying on the continuation and expansion of NATO to forestall any efforts by European powers or the European Union to create a separate defense organization independent of US influence. During the last year of the Bush Administration, US State Department and Treasury Department officials worried that the European move to create the Euro could have serious political and economic consequences for US interests in the region. The political consequences included the possible emergence of a defense organization outside US control. At the same time, US officials were concerned that the Euro could pose an economic threat to the international position of the dollar, a possibility that led the Treasury Department to warn against the establishment of new EC institutions that would bypass the traditional relationship between the US government and the finance ministers of the larger EC states. At the centerpiece of such concern is the importance of US and European trade, which totals about $1 trillion a year, and US direct investment in Western Europe, which accounts for about 40% of all US foreign investment and provides more than three-million US-based jobs (Nelson 1993, pp. 81–84).

The redefinition of NATO's role is connected to US concerns about the loss of US military and political influence in European affairs in the post-Cold War period. As part of the effort to redefine NATO, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has worked with the Clinton White House and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to steadily expand NATO membership and commitments throughout the arc that extends from Bosnia

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to the Southern Balkans, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs, summarized the outlines of this policy in a 1995 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, coinciding with and directly related to US efforts to promote a NATO-led force to occupy Bosnia to police the Dayton Accords that brought an end (at least temporarily) to the Balkan Wars. Holbrooke insisted that the expansion of NATO is an essential consequence of the raising of the Iron Curtain and that the United States must lead in the creation of a security architecture that includes and thereby stabilizes all of Europe: the West, the former Soviet satellites of Central Europe, and, most critically, Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union (Holbrooke 1995).

The US push for NATO expansion began in late 1991 with the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which fostered military cooperation between NATO and former members of the Warsaw Pact. NATO expanded its efforts to the more ambitious Partnership for Peace in 1994 to involve Warsaw Pact members in actual NATO operations as a prelude to eventual membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all of which were formally admitted to NATO membership in 1999. The efforts of the Bush and Clinton administrations to expand the military membership of NATO to the East had been seen as essential to provide NATO with the capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of strategically important US allies threatened with instability. The United States would thereby use expanded NATO bases in Eastern Europe to organize the rapid deployment of NATO forces to regions where civil wars or violent uprisings threatened the interests of the West.

Secretary of State Albright articulated the Clinton Administration's position at a December 1998 NATO meeting to discuss the future organizational and political structure of the alliance. In outlining a post-Cold War agenda for NATO, Albright argued for enhancing NATO's capacity to deal with any global crisis that had implications for the defense of common interests of NATO allies (Helms 1998, p. 14). Albright added that NATO was essential to respond to security threats posed by rogue states who possessed chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The use of the rogue state terminology to define a role for NATO coincides with the post-Cold War strategic doctrine of the United States, whose military forces have been reequipped to fight two-and-a-half wars simultaneously against rogue states that posed a threat to US strategic and economic interests. The US proposals for an expanded NATO represent a geopolitical effort by the Clinton Administration to expand the capability of the military alliance to rapidly intervene in Central Asia, Southern Europe, and the Middle East, especially given the importance of these regions for the production and delivery of oil.

US Imperial Strategy and Kosovo

The interplay between US geostrategic goals and the emerging globalization of NATO provides insight into the political economy of US policy in the former Yugoslavia, which was soon extended to the war in Kosovo. Throughout the Balkans crisis, US policymakers have been concerned with maintaining the credibility of the alliance in the face of challenges to its authority, first in Bosnia as NATO aircraft dropped bombs on the Bosnian Serb army until the Croatian and Bosnian armies were able to use force to bring the Serbian adversaries to the bargaining table. In the case of Kosovo, the United States and its allies relied on NATO's aircraft to launch a sustained series of aerial bombardments against Serbia to force compliance with a US-negotiated peace plan in Rambouillet, France. The key terms of the peace plan, much like the US-brokered Dayton Accords, involved a central role for NATO in monitoring the removal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. When Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic objected to the presence of NATO on Yugoslavian territory, the United States was unyielding in its insistence that NATO was the only acceptable organization in monitoring the terms of a Serbian-Albanian peace agreement in Kosovo. As part of the Rambouillet Accords, US negotiators insisted on a NATO troop presence in Southern Serbia as well as Kosovo to monitor compliance with the

agreement. When Milosevic rejected these conditions, the United States, without consulting the UN Security Council, worked to convince NATO allies to agree to the use of NATO airpower in Serbia and Kosovo to force Milosevic to accept the US terms for a peace settlement.

On March 24, 1999, the United States took the lead role in a NATO bombing campaign targeted against Serbia for the stated goal of preventing Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, who had been described by US political officials as having suffered "crimes against humanity." During NATO's bombing campaign, as many as 900,000 Serbian refugees fled the main cities in Central Serbia, including Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad. The NATO campaign had turned Kosovo into a staging ground for advanced US weaponry, including cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs, and depleted uranium explosives. During the NATO bombing campaign, thousands fled Western Kosovo, on the border with Albania, as Serbian forces clashed with Albanian combatants. By June 1999, the United States had led a contingent of NATO troops into Kosovo to enforce the provisions of an agreement that had been struck between US political elites and Kosovar nationalists as part of the Rambouillet Accord. The Serbian political leadership never signed this agreement, and the United States used its provisions to stake out the postwar goals of the war, which included the following:

> Kosovo would in effect be independent of Serbia, but Serbia would not be independent of Kosovo. Kosovo would be able to influence Yugoslavia as a whole by sending its representatives to both Yugoslav and Serbian parliaments, governments and courts, whereas Yugoslavia would be barred from influencing Kosovo's internal affairs. Kosovo would have its own constitution, making it a "free market economy". Substantial economic aid was promised to Kosovo, while Serbia was to get nothing; the agreement did not even mention suspending economic sanctions against Serbia, much less any help to the 650,000 refugees in Serbia. In contrast to the parliamentary government proposed by the Serbs, "self-governing" Kosovo was to be a Western protectorate whose chief of mission would have the authority to issue binding directives on all important matters, hire and fire officials and security personnel, and overrule election results. (Johnstone 2002, p. 245)

The above details pertain to the US-drafted document, "The Rambouillet Peace Accords," drafted primarily by State Department official Christopher Hill. Prior to the bombing campaign, the US State Department under Madeleine Albright had attempted to broker a deal between Milosevic and the various Kosovo rebel factions that had long been fighting Serbian forces. The aims of the various Kosovar rebel groups included forcing a Serbian exodus from the province and attaining independence for Kosovo. The Rambouillet negotiations opened in France on February 2, 1999, with the United States providing counsel to the Kosovo Albanian delegation during the negotiations with Serbian political leaders. The United States adopted two postures during the negotiations that alienated Serbian officials, leading ultimately to the breakdown in negotiations and the commencement of the bombing campaign.

The first concern of Serbian officials was the open US alliance with leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA, a guerrilla group who had engaged in armed violence against Serbian military and police officials, as well as armed attacks against Serbian civilians in Kosovo, during the 1990s. As late as February 23, 1998, the special US representative for former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, had condemned the KLA as a "terrorist group beyond any doubt" and strongly criticized the killing of civilians and the armed attacks on Serbian military and police installations in Kosovo. NATO had condemned both the Serbian military offensive in Kosovo, begun in 1989 in response to the emergence of successionist political movements in Kosovo, and the "terrorist activities" of the KLA. Still, by the time of the Rambouillet Peace Accords, the United States had close ties with the KLA, including welcoming the KLA leader Hashim Thaci as head of the Kosovar delegation to the Rambouillet agreements. This development caught the Serbian political officials by surprise, as they had counted on an isolation of the KLA in favor of nationalist groups that they saw as more responsible and willing to engage in the give-and-take of negotiations. The elevation of the KLA leadership to titular head of the Kosovar delegation seemed designed to provoke confrontation.

Still, by all accounts, the Serbian political leadership would have accepted the Rambouillet Peace Accords had it not been for a series of last-minute changes by the United States regarding the primacy of NATO in the occupation of Kosovo. In a section of the document entitled "Annex B," NATO was to be the primary occupying force in Kosovo and was to be given unlimited and unfettered access to all Yugoslav territory, as well as immunity from all local jurisdiction or legal process. At a Rambouillet Press Conference on February 20, Secretary of State Albright blamed the Serbian failure to reach agreement on their unwillingness to sign off on the NATO provision of the accords. Prior to the insertion of the NATO provision into the Rambouillet Accords, the US State Department was pushing its European allies to expand and redefine NATO's post-Cold War mission. Albright's redefinition of NATO involved utilizing its military structure for the type of operations envisioned in the Rambouillet Peace Accords: intervening in domestic conflicts to promote stability favorable to Western interests. This would involve utilizing NATO's arsenal to go to war against select rogue states whom Washington had identified as a threat to Western security interests. In short, NATO would be incorporated into the US rogue doctrine and would continue to have a leading role to play in the post-Cold War environment. The United States wanted this redefinition of NATO in part to fend off ongoing efforts by France and Germany to develop a military organization independent of NATO, which had been an ongoing subject of tension between the United States and its European allies at the time of the deployment of NATO in Kosovo.

The NATO operation in the former Yugoslavia can be understood only as part of a broader geostrategic effort to expand the purpose and scope of the alliance during the post-Cold War period. This effort resulted in cooperation between the Clinton Administration and US-based multinational corporations intent on expanding their investment opportunities in Central Asia. These multinationals, as well as top Clinton Administration officials, wanted to encourage the expansion of NATO in order to allow for rapid military intervention to protect the security of oil investments in the former Soviet republics, including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. In November of 1997, four major US oil companies signed an agreement at the White House to invest $8 billion in Azeri oil, following Chevron Corporation's $20 billion investment in Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field, one of the world's ten biggest at the time. International oil financier Roger Tamraz has worked with the Clinton Administration's National Security Council to promote the independence of these oil-rich [former Soviet republics] to in essence break Russia's monopoly control over the transportation of oil from that region, according to former National Security Council aide Sheila Heslin in testimony before US Senate investigators (Morgan and Ottaway 1997, p. A01). In 1995, Senate investigators released a document that detailed the involvement of US oil and construction companies such as Amoco, Mobil, Exxon, McDermott, Brown and Root, Bechtel, and Chevron, in contributing $300,000 to the Democratic National Committee for the purposes of gaining the support of the US government for a Caspian oil pipeline that would extend south of Russia through Georgia to the Black Sea (Morgan and Ottaway 1997, p. A01). The US State Department summarized the geostrategic and economic basis for US policy in an April, 1997, report which outlined the US goal to tie the region securely to the West through multiple pipelines and transportation corridors outside Russia (Morgan and Ottaway 1997, p. A01).

The connection between the NATO war in Kosovo and the US efforts to expand NATO to enhance its capacity to intervene in Central Asia and the Middle East was aptly summarized by Robert Hunter, senior adviser to the Rand Corporation and former US ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998. According to Hunter, Kosovo is the gateway of intense Western concern in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq and Iran, Afghanistan, the Caspian Sea, and Transcaucasia. Stability in Southeastern Europe must be a precursor to protecting Western interests and reducing threats from farther East (Shank 1999, p. 12). During the deployment of NATO troops in

Kosovo, the United States, without consulting NATO allies, began construction of a large permanent military base called Camp Bondsteel, located near two of the future European transport routes, including Corridor 8, which is part of the projected EU network known as the Pan-European Transport Corridors. The base "commands the most strategically interesting corner of Kosovo, in close proximity to the two main north-south mountain passes allowing traffic to pass from northern Central Europe to the important Greek port of Thessaloniki on the Aegean" (Johnstone 2002, p. 233). Also at the time of the Kosovo intervention, the United States was funding feasibility studies for a billion dollar pipeline to be built by the Albanian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian Oil Corporation of Pound Ridge, New York, along the Corridor 8 transport route. The presence of military troops to guard a key European transport corridor sent a strong signal that the United States and NATO were prepared to utilize its military capability to protect new investments in the region, including the tens of billions of Euros likely to be devoted to various transport and communication projects in the years ahead. But the central role of US troops in Kosovo and Washington's troop presence in the region had various side benefits for US firms hoping to compete in these potentially lucrative contracts:

> Local governments politically indebted to the United States are likely to award construction contracts to major U.S. companies. Washington's support for the Kosovar cause has helped make Albania the most enthusiastically pro-American country in the world, whose leaders constantly plead for establishment of permanent U.S. bases. Albania is one of the rare former communist countries in Europe "where all the political forces, left and right, parliamentary and non-parliamentary, desire such an American military presence." (Johnstone 2002, p. 232)

Conclusion

The USA acted as an imperial state in advancing its geostrategic and economic interests in a policy of NATO expansion designed to reinforce dependency on a US-led military alliance that would be expanded to protect the interests of US-based multinational corporations in accessing foreign

markets. The fact that US policymakers were worried about rival imperial competition from EU powers Germany and France is evident in the calculations made by US policymakers in pushing for a NATO-led intervention. US intervention in the former Yugoslavia had long been tied to protecting the interests of US commercial banks and oil corporations. These imperialist linkages between powerful multinational corporations and the US imperial state are central in explaining the political economy of US military intervention in the Balkan Wars.

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US Militarism and US Hegemonic Power

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This essay analyzes two interrelated key structural phenomena of the current historical epoch. It is largely devoted to an analysis of the rise and consolidation of US militarism, which is understood to be the fulcrum of US global hegemonic power. The condensation of a large body of research, some cited in this essay, demonstrates that far from being a corrosive agent undermining US power, militarism has been a major element in the continuation of US economic power since WW II, often mitigating economic downturns, creating new leading industrial sectors while promoting a vast array of technological innovations – an argument originally advanced by Baran and Sweezy in 1966 (Baran and Sweezy 1966).

All of this has occurred even while the USA was unable to establish stability in the "periphery" – in Korea in the 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, in Iraq since 1990, and in Afghanistan since 2001. Contradictory forces and factors notwithstanding, the significance of US militarism and US hegemonic power continue to be remarkable signifiers of the present order. The first section examines the rise, consolidation, and contemporary scope of US militarism. The emergence and maintenance of global unipolar order under US authority, from WWII to the present, are briefly considered in the second section.

US Militarism

Militarism – here understood to be a socially inculcated, pervasive deference to all apparatuses of the state that project US military power, are associated with it, are institutions that arise from it, or are dependent upon their policies – became a fundamental, unacknowledged, new element of the postwar structure. At any given moment, *militarism* constitutes a socially constructed *institutionalized* structure, including habits of thought and patterns of reflexive action (e.g., "patriotism") as well as tangible entities such as military forces and arms contractors. Militarism finds its expression both as ideology and as national policy exercised through state apparatuses – these two manifestations of militarism are not separable but continually interactive. Meanwhile, *militarization* encompasses the sociopolitical, ideological, and economic *processes* through which the structure of militarism metamorphoses over time.

The National Security State

The National Security State is the "state within the state" that has, on more than one occasion, been the agent setting US national priorities and policies while seemingly remaining invisible (Carroll 2006, pp. 303–304, 307, 429, 433). This "state" is never officially recognized as such. It remains unseen in large part because its activities cannot be documented due to the shroud of official secrecy which envelops it. At minimum it includes the US President (as Commander in

Chief of all armed forces) as well as some of the presidential cabinet – including the Secretary of State whose agency has long been militarized. This "state" is defined by decisions made by the National Security Council (NSC) – an entity whose members fluctuate but whose parameters are defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence. The NSC is without question, together with its professional staff of over 200, the most powerful government council ever created. The NSC both forms policy and implements policy.

More broadly, the National Security State includes the 18 intelligence agencies and the members of key Senate and House Committees concerned with national security policy – such as the armed services committees. It exercises a degree of relative autonomy from the national government as conventionally defined, setting the broad outlines for US science policy as it relates to present and future arms development, forming and executing policy with regard to US interventions, and, most importantly, establishing and revising the geopolitics and geo-economics of US "grand strategy." The essence of the National Security State – its *raison d'etre* – is the strategic exercise of state power; it is "the government's principal steering mechanism" always operating under conditions of profound secrecy (Jablonsky 2002–2003, p. 9). As such it is rarely analyzed or even acknowledged. The very concept of this "state" generally eludes theoretical formulation – in the best of circumstances, inquiry remains incipient and largely descriptive (Nelson 2007; Weiss 2014, pp. 1–50).

The National Security State inverts the popular portrayal of the US government – a state based in the overwhelmingly visible edifice of presidential power. Ostensibly, US national public policy arises within a pyramidal institutional structure, with the President and his cabinet occupying the highest positions of authority, exercising their great leverage to determine the trajectory and dynamics of national power. However, in the always undefined and completely mutable area known as "national security" – which is the area that "crowds out" all others when a reformulation

of national security policy occurs – the National Security State opaquely exercises its dominance.

Historical Contextualization

WW II was a climacteric in the trajectory of the political economy and cultural composition of the USA. Simultaneously, due to a plethora of cross-conditioned causal elements, US militarism and US hegemony emerged as two of the greatest constituent elements of the postwar structure: a new international order – the "American Century" of global US hegemony – commenced. The war ended with the US economy fully recovered from the Depression of the 1930s, now bolstered with a vast array of new technological developments that had clustered during the war (or just before), a renewed industrial base and with its rivals and allies abroad largely decimated. The major political economy lesson of the war was that for the USA, both "guns and butter" could be produced simultaneously – there was no "tradeoff," even while orthodox economics taught that such a state of affairs was inconceivable. This unanticipated lesson along with the consolidation of the Cold War in the months immediately after the end of WW II were the essential circumstances which enabled the long era, from 1948 to 1972, often labeled the "Golden Age," where solid economic growth went hand in hand with rising outlays for the military sector. Subsequently, economic growth became problematic with periods of stagnation, while intermittent economic crises became more intense: military expenditures oscillated to some degree, declining modestly and briefly with the end of the Cold War, thereafter generally rising (but not as fast as GDP grew over time) as interventions and regional wars created a propitious climate for arms manufacturers and professional military cadres. During WWII military power and policy emanated from the War Department. Subterfuge, secrecy and mystification regarding the scope and objectives of a newly institutionalized postwar US military structure led to the rechristening of the War Department as the Defense Department with the National Security Act of 1947 (which created the CIA, the crucial

National Security Council, and other institutions of the National Security State). Through this Act the USA systematically organized to *project* military power internationally: The word "defense" – suggesting the maintenance of military systems to protect the US populace from foreign aggression – had virtually no bearing within the vast, ever-evolving, never-defined, "national security" designs of the USA. Focused as it was on *projecting* military power internationally, the military delayed until 1958 the launching of the North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) system designed to secure the protection of the US territory. Always a small sideshow, it was first tested and utterly failed on September 11, 2001 (hereafter cited as 9/11). Even the Pentagon was helpless to avert a crude improvised civilian airline attack. This event starkly revealed to the US populace the magnitude of the massive breaches in the doctrine of "forward defense": Nevertheless, it did not evoke a critical reaction because militarism had long before attained its dominant conceptual status. Instead, bellicose power projection – or the threat thereof – continued to be *the* policy. Indeed, the unconventional attacks on New York and the Pentagon, on 9/11, ushered in a distinct and enduring era of heightened militarization.

Forward defense is the doctrine formed in WWII which established the nodal strategy of US military power projection from foreign bases: By 1946 the USA had already established at least 1 military base in 60 nations. Ostensibly armed forces stationed abroad were there to hold off an unprovoked attack by a then-prostate USSR. By 2018 at least 750 bases were under operation in 80 nations. Forward defense also entails the doctrine of "rapid deployment" from many of the bases located in the USA. Abroad, prepositioned sites dedicated to rapid deployment strategies, such as "Camp Justice" on the island of Diego Garcia – used jointly by the Air Force and the Navy to project power into Central Asia and Africa from the 1980s onward – proliferated. In contrast – revealing the fictitious nature of "defense" – US warfighting capacity within its "homeland," even in the wake of the 9/11, remained deeply subordinated to the enduring doctrines of forward defense, now bristling with post 9/11 preemptive, "first strike" policies (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018, pp. I9–I12).

The Ideological Hegemony of Militarism

US militarism – an unconscious deference to all things military on the part of the US populace – was created and almost seamlessly reproduced throughout the Cold War era. Militarism then became the essential ideological prism through which geopolitical events were filtered, perceived, and reproduced. When the Cold War ended, perhaps to the surprise of those who failed to understand the enduring impact it exerted on the consciousness of the populace, US militarism was haltingly reconstructed in the 1990s and then definitively, rapidly, reconsolidated after 9/11.

The term "ideological hegemony" is rooted in the ideas of Antonio Gramsci – in any given society some formulations become so pervasive that they are used without examination; they are, therefore, prevailing ideas or "common sense" (Gramsci 1971, pp. 56, 59, 80, 198). The "common sense" with regard to military strategy from the 1940s until the breakup of the USSR was that a war of total destruction could, and probably would, occur at any moment without the constant protective and expanding presence of the DOD. The accumulation of daily experience throughout the Cold War – as the US populace was inundated by an onslaught of imagery emanating from the entire phalanx of mediums of cohesive cultural expression (radio, television, newspapers, and magazines, as well as presidential discourses and pronouncements), along with the carefully curated lived-experiences during critical national events, such as the Cuban missile crisis – combined to anchor the idea of the "Soviet threat" as an unquestioned reality.

Shortly after the end of WWII, the DOD created its own propaganda agency, the Public Affairs Office (PAO). One of its notable accomplishments was the creation of the Motion Picture Production Office which became the DOD's permanent liaison with the film industry. This subsidiary of the PAO effectively co-produced

hundreds of widely viewed, influential, films that venerated the armed forces (Mirrlees 2017, pp. 8–10). The Public Affairs Office also operates another important entity, the Special Assistant for Entertainment Media, which encourages pro-military propaganda in TV shows, movies, sports spectacles, and music videos. The DOD's annually budgets from $0.5 to $0.8 billion for media-related propaganda and public relations outreach. One of the objectives of this well-funded effort is the promotion of military recruitment. But the larger objectives are (1) the militarization of all varieties of popular cultural expression, (2) the justification and sanitization of the US military's engagements, and, most especially, (3) the molding and mobilization of a militarist "national identity."

The PAO's Manichean portrayals resonated during the Korean War (1950–1953): Events on the Korean Peninsula were decontextualized and then reformulated to produce a "common sense" perception of an inevitably expansionist, perfidious, Soviet Union. Here, the USSR was presented as the puppet master behind invading North Korean military forces. At that time and thereafter, counterarguments were suppressed or marginalize – this was the fate of I.F. Stone's masterful *The Hidden History of the Cold War* (Stone 1953) and the two-volume effort by D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins* (Fleming 1961). Pervasive anti-intellectualism – or hostility to *critical* social thought as disguised through the power elite's nebulous "pragmatism" – has long been a known and troubling cultural characteristic of the USA, promulgated throughout its apolitical populace by dogma-spewing status quo institutions, including those of the State and organized religion. Superseding analysis, and demanding that there be none, is the ideological mission of the "exceptional" nation approach often deployed: This trope – sometimes refashioned as "the one essential nation" – mystically asserts that the USA (as the *indispensable* nation) has a right to use its military power as it will because it does so not for its national aggrandizement, but for benevolent, selfless, virtuous, objectives. Here, the USA is uniquely capable of acting on behalf of other nation's interests (Kagan 2014). As such, the complexities and

contradictions regarding the rationales behind US grand strategy are rarely effectively challenged. That is, the strategic application of military force, or threat of that force (i.e., "deterrence"), to revise the status quo in pursuit of objectives as defined by the National Security State (discussed below) as propounded by "defense intellectuals" is normally accepted, often vigorously. The momentous insertion of the PAO's propaganda apparatus has done much to ensure that this continues to be the case.

Any counter narrative regarding US militarism must be sufficiently robust to somehow overcome the "spontaneous" (to use Gramsci's terminology) "popular conceptions" of the underlying population (Gramsci 1971 pp. 198–199). The counter narrative challenging the militarist paradigm contends with the fact that (sometimes avid) consent for this governing construct arises not only, or necessarily, due to the coherence and persuasiveness of the anointed national security narrative as promulgated through the national media but also from *contemporary material interests and those arising from past-determined path-dependent processes*. In the US case, moving beyond the first line of contention requires the disabling of the embedded, "spontaneous," pro-military perceptions of the mass of military veterans and their spouses. While not a completely homogeneous group, these 32 million citizens have been trained within the hierarchical military structure to accept, without critical analysis, the rationales and objectives of US national security policy. Their compliance arises not merely from their prior ideological conditioning – some draw lifetime retirement pay, and others have accessed military-funded educational and training programs and/or subsidized home loans and medical care. Thus, there is a considerable, tangible, *material* basis for their tractability. In addition, as detailed below, there are millions of citizens actively employed by the Pentagon, both military and civilian, at any time, and, obviously, they have a direct material interest in the DOD. Furthermore, other millions are employed directly and indirectly by military contracting corporations whose comfortable survival arises from the lucrative business of provisioning the military. Here then, with spouses probably included, lies another mass

of the citizenry with a strong predilection – based at least partially on their material interests – to vigorously consent to the discourses propounded through the National Security State. Another wellspring of support for and promulgation of US militarism normally exists within the US Congress, composed to a considerable degree of military veterans. Furthermore, the programs and policies supported by the congressional armed services committees are influenced by the political donations and sophisticated lobbying efforts that Pentagon contracting corporations exercise. For these congressional representatives, in particular, and more broadly for the remaining members of congress who have significant levels of military base spending and/or corporate military manufacturing and supply interests in their districts, a militarist posture will help assure reelection or other desired career advancements. In all these instances, the ideological hegemony of US militarism is a result of a coupling of the material with the conceptual – it is not merely produced out of the ether of thought, norms, values, and customs.

Key peak business organizations, such as the powerful Aerospace Industries Association (analyzed below) and the National Defense Industry Association comprised of 1, 600 military contractor which claims it "drives [the] strategic dialogue in national security," play an important role, both ideological and material (National Defense Industries Association 2018). As well, retired military officers and civilians with deep roots in the National Security State (such as those who once thrived in the maze of intelligence agencies) in their role as quoted "experts" ubiquitously and endlessly promote via the public media and the press, the rhetorical tropes of US militarism whenever there is a shift in military policies or the looming opportunity for the USA to project power via foreign military intervention.

Hegemony, as Gramsci maintained, depends on a shifting combination of consent and coercion. Not immediately aligning with the dominant discourse regarding military policies has long carried a heavy price – a price largely unnoticed by those who repeatedly claim that the USA is "the land of the free." Freedom of dissent, to the degree that it can be found, is generally relegated to the special enclaves of academia. Even there, at critical moments, academics have found it necessary to muffle and silence their dissent (as many did after 9/11) less they be cast aside. Individual dissent, however, is often given short shrift because it is ineffective – thus numerous books and articles questioning aspects of US militarism have been published, to little effect, given their small circulation and the grip of the ideology of militarism. On the other hand, *organized* dissent will generally incite a coercive response: For example, the crucial years when US militarism consolidated after WWII were also marked by attempts by labor unions to challenge important elements of the status quo, frequently through waves of strikes in late 1945, 1946, and early 1947. But by early 1947, the USA had embraced the militant Truman Doctrine – effectively committing the USA to unlimited interventions, ostensibly to address the "Soviet threat," and the construction the National Security State was on the agenda. Conveniently, the Truman Doctrine and other similar policies facilitated a split in the then potent US labor movement whose most militant members were also, quite often, sympathetic to the pro-worker ideals championed (but not necessarily practiced) by the USSR. A purge of union leadership now ensued; the coercion of labor was broadly exercised to ensure the stability of Cold War ideological hegemony (Lipsitz 1982).

Yet, the ideological hegemony of US militarism forged in the aftermath of WW II and largely maintained to the present has not provided the political space for *integral*, or uncontested, hegemony: The intractable and meaningless slaughter that was the Vietnam War led directly to the "Vietnam Syndrome" which penetrated the rank and file of the US military and even, at moments, the officer corp. This awkwardly named "syndrome" was not a medical disorder, nor was it psychological in nature; it was an open aversion, particularly within the US military, to the "crackpot realism" that had guided US military doctrine, and military pretensions, in Vietnam. It carried through to much of society at large, but – most crucially – it interrupted the cohesiveness of the military forces.

Advocates of US intervention, including President Bush at the outset of the first Gulf War (1990–1991), believed that a stunning quick victory by US forces would vanquish the "syndrome" which had endured since the closing years of the Vietnam War. Yet, the results of the first Gulf War were vague, and the Iraq regime – the focus of US armed intervention – continued in power. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US populace supported the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, which quickly became a long quagmire. Then, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not go as planned by the neoconservatives who had ecstatically anticipated the building of a model new society in the Middle East. Resistance in Iraq, much of it arising from the inept occupation policies pursued by the USA, became a critical factor by 2006. Here, as well as in Afghanistan, unconditional public support could not be maintained. Instead, US policymakers were forced to settle for *minimal* hegemony – financial and emotive "support for the troops" was coupled with a deep reluctance to shoulder the burdens of US military fatalities. Instead, every effort was made to reposition US troops as advisors behind the lines of battle, while drones and missiles delivered deadly fire from a distance with mercenaries and local troops, along with their families, carrying the burdens of combat.

Institutional Continuity and Minimal Dislocation: The Legacy System

The deeply path-dependent nature of the US military establishment and its civilian counterparts reveals that attempted periodization formulations – such as the concept of a "new" US militarism after 9/11/ − are difficult to document (Bacevich 2005). Indeed, the Pentagon – tied to its institutionalized methods and perspectives rooted in WWII and the Cold War era – rejected the idea, put forward in 1998, that major policy realignment was necessitated in the aftermath of unconventional Al Qaeda strikes on two US embassies in Africa (The 9/11 Commission 2004, pp. 120–121, 482, note 61). Here, as elsewhere, the concept of "minimal dislocation," with regard to the narrow

parameters within which institutional change occurs, retains its salience (Bush 1994, pp. 294–295).

Thus, the formal shift toward Special Operations Forces (SOF) in 1987 – arising from a failed intervention in Iran in 1980 – has not altered the primary focus on large and costly weapons systems that has characterized the US military-industrial complex. SOF are small fighting units operating clandestinely or with low visibility, often embedded with indigenous military forces – they were deployed in a remarkable 149 countries in 2017 (South 2018). Such forces actually commenced in 1952: They were assigned to engage in counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare but were largely discontinued in the wake of the Vietnam War debacle. In the 1980s such forces were gradually reconstituted, culminating in the creation of the Special Operations Command in 1987: This command was tasked with establishing units worldwide. All deployed forces have multiple military skills along with language and cultural training. In the wake of 9/11, the number of SOF almost doubled to approximately 70,000, with a budget allocation of nearly $13 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. Yet, in relation to the 1.465 million uniformed US military personnel in 2018 (active duty personnel including full-time reserve support personnel), the SOF are extremely small in number (0.03% of all military personnel) as was their budget (0.02% of total FY 2018 Department of Defense expenditures) (Congressional Research Service 2018).

While recent reliance on SOF suggests that qualitative change in military organization *can occur*, in many other instances – such as the once proffered "Revolution in Military Affairs" popular of the 1990s – change failed to materialize, even as billions were spent (Rodriguez 2014). Such debacles illustrate the determinate weight of past-bound practices that continue to promote "legacy" weapons systems (newer versions of already developed large weapons) and the difficulties of achieving broad-based technological and institutional change at the Pentagon even though some advances in robotics and miniaturization have been realized (O'Hanlon 2015, 2018). The abandonment of the RMA was then followed

by the elimination of the Future Combat Systems program in 2009, after devoting $19 billion to what was once touted as "the Army's most important and transformative modernization effort" (Censer 2011; Pernin et al. 2012).

The failures of these two programs comprise merely a small part of a much larger, repetitive, history indicating that *systemically*, military procurement is often delinked from performance: A self-perpetuating cycle is maintained wherein weapons systems are devised, partially completed and then discarded, while contractors obtain high profits. Then, new weapons systems are planned, promoted, and abandoned, while weapons contracting corporations are generously paid once again. The cycle illustrates that the "defense" program of the USA has a great deal to do with, and is extensively conditioned by, the priorities, needs, and perspectives of military contracting corporations. However, more broadly, "cross-conditional" factors (i.e., the "needs" of the military contracting corporations versus the strategic "objectives" pursued by the professional military cadres) play a major role in shaping the overall dynamic of the entire military sector. This complex synergistic relationship is too rarely highlighted. Adding another layer of complexity is the fact that there is no "firewall" between the contractors and the officials at the highest levels of the Pentagon. Thus there is no clear division between those who putatively represent the government, or the public's collective interests, and those who seek to maximize profits on substandard weapons and supplies bought by the DOD. Rather, there is a "revolving door" whereby even cabinet level policymakers are appointed as a result of their past performance as corporate leaders selling arms to the DOD (such as the 2019 appointment of a former Boeing corporation executive as the US Secretary of Defense). Meanwhile military professionals retire into lucrative employment with the contractors – often the very contractors that they have "supervised" while employed at the Pentagon (Government Accountability Office 2008).

Such studies illustrate the long-established intersection of two powerful spheres – one comprising the interests, objectives, and leverage of the highly specialized and highly dependent military contracting corporations and the other comprising the *National Security State*. The military contracting corporations span a much wider spectrum of corporate interests than those conventionally portrayed. For example, the Pentagon buys approximately 100 million barrels of refined petroleum fuels per year. It employs over 30,000 acquisition staff members per year to process corporate contracts. Like most crucial details regarding the scope of the military contracting corporations' sphere, comprehensive data recording the total number of private companies that relish the opportunity to sell to the Pentagon – frequently under "no-bid," one-firm, selection arrangements and/or "cost plus" contracting that allow contractors to "gold plate" weapons systems – is not available. Nonetheless, it is instructive that *one* "multiple awards" contract, issued on June 20, 2016, by the US Navy, involved 608 individual military contracting firms. An indication of the massive scope of military procurement was that in 2014 the Defense Management Contract Agency supervised 20,000 individual "prime" contracts. However, this number leaves out of account all the "subprime" contractors who operate as first tier and second tier suppliers to the prime contractor. Thus, it could easily be the case that, annually, roughly 60,000 firms are producing for the Pentagon as prime and subprime weapons or parts and service contractors. While some contractors have lamented the procedures and oversight practices of the Pentagon, the lure of high profits, or the opportunity to establish a company's capabilities in order to enjoy decades of "follow-on" contracts, or the opportunity to develop technologies that can be spun-off into civilian production continues to strengthen the allegiance that contractors generally hold for the Department of Defense.

Viewed from the perspective of the Pentagon, the bonanza they provide to US corporations is not a matter that requires remediation. For the Pentagon, cost-maximizing practices pursued by contractors are not a priority. The Pentagon buys on the basis of "performance maximization," a criteria that ignores the issue of cost. This disregard is pervasive: For example, the Pentagon was mandated to conduct a comprehensive audit of its

activities, assets, and liabilities in 1990 but managed to resist this process until 2018, while all other government agencies complied. The first-ever audit (costing over $400 million in 2018) essentially concluded that, overall, the Pentagon could not properly account for all its assets, nor value them with accuracy (Editorial Board 2018, p. SR10). The Pentagon responded with indifference as, seemingly, did the US populace.

Long conditioned to exalt militarism, the US populace devotes little attention to the pratfalls of the military-industrial complex. For example, when an F-35 fighter valued at $100 million crashed in a routine flight over US territory in October 2018, the event was scarcely noticed. In the same month, 22 stealth fighter planes, ironically named F-22s, were insufficiently maintained and unable to fly away when the base where they were located was hit by a hurricane. This created a total loss of $7.5 billion (Philipps 2018). Neither the F-35 nor the F-22 events appeared to be worthy of the attention of the US Congress, the US press, or the US populace. However, in all likelihood, this will create billions of dollars in new "follow-on" contracts for the prime contractors of the F-22, (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney). It was, literally, an extraordinary windfall for a group of corporations that sold the Pentagon an "advanced" fighter plane that could not fly when a predictable event occurred.

The Enduring Effects of 9/11: More Weapons, New Wars

As conventionally presented the 9/11 incident in New York in 2001 that destroyed the symbolic World Trade Center buildings was an out of context event and a major turning point for the military sector. However, the attack was not out of context; rather, it demonstrated path-dependent effects, or "blowback," long understood by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as part of an action → reaction cycle (Johnson 2000). It did not evoke a turning point for the military sector – large-scale weapons procurement continued to be the prime preoccupation of the Pentagon and the weapons contractors. Nonetheless, as framed by

the National Security State, 9/11 exercised an outsized impact on the US populace, including their legitimation of preemptive war (Wotjeck 2008). According to a Gallup opinion survey, in 2001 public support for increases in military expenditures reached their highest levels since 1984 (when such polling began). Since 2001 public support for raising military outlays has remained on a very high plateau – while support for reductions ranged between 11% and 13% of respondents. As a result (after adjusting for inflation), DOD expenditures all but doubled between 2001 and 2010, thereafter dropping slightly as the 2009–2012 failed "surge" strategies in Afghanistan were largely abandoned from 2014 through 2018.

Measuring the Government Employment Impact Within the Military Sector

The Pentagon is the largest employer in the USA, with 1.465 million uniformed military personnel employed alongside the DOD's 740,000 civilian Pentagon employees (Blakely 2017). In addition the DOD employed a "shadow" military force along with many others who provide a broad range of skills – including intelligence expertise – of an estimated 640,000 private contract employees. In 2014, these contract employees worked in 41 components of the DOD (Hartung 2015; Hartung 2017). Of these contract forces, there are a large number of combatants, frequently labeled "mercenaries," in war zones. Reliable data for the total number deployed is unavailable. The DOD's motivation for mobilizing such forces is consistent with the "invisibility" hypothesis: When US soldiers die in combat situations, a detailed protocol must be followed, including making the information regarding such deaths widely available to the US populace. Contract combatant deaths, however, receive little official notice and are rarely the subject of widely disseminated information. *More* contractors died in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2009 through early 2016 than did official US military forces (1,540 vs. 1,301), with 68% of such deaths involving contractors who were non-US citizens.

Overall, then, a reliable estimate of the size of the US military in terms of personnel would include the active duty and reserve military units (1.465 million), the civilian employees (740,000), and the "shadow" military of private personnel contractors to staff US military facilities (640,000), for a total of 2.845 million. In addition, the armed forces have 650,000 reserves who receive pay based on limited monthly training. On a full-time equivalent basis, these reserves are estimated at 130,000, pushing the total of the US military force to roughly 3 million (Kapp and Torreon 2018, pp. 3, 5).

Furthermore, outside of the DOD, there are several state agencies that owe their existence to the national security paradigm. Included here are the 240,000 Homeland Security Agency employees, as well as at least 70,000 employed in intelligence agencies that are not directly within the DOD (such as the CIA) bringing the total to 3.155 million employees (Szoldra 2013). Military capacity in space is the underlying objective of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which estimates their employees at 80,000 – including 60,000 contract employees not included in the DOD's contract personnel estimated above (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2018). Nuclear weapons are built and maintained by the US Department of Energy through its National Nuclear Security Administration. This entity employs at least 52,400 professionals in nuclear weapons development facilities spread across the USA (Woolf and Werner 2018, pp. 13–21.)

Past military programs create massive present-day expenditures, the major one being the Department of Veterans Affairs budget. This document asserts that in 2019, annual expenditures will directly result in the support of "366,358 Full-Time Equivalent employees" (Department of Veterans Affairs 2018). Another employment generator arising from past military programs arises from the military retirement programs. In 2017, 2.1 million military retirees received a total of $54.4 billion. Using the expenditure of funds estimate for the US Social Security system and applying this to this retiree' pension spending, this created approximately 302,000 jobs (USDOD 2018, p. 18; Koenig and Myles 2013, p. 12).

Taking the components listed above, i.e., the estimate for all armed service employees including full-time reserves + a conversion of the part-time reserves to full-time equivalent + civilian Pentagon employees + private personnel contractor employees in the "shadow military" + Homeland Security Agency employees + Intelligence Agencies employees outside of the Pentagon + NASA employees including contracted workers, + Department of Energy nuclear programs employees + Veterans Affairs full-time equivalent employees + employment arising from the military retirement program, the total amounts to an estimated *4.08 million in 2018*. That is, the direct employment of the military sector constituted 3.2% of the full-time US labor force.

The Employment Multiplier Effect of Military Expenditures

It is necessary to account for the direct and indirect employment effect of military employees' spending – the number of jobs sustained by the 4.08 million who are directly employed by the military. In recent years 21 US states have commissioned detailed "input-output" economic impact studies to calculate the "downstream" employment effects of military spending in their perimeters. Using a representative sample of such studies for 6 US states (Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Washington) as compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the "job multiplier" averaged 2.28 full-time jobs sustained for each military employee. Extrapolating to the national level, the 4.08 million government jobs in the military sector resulted in approximately *9.3 million total employed* via *US military spending in the above cited categories in 2018* (National Conference of State Legislatures 2018).

Yet, a portion of the military's budget "leaks" from the US economy due to the fact that roughly 15% of the military's employees are located abroad (Bialik 2017). This "leakage effect" is relatively modest, however, since much of the spending that occurs on US military bases abroad takes place under stipulated conditions requiring

the use of products produced by US-based corporate contractors. They provide a full range of material and services – including military hardware, parts, and maintenance supplies such as fuels. Likewise, the bases have "exchanges" and "commissaries" which offer a complete range of consumer goods (including autos, appliances, food, and household goods all largely produced by US-based corporations and exported to the overseas bases). Thus, the "leakages" from the flow of military spending due to troops and civilians stationed abroad are relatively low, suggesting that a downward adjust of perhaps 5% of total employment would account for funds diverted from the US economy via overseas posting of troops and Pentagon civilian employees. Using the 5% reduction due to "leakages" as a reasonable approximate estimate, total employment summing all categories included above (including the "downstream" direct and indirect effects) would be 8.835 million – approximately 6.9% of the total full-time labor force of the USA in 2018.

Employment Effects of Weapons System Production in the Private Sector

These estimates – as large as they are – fail to capture the *total* employment impact of US military spending because, in 2018, 58% of the basic military budget was dedicated to buying weapons systems or other supply inputs from the private sector. Some of these vast outlays have already been accounted for in the above estimate – the 640,000 contingency contracted personnel who are not included as Pentagon employees and are considered in the category of "Services." Thus, of the 58% of the total budget devoted to military procurement and other outlays, a significant portion is utilized to hire contingency personnel. Subtracting out service contracts for contingency personnel, the net amount remaining which is devoted to military procurement and related supplies sums to approximately $300 billion (Blakeley 2017).

The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) – the all-important peak business association for all military systems contractors – estimated 2018 direct employment at military contracting corporations as 354,000 with linked "supply chain" employment of 654,9000 (including production for overseas delivery via the DOD's Foreign Military Sales program). Thus, the AIA estimates direct military procurement employment at 1.01 million (Aerospace Industry Association 2018, p. 6). Using the "job multiplier" applied earlier (2.28), *total employment (direct and indirect) sums to approximately 2.3 million*. This brings the total for the employment effects in 2018 for the *entire* US military sector to 11.14 million or 8.83% of all full-time employees in the US economy.

As large as this estimate may appear to be, it does not include State Department employees engaged in military foreign aid programs or others involved with the militarization of US diplomatic functions or those involved in similar activities at the Agency for International Development. Nor does it include the range of financial specialists who are employed due to the fact that a large portion of the national debt is attributable to past budget deficits arising from the need to finance military expenditures via the issuance of public debt. The US public debt reached $21 *trillion* in 2018; roughly 90% of this debt is refinanced annually as old debt matures. This debt is cumulative; it is the sum of the annual deficits (minus surpluses) of the US government's annual budget. As much as 50% of the debt may be traced to military expenditures, when properly defined to include all of the conventionally delinked arms spending categories (such as nuclear bomb-making in the Department of Energy and the pursuit of military dominance in space as funded through NASA). In 2017 the USA employed 367,180 "securities and financial services sales agents" as well as 109,720 accountants and auditors. A large, if undetermined, portion of these employees, as well as a substantial portion of those employed by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve System, were involved directly or indirectly in all the processes needed to trade and account for the $17.5 trillion in *refinanced* US federal public debt in 2017 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). While the workers trading and recording the US

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debt arising from past deficits attributable to military expenditures have not been included in the estimates presented here, the purpose of citing the employment effects of debt refinancing is to illustrate that the estimate of total employment arising in the military sector – as calculated above – is likely an *underestimate because it excludes a number of important categories that resist careful quantification*.

At the same time that employment in debt financing and the militarization of foreign affairs at the State Department and the Agency for International Development have been excluded (thereby effectively reducing the employment in the military sector), the estimate also excludes from the full-time labor force any calculation of the efforts of part-time workers (which would serve to lower the share of employment in the military sector as a share of total employment): Median annual wage for these workers was only $281 per week in 2018. The total wage bill for this group of workers was approximately 1.5% of GDP. Of this amount some significant portion of part-time employees were already included as indirectly employed due to military expenditures (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). The excluded elements, then, are effectively mutually canceling, or nearly so.

Summing Up: The Macroeconomic Impact of the Military Sector

Including the estimates for all of the abovementioned, but normally non-calculated elements, indicates that roughly 1 of every 11 full-time employees (i.e., 11.14 million or 8.83% of all full-time employees in the US economy) *is sustained by the military sector* (including Pentagon employees, weapons systems employees, and those employed in "downstream" or indirect, activities). Converting the employment figures into their proportion of the GDP, the military sector accounted for an estimated $1.82 trillion of output in 2018. This conversion estimate is based on the hypothesis that the employment level in the military sector is neither "labor-intensive" nor "capital-intensive" but rather roughly equivalent to that of an "average" mix with regard

to the entire US economy. (Conventionally, military spending is depicted as "capital-intensive" because a large portion of the budget is allocated to "procurement" of weapons systems and a significant portion is devoted to Research and Development. Procurement (19% of the base DOD budget in 2017) may well be capital-intensive in some instances, although some of the most complex weapons systems – such as nuclear weapons or ICBMs – are produced with a large component of labor because production is not usually standardized or produced under large-batch production. Rather, "hand-built" techniques are employed. Clearly, then, there are "labor-intensive" activities in weapons procurement: For example, a RAND study of comparative costs per ton to construct commercial ships and warships, based on a US example, demonstrated that "in every category of work, the military ship required many times the labor required by the commercial ship" (Birkler et al. 2005, p. 45). Wirls found that military buildups in the USA were marked by alternating periods of capital-intensive procurement programs followed by labor-intensive buildups (Wirls 2008, pp. 109–111). Since the end of the Cold War, the shift has been largely toward non-procurement, labor-intensive, operations, and maintenance activities (Snow 2017).)

In effect, the above basing of the estimate of the magnitude of the military sector on full-time employment, and then converting to GDP estimates, takes account not only labor in the sector but also all other income categories of the sector – proprietors' income, rent, interest, and profit. High profits in the military sector effectively increase the weight of this sector in GDP calculations: It is well documented that the military sector sustains high profits, thereby serving to raise the overall rate of profit in the US economy. Recently, Wang and San Miguel examined 110 military contractors operating in 23 standard industrial categories from 1950 to 2010. They concluded that the military contracting corporations' return on capital employed (ROCE) – an accurate measure of the profit rate – was *34% higher* than nonmilitary contracting peer firm (Wang and San Miguel 2012, pp. 388–393). Another significant finding was the trend after 1992 showing even higher profits for the military contractors.

The Military Sector Drives US Innovations

Another special characteristic of the military sector is of a *qualitative* nature. Research and Development spending is high in the military sector in relation to the economy at large – 68% of all federal government R&D in 2016 was military related (National Science Board 2018a, b). The US Corporations which lead in private sector R&D are heavily linked to the military sector, with the bulk of total outlays coming from aerospace, computers, electronics, and software producers. The aviation sector – a leading sector today with a high export capacity – was largely created by the US government during and after WWII and sustained ever since (Kofsky 1995, pp. 47–82). Of particular note since the 1950s has been the close participation of the military sector in the development of electronics, eventually producing the PC and the Internet and then the so-called digital economy – now forming the cutting edge of US economic prowess, with its epicenter focused in the San Francisco Bay area (Leslie 2000; Walker 2018, p. 38). As noted by Weiss, most private sector R&D is short-term and product-oriented, while government R&D is *transformative* (Weiss 2014, pp. 181–183). Numerous examples of such transformative innovations arising from military programs, particularly due to the advanced research of DARPA, have been well analyzed (Block 2011; Weiss 2014; Mazzucato 2013, pp. 74–79, 103–109; Ruttan 2006). Furthermore, the evidence supports the idea that high government R&D stimulates, or "crowds-in," private sector R&D, with the military sector leading the way while also raising US Total Factor Productivity in the process of creating a raft of product "spin-offs" into the civilian economy (Moretti et al. 2016).

Challenging the Conventional Wisdom Regarding "Defense"

The conventional wisdom asserts that the military sector, overall, is quite different than the remainder of the national economy. But, the evidence available suggests that in terms of its "production function" (the relative use of labor and capital), it is not particularly skewed toward capital-intensive activities. The analysis presented above based on estimates of full-time labor activities sustained by the military sector goes well beyond the conventional portrayal of the significance of military expenditures which entails comparing DOD budget outlays against the GDP, wherein the Defense Department budget accounted for 3% of total GDP – or $618 billion – in 2018. The striking difference between the total employment effect estimate, above, and the conventional depiction of the military sector as "small" or "shrinking" (compared to levels from 1950 through 1970) is largely accounted for by the lack of inclusion of the "multiplier" effects arising from military expenditures as well as the important elements left out of the calculation, which have been detailed above. The evidence indicates that the military sector, when adequately defined and measured, constituted roughly 9% of US GDP in 2018. This was roughly equivalent to the GDP of the tenth largest economy in the world.

The Costs of US Interventions

The US military sector should not be understood as arising directly from warfighting activities. Since WW II, the costs of wars and interventions cannot explain most of the outlays: Rather, during any period of active military engagement, such as the two Gulf Wars (1990–1991; 2003–2010), combat provided the occasion for bursts of military spending primarily devoted to building yet more legacy weapons systems and other activities unrelated to the two Gulf interventions.

Nonetheless, active warfighting should be analyzed, particularly due to the very long-term economic impacts involved and more importantly to take into consideration the maiming and killing of combatants and most especially of innocent civilians (sometimes referred to by the Pentagon as "collateral damage"). It must be borne in mind that in spite of the insistence of war planners that modern weapons offer "pinpoint accuracy," the ratio of civilians killed to combatants killed in

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Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2003 to 2018, was approximately 1:1 (Crawford 2018a). If account could be made of other civilian deaths due to war-related famine, injury, and sickness, the ratio of combatants' deaths to civilian deaths would likely double or more. In addition these US campaigns created eight million civilian refugees.

According to a 2018 estimate produced by Brown University's Costs of War Project, the increases in interventions following the 9/11 episode resulted in massive outlays, including especially those for future veterans' medical payments (through 2059) and future interest payments on the national debt created by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In all, the inclusive, cumulative, costs of these wars had amounted to $4.9 *trillion* by 2019 and will rise to an estimated $5.9 trillion by 2059 (Crawford 2018b). Such estimates pierce the veil of obscurantism spread by Pentagon public relations efforts designed to inhibit the US populace from understanding the extreme financial commitments that arise from "small" wars.

Yet, the focus on financial costs should not overshadow the magnitude of civilian and combatant losses. Unfortunately, the US populace remains riveted only on their combat fatalities. Nonetheless, the brutal brunt of these interventions has been borne by those living in the invaded countries: In Iraq, from March 2003 through October 2018, from 480,000 to 507,000 civilians and combatants perished. In Afghanistan, from October 2001 through October 2018, 147,000 civilians and combatants died (Crawford 2018a). Such estimates exclude an adequate accounting for the ecological devastation of these US interventions – much of it long-lasting. Such an accounting would have to contend with the damages caused by US use of depleted uranium weapons.

The Invisibility Hypothesis: "Out of Sight, Out of Mind"

In the entire period since the end of WWII, only once has the power elite openly lifted the official veil shrouding US militarism: In his remarkable 1961 farewell address, President Eisenhower – the supreme commander of Allied forces in

Western Europe during WW II – decried the enduring power of what he termed the "military-industrial complex." The virtue of this approach was to sever the concept of US militarism from its historically given parameters – the autonomous power of military officers and military institutions to determine the dynamics of civil society – and introduce a vague conceptual dualism which foregrounded industrial objectives (Berghahn 1981). While the President elided "militarism," the term had been powerfully deployed by C. Wright Mills in 1959 and even more so by Martin Luther King in 1967 (Garrow 2017; Mills 1959, pp. 222–224). After delivering a stinging rhetorical denunciation of US militarism in 1967, King, as never before faced searing, and effective, public dismissal – particularly at the hands of *The New York Times*, the power elite's herald. As a towering iconoclast, Mills' allegations and formulations have retained a limited currency among a small cognoscente while leaving no trace in the broader cultural matrix of the US. King's 1967 message highlighting US militarism – "the U.S. is the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today" – was buried in a wave of condemnation as 170 US newspapers denounced his message and his leadership.

Just as former General Eisenhower was grudgingly permitted to cast doubt on the structure of the US public policy of militarism given his warrior credence, so too may a few other military professionals, from time to time. But, even in while controversy over the Vietnam War reached unprecedented height, it was impossible for the most powerful civil rights leader in US history to assail militarism as one of the most potent specters haunting the USA.

The US government has exercised its leverage over print and electronic media sources to prohibit any use of photos of injured or dead US combat military personnel. This policy serves to sanitize US interventions apparently out of fear of the "Vietnam Syndrome." Thus, even in war, militarism remains all but invisible: It is glimpsed only rarely and strictly confined to the small and highly circumscribed political space wherein only war veterans might critically, but only very lightly, tread into the sacrosanct realms of US military affairs.

US Hegemony

Hegemony is the deployment of national power beyond a nation's territory in order to guarantee the hegemon favorable access to the economic and strategic assets of a foreign nation, without imposing direct structured territorial control. By 1900, or shortly thereafter, the USA had consolidated a hegemonic sphere of influence in Latin America, arising from its drive to have unfettered access to its natural resource-based wealth via both direct investments and trade. The building blocks for the attainment of US global hegemony were constructed during WWII when US policy planners began to perceive the imperative need to form a new core geographic area based on complimentary international trade and the imperatives of access to foreign markets able to receive exported US manufactures while other regions provided for the US's growing need for resource-based imports. As well, if not more so, the USA sought unhindered access to export capital – financial capital and most especially agro-mineral and industrial capital. A vague conception of the "Grand Area" that it would dominate (at first entailing Britain and its empire, Japan and oil-rich territories in the Middle East) gradually developed into what would be termed "the Bretton Woods system" – principally defined by its key institutions including the GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank but also through the US's ability to impose the US dollar as the world's key currency. Hegemony, particularly as understood by Gramsci, arises from an ever-dynamic combination of coercion and consent: The latter partially entails components of "soft power" – exercising strategies of persuasion – e.g., promoting the ideology of "free trade" and "comparative advantage" as "economic laws" leading to "mutually beneficial" results (while eliding the asymmetric results pursued by the hegemon). The hegemon is committed to create, maintain, and restructure international institutions, which are officially "neutral" yet inordinately facilitate hegemonic stability. The hegemon bears the stabilizing military and/or economic costs of "collective goods" within the hegemonic sphere, e.g., naval power to maintain merchant ship passage through all international maritime "choke points."

Rivalry, the antithesis of hegemony, has been a constant sub-theme throughout the era of US Hegemony. At every turn, thus far, the USA has been able to subvert the rise of a rival power, or bloc, be it the USSR in the 1950s, the rise of Japan in the 1970s, the rise of the "rest" (economically emerging nations of the global south) from the 1980s, the precursor to the EU in the 1960s, and the consolidation of Eurozone in 1999. At every turn the USA has used "threat inflation" to create a controlled crisis climate in order to recast national power, eventually confirming its unipolar dominance. At every turn theorists have clutched the myth of the impending loss of US hegemony, failing to understand the structures of hegemonic power – that of military dominance being the foremost (Strange 1987).

Today's rival to US hegemony is China. Once again the USA operates within the throes of "threat inflation" actively devising new strategies within another controlled crisis climate. Yet, beyond the consternation expressed in and near the Pentagon over China's rise, this nation suffers from a declining workforce (Wuttke 2017 p. 62). Extreme, growing, overcapacity in resource-intensive manufacturing industries such as steel and oil refining has been a concern since 2008 (Wuttke 2017 p. 64). China's consumers cannot keep pace with the subsidized support of the construction industry: Overproduction is remarkable –65 *million* unsold apartments inundated the market in 2018 (Stevenson and Li 2018). China's military prowess is modest in relation to that of the USA. The US dollar remains the key currency, and Brexit has weakened London as one of the rivals to US financial dominance. Meanwhile, China's currency has a low reserve status in the globe's central banks. As of 2018 less than 2% of all central banks' reserve holdings were denominated in yuan. Another metric of relative power is that US outbound foreign investment was roughly four times larger than that of China's in 2017 (World Bank 2019). China has successfully scaled the value-added production ladder by cross-conditioning technology sharing with foreign firms anxious to have access to China's labor force and infrastructure. But since 2017 US policymakers have targeted this strategy – this is

the actual basis for the US government's aggressive stance regarding tariffs and trade policy. These strategy switches on the part of the US are designed to slow China's efforts to raise its level of technological autonomy.

In 2015 China formulated an extremely ambitious new Industrial Policy, "China Manufacturing 2025," targeting ten technology-intensive industrial activities. One was robotics, an area suffering from overcapacity by 2016. In taking the measure of the problematic "2025" program – which has dismayed US policymakers – it should be kept in mind that the USA has long used military expenditures as its sub-rosa form of Industrial Policy, often achieving remarkable success (Cypher 1987; Weiss 2014).

Control of the world's key commodity, oil, has long been a central issue in theorizing the stability of the hegemonic order. From the 1970s onward, US strategists were bedeviled and heavily constrained due to the US's increasing dependence on foreign oil. In analyzing the many attempts to portray the USA as a nation in decline – a near-constant trope since the 1980s – analysts have been slow to recognize the spectacular recovery of the US's national oil industry. In 2018 the USA became the world's number one petroleum producer as a result of US's unchallenged technological edge in advanced recovery techniques, while China remained the world's largest importer of petroleum, indicating its dependence in a crucial metric of international power (Applebaum and Tankersley 2018). Thus, ignoring the latest round of "threat inflation" emanating from Washington, D.C, a serious challenge to US economic hegemony appears unlikely in spite of China's many economic achievements since entering the WTO in 2001.

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US Military

US Military Presence in Africa

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Synonyms

Africa; AFRICOM; China; The United States; US military

Definition/Description

This chapter examines the United States military's involvement in Africa, which is a twenty-first century phenomenon. The US military created the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, which was motivated by the US War on Terror, access to Africa's natural resources, including oil, and great power rivalry between the United States and China.

Introductory Paragraph

The course of United States' imperialism globally has been – and continues to be – a complex one. US imperial ambitions were evident from its seizure of colonies in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Later during the Cold War in the twentieth century, the United States conducted aggressive imperial interventions, both overtly, through wars in Korea and Vietnam, and covertly, in CIA operations in South American states and elsewhere (Blum 2002). Perhaps it was the obvious imperial intent manifest in these actions by the United States that has, in contrast, led many historians to the conclusion that "the African continent has remained a backwater of U.S. global strategic thinking" (Bamba 2010). While the United States has not charted a consistent and unbroken path of imperial ambition in relation to Africa, the United States has long had an interest in the continent and

its resources. Together with Britain, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, Norway, Turkey, and the Netherlands, the United States was a participant at the 1884–1885 West African Conference of Berlin (known as "the Berlin Conference"), where the African continent was divided up among Africa's colonial powers (Shepperson 1985). The United States "became fully involved in the proceedings at Berlin in order to protect its perceived actual and mostly potential interests in Africa" (Munene 1990). Although the United States' interest in Africa had arguably been overshadowed by its imperial strategies elsewhere across the globe, US interest in Africa continued into the twentieth century (Bamba 2010). While the relationship between the United States and Africa "has been defined primarily by the slave trade and the Cold War" (Nyang 2005), this chapter seeks to examine the factors that have motivated US military involvement in Africa during the twenty-first century.

The United States and Africa During the Twentieth Century

The twentieth century saw the realization of the United States' ambitions as an imperial power; however, the African continent did not feature prominently in the US grand strategy. By the end of the twentieth century, the United States had become the world's superpower, a feat that may not have been possible without the Second World War. The advent of Second World War presented challenges for the nations which were then the great colonial and imperial powers: Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Japan. By the end of the Second World War, Britain and France were in ruins, Germany and Japan were occupied, and these powers had lost control of many of their colonial "possessions." The United States emerged as, arguably, the greatest economic victor from the Second World War, with American goods, services, and Marshall Plan loans enabling the reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe (Kolko 1968). The US dollar was installed as the global reserve currency under

the Bretton Woods agreement and the American economy flourished in the postwar period (Panitch and Gindin 2013). The Cold War that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War bolstered the US economy too, driving production and vast expenditure on the military-industrial complex. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States was the sole superpower and had also assumed the role of "global policeman."

Africa's experience of the twentieth century was entirely different to that of the United States. Africa's subjugation by colonial rulers from the eighteenth century onward was finally challenged in the mid-twentieth century. Colonization was already underway by the time the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference was held to control this "scramble for Africa" – the frenzied acquisition by Western imperial powers of different regions of Africa (Craven 2015). Between 1885 and 1914, the major and minor European imperial powers "partitioned" Africa. Britain seized much of the eastern half of the African continent from Cairo, Egypt, to Capetown, South Africa. France secured most of West Africa from Morocco in the North, most of the expanse of the Sahara Desert, and regions of Equatorial Africa, including Gabon. Other coastal territories in Equatorial Africa such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia became British possessions. Portugal controlled Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique in Southern Africa. In the Horn of Africa, "Somaliland" was carved up into British, French, and Italian territories. Italy was granted Libya. The Congo became the sole colony of the Belgian king (Chamberlain 1999). The host and sponsor of the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, Germany, a rising industrial power, took control of the desert land of German West Africa, the tiny equatorial entity of Togo and Tanganyika, or German East Africa. Spain was conceded parts of Morocco and coastal Saharan Africa. The only African territories which Western imperialism did not grasp were Abyssinia, (now known as Ethiopia), and Liberia in Equatorial Africa (Zewde 2001). Liberia was colonized by freed Black slaves from America and the Caribbean from the 1820s and was regarded as a

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quasi-American protectorate until 1847, when its independence was recognized by America (Schick 1980).

The Western imperial "carve up" of Africa, sanctioned and formalized by the Berlin Conference, was a frantic scramble for the continent's resources: the Congo became the vast rubber tree plantation of Belgium; British South Africa represented a vast gold and diamond mine, and France and Germany's African colonies promised new markets and sources of investment. There was a continuous African resistance to this advance by European colonialism, but it was defeated by industrial military technology (Pakenham 1991).

European colonizers had carved their empires in Africa with little regard for the peoples of Africa. Regions had been divided up arbitrarily by the European colonial powers. In the period that followed the end of the Second World War, the process of decolonization began to take place in Africa. The European colonial powers did not relinquish their African colonies for humanitarian reasons; the Second World War and its economic consequences ensured that many of these European powers were not in a position to maintain control of their colonies.

Unlike the postwar economic boom experienced by the United States, postwar Africa encountered economic problems, with some African regions experiencing a decline post-decolonization, and poverty became entrenched. Some of the greatest problems Africa has confronted since the mid-twentieth century can be attributed to colonialism and its legacy. Decolonization did not erase the colonial legacy in Africa but instead enshrined it, as newly independent African states agreed to maintain the borders that were "the arbitrary creations of colonial happenstance and European agreements" (Fisher 2012). Preserving these colonial borders created postcolonial "artificial states," in which the "borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people" within these states (Alesina et al. 2006). This has been particularly problematic as 80% "of African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines and many scholars believe that such artificial (unnatural) borders which create ethnically fragmented countries or, conversely

separate into bordering countries the same people, are at the roots of Africa's economic tragedy" (Ibid.). The legacy of colonialism for Africa has, through the creation of these state borders, "shaped the trajectory of these societies by spurring civil conflict and unrest" (Michalopolous and Papaioannou 2012). In terms of the African economy, it has been argued that European colonizers had forced Africa into specializations in mining and agriculture that served the interests of the colonial powers, not the African population (Frankema 2015). This structuring of the African economy meant that the departure of the European powers during decolonization destabilized the economy and created a "post-independence economic decline in Africa" (Heldring and Robinson 2013).

Forms of Western economic neocolonialism soon replaced formal colonial domination in most African states leaving them in perpetual economic dependency, whether they were oil- and gas-rich Nigeria or resourceless Burundi. From the end of the Cold War, many African states were riven with internal struggles over existing resources, exacerbated by the demands of foreign markets. Despite their abundance of natural resources, most African nations were trapped in a state of perennial underdevelopment and debt peonage, a legacy of colonization. Beginning in the 1980s, they were compelled to adopt the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank which promised social and economic progress and the end of their indebtedness through the extension of existing loans (Moghalu 2013). It has been estimated that between 1980 and 2006, US$675 billion was extorted from the poorest countries of Africa to service their mounting debts to these international finance agencies (Nakatani and Herrera 2007).

However, from the period of their decolonization onward, most of these African states were burdened with the legacy of their colonial past. They were left as their colonizers had intended: weak, debt-ridden, deeply divided and unstable, and plundered by Western corporations for their strategic resources (Jalee 1968). Western neocolonialism replaced direct colonial rule in Africa, leaving it in a state of perennial economic

underdevelopment with its natural resources exploited and most Africans in poverty (Wengraf 2018).

In the twentieth century, relations between the United States and Africa were largely determined by the purview of the Cold War (Nyang 2005). When its interests were seen to be at stake during the Cold War, the United States had covertly intervened in Africa. The CIA organized the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese Prime Minister in 1960, after Lumumba had opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba (Gerard and Kuklick 2015). In 1973, Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the Liberation Movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, was murdered by the Portuguese secret police in coordination with the CIA (Akuno 2014). The United States endorsed the 1984 military coup against Thomas Sankara, Burkina Faso's revolutionary president, who was murdered during the coup. When the Ugandan leader, Milton Obote, threatened to nationalize all Western resource extraction companies operating in Uganda, the CIA responded by engineering the 1971 military coup which ousted Obote and brought the comprador Idi Amin regime to power (Hutton and Block 1979). The coup against Obote followed a similar course to the American-sponsored removal from power of the Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah, of Ghana in 1966 (Apter 1968; Hutton and Block 1979). During the divisive liberation struggle in Portuguese Angola, the United States provided the military aid and support for proxy forces (Minter 1991). Moreover, during the Cold War, the United States had "labeled all African freedom fighters as terrorists" and was involved in "the propping up of apartheid and destabilization in Africa" (Campbell 2015). Later, during the post-Cold War period, the United States intervened militarily in Somalia under the aegis of the United Nations (Livingstone and Eachus 1995).

The United States had only intervened in Africa when US interests have been viewed as being in jeopardy. Given this record, African nations were skeptical when, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States sought to create a US military command dedicated to African affairs. Some analysts have argued that this US decision was motivated by the quest for control of Africa's wealth of natural resources, as well as the increasing significance of China's role in infrastructure development and other activities on the African continent.

China's Involvement in Africa

China's rapid industrial advance over the last quarter of a century has profoundly affected the global economy. Its search for raw materials to fuel industrial growth has led to the development, extraction, and export of key resources from Eurasia, the Middle East, Latin America, Australia, and Africa. China became involved in Africa in order to extract and exploit its vast reserves of natural resources. The exploitation of raw materials by China in sub-Saharan Africa triggered a resources boom. In 2006, the China-Africa trade, primarily in raw materials, totaled $50 billion. Even after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, China has continued to represent a pole of growth and expansion in the world economy, albeit at a slower rate (Moghalu 2013). The emergence of China as a major economic force in Africa complicated the struggle between the European Union and the United States "over who controls Africa" (Campbell 2008). The strategic implications for the United States of the growing Chinese presence in Africa remain deeply problematic for Washington (Gill et al. 2007).

China built infrastructural supply chains for oil extracted from Angola and Sudan, copper from Zambia, and timber from Central Africa. The Chinese demand for oil and metals has created a major increase in the gross domestic product of many sub-Saharan economies. The continuing high Chinese demand for African oil and gas has also resulted in the rising cost of oil for African importers. China has brought development, aid, and investment to Africa, as well as cheaper consumer products which displaced many local producers, but has not ended the marginalization of Africa in the world economy (Zafar 2007).

By 2012, China was sub-Saharan Africa's largest trading partner, providing more development investment than the World Bank. Its imports of raw materials from sub-Saharan Africa

represented 17% of Africa's total export trade. Between 2000 and 2010, China provided nearly US$67 billion in loans and infrastructure investment to Africa. During this decade, China funded 50 of 54 infrastructure projects in African countries. It built housing projects in Angola, a new railroad system in Tanzania, all weather highways in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a subway system in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Many of these infrastructure projects were based on low-interest loans from China. They allowed Chinese companies to operate in African economies and facilitated the development of China's extraction and export of unprocessed raw materials from African countries (Hughes Butts and Bankus 2009). China's drive for Africa's natural resources is based on low-interest loans, aid, and investment projects which has left resource-rich African states such as Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ghana in massive debt, which may only be reduced by the continuing rapid export of their raw materials. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa contain, respectively, 50%, 77%, and 85% of the world's proven reserves of cobalt, manganese, and platinum, which are essential minerals for China's manufacture of industrial products (Kelly 2017).

With Africa viewed, in some respects, as the last frontier of the global economy, China's involvement in Africa prompted the United States to take a more active role in relation to the African continent (Moghalu 2013). To this end, the United States has established close military ties with a majority of African states since 2007. The activities of the US military in relation to Africa in the twenty-first century have been interpreted as evidence of America's great power rivalry with China, played out on Africa's soil.

The United States and Africa During the Twenty-First Century: AFRICOM and the War on Terror

The United States turned its attention to Africa in the context of the Bush Administration's global War on Terror. President George W. Bush had launched the War on Terror with the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States. From 2003, the United States expanded the War on Terror through the invasion and occupation of Iraq. In addition to destabilizing the war-ravaged states of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US War on Terror either exacerbated existing insurgencies and conflicts or generated new struggles within the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa (Thrall and Goepner 2017). Terrorist networks have continued to expand (Schmitt 2018). A key criticism of the US War on Terror is that, especially since 2011, it has "focused the U.S. on terrorist movements and terrorism per se rather than the conditions which helped generate it" (Cordesman 2018). That criticism is particularly relevant to America's militarized relations with Africa since 2007.

US President George W. Bush established a new military structure, the "United States African Command," known as "AFRICOM," in February 2007 (Hanson 2007). However, from its founding to the present, AFRICOM has failed to secure a base for its headquarters within Africa and has instead been located in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM in Stuttgart consists of approximately 1500 employees of the US Defense Department, with a further 500 situated in the United Kingdom and Florida (Shane 2018). The Bush Administration had initially sought to locate AFRICOM's administrative apparatus in a major African state, such as Nigeria, but Africa's "anti-imperialist traditions were so deep that no major African state could offer the U.S. military a base" (Campbell 2015). The United States "encountered unexpectedly stiff African resistance to AFRICOM" and was widely criticized for failing to consult with African leaders about the creation of AFRICOM (Burgess 2008).

AFRICOM's mission states that it, "with partners, disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, protects U.S. personnel and facilities, prevents and mitigates conflict, and builds African partner defense capability and capacity in order to promote regional security, stability and prosperity" (United States Africa Command 2018). However, in 2007, the then US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the African Affairs of the

Department of Defense, Theresa Whelan, had to refute claims that the United States was "establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism or to secure oil resources or to discourage China" (Kruzel 2007). Skepticism of US motives with regard to the creation of AFRICOM was warranted, given that the Bush Administration had designated that "access to Africa's oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a 'strategic national interest' of the United States" (Volman 2007).

While AFRICOM was not headquartered in Africa, a permanent American military base was established at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti in 2001. Camp Lemonnier had previously been a garrison of the French Foreign Legion (Bollee 2003). Djibouti leased the base as well as the nearby airport and port facilities to America military forces for an indefinite period. Since 2008, the base has expanded in size and consolidated its presence. The base is the centerpiece of a network of temporary and mobile drone and other surveillance bases which stretch across the African continent. The geographical location of the base is central to American military strategy in Africa. It is situated at the junction of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea and controls access to the Suez Canal. This location represents a crucial chokepoint for international shipping.

The creation of AFRICOM has been interpreted as a "tool" for the recolonization of Africa and the exploitation of the continent's resources (Pheko 2011). In 2007, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, then the executive director of AFRICOM's transition team, had asserted that "AFRICOM will focus mainly on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and crisis response missions" (Wood 2007). However, in 2008 Moeller had "declared that AFRICOM was about preserving 'the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market," while citing terrorism, oil disruption and China as major "challenges to US interests" (Demmers and Gould 2018). In addition to Moeller's admissions, another of AFRICOM's strategic purposes is to project US military power into Africa. Military power projection remains the key feature of imperial America in contemporary global politics. In contrast to the projection of US

military power with regard to Africa, China's form of power projection within Africa is unequivocally *economic*. AFRICOM's military operations must be seen in the context of growing regional and internal instability in Africa, the widening and continuing US War on Terror, and as a strategic US response to China's deepening economic power projection in Africa.

The United States in Africa: A New Form of Light Footprint Military Presence?

US military involvement in Africa in the twenty-first century has appeared at times to be escalating. During the Obama presidency, military operations in Africa were estimated to have increased by 200% and included "Airstrikes and commando raids in Libya, black ops missions and drone assassinations in Somalia, a proxy war in Mali, shadowy ops in Chad, antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea" (Turse 2015). Given the scale of the US military commitment that had been made to Afghanistan and Iraq early in the War on Terror, it may have been anticipated that these twenty-first century developments on the African continent signaled an ever-expanding US military presence within Africa. However, US military involvement in Africa has not mirrored that in Afghanistan or Iraq. In contrast to other regions of the world in which the US military is engaged, Africa has been described as an area where the United States is "weak militarily" and "the least militarized of the continents" (Campbell 2015).

Although the US military commitment to Africa is comparatively small, America's military has "established drone bases in Djibouti, Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Burkina Faso and the Seychelles, and sent troops to Liberia during the Ebola crisis in 2014" (Al Jazeera 2017). By 2018, it was estimated that US Special Forces were operating in "more than a dozen African nations," while AFRICOM's activities had "resulted in 46 various forms of U.S. bases as well as military-to-military relations between 53 out of the 54 African countries and the United States" (The Black Alliance for Peace 2018).

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The creation of AFRICOM had occurred during a period of major change for the US military, as it sought to "reduce the presence of large numbers of American troops overseas in order to consolidate or eliminate expensive bases" (Volman 2007). Its prolonged and massive military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq had caused the United States to radically change its response to any commitment to conflict zones in Africa. No longer will the United States send significant numbers of ground forces for extended periods to these conflicts. Instead, small military squads are deployed, not for direct ground combat but to provide training, air cover, and power and intelligence for African regional forces in struggles against armed insurgents or terrorist groupings. Units of US Special Forces often carry out brief military missions or provide surveillance to direct airstrikes against these enemy forces. This type of military response has been described by Washington as "light footprint warfare" (Karlshoej-Pedersen 2018).

Compared with its military engagement in other regions of the world, Africa has not represented a major investment by the US military. AFRICOM does not have assigned forces and has been described as under-resourced. The American military presence in Africa has consisted of relatively low-cost intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, regional operations with African forces, and limited special operations (Hunt Friend and Wise 2018).

AFRICOM's defense posture has been ad hoc and shaped by specific "incidents": the 2012 attack by Libyan militants on the temporary American consular facility in Benghazi; the US military support in 2012–2013 for the French intervention in Mali following a military coup; a Tuareg revolt and the Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb's seizure of the northern half of Mali; the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support given to the Nigerian state forces in 2014 to hunt down and end the terrorist attacks of Boko Haram; the US air support and deployment of Special Forces in the 2016 defeat and expulsion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant from Sirte, Libya; and the 2017 ambush and death of four American soldiers by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara militants in Niger. These AFRICOM operations by American forces in Africa have been described as reactive, contingent, and episodic (Hunt Friend and Wise 2018). According to the then Chief of AFRICOM's Media Engagement Division, Benjamin Benson, the number of US bases in Africa was difficult to quantify, as the United States had "teams coming in and out of Africa to different locations all the time" (Turse 2015).

While the US War on Terror motivated America to engage militarily in Africa, the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities of the United States have been a failure in Africa. Some analysts contend that America's "adoption of an aggressive strategy of military intervention" was both "ineffective and counterproductive" and caused problems "including spawning more anti-American sentiment and creating, rather than diminishing, the conditions that lead to terrorism" (Thrall and Goepner 2017). Others have observed more generally that "counterterrorism is often a form of terrorism and counterinsurgency is often a form of repression" that is used to the advantage of autocratic states and military forces (Cordesman 2018). Hussein Solomon has argued that, in the African context, "the state is often the source of insecurity for ordinary citizens," and he cautions that: "Any military strengthening of an illegitimate African state by the international community not only serves to bolster a predatory state but also undermines the human security of citizens" (Solomon 2013). Military-to-military relations are fundamental to the operations of AFRICOM, which has established military-to-military relationships with 53 African states (The Black Alliance for Peace 2018). Structures such as AFRICOM, which function through military-to-military partnerships, can serve to obscure military repression by their partner states in Africa.

Conclusion

There is no indication that the United States intends to expand its military involvement in Africa to become a long-term and substantial military presence of the kind that has occurred in Iraq

and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a "light footprint" from the US military does not represent a reduction in the US capacity or capability for military operations or war. With drones and surveillance technology, as well as US troops and bases stationed close by in the Middle East, the US military is no less capable of military intervention in Africa.

The United States' commitment to military involvement in Africa may decrease in the future, as AFRICOM has been targeted by the Trump Administration for reductions, particularly in relation to the estimated 1200 Special Forces troops deployed on missions within Africa (Gibbons-Neff and Schmitt 2018). In January 2018, the Trump Administration's then Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis, announced that the United States "will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists, but great power competition – not terrorism – is now the primary focus of U.S. national security" (Cooper and Schmitt 2018).

Whatever the future of AFRICOM may be, as Horace G. Campbell has identified, the "interconnection between imperialism, plunder, racism and primitive accumulation is the foundation to clearly understanding the US and security in Africa" (Campbell 2017). It is an unspoken racism that allows the United States to assume that it has the right to intervene in African affairs and to deny Africans their hard-won independence and self-determination, free from foreign military structures like AFRICOM.

Cross-References

▶ Forced migration and Imperialism in the Neoliberal Era

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Venezuela

▶ Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolutionary Anti-imperialism, and Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

Venezuela, Bolivarian Revolutionary Anti-imperialism, and Hugo Chávez (1954–2013)

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Synonyms

Biography; Bolivarian revolution; Hugo Chávez (1954–2013); US imperialism; Venezuela

Definition

This entry describes the political career of the late President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez (1954–2013), and the anti-imperialist Bolivarian revolution

that he led. It concludes with a brief examination of his legacy.

That Venezuelans should elect Hugo Chávez, a complete outsider, someone who only 6 years earlier had tried to overthrow a president via a military rebellion, should not have come as much of a surprise given the political and economic crisis the country suffered. In the 20 years prior to Chávez's election, poverty had increased from 15% to over 60%, corruption was perceived to be rampant, and abstention had reached historic proportions. Chávez promised to set the country right again by promising nothing less than a revolution: a Bolivarian revolution, named after Latin American independence hero Simón Bolívar.

While Chávez initially enjoyed support from a broad segment of Venezuela's middle class and from some of the country's elite, such as segments of its domestic business class and even from a key member of its transnational business class (Gustavo Cisneros, Latin America's media mogul), his support shifted dramatically after his first 3 years in office. His middle-class and upper-class support rapidly turned into enmity, so that his support eventually came almost entirely from the country's urban and rural poor. The process by which this shift in support took place was the result of Chávez's rejection of the country's old elite, his identification with the country's poor, and his pursuit of policies that redistributed the country's oil wealth and political power towards the poor.

Rise to Electoral Power

Chávez's promise of radical change appealed to a broad segment of Venezuela's population, including most progressive groups and social movements, leftist and even centrist political parties, and large parts of the middle and even upper class. The reason for this broad support was that the country had been undergoing a 20-year period of steep economic and political decline, which had pushed a large part of the country into poverty and had completely destroyed the old regime's legitimacy. Venezuelans thus were desperate for real

change. However, to get elected, Chávez needed to form a political party. He could not directly transform his clandestine revolutionary organisation that had organised the 1992 coup attempt, the MBR-200 (Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200; Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200) into a political party because it was a loose movement and because Venezuelan electoral law did not allow the use of the name Bolívar for political parties. Chávez's new political party was thus named the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR, Fifth Republic Movement). The party wanted to found a fifth republic (using the Roman numeral 'V') in that it counted four since Venezuela's independence and the fifth would begin with the passage of a new constitution.

Parties that ended up supporting Chávez's bid for the presidency included the Patria para Todos (PPT, Fatherland for All), Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS, Movement Towards Socialism), Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP, Electoral Movement of the People), Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV, Communist Party of Venezuela), Bandera Roja (Red Flag), and Gente Emergente (Emergent People). Of the parties in the pro-Chávez coalition, only the MVR had some centrist nationalists in it. The others were all parties with a long leftist tradition.

The 1998 presidential contest boiled down to an establishment candidate (Henrique Salas Römer), who was supported by the country's two former governing parties, the social-democratic Acción Democrática and the Christian-democratic Copei, and the antiestablishment candidate Hugo Chávez. Given the country's disgust with the old political establishment, Chávez won easily, with 56.2% of the vote – one of the largest margins in Venezuela's history.

However, even though Chávez had a clear mandate for the task of transforming Venezuela's political system, the country's old political class, once it realised that Chávez could not be co-opted, rejected him as the legitimately elected president. At first, there was not much this former governing class could do except to denounce the new president in the private mass media outlets that it controlled. Eventually, though, the opposition

gained momentum and managed to destabilise the country severely in its all-out effort to oust Chávez. One can divide this battle into four distinct phases: new constitution and consolidation of power; coup attempt and Chávez's retreat; oil industry shutdown and Chávez's comeback; and recall referendum and radicalisation.

Constitution of 1999 and Consolidation of Power

Chávez's landslide election, with crucial support from segments of Venezuela's middle and upper classes, gave him a mandate to convoke a constitutional assembly and to introduce far-reaching changes to Venezuela's political system. At first, those segments of the upper class that supported Chávez assumed he would be just like many politicians before him and would agree to do their bidding by appointing ministers out of their ranks. They presented him with a list of possible appointees, all of whom came from the upper ranks of the country's business and media elite. Chávez rejected all of their suggestions and thus the stage was set for confrontation. Chávez proceeded with his plan to convoke a referendum on whether the country should hold a constitutional assembly. Voters decisively approved the project. Next, a vote was held for who should constitute this assembly. Still riding his wave of popularity, Chávez won this vote overwhelmingly when 95% of the assembly members who were elected were his supporters. Following a relatively accelerated discussion process, the new constitution was put to a vote in December 1999, when it passed with 72% in its favour. With the new constitution in place, all elected offices had to be renewed in August 2000. In the National Assembly election the pro-Chávez coalition won two-thirds of the seats, with Chávez's own party, the MVR, winning just under an absolute majority. Also, in the regional elections for state governors and city mayors, Chávez supporters won a majority. Chávez was also reelected, this time to a six-year term, winning 59% of the vote.

The new 1999 constitution introduced many important changes to Venezuela's political system. One of its main objectives was to create a democracy that was both representative and participatory. The participatory elements included the possibility of organising citizen-initiated referenda to recall any elected official, to rescind or approve laws, and to consult the population on important policy issues. Also, the new constitution opened up the possibility of forms of direct democracy at the local level, via local planning councils and citizen assemblies, which would later become the basis for the creation of communal councils. Another key objective of the 1999 constitution was to include previously marginalised segments of the population, such as: the indigenous population, which received a series of new rights to their lands, culture, and language; and Venezuelan women, who received rights to non-discrimination and to affirmative action in all governmental programmes. Also, in terms of human rights, the new constitution gives constitutional status to all international human rights treaties. Another important change was the creation of two new independent branches of government, the electoral power and the 'citizen' power, which include the attorney general, comptroller general, and human rights ombudsperson. The new constitution's most controversial aspect was that it slightly strengthened the office of the president by increasing the term in office from 5 to 6 years, allowing for one immediate re-election, and giving the president stronger control over the military by allowing him or her to make all upper-level promotions. Finally, in an important departure from most constitutions in the world, it raises the state's commitment to achieve social justice to the same level as the state's commitment to the rule of law (Article 2).

By winning the so-called 'mega-elections' of August 2000, Chávez consolidated his control over the country's executive, with his supporters controlling the other four branches of government: the judiciary, the legislature, the electoral power, and the 'citizen' power. Chávez then had to act fast to introduce social programmes to address some of the most urgent needs of the country's poor. Since state revenues were quite low, largely due to an oil price that had hit rock bottom in 1998 at around $10 per barrel, Chávez

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immediately set about reconsolidating OPEC, so as to raise international oil prices. Chávez visited all OPEC members in 1999, plus several non-OPEC oil producers, and managed to convince them to lower oil production. The result was immediate and prices started to climb again. However, in order to save money, Chávez also got the military involved in the organisation and provision of a new social programme known as Plan Bolívar 2000. This plan provided free food in the country's poorest neighbourhoods and improved barrio housing, among other issues.

Meanwhile, the Opposition, since it was increasingly locked out of political power for the first time in 40 years, still could not accept Chávez as the legitimately elected president. At first, given Chávez's political momentum, there was little the Opposition could do to stop him. However, as Chávez's honeymoon began to wear off and his approval ratings declined (as they had to) from the unheard of heights of 90% approval, the former political class managed to regain its foothold in Venezuela's middle class by waging a relentless media campaign against the new president. Chávez ignored this development, which took place throughout 2001, and forged ahead with his larger political programme by presenting a set of 49 law decrees in October of that year, which Venezuela's National Assembly had in the previous year given him the authority to pass. The 49 law decrees were supposed to bring Venezuela's legal framework up to date with the new constitution and introduced far-reaching reforms, particularly in terms of a comprehensive land reform and large tax increases for the oil industry.

Heightened Resistance, Coup Attempt, and Retreat

The outcry against these law decrees was immediate. Fedecamaras, the country's largest and most important chamber of commerce, which unites most of Venezuela's big businesses, complained that the laws were anti-business, undermined private property rights, and were passed without consulting them or anyone outside of government

circles. Venezuela's main union federation, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), quickly supported Fedecamaras, arguing that the laws were harmful to Venezuela's business community and therefore harmful to Venezuelan workers. A more likely explanation for the CTV's support, in addition to its ties to the former governing party AD, was that the CTV had just gone through a pitched battle with the government over who would control the organisation. A month earlier Chávez had forced the CTV leadership to submit itself to a grassroots vote, which the federation's old established leadership won amid Chávez supporters' claims of fraud, resulting in the government's non-recognition of the leadership. The result of this vehement CTV/Fedecamaras opposition to the government was that the two organisations called for a general strike on 10 December 2001. The strike met with moderate success, but the private media's bias and the private sector's lockout of employees for a day gave the strike a heightened visible effect.

But it was not only the package of 49 laws that added fire to Venezuela's conflict. Another crucial factor was that the economy abruptly slowed down in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attack on the US. The attack sparked a worldwide recession and with it a drop in the price of oil. This double blow forced the government to adjust its budget and cut back spending in all areas by at least 10%, meaning that Plan Bolívar 2000 had to be abandoned, among other things. The impact was almost immediately noticeable, as unemployment and poverty began inching upwards again after they had declined in 2000 and 2001.

Meanwhile, there was an escalation of verbal attacks between Chávez and the Opposition. The economic downturn, the 49 laws, and Chávez's strongly worded discourse against the 'squalid opposition' and the 'rancid oligarchy' all made it relatively easy for the Opposition to chip away at Chávez's popularity, along with substantial help from the private mass media. Opposition opinion polls indicated that Chávez's popularity declined rapidly in this period, from a rating of around 60–70% to 30–40% between June 2001 and January 2002.

This was the context in which the Opposition became convinced that it could oust Chávez

(whose legitimacy it never truly accepted) before the end of his presidency. Three specific attempts took place between January 2002 and August 2004. The first was the April 2002 coup attempt, whose apparent detonator was the oil industry management's resistance to Chávez's efforts to wrestle control of the state-owned oil industry away from the old management. Crucial to the coup, however, was a disgruntled sector of the military which, for a variety of ideological and opportunistic reasons, believed it could and should get rid of Chávez. The failure of the coup, a mere 47 h after Chávez was removed from office, was emblematic of all subsequent Opposition failures to oust Chávez from the presidency. The Opposition consistently underestimated the president's popularity (especially among the poor), believing instead the mass media's constant claim that Chávez was highly unpopular and incapable as president. It was precisely Chávez's popularity among the country's poor and the military that swept him back into the presidency.

For the Opposition this was a bitter defeat because it lost an important base of its power: the military. With Chávez's election, the country's old elite had already lost the presidency, which in Venezuela's very presidentialist society is by far the most important form of political power. Each subsequent effort to oust Chávez, the oil industry shutdown and the recall referendum, represented the loss of another base of Opposition power.

Chávez's reaction to the coup attempt, after his return, was to moderate his tone and to play it safe. He put a new economic team in charge that appeared to move to the mainstream and promised to include the Opposition more in his policy deliberations. Also, he reinstated the old board of directors and former managers of the state oil company PDVSA, whose replacement had been one of the reasons for the coup.

Oil Industry Shutdown and Chávez's Comeback

Following a brief period of uncertain calm and few policy initiatives, the Opposition interpreted Chávez's retreat as an opportunity for another offensive against him, this time by organising an indefinite shutdown of the country's all-important oil industry in early December 2002. While the Opposition labelled this action a general strike, it was actually a combination of management lockout, administrative and professional employee strike, and general sabotage. Also, it was mostly the US fast food franchises and the upscale shopping malls that were closed for about two months. The rest of the country operated more or less normally during this time, except for food and gasoline shortages throughout the country, mostly because many distribution centres were closed down. Eventually, the shutdown was defeated, once again due to the Opposition's underestimation of Chávez's support. While about 19,000 employees (about half of the oil company's workforce) were eventually fired for abandoning their workplaces, the government nonetheless managed to restart the oil company with the help of blue-collar workers, retired workers, foreign contractors, and the military. The Opposition thus lost another crucial base of power, this time in the oil industry, whose managers were practically all Opposition supporters and were all removed from their jobs.

Despite the oil industry's eventual recovery, the strike represented a severe blow to Venezuela's economy, which shrank an unprecedented 26% in the first quarter of 2003, relative to the same quarter of the previous year. Unemployment skyrocketed to over 22% in March and capital flight caused the currency to plummet. It is estimated that the oil industry shutdown cost the industry over $14 billion in lost revenues. The oil industry's recovery (which was said to be complete by May 2003), along with a dramatically increasing price of oil and thus oil revenues, meant that Chávez gradually had the resources to introduce new social programmes, called missions, to address the desperate needs of the country's poor. The first missions Chávez introduced between late 2003 and early 2004 were for literacy training (Mission Robinson), high-school completion (Mission Ribas), university scholarships (Mission Sucre), community health care (Mission Barrio Adentro), and subsidised food markets (Mission Mercal). The population

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living in the barrios welcomed these missions with great enthusiasm, contributing to Chávez's renewed rise in opinion polls.

Recall Referendum and Radicalisation

The third and last attempt to oust Chávez during his first full six-year term in office was the August 2004 recall referendum. After having suffered defeat in two consecutive illegal attempts, the Opposition was forced to follow the only democratic and constitutional route for getting rid of the president. The commitment to follow a strictly constitutional route for resolving Venezuela's political crisis was formalised following many months of negotiations in a signed agreement between Opposition and Government that the Organization of American States and the Carter Center facilitated in May 2003. Eventually, once the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the rules governing recall referenda were in place, which took until the end of 2003, the Opposition collected 3.1 million signatures in December of that year. Of these, following much political debate, 2.5 million signatures were validated (a mere 100,000 over the required sum of 20% of registered voters) and a referendum was convoked for 15 August 2004. The vote took place peacefully and the following morning, shortly after 4am on 16 August, the CNE announced the first preliminary results. These gave Chávez a 58% to 42% victory. Immediately after the announcement, Opposition leaders held a press conference in which they stated unequivocally that fraud had been perpetrated. They offered no evidence for this claim, however. Election observer missions of the Organization of American States and of the Carter Center ratified the official result.

For the Opposition, this was perhaps the most bitter defeat of them all. Not only did it no longer have a base of power in the executive, in the military, or in the oil industry, it had also lost perhaps its most important base of power in the middle class. That is, following 3 years of continuous battle with Chávez, promising its supporters that he was on his way out and that Chávez was illegitimate because the Opposition represented the majority, Opposition supporters increasingly saw their leadership as being hollow and incompetent. Polls shortly after the recall referendum documented a dramatic loss of support for the Opposition, so that only 15% of Venezuelans said they identified with it.

While the Opposition leadership managed to win over and then gradually lose middle-class support, between 1999 and 2006 Chávez won over ever more solid support from the country's poor. This can be seen most clearly in the voting pattern of different neighbourhoods with different average incomes. For example, while middle-class neighbourhoods voted for Chávez by around 50–60% in 1998, for the 2004 recall referendum, these neighbourhoods tended to vote against him at a rate of 60–70%. In contrast, although support for Chávez in poor neighbourhoods remained in the range of 60–70% in 1998 and 2004, voter registration and participation increased dramatically in these neighbourhoods, thus giving Chávez a decisive edge in 2004 and 2006.

Chávez and the Bolivarian movement that supported him realised the near total loss of Opposition power and thus saw themselves in a position to further radicalise the government's political programme. In his victory speech following the recall referendum, Chávez announced that a new phase of his government would begin:

> From today until December 2006 begins a new phase of the Bolivarian revolution, to give continuity to the social missions, to the struggle against injustice, exclusion, and poverty. I invite all, including the opposition, to join in the work to make Venezuela a country of justice, with the rule of law and with social justice.

Later, in January 2005, Chávez took this call for a new phase even further by announcing that from now on his Government would seek to build socialism of the twenty-first-century in Venezuela. Thus, the continuous efforts of the Opposition to oust Chávez, based on its non-recognition of his legitimacy, led to a continuous weakening of this opposition and to the concomitant opportunity for Chávez and the Bolivarian movement to radicalise their programme.

The main expression this radicalisation found during this period was in the creation of a

nationwide effort to develop communal councils. These councils, which were first launched in early 2005, consist of 200–400 families in a contiguous neighbourhood. They represented an effort to deepen participatory democracy by giving them power and funds to decide on important infrastructure projects in their neighbourhoods. Also, these councils represented a pooling of grassroots mobilisation that had taken place over the previous 5 years, whereby communities founded health committees to work with the community health programme, water committees to work on improving the water supply, urban land committees to work on acquiring ownership title to barrio homes, and education committees to work with educational missions, etc. With the creation of communal councils all these committees were turned into work committees of the councils, thereby pooling and systematising community organisation. While the Opposition decried the communal councils as tools of patronage and clientelism, the communities themselves largely welcomed them enthusiastically and formed over 20,000 throughout the country by late 2007.

Chávez's call to build twenty-first-century socialism received another boost on 3 December 2006 when he decisively won a second six-year term. He beat the Opposition candidate Manuel Rosales with 62.9% to 37.9% of the vote. This 26 percentage point margin of victory was the largest in Venezuelan history. Also, Chávez managed to nearly double his support from an initial 3.7 million votes in 1998 to 7.1 million in 2006. More significant than the increase in support, though, was that Rosales admitted that Chávez had defeated him. This was the first time that an Opposition leader had conceded defeat in a confrontation with Chávez since he was first elected in 1998. In none of the Opposition's confrontations with him, whether following the 2002 coup attempt, the 2003 oil industry shutdown, or the 2004 recall referendum, had the Opposition admitted defeat. This implies that the 2006 presidential election was the first time in Chávez's presidency that the Opposition recognised Chávez as the legitimately elected president and thus opened the path towards a normalisation of Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era.

Hubris and Renewal of the Bolivarian Movement

At the start of his second term in office in January 2007 Chávez seemed unstoppable. His popularity had reached new highs and his mandate to create twenty-first-century socialism for Venezuela was indisputable. The first thing Chávez announced after his re-election victory was the creation of a new political party for socialism, the reform of the 1999 constitution, a new enabling law that would allow him to nationalise key industries, the politico-territorial reorganisation of the country, and the deepening of communal power.

When the broadcast licence of the oppositional TV station RCTV was up for renewal on 27 May 2007, Chávez decided to let the licence lapse and to give the wavelength to a new state TV channel. This was perhaps the most unpopular decision of his presidency, since RCTV was the country's most widely watched TV station. However, Chávez and his supporters argued that since RCTV participated in the April 2002 coup attempt and since it had continued to violate broadcast regulations, it did not deserve to have its licence renewed. This move gave the Opposition an opening to launch a new movement against Chávez, this time, though, headed by new student leaders mostly coming from the country's private universities.

Many of the other changes Chávez had announced for 2007 depended on the constitutional reform effort, which he presented in August of that year. The National Assembly, which had to pass the president's proposal before it could be put to a national referendum, added another 36 articles to be reformed to Chávez's original proposal of 33 articles. The reform was to address four major areas: strengthening participatory democracy, broadening social inclusion, supporting non-neoliberal economic development, and strengthening central government. The first two of these were relatively uncontroversial, but the second two, which included shortening the working week, strengthening land reform, removing central bank autonomy, and removing the two-term limit on holding presidential office, were far more controversial.

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The combination of the reform's top-down development, its complexity, well-orchestrated disinformation by the Opposition, the government's neglect of key social programmes, and the defection of prominent Chávez supporters all contributed to the referendum's eventual failure, despite Chávez's continuing popularity. The reform was defeated with a vote of only 50.7% against it, but it was generally interpreted as a major loss for Chávez and the Bolivarian movement. Based on an analysis of the referendum results by voting centre, it was clear that the main reason the referendum failed was because Chávez's supporters did not turn out to vote as strongly as they had done in previous elections. The result prompted Chávez to launch a process of 'reevaluation, revision, and relaunch' of the effort to establish twenty-first-century socialism.

The demise of the constitutional reform project took place in parallel to the effort to start a new party, the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), which brought together supporters from all parties of the pro-Chávez coalition. By April 2008, PSUV delegates, who had been elected in a grass-roots democratic process, approved of an explicitly anti-capitalist party programme and a new leadership for the Bolivarian movement that came mostly from the country's traditional left (between the centre left and the far left). With the formation of the PSUV it seemed that the Bolivarian movement was gradually developing a structure that would be less dependent on Chávez and thus more long-lasting and better equipped to develop new leadership and to channel debate within the movement.

Economic Crisis, Cancer, and Renewed Destabilisation

The global financial crisis of 2008 affected Venezuela primarily via the sudden drop in the price of oil, which went from a high of nearly $120 per barrel in mid-2008 to less than half that amount by the end of the year. As a result, the Chávez Government had to decrease its budget significantly for 2009, thereby pushing the country into a recession, with GDP shrinking by 3.2% in 2009 and another 1.5% in 2010.

Perhaps even more significant was the effect on the country's fixed exchange rate. The oil price decline reduced the availability of dollars, which, in turn, increased the dollar-bolivar black-market exchange rate. The higher black-market exchange rate created opportunities for arbitrage, whereby those with access to the official exchange rate faced tremendous incentives to take advantage of the growing gap between the official and the black-market exchange rates. The ultimate consequence was a dramatic increase in smuggling; government estimates in 2014 suggested that up to 40% of all subsidised imports (subsidised via the official exchange rate) were being smuggled back out of the country again, where they could fetch a price that was up to ten times higher than in Venezuela. Inflation also shot up during this period because many retailers used the black-market exchange rate to price their products, even when they had imported them with dollars that they had purchased at the official exchange rate. Inflation thus reached 27% in 2009 and even rose to 62% in 2014.

Around the same time that the economy began having difficulties, in June 2011, Chávez announced that he had been diagnosed with and treated for cancer in the previous six months. He underwent chemotherapy for the next year and by July 2012 announced that the cancer was in remission. Subsequently, he engaged in an active campaign for a third six-year term in office and went on to win the 7 October presidential election with 55% of the vote, against Opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonsky's 44% (with an 80% participation rate).

Shortly after this victory, on 20 October 2012, Chávez announced that he would institute a turn-about ('Golpe de Timón') to further radicalise his Bolivarian revolution. The announcement was important because it recognised that many goals had not been achieved yet and that more power and a more central role must be given to the communes (groupings of communal councils), both in the economy and in the country's political system.

The 'turnabout' announcement was relatively short-lived, however, because on 8 December that year Chávez made a new momentous declaration, namely that his cancer had returned in a very aggressive form and that he would immediately return to Cuba for more chemotherapy treatment. During this announcement Chávez also said that, should he not survive the cancer, the then vice president Nicolas Maduro should be his successor. Chávez spent the next four months in treatment in Cuba, while speculation and rumours about his medical condition reached unprecedented heights in Venezuela. On 5 March 2013, Maduro addressed the nation with nearly the whole Cabinet behind him, looking very ashenfaced, and announced that Chávez had passed away a little earlier that day.

Chávez's death meant that new presidential elections had to be called within 30 days, which Nicolas Maduro went on to win with 50.6% of the vote.

Legacy

Chávez's legacy as the founder of Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution and as the trailblazer of the resurgence of the left in political office throughout Latin America is unquestioned. Between 1999 and 2012, nine more countries would go on to elect leftist governments in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Uruguay). Furthermore, he inspired a global movement for the creation of '21st-century socialism', one which would later be emulated by political parties in Europe, such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece.

Cross-References

▶ Cold War and Latin America
▶ Indigenous Peoples and Neo-extractivism in Latin America
▶ Latin America, Political Economy of Minerals, Extraction, and Imperialism
▶ Latin American Solidarity: Human Rights and the Politics of the US Left
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Verticality

▶ Structural Violence and Imperialism

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W. E. B. Du Bois

▶ League Against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI)

Wage Differentials

▶ 'Global Labour Arbitrage' and the New Imperialism

Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice (1930–2019)

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Synonyms

Immanuel Wallerstein, Dependency theory; International political economy; Marxism; World systems theory

Definition

This essay examines the life and seminal contributions of US sociologist, economic historian, and world systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein (1930–2019).

Early Life and Academic Influences

The child of German émigrés to the US, Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein was born in New York on 28 September 1930. Jews who had emigrated to Berlin from elsewhere in the Austro-Hungarian empire earlier in their lives, Wallerstein's mother and father relocated once more to New York as did other members of his extended family to parts far and wide amidst the changing political situation in inter-war Germany (Wallerstein et al. 2012, p. 10). His early youth was imbued with a sense of political consciousness grounded in the polyglot culture of his parents and issues of Jewish nationalism, the rise of fascism and Nazism, and the great split within the global left between the Second and Third Socialist Internationals over support for the First World War (Wallerstein 2000). As a boy, his personal development was also marked by a sense of moral commitment born of a background in the Jewish tradition, an identity as a first-generation American coming of age in New York City, and a brief career from the ages of ten to 15 as a stage actor (Wallerstein et al. 2012, pp. 8, 12).

Wallerstein's formal academic development can be dated to a course taken in high school on Asia, which led to an early interest in newly independent India and its nationalist leaders. In the years that followed, his views matured as he developed a deeper concern for politics, world affairs, and the United Nations. Entering Columbia University in 1947, he earned his BA in 1951. After two years in the US army, Wallerstein

went on to study for an MA at Columbia in 1954, working on a thesis about the political foundations of McCarthyism in the US, the generally positive reception of which work confirmed his self-identification as a 'political sociologist' (Wallerstein 2000, p. xvi). Remaining at Columbia for his PhD (awarded in 1959), Wallerstein re-oriented his intellectual focus (as well as solidarity work) toward Africa, writing a dissertation that compared the development of nationalist movements in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. At Columbia, Wallerstein's interests in European social theory, including the work of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and the Frankfurt school also found fertile ground. By the early 1960s, the great French-Creole Caribbean psychiatrist and supporter of Algerian liberation Frantz Fanon, whom Wallerstein came to know personally, had also become a key influence (Wallerstein et al. 2012, p. 5).

While Africa would remain Wallerstein's empirical focus during the first phase of his academic career until the early 1970s, it was also during this time that the ideas that would culminate in the first volume of *The Modern World-System*, on *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (Wallerstein 1974a), began to take shape. Over the course of the next decade, he came into personal association with two other key influences. The first was the great French historian and leader of the Annales school of history, Fernand Braudel, whom Wallerstein first came to know in the early 1970s. Braudel's ideas about the historical contingency of time and space concepts and the need to understand historical change as unfolding over different time cycles (especially the so-called *longue durée*) were crucial foundations for what became Wallersteinian world-systems analysis. The second was the Belgian physicist and Nobel laureate Illya Prigogine, whom Wallerstein first encountered in 1980. Prigogine's ideas about dissipative structures, indeterminacy, and irreversibility within complex systems have proved especially important to Wallerstein's thinking about the character of the modern world-system *as a system* and his related concerns about epistemology.

The Political Economy of World-Systems

In its capacity as an approach to political economy (and related issues in historical sociology), world-systems analysis starts from an insistence on 'historical social systems' or 'world-systems' rather than nation states as the unit of analysis. For Wallerstein, such systems are defined by their autonomy ('they function primarily in terms of the consequences of processes internal to them') as well as their boundedness in time and space, being held together by an 'integrated network of economic, political, and cultural processes' (Wallerstein 2001, p. 230). With respect to the question of boundaries, as in other approaches to political economy in the Wallersteinian view, it is the social division of labour from which the unity of a historical social system commences. In the political economy of world-systems, however, the social division of labour comprises both an intra-societal class division as well as an inter-regional geographical division. As such, two main types of entities or social formations are defined in world-systems analysis: 'those with a single overarching political structure, the world-empires; and those without one, the world-economies'. World-empires are conceived largely on the model of tribute-siphoning military-bureaucratic hierocracies that extract surplus from within their contiguous territory, albeit in a graded pattern that leaves the peripheral hinterlands of the imperial domain the most intensively exploited. Within the political economy of world-systems, additional allowance is made for a third smaller-scale form as well, that of the mini-system, which is exemplified by entities of more limited geographical expanse and more finite temporal duration than either type of world historical social system (231). The mini-system is best exemplified by the society of the archetypical pastoralist or hunter-gatherer: subsistence-oriented economies that are thought of as being relatively homogenous and based on patterns of production and exchange that are supposed to be largely self-contained. In this tripartite distinction between minisystems, world-empires, and world-economies, Wallersteinian political economy extrapolates and develops Karl Polanyi's

distinction between reciprocal, redistributive, and market modes of exchange (Polanyi 1957, p. 58).

For the greatest part of history since the so-called Neolithic revolution, in the Wallersteinian view, it was the world-empire that remained the predominant form, proving capable of absorbing nearby world-economies. Together, these two varieties of world-systems are said to have comprised a large but countable number between 10,000 BC and AD 1500 (Wallerstein 2001, p. 231). Although more prevalent, world-empires are themselves said to have been constrained by the administrative costs of territorial expansion, which imposed relatively sharper limits – at least in principle – on their spatial and, therefore, temporal extent. Prior to 1500, Wallerstein contends that it was primarily in the void left by the disintegration of some previous world-empire – the larger instances of which persisted for as much as half a millennium – that new world-economies found space to develop, albeit usually so as to have made for systems that proved even more transient and fragile than their imperial counterparts (231).

In Wallerstein's view, there occurred a historically unprecedented reversal in the balance between these two forms during the fifteenth century, and it is in explaining this transition that the political economy of world-systems becomes focused on the origins, growth, and persistence of the particular world-system known as the 'capitalist world-economy'. As a synonym for the modern world-system, the capitalist world-economy is understood to have progressively expanded to its full global extent in three major phases. These can be briefly summarised as follows. From approximately 1450–1650, the modern world-system emerged on the wings of capitalist agriculture and the inability of any particular political hegemon (especially the Habsburgs) to assert dominance over the system so as to domesticate it into a world-empire instead. This first phase of the modern world-system was inclusive of the beginnings of 'mercantilism' and the development of long-distance trade and early European expansion across the Atlantic. In this early period, the system came to be centred in

north-western Europe (England, France, and Holland) while also including at its margins parts of the Americas and most of the rest of the European continent excluding the Russian and Ottoman Empires. In the period from 1750–1850, a second major expansion of the system took place, as the capitalist world-economy came to incorporate Russian and Ottoman territories as well as the South Asian subcontinent (with the decline of the Mughal Empire), parts of South-East Asia, large parts of West Africa and the rest of the Americas. During this second period, power within the system was consolidated inward, with an ongoing struggle taking place within the centre between France and Britain and a concurrent shift occurring from agricultural to industrial capitalism. The third and last expansion of the modern world-system took place in the halfcentury from 1850–1900, which witnessed East Asia, Oceania, and remaining parts of Africa and South-East Asia being brought into the system (Wallerstein 1999, p. 58). Of course, the precise details concerning the exact timing and coverage of the phases of expansion by which the modern world-system came to incorporate different parts of the globe are subject to disagreement. The above snapshot captures only Wallerstein's own particularly influential point of view, as developed at greatest length in the first three volumes of *The Modern World-System* (Wallerstein 1974b, 1980, 1989) and as yet to be developed in the still to be published fifth volume.

As should be apparent from the discussion to this point, exponents of the world-systems perspective proclaim a specifically historical approach to understanding the nature of capitalism. For Wallerstein, the commitment is summarised through the express equivalence that he has drawn between studying the development of the capitalist world-economy and studying 'historical capitalism' (Wallerstein 1995). In contrast to 'Marxist and others on the political left', according to Wallerstein, to study historical capitalism is to disavow a purely 'logico-deductive' analysis that starts 'from definitions of what capitalism' is 'thought to be in essence' in order to then see how it 'had developed in various places

and times' (1). At the same time, the dynamic of expansion through the progressive incorporation of new areas into the capitalist world-economy is suggestive of the lasting influence on the political economy of world-systems of post-war dependency theory, as initially formulated by the German development economist Hans Singer and his neo-Marxian Argentine counterpart Raúl Prebisch at the end of the 1940s. From the outset, Wallerstein thus presumed that the modern world-system comprised a relation between one or several territorial centres constituting the 'core' of the capitalist world economy and their respective 'peripheries'. The overlap with Prebisch's terminology for describing postwar patterns of relation between the 'peripheral' economies of poor countries that were concentrated on the export of primary goods to the 'core' economies of the rich countries (that themselves created value-added secondary products to be sent back in the opposite direction) was not accidental.

Defined as it has been in essentially functional terms, however, the relationship between core and periphery has been subject to significant modification in the world-systems perspective as compared to dependency theory. Most obviously, there is the notable divergence by which core and periphery are made to constitute not two different types of national economy but two different parts of a single historical social system. More importantly, to the extent that the core–periphery relation is coequal with a geographic division of labour, it was very quickly found necessary to supplement the conceptual vocabulary of world-systems analysis by introducing the category of the 'semi-periphery' to designate a third possible type of intra-systemic space. In so doing, world-systems thinkers both increased the explanatory power of their perspective and, at least to some observers, introduced a certain level of arbitrariness into it given the catch-all and/or bet-hedging quality of the notion of the 'semi-periphery' (Washbrook 1990, pp. 482–485).

The emphasis on the intra-systemic geographic division of labour and the importance of trade in generating and fuelling the expansion of 'historical capitalism' that it portends have precipitated other criticisms as well, especially from those working in a more traditionally Marxian vein. Robert Brenner's early critique of Wallerstein on these points (as well as various other related ones, including the latter's implicit criterion for defining capitalism) is suggestive of the larger disagreements that remain at play. In stating his original critique, Brenner not surprisingly completed the re-enactment of the earlier and more celebrated Dobb-Sweezy debate within Marxian theory. (According to Brenner, Wallerstein, like Sweezy, is to be designated a 'neo-Smithian Marxist' who displays a basic 'failure to take into account the differential limitations and potentialities imposed by different class structures' internal to a national economy; like Smith they are said to neglect class and class struggle by instead equating 'capitalism with a trade-based division of labour' [1977, p. 38].)

Be this last criticism as it may, world-systems analysis does not shy away from the implication that capitalism historically turned upon a process of 'not only appropriation of the surplus-value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas' (Wallerstein 1974b, p. 401). The process of 'unequal exchange' is thus at the heart of the master division of space into core, semi-periphery, and periphery (and, in the time before the capitalist world-economy reached its global limit, the parts of the world that were 'external' to the system). This leads to a version of the above-stated summary of the system's historical expansion that can be recast in more generalised terms. States at the core of the system are politically and militarily strong, specialising in production involving 'high skill levels' (ibid.) and capable of appropriating the lion's share of the system's surpluses. The result is the 'concentration of capital in core zones' and the further strengthening of their 'state machineries', thereby ensuring that the state machineries of the periphery become or stay weaker (Wallerstein 1995, p. 32). The latter eventuality further accords with the economic role of the peripheral states, which is defined by the fact that they are forced to specialise 'in tasks lower down the hierarchy of commodity chains' atop which the core states sit, such as through the production of raw materials. So is it that states at

the periphery gravitate toward 'using lower-paid work-forces', in the process 'creating (reinforcing) the relevant household structures to permit such work-forces to survive' (32). True to their categorical designation, the states of the semi-periphery inhabit a 'third structural position' that intermediates between the other two (Wallerstein 1974b, p. 403). The semi-periphery carries out this intermediating function both through its middling role within the order of economic exploitation and as its ideological role as part of a 'middle stratum' to which the most exploited areas can aspire, thus preventing the build-up of revolutionary fervour from below (402, 405).

The overall dynamic that links core, semi-periphery, and periphery thus involves a series of political and economic watchwords. These include the processes of the endless accumulation of capital for its own sake; commodity chains that from the system's first growth phase have been geographically expansive; the crucially important role of income-pooling households for suppressing wage rates, especially in the periphery; the emergence of an inter-state order consisting of strong, weak, and intermediate states; and the major cleavages of ethnicity, race, nation, class, and gender that run through the 'geoculture' that comprises not so much the superstructure as the 'underside' of the system (Wallerstein 1991, pp. 11–12; 2000, pp. 207–289).

A final key watchword is the 'Kondratiev cycle', a concept that has been crucial for Wallerstein in charting the course of the modern world-system, whether during the earlier phases discussed above, the period starting in 1900 after it reached its full global extent, or the 'age of transition' we are said to have been living through in the wake of the Second World War (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996). Comprising periods of global economic expansion and contraction that are thought to take place at 45–60-year intervals, Kondratiev cycles bespeak an important long-wave dynamic according to which the modern world-system ebbs and flows. As such, they are (and since being postulated always have been) conceived as being distinct from the shorter-term fluctuations of the ordinary business cycle (9). At the same time, Kondratiev cycles also signify the

debt of world-systems analysts to Marx's preoccupation with capitalism's tendency toward boom and bust crises and, mores proximally, to the loose attempt of their namesake – Soviet economist Nikolai Kondratiev – to restate Marxist crisis theory in formal terms during the 1920s. (It was Joseph Schumpeter, another important influence on Wallerstein, who first popularised Kondratiev's notion of 'long waves' and renamed them 'Kondratiev waves'.) In the political economy of world-systems, Kondratiev cycles are to be distinguished from the 'far longer' hegemonic cycles over the course of which predominant power holders within the modern world-system have tended to persist in controlling its core (9).

For many world-systems analysts – Wallerstein chief among them – the turn of the millennium is seen as finding world society on the downside of both a Kondratiev cycle, that started in 1945, and a hegemonic cycle that started in 1870 once Great Britain began to give way to the US and Germany as the key hegemon at the core of the system. By this view, each such cycle peaked during the late 1960s (9), not coincidentally in and around the time of what is seen to have been the 'world revolution' of 1968 (Wallerstein 1989). Ultimately, therefore, Wallerstein has consistently maintained that the long moment of the present that has assembled around the transition to a new millennium is emblematic of a period characterised not by equilibrium but structural crisis. As such, the present comprises a state of a system (in this case a historical social system) whose secular trends – e.g. toward the commodification of everything – have pushed it too close to its asymptotes to continue 'its normal, regular, slow, upward push'. As a consequence, the structural position of the system now leaves it to 'fluctuate wildly and repeatedly'. In turn, the possibilities that this circumstance allows are said to be only twofold. Ongoing fluctuation will either lead to the 'recreati[on] of order out of chaos or [to] a new stable system' (Wallerstein 2011). The vital normative commitments that undergird a perspective like Wallerstein's should make amply clear which way the future is hoped to lie for most adherents to the political economy of world-systems.

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West African Radicalism

▶ Ifeoma Okoye (1937–)

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▶ U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere

Western Militarism

▶ Liberalism, Human Rights, and Western Imperialism

White Peril

▶ Pan-Asianism

White Racism

▶ Baraka, Amiri (1934–2014)

White Supremacy

▶ Anti-apartheid, Anti-capitalism, and Anti-imperialism: Liberation in South Africa

▶ Imperialism and Settler Colonialism: Xenophobia and Racism in North America

Whiteness

William Howard Taft

Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

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Definition

Born on 25 September 1911 in Port of Spain, Eric
Eustace Williams is remembered as the father
of the Trinidadian nation and as a prominent
historian.

Williams was the first child of Eliza and
Henry Williams, a post office worker, and his
wife Eliza. In 1922, thanks to a scholarship, he
entered Queen's Royal College in Port of
Spain. A brilliant scholar and talented footballer,
Williams earned several scholarships during his
years at the college. Influenced by his teacher the
Caribbean historian and writer C. L. R. James
(1901–1989), the young Williams won the sin-
gle School Certificate Island Scholarship in
1932, and then left for Oxford University to
enrol for a degree in history. After graduating
B.A. in 1935, Williams undertook research in
Caribbean and colonial history, highlighting
the connections between the industrial revolu-
tion in England and the economics of slavery
in the West Indies, and in December 1938 he
was awarded the degree of D.Phil. for his dis-
sertation 'The Economic Aspect of the Abolition
of the British West Indian Slave Trade and
Slavery'.

The Historian: On Slavery, Monopoly, and European Capitalism

After earning his doctorate, from 1939 to 1948
Williams held the position of Associate and then
Assistant Professor in Social and Political Science
at Howard University in Washington, DC, the
highly distinguished black university. There he
worked alongside several prominent African-
American leaders such as the philosopher Alain
Locke, the political scientist Ralph Bunche, and
the economist Abram Lincoln Harris Jr, who had
authored the classic *The Negro as Capitalist* in
1936. Williams enlarged his critical vision of the
relationships between race and class in colonial
and Caribbean history and in 1942 published *The
Negro in the Caribbean,* an economic history of the
Caribbean. In 1944 he was invited in Atlanta to give
lectures on British historiography and the Negro
question. There he challenged W. E. B. DuBois,
whose *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade
to the United States of America, 1638–1870*
(1896) and Black Reconstruction (1935) were
pioneering works in the study of the role of eco-
nomic developing forces in ending slavery.

Also in 1944 a revision of Williams's doctoral
dissertation was published under the title *Capital-
ism and Slavery.* Inspired by C. L. R. James and
his *Black Jacobins*, a study which analysed the
political impact of the French Revolution and the
economic consequences of the Haitian Revolution
on the ending of slavery in the Atlantic world, this
was Williams's most influential book; it was
published in the US 20 years before it appeared
in Great Britain as a result of controversies raised
by Williams's emphasis on economic causes
of abolition, while the British historiography
linked the ending of slavery with humanitarian
campaigns.

In *Capitalism and Slavery*, Williams used very
detailed quantitative data and materials to analyse
the rise of the British economy. He analysed the
slave trade and the production of commodities in
minute detail, examining the usual economic,
social, and political assumptions. Williams
asserted that the use of the labour of enslaved
Africans in the Caribbean was neither the conse-
quence of the inability of native Indians and
European indentured workers to adapt to the

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working conditions in the plantations, nor the proof that Africans were racially inferior and were naturally fit to tolerate the tropical Caribbean climate. Nonetheless, the so-called racial inferiority of Africans was used as a pretext to justify their enslavement, while their enslavement was rather due to the fact that European capitalism needed the cheapest labour to exploit. In this way, Williams argued, modern capitalism is a world-wide system born from the transatlantic slave trade, and racism is a global ideology born from the economic exploitation of a specific category of humankind. Both capitalism and racism formed a structural element of European domination: 'Slavery in the Caribbean has been too narrowly identified with the Negro. A racial twist has thereby been given to what is basically an economic phenomenon. Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery' (Williams 1944, p. 7). Beyond slavery, the links between racism and capitalism gave birth to a hierarchy in which African peoples were at the bottom of the economic and social ladder. Williams's book described the roots of economic segregation and the reproduction of racial discrimination in the capitalist closed circuit of Caribbean colonial societies.

Secondly, in his book Williams questioned the roots of the capitalist system which produced wealth in England and poverty in the colonies. He claimed that the slave trade and the massive exploitation of Africans in the Caribbean economic system had generated the economic profits which allowed the rise of industrial capitalism in England. Using data from the Royal African Company, *Capitalism and Slavery* outlines the system by which a ship would sail from a British harbour to the African coast with a cargo including firearms, clothes, food, and manufactured goods. Produced through the labour of English workers, the cargo represented capital which was used to buy or capture the labour of Africans, who were then deported across the Atlantic Ocean. On arrival in the Caribbean, the Africans were sold in exchange for raw materials produced in the Americas. Briefly, the Africans imprisoned in the slave trade were both labour and capital, since as human beings, they were bought and sold by slave owners, and as enslaved workers, they produced sugar, tobacco, cotton, rum, and spices which produced the wealth in the colonies. For his emphasis on the concept of 'trade', his claim that the British abolitionists exaggerated the atrocities of the Middle Passage, and his very rational account of an emotional topic, Williams was both acknowledged and criticised by scholars who thought that using the economic paradigm of the 'trade' to talk about slavery paved the way to the assumption that trade is based on a mutual agreement between two parties, each one benefiting from the transaction. Hence Williams's thesis became also central to the revisionist historiography. Was the exchange of human beings for commodities a trade or a crime? What was the method of acquiring African labour?

Finally, in Williams's account, raw materials were transported from the colonies to England, where they were refined and sold. The slave trade led to the development of local industries (producing and refining wool, cotton, sugar, rum, and metal), to the growth of the British seaports (Liverpool, Bristol), and to the modernisation of the shipping industry. The imperial hegemony of the British navy on the worldwide seas was partly due to the Navigation Act and to the fact that the British were supplying rival European colonies with enslaved Africans. However, according to Darity (1985, p. 702), 'it was not profitability or profits from the slave trade that were essential in Williams's theory, but that the American colonies could not have been developed without slavery. Without the colonies mercantilist development would have been crippled'. This mercantilist development was controlled by British merchants, planters, and ship owners who organised the slave trade, British banks which gave credit facilities, and insurance corporations which took the risk for each triangular expedition. Since the West Indian plantations offered an opportunity for social climbing for many British workers, Williams also revealed the direct or indirect participation of several famous economic and financial British institutions and renowned familial dynasties that had benefited from the slave trade. Williams's thesis inspired much research on the impact of slave trade on both Western industrial capitalism

and African societies. Walter Rodney (1972) and Joseph Inikori (1982) explored the post-colonial consequences of the implication of Western capitalism in the making of slave economies, in the transformation of slavery in colonialism, and, finally, the economic dependency which kept independent African and Caribbean states under Western imperialist control.

Lastly, Williams opposed the myth built around the British philanthropists. On the basis of a critical reading of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and his notion of the 'invisible hand' of the market, Williams claimed that the British did not abolish the slave trade in 1807 and slavery in 1834 for primarily moral and humanitarian reasons: the British abolition of slavery resulted less from the implementation of modernity brought by the Enlightenment (see Beckles 1997) than from economic and political pressures upon an archaic system of exploitation which had reached its limits regarding the accumulation of capital needed for the heavy industry. Alongside the works of Williams, Rodney, and Inikori, the study of the economic impact of slavery nurtured the political debate on the reparations, that is to say the financial compensation and moral contributions that present-day governments of countries formerly engaged in the slave trade had to pay to the descendants of those who were enslaved. (One aspect of this debate was the evaluation of the number of African victims of the slave trade; see Darity 1985.) Williams also detailed the mechanisms which drove capitalism to introduce the system of slavery on a global scale, then the circumstances leading to the reproduction of the capitalist slave system, and finally the need for capitalism to abolish slavery before modernising production processes in order to create a wider market. In his own words, 'the commercial capitalism of the eighteenth century developed the wealth of Europe by means of slavery and monopoly. But in so doing it helped to create the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century, which turned round and destroyed the power of commercial capitalism, slavery, and all its works' (Williams 1944, p. 210). After the abolition of slavery reduced the production of sugar, the British imperial preference system of buying sugar from the Caribbean colonies ended in 1846.

As a result, Brazilian and Cuban sugar production increased, and some new sugar markets opened in India and South-East Asia.

Williams's analysis of the conflict between monopoly capital, free trade, laissez-faire, smuggling, and state control influencing the development and abolition of the slave trade echoed Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*, also published in 1944. Williams studied this transformation of the economic system, which showed that in England, the first nation to both abolish slavery and accomplish an industrial revolution, the maritime commercial bourgeoisie and the planters in the colonies together influenced political metropolitan life. Thus, from a very early stage, the Caribbean islands served as a laboratory for capitalism, imperialism, and globalisation (see Darity 1997). As Williams wrote, 'the West Indian islands became the hub of the British Empire, of immense importance to the grandeur and prosperity of England. It was the Negro slaves who made these sugar colonies the most precious colonies ever recorded in the whole annals of imperialism' (1944, p. 52). The importance of the Caribbean increased after the 1776 American declaration of independence, which provoked a reconfiguration of overseas trade: 'the Caribbean ceased to be a British lake when the American colonies won their independence. The center of gravity in the British Empire shifted from the Caribbean Sea to the Indian Ocean, from the West Indies to India' (Williams 1944, p. 123).

The Politician: Anti-Imperialist, Pan-Caribbean, Nationalist

While teaching at Howard, Williams had been recruited as a consultant by the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, an organisation founded during the Second World War to implement the future policies in the West Indies, which had been through massive social unrest since the period of emancipation and again with the riots in the aftermath of the depression of 1929. In his lectures for the commission, Williams highlighted the backwardness of Caribbean economies impacted by the legacy of monoculture, the economic

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exploitation of colonies during the Second World War, and the American investments in the post-1945 Caribbean economies. When Williams returned to live in Trinidad in 1948, after 17 years abroad, he was appointed deputy chairman and head of the research branch of the commission. He continued to travel and lectured in Trinidad and throughout the Caribbean, making contacts with trade unions, unemployed youth, academics, and political leaders. His open-air lectures given in Woodford Square, the main central square in Port of Spain, received positive feedback. His papers on the legacy of the sugar monoculture upon the Caribbean economies also inspired some supporters of a federation of the British West Indies based on economic cohesiveness. In the end, his enthusiasm in unveiling the forms of dependency put Williams in opposition to the neo-colonial expectations of the commission.

In January 1956, just after the commission had decided not to renew his contract, Williams entered politics. Gaining popularity in the Trinidadian middle-class and educational sector, he launched a successful petition for a constitutional reform which advocated moving from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature so as to enlarge the number of seats for elected representatives. After the petition was refused by the Colonial Office, Williams helped to form the first modern political party of Trinidad and Tobago, the People's National Movement (PNM), which in September 1956 won 13 seats out of 24. Williams was appointed chief minister and formed a new government; his political victory was reinforced at the 1961 elections with about two-thirds of the vote. Williams became one of the new leaders of the Caribbean, pressing for independence and for a federation of the West Indies to escape from American hegemony. After the Jamaican referendum voted against the federation, Williams changed his political orientation, from a Pan-Caribbean to a nationalist perspective. On 31 August 1962, he achieved independence for Trinidad and Tobago.

Holding the title of prime minister from 1962 until his death in office in 1981, Eric Williams was the father of the Trinidadian nation. His contribution was political and intellectual, national and international. His decision to publish a book, *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago,* in 1962, the same year in which Trinidad and Tobago achieved independence, revealed his entangled vision of the past and the future. While honouring the legacy from before 1962, the book argues that the story of the new Trinidadian nation should be written from the starting point of independence, and should be inserted into a national narrative.

In 1963, Williams achieved the withdrawal of the US from the naval military base of the Chaguaramas peninsula, which fell under Trinidadian sovereignty. In February and March 1964, he made a tour of 11 African countries including Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Egypt. He held political discussions with African leaders, gave academic lectures on development in African universities, established diplomatic relations on behalf of the Caribbean countries, and promoted a privileged relationship between Africa and the Caribbean. Along with Fidel Castro, Williams was probably the first Caribbean leader to give a strong support to the decolonising process in Africa, to promote non-alignment and anti-imperialism, and to denounce the similarities in the neo-colonial situations in Africa and the Caribbean. He also tried to introduce African and Caribbean topics into the academic institutions and curricula. Serving as pro-vice chancellor of the University of the West Indies (UWI) from 1963 to 1971, Williams worked towards the implementation of these Pan-African relations through the introduction of Afro-Caribbean studies in African universities and of African studies at the UWI.

Conclusion: Growing Conservative?

Although he was regularly re-elected with popular support, Williams faced criticism on account of his paternal style of leadership. In February 1970, in a racially divided country, he stopped a Black Power revolution in Trinidad by declaring a state of emergency and arresting activists and young officers suspected of plotting against him. From

then onwards, he sided with the conservative Caribbean regimes and strengthened his political control. In the early 1970s, he also took a right-wing turn on economic issues and industrialisation when the oil boom put Trinidad in the sphere of North American interests. Although beneficial to a growing black and Indian middle class and financing some social health and education programmes, the dependency on oil also engendered risks of clientelism and corruption, which would put Trinidad's national economy under the control of the foreign monopolistic corporations. Williams died of a heart attack on 29 March 1981. He left a nation endowed with modern institutions, infrastructures, and a dynamic economy, and his legacy remains influential in the academic and political Caribbean area.

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Women

▶ Women's Rights and Western Imperialism in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Women's Movements

▶ Women's Rights and Western Imperialism in Iraq: Past Meets Present

Women's Movements, Indian Anti-colonial Struggle

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Definition

The theme of women's participation in the Indian nationalist movement, though having been debated extensively over the last few decades, still draws historians' attention and calls for continuing revision and rethinking. This chapter explores women's contribution to the Indian nationalist cause.

The themes of nationalist consciousness and the birth of the nation have been major concerns for scholars of Indian history since the end of the British Raj and the attainment of independence by India and Pakistan in 1947. Several historiographical perspectives have investigated these topics over time. The Cambridge school described Indian nationalism as an ideology shaped by elite groups to mobilise the masses

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around their own narrow needs, which finally bargained successfully with the foreign rulers for power. On the other side, Indian nationalist historians have since the colonial period highlighted the mass, idealistic, and libertarian character of the nationalist movement, depicting it as a struggle aimed at freedom from colonial exploitation. This view has often overshadowed class and caste (not to mention gender) contradictions at work within Indian society, as well as the class perspective of the nationalist movement itself. Class became instead, from the early 1980s, the major analytical tool of the Subaltern Studies project. Research carried forward in this framework rejected a reading of the colonial era through the binary opposition between imperialism and the Indian people, rather focusing on the conflicts between elite groups (indigenous and foreign) and subalterns (Chandra et al. 1989, pp. 13–23).

The gender dimension remained marginal in the work of these schools of thought, until the emergence of feminist studies that have provided gender-conscious accounts of nationalist ideology and the anti-imperialist venture. These works have engaged in a critique of previous narratives, complicating the picture of women's involvement in agitational politics, as well as addressing the effects of Gandhian ideology on women's roles. Aparna Basu, one of the first to deal with such critiques, has hinted at how reassuring the Gandhian message sounded to the male guardians of women, something which led husbands and fathers to allow (or even encourage) the participation of their womenfolk in the movement (Basu 1976, p. 37).

Elaborating further on the nature of Gandhian ideology on women, several other scholars have come to define it as a complex set of discourses with contradictory implications. If, on the one hand, it recognised women's subordination and preached their equality and opportunities for self-realisation, on the other it never stepped out of the safe arena of a traditional, religious, and patriarchal sense of the world. Narrating women as unsexed beings, who embodied faith and 'by nature' could endure sacrifice and suffering (like the mythical Sita), Gandhi claimed that they would play a key part in organised passive

resistance and non-co-operation (Jayawardena 1986, pp. 95–97). At the time of the non-co-operation movement (1920–22) Gandhi urged elite women in public speeches to adhere to the swadeshi programme, boycotting foreign goods and devoting some time a day to spinning, thus acting as role models for the women of the lower strata. (Taneja 2005, p. 53).

While this call did receive a response from some elite women, the size and quality of their participation would increase dramatically only in the following decade, during the civil disobedience campaign. Although Gandhi had refused to include women in the 240-mile march from Ahmedabad to Dandi to manufacture salt that inaugurated the movement in March 1930, soon after it he fully incorporated them in the campaign, putting them in charge of the boycott of foreign cloth and liquor shops. Scholars agree on the fact that women responded to Gandhi's call *en masse*, and many studies have detailed the facts and figures of such participation both at the national and regional level (Kasturi and Mazumdar 1994; Menon 2003; Saxena 1988, pp. 2–10; Thapar-Bjorkert 1998, pp. 583–615), producing in some cases enthusiastic descriptions of these 'hordes of women pouring out of their homes . . . to give proof of their will, courage and forbearance' (Rao 1994, p. 38).

However, the so-called 'myth of participation' has universalised women's involvement in nationalist agitations, projecting it as homogeneous (Pearson 1979, p. 80). Such narrative has overshadowed the variety of experiences of those women, considering them as a collectivity rather than as a sum of individuals grouped according to a number of different criteria. The tendency to describe women participants as a homogeneous group is a legacy of the nationalist movement itself, which – in the attempt to become a mass movement and gain cohesiveness – utilised the category of 'woman' as the undifferentiated label it was in public consciousness, 'the sole universal category which cut through divisions and could mean all things to all persons' (Pearson 1981). Such a tendency has brought some historiographical accounts to overlook divisions of class, caste, origin (urban/rural), level of

education, religion, and age, to name but a few. Equally neglected has often been the distinction between the women belonging to preexisting women's organisations and the less educated women who could not boast previous forms of activism or political awareness.

In fact, under the umbrella-category of 'women' stood a number of different motivations to join nationalist agitations, experiences within the movement, practices, and expectations. Although often overshadowed by the Gandhian movement's popularity, other forms of agitations were present on the Indian public scene, and women joined them, too. During the partition of Bengal, in 1905, middle-class Hindu women joined the boycott campaigns at a time when *Bharat Mata* (Mother India) was a powerful symbol within Bengali nationalist rhetoric. (For an analysis of how the mother's body and the map of India came to overlap within nationalist cartography, see Ramaswamy 2010). Many were also the women and girls who later on, having grown dissatisfied with Gandhian politics, decided to side with the revolutionary movement – what the colonial state, some revolutionaries themselves, and much historiography have termed 'terrorism' (on the revolutionaries' self-definition as 'terrorists' and the lack of any negative connotation, see Ghosh 2006, p. 273). Mostly active in the states of Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Punjab, the revolutionary movements drew upon socialist and Marxist theories for the construction of their ideologies, were influenced by the Russian and Irish revolutions, and inspired by anti-imperialist as well as anticapitalist feelings, reflecting a wide range of local and transnational activities and philosophies (Maclean and Elam 2013, pp. 113–123).

Among the leaders of the revolutionary movement outside India was a woman, Madame Cama, who settled in Paris from the early 1900s and 'became the focus of Indian revolutionary activity in Europe', influencing a number of young Parsi women in Bombay, from where she came (Jayawardena 1986, pp. 103–104). However, it was only from the late 1920s that women joined revolutionary societies in significant numbers. Although such groups had been active in Bengal

and north India since the early twentieth century, for several years their underground activities had been carried out by small cells of men, who took a vow of chastity and were expected to be unquestionably loyal to their leader. Later on, many newly formed groups were eager to include women among their militants, and treated them as equals to men.

It is indeed in the definition of women's role in the anti-colonial struggle that – according to Geraldine Forbes – lies the difference between the Gandhian movement and the revolutionary societies. While the former envisioned a precise role and specific activities for women within the anti-colonial struggle, the latter believed that women revolutionaries could help the cause not only by playing subsidiary roles, but also by carrying out the same tasks as their male comrades, such as killing, sabotaging, or leading the cells' activities (Forbes 1997, pp. 113–115, 127; see also Chatterji 2001, pp. 39–47).

The two movements, however, had two major traits in common. Firstly, they were similar in the way they represented the activist woman, as both constructed their narrative around the same myth of female sacrifice. As a natural predisposition to endurance and self-sacrifice would make women the best satyagrahis, the same virtue would lead women revolutionaries to offer their own body and life to the nation. Secondly, both movements drew upon mythical and religious discourses to recruit members and explain their activities to the less educated. Gandhi's Sitas were the revolutionaries' Kalis and Shaktis, and each regarded these figures as symbols of the motherland; though projecting very different models of femininity, these images were powerful and very effective in mobilising women (Thapar-Bjorkert 2006, pp. 128–129).

The homogeneity of women participating in the nationalist movement, though, was not threatened only by the presence of different ideological subgroups on the Indian political scene, as even within the same group women made for a very heterogeneous lot. Female participants in the Gandhian movement ranged from the respectable 'few brave women' (Forbes 1997, p. 63) adhering to non-co-operation and the Khilafat movement in

the early 1920s, to Tamil prostitutes (Lakshmi 1984, p. 8); from national leaders like Sarojini Naidu, who had taken part in Congress activities since 1904, to women who set up organisations specifically for the purpose of co-ordinating processions, picketing and spinning activities; from those who had been mobilising for women's rights since the start of the century (and wished to see the social, legal, and political status of their lot improved, after their involvement in and support for nationalist agitations), to those 'who responded to their "dual duty" – to their beloved Gandhi . . . and to their guardians . . . [and who] generally followed men' (Forbes 1997, p. 83).

Yet, women participating in Gandhian agitations were not only those who joined the 'public' activities envisioned for them. Indeed, as highlighted by the work of Suruchi Thapar-Bjorkert and pointed out by Vina Mazumdar and Leela Kasturi one decade earlier, there were a number of women who could not access the world outside their homes, either 'women from the peasantry and the working class . . . or the thousands of housewives – mostly mothers and wives – who provided indirect support by shouldering family responsibilities when their men went to jail or got killed' (Kasturi and Mazumdar 1994: xxvi). Drawing upon oral interviews and women's autobiographies, Thapar-Bjorkert found that the lives of women who did not cross the domestic threshold during nationalist agitations were no less impacted by political changes than those of their more visible sisters. Although some of them were constrained by segregating social customs, 'they were more interested in what they did despite such constraints, and for these women the domestic sphere emerged a site of both contestation and subordination', as well as of political practices. These ranged from taking responsibilities for the family's elders when their husbands were imprisoned, to earning a livelihood, from taking independent decisions about their children, to dealing with food shortages; 'the awareness that they had to survive without inhibiting their husbands' commitment to the nationalist cause – the author concluded – helped in the development of their own political consciousness' (Thapar-Bjorkert 2006, pp. 209–210).

Among the protagonists in female involvement with Gandhian and Congress-led nationalist politics, women belonging to the organised women's movement deserve special attention. Although during the nineteenth century a number of women's groups and associations led by women had emerged in various parts of the subcontinent (mainly in Bengal and Maharashtra), it was only in the early 1900s that women's all-India organisations started to be set up by and for women of the urban elites – the first being the Bharat Stri Mahamandal, founded in 1901 by Saraladevi Chaudhurani. Such first experiment proved short-lived, but a few years later a new association was born which would gain greater recognition. It was 1917 when Irish feminists Margaret Cousins and Dorothy Jinarajadasa, and the British Annie Besant – all closely connected to the Theosophical Society – started the Women's Indian Association (WIA) in Madras, with branches all over India. The WIA welcomed members of both Indian and European origins, and engaged from the beginning in the fields of philanthropy, religion, politics, and education, the latter the area to which the association devoted most of its efforts. In 1918 the WIA started editing its mouthpiece, *Stri Dharma,* a monthly journal featuring contributions in English, Tamil, Telugu and – from the late 1920s – Hindi. International in its character, this publication mirrored the advocacy journals edited by British feminists in the late nineteenth century, and soon became 'a strong voice in the international feminist movement, supporting claims that women shared certain concerns *as women* that transcended all other differences' (Tusan 2003, p. 625). Although *Stri Dharma* and the WIA in general acted within a clearly anti-imperialist framework, their main concern was with international feminist politics: they imagined the women of the world as 'sisters in a great family' (Stri Dharma 1918, p. 2), and believed in gender solidarity as a unifying force.

An international aspiration also lay at the core of another all-India organisation, the National Council of Women in India (NCWI), established in 1925 as the Indian branch of the International Council of Women. Counting among its members women belonging to some of India's wealthiest

industrial and royal families, like Mehribai Tata and the Maharani of Baroda, the Council engaged in philanthropy and other activities that, modelled on those of upper-class British women, would seem 'enlightened' to British officials and policy-makers. Elitist in character, close to the British, and socially conservative, the Council never went beyond petition politics aimed mainly at making India reach the internationally accepted standards for health and welfare – an interest shared also by Indian and British men in power (Forbes 2004, pp. 75–78).

Ten years after the WIA, the third pan-Indian organisation was born. The All-India Women's Conference (AIWC) held its first meeting in Pune in 1927, thanks to the efforts of Margaret Cousins and responding to the call of the director of Public Instruction in Bengal, Mr Oaten, who had urged women to raise a unanimous voice and tell the government what kind of education they deemed suitable for Indian girls. The stated focus of the AIWC was thus on female education, although the Conference at the time did not imagine it as a mass phenomenon, nor as equal to the education received by men. From 1928 the Conference widened its scope to include social issues related to women and girls (like child marriage and *pardā*), a focus that would be extended in the following years to labour, rural reconstruction, textbooks, and indigenous industries (80).

From 1930, when civil disobedience broke out, two of these organisations that consistently contributed to create the Indian women's movement, drawing together the country's most active and engaged women, started to face important changes. While the NCWI, due to its social composition and alliances with the British establishment, never joined the struggle for independence, the WIA and the AIWC were more inclined to get closer to the nationalist movement. The AIWC initially chose to remain apolitical, but by the mid-1930s it could no longer ignore that its work was leading towards two directions, for which different and conflicting strategies needed to be put in place. On the one hand, its work for women's rights and equality required co-operation with the British; on the other, its growing commitment to the welfare of the nation and to Gandhian programme of reconstruction involved work at the grass-roots level. Furthermore, the AIWC found it increasingly difficult to counter critiques such as Nehru's, according to whom the association's programme was superficial and did not enquire into 'root causes' – that is, did not (yet) see women's uplift as part of a wider plan for the nation's uplift. The AIWC's priorities were deemed to change, as Margaret Cousins made clear during her presidential address in 1936, urging her audience to 'work first for political liberty, for liberation from subjection both internal and external, and side by side with that supreme task work for all our already expressed ideals and reforms' (81).

The WIA had stated its anti-imperialist feelings since its inception, but these became even clearer in the 1930s in response to the political events agitating the country, and thanks to the presence of Dr Muthulakshmi Reddy as *Stri Dharma*'s editor. Elected in 1927 as first woman member of the Madras Legislative Council, Reddy resigned in 1930 in protest over Gandhi's arrest, and dedicated herself to the nationalist cause. Slowly but surely, the journal's commitment to Gandhian politics started to grow, while the internationalist agenda of the previous years gradually faded away. 'Western' versus 'indigenous' leadership of the women's movement became an issue, as did 'Indian' versus 'universalised liberal female' subjectivity; along these lines political as well as personal conflicts among women activists started to emerge and the WIA, unable to deal with these concerns, finally closed the journal in 1936. In her analysis of *Stri Dharma,* Tusan concluded that the journal's story 'embodied the fragile relationship between Western and non-Western women during the beginning of the decolonization movement' (Tusan 2003, pp. 630–632, 642), thus ascribing the WIA's putting aside its aspirations to 'global sisterhood' (in favour of nationalist politics) to issues among Indian and European women, rather than among Indian women/feminists and Indian men/nationalists.

Previous studies, on the contrary, insisted upon the nationalist movement's interest in maintaining the patriarchal order, and on the incapability of

women themselves to 'use the occasion to raise issues that affected them as women' (Jayawardena 1986, p. 108). Maria Mies claimed that, while the movement could not but include women in the struggle for tactical reasons, it did not envision change in the social order. Having accepted their limited function, women made for excellent instruments in the struggle, but 'did not work out a strategy for their own liberation struggle for their own interests. By subordinating these goals to the national cause they conformed to the traditional *pativrata* or *sati* ideal of the self-sacrificing woman' (Mies 1980, p. 121). Despite the apparent radicalism of the Gandhian nationalist movement, Vina Mazumdar added, under its surface lay an essential conservatism aimed at maintaining women's roles within the family and society unaltered, or even further emphasising them (Mazumdar 1976, p. 76).

Younger scholars found such readings, concentrated exclusively on the coercive role of patriarchy, culpable for shadowing women's conscious agency. As claimed by Charu Gupta, accounts like Partha Chatterji's, according to whom the women's question was 'resolved' by the nationalists and co-opted to the larger project of national liberation, do not necessarily hold true for every context (Chatterji 1990, 1994). Not only was this not the case in several regions outside Bengal, but the various limitations inscribed in the reform and nationalist movement did not prevent many women from 'carv[ing] out spaces for themselves and pav[ing] ways for social and political activism, both in public and private domains, implicitly and explicitly . . . . Reforms and nationalism did signal new opportunities for women, however limited they proved to be' (Gupta 2010, p. 11; see also Gupta 2005).

Gupta highlighted several ways in which initiatives originally planned to control women were appropriated by women themselves, and transformed into instruments of assertion. In the minds of reformers and early nationalists, for instance, female education was meant to instruct a multitude of wives and mothers who would be up to the expectations of their 'modern' husbands, as well as to those of a nation in need of new generations of nationalist citizens. However,

once educated, women became difficult to control – what they read, and how they made use of their education went beyond their mentors' expectations, making them conscious agents (see Nijhawan 2012). Similarly, debates on issue like *satī, pardā*, infant marriages, and widow remarriage, though being more concerned with granting India a place among the 'modern' nations than with women's actual well-being and rights, had unpredicted outcomes, and women gradually became both the subjects and the objects of social reform (on the Sarda Act and women's involvement in debates around it, see Sinha 2006, pp. 152–196; see also Sinha 2000).

Padma Anagol argued that the historical quest for an understanding of patriarchal mechanisms and their effects on women's lives is an indispensable as much as an essentially incomplete project, for it 'obscures the ways in which women resist patriarchy, construct their identities, assert their rights and contest the hierarchical arrangement of societal relationships between the sexes' (Anagol 2005, p. 7). According to her, the theme of the 'creation and recreation of patriarchy' crossing much feminist historiography has prevented the recovery of women's agency, and of its twin aspects of assertion and resistance (14). The task of recovering women's voice and consciousness can be achieved – Anagol argued in her study on Maharashtra – by turning away from the most investigated regions, like Bengal (from where the image of the passive Indian woman has come), in search of different women's experiences and historical paradigms, as well as by concentrating on sources in the local languages.

Even more substantial for the recovery of women's agency is, according to Anagol, the adoption of a new chronology by historians dealing with the gender and women's history of modern India. The dominant 'imperialism-nationalism' frame of thinking has led scholars to privilege the first four decades of the twentieth century; in such readings, women's participation has often been described as a sudden phenomenon, whose credit is to be given primarily to Gandhi. This tendency has led to the obfuscation of continuities between 'the fiery women

nationalists' of the early twentieth century, and an earlier period of women's assertion, whose legacy women of the next generation must have inherited, or benefited from (Anagol 2008a, p. 606).

The real nature of female involvement in nationalist politics could be better retrieved – as Anagol suggested – if the nineteenth century were treated in its own right as the apex of the colonial period, a time during which India faced important changes at the social, economic, juridical, and educational levels. It is back to the social and religious movements of the nineteenth century, according to this author, that the origins of Indian women's activism can be traced. Several scholars analysed this period of reformist zeal through the prism of post-structuralism, showing that behind the efforts for the amelioration of women's conditions lay the needs and contradictions of the newly formed Hindu middle class. Caught between their desire for modernisation (a necessary step towards self-government) and their wish to project Indian culture as an example of morality (in opposition to Western materialism), nineteenth-century reformers were not as concerned about women's status as they were about nationalism and political power (on *satī* see Mani 1999; on conjugality see Sarkar 2008, 2010).

Anagol instead suggested that, far from being silent 'grounds' on which male actors constructed discourses and enacted laws, women took significant and often radical stands during the social-reform era (Anagol 2008b). Such stands were not about nascent nationalism or imperialism, but rather marked the beginning of women's politicisation and mobilisation for their own cause (Anagol 2008a, p. 621).

Conclusions

The theme of women's participation in the Indian nationalist movement, though having been debated extensively over the last few decades, still draws historians' attention and calls for continuing revision and rethinking. Despite the magnificent efforts of recent gender historiography,

the complex relationship between (the diverse segments of) Indian women and the several wings of the anti-imperialist movement requires further investigation. Women's contribution to the nationalist cause cannot be denied; their efforts in both Gandhian and revolutionary agitations, and in less visible roles as supporters of the males of their families, were essential in securing India's independence. Moreover, women as a category provided the symbolic imagery backing the anti-imperialist organisations, coming to embody various aspects of nationalist theoretical thinking: from an essentialised and pure 'Indianess' in the minds of early nationalists, to non-violence and passive resistance in Gandhian philosophy, to extreme sacrifice in revolutionary rhetoric.

However, many facets – which call into question an analysis of female agency, and require that women be studied as conscious subjects in their own right – still remain vague. Among these aspects are the roots of women's involvement in political life; the relationship of feminist organisations with the leadership of Congress-led movements, and the gains and losses that joining the mainstream movement entailed for such women; the strategic (rather than merely sentimental or patriotic) motivations behind such participation; and the changes that it brought about (or did not) in women's everyday lives, as well as in their self-perception.

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Women's Rights and Western Imperialism in Iraq: Past Meets Present

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Synonyms

Arabs; Authoritarianism; Baath regime; Feminism; Gender; Iraq invasion; Iraq war; Kurds; Middle East; Military intervention; Saddam Hussein; UN sanctions; US imperialism; Women; Women's movements

Definition

From the formation of the Iraqi modern state by the British in the 1920s, the US-backed overthrow of the revolutionary regime in 1963, the Gulf war, and the sanctions in the 1990s to the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, western imperialist interferences have shaped the social, political, and economic trajectory of Iraq and have impacted and shaped Iraqi women's rights, their political activisms, and their feminisms.

Introduction

From the formation of the Iraqi modern state by the British in the 1920s, the US-backed overthrow of the revolutionary regime in 1963, and the Gulf War and the sanctions in the 1990s to the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, western imperialist interferences have shaped the social, political, and economic trajectory of Iraq. This chapter explores the ways in which these interferences have impacted and shaped women's rights and feminist activisms. Contemporary Iraqi women's social and political activisms and feminisms have been modeled by various experiences of nationhood, by the nature of the different political regimes, and by the existence of social movements (e.g., leftists, nationalists, and Islamists). Feminist movements in the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by two main trends: nationalist and communist. The adoption in 1959 of an openly progressive Personal Status Code, a legal framework through which women's legal rights to marriage, divorce, and inheritance are enacted, resulted from the dominance of the leftist anti-imperialist political culture and the strength of feminist movements at the time. However, the emergence of the US-backed authoritarian Baʿthist regime at the end of the 1960s narrowed women's space for political activism. Since the 1980s, the country has been in a state of constant war and has experienced since 1991 harsh economic sanctions that have deeply affected its social and economic realities as well as state gender politics.

The US-led invasion and occupation of the country in 2003 exacerbated the deterioration of the social fabric of Iraqi society initiated by authoritarianism, wars, and UN economic sanctions. Since then, armed violence and identity-driven conflicts have characterized the everyday lives of Iraqis. Women have paid a very harsh price; the normalization of armed violence and the militarization of public spaces have impacted their everyday realities. The emergence of women's social and political organizations and the re-emergence of previously banned women's groups since the fall of the authoritarian Baʿthist regime have been shaped by the specificities of the post-2003 context. It is a context marked by the institutionalization of ethnosectarianism by the administration of the occupation, an invasion that plunged the country into generalized violence, and provoked the rise of conservative social and political forces that have questioned the very basis of women's legal rights enacted in Personal Status Code. The dismantlement of the Iraqi state by the US-led occupation administration in 2003 resulted in the loss of institutions and services for women and a strong dependency on US, UN, and international funds for women's rights activism. However, and against all odds, women's groups and feminist activists are also part of grassroots, social, and political movements denouncing the ethnosectarian, conservative, and corrupt nature of the post-2003 Iraqi regime.

The Colonial State and the Tribalization of Women

The Iraqi population was heterogeneous in its ethnic (Arab, Kurd, Turkmen, Armenian, etc.), sectarian (Sunni, Shiʿa), and religious (Muslim, Christian, Jews, etc.) composition. The Iraqi state established under the British Mandate (1920–1932), which began as a military occupation in 1917, was a contested and weak state. It was born in the face of popular movements, repressing the constitutionalist movement launched by the Shiʿa *ulemas* (religious scholars and clerics) in the first decade of the twentieth century, the movement against British occupation, and the Kurdish refusal to be incorporated into an Arab state. This Iraqi state relied on the ancient elite of the Ottoman Empire; Sunni Arabs

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exclusively comprised its leadership, administration, and army. In Baghdad, Sunni Arab religious, political, and economic figures – whether *ulemas*, heads of *tariqas* (such as Abd al-Rahman al-Gillani), Saiyyed related to the tribal leadership (such as 'Abdul Muhsin al-Sa'dun), Ashraf, landowners, or wealthy merchants – generally collaborated with and got involved as per wishes of the British occupying authorities. Although some Iraqi Shiʿa families belonged to the wealthy commercial elite, the urban educated elite was dominated by Sunni Arabs, as they benefited from secondary and higher education under both Ottoman and British rule, unlike the Shiʿas. Christians and Jews were also part of the educated urban elite, as they were favored by the British Empire. The power of the new state was effective only in urban areas; the countryside was managed by tribesmen who, at the time, were more heavily armed than the state army (In 1933, tribes possessed more than 115,000 guns, while the army only had 15,000.).

The Ottoman policy in the nineteenth century was to reduce the power of the tribes by settling the tribes in permanent villages, and playing one tribe against the other, many tribesmen resisted in refusing to register their land. While presumably intending to promote the formation of an integrated nation-state, the governments both under the mandate and under the monarchy (1932–1958) perpetuated tribal relations through tribal and land tenure policies. These policies halted the decline and disintegration of tribal leaders' power, which had been occurring toward the end of the Ottoman period, by providing administrative and fiscal powers, as well as land grants, to selected shaikhs (tribal leaders). Such policies enabled the shaikhs to tax and control those who subsequently became "their" tribesmen; thus British policy contributed to the transformation of a free cultivating peasantry into a population of serfs tied to the land of sharecroppers (Davis 2005; Dodge 2003; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1991, 1987). Under the monarchy, nation-building relied on traditional status groups – ethnic and religious – and overlooked the growth of the new, modern middle and working classes in the cities. The division in Iraqi society between the urban use of civil law

and the rural, predominantly Shiʿa (In 1900, according to Luizard (1991), 75% of tribes were Shiʿa Arab and 25% Sunni Arab.), use of Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR), more commonly called the "tribal law," is the most revealing aspect of this reliance (Efrati 2012).

The nascent state divided Iraqis into "original" and "non-original": Nationality Law No. 42 of 1924, which was enacted in the 1925 constitution, deemed "original" Iraqis to be those registered as Ottoman subjects, mainly the Sunnis and the Kurds. Shiʿas were registered as "Iranian dependency" [*tabaʿiyya*] and hence second-class citizens, because they were not Ottoman subjects prior to the establishment of the Iraqi nation-state due to geographical and political reasons (Some Shiʿas lived in areas far from the central administration, and most wanted to avoid military conscription and excessive taxation. More generally, many Shiʿas did not feel related to a Sunni empire that discriminated against and marginalized them.). The Law for the Election of the Constituent Assembly went even further in defining Iraqis as "every Ottoman subject now residing in Iraq and not claiming foreign citizenship" (Luizard 1991, 2006), imparting that any Sunni, even non-Iraqi, had more rights than Iraqi Shiʿas. Most Shiʿas had to apply for Iraqi citizenship, even when they belonged to well-known and established Arab families.

The Constitution also provided a basis for the election system in Iraq that alienated an important segment of the population; the Electoral Law of 1924 provided a two-tiered electoral system in which primary electors were to nominate secondary electors who were in turn to vote for deputies. Only male taxpayers older than 20 could be primary or secondary electors; only male taxpayers older than 30 could become deputies. Thus, the Electoral Law excluded the lower class, men younger than 30 and women serving in Parliament; the system was made in a way that it was difficult for men of the opposition to be elected, while in contrast tribal leaders were well represented.

The Constitution adopted in 1924 divided Iraqi citizens in three different classes regarding the law

and established three different courts: civil and religious courts in the urban areas and Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) for tribesmen in rural areas. The Constitution divided the religious courts into *shari'a* courts for the Muslims and spiritual councils for other religious communities. It affirmed that *shari'a* courts only were to handle matters of personal status – issues of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, thus related to family and women's right – and in accordance to each sect. Thus, under the mandate women's legal rights were divided according to their religion (Muslim, Christian, Jew, etc.), sect (Sunni, Shi'a), and location (rural, urban).

The legal system of colonial Iraq led to the "tribalization of women" (Efrati 2012; Ismael and Ismael 2007). Women were "tribalized" in the rural areas not only in their construction as tribal, subject to separate "tribal law," but also in the British involvement in determining "tribal law." Even in urban areas, people could involve "tribal motives" when it came to crimes committed in "the name of honor." Two main social groups advocated against the very establishment of the TCCDR: urban intellectuals – Sunnis and Shi'as – depicted it as "backward," unfair to women and halting the modernization of the emerging nation, while tribal shaikhs considered it as a direct threat to their power over tribesmen. Although Ismael and Ismael (2007) described tribal law as "inherently misogynous" and its very existence as detrimental to women, Efrati (2012, pp. 30–50) introduced a more nuanced analysis on the matter. The Tribal Code advocated by many shaikhs during the mandate and monarchy period aiming to reduce the power of the state over the tribes was characterized by a certain leniency and pluralism concerning women's issues. This leniency could be a reflection of the reality in the Iraqi countryside where practices regarding women were dynamic and diverse and not necessarily as harsh to women as it was represented by the British and the urban elite. According to Efrati (2012, p. 35), extramarital relations did not automatically mandate a death sentence; in some places murder for adultery was very exceptional, and there was a diversity of views regarding the way to settle blood disputes in which the handing over women was not the rule. The British refused the Tribal Code proposed by the shaikhs and wanted to set their own tribal law. Thus, tribal law tribalized rural women, not only in her construction as tribal, subject to separate "tribal law," but also British involvement in determining "tribal law," affecting rural women as harsh and uncompromising.

In the urban areas, in addition to being exposed to the possibility of the advocacy of "tribal motives," Muslim women were ruled by *shari'a* courts, divided into Sunni and Shi'a courts. Efrati (2012, p. 80) explored the reasons why both the British and the Iraqi monarchy maintained *shari'a* courts in the cities, despite increasing criticism from urban intellectuals, especially leftist, demanding a civil code similar to the secular Turkish judicial system. Examining the argument developed by Charrad on North African countries, which found that the breadth of the state-tribe relation directly correlated to the liberalness and egalitarianism of the Family Law, Efrati highlighted that the state-mosque relationship was central under the monarchy. Thus, although it is tempting to argue that because the Iraqi ruling elite emerged from the mandate period in close alliance with tribal kin groupings, the state was about to adopt a conservative personal status legislation that protected extended male-centered patrilineage. Nevertheless, as the personal status legislation governed only the urban population, the rest of the population was ruled by the TCCDR; in reality, it was the state-*ulemas* relation that was central to debates around personal status legislation. Preserving *shari'a* courts allowed the influential and respected *ulemas* class, from which the *qadis* were drawn, a share in the country's administration and, thus, ensured their loyalty and support to the ruling elite.

The dominant trend of British politics under the mandate and in the following years of the monarchy was to emphasize on the "different needs" of Iraqi society and establish a differentiated legal system in which citizens were granted different "rights" according to their religious and sectarian belonging as well as to their location and gender. Differences existed among women: Muslim and

Christian women were not granted the same rights regarding personal matters, neither Sunni nor Shiʿa, and the gap was even stronger between rural and urban women. This differentiated system was highly criticized among the intelligentsia, and the emergence of women's organizations will challenge the fragmented and uneven colonial system.

Iraqi Feminisms in the 1940s and 1950s

The major feminist organization, the Iraqi Women's Union (IWU, al-Ittiḥād al-Nisāʾī al-ʿIrāqī), was founded in 1945 right after the Arab Women's Congress in Cairo. The IWU was composed mainly of bourgeois women close to the male nationalist elites. It advocated for women's rights in the constitution, marriage, and work, as well as for the development of girls' and women's education. Simultaneously, women's groups linked to the communist party gathered in the League for the Defense of Women's Rights (LDWR, Rabitat al-Difāʿ ʿan Huqūq al-Marʾa) advocated for social justice, anti-imperialism, and women's rights. All organizations that made up what was commonly called the "women's movement" organized literacy and charity programs, including in rural areas, as well as civil and political rights campaigns.

Thus the women's movement was at the time characterized by two main trends: the nationalist feminists and the communist feminists. Although activists belonging to these two trends also worked together as part of the IWU, the government crackdown against left-wing organizations in 1947 shifted their activism. The IWU yielded under this pressure, removing the representatives of the leftist women's groups from its directorate. While the IWU received support from the government and royal family and remained a relatively small, elitist organization loyal to the Iraqi regime, the LDWR acted underground after failed attempts to obtain government permission. The LDWR was composed of leaders from the lower middle classes and was very much influenced by the radical anti-imperialist Iraqi communist party. Two personalities of the time represent these two trends, sometimes aligned and often in competition: Naziha al-Dulaimi, who remained vocal

regarding the repression of the government toward leftist activists, and Sabiha al-Shaikh Daʾud, who in contrast stayed silent regarding the shift in women's activism (due to governmental pressure).

Naziha al-Dulaimi, in *al-Marʾa al-ʿIrāqiyya* (The Iraqi woman 1952), posed the first and dominant competing narrative on Iraqi women's activism. This book is a short study of the conditions of women's lives in Iraq in the 1940s that uses social class as an analytical framework. Al-Dulaimi was a gynecologist, a prominent figure of the LDWR, the first Iraqi (Arab) female minister, and a prominent communist activist. She considered women in the *al-fallāḥīn* (peasants) class as the most deprived of rights. She depicted the "double servitude" of these peasant women: they were enslaved and exploited both by male domination and tribal rules and also by class oppression. Analyzing women of the landowning, bourgeois, and working classes, al-Dulaimi noted that although the conditions of economic oppression vary, women of all classes are oppressed both by marriage in which they are considered possessions rather than individuals and also by social injustice and imperialism. Using a Marxist and early feminist understanding of justice and equality, al-Dulaimi tackled issues of maternal and child protection, marriage, and even prostitution – a subject on which she does not employ a moralizing analysis of sexuality. Al-Dulaimi also situated *qaḍīyat al-marʾa* (the woman question) as a fundamental part of the struggle for class and national liberation. Feminist activists of the radical left rejected the idea of "gradual modernization" promoted by the pro-British nationalist elite in power; they considered that only a radical political change, a revolution that would get rid of the pro-British regime, could put Iraq on the road to modernization. The focus of communist feminists was on less-privileged women and was characterized by a will to address women's everyday, concrete problems.

Sabiha al-Shaikh Daʾud's landmark *Awwal al-ṭarīq* (The beginning of the road, 1958) represents the second competing trend of feminism in Iraq: nationalist feminism. Her book was published 3 months before the revolution that ended the monarchy and is considered one of the first

feminist books in Iraq. It gives interesting insight into the social, economic, and political realities of women under the British Mandate (1920–1932) and monarchy (1932–1958). Al-Shaikh Daʾud, the first female lawyer in Iraq, belonged to a prominent Sunni family and privileged an Arab nationalist version of Iraqi social and political history; her work overlooks underground, especially communist, women's groups. Nevertheless, her study is the first account detailing the gender dimensions of Iraq's modernization in the decades after the establishment of the Iraqi state and that modernization's social, economic, and political realities at the turn of the First Republic (14 July 1958). Al-Shaikh Daʾud's work brings to light the emergence, among urban, educated Iraqi women, of a growing nationalist awareness that placed women and gender issues at the core of aspirations of modernization and national liberation. It gives fascinating details about how women's rights issues – such as access to education and work, veiling, and legal and political rights – structured the emerging nationalist consciousness and the idea of the "new nation" among the elite.

Al-Shaikh Daʾud and IWU activists were more accommodating of the government's "gradual modernization" discourse, which considered that women needed to progress before they could be granted full citizenship rights. As is made clear in *Awwal al-ṭarīq*, women of the IWU used the rhetoric of the "new woman," active and assertive, and the "modern woman," educated, professional, patriotic, and capable of and willing to build the modern state, to promote the expansion of women's legal and political rights. These activists, from elite families, conducted their struggle in an "orderly manner" through legal and constitutional channels: they asked the government to expand education and health services (Efrati 2008, 2012). In order not to be perceived as "too radical," they insisted they did not want to "compete with men" in positions of power and leadership; rather, they wanted to "address the country's problems" (e.g., poverty, illiteracy), and they presented themselves as "mothers" demanding their right to participate in legislation for their sons and daughters, as a natural extension of their maternal duties – a position that did not threaten the family structure.

However, al-Shaikh Daʾud seems to have been influenced by al-Dulaimi on the condition of the peasant women – she, too, evokes in her book the "double servitude" that characterizes her life. This precise issue can be analyzed through the argument of the hybridization of the different nationalist narratives – pan-Arab and Iraqi – analyzed by Bashkin (2009, pp. 194–228). It means that at this time political activism was neither strictly nationalist (pan-Arab) nor Iraqist (focused on the Iraqi nation-state). This shows that despite their very different ideologies, agendas, and proposed solutions to change the political order of the time, nationalist and communist narratives also shared common imaginaries regarding the relationship between modernity and nationhood: both their ideological discourses situated modernity in the urban space, while rural space was perceived as the space of the non-modern.

In 1954, the government intensified its repression of the opposition, dismantling hundreds of societies and clubs and banning the existence of unions. The IWU had to be re-established as a single society rather than as a federation; it would be called the Women's Union Society (WUS, Jamʿīyat al-Ittiḥād al-Nisāʾī). After this campaign of repression, members of the WUS and the LDWR explicitly criticized the government's gender discourse, which constructed women as noncitizens: tribal law symbolized the absence of state intervention in matters of personal status and women's disenfranchisement. This evolution echoes the radicalization of the intelligentsia of the time, which was dominated by the radical anti-imperialist left rather than by the nationalists. It also prepared the ground for the institution of a legal framework regarding personal matters uniting rural and urban, Sunnis and Shiʿas, the Personal Status Code (PSC), also known as the Family Law.

The Iraqi Personal Status Code and the Postcolonial Question

In 1959, following the revolution of ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim, a pro-women PSC was adopted. It relied on both Sunni and Shiʿa jurisprudence. Women's rights activists, including Naziha

al-Dulaimi, participated in its drafting. It represented the political culture of the moment: a new state asserting its power over tribal and religious authorities and favoring a pro-women, cross-sectarian, nationalist approach to citizenship. The PSC or Family Law is the main legal framework governing family life. It is based on Muslim jurisprudence and was adopted by many Muslim-majority states at the time of their independence from European imperial powers. It gathered legislation regarding private matters (e.g., marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance), effectively most of women's legal rights. Mounira Charrad (2001, 2011) points out that the PSC represents a field of struggle between different social and political groups – the state, the *ulemas*, tribal leaders, and social and political movements, including the women's movement. In Iraq, the adoption of an openly pro-women's rights PSC in 1959 (in the form of Law No. 188) was due not only to the political culture of the revolutionary elite that came to power through Abd al-Karīm Qāsim's (1914–1963) 1959 coup but also to the questioning of the dictates of the *ulemas* and tribal leaders over private matters. Crucially, the adoption of this code marked the beginning of women activists' inclusion in the process of negotiating for their rights.

The 1959 PSC put certain intestate inheritance rights for male and female heirs under the civil code. The civil code is a legal framework that treats men and women equally, thus granted, indirectly, gender equality in certain inheritance cases. Inheritance, one of the most sensitive and sacrosanct issues within both Sunni and Shiʿa *fiqh* (Muslim jurisprudence), along with the severe limitations placed on polygamy and the adoption of 18 as the minimum legal marriage age for both sexes, represented a strong political statement by the new Iraqi Republic, one that directly challenged the power of the *ulemas* in urban areas. As for rural areas, the abolition of tribal law constituted an essential part of the new state's modernization project. Law No. 188 was inspired by different schools of *fiqh* and operated within religious jurisprudence, thus eliminating the differential treatment of Sunnis and Shiʿas and allowing state-trained and appointed judges to rule on

personal matters without consulting the *ulemas*. Thus the new PSC, gathering both Sunni and Shiʿa jurisprudence, provided a legal framework applicable equally to all Muslim Iraqis. This makes Law No. 188 a symbol of the new nation's unity beyond sectarian lines. It also marks the inclusion of women's rights activists' demands through their participation in the legislative process itself – many feminist activists, including Naziha al-Dumaimi participated in the drafting of the PSC (Efrati 2005, 2012). This shows the strong relationship between issues of nationhood and gender in postcolonial Iraq: at a time when the political culture was marked by the anti-imperialist left, sectarian unity and pro-women's rights aspirations were linked. The revolutionary regime aspired to provide, and even more importantly to determine, the rights of its citizens through a gendered definition of nationhood.

In comparison with most Muslim-majority countries, it is crucial to understand the PSC as a field of struggle between newly independent states, political elites, and social and political movements. In the political context of contesting European imperialism, this struggle resulted in the discursive claim of authenticity and of resistance to Western models. During early independence the landed Iraqi nationalist elite attempted to build a strong state that would be the arbitrator of all civil law matters, undermining its direct competitors, tribal leaders, and the *ulemas*. However, in this postcolonial context, marked by the Western/indigenous modern debate in which women were deemed as "bearer of the nation" and through which issues of "cultural authenticity" were played, the field of family and women's legal rights remained the only field submitted to the so-called "authentic" authority of religious jurisprudence. Thus the PSC represented a progressive national symbol for the emerging Iraqi Republic, uniting Sunni and Shiʿa *fiqh* and favoring a balanced interpretation of religious jurisprudence. However, in submitting women's legal rights to *fiqh* rather than to civil law, it limited the possibility of more radical reform of women's legal status. The "authenticity" and "indigeneity" of the emerging "nation" relied on the compliance of women and family issues with "Islam." Women

activists, therefore, were forced to operate in the spaces between state- and nation-building projects. They were, and still are, caught between these separate but entwined projects, which together reinscribed or reproduced patriarchal structures and practices legitimized by a so-called Islam used as symbol of an "authentic" culture.

Women's Rights and Authoritarianism Under the Ba'thist Regime

The Baath coup of 1963 that ended the revolutionary regime of Abd al-Karīm Qāsim's was backed by the CIA (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987). PSC reform – specifically the articles related to equal inheritance and polygamy – was one of the measures undertaken by the Ba'th regime after the first coup (Anderson 1963) (These articles of the PSC were reformed as soon as 18 March 1963, right after the fall of the Qasim regime in February 1963.). The inheritance article, which had relied on civil code, was replaced with an article that relied on *shari'a* and privileged Ja'fari jurisprudence. Thus, advancements in inheritance rights were abolished in Iraq in 1963, and no regime has ever reinstated it. The revised article on polygamy, while preserving its limitations, added a clause that allowed for polygamous marriages contracted outside the courts. Thus, the new article legitimized the illegal practice of polygamy. Reforming the PSC's most controversial and symbolic articles was clearly aimed at marking the end of the revolutionary atmosphere. Women activists, especially in the communist ranks, were violently repressed: some were jailed and tortured, and many others had no choice but to flee the country.

Suad Joseph's (1991) research has demonstrated that from the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, centralized Iraqi political power – unified around the authoritarian Ba'th Party and supported by oil revenues – came to impose state authority at every level of society, including at the community and family level. The regime was also the main and often unique provider of income for most of the population as it concentrated all the oil revenues of the rentier state. Until the mid-1980s, the Ba'thist regime subsidized the nuclear family in order to shift tribal, religious, and sectarian allegiances to the state (Joseph 1991; Ismael and Ismael 2000).

In the 1970s, women activists who mobilized for their legal rights, in the very limited political pluralism of the increasingly authoritarian Ba'thist regime, were able to push for reforms that were even more progressive. Their efforts were supported by full employment and the regime's ideological narrative promoting a pro-women secular socialism. Several authors (Farouk-Sluglett 1993; Al-Ali 2007; Ismael and Ismael 2007) indicate that the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW, al-Ittiḥād al-'am li Nisā' al-'Irāq) was central to the implementation of the regime's developmentalist campaign, which placed women at the core of the country's progress. Throughout the 1970s, the party's ideological discourse on women was to "focus on equal rights" and "on rejecting the views that put women in a secondary position," associated to "feudal and tribalism views and mentality" (Sassoon 2012, p. 254). In the 1970s, the Ba'thist regime implemented a series of legislative measures aimed at encouraging women's participation in the labor force and in the general development of the country. The provision of free childcare, equal salaries, and paid maternity leave greatly enhanced women's working conditions. In 1978, the Ba'thist regime reformed the PSC at an unprecedented scale, reinforcing women's rights to divorce and child custody, imposing strict limitations on polygamy, and criminalizing forced and extralegal marriages. More importantly, the language of the PSC was modified and secularized: the religious term *zinā'* (adultery) was replaced with *khiyānazawjiyya* (marital betrayal). The GFIW's social work, reports, publications, and media campaigns, along with Saddam Hussein's numerous declarations of "women's liberation" at GFIW annual meetings, showed women's essential place in the Ba'thist modernization and development project.

However, by the mid-1980s, with the country at war with Iran with the support of its western allies, the women's movement was reduced to the GFIW, which became a mouthpiece of the Ba'th party even when it turned into a more conservative

discourse regarding family and gender issues. As the regime concentrated its budget on the war effort, weakening itself economically, it invited women to return to their houses and give birth to the "future soldiers of the nation" (Efrati 1999; Rohde 2010). Khoury (2013, p. 70) has shown the important steps taken by the GFIW in propagating the government's war narrative in its local branches, providing support to the soldiers' families, encouraging women to participate in the war effort, training nurses, and even collecting women's gold and jewelry "donations," as well as conducting surveillance and reporting dissent. The GFIW's local branches were the organ through which martyrs' families addressed their requests for compensation and their complaints. The GFIW played a crucial mediating role between the cultural, social, and security components of the Baʿth Party's local work. Its role transformed from serving a developmental and social agenda in the 1970s to one intimately bound up with managing the war's social and political repercussions. Its role in the following decade would prove no less central.

The Gulf War and the Invisible War

The US-led coalition's 6-week bombing campaign in January–February 1991 destroyed the functionality of the Iraqi economy and state. A UN special report from March 1991 indicated that after the bombing campaign, Iraq moved from a modern, highly urbanized, and mechanized economy to a pre-industrial one (Ahtissaari, M, "Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment", New York, UN Report no. S122366, March 1991). The US government launched what Joy Gordon called an "invisible war" (2010) in pressuring the UN to adopt harsh economic sanctions on the country. The UN's imposition of drastic economic sanctions perpetuated the war's destruction of state infrastructure. Hardest hit were the sectors on which women relied: the public services and social, education, and health systems. The regime in Baghdad responded by imposing austerity measures: it reduced the number of government employees, demobilized thousands of military and civilian personnel, and curbed women's work in the public sector. It pushed the population into a "survival economy" as people were forced to work several jobs, selling personal belongings and sewing their own clothes (Al-Jawaheri 2008). The dismantling of the education system, public sector, and state services impacted women's everyday lives. The effects were especially felt by female teachers and public employees, who saw their salaries plummet to such a degree that they could not even afford to pay for weekly transport (Al-Jawaheri 2008; Ali 2018). Women could not work alternative jobs; men, on the other hand, could work as engineers in the morning and as a taxi driver or shopkeepers in the afternoon. This limited women's financial contributions to the household and pushed many into domestic life. More generally, women bore the burden of household survival, as many men were involved in the military. Many women found alternative, informal ways to provide for their family's basic necessities, selling ready-made meals, personal objects, and homemade sweets, giving tutorials for teachers, nursing, or cleaning (Ismael and Ismael 2008).

In the context of extreme poverty, new forms of patriarchy emerged that were marked by conservatism and the idea that women "needed protection" (Al-Ali 2007; Al-Jawaheri 2008; Ali 2018). On the one hand, the regime's Faith Campaign espoused moral propriety of Iraqi women, and, on the other, women were forced to make degrading lifesaving choices. Female and child prostitution became rampant, and young women were forced into marriages with old wealthy men, all practices that the PSC had sought to eradicate. Proportionate to this deterioration, general poverty decimated the marriage rate. Informal unions, ʿurfi marriages, and temporary marriages, filled the gap (Ali 2018). More generally, the spread of corruption and communal and neighborhood relations degenerated into individualistic economic survival and mafia-type racketeering. This period restructured the social and cultural fabric of Iraq, fundamentally altering the values of sociability and morality (Al-Ali 2007; Al-Jawaheri 2008).

The GFIW was again charged with implementing the regime's new "tribo-Islamic" policies. Several of its leaders appeared on television wearing loose headscarfs and using religious references. Saddam Hussein's declarations and the GFIW's publications of this period show that gender rhetoric focused on denouncing the corruption of the Western world, as well as on applying shariʿa and "good Islam," to promote women's rights. Qurʾanic lessons were organized in Baʿth Party-affiliated organizations, and the GFIW trained women on Islam and the Qurʾan. Nevertheless, according to Rohde (2010), the GFIW kept a remarkably low profile during this period, which reflected the state's general loss of status. In contrast Khoury (2013) shows that despite being weakened by the war and sanctions, the GFIW was central in propagating the regime's propaganda and in managing the concrete impact of the bombings and sanctions, as well as in surveilling dissent and opposition.

Concerning the participation of the GFIW in the military conflicts themselves, Khoury evokes the dominance of women as witnesses and informants and the participation of what Baʿthists called the *mujāhidāt* in the 1991 uprising, who hit anti-regime prisoners with their shoes (2012, pp. 245–267). The role of women as informants, as fighters, as victims, and, most important, as barometers for the morality or immorality of the perpetrators (whether Baʿthists or rebels) became central to all the narratives of the events that emerged in the 1990s. Khoury shows the centrality of the Baʿth Party provincial and national leadership to the collection of information, the planning of responses, and the assessment of damages. The GFIW was involved in the regime's surveillance system – its local members were sent to participate in the celebration of Shiʿi religious rituals in Muharram, perceived by the regime as an expression of Shiʿa opposition and a place of politicization. GFIW spread the regime's "modernist" religious narrative by reminding women participating in these processions that the practices of extreme mourning of al-Hussain were potentially harmful to their and their children's health and that they should not wear the traditional ʿabaya (black robe) as this was a sign of "backwardness" (2013, p. 65).

The 2003 US-Led Invasion and Occupation

The invasion of Iraq by the US-led forces, coupled with the bombing and fighting that occurred between March and May 2003, led to approximately 150,000 civilian deaths. After the establishment of the occupation through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the establishment of Iraqi governing councils based on communal quotas, Iraqis' daily lives began to be characterized by violence. The sectarian war and the generalization of violence in the country are the direct result of the invasion and politics undertaken by the occupation administration such as the de-Baʿthication campaign and the institutionalization of a political system based on ethnosectarian quotas. De-Baʿthication decommissioned 400,000 Iraqi soldiers and Baʿth Party members, undermining the state and politically marginalizing the Sunni population. The institutionalization of ethnosectarianism as the basis of the new regime exacerbated ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflicts and provoked political, social, and territorial fragmentation (Dodge 2005; Arato 2009; Ismael and Ismael 2015). The US army's repression of uprisings against the occupation – especially in Fallujah – and the rise of political and party-associated militias benefiting from the power vacuum all took a sectarian shape. The exacerbation of sectarian conflict reached its extreme during the 2006–2007 sectarian war. This civil war and all the associated events represented the second turning point after 1991 in Iraqi sectarian relations and reorganized society and territory according to sectarian lines (Haddad 2010, 2014). Such a fracturing is visible in the division of Baghdad into homogeneously Sunni and Shiʿa neighborhoods, each separated by checkpoints and concrete walls (Damluji 2010; Pieri 2014).

The sectarian dimension of the social retribalization that started under the Baʿthist regime in the 1990s was pushed even further in the chaos that followed the invasion. Several authors (Ismael and Ismael 2008; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Ali 2018) demonstrate that sectarian violence is gendered. Most women activists I interviewed, especially public and media figures, had received

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death threats or been directly targeted by violence, including car bomb attacks in front of their offices or homes. Some had to flee the country, but the majority remains in Baghdad. Some moved into areas controlled by their sect as their neighborhoods were attacked by sectarian militias. Many neighborhoods were controlled by foreign soldiers, especially the US army until 2011, which constituted an important barrier for women who wanted to circulate freely, away from the harassing gaze of foreign armed men. In addition to the overall insecurity, which led to the deaths of many Iraqi women activists, most women interviewed noticed how the rise of conservative gender norms impacted their dress and ability to move freely in specific neighborhoods of Baghdad.

Today, many areas of the capital (and of the country) are controlled by militias and armed groups backed by conservative, sectarian Islamist political groups, and many women have witnessed or experienced incidents regarding clothes or behavior when crossing checkpoints. Incidents such as the closing of hair salons or car bomb attacks to forbid women from driving have been reported (Ali 2018). More generally, an overwhelming sense of tension has been created by the violence and the dominance of competing armed militias in the streets. It was expressed repeatedly: "Before we had one Saddam; today we have a Saddam at every street corner" (Ali 2018). Moreover, ethnographic research shows that the militarization of Iraqi public spaces has turned Baghdad into a "city of men": checkpoints, walls, and soldiers in the streets everywhere (Ali 2018). Many places are now inaccessible for women, and places such as cafés, once the pride of riverside Baghdad, are forbidden for women after 5 p.m., even in neighborhoods known for their openness. In 2007, over half the Iraqi population lived on less than 1 dollar a day. Acute malnutrition has more than doubled since 2003, affecting 43% of all children between the ages of 6 months and 5 years. Almost 50% of all households have been deprived of healthy sanitation facilities. There is a critical lack of medical drugs and equipment, and more than 15,000 doctors have been killed or kidnapped or have fled the

country. Even in Baghdad, the state provides a maximum of 5 h of electricity per day (Dawisha 2009). In addition, the lack of control and stability since 2003, as well as the privatization and liberalization of the economy, has provoked a drastic increase in the price of staple goods and basic necessities. As a result, the majority of Iraqis are poor even though they live in an oil-rich country. No major plans or policies have been undertaken by the new regime to deal with these issues. The new state's weakness and its inability to provide security and respond to basic needs (e.g., access to running water, electricity, housing, and employment), its mismanagement, and its corruption have pushed Iraqis to rely on alternative sources of protection and service. Women are the first target of the humanitarian and social crisis that started in the 1990s with the sanctions and has continued since 2003. Since the 1970s Iraqi women have been employed mainly in governmental jobs and in the public system and rely heavily on childcare, healthcare, and education support. Thus the destruction of functioning state services and institutions in 2003 impacted heavily on their everyday lives.

Fragmentation of Women's Legal Rights

The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 has exacerbated the social, economic, and political crisis in which the country has been plunged since 1991 and framed it in ethnosectarian lines. In this context marked by the institutionalization of communal – ethnosectarian and ethnoreligious – identities by the US-led administration and the extreme weakening of the state, the PSC has once again taken a central role in debates about issues of nationhood and statehood. The US-led administration put in power ethnosectarian political groups that were at the marge of power under the Ba'th regime, Shi'a Islamist parties, and Kurdish nationalists. In Arab Iraq, the US-led politics through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) marked by the institutionalization of a communal-based political system, a marginalization of the Sunni population alongside with the destruction of the old state's

institutions, in addition to the contestation of the occupation itself by most Iraqis, plunged the country into a sectarian war. The post-2003 context is characterized by an extremely weak state, a largely contested political regime and the very fragmentation of Iraqi nationhood through the institutionalization of the separation of the Kurds and the Arabs, and the Sunni-Shi'a political divide.

While Kurdish nationalists dealt with the PSC on nationalist terms in the separate territory of Iraqi Kurdistan, Shi'a Islamists, driven by the defense of their politico-sectarian identity, pushed for a questioning of the unified PSC on sectarian grounds through different propositions that all introduce the possibility of a sectarian-based PSC: Decree 137 proposed in 2003, Article 41 of the new Iraqi Constitution adopted in 2005 and more recently in 2014 the Ja'fari Law proposition. The latter, based on the Ja'fari school – main Shi'a religious school in Iraq – could allow the marriage of girls since the age of 9 years considered by the Ja'afari school as *sin al-balagha* (the age of maturity) and allow precarious forms of marriages in which women and girls loose legal protection. Activists of the Iraqi Women Network (IWN), the main independent women's rights platform in Iraq since 2003 and the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq (OWFI), were firmly opposed to all these measures, defending the Law No. 188 for its inclusion of all Muslim Iraqis. According to IWN activists, Decree 137, Article 41, and the Ja'fari Law proposition brought the very notion of the comparatively progressive and unifying PSC into question on both religious and sectarian grounds. In turn, many civil society activists expressed fears over both the adoption of a system based on a regressive and conservative reading of Muslim jurisprudence and the sectarianization of women and family issues.

Significantly, Sunni Islamists also opposed these propositions, siding instead with the preservation of a unified code that facilitates intercommunal marriage. Conversely, many Shi'a Islamist activists supported the Ja'fari Law, considering it to be an affirmation of the freedom to practice Shi'a Islam after decades of repression under the Ba'th regime. According to a survey conducted by a women's organization in southern Iraq which confirmed my own research, even the majority of the Shi'a population (70%) considered Article 41 to threaten the unity of Iraq (Bint al-Rafidain/UNIFEM 2006). Most Shi'a clerics also opposed the Ja'fari Law, for example, Hussein al-Sadr – a prominent Shi'a cleric – stated that it was better for the state to adopt civil legislation in line with international conventions and leave issues of shari'a to the clerics: "We want Iraq to be a civilian [madani] and civilized [mutahadhar] state" (Al-hewar al-mutamaden, 2 March 2014). The fact that most of the Shi'a population and clerics also oppose the sectarianization of the PSC shows how much this issue does not divide Sunnis and Shi'as on strictly religious-sectarian lines but rather on political-sectarian lines. Shi'a Islamists who are in power push for a sectarianization of the PSC which is synonymous for them of more power, while Sunni Islamists who are on the marge of power defend a unified PSC.

Protest Movements

Alongside mobilizations around women's legal rights, women civil society activists were at the forefront of the struggle for welfare and social protection laws, against corruption, advocating freedom of expression, criticizing governmental salaries and "institutionalized corruption." Most of the independent women civil society activists I met participated in the Civil Initiative to Preserve the Constitution, which was launched in 2010 to apply pressure on the government, as well as mobilizations denouncing armed violence, sectarianism, and state incompetence in providing basic public services. The IWN took a strong stand with regard to Iraq's independence from foreign interference; it supported federalism and denounced human rights abuses in Iraq (Ali 2018). Activists also raised the issue of the disappeared and prisoners of the anti-terrorism campaign, who are still detained without judgment, as well as the police and security forces' use of violence (Ali 2018).

As pointed out by Zaid al-Ali (2014, pp. 125–60) and in line with my own observations (Ali 2016,

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2017), under Nūrī al-Mālikī's first term (2006–2010), there was no mass protest in Iraq as the population was plunged into a sectarian war; opposition to the new political system was an armed opposition. During his second term (2010–2014), the wave of Arab uprisings reached Iraq and protests started; 25 February 2011 was called the Day of Rage. Thousands took to the streets despite the fact that Baghdad was declared a "no-drive zone." The security forces killed 20 demonstrators, but a hundred-day deadline was set due to the pressure of the Sadrists, one of the main Shiʿa Islamist political groups in the country, and the demonstrators. More recently, in the context of the invasion by the Islamic State Organization (IS) of Mosul in June 2014, ordinary citizens, civil society, and women's rights activists launched a strong grassroots movement on 31 July 2015 (Ali 2016, 2017). From Basra to Baghdad's Tahrir Square, this movement has expressed citizens' general exasperation at the corruption and mismanagement of the post-2003 government, corruption, and mismanagement epitomized by electricity cuts and a lack of public services. These protests quickly turned into a massive popular movement – supported by the prominent religious figure Ayatollah Sistani – vilifying Iraq's post-invasion regime and demanding radical reforms. Every Friday henceforth, demonstrators have gathered in the main public squares of Iraq's big cities, including Najaf, Nasiriya, and Basra, and echoed the slogans of the protestors in central Baghdad: "Bi-ism il-din baguna al-haramiyya" ("in the name of religion, we have been robbed by looters") and "Khubz, Huriyya, Dawla Medeniyya" ("Bread, Freedom, and a Civil State"). Demonstrators consider the new regime's corruption and sectarian politics as directly responsible for the formation and spread of IS.

The Shiʿa Islamist Sadrist movement joined the protest that started in the summer of 2015, if many civil society and women's rights activists such as OWFI's activists were critical of the involvement and hijacking of the popular movement by the Sadrists, others were far more nuanced. Hanaa Edwar, head of the Al-Amel organization and a prominent figure of the IWN, was very hopeful regarding the popular protests. She expressed positive views on the development of the protest

movement the day she visited the sit-ins with a delegation of IWN activists on 22 March 2016. Despite remaining critical of the Sadrists' populism and conservatism, especially regarding gender matters, Edwar expressed her support for the protesters and a positive view of the Sadrists' involvement. She believes that Moqtada al-Sadr's presence pushed the Sadrists' wide grassroots proletarian base onto the streets in a show of united nationhood and citizenship, especially at a stage when after weeks of mobilizations, some protesters, tired of being in the streets every Friday, were starting to go home. Many women's rights activists who participated actively in this movement of protest emphasized the importance of linking gender equality advocacy with the struggles for religious and class equality. The IWN activists insisted on the preservation of equal citizenship for Iraqis from all ethnic and religious backgrounds as a cornerstone for the preservation of women's legal rights. On 12 February 2017, pro-government thugs carrying sticks and knives attacked protesters during a demonstration organized by civil society groups that were gathered around Taḥāluf al-Iṣlāḥiyyūn (the Coalition of the Reformers). The attack resulted in the deaths of ten people, including one policeman, and hundreds of wounded. In addition to calling for the abolition of the ethnosectarian quota system and the denunciation of corruption, the demonstrators called for the Electoral Law to be reformed to include nonsectarian, small, and secular parties.

Conclusion

Past colonial legacies have met present ones: when the British invaded Iraq in the 1917, they put a conservative elite in power and put in place a system excluding the majority of the population, the US-led invasion and occupation of 2003 did the same which resulted in the questioning of the basis of women's legal rights on ethnosectarian lines. The US-led administration's destruction of the state as a unifying entity and social and economic provider has deeply impacted the social and economic lives of Iraqis. The new regime's

endemic corruption and use of violence to repress the opposition have exacerbated sectarian and political violence. As a result, women activists work in a context where the state is weak, dysfunctional, corrupt, and repressive. The state's structural ethnosectarian functioning and corruption have made it incapable of providing basic rights for its citizens – such as security and access to basic services (water, electricity, healthcare) – or of implementing a state of law. The overall climate of insecurity and political crisis, along with the competing powers of conservative militias on the streets and conservative parties in power, impact women's everyday lives and shape the limits and possibilities for women's rights advocacy.

Whether involved in women's groups or social and humanitarian organizations, women's initiatives and campaigns cover a wide range of activities that substitute the state's (lack of) welfare, educational, and social functions. However, the dysfunctional, ethnosectarian, and corrupt post-2003 state has forced women's political activists to rely on foreign funds. As a result, NGO and UN programs have shaped their agendas and discourse according to human rights notions of women's "empowerment" and "agency." Iraqi women are caught between, in Deniz Kandiyoti's words, "the hammer and the anvil": "They have to fight both for their formal *de jure* rights that are under constant threat from conservative social forces and for their substantive rights to security and human dignity that have become the casualties of endemic lawlessness and impunity in their societies" (2007).

Against all odds, independent women's groups and personalities have managed to develop their grassroots work and to participate in massive nonsectarian civil society mobilizations that have pressured the Iraqi government to implement welfare and social support and fight corruption. The work of independent women's groups and networks, in line with growing opposition to the new regime through the popular movement of protests, questions the ethnosectarian and corrupt post-2003 political system. This involvement of women activists in the movement of protest is noticeable in a context in which the Iraqi government is using the "war on terror" narrative to violently repress any kind of radical grassroots political activism.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Arab Socialism
▶ Gender and Violence
▶ Iraq, Imperialism, Political Economy, and International Law
▶ Middle East: Socialism and Anti-imperialism
▶ Petrodollar Imperialism
▶ Postcolonial Social Movements

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World Economy

▶ Monopoly-Capitalist Imperialism and the Non-profit Industrial Complex

World Literature

▶ Senghor, Leopold Sédar (1906–2001)

World Money

▶ Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt

World Systems Theory

▶ Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice (1930–2019)
▶ World-Systems Analysis and Giovanni Arrighi

World-Systems Analysis and Giovanni Arrighi

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Synonyms

Biography; Capitalism; Giovanni Arrighi; Hegemony; Imperialism; World systems theory

Definition

Giovanni Arrighi (1937–2009) was one of the world's leading theorists of world capitalism, imperialism, and anti-systemic movements. With Immanuel Wallerstein and Terence Hopkins, he played a major role in the development of world-systems analysis, with its fecund synthesis of Marxism, Third- World radicalism, and critical social science, from *Annales* to the German historical school. World-systems analysis focused on the emergence of the capitalist world-economy structured into a tripartite zonal hierarchy divided into: rich and powerful core states; poor and weak peripheral states; and states of intermediate power and wealth in the semi-peripheral zone. From his early work on Southern Africa, to his iconoclastic *Geometry of Imperialism: The Limits of Hobson's Paradigm* (1983), to his trilogy on capitalism and world hegemony seen over the *longue durée*, Arrighi established himself as one of the most original and brilliant thinkers of the 20th and 21st centuries. This essay examines his life and work.

Giovanni Arrighi (1937–2009) was one of the world's leading theorists of world capitalism,

imperialism, and anti-systemic movements. With Immanuel Wallerstein and Terence Hopkins, he played a major role in the development of world-systems analysis, with its fecund synthesis of Marxism, Third-World radicalism, and critical social science, from Annales to the German historical school. World-systems analysis focused on the emergence of the capitalist world-economy structured into a tripartite zonal hierarchy divided into: rich and powerful core states; poor and weak peripheral states; and states of intermediate power and wealth in the semi-peripheral zone. From his early work on Southern Africa, to his iconoclastic *Geometry of Imperialism: The Limits of Hobson's Paradigm* (1983), to his trilogy on capitalism and world hegemony seen over the *longue durée,* including his magisterial *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times* (1994), *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World-System* (1999, with Beverly Silver) and *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of a New Asian Age* (2007), and a series of pathbreaking essays (including 'Marxist Century, American Century: The Making and Remaking of the World Labour Movement' (1990), 'World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism' (1991), and a host of others), Arrighi established himself as one of the most original and brilliant thinkers of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Born in 1937 in Milan, Giovanni's political and scholarly interests were shaped by the common anti-fascist sentiments of his family, as during the Second World War northern Italy was occupied by the Nazis, followed by the development of the anti-fascist resistance and arrival of the Allies. Trained as a neo-classical economist and working at a host of different-sized business enterprises, Arrighi next took a teaching position in then Rhodesia. Here, in Africa, like many other world-system scholars, Arrighi developed his scholarly trajectory, mapping out the inequalities of the global system, following in the footsteps of Immanuel Wallerstein and Walter Rodney, both of whom he met in Africa, and their forerunners such as Oliver Cox, W.E.B. DuBois and C.L.R. James. During his time in Rhodesia, Arrighi met the African of Indian descent Bhasker Vashee, who

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later served as long-time director of the Transnational Institute, an international fellowship of committed scholar-activists, headed earlier by the legendary anti-imperialist activist Eqbal Ahmad and Orlando Letelier, former adviser in Allende's socialist government in Chile and later murdered in a car bomb in Washington, D.C. by Pinochet's secret police. Arrighi and Vashee were in fact jailed together for their anti-colonial activities, with Giovanni deported after a week and Bhasker only released from solitary confinement after a year-long campaign. By 1966, Giovanni had gone on to Dar es Salaam, then home to many of Africa's national liberation movements, where he met Wallerstein, Rodney, John Saul and many others.

One of Arrighi's earliest essays, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia', included in his *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (1973, with John Saul), helped make his career. The essay was a brilliant analysis of the dispossession of the African peasantry in the age of imperialism. Here, along with the work of Saul, Martin Legassick and others, Arrighi helped develop a distinctive South Africa paradigm analysing the contradictions of this process for capitalist development in the region. Subsequently, Arrighi returned to Italy to teach, helping to found Gruppo Gramsci, before moving on to the centre of world-systems analysis in the US, SUNY Binghamton, and then later to Johns Hopkins, where he taught until his death in 2009.

One of Arrighi's most important but neglected works is his *Geometry of Imperialism.* Among the problems Arrighi identified here was that the term had come to be applied to everything and anything, thus weakening its conceptual usefulness. Indeed, Arrighi relates how, during an important seminar at Oxford on the subject in 1969–70 (a turning point in the debate on imperialism, according to Michael Barrat Brown), he presented a paper on the question, noting that its characteristics after the Second World War were radically different to those analysed by Hobson and Lenin.

> During the discussion, someone asked me whether I did not think that, by dint of filling 'old bottles' (the theory of imperialism) with 'new wine' (the

> novel content being lent to the theory) we would end up no longer knowing what was being discussed. (1983)

Lenin, in his work, noted that imperialism and colonialism were not synonymous with capitalism, going back as they did to Rome, and instead placed his emphasis on the central role of finance and/or monopoly capital. Moreover, Lenin specifically outlined the phenomenon of uneven development, which, he argued, following Hobson, was then leading to a global conflagration between imperialist states in the world capitalist system. This, argued Arrighi, was a quite accurate designation of the situation before the First and Second World Wars, but was largely irrelevant thereafter, as might have been expected from Lenin's own remarks on the subject. In applying the term 'imperialism' to quite different phenomena, it became what one analyst called 'A Tower of Babel'. In an analysis that was subsequently incorporated into his later work, Arrighi noted that Lenin tended to conflate two definitions of finance capital. The first was Hobson's, designating as it did a supranational entity with few if any links to productive activity; this resulted from class struggle, and led to income inequalities and the concomitant tendency towards underconsumption, his 'tap-root' of imperialism, as in England. The second definition was Hilferding's emphasis on the linkage between nations and their monopoly firms. These two designations more or less accurately captured the situation of England and Germany.

Hobson, first in his *The War in South Africa* (1900) and then later in *Imperialism* (1965), used the term to designate the process whereby nationalism, at least among the Great Powers, became subject to a general tendency by states to expand beyond their own borders. This was to be distinguished from colonialism of earlier periods, whereby population transfers became the basis for the effective expansion of a nationality, or new nations, as in the Americas or Australia. In the era of imperialism, the process tended to generate nationalisms of their own, replete with exclusivism and xenophobia, as with South Africa's white Afrikaners. Hobson contrasted this, too, with variants of internationalism, informal orders

of trade and investment based on peaceful exchange, which Arrighi refers to as 'Informal Empire' as opposed to formal territorial ones, based on economic inter-dependence in the former and replete with politico-military competition in the latter. Of course, as Arrighi outlined in his chapter on English imperialism, Britain combined both informal and formal territorial empires, with India the centre of the latter (hence the term 'Free Trade Imperialism') while the US tended towards Informal Empire based not on free trade but on free enterprise via the multinational corporation.

Clarified further here is Hobson's conception of finance capital, as speculative monetary flows going towards the great financial houses, or high finance, 'who use stocks and shares not so much as investments to yield them interest, but as material for speculation in the money market' (quoted in Arrighi 1983: 116). Hobson referred to these financial houses as the 'governor of the imperial engine', able to manipulate the life of nations. In Hobson's view, then, high finance presents two main characteristics. In the first place, it is:

> a *supranational* entity laying outside the place defined by the expansion of a nationstate. Secondly, while not belonging to this plane, it nevertheless influences it in a critical manner. *For in so far as it is a speculative intermediary* on *the monetary market,* high finance tends to transform the excess liquidity present on the market into demand for new investment opportunities, that is, principally for state loans and territorial expansion. (Arrighi 1983: 117)

This contrasts, too, of course, to a substantial extent, with Polanyi's conception of financial capital in his *The Great Transformation* (1957), as Arrighi points out. This goes back to a contradiction at the heart of high finance itself, needing the state for expansion and protection, but at times vulnerable to escalating inter-state competition, especially as this reversed the very tendency towards under-consumption to which it ostensibly owed its existence, presaging the triumph of commodity capital over money capital. Here, too, one can see the distinct types of supranational tendencies and variants of imperialism: the nation state and industrial and commodity capital, in Germany, contrasting sharply as it did with US hegemony and the supranational expansion of its

multinational corporations, especially after the Second World War. In his afterword, Arrighi arrived at an understanding that his work had become perhaps more useful, less as an analysis of imperialism than as a preface to a theory of world hegemony, with each expressing 'a different type of supra/transnationality of capital', with differing trajectories. To be sure, Hobson often referred to related aspects of imperialism, notably the public subsidy of private profit that went with its territorial ambitions, something that has been underscored in the context of US power by Noam Chomsky and others. Yet Arrighi, by focusing on the specific historical situation that Hobson and Lenin were analysing, tried to focus in on the analysis and specific object of the debates on imperialism overall during this period, in contrast to the conditions obtained after the Second World War. So while those related phenomena as Hobson and others underscored undoubtedly continue, including of course the use of violence to achieve politico-economic objectives abroad, Arrighi underscored the extent to which, despite US counter-revolutionary policies worldwide, US hegemony was associated with formal decolonisation of the vast majority of the globe.

Arrighi's most ambitious work, *The Long Twentieth Century* (1994; 2010), is widely considered by many the most compelling single volume account of capitalism over the *longue* durée. Drawing on Marx, Gramsci, Polanyi, and Braudel, he argues that capitalism has unfolded over a series of long centuries, within which hegemonic powers led systemic cycles of accumulation presiding over material and then financial expansions of the capitalist world-system. Here, Systemic cycles of accumulation brought together a hegemonic bloc of business and governmental organisations from the Italian city-states where capitalism emerged, wherein the capitalist city-state of Genoa allied with imperial Spain, the resulting transformation producing the successive three hegemonies of historical capitalism: the United Provinces, Britain, and the United States. What was distinctive here was the emergence of a capitalist logic of power, where the pursuit of money and profit was either more important than territory per se, or they cross-fertilised each other,

as in the example of imperial Britain. As opposed to the ideology of the competitive free market, the basis for the book is Braudel's conceptualisation of capitalism as the top level of world trade and finance, closely in league with violence and state power, where the law of the jungle operates and the great predators roam, guided by the principle of monopoly, where the great profits of capitalism have always been made.

This analysis is in line with Arrighi's emphasis on the centrality of Schumpeterian innovations and concomitant rents and monopolies in profits and related competitive pressures which, as part of recurrent bouts of inter-state and inter-enterprise competition, shaped and moulded the capitalist world-system as it evolved to global scale and scope, divided as it is between relational zones of unequal power and wealth, into the core rich states, the poor peripheral zones, and an intermediate semi-peripheral zone of medium level wealth. While all world-systems analysts agree on the reproduction of inequality in the capitalist world-economy, however, there is less agreement as to its causality. Here, Arrighi has underscored the centrality of unilateral transfers of capital and labour, both forced and voluntary, from the African slave trade to white-settler colonialism and related investment from Britain and elsewhere, in the great leap forward in wealth and power of that geopolitical designation today known as the West, underscoring of course, here, the entwined processes of race, ethnicity, and class formation in the global system. Furthermore, as conceptualised here, the capitalist world-economy is based on the reproduction of oligarchic wealth, presupposing the exploitation, exclusion, and ecological appropriation and despoliation of the great majority of humanity and their natural resources as outlined for example in Alfred Crosby's (2004) *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900.* While transformations in the structure are possible, as seen in the rise and fall of hegemonic and great powers, and rises or declines in wealth, underscored here is the structure of inequality. At the same time, as Arrighi argues, over time there have been substantial transformations in the social foundations of the three hegemonies of historical capitalism.

The publication of *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (2007) represented the culmination of what Arrighi called an unplanned trilogy on historical capitalism and the origins of our times, begun with *The Long Twentieth Century* (2010/1994) and continued with *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (1999). The central idea behind the book was twofold: first, to analyse the shift in the epicentre of the capitalist world-economy from North America to East Asia in the context of Adam Smith's theory of economic growth and development; and second, to interpret Smith's masterpiece *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) in light of this very shift.

The book begins, like the *Long Twentieth Century* before it, with quotations from Smith on the discovery of the Americas and Smith's emphasis on the 'superiority of force' in determining the outcomes of market exchanges, not unlike similar observations by Fernand Braudel's comments on Europe as that monstrous shaper of world history. Part I, 'Adam Smith and the New Asian Age', analyses what Kenneth Pomeranz refers to as the 'Great Divergence' between East and West, with the rise of Western Europe and its settler offshoots in the Americans, notably North America, and the decline of Chinese-led East Asia. Drawing on Smith and Kaoru Sugihara, Arrighi contrasts what, on the one hand, he calls a Smithian, natural-path, Chinese-led East Asia path of both extensive and industrious development, with pronounced investments in labour-intensive, labour-absorbing, energy-saving production and based on market exchanges; with, on the other hand, the unnatural capital and energy-intensive path, based on labour-saving technology and replete with an industrial revolution and a correspondingly close relationship between state and capital. Of course, this conceptualisation of the rise of Chinese-led East Asia as a market-based social system, rather than capitalist, is a subject of fierce controversy and debate, with many arguing against Arrighi for the capitalism-based nature of Chinese development in the world-system today.

The resurgence of Chinese-led East Asia today is seen as a result of a fusion between these two paths, though with a clear understanding that

given the ecological limits inherent in Western processes of industrialisation, some more ecologically friendly form of development will be necessary if East Asia's continued rise is to open up a more sustainable path of development for the global system as a whole. What is particularly distinctive here in the Chinese-led East Asian model is not that there are no capitalists in these developments, but that they have no capacity to dictate to the state their own class interests as opposed to the general interest. In the Western capitalist path, in contrast, to varying degrees, as Marx and Engels noted, the power of the capitalist class turns the state into the executive committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie. Two critical aspects of the capitalist path of Western development were the inter-state competition for mobile capital that allowed capitalists to dictate to the states the conditions under which they would assist them to power, and the related arms race that created a virtuous circle for capitalist development in the West and a vicious circle for most of the non-Western victims of white-settler imperialism and colonialism across the globe.

Part II, 'Tracking Global Turbulence', examines Robert Brenner's varying accounts of the crisis of capitalist development beginning in the 1970s, but also compares the present downturn with that of the late nineteenth century, notably the Great Depression of 1873–96. Central to the analysis is the way in which the downturn of the late nineteenth century heralded the classic age of imperialism, as inter-enterprise competition turned into inter-state competition for overseas territories and markets, leading to the generalised conflagration that was the First and Second World Wars. As Brenner argues, in an analysis that was first laid out theoretically by Adam Smith, increased inter-capitalist competition played a central role in declining profits, in what Arrighi sees as a crisis of the overaccumulation of money or finance capital which cannot be profitably reinvested, going instead to varying degrees into state loans for overseas territorial expansion, or military spending.

A central difference, then, and one crucial to Arrighi's analysis of the contrast between late 19th- and early twentieth-century imperialism and similar phenomena today was the US reconstruction of the global capitalist market after the Second World War within the institutional framework of US global military alliances. In this formulation, the Cold War was about containing America's communist enemies and its capitalist allies, the latter as semi-sovereign states, as part of its informal empire. While appreciative of Brenner's analysis, Arrighi critiques it for underestimating the role of the US war in Indochina in the declining fortunes of US hegemony, being almost exclusively focused instead on US competition with Germany and Japan. This process of hegemonic decline continued with the new Cold War beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the temporary efflorescence of US power in a unipolar one-superpower world. As in previous hegemonic cycles, the temporary reflation of the hegemonic power was simultaneous with a resurgence of its financial power in the global capital markets. This process was of course part and parcel of the financialisation of the US and global economy, with roots in the over-accumulation crisis and the move to floating exchange rates in the 1970s.

Here, the counter-revolution in monetary and development policy beginning with the rise of US interest rates in 1979 and the emergence of the Washington Consensus, ensured the reflation of world demand centred on the West, to the detriment of the Second and Third Worlds, which had borrowed money at variable interest rates for development in previous decades. This reversal also represented a massive abandonment of the New Deal tradition of subordinating private to public finance, showing too the ability of the capitalist class to dictate to all states the conditions under which it would assist to power, reflected here in the rise of the price of money, which facilitated an unprecedented wave of US indebtedness on the global capital markets. Simultaneous with the historic reversals in monetary policies were a host of inter-related bubbles and concomitant financial crises from Asia in 1997 to the global financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008.

Of course, it was also the Vietnam War and the related crisis of American capitalism and subsequent booms that allowed East Asia to move up the value-added hierarchy of the world-economy by simultaneous regional development and the selling of commodities in the West. Moreover, this process was part and parcel of what Arrighi called his systemic cycles of accumulation and related hegemonic cycles. Here, hegemonic powers preside over material expansions of the world-economy, with pronounced investments in material production and trade. When competition increases and profits concomitantly decline, the over-accumulation of capital and increased inter-state competition provides the supply and demand conditions for a financial expansion of the world-economy, the emergence of new regional centres or hegemonic contenders, and a related increase in systemic chaos. In these various autumns of hegemonic cycles and long waves of capitalist development, there are increasing polarisations of wealth, power, and income in the global economy and various national locales, as expressed for example in the *belle époque* of the European bourgeoisie in the late nineteenth century and the US's successive gilded ages, including that of today. This tendency has been recognised most recently in Thomas Piketty's (2014) *Capital in the twenty-first Century*, where he notes the tendency towards oligarchy globally and most especially in the US, which he sees as representing the most unequal society in world history in terms of the relationship between work, income, and wealth inequality. And in fact, though Arrighi's work in this regard is often misunderstood, class struggle and the polarisation of the capitalist world-economy into core and peripheral locales, along with related inter-state competition for mobile capital, in fact play critical roles in his conceptualisation of systemic cycles of accumulation, hegemonic cycles and recurrent phases of material and financial expansions of the capitalist world-system.

In Part III, 'Hegemony Unravelling', Arrighi begins by analysing the resurgence of the debate on empire and imperialism following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the ascendance of those promoters of the Project for the New American Century in the Bush Administration, which led to the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in the Spring of 2003, whose disastrous legacy is still with us today with President Obama's announcement of a new endless war against ISIS. Underscored here, however, are the differences between what Arrighi sees as the US's bid for a truly world empire after 9/11 and previous instances of imperialism. Most significant, Arrighi argues, is the degree to which the US invasion of Iraq has backfired, merely adding to the rise of Chinese-led East Asia in the global economy. In this light, the superbubble of American hegemony, as George Soros once dubbed it, appears to have been ephemeral indeed, despite the still great residual power of the US in the increasingly chaotic global system.

Arrighi reviews the literature on the new imperialism, including David Harvey's (2003) book of that exact title. Arrighi (2007: 11) notes that both Hobson and Harvey were quick to point out the variety of contradictory phenomena to which the term 'imperialism' has historically been applied, underscoring that: 'Its most general meaning is an extension or imposition of the power, authority or influence of a state over other states, or stateless communities'. By this definition, Arrighi notes, the phenomenon has been around for quite some time, assuming a variety of forms. But Harvey focuses in particular, as did Hobson, on the relationship between capitalism and imperialism, while Arrighi in turn underscores the space of flows, or capitalism seen as a succession of systemic cycles of capital accumulation, and the fusion between capitalism and the state, where world capitalism can be seen as part and parcel of the rise and decline of hegemonic powers, as outlined in his three hegemonies of historical capitalism. What is particularly interesting here is the link Arrighi establishes between the over-accumulation of capital and the production of space, drawing on Harvey's theory of the spatio-temporal fix of capital addressed early in his classic but sadly neglected *The Limits to Capital* (2007). This fix is linked to what Marx referred to as 'the annihilation of space through time', part and parcel of processes of capitalist globalisation, as capital seeks to overcome barriers to its

reproduction by moving through time and space seeking to valorise.

The accumulation of capital, then, and related processes of imperialism, become linked to Schumpterian processes of creative destruction, including what Henri Lefebvre (1992) called *The Production of Space*. There are many analogies here with Edward Soja's Postmodern *Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (2009). Here, creative destruction, including that of built environments, is part and parcel of the changing historical geography of capital accumulation, as landscapes are made and destroyed to facilitate the capitalist accumulation of capital, including through war, if necessary. As Arrighi notes, Harvey's analysis was inspired by Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (as was Marx's), where the contradictions of bourgeois civil society within unequal nation-states and their combination of wealth and poverty (what Marx called the absolute, general law of capital accumulation) necessitated the turn towards overseas expansion through imperialism and colonialism, which in turn ensured that the general law would be part of capital accumulation on a global scale, including the core–periphery divide. This spatio-temporal fix sought by bourgeois society was also analysed to varying extents by Hannah Arendt (1973) in her *Origins of Totalitarianism*.

One of the key processes is the ongoing primitive accumulation of capital, including the dispossession of original producers from their means of production, or what Harvey and others have called accumulation through dispossession. Here, Arrighi points out the convergence and divergence between his and Harvey's analysis, looking at the connections between dispossession and the expanding reproduction of capital in hegemonic powers, and his own and Marx's, who noted that the varied stating points of capitalist development (Venice, Holland, Britain, and the US) are simultaneously representative of the transfer of wealth and money capital, which restart capitalist development, in containers of ever larger scale and scope. At this point, Arrighi points to an anomaly within current processes of the expanded reproduction of capital on a global scale, namely that

instead of surplus capital going to the rising centre, China, it is the latter that is investing in the US.

This suggests a limit to the process, whereby, in Arrighi's reformulation of Marx's general formula of capital, M-C-M', also represents a recurrent pattern of global capitalism, in its alternation between phases of material expansions of the world-economy (M-C) and phases of financial expansions (C-M) (or Marx's abbreviated general formula (M-M'), representing what Arrighi calls systemic cycles of accumulation (M-C-M'). These cycles have propelled capitalist development and related processes of imperialism forward in space and time through recurrent spatial fixes aimed at the broadening and deepening the increasingly global division of labour during material expansions of the capitalist world-system. When these expansions reach their limits and there is an over-accumulation of capital relative to profitable outlets for investment, capital pulls out of trade and investment in material production and shifts towards investments in or betting on states, including through the buying-up of national debts until the system is remade under newer and broader social foundations under a rising hegemonic power. In previous cycles, then, overseas imperialism and related *belles* époques of the European bourgeoisie deepen the crises of capitalist development, including by the exacerbation of inter-state competition and inter-imperialist wars as part of struggles for world hegemony. Indeed, Arrighi (2007: 235) quotes approvingly Arendt's observation that imperialism ought to be thought of as 'the first stage in the political rule of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism'.

Arrighi moves on to chronicle Braudel's contention that the territorial size of the centre of accumulation in the global system necessitated growth to manage its ever-growing global spatial scale. Arrighi then takes the reader through a tour of capitalist imperialism from the Italian city-states, to the Dutch Republic, to the fusion of capitalism and imperialism in Britain, with a particular focus on the industrialisation of war. Thereafter, Arrighi, drawing on the work of Ludwig Dehio, shows how the rise of the US and the USSR transformed, to a larger extent,

the previous European balance of power with the emergence of superpowers on both sides of Continental Europe. As Arrighi chronicles the declining returns that the US is garnering from its militarised and extroverted path of capitalist development, part of the West European legacy, he sets the stage, finally, for Part IV, 'Lineages of the New Asian Age'.

Here, Arrighi traces China's astonishing resurgence at the centre of the material expansion of the East Asian region, underscoring the unique aspect of East Asia's 500 years peace, predating and relative to that of the West's militarised inter-state system, with its only 100-year peace on the European continent from 1815 to 1914. What was unique here, in what Fernand Braudel once called the super world-economy of the Far East, was its market-based economy, and China's related tribute trade system, here distinguished from capitalism, the top layer of high trade and finance closely linked with state power. While capitalists existed throughout this system, unlike in the West, they did not control the state. Of course, under the impact of the expanding Western inter-state system and capitalist world-economy, China and East Asia were eventually incorporated into the Western system as subordinate units.

Yet here, the achievements of the Chinese communist revolution, for all its violence and terror, made great gains, as Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen and others have shown, in the fields of health care, education, and eventually economic development. Along with the role of the overseas Chinese trading diaspora, not to mention China's almost unlimited supplies of labour, in sharp contrast to Africa, this enabled China to resume its former position at the head of the trade expansion in the region, not to mention its role as the world's industrial workshop. Underscored here are the market-based rather than capitalist aspects of this development, notably the process of accumulation without dispossession, including the role of township and village enterprises in the region, in sharp contrast to the processes of accumulation with dispossession that characterise the Africa of the labour reserves, especially in Southern Africa. In the latter region, drawing on the work of Gillian Hart and others, Arrighi notes that this legacy of white-settler colonialism and especially British imperialism impoverished the Southern African peasantry and working classes, eventually posing massive blockages to the continued accumulation of capital and contributing to the increasing peripheralisation of Africa in the global system.

While underscoring the social origins of China's ascent, Arrighi notes that unless China and the East Asian region are able to address the unsustainable aspects of capitalist development in the West and its impact on the global South, most especially ecological degradation, global impoverishment and global inequalities, then it is unlikely that a new path will be opened up for the remaking of the global system on new and enlarged social foundations, able to provide for greater democracy, equality and a new more sustainable relationship between humans, other species and nature and between human beings themselves. If, however, the positive traditions of the East Asian heritage can embrace new paths of development, more egalitarian and more sustainable, in conjunction with other forces in the global North and South looking for alternative socially just policies for a new global system, then Chinese-led East Asia's resurgence may be seen in hindsight as providing for a true commonwealth of civilisations based on mutual equality and respect that was Adam Smith's hoped-for long-term outcome of world-market formation and bring many of those phenomena associated with imperialism to an end.

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World-Systems Theory

▶ Ecological Imperialism: A Theoretical Overview

▶ Ottoman Empire and Imperialism

W

Y

Yellow Peril

▶ Pan-Asianism

Yemen

▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)

Yemen, Imperialism in

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Synonyms

British Raj; Commodities; Egypt; India; Indian Ocean; Indonesia; Islam; Middle East

Description

To better appreciate modern imperialism in Yemen, the following charts how relations with Eurasian powers like the Ottomans and Britain shifted from humble alliance making to outright (almost always failed) attempts at military conquest. As argued, it is crucial to reflect more closely on the manner Eurasian agents secured their initial foothold in the Western Indian Ocean world by way of such alliances. By the time Ottoman surrogates like Muhammad Ali and crews linked to venture capitalists in London established a presence in the Red Sea, the political orientations of a growing set of new political-spiritual movements were on the rise. The subsequent adaptations by Ottoman and British officers would directly impact how their respective empires evolved over the following nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Introduction: Yemen and the World

For millennia, the inhabitants of South Arabia maintained a complex relationship with the larger world. Of primary importance had been the economic relations a multiplicity of distinctive (occasionally hostile) polities inhabiting regions today associated with Yemen maintained with others. Exchanging their valuable commodities like coffee and frankincense with Eurasian, Eastern Africa, and the Indian Ocean communities, Yemenis accumulated considerable wealth. With this wealth, extended families influenced both market affairs and interstate politics well beyond Arabia.

It was especially the families originating from the Eastern regions of Hadhramaut that thrived as overseas conglomerates; their virtual colonies in

SE Asia, India, and Eastern Africa empowered Yemeni businesses, aided in the spread of Islam, and eventually led to the establishment of Muslim dynasties that remained linked to Arabia. By the time the Ottoman Empire and their European merchant rivals arrived in the Indian Ocean world in the sixteenth century, these Yemeni diasporas were entrenched politically from Eastern Africa to the South China Sea. In the subsequent era of Eurasian imperialism in the larger Indian Ocean arena, these Yemeni communities played the role of local interlocutor, a relationship with the empire that endures until today (Clarence-Smith 2002).

The wealth accumulated in these regions through this process of exchange was so great that it had long been deemed imprudent for trading companies based out of Amsterdam or London to betray these Yemeni origin diasporas. The ultimate arbiters of power, Yemenis as such had a critical role in shaping the nature of modern imperialism in Eastern Africa, Southeast Asia, and Arabia itself. As political dynasties throughout the Indian Ocean and South China Sea regions wielded enough influence to make or break commercial enterprises from Europe, the evolution of modern imperialist policies necessarily required as much politics as violence. Indirect "rule" thus found its most obvious utility in the interactions imperial administrations sought with indigenous actors claiming some familial, business, political, or spiritual link to Yemen (Bang 2004).

By the seventeenth century, traders representing North Atlantic companies sought access to the terraced hills covered in addictive coffee beans, while Ottoman Janissaries laid counterclaims to the richest lands of all the Islamic realms. In these early modern iterations of the kind of negotiated imperialism that went global in subsequent centuries, Eurasian engagements with Southwest Arabia were more overtures of partnership than attempts at conquest. As such, exchanges between Dutch and British traders and their South Arabian interlocutors constituted the nuanced relationship of opportunity that brought Northwestern Europe first economically into a realm once reserved for the Portuguese pirates infesting the Indian Ocean and their Ottoman/Persian rivals (Casale 2010).

By solidifying mutually beneficial relations that quickly extended beyond just trade to also include military alliances in SE Asia and Eastern Africa, indigenous actors and their Eurasian allies established a working formula to assure the integration of modern imperialism throughout the larger Indian Ocean. The form of this integration took invariably contributed to the way the two primary imperialist projects in Yemen during the modern era took form. Indeed, both the Ottoman and British investments in expanding the empire in the region did reflect ambitions to thwart the other's bid at monopolizing access to the region. But such measures can only be understood by appreciating the impact mediated engagements with Yemenis had on how such strategies were developed. In other words, what transpired in South Arabia from the beginning of the nineteenth century constitutes both a unique story in the larger history of modern imperialism and a likely corrective to our understanding of how these respective empires transformed over the period.

Yemen as Source of Legitimacy

As the various imperialist projects that directly impacted life in Yemen constituted an amorphous, sometimes disorganized cluster of competing interests, it is impossible to ignore the already well-iterated corrective scholarship on the British Empire (Cooper 2005; Wilson 2016). The same nuanced reflection on Ottoman operations remains at its early form (Kuehn 2011; Blumi 2012; Minawi 2016). Of crucial importance here is the role of indigenous actors such as the Zaydi imams and Hadrami shaykhs as well as their rivals and fickle allies. It was these local entrepreneurs' political acumen and spiritual and/or economic influence, however modest on the global scale, which overwhelmed imperialist efforts to subdue them over the last 200 years. As such, the approaches to administrating the necessarily dynamic relations two often rival imperialist projects maintained with Yemenis require contextualizing in as much local as global terms.

As noted throughout, of primary importance were the initial commercial gains from securing

alliances with local Yemeni polities. Perhaps of equal importance, however, especially over the long term, was the larger ideological reward for securing these alliances. Yemen's symbolic value to would-be global actors, often operating exclusively within Muslim-majority contexts elsewhere in Asia or Africa, necessarily required close attention to a balance between control and partnership (Green 2011). After all, many of the primary interlocutors in South Arabia were part of networks responsible for the maintenance of the robust cultural productivity found in South Arabia's long visited centers of spiritual pilgrimage. Be it Zabid, Abha, Tarim, or Saʻadah, the corresponding political and religious order (or threat of disorder) Yemenis could offer would-be Eurasian administrators of far flung Asian and African Muslim communities, meant Yemen's spiritual leaders had some leverage over those claiming global power (Laffan 2003; Ho 2006).

Indeed, it is impossible to appreciate the larger political order for much of the modern era (from 1800 to the present) without its mutually affective relationship to the short-lived Eurasian struggle to integrate Yemen into their respective spheres of influence. A presence in Yemen brought some legitimacy in the larger Muslim world. At the same time, alliances with prominent Yemeni spiritual leaders could also help instigate instability for rival empires. This dual role of stabilizing ally and weaponized rival is most evident in the events of the early nineteenth century.

The well-known story of the momentary rise of Wahhabism and the Saud conquest of Mecca/Medina in 1805 animated the Ottoman sultanate to initiate a response that had long-term consequences for the spread of Eurasian imperialism into the region. Forced to rely in the end on an Ottoman-Albanian general governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, the 1811–1818 war over control of the Hijaz and the holy cities had a spillover effect that extended to Yemen. While less studied, the manner in which Muhammad Ali's forces subdued the Saud rebellion proves crucial to the long-term stability of the Yemen and larger Red Sea region, by the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, of singular strategic importance to capitalist imperialism. As much a

loyalist as a rebel himself, Muhammad Ali returned not only the Hijaz region to Ottoman authority but extended the campaign to suppress equally dangerous rebellions with religious undertones throughout the Red Sea.

Long forgotten in the literature was the expansive role Muhammad Ali's forces played in introducing modern imperialism in Yemen. As his well-trained Egyptian and Balkan troops forged a formidable political unit that extended from Egypt, through Sudan, Ethiopia, and into the Great Lakes region, Muhammad Ali's expansive project, formally in the name of the Ottoman sultan, eventually extended to the eastern shores of the Red Sea (Blumi 2013: 21–42). At the time (1820s until 1838), indigenous, regional actors, and political leaders linked to merchant networks and often identified with rival religious organizations – Sufi orders and established Zaydi households – the entirety of what was politically and culturally Yemen was under the throes of destabilizing rebellions often induced by once loyal troops to Egypt's new ruling family (Fahmy 2012). Such conditions offered those with greater political ambitions (and a capacity to project violence across larger territories, especially Muhammad Ali and the British East India Company) an opportunity to service new alliances that proved the precursors to a longer imperialist project.

It is critical to highlight that these engagements were not the primary by-product of imperialist ambitions as long asserted in the literature. Indeed, revisiting the context in which this initial alliance was made – deemphasizing the violent subordination of all of Yemen, as often implied – puts front and center a local factor to account for especially British commercial interests gaining access to the region. Crucially missed in the larger context were the competitive origins of such alliances.

A Local Resource: Political Entrepreneurs and Indirect Rule

Local actors throughout the coastal areas of the Red Sea saw their potential marginalization as the

regional economy appeared to shift to reflect the new expansive – perhaps even imperialistic – ambitions of Muhammad Ali's surrogates. Be they entirely under his command or not, the violence they brought to the region threatened some locals to the extent that they made the perfectly logical overture to interested foreign parties for help (Miran 2009). In other words, local Yemenis, responding to indigenous conditions, opened the door to explore a new commercial (and soon political) arena for British capital.

That the exploitative dynamics of subsequent relations quickly translated into overtures to potential local allies – sanctioned and formalized by way of treaties with recognized "amirs" – necessarily entangles a larger set of actors in accounting for imperialism in Yemen. Crucially, it was the manner in which Ali's forces successfully engaged an ever-shifting menagerie of would-be religious leaders (or their followers) that offered the British merchants based in India their first opportunity to gain access to lucrative Yemeni trade. The region linking Mecca/Medina with Yemen by way of the 'Asir (until 1934, when Saudi Arabia annexed the territory from Yemeni polities) had become infested with religious-themed revolts, at times inspired by the ultra-orthodoxy advocated by the Wahhabi brotherhood or, as reactions, various Sufi-like Ismaili movements.

These multiple 'Asir rebellions over the 1818–1840 period may have found their origins in the actions of locals like Sharif Hammud of Abu 'Arish who established an alliance with the Wahhabis prior to the arrival of Muhammad Ali's forces in 1818. Another, more long-term threat to Ottoman/Egyptian plans to bring the Hijaz into the fold was Muhammad Agah. A mercenary with a large Albanian contingency of allies, by defecting from the service of the Ottoman sultan in the bloody period after the formal defeat of the Wahhabis in Mecca, Agah could seek an independent political path. From 1818 until his boarding a British ship for Bombay two decades later, Agah forged alliances with a variety of local communities in the search for political leverage and immediate economic gain. Allies like Ali bin Mukhtar, an early adherent to the Ismaili-orientated Idrisi

order just beginning to establish itself in the region, took advantage of such shifting power alliances to gain much sought-after overtures from Ottoman, British, Omani, or Dutch representatives.

It was in this context of seeking to reaffirm their investments in the larger Indian Ocean that Britain "discovered" a vibrant, fertile political arena into which merchants bearing English affiliation became willful allies with some of these Yemeni entrepreneurs. As reported by British officers surveying the Red Sea in 1838, the complex reactions initiated by Egyptian/Ottoman intrigues demanded a carefully considered response (TNA, FO 78/342, no. 15 Campbell to Palmerston, 27 March 1838, report from James McKenzie of the Bengal Lancers). The most important result of these debated overtures to local potential allies was an alliance with Muhsin bin Fadl of Lahj in 1838. Apparently under some threat of violence, British representative Captain Haines secured the port of Aden and environs from "the sultan of Aden" under the pretext of protecting trade from the larger instability caused by perpetual battles for power in areas north and west of Aden. Crucially, the precarious nature of this "alliance" meant the subsequent form of imperialist relations with South Arabian inhabitants required a multi-varied system of recruitment and coercion. This mediated, constantly renegotiated approach left much of the management of what authorities in Bombay formally identified as provisionally "British" to those living there (Dresch 2000).

The consequences of this "indirect rule" approach meant very little in terms of actual economic rewards but did start a process of integrating South Arabia into a strategic calculus that extended from the Red Sea to Singapore. Critically, the resulting emergence of an Aden base from which the British Empire protected access to its East Asian and African colonies empowered otherwise marginal indigenous actors. In time, more and more pliable local allies were integrated into a British sphere of influence. Despite their largely symbolic power, the leaders of the 25 separate polities signed treaties with the subsequent generations of British administrators, thus gaining some leverage over the operations of both

the British and Ottoman empires. This is proven by the periodic diplomatic crisis the two empires in Yemen faced as their respective local allies exploited the leverage they enjoyed to gain at the expense of rival Yemenis.

Capable of upsetting the precarious "stability" sought by both regimes, administrators based out of Bombay eventually formulated a plan to create a conglomerate of sultanates and emirates, calling it by the 1870s the "Western Protectorate" (WAP) to better define the political parameters of the empire's presence in Yemen. This cluster of vulnerable polities would serve as a bulwark to Ottoman and Zaydi imamate expansion toward Aden for the next 150 years. With the completion of the Suez Canal, Aden became more than just a coaling station, and the port became a veritable base of imperial operations.

Only in 1937, however, after much negotiation, would the formalities of British imperialism bring a South Arabian enterprise into the fold of the larger Indian Ocean context (Gavin 1975). In this year, Aden and its critical military and shipping role formally became an imperial colony and no longer a territory of India (Robbins 1939). At the same time an Eastern Protectorate was forged, consisting of a loose alliance of various Hadhrami polities with the sultanates of Kathri and Mahra. These modifications reflected once again a changing strategic value to British imperialism.

Here the foundations of modern imperialism in Yemen are laid. Necessarily predicated on alliances competing locals periodically sought, what were first only commercial enterprises like the British East India Company or a stopgap military expedition led by forces loyal to Muhammad Ali based in Egypt, by the end of the nineteenth century, became two very animated systems of political negotiation with little outstanding economic rewards. Rivalries between local claimants to authority offered, in other words, imperialism a point of entry but rarely a formula for reliable integration of Yemen into a truly exploitative imperialist project.

If imperialism itself is defined as a system in which one political, cultural, and/or economic order imposes itself on, in this case Yemen, the story of imperialism in Yemen is ambiguous. In this respect, Yemen since the 1830s has been going through violent political reorientations that induced direct imperialist investment into local and regional power struggles. Where foreign imperialism is most distinguishable from otherwise complicated local affairs is when the imperialist project attempts to impose the subordination of otherwise resilient indigenous actors. That every such project in Yemen recorded over this 200-year history has failed to implement such hegemony should be of importance to the reader, and a closer inspection of the forms of engagement between imperial administrators and locals is needed.

When a foreign power has tried to use direct violence in Yemen, it has been used in an attempt to tip the scales in favor of one of the local surrogates of empire rather than secure outright direct occupation. In the case of the Ottoman foray into local Yemeni politics, for example, from the 1830s to 1918, a variety of approaches were taken to recruit and then empower local allies to assist in administering Northern Yemen. Never was it a policy to occupy and colonize Yemen. Rather, Ottoman administrators long discovered that making headway in influencing Yemeni affairs to suit larger strategic concerns required indulging in taking sides in local disputes and helping tip the balance of local power. Indeed, throughout the period in question, in at least some part of what all maps from 1872 suggested was Ottoman Empire's sphere of influence in Northern Yemen, a local uprising was taking place. The fact violent exchanges took place does not, however, necessarily mean the objective of those fighting was the expulsion of a "foreign" force. As demonstrated in detailed research into the kinds of conflicts Ottoman officials had to manage while based in the highlands of North Yemen after 1872, invariably it was domestic conflicts between Yemenis that marked the violence and the Ottoman officials for the most part proved the necessary arbitrators (Blumi 2010, 2012, 2018).

As such, Ottoman administrative capacities in Southwest Arabia were largely steered to negotiating between rival parties, coopting when needed one strategically useful ally to subdue other

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parties but never aiming to exclusively rule over all Yemenis. The fact these configurations of ally and rival changed so often during the 1872–1918 period demands rephrasing the ways in which historians account for those events recorded in the records. A productive way to understand violence in Yemen, therefore, is to read struggles between locals as efforts to draw concessions from an imperial administration eager to maintain as much as possible stability. Crucially, it is never evident that Ottoman officials expected absolute calm; their primary objective for much of the 40 plus years entrenched in North Yemen was to assure roads and markets remained open. Conflict, in other words, often read in literal terms when consulting documents, could be understood alternatively as complex gestures by locals demanding a new level of engagement with their local adversaries and/or imperial interlocutors.

For the Ottoman administrators increasingly learning how their local interlocutors operated, the ideal result of a direct intervention into an otherwise local conflict was to secure a long-term alliance of mutual benefit. In return for a viable partnership over the maintenance of order and the collection of some taxes, the reasonable expectation from both imperial officials and local allies was a quiet, if not entirely stable, agreement to stay out of each other's way. In this regard, with some few exceptions, the Ottoman imperial state spent little resources in integrating Yemenis into the larger Ottoman world. Schools and garrisons used to train locals were selective, not comprehensive, as one may find in the Balkans or urban Syria at the time. Similarly, the maintenance of roads had as much a role as providing a concession to a local community as an imperial strategy to extend state power. As such, the need to apply violent coercion remained almost entirely up to how local politics, outside the purview of Ottoman influence, unfolded (Blumi 2012).

With the potential to upset the much sought-after stability, locals were regularly threatening violence against each other in order to secure political or economic rent from Ottoman (or British, Italian, French) operatives willing to pay for their compliance. To be sure, the Ottomans proved sophisticated administrators in such an arena, if not ultimately disdainful of how consistently manipulative Yemenis proved to be. Ottoman officials such as Ahmed Muhtar Pasha showed himself able to secure the necessary alliances to allow Ottoman troops by the thousands to make a rather stunning entry into the highlands of North Yemen in 1872. By no means an easy task, testimonials left behind in now well-studied documents and memoirs recount as much imperialist military bravado as appreciation for local politics (Pasha 1996).

All things considered, the successful arrival of a large number of Ottoman troops to help secure the political future of a number of would-be leaders scattered throughout the regions between the Red Sea coastal areas of Tihama and Sana'a' is impressive. No doubt the work of a political genius, the Ottoman policy of inducements, co-optation, and constant negotiation allowed relatively modest forces to eventually "fight" their way to Sana'a' (Farah 2002: 82–102).

In so reaching the heart of North Yemen, Ottoman officials extended the influence and thus power of their allies like the Zaydi imams, who at the time faced internecine fighting and external challengers. Overtime, even with so much political skill, maintaining these alliances proved a difficult and precarious task. The stabilization of the Mutawakkil dynasty for political expediency translated into a new era in which imamate power moved deep into middle Yemen, around Ta'iz, Ibb, and up to the boundaries of what would be for the next 130 years British "spheres of influence." As such, the entirety of the political project for the ultimate ascendant claimant to the imamate, by 1904 that would be Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid ad-Din (d.1948), began to recalculate the value of cooperation versus aggression toward other Yemenis. Crucially, the tactics used by the Ottoman imperial administration to keep this indigenous powerhouse in check, culminating in a treaty in 1911 that solidified Yahya's place in post-Ottoman Yemen, would resemble, if not outperform those strategies adopted, out of necessity, by their British rivals in the south.

Considering the abject failure of modern armies in 2015 onward to subdue peoples in precisely these areas, it is critical to consider further

just how uniquely successful Ottoman policies toward Yemen were at the time. Far from electing to simply use modern weapons against "savage" locals, the give-and-take that marked the Ottoman Empire's administration in Yemen would infrequently modify their otherwise sophisticated use of local knowledge and mutually beneficial alliances with powerful allies. Ironically, the increasingly studied cases in which imperialism was inspired by "modern state building ideologies," the generation of Ottomans loyal to the Committee of Union and Progress (the Young Turks) failed where their predecessors succeeded. The short time after the 1908 CUP "revolution" that brought – temporarily – modernist ideas to bear on policies in Yemen resulted in a vain attempt at circumscribing locals in a search for a more conventional, "rational" imperialist administration of Yemen. The upheavals caused by this inadvisable attempt to "modernize" Ottoman governance in Yemen proved more determinantal than positive and fortunately were reversed in time to negotiate a mutually beneficial treaty with Imam Yahya in 1911 (Blumi 2010: 68–85).

The lesson that Yemen can only be integrated so far by external forces would have to be learned again and again over the next century. These immediate investments in forging viable alliances with local communities, helping to arbitrate local disputes for the purpose of maintaining stability, rather than establishing a regime that would overtly exploit economically the region reflect the larger strategic concerns of both empires in the period.

By the end of the 1860s, with the global shift in trade patterns assured with the completion of the Suez Canal, an even greater array of interests linked to Europe entered the Red Sea theater. From Genovese companies making overtures to those with political ambitions on both sides of the Red Sea, to French, Swiss, and German companies paying equal homage to accepting local alliances in return for access to ports and land to serve as coaling stations, the Ottoman and British rivalry in the region grew exponentially more complicated. In this respect, it has been suggested elsewhere that the very presence of imperial rivals in the Red Sea and Arabian peninsula since the

1860s further assured local agents gained leverage over external powers (Blumi 2012). The possibility of mobilizing lucrative trading alliances with interests now able to link Mediterranean markets with the fringes of the Red Sea contributed to further complicating Yemeni domestic politics and opened new opportunities to new would-be rivals. In this regard, it would have been imprudent to attempt to subdue an entire population for economic exploitation. With so many possible resources available in the immediate region, the last thing the Ottomans or British needed was an insurgency with either side or third party (willing Italian or French) agents supplying locals weapons.

Of course, the very nature of these political engagements assured influence could be gained by the rival empire, a case in point being the Ottomans' attempt at stemming British expansion east of Yemen. As much as British agents have proven adept at instigating trouble for rivals by way of supporting local insurgencies to undermine rival states, events throughout the early 1870s, at a time when ascendency over the Red Sea constituted controlling all trade between Europe and Asia, prove the Ottomans were capable of exactly the same tactics. Ostensibly, Ottoman surrogates expanded influence throughout the Horn of Africa and constantly challenged allies to the British East India Company by providing logistical and financial support to religious firebrands calling for anti-European resistance. Perhaps the most useful example of this as it played out in South Arabia was the short-lived state in Dhofar, established in the eastern regions of Mahra province under the direction of a man named Sayyid Fadl Pasha (Alavi 2011). While claimed an area under British sphere of influence, the inhabitants of this agriculturally rich region, today located in the western regions of Oman, made open overtures for a native of the Indian Ocean in exile in the Ottoman territories to take over as an Istanbul-sponsored ruler. Fadl, a refugee from a Kerala homeland overrun by British imperialist forces earlier in the century, worked in union with indigenous communities to establish a state that pursued an overtly hostile relation to British allies. As such, the activities taking place

to upset local communications threatened the "Raj" government in Bombay's loosely administered territories in South Arabia. While eventually the threat would be eliminated, the local origins of this challenge highlight the precarious nature of British imperialism in the region (Blumi 2013: 130–133).

Imperialism in Yemen, in other words, constituted a constant shift in imperial state investment into local politics. The critical goal was assuring local allies survived the complicated rivalries that threatened their stability. The use of a larger empire's capacity to violently subordinate those who challenged local allies proved a modest investment of imperial resources; the regimes put in place certainly did not take on the contours of an occupation. Such policies allowed for local power circles to continue, grow, and invest in alliances that would outlive the empires themselves.

The legacy of the Ottoman enterprise, in particular, played a role in Yemen well beyond the actual 1918 date of departure. Many of the powerful actors in the twentieth-century North Yemen history can identify links of collaboration with this Ottoman operation, suggesting any successful transition for the twentieth-century leaders of North Yemen and their many southern counterparts, in part reflect the benefits gained from maintaining indirect political, economic, and sometimes cultural links in patronage of the British or Ottoman states provided. In this regard, while administratively it is impossible to confuse the two enterprises in South Arabia with imperialism in Eastern Anatolia or Bengal (in both cases policies led to millions of subjects dying), the superficial nature of the imperialist regime nevertheless had important roles to play in the post-imperial careers of polities that survived their respective departures.

World War I constituted one last major imperialist confrontation in Yemen. While Ottoman-Yemeni forces performed well in Southern Arabia, the larger context of an armistice left regional actors long allied with a now defunct Ottoman state scrambling in face of new contingencies. In time, the emergent local ruler – Imam Yahya – could transition from being the Ottoman's

unreliable ally to being the principle state builder of the period. Until his death in 1948 and indeed until the death of his son in 1962, the imamate navigated the pitfalls of northern Yemeni politics and proved a formidable rival to the remaining imperialist power in Southern Arabia (Blumi 2018: 29–56). Indeed, first from its Bombay administrative hub that maintained Aden as a territory until 1937, then in its struggle to maintain an "East of Suez" regime during the first half of the Cold War, British efforts to undermine North Yemen's uniquely independent state proved inept.

In the context of a largely hostile coexistence between North Yemen and British protectorates, imperialism in Yemen from the 1920s until the final departure of British forces in 1967 constituted a more violent story than the previous century. A fiercely independent and openly hostile rival to British imperialism, North Yemeni intrigues included the open investment in influencing the fragile day-to-day politics of largely autonomous WAP lands. Relying on a boundary reluctantly laid down between the Ottomans and British in 1905, the arbitrary line between now rival polities provided the never-ending instability British imperialism could not ever hope to survive. Indeed, the precarity of the imperialist project in the face of constant North Yemeni intrigues could only survive in the interim by offering a diverse group of increasingly mutually hostile political entrepreneurs to lucratively milk British stipends and weapons in return for relative calm.

With nothing more than a few "advisors" providing mountains of reports for the next century of exchange, British imperialism was not much more than a set of alliances with independent polities and a small "colony" in Aden that existed exclusively because of the business British India offered. Sustainable only as long as there remained a reasonable promise for profits (only assured with overt occupation of the Suez Canal in 1882), Yemenis tolerated their fumbling, otherwise illegitimate, and often poor European partners because their presence secured some balance of power. Otherwise likely overwhelmed by the explicit state building project of Imam Yahya in the interwar period, constantly flirting with

alliances with the Italians firmly entrenched in Eritrea, the WAP territories were the primary barrier and safety net for British imperialism.

With North Yemen's imamate funding and arming the periodic insurrection against British and allied local forces until at least 1960, what constituted British imperialist strategy proved both precarious and amorphous. By way of a hostile, proactive indigenous rival whose ideological orientation increasingly became anti-imperialist, the British imperial strategy developed entirely new approaches to its "indirect rule" policy East of Suez after World War II (Mawby 2006).

Here the complicated relationship between British (and by extension other Atlantic powers) investments in harnessing Islam to use against rival Muslims is evident (Massad 2015: 60–84). For the British Empire to survive the wave of anti-imperialism that infested its overseas ambitions – Pax Britannica misguides historians to overlook the massive potential for often united Muslim uprisings spreading across the entirety of London/Bombay's Asian and African territories) – administrators needed to find new tools. Apartheid regimes pitting racially divided societies and early forms of "ethno-national" difference only went so far. The resulting sectarianism often created the very instability that terrified advocates of "indirect" imperialism. Impossible to sustain under other conditions, the recognition that Muslim polities needed to learn to embrace British authority by way of surrogates with unequivocal loyalties proffered an investment in the survival and subsequent successful expansion of the Saud family. This policy shift in the 1920s had implications on Yemen with the direct occupation since 1934 of the 'Asir Province by Britain's most important ally in the region (Blumi 2018: 43–50). As had happened with the expulsion of the Hashemites from the Hijaz in the 1920s, the investment in Wahhabism as a tool to culturally insubordinate older Islamic traditions, including the prevailing order dominated by Zaydi/Shafi'i/Sufi traditions throughout South Arabia, British imperialism took on an increasingly violent form.

Coupled with this mutually beneficial investment in Wahhabi expansion, British authorities throughout the Indian Ocean capitalized on the availability of cheap labor and a growing cadre of Indian bureaucrats to partially colonize South Yemen with non-locals. In this demographic-induced shift, allied local families invested in sending surrogates throughout the larger British imperial realm, spreading in new ways a Yemeni presence in the larger world. Soon Yemeni diasporas were found equally in British-controlled ports, be it Port Said, Liverpool, or Hong Kong (Halliday 1992).

Ironically, the majority of the Yemeni merchants and sailing laborers who ended up in the port towns of England came from the North Yemeni provinces of Ta'iz and Ibb. The conflicted search for profits, the need to maintain law and order, and the growing influence the hostile North Yemeni imamate held over middle Yemeni migrants constituted another source of instability for the British Empire by the Cold War. In fact, it was these middle Yemeni migrants who would, by the 1950s, constitute the largest cadre of activists, be it in labor unions or often related, internationalist projects (Halliday 2001: 156–169).

This geographic spread deep into the imperialist homeland had consequences for the resistance to British Empire, with Yemenis from the North leading the way. Eventually forging alliances with pan-Arabist (especially Algerian and Palestinian) causes, labor activists linked to a variety of parties turned South Yemen into the epicenter of a global struggle against British imperialism. By 1967, the violent uprising against what remained of the British imperial administration in South Yemen pitted indigenous "Arab" Yemenis and the sizable South Asian colonialists whom London hoped would perform the role of useful surrogates upon the creation of a federated, loosely independent dependency after 1960. The violence thus projected at British troops, "traditional" local leaders, and South Asian colonists transformed the anti-imperialist insurgency into one bordering a veritable race war. As witnessed throughout Eastern Africa and Southeast Asia, old strategies to create tiers of allies among subjugated local populations using class, sect, and race had dire consequences for those empires left behind in Yemen.

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South Arabia Federation, Colony, and Imperial Albatross

Crucially, for many of the indigenous Arab-speaking communities along with the beneficiaries of commercial and political alliances with Britain, their fate in their homelands was also negatively impacted by the successful anti-imperialist insurgency of the 1960s. Initiated in the 1950s and taking its most reviled Federation of South Arabia in 1962, the British imperialist objective at the time was merely to secure Aden and its port facilities and air base in the most economical, politically austere manner. Instead, the clumsy efforts at leaving the transition to pliable, largely illegitimate emirs resulted in violence. When London attempted to coerce the far weaker emirates to accommodate the cosmopolitan inhabitants of what had until then been Aden Colony, the entire contours of the Cold War struggle between capitalist imperialism and the Global South manifested in open war. The eventual victory of the National Liberation Front initiated the exodus of what remained the old families long ago tied by treaty with the largely hands-off British imperialist enterprise in Southern Arabia.

Fatefully, the resulting exodus of many prominent South Yemeni families, either to North Yemen or dispersed in the larger world, had long-term consequences for those communities receiving them. In the case of the Trucial States (later Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE), the arrival of South Yemeni refugees, many of grand families from the former Eastern Protectorate, allowed for intermarriage alliances with local elites in Ajman, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi. The alliances forged at that time have consequences today as war with neo-imperialist imprints once again visits Yemen. Today, former British-allied Arab families now seek to secure influence in Yemen with legitimate claims that they wish to return to their ancestral homes in Mahra, Kathri, or Qu'aiti states. This is a forgotten but important factor to account for UAE policies in the war initiated in 2015 by neo-imperialist interests (Blumi 2018: 131, 176–183).

Conclusion

Since March 2015, under the guise of an "international coalition" operating under various code names – "Operation Decisive Storm" and "Operation Restoring Hope" – Southern Arabia has been visited by a new generation of imperialist violence. In its present-day manifestation, the violence unleashed by allies of North Atlantic powers subjects the majority of people inhabiting Northern Yemen to very different tactics than used by imperialist officers of the past. What is lost on present-day ambitions on Yemen is the long history of Ottoman- and British-mediated interactions with indigenous actors. Today, the aim is outright economic, political, and cultural domination. From attacks of food and water supplies, the strategic infliction of civilian suffering as much as direct confrontation with a resilient indigenous opponent shapes a neo-imperialist investment in subduing a region of the world historically impervious to such methods. Ironically, the ambition to plunder much of Yemen's largely untapped wealth has been largely informed by previously collected information by imperial era geologists and anthropologists, whose regular forays into the Yemeni hinterland produced mountains of data long sequestered away as secret by oil conglomerates and economic managers.

As recently argued, the objectives of the most recent imperialist engagement with Yemen are historically incoherent unless this long-denied untouched wealth is also acknowledged (Blumi 2018). As in the past, North Atlantic interests seek to pry open Yemen's economy to service ambitions to monopolize the region's considerable wealth. While the commodities are different – coffee then, oil, minerals, and fish today – the challenge of securing Yemen continues to require considerable direct engagement, not overt violence. In the end, what narrating Yemen's relationship to imperialism requires is a constant reference to the fact Southern Arabia's modern history is intimately interconnected to the transformations of the modern, and postmodern, world. In this regard, Yemen's diverse peoples and the varied polities they have sustained are

not mere victims of global processes driven by Western imperialism but often the causal forces behind it.

Cross-References

▶ Anti-colonialism and Imperialism (1960s–1970s)
▶ Arab Socialism
▶ Cold War
▶ Dollar Hegemony
▶ First World War and Imperialism
▶ Labour, Imperialism, and Globalisation
▶ Middle East: Socialism and Anti-imperialism
▶ Nasser, Gamal Abd al- (1918–70)
▶ Nationalisation
▶ Neoliberalism and Imperialism
▶ Ottoman Empire and Imperialism
▶ Petrodollar Imperialism
▶ Socialism, Nationalism, and Imperialism in the Arab Countries
▶ Two Pillars of US Global Hegemony: Middle Eastern Oil and the Petrodollar

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Archival Source

The National Archives at Kew Gardens (TNA), Foreign Office (FO)

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Zimbabwe

▶ Class and Race Complexities in Understanding Large-Scale Land Deals as New Forms of Imperialism in Zimbabwe

Zionism's Imperial Roots

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Imperialism; Israel; Palestine; Peace; Settler colonialism

Definition

This essay argues that the roots of the Zionist movement in the imperial orientation of the European powers at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century explain its subsequent behaviour and policies. The style of Israeli imperialism is the type of imperialism that is designed to eliminate the indigenous population and replace it with the population of the imperial conqueror. The relentless pursuit of this imperial aim explains the consistent Israeli policy of rejectionism when it comes to the supposed peace process ongoing since the 1970s. Israel is here understood as an imperialist state, both in its origins and its continuing practice and it is argued that this explains why there has been no solution to its conflict with the Palestinians. The essay concludes by suggesting that Israel will only cease be an imperialist state when the Israeli Jewish citizens will have to bear the social and economic costs of their government's imperialist efforts by themselves.

Imperialism

As commonly understood, imperialism is the domination of one people over another as a consequence of territorial expansion. At the root of this imperial process is physical conquest. What happens after conquest may vary. On the one hand, there might follow the most brutal form of imperialist aggression involving segregation and impoverishment of the indigenous population or even an attempt at their extermination. These extreme actions are usually taken to make way for the resettlement of the conquered land by elements of the conqueror's own population. Along with this would come a racist rationale explaining the primitiveness and inferiority of the conquered people, supporting the assertion that they must be removed to make way for the advance of civilisation. On the other hand, what might follow conquest is somewhat less

murderous political control and economic exploitation of the indigenous population. In this case there is no attempt at extermination (except of those who resist) and no large-scale displacement of population. There remains a rationale that pictures the 'natives' as primitive and inferior, but in this version of imperialism it is accompanied by a claim that conquest and economic exploitation will civilise and improve that population.

Just about all modern states outside of Europe have been shaped or influenced by past imperial conquest. This is particularly true of those states that are the product of the European expansion that took place from, roughly, the sixteenth through twentieth centuries. Interestingly, those that now appear most Western (the US, Canada, Australia and, as we will see, Israel) followed the first and most brutal path of imperial policy. Many of the states subjected to the second, allegedly more benign path, now languish in poverty and dependency. However, either path that was taken led to a modern political and economic picture built on the dead bodies of native peoples who were killed during a process of conquest, worked to death in its aftermath, or condemned to generations of second-class citizenship.

It is no surprise that most Western history textbooks do not dwell on the realities of this process, resulting in a situation where many otherwise educated Western citizens are barely aware of these facts. However, in other states, among the surviving native generations of peoples shaped by imperial victimhood, the memory of that process persists and still leads to tense and sometimes violent episodes between the Western and non-Western worlds. Indeed, in at least one case, that of Israel-Palestine, the process of imperial conquest goes on apace, and does so in that initial, more brutal way, described above.

Zionism

Modern Zionism is a movement seeking the establishment of a Jewish state. The idea took its present form in the work of the Austrian Jewish journalist Theodor Herzl who, reporting on the Dreyfus Affair in France (1894) and its

accompanying anti-Semitism for his paper, came to the conclusion that the Jews would never be able to successfully integrate into European society (Wikipedia, Dreyfus Affair). Therefore, in an era when nation states were the predominant form of political organisation, what the Jews needed was their own nation state. Herzl laid out his vision for a Jewish state in his book *Der Judenstaat* first published in 1896.

Important to the theme of imperialism is the fact that the motive for Zionism was the long trials and tribulations of Ashkenazi or European Jews. Herzl proceeded to found the World Zionist Organization (1897) but its members were almost exclusively Ashkenazi. An important question was where such a Jewish state could be located. Europe was out of the question, but Herzl was flexible when it came to the question of location. Over the years various territories in Africa and South America would be discussed. However, as the organisation grew it focused on the land of Palestine within the Ottoman Empire.

Herzl and his successors knew that wherever the Jewish state was realised it was going to be an imperialist undertaking, and particularly so if the target territory was Palestine. After all, the entire project, focused as it was on European Jewry, meant transferring large numbers of Europeans to a non-European land. Herzl and his fellow Zionists at the time did not think there was anything wrong with this because the nineteenth century was a time of European imperial expansion and thus constituted the foreign policy norm of the era. This being the case, the Zionist leaders who took over after Herzl's untimely death in 1904 (Chiam Weizmann and David Ben Gurion, etc.) concentrated their efforts on finding a Great Power ally that could facilitate the Zionist goal in the process of its own imperial expansion.

They eventually found this ally in the British Empire. It can be argued that the British were the most aggressive and successful imperialists of the age. By 1914 they were engaged in the First World War, which saw them also in need of allies. Thus, their alliance with the Zionists became possible against the backdrop of this war. We know why the Zionists sought this alliance, but why did the British react to the Zionist overtures favourably?

As late as 1917, the outcome of the First World War was in doubt. Indeed, the British and French were stymied on the Western Front and in the East they were in the process of losing their Russian ally because of the growing Bolshevik revolution. Under the circumstances, the British were casting about for assistance from just about anywhere they could find it. Because of the imagined worldwide influence of the Jews, men like the prime minister David Lloyd George and the foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour convinced themselves that the Zionists could help encourage the US to enter the war as an ally and discourage the Russians from leaving it despite growing communist power. After all, there was Wilson's friend, Supreme Court justice William Brandeis, head of the American Zionists, in a position of influence in Washington; and Leon Trotsky, who was Jewish, among the Bolshevik power circle in Russia. Trotsky was, of course, an opponent of Zionism, but the British leaders overlooked this fact. Many of the British leaders also were what we would today call Christian fundamentalists and so believed that the modern Jews were actually descendants of ancient Hebrews and therefore had a biblical destiny to return to Palestine. Finally, as the British considered their possible conquest of the Ottoman Empire (now a wartime ally of Germany), they envisioned securing the eastern flank of the Suez Canal by taking possession of Palestine and implanting there a co-operative 'client population'. Thus, the basis for a deal between Zionists and the British imperialist existed (see Davidson 2001). How then was the partnership formalised?

The Balfour Declaration

The partnership between the British government and the Zionists was made through the document known as the Balfour Declaration. It was issued on 2 November 1917 by Sir Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary. He did so in the name of the wartime Cabinet of prime minister David Lloyd George. The Declaration read as follows:

> His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for

the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

In a 1923 memorandum to the British Cabinet, colonial secretary Lord Cavendish described the Balfour Declaration as a 'war measure' carried out at 'a time of extreme peril to the cause of the Allies'. Yet the whole episode reflected the imperialist mindset of the time. A European government (Great Britain) had undertaken to promise a private Western body (the World Zionist Organisation) open access to the territory of a non-European government (the Ottoman Empire). It was never actually demonstrated that the Zionists came through with their side of the Balfour Declaration bargain, and we can compare this to the pragmatic deal struck by the British around the same time with the Sherif of Mecca to support an independent Arab state throughout most of the Arab lands east of Suez in exchange for military assistance against the Turks. The Arabs certainly did keep their side of the bargain by launching repeated attacks on Ottoman forces throughout the war. Yet in the end the British abandoned the Arabs and restricted Arab independence to Arabia while converting the rest of the Arab lands into appendages of the British and French empires. On the other hand, the British never hesitated to fulfil their promise to the Zionists to facilitate their subsequent colonisation of Palestine. To do so allegedly facilitated their imperial goals.

Upon the Allied victory, the British and the French, following US president Woodrow Wilson's lead, established the League of Nations. Also, because of President Wilson's anti-imperialism articulated in his 14 points (which had promised self-determination the peoples of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman Empires), they masked the enlargement of empires with the mandate system. This was a system through which the Europeans would supposedly 'tutor' the non-Europeans in the art of self-government. The notion of Europeans, who had just initiated the most destructive war in world history, teaching non-Europeans how to act in politically

responsible ways, must have struck the Arab leaders as absurd.

At the conference held at San Remo, Italy, on 24–25 April 1920, the British and French divided up the post-war mandates among the Allied powers as a form of spoils of war. The British gave themselves the mandate for Palestine. Later, the League of Nations, essentially following the dictates of the French and British, would confirm these 'awards'. The British then arranged for the Balfour Declaration to be incorporated into the preamble of the Palestine Mandate. It was in this fashion that the Balfour Declaration, which was in truth a payment for wartime services allegedly rendered by the World Zionist Organisation, metamorphosed into what Colonel Ronald Storrs, Britain's governor in Jerusalem from 1917–26, called 'a high and noble task placed on our shoulders by the voice of nations' (Davidson 2001, p. 41).

From the British point of view at the time, this sort of talk translated into high-minded rationalisations for carrying forward their plan to implant the Jews as a client people in a conquered Arab territory. However, in the hands of the Zionist lawyers it would soon become the principal legal justification for the founding of the state of Israel. Thus, the Balfour Declaration is now often described as 'the official creation of the country [Jewish Palestine] …. The moment of birth of Jewish legal rights and title of sovereignty' and a 'binding act of international law …' (Grief 2004).

It is to be noted that the Balfour Declaration promised a Jewish national home (which Zionists claim was but a euphemism for a Jewish state) in Palestine. Many Zionists insist that this meant all of Palestine, including Transjordan. This assertion places the UN resolution of 29 November 1947, partitioning Palestine, at odds with the Balfour Declaration. For those who assert the Declaration as the basis of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine, the UN partition resolution is 'an illegal abrogation of the Jewish legal rights and title of sovereignty to the whole of Palestine' (ibid.). It is on this basis that these same Zionists insist on Israel's 'legal right to keep all the lands it liberated in the Six Day War', (Grief 2005), and take violent

exception to any 'compromises' with the Arabs. Some Zionists are even willing to assassinate Israeli heads of state (prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed in 1995) based on suspicion of such compromises.

The Balfour Declaration has obviously taken on a life of its own. The real intent of its authors, while still argued over, now stands second to the military power and political influence of those who would give the document a maximalist interpretation. The history of the document is testimony to the ability of those with power to shape the meaning of history as well as current events.

Other Zionist Arguments

It comes as no surprise that today's Zionists insist that Israel is not a product of imperialist power and expansion. They have come to reinterpret their own origins in part because of changing times and attitudes. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, imperialism, at least from a Western perspective, was a legitimate pursuit. Indeed, Great Powers were 'great' in part because they were expansionist in this fashion. Therefore, the movement of European Jewish colonists into a non-Western land such as Palestine carried no stigma. However, by the end of the Second World War and the decolonisation process that followed, imperialism had acquired a quite negative image, and if the Zionists were going to claim legitimacy for their settlement project they would have to distance themselves from their imperialist roots and put in its place other claims to the territory they now occupied. Two arguments arose from the Zionists in their effort to escape their imperialist past.

Biblical Origins

To a certain extent the notion of Jewish biblical origins in Palestine had always been in the background of the Zionist movement. That is why, despite the fact that the great majority of early modern Zionists were secular and socialist, they nonetheless became fixated on Palestine as the

optimal site for colonisation. The ensuing argument claimed that Palestine was originally a Jewish place because of the existence of the short-lived ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judea. The inevitable differences between ancient Hebrews and modern Jews (so great that they might not recognise each other as 'Jewish' if they met) were ignored. Around this claim were laid all the religious trappings of Bible lore and storytelling despite the lack of evidence that any of these stories were real. Much of Israeli archaeology has been directly or indirectly devoted to establishing the legitimacy of these biblical claims with little in-depth success.

While the claim of Israeli legitimacy due to the prior existence of an ancient Hebrew presence has laid a mythic foundation for modern Israel, taking it seriously sets a very dangerous precedent. The assertion that past ancient residence is a legitimate basis upon which to claim present sovereignty is a formula for chaos. If the alleged successors of 2,000-year-old ancestors now laid claim to all ancestral land, the political stability of many countries would soon be turned upside down. There would be war in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, etc. as there is now in Israel-Palestine.

Zionism as a National Liberation Movement

As mentioned above, the post-Second World War era was one of decolonisation. That meant that it was correspondingly a period of national liberation with the creation of a large number of new nation states in the place of the collapsing empires of Britain, France and other Western countries. The Zionists attempted (and still attempt) to transform their imperialist roots into the actions of a national liberation movement.

The Zionists would point out that it is they who forced the British out of Palestine. In this they ignore the Arab revolt. But this claim is of little importance. It is how the Zionists got to Palestine that matters and objective history tells us that, prior to the Second World War, the vast majority of them arrived as clients of the British Empire.

That, once there, they eventually turned against their original ally does not negate the fact of the original alliance. Nor does the fact that a small number of Jews resided in Palestine throughout the Ottoman period. These Jews, mostly religious devotees, never espoused any nationalist ambitions and, in fact, originally opposed Zionist claims to the land.

The Zionist claim to the status of a national liberation movement would be the equivalent of the apartheid white South Africans, or the white settlers of Algeria or Kenya, making the same claim. It certainly distorts the usual meaning of the term and can be regarded as basically a piece of self-justifying propaganda. Nor does the claim justify the State of Israel's essentially brutal imperialist style of behaviour once it was established.

The Zionist leadership's Imperial Plans

The attitude of the early Zionist leadership toward the indigenous Arab population of Palestine was typical of European settlers. Here is how the founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, put it in a diary entry on 12 June 1895: 'We must expropriate gently, the private property . . .. We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries whilst denying it any employment in our own country' (Herzl 1960, p. 88). Herzl knew that expropriation was a generic behaviour for colonists during the era of European imperial dominance and he expected any Jewish colonial entity to follow suit and ethnically cleanse much of its territory of non-Jews. And, of course, to the extent that culture is rooted in geography, in one's traditional and ancestral place, such ethnic cleansing constitutes cultural genocide. Herzl was not a violent man and imagined that this ethnic cleansing could be engineered solely through the manipulation of the economy, but those who came after him would not be so delicate.

The European Jews who entered Palestine in the baggage train of the British army, which now served as a vehicle for the expansion of empire, did not seriously factor the native people into their plans. They went about creating an exclusively

Jewish economy which, when it employed Arabs at all, did so as cheap labour. The Zionists also required the eviction of all Palestinians from the land they purchased. This means that the Zionists never believed (and still do not) that the local population had any legitimate claims to Palestine. We happen to know what the Palestinian position was because it was documented by the ill-fated US King-Crane Commission. In 1919 that commission determined that the peoples of Greater Syria, of which Palestine was a part, wanted selfdetermination within an independent greater Arab state promised by the British to Sharif Hussein of Mecca in exchange for his willingness to rebel against the Ottoman Empire. That promise was never fulfilled.

Not surprisingly the British and the Zionists encountered evolving resistance to their imperial and colonial occupation. There were anti-colonial demonstrations as early as 1922, and in 1929 a large rebellion took place during which hundreds of lives were lost. What indigenous natural resistance to imperialism meant to the Zionist leaders such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben Gurion was that the Palestinians could now be envisioned as enemies and anti-Semites, and their expulsion could therefore be rationalised as selfdefence. This is a position adopted even today by the State of Israel. A number of forceful population transfer proposals followed. Indeed, from the late 1920s onward, 'transfer' became the polite term for proposed ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide.

There was at this time a recent precedent for the application of the concept of transfer. In 1923, Greece and Turkey signed the 'Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations' (Wikipedia, Convention). Eventually, some 2 million people were impacted by this agreement. It allowed for compulsory denial of citizenship of ethnic Greeks in Turkey and ethnic Turks in Greece, and the subsequent deportation of those who did not leave voluntarily.

Another immediate impetus to the notion of transfer was the British decision to sever Transjordan from Palestine proper. This was done in 1922 so as to provide a territory for Abdallah, the older son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca.

(Sharif Hussein was the leader who, during the First World War, had been promised an expansive Arab state in exchange for rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.) If the Arabs were not to get their large and independent Arab state, the British were willing to give Hussein's sons positions as rulers of small British client states. Thus, Hussein's son Feisal would become king of Iraq and Abdallah, the emir of Jordan. Dividing Transjordan from Palestine irked the Zionists (who were not allowed to settle there), some of whom, even today, feel that Jordan was 'stolen' from them. However, Weizmann seized on the separation to propose that the Palestinians living to the west of the Jordan river be transferred to Transjordan. 'Surely, if we cannot cross the Jordan the Arabs could', he wrote to the British colonial secretary Lord Passfield in 1930. At later moments, when the Zionists renewed their hope that Transjordan would become part of the future Jewish state, the concept of transfer of Palestinians was directed toward Iraq and Syria.

The Zionists subsequently applied pressure to the British government to consider a transfer plan, linking it to the success of the partition plan put forth by the 1937 Peel Commission. There is some evidence that the British were willing to go along with this idea and indeed at a meeting between Weizmann, Ben Gurion, and colonial secretary Ormsby-Gore on 28 June 1937 the latter agreed that 'the Arabs in the Jewish part [of Palestine] would have to be transferred' (Simons 2004, p. 42). As the probable outbreak of the Second World War became clearer to British leaders retreated from their advocacy of partition in order to keep the good will of the Arabs. But Weizmann never ceased to promote the possibility of transfer.

Weizmann was by no means alone in pressing for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. His fellow Zionist leader, and sometime rival, David Ben Gurion also promoted the transfer of Arabs. In a meeting on 9 July 1936 with Sir Arthur Wauchope, the British high commissioner in Palestine, Ben Gurion argued for the deportation of landless Palestinian peasants to Transjordan. He used almost the same words as would Weizmann. He told Wauchope that if Transjordan is

closed to the Jews, 'it surely cannot be closed to the Arabs'. A year later, in 1937, Ben Gurion was still pushing for transfer, now adding Syria to Transjordan as a possible area of relocation (25).

As Ben Gurion pursued this idea, it expanded in his mind. In July 1937 he wrote in his diary, 'it would be of tremendous advantage to us. ... for every transferred Arab, one could settle four Jews on the land'. Also, he was soon ready to see transfer forcefully imposed upon the Palestinian Arabs. In a 1941 memorandum he noted that 'complete transfer without compulsion – and ruthless compulsion at that – is hardly imaginable' (33). For Ben Gurion, compulsory transfer of as many Arabs as possible was now a necessary step toward achieving 'a truly Jewish state'. He doubted if the British had the 'courage' to take up such a project. However, he was determined that the Zionists would do so the moment they got the chance. 'Any wavering on our part as to the necessity of this transfer, any doubt on our part as to the possibility of its achievement, any hesitation on our part as to the justice of it, are likely to lose us a historic opportunity which will not reoccur' (29). Ben Gurion's hoped for moment would come late in 1947 and throughout 1948.

Both Weizmann and Ben Gurion, as well as most of the Zionist leadership in Palestine, were fixated on the needs of their group. That group was the Ashkenazic Jews of Europe, and those needs, the Zionists believed, could only be fulfilled in the Arab land of Palestine. That meant changing the very demographic nature of this non-European place. This was an imperialist formula if ever there was one.

Israel's 'War of Independence': The Concept of Transfer in Practice

In February 1947, the British government decided to give up its mandate and leave Palestine. The date for departure was set as 15 May 1948. Ben Gurion, sensing as early as 1946 that the British could not hold on for long, had been working on contingency plans for taking over Palestine once the British were gone. These efforts culminated in two plans known as Plan Gimel or Plan C and

Plan Dalet or Plan D. Gimel was a pre-planned series of responses to Palestinian resistance to the Zionist presence in Palestine, and included the murder of the Palestinian political and military leadership, financial supporters, and destruction of civilian infrastructure. Dalet was designed to realise the 'systematic and total expulsion' of Palestinians 'from their homeland' as a consequence of the upcoming military struggle with the Arabs (Pappe 2007, p. 28).

This was, of course, not the public position of the Zionist leadership. That position emphasised mass immigration of Jews into Palestine. But Ben Gurion, Weizmann, and the other Zionist leaders in Palestine knew that would not be enough to give the Jews a majority in the country. After all, in 1947 there were a million Palestinians in the territory the Zionists hoped to conquer. Against that number there were 600,000 Jews. For Ben Gurion, an acceptable, positive 'demographic balance' required at least an 80% Jewish majority (48). For that to be achieved, Jewish immigration had to be complemented by Arab emigration.

The steps taken in this process of ethnic cleansing have been laid out in detail by the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe. Putting his account together with other information, we get the following narrative: David Ben Gurion and the Zionist leadership saw the disintegration of British rule, together with the UN partition plan, as the 'unique historical opportunity' they had been hoping for since the 1930s. This was their moment to create an 'exclusively Jewish state' and, as Ben Gurion had written back in 1941, there must be no wavering or hesitation in doing what was necessary to rid the country of as many Arabs as possible. At this point 'the country' meant, for the Zionist leadership, all of Palestine west of the Jordan river. They gave up the ambition of conquering Transjordan because they were negotiating a deal with Emir Abdullah (whose army was the most formidable Arab military force in the region) that would ensure his staying out of the forthcoming war. So, even before the end of the mandate, the Zionists had decided to destroy the UN promised Palestinian state.

In December of 1947, Palestinian Arabs protested against the United Nations plan to partition

their country with a three-day general strike and demonstrations. The demonstrations spilled over into assaults on some Jewish shops and markets. Even though these actions were short-lived and there was soon a clear indication of a return to 'normalcy,' Ben Gurion used the incidents as an excuse to trigger Plan Gimel. Subsequent attacks on Palestinian villages and neighbourhoods were severe enough to cause some 75,000 Arab residents to run for their lives (40).

When in early January 1948 the first units of an all-volunteer Arab irregular force entered Palestine, the Zionist leadership initiated Plan Dalet (officially inaugurated in March but really acted upon earlier) and forced transfer or ethnic cleansing became a primary military objective. Ben Gurion told his followers that the Arabs were now a 'fifth column' and therefore they had to be arrested en masse or expelled. He concluded that 'it is better to expel them' (49). And how was one to expel them? Urban areas as well as villages were targeted for violent assaults, and massacres were apparently committed purposefully so as to spread panic among the Arabs of Palestine. Ben Gurion describes the tactics in a diary entry of 1 January 1948. Actions must be 'strong and brutal'. They must be carried out 'without mercy, women and children included'. And, finally, 'there is no need to distinguish between guilty and not guilty' (69). As part of this goal, the Zionist leadership was particularly anxious to destroy a longstanding tradition of Jewish and Arab worker co-operation in Haifa, and the unwritten truce between the Jewish city of Tel Aviv and the Arab town of Jaffa, or anywhere else where Jewish–Arab amity existed (58, 65). By the end of April, some 250,000 Arabs had fled. It is to be noted that this was before the entrance of regular Arab military forces into Palestine.

This was, of course, only the beginning. The Zionist 'war of independence' went on into early 1949 and a part of it continued to be waged against the unarmed civilian Arab population of Palestine. The Israeli historian Benny Morris has described the results: 'The principal cause of the mass flight [of Palestinians] ... was Jewish military attack. Almost every instance – the exodus – was the direct and immediate result of an attack on and

conquest of Arab neighborhoods and towns' (Morris 1999, p. 255). Some 419 Arab villages and towns were eventually destroyed and their populations killed or evicted. When it was all over Ben Gurion had achieved his 'positive demographic balance' and the vast majority of Palestine's Arabs were refugees. Only about 150,000 Arabs remained in what was now Israel. This is what the Arabs call the *Nakbah*, or 'Disaster'.

Post-independence Imperialism: Cultural Genocide

Having won 'independence', the Israelis embarked upon an ongoing process to 'Hebraise' the land they now called their own. Making the land 'Hebrew' automatically meant making it no longer Arab. As much as possible of the heritage of Arab culture, like the Arabs themselves, had to be evicted. This too can be seen as an imperialist process.

It began with a process of renaming things. It turned out that the Zionists had created a 'naming committee' back in the 1920s which had the job of 'Hebraising' the small areas of Palestine purchased by the Jewish National Fund (JNF). In 1949 this committee became a subdivision of the JNF and, with the help of archaeologists, geographers, and biblical scholars, began to systematically erase Palestine's Arab history and heritage from Israel's own official records, maps, histories, etc. This is a process that continues to this day. For instance, in July 2009, Israel's Transport Ministry announced that road signs (which now appear in Hebrew, Arabic, and English) would be replaced with signs in Hebrew only. This will happen despite the fact that 20% of the country are Arabic speakers and Arabic is supposedly one of Israel's 'official languages'. The transport minister, Yisrael Katz, asserted that he would not allow pre-1948 names on road signs. Doing so would threaten to turn 'Jewish Jerusalem into Palestinian Al-Quds' (BBC 2009).

Also in 1949, an Israeli meta-narrative was spun to the effect that when the Zionists arrived Palestine had comprised a small number of

hostile, backward, and nomadic residents but was otherwise largely empty. Thus, according to the history officially taught to all Israelis, and all Jewish children enrolled in Hebrew schools the world over, the only cultural heritage to exist in Israel, past and present, is the Jewish one. To make this alternative history plausible, the Israelis set about destroying many Palestinian archaeological sites and artefacts, ancient mosques, historic houses, and the like, to the extent that UNESCO's World Heritage office describes their actions as 'crimes against the cultural heritage of mankind' (Chamberlain 2014; see also Kletter 2005).

Through the 1950s, the Israeli government allowed both Christian and Muslim holy sites, museums, and archives to be looted by their own soldiers and then proceeded to destroy them. Those few Israeli archaeologists who objected were lied to about what was happening (they were told that the Arabs were doing the looting) and then, if they persisted in their opposition, forced to resign. David Ben Gurion, Moshe Dyan, and Golda Meir were all directly involved in this process of cultural destruction (Rapoport 2008). The process of preventing any public re-emergence of Palestinian culture goes on to the present day. For instance, in 2009 UNESCO chose East Jerusalem as the 2009 Arab Capital of Culture. The Israeli government immediately declared that no celebrations or demonstrations to this effect would be allowed. They banned all of the UNESCO-sponsored events not only in Jerusalem but also elsewhere such as in the city of Nazareth. Parallel Palestinian sports events, a literary festival, and a women's festival were also banned. Presently, Palestinians on the West Bank are under some 1,500 military regulations, many of which attack their ability to culturally and politically express themselves.

It should come as no surprise that Israeli textbooks mention none of this, but rather, according to Professor Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University, 'present the view that Jews are involved in a justified, and even humanitarian, war against an Arab enemy that refuses to accept and acknowledge the existence and rights of Jews in Israel'. He found that from the beginning of the state of Israel

up to the present time, Israeli school books have defamed Arabs by labelling them as 'killers' and 'robbers.' Israeli Jews, on the other hand are consistently pictured as 'improving the country in ways they believe the Arabs are incapable of' (Meehan 1999, pp. 19–20).

Jamal Atamneh, coordinator of the Arab Education Committee in Support of Local Councils, a Haifa based NGO, notes that while the textbooks used by the Arab Israeli population are written in Arabic, they are not prepared by Palestinians who also have no advisory role in their preparation. 'For the past 15 years, not one new Palestinian academic has been placed in a high position in the [Education] Ministry. There are no Palestinians involved in preparing the Arabic-language curriculum [and] obviously, there is no such thing as affirmative action in Israel' (20). As As'ad Ghanem of Haifa University notes, Israeli Arab education budgets are considerably below those of the Israeli Jewish sector and this is a consequence of 'continuing discrimination in practically every sphere of life' (Ghanem 2001, p. 159). One consequence of these cumulative efforts has been to make 'Nakbah denial' easier for Israeli Jews and Zionists generally. As far as Palestinians are concerned, Nakbah denial is the Israeli version of Holocaust denial.

After 1948, some of the destroyed Arab villages were transformed into Israeli towns. In a rare moment of public truthfulness, the Israeli general and politician Moshe Dyan stated, 'Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books [giving their them] no longer exist. ... There is not one single place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population' (Lis and Khoury 1969). As for Dyan's reference to missing Geography books, in January of 2010 the Al Jazeera news network reported on an interview conducted with an Israeli citizen doing a doctoral thesis at Ben Gurion University. The student's research shows that Israeli forces 'plundered and destroyed tens of thousands of Palestine books in the years after the State's establishment'. According to the researcher, this was done 'in the framework of its plan to Judaize the country and

cut off its Arab residents from their nation and culture'. It was a 'cultural massacre' concludes this researcher (Aletho News 2010). Over the intervening years there have been periodic attacks on Palestinian libraries and archives, not only in Israel and the Occupied Territories, but also in other countries such as Lebanon. These actions have not go unnoticed. In the summer of 2002 the American Library Association issued a resolution stating that the organisation (which has 450,000 members) 'deplores the destruction of library and cultural resources anywhere in the world, and therefore the destruction of these Palestinian library and cultural resources'. The resolution was considerably watered down under pressure. Its original version directly named the Israeli government as the perpetrator of the destruction (Heuer 1999).

Where the destroyed villages were not transformed into Israeli places, their ruins were bulldozed away and forests were planted in their place. Ilan Pappe tells us that this was part of what Israel calls 'making the desert bloom.' Referring to the web page of the Jewish National Fund, Pappe notes that many of the largest and most popular forest areas promoted by the site were not, as the JNF claims, built upon 'arid and desert-like areas' but on top of the ruins of once thriving Palestinian towns. Pappe refers to this as the 'deliberate airbrushing of history' (2007, pp. 229–234).

To these efforts one can add the destruction and desecration of Palestinian cemeteries, the purposeful uprooting or burning of the crops (particularly olive trees) of Palestinian farmers, the targeting of cultural centres, including the destruction of the Palestinian Ministry of Culture in 2002, and the special attention the Israeli government gave to undermining the Arabs of East Jerusalem following the 1967 war. For instance, the foundations of Jerusalem's Al Aqsa Mosque, one of the most sacred shrines of Islam and the religious and cultural symbol of Palestine, have been physically weakened by 25 adjacent Israeli archaeological excavations. The mosque itself has been the target of repeated acts of terrorism by Israelis including arson and vandalism. A fanatical sect within Zionism seeks the mosque's total destruction so as to pave the way

for the rebuilding of Solomon's temple. This effort is financially funded by fanatical Christian fundamentalists, most of whom are Americans (Chehata 2010).

Post-independence Imperialism: Treatment of Remaining 'Israeli-Arabs'

After 1948, in those areas where there were no more Arabs, it was relatively easy to perform cultural genocide. However, as mentioned, there was a small remnant of approximately 150,000 Arabs still left in what was now Israel. The Israelis often referred to them as 'present absentees' because, even though they had remained in Israel, they often ended up dispossessed of their land and homes. The historian Mark Tessler calls these people 'internal refugees'. Tessler tells us that the result was that they were 'divorced from their traditional social and economic institutional connections,' and 'cut off from their families and countrymen who resided in states with which Israel remained at war' (1994, p. 281). Both their physical and cultural presence in the Jewish state was seen as threat by the Zionist leadership who, following Ben Gurion's lead, continued to perceive this group as a 'fifth column'. And so, in October 1948, they were all placed under a system of martial law that lasted until 1966.

What martial law meant for the remaining Palestinians was a regime of restricted travel, curfews, administrative detentions, expulsions, confinement to certain geographical areas, limitation on the freedoms of expression and the press, assembly, and due process. The only legal right left to the Israeli-Arabs was the right to vote (they were given Israeli citizenship). Why give a feared and hated minority such a right? There are two possible reasons. First, it would be 'evidence' that Israel was the political democracy it claimed to be. Second, the Palestinians left in Israel were so small in number, so isolated and so controlled that voting was a meaningless act in terms of changing their condition, much less the essentially imperialist system that controlled Israel.

The military regime under which these people were placed facilitated their dispossession. A systematic transfer of the landed property

from the remaining Arabs to Jewish control now took place. This was done by the office of the Custodian of Absentee Property. According to the Custodian, any non-Jew who was 'absent' from his usual place of residence on or after 29 November 1947 could have his property confiscated. This was so even if you returned home on 30 November! It was deemed that the bulk of Israel's remaining Arabs were so absent.

The consequences of this process were economically devastating. For instance, the Palestinian Muslim societal structure, with its traditional hierarchy, its public and private endowments, social and economic support systems etc. all disappeared. The Palestine Christian community fared little better. Pauperised and isolated, the Palestinians of Israel quickly had the highest unemployment in the country. Mostly rural folk, many were forced to move to urban areas allotted to the Arab community where they became a classical cheap labour force. The Jewish state proceeded to deny them any personal benefits given to Israeli Jews, they were denied access to over 70% of the economy (through the ploy of not having served in the Israeli army), their education budgets were kept to a minimum, and any expression of Palestinian national feelings was made criminal (Pappe 2004, p. 160).

Ultimately, Zionist plans for the Palestinians under their control resembled the apartheid system then in place in South Africa. On a visit to Italy, ex-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon explained to then Italian prime minister Massimo D'Alema that South Africa's 'Bantustan model was the most appropriate solution to [Israel's] conflict [with the Palestinians in its territory]' (Eldar 2009).

Continuing Imperialism: The Occupied Territories

When Israel won the Six Day War in 1967, it found itself in control of territories that had traditionally been considered part of Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) by the Zionist Movement. As early as 1918, when Chiam Weizmann presented the case for Zionist control of Palestine to the Paris Peace Conference, he presented a map that

included the territories taken in 1967. After the Six Day War, this expansionist point of view was not just held by the conservative Likud Party. Leaders of the Labour Party also were of this conviction. Thus the idea that the conquered territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (as well as Syria's Golan Heights) were to be used as bargaining chips in negotiations that would trade land for peace has always been doubtful, and historically it is a tactic that has never been used.

Almost immediately after the end of the 1967 war, Israel's Labour Government began to establish colonies along the Jordan River. These were referred to as defensive military establishments but they soon had all of the characteristics of small civilian agricultural settlements. This made them illegal under international law. Within a year of the war's end, some 14 colonies had been set up throughout the conquered lands. In the early years of the colonisation programme, Israel's Labour Government tried to manipulate the process. This was done not to limit the numbers of settlers but rather to direct them to strategic points that would facilitate long-term control of the territories. With the election of more conservative Likud Party Governments in 1977 and afterwards, restraints on settlement loosened considerably. Both parties used special tax breaks and subsidised housing to attract colonists.

Two types of Israelis have been attracted to the colonies of the Occupied Territories. One group, making up about 60% of the current settler population, comprises citizens whose motivations are mainly economic. These people have been attracted by the government's tax breaks, cheap rents, and subsidised mortgages. Having grown up in a strictly segregated society that taught them to view the Palestinians as latter-day Nazis, they have no compunction about living on land confiscated from the local population. The other group, constituting of some 40% of the settler population, are religious fanatics who see the West Bank (an area they called Judea and Samaria) as well as Gaza as part of the God-given religious patrimony of the Jewish people. They believe that they have a divine mission to colonise the Occupied Territories. Their behaviour indicates that they are not only determined to settle the occupied lands, but

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that they hope to eventually drive out the non-Jewish population. They have also been willing to go to great lengths to sabotage any international effort that might result in a trade of land for peace.

A good example of this latter group is Gush Enumin (the Bloc of the Faithful). The group was established in 1968, significantly, in a hotel in occupied Hebron. By 1974, under the leadership of Rabbi Moishe Levinger, Gush Enumin was the most aggressive settlement organisation in Israel. This aggressiveness included booby-trapping the cars of several West Bank mayors, plotting to blow up Arab buses, and even planning an attack on the Muslim holy site of the Harem al-Sharif (Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock mosque). With the election of Menachim Begin and the Likud Party in 1977, Gush Enumin got a green light to settle anywhere in the territories. They did so as armed squatters with the co-operation and assistance of the Israeli government, particularly the man who was then agricultural minister, Ariel Sharon.

Once an alliance was solidified between fanatical religious colonists such as Gush Enumin and the right-wing Likud Governments of Israel, the position of the Palestinian population deteriorated rapidly. About 40% of the land on the West Bank was quickly taken and more is confiscated every year. Some 88% of the water drawn in the territories is diverted for the use of the colonists. Palestinian freedom of movement has been severely limited as the land they do live on is cut up into isolated cantons by checkpoints, Jewish-only roads, and 'security' walls. Violence by settlers towards Palestinians has become endemic. It must be understood that the status of the more fanatical and violent colonists is not that of rebels. It is that of a vigilante arm of the Israeli government. Taking the colonising movement as a whole, it represents an ongoing process of ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide against the indigenous Palestinian population.

Things have not always gone well for Israel's setters. For instance, the incessant resistance put up by the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip helped convince the Likud Government of Ariel Sharon, in August of 2005, to cut its losses and withdraw the settlements located in that area. There were only 8,000 settlers in the Gaza region living next to nearly 1.5 million hostile Palestinians. Such a move also made easier a subsequent neartotal blockade of Gaza which would rapidly impoverish its population. Nonetheless, the removal of the Gaza settlers so upset the Zionist religious settlement movement that they threatened civil war if they were called upon to leave the West Bank. There is no indication of present or future Israeli plans to do this. Indeed, settlement of the West Bank and East Jerusalem continue apace and Israel has now transferred over a 500,000 of its citizens into these areas.

All of Israel's settlements are illegal under international law. The law referred to here is the Fourth Geneva Convention to which Israel is a signatory. That convention forbids the forceful or voluntary transfer of a conquering country's civilian population into the conquered areas. The illegal status of the Israeli settlements has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice at the Hague, various international human rights organisations, various United Nations Resolutions, and even by the legal council for the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Legal Council Theodor Meron stated officially in 1967 that 'my conclusion is that civilian settlement in the administered territories [the Occupied Territories] contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention' (Wikipedia, United Nations). Sometimes Israel will deny the illegality of the settlements using rather contorted misinterpretations of the law, but most of the time the government just ignores the issue. It has been allowed to do so because the governments of the US and Europe have seen fit to ignore Israeli behaviour and policies. Thus, while Israel is in violation of international law, there are no police to move against that nation and its settler agents.

The settlements are at the heart of post-1967 Israeli imperialism but they are also, almost necessarily, accompanied by the accoutrements of imperial force: the arrest or execution of all who resist, characterisation of resisting groups as 'terrorists', checkpoints, internal passports and the control of population movement, control of the indigenous economy for the benefit of the imperial conqueror, and in the case of Palestine, we can add water theft and home demolitions.

Conclusion

In the case of Israeli imperialism the present truly flows from the past. The fact that the Zionist movement has its roots in the imperial orientation of the European powers at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century explains its subsequent behaviour and policies. The style of Israeli imperialism is the brutal kind explained at the beginning of this essay. It is the type of imperialism that is designed to eliminate the indigenous population and replace it with the population of the imperial conqueror.

The relentless pursuit of their imperial aim explains the consistent policy of rejectionism when it comes to the so-called peace process. The peace process, as described by William Quandt (2005) has been going on since the 1970s. Here are some examples of the process: the Rogers Plan (1970–72) sought a resolution to the 1967 War issues based on UN Resolution 242. The Israelis rejected this. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter arranged for the Camp David I Summit between Menachem Begin of Israel and Anwar Sadat of Egypt. This meeting was to create a 'framework for Peace' that included, among other things, autonomy for the Palestinians. As is it turned out, according to Carter, Begin lied about his intentions to grant that autonomy and so, in terms of the Palestinians, that part of the Camp David process failed (Carter 2008). In 1991–93 there was the Madrid Conference which sought resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as Palestinian-Israeli issues. This failed in good part due to Israeli intransigence. In 1993 came the Oslo Accords which saw the return to Palestine from exile in Tunisia of Yasser Arafat and the PLO. Israel allowed this under the assumption that Arafat would keep order among the Palestinians while the Israelis continued illegal expansion into the Occupied Territories. When the PLO refused to perform this role, the Oslo Accords began to break down. In 2000, the Camp David II Summit took place under the auspices of the Clinton Administration. At this meeting Israel allegedly offered Yasser Arafat most of the West Bank but configured in such a way that it

hardly came to more than a series of Bantustans. Arafat rejected the offer as not amounting to a functional state. In 2002, the Arab League offered up a plan for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that promised Israel full recognition from the Arab states and open trade in exchange for Israeli agreement to the 1967 line as the border of a Palestinian state. Israel refused. Finally, George W. Bush initiated the 'Road Map' for peace. Under this same rubric, and pressured by the Obama Administration, direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians took place in 2010 and again in 2014. President Obama aimed at a viable two-state solution. But these talks soon bogged down as well, largely due to Israel's reluctance to compromise on issues that they felt they could simply resolve by main force and the introduction of a relatively new demand: the insistence that the Palestinian side explicitly accept not only Israel's right to exist (which the PLO had done as early as 1988) but that it accept Israel as an eternal 'Jewish state'. As the Palestinian Papers (leaked to the public in January 2011) detailing the 2010 negotiations made clear, the Palestinians agreed to the vast majority of Israeli demands (Swisher 2011). And yet the Israelis turned up their noses and walked away. Thanks to US support, they could have all they want by virtue of their military superiority. And what they want is the West Bank (Judea and Samaria): all of it.

There can be no doubt that Israel is a an imperialist state, both in its origins and its continuing practice. That is why there has been no solution to its conflict with the Palestinians. The end of the era of European imperialism came when the cost of maintaining the imperial system was economically greater than the citizens of the imperial states were willing to bear. That is probably what, in the end, will bring down Israel as an imperialist state: when its outside allies cease to subsidise its imperialist policies and much of the world will no longer have economic intercourse with it, the Israeli Jewish citizens will have to bear the cost of their government's imperialist efforts by themselves. If history is any guide, that is when the Israelis will begin to rethink their imperialist character.

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Cross-References

▶ Settler Colonialism
▶ Settler Colonialism and the Communist International
▶ Settler Colonialism: Regional Development and the Dispossession of the Negev Bedouin
▶ Settler Imperialism and Indigenous Peoples in Australia
▶ Settler-Colonialism and the New Afrikan Liberation Struggle

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